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Egocentric representation in experience and action

Nudds, Matthew; (1996) Egocentric representation in experience and action. Masters thesis (M.Phil), UCL (University College London). Green open access

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Strawson has argued that in order to refer to a particular thing we must be able to locate that thing in space. That requires us to have some conception of space, but what is involved in our possessing such a conception? We can make an intuitive distinction between objective thought about space and subjective thought about space. In what does that distinction consist? All thought about space must employ a frame-of-reference to identify places. We can make a distinction between ways of thinking about space which employ a frame-of-reference which identifies places relative to the subject's body and those which do not. It is not implausible to think that this distinction corresponds to the intuitive distinction between subjective and objective thought about space. But a body-centred frame-of-reference cannot be used to identify places over time, and hence thought which employs a body-centred frame-of-reference cannot constitute subjective thought about space. It might be objected that we do not need to identify places over time in order to think about them, but there are good arguments in support of the claim that we do. Because thought about places requires us to identify them over time, Evans and Peacocke have argued that subjective and objective thought about space are interdependent. If this is right, then subjective thought about space is one aspect, or element, of our conception of objective space; but there are reasons for thinking that subjective thought about space independent of objective thought must be possible. Perhaps it was wrong to think the distinction between subjective and objective spatial thought consists in the frame-of-reference employed in identifying places. Is there some other account that we might give? Campbell distinguishes ways of representing space according to the way that a subject grasps the meaning or significance of the representation. He describes a way of representing space which is subjective; but does it really constitute a way of representing space?

Type: Thesis (Masters)
Qualification: M.Phil
Title: Egocentric representation in experience and action
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
Language: English
Additional information: Thesis digitised by ProQuest.
Keywords: Philosophy, religion and theology; Action; Egocentric representation; Experience
URI: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10106158
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