Diaspora, State and University: An Analysis of Internationalisation of Higher Education in Israel

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This thesis is submitted for the doctorate of Philosophy, PhD
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Abstract

Internationalisation is increasingly portrayed as a key feature of higher education (HE) systems around the world. It has been portrayed as both a universal and a novel phenomenon linked with the rise of globalisation. The prevalence of internationalisation aligns with analyses which see the world, and education systems specifically, converging on a common set of ideas, values, models and standards. While it is recognised that internationalisation has multiple overlapping political, economic, academic, and sociocultural rationales, historically these are usually depicted as moving from the pursuit in the post-World War II period of peace and mutual understanding; to aid and development in the Cold War period, to the contemporary period dominated by competitive and economic considerations. Despite criticism regarding the ties between internationalisation, neoliberalism, and Western values, internationalisation is usually associated with optimistic and humanistic connotations and tends to be presented as an ideologically neutral, worthwhile and normalised intervention. I problematise these claims and foci of the literature and demonstrate that they do not accurately explain internationalisation in Israel; I also suggest that they do not apply in many other societies.

My aim in this thesis is to expand the historical timelines, rationales, forms, strategies, categories and actors so as to enhance understanding of internationalisation. Through an in-depth investigation of Hebrew University (HU), Israel’s first University established before State formation, I trace the formation and development of HU, and in particular its international dimensions of research and teaching, from its origins in the pre-State period until 2018. Employing historical methods and a comparative education perspective, my analysis draws on an extensive corpus of historical documents and interviews, and identifies three distinct periods of internationalisation: 1900s – 1948: Formation and development of the Diaspora University; 1948 – 2000: State formation, stabilisation and the Diaspora; 1990s - 2018: State maturation and steering, the Diaspora and internationalisation. These periods reflect the shifting social, academic, economic, identity/status, security, and political considerations of the State, Diaspora and University. Thus, I argue that internationalisation in Israel can be understood at the nexus of the events, priorities and identities of the Diaspora, State and University.

This thesis sheds light on the inner workings of internationalisation in Israel and develops a model which holds considerable explanatory power for understanding its shifting patterns over time. I introduce new rationales; histories; actors; forms; and strategies of internationalisation around the role of Diaspora, opening a new category and lens to understand it. I challenge
widespread definitions of internationalisation; its converging nature and reactive role to globalisation. Thus, I provide significant new understanding of internationalisation in Israel and beyond.
Impact statement

This thesis has implications for academia and internationalisation policy and practice. I challenge, modify and enhance the literature contributing to greater understanding of internationalisation in diverse societies. Importantly, by challenging the literature and drawing attention to its inability to explain internationalisation in the Israeli case, this thesis has potential to spur both reflective discussion about the descriptive/normative/Western nature of much of the internationalisation literature; and critical scholarship in diverse contexts which will contribute to greater understanding of internationalisation globally.

I introduce novel rationales; histories; actors; forms; and strategies of internationalisation around the role of Diaspora, opening a new explanatory category and lens to understand internationalisation in diverse contexts. As a result, I am currently leading a BAICE Thematic Forum on the topic of Diaspora and Internationalisation in Higher Education which engages an international cadre of students, early career researchers, established academics and international education practitioners. This Forum will result in a special issue of an academic journal.

This thesis is the first study of internationalisation in Israel over time. It touches on Israel’s foreign, domestic and transnational relations through HE over time and thus, will be a foundational text for scholars of internationalisation in Israel and contribute to the field of Israel studies more broadly.

Some of the ideas I develop have already contributed to academic publications, which are available online; some of them are available as open-access and in multiple languages. I intend to publish several more articles over the coming years from this thesis in a variety of outlets: from academic journals; to open-access blogs and policy briefs.

I interviewed 41 senior stakeholders in Israeli HE, and this thesis will be distributed to them all. The historical trajectory and model developed in this thesis provides significant insights to current higher education policy makers. As internationalisation has become a major policy initiative at both the national and institutional level, this has spawned considerable interest in Israel for scholarship of this nature. I am likewise developing an M.Ed. programme in Global and International Education at a teacher training college in Israel that will be targeted at future policymakers, practitioners and academics alike which my thesis will inform. Thus, my thesis will have impact on academic knowledge and discussions; and has the potential to impact on an emerging cadre of policymakers and practitioners in Israel.
Acknowledgements

This thesis would not have been possible without the unwavering support and guidance of my supervisors, Prof. Paul Morris, of UCL Institute of Education and Dr. Miri Yemini of Tel Aviv University. Paul has been an incredible academic mentor. He encouraged me to think critically, to make an argument, and over the years, he even broke me of bullet points; my examiners may wish he hadn't! Our lengthy discussions and his astute intellectual input was vital to this thesis. More than this, Paul's support and unflappable demeanour kept me going through innumerable moments of stress and doubt; the care Paul shows for his students, his great moral fibre and his masterful way of simply articulating complicated ideas are only a few of his qualities that I admire and that I aspire to embody. Miri was an incredible force in pushing this thesis to completion; her expertise in internationalisation and intimate knowledge of Israeli higher education was invaluable. Miri encouraged me to develop my academic potential and gave me the opportunity to do so. I would never have embarked on this thesis if it were not for Prof. Robert Cowen. He introduced me to the field of comparative education and for that I am grateful. His patience and confidence in my academic abilities, was a source of continual reassurance to me; his British wit, a delight. My colleagues in Paul's tutorial group, were a source of encouragement, intellectual challenge and stimulation. Maryam Mohamed, Sue Grey, Laura Oxley, Diana Sousa, Ai Lian Chee, Heather Kinuthia, Xiaomin Li, Yuval Dvir, and Yan Fei – thank you for everything. In the final year of this thesis, I relocated to Tel Aviv and had the great fortune to join Miri’s tutorial group which likewise was a source of collegial support and intellectual inspiration. Special thanks go to May Amiel, Khen Tucker, Yifaat Bronshtein, Yaniv Weinreb, Maayan Mizrachi, and Timna Benn. Heela Goren, a member of both tutorial groups, deserves special recognition for her willingness to read and comment on the thesis; thank you.

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Abbreviations used in the thesis

AR&D – Authority of Research and Development
AFHU – American Friends of Hebrew University
BOO – Board of Overseers
BDS – Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Movement
BOG – Board of Governors
CHE – Council of Higher Education
EU – European Union
FSU – Former Soviet Union
FM - Foreign Ministry
FHU – Friends of Hebrew University
HE – Higher Education
HEI – Higher Education Institution
HU – Hebrew University
HUA – Hebrew University Archives
HUYB – Hebrew University Yearbook
IO – International Office
ISA – Israel State Archives
IoHE – Internationalisation of higher education
ISF - Israel Science Foundation
JAFI – Jewish Agency for Israel
MoF - Ministry of Finance
MoE – Ministry of Education
PAfEJ – Palestinian Arabs from East Jerusalem
PBC – Planning and Budgeting Committee
PM – Prime Minister
PR – Public Relations
RIS – Rothberg International School
SOS – School of Overseas Students
US – United States
UN – United Nations
ZO - Zionist Organisation
Hebrew words used in the thesis

Aliyah – a value-laden term used to describe Jewish immigration to the Land of Israel; literally to ascend

Mechina/Mechinot – (singular and plural); a preparatory course for admission into Israeli universities

Olim – masculine plural of ‘oleh;’ a Jewish immigrant (i.e. who makes Aliyah)

Ulpan – an institute or school that provides intensive Hebrew language instruction; literally ‘studio’

Yeridah – a value-laden term used to describe those who emigrate from the Land of Israel; literally to descend

Yishuv – the term used to describe the Jewish population in the Land of Israel before the State of Israel was proclaimed in 1948

Yordim – masculine plural of ‘yored;’ a person who leaves the Land of Israel (i.e. who makes Yeridah)
Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Personal motivation

In 2014 I relocated to London with my family to begin doctoral studies, and to open the European office of an Israeli college. As the Director of International Marketing and Recruitment for the UK and Francophone Europe, I was tasked with recruiting international students, alumni relations, public relations and fundraising activities. This position was a continuation of my role over the previous six years, in which I was based at the college’s campus in Israel, in a variety of positions from international student admissions, to marketing, recruitment and donor relations. Pointedly, my work was considerably focused on recruiting students and cultivating support for the College in established Jewish and Israeli expatriate communities. This was both for pragmatic and ideological reasons. Pragmatically, there was a feeling that these students and communities would be the most likely to study in Israel and support Israeli higher education institutions (HEIs). Thus, with limited recruiting manpower and marketing budgets, they represented low hanging fruit (i.e. best return for investment). Ideologically, however, these communities were targeted because an educational experience in Israel was viewed as a way for Jewish students to deepen their Jewish identities and connect with their roots; to provide an impetus to settlement in Israel; and to make connections between Israel and Diaspora Jews.

While I occasionally represented the College to European HEIs to solicit/negotiate different forms of cooperation, the main aspect of my position was cultivating relationships with Jewish and Israeli (expatriate) communities and organisations. So it was that I visited major cities throughout Europe, and organised promotional activities, events and information sessions in Jewish community centres, schools and societies. I forged relationships with Israeli diplomats and embassy staff, expatriate groups, emissaries to different Zionist organisations, prominent Jewish community organisations and youth groups. I held private meetings (at Israeli consulates, for security reasons) to meet with prospective students and families. I organised alumni gatherings and donor events. My colleagues in this work were a combination of HE administrators, Jewish community educators and professionals, Zionist educators and professionals, and Israeli expatriate community organisers and diplomats.
I was particularly suited to the position. I speak fluent English, French and Hebrew and had lived and worked in different European cities. Moreover, it was a trajectory I was familiar with; in my junior year at a college in the US, I studied abroad at the Rothberg International School (RIS) in Hebrew University (HU) in Jerusalem in the spring of 2006. This experience sparked my desire to immigrate to Israel, which upon completing my undergraduate and master’s degrees, I did in the summer of 2008. Upon my immigration to Israel, and an intensive Ulpan (Hebrew language study), I worked in international higher education, for close to a decade, resigning in the final year of my doctoral studies. I viewed myself as an international education professional in the broadest sense and while I had significant personal and professional experience in the field, I was interested in learning more about its academic foundations. Thus, as I embarked on my new assignment in Europe, I began my doctorate, taking introductory courses and acquainting myself with the internationalisation literature.

I was aware that my position was different from that of an international education professional in the UK and Europe where I worked; and from the US from whence I was born and educated. I became increasingly aware from my academic studies, that the Israeli situation was distinctive and not well conceptualised in the themes and practices of the literature. Thus, it was that after working for many years in international higher education at an Israeli HEI and upon exploring the internationalisation literature, I felt a dissonance between my job functions and the systems I knew in relation to the themes emerging from the literature. Plainly, these did not easily fit the reality I knew and experienced. Moreover, as I became acquainted with my diverse doctoral colleagues at University College London, I began to understand that I was not alone: internationalisation in many societies was not reflected in the literature. Thus, it was that I became fascinated with this gap in understanding internationalisation globally. In parallel, this concern of mine was beginning to be recognised by prominent voices in the field. In 2017, an edited volume The Globalization of Internationalization: Emerging Voices and Perspectives, sent out a resounding call for more empirical work in internationalisation to ‘globalise’ the field (de Wit et al., 2017); this study aims to answer this call in the form of a study of internationalisation in Israel.

1.2 Dominant portrayals of internationalisation of higher education (IoHE)

Internationalisation is increasingly portrayed as a key feature of higher education (HE) systems around the world and as a universal phenomenon (Chankseliani, 2018; Larsen, 2016;
Warwick & Moogan, 2013). It has come to signify institutional quality and is a key indicator of ‘World Class Universities’ as assessed by global ranking systems (Altbach & Salmi, 2011). Internationalisation has deep historical roots, however, it is widely portrayed as a novel phenomenon, linked with the rise of globalisation, and aligns with analyses which view the world, and education systems specifically, converging on a common set of ideas, values, models and standards (Bentley & Kyvik, 2012; Marginson, 2008).

While it is recognised that internationalisation has multiple overlapping political, economic, academic, and sociocultural rationales (de Wit et al., 2015), historically these are usually depicted as moving from the pursuit in the post-World War II period of peace and mutual understanding; to aid and development in the Cold War period, to the contemporary period dominated by competitive and economic considerations (e.g. de Wit, 2002; Knight, 2004; 2015). While clearly connected to Western historical timelines and events, this has become the dominant trajectory of internationalisation. These economic and competitive considerations are now portrayed in the literature as the driving force behind internationalisation on all levels: nations in a bid for the wider economic benefits of an influx of overseas students and skilled immigration to drive competition in the ‘global knowledge economy’ (Lomer, 2017; Trilokekar, 2010); institutions in pursuit of financial revenues, international branding, reputation and global rankings (Knight, 2015); and students in the pursuit of the cosmopolitan capital that is perceived to increase access and opportunity in local and global labour markets (Aktas et al., 2017; Bamberger, 2019; Kratz & Netz, 2018).

Yet even while these competitive and economic rationales have become increasingly hegemonic, internationalisation is widely depicted as a positive response to destructive forms of globalisation and the progressive, humanistic possibilities of internationalisation are often stressed, especially mutual understanding; diversity; intercultural awareness, global citizenship and tolerance (Haigh, 2008; Yemini, 2015). Thus, while scholars suggest that in recent years, internationalisation has become increasingly aligned with economic and commercial motives, it has maintained a strong connection to other rationales and ideas, particularly positive views of human connectivity and humanitarianism (Bamberger et al., 2019). In line with this view, a significant portion of the literature assumes these normative (Western) values, which is reflected in the prescriptive nature of much of the internationalisation literature.

Internationalisation is increasingly viewed as a central activity of HEIs and is regarded as a strategic process. The literature emphasises that the enactment of IoHE is driven by the values, rationales, intended outcomes, history, culture, and resources available; HEIs and nations employ different strategies and have different forms of internationalisation (Ayoubi &
Massoud, 2007; Maringe, 2010; Taylor, 2004). However, aligning with the profit motive, a dominant focus on international student recruitment and mobility has developed in the literature (Proctor, 2015; Streitwieser, 2014). Likewise, competitive rationales at the institutional and national levels have put increasing focus on enactment of IoHE through elite research collaborations and activities, connected with the rise of international rankings, and the perceived importance of the university in driving knowledge economies. Thus, despite the variety of forms of IoHE, Bamberger, Morris, Weinreb and Yemini (2019) argue that its enactment is portrayed as a strategic (economic) action by nations competing in the ‘global knowledge economy’; and universities competing in the global market of HEIs with the assumption of few constraints and a great deal of autonomy (e.g. Hudzik, 2015). As such, while the enactment of IoHE can take many forms, the literature focuses particularly on student and scholar mobility; and competitive knowledge production activities.

Overall, the literature has tended to focus on Western historical timelines, rationales, values and enactment of internationalisation, portraying internationalisation as a normative intervention, at the nexus of neoliberalism and humanitarianism (Bamberger et al., 2019). In breaking with this literature, I align my study with emerging critical scholarship in internationalisation (Mwangi et al., 2018; Lomer, 2017). I analyse the dominant themes and foci in the literature and argue that they do not accurately explain the scope and way that internationalisation has been fostered over time in Israel – and possibly in other societies.

1.3 Internationalisation of higher education in Israel

Internationalisation is viewed as a new phenomenon and an emerging policy discourse in Israel (Yemini, 2017). While rationales such as peace-making and multiculturalism are connected to internationalisation, Yemini et al. (2015) argue that due to the intractable conflict with its neighbours and the ethnoreligious character of the state, the multi-cultural purposes of internationalisation are minimal and limited to relations between majority/minority populations within the state, enacted primarily by colleges (second tier institutions). In contrast, in the elite research-intensive universities, internationalisation is associated with academic ‘excellence’ and enacted primarily through research collaborations with other elite institutions. Thus, the universities are characterised by a much greater emphasis on research with impressive performance on global quality metrics including international research funding, publication, and citation rankings (Marginson, 2006); Israel has two universities regularly in the Shanghai Ranking of top 100 global universities and three others regularly in the top 500 global universities (ARWU, 2017). However, as regards international students, with only 1.4%
of its student population coming from overseas, Israel performs poorly compared to the OECD average of 9% (Maoz, 2016).

One factor that has profoundly shaped Israeli HE’s internationalisation patterns is the intractable geopolitical conflict which has its roots in sectarian violence in British Mandatory Palestine (Bar Tal, 1998). Since the Arab-Israeli war of 1948, which immediately followed the declaration of the State, the conflict has been fought in sporadic wars, military operations and violent struggles. While Israel was founded as the nation-state of the Jewish people, there is a substantial Palestinian minority in the country, and about 4.8 million Palestinians in the Occupied Territories of Gaza and the West Bank (OCHA, 2017). Thus, one explanation for the relatively small number of international students in Israel lies in the limited mobility due to the unpredictable security situation. Others include regulations which restrict movement and possibilities for cooperation both among groups in Israel and across the region; Hebrew as the primary language of instruction; and the founding values of the state as the Jewish nation which limits who may live, work and immigrate to the country (Bamberger et al., 2019). Due in large part to limited mobility, financial incentives for internationalisation, while growing in recent years with the addition of English-provision programmes, are still small scale. Thus, it is difficult to locate Israel in the widespread portrayals of internationalisation as a means for mutual-understanding, peace-making and humanitarian purposes; and likewise mobility, fuelled by commercial incentives appears to hold little descriptive or explanatory power for internationalisation in the Israel.

The scant studies on internationalisation in Israel (e.g. Yemini, 2017; Yemini et al., 2015), while holding considerable descriptive weight, are insufficient to explain IoHE in Israel. Explanations (some implicit, others explicit) for the patterns described above rely heavily on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; and neoliberal forces effecting the university such as rankings, pressures for (measurable) academic ‘outputs,’ competition, and preparation of students for the ‘global knowledge economy.’ However, this focus, indicates why certain activities might not be done, however, it limits understanding of why certain forms of internationalisation do take place. For example, while certain types of mobility are restricted in the region due to the conflict, other mobilities are actively fostered for diverse reasons. Mobility amongst Israeli researchers, particularly in elite universities, is encouraged (to other top-tier institutions or with renowned researchers) through generous national funding for sabbaticals and attendance at international research conferences (Bamberger et al., 2019). Moreover, despite having low levels of student mobility, it still exists. Literature in the fields of Diaspora, Jewish Education and Tourism Studies, reveal that incoming student mobility to Israeli universities over time – and continuing to this day - has tended to be Jewish students, who are drawn to Israel by virtue of their ethnoreligious connection (e.g. Cohen, 2003; Donitsa-Schmidt & Vadish, 2005;
Thus, it appears that student mobility in Israel is strongly connected to Diaspora, however, as I will demonstrate in Chapter 2, Diaspora connections in HE – beyond ‘brain gain/drain/circulation’ - are not well incorporated into either the Israeli literature of internationalisation or the broader internationalisation literature.

While Diaspora mobility remains a focus today, there are other forms of mobility in Israel: the European Union (EU) programmes (e.g. Erasmus+) have gained traction and facilitate mobility. Since 2012, there is a large government initiative to bring closer economic and political collaboration with China and India, with academic partnerships and student mobility forming a basis for partnership. In 2017, the Council of Higher Education (CHE) introduced internationalisation as a focus in its new multi-year plan for HE (2017 – 2022). One of the aims of this plan is to double international (research) students to Israel to 25,000 students within five years. The plan singles out international students particularly from Diaspora communities in Europe and North America; and Asia, particularly India and China, These myriad initiatives and target student groups suggests that mobility in the Israeli case has over time been used for different purposes and fostered in different ways than those propagated in the literature.

The focus on ‘excellence’ enacted through research and elite partnerships, implicitly frames the internationalisation in universities which does take place, as a combination of academic and competitive rationales, broadly in line with the competitive rationales from the literature detailed in the previous section; and because the conflict limits the humanitarian aims. However, this framing de-emphasises other rationales which could be connected to these activities. Moreover, the focus on the conflict circumscribes the political rationale to what is not done (e.g. regional mobility/cooperation, because of the conflict) and not on what is done (e.g. strategic partnerships, in spite of the conflict). This is not to downplay the importance of the conflict in shaping all aspects of Israeli life; rather I assert that this focus on only the conflict obscures how the political (and other rationales) connects with and extends beyond the conflict, affecting internationalisation (e.g. partnerships with which nations; funding from which sources).

I will demonstrate in Chapter 2 that much research on internationalisation of HE in Israel portrays internationalisation as a contemporary phenomenon linked to globalisation. However, Israel has a long history of internationalisation which did not begin with this current phase linked to globalisation in the literature. The oldest universities (and some of the most elite institutions until today) were founded in partnership with Diaspora Jewry and the Zionist movement (pre-cursor to the State) decades before State formation (Cohen, 2006a; Lavsky, 1997). Historians of Israeli HE indicate the important role the Jewish Diaspora has played and
continues to play in developing HE in Israel, particularly in its funding and governance (e.g. Cohen, 2006b; Lavsky, 1997, 2005; Troen, 1992). Thus, the literature on internationalisation in Israel, has largely ignored the antecedents of contemporary internationalisation in Israel, the rich university histories and diaspora scholarship, and instead has employed a contemporary lens, focused on describing current manifestations, around the organising concepts of the conflict and neoliberalism/globalisation. As I demonstrate in Chapter 2, this is not characteristic of Israel, but of the HE literature more broadly. I suggest that a historical approach to the Israeli case, which develops the changing nature of IoHE and draws on diaspora scholarship from other fields (e.g. Abramson, 2017; Brubaker, 2005; Mavroudi, 2007; Shain & Barth, 2003) and accounts for the multifaced motivations and influences of diaspora, state and university holds potential to increase understanding of the internal workings of internationalisation in Israel, and to shed light on IoHE in diverse contexts.

1.4 Towards global internationalisation

I argue that the literature does not accurately explain internationalisation in Israel (this will be analysed in Chapter 2 and demonstrated over the course of the thesis). There is a persistent focus on ‘Western’ internationalisation research and there is a need for more in-depth empirical work to broaden out the categories and frameworks used in internationalisation to provide a more globally inclusive and widely explanatory field (de Wit et al., 2017). Echoing Acharya’s (2014) claims about international relations, I argue that internationalisation is ‘not yet a truly global discipline that captures the full range of ideas, approaches and experiences of both Western and non-Western societies…[internationalisation] theories and concepts remain heavily biased in favour of Western Europe and the United States. Consequently, they neglect the experiences and relationships in other parts of the world, or offer a poor fit for understanding and explaining them’ (p. 76). Thus, this thesis resonates with a Global International Relations (GIR) approach as developed by Acharya (2014, 2016) which aims to expand the field which has been focused on Western/European perspectives, particularly its history, categories and processes, to a more inclusive and global understanding.

The purpose of a global internationalisation approach is not to jettison the old frameworks, which could still hold value in some contexts (e.g. the historical timelines/rationales of internationalisation have explanatory value in certain areas of Europe and North America). Rather, the purpose is to broaden understanding of internationalisation and its organising concepts, theories and histories to facilitate a greater understanding of internationalisation on a global scale. An important critique of GIR is that it does not seek to
reject existing theories, but rather serves to incorporate them into a global tapestry of understanding; thus, there is some concern that it could globalise Western theories and concepts (Acharya, 2014). Likewise, some critical internationalisation scholars adopt a priori theoretical and political stances, advocating for radical change in HE (Ramirez, 2014; Shajahan & Morgan, 2016; Stein, 2017; Stein, Andreotti, Bruce, & Suša, 2016) and thus a global internationalisation approach may not be viewed by such scholars as sufficiently radical in its agenda for social justice. My belief is that greater understanding is the first step to social change, and thus my scholarly aim is to shed light on internationalisation. Thus, the emphasis in my approach is neither on accommodating other frameworks and theories, nor is it on advocating for social change; rather, my approach is based in deep empirical investigation of internationalisation in a ‘deviant’ context, to explore other possible influences and interpretive frameworks which could hold explanatory weight in particular contexts. Following this approach, as the thesis developed, the important influence of diaspora came to the fore, which I argue has been underdeveloped and underanalysed in IoHE literature. The fact that Israel is an archetypal case of diaspora, and the emerging emphasis on diaspora policies and practices in internationalising HE systems, indicates that insights from the Israeli case could shed light on this important and timely phenomenon more broadly. Thus, this thesis is located in a literature that is critical of projecting a priori theories and explanations of IoHE (particularly in contexts outside of the West); and emphasises the need for empirical research to pluralise theories and concepts for understanding IoHE.

1.5 Central argument

The point of departure for this thesis is that the literature is insufficient to explain the nature of internationalisation in Israel. This thesis demonstrates why this is the case. I argue that internationalisation in Israel can be understood at the nexus of the events, priorities and identities of the Diaspora, State and University. Thus, as the nature, needs and relations of the State, Diaspora and University shift, this is reflected in internationalisation. It is a form of internationalisation that has distinctive features, however elements of the Israeli case may resonate in (the growing number of) contexts which actively engage with diaspora (e.g. China, India, Ireland); ethnonationalist states (e.g. Korea; Japan); developmental states; and states in conflict. I also suggest that Israel is not an isolated case in the sense that there are likely many other cases which are not adequately explained by the dominant (Western) foci of the literature. Importantly, this thesis takes account of the intersections between transnational,
national and institutional identities; domestic politics and foreign politics; and global discourses in HE. It is my proposition that internationalisation in Israel is a reflection of the intersections of these aspects.

This thesis examines the actors, forms, rationales for and development of internationalisation in Israel from the formation of the first University in the pre-state period through to the contemporary period. The purpose of this study is to analyse internationalisation in Israel with the aim to both explain internationalisation in Israel and to challenge the widespread portrayals of internationalisation in the literature, broadening the understanding of the actors, rationales, forms and nature of internationalisation. While spanning over a hundred years of history, this study does not serve as an historical description; rather, it examines the changing nature and forms of internationalisation beginning with the creation of the first University in pre-state Israel with a focus on the following research questions:

RQ1: What forms of internationalisation have operated since the founding of the first university in pre-state Israel? How were these developed and by which actors? What was the purpose of particular forms of internationalisation?

RQ2: Why did internationalisation take the form it did over time? Why has it shifted?

These questions are examined over time, and changes in internationalisation are viewed through the lens of shifting domestic and foreign policy, diaspora relations, and global discourses around the university. This thesis is thus an inquiry to identify key elements and processes that shape internationalisation in Israel over time. By examining the historical period from pre-state creation through to contemporary times, this thesis locates these key elements through tracing an historical pattern. I assert throughout this study that to understand internationalisation in Israel, we must consider the broader political, economic, and cultural roots from within which the system was constructed and continues to operate. As the political, economic, social and cultural relations shift over historical periods, I demonstrate that particular forms of internationalisation appear (and fail to appear) which can be understood in this intersection. To grasp the processes, actors and implications of internationalisation that we see today in Israel, we must trace its historical roots, development, and transformation. Thus, I seek to understand the historical roots of contemporary internationalisation to grasp what has brought us to the present reality, and to understand where it is headed and why.
1.6 The research approach

This thesis employs historical methods and a comparative education perspective to trace the political, economic, and social interactions and relationships which shape internationalisation – and their evolution over time. By means of a single country in-depth study (Culpepper, 2005), I aim to create the first inductive periodisation of internationalisation in Israel which revolves around identifying ‘transitologies’ or critical events that bring on a shift in the organising concepts of society and hence education (Cowen, 2000).

While there are many different approaches to ‘doing history’, my approach aligns with the aim of this thesis to understand the patterns of internationalisation over time. I assert a commitment to the authenticity, representativeness, and accuracy of the archival and primary sources materials; thus, I affirm the importance of the empirical basis of my (historical) claims. My aim is to bring to light past facts and events (e.g. the creation of committees; recruitment plans) while also paying attention to the discursive meanings emerging from the documents (e.g. tropes such as ‘excellence’ and ‘Jewish genius’). I acknowledge the subjectivity of historical research and narration, and I understand that ‘truth’ may not equate to universal facts and that there are diverse interpretations of (historical) events. I recognise that archives are the result of curation and are thus historically contingent and partial (see Chapter 3 ‘Limitations’). I view documents as socially constructed artefacts with inherent bias, and that their interpretation depends on particular motivations, beliefs and perspectives of the researcher and the research project (see Chapter 3 ‘Insider status’). However, I also view it as imperative to recognise and mitigate these biases to the extent possible, acknowledging that this is never fully attainable. There are several limitations to this approach which will be addressed in Chapters 3 and 7, however, the contributions of this thesis to understanding internationalisation in Israel and more broadly, could only have been brought to the fore through such an approach.

Internationalisation is associated with a large variety of rationales, activities and forms, thus, in order to develop a comparative lens over time, I employ Gao’s (2017) conceptual framework for analysing internationalisation based on six dimensions (research, faculty, student, curriculum, governance, and engagement) which broadly align with the tripartite roles of the university (research, teaching and service). Gao’s (2017) framework indicates broad areas and themes that are examined in this study to hone the research focus, not to limit it to these categories, and I do not suggest that all of the categories will be touched upon at a given time.
While initially envisioned as a project that would analyse transnational, national and institutional policies, due to constraints in data collection (see Chapter 3), I conducted an in-depth investigation in one institution: Hebrew University (HU). I chose HU for four reasons. One, it is the oldest comprehensive university, which pre-dates the founding of the State and allows for the historical thread to be maintained. Two, it has an extensive and well-maintained archive which allowed for ample data to be collected to build a robust corpus of historical documents. Three, there is evidence that HU was a model for other universities in their international efforts (Tel Aviv University; Bar Ilan University; Ben Gurion University; Haifa University) and that an in-depth investigation of HU would represent one of the most internationalised Israeli institutions, at least until the 1990s. Four, Yemini et al. (2017) argue that colleges (second-tier HEIs) have embarked on a process of ‘universitification’ or a process of emulating universities, thus, while I am not be able to generalise to the whole Israeli HE system (nor is this the purpose of this research), there are elements which represent narratives in Israeli HE more broadly than HU. While HU is the focal point, I also show how other universities and colleges had similar or divergent foci and introduce relevant macro-level statistics to provide a broader context to understand developments in HU (e.g. international student numbers). Through research in the Hebrew University Archives (HUA), numerous historical State documents and documents from Diaspora organisations were unearthed. Thus, the project focuses on the institutional level, and where possible, State and Diaspora policies and initiatives were included.

This thesis is built on a large research corpus with a vast array of primary and secondary sources, most of them being used for the first time. Historical documents were procured through the Israel State Archives (ISA), Central Zionist Archives (CZA), Hebrew University Archives (HUA) National Library (NL), and Freedom of Information requests. Contemporary documents were procured through extensive searches for online and publicly available information on the websites of HU; CHE; Ministry of Education (MoE); Ministry of Aliyah and Absorption; Ministry of Economy; Ministry of Finance (MoF); Jewish Agency for Israel (JAFI); and Foreign Ministry (FM). These documents are supplemented with interviews of key decision-makers, administrators, academics, and stakeholders in HE and triangulated with secondary histories, studies and sources. The nature of the sources and the focus of the study (i.e. HU as the ‘University of the Jewish People’) meant that there was very little focus in the archival record on a Palestinian perspective. While I view an historical study of such a perspective of IoHE as a worthy and important task, it is outside the scope of this thesis, my personal abilities and researcher competencies. However, it is important to recognise the gaps and silences in the archival record and specific forms of internationalisation that have (not)
developed; thus I draw attention to this throughout the findings chapters and I address this more directly in the Conclusion (Chapter 7).

Through the analysis three periods were identified: 1900s – 1948: Formation and development of the Diaspora University; 1948 – 2000: State formation, stabilisation and the Diaspora; 1990s - 2018: State maturation and steering, the Diaspora and internationalisation. These periods represent shifts in the international dimension of HU; and the broader political, economic, social, and identity changes in the three main influences on internationalisation: State, Diaspora and University. Thus, the analysis resulted in the first inductive periodisation of internationalisation in Israel; one which in its forms, rationales and trajectory departs from those propagated in the literature. Pointedly, I demonstrate the close connection between the Jewish Diaspora, State and University. Despite views which might wish that HU would reveal more ‘diversity’ in its internationalisation, particularly with regards to Palestinians, this was not the case, and emphasising this would have deviated from my stated research approach, which was to adhere to the empirical sources. It also would have defeated one of the main contributions of this thesis, which is that this research serves to establish what have been and are the driving rationales, patterns and forms of internationalisation over time. This is imperative knowledge for all those involved who would like to actually make IoHE more ‘diverse.’

1.6 Thesis structure

In this section, I provide an overview of the structure of the thesis excluding the current chapter (Chapter 1) which provides a guide to how this thesis is structured to develop its aims and central argument. In Chapter 2, I critically analyse the extant literature and key concepts, models and approaches which define the field. After I have established and critiqued these themes, I critically analyse the literature on internationalisation in Israel. I consider what is known of internationalisation in Israel and if the literature accurately explains it. I point to insufficiencies and anomalies not easily explicated by the literature. I argue that the literature on Israeli IoHE, has largely ignored the antecedents of contemporary internationalisation and relies on the organising concepts of conflict and neoliberal globalisation. Instead of this approach, I point to the rich university histories and involvement of the diaspora in HE as a possible point of departure for a more comprehensive explanatory model of IoHE. Finally, I analyse the literature on diaspora, and its use in HE studies. Based on this critical analysis of the IoHE literature more broadly, and with reference to Israel, Diaspora and HE, I propose a
fresh research approach – the historical method to examine the case of Israel in subsequent chapters.

In Chapter 3, I describe in detail how this research was undertaken and explain why it was undertaken in a particular manner. I introduce the historical methods and comparative perspective used; I then proceed to follow a four-step historical method to give a clear understanding of how the study developed to attain its aims. This analysis identified the three aforementioned periods. Finally, I address my insider status, ethical issues, limitations of the research and establish the trustworthiness and validity of the analysis.

In Chapters 4, 5 and 6, I analyse each of the three periods in turn; each of these analysis chapters has three internal components: (historical) formation/development of HU; international dimension of research; and international dimension of teaching. The foremost section is based on an analysis of key events as described by primary sources (e.g. HUYBs) and analysed in secondary sources (e.g. academic and national histories) (see Lamberg and Tikkanen, 2006). It is presented in the tone of historical narrative. This provides the frame for contextualising the latter sections which build on this historical understanding, and are comprised of research based chiefly on an analysis of primary (archival) sources, supplemented with interviews. In each period I address RQ1, and in the period conclusion of Chapters 5 and 6, I compare it to the preceding period. The themes developed over the periods are (a) the historical and continued influence of the Diaspora and State on internationalisation (b) the role of Diaspora and State in defining, initiating, implementing, and supporting internationalisation (c) the sustained influences of the State's foreign policy and social cohesion agenda on internationalisation (d) the historical and continuing importance of the connections and disconnections between global trends, events, and communities; foreign policy; domestic policy; transnational, national, and institutional identity; discourses in higher education; and internationalisation.

In Chapter 7, I summarise the periods, reinterpreting internationalisation in Israel through the central argument, introducing a novel model of internationalisation in Israel; this addresses RQ2. Next, I revisit the literature as analysed in Chapter 2, modifying, challenging, and enriching it based on the findings. Finally, I establish the contribution of the thesis, analyse its limitations, and suggest areas for further research. I conclude by calling for further research into internationalisation in diverse contexts to globalise the field. Overall, this thesis is a study over time with two aims. First, to establish what the patterns of internationalisation in Israel have been, are, and are becoming. As Israel pursues internationalisation plans at the national and institutional levels, it is worthwhile to understand the legacy of internationalisation that has shaped the HE system that so many in the government and HEIs are trying to influence.
Second, to challenge, refine and enrich the historical timelines, rationales, forms, methods, and explanatory concepts of the internationalisation literature, shedding light on internationalisation in diverse contexts. As more countries and institutions around the world embark on internationalisation – many of them targeting diaspora – it is valuable to understand the limitations of the literature and develop new concepts and approaches to understanding internationalisation in diverse contexts.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

The purpose of this chapter is to critically analyse the widespread portrayals of internationalisation in the literature and to assess their usefulness in explaining the Israeli case. I argue that much of the literature reflects normative views, many of which derive from studies in the West, and that many prevalent themes are not helpful in explaining the Israeli case. While identifying emerging critical scholarship on internationalisation (Larsen, 2016; Morley et al., 2018; Buckner & Stein, 2019), this chapter problematises the normative inclinations of much internationalisation research, and argues for a more nuanced, relational and historical approach to the study of IoHE. Using the Israeli case, I thus, suggest that such an approach has the potential to increase our understanding of internationalisation in diverse contexts.

This chapter is organised into three parts: portrayals of IoHE; IoHE in Israel; and diaspora and IoHE. First, I critically analyse the historical timelines, definitions, rationales and enactment and models as portrayed in the internationalisation literature. After I have established and critiqued these themes, I critically analyse the literature on internationalisation in Israel. I consider what is known about internationalisation in Israel and if the literature accurately explains it. I point to insufficiencies and anomalies not easily explained by the literature and argue that it does not adequately explicate IoHE in Israel. These portrayals serve as a reference point from which I return to in the concluding chapter of this thesis. Finally, I analyse the literature on diaspora, and its use in HE studies. Based on this critical analysis of the IoHE literature more broadly, and with reference to Israel, diaspora and HE, I propose a fresh research approach – the historical method to examine the case of Israel in subsequent chapters.

2.1 Portrayals of internationalisation

**Historical roots of internationalisation**

Universities were founded on the idea of universal knowledge and therefore have always been ‘international’ (Neave, 1997). However, this universal/international character has changed considerably over time. Kerr et al. (1994) describe the university in terms of a unified model
gradually diverging into many national models with the advent of nation states and slowly re-converging during the current period of globalisation and internationalisation. De Wit’s (2002) ubiquitous history of IoHE in Europe and North America builds on Kerr et al.’s (1994) model and maps international elements in HE onto three periods.

The first period corresponds to the Middle Ages until the end of the eighteenth century, characterised by the ‘peregrini’ or wandering scholars of Europe (de Ridder-Symoens, 1992) and is defined by a common ‘European space’ (Neave, 1997, p. 6) which comprised a common religion (Christianity), language (Latin), curriculum, and examinations. It is particularly noteworthy the Western emphasis in this historical portrayal of the early development of the university and its universal/international nature. While some scholars acknowledge the ancient university of Al-Azhar and other forms of ancient ‘higher education,’ Islamic mobility and education (e.g. Welch, 2012) the historical roots of internationalisation are focused squarely on European institutions, histories and perspectives.

The second period, corresponding to the 18th and 19th centuries coincides with the rise of nation-states and nationalist purposes of the universities. Hobsbawm (1975) argues that in this period, nationalism, an ideology which held that a nation, defined by a (perceived) common history, culture, ethnicity and language, should be the basis for a territorially bound sovereign polity; and that this organisation - into a nation-state - must be wedded to liberal ideas of the time (i.e. sufficiently large enough to develop an economy, military and state institutions). Hobsbawn (1975) called this movement nothing short of ‘radical, democratic and revolutionary’ (p. 109) in that its aim was that those who were perceived to be from the same nation, should have right to self-determination and be organised in political entities which reflected these identities. This became the dominant political ideology of Europe and universities were greatly enmeshed with it. Scott (1998) views this period as the beginning of the ‘international’ and argues that most contemporary universities ‘are creatures, because they are creations, of the nation state’ (p. 110). De Wit (2002) argues that the international component of universities at this time was manifested by the ‘export’ of HE models and researchers from the West around the world. These were often part of colonial projects of settlement and exploitation; for example, German researchers were sent to African and Asian colonies to conduct biological, geological and agricultural research to better exploit the land and its people. British universities established in its colonies were based on a Macaulayian perspective, that advocated universities as social structures to form an elite class of indigenous peoples that could act as cultural translators and serve in the colonial bureaucracy/interest (Fajana, 1972). The language of instruction in such universities was English (or other colonial languages) and while de Wit (2002) argues that mobility of students and scholars was sporadic and unorganised, much of the international (student) mobility in
this period followed colonial trajectories (e.g. colonial elites were educated in Britain, see Braithwaite, 2001). Other international activities included dissemination of research through scholarly societies, publications and conferences. Hobsbawm (1962) argues that this is when scholars began to stay in their ‘linguistic areas’ while maintaining contact with their colleagues through international journals (e.g. Proceedings of the Royal Society (1831); Annales de Chimie et de Physique (1797).

The third period, corresponding to the 20th century until today has several sub-periods: namely, from the World Wars, to the Cold War, and the contemporary period of globalisation and ‘internationalisation.’ De Wit and Merkx (2015) argue that in the aftermath of World War I, that there was increasing international cooperation and exchange, fuelled by a (political) desire to promote peace and mutual understanding in an attempt to avert war. This cooperation began to take on an organised nature through the development of the League of Nations (1921) and later, educational exchange as a product of the post-World War II initiatives of Fulbright and UNESCO (de Wit, 2002). In the post-WWII period, with the ascent of the US as a global superpower, American universities took a dominant position in knowledge creation and exchange. Educational exchange and cooperation expanded during the Cold-War and in the 1960s and 70s a different political rationale for educational exchange developed between the Western bloc (led by the US) and the Soviet bloc, an ideological battle between capitalism and communism which was fought for influence in the developing world through aid projects, development programmes, and scholarship opportunities (Chomsky et al., 1997). ‘Together with aid, diplomacy, development aid, and cultural exchange, international exchange and cooperation in HE became an important tool to reach these [political] objectives. (de Wit, 2002, p. 11). The Cold War period also played an important role in developing international cooperation for research, student mobility, and area studies (Wallerstein, 1997).

In the 1980s and 90s, another shift took place with the fall of the Soviet Union, the rise of the EU and the dawn of contemporary globalisation. It is during this period that ‘internationalisation’ as a term was first applied to education and began to be seen as a strategic process, as opposed to isolated activities, projects or programmes (Knight, 2004). This transition is linked to a shift towards economic aims and according to Kerr et al. (1994), is the beginning of a move back to a convergence model of the university. The 21st century has seen several global ‘developments' combine to exert a powerful influence on HE including: the rise of the ‘global knowledge economy’ (Gibbons et al., 1994); the rise of information and communications technologies which connect our world and redefine the opportunities for international education while also changing the dynamics of space and time (Castells, 2011); the rise of market economies and the formation of liberal trade markets, increasing the
commodification, marketisation, and privatisation of HE (Knight, 2008); the rise of New Public Management (NPM) systems – which encourage quasi-market competition, incentives, performativity, and entrepreneurial activity in the management and organisation of HEIs (Marginson & van der Wende, 2007); the massification of HE provision (Guri-Rosenblit et al., 2007); the rise of the English language as the dominant global research and scientific common language (Crystal, 2012); the rise of regional and global governance structures which add supra-national dimension to policy and initiatives and are widely portrayed as challenging the sovereignty of nation states (Enders, 2004); the unprecedented scale of mobilities of people, ideas, programmes, and providers (Guruz, 2011); and, the advent of global university rankings which has created a ‘global system of performance and comparison’ and have increased competition (Marginson, 2013, p. xvi).

Much of the literature views contemporary internationalisation as a reaction to these developments in HE, and globalisation more specifically. For example, Altbach and Knight’s (2007) highly cited piece, is described as an ‘essay [that] delineates academic programs, institutions, innovations, and practices created to cope with globalization and to reap its benefits’ and they note that ‘globalization may be unalterable, but internationalization involves many choices’ (p. 291). Altbach (2004) claims that ‘internationalization describes the voluntary and perhaps creative ways of coping [with globalization]’ (p. 6) and de Wit (2002) describes ‘a transition to an integrated internationalization of HE; that is, a response of HE to globalization and regionalization’ (p. 17). Similarly, Taylor (2010) notes ‘globalisation, therefore, is a key social and economic trend and force for change, impacting on society in its broadest sense, and on HE as a part of that society…by contrast, internationalisation forms part of the response…’ (p. 84). Stromquist (2007) emphasises that ‘dynamics linked to economic and technological features of globalization have led to university responses known collectively as internationalization’ (p. 100). While there are some dissenters to this view (e.g. Cantwell & Maldonado-Maldonado, 2009; Larsen, 2016; Maringson & Rhoades, 2002), it has nonetheless become widespread. This narrative of internationalisation as a reaction to a static ‘out there’ globalisation – while providing a clear and actionable conceptualisation, particularly for policy makers and practitioners – is problematic and carries many assumptions: (1) institutions respond to globalisation automatically; (2) rationally; (3) and with institutional autonomy (Cantwell & Maldonado-Maldonado, 2009, p. 291). I argue that it assumes that internationalisation is part and parcel of globalisation. Furthermore, I argue that analyses focused on globalisation create a disconnect between the past and the present, severing the historical roots of internationalisation. Critical scholars are beginning to take account of these historical roots, connecting them to marginalisation and inequalities associated with IoHE; this critical research has tended to employ (post)colonialism as a theoretical lens, arguing that
Despite the official end of colonialism, its patterns of power and oppression continue, through the university and internationalisation (e.g. Leite, 2010; Sehole, 2006; Stein et al., 2016). More broadly, other comparative education scholars have called for closer attention to the role of ‘empire’ in shaping educational patterns over time (e.g. Bash, 2018; Cowen, 2018).

In line with this prevalent view of globalisation, the role of the state (and nationalism) is often described as weakening or deteriorating, ceding to global and supranational markets and institutions. Scott (1998) says ‘student flows are now driven by the market rather than by the state’ (p. 117). Enders (2004) argues that ‘in a globalised environment, the power of nation states is fundamentally challenged: states find that they have very limited control over policies that regulate HE “systems”’ (p. 368). Maringe and Foskett (2010) note that ‘HE is increasingly coming under the influence of international organisations where the roles of national governments in state HE systems are becoming subordinated to regional and international influence’ (p. 3); van Damme (2001) notes ‘an erosion of national regulatory and policy frameworks’ (p.3) while Knight (2008) notes ‘shifts in the locus of governance from national to subregional, regional, and international levels’ (p. 12). Beerkens (2004) describes universities as becoming ‘disembedded’ from their national missions and governance structures. However, the state of Israel, through regulation, national funding and accreditation procedures, has shown great control over HE. Thus, it is unclear to what extent this argument could be applied to Israel. In a time of rising nationalism (e.g. Trump, Erdogan, Brexit) indeed, some Western scholars may begin to rethink these ideas of declining state control which may be more of an ideology associated with early globalisation than reality, particularly as emerging scholarship describes not deteriorating state control, but rather its shifting operating structures (e.g. through NPM).

Consistent with this view of weakening state control, the literature, in line with neoliberal theory, tends to envisage a ‘small state’ and assume that its role is limited to that of a market regulator, as opposed to a strong, authoritarian state. The role that the state plays in internationalisation (in the West) is often limited to regulating immigration, and generally promoting ‘academic capitalism’ (e.g. Lomer, 2017; Slaughter, 2014). The state is not viewed as setting the criteria for institutional partnerships, international programme development or the like and a large amount of institutional, researcher and student autonomy is assumed. Indeed, with few notable exceptions (e.g. Cantwell & Maldonado-Maldonado, 2009; Larsen, 2016), internationalisation tends to be portrayed as an institutional (not a state) response by universities that have the autonomy to forge divergent strategies (e.g. Hudzik, 2015). Indeed, autonomy and academic freedom (combined with internationalisation) are viewed as significant factors in creating a ‘World Class University’ (Altbach & Salmi, 2011). This perspective necessarily precludes states in which institutional autonomy is limited and where
the state exercises great control over the targets and trajectories of internationalisation (e.g. regarding foreign partners, branch campuses, joint-programmes, international students). In this way, analyses of internationalisation tend to normalise (Western) weakened neoliberal states, while disregarding the role of authoritarian states (Bamberger et. al, 2019). Notwithstanding, some universities particularly from the US and UK have established branch campuses in nations where an authoritarian state imposes strong limitations on their core principles; namely academic and institutional autonomy (Bamberger et al, 2019; Clifford & Kinser, 2016).

This historical timeline of internationalisation, from academic focused in the pre-state period, to state controlled for national purposes, to post-globalisation market-oriented broadly fits within the view of the three actors of governance of HE in Clark’s (1986) Triangle of Coordination: State Authority, Market, and Academic Oligarchy (see Figure 1). This model was intended for comparative purposes to map different national systems according to where they would fall between these forces at a particular time. This heuristic is a simple tool, which allows for a comparison of different national HE systems and has become a highly-cited model in the field of HE studies. It has several shortcomings however, and as Salazar and Leihy (2013) point out, it is unable to show shifts over time, implying a static state of relations; and it presents the three actors as equal and distinct forces. Marginson and Rhoades (2002) critique Clark’s model for its lack of agency and focus on the national-level and propose a ‘glonacal’ model (global, national, local) which produces interconnected hexagons of global, national and local interactions around two forms of agency: human capacity to act and institutional agencies. Despite the potential of the glonacal approach, as it becomes increasingly complicated, it loses much of its power as a heuristic. Thus, Clark’s model remains a widespread tool to explain and compare different HE systems. However, when considering the Israeli case, and the important role of the Jewish Diaspora in Israeli HE, these models are limited to explain the Israeli case, as I will show throughout this thesis.

*Figure 1: Clark’s (1986) Triangle of Coordination*
Definitions

As demonstrated, ‘internationalisation’ as a term in relation to education entered common usage only in the 1990s; before that, alternate terminology was used, such as ‘international education’, ‘comparative education’ and so forth (de Wit, 2002). In the 1980’s and continuing into the early 1990s, several interpretations emerged which largely defined IoHE as organisational strategies and programme activities an institution employed to internationalise their institutions (Knight, 2004). Several models of internationalisation were developed based on these views (e.g. Davies, 1995; van Dijk & Meijer, 1997; Rudzki, 1995). These early models were descriptive or prescriptive in nature and represented attempts at mapping the international aspect of universities, seen largely as based on programme or institutional initiatives. Gradually, however, the focus shifted to viewing internationalisation as a process, which was more strategic as opposed to the piecemeal approach of isolated activities and programmes from the previous historical periods. In the early 1990s, there was a concerted effort to separate globalisation from internationalisation, and this stressed the importance of developing a definition and distinguishing this from globalisation. In 1994, Knight defined internationalisation as the ‘process of integrating an international and intercultural dimension into the teaching, research, and service functions of the institution’ (p. 7). Her definition became widespread and ten years later, perhaps as a response to criticisms of the definition.
(e.g. de Wit, 2002; van der Wende, 1997; Soderqvist, 2002) she updated the definition to ‘the process of integrating an international, intercultural, or global dimension into the purpose, functions or delivery of post-secondary education’ (2004, p. 11). In addition to the inclusion of the national and sectoral level, this definition includes a further dimension – that of the ‘global’ – and moves away from the traditional tripartite role of the university in teaching, research, and service, towards a more general purpose, functions and delivery, reflecting a recognition of the changing nature and forms of institutions and providers.

While Knight’s various definitions over the past decades have become ubiquitous, there have been challenges and attempts to provide alternatives. Broadly, these can be grouped in two categories: those that critically assess the assumptions embedded in the definition; and those who seek largely to redefine the term to more socially beneficial means.

In the former group, Larsen (2016) critiques three implicit assumptions embedded in Knight’s definition: the emphasis on ‘integrating’ into internationalisation assumes that universities are not already sufficiently international and require actions to ‘internationalise’ it; the focus on the three distinct terms ‘international, intercultural, or global’ implies that these areas are distinct, when in fact, they are overlapping and interwoven; and the implied assumption that internationalisation is responding to globalisation (which is external to internationalisation) and a coping mechanism (as echoed by earlier scholars). Moreover, Larsen (2016) notes that definitions focused around a process imply linear progression and an end point when universities will be sufficiently internationalised. I would add to Larsen’s critique that conceptualising internationalisation as a process, does not allow scholars to envision relational issues of time and space, for example, internationalisation as perhaps moving backwards or becoming more nationally focused, not linear. Furthermore, I would argue that the focus on a process de-emphasises agency, giving the impression that internationalisation is always moving forward and systems are becoming more international, and that this is happening without an actor. Larsen puts forth an alternative definition based on social, network and mobilities theories: ‘internationalization is the expansion of the spatiality of the university beyond borders, through mobilities of students, scholars, knowledge, programs, and providers (2016, p. 10).’ This definition does address some of Larsen’s critiques, however, it raises questions of its own. The focus on ‘expansion’, similar to a ‘process’ also implies that internationalisation could not be contracted/reversed and that it is continually growing, which particularly in the current populist times of Brexit, Erdogan and Trump, may not be the case. The use of the word ‘university’ may not be appropriate around the world, particularly given the large variety of HEIs. There is still little indication of the ‘who’ or source of agency. Also, the focus on ‘students, scholars, knowledge, programs and providers’, excludes other areas which may be internationalising as well, such as funding and governance. Perhaps most
strongly, is the embedded assumption that the university is not already internationalised from its beginning.

Scholars in the second group have proposed definitions to guide the process to more socially beneficial aims. Brandenburg and de Wit (2011) advocate for the ‘end of internationalization’ and refocusing internationalisation on the ends (i.e. rationales and outcomes) as opposed to the process and means. Deardorff (2014) in a similar vein, asks researchers and practitioners to reconsider the ‘why’ behind engagement with mobility. Several scholars developed these ideas into definitions with a focus on outcomes. In a report to the European Parliament on IoHE, de Wit et al. (2015) expanded Knight’s definition to highlight that the process was intentional and that its goal was to ‘enhance the quality of education and research for all students and staff, and to make a meaningful contribution to society’ (p. 283). De Wit et al. (2015) highlights the importance of outcomes of internationalisation and the need to rethink mobility and equality. Yemini (2015) proposes that internationalisation be defined as ‘the process of encouraging integration of multicultural, multilingual, and global dimensions within the education system, with the aim of instilling in learners a sense of global citizenship’ (p. 20). Brandenburg and de Wit (2011), Deardorff (2014), de Wit et al. (2015), and Yemini (2015) reject the ideas that (a) internationalisation should be divorced from outcomes or humanitarian goals; and (b) that internationalisation should be left to economic and political spheres. Rather, they advocate a refocusing of efforts on the positive outcomes that should be developed through internationalisation as a policy tool. These scholars advocate that internationalisation be reconceptualised with the emphasis not on a ‘neutral’, general, definition, but with the positive, equitable and humanistic aims of internationalisation which focus on learners and society. These definitions with associated outcomes – while limiting from an analytical perspective – are important to understand how internationalisation is depicted in the literature. These definitions belay a deep-seated view of internationalisation that it is (or should be) aligned with humanitarian aims. Moreover, it indicates that internationalisation is viewed as driven by considerations of economic profits and national competitiveness goals, in a context of competition over cooperation– and therefore in need of advocacy and refocusing. Thus, through the definitions of internationalisation, the literature promotes an ahistorical, advocacy, and linear view of internationalisation. When considering the Israeli case, these definitions are analytically limiting as I will show throughout this thesis.

Rationales for and enactment of IoHE
Rationales for internationalisation are comprised of the ‘values’ of the numerous stakeholders involved in the process including – students, faculty, institutions, and local, state, and supranational governments and agencies (de Wit, 1995; Knight, 2005). These values are the core issues that shape rationales and these in turn combine to form the expected and desired outcomes of IoHE (Knight, 2005). Rationales for IoHE have been descriptively mapped over the past decades, across individual, institutional, national, regional and global levels (de Wit 1995; Knight 2004; 2015b). The main rationales for internationalisation identified in the literature are academic, socio-cultural, political and economic in nature (de Wit et al., 2015). These correspond to different views on its purposes; the different ways it is enacted; and the different stakeholders involved. The academic rationale is the traditional motive for collaboration which is viewed as intrinsic to academia and linked to enhancing the quality of research and HE provision. It is enacted primarily through academic staff and is particularly linked to the internationalisation of research (Woldegiyorgis et al., 2018). The sociocultural rationales promote internationalisation to enhance mutual understanding, which relates to the internationalisation of the curriculum and also is enacted by academics (Leask, 2015). Political rationales for internationalisation, enacted by governments, are tied to foreign policy and tend to be viewed as a way to garner soft power (e.g. in England, see Lomer, 2017) and world influence (e.g. in China, see Wang, 2014) particularly through mobility programmes, diaspora ‘brain gain’ schemes, government sponsored scholarships, fellowships and research programmes. The economic rationale is either commercial in nature or for the development and support of a national ‘knowledge economy’; these are linked to international student recruitment and fees; institutional mobilities (e.g. branch campuses) and tend to be driven by university administrators/senior management. These rationales are intertwined, mutually inclusive and at times in tension. For example, Marginson (2006) argues that the academic rationale has been co-opted to the pursuit of the ‘global knowledge economy’ to support the global competitiveness of nations. Thus, while the internationalisation of research may promote the advancement of science and better quality HE provision, it also serves the economic development and political agendas of nations. These latter national considerations are often overshadowed in the literature by normative, aspirational discourses surrounding internationalisation of humanitarianism, mutual understanding, development, and global citizenship.

Dominant rationales have shifted over the years from espoused humanitarian ideas associated with peace and reconciliation in the post-war period, to a development agenda associated with political motives during the Cold War, and now increasingly with a focus on its economic and commercial potential (de Wit, 2002; Knight, 2015b). However, Guo and Guo
van de Wende (1997a) and Qiang (2003) argue that the primary shift in recent years was actually from political to economic motives, as the peace and mutual understanding rationale after WWII and the development rationale during the Cold War, were motivated by foreign policy and clear political rationales. Yeravdekar and Tiwari (2017) write of the ‘economics-driven’ approach which they view is of increasing importance and relates to ‘the contribution that internationalisation makes to regional economies and to the enhancement of a country’s ‘soft’ power...the enhancement of corporate competitiveness and comparative skill formation’ (p. 51). Taylor (2010) views the drive for internationalisation as ‘a response motivated by income and employment, skills requirements, quality of life and wider social values, and international competitiveness’ (p. 87). While Altbach and Knight (2007) argue that the primary rationales pushing forward IoHE are the profit motive in predominantly Western, Global North countries (based on international student fees) and the access/capacity building motive in Global South countries (to develop national economies). I argue that disentangling the political from the economic is increasingly difficult; indeed, much of the economic rationale is built on neoliberal ideas and reforms, which is itself a political project.

This shift of rationales in the literature, from the political to the economic, is linked to a shift in the late 1990s – corresponding to the fall of the Soviet Union and the global rise of neoliberalism – to international students (both at home and abroad) serving as important sources of revenue for many HEIs in the West. This economic rationale, which has fuelled the growth of internationalisation in the West, is now portrayed as a universal phenomenon (Chankseliani, 2018; Larsen, 2016). During this period, scholars argue that neoliberalism had become inextricably linked to the internationalisation of HE (Marginson, 2000; Shields, 2013); and indeed, the terms ‘internationalisation’ and ‘neoliberalism’ emerged into the lexicon of education discourse (de Wit, 2002; Rowlands & Rawolle, 2013) simultaneously in the early 1990s. The economic rationale is now portrayed as the driving force behind internationalisation on all levels: nations in a bid for the wider economic benefits of an influx of overseas students and skilled immigration to drive competition in the ‘global knowledge economy’ (Lomer, 2017; Trilokekar, 2010); institutions in pursuit of financial revenues, international branding, reputation and global rankings (Knight, 2015b); and students in the pursuit of the cosmopolitan capital that is perceived to increase access and opportunity in local and global labour markets (Aktas et al., 2017; Bamberger et al., 2019; Kratz & Netz, 2018). Critical scholarship is beginning to challenge these ‘grand narratives’ built around competition, rational choice and cost/benefit calculations (e.g. Bamberger, 2019; Marginson, 2017; Tran, 2016) however, this view is still widespread in the literature.

Yet even while economic rationales have become increasingly hegemonic, humanitarian values are widely stressed in internationalisation scholarship, as previously
noted in regard to some scholars’ efforts to define ‘internationalisation.’ Internationalisation is widely depicted as a positive response to destructive forms of globalisation and the progressive, humanistic possibilities of internationalisation are often stressed, especially mutual understanding; diversity; intercultural awareness, global citizenship and tolerance (Haigh, 2008; Yemini, 2015). Broadly, this humanitarian approach indicates a more holistic view of the individual; it emphasises cooperation over competition, fostering a more collaborative and communal approach (Bennett & Kottasz, 2011; Marginson & van der Wende, 2007). Further, it is associated with democracy (Svensson & Wihlborg, 2007) and consensus building while simultaneously downplaying ethnic and religious links in favour of a shared humanity. This humanitarian framing of internationalisation is reflected in the positive terms it is associated with (e.g. global citizenship; cosmopolitanism) (Goren & Yemini, 2017). Indeed, in a recent large-scale study on the state of internationalisation research in top HE journals, Mwangi et al. (2018) argue that internationalisation is widely viewed as a positive force. Thus, while scholars suggest that in recent years, internationalisation has become increasingly aligned with economic and commercial motives which internalise neoliberal categories and assumptions, it has maintained a strong connection to other rationales and ideas, particularly positive views of human connectivity and humanitarianism. Bamberger, Morris and Yemini (2019) argue that this framing reflects a complex entanglement of neoliberal categories and assumptions with other, primarily progressive humanitarian ideals. They further argue that this framing allows neoliberal practices and political projects to be advanced through the discourse of internationalisation and its association with progressive humanitarian values.

In line with the shift of rationales to the economic, scholars argue that the enactment of IoHE has moved from a cooperative approach, to a competitive one (Enders, 2004; Knight, 2013). Scholars have also noted the coordinated nature and centrality of internationalisation in HEIs today as opposed to a more peripheral role in earlier times, causing Teichler (1999) to describe internationalisation as becoming integrated into the core of university functions and Hudzik (2015) to address ‘comprehensive internationalisation.’ Marginson (2013) notes that, ‘during the 1990s, the global dimension moved inwards from the periphery of strategic vision in HE. It moved from being a main item only in research and knowledge, to a key external factor that required a central strategic response’ (p. xv) Thus, IoHE is increasingly regarded as a strategic process, expanding across the university, which is undertaken chiefly for competitive purposes.

There are many ways to enact IoHE and Knight (2008) has descriptively mapped academic and organisational initiatives; and policies and programmes at the sectoral, national, regional and supranational level. Academic initiatives include student mobility, research collaborations, Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs), dual or joint degrees, distance
learning, and branch campuses; while organisational initiatives include student and faculty international support services, support for sabbaticals and international faculty cooperation, the integration of international ideals in mandates and missions at the institutional level. Policies and programmes at the sectoral, national, regional, and supranational levels are portrayed as increasingly important. At the sectoral level, these include funding mechanisms, accreditation or regulation. Funding mechanisms have played a large part in setting the incentives for internationalisation in many (mainly Western) national contexts, through decreasing central government funding and increasing the fee structure for international students (e.g. England, Australia). At the national level, this includes policies from many branches of government including immigration, economic, scientific, cultural, and foreign affairs departments. In recent years, national bodies have created brands for the HE sector, aimed at attracting international students (e.g. Lomer et al., 2018; Stein, 2018). Immigration policy has played a particularly important role in recent years as the possibility of immigration after studies is attractive for international students and serves as a way to facilitate skilled migration (Choudaha & de Wit, 2014). Likewise, national programmes to encourage the return of diaspora academics and scientists have grown as competition for skilled workers has increased (Welch & Hao, 2016). At the regional level, this could be standards and integration policies (e.g. Bologna Process) and mobility and research programmes (e.g. Erasmus +, Horizon 2020). Globally, supranational agencies (e.g. WTO, World Bank, UNESCO, OECD) develop policies (e.g. GATS, Guidelines for Quality Provision in Cross-border HE) and programmes (e.g. HE for the XXI Century Project, HE Sustainability Initiative), in line with their organisational interests and missions (e.g. economic stability and development; political stability; cultural exchange; economic advancement) that shape national HE systems. While these missions were once more diverse, recent scholarship reveals a shift towards neoliberal agendas even in supranational organisations who are formally aligned with more humanistic values: even UNESCO, has embraced OECD, economic rhetoric in their new Sustainable Development Goals (Auld & Morris, 2019). Overall, the academic and organisational initiatives, coupled with policies and programmes across levels represent the forms and strategies of IoHE, setting the framework, incentives and defining the possibilities of internationalisation.

The literature emphasises that the enactment of IoHE is driven by the values, rationales, intended outcomes, history, culture, and resources available and HEIs and nations employ different strategies and have different forms of internationalisation (Ayoubi & Massoud, 2007; Maringe, 2010; Taylor, 2004). However, aligning with the profit motive, a dominant focus on international student recruitment and mobility has developed in the literature (Proctor, 2015; Streitwieser, 2014). Indeed, Buckner and Stein (2019) in a recent study of the three main
international HE professional bodies, argue that ‘internationalisation’ for these bodies, focuses on international students, student and scholarly mobility, and curricular change. This is part of an increasing critical scholarship that recognises and critiques the centrality of mobility in internationalisation literature (and practice), analyses the embedded sociological structures which limit mobility (e.g. gender, class, race, see: Larsen, 2016; Morley et al., 2018; Stockfelt, 2018), and draws attention to enduring colonial legacies or forms of ‘neo-colonialism’ that affect the uneven geographies of international student and academic mobility (e.g. Fahey & Kenway, 2010; Stein & Andreotti, 2016). Likewise, competitive rationales at the institutional and national levels have put increasing focus on enactment of IoHE through elite research collaborations and knowledge production activities, connected with the rise of international rankings, and the perceived importance of the university in driving knowledge economies. Meanwhile, ‘internationalisation at home’ activities – which usually do not carry the same economic and political incentives – tend to be overlooked and shrouded in advocacy (Rizvi, 2007; Brandenburg & de Wit, 2011). Scholars adopting post-colonial perspectives link this lack of engagement with domestic internationalisation with ‘epistemic violence’ and have spurred calls to ‘decolonise’ the curriculum and university (Stein, 2017). Thus, Marginson argues internationalisation strategies ‘are designed to make systems and institutions more globally engaged and competitive’ (2013, p. xiv-xv) and Bamberger, Morris, Weinreb and Yemini (2019) argue that its enactment is portrayed as a strategic (economic) action by nations competing in the ‘global knowledge economy;’ and universities competing in the global market of HEIs with the assumption of few constraints and a great deal of autonomy (e.g. Hudzik, 2015).

These portrayals of the rationales and enactment of IoHE have several shortcomings. First, a focus on the economic rationale de-politicises internationalisation, portraying it as an aspect of the global economic race, based around a ‘neutral’ market, with ‘objective’ indicators. Despite its linkages to neo-colonialism, inequalities and Western values; Buckner and Stein (2019) and Morley et al. (2018) argue that internationalisation continues to be presented as an ideologically neutral, and normalised intervention which is often portrayed as an ‘unconditional good’ (p. 538). Second, the focus on global competition, marginalises other aims of internationalisation, propagating the view that universities are ‘disembedded’ from local and national needs and governance structures (e.g. Beerkens, 2004); thus, the rationales for internationalisation domestically are ignored or underdeveloped. Third, despite the multiplicity of rationales for and manifestations of internationalisation that are enacted by different actors, the relationship between these areas and how they may work together or in opposition is also under investigated. Fourth, despite the recognition of the importance of ‘values’ in analysing the rationales for IoHE, very little scholarship has focused on values
outside of the (Western) neoliberal/humanitarian nexus. Thus, Bamberger, Morris and Yemini (2019) suggest that the progressive neoliberal framing of internationalisation limits understanding of IoHE in diverse contexts. Indeed, Israel, with comparatively low student mobility, and many scholarships available for different types of international students, does not appear to fit the dominant mobility theme. Israel has several top research institutions and, at least currently if not always, has enough (even excess) capacity to train its highly educated population (although many do go abroad, see Arar & Haj-Yehia, 2010; Marginson & van der Wende, 2007). Moreover, the rationales for internationalisation, both historical and contemporary, does not fit easily into the widespread rationales, or enactment of IoHE over time. Peace and mutual understanding, development aid, capacity building, or economic profits do not appear to be driving IoHE in Israel.

**Models**

Broadly speaking, there are two models of internationalisation available in the literature: first, country-specific or region-specific models which tend to represent one dominant rationale for internationalisation and are deeply embedded in national aims, ideologies and identities; and second, general ideal models of ‘international’ universities and institutions. While numerous countries have been explored, some widespread examples from the literature which represent diverse rationales and enactment strategies include Australia, United Kingdom (UK), Canada, United Arab Emirates (UAE), China and Cuba. While Australia was traditionally motivated by development and aid, since the 1980s and the dawn of globalisation, it is now portrayed as a commercial model of internationalisation with an emphasis shifting from ‘aid’ to ‘trade’ (Back and Davis, 1995, p. 147). This shifting emphasis of HE as an export commodity largely focuses on international student recruitment (Harman, 2005).

The UK, as a former imperial power, was active in developing HE systems throughout its empire, and at the end of colonialism, had a strong development and aid rationale. However, in recent years, the UK has moved to a commercial model based on international student recruitment which De Vita and Case (2003) argue ‘reconfigures them [international students] in such a way that they become part of a calculative cash nexus’ (p. 385). Lomer (2017) likewise links this strategy to a desire to foster soft power among international students. To these ends, the UK has extended its marketing and recruitment activities at both the national (e.g. through its national brand ‘Britain is GREAT,’ see Lomer et al., 2018) and institutional levels. UK universities have likewise expanded overseas provision, primarily through exporting academic programmes (and branch campuses) to countries which
(ostensibly) lack local capacity (see Bamberger, 2018; Lieven & Martin, 2006). Critical scholars have linked these strategies to a form of ‘neo-colonialism’ in which the UK trades on its cultural capital and advantages accumulated during the colonial era to perpetuate its domination in the international market of higher education (e.g. Ploner & Nada, 2019).

International efforts in Canada were historically seen as driven by ‘a traditional Canadian ethos and soft power policy of anti-imperialism and a need for a just and equitable world order’ (Trilokekar, 2010, p. 144). However, this has been changing and in 1995 Knight identified the top rationale for internationalisation as the preparation of graduates who are interculturally competent for a globalised world. More recently, Canadian internationalisation has been linked with aims of a more economic nature, through a strategy of international student recruitment, particularly designed to attract ‘top talent’ in a bid for global economic competitiveness (Trilokekar, 2010). Stein (2018) argues that this drive for more international students has spurred Canada’s new Edubrand which she argues is based in national exceptionalism and whitewashes its settler colonial past and present.

The UAE has adopted a hub design model of internationalisation, creating university cities, mainly populated by Western universities that aim to attract students from all over the region. Knight (2014) notes that ‘the development of human talent is arguably the strongest rationale driving the development of UAE’ (p. 66). The UAE aims to develop a skilled workforce, spur tourism and increase local HE capacity, largely in a move to diversify their economy away from oil. More recently, Rensimer (2020) has argued that this hub design provides HE for immobile people (i.e. foreign workers) and helps to ‘keep bodies in place’ (and working) without providing citizenship.

Cuba focuses on a socialist form of internationalisation and has a history of providing free tertiary education opportunities to youth from other socialist countries (Hickling-Hudson and Arnove, 2014). It is described as a socialist-ideological model with origins in the relations between the country and the Soviet bloc and which Hickling-Hudson and Arnove (2014) single out as a model of South-South cooperation.

Regional models of internationalisation have likewise been developed. The Confucian model, identified by Marginson (2011), addresses primarily China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR), South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and Singapore. These countries efforts are heavily directed by the state and have focused on internationalisation to develop their economies and global competitiveness. Strategies employed include alliances with top universities in the West; encouraging the return of diaspora academics and scientists; actively recruiting foreign academics and international students; and expanding research capacity through recruitment of science and engineering students (Paul & Long, 2016).
Several books have been published which describe regional or multi-country models of internationalisation, largely based on a conceptual framework of rationales, strategies, programmes, policies and some contextual and historical information. These books tend to present individual country analyses which are then compared in a concluding chapter, often with policy recommendations and implications for practitioners. Some regions explored using this format include: Africa (Teferra & Knight, 2008) which focuses on internationalisation as a means to improve human resource development and increased research capacity; Latin America (de Wit et al., 2005) which stresses nation-building and hopes to improve the position of the region in the ‘global knowledge economy’; and Asia Pacific (Knight & de Wit, 1997) which in addition to the strong economic development and political rationales for national competitiveness, identifies the possibility of building national identity and indigenous languages into the curriculum, taking back power in a post-colonial context. In similar frameworks, de Wit (1995) put forth an analysis of Australia, Canada, Europe, and the USA and in 2002, and an historical development and comparison of internationalisation in the USA and Europe. De Wit (2002) emphasises differences in internationalisation developments based primarily on educational systems and structures and national cultural differences. In his analysis, the USA operates a decentralised system, with greater private funding, and has more political rationales for internationalisation stemming back to the Cold War. Europe in contrast, is more centralised, dependent on national or supranational funding, and is driven by a desire for European economic competition and academic quality.

Models of international universities have also been developed. Mohrman, Ma and Baker (2008) describe an emerging global model (EGM) of the research university; they assign eight characteristics to this elite group of institutions: global mission, increasing intensity of knowledge production, changes in the academic profession, diversified funding, shifting relationships among universities and government, business, and society; worldwide recruitment; increasing complexity of university organisation; and global collaboration. The EGM is associated with expanding demand for HE, privatisation, globalisation, competition, and the knowledge economy. This model emphasises weakening state control; while providing practical measures and reflective questions for developing such a university.

Knight (2015a) introduces three generic models of international universities: classic, satellite, and internationally co-founded universities. Classic models, the most common models, entail international partnerships and activities both at home and abroad. Satellite models have a larger presence abroad and the main feature is ‘that the university has strategically planned and developed a series of research, teaching, or management offices in targeted countries around the world’ (p. 111). This would include branch campuses, recruitment and fundraising offices abroad, and alumni support among others. Co-founded
models are new institutions located in a home country but developed through international collaboration. While some flexibility is acknowledged, these models are a continuum with classic models representing the first and most common phase of internationalisation begun in the last three or four decades and the co-founded models the newest and least common. This model reflects a particular historical trajectory of internationalisation, which tends to align with Western timelines and enactment of internationalisation.

While there is an emerging critical turn in internationalisation studies, it is notable that many of these models move between the descriptive and the prescriptive. While they provide an idea as to some of the variety of rationales, strategies and enactments of internationalisation that exist, they do little to explain why a given nation or institution pursues internationalisation in the way that it does, at a particular period. Thus, these models provide more description, as opposed to explanation. Moreover, they hold little explanatory or descriptive power in the Israeli context. Israel has always had an international element in its HE system. While Israel recruits international students, this is on a relatively small scale and a commercial driver cannot be said to define it. A broader sense of multiculturalism, peace initiatives, or aid are equally unhelpful in locating the Israeli model. Furthermore, capacity or quality building cannot be primary motivators as several high quality HEIs exist in Israel and there is currently (if not always, see Volansky, 2005) sufficient capacity.

**Portrayals of internationalisation: A critical analysis**

Important limitations to the literature abound in several respects. First, the rationales as depicted in the literature do not seem to conceptualise the Israeli situation well. The predominance of the economic rationale and associated commercial models of ISM does not appear to be driving Israeli internationalisation; nor does the desire for increased human resource capacity, multiculturalism, cultural exchange or development aid. Furthermore, the values (and actors) that shape the rationales of internationalisation have been underdeveloped, as the literature tends to focus on describing (i.e. mapping), rather than explaining rationales. Thus, while scholars note the centrality of rationales, and generic models have been created to map these differing rationales, the conceptual and empirical work tends to ignore how these rationales are formed and through which forces and actors; with a significant reliance on ‘globalisation’ as explanation. The rationales and their movement over time have largely been generalised from the ‘West’ to the ‘Rest’ and complex local
histories, cultures, relationships and conditions - resulting in significant variations of internationalisation – underdeveloped.

Second, while there is recognition of a wide range of variation and particularity, internationalisation models and research tend to be descriptive or prescriptive and do little to advance our thinking. This makes it difficult to understand the forces shaping internationalisation and limits our powers not only to observe changes but also to explain them.

Third, while scholars recognise that universities have long been international, there is a tendency towards an ahistorical perspective when addressing contemporary internationalisation, often linked to globalisation as a recent phenomenon. Currently internationalisation tends to be depicted as intense with novel approaches and a centrality that marks it as fundamentally different than what was before. This emphasis has resulted in a loss of connection between the earlier international dimension of universities and the present, hindering explanation of the ways in which IoHE is changing and its explanatory mechanisms. Furthermore, the widespread historical accounts of the development of the IoHE are largely Western in nature. Can it be said that Israel in the post-World War II period – newly established, fighting an existential war, and reeling from the Holocaust – was interested in pursuing international activities in HE for reasons of peace and mutual understanding? The widespread historical accounts of IoHE are largely Western in nature, however, surely, other nations were affected by the same events (e.g. WWII) in different ways and also by their own domestic development, histories, cultures, economics and politics. Thus, the extent to which IoHE outside of the West can be explained by the literature is currently limited, and more empirical work in diverse contexts needed.

Fourth, much of the academic literature on internationalisation is aimed at practitioners or policy makers. It may be written in cooperation with the World Bank, UNESCO, or OECD, and tends to focus on recommendations and often carries an advocacy tone. A notable example is Altbach and Salmi’s (2011) influential book, sponsored by the World Bank. This book views internationalisation as one of the key factors in creating ‘World Class Universities,’ as judged by global university rankings, that likewise, consider internationalisation as a key indicator of prestige/quality. Thus, internationalisation as portrayed in this book, is a normative intervention, aimed at making the university more globally competitive, through diverse strategies (e.g. the recruitment of ‘talented’ researchers and students; elite research coalitions). This approach – while important for policymakers, administrators, and practitioners – is analytically limiting. Kehm (2011) in her analysis of the field of internationalisation notes that ‘the focus on descriptive trends for practical policy solutions and advocacy limits the scope for academic inquiry’ and ‘a large segment of studies is so pragmatic and so much driven by
practical concerns that we cannot easily identify a well-established field demarcated by a certain degree of quality’ (p. 237). Kehm (2011) goes further in her critique and notes that ‘many analyses on the international dimensions of HE are so much driven by the authors normative assumptions that they hardly offer any enlightenment to persons not sharing this normative umbrella’ (p. 237). Thus, research from an analytical perspective, which breaks this cycle of normative thinking, advocacy and policy recommendations is needed to understand internationalisation in diverse contexts.

Fifth, much of the literature, in line with the disconnection from its historical roots, depicts internationalisation as a reactionary and defensive measure to cope with globalisation. Internationalisation is viewed as undermining state sovereignty and bringing on convergence in universities around a world system (e.g. Bentley & Kyvik, 2012; Marginson, 2008). It is also a key indicator of global university rankings which have become an increasingly ‘high stakes’ game in which nations, universities and individuals cannot be seen to be outside of without dire consequences (e.g. Altbach & Salmi, 2011). While there is certainly an element of this, is it true that worldwide HE is converging around common rationales, values, strategies, models and world class universities which are hyper international? Clearly the diversity of responses to internationalisation as demonstrated in internationalisation models would undermine this idea, but how can we explain why some areas are converging, others are not, and the resulting variations which appear? Are there actors who have been neglected in internationalisation research? What might be alternative lenses that could throw light on the organising concepts of IoHE – outside of neoliberalism and humanitarianism? Echoing the calls for further empirical research of internationalisation in diverse cases (de Wit et. al, 2017) and research based in a global approach (Acharya, 2015, 2017), I argue that an in-depth analysis of Israel may shed light on these issues.

2.2. Internationalisation in Israeli HE

Thus far, I have argued that Israel is not well understood through the widespread portrayals in the internationalisation literature. Building on this, I critically analyse understandings of Israeli internationalisation in the literature. In this way, I develop an alternative approach to examine and possibly explain internationalisation in the Israeli case.

‘Internationalisation’ as a topic of scholarship in Israel has only gradually emerged over the past decade and studies are limited. Indeed, Yemini (2017) suggests that internationalisation is not prominent in the policy discourse in Israeli HE. While rationales such as peace-making and multiculturalism are connected to internationalisation, Yemini (2017)
argues that in Israel, these rationales are minimised due to the intractable Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Rather, the multi-cultural purposes of internationalisation instead focus on relations between majority/minority populations within the state (Yemini et al, 2015) and are particularly evident in second-tier institutions which comprise academic and education colleges. Thus, depending on the size, location, disciplines and student composition, colleges focus on internationalisation to retain academic staff and compete with universities, prepare students for the ‘global knowledge economy,’ and to foster inter-group relations within their diverse student populations (de Wit et al, 2015; Yemini et al., 2015). This represents a divergent focus from the prevalent ‘excellence’ rhetoric of most Israeli universities, the elite, top-tier in a purposefully stratified HE system (Yemini, 2017; Yogev, 2000). Given the restricted discourse around internationalisation viewed as primarily due to the conflict, internationalisation is associated with ‘excellence’ particularly among the research-intensive universities. In line with a rationale of ‘excellence,’ universities enact internationalisation primarily through research collaborations with other elite institutions. Thus, the universities are characterised by a much greater emphasis on research with impressive performance on global quality metrics including international research funding, publication, and citation rankings (Marginson, 2006) with less emphasis on student mobility than is common in other OECD and EU countries (Maoz, 2016). Mobility is limited due to the unpredictable security situation; regulations which restrict movement and possibilities for cooperation both among groups in Israel and across the region; Hebrew as the primary language of instruction; and the founding values of the State as the Jewish nation which limits who may live, work and immigrate to the country (Bamberger et al., 2019). Due in large part to limited mobility, financial incentives for internationalisation, while perhaps growing in recent years with the continual addition of English-language academic programmes, are still small scale. Thus, Israeli internationalisation scholarship focuses particularly on the restricted discourse around acceptable purposes for internationalisation, and limitations on mobility, compared to the rest of the world, connecting these limitations to the intractable conflict and to academic excellence associated with research at Israeli universities (Yemini, 2017). Thus, if a ‘model’ of Israeli internationalisation would be built from the literature, it would emphasise the limits on mobility, academic ‘excellence’ and competitive rationales at the level of the first-tier institutions, which enact internationalisation through research, while emphasising the desire to compete locally with universities for staff and students and to promote inter-group relations amongst second-tier institutions.

While this model as portrayed in the literature certainly holds some descriptive power, it is insufficient to explain IoHE in Israel. Explanations (some implicit, others explicit) for the patterns described above rely heavily on a) the Israeli-Palestinian conflict b) neoliberal forces effecting the university such as rankings, pressures for (measurable) academic ‘outputs,’
competition, and preparation of students for the ‘global knowledge economy’, and c), the role of the State or its national regulators (i.e. CHE) that have purposefully created a differentiated and stratified HE system between its elite (universities) and mass (academic colleges) HEIs. This portrayal has several shortcomings.

First, the focus on restricted mobility, limits understanding of the mobility which does take place. Thus, while certain types of mobility are restricted in the region due to the conflict, other mobilities are actively fostered for diverse reasons. For example, mobility amongst Israeli researchers, particularly in elite universities, is encouraged (to other top-tier institutions or with renowned researchers) through generous national funding for sabbaticals and attendance at international research conferences (Bamberger et al., 2019). Moreover, despite having low levels of student mobility, it still exists. Literature in the fields of Diaspora, Jewish Education and Tourist Studies, reveals that incoming student mobility to Israeli HEIs over time has tended to be Jewish students, who are drawn to Israel by virtue of their ethnoreligious connection (e.g. Donitsa-Schmidt & Vadish, 2005; Cohen, 2003; Herman, 1970). For example, Herman’s (1970) study of the one-year study abroad programme of HU (a first-tier research University) emphasises that academic issues were not of importance to this group, rather most were motivated to study in the programme to connect to Israel and the Israeli people as a country and a people to which they felt a connection by virtue of their Jewish identity. In different forms, elements of this argument have been echoed in other studies over time (Bamberger, 2019; Ben Tsur, 2007; Cohen, 2003). Thus, it appears that student mobility in Israel is strongly connected to Diaspora relations, however, the role of diaspora in ISM is not well incorporated into either the Israeli literature of internationalisation or the broader internationalisation literature (see section 2.3). This suggests that mobility in the Israeli case has over time been used for different purposes and developed in different ways than those propagated in the literature.

Second, the Israeli model propagated in the literature strongly focuses on enactment of internationalisation through research, tied to a focus on ‘excellence’, which is in turn portrayed as an inevitable side-effect of the limited discourses around internationalisation due to the conflict, and the increasing pressures of neoliberal policies and practices in HE. Yet, this focus on ‘excellence’ and research, is not an inevitable consequence of conflict and many other countries with conflict do not necessarily share this emphasis. Thus, the conflict and neoliberal and competitive shifts in global HE does not equate to an inevitable focus on ‘excellence’ and underplays the deeper values and purposes associated with IoHE. Moreover, Cohen’s (2006) study on the formation of the Hebrew University, Israel’s first comprehensive university, highlights the importance of ‘excellence’ in research in the early 20th century, long before the conflict had – at least officially - erupted and well before the rise of neoliberal
pressures on HE. Cohen (2006) related this to the prominent role the Jewish Diaspora played in the pre-State period in funding and governing the University and the connection between ‘excellence’ in academia and a long-held self-identity of Jews in the diaspora as an educated people, or ‘people of the book’. Thus, the antecedents of contemporary internationalisation may shed light on the ‘excellence’ rhetoric which may hold greater explanatory power for this contemporary feature of IoHE in Israel, than tropes of ‘the global knowledge economy’.

Third, the focus on ‘excellence’ enacted through research and elite partnerships, implicitly frames the internationalisation which does take place, as a combination of academic and competitive rationales. Thus, it de-emphasises political rationales would could be connected to these activities and instead the role of the political in internationalisation is limited to what is not done (i.e. regional mobility, because of the conflict) and not on what is done (e.g. strategic partnerships, in spite of the conflict). This is not to downplay the importance of ‘the conflict’ (see Trahar, 2017) in shaping all aspects of Israeli life; rather I argue that this exclusive focus on the conflict obscures how the political, beyond and in conjunction with the conflict, effects the practice of IoHE (e.g. partnerships with which nations; funding from which sources). It likewise obscures other rationales which may be relevant in this case, particularly the rationales of diaspora Jews to attend Israeli universities.

Fourth, most of the research on Israel echoes the wider portrayals of internationalisation as a contemporary phenomenon linked to globalisation and does not take an historical approach (e.g. Yemini et al., 2015; Yemini & Gilady, 2015). As previously discussed, relating to ISM and ‘excellence’ in Israeli HE, it appears that there are important antecedents to contemporary Israeli internationalisation, which are not adequately explained by analyses which rely on conflict, academic excellence and competition as organising concepts – and which furthermore, do not align with the widespread (stated) rationales for economic/commercial aims in the contemporary period. The oldest universities (and some of the most elite institutions until today) were founded in partnership with Diaspora Jewry and the Zionist movement decades before the State (Cohen, 2006a; Lavsky, 1997). Historians of Israeli HE indicate the important role the Jewish Diaspora has played and continues to play in developing HE in Israel, particularly in its funding and governance (e.g. Cohen, 2006b; Cohen & Sapir, 2016; Lavsky, 1997, 2005; Troen, 1992). Academic scholarship from other fields also points to the historical and contemporary role of Diaspora in shaping Israeli society (e.g. as an ‘innovation economy’, Drori, 2013). However, scholars have not connected this relationship and its development over time to internationalisation. Thus, the literature on Israeli IoHE has largely ignored the antecedents of contemporary internationalisation in Israel, the rich university histories and diaspora scholarship, and instead has employed a contemporary lens, based largely on the organising concepts of the conflict and neoliberalism/globalisation. To
better understand this aspect, it is important to analyse what is known about Diaspora and its relationship to HE and internationalisation.

2.3 Diaspora and IoHE

The increased movement of people coupled with the rise of communications technology has made it possible for ever larger groups of people to maintain contact with their homelands (and transnational groups) over vast distances (Cohen, 2008). Historically, the term ‘diaspora’ referred to the dispersion of the Jewish people from the land of ancient Israel; and has been adopted to analyse dispersions of other peoples, notably the Greek, Armenian and African diasporas (Butler, 2001; Tölölyan, 1996). However, in contemporary times, the term has been imbued with a certain amount of ‘sexiness’ (Butler, 2001, p. 9) and is used widely by academics across disciplines, policymakers, and national and supra-national institutions (Aguilar, 2015; Brubaker, 2005). I argue that this reflects a shift from ‘diaspora’ as a pejorative term referring to the tragic expulsion from a ‘homeland’, denoting a circumspect and marginalised social group in ‘hostlands’ (or from the view of the State as deserter or traitors see Gamlen et al. 2013); to a positive term in which hybrid identities and international global social capital is prized. However, some of the pejorative connotations may be resurfacing, in response to rising populism, and diaspora participation in terror and armed conflicts.

In contemporary times, the term ‘diaspora’ has come to encompass vast and diverse groups of people who claim a tie to both ‘their’ homelands and hostlands1 including highly-skilled migrants; refugees; expatriates; and religious and ethnic minorities amongst others. While there is considerable debate about what (e.g. forms of dispersion; relations with hostlands; cultures created) and who (e.g. individuals, the group, homeland/hostlands) defines a diaspora in contrast to other terms such as ‘immigrants,’ the term diaspora alludes to hybrid identities, allegiances and cultural practices (Brubaker, 2005). Moreover, Dufoix (2008) argues that ‘diaspora’ encompasses an emotional dimension and is much more inclusive than these other terms ‘for it keeps the idea alive that the nation is a family and that distance does not really matter.’ (p. 1372).

There are many different definitions, typologies and conceptualisations of diasporas and the past decades have witnessed an explosion in diaspora scholarship. Diaspora scholars invariably emphasise three primary features: 1) Dispersion, the dispersion (traumatic or not)

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1 The concepts of ‘homeland’ and ‘hostland’ are not fixed, singular or mutually exclusive entities. They rather serve as a conceptual device to understand shifting senses of belonging or allegiances.
of a people from a homeland; 2) Homeland Orientation, the real or imagined ‘homeland’ as a
source of value, identity, and loyalty; and 3) Boundary Maintenance, the preservation of a
distinctive identity vis-à-vis host land(s) (Brubaker, 2005, p. 5-6). Scholars across disciplines
have debated the nature of diaspora – e.g. Appadurai’s (1990) concept ‘ethnoscapes’ as
contributing to ‘disjunctures’ in both global and national cultural political economy, and
Bhabha’s (1994) concepts of hybridity and third space – and have conceptualised it myriad
ways. Diaspora is viewed alternatively as a noun which emphasises collectivity or a condition
diasporicity); as a process (diasporisation) of constantly negotiated construction of diaspora
identities, communities and relationships (Abramson, 2017; Mavroudi, 2007; Laruelle, 2007;
Ragazzi, 2009); as a social form, type of consciousness, and mode of cultural production
(Vertevec, 1997); as a category of practice (Brubaker, 2005); as a field of study (diasporology);
and as an attribute (diasporic, as in diasporic citizenship [Laguerre, 2016], cultures [Dawson,
2018]) and identities (Dwyer, 2000). Broadly speaking, diaspora scholarship can be
approached from two perspectives: essentialist or constructivist/post-modernist (i.e. Mavroudi
[2007] styles ‘bounded’ and ‘unbounded’ approaches). These two approaches are often
classified as between scholars who focus on ‘roots’ and those who focus on ‘routes’
(Mavroudi, 2007; Alexander, 2017).

Essentialist approaches take for granted the existence of diasporas, often viewing
them as natural, primordial and perpetual. This approach is associated with the traditional
notion of diaspora, and often revolves around defining, categorising and mapping (e.g. Cohen,
2008; Safran, 1991). This type of scholarship is critiqued for reflecting homogenising
discourses of ‘the’ diaspora (e.g. around nation, state, ethnicity) and for its static view of social
reality. Constructivist/post-modernist approaches view diaspora as a social identity, which is
always in the process of becoming, that can be created, dissolved, mobilised, hybridised and
that moves over time and space (e.g. Gilroy, 1993, 1997; Hall, 1990); it is often associated
with a focus on individual or collective agency. This approach has been critiqued for its loose
conceptualisation of ‘diaspora’; for its focus on agency and neglect of social structures which
can at times echo rationalist discourses (see Vertevec, 1997); and for its inattentiveness to
history (Alexander, 2017). These two approaches, belay different perspectives on what
diaspora is, how it can be studied and used as an explanatory device. For example, an
essentialist approach to diaspora policy in HE, begins with the assumption that there is such
a thing as the (homogenous) diaspora, and that the policy addresses it. A constructivist/post-
modern approach might analyse how/when/by whom ‘diaspora’ is invoked in such policies to
understand how the policy discursively creates the thing that it purports to address (Dufoix,
2008).
Echoing Alexander (2017), I argue that diaspora scholarship requires an approach that encompasses both roots and routes. Historical scholarship of diaspora has for too long been associated with an essentialising tendency, to investigate the historical and social contexts of groups, while taking them (often implicitly) as natural entities. In contrast, social sciences, particularly sociologists and anthropologists, focus on contemporary identity formations and ‘performances’, often excluding understanding of important historical antecedents that shape contemporary collective identities and practices. Thus, Alexander (2017) argues for (and employs in her work, see Alexander, Chatterji & Jalais, 2016) a synthesis of these approaches which recognises both the historical antecedents, and the socially constructed nature of diaspora identity and practice. This approach anchors studies of diaspora movement, identity creation, shift and perpetuation in the historical contexts and relations which so often shape it, shedding important light on ‘diaspora’ as an explanatory socio-political concept.

Despite the growing phenomenon of diaspora formations and the rich debates and literature in other fields, there has been rather less research on the complex relationship between diaspora and HE, and particularly scholarship around internationalisation. The proliferation of diasporas linked with increasing academic and student mobility/migration has contributed to shaping the contemporary diasporic conditions in many (internationalising and diasporising) national HE systems. Diasporas have also been the subject of increasing awareness of States, particularly their potential roles in internationalising national higher education systems and knowledge production. In the past decade, China, Israel, India and South Korea have initiated policies to strengthen relationships with ‘their’ diasporas in strategic ways through HE. This growing trend connects national and institutional internationalisation strategies, with mobile academics and students.

Existing HE research tends to focus on a narrow instrumental role of highly-skilled diasporas in fuelling knowledge economies and issues such as ‘brain drain, gain and circulation.’ This scholarship focuses on state diaspora engagement policies, which aim to harness ‘their’ particularly ‘talented’ knowledge diasporas for national development (e.g. Cai, 2012); employability and recruitment strategies of returning ‘knowledge diaspora’ (e.g. Hao & Welch, 2012); knowledge diasporas as links to homeland development and innovation (e.g. Welch & Jie, 2013); and issues of return migration (e.g. Hao et al., 2017; Tharenou & Seet, 2014). While there are some differences in these narratives in the literature over time and space (e.g. African diaspora studies tend to emphasise development and volunteerism in the spirit of lifting the continent out of poverty, while studies focusing on China once emphasised balancing inequalities in global knowledge production, but now focus more on global competition), much of this research is aimed at ‘best practices,’ assumes that ‘diaspora’ exists
as a natural and essentialised group, that it is loyal to the state, this it is a national advantage, and that it is something that can be (strategically) steered/dominated by the state.

This ‘knowledge diaspora,’ defined as academics/highly skilled researchers, excludes students. However, several countries appear to have diasporic connections to ISM (e.g. Korea (Rubin, 2014), China (Jiani, 2017), Cyprus (Statistical Service, 2016)) and emerging studies (Bamberger, 2019; Mahieu, 2014) have connected ISM to a form of ‘diasporisation,’ examining the ways in which diaspora identities and practices are created, expressed and transformed through international HE. These studies indicate that universities, through international HE programmes, are (becoming) a site for diaspora youth engagement programmes. Thus, a focus on diaspora identities and processes at the student level is significant and underexplored.

In line with the focus on ‘knowledge diaspora’ and state diaspora engagement policies, most diasporas in HE studies are conceived of along lines of citizenship (i.e. as the diaspora of a sovereign (nation-)state). This is likely because the literature focuses on how diasporas can aid national knowledge economies. However, diasporas are not always connected to sovereign states (e.g. Kurds; Sikhs); and state forms are not stable (e.g. governance; legitimacy). Thus, there are many forms of diaspora, there may be multiple diasporas in one sovereign state and the relationship between diaspora and state/sovereignty may change over time. The Israeli case is instructive. The Jewish people were sovereign in the Kingdom of Ancient Israel, became a non-sovereign ethnoreligious diasporic group, and since 1948 have once again become a sovereign ethnornational democratic state whilst maintaining the traditional ethnoreligious Jewish Diaspora. This particular case illustrates how the term ‘diaspora’ is in constant motion - alluding to its issues of roots and routes - and changes in its nature over space and time.

Political science scholars have mapped different roles of diaspora and state interactions and their motivations (e.g. Gamlen, 2006; Collyer, 2012; Koinova & Tsouapas, 2018). Focusing on the role of diaspora in homeland foreign policy, Shain and Barth (2003) conceptualise diaspora as independent actors who are ‘part of the people beyond the scope of the nation-state,’ emphasising their active (i.e. agency to act) and passive (i.e. to be invoked without consent/permission) roles in the affairs of homeland(s)/hostland(s). Diaspora actors can be core (elites, capable of mobilising the larger community, closely connected to ‘diaspora entrepreneurs’); passive (available for mobilisation by elites); and silent members (uninvolved, who might mobilise in crisis). Instead of volunteerism, Shain and Barth (2003) argue that the main motivation for diaspora action is identity-based. Following this view, diaspora policies/practices/involvement in HE should be considered in terms not of the actual
policy/practice itself, but rather its contribution to and reflection of a contested political process of asserting (a national/diasporic) identity. States are always trying to form national identities, an inherently contested and political process, to promote social cohesion, state legitimacy and ultimately guide the actions of the state (Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawn, 1975). However, diaspora actors, identifying as from the nation or ‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 1983) but outside it (e.g. the State), are invested in the national identity formulated. ‘Diasporas thus engage in efforts to shape national identity not so much to gain through it leverage over (material) interests, but mainly because it is their interest to insure and sustain an identity that perpetuates and nourishes their self-image’ (Shain & Barth, 2003, p. 459). In this way diasporas are viewed as participating in ‘long-distance nationalism’ (Anderson, 1998), in that they are involved in the political process of shaping a national identity, to which they internalise as a part of their self-image. This identity is neither static, nor homogenous; rather, it is contested, shifting and continually constructed over time and space. Given that diaspora involvement in shaping national identity is a political process, the extent to which members of a diaspora contribute to this political process of national identity formation is dependent not only on agency, but structural, positional and relational dimensions.

From the view of the state, Koinova (2018) identifies three motivations to engage diaspora: utilitarian, identity-based and governance. Utilitarian motivations, based on a rational ‘cost-benefit’ calculation, relate to diasporas as material resources (e.g. remittances; development; diaspora bonds) and social capital (e.g. networks). Identity-based motivations, viewed within the constructivist tradition, aim to extend and tie diaspora identities with that of the state (e.g. through sponsoring national holidays; mother-tongue education) fostering transnational nationalism. In this way, both the state and diaspora may be working to cultivate a particular (national/diasporic) identity, among citizens and co-nationals abroad. Governance motivations relate to diasporas as a group to be shaped and controlled in their host-lands. This is achieved for example through diaspora offices, consulates and other programmes which engage diasporas abroad (Margheritis, 2011). Importantly these motivations may be viewed as overlapping and mutually inclusive. Despite these different motivations for state involvement with diaspora, HE literature has focused considerably on the utilitarian purposes for state policies, with little recognition of other purposes for state engagement with ‘their’ diasporas.

Beyond rationales, political science scholarship indicates that diaspora will be differently empowered and engaged by the relative strength or weakness of the state (e.g. new, weak or contested states tend to be more receptive to (or in some cases reliant on) active diaspora involvement in the homeland affairs (Skulte-Ouaiiss & Tabar, 2015); by the ethnic/civic nature of the State (Tsuda, 2010); and the type of state governance (e.g. autocratic
states may be more likely to construct diaspora members as traitors or with dubious loyalties (Gamlen et al., 2013). Based in the Bourdieusian concept of social fields, Koinova (2018) develops a sociospatial positionality perspective to explain why and how different segments of the diaspora are differently engaged, valued and empowered to act in diaspora politics. Sociospatial diaspora positionality, defined as ‘the power which diaspora political agents are perceived to amass from their sociospatial position in a particular context and linkages to other global contexts’, (Koinova, 2018, 194), is based on five main concepts: positionality; relativity; power relations; fluidity; and perception. Positionality highlights that social actors take up positions (with differing levels of influence) in a global social field, based on connections and relationships. These positions are always relative to other actors in the field and are shifting within specific contexts (e.g. a diaspora actor in one context may be highly positioned to act, while the same actor in a different context may be impotent) and over time (e.g. specific contexts may become more/less important in line with global events) and are thus fluid. Some positions command more influence than others and thus power relations come into play; Koinova (2018) views this type of power as contextually embedded and as a ‘power to’ achieve goals. In this view, power is conditional and context-specific, and relational in its capacity to act vis-à-vis other actors. It is likewise perceptual in that diaspora actors are not objectively placed in the social field; rather, their position is perceived (either by themselves, other actors, or homelands/hostlands) and is inherently subjective. Thus, diaspora actors should be viewed as contextually embedded, differently placed, with different opportunities to play a role in shaping ‘homeland’ politics and national identities. This perspective takes account of both structure and agency. While Koinova (2018) views this as a rationale (i.e. as a way to explain why some states engage and value differently certain types of diaspora) I argue that it should be used more broadly as an overarching intellectual tool to explain both the ways in which states perceive the relative importance of diaspora actors, leading to differing attitudes and opportunities that the state affords disparate diaspora actors; and also as a way to conceptualise diaspora agency and structure in diaspora politics. Thus, diaspora is empowered to act differently based on their links to different contexts and their shifting (perceived) positional value. This combined with critical events, changing global power structures and domestic conditions shifts diaspora engagement over space and time.

In sum, in contrast to lively academic debates in other fields, diaspora in HE literature, is underdeveloped. The focus has been on the (recent) role of diasporas fuelling national knowledge economies, through the recruitment of ‘talented’ academics and a state-led approach. Rather little research has developed the role of diasporas in other areas of internationalisation (e.g. ISM, governance, financing), or diaspora-led initiatives and agency and how this has influenced HE systems. Moreover, the flows of much of this research tend
to assume the state as primary actor (and recipient) of the (utilitarian) benefits of diasporas with a certain amount of benevolence and volunteerism assumed on the part of the diaspora (e.g. Yong & Rahman, 2013). Little scholarship focuses on how diaspora individuals or communities may shape ‘homeland’ HE systems and what motivations they may have (e.g. identity, material). Rather, the HE literature tends to view diaspora as essentially a quasi-agent of the state. Thus, diaspora has tended to be viewed as a new influence in HE (e.g. Welch, 2010), it is often underdefined and undertheorised and promotes the view of diasporas being actively managed (or ‘engaged’) by states. In contrast to this scholarship, in the Israeli case, the role of the diaspora in HE goes far beyond contemporary state engagement policies, and even pre-dates the founding of the State. Moreover, as noted previously, scholarship in the Israeli case indicates that ‘diaspora’ is an important (historical and contemporary) concept not just in the recruitment of researchers, but also in ISM, financing and governance of HE. Thus, I suggest that an historical approach, which investigates the role of diaspora and state in international HE may provide a more nuanced understanding and explanation of contemporary internationalisation and its political, economic, and social roots. Such an approach would enable a better understanding of the internal workings of Israeli internationalisation. As Israel is an archetypical case of diaspora and is often emulated by other countries in devising ‘diaspora engagement policies’ this case likewise has potential to shed light on IoHE more broadly.

2.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I critically analysed the widespread portrayals of IoHE in the literature and assessed their usefulness in explaining the Israeli case. I argued that much of the literature reflects normative (Western) histories, views, and circumstances and that many prevalent themes, especially the role of globalisation and neoliberalism, are not helpful in explaining the Israeli case. I then critically analysed the model of Israeli internationalisation propagated in the literature, identifying its ahistorical nature and weak explanatory power, and also promising research from other fields – particularly relating to diaspora - which sheds light on the actors and histories of Israeli IoHE. I argued that a historical approach to the Israeli case, which takes account of the multifaced motivations and roles of diaspora, state and university holds potential to increase understanding of the Israeli case, and to shed light on IoHE in diverse contexts.
Chapter 3: Research methods

The purpose of this chapter is to describe how this research was undertaken and to explain why it was undertaken in a particular manner. I begin by introducing the historical method and comparative perspective used. I then proceed to follow a four-step historical method to give a clear understanding of how the study developed to attain its aims. Finally, I address my insider status, ethical issues, limitations of the research and establish the trustworthiness and validity of the analysis.

3.1 Historical method and comparative perspective

This study is based in a comparative perspective and is an in-depth single-country study over time (Culpepper, 2005). This study is comparative in two ways: it traces a phenomenon (i.e. internationalisation) through history and is thus comparative over time (Cowen, 2009); and internationalisation in Israel is compared with the widespread themes in the internationalisation literature (as analysed in Chapter 2). Single-country studies are particularly useful to generate additional classifications and confirm or weaken contemporary theories and explanations. With these aims in mind, internationalisation in Israel is not well explained in the literature and thus, provides fertile ground for such an approach and represents a ‘deviant’ case (Landman, 2008). Single-country studies with multiple levels of variance and units of analysis allow researchers to trace changes, processes, and mechanisms more effectively (Culpepper, 2005). Thus, this study varies along two axes: temporal and in level of analysis (i.e. transnational; national; and institutional).

An historical approach fits the purposes of this study and allows for greater understanding of contemporary issues ‘through an analysis of the way they have been and are constituted throughout the past and present, enabling a constitution of the future’ (Novoa & Yariv-Marsh, 2003, p. 436). It is important to understand the different approaches to ‘doing history’ and to locate the approach used in this thesis as this necessarily has a significant impact on the resulting analysis. Approaches to historical research are based on epistemological stances about the nature of knowledge, reality, truth and what can be known about the past; or as Munslow explains ‘genre should be defined as a set of epistemological decisions that have ontological and authorial consequences’ (2015, p. 168). Accordingly, many ‘schools’ of historiography exist, and there are a variety of ‘turns’ in the world of history (Munslow, 2019). Broadly speaking, epistemologies guide historical research and are associated with two
archetypical forms of histories: reconstructionistREALIST and postmodernistRELATIVIST. The approach to history advocated by ‘reconstructionist’ historians (e.g. Arthur Marwick, Geoffrey Rhoades) is based on an extreme form of empirical realism that maintains that historical facts can be ‘discovered’ from primary sources, that there is a single truth to the past, and that the objective historian can grasp and narrate this universal truth (Munslow, 2019). The popularity of this approach has waned. Critics point out that interpretations of even contemporary events can vary widely, that the archive as a source of a single ‘truth’ is highly circumspect, that the researcher’s questions and interpretations emerge from time/space/matter relations with the archive, and that the subjectivities of the researcher is paramount to the resulting analysis (Tamboukou, 2014).

In contrast, the approach advocated by ‘postmodernist’ historians (e.g. Frank Antersmit, Hayden White, Keith Jenkins) maintain that there are multiple, contested versions of the past and that all history is one researcher’s ‘representation’ among many. Postmodernists thus are reflexive and actively engage with their positionality in their research. They interpret documents through the technique of ‘deconstruction,’ scrutinising the language of the text itself (‘discourse’) and connecting this to understandings of reality (Jenkins & Munslow, 2004). These representations are rooted in the conviction that language forms the subjects it describes and asserts power over its subjects. Critics of this approach highlight that postmodernists preoccupation with their own positionality combined with a view of their history as only representing their personal interpretation, inspires a type of apathy and narcissism in the field (e.g. Why do history at all?). Critics also highlight the tendency in these histories to elevate ‘discourse’ and ‘representation’ as sources of power, diminishing the importance of historical context and social structures, undermining individual and collective agency of historical actors to mediate these power structures (Jenkins & Munslow, 2004). Critics of such approaches have likewise expressed concerns that this type of scholarship leads to a ‘politics of positionality’ as opposed to a ‘politics of reason’ wherein positionality grants privileged access to academic debates undermining the traditional academic foundations of evidence and argument (see Hirsh, 2017; Vickers, 2019).

While these two approaches represent extremes in the discipline, as many historians do, in this thesis I adopted a ‘common sense’ pragmatic approach which falls between these two epistemological extremes (Munslow, 2019, p. 11). I affirm a commitment to the authenticity, representativeness and accuracy of the archival and primary sources materials; thus, I affirm the importance of the empirical basis of my historical claims. My aim was to bring to light past facts and events (e.g. the creation of committees; recruitment plans) while also paying attention to the discursive meanings emerging from the documents (e.g. tropes such as
‘excellence’ and ‘Jewish genius’). I acknowledge the subjectivity of historical research and narration, and I understand ‘truth’ may not equate to universal facts and that there are diverse interpretations of (historical) events. I recognise that archives are the result of curation and are thus historically contingent and partial (see section ‘Limitations’). I view documents as socially constructed artefacts with inherent bias, and that their interpretation depends on particular motivations, beliefs and perspectives of the researcher and the research project (see section ‘Insider status’). However, I also view it as imperative to recognise and mitigate these biases to the extent possible, acknowledging that this is never fully attainable.

In line with the aims and research questions of the study, this work is inevitably placed in an interpretivist paradigm, and employs an historical method. The historical method involves identifying an area of interest in the past, verifying that it can be studied given available sources and involves the process of critically selecting, examining and analysing the records of the past, in order to enhance meaning of a particular event or phenomenon (Gottschalk, 1967). Scholars differ in how they operationalise this method. For example, Kipping et al. (2014) outline a three-step process which focuses on the heart of the historical method: selection of sources; criticism, triangulation and interpretation of sources; and the writing of an interpretative historical account. Aróstegui (cited in Sáez-Rosenkranz, 2016), employs a five-step process with additional steps addressing the formation of the research questions, initial propositions and assessing the suitability of historical method. Alternatively, Berg and Lune (2012) and Mason et al. (1997) outline a seven-step process which includes these and additional steps including identifying the research area and undertaking a literature review. Synthesising these approaches, I followed a four-step historical method:

1. Preliminary research to formulate an initial proposition and delineate the research area
2. Locating primary and secondary sources; selection of materials
3. Criticism, triangulation and interpretation of materials
4. Crafting an interpretive historical account

These steps are not discrete or linear. Rather, they must all be carried out and they are often intertwined, carried out simultaneously and circuitously (Kipping et al., 2014). While this study is historical in nature, it also stretches into contemporary times. However, the historical method is used to analyse change over time which can extend into contemporary periods (Huber & Van de Ven, 1995; Lamberg & Tikkanen, 2006) and thus the method was applied to the entire study. Next, I describe how the research was carried out using these four steps.
Step 1: Formulating an initial proposition and delineating the research focus

Study aims, initial proposition and research questions

As demonstrated in Chapter 2, it appears that internationalisation in Israel is not adequately explained by the literature. The purpose of this study thus is to analyse internationalisation in Israel with the aim to both explain Israeli internationalisation and to challenge the widespread rationales, enactment, historical timelines and views propounded in the literature, to broaden the understanding of the actors, rationales, forms and nature of internationalisation globally.

Building on a critical review of the extant literature about Israeli HE and internationalisation (see Chapter 2), my initial proposition was that internationalisation in Israeli universities, which has emerged in contemporary times, may be a reflection of the historic roots of Israeli HE to serve both the Jewish Diaspora and the State. Internationalisation in Israeli universities might thus be understood as having been driven and shaped by this two-fold aim. Consequently, changes in internationalisation, may reflect shifts in the State and Diaspora.

In order to examine and test this proposition, I focused on two areas: first, I aimed to analyse the changing nature, needs and relations of the State and Diaspora as reflected through internationalisation over time; and second, I aimed to understand the changing nature, forms and purposes of the international dimension in the University over time. Thus, I focused on the following lines of inquiry, from the beginning of HE in pre-state Israel until 2018:

RQ1. What forms of internationalisation have operated since the founding of the first university in pre-state Israel? How were these developed and by which actors? What was the purpose of particular forms of internationalisation over time?

RQ2. Why did internationalisation take the form it did over time? Why has it shifted?

Scope

Internationalisation, as demonstrated in Chapter 2, is associated with a large variety of rationales, activities, and forms. In order to develop a comparative lens over time, it was necessary to define the focus of the study. Scholars debate about how internationalisation should be assessed, however, they tend to analyse a variety of different components which fall broadly within three areas of university involvement: research, teaching, and service (e.g. Brandenburg et al., 2009; Hudzik & Stohl, 2009). Based on an extensive literature review and
consultation with university leaders around the world Gao (2015; 2018) developed a conceptual framework for analysing internationalisation based on six dimensions: research, faculty, student, curriculum, governance, and engagement. Broadly these six dimensions align with the tripartite roles of the university and each dimension has several components. I use Gao’s (2018) framework as a guide to examine internationalisation. However, unlike Gao (2015; 2018), I am not primarily interested in quantifying internationalisation and comparing systems. Rather, I am interested in understanding the different initiatives, programmes, policies, infrastructures and patterns of development over time, why they shifted, and the scale and scope of these patterns. Thus, the conceptual framework as outlined in Table 1 indicates broad areas and themes that are examined in this study. It is also essential to note that given the long period of time (a century) this study covers, certain areas or themes are emphasised more than others, and in certain periods some components are not relevant (e.g. joint degree programmes). Thus, this framework is intended as a broad guide to hone the research focus, not to limit it to these categories, and I do not suggest that all of the categories will be touched upon at a given time.

Table 1. Gao’s (2018) conceptual framework for developing internationalisation indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Components</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td>Internationally cooperative research programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International focused research centres</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International researchers</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internationally acknowledged research achievement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculty</td>
<td>International profile of the faculty team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International perspective and experience of faculty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>International students</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mobility of Students</td>
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<tr>
<td>Curriculum</td>
<td>Courses with an international component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint degree programmes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>Human resources for international activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Financial support for internationalisation</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Infrastructure and facilities for internationalisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Engagement</td>
<td>International presence</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International presence of alumni</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International networks and partnerships</td>
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</table>

Gao, 2018, p. 321
Initially, it was my intention to conduct a study of one HEI and to supplement this, with an analysis of HE policies and initiatives at the State and Diaspora level over time. The examination of the State level was to be undertaken through an examination of policies of its various branches (e.g. MoE, FM, PMs Office) and the sectoral agencies which link the State and HEIs and regulate and fund HE (i.e. Council for Higher Education [CHE]; Planning and Budgeting Committee [PBC]) and the Diaspora through Israel-Diaspora para-State, community and philanthropic organisations (e.g. JAFI; Yad HaNadiv). However, as the research progressed, it became apparent that this would not be possible, primarily due to a lack of access to these documents.

Prior to beginning my first round of fieldwork in Israel (November - December 2017), I submitted requests to the Israel State Archives (ISA) for 121 files related to international HE policy. In April 2016, the Israel State Archives closed to the public and began a digitisation process. Thus, it was not possible to visit the archives in person and very partial information was available online at the beginning of this research. Files that were requested would need to be approved by the relevant bodies (e.g. FM; CHE) before they could be scanned and made accessible online. This process caused considerable delays and thus, files arrived over a period of more than a year with some files denied access by the relevant bodies, and others still outstanding even at the time of writing. Some of these files contained pertinent information which was used (e.g. macro-level statistics on new Jewish immigrants in HE), others did not, and still others contained clues to different files which might have held pertinent information – but would have required further file requests (and the necessary approval and waiting period). Given the severe time delays in receiving the files, I did not continue working with the ISA above the original 121 files requested. Overall, with these files there was not enough information to recreate a full picture of State-level internationalisation policy historically from this source.

In tandem I submitted Freedom of Information requests to three government departments: the FM, requesting documents relating to international agreements of HE, and any evaluations, statistics or budgets for such agreements; the PMs Office, requesting government decisions relating to HE and diaspora education over time; and the Population and Immigration Authority, requesting information on international student and researcher visas over time, with information on HEI attended, age, sex, religion, and country of origin. These requests were only answered after a period of more than nine months and after several
follow-up emails and phone calls. The replies were disappointing and of limited use. The FM sent over 100 documents which detailed different agreements signed with countries and international organisations, however, these were only an illustrative number of those signed and no statistical data, budgets or evaluative reports were supplied. The PMs Office supplied a range of government decisions regarding HE with a limited historical lens and most of these were from 2008 onwards (which in any event, are available online). The Population and Immigration Authority provided the least information of all three: composite statistics of visas for 2016-2018. The statistics did not provide any labelling or any of the categories I requested and for my purposes were essentially useless. The limited nature of sources from both the Freedom of Information requests and the difficulty working with the ISA, necessitated focusing on the institutional level.

While at first I considered analysing internationalisation in several HEIs, in the end, given the large scale of the research (over a century) and the limited archival options in other universities, I decided to conduct an in-depth investigation in one institution: Hebrew University (HU). I chose HU for four reasons. One, it is the oldest comprehensive university, which pre-dates the founding of the state and allows for the historical thread to be maintained. Two, it has an extensive and well-maintained archive which allowed for ample data to be collected to build a robust corpus of historical documents. Three, there is evidence that HU was a model for other universities in their international efforts (Tel Aviv University; Bar Ilan University; Ben Gurion University; Haifa University) and that an in-depth investigation of HU would represent one of the most internationalised Israeli institutions, at least until the 1990s. Four, Yemini et al. (2017) argue that colleges (second-tier institutions) have embarked on a process of ‘universitification’ or a process of emulating universities, thus, while I am not be able to generalise to the whole Israeli HE system (nor is this the purpose of this research), there are elements which represent narratives in Israeli HE more broadly than HU. While HU is the focal point, I will also show how other universities and colleges had similar or divergent foci and introduce relevant macro-level statistics to provide a broader context to understand developments in HU (e.g. international student numbers). This becomes more relevant from the 1990s with the introduction of colleges and the massification of Israeli HE. Through research in the HUA, numerous historical State documents and trails of documents from diaspora organisations were unearthed. Thus, the project shifted to focus on the institutional level, and where possible, State and diaspora policies and initiatives were examined through archival evidence unearthed at the HUA, triangulated with other archival materials; and as developed through secondary histories and sources. Thus, despite the change in focus of the project, I was still able to achieve the aims of this thesis: to shed light and explain internationalisation in Israel; and to contribute to understanding of internationalisation globally.
Step 2: Locating sources, assembling and selecting the research corpus

Historical studies are based on a corpus of primary and secondary sources and require some form of selection to assemble it for analysis. This act has the potential for bias and sound historical works make explicit why and how they chose the sources they did. The selection of research materials should be done purposefully to match the aims and scope of the study; and robust historical research is designed to identify and reduce selection bias (e.g. by assembling a wide variety of sources) (Howell & Prevenier, 2001; McDowell, 2013). Next, I detail the process of selection and sources of the research corpus.

The research corpus

Data selection was a circular process, with criticism, triangulation, interpretation and writing (Kipping et al., 2014); it continued over a period of 20 months in which time I undertook four fieldwork trips (December 2017, April 2018, July 2018, October 2018) from London to Israel, ranging from 10 days to one month. In January 2019 I was offered an international doctoral fellowship from the PBC; as a consequence, I was a visiting doctoral researcher at Tel Aviv University, which allowed me continual access to archives and to follow current developments in internationalisation policy and practice while I completed the thesis.

The entire corpus of the study consisted of (a) primary source documents procured from the Central Zionist Archives (CZA), National Library (NL), HUA, Israel State Archive (ISA), Freedom of Information Requests, and online and publicly available reports (b) 41 semi-structured interviews (c) secondary sources which analysed the political, economic and social changes in Israeli society, HE and diaspora relations over time and (d) fieldnotes and research memos.

Primary sources: Documents

Given the historical nature of the study, documents were necessary. Documents comprise a large range of materials including correspondence, meeting minutes, pamphlets, reports, magazines, and policies (McDowell, 2013). Documents have many possible advantages including that they are efficient; depending on their location, they could have high availability; cost-effectiveness, lack of obtrusiveness and reactivity; stability, they stay the same over time; exactness (of data, in some cases); and have the possibility to cover a wide range of areas
and time periods. Documents however can be limited if they contain insufficient detail; are
difficult to access or retrieve; or if a limited range of documents are available (e.g. leading to
selectivity bias) (Bowen, 2009).

Documents are often used as forms of triangulation in social science studies, however
in historical studies, documents are often the bulk of the data (Bowen, 2009). In order to build
robustness into the study, and support triangulation, different sources of documents were
sought to examine the phenomenon (internationalisation). Sources produced by different
authors, organisations and for different purposes were sought out with the aim to reduce
reliance on one perspective and particular sources biases (Thies, 2002). These documents
were considered primary sources, as materials which provide evidence of an event, during the
time period it was happening (McDowell, 2013). This study relies heavily on different primary
source documents. Below, I detail what these documents were and how they were collected.

Documents were collected from the Central Zionist Archives (CZA), National Library
(NL), HUA, Israel State Archive (ISA), Government Ministries and Government Authorities
through Freedom of Information Requests and websites. These archives were chosen as they
represented the major archives which would have the richest and most abundant information
regarding the topic. Archival evidence was sought which related to the conceptual framework.
In the CZA, an electronic search catalogue was used to identify files which related to the
conceptual framework. Three sets of files were reviewed: those from the Student Authority (a
government department which financed immigrant Jewish youth university education in
Israel); those that dealt with Summer Institutes, a type of summer programme for Diaspora
Youth hosted at Israeli Universities; and those of the Youth and Hechalutz Department, a
department of JAFI that organised Diaspora youth trips to Israel, some of which were held in
universities. A total of two days were spent in the CZA.

The NL is a trove of information: since the founding of the State of Israel, by law, two
copies of all material published in Israel must be sent to the NL within one month of
publication. Thus, public universities (as well as all government ministries) are obligated to
send copies of their publications to the NL. In this way, I was able to find publications relating
to internationalisation at the HU (and other universities) over time. The vast majority of these
documents were newsletters to Friends Associations abroad, annual reports, and pamphlets
created to market the international offerings of the universities. General pamphlets on
international HE programmes were also produced by the Jewish JAFI, Ministry of Aliyah and
Absorption (tasked with promoting Jewish immigration and integration into Israel), and the
Student Authority, as these organisations and government ministries promoted HE

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programmes to Jewish students in the Diaspora. Documents from this archive provided an excellent source of triangulation. For example, it was possible to compare prospectuses created by HU for various purposes (e.g. recruiting abroad; BOG meetings), the FHU and different governmental departments. At times I was also able to compare similar documents over languages (i.e. French, English and Hebrew) to provide additional triangulation. Seven research days were spent in the NL.

The HUA was the most important source of documentary data. The HU has an expansive and well-organised archive which has documents from the early founding of the university until today. However, as a matter of policy, archival records are sealed 10 years back, thus I could access documents only until 2008. I began my research in the HUA after reading HUYBs which I found in the UCL Library. HUYBs were collected from 1926-27 (English); 1939 (Hebrew); 1942 (English); 1948 (English); 1957 (English); 1963 (English); 1966 (English); 1972 (English); 1980 (English); 1985 (English); 1992 (English); and 2000 (English). Some were procured from the UCL library, some were bought on Amazon.com, and others were copied from the HUA. HUYBs were particularly useful sources of information and contained a broadly uniform format over time, providing an excellent source to discern changes over time in the historical accounts, development of the university and importantly, in the nature of dimensions of internationalisation as outlined in the conceptual framework. The historical ‘context’ of the HUYBs was particularly illuminating and critically analysed, in tandem with other secondary sources from Israeli historians, to recreate the historical development of HU. HUYBs were based on questionnaires which were sent to all departments to collect up-to-date descriptive information requested for their publication (such questionnaires were found in the archive). Thus, these appeared to have up-to-date descriptive information regarding all major functions of the university - and touch on most areas of the conceptual framework. These books were made, however, primarily for public relations and fundraising purposes, and were widely distributed in Diaspora communities, to academic societies, governments and international funding institutions. Thus, to avoid inherent bias, they were approached critically with caution, and triangulation with other primary source documents from the archives, secondary sources and interviews was actively sought.

In addition to HUYBs, there were also several other publications authored by the HU, which resembled the Yearbooks and were incorporated into the corpus of research documents: the special issue of Scopus for the 25th anniversary of the opening of HE (HU, 1925-1950); and a special edition book for the 75th anniversary of the opening of HU (In pursuit of Excellence: The Story of The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2000). After 2000, the last printing of the HUYB, this gap was filled with the President’s Report to the Board of Governors (available from 2005 – 2019); the Scopus magazine (2005 – 2019); combined with secondary studies
on Israeli HE; newspaper coverage of HE policies and developments; and publicly available reports from the PBC/CHE and Knesset [Parliament].

This preliminary review combined with the conceptual framework, focused my search in the HUA. I spent the equivalent of three months in the HUA over a period of 20 months, and reviewed files relating to ‘Mechina’ (preparatory course); recognition of schools (in the Diaspora) for admission; Rothberg International School (RIS) (which had different names over time, see Chapter 5); visiting researchers and guests of the university; international organisations and cooperation; research students and post-doctoral students; Authority for Research and Development; international organisation and cooperation; and the BOG. Many of the file names changed or were organised in a different manner over time. Thus, there was also a certain amount of trial and error involved. Once an appropriate file was found, I reviewed all years of the file and traced them through, looking for divergent file names. I also solicited the help of the Archive Manager to trace the different organisational paths for the desired information over time. Meeting minutes, annual reports, statistical reports, promotional publications, government reports and personal correspondence were found in the files and incorporated into the research corpus. The documents were primarily in English and Hebrew (I am fluent in both), however, particularly in the early years of HU, there was correspondence in other languages (e.g. Polish, Yiddish); I was unable to analyse these, however they were found mostly in the files on recognition of schools in the Diaspora (see section 4.3).

Contemporary documents were sought and incorporated into the research corpus. Extensive searches were conducted on the websites of HU; CHE; MoE; Ministry of Aliyah and Absorption; Ministry of Economy; MoF; JAFI; and FM. These websites were also searched historically, using the internet archive Wayback Machine. These searches elicited a wealth of information including policy documents, annual reports, prospectuses, public relations announcements, newsletters, and evaluations of national programmes.

In all, the corpus of documents consisted of over 20,000 pages of material. Archival work was undertaken as suggested by Redman (2013): all archival documents were initially photographed, transferred electronically to my computer and categorised by source, year, name and file number for more detailed analysis. Contemporary documents obtained online were converted to PDFs, labelled and likewise prepared for analysis. All of the HUYBs, with the exception of 1930 that was digitised, were analysed in hard-copy form. A CD with all digitised sources for this thesis is available upon request (for copyright purposes it cannot be publicly circulated). Most of the documents used in this thesis have not been used before for research on internationalisation and were selected for relevance and representativeness. A conscious effort was made to represent diverse perspectives within the corpus (e.g. of different
diapora groups/individuals; academics) and to point out silences in the archive (e.g. exclusion of Palestinians in the project of HU).

Primary sources: Interviews

Semi-structured interviews were conducted for different purposes, depending on the participant and their experience, position, knowledge and place in time (Taylor, Bogdan, & DeVault, 2016). Despite being made for research purposes (unlike documents), interviews which focus on historical events often contain retrospective bias (Kirby, 2008). Thus, interviews for the study which were reflective in nature (e.g. people who were retired) were used primarily as triangulation (Oliver-Hoyo & Allen, 2006) and to better understand the context of the documents, holes in the documentary record, and to confirm the development of the analysis. Interviews with current HE policy makers, researchers and practitioners were used as a form of triangulation with contemporary documents as well, however, they were given more weight in the current period as there was not an issue of retrospective bias and the documentary evidence and secondary sources are less prevalent from 2008 onwards (see Limitations section below).

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 41 HE administrators, policy makers and academics. These consisted of past and present administrators in international education programmes in Israeli universities and colleges; academics with a specialisation in Israeli HE history and policy; leaders in national HE policy bodies; non-governmental organisation (NGO) administrators of international projects in HE; and government officials. The sampling of the interview participants was purposive (Robson, 2011); participants were targeted for their experience, knowledge and expertise in Israeli HE, and particularly its international dimension. There were also several interviewees that were referred to me by other participants, in a snowballing manner (Robson, 2011).

Interviews were conducted to understand the purposes, actors, forms and strategies of HE and how this shifted over time. While I interviewed all current (as of April 2018) management of the RIS at HU, and the head of the international office (IO), through my archival work, I also located participants who were involved in internationalisation in HU in the past to interview; notably, I interviewed three past Directors (Vice-Provosts) of the RIS from its inception in 1971 until today, which represented all previous Vice-Provosts with the exception of one.

Most participants were approached by email, however, some were approached by telephone (particularly elderly participants). Those approached were willing to participate, and
the only refusal (which came in the form of a non-reply to two requests by email) was the current President of HU. Many were eager to be interviewed. Those with a historical perspective on internationalisation in Israel were proud of their professional careers and wanted to tell their stories; some of these interviews went on for several hours. Contemporary interview participants were likewise keen to be interviewed, however, the encounter ended (or began in some cases) by the participant interviewing me, viewing me as an internationalisation expert and hoping for professional advice/consulting or counselling. Interviews were conducted in person, by Skype or by telephone. Interviews were conducted alternatively in Hebrew or in English, depending on the preference of the participant. Interestingly, almost all administrators (although not academics) interviewed were mother-tongue English, reflecting a possible preference for a specific profile of many internationalisation administrators in Israel. All interviews (with the exception of one participant who did not agree to be recorded) were audio-recorded and then transcribed verbatim, either in Hebrew or in English. Translation of interviews (and other sources) was done selectively to provide illustrative quotes. All interview participants were provided with an information sheet about the study and an informed consent document (see Appendices A and B), emphasising the right to withdraw and highlighting issues of anonymity; some participants requested the interview guide in advance which I supplied (see Appendix C). Before any data collection began, the study was approved by the Ethics Committee at UCL.

Secondary sources

Secondary sources are those which were not produced during the period in which they address and they include a degree of hindsight; there is an element of analysis and interpretation already embedded in these sources (Wewers, 2007). Secondary sources were an important source of information and triangulation in the study (Donnelly & Norton, 2012). HU (and other universities) have been the focus of much scholarship over the years, some of which touches directly on the areas of interest in my study (see Chapter 2). However, secondary sources were sought not only to understand the sort of research already undertaken but was critically regarded and incorporated as a data point in the study, as a form of triangulation (Donnelly & Norton, 2012). For example, in the pre-state period of HU, using archival documents and HUYBs, I calculated descriptive statistics on the international character of the study body. Benavot (1997) using a different data set from the HUA, analysed the student body. In this way, from two different primary data sets, I was able to triangulate (and corroborate) my findings. A further example was Herman’s (1970) study of international students at HU. His study focused on the American Study Program (ASP) at HU, a particular
international programme which I also analyse through primary documents. While Herman’s study focuses on other areas than my research (e.g. he surveys and interviews students from 1965-1967) his findings about the nature of the programme, its purposes, and administration also served to bolster the validity of my arguments.

Secondary sources were crucial in understanding the historical context of the primary documents. For example, studies on Jewish education during the 1990s, emphasised the great ‘threat’ of assimilation of Jewish communities in North America. This corroborated and provided important contextual background to some of the internal correspondence found in the HUA from North American Diaspora Jews to administrators at HU. Similar to archival materials, secondary sources were digitised and categorised by year, author and subject. Some secondary sources were collected and analysed in hard-copy form (i.e. Herman, 1970; Lavsky, 1997; Selzer, 2013).

*Fieldnotes and research memos*

Extensive fieldnotes were written during archival visits, which were then drawn upon for analysis (Redman, 2013). These covered key words used in the searches (of electronic databases), files requested and reviewed, potential files for exploration on future visits, and initial ideas about material viewed. Fieldnotes were also taken during the interviews, however, these were less extensive as I prefer to remain in eye contact during interviews.

*Sources over time*

The types of data and their sources for this study shifted over time. In the contemporary period, national policies and initiatives were added to the corpus of documents analysed, as they were readily and publicly available. Kipping et al. (2014) note that this type of variance in data sources is normal for historical studies, as documents cannot always be the same; organisations have a tendency to change their reporting mechanisms, develop ad-hoc committees, and change their internal structures so that certain reports, minutes and documents will also appear (and disappear) over time. While this could be considered a weakness, this is an almost inevitable part of doing historical work, and part of the added value of historical research for viewing changes over time. Moreover, historians tend to view this variation in documentation as an aid in triangulation of historical studies, as it adds different sources and perspectives over time to the study (Kipping et al., 2014).
Data sources also changed in their accessibility, quantity, and relevance for the study. As previously noted, the HUA are closed 10 years back (from 2008). Thus, this vacuum was filled with current policies and publicly available reports, meeting minutes, newsletters and interviews. Even within the different archives, the amount and type of data found in files shifted over time. The HUA, the pre-state period had rather sparse documentation in the areas which I was interested. However, in the 70’s – 90’s there was a large number of documents with a dwindling number from the 90s onwards. This may reflect shifts in technologies (typewriter, to computer/printer, to email). While the amount and types of data shifted over time in the HUA, the quantity of data over time in the HUYBs, grew linearly: the first edition in 1926-27 was about 70 pages with appendices, while the latest edition from 2000 was over 700 pages. Thus, the large number of sources provided a robust research corpus over time, although it was not always the same sources.

**Step 3: Source criticism, triangulation and interpretation**

Once texts have been selected, they are then subjected to a critical analysis of the internal and external validity (Thies, 2002). Primary sources in historical work have been made for other purposes than the research and thus it is imperative to establish their authenticity. This is associated with external validity and involves questions such as ‘Why did this survive? Where was it written? When was it written? Who was the real author?’ (Neuman, 2003, p. 421). Broadly external validity addresses the circumstances of a material’s production and preservation (McCulloch, 2011). Once the authenticity of the artefact has been established, internal validity is assessed. Questions such as ‘Why was it written? Is this an eyewitness/first-hand or second-hand account? Are there internal inconsistencies? What are the connotations associated with the material?’ (Neuman, 2003, p. 421). These questions aim to assess the trustworthiness or reliability of the source to address the research aims and also to assess bias that is present in the sources (McCulloch, 2011). For example, marketing materials will likely present a different narrative of an event, than meeting minutes or private personal correspondence. Assessing different forms of bias in documents is an important step to build triangulation into historical work: once a form of bias has been identified, alternate sources on the subject matter can be selected to triangulate findings (Howell & Prevenier, 2001). This builds robustness into the study, reducing selection and source bias (Kipping et al., 2014). In this way, triangulation in historical studies is based on multiple data sources; and secondary sources are included as a part of triangulation, not as ‘background’ as in much social science work, but as a data point which is also critically evaluated (Donnelly & Norton, 2012).
As noted previously, all documents were categorised with basic information from the time of selection (Redman, 2013). The criticism of documents consisted of a close reading and critical review of the documents first to assess their internal and external validity and forms of bias, then, to reduce source bias and to unearth different perspectives, they were compared across sources (Thies, 2002). For example, in a given year, BOG reports were compared with personal correspondence; internal memos; and marketing materials. Triangulation, with its roots in a centuries old technique for ship navigation, has been the source of considerable debate in the social sciences since its introduction into the field in the late 1950s (Fusch et al., 2018). Triangulation was initially conceived of as a way to strengthen validity by drawing on multiple sources of data. Denizen (1970; 1978), elaborating on triangulation, identified four forms of triangulation: data, investigator, theory and methodological. However, scholars have criticised triangulation, indicating that it is used primarily to demonstrate convergence across sources to validate arguments (e.g. Mathison, 1988; Flick, 1992). However, convergence is likely not the outcome of different sources or certainly not the only outcome. Instead, Mathison (1988) argues that triangulation may result in data which is ‘convergent, inconsistent and contradictory and that must be rendered sensible by the researcher...’ (p. 13). Thus, triangulation should be used to understand diverse perspectives which can aid the researcher to understand a given phenomenon. Recognising this importance, in response, Denzin (2011) clarified his concepts and indicated that the purpose of triangulation should be thought of as ‘crystal refraction’ which allows the researcher many different viewpoints on a particular phenomenon, facilitating greater understanding and reducing researcher and source bias. To this end, this thesis incorporates both data (e.g. different sources) and methodological triangulation (e.g. documentary analysis; interviews). Interviews were analysed thematically and incorporated into the emerging documentary analysis. At times interviews gave a different perspective than those of documents, which was crucial for this thesis (Kern, 2016). For example, interviews with contemporary HE professionals indicated that collaboration with Asia was based not only on economic/political/academic factors (as emphasised in the documents), but was also considerably aided by a (perceived) cultural affinity of Asian countries to the Jewish people.

Once information had been criticised and triangulated, a form of analysis and interpretation took place. The analysis of historical sources is characterised by an iterative use of both inductive and deductive reasoning that fits together evidence and interpretation and involves situating the source within a ‘hermeneutic circle’ that combines understanding of the historical contexts of the source and relates it to other sources (Kipping et al., 2014). It is a circuitous/iterative process with collection and selection of the data and writing that involves deep understanding of the phenomenon under investigation in its historical context. It is
recognised that in any historical work, it is important not to give contemporary categories to historical events, processes or phenomena and to endeavour to view historical events and phenomena on their own terms (Thies, 2002). Thus, in this thesis, I trace the roots of contemporary ‘internationalisation’ which would arguably begin only in the 1990s with the introduction of this term into education, and the early periods focus on the antecedents of contemporary internationalisation and focus on what was ‘transnational’ or ‘international’ at a given time. This process of analysis can be supplemented with other qualitative or quantitative analysis methods (Lamberg & Tikkanen, 2006). In this thesis, descriptive quantitative analysis on some of the primary documents was undertaken to understand the scale and scope of the study foci. For example, in order to analyse the international nature of HU academic staff, I used the HUYBs, which contained extensive biographical data on academic staff, to build a set of descriptive statistics on the international profile of HU academics over time. Thus, sources were analysed qualitatively and quantitatively to provide a rich picture of the scale and scope of forms of internationalisation, and to understand how they were achieved and for what purposes over time. Through this analysis the initial proposition evolved and is examined in detail in the Conclusion of the thesis (Chapter 7).

**Step 4: Writing an interpretive historical account**

Writing an historical study, relies on understanding the sources, making an interpretive argument based on their evidence and crafting a narrative (Kipping et al., 2014). One of the purposes of this study was to identify the continuity and change of core concepts over time; a way to represent this is through periodisation, or transitions that ‘must be characterised by the dissolution of old continuities and the forging of new ones’ (Green, 1992, p. 14). There are many different types of periodisation, which tend to revolve around watershed moments, (e.g. revolutions, wars, inventions) (Stearns, 2017). In comparative education, periodisation tends to revolve around events which bring on a shift in the organising concepts of society and hence education, or ‘transitologies’ (Cowen, 2000). While much of the histories of internationalisation, are heavily slanted towards critical (and catastrophic) events (e.g. WWII, Cold War), and the rationales and enactment of internationalisation from the viewpoint of the West, in this study, I endeavoured to set these aside and to create an Israeli periodisation, by examining patterns over time and locating transitologies. Through the analysis, three periods were identified: 1900s – 1948: Formation and development of the Diaspora University; 1948 – 2000: State formation, stabilisation and the Diaspora; 1990s - 2018: State maturation and steering, the Diaspora and internationalisation. These periods represent shifts in the transnational/international dimension of HU; they also reflect broader political, economic,
social, and identity changes. These periods are not concrete, exact cut-offs, rather there is some flexibility between periods and also within periods. For example, while the first period ends at the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, tangible changes in the international dimension of HU, were not immediate, rather, there was a transition period of several years. Also, within the different themes in a particular period, there is movement over time. For example, considering solely international students, great variance is linked with global antisemitism, irrespective of the other themes. While the periodisation I advance broadly resembles periodisation used in other areas of Israeli history (e.g. State development) this study is the first to identify, inductively, how these shifts affected IoHE.

Historical studies have traditionally been written chronologically, however thematic histories have become more common and this research could have been presented in numerous ways. I could have written a chapter on the development of HU, and then separate chapters over the main themes of research and teaching. I rejected this for two reasons: the historical connection of HU with the development of the two themes, namely, research and teaching, provided for a more direct connection between these areas and allowed the reader a direct reference to historical context within the ‘international’ dimensions of HU analysed. This in turn maintained the integrity of the periods and allowed clarity to understand how the international dimension of HU was located in a particular moment in time. Thus, after great consideration, for the sake of clarity, organisation, and the best possible continuity of the findings, the analysis chapters were organised in three chapters along the periodisation with three internal components: (historical) formation/development of HU; international dimension of research; and international dimension of teaching. The foremost section is based on an analysis of key events as described by primary sources (e.g. HUYBs) and analysed in secondary sources (e.g. academic and national histories) (see Lamberg & Tikkanen, 2006). It is presented in the tone of historical narrative. This provides the frame for contextualising the latter sections which build on the historical understanding established in the former section, and are comprised of research based chiefly on an analysis of primary archival sources, supplemented with interviews. In each period I address RQ1, and in the period conclusion of Chapters 5 and 6, I compare it to the preceding period. RQ2 is addressed in Chapter 7, the concluding chapter of the thesis. Despite views that an analysis of internationalisation in Israel would reveal more ‘diversity’, particularly with regards to Palestinians, this was not the case, and emphasising this would have deviated from my stated research approach, which as I previously detailed, adhered to the empirical sources. However, it is important to recognise the silences in the archival record and I have acknowledged this throughout the findings chapters, and I address this in the Conclusion (Chapter 7).
While some social science research separates secondary sources from the primary sources, historians tend to integrate them. This is done as secondary sources in historical research are considered as a part of triangulation (Kipping et al., 2014). For the sake of clarity, and to reflect social science norms, in the findings Chapters (4-6), secondary sources are given as in-text citations while archival references, difficult to locate sources, and relevant notes are provided in the endnotes. Reflecting historical writing conventions, I do not provide extensive quotes in the analysis, rather I paraphrase the interpretive analysis, providing succinct illustrative quotes (Gottschalk, 1967). This is not a complete institutional history; and I came across countless facts and anecdotes that were infinitely interesting but not necessarily pertinent to the interpretive argument of this thesis. Thus, this thesis cannot be viewed as a comprehensive institutional history, rather, it focuses very specifically on the international character, formation and development of HU.

3.2 Insider status

Thus far I have addressed ways in which I have tried to mitigate selection and source bias. However, it is important to recognise and address the many ways in which I am an insider in this research, to situate myself within the study, to reflect on the effects this has on the research, and the lengths to which I went to reduce researcher bias (Thies, 2002). This research touches on an area which I have worked in extensively in Israel: the marketing, recruitment and management of international education programmes. I was an international student at HU in my junior year of university and thus, I experienced some of the programmes I research, as a student, first-hand. These personal experiences were helpful to me in many ways, particularly in understanding the gaps in the literature on internationalisation and in gaining access to interview participants. I have likewise detailed my personal position in relation to the research in the introduction to this thesis (e.g. as a woman, diasporic Jew, Israeli-American). My purpose in detailing my positionality in this thesis, reflects my epistemological view of knowledge as situated (Harraway, 1988) meaning that my positionality influences the development of this study and the knowledge created in this research. However, despite this recognition, as stated in the beginning of this Chapter, aspects of insider research have been considered throughout the research and particular care was taken to reduce (while recognising that elimination is impossible) different types of bias. First, in line with historical methods, multiple sources were used as noted in the data collection (Howell & Prevenier, 2001). Second, I was in continual consultation with my main supervisor (who was based in London, and acted as a critical outsider) and my secondary supervisor (an academic staff member at Tel Aviv University) who acted as a critical insider. Third, I have shared my analysis
and findings widely with academics, interview participants and HE professionals. I also presented my research at both Israeli and international conferences.

3.3 Validity and trustworthiness

Historical research relies on identifying biases, using diverse sources and providing transparency to establish itself as robust, to instil confidence in the arguments of historical work (Kipping et al., 2014). As has been addressed thus far, this thesis builds in validity and trustworthiness in several ways. First, the use of different types of data (e.g. internal correspondence; policies; minutes; marketing materials); sources (e.g. primary: documents and interviews; secondary; different archives) to mitigate source bias and to triangulate and to support the arguments. Second, given the important role of sources and the large potential for bias in both the source materials and the researcher, historical scholarship is expected to provide a high degree of source transparency (Kipping et al., 2014; Tamboukou, 2017). In this way arguments can be evaluated based on the quality and quantity of the evidence, and specific sources verified and retraced by others. In addition to building validity and trustworthiness in the research, Tamboukou (2017) argues that revealing sources allows for historical documents (and researcher ‘archival assemblages’) to have ‘a new life’ while challenging the traditional authority of the researcher and the power relations of the archive (p. 6). Thus, perhaps the most important step that was taken, and to which historical studies are judged is the quality and quantity of the sources, provided with a well-documented research trail with a rich variety of both primary and secondary sources (Kipping et al., 2014). The findings chapters are supported with reference to a vast and varied research corpus, allowing for the archival trial to be followed. Third, the dissemination of the research and the views of critical insiders and outsiders builds validity in the research (see previous section).

3.4 Limitations of the methods

The research method as outlined has several limitations. First, archival research is broadly associated with elitist research (Opotow & Belmonte, 2016). Archives take time and resources and a great deal of effort to preserve, and thus, the documents they keep tend to reflect an elite or privileged perspective. Furthermore, the focus on HU, an elite research institution further compounds this. Second, historical documents and reflections can only answer certain types of questions (Jones, 2010). With the documents collected and interviews conducted, I will not be able to answer questions about what the international student experience or day-
to-day international feeling of the HU was, or the experience of those who were marginalised in the archival record (e.g. Palestinian students). Third, the closure of HUA from 2008 onwards, means that while policies, minutes and some correspondence was collected (and supplemented with interviews), the archival record is incomplete. It is possible that some of my arguments would have been different had this information been available or may change in the future when these documents are unsealed. Despite my best efforts, it is also possible that I overlooked documents in the selection, analysis or writing stages. However, this is an inevitable part of producing historical work: not all documents can be analysed and used, not all documents have survived, and even before the researcher begins, a large portion of data is already missing (Gottschalk, 1967). Thus, Elman and Elman (2001) noted that even with a meticulous selection process, ‘historians know that there are likely to be other documents, indeed whole collections of paper, that they have not seen. Accordingly, they are inclined to view their results as the uncertain product of an incomplete evidentiary record’ (p. 29). While it is clear that historical studies will always be an interpretive act and are dependent on circumstances outside the researcher’s control (e.g. what documents have been saved), source and selection bias and other forms of bias have been critically analysed, acknowledged and steps taken to minimise these as much as possible (Thies, 2002). Despite these limitations, I argue that the descriptive/prescriptive approaches to internationalisation research hold little explanatory power in Israel and thus, an historical approach, sheds light on the inner workings of one Israeli university, that has had considerable influence on the HE sector, and challenges the literature, expanding understanding of internationalisation in diverse societies.

3.5 Conclusion

In this Chapter I addressed how the research was designed and justified why it was undertaken in a particular manner. I began by introducing the comparative historical research approach and methods used; I then proceeded to follow the four-step historical method to give a clear understanding of how the study developed over time to attain its aims. Finally, I touched on my insider status, ethical issues and limitations of the research. The result of this analysis are the three periods of internationalisation which will be analysed in Chapters 4, 5, and 6.
Chapter 4. 1900’s – 1948: Formation and development of a Diaspora University

4.1 Formation and development of HU

In this chapter I analyse the creation and development of HU in the pre-State period until 1948. I argue that HU was itself a product of internationalisation promoted by ‘international’ actors seeking to promote Jewish culture and the Jewish national project. In the absence of a State, it was heavily shaped by Diaspora including its funding, governance, academic staff and students. While embedded in the national project, the historical struggles in the pre-State period resulted in a research-focused University which espoused a mission for worldwide Jewry: the ‘University of the Jewish People.’ However, the Diaspora did not exclude the Zionists; rather they were major partners in its development - and significantly benefitted from it.

The argument is developed in the following manner. First, I analyse the genesis and development of HU, from its initial idea and formation until the eve of the declaration of the State of Israel in 1948. The purpose of this section is to analyse and establish the historical actors and purposes for the creation of HU. I likewise establish its academic, funding and governance pattern in this period. Key dates I address are as follows:
Table 2. Key dates in the development of HU, 1400s - 1948

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Events and/or impact on HU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1466 - 1918</td>
<td>From initial idea to stone-laying ceremony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1466, 1762, 1882-1884</td>
<td>Pre-Zionist proponents of a Jewish university</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987, 1901, 1913</td>
<td>Idea of a Jewish University in Palestine is discussed at Zionist Congresses; finally approved in 1913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913 – 1918</td>
<td>Establishing the research institute model; purchasing the land on Mount Scopus; Balfour Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>Stone-laying ceremony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918 - 1925</td>
<td>From stone-laying to inauguration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>Einstein and Weizmann fundraising trip to the US; tough negotiations on funding and governing HU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923 – 1924</td>
<td>Research institutes opened in Microbiology, Chemistry and Jewish Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>HU inauguration: The ‘spiritual centre’ of a people and a nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925 - 1948</td>
<td>The Diaspora University model: Funding, governance and mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925 – 1948</td>
<td>From research institutes to an expanded research and teaching university</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>HU begins organised instruction for MA degrees in the newly inaugurated Faculty of Humanities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>The rise of Fascist regimes in Europe bring refugee students (and staff) to HU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>HU joins the Allied war effort, despite the White Paper of 1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>HU plans expansion for forthcoming Statehood</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Second, I will analyse the nature of research and teaching respectively, focusing on how HU’s formation as established in section 4.1, affected its international character. Thus, this chapter is organised into three sections: formation and development of HU; ‘international’ dimension of research; and ‘international’ dimension of teaching. I conclude with a discussion of this period.

**From initial idea to stone-laying ceremony**
The idea of a Jewish University was proposed as early as the Middle Ages when in 1466 the Jewish communities of Sicily petitioned King John II for permission to build such an institution. Despite approval of the petition, it failed to materialise.¹ Centuries later, Jean Jacques Rousseau voiced the importance of a Jewish University in a Jewish State in his book ‘Emile’ published in 1762 (before the Emancipation of French Jewry), in order to facilitate open dialogue between Christians and Jews, without fear of retaliation of Jews in Christian communities. He stated, ‘I shall never believe that I have seriously heard the arguments of the Jews until they have a free state, schools, and universities. Only then will we be able to know what they have to say.’² Rousseau emphasised that this type of university could only exist under the protection of a Jewish state. However, Zionism, the movement for the re-establishment of a Jewish national home in the Land of Israel, had not yet come into being.

In 1882-1884, Professor Herman Schapira of University of Heidelberg authored a series of articles that were published in Hamelitz (of St. Petersburg) which propounded the idea of a Jewish University in Palestine, however, at the time his idea received only modest attention.³ It was the confluence of Jewish nationalism, institutional antisemitism and rising antisemitic laws that were systematically excluding Jews from HE that produced a revival of the idea. Zionism, founded in the late 19th century by Theodore Herzl,⁴ emerged out of the growing nationalist sentiments in Europe at the time. Whilst in hindsight it may appear that Jewish nationalism, as represented by the Zionist movement, aimed at the creation of a nation-state (i.e. Israel), at least in the early years of the Zionist movement, the Jewish nationalist project was much more humble in its aims and statehood seemed a remote possibility.⁵ Different strands of Zionism were interested in a University in Palestine for the myriad roles that such an institution could play in achieving its aims: the revival of Hebrew culture and rejuvenation of Judaism; the physical needs that a settlement project would require; and an apex to a national HE system. At that time, Jews in Europe, particularly in Eastern Europe, were affected by oppressive laws and at the beginning of the twentieth century almost all Jewish students were barred by law from Russian and Romanian universities. While some Jewish students pursued HE in Western European countries, a system of stringent entrance exams and the status of a ‘foreigner’ resulted in the exclusion of large numbers of Jewish students from HE. Meanwhile, institutionalised antisemitism was widespread in Western Europe and North American universities.⁶ Thus, a Jewish University in Palestine would at once promote the physical and cultural needs of a re-established Jewish state, while alleviating the plight of Jewish students in Eastern Europe – and encourage their settlement in Palestine. This was expressed succinctly in the HUYB of 1939, ‘the HU owes its origin to the two forces which, in their combined working, have decided the destinies of the Jewish people in recent decades, namely: the awakened national consciousness with its creative manifestations...
The idea of a Jewish University was brought forth again by Schapira in 1897 at the first Zionist Congress in Basel, a gathering of 208 delegates from around the world that created the organisational structure for the Zionist project, the Zionist Organisation (ZO). At this first Congress, the idea garnered little attention as the focus was on more pressing, practical matters of organisation and settlement. At the fifth Congress in 1901, a group of Zionists (i.e. ‘Democratic Praxis faction’) led by Chaim Weizmann, a Russian-born and European educated Chemist; Martin Buber, an Austrian-born and European-educated Philosopher; Berthold Feiwel, an Austrian-born and European-educated Zionist activist; and Leo Motzkin, a Russian-born, European-educated Zionist activist, petitioned for attaching a more cultural purpose to Zionism and put forth more strongly the idea of a Jewish University for this end. In their petition, they were heavily influenced by Ahad Ha’am the head of Cultural Zionism, who emphasised the importance of the national project for building a ‘spiritual centre’ based on revitalisation and cultivation of Jewish culture for worldwide Jewry. Judah Magnes, an American-born and influential reform Rabbi with a PhD from Heidelberg, similarly was enthusiastic about the idea of a Jewish University and viewed it as a spiritual and intellectual centre of Judaism. While Herzl, then President of the ZO, suggested that the General Zionist Council make an in-depth inquiry into the matter of a Jewish University in Palestine, the matter was not put to a vote. However, this did not derail the project; Weizmann upon his return to Geneva, opened an office for the promotion of HU and wrote the pamphlet, Eine Judische Hochschule (1902) with Martin Buber and Berthold Feiwel. This pamphlet set out detailed statistical information and a survey of Jewish students, arguing for the creation of a Jewish University in Palestine. Reflecting on this period in Geneva, and the need for a Jewish University, Weizmann elaborated:

‘The HU was a response to a deep-seated need. The Russian-Jewish youth was being systematically excluded from the Russian schools. We felt the pressure in Germany and Switzerland; and part of the stream of migration was diverted to the south, to Italy. To us in Geneva it seemed logical to seek at least a partial solution for the homelessness of the young Jewish intellectual in a Hebrew University in Palestine. But only part of the impulse flowed from immediate practical considerations. It was also related to the general cultural programme and spiritual awakening which characterised the younger Zionist group.’

While the pamphlet garnered more attention and kept the idea alive, it was not until the 11th Zionist Congress in 1913 when Weizmann, with the support of Menachem Ussishkin, presented a proposal for the University, emphasising its importance for both practical as well
as cultural reasons; for the Jewish national project and for the Diaspora. On the latter points, he elaborated:

‘We will all sense the immense value of an intellectual center where Jews will be able to study, teach, and perform research in a convenient atmosphere, with neither restrictions nor pressure from non-Jewish cultures, amidst national life saturated with the will to create new Jewish values and connect our great heritage with the values of modernity. This synthesis will give rise to an authentic Jewish enlightenment that will be much to the benefit of the Jewish nation. Such a center that will give the Diaspora a great deal of influence and, thereby, will enhance the self-esteem of Jewish intellectuals…The university is of unimaginable value for the Diaspora….it will bring the new Jew, proud and blessed with creativity into being. The national enterprise will strengthen the Jewish people immensely and reinvigorate its intellect.’

The proposal was approved by the Zionist Congress and immediately a number of individuals pledged contributions to a total of 365,000 francs.

Soon afterwards a committee for the establishment of the HU was founded in Berlin, then the headquarters of the ZO; it succeeded in soliciting the support of the Chovevei Zion (Lovers of Zion) group of Odessa and, Isaac Leib Goldberg contributed a substantial sum to purchase the land in Palestine for HU. The location of HU, on Mount Scopus, was a spot which in Weizmann’s memoirs, he notes that he picked for HU in 1907 and which Magnes also favoured and purportedly picked on his 1912 visit to Jerusalem. It was a location which had symbolic significance and a dual scientific and cultural/nationalist significance:

‘The summit of Mount Scopus is the dividing line between the fauna and flora of the Mediterranean region and the desert. Hence it is an ideal site for a great scientific centre in Palestine. Scopus is also a very appropriate place for a great Jewish cultural centre symbolic of the national rebirth, because it was from there that the Roman general Titus nearly nineteen hundred years ago captured Jerusalem and destroyed the Jewish State.’

The house and estate were owned at the time by an English lawyer, Sir. John Grey Hill, and his wife. The purchase of the estate in 1916 was brokered by Arthur Ruppin, head of the Palestine Committee for HU. At this time the land was still under Ottoman occupation, and the victory of the British in the Middle East was far from assured (the British would not take effective military control over Jerusalem until early 1918). Thus, the approval of the Jewish University at the ZO Congress (1913) and the purchase of its land (1916) was in a period in which the prospect of the University ever being part of an independent Jewish State was remote; therefore HU was presumably considered a viable project under the Ottoman regime.
However, this purchase was considered by the British to be a great show of faith in the ultimate victory of the allies. In Weizmann’s memoirs he noted that Lady Grey Hill expressed the sentiment that ‘this act of ours had done more than anything else to convince her that England was going to win the war.’

In parallel to the work of the Berlin Committee, Weizmann began looking for support for HU throughout Europe and approached Baron Edmond de Rothschild, a Jewish Frenchman known for his generosity towards settlement of the land. Weizmann eventually received his support, however Rothschild was not interested in a teaching university, rather he envisioned a research institution, similar to the Pasteur Institute. Weizmann adopted this idea with the understanding that it would eventually progress into a fully-fledged University (Cohen, 2006a). He then spent much time trying to rally support for this vision of HU which began to take shape as a research institution in the first instance, with a language of instruction that would be Hebrew and located in Jerusalem (Cohen, 2006b).

A University with a research focus was not the only model proposed. Rather, from the outset there were diverse views on the purpose of a university, and the form it would take. Some Zionists, particularly the Revisionists led by Ze’ev (Vladimir) Jabotinsky, viewed HU primarily in its capacity to alleviate mass Jewish suffering and discrimination in Eastern Europe. In 1913 Jabotinsky wrote:

‘Dr Weizmann wants nothing but ‘research institutes’ where the teachers will strive to win the Nobel Prize – not a school where they teach students. I wrote a protest letter to the central committee of the Zionist Organisation of Germany in Berlin, and I even remember one of its paragraphs: ‘It is clear to me, too, that we’re not yet able to create a good university. So what? Let’s start with a bad university. You’ll see that it will have as much national and education value as a dozen top-flight research institutes’….I demanded that the ‘institutes’ plan be rejected and that the principle of a high academy for student-trainees be established’.  

The Zionist Labour movement, who in contrast to the political Zionist movement of Herzl, viewed the reclamation of the Jewish homeland through agricultural development and the creation of a Jewish proletariat (i.e. the Kibbutz movement) had different ideas; Cohen (2006b) argues that the Labour leadership felt that HU was an idea ahead of its time and that funds and efforts funnelled towards a University would detract from other, more fundamental needs of the national project. Opposing this view, cultural Zionists influenced by its leader Ahad Ha’am, emphasised that HU would advance the national project by serving as a ‘spiritual centre’ for the revival of Hebrew and Jewish culture. He argued that:
‘The establishment of a single great school of learning or art in Palestine, or of a single academy of language and literature, would in my opinion be a national achievement of first-rate importance, and would contribute more to the attainment of our aims than a hundred agricultural settlements.’

Other Zionists focused on the practical needs of the state in the making; with the first graduation of students from the Hebrew Gymnasia (secondary school) in Jaffa in 1905, the apex of a Jewish education system in Palestine was required unless students were to be sent abroad for HE. In the view of Ahad Ha’am, better to begin as a research institution, in areas in which they could make an impressive contribution to knowledge— and recruit impressive academics - rather than areas that would not ‘shed lustre’ on the Jewish people. A HU publication elaborated:

‘In the opinion of Ahad Ha’am, the establishment of a university on the model of other universities would not enhance the prestige of the Jewish people. We were not, he argued then in a position to acquire for the HU men of great enough calibre in the sciences and general humanities to make their mark in the world of scholarship and so shed lustre on the Jewish people as a whole. As a result, we would have a small and poor university, and this would not be worthwhile.’

This view represented an acute concern for the prestige of a Jewish University and how it would affect the image of the Jews to themselves as a self-identity of a learned people, and their image in Diaspora lands. Ahad Ha’am advocated beginning with a few research centres in areas that HU could excel, and that had a relation to Jewish studies with the hope that they could ‘reflect credit on an ancient and highly cultured nation.’ However, Weizmann, advocated the sciences as well. In his memoirs he states:

‘I felt too, that the sciences had to be encouraged in Jerusalem, not only for their own sake, but because they were an integral part of the programme for the full development of Palestine and also because opportunities for Jewish students in the leading universities of Europe were becoming more and more restricted.’

Weizmann further argued that the only model which was practical given the circumstances was a research institute, saying: ‘If these gentleman believe that they can conjure books, a language of instruction, professors, money, science out of the ground, let them find bliss in their belief.’ Importantly, from Weizmann’s fundraising efforts, he recognised that a research institution would be the only model which would gain sufficient financial support from the wealthy Diaspora.
Cohen (2006b) argues that these debates between the different Zionist factions and the non-Zionist Diaspora were based on the concept of two different models of University: a ‘University for the Jews’ and a ‘Jewish University’ (p. 275). The former denoted a primarily teaching university that was aimed at providing Jews in Palestine HE, while the latter denoted the more idealistic role of a research university which would benefit all Jews and would uphold Jewish self-worth, inculcate pride and reflect the importance of scholarship in Jewish life. Thus, Cohen argues, ‘the crux of tension concerned the relative statuses of research and teaching at HU.’ (2006b, p. 275). Pointedly, the idea of a teaching university was continually rejected by the affluent Diaspora and by the cultural Zionists. Thus, the model pursued in the beginning was that of research institutes, or a ‘spiritual centre’ that would serve world Jewry, including, but not limited to the Yishuv (Jewish population in Palestine).

In parallel to these debates, on 2 November 1917, during World War I, the British Government presented Baron Edmond de Rothschild, representative of the ZO in London, with the Balfour Declaration. It stated:

‘His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.’

It was the first public support for the Zionist project by a major world power. Having already purchased the land on Mount Scopus, Weizmann hastened to garner political support from Britain for HU and proceeded with a stone-laying ceremony, to solidify the promise of the declaration. The ceremony was attended by General Edmund Allenby and representatives from his staff, France and Italy, together with representatives of some of the heads of the religious communities in Jerusalem including the Anglican bishop and the Mufti of Jerusalem. In Weizmann’s memoirs, he noted that Allenby, looking back on the stone-laying ceremony remarked, ‘When I think back to that day – as I often do - I come to the conclusion that that short ceremony inspired my army, and gave them confidence in the future.’

Weizmann, in his address on the occasion, similarly noted the seeming incongruence of founding a university at such an early stage in the nation-building enterprise:

‘It seems at first sight paradoxical that in a land with so sparse a population, in a land where everything still remains to be done, we should begin by creating a centre of spiritual and intellectual development. But it is no paradox for those who know the soul of the Jew. It is true that great social and political problems still face us and will demand their solution from us. We Jews know that when the mind is given fullest play, when
we have a centre for the development of Jewish consciousness, then coincidentally we shall attain the fulfilment of our material needs."\textsuperscript{32}

On the afternoon of 24 July 1918, in poetic symbolism, Weizmann, acting as head of the Zionist Commission to Palestine, laid twelve foundation stones - for the twelve tribes of Israel - upon which the HU would be built.

**From stone-laying to inauguration**

Between the stone-laying ceremony and the inauguration of HU, seven years were to pass. With the stones-laid, Weizmann, began to rally support for HU in the Diaspora, working through the ZO, primarily out of London. In 1921, Albert Einstein and Chaim Weizmann embarked on a fundraising tour in the US for HU in conjunction with the Jewish National Fund (JNF);\textsuperscript{33} the trip had limited success. Cohen (2006b) argues that it was mired in tensions and controversy largely due to issues of funding and governance: it became apparent that the centralised funding of HU under ZO control would not solicit enough support for HU from affluent American Jewry, who wanted to retain control of their 'investment', and viewed their support of the project as more in partnership with the Zionist movement, than as passive donors. Negotiations on this front were slow and the issue was only resolved by the eventual acquiescence of the Zionists to explore a system of individual donations, which would then convey a level of governance in HU (i.e. membership on HU committees). Donations then began to flow, and the project began to take shape.

The trip taken by Weizmann and Einstein had one particularly important outcome: the support of the American Jewish Physicians Committee, which agreed to raise funds for the medical faculty, of which the pre-cursor would be the Microbiological Institute. The Institute was opened under the direction of Dr. Saul Adler in 1924. At the same time, the London Committee, directed by Weizmann, a chemist himself, succeeded in procuring support for an Institute of Chemistry with donations from Rothschild and other European donors. Thus, in 1923, an Institute in Chemistry was installed on Mount Scopus.\textsuperscript{34}

While these projects advanced in Europe and the US, a key event in Palestine provided an impetus for Jerusalem to form a committee: in 1922, the British Government proposed establishing an English University in Palestine, which would be for both Jews and Arabs. This plan was met with alarm by the ZO. Klausner elaborated:

‘this plan constituted a threat to Hebrew culture in Palestine, in that it meant competition for the projected HU. Ussishkin, who was then Chairman of the Palestine
Zionist Executive, recognised these two dangers, and he as well as I urged that Storrs (British Governor of Jerusalem) be informed of our refusal to participate in the English University since the HU was about to be opened.\(^{35}\)

The British proposal was squashed; however, the threat gave impetus to swiftly move HU forward. Thus, to address the threat of losing Zionist hegemony on a university in Palestine, a HU Committee to advance the Humanities in Jerusalem was formed in 1922, composed of prominent academics and Zionist figures.\(^{36}\) The first project was to form the Institute for Jewish Studies. The project gained support from the Committees established in London\(^{37}\) and Paris and in February 1924, Magnes obtained from Felix Warburg, a prominent leader in the New York Jewish Community and heir to a large banking family in Frankfort, $500,000 to open the Institute of Jewish Studies.\(^{38}\) Thus, with these funds – and others from the American and European Diaspora - the Institute of Jewish Studies was established in December 1924 with three professors. These first three areas of operation were linked to the myriad purposes of HU. Bentwich elaborated:

‘…the three first subjects of research should be Jewish studies, chemistry, and microbiology, marking the three primary purposes, the revival of Judaism, the development of the resources of the country, and medical progress to which the institute of higher learning should be devoted.’\(^{39}\)

Thus, these areas represented the views of both Ahad Ha’am and Weizmann, that the HU would serve as a spiritual centre, to revive and modernise Jewish and Hebrew culture; and simultaneously promote the development of the land through scientific research. Despite the fear from some Zionist factions, as embodied by Jabotinsky, HU, as a research institution provided significant service to the Zionist enterprise (see sections 4.3 and 4.4).

With three research institutes (founded by three committees spanning as many continents) functioning, the HU inauguration was set for April 1, 1925 and Weizmann, in his capacity as President of the ZO, presided over the ceremony, with Lord Balfour, at 76 years old, traveling from London for the occasion as the honoured guest. The event drew thousands of people and many notables among the different factions of the Zionist movement (e.g. Ruppin; Ahad Ha’am; Tchernichowsky); British government and armed forces (e.g. General Allenby; Dr. Rappard of Geneva, Secretary of the Mandates Commission); and representatives of famous universities, rabbis (e.g. Chief Rabbi Kook), diplomats, and journalists. The hopes pinned on HU as expressed during the inaugural speeches were enormous, particularly given its modest beginnings. Lord Balfour, describing HU as an endeavour to ‘adapt[ing] a Western form of University to an Asiatic site and to an education which is to be carried on in an Eastern language,’\(^{40}\) expressed his profound belief in the
success of the institution, his admiration for Jewish scientists and his confidence that HU would overcome issues of language and academic staffing to promote the cultural and national development; to contribute to knowledge (‘…the very loftiest plane of human intellectual endeavour’) and to advance peaceful relations between Arabs and Jews of the land. He concluded:

‘It is because I am confident that in that great task [increasing knowledge] HU of Jerusalem is going to play no small or ignoble part, that it is indeed animated by ideals of the highest, and that it will be staffed and composed of men not inferior to men in any part of the world, it is for these reasons and with supreme confidence in the future, I now declare HU of Jerusalem to be opened.’

Chaim Nachman Bialik, a renowned Hebrew poet, in his speech emphasised the beginning of the intellectual foundations of the nation in making:

‘I am sure that the eyes of the tens of thousands of Israel that are lifted from the dispersions of the Exile to this hill are shining with hope and comfort, their hearts and their flesh are singing a blessing of thanksgiving unto the Living God Who hath preserved us and sustained us and let us live to see this house. They all realise that at this moment Israel has kindled upon Mount Scopus the first candle of the inauguration of her intellectual life…’

Viscount Herbert Samuel reflecting on the day and his speech reminisced:

‘I remember vividly…as no doubt will everyone, still living, of those who were present. They will remember, as I do, the demeanour of the vast and crowded audience – the sense of a deep historical significance in the event, a feeling of achievement that such a beginning should at last be possible, and of fervent hope that it should lead to great accomplishment in times to come. And, for myself, what lives in my recollection most vividly of all was the pent-up emotion, released after centuries of longing, that could be sensed throughout the great assembly, when, at the end of my speech, I spoke in Hebrew the words of the ancient benediction, ‘Blessed art Thou, who hast kept us in life, and has preserved us, and enabled us to reach this season’. 

In addition to these international dignitaries and Zionist figures, Cohen’s (2006b) study analyses the ideological attitude of Diaspora Jews to HU at its inauguration, arguing that they viewed the foundations of HU as a comprehensive and dramatic step that was ‘rooted in the ancient Jewish tradition of fostering ‘intellectual excellence,’ an inseparable part of the self-perception of the Jewish Diaspora.’ The Diaspora had great expectations for HU including reviving and modernising Jewish life; promoting enlightenment values; preaching peace and
inclusion; and serving as ‘a repository of Jewish creative endeavour.’ Reflecting on the role of HU for the Jewish people, Bentwich remarked: ‘The HU of Jerusalem is to Jews everywhere what Oxford and Cambridge have been for centuries, not only to the people of Great Britain but to the English-speaking world, and what Athens was in the Hellenistic age to all who spoke Greek.’ HU thus possessed great expectations from the Zionists and Diaspora (and the world at large) to provide the ‘spiritual centre’ for World Jewry and to further the national project.

**Funding, governance and mission: The Diaspora University**

In the first years of HU's organisation, when the ZO took charge of forming committees around the world and facilitated the purchase of the Mount Scopus property, the bulk of the funding came from the ZO. The decision to begin as research institutes, meant that funding through tuition was not an option. The British Mandatory Government was never relied upon for funds, but rather was petitioned for political support (e.g. permission to buy the Mount Scopus property; building projects; roads). Thus, the ‘University of the Jewish People’, would be financed by the Jewish people, and from about 1925 the Diaspora become its primary benefactors (see Appendix D). In the early years of HU's development individual donations were solicited, primarily from Magnes, who became HU's first Chancellor in 1925 and had extensive personal connections with wealthy American Jews (before his position at HU, he was head of a prominent Jewish community in New York, and founded its Bureau for Education) which facilitated fundraising (e.g. he solicited the $500,000 donation from Warburg). However, in 1925, the Friends of Hebrew University (FHU) were initiated, first in the US (with Warburg as President) and spreading rapidly around the world becoming a well-organised network of supporters that was instrumental in facilitating HU's development, international public relations and the flow of funds. By 1930 HU Committees and FHU branches were established in: Palestine, USA, UK, Italy, Poland, France, Germany, Holland, Denmark, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Latvia, Romania and Switzerland with a growing list over the period (e.g. China, Egypt, South Africa, Luxembourg). Thus, despite its location in Palestine, the main funds for HU came from the Diaspora.

As established in previously, the implication of this financial commitment was that the Diaspora would wield influence in HU’s governance. Shortly after the inauguration, on April 12, 1925, the Board of Governors (BOG) was established to be the supreme governing body of HU; it was responsible for its ownership and control, and the academic and administrative bodies worked under its authority. The HUYB of 1939 explains: ‘The HU has always regarded itself as the university of the whole Jewish people. In its scheme and organization, the BOG is the trustee for the Jewish people as such, and exercises supreme authority in its affairs.’
The BOG was at first composed of nine members, headed by Weizmann, however, by the end of 1926, it was composed of 34 members representing an international coalition of three groups: the ZO; the FHU, large individual and organisational donors; and renowned Jewish academics51 (see Appendix E for the representation of the BOG by country from 1930-1948). It was continually headed by Weizmann and at various times included men of considerable renown including Albert Einstein, Sigmund Freud, Martin Buber and Baron James de Rothschild. In order to clarify its legal status under the British Mandate, on August 4, 1925, the HU Association was constituted (with the same composition as the BOG) and registered with the Government of Palestine; a month later it received the status of an 'Institution of Public Utility' and the ZO transferred all property and assets of HU to the Association. HU was thus not under the accreditation or auspices of the British Government in Palestine or the ZO; but under the direction of its international BOG. Alongside the BOG, an Academic Council was created in 1925 to act as a consultant for academic policies and to decide on senior academic appointments, until the size and research quality was such that a Senate could be established. The Council was originally headed by Einstein, and in 1930, it comprised 24 members from six countries, with 1/3 coming from Germany/Austria; and 17% from the UK and USA respectively. Pointedly, Palestinian Arab academics were not represented (see Appendix E). Thus by 1925, HU was funded, governed and academically guided (and staffed, see section 4.2) by the Diaspora, while centrally managed by Magnes.

In 1933, as a result of disagreements over Magnes’s management (led by Albert Einstein who disagreed with his involvement in academic affairs), HU appointed a committee,52 to provide recommendations for the development of HU. As a result, the office of Chancellor was eliminated and Magnes was made President, a largely ceremonial position. Fundraising was no longer his domain and was institutionalised into The Department of Organization and Information, representing a transition of fundraising from the personal to the institutional level.53 The Academic Council was disbanded, and a Senate created, which was composed of all the Professors and an elected Rector. Given the infrequency of BOG meetings and the geographic dispersion of the its members, an Executive Council, was created, which would include academics and give them a voice in administration. Thus, the governance of academic matters was in the hands of academic staff, as was large measure of control of the administration. Consequently, Cohen and Sapir (2016) argue that the academic staff enjoyed significant autonomy from the ZO in this period, protected by funding from the Diaspora, in a form of governance that they label the Diaspora University. The ZO was unable in this period to employ the coercive powers of a State; Cohen and Sapir (2016) argue that this system of governance ‘enabled the faculty to maintain continuous influence over the management of the university, reflecting the Board’s policy of research elitism and its
objection to the subjugation of the university to nation-building purposes.' (p. 611). In line with the aim of HU to serve worldwide Jewry, this coalition between the academic staff and the Diaspora consistently rejected initiatives from the ZO to steer HU towards national purposes (e.g. opening certain teaching faculties; faculty appointments). The HUYB elaborates this position: ‘The HU in Jerusalem is the only university that the Jewish people has established for itself. Therefore, it is not intended to serve the Yishuv, the Jewish community in Palestine, alone, but the entire Jewish people.’

From research institutes to a research and teaching university

In parallel to the developing Diaspora model, after the inauguration, HU gradually expanded its research institutes and added more departments (e.g. Institute of Mathematics; School of Oriental Studies). Pressure quickly mounted from within and outside Palestine for HU to begin organised instruction. The HUYBs indicate three forces which expediated degree instruction:

‘First of all, the professors realised that daily contact with students was a stimulus to research in new directions. Secondly, it had become necessary to train a staff of young research assistants. Lastly, numerous students were clamouring for admission. The Institute of Jewish Studies, for example was besieged with applications from Palestinian teachers and young Palestinian scholars. Moreover, Jewish students in the Diaspora were demanding ever more insistently that HU’s doors be opened to them, and they were supported by a certain amount of public opinion.’

The BOG thus passed a resolution to begin degree-programmes, while maintaining a strong emphasis on research:

‘…only such students could quality for admission as had had adequate training; instruction was to be offered only in those subjects for which competent teachers were available; degrees were to be granted only in connection with those courses for which HU had a professor with an adequate staff of assistants and for which research facilities were provided.’

The idea was based on the German model, in that research and teaching would be closely connected, and the latter would stem from the former. The degrees offered at HU in this period were four-year master’s degree courses and PhD courses. Notably, HU refused to create undergraduate programmes, or expand into areas by dint of pressure from the local Zionist community (see Cohen and Sapir, 2016). Following these principles, HU gradually enrolled students, first in 1928, in the newly inaugurated Faculty of Humanities, in 1931 in the Division
of Biological Sciences and in 1935 in the Faculty of Sciences. While the move towards teaching provided solutions for some Jewish students in Palestine, teaching was also instituted for the entire Diaspora, even secure and affluent Diaspora elements. The HUYB of 1942 explains:

‘It is most desirable that large numbers of students from the Diaspora should come to Jerusalem in order to attain proficiency in Jewish studies, and that graduates of HU should find scope for their abilities in the Diaspora as teachers, officials of Jewish institution and organisation and protagonists of Jewish culture.’

Thus, beyond meeting the educational needs of an oppressed Jewry in Europe and the growing Jewish population in Palestine, teaching was to strengthen Jewish communities in the Diaspora. Pointedly, given the aforementioned incorporation of HU, degrees were conferred on the strength of HU and the Academic Council, without any Zionist, or State (i.e. British) accreditation.

Beginning in 1933, HU confronted a new purpose; while antisemitism was an impetus for HU from its initial inception, the rise of Fascism and the existential threat to the Jewish community in Europe exerted tremendous pressure on HU to further expand its student body and academic staff. This growth was reliant on Diaspora generosity; new research and teaching departments (e.g. Cancer Research Laboratory; School of Education; Pre-Faculty of Medicine); academic chairs; research equipment, books and specimens (see section 4.2); and the physical infrastructures were opened with funding from the Diaspora. This dependence on the Diaspora for HU’s expansion was a readily recognised fact and the 1939 HUYB, states, ‘Faculties for the study of law, political economy, and medicine (subjects which have a particular attraction for Jewish students) must wait until HU is provided with the necessary means by the Jewish people.’ While the majority of funds came from the US, support for HU was widespread throughout the Diaspora and shifted with economic and political conditions. Salmann Schocken, Chairman of the Executive Council, remarked in the introduction to the HUYB of 1942:

‘The increased strain upon the University’s resources came at a time when many of its sources of income failed owing to the tragic fate which has befallen most of the Jewish communities of the [European] Continent. For the greatest part of its maintenance the University now depends upon the United States, which has always been the largest contributor, and the British empire. During the past year the Latin-American countries have come forward with substantially increased contributions.’ He continues to rally ‘its friends in all the free countries to support its efforts to the maximum, so that Jewish scholarship and science may be enabled to do their full share in the fight for freedom.'
The light of Jewish learning has been quenched in Europe: it must be kept burning all the more brightly in the Land of Israel.\textsuperscript{62}

Despite the precarious position of the Zionist project given the White Paper of 1939,\textsuperscript{63} that limited Jewish immigration to Palestine and land purchases, throughout the war years, HU was completely co-opted into the Allied war effort. HU ascribed to the tone set by David Ben-Gurion, then President of the Jewish Agency in Palestine and eventually Israel's first PM, who said 'We will fight the war as if there were no White Paper, and we will fight the White Paper as if there were no war' with the implication that all help would be given to the British in the fight against Fascism, but that this would not indicate an acceptance of the new British policy towards the Jews in Palestine.\textsuperscript{64} HU's activities during the war were detailed in the HUYB of 1948: 'as soon as the war broke out in 1939, HU placed its scientific and all other facilities at the disposal of the Government for the promotion of the war effort.'\textsuperscript{65} The support it provided was extensive and in 1942 a Scientific Advisory Committee for the Palestine War Supply Board was organised under the direction of the President of HU. It provided services to the various British armed forces including production and repair of wireless equipment; design, production and repair of scientific apparatuses and precision instruments; preparation of chemicals for military purposes and geological reports for the construction of wartime projects, such as airfields.\textsuperscript{66} Medical scientists gave courses in local tropical diseases to Allied doctors, malaria control and treatment, wound management advice given and even vaccines were developed and administered to Allied troops. Biologists, botanists and geologists assisted with crop development, irrigation and pest control to feed the large population in Palestine, while supply lines were cut.\textsuperscript{67} At this time, Bentwich recalled Mount 'Scopus was then a hub of activity in the war, an arsenal of brains.'\textsuperscript{68} While growth during WWII was restricted, by the end of the period, on the eve of independence in 1948, HU had grown to encompass over 1,000 students, 190 academic staff; it was planning a large development programme on Mount Scopus, attributed to two factors: 'the expected post-war growth of the Homeland and the imperative need to make good, as far as possible, the losses caused to Jewish scholarship by the destruction of the European centres of Jewish learning.'\textsuperscript{69}

In sum, throughout the history from an idea emanating from Europe in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century until the eve of independence in 1948, HU takes shape. The impetus for its creation was embedded in persecution, closely linked with the Jewish national project and the 'spiritual' and identity considerations of the entire Jewish community. During this period, there was a nearly absolute reliance on Diaspora funding for the creation, maintenance and expansion of HU. This kept the horizons of HU wider than just the national project, and HU was founded as a 'spiritual centre', intended to serve worldwide Jewry. The form of governance established
gave significant control to academic staff and the Diaspora, who could – and did – refuse to cater to the demands of the Yishuv.

4.2 ‘International’ dimensions of research

In this section I analyse the purposes of research, how it was funded, and the academic staff. Although some aspects (e.g. research projects) are more inward looking than international, it is important for the thesis to establish a starting point to understand the purposes of research and its international dimensions over time.

Research institutes and projects

Through the applications of (European) scientific methods and procedures, research aimed to create a dense knowledge of Palestine, and the foundations for settlement and industry while reviving the Jewish and Hebrew language and culture. Sciences were focused on problems of significance to the physical settlement of the country and Humanities were concerned with cultural revival – both vital for the nation-state in the making and important to the Diaspora. HU followed the German chair system, which granted significant autonomy and control of Professors over their research, budget and subordinate academic and administrative staff. However, they were expected to investigate problems that would advance the nation-building project. The HUYB of 1927 explains:

‘...the scientist is free is to select his problems and should never be pressed for rapid tangible results; yet as a rule, he will choose problems for the solution of which his surroundings present favourable conditions. He thus renders important services to the country and greatly helps the local engineers, physicians, teachers, etc. ...definite, if modest, results in this direction are being attained.’

HU’s founders, largely considered Palestine terra incognita; there was little scientific knowledge about the land, its climate, flora and fauna, natural mineral deposits, or diseases. Knowledge in these areas was vital for the physical settlement and improvement of the land and its people -- and for the commercial viability of country. These concerns guided the research of the Faculty of Science and Schools of Agriculture and Medicine.

The Department of Chemistry, the oldest and first research institute, from the beginning 'was in close touch with the problems arising from the agricultural and industrial development
of the Yishuv.' Some projects pursued included the manufacturing processes of scientific equipment (e.g. thermometers, aerometers, mercury switches, laboratory glass instruments); the utilisation of local waste products; production of agricultural fumigants; and the development of industrial plastics; polishes, paints drugs and vitamins from local materials. Likewise, the research of the different departments in the Faculty of Science were adapted to the practical problems of the period and for exploring the land in what Troen (1992, p. 49) calls a ‘German colonial model.’ This model included an utilitarian approach to studying, categorising and exploiting the land using scientific research – however, in this case, the motivation was not to enrich a foreign state, rather it was to facilitate settlement of the land and ensure the viability of a (future) Jewish community/State. The Department of Botany classified varieties of indigenous cereals, legumes, fodder plants, medicinal and industrial plants in Palestine. The Department of Zoology carried out research on the fauna of Palestine and neighbouring countries. The Department of Geology made surveys of the land, water and minerals of Palestine and ‘these investigations have also been made with a view to the economic development of the country, such as the search for groundwater.’ The Laboratory of Meteorology and Climatology made studies of the soil temperature, solar energy, rainfall and other weather and climate conditions across the region with a special emphasis on the Negev. This was particularly important as it comprised a significant portion of the land granted to the Jews in the UN Partition plan, but was mostly unsuitable at the time for agricultural and human settlement (Morag, 2001). The practical outcomes from this Laboratory were elaborated in the HUYB of 1948:

‘Conclusions from the data collected are applied to problems of agriculture, construction of houses, climatic therapy, and other essential problems of settlement in hitherto undeveloped regions of the country.’

Research in the School of Agriculture, opened in 1940 in conjunction with the Agricultural Research Station of the Jewish Agency in Rehovot, focused on the practical problems of agriculture in the Yishuv such as irrigation; crop and seed studies; soil quality; fertilizers; animal husbandry and breeding; farm planning; control of animal and plant diseases. These represented pressing problems in the Yishuv, with important connections to the viability of settlement of the land.

The School of Medicine, founded by a partnership between the Hadassah Women’s Zionist Organisation of America, the Jewish Physicians Association of America and HU, conducted medical research into the endemic and epidemic diseases in Palestine and the Middle East (e.g. Malaria, Typhoid, Typhus, Dysentery, Oriental Sore and Kala-azar) and through these efforts many of them were brought under control. In all of these endeavours,
HU research significantly contributed to the understanding and development of Palestine, the region and its people.

While the sciences addressed physical settlement, the humanities addressed the need for the knowledge of the people, histories, religions and cultures of the land and the region, with a focus on Hebrew and Jewish studies to contribute to revival of Hebrew culture and a revitalised, modern Jewish identity. By 1948, the Faculty of Humanities comprised three divisions: the Institute of Jewish Studies, the School of Oriental Studies and the General Humanities. Research in the Institute of Jewish Studies focused on Bible; Talmud; Hebrew Philology; Hebrew Literature; Jewish Philosophy and Mysticism; Jewish History; Archaeology of Palestine; Sociology and Demography of the Jews; Jewish Law; and Historical Geography of Palestine. These areas represented new fields of academic research, some of which had only been taught in Yeshivot (seminaries) and were marginalised (if present at all) in Western Universities. It was hoped that research in Jewish studies, through the use of scientific methods, unfettered by religious dogma, would advance scientific knowledge of the Jewish people, cultures and religion and serve to bind together world Jewry. The 1939 HUYB elaborated:

‘…a new and striking picture of Jewish history and Jewish contemporary life will emerge, that the forces which operated and still operate within Jewry will be made clearly manifest and that thereby the ties which bind Jews to one another and to Judaism will be revived and reinforced.’

Thus, through research projects in Jewish studies, such as tracing the evolution of Hebrew; criticism of texts and sources of the Talmud; and histories of the Jews and their languages, this department served an important role in the revival of Hebrew culture and modernising Jewish identity in the world. It gained in importance as the Holocaust wiped out large and established institutions of Jewish learning, and imminent scholars. The Department gradually took a leading role in Jewish education in the Diaspora as well and in 1947, hosted the first world conference on Jewish Studies and Jewish Education in the Diaspora in which about 200 lectures were given. Reflecting on HU’s contribution to knowledge in these areas, the HUYB of 1939 remarked that ‘the Jews of the Diaspora rejoiced particularly in the contributions of HU to the advancement of Jewish culture and the development of the Hebrew language.’

Research throughout the Faculty of Humanities advanced knowledge in many fields (e.g. Islamic studies; Philosophy) however, there was also a focus on Jewish and Hebrew dimensions. For example, while some of the research in the School of Oriental Studies focused on standard areas in the field (e.g. Arabic language and culture; studies of influential and sacred texts) and HU published some impressive works in these areas (e.g. concordance
of classical Arabic poetry), research in the department also addressed the Jews of the Orient (e.g. the Dialect of the Kurdish Jews; History of the Jews of Palestine in the nineteenth century; Judeo-Arabic; the language and history of the Yemenite Jews). The remarks of Dr. Eleazer Sukenik, a renowned Israeli archaeologist who won world renown for his role in identifying and dating the Dead Sea Scrolls, in 1926, when he was appointed to the first post in archaeology at HU illustrated this point: ‘The important work that lies before me is the creation of Jewish archaeology.’ Thus, through research in the Faculty of the Humanities, the mission of HU to serve the whole of the Jewish People through research was pursued, and aided in cementing national histories, cultural frames of reference and even in exploring the communities (e.g. Jewish communities of the Orient) which would arrive to the new State in mass post-1948. Notably, across the Sciences and the Humanities, researchers were creating not only new knowledge about Palestine and the Jewish people, but modern scholarship in the Hebrew language, producing textbooks, and scholarly publications, which would set the foundations for advanced study in all fields in the Hebrew language. Taken together, the Sciences and Humanities served the economic, political, social and cultural aims of the Diaspora and Zionist movement.

In the aid of this research, samples, books and equipment were donated by the Diaspora. For example, funds from the Women’s Zionist Society of Rhodesia and Louis Rosenbloom were used to acquire the Oriental Collection for the Jewish National and University Library; Prof. Otto Warburg donated his personal collection of volumes on Oriental Flora and complete sets of botanical and agricultural Journals; and rock and mineral collections were donated to the Dept. of Geology by M. I. Abrahams of Johannesburg. Research institutes and chairs were often established with the Diaspora, and at times with the Zionists. However, it was not only Diaspora and Zionist communities who contributed: States were (marginally) involved in promoting research and the development of particular fields: the British Council and French Government supported lectureships and provided libraries in English and French respectively; some research grants were likewise received from international ‘non-Jewish bodies’ (e.g. British Cancer Fund (UK); Wellcome Foundation (UK); Rockefeller and Dazian Foundations (USA).

**Diaspora academic staff**

In the early years, before fully-fledged academic departments and faculties were established, academic staff members were appointed to positions at the invitation of HU Committees in New York, London and Jerusalem and in consultation with the Academic Council. The
academic staff of HU began modestly and at the inauguration in 1925, there were five male professors, all of whom were born and educated in Europe and the US: Prof. Andor Fodor (born in Hungary, PhD in Switzerland), appointed as head of the Chemistry Institute in 1923; Dr. Saul Adler (born in Russian Empire, PhD, UK) head of the Microbiological Institute, appointed in 1924; and Professors Max Leopold Margolis (born in Lithuania, PhD, USA) Yitzhak Guttmann (born in Germany, PhD, Poland) and Samuel Klein (born in Hungary; PhD, Germany) of the Institute of Jewish Studies in 1924.

As HU developed, the academic staff expanded and in 1948 reached 190 members. According to my analysis of the academic staff biographies in the HUYBs of 1939, 1942 and 1948, the overwhelming majority of academic staff were born in Europe, with a large contingent from Eastern Europe. They were mostly educated in the universities of Europe, however by 1948, there began to be some HU educated academic staff, particularly junior assistants and student instructors. This is unsurprising given that the largest Jewish communities up until the Holocaust were located in Europe and that HU was the only university in Palestine which granted doctoral degrees and that HU and Zionism more broadly was a largely European/American (Ashkenazi Jewish) project. These academics brought with them European epistemologies, methodologies, notions of the purpose of a University (the pursuit of knowledge as opposed to professional purposes tied to labour markets) and models of how a university should be organised (i.e. the Germanic model, combining research and teaching, the Chair system). Pointedly, there is no mention of any Palestinian Arab academic staff in the HUYB biographies— even in areas such as Arabic language.

Some of the growth in the academic staff consisted of displaced German and Italian Jewish academics who had been pushed out of their former Universities by Fascist racial laws. In 1939, there were 22 academic staff who were obliged to leave their previous posts in German universities. Once Italy adopted its fascist racial laws in the autumn of 1938, Italian Jewish academics also sought refuge at HU. In 1942 this number had reached 29 academic staff from Germany and Italy absorbed into HU. This was not by chance; fundraising campaigns were organised around the world, and Magnes lobbied the Diaspora for the funds to bring these persecuted academics to HU. This sustained effort bore fruit and had an impact on the social and demographic composition of the academic staff at HU – as well as in saving the lives of these academics from the fate of their kind in Europe – however, it is interesting to consider these efforts in a comparative light. Bentwich, in his institutional history, viewed these efforts as largely disappointing; he explains that England accommodated about 200 displaced academics and even ‘Turkey, on the fringe of Western civilisation’ engaged about 50 academics and 50 assistants while HU engaged only about 100 students and a few score of exiles.
A significant challenge to this system of importing European (diaspora) academics, was that while there were regularly visiting lecturers who gave instruction in many languages, permanent academic staff had to teach in Hebrew. Hebrew was at the time in a period of rapid transition and it is clear from the archival records that the academics as well as the administrators were still trying to grasp the language (e.g. often using foreign words in Hebrew script). Moreover, the challenge of teaching in Hebrew was not limited to the sciences – even academic Jewish texts at the time were not usually written in Hebrew. While this did not cumulate in a ‘language war’ as it did at the Technion in Haifa (see Saposnik, 2008), it nonetheless created a practical problem. This was explicitly acknowledged in the HUYB of 1939 as a significant challenge for recruitment of academic staff and also limited the pool of candidates to those who would make the considerable effort, particularly at advanced ages, to learn Hebrew. This coalesces with the institutional history of Bentwich, in which he argues that it was important for HU to begin to train its own staff, who were mother-tongue Hebrews; not only because of language issues but also because renowned professors would likely not be attracted to HU, at least in large quantities. Academics were likely captivated by the Zionist undertaking, as indeed Bentwich notes that it was clear from the beginning that few academics would come to Israel unless they were either Zionist or religious because of the lower standard of living\textsuperscript{92} – or seeking refuge.

Part of the effect of the diasporic nature of academic staff was that HU, despite its geographical distance from large centres of learning in Europe and the US, and the official language of instruction, was linked quickly with the (primarily Western) academic world. Diaspora academics that came to Palestine did not totally break contacts with their former homes and they published in Hebrew and foreign languages (particularly German and English) and maintained international scholarly connections.\textsuperscript{93} HU researchers were also extended invitations by several governments (e.g. Syria, Iraq, Turkey, Argentina) for research services on afforestation problems and locust plague; entomological advising; and to survey water reserves and oil deposits.\textsuperscript{94} Demonstrating its international connections the HUYB of 1939 elaborated:

‘Many foreign universities and institutes have extended invitations to members of the academic staff of the HU to deliver guest lectures under their auspices...universities in Egypt, England, France, Holland, the US, Canada, Russia, Switzerland, Syria and Turkey. Conversely, foreign scientists have been invited to lecture at the HU when visiting Palestine. Some of the professors of the HU are members of foreign academies and other learned societies, and have taken part in scientific expeditions organized under non-Palestinian auspices. The HU is in constant communication with scientific institutes in other countries.’\textsuperscript{95}
In sum, the academic staff during this period were men, mostly born and educated in Europe. They brought with them European epistemologies; methods; ideas of how research and teaching should be organised; and international academic connections. However, at the end of this period, HU had degree programmes for almost 20 years and was beginning to employ some ‘home grown’ Palestinian Jewish academics. The research and teaching facilities and professorial chairs that many occupied, were supported by Diaspora supporters and Hebrew was a ‘hardly acquired’ tongue for these academics.

4.3. ‘International’ dimensions of teaching

Academic offerings and admissions

As noted in section 4.1, reflecting the focus on research, the first degrees conferred at HU, were Master of Arts and Sciences degrees (Magister Artium; Magister Scientiarum) and later the Doctor of Philosophy (PhD). The HU was officially open to all students, ‘whatever their race or colour, creed or opinions’, however it was established ‘as the University to which any Jewish student could claim admission as his inalienable right, a right not to be annulled by repressive laws, or by racial or social prejudice.’ Thus, HU was in principle open to all, however, it was established primarily for Jewish students, both to provide access to HE for Diaspora Jews, and as a matter of building the Jewish nation. This ‘right’ however, was quickly denied; there were too many students for too few places. The HUYB of 1939 elaborated:

‘HU can at present provide accommodation for only a restricted number of students. The Faculty of Science, for example, owing to limited laboratory space, was unable to admit all students who applied last year.’

Due to these limitations and a surplus of demand for limited student places, admission criteria were quickly established. Admission requirements varied by country of matriculation and language of instruction. In 1933, the HU Senate created the Committee on Secondary Schools, which performed a form of evaluation and accreditation of Jewish schools in Palestine. The HUYB of 1939 elaborated:

‘...the schools are naturally desirous of having their certificates recognized by the University, the Committee exercises a considerable influence over their educational methods even though it lacks official authority. Every school hitherto observed has received suggestions for improvements in its curriculum or in the teaching of particular subjects. Compliance with these suggestions within a definite period is made a condition for recognition of the certificates of a school by the University...’
Notably, this work, was part of the services that HU provided the Yishuv and the HUYB of 1939 declared, 'this work is carried on with the complete approval of the Education Department of the Jewish National Council, which welcomes the University's assistance in this field as in others.'

Eventually students with a matriculation from these schools could be admitted without examination or Hebrew preparatory courses. Countries which supplied many students to HU, also established recognised pathways for admission (e.g. from Poland, government certificates or certificates from recognised Hebrew secondary schools; from Romania and Germany, official matriculation certificates; from the USA, preparatory studies of at least two years at college; from England, matriculation certificate and usually a year of preparation).

Applicants without matriculation certificates or ones that were not recognised, could be admitted based on passing an entrance examination. Those unable to pass the entrance examinations and without a sufficient matriculation certificate, could be admitted by an admissions committee as a non-matriculated student, usually for up to one year, during which they would attend courses and prepare for the entrance examinations. There is evidence that this mechanism was used more during World War II to admit students ensnared in occupied Europe, in an attempt to receive student visas to Palestine, although this was not always successful. Thus, from the outset, HU admissions were highly international; and were tied to Jewish immigration to the country, strongly linked to persecution.

A significant proportion (about half) of the students were not educated in Hebrew and had matriculation certificates from around the world (see Table 3). Students who met the admission criteria, but lacked the appropriate Hebrew level, could be accepted with the addition of Ulpan (Hebrew language courses) usually taking place over a period of two years. Students were required to pass a Hebrew language proficiency exam no later than one year before their final degree exams. As Hebrew was still a language in development, particularly for academic purposes, much of the academic literature was written in foreign languages. Thus, in addition to Hebrew, HU had a policy that students must be proficient in either English, French or German, and exams were required one year before their final degree exams. Specific programmes and faculties had other preparatory courses (e.g. the humanities, offered preparatory courses in Talmud; Greek; Latin; Arabic; English; French; Italian; and Spanish). Notably, these courses did not prohibit students from participating in the regular lectures of their Faculties and there was not a designated ‘international’ pathway; rather the infrastructure of HU – from admissions to degree programmes - was developed to absorb and support the diverse student population, with supplementary courses, while keeping students together as a group as much as possible. HU thus departed from the colonial university model in regard to its language of instruction, which was a reflection of national cultural revival and
modernisation of the language of the Jews, and not that of the ruling States (i.e. Turkish; English).

**Formal curriculum: Creating new fields**

At the end of the period in 1948 there were two faculties – Humanities and Sciences – the pre-Faculty of Medicine, the School of Agriculture and the Department of Education (as yet unattached to a Faculty). Reflecting the close relationship between research and teaching, teaching grew gradually out of research institutes and departments. The curriculum reflected this deep connection with academic research and HU followed the German Model, which granted Professors complete autonomy and control over the curriculum and their teaching.

The formal curriculum incorporated the ‘universal’ foundations in different disciplines, which would be similar to those taught in European universities (in which the majority of the academic staff had been trained) while reflecting novel teaching subjects, that cultivated and disseminated knowledge about the Jewish people and the land and People of Palestine emerging from research. This was a pioneering project, and entailed the formation of new fields of teaching. In the sciences, in addition to introductory ‘universal’ courses, there were courses on the geology, biology, zoology and natural conditions in Palestine and its region. Prof. Picard from the Department of Geology taught courses in Physical and Historical Geology, Geological cartography, Geo-Morphology, and *Geology of Palestine*. Similarly, in the Social Sciences major, first year core courses included introductions to general sociology, economics, demography and statistics; and also *Bases of Jewish Society*. These represented some of the first courses in these areas and the beginning of academic study of a new area: Palestinology/Israel studies.

In addition to these novel courses in the sciences and social sciences, the role of Jewish Studies at HU was to explore, scientifically and using critical methodologies, Jewish history, culture and religion, in order to create and spur a revival of Jewish civilisation and identity which would work to bind Jews around the world together. To this end, in the Talmud major, the approach to the subject was not the dogmatic approach used in the Yeshivot (religious seminaries) but rather ‘from the historical and philological points of view. The course aims to introduce the students to the Talmud by a scientific comparison of the sources and criticism of the text and sources.’ Gaonic and Rabbinic literature was analysed, along with the its commentaries, focusing on its historical development, and in comparison, to other ancient civilisations, with an emphasis on the early phases of the Diaspora and ‘a particular attention is devoted to the relations between Palestine and the Diaspora.’ This represented...
a departure from how Talmud was taught in the Diaspora, and represented a significant step towards its development as an academic discipline; similarly courses from other fields usually more associated with the Yeshiva than the university were introduced and likewise studied with a similar academic view (e.g. Kabbalah and Jewish mysticism). During this period, about 50% of students took as either a major or minor, Jewish Studies. A critical approach towards texts, combined with a focus on exploring both universal and Jewish dimensions permeated the department of the Humanities and in novel courses such as ‘Arabic and Judeo-Arabic Philosophical Texts’ and ‘Jewish Settlement in Palestine in the Age of the Talmud.’

HU was thus a significant departure from the colonial university model ‘exported’ to other contexts; while HU used the administrative and academic models, in regard to the curriculum, it actively refused to cater to the needs of practical State administration and instead focused on creating and fusing Jewish character and culture with European methods.

**Informal curriculum and student services**

Complementing the formal curriculum, students were provided a wide variety of social and cultural activities; assistance and services. Given the large number of new immigrants and international students, a special committee was established to ‘assist the many newcomers from the Diaspora to adjust themselves socially within the student body and the Palestinian community.’ In this way, the informal curriculum was aimed at integrating these students into Yishuv life. Social activities included concerts, lectures and trips around the country, and even summer camps. A variety of clubs including a political forum, drama circle and several sports teams were maintained by the Student Organisation, the official body for which represented the students to the administration and tended to the social, economic and cultural needs of the students. A health service, financial assistance, food and housing support; and social and cultural activities were established for the students by the Student Organisation, with support from the Diaspora. This support became increasingly important during WWII when emergency scholarship loans were established in 1939/40 for students from European countries ‘whose allowances from their families have been cut off as a result of the war…’ leaving many students without means of supporting themselves.

**International students**

*1924 – 1933: Early years*
Organised instruction began only in 1928, however, beginning in 1924/25 there were non-matriculated students, who were not formally accepted into HU, attending lectures and serving as research assistants. In the 1928/29 academic year, the first degree-seeking students, entered the newly founded Faculty of Humanities. These first students were joined in 1931 and 1935 by degree-seeking students in Biology and the Faculty of Sciences respectively. Figure 2 shows enrolment of HU for the years 1925-1933. Student attendance during this period was limited and erratic (see Benavot, 2009). In these early years, the largest contingent of students were those with secondary school matriculations from Palestine, however, they represented less than half of the total student body; the majority of students were matriculated from secondary schools in Germany and Eastern Europe, particularly Poland, Russia, and Romania (see Appendix F). This trend continued until 1933 the rise of the Fascist regimes in Europe and the expulsion of Jewish students from German universities.

Figure 2. Number of HU students, 1924 - 1947


1933 – 1940: HU as refuge

Between the years 1933-1940, the student body almost quadrupled as Figure 2 demonstrates; an analysis of the shifts in students by source countries during this period, indicates that this surge was comprised of students who were mainly refugees from Europe (see Appendix F). During this period, students with Polish matriculation certificates became both the largest
contingent, and the majority of HU students: in 1936/37 and 37/38, Polish students composed 59.3% and 62.2% of the student population respectively. In the same years, Palestinian (Jewish) students the second largest contingent, comprised only 20.5% and 17.3% of the student body respectively. This situation reflected at once the shifting domestic situation in Palestine and the plight of the Diaspora in Europe. For Diaspora students, HU was a way to escape Fascist Europe; the situation in Palestine was quite different - and the view of academic study as well. Reflecting on this period, an interview for HU's Jubilee with Prof. Isaac Harpaz, Dean of the Faculty of Agriculture, elaborated:

‘By the time he graduated from high school in 1941, he was already a Hagannah (para-military organisation of the Yishuv; pre-cursor to the Israel Defence Forces) activist. A special emissary was sent to him from Yitzhak Rabin’s Palmach unit – just then forming. He was appealed to as a Sabra, as a youngster who knew the country well, to join Rabin’s unit, to become one of a group several of whose members had already distinguished themselves in action against the Axis forces in Syria...Harpaz’s determination to study was not well received. How could he think of such a thing now? Who would his companions be on Mount Scopus – a bunch of Yiddish speaking new immigrants from Poland! What did he have in common with them!’

A logical assumption would be that these refugee students did not know Hebrew and that the (Jewish) matriculated students from Mandatory Palestine would represent those who did. However, the numbers are slightly different due to two factors, illustrated by Table 3. One factor is that during this period some schools in the Diaspora taught fully or partially in Hebrew and in other local language(s) (i.e. ‘mixed’ in Table 3). Most of these schools were located in Eastern Europe. The HU archives holds a long trail of correspondence between local Zionist organisations, HU, and schools (mostly in Poland and Romania) which were adapting their teaching methods and language to facilitate the absorption of their students into HU. These schools applied to HU for recognition so that their students could be accepted as matriculated students without entrance exams or preparatory courses. After 1940, the mixed and Hebrew instruction schools outside of Palestine significantly decreased and the correspondence with these communities in the archival trail fell silent. By 1948 HUYB, the statistics for the ‘mixed’ schools disappeared completely, as presumably these schools were closed during WWII, and their communities and students destroyed during the Holocaust. A second factor which Table 3 shows, is that for the first time, graduates of non-Hebrew schools in Palestine began attending HU. Beginning in 1939/40 there were a few students (5) who were educated in Palestine in languages other than Hebrew; evidence from the HUYB of 1942, suggests that these were the first Palestinian Arab students enrolled at HU. As a consequence of these two factors, not all students from Palestine spoke Hebrew and not all students from the
Diaspora were ignorant of it; however as Table 3 illustrates, significant swaths of HU students were not educated in Hebrew prior to their arrival at HU.

**Table 3. HU students by language of instruction in secondary school, 1936-1941**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language of school</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>36/37</th>
<th>37/38</th>
<th>38/39</th>
<th>39/40</th>
<th>40/41</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Palestine</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td></td>
<td>150</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other than Hebrew</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>150</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other countries</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td></td>
<td>151</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed*</td>
<td></td>
<td>94</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other than Hebrew</td>
<td></td>
<td>336</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>581</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>649</td>
<td>806</td>
<td>706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total students</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>731</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>1041</td>
<td>1053</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Those w/Hebrew or Mixed Instruction (abs. and %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>36/37</th>
<th>37/38</th>
<th>38/39</th>
<th>39/40</th>
<th>40/41</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As %</td>
<td>54.04%</td>
<td>54.74%</td>
<td>47.93%</td>
<td>38.52%</td>
<td>45.11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**1941 – 1948**

From 1940/41 – with immigration to Palestine considerably restricted, Palestinian Jewish secondary school graduates became the largest contingent and for the first time, had grown to a majority of the student body (see Appendix F). Interestingly, a large increase of students from the USA appeared in the post-World War II period, attributed to the GI Bill, which gave free tuition for American servicemen; some Jewish American soldiers chose to study through this programme at HU. With the exception of this increase, there was a conspicuous lack of American students, particularly given the large financial support this community provided HU.
This indicates that persecution was likely the most significant driver of international student populations to HU.

Overall, the student body increased over time; sharply during times of crisis in the Diaspora. The largest contingent of students was originally educated in Palestine, however, due to persecution in Europe – this reversed in the years 1933-1940, and Polish students were the largest contingent and the student body mostly comprised refugees from Europe. Only on the eve of Statehood did Jewish students educated in Mandatory Palestine become an absolute majority. Students were mostly men and Jewish Studies and the Humanities continued to enrol more students than the Sciences (see Appendix F). The language of instruction was Hebrew, however, a large proportion of students (about half) were not educated in Hebrew secondary schools; like the academic stuff, Hebrew was an acquired tongue and HU part of the integration into the Yishuv.

4.4. Discussion and conclusion

In this Chapter I analysed the historical formation of HU and its development until the eve of Statehood in 1948. I demonstrated that HU itself was a creation of essentially internationalist influences seeking to promote Jewish culture and the Jewish national project. In the absence of a sponsoring state – either European colonial/imperial, Ottoman or Jewish - it was heavily shaped by the Diaspora including its funding, governance, academic staff and students. HU was founded as a research-intensive University, which espoused a mission for worldwide Jewry: the ‘University of the Jewish People.’ While Diaspora individuals and academics formed a coalition, and subjugated local Zionist interests in some cases, they did not exclude the Zionists; rather they were major partners in its development – and received significant benefits from HU. The result was a University that from its beginning balanced the needs and identity aspirations of the Diaspora with the shifting nationalist movement, while working to maintain its academic autonomy and research ‘excellence.’ For Diaspora elites, the idea of ‘excellence’ in scientific research to advance knowledge attributed prestige and pride, and served as a confirmation of a strongly held identity for Jewish people more widely. Jewish studies was an area which the Diaspora particularly supported, with renewed importance after the Holocaust. For the Zionists, scientific research propelled political ambitions forward and laid the foundations for increased settlement, modernisation and industry. The Humanities, and particularly Hebrew and Jewish studies served Zionist social and cultural agendas through revival of the Hebrew language, advancing Jewish history and modernising Jewish identity, a pre-cursor for the Israeli national identity. Thus, even though HU resisted pressures from the
Zionists to conform to some of their requests, it nonetheless provided significant service to the settlement project.

Research served the political, economic, academic, social, and identity needs of the Diaspora and Zionists, while preserving adherence to the German model of HE and the pursuit of knowledge. Academic staff were majority males of European birth and education, and exclusively Jewish. The curriculum reflected emerging research and aimed to disseminate universal and particular knowledge resulting in novel academic disciplines (e.g. Palestinology; Kabbalah). Students, like the academic staff were almost exclusively Jewish, however, the country of secondary education of the students, varied greatly over the period, depending on the political situation of Jewish communities around the world. Persecution – but notably not other forms of hardship, such as economic depression - brought Jewish students to HU. The teaching infrastructure, formal and informal curricula worked to unite Diaspora and Yishuv students, keeping them together and integrating them into Yishuv society.

When considering the timelines of internationalisation which emphasise colonial ‘exports’ of university models to exploit foreign lands and create elite colonial administrators, there are similarities with HU and important departures. The German model of applying European scientific methods for development is similar in its focus to that of HU’s mission to scientifically map and explore the land; and indeed, the administrative model of HU followed a German form. However, for those involved in this exercise, this was not viewed as a foreign land; rather, it was viewed as a long-lost homeland to which they were renewing their bonds. Likewise, scientific research, was aimed at improving local settlement conditions and renewing the social and cultural foundations of a (trans)national group who perceived itself more as an indigenous population, than as foreigners; likewise it was not engaged in research to exploit the land or people to enrich a foreign state. Troen (2013) argues that this perception, caused Zionists to view their actions as colonisation (i.e. the process of settling the land), yet they resisted the idea that they were engaged in colonialism (i.e. foreigners, exploiting another land and its indigenous people). This departure in motives and purpose, affected areas in the university such as its curriculum, research and teaching agenda, and language of instruction, setting it apart from colonial models. In terms of its curriculum, HU aimed to create an elite cadre of researchers, and actively avoided the colonial model of preparing administrators for the State (or Zionist movement); it likewise insisted on teaching in Hebrew, as a symbol of its national cultural renewal. In these aspects, this represents a considerable departure from the colonial model; echoing Penslar’s (2017) argument, these actions could be considered as more in line with the de-colonialisation movements in the 1960s or post-colonial nationalisms which aimed to rebuild nations in the aftermath of oppressive and discriminative practices of the colonial period.\textsuperscript{115}
While the literature likewise emphasises the political motives of peace and mutual understanding as key drivers of internationalisation between and after the World Wars, HU is strikingly different. The World Wars, particularly WWII, cemented Zionist political resolve that the Jewish nation, needed a nation-State, thus setting the conditions for further conflict with another indigenous group: Arab Palestinians. Thus, when HU was established, it was part of a nation-building exercise, but one that was not necessarily wedded to a State: either a Jewish nation-state or another European/Middle Eastern/North American sponsor/State. Rather, it was perceived first and foremost by its Diaspora founders as a Jewish national project of cultural rebirth and re-settlement in an ancestral homeland, which would eventually gain impetus for a nation-State. In this way, HU was established as a form of (inter)nationalisation.
Chapter 5. 1948 – 2000: State formation, stabilisation and Diaspora

5.1 1948 – 2000: Historical development of HU

In this Chapter I analyse the historical trajectory of HU after the creation of the State until the eve of the Second Intifada (Palestinian Uprising) at the turn of the century. I argue that during this period, the University became aligned with the aims of the State and the nation-building enterprise. However, the ‘University of the Jewish People’, neither neglected nor shed its links with the Diaspora; rather, the Diaspora remained a major partner in several specific ways which I will demonstrate. The key features of this period are succinctly captured by Brodetsky, President of HU from 1949 - 1952:

‘...the fact that the Hebrew University is the University of the Jewish people has naturally had a bearing on its work. Like all Universities the Hebrew University is concerned with extending the boundaries of human knowledge, and like all universities it is also concerned with study and research in the particular problems of the country in which it exists. But unlike other universities it must think, too, of a special group of people outside that country. It must serve the Jewish people everywhere. Thus, it is that it applies itself to the problem of Jewish Education in the Diaspora, that it organises special courses for Jewish students from abroad and that in general it undertakes many tasks which do not fall to other universities.’

This chapter is split into three sub-chapters: historical development; international dimensions in research; and international dimensions in teaching. The first sub-chapter analyses the development of the HU from 1948 – 2000, focussing on how the creation of the State shifted its mission, funding and governance. I also demonstrate how this impacted on the role of research and teaching. Key dates I address are delineated in Table 4.
Table 4. Key dates in the development of HU, 1948 - 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Events and/or impact on HU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948-1967</td>
<td>Shifting relations: development and growth of the ‘University in exile’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>War of Independence; exile of HU from Mount Scopus; loss in revenue from tuition and Diaspora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948 –</td>
<td>HU mission shifts towards State’s aims and nation building. The State becomes its primary financer; governance shifts to a state-sponsored model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Introduction of undergraduate degrees; massive expansion in University (e.g. students, staff, departments; branch campuses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Inauguration of new campus in West Jerusalem as part of 10th anniversary of the State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967 – 1981</td>
<td>Jerusalem ‘united’ and the return to and expansion of Mount Scopus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Six-Day War; HU regains access to Mount Scopus and begins rebuilding and expansion plans with Government and Diaspora support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Yom Kippur War; delays in Mount Scopus building plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Official return to Mount Scopus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982 - 2000</td>
<td>Setting the conditions for post-2000 shifts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Continual conflict and peace process; rise of neoliberalism; and Soviet Aliyah</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The two following sub-chapters analyse how these shifts affected the international dimensions of research and teaching respectively. I conclude with a discussion of the entire chapter, comparing it to the previous period.

1948-1967: Shifting relations: development and growth of the ‘University in exile’

On November 29, 1947, UN Resolution 181 was passed; this provided for the partition of British Mandatory Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab State, with Jerusalem designated as an international city. This renewed fighting in Palestine between the Arabs and the Jews which culminated in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War after the declaration of the State of Israel on May 14, 1948, one day before the departure of the British from the land. Immediately an Arab coalition consisting of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq with additional troops from
Saudi Arabia and Yemen, attacked the new State. As in WWII, HU was mobilised in the struggle, this time not in an effort to aid Jewish communities in Europe or fight Fascism, but in a struggle for its own national survival.

Due to the tense security situation in Jerusalem, and the mobilisation of the country, most regular HU activities were suspended in the months preceding the declaration of the State and the departure of the British. However, a convoy of HU Staff and Hadassah Hospital personnel still made armed trips from West Jerusalem (at the time called ‘Jewish Jerusalem’) to the HU and Hadassah Hospital on Mount Scopus in East Jerusalem (at the time called ‘Arab Jerusalem’). On April 13, 1948, one such convoy, was attacked in the East Jerusalem neighbourhood of Sheikh Jarra; 77 were killed, among them Dr. Chaim Yassky, Director of the Hebrew University-Hadassah Medical School. This signalled the end of activities on Mount Scopus; teachers and students were drafted into military service and classes and all activities on Mount Scopus suspended.

At the end of the war, about 10% of the student body perished in the fighting (as opposed to about 1% of the general population). Israel controlled the area allotted to it in the UN Partition Plan and about 60% of the area allotted to the Arab State; Egypt annexed the Gaza Strip and Jordan most of the West Bank. The war triggered the mass (largely involuntary) movement of people; about 700,000 Arab Palestinians fled or were expelled from their homes (an event referred to by Palestinians as the Nakba, or catastrophe). On April 3, 1949, the Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement (Jordan held East Jerusalem, while the Israelis held West Jerusalem) was signed with a clause ensuring ‘the resumption of the normal functioning of the cultural and humanitarian institutions on Mount Scopus and free access thereto,’ however, efforts to enforce this failed and HU was cut-off from Mount Scopus. Thus, once the fighting had ceased and armistice lines finally negotiated, Jerusalem was a divided city, West Jerusalem in the hands of the Israelis and East Jerusalem (and the Old City) in the hands of the Jordanians; Mount Scopus was inaccessible.

The creation of the State of Israel had profound effects on HU. HU lost access to its campus and physical teaching and research facilities. Efforts to extract materials from the Jewish National Library and scientific equipment from Mount Scopus were unsuccessful and great hardship to University researchers was reported in HU publications. Extensive pleas were made to ‘the generosity of friends and supporters in Israel and abroad’ who sent funds, books and equipment to HU, alleviating some of the hardship. HU’s funding also was significantly impacted. While tuition was not a substantial portion of income, it dropped to zero as classes were suspended. More importantly, funds from the Diaspora dwindled, in some
cases to naught, as emergency fundraising campaigns around the world were undertaken for the new State (Cohen, 2003).

National needs at this time were vast and pressing. With the declaration of the State (and the cancellation of British limits on immigration) according to the Jewish Agency for Israel (JAFI), between 1948 and the end of 1951, 684,201 immigrants arrived in Israel, more than double the Jewish population on the eve of the declaration of the State. These immigrants consisted of displaced Europeans, Holocaust survivors and large numbers of Jews from the Middle East and North Africa (Mizrahi Jews) many of whom were also displaced from their countries. Housing and basic material goods were scarce; tent cities (Ma’abarot) were established to house them; many of them did not speak Hebrew. Social integration of the large heterogenous population was of utmost concern. Despite being saddled with enormous challenges of integration, Aliyah (Jewish immigration to Israel) was continually encouraged during this period and Jews around the world were called on by the State to make Israel their home. Aliyah was important for the economic, political and physical development and viability of the State, and to confirm its legitimacy. With the strong emphasis on nation-building, Olim (Jewish immigrants) were viewed favourably by Israeli society; Yordim (people who left Israel) were stigmatised. As part of this process of encouraging Aliyah, the State was keen to define its relationship with the Jewish Diaspora, and to translate connections with the religious ‘Zion’ to the modern State of Israel, as the focal point of world Jewry. In line with its raison d’etre, to provide a home and serve as a refuge for all Jews, the ‘Law of Return’ was established which gave Israeli citizenship to all Jews as a right – while the State continued to deny the right of return to Palestinian refugees created during the 1948 war. Israel needed to build an economy and physical infrastructure, with few natural resources and little established industry. The State had to build its political institutions and international relations while politically isolated, subject to an Arab boycott, and under continual security threats. Thus, the national needs were acute and applied research was viewed as imperative for national development and economic industry; the absorption and education of a large immigrant population; the development of a national identity and centre of worldwide Jewry; and the training of professionals and civil servants.

It became clear that HU would need to react to these needs and changes and to negotiate its future relations with the new State. Cohen’s (2003) analysis of this transition period argues that there was a feeling of urgency surrounding these negotiations, not due solely to infrastructure and financial issues, but because the role of the university would need to be established while positions and institutional relations were being stipulated in the early years of the State, a process which would likely set patterns for HE in the future. In Cohen’s (2003) study, he includes a report to the Senate from May 1949, in which the rector notes:
'Although there were some who were pessimistic and who suggested making do with what we have and postponing creating new things, in light of the serious financial situation, they were lone voices, and the overwhelming majority of participants in the conference considered that the university cannot mark time, but must move forward, in particular whilst the state is being built and all of the positions in it are being defined' (Assaf, cited in Cohen, 2003, p. 118).

Thus, there appear to have been concerns and even fears that if HU would not be willing to adapt itself to new realities, other institutions would be created to do so (reminiscent of the fear that the ZO would lose its hegemony over a university in Palestine, if the British were to open their university, see section 4.1); or that it might be nationalised altogether (a plan that was pursued for a time by Ben Gurion, see Volanksy, 2005). Thus, a threat to the hegemony of HU was also a significant factor in considering the response of HU to the new State. As a consequence, HU began to align itself with national interests and to position itself as the leading (and indeed, only) HEI in Israel, that would be able to meet the myriad national needs of the time.

Cohen and Sapir (2016) argue that the reshaping of HU governance at this stage was the subject of conflict between the new State and HU. Many in the government, including Ben Gurion, favoured nationalising HU. While this never materialised, there was a significant threat that the University would become an agency of the State. Cohen and Sapir (2016) argue that this threat of nationalisation, pulled HU into a new form of governance: the state-sponsored model. This was distinct from the previous period in which Cohen and Sapir (2016) identify the Diaspora University model, in which academic autonomy was complete and guaranteed by Diaspora funding. What eventually emerged, was a state-sponsored model of HE governance which accommodated the State, academic faculty and Jewish Diaspora participation (primarily through Board membership, that was limited to certain areas of involvement, and shared with the Executive Committee and Rector, see Cohen and Sapir, 2016). This new model was characterised by a significant degree of academic control and institutional autonomy combined with vast amounts of government funding, with the tacit understanding that HU would largely focus on national needs. During the development of this governance model, the Council for HE Law of 1958 was passed which established the Council of Higher Education (CHE) as an independent body for national supervision of Israeli HE; in 1977, a sub-committee of the CHE, the Planning and Budgeting Committee (PBC) was created with the mandate to plan and manage the national budget for HE and to act as a buffer between Government and HE; thus, a national HE system took shape. Reflecting this new reality, and HU’s changing national character and governance structure, in 1959, the HU was re-incorporated under the CHE Law, making it an Israeli University, and in 1965 it redrafted its
constitution to this effect. Reflecting this new form of governance, a considerable shift occurred in HU’s funding: before 1948, HU was almost completely funded by Diaspora Jewry, but by the 1966/67 academic year, HU solicited the Government and JAFI for contributions of about 70% of the general budget, with only about 5% coming from abroad. This new mode of governance, spread to other universities and was influential until the turn of the century (Cohen & Sapir, 2016).

These shifts in governance and funding were accompanied by a significant shift in the purposes of the University. As established in Chapter 4, the subservience of HU to Zionist aims was actively resisted in the pre-State period as it was founded as the ‘University of the Jewish People’ with the aim to serve the entire Jewish community (both in Palestine and around the world, and the former not to the detriment of the latter), and humanity through ‘excellence’ in research. In the first HUYB after the creation of the State (1957) the purpose of HU was expressed as a ‘University with a three-fold aim’:

‘Although HU was established primarily with a view to supplying a vital Jewish need, it was of course always intended that it should perform the broad functions of every university of standing. Generally speaking, its aim today is a three-fold one: to serve Israel by helping to shape its national culture, by maintaining within it a reservoir of professional manpower, and by scientifically hastening the process of development; to serve the Jewish people by providing it with a Jewish intellectual centre and by promoting Hebrew culture throughout the world; to serve humanity by extending knowledge in every field.’

While there was evidence of these three aims in previous periods, the relative emphasis after Statehood, perceptively shifted from the Jewish people (Diaspora) and the pursuit of pure knowledge, towards the Jewish nation (Israel). This shift was not universally accepted; Cohen’s (2003) study uncovers a contingent of HU academics and administrators who were committed to the pursuit of knowledge through research and the absolute autonomy of the University from the State (notably, headed by Albert Einstein), however they proved to be in the minority and over time, and this shift towards serving the State’s needs became manifest. In the pre-State period, reflecting its Germanic model, HU resisted opening areas of importance to the Yishuv (e.g. Faculty of Social Sciences, see Gross, 2005), however, after independence, HU began to position itself as the only institution which could meet national needs, as the Yearbook notes:

‘... it became apparent that the infant State was desperately in need of trained personnel in every field. There was a shortage of teachers, of physicians, of scientists, of agriculturists, of economists, of jurists and of well-trained civil servants. The
University offered immediate assistance by 'lending' numbers of its scientists and scholars to head essential government bodies while continuing their work at the University, but it was obvious that the situation called for more radical measures. Clearly, as the only University in the country, the Hebrew University would have to make herculean efforts to train a very much larger number of students than previous and to extend the range of its teaching programmes...without hesitation the University rose to meet these urgent demands..."\textsuperscript{132}

That HU presented the shift to national needs in this unequivocal manner in its public relations materials, indicates the image it tried to impart as the exclusive servicer of national education needs. It further indicates a level of acceptance of this new direction of the University (if not outright support) from its donors (i.e. Diaspora Jews) as this publication was widely distributed to them and would likely be phrased so as not to alienate them.

These efforts to accommodate the new State resulted in the massive expansion of the University. HU opened and expanded several faculties and schools (many in conjunction with the Government and Diaspora organisations) including: the Medical School; School of Agriculture; School of Dental Medicine, School of Pharmacy, and the Faculty of Social Sciences. The upgraded School of Education and the new School of Social Work\textsuperscript{133} dealt primarily with issues of social importance to the country and integration of its heterogenous population.\textsuperscript{134} Intricately connected to the mission of these Schools was an issue of national importance: social integration and mobility. This mission likewise spurred the opening of the Centre for Pre-Academic Studies\textsuperscript{135} with an aim to prepare students (mainly Mizrahi youth) for HE, fill academic gaps from high school for university studies, and provide refresher courses to those recently released from military duty.\textsuperscript{136} These programmes reflected the shifting role of the University to promote social integration and mobility, so as to create a more cohesive and just society. Despite these programmes, until the final decade of the period, university education in Israel, remained an elite enterprise and HU an elite institution within that system. Reflecting on these developments Prof. Avineri, Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences, noted that:

‘With regards to our founders’ vision of this being the University of the Jewish people: I think it is still so perceived, and this places particular burdens on us which are not carried by other universities. The focus however has changed: in 1925 the aim was to create a spiritual academic centre; to help Jewish students, particularly those from Europe, find their rightful place in academic life. Today our role is related to the needs of Israel in times of emergency, in what is virtually a siege situation - to help in the educational advancement of disadvantaged sectors of our population for example.’\textsuperscript{137}
Avineri elaborated:

‘I have just come back from a meeting where I discussed with I.D.F. [Israel Defence Forces] personnel their request that certain Departments and Faculties ‘adopt’ army units and provide help with legal, welfare and other problems—and we will certainly do all we can. These are new needs, they have a national character which goes far beyond our strictly academic functions. Had we confined ourselves to the latter, had academic considerations alone dictated our development, then we would not be bearing much of the responsibility we carry today…it seems to me, at any rate, that we have preserved a successful balance between our academic and national functions.’

This focus on the national missions of the University, particularly in its teaching functions, and in its service to society, represented a significant shift from the previous period, in which HU largely focussed on the pursuit of knowledge.

In addition to new faculties, HU opened new applied departments and institutes (e.g. Robert Szold Center of Applied Science; Department of Applied Physics) which catered to national needs and reflected advances in applied sciences and interdisciplinary research in the post WWII era. HU also established branches of certain programmes (e.g. the School of Social Work in Tel Aviv), an Adult Education Centre which provided evening courses in Tel Aviv and Haifa, and Institutes for Advanced Studies in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and the Galilee. Eventually during this period, HU (in conjunction with Weizmann Institute and Technion Israel Institute of Technology) would also oversee the development of other regional research Universities, (Haifa University in the North, Ben Gurion of the Negev University in the South) however, always with the expectation that HU would remain an elite top-tier institution (see Yogev, 2000).

Perhaps the most significant change in this period was the introduction in the 1950s of three-year undergraduate degrees based on the European model of specialisation. As established in Chapter 4, despite significant pressures from the Jewish community in Palestine, teaching was only introduced gradually, and was conducted only as part of a four-year Master’s degree, with the aim to train new researchers. While in some areas, such as Education, HU in the pre-state period made efforts to cater to the professional needs of the Yishuv, it repeatedly refused to adapt itself to these needs (see Cohen, 2003; Cohen & Sapid, 2016; Gross, 2005). However, the shift of HU towards national needs, necessitated training not only researchers, but also civil servants and professionals; this in turn required the introduction of shorter, more professionally oriented degrees. This represented a significant shift in the vision, values and purpose of university education. Reflecting on this change, the 75th anniversary publication noted that it involved a ‘radical restructuring of the University and
its pedagogical basis. Practical courses were now offered alongside the more theoretical, and professors, accustomed to complete academic autonomy, had to adapt themselves to a system that was more practical and universal in scope. Through these new undergraduate degree programmes, HU began to take on a more national mission, teaching and training a cadre of national elites.

The expanded teaching demands were a significant departure from the pre-State model of the University. In a roundtable discussion on the occasion of the Jubilee of the HU, senior academics at HU reflected on this: ‘At that time [pre-State] it was modelled to a large extent on the European pattern and it was staffed by professors who came from European universities….today’s Hebrew University is entirely different…’ Prof. Isaac Harpaz (Dean of the Faculty of Agriculture) elaborated:

‘the University was undergoing a continuous process of ‘Americanization’. It started with small things such as breaking the concept of there being only one professor per department, and the introduction of teaching to the Bachelor’s degree...In the pre-State period, a student enrolled for four years [for a Masters], and no one examined his work or checked his progress along the line. Exams were given only in the fourth year…you saw your university teachers face to face only at the beginning of each term.…all of these are things of the past. We are getting steadily more like an American university.’

The physical ‘exile,’ of the University from Mount Scopus, significantly affected the space available for the expansion of HU. With the Egyptian, Jordanian and Lebanese armistices in effect and the release of about 500 students from military duty in March 1949 the University re-opened on April 22, 1949, the new academic year, out of a rented space of the Franciscan Monetary of Terra Sancta in West Jerusalem. Gradually as more students were released from active military duty, the student body increased and more premises for the University were scouted and individual departments and faculties were spread in buildings around the city. With the considerable growth in the numbers of students and faculty, this situation could not continue and in 1954, an extensive building campaign ensued, centred primarily on building a new campus, Givat Ram, and a new HU Hadassah Hospital in Ein Kerem, both located in West Jerusalem. Outside of Jerusalem, the Faculty of Agriculture in Rehovot and the University branch in Tel Aviv were also under construction. The land for the new campus in Givat Ram, was donated by the Government, and was part of complex which included the Knesset (Israeli parliament), the Israeli Museum and other central government buildings. By 1955, the first buildings which housed the Botany and Physics Departments were inaugurated on the new campus and more buildings were gradually added – many with the
help of Diaspora Jewry donations - and by 1956 the HU extended over 50 buildings around Jerusalem\textsuperscript{144} and the new campus comprised 25 buildings and housed 2,000 students, or about half of the University enrolment. In 1958, in a symbolic demonstration of the connection between the State and University, the Jewish people and the Jewish State, the campus was formally dedicated by Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, as a part of the celebrations of the 10\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the State. His speech, which drew on biblical sources and had the structure and language of a nationalist sermon, began by remembering the campus on Mount Scopus: ‘I want to say that the campus of the university is not the campus of the university, there is at least one more campus on Mount Scopus, and it will not stay empty much longer.’\textsuperscript{145} He continued his speech outlining his view of the nation and the task of the University therein. Israel should be a strong military and economic power, populated by millions of Jews. However, this vision would be dependent on what he dubbed the ‘spiritual’: the development of values, wisdom, and science which are needed for the nation to achieve its greatest aims; thus, Ben-Gurion assigned the ‘spiritual mission’ to HU.\textsuperscript{146} Recognising and seemingly accepting this interdependence of the State and the University, a HU publication reported:

‘On the tenth anniversary of the State of Israel, the campus (Givat Ram) boasted 25 major buildings which formed the backdrop to the dedication ceremony. The physical expansion of the University was the backdrop, too, to the institution’s intellectual growth, and to the intimate linking of the young State and its growing population.’\textsuperscript{147}

While the land for the new campus was given to HU by the State, as in the pre-State era, the buildings were erected with significant help from Diaspora Jewry,\textsuperscript{148} emphasising a continual partnership, albeit one that had shifted in its relative power relations. During this growth and the rise of the new campus in West Jerusalem, HU was careful to reflect the political feelings of the time and emphasise that ‘the new University buildings are intended not to supersed those on Mount Scopus, but to complement them’ and to stress that ‘the University has never abandoned hope of returning to Mount Scopus.’\textsuperscript{149} This aligned with sentimental feelings of HU leaders at the time and the State’s political desire to extend its control over all Jerusalem.

\textbf{1967 – 1981: Jerusalem ‘united’ and the return to and expansion of Mount Scopus}

On June 5, 1967, war broke out between Israel and an Arab coalition led by Egypt, Syria and Jordan.\textsuperscript{150} In this war, later dubbed ‘The Six-Day War’, Israel succeeded in repelling these forces and took possession of the (Egyptian) Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula, (Jordanian)
West Bank, and (Syrian) Golan Heights. This would begin the Israeli military occupation of these areas and bring a million Palestinians under its control.

The War had particular importance for Jewish sovereignty in Jerusalem; access to the Old City and Judaism’s holiest site, the Western Wall of the Second Temple, was interpreted as a symbol of the return of Jewish sovereignty to the land after over 2,000 years of exile. A united Jerusalem became the focus of (national and municipal) government policies to develop the city; HU was implicated in many of these goals, particularly in driving applied research to foster industry and the overall economic development of the city, which will be addressed in sub-Chapter 2. Significantly for HU, the War brought East Jerusalem under Israeli control\textsuperscript{151} and renewed access to Mount Scopus. No time was lost and on June 9, 1967, just four days after the outbreak of war, and two days after the road to Mount Scopus was secured by Israeli forces, a delegation set out to visit HU and the Hadassah Hospital. Reinforcing the espoused desire to return to Mount Scopus, within two weeks, a heavily symbolic degree ceremony was held in the HU amphitheatre, in the spot where the University was inaugurated 42 years earlier. Reinforcing the connection of HU to State agendas and political sentiments, there Chief of Staff (later, PM) Yitzchak Rabin, fresh from commanding the Six-Day War, received an honorary doctorate. The ceremony was attended by dignitaries, including the President of Israel, Zalman Shazar.\textsuperscript{152}

The Israeli victory in the Six-Day War evoked significant euphoria among Israelis, and stimulated pride and an outpouring of support from Diaspora Jews. Critically for the State, it increased ideological Aliyah from Western countries (particularly from Canada, US, Western Europe and South Africa). While there was a wellspring of goodwill from many countries around the world, there was also significant backlash against what was perceived as Israeli aggression and expansionism. This led to riots in Arab countries, hastening the Aliyah of remaining Jewish communities from these countries, or persecution-related Aliyah. Several countries suspended diplomatic relations with Israel, notably the U.S.S.R., and an onslaught of antisemitism ignited in the Soviet bloc. Renewed antisemitism combined with economic hardship and a burgeoning affinity of the Soviet Jewish community with Israel led to the immigration of about 100,000 Soviet Jews between 1968-1973 (before the Soviet Government sealed its borders to them).

Although HU had built a new campus at Givat Ram, space was a continual concern to keep pace with growth. The Givat Ram campus, built for 6,000 students, in 1967 was already double that number and growing. Moreover, some departments were still dispersed in temporary lodgings throughout the city leading the University to state that ‘what had been makeshift accommodation in the early fifties had become ramshackle by 1967, and the lack
of proper facilities providing for essential and close working contact among scientists threatened both further progress and a sabotaging of work already accomplished. Student housing was also a persisting problem, and this was exacerbated after 1967 as more government offices, institutions and immigrants arrived to the city. Thus, Mount Scopus, in addition to its clear sentimental value and political dimensions, was viewed by HU administrators as a practical necessity. The Mount Scopus campus, however, would need to be extensively expanded and rebuilt before it could be used again. Mount Scopus would house the Humanities and Social Sciences, while Givat Ram would be designated for the Sciences and retain the Jewish National Library. However, this was not an even split of the two campuses along disciplinary lines; rather, Mount Scopus was to be the ‘centre’ of HU which would also contain dormitories, athletic facilities, the Central Library and the administration of the University. This reflected nostalgic sentiments and aligned with the political desire for a united Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. To effectuate the move back to Mount Scopus, an extensive building campaign for the new ‘University City’ funded by the Government and FHU was undertaken. Gradually the old buildings were repaired, and new buildings erected. By the summer of 1973 the campus was moving steadily towards its goal of opening on Mount Scopus.

On October 6, 1973, Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar, Israel was attacked by an Arab coalition led by Egypt and Syria. The surprise attack was a serious debacle for the country, and only with great difficulty and cost to human life, did Israel succeed in repelling it. In the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War, economic austerity and difficulty fundraising abroad, HU noted that ‘a number of difficult decisions have had to be reached as regards the pace of construction on the Mount Scopus campus’ and thus the development project was delayed. By 1979, several departments, schools, research institutes and faculties were already operating on Mount Scopus and with the move of the Faculties of Humanities and Social Science to Mount Scopus in 1981, the HU celebrated its official ‘Return to Mount Scopus’ with international guests, prominent Israelis and more than 300 guests from AFHU making the trip to Jerusalem for the occasion. President of HU and former ambassador to the US, Avraham Harman said that ‘For me it’s an expression of the unity of the city’ however, the New York Times, reporting on the dedication, noted that ‘It is a move that goes beyond educational significance, reaffirming Israeli determination to retain control over all of Jerusalem’.

1982 – 2000: Setting conditions for HU shifts post-2000
Between 1982 – 2000 HU continued to develop new departments and programmes (e.g. Veterinary Medicine) under the shadow of conflict between Israel, the Palestinians and neighbouring countries (e.g. 1st Lebanon War, 1982; 1st Intifada, 1987 - 1991; Gulf War, 1991). In each of these cases, HU staff and students were mobilised in war efforts. However, upon signing peace treaties with Egypt (1979); Jordan (1994); and the Oslo Accords (1994; 1995) there was growing hope for a lasting peace agreement with the Palestinians and peace in the region - despite the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzchak Rabin by a right-wing Jewish-Israeli radical, Yigal Amir.

In parallel, two events would set the scene for a future shift in Israeli HE. One, the transition of power from the left-wing social democrats (Mapai) to a more right-wing party (Likud) with free-market views in 1977, pushed a neoliberal agenda through the various levels of the state, gaining ground in the 1980s (Maron & Shalev, 2017). Two, a massive wave of Aliyah from the Former Soviet Union (FSU) (1990 – 1996) brought 600,000 immigrants (one million by 2006) to Israel. This Aliyah would represent the largest and most highly skilled Aliyah in Israel’s history and would spur the development of its economy and industry, while also putting pressure on the development of its public systems, including HE. These two phenomena together, paved the way to reforms in HE in the 1990s which included the deregulation of the sector to foreign providers (since then restricted, see Bamberger, 2018; Lieven & Martin, 2006); the addition of a non-government funded sector of colleges; and the addition of a second-tier of colleges (Volansky, 2005). These events and reforms set the conditions for changes in the HE sector; however, the governance, funding and mission of HU would remain broadly unchanged until the early 2000s. In the 1999/2000 academic year, HU had a student body over 23,000 and academic staff had grown to about 1,300. It had granted over 100,000 degrees from bachelors to doctoral.
5.2 International dimensions of research

In this sub-chapter I analyse the international dimension of research in this period. I focus on the creation of the Authority for Research and Development (AR&D) and analyse its development and purposes. I argue that the purpose of research was closely connected to national development; it was funded at first by other national governments (i.e. US) and eventually the State with the Diaspora playing an important role in facilitating and funding research. While I established in Chapter 4 that research in the previous period also addressed the practical needs of Zionist settlement, what was different in this period was the strategic, institutionalised nature of research funding and organisation that was facilitated by the creation of State infrastructure. Thus, this period was characterised by a shift towards the State, international governments and to a lesser extent industry in funding research – as opposed to grants to the University through the Diaspora in the pre-State period. Countries from which HU received international funding and pursued international partnerships reflected the shifting political relations of the State (e.g. USA, Germany, EU), and was significantly aided by the presence and various forms of support from the Diaspora. Despite different sources of funding, similar strategies to secure international funding were in place throughout the period which drew on a confluence of Diaspora, State and University networks.

I begin by analysing the development of the AR&D and the shifting purposes and funding of research at HU. Key dates in this period are delineated in Table 5. As Table 5 indicates, the purposes and institutional organisation of research shifted in this period as did its sources of international funding. I then proceed to analyse these sources and the strategies used to procure it. Finally, I analyse the international dimension of the academic staff.

Table 5. Key dates in the development of the international dimension of research, 1948 - 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Events and/or impact on HU</th>
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<tr>
<td>1948 - 1968</td>
<td>Evolving purposes and infrastructure for research: from haphazard and individual to strategic and institutional organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Creation of the Authority for Research and Development (AR&amp;D)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Creation of Yissum</td>
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<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>US research funding cut scare</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969 - 2000:</td>
<td>Shifting and diversifying research funding</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970's</td>
<td>US-Israel bi-national funds</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Funding Source</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970's</td>
<td>Israel national infrastructures and funds</td>
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<td>1970s</td>
<td>HU internal research funding</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>German-Israel bi-national funds</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>EU Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>AR&amp;D hub of HU international research funding and collaboration</td>
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**1948 – 1968: Evolving purposes and infrastructure for research, from haphazard and individual to strategic and institutional organisation**

After the creation of the State, research expanded rapidly to support national needs, particularly for applied research. However, while the State began funding HU in greater measure in this period, research grants were not initially a significant portion of this. Rather, HU began receiving large amounts of funding in the form of competitive grants mainly from the US Government which were closely tied to the new State's international relations. The growth in HU, and importantly the growth in external funding opportunities, led HU to a more strategic organisation of research and gradually the de-centralised organisation of research through professors and departments from the previous period was replaced with a more central and strategic organisation of research. In 1960 and 1964, HU created two administrative infrastructures: the Authority for Research and Development AR&D and Yissum, a subsidiary company of HU, respectively.

The AR&D was created in order to ‘aid in the maintenance of a high level of scientific research in the University's departments and to utilise to the utmost the know-how and abilities of the research staff for the benefit of Israel as well as other countries.’ However, this aim was particularly outward focused. In a letter from the head of the Authority, Aryeh Dvoretszsky to Rita Blume of the American Friends of Hebrew University, Dvoretszsky explains:

‘The central function of the Authority is to develop the research activities supported and sponsored from the outside at the Hebrew University. As you know, we are already doing this. Besides grants from very many U.S. agencies, there are also grants from foundations in the States and elsewhere, from the Israel Government, and to some extent also from industry. All of this, however, has so far been organised more or less haphazardly, and no concentrated effort was made either to obtain the necessary grants or to channel them into the most useful directions – useful from the point of view of the University, as well as from the point of view of the State…Though the Authority has only now started functioning, and we are still groping our way, we have already
made very useful contacts with the various departments and agencies of the Israel Government, and with local industrialists, but of course, the major part of the funds should come from abroad, mostly from the United States.\footnote{162}

Thus, the AR&D was oriented towards attracting and streamlining additional funds from outside its normal revenue sources (i.e. State general budget grants) particularly from the US. The AR&D was organised with a board consisting of representatives of the different faculties, the Rector, with a Chairman and an Administrative Director, who also served as Vice-President. Similar to HU’s beginning and a reoccurring theme, in 1962, an International Board of Advisors (composed of influential and connected Diaspora Jews) was created.

The AR&D was created with the stated aims of:

1) Encouraging research of importance for the various Government agencies and private industries to spur the development of Israel
2) Advising faculties on research matters to expand their capabilities
3) Aiding in the acquisition of research equipment, particularly for young researchers who have not yet qualified for international competitive funding
4) Promoting the industrial and commercial development of HU knowledge through patent registration and utilisation
5) Negotiating outside research contracts from the Israeli government, foreign agencies and private industry; and helping scientists to obtain, manage and administer them.\footnote{163}

Thus, reflecting the nationalist focus and sentiments of the time, HU organised the AR&D with an aim towards bringing outside (international) funding, to conduct research which would be applied to national needs, and only secondarily to other countries or more universal applications. While HU did pursue research which had no direct relation to Israeli or Jewish life, in this period it saw its role in the development of Israel and Jewish research as likewise fulfilling its aims towards humanity. The HU publication of 1960 explains:

‘The stress which the University has laid on its aims of serving Israel and the Jewish people has by no means obscured its aim of also serving humanity at large. Indeed, in the very process of carrying out those aims is has in part fulfilled its third aim too [serving humanity], since all study and research no matter what the initial purpose, inevitability increases the sum total of human knowledge.’\footnote{164}

While the AR&D was created to organise research and attract international funding, shortly after its creation, the fourth aim above, was channelled to Yissum, a subsidiary company owned by HU, and created in 1964 to promote the commercial development of HU
knowledge and to stimulate industry through HU research. Yissum, based in part on a similar venture (Yeda) established in 1959 at the Weizmann Institute, was ‘given the responsibility of protecting all research results that may have practical or commercial value and the right to license them to interested parties, preferably in Israel or for manufacture in Israel.’\textsuperscript{165} The issue of encouraging industry was seen as an acute national need: to stimulate the fledgling economy through development of industry and skilled employment. The archival record suggests that there was a pool of educated manpower but no industry to absorb applied scientists. In a response to a report about the development of applied research, Prof. Low of HU notes that unlike the USA, ‘The situation in Israel is very different. There is essentially, with some minor exceptions, no industry. It is part of the duty of anyone who can contribute to the establishment of science based on industries, to do so.’\textsuperscript{166}

There was also an aspect of pressure and competition within the local hierarchy of HEIs in this area. The Head of the AR&D, Alex Keynan, noted that HU was lagging behind other institutions (i.e. Weizmann and Technion):

‘HU of Jerusalem was the only institution of higher learning in Israel, without an established policy in this important area of national endeavour. The other institutions have tried to persuade such companies to establish themselves in nearby areas, e.g. the Technion, together with the Haifa Municipality, proposed to create an industrial park for new industries with close contacts with the Technion Institute of Research and Development.’

Other considerations for supporting industry-university cooperation were likewise addressed:

‘What apart from the national interest, which is important in itself, are the advantages to the University for such close association with industry in the Jerusalem area?’\textsuperscript{167}

The response delineated four areas:

a) ‘Such industries in addition to Government inducements such as bonuses, need ‘know-how’ and therefore they may be prepared to support research. Thus, they are a potential source of finance for University research;

b) Much of the basic research being carried on in the University is of potential economic value for the development of the country but cannot be developed within the University framework. Industries which operate in the vicinity of the University may be able to take advantage of such potential applied research results;

c) These industries are potential employers of graduated of the University in various fields;
d) The establishment of such industries will enable the University itself to develop certain areas of applied science, especially in Physics and Chemistry. Furthermore, some of the post-graduate studies of research students might be carried out in industry itself, or in association with industry. Thus, national needs, intertwined with HU’s development and strategic needs. HU implemented a policy – which was described as ‘along the lines of other [policies of] institutes of higher learning in Israel’ to attract science-based industries to Jerusalem, to work with the University, and the involvement of Yissum was established in this area to be ‘actively involved in contacts and negotiations with interested industrial firms, and convince them to establish themselves in Jerusalem.’ This focus on Jerusalem was intimately connected to the Six-Day War, and the overall development of Jerusalem as the nation’s united capital when stimulating the development of Jerusalem became a key national (and municipal) policy.

Before the AR&D was established there was already contracted research (from within Israel and abroad), from international organisations such as the W.H.O; Israeli ministries (Ministry of the Interior; MoE) and industries; American philanthropies (e.g. Ford Foundation) and Diaspora organisations (e.g. Zionist Federation of South Africa); private Jewish foundations (e.g. Batsheva de Rothschild Foundation) and industry outside of Israel (e.g. Volkswagen). However, by 1967/68, 90% of AR&D funding came from US government agencies (e.g. Department of Agriculture; Department of Health and Human Services); and nationwide, funding from US government agencies to Israeli research reached 25 million IL, representing 25% of all civilian research and funding in the country. Thus, in the early years the main focus of AR&D activity was the US government and its agencies which funded research in Israel through Israeli Pounds from US counterpart funds. These funds were derived from the purchase of US food surpluses under US Public Law 480 (i.e. ‘Food for Peace’ programme) and were designated to cover the expenditure of the American Embassy in Israel with the remainder used for any activities agreed upon by the two governments – with research (and HU) receiving significant amounts of these funds.

However, in 1968 the US government was doubtful if Israel should remain in the PL 480 programme; this coincided with severe budget cuts to US federal research budgets (connected with a worsening situation in US involvement in the Vietnam War) and thus, a crisis ensued in which some US agencies pulled out of their funding obligations at HU, and others did not renew contracts under the programme. This crisis lead HU to embark on several actions to diversify and secure its sources of research funding: 1) apply pressure to continue US government funding and develop alternative US funding (e.g. through foundations and private endowments) 2) develop alternative international (mainly European) sources 3)
develop Israeli government, foundation and industry sources 4) develop internal research funds.\textsuperscript{176} While not all of these sources appear to be connected to international dimensions (namely, 3 and 4), in actuality, these sources involved an international dimension, either in a direct financial way, or in the strategies used to procure the funding (analysed in section AR&D strategies).

**1969 - 2000: Diversifying research funding**

Fearful for its continued research funding after the announcement of the US government, HU, in coordination with a wide set of actors, including other Israeli Universities; the Israeli Embassy in Washington, D.C.; and the Israeli Treasury, lobbied hard for continual US government funding. Eventually Israel was not struck from the excess currency list, however, the PL 480 programme was nonetheless winding down gradually (as opposed to abruptly as originally feared) and funds were made available to make the process gradual, with a plan to end it by 1972/73.\textsuperscript{177} This created great angst among HU administrators - and also very likely the Israeli government who was at the time providing limited funding to research in its Universities. As the PL 480 programme drew to a close, the ‘Harman Plan,’ named for its initiator, HU President, Avraham Harman, in which the US and Israel would create a bi-national science fund (BSF) for cooperative research was adopted.\textsuperscript{178} The BSF, with an initial Israeli investment of 10 million IL, would represent a significant amount of funding for cooperative research and institutionalise US-Israeli research cooperation at the national level across the HE sector. The BSF would be followed by other bi-national funds (e.g. BARD; BIRD) and in 1985 by the congressionally mandated United States-Israel Cooperative Development Research (CDR) programme, a part of USAID, that aimed to ‘link Israeli and developing country scientists in joint research projects.’\textsuperscript{179} In addition, for lobbying to secure these bi-national US government funding, HU embarked on a concentrated effort to attract further funding from other US sources, namely private foundations (e.g. Ford, Rockefeller, family foundations); industry; and endowments.

In parallel to these efforts, HU and other Israeli universities consistently lamented the lack of national funding for research and pressured the State to build national research funding and infrastructures. In 1967-68, the Kachalsky Committee was tasked with investigating the state of government research and to propose recommendations for its organisation. This committee recommended the creation of the position of ‘Chief Scientist’ in different government ministries, which would advance applied research in their respective field.\textsuperscript{180} Thus, in 1968, in anticipation of decreased funding from the US, the Israeli government,
through its ministries began funding applied research at HU (e.g. Ministries of Agriculture, Defence, Commerce and Industry).\textsuperscript{181} Furthermore, the AR&D Report to the BOG in 1969, notes:

‘a laudable development is the increase in Israel Government research contracts, a trend which we expect to continue due to the government’s growing recognition of the importance of research to the development of the country and to its international standing. The government is also beginning to be aware of its responsibly, within its budgetary limitation, of the need to some-what offset the consequences of dwindling American support to Israeli science.’\textsuperscript{182}

The State (with continual urging from Israeli HEIs) was also organising its own national institutions for Research and Development and searching for ways to integrate university researchers to achieve its aims, particularly those which benefited industry. In 1959 the National Council for Research and Development was established by law, and began operating in 1960, with many HU academic faculty on its Committees. It gradually began to fund applied research and HU along with other HEIs at the time, lobbied the government for a similar fund for Basic Research. In 1972, with a budget of $300,000 US, the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities (established in 1961) founded the Israel Science Fund (ISF), which would provide funding for basic research. Pointedly, this research fund was considerably smaller than that of the BSF. An internal report of the AR&D suggests that the State was more interested in applied research to solve its myriad problems at the time, than basic research.\textsuperscript{183} However, it also appears that the State, at least in some forms of funding, was more willing to put funds into joint research, to encourage greater collaboration with political and economic allies, than to grant research funds directly to Israeli universities. Notably, this view also supported academic views about the importance of international collaboration in science. In an interview I conducted with a renowned scientist and President of the Israel Academy of Sciences when asked about these international research connections, she explained: ‘They are more precious than gold. The founders of our [HE] system understood the importance of international connections in science and they set it up right.’

European sources of research funding, particularly for applied research were pursued as early as 1962 with the support of the MoF.\textsuperscript{184} However, after the 1968 announcement of US cuts in funding, the AR&D, intensified efforts to diversify its research funding with European sources. An internal HU report on European funding and collaboration efforts from 1968 elaborated:

‘We see ourselves as researchers, teachers and technologists, as part of the European Scientific Community. We need funding for our research but also partnership
and cooperation. The need to be connected to Europe is important also to avoid our complete reliance on America.\textsuperscript{185}

While HU actively targeted many countries and was successful in obtaining grants from some (e.g. Holland, France, Belgium, England), the bulk of funding came from West Germany (85% in 1978) and more specifically from industry sources (e.g. Volkswagen), foundations and government grants.\textsuperscript{186} This built on German and Israeli reconciliation after the Holocaust, and the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two in 1965. Over time, this relationship would include shared research centres; collaborations; funding; mobility; and culminate in 1986 with the German-Israel Fund (GIF), a bi-national fund to support research collaboration between the two countries.

HU internal research sources were likewise a priority after the 1968 US funding crisis. A proposal for the Central Research Fund (CRF) which highlighted ‘the over-dependence of the University research on overseas granting agencies’\textsuperscript{187} argued that internal resources were needed to ensure the development of HU. The proposal elaborated:

‘the research development of the HU has not really been within the control of the University since those areas of research not currently popular with the granting agencies do not receive sufficient support even though such areas are basic for any balanced University development.’\textsuperscript{188}

This led to the creation of the CRF which would be managed by a senate committee and executed by the AR&D; while several reasons for its creation were listed (e.g. to fund the Humanities; develop new disciplines; provide bridging funds for new researchers) it was particularly created to serve as ‘a nucleus for a University research financing capacity which will gradually try to replace some of the American Federal money for research at the University.’\textsuperscript{189} This fund would thus offset reliance on American funding specifically, but also be used to develop fields which were outside applied research. Support for this fund was through the taking of overhead from other extramural sources; and through targeted efforts to create research endowments and donor programmes around research (e.g. Research Founders Group; President’s Council on Research), largely through the FHU and Diaspora individuals and foundations.

These funding sources remained primary targets throughout this period, however, by 1996, as part of the peace process, Israel joined the Fourth European Framework programme. This was the beginning of the expansion of relations with the EU (not just Germany or individual countries), and Israel with research representing a significant area of cooperation. Between 1996 – 1998, HU won 55 projects amounting to over 7 million euro of funding leading the Vice-President of AR&D to note that ‘these projects have opened new avenues of
cooperation with European scientists.\textsuperscript{190} Building on developments in the peace process, international funding was increasingly channelled into joint projects with neighbouring countries for regional development to bolster and support these efforts. Commenting on this the VP of the AR&D elaborated:

‘Under the auspices of our supporters from North America, Belgium, Germany and the European Community, in recent years increasing emphasis has been put on research in collaboration with our neighbouring countries in the Middle East…HU was a pioneer in this revolutionary concept of scientific cooperation with our former adversaries… In view of the difficult Middle East peace process, hopes of many have once more been focused on science. Hopefully people more interested in the common solution to scientific problems than their political differences will build mutual trust…the partners in this [scientific] dialogue are, even in the case of contrary view or particular biases, subject to a minimum of mutual acceptance and tolerance…I am proud to suggest that our researchers at the HU are playing a critical role in building bridges to peace through science.’\textsuperscript{191}

By 2000, AR&D had desks specialising in North America, Israel, Germany, and the EU, with international offices in strategic locations (see section AR&D strategies). Thus, by the turn of the century, the AR&D had a sophisticated research infrastructure which channelled and directed research funding through its office. It had extensive international relations in the US and increasingly through the period in Europe, notably with Germany and at the end, was building extensive new cooperation with the EU and was actively engaging with Palestinian and regional Arab partners in funded research to promote the peace process.

\textbf{Research funding}

Over this period the significant efforts made by the AR&D to attract and diversify its research funding bore fruit. The total amount of research funding rose from about 8.37 million ILs in 1963, to $76.4 million in 1999. Table 6 illustrates the considerable shifts from the almost complete reliance on US government funding in the early 1960s, to a more diversified model at the turn of the century which attracted significant funds from the State, Germany, and at the close of the century, the beginning of EU funding.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{llllll}
\hline
Year & US & Israel & HU & German & Europe \\
\hline
1968 & 90 & N/A & N/A & N/A & N/A \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Percentage of AR&D budget by major sources of funding, 1968 – 1999}
\end{table}
1973 41 39 9 N/A 6
1978 31.5 32 9.6 N/A 15$^a$
1983 27 34.8 12.5 9.6$^b$ N/A
1987 30.9 30.4 10.6 9.3 N/A
1993 24.2 38.4 10.1 11.1 3.5
1999 N/A 47.7 6.9 N/A 6.5

Notes: $^a$European funding came from several countries, however, West Germany (government, foundations and industry) accounted for the majority (about 81%) of European funding.
$^b$In this year, only (West) German funding is listed.
Sources: See Appendix R.

Notably, the contribution of the AFHU (listed under US) rose significantly over this time, and it eventually exceeded US federal funds. In 1978/79, US federal agency funding was about 14 million ILs (excluding the BSF) while the AFHU contribution was about 28.5 million IL.$^{192}$

In sum, research in this period was increasingly funded by the State and other national governments, while the Diaspora continued to be an important source of, and network for research funding, as will be demonstrated in the next section. While I established that research in the previous period also addressed the practical needs of Zionist settlement, what was different in this period was the strategic, institutionalised nature of research funding and organisation that was facilitated by the creation of a State infrastructure. Thus, this period was characterised by a shift towards the State, international governments and to a lesser extent industry in funding research – as opposed to grants to the University through the Diaspora in the earlier periods. Countries from which the University received international funding reflected the shifting political relations of the State (e.g. USA, Germany, EU). However, despite different sources of funding, similar strategies were in place throughout the period which drew on a confluence of Diaspora, State and University networks. In the following section, I analyse the different strategies that the AR&D used to secure its international funding.

**AR&D strategies**

**Public relations (PR) activities**

One of the first activities the AR&D undertook to attract funding, was to begin a public relations campaign. In the late 1960s, this was considered particularly important as research funding in the US was becoming more difficult to secure given the federal government budget cuts, and Israel's controversial image on US campuses. The AR&D Head elaborated:
‘Israel’s political image on the university campus in the U.S. is controversial; many of the students and some of the young faculty (many of them Jews), are very critical of Israel, whom they regard as ‘an aggressive expansionist State’, which is not ready to initiate any action towards peace, which does not care about refugees and which ‘continuously escalates the war’. We still have many friends but the number of critics is increasing fast.’

Thus Israel was connected with social unrest on college campuses in the US (emanating from the Civil Rights movement and later Vietnam War protests) and there was recognition from the highest levels at HU that a public relations campaign was needed to combat this undesirable view of Israel; and that there was diversity in Jewish opinion on Israel and far from a consensus in ‘the Diaspora.’

The image that the AR&D desired to promote was that of a top research institution. A consulting report contracted by HU in 1968 to assess its position and opportunities for US research funding noted that HU was viewed as a ‘sub-American school mainly for Jewish or Israeli youngsters’ and ‘few could suggest what the size of the University might be, or what graduate school it had available.’

The AR&D elaborated:

‘Contacts with various funding agencies, particularly in the U.S., have showed that the HU does not enjoy the reputation it deserves. In many circles, the University is identified with Jewish studies or with the humanities only, and with the exception of scientists who maintain relations with the academic personnel of the University, few are aware of the variety, volume and quality of research done here.’

Thus, a central strategy of the AR&D was a PR campaign to project the image of HU as a modern scientific research centre of excellence which would be particularly oriented toward hard sciences (largely out of sync with the portrayals of the University by the RIS, see section 5.3).

The PR campaign included four ‘necessary’ areas: 1) the preparation of special research publications to make known the achievements and potential of the university; 2) interesting scientific journals and editors of key popular scientific journals to ensure HU representation in these media; 3) ensuring that key decision makers who determine policy and are part of granting agencies and foundations are invited to the University and are kept abreast of research activities; and 4) placing greater emphasis on international conferences.

First, an integral part of the first area was the AR&D’s first Research Report published in 1965, a biennial publication which outlined the University’s research projects followed by volumes alternately showcasing the Sciences and Social Sciences/Humanities. Given that HU
already published its Yearbooks, and the expense and time required to produce this volume, this appears to have taken a fair amount of convincing from the AR&D to enlist the support of the academic staff. In a memo to the academic staff, reasons for its importance were explained:

a. The fortieth anniversary of the founding of the Hebrew University.
b. The likely announcement that 1965-1966 will be Education Year.
c. The possible erection of a Ministry of Sciences.
d. Current discussion in the setting up of a HE authority (or a Universities Commission) in Israel to make recommendations on finance for the Universities.
e. Current government discussions on the development of applied science in Israel.
f. Increasing national concern as to the shortage of skilled technical manpower and what should be done about it.
g. The increasing attraction of overseas countries and other institutions for Israeli research workers in general and for Hebrew University staff in particular. In other words, to help counter the ‘brain drain’ from Israel.\(^{197}\)

Thus, it appears the Research Report was deemed necessary due to increased competition from other Israeli Universities for research funding – to ensure its place in the local hierarchy - and as part of its lobbying attempts to secure research funding abroad.\(^{198}\) This increased national and international competition for research funding led to a concern for the research reputation of HU. The 1967 Report to the BOG explains it thus:

`Admittedly, the quality of the research at the University is of a high standard and the results are published in learned journals throughout the world, but in these days this is not enough to maintain the public image of research at the University. When the Hebrew University was the only centre of learning and research in Israel, research reporting was less essential. But today, when the number of institutes engaged in research and who are also concerned with developing their own research image, then the need for research reporting by the University becomes a necessity. It is essential that the quality and scope of University research be widely known throughout the sectors of the community both within Israel and without, particularly those groups which influence public policy and/or the disbursement of funds.'\(^{199}\)

The Research Report was widely disseminated to the FM embassies and consulates; Israeli government ministries and officials; members of Knesset; FHU; the National Library; foundations and funding institutions overseas and in Israel; the US embassy in Israel; reviewing journals; Yissum; Israeli universities; selected industries; and the PR department.\(^{200}\) Given its national and international aims, the Report was published in English. While this was
the beginning of the Research Report, which continues in modified forms until today, by the end of this period, the HU would also have several different research publications including *Quest, Jerusalem* and *Research Review* (AFHU).

Second, in addition to the Research Report, HU, released public relations statements to the press to reinforce its role in research, in which it touted its research projects and international funding as a source of its status. Furthermore, there is archival evidence of international journalists and scientific journals visiting the campus for this purpose.

Third, HU cultivated extensive visits of important people to the campus. There is a substantial record of official visits over the period including: scientific attaches to foreign services; local and foreign government officials; university presidents; senior academics; foundation representatives; and industry leaders. Likewise, HU academic staff were encouraged to travel abroad to create networks with researchers. This appears to be an important way in which research relationships were initiated, cemented and maintained.

Fourth, international conferences began to take an important role in HU’s PR campaign. The AR&D requested academic staff to host international conferences on campus (with funding from the AR&D) and later, with support of FM Cultural and Scientific agreements. While originally this was linked with PR it became more important to forge contacts with researchers broad. In 1980, the Head of the AR&D elaborated:

‘…the benefits were quite large because conferences help to establish contacts between the scientists at our University and scientists abroad and help to initiate joint research projects besides helping to promote the University’s research image.’

*Diaspora funding and connections; FHU and international offices*

The Diaspora was a significant source of direct financial support and connections to different sources of funding. While the Diaspora was the main source of funds for HU in the previous period, in this period, when finance shifted to the State, Diaspora sources began to be funnelled towards specific projects, with the research budget (as opposed to the general or [building] development budgets) receiving considerable funds. FHU offices were specifically called on to play an active role in HU campaigns to bolster the CRF. It was during the late 1960s and the period of uncertainty of continued US research funding, that the Research Founders group was established with the assistance primarily of the AFHU. Half of these donations went to the general budget and the other half were allotted to the Central Research
Fund. By 1973, there were over 70 such members that had pledged at least $25,000 US. In the BOG report that year, it noted that this initiative had:

‘...proved to be very important source of ongoing research funds and very active in promoting the research image of the Hebrew University and emphasizing the importance of maintaining and extending high-level research as an essential feature of the University’s development.’

Thus, in addition to funding research, AFHU were also important partners in propagating the research image which took the lead in producing The Quarterly Review, a research publication on HU research for the lay man. With similar aims, in 1985, HU began a President’s Council on Research to solicit large donations of $1 million.

Alongside contributions to the CRF, endowment funds for special research institutes or defined research areas were actively pursued and the first such endowments became a significant source of revenue in 1972, with income from these sources reaching over 1.25 million IL. Many research centres were endowed in this way (in which the research unit received the interest from the endowment capital in perpetuity) including the Centre for the Study of Management of the Environment, The Centre for European Studies, The Institute for International Relations and The Soviet and East Europe Research Center. Thus, endowments were another area that were specifically solicited from and managed by FHU and the vast majority of endowments were from Diaspora individuals and foundations.

Beyond these avenues of direct financial support, FHU were influential in providing introductions to foundations, universities, industry, media, and government. However, while this cooperation was extremely valued by HU, there was also recognition that the FHU were not always the best avenue for approaching international contacts and this was strategically managed. Indeed, in its effort to expand US support for HU research, HU commissioned J. Richard Taft & Associates, a law firm in Washington, D.C. with experience in research funding to undertake a project aimed at 'Would it be possible to plan, structure, and manage a program with private foundations, corporations, and other funding agencies in the United States to enable financing for a variety of research projects?' This resulted in a consultant report which begins by noting that current HU relations with American foundations and corporations are limited, due primarily to three issues:

1) Focus on Jewish sources: while HU in the US 'has done an exceptional job of securing development resources from individual Jewish sources...it has not had the expertise or the professional manpower to deal with the more sophisticated educational and research foundation, corporations and other funding sources'
2) Lack of information: the University did not have an operational programme to get current information on grant opportunities and philanthropic agencies; and

3) Lack of strategic focus: until recently the University did not have a specific policy focus on foundations and corporations. 208

The report generally stresses the importance of public relations for the University and urges separating research activities in the US from those of the FHU, as they are viewed as having different purposes and public images. The report explains:

‘It would seem impossible to develop a relationship with such foundations without strong, sophisticated cultivation and planning in this country. Reviewing the Friends background and literature, it would be our opinion that the organization is not suited to dealing with such foundations. It is also our opinion that the image change necessary to make the Friends effective in this area, the vast changes in function and literature, would lessen the organization’s appeal to traditional sources of funding.’ 209

The report (and other internal correspondence) reasons that the FHU should not approach the foundations as their image – as a general fundraising organisation with a focus on the Jewish population - would not appeal to a wider audience. These sentiments were likewise evident in a report from a European trip by the AR&D, planned with the FM and a German representative of HU. A 1968 memo on the subject of the role of the Friends in university research states that FHU in Europe were already helpful in creating contacts with foundations such as Wellcome Foundation, French Petroleum Institute, Unilever Foundation, Volkswagen, Nestle Foundation, Wenner Gren Foundation, and Carlsberg Foundation. 210 However, another report also indicated that approaches and relationships with foundations should be managed in a strategic manner. The report explains:

‘If we want to operate in Europe, in order to help us with foundations, there will be a need to cooperate with senior scientists in Europe, Jews and non-Jews. It is advisable to find a way to connect these people to the University. In some cases this may be done with the help of the Friends, but in other cases, it would be advisable to be done in parallel to the Friends.’ 211

This suggests that the FHU were viewed as particularly helpful with Jewish contacts and in the case of non-Jewish contacts, this may best be achieved ‘in parallel’ (e.g. through academic staff; Diaspora contacts; the State). Recognising this, there was even a suggestion by AR&D Head Alex Keynan for an additional ‘Academic Friends of the Hebrew University’ to be created which would focus on institutionalising relationships among US and Israeli academics ‘with the aim to help propagate the research reputation of the HU and attain research funding.’ 212
To facilitate contacts and collect information on international funding opportunities, the AR&D established international offices in strategic locations. A consulting report explains the reasoning for this: ‘it is certainly impossible to compete successfully from Israel, due to the need for a continuing program of cultivation and the basic communications difficulty imposed by distance…’\textsuperscript{213} At times these offices were organised under a representative of HU in the local FHU office, and at other times they were distinct from the local FHU, for example the Washington, D.C. office established in 1968 under the auspices of Mr. Lawrence Mirel, ‘an attorney with wide experience in the organization of research funding.’\textsuperscript{214} International offices served several purposes: to liaise with the Israeli embassy and cultivate government agencies; to lobby decision-makers to influence research funding at national level; to cultivate foundations; to provide a meeting place for HU academics to meet with funders; at times to exercise power of attorney to sign important documents; and to engage HU academic staff on sabbatical leave in public relations campaigns. A letter from Harman to AFHU detailed this latter activity:

‘Our objective is to create opportunities for our professors to discuss their work at the University with the various media of communications in the United States. This may take several forms; the arrangement of an interview with science or education editors of important newspapers or magazines; or with a writer for a prominent popular scientific journal; or an interview on radio or T.V. on a suitable programme.’\textsuperscript{215}

Over the period, HU established (and closed) several international offices (at times beginning with just a representative) in strategic areas of interest to facilitate research funding. Notably, Washington, D.C. in 1968; in NY in 1980\textsuperscript{216}; Germany in 1970\textsuperscript{217}; London in 1970\textsuperscript{218}; and Brussels in 1998\textsuperscript{219}. In addition to their university and government contacts, the international offices drew on Diaspora connections (many made through AFHU) in approaching different foundations, industries, universities and governments. Indeed, in a memo from 1968 the role of the FHU in research funding was detailed and included collecting information about research funding; making introductions and using their contacts to ensure a sympathetic approach to HU proposals; advising HU about how, when and to whom, to submit proposals; assisting in the follow-up after research proposals have been submitted; helping with visiting researchers and organising financing missions; ‘in brief to act as ambassadors of the University in ensuring continued financial support of research.’\textsuperscript{220} It further details a ‘special project’ which entails taking responsibility for particular research projects, perhaps of a joint nature, with institutions or foundations in their own countries. Thus, the international offices operated in close cooperation with the local FHU, HU in Jerusalem, and Israeli and local governments.
State funding and connections

As established in section 5.2, the State began to fund research through its ministries; national infrastructures; and bi-national agreements. HU was not a passive recipient in these activities, rather, as noted in section 5.2, HU actively lobbied the government and its ministries for national funding; infrastructure; and international funds and by the 1970s the State grew to be an important source of research funding. The FM played a special role in international research, both through funding and facilitating it. In terms of funding, the FM, working at times through its development arm, MASHAV, created in 1958, supported several research institutes and departments at HU (e.g. Center for Research of U.S.S.R and Eastern Europe), some of which involved international research collaborations in the developing world or with strategic political partners, while others encouraged teaching programmes with such partners (e.g. MA in Public Health for Students from Developing Countries). In this way, HU was linked with the State’s international relations and development agenda. FM initiatives and funding were welcomed by HU, and there were high level meetings and cooperation between the AR&D VP, HU President, and senior government officials. While the FM likely viewed these projects as cultivating ‘soft power’\textsuperscript{221}, the archival trail suggests that HU viewed these relations as a way to obtain research funding from national governments (the US; Israel) and international organisations – (e.g. UN; World Bank); as a way to promote its public image of ‘universality’; and as a way to facilitate the development and mobility of its (future) academic staff (see section 5.2).

International collaborations and institutional partnerships

International collaboration, while always important in HU research, became closely connected to funding opportunities from national and international governments and foundations. The alignment of HU with State priorities was viewed as a hindrance to creating international research connections. A consulting report contracted by HU in 1968 suggested that HU was viewed by potential funders in the US as a particularly ‘nationalistic University.’\textsuperscript{222} This was further suggested in the report by discussions with HU staff. The report elaborated:

‘…one overriding factor noted throughout all of our interviews and discussions with University personnel is the close relating of the University to Israel’s growth and development. Hence an emphasis on applied research.’
This focus limited opportunities for international funding and cooperation. The report notes that HU staff had a strategy to relate their work to international partners:

‘To mitigate this factor in relation to American grants, it was frequently observed [by HU academics] that pilot projects at the University could be of vast value to underdeveloped nations as well as to certain problems in the United States.’

The report suggests that much more would need to be done in the way of PR to make this connection between HU research and universal needs and that HU would benefit from ‘a good deal more publicity on the work of the University on projects relating to the underdeveloped nations as well as this [US] country.’

Pointedly, one of the ways the report suggests making itself more attractive to international funders and in order to overcome its nationalistic image was for HU researchers to conduct cooperative research programmes with partners (in the US) and to further focus on promoting its role in underdeveloped nations, and universality. The report notes that ‘cooperative programs would be a sound idea for building the University’s reputation in the field of ”universality.”’ Thus, this report suggests that international cooperative research be undertaken to soften perceived nationalistic tendencies in HU research and that proposals and projects should be tailored to more universal (as opposed to nationalistic) audiences (whatever their real aims), with the goal of attracting funding. The implication here, is not that the projects would necessarily change in their content, but rather that the motivations for such a project should be framed differently.

Echoing the consulting report in the US, the report in 1968 on the European prospects for funding likewise states that:

‘…in many cases…[funding] is available only if the research is, at least for the sake of appearances, shared with a researcher from the country in which the fund operates.’

This demonstrates how feedback from both the US and Europe emphasised the importance of international collaboration to receive funding. Accordingly, joint research projects become a central part of the funding strategy of HU research – particularly through the bi-national funds of the US and Germany and later with the EU – and HU developed ties with research institutes and universities with the aim of ‘providing Hebrew University scientists with the opportunity of establishing regular contacts with colleagues in these countries which may result in close and fruitful research cooperation.’ Institutional affiliations were actively pursued with universities and research centres (e.g. SUNY, University of Michigan, Max Planck) with a focus on the US and Germany. Professors were encouraged to make institutional relationships, based on
shared research interests, with the eventual aim to apply for joint funding. A AR&D report from 2000 elaborates:

‘As part of our continuous efforts to assist and support our scientists in submissions to the EU research programmes…Special financial assistance is available to submitters to visit potential collaborating institutions with a view to establishing well-structured research consortia, essential for submitting high-quality research proposals….Additionally, the Authority’s representative in Europe…continues to invest efforts in networking and creating partnership with universities around Europe.’

Thus, if in the pre-State period, research was mainly pursued by individual researchers with little involvement from administration, now the administration was actively match-making between scholars and creating ties to institutions to facilitate these contacts. Sabbatical periods were likewise viewed as an opportunity to forge connections with overseas partners and to strengthen HU’s research image. Mobility programmes, particularly those from FM Cultural Agreements were viewed as an opportunity to create research relationships. Conferences increasingly were linked with creating not only PR for HU, but also connections between researchers which could provide the basis for shared research projects – and funding.

However, while HU, the Diaspora and the State were working to stimulate international research cooperation, there was growing concern about anti-Israeli sentiment among the academic community, particularly in the European context. Alex Keynan, VP of the AR&D, wrote a report on the refusal of Italian academics to take part in a course in Israel between Israeli and Italian scientists. In the opening letter to the report, he notes ‘I hope that this report accurately represents the trend of Anti-Israeli sentiment which is appearing among scientists in Europe, and the background from which it grows.’ He cautions the authorities to take the report seriously and suggests that while the incident may appear bizarre or perhaps a special case, ‘sorrowfully, we should pay attention because this phenomena characterises a not inconsequential part of the prevailing winds in the laboratories in France and even in the classrooms of the London School of Economics.’ He goes on to cite ‘not a little’ difficulty in organising scientific courses in Israel with overseas researchers, or in receiving help from overseas researchers. This despite, ‘since the founding of the State they [academic community] stood with us, helped and supported us, and sometimes more than what was appropriate or expected.’

**Overlapping strategies, defining targets**
The funding and initiation of many research projects and collaborations was a complex combination of interactions between HU and numerous other actors; as demonstrated above, there was a particular reliance on Diaspora and State connections and funding. Endowments from Diaspora individuals were often supplemented by other sources, primarily State sources. For example, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry provided matching funds to the Robert Szold Center for Applied Research (established with American Diaspora funding) and the Ministry of Agriculture allocated matching funds to projects in collaboration with the JCA (Jewish Colonisation Association) in London. Another poignant example was the Red Sea Marine Science Research Station at Eilat; it was viewed as a national need by HU, and was established in 1965 after receiving land from the government and Municipality of Eilat; later it would receive financial support from the National Council for Research and Development and a German source. It became the Interuniversity-Institute of Marine Sciences and was supported by all universities in Israel. In all these initiatives their emergence and funding involved complex interactions between the State, international partners, and Diaspora connections. Thus, while different targets were pursued over time, there was significant overlap in the strategies used to attain these aims and the archival record shows intensive and continual communication between HU, Diaspora organisations and individuals, and State officials and ministries. Targets are also those which were able to most effectively draw on these actors’ connections and interests (e.g. those with Diaspora communities or contacts; in which the State had good relations; and which had strong research communities). Pointedly, while HU pursued primarily US and German (European) funding, the UN and other international organisations were likewise approached, through the Israeli government, university officials, FHU and Diaspora contacts. However, these do not appear to have been successful as financial support for research from international organisations in 1987/88 was less than 1%.

Research funding and partners had come to reflect both the foreign relations of the State, as well as Diaspora relations, with both the State playing a role in developing collaborations for the University and also Diaspora Jewry. These two key actors along with academic considerations of the University circumscribed the collaboration partners. Thus, it was clear from different activities, the extent to which the University was working with the State, and the extent to which it relied upon the Diaspora connections to facilitate and receive international cooperation and funding.

**Academic staff**
With the rapid growth of the University in the State formation period, the academic staff greatly expanded. In 1948, the academic staff numbered 190; by 1984, the academic staff had increased by more than eleven-fold to 2172 members (see Appendix G). In order to achieve this growth, three strategies were pursued: recruitment of Anglo-Saxon academics; encouragement of visiting professors; and training of Israeli academics. Anglo-Saxon academics were sought as European Jewry, the previous bulk of the academic staff was decimated after the Holocaust and large numbers of staff would not be forthcoming from this region. Given the immigration legislation, only Jewish staff would be able to fill the academic ranks of the University (at least, on a large-scale and permanent basis) and at this time, there was no archival evidence of serious consideration of non-Jewish academic staff on a permanent basis. Rather, in line with the founding of the nation for the Jewish people, desirable academic staff were Jewish. Thus, the Anglo-Saxon countries, were viewed as those with sufficient pools of (Western-educated) Jewish populations that would have the appropriate qualifications and training to join the academic ranks of the University. Visiting professors consisted of those employed by institutions abroad, but who ‘…have responded to the University’s invitation to come to Jerusalem for varying periods…’ and Israelis who may be employed, particularly in applied fields such as law or medicine, outside HU, taught in a part-time capacity at HU as well. The third option was training of native Israeli academics. My analysis below reveals that the latter strategy was most relied upon over time, and how it was fostered.

In the previous period, the academic staff was largely composed of men, born and educated in Europe. The HUYBs provided detailed biographical information on 321 staff members in 1957 and 1575 staff members in 1985 and an analysis of academic staff biographies from these years reveals the shifting patterns of the staff, along lines of country of birth, country of education (PhD), and gender (see Appendix G).

The country of birth of the academic staff over the period shifted more towards Israel and away from Europe. Other, more subtle shifts, note the increase in academic staff born in North and South America (SA), and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) (See Appendix G). This broadly reflects shifts in Jewish demography worldwide and immigration trends to Israel. Between these periods, the Jewish communities in Europe were decimated by the Holocaust and in the post-War period, large-scale migration ensued to North America (NA) and Israel. While Jewish communities have deep historical roots in SA, the increase in academic staff likely reflects the increase in the total Jewish population in SA in the first half of the 20th century, as many Eastern European Jews, fled fascism and antisemitism to countries such as Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela and Brazil. Increased academic staff born in SA thus, aligns with the plight of Jews during the Nazi era to the continent. The increase in
academic staff from MENA origin, represents the convergence of two trends: 1) the Zionist movement in its early years, was largely a European movement and most Jews were thus of European origin and 2) the decimation of European Jewry in the Holocaust coupled with the mass expulsion of Jews from Arab countries beginning at the creation of the State of Israel and the subsequent transfer of these populations to Israel in first decades after its creation in a short period of time, brought significant numbers of Jews from the MENA region to Israel. Thus, the origin of academic staff, reflected worldwide trends in Jewish migration, which was tied to events of oppression, expulsion and genocide.

The country of education of the academic staff (where they received their PhDs or terminal degrees) was likewise analysed over this period (see Appendix G). While in the pre-State period, the vast majority of academic staff had been educated in Europe, by the early 1980s, only about 12% of the staff were of this background. The two largest education centres then for HU academics by the end of this period were Israel (with HU being the dominant institution) and the US. By 1985, many more academic staff were educated in Israel and the US, than were born there, again highlighting the dynamic migration trends of Jewish communities during this time.

Overall, there is a strong relationship between events in world Jewry, particularly persecution, in forming these trends: the nature of the University, and the wider character of the State (both of which were for the ‘Jewish People’). Israel was solidifying its national identity during this time, focusing on growing its population and world Jewry were the targets of this desired population increase. Thus, given immigration legislation, the academic cadre was bound to heavily reflect trends in world Jewish demography. However, as noted, this representation is not proportional, and communities were not equally represented. Jews from the MENA, while growing in the academic staff over time, were underrepresented. Moreover, aligning with the focus of solidifying the State, and defining its national character and relations, a significant focus remained on the Jewish character of the State – despite having a significant Palestinian Arab minority with Israeli citizenship. During this period, I did not find reference to any Palestinian Arab academic staff in 1957 and only two in 1985 (as determined by name and place of birth). Thus, the academic staff at this point was largely reflective of the dominant (elite) Jewish section of Israeli society (Ashkenazi Jews). While in the pre-State period, the academic faculty was almost exclusively male, a gradual shift towards more female academic staff is evidenced during this period, however, this was still limited, and women remained under-represented in the academic staff (see Appendix G).

Returning to the three options for growing the academic staff espoused by HU in the early statehood period, it appears that the channel most used was that of creating their own
academics and that limited recruitment of Anglo-Saxon faculty and visiting professors took place. There is record of targeted headhunting of particular academics for certain roles, largely from the Anglo-Saxon countries, and likewise, some visiting professors eventually were incorporated into the academic staff (e.g. Prof. Jack Gross, Dean of Faculty of Medicine), however, these strategies appear to have had limited success and numerous sources note the difficulty in recruiting (Jewish) researchers. A telling exchange on this issue in a roundtable discussion with the HU rector and deans of the seven faculties, on the occasion of HU’s Jubilee lends insight:

Prof. Avineri (Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences) ‘The history of our University is an outstanding success story – I can’t think of a parallel. It is all the more remarkable when we realize that the contribution made to it by Jewish scholars from abroad has in fact been far less than the contributions these scholars made to the growth of universities in the US. There are many U.S. universities that have absorbed far greater numbers of Jewish scholars than those taken into the faculty in Jerusalem.’

Prof. Michael Rabin, Rector of HU, agreeing with Avineri noted that ‘…the intellectual giants, such as Freud and Einstein, did not come here’

In the discussion, Prof. Azriel Levy (Dean of Faculty of Science) agreed with Rabin and stressed regret that HU ‘…fell short of the very highest standards achieved by Jewish scholars’ but that ‘Israel’s size and the financial resources available would make it close to impossible to build up a really powerful second line of scholars – more hope perhaps existed…for reaching the peaks of excellence with outstanding individuals.’

Echoing these sentiments, Prof. Aharon Barak (then Dean of the Faculty of Law, later to be appointed to the Israeli Supreme Court) noted that:

‘…in the pre-State days this country had been less attractive than others for Jewish intellectuals; nor was the position vastly different today. We should, he said, reconcile ourselves to these objective conditions.’

From this exchange, it appears that the top academic leaders of HU were simultaneously proud of the contributions of Jewish scholars in academic fields worldwide, and disappointed that they did not apply their talents to HU. Furthermore, they appear realistic about their prospects to attract ‘great talents’ to Israel and thus appear to agree that attracting Jewish scholars to Israel would not likely be a large-scale sustainable long-term solution. While Jewish scholars were tapped through the FHU or others for help in procuring sabbaticals, connections to funders or to other universities, it does not appear that they were migrating to
Israel en masse, and thus the majority of HU academics were Israeli ‘home-grown’ – if not by birth than by education.

While there were still a fair amount of academic staff who were born abroad, the trend is clearly towards native (Jewish) Israelis and the development of an Israeli academic cadre. However, these academics were not rooted solely in Israel, rather, they were encouraged to study outside Israel for post-doctoral research, and an increasing number also completed PhD studies in North America and in Anglo-Saxon countries before either immigrating or returning to Israel (see Appendix G). A senior researcher and President of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, reflecting on this period of Israeli academia, notes that ‘it was expected to go abroad at some point in your studies, but usually not before the doctorate or post-doctorate stage. The USA was the main destination of choice [when I started academia].’ Echoing these statements, Prof. Jack Gross, Dean of the Faculty of Medicine in 1975 noted that ‘Virtually all those who took post-graduate training in the Medical School went to the U.S. – the world’s best developed centre in this area. And they brought back to Israel the new approaches current there.’ At this time the U.S. and particularly in the medical sciences through the National Institute of Health was contributing vast sums in research funds to the HU Medical School. Thus, there was a clear penchant towards viewing the U.S. as a superior partner for research funding and for obtaining the best and most up-to-date medical knowledge.

The HUYBs also clearly indicated the importance of an international research experience abroad in their strategy for filling the ranks of its academic researchers:

‘...the emergence during the past few years of a growing cadre of Hebrew University graduates capable of assuming academic posts at the University after a period spent abroad in specialised studies...’

During this period, several funding channels were developed to send post-graduate/post-doctoral students abroad as well as facilitate visiting scholars to HU; the latter were encouraged, and began to be funnelled to HU through FM agreements with target nations, and endowment funding, however, these numbers remained modest (170 by 2000).

Bentwich in his insider’s history emphasises the FHU support for international training abroad of research students, other diaspora philanthropic organisations also sponsored research periods abroad, the most notable being Yad HaNadiv, that in 1979 began offering funding to Israeli doctorate holders with invitations for post-doctoral positions from universities abroad. These were supplemented by national level cooperation with specific countries (e.g. FM through its Cultural and Scientific agreements; Fulbright fellowships; bi-national agreements) and there is evidence that MASHAV directed post-graduate
scholarships to promising scholars to be trained in developing countries, who would then be absorbed back into Israeli academia and possibly provide on-going service to MASHAV (the FM). Research periods abroad, particularly in a post-doctoral capacity and through sabbatical periods were actively encouraged by HU and funds were provided for this purpose from the FHU, HU budget, Cultural and Scientific agreements with the FM of Israel and other countries, and through sector-wide funding for sabbatical leave (Keren Shabbaton) and international scientific conferences and connections (Fund for International Scientific Relations).

International research periods abroad, led many staff members to hold dual titles with institutions, primarily in North America and Europe and to have had research appointments and visiting lectureships. This is highlighted not only through academic staff biographies, but also through the information of the time, on sabbaticals (which shifted from 7 years to 4 years between 1957 and 1963). Thus, HU staff was connected to international academics and encouraged at the University, Diaspora funding and national policy levels to undertake research periods abroad (e.g. Fund for International Scientific Relations).

Many academics thus held a blend of international and national character and background, in terms of their origin and education, and in addition to having an international character to their research activities and training, academics also took special roles in the international relations of the State. Academics during this time were active not only in government positions, as consultants and practitioners, but also represented the State in international forums. The following excerpt from the 1967 annual report of the AR&D puts this succinctly:

‘In the International sphere the role of the HU staff is particularly worth noting. Large numbers [of academics] are invited to actively participate in International Scientific Congresses abroad and often hold important roles in international professional societies. On a continuing basis they act as editors or serve on the editorial boards of many international scientific and professional publications. They serve as consultant and members of standing committees on various international bodies as UNESCO, World Health Organization, NATO Committees, etc. During their periods of study leave staff members hold important visiting positions at leading academic institutions throughout the world, an increasing number of distinguished overseas visiting research workers spend varying periods of time at the HU, participating in research, conducting seminars, giving guest lectures, etc. As a result of contact made joint research projects have been initiated’
Once researchers had the requisite international training, a portion of the funding for academic positions and lectureships at the HU was supported by international funding. While in the previous period, the Diaspora financed positions for refugees from Europe, in this period more academics were being trained in Israel, and research funding coming more from the State and international sources (US), the Diaspora continued to support the absorption of academic staff. Notably, during this period there was a significant increase in chairs and lectureships endowed with Diaspora sources sponsoring 274 chairs/lectureships out of a total of 314 (see Appendix H). While this number is impressive, it is helpful to also consider the contribution from external research funding in facilitating the increase of academic staff. In 1967, the Report to BOG notes that over 500 researchers received their salaries from outside research funding and in the draft proposal for the BSF, from 1970, it noted that Israel-wide this number stood at about 850. Thus, between the international research funding and Diaspora sources, (not including regular budget, etc.) a significant portion of research positions were supported by international funding. The Government, likewise, funneled funds to the AR&D to integrate immigrant scientists into HU, notably through its Ministry of Aliyah and Absorption.

In sum, academic staff during this period grew significantly. At the beginning of Statehood, the academic staff was almost exclusively men, who were born and educated in Europe. However, over time there was a significant shift in these patterns: gradually over the period, academics became more Israeli-born and educated, however international academic experiences (e.g. postdoctoral training; international conferences, visiting lectureships, research stays abroad, sabbaticals) were an integral part of the formation of the Israeli academic. The target of this collaboration was particularly the US and other countries which the State held diplomatic relations and could access shared research funding. The shift towards a focus on the US, reflected shifts in research funding; national political alliances and aid between the US and Israel; the influence, size and location of Jewish communities after WWII; and the shift of the world academic centre from Europe to the US after WWII.
5.3 International dimensions of teaching

In this sub-chapter I analyse the international dimension of teaching in this period. I focus on the School of Overseas Students (SOS) (and its predecessor, the American Student Program [ASP]), as it was the institutional focal point of international teaching programmes and students at HU. While in the previous period, all international students were kept together in the faculties, the creation of the SOS represented a shift towards institutionalising international students and teaching as a separate entity within HU. I argue that over time, the SOS became the principal department charged with international teaching and students, with a dual purpose to serve as a site for Jewish identity, leadership and Diaspora-building; and Aliyah/new immigrant integration. Thus, the SOS was at once both closely aligned with Diaspora identities, concerns and priorities; and State concerns of immigration and transnational ‘ambassadorial’ links. At times these purposes and constituencies collided with that of HU’s academic mission, however, there was a process of negotiation between these actors and their various agendas, which resulted in widespread support from the highest levels for the SOS and its mission. This partnership affected the purposes, curriculum, marketing, student social composition, funding, administration and governance, which reflected their overlapping interests, priorities and relations.

During this period, the HU student body was dominantly ‘Israeli’, with international students at the SOS only ever comprising about 7% of the student body (see Appendix I). Despite this, it was the subject of intensive effort, due to its connection to State aims and Diaspora communities which I argue was of ideological and symbolic importance. International students were almost entirely Jewish, however the One Year Student Program (OYSP) was populated mainly by North Americans while the social composition of the student body in the preparatory course (Mechina) fluctuated with waves of Jewish immigration to Israel. CHE statistics indicate that HU was by far the dominant Israeli university hosting international students in this period. Data from the Institute of International Education in the US indicated that Israel (and as an extension HU) was one of the top destinations for American study abroad students throughout the 1980s and 1990s; in 1996 Israel was the eighth most popular destination for study abroad among American students, with almost the same number of students studying in Israel (2,621) as in all of South America (2,683). Thus, despite representing a small proportion of students at HU, international students at HU represented the largest population in Israel, and HU likely played an oversized role in US study abroad experiences.
I begin by analysing the creation and development of first the ASP and then the SOS. The key periods/phases identified and the events/initiatives within them are delineated in Table 7.

Table 7. Key dates in the development of the international dimension of teaching, 1948 - 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Events and/or impact on HU</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948-1967</td>
<td>Academia as a site to foster diaspora links</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>HU offers Summer Institutes for Diaspora youth in coordination with JAFI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>HU creates the American Student Programme (ASP) with AFHU, Israeli Embassy and JAFI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967–1980</td>
<td>From ASP to School of Overseas Students (SOS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Six-Day War brings student volunteers to Israel, many wish to make Aliyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>School of Overseas Students is created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-72</td>
<td>SOS moves to Mount Scopus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-2000</td>
<td>SOS institutionalisation and expansion; extension of SOS aims to national level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>SOS endowed and renamed after Samuel Rothberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>PBC/CHE Committee created, extending SOS mission to national level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Graduate programmes are inaugurated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998 &amp; 1999</td>
<td>Renamed Rothberg School of International Students (RIS); new building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>RIS hub of HU international students and teaching activities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 7 indicates, the analyses revolves around three sub-periods; namely 1948 – 1967, a period of Diaspora building which led to the creation of the American Student Program (ASP), a junior year abroad to develop and foster Diaspora links with the new State; 1967 – 1980, a period after the Six-Day War in which the SOS was created to integrate new Olim into the country, and to continue fostering Diaspora links; and 1981 – 2000, a period in which the SOS was endowed, expanded and its mission was adopted at the national level. After analysing this, I then proceed to analyse the international programme offerings, formal and informal curriculum; target international students, portrayals of RIS and recruitment; financial support; and administration and governance of RIS. I conclude with a discussion of the entire chapter.
1948 – 1967: HE as an institution to foster diaspora youth connections and identities

'When you look at a program and something is being created, you always have to look at the source of where it started and why, and who is funding it. And that will give you some interesting answers.' - Past Vice-Provost, SOS

With the creation of the State, there was a critical need for immigration - if possible, of educated and affluent Jews from the Western, developed countries - to legitimise its raison d’etre and to spur its development. The State also endeavoured to establish itself as the centre of World Jewry and to form connections between the State and the Jewish Diaspora. Such connections held potential to simultaneously reinforce its fledgling national identity which united Jews of very different backgrounds within the borders of Israel; and to provide important international connections which the isolated and developing country sorely needed. One of the ways to encourage these two goals, was through youth visits to Israel. From the summer of 1949, Zionist youth movements embarked on trips to explore the new State and HU played a role in this, by hosting Summer Institutes for Diaspora Youth. These trips were planned through JAFI and often in conjunction with Zionist youth movements, of which a portion of the programmes was held on the campuses of HU, Weizmann Institute and Technion. For example, in the Summer of 1949, HU in cooperation with the Zionist Organisation and the Youth and Hechalutz (Pioneering) Department of the WZO, organised a joint Summer Institute from July to September 1949. Showing the great importance of the Summer Institute, at the opening ceremony, in the first summer of the State, the speakers included: Sir Leon Simon (Acting President of HU), Prof. S. Assaf (Rector of HU), and Berl Locker, Chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive (a position that Ben-Gurion held when he declared the State of Israel in May 1948).250

While youth trips to Israel were important from the view of the State, important Diaspora figures advocated this as well, however, for different reasons. Samuel Rothberg, an influential Jewish businessman from Illinois, who was involved in Israel Bonds, bringing industry to Israel and eventually became President of the AFHU and Chairman of the International Board of Governors at HU, wrote an editorial in the American Israel Review entitled ‘We need not lose our Children.’251 He argued that Israel should be a place to rekindle and perpetuate Jewish bonds of Diaspora youth, through visits to the homeland, primarily as a reaction to Jewish assimilation in America. Director General of the PM’s Office and future six-term Mayor of Jerusalem (1965 – 1993), Theodore (Teddy) Kollek responded to Rothberg:
‘...I, like you, am convinced that if a few thousand American Jewish parents were to regard their children’s education as incomplete unless they had been to Israel, we would then be able to assure a strong and vital bond between the future generations of American Jewry and of Israel. I firmly believe that we are each essential to the other’s survival. Ours is an interdependence that pervades all spheres. Israel’s foremost task is to keep the bush burning; yours is to send your children to come and draw from its light.’

Thus, there was a confluence of agendas between the State and Diaspora to bring Jewish youth to Israel. In the archival record high-level support was apparent throughout the period, with successive Presidents of HU, key Israeli politicians (e.g. Golda Meir; Teddy Kollek) and prominent Diaspora figures (e.g. Samuel Rothberg; Family Bronfman; Family Mandel) expressing support for such visits. While there were many different youth programmes in Israel (e.g. Kibbutzim, summer camps), an academic framework was considered apt for targeting youth, particularly North Americans, as a ‘junior year abroad’ was becoming more prominent and indeed encouraged in American universities. It was thought that this year could be used to bring youth to HU (Israel’s only University at the time) for a unique educational experience which would simultaneously expose them to Israel, the Israeli people, and also deepen their connection to Hebrew and Jewish studies. Pointedly, this option did not obligate Jewish youth to immigrate to Israel, a prospect that for Jews in Western countries, did not appear overwhelmingly appealing, given the numerous hardships in the new State.

In 1955 the American Student Programme (ASP) was inaugurated. The programme was a partnership between the Israeli Consulate in NY (Consul, Avraham Harman), AFHU and JAFI. After receiving assurances from American universities that they would accept transfer credit from HU, AFHU and JAFI moved forward to create the programme. AFHU created an Office of Academic Affairs to take administrative responsibility for promoting the programme, logistical arrangements, fundraising for the scholarships; handling tuition payments and the brunt of admissions. An Academic Committee in NY was likewise inaugurated to provide academic input to the programme; while a Committee was established at HU to oversee it in Jerusalem. JAFI took the lead in coordinating (and funding) the informal programme and the Ulpan.

The programme was perceived to serve national purposes by developing a cadre of students in the Diaspora which would be familiar with Israel, have an affinity with it and could serve as bridges between the Diaspora and Israeli Jewry, particularly between the US and Israel. Comments made by the Chairman of the Academic Council at the farewell gathering of the American students on their way to Israel from NY expressed this sentiment: ‘Yours will be
the opportunity to further and deepen understanding between Israeli and American Jews, between America and Israel. Importantly, the programme was viewed from the perspective of its potential to impact on whole communities and national relations, not just individuals. HU Rector Prof. Rotenstreich noted: 'I need not dwell on the significance of the program, not only to the students as individuals, but to the American Jewish community as well as to Israel.'

The programme began with only approximately 20 students in its first years, gradually growing over time to 135 students on the eve of the 1967 war (see Appendix I). HU was soon solicited by other Diaspora communities and eventually a handful of students from other countries were admitted and the programme was renamed the One Year Student Program (OYSP).

1967 – 1971: From ASP to School of Overseas Students (SOS)

Fearful for the survival of the State, leading up to the 1967 war, thousands of Jewish students flooded to Israel to volunteer in the war effort. After Israel’s victory, many of these volunteers stayed. This was viewed favourably by the Israeli government and in a series of discussions between State officials, HU and Diaspora leaders, the State created a support mechanism (the Student Authority, part of the Ministry of Aliyah and Absorption) to integrate these students into universities. Through this act, it became clear that HU was expected to accommodate these students. Thus, by 1967, there was a new understanding and reality on the ground. HU needed to support and continue its OYSP, but also to create a framework to integrate new immigrants with varied backgrounds and levels of previous education. Unlike in the previous period, there was already an established Israeli student body and there was not serious consideration of admitting students on a trial basis. There was already a preparatory course in the Center for Pre-Academic Studies with some new immigrants enrolled, however, the number of new students put pressure on this infrastructure and the needs of the students considered so different to those of disadvantaged Israelis (for which the Center was designed), that a more appropriate solution was sought.

To respond to these new and pressing needs, many ideas were floated, including the creation of a 4-year college attached to the University which would teach in English. This idea, despite gaining support from some sources, was continually rejected by HU (and continues to be rejected today). Internal meeting minutes and personal correspondence indicate that HU was reluctant to create a full 4-year English college, because this would inhibit integration of these students into Israeli HE and later Israeli society. A 1967 report from the Dean of Students elaborated:
‘In some ways, it would perhaps be easier, from an administrative point of view, to establish an entirely separate academic framework for students from abroad. There is an over-riding importance, however, to integrating the overseas students, to the maximum degree possible, into the general university frameworks...Not only will this contribute to an enrichment of the academic experience abroad, as a result of intellectual contact with Israeli students, it will also facilitate the creation of living bonds between the overseas student and the people of Israel, which is after all, one of the cardinal purposes of the program.’

Importantly, it would also undermine the value of Hebrew, which was viewed as a vital tool for integration into Israeli society and an important part of the fledgling national identity. Meir Sherman, discussing the idea of such a college, wrote to Rothberg on the matter:

‘A comparison would also be invited with the American University in Beirut, with the implication that the “natives” are unable to furnish their own education in their own language.’

Thus, if an English college were to be sponsored by HU at the time, this was viewed as undermining the nation-building process, and one of the principal aims of encouraging international students to come to Israel.

Eventually, a new infrastructure to manage and handle international students – of both varieties – new immigrants and study abroad students, was deemed necessary and the subject of extensive debates. The proposal for a SOS was put forth by Rothberg, then Chairman of the International BOG. Rothberg, with the support of Harman, who after his stint in the Israeli FM, became HU President, lobbied hard for the SOS to PM Golda Meir; her deputy and Education Minister Yigal Alon; and waged a campaign for the SOS among the BOG. Eventually, the SOS was created in 1971 which brought the preparatory programme for new immigrants and the OYSP under the same administrative structure (and eventually other programmes see section 5.3). The SOS would have the status of a School in the University, steered academically by a rotating Provost and an Academic Committee (in the US and also HU). Crucially for its future academic development, it was a separate entity, unattached to the faculties. Administratively, it would be directed by a Vice-Provost at HU, while continuing its overseas arrangements with AFHU and the Office of Academic Affairs. In the 1971/72 academic year, the SOS moved to the Goldsmith Building, establishing it as the second academic unit to return to Mount Scopus.

At the outset, the purpose of the SOS was twofold: to integrate young (Jewish) immigrants into the University (and the country); and to provide an academic homeland
experience for Jewish Diaspora youth. In a report to the Executive Committee, the Provost, described it thus:

‘The staff of the SOS envision their role as having a two-fold purpose: the first is the absorption of new immigrants into the country in our specific field, i.e. to facilitate their entry to the HU and to make it as smooth as possible and indirectly, also to serve as a shock-absorber for their confrontation with a way of life different from that which they were accustomed in the past. We see our second purpose as a duty arising out of the special relationship between Israel and the Diaspora. We feel that we have to help provide the future Jewish and Zionist leadership to strengthen the different communities abroad and partly to reciprocate in fact for all that the Diaspora is doing for Israel. All this is to be done without prejudicing the high academic standards of the Hebrew University.’

This dual purpose was expressed repeatedly in letters, BOG Meetings and reports. For example, in personal correspondence HU President, Hanoch Gutfreund describes the school thus:

‘…[SOS] is thus at the center of the two essential processes that constitute the basis of Jewish continuity: immigrant absorption into Israeli society and the strengthening of Jewish identity in the Diaspora. The School’s fundamental premise is that these two roles are interconnected: that Jewish continuity cannot exist without the State of Israel, and Israel is dependent on Jewish continuity.’

Pointedly, these purposes tied the SOS to HU’s mission to be ‘the University of the Jewish People’, and it was rather estranged from its mission of research and knowledge creation. Senior members of HU, both administrative and academic often referred not to the academic merits of the programme (which were broadly seen in deficit, see section Portrayals of RIS) but in terms of its contribution to national and Jewish community aims. Illustratively, HU’s Rector, its supreme academic figure, referred not to the academic value of the SOS, rather to it as the university’s ‘most important outreach program to the entire Jewish world.’

1981 – 2000: Upgrading the SOS, HU mission adopted by the State

In 1981 on the 10th year anniversary of the SOS, it was endowed by and renamed the Rothberg School for Overseas Students (RSOS) in honour of its long-time supporter, Samuel Rothberg. A fundraising campaign was undertaken by Rothberg and Harman to endow the School and create a Board of Overseers (BOO). This signalled the increasing importance of
the RSOS and the institutionalisation of its main constituencies through governance (see section Administration and governance).

In 1982, the RSOS mission became a coordinated system-wide aim. A Joint Steering Committee for Overseas Students was established with JAFI; Israeli Universities, and WZO; it was coordinated by the PBC of the CHE. This Committee (henceforth PBC/CHE Committee) was the brainchild of George Wise, first president of Tel Aviv University (TAU) and former head of HU BOG. A formal proposal for the PBC/CHE Committee was submitted to the JAFI Executive, based on two premises which were noted as ‘by no means conflicting’:

a. Jewish students studying in Israel universities ‘will return to the Diaspora with personal knowledge of Israel and there is a very strong possibility that he will become more deeply attached to Israel, more knowledgeable as a Jew, and more active in the Jewish community and the Zionist movement…studies….show that in the vast majority of cases this is true.’ And

b. ‘Young Jews coming to Israel to study are likely to become candidates for aliyah…investigations…lead to the conclusion that 15-20% of student who come to Israel for a period of at least one year of study, do land up in Israel as Olim or stay on in Israel as Olim.’

The purpose of the PBC/CHE Committee was to ease coordination and aid the universities to increase international student numbers with a goal to double international student numbers from 2,000 to 4,000 in 2-3 years with an annual budget of $2 million. It provided scholarships and funds for recruitment and marketing; extra-curricular activities; housing (at times); and academic programme development. JAFI was viewed as the natural partner in this endeavour given that they were responsible for worldwide Aliyah. Moreover, Aliyah numbers were dwindling while the State was still desperately looking to attract new immigrants, particularly those from Western nations. The solution to this problem, as advanced in the proposal, was through Jewish international students. Importantly for JAFI, the PBC/CHE Committee would encourage ‘indirect aliyah of precisely the type of people whom we would like to come to Israel.’ Meaning, young educated Jews from Western countries.

While JAFI provided the funding for such activities, the PBC/CHE provided a ‘seal’ of approval of the academic level of the programmes - which bolstered the universities academic credentials abroad – and could likewise exercise a measure of control over the creation of new programmes. It also represented a strategic partner that could coordinate policies on a national level for the sector. For instance, Prof. Levtzion in his capacity of Head of the PBC/CHE Committee, wrote to the Minister of Finance, Igal Cohen-Orgad asking for him to
intervene to abolish the exit tax for international students. He appeals to him for his help justifying changes in national policies for this valuable group of future immigrants thus:

‘…this Committee aims to grow the number of Jewish students from overseas who come for academic studies in Israel. Our experience shows that studies in Israel strengthens Jewish and Zionist identity of overseas students. Many of them come back for further visits to Israel and about 20% come in the end as immigrants.’

The PBC/CHE Committee was managed from Jerusalem; however, it established an office in NY working with different partners to meet recruitment goals (see section Recruitment strategies). Overall, through this PBC/CHE Committee, the national body charged with planning and budgeting HE, became involved in the development of international programmes; funding and recruitment of Jewish students to Israeli HE. The purposes behind the SOS, were thus extended to the entire HE system.

RSOS programmes expanded over the period, and in 1993/1994, a special Graduate Programme was introduced, which rapidly turned into several Master’s degree-granting programmes. In 1998, with the opening of its own building (named after Lou Boyar, a donor and close friend of Rothberg) the school was renamed the Rothberg International School (RIS). Thus, over the period the RIS developed a sophisticated infrastructure for accommodating international students. It had its own building, library, maintenance fund, BOO, administrative staff, international offices and was a ‘one-stop shop’ for international students at the HU. On the eve of the Second Intifada, there was optimism and hope that the peace process would bring a flood of students to RIS.

*International programme offerings, formal and informal curriculum*

**OYSP**

From the beginning of ASP, RIS programmes were designed as more than an academic programme; it was often referred to as an ‘educational experience’ which would instil a deeper understanding of Judaism and modern Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people. It was created as a social experience which would bind together Jewish students and serve as a platform for strengthening identity formation. The ASP (and later OYSP) programme consisted of four components: intensive Hebrew language instruction; special courses in Jewish and

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\[\text{While the name of the international student infrastructure changed several times throughout the period, for the remainder of the thesis, I refer to it as RIS, its name at the end of this period (and until today).}\]
Israel studies; regular academic courses from HU; and a rich informal programme of trips and
tours around the country. The programme ran for a full year from approximately July to July
and began with a lengthy period of Ulpan (intensive Hebrew instruction) before courses in
Jewish and Israel studies would begin after the Jewish High Holidays in about October.
Hebrew courses would be continually maintained during the whole of the year. Teaching was
adapted for students without a background to advanced and students who had a high level of
Hebrew fluency were eligible to take regular courses in HU faculties, however, most students
enrolled in special courses in Jewish and Israeli Studies, and the Modern Middle East that
were designed for the programme, taught in English or elementary Hebrew. The formal
curriculum was designed to facilitate a deeper understanding of Judaism and also to acquaint
young Diaspora Jews with Israel. An Academic Committee member elaborated: ‘The
educational character of the programme allows the participants to not only get to know Israel
and her condition, but also to deepen their knowledge of Judaism.’

Gradually over time, the programme grew and incorporated more courses, and
somewhat broadened its subject areas; an attempt to broaden the curriculum and attract more
students, was undertaken and specialisations were developed (and closed) in other areas
such as Business Administration and Pre-Med. This was the subject of persistent debate
among the AFHU and RIS administrators. As a junior year abroad, a certain level of courses
would need to be offered, and students would require upper level courses in their major field
of study. Thus, the majors of the students were followed carefully, and shifts towards American
HE and a more professional focus, were keenly followed (and lamented) by RIS
administration. A recruiting report elaborated: ‘The greatest single danger to study abroad in
the U.S. stems from the growing professionalisation and vocationalization of undergraduate
studies in the US.’

To deal with this shift, a few select courses were offered in order to appeal to these
students. In an interview with a RIS administrator in this period (and subsequent Vice-Provost)
reflected course development:

‘We constructed many of our courses in such a way that they could be counted in
various disciplines… let’s say course X could with be sociology or history or political
science. It depends how you build it…but we knew if we can attract them for at least
one or two of the courses that they need for the major, we’re set. So…if you look at
our catalogue, you see a constant shift of courses and directions.’
However, the traditional courses remained dominant throughout this period and in the 1996/97 academic year, 110 courses were offered in the framework of the OYSP/Freshman programme, of which 53 were in Judaic Studies, 9 in Israel Studies, 11 Middle East and Islamic Studies, 4 Science Courses as part of a Pre-Med Specialisation, 19 General Studies courses and 8 in Languages (Arabic, English and Yiddish, in addition to a Hebrew requirement throughout the year).  

The OYSP was designed to complement the US HE system and was thus affected by changes therein. In addition to the professionalisation of HE, the OYSP required structural changes from HU. RIS developed a semester system that would be compatible with American HEIs (this was not in sync with the rest of HU, that used a year system). The one year was always upheld as superior – due to the educational experience that was desired. This was a losing battle however, as trends towards shorter periods of study abroad grew and begrudgingly HU began to offer a semester option, which became increasingly popular.

The OYSP attracted almost entirely a Jewish North American population. Even after expanding the programme to students from any country, the North American focus continued and according to the Annual Provost report from 1995, of 604 students in the OYSP, over 99% of students were from the Anglophone world: 510 (USA); 57 (Canada); 18 (UK) and 14 (Australia). While the programme was originally articulated as a ‘junior year abroad’, students early on were accepted from sophomores to recent graduates. The students were usually between the ages of 19-21 years old and were presumed to be supported by their families. Most were students from the social sciences and humanities with just 5% coming from the natural sciences. They were primarily from middle-class background, with some from upper middle-class backgrounds and most received financial support from their parents and were not in need of scholarship.

A research study of the programme conducted on participants in the 1987/88 academic year, found that the majority of students were affiliated Jews (predominately from the Conservative Movement) with some connection to Jewish community and organisations. They tended to be third and fourth generation Americans and most students had visited Israel previously, were affiliated with a synagogue, had received formal Jewish education (either through private schooling or afternoon/Sunday Hebrew schools), and a high percentage (57%) were affiliated with Jewish youth movements. The report noted that:

‘Students in the One-Year Program of the HU of Jerusalem are thus a special population, one that has had extended Jewish socialization and receives powerful reinforcement from a variety of sources, including peer groups, family, organizational
and communal involvements, and previous visits to Israel – factors that are, in turn mutually reinforcing."\textsuperscript{277}

The report surmises that ‘this year of study becomes in effect part of a wider process of Jewish socialization involving school, youth group, and prior visits to Israel. The One-Year Program is a link in a chain.’\textsuperscript{278} This fact was explicitly recognised by the Administration as early as 1979:

‘I want to emphasise that despite all our efforts from Israel and from New York we do not reach the unaffiliated Jewish public. I recommend again more wide-reaching activities this year.’\textsuperscript{279}

Thus, despite aims to bring any Jewish students to the programme, those who attended were from affiliated households.\textsuperscript{280}

Research on the OYSP showed that purposes for these students to study in Israel was for reasons of tourism and experiential exploration before settling into a vocation (both connected to pilgrimage, Jewish identity and personal searching) with academic reasons only coming in third place. This report supported previous research by Simon Herman (1970) on the programme during the late 1960s and later research by Cohen (2003) on international students in Israel at the end of this period. Thus, there is consistency in the type of student the programme targeted and hosted, and their reasons for participating in the programme.

Analysing student numbers over time and internal documents in the archival record, enrolment in the OSYP was highly reactive to the security ‘situation’ within Israel and the region. Typical internal reports during times of crisis, showed the highly volatile nature of student enrolment:

‘The extraordinary circumstances of the Gulf crisis and war cast their ominous shadow on the One Year Program…With the approach of January 15, however, there were signs of a growing tide of withdrawals. Some universities were making it clear that they would not be giving credit to those who remained and a vociferous campaign was being waged by individual parents for their children to return home.’\textsuperscript{281}

In this vein, recruitment for the 1974 OYSP was affected by the Yom Kippur war (in 1973), and the Gulf Crisis and subsequent Gulf War, the First Intifada, terrorist attacks and towards the end of this period, the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister and head of the Peace negotiations with the Palestinians, Yitzchak Rabin (1996) (see Appendix I).
Preparatory courses were aligned with the aim of the school to integrate new immigrants into Israeli HE and society more broadly. Several courses were developed over this period including various 4-year and 2-year programmes, and TAKA (from Hebrew acronym, an advanced preparation for those with prior academic experience), however, the largest and most enduring programme was the Mechina for new immigrants. These programmes were designed for those who had already or were planning to immigrate to Israel, and who wished to integrate into HU faculties. Of these programmes, the Mechina was the oldest and largest programme of this type.

The Mechina was a preparatory year, for those who did not yet meet HU entrance requirements. The formal curriculum of the Mechina contained three parts: intensive Hebrew study (and also English, for non-native speakers); Jewish and Israeli history and society and courses; and courses connected to a future degree programme, usually separated in two tracks: humanities and social sciences; and exact sciences. In the 1996/97 Mechina, 135 courses were offered, 41 classes in Hebrew Language (5 levels), 35 classes in English language (6 levels), 20 classes in Mathematics, 28 courses in Israel and Jewish Studies (taught in easy Hebrew, Russian, French, Spanish and Hungarian) and only 11 courses in Introductory/Departmental Courses in Various Disciplines (taught in easy Hebrew). As noted above, these courses were taught in a variety of languages, largely linked to waves of Aliyah. Courses were taught in a mixture of easy Hebrew and Jewish and Israeli courses were often taught in the mother-tongue of the students.

While the OYSP was tailored to the American model of HE, the various preparatory programmes were designed to bridge gaps between international (immigrant) students and the HU faculties. Reflecting on the role of the Mechina during the Soviet Aliyah in 1991, HU President Yoram Ben-Porath said, 'Universities which don’t care about the successful absorption of foreign students leave them to fend for themselves…our program is an expression of the desire that these people become full-fledged Israeli citizens and students without any disabilities.' There was also continual discussion of how to bridge the OYSP and preparatory programmes at the RIS. How could RIS assist students from the OYSP who after (or during) their time at RIS, wished to stay and complete their degrees at HU? Under what conditions and in what frameworks could RIS facilitate their continuation in the HU faculties? These questions and concerns spawned decades of propositions about different types of programmes, some of which opened and closed (i.e. two-year and four-year programme) and others such as the proposal for a separate three or four-year college taught in English which was brought up repeatedly over the period, yet never materialised. Overall,
these proposals highlighted the continual concern of the RIS to serve as a vehicle to expose Diaspora youth to Israeli and Jewish culture, and to offer them pathways to Aliyah. The programmes were designed to be credit-serving, particularly in the US and offer options for students to either continue in HU, or return back to the US, keeping their options open. Thus, the formal curriculum was heavily influenced by a desire to keep the programme both attractive to US students who may not desire to make Aliyah, while also facilitating their integration into HU, should they chose to.

The preparatory programmes were linked with Jewish immigration to Israel and the social composition of Mechina students shifted with different waves of immigration to the country (see Appendix I). While there was ideological Aliyah (which continues to this day) particularly after the initial waves of Western Aliyah in the immediate years after the 1967 war, persecution and unrest in Jewish communities around the world was a significant, if not the main determinant of the social composition of students in this category. Thus, during unrest in Iran, there was a rise in the Persian-speaking population; unrest in Hungary and South America were linked with increases of these students. The largest wave of such Aliyah, that of Soviet Jewry beginning in 1989, significantly boosted preparatory programme numbers. However, the RIS did not passively react to events; rather, there is significant archival evidence which points to a pattern in these situations: Jewish communities in distress were actively assisted through an organised effort, usually involving JAFI (tasked with Jewish immigration), the FM, and senior university administration as part of a larger Aliyah taskforce. For example, HU sent a representative to Iran in 1967 in preparation for their Aliyah (paid for by the Diaspora Centre and arranged with JAFI and FM) ‘to conduct a comprehensive and qualified survey of the problems involved in admitting students from there.’ In this way, RIS was a key actor in the reception and integration of new Jewish immigrants into society.

While Jewish students were the primary demographic, there was long a presence of some Palestinian Arab from East Jerusalem (PAfEJ) students; indeed, in December 1967, after the Six-Day War, the Dean of Students organised a meeting with new students from East Jerusalem. During this period, there is no archival evidence that these students were targeted in any way by RIS. PAfEJ students numbers reflected the shifts in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with student numbers dipping during the beginning of the First Intifada, but steadily rising through the period after the signing of the Oslo Accords. Pointedly, on the eve of the Second Intifada, the Mechina had more PAfEJ students than Anglophone or Francophone students. Notably, PAfEJ students were considered as a particular type of ‘international’ student; most did not hold Israeli citizenship and they had foreign matriculation certificates (see section 6.3).
Graduate programmes

Graduate students were coming to the RIS for many years and towards the end of the period, there was recognition of the need to create programmes for them. Graduate programme were viewed as a way to diversify the student body, opening up opportunities for students (particularly from Europe) that did not need to transfer credits; and bolster the academic character and reputation of the RIS. In 1994 the Provost elaborated on these objectives:

1. To meet the demand for overseers students to pursue an MA in areas which the HU had an advantage (e.g. Jewish Studies, etc.); 2. To expand the representation of the student population from other countries not sufficiently represented in the RIS; and to strengthen the bonds between the faculties and department of the HU with the RIS, by developing joint programmes which could also serve as a way to integrate Israelis and international students.288

Moreover, in discussions at the PBC/CHE Committee, Graduate students were also viewed as more mature and possibly better candidates for Aliyah, and thus worthy of investment.

The Graduate Programme (which began originally as a one-year programme within the OYSP) was inaugurated in 1993. The programme was designed and overseen by the faculties, notably the Faculty of Humanities, and quickly turned into degree-granting programmes. MA courses were chosen specifically in areas which HU felt that they could offer quality programmes, in competition with other universities in the world and in 1996/97, 35 Graduate Seminars were offered, all within the areas of Jewish Studies, Israel Studies, and Middle East Studies and Religious Studies. Courses were given in English; however, Hebrew was a mandatory component of the degree and students had to demonstrate Hebrew language proficiency to receive their degrees.289

The Graduate student population was different from other RIS programmes. Students were more mature, and less dependent on their family for approval and financing; many came with Fellowships (e.g. FM, Fulbright). They were not hampered by the pressure to make Aliyah (as in preparatory programmes) or by the limitation of transferring back credits to a home institution (a difficult feat in the European system). Notably, a significant percentage of students were not Jewish and had more academic and professional goals for their study in Israel. The Academic Director of the Graduate Programme, elaborated:

‘...we estimate that about 40% of the graduate students were not Jewish and it is a very diverse student population...while some of our energy is devoted to the theme of
Jewish continuity, we also need to be aware that we are here working with people many of whom will in the next generation be teaching Jewish studies, Israel studies and Middle Eastern studies all around the world or working in Foreign ministries’. Further emphasising his point, the Academic Director referred to a student from Mozambique, brought to Israel by the FM, who had special tutorials in international relations and worked with former African specialists from the Israeli FM he noted: ‘he will be going back to head the Middle East desk in the Mozambique FM.’ Given their maturity level, financial backing and intrinsic interest in academic studies, graduate students were also more resistant to security issues and student numbers grew over the period, even during flare-ups in the conflict. Thus, graduate students represented a much wider diversity of countries and in 1996/97 academic year, there were 296 graduate students from 39 countries with only about 1/3 hailing from the US.

*Informal curriculum*

All RIS programmes contained a significant informal programme of trips, cultural activities, social events and lectures. The informal curriculum became institutionalised in the function of the Office of Student Activities (OSA), founded in 1976, to put all the informal activities of the school under one administrative department. The goals of OSA remained consistent throughout the period:

1. Complements the academic programme with an introduction to Israeli society;
2. Providing opportunities to become acquainted with Israel by means of overnight and day tours;
3. Strengthening Jewish identity;
4. Exposing students to the political situation in the Middle East;
5. Providing diverse social and cultural activities;
6. Handling the day-to-day affairs and problems confronting the overseas student;
7. Facilitating the absorption of those students who have made aliya or are contemplating the possibility of settling in Israel.

Thus, the informal curriculum was designed to acquaint students with Israel (as the Jewish homeland), the Israeli people, and foster Jewish identity, leadership, Aliyah and advocacy for the State. HU President Gutfreund elaborated:

‘All the School’s activities have an intrinsic and strong Jewish heritage and Israeli society component. The variety of programs offered and the ways which have been
found to implement them are indicative of the intense effort invested by the Rothberg School in its endeavour to reach as broad group of young Jewish Diaspora students as possible.\textsuperscript{294}

The activities were ‘based on the underlaying assumption that extra-curricular activities encourage the development of strong ties to Israel.’\textsuperscript{295} Its activities broadly reflected these aims and included trips around the country; Jewish learning opportunities (Beit Midrash); invitations to Shabbat and Jewish holiday meals at family’s homes; volunteering; news updates about Israel; advocacy for Israel clubs and events (including a special programme developed with the FM); and eventually internships. Students were also addressed by important speakers and local and international dignitaries, including, Israeli Presidents (e.g. Ben-Gurion in 1960; Herzog, 1989). Further reflecting these aims, activities were financially supported by JAFI directly in the early years of the ASP and later indirectly through the PBC/CHE Committee and the Student Authority.

No less important than the actual activities, were the social connections made at RIS. In the beginning of the ASP, the students were a closed group, who travelled, roomed and boarded together. The closed group aspect faded in the late 1960s and students could travel to Israel on their own, dine and live in their own rented accommodations. However, most RIS students still relied on HU to arrange these aspects, and the emphasis on building social relationships – widely viewed as among Jews - were sustained through the informal curriculum. Given the closeness of the group, and the programme aims, there was considerable concern, about the cohesion of the students as a group. This is likely why non-Jewish students in the programme were handled with a certain amount of anxiety, particularly in the early years. In a letter from the coordinator of the ASP in Jerusalem, to his administrative counterpart in AFHU, he elaborated:

‘Such students [non-Jews] should be closely investigated as to their motive for their coming to Israel. We do have non-Jewish students from all over the world studying at the University, and we even encourage them to come, as they have a definite aim in coming to Israel. It should be remembered that the students of the One Year Program consist of boys and girls who do all their activities together. They eat together, live in the University campus, go for walks and tour the country, spend their leisure time together and therefore get very friendly with each other, and in the case of non-Jews there is fear of over friendliness. Without going into the problem of a more delicate nature, I feel that we have to be very careful.’\textsuperscript{296}

Thus, there was concern that the integration of non-Jewish students into the programme would undermine one of its main tenets—cultivating Jewish identity. However, the archival record
suggests that pluralistic principles prevailed. In a letter from the Head of the Academic Committee of the ASP (at the time, in charge of admissions, and part of the AFHU) to his administrative counterpart in Jerusalem, Segal, writes that:

‘...the question of non-Jewish students, has troubled me a great deal. Frankly, I was not too enthusiastic about it...However, there is a strong feeling in this country [US] that the program should be non-denominational, and I note that the HU, too, publicizes the fact that non-Jewish students are welcome...we have no alternative but to accept non-Jews who are qualified.'

Thus, despite reluctance, the programme was kept open to all and indeed, in 1958 a non-Jewish student in the ASP had been accepted for the 1958/59 academic year. While this appears to be the definitive matter on admissions, discussions, some of them rather heated, about non-Jewish students surfaced throughout the period. At a RIS Board meeting in 1992, it surfaced that some students were not Jewish and that they were eligible for RIS scholarships, which many Board members contributed to. This elicited a strong response from the Chairman of the BOO who threatened to withdraw his support from the Scholarship fund – and all money raised by the AFHU for it – unless it was used exclusively for scholarships for American Jewish Students. This put the Provost in an impossible situation, in which he needed the financial support of AFHU, but as an academic institution, HU could not be seen to discriminate against students. In an unsigned letter to the Chairman, but which further correspondence suggests was written by the Provost in an attempt to negotiate the crisis, he noted:

‘We all recognise that the main target population is Jewish, but all recognise also that the HU is a nondenominational institution which does not exercise any discrimination by religion or race. Not many non-Jews come, but some do...it does not cost us much to make them eligible for scholarships; it costs us much to discriminate and it certainly takes away much of the meaning of being non-denominational. Also from the purely Jewish and Israeli point of view and the PR aspects I have no doubt that we will serve these causes better if some non-Jewish students came back to their home town with the assurance that they received equal treatment and they may be as effective ambassadors of Israel as the Jewish students. I hope that you will reconsider your position on this matter.’

The Chairman eventually backed down from his demand, eliciting a relieved response from the Provost:
‘Because of your strong feelings on the subject, I particularly appreciate your flexibility on the matter of scholarships. You have spared me an awkward situation, and I can only be grateful for that.’ 300

Thus, there were constant tensions and debates surrounding the extent to which the RIS and its funding should be available to non-Jewish students. However, notably in both instances above, HU carefully negotiated between its different constituencies to protect its academic values and achieve its aims. With the exception of visits to Christian sites (e.g. Bethlehem at Christmas) the archival record did not reveal consideration about broadening the informal curriculum to cater to the increasingly diverse student population.301

Connections with Israelis was the most elusive of the aims of the informal curriculum. RIS administrators attributed this to differences in age; issues of language; different views on the purpose and expectations of a university education; and the ‘ghettoization’ of RIS students in English-language courses. This was a continual problem and the source of many initiatives to bridge this gap. RIS students could partake in Student Union Activities, however, Israeli students were usually not allowed to partake in RIS activities. Combined activities such as Hebrew language learning sessions; Shabbat trips; Hillel Events; ‘mifgashim’ or organised meetings of Israeli and international students; and mixed rooming were initiated, however, these appear to have had a limited effect. OSA also employed counsellors, usually native Israelis or international students already in HU faculties, that attended, organised and facilitated OSA activities, and generally looked after student welfare, and provided a connection between international and Israeli students.

The significant emphasis on the informal part of the RIS programmes, made some view it as more of a summer camp, gap year or high school (see section Portrayals of RIS). Moreover, the combination of an academic programme which was heavily laden with Jewish and Israeli subjects, with the intensive informal programme which emphasised homeland tourism, RIS took the shape of a homeland tourism experience that incorporated academic elements. For those staying in Israel (in the Mechina for example), it was an initiation into Israeli culture; for those returning to Diaspora lands, it was a way to create a connection to the physical homeland and its people, creating and perpetuating a diaspora identity.

**Tensions between the informal and formal curriculum**

Throughout this period, HU gradually developed more programmes, which aimed to attract Diaspora youth, while instilling in them academic components, connected to Jewish Studies and Israeli society, and an informal social experience which connected them to other Jews in
the programme, Israelis, and the land and culture of Israel. The relative emphasis between the formal and informal curriculum, was a subject of continual discussion and at times tension. There is a recurring tension between those who wanted the RIS to provide a serious academic programme and the purpose of the programme to achieve its broader social goals through significant emphasis on the informal curriculum. Should the RIS provide a serious academic programme and focus on these aspects or should it be more of a (Jewish) educational experience which would include a significant emphasis on the informal programme? Moreover, how could HU pursue its overarching aims to act as any university of standing and pursue academic aims – through ensuring high quality academic programmes, that will be inclusive and open to all, while sponsoring a programme that is clearly tailored to a particular (ethnoreligious) population? These questions were answered differently by its diverse stakeholders and were the subject of continual negotiating and balancing by HU administrators to appeal to its academic mission; while providing the educational experience desired. The Director of the OYSP, addressed one of these tensions directly in a report:

‘Although the OYSP must be the focal point of a year of study, we must learn to accept and capitalize on the irrefutable fact that for the student all of Israel is the University! Our challenge is to find a delicate balance between an exposure to Israel and a self-respecting academic program.’

Target students

The purposes of the RIS and programme offerings reflected its target audience: young Diaspora Jews. Discussion of the issue of non-Jewish students at the PBC/CHE Committee, elicited the response of Harman that suggested the feeling of the time:

‘The Steering Committee was established by the request of JAFI to the PBC to increase the number of Jewish students living in Israel. The Universities need to accept non-Jewish students from abroad, but this is not the interest of the Committee. The universities with the PBC or without the PBC should speak with the Departments of Public Relations and Foreign Relations at the Jewish Agency to discuss encouraging non-Jewish students to come to Israel in order to have a good ‘shofar’ [reputation] for Israel abroad.’

Thus, while HU accommodated students from a variety of backgrounds, and even formed close relationships with theological seminaries (e.g. the Pontifical Biblical Institute of Rome), Jewish students were the primary target population. The target student population was
evident not only through the partners involved in the RIS, the marketing messages and recruitment strategies employed (see next two sections) but also by analysing the distribution outlets of marketing materials during the period: marketing materials, almost entirely print (brochures, which were routinely translated into different target student languages) and PR articles, were widely distributed through Jewish organisations, FHU, and Jewish news outlets. Likewise, the PBC/CHE Committee, with similar goals to RIS, only distributed scholarships to Jewish students, with a focus on undergraduate students.

‘Academically qualified’ students were desired – at least by HU, if not its other partners. This latter point was the subject of continual discussions throughout the period. While it was generally agreed that the programme must be marketed as a prestigious programme, the underlining purposes of the programme, as well as the different main actors implicated in its funding, governance and administration (see sections Financial support for RIS; Administration and governance) created a tension surrounding the importance of the quality of students. The State and Zionist institutions were more flexible on this point. A representative of JAFI elaborated:

‘…the intellectual level is not the most important. Rather, the target should be – the normal American student. The programme is important to the [Jewish] Agency, and also to the University and because of this, the Jewish Agency devotes to it great resources.’

306 This attitude was evident throughout the period. While many HU academics and administrators placed a higher emphasis on academics and were concerned with protecting the academic reputation of the RIS, there were consistent voices in the administration and governance of the programme that stressed the need to expose as many students as possible. The desire to fill the programme and offer it to as wide a swath of the Diaspora community as possible, led to the establishment of a minimum admission requirement (as opposed to the HU policy more generally which was highly selective). The programmes thus had a wide range of students, hailing from Ivy League Universities, prestigious public universities and private liberal arts colleges, to community colleges and other less reputable institutions. Pointedly, HU rarely indicated the importance of international students for academic quality; indeed, international students were younger and viewed as more immature than their Israeli counterparts.

While Europe, South America, Australia and South Africa did receive some attention, geographically, North America was the main target of recruitment (for the OSYP, other programmes varied see section 5.3) with a significant focus on New York and the East Coast. The archival record reveals why this was so: 1) these areas represented a large and affluent
Jewish community (see Appendix J), 2) the US was becoming the most important ally of Israel and connections between the US and Israel viewed as a matter of strategic national importance 3) the AFHU structure supported and facilitated the programme 4) American families were accustomed to paying tuition (unlike European students) and 5) the HE system in the US accommodated and at times even promoted study abroad. In addition to these, another reason from the PBC/CHE Committee surfaced: JAFI did not want to interfere with its Aliyah recruitment in other countries. A PBC/CHE Committee member elaborated:

‘…the Aliyah Department was against activities of the Committee in Europe, South America and South Africa for fear that these activities would decrease the number of immigrants, and this fear in the end was legitimate.’

Thus, the PBC/CHE Committees activities were focused on areas (i.e. North America) from which Aliyah was considered more difficult to achieve, and where a student experience in Israel might be more successful than JAFI efforts had been in encouraging Aliyah. Although other groups attended the RIS over time, particularly Christian groups and students that were sponsored by the FM, the archival record did not produce evidence that they were actively marketed towards or targeted by HU. Rather, they were accepted – and according to interviews with Vice-Provosts of the time, welcomed by HU, as part of its connection to State needs.

**Portrayals of RIS**

RIS portrayed itself in different ways including Aliyah and ambassadors; Jewish identity, assimilation and leadership; and academic merit. These portrayals were apparent in HU publications; in personal correspondence between administrators of these different organisations and individuals; and in BOO minutes. These portrayals were carefully targeted and negotiated by administrators. I analyse these in detail below.

**Aliyah and ambassadors**

RIS programmes were portrayed in connection to Aliyah and a source of potential goodwill ambassadors for the State. While the Mechina had clear connections with Aliyah, pointedly, even the OYSP was portrayed as an Aliyah feeder. An RIS report elaborated:
‘From our experience we know that eventually about 10 percent of such [OYSP] students...decide either at the end of the year or later to remain as immigrants in Israel.’

The connection to ambassadors is perhaps best illustrated by a letter from HU President, to PM Yitzhak Shamir, inviting him to address an annual gathering of hundreds of students from OYSPs from all Israeli universities in the country. The event and the students were described thus:

‘...[a] day of study, of planning activities for the State of Israel, and of raising spirits. This event marks a milestone for concluding a year of study in Israel and its purpose is to serve as the last meeting before the students return to their countries and communities as goodwill ambassadors of the State of Israel.’

Despite these portrayals, there was enduring concern that the RIS (and its predecessor the ASP) should not be too publicly connected to Zionist organisations, particularly JAFI. Early internal documents refer to the school as the ‘Special One Year Course for American Students by the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Jewish Agency for Israel,’ however, in marketing the programme towards outsiders this connection was undesirable. The Academic Secretary elaborated: ‘We should strengthen the connection with the Jewish Agency, but the seal of approval towards the outside needs to be solely of the University.’ This position was accepted by the Academic Committee with a member replying that:

‘...cooperation with the Agency has always existed. They sit on the [Academic] Committee and will continue to do so. I agree about strengthening the cooperation in the future. The name of the [Jewish] Agency is not formally mentioned though because it is desirable that the programme will have an academic character, also in its outward appearance.’

Thus, JAFI was a strategic partner, however, for marketing purposes, RIS preferred that it not be associated with JAFI, as this could tarnish the academic perception of the programme. This was a persistent issue, however, as JAFI and Zionist organisations had significant infrastructure (via connections with Zionist youth movements; and community, Aliyah and campus emissaries) around the world to access their target audience (Jewish Diaspora youth). Yet, maintaining the academic reputation – and at least an aura of academic pluralism – was viewed as crucial to maintaining its credibility as an academic programme.

*Jewish identity, assimilation and leadership*
The college years were viewed as particularly important for provision of continued Jewish education, as it was when students were likely to make choices about marriage, vocation, and where they would live which would significantly shape their future paths. This was at a time of young adulthood when most students were not involved in Jewish community life (e.g. youth movements, formal Jewish education, synagogue attendance) and were more disconnected from Jewish homes and values. Moreover, some Diaspora parents and organisations, were more concerned with local issues of their communities and may not be in favour of their children and youth making Aliyah. Thus, RIS portrayed itself as a connection to Jewish identity, continuity, and leadership. Assimilation (particularly through intermarriage) was a significant worry for Diaspora communities. A period of study at HU was continually linked with empowerment of Jewish identity, emphasising its contribution to combat assimilation.

Rothberg, describing the RIS put it thus: ‘keeping young Jewish people Jewish and avoiding assimilation’ and noted that ‘the people who come here are already of marriageable age. This is where they begin to think about getting married, and this is where we make Jews out of them and keep them as good Jews.’ Another influential Board member added:

‘...the world Jewish community owes this school an awful lot and will in the future give thanks to what this school has done to keep this scattered race together. We have to get more people in...there are areas with significant pockets of Jews whom we will lose unless we take steps to bring their kids to this School...I believe passionately that this type of thing is the salvation of us as a culture and as race.’

Jewish leadership was likewise identified as an important issue in Diaspora communities (closely tied to continued leadership (and funding) of Jewish Community Organisations, and particularly FHU). Thus, the role of the RIS in promoting more active participation in Jewish communal life upon return home, and assuming leadership roles was emphasised. Larry Moses, a prominent RIS alum, portrayed the RIS in a speech at the General Assembly thus:

‘The Rothberg School has played a central role in motivating and developing the next generations of North American, indeed of world, Jewish leaders. It has been a wellspring from which flows nourishment to a Jewish world greatly in need of new and inspired leaders. In this sense, it has truly been a university of the Jewish people, playing a role no other institution in this world can equally claim. So let us remain focused on the high stakes of these efforts; for this still new building will house not only an outstanding program within an outstanding university, it will also house those precious individuals who, throughout the world, will write the next chapters in the story of the Jewish people.’
Jewish leadership was likewise a key portrayal of the RIS, particularly in support for scholarships. A solicitation letter from HU Rector and Acting President to the Co-Chairmen of the Joint Authority for Jewish Zionist Education argued:

‘…should sources of scholarship support for overseas students from the West now be cut, the increase in student enrolment will slow down or be reversed. One of the most effective tools in the areas of leadership training, and the struggle for long-term Jewish survival will be severely blunted. Can we afford such a risk?’

RIS was portrayed as a place to strengthen Diaspora education. For example, in the Autumn of 1981, President Harman wrote to several Zionist and Jewish Community organisations in the US requesting that they promote HU study in their communities. He closed the letters with:

‘We [HU] see the increase of American student representation on our campuses as a way of strengthening identification with Israel as well as providing strong support for the education and future of the American Jewish community.’

These portrayals were designed to solicit widespread support from the Diaspora for RIS.

Academic merit

RIS portrayed itself as a quality academic programme. This was important for its reputation, and to strengthen its legitimacy to other universities abroad who granted transfer credit to RIS students. However, the academic quality of the RIS and particularly the OYSP was of continual concern to HU, and often discussed as an inferior programme – a sentiment expressed in the archival record by international students, and academic and administrative staff. ‘Goldsmith High’, a derogatory reference to the RIS, was used to indicate that the programme was more of a high school or Jewish summer camp experience than a serious academic programme. Yet regardless of its actual academic standing, it was essential that the RIS be perceived to have a high academic level. Any threats to this caused significant anxiety and rapid response from HU administrators. The head of the Academic Committee in the US:

‘…stressed the need to represent the year program not merely as a Zionist experience, as a good way of spending a year in Israel, but as a serious academic experience. Unless that message gets through, we will have difficulty recruiting students...’

These different portrayals, at times overlapped. For example, in a print advertisement for the school in The Jerusalem Report the opening text read thus:
Archival evidence reveals that HU was keenly aware of the priorities of its different constituents and actively tailored portrayals of its programmes to these priorities. A proposal for expanded recruitment of international students in North America elaborates:

‘...for local [Israeli] bodies, it is clear that our Zionist interest should be highlighted. With respect to American organizations, I think we can make a good argument in an area with which they are increasingly concerned – the creation and nurturance of young leadership.’

This was recognised at the national level as well. The PBC/CHE Committee representative in NY explained:

‘...we must present our academic programmes in competition with programmes for American students in other countries, in addition to the emphasis we place on the Jewish aspect.’

Taken together, these different portrayals of the RIS ensured that the programme would appeal to and be supported by its major constituents: State, Diaspora and Academia.

**Recruitment strategies**

The RIS employed several strategies to recruit students including recruitment trips in Israel and abroad; local activities through FHU and alumni; partnerships with Jewish Diaspora and Zionist organisations; and academic partnerships with universities abroad. Recruitment trips were undertaken throughout the period. These trips were usually several weeks in duration and focused on areas which had significant Jewish populations. They included a mix of visits at high schools (i.e. Jewish high schools; and public high schools which had large Jewish populations); Jewish and Zionist youth movements (at times also Jewish summer camps, depending on the season); universities (e.g. Hillel Jewish Student Societies; Jewish Studies Departments; academic departments; international offices); synagogues; and local representatives of Israeli, Jewish and Zionist organisations. These trips were organised by
FHU, in coordination with the Academic Committee; academic's professional and personal contacts; and partners such as JAFI, Zionist organisations and Jewish Community connections; and university campus visits and private meetings with Jewish students arranged through RIS alumni. These actors provided introductions for HU trips and promoted the RIS in their own capacities. Thus, recruitment visits ‘hit’ all three of the main constituencies.

HU administrators did embark on such trips; however, these were often the domain of HU academics. Academics were sought for these trips because they were able to appeal to all three portrayals above (i.e. State; Diaspora; and Academia). HU academics on sabbatical were approached to help market the RIS. However, internal documents point to considerable agency on the part of academics and indicate that there was reluctance on the part of some academic staff to participate in these activities. The RIS Provost wrote to HU’s President advocating sending an academic staff member from Jerusalem because in his words: We cannot rely on those going on Sabbatical, in most cases they are not prepared to act [for RIS] even on the campus they went to. Furthermore, the RIS was aware that not all academics were suitable for the task. It was of great importance that academics could speak with the diverse groups on the itinerary and represent an academic view at universities, giving lectures in faculties, as well as speaking to Jewish and Zionist groups, and representing Israel. In a recruiting report a HU academic elaborated:

‘…it is worthwhile pointing out that beyond the promotion of the Overseas programme for the Hebrew University one finds oneself doing a considerable amount of ‘Hasbarah’ [advocacy] concerning Israel which should not be minimized or overlooked.’

Thus, academics were chosen which could balance these varied requirements and were both supportive of the State, and could speak to the different partners and purposes of the University. In an internal letter discussing the aforementioned academic noted that:

‘He is the best emissary that we have sent thus far, and he has proved himself again for the second year. The work in the USA is very tough, and it’s not easy to get suitable teachers to be used as recruitment agents, teachers that know our School and that have an ‘ideological’ approach to the work of the School.’

Recruitment trips were also organised around Israel, particularly to Gap Year programmes, Kibbutzim, and Absorption Centres for new immigrants.

The RIS maintained offices in the FHU around the world in key target demographics. Staff were expected to promote the RIS in the local community; plan activities and forge relationships with universities, local Jewish communities, Zionist and State emissaries, and RIS alumni; and as indicated above, plan the itineraries of visiting recruiters. By the end of the
period, offices were established in nine countries (see section Administration and governance).

Diaspora communities were viewed as strategic partners in the recruitment of students, and they were targeted to create programmes to bring their youth to RIS (e.g. NATIV, Young Judea). Zionist organisations provided access to their infrastructures and connections, which HU used extensively. As outlined above, most recruitment trips involved meetings with Zionist organisations and youth movements and JAFI emissaries. Moreover, recruitment trips were routinely financed by JAFI (and the PBC/CHE Committee). However, as noted previously, HU administrators carefully negotiated outward cooperation with JAFI, and importantly, tried to keep them from representing HU on university campuses – however, Jewish student groups were encouraged. An Academic Committee member explained:

‘…the programme has a good name and if we will have good cooperation between all the partners there is a good chance of success [in student recruitment]. It is not possible for the Jewish Agency to engage in these [recruitment] activities between the walls of the colleges in an official way because this could lead to them [colleges] withdrawing from the programme. They are very sensitive to propaganda…’

The State likewise was solicited in the recruitment of students. The FM was continually chided to take a larger role in the promotion of the RIS. A letter to the Director of the Department of Diaspora Relations at the FM, from the RIS Vice-Provost illustrates this:

‘The vast majority of those studying in the SOS are Jews and I have no doubt that representatives of Israel, wherever they may be can expand their activities to strengthen the connection between Diaspora Jews and the HU…a period of study by us is used by many as training period towards leadership positions in the Community or in the system of community institutions upon their return abroad.’

Over the period similar letters were sent to FM officials, encouraging them to promote the RIS abroad, to distribute RIS brochures in Israeli consulates around the world and make sure that FM staff abroad were aware of the RIS programmes.

Recruitment strategies focused significantly on developing agreements with (primarily American) universities. These agreements aimed to bring students to RIS, not to send Israelis abroad. Tellingly, this was not for a lack of offers for such arrangements. The archival record contains several overtures from universities to exchange students, however these were rebuffed. One such response read:
‘The RIS does not have any exchange agreement for undergraduate exchanges with any university. Instead, the RIS has developed general agreements of cooperation with universities abroad.’

The exception to this was a handful of programmes that exchanged undergraduate students from the for post-doctoral or research students from HU (e.g. Oregon University, University of California); there was no evidence of consideration of undergraduate Israeli mobility. In one instance an institution even offered to host Israeli students without sending any to HU (an economic loss) and HU declined, explaining:

‘The Hebrew University has exchange programmes with a number of universities in various part of the world. These programmes provide for an exchange of Faculty and post-graduate students. Many of the agreements provide for the SOS of the HU to receive in its regular programmes or in special programmes groups of students at the undergraduate level from foreign universities as well as provide special facilities for visiting graduate students.’

In place of exchange programmes, ‘University Units’ were sought to increase enrolment. Universities were approached (often by the AFHU) to engage in particular agreements with HU (or HU was also approached), often times aided by Diaspora academics, who had a prior relationship or affinity with HU. The University Units were viewed as helping expand recruitment, while saving RIS marketing efforts. HU President elaborated:

‘What we gain from that except for reputation is that they advertise it...they do part of our job there, rather than us coming there once a year. It is posted. Students get information and I think it is very useful.’

Pointedly, an analysis of RIS agreements and partnerships did not suggest a close connection to HU’s academic mission. Some were forged with institutions that had strong academic reputations (e.g. UoC; University of Michigan), while others with rather weaker ones. This suggests that while quality institutions were desirable, the aim of the RIS to bring as many qualified (and Jewish) students to the programme, meant that there was more variation in status among its partners; and the possibilities of cooperation in the faculties was marginalised. One example which encompasses both of these issues, was the agreement signed between RIS and HEC, a top Business School in France. RIS proposed an agreement which included very little academic input from HU, and the Faculty of Business. This was the subject of thinly veiled criticism from the Director of the School of Business Administration:

‘I am happy that the SOS will be a hostel for the HEC Business Administration programme, that the teachers are from HEC, and that the programme will grant an
HEC diploma...As I have said before, our School has great interest in strategic cooperation with HEC. My intention is student and faculty exchange, cooperation on the level of advanced students (doctorates), cooperative research projects and cooperative activities in executive education. Our interest is not in providing lodging, rather in programmes that our School has an equal academic input to HEC. I really hope that the programme that you prepared for cooperation with your School with HEC will open a door also for cooperation with HEC and our School.'

After signing the agreement with HEC, RIS signed a similar agreement with ESG, a private French business school. This institution was viewed as inferior by HEC and elicited harsh criticism of HU from HEC.

Notably, while the historical documents from the CHE were not forthcoming (see Chapter 3), there was a significant trail of correspondence between the PBC/CHE Committee and HU administrators including meeting minutes, reports and private correspondence; it suggests that the PBC/CHE Committee employed similar recruiting strategies, with a like network of partners to promote Israeli HE in North America.

Financial support for the RIS

The RIS was financed through tuition; diaspora institutions and individuals; subsidies from HU; and the State. Tuition was charged from the beginning of the ASP, rose steadily over the period and was an important source of support. However, the RIS wanted to attract as many students as possible and so additional support, particularly scholarships was continually sought. AFHU was the most important source of Diaspora funding and provided a subsidy for the school, as well as a scholarship fund. Pointedly, AFHU support for RIS was also closely linked to its overall fundraising campaign for HU. A memo from a meeting with top HU leadership elaborates:

‘...it should be emphasized that the material benefits to the fund-raising work of the American Friends of the Hebrew University arising from the activities of the Office of Academic Affairs [in NY], is not small. At almost every meeting of the AFHU which I attend in the US, I am approached by people who have children in the School of Overseas Students, or have had children studying there, or want to send children there in the future.'

This link between RIS and fundraising was made continually over the period. For example, in a meeting the Head of External Relations, charged with fundraising, ‘spoke of the relevance
of the School to the campaign for Jewish Continuity and asked that a task force be set up to deal with student recruitment [to RIS] and fundraising to make possible more exposure to our study programs. Making an explicit connection between HU fundraising and RIS students. RIS brochures were also used as a ‘fundraising tool.’

Although HU espoused the importance of the RIS, it was a closed-budgeted programme (i.e. it was not funded directly by the PBC) and HU was not eager to finance it from its regular budget. Given the aims of the programme, economic gains were not paramount, however the programme was expected to be self-supporting, and if possible, to subsidise some of HU’s other activities. Discussion of the Rectors position revealed:

‘[Rector] …wants to see the School of Overseas Students continue to grow and develop and prosper and take as little money as possible from the University, and if possible, even contribute more to the University.’

Although the State did not fund RIS through the PBC, it did support it through student scholarships (e.g. Student Authority funded Jewish immigrant students; FM funded graduate students) and was influential in creating international student lodging, and through the PBC, made a $3 million donation to the Boyar Building. Overall, the funding mechanisms for students reflected the priorities of their sources as well as the potential benefits this student could provide to their place of settlement (e.g. immigrant students were funded by the State; Diaspora Jewish students were funded through scholarship funds raised through their local communities and FHU). However, there was also overlap in funding these activities which suggested shared importance of all programmes to its partners. For example, the Mechina was subsidised by the Student Authority, however, the programme was more expensive than the subsidy and was long regarded as a financial burden; because the Mechina was closely linked with the Zionist ideology of the RIS, it regularly subsidised it from revenue from the OYSP.

Despite widespread support from its partners, the RIS was not lucrative, or even always self-supporting. While there were years with surplus, this was used to invest in new infrastructure or equipment, or to cover periods in which student numbers plummeted, usually as a result of the security situation. The budget for the programme expanded and contracted with fluctuations in the student population and in global financial markets. These periods of boom and bust, created significant financial challenges as many of the operating expenses remained fixed (e.g. staff salaries; maintenance).

Administration and governance
From the origins of the ASP, international student programmes were jointly administered through HU in Jerusalem and offices abroad situated within the FHU. While the RIS representative in Australia consisted of only a half position for recruitment in the Jewish community and universities; other offices were more substantial and conducted admissions interviews and collected applications and tuition fees; forged academic relations with universities, and handled recruitment, promotion and marketing campaigns; with some managing regional offices as well. By 1990, there were offices in Argentina, Australia, UK, Canada, France, US, Brazil and South Africa, however the largest and most important office was always AFHU.

In several countries, notably the US, Academic Committees were established which reviewed student files, made admissions recommendations, interviewed candidates, and allocated scholarship aid. No less important, their involvement signalled the academic nature of the RIS, bolstering the academic bona fides of the RIS and providing personal connections to universities. For these purposes, influential American Jewish academics were tapped and contributed to the administration.

In Jerusalem, the RIS was supported by successive HU Presidents and top HU leaders and administrators. It was managed by a Vice-Provost, which stayed for many years and was the administrative director of the RIS, and by a rotating Provost, who was an academic staff member and had the status of a Dean of a School and provided academic and strategic direction (as well as performing recruitment, lobbying and fundraising activities and development of new programmes). An analysis of senior RIS leaders’ backgrounds (and job tenders) indicated that they could navigate the multiple discourses and purposes of the school; they usually had intimate knowledge of and strong connections in the Diaspora; experience working with government offices, Zionist institutions; and HE. The importance of liaising between these partners and the similar aims among them, also provided overlap and movement between these areas. For example, Avraham Harman, London-born and Oxford University educated, was a significant force behind the RIS from its inception and until his death in 1992. He initiated the ASP in his position as Consul General for Israel in NY (1953-1955). From 1955 – 1959 he was Director of JAFI’s information department, and from 1959 – 1968 he was the Israeli ambassador to the US, before becoming HU President in 1968, holding the position of Chancellor at his death. Thus, he had a life that was in and out of the Israeli diplomatic service, HU, and Diaspora and Zionist institutions. This movement was possible, because these groups worked together and even if they had different perspectives and discourses, there was much commonality between them.
At the 10-year anniversary of the RIS, led by Harman and Rothberg, HU set out on an extensive fundraising campaign to endow it. As noted in section 5.2, Harman also proposed to institute a BOO for the RIS. A draft proposal for this BOO outlined three purposes for such a body: to develop financial assistance for the school; to assist recruitment (financially and organisationally) for the School; and to ‘deepen the consciousness’ of the RIS and its programmes in Jewish community organisations and Friends Societies that are important for the School. The proposal goes on to outline ideal members of the BOO:

“We should aim at bringing new people from the major Jewish communities, who are particularly interested in fighting Jewish assimilation, and who are concerned with Jewish education…people who have connections with the media…and can be influential in securing publicity for the School and also people of means.”

Thus, Harman as President of HU, viewed the optimal governance of the RIS in the hands of influential and affluent Diaspora members, who would be invested in the purposes of the RIS to perpetuate Jewish identity and create Israel-Diaspora bonds. Later, the agreement between Samuel Rothberg, AFHU and HU which established a $5 million endowment settled on mixed representation, between Diaspora figures, AFHU and worldwide FHU member, the International BOG members, the Rothberg Family, with the Rector, President, and RIS Provost. Thus, the Board reflected the different constituencies of the RIS and showcased the high-level importance accorded to the School.

In a manner that echoed its modes of financial support, the administration and governance of the RIS reflected the diverse purposes and partners’ interests in international students at the time. The shared funding, administration and governance ensured that the purposes of the school would include the interests of all actors, which would be continually balanced by HU. Notably, many high-level individuals were involved in the RIS, from prominent Diaspora figures, to senior government officials and University administrators.

5.4 Discussion and conclusion

In this chapter I analysed the historical development and growth of HU after the creation of the State until the eve of the Second Intifada, with a focus on how State formation and stabilisation impacted on the international dimension of research and teaching. This chapter suggests that HU realigned itself to a large degree with State needs; this period represented a shift in the relations between the State and the Diaspora as viewed through their involvement in HU and State control of HE. However, HU neither shed its connections with the Jewish
Diaspora (in fact, as demonstrated throughout this chapter, in many areas, Diaspora cooperation increased); nor its mission to serve as the ‘University of the Jewish People’. Rather, HU was constantly balancing the shifting needs and priorities of the two, while pursuing its academic mission.

This relationship had considerable effects on the international dimension of research and teaching at HU. International relations for research were institutionalised through the AR&D and aimed to increase research funding and activities to assist in national development, and to maintain its position and status in the domestic setting. The AR&D developed a sophisticated infrastructure for managing research and securing funding (both international and national). Research continued to be supported and facilitated by the Diaspora, however, the advent of State infrastructure greatly increased both the financial support for research, and created a network to facilitate it. Thus, HU leveraged Diaspora individuals and organisations, as well as State ministries, infrastructures and foreign relations in a strategic way to further at once national development, and its academic aims while building its research reputation. Research agendas were closely tied to national priorities; however, these could be flexible and recast to fit with the requirements of international funding bodies, with international cooperation forming a basis for procuring both national and international funding. Strategies to attain research funding reflected the contacts and influence of HU’s primary constituencies (State, Diaspora and Academic). As a result, international research funding broadly reflected changing foreign relations of the State, significantly aided by the presence and various forms of support from the Diaspora.

The international dimension of teaching became institutionalised through the RIS and I argue that it focused on creating and perpetuating Diaspora identities and bonds (i.e. diasporisation) through a homeland academic experience; and fostering Jewish immigration (Aliyah). This process was at once both closely aligned with Diaspora identities, concerns and priorities; and State concerns of immigration and transnational ‘ambassadorial’ links. Furthermore, while the State was grappling with forming a national identity, the focus on the Diaspora reinforced at once the unifying characteristic of the majority of the new State (i.e. Jewishness), bolstering national identities, while fostering strategic pragmatic aims for nation building, such as (skilled) immigration. Thus, internationalisation in this period could be viewed more precisely as ‘diasporisation,’ the process of creating Diaspora identities and bonds; and ‘nationalisation’ the process of creating national (nation-state) identities (i.e. Israelis). During this period HU served as a site of nation building, and aligned with the State’s priorities and needs, while serving as a major institution in which the Diaspora and the State interacted. This widespread support, and dual purposes and constituencies, at times collided with that of HU’s academic mission. However, there was a continual process of negotiation between these
actors and their various agendas, which resulted in widespread support from the highest levels for the RIS. This partnership affected the purposes, curriculum, marketing, funding, administration and governance, which reflected their overlapping interests, priorities and relations. While it was created for international Jewish students, it became the institutional base for all international students. Over time, it became the institutional base of HU relations for international student mobility cooperation.

When considering the historical timeline of internationalisation which emphasises peace motives after WWII, and development and international aid rationales in the Cold War period, this trajectory holds little explanatory value in the Israeli case. While there were certainly elements of the development and aid rationale, notably through joint research projects with developing nations, and education and training programmes underwritten by the FM, these were not linked to Cold War (communist/capitalist) struggles. Rather, on the State level, they were linked to the political and economic isolation of Israel, due to the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Arab boycott, and the State’s need to garner votes at the UN.\textsuperscript{358} Thus, the idea of using IHE to create certain sympathies for State political purposes resonates; however, these were connected to a different form of nationalism/national struggle. Institutionally, the AR&D viewed this as an opportunity to receive international funding from other (Western, primarily US) sources for their research. Towards the end of this period, the literature notes the beginning of the rise of commercial models of international HE, based heavily on recruiting international students. While HU (and Israel, through the PBC/CHE Committee) were actively marketing and recruiting international students, it was not a commercial model, and financial reasons were not driving considerations. Rather, as demonstrated in this chapter, international students were desired (and often heavily subsidised) primarily as a connection to bolster national identity, facilitate Aliyah (desirable immigration); as a form of goodwill ambassadors; to foster transnational ties with the Diaspora; and to build Jewish leadership and identity.
Chapter 6. 1990’s - 2018: State-steering, Diaspora and internationalisation

6.1 1990’s – 2018: HU development

In this chapter I analyse the development of HU in the third period from the Second Intifada (Palestinian Uprising) at the turn of the century until 2018. I argue that during this period, HU’s identity shifted from the national to the global; however, through a protracted period of struggles with the State, HU became increasingly intertwined with State aims, albeit employing humanitarian/universalist language. This shift was connected to the State’s social, economic and political projects; global developments in HE; and shifting identities and concerns of sections of the Diaspora which greatly affected the international character of research and teaching. The key features of this period are succinctly expressed by a senior HU staff member:

‘…academic excellence is definitely there, and it permeates to everything. It is our most important mission. Do the best we can in the best way possible. Get the best, hire the best researchers, the best faculty … the university very much prides itself on being very pluralistic and very open to all students of all religions, races, and ethnic groups. We have a very, very large Arab community. And everything that we communicate is in Arabic as well. Making people feel welcome and opening doors to everybody. So yes, Jewish, but that is kind of toned down a little bit. It's a very non-denominational university. Non-political, universal values…’

As in the previous transition, HU did not shed its links with the Diaspora; rather the Diaspora was a constant and major partner, in specific ways – which I will demonstrate.

This chapter is split into three sub-chapters: HU development; internationalisation in research; and internationalisation in teaching. The first section analyses the development of HU, focussing on how the trauma from the ‘lost decade’ a period defined by conflict between the Universities and the State shifted HU’s financing, governance, and mission, establishing ‘internationalisation’ as a central institutional and national focus. The key dates in the development of HU to be addressed are delineated in Table 8.

Table 8. Key dates in the development of HU, 1990s - 2018
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Events and/or impact on HU</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990s – 2010</td>
<td>Structural changes in Israeli HE, the ‘lost decade’ and shifting forms of governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993 – 1998</td>
<td>Structural changes in Israeli HE</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997; 2002</td>
<td>Maltz report</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Shochat Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>CHE multi-year recovery plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 - 2018</td>
<td>Emerging from the lost decade: rebranding and shifting mission of HU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 - 2014</td>
<td>HU embarks on strategic planning process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>New HU mission appears</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Internationalisation as key strategic focus; International Office (IO) is created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>New HU President, upgrading of IO, and CHE new multi-year plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>HU signs recovery plan with the State</td>
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</table>

As Table 8 shows, the analysis revolves around two distinct sub periods; namely pre and post what is referred to as the ‘lost decade’ which ended around 2010. The two following sub-chapters analyse how this development impacted on the international dimensions of research and teaching respectively. I conclude with a discussion comparing this to the previous period.

**1990’s – 2010: Structural changes in Israeli HE, the lost decade and shifting forms of governance**

In the 1990s, in response to massive immigration from the Former Soviet Union (FSU), combined with natural demographic growth, the State expanded HE provision. Three policies were implemented that drastically changed the HE sector which Menahem (2008) terms: diversification, privatisation and internationalisation of provision. First, instead of creating another research university, in 1993 the CHE adopted a policy to create a second tier of public colleges, in which undergraduate teaching would be the main focus. These would cover wider geographical territories and serve peripheral populations, increasing HE access for these populations. Second, the CHE created a sector of non-profit colleges which would be academically controlled by the CHE, but which the PBC would not financially support. Third, the CHE deregulated the Israeli HE sector to allow access to international institutions, which would be neither budgeted by the PBC, nor under the academic supervision of the CHE. This had disastrous effects, with many low-level institutions (many from the UK) providing sub-
standard provision. In 1998 these came under the academic supervision of the CHE, and the number of such institutions plummeted (see Bamberger, 2018; Lieven & Martin, 2006). Through these policies, between 1990 and 2004, the number of HEIs grew from 21 to 57; and the cohort of 20-24-year olds grew from about 23% in the 1990s to almost 50% in 2013/14. This growth was different from the previous period, in that HU was not the model used for its development. Thus, these reforms dramatically changed the face of Israeli HE. While these reforms did not initially challenge the supremacy of HU or the research universities, over time, colleges would achieve the right to grant undergraduate and master’s degrees and would increasingly become active in research areas, blurring the lines between universities and colleges.

While these structural reforms were underway, the beginnings of a long struggle between the State and Universities ensued. This struggle revolved around the State’s desire to reform its relationship with the universities, to bring the latter more in line with State aims and precipitated the breakdown of the State-sponsored governance model established in the 1950s. This battle was waged over a period of about 15 years, in which the State, through the MoF and the PBC, forced changes upon the universities through the continual threat of nationalisation and prolonged underfunding.

In 1994, in response to a university academic staff strike over salary a government Committee was created by the MoF to investigate university governance structures and provide recommendations for change. Essentially, the MoF viewed the university unions as too powerful and the role of the academic staff as too strong. The Committee produced the Maltz Report (1997, 2003), which recommended changes to the internal governance of HEIs. The proposed changes would undermine the strong academic control of the Senate, by both limiting its numbers, and making the Rector subordinate to the President. The proposed changes significantly weakened academic control and strengthened the management Committee and Presidency, aligning with a more corporate style of governance (Kirsch, 2018). While the report was adopted by the MoF; it was rejected by HU and the universities, who saw the changes as a breach of the CHE Law of 1958, which ensured institutional autonomy. Eventually a more palatable version, compiled by PBC Chairman Shlomo Grossman was adopted and the CHE in 2002 charged all universities with implementing changes. Thus, this represented a precedent in which the State forced internal institutional changes on the universities, through the PBC/CHE. In addition to this direct interference in institutional governance, Volansky (2012) elucidates three proposed legislative changes (2008, 2009, 2010) through which the State tried to nationalise the PBC and direct research. While these attempts were eventually abandoned and never materialised, these represented an on-going threat to the autonomy of the universities.
These struggles over governance continued and led to delays in block grants from the MoF to the PBC to fund HEIs. During the period of rapid HE expansion, the budget for HE did not keep pace with the growth of students, and the funding per student fell by about 20%; likewise, tuition fees at universities were reduced by 26%. Thus, between 2002 – 2010, the MoF began a campaign of underfunding the universities to bring them in line with national aims and to reshape the HE sector. This period, widely referred to as the ‘lost decade’ was characterised by continual unrest (e.g. strikes of students and staff), significant funding cuts to HE and resulted in the deterioration of the HE system, including its research infrastructures, aging of the academic faculty and decline in its numbers; and considerable uncertainty about the future of the sector. For HU, the financial strain was more damaging than for other universities for four reasons: One, since the outbreak of the Second Intifada, in September 2000 and a bombing on its Mount Scopus campus in 2002, HU implemented wide-ranging security measures. Given that it had 3 campuses in Jerusalem, a centre of terror activity in the Second Intifada, security costs were valued at about 30 million NIS, as compared to 3-7 million at other Universities. Two, during this period, HU was required to pay municipal taxes on all its campuses, buildings and properties, something from which it was previously exempt. Three, HU had the largest international student programme in the country, however, during the Second intifada, these numbers dropped significantly, saddling HU with the fixed expenses of RIS (see Section 6.3). Four, the percentage of the operating budget devoted to pensions spiked during this period and were the subject of continual friction with the MoF. To cope with these rising costs, HU implemented austerity measures, cutting expenditures – including staff - and sold properties.

In October 2006 at the request of the MoF and MoE and at the instigation of the PM, a Committee was convened to analyse the HE system with the aim of supplying recommendations to improve its funding and management. The Committee, chaired by Avraham Shochat (henceforth, the Shochat Committee) was viewed by HU as a sign of possible relief. HU’s 2007 President’s Report to the BOG notes:

‘As the Shochat Committee pursues its in-depth examination of Israel’s HE system, there are hopes that its recommendations will give high-level recognition to today’s highly problematic situation and provide relief through increased budgetary allocations to Israel’s universities.’

The Shochat Committee had three stated aims: to strengthen excellence in research and teaching; to facilitate full access to the HE system to all Israelis that met the admission criteria – regardless of their socio-economic status; to prevent ‘brain drain’ from Israel, and to create conditions to absorb excellent scientists from HEIs abroad. In order to achieve these aims,
the report suggested building a stratified system (which was already in place) that would both answer the supply for HE needed by the masses (through colleges), as well as the research needs of the State (through universities). In achieving these aims, the report suggested a massive increase in the HE budget and wide-ranging reforms to the system, including: diverting undergraduate students to the colleges, while encouraging post-graduate students to enrol at universities particularly in engineering and natural sciences; strengthening basic research in universities, by expanding the ISF and creating competitive funding for particular fields based on ‘excellence’ and adding funds for European cooperation; maintaining and developing research infrastructures and laboratories; raising tuition and providing government backed loans; and recruitment of excellent young faculty from Israel and abroad. Pointedly, the Committee emphasised the central role of research and knowledge production for national development and thus, the importance of having strong research universities.

The Committees recommendations were welcomed by HU, however, they proved politically impossible to implement to the disappointment of HU officials. The HU President elaborated:

‘The Shochat Committee’s in-depth examination of Israel’s HE system was previously regarded as the key to creating a new vision and increasing budgetary allocations to Israel’s universities. However, the report was presented almost one year ago and, for overtly political reasons, has yet to be discussed. Clearly, this stalemate on solving the crisis in HE can only make HU’s role more difficult as it seeks to grapple with the impact of the budget cuts.’

During this period, the support of the FHU was even more crucial. HU President and Chairman of the BOG explained:

‘Our ongoing struggle with diminishing budgets unfortunately makes it more challenging than ever to maintain the HU’s position as a world-league center for research and education. In such circumstances, the efforts of our loyal and long-standing network of Friends in enabling the brightest minds in Israel to work and flourish are even more appreciated.’

However, the global financial crisis of 2008 affected Diaspora philanthropy and adversely affected FHU funding and endowment returns.

Only in 2010 an agreement was achieved between the relevant government bodies which resulted in a new 6-year HE recovery plan that added 7 billion NIS to the HE budget over the period. It had a series of targets which were based on the Shochat Committee Report (e.g. hiring of new academic faculty; extending provision to marginalised populations including Ethiopian, Arab and Ultra-Orthodox students; addressing women in academia and the
sciences; promoting preferred disciplines for national needs; increasing ISF funding and competitive grants). These targets were implemented by the PBC using competitive funding models (Kirsch, 2018). In this way, the plan, while infusing the HE system with unprecedented funding, also aligned it closely to State priorities. While infringing on autonomy, these priorities were not necessarily at odds with those of HU. For example, since the early 2000s, HU had been lobbying (unsuccessfully) the State for assistance for Arab students (see Section 6.3), who they would now be encouraged to recruit.

Interpreting these struggles and policy changes over time, Menahem (2008) argues that while the structural reforms in HE in the early 1990s were sparked by demographic shifts and a desire to increase access to HE for a wider population, these reforms were continually pursued in order to transform the HE sector, as part of an ideational shift in Israeli state policy towards liberalisation; privatisation; and deregulation coupled with regulation. Resistance to these reforms, resulted in the lost decade. Thus, Menahem (2008) argues that ‘debates over university governance are to be seen in the context of the transformation of the relationship between the state and the HE system, that is, the emergence of a new policy paradigm and the attempt to institutionalize a new policy regime for the sector.’ From these struggles, emerged the erosion of the state-sponsored model of governance and a shift towards a ‘regime…(in) which market forces play a more significant role albeit coupled with increasing state intervention in the form of direct regulation’ (p. 519). Thus, under threats of nationalisation, coupled with financial incentives and sanctions, the HE sector as a whole, and HU specifically were pulled into a new form of governance: the State-Steering model. During this development, the PBC and CHE became a representative body of all HEIs in Israel (not just universities); the PBC implemented expansive competitive funding for its national HE plans, all under the continual threat of nationalisation of research, incentives and sanctions. Kirsch (2018) elaborates on the PBC/CHE’s increasing exposure to political pressures in this time period. While HU academics, students and even administration actively resisted these changes, the long drawn out periods of budget cuts, and threats to its effective operating and reputation, eventually brought HU into this new form of governance. Analysis of the President’s Reports to the BOG throughout the period indicates continual discussions between HU, the MoF, PBC and CHE, and other Government ministries. As the funding crisis continued, there was a growing sense of urgency and HU become increasingly desperate to find a solution to these issues, before irreparable damage was done. A HU publication from 2010 elaborates:

‘Every year, however, the damage caused by such [austerity] measures becomes increasingly evident: in the levels of academic and administrative services provided to students and faculty members and in the maintenance of campuses and physical infrastructure. The most significant impact is on the University’s ability to offer student
support and provide the basic equipment and infrastructure that are crucial to maintaining high research standards.\textsuperscript{371}

\textbf{2010: Emerging from the ‘lost decade’}

This extended period of conflict had profound effects on HU; these were compounded by shifting developments in the competitive nature of HE domestically and worldwide. First, as mentioned above, there was a decrease in its academic staff, and reports suggest an overall aging of the academic faculty throughout the sector.\textsuperscript{372} This all during a period in which the ‘global war for talent’ in academia was in full force, and HU felt increasingly that it could not compete in the international arena without young talented researchers (see section 6.2). Second, the scientific infrastructure and equipment needed to conduct – and compete – in international science was in decay and needed significant investment. Third, while the cohort of Israeli students spiked in the 1990s, it began to retract in the 2000s. The diminishing cohort of students, coupled with greater institutional competition in the newly expanded Israeli HE system, led to greater domestic competition for students. Fourth, the advent of global university rankings, with its associated indicators placing significant emphasis on publications, international students and staff, and competitive research funding became salient in the minds of HU academics and administrators. Fifth, State funds were more available after the ‘lost decade’ however, they were closely tied to State aims, and included social integration of minority populations (e.g. Ethiopian, Arab, Ultra-Orthodox students) and expansion of preferred areas of national research and development for economic exploitation. Sixth, the move towards greater ‘accountability’ for national goals and funding, coupled with greater domestic competition for students, made it imperative for HU to ‘make the case’ to the Israeli public that it was uniquely positioned to serve a myriad of public goals, including: inclusion and diversity (e.g. through expanding access to minority populations); national teaching and research targets; cementing global alliances; and remaining in the global university rankings. Seventh, during the Second Intifada, there were renewed calls for international boycotts of Israel – including Israeli academics. While the exact origins of the movement are debated (see Hirsch, 2017), by the end of the ‘lost decade’, the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement was in full swing, with the stated aims of ending colonisation of Palestinian lands; recognising the equal rights of Arab Palestinians with Israeli citizenship; and allowing the right of return to Palestinian refugees from 1948. The movement attacks Israel’s legitimacy in the international community, and targets businesses, governments and individuals to economically and politically isolate Israel, putting pressure on it to make these concessions.\textsuperscript{373} BDS has become a controversial global movement which has been viewed alternatively as a
radical new approach to Palestinian resistance (Chalcraft, 2019; Morrison, 2015) and the new face of institutional (and left-wing) antisemitism (Hirsh, 2017; Sheskin & Felson, 2016; Thiessen, 2019). BDS resolutions have been adopted on many North American and European university campuses. Thus, at a time when HE was becoming more globally competitive, and HU was experiencing more pressure to form international alliances to cement its academic position, there was an increasing call for academic boycotts of Israeli academics and HEIs.

Eighth, the Second Intifada represented a low point in Diaspora – Israel relations, as Israelis felt abandoned in their time of need; much of the Diaspora, particularly American Jewry, identified politically as progressive, and Israel’s policies towards the Palestinians were increasingly out of step with their views, straining this relationship. Moreover, the drive to establish (and after the Holocaust preserve) Jewish and Hebrew culture was waning as both were solidly established in the Diaspora and Israel. Likewise, Zionism had broadly fulfilled its vision (i.e. establishing a secure, economically viable Jewish State) and after the large wave of immigration from the FSU, Aliyah, was less of a priority.

Taken together, these provided strong impulses both within and outside HU for change. Thus, as in the previous period upon creation of the State, it became clear once again that HU would need to react to these changes and to revalue its position, reformulate its mission, and renegotiate its future, while balancing its academic mission with its primary constituencies: the State and the Diaspora. While the archival record is not yet available, documentary analysis of publicly available documents and interviews with HU staff suggest that the culmination of these forces led HU to reformulate itself as the University which could meet national needs of science and social integration of weak populations, while also representing Israeli science – and Diaspora identity needs – on a global scale. These myriad needs coalesced under the banner of a pluralistic, ‘world-class’ research institution. Thus, I argue that the reshaping of HU in the time between the 1990s and 2018, was the subject of substantial scuffles between the State and HU which resulted in a change in governance; a redefinition of the relationship between Diaspora supporters of the University; and a shift in the definition of what constituted a university of standing. This reflected the changing nature of the relationship between Universities, the State, the international and national academic environment, and Diaspora expectations of the ‘Jewish University’. Thus, as in the previous period, there was significant pressure for HU to adapt itself to new realities; or it was in danger of losing its place not only in the national hierarchy of HEIs, but also in this period – the emerging global hierarchy.
**2011 – 2014: Strategic planning process, shifting mission of HU and becoming a global university**

In the 2010-2016 CHE plan, HU was allocated a one-time grant from the PBC (2011 – 2014) to embark on a strategic planning process (with consultants, Rotem Strategy). The HU President commented:

‘We hope that this process will help us create a strong foundation for our institution, which will enable it to stand strong in the face of future crises. We hope that this process will help us to clarify our identity — or brand — from within and without: what we think of ourselves privately and how we are regarded in the public realm…’

The process was aimed at both securing HU’s future in the face of sustained financial crisis, while redefining HU’s identity, linked with its outward (marketing) image. Through this process, HU sought to build an identity which would garner widespread support from both within HU (i.e. academic and administrative staff) and outside (i.e. the State, Municipality, Diaspora and the international academic community). From the beginning of the strategic planning process, it was envisioned as a long-term redefinition of HU – not as a short-term ‘recovery.’ In the President’s words:

‘…we have embarked on one of the most significant university strategic planning efforts ever – a forward looking ”Renewal Plan.” Here we are not looking at next year or even a five-year plan but we are planning for 2020 and beyond.’

It was hoped that this new plan for HU would garner widespread (financial) support. He elaborated:

‘We hope that once we finalize our strategy, it will herald in increased support from the government, and that our friends within Israel and around the world will join us in embracing this process.’

Thus, the plan was to redefine HU, secure its national and global position, while also formulating a plan that would engender widespread support from its two most important financial backers: the State and the Diaspora.

This strategic planning process was undertaken in parallel with an internal branding process. The 2011 President’s Report to the BOG, under a section entitled ‘living the brand’ elaborates on this process:

‘Some time ago, with the help and encouragement of our Friends, the University community engaged in a branding process, through which two central areas which
symbolize the essence of the University were elucidated: cutting-edge creativity in research, and internationalization — becoming a “world university” in every sense. While the branding process was not completed and common branding symbols such as logos and slogans have not yet been adapted, we have been moving forward with implementing the essence, or the spirit, of our brand.\textsuperscript{378}

Thus, despite State attempts to draw HU closer to its aims and control, the identity and perspective of HU was moving away from the nation, towards that of a globally oriented institution.

After an internal review process, and in continual dialogue with its partners, HU began to formulate a Recovery Plan with the initial aims defined as:

- To be the leading research university in Israel and to be ranked among the world’s leading universities
- Maintain relations of mutual benefit with Jerusalem and the State of Israel
- All with a balanced budget\textsuperscript{379}

Noticeably absent from this list is mention of relations with the Diaspora or the FHU. This might be because these relations were not viewed as endangered; indeed, FHU raised over $1 billion for HU between 2006-2015, despite the global financial crisis, an average of $107 million per year.\textsuperscript{380} Thus, these ‘aims’ focus on those areas which were viewed as in crisis and in need of strategic action. Through the strategic planning process, the following year the goals for HU had been defined:

‘We wish to continue to be Israel's leading research university, and among the best in the world. We want to create innovative & cutting-edge research that pushes the frontiers of science, we want to ensure quality teaching that prepares our future leaders in all walks of life, we want to nurture cross-disciplinary discovery, and to be active members of the international academic community. We wish to ensure a pluralistic community, to contribute to the wellbeing of Jerusalem and to Israel, and all this while maintaining a balanced budget.’\textsuperscript{381}

As such, HU’s primary aim was to maintain its status in Israel and globally and the other aims represented areas which were viewed as necessary for ‘excellence’ in the shifting academic environment (i.e. ‘innovative’ research; interdisciplinarity in research and teaching; inclusion in the international community); while addressing national aims (i.e. future leaders; wellbeing of Jerusalem); and an emphasis on pluralism. These areas provided a considerable area of overlap between State aims (e.g. for excellence in research in particular fields; world-ranked
HEIs; increasing integration of minority groups); municipal aims (e.g. promoting pluralism in an ethnically divided city); academic staff aims (e.g. research focus); Diaspora aims (e.g. ‘excellence’ in research for all humanity, showing the Jewish People to be a ‘Light Unto the Nations’). These represented the core aims of HU which would guide its development in this period. Importantly, these goals and the strategic planning process, overlapped with the aforementioned branding process.\textsuperscript{382} While ‘excellence’ was always an important aspect at HU, this became more pronounced throughout this period, however, other words were entering the marketing vocabulary, particularly those which emphasised creativity and ‘cutting-edge.’ These words reflected national branding tropes that aimed to cement Israel’s image as the ‘Start-Up Nation’ and were a direct outcome of the internal branding process undertaken by HU. Billy Shapira, Director General, noted:

‘The word excellence is worn out. In the course of the University branding process, we tried to sharpen, polish and put the finishing touches to the product that is called ‘the Hebrew University’. We tried to find a good alternative to ‘excellence’. We decided to use words like originality and innovation.’\textsuperscript{383}

These tropes in the goals of HU aligned with the increasing rhetoric around a ‘global market for HE’ and rankings which began to be invoked in this period by HU leaders, particularly from 2008 onwards (see Appendix K for HU’s ranking over time). One outcome of this branding and strategic planning process was a new mission for HU, which comprised an assemblage of ideas that would garner widespread support from the main constituencies of the HU: State, City; Diaspora; Academics; and international academic community. Despite being more deeply embedded with the State than in previous periods, it was not in its advantage to be seen as too closely connected to the State; or to parochial causes. Therefore, the new mission actively disassociated itself from much of the language of nationalism (e.g. serving the State) and also with parochialism (e.g. Jewish People). In the previous period, HU espoused a three-fold aim, to serve Israel, the Jewish People, and humanity, with a particular emphasis on the State. However, as the strategic planning process unfolded, the HU mission, as portrayed in HU publications, underwent a series of changes between 2008 and 2012 (see Appendix L). These consisted of dropping an association with Israel as the Jewish ancestral homeland, something that was controversial, particularly in light of the BDS movement, and also created a barrier to programmes of Arab inclusion; adding a reference to the global ranking of HU, reflecting the more competitive atmosphere of HE; expanding the mission to serve Israelis of all backgrounds, aligning with national and municipal priorities to incorporate greater inclusivity; and importantly, shifting its mission from the 3-fold aim, to one which employs universal aims. From 2012, this mission and description of the University would remain unchanged through the time of writing (2019). Thus, the State is no longer explicitly at the core
of the HU mission. Even more so, any mention of the Jewish people has disappeared. Instead the mission relates to humanitarian goals and universal aims, achieved through research and teaching, focusing on HU as a top research institution, with a pluralistic character.

At first glance, the focus on pluralism, at a time when Israel was under a right-wing nationalist government which passed the controversial Nation-State Law and was increasingly calling for annexation and ‘divorce’ from the Palestinians, appears to be at odds with State policies for integration of Palestinian Arab students into HE. However, while the State was pursuing these policies, it was also actively trying to integrate Palestinian Arabs (with and without Israeli citizenship) into Israeli society for social, economic and political reasons (see section 6.3). Thus, HU’s pluralist identity, served State priorities. Therefore, while HU was actively shifting its perspective to be a global competitive University, it was also deeply connected to national priorities; however, these priorities dovetailed with HU in many ways. Thus, while HU was moving away in rhetoric, it was actually bound more tightly than ever in its financing, governance, and national activities. Some interview participants indicated dismay in light of this new direction, with one retired senior HU leader noting:

‘HU, in my opinion, has given up on its mission as the University of the Jewish People, completely. I actually think they’ve made a huge mistake about this. I think they haven't read the tea leaves of the Jewish people.’

However, the fact that HU presented its mission widely to its international BOG (primarily Diaspora donors), as well as through its main fundraising publication SCOPUS, further indicates a high level of acceptance and support of this new direction from its donors. Indeed, it appears that the FHU themselves were interested in rebranding and remaking HU for their own (fundraising) purposes. In 2010, the Director-General of HU remarked:

‘In addition to the University’s high profile in Jerusalem and Israel, we also seek high visibility internationally… we must present the University consistently and with a “unified language”. The branding process currently under way is a response to both the internal needs of the University, and those of our overseas Friends organizations.’

Given the aims of HU to compete on the world stage, and the problematic image of Israel in many communities today, it is not surprising that HU would want to de-emphasise the State in their mission. Numerous interviews indicated this difficulty; one senior HU leader noted: ‘the way Israel is viewed abroad, in our target areas... 70%, 80% of the American Jews are Democrats, you know what I mean? You can understand the hesitation.’ However, the motivation for the Diaspora (represented by FHU) to move away from a rhetoric of Jewish
Peoplehood to more inclusive, humanitarian aims, requires more explanation. Much of the universal language of ‘excellence’ recalls similar discussions during the pre-State period, in which HU research was viewed as a way for the Jewish People to demonstrate ‘Jewish Genius’ and in which scientific achievements reinforced deeply held self-identities. While phrases such as ‘Jewish Genius’ were not used in this period, other phrases with similar links were, such as HU serving as a ‘Light Unto the Nations’ and ‘Tikkun Olam’ (repairing the world). Indeed, these two tropes, accord to high views that Diaspora donors could support – regardless of Israeli politics which were increasingly right-wing and out of step with the majority of American Jewry. For example, in the SCOPUS 2012 edition, the one in which the mission appeared in its fully revised form, the focus was on ‘A Better World’ with the opening article addressing this topic through the concept of ‘Tikkun Olam.’ HU scholars from various disciplines interpret the term and its uses over time, alighting on its contemporary popularity in the Jewish world (‘widely adopted – oftentimes as a rallying call – by rabbis, leaders, politicians, and environment, social and peace activists alike’) which is understood as a Jewish value associated with promoting a more just and better world for all humanity.

Successive Presidents reached out to FHU to help raise funds and praised the FHU for their support for HU to serve not necessarily the Jewish People or exclusively the Jewish State, but rather, similarly to the first period, to represent what the Jewish people could contribute to humanity. HU President noted:

‘Our donors are people who give of themselves and they are characterized by their sense of true partnership with the University, partners in our mission for a strong Israel that serves as a light unto the nations — and in leading the way in pushing forward the frontiers of knowledge for the betterment of humanity.’

While there were projects which dealt with issues of the Jewish community, these were a minority and HU publications - targeted towards donors - particularly emphasised the research aspects of HU that were affecting all humanity; indeed, in addition to scholarship programmes and funding to recruit ‘young and talented’ academic staff (see section 6.2), the main targets for the FHU fundraising campaign included ‘Feeding the World through Sustainable Agriculture’; ‘Healing the World through Medical Research’; ‘Understanding the World through Excellence in the Humanities; and ‘Understanding the Mind: Leading in Brain Sciences.’ This strategy was explicitly recognised by the President: ‘University and Friends fundraising activities highlight not only the HU’s historical significance as the University of the Jewish People, but first and foremost its research achievements.’ This appeared to be the strategy perceived by the HU fundraising apparatus as the best way to appeal to its donors, with a focus on the pride HU’s accomplishment brought to its supporters:
‘Maintaining the highest standards of academic quality and encouraging our friends to take pride in and actively promote our achievements will ensure that the HU is a trademark of academic excellence.’

This portrayal for humanity was echoed in an interview I conducted with a senior administrator of a Jewish philanthropy who explained:

‘…a lot of Jewish philanthropy in Israel happens through academia. Academia is the pretty face of Israel. It’s also hard to address any significant issues without thinking about academia. If you’re interested in social mobility, or environmental improvement, to help the economy, to help soldiers, or to help integration of Arab students— all these things work through academia.’

**2014 – 2018: Internationalisation as central institutional and national policy**

With the new mission, the ‘brand’ of HU was established, and the strategic planning process moved forward to define its priority areas of engagement and institute wide-ranging changes. The President elaborated:

‘…after a ten-year crisis in Israeli HE, in 2010 we took advantage of the opportunity presented by the PBC for true change… We are evaluating and revaluating, planning for the future, and instituting follow up procedures to check our progress…We are changing our DNA.’

These changes to its ‘DNA’ included restructuring administration and implementing a combination of central planning, and decentralised governance; reorganising and prioritising academic programmes, faculties and schools, particularly those which were defined as ‘growth engines’ (e.g. Neuroscience; Agriculture; Medical Sciences; Humanities); re-assessing its relationship with the public, and embarking on PR campaigns to ensure widespread support for HU; redesigning its graduate school and doctoral training; promoting interdisciplinarity in research and teaching; designing student support programmes and services, particularly for minority groups singled out in the CHE plan (e.g. Arabs; Ultra-Orthodox); and recruiting the ‘best and brightest’ academic faculty. Importantly, a key means to achieve its overarching aim of bolstering its competitive position in Israel and globally, was through internationalisation. A HU publication elaborated:
‘Internationalization is important to the vision of the University and a top institutional priority. Collaborations—both in research and education—are necessary for fostering scientific exchange and cultural growth. The University seeks to be part of the process of globalization of HE, to improve our academic excellence, to pursue new research funding opportunities and to maintain our global competitive edge.’

This institutional priority led to the creation of the International Office (IO, see section 6.3) in 2014 backed by a new President (Prof. Asher Cohen, 2017) which would be upgraded to an Authority in 2017. A senior IO staff member elaborated:

‘…internationalisation is something that you should probably do nowadays. It is not sort of a choice. It has to become a mission of the University. Because the Israeli University, to maintain their position globally as a leading research university which, that’s our aim, you have to invest in internationalisation, globalisation of your academic programs…it’s driven by…academic excellence. Internationalisation as a means…not as an end but as a means…and it is obviously somewhat commercial as well…but I wouldn’t say that is a key factor…the other thing is the number of Israeli students is also going down slowly…obviously another source of student is the international student.’

In this period, ‘internationalisation’ has become a strategic focus of HU, particularly as a means to improve academic quality; compete internationally and nationally; and as a source of students in a dwindling domestic market. This increasing focus on internationalisation, was mirrored in the 2017–2022 CHE plan for HE which would include internationalisation as one of its key foci with a budget of $100 million. The result was a top-down focus on internationalisation, from both State and HU management.

While HU was uniting around its new identity and internationalisation as a key operational strategy, it was in ongoing negotiations with the PBC and the MoF. The heart of these negotiations was the settlement of pensions: in 2000 pension expenses represented 19.4% of the operating budget, ballooning to 33.9% in 2014. In 2012, as a limited, short-term solution, HU signed an agreement with the PBC to enable it to continue operation, however, HU remained burdened by this expense. Only in 2018, after HU had significantly reinvented itself did HU, the PBC and MoF, sign a comprehensive recovery plan which would infuse HU with an additional 700 million NIS over ten years and provide relief for its pensions bill. In exchange for this, HU agreed to sell property and assets, and implement austerity measures to raise 1.8 billion NIS to cover its deficit. Pointedly, it committed to changes in its governance structure; and to achieving several national aims:
• Increasing the number of students in knowledge-intensive disciplines by 70%

• Increasing the number of Arab undergraduate and masters students by 18% and 12% of the cohort respectively.\(^{397}\)

• Increasing the number of Ultra-Orthodox students to at least 815.\(^{398}\)

This programme is monitored quarterly by a Committee composed of representatives of the MoF, PBC, and public figures. Reflecting on the agreement, the Head of the PBC remarked, ‘HU is a symbol and brand of the State of Israel in general and the crown of the HE system in particular’ and emphasised the PBC’s commitment to monitoring the programme and HU’s adherence thereto.\(^{399}\) Notably, the programme was hailed by senior government ministers as an important step to ensuring the wellbeing of the national economy; and emphasised its importance to the State. The Finance Minister, Moshe Kachlon stated:

‘The agreement we have reached will enable the university to continue to contribute to the growth of the Israeli economy by investing in research and development and the cultivating of human capital.’\(^{400}\)

The Minister of Education, Naftali Bennett said:

‘The Hebrew University was and still is one of the best universities in the world, a source of pride for the State of Israel, and especially a prestigious academic institution that has grown thousands of distinguished scholars over the decades whose contribution to research and the country is tremendous. The recovery programme poses many challenges for the University and the State, but its implementation will ensure that the University is ranked at the top of universities worldwide.’\(^{401}\)

Reflecting its evolving relationship with the State, a considerable shift occurred in HU’s funding: from 2002 until 2016, PBC funding to the general budget stood at about 41 - 49%; jumping to 75% in the 2016/17 academic year.\(^{402}\) Pointedly, this funding is not assured. Rather, the agreement is evaluated on a quarterly basis by the PBC, and punitive measures can – and have – been taken by the PBC if HU fails to meet standards.\(^{403}\) Thus, HU is in a situation in which it is tied to State priorities, which cannot be ignored and must carefully be balanced with other aims.

By 2018, the BOG elected a new President, a new management team was assembled, and a new Chairman of the BOG was elected. HU had come to a settlement with the PBC and was embarking on a new $1 billion fundraising campaign for 2018 – 2025. The outcome of the shifting requirements of national funding, combined with shifting ideas of what constituted a ‘world-class’ University, and its renewed commitment to advancing Diaspora pride through
research, combined to reshape many areas of HU research and teaching, the international element of which will be analysed in sections 6.2 and 6.3. While I have separated research and teaching areas for the sake of clarity, as internationalisation has become an important university-wide goal, there is significant overlap in their targets and strategies.
6.2. Internationalisation of research

In this sub-chapter I analyse the internationalisation of research. I argue this became a key focus for HU and the State, however for somewhat different purposes: HU to access increased (national and international) funding and to secure its status among top global universities; the State to strengthen the national image, connect with new strategic partners and pursue research which supported their priorities. The scope and manner in which funding was allocated through competitive tenders and incentive funding was new. While the Diaspora remained an important facilitator and funder of research, research funding and partners were increasingly connected to the State’s shifting strategic interests. However, while HU internationalisation in research was ever more intertwined with the State, I argue that the purpose of research was re-framed from an imperative for national development in the previous period, to reflect the contributions of HU research for humanitarian benefit in this period.

I begin by analysing the shifting purposes and role of research at HU, and its funding. Key dates in this period are delineated in Table 9.

Table 9. Key dates in the development of internationalisation of research, 2000s - 2018

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As Table 9 indicates, the purposes of research shifted in this period as did its sources of international funding and collaboration. I proceed to analyse these sources and the strategies used to procure it and finally, the international dimension of academic staffing.
Evolving purposes and place of research and competitive funding

In this period, research became the primary area marketed by HU. Following the change of its mission, research shifted away from a nation-building framing to that of a humanitarian and universal benefit. The VP for External Relations noted:

‘Our greatest accomplishments come from fulfilling the original mission of the University — to cure the world, to feed the world, to understand the world, and to advance humanity.’

Notably, even Jewish Studies research began to take on interdisciplinary dimensions and a broader focus. In 2002, the Mandel Schilon Interdisciplinary Research Center in Jewish Studies was inaugurated (later to incorporate all Humanities). One of its founders explained:

‘The very choice of a Greek word [Schilon] for our center’s name reflects its philosophy: to place Jewish culture within a wider context, at the center of a general cultural debate.’

Reflecting this shift away from national development, the AR&D’s previous mission to promote research for national development (see 5.2), was dropped.

While AR&D undertook many activities, its primary purpose remained to secure research funding, which was greatly intensified for several reasons. HU was increasingly evaluated by the State and internationally on indicators which reflected research domains (e.g. publications; international research collaborations; international staff). This was connected to its mission and image; and closely tied to State funding as well. In a memo to the academic staff urging academic staff to apply for competitive research funding, the Rector explained:

‘Obtaining grants is critical for research, not only due to the grants’ direct contributions but also through its major effect on the University’s resources available to support research activity.’

It was also the key factor in its main aim: to be a top-ranking global university. Encouraging competitive funding was thus intensified in this period, particularly in the early part of the period, as research funding from the State was becoming less assured during the ‘lost decade’ and later in the period due to the competitive mechanisms of PBC funding allocation. Reflecting on the former point the HU President notes:

‘The chronic deficits in our budget threaten our ongoing academic activities. We can confront the challenges of our academic and financial commitments through the concerted and far-reaching actions of our Friends associations and by actively
encouraging our researchers to seek competitive research funding.'

Thus, competitive research funding was identified as a part of the solution to the funding problems connected to the lost decade and important for HU’s image and mission; obtaining national funds; and securing its global position. A HU publication elaborated:

‘Receiving competitive grants is an important component in how we measure our academic work, as is our place in the international academic arena. When a researcher succeeds in winning a competitive grant, they have opportunities to fund students and create a community of scholars based on shared resources, while having access to the best equipment and lab space.’

In 2016, the AR&D delineated four ‘steps to success’: recruit the best talent (with a goal of recruiting 550 researchers by 2020); build and renew research infrastructure; grow multi-disciplinary research centres; and support and identify prestigious funding.

While there was a flurry of activity in all these areas, funding for research spurred the activities of the AR&D. Reflecting on the challenges of HU, Ambassador Gal explained:

‘…our main challenge is to continue to give our scientists what they need in order to excel. Science is becoming very costly and we have an obligation to make sure our scientists have the means to conduct excellent research at the highest level.’

Funding throughout this period, US sources, through government agencies, foundations, bi-national funds, and USAID were an important source of funding and collaboration. German partnerships and research funding likewise continued and intensified through the development of more research centres and initiatives (e.g. Max Planck and Minerva Centres); increased bi-national funding (i.e. GIF); and international agreements and partnerships with German universities (see section 6.3). Reflecting on the development of German relations over time, HU President Ben-Sasson remarked: ‘today we have extremely strong collaborative research and study programs with Germany.’

Since 1996, European research relations significantly expanded and deepened as a result of the European Framework programmes and this represented a considerable new funding source for HU Research, particularly in this period. In 2015, HU researchers received 17 European Research Council (ERC) grants for 29 million Euros (97 since the programme was initiated in 2007, for a total of 160 million Euros); and 103 Marie Sklodowska-Curie Actions Fellowships since 2007, for a total of 14 million Euros. Notably, despite hopes expressed by HU in 2000, the Second Intifada combined with the rise of BDS, and regional instability caused considerable damage to academic partnership with regional partners in (primarily European-funded) research and academic mobility. An interview with a senior CHE officer close to the TEMPUS and Erasmus+ programmes explained:
‘We tried to advance actually a lot of partnerships with Palestinians in the universities through Erasmus+ and then at one point the heads of the Palestinian universities made a decision that they weren't going to enter any Erasmus+ programmes with Israeli universities so that took that whole initiative off the table, which is a bit frustrating because there were a lot of Israeli universities that were interested in it and they had partners, Palestinian researchers, but the universities themselves wouldn't agree to collaborate.’

Diaspora individuals and foundations remained important sources of funding and support, with over $1 billion raised for HU between the years 2006-2015, and several large grants directed towards establishing research centres (e.g. the Edmond and Lily Safra Center for Brain Sciences, facilitated by a $50 million gift from the Safra Philanthropic Foundation).413

Israeli sources remained the largest source of research funding. Government ministries, foundations, industry and bi-national funds still contributed vast sums, however, new strategic sector-wide mechanisms for research funding were introduced. For example, in 2010, the State adopted (Government Decision 1503) a plan to create cross-institutional research centres of excellence (I-CORE) which would be arranged around different research foci in which Israel was viewed to have a relative advantage. Significant funds were provided for this project (1.35 billion NIS) which were earmarked for recruitment of returning and new academic staff, international dissemination and promotion activities, and equipment purchases, among others. These Centres represented a significant shift in the State’s funding of research. Likewise, the 2010 – 2016 CHE plan doubled the ISF’s core budget.

In 2011 a new target for research funding and collaboration emerged: China. In a letter from the Head of the North East Asia Desk, Hagai Shagrir, in November, 2011, to Head of the PBC/CHE, Moshe Vigdor, he outlines the growing economic and political importance of China on the world stage, emphasising the increasing importance for Israel to have strong relations with the ‘superpower in the making.’ He explained that the PM (Benjamin Netanyahu) assigned all ministers to foster widespread cooperation with China in their different capacities. Shagrir noted that ‘One of the significant areas in which we see huge potential between the countries is the development and expansion of academic relations.’414 He drew attention to the importance the Chinese placed on HE, the vast sums invested in research and the large number of Chinese students studying abroad. He stressed the positive attitudes toward cooperation with Israel in this area:

‘There is great admiration in China for Israel and the Jewish people. For their intellectual abilities and impressive achievements in the areas of science and technology. There is not a Chinese person that will not mention with wonder and with
admiration the large number of Jewish and Israeli Nobel Prize winners, in relation to their small proportion of the world population.\textsuperscript{415}

However, he acknowledged that security issues have kept Chinese students away and proposed:

‘We believe that the successful operation of a scholarship programme for several years will help expose Israel and her abilities to the young intellectual generation in China, will bring a stream of Chinese students (also not on scholarship), will strengthen cooperation in the academic area and beyond and will significantly contribute to relations between the two countries.’\textsuperscript{416}

Building on this proposal, a committee was formed with representatives from the FM, Ministry of Finance and PBC. This Committee met several times and ‘checked ideas, collected information and analysed options to develop relations with the Chinese in academic areas.’ It further collected data, made inquiries and consulted with other actors – including a meeting with the Presidents of the Universities and the ISF.\textsuperscript{417} It eventually made several recommendations and the PBC, with earmarked funding from the MoF, in 2012/2013, embarked on four areas of cooperation with China and India (added with similar rationales):

1. Joint research funding (managed by the ISF, and in cooperation with Chinese and Indian counterparts)
2. Post-doctoral scholarships for excellent Chinese and Indian students
3. Undergraduate and graduate degree programmes, taught in English
4. Summer courses\textsuperscript{418}

Reflecting on these different opportunities for collaboration with Asia, a senior CHE officer elaborated:

‘I think for them [Universities] there are many advantages for cooperating with different institutions in Asia and it can be from different angles. It can be from creating research partnerships. It can be for recruiting high quality students at all different levels, and for promoting student and staff mobility. And it can be for helping to raise their international profile, international reputation.’

These activities were part of the State’s strategic agenda to draw Israel closer to China and India and continually strengthened throughout the period by Government decisions (e.g. 2013; 2018).\textsuperscript{419} They were sealed in cooperation with the universities and reports and interviews indicated extensive communication and consultation between the CHE and Universities, and that these national initiatives were received positively by the Universities.\textsuperscript{420} In 2017 the CHE Multi-Year Plan built on this initiative, with a focus on recruiting ‘excellent’ international
research students, particularly from Asia, Europe and the North America; and building internationalisation support services and infrastructure. Notably while areas 2-4 above will be discussed in more detail in section 6.3, the expansion of joint research funding, through bi-national funds with the ISF became a significant new source of research funding for the HE sector. By 2018, the ISF had developed research funding programmes with: China (National Natural Science Foundation of China); India (the University Grants Commission); Canada (Canadian Institute for Health Research, International Development Research Center, Azrieli Foundation); Singapore (National Research Foundation); Japan (Japan Society for the Promotion of Science); and the US (Broad Institute).421

By 2018, AR&D had desks specialising in North America and Pacific Rim, Israel, Germany, and the EU; with international offices in the US and Europe and a representative in China (see section 6.3). It had a sophisticated infrastructure which channelled research funding through its office, increasingly collaborated with the IO, and was a key actor in the university-wide internationalisation agenda. It had extensive international relations with the US, Germany and the EU and was building cooperation with Asian nations. Notably, there was little collaboration with regional or Palestinian partners.

Research funding

As Figure 3 shows, over the period, HU’s research funding grew from a budget of $83.5 million in 2000 to a budget of $185.4 million in 2018.

Figure 3. AR&D budget, 2000 – 2018
Notably, growth was slow and almost static during the lost decade, with considerable growth afterwards. Based on an analysis of HU reports from 2004 – 2010, Israeli sources comprised about 40-45% of the total research budget. US government and private foundation sources comprised about 11%; European sources grew considerably, linked to Israel's participation in the European Research Frameworks, and comprised about 12%; and significant funding from Germany continued and comprised about 7% of the research budget. In line with the shift towards Asia, there was also the advent of new sources of funding. The report from the VP of AR&D to the BOG from 2011 elaborated:

“For the first time, the HU was awarded grants from Taiwan and Singapore. Nanoscience research received grants from Taiwan's Academia Sinica and other partners, while the Faculty of Medicine and Faculty of Science received grants from the Government of Singapore. Although our researchers and scholars have previously been engaged in scientific and intellectual exchanges with their colleagues in Asia, this is the first time that funds from these countries have been awarded for research carried out in Jerusalem.”

While the reports from the AR&D were not available from 2010 onwards, funding from Asian sources was certainly becoming more salient. Likewise, the Israeli government (as indicated in the previous section) was co-funding such collaborations.

The Diaspora remained a major partner in research funding. While it was not possible to isolate contributions to the research budget alone, an analysis of FHU donations revealed that about half of all donations were classified as ‘Research and Special Budgets’ and the US
provided the bulk of the funds (see Figure 4). Reflecting on internationalisation at HU, the VP for Advancement & External Relations elaborated on the role of the Diaspora:

…it’s important to remember how the global community has always shaped and supported the University. Since its inception, our network of Friends organizations has ensured that we have the support to maintain the highest standards of research and attract the best students and faculty…I see this as one of the most central aspects of internationalization – when we look back to the founding of the University, and looking forward, to secure its future.\textsuperscript{1423}

Figure 4. FHU contributions to research and special budgets by country, 2004 – 2018

Sources: See Appendix Q.

In sum, research in this period was increasingly funded by the State and other national governments, with the Diaspora continuing to be an important source. Research funding represented a continuation of relationships cemented in the previous period, with an intensified focus on the EU and Germany, and a new shift towards Asia, reflecting shifting State priorities and the rise of Asia. Below, I analyse the strategies that the AR&D used to secure its international funding.

\textit{AR&D strategies}
PR continued to be a significant means for attracting international funding and support. HU continued producing publications that highlighted its research; these invariably flaunted HU’s international and national rankings; prizes (e.g. Nobel Prize; Israel Prize); and prestigious funding (e.g. ERC grants; industry sponsorships) with an overarching emphasis on its excellence, ingenuity, and implications of research for solving humanity’s problems. However, there was a heightened desire to disseminate HU research achievements, to foster its public image as a research centre, in terms which would be accessible to the public – its main source of funding. A memo from the Rector to the staff in February 2018 read:

‘We should also improve the popular “visibility” of our academic research. Please send me, possibly through the deans, updates of your recent research achievements that may be of general interest. We will inform our own community about it, as well as the local and international media.’

The following month, a more sophisticated system was instated. The Rector elaborated:

‘Visibility of our academic research. We continue to work on increasing the visibility of our research in popular media. Each faculty will appoint a faculty member, as well as students, to facilitate the process of disseminating information to the media, with the help of our Department of Marketing and Communication.’

In addition to these PR publications, HU academic staff were increasingly expected to publish their research in scientific publications, particularly in high impact factor journals (as defined by Web of Science). These were important for the international rankings of HU; and increasingly for national funding as the CHE issued reports about the publication records of the HEIs, linking this to national funding. The Rector explained:

‘The scope of research activity at the University requires attention. Various indicators recently published have shown a (relative) drop in the volume of research generated at the University. Among these indicators, the Academic Ranking of World Universities 2018 (“Shanghai Ranking”), in which our overall ranking rose to 95th place, but our score in academic publications is relatively low… In addition, our research score calculated by the PBC, which determines our public funding, has fallen. This score reflects the number of publications in academic journals, weighted according to the journals’ impact factor…as well as our success in obtaining competitive research grants. The result is a troubling decline in our share in HE public funding…Our primary aim is to conduct research that will have substantial scientific contribution. At the same
time, when all other relevant factors are (almost) equal, one should prefer publications in high IF academic journals.  

This put increasing pressure on academics to publish not only in certain publications (high ranking), but also in English. While many already did this, in certain areas, this was considered more difficult. HU Rector explained:

‘Because of the language issue, these dilemmas were the topic of extensive deliberations at the Faculty of Humanities. How much should a researcher at HU write in Hebrew at any stage in their academic career? English is the lingua franca of academic discourse, but Hebrew is the vehicle for reaching out to Israeli society… the University oscillates between Hebrew and English, between academic specialization and reaching out.’

Publishing was not only connected to indicators for rank and funding, but also to international student recruitment goals. The Director-General of HU elaborated:

‘We are strong in our Faculty of Humanities and in particular in Jewish studies, and we have good social sciences. Many of our scholars publish in Hebrew, but in doing so they don’t reach the student population that we could attract.’

Hosting (and attending) academic conferences, hosting distinguished visitors and encouraging scholar mobility intensified. As in the previous period, these activities were viewed both as essential in creating, cementing and maintaining international research relationships (and access to a wider pool of research funding) and as an important way to promote HU’s research image abroad.

**Overlapping strategies: Diaspora, State, and international partnerships**

The overlapping strategies from the previous period (see Chapter 5) intensified – appealing to the Diaspora (i.e. FHU) to fund and facilitate research; using (and lobbying) State funds, connections and infrastructure; and forging international partnerships – however, with a few shifts. First the Diaspora was still an important source of research funding (see Figure 4), and facilitated research connections and funding in North America and Europe. However, given that the archival records are closed from 2008 onwards, and the records available from 2000 were significantly reduced (likely due to the advent of email communications) it was difficult to assess the role of the Diaspora in the shift towards Asia. The FHU are much less established in Asia and the usefulness of the Diaspora in facilitating research in Asia, in which Jewish
Second, the State became a central actor in HU’s international research collaboration and funding. As shown in section 6.2, after 2010, the State began funding research through increased budgets to the ISF and the PBC which the HU benefited from. It also deepened relations with Europe through participation in the EU Framework programmes and there is evidence that HU (and other HEIs) lobbied the State intensively for these agreements, particularly the controversial Horizon 2020 agreement. Likewise, new bi-national funds were created (see section 6.2) and new research centres established at HU which received national and international funding, to draw Israel closer to foreign nations (e.g. French Interuniversity Center for Research and Cultural Collaboration; Confucius Institute). In this way, HU’s international relations were linked with those of the State. Interviews indicated that State initiatives and funding opportunities were welcomed by HU. An analysis of Government decisions from 2013 onwards which established bi-national cooperation and funding indicates that the State viewed these projects as cultivating relations with countries of strategic national importance. However, interviews and documentary analysis suggest that HU viewed these relations as a way to obtain research funding; to promote student and staff mobility; and to facilitate international partnerships for its status and recognition. Pointedly, some academic staff appreciated the new State infrastructure. Prof. Razin, reflecting on his experience with Singapore elaborated:

‘Singapore has great scientists who benefit from a top-down approach where the national vision of promoting research is matched by massive governmental investment…Our scientists, recruited for their expertise, are discovering just how much can be accomplished in the ideal infrastructure.’

In addition to its increased funding role, the State continued to play an important role in facilitating international research cooperation and funding from other sources. As noted above, the State facilitated exchanges and international projects (e.g. through Cultural and Scientific agreements; EU mobility schemes); continued to finance trips abroad to solidify research relationships (e.g. China-Israel fairs). Thus, while HU actively pursued its own partnerships, the State has been essential in initiating and promoting these relations.

Third, international partnerships continued to focus on the US, Germany and Europe, while developing a new focus on Asia. In 2012, HU President Ben-Sasson elaborated:

‘The University intends to expand its research collaborations and student exchange programs with European, British, and North and South American countries — as well
as Asian Pacific countries. Special attention will also be given to strengthening academic ties with China, India, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore.\textsuperscript{433}

In addition to its targets, international partnerships took new forms. For example, joint research degrees; research centres; student mobility (at all levels, including undergraduate); staff mobility and joint appointments; and shared funding.\textsuperscript{434} HU’s flagship example of such collaboration is with Nanyang Technological University (NTU). The Singapore-Hebrew University of Jerusalem Alliance for Research and Enterprise (SHARE), was established in 2016 ‘to advance and strengthen research collaborations between Israel and Singapore…’ The project hosts post-graduate, doctoral and post-graduate students, some of them in joint degrees. In 2018, there were 47 researchers between the two institutions, and all HU principal investigators held a joint appointment with NTU. This collaboration was expressly linked with new directions in international collaboration: ‘SHARE is the only international research center of the Hebrew University outside of Israel, part of a shift in academic focus to Asia.’\textsuperscript{435}

In sum, the funding and initiation of many international research projects and collaborations continued to be a complex combination of interactions between HU and numerous other actors; there was a particular reliance on State funding and connections; with Diaspora playing an important role. Research centres and projects were often initiated by a partnership between the State, HU and Diaspora.\textsuperscript{436} In these initiatives their emergence and funding involved complex interactions between the State, Diaspora, and Academia. Pointedly, in addition to the targets (i.e. Asia); and forms (e.g. joint degrees) what is different in this period, is that there is a greater reliance on the foreign relations of the State, with the State playing a more central role in funding and facilitating international research, particularly in Asia.

\textit{Academic staff: Recruiting the ‘best,’ brain-gain and diversity}

During the lost decade, HU academic faculty, as in the rest of the HE sector, decreased. An analysis of HU publications shows an overall decrease of about 15%, from a high of about 1100 in 2005 to a low of 947 in 2013. This reporting appears to match internal accounting as well. Reflecting on the lost decade and its effects on HU, President Ben-Sasson, noted in 2017:

‘We absorbed a cut of two hundred faculty members, an almost full stagnation in new hiring, and a cessation in the development of new research and teaching.’\textsuperscript{437}
With the focus on competitive research funding, coupled with a limited budget for new staff, recruiting the ‘best and brightest’ became increasingly important. In 2010, Ben-Sasson noted:

‘We must aspire to recruit the world’s best researchers to our ranks. This is a goal toward which the Hebrew University designates many resources, ranging from the purchase of state-of-the-art equipment for new faculty to providing them with the tools and knowledge that will enable them to succeed in the world of competitive research.’

He elaborated:

‘Throughout these difficult times, the University is focused on welcoming the crème de la crème of the research community, and encouraging Israel’s best and brightest to come home. We are investing enormous efforts in order to provide our faculties, centers, institutes, schools and departments with the necessary funds to fulfill this goal.’

There was also a focus on ‘young’ faculty members. In a plea for support from the FHU for funds for academic recruitment he notes:

‘...[there] is the fundamental need to fund the recruitment of young faculty; this is essential in ensuring that Israel’s best and brightest can remain in Israel and in helping to combat the brain drain that has become one of Israel’s greatest challenges.’

HU’s recruitment practices appeared to have successfully attracted some top researchers; a HU publication noted:

‘The ERC was established three years ago by the European Union with a simple mission: to identify the best scientists in Europe, regardless of field, and to provide them with a large grant of $3-$5 million over a five-year period to carry out their research under optimal conditions. The awards are divided into two categories: established/senior scientists, and young faculty members who represent the future. The results of the last three years indicate that the Hebrew University is one of the three leading universities in Europe, alongside Cambridge and Oxford, in terms of the quality of its young faculty members.’

To fill its ranks HU carried on encouraging visiting professors, and training ‘home-grown’ Israeli academics with international training experiences (e.g. post-doctoral positions). Visiting professors were an integral part of the new internationalisation focus at HU. While there were several internal and external sources of funding for these positions, increasingly visiting professors and faculty exchange were also the focus of the IO and agreements. In
2018, this was tied to State funding, as 30% of the PBC budget for internationalisation was allocated based on the indicator ‘research collaboration’ which included visiting faculty, international conferences and post-doctoral students.\textsuperscript{442} Thus, in this period, there is also an increased emphasis on HU hosting such students (see section 6.3).

To train Israeli academic staff, HU research students were still encouraged to go abroad for post-doctoral training, and this became a de-facto requirement across fields, and certainly in the sciences. Much of this mobility continued to be focused on the US and Europe, however, interviews indicated that more mobility towards East Asia and India was emerging. Post-doctoral periods were increasingly funded by national (e.g. ISF); Diaspora (e.g. Yad HaNadiv, Azrieli Foundation); and HU funding/agreements. An interview with a senior officer at a Jewish philanthropy that sponsored post-doctoral students elaborated on how they viewed a post-doctoral ‘gift’:

‘…networking and collaboration gets you to move around. It's a small self-contained system and that can be very bad for academia. If you're in Paris, or in London, or in Germany, you've got hundreds of academic institutions that are literally a stone's throw away. If you’re in Israel, you don't, so you have to make a real concerted effort to reach out and to make sure you're a part of that network...Israelis certainly seem to get around, and there's many ways of communicating, and collaborating with colleagues abroad, but it's still important that they get a chance to spend time in academic centres outside of Israel. That's the sort of gift that keeps on giving. You've done a post-doc in someone's lab and very often you'll continue to collaborate. When you go back to Israel, your students will be able to collaborate with that person’s lab and you create ties that last for a long time.’

The overall research standards of HU were increasingly linked not only with rankings and evaluations of quality; but also, with the viability of this latter strategy of training its future academics. HU President Ben-Sasson elaborated:

‘Maintaining exemplary research standards is crucial since it determines both how we as a university are judged and the extent to which our research students will be accepted to the world’s best research institutes for their postdoctoral research.’\textsuperscript{443}

In addition to these established strategies, two new foci for recruiting academic staff surfaced: combatting the ‘brain-drain’ and recruiting Israeli staff from abroad; recruiting more diverse academic staff from within Israeli society, particularly women and those from the Arab community. While ‘brain drain’ was mentioned in the archival trail as early as the 1960s, from
2000s onwards, this became a significant focus of HU activities and part of its fundraising appeals with the FHU. A HU publication, soliciting FHU for funds for this purpose explained:

‘The brain drain is a major threat to Israel’s future — we have lost too many of our best and brightest in recent years. By providing jobs and first-rate research infrastructures, we can provide a viable alternative in Israel to universities abroad for Israel’s most talented young minds.’

While returning Israeli academics represented a significant focus for HU and appeals to FHU, this was closely connected to national programmes which facilitated and funded returning (and new immigrant) academics – particularly after the Shochat Report of 2007. This was part of a larger shift from the 2000s in which the State actively sought to connect with a new Diaspora: Israelis abroad. In the previous period they were shunned as ‘Yordim’ in this period, they were actively called back home to support the nation. In 2007, the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities opened the Contact Center to provide information and place returning Israeli scientists in academia. In June 2013, a national Brain Gain programme, sponsored by the Israel Innovation Authority (IAA) in collaboration with the Ministry of Immigration and Absorption, the PBC and the MoF offered employment placement and mentoring; as well as streamlining the bureaucratic process of return. Diaspora and returning Israeli scientists were also appealed to through the Center for Absorption in Science at the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption, which helps universities fund these scientists. The Israel-Europe Research R&D (ISERD), through the Marie Curie International Reintegration Grants of the EU, offered funding for returning academics. Diaspora philanthropic foundations were likewise involved in the effort (e.g. the Azrieli Fellows Program, which sponsored Israeli academics moving back to Israel). In an interview with senior officer of a major Jewish Philanthropy that sponsored post-doctoral and academic mobility programmes described it thus:

‘A lot of focus is on the international aspect of getting [Israeli] students to have a post-doc abroad. We see a lot of funding for that and also with bringing Israelis back to Israel. It’s a priority of everyone, the whole sector really…’

Building on patterns established in the previous period, the academic staff continued to be (Jewish) Israeli, but with significant international training and experience. Yet, despite this new focus on returning Israelis, and renewed support for Diaspora academics there is evidence that HU wanted to recruit researchers (not only visiting researchers) from around the world, based on merit. In 2018, the VP of the AR&D put it thus:

‘…incorporating different perspectives and traditions, new methods and areas of expertise, by bringing people together — this is how great science happens. We are
currently recruiting people who are not necessarily obvious candidates for an Israeli university, but we see their talent. In physics, for example, we just recruited someone who isn’t Israeli, but he is brilliant; he isn’t speaking Hebrew yet, but he’ll get there. We’re trying to appeal to the international community so that we can continue to grow. This is very important.”

Indeed, in 2018, HU had 17 ‘international’ (i.e. non-Jewish) staff members. However, this type of recruitment is extremely difficult and complicated, given that Israeli law restricts those who can immigrate and work in the country to those with Jewish or Israeli roots. However, even if not possible on a large scale in the current political climate, it is nonetheless a significant shift that HU is pushing to accommodate greater diversity in its academic staff.

HU still has considerable issues with gender parity. The SCOPUS 2016/17 edition, ‘Celebrating Women in Academia’ elaborated on issues of gender and also highlighted intersectionality of minority representation in HU faculty. In an expose with VP and Director-General of HU, Billy Shapira notes that only 18% of the academic staff were women, and only 10% are full professors. While this is an improvement over the last period, it is still dismally low. Shapira points to two central problems for women: the increasing expectation of lengthy post-doctoral periods abroad; and the pressures of securing tenure during prime child-bearing age. Steps to ameliorate these areas include developing dual-location post-doctoral training with short periods abroad – a programme started ‘with the assistance of outside philanthropic associations.’ In addition to mentoring programmes and policies to extend tenure deadlines for new mothers. Pointedly, like ‘brain-gain’ this has also become a national priority and is tied to funding opportunities; in 2011 the PBC/CHE created a Steering Committee to analyse the condition of women in academia and in the 2018 – 2022 CHE Multi-year plan, 60 million NIS is budgeted to promote gender equality in HE with budgets for President’s Advisors on gender fairness; competitive prizes for those who make significant improvements in gender equality; competitive budgets for targeted projects to promote gender equality; scholarships for female research students; and a reporting mechanism, based on the EU’s ‘She Report’ that HEIs complete and publish on their websites. Thus, similar to many other initiatives, it appears that the CHE as well as motivated and dedicated institutional (and Diaspora) champions, are a key in pushing forward these aims.

Recruitment of Arab and Ultra-Orthodox academic faculty have also become a priority. In the 2016/17 SCOPUS report: of about 1,000 faculty members, only 11 were Arab (1%, despite comprising 20% of the general population). An expose featuring Prof. Mona Khoury-Kassabri, revealed that of these 11, only 2 were women, demonstrating the intersectionality of the problem for representation of women and minorities in HU faculty. The expose stated:
‘Prof. Knoury-Kassabri serves as the advisor on Arab affairs to University President, Menachem Ben-Sasson. Together with the CHE, they aim to raise the number of Arab students at the University, lower the drop-out rate, increase the numbers of Arab faculty members and administrative staff, and to provide cultural competence training for University staff.’

As noted in section 6.1, Arab inclusion – of both students and staff – has become both an institutional and national level aim with the CHE/PBC sponsoring programmes and supplying competitive funding in this area. Reflecting these new aims, according to a memorandum from the Rector, among the new academic staff to join HU in 2018/2019 were two Arab-Israelis (5% of the cohort intake); 2 international faculty members (5%), and 1/3 were women. Thus, greater social representation in HU’s academic staff was incentivised by the State, and bolstered by Diaspora support, and HU was moving towards greater inclusion, albeit with continuing inequalities.

Notably, the previous strategies of encouraging HU academic staff to engage in international cooperation and experiences abroad continued. However, as internationalisation became an increasing aim of HU and the CHE, more programmes, funding and opportunities were available for such cooperation. For example, in 2018, the PBC approved 5 million NIS in ‘glue grants’ for Israeli researchers who have won ISF grants to cement ties with researchers abroad; and in 2018 30% of the CHE budget for internationalisation would be allocated to promoting research collaborations (e.g. international conferences; visiting faculty). Reflecting on this change, a senior IO administrator explained:

‘...in Israel the academic community has always been very international from the outset and...individual faculty members have been very active internationally. They all have large research subjects, and collaboration, they are all studying abroad. They are all going to conferences abroad and they’re all inviting people to conferences. At the individual level they are very active internationally from the outset. The top down, national level as well as institutional, I mean that top down strategy hasn’t been there. That’s all changing.’

In sum, the number of academic staff during this period fluctuated with the lost decade. Building on patterns from the previous period, HU was employing ‘home grown’ Israeli academics who increasingly were obligated to have international experiences after their doctoral training. This period saw significant new efforts by the State, HU and Diaspora aimed at bringing back Israeli academics; academics were also being drawn from a wider swath of Israeli society, and international staff were increasingly a target for recruitment. The State, Diaspora and HU invested significant energy and resources in these projects. There was great
importance attached to international networks for academic faculty and an increased focus on competitive research funding, international conferences, visiting lecturers, research stays abroad, and sabbaticals as an essential part of the Israeli academic. The targets of this collaboration were still the US and Europe, however, with Asia becoming a greater focus. This new focus on Asia was buttressed and steered by the State and reflected a shifting focus on Asia as an economic, political and academic power.
6.3 Internationalisation of teaching

In this sub-chapter I analyse the internationalisation of teaching. I argue that the shift in HU’s mission, the movement of State priorities away from Aliyah, the increase in facilitation of Diaspora mobility through other programmes, and the prioritisation of internationalisation in HU and State policy, had significant effects on the purposes, targets and infrastructure of internationalisation in teaching. The main purport of this was that the RIS, the principal department charged with international education in the previous period, shed its dual purpose to serve as a site for Jewish identity, leadership and Diaspora-building; and Aliyah. Instead, the RIS developed and embraced a new identity of pluralism and inclusion. I argue that this shift towards inclusion did not represent a disconnect from State aims; I demonstrate that internationalisation in teaching at HU became increasingly dependent on the State. Thus, the shift towards inclusion represented the State’s and HU’s shifting purposes for and targets of internationalisation.

Notably, during this period, the social composition of the student body shifted from a mostly Jewish population in the previous period, to an increasingly diverse one. In the 2015/16 academic year, 2206 international students hailed from 94 countries including: 181 from China, 86 from Korea, 25 from India; 165 ‘Israeli Minorities’ (PAfEJ students), and 12 from Singapore. Thus, there were more Asian students than those from the UK (52), France (102) and Russia (47) – combined; North Americans, who previously formed the bulk of international students, made up only 36.5% of RIS students. This fluctuation in student population is connected to different programmes which I analyse over the sub-chapter, with the Mechina heavily populated by PAfEJ students; the OYSP increasingly populated by exchange students, many of them religious Christians from Europe and Asia; and graduate and post-doctoral students increasingly hailing from Asia. Overall, the trend is clear: towards a more varied student population by religion, ethnicity and country of origin. CHE statistics indicate that this pattern holds true for other research universities, however, one college, notably IDC Herzliya, has adapted a Diaspora focus of mobility, attracting significant numbers of international Jewish students (see Appendix M).

I begin by analysing the development of the RIS and the contested creation of the International Office (IO). The key periods/phases identified and the events/initiatives within them are delineated in Table 10.
Table 10. Key dates in the development of internationalisation of teaching, 1990s - 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Events and/or impact on HU</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000 – 2008</td>
<td>Violence, Competition and Shifting Diaspora, State and HU Priorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Beginning of Second Intifada; considerable drop in RIS enrolment</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Bombings of Twin Towers in New York, USA</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Bombing at HU Mount Scopus campus</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999 &amp; 2004</td>
<td>Inauguration of Birthright Israel and Masa Israel programmes</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>IDC Herzliya opens Raphael Recanati International School (RRIS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>International students begin to return to HU; Second Lebanon War</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Internal audit suggests new mission; academic improvements and integration</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>RIS begins to receive Erasmus exchange students</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008 – 2013</td>
<td>Improving academic quality, pluralising mission, and internationalisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>RIS begins reform process to clarify and pluralise its mission; increasing focus on academic quality</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009-2010</td>
<td>RIS and HU coordinate courses taught in English in the faculties</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011-2012</td>
<td>Incoming RIS Provost tasked with implementing internationalisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>2013 – 2018</td>
<td>Shifting towards ‘comprehensive internationalisation’ under the IO</td>
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<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Creation of IO</td>
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<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>HU Committee defines targets for internationalation</td>
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<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>RIS increasingly subsumed by IO; RIS crisis and uncertainty</td>
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As Table 10 shows, the analysis revolves around three distinct sub-periods; namely 2000 – 2008, a period of violence, competition and crisis that led to increasing scrutiny of the purposes and role of the RIS within HU; 2008 – 2013, a period in which the RIS began to pluralise its mission, and introduced wide-reaching changes to improve academic quality and implement HU’s burgeoning internationalisation mission; and finally from 2013 - 2018 as HU embraced internationalisation as a major university-wide policy, the IO was created to manage ‘comprehensive internationalisation’ and the RIS was gradually transformed into an international student service provider. After delineating the main highlights in the period, I then proceed to analyse shifts in the international programme offerings, formal and informal curriculum; target international students, marketing and recruitment; and financial support for internationalisation in teaching.
Beginning in the early 2000s, the RIS went through a period of extreme difficulty, directly connected to the Second Intifada. While security had been a recognised and on-going issue in the RIS, particularly through the Yom Kippur War, 1st Lebanon War, and Gulf War, the Second Intifada and the numerous suicide bombings around the country represented a serious and prolonged blow to the RIS. This combined with changes in HU governance, funding, mission, and identity as established in section 6.1, significantly shifted the direction of the RIS and its place within HU. During the Second Intifada student numbers dropped precipitously and remained low for many years (see Appendix I). American Universities pulled their support for the programme, and many called their students home, suspended their agreements, and some even refused to accept transfer credit from HU. The terror events of September 11, 2001 in New York, USA further contributed to the decline of American study abroad students. Perhaps the biggest blow to the RIS and the HU PR campaign during the Second intifada of ’business as usual’ was the bombing of the Frank Sinatra cafeteria (adjacent to the RIS) on the Mount Scopus campus, on July 31, 2002. Nine people were killed, five of them American students, and about 100 injured.

Further affecting international student recruitment to HU, competition for students from two sources emerged: Birthright Israel and IDC Herzliya. Birthright, an initiative of the Israeli Government, JAFI and Diaspora organisations and donors, to provide free 10-day trips to Israel for Diaspora youth, was inaugurated in 1999 with a vision ‘to ensure the vibrant future of the Jewish people by strengthening Jewish identity, Jewish communities, and connection with Israel.’ These trips gave Diaspora youth the opportunity to explore Israel – outside of an academic environment – and offered short-term, free mobility that was widely popular. Research on the trip has concluded that many of the same aims of the RIS, were achieved, and that lasting effects on Jewish identity and ties to Israel were created.

IDC Herzliya, a non-budgeted college, under the leadership of Jonathan Davis, previously of the PR department of HU, and with support from a prominent Israeli family, opened the Raphael Recanati International School (RRIS). This programme was designed with the same purposes of the RIS and had similar components (e.g. a strong informal curriculum), however, it concentrated on degree mobility, offering 3-year BA degrees in applied fields (e.g. Business Administration, Communications, Computer Science). It taught entirely in English – using the same curriculum and many of the same teachers as the Hebrew track; it did not require a Mechina. This programme drew many new olim and those students who were closely connected with Israel and willing to spend three years – many of them
children of Israelis abroad. By 2016, IDC Herzliya would surpass HU for the largest Jewish population of international students in Israel, and would represent the most densely populated international HEI (see Appendix M).

This competition combined with the precarious security situation led to a steep decline in students and plunged the RIS into financial difficulties. The situation was made more desperate by decreasing Aliyah, and subsequent low Mechina enrolment as the FSU Aliyah was petering out. JAFI exacerbated this problem by discontinuing Mechina funding for many immigrant groups that it had previously supported (e.g. French; Germans; British). The early 2000s also represented a crisis in Israeli-American Diaspora relations as American tourists (and students) became a trickle, at a time when Israelis felt under attack. Despite an emergency fundraising campaign for the RIS that elicited close to $2 million, this was a considerable psychological blow to the programme – one from which I argue it never recovered.455

In parallel, there was a shift in support for the RIS. In the previous period, the Israeli government supported Jewish international students to increase Aliyah. However, after the massive wave of immigration from the FSU, while ideologically important, and still encouraged, Aliyah was no longer a priority. Influential Diaspora leaders who supported the programme, were also fading away from public (and university) life, and their replacements did not appear to have had the same convictions about the need for Diaspora youth to spend time in HU. The AFHU, among the founding bodies of the ASP and once staunch supporters of the RIS, in 2007 moved to unilaterally terminate its annual $350,000 subsidy to RIS.456 Moreover, as established in section 6.1, HU leaders were focused on the on-going crisis relating to the lost decade; the loss in revenue from decreased international students and the subsequent financial burden of the RIS – a programme which was now not viewed as an integral part of its core academic mission. HU President Menachem Magidor stated that ‘the University in the present situation could [not] afford any kind of major subsidy’ for the RIS.457

There were students who still attended the RIS. Graduate student numbers remained stable (see Appendix I) and as established in Chapter 5, these students constituted a more diverse group, and were more closely linked to HU’s core academic focus. Their stability through the security crisis, contributed to a growing appreciation for this group. Also, while there were dwindling numbers of students in the Mechina, the number of PAfEJ students continued to rise. In 2008, when Israel joined the EU TEMPUS programmes, RIS began to receive exchange students from Europe, many of them religious Christians. Thus, the student population of the RIS was shifting towards a more diverse population and by 2018, my interviews indicated that Jewish international students were no longer the majority.
These factors contributed to an audit to assess the role of the RIS in HU. In 2007, an internal review committee established by the Senate reported that the RIS would ‘benefit from a structured process of internal review leading to a clear mission statement: the School needs to arrive at a better definition and understanding of its own academic mission and goals.’ Further correspondence between the RIS Provost and HU President suggests that the continuing tension between the aims of RIS to provide an opportunity for a large number of students to learn Hebrew and get to know Israel and Jerusalem, with the academic aims of HU was becoming increasingly problematic. The report points to academic shortcomings, while generally praising the Mechina, Hebrew teaching and social activities ‘which should be preserved, strengthened, and further built upon.’ The recommendations included:

‘Ideally, in the long run, the RIS should not function as the main supplier of courses for its MA students; rather it should function mostly as an administrative home for these students, while continuing to provide them with its well-designed Hebrew teaching as well as with its social and its Israel/Jewish-oriented programs…In addition to being attractive to good students from abroad, the School’s programs should aim to bring its students in touch with HU departments and research centers.’

2008 – 2013: Improving academic quality, moving towards pluralism, and internationalisation

In response to the 2007 audit report, in 2008, RIS began to implement several changes. First, the mission was revised to include a more diverse student population (i.e. Jews and non-Jews) signalling a shift towards greater pluralism that would continue. By 2010, the founding purposes of the school – instead of to promote Diaspora relations and Aliyah – were revised to:

‘…. coordinate under one roof the various programs and activities serving special needs of overseas students’; ‘the integration of new students into the academic and social fabric of HU and Israeli society’; and ‘to increase the scope and improve the content of study programs, in addition to developing new programs designed to meet the educational challenges of the day.’

Second, the chronically (perceived) low academic level of the RIS, became the focus of concerted efforts to improve its quality. An RIS report in 2010 from Provost Prof. Yonata Levy elaborates:
‘When the President appointed me Provost of the RIS, two-and-a-half years ago, he stated that my mission was to raise the academic level of the School. The focus on the academia can be largely attributed to changes that have been taking place world-wide in the academic arena. Recent years have witnessed the globalization of HE, and as a result academic institutions are placing growing emphasis on international contacts at all levels – research, teaching, and student exchange. The number of international students on campus is currently one of the criteria used in evaluating the international ranking of universities…Alongside the Zionistic mission and its focus on imparting to the student a positive Israeli experience, the School now has an additional object – promoting academic excellence.’

Several initiatives to improve quality were undertaken, many of which consisted of making closer links between the faculties and RIS. The pinnacle though was the introduction of English language teaching within the faculties. In the 2009/10 academic year, RIS inaugurated an Honours Programme with Harvard University (later other prestigious universities would join) in which courses would be given in English in the faculties to both Israeli and international students. The RIS Provost explained:

‘…the University supported changing the language of instruction from Hebrew to English of some 20 select courses, and the RIS is bearing the cost of the project, i.e. the RIS pays tuition to the departments for our students.’

This represented a significant shift in the long-held importance of Hebrew as the language of instruction at HU in the faculties. This was connected to HU’s international turn. The Director General elaborated:

‘If we want to establish an international presence, then we must offer more courses taught in English. Many potential students in Europe would love to study here but our classes are in Hebrew, which makes it difficult for them.’

Confirming this shift, HU President Ben-Sasson explained:

‘Over the last year (2010), we have been formalizing a plan for further ensuring the University's secure position on the international research and teaching map. This plan includes increasing the number of regular University courses available in English in order to ensure that our students are more fully conversant in the language of international academia and are comfortable in the international arena, and that we can welcome more overseas students and faculty from abroad into our classrooms. To this end all University units have taken it upon themselves to teach part of their academic program in English, even to Israeli students, and the Unit for Teaching English as a
Foreign Language has been strengthened and integrated more fully into the work of the faculties to help reinforce the English language skills of Israeli students at all levels.\textsuperscript{465}

Thus, the integration of English teaching and integration of international students with Israelis was supported at the highest levels and portrayed as important for HU’s competitiveness, and for Israelis. Building on this last point a HU report recommended that:

‘HU should begin to encourage its faculties and departments to teach certain specific courses in English. Exposure to the good foreign MA students will be beneficial to the Israeli students and will help raise the academic level of the HU.’\textsuperscript{466}

Likewise an RIS report goes on to remark that the joint courses in English benefit Israeli students:

‘Likewise, Israeli students have been given a chance to encounter international students and even to improve their English language skills.’\textsuperscript{467}

This was a considerable shift, as international students were broadly viewed of ambiguous or lower academic quality than Israeli students in the previous period (see Chapter 5). A further impetus for this was the 2012/2013 PBC/CHE initiative to create English instruction programmes (degree-granting and summer courses) for Chinese and Indian international students funded by the MoF (see section 6.2). Thus, while HU still did not open a separate college to teach in English, it was moving towards integrating English courses into its main faculties and other Israeli HEIs did likewise. This initiative would eventually be embraced and supported by the CHE 2017 – 2022 plan. In 2013, the HU Senate approved writing doctoral theses in English, and by 2017 a policy was in place in the experimental faculties whereby if a student in the class did not understand Hebrew, the class moved into English. In 2018, the Senate, announced that ‘all undergraduate students will now be required to study at least one course in the English language in their field of study’\textsuperscript{468}. In 2018, the Israeli press ran several articles indicating that HU would move all of its post-graduate instruction to English, while maintaining undergraduate programmes in Hebrew, sparking fiery condemnation by the Hebrew Academy. In response, the Rector declared HU’s local and international missions and clarified this policy with several caveats\textsuperscript{469}, however, a clear shift was taking place towards English teaching in the faculties. This was initially driven by HU, and subsequently reinforced by the State. Pointedly, this is something that was continually resisted and would have been politically impossible in the previous period. This reflects confidence in the establishment of the Hebrew language and wider trends in Israeli society of mother-tongue maintenance (or resurrection).\textsuperscript{470}
Prof. Levy’s tenure as RIS Provost (2007 – 2010) focused on promoting academic quality, and her successor Prof. Mimi Ajzenstadt, was specifically concerned with implementing internationalisation, which was becoming a central aim for HU. Ajzenstadt elaborated:

‘When Prof. Menachem Ben-Sasson [HU President] offered me the post of Provost of the RIS, we discussed the various challenges the School was facing. During these talks, the concept of ‘internationalization’ was frequently mentioned.’

Thus, while HU moved towards uniting around ‘excellence’, pluralism and internationalisation, the RIS was under increasing pressure to relate to these agendas, and successive Provosts were charged with these tasks. This shift corresponded to the on-going development of the HU ‘brand’ which emphasised pluralism, academic excellence and internationalisation as a means to maintaining/improving its competitive global position.

**2013 – 2018: International office (IO) and RIS**

Interviews with senior RIS and IO staff indicated that, given its reputation for parochialism, lax academic standards, and HU internal politics, the RIS was ultimately deemed unsuitable to take on the new university-wide internationalisation effort. In November 2013, to the dismay of many in the RIS who had hoped to lead the new internationalisation effort, HU created an International Office (IO). From the beginning, the IO was connected with the new mission of HU: ‘to be the leading research university in Israel and within the top leading universities worldwide’ and this, ‘along with additional internal and external factors, led the HU to set internationalization as a strategic institutional priority.’

In order to set a working agenda for internationalisation a HU committee was formed in November 2015 to:

‘...examine the current situation of the university, vis-a-vis the university mission and goals to be a leading world-class international university. Our belief is that an internationalization strategy will only have impact if we align our efforts and resources with a limited set of priority actions, while leaving innovative space for individual initiative.’

The Committee suggested five areas for action which would set the IO agenda:

‘1. Increase the number of outgoing HUJI students for international study experiences during their studies.'
2. Increase and expand international degree programs at HUJI for international students, especially at graduate level.

3. Increase the number of international doctoral and post-doctoral students

5. Expand short term summer and winter programs for international students

6. Build strategic partnerships with leading universities worldwide, in North America, Europe and the Far East.\textsuperscript{473}

These targets represented a considerable shift from the previous period: to post-graduate students, with the Far East representing a new geographic focus; to HU student mobility at every level, during their studies, and to \textit{strategic} partnerships. IO activities would be focused on these aims and would become the institutional authority for achieving these goals.

The aims of the IO dovetailed with the eventual internationalisation plan which would be championed by the CHE in its 2017-2022 plan. A senior IO staff member explained:

‘It's [CHE internationalisation policy] very nice because it is very much aligned with our policy. All the new activities. But they've also been talking to everybody, and they've picked up a lot of what we've been talking about before they even started thinking about it. So, it's good. We're all aligned. We have similar goals.’\textsuperscript{474}

The IO’s subsequent upgrading in 2017 to an independent authority, with its own Vice-President for International Affairs, signalled the significance attached to internationalisation and reinforced its strategic importance. Thus, while there was enduring high-level support for ‘internationalisation’ this was now closely connected to HU’s competitive and core research and teaching activities.

The creation of the IO was met by RIS staff with disappointment and incredulity. Reflecting on this a senior RIS leader opined:

'I think it's a mistake. For many years, the Rothberg school was, in many ways, the international office. It certainly did not meet all of the needs of an international office, but I think it could have been expanded and certain areas that weren't there could have been added very easily…now you have a duplicity…It's an artificial separation…I think because the people who set up the new system didn't know Rothberg well and/or were very suspicious of Rothberg, which I cannot understand why, but that's part of the internal politics here. Rothberg is frequently regarded in a hostile fashion by other parts of the university … we've never been able to divest ourselves of that. So, I think this desire to create something that's not going to be Rothberg, it seems almost ... It's very important that we create an international program that's \textbf{not} Rothberg.'
Another senior RIS leader noted:

‘This has to do with ownership, because who owns international? A lot of funds going towards it and a lot of power and a lot of perks… If you go into such a strong institution, like Rothberg, with all its heritage, you’re stepping out of your comfort zone and you might lose a lot of power. You want to create your own thing and control it.’

RIS staff also felt marginalised within HU and that the nature of their work was undervalued. A senior RIS staff member explained:

‘We [RIS] are the stepchildren of the University. HU, has adopted, as a major policy, their most central element of policy, the idea of internationalization. Rothberg is criticized still for being a Jewish, Zionist thing. We started being put down academically and the goal is really to get more international students to come here and study in the departments. The university policy basically rejects the whole Rothberg model, the separate international school, which was necessary because until the last five years or so, almost nothing was taught in English in the university ….the university now wants a different kind of internationalisation. They don't really see the academic value in Rothberg.’

RIS staff believed that they had embraced pluralism and stepped away from its founding purposes of providing a Jewish Diaspora experience and promoting Aliyah. Reflecting this shift one senior RIS staff member elaborated:

‘Jewish students coming here for this heritage kind of stuff has decreased. And HU doesn't care about that. Also, personally, I'm not here for Zionist purposes. I'm not trying to recruit Jewish students to Israel. I'm not even so sure that I'm here to be promoting. I want students to come here and see the complexity of Israel, and the complexity of the Israeli-Palestinian situation. There is a mission behind it. But in order to get Jewish students to come to Israel and to make Aliyah… I don't see that.’

This link of RIS to a form of Zionist humanism was referred to widely in interviews and one RIS staff member called it the ‘unwritten [mission statement] that everyone knows in their hearts.’ However, this purpose was not viewed as valued by HU. A senior RIS staff member elaborated:

‘Rothberg is an educational institution, it's very problematic because it's not that universities don't see themselves as educators, but it's not their main focus. Rothberg is not here to contribute new findings and research that would improve the world because that's not what we do, we improve the world through giving people a specific kind of experience. In that sense we're educational, and in that sense we're not what
the university is looking for. On the other side, if you look at Einstein’s vision of this university being a humanist, cosmopolitan centre, open to all ideas and races then this is where it happens. There’s no other place in the university where identities are celebrated, and diversity of worldviews is an ideology. You can relate some of the educational and global missions of the university to what we are doing here, but it’s not cutting-edge research that will benefit the world. It’s developing openness in Israel and exposing the Jewish University, to a multiplicity of ideas and identities and worldviews. In that respect, it is part of the global aspect of the university…but not what some people would think or what some people want. It’s really easy to detach a university from the people that are in the university. Then the mission, when it’s phrased that way [excellence, cutting-edge] it doesn’t mention people.’

As the IO grew and gained more ownership over internationalisation, structural changes were initiated. In 2018, a senior IO staff member elaborated:

‘The roles are changing. The university is changing its attitude towards Rothberg. It was our international activities…it checked the boxes. But it hasn't permeated the faculties and filtered down into the university over the years. So, it has been a bubble. Lovely activities. Great programs. But obviously very much in isolation. We’ve been working on it for years and realising there has to be some kind of amalgamation. Structurally we're changing.’

These changes increasingly subsumed RIS into HU and made it subordinate to IO; by 2017, the mission of RIS, was no longer distinct or noted on its website. These changes caused significant insecurity, ambiguity and crisis about the future of the RIS and its role in HU. This was palpable in the interviews I conducted with RIS staff, many of whom could no longer identify the direction or mission of the RIS: ‘Rothberg definitely doesn’t have a mission statement. I think it’s gone astray a little bit…’

By 2018, while RIS still had its own programmes, it was becoming the student service arm for an increasingly diverse group of HU international students. A senior staff member of the RIS elaborated:

‘They see the advantage of Rothberg in being familiar with international students and extending very good care. So now the idea is that Rothberg will…extend total care to international students, now even those who don't study here, that will become a major part of Rothberg's activity.’

A senior IO staff member concurred:
‘They have great experience with handling, taking care of international students. So that is a great resource for us as a university. That is something we are looking at and they may become the hub of all student services, international student services.’

Thus, while in the last period, international students and teaching was largely structured around the ‘bubble’ of the RIS, in this period, in which internationalisation became a key policy aim of HU as well as the HE sector, this become a University-wide aim, increasingly structured at the University level, within the faculties, and managed by the IO. By 2018, RIS was going through a critical stage of change, in which much of its autonomy was taken away, many of its activities (and staff) were gradually being incorporated under the IO, there were discussions of losing its closed budget, and it was increasingly moving towards a role as a student service provider. This change is reflected in the duties ascribed to the current RIS Provost:

‘[Provost] comes to RIS at a critical stage in the formulation of Hebrew University’s internationalization policy, and he [Provost] will guide the school’s development and activity during this important time of growth and expansion.’

**International programmes, formal and informal curriculum**

In this section, I analyse the new international programmes and initiatives of HU and the changing nature of RIS programmes and student population. I also analyse the informal curriculum.

**International programme offerings**

The international strategies of the IO as outlined above, were already in evidence in 2018. While in the previous period, international students were located primarily in the RIS, during this period, international students were increasingly integrated into the faculties with RIS providing support services and some courses. To support this move, HU introduced in 2009/2010, ‘cluster’ courses, a series of courses around a specific topic, but which can stand alone. These courses were aimed at integrating Israeli and international students in the same classrooms through English medium courses taught in the regular faculty. In 2018/2019 academic year, several hundred such courses were offered. An interviewee in the IO explained that these courses could eventually be combined to make an undergraduate degree taught in English.
Strategic partnerships in teaching were pursued in two ways throughout this period: joint-programmes; and faculty and student exchange agreements. By 2018, HU had several joint programmes with top universities in Europe and Asia: PhD programmes with Freie Universitaet Berlin (Germany); National University of Singapore; and NTU (Singapore); and a Double Masters with Shanghai Jiao Tong University (China). Exchange programmes, particularly as a way to promote Israeli student mobility within the degree has also been the subject of intensive efforts of the IO office. A senior IO staff member elaborated:

‘...a large focus has been on developing meaningful student exchange agreements. We obviously had loads of agreements that were never used or student exchange agreements, partly implemented, partly not implemented... instead of being always reactive, we’re trying to be more proactive in deciding where we want to develop more exchanges. The whole operation of out-going student exchanges, we have a lot of focus on that. We believe it is important to have students abroad and now we are entering into more and more strategic student exchange agreements and student implementation, which is a lot of internal work. You know the infrastructure, the sort of applicability of the curriculum, and all the information that is needed for students, and the events, the promotion. The whole chain of events from application to departure, basically. All that and improving the service. Over to the flip side of that the incoming students which we handle partially, very much in coordination with our Rothberg International school and faculties. And then we also have a function to take care of incoming post-doctoral visitors and academic researchers. So, in terms of the visas, and housing, and those aspects ... deal with building strategy, so building a cohesive international strategy process, looking at strategic partnership. Finding meaningful ways and if it makes sense to do partnership.’

An analysis of HU exchange agreements (at faculty and University level, see Appendix N), reveals that HU has been pursuing its espoused strategy with a focus on agreements with Europe, Asia and the USA; currently there are not any exchanges with African and very few with South American universities. Many of the overseas universities are prestigious world-ranked institutions, reflecting statements that HU aims to ‘foster collaborations with renowned partner institutions worldwide.’^{478}

In addition to these exchange programmes, the IO also aims to develop more short-term mobility for Israeli students. While this is a rising trend worldwide, short-term mobility is particularly important for Israelis. A senior IO leader elaborated:
‘Short mobility is super popular. Going abroad for a semester is more challenging for Israeli students who are often older, married. It’s harder to get up and go for a semester or a year. So that is something we are working on. We are promoting it actively.’

While it was not possible to obtain exact numbers for Israeli students at HU going abroad within the framework of their studies at HU, this type of mobility has become a focus in this period, for HU as well as the CHE. The largest programme supporting this type of mobility, Erasmus+ increased from 577 staff and students in Erasmus Mundus (2007 – 2013); to 1,176 in Erasmus+ (2015-2017).479 HU’s internationalisation plan sets an aim of 800 students by 2020 and 2,000 students or about 10% of its student population by 2025.480 In addition to these new programmes and foci, the traditional RIS programmes were shifting their curricula/offerings and student population. I analyse these below.

RIS undergraduate programmes

The Undergraduate Study Abroad Program (USAP) formerly the OYSP, went through considerable changes in this period. As Appendix I indicates, international undergraduate students at HU fell significantly during the Second Intifada and never recovered. Moreover, starting with the focus on exchange programmes, and HU’s participation in Erasmus mobility programmes, many USAP students no longer paid tuition fees to HU. By the 2015/16 academic year, of 343 undergraduate students, 78 or about 23% were labelled as ‘exchange’ students and did not pay tuition fees.481 Moreover, these students considerably diversified the countries of origin and interviews with RIS staff indicate that the vast majority of them are not Jewish, with many of them religious Christians. Thus, this represented a considerable change in the flagship programme of RIS, in terms of student diversity (and revenue).

In addition to the more diversified student body and dwindling enrolment, there were shifts in the curriculum and course offerings. While Jewish, Israeli and Middle Eastern studies courses remained, courses were now offered in social sciences, business, law, education, global studies, and psychology. New programmes were developed (e.g. dance; art; gap year in social change and high-tech) and internships and independent study options expanded. Students could also enrol in faculty courses offered in English. While all students were required to take the pre-Semester Ulpan, Hebrew courses during the semester could be swapped with Arabic courses; or students could be exempted from these by their home institutions. The decreasing focus on Hebrew has also been evident in the creation of a new track in the USAP: the Arabic Immersion Program. These changes represented a considerable shift away from the focus on Jewish Studies and Hebrew evident in the previous period.
The Mechina underwent a significant change: the diversification of its student body. There was still a connection to Jewish community security and Aliyah, which was most evident from the spike in French Aliyah in the years 2012 - 2015\textsuperscript{482} (and the inauguration of a Mechina track for French students, ‘BASIS’) but there was a growing presence of PAfEJ students. While they had long attended the Mechina in small numbers, these grew over time, and became more significant, particularly as Jewish students dwindled.

PAfEJ have a tenuous permanent residency status in the city, pay taxes, receive health and social security benefits and can vote (but not stand for election as mayor) in municipal (but not national) elections. They are eligible to apply for Israeli citizenship; however, many have been hesitant to do so due to bureaucratic exigencies; political pressures; and personal loyalties and identities.\textsuperscript{483} Thus, of the approximately 330,000 PAfEJ (about 38\% of the city’s population) only about 5\% have Israeli citizenship. \textsuperscript{484}

PAfEJ secondary students sit the Palestinian matriculation, Tawjihi, which is not widely recognised by Israeli universities as equivalent to the Israeli matriculation (Bagrut) and thus, many PAfEJ students attend HEIs in the Palestinian Territories, Jordan or elsewhere in the Arab world. Degrees and qualifications from abroad are not always recognised in Israel, or may require retraining and lengthy recognition processes.\textsuperscript{485} This coupled with a lack of Hebrew language skills, hinders their integration into the Israeli labour market and has contributed to high poverty rates among this population; 75\% of Arab residents in Jerusalem live below the poverty line, compared to 29\% of Jewish residents.\textsuperscript{486}

The State and the Municipality of Jerusalem have put forth several initiatives to extend Israeli sovereignty and politically, socially, and economically integrate PAfEJ into Israeli society. One such way has been through HE, the first step towards which is a Mechina.\textsuperscript{487} After successful completion, and in most cases a psychometric exam,\textsuperscript{488} students are eligible to apply to Israeli universities. In 2015, the government \textsuperscript{489} embarked on a comprehensive plan to integrate PAfEJ into Israeli society; the primary motivation for this was to decrease violence in the city and ameliorate poverty. In order to implement the programme, an inter-ministerial steering committee was established headed jointly by the CEO of the Prime Minister’s Office and the CEO of Jerusalem and the Diaspora; the PBC had the role of an observer. Building on these meetings, the PBC/CHE launched a national programme to fund Mechinot for PAfEJ students and to provide support to prevent drop-out with a total budget of 14.7 million NIS from 2014-2018.\textsuperscript{490} Over the next several years, additional government
decisions were passed and PBC programmes created and in 2017-2022 CHE Plan, a budget of 260 million NIS was allocated for this purpose.\textsuperscript{491} Thus, after years of quietly seeking financial support for PAfEJ students from the State and private donors\textsuperscript{492}, in 2015, RIS inaugurated the Kidma-Sadarah programme as part of this initiative. This programme, while providing funding to a programme starved for students, also aligned with the shift towards plurality of RIS/HU. The RIS Provost stated:

‘The Rothberg International School is proud to have launched this initiative. It helps further one of our main missions: the promotion of diversity and multiculturalism in a city where the implementation of these ideals is such a challenge.’\textsuperscript{493}

The programme was widely viewed by RIS staff as a way to promote social cohesion and critical reflection on the conflict. It was thus viewed as an area in which State and HU priorities aligned, albeit for different reasons. A senior RIS staff member elaborated:

‘Naftali Bennett [right-wing Minister of Education] might not be happy that we’re empowering Palestinians to think critically about their situation, but they’re still advancing this Mechina. Why? Because they think that at the end of the day, educated, self-independent people who play the capitalistic game are going to be less apt to be violent in whatever way.’

Thus, while Mechina enrolment dropped in the Second Intifada, by 2015/16 these numbers had rebounded. However, an analysis of the country of origin of the students indicates – for the first time - that the increase in students is not related to Aliyah alone, rather it is related to PBC/CHE initiatives to integrate PAfEJ students into HE. This number grew significantly after the introduction of the Kidma-Sadarah programme: of 371 students in the Mechina in 2015/16 academic year, 68 or about 18\% percent were in Kidma-Sadarah.\textsuperscript{494} This programme doubled to about 140 students in the 2016/17 school year\textsuperscript{495}, and interviewees quoted about 200 such students in 2017/18 year indicating this population is increasing. The rising numbers in the Mechina are having a spill-over effect in the faculties. In a memo from the Rector to the academic staff, he explains:

‘In recent years, we have witnessed a substantial increase in the number of Arab-Palestinian East-Jerusalemites at the University. This trend has grown this year, and the ratio of this group of students among our first-year undergraduates is expected to reach 8\%.’\textsuperscript{496}

In comparison, enrolment in the BASIS programme for French (Jewish) students was only 19 in 2015/16.\textsuperscript{497}
Notably, PAfEJ students in the Mechina represent a manifestation of internationalisation that would likely be considered widening participation or access to HE of indigenous populations elsewhere. However, given the political situation of East Jerusalem and of the PAfEJ students, this represents a distinctive case of overlapping access and internationalisation policies, which my interviews indicated was unintentional, and unacknowledged at the national (CHE) level.

The Kidma-Sadarah programme has two specialisations: humanities and social sciences; and mathematics and science. The curriculum comprises several compulsory courses: intensive ulpan, English courses, academic writing, history of European cultures; development of scientific thought; mathematics; civics; and introductory courses in the field of specialisation. While this programme required the creation of specialist courses, and significant academic and administrative staffing changes to accommodate Arabic language teaching and support, it is unclear the extent to which this could be considered part of the ‘decolonisation’ movement in HE. Several interviewees indicated aims of instilling critical thinking in students, however, I was not able to analyse syllabi of these courses or conduct classroom observations. It would appear that this programme has little in common with the call to ‘decolonise the curriculum’ which is based in an ethos of reconciliation for past marginalisation, respect for the plurality of knowledges and fundamentally rethinks content and pedagogy (Le Grange, 2016); or calls to ‘decolonise the university’ which extend these ideas to the institutional level, and are embedded in the recognition of the role of universities in perpetuating social violence against marginalised populations, calling for radical institutional change (Bhambra et al., 2017).

**Graduate programmes**

The new model of graduate programmes was for Faculties to supply the majority of academic inputs and additional courses (e.g. Hebrew ulpan, introductory Jewish and Israel studies courses), whilst student activities and services were provided by the RIS. In addition to continuing and expanding its MA programmes, several new MA programmes were established in this model. For example, in 2014 the Jerusalem School of Business Administration inaugurated a one-year international MBA, focused on entrepreneurship and innovation in English with the RIS, and an L.L.M. in Human Rights and International Law with the Faculty of Law and RIS. However, there are MA and MSc programmes which appear to have little connection with the RIS, particularly the programmes in the Faculties of Medicine; Science; and Agriculture, Food & Environment. By 2018, HU had 28 graduate degree programmes in
English, and had announced its intention to pursue online MA/PhD courses aimed at international students, who would come to Israel for short stays.\textsuperscript{499}

\textit{Informal curriculum and student services: Office of Student Life (OSL)}

The informal curriculum of the RIS, led by the OSL (formerly OSA), shifted considerably, reflecting the changing student population, mission and aims of RIS. While many of the traditional aims to introduce students to Israeli society and students remained, the focus on promoting and fostering Jewish identity disappeared and by 2010/11, the OSL had a new aim:

‘Initiating activities that promote social contact between the diverse student populations in the RIS – for example, in the Mechina there are contingents consisting of new immigrants, tourists and East Jerusalem Arabs.’\textsuperscript{500}

Pointedly, while RIS did not have a mission statement on its website, by 2017, it had a page dedicated to ‘Diversity and Inclusion’ which began with a statement, suggestive of a mission statement:

‘HU’s RIS is committed to supporting and celebrating the wide range of identities that exist in our world. We aim to create a fair, equal, safe and encouraging environment for all, regardless of race, religion, gender, sex and ethnicity. We strive to ensure that all students are fully supported and comfortable at our institution, and we hope to prepare them as much as possible for life in Jerusalem and Israel. RIS faculty, students, administrators, and staff fully embrace a vision of equity, diversity, and inclusion. By being in the unique and holy city of Jerusalem, we have an opportunity to lead by example, both as an institution and as people, to create a more equal and fair society.’\textsuperscript{501}

Building on this statement, RIS elaborated on its commitments:

‘- Elimination of intimidation, bullying, and harassment…

- Promoting an inclusive community…

- Developing and supporting programs and policies that help attract and retain students from historically underrepresented groups, as well as hiring and promoting faculty, administrators and staff from those groups.

- Building structures that promote inclusiveness and equity for all members of the RIS community, especially students and staff from marginalized groups.’\textsuperscript{502}
This vision is supported by a coordinator: the Director of OSL. Perhaps, most significantly, the RIS Diversity and Inclusion page addressed ‘heritage students’ and defined them thus: ‘Heritage students are Jewish or Arab students who have ancestors from or relatives still living in the region.’

The page goes on to provide information on what heritage students could expect in Israel, from both Jewish and Arab local populations. This statement, recognising the historical connections of both Jews and Arabs in Israel, and providing services for both populations, was a considerable shift from previous periods. Inclusion was implemented through activities, events, services, staff and holidays; Muslim, Jewish and Christian holidays are celebrated, and a Christmas tree now stands in the lobby alongside the menorah. RIS staff became more socially diverse, and by 2017, there were Arab madrichim, administrative staff and teachers. Activities and events were specialised by programme, and a wider range of political opinions and views were catered to – with the understanding that the majority of students were no longer Jewish. Events were also arranged to critically discuss political events and issues in Israeli society. This represented a shift from trying to promote Israeli and Jewish connections to Israel, to a more nuanced understanding of Israeli life in all its complexity.

A senior OSL leader explained:

‘…[during] your Israel experience you should be exposed to both positive and negative things. You should be asking questions and critically thinking like, okay this is an issue in Israeli society. There is racism in Israel, how can we make it better.’

He further addressed the role of Jewish content in the OSL programming:

‘I don't really offer Jewish content. I do offer Israeli content, some of which is Jewish. But we're not a religious organization in any way. So, I think it's a very difficult balance, giving the Israeli culture, which is sometimes Judaism, without making them [students] feel like, why are you shoving religion down my throat, I'm not even Jewish. So, we have to phrase things very carefully, like everyone is invited, everyone is welcome.’

This shift to pluralism has reduced tensions between the non-denominational mission of HU and RIS programmes. The relative emphasis between the formal (academic) and informal (experiential) curriculum appears to have shifted towards the academic and OSL staff complained of having limited programming opportunities as students were very studious. One staff member noted, ‘it’s an academic program before anything.’ The place of the OSL in the student’s life was also changing: if in the previous period, attendance rates at events were close to 90%, in this period, they were often very low. Activities were no longer mandatory, and in many programmes, were no longer included in the price of the programme. The advent of social media and digital technology and the ease of planning self-tailored trips has also decreased reliance on the OSL. This caused distress to some OSL staff: ‘I'm an educator
so it’s hard for me. Fun is also educational and important, I want to be the one to educate you, not just the teachers.’

In addition to the shifting place of OSL in students’ lives, a new challenge has arisen: how to provide a meaningful ‘Israel Experience’ to students from such widely different ethnic, religious, linguistic and national backgrounds; with different expectations; connections to the country; political rights; and educational levels. An OSL staff member elaborated:

‘Before there was a critical mass of American Jewish students. But now, the students are so mixed, it’s hard to know what they want. I wish sometimes that the school would just bring in an organisational consultant who can just hang out here for a semester or a year and then at the end of it say, “This is what the students want, this is what they need, this is what you should do. They want to go to these places. They want lectures about these topics at these times and on these days. ” Because it’s so tiring to make mistakes.’

This complexity caused OSL staff to consider alternative operating models; a staff member explained:

‘...if we reach a point where they don’t want our trips or not enough do and they don’t want our weekly events, then maybe we’ll ... I hate to say it privatise student services. We would offer the basics and we would just outsource to a group supporting Christian students with trips and events, conservative students, etc.’

One step towards this privatisation was the creation of externally-funded fellowship programmes for ‘Jewish leadership’, in a sense ‘outsourcing’ the informal Jewish curriculum. One such programme, The Nachshon Project, aimed to build Jewish leaders for the North American Jewish community, and provides participants with full tuition at RIS, with the expectation that they participated in an informal curriculum which:

‘...supplements the [formal] curriculum with approximately 6-8 additional hours per week in seminars, as well as weekly full-day excursions and monthly Shabbatonim (a group excursion taking place over the Sabbath). Sessions in Israel focus on leadership through exposure to innovative advancements in various fields. Throughout the semester, students reflect upon how these skills can be transferred to the Jewish communal world. Learning history, culture, religion, and politics in the Israeli context cultivates a stronger relationship to the State, Land, People, and Torah of Israel.’

In addition, to these leadership programmes, several Orthodox Jewish outreach organisations were targeting students and operating on-campus, often offering parties, trips, food and light-hearted events, however with the ultimate aim to make (Jewish) students more
religiously observant. In the view of OSL staff, some students were attracted to these organisations because they were more interested in having fun than critical discussion of Israeli society. A senior OSL leader observed:

‘…this past Tuesday we had a programme about religious freedom in Jerusalem. We brought in [Name] who is a professor here and is also on the city council. She is one of the founders of Shabus, the cooperative transportation in Jerusalem on Shabbat. We had seven people show up which is embarrassing. Where were they? At a Kiruv [Jewish outreach] event. I'm offended that the students choose to go to these organisations instead of to what we're offering, which I think is really critical thinking about Israel. I sent a survey this morning about activities because I was upset\textsuperscript{507} and some of the students wrote, "Look you're often-", "You're giving, negative things about Israel. We don't want to hear negative things. We want to have fun." I don't think we're giving negative things; I think we're raising issues that exist in Israeli society, talking about what's going on and how can we improve our society. But maybe all they want is a party, which I can't really offer them because I'm associated with this university... I can't offer a party, what if somebody gets alcohol poisoning?’

Thus, a tension began to emerge during this period, as the RIS took on its new role, between some of the critical insights that the OSL wanted to introduce into the programme, and the expectations of some of its students, creating an opportunity for private (missionary/party) providers to fill this gap.

**Target students**

As Jewish students have stopped being the primary target international students, they have gradually faded in the broader HU strategic internationalisation plan. A senior RIS leader elaborated:

‘……the HU was much more than just creating a university; it was a statement. And bringing Jewish students here was a statement of that statement. It was a materialisation or fulfilment of that statement and now, through the changes of Israel and the university, that statement has changed, and it changed the way we look at students coming in. We're not out there to recruit Jewish students anymore.’

This sentiment was echoed in all interviews with RIS and HU staff. The purposes for internationalisation and the aims of the IO, reflect new targets for international students:
graduate students, particularly from Europe, North America and Asia; PAfEJ students; and for the first time – exchange students and Israeli students for outbound international experiences.

However, this expanded focus also created tensions. A senior RIS administrator elaborated:

‘…the character of the school has changed very much. It's very interactive. Add the Asians, it changes in different years, but at least 100, if I put together Chinese, Koreans … So, we have from many, many more countries and large groups coming from China, Korea and they’re Christians, so that ... we have an increasing number of evangelical Christians who are attracted to Jerusalem. So, the character, in that sense, has changed. It's less of a Jewish experience. So now we have, obviously, a response to that. "Wait, I'm sending my child to Israel and ..." We have problems with the French Jewish students who say, "We're sending them away. We don't want ... we have enough Arabs in Paris." Then they come here, and we can hear, sometimes, very ... things that are hard for us to hear about ... "What, they're going to be with Arabs? I don't want them to go." French Jewish school principals saying, "Don't go to HU they're all Arabs there." There's that problem. Or, we've heard from Australia, again, people saying, "You've given up Judaism. You're not a Jewish programme anymore. ”

**Graduate and post-doctoral students**

International graduate and post-doctoral students are increasingly the primary target; portrayed as the ‘best and brightest’ and associated with building research capacity. They are also increasingly connected to CHE/PBC indicators, funding and the HU’s Recovery Programme. HU hosts the largest number of post-doctoral researchers in Israel (about 27%); in 2016 the HU post-doctoral student population consisted of 528 students, there were slightly more international post-doctoral researchers than Israeli, and 130 or about 49% of these came from China and India (see Appendix O). In interviews with the IO, the surge in students from these two countries was largely attributed to PBC/CHE funding and recruitment activities. Statistics released in a 2016 CHE report supported these statements: from 2012 to 2015, HU received 75 Chinese and Indian post-doctoral researchers who were sponsored by the PBC. Given the apparent success of the CHE/PBC post-doctoral scholarship to Chinese and Indian students, this was extended in 2018 as part of the CHE internationalisation plan, and additional forms of post-doctoral and doctoral programmes were created (e.g. one-year). In 1992/93, HU had 102 visiting faculty and post-doctoral students. The vast majority of which were from North America, rather fewer from Europe, and just two from India and 1 from Japan. Thus, compared to the previous period, this represents a two-fold shift: a
significant increase in the number of post-doctoral students; and a significant number of students from Asian countries (see Appendix O).

Based on marketing materials and interviews, graduate and post-doctoral students are perceived to have been attracted to HU because of its quality academic programmes and researchers; special place of Jerusalem; and relative advantage of HU in certain specialist fields. However, desirable post-graduate students are not only ‘best and brightest’ but also those from certain areas: notably, Europe, North America and – as demonstrated in section 6.2, an increasing focus on Asia. This focus represents a shift of the State towards Asia, and a growing sense that Asia is an important partner for academic partnership. A former senior RIS staff member explained:

‘The reason is academic and of course, it's Zionist in the sense that, if we do it right, it's good for Israel. Getting non-Jews to come today is an important mission. Getting students from the Far East ... is vital for Israel, but it's also an academic connection.’

The increasing focus on China, was widely referenced in all interviews and this is reflected in the creation of a Chinese version of the IO website and dedicated IO staff for Asian students. A senior CHE leader elaborated:

‘As a result of the [CHE] Asia programme, there's been a lot more focus on Asia, and particularly on China and India amongst the Israeli universities. They've been very positive and very engaged with the whole process, and I think there's an understanding of the importance of developing ties and closer cooperation with China and India. And I think one of the main things that we've seen happening over the last few years is the universities themselves have developed their own partnerships with universities in China and India and they've become very active in seeking out opportunities and in recruiting students. In a lot of cases now, you'll see within the international offices of universities, they have someone who is responsible for Asia or is particularly looking after students from Asia. And so, I think if you just look at that, you can see that there's already more attention and more focus on Asia. It's been an interesting process to see it developing over the last few years, and I think the CHE/PBC has played a part in it, but I think it's also a natural phenomenon as universities themselves have realised that there's a lot of potential to increase cooperation with China and India.’

Echoing the sentiments of Mr. Shagrir (see section 6.2) a further motivation for targeting Asian students was widely echoed in interviews across HU and the HE sector: their positive connotations of Israel and the Jewish people, that is in counterpoint to more critical views in many Western nations. While some interview participants were blunter on this point, with one
reminiscing that ‘they [Asians] think Jews are smart, it’s totally antisemitic, but in a good way,’
a senior CHE staff member put it thus:

‘If you look at how Israel is viewed within Asia, it's actually quite a positive viewpoint. A lot of Asian students, while they might not know a lot about Israel, they still have some kind of a positive association. So, if they are exposed to information and they see what opportunities there are within Israel, then there's actually a lot of interest in coming to study here.’

Also, the focus on Asian students aligns with growing interest of Israeli students in Asia. While the IO administrator noted that Israelis are still on the whole more interested in studying in the US, out-going mobility to Asian universities has increased. A senior CHE staff member elaborated:

‘you have more and more Israeli students who are interested in engaging with Asia or studying Chinese or other languages. I think there’s kind of a win-win situation there where as you see Israel's economy becoming closer to these countries, there’s a natural pull factor there as well, because people are interested in studying about the other side and interaction, and potentially working in those kinds of areas after they graduate from their studies.'

While research students from Asia were actively pursued by HU administration, interviews revealed some of the issues with this new focus:

‘We have excellent [Israeli] students. The Israeli professors that's what they prefer to have. Students who have been trained and grown in the [Israeli] universities. A Chinese student doesn't always work out. There's no English, or not so well, it's a different creed completely. And obviously in a field where the need is greater, where they are hungrier for students, it's easier to encourage them to continue their cooperation with China. We have the largest population of Indian students in Israel of all the universities and largest in postdocs. And there is a whole subculture of Indian students at the university. Largely at PhD level and in postdoc in experimental sciences. India is still very much more similar I think in many ways to Israel than China. But still when the lab has limited positions, and they have limited funding or scholarships, the Israeli student is always preferred.'

HU does have several post-graduate programmes which target the Global South, particularly the MA programmes in Agriculture and Public Health, however, these have not been identified as strategic interests and have thus been relegated to the support of other partners. A HU publication stated: ‘It is hoped that graduate programs serving students from developing
countries will be able to expand their activities with governmental and philanthropic assistance."^511

*PAfEJ students*

HU publications reveal that PAfEJ were not considered ‘international’ students in the internationalisation plans. They were routinely referenced under other categories such as ‘Multiculturalism’ and ‘Coexistence’ and were more aligned with access to HE programmes. However, these students, many of which do not have Israeli citizenship and are institutionally based in the RIS, were targeted for several reasons: the State and Municipality of Jerusalem were now financially supporting this programme – providing almost double the funding that the Student Authority allocated to new immigrants; this group of students was now tied to the Recovery Programme and thus HU had great financial incentives to recruit and accommodate them – and ensure that they would complete their studies; the integration of these students contributed to the pluralistic mission (and image) of HU; and it served HU’s national mission to serve Jerusalem, Israel and humanity.

*Exchange and Israeli students*

This period saw the beginning of two new target students’ groups, which were interrelated: exchange and Israeli students. Exchange students were desired as part of a move towards competitive global rankings:

‘Internationalization also impacts our world ranking. Some of the most influential ranking systems use a university’s number of international students and faculty as parameters. This creates a cycle: if our rankings suffer due to a lack of internationalization, then we fail to attract the international students and faculty that would increase our rankings."^512

They were viewed as a way to facilitate strategic connections with Universities overseas, as part of several different ways of partnering with Universities – exchange of students and staff; joint research and degree programmes. A HU staff member explained:

‘Sometimes it’s easier to begin with student exchange and then move to other areas of collaboration.’

And to diversify Israeli classrooms:
‘It’s also extremely important for students who remain in Israel to have the opportunity to study side-by-side with international students visiting from abroad. When the classroom is more international, students are exposed to new ideas and new ways of thinking and their minds are opened.’

Thus, in addition to English language skills, Israelis were portrayed to benefit in this way from ‘internationalisation at home.’ Exchange also implied that Israelis students would go abroad as part of their degree, another novelty of the period. HU publications revealed a significant employment narrative connected with this mobility. For example:

‘We have developed new English-language masters and doctoral programs, and are increasing the number of courses taught in English within the regular curriculum, all with the aim of drawing more students from abroad to our classrooms while better preparing our Israeli students for the global village.’

And through internationalisation, ‘our students are gaining the tools needed for today’s international marketplace.’ A HU publication promoted international study for Israelis thus:

‘Their academic lives are enriched and their networks for study and research is broadened. There is a proven correlation between spending a semester abroad and success in today’s world - and the world of tomorrow - where global connectivity is the driving force in any work environment. The more our students gain experience internationally, the greater they are prepared to succeed in an international economy, even if they remain in their country for their studies and careers.’

**Portrayals of RIS**

**Academic excellence and pluralism**

While in the previous period academic merit was a key portrayal (along with Zionism/Aliyah; Jewish identity/leadership, see section 5.3) in this period, it became the dominant portrayal with the addition of pluralism. The RIS created a marketing department only in 2014 (which in 2018 was moved to the IO). One of the first projects this department was tasked with involved rebranding the RIS. A senior RIS staff member of the marketing team elaborated:

‘…..our vision was to market ourselves as a part of the HU, so a lot of the messaging, even though it has our logo, has to do with speaking about ourselves as HU. RIS is its own entity but, we’re still part of the university and that's what you'll see.’
Thus, RIS materials increasingly reflected similar references to academic excellence, international rankings, and multi-culturalism and pluralism. The RIS logo likewise was interpreted in this way by a marketing staff member:

‘It’s a pomegranate, a globe, and it represents this idea of the unification of all these different people of different backgrounds coming together and studying together, which is exactly what I experienced as a student. And the pomegranate is a symbol of fruitfulness and I believe that that also gives us kind of a different perspective on things, because we really strive for growth and excellence and we do want to be fruitful in everything we do. It’s this very Israeli symbol of fruitfulness, but also this international globe like we are very welcoming to all.’

Pointedly, the new website launched in 2017 aligned with HU branding and parts of the RIS history were rewritten to reflect this. For example, Table 11 documents the shift in the espoused views of Samuel Rothberg as RIS ‘founding father’:

**Table 11. Description of Samuel Rothberg, pre and post 2017**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-2017</th>
<th>Post-2017</th>
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| ‘Of particular importance to him was the creation of the School for Overseas Students, today known as the Rothberg International School, which he perceived as a means of encouraging Aliyah and enriching Jewish life throughout the world.’  
  

This represented a considerable shift from Rothberg as analysed in the previous period (see section 5.3) and this shift elicited critical comments from outside HU. A former HU staff member and JAFI senior administrator stated:

‘Harman, who is really responsible for this [RIS], would be turning in his grave. And certainly, Rothberg who gave his name to this, the only thing he was interested in was Jewish students.’
Added value for Jewish students and Tikkun Olam

Portrayals of RIS as a Jewish experience were considerably marginalised. A senior RIS staff member elaborated:

‘….marketing yourself message-wise as the university for ... no one says Jews anymore, we talk about heritage students. It's politically incorrect to say Jew, so all of these things together make up the picture where you define yourself professionally, first of all as a study abroad program. Then you can say, I offer special value to heritage students, to Jewish students. But I can’t go out there and say, ‘Hey, I'm a programme for Jews. Why don't you come here to see the Israelis, we're great.’

Not only was it no longer viewed as politically correct to address ‘Jews’ as a target market but with intermarriage rates in the US reaching 50%, a focus on assimilation and Jewish continuity were likewise viewed as divisive issues that could alienate Jewish students. This approach of ‘added value to Jewish students’ was apparent in marketing campaigns. A short programme that involved study at RIS and volunteering in Nepal was described by a RIS marketing staff member thus:

‘This particular programme came out of the market research and a lot of discussions of marketing strategy. It came out that the concept of Tikkun Olam, repair the world, could be a great approach. You don't just have to be someone who's interested in international development and the environment. You can also be someone who is very active in volunteer work in the Jewish world. It is an appealing programme to students in general, but specifically to Jewish students which we can play up on different messaging like Tikkun Olam and doing Chesed [kind deeds] and all these ideas. You can bring in Jewish aspects to it. It's something that I see on a practical, day-to-day level. I've set up a digital marketing campaign and my target audience is the US and Canada and the messaging is general like adventure and volunteer and feel-good messaging, but there’s a completely separate campaign for Jewish students. To reach them in a different way.’

A further reflection of this strategy was evident in a new partnership with the Jerusalem Development Corporation and the Ministry of Diaspora; RIS received a grant for about 1 million NIS to market academic programmes to international Jewish students. A senior marketing staff member explained:
‘...the directive is not coming for us, but the messaging and the marketing that we're going to develop, it's going to be Jewish-focused... There are a lot of calculated steps in order to get to a place where the marketing and messaging will be extremely targeted towards the Jewish students.’

The content, however, for these types of campaigns would not affect the brand of HU/RIS. The staff member elaborated:

‘For the website and marketing materials it's generic branding of excellence and pluralism. [Online] Campaigns can be targeted. But the overall programme, I think over 60% of our students, we don't really have an exact number, are not Jewish. And it's not just that they're not Jewish, they could be Muslim, they could be Christian.’

Thus, there is still marketing for Jewish students, however this has shifted towards a ‘value added’ approach, employing non-controversial Jewish jargon; and it has become targeted in a way so as to protect the HU brand.

A new form of Zionism: from Aliyah and advocacy to complexity and understanding

From about 2010, explicit references to Zionism in HU publications were rare. When questioned on this, a former senior HU and JAFI interviewee provided his views: ‘Zionism is under attack because they [HU] don't want to be seen as Zionist, because maybe the students don't want to come to Israel for Zion.’ An RIS staff member elaborated:

‘...that's a big shift, from a Jewish University to a university that is in Israel and has many Jews, but it's first of all a university. It shifted, we're not allowed to be recruited to an agenda, we are a university. We have to look at things neutrally, critically. I think it's an illusion, but you can't be professional and start from an opening position, the Zionist university. It wasn't a problem 20 years ago to say, "Yeah we're Zionist." Today, saying I'm a Zionist, is already like ... where do you position yourself? Are you this kind of Zionist? Do you mean Zionist in this sense or that sense? What is it for a Palestinian to be Zionist and what is it for someone in the US to be Zionist?’

Thus, as the Jewish aspect of RIS has dimmed, so too has the explicit Zionist focus on Aliyah. There continues to be discussion of ‘ambassadors’ in some HU publications, for example:

‘Closely experiencing Israel is essential to all. Upon returning to their home countries, Jewish and non-Jewish students serve as enthusiastic ‘ambassadors’ who support us and draw attention to our positive sides. The black-and-white picture changes into a
more complex one that has brighter sides to it. The time students spent with us ultimately provides them with ways of handling their inner conflicts, helps them to resolve doubts that have arisen, and most importantly, provides them with the means to respond to the challenges, whether genuine or provocative, that arise within their own communities abroad.\textsuperscript{\textcircled{516}}

Moreover, in 2004, RIS inaugurated an Israel Advocacy programme in cooperation with the FM.\textsuperscript{\textcircled{517}} However, similar to ‘Zionism’ and ‘Aliyah’ from about 2010 onwards, explicit references to ‘ambassadors’ and advocacy faded - although the logic has persisted. An Israel experience is no longer for Jewish students only, but it is targeted at understanding Israeli society and its complexity, with the underlying hope of fostering more nuanced understanding and positive associations with the country and people. A senior RIS staff member elaborated:

‘I'm a very bizarre Zionist. My perspective on Zionism is much more evident in the kind of courses I try to promote, which are multicultural and include multiple perspectives. Because I think that's where our strength is, at the university level. I always say, “If there’s any place in Israel where you're going to have critique, and you're going to have the ability to question the status quo, it’s at the universities.” I think that's more of the motivation to bring students to Israel. It's not about trying to bring [content] that they might see as brainwashing. It’s in the sense of trying to show the multiplicity in Israel. Which I guess is still part of that [Zionism], but it’s a new version of Zionism.’

\textbf{Recruitment strategies}

The FHU still promotes RIS programmes in local Jewish and Israeli communities; and to Jewish university students.\textsuperscript{\textcircled{518}} However, RIS recruiting offices abroad were drastically reduced from nine in 1989, to just three RIS recruiters in the US, Canada and France in 2018. Meanwhile, the IO employed a representative based in Shanghai, China.

Partnerships with Jewish community organisations and youth movements (e.g. NATIV) persisted, and other national programmes directed towards recruiting Jewish students to Israeli HE were created. Masa Israel, a partnership between the Israeli Government, JAFI and the Jewish Federations of North America, and inaugurated in 2004, was designed to encourage Jewish youth between the ages of 18-25 to spend a period of at least 5 months in Israel. It:

‘...capitalizes on the powerful force of a deeper experience of Israel to build leadership-level connections and enduring commitment to Israel and the Jewish people...through
Masa, young Jewish adults will start their journey with a semester or year in Israel, exploring the land, experiencing its culture, growing and learning together as they enter the community as adults. A first-person experience of Israel is a proven gateway into Jewish life for many of today’s young unaffiliated Jews; for others it is a vehicle for deepening Jewish connection. More specifically, participation in a long-term program in Israel is the most effective tool for shaping the next generation of Jewish leadership in Jewish communities, for cultivating their Jewish awareness and their sense of shared destiny with the State of Israel, and for contributing to the creation of a common worldwide Jewish agenda. Masa programs emphasize study, meaningful encounters with Israelis, volunteering and contributing to Israeli society, together with outdoor adventures, sightseeing and familiarity with other young Jews and Israelis.519

Masa Israel sponsors several streams of programmes (e.g. internships; gap year programmes), however, an interview with one of its architects revealed that the primary target programme envisioned was study abroad. In many ways, it appears to have been a spin-off from the previous PBC/CHE Committee, which gradually faded from $2 million at its inception in 1982 to only $149,000 US in 2003520 and was eventually closed. Masa Israel grants scholarships to students, provides programme development budgets and organises promotional events and marketing campaigns; programme providers must commit to provide Hebrew courses and extra-curricular activities for participants. However, while the programme is still running it has not been viewed as a success in HE. Masa statistics indicate that only about 15% of its grant recipients were in academic programmes.521 Indeed, from an interview with one of the founders of Masa, he labelled its cooperation with the universities as ‘a failure’ putting the blame on the universities who did not ‘understand the potential of Masa.’ However, a senior RIS leader saw things differently:

‘This would have been a perfect place for Masa 20 years ago. Now they come [Masa] and they want a Jewish program, I know what their agenda is but it’s very hard to provide it. They have their interests. They also only advertise things for Jews, which is ... You can't do that anymore.’

In addition to promoting to a Jewish audience at a time when HU was actively trying to diversify its international student body, the tensions of marketing Jewish programmes on University campuses already in evidence in the previous period, were exacerbated by Masa marketing activities. A senior RIS administrator elaborated:

‘They started really getting in our way ... There was one person from Masa who started going to universities in America. She started going to different places and saying, "Oh yes, I'm here for the HU." and we’re like, "Who is this ... " This young woman had no
manners, she didn't know how to deal with universities and all of the protocol and the proper way to speak. We just said, "We do not want you to speak in our name. We will stop cooperating with Masa if you don't get out of our way. You have no place at universities.'

These issues combined with an 'extremely bureaucratic system' led senior leadership at RIS, to indicate that the programme was more of a hassle than it was worth, and HU threatened to terminate its Masa affiliation several times.

When Birthright began to offer summer courses for credit at HU in 2017, this was likewise viewed with little enthusiasm. A senior RIS member explained:

‘...30% of the students are Jewish. That means the majority of our students are not even eligible for these programmes. But if we don't do this, other universities will so I kind of felt pressured that we had to do it.'

Thus, while still relevant, these partnerships with were viewed ambivalently and even critically, and their importance for RIS recruitment waning.

In contrast to this, there is increasing emphasis on partnerships with universities – for faculty-led and joint programmes, and exchange students; and more use of State apparatus for recruiting international students. For example, PAfEJ students that were sponsored by government programmes; Erasmus + exchanges which were likewise a national initiative; and CHE-sponsored HE fairs in China and India. A senior IO administrator elaborated on the latter:

‘...they (CHE) organised participation in HE fairs in China in the last few years we all [Israeli Universities] participated in. I think that's been really helpful for enabling students to come from China and India. Particularly postdocs. They have a very good postdoc scholarship promotion.'

Likewise, recruitment for the English language programmes designed for Chinese and Indian students, was envisioned by the PBC thus: 'Marketing and student recruitment – will be done by the institutions in coordination with the FM and additional relevant actors.'

Notably, both the Jewish student partnerships and CHE initiatives, are funded by the State and overall, the State became a much more important source of funding for internationalisation. For Jewish students, it contributed to Birthright Israel and Masa Israel budgets; through the Student Authority it subsided the Mechina for Jewish students, and PAfEJ students through the CHE/PBC. Through the CHE/PBC it financed internationalisation infrastructure, recruitment and marketing; and international student scholarships. Thus, in this
period, HU was much more reliant on State funding for international students and activities than in the previous period. This will likely continue to draw HU closer to aims of the State. Indeed, this is the intended purpose of the CHE in its new funding mechanism\textsuperscript{523} to disperse its $100 million internationalisation budget; a senior CHE staff member elaborated:

‘We want to provide more incentives to the institutions to go in the directions that we think are important for internationalisation, but we think that they should decide in the end how they want to allocate resources for internationalisation. And that could be in a number of different areas, whether it’s scholarships or building capacity within the institution, infrastructure for internationalisation, and developing partnerships with institutions overseas.’
6.4 Discussion and conclusion

In this chapter I analysed the development of HU from the 1990s through 2018. I argued that in this period, HU redefined itself as a global University, uniting around a brand of excellence and pluralism. This represented a significant shift away from its previous image which focused on advancing national development and serving the Diaspora as the ‘University of the Jewish People.’ In parallel, HU was increasingly tied to the aims and priorities of the State, through the emergence of a form of governance which involved strong steering by the State. This period represented a shift in the relations between the State and HU, as well as shifting definitions of what it meant to be a university of standing. HU did not shed its connections with the Diaspora. As I demonstrated in this chapter, these connections remained strong, however, the way in which they were expressed, and the activities undertaken on their behalf, shifted. Thus, HU was balancing the shifting needs and priorities of the two, while trying to maintain its academic mission, and importantly, its place in the increasingly competitive and stratified global (and local) hierarchy of HEIs.

‘Internationalisation’ emerged as an important tool for HU to compete in the global and local ‘marketplace’ of HEIs; it was likewise stimulated by the State to further its strategic foreign and economic relations. Thus, building on patterns established in the previous period, there is increasing development and funding for internationalisation efforts in a top-down way. Notably, while the rationales for internationalisation between the State and HU were often expressed differently (e.g. the case of PAfEJ students) there was considerable overlap in the targets (e.g. Asian students; graduate students) and strategies for internationalisation (e.g. staff and student mobility) across levels. It is a case of HU and the State agreeing on a common new vision of internationalisation but for somewhat different rationales; for HU it allowed them to enhance their academic and global status as a research university, for the State it allowed them to strengthen the national image, address some domestic issues, connect with new strategic partners, and pursue research which supported their priorities. Thus, it could best be viewed as a workable compromise which avoided much of the conflict of the lost decade.

Research shifted from its national framing in the previous period to a humanitarian and universal framing; it was also increasingly evaluated on performance indicators at the national and global level. The AR&D aimed to increase research funding and activities, with competitive research funding playing an important role. The sophisticated infrastructure for managing research and securing funding (both international and national) of the AR&D was channelled towards new funding sources and targets, reflecting the shifting international relations of the State, facilitated and incentivised through competitive funding by national initiatives; and shifts
in world research centres. Diaspora funding for research was continually important and bi-
lateral research funds were created, some of which, were facilitated by the Diaspora. Thus, HU continued to leverage Diaspora individuals and organisations, as well as State ministries, infrastructures and foreign relations in a strategic way to further its academic aims and build its research reputation. However, in this period, the role of the State was much more strategic, coordinated, ‘entrepreneurial,’ and even coercive. Strategies to attain research funding reflected the contacts and influence of these actors (State, Diaspora and Academia) and the State became an increasingly important actor in funding and facilitating international research, particularly in Asia.

HU academic staff were increasingly obligated to spend research periods abroad, to create international networks, apply for international funding and publish in international (high impact) journals, however, in line with its new brand, the staff was also increasingly representative of Israeli society, and working toward greater inclusion. I further demonstrated that inclusion plans and academic recruitment were aligned to State priorities, incentivised by it, and in some cases tied to punitive measures through the Recovery plan.

The RIS moved away from its founding purposes, to a more pluralistic and inclusive educational mission. I showed that this represented a shift towards a more critical understanding of Israeli society and a shifting Zionist reasoning, which was more inclusive in its target audience, and was concerned with fostering more nuanced understanding and positive associations with the country and its people. This process moved away from a focus on Diaspora students, and was aligned with HU’s strategic internationalisation goals, and the priorities of the State to promote ties with diverse student groups studying in Israel (i.e. Asian and PAfEJ students), and increasingly to include Israeli students in the internationalisation process, over degree levels and in the framework of their studies. Thus, the focus on pluralism bolstered HU’s new brand and mission, while fostering strategic aims of the State to build its foreign relations, and provide international experiences for its students. This was different from the previous period because the RIS no longer focused on Diaspora building; indeed, much of this function had been taken up by other programmes (e.g. Birthright Israel, see Abramson, 2017). However, through the FHU, HU continued to serve as a major institution in which (elite) Diaspora Jewry and the State interacted. In this period, the aims of the different constituencies, were broadly aligned with HU’s strategic academic mission; while the rationales for internationalisation were different, their various agendas were aligned which resulted in widespread support from the highest levels for internationalisation. This partnership affected the purposes, curriculum, marketing, funding, administration and governance, and social composition of its international students and teaching, which reflected their overlapping interests, priorities and relations.
It is tempting to conclude that the HE sector is wholly moving towards pluralism, however, with the massification of Israeli HE, and the differentiation and stratification of the HE sector, it becomes increasingly difficult to extrapolate from HU to Israeli HE more broadly. Perhaps the most striking example of this is the different foci of target international students. HU has moved away from Diaspora mobility, however, IDC Herzliya, a non-budgeted college has maintained this focus, albeit within different academic conditions (English language teaching; degree mobility). Bamberger et.al (2020) analysed the marketing appeals of IDC to international students and argued that ‘IDC positioned itself as an institutional base between the transnational Jewish Diaspora and the national Jewish homeland’ appealing to international students through ‘diaspora sentiments, relations and routes of mobility’ (Bamberger et al., 2020, p. 488). Thus, IDC played on the ethnoreligious aspects of the (Jewish) nation in its marketing. This echoed Bamberger’s (2019) study of international students which indicated that students were drawn to study at the college for a ‘package’ of factors which combined cosmopolitan and ethnic identity capital. Pointedly, IDC has successfully attracted international (Jewish) students and currently has the largest Jewish international student population in Israel. This suggests that an ethnoreligious connection may continue to be Israel’s primary draw for international students, at least at the undergraduate/non-research level.

In contrast to IDC, among research universities, there is a common trend towards a more diverse student body of international students, particularly as their funding streams are connected to the State, and incentivise international cooperation. Bamberger et al.’s, (2020) study of the marketing appeals for a university in this sector revealed marketing tropes around research excellence, innovation and global rankings; however, the ‘nation’ – particularly its entrepreneurship and technological aspects was likewise embedded in these portrayals (e.g. as a Start-up Nation; high-tech hub). Thus, ironically IDC has kept much of the (ethno)nationalistic rhetoric and focus – continually identifying explicitly as a ‘Zionist University’ - despite its financial independence from the State; and the research universities have shifted towards an internationalist rhetoric, while still invoking the nation, albeit in a secular/civil form. This suggests that nationalism, in its varying forms, has a significant influence on the trajectory of internationalisation; and that State intervention, despite its reasons, is significant in promoting international collaboration and more inclusion and diversity in Israeli HE – even as the State has been under a right-wing government for the past decade.

In many ways, the new internationalisation strategy in HU addressed several of the tensions in the RIS of the previous period including integration between international and Israeli students; issues of academic supervision and quality; and tensions between a Jewish experience and an academic experience. However, it created a more difficult administrative
environment, and an opening for Jewish students who were still seeking a certain homeland experience, to missionary-type providers at RIS or towards other institutions which would provide this (i.e. IDC Herzliya). There was also evidence of backlash from some Diaspora communities to this new path of internationalisation, and interviews indicated that IDC Herzliya was likely receiving many of these students who might have attended HU in the past.

While the AR&D and RIS represented the institutionalisation of separate infrastructures for international research and teaching respectively, the new IO, represents the turn to ‘comprehensive internationalisation.’ Although all three remained separate entities, there has been increasing overlap between them and movement towards IO management and involvement across administrative units. This shift has been riddled with internal tensions, ambiguity, and uncertainty. It has also resulted in a much more complicated process of internationalisation which permeates the entire University, and I demonstrate the extent to which state, diaspora and university initiatives, strategies and funding increasingly touch all areas of the university.
Chapter 7. Conclusion

This chapter concludes the thesis. I begin by briefly summarising the three periods with respect to RQ1:

What forms of internationalisation have operated since the founding of the first university in pre-state Israel? How were these developed and by which actors? What was the purpose of particular forms of internationalisation?

I then address RQ2: Why did internationalisation take the form it did over time? Why has it shifted? I proceed to restate my interpretive argument as specified in the introduction (Chapter 1), introducing a novel model of IoHE. Next, I revisit the literature as analysed in Chapter 2, modifying and advancing it based on the findings. Finally, I establish the contribution of the thesis, analyse its limitations, and suggest areas for further research.

7.1 Summary of the findings: A new model of internationalisation

In this thesis I traced the formation and development of HU, and its international dimensions, from its origins in the pre-State period until 2018. My analysis identified three distinct periods: 1900s – 1948: Formation and development of the Diaspora University; 1948 – 2000: State formation, stabilisation and the Diaspora; 1990s - 2018: State maturation and steering, the Diaspora and internationalisation.

In the first period (Chapter 4), I argued that HU was itself a product of internationalisation, much of it negatively driven (e.g. persecution; World Wars) in the early 20th century. It was created by a transnational coalition of actors seeking to promote Jewish culture and the Jewish national project. It was created to be a ‘spiritual centre’ for the entire Jewish community, both within Palestine and outside. The British were not active partners in HU and thus in the absence of a State (and its coercive ability) its governance and funding was shaped by the Diaspora (primarily elites in Europe and North America) working in tandem with the academic staff; this situation allowed HU significant autonomy from the local Zionist leadership of the the Yishuv. Despite the subjugation of local Zionist interests by HU in some cases, I demonstrated that the national project significantly benefitted from HU. Thus, while HU was controlled by the Diaspora-academic coalition, the University from its beginning
balanced the concerns of the Diaspora (e.g. refuge from persecution; cultural rejuvenation; self-esteem and pride), with the national cause (e.g. through exploratory and applied research; revitalisation of Hebrew language and culture; integration of new immigrants) while working to maintain its academic autonomy and research ‘excellence.’ It was an ‘international’ model (German), transplanted in Palestine, which was staffed by European born and educated academics, many of them refugees; its student body was heavily influenced by immigration linked to persecution in the Diaspora, with HU serving as a haven during WWII and an ‘academic absorption centre’ into the Yishuv. Thus, in this period, the identity of HU, its funding, governance, staff and students – its very foundation - was ‘international’ and diasporic in nature.

In the second period (Chapter 5), I argued that in the early years after State formation, HU aligned itself with the aims of the new State and renewed its obligation to the nation-State building enterprise; this represented a shift in the relations between the State and the Diaspora which was reflected in the governance of the University. The State became the primary funders of HU, and a form of governance developed which accommodated State priorities while maintaining significant autonomy. I demonstrated the great extent to which HU continued to serve as the ‘University of the Jewish People.’ The Diaspora was still a principal facilitator, actor and constituent of HU. Thus, I argued that HU continually balanced the shifting needs and priorities of these two main influences, while pursuing its academic mission. This relationship had considerable effects on the international dimension of research and teaching at HU. International relations for research were institutionalised through the AR&D and aimed to increase (external) research funding and activities to aid in national development, and to maintain its position and status in the domestic setting. The AR&D developed a sophisticated infrastructure for managing research and securing funding (both international and national). Research continued to be supported and facilitated by Diaspora elites, however, the advent of State infrastructure greatly increased the financial support for research, and also created a network to facilitate it. Thus, HU leveraged Diaspora individuals and organisations, as well as State ministries, infrastructures and foreign relations in a strategic way to further at once national development, and its academic aims while building its research reputation and cementing its place in the local hierarchy of universities. Research agendas were closely tied to national priorities; however, these were flexible and recast to fit with the requirements of international funding bodies, with international cooperation forming a basis for procuring both national and international funding. Strategies to attain research funding reflected the contacts and influence of HU’s primary constituencies (State, Diaspora and Academic). As a result, international research funding and partners reflected changing foreign relations of the State, significantly aided by the presence and various forms of support from Diaspora elites.
The focus on Jewish nationhood (inside and outside the borders of the State) circumscribed the target international students in this period. The international dimension of teaching became institutionalised through the RIS and I demonstrated that it focused on creating and perpetuating Diaspora bonds through a homeland academic experience (diasporisation); and fostering Jewish immigration from the Diaspora (nationalisation). These dual processes were targeted (and in some cases led by) different populations within the diaspora: formation of a Jewish diaspora identity through study abroad was developed for the North American Jewish youth by Diaspora elites who felt threatened by increasing assimilation and were searching for a way to perpetuate Jewish identity – without immigrating to Israel. This (identity) motivation has since driven other diaspora youth initiatives, as Abramson (2017; 2019) shows in his study of the Birthright Israel programme. Given favourable conditions in the North American diaspora (e.g. high degree of integration of the Jewish community; relatively low levels of antisemitism; economic security) immigration was not viewed as a likely prospect for these students. Thus, diaspora elites from a strong position in a secure ‘host’ context, were able to significantly impact on the international character of the ‘home’ higher education system. However, the prospect of immigration for those diaspora youth living under more oppressive/discriminatory regimes and with economic insecurity, were considered much higher and thus programmes to integrate these students into Israeli society were developed largely by the State apparatus (e.g. JAFI, Ministry of Absorption). Thus, the dominance of the State or Diaspora in shaping the trajectory of internationalisation in teaching was largely based on the dynamics ‘over there’ in a specific diaspora context. These processes were at once both closely aligned with the differing identities, concerns and priorities of Diaspora communities; and State concerns of immigration and transnational ‘ambassadorial’ links. Furthermore, the focus on Diaspora Jews reinforced the unifying characteristic of the majority of the new State (i.e. Jewishness), bolstering national identities, while fostering strategic pragmatic aims for nation-building (i.e. skilled immigration). Thus, during this period HU served as a site of nation-building, and aligned with the State’s priorities and needs, while serving as a major institution in which the Diaspora and the new State interacted. These dual purposes and constituencies, at times collided with that of HU’s academic mission. However, there was a continual process of negotiation between these actors and their various agendas, which resulted in widespread support from the highest levels for the RIS. This process of negotiation affected its purposes, curriculum, social composition of its students, marketing, funding, administration and governance which reflected their overlapping interests, priorities and relations.

In the third period (Chapter 6), I argued that as result of the State’s social, economic and political projects; global developments in HE; and shifting identities and concerns of the
Diaspora, HU redefined itself as a global university, uniting around a ‘brand’ of excellence and pluralism. This represented a shift away from its previous image which focused on advancing national development and serving the Diaspora as the ‘University of the Jewish People.’ In parallel, HU was increasingly tied to the aims and priorities of the State, through the emergence of a form of governance and financing which involved strong steering by the State. Connections with the Diaspora remained strong, however, the way in which they were expressed (e.g. humanitarian aims and ties to Jewish concepts such as Tikkun Olam) and the activities undertaken on their behalf (e.g. Diaspora mobility was no longer a priority), shifted. Thus, HU was balancing the shifting needs and priorities of the State and Diaspora while trying to ensure its academic mission, notably, its place in the increasingly competitive and stratified global hierarchy of HEIs. ‘Internationalisation’ emerged as an important tool for HU to compete in the global and local ‘marketplace’ of HEIs; it was likewise stimulated by the State to further its strategic aims. Building on patterns established in the previous period, there is increasing development and funding for internationalisation efforts in a top-down way. Notably, while the rationales for internationalisation between the State and HU were often expressed differently (e.g. the case of PAfEJ) there was considerable overlap in the targets (e.g. Asian students; graduate students) and strategies for internationalisation (e.g. staff and student mobility) across levels. Thus, I argued that HU, Diaspora elites (e.g. donors) and the State agreed on a common new vision of internationalisation but for somewhat different rationales; for HU it allows them to enhance their academic and global status as a research University; for the Diaspora it reinforces self-esteem and pride in Jewish identity, while pursuing a progressive agenda; for the State it allows them to strengthen the national image, address some domestic issues; connect with new strategic partners; and pursue research which supports their priorities. Thus, it could best be viewed as a workable compromise which avoids much of the conflict of the ‘lost decade’.

As a result, research shifted from its national framing in the previous period to an increasingly humanitarian and universal framing; it was also increasingly evaluated on performance indicators at the national and global level. The AR&D aimed to increase research funding and activities, with competitive research funding playing an important role. Research was channelled towards new funding sources and targets, reflecting the shifting international relations of the State, facilitated and incentivised through competitive funding by national initiatives; and shifts in world research centres. Diaspora funding for research remained important and bi-lateral research funds were created, some of which, were facilitated by Diaspora elites. Thus, HU continued to leverage Diaspora individuals and organisations, as well as State ministries, infrastructures and foreign relations in a strategic way to further its academic aims and build its research reputation. However, in this period, the role of the State
was much more strategic, coordinated, ‘entrepreneurial,’ and sometimes coercive. Strategies to attain research funding reflected the contacts and influence of these actors (State, Diaspora and Academic), however, the State became an increasingly important actor in funding and facilitating international research, particularly in Asia.

The changing role of the RIS mirrored these shifts as it moved away from its founding purposes, to a more pluralistic and inclusive educational mission. I further argued that this represented a shift towards a more critical and pluralistic understanding of Israeli society and a shifting Zionist reasoning, which was concerned with fostering more nuanced understandings and positive associations with the country and people. This process was evident in the move away from a focus on Diaspora students, and was aligned with HU’s strategic internationalisation goals, and the priorities of the State to promote ties with diverse student groups studying in Israel (i.e. Asian and PAfEJ students). This increased focus on pluralism bolstered HU’s new brand and mission, which the Diaspora supported, while fostering the strategic aims of the State to build its foreign relations, and provide international experiences for its students. This was different from the previous period because the RIS no longer focused on Diaspora mobility; indeed, much of this function had been taken up by other programmes and HEIs (i.e. Birthright Israel; Masa internships; IDC Herzliya). However, through the FHU, HU continued to serve as a major institution in which Diaspora Jewry and the State interacted. In this period, the aims of the different constituencies, were broadly aligned with HU’s strategic academic mission; while the rationales for internationalisation were different, their various agendas were aligned which resulted in widespread support from the highest levels for internationalisation. Similar to the previous period, this partnership affected the purposes, curriculum, marketing, funding, administration and governance, and social composition of its international students and teaching, which continued to reflect their overlapping interests, priorities, and relations.

Taken together, these periods represent considerable shifts over time in the nature of internationalisation in HU including its purposes and targets; strategies and forms; organisation and institutional infrastructure; governance and funding. However, several themes emerge with respect to the international dimensions of research and teaching. Research has been closely tied with a rhetoric of ‘excellence’ and linked with the strategic political, economic and social needs of the State/State-in-making – both domestic and foreign, and the identity, esteem and cultural needs of the Diaspora. Teaching has been closely tied with promoting diasporic identity, diaspora/homeland ties, and integration of different ‘international’ communities into Israeli society. Thus, the international dimension of teaching has heavily reflected events in and priorities of the Diaspora (e.g. persecution; ‘crises’ of assimilation and Jewish leadership); and the State’s shifting agenda of social cohesion (e.g.
from Jewish immigrants to PAfEJ communities). For its part, HU has not been a passive actor responding to the State and Diaspora; rather I demonstrated that it has continually negotiated its place between these two, while pursuing its own shifting academic mission, to solidify its position in local and global hierarchies, adapting to the shifting expectations of a university of standing.

Thus, considering RQ2, why the periods have the shape they do and why they shifted over time, I argue that internationalisation in Israeli HE can be understood at the nexus of the events, priorities and identities of the Diaspora, State and University. Thus, this model of internationalisation would include the social, academic, economic, identity/status, security, and political considerations of the Diaspora, State and University. While I identify these three primary influences, I view them in a relationship that connects and disconnects at different points and are embedded in complex, overlapping networks (see Figure 5). While there are some activities that can be identified more easily with one area than another (e.g. research relations in Asia are more aligned with the State and the University); the overall shape of the model in each period, is the overlapping centre which represents the core features of the model at a particular point in time.

Figure 5. Model of internationalisation in Israel

Importantly this model nuances and expands explanations of Israeli internationalisation in the literature as described in Chapter 2. These explanations focus on conflict and neoliberalism as explanatory concepts. First, as I demonstrated, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has considerably affected all aspects of Israeli society, including HU and internationalisation; however, on its own, it cannot explain the forms that do take place (e.g. why certain types of mobility have and still do taken place). Rather, the conflict is reflected through the priorities, events and relations of the State, University and Diaspora, shaping internationalisation. Likewise, the trickle of neoliberal ideas, policies and governance into Israeli HE in the contemporary period (see Chapter 6) has had a considerable effect on internationalisation,
however, to a considerable extent, this was operationalised through shifts in the relationship of HU and the State (e.g. through regulations; funding mechanisms) and a simplistic ‘neoliberalism’ as explanation does little to advance our understanding of how neoliberalism is effecting university internationalisation. Likewise, in this thesis I demonstrate the deep historical roots of ‘excellence’ in Israeli HE, challenging the claim that ‘excellence’ in research universities has been a default position because the conflict has limited its more multicultural purposes. While there are certainly elements of this, I demonstrated the deep historical roots of this discourse, and how the rhetoric of ‘excellence’ has been and is continually intertwined with Diaspora and national identities. Importantly, this thesis, analyses the deep historical antecedents of contemporary internationalisation and provides an alternative explanation for its expression. Thus, this model helps to explain for example why certain types of international research partners have been desired and supported; why a particular type of mobility has existed; and the absence of other forms (e.g. regional/Palestinian partnerships and exchanges) and discourses (e.g. peace, reconciliation) of internationalisation. Thus, this model of IoHE provides significant explanatory (as opposed to solely descriptive) power for the development of particular characteristics of internationalisation over time; why other forms of internationalisation did not appear; why it has changed over time; and importantly, provides insight into its current and future trajectories. In some ways, the main argument of this thesis echoes Laat’s (2018) historical study of the changing nature of Evangelical higher education in the US. Laat (2018) argues that Evangelical colleges and universities were constantly negotiating what it meant to be an HEI of standing, with the shifting definitions and tacit understanding of their Evangelical mission (e.g. by way of its alumni and donors), both of which were necessary to their survival as institutions. In this case however, I demonstrate the importance of negotiating a mission which has to navigate three primary influences: Diaspora, State and University.

7.2 Challenging, modifying and enriching the literature

The point of departure of this thesis was that the literature did not accurately reflect IoHE in Israel. In the following section, I return to the literature from Chapter 2, and challenge, modify and enrich it through the findings of this thesis.

Rationales and historical timelines
The rationales for internationalisation in this thesis, and their shifts over time, represent a significant departure from the literature. In the first period, internationalisation was embedded in Jewish cultural revival; and the Jewish national project. As opposed to the widespread view of the literature (e.g. de Wit, 2002; 2015) the political rationales of peace and mutual understanding to avoid conflict was not a serious motivation between and immediately after the World Wars; rather internationalisation was a way to provide refuge for persecuted Jewish students and academic staff (in Europe); and to rekindle and preserve Jewish culture and heritage, particularly after the Holocaust. It was likewise embedded in the fabric of HU from its creation: the German model of university was brought to Palestine by Western educated and born academics to explore the land and its people. Thus, internationalisation was affected by the events of WWII, however, it was not the same effects for the Jewish people as for others, and instead of stimulating an impulse for peace, it fuelled the desire for a Jewish state. When considering the timelines of internationalisation which emphasise peace and mutual understanding as key drivers of internationalisation between and after the World Wars (e.g. de Wit, 2015; 2002), HU is strikingly different. While there was hope that HU would bring greater understanding to the region and bridge East and West, this was not the primary motive for its founding or its activities. Rather, HU was from its genesis ‘international’ and founded largely out of a confluence of ‘internationalist’ factors (World Wars; Diaspora persecution).

In the second period, during the Cold War, international development and aid are cited in the literature (e.g. Gao & Gao, 2015; Qiang, 2003) as the primary rationales for internationalisation. However, while there were certainly elements of this, notably through joint research projects with developing nations and education and training programmes underwritten by the FM, these were not linked to Cold War (communist/capitalist) struggles. Rather, on the State level, they were linked to the creation of the State, and the political and economic isolation of Israel, due to the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Arab boycott, and the State’s need to garner votes at the UN; thus a different set of national concerns and ideological standpoints (e.g. Zionism, instead of communism/capitalism). Institutionally, the AR&D viewed this as an opportunity to receive international funding from other (Western, primarily US) sources for their research. Towards the end of this period, the literature notes the beginning of the rise of commercial models of international HE, based heavily on recruiting international students. While HU (and Israel, through the PBC/CHE Committee) were actively marketing and recruiting international students, it was not a commercial model, and financial reasons were not driving considerations. Rather, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, international students were desired (and often heavily subsidised) primarily as a connection to bolster national identity, facilitate Aliyah (desirable immigration); form goodwill ambassadors; foster transnational ties with the Diaspora; and build Jewish leadership and identity.
In the third period, the literature (e.g. de Wit & Merkx, 2012; Knight, 2015b) emphasises shifts towards commercial, branding and competitive rationales from the 1990s onwards. This appears to hold some explanatory value in the HU case – much more so at least than the previous periods. However, there are also significant departures. The literature focuses on the rise of commercial models of international HE, based on student mobility. While HU (and Israel, through the FM and CHE/PBC) continued to actively recruit international students, it was not a commercial model, and financial reasons (i.e. student fees) were not significant considerations. Rather, as I demonstrated in Chapter 6, international students were still desired (and often heavily subsidised), however the rationale for this changed: instead of recruiting Diaspora students to promote Jewish identity and Aliyah, it was primarily an activity to bolster HU’s global and local rankings; access additional funding from the State; and build strategic alliances. Jewish students were no longer targeted, and the preference was for graduate and research students. Thus, there were elements of the economic rationale, which was important in the development of HU’s internationalisation, however, this was not primarily through international student fees; rather hosting international students (even through exchange students) became an indicator of its global ranking, and tied to State funds. It was likewise viewed as a way to increase research cooperation, a key aim of HU, and an important global and national indicator of its quality, and source of funding. From the level of the State, the economic and political rationales were extremely relevant, however, again, not for international students to contribute to the local economy, rather as a way to cement relationships with emerging political powers and economic leaders, that served as important export markets for Israeli high-technology products and services. The branding and competitive rationales are certainly evident at HU, however, through the prism of its excellence and pluralism brand, I demonstrated that social and cultural rationales are intricately interwoven within these rationales. I further demonstrated how this new form of internationalisation was buttressed and fostered by the State, albeit for very different reasons.

In sum, internationalisation moved from rationales of cultural revival, refuge and bolstering the Jewish national project; to fostering Diaspora links and identities, immigrant integration and nation-building; to competitive, economic, political, and social cohesion rationales. These rationales and historical timelines represent several areas which are underdeveloped in the literature, notably, cultural revival, diaspora links, immigrant integration, nation-building, and social cohesion. Thus, this thesis identifies rationales and their timelines which depart from those in the literature (e.g. de Wit, 2015; Gao & Gao, 2015). Importantly, this thesis also empirically demonstrates how divergent and overlapping rationales, at different levels (e.g. national and institutional), can result in similar targets (e.g. PAfEJ; Asian research students) of internationalisation.
**Strategies and forms of internationalisation**

Building on these rationales, this thesis introduces new forms of and strategies for internationalisation. Regarding the former, the rationale for Jewish continuity, diaspora links, cultural revival and refuge, spurred a form of (ethnonational) internationalisation that aimed to create and deepen ethnoreligious diaspora links and identity; national identity; and integrate diverse student populations into the local society. Thus, this thesis introduces international HE as a way to create, foster and deepen such identities, and promote greater social cohesion, albeit with shifting targets (i.e. from Olim to PAfEJ students). While HU has shifted away from a form of diaspora oriented internationalisation in recent years, diaspora mobility has not disappeared; rather it is has shifted to colleges, notably IDC Herzliya. Thus, this thesis demonstrates that international HE has been, and is currently used to create and perpetuate diaspora bonds and identities and could be more accurately thought of as a process of ‘diasporisation’; however, it also shows how and under what circumstances this can shift in its characteristics (e.g. academic patterns) and its institutional base (i.e. from the University to colleges). Importantly, by establishing the rationales and actors of internationalisation in the Israeli case, it is also possible to understand those forms of internationalisation which did not appear. While the literature associates internationalisation as a means to resolving conflict and promoting peace and reconciliation, particularly in the post-War years, the rationales in the Israeli case, at least in the early years did not lead to this form of humanitarian and reconciliatory internationalisation. In the current period, there are attempts underway which aim at integration of PAfEJ, although these appear to be driven by political and economic rationales.

In addition to its rationales, strategies for internationalisation are usually viewed at the institutional, national or regional level. However, this thesis demonstrates the important role of diaspora as a transnational actor in internationalisation strategies. Specifically, its role in facilitating, funding and governing international research and teaching, through both personal contributions, connections, and NGOs (e.g. FHU).

**Identity: Delving into the ‘values’**

While the ‘values’ of IoHE as Knight (2005) and de Wit (1995) refer to them, are viewed as closely connected to the rationales and affect the whole trajectory of internationalisation, these are rarely analysed in the literature. I argue that this is because the field caters more towards
the concerns of practitioners and advocating ‘best practices’ than providing deep, critical analysis of the explanatory categories and mechanisms associated with internationalisation. As a result, the ‘values’ are often the normative ones of a particular author – with a significant penchant towards Western contexts and assumptions.

In contrast, I demonstrated the importance of identities – as a reflection of the vision and values on internationalisation – at the institutional, national and transnational levels. Institutionally HU’s identity shifted from a Jewish University, to a National University, to a Global University. While HU always had multiple identities, which closely aligned with its different constituents (i.e. Diaspora, State and Academia), the identity of HU in any particular time, its gaze and how it perceived itself, was a central aspect in how internationalisation was shaped.

The national identity, that of a Jewish nation, continually circumscribed – to greater or lesser extent - the possibilities for internationalisation. While this was clearer in the rhetoric and targets of internationalisation in the second period, this (shifting) identity continues to influence many areas of internationalisation (e.g. immigration, work and visa regulations). While in the current period, this would appear to be waning, and indeed, the State has been promoting a new form of internationalisation which largely pulls away from diaspora mobility, at least in the universities, it has in parallel asserted through legislation its identity as a Jewish nation (e.g. through the Nation-State Law). Thus, IoHE has been continually shaped by the negotiated, political process of asserting a national identity.

Diaspora identity throughout all periods, was an important aspect that shaped internationalisation. From its foundation, ‘excellence,’ particularly in research was a strong undertone for the ‘University of the Jewish People’ which at once reinforced a deep-seated identity that the Diaspora held as a learned and wise people, and reflected the vulnerability of this group through their need to prove their capabilities to a world in which they had long been persecuted. However, as Diaspora concerns and identities shifted (strongly connected with different levels of integration and material conditions in ‘host’ societies), new framings of internationalisation emerged (e.g. humanitarian views, fused with progressive Jewish values). Importantly, the shifting framing of internationalisation in line with Diaspora identities has elicited great Diaspora support for HU, connecting a transnational group identity, to the expression and support of internationalisation. Thus, I demonstrated that the identities of the main constituencies in internationalisation (i.e. Diaspora, State, University) are central to understanding and shaping internationalisation. This challenges the tendency towards viewing internationalisation as a normative and value-free intervention. It further indicates an area which should be analysed in internationalisation studies.
**Actors: Incorporating diaspora and analysing the state**

Over the course of this thesis I demonstrate the central role of the Diaspora, as a transnational actor, in shaping the governance, funding, purposes, strategies, and trajectories of internationalisation. Typically, transnational actors in higher education are viewed as organisations such as the OECD, UNESCO and World Bank with little focus on diaspora (organisations or individuals). My analysis shows that unlike the HE literature which frames diaspora as a passive target for facilitating internationalisation (e.g. Cai, 2012; Welch & Jie, 2013), the diaspora can play an important, active and indeed leading role in internationalisation in some cases, shaping it to their needs. Diaspora needs/motivations in this case were multiple and varied considerably over space and time: these could be material (e.g. in the case of those fleeing from persecution) or identity (e.g. in the case of Diaspora elite donors). This view is in opposition to the assumption in much of the HE literature that the state’s needs are those being met by diaspora engagement policies. The findings likewise indicate that the state’s needs/motivations are not limited to the realm of the utilitarian/material; rather diaspora engagement in this case played a significant role in cementing national identity. This study reinforces arguments about the fluid and socially constructed nature of diaspora. This opens up new possibilities for research on how diasporas are being created and influenced through HE, challenging much of the HE research which (often implicitly) takes essentialist views of diaspora. These are particularly timely findings as many nations institute diaspora engagement policies and practices through HE (e.g. China, South Korea, India) and is important to develop greater understanding of the purposes and roles of the various actors.

This thesis demonstrates the important role of the state in shaping internationalisation over time. Contrary to much of the literature (e.g. Beerkens, 2004; Mohrman, Ma, & Baker, 2008) which argues that as a result of globalisation, universities are becoming disarticulated from local and national frameworks, this thesis demonstrates that the opposite is the case: HU is deeply embedded in the State’s agenda, perhaps even more so than ever, despite that the ‘rhetoric’ or identity of the University has shifted away from the State. Furthermore, this thesis draws attention to the nature of the state, its stage of development and its impact on internationalisation. Regarding the former, President Brodetzky put it succinctly:

“The unique character of the HU as the University of the Jewish people is analogous, of course, to the character of the State of Israel itself. The State is the State of the people of the country called Israel. It is at the same time the country which Jews the world over have an interest and a share.”

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Thus, the nature of the state, is deeply intertwined with the character of the university and this will necessarily have an impact on its internationalisation. The nature of the state is often under analysed or left out entirely of internationalisation analyses; Bamberger, Morris and Yemini (2019) argue that the internationalisation literature often assumes Western, liberal states, with rather little state interference, a large degree of autonomy and progressive neoliberal framings of internationalisation. However, there are a plethora of other forms of states (e.g. developmental states; communist states; dictatorships; monarchies; theocracies) which this thesis suggests impact on how internationalisation is perceived, governed, and enacted. Finally, this thesis uncovers a considerable connection between the rationales and forms of internationalisation and the stage of the state in nation-building. For example, it would have been impossible for HU to consider English language instruction in its faculties (i.e. ‘comprehensive internationalisation’) in the early stages of (nation)state-building, something that is now embraced and pushed by the State. Thus, this thesis argues that the State has continued to be a central actor in internationalisation – despite HU’s rhetoric to the contrary - and that the nature of the State and its stage of nation-building are important categories to explain internationalisation.

**Governance**

While I did not set out to align the three periods with HE governance, this indeed ended up being the case: a shift of governance affected the international nature of the University. In the first period, the University was dominated by the Diaspora-Academic coalition; in the second period, this shifted to a State-Academic coalition; in the final period, the State weakened academic governance and exercised increasing control and regulation, through the use of competition and market principles. Thus, modifying Clark’s (1986) triangle of coordination (see Chapter 2), Figure 6 illustrates these shifts over time.

*Figure 6. Clark’s (1986) modified model of governance, periods 1-3*
Thus, this thesis establishes university governance as a key determinant of internationalisation; and likewise modifies Clark’s governance model to reflect both changes over time and an additional influence on governance: the Diaspora.

**Challenging globalisation as explanation, rejecting convergence**

This study challenges the ‘internationalisation’ as a reaction to or manifestation of ‘globalisation’ narrative (e.g. Altbach & Knight, 2007; Taylor, 2010). Throughout this thesis, I demonstrated the historical roots of internationalisation and the strategic and deliberate project that it has been (before contemporary globalisation) and is becoming. While different strands of globalisation have impacted on the way in which internationalisation is expressed (e.g. economic neoliberalism) its possibilities (e.g. ease of mobility) and characteristics (e.g. English language); a straight connection between the two, or reactionary relationship, I argue shrouds the underlying actors, rationales, and mechanisms which bring about different forms of internationalisation over time.

Similarly, this thesis challenges and ultimately rejects the convergence narrative. While some of the forms, strategies and rhetoric around internationalisation are indeed similar across many contexts; the Israeli case diverges in its rationales; concerns; values; mechanisms of implementation and steering; and in the actors which shape it. Kerr et al.’s (1994) argument that HE was a universal model before state creation, then gradually moved apart into multiple
national afterwards, to come back together in a common model during globalisation is unhelpful. A common model converging in a common 'global' space, suggests shared values, concerns, equality and consensus. However, this thesis demonstrates the fallacy of this claim. Thus, I argue that ‘internationalisation’ should not be viewed as a converging practice or model (e.g. Bentley & Kyvik, 2012; Marginson, 2008), but as a flexible construct that can be suited and adapted to many different purposes and actors; that at times makes use of similar strategies or discourses.

Definitions

The widespread definitions of internationalisation from the literature have several flaws (see section 2.1); notably the emphasis on a ‘process’ which indicates linear progression and undermines agency/actors; its ahistorical nature, which assumes that the starting point of the University is not international; its reactive association with globalisation; and its obligatory connection with worthwhile humanitarian purposes. While these definitions may be useful, particularly for practitioners, I argued that they are intellectually limiting, and moreover, they do not accurately reflect the Israeli condition. I demonstrated that HU was created as an international venture through a complex web of negotiations among transnational, ‘national,’ institutional, organisational, academic and individual actors. It has deep historical roots which continue to circumscribe it today. While at times humanitarian rhetoric was and is associated with it, it is driven by a complex fusion of diverse rationales among different actors. Thus, a working definition for analytical purposes, tailored to the Israeli case would be:

‘……internationalisation is at once a beginning point and an on-going project; it has deep historical roots and is continually being politically, economically, socially, culturally and academically shaped. It is constructed, crafted and implemented through a web of complex interactions with global, transnational, national, institutional, organisational, and individual actors. It is shaped by overlapping, mutually inclusive and ever-changing rationales. It is a project that combines ‘global’ trends with ‘local’ histories; cultures; conflicts; identities, interpretations and experiences.'

While this definition is helpful to understand the Israeli case, my main purpose in critiquing the definitions of internationalisation is not to add another working definition to the literature. Rather I aim to critically analyse the assumptions embedded therein to demonstrate through the Israeli case how these definitions can shroud our thinking and understanding of internationalisation in diverse contexts.
7.3 Contribution to knowledge and practice

As demonstrated in the previous two sections, this thesis develops significant new understandings of internationalisation in Israel; and challenges, modifies and enriches understanding of internationalisation more broadly. As delineated in section 7.1, the model developed for internationalisation at HU, represents a significant departure from how Israeli internationalisation has been framed in the literature, and provides a model which holds considerable explanatory power for the shifting patterns of internationalisation in Israel over time.

As delineated in section 7.2, this thesis deeply engages with diaspora and its role in shaping IoHE over time. Specifically, this thesis develops novel rationales (e.g. creating and perpetuating diaspora identities, links, cultural revival); histories; strategies (e.g. diaspora engagement); forms (e.g. diaspora mobility); and actors (e.g. diaspora) of internationalisation. While some of these aspects may be distinctive to HU and Israel more broadly, this thesis challenges many areas of HE literature on diaspora (e.g. role and motivations of the State for engaging with diaspora and in IoHE; diaspora roles and agency; rationales; histories) and indicates that diaspora is an important and underexplored category in IoHE. In addition to introducing a fresh lens to study and analyse internationalisation (diaspora), this thesis draws attention to the importance of the nature (e.g. in this case ethnoreligious) of the state, its stage in nation-building and its relations with diaspora in shaping internationalisation. This is timely as the rise of anti-globalisation governments and movements are increasingly putting the focus back on the state; and as many younger nations embrace internationalisation as a strategic policy, often trying to harness relations with ‘their’ diaspora. Governance and its actors are likewise developed as a key component of internationalisation and this thesis reveals the importance of diaspora (transnational), national and institutional identities in shaping internationalisation. Furthermore, this thesis challenges widespread assumptions about definitions of internationalisation; its converging nature and the reactive role of internationalisation to globalisation. Thus, this thesis contributes to critical internationalisation scholarship by exposing the (Western) assumptions in the literature, and questioning its relevance in different contexts. In this way, this thesis contributes to greater understanding of internationalisation through its findings, and through this critical perspective. While internationalisation in Israel represents a case with distinctive features, I suggest that it is not an isolated case and that there are likely many other cases which are not adequately explained by the literature.

This thesis departs from the widespread approaches of the literature and employs an historical method to trace the political, economic, and social interactions and relationships
which shape internationalisation – and their evolution over time. The contributions of this thesis could only have been brought to the fore through such an approach. Thus, I further demonstrated my secondary argument, and showed the fruitfulness of the historical approach and the great extent to which contemporary internationalisation is shaped by its roots in higher education. This approach has shown its robustness and invites others from diverse contexts to analyse ‘deviant’ cases to enrich understanding about internationalisation globally.

This thesis contributes to Israel studies by tracing the development of Israel’s international, transnational and domestic relations through the international dimension of HU. While there are partial histories of some universities, studies on HE policy and studies of diaspora youth travel, informal youth education initiatives, and university experiences, there has yet to be a significant analysis of this area which pulls these areas together. This study develops the political, economic, and social conditions, structures, actors, and networks implicated in internationalisation throughout the State’s history - and indeed, even before the founding of the State. While this in itself contributes to the academic knowledge of Israeli society, this thesis makes a practical contribution to policymaking. This thesis identifies the explanatory categories, actors and concepts of Israeli internationalisation over time. I view a critical understanding of how, why and by/for whom policies/infrastructures/programmes were created, as important pre-cursors to critical and effective policymaking (and borrowing). As internationalisation becomes increasingly a top priority of both the State and HEIs, this study will grant policy-makers important insight into how internationalisation has been and is becoming – identifying the main actors, their rationales and strategies, which could be influenced and represent areas where change could emerge and how internationalisation could be reoriented towards other goals.

7.4 Limitations

This thesis has four main limitations: scope; scale; categories and method. The scope of the thesis was necessarily limited given that the empirical sources address the State, institutional and diaspora levels of internationalisation. It does not focus on individual experiences or perspectives; thus, the role of individual agency is underdeveloped (Pomper, 1996). For this reason, I likewise cannot (nor was it the aim of this thesis) to evaluate the effectiveness of IHE programmes (e.g. if the RIS actually instilled/perpetuated a diasporic identity among its participants). The scale of the project was likewise limited to one institution, HU, because given the historical method, the project would have become unwieldy; moreover, the inclusion of additional institutions would have not been able to develop the historical trajectory.
This thesis employs large categories (i.e. ‘State,’ ‘Diaspora’ and ‘University’) which tend to homogenise, with a significant focus on the group, particularly elites and to underdevelop individual agency (Pomper, 1996; Vertovec, 2005). Large categories tend to lump people together, who may have very disparate identities and lived experiences because of membership in a certain national/religious/ethnic/ancestral/organisational group (Fass, 2003). It may also cloud understanding of institutional dynamics (e.g. ‘the State’ is not unitary and different branches may (not) be active in diaspora affairs, in (dis)similar ways, see: Koinova & Tsourapas, 2018). Another consideration is that at times, using a large category can understate differences within categories (e.g. ‘Diaspora’ in the first period, is both an affluent one which supports a research-oriented university as a ‘spiritual centre;’ and an oppressed one seeking refuge from persecution). In this thesis there is also significant overlap in the explanatory categories of the thesis (i.e. Diaspora, State and University). To counter simplistic and essentialist views, throughout this thesis, I have drawn attention to these nuances and challenges; I have purposefully analysed the different views between and among the different categories (e.g. Zionist and Diaspora views on the creation of HU; different Diaspora reactions to HU’s shift away from Diaspora mobility). I further demonstrated the great extent of movement and interaction between these categories/actors over time, which resonates with emerging migration theories that begin with movement (as opposed to stasis) as its point of departure (Nail, 2015).

The historical method, and specifically archival research has several limitations. It is broadly associated with elitist research. Archives take time and resources and a great deal of effort to preserve, and thus, the documents preserved tend to reflect an elite or privileged perspective and are inherently partial and unbalanced (Opotow & Belmonte, 2016; Tamboukou, 2014). Moreover, the focus on HU, as an elite research institution further represents an elitist perspective. Another shortcoming is that historical documents and reflections can only answer certain types of questions (Berg & Lune, 2012). With the documents and interviews conducted, I was not be able to answer questions about how international students experienced HU. I am likewise unable to answer questions about marginalised populations (e.g. Palestinian students). The fact that the HU archives are sealed for the last 10 years, hindered the development of an internal view of HU’s development in the contemporary period. While I supplemented publicly available documents and interviews for these documents, it is possible that when the archives are opened in future that my arguments will be revised. Finally, this thesis explores the case of internationalisation at HU, which I argue has had significant influence in the Israeli context, however, it cannot be generalised to the entire HE sector in Israel, nor is this the purpose of the thesis. Rather, the aim was to explore a ‘deviant’ case to expand the historical timelines, rationales, forms, strategies, categories and
actors of internationalisation to enhance understanding of internationalisation globally. Thus, despite the limitations, this thesis sheds light on the inner workings of Israeli internationalisation, challenges, modifies and enhances the literature and expands understanding of the nature, rationales, and enactment of internationalisation in diverse societies.

7.5 Future directions

This thesis provides fertile ground for future research in several directions. First, the exploration of diaspora in relation to IoHE. This thesis indicates that diaspora could be an important conceptual lens, actor and explanatory category to analyse and understand various aspects of internationalisation, from ISM, to research partnerships, funding, and governance. Furthermore, I demonstrate that international higher education can be used to create and foster Diaspora connections and identities (i.e. diasporisation). In the current tumultuous period of COVID 19, in which states are reaching out to ‘their’ diasporas, calling international students and co-nationals ‘home;’ expelling and controlling mobility and which racism and xenophobia are directed at the ‘other,’ diaspora is becoming an even more appropriate lens to understand contemporary international HE. However, the question remains: to what extent does the Israeli case, as an archetypal one, extend to other contexts? It would be insightful to conduct comparative research in other ethnoreligious diasporas/states to understand the extent to which the Israeli case is distinctive, or more indicative of a model of ‘ethnonationalist internationalisation.’ Case studies particularly of states that are considered ‘ethnonationalist’ (as opposed to civil nationalist) would be constructive as a first step in this research agenda. Such research could develop a typology of different forms of internationalisation, and their organising concepts, with potential to explain variances in IoHE, unpacking concepts such as nations, nationalisms, nation-states, mobility and belonging. This could lead to other questions: To what extent are HE systems internationalising and/or diasporising? What are the connections and distinguishing features between diasporisation and internationalisation in different contexts?

While I focus on an ethnoreligious/national diaspora, the vast movement of students and academic staff, indicates that HE could also be serving as a site for the creation of new forms of diaspora, which perhaps incorporate ethnic elements, but not exclusively so (e.g. groups of international students and staff). Indeed, Rizvi (2019) has argued this point in relation to HE and the creation of a ‘Business Diaspora.’ The movement of globally mobile people through higher education is creating new diaspora formations and studies of these
formations, their binding ideologies and characteristics could shed light on emerging shifts in global society and the role HE plays in this. This research agenda would focus on movement and connectivity over time and place; in combination with structural issues (e.g. nationality, ethnicity, religion) in which diaspora could serve as a robust conceptual tool.

Third, while diaspora can be used to analyse inclusion in a transnational group, it can also be a powerful lens to analyse exclusion. This thesis reveals the politics of diaspora and how these impact on internationalisation. While I have focused on the Jewish Diaspora and emerging Israeli Diaspora, I am acutely aware of another diaspora that has been marginalised in Israeli internationalisation: the Palestinian Arab Diaspora. As the thesis progressed, I became fascinated with how the model that was developing in Israeli HE, must necessarily impact on internationalisation in the Palestinian Arab Diaspora (both within and outside Israel). Indeed, emerging research from Palestinian Arab Minority Israelis (PAMI) colleagues, reveals that some of the same forces which brought Jewish international students to Israeli universities (e.g. nation-building; Jewish cultural revival), resulted in large cohorts of PAMI students studying in Jordan and in other neighbouring Arab countries, connecting with and creating new diasporas (Arar & Haj-Yehia, 2010). In order to have a more comprehensive understanding of the role of diaspora in internationalisation, further research which would comprehensively explore these two diasporas in parallel could provide significant insights on how the politics of diaspora inclusion/exclusion operate through HE and their implications for social cohesion and justice.

Fourth, I discovered considerable overlap between internationalisation and access policies at the institutional level, through the Mechinot for PAfEJ students at HU, most of whom do not hold Israeli citizenship. Despite recent calls to investigate how these two policies could be incorporated to promote global social justice (Tannock, 2018), little empirical research has investigated the nexus of these policies. Thus, this thesis reveals an exciting empirical opportunity to explore the intersection of access and internationalisation policies. Future research which explores how these polices are formed and conceptualised at the national level; interpreted and implemented in institutional practice; and lived by students holds considerable promise to expand thinking on how social justice and internationalisation are brought together. This area of research is particularly important as globally access and internationalisation policies are coming together through ‘forced internationalisation’ in refugee contexts (e.g. Germany; Turkey, see Ergin, de Wit & Leask, 2019) and as scholars become increasingly concerned with ethical internationalisation (e.g. Pashby & de Oliveira Andreotti, 2016; Stein et al., 2019). Thus, an examination of this empirical case could provide significant theoretical and practical implications for ethical internationalisation in the Israeli context and more broadly.
7.6 Concluding remarks

The departure point of this thesis was that the existing literature did not accurately explain internationalisation in the Israeli case. Through an in-depth study over time, I aimed to broaden understanding of internationalisation and its organising and explanatory concepts, rationales, strategies, actors and forms to facilitate a greater understanding of its manifestations globally. Taking HU as a ‘deviant’ case, I argued that internationalisation in Israel can be understood at the nexus of the events, priorities and identities of the Diaspora, State and University. This thesis thus, provided significant explanatory power of internationalisation in Israel and developed themes around the contemporary and historical roles of the state and nation-building in shaping IoHE; the diaspora in IoHE; diasporic, national and institutional identities in shaping IoHE; and governance. It likewise introduces new rationales, histories, actors and concepts into the literature, while challenging much of its widespread framing, and embedded normative assumptions. Despite several limitations, this thesis provides significant contribution to both the academic knowledge and policymaking of internationalisation in the Israeli context, while advancing understanding of internationalisation, opening new ways to think about internationalisation. Thus, in this thesis I demonstrated that ‘internationalisation’ allows for a multitude of ideas and practices that at times may align and fuse with understandings in the literature but extend beyond. Internationalisation should be understood as a multi-faceted and complex assemblage of practices in which multiple intentions and ideas are interwoven with particular economic, political, social and cultural concerns which shift over time and space. The current tendency in the literature towards a reliance on a progressive neoliberal framing of internationalisation as a reaction to globalisation limits our understanding of internationalisation in diverse contexts. As this thesis has shown the limits of the literature to explain internationalisation in Israel, I suggested that there are likely many other contexts in which internationalisation is not adequately explained by the literature. In this way I suggested that while Israel has many distinctive features, it is not an isolated case. Thus, I argued for more nuanced, critical, historical and contextually-dependent analyses of internationalisation. This thesis should be viewed as an invitation to scholars to pursue novel approaches in diverse contexts to provide greater understanding of internationalisation.

See also Troen (1992).

See also: Marks, J. (2010). Rousseau's Use of the Jewish Example. The Review of Politics, 72(3), 463-481


Before widespread Jewish emancipation in Europe beginning in the late 18th and early 20th centuries, Jews were barred from several countries (e.g. Spain, Norway), and were denied citizenship and equal rights in the countries they resided. A strong tradition of Jews establishing their own social institutions and services developed in Jewish communities over time (e.g. schools, courts).


4 Born in 1860 in Pest, Kingdom of Hungary, Herzl advocated for a Jewish State, formed and headed the ZO, and is considered the father of Zionism and the State of Israel. He died in Vienna in 1904 before State creation. For a republished version of his original Dur Jeugestaat with updated commentaries and a biography of Herzl's life see:


6 In the HUYBs and other primary sources, there is a notable absence of any discussion of institutionalised antisemitism in higher education in Western Europe and North America, despite numerous studies on the subject. This may have been because the monied Diaspora in these countries, which financially supported HU, was not keen to have this publicized. For an historical study on institutionalised antisemitism at elite universities in the United States see: Karabel, J. (2005). The chosen: The hidden history of admission and exclusion at Harvard, Yale and Princeton. New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin. For an astute and comprehensive study of the historical development of antisemitism in England (including its elite universities) see Julius, A. (2010). Trials of the Diaspora: A history of Anti-Semitism in England. Oxford University Press.


9 Cultural Zionists focused on Jewish cultural revival in the Land of Israel that would benefit the whole of the Jewish people. This was distinctive from the mainstream political Zionism of Herzl, which sought to develop an internationally recognized sovereign Jewish community in Palestine, through political means.

The Cultural Zionists were led by Ahad Ha’am (Shlomo Ginsberg) who was born in 1857 in the Russian Empire. He is arguably the most respected of the early intellectual Zionist thinkers; he advocated settlement in the Land of Israel (not necessarily a political State) to create a secular ‘spiritual centre’ for the Jewish people as a whole.

For an in-depth biography of the life, writing and thought of Ahad Ha'am, see:


12 Hebrew University of Jerusalem (1939). Hebrew University of Jerusalem: Its History and Development. Tel Aviv: Haaretz Press. HUA. p. 2


19 Bentwich notes that Rothschild extended support on the stipulation that Weizmann receive support from Jewish intellectuals, particularly of Paul Ehrlich, a German Jewish scientist who discovered the cure for Syphilis. This was a theme that would repeat itself: the desire for Jewish academics around the world to support HU. Having convinced Ehrlich, Rothschild agreed to support the institution and nominated his son James de Rothschild to represent him on HU Committee.


20 Revisionist Zionism, founded by Vladimir (Ze’ev) Jabotinsky, aimed to establish a Jewish state with a Jewish majority over the entire Land of Israel. It emphasises physical settlement over political processes to achieve this aim and is the basis of contemporary right-wing Israeli politics and the Likud party.


28 This is a play on Ahad Ha’am’s words when he distinguishes between a Jewish State and a State for the Jews.


30 At this time Kamel el Husseini, not Haj Amin Husseini, a collaborator with Hitler in WWII, and a bitter enemy of the British, the Jews and Zionism; see: Rowley & Taylor (2006).


33 The Jewish National Fund was the centralised fund of the Zionist Organisation to purchase and develop land in Palestine.


36 Chaim Weizmann; Eliezer Ben-Yehuda; David Yellin; Menachem Ussishkin; Ahad Ha’am and his son, Shlomo Ginzberg; Norman Bentwich; Judah Magnes (who installed his family in Jerusalem at this time); Dr. L. A. Mayer, who had been the Jewish member on the Committee for the English University; and Joseph Klausner.


37 The London Committee was chaired by Chief Rabbi Dr. Hertz and with Dr. Buechler and James de Rothschild as members. A similar Committee was organised in Paris, headed under the Chief Rabbi, Israel Levi.


The closing line of this quote is an ancient Hebrew benediction, which is recited on special occasions, and from which one derives pleasure or benefit. Common instances where it is employed are on major Jewish holidays, the birth of a child, acquiring a new home or items of significant value, and performance of some religious rituals.


46 Even when teaching began in 1928, tuition was not introduced until the 1931/32 academic year and only comprised 1.3% of the operating budget. Over time, student numbers increased and in 1936/37 tuition came to represent 12.1% of annual receipts growing to about 12.5% in 1946/47. However, HU Administration felt that there was a limit to this which was reinforced by War Time, and a student strike even when modest increases were introduced.


50 Hebrew University of Jerusalem (1939). Hebrew University of Jerusalem: Its History and Development. Tel Aviv: Haaretz Press. HUA.

51 Hebrew University of Jerusalem (1939). Hebrew University of Jerusalem: Its History and Development. Tel Aviv: Haaretz Press. HUA.

52 The Committee was comprised of Sir. Philip Hartog, Prof. Louis Ginsberg, and Dr. Redcliffe Salaman.

See:


57 Reflecting the focus on research, the first degrees conferred at HU, were Master of Arts and Sciences degrees (Magister Artium; Magister Scientiarum) and later the Doctor of Philosophy (PhD). Most programmes offered at HU in the pre-State period were based off of a 4 year-MA or MSc (Faculty of Humanities and Sciences) programme, although some programmes (e.g. School of Agriculture) deviated from this framework. Masters students must have attended for at least four years and passed all final exams in one major and two minor subjects to matriculate; students were free to attend (or not) classes as they wished and besides the comprehensive final exams at the
end of the four-year course, no additional coursework was required. The PhD was at least two years of research beyond the MA and a thesis which was approved by the Senate. The fact that the BA degree was not granted in this period, reflects the way in which degrees at the time were designed not to create a civil service for the Zionist movement; rather, in line with the Germanic model, the desire to pursue pure knowledge, and the purpose of teaching to train research assistants – not civil servants or cater to the needs of the labour market.


63 The British White Paper of 1939 came in the wake of the Arab Revolts in Palestine (1936-1939), the Peel Commission and Woodhead Conference. It was a government policy that rejected partition of Palestine. It restricted Jewish immigration to Palestine to 75,000 people over the next five years and restricted Jewish purchase of land. See: The Avalon Project, Yale Law School. *British White Paper of 1939.* Retrieved from: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/brwh1939.asp

64 Indeed, the Technion at the time lent its services to the British in the war effort but continued its support for the Haganah (the pre-cursor to the Israeli Defense Force). See Cohen (2003).


An exhibition entitled 'Uprooted: The German-Jewish Scholars of the Hebrew University,' at the Jewish National Library of HU in 2018 revealed several letters from the HUA documenting the plight of Jewish students in Occupied Europe in the 1930s and 40s. These letters (to the Admissions Committee) follow several students who sought to gain admission to HU as a way of escape. These letters illuminate the difficult situation of the students, and indicate that HU relaxed its admissions standards to help save students. However, these efforts were severely limited due to the British quotas on immigration, a lack of immigration certificates and financial resources. See: Aderet, O. (2018, November 17). Life-or-death Applications to Hebrew University Exhibited. Haaretz. Retrieved from: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-life-or-death-applications-to-hebrew-university-exhibited-1.6657590

See also Benavot (2009).


In the early years of the Zionist movement under the British mandate, local Zionist elites were aligned with the Kibbutz movement and the local militias; the Kibbutz movement was largely hostile towards higher education,
viewing manual labour (i.e. practical Zionism) as the key towards making a Jewish community in Palestine. For a history of the changing attitudes of the Kibbutz movement towards higher education see:


114 This was due in part because of the restrictions placed on immigration due to the White Paper of 1939, and also as Fascist Europe closed its doors to Jewish emigration.

115 Penslar (2017), critiquing the widespread and loose usage of ‘colonialism,’ argues that it is used as a pejorative catch-all and obscures more than it explains. He argues instead that greater understanding of Zionism could perhaps be achieved through other theoretical lenses; or that at least there must be recognition that the Jews were themselves a colonised people and that Zionism had anti-colonial; de-colonial and colonial aspects embedded in it.


117 For a map of the partition plan, and a map of the armistice lines in 1949, see:


119 Traditional Zionist historiography was that the Arab population of Palestine willingly fled during the Arab-Israeli War of 1948. However, as new archival material has become available scholars from the ‘new history’ camp, have convincingly argued that many were expelled by the IDF, and that these expulsions began in the lead-up to the Arab-Israeli War of 1948.


121 There was a fortnightly convoy to supply the hospital and university; and to change guards. The rest of East Jerusalem was inaccessible. One of my interview participants and a long-serving senior administrator at HU served in this convoy.


124 The displacement of Jews across the Middle East coupled with ideological Aliyah; and the expulsion of Arabs from Palestine during the Arab – Israeli War of 1948, has been portrayed by many as a ‘population exchange.’ However, critics have questioned this logic, arguing that the timelines do not support such a theory and that the Israeli government has long pursued a policy of ‘constructed ambiguity’ on the subject. See: Shenhav, Y. (2006). The Arab Jews: A Postcolonial Reading of Nationalism, Religion, and Ethnicity. Stanford University Press.

125 Aliyah is a value-laden term which means ‘to ascend’ and in this context means Jewish immigration to the Israel. It is connected to the three Jewish historical pilgrimages undertaken to Jerusalem at the festivals of
Sukkot, Passover and Shavuot. Thus, ‘Aliyah’ is also used within Israel to describe going to Jerusalem from other locations in the country (e.g. Ascending from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem).

In 1970 this would be expanded to all that had at least one Jewish grandparent; or the spouse or child of such a person. This definition varies from the Orthodox definition which defines a Jew through matrilineal decent; this extension was based on Nazi racial laws.

The HUYB of 2000 republished a letter from the Government of Israel to HU in the early days of the State (August 1948) which stated:

‘…in the future as in the past, the city of Jerusalem shall be the religious, cultural, and scientific center of the entire country and of the Jewish People...it is incumbent upon The Hebrew University to continue its activities and to develop them in Jerusalem, as a central scientific institution of Palestine and the State of Israel.’

Cohen (2003) reveals the HU reaction to this statement at the time, and the panic which ensued as ‘a central...’ as opposed to ‘the central’ in the above text was taken as a possible threat to HU’s hegemony over HE in the new State.

For a detailed history of its creation see Volanksy (2005).

Teacher training in the new State was chiefly an activity of the teaching training colleges, not the University. Many prominent teacher training colleges were established in the pre-State period or shortly thereafter (Seminar HaKibbutzim, 1939; Levinsky College, 1913; Beit Berl College, 1949; Gordon College, 1953; David Yellin College, 1913). During this period, these colleges were budgeted under the Ministry of Education (not the PBC).

This opened in 1963 in cooperation with the Israel Defence Forces (I.D.F.); the Ministry of Education; and with financial backing from Sephardic Jewish communities in the US. A long correspondence trail can be found in the HUA on this subject under the file name/number: Courses for students from abroad, 2182.

Israeli University students are older than their counterparts in much of the world due to mandatory military service. Shortly after the founding of the State, men were conscripted for 2.5 years and women 1.5; this was increased to 3 and 2 years respectively in 1968.
The HU YB of 1957 refers to ‘the university in exile,’ a particularly derogative term in Judaism; it also emphasises a historical connection to the land on which HU was established.


For a campus map, see:


This document was procured through the kind assistance of Dr. Adi Sherzer-Druckman.

Ben-Gurion notes that it is not only HU, but also ‘her daughters’ meaning other universities around the country.


There are many disputed versions of the 1967 War. Guy Laron writing in The Nation, argues that the basic difference in these histories is their position with regard to the ‘grand narrative’ of inevitability of the War. He writes: ‘American and Israeli writers who believe that the Arab-Israeli conflict is intractable and unsolvable are still searching for ways to portray Israel’s attack in 1967 as an act of self-defense. This is part of a larger narrative that depicts Israel as a Western citadel surrounded by a hostile Arab world. Historians who believe that Arab-Israeli coexistence and cooperation are possible seek to show that the war was avoidable and that a diplomatic solution to the crisis of May 1967 was within reach. In short, when we debate the Six-Day War, what we are actually arguing about are the chances for peace in the Middle East today.’


For more detailed histories see:


East Jerusalem is a disputed territory. Israel annexed this area after the Six-Day War in 1967, however, this is not recognised by international law.


More than 120 HU staff and students were killed in the war and over 200 spent extended periods in hospital; in 1975, about 100 students still received psychological care in connection with the war. The academic year was significantly delayed, beginning only at the end of December, however, large numbers of students and staff remained in reserve duty even then.


A set of agreements between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) signed in 1993 and 1995 which were aimed at establishing a peace between the two based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.


178 Proposal for a Joint USA-Israel Fund for Development of Science, Scientific Research and HE. Authority for Research and Development Collection (219, 1970, Folder 4). HUA.


HU conducted significant lobbying from the Washington office, and there is a considerable trail of correspondence between the AR&D, the Israeli Embassy in Washington, FM officials and US government offices, highlighting combined lobbying efforts and close collaboration between the AR&D and the State, particularly as concerns the development of the BSF. This correspondence between HU, the Israeli FM and US government officials precedes the founding of the US office of HU. For example, a letter date August 27, 1962, from the then head of the AR&D, W. Low to Dr. A Lahav, Scientific Attaché at the Israel embassy, stated ‘…it is very important for me to know the main science advisers connected with the Kennedy Administration. This includes all scientific endeavour, that is to say Medicine, Physical Sciences, Agriculture, etc.’


This correspondence intensified with the opening of the Washington office, which was eventually supported financially in part by the Technion and Weizmann Institute, as the activities served all Israeli Universities contacts with the US government.


After 10 years with the Washington office, HU decided not to renew this contract and instead opened an office for the AR&D in the AFHU office in New York. This new office would take over the Washington, D.C. operations and would also begin to cover medium and small Foundations; it would be headed of the former AR&D Director, Alex Keynan who relocated to NY. This move from Washington to NY, represented a shift in the situation in US funding. While HU was still getting significant funds from the federal government, these were now institutionalised through the bi-national programmes, and there was less of a need for direct lobbying in Washington, D.C. However, the small and med-sized foundations, as well as the increasing role of American Jewry in endowing and funding research facilitated this shift in location and priority. Interestingly, in the question of salary for the staff of the new office, the 1980 Executive Committee meeting minutes, note that ‘…our representative in the United States was receiving the same salary as was received by comparable personnel of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs,’ indicating that the role was viewed similarly.


There was an AR&D representative in Germany (Dr. I. Rappaport) as early as 1970, however, the first mention of an office is in 1973.


more such links. See the following archival sources:


- MASHAV has been linked to the State’s activities designed to cultivate votes in the UN, particularly in Africa in the period up until the Yom Kippur war in order to thwart the Arab boycott. See: Oded (2009).


- It further suggests HU develop a position paper on research on/with developed nations to be distributed among foundations - which was carried out by AR&D Head, Alex Keynan. See:


- It was the only organisation which could transfer research funding outside of Germany and between 1968 -1969 they awarded HU $300,000 US for the Red Sea Marine Research Station at Eilat. DFG received the funds from a ‘third party.’ The archival trail reveals two possible options for this source. One source was the Thyssen Fund, which was negotiating with HU directly on the Station and were particularly concerned that it be open to international researchers (with reserved places for Germans) and also that their involvement not be publicised without their consent; this was understood by HU administrators as due to fear that Arab countries would protest. Another possible source of the funds – which would also preclude publicising the connection – were frozen German funds in the US. Correspondence between HU, a German Scientist and the United States Airforce (USAF) representative in Brussels reveals that funds given by Germany to the US to offset the dollar drain due to the US armed forces present on German territory were being held in Washington. The funds were designated for weapons purchases, however, the funds transferred exceeded Germany’s weapons needs and thus, there was a large amount of surplus funds in Washington. The Head of the AR&D, Alex Keynan, solicited the USAF Representative in Brussels to use these funds for research. At no time in the HU archives did I find marketing materials or even in the BOG reports, a mention of this German support, but rather in the AR&D report from 1968 it was referred to as a ‘large donation from an overseas organization.’ This example shows the complicated, political nature of research funding; there may have been more such links. See the following archival sources:


  - Keynan, A. (N.D) [Cover Letter to Report on Meeting with Researchers from the Institute for Genetics and Biophysics in Napoli, On the Background of Refusal to Participate as Teachers in a Joint Israeli-Italian Course in Jerusalem – For Political Reasons]. Authority for Research and Development Collection (219, 1968, Folder 4). HUA.


  - It further suggests HU develop a position paper on research on/with developed nations to be distributed among foundations - which was carried out by AR&D Head, Alex Keynan. See:


  - It was the only organisation which could transfer research funding outside of Germany and between 1968 -1969 they awarded HU $300,000 US for the Red Sea Marine Research Station at Eilat. DFG received the funds from a ‘third party.’ The archival trail reveals two possible options for this source. One source was the Thyssen Fund, which was negotiating with HU directly on the Station and were particularly concerned that it be open to international researchers (with reserved places for Germans) and also that their involvement not be publicised without their consent; this was understood by HU administrators as due to fear that Arab countries would protest. Another possible source of the funds – which would also preclude publicising the connection – were frozen German funds in the US. Correspondence between HU, a German Scientist and the United States Airforce (USAF) representative in Brussels reveals that funds given by Germany to the US to offset the dollar drain due to the US armed forces present on German territory were being held in Washington. The funds were designated for weapons purchases, however, the funds transferred exceeded Germany’s weapons needs and thus, there was a large amount of surplus funds in Washington. The Head of the AR&D, Alex Keynan, solicited the USAF Representative in Brussels to use these funds for research. At no time in the HU archives did I find marketing materials or even in the BOG reports, a mention of this German support, but rather in the AR&D report from 1968 it was referred to as a ‘large donation from an overseas organization.’ This example shows the complicated, political nature of research funding; there may have been more such links. See the following archival sources:

Keynan, A. (1968, September, 17) [Letter to Dr. H.L. Mossbauer]. Authority for Research and Development Collection (219, 1968, Folder 4). HUA.


247 Beyond the actual number of students, what is clear is the tremendous effort put into recruiting and accommodating these students, not just at HU, but also across the HEIs, JAFI, and government. This reflected the perceived importance of these students for national and transnational goals. A RIS staff member elaborated:

*Viewed against the background of current political and economic crises, the potential nature of this body of overseas students deserves special attention and consideration. Even if this group comprises only a small percentage of the total population, its effect on both the future of the university and of the country is inestimable.*
While it was not possible to find comprehensive data on all international students and programmes in Israeli HEIs over time, statistical data from the PBC/CHE Committee over several decades revealed that HU consistently accommodated the most international students in the OYSP and Mechina – by a significant margin. For example in 1988/89, the PBC/CHE Committee funded 848 students at HU, with Tel Aviv University the second largest institution for international students, trailing significantly behind at 550 students (see below).

**PBC/CHE Committee Funded International students in OYSP and Mechina, by HEI, 1988/89**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HEI</th>
<th>International Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HU</td>
<td>848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAU</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa University</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem College for Girls</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bar Ilan University</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ben-Gurion University</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technion</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Elective Programme</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wingate Institute</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem College of Technology</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betzalel Academy of Art and Design</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shenkar School of Textile Science and Fashion</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is not surprising that HU led in the sector in international students. The RIS had the oldest and most organised infrastructure for international students and also actively helped the other Universities create their own international programmes (in their own image) and aided them at different times with programme development, admissions and marketing abroad, particularly Haifa and Ben-Gurion University. Reflecting on this, a past RIS Vice-Provost noted:

‘The programs in the other universities would not exist were it not for us, because we were not only the pioneers, but gave them all the material and all the encouragement because we saw this as a national project.’


While Israel may have been a popular destination for American (Jewish) students during this period, not only did a small percentage of Americans study abroad but in addition a small percentage of American Jewish students participated in these programmes - to the continued frustration of HU and its partners, notably JAFI. The CHE/PBC Committee originally hoped to double international student numbers in 2-3 years, and had estimated a pool of approximately 40,000 American Jewish students in the US. However, in 1985, after receiving the Open Doors statistics for all US students (27,145 students studying abroad in total), Prof. Levtzion remarked in a letter to the PBC/CHE Steering Committee members:

‘Based on these statistics we have to let go of the myth of ‘40,000 Jewish students from US that go abroad every year.’ It is clear that only a small percentage of American students go overseas to study. People in the know say that the numbers are even getting smaller because students are becoming more pragmatic.’


Difficulties with recruitment were likely exacerbated by the fact that HU and the HE system as a whole appealed to and targeted students with strong Jewish affiliations at a time when assimilation was rising and Jewish education waning. Moreover, those with strong Jewish identities of the Orthodox persuasion, likely went to Yeshivas (Jewish seminary) or Bar Ilan University, that was linked to the National Religious movement.

Based on these statistics we have to let go of the myth of ‘40,000 Jewish students from US that go abroad every year.’ It is clear that only a small percentage of American students go overseas to study. People in the know say that the numbers are even getting smaller because students are becoming more pragmatic.'


The Israeli consulate in NY pledged financial support for the ASP, however, this does not appear to have materialised, and successive senior HU administrators wrote to the Israeli FM requesting them to honour their pledge. See for example:


This was supposed to be a temporary support programme, however, it continues until today.


There was considerable debate about the best infrastructure to handle international/olim students and extended discussions about different possibilities for accommodating them. Notably there was concern from the about a separate English programme lowering the level of HU; and also of American students bringing drugs into the University.

There were several different Mechinot at the time; for Israelis and Olim. When the SOS was created, it took possession of the Olim Mechina, while the Centre for Pre-Academic Studies, continued the Mechina for Israelis.


HU was protective on this account and when other universities and institutions in Israel began offering transfer credit to American universities that HU deemed unworthy of such, and that might cast doubt on the quality of its programmes, HU petitioned the PBC/CHE to intervene.


The archival record reveals a certain opportunistic nature to programme development. Programmes (including their formal and informal components) were created based on cooperation with different partners. Some of these were with other Universities; some Zionist or Jewish organisations, some with government ministries. In interviews with a past Vice- Provost of the RIS, this was expressed as an ‘entrepreneurial’ attitude towards
creating programmes, and continual efforts of the RIS to keep their finger ‘on the pulse’ of Jewish communities around the world, to create programmes that would appeal to them.

Ulpan, summer courses and tailored programmes are not dealt with in the main body of the thesis. These are analysed in Appendix Q.


270 The academic staff of the programme was of great variance over the period. Some teachers were world-renown scholars from the HU faculties, however, there were also great numbers of contractual workers, Emeritus staff and those who did not have tenure-track positions in the University, indicating a lack of parity with HU faculties. Given that teaching in the RIS would not lead to the development of research assistants, BOO minutes noted that professors likely felt that teaching in the RIS was part of a service they provided for Zionist purposes. The quality of the teaching staff (as viewed by grade in the University) fluctuated considerably with different teaching policies over the period, such as counting RIS teaching towards required teaching hours in the faculties; and additional payments for teaching in the RIS, however, with austerity measures in the University over the period, these initiatives dwindled. The academic level and reputation of the programme were viewed by Administrators as key to preserving the programme. So, on the one hand, the School required high quality teachers, but on the other hand it also needed teachers who could teach in English (or other languages), relate to international students, and who would be willing to teach in the programme. The archival record reveals that there was recognition by the Administration of the RIS that the best researchers at HU were not always suitable for teaching international students; and from academic staffing decisions, it appears that the later consideration trumped the quality concern, and senior faculty members were sometimes removed from teaching at RIS.


274 Provost’s Report, The Rothberg School for Overseas Students 1995/96. School for Overseas Students Collection (1999, 1995-1996, International Board). HUA. p. 10. In other sources 607 was the number of OYSP for this year. At times the statistics between reports on student numbers varied, however usually by only a few students.

275 In addition to the OYSP, in an effort to attract students directly from high school to HU (without the pressure to make Aliyah), a Freshmen programme was created in 1967/68. It had a similar curriculum to the OYSP, however, courses were offered on a more introductory level. At the end of the year, they could either join the Mechina, or if their language and qualifications were sufficient, enter the HU faculties; or transfer their credits back to a US university.


278 Dov Friedlander, Penina Morag Talmon and Daphne Ruth Moshayov. The One-Year Program in Israel: An Evaluation, North American Jewish Students in the Rothberg School for Overseas Students at the Hebrew

280 Given high assimilation rates in the US, the fact that OYSP appealed primarily to affiliated students, necessarily limited its recruitment pool.


282 The other preparatory programmes, were for those who potentially met the requirements but did not know Hebrew; their matriculation certificates were not recognised by HU; or they needed to improve their scores or prepare for the psychometric entrance exam.

283 In some years, preparation for the psychometric exam was also offered as part of the programme.


While there was never any specific reason given for offering Jewish/Israeli courses in students’ mother tongue, these courses were likely considered so important to the integration of the student into Israeli society, that they must be taught in the students’ mother tongue to facilitate their understanding as a key component of their integration into Israeli society. The variety of languages offered in the Mechina, linked with different waves of Aliyah spawned courses in specific languages (e.g. Jewish Studies courses in Hungarian) which after this wave subsided, would be cancelled and teachers made redundant.


Similar missions took place throughout South America during the 1980s a time of considerable political upheaval and also after antisemitic attacks (e.g. bombing of Argentinian Jewish Community Centre). In Russia, before the large wave of Aliyah, representatives from HU (with FM and JAFI support) were likewise sent to assess credentials and prepare for a mass Aliyah and enrolment in the RIS.


Actually 38 countries were listed, and one continent: Africa.

Certain aspects of the formal curriculum did cater towards non-Jewish populations, such as the Vatican Pontifical programme and Bible translators.


This programme appears to have been undertaken more for public and foreign relations than purely academic purposes. In a solicitation letter from Avraham Harman to Dr. Gerhard Riegner of the World Jewish Congress, he notes 'There is no need for me to elaborate on the importance of this programme, in furthering Israel's relations with the Catholic world, nor on its academic success. It has also received comprehensive international press coverage in recent years.'


There was evidence in the archival record of attempts to broaden this focus at different points, however, these did not materialise. See for example:


Interestingly, particularly in the earlier part of this period, mentally and physically fit students were also desired, and health forms were submitted to the admissions committee and factored into the admissions decision. This suggests a further link with the programme to select desirable future immigrants.

In addition to FM students in the RIS, several programmes sponsored by MASHAV (e.g. MA Public Health; MD) were from the outset built with cooperation from the W.H.O and were not located within the RIS. Rather they had their own administrative infrastructures within the different faculties. These programmes were particularly active in the 1960s.

These programmes were however, highlighted in HU public relations and marketing materials.

The Hebrew text uses the phrase 'רוממות רוח' which has a particularly spiritual connotation.

Notably, this was not the only letter to a Prime Minister about the RIS. Others were found with similar portrayals. For example, a letter from Israel Roi (RIS Vice-Provost) to Prime Minister Yitzchak Rabin in 1976 read:

'The University invests great effort in planning the schedule of special courses in English and in Hebrew and we also make our best effort to develop the general dimension – Israeli and advocacy (ההסברתי). It is well known that many of the alumni of the programme will fill places of leadership in American and Canadian Jewry, in campuses and in communities.'

The letter continues to request him to visit the students and address them at part of a larger marketing and promotion campaign for the RIS.


Summary of Income and Expenditure. Special One Year Course for American Students by the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Jewish Agency for Israel 1959/60. [1960, November 21]. Courses for Students from Abroad Collection (2182, 1960). HUA.


It is rather ironic Rothberg's conviction as he himself was married to a Christian woman. A flyer was found in the archival record publicising this fact to the student body (and questioning the suitability of his involvement as benefactor on these grounds).


From 1972 – 1998, the RIS was located in the Goldsmith Building on Mount Scopus.

A slew of complaint letters from US HEIs (and students) were found in the archive, most of them collected by the AFHU and forwarded to Jerusalem. They were marked ‘confidential’ and sent to top officials, including the RIS Provost and HU President.


The first such evidence was immediately after the 1967 Six-Day war. A memo to Sam Rothberg from the Head of the NY office is instructive:

‘The fact that Aliyah is central to our thinking – the fact that our study program can and do serve as stepping stones toward ultimate settlement in Israel – should not lead to a conclusion that the slogans of Aliyah should figure in our recruitment procedures on American campuses. As a matter of fact, such an approach would be self-defeating. We must be astute enough to recognize that our motivations are not necessarily shared by large segments of the American academic community within which we must function. That communities relates to our study programs for very different reasons. We have gained a firm foothold on many American campuses, over the year and have won acceptance on the part of US colleges on the basis of our high academic standards...we must also avoid an approach which could create resistance on the part of parents who are at present content with the idea that their sons and daughters will be away in Israel for one year of study.’


Forms were sent to Academic staff departing on sabbatical leave, inquiring if they would be willing to help promote the RIS (similar to the AR&D). This was not just the strategy of HU. Professors on sabbatical were also identified as important resources for recruiting international students by the PBC/CHE Committee.

Even when appropriate academic staff could be recruited to promote the RIS abroad, some academic staff felt that they could not retain their academic integrity and pass out brochures after lectures (as they had been requested to do). Thus, while academic staff could access campuses, promotion of RIS had to be done in an understated way.


The actual word in Hebrew was שליח דרבנן (שד"ר. This is an historical term used for Jews who would go out from the Land of Israel to Diaspora communities to collect donations for the Jewish community in the Land of Israel; it was also a way for Jewish communities to stay connected to the Land of Israel and the community that remained there. Thus, the choice of this word, has deeper meaning about how HU viewed this type of work and its connection to the RIS. An alternative word (שגריר) or ‘ambassador’ could have been used to highlight a political/national connection.


The FM also proctored psychometric exams for HU in many countries throughout this period.

Indeed, the only record of Israeli students being sent abroad in an exchange fashion was through the University of California (UoC) agreement, in which undergraduate students from UoC would come to RIS, and Israeli post-graduate students from HU would be hosted (and supplied with stipends) at UoC campuses.


HEC Associate Dean for International Affairs noted, ‘…nowadays as the priority is currently given on self-esteem networking basis we are definitely not ready to endorse any association with ESG…I must stress that HEC, as one of the leading business school in Europe, won’t accept its prestigious name to be used in any ways in a campaign to promote a low level school, without any academic recognition.’


While there was not any archival evidence for this agreement between RIS and ESG; ESG had a large Jewish student population and this might have motivated the cooperation.

A summary report of the first year of activities of the head of the PBC/CHE Committee representative in NY included campus visits; institutional partnerships and American HE sector fairs; a sector-wide marketing campaign under the slogan ‘Study in English in Israel’ (e.g. printing brochures, advertising in daily papers and the Jewish press); visiting campuses and high schools; enlisting help from professors on Sabbatical; soliciting Jewish Federations for cooperation and scholarship funding; Jewish student organisations (e.g. Hillel); and coordinating activities among the different bodies which deal with the area, specifically, the academic offices of the FHU of the different Israeli Universities in NY, representatives of the University Services Department (U.S.D) of the American Zionist Youth Federation; student, community, and youth movement emissaries.


Likewise, similar to HU, Prof. Levtzion sent a letter to all the Academic Secretaries at the Universities, requesting a list of academic staff scheduled to be away on Sabbatical. This list was used to contact professors with the hope to enlist their services in what Levtzion in his opening line of the letter calls a ‘national effort to increase the number of students from overseas coming to study in universities in the country.’


When other Israeli universities began offering international student programmes, the Union of University Heads began to fix a sector-wide tuition for international students in the OYSP and Mechina, which HU was influential in setting.


‘Jewish Continuity’ was an important discourse throughout this period, but particularly in the 1990s. HU conducted a fundraising campaign around ‘Jewish Continuity’ in this period, to which the RIS was closely linked.

Darby, J. (1970, March 30) [Letter to Mr. Issachar Miron, Director of Information and Special Events, American Friends of Hebrew University]. Courses for Students from Abroad Collection (218, 1970). HUA.

This does not appear to have materialized. Indeed, HU regularly subsidised the RIS, both for Hebrew instruction services rendered, and during periods of distress.


This was the source of continual negotiations between the Ministry of Aliyah and Absorption and the RIS.

The RIS was considerably exposed to fluctuations in global financial markets as its receipts were primarily in US dollars, but its expenses (e.g. salaries) were in local currency (NIS).

The RIS office inside the AFHU in New York eventually became the hub for all US students applying to the faculties of HU as well.
By October 1981, 68 Trustees, most from the US, pledged $50,000 US each for this purpose, with Rothberg pledging $500,000.


In 1997, Rothberg would endow the school for a further $2.5 million US.


Proposed Guidelines for Board of Overseers? Trustees?. February 5, 1981. School for Overseas Students Collection (1999, 1980/81, Folder 3). HUA. This document was unsigned but on letterhead from the President of HU (Harman). Several versions were found, all quite similar.

Proposed Guidelines for Board of Overseers? Trustees? February 5, 1981. School for Overseas Students Collection (1999, 1980/81, Folder 3). HUA. which was unsigned but on letterhead from the President of HU, presumably from Harman. Several versions were found, all quite similar.


For a short period when Golda Meir was FM, these projects took on a connection to Jewish ideals of providing a 'Light Unto the Nations' and 'Tikkun Olam.' See: Oded (2009).


In 2018, the first non-budgeted institution, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya was granted CHE permission to award a PhD, in what IDC touted as the first 'private university' in Israel.


Previously Israeli universities had dual heads: a President for administrative matters, and a Rector for academic matters.


HU contended that pension allocations were to be covered (at least in part) by the PBC (MoF), in an historical agreement with the State during its move back to Mount Scopus. This was disputed by the MoF and financial assistance was not forthcoming. The result was ballooning pension payments, which had to be paid out of its operating budget.


At times (only in English) did HU refer to this as a ‘renewal’ plan/programme. In Hebrew it was always a תוכנית הבראה or Recovery Programme. I use the later.


As noted in Chapter 5, the shift towards national aims was viewed as anathema to a certain contingent of HU academics – chief among them, Albert Einstein - who were committed to the pursuit of knowledge through research and the absolute autonomy of the University from the State. Despite this, throughout HU publications, Einstein is widely invoked as a founder and supporter of the direction of the University and is an increasingly integral part of its branding.
Basic Law: Israel - The Nation State Of The Jewish People, was passed in July 2018. It stipulates that Israel is the nation-state of the Jewish people. For a full translation of the law see: https://knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/BasicLawNationState.pdf

While widespread, particularly in the American Jewish left, 'Tikkun Olam' has come under scrutiny for its loose relationship to Judaism and its use to promote a left-wing social justice political agenda. For example, Neumann (2018) argues that contemporary usage of Tikkun Olam, is an invention of the Jewish left, and has diluted the true essence of Jewish practice and belief into a 'vague feel-good religion of social justice,' endangering Judaism and its founding tenants. Pointedly, despite the left's association with secularism, Neumann shows how the Bible is used to support left-wing politics. This debate is indicative of political processes of contestations in Diaspora constructions of national collective identities.


This, of course, should not be taken to speak for all diaspora individuals and communities. HU is known to have a more liberal and progressive donor base. More conservative universities/colleges (e.g. Bar Ilan University; IDC Herzliya) are reputed to have a more conservative donor base and presumably approach their (diaspora) donors differently.

The Arab population targeted by this programme were two: Palestinian Arabs with Israeli citizenship (i.e. 'Israeli Arabs') and Palestinians from East Jerusalem. Palestinians from Gaza or the West Bank are not included.
in these measures by the State; although HU administrators indicated, and CHE officials confirmed that they have tried to negotiate with the State to ease movement of these populations into Israel and allow them access to Israeli universities.

399 Decisions of the Planning and Budgeting Committee, No. 6. (1068). February 27, 2018. Point 1. Recovery Plan for Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Retrieved from: https://che.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/%d7%94%d7%97%d7%9c%d7%98%d7%94-%d7%aa%d7%99%d7%a2%d7%97-6.pdf

This agreement has had the effect of placing significant focus on these three areas. While marketing materials emphasize the plurality of HU, internal memos are more quid-pro-quo about the agreement. A memo to the academic staff from the Rector is instructive:

'Minimizing Drop-Outs: Not a few students among the accepted to the HU have a hard time realizing their academic abilities because of personal, academic, social or economic hardships. According to the VATAT [PBC] model, the University budget for these students (who are allocated about a quarter of the entire budget, a billion NIS/year) is configured by the number of students who successfully complete their studies.'


403 For example, on December 26, 2018, PBC sanctioned HU 3.5 million NIS (about 5% of the budget for the recovery programme) due to incomplete reporting. The CHE decision finished by saying 'PBC expects the Hebrew University of Jerusalem to ensure proper and transparent conduct with all the authorities, including the PBC, the MoF and the Supervisor of Wages, and in accordance with recovery agreement so that such cases will not occur in the future.'


405 The mission and duties of the AR&D in 2018 were:

- Encouraging and promoting research at the university.
- Implementing the research policy of the Authority’s Executive Committee.
- Identifying potential sources of funding for research, in Israel and abroad
- Managing the university’s research grants according to Authority and university regulations.
- Collaboration with Yissum regarding research of a potentially commercial nature.
- Representing the university in Israel and abroad in order to develop research at the university.
• Publishing reports, surveys and brochures describing the research activity at the university.
• Organizing scientific meetings and visits by scientists at the university.
• Arranging and supervising the allocation of research funding from university intramural resources.


418 Zohar, T & Taubman, Y. (2012, November 21) [Letter to University Presidents]. p. 1. Retrieved from: https://che.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/%d7%95%d7%94%d7%93%d7%95%d7%94%d7%99%d7%9c%d7%95%d7%a2%d7%9d%d7%9c%d7%94%d7%99%d7%95%d7%93%d7%95%d7%94%d7%95%d7%93%d7%95%d7%94%d7%93%d7%95%d7%91%d7%9a%d7%93%d7%95%d7%94%d7%99%d7%95%d7%93%d7%95%d7%94%d7%99%d7%95%d7%93%d7%95%d7%94%d7%93%d7%95%d7%94%d7%93%d7%95%d7%91.pdf


Despite dwindling regional cooperation in the latter part of the period, publications were also released (the first in 1996; the second and last in 2006) entitled ‘Paths of Peace’ in which HU touted its role in regional cooperation, highlighting cooperative research and teaching projects.

Diaspora funding for research was particularly apparent in the development of new multi-disciplinary research centers, many of which were founded in partnership with Diaspora individuals and foundations. For example, the Jack, Joseph and Morton Mandel School for Advanced Studies in the Humanities; the Louis Frieberg Center for East Asian Studies; or the Institute for Medical Research Israeli – Canada (IMRIC). About us. Retrieved from: http://imric.org/mobile/about-us.

There is also evidence of Diaspora facilitating and funding international research cooperation on the national level (which then, HU could take advantage of). In 2015 a memorandum of understanding between the British Royal Society and the Israel Academy of Science and Humanities was signed that provides funding for post-doctoral exchanges and research grants, secured by funding from the Sir Ralph Kohn Foundation.


This Centre was funded for the first four years by the French Education Ministry, and aimed to strengthen cooperation between French universities, industries and HU. Its activities included student and staff exchanges and joint research projects. The Center’s aims were on the national level: it ‘is doing its best to stabilize and facilitate these ties between France and Israel.’


434 Some of these cooperative programmes are sponsored by Diaspora foundations (e.g. Princeton University – HU doctoral exchange in Jewish Thought, sponsored by Tikvah Foundation); others, by national governments.


436 For example, in 2008, the Britain Israel Research and Academic Exchange (BIRAX) was established to deepen scientific collaboration between British and Israeli researchers. It provides funding for research projects and scholarly exchanges between British, Israeli and Palestinian scholars and was founded by the British Council, the British Embassy, Pears Foundation and United Jewish Israel Appeal (UJIA).


442 Decisions of the Planning and Budgeting Committee, No. 6. (1068). February 21, 2018. Point 6. Promotion of Internationalisation in HE. 6.1. Funding Model to develop the area in PBC Budgeted Institutions of HE. https://che.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/%d7%94%d7%97%d7%9c%d7%98%d7%94-%d7%aa%d7%a9%d7%a2%d7%97-6.pdf


Decisions of the Planning and Budgeting Committee, No. 6. (1068). February 21, 2018. Point 6. Promotion of Internationalisation in HE. 6.3. Approval of the Glue Grants programme of the ISF. https://che.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/%d7%94%d7%97%d7%9c%d7%99%d7%94-%d7%aa%d7%99%d7%a2%d7%97-6.pdf


This brochure was collected from an onsite visit to the RIS offices in December 2017.

‘Business as usual.’ (i.e. continuing with scheduled programming) was how HU preferred to handle periods of unrest and heightened violence. However, this was difficult as the financial health of the school was negatively affected by drops in student enrolment. Numerous times HU supporters donated funds to keep the RIS programme running. For example, after the September 11th attacks and heightened violence in Jerusalem, an emergency campaign for the RIS in 2001 was undertaken which would raise almost $2 million for the RIS. HU President, Prof. Magidor sent out a series of thank you letters to HU supporters:

‘I would like to express my personal gratitude to you for your generous donation for the HU’s RIS. As Moshe Vigdor will have explained to you, we are determined to continue with ‘business as usual’ at the School despite the decrease in the numbers of students enrolled there due to the current situation, and despite the fact that this will involve us in considerable financial loss. We believe that, as one of the Jewish worlds’ most precious assets, we have a moral duty to keep the School functioning as normal.’


For example, the Maurice & Marilyn Cohen Center for Modern Jewish Studies of Brandeis University publishes evaluation reports on Birthright Israel from 2000 – 2017. See: https://www.brandeis.edu/cmjs/researchprojects/birthright/publications.html#Birthright

In addition to this emergency campaign during the Second Intifada, there was at least one other in this period in summer of 2014 as a result of Israel–Gaza conflict known in Israel as ‘Operation Protective Edge’. The President’s Report to the BOG in 2015 elaborated:

‘A further result of this summer’s tensions were the many cancellations by students and programs scheduled to attend our Rothberg International School. Our Friends quickly came to the rescue in an Emergency Campaign for Rothberg, raising funds both to cover the resulting deficit and to increase scholarship assistance and marketing in order to increase enrolment for the Spring semester and subsequent years.’


Jews were long a polyglot nation. However, with the advent of Jewish nationalism, Hebrew became a sign of Jewish cultural revival and the focus of significant efforts by the State. While some immigrants maintained their mother-tongue languages (at home), in the early years of the State, Israel pursued a monolinguistic policy. However, after the massive Soviet Aliyah in the 1990s, Israel’s policy began to change and there were explicit attempts to maintain the Russian language among these new immigrants. With the establishment of Hebrew, there is more tolerance towards maintaining mother-tongue languages, and even Yiddish and Arabic (and dialects from Oriental Jewish communities) are making linguistic revivals.


474 While similar goals for internationalisation were acknowledged in interviews between both the CHE and HU, pointedly, there was not any mention of the government’s role in preventing international student entry to HU for political reasons. For example, HU publicises that it is pushing for greater access to HU for Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza (not just East Jerusalem), which currently is difficult if not impossible. There was also a widely publicised example of the government banning an American international student from attending HU because of BDS activism in October 2018.

For more detailed information on this see:


476 This option was pursued because the HU academic calendar is tied to the Jewish calendar and begins its year after the Jewish high holidays, ranging between the beginning of October to November. In order to accommodate international students from a range of countries Europe/North America and also Southern Hemisphere, these courses are more intense, condensed and offered in the Spring semester.

477 Evidence from a CHE policy paper indicated that HU received an initial approval to open a BA prgorammme in English, however until 2018, this has not materialized. See:


311
The first open house was noted in the Minutes of the BOO in 2003. It is worth quoting at some length:

Towards them and their families. An interesting exchange about their status, prospects for scholarships and the recognition process of degrees in Israel see Bamberger (2018).

Some programmes within HU offer acceptance based on the Mechina alone, without the psychometric test.

In 2016, PAfEJ were added to Ro’ad – a programme designed to provide counselling support and information for Palestinian Arab Minority Israelis (PAMI) in the final years of high school (or youths out of school).


As early as 2003 there were discussions at the RIS BOO about PAfEJ students and their attendance in the Mechina. The RIS was discreetly trying to raise funds for this group, and even conducted an open-house targeted towards them and their families. An interesting exchange about their status, prospects for scholarships and the first open house was noted in the Minutes of the BOO in 2003. It is worth quoting at some length:

Kaplan: …One of the most amazing things is that, this year, we had a record number – over 30 – of Palestinian students registered in the pre-academic program at the RIS. The day after the terrorist attack, we were pretty sure these students would not show up, but they did, and they began studying Hebrew in the classes with all the rest of the students. We appointed an Arabic-speaking advisor – who himself is a graduate of the Mechina program from the days when there were three or four Arab students in the program – and its been an enormously successful endeavor. These are Palestinians, not Israeli Arabs. They are students from the surrounding area who do not do the Israeli high school curriculum. Therefore, they come to us in order to gain university admission.
Mandel: Do they have money or are they on scholarship?

Kaplan: This is one of the challenges that we face. Normally, immigrant students in the preparatory program pay tuition of about $2,400, around one-third of what the majority of our students are paying. In this case, these students are paying the tuition we charge non-immigrant students, which is $4,000, an enormous amount of money. Almost all our scholarship money is earmarked for immigrant students. And of course, the Student Authority doesn’t pay…They are not Israeli citizens and they do not study in the Israeli high school system. So far, we have kept a very low profile about this for concern of embarrassing students and creating a big issue about it. When Shimon Lipsky [Vice Provost] contacted the FM to see if, through the monies that they have for encouraging peace, they would be willing to fund these students, they informed us that since most of these students are technically residents of Jerusalem, it would be politically impossible for the FM to fund them. That would be making a statement they the FM was not prepared to make. So they are not immigrants, not Israeli citizens, and not international students.

A month ago, we were able to hold an open house for incoming students and their families. Over 70 Palestinians from the neighboring areas who were interested in gaining admission to the University, were able to visit the School smoothly and in an orderly fashion. We were able to both meet security needs, and also give them a chance to see the School without any embarrassing incidents. We avoided a situation where, right off the bat, the parents would be saying, How can we send our children to study here. We can’t even get into the complex.

Sorkin: It would seem to me that the Palestinians know their kids are here, so you wouldn’t be embarrassing them.

Kaplan: Its not the parents. Other people in the community would be opposed.

Rabinowitch: Its acceptable as long as its kept quiet. If it were to become public, they would prohibit it.


This programme was established as part of a large-scale effort by the Israeli government and JAFI to ‘absorb’ Aliyah from France which rapidly nearly doubled to 3,297 in 2013 and peaked at 7,835 in 2015. In addition to ideological reasons, this Aliyah is viewed as stimulated by antisemitic attacks in France. Namely, the March 2012 murders of a Rabbi and three children at the Jewish school of Ozar HaTorah in Toulouse; and in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo massacre, the January 2015 siege at a Paris Kosher Supermarket in which four Jews were murdered.


498 Noam Chomsky argues that that critical debate in Western societies actually serves to bound the limits of accepted criticisms and does not undermine systems of power. He states:
'In fact, the nature of Western systems of indoctrination is typically not understood by dictators, they don’t understand the utility for propaganda purposes of having “critical debate” that incorporates the basic assumptions of the official doctrines, and thereby marginalizes and eliminates authentic and rational critical discussion. Under what’s sometimes been called “brainwashing under freedom,” the critics, or at least, the “responsible critics” make a major contribution to the cause by bounding the debate within certain acceptable limits—that’s why they’re tolerated, and in fact even honored.’


504 Interviews indicated that this was accepted by most of the staff, although there were some who accused RIS leaders of creating a ‘war on Hanukkah.’

505 This was viewed as necessary because a large percentage of the students attend the RIS as part of exchange agreements and do not pay for activities.


507 The culmination of these struggles was the banning of Jewish outreach programmes from HU campuses in December 2017.

508 Maoz, L., 2016. Internationalism in Higher education: International students in Israel. Suggestions for Policy. Prepared for the Israel Council for Higher Education. Jerusalem, Israel. Retrieved from: https://che.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/%d7%a2%d7%a7%d7%a8%d7%95%d7%a0%d7%95%d7%aa-%d7%9c%d7%9e%d7%93%d7%99%d7%a0%d7%99%d7%95%d7%aa-%d7%91%d7%a0%d7%99%d7%9c%d7%90%d7%95%d7%9e%d7%99%d7%95%d7%aa-%d7%a1%d7%95%d7%aa4@d7%99.pdf

509 Decisions of the Planning and Budgeting Committee, No. 6. (1068). February 21, 2018. Point 6. Promotion of Internationalisation in HE. 6.2. Outline for scholarships and academic programs for international students and outstanding international doctoral students. Retrieved from: https://che.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/%d7%94%d7%97%d7%9c%d7%98%d7%94-%d7%aa%d7%99%d7%aa2%d7%97-6.pdf


For example the US, Canadian and French international student affairs offices outlined their activities in RIS Annual Reports and focus on cultivating Jewish organisations and ties within Jewish/Israeli Communities up until 2013.


In 2018, Masa Israel provided me with the table below, detailing total overall participants, participants in academic programmes, and the number of academic programmes from 2011-2017. Interestingly there has been a significant increase in the academic programmes which qualify for Masa funding. This indicates that the funding mechanism, combined with other pushes towards internationalisation at the institutional and national level, were likely fueling the creation of international programmes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Participants</td>
<td>9500</td>
<td>9930</td>
<td>10450</td>
<td>11290</td>
<td>12160</td>
<td>12080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Academic Participants</td>
<td>1356</td>
<td>1490</td>
<td>1477</td>
<td>1684</td>
<td>1694</td>
<td>1346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Academic Programmes</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Masa Israel, 2018.


In 2018, a funding mechanism for internationalisation was decided by the PBC. It included:

- **A. The arrival of international students: 35%**
  - The proportion of international students studying full-time at the institution
  - Number of international students for short periods - summer courses, study abroad, doctoral students Guests and so on

- **B. Providing international skills to Israeli students - 35%**
  - The proportion of combined courses (Israeli and international) from the foreign language courses
  - The number of Israeli students taking an academic course (s) or internship abroad as part of their degree (First-third)
  - Israeli students taking at least one foreign language course as part of their degree (first-second)
C. Promoting international research collaborations - 30%

- The number of international post-doctoral students attending the institution
- The number of international research conferences held at the institution
- Number of international faculty members visiting the institution (for periods of at least one week)

The annual output for the output-based budgeting model will total NIS 40 per year in years 2006 - $ 80 million and a total of NIS 80 million.

See: Decisions of the Planning and Budgeting Committee, No. 6. (1068). February 21, 2018. Point 6. Promotion of Internationalisation in HE. 6. 1. Funding Model to develop the area in PBC Budgeted Institutions of HE. Retrieved from: https://che.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/%d7%94%d7%97%d7%9c%d7%98%d7%94-%d7%aa%d7%a9%d7%a2%d7%97-6.pdf

524 For a short period under Foreign Minister Golda Meir, these projects took on a connection to humanistic Zionism and Jewish ideals of serving as a 'Light Unto the Nations;' see: Oded (2009).


526 RIS Provost Mimi Ajzenstadt provided a definition in the 2011 RIS Annual Report which includes several elements of the definition I propose. It reads thus:

‘Internationalization is thus a dynamic process, which is continually being politically, socially, culturally and academically shaped. The various means by which it is constructed, crafted and implemented are neither uniform nor static. Rather, it is driven by dynamic and ever-changing rationales. It is being applied and mediated through a web of complex institutional, organizational, academic and personal filters. It is a “glocal” project, combining global trends with local interpretations and personal experiences, making modifications according to the specific Israeli context.’

References


Braithwaite, L. (2001). *Colonial West Indian Students in Britain.* University of West Indies Press.


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Appendix A. Interview participant information sheet

Internationalisation in Israel academia: an historical analysis 1912-2017

INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS

Dear Participant,

You are invited to take part in a research study to examine international initiatives in Israeli academia. This study is being done in the framework of doctoral studies at the Institute of Education, University College London (UCL).

Before you decide whether to take part in the study it is important that you understand the purpose of this research and what you will be asked to do. Please take time to read the following information. It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part and if you decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep. You will also be provided a consent form. You can change your mind at any time and withdraw from the study without giving a reason.

The purpose of the research study is to investigate international initiatives in the arena of higher education in Israel. I would like to ask questions about different policies, initiatives, and events in relation to this topic. You have been chosen because I believe you may be in a position to expand, clarify or confirm different areas of inquiry this study aims to develop.

The study will involve about 40 participants, who will be interviewed separately. The interview will take approximately one hour. If you choose to take part I will organize a location for the interview that is convenient to you. Skype will also be an option.

The information gained from this study will be used to better understand international policies, initiatives, and events in Israeli academia.

While I do not anticipate distress speaking about this topic, if at any time the discussion becomes uncomfortable you are free to stop the interview at any time.

The interview will be audio recorded and then transcribed. The files will be stored on a secure server and a password-protected computer. Unless permission is given to use your name, responses will be treated with confidentiality and all effort will be made to anonymize your identity. At the end of the research I will write a report and the results may be published. This study has been reviewed and approved by the Research Ethics Committee at UCL.

Please do not hesitate to contact me if you need further information

Thanking you in anticipation,

Yours sincerely,

Annette Bamberger
PhD Candidate
University College London
Institute of Education
Education, Practice and Society
Supervisors: Prof. Paul Morris and Dr. Miri Yemini

Annette.bamberger@gmail.com, +447783846852
Appendix B. Interview participant consent form

Consent for Participation in Interview Research

I volunteer to participate in research conducted by Annette Bamberger from the Institute of Education, University College London (UCL). I understand that this study is designed to gather information about higher education in Israel.

1. My participation in this study is voluntary. I understand that I will not be paid for my participation. I may withdraw and discontinue participation at any time without penalty.

3. Participation involves being interviewed by Annette Bamberger within the framework of her doctoral studies at UCL. The interview will last approximately one hour. Notes may be written during the interview. Unless otherwise requested, an audio recording of the interview will be made with a subsequent transcription.

5. My responses will be treated with confidentiality and quotes will not be attributed to me unless I specifically request this. At the end of the research report, a list of all interview participants will be given. I may opt for my name to be anonymized on this list.

4. Transcription may be undertaken by a third-party; any data transferred will be anonymized and transmitted through secure procedures. The interview transcripts may be reviewed by others in the research team (i.e. doctoral supervisors: Prof. Paul Morris and Dr. Miri Yemini). If anonymity is requested, subsequent uses of records and data will be subject to standard data use policies which protect the anonymity of individuals and institutions.

2. I understand that most interviewees find the discussion interesting and thought-provoking. If, however, I feel uncomfortable in any way during the interview session, I have the right to decline to answer any question or to end the interview.

4. Recorded and written material generated during this interview may be used in further studies and publication.

6. I will be provided with any publications emanating from my participation in this study.

7. I understand that this research study has been reviewed and approved by the Research Ethics Committee (REC) at the Institute of Education, University College London.

8. I have read and understand the explanation provided to me. I have had all my questions answered to my satisfaction, and I voluntarily agree to participate in this study.

9. I have been given a copy of this consent form.

____________________________________ My Signature, Date

____________________________________ Signature of the Investigator

For further information, please contact:

Annette Bamberger,
Annette.bamberger@gmail.com, +447783846852
Appendix C. Sample interview guide (contemporary senior RIS administrator)

1. Please can you describe your position and responsibilities at RIS and your previous professional experience.
2. Could you start by describing the international aspect of Israeli higher education when you first entered RIS? How have you seen it change over the years? In your view, what has brought about these changes? Have there also been changes in terms of actors, populations targets, motives, intensity, budgets, etc.?
3. What do you think the most important influences on Israeli higher education have been over your tenure? Particularly from an international perspective.
4. Could you possibly speak about how the international dimension of Israeli HE might vary for institutions of different types? (colleges, universities). Could you please give examples.
5. Do you think it is important that Israel cooperates and internationalises its higher education system? In what areas (research, students, teaching, etc.)? What areas do you think are of greater and lesser importance?
6. What role do you think Israeli academia plays in Israel’s economic, foreign and diaspora relations?
7. Have you seen shifts in the countries or types of students that were participating at HUJI over your tenure? What were these and how would you explain this?
8. What are some of the biggest challenges for you in securing and managing international programmes - international students and academics specifically? Have you seen any changes?
9. In the earlier years of the state, international students would come to Israel to learn Hebrew and about Jewish history and culture. Would you say this is still the case? Why/not?
10. What would you say the motives for creating/sustaining international programmes are? Do you think these have changed over time? Do you see a difference between the universities and colleges? Or even between higher ranked universities and lower ranked? What might these be?
11. The FM, Government, MoEdu, MoEconomy, Vatat/CHE, Israel Academy, Jewish Agency, NGOs, MASA, university employees, academics, donors, students, all have a hand in international higher education. Yet they have different perspectives and areas of remit. Do you think there are tensions between these groups? Or do you think they have similar goals? Have you seen any shifts in this relationship over time?
12. The new multi-year plan of the CHE focuses on internationalising Israeli HE, including supporting English study and bringing excellent research students to Israel, particularly from China and India. This has been framed as a way to increase Israel’s academic quality. How has this initiative affected HU? Cooperation? Why do you think this has come to light now? What opportunities and challenges do you see?
13. Can you tell me about the mechina for Olim students? Can you speak possibly about the development of this programme and its purpose? Perhaps changes over time?
14. What is the role of Aliyah at the RIS? Have you seen this shifting over time?
15. Can you speak about the role of Hebrew and foreign languages at RIS and how that has changed over time?
16. In your view, what role does the political situation of Israel play in internationalising its HE system? Could you speak about the role of BDS in Israeli HE? The conflict?
17. In what ways do you think the international dimension of Israeli academia is similar to other countries, in what ways is it different?

18. Israel defines itself as the Jewish nation. In what way do you think this is expressed through the international dimension of its higher education? HU strives for academic excellence as well as Jewish heritage and values. Can you tell me about how this is apparent in its international activities?

19. What do you see as the future for international Israeli higher education? Particularly its international side.

20. Many countries aim to attract international students as a way to plug budgetary holes in their higher education systems. Do you think this applies to Israel? Or perhaps to certain programmes? To HU?

21. Could you speak about the role and relationship of international donors at HU?
Appendix D. HU income according to sources, 1925 - 1947

Table 12. HU income according to sources, 1925 – 1947, in thousands of LP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FOR MAINTENANCE</strong></td>
<td>1925/26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From contributions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish Public Institutions</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Friends of HU and American Jewish Physicians Committee</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societies of Friends in Other Countries</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisations, Associations, and Scientific Endowment Funds</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governments</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large Individual Contributions</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest on Funds</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total for maintenance</strong></td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FOR BUILDINGS AND EQUIPMENT</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisations and Associations</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Contributions, etc.</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total receipts</strong></td>
<td>44.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix E. Representation on the BOG and Academic Council by country of origin: First period

Figure 7. Representatives on the BOG by country, 1930-1948

Note: those with dual residences were assigned .5 for each residency; only dual residencies were noted between Palestine and the Diaspora (S. Africa, UK, USA).

Figure 8. Composition of the Academic Council by country of origin, 1930

Germany/Austria 33%
USA 17%
UK 17%
France 17%
Italy 8%
Holland 8%

Appendix F. HU students in the pre-State period

Table 13. Students by country of secondary school matriculation, 1928-1941

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>28/29</th>
<th>36/37</th>
<th>37/38</th>
<th>38/39</th>
<th>39/40</th>
<th>40/41</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oriental Countries</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Countries</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>731</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>1,041</td>
<td>1,053</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 14. HU students by country of secondary education, 1946/1947

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>732</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany/Austria</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1027</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 15. Percentages of men and women students in HU, 1925-1941

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1925-26</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928-29</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936-37</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937-38</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938-39</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939-40</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940-41</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-47</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 16. HU students by faculty of study, 1935 – 1947

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Humanities</th>
<th>Sciences</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Humanities</th>
<th>Sciences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1935/36</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>74.18%</td>
<td>25.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936/37</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>731</td>
<td>70.73%</td>
<td>29.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937/38</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>63.65%</td>
<td>36.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938/39</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>66.22%</td>
<td>33.78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939/40</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>1041</td>
<td>67.63%</td>
<td>32.37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940/41</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>1053</td>
<td>62.58%</td>
<td>37.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946/47*</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>1005</td>
<td>57.51%</td>
<td>42.49%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Agriculture students are included in the ‘Sciences’ category in 1946/47.

### Appendix G. Academic staff, Chapter 5

**Table 17. Number of academic staff at HU by grade, 1955 -1984**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professors</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associate Professors</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Lecturers</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lecturers</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinical staff</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers/Assistants/Research fellows</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visiting teachers</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>582</strong></td>
<td><strong>1045</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,266</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,801</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,811</strong></td>
<td><strong>2172</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Does not include Emeritus or retired staff members


### Table 18. Country of birth of academic staff, 1957 and 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1957</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>Change 1957/85</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Absolute</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Absolute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>77.6%</td>
<td>680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East North</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa (MENA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine/Israel</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania/Asia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlisted</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

342
### Table 19. Education of academic staff, 1957 and 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1957 Absolute</th>
<th>1957 Percentage</th>
<th>1985 Absolute</th>
<th>1985 Percentage</th>
<th>Change 1957/85 Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>57.0%</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>-44.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>-0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine/Israel</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
<td>916</td>
<td>58.2%</td>
<td>32.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania/Asia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlisted</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>-0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>321</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>1575</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Europe included USSR, and Baltic regions; Turkey is included in MENA


### Table 20. Gender of academic staff, 1957 and 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1957 Absolute</th>
<th>1957 Percentage</th>
<th>1985 Absolute</th>
<th>1985 Percentage</th>
<th>Change 1957/85 Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Male</strong></td>
<td>303</td>
<td><strong>94.4%</strong></td>
<td>1383</td>
<td><strong>87.8%</strong></td>
<td>-6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Female</strong></td>
<td>18</td>
<td><strong>5.6%</strong></td>
<td>212</td>
<td><strong>12.2%</strong></td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>321</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>1575</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Gender was assessed by given name and cross-checked through search engines in cases of any ambiguity.

Appendix H. Endowed chairs and lectureships, 1925 - 2000

Table 21. Sources and number of endowed chairs and lectureships, 1925 - 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Number of chairs and lectureships</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-1948</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Diaspora</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU/Israel</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948-2000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diaspora</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU/Israel</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlisted</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Gov/Industry/Foundation</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Foundation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Corporation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>314</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: two chairs donated by the Diaspora were listed without a date; one chair was joint listed between the diaspora and Israel, which was included under 'Diaspora'.

Appendix I. HU International student statistics

Table 22 illustrates the RIS student population by programme from 1955 to 2015. When considering this Table, it is important to understand how international students were counted. International students were tracked based on programme of registration in the RIS. Once a student had Israeli citizenship, moved out of the RIS and past his first year in the faculties at HU, they were considered a regular student in HU, and were no longer tracked. This appears to have been common across the sector. A HU administrator elaborated:

‘There is not a way for the central statistics bureau to find the data on all the overseas students in the universities, because there is not a separate registration for overseas students in the University from the second year of studies onwards (i.e. after the Mechina)… numbers do not include regular students in more advanced years of study. From this, clearly, the percentage of overseas students in the universities as part of the overall student population is much higher than 8%...’ (1)

Thus, this reporting impeded understanding of the ‘international’ dimension of its student body and statistics included only OYSP, Mechina and first-year students. There were also surely some international students that had the requisite Hebrew level, made Aliyah and were integrated directly into the faculties, without first passing through the RIS. This reporting reflects the attitude of the time about integrating students, erasing diversity, and making Israelis. Thus, these statistics are an estimate of international students at HU over this period; and they also belay vast differences in the social composition of the student population; and fluctuations in the student population over time.

Table 22. RIS students by programme of enrolment, 1955 – 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ASP/OYSP</th>
<th>Mechina</th>
<th>TAKA</th>
<th>Freshmen</th>
<th>MA</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>1957</td>
<td>19</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>34</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>1960</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>1961</td>
<td>49</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>49</td>
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<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>62</td>
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<td>1964</td>
<td>74</td>
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<td>74</td>
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</table>

345
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1965</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>84</td>
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<td>1966</td>
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<td>1968</td>
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<td>470</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>603</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>623</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>653</td>
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<td>363</td>
<td>84</td>
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<td>1974</td>
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<td>269</td>
<td>28</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>60</td>
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<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>421</td>
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<td>1978</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>446</td>
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<td>1979</td>
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<td>398</td>
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<td>1980</td>
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<td>313</td>
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<td>1981</td>
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<td>321</td>
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<td>415</td>
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<td>425</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1984</td>
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<td>498</td>
<td></td>
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<td>1988</td>
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<td>530</td>
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<td>596</td>
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</tr>
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<td>578</td>
<td>89</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2004</td>
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<td>271</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>465</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>394</td>
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<td>2007</td>
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<td>2008</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>216</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Notes
From 2000, TAKA and Mechina student statistics were combined; Freshmen statistics were combined with OYSP.

Table 22 represents students within the RIS, and where international student numbers in the faculties were forthcoming, (i.e. from Maoz, 2016, p. 43), they are added in brackets.


Table 23. RIS Students as a proportion of overall HU students

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>RIS</th>
<th>HU</th>
<th>RIS as % of HU student population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965/66</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>11,720</td>
<td>1.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976/77</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>13,285</td>
<td>5.95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984/85</td>
<td>1,018</td>
<td>16,517</td>
<td>6.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990/91</td>
<td>1,475</td>
<td>20,610</td>
<td>7.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999/00</td>
<td>1,414</td>
<td>22,971</td>
<td>6.16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: At times the HUYBs also listed overseas student numbers, there were at times slight discrepancies between these two figures.

Table 24. HU Mechina students by language spoken, 1981-1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>English</th>
<th>French</th>
<th>Spanish</th>
<th>Russian</th>
<th>Persian</th>
<th>Amharic</th>
<th>Hungarian</th>
<th>Arabic/ PAfEJ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>219</td>
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<td>137</td>
<td>44</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
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<td>41</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix J. Jewish population in the US and Israel, 1945 - 2006

From 1945 until 2006, the US was home to the largest Jewish population worldwide. Only in 2006 did Israel overtake the US; see Table 25 below.

Table 25. Jewish population in the US and Israel, 1945 - 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>Israel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>4,359,000</td>
<td>565,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>4,680,000</td>
<td>1,203,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>4,941,000</td>
<td>1,591,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>5,197,000</td>
<td>1,911,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>5,300,000</td>
<td>2,299,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>5,370,000</td>
<td>2,582,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>5,387,000</td>
<td>2,959,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>5,435,000</td>
<td>3,283,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>5,500,000</td>
<td>3,517,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>5,515,000</td>
<td>3,947,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>5,450,000</td>
<td>4,522,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>5,350,000</td>
<td>4,955,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5,275,000</td>
<td>5,313,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DellaPergola, 2006, p. 561
### Appendix K. Ranking of HU, 2003 - 2019

#### Table 26: ARWU ranking of HU, 2003 - 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>'03</th>
<th>'04</th>
<th>'05</th>
<th>'06</th>
<th>'07</th>
<th>'08</th>
<th>'09</th>
<th>'10</th>
<th>'11</th>
<th>'12</th>
<th>'13</th>
<th>'14</th>
<th>'15</th>
<th>'16</th>
<th>'17</th>
<th>'18</th>
<th>'19</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>101-150</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>101-150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# Appendix L. HU Mission Statement, 2008 and 2012

## Table 27. HU mission statement, 2008 and 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel's first university and a symbol of the cultural rebirth of the Jewish nation in its ancestral homeland, is a multidisciplinary institution of higher learning and research. It is a scientific center of international repute, with formal and informal ties extending to and from the worldwide scientific and academic community. It is an institution where thousands of young Israelis receive a university education with an emphasis on excellence; where advanced, postgraduate study and research are stressed; and where special programs attract many overseas students to pursue degrees or earn credits for transfer. This is a university with a three-fold function: to serve the State of Israel by training its scientific, educational and professional leadership; to serve the Jewish people by preserving and expanding the Jewish cultural, spiritual and intellectual heritage; and to serve humanity by extending the frontiers of knowledge.a</td>
<td>The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel's first university, is a multidisciplinary institution of higher learning and research where intellectual pioneering, cutting-edge discovery and a passion for learning flourish. It is a center of international repute, with ties extending to and from the worldwide scientific and academic community and where teaching and research interact to create innovative approaches that ensure the broadest of educations for its students. Ranked among the world’s leading universities, at the Hebrew University Israelis of all backgrounds receive a university education where excellence is emphasized; where advanced, postgraduate study and research are encouraged; and where special programs and conferences attract students and academics from around the world. At its core, the Hebrew University’s mission is to develop cutting-edge research, to educate future leaders in all walks of life, and to nurture future generations of outstanding scientists and scholars in all fields of learning.b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Appendix M. International students in Israel in the third period

In 2016, according to a CHE policy, HU was the third most international Israeli HEI (behind Weizmann Institute and IDC Herzliya), with between 5-12% of its population composed of international students (the discrepancy is based on two different sampling methods used, see Maoz, 2016). However, it contributed the most students to the overall total of international students in Israel (25%). Table 30 breaks down these statistics by programme (Research; Academic Experience; and full degree without thesis) and student type (Jewish; General) and reveals several interesting aspects:

1) HU contributed the most international students in the area of Research (PhD, post-doctorate and MA with thesis) and Academic Experience (summer courses; study abroad).

2) It also contributed the most international students who were not Jewish.

Looking at patterns across the system, Technion and Weizmann Institute, research intensive institutions with the second highest percentage of international research students, contributed considerably more to the general than Jewish population of international students. In contrast IDC Herzliya, who specialises in full BA degrees and 95% of their students are Jewish, contributed 35% of the overall students pursuing full degrees, and 28% of the Jewish international students studying in Israel, with only 2% of the non-Jewish students.

Table 28. International students in Israel by HEI by percentage, 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% of total</th>
<th>From academic experience</th>
<th>From full studies</th>
<th>From research</th>
<th>Of Jewish students</th>
<th>Of general students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HU</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weizmann</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAU</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technion</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bar Ilan</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ben Gurion</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDC</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Maoz, 2016, p. 42
Analysing the entire international student population by programme, as illustrated in Figure 10, sheds further light on these patterns. While nationwide there are about 10,070 international students in Israel with 47% Jewish and 53% general, Figure 10 indicates that full degrees (without thesis) are populated by Jewish students; while research students are associated with general students. These patterns are likely to continue as research students are increasingly targeted from Asia. These patterns build on specialisations in research, with institutions which aim to internationalise their student body through research, emphasising broader targets than Jewish students.

While Israel did not supply information for the 2016 OECD indicator on international student mobility, the CHE indicates that only about 1.3% of students are international in Israeli degree programmes, as opposed to the OECD average (9%) (see Maoz, 2016, p.16). Moreover, international students in OECD countries are usually concentrated at the PhD level, then MA, with the least in BA. However, Israeli universities usually have more international MA, PhD, then BA students; when including the colleges, and particularly IDC Herzliya, international students in Israel are BA, then MA, then PhD (Maoz, 2016, p. 51), indicating that most of the international students in Israel are not in research programmes.

Figure 9. International students in Israel by programme, 2016

![Chart showing international students in Israel by programme, 2016](chart_image)


According to the Open Doors Reports (2009; 2017; 2018) on American study abroad, Israel never recovered its place after the Second Intifada: from a high of almost 4,000 students and the eighth most population destination in 1999/2000; to an unranked position with 2,999 students in 2016/17. Thus, while Israel was a leading destination for the US, and
HU its leading institution, as international student mobility has grown worldwide, Israel has not maintained its position.

**Figure 10. US study abroad students in Israel, 1999 – 2017**

Appendix N. HU exchange agreements, 2018

Figure 11. HU exchange agreements by country, 2018

### Appendix O. Post-doctoral researchers at HU: 2016

**Table 29. Post-doctoral researchers at HU, 2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Israeli</th>
<th>Int'l</th>
<th>China &amp; India as part of Int'l</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>528*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This number was originally 580, but this appears to be an error.
Source: Maoz, 2016.
Appendix P. Ulpan, summer courses and tailored programmes: Chapters 5 and 6

Second Period (Chapter 5)

RIS developed Hebrew language instruction, summer courses, and a variety of tailored programmes in the second period. Hebrew instruction was originally handled by JAFI, however, over time this transferred to the RIS. Hebrew language was a cornerstone of the curriculum of all the other programmes, and was available to students in HU Faculties, tourists, adults and academic staff. Over time, HU developed a large and eminent programme in Hebrew language instruction which grew to include several summer sessions of varying lengths and intensities (i.e. Jerusalem Ulpan; Summer Ulpan); Hebrew courses during the academic year; and other intensive periods of instruction between the two semesters (Winter Ulpan). Instruction was given over a series of levels from beginner to advanced (alef – vav) and intensive courses consisted of about 5 hours of daily instruction over a period of weeks to produce rapid progress in the language. Students in the OYSP were expected over the year, to make significant gains in Hebrew language acquisition. Through the courses, Hebrew language also introduced connections to Jewish culture and Israeli society, which were viewed as an imperative for integration into and understanding of Israeli society. Hebrew teachers at HU were at the forefront of Hebrew language teaching and created innovative new ways to teach the language and a steady stream of materials for the Diaspora. The departments made their own textbooks, recordings, tests, curricula, and resources for Hebrew teaching. They experimented with giving Ulpan abroad, notably for several summers in New York, and also with online provision, piloting new forms of instruction through IT. Broadly speaking, every student who came through the longer programmes at RIS, participated in these courses.

Summer courses for international students were in existence at HU from the eve of the State, however a more extensive cadre of organised courses was initiated in 1968. While originally offered in English, over this period, they were eventually offered in several languages (e.g. French, Spanish, Portuguese, Russian) to tourists and students alike, and special sessions were given in January for Southern Hemisphere students. These were open to all ages (18+) and drew a large group of participants (see section 4.4). These courses could be arranged for academic credit, taken as single course or paired with several courses, including Hebrew language courses. Summer courses were usually around topics of Jewish, Israeli, or Middle Eastern significance. The formal programme was also paired with an informal programme (see the next section) and over time, summer courses were recognised as an
important steppingstone to longer periods of study (and Aliyah) in Israel (something that will resurface in the Chapter 6). This understanding led Rothberg to push for the RIS to embark on summer courses for high school students, in order to promote Aliyah and future attendance at HU. In a BOO meeting Rothberg stated:

‘the ‘raison d’etre of the school was to promote immigration....in order to attract students to the University one has to start at the high school level...for which they could get pre-credits when they got to the University and could be an attractive way of encouraging aliya...this was the kind of program he was interested in promoting. He was first and foremost a supporter of Israel and Aliyah and only secondly interested in the University.’ (1)

This rather daring remark, elicited the measured reply of the President and Rector of HU that ‘he did not believe this was the forum to discuss such an academic matter’ and that ‘while he was sure all concerned wanted the best for Israel and supported Aliya he believed the way the University could best serve Israel was by doing what it was best at, namely HE.’ (2). He then proceeded to offer suggestions for other types of summer programmes that HU could successfully undertake. Thus, there was always the negotiation between different interests, and an endeavour to both serve national interests, while maintaining academic integrity.

RIS also created tailor-made programmes for Universities abroad, Jewish youth movements (e.g. NATIV, Young Judea Year Course), institutions with specific goals (e.g. Bible Translators from Africa and Asia) and adult programmes (e.g. Elderhostel; ‘Kesher’ tours to Israel for parents of RIS students). At times these programmes drew on courses already offered within the frameworks of its other programmes (e.g. students from NATIV would take courses from the OYSP) and other times they were specially designed with the input and direction of the sponsoring institution and the RIS. Contracts for these programmes were negotiated and usually involved some level of academic provision (although not always, some tailor-made programmes used RIS as a logistical infrastructure to run its own academic courses, see section 4.3) and depending on the group, at times extra-curricular activities and trips, lodging, health and student services were included. While some of the programmes had academic or Zionist rationales (e.g. NATIV), the archival record reveals that many of these programmes such as Elderhostel and Kesher, aimed to publicise the RIS more broadly, create connections to future donors, and were more aligned with PR and financial motives. Drawing attention to these programmes, Harman, noted that ‘while not of considerable educational value, it is of great public relations value to the University.’ (3)


Third Period (Chapter 6)

Hebrew ulpan continued in this period, however, a new language was offered with increasing popularity: Arabic. Arabic summer courses, like the Hebrew courses, are built on intensive study over a condensed period of time, usually 6 weeks, with 5 days of study/field trips, for 5 hours a day. This reflected both the changing nature of the RIS, and also practical considerations as RIS staff professed that it appealed to a wider audience. While international students were offered more options for language study, Israeli students were increasingly interested in Asian languages: by 2017, Asian Studies (with a mandatory language component) became the largest department in the Humanities Faculty.

Summer courses and special programmes continued, the latter particularly in conjunction with University partners (faculty-led), however the range of courses shifted and diversified considerably. In the previous period, the majority of the courses were centred on Jewish Studies, Israeli Society, the Middle East and Hebrew language, by 2018, there were courses in STEM, social sciences, law, business and as many courses in Arabic, as Hebrew. Reflecting on these changes a senior RIS leader elaborated:

‘we have only one remaining course in Jewish Studies. And I keep it, even if it's not making money, which it's not, just because I want to be able to say that HU RIS Summer Course has a Jewish Studies program.’

He further addressed the decline in Middle Eastern courses:

‘I have stopped even offering them because Middle Eastern Studies programs are reluctant to send students to Israel. Israel's position in Middle Eastern Studies in general, and especially in North America, also in the UK, is very precarious. Why offer a Middle Eastern Studies course when students who are interested in the Middle Eastern Studies won't come to Israel and take it?’

Thus, across programmes, there was a shift away from the traditional Jewish, Hebrew, Israeli and Middle Eastern studies; towards diverse courses, more closely aligned with the labour market. New programmes financed by the CHE/PBC emerged as well: from 2012 – 2015 a special Jerusalem Ulpan held for Chinese and Indian students drew 96 participants; and a summer course in 2013-2015 in Genetic Engineering for this population drew 33 students (Maoz, 2016). In 2017, a senior RIS leader estimated that only about 30% of summer and special course students were Jewish.


Appendix Q. Sources for Figures 3 and 4


Appendix R. Sources for Table 6


