A PERSPECTIVE ON THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM,
WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA

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Spinoza's thesis of non-reductive monism was conceived in critical response to earlier dualist and materialist theories of mind. He rejects dualism with respect to both Nature and mind-body, yet his principles mark off the mental as severely as is possible without forfeiting monism, showing his awareness that monism (attribute identity) threatens mental irreducibility. The constraints Spinoza imposes in order to preserve mental irreducibility and to make human beings partial expressions of one thinking and extended substance produce a tension between mental autonomy and mind-body identity. However, I propose that while this remains a serious philosophical problem, some degree of tension must persist in any non-reductive monism which succeeds in giving the mental a weighting equal to the physical, and that Spinoza's sensitivity to this requirement is instructive.

I argue, on the other hand, that Spinoza's theory of mind is irrevocably damaged by his turning of the traditional Mind of God into the Mind of the Whole of Nature in so far as he extrapolates from this Mind of God–or–Nature to finite minds. In characterising finite minds as partial expressions of "God's" infinite intellect I believe Spinoza becomes caught between his unorthodox conception of God's Mind as all-inclusive and a retained conception of the Mind of God as all truths. I argue that by characterising our thoughts as fractions of the adequate and true ideas "in God", that is, by claiming them (i) to express in some measure immediate judgement; (ii) to have a state of our body as a necessary feature of their representational content, and (iii) to have a place in a determined, lawlike mental concatenation, Spinoza creates a tension between two mental perspectives, namely a metaphysical explanation of human mental states, and our ordinary mental experiences. I argue that he fails acceptably to characterise the latter and that his theory of mind is therefore unsatisfactory.
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SPINOZA
Abbreviations

E Ethics
TIE Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect
KV Short Treatise on God, Man and his Well-Being
DPP Principles of Descartes's Philosophy
CM Appendix containing Metaphysical Thoughts
TTP Theologico-Political Treatise
TP Political Treatise
P Proposition
D Definition
C Corollary
S Scholium
Exp. Explanation
L Lemma

Translation is Curley's (C) unless otherwise stated. Translation of Letters 29–84 is Wolf's. Translation of TTP and TP is Wernham's except for sections he does not translate, when it is from Elwes.

Double quotation marks are used for Spinoza quotations and technical terms.

"Nature" (or "God") is given a capital letter at all times to distinguish it from nature (or essence).

"Emend" and "emendation" are retained as Spinozistic terms which involve his doctrine of logical interrelation (mental causality) between ideas.

"Sive, seu" Latin for 'or' denoting an identification of referent objects or an equivalence of terms. Such identifications and equivalences are indicated, after introducing them with textual evidence, by an oblique e.g. God/Nature.

DESCARTES
Abbreviations
CSM I Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Discourse on the Method, Principles of Philosophy, Comments on a Certain Broadsheet, The Passions of the Soul
CSM II Meditations, Objections and Replies
CSMK The Correspondence

Translation in Volumes I and II is by Cottingham, Stoothoff and Murdoch. In Volume III, translation is by Cottingham, Stoothoff, Murdoch and Kenny.
INTRODUCTION

I take the mind-body problem to be the philosophical question of what mind or 'the mental' is, and how it is related to matter. This problem resists strategies designed to resolve it since any solution advanced seems to generate intractable difficulties. At one extreme the dualist, holding that mental substance is a distinct substance from material substance, fails to explain how mind interacts with body since the two substances have nothing in common. At the other, the reductive or eliminative materialist, claiming that only truths about the brain make sentences about the mental true, and that folk psychology is a primitive theory that deserves to be replaced by neurophysiology, fails to allow for the scheme of mental explanation humans find indispensable. Between these two polarities lie an array of non-reductive theories of mind which do not posit distinct mental and material substances, but nonetheless consider the mental irreducible to body. (I take 'mental irreducibility' to involve some characterisation of the mental which logically prohibits the mental from being subsequently redefined as physical and which affirms the mental as a reality in our lives.) Non-reductive accounts are not uniform. For example, talk of mental 'properties' often indicates a commitment to some essentially or constitutively mental feature, while reference to mental 'events' tends to signify a weaker claim about diverse mental and physical meanings. But all such theories come up against serious difficulties in attempting to supply a satisfactory account (that is, leaving no unexplained or implausible entailments) of what it is about the mental that justifies a claim of mental irreducibility, and how the mental and the material can constitute radically different expressions of a single thing.

For Spinoza there is no mind-body problem. In his view, difficulties over fixing the place of the mind in Nature are something earlier philosophers brought on themselves. On the one hand, he says, they "did not observe the proper order of philosophising" (E2 P10 S2), and on the other they "did not know the true nature of the human mind" (Letter 1). Yet I believe Spinoza's theory of mind is no exception
to the general pattern of failure either preceding or following him. Spinoza stands in many respects Janus-faced between Descartes and modern philosophy of mind, his chosen framework of non-reductive monism being a popular current option, albeit among people who do not associate it with Spinoza. While the interface of Spinoza's doctrine with that of Descartes is intense, complex and instructive, his metaphysical thesis, which stipulates an essential mental property and a system of independent mental causal power, is thought-provoking for modern philosophers of mind in showing what we may have to espouse if we take the project of mental irreducibility seriously. I shall argue that far from presenting a model thesis of non-reductive monism, Spinoza's theory of mind is ultimately unsatisfactory because in failing to characterise all human thoughts it exposes a rift between how we experience and explain our thoughts. Yet I suggest that his doctrine may take its prima facie puzzling form just because he has foreseen certain difficulties which still beset attempts to preserve mental irreducibility within a monistic framework, and that it forces us to explore these issues thoroughly.

Six principles which govern Spinoza's theory of mind (or are premises concerning a theorem of the mind-body relation) are addressed in turn below, in Chapters named according to the principle under discussion. Spinoza does not isolate these principles under the names I have given them but they are without dispute principles of Spinozism, which Spinoza believes he has demonstrated.

Chapter 1 (Principle of monism or attribute identity) explicated Spinoza's challenge to the Cartesian enterprise. In postulating autonomous attributes of mind and body within one entity Spinoza rejects the notion of God's soul, and therefore all soul, as inhering in a diverse entity from body (matter), so denying both Descartes's dualism of God and the world and his dualism of the human mind and body. I argue that Spinoza expresses his most fundamental objections to Cartesian principles in the Cogita Metaphysica (the Appendix to his exegetical The Principles of Descartes's Philosophy), a source not much mined for early reactions to Descartes's theory of mind, but of an interest analogous to the Objections made by various theologians and philosophers against Descartes's Meditations. In this Appendix (CM), Spinoza
disguises the strength of his opposition to Descartes's substance dualism while showing quite clearly the incoherences he perceives. I also make use of passages from the early *Short Treatise*. This first Spinozistic text, written in Dutch for students, should not perhaps serve as sole evidence for claims about Spinoza's doctrine, but it shows how central are some of its simply expressed notions to Spinoza's later, more formal philosophy. I argue that in comparison to these early texts Spinoza's semi-formal argument for monism or attribute identity at the start of *Ethics* Part 1 lacks explanatory force. Nonetheless, I find in that argument two grounds for his belief in one substance, namely that no one attribute expresses the whole of substance, since perfection/completeness requires all attributes, and that essential properties which have no effect on one another, but logically necessarily complement each other because each requires the other for the expression of any instantiation of God or Nature, must be identified in substance.

I do not question the label 'attribute identity' in relation to Spinoza's monism. The identity theory in contemporary philosophy of mind allows that two diverse properties may be united in one entity. Even so, in relation to a theory of mind which espouses two essentially different properties this identity claim requires a brief explanation. Allison, to whose reading of Spinoza I am indebted, says that:–

'he [Spinoza] advocates a kind of mind–body identity theory, albeit a different one from the usual materialistic versions of such a theory in its insistence on giving equal weight to the mental' (Allison p.86).

Spinoza asserts more than once that mind and body are "the same thing" because they are parts or modifications of attributes which are unified in substance. An attribute characterises any state of substance, so any manifestation of substance exhibits this identity: substance is always and everywhere both thinking and extended. Any claim we make about a person is re-statatable in terms of substance expressed in attributes. A person is always both thinking and extended, in every aspect of his or her being.

Chapter 2 (Principle of mental autonomy) reflects Spinoza's antipathy to both materialism and immaterialism. I argue that when he eradicates Cartesian *res cogitans* Spinoza calculatedly replaces soul–things with "ideas", units of intelligence
inhering in no further thing. But his thesis remains robustly metaphysical, and the tension produced by the relation between diverse essential attributes within one entity is still important. However, I suggest that this tension may be healthy. I conclude Chapter 2 by demonstrating within a framework of dual aspect theory that theses of non-reductive monism which do not exhibit a tension brought about by equal weighting of the mental and physical are likely to fail to preserve mental irreducibility.

This discussion ends the part of my thesis concerned with the identity/autonomy tension, apart from a review of it in the light of Spinoza's principle of independent mental causal power (§6.3). Discussion of the ensuing four principles focuses increasingly on a different tension which I argue must be seen as fatally damaging to Spinoza's theory of mind, namely that produced by Spinoza's attempt to extrapolate from the Whole-mind of God/Nature to the minds which are its fractional expressions. Almost a century ago Harold H. Joachim objected that Spinoza's continuum of thought does not run seamlessly from infinite mind to finite minds:

'It seems clear, then, that the world of presentation and 'natura naturata' [Nature's effects] as an order of distinct modes are in some sense 'facts' which Spinoza has not brought into harmony with his general principles. And so far as his conception of the infinity of completeness is irreconcilable with the indefinite infinity of the finite - so far as there is a gulf fixed between the two forms of God's causality - these 'facts' appear for Spinoza under a form which comes into positive collision with these general principles' (Joachim p.113).

It is my thesis that regarding several of Spinoza's principles this view of Joachim's is in some measure true. Joachim's complaint is put differently but with the same general thrust in the 1930s critical commentaries of A.E. Taylor and H. Barker, and with particular reference to the way in which an infinite mind and finite minds represent external objects by Margaret D. Wilson (1980).

My interest in the key Spinozistic move from Whole-mind to part-mind has been triggered by the interpretations of Allison (1975, revised 1987) and Genevieve Lloyd (1994), which propose that if the mind is seen at each stage of interpretation as "the idea of the body", then the move from Whole-mind to part-mind may be legitimised. For both, the human mind is seen as a function of the human body's
organic complexity and, these commentators suggest, while this account of the mind–body relation is full of obscurities and anomalies, it prompts a rethinking of various issues still troubling philosophers. My stance on this falls midway between Barker's and Taylor's scepticism and Allison's and Lloyd's (especially Lloyd's) charitable interpretations. I have found (to a large extent as a result of Tom Sorell's stimulating dissatisfaction with Spinoza's account of human thought) that we cannot save Spinoza's doctrine from a conceptual chasm between what Spinoza thinks a mind must be, and the specific content of our ideas. I have been helped in tracing the source of this tension – which I find to lie in Spinoza's problematic conversion of the traditionally perfect 'Mind of God' into the "perfect" (complete) Mind of the Whole of Nature – by Edward Craig's *The Mind of God and the Works of Man*, which places Spinoza's 'attempt to bring our minds as far as possible into congruence with the divine mind' (Craig p.49) in its seventeenth–century context.

In each of the following Chapters I first explicate the relevant principle with help from established commentators, showing how it is grounded in the *all–inclusive* infinite intellect of God–Nature and in a retained traditional conception of the Mind of God as *all truths* or ideal mind, and also in what ways it is geared to preserving mental irreducibility. I then demonstrate the anomalies Spinoza creates for himself in trying to give an account of human ideas based on that principle, and finally give some indication of the bearing of his failure on the mind–body problem in general.

Chapter 3 (Principle of mental holism) examines Spinoza's claim that God's Mind contains all partial or finite minds; shows how for Spinoza the infinite intellect of God is in one logical dimension *all truths*, and suggests that if we are to agree on a definition of thought we must fix on a nature or essence shared by Whole–mind and part–mind alike. (I use the general terms 'thought' and 'thoughts' throughout Chapters 1, 2 and 3, since argument is required to show that for Spinoza all thoughts are to be defined as ideas, and this cannot be given due attention until Chapter 4.) The discussion of Chapter 3 concludes, after considerable argument concerning Spinoza's inference from what must be true of an infinite intellect which is all adequate and true ideas to what must be true of the human minds said to be its partial expressions, in
which anomalies such as evil and error are with difficulty – and some flexibility in interpretation – included, that Spinoza's "infinite intellect" of God captures all possible instances of thought, and that all, in being expressions of an infinite (self-contained and all-inclusive) attribute, will share a basic nature or essence.

Chapter 4 (Principle of mental formal being) constitutes the first stage in defining or fixing a Spinozistic mental essence. We encounter Spinoza's stricture that the mental is exclusively "ideas", and that any idea is an immediate cognitive judgement (affirmation or denial) because that is the formal being of "God's" ideas. I argue that while this designation aptly characterises true ideas, and is plausibly ascribed to more human ideas than might at first be supposed, Spinoza strains our credibility in alleging that all human ideas have as their formal mental being a nature (albeit partial, fragmentary or confused) of instant cognitive judgement.

Chapter 5 (Principle of objective being) intensifies the lacuna between what Spinoza thinks a mind must be, and the specific content of our ideas. On the one hand, we see that God/Nature is all true ideas of objects, and Spinoza's doctrine of the identity of true ideas with their objects supplies, in cases where those objects are particular bodies, a coherent thesis of mind-body pairs or unions. This doctrine does not, as stated at this point, involve any thesis of causal ordering. Nor, considered only as a true correspondence of God's knowledge with objects which are internal to God, does it address the question of representational content in the ideas of its parts which, unlike the mind of Nature-whole, must represent objects which are external to themselves. §5.3, on the other hand, constitutes a critical examination of Spinoza's principle of objective being in the light of my claim that a different kind of objective being is involved in the mere direction on the world of most human ideas from the objective essence or identity relation proper to the agreement of idea with object (ideatum) in the set of truths of the mind of Nature-Whole. I argue that Spinoza's characterisation of the mental collapses because he insists that all human ideas necessarily involve direct perception of the body. This is not true in the case of all our ideas, adequate or inadequate. I submit, with Wilson, that when we have ideas their object is usually something other than our body, and external to it. In §5.4 I
examine the weaker Spinozistic claim that all ideas are necessarily intentional, that is, they are necessarily 'of' or 'about' something. I conclude that intentionality (objective being) is not a necessary condition for any idea because there are human mental states which do not represent anything outside themselves, but that Spinoza shows a special grasp of the necessary conditions for intentionality to mark off the mental.

Chapter 6 (Principle of purely mental causal power) explicates what must be intended by Spinoza as a clinching condition for mental irreducibility since it postulates maximal mental causal efficacy and causal independence from the physical. But this final principle concerning the theorem of the mind–body relation, expressed in the 'parallelism' proposition of E2 P7 ("The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things"), requires exegetical help, since it seems to me that Spinoza only justifies his claim of a nomic (lawlike) flow and interconnection of mental events by relying on ancient assumptions about the logical mind of God. In §6.2 I explicate the essentially diverse causal powers of extension and thought in finite modes. In §6.3 I re-examine my claim that a degree of tension between identity and autonomy principles may be necessary for the preservation of mental irreducibility. I assess the explanatory profit and the implausibility of Spinoza's dual causal flowchart involving an independent mental causal property by relating this causal thesis to the modern doctrine of functionalism. In §6.4 I scrutinise Spinoza's claim that all ideas are not only determined, so preventing free decision, but that they are "the concern of logic" because the power of logical reasoning can "emend" inadequate ideas in a way which reveals their logical interconnections with adequate ideas. I propose that the destructive tension caused by Spinoza's attempted inference from Whole–mind to part–mind undermines his principle of independent mental causal power since there are human ideas which cannot be shown to have a place in a lawlike scheme of mental inputs and outputs.

I conclude my thesis by briefly recapitulating the elements of Spinoza's theory of mind which I take to prevent it from being a model of non–reductive monism.
CHAPTER 1

PRINCIPLE OF MONISM OR ATTRIBUTE IDENTITY

§ 1.1 Early commitment: God and the mind are not outside Nature.

From the start of his philosophising Spinoza has three unswerving beliefs which conflict with the Cartesian philosophy, namely that God cannot 'will' something that Nature does not; that no mind, even God's, can be a separate substance existing outside Nature, and that people must be unions of the same kinds of body and mind as is God. I suggest that the reasoning behind these commitments is more revealingly stated in Spinoza's early and political works than in the semi-formal argument for monism which occupies the first fifteen propositions (together with related proofs, corollaries and scholia) of Ethics Part 1, and to which we turn in the second section of this Chapter. The Ethics argument is set within a paradigm of scholastic argument, and largely turns on premises couched in terms of archaic principles.

While in the Cogita Metaphysica (Appendix to DPP) Spinoza tends to mask his intense disapproval of Descartes's treatment of God, Nature and the human mind (or soul), he nonetheless expresses grumbles which do not feature prominently in the initial Ethics argument. As Meyer warns in the Preface (C p.230), Spinoza will address the implausible disparity Descartes allows between God's will, God's intellect and the laws of Nature. Spinoza repudiates the Cartesian claim that although human beings are created things their souls have an existence distinct from the body by God's divine decree, that is, in apparent defiance of the laws of Nature. In Spinoza's view, Descartes only establishes a human immaterial soul by incoherently pitting God's power of acting against the laws of Nature which God himself has ordained, and which Descartes gives us to believe are eternal and immutable truths (Letter to Mersenne, April 1630, CSMK p.23).1 In Ethics Spinoza does not argue until towards the end of Part 1 for the equation of will and intellect in God (voluntate sive intellectu – E1 P32

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1 While Frankfurt and Wilson maintain that the laws governing creation are not, for Descartes, immutable, since God does not change his mind, it seems Descartes commits himself to true and immutable natures in (i) his ontological argument, (ii) his thesis of clear and distinct perception of certain truths as necessary, and (iii) as part-basis of his physics. See Curley, 'Descartes on the Creation of Eternal Truths' Philosophical Review, October 1984, p.574 and Wilson pp.169–174).
C2), and not until towards the end of Part 2 that in humans "The will and the intellect are one and the same" (E2 P49 C). Yet the claim is in place in the earliest texts that God cannot contradict himself by thinking or acting outside the laws of Nature.

Spinoza has already entered a philosophical minefield by arguing that, if God is the 'most simple being' traditionally postulated, the objects of God's knowledge cannot be a distinct substance from his God's intellect:

"Outside God there is no object of our knowledge, but he himself is the object of his knowledge, or rather is his own knowledge. Those who think that the world is also the object of God's knowledge are far less discerning than those who would have a building, made by some distinguished architect, be considered the object of his knowledge. For the builder is forced to seek suitable material outside himself, but God sought no matter outside himself" (CM 2 vii, C p.327-8). "God is not composed of a coalition and union of substances" (CM 2 v, ibid. p.324), but "the whole natura naturata [Nature's effects] is only one being (CM 2 ix, ibid. p.333).

The clear conclusion to be drawn from the premises obliquely postulated in the Appendix to DPP (CM) is that the soul is a natural phenomenon which does not exist independently of God, but is a partial expression of God, or Nature.

Spinoza's Short Treatise, on the other hand, was secretly circulated to friends. In it he writes freely on the topic of "the soul"2 while requesting that due to "the character of the age in which we live" the contents of the Treatise be communicated only very judiciously (KV 2 xxvi, C p.150). The "character of the age" dictated, as Descartes had also discovered, that religious orthodoxy was political correctness. Spinoza claims openly to his friends that it is as incoherent to suppose that the human mind could be a different substance from its body as it is to make God a "coalition" of thinking and extended substances. God or Nature does not, as seen exist apart from its 'body', but is united with all the objects of its thought in one entity:

"Because of the unity which we see everywhere in Nature; if there were different beings in Nature, the one could not possibly unite with the other. .. From all that we have said so far it is clear that we maintain

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2 Its final short chapter called "Of the Human Soul" is a cryptic but seminal account of Spinoza's doctrine of non-reductive monism. It shows that the basics of his doctrine were in place by 1660 (C p.50).
that extension is an attribute of God. i.e. If there were different substances which were not related to a single being, then their union would be impossible, because we see clearly that they have absolutely nothing in common with one another -like thought and extension, of which we nevertheless consist" (KV 1, II §§17, 18 and Note e, C p.70).

We have here an early example of how Spinoza moves directly from the nature of the relation of thought and extension in God to the mind–body relation in human beings. It was Schopenhauer's view that 'Spinoza's philosophy consists mainly in the negation of the double dualism between God and the World and between soul and body which his teacher Descartes had set up' (The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, quoted in Curley 1, p.154). Denying the second dualism depends, for Spinoza, on denying the first. First then, we observe that if God's will or intellect cannot be outside Nature or subject to different laws, the human soul certainly cannot be outside Nature or subject to non–natural laws. People are parts of the same universal metaphysical system in which Nature and God act as one:–

"We do not ask, when we speak of the soul, what God can do, but only what follows from the laws of Nature" (CM 2 xii, C p.342).

For "man is a part of Nature, which must be coherent with the other parts" (CM 2, ix, C p.333).

These remarks, despite being somewhat veiled for Cartesian readers, signpost Spinoza's thoroughgoing doctrine of determinism in Nature. However, his view that souls do not have free will is brusquely asserted in the early Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect:– "As far as I know they [the ancients] never conceived the soul (as we do here) as acting according to certain laws, like a spiritual automaton" (TIE §85).

Given the tension Spinoza observes in Descartes's thesis between God's active power and the laws of Nature, and his wish to resolve this tension, he must speak of his single substance in terms of both God and Nature. Even had Spinoza never heard of God before studying Cartesian philosophy he would have to take 'God's power' into account when doing metaphysics in order to respond to Descartes's theory of mind. While we may seem to be primarily or only concerned with a monism of mind and body, Spinoza has to deal with the equally problematic monism of God and Nature.
On one reading of his motivation this is merely a question of placating orthodox philosophers by fitting 'God' in as first causal principle, all omnipotence, omniscience, and so on. Certainly Spinoza tries to push through an identification of the traditionally acknowledged 'perfect' Mind of God with the "perfected" Mind of the whole of Nature (perfectus also means complete) by, as we see shortly, a few arguments for attribute plenitude. However, it is my thesis that the God/Nature identity turns out to be troublesome for Spinoza's theory of mind in ways he does not recognise, and to an extent which undermines his theory of mind more decisively than his more frequently criticised — and still contentious — thesis of mind–body identity.

By the time Spinoza comes to construct his argument for substance monism in *Ethics*, he is openly committed to a God–Nature monism. He calls his single substance God; argues for this designation, and eventually supplies a formal identification of God with Nature in the equation *Deus, seu Natura* (E4 Preface). I therefore refer henceforth to God/Nature when talking of Spinoza's one substance. This way of referring to God has, I suggest, three useful functions. Firstly, while Spinoza does not reduce God away, he clearly dispenses with the transient (external to Nature) and purely immaterial creator–God worshipped in seventeenth–century Europe. Regularly reminding ourselves through use of the term God/Nature that these epithets are interchangeable may reduce the traditional religious gloss of *Deus*. Secondly, of all Spinoza's substance–equivalences I think the God/Nature best reflects his metaphysical project of learning "the knowledge of the union that the mind has with the whole of Nature" (TIE §13). Thirdly, the odd–looking conjunction signifies my concern that the God/Nature monism constitutes the roots of what I argue is a major tension in Spinoza's philosophy of mind.

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3 At some point between excommunication (1656) and his third letter to the Christian secretary of the Royal Society (1662) Spinoza crystallises this point, for says of "this work of mine which might somewhat offend the preachers — "I do not separate God from Nature as everybody known to me has done" (Letter 6).

4 Spinoza also identifies substance (by sive or seu) at various points in *Ethics* as:— God or the Power of Nature (*Deus, sive Potentia Naturae*, E4 P4 Proof); God or Substance (*Deus, sive Substantia*, E1 P11); Absolutely Infinite Being or God (*ens absolute infinitus sive Deus*, E1 P11 S); God or Eternal Being (*Deus sive Ens Aeternus*, E2 Preface); Reality or the Being of Substance (*Realitas, sive esse substantiae*, E1 P10 S); God or all the Attributes of God (*Deus sive omnia Dei attributa*, E1 P19).
§ 1.2 The semi-formal arguments in *Ethics* for monism regarding (i) God/Nature and (ii) attribute identity.

We have seen that the motivation for Spinoza's argument for just one substance is his belief that it is incoherent to suppose that the divine mind of God (or any other mind, therefore mind in general) exists outside Nature. Since Nature and God cannot be at odds, they must be one, therefore all mind is both natural and, in a non-Cartesian sense, "divine". However, in *Ethics* these relatively straightforward premises must be put in the formal terminology of Spinoza's day. He must supply convincing premises for a claim (i) that God and Nature are identical and (ii) that thought and extension constitute one, not two substances: that is, an essential attribute of thought is logically necessarily an expression of the same substance (entity) of which the essential attribute of extension (or any other attribute there could possibly be) is an expression – and that this one substance must be God.

The *Ethics* argument for one substance, which is God, is a protracted and contentious area of Spinoza's philosophy and I do not supply a comprehensive examination of it. I suggest that the generally acknowledged weakness of Spinoza's premises here is due to a certain lacuna in expression between the almost commonsense motivation for monism of the informal texts (quoted above) and the Proofs he offers to defeat familiar and respected arguments and thereby convince professional philosophers. For example, Spinoza must adhere to – or explain why he redefines – technical terms such as substance and attribute, and he must involve well-established arguments for the existence of God in order to justify in an acceptable way his belief that God and one absolutely infinite substance are identical. I therefore forefront those premises which support the commitments to monism I have already isolated in Spinoza's earlier works.

Spinoza supplies an orthodox scholastic and Cartesian Definition of substance:–

"By substance I understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself, i.e. that whose concept does not require the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed" (E1 D3).

('By substance we can understand nothing other than a thing which exists in such a way as to depend on no other thing for its existence'
From this point on, Spinoza's classification of substance and attribute diverges from the Cartesian model. Firstly, Spinoza has a more austere view of substance than Descartes. Whereas Descartes's doctrine of substance allows for created corporeal substances, which exist 'by God's concurrence', and so depend on another (thinking) substance, Spinoza argues that the mere independence of a substance (being self-conceived) logically necessitates that it is self-produced (El P6 Proof), exists necessarily (El P7 Proof) or (by El D8) "eternally" i.e. as an eternal truth, and that it is "infinite".5

Spinoza also uses the term attribute more strictly than Descartes. He concedes that Descartes was the first to make thought and extension 'principal attributes', meaning that they are not like Aristotelian propria, changeable qualities, states, or processes, but are defining properties, inmost or essential natures without which the thing cannot be or be conceived. For Spinoza an attribute is an essential property, nor does he use the word attribute to designate anything but an essential nature, whereas for Descartes there can additionally be lesser, non-essential, Aristotelian-style attributes or qualities. While Spinoza agrees that "By attribute I understand what the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence"6 (E1 D4) he does not agree that an attribute necessarily marks off a distinct substance. He must therefore persuade his contemporaries (who, like his Amsterdam circle of friends, represented by de Vries in Letter 8, at first assume a Cartesian framework of one attribute per substance), that a single "absolutely infinite" substance (i.e. all there could possibly be in any possible kind, and the only possible world) must express all attributes.

The attack on the Cartesian stipulation that there can be only one (principal) attribute per substance, and that if we conceive an attribute we thereby posit a

5 "Infinite" means for Spinoza unlimited in its kind, including all that is logically possible – all possible expressions – in that kind (Letter 2, KV 1 ii 1 and E1 P16 and Proof). All Spinozistic attributes are infinite whereas for Descartes mind is divine and infinite but extension, being created and no part of the divine nature, is merely 'indefinite' (Principles 2, 21 and Letter to More, 1649 [CSMK p.364]). For Spinoza an attribute which is "infinite" is unlimited in a wider sense than for Descartes, although Descartes defines God's infinity as 'that in which no limits of any kind can be found' (1st Replies to Meditations, CSM 11 p.81).

6 "Essence is defined by Spinoza as "..that without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived, and which can neither be nor be conceived without the thing" (E2 D2). The expression of an attribute is essential since if it is taken away, that thing is taken away. In a person, the mind is taken away. More is said on Spinoza's notion of essence in following Chapters. See Note 9 below and §4.1 Note 2.
substance, starts with the stipulative Definition of E1 D6\(^7\) and culminates in the Scholium to E1 P10, where Spinoza claims that nothing bars an absolutely infinite substance from expressing more than one attribute, although those attributes have (in line with our perception of them) nothing in common. Spinoza seeks to undermine the assertion of a difference of substance due to difference in "affection" (quality). While we do perceive a difference between attributes because they have diverse natures, says Spinoza, and a substance is indeed distinguished by its attributes (E1 P5 Proof), this does not mean either that the attributes actually denote different substances,\(^8\) or that attributes cannot belong to the same substance.

This notion is not original to Spinoza. The physician Regius had floated the idea long before Spinoza began to philosophise. Descartes had responded to Regius that 'that would be equivalent to saying that one and the same subject has two different natures - a statement that implies a contradiction' ('Comments on Certain Broadsheet': CSM 1 p.298). Spinoza insists that a substance may coherently be characterised by an infinite number of essential properties without contradiction. He uses the familiar notion of an essence to support his argument for monism:—"If something is absolutely infinite, whatever expresses essence and involves no negation pertains to its essence" (E1 D6 Exp.).— The essence of God/Nature is all possible essences. God/Nature is essence plenitude. And since for Spinoza an essence is equivalent to a nature or attribute,\(^9\) God/Nature is a single unified substance expressing all attributes. Spinoza thus argues for a single absolutely infinite substance constituted by distinct essential or constitutive properties which are, in being naturally and inextricably co–functioning, the constituents of a unified whole. All attributes are united in the absolutely infinite essence of God/Nature. That "essence", (that is, by E2 D2, what it cannot exist

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\(^7\) "By God I understand a Being absolutely infinite, i.e. a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, of which each one expresses an eternal and infinite essence" (E1 D6).

\(^8\) Allison cites an ingenious response by Russell to the one attribute per substance dictum. He paraphrases Russell's argument:— 'Although we could certainly distinguish between the two Cartesian substances by referring to their distinct affections, we take this to mark a distinction between substances only because we have already assumed that the distinct affections must belong to numerically distinct substances' (Allison p.54).

\(^9\) Spinoza's equivalence–signalling device shows 'attribute' to be equated with 'nature' (attributus sive natura, E1 P5); 'nature' with 'essence' (natura sive essentia, E1 P36 Proof). Therefore attribute = essence.
without, and how it is conceived or defined) is, while expressed in infinite independent ways, single in being unified. It is unique in expressing all possible essences. And since it is unique, an essence of substance would seem to be posited over and above the essence of each attribute.

However, further argument seems needed to show that essence plenitude is not a loose conjunction of natures but an identification of them, and it is sometimes thought that Spinoza does not provide convincing evidence for this.\(^\text{10}\) That said, I believe exegetical help on two fronts fosters the plausibility of Spinoza's claim. Firstly, it is not often granted in the literature that although each Spinozistic attribute expresses the whole of nature in one of its dimensions, \textit{all} attributes are needed for God's reality or perfection, and therefore no \textit{one} of them can express that \textit{whole} nature.\(^\text{11}\) As Allison points out, Spinoza's retention of the definition of an attribute as "what the intellect perceives" shows that he takes the notion of perspective and perception seriously (Allison p.50). A thing would only be fully known in \textit{all} its perspectives. This consideration seems to affirm that since only one aspect of Nature can be explained through thought and one through extension, an explanation through one attribute is \textit{not} a complete account of substance. It is an explanation of Nature as Nature exists in one dimension. Spinoza has shown in his earliest arguments that thought and extension require one another, and are inseparable from one another. God is the necessary and universal system of all possible \textit{facts}, each of which has a thinking and an extended aspect.\(^\text{12}\) While the attributes are infinite in their kind, they lack the absolute infinity of the substance of which they are elements or constituents. Thus, while substance is not an aggregate of attributes, it is a union of complementary properties, no one of

\(^{10}\) This claim has been made, notably by Gueroult, who claims Spinoza has no monism because no 'absolutely infinite' essence is shown to exist over and above the irreducible infinite-in-kind essences of each attribute (Gueroult 1 p.238). Gueroult holds that Spinoza's arguments posit instead a self-produced plurality of substances, each infinite in its kind and expressing a single attribute entirely and uniquely (ibid. p.141). A detailed defence of Spinoza's claim versus Gueroult's based on Spinoza's revolutionary claim about God is found in Donagan (1). Donagan also offers a different defence, which I introduce below (p.19).

\(^{11}\) This point is owed to Barker (Barker 11 p.124) and Curley (Curley 1 p.16).

\(^{12}\) Curley calls the modes of extension 'facts' \textit{about} the physical world, and the ideas of them 'propositions'. We should, he says, 'think of the relation between thought and extension as an identity of true proposition and fact' (Curley 1 p.123). In my view this does not confer materiality on extension. Also, a proposition may be about another proposition, which is confusing.
which expresses the absolutely infinite essence of substance, and each of which requires the other for completion. A further argument supporting this identity premise, based on the agreement of true ideas with their objects, is given in §5.3 below.

The other exegetical help comes from Donagan, and – paradoxically yet usefully for Spinoza's assertion of mental irreducibility – makes monism depend on the diverse and essentially distinct natures of the attributes. As Allison observes, although Spinoza's thesis is a monism, 'the very formulation of this thesis involves a dualism of sorts' (Allison p.63). Statements of attribute independence are made in the El Definitions, and appear in Propositions 5, 6 and 9, that is, in the heart of the argument for monism. (It is not surprising that Cartesians were confused by Spinoza's arguments for monism, since he retained part of their central argument for dualism while denying that it had any force to entail dualism!) Donagan assists Spinoza's intentions by pointing out that his claim is not best expressed by the words "although attributes may be conceived as really distinct .. we still cannot infer from that that they constitute two beings, or two different substances" (E1 P10 S – my emphasis) but by stressing that because they are conceived as entirely different – having nothing in common – they cannot exclude one another from the same substance (Donagan 2 pp.72–3 and 79–80). They have no power to do so because "a body is not limited by a thought nor a thought by a body" (E1 D2). This stronger expression of the non-prevention claim gives Spinoza what he needs with respect to both monism and non-reduction. It also shows (I propose) why he will not be espousing a doctrine of mind-body interaction. Quite simply, the attributes have no causal clout regarding one another. That they cannot "limit" one another does not just mean that one cannot stop the other being necessary or eternal, but that the power of one has absolutely no effect on the other. ('Like a knife on air' may give the right impression, although of course a knife does have a physical effect on air.) On this view, establishing monism entails repudiating attribute interaction, so this premise has the merit of cohering with the other principles Spinoza advances with regard to mental irreducibility and the union of the mind with Nature.

I conclude that we have isolated within Spinoza's semi-formal Ethics argument two justificatory premises for one substance, namely that no one attribute expresses the
whole of substance since perfection/completeness requires all attributes, and that essential properties having no causal effect on one another, but complementing one another in a logically necessary fashion because each requires the other for the expression of any instantiation of God/Nature, must be identified in substance.

Finally, we should note how Spinoza formally demonstrates his earliest conviction that God cannot be outside any substance by establishing that the one substance, constituted by all possible essences, must be identical with God.

First, he exploits the scholastic argument for "God's perfection" to try to show that only God can match up to our concept of substance. We have seen that he uses perfectus in its non-evaluative sense of 'perfected' or complete (or maximally real – realitas sive perfectio [E2 P1 S]), a shrewd recasting of the divine mind as complete mind on Spinoza's part, since in due course he will have to show how "Whatever is, is in God [Nature], and nothing can or be conceived without God [Nature]" (E1 P15). His argument is sparse (E1 P9), and relies on an equation of perfection with reality (E2 P1 S) and reality with the Being of Substance (E1 P10 S). Spinoza can count here, as Lloyd notes, on the assumption of his contemporaries that whatever we postulate as a most real or perfect (complete) being must contain all possible attributes or it would lack something. Conversely, as he has argued in the Short Treatise, the more attributes we conceive a thing to have, the more reality it necessarily has. Spinoza reiterates this in E1 P11 S to persuade his Cartesian readers that an absolutely infinite substance must contain all infinities, and that such a maximally real and complete being must be God, and must exist:–

"Perfection, therefore, does not take away the existence of a thing, but on the contrary asserts it. But imperfection takes it away. So there is nothing of whose existence we can be more certain than we are of the existence of an absolutely infinite, or [sive] perfect Being, i.e. God."

While this argument looks weak to us, it was would be hard for a Cartesian to deny that 'God' must be the 'most real being', given that one must be conceived to exist. We know Spinoza was on non-Cartesian grounds convinced at a very early stage that God, Nature and all possible power were unified in a complete Being (or "the All"):–
"The reason for this is that since Nothing can have no attributes, the All must have all attributes; and just as Nothing has no attributes because it is nothing, Something has attributes because it is something. Consequently, God, being most perfect, infinite, and the Something—that is—all, must also have infinite, perfect, and all attributes" (KV 1 ii, Note a, C p.65).

Secondly, Spinoza exploits the scholastic assumption that there must be a cause, or reason, for the existence or non-existence of any thing, and the self-evident truth denying that a thing can have for its cause something other than what has already been postulated as Supreme Being, sole cause of itself and sole causal principle (E1 P11 Proof). This claim will be given extensive attention later, in Chapter 6, when the distinct metaphysical principle of causation is discussed. Spinoza describes this Proof as an a posteriori proof of God's existence from his effects. In my view it only indirectly addresses Spinoza's prime concern that God cannot be in conflict with the laws of Nature, and that the reason or cause of a thing's existence is immanent in God, who, as Spinoza will spend much time later in Ethics Part 1 explaining, does not wield capricious power "like the power of Kings" (E2 P3 S). What Spinoza is really intent to drive home — although he does not dwell on this point in the earliest Propositions of Ethics, but a little later on — is the absurdity of supposing God can cause things by inconsistently 'willing' rather than by the necessity of his own nature:—

"From the necessity of the divine nature alone, or (what is the same thing) from the laws of his nature alone, absolutely infinite things follow" (E1 P17). "Others think that God is a free cause because he can (so they think) bring it about that the things which we have said follow from his nature (i.e. which are in his power) do not happen or are not produced by him. But this is the same as if they were to say that God can bring it about that it would not follow from the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles; or that from a given cause the effect would follow — which is absurd" (E1 P17 S1).

Spinoza devotes the second half of Ethics Part 1 to the notion that God must be an immanent cause, internal to Nature, and an efficient cause in so far as 'he' is not a final cause (i.e. causing things to happen for some purpose). Spinoza does not make God an efficient cause in the traditional sense of being an agent of change or in the
Cartesian sense that God controls things from outside Nature.

We now assume, as Spinoza does, that the God/Nature identity is in place, and reflect on what he has established regarding the monism of mind (thought) and body (extension) which would seem to be the dominant monism associated with the term 'non-reductive monism'.

§ 1.3 Conditions for a principle of monism.

In my view, the two premises for monism we isolated in Spinoza's early Ethics argument demonstrate Spinoza's awareness that monism may be a threat to mental irreducibility; that is, that a thesis of non-reductive monism which does not ensure that the mental is given a weighting equal to that of the physical may collapse into materialism. It is likely that this awareness arose from contemplating Hobbes's materialist thesis, which was widely disseminated and discussed throughout the period of Spinoza's philosophising. Since Spinoza never directly addresses Hobbes's claim, my argument is based on inferring from what we know Spinoza studied to what he postulates. Oldenburg echoes contemporary disquiet among philosophers and scientists about the Hobbesian thesis when he asks Spinoza

'Are you certain that body is not limited by thought, nor thought by body? For the controversy about what thought is, whether it is a corporeal motion or some spiritual act, entirely different from the corporeal, is still unresolved' (Letter 3).

Spinoza must have also felt the impact of Hobbes's attack (in his Objections to Meditations, which we shortly discuss further) on Descartes's certainty that his awareness of himself could not, in fact, have been caused by his own corporeal nature. Spinoza must have seen that if Descartes's postulation of an independent thinking substance was deemed insufficient to show that the mental is not caused or limited by body, then a stout metaphysical thesis claiming two essential properties from the outset was required. It seems Spinoza foresees that if we are working within a framework of non-reductive monism, that is, within parameters where there is a fundamental commitment to preserving mental irreducibility, then our stated conditions for monism must neither misguidedly entail radical indistinguishability of the mental from the
physical, nor make a thesis of monism implausible. Cynthia Macdonald has made an intensive study of assumptions and principles governing identity claims. She points out that if an argument for an identity theory is to be non-trivial, initial assumptions must not either foreclose its possible truth (i.e. make it impossible for the mental to be identical with the physical following any amount of argument) or anticipate identity by working with conceptions of the physical and the mental that are logically dependent on one another (Macdonald pp.4–5).

It is not possible to say in advance of explication of the attribute autonomy principle and of the defining characteristics of the attributes of thought and extension whether Spinoza's properties, which are logically bound together and necessitate each other, are also 'logically dependent' on one another. However, if some criticism of Spinoza's identity principle is to be made now on the grounds of Macdonald's stricture, then I think he must err on the side of logical interdependency of thought and extension on one another, rather on the side of than radical preclusion of identity, simply on the basis that we have to think harder about the issue of logical independence and defer our conclusion on it. On the other hand, I argue in Chapter 2 that any more stringent conditions than Spinoza offers for attribute autonomy would put monism out of the question. While Macdonald's strictures enable us to look critically at what is going on in the hidden assumptions and motivations which underlie theses of non-reductive monism, and allow us in some cases to expose obvious prejudgement of the issue of identity (e.g. in physicalist theses where the mental is defined as a secondary physical property), Spinoza preserves what I shall argue (after the principle of mental autonomy has been expounded, at the end of the following Chapter) is a healthy tension between identity and autonomy, granting both and denying neither.

Davidson offers no argument for monism although this is the label he applies to his theory of mind. While he explains, 'It is clear that this 'proof of the identity theory will be at best conditional, since two of its premises are unsupported, and the argument for the third may be found less than conclusive' (ME p.209), none of these premises includes monism. This is stipulated (ME p.214). Davidson believes that the establishing of his identity theory stands or falls on the reconciliation of his stated premises, but in Macdonald's view, and as I shall indicate in footnotes below, Davidson's linguistic formulation 'entails the truth of some version of the identity theory, thereby trivialising it' (Macdonald p.8).
PRINCIPLE OF MENTAL AUTONOMY

§ 2.1 Thought is not body, nor a property of body.

In this first section of Chapter 2 I demonstrate Spinoza's awareness that materialism is wrong. In §2.2 I show his rejection of immaterial substance. In §2.3 I argue that the tension Spinoza maintains between his identity and autonomy principles is defensible.

While Spinoza's move in making God "immanent" (E1 P18) in Nature was regarded as heretical by all orthodox Judaeo-Christian authorities, his claim that all thought must be entirely natural was equally scandalous, and was sometimes mistaken for materialism¹ (or physicalism: I do not distinguish these terms). Materialism was familiar enough to Spinoza for him to reject it firmly in his first text:--

"... it is necessary that what [man] has of thought, and what we call the soul, is a mode of that attribute we call thought, without any thing other than this mode belonging to his essence ... Similarly, what he has of extension, which we call the body, is nothing but a mode of the other attribute we call extension" (KV Appendix 11, 1–2).

Spinoza was aware of Hobbes's belief that thought consisted solely in body motions. For Hobbes, there is only corporeal substance: body and substance are two names for the same thing, "For the universe, being the aggregate of bodies, there is no real part thereof that is not also body" (Hobbes 1, 3, 34, p.428). 'Incorporeal substance' is a contradiction in terms (ibid. p.429). 'Mind' is body; so is spirit, which is air, vital and animal spirits, 'subtle, fluid, and invisible body' (ibid. pp.429, 440). Hobbes tells Descartes that it cannot be inferred from experience that the soul is purely thought:--

'It does not seem to be a valid argument to say, "I am thinking, therefore I am thought!", or "I am using my intellect, hence I am an intellect"' (2nd Objection, 3rd Replies to Meditations, CSM 11 p.122).

On the contrary

'... it may well be the case' [that] 'mind will be nothing but the motions in certain parts of an organic body' (ibid. p.126).

Hobbes's materialist view was that attacked by Cudworth (1678) as the falsehood 'that Cognition, Intellection and Volition are themselves really nothing else but Local Motion or Mechanism, in the inward parts of the brain and heart' (Yolton p.7). But it is not Spinoza's view, and was not so considered in his day by those who understood his doctrine. Philosophers who lived soon after him, including Bayle and Hume, called him an atheist on the grounds that his God was extended, not above or beyond the natural world and having no 'personality'. Hume recognises that Spinoza's 'hideous hypothesis' is of 'two different systems of beings presented', one of which (although both are included in the same substance) is non-material (Treatise Bk.1 Pt.1V §V). Spinoza was rarely accused of making God or soul merely matter. His 'two different systems' of matter and mind, existing in God the One Substance, were amply recognised and reviled. Leibniz refers to the 'error of Materialists and of Spinoza' of not allowing God's power to go infinitely beyond his creation (Leibniz 1 p.209, my emphasis.) Like Hobbes, Spinoza holds that there is only Nature. But Nature is not, as Hobbes believes, only body.

While Spinoza opposes Descartes by making the attributes inhere in one substance, we have seen that his commitment to the irreducibility of the mental makes him retain part of a Cartesian principle in fixing an attribute as an essential property, saying that an attribute is "what the intellect perceives"; and claiming that, like a substance, an attribute involves the concept of no other thing (E1 D4). Spinoza makes the additional Cartesian claim that we perceive the mental as an independent essence because it is independent. While he does not think that whatever we conceive as logically independent of another thing is also an ontologically independent entity or substance, he does hold that whatever is conceived as distinct is essentially distinct:

"Things that have nothing in common with one another also cannot be

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2 See Letter 12A on this, referring to KV 2 viii, which Meyer begged Spinoza to alter before publishing his Principles of Descartes's Philosophy. Bayle makes a logical objection to God considered as extended, claiming that if God is mutable and divisible, then modes are His parts and are separate substances (Bayle p.308). He does not accuse Spinoza of materialism.

3 A modern non-reductive monist such as Davidson, who assumes a categorial difference between the mental and the physical as a 'commonplace' (ME p.223), and denies that a correct view of the mental 'is not apt to inspire the nothing-but reflex' (ME p.214) at least implicitly acknowledges that the work of producing justificatory argument for this vital premise has been done by Descartes in his Meditations.
understood through one another, or the concept of the one does not involve the concept of the other" (E1 A5).

In the same way, we do not reduce body to a phenomenal experience. That which we perceive to be body really exists as body, in itself:

"... man consists of a mind and a body, and the human body exists, as we are aware of it" (E2 P13 C).

Spinoza believes reality is known in its most general properties, and in the deductions we can make from these, and he resists the idea that the attributes are limited to man's "fictions" (KV 1 i Note d, C p.63). His admission that there may be an infinity of attributes/natures/essences we do not know (ibid.) has no force if we do not accept that "So far, however, only two of all these infinite attributes are known to us through their essence: Thought and extension" (KV 1 vii Note a, C p.88).^4

The two attributes of thought and extension are essentially distinct, and distinctly known. While Spinoza's assertion that "all the distinctions we make between the attributes of God are only distinctions of reason - the attributes are not really distinguished from one another" (CM 2 v) has been taken, together with his stricture that an attribute is "what the intellect perceives", to suggest that Spinoza has a subjectivist view of the attributes (i.e. they are ways a single thing appears to us, and are not really different from one another), it is now generally considered that this reading is unreliable.^5 For example, when Spinoza refers to an attribute's being "really distinguished" he is saying that the attributes are not 'really distinct' in a Cartesian sense; that is, they are not distinct substances. And when he uses the scholastic term "what the intellect perceives" he does so for the express purpose of marking off the mental as conceptually and explanatorily distinct from the physical,

^4Those which are known to us consist of only two, viz. thought and extension, for we are speaking here only of attributes which one could call God's proper attributes, through which we come to know God in himself" (KV 1 ii, C p.73). "The human mind .. neither involves nor expresses any other attribute of God besides these two. Moreover, no other attribute of God can be conceived from these two attributes or from their modifications" (Letter 64). (See also E2 Preface; E2 A5.) Spinoza further asserts that "We neither feel nor perceive any singular things, or anything of Natura Naturata but bodies and modes of thinking" (E2 A5).

^5Wolfson argues that for Spinoza the attributes were merely human imaginings (Wolfson pp.137–153). This interpretation is now standardly refuted (Bennett p.147). See also Kessler (pp.191–194); Haserot (2); Allison p.49; Sprigge 1 pp.149–154.
making direct appeal to his readers' belief that the attributes appear different because they are different. Far from making the attributes merely conceptually distinct, or distinctly observed phenomena, Spinoza adds constraints on causality and explanation which estrange the mental from the physical more radically than does Descartes's doctrine of diverse substances. For Spinoza, only the mental can explain the mental because only the mental can cause the mental. (Much more is said on this.) For Descartes this is not the case. Some acts of thought (e.g. sensory perceptions and passions) are for Descartes closely connected with the laws of motion and rest, and so appear to be causally dependent on body. They do not consist in thought alone, and

'must not be referred either to the mind alone or body alone. These arise ... from the close and intimate union of our mind with the body' (Principles 1 §48 CSM 1 p.209). '... the passions are to be numbered among the perceptions which the close alliance between the soul and body renders obscure and confused' (Passions §28, CSM 1 p.339).

Descartes's stated thesis of interaction is that the 'actions of the soul' involved in making judgements interact with brain activities in the pineal gland (Passions 31–2). The Cartesian mind 'applies itself' to corporeal motions [5th Replies to Meditations §4]), and disturbances in the body can 'prevent the soul from having full control over its passions' (Passions 1,46). For Spinoza, the mental, that is, all possible "modes" or ways of being of the attribute of thought, constitutes a holistic system, a realm of purely mental activity and explanation. Conversely, since no other attribute shares the mental causal system, the modes of no other attribute can be explained through thought:–

"Each attribute is conceived through itself without any other. So the modes of each attribute involve the concept of their own attribute, but not of another one; and so they have God for their cause only insofar as he [it] is considered under the attribute of which they are modes, and not insofar as he [it] is considered under any other, q.e.d." (E2 P6 Proof).

"The body cannot determine the mind to thinking, and the mind cannot determine the body to motion" (E3 P2).

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^ As noted in Chapter 1, Spinozistic "modes" or "modifications" are ways of being of substance under some attribute (E1 P25 C). But they are constitutive items, whereas Cartesian modes are changeable properties joined to a name. Modis means 'in ways' or 'in modes'.
Thoughts and bodies have no causal or explanatory interplay with any but their own kind since their causal inputs and outputs cannot causally affect one another.

Moreover if, as Spinoza thinks, mental states and events are caused only by thought, then they cannot be causally dependent properties of the body. Thus modern property dualisms which make the mind a property of the brain cannot represent Spinoza's theory of mind any more than reductionist theses which make mental phenomena nothing but body. It is not enough that the mental is judged irreducible in being a state with conscious aspects which resist explanation through reference to brain mechanisms. Spinoza's claim is that the mental is a closed explanatory realm because mental states and events are not body properties, nor caused by them. As is discussed fully in Chapter 6, two causal powers are involved, one physical and one mental. "The power of the mind is intelligence itself" (E2 P43 S), and this power does not move body.

The Spinozistic attribute of thought is thus a robust constitutive property having no causal connections or ultimate causal dependency on matter. It is not technically in se – in itself, for it is not a distinct entity (substance) depending on itself alone. Yet it is self-conceived and has always existed, necessarily, with matter in Nature:

"It is in the nature of substance that each of its attributes is conceived through itself, since all the attributes it has have always been in it together, and one could not be produced by another, but each expresses the reality or being of substance" (E1 P10 S). "For since God has existed from eternity, so also must his Idea in the thinking thing, i.e. exist in itself from eternity" (KV 2 xxii Note a, C 1 p.139).

When Meyer introduces the Principles of Descartes's Philosophy, he summarises Spinoza's belief in the necessary and eternal co-existence of mind with body:

'Just as the human body is not extension absolutely, but only an extension determined in a certain way according to the laws of extended nature by motion and rest, so also the human mind, or soul, is not thought absolutely, but only a thought determined in a certain way

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7 I use this general term throughout Chapters 1, 2 and 3, since argument is required to show that for Spinoza all thoughts are to be defined as ideas, and this cannot be given due attention until Chapter 4.

8 An "eternal" attribute exists necessarily:-- necessitas sive aeternitas (E1 P10 S).
Spinoza's doctrine suggests he has thought out what must be the case if the mental is not to be causally dependent on body, emergent from body, or in any other sense supervenient (i.e. dependent in a logical or causal way) on body. To avoid these reductive snares the mental must be shown to be *sui generis*—a kind of its own. For, as Hobbes has pointed out to Descartes, any admission of physical cause, or failure to characterise the mental in some way which explicitly precludes matter, lets in the possibility of physical etiology or straight materialism.⁹

§ 2.2 Thought is a natural property.

That the mental is *sui generis* does not entail, Spinoza maintains, that it is supernatural or weird. While thought is an autonomous attribute, it is a natural attribute; as natural, in being an expression of God/Nature, as any other possible attribute, including the physical. Today, 'the natural' is considered synonymous with 'the physical',¹⁰ but that is not Spinoza's thesis. He argues that nothing can avoid the laws of Nature: if God which is Nature is all there is, nothing which exists can exist outside it (E1 P15):

"Will and intellect [for example] are related to the God's Nature as motion and rest are, and as are absolutely all natural things" (E1 P32 C2).

For Spinoza there is no supernatural hypostasis (soul-stuff) of which individual soul substances consist, as there is for Descartes or for most of the Neoplatonists whose doctrines we know Spinoza encountered.¹¹ Most Neoplatonic doctrines kept to the Platonic view that the mental was divine soul-stuff pervading the universe, whereas matter was inert until 'informed' by the mental (a doctrine of interaction Spinoza must

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⁹ Crane argues for this precise conclusion in his paper 'All God Has to Do' (1990). He suggests that a thesis of 'parallelism' can 'in principle' provide a short cut to his conclusion that supervenience physicalism is false, since therein mental facts are fixed separately, right from the start (Crane p.239).

¹⁰ See, for example, Davidson ('Mental Events', 'Philosophy as Psychology' and 'The Material Mind'), who wants to retain an unbridgeable gulf between psychological events having a content not subject to laws of nature, and physical theories which do have that content (i.e. are natural). While this is not a metaphysical thesis, and Davidson does not think the mental in any sense supernatural, he equates the natural and physical.

¹¹ Spinoza was well read in Stoic, Neoplatonic and Cabalist doctrines. See Jacob; James, Susan (1); Kristeller (1) and (2); Hallie, Müller and van Rooijen.
explicitly reject since he holds that one attribute has no causal influence over another).

Spinoza's natural, non-physical property of thought drops those features of the supernatural which repel modern thinkers. There is no need for modern physicalist realists to regard his essential or inmost property of mind with the kind of repugnance which would prompt them to consign it to the scrap-heap of myth, along with phlogiston and fairies. Spinoza takes much this attitude himself to "confused perceptions of things existing in Nature — as when men are persuaded that there are divinities in the woods, in images, in animals etc..." (TIE §68). He describes what we take to be apparitions as "The effects of the imagination (or the images which have their origin in the constitution of the mind" (Letter 17). There is no ghost in the machinery of the body, and none following the death of the brain. The mental is not, for Spinoza, the concern of medicine or any other science of extension but "of logic" (E5 Preface). I shall argue that there is only what I call for the time being, until we have discussed in detail what Spinoza intends as his essence of thought, "intelligence". As we have seen, "The power of the mind is intelligence itself". This power is inherent in Nature and exists nowhere else.

I shall later devote two Chapters to characterising the mental, so only remark briefly here on what Spinoza can mean by the mental if he makes all thought the subject matter of the study of logic. To return to the basis of his metaphysic of mind, Spinoza did not say God 'had' a mind — something to be intelligent with regarding systems of thought and objects in the material world — but that God's intellect was the knowledge of those objects. I suggest Spinoza encourages us to shed a certain cumbersome class of thinking furniture which he sees as a fiction of past ontologies, and I shall argue throughout this thesis against the view that Spinoza either postulates or requires a conception of mind as a 'stuff' or as a thing which contains thoughts. I believe both these characterisations pertain to mens conceived as substance. However, argument is required because some commentators think Spinoza must give the mental some essence befitting an attribute defined as an essence of substance. Barker, for example, concedes that Spinoza sees the human mind as an "idea", and that a stipulation of 'mental stuff' sits awkwardly with other aspects of Spinoza's doctrine of mind. But
he insists that *mens* must be a stouter property than mere 'knowledges of objects', given that Spinoza 'starts from a rigid dualism of the attributes', of which thought is *res cogitans*, "thinking thing" (Barker 1 p.114 and pp.111-112). He holds that the existence of mind and its cognitive relation are two distinct conditions:

'The attribute of thought has a quite exceptional function, namely that it 'knows' – and for Spinoza this really means 'reproduces' or copies' the contents of the other attributes; it has thus a double status, it exists on its own account and it knows the other attributes' (Barker 11 p.125).

But, Barker argues, the 'knowing' condition is insufficient for mental being:

'For, though the human mind is not a substance in any sense Spinoza could admit, it is nevertheless an independent entity in a sense which the particular idea which it thinks is not. Spinoza may have thought of the mind as related to particular ideas in a manner comparable with that in which a larger space is related to the smaller spaces contained in it, but if so, his thought was not true, for the mind is not merely a marked off part of an infinite and homogenous continuum that exists all at once and unchanged, as space does, but an individual being that develops in time and is characterised by a certain unity and continuity amidst change' (Barker 111 pp.145-6).

Odegard also believes 'substance modified' must instantiate more than 'ideas or mental states'. He does not think 'that God does have certain bits of knowledge of certain bodies with human minds merely consisting in those bits of knowledge' (Odegard p.63). God, he says, is 'thinking beings'. But Odegard does not think a 'mind' exists without its states (Odegard pp.65), and he does not suggest what further property the thinking beings which are partial expressions of God's thought could consist in. Moreover, the only examples he gives of cases where a classification of minds as mental states will not serve are those cases where a knowing subject conceives a new idea (ibid. pp.63-64). Yet it is not clear to me why a system of ideas which is self-generating – a dissemination of intelligence wherein ideas cause other ideas – cannot cater for the conceiving of new ideas without some thinking machine to perform this operation. To postulate 'minds' as existing in addition to the ideas they have seems to me to deny the independent power of thought, and vest it in some power other than intelligence. More is said about Spinozistic 'knowing subjects' in §5.4 and §6.3.
I do not think either Barker or Odegard shows from the texts that Spinoza posits some essential mental property over and above God's knowledge of objects, or that mental events are insufficient to serve as 'minds', and I believe it will become increasingly clear during the course of my thesis that while Spinoza makes the mental maximally indispensable and irreducible, he also noticeably deflates the notion of mind. I am convinced of this on two counts. 1. We recall Spinoza's remarks on God as architect and builder seeking neither matter nor natural laws outside himself. The "divine" thinking attribute of which all finite minds are parts is the knowledge of objects within itself:-- "God, God's intellect, and the things understood by him are one and the same' (E2 P7 S). In this mind of Nature–whole it is inconceivable that the intelligence and the material object are elements of different Being. We see further in §3.2 how Spinoza eradicates the Cartesian creator–God who overviews Nature "like a spectator at a play" (CM 2 iii). And if infinite knowledge is not embedded in some separate mind–substance, then this cannot be the case with the finite minds which are its partial expressions. 2. As we see in §4.2, Spinoza defines all modes of thought as ideas, and allows no room in his thesis for kinds of ideas other than those which have a place in his three kinds of knowledge.

Spinoza does not simply unite in one substance and rename as 'Nature' the very same attributes distinguished as substances by Descartes. Nature is for Spinoza a union of attributes which naturally unite within one substance, as Descartes's distinct substances of extension and (non-natural) thought could not. (We see in §6.2 that the essential nature of extension also differs from that of Descartes.) It is my thesis that Spinoza is as strongly aware that Cartesian–style essences of extension and thought, would undermine the possibility of monism as he is alert to the threat to mental autonomy posed by a doctrine of monism. Many commentators – starting with Leibniz – believe that Spinoza dissolves 'God's' soul–substance and individual soul–substances, replacing them with a single power of intelligence differentiated in an infinity of instances. Leibniz attacks Spinoza for claiming ideas to replace minds:--

'There is not the slightest reason for supposing that the soul is an idea: ideas are something purely abstract, as numbers or figures, and cannot
act; they are abstract and universal' (Leibniz 2, p.967).

Parkinson also suggests that, for Spinoza, mental states themselves are necessary and sufficient for mentality:

'What else would 'the mind' be, other than will, intellect, feeling and so on? ... There is no substratum self which has various mental states, but any human mind is simply a number of ideas organised in a certain way' (Parkinson 1 p.102 and p.105).

Parkinson and Lloyd both propose that, having due respect for Spinoza's metaphysical commitment which sets individual 'minds' apart from one another, we do not go far wrong if we see Spinoza as to some extent anticipating Hume's notion of the human mind as a bundle of ideas (Parkinson p.102; Lloyd p.173). Hume says,

'When I turn my reflexion on myself, I can never perceive this self without some one or more perceptions; nor can I ever perceive anything but the perceptions. 'Tis the composition of these, therefore, which forms the self .... 'This must pave the way for a like principle with regard to the mind, that we have no notion of it, distinct from the particular perceptions' (Treatise, Appendix, p.634–5).

Hume's point is that we have no idea of substance (ibid.), and that perceptions are logically sufficient for a mind. Spinoza adds to the Humean view a stricture that any 'mind' is the intelligence in God of a particular portion of matter or body. We may note at this early stage (although further evidence for a marking off of minds solely through the attribute of thought will be given) that a specific mind-body relation and a subsequent marking-off of an individual 'mind' ensues from that characterisation. Neither thoughts nor the 'minds' they comprise float detached from identifiable bodies.

That said, each thought has its own being or existence (esse) in relation to all other modes, and its own essence (essentia), which is its particular expression in terms of an attribute of substance. A circle, for example, is both a particular physical instantiation and the idea of it. The latter is not a mere epiphenomenal reflection of the material circle – a passive doppelgänger expressing in thought what is instantiated in extension:– "For a circle is one thing and an idea of the circle another – the idea of a circle is not something which has a circumference and a centre, as the circle does" (TIE §33). Moreover, in extension and thought Spinoza postulates two essentially
different properties expressing diverse powers. The mental operates under its own steam. I will give an example of this dual causal system in advance of the detailed later discussion of Chapter 6. Spinoza does not provide this example, but I offer it to enlarge on his example of a circle, since I think it helps to explain how any fractional entity (mode of thought and mode of extension) does not exist in isolation but has a place in a causal scheme of differentiation and modification in substance.

Mathematicians believe that the arrangement of the separate scales on a fir cone represent a masterpiece of mathematical precision. Set down as an algebraic equation this pattern is immensely complex. It would take extensive calculation to construct a similar model. Spinoza's thesis entails that the fir cone's mathematical construction, viewed as such, is indeed the product of calculation and is not caused by the wooden material which forms the scales. The visible scaly arrangement has been generated through extension, but the algebraic equation is the outcome of an interplay of intelligence ("logic"). If we did not consider the mathematics of the calculation as a property other than the physical property of the fir cone we would, in Spinoza's view, misunderstand Nature:

"If we neglect them we shall necessarily overturn the connection of the intellect, which ought to reproduce the connection of nature, and we shall completely miss our goal [of knowing the order and connection of Nature]" (TIE §95).

We may note here that our calculations, if wrong, are not identical with their object. We shall spend the next four Chapters examining how the power of intelligence in humans does not match the order of true ideas or "the order of the intellect". Each principle examined throws up different worries over Spinoza's attempt to make finite minds fractional expressions of God's mind. However, I wish to argue a little further here for the reasonableness of Spinoza's assumptions about the infinite attributes of the one substance in so far as these are God/Nature and the things he thinks (E1 P17 S).

Spinoza's claim makes demands on our conceptual abilities because (I think) no similar theory of non-reductive monism, postulating identification across a chasm of kinds and causal powers, has been advanced. Spinoza is committed to the strongest
possible conditions for mental independence short of independence of substance. Thought is ontologically, causally and explanatorily self-sufficient. Yet we know that Spinoza takes his principle of monism or attribute identity equally seriously. The tension caused by these simultaneous assertions of sameness of substance and distinctness of essential property confused his earliest pupils and still gives rise to conflicting interpretations of his theory of mind. Yet I suggest that this apparent paradox of sameness and otherness exists in some form in any thesis of non-reductive monism, since any version must contain in some sense a contradiction if both identity and mental autonomy principles are postulated, even if these principles are flimsy in comparison with Spinoza's. Further, I believe Spinoza's doctrine of mind shows us that such a tension is healthy, and needs to be kept at the forefront of awareness while considering the mind–body relation. I shall try to explain this view forthwith.

§ 2.3 A proper tension between identity and autonomy.

I have suggested that Spinoza's robust metaphysical thesis of non-reductive monism acts as a control or measure of what is involved in claiming mental autonomy within a monistic framework, and I conclude this preliminary part of my thesis by reflecting on how Spinoza's thesis is catalytic in showing options for non-reductive monism as depicted within the familiar framework of dual aspect theory. In any version of non-reductive monism the mental and the physical are seen as two aspects of one thing, but the ontological commitment involved in the various properties, phenomenal experiences, or semantic distinctions designated as the 'aspects' differs widely.

One analysis\textsuperscript{12} of 'dual' or 'double' aspect theory isolates three elements in our everyday concept of an 'aspect'. It distinguishes (i) that which presents or 'has' the aspects; (ii) the aspects themselves, and (iii) the person to whom the aspects are presented (Vesey p.146). A dual aspect theory postulating only two meanings or predicates is at most realist about (i) – that which presents the aspects, and (iii) – the person to whom the aspects are presented. It does not regard 'the aspects themselves' (ii) as 'objects' existing in themselves outside our experience. At the far (Spinozistic)

polarity a dual aspect thesis positing existentially independent states or essential properties concentrates on the aspects themselves as autonomous properties of the entity or event which presents the aspects. We might liken these aspects to the east and west aspects of a house, although for Spinoza no 'house' or third thing having aspects underlies the aspects. Substance just is "All Attributes" (E1 P19).

The challenge for any non-reductive monist lies in sustaining the unique and diverse characters of the mental and physical aspects. This is as true of a theory of mind positing only a linguistic difference as of a metaphysical thesis such as Spinoza's. It was observed almost a century ago by Baldwin that the double aspect theory

'... while professing to harmonise materialism and spiritualism, occupies a position of somewhat unstable equilibrium between the two, and shows a tendency in different expositors to relapse into one or the other.... The former theory may be called "psychical monism" or "spiritualism", the latter, "physical monism" or "materialism" (Baldwin: Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology [1901], quoted by Vesey, p.149).

The tendency to identify one of the aspects with the other, or with the underlying entity illustrates how a dual aspect thesis can fail in its commitment to non-reduction. Currently there is a tendency for the mental aspect to be reduced, as is shown by the problems physicalist identity theorists have in demonstrating independent mental causal efficacy. The physical seems inevitably to wear the trousers. Conversely, a dual aspect thesis positing only phenomenological experiences of the mental and physical would be in effect an idealism. Spinoza's doctrine of mind has been read as both idealist and materialist (above, Note 1), showing that he is not immune to the threat

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13 While for both Davidson and Spinoza (where x is an event, P is physical and M is mental), \( \exists x (Px \land Mx) \), the ontological commitments underlying this formula are quite different. For Spinoza, P and M are physical and mental essential properties, so there can be no reduction. For Davidson, they are only physical or mental predicates (propositions). There is no distinction of kinds in the events underlying P and M. Davidson admits his thesis of non-reductive monism 'resembles materialism in its claim that all events are physical' (ME p.214). Thus, while Spinoza may seem pressed to preserve a monism because he posits two essential properties in one entity, Davidson will be pressed to preserve mental irreducibility.

14 The doctrine of 'neutral monism' appears first in the theses of Russell and James, both of whom offer explanations of how a single neutral stuff (embodying no existential duality of physical and mental properties) could support our phenomenal perceptions of mind and matter. In both cases the ontological commitment turns out to be idealist, so fixing two aspects of the same 'kind' (James, W. p.208; Russell pp.307-8).

15 James claims Spinoza is an idealist (James W. p.208). Curley regards Joachim and Harris as idealist interpreters of Spinoza (C p.432). Sprigge reflects on an idealist identity in Spinoza (Sprigge 1 p.172).
of subsumption of one attribute/nature/essence into another. If Spinoza's attributes, forcefully argued to be in all respects self-sufficient, are vulnerable to charges of relapsing into one or other of these natures, then it is hard to see how mental and physical aspects which are not subject to metaphysical constraints can fare better. It is arguable that fixing the correct tension between identity and autonomy is a delicate conceptual balancing act of which Spinoza has made a profound study, and that any weaker commitment than his to properties of thought and body may fail to preserve mental irreducibility. If Spinoza should ever be demonstrated to have fixed an irreducible place for the mind without sacrificing identity or espousing two aspects of the same kind, then his thesis of non-reductive monism might seem to be a successful prototype, showing how to avoid the mind dissolving into body, or the body being reduced to a phenomenal or semantic experience.

Unfortunately I do not think it worth pursuing this argument since it is my thesis that, on other grounds, Spinoza fails to give us a satisfactory account of the human mind. I suggested while introducing my thesis that in my view the tension traditionally recognised in Spinoza's philosophy between these identity and autonomy principles is not the most serious tension in his theory of mind. While the principles which induce it are now in place and could be seen as poised for further testing, I believe any difficulties they create are dwarfed by those dogging Spinoza's attempt to move directly from the whole intellect of God/Nature to the finite fragments of intellect which are, for him, human minds. In my view, Spinoza's theory of mind is severely damaged by this last strategy, and I believe that at some points in the Chapters below it proves easier to go along with Spinoza's combined principles of identity and autonomy than to concur with those which depend on extrapolating from the complete mind of Nature-whole to the human mind. However, it is not the major concern of my thesis to vindicate Spinoza's sustaining of tension between attribute autonomy and attribute identity, and apart from a consideration of its explanatory benefit in Spinoza's dual causal system (Chapter 6), explicit discussion of this tension ends here.
CHAPTER 3

PRINCIPLE OF MENTAL HOLISM

§ 3.1 An infinite attribute of thought must contain all possible thoughts.¹

We have seen that Spinoza postulates an irreducibly mental attribute of thought which is a closed explanatory realm just because mental states and events are not body properties, nor caused by them. Thoughts have no causal connection with, and thereby no explanatory interplay with, any but their own kind.

Mental holism considered as self-containedness is entailed by the Spinozistic recognition that modes of one attribute cannot "limit" modes of another (E1 D2 and E1 P10 S). Because thoughts are only caused by other thoughts there can be no semi-or quasi-physical sensations. Spinozistic mental independence is, in contrast to the Cartesian thesis in which, as we have seen, some mental events appear causally dependent on body, or else are 'not be referred either to the mind alone or body alone', very clear-cut. Mental self-containedness is, for Spinoza, as complete as may be postulated within an entity where each essential property complements the other. It is clearly far more radical than that of modern theories of mind which assert that an independent mental realm exists on the basis of a semantic or verbal divide between mental and events and physical events, but that a single causal scheme underlies the mental and physical events these predicates are said strictly to segregate.² This thesis leaves room (Hobbes would suggest) for the possibility that although we conceive of a diverse domain of thought 'it may well be the case that mind will be nothing but the motions in certain parts of an organic body'.

Mental holism is further taken by Spinoza to entail mental all-inclusiveness. An attribute which is "infinite" is unlimited in a wider sense than for Descartes: it includes all that is logically possible in its kind (Chapter 1, Note 5). We have to look

¹ I use this general term throughout Chapters 1, 2 and 3, since argument is required to show that for Spinoza all thoughts are to be defined as ideas, and this cannot be given due attention until Chapter 4.

² Davidson also asserts a thesis of mental holism in which the 'conceptual domains' of the mental and the physical are disparate: each entails 'allegiance' to a different overall scheme of explanation (ME p.222). However, it is a prime principle of Davidson's that 'at least some mental events interact causally with physical events' (ME p.208), and an assumption that the events themselves are physical (ME p.214).
carefully into this claim since, if examples of thoughts can be found which a sole attribute (property, kind or essence) could not embrace, the possibility that some thoughts are physical, or of some other kind, gets a foothold. Spinoza eschews unnecessary distinctions between modes of thought just because anything which prevents thoughts being aspects of a unified power of intelligence leads to conceptual impasse at every stage of explaining the mental. We would then have to abandon the project of fixing a defining characterisation for thought, and would consequently be disadvantaged in trying to demonstrate an essential irreducibility of the mental. Our monism might not, therefore be correctly be called non-reductive.\(^3\) I shall begin to argue shortly that the pressure Spinoza puts on the mind of God/Nature to make it all-inclusive, that is, to include all "adequate" (complete and true) thoughts, and also all "inadequate" (partial and confused) thoughts, produces cracks in his thesis of mental holism. First I explicate that thesis.

*Ethics* Part 2 is called "Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind". Here Spinoza begins to spell out what must be deduced from the Part 1 claim that

"...there belongs to God an attribute whose concept all singular thoughts involve, and through which they are also conceived" (E2 P1 Proof).

This brief paraphrase of the detailed metaphysic of Part 1 seems straightforward, but, Spinoza says, we shall get nowhere by trying to analyse "absolute thought". We cannot extrapolate from this abstraction to the essence of the mental, any more than we could infer from the experience of thinking which was Descartes's starting-point for inquiry into the nature of the mind to what thought, in general, is. A new approach is needed, Spinoza says, through a concept which should enable us to see the relations of our thought to the totality of thought in God/Nature-thinking. Since God/Nature is thought in general in being all possible modes of thought, it is an "infinite intellect":--

"From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinitely many things in infinitely many modes, (i.e. everything which can fall under an infinite intellect" (E1 P16).

\(^{3}\)In this, Spinoza anticipates the need for an essentially mental description which marks off a purely mental event, as proposed by Davidson (ME p.211). Davidson also (we see in due course) fixes a defining characteristic of the mental which, he says, makes mental events irreducibly mental.
The infinite intellect is said by Spinoza to be the immediate infinite mode of thought, that is, the most general way of being of substance-thinking. A part-'mind' is a finite mode of thought, a fractional expression or mental event, an effect or thought-stage in this all-inclusive system of thinking: "The human mind is [like any other finite mind] part of the infinite intellect of God" (E2 P11 C). Each of the finite modes of thought which comprises those 'minds' is also an individual mental event or fractional expression of this holistic matrix of thought:—

"When we say that the human mind perceives this or that, we are saying nothing but that God, not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he [it] is explained [or displayed] through the nature of the human mind, or insofar as he constitutes the essence of the human mind, has this or that idea" (E2 P11 C).

I have already suggested that a 'mind' has no other being than the thoughts that comprise it. I shall therefore sometimes use scare quotes to stress that what we refer to as 'minds' are, for Spinoza, collections of particular ideas within the infinite system of all ideas 'of' particular bodies. Strictly speaking, a mind is a single complex idea, Allison reminds us (Allison p.88). This does not make the term 'mind' an anthropocentric construct for Spinoza, amounting to a false view of what really exists. It merely urges us to understand the designation 'mind' in a non-Cartesian sense, that is, as a complex unit of intelligence rather than a substance or a nugget of soul-stuff:—

"The idea that constitutes the formal being of the human mind is the idea of a body which is composed of a great many highly composite individuals. But of each individual composing the body, there is necessarily an idea in God. Therefore, the idea of the human body is composed of these many ideas of the parts composing the body, q.e.d. (E2 P15 Proof).

First, then, we have to understand each human mind as a unified collection of fragments within the infinite intellect, God/Nature-thinking. Lloyd's recent book is devoted to showing that this does not deny the existence of 'minds' but makes each mind 'a unique permutation of ideas' (Lloyd p.53). She distinguishes two grounds for
this assurance. An individual mind is differentiated (i) through its particular relations to other ideas. It is not merged in the flux of modes of thought, but 'can exist as an individual only in the context of other modes of thought' (Lloyd p.29, my italics). (ii) A mind has individuality through its status as an idea in the mind of God of a particular body, and this guarantees its individuality and its relation to the rest of the world (ibid. p.173). It is Lloyd's thesis that our selfhood is not threatened but that we can only understand the place of our 'minds' in the universe if we look at ourselves not as self-contained wholes but as elements in "the whole".

Lloyd's thesis provokes certain questions we shall have to answer before long. Firstly, hasn't Descartes shown that we can easily think of our mind and its functioning as a unit separate from any other body or mind in the universe? Yet, in Spinoza's thesis as interpreted by Lloyd, we seem to need to know about our body before we can believe our mind is an individual. Spinoza has not so far given any explanation of how a mind is to be marked off just as a collection of ideas. And is this 'idea in God' which is the complex of my thoughts really the same 'mind' I experience in so far as my thoughts are beliefs directed on the world, and are not concerned with states of my body? We shall not be able to resist addressing these complications for much longer, but for the present we must press Spinoza's principle that for all-inclusiveness, a unified domain of thoughts, there can only be one sort of thought, subject to a single and unequivocal definition.

All-inclusiveness entails there can be no expression of mentality which is not captured in the whole. We recall that Spinoza sets out to avoid the incoherence of confining minds to God and homo sapiens. He protests that those who "maintain that the human mind is produced by no natural causes, but created directly by God" create "a State within the greater State of Nature" (TP II 6), that is, an enclave of uniquely immaterial human mentality whose nature must be explained in so parochial a way as to disallow a general characterisation of the mental which could include non-human species. Spinoza is not alone in pointing out that Descartes gets himself into difficulties by making the human intellect different in kind from the mentality of animals, which Descartes judges to be 'completely different in nature from ours'
Discourse on the Method, Part 6, CSM 1 pp.140). Gassendi observes the tension between Descartes's denial that animals have mentality (Letters 1646 and 1649, CSMK pp.302 and 365) and his admission that 'knowledge' and other goods, including virtue, 'could belong to all the intelligent creatures in an indefinitely extended world' (Letter 1647 CSMK p.322). Descartes does not demonstrate why it is that although 'we see that many of the organs of animals are not very different from ours in shape and movement ... there are two different principles causing our movements', one 'mechanical and corporeal', the other mind or soul defined as thinking substance' (Letter 1649, CSM p.365). He merely asserts that the mentality of animals is mechanical and corporeal, so is different in kind from our own. Gassendi protests to Descartes that if he classes sense-perception and imagination as thoughts

'... in that case you must consider whether the sense-perception which the brutes have does not also deserve to be called "thought, since it is not dissimilar to your own. That would mean that the brutes, too, have a mind which is not unlike yours' (Fifth Set of Objections to Meditations, CSM 11 p. 187).

Descartes does not, as we have seen and shall discuss further, consider sensation to be wholly thought, but this does not release him from the difficulty that many perceptions seem exactly comparable in humans and animals. Spinoza argues that an "infinite" attribute of thought cannot by definition - even by Descartes's definition it is 'unlimited' (Chapter 1, Note 5) - be limited to God and human souls. Spinoza's thesis is surely meant as a rebuttal to Descartes's complaint that

'we have long believed that man has great advantages over other creatures, and it looks as if we lose them all when we change our opinion' (i.e. when we ) infer that there are intelligent creatures in the stars or elsewhere' (Letter to Chanut 1647, CSMK p.321).

Spinoza is not interested in specific inference to other intelligences, and does not think, for reasons which emerge shortly, that detailed knowledge of finite modifications of Nature are available to us. His reaction to Descartes's thesis seems merely to suggest that philosophers who claim to catch sight of some universal pattern in Nature should recognise the need to give an account of thought in terms other than those dictated by theological dogma or by the convention or ancient authority they purport
to reject (Discourse Part 1, CSM 1 pp.113–115).

Spinoza's doctrine of a universal concatenation and continuum of thoughts duly allows for an in-principle mental interconnectedness with all non-human denizens of the universe (E2 P13 S). He emphasises while explicating his theory of mind that "The things we have shown so far are completely general and do not pertain more to man than to other individuals ..." (E2 P13 S).

This open-ended metaphysic does not entail that thought-expression is in any way comparable between species. Minds are the ideas of bodies, and the bodies of other species differ greatly from our own, therefore there is no reason to suppose their thoughts are like ours, either. Nonetheless, this evidence for difference is also evidence for a degree of sameness of perception in human and animal minds. In so far as our bodies precisely resemble other bodies, our perceptions may resemble theirs, too. This circumstance logically facilitates the gradations of pains, pleasures and desires etc. that we seem to observe in animals. While Spinoza personally considers attempts at extra-human communication pointless (E4 Appendix XXVI), his doctrine coheres with the view of many people that there is cognitive kinship between animals and ourselves.

Spinoza's concern that all thoughts must share a common nature if we are to fix a defining characteristic of thought which does not limit our account of the place of the mind in Nature is a lively one in contemporary philosophy of mind. Problems of multiple realisation in mind-body identity theories which stipulate 'types' of identity are anticipated by Spinoza's theory that a particular (or token) thought is the idea of a particular (or token) body-state, and that typing is a secondary concern. His thesis is calculatedly not parochial.⁵ We must, he says, look beyond our own specifically human states of mind in the search for a shared nature of thought. He believes we shall be led astray if we concentrate on the human case since this must misrepresent the nature of mind in general. He claims that certain mental features we isolate in ourselves and seem to think indispensable, like consciousness, subjectivity and privacy, cannot constitute what is common to all mental properties, since if we look into the

⁵ Spinoza aims to avoid limiting his thesis, Cartesian fashion, in a way which leaves anomalies sitting outside his metaphysical scheme. Consequently, he makes his thesis deliberately neutral, and leaves trailers of possibility of intelligence. Taken to their absurd conclusions these theses may be very distracting.
matter carefully we find they are not even universally expressed in all human thoughts. Consciousness (the 'awareness' considered by Descartes the defining feature of any mode of thought)\(^6\) is, for Spinoza, a property of only some mental events. Spinoza says infants have no consciousness of themselves or their bodies (E5 P6 S):

"And really, he who [is] like an infant or a child ... has a mind which considered in itself is conscious of almost nothing of itself, or of God or of things" (E5 P39 S).

A good deal more is said on unconscious ideas in Chapter 4.

Privacy is not a universal feature of thought since some thoughts (e.g. that we have bodies) are common. Nor are our thoughts invariably expressed in propositions: a silent, phrase-less, verb-less sigh may serve for a dozen thoughts. Since features such as consciousness, privacy and aptness for verbal articulation seem to be patchily expressed in human minds, why should we expect to build a taxonomy of non-human psychology\(^7\) on the basis of them? Spinoza warns that it is as foolish to postulate specifically human ways of thinking as characteristics of Nature in general as to assign them to God (E1 Preface). While these modes of thought are real and must be taken into account in fixing the defining feature of thought, they do not define thought.

We may well wonder how Spinoza expects us to get outside our own necessarily perspectival way of thinking in order to discover the essence of any possible thought. Spinoza is ready with his answer. He argues that we can have an adequate notion of what mentality, in general, is, without the absurd and impossible expedient of trying to get outside our own natures. Knowledge of the general essences of thought and extension which we ourselves express is, Spinoza says, a matter of having notions of common properties, for "Those things which are common to all, and which are equally in the part and in the whole, can only be conceived adequately" (E2 P38). The notions we have are therefore "common notions". Here Spinoza makes no appeal to

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\(^6\) *Thought*: I take this term to include everything that is within us in such a way that we are immediately aware of it' (Def.1, 2nd Replies, CSM p.113).

\(^7\) The term 'psychology' was not introduced until 1693 and so was not available to Spinoza, but few philosophers have more thoroughly investigated everyday perceptions and attitudes, or advanced a more comprehensive psychotherapy and analysis of social dynamics. It seems ironic that some critics (e.g. Balz and Sellars [Sellars p.8]) have held that Spinoza's aim in improving the intellect is the elimination of commonplace ways of thinking and feeling, yet we see below that in a sense Spinoza invites such views.
the ancient theory, kept alive by Descartes, that 'common notions' are true because they are innate, planted in our minds at birth by God ('Comments on a Certain Broadsheet' CSM 1 p.305). For Spinoza, all thoughts are both "divine" and innate in constituting the human mind. Instead, he explains that common notions must be adequate knowledge because they represent common properties in really existing things:

"What is common to all things, and is equally in the part as in the whole, does not constitute the essence of any singular thing" (E2 P37).

"Common notions" are of those properties which are actualised in each instance of all of a type. Since the same general essence exists in every mode, every singular thing is an exemplar of that general essence. We need only know the general nature of any finite mode of thought to know the general nature of thought. Conversely, knowing this essence logically entails that we know the most general nature of any singular thought. In my view, Spinoza endorses a concept of common notions as propounded by Socrates, that is, a 'one over many' which has no meaning if separated from its real instantiations. Spinoza's doctrine of common notions should allow him to supply a defining feature of the mental which is equally true of thought in general and of any finite mode in the infinite intellect.

Spinoza's zeal and commitment in dissolving unnecessary boundaries and showing how all expressions of thought must share a basic nature and interrelate if there are not to be alien pockets of this and that kind of thought in the universe forces us to examine in depth what is involved in a plausible principle of mental holism. We have seen that mental holism entails both self-containedness and all-inclusiveness. The infinity of the infinite intellect (i.e. its condition of all-inclusiveness) entails that all

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8 I believe we can avoid the nominalist-universalist controversy expounded by Haserot (1) pp.43–67. through this approach. Haserot denies Spinoza a nominalist view on many counts, and Bennett, who believes that if Spinoza talks in terms of properties (Bennett p.39) and natures or essences (ibid. p.302), Spinoza's text cannot be given an entirely nominalist reading. Aristotle commends Socrates for not separating off, as Plato did, a transcendent Form or eternal idea as a 'one over many, separated' (cf. Fine, Gail). In my view (and as is agreed by classical scholar David Sedley) Spinoza's doctrine of common notions resembles the Socratic 'one over many', in contra-distinction to Platonic and Aristotelian views. For Plato, essences existed ante rebus, 'before things', i.e. before being in some inferior way exemplified in actual existents. For Aristotle they were abstractions, universals known post rebus – after things. For Socrates, 'forms' do not exist ante rebus, that is, before there are actual existents for the ideas to be 'of', but are in real things. For Spinoza, essences must also exist in rebus, in actual things, for universals "do not exist nor have any essence beyond that of singular things" (CM 2, VII). Spinoza's nominalism is not, therefore, inconsistent with a rational universalism.
human inadequate (partial and perspectival, mutilated and confused thoughts) together
with whatever common notions we have and the deductions we are able to make from
them, are in God/Nature-thinking. It also entails that God/Nature-thinking must
contain any other finite-mind thinking there is. But the dimension of all-inclusiveness
is not just a question of reconciling differently modified mentality in differently
modified instances of substance. Spinoza's principle of mental holism requires a
further reconciliation, for God/Nature-thinking has another, and apparently
incompatible, logical dimension. Because it is, as was explained in §1.1, 'the mind
of God', it is also all truths, that is, all the "true" thoughts which agree internally with
their objects - "A true idea must agree with its object" [E1 A6]). The infinite intellect
is thus at once both causal thinking principle and its effects ("the whole natura
naturata"). These diverse logical dimensions of thinking (i.e. all truths and all-
inclusiveness) should cohere. We need to see if, or how, Spinoza brings this about.

§ 3.2 In one logical dimension an infinite intellect
is all truths.

Spinoza at times emphatically characterises the perfect or complete mind of God/Nature
in a way which marks it off as distinct from the totality of its parts. This perfect or
complete mind is not ontologically distinct from its modes, for God/Nature cannot stand
outside the totality of thought as a distinct existence. We have seen Spinoza's denial
that God overviews Nature "like a spectator at a play" (CM 2 iii). The viewpoint I
wish to demarcate is therefore less a view of 'how God knows Nature' than a view of
'how Nature knows itself' in one logical dimension as the complete intelligence of the
universe, the set of all truths of all objects. Barker objects that an infinite intellect
cannot split itself from the totality of its modes in this way since it cannot empty its
mind of its other knowledge. He considers Spinoza's doctrine incoherent, for 'the only
way in which we can have both finite minds and an infinite or omniscient mind is by
taking them as distinct existences, and Spinoza could not do this' (Barker 1 p.118).9
I have said it is my thesis that serious anomalies arise from Spinoza's attempt to square

9 Taylor thinks that the only coherent omniscient first principle is to be found in Descartes's transcendent
the mental characteristics of finite modes with those of an infinite mind, and that these anomalies ultimately undermine his principles. However, I believe the principle of holism survives this first test. I think it is possible for the infinite intellect as all truths to be a logical, not an ontologically distinct aspect of God/ Nature's mind, as I try to show below with help from established commentators. Nevertheless, while not interpreting this entirely adequate dimension of thinking as different in kind from finite minds, I suggest that its thoroughgoing scope and accuracy removes it as utterly from the human mind as the conventional 'mind of God' entrenched in Western culture and sometimes referred to as a 'God's eye view' or absolute conception.

Craig, whose study The Mind of God and the Works of Man traces the decline of man's vision of himself as aspiring to emulate God, shows how Spinoza converts the traditionally perfect 'Mind of God' into the mind of Nature:–

'The mind that corresponds to the whole of nature ipso facto thinks every thought in full; besides that, it also thinks every thought actively – none of its thoughts are reactions to any states of itself which have any external origin. In full, because for Spinoza to think something in full is to think it along with its causes (or reasons), and this the mind of God inevitably does. For it corresponds to all nature, and nature, as causa sui, contains all its causes. Actively, because it is everything, and therefore there is no external cause to which any of its states could be a passive response' (Craig p.49).

There can be no doubt that Spinoza marks off within the immediate infinite intellect considered as the totality of thought the elite cognitive view of God as all truths which I shall call for brevity the 'ideal mind' and refer to as "God". While the equation God/Nature is intended to forefront the monism claim, the Spinozistic double quotation marks for "God" or "in God" indicate with what difficulty, and what unfortunate effect on his philosophy of mind (I shall argue) Spinoza reorganises the traditional 'mind of God' conceived as all truths. Spinoza accentuates the difference between our intellect and "God's" through an analogy between "the dog that is a heavenly constellation and the dog that is a barking animal" (El P17 S2). He stresses that the intellect "which would constitute the essence of "God" would have to differ entirely from our intellect, and could not agree in anything except the name" (ibid.).
While this ideal mind is undoubtedly picked out by Spinoza as a distinct logical dimension of the infinite intellect, we know Spinoza cannot logically say that the infinite intellect differs "entirely" from our own, since an "infinite" attribute embraces all of its kind. There cannot be an essential nature of thought which is of some kind other than its own partial expressions. Spinoza cannot really want to insist on such a radical distinction as is suggested by the dog analogy, for this would utterly confute the seamlessness of his holistic realm of thought. But he wants us to see the difference between the active, generative or causal and the passive, determined or caused, and between an intellect which is wholly "adequate", unlimited understanding or the set of all "true" propositions, and the thinking of its component part-intellects whose thinking comprises an infinity of thoughts which are largely gappy, confused and perspectival.

We need to clarify further this sense in which God/Nature-thinking has, and, in constituting the human mind, is all thoughts, but is also "God", an intellect incomparably more powerful than our own. Joachim reproaches Spinoza in a similar but less severe way Barker. Whereas Barker believes Spinoza's attribute of thought is threatened with an ontological split between its infinite and finite modes, Joachim isolates a logical distinction which indicates how Spinoza's difficulties with the transition between ideal and finite 'minds' arise. Spinoza's \textit{Natura naturans}/\textit{Natura naturata} distinction is not much examined by Spinoza scholars. But Joachim gives it a good deal of space. He observes that for Spinoza \textit{Natura naturans} must be logically prior to \textit{Natura naturata} (as we have seen from the ordering of Spinoza's arguments from "first cause or God" (TIE §92), to Nature's effects). That being so, says Joachim, it would seem on first blush that \textit{Natura naturans} can 'be conceived without \textit{Natura naturata}, though not vice versa' (Joachim p.67, Note 1). I do not call the ideal cognitive dimension \textit{Natura naturans} (although the contrast this term draws with the finite and inadequate thoughts of Nature's effects in \textit{Natura naturata} seems convenient) since Spinoza explicitly forbids us to do this.\footnote{The actual intellect, whether finite or infinite, like will, desire love, etc., must be referred to \textit{Natura naturata}, not \textit{Natura naturans} (E1 P31). This stipulation endorses Spinoza's assertion in the \textit{Short Treatise} that he will not regard the mind of God as \textit{Natura naturans}, as was the custom of the scholastics, since for them God's mind was "beyond all substances". Spinoza clearly makes the Intellect whose "sole property is
aside, Joachim interestingly affirms that in one logical dimension the infinite intellect does not involve the partial and perspectival perceptions and beliefs of its parts. As ideal mind, "God" is all true and adequate thoughts. I have suggested that we might want to call it the set of all true propositions, or an absolute conception. (McShea suggests 'a master equation, such as is envisaged in the unity of science programme - a single massive tautological statement of every relationship and the formula of every existent (McShea pp.33-4). Spinoza calls it knowing things through their causes (TIE §92) or "from a true or legitimate definition" (§93) or "in their true codes" (§95). In *Ethics* it is knowing *sub specie aeternitatis* (under an aspect of eternity - E2 P44 C2).

Spinoza claims that humans can share in this entirely adequate logical dimension when they have common notions and make deductions from them, that is, when they know adequately through reason, for "It is of the nature of reason to perceive things under a certain species of eternity" (ibid.). The continuum of thought Spinoza postulates is of levels of intelligence or knowledge. The Spinozistic Mind of "God" cannot transcend this, but it can maximally express all adequate ideas. Adequacy should, clearly, be uniform wherever it occurs, either in Whole-mind or part-mind, for one thought cannot coherently be more complete than another complete thought. This consideration implies that the infinite intellect conceived as ideal just knows more things completely than we do.

But the epistemic situation is not that simple. Spinoza makes clear that "God" (ideal mind) knows not only all particular existences in thought and extension but all the modes of any other attribute there might logically possibly be:-

"I say of an object that really exists, etc., without further particulars, in order to include here not only the modes of extension, but also the modes of all the infinite attributes, which have a soul just as much as those of extension do" (KV Appendix 2 §9).

This dogma brings home to us that human knowledge is limited *in its subject matter* with regard to the number of attributes known: its knowledge is radically incomplete to understand everything clearly and distinctly at all times" a mode of *Natura Naturata* (KV 1 viii and ix). Thus I do not think we can assign the set of all true propositions to *Natura naturans*.

11 Curley's translation, but 'aspect' seems to render *species* better.
because whole sets of common notions are missing from human minds.

Further, although as seen the existence of other attributes does not affect Spinoza's theory of mind, since the mind-body relation only involves the attributes of thought and extension (Chapter 2, Note 4) the super-human scope of an ideal mind regarding *possibilia* gives it a unique view of Nature, and may seem to put up barriers to Spinoza's intentions regarding a seamless transition from Whole-mind to part-mind. Finite-mind understanding encompasses only possibilities expressed in conditional a priori claims constructed on the basis of the common notions – these comprising our only sure knowledge and "the foundations of our reasoning (E2 P40 S1)." An ideal intellect, on the other hand, knows infinite possibilities with respect to all possible attributes and all possible particulars. While there is some dispute among Spinoza scholars over whether, for Spinoza, all possibilities must be actualities (since Spinoza posits only real things) it is standardly acknowledged that he thinks that what appear to us contingencies are possibilities when conceived by a ideal, all-knowing intellect, and what we conceive as possibilities may or may not in fact be so:

"I call singular things contingent insofar as we find nothing, while we attend only to their essence, which necessarily posits their existence or which necessarily excludes it" (E4 D3).

"I call the same singular things possible, insofar as, while we attend to the causes from which they must be produced, we do not know whether those causes are determined to produce them" (E4 D4).

We humans just do not know whether a certain imagined effect is possible, or what real possibilities may be postulated of any singular thing. Thus it seems our knowledge of common notions take us only so far in being able to make deductions. (I do not think Spinoza believes that the deductions we can make from our common notions are in principle limited, for he says that "Whatever ideas follow in the mind from ideas that are adequate in the mind are also adequate" [E2 P40]). But our knowledge of causes is certainly limited, whereas "God" (ideal mind), in knowing the multiple and complex truths of the events which would allow or preclude any event, is the truth of any possible object. For example, it is the true ideas of my grandchildren in so far as they will or will not exist. If they will exist, they exist now within some set of codes
and raw material. Similarly, "God's" true idea of a particular apple will be the complete fact about, or total history of, a particular apple: that is, everything that could be known about it in terms of causal connections, including its provenance and the truth of what future apples will or will not grow from its seeds; how their progeny would make out as apple-orange hybrids, etc. Spinoza emphasises that to know a thing truly is to know its causes:—

"The knowledge of an effect depends, and involves, the knowledge of its cause" (E1 A4).

Knowing "under an aspect of eternity", without part–mind limitation, involves – not withstanding any other implications of knowledge beyond time and place this expression may encompass – a thoroughgoing knowledge of the etiology of any particular, including causes of future potentialities. This is not a knowledge of future causes in the sense of pre–vision, but in the sense of knowing particular essences completely – knowing their causal trajectories as made possible by their inbuilt dispositions–to–power, or "the laws inscribed in these things, as in their true codes". If something happens in Nature it happens because a predisposition for it to happen was built into its essence. This is as true of our 'decisions' or 'freely chosen judgements' (as we suppose them to be) as of those events in Nature which seem to go against Nature for some special purpose and which we call miracles (E1 Appendix [11]; TTP Ch.VI.). Nothing happens contingently.

We should note here, however, that while God/Nature is the sole "free cause" (E1 P17 C2) it does not act arbitrarily. Although "God is the [internal] efficient cause of all things which can fall under an infinite intellect" (E1 P16 C1), "there is no cause which prompts God to action except the perfection of his nature" (E1 P17 C1). Consequently, "God's intellect, will and power are one and the same" (E1 P17 S2).

In my view, a perfect knowledge of possibilia sets the ideal mind of "God" apart as a supreme and omniscient view as effectively as does Descartes's conception of God's intellect as 'supremely great and infinite .. immeasurable' (4th Meditation. CSM 11 p.40). The entire view of Nature under an aspect of eternity is distinct from our own. "God" conceived as ideal intellect knows all finite extended objects, all finite
(singular and partial) thoughts, and all modes of all possible other attributes as they exist in full causal context and in relation to all other modes. This view not only constitutes a way of knowing mode interrelationships too complex for a finite mind to conceive, but encompasses aspects of knowledge (e.g. possibilities and other attributes) unavailable to finite minds.

That said, the logical distinctness of this view only damages the principle of mental holism if it can be shown that ideal and finite minds cannot plausibly co-exist in one domain of thought. And nothing we have said so far prevents an infinite intellect, having all knowledge of all possible things, from being partially expressed by part-minds which know nothing at all of some things; only general truths (with deductions made from them) about two kinds of things, and very many randomly experienced qualia of those two kinds of things. Spinoza does not, anywhere, suggest that human beings are microcosms of the macrocosm, that is, models in miniature, identical in every respect, of a whole mind. In this respect the principle of mental holism is not thus far ruptured.

However, Spinoza is obliged to show how all parts can be related to the whole, and it is this thesis which gives him trouble, as we see shortly.

Remaining for the moment with the infinite intellect conceived as all truths, I believe a further important corollary is to be drawn from Spinoza's conception of a true idea as agreeing with its object. While the infinity of the attribute of thought ensures that a set of true thoughts is not to be contemplated as a certain number of thoughts, the adequacy (completeness) of a true proposition entails that there can be only one "true" thought about any object. How could an idea be the complete, adequate idea of a thing and yet there be another true idea of it as well? "For to have a true idea means nothing other than knowing a thing perfectly, or in the best way" (E2 P43 S). A true idea (i.e. agreeing with its object) is, in being also adequate, the complete idea of its object (i.e. everything that is true of it in terms of its "particular affirmative essence" [TIE §93] – what it, as an individual mode, can neither be nor be without – and having regard to its existence as a singular thing grounded and modified in substance (TIE §101) relative to all other modes, and in full causal context. Spinoza
seems to acquiesce in the Scholastic definition of truth as the conformity or likeness of
the thing and the intellect, denoting "the agreement of an idea with its object, and
conversely" (CM 1 vi, C p.312). In his first text Spinoza\textsuperscript{12} envisages a system of true
ideas each unified with its object:–

"Between the idea and the object there must necessarily be a union,
because the one cannot exist without the other. For there is no thing of
which there is not an idea in the thinking thing, and no idea exists unless
the thing also exists" (KV 2 xx Note c10, C 1 p.136).

"But it should be noted here that we are speaking of such ideas as
necessarily arise in God from the existence of things, together with their
essence, not of those ideas which things which now actually present to
us or produce in us. Between these two there is a great difference.

For in God the ideas arise from the existence and essence [of the
things], according to all they are – not, as in us, from one or more of the
senses (with the result that we are nearly always affected by things only
imperfectly and that my idea and yours differ, though one and the same
thing produces them in us)" (ibid.)

The second part of this Note has huge significance for Spinoza's doctrine of different
representation in infinite and finite modes of thought, and much more is said on this in
Chapter 5. The variety of mutilated and confused thoughts is infinite, and no finite
mind ever knows itself adequately. Joachim aptly contrasts the 'infinity of
completeness' with the 'indefinite infinity of the finite' (Joachim p.113). It may
additionally be noted that we can only make sense of Spinoza's stricture that when we
think we know the truth of a particular object (e.g. an apple, or the way the phases of
the moon affect tides) our notion does not, in fact, "agree" with it, if we admit that our
idea is correct as far as it goes, in other words, is an inadequate (incomplete) idea.

Yet it might seem that even an ideal intellect could not have just one true idea
of an object if there is no logically necessary relation between diverse descriptions
which seem to refer to different objects. It seems that in such cases there would be
two or more distinct ideas which have to be seen to converge. Venus and the Morning

\textsuperscript{12} The doctrine which makes God and the things he thinks One, and allows for a manifestation of the finite
in the infinite) is non–scholastic, and common to any of the cabalic cosmologies familiar to Spinoza (see van
Rooijen), also Jacob, Runes, Müller and van Rooijen. The matching of ideas and objects due to God's true
knowledge of objects is also scholastic. Spinoza's thesis may be read as an interface of these notions.
Yet "God's" true idea of whatever it is we designate by those descriptions is necessarily that 'whatever-it-is'. It is not obvious that the idea of 'the first man on the moon' is logically necessarily united to Neil Armstrong, whom we take to meet that description, since (we suppose) a different man could have been the first man on the moon. But we can see how there is only true idea about this if we return to our example of the apple. We would expect that if (say) a first apple existed it must be the very one that "God", conceived as ideal intellect, knows, not only because "God, God's intellect and the things understood by him are one" (E2 P7 S) but because there cannot be a true, complete idea of the origins of the apple without inclusion of that first apple-element in the flux of its organic development. As in this case, and in the case of my (possible) grandchildren, an ideal intellect is the true idea of the interrelations between modes which dictate that, as a matter of natural law, Neil Armstrong must instantiate firstness-on-the-moon — if, in fact, that was the case. The logical connection between apparently different ideas having the same referent object lies at the level of perfectly true knowledge. If our idea that Neil Armstrong got there first is false, because the truth is that someone else got there first, then that truth, too, is a matter of agreement of an idea in the infinite intellect of the causes which made that other person's firstness-on-the-moon inevitable.

I shall be in a position to explain in more detail why there can be only one true idea of any object in Chapters 4 and 5 above, when we fix the defining characteristic of thought for Spinoza. Yet I believe we can see now that only a single strictly "true" set of ideas (logically distinct from the infinite intellect as containing all thoughts) can explain the cryptic assertion that

"All ideas, insofar as they are related to God, are true" (E2 P32).

For the laconic Proof to this reads,

"For all ideas in God agree entirely with their objects and so they are all true, q.e.d."

The Proof refers us back to the axiom which says a true idea must agree with its object.

It is a central claim of my thesis that Spinoza sustains this doctrine of pairing ideas with their objects (i.e. that there is an idea of everything and that nothing exists
without there being an idea of it, including other ideas) only in the case of true ideas.

In this dimension the infinite intellect is the set of true thoughts of all objects, and manifests a one-to-one mapping of facts, mental and physical. I call this the 'pairs' or 'unions' doctrine. The logical aspect of the infinite intellect which we distinguished as 'infinitely complete' enjoys only adequate knowledge of itself, and Spinoza clearly preserves this quasi-traditional 'Mind of God' dimension of the infinite intellect:--

"Its sole property is to understand everything clearly and distinctly at all times. From this arises immutably a satisfaction infinite, or most perfect, for it cannot omit doing what it does" (KV 1 ix, C p.92).

I believe this is the model on which Spinoza's thesis of complete idea-object agreement is built and which, as an ideal, culminates in the thesis of "the intellectual love of God" of Ethics Part 5. It is what Spinoza himself is most concerned to enjoy. He only considers it worth striving for because adequate and inadequate thoughts are on an interrelating continuum, expressions of a unified system of thought. Generally, however, humans experience their world "from the common order of Nature" (E2 P29 S and C), or in so far as their thoughts "are related only to the human mind" (E2 P28), or "in relation to a certain time and place" (E5 P29 S), or perspectivally. Since finite minds are partial expressions of God/Nature-thinking, the infinite intellect is in an all-inclusive dimension all thoughts.

As noted above, the relation of a part mind to the Whole-mind causes problems. This is not because the infinite intellect is all there is in the thinking kind, so that any existing mentality must be an expression of it. This aspect of the principle of holism (self-containedness with all-inclusiveness) is not damaging to Spinoza's thesis. We may also readily accept that an ideal intellect has a true (scientific or objective) view of, for example, my idea of the sun (i.e. its "particular affirmative essence" or [sive] its "true or legitimate definition"). But if the entire infinite intellect is all possible thoughts we must also accept that it includes my particular thought in its experiential existence. While the infinite intellect is in one dimension the complete and entirely accurate view of Nature delineated above, in another dimension God/Nature conceived as the substance of finite minds not only knows, but is, the full phenomenological
compliment of any mental event (that is, its qualitative experiential features). It is the understanding of that singular (finite) mode of thought, not only as it exists and has interrelationships with all other modes in the infinite system of modes (the knowledge-in-full-context inaccessible to finite minds), but as it views the world from its own perspective, that is, as God/Nature "constitutes the essence of the human mind" (E2 P11 C). God/Nature is, in this dimension, omni-perspectival.

This thesis gives rise to two pressing problems. We have to understand how all our thoughts, adequate and inadequate, just are partial expressions of "God's" ideas of our bodies. Since God/Nature is claimed to be the minds of all natural things, these mental states must not only be parts of God/Nature's infinite intellect, but must be fragments of those very ideas which are "God's" true ideas of our bodies. Spinoza is not just saying that our inadequate ideas have something in common with "God's" true ideas: any human state of mind is a fraction of "God's" idea of our body. We address this confusing issue immediately, in §3.3. The second anomaly is that the very same Whole-mind which is all truths is also all-inclusive. The problem this gives rise to is that an intellect which is all truths must, in being all-inclusive, contain thoughts which are not only fragmentary, but untrue. It is hard to see how the principle of mental holism is not ruptured by the apparently contradictory claim that all truths has parts which are untruths. We examine this further anomaly in §3.4.

§ 3.3 Minds which are parts of an infinite intellect know only in part.

For Spinoza, God/Nature-thinking is all finite expressions of mind, all inadequate thoughts - that is, knowledge conceived as "related only to the human mind" or "in relation to a certain time and place". We finite minds are fragments of mind and we know only in part: our thoughts are generally inadequate in being partial (fragmentary) and 'partial' (perspectival or subjective). Spinoza was unfamiliar with the word 'subjective' as it is currently used. For him, it would simply denote a thought held by a subject. Yet the word 'subjective' properly characterises Spinozistic "singular thoughts or this or that thought" (E1 P2 Proof), "as they are related to the singular mind of someone" (E2 P36 Proof). Singular or particular mental events include, for Spinoza,
all the subjective opinions, beliefs, emotions and sensations of any finite mind: all are modifications of the infinite intellect. In *Ethics* Part 1 Appendix Spinoza talks almost despairingly of the wild variety of possible inadequate thoughts about things:–

"Different men can be affected differently by one and the same object; and one and the same man can be affected differently at different times by one and the same object" (E3 P51). "What seems good to one, seems bad to another; what seems ordered to one, seems confused to another; what seems pleasing to one, seems displeasing to another, and so on. I pass over other notions [modes of imagining] here, both because this is not the place to treat them at length, and because everyone has experienced this [variability] sufficiently for himself. That is why we have such sayings as, 'So many heads, so many attitudes', 'everyone finds his own judgement more than enough ....." (E1 Preface).

There can only be, I have argued, one truth (one complete idea, agreeing with its object), but an infinity of inadequate thoughts may exist about any object. (We discuss the excess of ideas over objects this infinite concatenation of finite ideas undoubtedly produces in §5.4). The immediate problem we have to consider is the tension produced by Spinoza's thesis that any human state of mind is, and only is, a fraction of "God's" idea of our body. The schema of confused and distorted human direction on the world, referred to by Joachim as the 'indefinite infinity of the finite', is a different ball-game from "God's" tidy set of truths, or perfect correspondence with objects, in which there is an identity of idea with object. Yet our thoughts do not have some different nature and content because they are inadequate: they just are distorted versions of their being "in God" as reflections of some state of our body. When we think about some external object the thoughts in our minds are parts of "God's" ideas of states of our bodies, even if they do not seem like that to us – even if they seem to have a content which has nothing to do with our bodies. I shall argue in due course that Spinoza has immense difficulty in reconciling the thoughts God has of our bodies with our face-on thoughts of objects (and of other ideas), but I shall not suggest that Spinoza allows an alternative characterisation for human thoughts. Each human thought just is, for Spinoza, a reflection of, or a function of, a state of the human body, and not an idea of that idea "in God". To recall:–
"When we say that the human mind perceives this or that, we are saying nothing but that God .... has this or that idea" (E2 P11 C).

Despite this clear statement my view requires justification since some commentators, notably Curley (Curley 1 pp.119–126) argue that Spinoza's doctrine is so implausible on this point that the two accounts of our thoughts (i.e. God's ideas and our inadequate mental experiences) can only be reconciled by turning Spinoza's obscure doctrine of "the idea of the idea" (put in Ethics Part 2, in the midst of his exposition of the human mind) into a thesis of self-consciousness. On this reading, human subjective or perspectival thoughts are allowed to be about the idea of their bodies that "God" has. In other words, a finite mind is only conscious if and when it has an idea about its own mind (that being "God's" idea of its body). Read this way, our inadequate thoughts form the rudimentary elements of a psychology. It would be convenient to have recourse to this interpretation, since it would allow human ideas merely to exist within the same holistic matrix as the true notion of them as understood by an ideal intellect. However, the reading is not ultimately useful. As Allison observes (Allison p.110 with Note 31, crediting Wilson), if there is in God an idea of every idea, then self-consciousness becomes universal wherever there is a mind (i.e. wherever God has an idea of some extended object). We do not want to think self-consciousness extends to all embodied creatures, perhaps to inanimate modes, so we may not want, after all, to equate "the idea of the idea" with self-consciousness. Barker argues, on the other hand, that it is absurd to postulate reflective knowledge "in God" since there is 'no need or room for it' (Barker 111 p.158). "God's" ideas are adequate and doubt-free.

In my view, the strongest objection to a 'self-consciousness' reading of "the idea of the idea" is that Spinoza's own constraints on the concept of "the idea of the idea" seem to prevent it from being taken as equivalent to awareness of one's own mind, at least in the sense needed to allow human ideas to be different from "God's" ideas of their bodies. Spinoza says that "the idea of the mind, i.e. the idea of the idea, is nothing but the form of the idea insofar as this is considered as a mode of thinking without relation to the object" (E2 P21 S). This characterisation follows the assertion
that "the idea and of the mind and the mind itself are one and the same thing" (ibid.). Hubbeling holds that 'pure thinking without relation to the object' is an 'ego-structure' having a relation to itself (Hubbeling p.36 and p.84). How can this be? The mind being merely its ideas, there is no ego (psyche) to operate or juggle our ideas. Moreover, any relation between ideas that we can apprehend is a relation among representational contents. Taylor quotes Martineau's insight that 'it is not the man who is said to be aware of himself, but his ideas which are asserted to be conscious of themselves' (Taylor p.201). Thus, while a relation between ideas in one mind is necessary for reflexivity – we could not learn without such a procedure – this pedestrian sense of "the idea of the idea" does not confer self-consciousness of the sort we would need to distinguish our experiential notions from "God's" true ideas which have our bodies as their object. In Taylor's view, Spinoza 'ignores' the notion of self-consciousness (Taylor p.201). It seems rather that we might say he postulates a kind of self-consciousness but that it is not what we normally mean by that term, and that we cannot exploit it as we would wish. Lloyd points out, 'the mere presence of "ideas of ideas" does not guarantee consciousness. In this she endorses Martineau's view that

'This idea [viz. of the essence of the body] as a reflex of its individuality, is that of a composite proportioned system [a body], and contributes nothing new to the unity of self-consciousness which repeats itself in every idea' (Martineau pp.299–300).

Bennett also believes that 'There seems nothing left to stop I (I (x) ) [idea of the idea of x] from collapsing into I (x) – i.e. to stop the identity from being so total and unqualified that the "ideas of ideas" terminology becomes idle' (Bennett p.185).

I conclude that while Spinoza's concept of "the idea of the idea" is not idle in that it is vital to the internal generation of ideas conferred by the power of intelligence (discussed in Chapter 6), it cannot be used as a strategy to prevent all human ideas, adequate and inadequate, from being fragmentary expressions of that very same idea which is "God's" idea of a state of our body. I believe it will be confirmed during my later critical examinations of Spinoza's inferences from Whole-mind to part-mind that this characterisation of our minds is all Spinoza gives us; that he wants us to refer to
it at all stages of talk about our own thoughts, and that he gives us no alternative framework for a purely human inadequate and perspectival direction on the world. We have to – as Lloyd in particular exhibits in a thoroughgoing way – explicate all human ideas in terms of their essence as functions or reflections of states of our bodies.

§ 3.4 Some mental events which threaten the holism principle.

We now address the difficulty of how an intellect which is all truths must, in also being all-inclusive, contain thoughts which are not only fragmentary, but untrue. This is our first major confrontation with the tension resulting from Spinoza's extrapolation from an ideal mind to the muddled reality of human subjective and perspectival minds. Joachim suggests that the world our patchy and partial view constructs – our direction on the world – is illusory (ibid. p.112). It must 'be' in God, since 'an illusion must fall somewhere' (ibid. p.113). It cannot be a "negation", having no degrees of reality (ibid. p.111). Spinoza's metaphysic entails that our experiential thought can be nothing other than a part-version of that very same idea which is "God's" idea of a state of our body. Such real parts cannot be illusions. Moreover, I do not think that 'illusion' correctly describes those sense perceptions and other inadequate ways of knowing which allow us successfully to feel our way round the world, and which Spinoza describes as "useful in life" (TIE §20). Our inadequate ideas are functions of bodies rooted in, and inextricable from, the modal system of the extended world. Sense perceptions, imaginings and opinions are real and they constitute information which is necessarily perspectival. It would not, for example, do a bat or a dolphin much good to have our sense perception.

The problem of transition from the complete infinite intellect to the modal system of Natura naturata recognised by Joachim is not only that our ideas seem usually to differ from what they really 'are', but that the set of true thoughts must contain the partly or untrue thoughts. For Barker this is incoherent: in his view the realm of inadequate, finite thought should be as distinct an existence as the realm of all true thought, since even an omniscient mind cannot exist in a state of finite apprehension, emptying itself of its truth (Barker 1 p.118). The significance of a
dimension of untrue thoughts is not that we seem to have come across an expression of thinking which a divine or perfect Mind of 'God' cannot have, for Spinoza has shrewdly recast God's 'perfect' mind as 'complete' mind. The worry is that the notion of truth containing falsehood looks self-contradictory, and so threatens to destroy the seamless continuum of thought Spinoza postulates. Barker takes this line, believing that it is the existence of false ideas in the human mind that seems to make it impossible that that mind should be part of the infinite intellect (Barker 111 p.164). In Barker's view, Spinoza is caught in a conceptual impasse because he has to admit either that the human mind and the infinite intellect (qua all truths) are 'distinct psychical existents', or that the infinite intellect 'is not a psychical existent at all, but an expression signifying the totality of truth' (ibid.) As Barker points out, neither of these suggestions can be acceptable to Spinoza in view of other parts of his doctrine. Barker concludes that on this issue Spinoza is incoherent.

We consider below some modes of thought we consider very 'imperfect', namely error and evil, in order to see if Spinoza can show (i) that these can be fractional aspects of "God's" ideal intellect; (ii) that the two dimensions of Whole-mind and part-mind cohere, and (iii) that the experiential reality of our thoughts is not characterised beyond plausibility. Only if these conditions are met is Spinoza's principle of mental holism, that is, the postulation of a self-contained and all-inclusive attribute of thought in which all thoughts share a basic nature, upheld. For all thoughts to share the basic nature that their being 'all of a kind' dictates, Spinoza must show that "God" is all modes of ignorance and all false notions – for Descartes outrageous mental items to ascribe to God – but vis-à-vis Spinoza's thesis incompatible with the prior concept of the infinite intellect as all truths. Error in matters of fact, including erratic sense perceptions, wrong conclusions and inappropriate or subjectively grounded emotions and opinions (psychological thoughts) are the lot of partial minds. Falsity must, if false notions are to be real, exist in the infinite intellect of God/Nature since there is nowhere

13 By this means he showed, for example, how we could turn the Cartesian view of extension as a 'limitation' which a 'perfect' God could not express (CM I ii, C p.304) to a view of God's non-expression of extension as a limitation (E1 P15 S).
else for such thoughts to be. Yet "God" cannot, by Spinoza's own principles, contain 'negative furniture' (Bennett's term).

We may readily distinguish between error which is mere ignorance, and error which is equivalent to falsity – positive untruth. Yet Spinoza tells us that falsity, too, is not positive untruth but merely privation, lack of knowledge:–

"Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge which inadequate, or [sive] mutilated and confused, ideas involve" (E2 P35).

The proposition above contains two technical terms whose meaning is not immediately obvious to present-day readers. The first is "mutilated". The Latin mutilatio means deprived of an essential part. A mutilated thought is partial: it contains less than is necessary for truth. It is easy to see that shortfalls in understanding are caused by such deficiencies in information. Ignorance is simply failure to know or to 'see' something and to take it into account in our thinking. Spinoza confirms this:–

"The mind does not err from the fact that it imagines, but only insofar as it is considered to lack an idea that excludes the existence of those things it imagines to be present to it" (E2 P17 S to C).

But how can falsity be described as privation? Spinoza agrees that "to be ignorant and to err are different" (E2 P35 Proof), yet he insists that

"There is nothing positive in ideas on account of which they are called false" (E2 P33).

This is what Spinoza must assert for his doctrine of a unified attribute of thought to hold. There can be no positive falsity in a system which is fundamentally true. How can Spinoza defend this claim? There seem to me be three things he can say. The first relies on the technical term 'confusion'. A false notion is a con-fusion or wrong juxtaposition of separately true thoughts. For example, a unicorn is the con-fusion of ideas of a horse, of a horned beast, and of male fertility. There is no 'negative furniture' here, only a bizarre conjunction of positive items. This analysis also accounts for fictions, thoughts of non-existent things. For Spinoza, as for Descartes, some fictions are a merging of two incompatible notions. A conceptual
chimaera is, via an analogy with the mythical animal hybrid of that name (lion's head, goat's body and serpent's tail), a hybrid of logically incompatible thoughts. A square circle and a winged horse are likewise chimaerae, con-fusions of ideas in finite minds, or contradictions (TIE §54). "A chimaera, of its own nature, cannot exist" says Spinoza (CM 1 i). Yet its component parts, such as a square and a circle, or a horse and wings, exist. When Burman protests to Descartes that, 'Since I can demonstrate various properties of a chimera, on your view not even a chimera is going to be a fictitious entity', Descartes replies

'Everything in a chimera that can be clearly and distinctly conceived is a true and real entity. It is not fictitious, since it has a true and immutable essence, and this essence comes from God as much as the actual essence of other things. An entity is said to be fictitious, on the other hand, when it is merely our supposition that it exists' (CSMK p.343).

On this account, it seems Descartes himself will not challenge Spinoza's claim that false judgements do not involve false furniture. Indeed, he says explicitly that

'Considered in relation to God they are merely negations, and considered in relation to ourselves they are privations' (Principles 1, 31).

(We may be encountering here the origins of Spinoza's puzzling term 'in relation to God' which, as we have seen, he transfers only awkwardly from the Cartesian mind of God to the mind of Nature-whole.)

The second explanation comes from Parkinson, who argues that 'every sense-perception may be said to be at least partly true, in so far as it relates to the look of things' (Parkinson 1 p.125). We have many false notions because we take 'the look of things' at face value (ibid. p.123). He includes as an example of this Spinoza's view of the false human belief in its own agency:--

"Men are deceived in that they think themselves free (i.e. they think that, of their own free will, they can either do a thing or forbear doing it), an opinion that consists only in this, that they are conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined" (E2 P35 S).

Parkinson's observation that we take things at face value has profound implications for my thesis. I shall have much to say in Chapters 4 and 5 on the face-value 'content'
of our thoughts, and their failure to match the essential characterisation of thought assigned them by Spinoza. (I do not like using the word 'content' since this implies that some other mental property has the content, but it is not easy to replace this standardly used term. I shall sometimes put it in scare quotes as a reminder that thoughts are not the contents of some mind having them. I shall also have something to say in Chapter 6 on Spinoza's theory regarding our gappy awareness of causal processes, and the "false" conclusions we accordingly draw on the 'free' causes of our own actions.) What we need to note at this stage is that Parkinson's reading of positive falsity as privation is consistent with a conception of mutilated thoughts as real. They may be illusory - "false" as knowledge of their objects - but they must be real thoughts, capturing some facet of the real world. (What else could they represent?)

The third argument for the plausible inclusion of falsity within a matrix of true thoughts explicates, by involving the body as the mode of extension of which the mind is the idea, Parkinson's view. We can have false notions without there being positive falsity in "God" because our limited minds are, under the identity principle, the ideas of our limited bodies. Inadequate or fragmented understanding comes about precisely because our minds (and our bodies) are fragments of substance. False ideas arise as reflections of what is going on in the body. Lloyd interprets Spinoza's cryptic statement that "All ideas, insofar as they are related to God, are true" (E2 P32) by contrasting our inadequate perspective with the view 'in relation to God'. She writes:-

'We begin to see a way through the perplexities if we think through what is involved in an idea being grasped in relation to an individual mind rather than in relation to God' (Lloyd p.50).

Human minds are limited in that their thoughts are functions of states of their (limited) bodies. A common notion is true because the state of the body is in this general respect the same as all other bodies. But when the body has a particular relation with other bodies, the idea will also have particular features. My singular, inadequate notion exists as a function of the relation my body has with the bodies surrounding it:-

'An idea, considered in relation to an individual mind rather than in relation to God just is the direct awareness of body involved in sensation and imagination - the awareness that constitutes, at its most basic level,
the mind as idea of body' (Lloyd p.51).

The radical hiatus I detect in these two perspectives involves long discussions later on how the reality of our inadequate ideas in an ideal intellect can converge on their face-value reality – how we experience things. For the moment I wish only to emphasise that Spinoza's explanation of falsity in finite-mind ideas takes into account the role of our thoughts as reflections or functions of our bodies.

Spinoza knows he cannot supply a definition of the mental if there are rogue thoughts which will not 'cohere' in the infinite intellect because they are of some radically alien kind. I have argued that the ideal mind of "God" (all truths) can be seen as a distinct logical dimension which provides the doctrine of identified pairs of ideas and objects without being ontologically split off from the infinite intellect as all-inclusive (i.e. containing all possible finite thoughts.) We can consider this last 'indefinite infinity of the finite' to be a distinct logical dimension of all un-truths without drawing the (absurd) conclusion that these parts are ontologically separate from the whole of which they are parts (or else are, as Joachim says, illusions). Yet none of the exegetical explanations may dissuade us from thinking that evil actions originate in positively evil thoughts. Can Spinoza show that these thoughts can exist in the mind of the whole of Nature when they could not possibly be elements in the traditional 'Mind of God'? He has to confront the real fear of his contemporaries that external, devilish influences causally influence our thoughts. Descartes takes seriously (for the sake of his readers' beliefs, at least) the notion of a 'malicious demon' which intrudes thoughts into our minds. He does not suggest what manner of thinking thing might constitute the demon's wicked mind, but it has no place in God and can have no victory over God (1st Meditation CSM II p.15). Spinoza's deflationary attitude to the traditional conflict between good and evil is quite startling for his day. He dismisses devils as fictions in the early Short Treatise, and does likewise with evil in Ethics:

"As far as good and evil are concerned, they also indicate nothing positive in things, considered in themselves, nor are they anything other than modes of thinking, or notions we form because we compare things to one another" (E4 Preface).
This explanation is in line with Joachim's belief that the world we posit is illusory. Joachim plausibly dismisses, in my view, what we take as 'our own convenience, our likes and dislikes, our arbitrary fancies' as misrepresentations of the universe based on deficiencies in our knowledge (Joachim p.169). But, more surprisingly, he accepts 'the iniquities of the criminal or the horrors of putrefaction' as examples of our turning 'this private world into the Reality', and making ourselves the victims of illusion' (ibid. p.170). In my view, the 'iniquities of the criminal', at least, are not easily trivialised as a matter of taste. Spinoza himself denounces the brutal activities of 'the mob' (E4 P54 S; E4 P58 and the Political Works, passim). Yet Spinoza does believe that 'sin' is a human fiction (E1 Preface; E4 Preface; CM 2 iv; CM 2 vii) and, in his last works, where he principally addresses the causes of social and political disharmony and prejudice, he shows graphically how evil attitudes are real, natural, and positive, yet inadequate ideas. They are the ideas of bodies striving to survive:–

"Each individual thing has a perfect right to do everything it can, in other words, its right extends to the limits of its power. And since the supreme law of Nature is that everything does its utmost to preserve its own condition, and this without regard to anything but itself, everything has a perfect right to do this, i.e. to exist and act as Nature has determined it to do. Hence, if anything in Nature seems to us ridiculous, absurd or bad, this is because we know things only in part, being almost entirely ignorant of how they are linked together in the universal system of Nature; and because we wish everything to be directed in conformity with our own reason" (TTP Ch.xvi, Wemham p.127).

However, when one of Spinoza's correspondents presses him on "whether stealing, in relation to God, is as good as being just" Spinoza makes two distinct replies. First, he rephrases this question as "Whether the two acts, insofar as they are something real, and caused by God, are not equally perfect?" and answers this by saying that "if we consider the acts alone, and in such a way [as "following necessarily from God's eternal laws"] it may well be that both are equally perfect" (Letter 23, C p.389). Then Spinoza frames a different question:–

"If you then ask 'Whether the thief and the just man are not equally perfect and blessed?' then I answer 'no'. For by a just man I understand one who constantly desires that each one should possess his own ... this
desire necessarily arises in the pious from a clear knowledge which they have of themselves and of God. And since the thief has no desire of that kind, he necessarily lacks the knowledge of God and of himself, which is the principal thing that makes us men" (ibid.).

I find this answer contradictory, both internally and with regard to Spinoza's first answer that the two are "equally perfect". Spinoza's claim that "the supreme law of Nature is that everything does its utmost to preserve its own condition, and this without regard to anything but itself" and that men 'are usually envious and burdensome to one another' (E4 P35 S) does not cohere with the view that understanding God/Nature leads us to be "just" and want each to possess his own. And neither view coheres with Spinoza's assertion that there is no evil – that the very idea of evil is a confusion:—

"Knowledge of evil is inadequate knowledge .... From this it follows that if the human mind had only adequate ideas, it would form no notion of evil" (E4 P64 and C).

I believe this apparent equivocation is due to the perspective shift to which I have begin to refer, namely the switch from the metaphysical account to the perspective of ordinary experience. Spinoza's metaphysical thesis shows clearly enough that there is no scope in the infinite and unified matrix of thought for any thought to be positively false or evil. Any attempt to argue that false or evil thoughts have positive being reintroduces the myth of the malicious demon: for if thoughts are not generated within some universal natural matrix of thought where do they come from? It is Spinoza's thesis that any conceptual difficulty in seeing that apparently positively evil thoughts are natural and neutral elements in a single domain of thought are nothing to the anomalies generated by trying to conceive them as existing outside it. But while this holds, internally to his metaphysic, it does not help to make his account of evil tenable.

For Spinoza seems to me to converge on evil thoughts from two perspectives. He supplies one account (call it view 1) which is metaphysical, grounded in what must, truly, be the case, given immutable conditions regarding the determined nature of thought. The other account (call it view 2) seems to address the notion of evil we humans just do have, as specific thought content. Seen this way, Spinoza seems to accept that we include evil thoughts in our battery of psychological mental events
because we do think they are real (and really evil) features of human nature. The confusion in the mind of the man who (for example) guns down innocent strangers is, on view 1, not positively evil because that man is doing what comes naturally to him (or because he does not consider his victims innocent), while on view 2 his thoughts are not just confused, but plain and positively evil.

In discussing evil I have spent even more time plastering over the cracks which are appearing in Spinoza's Whole-mind to part-mind continuum of thought than was necessary in the case of falsity. However, I am not going to accuse Spinoza (yet) of failing to extrapolate successfully from the Whole-mind of God/Nature to certain specified inadequate thoughts. For there is today no consensus on what constitutes evil, or whether 'evil-doers' are to blame for their deeds. Liberal or psychological lobbies often claim mental confusion or naturalistic explanation. Moreover, when an 'evil act' is so repellent to us that we can scarcely credit the human mind with conceiving it we want to say it is *not* evil, but pathological – that is, reflecting, or caused, by a disturbed body state. Therefore, although we have found anomalies in the form of false and evil thoughts, I believe an element of doubt that there is positive falsity or evil allows Spinoza's principle of mental holism (for the time being) to stand. It is the task of my thesis to show that Spinoza does not achieve the smooth extrapolation from this ideal scheme of *all truths* to the muddled reality of human subjective and perspectival thinking. To that end I shall argue in due course that the defining characterisation Spinoza assigns any mode of thought throws up further anomalies in the form of specific content which does not answer to one or more elements of that defining characterisation, and that his principle of mental holism is thereby ultimately undermined. But this cannot be shown yet.

However, while Spinoza's principle of mental holism presently survives intact, we may be left worrying, as I have suggested earlier, that the most convincing argument for it rests on explanation through the body. This would seem to fly in the face of Spinoza's intention to make the mental an autonomous explanatory domain:

"As long as things are considered as modes of thinking, we must explain the order of the whole of Nature, or the connection of causes, through
the attribute of thought alone. And insofar as they are considered as 
modes of extension, the order of the whole of Nature must be explained 
by extension alone" (E2 P7 S).

Taylor voices concern that we cannot get to a human individual in Spinoza's thesis 
unless we make reference to the body, and that 'Spinoza himself habitually neglects to 
observe his own rule that the modes of each attribute are to be explained exclusively 
by reference to other modes of the same attribute' (Taylor p.203). We have seen that 
Allison's and Lloyd's accounts of Spinozistic perception and cognition concentrate on 
the mind as the idea of the body in order to give a characterisation of thought which 
runs seamlessly from God/Nature-thinking as all ideas of objects to human minds as 
ideas of a specific object (a body) interacting with its environment. Allison believes 
the best way to avoid absurdities and inconsistencies in Spinoza's doctrine of mind is 
to make intelligence or 'mindedness' a function of organic complexity (Allison pp.110– 
111). Lloyd has explained above how 'the capacity of the human body to retain traces 
of modification [by other bodies] makes possible both error and the formation of the 
common notions of reason' (Lloyd p.106). But by this means we seem to have 
explained error, falsity and evil – at least partly – through the body. Have, we, 
thereby, crossed a Spinozistic conceptual and explanatory barrier?

As Taylor observes, Spinoza himself makes constant reference to the workings 
of the mind as reflections of states of particular body. Some dozen years after Ethics 
was drafted Spinoza responds to Schuller that human understanding is limited to 
"those things which the idea of an actually existing body involves, or 
what can be inferred from this idea. For the power of each thing is 
defined only by its essence. But the essence of the mind consists only 
in this, that it is the idea of a body actually existing. Therefore the 
mind's power of understanding only extends to those things which this 
idea of the body contains in itself, or which follow from the same" 
(Letter 64).

It is clear from this delineation of the essence of the human mind that Spinoza does not 
think that the modes of one attribute involve the concept of 'no other attribute'. Were 
we to deny that explicating human thinking involves the concept of the body–states 
with which modes of thought are correlated, we would not be describing Spinoza's
Spinoza's thesis entails interdependence of the attributes in the following sense, pointed out by Barker:

'Thinking and knowledge, as we actually experience them are directed upon an objective world and depend upon it for their content and existence, while conversely the only extended world known to us is that with which we become acquainted in perception. The doctrine of the complete independence of the attributes is simply not true as regards the only two attributes with which we are acquainted, taken as we actually experience them' (Barker 1 p.101).

I shall argue in Chapters 4 and 5 that logical interdependence of the attributes holds at the level of the set of all truths. Moreover, I think the account of mind which involves talk of the body's functioning positively reinforces both the autonomy and the identity principle by accentuating a union or complementing of diverse properties of 'mind' and body. God's perceptions of objects do not exist without objects, and our perceptions could exist without our bodies and without external objects to perceive. An explanation which allows for a logical dependency of the mind on the body does not conflict with Spinoza's claims (i.e. reduce the mind to body, or allow the possibility that thought has its origins in body) unless it constitutes a causal explanation through body. We shall grasp the force of Spinoza's ban on causal explanation through body when we examine his principle of independent mental causal power (in Chapter 6), and see how he assimilates the relation of logical implication (logical grounds, or reasons, for an effect) with that of causality itself. Neither Allison nor Lloyd offers a causal explanation, and I believe their explanations of our thoughts as functions of our bodies precisely echo Spinoza's own chosen mode of explanation.

I propose that, having taken note of the degree of argument needed to defend the principle of mental holism, and carrying forward an awareness of a fresh tension in Spinoza's theory of mind - namely his inference from what must be true of an infinite intellect which is all adequate and true ideas of Nature to what must be true of the human minds said to be its partial expressions - we now move on to the first stage of fixing the defining features of Spinozistic thought.
CHAPTER 4

PRINCIPLE OF MENTAL FORMAL BEING

I have argued that the principle of mental holism exposes the roots of what I have suggested will generate a fatally damaging tension for Spinoza's theory of mind, namely his extrapolation from what is true of an infinite intellect which is all adequate and true ideas of Nature to the inadequate ideas of minds which are parts of it. In Chapter 4 we examine what is involved, for Spinoza, in assigning mental formal being. We find that the formal being of any Spinozistic mode of thought (i.e. its exclusively mental nature) consists in its 'being' as an "idea" in the infinite intellect of God, all "ideas" being units of intelligence and immediate judgements. We finally examine Spinoza's claim that all our inadequate ideas are properly characterised as cognitive judgements.

§ 4.1 Definitions and Formal Being.

For Spinoza, fixing the "formal" being of a thing is a stage in furnishing a real definition. A real definition "explains a thing as it is in itself outside the intellect"; that is, "it is solely concerned with the essences of things or of their affections" (Letter 9). This kind of definition is to be contrasted with a nominal or stipulative definition which states what a certain word or term will be taken to mean. Spinoza uses both kinds of definition, but usually (eventually) unpacks his stipulative definitions to show that they are intended to be real, or "good" definitions. He tells his earliest pupils that "to be called perfect, a definition will have to explain the inmost essence of a thing, and to take care not to use certain propria in its place" (TIE §95). Descartes's definition of thought as immediate 'awareness' must exemplify for Spinoza the use of an isolated proprium to define thought, since Spinoza believes there are thoughts which express no conscious awareness.\(^1\)

Since the function of a real definition is to fix an essence,\(^2\) the definition must

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\(^1\)\textit{Thought}: I take this term to include everything that is within us in such a way that we are immediately aware of it' (Def.1, 2nd Replies, CSM 11 p.113).

\(^2\) Spinoza's conditions for fixing an essence match two of four scholastic definitions of an essence noted by Hubbeling (Hubbeling p.21). He retains those only those concerned with real things. An essence corresponds to some actual existent (\textit{essentia in re} - in a thing). It is the inmost nature of a thing - \textit{natura sive essentia} (El P36 Proof). Spinoza also claims essences to be definitions or 'quidditities' (i.e. answers to
include all elements of what a thing is (E2 D2). That which a thing can neither be without nor be conceived without is largely represented by its "formal being", but not entirely. Further essential elements will need to be added, for "Being" (esse) is not equivalent to "essence" (essentia).

The term "formal being" is a piece of Cartesian and scholastic technical terminology which Spinoza does not reject or adapt. It affirms the Cartesian element in Spinoza's theory of mind which he deliberately retains, believing it necessary for the preservation of mental irreducibility. For Descartes, existence formaliter signifies how a thing is to be described according to definition (2nd Replies, CSM 11 p.114):

"The nature of an idea is such that of itself it requires no formal reality except what it derives from my thought, of which it is a mode (i.e. a manner or way of being (3rd Meditation, CSM 11 p.28).

In the 6th Meditation Descartes says he is an essentially thinking thing because no other thing but thought is included in defining 'my soul, by which I am what I am' (CSM 11 p.54). Following Mersenne's criticism that in Meditations 'no distinct idea of mind' had been given (Objections 1 and 7, 2nd Objections, CSM pp.88 and 91), Descartes defines thought as 'immediate awareness ... so as to exclude the consequences of thoughts; a voluntary movement, for example, originates in a thought but is not itself a thought' (2nd Replies, D1).

For Spinoza, as for Descartes, thought is "formally" mental:

"The formal being of ideas admits God as a cause only insofar as he is considered as a thinking thing, and not insofar as he is explained by any other attribute ... " (E2 P5).

Here Spinoza affirms that thought is not dependent on any other thing but itself for its existence or explanation, and that all modes of thought have essentially mental "formal being" or "reality". Thus for both Descartes and Spinoza a mode of thought is, formally, a mental episode or event. However, this consensus of view does not get

Quid sit? – What is it?): essentia seu definitio (E1 P33 S1). He rejects essences ante rebus (before things exist, as ideas or Forms), or post rebus (after the things, as abstractions). The two defining features of an essence accepted by Spinoza are embedded in E2 D2, linked by a disjunction: an essence is "that without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived, and which can neither be nor be conceived without the thing" (E2 D2). The second leg of the Definition reflects Spinoza's belief that a true definition expresses the essence.
us far towards a definition of thought; indeed it may mislead us, if other stipulations concerning formal mental being are not clarified. This was the thrust of Mersenne's objection that 'no distinct idea of mind' had been given. Descartes had asserted mental formal being without conferring on it any defining feature. We saw that Spinoza had difficulty in justifying his claim of an all-inclusive attribute of thought without recourse to explanation through the mind–body relation, and in characterising thought I believe Spinoza also somewhat overestimates his capacity to account for the formal being of the mental without at all involving the concept of the physical. However, his motivation for asserting such explanatory independence for the mental becomes clear enough in the following paragraphs: he wants his readers to put aside their preconceived or Cartesian views of the relation of mind to body (involving causal interaction) and start afresh on the project of characterising thought:

"... prejudices can easily be put aside by anyone who attends to the nature of thought, which does not at all involve the concept of extension" (E2 P14 S11).

Bennett translates formaliter by 'inherently', which accentuates the assigning of formal being as fixing that in which a thing inheres (its inmost nature). However, as noted, we should not take 'inhering in' to imply that some other property underlies extension and thought, for

"no third thing is necessary here which would produce the union of body and soul" (KV 2 xx Note 10, C p.136).

The essential properties of thought and extension are the sole constituents of mind and body, and the union of mind and body results solely from their own natures. Nor should we forget that thoughts are the attribute. I suggested in §2.2 (and I think my thesis will affirm, firstly through Spinoza's limiting of all modes of thought to "ideas" as shown in §4.2 below, and later by testing the capacity of Spinozistic 'idea–selves' to be subjects having thoughts, and also to be the objects of thought) that Spinoza has no place for a mental thing equivalent to soul–substance in which thoughts are embedded, or which 'has' ideas. That said, Bennett's point is helpful in reminding us that formal

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3Bennett follows Anscombe and Geach in Descartes: Philosophical Writings. (Note 1, Bennett p.154.)
being does not wholly define thought. It only stipulates the basic or inherent nature of a (principle) attribute, which is one necessary element of the definition.

The formal essence (inmost nature) of a thing is immutable (5th Meditation, CSM 11 pp.44–5) and cannot be redefined without the thing also being removed. For example, if a thing defined as thinking is redefined as physical, then the thinking features have been reduced away. The thing is no longer mental. It was noted that explaining error and evil as ideas reflecting bodily states does not redefine them as body. Their mental formal being remained unassailed.

Spinozistic thoughts differ in their mental formal being from Cartesian thoughts since they are fragments of God's intellect. In the first place, we know the thing in which the mental inheres differs primarily for Spinoza from Descartes in being an attribute rather than a distinct substance. Human minds are neither individual substances nor fragments of an immaterial substance. I argued in §2.2 that Spinoza does not just unite in one substance and rename as 'Nature' the very same attributes distinguished by Descartes, but eliminates that which makes thought a separate substance, namely the soul-thing or 'stuff' in which Cartesian thoughts inhere. Where Descartes claims to make nature intelligible by eliminating through a rational natural philosophy the occult properties hitherto believed to operate in nature, Spinoza agrees but believes that immaterial thinking substance falls within the scope of this enterprise.

For Spinoza, mental formal being involves no mystery. Indeed, his project of defining the human mind largely involves deflating Cartesian supernatural paradigms. I think this will be as apparent regarding his characterisation of any mode of thought as it has been respecting his conversion of the formal being of thought from an immaterial substance to an attribute of a single entity. He readily admits to adopting the ideal of human understanding initiated by "that most distinguished man" – Descartes (E5 Preface), which ideal consists in deduction from clear and distinct ideas, undeniable axioms. He acknowledges that Descartes has revolutionised the method for 'rightly conducting one's reason and seeking truth in the sciences' (Subtitle to Discourse on the Method (CSM Vol.1 p.111) by urging a rejection of preconceived notions in favour of first principles which are not subject to doubt. But he believes Descartes
unnecessarily perpetuates certain mysteries regarding the nature of God and the nature of thought (and also, as is mentioned later, the function of force in extension.) For example, Descartes claims that certainty about his existence allows us

'to achieve full and certain knowledge of countless matters, both concerning God and himself and other things whose nature is intellectual, and also concerning the whole of that corporeal nature which is the subject matter of pure mathematics' (5th Meditation, CSM 11 p.49).

Yet he acknowledges to Mersenne that because the eternal truths of mathematics are knowable by us, those mathematical truths are less 'something less than, and subject to, the incomprehensible power of God' and that 'our soul, being finite, cannot comprehend or conceive [God]' (Letters May 1630, CSMK p.25). For Spinoza the truths of mathematics just are "God's" thoughts: "God" is equated with eternal truths, not superior to them. If we get our mathematics right, we know "God's" mind (E1 Appendix).

There are further obscurities in Cartesian philosophy which Spinoza struggles to eliminate, not always successfully. Cartesian intuition, for example, seems more to resemble the light of faith than the light of reason. It is not clear that Spinoza makes use of (though he shows in Ethics Part 5 that he yearns for) a direct intuition of essences through Cartesian 'natural light'. Difficulties in interpreting Spinozistic intuition will not be dealt with in my thesis, and discussion of the mind–body relation does not require that they should, since the general natures of thought and extension are common notions. Spinoza certainly re-invents the Cartesian common notion, turning it from an 'eternal truth which resides within our minds' (Principles 1, 49; CSM p.209)\footnote{Spinoza claims that "The greatest striving of the mind, and its greatest virtue, is understanding things by the third kind of knowledge [intuition]" (E5 P25). Yet knowledge of particular affirmative essences is barred to us. As Bennett suggests, it seems we cannot make use of intuition (Bennett p.369) although Spinoza claims it as a human "kind of knowledge". Parkinson says, 'as far as epistemology is concerned the differences between the second and third kinds of knowledge are hardly worth much emphasis' (Parkinson 1 p.188), but adds that Spinoza's views can be reconciled if Ethics is taken as saying that very many things can theoretically be known by intuitive knowledge, and TIE as saying that what Spinoza has succeeded in knowing in this way is very little (ibid. p.189). But see Lloyd on Spinozistic intuition (pp.107–110).}

\footnote{The examples Spinoza gives of human intuitions in the TIE and E2 P40 S2 are general mathematical truths, common notions. Yet in E5 P36 C Spinoza says that intuitive knowledge of singular things is much more powerful "than the universal knowledge I have called knowledge of the second kind", and that "the best conclusion is drawn from some particular affirmative essence or [sive] from a true and legitimate definition" (TIE 93). Although common notions are axiomatic, undeniable, they are reason, "knowledge of the second kind." But "knowledge of the second and of the third kind is necessarily true" (E2 P41).}
to knowledge of a common property which must logically necessarily exist. Lloyd contributes to the assurance that, for Spinoza, common notions are not Cartesian flashes of divine light, by explaining how Spinozistic 'perspectival awareness is radical' because Spinoza's common notions do not reach individuals in a different way from inadequate thoughts, but are anchored in our status as the ideas of particular bodies (Lloyd pp.45–6). All perceptions, true and false, are functions of our bodies' ability to bear traces of other bodies with which they interact. Common notions are not intuitions for Spinoza, but are classified by him as "reason" (E2 P40 S2). Where Descartes distinguishes between 'innate' (inborn) ideas and those which are 'adventitious' (acquired by experience), we have seen that Spinoza holds that all ideas are innate in the sense of being necessary parts of the mind, so this distinction is demystified and collapses. As seen in §3.1, innateness has no special relation, for Spinoza, to truth.

Spinoza's intention to eliminate doubt, mystery and obsolete assumptions is typified by his use of geometrical–style proofs. These are based on axioms which are themselves propositions or theorems subject to rational deduction. He expounds Descartes's Principles in this 'manner familiar to the geometricians' (Meyer's Preface, C p.227), supplying a Demonstration (Proof) for each Proposition or theorem as a Euclidean test, and hinting that fewer things surpass our understanding than Descartes supposes, given different foundations for the sciences (ibid. p.230).

Given this commitment to de-mystifying the mental, it is not surprising that Spinoza aspires to analysing the first principle of intelligence. He finds it incoherent to suppose that the principle of all thought is itself unintelligible, as Descartes's remarks above suggest (although it is relevant to recall that, there, Descartes was addressing the Catholic theologian Mersenne). Spinoza wants to halt the Cartesian practice of what Allison describes as using God as 'a place where the explanatory buck stops, as it were' (Allison p.48). Spinoza argues that while we cannot achieve adequate cognition of particular affirmative essences, we can comprehend the sort of infinite understanding of connections in Nature such perfect cognition would involve. Singular existences are too complex for us to comprehend in detail, but they are not known in some super-human way. "God", he believes, does not have a different kind of mind from our own:
§ 4.2 All modes of thought are ideas.

Spinoza, being at pains to avoid an accusation of providing 'no distinct idea of mind', explains to his pupils why thought, conceived absolutely, is explanatorily empty, and why it is that we have to define the essence of thought through its modifications. De Vries had written to him about a group worry:—

'I reported what you, Sir, said, ... that the intellect can be considered either under thought or as consisting of ideas. But we do not see clearly what this distinction would be. For we think that if we conceive rightly, we must comprehend it in relation to ideas, since if all ideas were removed from it, we would destroy thought itself' (Letter 8).

Spinoza replies that "thought" has indeed no meaning unless understood in relation to concepts, which cannot be "put aside" from thought. He comments, "It is no wonder that when you have done this, nothing remains for you to think of" (Letter 9). In fixing a definition of thought Spinoza therefore chooses a designation which expresses as well as possible, given the inadequacy of vocabulary (TIE §96; E1 P16 Proof) the mental features he considers indispensable for any possible mode of thought.

Up to this point in my thesis we have, in order to avoid distraction from Spinoza's basic claim that the mental is an autonomous and self-explanatory attribute of a single entity, and that all possible mental modifications share a common or general thinking essence, described Spinozistic mental modes loosely as 'thoughts'. We have also seen that the power of the mind is "intelligence" and that human minds are parts of all "intellect". But Spinoza's definitional term for any mode of thought is "idea" (E2 A3; E2 P11 C). Spinoza defines thought in terms of "ideas" : there are no modes of thought which are not "ideas". Descartes, in all his later works at least, makes ideas just one mode of thought (Ds 1–2, 2nd Replies, CSM 11 p.113):—

'I make it quite clear in several places throughout the book [Meditations]

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During the early seventeenth-century 'ideas' were a topic of widespread scholarly dissension. The strict conception of 'Ideas' as Forms became confused by reference to 'images' or 'phantasms' imprinted on the brain as 'phantastick ideas', and by the emergence of the vague use of the word 'idea' in conversation to mean anything conceived in the mind (Michael p.32). An 'idea' could mean equally an incorporeal eternal truth (Form) or an image in the corporeal imagination. Descartes in a sense returns to Platonic usage.
... that I am taking the word 'idea' to refer to whatever is perceived immediately by the mind ... I used the word 'idea' because it was the standard philosophical term used to refer to the forms of perception belonging to the divine mind' (3rd Replies, CSM 11 p.127).

For Spinoza, all modes of thought are (in his special deflationary sense) "divine" in being partial expressions of "God". It is, I surmise, because all thoughts are aspects of "God's" thinking, and "God" has (as ideal mind) only intellectual ideas, that all finite modes of thought must have a basic nature of intellect, too. This does not stop them, for Spinoza, from being (usually) inadequate.

Spinoza's conception of an idea is, in containing in its full implications his entire philosophy of mind, the topic of this and the next two Chapters. The thesis of formal mental being which we are currently examining is only the first of the essential elements of a Spinozistic "idea". For the rest of this section we scrutinise Cartesian strictures on the use of the concept of 'idea' which Spinoza collapses because he believes Descartes misunderstands the nature of the mental, and because, for Spinoza, understanding the mental means seeing all instances of it as the expression of "God's" thought. We have already seen that (1) Spinozistic ideas do not inhere in an immaterial substance, and that (2) that any mode of thought at all is an "idea".

3. For Spinoza, all ideas, that is, all the modes which Descartes calls 'thought' (and more, since Spinoza includes sensations and emotions which are not always, for Descartes, wholly thought) are conceptions and/or perceptions. Spinoza uses "conception" and "perception" indiscriminately in his texts.\(^7\) I believe that the tension created by Spinoza's extrapolation from Whole-mind (all ideas) to part-minds is encapsulated in his Definition and Explanation of "idea":-

"By idea I understand a concept of the mind that the mind forms because it is a thinking thing" (E2 D3). "I say concept rather than perception, because the word perception seems to indicate that the mind is acted upon by the object. But concept seems to express an action of the mind" (E2 D3 Exp.).

\(^7\) It is sometimes claimed that Spinoza contrasts active "conceptions" with "passive" perceptions, but this distinction cannot be pressed hard. In E2 P48 he makes all ideas "conceptions", and in E2 P49 Proof Spinoza equates concept with idea (conceptio sive idea), whereas in the TIE he classifies all kinds of knowledge, adequate and inadequate, as "perceptions" (TIE §19).
As claimed earlier (§3.2) a traditional 'Mind of God' must be a set of active concepts. I have argued that Spinoza never renounces this dimension of "God" as all truths, and in this dimension ideas are typically concepts, disseminated throughout Nature as concept-fragments. On the other hand, God/Nature considered as all-inclusive must contain mental events which are passive, confused, and for Descartes scarcely mental or not mental. Viewed this way, all human ideas will typically be perceptions. Lloyd has shown how all human ideas have a basis for Spinoza in perception because all, including our (adequate) common notions are grounded in a direct awareness of body (Lloyd p.106). Thus, for Spinoza, it has to be right to call human ideas both conceptions and perceptions, and on grounds of the all-inclusiveness of the attribute of thought it has to be right to call the constituents of "God's" mind both conceptions and perceptions, too.

Whereas Descartes unpacks thoughts into categories which include quasi-mental events (Principles 1 §48) all Spinozistic ideas are strictly mental. Descartes does not regard perceptions, which are for him non-intellectual faculties, as purely mental, and uses sentire, to sense, rather than percipere, to perceive, for image-seeing and sensation, neither being a 'necessary constituent of my own essence, that is of the essence of the mind' (6th Meditation, CSM 11 p.51). The 'passions of the soul', for example, 'differ from all its other thoughts' in being 'caused, maintained and strengthened by some movement of [animal] spirits' (Passions 1 29, CSM 1 p.339). For Spinoza all ideas, whoever or whatever has them, and whether conscious or unconscious (we discuss this below) are perceptions and conceptions.

Descartes defines an idea as the mode of thinking occurring 'whenever I express something in words, and understand what I am saying' (D2, 2nd Replies, CSM 11 p.113). Such ideas are not necessarily true; they are merely clearly perceived (Principles 1, 46). In Spinoza's view, this is one of several Cartesian philosophical tangles resulting from Descartes's urge to confer soul on humans, alone of all created species. Humans alone have language: and without language, says Descartes, there is no reason, and 'no intelligence at all' (Discourse Part 6, CSM 1 pp.140–141). Genuine language is a 'sure sign' of the presence in humans of a wholly non-physical thing,
namely a rational soul (Letter to More, 5 February 1649, CSMK p.366). Like Descartes, Spinoza believes we can lucidly utter received banalities or outright falsities. But Spinoza points out that words can *come apart from ideas* and that at times we have to ignore or substitute them to grasp what is in the mind, because words positively mislead. He says, for example, that there was no positive mental error in the man "whom I recently heard cry out that his courtyard had flown into his neighbour's hen, because what he had in mind seemed sufficiently clear to me" (E2 P47 S). Further, vocalising is in itself not mental:

"For the essence of words and of images is constituted only by corporeal motions, which do not at all involve the concept of thought" (E1 P49 S11).

This point is made merely in order to emphasise that for Spinoza there is no necessary connection between language and ideas, and that his designation "idea" covers a spectrum of mental events which includes registerings of the world unlinked to language. Yet his radically non-Cartesian thesis of ideas as the common currency of all possible thinking confers on all these modes of thought a character of *cognition* (idea or cognition – E2 P20). All expressions of God/Nature-thinking are ways of knowing, no matter how mutilated or confused. Descartes finds it absurd to suppose that all thoughts are cognitive:– 'No act of awareness that can be rendered doubtful seems fit to be called knowledge' (2nd Replies, CSM 11 p.101). Spinoza's thesis is that our minds just are the ideas we have – what we know. There is no element of 'mind' that is not knowledge. For Spinoza ideas (cognitions) are of three kinds, expressing inadequacy (partiality) or adequacy (completeness) on a scale of 1–3, of which "the first kind", which Spinoza calls collectively "opinion or imagination" is "the sole cause of falsity" (E2 P41). It includes dreaming, which is "sheer imagination" (Letter 17). But imagination is, like the second kind (reasoning) and the third kind (intuition – immediate apprehension of truths [see Note 6 above]), a kind of knowing. Spinoza never mentions any ideas other than those of his three kinds of knowledge. I mentioned in §2.2 that this condition for formal mental being supports the claim that

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8 TIE 88ff; TIE 96; E2 P18 S; E2 P47 S; E2 P49 S11.
there is no soul–stuff over and above ideas, or mental 'thing' having ideas.

Barker, who, as seen, thinks Spinoza must postulate mental stuff, admits that if thought is essentially cognitive Spinoza is stuck with the absurd claim that mental stuff must be true or false (Barker 1 p.121). I believe it is now apparent that the characterisation of mental formal being as soul–stuff or thing inherited by Spinoza from the notion of Cartesian immaterial substance no longer operates. Since all modes of thought are necessarily ideas, and ideas are necessarily members of cognitive categories, it is evident that 'soul' of either a Cartesian or Neoplatonic kind cannot be a Spinozistic property. I also suggested (in §4.1) that while formaliter is importantly translated as 'inherently', modes of thought inhere in nothing beyond themselves. If we do not accept that ideas are solely cognitions we shall have to isolate and label some other mental property which 'has' the ideas. Spinoza supplies no clue to such an enterprise:–

"When we say that the human mind perceives this or that, we are saying nothing but that God, not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he [it] is explained [or displayed] through the nature of the human mind, or insofar as he constitutes the essence of the human mind, has this or that idea" (E2 P11 C).

It is clear that the Barker–Odegard worry over making human thoughts merely mental states or events embodies a concern that this will in some way dissolve the formal being of ideas. Both are concerned that cognition does not, alone, properly characterise Spinoza's robust essential property of thought. However, it is not clear what role an additional existential property of thought would have, over and above the mental formal being of ideas as cognitions/judgements, in preserving mental irreducibility. If our (essentially mental) ideas are caused only by a self–generated and self–empowering system of idea–creation, having no causal link with the processes of extension, the autonomy and irreducibility of the mental is not assailed. My claim that all Spinozistic ideas are instances or part–expressions of "God's" cognitions, and that no aspect of Spinozistic mentality requires a characterisation of mens as soul–stuff or soul 'thing', will be further defended in Chapters 5 and 6.

4. Besides being necessarily cognitive, Spinozistic ideas are necessarily
immediate judgements or beliefs (affirmations or denials).\(^9\) Having an idea is, for him, sufficient condition for the making of a judgement. For Descartes, acts of judgement are only one kind of thinking. Descartes accounts for error by separately classifying the will involved making judgements: a thought does not, for him, become an idea until the will has acted upon it:

'In order to make a judgement, the intellect is of course required since, in the case of something which we do not in any way perceive, there is no judgement we can make. But the will is also required so that, once something is perceived in some manner, our assent may then be given. Now a judgement some kind of judgement at least – can be made without the need for a complete and exhaustive perception of the thing in question, for we can assent to many things which we know only in a very obscure and confused manner' (*Principles 1*, 34, *CSM* p.204).

Spinoza's doctrine of ideas as immediate cognitive judgements is iconoclastic. We saw the origins of his commitment to the view that the will and intellect cannot come apart in Chapter 1. "Will" cannot lie outside Nature, therefore the 'will' taken by Descartes and Aristotle to be an independent power is "no thing in Nature, but only a fiction" (*KV 2*, XVI 4). "The will and the intellect are one and the same" (*E2 P49 C*) because "God" makes (is) all immediate judgements and our 'minds' are finite and determined fractions of that thinking power. Spinoza thus denies the two traditional stages of firstly entertaining a thought and then, secondly, confirming or denying a proposition concerning it. We do not have, he says, the power of suspending judgement. The ideas we have are those we are determined to have:

"Inadequate and confused ideas follow with the same necessity as adequate, or clear and distinct ideas" (*E2 P36*).

Much hangs on the term "follow" used here, and separate argument is needed to show that ideas are internally caused, and cause one another. Spinoza's principle of independent mental power is fully discussed in Chapter 6. Here, we need register only that *we cannot withhold judgement*. Our choice of what ideas to have is a necessary product of our internal natures and all the external factors that, in combination,

\(^9\) Judgement: Parkinson pp.102 and 180; Hampshire p.74. Affirmation: Donagan p.46. Belief: Allison p.88. Allison says he follows Bennett, but Bennett does not explicitly state this view of ideas.
determine that this idea, and not that idea, will occur to us. For Spinoza, to have a mode of thought is to make, consciously or unconsciously, a judgement. (For Descartes we cannot make judgements unconsciously. I discuss this difference of view shortly.) For Spinoza, if we think of a winged horse, for example, we perceive and affirm or deny that idea in one and the same apprehension (E2 P49 S3 Bii). Affirmations and denials are equally perceptions: there is no mode of thought which is, for Spinoza, undetermined or in its own being an error or a doubt, a suspension of judgement or a piece of utter indifference. While disbelief is positive judgement, what we call doubt, or "vacillation" consists in the holding of two contrary imaginings or opinions, "now this one, now that" (E2 P44 S). Each of these inadequate ideas is equally, in turn, a judgement made: the setting forth of an argument involves 'now this belief, now that'. This process goes on within the little network of our own 'mind' when we "vacillate". Should someone say they are indifferent to the outcome of a particular issue, that is in itself a judgement on the issue.

To summarise, we have seen that the formal being of a Spinozistic "idea" differs from the Cartesian model in the following respects:

1. In its formal being as an expression of an autonomous attribute of a single entity, rather than as an immaterial and divine substance.
2. In characterising any mode of thought at all (conscious or unconscious, perceptual or conceptual, and including emotions and sensations, as an "idea".
3. In being necessarily cognitive. All Spinozistic modes of thought (adequate or inadequate, true or false ideas) belong to some "kind of knowledge".
4. In being an immediate judgement or belief (affirmation or denial). No separate act of will operates, when we have an idea, to make it a judgement.

Spinoza categorises all perceivings, knowings, decidings, sensations and feelings, as immediate cognitive judgements which are elements in a single internally determined mental ordering. I propose that this characterisation of formal mental being is a direct result of his rejection of Descartes's starting-point for fixing the nature of human thoughts (i.e. in his own awareness), and of his alternative project of extrapolating to what any thought must be from the concept of All Thought, which is both God/Nature
(all-inclusive) and "God" (all truths). The prima facie astonishing claim which this thesis entails (i.e. that all human thoughts are judgements) is tested in §4.5, after we have established the logically prior principle of mental formal being "in God"

§ 4.3 All true ideas have formal being as units of knowledge, judgements.

I do not think that in the case of an infinite intellect considered as omniscient and "perfected" knowledge it is hard for Spinoza to justify calling all thoughts "ideas", and all ideas immediate cognitive judgements. Descartes would have done the same. This short section therefore principally endorses the claim of §3.2, that is, 'In one logical dimension an infinite intellect is all truths', by stressing that the set of true propositions, the truth about Nature, is a set of infinitely true and infallible judgements. As we saw in that delineation of a distinct logical dimension of the infinite intellect, such a set of true propositions is obviously 'ideal' in being all complete or adequate ideas, which are "true" in agreeing with their objects. There is a true and adequate (complete) idea of any object, thinking or extended. The true idea, in agreeing entirely with its object, will be the "perfect" (complete) judgement, that is, everything that could be known about it. To know a thing truly is, as we have seen, not only to know its essence and precise existence, but to know its causes. Since "God" knows things under an aspect of eternity, knowledge of causes will involve every relevant causal connection within the entire system of modes. Finite minds cannot make judgements of this completeness about particular objects. But they can conceive of an ideal intellect constituting infinite – limitless and also timelessly true – judgements.

An eternal truth is plausibly immediately known, with no second stage of judgement. We do not suppose an ideal intellect to dither in its judgements – to weigh up contrasting notions or consist in a multitude of conflicting ideas – although of course it will do so in its other dimension of infinity as all-inclusiveness – the ideas of all its modes. If all the ideas in which it consists agree with their objects there is no room for doubt or emendation of ideas following reasoning or reflection (as noted by Barker, above §3.3). The ideas of this ideal dimension of the infinite intellect express the laws of Nature and, as we have seen, it is self-contradictory to suggest a law can override
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a law. If they are truths they are truths under any circumstances.

The most general set of true judgements is equivalent to a statement of the most
general laws of Nature (e.g. all bodies function through motion and rest). Less general
ideas are statements of the instantiation of laws of some modes of Nature (e.g. water
freezes at 32°F or 0°C at sea level). As we saw in §3.2, there also exist true
judgements of all singular occurrences, each of which is a

"particular affirmative essence" (TIE §98), "and at the same time [drawn]
from the laws inscribed in these things, as in their true codes, according
to which all singular things come to be, and are ordered' (TIE §101).

Not surprisingly, Spinoza does not supply an example of this kind of fact, since true
and adequate judgements of particulars are not available to finite minds. As noted
(above, Notes 4-5) the only examples Spinoza gives of intuition – supposedly ideas of
particular essences and existences – are general mathematical truths, common notions.

This set of judgements (or laws and instantiations of laws) is what we would
want to call scientific truth, judgement existing without the limitation and alteration
brought about by subjectival perspective. It is a unified system of ideas in which there
is no ignorance, no confusion, no vacillation, no contradiction and no perspectival bias.

It represents for us the ideal to which we aspire with respect to physical events. We
see in Chapter 6 that Spinoza also claims that a set of true judgements of all mental
events necessarily exists, and that we can aspire to knowing some of its more general
laws (the 'laws of logic' – Allison p.128) and some of those less general ones related
only to human minds, and can infer from these conditional truths about particular ideas.

§ 4.4 Are inadequate ideas, having the same formal being as adequate ideas,
necessarily units of knowledge, immediate judgements?

I believe we can accept Spinoza's claim that "in God" (i.e in an infinite intellect
conceived as ideal) all ideas would be necessarily cognitive, and immediate judgements.
However, it was argued in Chapter 3 that if examples of thoughts could be found which
did not share the same basic nature, the possibility would arise that some thoughts are
physical, or of some other kind. Spinoza is clearly aware of this threat to the coherence
of an attribute asserted to be infinite (self-contained and inclusive of all in its kind).
His conferring on all modes of thought the defining designation of "idea" is meant to avoid the Cartesian hiatus between modes of thought which are pure intellect and those which are will (capable of overriding intellect); and between these modes of thought and sensations, perceptions and emotions which have some input of body.

Spinoza has asserted that all modes of thought are ideas (E2 D3), and that all ideas are immediate affirmations or denials (E2 P49 S3 Bii). For his extrapolation from the set of true facts of an intellect conceived as all true and adequate immediate judgements to follow seamlessly throughout the modes of Natura naturata which are partial expressions of that mental formal being (and ipso facto for his principle of mental formal being to hold) Spinoza must demonstrate that immediate judgement is inseparable from thinking in any finite mode of thought, that is, in any familiar mental event - the kind of thought we have when we take the world on face value. Can Spinoza show that all "singular thoughts or this or that thought ... as they are related to the singular mind of someone" are immediate judgements? He says that "an idea is called true when it shows us the thing as it is in itself, and false when it shows us the thing otherwise than it is. For ideas are nothing but narratives, or mental histories of Nature" (CM 1 vi, C p.312).

An ideal mind is the true history of Nature. Human minds spin their own narratives of Nature. While we may be inclined to accept Spinoza's claim that many of our inadequate ideas are judgements, it is not intuitively obvious that all mental events are instant judgements - or judgements at all. Some seem brute impressions. They may be instant registerings of the world but they do not seem to be judgements. (We are not at this point concerned with the truth of ideas as judgements of objects, although it is obvious that many of these partial accounts of Nature fail to agree with objects. Representational content pertains to a further Spinozistic principle which we discuss in Chapter 5.) The question asked in the present discussion is merely 'Can all human ideas be plausibly said to have the mental formal being Spinoza assigns them?' My yardstick is that this or that inadequate idea is an instant judgement or belief in its raw, face-value aspect, as a way of knowing through the "common order of nature". I
shall argue that while Spinoza's claim has more going for it than might at first be supposed, he cannot successfully make the move he wants from "God's" knowledge to the knowledge of the minds said to be its parts, for his claim that all human ideas are cognitive, instant judgements is not sustainable.

Spinoza claims that we cannot stop ourselves making judgements. If we think, we affirm or deny. Descartes himself does not claim that judgement is always a second stage following the entertaining of a proposition, for he waives this second act of will in the case of knowledge by 'natural light', since with regard to clear and distinct ideas there is no question of doubt or confusion. Curley points out that whereas an 'image' is not apt to be affirmed or denied, if any clearly perceived idea is already a proposition, then it is a statement about something before (according to Descartes) a judgement is made about it, and that original statement was an involuntary affirmation or denial about something (Curley 2 p.173). Curley argues that there are other cases of involuntary human judgement which Spinoza might have invoked to refute Descartes by showing that 'belief is not a voluntary action, not something that we decide to do, but something that happens to us' (ibid. p.178) – like flashes of divine light. He claims, for example, that no-one thinks we always choose what to believe, which is why 'heterodox opinions are not a proper subject for legislation' (ibid. p.163).

Dreaming, Donagan points out, is the strongest proof we could have that affirming or denying ideas 'depends on your power to form ideas, and not on a power of will independent of it' (Donagan 2 p.47). Dreaming is passive:

"When the body is at rest in sleep, the mind at the same time remains senseless with it, nor does it have the power of thinking as it does when awake" (E2 P2 S[i]).

While the concept of unconscious ideas is for Descartes a contradiction in terms, I think dreaming may be seen as a paradigm case of unconscious ideas which are instant or involuntary judgements. Even if we find it strains belief to call the fantasies of our dreams 'judgements', I believe the examples given below show these mental events to be so akin to subliminal thinking that at least some dream–ideas must be accounted such. Spinoza recounts a nightmare which was so vivid that for some time after waking
he still believed "a certain black, scabby Brazilian whom I had never seen before" was standing in his room (Letter 17). His unconscious idea persisted into consciousness. The probability of involuntary belief-formation under conditions of insensibility is strongly suggested by current legislation against the transmission of subliminally received messages in films and television advertising. Unconsciously-made judgements may be hard to shake off even after being confronted with reliable evidence. For example, our experiences while dreaming may be so graphic that, as in the case of Spinoza's image of a visitor, they linger for a while as beliefs. More sinisterly, attitudes insinuated while minds are dulled by brutality, narcotics or passion may result in beliefs sustained for a lifetime (e.g. that it all right to kill members of this or that ethnic group because all are lazy, deceitful, and so on). No reflection or 'holding before the mind' has taken place in the case of such judgements.

It is Spinoza's thesis that we are at times put in mental bondage by past unconscious judgements. Descartes gives an analogous example of his own 'special inclination to love' 'persons with a squint', deriving from his early passion for a young girl of his own age who was slightly cross-eyed. But for Descartes this compulsion has a physical cause. He believes a fold was made in his brain by the initial experience, and its tendency to be folded again in the same manner was deepened at each reinforcement of attraction to 'persons with a squint' (Letter to Chanut 1647, CSMK p.322). Spinoza makes this syndrome a purely mental one: an unconscious idea about cross-eyed people has been stored in the (mental) memory. For Descartes memory is physical, not the store of "imaginings" it is for Spinoza (E3 P2 Sii). Spinoza believes imagination can deceive; hence such tricks as false projection of emotions, and false associations of ideas. But it is a purely mental operation, and, for him, a form of judgement.

I believe some defence can be offered for this view. For if the retained impressions of past ideas are physiological states, it would seem that, for Descartes, myriad notions we use daily in a cognitive fashion also lack essential mentality. Without this store of memories (unconscious judgements) we would have to consciously 're-have' each of the thoughts involved in any chain of thinking. For example, I would
not be able to talk philosophy or politics with you while I ironed or drove the car, because I would have to think consciously all the time about what I was doing (press collar first etc.; change gear, look in mirror etc.). If, by drawing on these mental impressions, and working on them, and sometimes using them as sound reasons for action, our minds operate rationally, we can scarcely submit that they are not instant judgements. We surely want to say that, in being held 'at the back of our minds', and interacting intellectually with present judgements, these past ideas are indubitably and irreducibly mental – and judgements we could not help making. They cause our present ideas and are part and parcel of the conditions of consistency and rational coherence which make it reasonable for us to assert things.

Spinoza further argues that we may mask our original judgements by "feigning" or denying them. He claims that words can express views we do not truly affirm:–

"Although I know that the earth is round, nothing prevents me from saying to someone that the earth is a hemisphere and like half an orange on a plate, or that the sun moves around the earth, and the like" (TIE §56).

It is Spinoza's general view, as we have seen, that words and meanings can come apart. We can say one thing while believing another: judge, then disavow our judgement:–

"Those who confuse words with the idea, or the very affirmation that the idea involves, think that they can will something contrary to what they are aware of, when they only affirm or deny with words something contrary to what they are aware of" (E2 P49 S11).

"We cannot feign, so long as we are thinking, that we are thinking and not thinking ... or, after we know the nature of the soul, we cannot feign that it is square, though there is nothing that cannot be put into words" (TIE §58).

Spinoza is arguing that judgements are instantly and internally determined, but that they are not necessarily overtly asserted. We can dissemble or lie, or we can keep silent. We may deny a belief for reasons of expediency, as Galileo publicly disavowed his belief that the sun was circumnavigated by the earth. In the case of self–deception a spontaneous idea is quickly suppressed. On the other hand, it is incoherent to speak of someone as saying—in–their–heart what they do not think is true. That would be
a contradiction – at once a belief and a denial.  

Certainly we conceal powerful emotions which may aptly be described as instant judgements. Emotions or "affects" are, for Spinoza, purely mental states, having no physical input of motion through animal spirits as they do for Descartes. They interact with our adequate ideas (and may, as we see in Chapter 6, be turned into rational emotions) just because they are ideas, on a continuum with all other ideas:–

"So we maintain that knowledge is the proximate cause of all the 'Passions' of the soul" (KV 2 ii [4] C p.99).

For Spinoza, affects are judgements of imagination – instant appraisals of people and situations. They may infiltrate our arguments in the form of ad hominem judgements – emotions masquerading as reason. Such mental states may be near-unconscious, the speaker unaware of these judgements made 'in his heart'. Yet under conditions of sleep or near-unconsciousness words and meanings do not come apart, but coincide, for it is known that when the mind is all-but senseless its cognitions or judgements – including acknowledged feelings – are freely released on questioning. Our tendency to make genuine utterances under such circumstances (or our inability to dissemble) is readily exploited through hypnosis or the mind-numbing processes of torture.

Sense perceptions, too, are for Spinoza instant judgements. We may deny our brute impression in the light of further knowledge, he says, but making it was an involuntary and inevitable result of our (perspectival) view of the world. Our "imaginings" (ideas of images) are instant and, Spinoza points out, it is possible to live a lifetime making only such confused judgements (E1 Appendix 111; E2 P18 S), never "emending" them through reason. For Spinoza, to take our sense-perceptions neat is not to reason, but it is, nonetheless, to make judgements. (Lloyd, as seen, argues that all human ideas are versions of sense perception.) Sensations are not classified by Descartes as ideas, although sense 'perception' is, for him, a mode of thinking. Yet in my view it is hard to distinguish the 'sensations' of animals from many of the confused judgements made by humans. Descartes would not deny this: he thinks 'common

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10 This point is made by Delahunty (Delahunty p.9), and Curley (Curley 2 p.177), crediting P.Geach (Mental Acts) for the technical concept 'saying-in-one's-heart'.
sense' is barely thought at all. For both philosophers the senses sometimes convey
indispensable information, sometimes data which is prejudicial to true judgement (E1
Appendix; E2 P40 S1). Descartes blames this only too easily acquired and often
deceptive information for intellectual errors (1st Meditation, CSM pp.12-13), since it
is taken as truth. It seems he does therefore regard as instant judgements at least those
sense perceptions which do battle in our minds with rational, considered judgements,
for these sensations clearly have interplay on an intellectual continuum. Thus
Descartes's claim that sensations are not a 'necessary constituent of my own essence,
that is of the essence of the mind' begins to look doubtful, and Spinoza's claim that
sense perceptions are instant judgements, less outlandish.

There is also a prima facie case for pain as immediate judgement. For Spinoza,
pain is an emotion – a kind of sadness – and therefore, like all emotions, amenable to
rational emendation. Even if pain does not strike us as immediate judgement, we may
later think it was an instance of cognition having a vital place in the causal network of
our beliefs and desires. My pain has causal effects on later ideas (e.g. I subsequently
have the idea of staying in bed, or going to the doctor). By applying reason to my
pain-idea, I may see that others do not go to bed when they appear to have this
kind of pain. I may then think about the circumstances of my pain. It is certainly
to be hoped that my pain-idea has, as a judgement or belief, intellectual clout within
the network of beliefs and judgements of my doctor, for a doctor's report on my body-
state cannot be logically sufficient for the truth of my mental pain.

There is, then, something to be said to support Spinoza's view that "the will and
the intellect are one and the same" – that there is no slippage between having an idea
and making a judgement. But while we may concede that sense perceptions and
emotions, including pain, are mental awarenesses or registerings of the world, do we
think they are properly called judgements? Many sense perceptions are raw feels or
passive impressions which we only reflect upon, for example the 'Ouch!', which causes
the later judgement 'That hurt'. Some emotions, too, cannot be construed as opinions.

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11 Descartes uses this term in an Aristotelian way, that is, as a 'common sensorium' or faculty by which
the soul discriminates between the perceptions of the senses (6th Meditation, CSM 11 p.59).
They may affirm or deny nothing. They may conceivably be *caused* by ideas but they themselves lack cognitive or judgemental quality. Depression, for example, is a state of mind which hardly seems to be a judgement about anything. And if it is not, at face value, a judgement, then we have found a loophole in Spinoza's thesis.

We have found, perhaps in more instances than we thought possible, that the human ideas we have examined have been immediate judgements. But if we find just one ordinary thought which is not an instant judgement then Spinoza fails acceptably to characterise our inadequate ideas. His principle of mental formal being will not act as a control on a shared basic nature for all thoughts, but will collapse.

There is more to say before drawing this conclusion, and it involves recalling Spinoza's exhortation that we should try to understand our thoughts through reason, since "It is of the nature of reason to perceive things under a certain species of eternity". We cannot hope, he says, to understand our ideas if we look at them as they occur "from the common order of Nature". Here we come up against the same problem we had in Chapter 3 with falsity and evil. I suggested there that Spinoza made us converge on evil thoughts from two perspectives, for while on the one hand he addressed the notion of evil we humans just do have, on the other he asked us to look at evil thoughts metaphysically. It is easy (following the lead of Allison and Lloyd, in particular) to make use of the form of explanation we employed at the end of Chapter 3. Emotions can readily be perceived as judgements through the metaphysical picture Spinoza believes we can grasp if we remember that "The idea of the human body is composed of these many ideas of the parts composing the body" (E2 P15 Proof). Inadequate ideas just are "God's" judgements about body–states as that body interacts with its environment. Sensations can readily be seen as the intelligence of our direct bodily interactions with our surroundings. We have come close to merging the ideal and the experiential perspectives in the case of pain, when we cannot help thinking about our body. When we have a pain our idea is directly of our body. We can also conceive depression as the idea (in "God") of a particular body (brain) state. It will have a particular physiological counterpart, perhaps a chemical state. But are either of these notions (of pain and of depression) our *original experiences*?
In my view, in conceiving our depression as "God's" judgement about our body we abandon our face value judgement in favour of a view "in relation to God". Lloyd seems to accept that it is all right for the judgement involved to be "God's":

"The adequacy that is lacking within the limits of a mind is supplied in wider contexts of which it is a part. To say that all things flow from God's nature with the same necessity as the sum of its angles flows from the nature of a triangle is to say that in the infinite intellect of God all truths are necessary. But their affirmation is not always encompassed in our minds. Ideas are always accompanied by affirmation, but the affirmation is not always "ours" in Descartes's sense' (Lloyd p.71).

But in my view 'our' ideas must have the formal being (reality) proper to them, and this has to be characterised, whether or not this disturbs Spinoza's extrapolation from "God's" mind to its part-minds. If an idea is essentially a cognitive judgement, as Spinoza claims, this must so in all cases, without altering or emending some ideas in order to accommodate them within a complete view we can only have after our raw experience. Thus a claim that ideas are affirmations even if they just do not (in being "those ideas which things which now actually present to us or produce in us") affirm or deny anything, is false. The view above, explicated by Lloyd, explains Spinoza's claim about all adequate ideas being judgements in reality, but (I submit) cannot not justify it with respect to our ideas if the 'affirmation is not always "ours"'.

I have mentioned earlier that commentators who have objected to this Spinozistic switch in perspective may (like Joachim) believe our ideas cannot, therefore, be 'real', since if they are real their reality does not seem to have the real being which is asserted to be their real being. It seems we must either endorse Joachim's move of making inadequate ideas an illusion (i.e. not real) or adopt some other deflationary strategy if we are to accept Spinoza's claim that our ideas are judgements. Joachim denies our ideas reality and Spinoza cannot want it endorsed, for he says he regards human inadequate ideas as real "properties which belong" to Nature (TP 1 4, Wernham p.263).

I suggest Spinoza does adopt a deflationary stance to some of our face-value experiences. I propose that when he says we do not always acknowledge our first judgement, but feign that a second judgement is our first, he does not see that this is
what he himself is doing with regard to our brute impressions and passive emotions. For I believe he is asking us to disregard our first, raw, genuine responses to the world. For example, I have suggested that taking our pain to have been a judgement may be to make a judgement about our pain: the 'That hurt' which follows 'Ouch!' is a judgement. But it is not clear that 'Ouch!' is a judgement. I have claimed that according to Spinoza's defining of formal being as ideas, and ideas as immediate cognitive judgements, all ideas, from the true and adequate to the nadir of ignorance and phenomenological confusion in "the singular mind of someone" must be characterised in the same way. Moreover, we should not forget that Spinoza's metaphysical concatenation of Whole-mind and part-mind allows for an in-principle extrapolation to mental events in non-human minds. It is to be presumed that since reason does not function much in those minds, we shall allow even fewer of those non-human thoughts to be immediate judgements.

I conclude that Spinoza fails to show that the mental formal being of all modes of thought is necessarily immediate cognitive judgement. In attempting to move from his starting-point in the mind of "God" to the mental formal being of its fragmentary expressions, Spinoza tries to force through a claim that "God's" wholly active ideas (which are readily conceived to be judgements) are expressed as partial, confused or distorted fractions in the inadequate ideas of Natura naturata. In so doing he further exposes the rift between two perspectives on reality; that is, between how we explain our thoughts (i.e. make appeal to some metaphysical or scientific scheme) and how we experience them face-on.

We next address the further necessary feature of any Spinozistic mode of thought (idea) which is its "objective being". Here, the chasm between the representational content of our ideas as known metaphysically and as experienced "from the common order of Nature" or as "related only to the human mind" is so great that, in my view, even adequate human ideas fail to be properly describable as parts of "God's" complete ideas of states of our bodies as these interact with their surroundings.
CHAPTER 5
PRINCIPLE OF OBJECTIVE BEING

§ 5.1 Any idea has objective being.

For Spinoza every idea, in its inmost nature, not only has "formal being" as a mode of intellect, but also exists "objectively" by necessarily representing an "object". (Objective", in the sense of 'of' or 'about' an object, is unconnected with any modern use of this word.) Descartes also includes in his Definitions the orthodoxy that while a thing has formaliter its inherent characteristics, it has objectively the characteristics of whatever it is 'about'. Descartes defines the objective 'reality' of an idea:–

'By this I mean the being of the thing which is represented by an idea, insofar as this exists in the idea. .. For whatever we perceive as being in the objects of our ideas exists objectively in the ideas themselves (D3, 2nd Replies, CSM 11 p.114).

Spinoza reproduces this definition in his Principles of Descartes's Philosophy (Part 1, D3, C p.239). He does not supply a similar definition himself. Yet objective being turns out to be a central notion for him. At times he actually equates "objective being" with ideas (KV Appendix 2, passim; TIE §§ 32–36; E2 P8 C – esse objectiva sive ideae). Since all thoughts are ideas, all thoughts necessarily have objective being.

For Descartes, there are degrees of objective reality:– 'In so far as different ideas <are considered as images which> represent different things, it is clear that they differ widely' (3rd Meditation, CSM 11 p.28). For example, some thoughts lack objective reality altogether since they are 'materially false', that is, not representing anything. Alternatively, they may 'represent non-things (chimaerical things which cannot exist) as things' (ibid. p.30). As seen earlier, such thoughts do not entirely lack objective being since 'Everything in a chimera that can be clearly and distinctly conceived is a true and real entity' (CSMK p.343).

For Spinoza, too, the objective being of an idea varies in accordance with the truth it expresses of its object. We saw in Chapter 4 that both Descartes and Spinoza use the idea of the sun as an example of an object which illustrates 'a great disparity between an object and its idea in many cases' (3rd Meditation, CSM 11 p.27).
Descartes adds to his two ideas of the sun the comment that 'Obviously both these ideas cannot resemble the sun which exists outside me'. However, Hobbes and Gassendi consider that both Descartes's ideas do in some way resemble the sun (Objections 3 and 5, CSM 11 pp.129 and 197). While it is impossible for both Descartes's ideas (or in Spinoza's view, either of them, the sun being a particular object) to be the idea of the sun, they can both 'resemble' it, being directed towards it in some more (or less) confused way. For Spinoza, objective being is a necessary feature of any idea, logically entailed because all ideas are units of knowing, judgement or belief. Since we could give no sense to a cognition or judgement/belief/affirmation if it did not necessarily involve an attitude towards, of, or about something, the objective or representative dimension of ideas is not an extrinsic or relational extra tagged on to an existing formal characterisation, but an intrinsic component of it.\(^1\) This may further explain Spinoza's response to de Vries's worry, quoted in §4.2. Spinoza could mean, when he tells de Vries that "thought" has indeed no meaning unless understood in relation to concepts (ideas), not only that the term 'thought' is explanatorily vacuous, but that without ideas there is nothing to think of because all concepts or ideas necessarily have objects. For Spinoza, all mental functioning is intrinsically representational: the system does not operate without cognitive focus on an object.

Objective being is not existence as an image. This is an interpretation Spinoza especially wants to avoid, since images were usually taken in his day to be corporeal:—

"By ideas I understand not images formed at the back of the eye – and if you like, in the middle of the brain – but conceptions of thought (or the objective being of a thing insofar as it consists only in thought)" (E2 P48 S).

Spinoza also fears that the use of the term "image" could intrude the notion of an intermediary object, preventing direct judgement about a real object. He stresses that ideas are not "mute pictures on a panel" (E2 P49 S11), something hovering between

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\(^1\) Lloyd and Allison make objective being a central feature of Spinoza's theory of mind. Intentionality or representation is as a necessary feature of any Spinozistic idea is specifically affirmed by Sprigge p.153: Matson p.59; Kashap (in Shahan and Biro) p.58; Bennett p.155. Donagan equates it with representativeness and says that it is 'a fundamental non-physical property' for both Descartes and Spinoza (Donagan p.38). Delahunty calls it Spinoza's 'Postulate of Representationalism' (Delahunty p.109).
Spinoza accuses Descartes, perhaps unfairly, of missing the essentially mental character of objective being by construing it as images (E2 P49 S11). Whether or not this accusation is unfair, the point Spinoza wants to make, and which needs to be stressed here, is that mental representations are, for Spinoza, irreducibly mental, and are also directly of real objects ("the thing itself or the object perceived" (E2 P5). Sometimes Spinoza himself talks misleadingly of mental representations as images, but he does not mean they are physical representations or intermediary objects of perception. They are figments of imagination — imaginings:

"In just the same way as thoughts and ideas are connected in the mind, so the affections of the body, or images of things are ordered and connected in the body" (E5 P1). "When the mind regards bodies in this way, we shall say that it imagines" (E2 P17 S).

It is evident that the dogma of objective being will work harder for Spinoza than it does for Descartes, since the necessary presence of "objective"-ness in all modes of thought is entailed by the cognitive and judgemental status Spinoza confers on them all. Cartesian thoughts are not necessarily either judgements or about anything. Spinoza's doctrine of ideas forces us to consider in detail the notion of 'of'-ness or 'aboutness' in ideas, currently familiar in the philosophy of mind as 'intentionality'. Objective being is, for Spinoza, essentially mental, the affirming or intellectual measuring of some object. That is not to suggest that intentionality is, for Spinoza, the defining feature of the mental — sufficient condition for mental irreducibility. Indeed, I shall argue that Spinoza's doctrine is instructive in showing us why it cannot be so. Mental irreducibility is, for Spinoza, guaranteed by the formal mental being of any mental

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^2 Spinoza must have Descartes's early works (e.g. *Treatise on Man* CSM p.106) in mind. Curley writes that, given Descartes's usual insistence on drawing a sharp distinction between ideas and images (e.g. in 3rd and 6th Meditations, and in reply to Hobbes's 5th Objection) 'it is curious to see a central tenet of his doctrine of judgement traced to a confusion of ideas with images' (Curley 1 p.486, Note 74). Descartes sometimes makes use of, and sometimes rejects, the standard scholastic doctrine of 'intentional forms'. Intentional forms were abstractions interposed between ideas and the things which are their proper objects. Descartes rejects this doctrine (*Optics*, CSM 1 p.154). He views more favourably Gassendi's concept of intentional forms as corporeal images which transmit information from the senses to the soul (4th Replies, CSM 11 p.174).

^3 Brentano writes: — 'Every mental phenomenon is characterised by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction towards an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing) or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way'(Brentano p.88).
event as a mode of a *sui generis* attribute, and is strongly bolstered (as will be explained in Chapter 6) by the postulation of autonomous mental causation. Objectiveness or 'aboutness' is a necessary condition of a Spinozistic idea, but while Spinoza sometimes suggests that ideas are equivalent to objective being, he often appends a condition of formal mental being, as in the remark quoted above:— ".. the objective being of a thing *insofar as it consists only in thought*" (my italics).

We might, in fact, take the quite opposite view, namely that Spinoza need not separately postulate objective being because it seems that cognitive judgement *entails* representational content. Spinoza does not, as noted above, assign any independent character to objective being through definition. Nor does his laconic Definition of "idea" exhibit an idea's necessary elements of formal or objective being:—

"By idea I understand a concept of the mind that the mind forms because it is a thinking thing" (E2 D3).

We have had to unpack "idea" as a technical term in order to see how it includes all the essential features of the mental (i.e. cognition, immediate judgement and direction on an object). Thus, while I believe it could be said that objective being is logically dependent on the mental formal being of ideas since it is implicit in that characterisation, any idea has two elements of formal being and objective being. These conditions are, for Spinoza, individually necessary and collectively sufficient for mentality, and they perform different roles in his theory of mind. The logical distinctness of the dimension of the "objective-ness" condition is enhanced in my view (as in the views of Hampshire, Allison, Lloyd and others) in being the basis of Spinoza's theory of the mind-body relation. Only the element of objective being lets Spinoza claim that "From the fact that I know the essence of the soul I know that it is united to the body" (TIE §22). This thesis is grounded in the agreement of true ideas with their objects, which I now clarify.

§ 5.2 *A true idea is an objective essence.*

Two principles are at work in order for Spinoza to claim:— "God has all things objectively in himself" (CM 1, 11), one ontological and one logical. On the one hand, we know that "God sought no matter outside himself" (CM 2 vii). Substance is
thinking and extended in every one of its instantiations. On the other hand, "God" is all judgements and is therefore inherently 'objective'. As noted, objective-ness cannot operate in a vacuum: an "idea", being a judgement, logically necessitates an object. "God" is all true judgements. Since it is absurd to think the true idea of an object could be, in fact, of some other object, all true ideas are internally logically bound to their objects. And (to recall from §3.2) since a true idea is, in being adequate, the complete idea of its object (i.e. everything that is true of it considered in relation to all other modes) there is only one true and complete idea of any object. There could not be a completely true idea of a thing and yet there be another thing true of it. The system of idea-object union conferred by this internal logical relation is thoroughgoing: mind-body unions are, as we discuss shortly in depth, only one feature of this system, for the "all things" which "God" has "objectively in himself" includes, as seen, objects which may not be bodies:–

"The idea, as far as its formal essence is concerned, can be the object of another objective essence, and this other objective essence in turn will also be, considered in itself, something real and intelligible, and so on, indefinitely" (TIE §33).

"God" is infinite objective essence, not only of all possible ideas and all possible physical objects, but also of the modes of any other attribute there might logically possibly be, unknown by human minds. In an early work Spinoza equates this objective essence (essentia objectiva) with certainty:–

"Certainty is nothing but the objective essence itself, i.e. the mode by which we are aware of the formal essence is certainty itself" (TIE §36).

Certainty requires no proof. It is an internal relation, not a juggling of ideas until we have brought our idea into line with its object. Again, Spinoza takes his readers back to the 'Mind of God', which he recasts in this case as all adequate objective being, in order to demonstrate the logical constraints on certain agreement. Objects are not prior to the true ideas of them, but things are not caused by God's intelligence, either:–

"The formal being of things which are not modes of thinking does not follow from the divine nature because God has first known the things; rather the objects of ideas follow and are inferred from their attributes in the same way and by the same necessity as that with which we have
shown ideas to follow from the attribute of thought" (E2 P6 C).

There is, then, in an ideal intellect, for any object a true idea of it to which it is internally logically bound, and for any idea an object of which there is a complete idea. A perfect idea-object correspondence maps out the universe as an infinity of differentiations of substance in the form of unified pairs of modes of thought and extension (or thought and another idea, or thought and a mode of any other attribute of which thought may have objective being). When an idea is true it agrees entirely with its object: it is the essence of its object, expressed in thought.

I stress that we refer here to the logically independent ideal cognitive dimension of the infinite intellect ("God"), in which there is a single true and adequate idea of any object, and to any entirely adequate ideas we may have (if we have any: there is more on this below). The haphazardness of the objective being of inadequate ideas, that is, their inaccurate and confused direction on the world, arises from "singular things which have been represented to us through the senses in a way that is mutilated, confused, and without order for the intellect; for that reason I have been accustomed to call such perceptions knowledge from random experience" (E2 P40 S2). Such "judgements" lack the perfect union of ideas with objects which holds "in God":

"It should be noted here that we are speaking of such ideas as necessarily arise in God from the existence of things, together with their essence, not of those ideas which things now actually present to us or produce in us. Between these two there is a great difference. For in God the ideas arise from the existence and essence [of the things], according to all they are, not as in us - from one or more of the senses (with the result that we are nearly always affected by things only imperfectly and that my idea and yours differ, though one and the same thing produces them in us)" (KV 2 xx Note c10, C 1 p.136).

In Ethics Spinoza distinguishes between the having of inadequate ideas "from the common order of Nature", and the having of adequate ideas according to "the order of the intellect", and says that while the former "imagines" (engages with mental images - reflections of images in the body) the latter "perceives things through their first causes" and "explains the nature of the same things" (E2 P18 S). The latter constitutes the ideal view or system of objective essences "in God" whose "sole property is to
understand everything clearly and distinctly at all times" (KV 1 ix, C p.92), and it is this system alone which maintains a union of idea and object. While objective being is, Spinoza says, intrinsic to any idea, "truth" is an extrinsic or relational denomination of an idea (E2 D4 Exp.). Objective being (direction towards) does not entail objective essence (agreement and certainty). Only the objective "essence" or complete agreement of idea and object supports the unified relation (which we have now seen is one of logical interdependence) between idea and object. Most of our ideas are directed towards objects external to ourselves, whereas "God's" mind is directed only on objects of which it is the objective essence. Few of them agree with objects in Spinoza's strict sense. I therefore reserve the term "objective essence" for ideas which agree entirely with their objects, and I shall call this thorough-going system of agreement of idea with object (called by the Scholastics 'the conformity or likeness of the thing and the intellect') the 'pairs' or 'isomorphism' doctrine.4

§ 5.3 The mind is the idea of the body: any human idea is the idea of a state of an actually existing body.

I now expound the view that Spinoza's doctrine of objective essence or true agreement, that is, his thesis of a correspondence of idea and object which is so immediate that constitutes certainty, is inextricable from Spinoza's doctrine of the mind-body union. I shall argue that it constitutes an argument in support of the identity of modes of mind and body asserted by the identity principle. I shall then argue that while this doctrine seems problematic even on its most basic level, that is, considering the mind as the true idea of a body (its objective essence), Spinoza's metaphysical scheme can sustain this claim internally. However, it cannot justify his claim that all our ideas have content (objective being) of states of our bodies.

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4 This term (a) allows for Spinozas's full thesis of objective essence, which is not restricted to ideas of human bodies. It (b) avoids using the term 'parallelism', which is not appropriate until we have explicated the claim about dual causal ordering. A parallel causal flow of (token-token identical) modes of thought and modes in extension involves an additional element, namely an "order and connection" of ideas and objects, or the concurrent flow of determined causes within the powers or attributes of Nature. Whether Spinoza satisfactorily demonstrates a thesis of parallelism is a matter for discussion in Chapters 6 and 7. The truth of parallelism affects the validity of Spinoza's theorem concerning the mind-body relation, but it does not affect the doctrine of pairs of ideas of bodies, and bodies (i.e. token-token identity). In my view (as in Allison's and Lloyd's) the doctrine of objective essence (and only objective essence - not mere objective being or intentionality) upholds the mode-identity claim without recourse to the issue of order and connection.
Many commentators hold that mind-body identity is binding on the basis of Spinoza's ontological stipulations (e.g. in E1 P10 S, E2 P7 and E3 P2 S) alone:--

"Since "substance thinking" and "substance extended" are but the one substance under different attributes, there must also be a unity of material modes and their corresponding ideas' (Lloyd p.20). ... 'A well-formed [adequate] idea cannot lack its object, for idea and object are not separate items to be brought into alignment. They are one and the same thing – their identity grounded in that of thought and matter as different attributes of one substance' (ibid. p.59).

However, I believe (with Hampshire and Allison) that the principle of true objective being (objective essence), which makes a mind a single complex idea of the body, constitutes an important premise for the expression of substance in two ways, or modes, so reinforcing one of the grounds for Spinoza's claim of monism at the start of Ethics Part 1, namely that essential properties which have no effect on one another, but which logically necessarily complement each other because each requires the other for the expression of any instantiation of God/Nature, must be identical in substance. Any idea requires an object, and would not exist without the object: nor does the object exist without a true idea of it. A true idea entails perfect idea-object correspondence.

Setting aside the condition of parallelism (i.e. the concurrent dual flow of mental and physical dispositions-to-power which ensures isomorphic order and connection), the separate conditions of formal being and objective being support an identity of mind-mode and body-mode. Allison says:--

'Insofar as ideas are considered in the latter manner [i.e. as the ideas of bodies], their "object" is identified with their physical counterpart (in the case of the human mind, this is the human body) (Allison p.88).

Every mind is the idea of (i.e. corresponds with, or is a function of, or reflects, or is isomorphous or identical in substance with) a particular body. It would clearly be absurd to suggest that the true idea of a certain body is really the idea of another body. Minds belong, then, as the ideas of bodies, to the particular bodies of which they are the ideas: they are internally connected with them:--

"Between the Idea and the object there must necessarily be a union, because the one cannot exist without the other. For there is no thing of which there is not an idea in the thinking thing, and no idea can exist
unless the thing also exists.

Further, the object cannot be changed unless the Idea is also changed, and vice versa, so that no third thing is necessary here which would produce the union of body and soul" (KV 2 xx Note 10, C p.136).

This identification of singular 'minds' with particular bodies extends throughout Nature. Humans are generally 'minded' in a more or less similar way to one another on the macro level, their minds being common notions of the common properties of their bodies. The latter parts of *Ethics* dealing with social and political harmony require that we understand "the laws of human nature" through adequate ideas of common properties. But each body, although a fragment of one undivided Body, exists with recognisable individuality. Thus an isomorphism of true ideas of bodies with the bodies of which they are the ideas forms the paired modes of substance we call people:—

'The union of mind and body which constitutes a person [is] only a special case of the general principle of the coincidence of ideas and their *ideata* ... For everything which would ordinarily be called a human body, there exists an idea of that body, and such an idea is what is ordinarily called the human mind' (Hampshire p.61).

I conclude that Spinoza's mind–body 'pairs' or isomorphism doctrine depends on three principles only:— i) Wherever substance is extended it is also thinking (KV 2 xx Note c10; E2 P7 S and E3 P2 S); (ii) The attributes of thought and extension are autonomous properties (E1 P10); (iii) The mind is the objective essence of the body (E2 P3 and P11). No thesis of causal ordering within attributes is involved here, although it becomes important later on. At this stage Spinoza's identity doctrine could be a kind of "anomalous monism", that is, a thesis stipulating no lawlike dual flow of modes.

I have argued that Spinoza's theory of mind, that is, his concept of a particular mind as the idea of a particular body, is a development of the traditional concept of the 'Mind of God' and the cosmological speculations of the Stoics, Neoplatonists and Cabalists who inspired his interest in an all–encompassing and complete intelligence of

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5 While (I think) Spinoza never says explicitly that notions related solely to human minds are common notions, Hampshire holds human minds to be types of ideas (Hampshire p.60). Bennett writes critically on the extrapolation from this to "common", or type, human ideas (Bennett p.74 and pp.299–302). Parkinson distinguishes between common notions and the "adequate ideas of the properties of things" (E2 P40 S2) said in E2 P39 to correspond to a finite system of bodies rather than all bodies (Parkinson 1 pp.164–165).
physical things within one natural Whole. The mind–body relation as described above is, as Spinoza has promised, a metaphysical thesis devoted to showing the place of the mind in Nature. 'Minds' exist as the true ideas of, or reflections of, or functions of body–states, and any one of our ideas reflects a state of our body. Our perceptions are the ideas of particular modifications or proportions of motion and rest in our bodies:

"So this existing portion's objective essence in the thinking attribute is the soul of the body. Hence when one of these modes (motion or rest) changes, either by increasing or decreasing, the idea also changes correspondingly. For example, if the rest happens to increase, and the motion to decrease, the pain or sadness we call cold is thereby produced"

(KV Appendix 11 §15, C p.155).

This is the true story "in God". It is the metaphysical account of our 'minds' as ideas in the mind of "God". (The story of the direction of our ideas on the world is a different story, which we are not yet addressing.) As a metaphysical thesis – as a piece of scientia – it is in line with a token–token identity account of mental events and body events. I shall stick with the term 'body events' because I do not want to restrict Spinoza's claim by saying that ideas are functions of brain states. While Spinoza quite often refers to the brain (e.g. "By ideas I understand not images formed at the back of the eye - and if you like, in the middle of the brain ...") (E2 P48 S), he does not suggest anywhere that his isomorphism involves only the brain or, for that matter, a body of flesh and blood. To suggest this would be foolishly parochial, for "God" has ideas of bodies which do not have brains. In my view it must misrepresent Spinoza's insight to be very specific about bodily functions or processes, since our anthropocentric and perhaps in the long run time–dated physiological or chemical theory would detract from the way his postulate "the mind is the idea of the body" is intended to be universally true, unbounded by present knowledge, and not confined to the human case. Spinoza's metaphysic is, as we have seen, calculatedly neutral in this respect. That said, many human ideas seem likely to be identified with complex states specifically of the brain.

Spinoza's metaphysical description of our perceptions is that our bodies interrelate with their surroundings, of which they retain traces. Our ideas are generally inadequate representations of their objects because "the ideas we have of external bodies
indicate the condition of our body more than the nature of the external bodies" (E2 P16 C2). They are the intelligence of the interplay of our bodies with their environment:—

"When we say that God has this or that idea, not only insofar as he constitutes the nature of the human mind, but insofar as he also has the idea of another thing together with the human mind, then we say that the human mind perceives the thing only partially, or inadequately" (E2 P11 S).

For Lloyd and Allison our mental experiences echo this metaphysical view:—

'The mind as the idea of the body ... reflects in the realm of thought everything that occurs in the world of extension .. the human body provides the focal point from and through which alone the human mind can perceive its world' (Allison p.107).

'For Spinoza the reality of the mind consists in the reality of inadequate ideas — in the awareness of body from within the totality of ideas of body. The individual mind is a direct, inherently perspectival awareness of body' (Lloyd p.44)

Both Allison and Lloyd believe that, for Spinoza, awareness of the body is necessary for self—awareness (Lloyd p.46; Allison p.111). These views endorse Spinoza's —

"The essence of the mind (Proposition XIII, Part 11) consists only in this, that it is the idea of a body actually existing" (Letter 64).

Yet I am not convinced that this essence aptly characterises all human ideas, even on a metaphysical or scientific level. I shall have much to say soon on how Spinoza fails to capture the representational content of most mental human experiences. My criticism will endorse Wilson's clearly argued thesis that 'This is one major respect in which the theory of "minds" (God's ideas) fails to provide an acceptable model of human mentality' (Wilson p.113). But for the moment I press the plausibility of Spinoza's metaphysical thesis of the mind—body union as viewed on a level of truth.

Why is Spinoza's basic claim that the mind is the idea of the body, and all our ideas representative of a state of body, unsatisfactory? My objection does not involve Spinoza's definition of ideas with regard to formal mental being. I agree with Allison and Lloyd that there is no radical equivocation over the reality or being of an idea, since as either a mental state correlated with a body state or as a belief directed on some object external to the human body, an idea conforms to Spinoza's basic
characterisation as an affirmation or belief, caused only by other ideas, operating only within a context of a continuum of adequate and inadequate ideas (Lloyd p.26) and existing as 'a function of the sensitivity of the body" (Allison p.100). My criticism is, at this stage, that it is not easy to see how all ideas are, even "in relation to God" invariably identical with states of a particular body "actually existing".

Consider, for example, what happens to Spinozistic ideas and bodies when we die. The body clearly ceases to be an individual, for its component parts return to the realm of all body. We know that the "essence of the mind" is what a thing can neither be nor be without. If the essence of the mind is the idea of a body actually existing, what happens to the mind when the body of which it is the idea is no more, or is dust? Spinoza says that some ideas "cannot be destroyed absolutely with the body" (E1 P23). And if human ideas endure, they do not remain as the ideas of the bits of bodies now decomposed, or as the ideas of particular past bodies. They exist, he says, eternally, having an "existence that cannot be defined by time or explained through duration" (E5 P23 S). So in what sense are they now identical with the human body states of which they were once the ideas? Spinoza's view, clearly expounded in his earliest text, is that human ideas do not remain the same after death:

"Our body had a different proportion of motion and rest when we were unborn children, and later when we are dead, it will have still another. Nevertheless, there was before our birth, and will be after our death, an Idea, knowledge, etc: of our body in the thinking thing, as there is now. But it was not, and will not be at all the same, because now it has a different proportion of motion and rest".

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6 Taylor and Barker claim that Spinoza confuses 'being' and cognitive relations by making human ideas sometimes mental stuff and sometimes knowledge of objects (representations). Barker holds, as seen, despite Spinoza's assertions that the mind is essentially cognitive, that 'knowledges of objects' cannot by themselves constitute a mind. The esse formale of the human mind must, Barker says, be mind-stuff, yet mind-stuff, as an essence, cannot be essentially cognitive. Taylor glosses Barker's complaint by accusing Spinoza of conflating the human mind (which he dubs the 'concipient') with the concept (Taylor p.200), for Spinoza says both that the mind is an idea, and that the concepts that mind has are also ideas. In Taylor's view, Spinoza postulates a correspondence of the idea (that is, the mental complex which corresponds to Peter's brain and nervous system) of Peter with Peter's body, and makes this is an identity relation, whereas Paul's idea of Peter - either of his body or his mind - is purely a matter of 'information' (Taylor 1 p.206).

7 Spinoza says that the eternal part of the mind is the active intellect, and that the imagination perishes (E5 P39 C). We do not need to engage with this contentious area of Spinoza's philosophy (on which the general judgement is that his thesis does not allow the mind to have any existence at all apart from the body [Note 13 C p.606]) to protest that many of the ideas in our minds - some of them common notions, some modes of imagination, do survive the states of body associated or identified with them.
An idea which is a function of a living body having a proportion of motion and rest (of, say, 1–3) is not a function of that body state after death:–

"If other bodies act on ours with such force that the proportion of motion [to rest] cannot remain 1–3, that is death, and the destruction of the soul, insofar as it is only an Idea, knowledge etc: of a body having this proportion of motion and rest" (KV Preface to Part 2 [10], [14] C p.95).

It is not easy to see in what form the idea could remain, given its essential character as an idea of an actually existing body-state, except as the idea of a bit of dust or whatever. Yet we have many ideas originating in the minds of persons now dead which have no obvious associations with the particular bodies of those persons, and we suppose them to have the very same content they had when conceived. For instance, we have Copernicus's idea that the earth moves rather than the sun, and we share Wordsworth's imagining of a host of golden daffodils dancing on a hill side. The content of these ideas seems, moreover, wholly to be their object represented in thought, not a body state represented in thought together with that object. We think Copernicus's idea that the earth moves is 'of' the earth's movement, not of Copernicus's body, dead or alive. We take Wordsworth's idea of daffodils dancing to be about daffodils, not about Wordsworth's body mixed with daffodils blowing in the wind.

We think we can 'have' these ideas with no knowledge of a particular body existing in place and time, and that the ideas exist without "a body actually existing". Even if we feel able to describe these ideas as at one time having been functions or reflections of specific bodies, we cannot say they have that content now.

I conclude that unless we are to believe that such passed-on ideas exist independently of the bodies with whose states they were once identified, as free-floating denizens of the universe (a thesis which Spinoza's doctrine absolutely precludes), we must accept that they are now ideas reflecting our bodies. Someone else's idea is now ours – a function of our organic complexity. If our brains were examined we suppose that a state precisely correlative with those ideas would be found – we who have never had the direct perception of those dancing daffodils. Spinoza seems to affirm that ideas are always functions of living bodies when he consoles a friend who has lost a child that the child's sighs haunt him because
"since the father's soul participates ideally in the things which follow from the son's essence, he can sometimes imagine something of what follows from the son's essence as vividly as if he had it in his presence" (Letter 17).

The son's emotion is now the father's.

This account of ideas as reflections of body states explains why, for Spinoza, inadequate ideas are not (truly known) identical in content no matter how many minds share them. There is no duplication of any finite idea because each is identical with a different body-state. My thought today about object o differs from my thought about it yesterday, since today's idea is identical with a body-state changed (at least) by passage of time. Thus my twin's idea of John Major's present attitude to the IRA, which could seem to be 'identical' in content with mine, making the idea I have, supposedly of my body, also the idea of my twin's, cannot have – under Spinoza's metaphysical perspective – the same idea as mine. We know that human bodies are very similar, and that we therefore have many similar ideas. Moreover, Spinoza wants the human world to turn on exactly similar human ideas, for common notions constitute true understanding of Nature, and generate harmony in human minds. The principles of the latter Parts of Ethics, and of the political works, which concern how we should live, are built, Spinoza claims, on these rational foundations. But such notions do not lead to knowledge of particular affirmative essences of particular existences (e.g. John Major's present attitude to the IRA) because these inadequate ideas differ in terms of their minutely differentiated being in our bodies. There cannot be a true union of 'minds' via a combining of inadequate ideas, for an apparent union of minds through opinion or emotion is dis-agreement, and ultimately disadvantageous.8

Yet a serious problem remains about the actual object of the idea. The account of our ideas "in relation to God" makes 'the actual "object", or correlate' of those ideas (Allison p.107) a state of our bodies. As Wilson also points out, Spinoza's thesis dictates that this is our only object of thought: there can be no ideas in the human mind that are not 'of parts, processes or aspects of the human body' (Wilson p.109). What

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8 E4 Ps 32–34; TPP Ch.xvii (Wernham p.129); TP ii 14 (ibid. p.277) and TP vii 12 (ibid. p.345).
we take to be some particular external object is, Spinoza insists, a state of our own body mixed with its perceived object. Spinoza admits at this point in *Ethics* Part 2 that

"Here, no doubt, my readers will come to halt, and think of many things that will give them pause. For this reason I ask them to continue with me slowly, step by step, and to make no judgement on these matters until they have read through them all" (E2 P11 S).

This plea precedes a yet more astonishing claim:—

"Whatever happens in the object of the idea constituting the human mind must be perceived by the human mind, or, there will necessarily be an idea of that thing in the mind, i.e. if the object of the idea constituting the human mind is a body, *nothing can happen in the body which is not perceived by the mind*". "Knowledge of this thing will necessarily be in the mind, or the mind will perceive it" (E2 P12 and Proof, my italics).

We may acknowledge that an adequate idea of the underlying bodily transaction with our phenomenal object exists, and that we could get at it in part through scientific study. We may concur with Parkinson that the mind only perceives the body in that 'nothing occurs in the organism that does not have its mental correlate' (Parkinson 1 pp.110–11). But that is not what Spinoza is saying. He says that all our ideas of external objects are directly of our bodies *and that we are aware of this*. He insists that "nothing can happen in the body which is not perceived by the mind" .... "Knowledge of this thing will necessarily be in the mind, or [sive] the mind will perceive it" (E2 P12 and Proof).

In my view, as in Wilson's, this Spinozistic claim about the perceived or face–value content of our ideas makes his principle of objective being untenable. While it holds in instances of sensation (pain, for example, has nothing but our body as its object) we do not normally seem to think about what is happening in our bodies at all. We are not always consciously aware of our bodies when we have ideas, even when those ideas involve our bodies. For example, we normally use our legs without being at all aware of them. Dancers, athletes, actors and learners of yoga have to be trained into awareness of their limbs. An idea of walking to the station may not include any representational content of our leg. Our ideas of daffodils, or of the shape of the earth, certainly involve no explicit data of our bodies. Moreover, I shall argue, many of our
adequate ideas (i.e. common notions) do not exhibit representational content of our bodies, either. Descartes points out that the way we experience our thoughts does not require us to be aware of the underlying metaphysical transaction going on. When the rational soul 'considers directly' that which it perceives, it does not experience it in some specific part of the body (Treatise on Man CSM 1 p.106; Passions 1, 33). It was the intuitive plausibility of Descartes's conception of the thinking self as existing apart from the body – a sensation familiar to us all, to which he could make appeal – which provided the springboard for his thesis of mental irreducibility.

Perhaps the most plausible and valuable defence of Spinoza's claim that our direction on the world necessarily includes a content of direct awareness of our body would be evidence for the proposition that we have unconscious awareness of interactions in our own bodies. This state of affairs arguably holds in some cases of perception. We preserve our own existence by avoiding dangerous external obstacles, driving carefully, and so on, without being aware that we are conscious of our bodies, although we must on some profound level be aware of them. But Spinoza does not say that our ideas have a content of unconscious awareness of our bodies. On the contrary, he wants us to grant that we are always aware of the body that is ours:–

"All those postulates which I have assumed contain hardly anything that is not established by experience which we cannot doubt, after we have shown that the human body exists as we are aware of it" (E2 P17 S).

The implausibility of Spinoza's claim that we experience all perception to have a content of our own body is not mitigated, in my view, by saying that such knowledge is inadequate – that we only have an inkling of what is going on – as Donagan suggests in response to Wilson's criticism that the object of our ideas must be our body:–

'In saying that your mind "perceives" every happening in your body, Spinoza therefore implies no more than that you must have some idea of what is happening in it, not that your idea must be clear and adequate' (Donagan 2 p.129).

I want to protest that not only is it untrue that "nothing can happen in that body which is not perceived by the mind", but that except in some cases of direct perception we perceive nothing at all of an interaction in our body with things surrounding it.
Why does Spinoza make all mental events direct awarenesses of the interplay with external bodies that takes place in our bodies? I offer two possible reasons.

1. He needs to establish that we are only aware of one body in our perceptual experiences – our own – and that therefore we are justified in believing that "the human body exists, as we are aware of it" (E2 P13 C). Allison sees the E2 P12 passage about perceiving the processes of our bodies as furnishing a proof of this:

'. the basic point seems clear enough: namely, that the human mind has an immediate, sensitive awareness of its own body and of its own body alone (I feel my pain and not somebody else's). Thus the object of the idea constituting my mind must be my body' (Allison p.96).

This is an important foundational tenet for the Spinozistic account of a self, not because we would ever suppose the body we are aware of is someone else's, but because it is important for Spinoza to refute the Cartesian claim that we can readily observe ourselves to exist without a body. The Spinozistic counter-claim is that our bodies are always present to our perception and that therefore we cannot pretend our minds have an independent existence. Lloyd further explains that the direct presence of the body to the mind precludes images or mental representations interposed between idea and object, 'awaiting the mind's choice' (Lloyd p.74) as the Cartesian thesis of thoughts held before the mind prior to judgement would seem to have it. The mind's awareness of images is strictly of its own bodily traces (ibid.).

2. A fruitful scientific thesis is made possible by the certainty that all minds are the ideas of the particular bodies those minds conceive to be 'their own'. It advises us that we should take a specific state of our body into consideration along with our experiential idea. Spinoza thinks that only a metaphysical view expresses the content of our ideas. In his view, Descartes's project of inquiry got off to a poor start because he did not meditate first on how things must, necessarily, be in the whole scheme of things, but took his mental experiences at face value. Spinoza's view must be that had Descartes not banned from the stove-heated room all the metaphysical and scientific data at his intellectual disposal he would not, as is suggested by his remarks above on failing to perceive transactions in his body, have submitted that his thoughts could exist in isolation from his body. It is important, Spinoza emphasises, to be
aware of the transactions of the body in relation to the flux of ideas in the mind. We have seen in the case of depression (§4.4) that we accept our states of mind to be reflections of states of our body responding to external stimuli. We are likely to concede that depression (a mental state or event) has a physiological counterpart (a chemical state or some such). Our perceived depression is that state, expressed as a mental event. The depression considered as a mental event may be understood (as is explained in Chapter 6) by analysing the train of mental occurrences which have caused it, but its correlated chemically abnormal body state is also available for treatment through understanding of its causes.

Spinoza thesis seems to me justified to the extent of its claim that, viewed under an aspect of eternity (i.e. scientifically, or from a detached, non-experiential viewpoint) "the ideas we have of external bodies indicate the condition of our body more than the nature of the external bodies" (E2 P16 C2), and that

"The human mind does not know the human body itself, nor does it know that it exists, except through ideas of affections by which the body is affected .... To that extent only, the human mind perceives the human body itself (E2 P19 and Proof).

When I have an idea of an extended thing – a body external to myself, say, the sun – my idea is plausibly a function of my body interacting with the sun. We may concede after reasoned reflection that Wordsworth’s idea of daffodils was the working of imagination on an idea of sense perception, and that it is now one of our ideas, correlated with one of our brain states, and we may accept that the perceptual power of the mind is, as a mental act, a function of the sensitivity of the body to its environment. Spinoza insists that the adequate scientific view must be taken into account when we make assertions about the place of the mind in Nature. This compels us to switch to a metaphysical account. For example, in re-conceiving depression – which did not seem from our experiential viewpoint to be a judgement – as a judgement about our body, we had to switch from our face value judgement or knowing "from the common order of Nature" (E2 P29 C), in which our thought is "related only to the human mind" (E2 P28), to a view "in relation to God". When we have that correct view, Spinoza says, we are necessarily aware of our bodies.
Perhaps by now we are so used to switching from the partial or subjective to the metaphysical view that some of the ideas which at first seemed to threaten the plausibility of Spinoza's thesis now appear thoroughly susceptible to his analysis. It is easy, in my view, to be sympathetic to Spinoza's proposition that our perception just plays us false, this being the inevitable result of our fragmental nature and fragmented knowledge. However, I maintain that on a day-to-day basis we experience, as Descartes suggests, only our own direct intelligence of things existing beyond our bodies. It seems to me after much struggling with what is involved in this perspective switch that the 'actual object' has to be the one we apprehend, as the content of our ordinary mental experience. We know our raw, unexamined experience ought to be interpreted by taking a broader perspective on it – seeing its place in the fuller picture of nature – if we are not to have a distorted view of life. But my (Cartesian) point is that all our thoughts do not have metaphysical content. This point is related to Barker's protest that 'the ideas which are inadequate in man must surely undergo a change in order to become adequate' (Barker 111 p.166), and that our body states 'are objects only for the physiologist' (11, p.142).

Spinoza in a sense grants this, too, when he admits that "there is a great difference" between "God's" true ideas and "those ideas which things now actually present to us or produce in us". He suggests that philosophers when philosophising (i.e. in pursuit of scientia) will want to know our human ideas as they truly exist, that is, as Nature itself knows them sub specie aeternitatis

"... so that our mind, as far as possible, reproduces objectively the formal character of Nature, both as to the whole and as to the parts" (TIE §91).

But this thesis of the "emendation of the intellect" and the rationalising of the emotions (which we examine in Chapter 6), demonstrates a strategy of aspect-switching from an inadequate view under an aspect of duration to an adequate view under an aspect of eternity. Spinoza knows it is one thing to explain our ideas (that is, to adopt a philosophical or scientific approach, so allowing new content to augment and influence our phenomenal ideas) and another just to 'have' our ideas in the sense of experiencing them. He concedes that our phenomenal experience may be in tension with our critical
or scientific ideas and that we must consciously set ourselves to adopt an adequate perspective. We have to, as it were, put on scientific spectacles:

"When we look at the sun, we imagine it as about 200 feet away from us ... even when we later come to know that it is more than 600 diameters of the earth away from us, we nevertheless imagine it is near" (E2 P35 S).

Spinoza’s recognition here that we automatically return to our phenomenological notion of the sun shows how we have consciously to 'turn our minds' or make a shift of perspective from the phenomenal experience of our body to a detached or scientific view. This is how Allison interprets Spinoza. In Allison’s view, passively accepting the "common order of Nature" is error. Conversely, if we actively review our perception in the light of knowledge about the way an external object is affecting our sensory apparatus, then 'error is avoided insofar as our thought follows "the order of the intellect"' (Allison p.107). But even a perspective switch and a scientific "emendation" of our idea does not necessarily endow all ideas with a content of data about our body.

We begin to see how Spinoza, by urging us to understand things in a less partial and perspectival way, is asking us to adjust our phenomenological experience – to superimpose, as I suggested in §4.4, a second judgement on our original brute impressions. I think we can see what is going on by recalling how we have found it necessary to use expressions like 'in relation to God' or, according to "the order of the intellect" or 'a detached or scientific view'. Our face-value representations are being explained by the addition of new content. This helps us to improve our understanding of our object. As suggested above, we can often quite effortlessly make the required switch and augment the content of our ideas to include new knowledge, so "emending" our understanding. For example, our experiential idea of a daffodil is now enlarged (if not wholly altered) to make it an idea of something interacting with our body. But we are, I submit, giving our original ideas a content they did not have before.

The example used earlier of the idea of our leg shows not only the need to alter our perspective if we are to "emend" our ideas, but also the disparity in content between ideas truly characterised and the representations we have in the ordinary course of events. We may feel pain in our leg. This is an idea directly about our leg. It hurts.
We may subsequently see an x-ray of it. When we do, our idea of our leg undergoes a change of content. We become aware of it as a construction rather than a sore limb. In both ideas the representational content (objective being) is indisputably real. (I do not suggest our scientific idea is the true idea of our leg: the content of our ideas may be "emended" without matching the ideal or true idea.) Nonetheless, "emended", our idea of our leg is not the same idea as our original pain-idea. Two distinct lots of 'content' seem to be involved here. While in the case of ideas of our leg both representations do include our bodies, the idea is nevertheless altered and enlarged.

The objective being of the ideas contained in an ideal view is not, therefore, equivalent to the objective being of our experience. I argued in §3.3 that there is no way in which our experiential thought can be other than a fragmentary expression of that very same idea which is "God's" idea of a state of our body. This characterisation constitutes the formal and the objective being of our 'minds', and consequently the essence of an idea. For both Descartes and Spinoza conditions of 'being' collectively state what a thing can neither be nor be without, and thereby stipulate and define a thing's essence. Spinozistic conditions of being are in place, yet if we ask if 'our' ideas 'really' have in their reality the basic nature of thought as defined, I believe we are inclined to challenge Spinoza's account. Lloyd says on this:–

'Omniscience about what happens in a body may be all very well for a divine intellect. But the ideas that are vehicles of this knowledge are supposed to be the minds we know and love so well. It is not less counter-intuitive to be told that the ideas are "inadequate." For there is surely a great deal that goes on in our bodies of which we cannot be said to have even inadequate knowledge" (Lloyd p.22).

But Lloyd's view is that

"To follow Spinoza here, we must both think of ourselves as knowing subjects, with particular perspectives on the world, and place ourselves outside that perspective, to think of relationships among ideas that include ourselves' (Lloyd p.21).

It is Lloyd's thesis that Spinoza's characterisation of an idea evinces a deliberate attempt to give a more satisfactory account of the representation relation than Descartes, in supposing that the mind could exist without real objects of representation, could
contrive (Lloyd p.27). Lloyd wants it to make it clear that our awareness of real objects may be distorted because our perceptions register only the interactions of our bodies with real external objects. Allison does not assign Spinoza the 'absurdity' that we have conscious awareness of everything that occurs in our bodies' (Allison p.110). But he believes a true idea expresses

'the condition of the organism in its interplay with the environment (which is their actual "object", or correlate), rather than the true nature of some independent reality' (Allison p.107).

Both Lloyd and Allison concede here that having true ideas requires a perspective shift, and in conceding this they imply that there is a difference in our phenomenological object from what Allison calls the 'actual object' of our idea (i.e. our body state). Lloyd, being concerned with knowledge of the self rather than of external physical objects or ideas, can avoid the problem of Spinoza's insistence that we are necessarily aware of the body – that all ideas have that awareness as part of their content. Since the quest for self-knowledge is a quasi-scientific project she is able to build on Spinoza's notion of the self through the notion of the mind as the idea of a particular body, and to show how self-knowledge results from looking consciously at one's mind in this way, as Spinoza suggests we should. Because all ideas are of a particular body, that particular body both has individuality and is necessarily subjectively orientated:-

"The mind's immersion in the totality of modes of thought means it lacks a standpoint from which it could readily have "adequate" understanding either of things or of itself.

To be self-aware, then, is not to direct attention on an intellectual object – there to be known, independent of an awareness of body. It is, rather, a refining of the direct sensory awareness of body" (Lloyd p.18).

Lloyd therefore advocates aspect-switching, and does not address Spinoza's failure to characterise the face-value representational content of our ideas.

However, while Lloyd can use Spinoza's thesis of bodily awareness instructively for her purpose, I believe our concern with the direction on the world of our ordinary ideas forces us to question Spinoza's claim about the content of our ideas in so far as they are 'ours'. His scientific thesis does not truly describe the content of our face-on ideas, but our ideas of them when we want to adopt a scientific perspective. My
worry is not about the rampant confusion of our direction on the world, but the actual representational content of our ideas. I am concerned with Spinoza's attempt to move seamlessly from the representational content of the Mind of "God" to that of its fractional expressions. I think we have to reject Spinoza's dictum that our normal direction on the world consciously represents for us the physical state of our bodies as well as the phenomenal object we would more naturally call its intentional object, even when we have what Spinoza must say is an adequate idea. It is not clear that our most scientific ideas (e.g. of the sun) always include data of its bodily interactions with its observers, although science may allow for the human body's contribution. Our mathematical conclusions and common notions about extension (e.g. the general properties of a triangle, or of the boiling-point of water) certainly do not include understanding of our bodies.

This omission seems to underline how little part the body plays in relation to our perceptions and theories about objects. If our theories do not involve data about our body-states they are inadequate, and if they do, they may be perspectival in a thoroughgoing way. In Spinozistic terms this representational content concerning our bodies seems to indicate that our 'adequate' ideas are inadequate. This consideration compels the conclusion not only that our science is radically inadequate, but that "God's" adequate ideas, in including this content, are more adequate than our 'adequate' ideas. It may be that we never put on 'truly' scientific spectacles. In any case, many of our ideas just do not have the representational content Spinoza claims, for humans do not seem to be endowed with much overt mental sensitivity to the interplay between their bodies and the environment.

I conclude that Spinoza's principle of objective being breaks down for the same reason that many other theories of mind have proved disappointing; namely that he fails to characterise thought as the psychological and phenomenological reality we

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9 I cannot go into this worry in detail. Spinoza admits that we cannot have adequate ideas of particulars. Yet I do not think common notions involve "adequate" representation, either, if this involves necessary representational content of our body states. Craig remarks:— "That what our best endeavours tell us is a valid inference may not be so in the sight of God is a thought that never seems to enter Spinoza's head. If it had, he would probably have dismissed it ... on grounds internal to his philosophy' (Craig p.46).
experience. I have argued that to integrate the undisputed reality of our raw experiential or face-value ideas with Spinoza's account of them as ideas of organic complexity we have generally to "emend" them by adding a new judgement and new content. I suggested earlier that although Spinoza blames incoherencies in earlier accounts of the human mind on erroneous starting-points (especially starting with specifically human mentality, or just one aspect of it, such as conscious awareness) is not clear that Spinoza does any better by adopting as a starting-point the mind of "God" and extrapolating from that to a part-mind whose ideas must (as Lloyd demonstrates) be fundamentally perspectival. I have further suggested that our adequate ideas often include no more representational content of our bodies than our inadequate ideas: that, indeed, it seems those ideas most directly expressing a content of knowledge of our body-states turn out to be the crudest of our sensations, and therefore inadequate ideas (e.g. I have a headache).

§ 5.4 The face-value representational content of human ideas.

I have found Spinoza's claim that all our ideas have real content of their object together with a state of our body false. We simply ask, now, if Spinoza is justified in claiming that our thoughts necessarily express any intentionality, and if so, what the significance of this is for preserving mental irreducibility. We know Spinoza claims that the most mutilated or confused of our ideas represents something (TIE §§32–36; E2 P8 C). I propose that he argues persuasively for this weaker claim, and that he has a thorough understanding of the role of intentionality in our thinking. I believe he makes us ponder what our thinking consist would consist in if it was directed towards nothing whatever. We recall how he tells de Vries that removing ideas leaves nothing to think 'of'. Yet I shall conclude that Spinoza cannot show that all our thoughts exhibit intentionality of any kind (let alone direct perception of our bodies).

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10 The lacuna between a metaphysical understanding of our mental states, and the representational content of our mental experiences is at least implicitly acknowledged in several scholarly readings. Barker (following Pollock) directly attacks Spinoza’s thesis (Barker I pp.136–144). The rift may account for Joachim’s belief that all inadequate ideas must be illusions (Joachim pp.113–122); for Sellars’s view that Spinoza’s aim in improving the intellect is the elimination of commonplace ways of thinking and feeling (Sellars p.8); for Cook’s belief that Spinoza may want us to adopt an eliminative attitude towards our minds (Cook p.94) and for Balz’s thesis that, for Spinoza, no psychological ideas actually exist (Balz p.52).
First, we have to clarify the matter of the 'inequality' (noted in §3.3) or many-one relation conferred by the mapping on to any one finite mode (in extension or thought) of our inadequate ideas. The infinite modification of inadequate ideas, and their infinite reflexivity (i.e. many inadequate ideas of one object, and many inadequate ideas of one inadequate idea) is entailed by the definition of an attribute as being infinite in its kind. This infinity of inadequate representations, referred to by Joachim as the 'indefinite infinity of the finite', was observed by Spinoza's learned correspondent Tschirnhaus, who objected that 'The Attribute of Thought is made much more extensive than the other attributes' (Letter 70). There are not only thoughts of modes in all attributes, but many inadequate thoughts of one object. This 'inequality' (in scare quotes to warn that we do not want to introduce the concept of number into the concept of infinity), or prolific dissemination of the mental, is admitted by Spinoza:— ".. each thing is expressed in infinite modes in the infinite understanding of God" (Letter 66). One object (say, the sun) may be represented in an infinity of singular ideas:—

"Different men can be affected differently by one and the same object; and one and the same man can be affected differently at different times by one and the same object" (E3 P51).

In each idea (as noted) the cognitive and representational content will be different.

This 'inequality' does not seem to me a problem for the characterisation of true ideas. The doctrine of 'pairs' or 'unions' — true ideas of objects — which sustains the mind-body relation remains intact. The tidiness of this totally true system, and the messiness or 'indefinite infinity' of our raw direction on the world, are irrelevant here. We know now that most of our idea-object directedness has nothing to do with the identity principle, for Spinoza says our inadequate ideas are not identical with their phenomenological objects, and I have suggested that even our seemingly adequate ideas are less than true by virtue of their lack of data about our body-states — for Spinoza, their actual object. Nor is Spinoza's claim about the actual representational content of our inadequate ideas any longer at stake. All we address now is the schema of confused and distorted human direction on the world, with a view to seeing whether each of our mental experiences can be said to exhibit such direction.
Spinoza makes objective being inherent in any idea (*esse objectiva sive ideae* – E2 P8 C), and reinforces it with an axiom as a necessary feature of emotions:

"There are no modes of thinking, such as love, desire, or whatever is designated by the word affects of the mind, unless there is in the same individual the idea of the thing loved, desired, etc: But there can be an idea, even though there is no other mode of thinking" (E2 A3).

Any emotion is, he says, a variant of one of three primary affects, namely joy, sadness or desire (E3 P11 S). These same affects are acknowledged by Descartes as three of six 'primitive passions' (*Passions* 11, 69). They are, for Spinoza, true type–ideas in human minds, and therefore common notions (cf. above, Note 6). Since Spinoza holds that common notions can be "caused" (E2 P40 S1), that is, can be conclusions deduced from true premises which are in themselves common notions, deductions can be made from the definitions of the three primary affects.

I think most emotions are acknowledged to be about something. Love, loathing and desire obviously have objects (n.b. we are not talking of causes) at which they are directed. But some emotions (as was noted when discussing emotions as judgements) do not clearly concern anything outside themselves. For Descartes, 'Passions of the soul' are emotions which do not refer to external objects:

'... they are so close and so internal to the soul that it cannot possibly feel them unless they are truly as it feels them to be' (*Passions* 1, 26, CSM 1 p.338.)

Descartes has support for his belief that some emotions do not take objects. Hume, for example, writes that 'When I am angry, I am actually possessed by passion, and in that emotion have no more reference to any other object than when I am thirsty or sick..' (*Treatise* p.415). Object–less emotions are also cited in modern literature as threats to the notion that intentionality is a necessary (let alone sufficient) condition of the mental. Thalberg admits that emotions which do take objects are thoughts but he argues that not all emotions take objects. Depression, euphoria and total apathy are, for Thalberg, object–less. Pride might also be thought in some instances to have no object. While it is readily conceived as intentional in an instance such as 'pride in' an achievement, we may ask what the proud person is proud 'of'? Is his mental state, like
that of the depressed or euphoric person, merely a reflection of a body-state, having face-value representational content? I have argued that for intentionality to be a sufficient condition of any experiential idea each emotion must have an apparent object. Spinoza meets this challenge. Simply, he says, the proud person is proud 'of himself':-

"Pride is thinking more highly of oneself than is just, out of love of oneself ... Pride is an effect of the property of Self-love. Therefore, it can also be defined as Love of oneself, or self-esteem" (E3 Definitions of the Affects, XXVIII).

Self-esteem, a synonym for this kind of pride, contains the elements of intentional judgement in its very wording (esteem 'of oneself). Hume agreed that in the case of pride 'This object is self, or that succession of related ideas and impressions ..' (Treatise p.277). Yet this Spinoza–Hume view reintroduces a doubt that a mind which is only ideas can constitute a 'self' apt to be an object of thought. It was suggested in §3.3 that Spinoza ignores the notion of self-consciousness. It might also be suggested that he ignores the notion of a conscious subject which has, or is the object of, feelings. I have argued that Spinoza's doctrine of the mind as ideas which are solely kinds of knowing (above, §4.2), and his thesis concerning what happens to our minds after death (above, §2.2 and §5.3), affirm that he dissolves the 'ghost in the machine' – a subject–self grasping and rejecting ideas at will. Spinoza's preoccupation with the fate of individuals shows that he must, like Hume, think that he has furnished a satisfactory concept of 'self' as subject, and also as an object of representations. I do not think the conception of a self as an aggregate of attitudes is hard to justify. We confront 'idea–selves' as the objects of our thought whenever we contemplate fictional characters: Pickwick and the man in the moon, for example, have no other being than as ideas. Moreover, a Cartesian soul may be riven and incoherent – its component thoughts so out of tune with one another that as a self it seems radically split into diverse subjects or multiple personalities. Or it may be observed to express no 'selfhood' at all.

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11 For Hume, although pride may be immediately perceived as 'an original existence' or 'ultimate felt quality' which has no reference to any other object, it is analysed as being 'directed to' some object (Treatise pp.415, 292). Hume's analysis matches Spinoza's view of pride about an achievement, or a pride 'about' or 'of' oneself. In 'Hume's Cognitive Theory of Pride' Davidson notes that Hume distinguishes the cause of pride from the object of pride (HCTP p.282; Treatise 2 §§11 & 111), and says that this relation of the subject to the object of pride is a matter of unquestionable logical connection (ibid. p.290).
Spinoza has some contemporary support for his claim that all emotions must have an object. One modern philosopher has considered the consequences of conceding some emotions to be about nothing at all, and found those consequences disquieting:—

'it is conceptually impossible that someone be angry yet not angry about something'. The aboutness of anger seems to me to be a very important semantic feature, for without it anger would be little more than a strange psychosis that strikes people suddenly from time to time, saddling them with ugly desires and bizarre physiological disturbances' (Gordon p.35).

What Gordon says here (in 'The Aboutness of Emotion') could equally support a belief that emotions such as anger must have causes — a point not at issue here. But it does also suggest that we are bewildered when emotions do not seem to have an object. Gordon points out that object-less anger (like other emotions) is so rare

'that we not have a contrasting term which enables us to say, 'This is not true anger but at most ---- .' Were such cases to become common, I should think they would soon acquire a name of their own — most likely a name that clearly marks the state as a disease' (ibid.)

Truly object-less anger, euphoria, apathy or depression seem tantamount to a physical illness which we would describe in mental terms as 'insanity', or in physical terms as clinical malfunction. Had we to endure object-less misery or apathy for long, we would soon want to consult a doctor (or someone else would, on our behalf) because mental or physical disturbance on the neural level would be suspected. Spinoza would say this vindicates his thesis that it is our bodies that sensitively react to the world, and that our ideas reflect this. But this conceptualisation re-introduces Spinoza's metaphysical view of ideas as reflections of body states, and I have argued that for intentionality to be true it must be true of "those ideas which things now actually present to us or produce in us", not as we make a second, later judgement on them.

It is sometimes argued today that pain does not take an object. Pain is currently considered a sensation, but for Spinoza it is a mental event,¹² a chronic and wretched state of mind best expressed today in the American 'I am hurting'. Spinozistic "pain" is always sadness (E3 P11 S), and as a variant of one of the three primary

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¹² Descartes was unsure about this. For him, pain is one of 'the emotions or passions of the mind' which 'must not be referred either to the mind alone or to the body alone' (Principles 1,48).
affects it must have an object, since all emotions have objects. Yet the intransitivity of the expression 'I am hurting' suggests that no object is involved with pain whether it is taken as an emotion or a sensation. However, I suggested earlier (following Lloyd) that no inadequate idea justifies more conclusively than pain Spinoza's claim that our ideas involve a direct awareness of body. Pain is known as directed on our body not merely when explained that way, but as a raw perception. As noted above (§4.4) we could not intelligibly make a claim about a pain unless it was perceived by us as having our body as its object. Are there, then, no object-less sensations? I suggested (above, §4.4) that those who claim that cognitive awareness fails to characterise sensations must explain how we have most of our understanding of the world, since sensations 'of' or 'about' our surroundings are largely supposed to constitute that knowledge. Yet it is clear that we do sometimes have creepy or odd sensations, such as a sudden violent shiver, or a prickle of fear, or the conviction that someone is standing behind us, which have no obvious direction on a real external thing. (Again, we do not speak here of causes.) Spinoza must say that such experiences are, "truly", ideas of abnormalities in the nervous system, but we are currently discounting that metaphysical story, which has now been exposed as additional representational content.

While Spinoza anticipates Brentano and later philosophers of mind who think intentionality is a necessary mark of the mental, I believe his defining of ideas shows insight in the following ways into how – although intentionality does not pertain to any attribute other than thought – the condition of intentionality requires a further condition of formal mental being (ie. a mental property) if it is to establish purely mental direction on the world. 1. Spinoza makes all thoughts intrinsically representational: an idea, being formally defined as a judgement, has to be of or about something. 2. If intentionality is specified as mere 'direction on the world' it has no distinctive inmost

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13 Many philosophers credit the term 'intentionality' to Brentano, its first twentieth-century proponent (cf. above, Chapter 5, Note 4). Attending to Brentano's reading is likely to forefront conditions of (i) consciousness, since Brentano argues protractedly for his conclusion that there are no unconscious ideas (Brentano p.121) and (ii) not-physical-ness. Brentano holds that for Spinoza, as for Descartes and Kant, mental phenomena are 'definable' as 'those phenomena which do not have extension or spatial location' (Brentano p.85). Absence of extension is a necessary condition for Spinozistic ideas, but intentionality cannot be a sufficient condition for their being as ideas, since being non-extended is, for Spinoza, the mark of modes of any attribute other than extension. But no other attribute expresses objective being.
nature. We might take heat-seeking mechanisms or predatory instincts (both physical properties) to be direction on the world. Unless the propensity for mental representation is claimed to inhere in mental properties, there is nothing specifically mental about representation.  

3. An idea may be the object (ideatum) of another idea, and so on, ad infinitum, all these relations holding within one attribute. What, therefore, distinguishes one idea from another if not some extra element of formal being? We cannot claim that an idea which has X as its content cannot coherently be X itself unless we assign distinct mental formal being to each individual idea. I conclude that confining intentionality to the mental requires an additional stipulation of mentality, which Spinoza provides.

However, I have proposed that Spinoza does not establish intentionality as a necessary feature of all thoughts. If experiences such as vague sensations or emotions have no apparent object it will not do to replace them with new ideas which confer on these undirected thoughts some metaphysical intentionality in the mind of "God". I conclude that while intentionality qua mere direction on the world characterises many of our thoughts, it does not characterise them all, so is not a necessary condition for mentality. If we add to this deficiency the failure of Spinozistic ideas to include as features of their necessary representational content states of our bodies, I conclude that Spinoza fails to characterise most of our ideas.

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14Davidson chooses intentionality as the mark of the mental:— 'On the proposed test of the mental, the distinguishing feature of the mental is not that it is private, subjective, or immaterial, but that it exhibits what Brentano calls intentionality' (ME p.211). Intentionality, he proposes, acts as a test and, as a criterion of the mental, covers events which 'one would intuitively accept as physical' (ibid. p.211). Davidson's thesis is non-parochial:— 'We can afford Spinozistic extravagance with the mental' (ME p.212). 'There seems no compelling reason to deny that there could be coextensive predicates, one mental and one physical' (ibid. p.215). But, as we have seen, and as Macdonald notes, Davidson's 'generous construal of the mental by linguistic formulations of the intentionality criterion' is exploited by him in his claim that every event counts as physical (Macdonald p.8). Davidson is thus aware that intentionality does not guarantee a purely mental description.
CHAPTER 6  
PRINCIPLE OF INDEPENDENT MENTAL CAUSAL POWER

§ 6.1 The gap in the evidence for 'parallelism'.

We have so far examined the following Spinozistic principles which may be seen as premises concerning a theorem of the mind-body relation:—

1. Identity premise. (Wherever substance is extended it is also thinking — KV 2 xx Note c10; E2 P7 S; E3 P2 S).

2. Autonomy premise. (The attribute of thought is eternally (necessarily and always) independent from the physical — E1 D2; E1 P10 S; E2 P5; E2 P6 Proof).

3. Holism premise. (The attribute of thought [infinite intellect] is a self-contained and all-inclusive explanatorily independent realm — E2 P7 S).

4. Formal being premise. (Any mode of thought is an idea — E2 A3; E2 P11 C: any idea is a judgement — (E2 P49 S3 Bii).

5. Objective essence premise. (The mind is the idea of the body — E2 P3; E2 P11).

The theorem these premises go some way to supporting is expressed in a proposition which is widely recognised by Spinoza commentators as one of the most troublesome in *Ethics*, but one which is pivotal to Spinoza's theory of mind:—

"The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things" (E2 P7).

It is re-stated with more direct reference to the mind-body relation in *Ethics* Part 5:—

"In just the same way as thoughts and ideas are connected in the mind, so the affections of the body, or images of things are ordered and connected in the body" (E5 P1).

The *Short Treatise* statement of the mind-body 'parallelism' runs:—

"So this existing portion's objective essence in the thinking attribute is the soul of the body. Hence when one of these modes (motion or rest) changes, either by increasing or decreasing, the idea also changes correspondingly." (KV Appendix 11 §15, C p.155).

This is a strong claim about concurrent causal processes. We saw in §2.1 that Spinoza assigns causal explanations strictly to either a physical or a mental domain, and says this is due to diverse causal processes, due in turn to dissimilar causal natures or potentialities. The significant Spinozistic causal claim is that, over and above the
pairs of ideas and objects (i.e. human ideas and body states) entailed by the principles or premises we have already discussed, in any sequence of such paired states a dual causal ordering is at work. For example, at a specific time it occurs to me to sit in the sun. This idea is identical with a state of my body. Later I sit in the sun and my idea of this experience is also identical with a particular state of my body, but the two events are separately nomically connected on mental and physical levels. We may clarify this Spinozistic claim of two separate but unified tracks of events by analogy with a cine-film. Just as the succession of pictures is in one dimension a story or train of ideas and in another a sequence of celluloid images, for Spinoza my ideas and my body states, identical in substance, follow their own mental and physical trajectories. For him, they are determined by disparate causal powers.

This Spinozistic thesis is traditionally called a 'parallelism'. (This is not Spinoza's terminology, but Spinoza offers us no alternative label). It embraces – in modern terminology – a dual flowchart and a token-token identity of mental and physical events. At the point where the parallelism claim comes in Ethics Part 2 it should, as already mentioned, be a theorem: that is, we should be able to append 'Q.E.D.' to it because it is derived from separately demonstrated premises. But none of the principles or premises we have discussed so far legitimises a claim that the mental is either causally efficacious or ordered in a regular or lawlike way. Given that Spinoza postulates a mental property which is maximally independently causally efficacious, and given that modern debate centres for many philosophers on the requirement for mental irreducibility of a causally efficacious mental property, evidence for a principle of the independent power of intelligence is urgently needed. We know Spinoza believes that all modes of thought are "the concern of logic", and that "Inadequate and confused ideas follow with the same necessity as adequate, or clear and distinct ideas" (E2 P36). But ideas must be shown to be strictly causally ordered in their own formal being. If such an account cannot be supplied, Spinoza's theory of

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independent mental causation may be, in the end, deflationary. What we call 'mental' causal roles could all be physical. The parallelism doctrine requires explanation of the disposition—to—power of intelligence, that is, of how ideas move along under their own steam correlative with the body states of which they are the functions. While the mind is a function of the body, or a reflection of its states, we know Spinoza thinks that "The power of the mind is intelligence itself" (E2 P43 S). If the idea changes it is changed by the power of intelligence alone because

"The body cannot determine the mind to thinking, and the mind cannot determine the body to motion" (E3 P2).

But it is not generally thought that Spinoza supplies any account of why or how the "power of intelligence" determines ideas. Several commentators have scrutinised *Ethics* Part 1 and the six propositions leading up to the E2 P7 'parallelism' statement and found them deficient in this respect.\(^2\) Thus the first problem connected with Spinoza's principle of the power of intelligence is its validity. We later address the objection that Spinoza's claim that inadequate ideas are nomically determined is not plausible. First, however, we deal with the objection that Spinoza's claim that all psycho–psycho connections are necessarily nomically ordered is not justified.

We seem, in questioning Spinoza's doctrine of mental causal connections, to assume he has explained his claim of nomic physical causal relations. In fact, he has given no more justification for this in the pre–parallelism statement of E2 P7 than he has for mental lawlikeness. His thesis has been quite general regarding determinism, causality, and the equivalence of Nature's laws with the necessity of God/Nature:–

"From the necessity of the divine Nature alone, or (what is the same thing) from the laws of his Nature alone, absolutely infinite things follow" (E1 P17 Proof).

What does Spinoza mean by the 'laws of Nature', which he claims in the latter passages of *Ethics* Part 1 equally to govern *Natura Naturans* (God/Nature conceived as causal)
and Natura Naturata (i.e. all Nature's effects)? He explains elsewhere that

"The word 'law' in the widest sense means a rule in accordance with which all individual things, or all things of the same species, or some of them, act in one and the same fixed and determinate way" (TTP iv, Wernham p.67).

Laws, then, are the actual regularities in Nature which nothing can elude. We saw in §1.1 Spinoza's early insistence that God himself cannot flout the laws of Nature. For Spinoza there can be no miracles or contingencies. The claim we now examine is that things happen as they must not merely because they are determined but because they determined in a certain way. Any singular occurrence, however bizarre, accidental or unnatural it may seem, is subject to natural explanation through immutable laws:-

"Nothing happens in Nature which can be attributed to any defect in it, for Nature is always the same, and its virtue and power of acting are everywhere one and the same, i.e. the laws and rules of Nature, according to which all things happen, and change from one form to another, are always and everywhere the same. So the way of understanding the nature of anything, of whatever kind, must always be the same, viz. through the universal laws and rules of Nature" (E3 Preface, my emphasis).

It is not difficult for us to acquiesce in Spinoza's belief that the causal processes of extension are lawlike. As Spinoza points out, those who allow God an arbitrary will to disrupt Nature's causal laws must also grant knowledge (scientia) to be impossible:-

"If they are willing to reflect on the matter, and consider properly the chain of our demonstrations, in the end they will utterly reject the freedom they now attribute to God, not only as futile, but as a great obstacle to science" (E1 P33 S2).

We currently consider it reasonable to treat the physical world as behaving in a lawlike way despite the warnings of physicists that nature is indeterminate on the micro level. But the emphasis in E3 Preface (above) shows that, for Spinoza, Nature's laws are thoroughgoing. The mental is a natural kind and it, too, is lawlike.

It seems at this point that we are prepared to grant Spinoza an assumption of physical lawlikeness while we are inclined to challenge his unsupported assumption of lawlike mental behaviour. Why should this be? We need to probe deeper into the
actual causal claim Spinoza makes. This does not involve, as noted above, the notion that the mental may be thought of as behaving in a lawlike way because we understand it best as a function of the physical, and we grant that the physical is lawlike. This is not a Spinozistic claim and it would allow for causal roles to lie in the physical. As argued earlier (§3.3) for Spinoza, physical statements are never logically sufficient for the truth of mental ones: Spinoza is not a behaviourist (Bennett p.137). The logical interdependence of mental and physical properties confers no causal dependence of the mental on the physical as regards the etiology of mental states.

It is evident from the number of allusions made in earlier Chapters of my thesis to Spinoza's causal thesis that causality is, for Spinoza, a dominant metaphysical concept. There is, for him, no true knowledge which does not involve knowledge of causes. Rational explanation necessarily includes knowledge of causes, and any explanation is inadequate which is not intrinsically a causal explanation. Spinoza makes it axiomatic that "The knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, the knowledge of its cause" (E1 A4), and says again in E2 P28 SII that "God's effects can neither be nor be conceived without their cause". Any instance of causality is an expression of God/Nature's causality. God/Nature is sole causal principle and, being internal to Nature, constitutes all causal power and all actual causal roles. Spinoza is an explanatory rationalist: for him there is, in principle, a true causal story to be told about any occurrence. We have seen that "God" as all truths is marked off as all true and complete knowledge of causes - the total history of each thing, everything that could be known about it in terms of its causal connections with every other mode of its kind. And, as seen, in knowing the generalities of Nature truly, and other aspects partially, we humans also know causes generally or partially, for causation does not come apart from a nature/essence. Whenever we say what kind of thing some thing is we say at the same time that it is an expression of a certain kind of causal power. For example, even if we merely say the sun is hot, we refer implicitly to a causal power. The Mayan sun god 'Sun Face Fire Macaw', striding malignantly across the sky with a flaming torch in his hand, represents the view of the Maya people that some sun-power makes things hot (Thompson p.72). A thing's essence, that is, what a
thing is, and cannot exist without – is its place in a causal system of a certain kind. That essences are powers through some attribute (i.e. of some kind) is shown by the equivalence of "God's supreme power or infinite nature" (E1 P17 S1). Since "God's power is his essence itself" (E1 P34) and God/Nature just is its attributes "God or all the Attributes of God" (E1 P19), essence-as-nature = essence-as-causal role. Thus, any attempt at a causal explanation of a mental event drives us back to a specific thesis of independent mental causality. This will involve a section of the chain of purely mental causes which leads back to the immediate infinite mode of thought, or first causal principle of thought.

However, only after the parallelism statement does Spinoza make it clear that ideas do not 'flow' in some mysterious manner from "God's" thought-essence but are caused through a modal system in which

"The cause of one singular idea is another idea or God, insofar as he is considered to be affected by another idea; and of this also God is the cause, insofar as he is considered to be affected by another, and so on, to infinity, q.e.d." (E2 P9 Proof).

This concatenation is echoed in the causal system of the attribute of extension:–

"a body which moves or is at rest must be determined to motion or rest by another body, which has also been determined to motion or rest by another, and that again by another, and so on, to infinity" (E2 P13 L3). "And if we proceed in this way to infinity, we shall easily conceive that the whole of Nature is one Individual, whose part, i.e. all bodies, vary in infinite ways, without any change of the whole individual" (E2 P13 L7 S).

Spinoza stresses in the Proofs of Ethics Part 2 Propositions 2–6 that all causality is necessarily limited to some attribute, yet the laconic Proof to E2 P7 ("The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things") makes reference solely to E1 A4:– "The knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, the knowledge of its cause" (E1 A4). Allison voices the scepticism of other Spinoza

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3 I shall not dwell on the problem noted by Taylor and others that God/Nature cannot be both a cause through essence (immanent cause) and also operate through a system of local causal connections, which for Taylor, following Martineau, is transitive causation (Taylor pp.196–7). I think theories in modern physics make it easy to conceive of an internal force disseminated through fields (cf. Bennett (pp.88–92 and 149–151).
interpreters (especially Bennett [Bennett pp.127–131]) that E1 A4, 'a claim about the
dependence of the knowledge, or cognition, of a cause' should have anything to do with
the causal order of ideas considered solely as mental occurrences (Allison p.90).

I suggest that Spinoza does not make explicit the premise we need in the early
Propositions of Ethics Part 2 because it is very obvious to his contemporaries. I
believe he exploits certain scholastic concepts and works with other hidden assumptions
(familiar to his readers) to support his doctrine of mental "order and connection" and
of a network of intelligence he postulates as "the concern of logic", and that these are
coherently deduced from E1 A4. Two such scholastic claims are embedded in an early
Ethics Proposition:— "For each thing there must be assigned a cause, or (seu) reason,
as much for its existence as its inexistence" (E1 P11). The claims are (i) that for each
thing there must be assigned a cause, and (ii) that causes and reasons are equivalent.

Regarding the Cartesian and scholastic assertion that for each thing there must
be a certain cause on account of which it exists, that cause must, for Spinoza, be an
'efficient' one, that is, a 'push' which contains everything needed for a given effect. If
a cause contains more than is required for a given effect it is said by Descartes to be
an 'eminent' cause and, for him, God is the eminent cause of all thoughts. Descartes
appeals in Meditations to the principle of 'eminent' cause to justify the existence of his
idea of God's existence (3rd Meditation, CSM pp.28–29,32), and subsequently to justify
all his clear and distinct perceptions (4th Meditation, CSM p.43). For Descartes, God,
as external efficient cause, has 'pushed' all eternal truths into his mind from outside
Nature. Spinoza also makes his God/Nature the efficient cause of all things, not (as
we saw in §§1.2 and 3.2) as a traditional First Cause – an external power giving a
'push' from outside Nature – but as sole internal or essential cause. Spinoza's
God/Nature is internal Natural power, while the Cartesian 'God' exerts power on its
created effects. The God of the Neoplatonists, too, remains in its divine intellectual
dimension external to, and above, Nature, 'infusing' Nature from this greater power. In
contrast, Spinoza's God/Nature subsumes any conception of God, leaving no God
outside Nature as a creative or animating principle:—

"We say that God is an emanative or productive cause of his actions ...."
He is an immanent and not a transitive cause, since he does everything in himself, and not outside himself (because outside him there is nothing)" (KV 1 iii, 1 and 2, C p.80).^4 Whatever power inheres in thought is integral to Nature, and, by the holism principle, whatever essential power is expressed in God's thought must also be expressed in some adequate or inadequate way in the thoughts of God's partial expressions. We see here that Spinoza exploits the assumptions of his contemporaries by hijacking their assumption of a cause for any existing thing, and their assumption that 'God's' intellect is causal. In Platonic, Aristotelian, Neoplatonic and Judaeo-Christian ancient philosophy alike 'God's' intellect is first causal principle (not only of thought, but of material things, too). Spinoza manipulates these assumptions into conjunction with his claim that the causal potential of thought must be the same in our human minds as it is for "God" since our minds are fragments of "God's" thought. Our ideas must be internally determined by the same power of intelligence as is "God's". But Spinoza dissolves the planning and willing aspect of all earlier 'Gods' - Neoplatonic, Judaic and Christian. In his view the assertion of God/Nature as logical grounds is made consistent only by excluding the 'will of God' as an arbitrary and external causal force. God cannot conflict with the laws of Nature: it is those laws expressed in a Natural generation of things and ideas. I suggest that this adaptation of a familiar causal principle gets Spinoza part way to a principle of independent mental causal power. His claim is that, because divine thinking power is immanent in all ideas, the reason we think 'pulls' us to a decision is really an inner push:–

"What is called a final cause is nothing but a human appetite insofar as it is considered as principle or [sive] primary cause, of some thing" (E4 Preface).

Turning to the claim that, for Spinoza, causes and reasons are equivalent, Spinoza equates cause with reason (causa seu ratio) not just once, but seven times, in

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^4 When Spinoza says, "I do not separate God from Nature as everyone known to me has done" (Letter 6) he marks his thesis off from Neo-platonists, Cabalists and others for whom 'God' does not exist entirely within, or as, Nature. He must think this includes those Stoics for whom 'God' as logos, divine intelligence, designed and created the natural order, making the world in a sense a product of 'God's' thinking-power (James S. p.304), but is contained in matter 'in a more relaxed and less creative way' (Hallie p.21).
E1 P11, 2nd Proof. Causes in extension are reasons, and reasons for ideas are the
causes of them. By this Spinoza means that God/Nature is the logical ground of all
things: all things follow from this causal principle just as they are deduced from it.
This is a medieval assumption (Allison p.55). There is no causal sequence which is
not *at the same time* a set of reasons: effects follow from God/Nature in exactly the
same way as the conclusion of a valid argument follows from its premises. It might
have been more convenient for us to take Spinoza's 'or' as a disjunction and accept
Curley's suggestion that the causes lie in the physical flow while the logical relations
interconnect the mental 'propositions' (Curley 1 pp.123–4). But I do not think Spinoza
intends this. The assertions he makes which equate causation with logical entailment
would seem nonsensical if we did not understand this to be deliberate. For example,
Spinoza says that real divisions in extension would be a "contradiction" (KV 1 ii 20).
We have also just seen the equivalence of "principle *or* primary cause", and we shortly
encounter an equivalence of "inferred *or* perceived through some attribute" (E1 P23
Proof). Causes and reasons seem, for Spinoza, truly interchangeable.

Spinoza also stresses in the medieval E1 P11 claim that there is a reason for the
non-*existence* of a thing. If something does not exist, this is due to the logical
causation which dictates that \( [p] \rightarrow \neg q \). This is his explanation of why things are
determinedly, not contingently, absent from the world. As used in E1 P11 the cause/
reason equation seems to be a principle of sufficient reason; that is, Spinoza claims that
there is a reason, which represents an actual cause, for the existence of anything.\(^5\)

The cause/reason equation is a commonplace among philosophers preceding
Hume (Bennett p.30). For Spinoza and others it is a slogan of causal rationalism
representing an ideal in scientific explanation. The ideal is Euclidean. Explaining
means showing, through reasons, how one thing must be the logically necessary

\(^5\) The \( [p] \rightarrow \neg q \) formulation is from Savile. Bennett believes Spinoza's causal rationalism is forced on
him by his explanatory rationalism (Bennett p.31 and Ch.2, §§ 8–10). See also Hampshire pp.39–40; Allison
pp.63–64 and Lloyd pp.9 and 53. Barker thinks Spinoza 'confuses the relation of cause and effect with that
of ground and consequence, or that he resolves the former into the latter, or even that he rejects the former
altogether' (Barker 1 p.118). Donagan takes a line closer to Curley's, claiming that Spinoza 'did not confound
causal necessity with logical necessity' (Donagan p.113): – 'Like Descartes before him and all physicists after
him, Spinoza believed that, *given a law of nature*, a statement of an effect worded in terms of that law will
logically follow from a similarly worded statement of its cause (Donagan p.75).
consequence of another. Explanations demonstrate necessary connections between real things. This view was repudiated by later philosophers on the grounds that causal necessity is weaker than logical necessity; that we can argue logically for many a bizarre causal thesis without contradicting ourselves, but that such admittedly valid arguments do not entail real causal possibilities. For Spinoza, causal rationalism is linked in practice with cognitive *a priorism*: science is in the first instance a matter of pure deduction, made without recourse to experience or experiment. Spinoza is generally thought to be a more thoroughgoing causal rationalist in his science than Descartes. For Spinoza, looking for scientific truth always requires the mind's eye; hence the equivalence, "inferred or perceived through some attribute" (E1 P23 Proof). Both Descartes and Spinoza also make use of the medieval philosophical technique of arguing things into existence. But while Descartes relies more heavily than Spinoza on a medieval ontological argument for the existence of God, he makes strenuous efforts in his science to discard the excesses of causal rationalism commonly used. He attacks and rejects the causal syllogisms of the scholastics, which he says can produce false judgments and ridiculous scientific conclusions. For, from any consistent (non-contradictory) set of premises we can draw a conclusion which is certain simply in virtue of the form. But truth often slips through these fetters, while those who employ them

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6 For Spinoza the role of experience is curtailed and goal-directed: "Experience does not teach us any essences of things. The most it can do is to determine our mind to think only of certain essences of things" (Letter 10). Severity (and sarcasm) is evident in Letters 39, 40 and 41: "The fact is that if nothing else is taken into consideration except the length of the eye or of the telescope, we should have to make very long telescopes before we could see the objects on the moon as distinctly as the objects here on earth" (Letter 39). It is interesting that Spinoza owned a microscope (Colerus p.42) and ground optical lenses for most of his adult life but did not record any findings, despite having Huygens (who praised the lenses he bought from Spinoza) as a neighbour, and van Loewenhoek making discoveries about insects not far off in Delft. He seems to see no point, for example, in Boyle's chemical research, whereas Descartes is willing to concede that causes cannot always be ascertained from the armchair. For Spinoza there is no point in looking for laws in a few local sequences of causal interaction (TIE §27 and Letter 6), although the water-pressure experiment he sets up in his garden seems not to be geared to previous calculation (Letter 41).

7 i.e. a claim for God's real existence on the grounds that we can deduce his existence from our concepts. This form of argument was attacked by Hobbes (3rd Objections to *Meditations*) and was later definitively refuted by Kant. Spinoza's claim, on the other hand, that "God's" essence involves, that is, entails, or is logically inseparable from, his existence, is to be unpacked into separately undeniable scientific statements, that is, axioms and postulates concerning what must be true about Nature. While we may not find them all undeniable either *prima facie* or after protracted debate, it cannot be said that Spinoza relies on an ontological argument for the existence of God as traditionally conceived, upon whose truth all future assertions depend. Bennett finds the scholastic phrase "essence involves existence" vacuous, but admits that Spinoza 'is really operating with the notion of a thing whose nature must be instantiated' (Bennett p.74).
are left entrapped in them' *(Rules* 10, CSM 1 p.36).

Nonetheless, Descartes urges the use of rational deduction for establishing causes, claiming that sense perception distorts our view of things:—

'If a cause allows all the phenomena to be clearly deduced from it, then it is virtually impossible that it should not be true' *(Principles* 3, 43, CSM 1 p.255).

Spinoza, however, seems at times to reaffirm the logical necessity of the causal syllogisms of scholastic philosophy. Hubbeling believes 'there is not so much difference between the syllogistic thinking of Scholasticism as a method and the geometrical thinking of Spinoza' (Hubbeling pp.25 and 33–4).

I conclude that in his iconoclastic reorganisation of "God's" ideal mind Spinoza appropriates the assumptions of his contemporaries and makes them work for his thesis of immanent cause. "God's" reasons are causes; so are ours. "God's" reasons/ causes, insofar as these are ideas cause only ideas; so do ours. No idea can elude this causal network. Even if our ideas are inadequate they are passive effects in a unified causal network of thought, and can be acted upon. We return to this theme in §6.4. I further suggest Spinoza capitalises on another medieval assumption, as he did regarding the accepted dogma of God/Nature's attribute plenitude. I refer to E1 P17 C1, in which Spinoza expounds at some length why God/Nature "is only an efficient cause from the force of his own perfection" (E1 P17 C1 and Note). Spinoza argues that the inevitability with which all things flow from the divine nature indicates that

"God's omnipotence has been actual from eternity and will remain in the same actuality to eternity. And in this way, at least in my opinion, God's omnipotence is maintained far more perfectly" (E1 P17 S1).

I have indicated Spinoza's view that 'God' cannot coherently intervene in Nature or disrupt its lawlike necessity. Here he claims that God/Nature's thoroughgoing involvement in Nature (which we might deem radical or maximal intervention) can only maximise God's omnipotence. As shown earlier in relation to devils or other alien pockets of mentality which seem to elude a general characterisation of thought, Spinoza claims here that for a consistent account of mental causality no mode of thought can have a causal role outside the network of "God's" causality — the modal system of ideas.
I have tried to show that Spinoza has interfused mental power with Nature, and conferred internal mental power on every mode, making all mental dispositions—to-power both causes and reasons. A thoroughgoing system of determined mental causality is in place. But is it lawlike? Do "God's" true ideas interconnect in a lawlike way just because they follow necessarily? Spinoza equates necessity and lawlikeness:— "From the necessity of the divine nature alone, or (what is the same thing) from the laws of his nature alone" ... (E1 P17 Proof). He therefore asserts a nomic character for Nature.

I believe that underlying this assertion of a thoroughgoing lawlike concatenation of thought is the notion of "God" as ideal mind or all truths, which precisely reflects states and changes in extension. We recall:—

"The aim, then is to have clear and distinct ideas ... And then, so that all ideas may be led back to one, we shall strive to connect and order them so that our mind, as far as possible, reproduces objectively the formal character of Nature, both as to the whole and as to the parts" (TIE §91).

"The truth and formal essence of things is what it is because it exists objectively in that way in God's intellect" (E1 P17 S).

I have used examples of a fir cone and the true intelligence of its material growth (§2.2) and of a cine-film and the story it tells (above) to show the reflection of physical events in mental events, and to demonstrate the duality of mental and physical "order and connection" Spinoza espouses. Bennett points out that a pattern of true knowledge of objects is established just before the parallelism statement of E2 P7:—

"In God there is necessarily an idea, both of his essence and of everything that necessarily follows from his essence" (E2 P3).

This does not, Bennett says (Bennett pp.130–131) justify the parallelism claim. It only states that there is a system of pairs logically related by the objective essence of the true ideas "in God". This is, as noted at the start of this Chapter, one premise for the "order and connection" claim. But I think it provides a clue as to why Spinoza refers us back from E2 P7 to E1 A4, "The knowledge of [or idea of] an effect depends on, and involves, the knowledge of [or idea of] its cause". For I believe E2 P3 says implicitly in the word "follows", in a way which is obscure for us but which would not have been in Spinoza's day, that not only is there in an infinite intellect a complete, true
knowledge of all objects including their causes, but that God's intellect is in itself causally active. This is a third scholastic claim. Craig gives an extensive account in Chapter 1, 'The Mind of God', of how the traditional scholastic belief that God's knowledge was the perfect conformity or likeness of intellect with thing, and that God's true ideas were logically interconnected while corresponding with their objects, became intensified in the seventeenth-century philosophies of Galileo, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz and Malebranche. It was believed by these rationalists, and other intellectuals including the Cambridge Platonists, that 'God's reason resembled human reason, and the doctrine of the divine perfection insisted that he possessed it and used it to the logical maximum' (Craig p.37). The logico-mathematical model which was a normative ideal for man was 'a descriptive ideal for God' (ibid. p.39). This divine chain of causes and effects was judged the embodiment of a deductive system: causal connections (or reasons) had to be 'intelligible' and must therefore stand in a lawlike relation:—

'If it were not so, there would be facts about the course of events which were intrinsically inexplicable; and this last thought, because of its position in the complex of ideas composing the epistemological version [Insight Ideal] of the Image of God doctrine, was in the seventeenth-century widely felt to be intolerable' (ibid. p.40).

Craig holds that Spinoza's 'mind of God' is the "proof" of nature ordine geometrico, generating all ideas actively and deductively from within its own intellect (ibid. p.47).

The "order and connection" of ideas was universally assumed to be perfect within a totally causally active mind: God's ideas "followed" as a conclusion follows premises. We have already conceded that God's active ideas are plausibly judgements and plausibly identical with their objects in the sense of expressing their essence in thought. Since God could only think logically and know perfectly, there would also be no slippage between the two trains of mental and physical causal concatenation. The concept of parallelism (omitting the Spinozistic doctrine of immanence, which makes the agreement of true ideas with their objects a matter of identity for Spinoza [E1 P17 S2]), is not peculiar to Spinoza, but was familiar before he started to philosophise. As is implicitly acknowledged in E2 P18 S, and in a thesis written at a university close to
Spinoza, during his lifetime, the objective being of our ideas has nothing to do with the 'parallelism' claim (Bennett p.220). However, the doctrine of objective essence has everything to do with the binding parallelism outlined above: without the internal logical relation of a true idea with its object there would be no mind–body unions and no token–token identity of events and causal processes in those minds and bodies.

We are likely to have intuitive sympathy with Spinoza's belief that logical truths generate true implications and, conversely, that correct inferences can be traced back to foundational, undeniable principles. Allison concedes that there may be a logically correct order of inference in so far as the intellect conceives things adequately, since in this case, 'the belief that $A$ provides "adequate" (logically compelling) grounds for the belief that $B$', making its ideas causally condition one another (Allison p.91). This happens of necessity, and in a lawlike way, given that we hold logical connections to be homonomic (operating within a closed system) and quasi–mathematical. If all ideas are true, all ideas may indeed be led back to one, as Spinoza claims. Leibniz, inspired by Aristotle, held this to be an ideal to be worked towards. Even Hobbes, who acknowledged no divine logico–mathematical paradigm so did not share the general view of his contemporaries that the human mind converged, when reasoning, on God's thought, considered Euclid the model of rational thought and regarded ratiocination (reasoning) as 'computation' (De Corpore I, 1, 2 (Hobbes 2 p.3). But, because for Spinoza human thoughts are fractions of God's thought, his much stronger claim is that all finite ideas, being empowered by the same force which drives "God's mind" are in some degree expressions of that same Natural law:–

"Whether a man is led by reason or by desire alone, he always acts in

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8 It is seldom noted that de Raei, a Cartesian physician at Leiden University, published in 1654 a book on the medieval notion of a relation between the order of ideas and the order of objects. Spinoza is likely to have heard or read Raei's version of this doctrine. Dünin–Borkowski writes:-- This was not a new problem for the philosophical circles of his time. The later Spinozistic axiom "Ordo idearum idem est ac ordo et connexio rerum" can be found in Raei in a weaker form and of course in a completely different systematic classification. He says that it is "true in most cases". It is always true if human beings abide by the laws of reason. However, since human beings are deceived by the senses because of their dependence on their bodies, they fail to grasp the truth' (Dünin–Borkowski 2 p.157. Translated by Jörg Tuske, University of London).

9 Leibniz on Aristotle's extension of mathematics to logic – Letter to Wagner, 1596. Leibniz's logical calculus (Characteristica Universalis) 'whence in some combinatory way truths could arise and be estimated as though by numbers' when translated into symbols and treated as algebraical calculations' (Elementa Rationis) was dreamed up as a boy (Thomas p.538).
accordance with the laws and rules of Nature" (TP ii 5, Wernham p.269).

Because Spinoza believes all human thought and action to be determined in a lawlike way, he says he will "consider human actions and appetites just as if it were a question of lines, planes and bodies" (E3 Preface):

"In order to investigate the topics pertaining to this branch of knowledge with the same objectivity as we generally show in mathematical inquiries, I have .... regarded human passions like love, hate, anger, envy, pride, pity, and other feelings that agitate the mind, not as vices of human nature, but as properties which belong to it in the same way as heat, cold, storm, thunder and the like belong to the nature of the atmosphere. Inconvenient though they be, such things are necessary properties; they have definite causes through which we try to understand their nature" (TP i 4, Wernham p.263).

Our minds are "the concern of logic" however minimally they may express the logical truth of "God" (all truth), for they are partial expressions of that logical scheme.

Spinoza extrapolates from the perfect mind of "God" to human minds in a way the great rationalists of the seventeenth-century did not. For both Descartes and Leibniz, all causation ultimately rests in the overriding will of a God external to Nature. For them, thoughts do not cause thoughts through their own power. We recall that, for Descartes, the intellect is acted on by will, and that for Leibniz ideas cannot in themselves be active (above, §2.2). We thus confront in Spinoza's principle of independent mental causal power a further example of the tension caused by his inference from "God's" mind to part-minds. Again, in asserting how things must be on the ideal level, Spinoza introduces anomalies from the human or finite perspective. Spinoza must show how passive, inadequate ideas either express in some measure the disposition-to-power of ideas which are wholly active, or can cohere with that power.

We have now seen enough of the transition from Whole-mind to part-mind to see at once that Spinoza will want us to apprehend that the causal principle (reason) for our decision stands apart from what we conceive to be our reason for that decision. The reason (cause) lies in our determined thinking natures. What we conceive to be the reason or the cause is imposed by our partial or mutilated understanding of causal processes. The reason for an effect is understood in terms of logical, lawlike
relationships between ideas, not in terms of the way we see it as distorted by imagination, opinion or emotion. Yet we are asked to believe that our ideas cause each other in a lawlike way, so that if, for example, I have the idea that a repulsively ugly cross-eyed person is attractive, or the (psychotic) idea that a gnome lives in my chimney) there is a causal explanation which will account for my idea in a logical way.

We shall be in a better position to deal with this tension when we have finished explicating the dual causal thesis as this is conceived by Spinoza to hold at the level of all truths.

§6.2 There are (at least) two causal powers, each confined to its own attribute.

We have seen that Spinoza assigns causal explanations strictly to either a physical or a mental domain, and that this is due to diverse causal processes, due in turn to dissimilar causal natures or potentialities. It is therefore not surprising that the tension addressed in Chapters 1 and 2 above concerning Spinoza's postulation of two radically diverse essential properties within one entity also appears to resurface. Spinoza's twofold causal system is geared to demonstrating the absurdity of suggesting that pieces of matter are pushed around through logical implication, or that ideas have causal interactions through exchanges of motion and rest. To avoid what he sees as the utter implausibility of physical–mental or mental–physical causation (but with an eye, I shall argue, to preserving mental irreducibility) Spinoza is logically compelled to posit separate causal/rational flowpaths. Only the system of thought involves logical implication and inference, and makes ideas cause one another:–

"The formal being of ideas admits God as a cause only insofar as he is considered as a thinking thing, and not insofar as he is considered under any other attribute" (E2 P5).

Mental power is not the same kind of power as physical power, the power of extension, although we need hardly reiterate that it is an equally natural power. Whereas "Bodies are distinguished from one another by reason of motion and rest" (E2 P13 L1), "The power of the mind is intelligence itself" (E2 P43 S), and modes of thought are marked

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10 We are not concerned in this thesis with attributes other than extension and thought, but Spinoza's causal thesis entails a necessarily exclusive power per attribute (essential property).
off from one another within the causal network of all thought according to their individual expression of this thinking power. The power of motion and rest in extension, and the power of intelligence in thought, function only within their own attributes/natures/essences. A causal chain is internal to each of God/Nature's attributes, and any singular event has a place on one of those chains. Spinoza, objecting to Descartes's thesis of mind–body causal interaction, points out that

"since there is no common measure between the will [of God/Nature] and motion, there is also no comparison between the power, or [sive] forces of the mind and those of the body" (E5 Preface).

For the time being we shall be talking about both the causal powers involved in the mind–body relation. We cannot examine the expression of the power of intelligence in human ideas until we have said more on the basics of determinism, as this functions in human minds and bodies, and have described the power of extension.

The last dozen propositions of Ethics Part 1 cement and explain Spinoza's thesis of determinism:— "God acts from the laws of his own nature alone, and is compelled by no one" (E1 P17). Yet, as seen,

"God acts with the same necessity by which he understands himself, i.e. just as it follows from the necessity of the divine nature that God understands himself, with the same necessity it follows that God does infinitely many things in infinitely many modes" (E2 P3 S).

Moreover, since "God acts from the laws of his own nature alone, and is compelled by no one", it is no good petitioning 'him' for favours. 'God's guidance' or 'God's help' consists in understanding 'his' laws, the laws of nature:— "By the help of God, I mean the fixed and immutable order of nature, or the coherent order of natural things" (TTP 111, Wernham p.53). God/Nature considered as sole cause (Natura naturans) is not subject to causal pressures external to itself, any more than "God" conceived as ideal mind is subject to ignorance or error.Finite modes, on the other hand, are causally dependent and do not 'necessarily' exist as either minds or bodies:—

"The essence of man does not involve necessary existence, i.e. from the order of nature it can happen equally that this or that man does exist, or that he does not exist" (E2 A1).

Yet, as seen earlier, Spinoza does not want us to think finite modes exist contingently.
Anything which exists, exists necessarily, as causally determined (E1 P33 and Proof).

Finite things express the powers of thought and extension in an internally determined way, so far as they can resist external pressures. In the 'caused' system of Natura Naturata finite modes of both attributes are causally affected by external pressures. They must exert themselves to persist in their own particular natures, that is, to survive in body, and to express the mental power of their own minds against the exertions of other finite modes. Spinoza adopts from scholastic philosophy, and dramatically adapts, the concept of conatus, a medieval term meaning the striving of a thing to persist in itself:—

"Each thing, as far as it can by its own power, strives to persevere in its own being" (E3 P6).

Conatus is traditionally diversely expressed in bodies and minds, but for Spinoza physical and mental modes express — uniquely in the philosophy of his time — independent kinds of internal force. Spinoza's conatus is more than Cartesian solid resistance to external bodies: it is internal, positive and active striving, the power of God/Nature—extended expressed in every mode. The conatus is "nothing but the actual essence of the thing" (E2 P7): any thing is an expression of a certain power. We cannot conceive of striving without conceiving of some thing or kind striving. There is mental striving and physical striving, and they are different. Mental power operates through the conatus as mental endeavour (E3 P9). Conatus is the source of our words 'conation' and 'conative', meaning the exertion of willing, desire or aversion. This kind of endeavour is quite different from the 'push' of motion and rest in body. The face of the universe is modified into causal complexes obeying specific laws of motion—and—rest in extension, but the "mind" of the universe is modified into dispositions—to—power of intelligence. Force, the essence of God/Nature, is twofold: each attribute—force has a different inherent nature. Yet the two are inextricably related: one does not function without the other in the mind—body relation. A chain of ideas is mapped on to a chain of correlated body states, the ideas being functions of those brain states:—

"Mind's conatus is the endeavour to persist as an active articulation and affirmation of the body. But this conatus is not a mere passive
reflection of the body's vicissitudes. As well as being mapped on to a segment of the material world, the mind is inserted into the totality of thought. This gives, it as it were, scope for expansion that is causally independent of the body. The mind strives to understand its own connections with other ideas." (Lloyd p.27).

Before discussing the implications of this dual causal system for our notions of perception and volition we summarise the character of Spinoza's power of extension.¹¹

Any account of causality in extension must be consistent with E1 P16, which says that infinitely many things follow from the necessity of the divine nature, God/Nature being "cause through himself", first cause and efficient cause. To this end we must show that the extended essence of God/Nature is expressed immanently as motion and rest in all its modes, and that all modes exhibit a disposition–to–power of this kind.

I have argued that Spinozistic thought is not Cartesian thought. We now see that his attribute of extension is not Cartesian, either. The intrinsic properties of Descartes's indefinitely divisible extended particles (moving in vortices) are their spatiality, and their inertia or cohesive resistance to other particles of matter moving to replace them. Descartes rejects the traditional notion of conatus, adopting instead the law of inertia of the corpuscularian system (Harré p.129; Williams 2 p.254). 'Striving' in extension is for Descartes inert or inelastic resistance, the endeavour not to yield to other bodies so much of its own quantity of motion and rest that the equilibrium which constitutes its being as a recognisable conglomerate of particles is disturbed, making those particles re–form into new differentiations:–

'Since God preserves the world by the selfsame action and in accordance with the selfsame laws as when he created it, the motion which he preserves is not something permanently fixed in given pieces of matter, but something which is mutually transferred when collisions occur' (Principles 2, 42, CSM 1 p.243).

The properties of Cartesian created corporeal substances are limited to primary qualities such as length, breadth and depth (Principles 2, 4). Bodies retain their solidity according to the laws of motion and rest as these operate in relation to the geometric

¹¹ This account owes much to Harré, Williams, Lecrivain, Lachterman, Frankel, Bennett, Wolf and Zukav.
identities of the finite extended substances themselves. Descartes gives no explanation of particular transactions of force (Wolf 2 p.23; Williams 2 p.255), but this is not a purely Cartesian lacuna in explanation. In all mechanistic theories causation, as a relation between bodies, is a matter of impact, but the origins of the force involved in the impact are obscure. We learn how regular causes and effects occur, but not why they occur. Action as reaction does not explain force: this point is made in all critiques of mechanical theory (Harré p.64). Within Spinoza's lifetime Newton introduced a concept of force in which force is shown to depend on the natures of bodies, but it is held by contemporary scientists and philosophers of science that even for Newton explanation of force is in scientific terms absent. Despite Descartes's claim that the principles of geometry and pure mathematics can explain all natural phenomena (Principles 2, 64), he does not demonstrate the origins of force in corporeal substances except by invoking the unscientific principle of external divine will ruling matter. While Descartes claims that the only principles he accepts or requires in order to explain the behaviour of natural phenomena are those of geometry or pure mathematics, and repudiates magical force, ultimately he allows for supernatural divine agency to provide the 'push' in Nature, as does Boyle, who describes the causal agency fixing the relation of the principle of mechanics (motion) to matter as the 'hidden transactions that pass among the minute particles of bodies' (Frankel p.416).

Spinoza's theory of causation in extension is that if God/Nature is every extended item, then God/Nature's power is right there in each mode: its essence is such as to cause motion and rest in itself and in all its partial expressions. Bodies are not mechanical devices subject to domination by divine or human will, influenced to advantage or disadvantage by mind, but individually internally empowered causal units possessed of an intrinsically dynamic nature; partial expressions of an independent, infinitely active and causally productive attribute of extension. Extension is not "as Descartes conceives it, a quiescent mass" (Letter 81). Spinozistic efficient cause is not a shunting of passive particles or compositions of matter since modes of extension express active-power transmission intrinsically. Thus, while Spinoza's principle of motion and rest in bodies reflects the concept of conservation and transmission of
motion inherent to Cartesian mechanics, it differs from Cartesian and all other mechanistic physics to the point where it cannot be called 'mechanical'. There is no external power giving a 'push' from outside the attribute. Lachterman suggests that Spinoza's dynamic causal system succeeds in unifying force and causation in an internally ordered, theorisable system (Lachterman p.82), so plugging an explanatory lacuna in physics.\(^{12}\) To summarise:— Our bodies cause our physical actions either by themselves, or as part-determined by external bodies in so far as we interact with them, or as wholly externally determined if we fail to resist the pressures of other bodies.

This physical system deliberately provides no place for talk about causal processes between thoughts. Spinoza's dissatisfaction with the implausible Cartesian thesis of mind–body interaction, as well as his awareness of the threat to the autonomy of the mental posed by a Hobbesian reduction of thought to motion in the brain, leads him to preserve mental irreducibility at all costs. For Spinoza, not only are causal explanations entirely different: two essentially different causal powers are postulated. The gulf between these two causal systems is not, in fact, maximal: Malebranche, criticising Descartes' thesis of mind–body causal interaction but wanting to retain immaterial, non–natural soul–stuff, argued (in Spinoza's lifetime) that the correlation between physical and mental changes should be described by saying that one might be the 'occasion' of the other, rather than the cause. Because this thesis implied divine control it was acceptable to the orthodoxly religious. Spinoza wants neither mystery nor an implication of external control, and instead offers an explanation of the identity of physical and mental changes through his arguments for monism and objective essence. It is because each idea is logically necessarily a reflection of a physical state that Spinoza's doctrine of parallelism has an explanatory edge on Malebranche's. The concatenation of power in two diverse causal systems is unified and made logically

\(^{12}\) Spinoza's thesis of modes of extension as units of force might seem to make his physics compatible with the claims of modern physics to a single unified force disseminated throughout nature, and his scientific explanation compatible with a mathematical physics which posits physical things as configurations of energy (cf. Wolf 1 p.62; Bennett pp.91–2). But while it is generally granted that Spinoza transforms theories of extension by including and explaining natural force, all modes of extension have properties of body, and most philosophers of science that I have read find his science of extension to remain a study of material particles, practised within the parameters of the mathematical science of his day.
interdependent both through the attribute theory (above, Chapter 1) and the theory of
mind–body relation provided by the doctrine of objective essence (§§3.2, 4.3 and 5.3).
Yet the sheer oddity which characterises occasionalism also colours Spinoza's causal
thesis. To justify such an arcane and extravagant metaphysical scheme Spinoza must
supply a convincing account of autonomous mental connections.

Two major concerns underlie the following final discussions of the causal system
of God/Nature thinking. 1. Given my claim that the tension between the autonomy and
identity principles may be healthy, we want to know what explanatory benefit accrues
from Spinoza's assertion of a purely mental causal system and ban on attribute–
interaction. 2. We need to know how a seamless continuum of logical interconnections
between ideas is possible, bearing in mind not only that our associations of ideas are
manifestly not always logical, but that Spinoza's open–ended metaphysic allows for
mental processes in embodied creatures which do not reason at all. These two
concerns pull together the threads of discussion from earlier Chapters, for the principle
of independent mental causal power forefronts both the tensions addressed so far,
namely (vis–à–vis concern 1) the tension between the identity and autonomy principles
and (regarding concern 2) the tension between Whole–mind and part–mind. I address
concern 1 in §6.3 and concern 2 in §6.4, the concluding discussion of my thesis.

§ 6.3 "So long as things are considered as modes of thinking, we must explain
the order of the whole of Nature, or the connection of causes,
through the attribute of thought alone" (E2 P7 S).

We can start to focus on what is involved in concern 1 (i.e. the explanatory benefit of
an exclusively mental causal system and ban on causal interaction) by reconsidering the
possibility of isolating an individual 'mind' in the flow of all ideas, without reference
to it as the idea of a particular body. Wherever inputs and outputs of the power of
intelligence mark off a particular local interplay of ideas (associated with a particular
body), there exists a mind. We saw that Lloyd makes a special study of Spinozistic
selfhood, with particular reference to understanding our 'selves' in terms of the
limitations of our bodies. Yet, as seen, she also emphasises that 'the mind belongs in
a totality of thought that relates directly to substance': our mind is both 'mapped on to
a segment of the material world, and inserted into the totality of thought' (Lloyd p.27). In this context the mind is considered without reference to the body. Lloyd stresses Spinoza's emphasis on recognising the inherently perspectival content of our ideas, and on looking to wider wholes than our own soul-selves, which can so easily and distortingly be seen as independent Cartesian substances. When we look beyond our 'selves' we apprehend the continual interaction of our ideas with 'the frequently overwhelming external forces that put the mind into bondage' (Lloyd p.30). "Human bondage" means, for Spinoza, the domination of our minds by passive mental states caused by inadequate ideas. If we strive to make inferences from common notions we begin to free ourselves from radical subjectivity – to see our mental states in a more detached way. We shortly look into this strategy. As noted earlier (§3.1), this thesis does not signal a Spinozistic ambition of unravelling the tangle of ideas which is a particular 'mind' to the point where it merges indistinguishably into the flux of all ideas. While a mind can "participate" in a system of ideas (as indicated in §5.3 by the father's suffering of his child's ideas) Spinoza would not endorse, for example, a concept of rational altruism involving a blurring of the boundaries of actually existing minds. Spinoza refers to the distinct 'natures' and needs of singular minds as discrete, purely mental, complexes (Letters 21 and 23, C pp.380 and 389) without reference to his separate thesis that minds are logically bound to bodies. As noted above, for neither Spinoza nor Hume could a person be proud of him or her 'self' if a complex of ideas were not logically sufficient for a 'self'.

Two prima facie explanatory benefits are conferred by Spinoza's doctrine of an exclusively mental causal system and ban on mental-physical interaction, namely (1) that looking for unsuspected purely mental causes is a heuristic for discovering the truth about what causes our thoughts, and (2) that a self-contained causal system of intelligence facilitates in principle a transference of ideas from one mind to another. I say 'prima facie' because I think Spinoza's rigid constraints on independent mental causation undermine the first benefit and confer minimal benefit over the Cartesian account in the case of the second. I argue towards the end of this section that the full picture of Spinoza's dual causal thesis (in both its explanatory profit and its
implausibility) is shown by referring it to the modern doctrine of functionalism.

Regarding (1) – looking for unsuspected purely mental causes – Spinoza makes us recognise that we do not always notice some of the stages which occur in causal episodes, and so we often assign causes erroneously. Bennett argues in support of Spinoza's thesis that Nature could intelligibly embody a quite different causal system from that which we observe. Certain events are hidden from us, and this confuses us into thinking there is mind–body causal interaction. We simply tend to 'focus on the bits of each [chain] we are acquainted with' (Bennett p.132). Sprigge, too, suggests that finite minds often have to mix physical and psychological explanation, appealing to that aspect of a process which is best known to us; e.g. we may explain the stimuli reaching our sense organs physically, and our reaction to them psychologically (Sprigge 2 p.160). An example of this approach seems evident when, for instance, I claim that 'my car has made me bad-tempered'. This is a claim that a physical object has caused a mental state. If I think carefully about the chain of events preceding my anger, I may decide that it was caused by my ideas about my car; by, for example, resentment that it doesn't work after all I have spent on it. Similarly, if I think about what has made me red-faced, I may conclude it was not my anger (which would be a mental cause for a physical event), but the body–state my mental anger reflects. Following such a scrupulous search for true causes, interactive causes are denied in favour of causes within one attribute, and Spinoza's point about our error in taking the apparent cause to be the cause may be found to be well made.

However, we do not inevitably draw these new conclusions. While Spinoza's heuristic for rigorous etiological inquiry may result in an emendation of a particular causal story, I may not, for instance, be dissuaded from the belief that my car caused my anger, or alternatively that some pathological body–state, hormones or whatever, was the true – and physical – cause of that mental event. I may be sure that my angry feeling (mental event) caused my red face (physical event). My doctor may think so, 

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13 Bennett merely explicates Spinoza's thesis. But Ruben argues that no current concept or theory of causation escapes fatal criticism because none copes satisfactorily with a) effects b) epiphenomena and c) pre-emption. The concept may be unanalysable (Ruben p.35).
too, and warn me against anger with a view to the health of my body. It is the case
that not only do we observe interaction, but that following scientific inquiry we may
still insist that physical events cause mental events, and vice versa.

Willingness to admit unsuspected mental causes for mental events on just some
occasions will not do for Spinoza. His thesis requires total commitment to a purely
mental causal explanation of mental events. In his view our knowledge of causes is
just wrong if we grant any mental−physical or physical−mental causal explanations.
To grant interactive causal explanation is disastrous for Spinoza's thesis, given that, for
him, reasons are causes. If he allows a single instance of causal interaction he gains
nothing over Descartes's claim of a certain range of " occult" transactions: Descartes,
too, explains many mental events via the purely mental processes of deduction and
thought association. A single instance of physical−mental causation also allows the
possibility of Hobbesian materialism, for if one thought is alleged to be caused by the
physical, perhaps it is an illusion to suppose that there are any non−physical thoughts.
I have suggested that a mental causal property which the physical cannot touch is
Spinoza's ace bid for mental irreducibility. But the price of preserving this mental
causal independence is that we must often deny that we see the causal connections we
see. Spinoza requires that we not only deny all possibility of mind−body interactive
cause, but that we see causation quite differently from the way we normally 'have to'
see it. He believes that if we want to know the place of the mind in Nature we have
to set our experiences aside. He wants us to grasp that the causal principle (reason)
for a particular decision stands apart from what we conceive to be our reason for it.
He asks us to deny the "common order" of our ordinary perceptions in favour of
subjecting our experience to the "order of the intellect" (E2 P18 S) − the order and
connection of ideas "in God". A metaphysical inquiry, like a scientific one, looks for
what underlies our experience. Spinoza scorns the allegedly scientific thesis Descartes
constructs on the basis of apparent transactions between mind and body:−

"I cannot wonder enough that a philosopher of his calibre .. should
assume a hypothesis more occult than any occult quality .. I should very
much like to know how many degrees of motion the mind can give to
that pineal gland" (E5 Preface).

Spinoza's view is that since we are parts of Nature, and our view of causality is accordingly limited and perspectival, it is obvious that our normal experience of causation will lead to difficulties in theorising about causation. We are constrained to perceive mental events as interacting with our bodies, but Spinoza's claim is that we should not construct a grotesque scientific hypothesis on the basis of that belief. While we are indeed confronted by real everyday experience of causes, he says that we should seek to understand them in terms of a true natural history. Our inadequate ideas of causal transactions undoubtedly exist, but they are irrelevant to the enterprise of supplying a true etiology of the events involved.

This enterprise may be illustrated by the car example used above. The causal stages of the car's gradual deterioration and the causal stages of my thoughts about my car were not available at the time of my anger. But if they were, we would have to distinguish the true causal story of my ideas as reflecting my body states from the mental causal story of my face-value views on the subject of my car. For while in the former story the order and connection of ideas would reflect the order and connection of my body states, there would be no such parallel ordering regarding my ideas of their representational object - the car. I did not include the principle of the representational content of inadequate ideas as a premise supporting the parallelism theorem, for I believe it does the opposite: it undermines it. Our inadequate ideas lie outside the scheme of parallelism which establishes mind-body unions in Nature. Spinoza does not suppose we would confuse our direction on the world with this true scheme of things. He claims (as seen in §3.2) that the union of idea with object pertains only to agreements in "God" as ideal mind:--

"Between the idea and the object there must necessarily be a union, because the one cannot exist without the other... But it should be noted here that we are speaking of such ideas as necessarily arise in God from the existence of things, together with their essence, not of those ideas which things now actually present to us or produce in us. Between these two there is a great difference" (KV 2 xx Note c10, C 1 p.136).

Spinoza does not think there is a pairing or a parallelism of an inadequate idea with the
representational object we take that idea to involve. For him, the true representational object in a human idea is always a body-state interacting with that object. Thus, when Spinoza says that "The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things", he is talking about the agreement of true ideas with objects, and the mind-body relation this confers, not the relation of inadequate ideas and their apparent objects. While parallelism holds in the case of true ideas, inadequate ideas are, as we have seen, of "singular things which have been represented to us through the senses in a way that is mutilated, confused, and without order for the intellect" (E2 P40 S2). Emotions, opinions and imaginings also follow "from the common order of Nature", not according to the order of the intellect.

As Craig has shown, a search such as Spinoza's for reasons/causes involves the belief that our perceptual states are brute facts which have no explanatory force concerning themselves, or interconnections between themselves or between external things. Seeing that something is the case is a kind of access to reality, but 'Seeing why it is the case is a quite different intellectual operation calling for a rather different mental capacity' (Craig p.38). Spinoza does not think our perceptions, imaginings, emotions or opinions reveal causal connections in God/Nature, and he wants us to see just how radically faulty such inadequate ideas can be. Hence a tension is built up between our ordinary experience of causal connections, and Spinoza's account of what that causal ordering truly is, "in God". While this is a specifically causal tension we nonetheless in a sense cover old ground here, for Spinoza is once more asking us to discount our mental experiences. In the same way that he requires us to see all human ideas as judgements of body states, he now wants us to see that our face-value ideas of mental and physical causes and effects are distortions of the truth and that we must look beyond them. This disregard for the actual content of our inadequate ideas is now a familiar feature of Spinoza's doctrine of ideas, so we should not find it surprising that Spinoza is unperturbed by an apparent conflict of his dual causal account with our everyday experience. Denying the veracity of views formed "from the common order of Nature" is of no more significance for him than dismay caused by the discovery that the earth moves, rather than the sun. I have argued that he regards as real but distorted
"those ideas which things now actually present to us or produce in us", and asks us to emend that view in favour of a metaphysical one, and I concluded that while Spinoza does not reduce the mental, he does reduce our ordinary direction on the world. I believe his principle of independent mental causation reduces our ordinary experience of causation, since for him many of the causes we apprehend do not count.

I now turn to the second prima facie explanatory profit of Spinoza's exclusively mental causal system and ban on causal interaction, namely that a self-contained causal system of intelligence facilitates in principle a transference of ideas (i) between human minds and non-human minds, and (ii) between individual human minds. We have noted that Spinoza's thesis of individual minds as causal networks in a unified thinking whole is a development of the holism principle. Regarding (i) we saw in §3.1 that Spinoza does not contemplate an exchange of ideas between species, so such a thesis is not an explicitly Spinozistic insight and I do not pursue it. Respecting (ii), a thesis of mental interconnectedness between human minds should derive not only from the doctrine of common notions but from the causal claim that God/Nature is "cause through himself", first cause, and efficient cause through local connections. We know Spinoza sets out to avoid the egocentric predicament created by Descartes, and his infinite continuum of thought is designed to allow for the intelligible interrelation of all adequate and inadequate ideas in a literal meeting of 'minds'. What difference does this make? I shall try to show below that, despite some promising conditions for an interchange of understanding, Spinoza's holistic, exclusively mental, causal scheme is much advance on the Cartesian thesis in which all human ideas are also caused in the same way as one another (i.e. through the operation of a discrete soul-substance on an individual pineal gland) and so also share a common human mental nature and a common etiology. I argue (as I shall again in §6.4) that although Spinoza's scheme dissolves certain Cartesian obstacles which work against a causal continuum of thought,

\[14\] A developed psychology addresses the question of intelligence in non-human species (n.b. not intelligence between species.) One neuroscientist argues that 'stored' intelligence may be vast in relation to explicit or 'active' intelligence, and that there should be a procedure for measuring the former. Human inventions may aspire to mechanisms perfected in the 'intelligence' of certain non-human forms of life, such as plants (Gregory pp.317-320). I think my conclusion that some human thoughts elude a lawlike network of thought covers non-human thoughts makes it unnecessary to extend investigations to non-human thoughts.
it does not prevent alienation and failure in communication between human minds.

Lloyd has much to say on the importance of the differences between Cartesian created thinking substances, worked on by independent wills, and Spinozistic minds which are not isolated from one another in this way. She stresses that while a Cartesian mind acquires knowledge from outside itself, it is in some sense locked into its own mental states since the mind is a self-contained substance and discrete mental system involving a rational, autonomous will which transcends nature and 'can conduct forays into the world, extending the realm of its control and hence of its rightful self-esteem' (Lloyd p.154). Williams also argues that Descartes constantly affirms that this viewpoint comes first in cognitive inquiry (cf. Williams 2 pp.68–71). It is generally admitted that this viewpoint is detrimental to Descartes's epistemological programme, since such starting-point impedes access to a mind-independent reality. For Descartes, God is guarantor of true knowledge in a private, one-to-one relationship of soul to God, and the common notions which are for Descartes (as seen in §4.1) eternal truths residing separately within our minds, are to be individually divined. For Spinoza, on the other hand, these truths are literally common properties in the minds which are complexes of ideas. Lloyd propounds the enhanced relation to world of a Spinozistic mind which is freed from the stress of interaction endured by a Cartesian mind. She describes, for example, the difficulty for a Cartesian soul in knowing what is natural in its thoughts and what is not (Lloyd p.152) and therefore what agrees and disagrees with its nature (ibid. p.155). She also dwells on the harmonising and fruitful effects of Spinoza's view of reason as natural, emphasising that the continuum of reason, sensation and emotion as purely mental states means that Spinozistic selves are not subject to the confusion generated in a mind which has as a constitutive element a rational, autonomous will transcending Nature, but which is simultaneously united to a body that is a mechanical system in Nature (ibid.). Whereas Descartes urges us to

15 This thesis is relevant to Williams's quest for an absolute conception as 'a conception of reality as it is independently of our thought, and to which representations of reality can be related' (Williams p.211). An absolute conception must not only include the images grasped by all observers, but must 'relate the various points of view comprehensibly to each other' (ibid. p.245).

16 See Lloyd on this topic from p.149 to the end of her book.
distrust the information conveyed by sense impressions in favour of the clear and distinct ideas of pure intellect, forcing us to make a sharp distinction between the two, and permitting our self-esteem to reside in our mental 'transcendence and the prospects for control which go with it' (ibid. p.159), for Spinoza the findings of reason and the directly felt awarenesses of body remain on a natural continuum (ibid. p.155). If a man feels himself to be a superior creature within Nature this is not because he thinks himself possessed of the reasoning, immaterial soul which makes humankind a "State within a State", but because he knows himself possessed of a body of a complexity which is reflected in his power of reasoning and the understanding of other things this brings (ibid. p.159). The obvious human-centredness of our interests does not, Lloyd suggests result in a narrowly anthropocentric view of the world since reason leads us look at all times for interconnectedness with the rest of the world rather than (as is likely for a Cartesian soul) to some other, spiritual, world where it equally belongs.

I agree that Spinoza dissolves the yearning for a spiritual home beyond the natural which deflects human concern from the business of embodied living (E5 P41 S), and that he disposes of the ego as a mental manager controlling inputs of thought. I have argued that no mental thing 'has' our thoughts, and shall argue further that the power of intelligence inherent in ideas permits their internal generation: no soul-thing wilfully grasps or rejects them. It is clear that, as seen in Spinoza's claim that the whole of Natura Naturata is one individual (E2 P1 S ff) and, for example, in his claim that "The father's soul participates ideally in the things which follow from the son's essence", a channel of communication is in principle open, permitting a natural participation in a determined flow of purely mental processes of inference and implication. This clearly has important implications for education and psychological theory. It is also the basis of Spinoza's social and political theory. Differences of race and religion should fade, he says, in the face of a mental continuum operating between all levels of ideas in which a union or agreement of minds, optimally a social contract (TTP Ch.xvi), can come about. But such agreement depends on the striving of the mind through reason, without external pressures, and (as we discuss further below) Spinoza does not believe reason is sufficiently universally used for much
progress to be made in this direction (E4 P35 S; TP vi 3). While the exertion of just some rational minds to understand the laws of human mental nature can assuage the divisive effects of passion on society, unreasoning individuals remain trapped in radically perspectival attitudes which they are unable to place in a wider perspective.

Thus it seems that a version of the egocentric predicament is sustained in Spinoza's doctrine, for ultimately, as is made plain in the Political Works and the final propositions of Ethics Part 5, the Cartesian confusion brought about by obscure mind-body transactions is almost matched by Spinozistic individual inadequate perspectives - "So many heads, so many attitudes" - and by the passions he believes make "men by nature enemies" (TP ii 14, Wernham p.277) which are difficult to resist even for those most habitually guided by reason (E5 P42 S; TP vi 3). Spinoza's admission that there can be no agreement of minds through imagination, passion, opinion or ordinary sense perception seems to me to acknowledge and to perpetuate, despite the role of the doctrine of common notions in helping us to emend our inadequate ideas (on which more is said in §6.4) the mental confusion and isolation we experience as individuals.

Can Spinoza show us that a ban on causal interaction is explanatorily fruitful? I have said that I believe the full picture of Spinoza's dual causal thesis is revealed by referring it to the modem doctrine of functionalism, and I now try to demonstrate this. A functionalist theory in the philosophy of mind claims that the entire essence of a mental item is captured by its psychological causal role. This is not just a claim that any mental item has a place within a network of causal connections, but that the causal role logically includes the full phenomenal character of the mental. Currently, functionalism is almost exclusively a physicalist thesis. For Spinoza, however, causal roles are identical with an essence/attribute/nature of a kind, and this ensures that the mental causal concatenation cannot be reduced to a single flow of physical causal roles. It is thus clear that if Spinoza is a functionalist he is not a physicalist functionalist but a 'dual'-functionalist.17

17 With regard to a causal role theory of "All Attributes" he might be considered a pluralistic functionalist, but insofar as functionalism is considered a doctrine in the philosophy of mind he is a dual-functionalist - if he is aptly described as a functionalist at all. Bennett rejects functionalism as a non-Spinozistic, materialist thesis, yet holds Spinoza to have grasped its insights (Bennett pp.137 and 139).
Functionalism is held by some commentators to represent Spinoza's truest intentions regarding the mind-body relation. Cook has recently claimed that Spinoza espouses a functionalist theory of mind: his account is discussed below. I also believe a certain proto-typical functionalist view of Spinozistic mental items is implicit in Joachim's analysis, and it may be helpful to look at this first.

Joachim's (1901) thesis predates 'functionalism' as a theory in the philosophy of mind, but he nonetheless sees Spinozistic modes only as causal thing-stages. He builds his thesis on Spinoza's avowals that extended modes are "distinguished by" and are "nothing but" their ratios of motion-and rest, and human minds are only the ideas of these states, not differentiated any other way and in themselves merely mental relata (Joachim pp.23–24). Further, Joachim professes surprise at the easy acceptance of other commentators of a 'parallel' relation between the two attributes (ibid. p.137). He holds instead that 'The inner articulation of each attribute is one and the same; or there is, in reality, only one modal system' (ibid. p.126). The same mode which is an idea, Joachim claims, is also extended: 'It is the same thing, one and the same mode of God, which is both body and soul' (ibid. p.71). Joachim asserts that 'God's free causality is actual in two separate lines of force' (ibid. p.140), but he merges the diverse forces in those lines. I do not think this move is justified, for Spinoza makes it clear that while the mind is the intelligence of the functionality of the body, and mind and body are identical in substance, the mind is a self-contained causal system, operating through a power which cannot influence extension. Humans are therefore radically twofold in nature. They are two modes in union since substance expresses two eternally disparate essential natures. Spinoza's thesis of parallel power-concatenation (that is, the way in which instance y of thinking-power relates to instance x of extension-power, in a logically necessary correlation) shows that Nature is a unified causal system, but that its two separate causal systems are not reducible to just one. His principles forbid us to liken his causal role theory to a functionalism which allows the causal role of a mental item to lie either in the physical, or in some attribute-neutral flow of power.

As seen above, he claims:

"Since there is no common measure between the will [of God] and
motion, there is also no comparison between the power, or [sive] forces of the mind and those of the body" (E5 Preface).

Yet Spinoza's parallelism statement ("The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things" [E2 P7]) is taken by Cook as evidence for a single kind of "increasing and decreasing" of activity. Cook, an admirer of Spinoza, does not want to leave Spinoza committed to a dual causal system. He thinks we could be wrongly assigning Spinoza double vision, a faulty and extravagant view of Nature quite out of line with Spinoza's true design. Cook argues for a physicalist functionalism in two stages. He first proposes a 'functional psycho-physical account of ideas and affects' (Cook p.81), which must include a necessarily separate system of intentionality (ibid. p.83). But he goes on to infer from Spinoza's remark that there is "only one way of understanding anything" (E3 Preface) that this one way is through extension, so that the causal role of an idea must lie in the physical:

'Having laboriously explained the individuation of bodies ... he is not obliged to provide further account of the individuation of minds. And since the mind is epistemically related to the body, mental processes can be understood and discussed by reference to the physical processes of which they are cognitive reflections' (Cook p.84).

Cook argues that we need not follow the 'etiological theory of the emotions' of Ethics Part 3, since Spinoza himself exploits the possibilities for understanding all variants of the three basic affects (desire, joy and sadness) in terms of 'the body's natural homeostatic endeavour' (ibid. p.85). Cook thinks our recognition of this might well bring about the blessedness or salvation Spinoza wants for us, since, 'For a mind which knows itself in physiological terms, there is no conceptual foothold for the debilitating passions which concern Spinoza as philosophical therapist' (ibid. p.91). To the end of his paper Cook is slightly worried by his own question, 'How could the mind have an intentional structure if it is identical with physical states which are not intentionally structured?' (ibid. p.92). Yet he concludes that 'functionalists can deal with this issue (as could Spinoza, at the level of functional descriptions of the body)' (ibid. p.92). Cook is thus satisfied that what we call intentionality actually exists in the body. In effect, he seeks to identify mental 'direction towards' with physical conatus, which
Spinoza distinguishes from mental 'will' as appetite.

In my view, Cook's belief that Spinoza's scheme of intelligence of the body's functionality is dispensable as a distinctly mental form of intentionality misrepresents Spinoza's metaphysical system and philosophical aspirations. It goes against the thrust of Spinoza's ethical doctrine, which occupies two of five Parts of *Ethics*, to suggest that Spinoza wants us to look at ourselves in physiological terms. (We see this in §6.4). Yet it is clear that at points in his explication of the mind–body relation Spinoza does seem to confer radical causal dependency on the body. Does Spinoza's aspiration therefore conflict with the metaphysic he supplies, so that while Cook is mistaken about Spinoza's intentions, he is right about what his metaphysic dictates? I concluded in §1.3 that Spinoza overcommits himself to exclusively mental explanation. We also saw (above §5.3) that it is very hard to assign any Spinozistic being for mental events once the actually existing body of which they are ideas disintegrates. Without the existence of our bodies we would have no ideas. Moreover, Spinoza's thesis that our ideas are reflections of states of our bodies bearing traces of their contact with other bodies suggests that we would have no ideas without the existence of external objects either. Further, we know that all our ideas, including common notions, are ideas of our own body states. That is why Spinoza says when concluding his account of the etiology of common notions, that

"From this is follows that the mind is the more capable of perceiving many things adequately as its body has many things in common with other bodies" (E2 P39 C).

We saw earlier that a mind capable of perceiving a great many things is a reflection or function of a complex brain, and we acknowledged (following Lloyd) that we feel ourselves superior among living creatures because we know we have bodies of a complexity which is reflected in correlatively powerful understanding. Does Spinoza then, in the final analysis, commit himself to causal explanation through the body, and therefore (by his cause/reasons equivalence) to physical causes of mental events?[^18]

[^18]: Lloyd sometimes comes close to indicating a Spinozistic causal dependency of mental states on body states. For example, 'Sex differences apply to minds just as much as, and because, they apply to bodies' (Lloyd p.166). But she does not come as close as does Spinoza himself when he writes:— "From this proportion of
The crunch question on the issue of a single or dual flow of God's essence must be, 'What determines that our ideas have the content they do?' For Spinoza, neither the common properties of our bodies nor their singular physical differentiations cause our ideas. Lloyd notes that introspective awareness of the flux of perceptions presupposes sensory intake, but that this is not a Lockeian thesis of knowledge being constructed out of ideas conveyed by the senses (Lloyd pp.170–171). Spinoza defines the attributes of thought and extension as having no causal clout with one another ("A body is not limited by a thought nor a thought by a body [E1 D2]), and subsequently (I think) gives no specific examples of causal explanation of ideas as originating in the body. He is careful at all times to indicate the identity, concurrence or isomorphic expression of mental and physical states. He emphasises, for example, that an individual is determined to express conatus as mental "will" but as "appetite" through the mind and body "together" (E3 P9 S), and that these two expressions of causal power are functions of one another:–

"The decision of the mind and the appetite and the determination of the body by nature exist together – or rather are one and the same thing, which we call a decision when it is considered under, and explained through, the attribute of thought, and which we call a determination when it is considered under the attribute of extension and deduced from the laws of motion and rest" (E3 P2 S).

I wish to say at this point that I do not think it can be argued that there is no physical causation of mental states because mental and physical modes are identical in substance. It is sometimes claimed that a bodily change does not produce a mental change because every bodily change is a mental change and vice versa. But it is the case that, without a stipulation of two distinct causal forces, if one physical/mental motion and rest, then, there comes to exist also this body of ours" (KV Preface to Part 2, C p.95), and "To understand how this mode, which we call soul, has its origins from the body, and also how its change depends on the body ..." (KV Appendix 11, C p.152). An annotation, generally regarded as a reader's comment, indicates how close to a causal relation Spinoza's logical "union" appeared to some. The Note reads, 'I.e. our soul being an Idea of the body, it has its first being from the body, for it is not only a representation of the body, but of the whole and of the parts, in the thinking thing' (Note b, Curley 1 p.140. See also Spinoza's (KV Preface to Pt 2, [7] Curley 1 p.95). However, Spinoza's metaphysical scheme forbids this conclusion.

19 e.g. by Hampshire p.72. In contrast to this view, Delahunty claims that the acceptance of an identity theory entails an acceptance of interactionism (Delahunty p.197), and Bennett also fears this is so (Jerusalem Spinoza Conference 1989). Della Rocca argues against this that Delahunty's claim is only true if the attributes and their modes are taken as real properties, existents, not merely conceptual distinctions (Della Rocca p.271).
thing causes another physical/mental thing, the physical component of the causal physical/mental thing must be part-cause of the mental component of the caused physical/mental thing. That is, if \( m_1 \) (reflecting \( p_1 \)) causes \( m_2 \) (reflecting \( p_2 \)), then it seems \( m_1 \) causes \( p_2 \) and \( p_1 \) causes \( m_2 \). This must be the case even if the identity involves only meanings, that is, if there is no constitutive difference in the two elements identified, for the single referent of the two conceptual distinctions embodies a causal interconnection at the most fundamental ontological level.\(^{20}\) Spinoza's identity thesis avoids attribute interaction only because there are two distinct causal chains generated by two diverse causal powers, not because the modes are identified in substance. Thus, when Spinoza says that a thing is 'considered under, and explained through' a certain attribute, he must – if he thinks such a claim supports or even coheres with his denial of interaction – be relying on a hidden assumption about reasons being causes, which assumption entails that mental causal explanations are generated only by mental causes.

Taylor, as seen in §3.4, denies that Spinoza achieves an independent mental explanatory domain. He thinks Spinoza should not include any physical data when reasoning about the etiology of mental states:

'Since no appeal is to be made to any fact of the one order in accounting for any fact of the other, our psychology, theory of knowledge, ethics should never be allowed to make any mention of the existence of bodies; they should deal exclusively with relations between "modes of thought"' (Taylor p.203).

I have proposed that when Spinoza involves the concept of body while explaining mental states he is not giving a causal explanation. I argued in §3.4 that explicating human thinking sometimes, for purposes of enlightenment, involves the concept of the body–states with which modes of thought are correlated. But, as we saw with the case of evil, this is not a causal explanation. No knowledge of mental etiology is provided by knowledge of physical states. We have further seen while discussing Cook's reading of Spinoza that we cannot say what an idea is without saying it is the idea of a body state. Its objective essence is intrinsic to its definition. As Lloyd's thesis

\(^{20}\) It seems clear to me that it is on these very grounds that Davidson is able to help himself to causal interaction and two distinct conceptual realms within his version of the identity theory.
demonstrates, it is necessary to include reference to the body when explicating Spinoza's theory of mind if we are properly to understand the place of the mind in Nature. We also need to be accurate when referring to the 'mind'. For example, I wrote at the start of this section that 'Wherever inputs and outputs of the power of intelligence mark off a particular local interplay of ideas (associated with a particular body), there exists a mind'. I had to add the phrase in parentheses because it would not have been correct to say that every local interplay of ideas is a mind. For Spinoza, 'minds' are defined as the ideas of bodies, but a 'local interplay of ideas' could have as its object modes of some attribute of which we know nothing. The reference I made in that case to the human body was not a causal explanation, but one of relation.

However, when Cook writes that 'the mind can be seen as a monitoring of various physical processes in the body, so that mental changes can be discussed as reflections of physical changes' (Cook p.84), he correctly expresses the indispensable relation between the orders and connections of mind-power and body-power. Spinoza clearly wants us to be aware of the unified nature of paired modes, for he is intent on eradicating the implausible isolation of the Cartesian soul and he positively wants us to see that our ideas as identical with states of our bodies. The expression of thought in substance is "at the same time" the expression of extension: the whole essence of substance has to be manifested wherever substance ranges. Should we take a section through substance at any point we would find that all ideas are reflections of states of extension. Thus, even as we blinker off our causal explanations of mental states from the physical flow of events, the idea-body state identity is always there, underlying any idea, inextricably logically linked to it.

I conclude that the only way Spinoza can avoid interaction within a monism is to postulate a dual functionalism involving essentially diverse causal properties. I believe this is what he does, and that the final section of my thesis (§6.4) will demonstrate that Cook is beyond question mistaken in claiming that Spinoza wants us to abjure mental etiology and look for causal explanations in physiological terms. That said, I shall argue that Spinoza's intentions are undermined by the nature of the independent mental power he postulates.
A dual functionalist scheme interestingly reveals mind–body causal correlations, and as a thesis of relations between two different sets of causes and effects it confers explanatory fruitfulness in cases of particular mental states about which we want to know the correlated physical story. We saw in §6.2 that we think depression (a mental event) has a physiological counterpart. We are likely to allow that depression considered as a mental event can be understood by analysing the train of mental occurrences which have caused it, while the chemically abnormal body state with which it is identical is also available for treatment through understanding of its causes. The dispositions of the body are not (as Cook would have it) all that causally counts, but they are nonetheless, for Spinoza, logically inextricable from the causal story. If we pick out any particular human mental event and ask 'What is it?' we must reply that it is a mode of thought, caused only by thought, but that it is also necessarily in the mind of "God" the idea of a body state. This is not a dependency relation of the mental on the physical, but it is a metaphysically necessary one.

It may be objected to this claim that neither an independent essence of the mental, nor a distinct chain of mental causes is necessary for independent mental causal explanation. We do not need to postulate a metaphysical thesis at all: we can supply two sets of causal explanations or two descriptions which allow a purely mental account of connections between mental events while denying two causal chains. But, for Spinoza, a merely semantic distinction of this sort, especially when coupled with a thesis of mental–physical interaction, not only lets in confusion and error in causal explanation, as explained above, but threatens the autonomy of the mental as a distinct causal force. We recall that Spinoza's original motive for stipulating independent mental causal power probably sprang from contemplating Hobbes's materialist thesis. He must have seen the seriousness of Hobbes's attack (in his Objections to Meditations) on Descartes's certainty that his awareness of himself was caused independently of his

21 Davidson specifies a distinct conceptual and explanatory mental domain (ME pp.222, 225) which expressly excludes physical causal explanation (ME p.224; MM p.258). But 'There is no dualism of "causal factors", "causal systems" or "types of causation". Nor is there is there any reason to suppose, from the dualism of descriptions, that there are two kinds of law'. Causes are physical (ME p.215; PP [Comments and Replies] p.243). In my view this thesis exposes Davidson's shallow commitment to mental causal efficacy.
own corporeal nature (above, §2.1), especially since Hobbes's objection was endorsed by the theologian Mersenne (above, §4.1). We saw in §1.3 that Spinoza's insistence on an essential mental property was probably motivated because Descartes's postulation of an independent thinking substance was deemed insufficient to show that the mental is caused only by the mental. Thus Spinoza guarantees mental autonomy by stipulating an independent causal power. He must have seen that claims of mental holism and purely mental explanation could not by themselves preserve mental irreducibility, for Hobbes regarded the scope of logical mental interconnection (aptness for 'computation') with awe, yet still declared that nothing could be shown to stop the causal role of these mental events from lying in the physical. The special benefit of Spinoza's principle of independent mental causation is (all other conditions being satisfactory) its rigorous preservation of mental causal efficacy. This principle, added to the autonomy principle (which, as seen in §2.2, posits eternal and necessary causal independence, so ensuring that mental states cannot be emergent from physical states at any stage in the history of substance) makes it impossible for any mental causal role to turn out to be physical.

I conclude that Spinoza has sound reasons for fixing maximal constraints on mental irreducibility within an innovative framework of non-reductive monism, and that his theory of mind shows how we could be driven into metaphysics if we take the project of demonstrating mental irreducibility seriously. What we may consider an intolerably rigid ban on interaction between attributes - attributes which we may in turn see as intolerably robust essential properties - may be inevitable conditions for preventing a reduction of the mental to the physical. Following discussion on dual aspect theories (above, §2.3) I concluded that any weaker commitment than Spinoza's to properties of thought and body may fail to preserve mental irreducibility. I now add to that conclusion the thought that if we do not want to accept Spinoza's principle of independent mental causation we may have to abandon the search for a watertight argument for mental causal efficacy, since it seems we cannot postulate stricter constraints than Spinoza's essential mental property and radically autonomous mental causation without thereby sacrificing monism.
I do not thereby claim that Spinoza's thesis amounts to a formula for preserving
the mental within a framework of non-reductive monism. I suggested at the end of
§2.3 that interest in Spinoza's constraints on mental irreducibility cannot be
accompanied by a claim that he gives us a satisfactory prototypical thesis of non-
reductive monism. I have tried since then to show that even if we see the tension
involved in a diversity of essential properties and causal forces as healthy (i.e. helping
to preserve mental irreducibility, Spinoza's theory of mind does not succeed in showing
the place of the mind in Nature. For it is my thesis that a more damaging tension is
created between the principles of holism, objective essence and independent mental
causal power by Spinoza's disregard for the real content of our inadequate ideas. I
argue further for this claim in my final discussion, which now follows.

§ 6.4 "The power of the mind is intelligence itself" (E2 P43 S).

In this last discussion we scrutinise Spinoza's claim that "The order and connection of
ideas" which is "the same as the order and connection of things" is lawlike, and that all
ideas are the concern of logic because the power of logical reasoning can "emend"
inadequate ideas in a way which reveals their logical interconnections with adequate
ideas. Spinoza's claim is that even if our ideas are inadequate and passive they are
effects in a unified causal network of thought, and can be acted upon. I have proposed
that we shall want to know how a seamless continuum of logical interconnections
between ideas is possible, bearing in mind that the connections between many of our
ideas are associative rather than logical, and that some ideas seem disconnected from
any ordered flow of ideas. It is prima facie hard to see how mutilated and confused
ideas are in any sense governed by the laws of logic. How can the power of
intelligence govern the inputs and outputs of ideas which are frankly irrational (e.g. a
baby's perception or a psychotic delusion)? I believe Spinoza's claim about a lawlike
ordering of all ideas gives rise to anomalies regarding (i) the operation of our
will/intellect on our own minds, (ii) human agency in decision-making, and (iii) the
lawlike interconnectedness of inadequate ideas with adequate ideas. I argue below
that while anomalies standardly noted regarding the operation of our will/intellect on
our own ideas, and regarding human agency, need not be serious since Spinoza seems to provide a plausible account of the degree of freewill we might naturally expect to have. Spinoza's claims regarding the lawlike interconnection of inadequate ideas, added to the implausible characterisation and implausible representational content he assigns most human ideas, undoes his account of the place of the human mind in Nature.

From earlier discussions I believe we can already see that Spinoza will claim our ideas are logically interconnected whether we think so or not. For him, they are partial manifestations of an all-inclusive thinking scheme which, being entirely within "God", can only be logical. Spinoza will ask us (as he has in connection with earlier principles) to deny what is apparent to us regarding the anomalous ordering of our imaginings, emotions, opinions and desires. Herein Spinoza again creates a lacuna between what he says is necessarily the true understanding of human mentality, and our perception of it, and I shall intensify my claim that while Spinoza's doctrine is not reductive with respect to the mental it is reductive vis-à-vis our ordinary direction on the world, since his constraints on the essential nature and causal disposition of ideas seem to preclude most of "those ideas which things now actually present to us or produce in us". These strictures entail, implausibly, that any idea is determined (so never a result of, or a cause of, free decision) and an instant judgement. However, we should not beg the question of Spinoza's failure since he is in my view, as in the view of several Spinoza commentators, very persuasive with regard to the possibility of a determined, all-inclusive and nomically causally interconnected network of ideas which encompasses such inadequate ideas as passions and sense perceptions – states of mind which are not generally considered nomically ordered.

For Spinoza, the logico-mathematical paradigm which characterises "God's" thought (shown above, §6.1) ipso facto covers its partial expressions, making the analysis of all mental trains of thought a science. His conflation of God/Nature as all-inclusive with "God" as all truths entails this condition. The attribute of thought is an independent and unified explanatory domain because its modes are conceived as sharing a basic nature as units of that power. Even if finite modes of thought are not themselves active they cannot avoid being 'pushed' by their inner natures. The power
of intelligence has causal clout with them, making all ideas homonomic (i.e. in principle predictable) because contained in the closed and lawlike system of "God"-thinking.

Spinoza believes we can improve our understanding and rationalise our emotions on the basis of common notions which are undeniably true and are therefore epistemic building blocks which preclude an infinite sceptical regress. From them we can construct conditional a priori claims through which logic can get a foothold in the morass of inadequate ideas in which our minds largely consist. The passive ideas of the unreasoning individual may be "emended" (made active) through the guidance (power) of reason, not just by a detached observer, but by the individual himself:-

"Nothing is more useful to man in preserving his being and enjoying a rational life than a man who is guided by reason. Again, because among singular things, we know nothing more excellent than a man who is guided by reason, we can best show how much our skill and understanding are worth by educating men so that they live according to the command of their own reason" (E4 Appendix IX).

The motivation for emending our intellects is epistemic, social, ethical, politic or psychotherapeutic, but in each case it involves a dynamic psychofunctionalism. I cannot expound this without first setting forth as clearly as possible what Spinoza means by mental determinism; distinguishing reason as a cause from reason as the (adequate) second kind of knowledge, and explaining the apparent paradox of the power of the (passive) affects. It is my view that Spinoza's project of turning inadequate affects into 'rational emotions', which is, according to Delahunty, 'a terrible tangle' (Delahunty p.236ff), is clearly expounded (as we see below) by James and Lloyd.22

Spinoza's basic metaphysic dictates that inadequate ideas are compelled to follow in the same necessary way as adequate ideas follow:--"Inadequate and confused ideas follow with the same necessity as adequate, or clear and distinct ideas" (E2 P36):--

"For even if each one is determined by a singular thing to exist in a certain way, still the force by which each one perseveres in existing follows from the eternal necessity of God's nature" (E2 P45 S).

Ideas are internally generated through our particular natures, and there are no ideas

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22 James, Susan (1) and (2). See also Lloyd Ch.1 pp.27–31, and Chs.2 and 3 (passim); Wernham's Introduction (pp.6–10 and p.15), and Delahunty's critical 'The Laws of Feeling (Delahunty §7.7).
which do not exist in just the way they must. Cognitions, emotions and volitions are alike determined by the constituents of our own minds, and the minds of others in so far as we fail to resist external pressures. Any appearance of decisions being willed by ourselves in a stronger sense is, Spinoza says, an illusion and a projection upon Nature (E1 Appendix). Whatever local cause for our decision we may assign, our essence as a fragment of "God's" thought is the operative cause. But inadequate ideas are 'pushed' rather than being active components in the 'push':-

"The power of the mind is defined by knowledge alone, whereas lack of power, or (sive) passion, is judged solely by the privation of knowledge, i.e. by that through which ideas are called inadequate" (E5 P20 S5).

As we have seen, there is no Cartesian 'will' operating externally on ideas, no second stage of judgement-making disrupting their natural trajectory. This is the case with both active and passive ideas. For Spinoza, the striving involved in logical thinking (wherein we actively participate in the concatenation of "God's" logic) is also internal and determined, rather than, as for Descartes, external, an act of will which is a 'striving' to correct natural faults by overcoming intellect, flesh, sensation and passion (Passions 3, 211 CSM p.403). Mental empowerment is possible only through reason, which gets to work on the fixed ordering of causes/reasons among inadequate ideas:--

"Matters here stand as they do with corporeal tools ... In the same way the intellect, by its inborn power, makes intellectual tools for itself, and from these works still other tools, or the power of searching further, and so proceeds by stages ..." (TIE §§29-31).

Two distinct concepts of 'reason' are operating here. Reason is, as "the power of searching further" the second kind of knowledge which, Spinoza says, is "necessarily true" (E2 P41). It is the epistemic property of the 'reason' which is the stream of causes/reasons of ideas as causal items. Both are aspects of the power of intelligence. Reason (second kind of knowledge) is the "logic" of which the

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23 I owe the point about the conflation of two uses of "reason" to Lloyd. The first way of interpreting the necessary "following" of inadequate ideas answers to Spinoza's rationalism. The second answers to his realistic recognition of the limitations of reason. It is a tension that runs right through the Ethics' (Lloyd pp.52-3).

24 While Spinoza retains the concept of intuition as an ideal way of knowing, which I have suggested, with Bennett and Parkinson, seems unavailable to humans (above, §4.1 Note 6) his practical doctrines rely on the powers of intelligence operated through reason and the common notions.
universal concatenation of mental events is "the concern". While reason is elevated in Spinoza's esteem it remains on a continuum of all ideas: 'Reason, in Spinoza's version of it, although clearly superior to sense and imagination, does not transcend them in the Cartesian way' (Lloyd p.44). Lloyd argues that it is 'this notion of transition between levels of ideas that is crucial to understanding Spinoza's treatment of self-consciousness and self-knowledge' (Lloyd p.45). Reason is itself an idea of the body. Common notions, too, are not flashes of divine inspiration from a different realm of thought from sense perceptions, but (as noted §3.1) ideas which are true because as ideas of the body they are also true of all others (at least of their type). Thus, Spinoza claims, there is an interface of all ideas, through which they can work on each other. Confused and mutilated ideas can be "emended" by relating them to general a priori conditional truths. For example, we can use our knowledge about the general principles of triangularity to think more clearly about what looks to us like a triangle. Erroneous or partial ideas can be understood by tracing them back through to an earlier confusion. In this way, a chain of reasons—as-causes is uncovered.

Spinoza's claim is not contentious with respect to ideas which have truth conditions or are otherwise amenable to conditions of consistency and rational coherence because they are predictable, that is, in some sense intrinsically logically ordered. Schools function on the premise that knowledge and sound judgement can be erected on the basis of ignorance and unreason, given some elementary adequate ideas. The Mayan who grasps that the sun causally affects things on earth has some ideas and is ready to learn more. His ideas of the sun are not different in kind from ours, as ours do not differ in kind from those our descendants may have, using methods of scientific research inconceivable now. Our knowledge that the sun is hot arises from subjective or perspectival experience, and our mathematical calculations about the sun are the product of reason, but all these ideas can be cognitively related to common notions of extension. Lloyd explains,

'Method must start from within knowledge. Rather than setting itself to acquire true ideas, it begins from the awareness of true ideas we already have' (Lloyd p.56).
But Spinoza also claims that emotions, passions and opinions are subject to rational ordering. His "emendation" thesis is central not only to the project of emending the intellect in relation to cognition and to theories of social and racial policy, political consensus, religious tolerance and "morality," but also to singular and subjective beliefs, desires and perceptions, that is, all those areas of psychology and phenomenology most generally thought to elude rational analysis. Looking at how these mental states are connected to the "laws of human nature", which follow from more general laws of Nature (TTP Chs.iv and xvi, Wernham pp.67 and 125), rather than remaining blindly trapped in them, reveals the power of our reasoning to gain us freedom from epistemic and emotional bondage, for we start to see how our fragments of thinking are linked to the whole. We can remain passive and shackled by external pressures and internal bias, or we can embark on the mental task of investigating the inputs and outputs of intelligence which constitute our own mentality.

But if passions are the products of passive, inadequate ideas (E3 P3), why does Spinoza say that the "power of the passions" can "prevent the mind from understanding" (E5 P10 Proof) and entitle Ethics Part 4 "The Power of the Affects"? How can inadequate ideas have the "power" to blot out reason and put us in bondage if they are passive? Spinoza does not think passive ideas surpass the power of reason. While "To be able not to exist is to lack power, to be able to exist is to have power" (E1 P11 Proof), so that it would seem that any existent idea, however passive, has some power, we know that "The mind is more active the more it has adequate ideas" (E3 P1 C). In what, then, does the power of an affect consist? Strictly, mental states are ideas of affects - their mental correlates. Spinoza often calls mental states and events "affects" (e.g. in E3 P14) but he defines affects as extended items:

"By affect I understand affections of the body, by which the body's power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at

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25 It is on this issue that Davidson claims mental anomalousness. For him, lawlike mental events, which can be seen as connected by causal conditions, come apart from anomalous desires and beliefs whose causal processes cannot be provided: - "What prevents us from giving necessary and sufficient conditions for acting on a reason also prevents us from giving serious laws connecting reasons and actions" (PP pp.232-3).

26 "Morality" is to be construed in a uniquely Spinozistic sense, since what is moral is what is deduced through reason being to the advantage of all (E4 P18 Siii and E4 P37 S1).
the same time, the ideas of these affections. Therefore, if we can be the
cause of any of these affections, I understand by the affect an action;
otherwise a passion" (E3 D3).

The mind's experience of passion is caused by the ideas of external extended sources
of force (E4 P57 S). This is received by the corporeal imagination in the form of
images. Passive imaginings (the ideal correlates of these bodily images) are not
powerful, but indicate feeble mental power. Our ideas of the affects express low
active power in their "privation of knowledge" of one's own emotional state. Thus:--

"The order of actions and passions of our body is, by Nature, at one with
the order of actions and passions of the mind" (E3 P2 S, paragraph 1).

The system of thinking, not the system of extension, is responsible for the mind's
passive states. When Spinoza says that a person is led to suicide "because hidden
external causes so dispose his imagination" (E4 P20 S), he does not mean that extended
power causes the suicidal idea, but that a suicidal notion is (truly known) a passive,
irrational idea of a body-state overwhelmed by external pressures. We might want
to call this body-state a nervous condition, but the idea of it is a passive idea, caused
by other ideas. As in the case of depression (discussed above, §6.2 and §6.3) the
suicidal mental state may be understood by analysing the train of mental occurrences
which have caused it, but its correlated chemically abnormal body state is also available
for treatment through understanding of its causes.

As a scientific thesis which gets behind apparent causal connections the thesis
of the emendment of the passions is plausible with respect to many emotions. We saw
above (§5.4) that for Spinoza all emotions fall under some emotion-type, or common
notion. A passion in a singular mind, say, sexual jealousy, may seem to be the
complex product of totality irrational input, yet Spinoza says, it is not to be eradicated,
but understood and thereby emended (E3 P35 Proof and S). As with learning
processes, power over the affects is a matter of cognitive emendment through improved
knowledge of what is happening:-- "The more an affect is known us, the more it is in
our power" (E5 P3 C): "There is no affect of which we cannot some clear and distinct
concept" (E5 P4 C). We can, Spinoza says, free ourselves from bondage of our
"passions" (as we can from the epistemic bondage of ignorance) through the active power of reason; through recognising that these inadequate ideas are 'of' a state of our body which is passively responding to external force. After examining our "affects" in this way we can have (more) adequate ideas of them, and so prevent the state of mental bondage which arises when inadequate ideas of the body's affections grip our minds. Thus we should not purge our feelings and opinions, but maximise their potential as ideas by turning them from irrational (passive) feelings to rational (active) emotions. We can call them 'rational emotions' because our ideas are no longer rational ideas about our emotions, but are those emotions.

It is clear that if we are able to rationalise our emotions, an interactive process involving purely psycho–psycho connections relates reason to inadequate ideas in one and the same mind. Our mind is a little local network operating as it must within the greater scheme of the mental. All its ideas are equally determined: none is a matter of free choice. James shows us how, in accepting the passions as determined, we must also see how reason and "morality" merge, for our view is diverted from the passions of others to the causal functioning of the system which gives rise to them:--

'Our feelings for others are normally based on the assumption that their actions are within their control, so that it is appropriate to praise or blame, love or hate them, for what they do. We take it that they are in general able to choose whether or not to act, and identify something about them -- some constellation of passions for instance -- as the cause of their action. But rational enquiry will show us that these assumptions are mistaken' (James 2, forthcoming February 1997).

Not only are passions determined, but so is the rational potential of each 'mind'. The screw–turn of Spinoza's philosophy lies for me in the seemingly unfair endowment of the intellectually gifted, whose power–to–reason must, it seems, determine their minds to knowledge of causes, not only of the workings of their bodies, but of the etiology of their psychological mental states. Since adequate ideas generate adequate ideas, people habitually guided by reason should in principle succeed in avoiding of states of mental bondage, and in due course should achieve a sanguine or detached general mental attitude (E5 P25ff). Spinoza becomes increasingly aware that some minds
cannot be reached by reason. That is why in his last political work he forswears the social contract he has earlier postulated as agreement, grounded in reason, about mutual advantage. Yet Spinoza warns that a consistently rational mentality is rare, for "it requires a singular power of mind to bear with each one according to his understanding, and to restrain oneself from imitating their affects" (E4 Appendix XIII).

One standardly noted tension in Spinoza's claim about the emendation of the intellect is that this project seems blatantly teleological, that is, it requires a purposefulness or working towards an end which is incompatible with his doctrine of determinism. While on the one hand Spinoza says we do not have any say in what we think, on the other we can, it seems, alter our thoughts through our own will to look beyond our immediate responses, so that there is an element of self-control not dissimilar to a Cartesian striving of the will. However, while the difference between Descartes's and Spinoza's theories of the schooling of the intellect and the curbing of the passions is subtle, I believe it is there, and that this part of Spinoza's thesis is sound. In both Descartes's and Spinoza's moral philosophies there is indeed some version of the conflict between the strong and the weak propensities of our natures. For Descartes the weaknesses of the flesh (including the errors induced by sense perception) are parts of a nature with which we are lumbered and from which we aspire to escape to a sunnier soul-life. For Spinoza we do not have that prospect to look forward to in any personal sense, so our understanding of ourselves is geared to "blessedness" right here and now. There is no eschatological profit in shaking off the shackles of ignorance, prejudice and passion: the "advantage" is immediate growth, dependent not only on understanding our place in the Whole but also, as it were, on examining the hand of cards Nature has dealt us as individuals. This involves looking inwards and backwards at causes, rather than outwards and forwards at effects: it means we are in a sense abandoned by 'God' to the internal determinings of God/Nature. 'God's help' is not

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27 The social contract is expounded in the *Theologico-Political Treatise* Ch.xi. It is abandoned by the time Spinoza supplies his theory of democracy based on reasoning in just some individuals, in the *Political Treatise*—"Those who believe that a people, or men divided over public business, can be induced to live by reason's dictate alone, are dreaming of the poets' golden age, or of a fairy-tale" (TP i 5, Wemham p.265).

28 This topic is treated especially thoroughly by Bennett pp.213–230 and pp.244–5. Lloyd p.61.
forthcoming except from within ourselves. Our mental power is a function of the complexity of our brains and its contact with other bodies and it is not (as James has just shown) under our control in any Cartesian sense.

Spinoza's thesis of determinism allows, in my view, choices proper to the potential of our own natures. The functional systems which are our minds do not permit just one outcome from their complexity of input. Reasoning may result in multiple choice; so may succumbing to external pressures. Vacillation results, as we have seen (above §4.2) from holding two contrary imaginings or opinions, "now this one, now that" (E2 P44 S). Thus it seems our final idea need not be the one determined thought our nature allows but will emerge from a clutch of ideas. Spinoza says, for example, that a suicide could have done otherwise than kill himself: that the urge to persist in one's being conferred by active reasoning precludes such a decision:

"Those who kill themselves are weak-minded and completely conquered by external causes contrary to their nature" (E4 P18 S).

Reason was overcome by the predomination in the mind of ideas of external pressures. Ethics Parts 3 and 4 contain numbers of such multiple choice determinations, in which the input of ideas is shown to be prolific, complex and discordant. Consider, for example, Spinoza's thesis of the causes of hope or fear:

"Things which are accidental causes of hope or fear are called good or bad omens. And in so far as these same omens are causes of hope or fear, they are causes of joy or sadness; consequently, we love them or hate them, and strive either to use them as means to the things we hope for, or remove them as obstacles or causes of fear" (E3 P50 S).

Lloyd calls Spinoza's rational enterprise an opening up of conceptual space, resulting in 'an increased awareness of what our selfhood is, and of what it might yet be' (Lloyd p.174). Reasoning is the active power of intelligence and it brings thinking into line with the "order of the intellect" – the true causes/reasons flow of "God".

To allow a choice of among a clutch of determined ideas is to furnish a compatibilist reading of Spinoza. As a doctrine of limited choice within the

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29 See §3.2 p.51 on Spinoza's thesis that what appear to us contingencies are possibilities when conceived by a ideal, all-knowing intellect, and what we conceive as possibilities may or may not in fact be so.
propensities of our own natures, it offers the amount of agency we anyway suppose ourselves to have. This is important, for Kant later claimed that any satisfactory theory of mind must reconcile the apparent contradiction of man's free agency and his subjection to the laws of Nature:

"It is an indispensable problem of speculative philosophy to show that its illusion respecting the contradiction rests on this, that we think of man in a different sense and relation when we call him free, and when we regard him as subject to the laws of nature ... it must therefore show that not only can both of these very well co-exist, but that both must be thought of as necessarily united in the same subject' (Kant, *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals*, 75–6, quoted in ME p.225).

Kant's stipulation has been taken by Davidson to entail that 'there are no strict deterministic laws on the basis of which mental events can be predicted and explained' (ME p.208). For Davidson, the determinism of physics is compatible with every appearance of intentional action (MM p.247), but psychological phenomena are not, 'even in theory, amenable to precise prediction or subsumption under deterministic laws' (PP p.239). Davidson wants to supply 'a version of the identity theory of the mental' (ME p.209) which satisfies the condition found indispensable by Kant that we just do 'view men as rational agents with goals and purposes' (PP p.239). Davidson writes:

'We explain a man's free actions, for example, by appeal to his desires, habits, knowledge and perceptions. Such accounts of intentional behaviour operate in a conceptual framework removed from the direct reach of physical law by describing both cause and effect, reason and action, as aspects of a portrait of a human agent. The anomalism of the mental is thus a necessary condition for viewing action as autonomous' (ME p.224).

Spinoza's doctrine as presented above shows *prima facie* that freedom of the will, as we commonly recognise it in ourselves, is consistent with a determination of the causal connections of the contents of our minds by the laws of Nature. We cannot make choices which go against the laws of Nature, but we do still have choice.

But Spinoza will reject this compatibilist reading of his doctrine. He wants us to shed what he calls the "superstition" of free will, since for him this superstition is grounded in ignorance of causes (El Appendix). He believes that the more we
understand the workings of our minds the more we will see that we are not really free at all and that our eventual decision was indeed entirely determined by forces in Nature (E2 P48). Moreover, we shall now see that the constraints he puts on the causal roles of ideas (including the special class of psychological ideas which Davidson takes to elude any nomological scheme) entail that the anomalies which arise from his doctrine of determinism are troublesome and do threaten his theory of mind. I argue that Spinoza does not want his theory of mind rescued and that he must therefore pay the price of its being found implausible.

I have tried to show how all Spinozistic ideas are not only fragments of an all-inclusive infinite intellect but they are also inevitably fragments of "God" as all truths. By making God both co-extensive with all there is, but also a 'Mind of God' which has lost nothing of its awesome logical and cognitive capacity, Spinoza is committed to a characterisation of human minds as parts of this God. It caused him trouble with the principle of holism (re evil and error); with the formal mental being of ideas (re characterising all ideas as immediate judgements), and with the principle of objective being (re the representational content of our inadequate ideas). It was not a problem with respect to the principle of objective essence, since in a thoroughgoing agreement of true ideas with objects, in which the very essence of those objects is expressed in thought, only truth is involved. I have agreed with Hampshire, Allison, Lloyd and others that the principle of objective essence ensures a precise correspondence of pairs of ideas and bodily objects – mind–body unions. But I have pointed out that we humans only see ourselves in that metaphysical perspective by superimposing second-order judgements on our ordinary direction on the world. I believe this also happens with regard to the principle of independent mental causation under discussion.

Spinoza says that all ideas are "the concern of logic", that is, they are captured by a logical principle. This is a strong claim. I do not address the even stronger claim that all ideas, however mutilated and confused, are (in being part–expressions of

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30 It is paradoxical, in my view, that Spinoza achieves an intuitively acceptable version of free will but denies it, whereas Davidson's physicalist causal thesis shows that mental events are determined in a lawlike way (in being physical events), but he maintains that they are anomalous.
"God's" thought), themselves essentially logical. Although this conclusion seems deducible from Spinoza's metaphysic, he explicitly denies this. We must, he says,

"... distinguish between understanding and imagination, or between true ideas and the rest, namely the fictitious, the false, the doubtful, and absolutely all those that depend on the memory" (Letter 37).

Inadequate ideas are not logical elements in the ordering of the intellect. But this does not mean, for Spinoza, that they are outside its reach. Since for any idea there is a cause/reason, the apparently logic-resistant, disconnected opinions of (for example) a psychotic mind can only, being internally determined by "God", be elements in that single lawlike concatenation of thought, and so must be in principle predictable and explainable through intelligence. The mental is not, for Spinoza, in any of its manifestations, positively anomalous, because there are no ideas which cannot satisfy conditions of consistency and rational coherence if their interconnections in the entire system of mental modes are known. This is the claim I now criticise. My complaint is that we cannot argue all inadequate ideas to have a place in a nomically ordered scheme, although many can be shown to be amenable in principle to such ordering.

This claim gives most Spinoza commentators "pause". While some try to show how all ideas could "follow" in some lawlike way because Spinoza postulates mental laws which fall short of being logical but which govern human thinking (Lloyd, Allison, Parkinson, and – up to a point – Delahunty), others hold that ideas which follow from "the common order of nature" have no place in a lawlike scheme and that we cannot avoid a rift in Spinoza's causal account any more than we could regarding the lacuna between a metaphysical understanding of our mental states as functions of the organic complexity of our bodies, and our ordinary direction on the world (above, p.122). For Bennett, Spinoza is incoherent on this topic (Bennett pp.276–278). In Allison's view, as we saw above, while true ideas are plausibly logically compelled, in the case of inadequate ideas the ordering is plainly illogical and A does not justify belief that B. It is certainly not obvious how we can get in touch, through reasoning, with some of our inadequate ideas. There seems no rational point of contact with, for example, a
sexual desire, or if there is, any rational order is imposed by us, not inherent in the desire. Allison doubts that what he calls 'the laws of psychology' can follow from (be deduced from) the laws of logic which must be the most general laws of thought. Yet Spinoza says clearly (i) that "The order of actions and passions of our body is, by Nature, at one with the order of actions and passions of the mind" (E3 P2 S), and (ii) that "Inadequate and confused ideas follow with the same necessity as adequate, or clear and distinct ideas" (E2 P36). The first of these propositions asserts the parallelism thesis: the second makes appeal to the doctrine of causes/reasons in which "following necessarily" means following in a lawlike way.

Allison does not share Bennett's and Delahunty's radical scepticism about the ordering of our ideas in relation to objects, since he accepts (i) – the parallelism claim. Our inadequate ideas are functions of bodies states: they relate to a bodily object in that sense. He affirms that since the ideas in one's mind reflect the nature of one's own, and external, bodies, 'the laws determining the relations of ideas in the mind must reflect the laws determining the relations of bodies conceived under the attribute of extension' (ibid. p.108). Allison proposes that this 'quasi-mechanistic psychology, which formulates universal laws concerning the relations of ideas', makes inadequate or psychological ideas 'natural and predictable' in ways other than the logically necessary. For example, the fundamental operations of the mind include imagination, memory and 'the law of the association of ideas' (ibid. pp.108–9). He finds it perfectly plausible that God's true ideas "follow" in a lawlike way, and that they are accurate reflections of states of our bodies, but he abandons hope that human psychological ideas actually express that logical ordering. As seen (above, §4.3) for Allison the laws of logic are the first principles and most general laws of thought, and the less general laws relating only to human minds, which Allison calls 'the laws of psychology' should follow from them as common notions in human minds (Allison pp.114–115 and p.128). But Allison holds that the laws of psychology are congenitally different from the laws

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31 This is Davidson's view.

32 This affirmation seems to confirm psycho-physical laws.
of logic. He says he follows Parkinson in this reading. Parkinson certainly radically
distinguishes the laws of logic from the laws of psychology (Parkinson 1 p.164).

As I understand the contrast made by Parkinson and Allison between the laws
of logic and the laws of psychology, which is developed in Allison's later, socially and
politically orientated chapters, the refusal of these two commentators to let these laws
lie on a continuum collapses the concatenation of mental laws Spinoza postulates. Do
we have to accept this without further defence of Spinoza? It is clear that Spinoza's
thesis entails that the laws of psychology must be derivative of the laws of logic, just
as the more detailed laws of extension, pertaining only to local connections between
finite modes cannot be different in kind from the most general laws of motion and rest
in bodies, but must be localised applications of more general physical laws. Can the
laws of "imagination" be inferred from the laws of logic?

While I am led by my earlier conclusions on rogue thoughts such as falsity, evil,
hazy registerings which are not judgements, and ideas having no representational
content of our bodies, to conclude that the principle of holism finally comes unstuck
over this severe constraint of nomic ordering among all thoughts, I do not think we
have to reject Spinoza's principle of independent causal power on the issue of the
relation of the association of ideas to the logical order. For I think we can grasp how
the "order of the imagination" is a distortion of, and thereby not irredeemably lost to,
"the order of the intellect" in, for instance, Descartes 'special inclination to love'
'persons with a squint'. In this case a link with a past idea is elicited by using the
tools of reason. Sense perceptions often give rise to emotions or opinions which may
be emended into reasons. For example, my pain makes me bitter, or bad-tempered,
or sympathetic to others, but may result in rational propositions following subjection
to reason. Lloyd, as we know, believes all ideas are grounded in sense perception:–

'Sensation is not a distorting and irrelevant intrusion into the mind's
clarity. It is basic to knowledge. Although it is transcended through
the cultivation of reason, it remains on a continuum with the higher
forms of knowledge' (Lloyd p.40).

I believe we can 'see the logic' in the everyday trains of thought of rational
individuals when they apply reason to their inadequate ideas. We call someone reasonable if they apply reason to their sense perceptions, or rationalise their emotions. According to Spinoza, and as explained by James and Lloyd, these very ideas then become rational. Reason labours on behalf of logical interconnection. Neurotic ideas are not generally considered to be outside the reach of rational analysis: that is why we bother with psychoanalysis – the study of the inputs and outputs of psychological ideas. Consider for example, the child who suddenly develops an 'irrational' fear of school, and undergoes months of counselling before it is dredged from her memory that on the last day she attended school the teacher said, 'Tomorrow I am going to divide you all into two'. This confused idea has clear potential for 'seeing the logic'. Consider, too, instances of sexual jealousy which are 'reasonable' in that the complex input of ideas which produces them can be seen as coherent (e.g. notions of commitment, betrayal etc.) Anger may also be 'reasonable', if its causes can be traced in terms of earlier ideas: so may envy and hatred and the many other psychological states whose provenance Spinoza traces through reason (Ethics Parts 3 and 4). I believe that on the basis of this test (i.e. the conceivability of a train of earlier ideas as causes for a particular inadequate idea) the laws of type–modes of human thinking may interrelate with the adequate ideas of reason (and thereby the laws of logic) to a greater extent than Allison, Parkinson, Delahunty, Balz and others allow, without supposing that order to be imposed by us.

Nonetheless, I do not think Spinoza demonstrates logic to have clout with all mental states – and that is his claim. Some notions seem definitely to lie beyond reach of the power of intelligence. Even the maximally wise person must sometimes have ideas which seem to arise a propos of nothing at all, perhaps in dreams, like Spinoza's vivid impression that a Brazilian was standing in his room. Spinoza calls these apparently disconnected notions imaginings (of images in the body). We might want to put them down to random firings of the synapses. The dream–ideas reflecting some

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34 Forrester's thesis of 'the logic of repetition' addresses the triggering of an early traumatic memory (a malfunctioning mental input) by a later mental experience (Forrester p.295).
such firings may be so inconsequential that they are not even committed to memory.

I have also distinguished between neurotic ideas and psychotic ideas. Sexual jealousy may be psychotic. It may focus on a public figure, or a piece of clothing. While a psychoanalyst might succeed in finding causal connections or a distorting earlier idea in some such cases (along the lines of ferreting out an early idea such as Descartes's about squinting), our reaction to someone who is sexually jealous of a gnome which, he says, comes down the chimney, is likely to be rather different. We are likely to doubt from the outset that reason can assign this idea a place in a purely mental flowchart. It must elude even the psychological process of the association of ideas. We recall Gordon's suggestion (above, §5.4) that anger which was not about anything would be 'little more than a strange psychosis'. While Spinoza's thesis that "The order of actions and passions of our body is, by Nature, at one with the order of actions and passions of the mind" is interestingly relevant, we may reject his claim that the anger of a madman is apt for emendation through a chain of purely mental causes.

Spinoza's thesis of lawlike mental causal power throws up a plethora of unanswered questions, for an infinity of finite modes of thought less rational than the least rational of human ideas must exist in the universe, given that extension and thought apply of necessity everywhere, and are also in principle the concern of logic. Spinoza is not to be expected to provide an account of such connections, any more than his doctrine explains detailed connections in extension. But he needs to show how all human mental direction on the world can fit into his causal scheme. If we can come up with a single mental event which appears to elude any conceivable sub-branch of the laws of logic then I believe he has put himself in an indefensible position. I believe there are psychotic ideas, brute impressions and thoughts which are so unfocused as to elude any mental causal network — and also ideas which seem inevitably to have physical causes. Ideas in this last class may be emended through some tortuous recasting to show purely mental provenance, but I propose that they are not, thereafter, our genuine, original ideas. For example, if I drive round a motorway

35 "I do not know how the parts are really interconnected, or the agreement of each part with the whole... for to know this it would be necessary to know the whole of Nature and all its parts" (Letter 32).
bend and confront a traffic standstill, my idea is (qua Spinoza) an input of all my earlier ideas about cars, motorways, driving etc. But I want to say it is caused by a visual object – a pile-up. I suggest a mental causal explanation of this impression which comes out of the blue is a judgement on my brute impression as squarely as 'That hurt' is a judgement superimposed on my original reaction of 'Ouch!'

I conclude that Spinoza's independent, lawlike mental causal system is ultimately undermined by his non-recognition of the reality of our ordinary direction on the world and our ordinary apprehension of causes. While I think his thesis is more plausible than Allison and others allow, Spinoza has not accounted for indispensable elements of our thinking which elude the metaphysical scheme entailed by his principle of independent causal power. Despite his admission that such ideas "actually present" things to us, his response to mental states which resist his analysis is that this just is not how they really are: they are really are the way they are metaphysically explained.

Spinoza's principle of independent causal power is thus doomed, in my view, without disputing his thesis of dual causality or the autonomy–identity tension it reinforces. It collapses simply on the grounds that he disdains (to recall Craig's view) 'seeing that something is the case', and only admits the quite different mental operation of 'Seeing why it is the case'. Consequently a tension builds up between having our face-on mental experiences and understanding them through his causal scheme. In my view we must finally give up on Spinoza's principle of independent mental causation because he denies that brute impressions and psychotic thoughts are, in their immediate being, flashes on the trackway of our thoughts, only explicable as functions of body states, beyond reach of rational emendation, and therefore having no place in the only mental scheme he allows.

At this point I conclude that Spinoza has failed to capture the essence of the mental, and I briefly recapitulate the elements of his theory of mind which I take to prevent us from accepting it as a model of non-reductive monism.
CONCLUSION

I have proposed that by deflating the Cartesian conception of immaterial substance into an essential property which consists merely in ideas which are dispositions-to-power of intelligence Spinoza expedites his claim of monism, and that by retaining radically diverse mental and physical essential properties and causal forces he positively preserves mental irreducibility. But I suggested at the end of §2.3 and again in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 that even if we see the tensions these constraints bring about as healthy, we must reject Spinoza's theory of mind since it does not succeed in showing the place of all elements of the human mind in Nature.

It was not obvious at the start of my thesis that the reorganisation of the Mind of God into the Mind of God/Nature would confer on finite (human) thoughts an implausible characterisation. Spinoza seemed alert to the special mentality of humans. Yet he has left us with thoughts which have as their defining feature instant cognitive judgement; which necessarily express as their representational content states of bodies; which are strictly determined, and which are logically interconnected with the other thoughts in our minds (and in the long run with all other thoughts). He has, in sum, shown disregard for the real phenomenological content of our ordinary ideas. Why?

I have argued that Spinoza's postulation of God/Nature-thinking (thought conceived as all-inclusive) is in tension with his barely disguised traditional view of God as an elite, logico-mathematically ordered set of all truths. Thus, when Spinoza extrapolates to the nature of human minds from the nature of an infinite intellect he is constrained, not by a view of thought-in-general, but by a criterion of ideal knowledge, of which human thinking has to be in some sense a partial expression. So it is that our thoughts end up as (albeit mutilated, confused, subjectival and perspectival) "ideas" which are cognitive and instantaneous judgements; for what else could "God's" ideas be but units of intellect, necessarily true, instantaneous judgements? "God's" ideas are necessarily reflections of our body states; so what else could our thoughts be, in their objective being, but partial or distorted representations of our body states? And since "God's" ideas can only be logically ordered, ours are also, as elements of that mental
causal concatenation, nomically ordered, whether we apprehend that order or not.

I have proposed that if we look at our ideas from a metaphysical perspective (as advised by Allison and Lloyd), we may find Spinoza's account of the mind as the idea of the body plausible. But Spinoza claims to show how all our perceptions, imaginings, emotions and opinions fit into Nature as the real properties they are:–

"I have regarded human passions like love, hate, anger, envy, pride, pity, and other feelings that agitate the mind, not as vices of human nature, but as properties which belong to it in the same way as heat, cold, storm, thunder and the like belong to the nature of the atmosphere" (TP i 4. Wernham p.263).

This, I have contended, he does not do. In asserting that "The necessity of things concerns metaphysics, the knowledge of which must always come first" (Letter 27), and in starting from the nature of God, and God's causal laws, Spinoza traps himself in a metaphysical enterprise which fails to capture phenomenological impressions as surely as Descartes's starting-point makes it hard for him to get outside it to a mind-independent reality. From his perspective Spinoza cannot get to face-on mental impressions, for a consistently metaphysical view looks at what these states must be, not what they just are for us. His thesis therefore sustains a rift between the metaphysical view and the view we do, rawly, have. Because he adheres to a metaphysical perspective (for him a scientific perspective) he is caught out as thoroughly as is the eliminative materialist, who cannot dislodge our talk about folk psychology, but fails to give it an essential place in his conceptual scheme.

It has been my thesis that Spinoza's theory of mind fails through his extrapolation from the mind of God to the minds of its parts. But if, as I have suggested, it shows us on the one hand that a robust metaphysic is needed to preserve mental irreducibility, yet on the other that a metaphysical ('scientific') account of psychological mental events as elements in an independent mental realm will not satisfactorily characterise our thoughts, it seems that neither eradicating the mind of "God" nor dissolving God/Nature into nature will help to solve the mind–body problem.
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*Metaphysical Thoughts.* The Appendix to DPP, and published with it.

*A Theologico-Political Treatise.* Published 1670.

*A Political Treatise.* Last work, written after 1672. The *Theologico-Political Treatise* and the *Political Treatise* are together known as 'The Political Works.'

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*Abbreviations*

| ME | 'Mental Events' (1970) |
| PP | 'Philosophy as Psychology' (1974) |
| MM | 'The Material Mind' (1973) |
| HCTP | 'Hume's Cognitive Theory of Pride' (1976) |


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The following texts in Spinoza's library (listed above) are agreed by Dr A. Offenburg, University of Amsterdam, to have inspired aspects of his philosophy.
1. Buxtorf, Jean. *Bibliothèque Rabbinique* (1571). In this, according to Friedmann, the difficult words of the Cabala are explained.


3. ben Israel, Menasseh (Spinoza's teacher of Hebrew). (i) *Hope of Israel*. (ii) *Nishmat Hayim*. On the union of the soul with the whole of Nature. These two books are thought to have influenced the Short Treatise, and many phrases found in the Lurianic Cabala appear in KV (e.g. the 'all in all' of KV 1 ii [C p.69]). But ben Israel's work contains many features Spinoza would disapprove, such as punishment of the soul after death.

4. Joseph del Medigo's *Sefer Elim* (1625), a treatise on cabalistic mathematical cosmology, is ridiculed in TTP IX Elwes p.140).


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