CHURCHILL'S DIPLOMATIC EAVESDROPPING AND SECRET SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY, 1941-1944: THE CASE OF TURKEY

Submitted for the Degree of Ph.D.
Department of History
University College London

by

ROBIN DENNISTON M.A. (Oxon) M.Sc. (Edin)
ABSTRACT

Churchill's interest in secret signals intelligence (sigint) is now common knowledge, but his use of intercepted diplomatic telegrams (bjs) in World War Two has only become apparent with the release in 1994 of his regular supply of Ultra, the DIR/C Archive. Churchill proves to have been a voracious reader of diplomatic intercepts from 1941-44, and used them as part of his communication with the Foreign Office.

This thesis establishes the value of these intercepts (particularly those Turkey-sourced) in supplying Churchill and the Foreign Office with authentic information on neutrals' response to the war in Europe, and analyses the way Churchill used them. Turkey was seen by both sides to be the most important neutral power and therefore constitutes the case study for this analysis.

The thesis answers the question 'why did Turkey interest Churchill?' by tracing his involvement with diplomatic intercepts back to 1914, and then revealing how the Government Code and Cipher School (GCCS) was empowered to continue monitoring such traffic until 1939, when 'Station X' was established at Bletchley Park (BP).

Following two chapters that trace the interwar work of GCCS on the secret diplomatic traffic of most major powers and outline Turkey's place amongst those powers, the thesis concentrates on four events or processes in which Churchill's use of diplomatic messages played a part in determining his wartime policy, which was sometimes at odds with that of the Foreign Office.

Chapter four answers the question what use did Churchill and the Foreign Office make of bjs to persuade Turkey to join the Allies between 1940 and 1942? Chapter five offers a new explanation of why the Adana conference of January 1943 produced little change in Turkish foreign policy. Chapter six explains the Dodecanese defeat of 1943 in the light of the signals intelligence Churchill was reading. Chapter seven shows the results at GCCS in London of the theft of secret Foreign Office papers in Ankara from November 1943: whether actual bjs were included in these papers; how they were received in Berlin and subsequently in Berne, Washington and London; and how they led to a breakthrough in reading the German diplomatic cipher, too late to be useful to Churchill.

The thesis concludes by emphasising the personalised nature of wartime diplomacy and re-iterates the reasons why Churchill and the Foreign Office attached such importance to their 'Most Secret Sources', though their availability to historians requires little change to the record.
CONTENTS

Prelims

Introduction .................................................................................................................... page 9

Chapter One - WHY TURKEY? ...............................................................page 18
   (i) Churchill and Turkey, 1914-15
   (ii) Turkey in Context
   (iii) Churchill's Secret Source
   (iv) Churchill and Turkey, 1940-42

Chapter Two - CHURCHILL'S DIPLOMATIC INTERCEPTS.............page 37
   (i) The 'Classical Cryptographers'
   (ii) Churchill's Intercepts: World War One
   (iii) Between the Wars
   (iv) Diplomatic Intercepts in the 1930s
   (v) GCCS's Interwar Achievements

Chapter Three - BEFORE THE DELUGE: 1940-41 .........................page 53
   (i) The Foreign Office and Turkey
   (ii) The Phoney War
   (iii) Germany Triumphant
   (iv) Different Views on Turkey
   (v) Churchill's Secret Intelligence, 1940-41

Chapter Four - CHURCHILL'S TURKISH APPROACH ...............page 72
   (i) Churchill and Turkey, 1941-43
   (ii) DIR/C On Stream
   (iii) Churchill's Turkey Hand: October - December 1941
   (iv) Turkish neutrality and British Disasters, Spring 1942
   (v) Turkish Friendship Sought

Chapter Five - ADANA AND AFTER ...........................................page 102
   (i) The Road to Adana, January 1943
   (ii) Why Churchill Failed
   (iii) Consequences: The Foreign Office and The Record
Chapter Six - CHURCHILL'S 'ISLAND PRIZES LOST' REVISITED .......................................................... page 132

(i) Preparations for the Dodecanese Assault
(ii) The Dodecanese Assault and Counter-Assault
(iii) Churchill Attempts Counter-Attack
(iv) Diplomatic Consequences of Failure
(v) Churchill and Turkey: November 1943
(vi) The Conferences

Chapter Seven - CICERO, DULLES, PHILBY: THE MISSING DIPLOMATIC DECRYPTS...... page 158

(i) Introduction
(ii) Historiography
(iii) What Basna was Photographing
(iv) How he did it
(v) Berlin Assessments
(vi) Washington Assessments (Venona)
(vii) Whitehall Assessments

Chapter Eight - CONCLUSIONS................................................................. page 173

Appendices................................................................. page 181

(i) DIR/C - HW1 (Public Record Office)
(ii) Prewar bjs
(iii) Draft History of Room 40 OB by A. G. Denniston
(iv) Wartime bjs HW3/162
(v) 'Y' Programmes (Home Stations) June 1942
(vi) Diplomatic Venona in 1943
(vii) HW3 (Public Record Office) - GCCS in 1939
(viii) The Nazis' use of Diplomatic Intercepts
(ix) Berkeley Street Organisation Chart, 1943 (HW 3/3)
(x) Who was Who

Bibliography................................................................. page 208

(i) Primary Sources
(ii) Secondary Sources
## ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIR</td>
<td>Air Ministry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADM</td>
<td>Admiralty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bj</td>
<td>Secret signals intercept circulated in Whitehall in blue jackets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BP</td>
<td>Bletchley Park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSC</td>
<td>British Security Co-ordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'C'</td>
<td>General Sir Stewart Menzies, Head of the SIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>Churchill College, Cambridge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C in C</td>
<td>Commander in Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIGS</td>
<td>Chief of the Imperial General Staff (Lord Alanbrooke)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COS</td>
<td>The (British) Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C&amp;W</td>
<td>Cable and Wireless</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEFE</td>
<td>Files of the Minister of Defence (Churchill) at the PRO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedip</td>
<td>Foreign Diplomatic Decrypts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF</td>
<td>Direction Finding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIR/C</td>
<td>Churchill's Secret Intelligence Files</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMI</td>
<td>Director of Military Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNI</td>
<td>Director of Naval Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FO</td>
<td>The (British) Foreign Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCCS</td>
<td>The Government Code and Cipher School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCHQ</td>
<td>Government Communications Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHQ</td>
<td>General Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPO</td>
<td>General Post Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IWM</td>
<td>The Imperial War Museum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIC</td>
<td>Joint Intelligence Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEW</td>
<td>Ministry of Economic Warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI 1B</td>
<td>Military Intelligence (Cryptanalytical Section)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI6</td>
<td>Secret Intelligence Service (SIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>National Archives of Canada (Ottawa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OKW</td>
<td>High Command of the German <em>Wehrmacht</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTP</td>
<td>One Time Pad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREM</td>
<td>Prime Minister's Office Papers (PRO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRO</td>
<td>Public Record Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Royal Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Sicherheitsdienst - Intelligence Branch of the German SS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sigint</td>
<td>Signals Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIS</td>
<td>Secret Intelligence Service (MI6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TA</td>
<td>Traffic Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WO</td>
<td>The (British) War Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W/T</td>
<td>Wireless Telegraphy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
'I am after the Turk' - Winston Churchill to Anthony Eden, 8 October 1942
PREM3/448
Dedication

In memory of
Alexander Guthrie Denniston
1881-1961
INTRODUCTION

The literature on Churchill's use of secret intelligence at war is large and growing, in the USA as well as the UK. This thesis studies his use of diplomatic intercepts, based on newly discovered files Churchill himself hoarded during his lifetime. These files - which came to him almost daily from his intelligence chief Brigadier Stewart Menzies - contain a surprise, in that together with much Ultra traffic (high-grade or Enigma/Fish intercepts frequently referred to as 'Boniface'), there was much more diplomatic material in what Churchill was reading than any historian has hitherto realized. It was widely recognised, of course, that he studied the military, naval and air intercepts supplied to him from 1941. But it has only recently become apparent that Churchill's absorption in the product of the government's decyphering department had its origins in the First World War. In November 1914, when First Lord of the Admiralty, he had written the original charter for the legendary 'Room 40 OB', ensuring that German naval intercepts were available to his nominees. This involvement with, and possessiveness over, secret signals intelligence continued unabated until 1945 when Japanese diplomatic messages between Berlin and Tokyo informed the war leadership that the time had come to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The intercepted telegrams he studied were diplomatic as often as army and navy traffic in and between both world wars.

Churchill had always been interested in Turkey, ever since intercepts supplied to him by the Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Reginald Hall, told him he could have secured Turkish non-participation in hostilities in February 1915 and he chose to disregard this vital information. Later he backed a Greek foray against the Turks at Smyrna in 1922 in an episode in which intercepted diplomatic messages between the Turkish ambassador in Paris and Constantinople provided him, Curzon and Lloyd George with vital information on the attitude of the Turkish leadership. By 1940 he had convinced himself that he alone could bring Turkey into the war as an ally. Few people, then or now, agreed with him, but he took immense pains to develop British policy towards Turkey in a manner that would shorten the war.

Why was Churchill so interested in Turkey? This thesis will argue that Turkey, like the other major neutral powers, collectively and individually, had the opportunity to affect the outcome of the war. Turkey was one of the most powerful neutrals, for historical and geographical as well as strategic reasons. So Turkey could help to determine which way the war would go. Other questions then follow: What effect did Churchill's interest have on Turkey's determination to stay neutral in the Second World War? By what means did
Turkey exploit the international situation to safeguard its own sovereignty? In Whitehall, how did the policies of the Foreign Office and the War Office differ from Churchill's own policy in playing 'the Turkey hand'? And within the Foreign Office whose voice counted for most, or did the diplomats speak with one voice? How did the government obtain authentic and timely knowledge of Turkish intentions? How did the diplomatic intercepts produced in London and Bletchley between 1922 and 1944 alter the course of British foreign policy, in the Eastern Mediterranean, and what use was made of them by the Foreign Office and Churchill?

In considering these and related questions, this thesis focuses on three specific events: the conference in January 1943 between Churchill and the Turkish leadership; the abortive British campaign to recapture the Dodecanese later that year and its diplomatic consequences; and one of the single most spectacular spy coups of the war, the so-called 'Cicero' affair, on which new light is thrown by reference to Churchill's files of diplomatic intercepts in November 1943. All these events are seen against a background of international diplomatic intrigue in which Turkey's determination to stay neutral played a central role.

The Public Record Office has provided access (except where documents have been withheld by GCHQ) to files Churchill valued so highly that their contents had often to be recyphered and cabled to him -- sometimes in ipsissima verba (the exact words) -- whenever he was out of the country. Their recent arrival at the PRO means that diplomatic historians have had no more than a few months to review the material and undertake the dangerous counterfactual exercise of answering the question of how Churchill and the Foreign Office would have handled Turkey without the Turkey-sourced intercepts? An attempt is made here to strip out these messages from the general progress of Turco-British relations to see how differently Churchill would have played the Turkey hand had this material not been available to him, in its ipsissima verba state, in DIR/C.¹

Little attention has hitherto been given to the British government's achievements in obtaining intelligence by intercepting letters and telegrams and by breaking the diplomatic ciphers of neutral and friendly nations, and its impact on the conduct of foreign policy during the Second World War. Such references as there are to the non-military side of the wartime secret intelligence have been made despite the fact that both the US State Department and Her Majesty's Government have been unwilling until recently to disclose any diplomatic material. The arrival of DIR/C in the PRO means that a new source of secret information available throughout much of the war to the Foreign Office but hitherto

¹ DIR/C is the name given to Churchill's files of secret intelligence.
unknown to most historians of secret intelligence can now be studied at least for part of the period during which Turco-British relations were a major concern of British foreign policy. This also raises questions related to the Foreign Office's perception of the Turkish mind which require answering.

This thesis suggests that the intelligent reading and use of secret signals intercepts in war and peace by the major Western Powers assisted foreign policy makers (notably Churchill) who understood their limitations as well as their potential value. Churchill read diplomatic intercepts whenever he could, and hence concerns expressed in them significantly counterpointed his own study of the changing course of the war. But the corollary that diplomatic history might need to be substantially re-written in the light of recent releases in London, Ottawa and Washington does not necessarily follow. Little now known from the released intercepts, and unknown or only partially known before, actually affects existing diplomatic history.

Turkey was a crucial case. The Foreign Office had been hard at work improving Anglo-Turkish relations since the early 1930s, but by 1940 this was reduced to Turkey's trade in chrome with Britain and with Germany. Without Churchill relentlessly seeking any opportunity to divert German armies from the Eastern front and looking for an ally in the Eastern Mediterranean, it is unlikely that Turkey would have loomed so large in Allied war strategy. At least two policies, therefore, towards Turkish neutrality in World War Two can be discerned: those of Churchill and of the Southern Department of the Foreign Office which was responsible for Turkey. What united them was their common reading of Turkey-related diplomatic decrypts.

Within the Southern Department, the wartime minutes of George Clutton and John Sterndale-Bennett (nicknamed 'Benito' after Mussolini) predominate, but the observations of very senior diplomats such as the Deputy Under Secretary, Orme Sargent ('Moley'), and the Permanent Under Secretary, Sir Alexander Cadogan, throw light on the different perceptions of Turkish neutrality within the government. The Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, himself played a part, marred by his too obvious concern with the consequences to his own political career of the success or otherwise of Britain's Turkish policy. From Ankara the British ambassador, Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, wrote informally about Turkish affairs to both Sargent and Cadogan. John Sterndale-Bennett and another even able colleague, Knox Helm, were posted to the embassy in Ankara, thus ensuring coordination of policy between Ankara and London. This relationship can be traced by studying the FO371 (general correspondence) and FO195 (embassy and consulate) files of the period. While the thesis is concentrated on DIR/C, these and other Foreign Office files have also been useful. There are drafts of Churchill's unsent letters to colleagues and to
Roosevelt, relating to Turkey, in the PREM 3 and 4 (Premier) files. Some War Office, Admiralty and Air Ministry files contain references to decrypt diplomacy which the 'weeders' have missed.

That a new theme in Churchillian historiography has thus emerged is due to the release of DIR/C. The evidence therein points up Churchill's enthusiasm for playing the Turkey hand alone and demonstrates his personally directed policy towards Turkey, despite this being the responsibility of the Southern Department under the Secretary of State. The thesis includes an attempt to assess:

1. The importance to the Department of the diplomatic intercepts as distinct from other sources of information;

2. How officials regarded and used them; and

3. How their advice, consequent on these questions, was received and adopted or otherwise by the framers of British foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean throughout the war.

This study of Churchill's use of secret signals intelligence, before and during World War Two, breaks new ground in several other respects. The role of the neutrals has never received much attention from historians. In focusing on Turkey's remarkably resilient and subtle diplomacy towards Italy, Germany, Britain and especially the Soviet Union throughout the war, several significant themes develop. One theme is the alternating strategies of Germany and Britain towards the Balkans -- the former involving an invasion of Turkey from Bulgaria to carry the blitzkrieg to Egypt and Persia in 1940-41, the latter the opening of a second front in the Balkans from Turkey across the Eastern Mediterranean in 1943, to divert German divisions from the Eastern front and thus hasten D-Day in the West. Another is the predominating voice of Churchill in Allied war planning in the Eastern Mediterranean. Since he was neither a Commander in Chief nor a Head of State (as Roosevelt and Stalin were) his strategic ambitions could only be promoted through a cumbersome programme involving the Americans, the Russians, and his own War Cabinet and Chiefs of Staff. Despite these handicaps Churchill struggled with his allies and

---

colleagues for what he saw as the best way forward from 1941, and Turkish involvement in the war was always on his agenda.

Why this was so leads to the third theme of this study — his lifelong interest in and use of signals intelligence. Churchill had always read naval and diplomatic intercepts. As early as 1915 when First Lord of the Admiralty he had personally drafted the first charter of Room 40 OB — the navy's legendary decrypting department. Its longest serving member remarked scathingly of this charter that 'to have carried out his instructions literally would, no doubt, have safeguarded the secret but must also have nullified the value of the messages' because of the restricted distribution and the prohibitions attached to any mention of them. This sentence, it may be said, neatly encapsulates the whole problem of how to use intercepts whilst protecting their security: not enough security and they cease to exist: too much and they cannot be used. Churchill's use of intercepts continued through the long interwar years of 'his War against the Russian Revolution' in 1920 and against the Turks at Chanak in 1922. At the approach of World War Two he was reading diplomatic intercepts received from a friend in government (Desmond Morton). He found the study of raw authentic intercepts, not gists or summaries or paraphrases, indispensable in formulating policy, and explained their importance to Lord Curzon in 1922. Curzon himself observed: 'The deciphered telegrams of foreign governments are without doubt the most valuable source of our secret information respecting their policy and actions.' Interwar diplomatic decrypts are still withheld and what Churchill was reading between 1941 and 1945 has only recently been released and so has not yet been studied by historians. His written comments and observations on many of these messages can be seen for the first time, both on Axis service traffic (Enigma) and diplomatic (medium-grade) traffic. They are a pointer to his daily study of the inner movement of the war through the voices of his enemies, and of the neutrals.

---

3 While this has been massively documented, Robin Maugham's memory of Churchill's electoral defeat in 1945 is worth recording. Churchill told him at a party: 'What I shall miss most of all are the . . . cables being brought in at the start of every day'. (Quoted in Michael Woodbine Parish, Aegean Adventures 1940-1943 (Lewes: Book Guild, 1993), p.299).

4 Hand-written undated notes on the origin and wartime work of Room 40, by A. G. Denniston, lodged in the Churchill Archives in Churchill College, Cambridge. See also Patrick Beesly, Room 40: British Naval Intelligence 1914-1918 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1982), pp.16 and 20. See also appendix 3.


8 See PRO HW1/12 'Government Code and Cipher School,' which only covers the diplomatic section for the period from 1919 to 1926.
So far as Turkish neutrality went this was, of course, the responsibility of the Southern Department, not of the Minister of Defence. By reading the new (DIR/C) files alongside the Foreign Office files on wartime Turkey it is possible to discern significant differences in attitude between officials of the Southern Department whose Turkish remit was jealously safeguarded against GHQ Middle East, and against Churchill himself, who wished 'to play the Turkey hand' alone, and proceeded to do so in early 1943 much against the wishes of the Foreign Secretary and the rest of the War Cabinet. New connections can thus be drawn between Churchill and the Foreign Office over Turco-British wartime relations, themselves an organic development from the Foreign Office's prewar policy towards Turkey, ably set out by D. C. Watt in his *How War Came*.9

These causal connections can not be fully developed without some account of two separate strands in British twentieth century history. An early chapter of the thesis, therefore, describes the development of British cryptography from 1915, through the Russian, Turkish and Italian crises of the 1920s and 1930s. This is followed by an account of Turco-British relations between the Dardanelles crisis of 1915 and the Chanak crisis of 1922 up to September 1939. A bridging chapter carries the story of Churchill, wartime signals intelligence and the progress of the war in the Mediterranean to mid 1942, by which time the DIR/C files come on stream. Thereafter, until January 1943, when Churchill made his surprise visit to the Turkish leadership at Adana, and beyond, until early 1944, bjs relating to Turkey are reviewed in the light of the changing nature of the war.

The Adana conference was followed later in the year by two significant events -- one disastrous, the other ludicrous. The disaster was the Dodecanese débâcle of October 1943 in which British forces were beaten by better-officered Germans with a consequential loss of British credibility in the area.10 The other was the theft from inside the British ambassador's residence in Ankara of important Foreign Office papers by his Albanian valet, Eleyesa Basna -- codenamed 'Cicero' -- who was in the service of the German ambassador in Ankara, Fritz von Papen. Since much of this material, a chapter of this thesis seeks to demonstrate, was identical with Churchill's own reading, and since captured German documents have demonstrated the great interest shown in it by Hitler, Göbbels and Jodl in Berlin, a revised account is given of what diplomats until recently have regarded as the biggest FO security lapse until Burgess and Maclean. This is written in the light of

---


what we now know, fifty years later, about British cipher security, Churchill's use of
deciphered messages, and the state of the war in 1943-44.

The Dodecanese débâcle and the Cicero affair conclude this study of Churchill's use
of signals intelligence and the Foreign Office's policy towards Turkey in World War Two.
A year was to elapse before Turkey joined the Allies and in that year much diplomatic
activity persisted, but the end was no longer in doubt and the focus of Churchill's interest
moved to Western Europe, and to operation Overlord, the invasion of Normandy in June
1944. A concluding chapter develops the basic thrust of this thesis - that while the release
of the new files is to be welcomed as revealing interesting new connections between
Churchill and his war work, and in particular how he came to follow the inner movement
of the war through the bjs that told him how the neutrals perceived events, they do not
materially alter the history of World War Two.

Wartime Turkey has been the subject of several ambassadorial memoirs (René
Massigli, Hugh Knatchbull-Hugessen, Fritz von Papen) and spy memoirs (Eleya Basna,
Ludwig Moyzisch, Nicholas Elliot, Walter Schellenberg). The opening up of DIR/C is by
far the most notable primary source, but does it add to or alter what is already in the books?

Much was known before: Churchill knew it at the time because he read DIR almost every
day. President İnönü of Turkey knew it because he was reading much of the same material,
the reports his ambassadors sent to the Foreign Ministry in Ankara, which was pivotal in
formulating Turkish foreign policy. Whitehall knew it. Hitler and Göbbels knew it.

Turkey-related diplomatic intercepts corroborate the historical record but contain few
surprises, since the narrative is already in place. While that does not reduce their
importance, which is in relating the study of diplomatic signals intelligence to foreign
policy in wartime Whitehall, Berlin and Ankara, it may provide a convincingly negative
answer to the question previously raised of the requirement to adjust the record.

How the British came by the Turkish diplomatic telegrams is another question the
thesis seeks to answer. British wartime radio and telegram interception and decryption at
Bletchley Park have, of course, been the subject of a substantial literature of which
Hinsley's monumental British Intelligence in the Second World War holds pride of
place. Professor Hinsley (with his co-authors) not only had full access to the files when
writing, but was himself a key figure in running Bletchley Park from 1941-44: originating,
developing, modifying and operating the complex procedures which turned the raw
messages which arrived at Bletchley at all hours of the day or night from many intercept

11 F. H. Hinsley, et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and
stations scattered across the world into usable, relevant, topical material -- still authentic despite the many processes they had gone through. Other Bletchley Park veterans have written about signals intelligence in the Second World War including Gordon Welchman, Peter Calvocoressi and Ralph Bennett, but none of these, apart from Hinsley, had access to the diplomatic material which is the subject of this thesis, which sets out the case that Churchill's use of secret diplomatic traffic played a vital part in his war work, and concludes that despite this, the provision of much of Churchill's wartime study hardly alters the judgement already made by the official historians.

Churchill famously told his researchers that his own history of the Second World War was not history, it was his case. Official historians, as will be shown, followed him, particularly in 1943 over the Adana conference and the Dodecanese assault, not because he had put his 'case' together with his own selected documents before they had completed their task, but because they found that the files gave little extra useful information, and that what Churchill thought and did at the time, as recorded by him, remained the best source available. Nor did a subsequent generation of revisionist historians greatly alter the received Churchillian account of the years of the Second World War, as recent scholars have pointed out. The missing material for a definitive account of Churchill's 1943 war work is to be found in the diplomatic intercepts. Though they throw valuable new light on what Churchill was up to in his Eastern Mediterranean policy (as this thesis hopes to demonstrate) they require little, if any, re-writing of history. To say this, however, is in not way to denigrate the significance of the newly released diplomatic sigint intercepts in HW1 and HW12. On the contrary, two complementary themes have emerged: their importance to the highest national leaders wherever they were read, both in peace and war, and the personal nature of warmaking and policy-making amongst the 'great ones of the world'. These two aperçus come together to form the outline of a new understanding of 20th Century diplomatic history. It is important not to overstate the case, but even the most sceptical investigative historian must note the appearances of intercepts on the desks of heads of state and war leaders. Before these intercepts could become used, new skills at GCCS and its counterparts elsewhere, in the new cryptography extended activities and expertise into the wider task of the provision of immediate relevant secret intelligence, requiring detailed knowledge of the mindset of senders and receivers alike, the exact state of whatever emergency or situation was being targeted, the 'ministerial requirements' and their interpretation by officials, their occasional emergence as official jargon and disappearance when duly burnt after reading; their re-appearance in Parliament,

in obscure references still lurking unweeded in Foreign Office files, or muttered at a
diplomatic reception, or pillow talk between lovers. Facts here may seen to merge into
fiction, but the distribution of diplomatic intercepts throughout the chancelleries of the
major powers -- certainly between the wars -- may suggest an interesting new angle on
both the conduct and the study of international diplomacy. But to trace these intercepts,
through Churchill's use of them, to his directives and memoranda, and then to his actual
history, and ultimately to the lavish use made of them by both official and revisionist
historians, is to gain a glimpse at last of how diplomatic decrypts influenced policy.

I should like to thank Professor Kathleen Burk and Professor David French of
University College London, for help and guidance throughout the preparation of this thesis;
and also Professors Christopher Andrew and Peter Hennessy for encouragement and
information. Thanks are also due to Rupert Allason, M.P., Dr. Rosa Beddington, Ralph
Erskine, Dr. Selim Deringil, Professor John Ferris, Sir Martin Gilbert, Randal Grey,
David Irving, Professor Sir Harry Hinsley, Rachel Maxwell-Hyslop, Dr. Joe Maiolo, Sir
Patrick Reilly, and Paul Thomas at the National Institute for Medical Research. Special
thanks are due to the staff of the PRO at Kew, at the Churchill Archives in Churchill
College, Cambridge, and at the National Archives of Canada in Ottawa.
Chapter One

WHY TURKEY?


This chapter attempts to answer the question, Why was Turkey so important to Churchill in 1941? It brings together Turco-British international relations from 1914 to 1943, relates Churchill's failed attempt on Turkish neutrality in World War One to his playing of the Turkey hand in World War Two, links his perceptions of, and intelligence on, Turkish foreign policy to his war strategy, considers the balance of advantage of having Turkey as an active and demanding ally, and then summarises Turco-British relations between 1940 and 1943 using newly disclosed diplomatic intercepts. The following pages also touch on Turkish economics, geography and historical importance in relation to world affairs since the ascendancy of Atatürk. His successors shared with Britain (and probably also with Germany) a common source of intelligence: ambassadorial reports from most European capitals sent to Ankara for their guidance, which were also intercepted and used by the Foreign Office in London. Churchill's interest in signals intelligence generally is then integrated into the picture, particularly that related to Turkey. His obsession with the Turks had strong roots in the Great War, and thus can be seen to lead directly to his unilateral decision to seek out the Turkish leadership on Turkish soil in January 1943.

(i) Churchill and Turkey, 1914-15

To answer the question ‘Why Turkey?’ some account of Turco-British relations in 1914-15 is first required, for significant parallels can be observed between British war strategy towards the Turks at the Dardanelles, in part driven by Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty in 1914, and remarkably similar thoughts of a Balkan offensive launched from Turkey harboured by an older if not wiser Churchill in 1942-43.

In late August 1914 the German failure after the battle of the Marne to destroy France induced the Reich to look at Turkey, then still neutral. A Turkish threat to distract Russian armies from Germany's Eastern front would stop Russian trade through the Dardanelles, might hasten Bulgarian involvement and would threaten British imperial communications at Suez. The parallel, so far as Germany was concerned, with World War Two was clear: von Falkenhayn like Jodl in 1943, promoted the view that a threat to Suez would weaken British forces in the West. In Whitehall Winston Churchill was trying to persuade the Greeks to take part in an Anglo-Greek combined operation at Gallipoli, and
urged the cabinet towards an offensive against Turkey -- first conceived as involving a strong military contingent as well as the then all-powerful Royal Navy, subsequently a navy-only operation. The generals and admirals failed to deliver unequivocal support. On 30 October 1914 the Germans provoked the Turkish navy to shell the Russian Black Sea Fleet and provided Churchill with his opportunity in the Mediterranean. He unilaterally -- and unconstitutionally -- ordered the Royal Navy to shell the Turks stationed round the Dardanelles. This obliged the Turks to strengthen their defences, though their ammunition remained in short supply. Churchill's advocacy of an attack on the Dardanelles was based on the perception that a successful result would give Britain the chance to dictate terms at Constantinople. However he knew (as he knew about the Dodecanese assault in 1943) that the venture would be both costly and risky. In 1914 he found insufficient support for his plan. An attack on Turkey would only relax pressure on Russia. To attack Turkey would be to play the German game. In all this the he was abetted by Admiral 'Jacky' Fisher, the First Sea Lord, who wrote on 3 January 1915: 'The attack on Turkey holds the field, assuming a strong body of British troops to achieve a continued assault.' In the event, this was unforthcoming, but Churchill pressed on despite Fisher's view, expressed to the Dardanelles Commission in 1917, that the naval operation alone was doomed to failure.

The consequence of the confused leadership structure in Whitehall and of the First Lord's determination to play the Turkey card himself led to disaster for the British empire. This remained as a stigma to be born by Churchill for the next twenty years. That leadership structure was no less confused at the outbreak of World War Two, except that Churchill by June 1940 was in undisputed command and so not compelled to work entirely through advocacy. A parallel situation with regard to Turkey quickly developed in the stricken years of 1940-41, but between Gallipoli and 1940 Turco-British diplomatic relations had taken a turn for the better. To see why, Turkey needs to be viewed in a European context.

(ii) Turkey in Context

The dismemberment of the Ottoman empire in 1879 followed the successful Russian siege of Erzerum five years earlier. Previously extending to the Adriatic in the West and the Danube basin in the North-west, the empire had been in decline since 1690. By 1878 new nation states had grown within the Ottoman boundaries, while Bulgaria had thrown off the Turkish yoke in a revolt backed by fellow Slavs in Russia, to whom thereafter she was tied by race, religion and gratitude. Despite their victory over the British at the Dardanelles, World War One proved disastrous for those in Ankara reluctant to face

---

the realities of the post-Ottoman world. The Treaty of Versailles left Turkey with no European territory, and Western leaders, in particular Lloyd George, were determined to extrude her from the continent. She was disliked and feared by the international community. The dislike stemmed in part from a deep-seated anti-Moslem prejudice, partly explained by the residual predominance of Christian prejudices in the chancelleries of the Western Great Powers. The legacy of Ottoman oppression and corruption had left Turkey the sick man of Europe and something of a pariah. The fear arose from Turkey's strong tradition in arms, weakened but not allayed by being on the losing side in the Great War. The rise of Atatürk signalled to the architects of Versailles a recrudescence of Ottoman imperialism, symbolised by the Turkish victory over Greece at Chanak in 1922. Greece, backed only by Britain and in spite of British public opinion, was repelled from Turkish territory amidst some savage ethnic cleansing. A severe earthquake then compounded the problems of the Turkish leadership. Thereafter Atatürk was to prove a friend of the West, and Britain in particular, thanks in part to the close friendship he established with the British ambassador in Ankara, Sir Percy Loraine.

The world longed for peace, and thus good relations with the nascent, etiolated Turkish state became the cornerstone of the Balkan policies of all the Western Great Powers -- of none more so than Britain. Additionally Turkey's foreign minister, İsmet Pasha -- later, as President İnönü, to lead the Turkish nation through World War Two and beyond -- proved to be a formidable successful negotiator at the Lausanne Conference of 1923. While Lord Curzon was perceived to be the ablest tactician of the Great Power statesmen present, it was İnönü who won for his country significant modifications to Versailles, including parts of Western Thrace which made the Straits in effect a broad river through Turkish territory, much to the chagrin of generations of Russian and Bulgarian diplomats.

Chanak in 1922 and Montreux in 1936 were significant moments in the development of Turkish foreign policy in the interwar period. British attitudes to Turkey were affected by two factors which bound Turco-British relations together for the next 20 years. One was the presence of Winston Churchill back in government after serving in a sort of honourable disgrace as a battalion commander on the Western Front. Churchill was passionately in favour of the Chanak provocation in 1922, pressing information derived from Turkish diplomatic intercepts on his colleagues to show which way the wind was blowing. The second, arising from the first, was Britain's access to Turkish military and diplomatic ciphers continuously from 1915 to 1945. These informed Churchill how he could have taken advantage of the shortage of Turkish ammunition and the willingness of the Turkish banks to accept bribes to intervene: thus informed, he could have averted the Dardanelles fiasco. Seven years later he read the intercepts which spelt out the chances of

2 See chapter 3.
the success of the Chanak provocation, and, twenty years after that, he plotted each step in Turkey’s plans to stay neutral in 1941-43. Thus the relationship between Churchill, Turkey and diplomatic intercepts can be traced over twenty-nine years, which helps explain why playing 'the Turkey hand' was so important to him in World War Two.

Some account of Turkey’s economic and political developments will serve to bridge the interwar years. The crises and conferences which brought modern Turkey into being created an essentially non-viable state, lacking the infrastructure and resources of other Middle Eastern countries, settling uneasily for a centralised one-party state on Portuguese lines but with a commitment to some form of eventual social democracy which was slow to come and over which the Turkish leadership procrastinated, often with good reason. Turkey's strategic position at the Eastern end of the Mediterranean and the Southern shore of the Black Sea was a target of constant surveillance by Whitehall, but in fact the country was split, not geographically but ethnically and culturally, into two quite distinct groupings. Turkish discrimination against Armenian, Azerbaijani, Kurdish and Greek minorities obscured the fact that many Turks shared more in common with populations between the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea than with their Balkan neighbours. The huge Anatolian hinterland was comparatively undeveloped, and schools, roads and amenities generally were scarce. The economy was fragile, illiteracy widespread, and taxation yielded insufficient revenue to support not only a large standing army but also by 1939 a massive call-up of reservists and a state of emergency. Foreign trade was hard to come by without credit, or barter, or state intervention. Here was a third world country in which a million peasant farmer producers had become consumers through the call-up, as Prime Minister Saracoğlu explained in the Turkish National Assembly in July 1941. A wealth tax, introduced as a consequence, caused widespread alarm, particularly amongst the non-Moslem minorities in the West of the country, against whom it was targeted and who involuntarily contributed 85% of the additional revenue raised. After a good harvest the peasantry regularly worked on the roads for additional subsistence, and thus gradually opened Anatolia up to the internal combustion engine. Looking East and South, to Mecca and Arabia and central Asia rather than to Europe, the 18 million population had no wish to fight the Germans, the Russians or anyone else, except perhaps the Bulgarians. Only Moslems could bear arms and many of the minorities suffered discrimination. Dissent was discouraged and the press followed the government line with only mild differences of emphasis depending on whether the proprietor or editor inclined to national socialism or democratic capitalism. All alike were afraid of Russia, until Mussolini's interventions in Africa, Spain and Albania made Italy Turkey's chief problem.

---

3 Reported in PRO ADM 223/147 in an appreciation of the strengths and weaknesses of the Turkish soldiery.
The Turkish president knew that his army was equipped to fight and win on Turkish soil and elsewhere in Asia but not against the Wehrmacht with its new weapons and frightening new ways of carrying out a blitzkrieg. On Atatürk's death in 1938 İnönü had been appointed his successor in the Presidency. He concentrated his attention on foreign policy. He maintained his predecessor's priorities: holding Turkey's new borders inviolate; keeping her hard-won rights in the Straits; buying only from nations that bought from them; making wary non-aggression noises to her equally fragile neighbours - Romania, Greece, and Bulgaria; ignoring the Arab world and Jewish refugees from Eastern Europe; and maintaining friendship, albeit on their terms, with the Great Powers, particularly Britain. And he based the policy on the reports of his ambassadors which were invariably delivered straight to him.

At the start of hostilities in September 1939 Turkey's major enemy was Italy, whose advance into Albania two months previously was seen as further evidence of Mussolini's neo-imperialist policy, already condemned by the League of Nations, though later condoned. It was clear to the Turks that Mussolini's ambitions were by no means fully realised, and his occupation of the Dodecanese islands might prove to be the prelude to sharp fighting in the Eastern Mediterranean. But elsewhere İnönü followed Atatürk in seeking to ensure the balance of power in Europe was maintained. So Germany's ambitions in Eastern Europe, already realised in Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland, loomed menacingly, although German diplomats then and thereafter, on Hitler's orders, treated Turkey with politeness and care. The British approach by way of reciprocal guarantee in April 1939 came as the climax of several years of diplomatic activity designed to keep Turkey sweet. The formalities were completed by the Franco-Turco-British Pact which guaranteed Turkey's borders from any threat in the West -- but the Foreign Office files reveal that almost no-one understood what the pact really entailed, and in particularly what would happen if a belligerent country attempted to sail its ships through the Straits. It was never put to the test. French influence, hitherto dominant, was severely eroded by the immobilism of the French position which failed to maintain her mission civilisatrice in the Middle East, and was effectively eliminated when France surrendered to the Germans in June 1940.4

Thus preserving Turkish neutrality required all İnönü's concentration and formidable negotiating powers. Conflicting concerns swirled round the politicians in Ankara, and historical and ancestral memories skewed the negotiating processes. Fear of Russia was compounded of the widespread fear of international bolshevisation which by 1938 threatened to bring parts of Northern Spain into the Russian orbit, with a growing awareness of what Stalin's purges were doing to the Russian officer-class. With France immobile and Italy flexing its muscles, with Germany enticing her into trading dependency

---

and Britain unable to deliver what she promised, Turkey also had potential problems on her Eastern borders where in Persia and Afghanistan unstable regimes, tribal loyalties and oil complicated international relations. Many Turks, sometimes İnönü himself, hankered for a recrudescence of Panturanism -- the re-establishment of the wider frontiers and spheres of influence of the declining years of the Ottoman empire -- and longed at least to fight the Bulgarians, their erstwhile vassals. In July 1941 the Germans considered stirring up the Turkish-speaking populations in a local federation of Caucasians tribes, with or without the help of the Turkish government. Control of the Straits was maintained by Turkey only through the terms of the Montreux Convention which were widely resented by the other Black Sea littoral powers.

Such was the geopolitical reality for Turkey in 1939. This was the situation Churchill manipulated constantly, though in the end unavailingly. He was kept informed of Turkish military thinking by Howard Kelly, a retired admiral whom he appointed his special envoy in Ankara. Kelly was liked and trusted by the Turkish leadership. His manuscript diary entries covering these years are at the National Maritime Museum. The Turks, he reported, admired German efficiency. He went on unauthorised walks near strategic installations and was constantly being arrested. In 1940 he predicted that it was evident that Turkey would not go to war except for the protection of her own interests, but Churchill disregarded his view. Despite his knowledge of Ottoman history and the wounds left by the Dardanelles venture, Churchill's wish to get Turkey into the war was not based on geopolitical reality but on a mixture of hope and desperation. In 1940 when France fell he had no-one else in Europe to turn to, and when a year later Russia joined the Allies, and America six months after that, neither partner went along with his Turkish ploy, though such was his influence until mid-1944 that the other two sometimes pretended to do so.

He went about bringing Turkey into the war by proposing a Platonic marriage, based on mutual convenience. He ignored Turkey's fear that the success of any Great Power would threaten the balance of power in Europe and her own territorial sovereignty. By 1940 Germany was almost at Turkey's doorstep, Russia was a less than friendly neighbour to the North, whose plight in 1941 raised the spectre of a plea for help against the German invader. Russia's later successes displaced Italy and Germany as the major threat, as the prospect rose of Germany being rolled back by a newly victorious Soviet Union still suspected of promoting international bolshevisation. And when British successes in the Mediterranean seemed likely to throw the Axis out of the region, Turkey grew to fear that yet another imperial superpower would displace Italy as a potential

---

aggressor. Thus Germany, Russia, Britain, Italy (and France until mid-1940) had all constituted a direct challenge to Turkish independence.

In 1941 all Churchill had to go on was the Turco-Franco-British guarantee of mutual assistance of 1939, effectively nullified in 1940 by the collapse of France. But he had something else which only Hitler, Ribbentrop and a handful of Foreign Office officials in London and Berlin shared: he had intimate access to the formulation of Turkish foreign policy through the secret diplomatic intercepts from Turkish ambassadors abroad to Ankara. These told him in great detail when to press his Platonic marriage suit and when to quench his ardour: when President İnönü might be ready to receive him, and under what conditions and with what agenda and with what outcome; what Axis pressures were exerted on Ankara and how they were received; how the Turks reacted to German successes in 1940 and 1941, and the Russian successes thereafter; their suspicions of American intentions, their fears of the bolshevisation of Europe, shared by the Iberian countries, their scepticism of his own good faith -- would the British, could the British, deliver what they were promising: both success in fighting the Germans and sophisticated new weaponry for the Turks to defend themselves against the Bulgarians.

He had little help from his colleagues. Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, did not like the Turks and was not liked by them. Harold Macmillan was assigned political responsibility for most Mediterranean littoral countries, but specifically bound out of Turkey. The British generals were too assertive, the air marshals only marginally less so. Turkey should be handled by the Foreign Office, Churchill ruled. And the Foreign Office meant Churchill, both with regular access to diplomatic intercepts.

As for the other Allies, neither America nor Russia shared his enthusiasm for Turkey -- but for different reasons. To the Americans Turkey looked like a part of a plot to set up a second front as far away as possible from the British or imperial homelands, in the Balkans, an area they regarded as an exclusively European can of worms. In November 1940 the Russians had urged on their Axis partners a carve-up of the world: Molotov wanted Russian expansion at the expense of Turkey and proposed that Moscow and Berlin should impose these claims by force. But a year later the Russians, fighting for their lives, had no time for or interest in the Turks. They could not understand why the British continued to court them after Adana and though they agreed it was important they join the Allies in 1943 they cooled to this project, as indeed to Turkey, when they saw the diplomatic game the Turks were playing so successfully.

So Churchill had his Platonic marriage of convenience, a stick and carrot method of proposing it (if you don't you'll be invaded by someone, probably Russia, perhaps Bulgaria; if you do you'll get the best new weaponry and maybe the Dodecanese) and his

Turkish diplomatic intercepts. Given such a poor hand he may be thought to have played it with panache and skill and an endearing lack of self-importance. All present at Adana thought so. The conference itself took place amid scenes of amazing friendship and conviviality. But the British could not or would not deliver as promised, while the Turks were reluctant to accept and make use of what did arrive, for fear of provoking the Germans. A stalemate developed thereafter and a year of diplomatic stand-off began, until President İnönü quite unexpectedly removed his reputedly pro-German Foreign Minister, Numan Menemencioglu, stopped sending chromite to Germany, forbade the passage of German naval vessels through the Straits, and ultimately, with one week to go, entered the war. By that time the fighting was almost over. Despite the malingering and some consequential ill-tempered remarks, Churchill persisted in his attachment to his idea of Turkey and was personally instrumental in bringing her into the United Nations in late 1945.

If Churchill thus failed basically to secure a useful ally in the Turks, it was because there was nothing in it for them. The Turkish leadership called his bluff, very politely, and the German bluff (perhaps the more honest of the two). They also called the Russian bluff when in 1945 Molotov proposed a revision of the terms of the Montreux Convention.

The Turkish ambassadors, attachés, diplomats and foreign ministry officials kept their President au courant with the progress of the war, mainly by means of the diplomatic reports, which were systematically intercepted, decrypted and read assiduously in Whitehall and the Wilhelmstrasse -- and by none more assiduously than Churchill himself. These Turkish officials were united behind İnönü in working for continued Turkish neutrality at almost any cost. They all refused to think seriously about becoming a belligerent unless and until Turkish sovereignty had been infringed. It never was.

(iii) Churchill's Secret Source

Two factors can now be seen to have tied Turkey umbilically to Whitehall in the interwar period. One was Churchill at the Dardanelles and at Chanak; the other was the secret signals intelligence that the British obtained, unknown to the Turks, which gave them easy access to the reports from European capitals on which the Turks themselves, and İnönü in particular, relied in shaping foreign policy. This form of intelligence had always been highly regarded by Churchill and some account of his early use and appreciation of it now follows.

Churchill's direct involvement with the product of the cryptographers did not start in 1940 when he became Prime Minister or even in the latter days of peace when Major  

---

Morton kept him *au courant* with what the intercepts were saying to the government.\(^9\) It started in 1915 when he was First Lord of the Admiralty and Room 40 OB was born. He himself wrote the rules and procedures whereby naval decrypts - wireless messages and telegrams - should be processed. He decided who should see them, apart from himself, and more significantly who should not.\(^10\) He dealt with Room 40 OB through successive personalities -- first Sir Alfred Ewing (head of Naval Intelligence Division's cryptographers), and then Admiral Sir Reginald 'Blinker' Hall (DNI). His relationship with Hall was not easy because they were both mavericks. It was Hall who without cabinet authorisation fixed the price on receipt of which the Turks would withdraw from the Dardanelles.\(^11\) His negotiation was aborted by Churchill who was too preoccupied with his own agenda, and looked Hall's gift-horse in the mouth. Hall's use of signals intelligence in World War One went on to include the spectacular success of the disclosure of the Zimmermann telegram - bringing the USA into the war -- a feat Churchill may have envied as well as admired, and for lack of a similar intercept in World War Two he had to wait many anxious months before the United States was forced into the war by Japan and Germany.\(^12\)

So diplomatic intercepts, or blue jackets or 'bj telegrams', were familiar to Churchill over nearly 30 years in and out of government. What they were, where they came from, how they evolved from the routines of those manning Room 40 OB in World War One, who read them and what they thought of them -- and what was done with them at the time and afterwards -- all throw light on their use in the Second World War.\(^13\)

Diplomatic as well as naval intercepts were decrypted by Room 40 in the First World War and became part of peacetime foreign policy making in 1919 when decisions were made to maintain an intercepting and decrypting facility based on cable censorship and the identification of appropriate diplomatic traffic. Similar work continued in Germany, the USA and the USSR. The British specifically targeted traffic to and from the USA, France, the Soviet Union and Japan.\(^14\) Italy, Spain and Turkey followed later.

The fledgling Government Code and Cipher School (GCCS) eavesdropped on all major countries except Germany, which adopted supposedly unbreakable machine


\(^{11}\) For Ewing and Hall see Beesly, op. cit., pp.125-7.


\(^{13}\) The main source is A. G. Denniston, 'The Government Code and Cipher School Between the Wars' (ed. by Christopher Andrew) *Intelligence and National Security* Vol. 1, No.1 (1986), pp.48ff. This document is also located at Churchill College Archive in file DENN 1/4 and at the PRO in HW3/32.

\(^{14}\) Denniston, op. cit., p.55.
encipherment, and the Soviet Union, which used the labour-intensive but secure ciphering technique known as the One Time Pad (OTP) after British politicians had revealed that they were reading her secret messages from May 1920 till March 1921. Japanese and Turkish diplomatic traffic proved to be of particular interest and importance. The lack of naval and military traffic was an inevitable consequence of peace. Targeting Japan proved clever or lucky or both, for the penetration of Japanese diplomatic and naval signals yielded vital wartime information on the state of Germany to the Americans and Russians as well as the British. The importance of this will emerge in the pages that follow. Turkey's diplomatic messages were targeted by Cable and Wireless in Constantinople, and were also read in Berlin and probably Moscow. The Spanish Civil War released valuable Italian naval material including Enigma intercepts which enabled GCCS to study machine encipherment. Access to German naval traffic was limited to Traffic Analysis (TA) until June 1940, but a careful analysis of the volume and direction of enemy traffic developed into a new cryptographic skill based on wireless telegraphy, which eventually provided much wartime tactical signals intelligence. During the Second World War service traffic was obviously the main priority, and has subsequently dominated the literature of secret intelligence. But in the 1920s there was no military or naval traffic, only diplomatic telegrams. The Spanish Civil War yielded a bonanza of Italian military and naval traffic, all successfully read by GCCS, and the Abyssinian War of 1935-36 produced readable Italian material both military and diplomatic.

The changing nature of GCCS's product mix affected relations between GCCS and its client ministries. These varied. Through its own Room 40 operation, the Admiralty had had a long-term interest since 1914, and continued to control its own assessment and distribution. The army had its excellent decryption department, MI 1B in World War One, and the arrival of Brigadier John Tiltman to liaise with the army at GCCS strengthened links with the War Office, because he was not only a first-class cryptographer but an effective diplomat who became a founding father of Anglo-American signals co-operation. The RAF with its shorter history had, in consequence, a less possessive attitude to the handling of signals intelligence derived from sources other than its own. It provided GCCS with technical facilities. Outside the peacetime service ministries, the chief client was the Foreign Office, but a separate Commercial Section of GCCS emerged in 1937 and later became crucial to the Ministry of Economic Warfare. This section monitored German imports of vital minerals especially from Spain and Portugal. Major

15 See Chapter 2.
17 This information comes from professor J. Ferris, and from the NAC (See appendix 5).
18 PRO HW3/3.
19 See WHO was WHO (appendix 10), and Bradley Smith, The Ultra Magic Deals: The Most Secret Special Relationship 1940-1946 (Los Angeles: Presidio, 1993).
Desmond Morton, Churchill's confidant, was on the circulating list of bjs in the period covered by DIR/C and therefore, as head of the department which evolved into the Ministry of Economic Warfare, would have seen prewar bjs from the Commercial Section of GCCS.20

Diplomatic traffic predominated throughout the interwar period, and the importance of Turkey to the Foreign Office in the 1930s suggests that Turkish traffic, in any case easily available, would have formed a significant fraction of the intercepts continuing through 1939 and the 'guarantee' period till 1941 when DIR/C, now available, shows Turkey still in a leading position as suppliers of bjs.21

The object of this thesis is to link wartime bjs to British foreign policy in relation to Turkey. These reports (in French) were sent to and read by the Turkish President and Foreign Minister, and formed the basis of their subtly changing attitudes to both Axis and Allies. Perhaps it was because both Britain and Germany were reading their messages that Turkey was never pressurised by either belligerent. Both knew the high cost of equipping a major new ally's large army. German as well as British commanders knew that a Turkish alliance might be more a liability than an asset -- as Field Marshal Lord Wavell summed up Turkish involvement -- and courtship rituals seemed preferable to rape. Churchill used his daily access to DIR/C to advise, threaten and cajole his colleagues in the War Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff to accept his view of how the Allies could beat the Axis. His conviction that a second front in the West would be unsustainable until the Russians had seriously reduced the fighting strength of the Wehrmacht on the eastern front led him to promote several alternative second fronts: one of which of course was an Aegean initiative in conjunction with Turkey. This would be the one most likely to head off the insistence of Stalin and Roosevelt on an early launch of a second front in the West. Few people, then or now, agreed with his Turkey policy and by 1944 it was off the agenda.

Why was Turkey so important to him? Several clues have already been noted. He was believed by the Germans to be obsessed with his personal responsibility for the British failure at the Dardanelles in 1915. In 1941 he saw a pro-Allied Turkey as guardian of the imperial route to India, the Far East and Persian oil. He dreamed of a million hardy Turkish soldiers joining the exiguous divisions of Britain and the inexperienced Americans. He was starved of allies after France fell in 1940, and in his determination to keep the fighting away from the shores of Britain he lighted on Turkey, and worked unceasingly against

20 Bjs or 'blue jackets', so-called because of the blue folders in which they were circulated. DIR or DIR/C Archive in Hinsley stands for Director, and refers to the Chief of the British Secret Service, General Sir Stewart Menzies, and identifies the files Menzies ('C') brought constantly to Churchill.

21 Diplomatic decyphering from 1939-1942 took place in the main building at Bletchley Park, while 'High-Grade' sigint (Enigma, later also 'Fish') was carried out in Huts 3, 4, 6, and 8, in the grounds of the Park (information from Professor F. H. Hinsley).
opposition and indifference from his new allies after 1941, and against his own government colleagues, to bring her in.

While this can be substantiated from the existing Churchillian historiography, this thesis offers a new aspect of his playing the Turkey hand. Churchill's insistence on seeing intercepts 'raw' on a daily basis gave him a unique insight into Hitler's war planning in the Caucasus and on the Eastern front, as well as in North Africa. The Turkish diplomatic intercepts significantly augmented his picture of how the war was seen by others. He made no secret of his personal commitment to Turkey, and this can be seen in the manner in which he later wrote his history of the war. 'This is not history,' Churchill told one of his assistants working on his multi-volume history of the Second World War, 'it is my case'. He selected and reproduced, often in extenso, his own directives for the conduct of the war and the policy that he believed HM Government should adopt towards Turkey. His use of his own documents, especially those relating to Turkey, makes his history arid reading; but his selection of documents becomes of new interest when correlated with DIR/C and his attitude towards Turkey. This can now be seen not with his own hindsight when he was writing after the war but as the war developed. This is particularly true of the autumn of 1943, when he personally drove the British Dodecanese assault using intercepts and rhetoric for lack of a proper plan of campaign, and the senior officers able to carry it out successfully. It is difficult to learn much about the 1940-41 period before DIR/C came on stream in the autumn, by which time the war had been nearly lost. But from September 1941 until mid-1945 DIR/C provided Churchill with diplomatic decrypts which formed the basis of the British government's foreign policy towards neutrals as well as enemies. Turkey provided the most.

If this is but a provisional answer to the question 'Why Turkey?', a clearer picture may be gained by identifying the common ground offered by DIR/C, Churchill, the Foreign Office and Turkey's understandable wish to stay non-belligerent. Churchill himself bulked large in this scenario. Most of the other characters are half a dozen Turkish ambassadors, and an equal number of ambassadors of other countries posted to Ankara. Why did they report what they did? Was it because they wanted to impress, to alert, to alarm, to press their own cause, to win favour at home, to advance their careers by saying what they thought their masters wished to hear? Or were they routine communications by a run-of-the-mill diplomat? Only a full reading of reports over a sustained period could give Churchill then or historians now the flavour, the nuances, the context to make meaningful judgements. In fact cumulatively they read less like formal diplomatic exchanges and more like a novel -- by Anthony Trollope, Benjamin Disraeli, perhaps even Leo Tolstoy. The question is answered by incorporating the new DIR/C source into the history of the war and by analysing the Prime Minister's position on and use of this daily

---

file, and testing the hypothesis that the new source provided crucial information to him and certain departments in Whitehall. The emergence of Turkish foreign policy as a major factor in British strategic planning from 1941-45 confirms the view that Turkish neutrality deserves further study. Since the Turkish leadership based policy decisions largely on the reports received from their diplomats in foreign capitals, and since intercepts of many of these appear in DIR/C, it is theoretically possible to construct a hidden dialogue between Churchill and the three Turks who together conducted Turkish foreign policy -- İnönü, Saraçoglu and Menemencioglu.

In order even to guess at how GCCS's main client, the Foreign Office, used its most secret source in relation to Turkey, the next chapter traces the development of the techniques of British interception, decryption, translation, assessment and distribution of the secret diplomatic communications of foreign governments in the prewar period. Since Turkish material is prominent in both, the case for a special study of Turkey emerges naturally. Other Foreign Office files reveal that intercepts illuminated many patterns of decision making in Ankara, the nature of Turkish strategy and its diplomatic relations with other countries, especially the USSR and Britain.23

While Turkish wartime foreign policy was in the hands of no more than three men, British policy by 1940 was conducted by Churchill, despite the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Anthony Eden, and the staff of the Southern Department of the Foreign Office. Diplomats in both capitals relied on reports by Turkish ambassadors, chargés d'affaires and attachés from most of the capitals of Europe and of America and Asia, but London could also read directives and circulars from the Turkish foreign ministry, and reports sent from Ankara by representatives of European countries covering the war situation in the Eastern Mediterranean and on the Eastern and North African fronts in general, and official Turkish reactions thereto. Far from being restricted to the news and views of non-Turkish neutrals, the wartime bjs (for instance) throw light on the Iberian terror of the impending 'bolshevisation of Europe', the effect of Mussolini's resignation on the Axis conduct of the war and the neutral overreaction to it, on the conflicting agenda of the Big Three after Casablanca at Moscow, Tehran, Cairo and Yalta, the reasons for the defection of Hungary and Bulgaria from the Axis, and the reasons why Russia did not declare war on Japan till 1945, and on many other diplomatic concerns.

(iv) Churchill and Turkey: 1940-42

What new light does DIR/C throw on the Foreign Office, Churchill, Turkey and the relation between all three from 1941-45? The answer may be that Churchill's understood

the changing diplomatic situation at the time because he was reading about it almost every day. İnönü knew because he was reading some of the same material. Hitler, Gőbbels, Kaltenbrunner and Ribbentrop knew about it too. By concentrating on the British archive and correlating DIR with the files relevant to Turkey during the war, it has proved possible to make new connections between the Southern Department of the Foreign Office, the policies which officials there advocated towards Turkey, and the part played by Churchill in using the Turkish gambit to hasten Allied victory.

Why the Turkish gambit should have loomed so large in British war strategy in 1942 is a question answered in chapter three. The Joint Planning Staff, after consultation with Churchill, expressed the hope as early as December 1941 that the offensive against Germany will take the form of large-scale land operations on the Russian front, large-scale bombing operations supplemented by amphibious raids of increasing weight from the United Kingdom and a gradual tightening of the ring round Axis-controlled Europe by the occupation of strategic points in the Atlantic Islands, North and West Africa, Tripoli and Turkey. Every opportunity will be taken to try and knock out Italy as an active partner in the war. These operations will be followed in the final phase by simultaneous land operations against Germany herself, from the West by the British, from the South by the United States and from the East by the Russians.24

A minor amendment was made later but essentially this remained Britain's grand strategy. It was not until 8 October 1942 that Churchill told Eden: 'I am after the Turk'. However, grand strategy, British historians now agree, is something of a misnomer for what was actually going on in the minds of the Chiefs of Staff and the Prime Minister. For Churchill, instinct or rhetoric would be a more accurate word. What is noteworthy is the important role that Turkey was playing in Allied war planning at this early stage, and without any evidence that she would be a willing partner. That it was Churchill who introduced the Turkey factor can be asserted with confidence since Turkey was neutral and thus belonged, in Whitehall terms, to the Foreign Office and subject to the wiles of British foreign policy, rather than belonging -- as an ally -- with the war planners. While Churchill was only an important voice in the latter debate, he did not have to argue his case in foreign policy matters.25

By 24 July 1942, Churchill predicted that 'our second front will in fact comprise both the Atlantic and the Mediterranean coasts of Europe, and we can push either right-handed, left-handed or both-handed as our resources and circumstances permit'.26 Churchill's approach to war planning was characteristically, and realistically, opportunistic. How could it be otherwise in 1940 when Britain was at the mercy of German blitzkrieg?
in Southern and Eastern as well as Western Europe, Germany was well on the way to becoming master of Europe, defeated but for a moment in the Battle of Britain, and so full of enterprising and aggressive new schemes that hastily reactive and provisional half-measures were all that were practically available to the Chiefs of Staff. In July 1940 Churchill told the Russian ambassador, Ivan Maisky, that his strategy was to get through the next three months. He wanted Turkey in the war because only thus could German troops in large numbers be diverted from the Russian front, to assuage the Russian need for a second front immediately, while the RAF could bomb the oilfields and refineries of Romania, Austria and Hungary which he and others believed to be vital to Germany’s war effort. Turkey had a large army, a million men. This factor, as well as her geographical position impelled Churchill to seek to make common cause with the Turks. The Turkish soldiers, *per contra*, -- cheap, cheerful, plentiful and expendable -- were already under canvas and might account for 500,000 invading German troops as well as providing a fierce and reassuring comradeship in arms. German aggression in Poland in September 1939 soon gave Russia the large portions of Eastern Europe she acquired by signing the Nazi-Soviet Pact. The Baltic states, valuable mining areas of Eastern Poland and Bessarabia, Moldova and Buckhovina fell to Stalin. The Soviet Union in one bound had closed on Turkey’s borders. Russia joined Italy in joint first place on the list of Turkey’s bogeymen. Meanwhile British catastrophes in Norway in the spring of 1940, the overrunning by Germany of the Low Countries, and particularly the fall of France, resounded menacingly in Ankara. Hitler had triumphed, almost without opposition, over what had been believed to be the world’s greatest army -- the French -- in a matter of weeks and his Greater Germany policy brought the victorious *Wehrmacht* to the borders of Turkey, while his need for oil, wheat and minerals was now satisfied by the adherence of Romania to the Axis and the opening of new oil wells in Austria. Thousands of tons of war equipment, left behind by the Allies at Dunkirk, were put to good use by the Germans. In June Italy declared war on the Allies and France sued for an armistice with the Axis. What Germany had achieved by *blitzkrieg* in the West she could as easily achieve in the Near East, and if that meant invading Anatolia *en route* to the oilfields of Persia, the Suez Canal and the borders of India, even that might seem possible after the rout of France.

France’s fall created strong anti-French feeling in Ankara. One signatory of the Turco-Franco-British Pact having already defaulted, Turkey signed a commercial agreement with Germany in July 1940. Japan joined the other Axis partners to sign the Tripartite Pact on 27 September. Japan was a long way from Turkey but fear of the ‘yellow peril’ was only dormant in diplomatic circles, as the bjs constantly attest. On 7 October Germany entered Romania and on 28 October Italy attacked Greece. German aircraft and Italian troops were stationed close to the Thracian border by the end of the year. Though
Turkey stayed friendly with Britain, Ankara little doubted that the Germans would shortly be masters of Europe.27

For Britain the worst was not over. Germany occupied Bulgaria in March 1941 and Yugoslavia in April. German armies invaded Greece and defeated Greek and Commonwealth troops there. The brief Allied occupation of Crete was brought to a bloody end when the remaining troops were evacuated. While British successes against the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain and against the Italians by land and sea, as well as her still powerful influence in Persia and Egypt, bolstered her prestige amongst unaligned nations, German military supremacy was by now the dominating concern of Turkish diplomats. Where would Germany turn next? She had proved unbeatable everywhere, though containable momentarily when Hitler inexplicably called off the invasion of Britain. The RAF's convincing success against the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain seemed only a temporary setback to Germany's unstoppable ambition for world domination. Turkey had to align herself with the future victor.

On 22 June 1941, however, Germany invaded Russia, and Turkish diplomats speculated to each other whether Hitler had finally overreached himself. Turkey was relieved because pressure from both Germany and Russia would be eased so long as they were locked in mortal combat with each other. Germany had opted not to threaten or cajole Turkey to join the fray by allowing German troops and matériel through Anatolia towards Egypt and Persia. But the breathing space was short-lived. For the rest of 1941 the fragile alliance between Britain and Russia, celebrated by their joint occupation of Persia in August of that year, and promoted almost single-handedly by Churchill, did little to mitigate the results of the military disasters suffered by Britain in North Africa, or the crippling of her Atlantic supply lines by German U-boats. For Turkey these setbacks meant that British offers of friendship in arms were irrelevant to her real needs. Diplomatic efforts by the British ambassador in Ankara, Sir Hugh Knatchbull-Hugessen, and the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, were politely shrugged off. A British offer to mediate between Turkey and Russia was ignored. Menemencioglu Numan, whom the German trade minister, Dr. Carl Clodius stated was the spiritual leader of Turkish foreign policy, told Clodius that Germany cannot be conquered, but he cannot envisage a German victory over England.28 It was a war which Turkish diplomacy, given sufficient skill and nerve - and İnönü had plenty despite his frail appearance, deafness and lack of popular appeal - would keep her doing nicely out of it rather than in it. As indeed it proved.

For readers of diplomatic decrypts, the early months of 1942 saw Rommel driving the British relentlessly eastwards in North Africa and a new enemy, Japan, striking South as the Germans had done in Europe so that Malaya, Burma and Indo-China were soon part

28 Documents on German Foreign Policy, D, XIII, document no. 633 of 10 October 1941, p.319.
of the East Asian Co-Prosperity Region. The Japanese were dominant in the Indian Ocean, talking of invading Australia and/or India, and of linking up with their Axis partners somewhere near the Persian Gulf. The world war had become a reality and few doubted who would be the victor, for Allied shipping losses in January - June 1942 were insupportable. The Germans had intercepted and read British codes and ciphers and knew the whereabouts of all convoys of importance while it took the British a further year to crack the German naval code.\textsuperscript{29} While the Turkish leadership were not to know the full extent of Allied defeat, they knew from their ambassador that Churchill was in a deep and understandable depression. On 12 February 1942 the British surrendered at Singapore, and Sir Alexander Cadogan in the Foreign Office noted that 'it was the blackest day of the war'.\textsuperscript{30}

In Ankara Sukru Saraçoğlu had just become Prime Minister and shortly afterwards Numan Menemencioglu was appointed Foreign Minister. March saw Turkish diplomats abroad reporting armistice approaches between Germany and Russia with sometimes Turkey, sometimes Sweden, sometimes the Iberian nations named as would-be mediators. İnönü proclaimed Turkish neutrality. Diplomatic intercepts yielded signs in March and April that Germany would attack Turkey as part of her spring offensive, while in Berlin, the Japanese ambassador, Oshima Hiroshi, confidently predicted global German victory. May saw further evidence of possible peace negotiations between Russia and Germany. The Spanish thought the Allies had decided to occupy Turkey. Molotov, visiting in Washington, called for a second front in the West in 1942. In June a delegation of Turkish arms dealers were treated by Hitler to a lecture in international history and to his assurances of undying friendship between the two countries. In June Tobruk fell to Rommel with the loss to Britain of face and booty. The intercepts were full of it.\textsuperscript{31}

While the Turkish leadership were slowly adjusting to the prospect of German omnipotence and the inevitability of a Russian request to revise the terms of the Montreux Convention, Churchill was still hankering after Turkey. From the intercepts he could observe others failing to handle Turkey effectively. The Turks resented the arrogance of British soldiers, Eden failed to impress his counterparts in Ankara and Hugessen wrote long reports but failed to make headway against the Turkish diplomats resolved to stay neutral. The Germans had decided to leave Turkey in a state of benevolent neutrality supervised by their ambassador, Franz von Papen, and the Russians had other matters on their minds. The Turks suspected that the British neither could nor would keep their promises about the supply of equipment for the army. The Turkey hand was being played,

\textsuperscript{29} See David Kahn, \emph{Seizing the Enigma: The Race to Break the German U-Boat Codes, 1943-1945} (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991).
\textsuperscript{31} HW1/452-706.
in fact, rather ineptly. Churchill's concern with Turkey, testified to by his doctor, his colleagues, and himself in his account of these traumatic months of the war, was so intense that he would play the hand himself. And at the end of January 1943 he did.

It was not until end of 1942 that the tide of war turned -- El Alamein on 4 November and Stalingrad on 23 November. Meanwhile American successes in the Pacific were followed by Allied landings at Casablanca and Oran. Bjs of the period buzzed with these events. A new belligerent, the United States, was as worrying to Ankara as the new Soviet successes in the South, bringing Soviet claims as a Black Sea littoral nation back into the minds of the Turkish leadership. Pressures on Turkey to join (or not to join) the Axis or the Allies continued until October when Soviet successes in the Caucasus and in the North eased German pressure on Turkey.

This was the background to Churchill's Turkish visit in January 1943, the hidden trick in the Turkey hand. We have seen that his interest in Turkey was out of all proportion to Turkey's likely usefulness on the Allied side in a combined operation. The Foreign Secretary joined the Chiefs of Staff and the rest of the War Cabinet in attempting, and failing, to head off Churchill's Turkish trip en route from the Casablanca Conference in January 1943. But despite what followed, or failed to follow, from that extraordinary encounter in the railway carriages parked in the wasteland in the slush of the Mediterranean winter, Churchill's instinct seemed vindicated, and Turkey's views of the comparative merits of friendship with the Allies or the Axis were never the same again.

Post Adana there was much martial activity in Turkey but the course of the war in the Eastern Mediterranean remained static until the resignation of Mussolini in June 1943. This caused a flurry of Turkish ambassadorial reports to and from Ankara. Would the Allies achieve a quick victory? Would Italy make a separate peace? Would Japan insist on a re-assertion of the Tripartite Pact? Would Germany invade the Dodecanese and arrive on Turkey's doorstep with one eye on the pipelines of Persia of which only Turkey now stood in the way? All the Balkans were as shocked by Italy's collapse in 1943 as by the fall of France in 1940. It seemed to presage an early Allied victory which never came. For the Allies it proved a false dawn, as their conquest of Italy dragged on, the Germans replaced the Italians and retook the Dodecanese.

The war took on a different aspect in Ankara after January 1943. Protestations of friendship were followed by two British military missions intended to bring Turkey into the war by providing equipment and training. It was not an easy agenda and it was not successfully carried out. Britain failed to provide what was needed. Direct American involvement ensued. Whether for this reason or as part of a complex strategy to maintain her neutrality, Turkey's demands escalated. Reconditioned Hurricanes were rejected for the new Spitfires which had been promised. Guns urgently needed elsewhere could be ill spared to a country which perhaps could not use them and might never need them. Churchill himself goaded his reluctant Chiefs of Staff partly to save his own credibility, but
his own powers were less than total and all he could offer the Turks when begging in
America was his moral support. The second front in the West had to be postponed again,
ot once but twice. Stalin's ill-concealed frustration found outlets in threats of patching up
peace between the Soviet Union and a battered Germany -- a possibility dreaded in Turkey
and Britain. It was not until 6 June 1944 that the second front finally became a reality, and
Turkish neutrality at that point ceased to be relevant to final victory.

This account of Turkey's geopolitical situation and of Turco-British relations
between 1919 and 1944 has discussed the diplomatic messages on which the Turkish
leadership relied. Churchill's part has been demonstrated. Addressing the question 'Why
Turkey?' uncovers evidence dating back to World War One showing Churchill's particular
interest in Turkey, as well as some socio-economic background to that country in the inter-
war years during which she was courted by all the Western European Powers. The DIR/C
files show how Turkish relations with her neighbours and the Great Powers, both Allied
and Axis, changed and developed in the first two years of the war. Some of the characters
-- British and Turkish in the main -- who dominate the pages that follow have been
introduced. A reconstruction of the early years of the war as seen in Ankara and in DIR/C
is preceded by a detailed examination of these files. These reveal the regular presence of
diplomatic intercepts, the intercepts which fuelled Churchill's Turkey policy. These
intercepts have a history which will be the subject of the next chapter.
Chapter Two

CHURCHILL'S DIPLOMATIC INTERCEPTS

(i) The 'Classical Cryptographers' (ii) Churchill's Intercepts: World War One
(iii) Between the Wars (iv) Diplomatic Intercepts in the 1930s (v) The GCCS's Interwar Achievements

Any analysis of Churchill's use of diplomatic intercepts must start with an attempt to answer the question how those intercepts came to be in the possession of the British government in the first place. The first section of this chapter tackles a cognate question 'who produced them, and how?' Diplomatic eavesdropping in Britain in 1922 was not a new or recent practice, but the coming of wireless telegraphy (W/T) at the turn of the century gave access, via interception and decryption, to greatly increased volumes of traffic. Much of this would have been worthless, emanating from chancelleries without power or influence to affect the course of European affairs. But not all. For the victors in the First World War and from the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, British, French, Italian and American code-breaking departments were re-instated or established.\textsuperscript{1} In Britain the history of signals intelligence, or sigint, has concentrated on the Admiralty code-breaking department in Room 40 OB (Old Buildings) from 1914 to 1918, and on the interwar abuse of Soviet cipher insecurity, fuelling the anti-Bolshevik scares of the 1920s and precipitating a Soviet change to a more secure cipher system. 1939 brought not only a new world war but a new dimension of cryptanalysis involving breaking machine-enciphered messages. The Enigma breakthrough and what followed therefrom has been well documented. This chapter traces recent research into non-service (i.e. diplomatic) traffic, some of which was enciphered by systems which predated machine encipherment. The period covered includes the interwar years.

The nature of prewar intercepts can be identified by the diplomatic component of the files that came to Churchill from MI6 from late 1941 to VJ Day. It was called DIR/C, and in the Public Record Office system it is known as HW1. This material (still described by retired governments officials as 'the intercepts') can now be assessed, because Churchill was not only a prime user of diplomatic sigint but a compulsive hoarder of any and all papers that came his way, and it is his daily files of intercepts that have survived and been released. They provide the first and almost only indication that diplomatic eavesdropping, on friends, neutrals and enemies, was an important part of the British cryptanalytical war effort. Churchill's use of it, particularly in 1943, and particularly the Turkish messages, is

the main theme. Extrapolating backwards it is possible to discern some of the prewar work, undertaken under the auspices of the Foreign Office by the Secret Intelligence Service, which had to be done to make possible the wartime achievements of Bletchley Park. Unlike the war period, now extensively documented and researched, the evidence for the prewar period remains scanty and the literature somewhat specialised. While most war historians are familiar with the work of Bletchley Park, in particular the breaking on a continuous basis of the German machine cipher Enigma, and the distribution of the resulting decrypts in a process called Ultra, few scholars so far have more than anecdotal evidence for the history, or the people and the evolving processes within the British secret establishment from 1914 onwards which enabled Enigma to be read and Ultra to function from 1940 onwards. The intention of this chapter is to answer the question, What made this achievement possible in the years before 1939? The claim made here is that a small group of non-established civil servants lodged in the Foreign Office and working on diplomatic intercepts from 1917 (and on naval and military messages since 1914) rose to the occasion in 1941 to provide the British war leadership with invaluable information on the state of the enemy. If that is proved true, it will also answer an important question about Churchill's contribution to Allied victory.

(i) The 'Classical Cryptographers'

The main sources for what follows consist of two documents, one hand-written until typed in 1994, covering World War One, the other covering the interwar period, both deposited in the Churchill Archives in Cambridge. By linking the names which appear in both documents, and the cryptographic processes described in them, it becomes possible to sketch the progress of British cryptography from 1915 to 1939 from a primary source, part of which has not hitherto been referred to in print. The First World War document, which bears no signature, was written by Commander Alastair Denniston to answer an enquiry put to him by Admiral Sir William ('Bubbles') James, who wished to include a chapter on Room 40 in his autobiography, which was eventually published as The Skies Were Always Blue. The second, also written by Denniston in 1944, also unsigned, was to rebut an assumption made by the then head of GCCS, Group Captain Eric Jones, that GCCS had failed to prepare effectually for the cryptographic needs of the Second World War.

Cryptography lies at the heart of secret signals intelligence. It is a misleading word, though used by 'the classical cryptographers' of Britain's codebreaking operation, because it implies only the creation and security of codes and cyphers, whereas the key part of the job, carried out by all the major European powers since the establishment of wireless

---

2 See CCC DENN 1/4, 'The Government Code and Cipher School Between the Wars,' 2 December 1944, by A. G. Denniston, and his draft manuscript history of Room 40 in CCC DENN 1/4, reproduced here as appendix 3.
telegraphy, was the reading of the secret diplomatic ciphers of other nations. And reading them (i.e. successfully and continuously solving them) was only part of an operation which started with interception and the channelling of raw, authentic, relevant Morse messages to a central decryption unit, manned by 'specialists' (i.e. cryptographers), and concluding with translation, assessment and distribution in suitable form to the appropriate clients. Each part of the total process was essential for the production of useful signals intelligence. Yet all these aspects were embraced in the one word cryptography. This extended meaning will be used here. Efficient interception and intelligent assessment both proved as important as decryption in the total cryptographic process whereby wireless intelligence on the activities of foreign nationals was made available to named departments and individuals within the British government who could use the information in foreign policy reports and recommendations.

This chapter charts the work done on diplomatic cipher messages between the wars by the classical cryptographers who, learning from their own experience and mistakes, surviving on exiguous resources, made possible the successful handling of the exponential increase in traffic occasioned by the breaking of the Luftwaffe Enigma cipher (using hand methods) in January 1940, which in turn played a key part in turning probable British defeat in 1940 into Allied victory in 1945. It was a group drawn from different backgrounds -- academia, the peerage, business, the stage, schoolteachers, servicemen, university graduates and GPO trainees. All were linguists and most were proficient in mathematics. All practised critical analysis. Some had worked on naval and diplomatic intercepts in World War One. Other key figures joined when GCCS was set up in 1919. A Russian refugee joined in 1922. Only two women, one the wife of the Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Godfrey, and the other the sister of 'C' (Admiral Sinclair), were specialists, showing the tight security required for initiates. Two had made the Zimmermann telegram readable in 1916. It was their common perception of the interlocking requirements of the service, enabling them to deliver relevant messages on time to the right people, which may justify the use of the word 'group' in describing the informal, collegial approach to their clandestine work from Room 40 in 1914 to Bletchley in 1942, work which played an understated part in turning defeat into victory.

This section has introduced the cryptographers who made Churchill's reading of diplomatic intercepts possible. But he was no stranger to the interception of German naval signals, as the next section makes clear.

---


4 Ibid.
At the beginning of World War One German wireless signals were being easily intercepted but no-one knew what to do with them. Under Sir Alfred Ewing and Admiral Reginald 'Blinker' Hall the founder-members of the group helped to solve that problem. Whether the supreme user of intercepts, Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, was a help or a hindrance is a moot point, but his understanding of the importance of signals intelligence in the Second World War, which no one now doubts, can now be matched with his enthusiasm for the naval intercepts of Room 40 from 1914 onwards. For it was he who as First Lord of the Admiralty directed, on 29 November 1914, that a particular naval officer selected by the Admiralty to monitor the German messages that were pouring in, was

to study the telegrams with a view to finding out the general scheme of the enemy, and tracing how far the reports of the telegrams have in the past been verified as recorded facts...The telegrams when intercepted will go direct and exclusively to COS.

Churchill had immediately spotted the political value of these golden eggs, and the need to protect the goose that laid them, though his rules of procedure had to be drastically changed. Characteristically, he steered them past the new Director of Naval Intelligence, Hall, and would not leave the procedures to the people doing the work. The arrangements he made in 1914 for handling naval intercepts bear a strong resemblance to the orders he gave out for getting Ultra to him in 1941.

Very early in 1915 Churchill, together with Admiral 'Jackie' Fisher, the First Sea Lord, made a disastrous decision with consequences which affected British standing in the Near East for a generation. Never one to enjoy sharing knowledge that brings power with anyone, and particularly not with one, like 'Blinker' Hall, as enterprising and ambitious as himself, he received from Hall information which would have averted the Dardanelles campaign fiasco. Hall had despatched two emissaries to persuade or bribe the Turks to break with Germany and allow the Royal Navy a free passage through the Dardanelles.

---

5 See appendix 10: Who was Who.
7 Rotter or Hope. See Who was Who. Beesly, Ibid., p.15. A. G. Denniston, in his draft manuscript history of Room 40 OB CCC DENN 1/4, asserts both were vital to the early success of the enterprise. Hope later became Room 40's operational head.
9 Beesly, Ibid., p.80.
Negotiations were protracted and not helped by the alternative agenda of the Foreign Office, but on 13 March Hall read an intercept 'From Nauen to Constantinople.'

Hall showed the intercept to the First Lord of the Admiralty, Churchill, who said, 'that means they [the Turks] have come to the end of their ammunition.' Hall then briefed Churchill on his private initiative to buy off the Turks. His emissaries were Griffin Ender and Edwin Whittal. They met a Turkish emissary at Dedeagatch. Hall informed Hankey of these negotiations on 4 March. Much later (on 7 October 1937), he sent his account of the episode to Captain (then Sir Herbert) Richmond, adding: 'I had no cabinet authority for the money then. Because of the Turkish shortage of ammunition and the inability of the Germans to make good the shortage for at least a week, victory to them seemed inevitable.' In his Churchill encounter in 1915, Hall went on to add 'If we were to get peace, or if we were to get a peaceful passage for that amount [up to £4,000,000] I imagine...[the cabinet] would be glad enough to pay.' This money paid into a Turkish bank would have split off the Turks from the Germans and allowed the Royal Navy a free passage through the Dardanelles, thus averting the catastrophe that threatened. Churchill refused to sanction the bribe, the campaign duly started, and this may have accounted for his subsequent unavailing pursuit of a Turkish alliance in World War Two.

(iii) Between the Wars

The armistice in 1918, followed by an acute cash crisis in Whitehall, threatened the continuity of Room 40 and its military counterpart, MI1B, but not for long. Unlike the State Department in Washington, the Foreign Office continued to monitor peacetime diplomatic messages into and out of London and as many European capitals as could legitimately be targeted by cable scrutiny as well as by intercept stations. Funds were made available, procedures and priorities were established, and the Government Code and Cipher School was formally set up on 1 November 1919.

The key to the whole operation was, and is, interception. Without interception there can be no intercepts and no clandestine eavesdropping. The British seem to have been alone in adding cable interference as an additional means of reading messages -- though telephone tapping became standard international practice in the 1930s, and tapping into other peoples'

---

10 '12.3.15. Most Secret. For Admiral Usedom' [the German Inspector-General of Coastal Defences and Mines at the Dardanelles] 'HM the Kaiser has received the report and telegram relating to the Dardanelles. Everything conceivable is being done to arrange the supply of ammunition. For political reasons it is necessary to maintain a confident tone in Turkey. The Kaiser requests you to use your influence in this direction. The sending of a German or Austrian submarine is being seriously considered. By command of All Highest, v Müller.'


12 Beesly, op. cit., p.82, comments that 'this may seem a somewhat unbelievable story, but then so are most of the stories about Hall, and most of them are true!' Hall's papers are in Churchill College, Cambridge. See also Gilbert and Andrew, ops. cit.
landlines may also have been practised. The operation of censorship is impossible to track, for lack of any references in the files. But the use of intercept stations run by all three services in the interwar period was on a substantial scale.13

GCCS was the responsibility of the Head of the Secret Intelligence Services (SIS), but for reasons of security became 'the adopted child' of the Foreign Office, of which it was in fact a department. Both parents valued this unacknowledgeable child. In the case of the head of SIS, Admiral Hugh Sinclair, the evidence for this is largely negative. Sinclair allowed GCCS's distribution of Russian commercial and diplomatic intercepts to be used politically to expose the horrors of the Revolution, thus compromising the work with the result that the Soviets resorted to the One Time Pad (OTP) which made their traffic unreadable for many years to come.14 Sinclair has been almost entirely weeded out of the Foreign Office files but, despite his Russian blunder, those who worked for him (and his sister) held him in such respect and admiration that the group must have forgiven him; and under him GCCS continued to function effectively up to the time that he bought Bletchley Park with his own money for the nation in 1938, and his death in November 1939.15

The role of the Foreign Office as foster-father is easier to trace from the record but more difficult to evaluate. The cultural climate of the prewar Foreign Office was many-layered but on the top lay, like thick cream on a trifle, an Eton, Winchester and Oxbridge elite. For these people integration would have diluted their privileges by association with the Consular Service and the refugee specialists, linguists and ex-servicemen of GCCS. The crossover between the Foreign Office and GCCS may also have been limited by the absence of any career structure in the latter, as well as by its formidable linguistic requirements. But the Foreign Office could recognise value when they saw it, as they did as early as October 1922, when the distribution of Turkish diplomatic intercepts within Whitehall kept the authorities au fait with the dangerous Turkish and Greek military build-up in Thrace which resulted in the Chanak crisis. These 1922 intercepts, shared by those in power in Britain, revealed the extent of Turkish anger at the unprovoked bellicosity of the Greeks, from whom first Italy and then France withdrew support, leaving only Britain to back an untimely attempt to keep Turkey out of Europe. A year later GCCS's successful reading of the Soviet diplomatic cipher brought about a diplomatic crisis which nearly precipitated a confrontation with the Bolshevik leaders.16 Both these crises were managed

13 Denniston, op. cit., pp.66-8; Ferris, 'Whitehall's Black Chamber,' p.70.
14 See C. Andrew, 'The British Secret Service and Anglo-Soviet Relations in the 1920s,' and his 'British Intelligence and the Breach with Russia in 1927,' Historical Journal Vol. 20, No.3 (1977), pp.673-70 and Vol. 25, No. 4 (1982), pp.957-64 respectively. One Time Pad: an unbreakable code system employing pages of 5-figure numbers available only to sender and recipient.
15 Private information. Sinclair nurtured his specialists, recognizing the stress of their work by instituting short working hours, a long lunch break and a six-week holiday, and by writing to the Foreign Office of 'their talents . . . amounting almost to genius'. (PRO HW 3/62, document x 356, 1937).
16 'The Intercepts,' Hankey minuted: 'Marta is a very ingenious cipher which was discovered by great cleverness and hard work. The key of the cipher is changed daily and sometimes as often as 3 times in one message. Hence if it becomes known that we decoded the messages, all governments of the world will
by the Cabinet on the basis of the diplomatic decrypts of GCCS. In 1922 Churchill and Lloyd George regularly discussed their content and implications, while Sinclair, who as Head of the Secret Intelligence Services saw them routinely, encouraged their use as a means of expelling two leading Bolshevik diplomats then in London, though he later regretted this. Fifteen years later when the Italians uncharacteristically erupted South East into Abyssinia and West into the Spanish Civil War, increased volume of Italian diplomatic and naval traffic, enabled GCCS not only to read machine ciphers but to contribute to foreign policy. Anthony Eden, to whom historians have not been kind, then personally drafted a successful request to the Treasury for funds to cover GCCS's enhanced activities in 1936-37. The War Office lent its support to the expansion.

At the end of 1919 GCCS employed 66 staff. This number went up to 94 in 1924, of whom 65 were support staff. By 1935 there were 104 on the payroll, of which 67 were support staff. The Abyssinian war produced a temporary need for Italian specialists, some of whom were laid off when the emergency receded, but the remainder supplied a firm basis for Bletchley's outstanding Italian Section. A few were allowed to stay on because other and larger shadows were looming. In 1939 there were 125, of whom 88 were support staff. Of the 37 senior assistants and junior assistants recruited between the wars and employed in 1939, many served throughout the war and into the Cold War period -- testimony to the success of the informal and even eccentric method of recruiting practised by the Head of GCCS.

Little is said about formal training, which perhaps tells its own story. About training the War Office early on took the view that 'the only way a man can learn to be a cryptographer is by devilling for an expert. A training programme would be an impossibility. The senior assistants were all proven cryptographers with a track-record of achievement and expertise stretching back in some cases to 1915. Cryptography (or cryptology, to use the American word) has a history which goes back to ancient Egypt, and in the USA formal cryptanalytical training, including the history of the subject, was...
promoted by the Head of Army Signals Intelligence, William Friedman.\textsuperscript{21} He had studied the subject academically as well as being an outstanding practitioner. Other than James Strachey's notes of his lectures to GCCS recruits in Churchill College, Cambridge, there is little evidence of similar training in the 1920s, which suggests that training was mostly 'on the job', and this is confirmed by the memoirs of recruits to Bletchley Park between 1940 and 1943. By then the techniques were changing so fast, and the work to be done was so urgent, that formal training may well have been impossible. In the prewar GCCS the Head and his Deputy and the Senior Assistants were considerable cryptographers, but regarded their job as too hush-hush even to give it a name, much less a pedigree and academic respectability. They referred to 'special work' as opposed to 'administrative duties'.

The age and previous experience of most recruits, until the arrival of Oxbridge graduates in the mid-1930s, would indicate that a career structure within GCCS would have been impossible anyhow. Within the Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service as a whole there was, of course, a clear structure. GCCS's staff, both senior and junior, were explicitly bound out of this. Any crossover between the Diplomatic Service and GCCS was minimal. Yet to achieve what GCCS undoubtedly did required intelligence, dedication, discretion, flair, self-discipline and self-motivation of an uncommonly high order. The dichotomy between what was needed and the lack of incentives, both for recruits and experienced staff, was acknowledged by the Head of GCCS: 'It must be remembered that beyond a salary and accommodation vote GCCS had no financial status; it became in fact an adopted child of the Foreign Office with no family rights, and the poor relation of SIS (Secret Intelligence Service) whose peacetime activities left little cash to spare'.\textsuperscript{22}

GCCS's relations with other parts of government changed when Sinclair died on 8 November 1939. He had held the trust, loyalty and affection of all the staff, and his death at such a crucial moment was the worst possible news for them. Denniston himself never recovered professionally, and found it difficult to share problems with his successor. 'The Admiral' was, indeed, irreplaceable: he understood the high degree of autonomy essential to cryptography. He ensured that the specialists worked in conditions appropriate to the intellectual strains of their work. He moved confidently in the highest Whitehall circles of power. Menzies's role as Director of Bletchley Park is more difficult to assess, and outside the scope of this chapter. He kept Churchill supplied with intercepts, and annotated them in green ink right through the war. He protected their security.

By whatever means and to whatever effect GCCS had developed a capacity for diplomatic eavesdropping on every major country except Germany, enhancing traditional


practices in the light of experience and the intelligent application of critical analysis. The recruiting of cipher-brains destined to play a vital part at Bletchley might have appeared haphazard and restricted but the results must with hindsight be said to have been remarkable. Professor Peter Hennessy, the historian of Whitehall wrote:

Commander Denniston, head of GCCS and one of the best-informed people in Whitehall when it came to events in Europe, was ... at his desk in Broadway that Sunday [Sept 3, 1939], drafting a letter to the Clerk's Department in the Foreign Office which controlled his manpower. Referring with sublime understatement to the activities of Hitler, he wrote: 'For some days now we have been obliged to recruit from our emergency list men of the professor type who the Treasury agreed to pay at the rate of £600 a year. I attached herewith a list of these gentlemen already called up together with the dates of their joining. I will keep you informed at intervals of further recruitment.

The first list included Nigel de Grey, one of the Zimmermann telegram codebreakers, and Professors E. R. P. 'Vinca' Vincent and Tom Boase, both Italian specialists who worked at BP throughout the war. The second list 'was even more glittering with some of the greatest names ever to work in the trade', 23 They included E. R. Norman, John Jeffries, Gordon Welchman, Frank Adcock, Hugh Last and Alan Turing. Three of these (Jeffries, Welchman, Turing) were to become crucially important to the work of Bletchley Park. The belief of the seniors at GCCS that trawling Oxbridge for bright graduates was not just the best but the only way to solve the new cryptographic problems led to the assembly at Bletchley by the end of 1939 of 'the ablest team of cryptographers and intelligence analysts in British history.' 24 But even before the graduate recruits joined in late 1939 GCCS had made significant strides towards providing a total cryptographic service to those in government able and willing to use it. How this took place is the subject of the section that follows.

While the relationship of GCCS to the Foreign Office is documented, it also had a totally secret relationship to the SIS, whose interwar head Admiral Hugh Sinclair had acquired responsibility not only for GCCS but also for Interception and Direction Finding. 25 This enabled GCCS to develop a number of intelligent enhancements of their strictly cryptographic work. The first of these was Traffic Analysis (TA). 26 This was the scanning of a targeted subject's wireless activity when the actual messages could not be read but the volume and direction of them might indicate future activity. TA was acceptable when the cryptographer was temporarily unproductive, because the scale, intensity and

24 Christopher Andrew, op. cit., p.454. See also notes by J. E. Cooper and Nigel de Grey and the comments of F. H. Hinsley in appendix 7.
direction of signals emanating from a targeted station could yield trustworthy information. TA played an important part in tactical planning, and indeed led in 1942 to a whole world of Y (or low-grade tactical) sigint.

The second was Direction Finding (DF), whereby the origin of a stream of signals and the location of a targeted enemy signals station could be worked out mathematically, by tracking the volume and direction of messages and applying co-ordinates. DF and TA were not useful in relation to diplomatic as distinct from service traffic. Diplomatic signals all came from fixed sources and the ups and downs in its volume did not reveal much. However, the work of GCCS and its outstations between the wars on TA and DF developed into the successful and secret Radio Security Service, which provided continuous useful traffic for all three branches of the British armed forces from 1941-45.

Perhaps even more significant was the evaluation of what should be fully processed and circulated, and what should not. 85% of traffic processed was never distributed. The credibility of what was circulated depended on eliminating the inessential, the marginal, the boring and the irrelevant. Keeping the customer happy was an essential part of this assessment, and required an intimate knowledge of the workings of Whitehall minds.

A conviction arising from GCCS's response to interwar diplomatic eavesdropping was that apart from secure machine encipherment only the One Time Pad (OTP) would stay impervious to cryptanalytical attack. OTPs are essentially codes only available for one message, and known only to sender and recipient. The sender indicates the page, the column and the line where the message is to start in the first group of the signal. Other groups of numbers are added, and once used the whole page is torn off the pad and destroyed. GCCS between the wars promoted OTP, which became standard procedure for British diplomatic and Most Secret Source traffic throughout the war. One disadvantage of OTP is the scale of the printing requirement. Oxford University Press was the chief supplier of OTPs to the Government, through HMSO, in the Second World War. Since it had unfilled capacity and a deserved reputation for discretion it proved a valued supplier.

Evaluation -- or assessment or 'discrimination' (Canadian jargon) -- is a complex subject that by 1945 the leading classical cryptographers at BP continued to debate. Was their function to provide intercepts or intelligence? At what point did one shade into the other? Nigel de Grey's paper in PRO HW 3/33 on the subject would repay detailed study.

Most secret diplomatic cables to and from the FO were in OTP. Oxford University Press was the OTP supplier. The go-between was Edward Travis, c/o Mansfield College. The volume of business he generated was such that HMSO (the paymaster) became the Press's chief outside account, and many skilled workers were kept busy tapping out random numbers throughout the hostilities. A satellite printing works was set up in nearby Juxon Street to handle OTP business that exceeded the capacity of the main printing works. Retired pressworkers are still reluctant to talk about their secret wartime work, and since no accounts were to be submitted in writing, tracing the production of OTPs has been difficult. PRO FO366/1059 shows that Mansfield College, Oxford, became the 'Construction' [codemaking] department of GCCS where some 70 Oxford girl graduates were employed by Edward Travis, head of 'construction' (i.e. encipherment) at GCCS and deputy head, in supplying the figures to the Press. I asked one retired printer, Harold Dotterill, if the comps were allowed to produce their own random figures; the answer was no (I am grateful to Peter Foden for assisting me through the day books and order books of the war years, and to Mr Dotterill for showing me the 'code' and 'decode' process whereby print security was guaranteed).

---
27 Evaluation -- or assessment or 'discrimination' (Canadian jargon) -- is a complex subject that by 1945 the leading classical cryptographers at BP continued to debate. Was their function to provide intercepts or intelligence? At what point did one shade into the other? Nigel de Grey's paper in PRO HW 3/33 on the subject would repay detailed study.

28 Most secret diplomatic cables to and from the FO were in OTP.

29 Oxford University Press was the OTP supplier. The go-between was Edward Travis, c/o Mansfield College. The volume of business he generated was such that HMSO (the paymaster) became the Press's chief outside account, and many skilled workers were kept busy tapping out random numbers throughout the hostilities. A satellite printing works was set up in nearby Juxon Street to handle OTP business that exceeded the capacity of the main printing works. Retired pressworkers are still reluctant to talk about their secret wartime work, and since no accounts were to be submitted in writing, tracing the production of OTPs has been difficult. PRO FO366/1059 shows that Mansfield College, Oxford, became the 'Construction' [codemaking] department of GCCS where some 70 Oxford girl graduates were employed by Edward Travis, head of 'construction' (i.e. encipherment) at GCCS and deputy head, in supplying the figures to the Press. I asked one retired printer, Harold Dotterill, if the comps were allowed to produce their own random figures; the answer was no (I am grateful to Peter Foden for assisting me through the day books and order books of the war years, and to Mr Dotterill for showing me the 'code' and 'decode' process whereby print security was guaranteed).
Some of the classical cryptographers and their support staff, with their different backgrounds and skills, working in close proximity with each other over the years, formed a group, became friends, played golf together and got to know the wives and children of other members. GCCS became known humorously as the Golf Club and Chess Society, a sobriquet bestowed on it by Dilwyn Knox. To what extent is the word 'group' applicable? Nigel West takes the view that for more than twenty years 'Denniston essentially was GCCS'. An alternative theory emerges from the foregoing that under his leadership a group of like-minded but differentially talented civil servants evolved together a strategy which, while dealing adequately with the needs of the 1920s and 1930s, successfully anticipated the wartime requirements of a greatly enhanced cryptological bureau, and thus enabled Churchill and his government to read German intentions on a comprehensive basis from January 1940 till May 1945. There is sufficient evidence that group-thinking prevailed from 1933 till 1940 to evolve the systems and practices which led to the successful breaking of Luftwaffe Enigma and its distribution on a continuous basis from January 1940. That in turn led to other Enigma successes, and to Ultra, which got the messages at speed to Churchill and the other relevant users. And that played a significant part in the Allied victory against the U-boats, and in Europe and the Far East. There is a strong microcosmic resemblance between the cryptographic structures and working practices of the First World War and the interwar period on the one hand, and the greatly expanded but still recognisably similar work of the 'huts' at Bletchley Park from 1939-45.

(iv) Diplomatic Intercepts in the 1930s

By 1936 the substitution of German aggression for the Bolshevik threat was high on the Foreign Office agenda and GCCS was correspondingly required to reallocate its resources accordingly. While the German diplomatic cipher 'Floradora' remained unrecovered, Italian and Japanese traffic, together with that of Turkey and other countries, enabled GCCS to keep its masters fully informed of the approach of war. But who read the intercepts? How did the GCCS product figure in the minds of the Secretary of State, the mandarins at the Foreign Office, politicians in the know, and service chiefs who preferred their secret intelligence brought to them by their own people? The evidence for the prewar period is slight, but it appears that they were available to most Foreign Office established officials.31

What is even more difficult to discover is what the FO made of their intercepts. The Head of GCCS does not mention what happened to bjs after they left his office. The

30 Nigel West, op. cit., p.133.
31 Private Information.
distribution lists of wartime bjs indicate that the head of the Civil Service, Sir Edward Bridges, received a copy of everything circulated.\textsuperscript{32} Under the rules of its establishment GCCS delivered selected material to the FO and later to the service ministries. Sir Robert Vansittart had his own sources of secret intelligence and must have read bjs. Eligibility to handle them was a function of Foreign Office bureaucracy. Ordinary outgoing and incoming telegraphic correspondence were treated differently from the receipt of intelligence from SIS and GCCS. The former was dealt with in the Communications Department, ciphered or deciphered, typed, and circulated. There was a distinction between the 'circulation' and the work on the telegrams in the separate departments. The circulation of all but telegrams classified Secret or Most (later Top) Secret was very wide throughout the Office. But incoming telegrams (as other incoming correspondence) would be 'entered' in the appropriate Registry and submitted by it to the department which it served. In the department all papers would go to the junior in the 'Third Room' (who could be a Second or even a First Secretary) responsible for the subject in question. Material received from SIS and GCCS came direct to the office of the Permanent Under-Secretary and distributed from there under the direction of the latter's Private Secretary, who was responsible for the FO's relations with GCCS and MI6. Bjs relevant to Turkey, for instance, would then go to the Southern Department which had been carved out of the old Central Department in 1932. The increased Italian traffic produced important information in the mid-1930s which would have been evaluated in the Southern Department, and would 'be taken into account in forming judgements on situations or making recommendations for action. Their contribution could, of course, be very important'.\textsuperscript{33}

It is impossible to be more specific about prewar bj reading, and this makes difficult the assessment of the direct value of intercepts in the formation of government foreign policy before the advent of Churchill. The question is indeed unanswerable because they were but a part of the information gathering service on which the Foreign Office based its advice to minister. Moreover GCCS was making only slow progress on the German diplomatic machine cipher, of vital importance to the Foreign Office, until 1943. Foreign Office officials, like most other civil servants, read what was brought to them without too many questions about what could not be decrypted. They would have had preconceived ideas of what was important. They might reject whatever relevant information conflicted with these ideas. In general, their classical education made them philhellenic, which may by the same token have disposed them to be anti-Turk. Moreover they had other sources of information on international diplomacy, privileged news and views, both clandestine and semi-official, in addition to bjs. To the reports of British military, air and naval attachés in most European capitals could be added the results of monitoring foreign press and

\textsuperscript{32} In fact a study of PRO HW3 files shows that he did not receive all bjs.

\textsuperscript{33} Private information from Sir Patrick Reilly.
broadcasts, covering much of the same ground as the bjs. The value of bjs was their pristine quality. Without any mediating factor beyond GCCS’s decision that they were worth circulating, they conveyed what Britain's friends and enemies, well-wishers and ill-wishers, thought about the coming hostilities. In the main, judging from wartime diplomatic intercepts, they would have been ambassadorial reports on conditions, events and comment on the countries for which they were responsible. But interception was a limited option since most European countries safeguarded their cipher security by using landlines for their communications. The Germans invested heavily in machine encipherment. Targeting Japan, Italy and Turkey so effectively produced important information, in the case of Turkey through cable scrutiny at the Constantinople headquarters of Cable and Wireless, in which the British Government was a major shareholder, thus empowering itself to read Turkish traffic on a 'complete coverage' basis. After the Montreux Conference of 1936, Turkey became a prime target from which the Foreign Office learned many patterns of decision making in Ankara, and the nature of Turkish diplomatic priorities, particularly in relation to Italy, France, Germany and Britain.

(v) GCCS’s Interwar Achievements

Against a background of recently released files which reveal strong criticism in 1945 of the prewar GCCS’s pessimistic attitude towards the breaking of German machine codes, it may now be appropriate to summarise the four major interwar achievements of GCCS. The first was the deep penetration of the diplomatic codes of France, Turkey, Italy, Russia, Japan, Iberia and the USA. The Turkish traffic already referred to, obtained in full, with minimum delay and without any 'corrupt groups' thanks to Cable and Wireless's efficient service, deserves singling out. A file in the House of Lords library contains copies of the actual Turkey-sourced bjs on which Churchill, Curzon and Lloyd George relied in attempting to thwart Turkish aggression at Smyrna in October 1922. These intercepts were translated from the French by the fledgling GCCS in Melbury Road, Kensington. In all essentials they are identical to later bjs which were sent to named individuals in government from then on continuously until 1945. According to the Lloyd George files, copies of the intercepts went routinely to a printed distribution list which included the directors of service intelligence, senior ministers including Lloyd George, Curzon and Churchill, and Sir Basil Thomson (the Directorate, Intelligence security at the Home Office). All through the Chanak crisis of October 1922 the diplomatic messages from the Turkish ambassador in Paris to Constantinople were the required reading of the policy makers. Thus bjs were, even at this early stage, at the heart of British foreign policy.

34 House of Lords Library, Lloyd George Papers, file F/209.
35 See R. Ullman, op. cit., p.308-9. Ullman quotes from Trotsky's Archives T-628: 'England has organised a network of intercept stations designed particularly for listening to our radio. This accounts for the...
The second achievement was the coverage of the total process of signals intelligence from interception to distribution without which any one aspect was unable to fulfil its function. It is this second achievement which this chapter seeks to underline, because without a worked-out functional system, acceptable to all, available to the Enigma specialists at Bletchley in 1939, the results of their achievement -- usable high-grade sigint or Ultra -- might have been unavailable to the British armed forces by mid-1941.36

By September 1938 GCCS was on a war footing and under Sinclair had completed a successful dummy run, simulating war conditions, at a time when the appeasers still thought they had bought peace in their time. At the Foreign Office the diplomatic intercepts GCCS distributed round Whitehall told a different story, requiring a different policy, promoted by the Deputy Permanent Under Secretary, Sir Orme Sargent, who acquired such a reputation as an anti-appeaser that he was nicknamed 'Moley' by his colleagues, after the character in *The Wind in the Willows* who could not let his friends off with easy answers. Sir Alexander Cadogan and most other ranking mandarins with access to the intercepts were of the same mind. No bj files between 1926 and 1941 have yet been released, and relations between GCCS and the Foreign Office can only be guessed at because no files survive: all intercept material was burnt immediately after reading and all references to GCCS and its product required modification to 'special' or 'reliable sources' before appearing in governmental minutes. Yet, despite this tight security there may have been a close enough thread joining the diplomatic intercepts and the now famous Foreign Office opposition to Chamberlain's policy towards Hitler. GCCS may have had its own political stance towards the German menace. Its members had backed Vansittart, whose views they preferred to those of Cadogan and Eden, which in turn they preferred to those of Lord Halifax. Reading intercepts with this background would have produced a more anti-appeasement view even than that of the Foreign Office. Lord Gladwyn [Gladwyn Jebb] remembers taking a bj to Chamberlain's office in the House of Commons in 1938. The Foreign Office wished him to see it as further evidence of the futility of appeasement. But the Prime Minister simply glanced at it, threw it down and addressed the young Jebb bitterly on the subject of his masters' disloyal practice of trying to influence the government's foreign policy by the selective use of diplomatic intercepts.37 This is the third of GCCS's interwar achievements.

Also discernible in the sparse literature is a significant difference in GCCS's attitude towards its clients. Amongst the service ministries the Air Ministry, the newest and most flexible in its mindset, was judged the best customer. The Admiralty still had its own deciphering of more than 100 of our codes. The keys are sent from London where a Russian subject Feterlein (sic) has been put at the head of cipher affairs having done such work before in Russia'. For Feterlein, read Fetterlein, who joined GCCS in 1922 as head of the Russian department.

37 Private information from Lord Gladwyn.
intelligence assessment department, using raw data from GCCS, while the War Office fully realised the importance of sigint in the field only during the fighting in North Africa in 1942. These attitudes are important because they formed the basis of the assessment of what should be circulated and to whom. Knowing your customers' character, prejudices and needs was part of GCCS's expertise. This, in turn, was a function of GCCS's autonomous management, which had become such an accepted feature of the Whitehall landscape that it extended right through the Second World War. GCCS had won for itself the power to decide what their customers should read and hence influence policy. Without having established this degree of authority over all aspects of the total sigint operation in the years between the Spanish Civil War and the outbreak of hostilities on 3 September 1939, GCCS could not have developed its wartime role with so little delay. That is the fourth achievement of British cryptography before 1939.

The interwar period culminated for GCCS in two visits paid to mainland Europe in 1939 by GCCS's head -- the first to Paris in January and the second to Poland in late August. Denniston, Knox and Menzies himself travelled by ferry and train across France and Germany to Poland. At Pryr, near Warsaw, the British and French parties learned that the Poles could read Enigma (though not currently) and would give an Enigma machine to France and Britain, knowing their chances of survival in the coming German invasion were slight. One of the priceless Polish gifts was brought from Warsaw to Paris, thence via London to Bletchley, where a new generation of British cryptographers soon achieved amazing results on an almost daily basis, culminating in the breaking of the Luftwaffe cipher in January 1940.

These four achievements, it is here suggested, together with the successful reading of the diplomatic ciphers of many countries and the recruiting campaigns of 1937-39, made possible the activities of Bletchley Park in 1939, which became by June 1940 vital to Churchill's conduct of the British war effort. Enigma was then, after many agonising difficulties had been overcome, integrated into GCCS's existing but enhanced structures and practices, while Ultra was a natural development of the interwar distribution system. The process was immensely demanding and there were casualties. But there was no alternative. In 1940 and 1941 Britain did indeed stand alone. Her armies had been outclassed in Norway, France and Libya, while the Royal Navy had failed to protect convoys carrying vital war material. If the RAF had not defeated the Luftwaffe over British

---

38 See P. Paillolé, *Notre Espion chez Hitler* (Paris: Laffont, 1985), p.270. Bertrand, Chief of the French Secret Service, here confirms that Captain Braquenie was the head [French] cryptographic specialist. Both he and Colonel Langer of the Polish secret service signed the Dennistsons' visitors' book on 9 December 1939, proving that he and Bertrand stayed with Commander Denniston and worked with him at Bletchley. Denniston recalled that 'an ever closer liaison with the French, and through them with the Poles, stimulated the attack. Fresh ideas flowed, even from those selected from a university as recruits in the event of war. I think it may be rightly held that this effort of 1938 and 1939 enabled the party at B/P to read the current traffic of the G[erman]A[ir]F[orce] (sic) within five months of the outbreak of war.' See his draft narrative 2 December 1944, copies in PRO HW3/32, CCC DENN 1/4, and Denniston, op. cit., p.62.
air space in September 1940, Hitler would have launched Operation Sealion and Britain might well have been occupied like Denmark, Hungary, and Romania. A British government-in-exile would have been established in Canada. A gauleiter from Berlin might have installed himself at Whitehall or Buckingham Palace. With access to British war factories, radar and the still formidable navy, Germany could have contemplated the unbelievable and become -- what some Germans already felt themselves to be -- masters of the Western World. It is neither rhetorical nor sentimental to assert of Churchill that he was the saviour of the nation. How he did it has been endlessly discussed. But the part played by Bletchley Park and the geese that 'laid the golden eggs and did not cackle' can be illuminated by tracing both eggs and geese to their point of origin, first in the Admiralty, then in the Foreign Office in the twenty years before war was declared. Churchill's wartime achievement might have been significantly diminished had not British cryptographers served him and the country so effectively from his days as First Lord of the Admiralty in 1914, through the Turkish crisis of the early 1920s, the Russian, Spanish and Italian crises of the 1920s and 1930s, through the period of Hitler's European supremacy, to the breaking of Enigma and the creation and daily working of Ultra all through the war, until 8 May 1945, when the Germans surrendered unconditionally to the Allies.

While most war historians are familiar with the work of Bletchley Park, in particular the breaking on a continuous basis of the German machine cipher Enigma, and the distribution of the resulting decrypts as Ultra, only few so far know more than some anecdotes about the history, the people and the evolving processes within the British secret establishment which enabled Ultra to function at all. This chapter is an attempt to answer the question, What and who made this achievement possible in the years before 1939?

---

Chapter Three

BEFORE THE DELUGE, 1940-41

(i) The Foreign Office and Turkey (ii) The Phoney War (iii) Germany Triumphant 
(iv) Different Views on Turkey (v) Churchill's Secret Intelligence, 1940-41

The previous chapter has shown the government fully aware of the importance both of diplomatic intercepts and, since the Abyssinian crisis, of the breaking of the Italian naval machine ciphers with its consequential provision of full and immediate information on Italian ship movements in the Mediterranean. This breakthrough was of more immediate use to the service ministries, and in fact became the basis of Enigma and Ultra which developed at Bletchley Park from late 1939. It is upon the implications of the diplomatic messages that this chapter now concentrates. It is divided into two parts: the first reconstructing Churchill's and the Foreign Office's view of Eastern Mediterranean affairs; and the second attempting to show the results of DIR/C becoming available to Churchill from September 1941.

(i) The Foreign Office and Turkey

Anglo-Turkish relations were a high priority for the Foreign Office throughout the 1930s and were developed by Sir Percy Loraine, the British ambassador who preceded the ill-fated Sir Hugh Knatchbull-Hugessen in Ankara. At war with each other in 1914-18, seriously at odds during the Chanak crisis of 1922, both parties realised that there were many advantages in Turco-British friendship. For Britain Turkey would provide a hedge protecting the imperial trade route, Persian oil and a defence against either German or Russian incursions into Egypt: for Turkey, Britain was still unquestionably a Great Power, still with a great navy and an empire.

The Foreign Office knew little about the actual economy and government of Turkey outside the main cities and embassy staff rarely ventured into the interior. The few who did reported back on the primitive state of the roads, railways, towns, villages, schools and peasantry. Illiteracy was almost universal, despite Atatürk's social engineering. Only Moslems could bear arms or become magistrates. Democracy was more a matter of good intentions than of actual implementation of policy, which suited both the government and the people. There was never any significant opposition either to Atatürk's reforms or İnönü's more directly dictatorial rule. None of this seems to have affected the patronising Foreign Office view that 'Johnny Turk' could be relied on in emergencies, and so in the
spring of 1939 a guarantee was offered, similar to those already made to Poland and Romania.

In Ankara the chief government ministers had to balance the advantages of unconditional friendship with Britain against a number of complex and contradictory possibilities: a multi-lateral alliance with France, whose *mission civilisatrice* had made Turkish society Francophone and Francophile; with Italy, a powerful and unpredictable Mediterranean power under Mussolini; with Russia, feared in its new Bolshevik clothing for its czarist ambitions in the ancient Near East, which had only been discarded momentarily by Lenin in the early 1920s; and with Germany, Turkey's ally of World War One and now becoming the main force in Europe. There were good but different reasons for staying on friendly terms with all the Great Powers.

However, Halifax and Chamberlain delayed their approach to Turkey until it was almost too late, and reactions in Ankara to British diplomatic activity in Europe throughout the early months of 1939 grew sceptical. Hitler's Germany was disliked for its arrogance and both feared and admired for the overnight success of its Czech invasion of March 1939. In Britain the Southern Department of the Foreign Office continued to assume that Turkish friendship was on open offer, to be taken up as and when required -- a dangerous assumption for which the British embassy in Ankara should have taken some blame.¹

At the Foreign Office, first under Eden then Halifax then Eden again, two departments were studying Turkish foreign policy. One was the Southern Department, the other was the GCCS. The latter regarded Turkish diplomatic messages as of prime importance because in 1919 and 1922 Turkish and British government leaders read Turkish diplomatic telegrams and based their policy upon what they read. These messages were extracted by GCCS from the full cover of Turkish diplomatic telegrams intercepted by the government-owned Cable and Wireless. These were delivered complete and at speed to GCCS and may only have needed translation from French and assessment before distribution.² Thus they formed a significant part of the total office traffic distributed which might have been out of proportion to their actual importance.

The Foreign Office files suggest that Eden inherited this Turkish policy without Churchill's enthusiasm, presumably because his concern over Italy dominated Mediterranean policy. Later Eden showed little finesse in his dealings with the Turks. After the Italian adventures in Africa and Albania he realised that a benevolently neutral Turkey had become a strategic necessity, but as Minister for War there was little he could do to expedite the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Pact of 1939.³ The Foreign Office's policy towards Turkey in the run-up to the start of hostilities in 1939 can thus be seen to have been a

² See the previous Chapter.
³ Eden did not assume the full title Secretary of State for War until May 1940.
somewhat haphazard product of a close study of what Turkish diplomats were saying to each other and a hazy conviction, often overlooked when more important countries flexed their muscles, that a friendly Turkey was a useful protection for the imperial trade-routes to the Far East.

Churchill had a more romantic attitude towards Turkey while out of office. He had long been interested in the country as an ally in any future world war, remaining as ignorant as the Foreign Office until 1945 of the true nature of the country's economy and willingness to fight outside its own borders. Moreover he had been a consistent advocate of the use of diplomatic signals intelligence in its raw, authentic form, as the best means of assessing the intentions of the major powers. Through his friendship with Major Desmond Morton who had regular access to bjs, he would have been nearly as well informed of Turkish attitudes towards friendship with Britain as the Southern Department itself. By 1940 these two strands in Churchill's thinking -- the importance of Turkey and the significance of their diplomatic intercepts -- came together. His reading Turkish diplomatic intercepts, several a week before the war, would probably have influenced his Mediterranean policy as soon as he became Prime Minister in May 1940. There was, as has been shown, a two-fold reason why Turkish bjs were of particular significance: one was that Cable and Wireless supplied them in their entirety, so a complete picture of Turkish international diplomacy was available to the Foreign Office on a daily basis. The other was that the Turkish leadership used them as the basis of their foreign policy.

Turkey was governed by a small clique of French-speaking statesmen and diplomats; ambassadors in the main European capitals regularly reported to Angora (as the Foreign Office still called the new Turkish capital), and their reports had become the chief source of intelligence for foreign policy decisions. Churchill's developing view of the importance of a wartime alliance with Turkey can thus be seen as a somewhat bizarre scheme of a sometimes out-of-office politician, while the Foreign Office, despite regular access to Turkish diplomatic messages, may have underestimated the importance of Turkey. Both shared the regular supply of Turkish intercepts, which made them unusually well-informed of the reactions of an important neutral to the dire results of deep German penetration across Europe in the immediately following months, but their interpretations may have been different. The consequences of German success, however, were so dangerous to Britain, whose survival was seriously in doubt, that Turkish attitudes became of secondary importance to Churchill's expressed strategy, which was to get through the next three months, as is made clear in the section that follows.

---

4 Churchill did not receive bjs in the interwar period since these were only fully circulated to the Foreign Office. But through Desmond Morton he probably saw enough to keep him au courant with Turkish affairs. See C. Andrew, Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community (London: Heinemann, 1985), pp.315-6.
(ii) The Phoney War

The nine months of the 'Phoney War,' the months before Germany spread her claws all over Europe, constitute a black hole in Turco-British relations. The Foreign Office files are sparse. The French, swayed by their influential ambassador in Ankara, René Massigli, were keener than the British during this period on aggressive forays in the Near East. To reduce Germany's war effectiveness, Admiral Darlan and General Weygand recommended on 22 February 1940 bombing the Baku oilfields. France also wanted to make a pact with Turkey similar to the Turco-British Guarantee but the Turks would only agree if Britain was party to this also. Thus the Turco-British-French Pact was agreed, on the basis of which Dr Carl Clodius (the German trade negotiator) later tried to persuade the Turks to let Germany have the chrome otherwise due to go to France, by then a defeated nation. In London Cadogan worried about Turkey. He and the COS, reading Turkey-related bjs, believed Turkey to be the northern bastion of the British position in the Middle East but was unready to help the Allies and risk German anger. These considerations and German success in Norway ruled out the French project of an attack on the Caucasian oilfields.

Nonetheless neither the Axis nor the Allies could keep their hands off Turkey. The Russians, then uneasy allies of both Germany and Italy, proposed to incapacitate Turkey and thus safeguard their Southern flank. Meanwhile in April 1940 three plans had been drawn up by the British Chiefs of Staff to thwart three possible German moves: an attack on Turkey from Bulgaria, the seizure of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, and a crossing into Asia Minor. The first, codenamed 'Leopold,' was the setting up of 30 British observer groups in European Turkey and Anatolia. The second, 'Tiger,' was for three British fighter squadrons to operate in Asia Minor. The third, 'Bear,' was for an expanded air defence programme if German pressure on Turkey mounted: the despatch to Turkey of 5 squadrons of 10 aircraft each, capable of attacking German air bases, lines of communication in Bulgaria, Southern Romania and Southern Yugoslavia. Churchill pushed through 'Leopold' within a fortnight of becoming Prime Minister. Further plans in case of a German attack on Turkey were completed by 20 July but not implemented as the Turks refused the proffered help. Churchill told the Defence Committee on 31 October that the Germans might seek to drive through Turkey to the Suez Canal and a Turkish resistance 'might greatly delay the German advance'. He speculated on deploying as many as 55

---

Turkish divisions by the end of 1941, showing how Turkey stirred his imagination. The Chiefs of Staff wanted Britain to do all in its power to encourage and assist the Turks to resist any German advance. But if this was not enough plans were to be made for the demolition of Turkish communications. Moreover an intelligence centre was contemplated at Ankara, and a plan to use the Polish navy to stop the Germans shipping oil across the Black Sea from Batumi to Burgas was canvassed because Poland was not a signatory of the Montreux Convention which bound its signatories not to undertake aggressive action in the Black Sea on pain of Turkish counter-aggression.

Before the fall of France, the French Prime Minister Paul Reynaud had been trying to rush Turkey onto the Allied side, as Orme Sargent wrote to Hugessen on 26 March 1940, the object being to strike at Soviet interests in the Caucasus. Although the sequence of events remains a murky affair, it seems fairly clear that Turkey was sounded as to her likely intentions if the French initiative was activated. Turkey's traditional enmity with Russia was thought to facilitate an approach by the Allies. Reynaud's ambitious project to direct German forces from the west would have been doomed to failure as Turkey had no infrastructure to deal with modern weaponry. The Foreign Office thought Turkey would not fight against Russia unless directly threatened but if Russia realised Turkey would work with the Allies this would not provoke but deter them. In the Foreign Office Sargent and his friend the recently appointed ambassador in Ankara, Sir Hugh Knatchbull-Hugessen, agreed that anything Britain did do against the USSR depended on Turkey. Hugessen responded by speculating that Russia's recent poor fighting performance in Finland might decide Turkey to attack the Baku and Batumi oblasts, whose populations were largely Turkish-speaking. Speculation about possible Turkish moves ceased on 9 April when Germany invaded Denmark and Norway. On 10 May (the day Churchill became Prime Minister) Hitler commenced his offensive against France and the Low Countries. Dunkirk followed less than three weeks later. A German-Norwegian armistice was signed on 9 June and by 22 June France too had signed an armistice. Italy had also declared war on the Allies on 10 June. This rendered operational Turkey's obligation under Clause 1 of the second article of the Treaty with Britain. But the Turks had already decided to keep out and stay out.

The Turks were both alarmed and impressed by the scale and speed of the German advance. They were even more alarmed when by the end of June 1940 the USSR had

---

9 Gilbert, Ibid., p.880.
10 Deringil, op. cit., p.93.
11 PRO FO195/2462, Hugessen to Nichols, 7 July 1940.
12 Though France was out of the fighting Anglo-French sigint co-operation was to continue effectively for another two years. From 20 May 1940 until 14 June the French cryptographic team at Bruno intercepted and decrypted 3,074 Luftwaffe messages, and on 21 May the first intercepts were sent from Bletchley Park to the British Military Mission in France. Hugh Skillen, Spies of the Air Waves (London: Skillen, 1988), p.103.
13 Deringil, op. cit., p.102.
acquired the whole of Bessarabia and Bukhovina. Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria were soon to fall within the Axis orbit. Turkey found herself with her former partners, Britain and France, in a state of near paralysis. Meanwhile the Germans were openly planning an assault on the Suez Canal and the empire trade route by further invasions of countries including Turkey. Russia's Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, having recently snubbed the Turkish Foreign Minister in Moscow, was threatening the Turks with talk about revising the Montreux Convention. There was little chance of Churchill putting his reading of diplomatic intercepts to much use in Turkey, which in July had signed an agreement to supply the Axis with chrome.

In August the USSR declared the Baltic States socialist republics, the RAF heroically retrieved British prestige in the Battle of Britain, and Hitler started doubting the wisdom of invading England. In the Eastern Mediterranean any further thoughts of getting Turkey into the war were muted by Field-Marshal Wavell's perception that Turkey would be more a liability than an asset, given the poverty of equipment and training of the soldiery and the passivity of most of the generals. Hugessen, Halifax and George Rendel (recently promoted from the Foreign Office to be Minister Plenipotentiary in Bucharest) corresponded about the Turkish situation. In August Rendel wrote: 'I don't think the Turks have a Balkan policy, except being nice to Greece'.

The Foreign Office was responsible for Turkey, but no-one there, not the Secretary of State, nor the Permanent Under Secretary or his senior aides, nor the British ambassador, could bring together a coherent policy which took the realities of the Turkish economy and the daunting facts of German expansionism into the Balkans into proper account. This had to wait until Churchill took over Turkey personally, still some months off. To what extent the Turkish diplomatic intercepts acted as a spur to keep Turkey high on the priority list of the Foreign Office in this period is difficult to assess, but given the pace of world events and the imminent possibility of a further German victory in the West -- one that might have sent the whole Foreign Office off to Canada -- it is unlikely that the intercepts were given much weight.

(iii) Germany Triumphant

The Phoney War was over in April 1940 when the Germans invaded Norway. It was not until 27 September that the Axis partners signed the Tripartite Pact. At that point Turkish foreign policy was hardening up in the face of this alarming evidence of an imminent German victory. Her intentions were not kept particularly secret and General Franz Halder, the German Army Chief of Staff, wrote in his diary on 26 October that 'if anything conclusive is to be achieved, Bulgaria and Turkey have to be subdued, if
necessar}^ by force, especially in the case of the latter, to leave the way open through the Bosphorous to Syria'. And a month later: 'If Turkey does not keep quiet in the event of an attack against Greece, she must be thrown out of Europe'. Halder was only repeating what Hitler had just said to him.

On 1 November 1940 President İnönü of Turkey declared Turkey was out of the war, which precluded any use of her sea or air space by any of the belligerents. He wrote later: 'The situation of the Allied front was clear. France had collapsed. Britain had gone into this war unprepared. According to Marshal Pétain Britain would not last long. In this situation, to make a declaration implying commitment to the alliance would be a grave mistake...As far as I was concerned the alliance was annulled de facto. It was not necessary to explain this'. By the end of the year Hitler had decided against taking on Turkey and was turning towards Barbarossa. Halder noted on 24 November that 'we have come to the considered decision to avoid conflict with Turkey at all costs'.

The Foreign Office's interest in Turkey meant that Turkey became in effect the focal point of diplomatic pressure by all three belligerents: Germany, Italy and Britain. This became apparent when the Germans surged through the Balkans and occupied Bulgaria, Turkey's ancestral foe, bringing their troops within firing distance of Thrace. By January 1941 the Luftwaffe was flying into Bulgaria in force. Churchill had sent Eden twice to Turkey. On his January 1941 visit to Ankara Eden told Churchill that his policy towards Turkey had got nowhere. Churchill had also requisitioned Lieutenant General Sir James Marshall-Cornwall, about to take up his command to defend the South-West sector of the Home Front, to 'parley with the Turks' -- in Churchill's own phrase. The General was the only high-ranking British officer with a certificate as a Turkish interpreter. He met the Turkish Chief of the General Staff, General Assim Gubnuz, on 15 January, and spent a week fruitlessly trying to galvanize the somewhat torpid Turkish High Command, accustomed to easy soldiering in the long years of peace, and despite the state of emergency reluctant to learn about new methods of warfare or to retrain on the new equipment offered by the British. Marshall-Cornwall was so keen on greater British co-operation with the Turks that Eden nervously minuted that he wished the soldiery would keep out of politics. On 29 January 1941 Churchill offered RAF squadrons to President İnönü of Turkey, who refused them.

---

16 Quoted in Deringil, op. cit., p.105.
17 Quoted in Deringil, ibid., from the 3-volume Kriegstagebuch (Kohlhammer, 1964), Vol.2, p.151.
18 See James Marshall-Cornwall, Wars and Rumours of Wars (London: Leo Cooper/ Seeker and Warburg, 1982).
19 Eden memorandum on Turkey, January 1941, and Hugessen to Foreign Office: 'This will have been seen by No 10' - i.e. Churchill read a bj report on Eden in Turkey: all in PRO FO371/30076, R139/139/G44, 4 January 1941. This is one of the few references to Turkish intercepts in the FO files.
The month of January 1941 saw much ado about Turkey, involving the Russians, Greeks, Bulgarians and Italians, as well as Turks, British and Germans. On 6 January Churchill had written to General Ismay that 'we must so act as to make it certain that if the enemy enters Bulgaria Turkey will come into the war.' It took four more years for Churchill's hope to become reality. But two days later Ambassador Hugessen reported to the Foreign Office: 'The Turks' faith in ourselves and France, particularly France, was considerably shattered by our asking them to join in'. The next day Halder recorded a major Hitler conference on Barbarossa and Bulgaria occupied by German troops. In Berlin the Foreign Ministry was plying Hitler with Turkish diplomatic intercepts similar, perhaps identical, to those circulating in the Foreign Office, including reports on possible British reactions to the entry of German troops into Bulgaria.

Churchill thought Hitler would turn East. On 20 January the COS wondered whether, after Bulgaria, Germany would operate against Britain or drive into the Ukraine and the Caucasuses. On 17 January the Soviets protested to Germany about the presence of German troops in Bulgaria. Two days later a German attack on Greece through Bulgaria was expected to be opposed by Turkey. On 21 January Field Marshal Sir Archibald Wavell, British C-in-C Middle East, was ordered to build up a mobile force of four infantry and one armoured divisions for use in Greece and Italy. On 23 January the Turkish ambassador in London thought any German attack on Russia would be a deception to mask a German invasion of Turkey. On 26 January Churchill wrote to Wavell about 'infiltration [into Turkey]...before any clear-cut issue of invasion has been presented to the Turks who will then be told [by the Germans] to keep out or have Constantinople bombed.' Meanwhile Ribbentrop was writing to the German Foreign Office: 'England will try to forestall German troops [in Bulgaria] to occupy the Straits to start military operations against Bulgaria in alliance with Turkey'. On 30 January Military Intelligence predicted that Germany would attack Turkey. Finally, on 31 January, Churchill wrote to the Turkish President: 'Germany is preparing to repeat on the frontiers of Turkey the same manoeuvre as she accomplished on frontiers of France in April and May 1940...You and I, Mr President, should repeat in defence of Turkey the same measures the Germans are taking over Bulgaria'. Churchill went on to offer İnönü 100 anti-aircraft guns and crews, a major commitment during the Blitz yet proof of the slenderness of British resources. He

---

21 Halder, op. cit., p.118.
23 PRO CAB 69/2, Defence Committee of the Cabinet, DO (41), 6th meeting of 20 January quoted in Hinsley, op. cit., p.443.
24 Hinsley, op. cit., p.443.
26 Irving, op. cit., pp.126, 127.
27 Hinsley, op. cit., p.352.
also asked to be allowed to station 100 RAF squadrons on Turkish soil.\textsuperscript{28} The same day Churchill wrote to the COS that 'Air support promised to Turkey cannot be delayed'. The Graeco-Turkish operation takes precedence, replied the COS to the C-in-C.\textsuperscript{29} On 1 February a British military mission inspected the only three Turkish tank regiments while the Germans invaded Romania with 680,000 troops, monitored at Bletchley Park by the readers of \textit{Luftwaffe} Enigma. Thus Churchill and the COS were kept informed of German troop movements in the Balkans but had little scope for action to counter, still less forestall, them. On 7 February the War Office speculated that twenty-five Turkish divisions would be enough to hold off Russia if Germany attacked Turkey.\textsuperscript{30} Three days later Germany and Russia signed a treaty establishing the new German-Soviet borders in Eastern Europe. On 14 February British war planners speculated on Germany's aggressive approach to Turkey, and (3 days later) that Germany's entry into Bulgaria would be matched by Turkey's into Greece.\textsuperscript{31} On 16 February Turkey signed a non-aggression pact with Bulgaria, and the French urged bombing raids on the Baku-Batumi oblasti to eliminate the oil wells, not realising the offence that would cause in Turkey; the CIGS and Foreign Secretary went to talk to the Turks -- without getting far -- and Rommel became C-in-C of all German forces in North Africa.

This section has drawn attention to the rapidly changing relations between Turkey and Britain, and between Turkey and the Axis powers, during the period when Germany seized power in Europe. In Britain, the Foreign Office could do nothing to stem the German menace except to attempt to stiffen resistance in Turkey. How this was achieved is outlined in the section which follows.

(iv) Different Views on Turkey

It can be seen that the War Office was looking at Turkey as a future battlefield while the Foreign Office still thought that the Anglo-Turkish alliance could achieve the same results -- safeguard the imperial sea-routes and contain German expansionism in the area without hazarding Turkish troops in aggressive forays beyond their own borders. The section that follows attempts to present the confused British tactical response to the German threat in South Eastern Europe, using a variety of sources, including Enigma and diplomatic intercepts, plus valuable reports from a senior Czech intelligence officer.

\textsuperscript{28} Churchill, op. cit., pp.30-1. An Enigma decrypt of 18 January shows German hutments being shipped to Bulgaria and a Luftwaffe mission in Romania discussing long-term fuelling arrangements for the German airforce. See Hinsley, Ibid., p.355.

\textsuperscript{29} Hinsley, Ibid., p.355, and Gilbert, op. cit., p.1003, fn. 3.

\textsuperscript{30} FRO WO190/893/22832, MI4 Appreciations Nos. 3A and 5A, 15 January 1941, and Hinsley, op. cit., p.446.

\textsuperscript{31} Hinsley, Ibid., p.358.
working for the Abwehr in Prague who supplied the British with vital information on German plans in the East.\textsuperscript{32}

The Foreign Office, Ministry of Economic Warfare and the War Office appreciated the Turkish situation differently. The Foreign Office relied heavily on Hugessen, but putting such an important and delicate problem into the hands of any diplomat worried both politicians and military men, and Hugessen as a diplomat did not carry the weight of people like Loraine in Rome or Samuel Hoare in Madrid. The military establishment turned its mind to other Turkish options. On 6 February a War Office appreciation noted the possibility of Germany attacking Turkey, then Egypt:

It is probable that Germany might defeat the Turks in Thrace and reach the Straits in not more than six weeks after the occupation of Salonika -- say by the middle of May. But a further advance through Anatolia would be a big undertaking from the point of view of communications and the establishment of landing grounds; and although it might be possible for a German force to establish itself South of the Taurus by the end of July -- this depending on the degree of Turkish resistance -- it is estimated that 8 divisions (increasing to 12 after 2 months) could be maintained through Anatolia for an advance via Syria on Egypt, and with Turkey hostile a considerable additional force would be required for protection of her lines of communication . . . A German invasion of Turkey would not aid her main thrust which is the invasion of Great Britain. Turkey would take action against any German force from Greece which crossed the Turkish border. But Turkey would take no action against German forces advancing further to the west against Greece.\textsuperscript{33}

Where did Churchill stand, as between these two ways of playing the Turkish hand? It is hard to say. Perhaps he was not alone in anticipating a poor Turkish military performance unless she was repelling an aggressor from within her own borders. Certainly on 7 February, the day of General O'Connor's destruction of the Italian Tenth Army in North Africa, Hugessen wrote to Eden: 'I am convinced of extreme importance of increasing military supplies without delay. The President [Inönü], who spoke still more strongly on this, said to me that, if Turkey had all that we promised, we might have had a different answer'.\textsuperscript{34} Two days later Churchill wrote to Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff: 'You proposed sending ten squadrons to Turkey, which the Turks have not yet accepted. . . I am in it with you up to the neck. But have we not in fact promised the same pig to two customers?' [i.e. to Greece and Turkey].\textsuperscript{35} Churchill pressurised President İnönü in a long letter to Ankara, CAS Sir Charles Portal proposed to send ten air squadrons to Turkey, despite the primitive conditions of the airfields there, but Enigma indicated a major German build-up in the Balkans, so Churchill felt that there

\textsuperscript{32}Hinsley, Ibid., p.404.
\textsuperscript{33}PRO WO190/893/22832, MI4 Appreciation 79A, 6 February 1941.
\textsuperscript{34}Gilbert, op. cit., p.1003.
\textsuperscript{35}Gilbert, Ibid., p.105, fn.4, 'Private, Secret', Prime Minister's Personal Minute, M131/1, 6 February 1941.
was no alternative approach to Turkey 'who will then be told to keep out or be told that Constantinople will be bombed'.

On 12 February Pierson Dixon of the Foreign Office was told to be ready to leave for Ankara as part of the British diplomatic mission that would bring Turkey to the brink of war. The next day he reported on British foreign policy towards Turkey. Dixon told Eden later that 'the first question to decide was whether our forces should be offered to Greece or to Turkey...'. On 19 February, Hitler learned that Romania, now Germany's ally, would no longer supply Turkey with oil. The Turkish minister re-stated Turkey's position that she would only enter the war if her own borders were attacked. Two days later Churchill wrote to Smuts: 'The Russian attitude has undermined the Turks', and to Eden: Commitments made to Ankara ... would tie your hands about the Greeks'. Two days later the War Cabinet in London decided to support Greece, even without Turkey and Yugoslavia.

On 26 February General Sir John Dill, the CIGS, and Eden flew to Ankara for talks lasting well into March. Dill had gone out to Cairo firmly believing Wavell's British Expeditionary Force should go to Turkey, not Greece. Two days later Eden wrote to Churchill: 'they [the Turkish leaders] thought Turkey's turn would come next... the common cause would be better served by Turkey remaining out of the war until her deficiencies had been remedied. They felt concerned lest the Russians should attack them if Turkey became involved in a war with Germany'.

It was now clear that in the uneasy months that followed the Phoney War, events were moving too swiftly for the British response to be anything but hastily reactive, and based on hope rather than fact. The part played by the bjs in bringing some hard information out of the chaos reigning in the Eastern Mediterranean can only be guessed at, since none have yet been released. But Hinsley refers frequently during this period to 'neutral diplomatic intercepts', which suggests they were available to him and to those in the Foreign Office seeking to formulate British foreign policy towards Turkey. However, secret intercepted neutral traffic can affect policy only when the receiving government has some scope to take initiatives and set priorities. When nothing, or too much, was happening, such traffic played little part in the policy making process. It was to be another two years therefore before bjs significantly aided Churchill and the Foreign Office.

Moreover it is difficult to exaggerate the intense fear aroused by Germany's military successes in this period. Millions and millions of Europeans felt (and many were) individually threatened by Hitler. Britain's hour had come in the summer of 1940, and

---

38 Irving, op. cit., p.172.
40 PRO PREM 3/206/3, Confidential Print, 29 September 1941.
despite the Battle of Britain, it was to be nearly two years before fear of Nazi triumph could finally be dispelled. Because of this the Foreign Office continued to target Turkey in the months that followed, and Turkey constituted a major part of the Southern Department’s workload. Diplomats there expected Germany to attack Turkey, while the Yugoslavs expected Germany to insist they join the Axis. The Turkish army had a million men called up and reservists amounting to another 1.5 million. Their purpose was clear: to keep all comers at arms’ length.41

On 1 March Churchill wrote to Eden: ‘The obvious German move is to overrun Bulgaria, further to intimidate Turkey by threat of air attacks . . . after which Turkey can be attacked or not, at their hostile convenience’.42 Churchill noted a growing pessimism in Turkey, which he must have derived principally from reading the Turkey-related bjs of the period.43

Hitler had been keeping a wary eye on Turkey through his own intercept reading, but had concluded that an invasion of the country, as a preliminary to an assault on Egypt, was possible but difficult and ultimately pointless.44 He correctly assessed the geographical and socio-economic factors discouraging an invasion of Turkey. But Churchill’s intercepts could give little indication of the way Hitler’s mind was working, and then only at second or third hand through the reports of Balkan and Japanese diplomats to each other or to their respective foreign ministries. On 6 April 1941 Germany attacked Yugoslavia and Greece instead, and stirred up trouble in Iraq and Persia. Churchill wrote to Eden: ‘We have no power...to avert the fate of Greece unless Turkey and/or Yugoslavia come in, which seems most improbable’. The loss of the Balkans would be ‘by no means a major catastrophe for us, provided Turkey remains honestly neutral’.45 Three days later Hitler gave Halder his views on Italy, Spain, France and Turkey. On 10 March Halder noted: ‘Turkish attitude not clear: bribed by British.’46 Two days later İnönü told Hitler: ‘[Turkey] cannot allow her sacred right to inviolability to be judged from the point of view of the victory of any foreign country.’47 The same day he refused likewise to commit Turkish friendship to Britain, while German aircraft were already arriving at the airfields of Turkey’s neighbours, Syria and Iraq.48

The next day Churchill wrote rather disingenuously to Eden in Ankara, where he had been sent to sort out the confusion caused by the German invasions of Yugoslavia and

41 See Deringil, op. cit., pp.119-20.
42 Churchill, op. cit., p.86.
46 Halder, op. cit., p.358.
48 Hinsley, op. cit., p.413 and PRO CAB 105/4, ‘War Cabinet, The Principal Telegrams Relating to Operations in the Middle East,’ Nos. 83-4, 12 May 1941. This was the time when Luftwaffe Enigma decrypts were first sent to Allied field commanders (Hinsley, op. cit., p.407; also PRO AIR 40/2323, ‘The Use of “ULTRA” in the Mediterranean and North West African Theatres of War,’ October 1945.)
Greece: 'Turkey requires stimulus and guidance as events develop. No one but you can combine and concert the momentous policy which you have pressed upon us and which we have adopted'.

On 18 March Eden met Saraçoğlu in Cyprus and Hugh Dalton at the Ministry of Economic Warfare noted that the Turks were complaining about non-delivery of the arms promised to them.

On March 23 the Greek army capitulated, and Turkey broke off talks with the Yugoslavs, whose government had temporarily capitulated to the Germans.

Not everything was going the Axis way. On 26 March the Italian navy suffered a major defeat at Cape Matapan, thanks to Dilwyn Knox's achievement in breaking a new Italian naval cipher at Bletchley Park.

Eden's approaches to the Turkish leadership yielded little so on 27 March Churchill himself wrote to İnönü: 'Surely now is the time to make a common front which Germany will hardly dare assail.'

The same day, the Yugoslavs having rebelled against the Axis, Churchill wrote to Eden in Turkey: 'This is Turkey's best chance of avoiding war . . . The Germans may . . . turn their whole striking force rapidly against Turkey in Thrace . . . There have been suggestions of this in various telegrams . . . The mass of Turkish troops gathered in Thrace would soon be driven back in confusion upon the Chatalja lines and the Bosphorous . . . The Turks' greatest danger is to be taken on alone jammed up in Thrace'.

Turkish involvement seemed to be reaching crisis point. By the end of the month, GCCS provided evidence of Germany gearing up to attack Russia, while Churchill had endured the spectacle of Germany overrunning Yugoslavia, invading Greece, and defeating both Greeks and British there, all in the hectic space of twenty-four days. Nonetheless, he told Roosevelt that Britain would be content if Turkey remained neutral.

But informed sources were by now confidently awaiting a German attack on Turkey. The German attack in the Balkan commenced on 8 April. Within three days Belgrade was a mass of ruins. Yugoslavia capitulated on 21 April. On 25 April Turkey signed a trade agreement with Germany. Four days later the COS thought Germany would go on through Greece, across the islands and invade Turkey. On 24 April Raschid Ali of Iraq appealed to Germany for help against advancing British forces. By the end of the month Turkey seemed under direct German threat, with Rommel pounding Tobruk and menacing Egypt. Churchill concluded that British failure to hold Egypt would have a disastrous effect on Turkey's ability to stay out of the Axis camp.

\[\text{References:} \]

49 Churchill, op. cit., p.119.
51 Halder, op. cit., p.373.
53 Churchill, op. cit., p.149.
54 Churchill, ibid., pp.149-50. Italics added.
55 Gilbert, op. cit., p.1073.
57 Hinsley, op. cit., pp.410, 412.
The pace of events in the Mediterranean was astounding, and Germany was still making all the running. On 22 April a War Office appreciation noted that the Turkish army had been mobilised for many months. Turkey and Germany were talking trade, and many German businessmen were spending time in Turkey. It was thought probable that Germany would force transit of her troops on the Turkish government and would then occupy Syria and thus isolate Turkey. However, neutral opinion thought Spain a likelier target for German aggression than Turkey.

It can be seen that the War Office, through General Headquarters Middle East, had a distinctive view of Turkey's potential to bolster the inchoate British military and diplomatic reactions to German aggression in the Mediterranean: on 30 April, the day the British Expeditionary Force finished its evacuation of mainland Greece, one option the chairborne soldiery considered was 'based on a hostile Turkey'. They, like the rest of the world, were paralysed by the speed of German armour through mountainous Yugoslavia and Greece, and despite the equally poor state of the roads in Turkey they thought the Germans would achieve 20 miles a day there if they were to invade Anatolia (seen as more probable than Thrace).

The Turks had offered to mediate between the Axis and the Allies over Iraq, but Churchill wrote to Wavell: 'There can be no question of accepting the Turkish offer of mediation.' This offer, had it been accepted, would have substantiated Turkey's neutrality claims, which was not at all what Churchill had in mind. By May the Turkish government had agreed with von Papen's to offer to negotiate with the Germans. The same tough bargaining the Turks used against the British was now brought to play against the Germans. In Greece the British, close to collapse, asked the Turks to occupy the islands of Chios, Mytilene and Samos, a provocation against Greece as well as a protection against the Germans. The Turks understandably said no. Instead, the Germans occupied the first two on 5 May and had completed their grip, on all the Aegean islands a week later. On 12 May the Turks announced they could not under current conditions commit themselves to friendship with Britain. On 4 May, with neutral diplomatic intercepts before him, Churchill reminded Roosevelt that the attitude of Spain, Vichy, Turkey and the Middle East might be finally determined by the outcome of the struggle off Turkish coastal waters. On 8 May Luftwaffe aircraft landed at Mosul, in Iraq, and three Heinkels IIIs came in to land at Baghdad on 12 May, though one was shot down in error. They were

---

58 PRO WO190/893/22832, Appreciation 234, MI3b, paragraph 4a, 'Attitude of Turkey,' n. d., April 1941?
59 Ibid
60 Churchill, op. cit., p.127.
61 Dengil, op. cit., p.120.
joined by Italian formations on 17 May. This Axis effort, staged via Vichy and Syria, proved too late to sustain Raschid Ali.

On 20 May the Germans invaded Crete, thus threatening Turkish coastal waters. Churchill read an Enigma intercept providing a complete picture of exactly where the Germans intended to land there and wished to send the intercepts raw to General Freyberg, C-in-C British forces Crete, but was overruled. Had the Germans learnt that Britain was decrypting the Enigma messages, the single most important British advantage of the war would have been irretrievably lost. On 18 May Ribbentrop offered 'frontier rectification in return for transit facilities' to Turkey. The next day Churchill learned that the Iraqi situation was not secure and that a big German movement into Syria was impending. Churchill told Roosevelt that the fate of Turkey hung in the balance, and Turkey told the British on 21 May that she was not ready to resist Germany. On 24 May Vichy asked for transit facilities for reinforcement of her garrison through Turkey to Syria. In Berlin, on 25 May, Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador, predicted a German advance towards India via Turkey and the Middle East. On 30 May Crete fell and Germany acquired much British war material. But the next day Baghdad surrendered to the British and GCCS was intercepting messages confirming the certainty of Barbarossa.

The period of German ascendancy in the Mediterranean, the subject of this section, concentrated minds at the Foreign Office on the possibility of a total German victory that left Turkey's role in the war a minor affair. During the subsequent two months events in Eastern and South Eastern Europe swept Churchill's plans for Turkey aside.

Although the DIR/C series for this period has not yet been released, Hinsley refers regularly to 'Axis diplomatic sigint'. As early as the summer of 1940, the Prime Minister had required 'authentic documents...in their original form' to come to him through Major Morton. Since many of these authentic documents were diplomatic decrypts, and many of these referred to or emanated from Turkey, it is reasonable to assume that Turkey was still a high priority for him, despite the many other calls on his nervous energy. The evidence of his involvement in bjs is provided in Hinsley. The Foreign Office tracked Hitler's ambitions in the Balkans in detail through this period in case he decided to switch his combined forces back to invading Britain.

By 1 June Crete had been cleared of British forces. The Luftwaffe was to be withdrawn from Iraq and the British and Free French advanced into Syria on 8 June. On 6 June von Papen was reported by a US source in Bucharest as hinting that the Italian-owned

63 Gilbert, op. cit., p.1086.
64 Hinsley, op. cit., p.71.
65 Hinsley, Ibid., p.422.
66 Hinsley, Ibid., pp.407-8, 422.
67 Hinsley, Ibid., p.319.
but formerly Ottoman Dodecanese could become Turkey's after a German victory, and the Germans and Turks agreed to German matériel passing through Turkey towards Iraq and Syria, but not troops. The climax of German supremacy in the region arrived on 18 June when the Turco-German treaty of friendship was signed. The Turks worked hard to create an auspicious atmosphere for the treaty. The press gave the treaty a warm welcome and underlined that 'Turco-German friendship was not a new thing'. But on 21 June Turkey refused passage to French troops across the country.

This section has tried to present the bifurcated British reaction to German successes in South Eastern Europe from June 1941 till March 1942. Signals intelligence available to the British was crucial by this time, and led directly to the striking British victory over the Italians at Cape Matapan. Unfortunately the actual messages prior to the autumn of 1941 have not yet been released, and consequently reliance is confidently placed on Hinsley's account of these months of the war in the Mediterranean.

(v) Churchill's Secret Intelligence, 1940-41

Churchill was already receiving the intercepts he needed to mastermind the British war effort in the Eastern Mediterranean, and 'to play the Turkey hand': by 24 June 1941 the first DIR/C came on stream and is available to the historian. In London the service ministries were now receiving Enigma but only summaries of bjs, while the Foreign Office studied bjs but had no access to Enigma/Ultra until later in 1943. Churchill, of course, had both, but would not allow anyone else, including those on his private staff, John Colville for instance, to see them. Since there was overlap in content and a complementary aspect to the two different sources of information, it can be seen that Churchill was putting himself in an unrivalled position as Britain's warlord, a position he did not intend to share with anyone. It was an impressive example of the need-to-know principle. He made effective use of his personal resource from mid-1941 to mid-1944. After D-Day his role in war planning was diminished, but bjs remained vital reading to him and others planning whether and how to drop atomic bombs on Japan and thereby finish the war. In this early period, however, his frequent annotations, instructions to 'C' and others on cipher security, concern for the battles being waged on the Eastern and North African fronts and at sea, all show that his use of intercepts was a crucial part of his conduct of the war, and his attitude to the neutrals.

---

69 Halder, op. cit., p.404.
70 See Deringil, op. cit., p.121.
71 Hinsley, op. cit., p.278.
73 In the PRO as HW1/6, decrypted 24 June 1941.
On 27 June GCCS broke the German *Abwehr* Russian front code. The very next day Churchill was upset at not having been shown a document from Hut 3, despite two copies going to Major Morton, and protested directly to 'C' who offered to 'submit all naval material to you in future...if you so direct'. The Prime Minister replied 'Yes, if not pure routine'. The document was in fact an account of the German admiral commanding U-boats [Admiral Dönitz]. Churchill's appetite for authentic detail was insatiable. Two days later he asked Hut 3 via 'C' to state whenever possible tonnage and whether northbound or southbound of ships in the Mediterranean. On 26 June Hugessen reported that the Turks in general and Saraçoglu in particular were 'in a very touchy frame of mind' and Churchill, who was making his pitch towards Russia, despite Turkish sensibilities, was discreetly told by the Foreign Office to moderate his newly pro-Soviet speeches.

On 15 July a report to Ankara by the Turkish ambassador in Moscow on the attitude of Turkey to the German-Russian conflict was intercepted by the Germans and was shown to Hitler. Six other Turkish intercepts were passed by Hitler to Göbbels. A German descent on Turkey still appeared imminent. Few doubted he could do it, but Hitler himself began to doubt if it was worth doing when he could get so far without such a dangerous extension of his supply lines.

During the rest of July and most of August the war had swung so far in Hitler's favour that total victory for the Axis seemed inevitable. The steady loss of shipping to the U-boats in the Atlantic was Churchill's overriding preoccupation at this period. Britain was in serious danger of being starved into submission, while a swift German victory on her Eastern front might have immobilised the Soviet Union and neutralised the United States. This démarche would have enabled the Japanese to cross the North of India and join up with her German allies to safeguard the all-important Persian oilfields. With so much at stake, Bletchley Park's breaking of the German naval Enigma -- reducing monthly shipping losses from 600,000 tons to 100,000 within a few weeks -- proved supremely important to Churchill. Turkish affairs passed to the Foreign Office. On 24 July Harvey noted in his diary 'an encouraging telegram from Ankara'. Turkey wanted to talk to Britain and was anti-German. Though Eden had always backed the Turkish front, nothing came of the Turkish approach. The next day von Papen reported that the Turkish-speaking in Azerbaijan were stirring, and Hitler learnt from an intercept that the five-week-old Turco-German treaty meant nothing to Turkey.

Stalin was only slowly waking up to the fact that his countrymen had the fight of their lives on their hands. On 28 July he told İnönü he had no territorial interest in revising

---

75 Pro HW1/38, PM to C, 29 June 1941.
76 Irving, op. cit., p.132.
77 Gilbert, op. cit., p.138.
79 Irving, op. cit., p.132.
Montreux, and he, too, put Turkey aside for the time being. On 2 August, an Italian diplomatic decrypt showed that the Italians were suspecting that Germany had been talking to the Persians about oil and about the territorial expansion of Persia in the event of a Soviet collapse.\textsuperscript{80} On 6 August Eden complained to the Persian government about thousands of German spies -- 'tourists' -- coming into the country from Turkey, which had become the international espionage capital of the world. Six days later the Italian diplomatic service, in a telegram decrypted at Bletchley Park, quoted Rashid Ali as believing that the Persian government was 'substantially favourable' to the Axis and would throw off the mask as soon as German troops appeared in the Caucuses.\textsuperscript{81} The possibility of a German attack on Turkey had also been reported in September 1941 by A-54, a well-placed Czech agent working for the \textit{Abwehr} in Vienna.\textsuperscript{82}

Turkish involvement in the war was pivotal for the Axis as well as the Allies. In Berlin Ribbentrop set up a committee to exploit panturanism -- a movement to extend Turkish Frontiers north-eastwards -- amongst the tribes round the Caspian sea, while guaranteeing Turkish territorial integrity. His underlings were carrying out a number of subversive activities throughout the Middle East. The Wehrmacht was continuing to transport arms and ammunition to Persia via Turkey. Turkey was considering building a lorry route through Anatolia to help the process. Churchill found time to tell Stalin on 29 August: 'We are trying...to provide for Turkey so as to bring her in on our side'.\textsuperscript{83} Thus despite the parlous state of Britain in the summer of 1941, Turkish involvement remained a high priority to constitute the main thrust of British diplomacy towards the neutrals.

From then on Turkey was a prime target for the diplomatic cryptographers of both Germany and Britain, and intercepts of her ambassadorial reports remained part of Churchill's daily workload. The continued neutrality of the Turks from the end of 1941 to the beginning of 1945, despite Churchill's agitation, is a theme of several of the chapters that follow. Their success in staying out of the war, despite the threats and blandishments of von Papen in Ankara and of Churchill and the Foreign Office in London, which resulted in the Adana Conference of January 1943, is recorded by the official war historians. Nothing in the new secret diplomatic intercepts substantially alters the Turkish wartime scene as already recorded, but more significantly new light is shed on how Churchill himself conducted British foreign policy towards Turkey in those years.

At the beginning of this chapter, two questions were asked: the first was how important was the work of GCCS on Turkish diplomatic messages between May 1940 and October 1941 and 1939 to the Foreign Office? The answer is that the expansion of GCCS

\textsuperscript{81} Decrypted at Bletchley Park, see Hinsley, Ibid., Vol.2, p.840.
\textsuperscript{82} Hinsley, Ibid., Vol.2, passim, especially p.836 for Churchill and bjs.
\textsuperscript{83} Churchill, op. cit., p.403.
from its mainly diplomatic work to its decryption of *Luftwaffe* and *Kriegsmarine* Enigma messages in 1940-41 was of overriding importance to Churchill, so bjs figured less prominently than Enigma during this period, and their use by the Foreign Office cannot be realistically assessed from current data.

This chapter has provided a provisional answer to the second question about the quality and quantity of Turkey-sourced bjs in 1941: the evidence is to be found in Hinsley's history of British secret signals intelligence. Though Churchill's mission to save the world from the Nazis benefited greatly from the work of Bletchley Park in the early years of the war, reliable information on Turkey and neutral attitudes to hostilities from Turkish and other sources did not make Turkish participation in the war a high priority for Churchill, who had other and greater problems to deal with. It should be added that these answers must remain speculative, given the non-availability of bjs before September 1941. In the next two years Churchill's concern with Turkey can be scanned in conjunction with his reading of diplomatic intercepts in a way which suggests the intercepts underpinned as well as infused his 'playing of the Turkey hand'.

The next chapter is devoted to a study of Churchill's use of Turkish diplomatic messages in his Eastern Mediterranean policy between 1941 and November 1942.
Chapter Four

CHURCHILL’S TURKISH APPROACH

(i) Churchill and Turkey, 1941-43 (ii) DIR/C On Stream: September 1941
(iii) Churchill’s Turkey Hand, October-November 1941 (iv) Turkish Neutrality and British Disasters: Spring 1942 (v) Turkish Friendship Sought

This chapter charts the developing relationship between Churchill and the Turkish leadership in the light of the Turkish intercepted telegrams. His efforts to persuade Turkey to enter the war when military events in the Balkans, the Mediterranean and North Africa were going against Britain were frustrated not only by Turkish reactions to British disasters, but by Germany's continued predominance until mid-1942 and thereafter by the even more potent threat to Turkish independence occasioned by Russian successes. In the months before January 1943, the balance of power had swung towards the Allies, who had been victorious in North Africa, displacing the Italian dictator, while the Russians had achieved a massive victory at Stalingrad. The chapter also shows the extent to which Turkey, as a leading neutral, observed the signs of a possible separate peace -- between Italy and Britain after Mussolini's collapse, and between Russia and Germany all through this period till 6 June 1944. Linked to the possibility of a separate peace were the questions whether, when and where a second front would be launched by 'the Anglo-Saxons'. Speculation amongst the neutrals continued throughout the North African campaign, the invasion of Sicily and the Italian campaign. Gauging neutral sensibilities gave Churchill, and other readers of bjs, an unrivalled entry into the mindset of Turkey, as well as Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, Sweden, Brazil, Chile, the Vatican and Vichy France. These powers could collectively alter the course of the war, and there lay their importance to Britain. Turkey was strategically the most important, so questions affecting Turkey's continuing policy of neutrality led Churchill and Eden in London, and Hitler in Berlin, to believe that Turkey, despite its fragile economy, might hold the key to the balance of power in the post-war world.

Churchill's strategic objective, conditioned by his daily reading of DIR/C, was to defeat the enemy, so his intercept reading resulted in strong and often otherwise inexplicable hunches. He favoured a Balkan offensive, to be launched from Turkish territory across the Bosphorus and Greece and up the Danube to attack the German heartland, and discussion of this recurred annually between 1942 and 1944, though it is doubtful whether it was more than a figment of his imaginative way of looking at strategic
possibilities, fuelled by intercepts from Balkan, Italian and Turkish diplomats. It was probably beyond the competence of the Allied commanders to plan, still less to realise, such a project. In any case, Churchill was an extemporiser rather than a planner -- and in late 1941 he could only react to what the enemy was doing, or might be planning to do next. The Turkish march was one theme on which he extemporised with many variations. First, as has been shown, he asked the CIGS, Sir John Dill, to send General Sir James Marshall-Cornwall to Ankara on a one-man military mission to get Turkey onto the Allied side in late 1940 and early 1941. Marshall-Cornwall made two trips to Ankara. He did his best but he knew his job was impossible. On 19 February 1941 Field Marshal Wavell, the C-in-C, told him that 'the policy of our government is to build up a Balkan front.' In pursuit of this objective, Churchill then sent the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, twice to Turkey in 1941, to bully or lure the Turks in. The results were negative. Between Eden's second visit and Churchill's own arrival on Turkish soil in January 1943 the thrust of the war developed in other theatres, but from May 1942 onwards Churchill set his sights on a personal intervention into Turkish foreign policy, partly as the start of a great Balkan second front to aid the Russians at Stalingrad, but more because he badly needed the comfort of the formidable Turkish army at his side, and his study of the diplomatic messages told him the time was ripe.

In Washington the leadership disliked pressurising Turkey, while in Whitehall Turkey remained the province of the Southern Department of the Foreign Office, doubtful about Churchill's Turkish initiative. For over two decades it had been responsible for developing British friendship and trade with Turkey, it was proud of this not very difficult achievement and defended its right to look after the Turkish agenda. The War Cabinet, following Eden, took the same view as the Southern Department, while after 1942 the COS had their minds on the Western Mediterranean and never looked favourably on a Balkan initiative from the East. In this they echoed the views of the Americans, who only saw trouble in stirring up Turkey and opening a Balkan front. Sir John Dill, by then in Washington, who had sent Marshall-Cornwall to Ankara in 1940, tried to explain the problem of the American leadership to Churchill on 8 January 1944: 'Can I suggest without offence that you look at it [Turkey] from the US Chiefs of Staff point of view, with their vast responsibilities in this great democracy, which are much more direct and more publicly recognised than in our country, and then do as you would be done by.' But Churchill did not understand Roosevelt's sensitivity to emigrant minorities in the United States. Few except Lord Alanbrooke shared Churchill's determination to do everything possible to postpone Overlord until the Allies were capable of delivering it. This was the only credible

---

2 PRO PREM 3/447/6, p.330, no. 387: Grand no. 125. Churchill's doodle on the paper suggests he was giving the suggestion some thought.
second front. It was this determination rather than any long-term plan of attack on the European heartland through Bulgaria that drove Churchill into the welcoming if hesitant arms of President İnönü at Adana in January 1943. Churchill himself must have realised that, from the moment Hitler re-armed the substantial Bulgarian army with the latest German weaponry in 1941, the Balkan front option did not exist: if so, he kept his own counsel.

The view from Ankara in 1941 was rather different. Turkey was beset on all sides. To the East, a joint Russo-British invasion of Persia from the North and South respectively had cut off both oil and Arab friends in the area. To the North West, Bulgaria and Romania had been reduced to satellite status by Germany, compelled to supply half a million men for the Eastern front, fully equipped and politically neutered. To the North, the Germans reigned supreme over the rich arable plains of the Ukraine now basking in autumn sunshine and with a record wheat harvest to be transported back to Germany. To the South, British reverses in the North African desert had left Egypt twitching helplessly while to the West Italy was still in aggressive mode.

This was the situation when DIR/C came on stream and Churchill was able to give his full attention to Turkey. The diplomatic decrypts which follow reveal that the Southern Department knew well that the Turks would reject all attempts to bring them into the war unless one or other combatant invaded their territory. They knew there existed some differences of emphasis on this point amongst the leadership in Ankara. They also knew how both neutral and Axis diplomats apprised Turkish foreign policy, because they read the reports of foreign ambassadors, German, Italian, Japanese, Russian, Spanish, Portuguese, South American and Balkan, conveying to their home governments the Turkish attitude to the belligerents, while they could also study the occasional updates circulated by the Turkish foreign ministry to their embassies abroad. To Ankara came reports from Turkish ambassadors in the same capitals reporting secret conversations with others on the international diplomatic network. Many of these reports read by the Southern Department referred to the possibility of a Balkan front, and some, even at this early stage, glanced at the dreaded possibility of separate peacemaking, first between the Western Allies and Italy, next between Germany and the Soviet Union. A separate peace would leave at least one major combatant on both sides with sufficient strength and energy to continue and extend the world war, perhaps drawing in the neutrals. The Southern Department also read of the fear, particularly in Spain and Portugal, of the possible bolshevisation of Europe if Soviet successes were to be fully exploited. The Foreign Office knew from other sources that Stalin had no interest in the Comintern or in Trotskyism, but memories of the international brigade in Spain five years earlier were still strong enough to keep this dire threat alive. The neutrals hoped for some sort of balance of power in Europe. As first Italy and then Germany declined as a power in the Mediterranean, these fears were transferred, first to the 'Anglo-Saxons', and then, irrevocably, to the Soviets.
The Anglo-Turkish conference at Adana in Southern Turkey took place on 31 January 1943 and is the subject of chapter five. It came as the climax of Churchill's efforts to get Turkey into the war on the Allied side. This chapter sets out to trace the progress of the idea of a direct approach to the Turks, using the DIR/C files. By connecting the diplomatic and Enigma intercepts of the period with the events leading up to the conference itself, it concludes that Churchill's minute study of the intercepts, and the decisions and events which followed, failed to alter the course of events. But this conclusion does not imply that the intercepts were not capable of providing vital information on which action plans could be discussed by British foreign policy makers. Of these, the Foreign Office saw diplomatic traffic only; the Chiefs of Staff saw Enigma but not diplomatic; and the rest of the War Cabinet saw arbitrary selections of both sources on a 'need to know' basis. But Churchill saw everything, and it was for this reason that he found more cause for believing Turkey could be seduced into the war than anyone else. Though the Southern Department 'handled' Turkey, a passive or reactive view was taken there of Churchill's attempts to 'get her in', partly because it had no remit to instigate such a policy, and 'getting her in' would have entailed handing her over to Combined Allied Headquarters Middle East, in Cairo. It was also very conscious of the danger of arousing Russian suspicions of a post-war Turco-British deal involving the Straits, and knew from the intercepts that Turkey remained fearful of a sudden Luftwaffe assault on Istanbul as late as autumn 1943.

Thus the Southern Department wanted to keep Turkey neutral, while the Chiefs of Staff, largely under the growing influence of the Americans, were against any talk of a Balkan front or offensive action in the Eastern Mediterranean which would divert Allied forces from Italy and Western Europe, and probably alarm the Soviet Union. For the rest of the War Cabinet Turkish involvement was relatively unimportant. So Churchill concluded that he could and should make Turkish participation in the war on the Allied side a high personal priority. Can his reading of diplomatic intercepts be seen to have been the cause or the effect of that policy? Or were there occasions when his determination to get Turkey into the war made him blind to what he read in the DIR/C? The message coming from the intercepts was unequivocal about Turkey, so recipients of bjs would have known that Churchill had an impossible job on his hands. On the other hand it is quite possible that both Eden at the Foreign Office and the COS might have ignored evidence from the DIR/Cs which suggested that Turkey might be persuaded to enter the war because they had already decided that her assistance was not worth the price. The Southern Department, the COS and the War Cabinet had somewhat differing views on the advantage of a change in Turkish neutrality, but none shared Churchill's conviction that his personal intervention would effect the change on which he had set his heart. So he went to Turkey without Eden, though with Alexander Cadogan, his Permanent Under Secretary. Despite the apparent failure of the Adana conference, Churchill remained determined to create, if not a
Balkan front, then certainly a lot of trouble for the enemy, by risking an attack on the Italian-held Dodecanese later in 1943. The disastrous though short-lived results of this campaign are the subject of a later chapter.

Diplomatic interception, decryption, translation, evaluation and distribution had continued through the 1938 war scare, when 'Station X' was set up in August at Bletchley simulating war conditions, to the establishment of Bletchley Park as a going concern by September 1939. This part of GCCS's product was not part of the main cryptographic work, which the arrival of the Enigma machine in Britain earlier that month and the consequential breaking of the Luftwaffe high-grade cyphers, generated. 'Dedip' (diplomatic decrypts) derived from both interception and cable scrutiny, continued to be supplied to the Foreign Office and other Whitehall departments, alongside Enigma/Ultra. How this joint/parallel operation was managed does not emerge from the files disclosed in the PRO, but it must have been an uneasy marriage, brought to the point of separation (though never divorce) by the decision to hive off diplomatic and commercial traffic to blitz-torn London from Bletchley in February 1942. From Berkeley Street the Foreign Office and Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW or 'Mousetrap') continued to receive an uninterrupted and increasingly valuable flow of diplomatic intercepts. In Whitehall the usefulness of the diplomatic and commercial intercepts grew further in 1943, after the decryption and distribution of commercial messages had been separated out from GCCS's diplomatic work in Berkeley Street and set up in nearby Aldford House, Park Lane. There, careful monitoring of Spanish exports of wolfram, tungsten and manganese to Germany gave the Ministry of Economic Warfare much of the information it needed to maintain the economic blockade. The Foreign Office rather than the Ministry of Economic Warfare (which started the war as a department of the FO) looked after the Turkish supply of chromite and other minerals to Britain, the USA and Germany, as part of its responsibility for Turkey. It failed to stop the supply to the Germans until 1944 by which time they had all they needed anyway. Through the British ambassador in Ankara the Southern Department sought to influence Turkey away from Germany by vague threats the ambassador found very difficult to make convincing, substituting a sort of offended withdrawal of interest which in the end may have played some part in President İnönü's revised anti-German policy in early 1944. But this is doubtful. İnönü on his home territory was never greatly influenced by anyone else's ambassador.

To advance a provisional answer to the question of what actions were taken by which organs of British government on the conclusions they were drawing from a reading of Turkish diplomatic telegrams: the War Cabinet took instant and effective action to prevent any possibility of Churchill being murdered on his way back from Adana in

---

3 Dedip is an acronym for diplomatic decrypts that became accepted usage in 1943.
February 1943 by Algerian extremists. This is recounted in chapter five. The War Office kept a military mission going in Ankara, extended runways on Western Turkish airfields and trained Turkish soldiers in the new weaponry. The Air Ministry trained Turkish pilots in Britain alongside those of countries allied to Britain, and both contributed by keeping in touch with the Turkish military establishment in Ankara.

The results in the short term were modest. Churchill's visit to Turkey in January 1943 produced nothing tangible. The Southern Department admitted, to itself but to no-one else, that its Turkish policy had failed, withdrew the ambassador, largely for security reasons, and may have consistently underestimated Turkish usefulness as a full ally. But when Greece was overrun by the Germans in 1940, and with Italy firmly in the Axis camp, this love of Greece and Rome had little outlet. Classical archaeology in Asia Minor was still in its infancy, and understanding within the Southern Department of what Atatürk had achieved for Turkey between the wars was lacking. Despite Loraine, Foreign Office views on modern Turkey were still conditioned by her Ottoman past and Islamic culture. Sharing these prejudices, the War Office, and the visiting generals, admirals and air marshals, failed to make much headway in integrating modern equipment and methods within the Turkish military system. Thus even regular reading of Turkey-sourced bjs did not get British foreign policy-makers to appreciate the advantages of a more pro-Turkey policy.

This section has sought to set the stage for Churchill's use of Turkish diplomatic messages starting in the autumn of 1941.

(ii) DIR/C On Stream: September 1941

Governmental thinking and decision-making grew to rely on regular information from Boniface, for the COS, and diplomatic messages, for the Foreign Office, as soon as the likelihood of a German victory had receded -- in fact by the spring of 1942. To appreciate the growing importance to government of sigint it is necessary to revert to its source at Bletchley Park (BP), where both Ultra and diplomatic decrypts were handled from 3 September 1939 until February 1942. BP had grown considerably by September 1941. Two years after its establishment there, with the number of Enigma solutions growing exponentially, with elaborate new procedures improvised out of necessity, and with the beginnings of an Anglo-American sigint co-operative, the complexity of its activities outstripped the experience of those who administered it. Reflecting the pre-war constitution and priorities of GCCS, these were Foreign Office civilians and ex-service officers who had been trained for cryptanalysis and who still coupled their new administrative responsibilities, as the Head of GCCS or as the heads of its sections, with

---

4 This could have been due less to reading bjs and more to an ancestral philhellenism, which might have made them subconsciously anti-Turk. The culture of the pre-war FO was conditioned by the pursuit of classical scholarship. In this respect Pierson Dixon was *primus inter pares*. 
the role of cryptanalyst. A management crisis, highlighted by a now famous letter asking Churchill for more manpower resources, and delivered to him personally by Stewart Milner-Barry, on behalf of Alan Turing, Gordon Welchman and Hugh Alexander in October 1941, was thought to have beset Bletchley Park during that autumn, by which time Churchill was receiving signals intelligence from there. But the supply was intermittent and limited in those early days. Arrangements for reporting and handling the intelligence were distinctly informal and some reports may not have been retained (with no record of disposal). Moreover, with the German invasion of England thought to be imminent, an effort was made to minimise holdings of sensitive documents. On the other hand research into the provision of diplomatic decrypts to the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Economic Warfare and Churchill in June 1942 suggests strongly that they were all receiving many diplomatic decrypts to and from Ankara from the very early days of the war, and before. As we have seen, senior government ministers, including Churchill had been reading Turkey-based diplomatic intercepts since 1922. Further, one should not overlook the 'because it is there' factor in assessing the importance of Turkish diplomatic messages to Churchill. A list of GCCS's diplomatic interception facilities dated 6 June 1942 is remarkable not only for its comprehensive coverage of diplomatic material but also for the indication that the material from Turkey was 'full cover' -- that is to say complete, and to be provided not by wireless interception but by clandestine scrutiny and in collusion with Cable and Wireless Co Ltd. All other targeted countries sent their messages by W/T, which were intercepted by some ten stations in Britain and abroad. These would be Morse, enciphered, perhaps doubly enciphered, and, after transmission to Bletchley, in need not only of decrypting but of translating before assessment was possible. This in turn meant that recipients of bjs had unrestricted access to messages from Ankara. From there the ambassadors of France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia and Britain, as well as many Balkan and South American states and Spain and Portugal, reported to their foreign ministries on Turkish reactions to Barbarossa, Pearl Harbor, Mussolini's misfortunes, Hitler's talks with Antonescu of Romania, and the North African campaign. However, many of the most valuable messages came to Ankara from neutral capitals where Turkish ambassadors were stationed. The list in appendix 5 shows that Ankara-bound traffic from France and Germany was intercepted at Denmark Hill, from Persia and Italy at Sandridge, and from Switzerland at Brora, in North East Scotland, and St Albans. This leaves unclear

---

5 See P. S. Milner-Barry, 'Action This Day: The Letter From Bletchley Park Cryptanalysts to the Prime Minister, 2 October 1941,' Intelligence And National Security, Vol. 1, No.2 (1986), pp.272-3. It is now thought possible that the heads of BP actively encouraged the sending of the letter because communication with Menzies was so difficult.
6 Letter to the present writer from the Archivist at GCHQ of 2 February 1995.
7 See appendix 5 for alphabetical list of countries targeted, call signs, frequencies in kilohertz, which 'Y' station provided interception and which countries received the messages.
8 See Chapter 1 in connection with the crisis in Smyrna in October 1922.
9 See appendix 5.
who intercepted Ankara-bound traffic from other leading suppliers of significant and reliable messages -- neutral ambassadors in Tokyo, the Balkan capitals and Kuibyshev. There is plenty of such material in DIR/C, but how and whence it arrived, usually in very good order with few 'garbled' or 'corrupt' groups, from these other originating centres remains a mystery. The point to stress is that the very quality and quantity of the Ankara-sourced material might have induced regular readers in the Southern Department, and Churchill, to take a particular interest in Turkish foreign policy -- on a 'because it is there' basis.

Researhing the history of Bletchley Park in those months, the reasons for the lack of DIR/C become clear. By September 1941 Barbarossa had come and gone. The Foreign Office had failed to predict Hitler's onslaught on the Soviet Union, despite the information the bjs carried. On the contrary, both the Foreign Office and the COS thought Hitler would mount a Balkan offensive through Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey to cut off Allied oil supplies, isolate Egypt and threaten the route to India and the Dominions. The British persisted in that view long after Enigma and the intercepts showed that Hitler would mount only a defensive campaign in the Balkans, to protect the Southern flank of his great drive into the Ukraine, while maintaining his option to invade Britain, despite the bold determination of the German naval chiefs that the Balkan drive of 1940 should be consummated by a major thrust eastwards to join up with the Japanese in the Red Sea. Evidence for pre-knowledge of Barbarossa is harder to evaluate, and was probably more apparent to the War Office than the Foreign Office. It is equally difficult to guess how much the British learnt from signals intelligence about Turkey's plans to stay neutral in 1941 since few bjs have yet been released. But presuming the Foreign Office had access to them in roughly similar quantities and quality as in subsequent war years, Turkey would have continued to preoccupy the Southern Department.

Churchill, however, went further: it was he (as has been shown) who ordered Dill to order General Sir James Marshall-Cornwall to leave his operational command, awaiting a German invasion of the British Isles, to persuade the Turks to join the war on the Allied side. And it was he who urged Eden to make his two fruitless visits to talk to the Turks in the Spring of 1941. The Foreign Office, in the person of Sir Alexander Cadogan, told Churchill on 6 April 1941 that Turkey had an obligation under the Balkan Pact to come to the assistance of Yugoslavia if she was attacked by Germany, but if Turkey did not look on

---

10 A captured German codebreaker called Schmidt, under interrogation, told British authorities that 'the intercepted messages of the Turkish embassy in Moscow and the American Embassy in Berne were deemed of especial value'. He also asserted that Turkey was amongst the 34 countries whose secret communications the Germans were reading at this time. See S. Deringil, *Turkish Foreign Policy During World War Two* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p.61.
this as a *casus belli* 'it was not worth trying further'. Though the Southern Department and the War Office shared broadly similar attitudes towards Turkey, only Churchill saw that some activity -- *any* activity -- was better than nothing.

Across the Atlantic the Americans were furious that Turkey was still supplying chromite to Germany. Their reaction was to cut down on Lend-Lease supplies to Turkey. The Foreign Office took a different view, because the British wanted to save their dwindling gold reserves by supplying Turkey with American *matériel*, and knew there was no way of playing the Turkey hand without also providing her with massive amounts of equipment and expertise in the use of the new weaponry. But the technicians supplied to Turkey by Allied firms were reluctant to go in case Turkey was invaded by Germany; and the home-based companies needed their services anyhow. Despite all this, the close Turco-British relationship was everywhere apparent. Turkish air officer cadets learnt to fly from British airfields, alongside Belgian, Polish, French and Dutch cadets. The British ran the Turkish air force and German spies regularly reported to von Papen on British officials organising the extension of Turkish runways.

In Ankara, Ambassador Hugessen was entrusted with the important and delicate task of keeping the Turks sweet. He had a hard act to follow in that his predecessor in the job, the popular and powerful Sir Percy Loraine, had been an intimate friend of Kemal Atatürk's. Loraine's prewar briefings to the Foreign Office on the importance to Britain of Turkey's friendship had been so influential in determining Foreign Office Southern Department policy that another British diplomat had fantasised in print that Atatürk would appoint Loraine as his successor in the Presidency instead of his old *protégé* and companion in arms, Ismet İnönü. However, neither Loraine nor Hugessen nor anyone else at the British Embassy bothered to explore the *hinterland* of Anatolia to report on the actual socio-economic state of the country whose alliance they sought. Had they done so Churchill might well have followed Hitler in deciding against further pressure. Conditions remained primitive in the extreme. Though the Turks suspected Hitler of planning to cross their country to get to Egypt, they would keep out of the war unless and until they were actually invaded; and then they would fight the invader to the death. On 27 August Churchill wrote to Lt-General Sir Leslie Hollis of his defence staff - for the COS - about the staff conversations with the Turks: 'A good start has been made in recommending a *rapprochement* [between Turkey and the Soviets]. We do not mean to push the Turks into the war against their better judgement. Turkey will become a partner in the immense

---


14 See Pierson Dixon, (ed) *Double Diploma: The Life of Sir Pierson Dixon, Don and Diplomat* (London: Hutchinson, 1968), pp 42-4, and addendum pasted into the prelims giving an account of the imagined talk between Mustapha Kemal and Loraine was written by Sir Charles Mott-Radclyffe, as a fantasy on the voluminous telegrams sent back to London by Loraine in the 1930s.
resources of the British empire and the USA'. But Ismay minuted that the Turks had taken fright.

Warlike friendships were being offered to Turkey by all sides. Captured German documents later published in Document on German Foreign Policy show Berlin studying Turkish involvement in the war. On 1 September 1941 Churchill wrote to Roosevelt that the recent Russo-British invasion of Persia served the purpose of encouraging Turkey to stand as a solid block against German passage into Syria and Palestine. Roosevelt disliked his allies' activities in Persia intensely, as did the Turks. Britain was going to make Persia a puppet 'and get all the wealth for nothing'. 'Would a similar fate await Turkey'? 'The genuineness of British friendship can always be measured by the degree to which their interest is involved'. The Turkish ambassador in London commented 'neutrality no longer has any meaning . . . Britain will occupy Persia so we should be on the same side'.

Many Turkey-sourced diplomatic messages were also being read by Hitler from September 1941 onwards. Hitler used them to pursue a moderate Turkish policy. As early as 1 March 1941 he had written to İnönü that the German move in Bulgaria should not alarm Turkey as he had ordered his troops to keep well back from the frontier. His table talk showed him well briefed on domestic Balkan affairs. He decided early on that Turkey should not be invaded or forced into the war: the country's benevolent neutrality suited him well, even when his egregious ambassador, Franz von Papen, told him on 2 September that the Italians were expected to march through Turkey. But the Italians observed Turkish reactions to the Russo-British adventure in Persia: there would be revolts in former Turkish territories on the Persian borders, fomented to justify Russian intervention. 'Now England is allied with Russia the British-Turkish link is weakened, and the Turco-Axis link strengthened. Turkey would offer to mediate between Persia and the Allies'. On 5 September Churchill told the Soviet ambassador, Ivan Maisky, that 'some offensive action might be possible in the spring of 1942', perhaps in conjunction with Turkey, who 'would be encouraged to join with us as she saw our strength grow'.

---

15 PRO PREM 3/445/2, Churchill to Hollis, 27 August 1941.
16 PRO PREM 3/445/2, Ismay to Churchill, 8 August 1941.
18 Most people called the country Iran, as now, but Churchill was keen to use the traditional name Persia, so out of deference to the war leader, this thesis will do the same.
19 PRO HWI/38, bj 095065, Moscow to Ankara, decrypted 1 September 1941.
20 PRO HWI/38, bj 095064, London to Ankara, decrypted 1 September 1941.
24 PRO Dir HWI/38, bj 095114, Ankara to Rome, decrypted 5 September 1941.
Balkan front', Churchill told Stalin, 'could be opened without the help of Turkey'.

A week later, Halder, the German Army Chief of Staff, noted that 'the situation in that country [Turkey] is considered to be developing in out favour'. Hitler told his dinner guests: 'The Danube is the link with Turkey. Gerede has been called to Ankara...The fall of Sebastopol has caused great jubilation...Gerede may be appointed [Turkish] Foreign Minister. He is not a militant diplomat like Oshima but he is absolutely convinced that Turkey and Germany must go forward hand-in-hand.'

Turkey's balancing act between the Axis and the Allies was complicated in Britain by the question, who should handle Turkey? Combined Forces HQ in the Middle East, or the Foreign Office? Both urged their cases to Churchill, but he and the Foreign Office were at one on this issue at least: it must continue to be handled by the Southern Department, from London. In late September 1941 the War Cabinet wrote to GHQ Middle East: 'Turkey occupies such an important position in our foreign policy that relations with that country must be directed from London...If Turkey came into the war the position would be radically different'. The question recurred constantly, particularly when Churchill and General Sir Henry 'Jumbo' Maitland Wilson needed troops and equipment for the Dodecanese operation of autumn 1943. But since Turkey never passed from a political to a strategic relationship with the Allies, the Southern Department maintained its hold on Turkey, while in all material respects Churchill himself acted for them.

Following the invasion of Persia, the possibility of a move in Afghanistan presented itself to Churchill, when the influential Italian ambassador in Kabul reported that the government there was prepared 'to grant anything the British cared to ask'. The Prime Minister sidelined this by heavily and ordered it sent to the 'F Secy' (sic) 'to be returned to WSC'. The PM wrote to Eden: 'you have an open door which you should force at the earliest moment...Let us get rid of [the ringleaders of the pro-Axis rebellion there] now while all this part of the world is under the impression of our Persian success.' Eden then wrote to India about 'secret information from reliable sources...the Afghans would grant any demand we might make...short of military occupation'. Using the ipsissima verba of Churchill and the intercept, Eden was making little personal contribution to policy.

---

26 Ibid.
28 Trevor Roper, op. cit., p.339. H. Gerede was Turkish Ambassador in Berlin.
29 War Cabinet, *Principal War Telegrams and Memoranda* (London: Kraus, 1976). See also PRO PREM 3/446/10, no. 573, 29 January 1943, Jacob to PM: 'The Foreign Office have always maintained that relations with Turkey are so delicate that they should not be handled in any way by the Minister of State [Macmillan].'
30 PRO HW1/49, bj 095195, Kabul to Rome decrypted 5 September 1941.
31 PRO HW1/49, bj 095195, Churchill to Eden, 6 September 1941.
32 PRO HW1/49, bj 095195, Kabul to Rome, decrypted 5 September 1941. Also enclosed in this file are Churchill's comments to Eden, 6 September 1941, and telegram from Secretary of State for India to Government of India, 6 September 1941.
This accumulation of Turkish diplomatic messages culminated on 13 September when the well informed Japanese ambassador in Ankara, Sho Kurihara, reported that the Allies 'were forcing Turkey to join up with them.' British pressure had increased since the Allies went into Persia; but 'Turkey would resist such pressure as they are afraid of Germany'. Pressure from a different point came from British insistence that Turkey should allow British ships through the Dardanelles so the Russian navy 'can leave the Black Sea'. Churchill minuted to the First Sea Lord (Admiral Sir Dudley Pound): 'What is the Admiralty view? Would you like [the Russians] to get out or leave them to keep their command of the Black Sea till the end of their tether? Better have this looked at.'

This section has linked the Turkish diplomatic messages received by Hitler as well as Churchill to the development of both Axis and Allied policies towards Turkey from September 1941 till September 1942. The next three months were to prove conclusive so far as Churchill's grasp of the Turkish problem was concerned. This forms the subject matter of the section which follows.

(iii) Churchill's Turkey Hand, October - December 1941

Churchill's advocacy of his Turkish policy was by now in full spate. On 17 September he wrote to Stalin, the very day British and Soviet troops entered Tehran after the Shah's abdication: 'The great prize is Turkey; if Turkey can be gained another powerful army will be available.' And two days later, on the 19th, he wrote to the COS on the 'effect produced upon Turkey by our being able to add two divisions to the forces...thus appreciably increasing the chances of influencing the Turkish action'. The most immediate prize would be getting Turkey to resist German demands for passage of her troops through Anatolia. He added to Stalin on 21 September: 'Effective help would come if Turkey could be induced to resist a German demand for the passage of troops, or, better still, if she should enter the war'. The next day he was addressing the COS: 'It would be well worth Great Britain and Russia revising their arrangements...in order to induce Turkey to come in on our side.' His reading of the Ankara material coincided with his wish to make a sensational contribution to the war effort by a personal visit to Turkey.

But Turkey was pressing ahead with an agreement to supply chromite to Germany to raise much needed foreign currency, and also to maintain the balance of neutrality. The US Secretary of State Cordell Hull was outraged and summoned the Turkish ambassador

33 PRO HW1/64, bj 095419, 6/449, Ankara to Tokyo, decypted 13 September 1941.
34 PRO HW1/64, bj 095417, Sophia to Rome, decypted 13 September 1941.
35 PRO HW1/67, bj 095417, Churchill to Pound, decypted 15 September 1941.
37 Gilbert, op. cit., p.1196.
38 Churchill, op. cit., p.767.
in Washington for an explanation. The demand was deftly passed to Ankara, but in London the Japanese chargé reported to Tokyo that 'Turkey had given in to Germany's vigorous demands. It seems that the British are not actually opposing this though it is against their wishes'. Dr Carl Clodius, the German trade negotiator, upstaged von Papen and conducted his business directly with the Turkish government. The Vichy French ambassador in Ankara (Massigli) learnt 'd'une bonne source j'ai reçu connaissance des négociations avec Dr Clodius et le gouvernement Turc...Les négociations se déroulaient dans une atmosphère cordiale.' Clodius first approached the French, to ask the Turks under 'l'accord du Janvier 1940' to help Germany to get the chromite for steel refining. But this astonishing piece of diplomacy foundered since the accord provided chrome only for Britain and France, and Vichy France was now almost hors de combat, not yet part of the Axis but scarcely neutral. Menemencioglu himself left Istanbul for Ankara to lead the Turkish delegation. The Germans will buy oil, maize, agricultural produce, tobacco, cotton. They will demand manganese, chrome and antimoine. They will make available 75 million Turkish pounds'.

In Berlin, Hitler realised that one strategic option, which included the invasion of Asiatic Turkey, had been aborted by the Royal Navy. The Japanese chargé in Berlin reported on the modest size of the Russian Black Sea Fleet: the German army were contemplating crossing from the Romanian and Bulgarian coasts and landing in the Caucasus in one bound. 'So Turkey's position would be jeopardised...Britain would be compelled to thrust her fleet into the Black Sea and upset Germany's landing scheme...If the German army attacks Turkey the British fleet would force the Straits and enter the Black Sea. As Germany is aware of this, Germany will not at present attack Turkey.'

On the same date Hugessen wrote to his friend Emrys Evans, a prominent Conservative MP:

My main job is to diagnose how far the Turco-German treaty really represents a falling away from the previous stout-hearted policy. If one found oneself unexpectedly surrounded by Huns (as the Turks did in May) one would at least avoid all foolhardiness...they won't throw all away for our beaux yieux.

39 PRO HW1/93, Washington to Ankara, decrypted 26 September 1941. Diplomatic distribution (i.e. MEW, not service ministries, Political Intelligence Division, Department of Trade).
40 PRO HW1/93, London to Tokyo, decrypted 27 September 1941.
41 PRO HW1/79, bj 095665, Vichy to Ankara, decrypted 20 September 1941.
42 PRO HW1/79, bj 095665/795 and 796, Vichy to Ankara, decrypted 20 September 1941.
44 PRO HW1/79, bj 095666, decrypted 20 September 1941.
45 PRO HW1/79, bj 09666, Ankara to Tokyo, decrypted 20 September.
46 PRO HW1/82, bj 095748, Berlin to Tokyo, decrypted 24 September 1941.
47 PRO HW1/79, bj 095666/1609 and 1610. French ambassador to Ankara to Algiers, decrypted 20 September 1941.
Clodius and co. have been here for about a fortnight. We put a big spoke in their wheel over chrome. I hear the Hun delegate is sick as mud.48

On 2 October the Greek chargé in Cairo reported to London:

The Turkish government is disquieted as German action appears imminent, whereas Turkey wishes to stay outside the ring and will ... make many concessions, much more substantial than is generally supposed ... The highest [Turkish army] officers exclude a [quarrel] with Germany ... The Foreign Minister [Numan Menemencioglu] anticipates a German attack ... to justify nonresistance he is putting forward various excuses, such as inadequacy of supplies of war material, and Britain failing to honour the Second Front in the West ... He hopes that by the Spring Russia will be defeated and that the war will thus be brought to an end by negotiation before Turkey is compelled to take part in it.49

On the same day (2 October) De Peppo, the Italian ambassador at Ankara, reported his conversation with Clodius: 'My own impression is that he took some political soundings too, and that he is convinced that Turkey [garbled] to maintain her neutrality against everyone. In the matter of foreign trade, too, Turkey is trying to keep out of either camp, with leanings towards Britain who controls and regulates Turkish trade with herself and the US.' Churchill minuted to Eden: 'This is noteworthy'.50

The next day GCCS circulated an intercept from the German chargé in Stockholm noting that 'the whole world had its eyes on Turkey ... Everyone wishes to win her to his own side. England naturally wishes to see the German and Turkish armies weaken themselves in fighting one another, but Turco-German friendship stands solid. Sweden has understood from this how great a danger Russia, with her desire for a corridor to the open sea, constitutes both for herself and for Europe.'51 On the same day the Japanese ambassador in Ankara spelt out a 12-point scenario for Turkey:

1) Germany will drive to the Caucasus
2) Turkey will keep in step with Germany
3) If Turkey's attitude is ambiguous Germany will exert pressure 'or even try conclusions with them once for all'
4) Germany will [garbled] Turkey in the end so the outlook is not hopeful
5) Britain attaches great importance to Turkey as 'centre of Near Eastern defence'
6) Anglo-Soviet activity in Persia was a sideshow
7) Popular sentiment in Turkey is expecting a breakaway from Britain
8) Britain may demand passage of Soviet aid through Turkey
9) British ships would go through the Straits
10) There could be a joint (Allied) defence in the Caucasus, consisting

48 Typed letter of 24 September, in British Museum, Emrys Evans papers. Hugessen dictated letters and reports to the FO to a Miss Brown, an English lady who thereby performed valuable war work in faraway Ankara. Information from Miss Hugessen.
49 PRO HW1/108, bj 096091/3540, Greek chargé, Cairo to London, decrypted 2 October 1941.
50 PRO HW1/109, bj 096081, Ankara to Rome, decrypted 2 October 1941.
51 PRO HW1/110, bj 096132, Stockholm to Berlin, decrypted 3 October 1941.
of Russia, Britain and Turkey

11) Turkey will lean neither way
12) The British are becoming desperate.52

George Clutton in the Southern Department of the Foreign Office minuted forcefully on 9 October: 'We can only reflect on our folly in refusing the Turkish proposals of 1939-40 that we should take the total chrome output for a period of twenty years'.53

On 10 October, the Japanese ambassador reported from Ankara to Tokyo that Gerede, the Turkish ambassador to Germany admired by Hitler, advised İnönü 'to disregard Anglo-Turkish relations and cooperate with Germany. The President is understood to have accepted his advice on the whole and to have decided to follow an opportunistic policy.' He also reported that two high-ranking Turkish generals had been invited by the Germans to inspect the fighting on the Eastern Front:

...taken in conjunction with the recent German-Turkish joint declaration and trade agreement, this is seen to indicate a tightening of relations between Germany and Turkey. Generally speaking Turkey sees that the outcome of the fighting on the Eastern front is already decided and the collapse of the Soviet is near at hand. Little by little, therefore, she appears to be trying to bring about a rapprochement with the Axis and I have the impression that the feeling is that this attitude has been decided upon earlier than expected.54

This message was repeated to Berlin and Rome. Berlin may have obtained it through the Forschungsamt, who may well have used similar arrangements to the British for reading Ankara-based diplomatic traffic.55

Despite Hitler's relaxed attitude towards Turkey, 'C' reported to Churchill on 10 October that the Turks expected to be invaded by the Germans in the Spring, and on the 19th an intercept contained speculation about a German attack on Suez through Turkey.56 The next day Churchill was writing to Roosevelt about Turkey: 'She may be consolidated in her resistance to Hitler. We do not require Turkey to enter the war aggressively at the present moment, but only to maintain a stolid, unyielding front to German threats and blandishments.'57 His language about Turkey strikingly mirrors that of the German diplomat in Sweden.58 Churchill was well aware, through his intercept reading, of the true state of German global intentions in late 1941: as Oshima reported from Berlin to Tokyo the next day: 'German plans for an invasion of England were still in an active phase. The next

52 PRO HW1/112, bj 096137, Ankara to Tokyo, decrypted 3 October 1941.
53 PRO FO 371/30085, R8965/79/44, Clutton hand-written note of 9 October 1941.
54 PRO HW1/140, bj 096527, Ankara to Tokyo, decrypted 10 October 1941.
55 PRO HW1/112, bj 096137, Ankara to Tokyo, decrypted 3 October 1941. The Germans would not, of course, have had access to the cable facilities of Cable & Wireless in Istanbul, like the British.
58 PRO HW1/110 (7709), bj 096132, Stockholm to Berlin, decrypted 3 October 1941.
step is the overthrow of Britain.' He also reported Hitler and Ribbentrop saying to him that 'Germany is firmly resolved to carry out an invasion of Britain.' Both Hitler and Ribbentrop admired Oshima because he spoke as much for the Japanese army as the Foreign Ministry. They were almost equally impressed by Gerede, the Turkish ambassador in Berlin, summoned to Ankara at the time, so they believed, in ordered to be appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs there. Hitler approved his pro-German stance but noted that Oshima had the more 'militant' mindset. In fact that key job went to Numan Menemencioglu. The report was sent to Ankara as well as Tokyo. Ambassador Hugessen, intent in Ankara on Turkish involvement, asked the Foreign Office on 18 October 'whether German boasts of victory in the East were bluff or not.' An anodyne reply was drafted which the Foreign Office sent to its main ambassadorial clients: Cadogan railed against Turkey's 'timorousness'.

Hitler was still carrying all before him. On 11 November Oshima reported on German plans to shift their Eastern offensive South, to pincer the British in the Mediterranean and enable Spain to take Gibraltar, while on the same day in Ankara, Kurihara reported that Germany would continue South to the Caucasus and 'may send 15-20 divisions from the Balkans to proceed through Turkey and make Turkey the nucleus of their Near Eastern plans of operation'.

The Mediterranean was in fact a side-show for the Germans but mainstream for the Allies. The UK claimed to have 15 divisions in the area but no-one believed them, and the Turks, Iraqis, Persians and Syrians were all turning against Britain, looking for their independence with the whole of the Arab world, under German protection. 'So German troops in the Near East might mean a Moslem uprising and a mortal blow to the British Empire, India and the South Pacific'. The next day Kurihara was less specific about his Turkey-based information on German intentions in the area. 'If Germans cross Turkey ...the consequences would be profound'.

Diplomatic intercepts were providing not only valuable, if sometimes exaggerated, reports of German aggressive plans but equally important observations on the war plans of Britain's inscrutable new ally, the Soviet Union. Changes in the Soviet high command, reported by the Turkish ambassador in Kuibyshev, whither the entire diplomatic community had been moved on 16 October, would not in any other way have been known to Churchill and the COS, since the latter acknowledged that diplomatic intercepts were not

---

59 PRO HW1/159 (7858), bj 096774, Berlin to Tokyo, decrypted 21 October 1941.
60 Trevor-Roper, op. cit., p.546.
62 PRO HW1/206, bj 097561, Ankara to Tokyo, decrypted 11 November 1941, and HW1/207, bj 097604, Berlin to Tokyo, decrypted 12 November 1941: Distribution: DIR/C 3, FO 3, Political Intelligence Department, Admiralty, War Office 3, India Office 2, Air Ministry, Department of Trade, R. Hopkins, Ministry of Economic Warfare 2, Dominions Office, Colonial Office = 21 copies.
63 PRO HW1/207, bj 097604. Ankara to Tokyo, decrypted 12 November 1941.
just their main but their only source of information on the Russian order of battle. And of more immediate urgency than the possibility of an invasion of Turkey was the apparently irresistible surge of Panzer troops through the Ukraine: it was here that the final outcome of hostilities would be determined, as Churchill knew well. On 30 November, his birthday, Churchill annotated a blue jacket: 'Fear. It does not prevent, it may provoke action. But it is a fact all the same'. Who can blame Churchill for thinking of fear on his 67th birthday, with the invasion of England still high on Hitler's agenda?

A fortnight later those fears were finally put to rest by Hitler, who declared war on the USA following the Japanese bombing of the American navy at Pearl Harbor on 7 December. The ring was closed. It was not enough for Japan to be fighting America in the Pacific, particularly as Russia saw no need to join in. It was not enough for Germany and Russia to be at each others' throats in the Ukraine, with the outcome in doubt and the possibility of a separate peace between them an ever-present nightmare. It was enough when Hitler finally overreached himself, and having forced war on both the superpowers, finally ensured that Churchill need no longer brood over his personal fears.

With Turkey now more likely to become a belligerent, the rest of the year saw little change in her position. On December 5 Churchill wrote to Eden: 'The attitude of Turkey becomes increasingly important, both to Russia and Great Britain. The Turkish army of 50 divisions requires air support. We have promised a minimum of 4 and a maximum of 12 fighter squadrons to Turkey in the event of Turkey being attacked'. Kurihara knew of a German study of future operations including 'Plan Orient' -- 'From Bulgaria, if Turkey were acquiescent, a force of 10 divisions...would traverse Anatolia into Syria and Turkey will support the Axis in the Spring'.

Kurihara was wrong. Before Spring came many thousands of German and Russian troops had died of cold, as well as of combat. Singapore fell to the Japanese in February and this took Turkish neutrality again off the agenda. Warfare, even global warfare, is seasonal. If snow and ice make invasion impossible in deep winter, mud makes the passage of non-tracked vehicles impossible throughout most of the spring. The Caucasus and South Russia are amongst the muddiest places on earth and the spring thaw in Russia was in April. Hitler's ambitions were restrained by the weather.

This section has traced Turkey's understanding of neutrality through the autumn of 1941, and has drawn on the early files of DIR/C (HW1) for the differences they indicate in Churchillian historiography between periods when a study of DIR/C can throw light on what he wrote, thought and did, and others periods (e.g. January to February 1942) when

---

64 The DIR/C were sent to the COS, as well as the minutes of the well-sourced Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC, PRO CAB 81). See D. Fraser, Alanbrooke (London: Collins, 1982), p.280.
65 PRO HW1/281, on bj 098360, decrypted 11 November and circulated 30 November 1941.
67 PRO HW1/314, bj 098766, Ankara to Tokyo, decrypted 9 December 1941.
the DIR/C files are unavailable. The section that follows develops this for the early months of 1942.

(iv) Turkish Neutrality and British Disasters, Spring 1942

Churchill's daily reading of diplomatic files and Enigma continued, and from the comparative safety and warmth of Whitehall, the Foreign Office developed its own plans for Turkey. Dixon of the Southern Department listened to the Bulgarian diplomat Gavrilovitch, full of the advantages of a Balkan federation; full, too, 'of tiresome ideas about the future of Europe'.68 This was a subject of increasing interest to the Foreign Office. George Rendel suspected that Russia would take over the Balkans after the war, and Pierson Dixon hoped that Turkey would stay wary of the Soviet Union. Dixon noted Turkish suspicions of Soviet intentions: 'We should pretend to dispel this. We want Turkey to stay wary of Russia'.69 Over both these diplomats loomed the presence of the Deputy Permanent Under Secretary, Sir Orme Sargent, whose views of where Britain should be in world affairs came straight from the Foreign Office policy of about 1910. Looking for the re-establishment of British influence in the post-war Balkans at a time when peace was four years off, and Allied victory by no means certain, suggests a lurking folie de grandeur in the Foreign Office which contrasted with Churchill's instinctive grasping of the moment.70

Reality was different. The British were retreating before the numerically inferior Japanese down the Malay peninsula. Eden failed to charm the Turkish ambassador in London. Churchill ironically marked an intercept which told him that he was about to resign and the British Cabinet would be reconstructed without him.71 On 21 January Hugessen cabled the Foreign Office reporting his talk with President İnönü who was expecting a German attack through Thrace and had authorised many divisions of Turkish soldiers to bivouac there.72 Churchill queried the COS: 'I thought Turkish forces were mainly in Anatolia, not Thrace?' But 40% were manning the borders with Greece and Bulgaria.73 In early February Numan Menemencioglu was reckoned by the Southern Department to be the 'best bargainer the Turks ever had' and 'was reluctant to let slip any chance of extra arms'.74 These messages showed Churchill that the Turkish leadership was

---

68 PRO FO 371/33133, R57/43/67, Dixon, 6 January 1942.
69 PRO FO 371/33133, R474/43/67, Dixon, 8 January 1942.
70 PRO FO 371/33133, R216/43/67, Sargent, 11 January 1942. Sargent was another of Hugessen's confidants, the latter dictating letters to Miss Brown regularly and at length to him, as much to clear his own mind on the appropriate British diplomatic response to Turkey as to inform the Foreign Office.
71 PRO HW1/374 (8611), bj 100577/69, Ankara to Rome, decrypted 27 January 1942; see also Deringil, op. cit., p.61.
73 PRO PREM 3/445/4, PM to COS, January 1942.
74 PRO FO 371/33368, R953/486/44, see comments by Clutton and other officials, 11-15 February 1942.
in a truculent mood, with so many of their forces on the frontier with Greece and Bulgaria, prepared not only to defend Thrace, but if called upon to invade Bulgaria -- an action the Turkish officer class thought both desirable and inevitable.

HW1 is silent from 382 of 23 January to 385 of 23 February. This particular lacuna may have been due to the reorganisation of GCCS which, as has been shown, brought work on diplomatic and commercial messages from Bletchley Park to Berkeley Street, and later Aldford House, serviced by the FO intercept station at Wavendon near Bletchley at the end of February 1942. Cadogan, to whom the diplomatic traffic came directly rather than monitored through BP's 'Director', Menzies, wrote that 12 February was 'the blackest day of the war'. Allied and neutral shipping losses achieved staggering proportions, the British were on the run in Libya, and Singapore was about to fall to the Japanese. So we do not know from the DIR files of the period what the diplomatic community world-wide made of British disasters. It is noteworthy that Pacific affairs always commanded less attention than European affairs in the reports of the diplomats. An event like the dismissal of Mussolini echoed round European chancelleries for months; but a major victory or defeat in the Pacific theatre rarely commanded similar attention, though Allied defeat and eventual success in nearby North Africa did.

In Ankara Turkish neutrality was infringed, allegedly by the Russians, when von Papen and his wife barely survived an assassination attempt. But Hitler felt no need to change his Turkey policy to save his ambassador's dignity. Changes in the top echelon of the Turkish leadership at this time brought no discernible change in the consistency of Turkish foreign policy, so Hugessen was able to write again to the MP Emrys Evans: 'Things here are very calm...the Germans have more important things to think about than attack Turkey...We are not likely to become more than a factor in some general scheme.' But the next day the Japanese ambassador in Sofia reported to Tokyo that Turkey was in a state of extreme anxiety. If Russia is defeated in the west, it can still have Siberia as a stronghold for communist doctrine. The Japanese should take over India while 'others are otherwise occupied' to prevent it falling, via international communism, to Russia.

---

75 Whether this was official withholding or a symptom of the developmental stage of the handling of DIR/C it is difficult to say, but both Hinsley and GCHQ think it is the latter.
76 Private information from A. G. Denniston's pocket diary for 1942. Both aspects of the truncated GCCS -- diplomatic and commercial -- were to flourish from then on, due to the needs of the FO in respect of diplomatic intercepts, and to those of the Ministry of Economic Warfare for updateable economic information, particularly of Spanish exports of tungsten, wolfram and antimony to Germany.
77 Dilks, op. cit., p.433.
78 Typed letter dated 26 March 1942 in British Museum, Emrys Evans papers.
79 PRO HW1/452, bj 102680/82, Sophia to Tokyo, decrypted 27 March 1942. Distribution 20 including Political Intelligence Division.
A day later 'C' sent a significant intercept to Churchill. The Chinese ambassador in Ankara, having reported the assassination attempt on von Papen added: 'Turkish territory will not be subdued by the Germans, but the Germans think that if all goes well Turkey will be surrounded, and will become a second Sweden'. He went on to say that Turkey was hemmed in by the Soviets, and might have to escape by the Dardanelles if Germany occupied the Crimea. Bulgaria would then join in. If British and Soviet troops invaded Turkey, he added, Bulgaria and Germany would enter Turkey: 'German troops are already in Thrace and the Aegean islands. Bulgaria hopes in this way to stop Turkey yielding to the Allies.' In fact Bulgarian troops were never sent beyond the borders of their own country; Hitler respected the traditional historical and religious Slavic entente between Bulgaria and Russia. An intercepted message from the Turkish ambassador in Kuibyshev (read by British and Germans as well as Turks) noted hostile Bulgarian reactions to German demands for Bulgarian troops to replace some of their own casualties on the Eastern front. The Bulgarians would need the troops to defend Bulgaria against the Turks. So the potential Turkish menace pinned valuable divisions, already equipped by the Germans, in Bulgaria when they might have fought the Russians at Stalingrad; and Churchill's instinct about Turkey's key role in Balkan affairs proved sound. These contrasting accounts of the state of Turkish morale suggest Hugessen was too bland, and other ambassadors -- Chinese, Japanese and Turkish -- got closer to the truth.

At the end of March, with the new fighting season due to start, Hitler told his dinner guests: 'I prefer the Turks [to the Romanians]...I would conclude a trade treaty with her, supply her with arms and ammunition, and guarantee the inviolability of the Straits and the integrity of her frontiers, if the Turks had any wish for an alliance with us'. In early April Rommel began his offensive against the British in North Africa. And on 9 April Churchill read that Germany would attack Turkey as part of the Spring offensive, either from the Caucasus or Serbia. Five days later Alanbrooke was reflecting on the consequences of a successful Japanese incursion into the Indian Ocean: 'Germany would get all the oil she required, the Southern route to Russia would be cut, Turkey would be isolated and defenseless.'

This section has traced Turkish foreign policy from January to March 1942. In drawing attention to the differing perceptions of Churchill, the Foreign Office and the COS

80 PRO HW1/456/1311, bj 102371/1191, Ankara to Chungking, and bj 102755/10, Kuibyshev to Ankara, both decrypted 29 March 1942.
81 Dengil, op. cit., p.119.
82 PRO HW1/456, bj 102755, Kuibyshev to Ankara, decrypted 29 March 1942.
83 Trevor Roper, op. cit., p.378.
84 PRO HW1/484/9155, Kuibyshev to Ankara, decrypted 9 April 1942.
85 Churchill, op. cit., Vol. 4, p.284, quoting the comprehensive memorandum prepared by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, 'Operations in Western Europe' of April 1942.
to Turkey, it concludes that only Churchill had the sheer energy to continue to struggle for a meaningful Turkish alliance, despite the terrible news he was receiving from the Admiralty, from Libya and from the Far East. Throughout the period, his reading of bjs concentrated his mind on this matter, though the lack of bjs in the earlier part of the period is unfortunate. The next section shows how this energy was channelled into his attempts to persuade his colleagues and the other Allies that he should make a personal approach to the Turkish leadership.

(v) Turkish Friendship Sought

Churchill's depression at the course of events culminating in the surrender at Singapore on 12 February 1942 is palpable all through this period. The Japanese rout of British arms signalled the end of Empire, and Churchill was an imperialist. A perceptive American historian of Churchillian war strategy noticed Churchill's frequent inexplicable bouts of pessimism at this time. This could well have been brought on by his compulsive reading of bjs. Writing in 1959, nearly 20 years before the breaking of the Ultra secret, Higgins's analysis of Allied strategy in 1942 remarkably anticipates the release of the most secret source and shows that history and historical perceptions are not greatly changed by the discovery of new sources, however clandestine and exciting. The same can be said for the Official Historians' account of Churchillian strategic planning and activity in the Eastern Mediterranean from 1941-43. Both draw substantially on Churchill's own history. Churchill's disingenuous claims for his history are prominently displayed in volume 5 (Closing the Ring): 'I do not seek to do more than make a contribution to history from the standpoint of the British Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. In this, my directives, telegrams and minutes, written at the time and not in the afterlight are my stepping stones'. With hindsight, he can be said to have underestimated the influence his history would exercise on the work of subsequent historians, both official and revisionist.

Due perhaps to the very scale of British disasters in the Spring of 1942, Turkish friendship rose high once again on Churchill's agenda. On 17 April he invited the Turkish ambassador to accompany him to Washington, to facilitate the movement of American Lease-Lend matériel and equipment to Turkey. DIR/C files came to him there from 'C' at the rate of 2 and sometimes 3 a day. Turkey was deeply impressed by German successes


88 Italics added.

89 PRO HWI/497 of 15 April 1942: 'I shall shortly be going to America. Will you be willing to accompany me?' The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Ankara immediately concurred (Distribution to Director (Menzies) and Churchill only).
in the Balkans and South Russia and by 21 April the Foreign Office read with some scepticism that Turkey would offer to mediate between Britain and Germany if Germany won the spring offensive towards the Caucuses. Military talks were going on between the Turks and British in Ankara. The British learnt that Marshal Chakmak's deputy was pro-Axis, but nonetheless the Turks would not want either Germany or Britain to invade the Dodecanese, though they would accept a Greek takeover from the Italians. On 21 April the Foreign Office explained why it was hanging on to Turkey: Turkey's position is of extreme delicacy and complexity. A fundamental factor is Turco-Soviet relations, and bearing thereon on Anglo-Soviet relations, a subject outside the sphere of the Minister of State (Harold Macmillan). Turco-American relations become increasingly important, and the complete picture is only visible in London.  

Throughout April bjs tracked Turkish reactions to Axis successes and to counteract these, a party of Turkish journalists, fresh from a visit to Germany, was invited to Britain in May. The project was Eden's, and Hugessen was hesitant. Dixon thought the idea 'excellent' if the Prime Minister would agree to be part of the programme. The Turkish party was impressed by the Minister of Food, Lord Woolton, and the RAF, as well as factory managers in Glasgow. The audience with Churchill, however, was a disappointment. He reminisced about World War One with a veteran Turkish journalist and failed to notice his audience at all. The Turks were also unimpressed by former appeasers such as the Astors, but approved of Eden. But on their return they said they were sure the Allies would win and Menemencioglu thought they came back too pro-British.

Deringil observes that it was essential for Germany to neutralise Turkey when attacking Russia. The main Axis offensive did not start until 28 June, when the Germans defeated the Russians in the Kharkov offensive, and the Anglo-Soviet Twenty-Year Mutual Assistance Treaty was signed in London by Eden and Molotov, so Turkey realised that if she had to fight Russia she would have to fight Britain too. The Portuguese ambassador in Ankara, who thought that a Russian victory would entail the bolshevisation of Europe, reported that 'to avoid the triumph of Russia Turkey would sacrifice everything, even the British alliance'. But the Turkish Foreign Ministry the same day assured its diplomats

---

91 Italics added. PRO PREM 3/446/10, p. 513.
92 PRO FO 371/33403, R5067/3458/G44, V. G. Lawford minuted on 26 August: 'The Prime Minister is the symbol of the national war effort in Turkish eyes, and a personal glimpse of their hero would undoubtedly 'make' their visit to this country'. Dixon minuted: 'excellent'. The PM interview did not last more than 1/4 of an hour. He and M. Yalin spoke to each other in French, on World War One, Enver and Atatürk. Yalin asked that Turkey should be at the peace conference. 'The PM's reply satisfied the Turks less than Eden's interview'.
93 Deringil, op. cit., p 117.
95 PRO HW1 563, bj 104279, Ankara to Lisbon, decrypted 11 May 1942.
abroad that ‘everyone is friendly, despite the recent bomb trial. [The attempt on the Papens’ lives.] Our country is completely calm, united round our national leader’. 96

Churchill, now at odds with Eden and the Foreign Office, wanted to offer matériel, 'a large, simple offer'. He roundly attacked Eden’s foreign policy.97 Both the Southern Department and Churchill were following Turkish sensitivities day by day, and the record showed he was wavering himself. Though he wrote to Eden: 'I have proposed a practical and hopeful policy towards Turkey and I should be grateful if you would address your mind to this,' an intercept on 22 May bears Churchill’s comment on that he was 'not too sure of the Turks'.98

HW1/596-9 of 25 May all show diplomatic speculation on Britain and the USA planning the invasion of Turkey but whether this was based on hope, or fear, or disinformation, or a successful war of nerves by Germany, or a combination of all, is difficult to determine. Certainly there is no evidence that the COS ever developed even a feasibility study of a full-scale invasion, which would have gone against all their instincts. And equally the Turks themselves were certainly not unduly alarmed: when the Turkish ambassador in Madrid was warned by his Italian colleague about British designs on Turkey with the words ‘the British will start a military action against our country,’ his reply was ‘propaganda’.99

British reverses remained the main concern of neutral and Axis diplomats. Churchill and those in the Southern Department who studied Turkish reactions picked up the diplomatic networking based on Ankara. On 21 June Tobruk fell, with a resonance throughout all the Mediterranean countries, not least in Turkey, whose admiration of German military efficiency proved justified. The Turks now began to doubt the wisdom of unconditional friendship with the British. The Chinese ambassador in Ankara reported that ‘Turkey's desire was to remain neutral and independent. The British had lost control of the Mediterranean so the Axis powers could get to Suez without using Turkey’.100 At the same time the Portuguese ambassador in Ankara reported on the problems facing Turkey if Germany conquered Egypt: ‘The Turks are great realists.’ The Axis has not decided about Turkey but ‘Turkey must declare herself soon’.101 On 3 July Rommel halted his 400-mile advance at El Alamein in the face of the Eighth Army's fierce resistance, but Turkey was by

96 PRO HW1 563, bj 104284, Ankara to all stations, decrypted 11 May 1942. İnönü proved the best survivor of the lot and was still active in Turkish politics until the 1970s.
97 Churchill, op. cit., Vol. 4, p.769; see also PRO PREM 3/446/8, PM to Eden, 12 May 1942: 'Your last sentence leads swiftly to our usual conclusion, viz. to do nothing.' Eden thought Churchill was attacking him because he thought saying anything to the Turks was risky. Churchill tried to pacify him by pointing out he had said 'our' not 'your' — i.e. the Foreign Office. It was not difficult to see through this as brazen flannel -- the puzzle is why Eden appears not to have done this.
98 PRO HW1/577, Madrid to Ankara, decrypted 17 May 1942; and PRO HW1/589/9555, Madrid to Ankara, decrypted 22 May 1942; PRO PREM 3/446/8, PM to Eden, 22 May 1942.
99 PRO HW1/631, bj 105334, Madrid to Ankara, decrypted 17 May 1942.
100 PRO HW1/689, bj 106218, Ankara to Chunking, decrypted 2 July 1942.
101 PRO HW1/700, bj 106356, Ankara to Lisbon, decrypted 5 July 1942.
now feeling the full weight of German pressure. On 7 July the Japanese ambassador in Istanbul (Kurihara) reported that 'Turkey is shilly-shallying and heading for friendlessness... Since the fall of Tobruk Turkey was dismayed at the sudden change in the war situation, and seemed to be considerably agitated, and it is generally thought that there would be some change shortly.' Neither Churchill nor the Foreign Office would have been pleased to read Kurihara reporting that 'I think we [the Japanese] should lean on Turkey because the Prime Minister and Cakmak [marshal of all Turkish armed forces] have for a long time advocated co-operation with Germany, so Turkey getting closer to the Axis may not be difficult.' He had spoken to von Papen who observed that Turkey reacted badly to pressure, but would give some pledge to Germany 'when a suitable opportunity arose'.

In Sofia the same diplomatic reactions were expressed, as also in Madrid and Vichy, where the German representative pressed both Turkish and Hungarian ambassadors about their countries' attitudes towards Axis Mediterranean successes. On 17 July the Turkish military attaché in Washington reported that '1942 was the year of the Axis powers. The British have been heavily defeated. The Americans have no experience of a shooting war, and there is no unified Anglo-US command.' The German offensive in the East looked unstoppable. The Portuguese ambassador in Stockholm reported that the Germans, whose summer offensive had begun on 28 June, were close to reaching the Volga, thus threatening the Caucasus through Rostov-on-Don and cutting off Russia from her oil supply. The threatened people of Asia Minor (including the Turks) do not like this joining up of German armies in Russia with those in Egypt. Would Germany go for a separate peace with Russia? Germany would in any event retain the territories captured from Russia (Churchill marked this with an !).

On 26 July the Turkish ambassador in Cairo reported to Ankara that British failures against the Germans put Alexandria under threat. The new 'generation of [British] tank commanders were not as good as the old ones'. In the event of defeat Britain would flood Egypt and withdraw to the Nile. On 30 July Kurihara reported the Turkish view of the Russian plight. He reported that the Russian army was said to be near to collapse. Stalin had gone to the front to shoot generals. Stalin meanwhile sent Maisky to Churchill to demand a second front immediately. A week later the

---

102 PRO HWI/706, bj 106428, Ankara to Tokyo, decrypted 7 July 1942. Kurihara was ordered to stay in Istanbul and not move to Ankara, reflecting Japanese preference for the international information available in the former capital.
103 PRO HWI/718, bj 106618, Sophia to Tokyo, decrypted 11 July 1942; PRO HWI/746, bj 106837, Sophia to Tokyo, decrypted 17 July 1942; PRO HWI/721, bj 106684, Madrid to Tokyo, decrypted 12 July 1942; and PRO HWI/729, bj 106754, Vichy to Ankara, decrypted 14 July 1942.
105 PRO HWI/793, bj 117213, Stockholm to Lisbon, decrypted 26 July 1942: 'I was told from an official source that the Reich would accept [group missing 'peace'] based on the status quo conditional however on Germany's retention of the territories captured from Russia.'
106 PRO HWI/793, bj 107221, Cairo to Ankara, 26 July 1942, reporting Sarajolu's far ranging thoughts: 'please keep the whole conversation absolutely secret.'
107 PRO HWI/804, bj 107357, Ankara to Tokyo, decrypted 30 July 1942.
Turkish ambassador in Kuibyshev reported to Ankara that the Russians were at last consolidating their positions behind the Don. On July 29 the new Italian ambassador in Ankara reported his talk with Saraçoglu. Turkey intended to remain neutral despite the propaganda efforts of British agents. Turkey will 'defend her frontiers without asking for help from the Axis, if Britain decides to open up another front [on the coasts of Turkey]' . 'Turkey could no longer be indifferent towards the Arab movement', Saraçoglu had continued: 'Turkey would abandon the policy of absenteeism towards the Arabs, adopted by Atatürk...Turkey shared common origins with Muslim Arabs...This need not worry the Axis.' Saraçoglu begged his visitor to use discretion in relaying these far-ranging thoughts: 'keep the whole conversation absolutely secret'. That interview gave the Foreign Office, and Churchill, new insight into the mind of the Turkish leadership: not just the frankness or the indiscretion, but the possibility of a recrudescence of Panturanism -- the longing for the great days of Turkish power, through a new approach to the Arab world, already half seduced by Hitler's successes. Later Cadogan report a meeting with Eden: 'Turks are most awful brigands. We daren't threaten them -- we can't bribe them.'

The Foreign Office had no divisions to implement its policy. It could only listen, ruminate, squabble and recommend in balanced paragraphs of faultless prose which infuriated Churchill, himself no mean stylist. On 24 August the Turkish ambassador in Berlin reported a renewal of Turco-German friendship over lunch with Hitler. On 31 August Clutton minuted that Turkish neutrality meant having a foot in both camps but with one more firmly placed than the other: 'This is the policy which Bismarck called re-insurance and what Menemencioglu calls active neutrality'.

The Southern Department had known for at least five months that Turkey was being heavily bribed by Germany. As far back as March the Foreign Office had known that the Axis have been offering neighbouring territories to Ankara. A German diplomat in Ankara expected that the Turks would demand Syria, Aleppo and Mosul. On 22 June Clutton wrote: 'quite likely the Turks have territorial aspirations in the Aegean islands, but unless they play a more active part in the war they are unlikely to see them realised'. On 9 September the same official summarised Turkish territorial ambitions: 'We may see Turkish claims to a rectification of the Turco-Persian frontier, and in Bulgaria similar adjustments south of Burgas....The Turks undoubtedly expect to receive a major portion of the

108  PRO HWI/814, bj 107585, Kuibyshev to Ankara, decrypted 5 August 1942.
109  PRO HWI/793, bj 107221, Cairo to Ankara, decrypted 26 July 1942.
111  PRO HWI/833499), bj 108167, Berlin to Ankara, decrypted 24 August 1942. There are no less than 23 bjs in this one DIR file; copies of all of them were sent to Washington.
112  PRO FO 371/33376, R5472/810/44, Clutton to Department, 31 August 1942.
113  PRO FO 371/33312, R4087/24/44, Clutton hand-written minute, 22 June 1942.
Dodecanese and would also like Mosul'. They were, moreover, angry at British failure to deliver matériel as agreed, and Rauf Orbay, the controversial but long-serving Turkish ambassador in London, asked to see Churchill rather than Eden, since Churchill was seen to be the more emollient of the two. The ambassador expressed his worry that Turkey was not being treated as a full ally. There was straight talk of less than complete mutual confidence. On 12 September Orbay reported that London was at last expediting the war deliveries. Russian Ambassador Ivan Maisky, sitting next to him in the House of Commons Visitors' Gallery, whispered, 'There are new dangers facing Turkey.' This view was expressed more graphically by Oshima in Berlin cabling Tokyo that 'the link between Europe and Asia must be perfected, opening the road over which Japan and Germany may mutually fulfill their economic duties.' The anti-British struggle in India was intensifying, as means to that end.

Japan's ambition to march across North India and join the victorious German armies in the oil-rich plains of Persia seemed close to realisation. On 14 September Berkeley Street intercepted, processed and circulated a brief report from the Turkish ambassador in Berlin to Ankara: 'According to a reliable source Rommel [is] going to attack in a week's time.' This dramatic confirmation of Enigma indicators arrived on the same day that the Turks received confirmation of American foreign policy towards Turkey. The Greek chargé in Ankara had talked with the former US Presidential candidate Wendell Willkie and Erkin of the Turkish Foreign Ministry. Willkie made six points:

- importance of Turco/US relations
- allied victory certain
- USA will be involved in the postwar settlement of Europe
- Turkish foreign policy is approved of by the President
- the allies will win in Egypt, despite setbacks
- More matériel is to come to Turkey direct from USA under the Lend-Lease agreement.

---

114 Deringil, op. cit., pp.140-1; PRO FO/33395, R5618/2713/44, Clutton, 9 September 1942. 44 is the FO code for Turkey.
115 PRO HW1/869, bj 108656, London to Ankara, 28 August 1942. The day before British diplomatic cryptanalysis broke the 'Floradora' (German diplomatic) cipher and passed the results to Adcock of Berkeley Street to process for the FO. Professor Frank Adcock, a veteran cryptographer and long-term friend and associate of Denniston's, moved with him (and many others) to Berkeley Street in February 1942. Adcock later became Professor of Ancient History at Cambridge. See P. W. Filby, in *Intelligence and National Security* Vol. 6, No 3. (1988), pp.272-84, which is the definitive article on Berkeley Street's war work. See also Martin Gilbert, *Winston S. Churchill: The Road to Victory 1941-1945* (London: Heinemann, 1986), p. 869.
117 PRO HW1/929, bj 109491, Berlin to Tokyo, decrypted 27 September 1942.
118 PRO HW1/895(707), bj 14518, Berlin to Ankara, decrypted 14 September 1942. This is an early appearance of a second number on a bj. This number (typed rather than rubber-stamped as the main number invariably was) was the office number given to reassure recipients that they had a complete set of records of intercepts sent from one particular station, e.g. Ankara, to another, e.g. Tokyo.
120 PRO HW1/896, bj 109039/444, Ankara to Cairo, decrypted 14 September 1942.
This important démarche by a leading American politician, who travelled at the express wish of the President, did not include the Soviet Union. Erkin (Secretary General) was pleased and said that this was 'a measure of Turkey's distrust of Soviet designs'. The next day the Turkish foreign ministry distributed its observations on the Willkie visit to all Turkish diplomatic representatives abroad. Willkie had praised Turkish foreign policy as 'straightforward and loyal' (English word used).  

In October 1942 allied victories were imminent or accomplished in the Pacific, in North Africa, and on the Eastern Front, while the German and Japanese war machines were temporarily stalled. German relations with Turkey still remained friendlier than Churchill and the Foreign Office intended, or than the Americans and Russians understood. This was because the Hitler/von Papen axis put forward a simple and acceptable theorem to the Turkish leadership, and stuck to it: 1) Stay neutral; 2) If you allow the British to persuade you to allow them air bases to bomb the Romanian oil installations, you will no longer be a neutral; and 3) In that event we will bomb Istanbul and its environs, and for you the war will be over.

At this point Churchill pushed for his personal intervention in Turkish affairs: he continued his pressure on Eden: 'I am after the Turk: I am not after your chrome...I am much disappointed at the way the gift I got with so much trouble has been marred by this verbose ambassador' [i.e. Hugessen]. Four days before, Churchill had written at length to his younger colleague about what he thought was Hugessen's inept handling of the Turkish matter: 'In the picture I make to myself of the Turk, comradeship and generosity, the impression of power and resources, are what will count'. The chromite affair, conducted by the Foreign Office via the Embassy at Ankara, had obscured this simple vision of a strong Turco-British war comradeship. 'I took great pains to get the tanks etc. ...the gift of arms from Britain to Turkey is meant as a token of comradeship and comprehension'. Later, on 5 November, Churchill again wrote sarcastically to Eden: 'Although the world war is proceeding with diverse episodes of interest cropping up from time to time, the entire politics of the Foreign Office with Turkey are expressed in the one word 'chrome'. I thought you told me you were going to wind this up but your pertinacious secretariat and your verbose ambassador continue to wear out the cipher staff and aggravate the paper shortage, to say nothing of wearing out my eyesight by endless disputation'. He added in his own handwriting, 'Don't let the military get out of giving the 200 tanks on the score that the Turks can't (sic) digest them. You know how my mind is working'. He repeated his urgings to 'press on' and instructed: 'we should send off 300 instructors for delivered tanks as fast as the Turks can take them, Middle East must face up to this'.

121 PRO HW1//896, bj 109039/446, Ankara to Cairo, decrypted 14 September 1942.
122 PRO PREM 3/446/8, Churchill to Eden, 12 October 1942.
123 Ibid.
In Ankara, Hugessen and his team sang 'chrome sweet chrome'. He represented the policy of the Foreign Office, which was proving inadequate for the job Churchill had in mind. He wrote regularly to 'Moley' Sargent about Turkey. He was having a difficult time, he was doing his best, he worked hard for Turkish trust and friendship, he liked, and was liked by, the Turks; but perhaps in a world of state presidents and large armies, of looming global disasters, of international operators like von Papen and Churchill, he was the weak Southern Department link in a chain drawing Turkey towards the Allied camp. Churchill's antipathy to Hugessen's handling of the chrome issue may have been more influential in differentiating Churchill's policy from that of the Department than was outwardly apparent. But Hugessen was always on very good terms with his Foreign Office confrères, and many of his staff in Ankara had already served their time in the Southern Department, so Hugessen in Ankara was simply an extension of Foreign Office Turkey policy, but more directly exposed than the Southern Department to Churchillian tantrums and Turkish wiles.

Churchill records his own efforts to play the Turkey hand in his war memoirs. His most recent conference with the other Big Two (in Moscow, 12 August 1942) established an order of priority in order to win the war: 1) knock Italy out of the war; 2) bring Turkey into the war; and 3) give the Axis no respite for recuperation. Since the first item was ongoing and the third no more than a rallying cry, the high priority Turkey now assumed in Allied thinking confirms the thesis that Turkey was now playing a key role in Churchill's European war picture. He records 'a ceaseless flow of weapons and equipment to Turkey'. He told Stalin he had told Roosevelt about Turkey and how he should play the Turkish hand, and Stalin responded appropriately, if unspecifically. 'Now he wrote 'I wished to clinch the matter' by making a personal appearance on Turkish soil to force a Turkish imbroglio. The exact shape of the project varied a little according to circumstances,' wrote Elisabeth Barker, that most sensitive of World War Two diplomatic historians, in her study of Churchill and Eden at War. 'When in January 1943 [Churchill] made an impromptu dash to Turkey to persuade the Turkish leaders to think hard about entering the war, and wanted to overcome their fears of the Russians overrunning the Balkans, he was inspired to set down his 'Morning Thoughts' and to communicate them to the Turks'.

---

124 His staff in Ankara was of high calibre, especially John Stemdale Bennett and Knox Helm. The latter was a career diplomat who had come up the hard way in the Levant Consular Service, eventually to become the last Governor General of the Sudan. But the Foreign Office thought his views on pressurising Turkey too radical.

125 These letters were certainly not part of the 'Cicero' corpus, as already shown he dictated them to an English secretary, Miss Brown, who would have put them into the diplomatic bag before they got back to the ambassadorial residence. See Hugessen's notes on Cicero, Moyzisch and 'his period of some difficulty', kindly lent to me by his daughter.

126 There are no files of DIR/C between numbers 929 and 1107, which may go some way towards explaining the dearth of PRO HW1 intercepts during the latter half of 1942.

that, however, Attlee and Eden both tried to stop him, for different and in Eden's case complex reasons. Eden resented Churchill's forays into British foreign policy making, which robbed him of the chance of an appearance on the world stage while marginalising his own attempts to conduct an active anti-Axis foreign policy. But Churchill was in his persuasive child mode and cajoled them by saying, ' if the Turks were afraid to come I should not feel at all rebuffed'. For a while his Cabinet colleagues withstood his charm offensive and Churchill 'got quite upset...as I lay on my luxurious bed in the Villa Taylor [at Casablanca] looking at the Atlas mountains over which I longed to leap in the 'Commando' aeroplane, which awaited me so patient and contented on the airfield'.

In Turkey there were internal as well as external pressures on the leadership. John Stemdale Bennett reported in Foreign Office diplomatic cipher on Saraçoglu's account of Turkey's economic conditions, and evidence of rising anti-Semitism there. The iniquitous wealth tax penalising foreigners and traders was introduced. The Foreign Office monitored the effects of the tax, which included forced labour for some evaders and ancient foes -- rich, vulnerable, non-Moslem, mainly Greek, particularly Greek orthodox churchmen -- as the chief victims. The cost of keeping a million men in training and under arms was growing prohibitive. Saraçoglu rightly said they had ceased to be producers and had become consumers, by leaving their farms and joining the army. Oliver Harvey, by now Eden's private secretary, noted:

Churchill, Eden told me, is wildly in favour of roping Turkey in and of entering Europe from her end. He even mentioned this to Maisky yesterday . . . I told AE on thinking it over, whatever the military merits, to bring Turkey in would involve enormous political troubles. It would arouse the worst suspicions of Soviet Russia and it would be doubtful if she and Turkey could be prevented from fighting each other. Russia is always suspicious of Turkey and would think we intended by this means to counteract her influence in the Balkans. On the other hand, the Greeks would be upset because they would fear for their islands. The Turks would prove grasping Allies.

Eden replied that though Greece must certainly get her islands [the Dodecanese] this time it was the PM's idea to give the Turks nothing at all.

Neutral opinion, as expressed in bjs, was slow to change. The Portuguese ambassador in Ankara reported on 17 November that the ruling classes there 'greatly fear a German defeat, Soviet predominance, and the bolshevisation of Europe.' But the Japanese ambassador in Rome observed that though Turkey's attitude is open to criticism...it is not

---

129 See generally PRO FO 371/37400, R569/7/44 to R991/7/44, 19 January 1943 - 4 February 1943. In fact there was little to be done about individual cases but pressure from both Allied and Axis countries combined to induce İnönü to rescind the Tax law in October 1944.
thought that she, fearful as she is of the power of the USSR, will depart from her neutrality straightaway.¹³¹

This chapter has followed Churchill and the Foreign Office's concerns with Turkey from September 1941 to November 1942, the period in which Germany for the most part remained triumphant, with neutral opinion conservatively reserving judgement on the eventual outcome of the war: respectful of Germany, frightened of the Soviet Union's capacity to spread the Bolshevik plague into places hitherto uncontaminated with it, worried about Britain's failure to perform on the field of battle. It has examined Churchill's unavailing efforts to get others to persuade Turkey into the war when bjs came on stream but when military events were going strongly against Britain, in the Balkans, the Mediterranean, the Ukraine, North Africa, the Far East, and at sea. It has shown why Turkey, along with other major non-aligned powers, found it so difficult to respond effectually to the Allies' call to unite against the global Axis menace, and why German victories in the West went so far to destabilise current diplomatic and strategic attitudes to the world conflict. It thus shows that signals intelligence alone, however relevant and useful, cannot in total war match in effectiveness the successful prosecution of a military campaign or combined operation. Though without it British military planning would have lacked the vital ingredient of firsthand knowledge of the enemy's intentions and capabilities, yet even with it in good working order, as Bletchley Park proved itself to have been from June 1940 onwards, victory for Allied arms was a long way off in 1942.

¹³¹ PRO HW1/1107, bj 110939, Rome to Tokyo, decrypted 16 November 1942 and bj 111188/690, Rome to Tokyo, decrypted 16 November 1942.
Chapter Five

ADANA AND AFTER

(i) The Road to Adana: January 1943  (ii) Why Churchill Failed  
(iii) Consequences: The Foreign Office and the Record

'He had the feeling that the time had come to cash in on the Russian victories, and on the favourable turn of events in the Mediterranean, and to nail Turkey to the mast...He felt that a talk between him and the Turkish president would show the world clearly which way the wind was blowing.'

Ian Jacob, December 1942: JACB 1/16 p.94 in Churchill College Cambridge

This chapter traces Churchill’s attempts, culminating at Adana at the end of January 1943, to persuade Turkey to join the Allies at a time when the military situation in the Soviet Union and North Africa, and the war at sea, had all after many perilous months improved. It also attempts to analyse the reasons why Churchill failed, and why his reading of diplomatic decrypts during this period (with the exception of the conference at Adana itself, when bjs could not be produced for security reasons) sheds light on both aspects of his endeavours.

By February 1943 the tide of war was beginning to turn against the Axis; in the Pacific, the Japanese had lost initiative to the Americans after Midway and Guadalcanal; in Africa the British had taken Tripoli, and in Russia the Soviet Army had just forces von Paulus to capitulate at Stalingrad. Churchill wrote at length to the Chiefs of Staff about Turkey: 'A supreme and prolonged effort must be made to bring Turkey into the war in the Spring...Turk must be won if proper measures are taken. Turkey is an Ally...She has a great desire to be well armed. Her army is in good order, except for the specialised modern weapons in which the Bulgarians have been given so great an advantage by the Germans'.

Recent Allied successes in Egypt, Cyrenaica and, above all, Soviet army triumphs in the Caucasus, had rendered pointless Turkey's successful dodging of her obligations hitherto. It was now possible to build up a powerful British land and air force to assist the Turks...[who] all through the winter from now on must be equipped from Egypt and from the United States with tanks, Anti-Tank and Anti-Aircraft guns, and active construction of airfields must be undertaken...Experts must be provided to assist the Turks in learning to use and maintain this material.' He repeated, 'A ceaseless flow of weapons and equipment

---

must go to Turkey'. He also wrote to Stalin: 'A new Allied effort to get Turkey in' would 'help Russia by opening the shipping routes on the Black Sea and bomb the Roumanian oilfields at Ploesti.' Stalin agreed.

Elsewhere threats to Spanish as well as Turkish neutrality were being expressed: 'The Axis will take Gibraltar or invade Turkey.' In London these two possibilities were canvassed by the Turkish ambassador: 'Turkey would resist with arms...Turkey believes the neutrals coming into the war depends at present more on the wishes and plans of the belligerents than on our respective governments'. The Turkish stance on entering the war was further commented on by Yamaji, the Japanese ambassador in Sofia. Kurihara in Ankara reported that the Turkish administration knew 'territorial aggrandisement was more a burden than a benefit' and would not be tempted to enter the war by offers of this sort by either side. Turkey would 'be an ally of no-one'. But Papen was reported as saying the Germans would not be rash enough to invade either Turkey or Spain. In Ankara the Japanese Ambassador Kurihara reported no change in Turkey's attitude: 'The Allies would occupy Turkish airfields without warning; bomb the Balkan oilfields while Germany was concentrating on the Eastern front'. He also reported a plot to oust İnönü from the Turkish Presidency and install a pro-Allied administration. The İnönü Government, he added, 'reckoned that if Turkey comes into the war the Axis will without delay carry out an advance from Bulgaria and Greece, and gain control of Western Turkey'.

What became of this coup attempt is not known and İnönü himself never displayed any worry about his own position as virtual dictator. On 1 December he was re-elected President. Hitler was among the first to congratulate him. At the Foreign Office Clutton doubted whether he deserved a similar message from King George VI, but eventually that too was despatched. The next day Kurihara commented on Turkey's traditional self-esteem. Oshima reported from Berlin that Germany saw no need to invade Turkey. This was confirmed to British decrypt readers by Yamaji in Sofia reporting on 11 December about Bulgarian preparations to defend herself should she be attacked from Turkey: 'It was not wise for Germany to seek out new enemies'. Saraçoğlu had told Germany that Turkey was the ally of Britain but now he was no-one's ally: 'Turkey relies on herself'.

---

2 Ibid., p.625.
3 PRO HW/1125(1449), bj 111327, London to Ankara, decrypted 20 November 1942.
5 PRO HW/1145, bj xxx, Ankara to Tokyo, decrypted 24 November 1942; also PRO HW/1148, Sophia to Tokyo, and PRO HW/1156, Ankara to Tokyo, decrypted 26 November 1942; and PRO HW/1164, bj 111398, decrypted 27 November 1942; also PRO HW/1171/383, decrypted 27 November 1942.
6 PRO HW/1178, bj 111713, and HW/1142, bj 111451, Ankara to Tokyo, decrypted 30 November 1942.
7 PRO FO 371/37491, R2136/123/44, Clutton, 10 March 1942, and correspondence between Sir Alexander Hardinge, the King's Private Secretary and the FO.
8 PRO HW/1182, bjis 111767, 70, 71, 78, Ankara to Tokyo, decrypted 2 December 1942; PRO HW/11210, bj 112093/249, Sophia to Tokyo, decrypted 2 December 1942.
9 PRO HW/1182, bj 111767, 70, 71/383 (Kurihara).
Despite all this Churchill had been persisting in his shotgun wedding approach to Turkey. He told Stalin on 24 November that the Allies 'needed a new effort to have Turkey enter the war on our side.' The Prime Minister considered that 'an Anglo-Soviet guarantee of territorial integrity should be offered Turkey, and much equipment. A large Allied army assembling in Syria could help Turkey if the Axis attacked her, and your operations in the Caucasus or north of it may also exercise a great influence'. The consequences would include more effective bombing of the Romanian oilfields.

Surprisingly in these evident half-truths, blandishments and hopes as yet unfulfilled, Stalin acquiesced. On 28 November he had replied that everything possible should be done to get Turkey in. 'This would be of great importance in order to accelerate the defeat of Hitler and his accomplices.' There seems more politics than conviction in this exchange of views on Turkey, and anyway the Soviets had too much else to worry about. By 20 December Kurihara reported from Ankara that German circles 'here are considering a passage through Turkey by force but I understand that as a result of the most thorough investigations they have reached the conclusion that, owing to topographical conditions in Anatolia, inadequacy of communications and various other difficulties which they foresee, a move southward from the Caucasus would actually be a short cut and an easier route [i.e. to Egypt]. Germany considered the Western Allies had no intention of laying hands on Turkey for the time being: 'but it is impossible to ignore the infiltration of US/UK influence into the Turkish army, the construction of airfields and roads with the guidance and collaboration of British and American engineer officers already present all the appearance of preparation for joint operations'. Another bj of the same date from Oshima shows Ribbentrop assuring him that 'this was not the time to go out of one's way to turn Turkey into an enemy'.

John Sterndale Bennett wrote to Sargent on 18 December, giving his appreciation of Turkish public opinion towards what all felt to be the coming war. In the Kayseri area an aircraft factory manager told his informant that 'undoubtedly Turkey would be in the war by May 1943', and that this belief was general. 'Turkey would settle affairs with Bulgaria in the Spring, but reckoned there was no danger of an invasion of Thrace by Germany.' 'Coming into the war' was the main topic of mess talk. Aggressive gestures towards the inveterate enemy Bulgaria were soon to be superseded by more defensive and more fearful thoughts -- about the newly successful bearlike neighbour to the North East -- the Soviet Union.

All through this period Churchill's mind would have concentrated on Allied shipping losses in the U-boat war. But on 15 December GCCS broke the four-rotor key.

---

11 Ibid., p. 622.
12 PRO HW1/1240, bj 112341 and 369/400, Ankara to Tokyo, decrypted 20 December 1942, bj 112341/369 and 112370, Berlin to Tokyo, decrypted 20 December 1942.
13 PRO FO 371/37465, R56/55/G44, Sterndale Bennett to Sargent, 18 December 1942.
SHARK, so the blackout on U-boat traffic was lifted and the only major impediment to eventual Allied victory was removed.14 1942 was the year which might have seen Turkey enticed by Churchill out of the arms of Germany. Increasing Allied success on all fronts should have pointed the way. Yet, curiously, the Turks derived little comfort from the battering Germany was getting in the Caucasus and the Ukraine, while the eclipse of Italy in the Mediterranean signalled less the departure of one menace, and more the arrival of another one, Britain. Germany, with one shrewd diplomatic move orchestrated by von Papen, Ribbentrop and Hitler, paralysed Turkey's wish to join the eventual winner for another two years of war by pointing out that allowing Britain landing rights for her combat aircraft on Turkish soil would be construed in Berlin as an act of war that would bring immediate retribution on Istanbul. Eden's view of Turkey had deteriorated still further: 'The Turks seem to be playing pretty double even for them...Is it not time that we were a bit rough?'15 But Churchill, released at last from his overriding worry about the war at sea, had more precise plans for Turkey in his mind.

1942-43 saw a milder winter than 1941-1942 and more diplomatic activity. The build-up to Churchill's stay on Turkish soil produced a flood of diplomatic decrypts which dominate DIR/C through much of 1943. Differences again emerged between London and GHQ Cairo, who wanted to handle supplying Turkey and all Turkey-related military matters themselves, despite the Prime Minister's ruling that Turco-British relations, being political, were the responsibility of the Foreign Office. In London Churchill was at odds with both Eden and Attlee over the wisdom of his inspirational trip to Turkey, while in Washington the State Department sought to minimize the extent to which Britain should be the sole player of the Turkish hand, and distinguished political from military handling. The Foreign Office view was that Steinhardt in Ankara 'had much better leave these matters to us.'16 They accepted the military arguments but were concerned about the political risks of Churchill's Turkey policy and had no interest in his Eastern Mediterranean plans. William Strang, a senior Foreign Office official then in Washington, pleaded ignorance of British assertiveness, though he conceded that recent conferences reflected that view, and had to beat a hasty retreat as the Southern Department grabbed the whole hand again, using the division of responsibilities over Turkey recently established by Roosevelt and Churchill at the Washington conference.17

15 PRO FO 371/37489, R3421/95/G44, Eden to Southern Department, 18 April 1943.
16 PRO FO371/37509, R2336/55/G44, Clutton to Department 17 March 1943. For Strang, see PRO FO371/37647, R3029, Strang to FO, 11 April 1943.
The reasons for the Foreign Office's possessiveness about Turkey lie at the heart of this thesis. For many years, under the aegis of Sargent, it had pursued interventionist policies in the Balkans, and Turkey was for Britain the key to the Balkans, so playing the Turkey hand was seen merely as a continuation of existing policy. But there was more to it than this. All through the 'thirties, friendship with Turkey, as has been shown, had been the cornerstone of Foreign Office policy in the Eastern Mediterranean. But by 1939, despite Loraine's personal friendship with Atatürk, this policy had only generated the Mutual Assistance Pact of 12 May 1939 and some fairly glutinous expressions of mutual esteem. It was never put to the test until 1942-43, when it emerged that it had failed. But the Foreign Office mandarins would not admit defeat and hand over to the military because that would have meant a serious loss of face in one of its main wartime areas of responsibility. They sought Churchill's support for continuing to handle Turkey and he gave it, albeit reluctantly, since Eden had failed to follow through on his Turkish initiatives. The alternative, for Churchill, would have been even worse, because he would have had even less direct access via GHQ Middle East, which wanted Turkey to be part of Macmillan's bailiwick. Playing office politics in wartime is a dangerous pursuit, where the people on the spot are the ones who win. And the spot, unquestionably, was London, while the person was Churchill.

Since the Southern Department had unlimited access to Turkish intercepts secretly provided to GCCS via its Istanbul office, it was always up-to-date on what the leadership in Ankara was thinking. Intelligent study of these, as we have seen, gave the department accurate information on the chief characters involved: their intentions, their prejudices, their trustworthiness, their hopes and their fears. Since Turkey was run by oligarchs with only formal reference to the National Assembly, what the Department knew on a daily basis was far more valuable than anything GHQ Middle East might glean from reports from British attachés in Ankara and neighbouring capitals. The intercepts were circulated widely within the Southern Department, and reports and minutes on them from quite junior officials would end up as British policy, signed off by the Secretary of State himself. Churchill's access to the intercepts through Desmond Morton, strengthened when he became Prime Minister and when the supply of DIR/C grew to a daily delivery, encouraged him to insist that the Southern Department should be responsible for Allied policy towards Turkey but that he, in this respect, was the department. This goes some way towards explaining his determination to fly to Turkey in January 1943. Reading Turkey-related bjs in the run-up period with something of the same care as Churchill himself did, enables the historian to study the subsequent months of negotiation with a new interest. It may have been...
Churchill's refusal of 'gists' and summaries, and insistence on *ipsissima verba* in DIR, that is the key to this new explanation of HMG's policy towards Turkey in the war. The actual *bj* was what he needed. Perhaps it was for this reason that in January 1943 he sought to explain to Menzies and the Head of Hut 3 at Bletchley Park just why 'documents [decrypts] needed to be authentic: 'The whole force is destroyed in the paraphrase....As I have told you before you greatly weaken the value of your information by paraphrasing'. C passed this to Group Captain Eric Jones, in charge of Hut 3 at BP, who commented pacifically: 'It is generally felt that few men rival the Minister of Defence in this mastery of language...few of our recipients [i.e. of Ultra] would detect points raised by him...' But 'matters of major strategic importance are sent *ipsissima verba. *'18

Turkey, Hugessen reported, seemed to be coming out of its shell.19 On 5 January the Portuguese ambassador in Bucharest reported to Lisbon 'that the Turkish ambassador drew me aside and said Turkey might join the Allies in attacking the Balkans from the Black Sea.'20 Two days later Clutton minuted that 'the best means of drawing the Turks into the open is to make a combined plan of their fear of Russia and their inveterate hatred of Bulgaria in the hope of thereby embroiling Turkey and Bulgaria.'21 But Oshima reported that 'Bulgaria was terribly frightened of Turkey...Turkey wanted Germany to retain her position as a great power...There would be no change in Turkey's attitude.'22 On 9 January Cadogan noted that Eden was 'in his usual weekend flat spin about Turkey, but was convinced by Snatch's reports that it might be a disaster to get Turkey into the war'. Cadogan convinced Eden of this.23 On 15 January Sargent expressed surprise that Hugessen did not produce the detailed report on Turkey's readiness for combat prepared by the military attachés in Ankara. He left it behind on a routine visit to Whitehall, where officials read it with interest and may have felt confirmed in their view that Hugessen's competence was not entirely without question.24

It was the sudden change in the balance of power in the Mediterranean that caused Churchill, intent as ever on the accession of 40 Turkish divisions to the Allied cause, to

---

18 PRO HW 1/1281, Jones to C, 3 January 1943. The security of Ultra is a recurring theme of the DIR file. The main question was, what was and what was not, to be sent to the Russians, and through what channel. What no-one at BP or the FO knew is that the DIR was available to the least mentioned but possibly most important members of the Famous Five Cambridge Soviet spies, John Cairncross. We may never know the volume and extent to which Stalin used his knowledge of DIR via this route, but it has been asserted that without it the Battle of Kursk would have been lost. See Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1990), pp.248, 600. See also Churchill, op. cit., p.602.
19 PRO FO 371/37509, R1593/55/G44, Huggessen to Southern Department, 5 January 1943.
20 PRO HW 1/1286, bj 112758, Bucharest to Lisbon, decrypted 5 January 1943.
21 PRO FO 371/37465, R56/55/G44, Clutton, 7 January 1943.
22 PRO HW 1/1309, bj 113201, Berlin to Tokyo, decrypted 5 January 1943: (Turkey at War 2 January 1943).
23 See David Dilks (ed.), *The Cadogan Diaries* (London: Cassell, 1971), p.394. Hugessen was nicknamed Snatch by the FO.
press ahead with his personal conference with President İnönü. In anticipation of Churchill's imminent visit, Clutton drafted a situation report on Turkey on 16 January 1943. Two days later the British Joint Planning Staff issued their own Turkish policy document. Turkey would not come into the war unless she could hold Thrace without Allied assistance and immediate air defence would be forthcoming. Turkey's value to the Allies was as an offensive base for air rather than for land operations. The invasion of the Dodecanese was being studied by GHQ Middle East: 3 divisions and 123 air squadrons would be needed. 'We should exploit Turkish fears that Turkey will lose allied support which is conditional on her entry into the war without delay.' Turkey would be used 'as a base to bomb Ploesti, to close the Dardanelles to the Axis, and to force increased dispersal of German troops by using Turkey as a threat to the Balkans, and to deny chrome to Germany'.

An Allied Balkan initiative from Turkish soil was never far from Churchill's mind. He learnt from a bj that a Russian victory was dreaded by the Turkish leadership, but a new role in Balkan politics under Soviet hegemony might emerge, particularly in relation to Bulgaria. In the opinion of the German attaché in Sofia, Germany would require 20 divisions to attack Turkey and, therefore, had no intention of doing so. On 25 January, six days before the main Stalingrad pocket surrendered to the Russians, the Turkish ambassador in Washington reported: 'If it be true that the buffer states of central Europe have begun to try federation with Russia, this fact is of immense importance [to Turkey].' In any Balkan initiative Bulgaria would be the key, and the Foreign Minister in Ankara reported on 26 January to his colleague in Washington that 'the Bulgarians fear the Turkish army may one day attack them', adding that the present Bulgarian régime relies entirely on King Boris. Furthermore, 'if Russia forces landings at Varna, Bulgaria will go over to the Soviet. A coup d'état in Sofia awaits only a German defeat.' Such an event would be partly communist-inspired, partly a matter of Slav brotherhood and partly in reliance on Russia to escape punishment at the hands of England. The same day, travellers to Budapest reported fear that Turkey may enter the war on the allied side. Two days later Menemencioglu reported on continuing Turkish neutrality, despite the weakness of Greece, and continued to maintain cordial relations with the Soviet Union by playing chess with Vinogradov. A Balkan imbroglio now seemed inevitable, with the alignment of Bulgaria towards the Soviet Union rather than Britain, leaving Turkey again unsure where her best interests lay.

---

25 PRO PREM 3/446/1, CCS157, 'Allied Plans Relating to Turkey,' 18 January 1943.
26 PRO HW1/1325, bjs 11328 and 11329, Sophia to Tokyo, decrypted 21 January 1943.
28 PRO HW1/1331, bj 113524, Washington to Ankara, decrypted 25 January 1943; HW1/1332, bjs 113499, 519, 521, 540, 541, 545, 548, 557, Budapest to various capitals, decrypted 27 January 1943.
29 PRO FO 371/37503, R466/55/G44, Hugessen to FO, 28 January 1943. Vinogradov was the Soviet ambassador in Ankara.
The effect of Allied victory in North Africa had dominated the bjs since November 1942, and Hugessen's pressure on Menemencioğlu to come off the fence, on instructions from the Southern Department, had taken a slightly threatening tone. The Turkish Foreign Minister had made only debating points in response, as Clutton's draft instruction to the Hugessen, approved by Sargent, noted. The head of the Southern Department from 1941 till 1945, Douglas Howard, commented that our 'veiled threat to keep them [the Turks] out of the Peace Conference amounts to nothing...The Turks are conceited enough to think they are indispensable to us. And I am not sure they are not right'.

Cadogan and Eden both signed off this memorandum, indicating their view that a more robust approach to the Turkish leadership would be unavailing. Hugessen in Ankara told the Foreign Office that the Turks wanted to conserve their strength against Russia. A reply drafted in the Southern Department contained the suggestion that the British might occupy the Dodecanese, but this was struck out by Eden who no doubt thought the Foreign Office was exceeding its brief. American involvement in the tough new diplomatic approach was observed in Whitehall with some scepticism. Lawrence Steinhardt, the politically ambitious American ambassador in Ankara, was thought to be overactive, though he had recently assured Hugessen that it was his rule, as instructed by the President, to follow Hugessen's lead on Turkish neutrality: but British diplomats noted that 'He cannot keep still or quiet' and Hugessen's laudable attempt to keep his American colleague in the picture received a cautionary note from Cadogan.

Indeed, all through this period Hugessen seems to have been at odds with the Foreign Office and had to put up with some coldness from Whitehall, for reasons which are not clear. During a pre-war tour of duty in Nanking Hugessen had upset the Chinese authorities by driving through a war zone without asking permission. His old-fashioned views on recruitment to the diplomatic service failed to reflect the slowly awakening wish of Parliament to open up the service to non-Etonian, non-Wykehamist, non-Oxbridge entrants. On 19 January 1944 Churchill queried Eden about 'the leaky conditions' at the Ankara embassy, suggesting they reflected badly on Hugessen. Eden agreed cautiously. As a commentator Hugessen was obviously first-class, and his intelligence and conscientiousness were evident; but doubts were surfacing again. Further references to the 'leaky conditions' at the embassy occasionally appear, and when the 'Cicero' leaks were being investigated, they appeared not at the embassy but in the ambassador's private residence. His eccentricities, such as his habit of practising on Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov's Bechstein through the hot summer afternoons when others were either working or sleeping, would have been remarked, but hardly called for censure. Possibly

---

31 PRO FO 371/37465, R466/55/G44, Cadogan to Eden, January 1943, and draft telegram FO to Hugessen, January 1943.
33 PRO FO 371/44148, R1518/1518/G44, PM to Eden, and Eden to PM, 19 January 1944.
he found it difficult to delegate or share credit, a not uncommon phenomenon amongst those who know they are abler and more intelligent than most of their colleagues, as Hugessen certainly did and was. For instance, his 59-paragraph annual report on 1942 was only briefly acknowledged by the Southern Department, while his colleagues, who were assumed to have 'helped the compilation', were officially thanked; he later pointed out that the report was in fact 100% his own work.\textsuperscript{34} In it Hugessen mentioned the Bulgarian threat to use its ancient ties with Russia to achieve frontier rectification in Thrace at the expense of Turkey. The Turks, according to Stemdale Bennett, 'believed the Balkans [i.e. Bulgaria] should be occupied by the Allies before the Russians got there'. This was reported back by Hugessen. Eden knew 'the Bulgars', with the latest German weaponry, were better equipped than the Turks. He also knew 'from other sources' [i.e. bjs] that Papen knew 'in advance about Adana'.\textsuperscript{35}

So the run-up to Adana concluded. Hugessen and Cadogan represented Foreign Office Turkish policy, while Alanbrooke and other high ranking service officers represented the views of the COS. Neither viewpoint was heard in the plenary sessions at Adana, which were totally dominated by Churchill and İnönü, so it is difficult to tease out the complex attitude the Foreign Office took of Russian involvement in Turkish neutrality at this key moment when, having gained the right to play the Turkey hand, it found that hand whisked out of its grasp by the Prime Minister.

Churchill himself, after the Casablanca Conference, though at loggerheads with the Foreign Office, Eden and Admiral A. B. Cunningham (C-in-C Mediterranean Fleet) over the fate of the French fleet, was mentally preparing for Turkey on 28 January. That day he had written to Eden from Casablanca: 'We play the hand in Turkey...Is not this the opportunity and the moment for me to get into direct touch with the Turks?' Two days later he joked about Adana to Eden: 'You can imagine how much I wish I were going to be with you tomorrow on the Bench [i.e. in the House of Commons] but duty calls'.\textsuperscript{36} In making his pitch for a direct conference with the Turkish leadership on Turkish soil, he drafted a cable for Roosevelt to send to İnönü, 'if approved by my colleagues': 'To President İnönü: "Churchill, who has been conferring with me, is going shortly to Cairo. He will in all probability wish to confer with you and with your Prime Minister at some convenient secret place. In case Prime Minister Churchill does seek a conference I earnestly hope you or your Prime Minister will find it possible to meet him." ROOSEVELT.' The ensuing argument about whether to go, where to go and who should go, so diplomatic historians agree, seriously weakened Eden's standing as Foreign Secretary.\textsuperscript{37} Turkey was an important part

\textsuperscript{34} PRO FO 371/37466, R1423/55/44, Hugessen to FO, 29 January 1943: 'Modesty forbids me to tell you that my staff had nothing whatever to do with it.'
\textsuperscript{35} PRO FO 371/37503, R1084/265/44, no. 240, Hugessen to FO, 7 February 1943.
\textsuperscript{36} Churchill, op. cit., pp. 639-41.
\textsuperscript{37} See for example David Carlton, \textit{Anthony Eden} (London: Allen Lane, 1981), p.207: 'Eden's difference with Churchill over Adana was to have considerable longterm significance.'
of Eden's portfolio, and it was not only the fear of a Turkish rebuff but a simple dislike of Churchill hogging the limelight that made Eden so nervous.\textsuperscript{38} A 'clear the line HUSH' telegram from Attlee and Eden to Churchill on 27 January had strongly opposed Ankara as the venue of choice. It was 'full of German agents...there would be serious risks...Remember the Papen incident'.\textsuperscript{39} Adana, on the Mediterranean seaboard and many hours' train time from Ankara (then in deep snow), was preferred.\textsuperscript{40} Churchill renewed his arguments a day later, despite the rebuff he had received from the War Cabinet. Having consulted Roosevelt he got somewhat ambiguous backing for his venture which he used to overcome Cabinet objections. On 24 January he had cabled İnönü suggesting 'a secret rendezvous'. He then blandly wrote to the War Cabinet: 'I am most grateful to you for allowing my (sic) to try my plan', and even more triumphantly to the CIGS that the War Cabinet were in entire accord with him and that 'the United Kingdom plays the hand in Turkey...'. He even got Stalin to 'not deny the rumours that you have gone to Moscow'. Rarely has such a poor hand been played with such bravura.\textsuperscript{41}

Churchill's account of the Adana Conference starts with a lengthy quotation from his 'wooing letter containing an offer of platonic marriage both from me and the President' which was handed to İnönü.\textsuperscript{42} İnönü had replied to the earlier invitation that he would prefer to meet Churchill, openly or secretly, in Ankara and could not leave Turkey for constitutional reasons. Churchill was delighted when he accepted, according to Jacob. 'This is big stuff', he kept saying. 'He read and re-read the telegrams and was obviously not unhappy at the thought of how right he had been and how wrong the Cabinet and their advisers [i.e. the Foreign Office] had proved. The next day he spent in preparing for his visit and considering with his retinue 'how best we can help the Turks'.\textsuperscript{43} 'During that meeting a long paper which had been dictated by the PM arrived bit by bit, hot from the typewriter, for the Commanders-in-Chief to check'. It proved to be a statement of the position for the Turks, from which the Prime Minister proposed to speak when he met President İnönü.\textsuperscript{44}

The Prime Minister's party was to arrive at the meeting place outside Adana in time for lunch on Saturday 30 January and stay for 24 hours. An advance party under Group Captain Hudleston (an Air Staff Officer) would set off earlier. From Ankara Ambassador

\textsuperscript{38} Churchill, op. cit., p.627.
\textsuperscript{39} PRO FO 371/37465, R709/55/G44, War Cabinet to Churchill, 27 January 1943.
\textsuperscript{40} Hugessen gives a vivid account of his and the President's departure from a small town outside Ankara, to preserve secrecy, which the arrival of a snowstorm and many Turkish labourers to clear the roads and railway totally aborted. See Diplomat in Peace and War (London: John Murray, 1949), pp.129ff. See also Adrian Seligman, No Stars to Guide (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1947).
\textsuperscript{41} Typo in the printed text. PRO FO 371/37465, R795/55/G44 and R709/TOO[type once only] 21302/3, Ivan Maisky to FO, 31 January 1943; Churchill, op. cit., p.628.
\textsuperscript{43} Ian Jacob, unpublished typescript journal of the Adana Conference, CCC JACB 1/16, p.122. Quoted by permission of his son, Commander John Jacob.
\textsuperscript{44} Jacob, MS journal, p.123.
Hugessen would be accompanied by his military and air attachés (Major General Arnold and Air Vice Marshal George). They were to accompany the Turkish party and bring interpreters. 'Our communications would be by our own W/T sent to Cairo and thence to London'. Sir Alexander Cadogan and Peter Loxley of the Foreign Office arrived from England. The whole operation was shrouded in secrecy. In Ankara Hugessen pretended to be off on a shooting expedition, despite deep snow, and waved his guns at local journalists to prove it. He left Ankara for the 8-hour journey to Adana from a suburban station on the outskirts of the capital. Unfortunately the President's party's organisers had the same idea, and a small army of Turkish labourers, busily brushing away the snow to permit the presidential car to get through, witnessed the ambassador's arrival. The next day, according to Numan Menemencioglu, everyone knew that Churchill was coming to talk to President İnönü.45

This section has attempted to address the question, How did Churchill develop his determination to substitute for Turkey's wish to stay neutral an action plan that would pressurise her into the war on the Allied side, thus threatening the Axis with a second front in the Balkans and a European invasion from the South East? In the event the Turkish leadership kept its nerve and remained true to Atatürk's foreign policy inherited by İnönü. Churchill had to carry a reluctant Foreign Office, hesitant COS, impercipient Americans, preoccupied Russians, at a time when all eyes were looking elsewhere in the Mediterranean -- on the landings in North Africa. Fully au fait with the politics and diplomacy required, Churchill was unable to deliver a united Allied front to achieve his purpose. But even if he had forces available, and had insisted on using Turkish bases for an attack on the Balkans through Thrace, the diplomatic intercepts told him that the Germans would bomb Istanbul out of existence, thus truly neutralizing Churchill's ploy as well as the Turkish nation. Thus there was never any rational basis for Churchill's Turkey policy.

This thesis argues that by reading Turkish diplomatic intercepts on a careful and regular basis Churchill knew how and when to approach the Turkish leadership directly, what to say, and what not to say, to them; in short, how to appeal to their hopes and fears. He set out his 'Morning Thoughts' in a document designed to bring the Turks closer to the Allies whilst allaying their fears of a powerful post-war Soviet Union, but without the bjs he might never have gone to Turkey and a great opportunity would have been lost. Such a claim cannot of course be proved. Against it can be set the fact that the meetings at Adana were so chaotic that inspirational extemporisation was all that was needed. For this Churchill had great talent that he fully exploited. Though he summoned a large staff of advisers, experts and spectators from Cairo, Ankara and London, including his egregious son Randolph, he spent most of the time talking himself, either at the plenary conference at the start of the proceedings or privately with President İnönü on political implications. That

45 PRO HW1/1346, bj 113744, Ankara to Vichy, decryped 4 February 1944.
his bj reading provided valuable backup for this improvised programme is therefore not in
doubt; that it was responsible for making a success of Adana is more than the following
section claims because he failed to bring the Turks in.

What part did bjs play in shaping what Churchill said at the conference? The part
played by bjs at Adana was clearly generic rather than specific because for security reasons
they could not be shown to Churchill on the train. But the information he had gained from
them in the preceding months -- or the character of the President in particular -- would have
provided immediacy and excitement to his powerful presentation of the case for Turkey to
come off the fence. Churchill and İnönü dominated the talks. Both had been reading
Turkish diplomatic reports and had prepared for these talks by a careful study of them over
the previous months. Access to them, as has been shown, was impossible for security
reasons, so improvisation was called for on both sides. Both statesmen were masters of
the art of thinking on their feet. İnönü's skills as an international negotiator had been
established in the early interwar period, while Churchill's public life was marked by his
capacity to respond to his audience. What part did Churchill's bjs and İnönü's diplomats' reports
play in shaping what was said at the conference? To answer this question it is
necessary to distinguish between the shared expertise of both statesmen in the general
diplomatic mise-en-scène, which provided the background of their talk (and for which bjs
provided most material), and the particular information from these sources which might
have been useful for each of them, had this been available at the time. The importance of
the first is not diminished by the non-availability of the second. As to the further question
that this thesis offers an answer to -- Why did the Turks refuse Churchill's bait? --
Churchill himself was to insist that his rod was not baited, and İnönü had only to listen,
thank, depart, and continue to play his watchful waiting game to gain all he needed for his
country.

Churchill himself did not provide a detailed narrative of Adana when compiling
Volume 4 and 5 of his Second World War history, preferring to select such documents as
his 'Morning Thoughts' and his other communications with Eden and the COS that make
his case for him -- the case being that Adana was an important step towards beating the
Germans.46 Other attendees to the conference, including Hugessen, Ismay, Cadogan and
Alanbrooke, left first-hand accounts. Hugessen's 1943 jottings and Brigadier Ian Jacob's
journal are the only circumstantial accounts still unpublished. It must be remembered that
Jacob had access neither to Ultra nor Dedip, and since Adana was a short conference with
maximum security but also maximum propinquity, both of the high with the low and the
Turkish team with the British, handling Most Secret Source material in the train outside

46 W. S. Churchill, The Second World War: The Hinge of Fate and Closing the Ring Vols. 4-5 (London:
Cassell, 1951-52). See also Martin Gilbert, The Road to Victory: Winston S. Churchill 1941-1945
Adana would have endangered its security, and therefore no contemporaneous Turkish intercepts were available to the British party.\(^{47}\)

The British party assembled in flying kit over civilian clothes on Landing Ground 224. It consisted of Generals Alexander, Wilson and Lindsell; Air Marshal Drummond; Commodore Dundas; Peter Loxley, 'Mr Kinna' and Jacob himself.\(^{48}\) The generals occupied the flight deck, Jacob had the bomb bay.\(^{49}\) The Prime Minister travelled from Casablanca in another plane with his son Randolph, his doctor Sir Charles Wilson, his security guard, 'Tommy' Thompson, two police officers and Sir Alexander Cadogan.\(^{50}\) The airport was close to the town of Adana in the centre of an alluvial plain between the Taurus mountains and the North East coast of the Mediterranean. At this time of year the fields were all waterlogged, if not submerged. 'The villages we saw were extremely squalid. The houses were built of mud, the general practice being for the family to live in an upper storey reached by ladder, and built over the shed which is the home of the cattle, goats and poultry. The roads are atrocious, and the whole country is obviously primitive in the extreme'.\(^{51}\) At the airport the two British parties met the Embassy contingent, which outlined the manoeuvre to install Churchill on Turkish soil. He was to be taken to a nearby level crossing 'where he would be whisked on board' [his special carriage] which would pause for the purpose. The co-ordination of planes, cars and trains was complicated and extemporising was needed, particularly when Hugessen arrived with his team. 'However, all was well and at 12.50 pm cordial greetings were taking place, after Churchill had inspected the Hurricane aircraft supplied by the RAF to the Turkish air force and drank with the Turkish officials on the aerodrome'.\(^{52}\) Outside Adana, the whole party came aboard the train at the designated level crossing and settled down for lunch (eating and drinking took up a great deal of the time). Hugessen, who had brought the Embassy party from Ankara through thick snow by train, told the whole party that the Germans knew all about the meeting and Papen had rung the Foreign Ministry to ask 'whether this meant that the Turks had come down on our side of the fence'.\(^{53}\) His information revealing German awareness of Churchill's whereabouts was not seriously regarded.\(^{54}\) Jacob described the Turkish leadership as 'rather nondescript people, obviously very delighted with the whole


\(^{48}\) This and following quotes are all from the Ian Jacob MS journal, CCC JACB 1/16.

\(^{49}\) PRO PREM 3/446/10, p. 501.

\(^{50}\) Jacob, MS journal, p.127.

\(^{51}\) Jacob, MS journal, p.128. See also PRO FO 371/44083, R142/34/G44, for George Clutton's 10 January 1943 minute on problems of maintaining living standards for British personnel in Turkey - 'a backward country and financially very dicky'. These are rare occurrences of Britons observing upcountry Turkey.

\(^{52}\) Jacob, MS journal, p.132.


\(^{54}\) PRO PREM 3/446/10, p.502, 30 January 1943, RT NOPAR No. 3. DEYOU. Also 0243/29 and 0420/29 for attendees from Ankara.
affair, and having none of the pomposity of Ministers in some countries... They put on no airs, and the whole arrival was more like a family welcoming a relation than an official reception'. The bigwigs had a special saloon for their lunch where Churchill met İnönü, both with their ministers and Churchill with Hugessen. 'Gradually more and more people squeezed in, including Marshal Chakmak (sic). Churchill conducted the preliminaries in his Franglais. He and İnönü decided on a formal meeting of the two delegations (one political, one military) forthwith, but continued their tête-à-tête before joining the political session. Churchill produced the paper he had been working on in Cairo and held forth for over an hour -- having dispensed with the services of Paul Falla, the British Embassy junior official listed as secretary and seconded to act as interpreter. Falla had not been properly briefed or given a sight of Churchill's document; and when he translated Churchill's 'miles' into 'kilometres' for the benefit of his French-speaking Turkish hosts, Churchill waved him away on the quite wrong assumption that he was not following the ipsissima verba instructions so close (as we have seen) to his heart. Most of the British were fluent French speakers, and the Turks might have got down to business more quickly had Falla been allowed to proceed. Jacob wrote: 'The result was completely intelligible to all the English present . . . but the Turks could only have formed a very hazy idea of what the whole thing was about . . . Peculiar though it all was, I do not think anyone felt like laughing. They couldn't help admiring his determination and self-possession. The Turks were much too polite to express any surprise or amusement'. Hugessen later wrote: 'Practically all the talking [in French] was between the PM and Ismet...The PM played all the right cards at the right time'. Later Peter Loxley, Knox Helm, Paul Falla and Mrs Sterndale Bennett translated Churchill's document into real French for the Turks.

İnönü then proposed the conference should separate off into the political study of the circumstances in which Turkey might become involved in a war and a military question of how to prepare for that situation. He and Churchill and their advisers should attend the first group, Alanbrooke and Marshal Fevkik Chakmak, the Turkish military supremo, the second.

Churchill's whole demeanour bowled over his Turkish hosts, who found it quite easy, nevertheless, to resist his blandishments. There were not two but three items on the agenda: encouraging Turkey off the fence with carrots in the form of modern war equipment, and sticks in the form of the need to come to terms with the imminent possibility of a major Russian success in the Caucasus or at Stalingrad; possible joint

55 Jacob, MS journal, p.133.
56 Jacob, MS journal, p.135.
57 Jacob, MS journal, p.136.
58 Interview with Falla. See also Churchill, op. cit., p.636.
59 Jacob, MS journal, p.137-8.
60 Hugessen, MS diary for 1943, CCC KNAT1/14.
61 PRO PREM 3/446/10, p.504.
operations in the Eastern Mediterranean involving the capture of the Dodecanese and the recapture of Crete; and bombing raids by British or American aircraft from Turkish bases on Romanian oilfields. The Turks were worried about the political outcome of Russian successes to their North and less about the bolshevisation of Europe which so panicked the Spanish and Portuguese. The military men discussed the material the British could supply to the Turks, whose 'oriental behaviour showed in the keenness with which they entered into this aspect of the business, which was the only thing they were really interested in...They asked no questions about the progress of the war' nor about what had been decided at Casablanca. They agreed to the meeting because of their fear of Russia's post-war intentions, and the state of Europe following a German collapse: They wanted to be sure of our support if Russia turns nasty. They were a bit apprehensive that the P.M. would come with proposals for their immediate entry into the war. When they found he had no intention of trying to push them along, they heaved a sigh of relief and entered wholeheartedly into the fun'.

Alanbrooke pressed his opposite number over what the Turks could do since his RAF colleagues had been having a hard time establishing meaningful dialogue in Ankara. He and his staff could now 'really get down to the Turkish problem which they had never been able to do before. The Turks have always tried to exclude foreign influence, remembering as they do the domineering attitudes of the Germans in the last war'.

The political group had made good progress too, and both parties re-assembled for a huge dinner, 'tottering off to our sleeping cars' at 1 a.m.

As we have seen, Churchill had been working on his 'Morning Thoughts' for some days; he finished them in the saloon-car of his train at Adana on 31 January. They gave a vision of a post-war Europe consisting of three or more blocs. Turkey's highest security lay in becoming a 'victorious belligerent'. Churchill remained 'in love with his idea'.

The conference was due to conclude that same day. Draft communiqués were prepared and approved, but the proceedings were by no means over, and it could well be said that Churchill may have overstayed his welcome: he certainly said he was in no hurry to go while the soldiers were still talking to each other. He thought he would return to Cairo via Cyprus to see some of his old comrades in arms there, but changed his mind after lunch and said he must get to Cairo to telegraph Roosevelt, Stalin and the War Cabinet in London. Hurried good-byes were exchanged at the level crossing, and the large and well fed party proceeded by car from the train to the aerodrome where one of the aircraft failed to take off and slewed off the runway into the mud. Getting it out took hours of

---

62 Jacob, MS journal, pp.139-40.
63 Jacob, MS journal, p.141.
64 Jacob, MS journal, p.143.
65 Drafts and the final version of "Morning Thoughts": Notes on Post War Security by the Prime Minister, 1 February 1943, can be found in PRO files FO 371/37465, R709, Strategem C/6. Also summarised in Churchill, op. cit., Vol. 4, p 636.
manoeuvring supervised in part by Churchill himself. By 5.40 the party was in the air, but whither? That was the next question. It was too late to get to Cairo in daylight so Jacob's proposal that they stay another night on Turkish soil was accepted, and back they went to the level crossing and the train. İnönü left at 8.00 pm having better things to do than prolong the goodbyes: 'He was most charming and might have been saying goodbye to his dearest friends'. The politicians changed places with the soldiers and Chakmak dined with Cadogan and Hugessen while Saraçoglu Sukru dined with the British generals. Eventually the Turkish train steamed off at 11 pm. Numan Menemencioglu, the Foreign Minister, was so exhausted that he sensibly went to bed before dinner. The British party left Turkey the next morning, some members no doubt with a hangover. Churchill reported to Deputy Prime Minister Attlee from Cyprus.

Lacking bjs, this account of the Adana conference, as already stated, is based on first-hand reports. But it is only right to quote the Official Historian, whose paragraph on Adana requires little change in the light of recent releases of documents:

From Cairo the Prime Minister flew to Adana on 30 January 1943 accompanied by the C.I.G.S and by Sir Alexander Cadogan from the Foreign Office. Friendly meetings took place with the Turkish President, Mr. İnönü, the Prime Minister, Mr Saraçoglu and Marshal Chakmak. Arrangements were made to increase supplies of British and American equipment to Turkey and Mr Churchill was able to assure the authorities of the readiness of anti-aircraft and anti-tank units and of divisions of the 9th Army to come to Turkey's help, particularly now that the German threat from the North was much less. But the Turks, conscious that Russian and British successes might lead to a desperate venture by the Germans to reach oil by the middle road through Turkey, were not prepared to risk encouraging such action by granting them the use of airfields from which to attack the Roumanian oilfields.

(ii) Why Churchill Failed

What exactly had been achieved? According to Cadogan there never were men so resolutely disinclined to be drawn into a war as the Turkish leaders:

When the conversation began to veer towards anything like practical action on their part it seemed that they found more than usual difficulty in hearing what was said. [Cadogan went on] The Turks had already showed themselves to be co-operative in allowing the British to build up stores on Turkish soil....It became plain that [the Turks] looked upon Russia as the principal threat. Perhaps Mr. Churchill, in his heart of hearts, did not disagree...Saraçoglu was evidently not convinced by the Prime Minister's evocation of the international organisation which was to restrain aggression, or by his assertion that he had never known

---

67 Jacob, MS journal, pp.147, 150-1, 152.
68 PRO FO 371/37465, R709/55/G44, see Stratagem c/3 of 31 January 1943.
69 PRO PREM 3/446/10, p.505, no. 58550, Jacob to Hollis, confirming no bjs.
the Soviet Union to break an engagement. Turkey, said Saraçoğlu, was looking for something more 'real'. All the defeated countries would become Bolshevik or Slav if Germany was beaten. The *Pensées Matinales* claimed that the new world organisation would embody the spirit, but lack the weaknesses of the League...The military men agreed on increased supplies of modern weapons to Turkey. This was the only practical result of the Adana conference...Turkey's determination to cling to her neutral position and keep her forces intact against Russia was well known to the Germans from the intercepts.\(^1\)

Cadogan was referring here to Göbbels' notes on the diplomatic intercepts passed to him by the *Forschungsamt* in 1942-43. One such note reads: 'Other intercepted diplomatic reports from Ankara proved that Turkey intended to hang grimly on to her neutral position until the war is over if possible. The main reason given is that Turkish statesmen realise the necessity of maintaining their armed forces intact at the end of the war, in order to be able to ward off possible encroachments by the Soviet Union'. Göbbels later learnt from his intercepts that at Adana Churchill proposed a three-way partition of Europe -- into Southern, Northern and Central blocs: 'Churchill has put it to the Turks that he has no intention of destroying the Third Reich. But of course one knows just how much to believe of these Churchillian protestations'.\(^2\)

Churchill himself came away from the discussions claiming that 'the Turks have come a long way towards us'.\(^3\) But Deringil quotes Erkin as saying: 'At Adana and in the months that followed the Turks and British had not spoken the same language.'\(^4\) At the Foreign Office Turkish *politesse* was taken at face value as a 'change of heart' and it took months of mutual exasperation before officials there acknowledged that their policy had failed. But Eden minuted to his officials, 'As the department know I never liked the Adana meeting or the Adana policy'.\(^5\)

The immediate aftermath was suffused with vague noises of *camaraderie*. Stalin sent a message from the Kremlin via Ambassador Ivan Maisky: 'I received your message of the impending meeting with the President of Turkey. I will be very grateful to you for information on the results of the conversation. The importance of this meeting is clear to me. Of course your wish will be respected and we will not deny the rumours that you have gone to Moscow'.\(^6\) Churchill's doctor, Sir Charles Wilson, recorded his patient's delight at the results he had achieved at Adana: 'He will bring Turkey into the war and is in great

---

1 David Dilks, op. cit., p.509.
3 Churchill, op. cit., Vol.4, p.638.
5 PRO FO 371/37471, R7114/55/G44, Eden to Department, 6 August 1943.
heart'. Churchill told him this was 'about the best day's work I have ever done'.

Jacob's diary shows Churchill reveling in the thought that he had outmanoeuvred the rest of the War Cabinet, displaying a pettiness that his subsequent detractors seem to have overlooked. Alanbrooke was later to note in his diary:

The PM was a great success, and the day ended on the whole successfully...On our arrival at Adana the Turkish foreign minister...told me how delighted the whole of Turkey was at this visit by the PM. I asked him how this could be, since the visit was being kept as a matter of first-class secrecy and nobody could know that he had arrived. To this he replied: “How could you keep an event of that kind secret? Of course everybody knows about it”.

Hugessen noted that Churchill and İnönü did practically all the talking. Churchill 'played all the right cards at the right time . . . His conduct of the business was brilliant . . . All the cards which had been put into his hands were played at exactly the right moment and with the fullest effect . . . Really a triumph'. Hugessen wrote this on 3 February, adding that 'I hear the Germans are flabbergasted and really frightened that Turkey was coming in on our side at once'.

The most useful service sigint performed for Churchill after Adana was to alert the War Cabinet to the possibility of his being murdered. Until DIR/C was released to the public in 1994 historians of the Second World War were unaware of the dangers he was in. On 1 February, the day after the conference closed, Charles Wilson, Churchill's doctor and companion, noticed inexplicable arguments about whether the party should fly home immediately, and by a new route, or whether to continue as planned via Cairo. By that time the Prime Minister may have known that plans to assassinate him had been intercepted in London. On the same day a Tangier to Berlin message was intercepted by Bletchley Park of which the gist is as follows:

Parsifal. According to reports here Churchill went from Ankara direct to Cyprus and then on to Egypt. From there he will probably go by air line direct to Gibraltar via Algiers and on to England, probably breaking his journey at Lisbon. MUH will try through TONI to get people to Algiers and Casablanca in time. As it takes at least five days to get people across the frontier, it appears doubtful whether Churchill can still be reached.

---

77 Lord Moran, The Struggle for Survival (London: Constable, 1966), pp.83-6, 145. He later noted that Churchill's failure to induce İnönü to declare war on the Axis at their next meeting at Cairo in November of 1943 had made him physically ill.
78 Bryant, op. cit., p.571.
79 See Hugessen's MS diary, in CCC KNAT1/14.
80 PRO HW1/1346, bj 113743, and ISOS [intelligence source Oliver Strachey -- the GCCS cryptographer who solved the Abwehr cipher], Ankara-to-Berlin contain the aborted plan to poison Churchill.
81 Ibid. This message was sent by the Sicherheitsdienst (SD): TONI is identified as an Islamic militant whose organisation had already attempted to assassinate the French General Officer Commanding Mediterranean, Giraud. MUH (abbreviation for Muhamet) is alias for Peter Schulze: 28 years old, second press attaché at the German legation in Tangier.
The timing of Churchill's intended assassination shows the attempt would certainly fail and the danger therefore more apparent than real; but Attlee took immediate action on being shown an intercepted telegram of which the text is as follows:

Hans Peter Schulze, head of German S.D. repeat S.D. in Tangier is trying to arrange attack on Churchill repeat Churchill probably at Algiers and/or Casablanca. Attempt if any would be made through agents of Sidi Abdelhalek Torres repeat Sidi Abdelhalek Torres leader of native nationalist reform party in Tangier. Also through agents of Sherif Ibrahim El Wasani repeat Sherif Ibrahim El Wasani, founder of Oficina [sic] nationalista in Tangier. Arrange inform governor immediately as Chiefs of Staff here are also wiring him. Informed. Extinguish.  

He reported to Churchill as follows:

To: Prime Minister
From: Deputy Prime Minister

CLEAR THE LINE 1) C reports a communication from Germans in Tangier to Berlin which show that your itinerary, i.e. Algiers, Gibraltar, England, has been accurately forecasted and that attempts are going to be made to bump you off.
2) We have studied possibilities very carefully and I and my colleagues, supported by the Chiefs of Staff, consider that it would be unwise for you to adhere to your present programme.
3) We regard it as essential in the national interest ['we strongly recommend' crossed out] that you cut out visits to both Algiers and Gibraltar and proceed to England, stopping only at Marrakesh.
4) We have taken following action:-
   (i) warned Gibraltar that present plan may be changed, but that in case you adhere to it special precautions are to be instituted; 
   (ii) Requested Eisenhower to make arrangements for your reception and safety at Marrakesh early tomorrow and lay on communications. At the same time, all possible security measures are to be instituted at Algiers in case present plan is adhered to. 

---

82 This text appears in a telegram from C.S.S. ('C') 'for Gibraltar' encoded by B.L. at 1330 hours on 4th February 1943. 'Two copies based on VD [SD] most secret material. Both the S.D. Sicherdeinst and Abwehr cipher systems had been broken and were referred to as ISOS [intelligence source Oliver Strachey]. The text quoted above is supported in the HW l files by intercept X111/31 Tangier to Berlin 1529 of 5 February: for PARSIFAL: 'Schultze (2nd Press Attaché, Tangier, has despatched two Wasani men and one Torres, and he himself took one Wasani man, to the frontier at Alcazar, on 4th January (sic.) with an assignment against Churchill. If the attack on Churchill does not succeed, they are to use the material given them for acts of sabotage. (signed) Schultze'. C passed this via SCU (special ?cipher unit) zzzzz as follows: - 'a) tested source reports at least four saboteur with necessary material crossed frontier on February 4th to take action against Churchill. b) inform Brigadier and Eisenhower immediately. Distribution C.S.S. and Section s [i.e. at Bletchley Park. Encoded by Baker at 2015 hours on 5 February. The text of two Isosicles (jargon for ISOS) was passed to C. '1) X111/31 Please dispatch urgently 20 to 50 machine pistols with ammunition, magnetic mines adhesive mines (Klebminen). Also poisons for (adding to) drinks and effective upon bodily contagion. Some saccharine for a diabetic female relative of TONI MUH 2) 10 magnetic mines went off today to be used against U.S.A. tanks. Organisation for the housing of the material and distribution of required amounts, also immediate operation, taken care of at our end. MUHAM.' PRO HW1/1346, bj 113743.
83 PRO HW1/1346, bj 113743. It is headed 'telegram' without a registration number and is annotated 'Scrambled to Mr. de Grey [of BP] 4/2/43.'
This section has shown how the War Cabinet reacted promptly, perhaps not surprisingly, to intercepted signals intelligence. The actual danger to Churchill was more apparent than real, and his pneumonia on return to London provided a more cogent reason for the sense of anticlimax which followed the Adana conference.

Churchill telegraphed Stalin to ask him to state that he had been kept fully informed of events at Adana, and said 'the Turks have come a long way towards us', to which Stalin replied chillingly: 'Of course I have no objection to you making a statement that I was kept informed on the Anglo-Turkish meeting, although I cannot say that the information was very full.' Admiral Howard Kelly in Ankara earned grudging praise from the Southern Department's Pierson Dixon when he commented that 'an Imperialist Russia is much more frightening to the Turks than a thoroughgoing Communist Russia'. On that document the PM wrote tersely 'Yes' to a request that the Turkish officers and NCOs in training with the British should be fully subsidised by their hosts.

The Foreign Office circulated a 'Most Secret' memorandum early in February summarising the Adana conversation under three headings: A) present; B) war future; and C) post-war future. Under A) there was 'the underlying suggestion that Turkey might come into the war either through being attacked or on her own initiative and in her own interests, or at least stretch her neutrality to a very wide extent in our interests'. On B) Turkey might be attacked by Germany to obtain oil or as part of a Drang nach Osten. 'It was on this basis that our proposals for completing Turkey's defences were based'. The Prime Minister is then credited with three hypotheses: 1) The destruction of Italy and the capture of Tunis would lead to action in the 'western Balkans' and therefore the need for Turkish security was paramount. Coupled with this was the Russian advance, precipitating a crisis in the summer. 2) Turkey might allow Britain to use her airfields to bomb Romanian oil installations. 3) Turkey might invade Bulgaria. But Churchill asked 'for no engagement. Turkey must decide for herself. She should not act until it was in her interests and those of the Grand Coalition to do so'. Numan remarked that this 'was extremely reasonable'. Under C) (Post-war), Russia was the most important factor. Churchill urged an international agreement but added: 'If Russia attacked Turkey, we should arrange the best possible coalition against her and he would not hesitate to say so to Stalin. He also told the Turks of Roosevelt's wish that Turkey should emerge from the war free and strong and independent. Finally, the gist of Churchill's 'Morning Thoughts' highlighted the various possibilities in the Balkans which might induce Turkey 'to win her place in the Council of the Victors'.

84 PRO PREM 3/446/14, PM to Stalin, 6 February 1943.
85 PRO FO371/37466, Dixon, minute, 25 February 1943.
86 PRO FO 371/37516, R2326/1016/G44, 'Situation as left after Adana Conference,' 17 February 1943. On internal evidence, it appears that this document was written by Cadogan and distributed to the Southern Department.
In Ankara Saraçoglu reported to the National Assembly on the outcome of Adana in what Clutton called 'a very pretty speech. Never before, not even in the safe and palmy days of 1939 has the "Alliance" been so amorously intimate. A week later Churchill spoke about Turkey in the House of Commons: 'Turkey is our Ally', he said. Turkey is our friend. We wish her well, and we wish to see her territory, rights and interests effectively preserved. We wish to see, in particular, warm and friendly relations established between Turkey and her great Russian Ally to the North-West, to whom we are bound by the 20 years Anglo-Russian Treaty. Whereas a little while ago it looked to superficial observers as if Turkey might be isolated by a German advance through the Caucasus on one side and by a German-Italian attack on Egypt on the other, a transformation has occurred. Turkey now finds on each side of her victorious Powers who are her friends. It will be interesting to see how the story unfolds chapter by chapter, and it would be very foolish to try to skip on too fast'. These fine words were sent back in diplomatic cipher to many of the world's capital cities, including Ankara, so Churchill found himself re-reading them in the bj from Rustu Aras that Cable and Wireless had routinely intercepted and transmitted to Berkeley Street for processing, the day after they had been spoken.

The bjs were full of Adana from neutral diplomats in Berlin, Ankara, Rome, Lisbon, Madrid and Buenos Aires to their respective Foreign Ministries: 'une nouvelle offensive diplomatique et une de pousser les derniers neutres a entre dans la guerre...mais, a-t-il adjuté, je suis absolument sur que les Turcs reprouvrent en justifiant leur politique par le danger russe et la nécessité de faire la paix en Europe'. (4 February) The Japanese ambassador in Sophia reported that many Russians were entering Turkey, which would suggest joint Allied pressure. Two days later Kurihara reported to Tokyo the comments of the Polish commander, General Anders, that 'there was strong anti-British but equally strong pro-American feeling throughout Russia. He added that there was 'serious tactical bankruptcy' in Anglo-American war planning, which relied on saturation bombing and being no match militarily with the Axis and suffering heavy losses at sea. The Portuguese ambassador in Ankara reported that the Adana meeting was to urge Turkey into the war -- and it failed. The plan was to polish off Tunisia, occupy Crete and the Dodecanese, attack the Balkans, and occupy Thrace. Neutrality was a word to be avoided. It was likely that Turkey would gain time by pleading lack of armaments (Prime Minister marked this 'important' for Alanbrooke to read). Mussolini commented to his son-in-law Galeazzo Ciano that the weakness of Britain was proved if Churchill must go to the trouble

88 It is to be found in HW1/1346, bj 113744, Ankara to Vichy, 4 February 1943.
89 PRO HW1/1346, bj 113744, Ankara to Vichy, 4 February 1943.
90 PRO HW1/1210, bj 112093, Sophia to Tokyo, decrypted 10 February 1943: ticked by Churchill.
91 PRO HW1/1348, bj 113849, Ankara to Tokyo, decrypted 6 February 1943.
92 See also PRO HW1/1387, bj 11439, Stockholm to Lisbon, decrypted 20 February: 'Turkey's role is to sound German views on how to avoid the Bolshevisation of Europe, and a separate peace between Germany and the Western Allies.'
of begging for Turkish help. He added that 'Turkey is too important not to be exploited...I do not think Turkey has been neutralised as Berlin says.' The Japanese ambassador in Ankara noted that the many Allied spies in Turkey looked like a preparation for joint operations. From Berlin Oshima told Tokyo that 'this was not the time to go out of one's way to turn [Turkey] into an enemy.' The Turkish Foreign Ministry put out an anodyne account of Adana, talking of complete friendship and cordiality: 'Churchill had observed the lack of mechanisation of the Turkish army. Churchill would put this right. Churchill praised Turkish foreign policy, and asked for no change in it.' Reports of Adana continued in the intercepts to and from the neutral capitals. Neither the Southern Department nor Churchill could have been in any doubt about the significance of Adana to the Italians, the Japanese and the neutrals. Neutral diplomats, however, were less aware of the continuing problems to Turkey of its determination to sell its chrome to both Axis and Allies. This remained an issue which continued before, during and after Adana. The Germans had failed to expedite deliveries and the Americans sent 'wild men', in Clutton's phrase, to 'ginger up the chrome business' by contacting the mine owners directly, and sabotaging Germany-bound chrome convoys. Clutton minuted that the Turkish mine owners hated the Germans like poison: 'provided they received adequate compensation they wouldn't mind if production suddenly ceased and wagons became derailed.' The 'best way to stop the Germans getting chrome is to let the Turks do it.' But the mine owners were also on the losing end of the wealth tax: profits were down 60%.

Through the Adana period the Soviet ambassador, Ivan Maisky, in London, delivered notes to and from Churchill and Stalin. His personal relations with Churchill were relaxed and usually cordial, as they had known each other for a long time. But he appeared to regard his master, Stalin, with something like terror. Back in the Foreign Office, Dixon minuted: 'We want Turkey strong and ready to play her part,' and Clutton commented: 'It would be moonshine to imagine that in a couple of months distrust that goes back centuries can be dispelled. It will probably always remain. But there is no reason why this distrust should not be kept in control and indeed so exploited that the Turks come to realise that their best means of protection is collaboration and participation in the war.' On the diplomatic front the Southern Department read from intercepts that Menemencioglu told Vinogradov to say to Moscow that the Turkish government was willing to improve

94 PRO HW1/1240, bj 112341 and 112369, Ankara to Tokyo, both decrypted 20 February 1943.
95 PRO HW1/1240, bj 112370/29, Berlin to all points south and east (Ankara, Vichy, Rome, Madrid, Berne.) This bj, like others in this period, was shown to G20 [Military Intelligence] in Washington.
96 PRO HW1/1348, bj 113908, 113855, Ankara to all stations, decrypted 6 February 1943.
97 PRO FO 371/34461, Clutton hand-written minute re Jackson, sent by the State Department to add muscle to the FO's dithering over chrome shipments.
98 PRO FO 371/37460, Clutton, minute, 1 February 1943.
Turco-Russian relations. By mid-February Churchill was back with his bjs after his pneumonia, and told Eden to get Hugessen 'to impress upon the Turks that they miss their opportunity altogether with Russia and that now is the time to reach favourable agreement'.

Cadogan worried about Russian objections. It was common knowledge amongst near eastern diplomats that the Russian danger was imperialistic not communist. Clutton commented that 'we seem to have steered the Turks successfully off the Balkans'.

The Turkish consul in Moscow observed to Ankara that 'I respectfully submit my opinion that this year the lands which the Germans have destined for their living space will become their dying space.'

On 20 February the Portuguese ambassador in Stockholm reported that the only way into Europe for the Allies was via Turkey.

This section has revealed neutral reactions to Adana, scrutinised in London by the Foreign Office, and, when he was well again, by the Prime Minister. The consequences, as the following section makes clear, showed that the conference failed to alter in any fundamental way the Turkish leadership's determination that the country should stay neutral.

(iii) Consequences: The Foreign Office and the Record

What has been attempted in the foregoing pages is to use the Foreign Office intercepts which the Southern Department and Churchill read to trace the cause, course and consequence of Churchill's Turkey visit in January, to answer questions raised by the differing perceptions both within the Foreign Office and between that body and the Prime Minister as to the advantages or otherwise of playing an aggressive Turkey hand. While this enterprising move produced no immediate consequences of any significance, it revealed a lack both of vigour and rigour in the Southern Department's policy recommendations in regard to its prize client, Turkey, at a time when a bold reassertion of traditional British commitment to Balkan affairs might possibly have influenced the timing and the outcome of the Italian campaign and the early preparations of D-Day, as well as the rise and fall of the South of France option ('Husky') to supplement a second front in the West. Certainly one Portuguese diplomat thought so: The Adana meeting was to urge Turkey into the war; and it failed. The plan was to polish off Tunisia, occupy Thrace and the Dodecanese, attack the Balkans. Neutrality was a word to be avoided, but the Turks would plead lack of armaments.

Churchill marked this bj 'important' and sent it to Alanbrooke to study. Churchill's concentrated study of diplomatic messages during the period autumn 1941 to Spring 1943 guided him towards a view of Turkish neutrality.

---

100 PRO FO 371/37509, R1390/650/G44, PM to Foreign Secretary, 17 February 1943.
101 PRO FO 371/37465, R1096/55/944, Clutton, 8 February 1943.
102 PRO HW1/1384, bj 114359, Moscow to Ankara, decrypted 17 February 1943.
103 PRO HW1/1387, bj 114391, Stockholm to Lisbon, decrypted 20 February 1943.
104 PRO HW1/1348, bj 1113855, Ankara to Lisbon, decrypted 6 February 1943.
which, while at odds with the Americans, the COS and often the Southern Department, shows him to have been still an instinctively imperialist maker of British foreign policy, capable of maintaining valuable if precarious relationships with both the real power brokers, Roosevelt and Stalin, and with new potentially useful friends such as İnönü.

In Ankara Ambassador Sho Kurihara continued to report 'tactical bankruptcy' in Allied war planning, with most action concentrated on the Eastern front and with German and Italian U-boats taking a dreadful and growing toll on neutral as well as Allied shipping. Kurihara continued that there were 80 divisions of Asiatics [i.e. non-Russian communists] in the Russian army: 'they have forgotten [their aim of] making the world red, and are burning with desire to defend their fatherland...The Allies' talk of a second front may be via Turkey and the Balkans. The Anglo-Saxons relied on saturation bombing and were no match militarily for the Axis.¹⁰⁵

But no-one seriously expected the Anglo-Saxons to invade the Balkan heartlands and beat the large and well equipped armies who would then be defending their fatherland: something short of this, and something involving Turkey. But what? On 1 March, Hugessen suggested a three-phased de-neutralising of Turkey: 1) Defensive - make Turkey strong; 2) Turkey lends US/UK air bases; and 3) Turkey joins the war.¹⁰⁶

British foreign policy, led at different speeds by Churchill and Eden, now involved a strongly pro-Soviet stance while German Panzer forces were still strong, but others were beginning to anticipate the Cold War. On 15 March the Portuguese ambassador in Bucharest reported on Churchill's demands on the Turks at Adana, while from Ankara Kurihara reported to Tokyo that after their North African successes the Allies would begin operations in the Balkans.¹⁰⁷ Churchill had pressed for a new Balkan entente, and for Turkey to have a strong and well equipped army. İnönü's comment that Churchill was not making up to Turkey 'pour nos beaux yeux' was given wide circulation.

In Whitehall it was unclear who had offered what to whom at Adana. Lord Leathers, the Minister of War Transport and one of the few Conservative politicians Churchill liked, on 27 March told Churchill that he asked the WO and COS what Turkish commitments amounted to but could get no answer. Ralph Assheton of the Treasury supplied Churchill with fortnightly reports of what was being sent to Turkey but the whole subject remained a bone of contention throughout the next nine months.¹⁰⁸ Churchill did

¹⁰⁵ PRO HW1/1348, bj 113731, Ankara to Tokyo, decrypted 6 February 1943. In the same files bj 113849 carried Oshima's report to Tokyo that no change was expected in Berlin in Turkish policy towards Germany (decrypted 6 February 1943).
¹⁰⁶ PRO FO 371/37516, R232/1016/G44, Hugessen to FO, 1 March 1943.
¹⁰⁷ PRO HW1/1627, bj 115283/91, Bucharest to Lisbon and Ankara to Tokyo, decrypted 15 March 1943.
¹⁰⁸ PRO HW1/1346/2189, bj 115249, decrypted 4 February 1943; PRO PREM 3/446/2, p.78, Leathers to Churchill, 27 March 1943; also see related correspondence in PRO PREM 3/446/4, pp.175-95; PRO FO 371/37466, R1443/55/G44 of 22 March. Knox Helm in Ankara pressed for a multilateral guarantee from Britain to Turkey, but the FO rejected the suggestion. Also in Ankara Admiral Kelly observed that 'an imperialistic Russia is more frightening than a thorough-going Communist Russia' -- to which Dixon minuted 'good point'. Kelly was Churchill's personal appointee in Ankara and continually riled the Southern
not join the anti-Bolshevik chorus because of the Anglo-Russian Alliance and because to be anti-Bolshevik could imply Fascist leanings, but the Turkish ambassador assumed that the proposed new Balkan *entente* would be anti-communist. The next day Kurihara reported: 'Not only is the outcome of the fighting on the Eastern front important to Turkey but it will decide the fate of the war. So Turkey is watching very carefully'. The next day his daily telegram reported Britain's failure post-Adana to deliver aid as promised: 'Since Feb. 10 no more weapons had arrived as Turkey will not let Britons train Turks on Turkish soil' -- this being an infringement of Turkish sovereignty and a continual cause of mutual irritation.

The rest of the war in the Eastern Mediterranean can be seen as the aftermath to Adana. But the war itself moved into another gear by the Spring of 1943, and even in the Eastern Mediterranean: for the Soviet Union and the USA something of a backwater, if not for Germany, Italy and Great Britain, Adana faded into the British disaster in the Dodecanese that autumn -- the subject of the next chapter.

After Adana, Turkey was temporarily disappears from DIR, for reason which are not clear. During April the bj telegrams Churchill read concerned alleged separate peace proposals between Russia and Germany, a perennial nightmare quite enough to drive Turkish involvement out of his mind. The Japanese ambassador in Sofia reported fictitious Axis confidence and Churchill annotated to C that 'I presume the President is kept informed of all this rubbish, which none the less (sic) tells its tale of despair'. The next diplomatic intercepts to be circulated came from Kabul where the Italian ambassador reported to Rome that 'nationalist and imperialistic sentiments are completely replacing the communist idea' and Kurihara in Ankara reported that 'British plans [at Adana] entirely miscarried'.

The neutrals, preoccupied with the imminent Italian collapse following the fall of Mussolini, began to wonder what the Allies would do next, when they realised that the initiative had passed from the *Wehrmacht* to the Allied high command. But the second front in the Balkans that was so widely canvassed was never a real starter because Russia would suspect a post-war agenda in any such Anglo-American initiative, while the Americans had no wish to divert any more forces away from North Africa and the beginning of the build-up to the invasion of Sicily and D-Day.

Turkey had been temporarily sidelined by a spasm of massive indecision by all the belligerents, but the Foreign Office continued to play what was left of the Turkey hand.

Department - e.g. 'we do not want a number of Admiral Kellys throwing spanners into the works in the course of independent conversations'. Meanwhile the Air Attaché in Ankara was having his nose put out of joint by the Admiral and indulging in *schadenfreude*. (All citations from PRO FO 371/37466, R1443/55/G44 of 22 March.)
Eden thanked Hugessen for his 'admirable summary' of current negotiations: Orme Sargent
minuted: 'great importance attached to chrome not only from the point of view of Anglo-
Turkish relations but because it is also a touchstone of German/Turkish relations.'
Fortnightly reports on the supply situation were requested using the unbreakable OTP
procedure. A chrome control officer was appointed at the Ministry of Economic Warfare,
which was a regular customer for the commercial as well as the diplomatic section of
Berkeley Street bjs. The commercial counsellor in Ankara was given discretion to agree the
price which Turkey would propose to demand from the Germans in their contract. Price
was 'not to be the determining factor...but we and the Germans are going to pay heavily
for the chrome because it will be the Turks who will fix the price'. The non-arrival of
the equipment promised by Churchill at Adana exacerbated relations.
Ahmet Emin Yalman, the doyen of Turkish journalism wrote about the 'bad Briton', who 'adopts all
sorts of disguises, resorts to all sorts of intrigues ... Nazism and Fascism have merely
become jealous of the English imperialist'. Referring to the non-arrival of war supplies the
journalist asserted that Briton was 'now asking the Turks to throw themselves into the
fire'.
A British military mission arrived in Ankara under General Sir Henry Maitland
Wilson in April but achieved none of its set objectives -- permission for British officers and
troops to train the Turkish soldiery in the weapons, and to develop the runways and
harbours. Kurihara reported Wilson's huge, alarming presence, and added Wilson was
openly critical of İnönü and would cut short his visit to Turkey. The Brazilian
ambassador also reported Wilson's visit: 'finishing touches were being put to the Allies'
offensive against Greece and the Balkans'. Kurihara reported Wilson was too boastful
and, wrongly, that İnönü had been taken in by Allied propaganda.
In London the Southern Department was concerned that control over Turkish affairs
was being wrested from them. For a start Admiral Kelly would not report through the
correct channels (via the ambassador to the Foreign Office) though none could deny that he
had the ear of the senior Turkish military and served a useful purpose. Besides he was the
PM's personal appointee. The Foreign Office could not agree on how to handle their man
in Ankara. When Clutton drafted a note of congratulation to Hugessen ('I have every
confidence that in the coming months you will display the same patience and skill which

113 PRO FO 371/37460, Sargent, minute, 7 February 1943.
114 PRO FO 371/37460, R710/49/44, FO to MEW, 30 January 1943. Also see PRO HW1/1476, bj
115 PRO FO 371/36467, R2986/55/G44, 16 April 1943.
116 Deringil, op. cit., p.147.
117 It is unlikely that Wilson would have access to these diplomatic comments on his Ankara visit, since
GHQ Cairo received Boniface/Enigma but not diplomatic messages.
118 PRO HW1/1621, bj 116615, Ankara to Tokyo, decrypted 20 April 1943; PRO HW1/1621/3036, bj
116613, Ankara to Tokyo, decrypted 4 April 1943; PRO HW1/1621/3036, bj 11613, Ankara to Tokyo,
decrypted 20 April 1943.
proved so valuable in the post') Eden struck it out, perhaps aware of Churchill's view of the ambassador's performance. But when GHQ Middle East sent Wilson, and shortly afterwards Air Chief Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas, Chief of the Air Staff, Middle East, on ill-defined and open-ended quasi-military missions to Ankara the FO tried to put its collective foot down. In fact Wilson's visit concluded with his agreement with Wavell's remark in 1941 that the Turkish army on the Allied side 'would be more a liability than an asset'. Wilson's view of Turkey was perhaps influenced by his having presided over the disastrous 1941 Greek campaign. This might have encouraged a mixture of fear and contempt of the Turkish Military. And any diplomat who could imagine that the titanic battles being then waged between the Russians and Germans in South Russia would be affected by the presence of British military missions in Ankara was seriously out of touch with reality. This is illustrated by Cadogan's draft for a Turkish policy to Hugessen, amended by Eden, who rightly deleted a sublime statement of the obvious: 'it is a problem of steering a course between being too pressing and not being pressing enough'. But the truth was it was not part of Turkish foreign policy to accept Allied matériel, codenamed 'Hardihood', if this entailed alienating not only Germany but Russia as well. Clutton fumed in London that 'the Turks will be taught the lesson which exists in the Christian bible and doubtless in the Koran - that you cannot serve two masters'. In June Hugessen reported, 'I have pretty well given these people up'. Eden asked for the Foreign Office's implementation of Churchill's Turkey policy to be reviewed. Churchill thought the Foreign Office were spoiling his Turkish plans and suspected that not all the foot-dragging was Turkish - some might be British diplomatic and military incompetence. The Foreign Office had the same doubts and instructed Sterndale-Bennett in Ankara to insist to Numan Menemencioglu that 'maximum cooperation with the Turkish government was required', to which Menemencioglu replied that 'we were in effect asking for Turkey to abandon her neutrality. Such a request could not be reconciled with what Churchill said at Adana. There were more than one ways of killing a dog than hanging it'. He was not prepared to provoke German antagonism 'before we are ready to', so the proposed new policy would be difficult. Sargent commented that 'Numan, like every Turk, is convinced the Russians will pour over the Balkans and Persia post-war and envelop Turkey.'

The unstoppable Kurihara submitted 'the following observations, prolix though they be...Turkey unflinchingly and unchangingly leaned towards none of the belligerents, but after Adana leaned towards the Allies.... This does not mean that it is to be feared that Turkey will enter the war...no change in radical policy of continuing to preserve neutrality to the last'. Turkey doubted the possibility of a German victory in the East (Churchill

119 PRO FO 371/44072, R12409/G/44, Clutton draft note, 9 August 1943.
120 PRO FO371/37467, R3573/55/G44, Wilson to War Office, 19 April 1943.
121 PRO FO 371/37467, R3087/55/G44, Cadogan draft memorandum, Clutton and Eden, minutes, and Hugessen to FO, 15 April to June 1943; PRO FO 371/34461, R5310/55/G44, Sargent, 27 April 1943.
122 PRO FO 371/34461, R5310/55/G44, Sargent, 27 April 1943.
sidelined). But the Western Allies would not beat the Germans. Turkish neutrality was based on a possible threat from Soviet Russia. Turkey was merely borrowing the power of Britain, using it as a catspaw to guard against the danger of Bolshevism after the war. British talk of occupying Turkish airbases to attack the Balkans was propaganda. The British failed to get Turkey in and settled 'for second best'. The Axis think the Turks may offer nominal resistance and may be drawn in by the enemy. If Germany is defeated on the Eastern front 'Russo/Japanese relations will be important'.

Kurihara may have been prolix but he had got close to the heart of the Turkish leadership. His colleague, the Spanish ambassador in London, was less reliable when he commented: 'Churchill will be driven out by leftwing elements, legally or illegally'. This C forwarded to Churchill commenting, 'This is an amusing example of the nonsense which the Japanese forward to Tokyo'. Churchill ticked the comment.

By mid-May, when the main Axis forces surrendered in Tunisia, Churchill supposed that Italy had ceased to be a potential danger to Turkey, so continued to play the Turkey hand, commenting that 'Turkey...had always measured herself with Italy in the Mediterranean' and should now 'enter the war...The moment had come when a ...request might be made to Turkey for permission to use bases in her territory' which 'could hardly fail to be successful if Italy was out of the war'. What had Churchill in mind? Controversy has continued: what is clear is that by now Turkey loomed as large as Italy in his war strategy. However the Americans declined to join the pressurising of Turkey, and thought their bombers were better used in Italy than in Turkey. The British were left to play their hand without American support. This Anglo-American dispute led later in the year to the debacle in the Dodecanese and extended Turkish suspicions of the Allies when apparently acting in concert. The fall of Mussolini, then Russian ambitions in the Balkans and Aegean, together with American withdrawal of interest in that part of the world, led Turkey in 1943 to hope for the defeat of the Allied powers with particular vehemence and she strengthened her ties with Germany. Other neutrals reflected on 'how small a guarantee British protection can give and that in general it cannot be trusted.'

Bjs loomed large again. When Churchill was in Washington to discuss French affairs with Roosevelt, some 17 of them were sent to Washington for him, as well as daily summaries of their content. In the intercepts of early May, the bjs really contained little

---

123 PRO HWI/1626, bj 116723, Ankara to Tokyo, decrypted 22 April 1943.
126 PRO HWI/1702, bj 11719, Rome to Ankara, decrypted 24 May 1943; PRO HWI/1703/118, bj 117915, London to Baghdad, decrypted 25 May 1943. PRO HWI/1707 Ultra summaries for Commodore Spencer[Churchill] 'to be handed over personally, then to retrieve document for destruction by yourself.'
more than secret, but largely inconsequential diplomatic chatter. That they were so urgently
needed by Churchill, despite this, shows how he read bjs not only for there particular
content, but for the overall view of the war the cumulatively presented. Balkan leaders
showed themselves restlessly waiting for the invasion of Turkey. Antonescu thought there
was no alternative.\footnote{PRO HWI/1709, G 45 (ISK) sent 30 May 1943; PRO HWI/1715, bj 118510, Rome to Ankara, decrypted
27 May 1943; PRO HWI/1716, bj 118510, Rome to Ankara, decrypted 1 June 1943.}
The Greek ambassador in Ankara reported more of Saraçoglu's indiscretion. The Japanese ambassador in Rome reported that Turkey was preparing for a
joint assault on the Dodecanese with the British and told his colleague in Kuibyshev of
Saraçoglu's latest indiscretions.\footnote{PRO HWI/1659/3171, bj 117985, Berlin to Tokyo, decrypted 2 May 1943.}

The Japanese ambassador in Rome reported a talk with a Turkish colleague:
'Turkey had no territorial ambition and would maintain neutrality'. But the Turkish General
Staff was gearing up towards a joint landing with the British on 'two or three of the
Dodecanese...sufficient to safeguard navigation in the Mediterranean'. On June 10 the
Japanese foreign ministry circulated a directive reporting 'efforts made to get Turkey into
the war by the Anglo-Saxons'. The next day Raphael, the long serving Greek ambassador
in Turkey, reported to London that Berlin thought the Allies would push towards the
Balkans through Turkey; while in Moscow (whither he had returned from Kuibyshev, now
that the Soviets were winning) the Turkish ambassador, Açikalin, reported that the
Germans were profiting by the time they had 'before the opening of the European front by
the Turks, British and Americans. The Russians were expecting the opening of Second
Front by the Turks; the Germans would cope with the Eastern front first, by peace
overtures or victory'.\footnote{PRO HWI/1721, bj 118658, Budapest to Tokyo, decrypted 7 June 1943.}

In mid-June Kurihara summed up his view of Turkish policy towards both Axis
and Allies. The Turkish press was worried about German defensiveness: 'There was a
tendency towards friendship for England manifest after Adana, but this was thought to be
less marked. The press were instructed to be less anti-Axis. Turkey was becoming politer
towards Germany again.' However an Oshima despatch on the war situation reported the
view that 'the contact you know of that possibly the main allied offensive will be in the
Eastern Mediterranean through the Dardanelles, the coercion of Turkey, to threaten
Roumania and Bulgaria through the Black Sea' (Churchill sidelined). 'All Axis powers
retain respect for the British navy -- as friend or enemy'.\footnote{PRO HWI/1914/44077, bj 129892, Ankara to Rio de Janiero, decrypted 4 August 1943. PRO
HWI/1921, bj 122660, Ankara to Tokyo, decrypted 25 August 1943.}

This was a very productive period for Berkeley Street. The overwhelming interest
of the neutral diplomatic world in events in the Mediterranean ensured that Turkey would
continue to dominate the bjs. Churchill annotated many of them, and sent some to Eden for comment. But earlier in this chapter the question was raised whether our new knowledge of bjs in mid-1943 would require the re-writing of the history of Turco-British relations. Bjs, as is clear from the foregoing pages, acted as a spur to Churchill, the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff. Their recent reappearance as HW1 in the PRO enables the historian to focus on the different ways in which neutral diplomats reacted to events in the Mediterranean and how the British leadership reacted to the neutrals' reports, but requires little re-writing of the record. The official military historian's account of Adana, already quoted, adequately summed up the situation and requires no revision.

The love/hate affair between Turkey and Churchill with his intercepts and Eden with his secretariat at the Foreign Office can now be seen to be the main feature in the months after Adana. Churchill can be seen to have outgunned Eden in at least four respects: first over Europe, by letting him follow the American foreign policy line set by Harry Hopkins; next over the Empire, as a longtime imperialist who could use Turkey's geographical situation as part of his imperial defence policy; next over the USA, because of his special relationship with Roosevelt, which was foundering by late 1943, but which was never replaced by anyone else; and finally over the Soviet Union. Both British statesmen were at times seduced by Stalin's bearlike charm, but Stalin's non-ideological approach to British politics was closer to Churchill than Eden's enthusiastic pro-Soviet stance. Churchill's obsession with Turkey persisted, but from this time on, instead of the Foreign Office, it would be the service ministries and Eisenhower, who would effectively block Churchill's private war against Hitler, to be waged off Turkish waters, and possibly even on Turkish soil, with the object of bringing Turkey into the war. The use and abuse of signals intelligence during Dodecanese campaign in the autumn of 1943, and the activities of the spy 'Cicero' in filching, photographing and reading highly secret Foreign Office documents (possibly included diplomatic intercepts) at Hugessen's residence during the same period, are the subjects of the next two chapters.
Chapter Six

CHURCHILL’S 'ISLAND PRIZES LOST' REVISITED

(i) Preparations for the Dodecanese Assault (ii) The Dodecanese Assault and Counter-Assault (iii) Churchill Attempts Counter-Attack (iv) Diplomatic Consequences of Failure (v) Churchill and Turkey: November 1943 (vi) The Conferences

(i) Preparations for the Dodecanese Assault

What is new in this chapter is the evidence from bjs reflecting neutral surprise, disappointment and secret glee at British failures in the Aegean. By contrast the Germans, though beaten in North Africa and South Russia and forced to revive Italian resistance by taking over control of the country as the Allied invasion gradually developed, were able to ignore their air inferiority and the lacklustre performance of their former comrades in arms to retake the crucial Dodecanese. This reminded the rest of the world that the invincible Wehrmacht of 1941 still had a fearsome power to achieve Hitler's commands. This chapter relates Allied and Axis preparations for the fighting in the Aegean in October 1943, to the cause, course and consequences of the Dodecanese campaign, and also the manner in which British policy in the Eastern Mediterranean reflected the differing understanding of both service and diplomatic intercepts shown by the COS, the Foreign Office and the Prime Minister.

For Churchill this phase of the war was unbearably distressing, as he reveals on pp.199-200 in the chapter 'Island Prizes Lost' in volume 5 (Closing the Ring) of his history. All other historians of the Dodecanese disaster have used this chapter as a prime source. Churchill knew from reading bjs that the surrender of Italy gave the Allies 'the chance of gaining important prizes in the Aegean at very small cost and effort'. His determination to pick up these treasures was thwarted mainly by the United States' Chiefs of Staff who redirected the landing craft needed in the Dodecanese to India, insisted on withholding both troops and ships for the Eastern Mediterranean, and saw any resurgent Balkan initiative sponsored by Churchill as yet another attempt to postpone or avoid Operation Overlord. General Wilson's handling of the situation from faraway Cairo was also criticised, both at the time by the press and later by historians of the war. Eisenhower was reluctant to back Churchill's initiative, Tedder argued against sending air support to the Islands while the invasion of mainland Italy was in full swing.1 There was a change of command in the British navy (John Cunningham taking on the Mediterranean from his cousin Andrew) that resulted in poor naval co-ordination and support of British invading

---

1 PRO PREM 3/446/10, p.163, no. 092001.
troops already outmanoeuvred by the Germans who rediscovered their earlier skills at combined operations at the personal insistence of Hitler. The Führer believed the Allies planned, and had the resources, to mount a successful Balkan front from Turkey, giving the Anglo-Saxons credit for an invasion scheme which never existed except in the mind of Churchill. The Dodecanese can thus be presented as something of a personal contest between the two warlords, won by Hitler, which disrupted Churchill's immediate plans to involve Turkey in the war. By the summer of 1943, he wrote, 'the command of the Aegean by air and by sea was within our reach. The effect of this might be decisive upon Turkey, at the time deeply moved by the Italian collapse'. 'My parleys with the Turks were intended to prepare the way for her entry into the war in Autumn 1943....This did not happen because of unfortunate events in the Aegean.'

This chapter leans heavily on Churchill's own account of what happened in the Dodecanese, as does the official military historian's chapter on the same subject. It remains definitive, if partisan, despite the recent access to Boniface enjoyed by more recent war historians, one of whom, Professor Hinsley, draws substantially on Enigma/Fish intercepts when retelling the story of the campaign. At the start of his exposition of the Dodecanese imbroglio Molony quotes Churchill's brief to the COS of 2 August 1943: 'Here is a business of great consequence to be thrust forward by every means...I hope the Staffs will be able to stimulate action which may gain immense prizes at little cost though not at little risk'. Churchill's archaic rhetoric may have been a subconscious smokescreen to conceal his lurking conviction that the risks were unquantifiable and the chances of success doubtful given the other Mediterranean priorities. Molony adds that the Germans 'largely through war's extraordinary chance...won a resounding tactical success but no long-term advantage'.

Professor Hinsley's history is based, as already noted, on his privileged access to Dir/C archive. The influence of Enigma messages when delivered in time for appropriate reactions is compellingly demonstrated. British success against enemy shipping, for instance, was directly derived from timely Ultra. But growing delays in W/T communications, doubtful interpretations of enemy intentions and the non-availability of combat-worthy aircraft led to inadequate (or 'unsatisfactory' in the phrase used by the Enigma translator in Hut 4 and also by Churchill) British resistance to well-mounted enemy

---


3 See Sheila Lawlor, Churchill and the Politics of War, 1940-1941 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) for a definitive analysis of the part Churchill's own war histories plays in the historiography of World War Two. The author concludes, (p.11) it is Churchill's history which is reflected in much subsequent interpretation'.

combined operations. Hinsley's account of the Dodecanese echoes that of Molony, Howard and Roskill and is a classic statement not just of the usefulness of sigint to the Allies at the time, but of the smallness of the changes needed to the historical record already in place.\textsuperscript{5} The intelligence historians were faced with two problems common to all the official histories dealing with the last years of the war: the massive volume of data available; and the difficulty of avoiding duplication with the \textit{Grand Strategy} and \textit{Theatre} series.\textsuperscript{6}

Where this account of events in the Aegean in the autumn of 1943 differs from the others cited is in identifying Churchill's continued determination to mount a major Balkan campaign, if possible from Turkish soil, to bring Turkey into the war, to impress the neutrals and to divert up to 30 German divisions from the Russian front, all without jeopardizing the invasion of Italy and the ultimate invasion of Western Europe. When the combined operation failed in the Dodecanese he was faced with the consequences of his over-ambitious scheme, with some impairment of his credibility. His interest in the area, and political instinct to maximise the fallout from Mussolini's downfall can both be identified with his parallel reading of bjs throughout 1943. For instance, a bj decrypted and read on 12 July 1943 told Churchill he \textit{[Churchill]} regarded Turkey as the key to victory.\textsuperscript{7}

A miscalculation by the C-in-C Middle East as to German strength and intentions in the area was caused by the very success of the Allied deception operation codenamed 'Mincemeat' in persuading the enemy that the Allied plan for Operation 'Husky' was a major landing in the Aegean. The Germans thereby believed in an Allied invasion of the Balkans in the summer of 1943 and transferred extra troops, ships, aircraft and guns and ammunition to this front, thus making it more unlikely, and ultimately impossible, for Wilson's pared-down operation against the Dodecanese to succeed. 'OKW was aware that the Allies were practising deception on a large scale.'\textsuperscript{8}

Churchill's plan included getting Turkey into the war that autumn. Operations in the Dodecanese were planned in late November 1942 as a preliminary step. But skilled Turkish delaying tactics (already noted), as well as British reverses off the Turkish coast, aborted the plan. As far back as 7 February 1941 the War Office had speculated on Hitler's intentions in South East Europe, noting that 'his object in attacking Turkey would be to advance ultimately through Anatolia to Egypt', adding that if Great Britain 'is defeated by invasion this will prove unnecessary'.\textsuperscript{9} By 27 November 1942 the tide had turned and the Joint Intelligence Committee now considered opportunities for Allied action in the Balkans


\textsuperscript{7} PRO HW1/1824, bj 119921, (Greek) Washington to London, 12 July 1943.

\textsuperscript{8} Hinsley, op. cit., Vol. 3 Part 1, p.120.

\textsuperscript{9} PRO WO 190/893/22832, 'German Intentions in Southeast Europe,' n. d., p.3, paragraph 8.
from Turkey. At Casablanca in January 1943 an Allied strategy that promoted action in the Mediterranean at the expense of the war in the Far East was accepted and on 12 February 1943 Wilson was directed by the COS to prepare for amphibious operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. The next month the Joint Planners considered what should follow the projected invasion of Sicily, and the plan to bring Turkey into the war, codenamed 'Hardihood', was discussed on 20 April. By 7 July Kurihara reported (to Tokyo, and of course to Churchill and the Southern Department) the Ankara view that because a second front in the West would involve heavy casualties there would be no second front, either in the Balkans or in France that year, and therefore no change in Turkish neutrality. The Anglo-Saxons 'cannot lay hands on Europe' and '...in a state of semi-paralysis have set about exerting themselves to win over Turkey...'. On 20 July Wilson developed no less than three versions of the planned operation in the Eastern Mediterranean, to be known as 'Accolade', and in early August opted for an opportunistic 'quick' assault in the wake of the Italian collapse, reflecting Churchill's political effort to maximise Mussolini's misfortunes. Throughout August Wilson's quick plan was delayed by General Dwight D. Eisenhower and Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, for reasons which certainly included the fact that neither of them had access to Dedip. On the 12th Eisenhower, Alexander and Tedder revised their recent commitment to 'Accolade' and a week later the 'Quadrant' Conference (14-24 August) limited Churchill's freedom of action in the Dodecanese. Despite this Wilson signalled on 23 August that he was loading the 'Accolade' taskforce (the 26th Indian Brigade at Suez) and on 31 August he was forced to tell the Supreme Commander that 'Any enterprise against Rhodes or Crete except as unopposed walk-in is now impossible'.

Hitler was challenged by the Italian collapse to save the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. He had not lost all the initiative after the battle of Stalingrad, because thanks to Manstein's Spring 1943 victories, he was able to launch the Kursk initiative on 5 July, disastrous to Germany though it proved. He had been waiting (as had the neutrals) ever since for a combined Allied war strategy to emerge, to exploit the fall of Italy. Alanbrooke blamed himself for failing to bring the Americans to exploit the Mediterranean. Churchill,

11 PRO HW1/1800(3765), bj 1196696, Istanbul to Tokyo, decrypted 6 July 1943.
12 By the summer of 1943 diplomatic intercepted traffic distributed in Whitehall had become known as Dedip.
13 Walker, op. cit., p.58.
14 Soviet historians have given some of the credit for the Red Army's great tank battle victory in the Kursk salient to (amongst others) a British cryptographer working at Bletchley, who supplied the Russians with priceless information, derived from Boniface, on the thickness of German tank armour, enabling Soviet war workers to produce armour-piercing weaponry capable of knocking out the German tanks. (He was not, of course, authorised to do so.) His name was John Cairncross. (See C. Borovik, *The Philby Files* (London: Little Brown, 1994), p. 377).
who had always backed this project, pressurised him remorselessly. If only Alanbrooke
had done so, perhaps Crete and Rhodes would have been taken and the gateway to the
Danube opened.\textsuperscript{15} The Balkan Front never happened, partly because there was no agreed
Allied policy in the Mediterranean, or in any other area, except on the unconditional
surrender of Germany, and how that was to be achieved depended on the when and how of
the Second Front in the West. Stalin knew this, and so did Churchill and Roosevelt,
though the former exercised his ingenuity and persuasiveness over the months to postpone
D-Day until the chances of victory were significantly increased. Playing the Turkey card,
therefore, was his individual contribution to the strategic debates of 1943.

The aftermath of Adana had left Turco-Allied relations in disarray, although
protestations of friendship alternated with mutual criticism. In Ankara, Ambassador
Hugessen was entrusted with the thankless task of mitigating Turkish resentment at the
non-arrival of the promised \textit{matériel}; of neutralising the effect on diplomatic opinion of the
British failure to stop Turkey selling chrome to Germany; and of keeping a watchful eye
through intercepts, through agents via SOE and SIS and via some good service \textit{attachés}
stationed in Ankara, on the progress of the war on the Eastern front and its effect on
Turkish views about whether and who to join. Kurihara reported to Tokyo from Ankara
that Turkey respected the power of the Axis and had refused to let the Allies set up repair
shops and store goods in Turkey. Churchill marked this intercept for the FS \{Foreign
Secretary\} to see. Churchill optimistically expected the invasion of Sicily would speedily
lead to the collapse of Italy, and 'this should fix the moment for putting the strongest
pressure on Turkey to act in accordance with the spirit of the alliance.'\textsuperscript{16} The view in
Kuibyshev was rather different. There the Turkish military attaché reported that a second
front was vital, with 'various parts of Europe, especially France, being the optimum points;
thus Germany would withdraw forces from the Eastern front and so Germany would be
defeated by Russia'.\textsuperscript{17} He was right, but it was to take nearly two more years.

Diplomatic intercepts, this thesis seeks to demonstrate, played a key role in
Churchill's handling, or mishandling, of the Dodecanese campaign. October and
November saw the British defeated by German troops in the Aegean in a disaster regarded
by the press at the time as of the same order as the Dieppe raid and the Cretan campaign of
1941.\textsuperscript{18} It was a smallish side-show, so far as the Americans, who gave no help, were
concerned. But it was an important strand not only in Churchill's personal war strategy but
also in Hitler's, who insisted his forces retain Rhodes whatever the cost, partly to pin

Alanbrooke diary entry for 28 October 1943.
\textsuperscript{16} Churchill, op. cit., p.255.
\textsuperscript{17} PRO HW1/1885(4003), bj 120446, Kuibyshev to Ankara, decrypted 27 July 1943. Kuibyshev was 500
kilometres East of Moscow. The entire international diplomatic corps was relocated there in September
1941 on Stalin's orders, returning to Moscow in late 1943.
\textsuperscript{18} See L. Marsland Gander in the \textit{Daily Telegraph} of 9 November 1943.
down a number of non-existent British divisions which he had been deceived into locating in the area, and partly because it was generally expected that the Allies would build on their North African success not only by invading Italy but also by establishing a Balkan front to the East.

Initially it was not Churchill but Wilson who sponsored the Dodecanese débâcle. What use Wilson made of Boniface is not known but Churchill would have learnt not only of the build-up of enemy forces but the reason for the success of the British deception operation referred to earlier. So why did he press it? The clearest answer comes from his own directive to the COS: 'at no little risk'. That, he certainly knew, was an understatement. Thirty years before he had flung 250,000 imperial troops through the Dardanelles where they were mown down by Turkish bullets. It might be thought that he was trying again, because an aggressive mode had to be sustained: victory would have brought substantial benefit to the Allies, including the possible acquisition of Turkey as an ally. Like Queen Victoria he was not interested in the possibilities of defeat: unlike her, he knew they existed. But he pressed on with the operation disregarding the intercepts which pointed to Hitler's determination to retain the islands, despite inferiority in numbers and the pessimism of his local commanders.

Since 1940 Churchill's instinct had played with a second front in the Balkans. In June 1941 'Barbarossa' had put this on a backburner. But Turkey always hoped for an Allied invasion from the Dodecanese and the Straits. The Turks did not realize that the Americans had no intention of deflecting their war effort to these remote regions and away from their primary areas of concern - the Far East, North Africa, Sicily and Italy; and, eventually, 'Overlord': while the British had neither the troops, the organisation nor the psychological energy to plan realistically for a Balkan thrust along the Danube to Vienna. The Balkan project withered from 1941 till D-Day when it died. But in September 1943 it bore bitter fruit in Wilson's attempt to take over the islands from the Italians only to lose them to the Germans. Behind Wilson loomed both Alanbrooke and Churchill who maintained daily telegraphic contact with the C-in-C from 10 September to the end of November. Hitler for his part insisted on his local commanders, and in particular Lieutenant General Frederich Müller, maintaining the initiative despite poor weather, lack of backup and the demand for all resources, especially aircraft, on the Eastern front. Müller's island-hopping in the Dodecanese, first to rid them of the Italians, next to expel or kill British troops and terrorise the islanders, impress the neutrals and strengthen Hitler's Eastern Front at its Southernmost point, can be partly explained by two factors which the release of DIR newly establish. One, as has been shown, was the success of Dudley

---

Clarke's deception campaign in the Eastern Mediterranean, which had established some 10 (non-existent) Allied divisions in the Mediterranean, ostensibly in preparation for an invasion of the Balkans.\(^1\) Hitler believed that he needed to maintain aggressive pressure in the area to prevent a full-scale British invasion of the Balkans. The other was the reinstatement of Mussolini as a German puppet. Hitler clung to his friendship with the Italian dictator -- as much in bad times as in good -- and this led him to believe in an Italian *risorgimento* that never happened. The ups and downs of Mussolini's later career path were carefully monitored by neutral diplomats for whom he remained a pivotal figure in Mediterranean politics. Both factors influenced Hitler's determined stance in the Aegean that autumn. Mussolini had been toppled from power on 25 July, replaced by Badoglio, who tried -- from 3 August to 3 September -- to conclude a separate peace with the Allies and remove Italy from the war. The bjs of the period comment on his failure to put together a credible administration. Italy's surrender seemed imminent and the COS therefore decided to concentrate all resources on polishing off one third of the Axis. At the 'Quadrant' Conference the Americans recognised the psychological frailty of British military thinking. (The U.S. Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson told Roosevelt just before 'Quadrant': 'The shadows of Passchendaele and Dunkirk still hang too heavily over the imagination of the leaders of the [British] government'.\(^2\) The Americans saw in Churchill's interest in recapturing the Dodecanese -- particularly Rhodes -- no more than an attempt to evade or postpone Overlord, while the COS knew that unless many German divisions were pinned down in Italy, Overlord might prove a costly and terrible disaster -- so neither group was keen to divert forces needed elsewhere to support Churchill, who saw in a Dodecanese venture ('Accolade', afterwards 'Saturn') as an ideal opportunity to get Turkey in.

Speculation on the opening of a Balkan front continued throughout August, a month which also saw preparations for the campaign.\(^3\) What followed was a catalogue of countermanded orders, reflecting principally Eisenhower's lack of understanding of the political importance of a successful Aegean operation. On 1 August Wilson opted for a scaled down, improvisatory 'Accolade'. The next day, Churchill wrote to him: 'Here is a business of great consequence to be thrust forward by every means. Should the Italians in Crete and Rhodes resist the Germans and a deadlock ensue, we must help the Italians at the earliest moment, encouraging thereby also the support of the populations'.\(^4\) On 3 August he ordered the COS to stop supplying Turkey and to work up an action plan for the Dodecanese. On 5 August Wilson asked Eisenhower for 8 ships, 4 squadrons of Lightnings, transport aircraft and troops, to arrive in the Middle East by 14-15 August. On

---


\(^3\) Holland, *op. cit.*, p.168.

7th Eisenhower agreed to some but not all of these requests, but five days later he and Tedder reconsidered the commitment and urged the abandonment of Accolade. The Quadrant Conference set limits to operations in the Aegean, yet despite this drastic change in Allied Mediterranean priorities Wilson signalled Eisenhower of 23 August that he was loading the taskforce for 'Accolade'. Eisenhower and Tedder kept their eyes steadfastly on the invasions of Sicily and mainland Italy and would let no matériel be diverted eastwards for Churchill's risky and badly thought out campaign in the Aegean.

This section has linked Hitler's mistaken presumption that a sizeable British force was assembling in the Eastern Mediterranean to open a Balkan front from Turkey with Churchill's need, backed by Wilson, for a successful takeover of the Dodecanese. The two warlords studied each other's intercepts, on the basis of which Hitler insisted on his combined forces taking and holding Rhodes against all opposition, while Churchill unavailingly begged Roosevelt for troops and aircraft to secure the other islands. Hitler won, Churchill lost. But by the autumn of 1943 an Allied victory was only a matter of time, and the official historian correctly observed that the disaster did not have long-lasting implications for the outcome of the war.

(ii) The Dodecanese Assault and Counter-Assault

Churchill attempted to wrest the Dodecanese from the Axis in a curiously personal way. 'Improvise and dare,' he cabled to Wilson on 9 September, the day of the Allied Salerno landings south of Naples and the day after Italy's surrender: 'This is the time to play high'. And on 13 September he telegraphed Wilson: 'The capture of Rhodes by you at this time with Italian aid would be a fine contribution to the general war.' On 25 September he telegraphed Eisenhower: 'Rhodes is the key both to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean. It will (sic) be a great disaster if the Germans are able to consolidate there'. On the same day he learnt that an unknown naval convoy was due at Milos at 0400 hours, due to sail again at 1700 hours for Candia (Crete). This was the moment to attack the Germans operating out of Athens. Operational instructions were issued the same day. First Rhodes, then Cos, then Leros had become the target for a British assault and a successful German counter-assault.

Wilson was to undertake the long-planned capture of Rhodes largely by bluff, since Eisenhower by now refused support, for reasons already given. He had to be content to try and occupy the lesser Dodecanese islands, Kastellorizo, Leros, Cos and Samos, while sending an Inter-Service Mission to Rhodes to treat with General Scarioni and Admiral Campioni and attempt to destroy the 7,000 strong German Assault Division based on Rhodes. If this was successful he planned to land the 234th Infantry Brigade in three

26 PRO HW1/2043(4450), naval headlines 810 of 25 July 1943.
merchant ships, not assault loaded: success would depend on the use of the harbour at Rhodes and the airfields on which one or two squadrons of Spitfires would be ready to land. But Müller managed to catch him off balance. On 9 September Hitler ordered Müller to resist all attacks on Rhodes from any source, and when on 9-10 September Major the Earl Jellicoe led the Inter-Service Mission to Scarioni and Campioni, the German General Klemann seized the former while on 11 September the latter ordered the Italian garrison on Rhodes to capitulate to the Germans. The Germans had adjusted to the possible loss of Italy following the Axis collapse in North Africa in May 1943, by training General Klemann's mobile division on Rhodes to be able, in the event, both to accept the surrender of far more numerous Italian troops there, and then also repel the British assault of Rhodes. It is worth repeating that it was on Hitler's personal orders that the islands were to be held, to head off the mythical Allied invasion of South Eastern Europe from Turkey.

Churchill continued to exchange signals with Wilson, who kept Churchill in touch with his scaled down assault on the smaller islands in a signal the following day. On 17 September a substantial force of imperial troops invaded Cos. On 21 September Wilson submitted similar plans to the COS for Leros and two days later the Second Battalion of the Royal West Kent Regiment (minus B company) invaded Samos. But the next day the German Assault Group was assembled to retake Cos and plan the retaking of Leros under the codename 'Leopard'. On 27 September an intelligence report on the Aegean situation noted that (German) landing craft left for Piraeus with all the Italians on Kythera. Drache was attacked off Syros; Polone was blown up and an unspecified operation by Bulgaria was postponed for twenty-four hours owing to lack of air escort. The Greek ship Elleni Coliorio sailed from Pegadia but was set on fire by the Luftwaffe south of Skarpanto. Bj 137725 reported two landing craft and 200 troops on Mytilene were to 'operate against the island of Chios'. Cephallonia was occupied by the Germans on 26 September after a heroic ten-day Italian resistance and nearly 100 Italian officers were executed as traitors to the Axis cause. Churchill, learning of this from an Enigma decrypt, exploited the German atrocity for all it was worth, stirring the Turks, Italians and French with this news of

27 The following PRO DIR/C HW1 files contain messages directly relevant to British handling of the Dodecanese campaign: 2006; 2043(4550) of 25 July, naval headlines 810; 2051(4476) of 27 July; 2058 (4501) of 29 July; 2067 (4531) of 2 October; 2076 (4550) of 4 October; 2080 (4563) of 5 October; 2082 (4567) of 6 October; 2085 (4574) of 6 October; 2094 (4041) of 9 October; 2097, 2118 (4690) of 16 October; 2122 (4700) of 18 October; 2132 (4774) of 21 October; 2142 (4757) of 21 October; 2150 (4778) of 22 October; 2162 (4804) of 26 October; 2163 (4804) of 26 October; 2185, 2187 (4855) of 31 October, 2190 of 1 November; 2202 (4888) of 3 November; 2212, 2219 (4935) of 5 November; 2220 (4938) of 10 November; 2221 (4940) of 7 November; 2222 (4943) of 8 November; 2226 (4951) of 9 November; 2224 (4973) of 10 November; 2226 (4978) of 11 November.

28 First Battalion Durham Light Infantry, 29th Squadron RAF Regiment with light Anti-Aircraft weapons and the 7th Squadron South African Air Force with 7 Spitfires.

29 PRO HW1/2051, intelligence report of the Aegean situation, 27 September 1943. This was marked TOO (type once only), an alternative acronym for OTP.

German callousness. On Kythera the Italians joined the Greek partisans and offered stout resistance on Andros. On 2 October the Italians were being disarmed by the Germans on Andros, and operations were in progress against Naxos, Paros and Antiparos. Reinforcements were requested for the garrison on Syra. The next day Cos fell to a German Group of 2,000 troops, 17 ships and 130 bombers after what Churchill (picking up the phrase from its opposite in a Fish intercept) described as 'unsatisfactory resistance'. The day after, he was heavily marking an intercept which contained the following German signal:

The aim of the enemy [in the Aegean] is clearly apparent. It is to obtain possession of the Dodecanese islands and to create there sea and air bases from which to cripple shipping in the Aegean which will serve for a base from which to launch an operation against Northern Greece - Salonika - from the Aegean, if it should be undertaken. Daily recces are requested and if possible a survey twice a day of the naval base of Leros which dominates the Aegean, is necessary in order to obtain a picture of the further intentions of the enemy.

Despite German successes amongst some of the islands, by the end of September the British had established themselves on Cos, Leros, Samos, Simi, Stampalia, and Icaria. By 3 October Churchill was telegraphing Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, C-in-C Allied Air Forces in the Mediterranean: 'Cos is highly important and a reverse there would be most vexatious. I am sure I can rely on you to turn on all your heat from every quarter, especially during this lull in Italy'; and to Eisenhower on the same date: 'We are much concerned about Cos, and are sure you will do all in your power to prevent a vexatious injury to future plans occurring through the loss of Cos'. Eisenhower and Tedder strengthened their view that the Italian campaign -- however it developed -- would need all available allied resources. They were right about this in the long run, but Churchill knew from Dedip (and they might therefore have not known that he knew, not being privy to this source) that sparing a substantial force of men and equipment for the Eastern Mediterranean might have paid off. Their reading of Boniface and consequential appreciation of the war throughout the Mediterranean led them to a cautious and negative response. Dedip also told him the von Papen threat to Turkey - that the Germans would bomb Istanbul if they allowed the Allies to use air bases on Turkish soil -- was no longer a realistic option for Germany. It was unlikely that Hitler would have sanctioned such a move anyhow.

For Churchill, things were going from bad to worse, and the strongest political factor in the whole Aegean imbroglio of 1941-43 was Turkey's determination to stay out of the conflict unless she was attacked. Across Turkey's neutral coastal waters plied the ships, refugees, spies and supplies of many countries large and small, for the inhabitants of the

31 PRO HW1/2067 (4531) of 2 October 1943.
32 PRO HW1/2076 (4550) of 4 October 1943.
33 Churchill, op. cit., p.186.
Dodecanese were mostly of Greek descent, and they had reluctantly put up with the Italian occupation two years before. To find themselves in great danger from a British invasion, and a consequential German reprisal, led to great bitterness, heavy casualties, and the shooting of hostages. Between the Greeks and Turks there was (and is) little love lost. By 5 October 600 British troops had been taken prisoner on Cos, and much booty captured. Churchill circled 'an Italian colonel shot'. 2,500 other Italians, with guns, cutters and 'one luxury yacht for the use of Oc Battle Gruppe', were also captured. German losses were reported as 15 killed, 70 wounded. Mopping up continued. That same day the German army assault division was assigned to Rhodes; a 3-page Ultra intercept set out who was occupying which island; 'about 700 Italians went to the bottom in the SS Ardena. Good results were reported on Antimachia (Cos). There were indications, too, of impending operations against Naxos 'compiled from a document seen by source'. The Luftwaffe reported Germany was in complete possession of Cos. Churchill circled German 'losses small in the face of tough English resistance', indicating his concern that German losses were not serious, and possibly contrary to what was being reported to him from Cairo. The Cos situation was still fluid and 'it is not certain whether Müller was in Crete or somewhere in the Dodecanese (e.g. Rhodes) when he sent his report'. The same day the Germans were ordered to occupy Amorgis (in the Cyclades) and then go on to assist their fellows on Cos. German landing craft laden with prisoners were heading from Cos to the Piraeus.

Roosevelt, as we have seen, was more inclined to respect Turkish sensitivities than the other warlords, and much less interested in the Eastern Mediterranean. So his 'final negative quenched [Churchill's] last hopes'. Churchill told Wilson: 'I am doing all I can', and on 7 October telegraphed Wilson: 'I'll back you through thick and thin even if things go wrong provided everything in human power is done'. Wilson's reply the next day referred to 'intelligence from all sources, including most secret sources', indicating that Enigma decrypts to GHQ Middle East were being read. How it was thought possible to coordinate resistance to the Germans in the Aegean from 700 miles away in Cairo (or even in Cyprus) remains a question to which military historians have no clear answer. They tend to pin blame for the Dodecanese disaster not on Wilson but Tedder, who refused to supply air cover except tokenly even when Allied superiority in the Mediterranean was massive --

34 PRO HW1/2080 (4563), JP6325, 15 October 1943.
35 All from PRO PREM 3/3/3.
36 The legend B% here might indicate input from Broadway Buildings (M16) or more likely Hut 3 at Bletchley Park - elsewhere 'comment'. It is worth noting that the % symbol is also used regularly on those Venona decrypts which have recently been released by the National Security Agency on Internet, indicating input from the cryptographic, assessment, discrimination or translation sections.
37 PRO HW1/2080 (4563) of 4 October and 2082 (4567) of 6 October 1943.
38 The report has the symbol C% indicating that C had added his comment to the message.
4,000 Allied aircraft to 800 Axis. On 10 October Churchill pursued the chimera of island prizes by telegraphing Wilson: 'If you are left to take a setback it will be bad. Do not therefore undertake this on the cheap. Demand what is necessary and consult with Alexander. I am doing all I can'. And the following day, 'Cling on if you possibly can. It will be a splendid achievement. Talk it over with Eden, and see what help you can get from the Turk. If after everything has been done you are forced to quit, I will support you, but victory is the prize'. Two days later, on 12 October, Eden met Wilson and the Middle East commanders in Cairo, where it was agreed that Cos could not be recaptured but Leros should be retained and everything depended on 'Handcuff', the assault on Rhodes, now known by commanders on the spot to be impossible. Kalymnos had been captured and garrisoned by the Germans on 7 October, and Müller postponed Leopard (the operation for Cos) 'for naval technical reasons'. On 16 October HW1/2118 confirmed the enemy knew that Accolade could not now be staged. Tedder's view had prevailed. Bad weather was feared, but that produced equal hazards for both sides. Churchill minuted to Portal, 'is all this to stop altogether? It seems very profitable'. By then Cos was being used as a base for German attacks on other islands. Churchill minuted to the COS via Ismay (his usual route): 'What actually is being left to ME? Are they getting any bombing help from Tedder?' and reminded them of Tedder's responsibility for the Eastern as well as the central Mediterranean area. Later, Alanbrooke blamed himself on 1 November: 'If only I had had sufficient force of character to swing [the Americans] how different the war might be. We should have had the whole Balkans ablaze by now and the war might have finished in 1943'. On 18 November Admiral Kelly, Churchill's special naval appointee in Ankara, arranged for the withdrawal as well as the evacuation of stragglers from Leros, using his influence to aid his compatriots in their desperate plight. That same day Churchill telegraphed Wilson: 'I approve your conduct....There was a serious loss and reverse but I feel I have been fighting with one hand tied behind my back.' The next day reports from Bletchley Park told him that the Germans were poised to beat the British and Italians. Churchill and Wilson were mortified. But other tasks awaited them.

(iii) Churchill Attempts Counter-Attack

Those early days of October saw bitter Anglo-American recrimination. But on 6 October the new First Sea Lord and former naval C-in-C in the Mediterranean, Sir Andrew Cunningham concluded: 'The use of Turkish airstrips, while enabling us to provide a

---

40 Portal seems to have been too weak to deal with Tedder, as indeed he was with 'Bomber' Harris.
41 PRO HW1/2097 of 9 October, naval headlines 827, reported the minelayer Bulgaria laying mines off Cos.
43 Ibid.
44 PRO HW1/2253(5040) naval headlines 868.
valuable support for offensive operations against the islands, would not help us a great deal to defend Leros and Cos on account of the distances involved and the absence of an adequate warning system. This may explain Tedder's reluctance to send aircraft. The next day Churchill begged Roosevelt for nine landing-craft, standing idle because it would be six months before they would be needed for Overlord. But Roosevelt answered two days later: 'Strategically, if we get the Aegean islands, I ask myself where do we go from here, and vice versa, where would the Germans go if for sometime they retained possession of the islands?' It was a good question: in the event they went nowhere.

Meanwhile, in Ankara, Menemencioglu rejected Eden's demands for the use of Turkish airfields, since this would constitute a commitment to enter the war, and would be so regarded by the Germans. Churchill turned to the Foreign Office, which had hitherto contributed little to the Aegean disaster except to warn Churchill not to upset the Turks. He wrote to Eden, then in Ankara on another attempt to get the Turks in - 'Is there no hope? If nothing can be done you should consult with Wilson whether Leros garrison should not be evacuated to Turkey': and to Alexander 'You should now try to save what we can from the wreck'.

By 22 October Churchill had become extremely upset about the Dodecanese, especially Cos and Tedder. From Boniface he knew of Müller's postponement of Leopard. From the same source he knew the Germans knew that a mine-laying operation between Cos and Leros was impossible without MTB (motor torpedo boat) protection. He knew SS troops were involved, to oversee the disembarkation of troops on landing craft. This meant crack Nazi troops were engaged, which meant still higher risks for the troops on the ground and even less chance of island prizes being won. He knew the Germans thought onward passage from Syros, in the Cyclades, to Cos was too dangerous 'unless Allied cruisers and destroyers were first eliminated'. He knew of the German plan to get Amorgos and 'break through at dawn to Cos'. He knew the German reaction to the British commando raid on Levitia (an island of the Dodecanese west of Kalymnos). He knew that the local German commander sought permission 'to seize Italian uniforms for Brandenburg unit for use as a disguise. All this and much more he learnt from timely daily supplies of Boniface and Dedip. But none of this knowledge averted disaster. All he could do was to congratulate Wilson on 'the way you used such poor bits and pieces as were left to you' and urged him to 'keep Leros safely. Nil desperandum'. He did not need Boniface to tell him that on 22 October the Fourth Battalion of the Buffs embarked for Leros in two ships,
one of which, HMS Eclipse hit a mine two days later, with the loss of 135 officers and men plus over 125 of the ship's crew, inducing Churchill to telegraph Wilson: 'I'm sorry you had bad luck over the destroyers and getting the Buffs [4th Battalion, Royal East Kent Regiment] into Leros yesterday.'

British failure to retain control of the islands was an example of where the best intelligence is useless without the military means to take advantage of it. Hinsley's account emphasises the importance and yet the impotence of Boniface throughout the campaign. Molony wondered why the British admirals 'could not have deduced from perplexing intelligence that German warships were about to go into action' -- reflecting on the lack of any local inter-service co-ordinating machinery or any of the infrastructure necessary for a successful combined operation. Tedder pronounced the Aegean situation fundamentally unsound, but on 1 November Churchill telegraphed Eden, now in Moscow, to try and grip the Leros-Samos situation: 'This is in a most hazardous plight but the prize is well worth struggling for'. On 7 November Menemencioglu rejected Eden's demands for the use of Turkish airfields and a commitment to enter the war. The same day Boniface reported that the Leros operation was imminent. 'Convoy to proceed as planned'. There followed a German appreciation of British forces on Leros. Churchill circled strength of British navy and land batteries. He was telephoned by C later in the day that the landing convoy was at Leros. C told him the next day that three German landing craft were aground there.

HW1/2221, 2222, 2226 and 2234 carry more Enigma tactical details. 11 November was D-Day for 'Tragic'. The Allied bombardment of Cos early on that day caused some German naval casualties. 'Two British destroyers came out of Turkish waters and will fire on Cos'. Hinsley observes: 'Sigint made it clear that Hitler, though he increased the risks and prolonged the postponement by vetoing attacks on Allied warships as they lay up in Turkish territorial waters nevertheless remained determined that 'Leopard' should be carried out, as a surprise move, at the first opportunity'. Hitler still believed that 6 or 7 British divisions were standing by in Egypt to attack Rhodes, Crete and the Greek mainland via Crete and the Peloponnese.

---

51 PRO HW1/2822 (4935), decrypted 5 November 1943.
52 PRO HW1/2219 (4574), decrypted 6 October 1943. PRO HW1 2080 decrypted 5 October carries 3 pages on which nation occupied each island.
53 PRO HW1/2220 (4938), decrypted 10 November 1943.
54 PRO HW1/2221 (4940), decrypted 7 November 1943.
55 C marked this 'important'.
56 PRO HW1/2238 (4984), decrypted 12 November 1943.
58 Ibid., p.134.
In Ankara, Kurihara reported from Ankara to Tokyo on new Anglo-American-Russian pressure on Turkey to join the war...but 'it will be a considerable time before Turkey joins. Papen says Russia strongly attacks Turkish neutrality.' There was pressure from both sides: 'An advance by the Soviet army is what Turkey fears most of all'.

In London the War Cabinet agreed to invite the Turks to join the Allies before the end of the year, and to be asked whether they would retake the Dodecanese from the Germans. But the Turks were more impressed when on 16 November Leros fell to the Germans, after what Churchill described as 'unexpectedly strong resistance', another phrase he copied from an Enigma decrypt: he had marked approvingly a phrase used by the local German commander reporting back in identical terms. Not for the first time the Germans had put their own gloss on 'enemy' intentions, reasoning that if they were in the other's shoes, this is what they would be doing or at least thinking. No wonder Churchill found their reports so compelling, yet so discouraging. The Turks, without access to Boniface, aware that both Britain and Russia had by now agreed on a policy of forcing them into the war, found the discomfiture of the British in the Aegean a convenient way of postponing their decision from the autumn of 1943 until the spring of 1944. Even then, only a token support was forthcoming, and it was another year before they actually joined the Allies.

Under intense diplomatic pressure from both sides, İnönü allowed Germany as well as Britain to infringe Turkish territorial integrity under certain conditions well understood by both adversaries. One of the many Oshima reports told Churchill and the Foreign Office how things were between Germany and Turkey that autumn. The full paragraph is quoted in a footnote below, but a summary of it dated 18 December 1943 was passed from ‘C’ to Robertson, to Martin for 'Colonel Warden' (Churchill):

Churchill and Roosevelt carried out Tehran decision by pressing strongly for Turkish entry into the war, which USSR also desired urgently. Churchill threatened to suspend supplies to Turkey and Eden also took a menacing stand but Roosevelt adopted no such attitude. Turkish Foreign Minister told Papen that he was firmly convinced that even England was not strong enough to risk Turkish enmity by applying sanctions and that U.S.A. would in any case refuse to participate: Turkey had given absolutely no promise of entry into the war.

59 PRO HW1/2225 (4949), bj 124726/406, Ankara to Tokyo, decrypted 11 November 1943.
61 See Stephen Roskill, *Churchill and the Admirals* (London: Collins, 1977), p.328, footnote 37: Admiral Willis's despatch on the Aegean operation was heavily censored before publication 'in order to eliminate all references to the fact that British warships had made frequent use of Turkish territorial waters in order to prolong their patrols off the islands without returning to Alexandria to refuel'.
62 PRO HW1/2292, summary dated 18 December 1943.
Ribbentrop's comment was that Germany had always made it clear that Turkey would be considered to have entered the war if land and air bases were granted even without direct participation. The American High Command continued to refuse pressurising Turkey, or to allocate troops, landing craft or fighter planes to the Eastern Mediterranean, accepting as a fait accompli that Russian successes in Eastern Europe would leave the whole area open to Soviet aggression at some point in the near future. Though D-Day was still several months off, Smolensk had fallen to the Russians on 25 September and on 22 October the Red Army had crossed the Dnieper -- the 'Eastern Rampart' -- South of Kiev, hailed somewhat nervously by the Turkish leaders. The great Russian counter-offensive was about to unbalance still further the international politics of the Eastern Mediterranean.

While these stirring events were taking place by land and sea, diplomatic moves regarding Turkey and the Aegean had been high on Churchill's agenda. On 10 October Eden was able to report to Churchill that 'the Turks have shown themselves unexpectedly co-operative in the matter [of Cos and Leros: the Turks were also unexpectedly cooperating with the Germans]. They have certainly strained their neutrality and their action [in offering protection to British warships off their western coast] is the subject of German protest.' On the same day Eden was to meet Wilson to see if 'there is any help we can give him with the Turks'.

Churchill's Turkey hand had depended crucially on British success in the Dodecanese. Wilson's failure there not only depressed the Turks but signalled the end of Churchill's unilateral Turkey policy. In his account of the Dodecanese débâcle, full of suppressed fury but free of hindsight, he quotes his own speeches to Stalin at Tehran about Turkey. He prevaricated when Stalin asked what he would expect from the Soviets 'in case Turkey declares war on Germany, as a result of which Bulgaria attacks Turkey and the Soviet Union declares war on Bulgaria.' Poor Mr Eden had to ask for enlightenment: What

---

63 A hand-written note at the head of the paper signed by the Chief of the Secret Service’s Secretary requires 'all copies to be destroyed after passing to addressee - Following from Duty Office Hut 3 [sc at Bletchley Park]'. The full Oshima paragraph is important enough to be worth quoting in full: 'Menemencioglu stated that the Soviet Ambassador to Turkey also was to have taken part in the conversations but he was unable to do so for reasons connected with his aeroplane, and the talks [at Cairo] took place between the British, the Americans and the Turks. Having decided, at the Tehran Conference, on Turkey's participation in the war, Roosevelt and Churchill pressed strongly for it, but there was considerable difference in the degree of their desire to secure it, for whereas Churchill's stand was one of threatening to suspend the supply of goods to Turkey, Roosevelt took up no such attitude. Eden adopted a most menacing line. It is clear that the Soviet Union also earnestly desires Turkey's entry into the war. When von Papen asked him whether, in the event of Turkey's non-participation, Great Britain and America would, in practice, apply sanctions, Menemencioglu replied that he was firmly convinced that even England was not so strong as to enforce sanctions at the risk of making an enemy of Turkey and America in any case would have no part in them. He had further stated categorically that Turkey had not given any promise to the British and Americans at the said Conference that she would come into the war under any conditions. (Ribbentrop added the comment that realising that Turkey, while not directly participating in the war, might grant the use of land and air bases in Turkish territory, the German Government had made it clear to the Turks that in such an event they would consider that Turkey had entered the war). (Emphasis added) PRO HW1/2292, bj 12184, decrypted 16 December 1943; also PRO HW1 2279, bj 126571, Berlin to Tokyo, decrypted 15 December 1943.

64 Churchill, op. cit., p.347.
exactly had Churchill in mind in getting Turkey into the war? Churchill recalls: 'Although I
felt how deeply Turkish minds had been affected by the loss of Cos and Leros, and the
consequent German command of the air in the Aegean, I left the subject, having got all I
had thought it right to ask, and with fair hopes that it would not be insufficient.' This,
perhaps, is his own epitaph on his Turkey policy.65

In Moscow on 19 October the opening of the Foreign Ministers' Conference saw
the beginnings of a new but short phase of Soviet interest in Turkey. By the end of it the
Red Army had cut off the German-held Crimea, recapturing Kiev on 6 November. In the
light of these Soviet success and British failure, Eden confirmed that 'there was no
disagreement between the Allies as to the desirability of bringing Turkey into the war'.66
On 2 November a joint protocol was signed whereby Turkey would be asked to come in
before the end of 1943. Roosevelt took a different view.67

It was against this background that Menemencioglu confronted Eden in Cairo on 5-
7 November. The meeting was not a success.68 Eden proposed a phased entry, beginning
with the offer of bases and a movement from pure to 'active' neutrality, but the Turkish
foreign minister saw no advantage to his country in such a concession. The phased entry,
which both Russia and Turkey thought pointless and counterproductive, may have been
propounded by the British because they realised that their successful Turkey-based
deception plans would be exposed if Turkey immediately entered the war -- and the great
flow of seasoned Allied troops into Turkey failed to take place. Eden told Churchill, 'My
persuasions were the less effective as both [Menemencioglu and Acikalin] seemed to be
particularly deaf'.69 Deafness proved a useful device, and a report circulated in Cairo 'that
all the Turks were wearing hearing devices so imperfectly attuned to one another that they
all went out of order at the same time whenever mention was made of the possibility of
Turkey's coming into the war'.70 Eden commented on German sources (by which he was
presumably referring to Boniface) reporting their success in the Dodecanese.71 The next
day Churchill noted 'the nadir of Turco/British relations.'72 On the same day the

65 Ibid.
66 Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers. 1943 Vol.4 (Washington, D.C.,
67 Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran 1943
(Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), pp.476-82. Roosevelt said that 'he did not have the conscience to urge
Turkey to go into the war.'
68 Laurence Weisband, Anticipating the Cold War: Turkish Foreign Policy 1943-1945
Menemencioglu and Hugessen travelling through the Taurus mountains on a 24-hour journey made more
difficult by a cave-in blocking one of the mountain passes.' Weisband's interviews with both diplomats
show how far Hugessen had moved from a strictly FO approach to something more sensitive to Turkish
sensitivities.
Derinligil, op. cit., p.155.
70 Weisband, op. cit., p. 177, fn. 30.
71 PRO HW1/2145, Eden's comments, 22 October 1943.
Forschungsamt in Berlin intercepted reports of the Moscow Conference and showed them to Hitler, who read a German version of

At Menemencioglu's request Eden had had talks with him in Cairo. While there he advised him of the Soviet demand for military bases in Turkey. Eden represented the Soviet case only half-heartedly, and did not make it at all difficult for Turkey to reject them. 73

He, or Ribbentrop or Kaltenbrunner, would also have been reading the British Foreign Office's correspondence to Ambassador Hugessen, as November was a productive period in Cicero's career as an international spy. 74

Turkish neutrality remained even-handed, so when, despite the arguments and quarrels, Turkey declared on 17 November that she would come into the war, the Turkish press and public considered they had been bounced into action of which they did not approve. One journalist told Deringil that Britain was suspected of intending to face Turkey with a fait accompli by giving her just enough aircraft to provoke a German attack. Molotov's keenness at Moscow to have Turkey in quickly reverted to a more detached attitude, on the basis that he hoped thereby to separate Turkey from Britain, thus laying the ground for the Soviet post-war policy towards Turkey. 75 At Tehran later that month (28 November) Churchill offered to lay before İnönü 'the ugly case which would result from the failure of Turkey to accept the invitation to join the war, and the appetising picture of what help could be offered her if she did'. 76 But his credibility had gone.

In Whitehall the Dodecanese débâcle rankled. Had Churchill agreed at this stage to anticipate Turkey's joining the Allies by putting the politics of the area under GHQ Middle East, a different outcome to the state of affairs in the Eastern Mediterranean might have resulted, with after-effects stretching through to the post-war period. But after Adana Churchill was not going to give Turkey to anyone, not even, indeed, to the Foreign Office. For he went on studying Turkish moves through bjs, to which Macmillan had no access. Nor, of course, had General Eisenhower, who only received brief political analyses compiled from them.

This section has sought to show that those without access to bjs lacked the knowledge to make the right decisions, and this led to the débâcle and an unresolved

73 David Irving (ed.), Breach of Security: The German Secret Intelligence File on Events Leading to the Second World War (London: Kimber, 1968), p. 183. The Turks did not ask to see Eden or come to Cairo, as the Germans and Americans had been led by the British to believe. Weisband, op. cit., p.189 for a discussion on the different approach of the Soviet Union and of Britain to Turkish neutrality, between Açıkalın Cevet and Vinogradov.
74 See the next Chapter; also Eleya Basna I Was Cicero (London: Andre Deutsch, 1952) and Ludwig Moyzisch, Operation Cicero (London: Wingate, 1947), pp.148-65.
75 Deringil, op. cit., p.157.
conflict between Churchill and the other Allied war planners as to the priority rating of the Eastern Mediterranean in the context of victory in the West.

(v) Churchill and Turkey: November 1943

What follows analyses the complex causes which led to German victory and British defeat in the Eastern Mediterranean in November 1943.

The Dodecanese débâcle had robbed Churchill of his credibility in the Eastern Mediterranean. After mid-September when Rhodes was entirely in German hands, one island after another saw the weak invading forces of Britain capitulating, and drastic losses suffered by the British navy. The Turks took full advantage, and Churchill noted: 'Turkey, witnessing the extraordinary inertia of the Allies near her shores, became much less forthcoming and denied us her airfields'. The Foreign Office watched sceptically as Churchill refused to give up: 'He is excited about Cos, and wants to lead an expedition into Rhodes!!' (sic) Deringil met many eyewitnesses of the British disaster at Bodrum, opposite Cos, who all remembered the pell-mell retreat and the awe inspired by German aggressiveness.

The official British military historian's account draws as heavily on Churchill's war history as almost every subsequent historian has done. He opens his account of 'the star-crossed British operation in the Aegean during the period September to the end of November 1943' by citing the occupation of Cos in mid-September:

[it] then fell to the German attack on 3 and 4 October. The island of Leros was garrisoned by a battalion in mid-September, was re-inforced at intervals up to 11 November and was lost between 12 and 16 November...The forces employed during the whole period were not great but the losses were grievous. The land forces amounted to five battalions and some supporting arms and were lost. The naval forces, never all engaged at once, were 6 cruisers and 33 destroyers including 7 Greek, a few submarines, some lesser ships and craft. 4 cruisers were damaged, 6 destroyers were sunk and 4 were damaged, two submarines and coastal craft and minesweepers were sunk...282 aircraft flew 3746 sorties. 113 Allied aircraft were lost, including 50% of the Beaufighter strength.

Who was responsible? Could the Turks have been more effectively mobilised? Only provisional answers are possible. There was no combined operations HQ (a fact the

---

79 Deringil, op. cit., p.215.
Germans remarked on with incredulity), no Allied mission statement, no tactical HQ in the area. The Foreign Office's responsibility was limited to their advice against involving Turkish forces on the ground that they had no training in or experience of combined operations. Nonetheless, superiority in numbers and the comparative closeness of Turkish land and air bases to the Dodecanese would have helped to swing things Churchill's way, had there been genuine commitment to the project. The Foreign Office can here be seen to be preserving Turkey as their private possession, which would cease the moment she took up arms against the Axis.

The Aegean campaign of late 1943 lasted from the Italian surrender in September to the Allied evacuation of Samos by caïque into Turkey in late November. Hitler's determination to hold onto Crete and Rhodes, it was acknowledged, resulted in a crushing local defeat for the British forces involved. Cos had fallen in 2 days (3-4 October) and Leros in five (12-16 November) to 'brilliantly improvised German and amphibious and airborne attacks launched from Athens and Crete'. What went wrong, particularly with the Royal Navy, given Allied naval superiority in the Mediterranean? There was the mistimed change of command at the top. British destroyers laid up in Turkish waters by day — where Hitler forbade their being bombed by Luftwaffe (as the Enigma decrypts of 12 October showed) — failed to protect or deliver British invading forces. There was American reluctance to commit troops to a scheme in which Roosevelt's military advisers had no interest. Boniface and bjs (as PRO HW1 confirms) provided full intelligence of German moves, yet the Germans achieved an unintercepted tactical surprise landing of troops on Leros. The defenders of the island were not surprised as the invasion convoy was tracked, but it had also to be intercepted: this it was not. After land fighting as bitter as for Crete in 1941, the Allied garrison surrendered on 16 November. A recent war historian quotes from contemporary press reports and adds that 'they point to the twin problems of poor planning and equally poor execution resulting in the sacrifice of an entire infantry brigade, corps troops, and special forces, as well as frightful naval losses due to enemy air attack. The effort sustained did not achieve the primary objectives (Rhodes and Turkey) nor the secondary objectives (Cos and Leros)'.

Who in Whitehall was responsible? This thesis shows that the possession of vital signals intelligence about the enemy's plans and needs — to which Churchill, Alanbrooke and Wilson all had access — was not in itself sufficient to provide victory over Müller and his superiors, who, at Hitler's insistence, overcame all obstacles and won a brilliant if short-lived victory. Churchill very publicly accepted responsibility for defeat though continuing to criticise Eisenhower and Tedder -- and by implication the US C-in-C, Roosevelt -- for failing to see the point of the operation and take the comparatively modest

---

81 I am grateful to Randal Gray for help over the Dodecanese chronology.
82 Holland, op. cit., p.95.
steps needed to bring off a surprise victory. Improvise and dare: neither option stood very high in the perceived priorities of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

For the British all went wrong not only because there was no co-ordination of operations, but because the FO on the sidelines advised against bringing Turkish forces in. The War Office also opposed the plan, arguing that Turkish forces lacked training in or experience of combined operations. Nonetheless, superiority in numbers and the closeness of Turkish air and naval bases to the Dodecanese would have helped Britain towards victory. Whether the closeness of the combat would have led the Turks to reverse their stance that they would only fight an invader of their territory remains speculative. The FO can be seen to have been limited to preserving Turkey as their private possession, which she would remain so long as she did not take up arms against the Axis. But the official historian of the war at sea rightly concludes that most of the responsibility rests with Churchill, whose addiction to the capture of islands, which would prove difficult to supply, was well known.

That he strongly resented Roosevelt's refusal to help is proved by the telegram about holding Leros...when he told him (misquoting St Matthew) that "even the dogs under the table eat of the children's crumbs". Furthermore his hope of bringing Turkey into the war, which was the principal plank on which he rested his case, was an illusion: for the Turks could not have defended themselves as long as the Germans held Greece and most of the Aegean Islands...Yet the Aegean fiasco was a tragic, and one may feel a wholly unnecessary ending to a year which had brought important and long-awaited successes.\(^3\)

Molony's 1973 account of the Dodecanese requires neither alteration, emendation or supplementation, and Stephen Roskill's conclusion about Churchill's responsibility is one which no amount of intercept reading is likely to affect. He certainly felt responsible for failing to persuade the Foreign Office, the War Office, or the Americans why the secondment of comparatively few combat aircraft from the Italian front might have materially shortened the war.

A comparison between Churchill's political performances off the Turkish coast in 1915 and 1943 is instructive. In World War One, strategic objectives were set by senior government ministers and carried out by the commanders of the armed forces. Churchill failed to produce a consensus on a viable operation at the Dardanelles that would have achieved his intended effect of neutralising Turkey, despite his enormous influence as First Lord of the Admiralty. In 1943 his powers were much greater, as Britain's Minister of Defence as well as Prime Minister. But even that, as we have seen, did not enable him to carry though his objective of retaking the islands. His powers were still limited, and his plans thwarted, by the Americans and the COS and the need to concentrate the Western Allies' forces on the invasion of Italy. Hitler, on the other hand, with absolute power even

after Stalingrad, simply overruled his generals and won the contest. Two failures off the Turkish coast, in 1915 and 1943: both of which were large, public and acknowledged by Churchill.

(vi) The Conferences

This chapter has sought to answer the question of why the British failed in the Aegean in the autumn of 1943, and what were the diplomatic repercussions of that failure? In particular, why and how did Turkey successfully resist Churchill's determination that she should be levered into the Western Alliance, this being an important part of his European politico-military activity in 1943? Any answer to this throws up the importance attached to Turkish involvement in the war at the Moscow and Cairo conferences.

British attention to Turkey continued to the end of 1943 and well into 1944. On November 24 Eden and Ismay had met Numan at Cairo. Eden 'dwelt on the advantages that would be derived from Turkey's entry into the war...It may well hasten the process of disintegration in Germany and among her satellites...By all this argument the Turkish delegation was unmoved...considering what was happening under their eyes in the Aegean, the Turks can hardly be blamed for their caution...'. The prize was Turkey: 'If we could gain Turkey it would be possible...to dominate the Black Sea with submarines and light naval forces and to give a right hand to Russia'. Ismay observed that 'recent events in the Aegean had evidently done nothing to erase their [Turkish] fears of the German power to take reprisals, or increase their confidence in our ability to protect them'. On the same day Oshima in Berlin shared the Turkish view of the balance of military power in a 9-page tour d'horizon, eagerly read not only by his colleagues in Tokyo, Madrid, Lisbon, Ankara, Rome, Moscow and elsewhere but also by Churchill and Eden, the British Foreign Office, and the Wilhelmstrasse and von Ribbentrop. Oshima gave the authorised Nazi view, discounting the setbacks on the Eastern Front, and demonstrating that Turkey still loomed large in German foreign policy.

Diplomatic talks between Vinogradov and Acikalin made it clear that the Soviets required Bulgaria for themselves and would use Turkish entry into the war as an excuse to insist that Soviet troops be given passage through Turkey. But it is unlikely that Churchill or Eden knew this. Later in November a key talk between Numan and Vinogradov took place about the post-war settlement of the Straits. At Tehran on 28 November Churchill

84 Churchill, op. cit., p.367
86 Weisband, op. cit., pp.189-90, and fn. 67.
87 PRO HW1/2276, bj 125337/1347, decrypted 12 December 1943. See also Weisband, op. cit., p.189.
asked 'How could we persuade Turkey to come into the war?...What would be the effect on Bulgaria who owed a profound debt to Russia for rescuing her in former days from the Turkish yoke?' Stalin asked 'How many Anglo-American troops would have to be allotted if Turkey came into the war?...He thought it would be a mistake to send part of our forces to Turkey and elsewhere and part to Southern France'. He added that 'the entry of Turkey into the war...was relatively unimportant'. Churchill reverted the discussion later to Turkey. But Stalin was interested only in Overlord and possibly the South of France. Meanwhile Roosevelt was briefing his chiefs of staff about UK policy towards Turkey. He would not urge the Turks to go to war, Molotov reversed Soviet policy and agreed. Churchill met İnönü again on 4 December in Cairo, but discovered that İnönü 'was still impressed by the German military machine, due no doubt to their successful capture of Rhodes, Cos and Leros.'

From now on Turkey-related bjs continue to appear regularly till VJ day (as we shall see) and the Foreign Office and Minister of Defence continued to adjust their policies and practices in the Eastern Mediterranean in the light of the intercepts from and to Ankara.

Turkey had been high on the agenda at the Conferences. Eden and the Foreign Office played the Turkey hand as energetically as they knew how, but failed to dislodge the Turks from their deeply held positions and their diplomatic deafness. The air waves had little to say about what was going on at the conferences; but diplomatic comments on them followed shortly afterwards, as Oshima's report to Tokyo of 4 February 1944 comprehensively attests. Hugessen told the Foreign Office on 3 December that İnönü was the key to the whole Turkish manoeuvre: 'He is taking some risk in coming to Cairo and it is surprising that he is able to carry a reluctant Parliament with him...I think he could bring the country along in a short time'. Menemencioglu commented on the absence of the Russians from Cairo; his reconstruction was that 'the Soviets were pressing for a second front which the Americans could not yet provide, and the entry of Turkey into the war was to be their compensation'. Although Roosevelt saw İnönü alone on 6 December to press Turkey to come in 'if she did not want to find herself alone after the war', İnönü may have known that Roosevelt did not have the conscience, as he said, to force her in. İnönü's achievement at Cairo was to postpone the date of Turkey's entry. Churchill was flattered to be kissed goodbye by him but Eden remarked sulkily that 'that was not much for 15 hours' argument'.

89 Weisband, op. cit., p.195.
91 Churchhill, op. cit., p.367
92 PRO HW1/2447 (5694), bj 127854/77, Berlin to Tokyo, decrypted 9 February 1944.
93 Dengil, op. cit., p.160
94 Ibid., p.161.
95 Eden, op. cit., p.429.
Eden records that on 1 December that 'the question of inducing Turkey into the war was our first (Anglo-Russian) topic.' He then reported to the Big Three on his Cairo conversations with the Turks. Churchill said that 'I would be satisfied with a strained neutrality from Turkey'. And added that 'Turkey should come into the war on the side of the allies by the end of the year.' Churchill wrote to the Chiefs of Staff on the action needed if Turkey 'came in on our side.' To Eden he wrote that 'Angora must be left under no delusions that failure to comply when request is made on 15 February [1944] meant the virtual end of the alliance, and that making impossible demands is only another way of saying no'. He dismissed as nonsense the possibility that Germany would or could undertake a separate invasion of Turkey. On 13 December he ordered Eden to instruct Hugessen to 'put the screw hard' on Ankara. He was to say that if the Turco-British military talks failed to produce results this time, Britain would not support Turkey after the war: 'The Turks must be made to see that with the development of aerial warfare the Dardanelles was no longer of crucial importance and the Turks were not indispensable.'

The Turks seemed to take not a blind bit of notice, but their President was preparing for a significant change of policy. On 15 December Churchill and the Foreign Office learnt that Numan told the Turkish ambassador in Berlin that the cabinet had decided not to accept what was agreed at Cairo 'but this decision should be applied very leniently and everything possible should be done to preserve the Anglo-Turkish alliance intact'. On the same day they read that Kurihara had learnt from von Papen that though Numan had told him that in spite of Allied requests for Turkey to enter the war, he'd refused...because 'participation was not necessarily in the Allies' interests'. Papen's telegram to Hitler was summarised. On 16 December he had reported to Berlin on the pressure put on Turkey in Cairo, mainly Russian, and that therefore the Allies would send reinforcements through the Straits, so there would be an Allied counter-attack, on the Dodecanese, so a Russian attack on the Southern front would not begin until then (which was intelligent strategic thinking). The same day Oshima reported that Churchill had threatened Turkey in Cairo, Roosevelt was placatory, and Papen wondered whether Britain would use sanctions against Turkey: 'Not even Britain was strong enough to make an enemy of Turkey, and USA would have no part of it.' Ribbentrop said if Turkey guaranteed air bases to Allies, then 'Turkey had entered the war. Eden, Churchill and Roosevelt all spoke with different

---

96 Churchill, op. cit., p.357.
97 PRO HW 1/2287 (5173) of 14 December 1943: summaries.
98 PRO HW1/2289, bj 126571, Ankara to all stations, decrypted 15 December 1943.
99 PRO HW1/2289, bj 126101, Berlin to Tokyo, decrypted 15 December 1943.
100 PRO HW1/2290, Ankara to Berlin, decrypted 16 December 1943.
101 PRO HW1/2289, bj 126571, Berlin to Tokyo, decrypted 15 December 1943.
voices. Britain would not enforce sanctions against Turkey.\textsuperscript{102} 'C' forwarded the intercept to 'Spencer' [Churchill] to be destroyed after reading.\textsuperscript{103}

With so much open diplomacy the intercepts could throw little new light on matters. The bj's of December are dominated by the penetrating tones of Oshima Hiroshi in Berlin, opining and informing Tokyo, Washington and London. A 12-page intercept was circulated describing his visit to the front. A copy of this was flown to Roosevelt. In Ankara the Turkish foreign ministry informed their ambassador in Berlin that Turkey will not accept the Cairo proposals' but they also wished to preserve the Turco-British alliance intact. Kurihara learned from von Papen that Turkey would not join the war, and that Roosevelt had extracted a promise from Stalin that the Soviet Union would fight Japan after victory in Europe. He also reported that government circles in Ankara believed the USSR would declare war against Japan when the second front took place in the West. Berlin observed that 'Eden, Churchill and Roosevelt all spoke with different voices. The UK would not enforce sanctions against Turkey'.\textsuperscript{104}

Not many months were to elapse before İnönü replaced Numan Menemencioglu, stopped shipping chromite to Germany and eventually joined the Allies. On 21 December Oshima reported: 'at Cairo Turkey had to go to war, Turkey said no', but on December 23 Churchill said he 'was resigned to Turkish neutrality'.\textsuperscript{105} Oshima remained in spate throughout the Christmas period.

The Dodecanese and the conferences passed from Churchill's priority list and he reluctantly confronted the greater demands of Overlord, for which Boniface and Dedip were to continue to provide vital information. But this belongs to a different phase of his war leadership than that which is the subject of this thesis. The year ended for Churchill's staff on 30 December with Ismay, Hollis and 'C' 'writing about 'master' [Churchill] now taking an interest in plans for Overlord: 'Master rather buoyant at the moment but quite open to reason'. Churchill suggested a 'kind of reverse Dunkirk . . . small boats landing infantry then proper assault troops . . . I know this sounds impracticable but he is likely to harp on it until it is proved to him to be so'.\textsuperscript{106}

This chapter shows the effect on Churchill of signals intelligence, both Enigma/Fish and Dedip, in his final attempt to breach Turkish neutrality and create a diversion which would pin down German divisions in Greece rather than being seconded to the Western or Eastern Fronts. It also shows the limitations of signals intelligence unbacked by a strong coherent strategy, insufficiently flexible Allied leadership in Combined Operations, and growing rifts in the post-war goals of the USA, the USSR and the UK.

\textsuperscript{102} PRO HW 1/2292, bj 126184/1415, Berlin to Tokyo, decrypted 15 December 1943.
\textsuperscript{103} This instruction was not carried out, as is evidenced by its appearance in HW1.
\textsuperscript{104} PRO HW 1/2289, bj 126571, Berlin to Tokyo, decrypted 15 December 1943.
\textsuperscript{105} PRO HW 1/2298, bj 126329, Berlin to Tokyo and all stations, decrypted 21 December 1943.
\textsuperscript{106} PRO HW 1/2309, Hollis to Ismay and C, 30 December 1943.
In Chapter One mention was made of two events — one disastrous and one ludicrous — on both of which new light could be thrown by Dedip. This chapter has given some account of the disaster, of Churchill's crucial part in it, as well as the use of Boniface and Dedip by all levels of British command in attempting to respond appropriately to the daring improvisation of the Germans. The ludicrous event is the subject of the chapter that follows.
Chapter Seven

CICERO, DULLES AND PHILBY: THE MISSING DIPLOMATIC DECRYPTS, 1943-44

(i) Introduction (ii) Historiography (iii) What was Basna Photographing? (iv) How Did He Do It? (v) Berlin Assessments (vi) Washington Assessments (Venona) (vii) Whitehall Assessments

'It was a strange kind of colloquy with the great ones of the world, whose names turned up in the documents: Roosevelt, Hopkins, Churchill, Eden, Stalin, Molotov...'

Eleysa Basna, *I Was Cicero*, p. 72

(i) Introduction

A sharp reminder of the importance of the Moscow, Cairo and Tehran Conferences to Turkey is provided by the care which the minutes recording them, or diplomatic reactions thereto, were studied not only in Ankara but also in Berlin. In Ankara the leadership relied as always on its ambassadorial reports. But in Berlin supposedly vital stolen British Foreign Office documents, some bearing on the conferences, had arrived by a circuitous route which it is the aim of this chapter to unravel. It seeks to validate the claim that a study of wartime diplomatic intercepts from September 1943 till March 1944 can throw new light on what has universally been acknowledged to have been the most bizarre spy coup of World War Two. A new appreciation of Foreign Office attitudes and approach to neutrals -- pre-eminently Turkey -- is possible from a study of what the Ankara-based bjs have to say about the course of the war: and this in turn opens up further diplomatic secrets when applied to the following attempt to chart the progress round Europe of the Foreign Office papers stolen from the British ambassador to Turkey, Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen. Selections of these papers were routinely filched from his safe, photographed by his valet, and sold to the Abwehr chief in Ankara, re-encyphered and transmitted to Berlin, so that a further dimension of diplomatic activity -- this time German -- can be added to the picture. And finally, since a further selection of these were secreted from the German Foreign Ministry by one of its senior executives and presented to the American consulate in Berne (after having been turned down by the British) whence they were yet again re-encyphered (in the American diplomatic cypher) before transmission to both Washington and London, it is possible to complete the circle of excitement, mystification, horror, disgust and office politicking which ensued, after their final
assessment by the department responsible for their original sourcing, in the offices of
GCCS's diplomatic cryptographic department in Berkeley Street, MI6 in Ryder Street and

In reviewing the literature of what came to be called 'Operation Cicero' many
questions arise. This chapter attempts to provide answers to some of them: What was the
valet (Basna) photographing? What did the Germans think of it and how did they use it?
How did some of the material get to Allen Dulles in Washington; and to MI6, in the person
of Kim Philby, in London? What did the Americans think of it? How did GCCS assess it?
What was the real importance, if any, of the material to the conduct of the war by both
sides, and in particular how did it affect Turkey's determination to stay neutral?

(ii) Historiography

The great spy coup was first revealed to the world as early as 1947 with the
publication throughout the world of Ludwig Moyzisch's Operation Cicero. This achieved
world fame and became the basis of a film, starring James Mason, called Five Fingers. But
Moyzisch, who in 1943 was the head of the Ankara branch of the foreign intelligence
branch of the German Sicherheitsdienst (SD), itself a branch of the
Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA VI), was not the only participant in the story to commit
his part in it to paper. In the following years Walter Schellenberg, the charming young
Brigadier in charge of the whole Sicherheitsdienst foreign intelligence bureau in Berlin,
published the results of his post-war interrogation, while in Ankara Hugessen's valet
Eleysa Basna himself, as well as the German Ambassador Franz von Papen and the British
Ambassador, all published memoirs, though the latter failed to mention his problems with
his valet. 1 'A period of some difficulty followed' was how he described what his
colleagues thought was the greatest breach of Foreign Office security prior to the Burgess
and Maclean affair. 2

Before the release of DIR/C the unpublished primary sources relating to Cicero
were non-existent in the Public Record Office, since the affair led to a comprehensive
weeding of files containing any reference to this episode in Foreign Office history, though
two files, FO371/44064 and 44067, carry references to the subsequent security mission to

---

1 Ludwig Moyzisch, Operation Cicero (London: Wingate, 1947); Walter Schellenberg, The Schellenberg
Memoirs (London: Andre Deutsch, 1959), pp. 376ff; Eleysa Basna (with Hans Nogly) I Was Cicero
(London: Andre Deutsch, 1962), especially pp. 62ff; Fritz von Papen, Memoirs (London: Andre Deutsch,
1952), pp. 510-19; Sir Hugh Knatchbull-Hugessen, Diplomat in Peace and War (London: John Murray,
1949). Hugessen also produced comments on Moyzisch's story in August 1956, in a series of papers kindly
lent to me by his daughter, Alethea Knatchbull-Hugessen. He denied accompanying Basna on the piano and
dismisses much of what Basna may be assumed to have told Moyzisch. Basna's own story was published
six years later, and answers many of the questions Hugessen raises about what he was photographing.
Unfortunately we do not have the ambassador's comments on I Was Cicero.

Ankara which failed to find anything amiss at the Embassy, for the good reason that there was nothing amiss there: the theft of papers was being perpetrated at the ambassadorial residence some way away. There may still be files in the German and Turkish archives. But the bjs dated autumn 1943 and spring 1944 constitute a vital new primary source, which tend to corroborate the descriptions by Moyzisch, Basna, and Papen of the content of the documents photographed by Basna. Some of these DIR documents are identical with certain of those which were sold to Moyzisch in Ankara, and then transmitted to Berlin for evaluation and use by Kaltenbrunner, Hitler, Goebbels and Ribbentrop. Some of these, in turn, (as has been mentioned) were subsequently purloined from the Wilhelmstrasse by Fritz Kolbe, who took them in conditions of great secrecy and danger to the American consulate in Berne. Here Allen Dulles, realising their importance to his masters in Washington, had them laboriously re-encyphered and sent in batches there as well as to London - to spread an encryptographic load which would otherwise have been insupportable. In London they were variously assessed by Philby and his superior Dansey in MI6. They were finally validated by GCCS (diplomatic) whence some of them may even have originated.

Fortunately, as we have seen, four leading participants and three minor players published memoirs. These have been derided in some official quarters as partial, lying, self-serving and based on no corroborative evidence. Though this is likely in the case of Papen and Schellenberg, on trial for their lives, Basna’s story which appeared in 1961, ten years after Moyzisch’s, stands up well to renewed scrutiny in the light of the release of Churchill’s bjs. Moyzisch’s book ends with an epilogue by Papen, the formidable and complex diplomat who at one stage of the war was widely thought to be a candidate to replace Ribbentrop as German Foreign Minister. Papen was later acquitted of war crimes but served a prison sentence for lesser offences under German law. Historians have labelled him a congenital liar and hate-figure, for no better reason, perhaps, than that he was in no position to answer back. Actually the part he played in keeping Turkey out of the Allied camp was crucial to Hitler’s strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean, and his account of the Cicero period in Ankara is believable, and is corroborated by bjs. The intense mutual dislike between him and Ribbentrop is there for all to see. The three minor players were Allen Dulles, Kim Philby and Nicholas Elliott.

---

3 Eden wrote to Churchill about Hugessen: ‘I consider it best to keep [him] where he is. There is another reason not mentioned in this telegram, namely that I want [Hugessen] to be in Angora (sic) when the officer we sent out to investigate charges [of insecurity] arrives there.’ See the memo dated 13 February 1944 in PRO FO 371/44066. The officer in question was Sir John Dashwood, who, on his return from Ankara contacted the head of British diplomatic decryption in Berkeley Street, who recorded this encounter in his appointments diary for 1944. They dined together on 22 May 1944. It would be interesting to know what they talked about. As to where the thefts took place, Hugessen himself suggested they might have been from the Chancery buildings – i.e. neither from the Residence nor the Embassy.

There are many references to Cicero in the secondary literature, both popular and academic, of espionage in the Second World War. Of the former, Nigel West has probed the story most recently, and of the latter David Kahn has used German archives microfilmed after the war for the National Archives in Washington. Anthony Cave Brown writes of Cicero in his monumental life of 'C' as well as in his Bodyguard of Lies. The most widely respected academic historian of secret intelligence, apart from Professor Christopher Andrew and Sir Harry Hinsley himself, is Professor Bradley Smith, who wrote about Cicero in his The Shadow Warriors. The official historian of British secret intelligence in the Second World War had to rely on a secretary with a good memory for the answer to the question what was Basna photographing? But it is now possible for researchers in DIR/C to identify secret documents, in some cases already correctly cited and reproduced by Basna in the early 1960s, as well as by Papen and Moyzisch. As an exercise in rehabilitating old sources this will be of some comfort to the descendants of Basna, Papen and Moyzisch, however, for the historian of secret intelligence, little if anything is changed by the release of the bjs.

This summary of the Cicero historiography in the light of bjs in 1943 and 1944 raises the question whether 'the greatest spy coup of the war' is a justifiable description of the tissue of muddle and mixed motives which surrounded the Foreign Office documents at the centre of the story.

(ii) What Basna was photographing?

Having reviewed the Cicero historiography it is now comparatively simple to answer the question posed at the beginning of this chapter: what was Basna photographing? Reference has been made earlier in this chapter to the reliance of the official historian on the memory of a former secretary to answer this question. This was Maria Molkenteller, the translator of Cicero's material in Berlin:


From her interrogation and from the postwar capture of the telegrams to Berlin in which von Papen summarised some of the photographed pages, it appears that they consisted of briefing papers for, and reports on, the discussions in Cairo in November 1943 between Churchill, Roosevelt and İnönü and probably that in January 1944 between Churchill and the Turks, together with telegrams between the Ambassador and Whitehall about the subsequent negotiations, day to day business and reports from the Embassy about Turkey's trade relations with Germany....According to Maria Molkenteller there were between 130 and 150 telegrams and they included one in which the Foreign Office warned the Ambassador that Berlin had copies of important documents that had been taken from his Embassy.

He adds that there is no foundation for the claim made by both Moyzisch and Basna that Cicero's material enabled the Germans to break the Foreign Office cyphers.® The converse, however, is reasonably certain: the translated, re-enciphered and re-translated and re-re-enciphered material enabled the British finally to break the German diplomatic cypher, as will be demonstrated later in this chapter.

The earliest claims about the content and importance of the material came from Moyzisch.® He reported they contained the signals passed between the Foreign Office in London and the British Embassy in Ankara at a time at which German cryptographers were trying to break the British diplomatic code: 'The intercepts enabled the German SS to break an important British cipher'.¹⁰ He also reported that the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, Oshima, knew about Cicero.¹¹ He confirmed that December 1943 was the crucial period for Cicero's work, and that the material was validated when the Allied air raid on Sophia on 14 January 1944 was correctly predicted. This intercept was not shown by Moyzisch to Papen, who thus knew some material was getting direct to Berlin and drew his own conclusions about the working of the SD (Sicherheitsdienst).

Moyzisch did not know in any detail of the content and importance of the material, according both to von Papen and Hinsley. Papen himself assessed it very highly indeed, from the moment when he realised he was

looking at a photograph of a telegram from the British Foreign Office to the Ambassador in Ankara. Form, content and phraseology left no doubt that this was the genuine article. It consisted of a series of answers from the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Eden, to questions which Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen had asked in another telegram, requesting guidance on certain aspects of his country's policy, particularly as regards Turkey. T realised I had come across a priceless source of information.

---

® Hinsley, op. cit., Vol. 4, p.214.
9 Moyzisch, op. cit. Anthony Cave Brown relies heavily on Moyzisch in his account of Cicero in Bodyguard of Lies, p.400. Some of the more exotic details must have been lies told by Basna to Moyzisch, since Basna himself omits them in his own book.
¹⁰ Moyzisch, op. cit., p.113.
¹¹ Ibid., p.103.
He then named Basna (whom he refers to as Diello in his book) as 'Cicero'. Papen adds that 'during the period of the Foreign Ministers' meetings in Moscow, of the Tehran and Cairo Conferences, and, indeed, right up to February 1944, the flow of Cicero's information was of priceless value'. He learnt of Moscow's decision to force Turkey to declare war against the Axis by the end of the year, communicated to Sir Hugh in Foreign Office telegram No. 1594 of 19 November and of Sir Hugh's reply (in telegram No. 875) which he proceeds to quote at length, and without permission. A footnote informs the cautious reader that Papen's own files were lost during the war and the quotation is taken from 'an incomplete photostat copy of an article by Dr. Paul Schwarz which he was given to understand appeared in the New Yorker Staats-Zeitung'. Subsequent pages show von Papen fully apprised of the complex politics surrounding Turkey's continuing neutrality, the main political debate between the Big Three at Tehran concerning the unconditional surrender formula, the differences of opinion between the service chiefs at the same conference and the imminent launching of Operation Overlord. Thanks to Basna the Turkish government's reply to the Allies about supplying the Turkish forces 'lay on my desk a few days after' December 12 when it was communicated to the Allies. As a result of reading Cicero's telegrams, von Papen concluded he should do all in his power to end the war, an ambitious project in which he failed. But he gave two reasons for his belief in the value of Cicero. One was the revelation of Allied intentions towards Germany post-war - intentions which differed sharply between each of the Big Three. The other 'of even greater and more immediate importance was the intimate knowledge it gave us of the enemy's operational plans'.

Ten years later Basna, helped unspecifically by a German journalist, Hans Nogly, described what he had photographed nearly twenty years earlier. Despite the statement of Sir John Dashwood, of the Foreign Office, that Basna was stupid and unable to understand English (a judgement of breathtaking ineptness) he knew, and describes in convincing detail, what it was he was looking at. Perhaps Herr Nogly had done some relevant research, because he quotes aptly from Churchill's war history. *I Was Cicero* gives evidence to the trained eye of care in research and narrative structure. Hindsight and subsequent editorialising may exaggerate Basna's feat in 1943, but the following passage could be endorsed by any reader of Foreign Office telegrams. On page 21 he writes: 'I put down the file beside me. It contained memoranda received at the British embassy. It gave me a clear picture of the little game in which Turkey, my country, was involved...I read what Churchill had to say...' He photographed everything 'I can lay my hands on.'
Telegram no 1594 from the Foreign Office told Hugessen that ‘You will recall our obligation under the protocol signed in Moscow to bring Turkey into the war before the end of the year’ and directed him to tell the Turkish Foreign Minister the bad news. It was signed by Eden himself. Hugessen went to see Numan Menemencioglu, the Turkish Foreign Minister, with a heavy heart, but later telegraphed the Foreign Office that ‘M Menemencioglu assures me that the Turkish government will be prepared to take part as soon as it is clear that the allied landings in the west have been successful.’

Basna continued:

The telegrams and memoranda deciphered for Sir Hughe passed through my room in the servants' quarters' and commented on his association with 'the great ones of the world', Churchill, Stalin, Roosevelt, Eden, Hopkins.

He went on:

The cover-name 'Overlord' kept recurring in front of my camera...One telegram said "if Turkey came in on our side it would free the escort vessels we need so urgently for 'Overlord'.

A Hugessen memorandum recorded a conversation with the Turkish Foreign Minister. It said that the Turks were hesitating. If only they could be brought in, it would be a dreadful blow for Germany. This phrase echoes Churchill's signal to Stalin on the same subject and at the same time.

The circumstantial description of what Basna was photographing contrasts with Hugessen's memories of the filched documents. Unfortunately Basna and Nogly provided verifiable references as well as descriptions of some of the documents, which are difficult to square with Hugessen's dismissive comments in two documents in the possession of the Foreign Office, and withheld from access, but which were provided to the present writer by Hugessen's daughter. Hugessen's notes were compiled in response to Moyzisch's *Operation Cicero*, published in August 1947, and to Papen, published in 1952. He emphasised that no British ambassador would have been privy to Operation Overlord: 'My own connection with this consisted in receipting a telegram from the FO in which the word 'Overlord' occurred. No clue was given as to its meaning, of which I remained in complete ignorance ... The main subject...related to schemes in the Balkans'. He added: 'I can categorically confirm that on no occasion whatsoever was a telegram sent by the Foreign Office announcing that the Western offensive was to take place on any given date'. Hugessen set down his observations 'based on a clear recollection of what took place.' He dismissed Moyzisch's list of filched documents as 'possible but doubtful'. He never learnt that 'Elias' (he did not know Basna's surname) spoke English, still less sang. He found it

---

16 Telegram 875, Ankara to London.
17 These, though undated, were written in 1963, as Hugessen refers to ‘the whole episode, now twenty years old.’ There are three papers: A) Cicero (4 pages) B) Notes on Operation Cicero (7 pages) and C) (no heading) 6 pages.
incredible, though he did not specifically deny, the suggestion that he was shown the first minutes of the Moscow conference. The leakage of documents had been known to him and the Foreign Office in early November 1943 and a watch was kept on two likely sources. As to the minutes of the Tehran Conference, mentioned by Basna and Nogly, he had no recollection of ever having seen them, or the advance warning of the bombing of Sophia in mid February 1944.

Who was right about the documents? Hugessen, the Foreign Office, or Basna and Papen? Though no-one can be positive, it is quite clear what Basna was photographing. The files of FO371 and PREM3/446 1-14, and the bjs referring to Turkey in DIR/C between October 1943 and February 1944, contain many papers written or read by Hugessen, and some of these were undoubtedly photographed by Basna, and consequently read in Berlin, Berne, London and Washington. Reading parts of I Was Cicero is like browsing through PREM3/446 or FO371 at the PRO.18

(iii) How He Did It

Before assessing German reactions to the material, it is necessary to answer some still unresolved questions about how he managed to do it.

Great ingenuity, courage, daring and expertise were required to copy the ambassador's safe key, purloin the documents, take them through the residence to the servants' quarters, insert them one by one on a makeshift tripod and photograph them with a hand-held camera before returning them undetected to their proper place. The chances of discovery were ever present, the likelihood of poor definitions of the negatives almost certain, and there was nothing in Basna's previous career or character to indicate such a combination of qualities. How did he do it? He was not even interviewed by Sir John Dashwood, the Foreign Office security expert who investigated in the spring of 1944 and was told he must be stupid and ignorant. The Germans believed he must have a secret collaborator -- the evidence of a pair of hands on one positive suggesting another conspirator -- but this possibility is ruled out by Basna's own account of how he did it.

He had already removed the brief-case of his previous employer (a British diplomat called Douglas Busk) and photographed secret documents page by page, climbing on to a kitchen stool to photograph them vertically from above, with an old camera previously only used to take snaps of his children: 'when I had finished I put the camera back in the saucepan, took the documents and the untouched brandy back to the study, and carefully

---

18 See the telegrams printed by Papen and Basna, some quotations from which have been cited earlier in this chapter. It is unclear from Basna's account how much of the material came from Busk home and how much from the ambassadorial residence.
put everything back exactly where I had found it'. So he was well able to handle the similar situation he found at the British ambassador's residence.

The key in both cases was an intimate knowledge of his masters' habits, and in Knatchbull-Hugessen he had a man 'whose ways were so regular that you could have set your watch by them'. Basna records that Hugessen always played the piano in the drawing room for an hour and a half after lunch. This is confirmed in Hugessen's manuscript diary for 1943 now in Churchill College, Cambridge. He was a keen musician, who provided a fortnightly concert for his wife, and was defeated only by the complexities of the last movement of Bach's Italian Concerto. Basna built a home-made tripod and obtained impressions of the safe key. On 26 October 1943 he took 52 photos to the German embassy. His operation mission continued till February 1944. Even then, he was never found out, and later resigned more because he was bored and anxious and recently enriched by the Germans. So the answers to the two questions -- how did he do it and how could he have done it on his own? -- are that he was seriously underestimated by both his employers, and successfully exploited Hugessen's idiosyncrasies. It could be argued that taking Basna at face value is somewhat ingenuous, particularly when he asserts it took him less than three minutes to process one day's documents. But possibly that day's haul was a small one, and Basna's English publisher got it right in his jacket blurb:

Nobody trained him, nobody briefed him. A piece of wax, a Leica camera and a 100 watt bulb was all his equipment. And with it he made himself free of the top secrets of World War Two.

The foregoing account of Basna's *modus operandi* makes no claim to be definitive for it is less important to establish how he did it than the evidence his photography provided that the Foreign Office -- both in London and Berlin -- highly regarded Turkish diplomatic intercept traffic.

---

19 Basna, op. cit., pp.35, 38. Basna career as a valet started in 1935, when he became driver/valet to the Yugoslav ambassador Jankovic, who spotted his valet's musical ability, and encouraged him both in music and photography. Basna then served Jenke, the counsellor at the German embassy, whose wife was a daughter-in-law of Ribbentrop; and then Basna served Douglas Busk, latter HM Ambassador in Venezuela, at whose house he photographed minutes of the Moscow conference, and detailed lists of American equipment supplied to the Soviet Union.

20 Basna, Ibid. This is confirmed by private information from Rachel Maxwell-Hyslop, who worked in the Italian Section at BP and was a family friend of the Hugessens.

21 Cave Brown, quoting some disenchanted British diplomats as saying he played extremely badly is wrong here: all the evidence amassed by this diplomatic researcher suggests the contrary. See *Bodyguard of Lies*, p.393. His daughter, however, reported that Lady Hugessen was not the most appreciative of audiences.

22 Though with counterfeit British money.
(iv) Berlin Assessments

Further evidence of the significance of diplomatic eavesdropping by Britain is furnished by the excitement caused in Berlin by the arrival of Moyzisch's material. The first policy-maker to see the documents was von Papen, and his view of them has already been noted. But Moyzisch reported not to von Papen but direct to the head of the SD in Berlin. He showed only some of the material to his local employer, who summarised and commented on what he was shown in telegrams to Berlin, while Basna's rolls of film travelled there from Moyzisch by diplomatic pouch. There, no one was sure of their authenticity. Schellenberg, as has been noted earlier, exploited them to expand his flow of intelligence and was given credit for the success of the whole operation. Hitler and Ribbentrop used the telegrams to discuss Turkish neutrality with Hungarian and Bulgarian diplomats. Hitler had known all along of the importance of Turkey and had been building up his forces in the Eastern Mediterranean before Cicero appeared: as we have seen he won back the Dodecanese by December 1943, just when Cicero was in full spate. Göbbels wrote enthusiastically about the Cicero material, shown by the fact that German archives contained files which included intelligence summaries derived from Cicero. General Jodl noted in his diary: 'Results from Cicero: 'Overlord' = major invasion from Britain'.

Competition and discord among the different organs of the German government arose over Cicero, according to Allen Dulles. The intelligence community under Himmler and Kaltenbrunner, and the diplomatic service under Ribbentrop were at odds, 'as a result of which anything Kaltenbrunner thought was good, Ribbentrop thought was bad.'

Eden cabled to Churchill: 'I learn from M[ost]S[ecret]S[ource] that Ribbentrop read to Oshima on 11 December 1943 a telegram from Papen as follows:

(i) Churchill and Roosevelt carried out Tehran decision by pressing strongly for Turkish entry into the war, which USSR also desired earnestly. Churchill threatened to suspend supplies to Turkey and Eden took a menacing stand but Roosevelt adopted no such attitude.

(ii) Turkish Foreign Minister told Papen that he was firmly convinced that even England was not strong enough to risk Turkish enmity by applying sanctions and that USA would in any case refuse to participate.

23 David Kahn, op. cit., p.343.
24 Schellenberg thought the plaintexts of the telegrams might be useful to the Forschungsamt in reading the British diplomatic cipher, but as the FO routinely used the One Time Pad (OTP typed on all such documents) which was by definition unreadable, Cicero's material was not usable.
25 West, Unreliable Witness, p.104. Hitler definitely learned that Operation Overlord would take place on the Normandy Beaches from Cicero material, as one of his aides records his astonishment was not that the Allies had made this decision, but that the British FO had thought it necessary to inform their ambassador in Turkey of the fact.
(Ribbentrop's comment was that Germany had made it clear that Turkey would be considered to have entered the war if land and air bases were granted even without direct participation.) Eden's despatch could have made no difference to 'Colonel Warden' or to the course of the war, but here is good evidence that Churchill relied on such summaries, and, as soon as possible thereafter, the actual Oshima bjs.

(vi) Washington Assessments

A number of Cicero telegrams were later removed, together with other secret documents, from the German Foreign Ministry in the Wilhelmstrasse by a trusted senior civil servant there, Fritz Kolbe. Kolbe's motive for running this dangerous liaison remains obscure. He claimed to have hoped for a place in post-war diplomacy by revealing Nazi diplomatic secrets to the Allies. In fact his espionage was ill-rewarded.

This section carries the Cicero story from Ankara to Washington, where Arlington military codebreakers were intercepting secret diplomatic telegrams passing from the Soviet Vice-Consul in New York to Moscow Centre. Decoding was not achieved until after the end of hostilities. Through this the Americans latter learned Soviet reactions to the Allied conferences which formed the subject matter of the last section of the previous chapter. This material, code-named 'Venona', later led to the unmasking of Donald Maclean (code-named Homer or Gomer (a confusion arising from the Russian cyrillic alphabet). But the arrival twelve years previously, in 1943, of the Kolbe/Cicero material seems not to have alerted the NSA to the possibility of breaking the German diplomatic cypher, this being anyway a British assignment.

The material was brought by Kolbe to the American consulate in Berne. It is now possible to re-assess what the Americans thought of the Cicero material. Previous American involvement, as related by Moyzisch and von Papen, was something of a cowboy exercise, involving spying on their British allies in Ankara and seducing a German employee of von Papen who happened also to be Ribbentrop's sister. But now Dulles was to introduce an American dimension to the Cicero material. According to OSS's war report, declassified in 1976, Kolbe went to Switzerland every few weeks. Dulles, as we have seen, was in no doubt that he had a spy coup on his hands, and undertook the task of translating and encoding Kolbe's material which occupied the entire staff at Berne for

28 PRO HW1/2292, bj 126184, Berlin to Tokyo, decrypted 16 December 1943. Preamble scrambled to Duty Office Hut 3 (BP) 7.10 pm same date. 'Following for Robertson for 'C'. Pass following to Martin for Colonel Warden [sc Churchill] from 'C' Following from Duty Officer Hut 3 from CSS[Chief of the Secret Service or 'C'] secretary. All copies to be destroyed after passing to addressee.' The full text of Oshima's report was distributed to twenty regular recipients of bjs, including of course Churchill, who would not have been content with the FO's summary sent by Eden.

weeks after each batch was received. From it Dulles learnt of Basna's activities. So did the British:

As the Franco-Swiss frontier was not opened to Allied traffic until September 1944, no letters were sent or delivered before that date; instead all information for transmission abroad was enciphered and sent by wireless. In order to ensure their integrity during transmission from Geneva, the Kolbe/Cicero telegrams were divided equally between the British and Americans, half going to Washington and half to London.30

No extant files reveal American State Department reactions to Kolbe, but the recent release on the Internet of some early Venona intercepts, referred to above, dated autumn 1942 and extending to October 1943, show that the National Security Agency at Arlington, Virginia took a lively interest, on behalf of the State Department, in foreign diplomatic intercepts, and monitored the reports from the Russian consulate in New York to Moscow with something of the same zeal and expertise that the diplomatic and commercial departments of GCS plied the Foreign Office and Ministry of Economic Warfare in London with bjs.31 The Russians were running many agents supplying details of American war production and monitoring the communist activities of some of the British who work in BSC (British Security Co-ordination) under Sir William Stephenson. One such intercept listed the NSA departments charged with intercepting and processing diplomatic material, indicating 4 departments, which

encompass 14 sections: the first department consists of 3 German and 1 Italian section; the second department - French, Spanish, (C% Scandinavian) Arabian, Turkish, Russian and English sections; the remaining sections - Counter-Intelligence, photographic and officer (sic).

The American cryptographer Meredith Gardner devoted himself to decrypting Venona on a daily basis, to show his masters that the Soviet Union had major reservations about their Western Allies, and about the shape of the post-war world. Given these preoccupations it seems unlikely that, even had he been given the opportunity, he would have devoted much care and attention to what was arriving from Allen Dulles in Berne.

Dulles later noted a connection with Cicero himself which led him to suspect a leak in British diplomatic security. He supplied a British diplomat in Berne with a Kolbe document which, he later suspected, brought about the Dashwood visitation to the embassy at Ankara, and a cessation of Basna's activities at the ambassadorial residence. From these two sources derived the American scepticism of the integrity and competence of the British secret intelligence services and foreign service, which was to last throughout the Cold War.

30 Information supplied to Rupert Allason, MP, and quoted in West, op. cit., p. 106.
31 The 1942-1943 Venona intercepts from the National Security Agency, Arlington, via the Internet, were kindly procured for me by Rupert Allason. See appendix 6.
Given the traditional American caution with regard to European and especially Balkan affairs, and Roosevelt's own preference for open diplomacy, it is probable that diplomatic decrypts did not figure so crucially on the agenda of top American foreign policy makers as they did of the British. Nonetheless, the answer to the question, what did the Americans make of their share of the Kolbe/Cicero material, apart from the memories of Allen Dulles and Kermit Roosevelt, must remain unanswered. But the half that went to London provoked an unlooked for bonus for the diplomatic cryptographers there.

(vii) Whitehall Assessments

This section reveals for the first time how important the chance arrival of some Cicero material went to the British diplomatic cryptographers in Berkeley Street, London. This office had been working on the German diplomatic cipher nicknamed Floradora. This work had gone on since 1919. A partial breakthrough occurred in February 1942, helped by the American cryptographer Major Solomon Kullback at Arlington. The chief diplomatic cryptographer in London, Alastair Denniston, had coincidentally received the daily keys for Floradora from the British Consul in Lourenco Marques. Although Floradora was diagnosed as unbreakable before the war, at least three factors led to its solution in early 1944. Denniston remembered the three chances were:

The basic book fell into our hands. The second - close co-operation with USA. The third was SS work by an able ally who obtained first hand information and one page of figures from a German cipher officer.

By early 1944 some Floradora messages were being currently read, but a breakthrough occurred with the arrival of the Kolbe/Cicero material in Berkeley Street. The London-bound portion of this came from Dulles in Berne, supposedly to the Head of MI6, General Sir Stewart Menzies, but in fact straight to the offices of MI6 where, in the absence of the Departmental head, Felix Cowgill, it came directly under the scrutiny of the then head of the Iberian section of MI6 and a Soviet spy, Kim Philby. A rarely cited passage in his controversial memoir *My Silent War* details the moves he made after spotting the value of the Kolbe/Cicero material, to enhance his position within the secret service.

---

32 See P. W. Filby, 'Floradora and A Unique Break Into One-Time Pad Ciphers' in *Intelligence and National Security* Vol. 10 No. 3 (1995), pp.408-22, for a recent technical account of how both Floradora and the German diplomatic cipher OTP system were solved.

33 See A. G. Denniston, draft narrative on GCCS in files CCC DENN 1/4 and PRO HW3/32, as well as the edited version in *Intelligence and National Security* Vol. 1, no 1 (1986), p. 56. P. W. Filby revealed that the 'basic' book had come to Denniston from the British Consul at Lourenco Marques, in his, op. cit., p.413

34 Later events suggest that Allen Dulles of OSS Berne and Philby of Section V provided technical evidence in 1943 that led to the large-scale decryption of Floradora from late 1943 onwards. Cave Brown, *The Secret Servant*, p.406.

behind the back not only of his bosses, Felix Cowgill and Claude Dansey, but of the chief himself, 'C', to Denniston, who, he records, was extremely excited by what he was shown, and asked for more, which was duly forthcoming. He then confirmed to Philby that the telegrams

exactly matched intercepted telegrams already deciphered, and others, proving of the utmost value to his cryptographers in their breakdown of the German diplomatic code.36

HW1/2743 of 26 April 1944 contains a reference to these German diplomatic intercepts (including Cicero/Kolbe). A departmental note [i.e. Denniston to Menzies] refers in it to a special series called gunpowder . . . These contain what purport to be the close substance of German cipher telegrams relating to various countries, as obtained through a channel which has not yet been fully and finally tested. In a number of cases, however, it has been possible to exercise a definite check, and in these cases it has been found to be authentic.37

If the assumptions made here are right the 'definite check' is the comparison of Philby's documents with those Filby and Denniston were working on a few hundred yards away. The 'close substance' or close paraphrase using the same key words 'with many words identical with the actual message' could be applied to the raw material which still eluded the cryptographers. It is noteworthy that HW1/2743 was given a particularly restricted distribution -- in effect to C (and so to Churchill) only, not even to the Foreign Office, by now revealed to Berkeley Street to be insecure, through Philby's Cicero material. Indeed the Foreign Office had no part in any of this: Dedip was dealing direct with the Prime Minister, using Menzies as a sorting office.

It is unfortunate that the technical report supplied by Denniston at Philby's request validating the material is not to be found in any files yet released, but even without it, it is legitimate to conclude that the Cicero material, which was processed by Basna for Moyzisch, assessed by Kaltenbrunner and Ribbentrop for Hitler after translation and enciphering from the German diplomatic cipher, then brought to Dulles in Berne where it was re-enciphered in the American diplomatic cipher before being sent to Arlington and Berkeley Street, provided the coup de grâce enabling Berkeley Street at long last to read the German diplomatic cipher, Floradora. This certainly may have been one of the causes of the breaking of Floradora by the British. But while at the time that cryptographic achievement was the subject of much jubilation, the actual diplomatic messages proved of limited use to Churchill now that the war had moved into preparations for D-Day.

Thus in retrospect it can be seen that though Hugessen's insecurity may have ranked as the Foreign Office's greatest lapse before the defection of Burgess and Maclean,
and the material his valet sold to Berlin was highly regarded there, the drama made no difference to the course of the war, as Kolbe hoped and Dulles claimed. The constantly re-ciphered Foreign Office telegrams, it is now clear, led to the breaking of Floradora, which was acknowledged as a great cryptographic success. But the outcome of the war was no longer in serious doubt, and D-Day was only four months off, so the achievement had little impact on the military or the diplomatic front. Nor indeed, as has become apparent during this chapter, did the Cicero and/or the Kolbe material. Great spy stories are about the amazing way spies work to deliver secret material to the enemy. What the enemy does with it is assumed to make an astonishing difference to the course of history. The truth seems to say otherwise.

This conclusion, similar to those reached in respect of the Adana Conference, the Dodecanese affair and the achievement of Turkish neutrality in 1942-43, together with questions of the second front and the possibility of a separate peace -- between Italy and Britain, and between Russia and Germany, will be reviewed in the following and concluding chapter.

---

Chapter Eight

CONCLUSIONS

DIPLOMATIC DECRYPTS AND BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS TURKEY, 1941-1944

In several of the preceding chapters, extensive use has been made of the diplomatic decrypts which 'C' sent to Churchill, and GCCS (diplomatic and commercial) distributed within Whitehall. Until recently these ambassadorial reports were inaccessible, their very existence officially denied, though researchers were aware of them from veiled references in Foreign Office files. Indeed, the very acronym 'bj' was a mystery until 1993, the 'b' being often 'black' and the 'j' 'jumbo', rather than standing for 'blue jacket', until Antony Best tracked them down and published their existence in Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor: Avoiding War in East Asia (London: Routledge, 1995). This thesis can be seen as following in his footsteps, in attempting to achieve for diplomatic reports what he did for Japan-sourced intercepts from 1936-41. Churchill's knowledge and use of them had a long history starting in 1919.

A regular reader of bjs, Sir Edward Bridges, for instance, or Sir Alexander Cadogan, would have built up over twenty years an expertise in international diplomacy which would have incalculably enhanced the quality of their reactions to, and advice on, British foreign policy to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Moreover regular reading would have informed them of the quality of the ambassadors of the great and middle-ranking powers targeted by GCCS: their alternative agenda, their prejudices, their ambitions and career prospects, their well-placed uncles and aunts, which would have enabled them to interpret incoming bjs and thereby anticipate and even forestall future diplomatic moves, while advising on British foreign policy. Further factors become apparent to the regular reader of interwar bjs: it was assumed that peace would produce stability, fewer or no emergencies, attempts by all governments to recover from the traumas of World War One by the pursuit of policies which would gradually restore the world economy, make reasonable accommodation with the Bolshevik revolution, and ensure that Germany would never be in a position to precipitate another world war. But the surface of the international diplomatic waters was constantly ruffled, from 1919 to 1939. These breezes, at times amounting to gales, can be charted schematically by a numerical survey of bjs in the 1919-26 period, since these were released to the Public Record Office as recently as July 1996. This shows, for instance, Germany absent from the international diplomat surveillance scene from 1919 to 1922, because of the Allies' failure to read their cyphers and the German switch to OTP; Turkey becoming prominent in 1922 over the Chanak
emergency; and Russia threatening the West with the spectre of the bolshevisation of Europe in 1926-27. Further releases will doubtless reveal further ruffling of the waters between 1926 and 1939, especially the Spanish Civil War. All this is reflected in the fact that GCCS in 1919 followed the ebbs and flows of the uneasy peace by its informed changes of priority over the countries whose diplomatic traffic it intercepted, so creating an important nexus between client ministries in Whitehall, the bjs themselves, and their originating and receiving offices (the foreign embassies, the foreign chancelleries) of the key countries -- USA, Italy, France, Russia, Turkey, and later Germany -- that continued to be useful to Churchill and the government from 1940 till VE Day.

It is, of course, difficult if not impossible to quantify this contribution of the interwar GCCS, which has been the subject of chapter two of this thesis. But quantification is not itself a goal. The point this thesis has been trying to develop is less quantifiable than qualifiable. If it has achieved anything, it is not by way of proof that knowing about bjs and their use in Whitehall was important to diplomatic historians, or about Churchill's use of bjs in driving his Turkey policy, his attitude to the other neutrals, and to Italy and Japan. Its purpose is to underscore the achievement by pre-war GCCS in turning cryptography into intelligence in difficult circumstances, with the Geddes axe (a programme of civil service economies) wielded and no-one knowing what internationally was going to happen next in eventually making a discrete contribution to Churchill's wartime achievement. What matters is not that history needs, or does not need, to be re-written, but that Churchill's reading of bjs can now at last be seen to illuminate his attitude to the inner movement of the war and the formulation of British foreign policy towards the neutrals. This thesis, in fact, has been how Churchill, without much help from the Foreign Office, tried to bring Turkey into the war on the allied side, first by sending emissaries, second by threats and promises, next by a personal visitation, and finally by starting up a personal war with Hitler in the Dodecanese in the autumn of 1943.

While the interwar years can thus be shown to be crucial in establishing the use and abuse of bjs, this thesis is mostly concerned to answer the question how Churchill, the Foreign Office and the British Chiefs of Staff used their intercept information to formulate and implement policy in regard to Turkey from 1941-44. It has been shown that behind this question lies the unknown territory of counterfactual history -- principally, what would have happened had Churchill not become Prime Minister and Minister of Defence in May 1940 and/or had not been a lifelong student of intercepted messages from foreign governments. But subsidiary questions also arise: did the Foreign Office produce sufficient, well-informed advice on Turkey for the Secretary of State and the Minister of Defence following the French collapse of 1940? If not, why not? Did the entrenched attitudes of Foreign Office officials of the interwar period unduly influence the advice their counterparts in 1941 offered the government in formulating policy towards Turkey? What were the relations between the Foreign Office and the Ambassador and his staff at Ankara?
What sort of information was (and more crucially was not) given by these officials to guide Whitehall with a true view of Turkish capabilities and intentions? Did ambassadorial insecurity in Ankara seriously affect the course of the war? Was the Foreign Office's use of Dedip sufficiently convincing and subtle given the volume of crucial information it was receiving from GCCS in Berkeley Street from 1942 onwards? Who in the Foreign Office was making real use of this valuable source, and why did it not lead to more positive proposals in regard to Turkey? In attempting to answer these questions, the investigation has focused particularly on the work of the diplomatic and commercial sections of GCCS, at Bletchley Park until February 1942 and thereafter at Berkeley Street and Park Lane in London. The bjs these offices produced for Churchill and the Foreign Office came as the climax of a twenty-five year long task of reading the diplomatic telegrams of all the major powers. The developing relationship between GCCS and its client ministries, as well as with its prime user, Churchill, proved an inseparable part of the answer to the question about the value set upon its product, and the use made of it, by all concerned with it.

If these are some of the questions posed by the arrival of DIR/C at the Public Record Office, a new range of counterfactual possibilities arise: what use, if any, was made not only by the Foreign Office of Dedip in 1941-44 with regard to Turkey but by the COS in 1943-44 regarding the feasibility of a second front in the Balkans launched from Turkish soil? Much is already known about how Boniface was crucially employed by GHQ Middle East throughout the various Mediterranean campaigns of 1942-44, but a key operation in the Aegean in October 1943 has not hitherto received the attention it merits, and this is something this thesis has sought to rectify. In so doing the tactical importance of Boniface has been shown not to have been a decisive outcome of the Dodecanese assault, which was repelled by the Germans through superior skill. This is another example of the truism that battles, never mind wars, can never be won by superior intelligence alone. But had the Combined Chiefs of Staff really grasped the implications of what their intelligence advisers were telling them of the state of the German war effort, would more attention have been given to the South of France landings and the Balkan front, and less to Overlord?

Such is the nature of historical speculation created by the appearance of Boniface and Dedip, and is relevant to this thesis which has concentrated on Churchill and on Turkey, which has led to an analysis of Turkish diplomatic messages read by Churchill, and that in turn has led to the question what difference, if any, did this reading of those messages actually make to the course of the war? This is the prime question addressed in the earlier chapters.

It has been said by sigint historians that the history of World War Two requires reviewing in the light of Enigma and Ultra. Against this received wisdom, my thesis takes a revisionist standpoint: despite Enigma/Ultra and Dedip, there is almost nothing to add to or subtract from the official historians' account of World War Two, published between the
early 1950s and the mid-1970s. These stand up well to renewed scrutiny, despite their treatment of Turco-British relations without the benefit of Ultra. They describe what happened giving due weight to the priorities and the surprises of war in the Eastern Mediterranean; to the demands of other theatres, in the Mediterranean and beyond, to the concerns of Churchill, Hitler, and İnönü; and to the balance of advantage to both sides in having Turkey in or out of the war.

What might have happened had the War Cabinet not known what it did from signals intelligence is little more than a frustrating counterfactual exercise. But we now know what Churchill and the generals, the admirals and air marshals knew of enemy intentions and potential. We may conjecture that had they not had vital secret information from the air waves they might have assessed these intentions differently, and prepared counter-offensives differently — and these alternative plans might have been less effective for being constructed on less authentic intelligence. But the facts are that they did read and react to Enigma and Dedip, thus (amongst many other things) delaying Operation Overlord until there was every chance of final victory — and this requires no re-writing of history, just some acknowledgement of the value of sigint to war planners on the allied side — acknowledgement all concerned gave freely at the conclusion of hostilities. This thesis has shown how from diplomatic decrypts Churchill acquired valuable insight into why a conference on Turkish soil might be feasible in January 1943, and why later that year a successful offensive to retake the Dodecanese would have disproportionately large political implications for the whole Mediterranean sphere. These insights were based on secret knowledge acquired from intercepts of what neutrals, Turkey is particular, were thinking about the progress of the war, and how that thought could be usefully exploited. Diplomatic intercepts or reports — clandestinely obtained by Cable and Wireless in the case of messages originated in Ankara — did not provide instant tactical information but a broader context which was equally timely though not nearly so sensational. That Churchill must have made direct use of it is clear when the record is studied, but what did other readers make of it, and what might they have done differently had any of them had something of Churchill's understanding of this source? One thing is certain: the intercepts showed the Turkish government's continued determination to remain neutral.

Some historians have also said that Churchill's strategic objectives were materially affected by his daily reading of DIR/C. This thesis accepts the now current view that he had

---


2 Brigadier E. T. Williams, Montgomery's chief intelligence officer, reported on 5 October 1945: 'Very few armies went into battle better informed of their enemy and it is recognised by those who ostensibly provided the information that they were but useful hyphens between the real producers at Bletchley Park and the real consumers, the soldier in the field whose life was made that much easier by the product'. (PRO WO/208/3575, memo on the 'Birth of Ultra').
no long-term strategy, except to defeat the enemy, and therefore his intercept reading resulted not in strategic planning but in strong and often otherwise inexplicable hunches. His propensity to read what he chose into the intercepts is another revelation of this thesis.

On the basis of the files available this thesis has attempted to establish that the Southern Department of the Foreign Office was rationally and justifiably opposed to Churchill’s Turkish initiative. The intercepts gave diplomats there a solid foundation of evidence to support their sceptical view that Turkey would not come in: their case was not built on inherent attitudes but on reason. For over two decades the Foreign Office had been responsible for developing British friendship and trade with Turkey; it defended its right to look after Turkey partly because its restricted wartime role left little else on the agenda.

Before reaching any conclusions it is worth stressing the limits on Churchill’s own powers, since in the early years of the war it was not Churchill but Hitler who made the running, just as in the latter years it was Stalin, not Hitler or Churchill. Theses tend rightly to be microcosmic and this one is no exception. But standing in its shade are gigantic figures -- Stalin, Roosevelt, Hitler, as well as Churchill -- who actually created the situation in which Britain found herself in 1940, and again in 1943. Researching British diplomatic intercepts during 1943 powerfully reminds the scholar of the close connections between bjs and the great politicos of the world at war, bound together by the actual secret communications to which they all in different degrees had access. In intelligence history the accent is all on individual leaders, as has been shown. For Berlin, England meant Churchill, for Churchill Hitler, or the Nazis, meant Germany. It is thus possible to surf effortlessly from the microscopic to the magacosmic and back without being ridiculous. Running the war seemed to be an endless chess match between Hitler, Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt, with Mussolini and the less easily identifiable Japanese leadership, along with Franco, Inöni, de Gaulle and Laval, as enthusiastic and often frustrated onlookers. One such reader, as a previous chapter has sought to demonstrate, was an obscure Turk of Albanian origin, Eleya Basna, who while photographing bjs and other Foreign Office secret communications in Ankara, commented on the 'strange kind of nightly colloquy I had with the great ones of the world whose names turned up in the documents: Roosevelt, Hopkins, Churchill, Eden, Stalin, Molotov'.³ This association over the airwaves of warlords, cypher clerks, bureaucrats and spies brings an unusual dimension to the study of diplomatic documents and prompts questions of the 'what if...?' variety. The question posed throughout this thesis is, what if Churchill's daily reading and hourly attention had not been focused on those issues and battles presented to him in the DIR/C files which followed him everywhere? How would those issues and battles been handled and fought differently, and how would other issues and battles, not so presented, have been handled and fought differently?

The counter-factual theme applies also to more specific events. What if Hitler had decided on operation 'Marita', to invade Turkey and attack Egypt via Syria in 1940? All diplomats knew that the Luftwaffe could have destroyed Istanbul in 15 minutes, while the Wehrmacht would have marched through Anatolia at 30 miles a day -- according to a War Office appreciation it was only a two month job. There would have been casualties, but 60% of the one million strong Turkish army would have been bypassed in Thrace, leaving the rest to defend their homeland against the so far all-conquering Germans. Ankara would have been blitzed and the Turkish government forced to retire to Erzerum or Kars. It could only have happened in 1940 and would have involved Hitler's early cancellation of Operation Sealion and a massive redeployment of Panzer army groups right across Europe from West to East. And even given these drawbacks Germany would almost certainly be putting her Soviet ally under intolerable pressure to defend her own Southern borders. But at the time Hitler was being strongly advised by his successful generals to do just this, and the British knew it. The immediate gains would have been the Persian oilfields and the cutting off of Britain from Australasia, India and the Far East. Would that have been sufficient for Hitler? The war might have been shortened by several years, and victory might have gone to the Axis. By 1941 he had decided not, although he had every expectation that a successful combined operation against a weakened Britain would produce at worst a negotiated peace on French lines, and at best, German sovereignty of Europe. In 1940 Hitler did not overplay the hand his armies had dealt him with the conquest of Norway, the Low Countries, France, Greece and Yugoslavia. By the end of 1941 his supremacy over world affair had lapsed once he declared war on the Soviet Union and the USA. A study of neutral diplomacy inevitably raises the question: what if Hitler had pressed home his advantage in the summer of 1940 and forced Britain to surrender?

So much for counterfactual historical speculation. In fact the war became a duel between the USA and Russia, with Britain a minor player and Turkey even smaller. The war was to be won and lost by two factors. One was the tooling up of a vast North American war machine, able to supply its allies as well as itself, able to destroy Japan, able eventually (with Britain) to invade the German heartland and link with the Russians West of Berlin. The other, centred on the Battle of Stalingrad and the world's greatest tank battle on the Kersh Peninsula jutting into the sea of Azov North of the Black Sea, was the annihilation of German military supremacy by Soviet citizens defending their own country and dying in millions for it.

Yet in considering Churchill's unavailing determination to play and win the Turkey hand in 1941-43 the question 'what if?' arises again. What if he had succeeded in persuading the Turkish leadership to abandon their policy of neutrality? Here counterfactual history itself encounters bedrock. It would not, could not, have happened. The reasons have emerged in the preceding chapters, they are clear from the record and the literature. They are further clarified by some understanding of Turkish self-identity in 1940.
The part Britain played in beating the Nazis was crucial and desperate in 1940-41, and became gradually less so as the USA and the USSR took up arms. The official British war historians, without acknowledged access to good intelligence which enabled Churchill to hold his own as one of the Big Three well after the true nature of world supremacy had passed Britain by, worked from primary sources which incorporated intelligence reports and assessments based on the contribution Ultra made to the course of events but without acknowledging it. Ultra's immediate contribution is thus subsumed in the official record of the way the war developed. To assess its significance, it has to be stripped out of existing accounts of the course of the war -- in order to calculate how Britain would have fared had Ultra not existed. 'In the jargon of my trade', writes Professor Sir Harry Hinsley, now the only surviving architect of the structures at Bletchley which actually turned Enigma into Ultra, 'we have to engage in counter-factual history': acknowledging this to be 'a dubious enterprise, only permissible if we are fully aware of what we are doing. But it is equally true that unless we attempt it, we shall not grasp the significance of Ultra's contribution'. What that was best expressed in a 1945 report by the late Brigadier E. T. ('Bill') Williams: he concludes his report on the contribution of intelligence to tactical Allied victories by asserting that the whole intelligence apparatus 'was a hyphen between Bletchley Park and the soldier at war'. Had his report been made available to historians at any time between 1945 and 1973, a rather different history might have been written, though the actual narrative would not have differed more than marginally from what was published.

What Williams said of Ultra's part in Britain's contribution to the defeat of the Axis powers can be said a fortiori of its diplomatic dealings with the neutrals and particularly with Turkey, because these were all part of the common aim which was to beat the Germans by all and every means possible. And they were both in large part conducted by the same person -- the nearest thing Britain's constitution permitted to a warlord. While since 1973 the Ultra contribution to winning the war at sea and in the Mediterranean and North Africa has become a target for historical scholarship, the ambassadorial reports from European capitals which Churchill used to handle Turkey were released over 20 years later, as recently as 1994. This means that diplomatic historians have had no more than a few months to review the new material and undertake the dangerous counterfactual exercise which Hinsley both warned against and also showed had to be undertaken. This thesis has attempted to strip out the diplomatic messages from the general progress of Turco-British wartime relations to see whether, and how differently, Churchill would have played the Turkey hand on behalf of the Allies had this material not been available to him -- in its ipsissima verba state -- in DIR/C. This attempt reveals that very little was to Churchill's hand apart from bjs and his own instinct about the importance of a strong Turco-British

relationship, which may have been based on his experiences over the Dardanelles in 1915. The consequence of this is to take seriously his insistence on seeing the *ipsissima verba* of Turkey-based bjs, and that has been part of the thrust of the foregoing chapters.

Churchill, as has been shown, studied the Turkish bjs continuously from 1941 to 1944 and adjusted his policy in the light of that study. But it was not only the study itself which convinced him that he could persuade the Turkish leadership to attach their country to the Allied cause. His strong instinctive reaction to the German successes of 1940 had its roots in World War One, so he might have pursued this will o' the wisp regardless of the bjs. Why, then, does their release in 1994 create a significant gap, requiring filling, in wartime diplomatic history? That is the fundamental question this thesis has attempted to answer. And the answer is that the bjs, however important at the time to Churchill and the Southern Department, did not of themselves develop in Churchill's mind a policy other than that to which he was already committed and which he consistently if unavailingly pursued.
Appendix 1

DIR/C - HW1 - Public Record Office

DIR/C first appeared at the PRO in Spring 1994. The files date from 1940 to 1945 but there are significant gaps, particularly at the beginning. They are prefaced in the listings supplied by the PRO by a short summary of their content, which differs only marginally from what appears in Chapter 2 above. This summary draws attention not to 5 but to 3 items:

1) Items CX/FJ, CX/JQ and CX/MSS - Enigma;
2) Naval Headlines; and
3) Bjs: selected translations of intercepted diplomatic telegrams.

They also mention 'certain original cover notes and actual documents passed to Churchill or in his absence the Lord Privy Seal and Deputy Prime Minister (Attlee), using Boniface, complete with annotations and minuting'.

All these documents are said by the PRO Archivist to have been returned by Churchill to GCCS for safekeeping. This is doubtful: the bj component was intended for immediate destruction after reading by each named recipient of each bj; and many of them had been reading and burning them for years before the start of DIR, and would never have lost the habit. In the Foreign Office wartime files there are no authentic bjs, though there are summaries, paraphrases, 'gists' and references to them as 'reliable sources' or sometimes 'our secret sources'. In PRO WO 190 and 208 some prewar bjs have escaped the attentions of the 'weeders'.

The only person who did not routinely burn them was Churchill himself, exercising his magpie instinct to throw nothing away. Strong efforts were made during his many absences from London not only to get the fullest possible amount of intercept material to him wherever he was, but also to safeguard security and ensure that the end-user, after Churchill, destroyed them himself. But Churchill must have somehow kept nearly 4,000 DIR files. They were discovered almost by chance at Chartwell after his death, and transferred immediately to GCHQ.¹ The blue transmittal notes which accompany most of them emanated from 'C' and carry a serial number from 6112 (HW1/3) to 9995 (HW1/715). Thereafter the serial number ceases. For other Boniface messages the PRO Archivist refers the researcher to PRO ADM 223/1-7 and 438-640, as well as to DEFE, the main source used by previous researchers into the use of wartime high-grade sigint. Antony Best draws attention to the absence of prewar bjs: 'A full assessments of

¹ Private information: Professor F. H. Hinsley. He and his colleagues refer to them in their great history of British intelligence in World War Two as 'Dir Archive'.
British perceptions is still hampered by the holding back of much of the British intelligence material, both diplomatic and military, for this period [1936-41]. This remains the case: prewar bjs for the period 1919-26 have been released in 1996 (HW/12) and HW1 covers the period from September 1941 to the end of the war. Releases for 1926-41 are thought to be imminent.

Below are listed all those files containing Turkey-related bjs, many of them used in the chapters that precede this. Dates of decryption are also given: there are occasions on which the date of the file cover note may differ from that shown on an individual bj. On the bj, at the start of the series, two different dates sometimes appear, indicating the time difference between receipt of the intercept and its distribution in processed form. Churchill queried any undue delay indicated by these dates since their usefulness to him derived largely from their immediacy.

---

Appendix 2

Pre-War bjs

Dr. Antony Best, who identified the substance of prewar bjs in PRO WO 190 and WO 208 files, observes that 'a full assessment of British perceptions is still hampered by the holding back of much British intelligence material, both diplomatic and military, for this period [1936-41].' His researches convincingly suggest that no less than 36,000 bjs passed through GCCS between 8 November 1935 and 8 December 1941, by subtracting the serial number for the former date (062694) from that of the latter (098694). He points out that these bjs covered French, Italian, Spanish, Turkish, Irish, Chinese and Japanese.

Following in his wake, this thesis suggests that by extrapolating backwards, prewar bjs would have been similar to the wartime ones now available in HW1. But the arrival of HW/12 at the PRO in 1996 provides convincing evidence of the usefulness of prewar bjs from 1919 to 1926. These seem to be the lineal ancestors of the bjs in HW1. The following similarities emphasise this: each bj carries a headline and date of decryption, and a serial number (right hand side) together with the originating agent, recipient and date sent. The messages are similar in tone, in length and in content, mutatis mutandis. The subject matter varies with the current concerns of the Foreign Office: thus American and Japanese telegrams arising from the Washington Conference in 1921, and Turkish pre-Chanak messages predominate in 1922. Later, Russian and Japanese messages appear frequently. The icy tones of the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Chicherin, arouse reluctant admiration. Italian messages are greater in number than Turkish, and have the added authenticity that Rome-originated material came direct from Mussolini.

Early prewar bjs carry the printed distribution list already mentioned in chapter one. Later these appear less regularly, and sometimes, when there is no list provided at all, it must be assumed that they did not leave the Foreign Office. But many have a limited typed distribution list, on which MI5, Scotland Yard, and the India Office feature regularly.

A unique feature of prewar bjs is their listing, at the end of each week, by headline and bj number. These were typed on paper of thicker quality than the flimsies themselves and were no doubt circulated within Whitehall to any ministry who may have been thought likely to be interested in any on the list. HW 3/32 records that GCCS's daily issue was supplemented by a daily 'Summary of telegrams decoded but not circulated', but this would have been yet another listing since the weekly summaries had all already received some circulation.

It is expected that bjs between 1926 and 1941 will be released shortly.

---

Appendix 3

Draft History of Room 40 OB
by
Commander A. G. Denniston

CCC DEN 1/4 (n. d. 1944?)

It is proposed in this chapter to recount the development of the staff of the Section. As the scope of the work increased new blood was needed, and yet it is possibly true that at no period was any section of the work overstaffed. It will be necessary to mention many names but without giving the biography of the owner. In the earlier stages of development, new men were sought who had but two qualifications; a good knowledge of German and a reputation for discretion.

Cryptographers did not exist, so far as one knew. A mathematical mind was alleged to be the best foundation, but it must be noted that except for Sir Alfred Ewing, Henderson, Russell Clarke and Hopkinson, no one had such a reputation, and in fact the majority of those chosen had actually had a classical training. As time went on, when assistance of a less skilled nature was urgently required to work for these self-trained cryptographers who knew German, ladies with university education and wounded officers unfit for active service were brought in, and finally expert typists were admitted when the need for their help was almost too apparent. It should be noted in the light of later experience that the last should have been first, or at any rate let it be said that every expert cryptographer must possess at least one typist skilled in sorting, filling and analyzing.

On the outbreak of War, the D.I.D. [Director of Intelligence Division] received from the Admiralty W/T station appointed for police duty, various signals, of which the only thing that could be said was that they were not British. These were at once supplemented by signals intercepted by various stations belonging to the Marconi Co. and to the Post Office. The D.I.D. had no staff prepared to deal with this unknown and unexpected occurrence. He therefore suggested to Sir Alfred Ewing, the Director of Naval Education, that Education would probably be considered little importance for the next few months and that, further, this mass of intercepted telegrams was possibly in code, a subject in which the D of E was known to have an interested himself. He also provided Sir Alfred with the photograph copy of a German Code obtained by the Secret Service. (This ultimately proved to be a pup of the poorest class.)

Osborne and Dartmouth being on leave, [Ewing] the D of E was able to obtain the services of several of the modern language men from these colleges and thus it happened that several men who ultimately became permanent members joined up temporarily in August 1914 (Denniston, Anstie, Hooper, and Bond first met German signals at this period).

It is necessary to digress here to introduce the activities of the War Office. The same phenomena of intercepts had been observed in the Military Intelligence Directorate and in the first week of the War Colonel Macdonagh called in Sir Alfred Ewing to inform him that the W. O. had instructed Brigadier General Anderson to investigate these intercepts and to propose some form of amalgamation. Sir Alfred agreed to send a representative to work with General Anderson and what might be called the prenatal life of the cryptographic section began.

In those days the very amateur and inexperienced staff were greatly elated if they could obtain some sense from the P/L intercepts. It was the time now of the German advance into France, and their movements could be directly observed from the study of the en clair.
Code and cypher were however not neglected. Sir Alfred's party had fastened on to an obvious 10 letter code sent out by what were now known to be high power German stations to receiving stations in Africa and elsewhere. The staff included no one who knew anything of W/T procedure but, with the help of Mr Bradfield, a manager of the Marconi Co., various call signs were identified as German possessions. Code books of German commercial firms were collected and the investigations proceeded without, however, any discovery beyond the fact that Germany was communicating with her colonial governors and others.

The staff under General Anderson learned how to analyze. This they did with the utmost enthusiasm an entire lack of descretion. It was afterwards clear that military cypher messages were confused with naval codes and call signs figured as standard groups. But this staff did learn how to file and analyze. in the course of a few weeks codes and cyphers could be separated, and when about the middle of September the French gave G. H. Q. the method and the key military cyphers, no time was lost in settling down to decipher. Watch keeping was organised in the W. O. with the assistance of some of Sir Alfred's staff and the improvement in W/T interception began to make itself felt.

Early in September, Russell Clarke called on the D of E and told him that he and his friend, Hippisley, had been obtaining German intercepts on their receiving sets in London and Wales. Both these men had been enthusiastic W/T amateurs since the earliest days. It is not clear why the police or the Post Office had not sealed up their apparatus, but it can well be imagined that some rash official had tried his best on Russell Clarke and had been forced to retire the worse for wear. These two men had no difficulty in persuading the D of E that, given reasonable conditions, they could produce all that was needed.

Sir Alfred obtained permission for them to install their apparatus at Hunstanton Coast Guard Station. Geographically the position was most satisfactory for the tapping of the Flanders air and, as events proved, it was the ideal place for the work they were soon to initiate and develop to such perfection. But Hunstanton was chosen because there was a Coast Guard Station, equipped with W/T and it was suitable for the interception in Flanders and North France. Russell Clarke and Hippisley brought along another W/T amateur, Lambert, and with the assistance of C. G. P. O., a continuous watch on the German field stations was kept, thus giving a very necessary duplication to Stockton (the Admiralty police station) and the Marconi stations. Work on these cyphers continued in the Admiralty and W. O. by day, while the night watch worked in the W. O.

One is bound to admit that the signs of jealousy were not absent even in this small section of men drawn from many branches of civil life. It must be remembered that, at this time, civilians deciphered and translated the messages which all concerned the Western Front and were of immediate value to the Intelligence Section of G. H. Q. whither they were transmitted by wire and by daily bag. But it must be remembered that by day they were also deciphered and translated in the Admiralty, and if of no immediate value, they were occasionally of extreme interest and could hardly be concealed from those in supreme control. It is said that a climax was reached when the all highest on one side of Whitehall was told a translation of great interest (actually, proposals for treatment of Indian prisoners) by his opposite number before his own section had managed to get the information through to him.

It might be stated here that the colleges had now reopened and had claimed the services of certain of their staff who had worked with the D of E during August and September. Sir Alfred's staff therefore now consisted of Naval Instructors Parish and Curtis, and Professor Henderson when their other duties permitted them and, as watchkeepers doing night duty in the W. O., Denniston (who had obtained leave from Osborne), Hershall and Norton. The first three knew something of mathematics and little of Germany; all six were singularly ignorant of cryptography, but they were becoming expert analysers, filers and translators of German military telegraphese.
The Russian Naval attaché had brought a copy of the German Naval Signal Book which had been salved from the light cruiser Magdeburg. The quiet ever-working Naval Officer was Fleet Paymaster Rotter, the Head of the German Section of the Intelligence Division, whom the D. I. D. had lent to assist in tackling the new problem. The Russians alleged that the salved book was the one now in force in the German Navy, and that any naval intercepts we possessed must be decipherable by that book.

So far it had been discovered that the weather reports alone came directly out of the book and that all other signals were submitted to some process of reciphering which Rotter was now investigating. In a few days he solved the key which proved to be simple substitution, and within a few days of the solution he key changed! He set to work again and in a short time produced the current key which was to last for three months.

The material he had to work on was the numbered series of messages sent out by Nordderch (K. A. V.) to all ships (A. S.). The Germans, whose folly was greater than our stupidity, reciphered the numbers of the messages thus offering the simplest and surest entrée into their reciphering tables. Before very long, Rotter was able to instruct the office in the use of the Signal Book and the key, and the current messages could be read.

Then Russell Clarke happened to come up from Hunstanton and look into the office. He was these new signals and exclaimed that he could intercept hundreds of such messages daily on short waves which, if read, would give the daily doing of the German fleet. K. A. V. to all ships were merely the intelligence reports circulated by the German naval staff concerning the movements of enemy shipping. The movements of the German Fleet would be of supreme interest.

There was, however, only one aerial at Hunstanton which was doing good work on military interception, and the D of E was a little loathe to lose good stuff for a pig in a poke. However, he agreed to a week-end trial which was of course conclusive. From what we could read of the stuff intercepted at Hunstanton alone, it was clear that we should from now onwards be able to follow every movement of the enemy fleet, provided always they used the same key, callsigns and book.

It might be noted here that the German Signal Book used four additional morse letters to which they gave the names 'alpha, beta, gamma and rho (delta, epsilon, and lambda were added in later books). Ordinarily morse had no signs for these and the transmission on the land lines caused the office endless confusion. Russell Clarke evolved a suitable alphabet in which he instructed the Admiralty Telegraph Room, who in turn instructed various interception stations. Later on in the War the army evolved another alphabet and the French yet another, but 40 OB refused to come into line, and stuck to the plus and equal sign and the rest of them which Russell Clarke had invented and which had been learnt in the pain and turmoil of those early days.

It was now clear that the Admiralty cryptographic section had found a task which concerned the Navy alone, and that there might be an enormous outlet for their energy. The watchkeepers were therefore recalled from the W. O. and started to keep a continuous watch on the naval signals. As stated above, the relations between the two offices were already somewhat strained and, as the new activities in the Admiralty were a closely guarded secret, a definite breach occurred which endured till the Spring of 1917 when, as will be seen later, a liaison under completely new conditions was effected. Looking back over those years, the loss of efficiency to both departments caused originally by mere official jealously is the most regrettable fact in the development of intelligence based on cryptography.

The watch on the naval signals began with the staff mentioned above in Sir Alfred Ewing’s room. Work was complicated by the crowd, the need for secrecy and the equal need for charwomen. Sir Alfred’s visitors were now denied entrance to the room and it is remembered how the august Assistant Secretary tot he Admiralty was refused admittance
by a temporary civilian ignorant of his identity. This apparent indiscretion bore good fruit, for very early in November a new room was placed at the disposal of the Section. This was the original 40 OB where the work was carried on till once again the growing staff was overcrowded.

To preside over this room came Herbert Hope, then Commander. It has always been alleged by himself that he knew no German, no cryptography, nor why he had come. His official duty was to keep the Operations Division and Intelligence Division informed of the activities of the German Fleet as elucidated by the D of E's cryptographic staff. Before very long, however, he was able, by his constant presence, to be the connecting link between the watches and to be the guide and helper of all such as were in difficulties, either with the German language or cryptography.

The First Lord [Churchill] now took official note of the existence of the Section and issued its charter. As is seen, he laid down certain instructions for the distribution of the translations. One is bound to confess that the First Lord's view of the possibilities of cryptography appear now distinctly limited. To have carried out his instructions literally would, no doubt, have safeguarded the secret but must also have nullified the value of the messages.

The Operations Division under the Chief of Staff should have been most interested in these messages, but this Division was at first most sceptical. Two unfortunate incidents in the days before the staff moved to 40 OB were perhaps the cause of this scepticism. Owing to poor interception and lack of knowledge on the part of the staff, a signal was circulated alleging that the Ariadne was proceeding to the Jade. The Operations Division knew that the Ariadne was sunk in the Heligoland Bight action. Worse than that, a message was circulated on two or three successive evenings purporting to order destroyers to patrol the Inner Gabbard. The C.O.S. took counter-action and, at some considerable trouble and expense, English destroyers also patrolled that spot and never found the enemy. Subsequently it was found that the German destroyers had merely been ordered to proceed to Heligoland, which island could only be distinguished from the Inner Gabbard by the bar over the letter “A” which had escaped the notice of the inexperienced and geographically ignorant watchkeeper.

Further, any signal which could be read was circulated without comment and for reasons known to W/T experts, many of those emanating from Bulk were among the best intercepted and hence most easily read. The poor watchkeepers had the haziest of notions as to the whereabouts of Bulk but the Operations Division cannot be blamed for their lack of enthusiasm for the times at which the Kiel barrier was opened. The watchkeepers knew nothing of the German fleet, very little of the geography of the German coastline, while there ignorance of English and German naval phraseology was profound. Hope did his best for them, while Lord Fisher point out that warships did not “run in” and begged the staff to adopt the word “proceed”.

At the beginning of November 1914, the work of watching the German Fleet seriously began and the organisation known popularly as “40 OB” began its career. The personnel was as follows: Sir Alfred Ewing in charge, Commander Hope and Fleet Paymaster Rotter dealing respectively with the intelligence and cryptographic sides of the work, Herschell, Denniston and Norton watchkeepers in 40 OB, Russell Clarke and Hippisley at the Hunstanton intercepting station. The permanent educational staff of the D of E, Naval instructors Parish and Curtis and Professor Henderson, gave all the assistance they could when their other duties permitted.

The gear consisted of one copy, the original, of the Naval Signal Book. However, Russell Clarke turned himself into a photographer and his private house into a studio and by the end of the month three additional copies were available. Lack of apparatus forced him to reduce the size considerably and as time went on it was found that the strain on the eyes of the watchkeepers using electric light was too great, so the Admiralty provided a suitable
apparatus and Naval Instructor Curtis again reproduced this book (and many others) in the course of 1915.

The other "gear" arrived from Australia during November. It was the Handelschuffs Vertehrsbuch (HVB) captured very early by the Australians, photographed and sent home for distribution. It had been found that merchantmen acting with German cruisers used this book for communication, but once in 40 OB it was soon discovered that the whole High Sea Fleet and especially outposts, submarines and airships used it very extensively, of course always in reciphered form. It continued in force till March 1915 and was of the greatest value, especially in the matter of air raids.

With this gear, then, the staff started work. There was no traditional routine to be followed. New methods had to be evolved to meet new needs. It may be of interest to sketch out the daily routine as it was in November 1914. Hope and Rotter were present daily from 9 a.m. till 7 p.m., the former dealing with the translated messages, the latter working on the many fragments and examining the unknown. The man on watch had to sort, decode and translate the new.

Hunstanton, Stockton Leafield and Hall Street had direct lines to the Admiralty. There was a never-ending stream of postmen delivering bundles of intercepts. In a few months these men were replaced by an automatic tube which discharged the goods into a basket with a rush which shook the nerve of any unwitting visitor and very much disturbed the slumbers of a night-watchman taking his time off.

In the very early days every message which appeared to give sense to the man on duty was "logged" and "sent". That is, the translation was written in the current log book and 3 copies were made for circulation, one for the C.O.S., one for the D.I.D. and one for Hope. With luck, there were three or four copies of every message from the various stations. These had to be pinned together and stacked in the file of logged messages. But still there was a vast number of fragments, of messages which failed to satisfy the fastidious German taste of the watchkeeper, or messages in unknown codes and languages. All these were bundled into a tin on which was printed in large and black "N. S. L.". It was a very important tin, nearly always very full in those days, but to explain it to the many newcomers was one of the most complex points in the very complicated system. Truly N. S. L. only meant "neither sent nor logged". When the War was finished there was still a box called N. S. L. when there had been no log for the last two years. N. S. L. was a living thing with a specific meaning, and it is recounted how a night watchman woke trembling in a sweat — he had dreamt he had been sent in the N. S. L. and got lost.

The log became an object of hatred before long. The First Lord [Churchill] had called into being that particular form of filing current work and it was over two years, when its originator was elsewhere, before a more labour-saving and less soul-destroying method was allowed to replace it. In the days when a watchkeeper averaged 12 messages it could be written up, though even then it was fashion to let the messages accumulate and allow the new watch to write up the log, and thus appreciate the situation! But it was beyond a joke when naval actions were pending or zepps fluttering and the watchkeeper had 12 to 20 pages of the book to write up.

For two months at least the night man had a lonely time, though he was probably too busy to note it. It was no good bringing pyjamas in those days or hoping the Admiralty would provide a bath. All that was needed was plenty of sandwiches. Tastes in drinks varied and only one man is alleged to have worked throughout the night with a revolver at his elbow.

It was already obvious that an increase of staff was essential when a further access of "gear" made it imperative. Trawlers working in the neighbourhood of the spot where 4 German destroyers had been sunk on . . . . , dragged up a heavy chest with German markings. This was at once forwarded to D. I. D. and was found to contain a copy of the V. B. (Verkehrsbuch), a most secret code book used by the German Admiralty and senior
officers, also a mass of secret papers dealing with navigation. The D. I. D. handed over
the former to Sir Alfred Ewing and collected a staff under Hershall to translate the latter.

The V. B. was found to be of the greatest immediate value in dealing with the German
cruiser fleet, while the fact that it was solely used for the correspondence with the Naval
Attachés abroad, especially in Madrid, escaped notice for some months. The pressure of
purely naval work on the small staff rendered research into new problems impossible in
those days. To fill the vacancy caused by Herschell’s transfer to D. I. D., and to bring the
watches up to 2-man strength, Monk Bretton, Hopkinson, Freemantle, Lawrence and
Morrah joined in December.

None of these men had more qualifications than the original men. They knew ordinary
literary German fluently and they could be relied on. But of cryptography, of naval
German, of the habits of war vessels of any nationality, they knew not a jot. Their training
was of the shortest before they were sent off in watches of 2-men each and given the
responsibility of looking after the German Fleet. Worse than that, they had to learn the
intricacies of the office routine. They probably had more than their fair share of log-
writing, and they had to sort and circulate. They had to turn the German squared chart into
latitude and longitude of which they had not heard since the geography class of their school
days.

It is to be imagined that Hope had an anxious time when he arrived each morning, fearing
to find that the German mineseekers had found a mine apparently off New Zealand which
on closer examination proved to be off Heligoland and then a hurried correction “in our no.
XYZ for so and so please read thus and thus” would be circulated in triplicate. However, it
was already a cheerful party by New Year in 1915.

Everything the Germans said was contained in one of the three books in 40 OB and in
those days the Germans were by no means discreet or cryptic in their W/T. The exact
disposition of the High Sea Fleet, the submarines and the airships was mentioned from
time to time, and duly read and circulated.

It is not the function of these notes to go into any details of the actual signals but merely to
record how and why the organisation which read them grew. When 1915 began, 40 OB
was fairly pleased with itself in its innocence. All German naval signals which the stations
could intercept were read and circulated. No attempt was made to develop any intelligence
side of the work, beyond Hope’s duty of instructing the authorities on the real meaning of
certain signals. The request that 40 OB should be allowed to keep flagged chart of the
German coastline was vetoed as an unnecessary duplication of the work in the Operations
Division. (In May 1917 this request received sanction.) But all naval signals were read
even if without intelligence. True it is that in certain cupboards there were increasing piles
of “stuff” which was not read but it was not naval German. The art of reading other
peoples’ telegrams was still in extreme infancy; no one then imagined that all those piles
contained telegrams possibly of the greatest interest which could be read and, in 1915 it
may be said, read without extreme difficulty.

In those days the possibility of a change in the cypher key was prophesied with bated
breath and the authorities were informed that such a danger must be reckoned with. Should
it happen, it was generally considered that our sources of intelligence would dry up for
several days at the very least. At last, one evening early in January, the watch was
confronted with signals which would not yield to the ordinary treatment. The dreaded
change had come! All the available staff were summoned by telephone and after a night
long struggle the new key was obtained to the joy and admiration of all concerned. The
First Lord called early next morning and congratulated the experts who had solved the key
so promptly.

In the course of the day it was discovered that the key had not changed but that the existing
key had been “slid” and that the actual work involved need not have taken five minutes.
This discovery 40 OB kept to itself and when, a few days later, the key really did change one morning, the new one was produced quietly and without much trouble in a few hours.

During the early Spring of 1915 the increase in the number of intercepting aerials controlled either by Russell Clarke or the Marconi Company led to a very large increase in the number of telegrams received. It was, of course, necessary to have 2 or 3 copies of each message in order that the text might be absolutely sure. But the intercepting officers were now learning a lot about the methods of German naval W/T and it was possible to allot aerials to various wavelengths and even districts. Thus the operators soon realised that the Baltic and North Sea Fleets were on different circuits and under different controls. The submarines formed a separate group and the small outpost craft in the Bight yet another. 40 OB learnt these thing too and, even at this period, Baltic messages received scanty treatment.

It was again found necessary to enlarge the staff to cope with the increase in daily bag and Lytton, Young, Talbot and W. L. Clarke came in, one into each watch. There was at this moment no thought of enlarging the scope of our activities, but merely competing efficiently with the current naval messages. However, one day in April, D. I. D. produced a fresh line of goods - treasure trove in Persia it was said, obtained by sandbagging said one, by payment said another. Later it was alleged that the India Office had obtained the effects of a German Consul expelled from Persia and, knowing nothing of such things as code books, had turned the lot over to D.I.D. The so-called cryptographers examined the books. They were obviously not naval but diplomatic codes but were no good to us unless we also had the telegrams. So the cupboards where the “stuff” was piled were made to disgorge.
Appendix 4

Wartime bjs: HW3/162

Numbers supplied to regular receivers by year. The DG (Menzies) had copies of all bjs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1941</th>
<th>1942</th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>1944</th>
<th>1945</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Office</td>
<td>2288</td>
<td>3485</td>
<td>13041</td>
<td>13095</td>
<td>14050</td>
<td>13153</td>
<td>8512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admiralty</td>
<td>962</td>
<td>4526</td>
<td>7272</td>
<td>6901</td>
<td>5481</td>
<td>5049</td>
<td>3092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Office</td>
<td>983</td>
<td>3767</td>
<td>5517</td>
<td>6927</td>
<td>5697</td>
<td>5421</td>
<td>3710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India Office</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>1160</td>
<td>3182</td>
<td>2848</td>
<td>1887</td>
<td>2093</td>
<td>2068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial Office</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>1448</td>
<td>3821</td>
<td>3447</td>
<td>1284</td>
<td>1265</td>
<td>1012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Ministry</td>
<td>1198</td>
<td>4274</td>
<td>5002</td>
<td>6158</td>
<td>4162</td>
<td>4554</td>
<td>2879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI 5</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>1166</td>
<td>3898</td>
<td>9315</td>
<td>9850</td>
<td>8032</td>
<td>5302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept. of Trade</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>1683</td>
<td>1460</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>1214</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EB (FO and MEW)</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>3639</td>
<td>5464</td>
<td>3417</td>
<td>1702</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morton</td>
<td>793</td>
<td>2590</td>
<td>2505</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1167</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridges</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>6048</td>
<td>3614</td>
<td>1534</td>
<td>2036</td>
<td>974</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominions Office</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>1185</td>
<td>2515</td>
<td>1086</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>296</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIS now RSS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>704</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 5

National Archives of Canada RG 248125, NSS 1282-85 (i)

'Y'Programmes - Diplomatic and Commercial (Home Stations) supplied to the Canadian National Security E at Ottawa by GCCS in London on 3 June 1942.

It consists of a list of countries whose diplomatic messages were intercepted for the cryptographers in Berkeley Street, together with the relevant callsigns and frequencies in kilocycles, which intercept (or 'Y') station received the messages -- or in the case of Turkey and French Colonial which cable censor -- which receiving country received the messages: plus comments when necessary:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Call Sign</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Service to</th>
<th>'Y' Stn</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>YAK</td>
<td>18640</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Baldock</td>
<td>Line to BP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13580</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9975</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>LZN</td>
<td>18640</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Baldock</td>
<td>Line to BP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13580</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9975</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>LS02</td>
<td>21360</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Hill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>PPU</td>
<td>19260</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Cupar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>LZB</td>
<td>7460</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Sandridge</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>China</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>German</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>LZD</td>
<td>5740</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Sandridge</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>China</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>German</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Code2</td>
<td>Schedules covered</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>LZS</td>
<td>105.26</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CEA2</td>
<td>17410</td>
<td>Argentine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cupar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eire</td>
<td>EJK</td>
<td>11470</td>
<td>Vatican City</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FYB</td>
<td>19150</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FYC</td>
<td>15935</td>
<td>Saigon, Hanoi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FYC2</td>
<td>9840</td>
<td>Saigon, Hanoi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FYM2</td>
<td>82.2</td>
<td>Colonies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FYN</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>FYQ</td>
<td>14730</td>
<td>Saigon, Hanoi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FYQ2</td>
<td>8865</td>
<td>Saigon, Hanoi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FYR2</td>
<td>7894</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FYT2</td>
<td>9930</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FYU</td>
<td>1890</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FYU2</td>
<td>12105</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Saigon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FYX</td>
<td>16130</td>
<td>Fr Indo-China</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Whitchurch</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fr IndoChina</td>
<td>FZO</td>
<td>15544</td>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FZQ2</td>
<td>7408</td>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FZS</td>
<td>18388</td>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sandridge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FZS3</td>
<td>9485</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sandridge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FZT</td>
<td>17890</td>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>French Colonies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Whitchurch</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Whitchurch</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FZT2</td>
<td>10515</td>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Whitchurch</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>DEY</td>
<td>7632.5</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Denmark Hill</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DEL</td>
<td>7389</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DER</td>
<td>10033</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DEW</td>
<td>98.36</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Denmark Hill</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DFC</td>
<td>12985</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Brora</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DFJ</td>
<td>19700</td>
<td>As DGO/DGY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Brora</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Argentine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DADRO FZS3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FZS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFK</td>
<td>7325</td>
<td>As DGO/DGY</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFN</td>
<td>9910</td>
<td>As DGO/DGY</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFO</td>
<td>9730</td>
<td>As DGO/DGY</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFP</td>
<td>7917</td>
<td>As DGO/DGY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFQ</td>
<td>18700</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFS</td>
<td>10920</td>
<td>As DFJ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFT</td>
<td>7812.5</td>
<td>As DGO/DGY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFY</td>
<td>16.55</td>
<td>As DGO/DGY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFH</td>
<td>10440</td>
<td>As DFJ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGO</td>
<td>13225</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGR</td>
<td>17341</td>
<td>As DFC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGY</td>
<td>17880</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGZ</td>
<td>14605</td>
<td>As DFC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DKD</td>
<td>69.70</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAR</td>
<td>65.64</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAR2</td>
<td>6840</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAT2</td>
<td>9125</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAW</td>
<td>57.46</td>
<td>As HAR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPA</td>
<td>10810</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPJ</td>
<td>18560</td>
<td>As EPA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPX</td>
<td>16376</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAC</td>
<td>12445</td>
<td>Colonies</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAS</td>
<td>10380</td>
<td>Bulgaria Colonies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEO</td>
<td>6706</td>
<td>Colonies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGA</td>
<td>8750</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGB</td>
<td>10718</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGD</td>
<td>10764</td>
<td>Argentine Colonies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>10730</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGZ</td>
<td>18630</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IQA</td>
<td>14736</td>
<td>Argentine Colonies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IQT</td>
<td>55.05</td>
<td>Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Romania, Sandridge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IQU</td>
<td>67.07</td>
<td>Denmark Hill</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRE</td>
<td>47.62</td>
<td>Germany, Denmark Hill</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRF</td>
<td>8930</td>
<td>Germany, Sandridge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRL</td>
<td>19656</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Argentina, Romania, Sandridge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRS</td>
<td>9966</td>
<td>Bulgaria, Colonies, Germany, Hungary, Romania, Sandridge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRV</td>
<td>78518</td>
<td>Bulgaria, Colonies, Germany, Hungary, Romania, Sandridge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRW</td>
<td>19520</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Argentina, China, Japan, Sandridge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRX</td>
<td>12017</td>
<td>Bulgaria, Colonies, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Sandridge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Japan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JMO2</td>
<td>7550</td>
<td>Germany, Italy, Brora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMO4</td>
<td>15905</td>
<td>As JMO2, Brora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JNB</td>
<td>13880</td>
<td>Afghanistan, France, Whitch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JNC</td>
<td>17960</td>
<td>As JMB, Whitch.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JNE</td>
<td>10160</td>
<td>Germany, Brora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JNF</td>
<td>15720</td>
<td>Germany, Brora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JNL</td>
<td>6810</td>
<td>Germany, Brora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JNO</td>
<td>8110</td>
<td>Germany, Brora, Italy, Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JNP</td>
<td>13740</td>
<td>Italy, Switzerland, Brora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JNQ2</td>
<td>18945</td>
<td>Italy, Switzerland, Brora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUH</td>
<td>11520</td>
<td>Portugal, Brora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUI</td>
<td>7570</td>
<td>Germany, Brora, Italy, Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUJ</td>
<td>9265</td>
<td>As JUI, Brora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUL</td>
<td>6730</td>
<td>As JUI, Brora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUM</td>
<td>13705</td>
<td>As JUI, Brora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUW</td>
<td>10980</td>
<td>As JUI, Brora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUW</td>
<td>10980</td>
<td>USSR, Denmark Hill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUX</td>
<td>17950</td>
<td>USSR, Denmark Hill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Country 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDH</td>
<td>13520</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDH</td>
<td>13520</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDH</td>
<td>13520</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDH</td>
<td>13520</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan (Shanghai) XOC</td>
<td>10540</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan (Shanghai) XOC</td>
<td>10540</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan (Shanghai) XOC</td>
<td>10540</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal CUD2</td>
<td>13345</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal CUD2</td>
<td>13345</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal CUD2</td>
<td>13345</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal CUD2</td>
<td>13345</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal CUD2</td>
<td>13345</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUK</td>
<td>10905</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUK</td>
<td>10905</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUK</td>
<td>10905</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUK</td>
<td>10905</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUT</td>
<td>8095</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUT</td>
<td>8095</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUT</td>
<td>8095</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUT</td>
<td>8095</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUT</td>
<td>8095</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUW</td>
<td>19180</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUW</td>
<td>19180</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUW</td>
<td>19180</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUX</td>
<td>9195</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUX</td>
<td>9195</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUX</td>
<td>9195</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUX</td>
<td>9195</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUY</td>
<td>9195</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUY</td>
<td>9195</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUY</td>
<td>9195</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUY</td>
<td>9195</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania YOA</td>
<td>9027</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania YOA</td>
<td>9027</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania YOA</td>
<td>9027</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania YOA</td>
<td>9027</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania YOA</td>
<td>9027</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania YOA</td>
<td>9027</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YOB</td>
<td>25.37</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YOB</td>
<td>25.37</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YOC</td>
<td>94.3</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YOM</td>
<td>10845</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YOP</td>
<td>7333</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YOP</td>
<td>7333</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YOP</td>
<td>7333</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain EAA</td>
<td>81.74</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain EAA</td>
<td>81.74</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain EAA</td>
<td>81.74</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain EAA</td>
<td>81.74</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain EAN2</td>
<td>9772</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain EAN2</td>
<td>9772</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain EAQ</td>
<td>9860</td>
<td>Argentine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain EAQ</td>
<td>9860</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain EAQ</td>
<td>9860</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden SAQ</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden SAQ</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden SAQ</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden SAQ</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden SAU</td>
<td>9434</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden SAU</td>
<td>9434</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden SAV</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden SAV</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden SAV</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden SAV</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>USSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden SDA</td>
<td>7436</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden SDB</td>
<td>10780</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden SDE</td>
<td>13815</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden SDE</td>
<td>13815</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden SDE</td>
<td>13815</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden SDE</td>
<td>13815</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Call Sign</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>SDO</td>
<td>13825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>SDX</td>
<td>9442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>HBA</td>
<td>82.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HBC</td>
<td>9000</td>
<td>St Albans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HBF</td>
<td>18450</td>
<td>Brora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HBG</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>As HBA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>HBM</td>
<td>8065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>HBO</td>
<td>11402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>HSP</td>
<td>17741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>As TAB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>TAE</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>TAF</td>
<td>8045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>TAG</td>
<td>13090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>TAJ</td>
<td>109.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>RGE</td>
<td>Various</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>RNN</td>
<td>6880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>RWZ</td>
<td>13960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>RYS</td>
<td>13960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Whitchurch</td>
<td>15090</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 6

Venona

Venona was the name given by the Americans to a long-lasting series of decryptions of Russian diplomatic messages between the KGB in the form of the Soviet Consul General in New York and Moscow Centre. While it was known that references to a Soviet agent nicknamed Gomer - or Homer - actually referred to Donald Maclean, little else was known about Venona until the National Security Agency released it on Internet in 1995. Since the second of three tranches released covered the 1943 period and referred (by pseudonyms) to Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin and the conclusions of several major conferences, it is appropriate to include messages relative to Turkish neutrality in this appendix, and to give a brief account of their emergence.

The Venona material was decrypted by Meredith Gardiner, a US cryptographer. He achieved this by reconstructing the Soviet code-books. This in turn was achieved because he identified double use of OTP at the Moscow centre end. His purpose seems to have been to show his Washington masters that the Soviet Union had major reservations about their Western Allies, and about the shape of the post-war world. Since Roosevelt at this time was starry-eyed about Stalin and his post-war policies, Gardiner may well have hoped his Venona telegrams would reach the President, but there is no evidence that they did.

There are four years' of material, released in three tranches: the first was the period 1944-52 (released in 1994), the second 1943 and the third 1947-52. It is with the second release that this appendix is concerned.

The Venona traffic has features in common with bjs: the office's date and number; the intercepted station, destination and number; a summary of content by way of heading. There are two notable differences: one is the amount of 'unrecovered' or unrecoverable' groups in this early period of Gardiner's cryptographic effort, so that the meaning and gist of many of the intercepts offered for circulation seems all but lost. The second is the American practice of re-issuing decrypts as and when new information makes this appropriate. Some of the 1943 traffic was re-issued in 1974, but with key words blacked out, no doubt by the National Security Agency at the request of GCHQ, so the 1996 reader is little the wiser. The content of the decrypts varies from reports on the performance of new local agents to reactions in New York to the Allied Conferences then taking place. The Soviet Consul General in New York, 'Victor', must have been ordered by his KGB masters to watch out particularly for any evidence of the Western Allies seeking to make a separate peace with the Germans opposed to Hitler, as this question is raised in several of the extant 1943 decrypts.
Places and people are graphically identified -- viz. 'Kaban' or 'Boar' is Churchill, 'Kapitan' is Roosevelt, 'Ras' is de Gaulle, 'the Island' is Great Britain. Sidon is London, Tyre is New York, Carthage is Washington. Sir William Stephenson of British Security Coordination and Colonel Donovan of OSS ('izba') were regularly reported on. Several British agents appear - Cedric Belfrage, Klaus Fuchs, Elizabeth Bentley and Donald Maclean ('Gomer' or 'Homer'). Venona eventually provided incontrovertible evidence of Maclean's espionage activities on behalf of the Soviet Union after as well as during the war.
APPENDIX 7 - HW 3

Papers on GCCS in 1939
Comments by Professor Hinsley on memoranda supplied by J. E. Cooper and Nigel de Grey to Frank Birch in HW 3/33 (1944) and HW3/83 (1946-75) at the Public Record Office.

By 1945, with the result of the war no longer in doubt, GCCS at BP turned its attention to writing its own history, or rather the history of the war through the interpretation of its work. The historians assigned this task included W. F. Clarke, in charge of the German section in 1939, and Frank Birch, his successor. The recently released files of HW3 in the PRO contain memoranda written at his request. These concentrate on the immediate pre-war period. They seem to be in response to a conviction that pre-war GCCS failed to adapt itself to the probability of a second world war and of machine encipherment, and that the resulting pessimism about the possibility of ever reading Enigma messages delayed the breakthrough of Turing and Welchman in 1940. Two of the most senior 'classical' cryptographers, J. E. C 'Josh' Cooper and Nigel de Grey, were asked for their comments and to assess the accuracy of Alastair Denniston's memory when he wrote the interwar history of GCCS, now to be found in HW 3/32. Cooper wrote in 1975 a memoir of 1940, in which he said:

Denniston went on a round of visits to the universities...it would be hard to exaggerate the importance of this for the future development of GCCS. Not only had Denniston brought in scholars of (sic) of the humanities but he had also invited mathematicians of a somewhat different type, who were especially attracted to the Enigma problem.

His earlier comments were reviewed at the request of the present author by Professor Sir Harry Hinsley, who wrote the following comment on May 1 1996:

I believe Josh Cooper is right when he says in his para. 8 that AGD understood the wider problem of Sigint better than he was given credit for. It is certainly true that he had to be careful about crossing the boundary between cryptography and intelligence because the Service departments were extremely jealous in insisting that intelligence was their business. It is also true that most of the pre-war cryptographers Josh refers to had no interest in intelligence. Neither of these situations was to change until after the outbreak of war -- in new circumstances and with new people. Even so, it is to be noted that despite Josh's criticisms of the pre-war staff in his para 6 (FO/371/2182), and of the office's amateur structure, the place did remarkably well on the cryptographic side before the war. In addition to its good results on the diplomatic, it made good progress against Italian and Japanese service cyphers. Only against Germany and the Soviets, both diplomatic and service cyphers, did it have no success. But this was due to circumstances that would not change till after the outbreak of war - very little traffic intercepted because of the use of landlines; very difficult cyphers - German diplomatic was not broken until 1943 and German Enigma only broken by the Poles with the aid of
stolen documents before mid-1940 (for Air Force) mid-1941 (for navy) and autumn 1941 (for Army).

Josh in para 9 (FO 371/2182) is also right to stress that it was AGD who recruited the wartime staff from the universities with visits there in 1937 and 1938 (also 1939, when he recruited me and 20 other undergraduates within 2 months of the outbreak of war). I believe this was a major contribution to the war-time successes - going to the right places and choosing the right people showed great foresight.

Josh's comment in para 10 (FO/371/21842) that AGD was 'diffident and nervous, a small fish in a big pool that contained many predators' may seem unduly harsh, therefore, but I think it is harsher than Josh intended. There were many predators (the Services seriously thought of winding GCCS down when war came) and Josh would agree, I'm sure, that it was necessary to be diffident and understandable to be nervous. He quite rightly adds at the end of para 20 (FO 371/21482) that AGD remembered World War One very well but "was tied by the narrow terms of reference imposed on him from above". This is an accurate conclusion.

The only other paper that calls for comment is the 3-page memo, by de Grey. He says that more was achieved cryptographically before the war than is generally recognised, but that the overall effort was limited by lack of funds, lack of imagination and forgetfulness of the lessons about Signals intelligence learnt in war. But he adds that the fault was not all or mainly the fault of GCCS. "National policy was directed by axe men - very difficult to fight at the time." I think he exaggerates the lack of imagination and the forgetfulness of the lessons of the previous war. AGD was severely restricted by the axe men -- and by the difficulty of doing signals intelligence, as distinct from cryptography, in the inter-war years.

Hinsley added his own comment on the spirit of pessimism which allegedly hung over BP in 1940. The German Air Force Enigma was broken early because of Norway but was of limited use operationally, so the breakthrough did not signal great new importance to Bletchley in Whitehall.' Alan Turing told him that he would never break Enigma without the weather-ships. These, BP knew, carried German naval Enigma machines and codebooks, for the current months by the coding clerk, for the subsequent month, locked in a safe in the officers' mess. Twice Hinsley, who had good relations with key Admiralty officials with whom he dealt direct, pinpointed German weather-ships for the Royal Navy to board, in order to seize not the current month's book -- which would have been destroyed by the coding clerk -- but the safe which contained the next month's books. Both raids were successful and the material they produced enabled Turing to complete his work on the machine successfully. See Appendix 12 (pp.565-569) in Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations (London: HMSO 1979), Vol. 1.
Appendix 8


The use by Hitler, Ribbentrop, Göbbels and Kaltenbrunner of intercepted diplomatic communications from the neutrals was disclosed in 1968 by David Irving and Professor D. C. Watt. Their *Breach of Security* summarizes some of the diplomatic intercepts supplied by the Forschungsamt, and the German Foreign Office's Deciphering bureau - Chiffierstelle. The dates on which these were supplied to Hitler are given. They begin on 14 February 1940 and end on 13 November 1943. They emanate from the same capitals as DIR/C - namely Ankara, Washington, Vichy, Cairo, Berne, Rome, Buenos Aires, Santiago da Chile, London, Sofia, Bucharest, Belgrade, Lisbon, Madrid and Tokyo. Their content, as summarised, show they cover the same topics as the BJS, and it must be theoretically possible to marry up the two archives. Some 472 intercepted foreign diplomatic cables were shown to Hitler, according to this compilation, and of these 180 emanated from Turkey.
Appendix 10

WHO WAS WHO

(1) = served in the First World War
(1a) = served between 1919 and 1939
(2) = served in the Second World War.

Adcock, F. E. (1) and (2)
Anstey, W.H. (1)
Birch, Frank. (1) and (2)
Boase, Tom (Later Professor, in GCCS's Italian section) (2)
Clark, E. Russell (1) (1a)
Cooper, Josh (1a), (2). Head of the Air Force Section in GCCS
Denniston, A.G. (1) (1a) (2)
Ewing, J.A. Director of Naval Education in 1914 and first head of Room 40 (1)
Fetterlein, Ernst (1a) (2) d. 1944
Forbes, Courtenay (1a) (2) Sir (Victor) (Walter) 1889-1958
Foss, Hugh (1a) (2)
de Grey, Nigel (1) (2) 1886-1951
Godfrey, Margaret (wife of Admiral Godfrey, DNI) (1a) (2)
Hall, Reginald (Admiral) Sir William DNI in WW1 1870-1943
Hippisley, Baytum (1)
Hobart-Hampden, Ernest (Miles) (1a) 1864-1949
Hooper, Joe (1a) (2) (later Director of GCHQ)
Hope, G.L.N. (1) (1a) (2)
Hope, H.W.W. (later Admiral) (1) Operational Head of Room 40.
Hinsley, F. H. 'Harry' (later Professor Sir, Vice Chancellor of Cambridge University)
Jeffries, John (2)
Jones, Group Captain Eric (later Head of GCHQ) (2)
Kendrick, A. D. (1a) (2)
Kenworthy H. C. (1a) (2)
Knox, A. D. (2) Head of ISK at Bletchley Park. d.1943
Lambert, Leslie (1) (1a) (2) (also broadcaster and conjuror)
Last, Hugh (2) (Professor of Roman History. d.1957)
Maine, Henry (1a) (2)
Montgomery, William (Revd) (1)
Parlett, Sir Harold. Previously Japanese Counsellor at the Tokyo Embassy
(1a)
Rotter, C.J.E.. (1) Paymaster Captain, later Rear Admiral, 1871-1948
Sinclair, Evelyn (Sister of Admiral Sinclair)
Sinclair, Admiral Hugh (Head of SIS 1922-39) 1873-1939
Strachey, Oliver (1a) (2) Formerly of MI1 1b, later head of ISOS at
Bletchley. 1874-1960
Tiltman, John (1a) (2) Head of the military section in GCCS
Travis, Edward (1a) (2) Head of GCCS 1942-52. 1888-1956
Turing, Alan (2)
Welsford, Rhoda (1a) (2)
Welchman, Gordon (2) (also author of The Hut Six Story)

TURKS
Saraçoglu, Sükrü
Menemencioglu Numan
İnönü, İsmet
Cevet Acekalin
Rauf Orbay
Cekir Cakmak
Assim Gubnuz

AMBASSADORS
Oshima, Hiroshi - Japanese Ambassador in Berlin
Kurihara, Sho - Japanese Ambassador in Ankara
de Peppo - Italian Ambassador in Ankara

BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIALS
Butler, R. A.
Cadogan, Sir Alexander
Clutton, George (GL), 1909-1970
Dixon, Pierson, 1904-1965
Harvey, Oliver
Helm, Knox
Jebb, Gladwyn
Falla, Paul
Knatchbull-Hugessen, Sir Hugh
Peter Lawford
Reilly, Patrick
Rendel, George
Sargent, Sir Orme 'Moley'
Sterndale-Bennett, John
BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

DEPARTMENTAL PAPERS IN THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW, LONDON

ADM1  Admiralty and Secretarial Papers
ADM 223 Naval Intelligence Division
AIR 40  Directorate of Air Intelligence
CAB 23  Cabinet Minutes
DEFE 3  Intelligence from Enemy Radio Communications
FO 195  Embassy and Consular Archives Turkey: Correspondence
FO 198  Embassy and Consular Archives Turkey: Miscellaneous
FO 226  Embassy and Consular Archives Turkey: Beirut Correspondence
FO 366  Chief Clerk's Department Archives
FO 371  Foreign Office General Correspondence
FO 837  Industrial Intelligence Centre and Ministry of Economic Warfare
HW 1  Intelligence for the Prime Minister
HW 3  GCCS and Predecessors: Personal and Miscellaneous Records
HW 12  GCCS: Decrypts of Intercepted Diplomatic Communication
PREM 1  Correspondence and Papers of the Prime Minister's Office
PREM 3  Operational Papers of the Prime Minister's Office
PREM 4  Confidential Papers of the Prime Minister's Office
WO 190  Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence: Appreciation Files
WO 208  Directorate of Military Intelligence

CHURCHILL COLLEGE ARCHIVE, CAMBRIDGE

Sir Alexander G. M. Cadogan, Papers
Winston S. Churchill, Papers
W. F. Clarke, Papers
Commander A. G. Denniston, Papers
Admiral Sir Reginald Hall, Memoirs and Papers
Lieutenant-General Sir (Edward) Ian C. Jacob, Adana Conference Diary
Sir Hugh Hughe M. Knatchbull-Hugessen, 1943 Diary
HOUSE OF LORDS LIBRARY

Lloyd George, Papers

INDIA OFFICE LIBRARY


NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF CANADA, OTTAWA

RG 25 'Y'Programmes (See Appendix 5)

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, ARLINGTON

Venona Intercepts, 1943, Reproduced via the INTERNET (See Appendix 6)

KING'S COLLEGE, LONDON

Lord Alanbrooke Papers

LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS

Hugh Dalton, Typescript War Diaries

BRITISH MUSEUM

Oliver Harvey, Mss. Diary
Emrys Evans, Correspondence

PRIVATE COLLECTIONS

Sir Patrick Reilly, Wartime Memoir
Alethea Knatchbull-Hugessen, Typescript by Sir Hugh on the 'Cicero' Affair
PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS

Ferris, John, (ed.), The British Army and Signals Intelligence During the First World War (Strous: Alan Sutton, 1992)

Germany, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Documents on German Foreign Policy: 1918-45. War Years, 1940-1941 Series D. Vol. 10 (June 23-August 31 1940); Vol. 11 (September 1 1940-January 31 1941); Vol. 12 (February 1-June 22 1941); Vol. 13 (June 23-December 1 1941). (London: HMSO, 1957-1964).


Wilson, Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland (Lord Wilson of Libya) Operations in the Middle East from February 1943 to January 1944, Supplement to the London Gazette, 12 November 1946
PUBLISHED MEMOIRS AND DIARIES

Churchill, Winston S. *The Second World War:*
Vol. 5 *Closing the Ring* (London: Cassell, 1952).


SECONDARY SOURCES

UNPUBLISHED THESES AND LECTURES

Ataov, T., 'Turkish Foreign Policy 1939-1945' (Ph.D., Ankara, 1965).
Bailey, J., 'The Lion, the Eagle and the Crescent: Western Allies in Turkey in 1943' (Ph.D., Ann Arbor, 1970).
Miner, S., 'Stalin's Minimum Terms: the USSR and Great Britain 1940-1942' (Ph.D., Indiana, 1987).
Lippe, J.M. Van der, 'Decade of Struggle: Ismet Inönü and Turkish Politics' (Ph.D., Austin Texas, 1993).
Peart, Maurice, 'Britain and Turkey 1939-1941' (text of a lecture delivered at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, kindly supplied by the author).
Robertson, John William Bruce, 'Anglo-Turkish Relations 1941-1945' (Ph.D., London School of Economics, 1982)
Trask, R., 'Relations Between the USA and Turkey' (Ph.D., Penn State, 1959).
Stripp, Alan, 'Bletchley Park and Enigma' (text of a lecture given at Clare College, Cambridge, on 7 December, 1994, kindly supplied by the author).

PUBLISHED SECONDARY SOURCES

Andrew, Christopher, and Noakes, J., Intelligence and International Relations 1900-1945 (Exeter: Exeter University Press, 1987)
Ataov, Turkay, Turkish Foreign Policy 1939-1945 (Ankara, 1965).


Bennett, Ralph, *Behind the Battle: Intelligence in the War Against Germany 1941-1945* (London: Sinclair Stevenson, 1994).


Dallin, David, *Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy* (Hertford, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1942).

Deringil, Selim, *Turkish Foreign Policy During World War Two* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).


Hodges, Andrew *Alan Turing: The Enigma of Intelligence* (London: Hutchinson, 1983).


Kozacuk, Wladislaw, *Enigma: How the German Machine Cipher was Broken and How it was Read by the Allies in World War Two* (Warsaw: Ksiazka i Wiedza, 1979).


Petrov, Vladimir, *Soviet Historians and the German Invasion* (Columbia, South Carolina, 1968)


Teichman, Miroslav, *Turkey and the Anti-Hitler Coalition in World War Two* (Czechoslovakia: Slovansky Prehled, 1983).


**JOURNAL ARTICLES**


Andrew, Christopher, 'British Intelligence and the Breach with Russia in 1927' *Historical Journal* Vol. 25, No. 4 (1982), pp.957-64.


NEWSPAPERS


THE DAILY WORKER, September 1942-March 1943.

THE ECONOMIST, 23 August 1941.


Brasseys Naval Annual: Fuehrer Naval Conference 1939-1944.