Changing Values in Contemporary Society?

A reconceptualisation of values using the analytics of Michel Foucault

Thesis submitted to the University of London for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

David Scott
Department of Psychology
University College London
August 2000
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my supervisor Peter Lunt. Peter provided encouragement and careful comments on the thesis, and through his interest in the potential contribution of social theory to psychology was an important influence on my work.

The thesis owes a particular intellectual debt to Milton Rokeach and Michel Foucault.

I am grateful to the Department of Psychology at UCL for their award of a Demonstratorship to fund this project, and for providing generous resources and facilities.

Many people have helped through the general discussions we have had about social psychology and philosophy, or by making specific comments about my work, including Paul Stenner, Helene Joffe, Adrian Furnham, Sonia Livingstone, Hal Sigall, Harriet Marshall, Steve Brown, Joan Pujol, Rex Stainton-Rogers, Margaret Wetherell, and Alexa Hepburn.

I owe a debt to the various members of the Social Theory reading group for sharing their ideas and helping to create an intellectually stimulating environment, particularly Francis Djabri, Tony Lambie, Tania Kurland, Liz Moor, and Jo Bower.

Other people have contributed by simply being around, offering their encouragement, or sharing their positive outlook, particularly Chris McManus, David Green, Tim Shallice, John Morton, Peter Howell, Oliver Braddock, Maria Woloshynovich, Moira Bovill, Gill Rye, and A.R. Jonckheere.

I would especially like to thank Karen Ciclitira and Armand D’Angour for their generous friendship and support throughout the thesis.

I am also very grateful to all those who participated in the studies or helped with the data collection.

Finally, I would like to thank Anne Miles for her continual support, guidance, and patience, for sharing her concerns with me, being appreciative of mine, and for listening to the details of values and Foucault well beyond all reasonable expectations.
To Anne.
ABSTRACT

The thesis presents a reconceptualisation of the psychology of values using the analytics of Michel Foucault. To address questions raised by postmodern analyses of contemporary society and by discursive psychology, the thesis presents a detailed exposition and examination of the thought of Foucault, focusing on its implications for the dominant theoretical tradition in the psychology of values. It then reports a programme of empirical research investigating a Foucault inspired conceptualisation of values.

After reviewing the values literature and introducing the central research problem, the thesis provides an overview of the oeuvre of Foucault and an analysis of the nature and evolution of his work. It follows Foucault's own interpretation of his project as a reformulation of the Enlightenment tradition, and emphases three distinct axes of his thought. This perspective guides the subsequent interpretations.

A reading of Foucault's Archaeology of Knowledge offers an alternative understanding of the notion of discourse to that popularised in psychology, emphasising the enabling as well as constraining properties of discursive, knowledge producing practices. Foucault's work on contemporary social change is then interpreted through his writings on ethics. It is argued that it is in the relationship one has with oneself through which one forms oneself as an ethical subject that one might find changes in contemporary society.

The implication for the psychology of values is that the potential for change exists not only in the priority of values, as posited by values theorists, but in the ethical foundation of values, with consequences for the way people conceptualise values. Hence, the dominant conceptualisation of values as abstract and enduring guiding principles may represent only a single understanding of values, embedded in the theories and instruments of current research, but dependent on particular forms of ethics.

The first two empirical studies replicate and provide support for existing approaches, finding changes in value priorities and evidence for a universal model of the content of values. Subsequent studies, however, using qualitative and Q methodology, show that independent of these results, one finds a diversity of forms of ethics, as suggested by the work of Foucault. Moreover systematic relationships are intimated between ethics and conceptions of values. An Ethical Self Formation Scale is then developed and used to show that people do hold a conception of values approximating to the conceptualisation of Rokeach, but only to the extent that their values are related to an ethics based on Spiritualism, Tradition, or Principle.

The implications of the analysis of Foucault and reconceptualisation of values are discussed in terms of the psychology of values, postmodernity, and the use of Foucault in psychology.
# Table of Contents

ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................................ 4  
TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................................................................... 5  
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................................. 11  
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................................ 13  
ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................. 14  

## PART 1 INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF VALUES, POSTMODERNITY, AND DISCURSIVE PSYCHOLOGY .............................................................................................................................. 19  
  
GENERAL INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 19  
THE CONCEPT OF VALUES ..................................................................................................................... 22  
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF VALUES ............................................................................................................. 23  
THE ROKEACH VALUES TRADITION ................................................................................................. 26  
  
  Measurement of the values of individuals, groups and cultures ....................................................... 26  
  Value-attitude-behaviour relations .................................................................................................... 27  
  Values in wider theoretical networks ............................................................................................... 27  
  Values and social issues ..................................................................................................................... 28  
  Value transmission and change ......................................................................................................... 28  
ROKEACH’S (1973) THEORY OF THE NATURE OF HUMAN VALUES ..................................................... 29  
THE ROKEACH VALUE SURVEY (RVS) ............................................................................................... 30  
CRITIQUES OF ROKEACH’S THEORY AND THE RVS ........................................................................ 32  
  1. The choice and number of values ................................................................................................. 32  
  2. The underlying structure of values ............................................................................................... 33  
  3. The meaning of values .................................................................................................................. 34  
  4. The ranking or rating of values ..................................................................................................... 35  
  Summary ........................................................................................................................................... 37  

THE EMPIRICAL VALIDATION OF SCHWARTZ’S THEORY .................................................................. 41  
THE ROKEACH-SCHWARTZ TRADITION: SUMMARY AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS ......................... 43  

CHANGES IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY: THE ‘POSTMODERN’ CONDITION ....................... 45  
CHANGING VALUES IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY? ................................................................. 48  
PROBLEMS WITH POSTMODERNITY .............................................................................................. 52
PART 2 THE ANALYTICS OF MICHEL FOUCALT

CHAPTER 2 RE-THINKING THE THOUGHT OF FOUCALT

INTRODUCTION

AN OVERVIEW OF THE OEUVRE OF MICHEL FOUCALT

‘Madness and Civilization’ to ‘The Archaeology of Knowledge’

‘Discipline and Punish’ and ‘The History of Sexuality: Volume 1’

‘The Use of Pleasure’ and ‘The Care of the Self’

FOUCALT IN PSYCHOLOGY

Alternatives to psychology’s ‘Foucault’

FOUCALT: THEORIST OR IMMANENT CRITIC OF THE PRESENT?

Theories or analytics?

What is Enlightenment?

ONE ‘FOUCALT’ OR THREE?

Transformations in the thought of Foucault

Consequences of a multiple-axis interpretation

SUMMARY

CHAPTER 3 THE ANALYTIC OF ARCHAEOLOGY: FOUCALT’S CONCEPTION OF KNOWLEDGE

INTRODUCTION

THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

The intellectual tradition of archaeology

The analytic of archaeology

Discursive formations

Objects

Enunciative modalities

Concepts

Themes

The statement, archive, and historical a priori

ARCHAEOLOGY AND DISCURSIVE PSYCHOLOGY

The question of truth

The concept of discourse

AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF VALUES

The emergence of Rokeach’s conceptualisation of values
CHAPTER 7 A QUALITATIVE STUDY OF VALUES: WHAT DO PEOPLE UNDERSTAND BY 'VALUES'?...

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 170

METHOD: ....................................................................................................................... 174
Participants: .................................................................................................................. 174
Measures: ....................................................................................................................... 176
Procedure: ..................................................................................................................... 176
Interview schedules: ...................................................................................................... 176

RESULTS AND METHOD OF ANALYSIS: .................................................................... 182

ANALYSIS: .................................................................................................................... 184

1. ROKEACH'S CONCEPTUALISATION OF VALUES .................................................... 185
Rokeach's theory as expressed in interviews ................................................................. 185
Problems for Rokeach's theory ................................................................................ 189

2. 'POSTMODERNITY': CHANGING SOCIETY, CHANGING VALUES? ................. 193

3. FOUCAULT'S ANALYTIC OF ETHICS .................................................................... 197

1. Ethical substance ...................................................................................................... 198

2. Telos ......................................................................................................................... 199

3. Mode of subjection .................................................................................................. 200
‘Divine Law’ .............................................................................................................. 201
‘Personal faith’ ............................................................................................................ 201
‘Practical Reason’ ...................................................................................................... 202
‘Discourse ethics’ ....................................................................................................... 202
‘Care’ .......................................................................................................................... 203
‘Integrity’ ..................................................................................................................... 203
‘Virtue’ ........................................................................................................................ 204

4. Ethical work ............................................................................................................ 205

4. CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF VALUES IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY? .... 209

Values: Abstract or contextual? ............................................................................... 210

Values: Enduring or transitory? ............................................................................... 211

DISCUSSION: ............................................................................................................. 213

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: ................................................................................. 217
CHAPTER 8 A Q METHODOLOGY STUDY OF UNDERSTANDINGS OF
VALUES..............................................................................................................................219

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................219
Q methodology.....................................................................................................................220
Q ANALYSIS OVERVIEW: ....................................................................................................221
PART 1: SAMPLING THE CONCOURSE AND PRODUCING THE Q-SET .....................................222
PART 2: THE Q SORT.............................................................................................................223

METHOD: ...........................................................................................................................223
Participants: .......................................................................................................................223
Materials and Measures: .................................................................................................223
Procedure: .......................................................................................................................226

DATA ANALYSIS: ...............................................................................................................226
Factor interpretation: .......................................................................................................227

FACTOR BY FACTOR REPORT: ............................................................................................228
Factor 1: Post-traditional ...............................................................................................228
Factor 2: Principled .........................................................................................................231
Factor 3: Spiritual ...........................................................................................................234
Factor 4: Hedonist ..........................................................................................................236
Factor 5: Existentialist .....................................................................................................238
Factor 6: Traditional .......................................................................................................240

THE Q FACTORS AND VALUE PRIORITIES ........................................................................242

DISCUSSION: ......................................................................................................................243

CHAPTER 9 ETHICAL SELF FORMATION AND CONCEPTIONS OF
VALUES...............................................................................................................................248

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................248

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MEASURE OF ETHICAL SELF FORMATION .........................249
Re-framing the moral domain through the concept of Ethical Self Formation ................250
Measuring Ethical Self Formation .....................................................................................252

METHOD: ...........................................................................................................................255
Structure of the Instrument: .............................................................................................255
Item Development: .........................................................................................................256
Participants: .......................................................................................................................256
Questionnaire Measures: .................................................................................................257
Procedure: .......................................................................................................................261

RESULTS: ..............................................................................................................................261
Exploratory Factor Analysis: .............................................................................................261
Confirmatory Factor Analysis: .........................................................................................265
Reliability: ..........................................................................................................................267
LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1.1: DEFINITIONS AND MARKER VALUES FOR THE 10 UNIVERSAL MOTIVATIONAL TYPES OF VALUES (ADAPTED FROM SCHWARTZ ET AL., 1997). ................................................. 40

TABLE 2.1: SUMMARY OF FOUCAULT’S OEUVRE ACCORDING TO HIS MAJOR AXES OF THOUGHT. ............................................................................................................. 84

TABLE 5.1: COMPOSITE RANK ORDER (CRO) FOR INSTRUMENTAL VALUES, WITH COMPARISON SAMPLES FROM 1968 .................................................................................................. 153

TABLE 5.2: COMPOSITE RANK ORDER (CRO) FOR TERMINAL VALUES, WITH COMPARISON SAMPLES FROM 1968 .................................................................................................. 154

TABLE 5.3: SUMMARY OF CHANGES IN VALUES FOR TWO STUDENT SAMPLES OVER THE PERIOD FROM 1968 TO 1996 WITH SUGGESTED INTERPRETATIONS. ......................... 156

TABLE 7.1: THEMES, QUESTIONS, AND PROMPTS USED IN INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 1 (SAMPLES 1 AND 2). ................................................................................................................... 179

TABLE 7.2: THEMES, QUESTIONS, AND PROMPTS USED IN INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 2 (SAMPLES 3 AND 4). ................................................................................................................... 181

TABLE 7.3: SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS OF THE QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS. .......... 215

TABLE 8.1: SUMMARY INFORMATION INCLUDING PARTICIPANT NUMBER, AGE, GENDER, SELF-REPORTED OCCUPATION AND LOADING ON THE FACTOR FOR THE 13 PARTICIPANTS WHOSE Q-SORTS EXEMPLIFY FACTOR ONE ................................................................. 229

TABLE 8.2: SUMMARY INFORMATION INCLUDING PARTICIPANT NUMBER, AGE, GENDER, SELF-REPORTED OCCUPATION AND LOADING ON THE FACTOR FOR THE 9 PARTICIPANTS WHOSE Q-SORTS EXEMPLIFY FACTOR TWO ................................................................. 232

TABLE 8.3: SUMMARY INFORMATION INCLUDING PARTICIPANT NUMBER, AGE, GENDER, SELF-REPORTED OCCUPATION AND LOADING ON THE FACTOR FOR THE 6 PARTICIPANTS WHOSE Q-SORTS EXEMPLIFY FACTOR THREE ................................................................. 235

TABLE 8.4: SUMMARY INFORMATION INCLUDING PARTICIPANT NUMBER, AGE, GENDER, SELF-REPORTED OCCUPATION AND LOADING ON THE FACTOR FOR THE 5 PARTICIPANTS WHOSE Q-SORTS EXEMPLIFY FACTOR FOUR ................................................................. 237

TABLE 8.5: SUMMARY INFORMATION INCLUDING PARTICIPANT NUMBER, AGE, GENDER, SELF-REPORTED OCCUPATION AND LOADING ON THE FACTOR FOR THE 6 PARTICIPANTS WHOSE Q-SORTS EXEMPLIFY FACTOR FIVE ................................................................. 238

TABLE 8.6: SUMMARY INFORMATION INCLUDING CASE NUMBER, AGE, GENDER, SELF-REPORTED OCCUPATION AND THEIR LOADINGS ON THE FACTOR FOR THE 4 PARTICIPANTS WHOSE Q-SORTS EXEMPLIFY FACTOR SIX ................................................................. 240
TABLE 9.1: EXPLORATORY PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALYSIS (WITH VARIMAX ROTATION) FOR THE ESFS.......................................................... 264

TABLE 9.2: COMPARISON OF MODELS FOR THE FACTOR STRUCTURE OF THE ESFS. ..... 266

TABLE 9.3: RELIABILITY OF THE SUB-SCALES OF THE ESFS............................................. 267

TABLE 9.4: PARTIAL CORRELATIONS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (MEANS, SDs) FOR FACTORS OF THE ESFS AND OTHER RELATED SCALES, CONTROLLING FOR MEAN ESFS SCORE......................................................................................... 270

TABLE 9.5: REGRESSION OF VALUE TYPE PRIORITIES (SVS) ON FACTORS OF THE ESFS. ........................................................................................................................................ 272
LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE 1.1: THEORETICAL MODEL OF RELATIONS AMONG MOTIVATIONAL TYPES OF VALUES, HIGHER ORDER VALUE TYPES, AND BIPOLAR VALUE DIMENSIONS (ADAPTED FROM SCHWARTZ, 1992). ................................................................. 42

FIGURE 3.1: SCHEMATIC MODEL OF THE ELEMENTS AND KEY TERMS IN FOUCAULT’S ANALYTIC OF ARCHAEOLOGY, DEMONSTRATING THEIR INTER-RELATIONSHIPS AND ROLES IN THE REPRESENTATION OF KNOWLEDGE ................................................................. 107

FIGURE 4.1: SCHEMATIC MODEL OF THE ELEMENTS IN FOUCAULT’S ANALYTIC OF ETHICS. ......................................................................................................................................................... 136

FIGURE 6.1: TWO-DIMENSIONAL SCALING SPACE PARTITIONED ACCORDING TO SCHWARTZ’S THEORY (1992). .......................................................................................................................... 165

FIGURE 8.1: PARTICIPANT RESPONSE MATRIX ........................................................................................................ 225

FIGURE 9.1: SCREE PLOT FOR THE ETHICAL SELF FORMATION SCALE (ESFS) ....................................................... 262
Aims, Research Problem, and Research Questions of the Thesis

Contemporary society is marked by rapid social, political, and economic change, theorised by some as the emergence of the ‘postmodern condition’ (Lyotard, 1984). Recent years have also seen a transformation in social psychology, particularly through the emergence of discourse analytic approaches to research (e.g. Parker, 1989a; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). The present thesis was motivated by concerns about the substantive and theoretical issues raised by these developments for the psychology of values, specifically: whether values in contemporary society have changed, and whether existing theories can respond to the implicit critique of discursive psychology.

These concerns, however, are too broad to address directly, and the relevant literatures too diverse and problematic. Hence, the thesis engages with these issues in a more limited but focused way through an examination of the work of a specific thinker, Michel Foucault, whose writings have contributed to both these developments. He has written specifically about changing ethics in recent society and has been a key influence on the notion of discourse now common in psychology. The central research problem chosen for the thesis is therefore: what are the implications of the thought of Foucault for traditional approaches to the psychology of values. More specifically: how might one conceptualise the psychology of values using the analytics of Foucault?

The thesis is thus able to address a series of questions related to the initial concerns:

i) Are there other ways of interpreting Foucault’s notion of discourse than that popularised by discursive psychology, with less critical implications for the psychology of values? ii) What do Foucault’s writings suggest about the postmodern condition of contemporary society? iii) How might these arguments be applied to the psychology of values? And, iv) What is the empirical evidence for the validity of a Foucault inspired reconceptualisation of values?
Overview of the Thesis

Part 1 Introduction

1. The psychology of values, postmodernity, and discursive psychology .......................... 19

The thesis begins with a review of the psychology of values literature. It then introduces the substantive and theoretical problems raised first by the idea of social change, as discussed under the rubric of postmodernity, and then by changes in social psychology, particularly the emergence of discursive approaches. It is shown how an examination of the work of Foucault offers a way of addressing key aspects of both these concerns.

Part 2 The analytics of Michel Foucault

The second part of the thesis presents a detailed exploration of the writings of Foucault. It reassesses existing uses of his work, and considers the application of a new reading of Foucault to the issue of change for the psychology of values.

2. Re-thinking the thought of Foucault .............................................................................. 60

The first chapter presents a brief overview of Foucault's oeuvre, considers some common existing readings of his work in psychology, and then proposes a general interpretation of his project that opens the way to a new interpretation. It argues that Foucault's work offers analytics in the service of a form of immanent critique, not a meta-theory of language or subjectivity; and that there are three axes to his work that must be considered in their inter-relationship, highlighting the neglected axes of 'archaeology' and 'ethics', and pointing to Foucault's analysis of postmodernity.

3. The analytic of archaeology: Foucault's conception of knowledge ............................. 90

The next chapter focuses on a specific aspect of Foucault's work. It presents an exposition of his analytic of archaeology, emphasising the importance of reading it in its intellectual tradition. It then offers a critique of Potter's (1996) discursive account of the archaeology, and shows how it might be applied differently to the psychology values. It is argued that Foucault's notion of discourse is not a rejection of truth, but an analysis of the importance of distributed systems for the production of knowledge, offering new insight into the constitution of contemporary theories of values.
4. The analytic of ethics: Foucault's conception of morality

The final chapter on Foucault draws on his later work on morality and ethics to suggest an alternative analytic framework for conceptualising values. It suggests the need to consider not just the moral code, analogous to the psychological conceptualisation of values, but also the ethical self-relationship through which moral codes (and values) are understood. It is in this neglected dimension of the relationship one has with oneself that Foucault suggests there may be changes in contemporary society.

Part 3 An empirical investigation into the psychology of values

The third part of the thesis reports a series of empirical studies investigating the conceptualisation of values suggested by the reading of Foucault. It employs a range of methods in order to explore a new way of thinking about values, beginning with established approaches, then exploratory methods, and ending with a formal test of the key theoretical question that emerges in the course of the research.

5. An investigation into changing priorities of values

The empirical research in the thesis begins from the perspective of the currently dominant approach to values in psychology. The first study replicates the method for assessing value change developed by Rokeach (1973). Tentative conclusions are drawn suggesting that there have indeed been changes in value priorities, some of which may be consistent with claims made about postmodernity. However, the study also demonstrates the inherent limitations in this method, and the way in which it restricts the types of change that are open to investigation.

6. An investigation into the universal structure of values

The second study turns to the most recent theory in the Rokeach tradition, developed by Schwartz (1992). Using Schwartz's Value Survey and following his method of analysis, the study offers a further replication of his model of the universal structure of values. However, this study also demonstrates the limits imposed by the analytic method advanced by Schwartz.

7. A qualitative study of values: What do people understand by 'values'?

Adopting a more open, exploratory approach, the chapter presents a qualitative
analysis of values. Findings from 47 semi-structured interviews showed a range of results, some consistent with Rokeach's original theory, others that were not. As expected from Foucault's analytic, it was found that there were a number of ways of understanding the notion of values, and that different conceptions of values may be related to a range of different forms of ethical self relationship.

8. A Q methodology study of understandings of values ................................................. 219

Extending the findings of the qualitative study, 'Q' methodology was used to identify coherent patterns in people's understandings of values. Participants sorted a pack of Q items, each describing a different aspect of conceptions of values. The analysis revealed six factors, representing coherent and consistent ways of interpreting the notion of values. They were labelled 'Post-traditional', 'Principled', 'Spiritual', 'Hedonist', 'Existentialist' and 'Traditional'.

9. Ethical self formation and conceptions of values ....................................................... 248

The final study presents a more formal analysis of the specific hypothesis that emerges from the previous studies: that conceptions of values are clearly related to the forms of ethics one practices. A scale is developed and partially validated to measure adherence to six different modes of Ethical Self Formation, based on the findings of the Q study. Four of the six were found to be statistically related to the extent to which people conceptualise values as being abstract and enduring guiding principles, or more contextual and transitory goals.

Part 4 Conclusion

10. General discussion and conclusions.......................................................................... 278

The last chapter summarises the findings of the thesis and draws conclusions. It is argued that Foucault's analytics offer a new and coherent conceptualisation of values drawing attention to an important neglected dimension in which values might change. The implications for the psychology of values and for more general debates about Foucault, postmodernity and discursive psychology are discussed.
Part 1

Introduction
Chapter 1

The psychology of values, postmodernity, and discursive psychology

General introduction

Contemporary society is characterised by rapid change. Over the course of the present thesis, for example, a New Labour party has taken office espousing a ‘third way’ in politics; major advances have been made in biotechnology, heralding unknown consequences; and a transformation has taken place in the nature of commerce through the emergence of the internet. These developments and many others like them have brought diffuse and perhaps profound political, technological, economic, and social changes.

Over the past 30 years, social psychology has likewise seen a number of important developments. Since the so-called ‘crisis’ in the discipline of the early 1970s (Elms, 1975), the number and variety of approaches to psychological research has greatly increased. Particularly in the last decade, approaches making new assumptions about the nature and aims of the discipline have become popular (e.g. Parker, 1989a; Potter & Wetherell, 1987), proposing discursive rather than cognitive accounts of psychological phenomena and suggesting a very different view of how psychology should be practised to traditional approaches.

The starting point for the thesis was a concern with the possible effects of these developments for established psychological theories. The specific domain that was chosen as a focus was the topic of values. Hence, the thesis initially began with two broad questions: Have values in contemporary society changed, and if so, in what ways have they changed? And, how can we understand traditional theories of values in the context of the critiques implicit in newer discursive approaches to psychology?

In everyday language, the concept of ‘values’ is generally used to refer to desirable goals or ways of being: worthy ‘goods’ that we hold in high regard. Examples might include: world peace, freedom, friendship, or financial security. All these things
are, by definition, of value: they are all important to us. Yet their relative importance will differ between people and vary across historical periods. Hence, the question of whether values have changed or not in contemporary society would appear to be a matter of priorities; whether certain values are relatively more important to us now than they once were, and vice versa.

Changes in values have traditionally been studied in psychology using an approach based on these principles. People first rank lists of values according to their relative importance to them as guiding principles in their lives (Rokeach, 1973). The results can then be compared over time for comparable groups in order to see whether there have been changes in the priority of values in society over time. Notable differences have previously been found using this method (Rokeach, 1974; Rokeach & Ball-Rokeach, 1989). In order to address the same question here, therefore, the empirical research reported in the thesis begins by adopting these established methods and extending them to include data from a contemporary sample. The main aim of the thesis, however, is to attempt to address some other problems and conceptually more difficult issues raised for this tradition of research.

As our contemporary social conditions have been discussed in the social science literature in recent years, it has been in terms suggesting more fundamental changes than may be revealed purely by studying changes in priorities of values. Social change has been widely debated under the problematic, but nevertheless challenging rubric of 'postmodernity' (e.g. Seidman, 1994b). It has been suggested that recent developments in Western society have led to basic changes in the fabric of our social world, and to the foundations of our knowledge and beliefs. The implication of this literature is that we may need to reconsider the ways in which values might change, perhaps even to reassess the notion of 'values' itself, if we are to theorise the concept in a way that takes into account prevailing conditions of contemporary societies. Though 'postmodernity' as a concept and all-embracing generalisation has been rightly criticised (e.g. Norris, 1990a; Norris, 1990b; Rorty, 1991) and fallen out of fashion in recent years, some of the issues raised in the literature nonetheless remain worthy of consideration.

The notion of postmodernity is related to the second initial interest of the thesis concerning the implications of newer discursive approaches in psychology. Some of the
most influential proponents of discursive psychology have drawn on philosophers that have been associated with the idea of postmodernity, for example, Foucault and Derrida (Parker, 1989a). In other cases, postmodernity has served as a broad theoretical backdrop for the emergence and popularity of discursive forms of psychology (e.g. (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). In both cases, as these ideas have been interpreted and embodied in newer approaches, they too have come to raise serious questions for established approaches like that used in the psychology of values. They likewise suggest a need to consider more than just the priority of different values, instead questioning the very status of the concept of ‘values’.

These are the problems that prompted the present research. However, the postmodernity and discursive psychology literatures are too broad and in many ways too problematic to address directly. In order to limit the scope of the thesis and offer a focused analysis of at least certain aspects of these concerns, the thesis focuses on the work of a single writer, who has been highly influential in both the postmodernity debate and in recent developments in social psychology.

It is for these reasons and with these concerns that the thesis turns to the work of the French historian and philosopher, Michel Foucault. The name of Foucault is associated with postmodernity and with some of the more challenging analyses of our contemporary social condition. His work on the discursive foundations of knowledge has likewise been highly influential on the emergence of discursive psychology. A detailed analysis of Foucault therefore offers a way of examining and addressing a specific account of what the consequences of these social developments might be for the psychology of values. It also offers a way of reassessing some of the more general and critical claims that might be made against this tradition by discursive psychologists, at least in so far as they claim to draw on his work. Hence the specific task of the thesis is to consider the implications of the thought of Foucault for the dominant tradition in the psychology of values.

The thesis will argue that Foucault does offer a perspective on values that presents a different view to the dominant conception of values in current research. However, it will also be argued that Foucault’s thought does not support the complete rejection of traditional forms of psychology commonly suggested in discursive psychology.
Contrary also to some popular interpretations of Foucault in the postmodernity literature, it will similarly be argued that Foucault presents a positive framework for the analysis of values in contemporary society. The thesis will thus show how the work of Foucault, rather than dismissing the established tradition of values research, can be seen to offer a potential resolution to the issues raised by the notion of 'changes' in values, and a positive new formulation of the concept of values will be suggested based on Foucault's analytics. The thesis will present a programme of empirical research exploring and elaborating this reconceptualisation of values.

The thesis begins in this chapter by introducing the concept of values and reviewing the current psychology of values literature. It focuses specifically on the tradition that is dominant in research today, pioneered by Rokeach (1973) and further developed by Schwartz (1992). The chapter then introduces some of the issues raised for this theoretical tradition by postmodern analyses of contemporary society and by the claims of discursive psychology.

The concept of values

The term 'value' is one of the Great Words, and, like other such words ('science', 'religion', 'art', 'morality', 'philosophy'), its meaning is multiple and complex. (Morris, 1942, p. 9)

The concept of values is central to human life. Unlike many technical terms in psychology, the term 'values' has an everyday meaning, deeply embedded in social practices and everyday discourse. As Morris, an early pioneer of values research suggests, the meaning of the concept of values is thus 'multiple and complex'.

There are a number of distinctions that can be made to map out the varied meanings attributable to the term. The application of the concept in the context of objects is clearly different from its use with people. In this respect, the singular is often used to highlight the economic or sentimental 'value' of objects, in contrast to the plural, 'values', held by people. Values may similarly be explicit, symbolic objects readily available for discussion, or implicit, unarticulated qualities present in our language, practices and systems of rules and regulations. The concept of values almost always refers to something that is 'good', desired or desirable, but may take the form of either the object desired, or criteria against which something is judged. Moreover, we
may speak of values as properties of individuals, or values as properties of groups, societies, nations, or cultures. Values vary in importance from the mildly desirable, to deeply held moral principles or convictions. All these distinctions apply to the nature of the concept of values, before one has even begun to add substance to this concept, to suggest specific entities that might be considered to be 'values'.

A concept with such varied meanings, all of which imply a pervasive and central role in human affairs, clearly offers a significant opportunity to psychologists and social scientists. As Bond has suggested, for example, it has the potential to be the 'royal road to explaining cultural differences' (Bond, 1996, p. 208). Almost uniquely, values refer, by definition, to a domain of importance and worth, and so intrinsically possess the justification for their study. Values would appear furthermore to offer a strong basis from which to pursue the central goals of social psychology, the prediction of attitudes and behaviour. As desirable 'goods', it is reasonable to expect values to guide and orient our behaviour in consistent and reliable ways.

However, the very breadth and importance of the notion of values also creates problems. A social science of values entails measuring values in some way, for which one must offer a conceptualisation that can be integrated with a theoretical network. It thus requires the definition of this complex concept and the development of tools and procedures making it amenable to investigation. Given the many potential ways of understanding 'values', it is perhaps not surprising that even in recent research it is still described as being 'among the most fuzzy concepts of the social sciences' (Miceli & Castelfranchi, 1989, p. 169). As Wilson (1988) suggests 'of all widely invoked concepts, few are as difficult to specify as the concept of values' (p. 1). In sum, the concept of values offers psychology both a great opportunity as well as a challenge.

The next section briefly introduces some of the varied ways values have been conceptualised and studied in psychology providing the broader context for the specific theoretical tradition that is the focus for the thesis.

The psychology of values

The breadth of meaning of the concept of values is reflected in the use of the term in psychology. Many psychological topics could be considered to be value-laden, and hence, their investigation to be contributions to the study of values. Thus Hollander
Values, postmodernity and discursive psychology

Introduction

(Hollander, 1971) frames the topic of social influence as a study of 'values', even though there is no attempt in this research to study values as a distinct psychological construct. The term is articulated only slightly more clearly in research like that of Grusec and Goodnow (1994). Their investigation into the internalisation of values operationalises the concept through a number of value-laden domains. Respondents are asked to note their occupational aspirations, their endorsement of well-known proverbs, and their ratings of the importance of various 'good' behaviours. Their values are thus indirectly revealed in order to assess the extent to which they match those of their parents. Distinct from these more general studies of 'values', there have also been a number of attempts to conceptualise, operationalise and study values directly.

In one of the first successful studies in psychology, Allport and Vernon (1931) understood values to be the basis of personality, expressing themselves in broad preferences and desires across a wide range of domains. In their 'Study of Values', values are conceptualised through six interests or motives in personality: theoretical, economic, aesthetic, social, political, and religious. One's endorsement of one or another type is ascertained through ratings of statements operationalising the desires and preferences inherent in these different types. Values are thus conceived in this approach as the basis of personality.

Triandis and co-workers (Triandis, Kilty, Shanmugam, Tanaka, & Vassiliou, 1972) offered a different view of values, as underlying one's judgements about the antecedents and consequences of abstract concepts. Respondents in their approach judge a set of 20 abstract concepts, making six choices from 5-item lists to indicate what they believe to be the causes and consequences of these concepts. From these choices are inferred themes that reveal cultural values. Values are therefore conceptualised at a cultural level as preferences for particular outcomes. The later work of Triandis and colleagues (Triandis, et al., 1986) offered a more specific approach focusing on the single value orientation of individualism-collectivism.

Other approaches have similarly found ways to limit the scope of their investigation of values. Hofstede (1980), in a study recently replicated by Smith, Dugan, and Trompenaars (1996), analysed cross-cultural differences in values focusing on a specific aspect of life: the domain of work. In his study of employees of the IBM
Corporation around the globe, he offered a conceptualisation of values in terms of fundamental dimensions concerning 'basic problems of humanity with which every society has to cope' (p. 313). Four dimensions were thus considered to be the foundation of values: 'Power Distance', concerned with social inequality and the authority of one person over another; 'Uncertainty Avoidance', relating to the way societies deal with the uncertainty of the future; 'Individualism and Collectivism', the individual's dependence on the group; and 'Masculinity versus Femininity', understood as the endorsement of masculine assertive goals in contrast to feminine nurturing goals.

In other approaches the scope of research has been limited further still by focusing on certain subsets of values. Richins and Dawson (1992), for example, offer a measure specifically of consumer values. Wilson and Patterson (1968) present a specific measure of conservatism, and Rushton, Chrisjohn and Fekken (1981) a measure of altruistic values. Inglehart's (1977) work on values restricts the analysis to desirable national goals. In this theory, drawing on Maslow's (1962) hierarchy of needs, materialist values representing safety and sustenance needs, are distinguished from 'post-materialist' values, emphasising belongingness, esteem, intellectual and aesthetic needs. Kahle's (1996) extensive research programme using his 'List of Values' combines aspects of the general with the more specific approaches. It comprises a general set of values: 'Sense of belonging', 'Excitement', 'Warm relationships with others', 'Self-fulfilment', 'Being well-respected', 'Fun and enjoyment in life', 'Security', 'Self-respect', and 'A sense of accomplishment', but its use has been oriented almost exclusively to the analysis of values in consumer behaviour.

From this selection of key studies in the field, it can be seen that there has been a range of interpretations in psychology of the concept of values. From the study of value-laden topics, to the direct study of values as a theoretical construct, a number of conceptualisations have been proposed, with varied theoretical assumptions, underlying concerns, and levels of specificity. This variability has made the topic of values less focused and more diverse than many other areas of the discipline. It is against this background that the importance can be appreciated of the tradition of research begun by Milton Rokeach (1973) that the thesis will concentrate on.
The Rokeach values tradition

Whilst the varied theories and studies introduced in the previous section have made valuable contributions to our understanding of values, none has introduced a conceptualisation and theory of values that could unify the field and generate a readily expandable programme of research. As suggested by Braithwaite and Scott (1991), it is precisely this role that has made the contribution of Rokeach (1973) so influential.

Rokeach proposed a new conceptualisation of values as a special type of belief with distinct qualities. Values for Rokeach are a special form of cognitive representation serving as guiding principles in our lives. They are absolute, enduring and transcendent across situations. Rokeach proposed a set of 36 values and operationalised the theory in an easily administered questionnaire in which respondents rank the values according to their importance as guiding principles. This basic notion of values and this straightforward means of measuring them offered a significant advance in the field. It established a tradition of research that expanded rapidly and that continues today, with some modification, most prominently in the work of Schwartz (1992). This approach to values has opened a range of research possibilities. It has allowed researchers to measure the differences in values between groups; to analyse value-attitude-behaviour relations; to integrate values research with other theoretical areas of psychology; to study the role of values in social issues; and to consider questions of value transmission and change. The following section will first consider some contributions to each of these areas as studied using the surveys developed by Rokeach or Schwartz, before turning to discuss in more detail the theories that underlie this tradition.

Measurement of the values of individuals, groups and cultures

One of the main topics for values research has been the measurement of the value priorities of specific groups, and the identification of differences in values between groups. The ease with which values can be measured using Rokeach's value survey has enabled investigators to make many comparisons across categories of people. Rokeach's (1973) original study, for example, compared values across gender, age, class, education, and occupation. Rokeach also compared the values of specific minority groups (e.g. 'hippies' and homosexuals) with those of the general population. Value comparisons have since been made on a variety of other bases, including: religion
I. Values, postmodernity and discursive psychology

Introduction

In the context of modernity and the construction of the self, values have been central to understanding the development of personal and social identity. The construction of the individual is closely linked with the role that values play in the formation of the self. Thus, values are seen as the basis for the development of personal and social identity (Brown & Lawson, 1980; Roccas & Schwartz, 1997), and as the foundation for the construction of the self (Billig & Cochrane, 1979; Jones, 1982), and occupation (Mahoney & Pechura, 1980; Vechiotti & Korn, 1980). Of particular importance has been the extension of the measurement of values of different groups across cultures. The approach of Schwartz especially has generated a highly productive tradition of cross-cultural research (Bond, 1996; Schwartz, 1994). This has explored both differences in values across culture, as well as similarities, suggesting potentially universal underlying dimensions in the structure of values (Schwartz & Ros, 1995).

Value-attitude-behaviour relations

The theorisation of values as guiding principles has naturally led to a further field of investigation exploring the relationship between values, attitudes and behaviour. Contributions have focused on both theoretical (e.g. Feather, 1995; Schwartz, 1996) and a wide variety of applied issues. For example, values have been found to account for 16% of the variance of a manager's success in an organisation (Thomas, 1997), to predict the purchase of organic food (Grunert & Juhl, 1995) and the choice of different types of luxury automobile (Sukhdial, Chakraborty, & Steger, 1995). As validation of the potential breadth and utility of the notion of values, other studies have found values to predict behaviours as varied as cheating (Homant & Rokeach, 1970), volunteering (Raymond & King, 1973), participation in social activism (Thomas, 1986) and engagement in preventative health practices (Kristiansen, 1985).

Values in wider theoretical networks

Beyond the relationship between values and attitudes, researchers in this tradition have explored the relationship between values and a number of other theoretical areas. A number of studies have focused on personality variables, including the 'Big-5'. Dollinger, Leong, and Ulicni (1996), for example, found that the trait 'openness to experience' was positively related to values of 'A world of beauty', 'Broadminded' and 'Imaginative', and negatively related to 'Social Recognition' and 'Self-Controlled'. Other studies have found relationships between values and constructs and areas as diverse as: the Freiburg personality inventory (Bilsky & Schwartz, 1994), Conservatism (Braithwaite, 1998; Feather, 1979), the protestant work ethic (Feather, 1984b), life orientation (Cileli & Tezer, 1998), gender stereotypes (Di-Dio, Saragovi, Koestner, &

Values and social issues

The central importance of values to individuals and society suggests the importance of the concept for the study of broader social issues. Ball-Rokeach and Loges (1994) have studied the role of the value of equality in racial attitudes and shown how values may be used to analyse choices constructed by the media (Ball-Rokeach & Loges, 1996). Schwartz and Bardi (1997) have considered the development of particular types of values in the context of political systems, looking especially at those relating to hierarchy and social order in the context of the communist political systems of Eastern Europe. Other recent work has explored the relationship between values and fairness judgements of wage differentials (Dickinson, 1991), affirmative action in college admissions (Peterson, 1994), the fear of conventional and nuclear war (Boehnke & Schwartz, 1997), of anti-nuclear political activism (Mayton & Furnham, 1994), estimates of the relative importance of nature vs nurture in psychiatric disorders (Schwartz, 1998), and the underlying dimensions of political ideology (Braithwaite, 1994).

Value transmission and change

Values in this tradition are theorised to be enduring and stable properties of people and groups but also to be open to change (Rokeach, 1973). This occurs both slowly over time and, as Rokeach was keen to show, potentially quite rapidly as a result of experimental manipulations. Both these dimensions of value change have been studied. Rokeach and Ball-Rokeach (1989), for example, report a study of changing values in American society between 1968 and 1981. They found that the priority of most values remained stable, but that aggregated over a representative sample of the total population, some values, notably the value of ‘Equality’, declined in relative importance. Research into induced changes have employed Rokeach’s concept of ‘value self-confrontation’. Based on the theory that value change follows from the need to reduce self-dissatisfaction, changes in values are provoked by confronting an experimental subject with a measure of their own values, alongside those of another
group whom the subject is known to admire, aspire toward, or respect in some way. This technique has been found to lead to short and long-term changes in the values of a range of groups, including teachers (Greenstein, 1976) and dieters (Schwartz & Inbar-Saban, 1988).

In sum, through the conceptualisation of values of Rokeach, the psychology of values has been able to successfully encompass a broad field of research. Though there have also been a number of contributions to this literature critical of Rokeach’s theory, that will be discussed in later sections of the review, the widespread adoption of his formulation of values has nevertheless been a major influence in shaping the modern domain of values research. The next section now turns to the theory itself.

**Rokeach’s (1973) theory of the nature of human values**

Rokeach’s theory combined his previous work on belief system theory (Rokeach, 1960; 1968), with a careful consolidation of the inter-disciplinary literature on values of the 1950s and 1960s. Rokeach first developed belief system theory in the ‘Open and Closed Mind’ (1960), a construct he operationalised in the ‘Dogmatism scale’. In contrast to research identifying specific, political personality types, like Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford’s (1950) ‘Authoritarian Personality’, Rokeach argued that such differences in personality were the result of variation in the underlying operation of belief systems. Those with rigid systems were likely to become authoritarian, those with flexible or open systems, liberal. He thus offered a way of abstracting from the particular to the properties of an abstract cognitive system to explain the manifestation of psychological phenomena. Rokeach then extended this theoretical framework of the belief system to first incorporate the central social psychological construct of attitudes (Rokeach, 1968), and then the more general concept of values.

The work that provided the context for Rokeach’s conceptualisation of values was widely distributed across the social sciences. It was theoretically rich, but diverse and fragmented. An important part of Rokeach’s innovation came from his elegant incorporation of the most widely agreed aspects of this literature. He drew on the highly influential analysis of values by the anthropologist, Clyde Kluckhohn (1951) that theorised values as ‘conceptions of the desirable’. From the sociologist, Robin Williams
(1968), Rokeach understood values to operate as ‘criteria’ for the selection of behaviours. From Scott (1965), came the idea that values were ‘absolute’, that they were admirable or desirable all the time, not just under certain conditions. From the philosopher, Lovejoy (1950), he drew the idea that values were of two types: one representing desired states of affairs, or in Rokeach’s words, ‘terminal values’; the other representing ways of being, or adjectival values, or ‘instrumental values’. Finally, from Florence Kluckhohn (1950), Rokeach understood values to be ordered in importance, forming a hierarchy.

Combining these influences, Rokeach presented his compelling conception of values and value systems, summarised in the following formal definition:

A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence. A value system is an enduring organization of beliefs concerning desirable modes of conduct or end-states of existence along a continuum of relative importance. (Rokeach, 1973, p. 5)

This formulation was further elaborated within the parameters of belief system theory. Rokeach proposed different types of values, within the main distinction of terminal and instrumental values. The former could be either ‘personal values’, states of affairs desired for oneself, like ‘Health’ or ‘A comfortable life’, or ‘social values’, of benefit to people generally, like ‘Freedom’ or ‘A world at peace’. Instrumental values could be either ‘competence’ values, like ‘Intelligent’ or ‘Creative’, or ‘moral’ values, that affected others, like ‘Honest’ or ‘Loyal’. It was the latter, in particular, to which Rokeach attributed the quality of ‘oughtness’, the feeling that one was morally obliged to follow one’s values. These elements, then, became the foundations for Rokeach’s influential theory.

The Rokeach Value Survey (RVS)

A critical additional factor in the success of the theory was its precise operationalisation in a measurement instrument. It carefully codified the central features of the theory, so affording the relatively straightforward measurement of values and the application of the theoretical formulation of values.
Rokeach had argued that since values were abstract principles serving as criteria, there must be only a limited number. Moreover, since they were universal this limited range of values must be shared. Thus there was the possibility of producing a circumscribed list of values. Rokeach offered a list of 36 values, 18 terminal and 18 instrumental. These were selected using standard procedures from attitude and personality research. A large initial item pool was generated by reviewing the literature on values and personality traits, and by interviewing a sample of participants. The initial pool of items was then reduced through the deletion of repetitions. Each value was defined by a value name, e.g. ‘Honest’, and a clarifying description, e.g. ‘sincere, truthful’.

The task for the survey respondent is to assess the importance of each value to them as ‘a guiding principle in your life’. Consistent with the theory that values exist in a cognitive hierarchy, importance was to be expressed in terms of priority. Hence, the objective was to rank each of the lists of 18 values in order of priority, from most to least important. Several forms of the instrument were developed: including a version where the ranks were written alongside the values (Form E), and a version with removable gummed labels (Form D). The most recent version (Form G; Rokeach, 1982), retains the gummed labels, but replaces two of the original values: ‘Happiness’ with ‘Health’, and ‘Cheerful’ with ‘Loyal’. Completion of the survey then generates data that is directly interpretable. Scores for particular values between groups may be compared via means or medians. Similarities between individuals or groups, or for individuals over time are easily computed using Spearman’s rho.

The psychometric properties of the instrument were rigorously tested by Rokeach, then later by other investigators, most extensively by Feather (1975). Rokeach (1973) reports the test-retest reliability for adults using the Form D, for time-intervals of 3-7 weeks ranged from .76 to .80 for terminal values, and .65 to .72 for instrumental values. For longer time periods of 14-16 weeks, the reliabilities were .69 and .65 for the two types of values respectively. The validity of the instrument was further demonstrated in studies that tested it for order effects (Greenstein & Bennett, 1974) and social desirability (Kelly, Silverman, & Cochrane, 1972).
Validated in this way, Rokeach’s theory of values and the accompanying research instrument were then widely adopted. It is this conceptualisation of values that introduced the major tradition of research in psychology discussed in the previous section. However, Rokeach’s theory, and especially the value survey, have also been widely criticised over the years. The next section will discuss some problems for the theory that have been a focus for the critics.

**Critiques of Rokeach’s theory and the RVS**

Critics of Rokeach’s theory and value instrument have largely focused on four main areas. They concern: the choice and number of values; the underlying structure posited by Rokeach; the meaning of individual values and the possible range of interpretations; and the question of whether they should be ranked or rated. These four areas will be discussed in turn.

1. **The choice and number of values**

   Central to the theory is the idea that there are a limited number of values that are universally shared. This postulate introduces the possibility of directly measuring a limited set of values, but also raises the difficulty of specifying exactly how many and which values to include. The 36 values Rokeach selected were soon criticised as arbitrary and subjective (Keats & Keats, 1974; Kitwood & Smithers, 1975). Rokeach’s position was not helped by his own admission that items were chosen ‘on various grounds - intuitive, theoretical, and empirical’ (Rokeach, 1973, p. 350). For example, the number of terminal values was ‘estimated’ to be ‘about a dozen and a half’, based on the claim that ‘on intuitive grounds, it seems evident that there are just so many end-states to strive for and just so many modes of behaviour that are instrumental to their attainment’ (p. 350). In a further effort to justify the limits placed on the values, Rokeach argued that they must be limited by the extent of people’s needs, drawing on writers who had theorised a restricted number, including Freud (1922), Maslow (1954) and Murray (1938). But still, there is a long way between such basic needs, and the articulation of a specific set of values.

   Unfortunately, the instrument itself does not allow for the vagueness evident in Rokeach’s theorisation of this problem. Subsequent studies have explored this issue further. Braithwaite and Law (1985) allowed respondents to add values to the RVS that
they thought should have been included. Finding few values shared between participants in addition to those selected by Rokeach, their study provided some support for the generality of the values included in the RVS, though they maintained that it was a potential fault. Jones and Ashmore’s (1978) findings were less positive. They asked respondents to spontaneously generate their own set of values, independently of the RVS, but following instructions designed to elicit terminal and instrumental values; i.e. they were to write down the ‘social and personal goals you think are worthwhile’ (p. 258) and ‘the modes of conduct that you feel should guide people’s behaviour’ (p. 258). Of the 3458 values generated by their subjects, the 36 most frequently mentioned accounted for 42.1 percent. Less than one third of these, however, they considered equivalent to the values included in the RVS. Moreover, they argued that the spontaneously generated values exhibited a simpler underlying structure than that posited by Rokeach. They concluded that it was worthwhile to further explore the nature of Rokeach’s hierarchy of values ‘but only if the subjects utilized in the research are allowed to express their own values and attitudes’ (p. 269). Thus, one aspect of the theory that has been criticised is the idea that there are a limited number of values shared by everyone that the researcher can specify. A problem for the survey is thus the specific number and choices of values that are included.

2. The underlying structure of values

Rokeach was interested not only in the priority people accorded specific values, but the relationship between values. His theory was also fundamentally about ‘value systems’. An underlying structure was therefore incorporated in the theory. He distinguished two, distinct, hierarchically ordered value systems: one for terminal values, and one for instrumental values. This distinction is important for several reasons: it fundamentally divides values into two types; it involves potential inter and intra-category relationships between the two systems; it limits the number of values incorporated in the survey; and it produces a central division in the construction of the instrument, important methodologically, since it would be less feasible to rank a single list of 36 values.

The distinction between terminal and instrumental values has, however, been widely criticised. Gorsuch (1970) was one of the first critics, arguing that it was not
simply a conceptual matter as Rokeach argued, but a function of individual value structures. Values might be organised differently across individuals, hence one could not theorise the distinction in advance. Heath and Fogel (1978) addressed the question empirically. They found that participants in their study were unable to reliably divide the values of the RVS into two types matching the categorisation of Rokeach. They did, though, find numerous differences between gender as to which values were instrumental and which terminal. Though the definitions of the two types included in their instructions differed considerably from those of Lovejoy (1950), whom Rokeach had originally drawn the distinction from, their findings point to a greater flexibility in values than suggested by the theory. Though the RVS continues to fundamentally codify this distinction, it is therefore problematic. Moreover, the distinction between two value systems has been widely challenged by attempts to derive alternative underlying structures for values.

The data generated by the RVS is amenable to several techniques for exploring other possible structures, including factor analysis and multi-dimensional scaling. Rokeach conducted a factor analysis in his original study. However, he concluded that 'it is unlikely that the 36 values can be effectively reduced to some smaller number of factors' (Rokeach, 1973, p. 23). This has not been the view of other researchers however. Heath and Fogel (1978) also factor analysed data from the RVS and found what they considered interpretable factors they labelled 'personal freedom', 'humanitarianism', 'accomplishment', 'true friendship', 'moral obligation', 'understanding', 'contentment', and 'social recognition'. However, other factor analytic studies have failed to find equivalent solutions. They have ranged from 5 to 10 factors (Feather, 1975; Kahalas, Groves, & Uhr, 1974; Madden, 1976; Mahoney, 1976). It is only through the work of Schwartz using multi-dimensional scaling that a widely replicable solution has been found. This will be discussed later. To summarise it is clear that there is considerable dispute over the distinction between terminal and instrumental values, and the idea of two underlying value systems it implies.

3. The meaning of values

A distinct issue to that of which values to include in the RVS, is the question of how respondents interpret the meaning of the values that are included. Mueller
Mueller (1974) examined this problem and found considerable differences in participants' interpretation of the values. He concluded that the simple two- or three-word descriptions of each value were therefore insufficient to supply specific enough meanings to compare value ratings across respondents. Gibbins and O’Gorman (1975: cited in Gibbins & Walker, 1993) addressed this problem by exploring several of Rokeach’s terminal values in some detail and also found extensive disagreement about their meaning. The problem is especially acute in the case of the larger concepts encompassed by the political values included in the survey. Thannhauser and Caird (1990) and Cochrane, Billig and Hogg (1979) have both considered these values specifically. The latter argued:

A word expressing a value, or indeed the value itself, might have several contradictory meanings. In particular, different political ideologies might interpret the same value in diametrically opposed ways. (p. 165)

The problem has been investigated most thoroughly by Gibbins and Walker (1993). Participants in their study first ranked the terminal values of the RVS in the usual way. They then selected from a number of interpretations of each value which meaning they had intended when they completed the task. These interpretations generated by Gibbins, Walker and colleagues, and included space for participants to add their own versions. The interpretations that were selected for each of the values were then subjected to factor analysis. Fifteen of the 18 values analysed revealed 2 factors, from which the authors inferred that there are multiple meanings employed in the completion of the survey. There are, then, questions for Rokeach’s approach about the meaning given to the values included in the RVS.

4. The ranking or rating of values

The issue that has generated most debate, however, as well as empirical research, concerns the ranking procedure incorporated in the survey. For Rokeach, this is based on a theoretical rather than simply methodological point. It follows a fundamental feature of values: that they are by their nature ipsative. One cannot rate a value in absolute terms, as one would agree or disagree with an item on a personality scale. Values are all desirable, by definition; each value Rokeach regarded as a ‘different ray of sunshine’ (cited in Ball-Rokeach & Loges, 1994). Hence it is not of interest whether
a value is simply of importance to someone, only whether it is more or less important than some other value. This theoretical consideration underlies the issue of ranking in the RVS.

Debate over the question of ranking has taken several forms, and has produced both support and criticism of this aspect of the theory and instrument. First, attention has been drawn to some basic limitations ranking introduces to the inferences that can be made on the basis of the RVS. Hence, the only criticism of the RVS made by Lynn (1974) in an early review, was that it could not be used to measure differences in absolute evaluations. For example, 'is it true that the young care more passionately about values than the middle-aged?' (p. 453). Also, as Miceli and Castelfranchi (1989) have argued, one cannot be sure that even a value rated most important is still not less of a priority than another value omitted from the scale. Caution must also be exercised in comparing different scores. It is deceptive, for example, to say that men value 'Social recognition' more than women, if the mean ranks are 15.6 and 13.2 (Rokeach, 1973). This may be true relatively, but absolutely, one might argue that the value is of little importance to either. Other critiques of ipsative data have been made on mathematical grounds by Hicks (1970). He has argued that ipsative measures may only be legitimately used for intra-individual comparisons. From a purely practical point of view, it may be noted that ranking data is also considerably slower and so more difficult to collect.

There have been a number of attempts to address this problem empirically. The results of these studies have been mixed. Feather (1975), for example, compared the traditional ranking procedure with rating values on an 8-point scale and found that ranking was superior. Meithe (1986) compared ranking, with both rating and psycho-physical measures of values (magnitude and handgrip scaling) and similarly concluded by recommending ranking. Moore (1975) on the other hand, defended the rating approach on the grounds that it offered more information. Finally, in a particularly comprehensive examination of this question, Rankin and Grube (1980), compared ranking and rating for test-retest reliability, construct validity, and convergent and discriminant validity. They found the convergent validity carried out twice over a 6-week period to be good for both techniques. In their view, both methods therefore were of equal reliability and validity.
Ng (1982) has offered a brief but influential alternative interpretation of Rankin and Grube's findings. He defends their work and conclusions, but suggests their findings may only be valid for American samples. As a cross-cultural researcher, he argues that the theoretical hierarchy that underlies the ranking procedure may not accurately depict the value systems of other cultures. It may be possible, for example, for values to hold a similar rank. Moreover, the routine use of the ranking procedure precludes the possibility of testing this theoretical assumption.

In the context of Ng's comments, two empirical studies are important that have since explored this theoretical assumption. Braithwaite and Law (1985), interviewed participants immediately after completing the RVS, and found that they commonly experienced difficulty placing the values in a hierarchy. Their respondents considered some values, as Ng suggested, to be of equal rank, others not to be comparable, and some, determined by the situation. Respondents also often understood different values to be interrelated. Hague (1993), instructed participants to write down comments about their experiences of the RVS, as they completed the survey. He found similar problems to Braithwaite and Law. Respondents in Hague's study also considered some values to be of the same importance, or to be interrelated. They also reported being overwhelmed by the number of values and being unclear about whether they were supposed to be responding for their ideal or real selves. Hague also reported the finding that some values were considered to be dependent on the circumstances.

In conclusion, there would appear to be both methodological problems with ranking values, as well as perhaps theoretical problems with Rokeach's notion of a value hierarchy. This long-running issue is, however, still being debated in the literature. Ball-Rokeach and Loges (1994), for example, have recently reiterated the defence of ranking, as both an important part of the survey and a fundamental feature of the nature of human values. And on the other hand, Maio, Roese, Seligman and Katz (1996) have conducted a further study finding that rating is the superior approach.

Summary

Rokeach's theory initiated the modern era of values research in psychology. He offered a cogent and well-specified formulation of this complex concept, incorporating central features from preceding research, and providing the means and impetus for a
productive, new field of investigation. But Rokeach’s theory also has been subjected to a number of critiques. There are problems with the number and choice of values included in the survey; questions raised about the underlying structure postulated by Rokeach; problems assuming the meaning of the values; and an extensive debate about the validity of ranking values. The most important development in recent years has been the work of Schwartz whose theory and methods have found ways to overcome these critiques whilst further advancing this theoretical tradition. Schwartz’s theory will therefore be considered next.

Schwartz’s (1992) theory of the universal content and structure of values

The theory first proposed by Schwartz and Bilsky (1987; 1990), and extended and refined by Schwartz (1992; 1994), has made two key contributions to the values literature. First, it presents a way of overcoming the main criticisms that have been discussed of Rokeach’s original theory and of the RVS: it does not assume a fixed set of values; it moves away from the simple terminal/instrumental underlying structure; it inherently allows for some variability in the interpretation of values; and it adopts a rating format. Secondly, it draws out theoretical dimensions of values that were only suggested in outline by Rokeach, that Schwartz has developed into a substantially richer theory of the dimensionality of values.

The theory takes its basic conceptualisation of values from Rokeach, and from the same multi-disciplinary literature. Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) similarly combined elements from the sociologists, anthropologists, philosophers and psychologists, who laid the foundation for values research in the 1950s and 1960s. Schwartz and Bilsky concluded, similarly to Rokeach:

According to the literature, values are (a) concepts or beliefs, (b) about desirable end states or behaviors, (c) that transcend specific situations, (d) guide selection or evaluation of behaviour and events, and (e) are ordered by relative importance. (p. 551)

This formal definition of values incorporates the main elements of the conceptualisation of Rokeach. Schwartz and Bilsky’s (1987) innovation was to propose a different and more powerful way of substantiating this formal conception of values, i.e. of adding content to this formal definition of values. In contrast to Rokeach, they
moved away from the idea of a set of universally shared specific values. They thus avoided the inherent problems discussed earlier, of a limited and fixed set of values. Formally, values followed the conception of Rokeach, but the content was allowed to vary across cultures. The universal aspect of values posited by this new theory was therefore based not on particular values, but universal requirements, that are shared by all cultures and all people. The idea that values are somehow related to the (potentially universal) individual needs of human beings, moderated by social and institutional demands, was discussed by Rokeach though not elaborated by him. As he says:

Values are the cognitive representation not only of individual needs but also of societal and institutional demands. They are the joint results of sociological as well as psychological forces acting upon the individual. (Rokeach, 1973, p. 20)

Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) took seriously this notion of the basis of values and offered the more formal foundation for their theoretical contribution:

Values are cognitive representations of three types of universal human requirements: biologically based needs of the organism, social interactional requirements for interpersonal coordination, and social institutional demands for group welfare and survival. (p. 551)

Hence, 'sexual needs may be transformed into values for intimacy or love, requirements for coordinating resource exchange into values for equality or honesty, and demands for group survival into values for national security of world peace' (p. 551). Drawing on this formulation of the foundation of values allowed Schwartz and Bilsky to argue that values would relate to specific motivations, derived from these universal requirements. Hence, one could hypothesise 'motivational types of value', (Schwartz, 1992), and hypothesise that it would be in this domain, rather than in specific values, that one might find universality, as well as the underlying structure of values, in the structural relations existing between these motivational types. Originally, eight types of value were identified (Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987), later expanded to 10 in the current version of the theory (Schwartz, 1992). These motivational types are: Power, Achievement, Hedonism, Stimulation, Self-direction, Universalism, Benevolence, Tradition, Conformity, and Security. The motivational types with definitions and representative values are given in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Definitions and marker values for the 10 universal motivational types of values (adapted from Schwartz, Verkasalo, Antonovsky, & Sagiv, 1997).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motivational Type</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Representative Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources</td>
<td>Social Power, Wealth, Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards</td>
<td>Successful, Capable, Ambitious, influential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedonism</td>
<td>Pleasure or sensuous gratification for oneself</td>
<td>Pleasure, Enjoying Life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stimulation</td>
<td>Excitement, novelty and challenge in life</td>
<td>Daring, A varied life, An exciting life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-direction</td>
<td>Independence of thought and action – choosing, creating, exploring</td>
<td>Creativity, Freedom, Curious, Independent, Choosing own goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>Understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature</td>
<td>Social justice, Broadminded, World at peace, Wisdom, A world of beauty, Unity with nature, Protecting the environment, equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence</td>
<td>Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact</td>
<td>Helpful, Forgiving, Honest, True friendship, Loyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>Respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that one’s culture or religion impose on the self</td>
<td>Accepting my portion in life, Devout, Respect for tradition, Humble, Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conformity</td>
<td>Restraint of actions, inclinations and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms</td>
<td>Obedient, Self-discipline, Politeness, Honouring parents and elders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Safety, harmony and stability of society, of relationships and of self</td>
<td>Family security, National security, Social order, Clean, Reciprocation of favours</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Schwartz’s theory, ‘motivational content of values is the most powerful principle in the organization of people’s value preferences’ (Schwartz, 1994, p. 22). Motivational types are therefore evident in the priorities given to different values. They reflect both involvement with a particular type of motivation, and the compatibility between different types. For example, values motivated by Benevolence are not compatible with those motivated by Achievement. Hence, a structure can be hypothesised between these types. This structure also originally included Rokeach’s dimensions of terminal and instrumental, and the distinction made in Hofstede’s (1980) value study between individualistic and collectivist values.
The empirical validation of Schwartz’s theory

Schwartz has made extensive use of multi-dimensional scaling in order to test the theory that there are universal types of values. In this technique, the relationships between value ratings are first computed, typically as Pearson product-moment correlations, and these indices of similarity and dissimilarity are transformed into distances. Using these distances, representing the similarity between values, the values are then plotted in multi-dimensional space, as closely as possible using only a limited number of dimensions. The position of the values in the resulting semantic space thus represents the relationship between the values. For the purposes of the theory, two features of the resulting scaling space are important. First, one would expect to find values of the same motivational type in the same part of the space; that is to say, aggregated across individuals, values of the same motivational type should be seen as similar, and be rated or ranked of similar importance. Second, on account of the compatibilities and incompatibilities between the motivational types, they should fall in the structure hypothesised in the theory. The structure hypothesised by Schwartz is shown in the ideal model in Figure 1.1.
After the first presentation of the theory, based on Israeli and German samples (Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987), empirical findings consistent with the theoretical structure were found with samples from Australia, Finland, Hong Kong, Spain and the United States (Schwartz and Bilsky, 1990). In the latter study, it was found that between 81% and 97% of the values fell into regions on the scaling spaces corresponding to their predicted motivational domains.

Schwartz's (1992) modification of the theory both refined the value types and introduced a new instrument for measuring values, the 'Schwartz Values Survey' (SVS). This added further values to those included in the RVS, in order to tap the full-range of value types. It also utilised rating, rather than ranking in response to criticisms discussed earlier of the latter. Using this new instrument with 40 samples from 20 countries the results were again highly supportive of the theory. In 67.5% of the samples, all 10 value types were found, and at least eight or more types were identifiable in 92.5%. Overall, the median number of values falling in the hypothesised
domain in each sample was 46 out of 56 (88%). Schwartz (1994) extended these cross-cultural replications to include 97 samples from 44 countries, with considerable success. Finally, Schwartz and Sagiv (1995), using test-retest and randomly split sample analyses, have argued that considerable variability is due to errors of measurement. They found that forty-four values demonstrated high cross-cultural consistency of meaning. Two-thirds of deviations they argue represent unreliable measurement, and one-third culture-specific characteristics. The theory that there is near-universal content and structure of values has now become firmly established in the literature.

The Rokeach-Schwartz tradition: Summary and future directions

The review of the values literature has emphasised the breadth and complexity of the concept of values, the corresponding diversity of the literature, and the centrality of the theory and conceptualisation of values pioneered by Rokeach. Though the theory has received criticism, Schwartz’s modifications have both answered these critiques and further expanded key aspects of the theory. The approach developed by Rokeach has thus formed the main tradition of values research in psychology and continues to be the most influential today.

Other recent reviews have praised the unifying influence of Rokeach’s theory and the theoretical development offered by Schwartz (Braithwaite & Scott, 1991). They have also commended the introduction of more sophisticated possibilities for cross-cultural research afforded by Schwartz’s new instrument (Bond, 1996). The most recent research has contributed additional developments to this theoretical tradition and yet further applications. For example: Oishi, Shimmack, Diener, and Suh (1998) have added a new method of measuring the 10 value types theorised by Schwartz, providing further support for these distinctions and potentially greater flexibility in the measurement of values; Garling (1999) has demonstrated the relationship between values and cooperation in social dilemmas; and Allen and Ng (1999) have investigated the indirect role of values in guiding consumer choices through the influence of the meaning of products on consumers.

There are a number of ways in which one might further contribute to this tradition. Bond (1996), for example, suggests extending Schwartz’s project to incorporate a larger number of more representative samples. He also draws attention to some areas of the
literature that have been neglected in recent years, including the relationships between values and behaviour, longitudinal studies of values and consideration of the values that are unique in different cultures.

However, it may be that a more radical approach is required in this field of research. There are also suggestions in the current literature that there are some serious problems for the tradition that require attention. The present review has concentrated on the positive contribution of the work of Rokeach and Schwartz. But there have been a number of highly critical assessments of the approach that has now been so widely adopted. Gibbins and Walker (1993), for example, conclude their study by rejecting Rokeach’s fundamental conceptualisation of values:

The present small-scale investigation adds to a growing literature that is critical of Rokeach’s conceptualisation of values, and strongly suggests that at least 2 decades of research on values requires reconceptualisation after principles in research on values have first been re-examined. Researchers should be aware of wider possibilities in the search for a dynamic system of true values. (p. 804)

Hague (1993) also rejects Rokeach’s conceptualisation. Following interviews with respondents to the RVS, he argues that it may serve as a useful tool for clarifying values, but is designed contrary to basic properties of values and should not be used for either measurement or theorisation.

Other recent contributions have presented subtler, yet perhaps nonetheless serious critiques. The work of Seligman and Katz (1996) is a good example. It is a central assumption of Rokeach and Schwartz’s theories that values are stable principles guiding behaviour across different situations. These are the qualities that have been used to define certain beliefs as values, rather than attitudes, embedded in the common means of measuring values as ‘guiding principles in your life’. Seligman and Katz have argued that this key assumption may be misguided, that we should be thinking in terms of multiple, modular value systems oriented to specific issues and conceptions of self, either ideal or real. Moreover, their empirical research has shown that the priority of values changes for respondents from their assessment of values as general guiding principles to their assessments when considering specific issues, in their study, abortion and the environment. They therefore propose a distinction between a specific and a ‘general’ values system. Though they do not deny the existence of the latter, the
traditional linchpin of values research, they do suggest that it 'may largely reflect how we like to think of ourselves – when asked to do so abstractly – which may or may not transcend particular social issues or ethical dilemmas' (p. 72). Their conclusion could be interpreted as suggesting, at the least, important unresolved issues for the existing tradition of values research.

Rather than continue directly with the Rokeach-Schwartz values tradition, therefore, the research reported in the present thesis aims to contribute to the further understanding of these underlying issues for the basic theoretical approach. The concerns that prompted the present work, however, did not originate in the values literature itself, either from existing recommendations for future research, or from the critiques that have been noted. The thesis began with questions raised by two important developments that have occurred since Rokeach first initiated this research tradition in the early 1970s. Since then, there have been changes in society, as well as in social psychology. In so far as the former has been discussed using the notion of postmodernity, and the latter has led to approaches offering discursive accounts of psychological phenomena, it will be argued that these changes pose a serious challenge to the Rokeach-Schwartz research tradition. It was a concern with these potential problems that suggested the research problem addressed in the thesis. The remainder of the chapter will therefore introduce the issues raised by postmodernity and discursive psychology, and show how these concerns underlie the research questions the thesis will pursue.

Changes in contemporary society: The 'postmodern' condition

It has been almost thirty years since Rokeach first presented his theory of values. In the period since, there have been many important political, technological and social changes. The radical nature of some of these social changes has led to a widespread debate across the social sciences and humanities questioning the consequences of these changes, and whether they have led to more fundamental transformations captured by the notion of postmodernity.

The term 'postmodernity' first gained currency in the 1970s, and generated a literature that expanded rapidly in the 1980s. As is often noted, the concept cannot be
1. Values, postmodernity and discursive psychology

Introduction

It is easily defined. It is associated with a critique of the very notion of definitions, or more precisely, the presupposition that there is an essence that can be defined. But as critics now respond, this convention has merely fuelled the vague nature of much postmodern writing, and allowed it to escape serious discussion. It promotes 'a constellation of vague concepts and ambiguous and conflicting historical referents and periodizations' (Brown, 1994, p. 13). Since Brown's description is not an unreasonable characterisation of the literature as it now stands, the discussion in this section will not attempt to describe the details of any specific postmodern theorists, or to provide comprehensive coverage of the literature. It will first simply introduce some of the key ideas that have become associated with the term. The literature may be divided into broadly three areas covering culture, philosophy, and the contemporary social epoch.

The first domain in which the notion of postmodernity was used was cultural critique. 'Postmodernism' became a fashionable way in the 1970s of describing a wide range of cultural phenomena, including literature, art, film, photography, dance and architecture. It has been used to describe the novels of Milan Kundera, the films of David Lynch, and the architecture of Robert Ventura. The flexible term 'postmodern' has been used to signify a number of related trends in these disparate fields, including a new emphasis on pastiche and the combination of incongruous styles; on the revival and repackaging of retro and classical designs; the self-conscious use of irony and visual humour; and the emergence of a new reflexivity and narratives of self-reflection (Connor, 1989). To the consternation of more traditional critics and writers, postmodern critique has also become associated with a levelling of cultural distinctions and the suggestion of an equality between traditionally 'high' and 'low' culture.

A second literature originates in philosophy and social theory. A variety of thinkers have been labelled 'postmodern'. Best and Kellner (1991), for example, include summaries of Foucault, Lyotard, Baudrillard, Jameson, and Deleuze and Guattari in their introduction to postmodern theory. These philosophers have in many ways very different views, but in so far as they are commonly understood to be representatives of postmodern thought, there are a number of themes that run through their varied projects. They include the turn to language and an emphasis on its constitutive role in both knowledge and subjectivity; the replacement of singular, 'grand narrative' notions of knowledge and progress, with multiple, dispersed and local knowledges; and the 'death
of the subject' as a central category in philosophy. Postmodern philosophy has thus been widely understood to strike at the heart of rationalism and the ideals of the Enlightenment. These philosophers have been interpreted as rejecting the foundations one might find beyond the limits of language, and in the abandonment of the notion of truth as an ideal for philosophy or science (Best and Kellner, 1991).

A third distinct literature has focused on the unique conditions of contemporary society. It, too, is related to postmodern culture and philosophy, but has specifically addressed the organisation of our society and the impact of recent socio-political transformations. In particular, theorists have concentrated on the social and technological events of the 20th Century that have cast doubt on the ideals of modernity, for example: the two World Wars, the use of nuclear weapons, the failure of American intervention in Vietnam, the corruption of Watergate, and the emerging threat of environmental catastrophe as a direct result of the failed attempt by scientists to control nature (e.g. Seidman, 1994a). It has been suggested that these developments have challenged ideas that maintain conceptions central to the Western world view: about social progress, the ability of science to answer fundamental problems, the individual as the creative force of society and history, and the ascendancy of the political systems of the West. This disillusionment with the fundamental assumptions of modernity have coincided with important developments such as the increasing diffusion and importance of the media (Baudrillard, 1983), the expansion and growing importance of a consumer society (Featherstone, 1991), and the dissolution of traditional social roles (Giddens, 1991). As understood through the concept of postmodernity, therefore, changes in our contemporary social world have introduced profound and far-reaching effects to fundamental aspects of the fabric of society.

It is various combinations of ideas from these three domains that are often understood by the terms 'postmodernism', 'postmodernity' and the 'postmodern' turn. Before considering some of the problems with the concept of postmodernity, the next section will consider some of the potential implications of these ideas for the psychology of values.
Changing values in contemporary society?

As Roiser (1997) suggests:

If it is the case that culture has changed dramatically in a postmodern manner, then we would expect some indication of this even in the imperfect instrument of the psychology experiment. (p. 106)

The domain of values is a good example of an area of psychology where one might expect to witness changes. Values are a psychological phenomenon, developed through diverse forms of socialization and intimately related to broader society. Where there are significant changes in society, one would expect corollary changes in people's values. The domain of values is therefore a potentially fruitful field for the analysis of the psychological effects of broad social change, of the sort suggested by the notion of postmodernity.

The question of changing values is also one that has already been studied in psychology. Since Schwartz's theory has switched emphasis to the underlying dimensionality of values, the question of value change has not been a central issue in the values literature. The issue of value change was, however, of considerable interest to Rokeach, and held a central place in his theory. As he argued:

Any conception of values, if it is to be fruitful, must be able to account for the enduring character of values as well as for their changing character. (Rokeach, 1973, p. 6)

Taking seriously this aspect of the theory, Rokeach included in his research programme a study of changes in values prevalent in society over time. As mentioned earlier, Rokeach and Ball-Rokeach (1989) found that certain values, particularly 'Equality', had changed in priority in American society between 1968 and 1981. More generally, they concluded that:

American society is undergoing change in certain values, as a result of naturally ongoing events that give rise to various kinds of dissatisfaction. The changes we found between 1968 and 1981 can perhaps be best described as a shift away from a collective morality value orientation to a personal competence value orientation. (p. 783)

There is, therefore, already an answer in the psychological literature to the question of whether values in contemporary society have changed. At least in America, and over the 13-year period to 1981, we can say that there was a change in values.
Moreover, Rokeach and Ball-Rokeach’s summary of these changes as a shift from a collective morality to a personal competence orientation is consistent with some of the themes of postmodernity. Their conclusions could be interpreted as offering support for the postmodern claim that there has been a shift from universalistic to individual conceptions of morality (Bauman, 1993). Rather than reject existing research, as has commonly been the case in previous attempts to address postmodern concerns in psychology (e.g. Kvale, 1992), extant research findings would appear therefore to usefully contribute to an analysis of these issues. The first empirical study that will be reported in the present thesis will likewise initially follow, rather than reject, the established methods for addressing value change. It replicates the method of Rokeach, extending his analysis of changing values to include a contemporary sample and to consider the 28-year period from 1968 to 1996.

If this were all that was required, however, the current project would be relatively straightforward. But social change understood through the notion of postmodernity raises conceptually more difficult issues. Rokeach’s analysis of value change is grounded in the framework of the theory as a whole. The theory includes a conceptualisation of values, and a conceptualisation of value change. The latter is defined by Rokeach’s notion of a cognitive hierarchy of values. As people go through life, they are constantly forced to choose between values. Through this process, a personal cognitive hierarchy forms as one’s decisions demonstrate the relative importance to us of different values. This hierarchy is relatively stable, but open to change over time, as different situations arise to challenge our priorities. Values therefore change as their rank slowly moves up or down the hierarchy. In the same way, broad social changes may lead to changing personal conditions, and so produce collective changes in the priorities of values. Rokeach’s theory thus offers a precise, and measurable account of value change. But it simultaneously presents a very specific, and narrow conception of the ways in which values can ‘change’. The diversity and often vague nature of the postmodernity literature means that it is not clear exactly what the implications are when considered at the level of a distinct and well-defined concept like Rokeach’s formulation of values. However, it does seem clear that the sort of impact one might envisage is not of the same order as the notion of change assumed by Rokeach, in terms simply of priority.
The postmodernity debates have focused on the possibility of more fundamental changes in beliefs, knowledge, and morality. They have questioned the very foundation of these concepts, and implied that, for example, 'the distrust of grand narratives' (Lyotard, 1984), has become a prevalent element of Western society. For example, as Heller (1988) discusses the effect of the conditions of contemporary society on our moral life, it is in terms of the deep-seated effects of subtle, but pervasive, everyday circumstances. Hence:

We consume our weekly dosage of Nietzsche and postmodernism with our Sunday breakfast as it is presented in our newspaper. During that same afternoon we will be involved in a heated discussion concerning affirmative action. In the evening, we will watch the picturesque images of world poverty on the TV and begin to ponder how we might best be involved in remedies of that poverty ... All of the symptoms described by each of the three discourses are truly symptoms of the moral life of modern societies. (p. 532)

It is in terms of deeper transformations that these recognisable symptoms appear, therefore, and lead to more fundamental change in morality. The implication is that there might similarly be deeper changes to our values in some way.

A number of theorists have attempted to articulate the consequences of the postmodern condition for morality, if not directly for values. Bauman (1993; 1994) has focused on the increasing individualism of modern life. He draws out the implications in terms of the sense that people have to make their own, personal moral commitments, rather than relying on broader social institutions and frameworks. He also stresses other changes, for example, toward an increasingly risk oriented society (Beck, 1992) simultaneously making our life choices more difficult. Thus: 'it is harder than ever to think ethically, with powerful pressures towards privatism, immense new technological risks and rapid changes in the character of people’s lives’ (p. 50).

Giddens’ recent work on reflexive modernity (1990) and the ‘reflexive project of the self’ (1991) offers another analysis, focusing on the effects of social change on identity. In place of the certainty and foundations of traditional cultures, his work stresses the importance of a range of expert systems and disembedding mechanisms that extract us from the security of nature and tradition. In conditions of reflexive modernity, the maintenance of a coherent yet revisable biographical narrative becomes our principal concern. In the absence of broader, stable social institutions, it is the personal
'stories' through which we understand our lives that become the new foundations for one's sense of self, and thus also for our sense of morality, ethics, and, one might add, values.

Consistent with these broader accounts of the potential impact of social change on values, members of the recently established centre for the study of cultural values at Lancaster University have neatly summarised the more fundamental concerns that arise from these debates. As stated in the journal 'Cultural Values', for them, the key questions are now:

Are values disintegrating? Do values merely serve to mask strategies of preference and power? Why and how do values change? What is the value of the critical evaluation of values? Is the discourse of value flawed from its inception? (Cultural Values, 1997)

To summarise, there is the suggestion in accounts of contemporary social change that there are deeper 'changes' in the foundations of morality and values that need to be taken into account. Though these examples are typically distant from the specific concerns and theoretical conventions of the values literature, they nevertheless suggest that there may be other senses of change, and therefore other theoretical issues that need to be considered in the psychological literature on values.

This more fundamental notion of change has not been addressed in the Rokeach-Schwartz research tradition. Where the possibility of such changes has been recognised, it has merely been to dismiss it. For example, Mayton, Ball-Rokeach and Loges (1994) note in passing that 'it is common to talk of a decay or decline in values' (p. 4), but then suggest that:

One of Rokeach's major contributions was to observe that values do not decay, but that they do ascend and descend in our estimation of their importance. (p. 4)

For this theoretical reason, analyses of change in this tradition have stopped at an analysis of changes in priority.

This conceptualisation of value change is, however, hard to sustain, even without considering the issues raised by postmodernity. The assumption that values can differ only in priority has been cogently criticised by Robin Williams (1979), for example, whose notion of values as 'criteria' (Williams, 1968) Rokeach adopted in his theory. He
argued explicitly that 'differences reside not only in hierarchies or priorities – the ordering of values according to importance, in some sense – but also in other important modes of relationship among values' (p. 18). He goes on to suggest, for example, that values might differ in their 'universality of application'. The value 'Equality' for instance might be understood to apply only to white, middle-class Americans, but over time come to incorporate an increasing part of the population of America and other nations. They might also differ in 'consistency'. In some societies a meta-value might emphasise consistency amongst values according to logic or duty, whereas others might appreciate ambiguity or paradox. Other writers have proposed further ways in which values can differ. Wilson (1985), for example, stresses subtle changes in the more implicit aspects of values in our everyday lives. Thus, where once our choice of language and dress were imbued with moral significance and therefore expressions of values, he argues that they are now increasingly understood outside of a moral or value framework. There are, therefore, other potential points of difference in values, yet to be explored in the psychological literature.

In conclusion, changes in values might be expected to follow from the changes in society discussed by postmodern theorists, and indeed, relevant changes have already been recorded in the literature. However, 'change' has been understood only in terms of priority. In contrast, the postmodemity literature implies consideration of the potential for more fundamental shifts in values in contemporary society. This idea, whether or not it is empirically demonstrated, questions basic assumptions in the dominant theory of values research in psychology. It suggests other dimensions of values need to be considered. It may even be that the notion of value itself needs to reconceptualised if values are to be successfully theorised as they occur in contemporary society. But before taking these concerns further, there are also some problems with the notion of postmodemity that must be discussed.

Problems with postmodemity

In the course of its rapid expansion on the intellectual scene, the concept of postmodemity has been embraced by academics throughout the social sciences and humanities. In the past decade, it has also been used by a number of psychologists (Curt, 1994; Gergen, 1992; Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1990; Kvale, 1992; Lunt & Livingstone, 1992). However, there have also been many critics of the notion of postmodemity. It
has been critcised, for example, as a passing fad (Fo, 1986), a mere invention of intellectuals in search of new sources of cultural capital (Britton, 1988), and yet another conservative ideology serving to devalue emancipatory theories (Habermas, 1981). Postmodernity should therefore, even at its most popular, be understood to have been the focus for a debate rather than the *fait accompli* it is sometimes presented as by its advocates (e.g. Kvale, 1992).

Moreover, in the 1990s, the debate has moved further from the claims of postmodernists. There are now far fewer contributions to the postmodern perspective, and many more critical publications (e.g. Norris, 1990b; O'Neill, 1995). Wavering enthusiasm for the concept is also evident in psychology (e.g. Roiser, 1997; Simons & Billig, 1994), even amongst those who once promoted postmodern ideas (Parker, 1998). These criticisms have focused on the lack of coherent theoretical support for the claims of postmodernity, problems the uncritical acceptance of postmodern notions creates for political programs, and the failure to clearly demonstrate evidence of the radical changes in selfhood and society suggested in the literature. As an all-embracing concept, therefore, the notion of postmodernity is problematic.

The view adopted in the present thesis follows the recent critiques in rejecting the concept of postmodernity. The claims made for postmodernity in secondary texts have tended to grow increasingly distant from the subtle observations about contemporary society, or the complex philosophical arguments of the original authors first associated with the term postmodern. The concept has become further simplified as it has been abstracted to encompass the work of a growing body of postmodern commentators, at the same time as it has been asked to do more theoretical work in capturing in a single concept diverse movements in the domains of culture, philosophy, and society. Hence, Richard Rorty (1991), once one of the best-known so-called postmodern philosophers, comments:

*I have sometimes used “postmodern” myself, in the rather narrow sense defined by Lyotard as “distrust of metanarratives.” But I now wish that I had not. The term has been so over-used that it is causing more trouble than it is worth. (p. 1)*

The thesis will not, therefore, take too seriously the concept of postmodernity, or draw directly on the diverse postmodern literature. But it will argue that the rejection of
the more general and extravagant claims of the postmodernity literature does not resolve the issues for the psychology of values this section of the thesis has raised. It remains undeniable that we live in a world replete with important changes. The postmodernity literature may now be causing more trouble than it is worth, but the questions it draws our attention to nevertheless are of interest and importance. It is in this critical spirit that the notion of postmodernity will be understood and used in the remainder of the thesis and with this broader understanding of the term that these concerns will be addressed. The difficulty is finding an acceptable way of tackling the consequently diffuse questions. The chapter will return to this problem having first considered a second set of issues for the psychology of values.

Changes in social psychology: Discursive psychology

Also in the time since Rokeach first presented his theory, there have been important changes in social psychology. 'The Nature of Human Values' was published during the so-called 'crisis' in social psychology (Elms, 1975). This period brought new criticisms of some of the fundamental assumptions of the discipline and began a diversification of social psychology that has continued ever since. The crisis introduced new approaches to social psychology including the ethogenics of Harré and Secord (1972), the politically oriented approaches of contributors to Armistead's (1974) edited collection, and the European tradition inspired particularly by Tajfel (1972) and Moscovici (Moscovici, 1972). There was then a further expansion of the discipline in the 1980s, with the introduction of approaches inspired by Feminism (Wilkinson, 1986), social constructionism (Gergen, 1985), and continental philosophy (Parker, 1989a; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Moreover, the diversification continues today, with renewed interest now being shown in psychoanalytic (e.g. Parker, 1997) and evolutionary theory (e.g. Buss, 1975). As Sapsford, Still, Miell, Stevens and Wetherell (1998) comment of the discipline today:

A major problem for all of us in coming to grips with current social psychology is that there is so much of it and such great diversity of approach. Human behaviour, action, experience and social relations are conceived from a vast array of more or less independent and sometimes incompatible perspectives. (p. 1)
There has been a range of reactions to this diversity of the discipline. Some have expressed concern at 'the increasing gulf and lack of communication between proponents of different approaches' (Stevens, 1997, p. 1) and the possible fragmentation of the discipline it implies. Others have attempted to find common ground between approaches. Augoustinos and Walker (1995), for example, have written an integrationist introduction to social psychology, drawing together the theoretical perspectives of social cognition, social representations and social identity theory; Smith (1996) has attempted to build bridges between phenomenology and social cognition; and Yardley (1996) has argued that we should find ways to draw together 'material' and 'discursive' approaches.

The concern of the present thesis with this diversity of approaches is not so much the opportunities or dangers they raise for the discipline, but the theoretical challenge certain of the newer approaches raise for existing theoretical traditions, including that of Rokeach and Schwartz. Particularly problematic is the perspective introduced by discursive psychology (e.g. Parker, 1989a; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). As Billig (1997) says:

Discourse analysis, as used in social psychology, is much more than a methodology, or set of procedures for conducting research: it is a wider, theoretical approach towards psychology. (p. 39)

It is, furthermore, a theoretical approach that presents a very different view of the nature of psychological phenomena and even the objectives of psychological research. The arrival of discursive psychology has led the majority of its followers to dismiss the traditional methods of psychological research, including experimentation and questionnaires. Moreover, quantitative methods as a whole have been dismissed in favour of the qualitative approach of discourse analysis. This profound break with the established methodological foundations of the discipline is consistent with two crucial theoretical assumptions of the discursive approach.

First, it is argued that the theorisation of cognitive processes or mechanisms is fundamentally misguided. In place of such theoretical entities and causal explanations are substituted discursive accounts of phenomena previously construed as cognitive. It is not just the basic methods of psychology that have been rejected but the very objects of investigation. Mentalistic concepts like 'attitudes' are reframed as positions adopted...
in specific instances of discourse (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). Other mainstays of social psychology like ‘attributions’ are likewise recast as forms of ‘discursive action’ (Edwards & Potter, 1992).

Second, discursive psychology has brought a radically new conception of the nature of science. Its emphasis on the discursive constitution of reality has led to the questioning of claims that psychology should be aiming to discover empirical facts. The knowledge produced by the discipline has rather been interpreted as offering merely further constructions of reality (Potter, 1996). Discursive psychology has thus brought an emphasis on ‘reflexivity’, extending social constructionism (Gergen, 1985) to encourage the deconstruction of the devices used by scientists to make their explanations appear as if they are offering neutral, detached descriptions of the way the world is.

Like the notion of postmodernity, therefore, discursive psychology can be seen to also raise serious questions for the psychology of values. Values, understood in the Rokeach-Schwartz tradition, are mental representations. This form of theorisation would thus be rejected by discursive approaches, in favour of an account of values that conceptualised them as discursive resources employed in social interaction. Likewise, even the basic claim of this tradition to be pursuing scientific research comes under threat. Again, an interest in these apparently fundamental issues for the psychology of values were a motivation for the present thesis. However, like postmodernity, these are also problems that are hard to address directly. Clearly, one cannot investigate these claims using the traditional empirical tools of the discipline. Moreover, it is not easy to establish the exact nature of the critiques, since there are now numerous different views expressed in discursive psychology. There are, for example, basic differences between the schools that have developed at Loughborough (e.g. Potter and Wetherell, 1987) and Manchester (e.g. Parker, 1989a). Finally, then, the last section proposes a way that these questions might at least in part be addressed.
Research problem and research questions:

The thought of Foucault and the psychology of values

Having reviewed the psychology of values literature, the chapter introduced some challenging issues raised by the notion of postmodernity and discursive psychology. These problems inspired and provided the point of departure for the present thesis. They arise, however, out of extensive, often problematic literatures, and extend well beyond the scope of a single project. Hence, the thesis will not aim to address these problems directly, or to attempt to provide any complete or definitive resolutions. It will, however, propose an approach to these problems that will at least allow the clarification and closer examination of some of these major issues.

The approach follows the suggestion of Russell and Gaubatz (1995). Commenting on a debate about postmodernity between Gergen (1994) and Smith (1994), Russell and Gaubatz argue:

Postmodernism can hardly be talked about as a single symbolic monolith. To take Smith's (1994) or Gergen's (1994) arguments further, particular authors' views about particular topics must be explicated and critically examined. (p. 390)

Russell and Gaubatz's view of postmodernity is pertinent to the way in which the concerns of the present thesis might be addressed. Rather than tackle the problematic postmodern literature, or the critiques one might find in the diverse literature of discursive psychology, the argument of the thesis is similarly that the best way to take these issues forward is through the detailed explication and critical examination of the work of particular authors, writing about particular topics. It is for this reason and with these concerns in mind that the thesis turns to the thought of Michel Foucault. Foucault's work offers an opportunity to consider at a specific level some of the key problems raised here for the psychology of values. As will be discussed in depth in the following chapters, Foucault's work has been used to promote arguments about postmodernity and the changing nature of contemporary society. Through his analyses of the discursive foundations of knowledge he has also been highly influential on discursive psychology. Addressing his work in some depth, therefore, will allow the thesis to consider some of these general problems.
The task of the thesis may now therefore be proposed and the specific research questions it will address be formulated precisely. The research problem is to explore the implications of the thought of Foucault for the psychology of values. More specifically, it is to investigate how one might reconceptualise the psychology of values using the analytics of Foucault.

In response to the issue raised in the present chapter, there are several specific research questions that will be addressed through tackling this problem. First, it will consider whether an alternative reading can be made of the work of this influential thinker, and especially his notion of discourse, that offers less dismissive consequences for psychological research than that presented by discursive psychology. Second, it will ask what Foucault contributes to an understanding of the implications of contemporary social changes for values. What exactly does Foucault say is characteristic of 'postmodernity'? Third, the thesis will consider whether an alternative conceptualisation of values can be developed from the work of Foucault. Finally, it will consider what the empirical evidence is for a conceptualisation of values that might follow from the thought of Foucault. The next part of the thesis thus begins the project by turning to the oeuvre of Foucault.
Part 2

The analytics of

Michel Foucault
Chapter 2

Re-thinking the thought of Foucault

The reception of Foucault’s work in the social sciences and humanities has been truly phenomenal. It is difficult to overestimate his influence over the last decade or so. Few subject areas remain untouched by his analyses of discourse, power and governance. (Bunton & Peterson, 1997, p. 1)

Introduction

The French philosopher and historian, Michel Foucault (1926-1984), is one of the most influential thinkers of the 20th Century. He came to prominence in the mid 1960s, first through his studies of Madness (Foucault, 1967), and then of the human sciences (Foucault, 1970; 1973). He became Professor of History of Systems of Thought at the Collège de France in 1970, and subsequently emerged as one of the most celebrated of the post-war French intellectuals. His later work added further diversity to his oeuvre, with studies of the prison system (Foucault, 1977), sexuality (Foucault, 1978) and ethics (Foucault, 1984a; Foucault, 1984b). Foucault’s detailed historical analyses offer not only new conceptions of central aspects of each of these substantive domains, but suggest new possibilities for thinking about the very nature of knowledge, subjectivity, and power. Through his contribution to such fundamental issues, Foucault’s influence has extended well beyond continental philosophy and history, to have an impact throughout the social sciences and humanities.

Foucault has likewise been influential in psychology. Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn and Walkerdine (1984) were one of the first to introduce his work. In ‘Changing the subject’, they drew on Foucault to argue for no less than a reformulation of the discipline, as implied in the ambiguity of their title: the transformation involved both the theoretical content of the discipline and its object of inquiry. They defended an understanding of subjectivity as grounded in discourse, and the subject of psychology as the analysis of discourse. In support of this new conception of the discipline, they offered one of the first theoretical introductions to continental thought for Psychology,
as well as a variety of innovative, discursive analyses of traditional areas of research including occupational, developmental psychology and gender studies.

Nikolas Rose (1979; 1985) introduced a different perspective. Rose's research continued more closely in the tradition of Foucault's own. He adopted an historical approach using Foucault's genealogical method to generate innovative accounts of the history of psychology. Rose's Foucaultian accounts present an alternative to the traditional view of the evolution of the discipline. From the steady expansion of the use of scientific methods to further our knowledge of human beings, he turns our attention to the relationship between the growth of psychology and prevalent conditions in society, particularly the need to organise and exert control over large groups of people. Drawing on Foucault's understanding of the relationship between knowledge and power, he argued that it was the ability of Psychology to make people visible and calculable that had provided the impetus for its growth, particularly in the context of events such as the Second World War.

It is through the growth of discourse analysis and critical psychology, however, that Foucault's thought has become most well known. The contributions of Potter and Wetherell (1987) and Parker (1989) have been particular influential in this respect. Foucault has served as a popular representative of postmodernist or post-structuralist philosophy, sometimes used specifically, but more often as part of a general theoretical movement promoting and justifying the turn to language and the analysis of discourse as the proper object of psychological research. With the rise over the past decade of discursive psychology, critical psychology, and the more general notion of social constructionism, interpretations of aspects of Foucault's thought have been carried into the mainstream of British social psychology (e.g. Fox & Prilleltensky, 1997; Ibanez & Iniguez, 1997). His work has been cited in a variety of different contexts, including some papers focusing purely on Foucault (Parker, 1995; Richer, 1992), but many more using Foucault as support for a variety of discourse analytic empirical studies, often in combination with other influences, including conversation analysis (Wetherell, 1998), Derrida (Hepburn, 1997), and Lacan (Malson, 1998).

It is through these disparate routes that Foucault's name has now become an established part of the discipline. The thesis, however, does not follow one of the
existing uses of Foucault’s thought in psychology. It turns to his work with the specific concerns outlined in the introduction about changes in contemporary society, discursive psychology, and their implications for the psychology of values. Hence, apart from the substantive concerns about changing values, one of the specific aims of the thesis is to consider the possibility of other readings of Foucault’s thought than those that have been most popular in psychology to date.

The current part of the thesis examining the work of Foucault comprises three chapters. The second and third address specific aspects of his thought: his analytics of archaeology and ethics. The present chapter first offers a more general discussion of Foucault’s oeuvre and philosophical project. It provides a basic introduction to his thought, as well as a broader analysis that will guide the remainder of the research reported in the thesis. It will be argued that there are indeed grounds for doubting some of the received readings of Foucault in psychology, opening the way for alternative interpretations. It will consider some general problems interpreting Foucault as well as contributing two new arguments. They stress the importance of understanding Foucault as an immanent critic of the present rather than as a meta-theorist of language or subjectivity, and of emphasising the complex inter-relationships between the different axes of his thought, rather than focusing on only the most popular aspects. The chapter begins with a short summary of Foucault’s oeuvre serving as an introduction to his work.

An overview of the oeuvre of Michel Foucault

‘Madness and Civilization’ to ‘The Archaeology of Knowledge’

Foucault’s earliest writings were an extended introduction to the work of the existentialist psycho-analyst Ludwig Binswanger (1954), followed by a short book on Psychiatry (Foucault, 1976). His first major work was a history of madness, ‘Madness and Civilization’ (1967). This looked at the way certain people were treated as ‘mad’ from the middle ages to the beginnings of the modern period in the 18th Century. Foucault’s analysis incorporated a disparate array of historical artefacts, including philosophical, historical, literary, and scientific texts, as well as poetry, art, and political decrees. His aim was to account for the emergence of the specific notion of madness as it has become established in modernity.
He argued that there was a distinct transition in the way that 'madness' was construed. Having once lived freely amongst the general population, those considered 'mad' began to be treated as a threat. They were separated from the general population, and exposed to new forms of 'treatment' and 'cure'. Foucault's analysis highlighted the way that the modern experience of madness required the combination of a variety of apparently unrelated elements. For example, the incarceration of the mad was linked to the widespread eradication of leprosy, and the vacation of the lazar houses in which they had previously been held. Leprosy disappeared, but the same structures of exclusion remained. This then formed one aspect of the modern constitution of madness. It further relied on the emergence of other factors, central for Foucault being the notion of Reason at the heart of the Enlightenment. It offered the surface against which madness as a particular embodiment of unreason could exist. Thus an underlying inference of Madness and Civilization was a challenge to the view that madness, as a particular mode of subjectivity, was universal, asocial and ahistorical.

Foucault's next book, 'The Birth of the Clinic' (1973), changed topic to clinical medicine and focused on a more limited historical period, but like 'Madness and Civilization', it concentrated on a single, concrete problem. He noted that a remarkable transformation in medical practice had occurred over a very short period at the end of the 18th Century. He cites a case at the beginning of this period where treatment had consisted of taking 'baths, ten or twelve hours a day, for ten whole months' (p. ix). At the end of this period, by contrast, prescriptions showed all the signs of the more cautious treatment combined with careful observation characteristic of modern forms of medicine. The question was how this radical shift came about.

This second book was more abstract than the first. As described in the first sentence, the birth of the clinic was 'about space, about language, and about death; it is about the act of seeing, the gaze' (p. ix). From the more accessible analysis of the formation of the 'mad person', 'The Birth of the Clinic' was an attempt to reveal more subtle processes underlying the development of forms of knowledge, unveiled in the treatment of the 'physically sick person'. The objective was to find an alternative to the explanation that seems obvious: that it was merely the result of an improvement in knowledge and research procedures. It could simply have followed from the increasing dominance of empiricism, with its demands that one ground claims on empirical facts.
Foucault's notion of the 'gaze' offered a different understanding. He argued that much more was required than that one simply look more closely at the results of one's manipulation. A range of elements needed to be in place before it could become possible to 'look' in the specific way that constituted the medical perspective. The medical 'gaze' presupposed a complex supporting structure of representation in language, an emerging medical institution, a body of widely shared knowledge and the means of distributing it, particular social and political conditions that would afford such developments, and new formalizations underlying medical practice. More must be taken into account than merely the perception of sense data.

The subsequent books, 'The Order of Things' (1970) and 'The Archaeology of Knowledge' (1972) continued the themes begun in 'The Birth of the Clinic', integrating further substantive research with ever-increasing levels of abstraction. From medicine, 'The Order of Things' turned to the 'Sciences of Man', comprising in the 18th century general grammar, the analysis of wealth, and natural history. Foucault turned his attention to the underlying changes in the structure of representation that led to the transformation of these topics into their 19th Century equivalents: philology, political economy and biology. He again argued that this change involved more than just the progress of knowledge. In a more ambitious thesis, Foucault extended his analytic to highlight what he believed to be a fundamental mutation in the relationship between 'words' and 'things'. The organisation of these earlier disciplines was limited by the mode of rationality governing representation, constituting a central feature of what Foucault called 'the episteme' of the classical age. This complex notion, bearing some similarity to Kuhn's (1970) idea of a 'paradigm', Foucault held to provide the conditions of existence for knowledge. He argued that it was a change in this episteme that afforded the emergence of linguistics, economics and biology. In one of his more infamous claims, he went further to suggest that our current episteme, founded on the representational nature of 'Man', was also in the process of mutating. Hence the dramatic substantive argument of the Order of Things, the idea of the 'death of Man', as a philosophical category.

'The Archaeology of Knowledge', Foucault's only purely methodological book, presented an exposition and clarification of the complex position that emerged in these early books. It suggested a coherent new analytic perspective of 'archaeology'. A
detailed discussion of this text and Foucault’s archaeology is presented in the next chapter, applying its principal arguments to the psychology of values.

‘Discipline and Punish’ and ‘The History of Sexuality: Volume 1’

There was a considerable gap before the publication of the books for which Foucault has perhaps now become best known. It was in ‘Discipline and Punish’ (1977) and the ‘History of Sexuality Volume 1’ (1978) that he changed direction from a more abstract analysis of the constitution of knowledge, to concrete considerations of power. In ‘Discipline and Punish’, he characteristically analysed a discontinuity, this time in the treatment of criminals. From the spectacular punishments employed in the 18th century, there emerged a very different disciplinary regime at the beginning of the 19th century. Where a typical punishment might once have consisted of spectacular torture, involving being publicly burned with molten lead, before being hung, drawn and quartered, punishment rapidly transformed to incarceration, in combination with the strict discipline of a rigorous course of education, work and exercise.

As in the previous cases analysed by Foucault there is a simple explanation, that this was merely the natural manifestation of the emergence of respect for human rights. Foucault set aside this progressive view to emphasise instead the different conceptions of power each system implied. These different modes of punishment and discipline represented not only a transformation to a more humane practice, but to an alternative rationality for the exercise of power: from ‘sovereign’ to ‘disciplinary’ power. Public executions were an extension of the complete power embodied in the King or Queen, invested by God. Even minor transgressions against the law were considered to be direct transgressions against the sovereign. Hence, the rationale, and mechanisms, existed for the exercise of a power without restraint, directed against the body of the perpetrator. This idea matches in graphic form our common understanding of power, that it is something people possess in certain positions of a society, and may exercise against us, at least in so far as they are in accordance with our rights. Today it is no longer the King or Queen, but a government with its officials and representatives. Foucault argues that this model of power persists in both common understandings and political philosophy, but that it is nevertheless inappropriate in modern societies. It leads us to see the existence and justification of strict hierarchies of power, and how it might be applied in
accordance with principles of justice. In contrast, examining the model of the prison that emerged at the beginning of the 19th Century, Foucault reveals a different rationality for the exercise of power that shifts our attention towards the micro-application of relations of power as they exist in specific situations. To realise this form of power, we need to consider not the hierarchical distribution of an abstract capacity for power, but a system making available relations of power based on surveillance and discipline.

Foucault took as an exemplar the panopticon, a model for a highly efficient prison proposed by Jeremy Bentham. His design included a central watchtower, around which backlit cells were arranged. A single guard could then potentially observe a large number of prisoners. Crucially, since the tower was not itself lit, the prisoner could not see the guard or know when they were being observed. They thus learned to internalise this process of observation. Surveillance was simultaneously linked to increased discipline. The closer the observation of prisoners’ behaviours, the more rigorous could be the application of control that could be exercised over them. Their movements could be co-ordinated to the minute, in order to produce controlled, ‘docile’ bodies. Foucault argued that this epitomized a new rationality of power. Public, punitive power could not operate in developed, industrialised societies. A modern state could not effectively exert control through public executions. The effects of power would have to be more subtle and diffuse.

Foucault extended this argument in several ways. First, he proposed that this model of disciplinary power was appropriate not just for prisons, but for many of the institutions that flourished in the 19th Century, for example armies, schools, and factories. These all increasingly adopted a system of surveillance coupled with strict discipline. Secondly, he showed how knowledge was intimately linked to these developments. As knowledge expanded, it generated conceptions that made new aspects of human beings and society visible. Hence, it operated to increase the potential for surveillance and control. Once human behaviours became objectified, they became subject to norms and categorisation, and became further open to relations of power. Finally, this process of objectivization was extended in the first volume of the ‘History of Sexuality’ to include subjectivization. This text analysed the means through which people were incited to turn themselves into subjects of knowledge. Foucault took the confessional as the exemplar through which surveillance was extended to include our
innermost thoughts and feelings. The confessional also was a form of relationship of power that generalised in contemporary society to play a part in, for example, justice, medicine, education and family relationships. We exist in forms of relationship dependent on the confession of our crimes, troubles and illnesses, what we know, what we think and desire. Thus, these texts from the mid-1970s considerably expanded Foucault's earlier work, from knowledge, to the relationship between knowledge and power.

'The Use of Pleasure' and 'The Care of the Self'

There was a further delay before the publication of the next two volumes of the History of Sexuality, 'The Use of Pleasure' (1984a) and 'The Care of the Self' (1984b). From an interest in what people do to us (the doctor, psychiatrist, prison guard, priest, judge), Foucault began to analyse what we do to ourselves. The topic in these volumes, remains, at least overtly, the notion of sexuality. But it is not sex that is itself of interest, either as a behaviour, or history of representations. It is the way in which our understanding of sexuality is constituted in historically singular ways, and the implications this has for our sense of self and self-relationship. Turning to antiquity and the first two centuries of Christianity, these texts analyse the ways in which sexuality served as a site for the varied ways in which people regulated their own behaviour. They analysed the forms of interrogation with oneself one engaged in, outside of a practice of confession or of discipline imposed by others. Foucault again exposed implicit continuities as well as discontinuities in the ways in which we monitor and take charge of our own actions, characterising specific forms of self-regulation, and so modes of self-relationship. These last works of Foucault will prove particularly useful for presenting an alternative interpretation of some of the potential problems facing the psychology of values in contemporary conditions. They will be discussed in some detail in the final chapter of this part of the thesis.

These, then, are some of the main arguments presented in the major texts of Foucault's oeuvre. The next section now briefly discusses common interpretations of these arguments in Psychology, before considering whether there might be other ways of understanding them.
Foucault in psychology

Though Foucault’s texts are almost all detailed, historical accounts of specific phenomena, only a few contributions in psychology specifically make use of his substantive arguments, as for example in Ussher’s (1991) account of women’s madness. In the majority of cases, it is the broader, philosophical implications of Foucault’s analyses that have proved influential. Three themes in particular have become closely associated with his work: the critique of the objectivity of science through the notion of discourse; a non-essential view of the nature of subjectivity; and the intimate relationship between knowledge and power.

Foucault’s analyses begin with the perspective that there is no simple referential relationship between language and the world it describes, even when rigorously applying the methods of science. This idea, popularised through social constructionism (Gergen, 1985), is explored in Foucault through a strategy of exposing and analysing striking transformations in the nature of knowledge. His underlying aim is to demonstrate how one cannot simply attribute these changes to theoretical advance, to a more refined form of representation. ‘Knowledge’ is not simply therefore a more or less accurate description of the ‘world’. It is closely linked to diverse institutional, social and historical transformations. In other words, knowledge does not provide us with a simple description of reality, but is dependent on the discourse and discursive practices through which we represent the world. Malsom (1998) neatly summarises the received understanding of this argument in psychology:

For Foucault ... discourse is not a transparent medium which simply describes or reflects some underlying reality. Rather, discourses (and discursive practices) are constitutive of their objects. (p. 27)

Knowledge, understood as ‘discourse’, is therefore never able to objectively describe an object of investigation: it constructs it. This argument has further important consequences for psychology. The object of investigation for our discipline is the human subject. The argument suggests, however, that there is no object outside of discourse. Hence, contrary to popular belief as well as basic assumptions of psychological research, there is no essential ‘human subject’, with natural qualities waiting to be uncovered through the application of scientific methods. Rather, it is often claimed that:
For Foucault, the subject is constituted through discourse rather than having a prediscursive existence (Bunton & Peterson, 1997, p. 3)

In Foucault’s writing he shows not only that knowledge can undergo fundamental changes, but, as far as this knowledge is of people, it is also related to transformations in how we understand the nature of human beings. It is not just the development of Psychiatry, or medicine, or the prison system that is important. It is the parallel transformations in widespread conceptions of what it is to be a ‘mad’ person, a ‘sick’ person or a ‘criminal’. Hence, with different systems of knowledge, the very nature of what it is to be human is open to fundamental change. Knowledge can be seen to be constitutive of prevalent forms of personhood, or ‘subjectivity’.

Finally, also associated with these themes is the notion that knowledge is intimately linked to power. If knowledge creates the truths it represents, and constitutes rather than describes the nature of subjectivity, then knowledge can be seen to be inseparable from power through its association with the forms of subjectivity through which power comes to be exercised. Whenever a particular notion of subjectivity becomes a focus for a power relation, knowledge, or discourse must be implicated in this form of power. For example, the categorisation through psychological knowledge of people displaying certain behaviours into classes of psychiatric illness, does not only present a scientific description of the problems of that person, but also situates them in a nexus of institutional power relations that includes the law and the limits of the justified actions that may be exercised by psychiatric hospitals. Arguments derived from Foucault have been generalised in psychology to include many basic constructs traditionally central to the discipline. Hepburn (1997) proposes, for example, that:

Foucault would argue that ... power operates through the taken-for-granted ‘truths’ about what it is to be human, which are manifest in discourses of ‘personality’, ‘attitude’ and ‘abnormality’. (p. 32)

Malsom (1998) describes well some of the more general conclusions that emerge from combining these three themes:

Foucauldian theory rejects any categorical distinction between ideology and science, between fact and fiction. The notion of an empirically verifiable, objective or absolute Truth becomes untenable because societies produce their own specific, normalizing, regulating truths. (Malsom, 1998, p. 31)
Given this interpretation of Foucault, it is not surprising that his work has led to the development of fundamentally revised notions of what psychology should be and what it should study. Most psychologists having emphasised in the past the importance of adherence to scientific methods and the discovery of objective facts, it has now become common to openly defend relativistic versions of psychology (Potter, 1996). The Psychologist has seen numerous articles playing out the debate between 'relativist' and 'realist' conceptions of scientific psychology, some of which have been influenced by these Foucaultian themes (e.g. Burt & Oaksford, 1999; Morgan, 1996; Morgan, 1998; Sherrard, 1997). The object of study has likewise changed for many psychologists from psychic properties to constructions of discourse. Indeed, Curt (1994), for example, come to define psychology in their glossary as 'the science of measuring (mental) things that do not exist' (p. 241).

In these popular interpretations of Foucault, therefore, may be seen the problems for the psychology of values generated by discursive psychology, discussed in the last chapter. The conceptualisation of values on which the tradition is based would be rejected out-right by most approaches in psychology currently drawing on Foucault's work. There are, however, reasons to doubt this common reading of Foucault.

**Alternatives to psychology's 'Foucault'**

Foucault has become commonly associated in psychology with the rejection of traditional research methods. However, though it seems often to be assumed that this is a natural consequence of his arguments, it presupposes a particular interpretation of his work. There are, moreover, strong grounds for questioning this interpretation.

First, Soyland and Kendall (1997) have recently presented a cogent critique of such uses of Foucault in psychology. They are sympathetic to authors like Rose who have continued to use and expand Foucault's historical approach. But they are highly critical of the more popular use of Foucault to justify discursive approaches to psychological research. They question these approaches on a number of grounds, including the lack of historical analysis and sensibility, the absence of a rigorous method, and the ungrounded use of the key notion of discourse. They argue that the subtlety of the term as it has developed in the French tradition in which Foucault worked has been lost in the translation into psychology. It is no longer the notion of
discourse that Foucault developed in his ‘Archaeology of Knowledge’ (1972) that underlies discursive psychology. Soyland and Kendall conclude that popular uses of Foucault display only a tenuous grasp of Foucault’s themes and that his name is being used only to establish authority and legitimacy rather than as the basis for a method.

Secondly, it would be surprising given the extent and complexity of Foucault’s work, if there were not competing interpretations and some debate about how to interpret both his arguments and their relevance to the specific concerns of psychology. It has become common in the discipline to cite quotes from Foucault and offer summaries of his views on discourse, knowledge, power and subjectivity, but not to argue about the details of what exactly Foucault’s arguments imply for psychology. In contrast, as Jones and Porter (1994) comment prior to their summary of Foucault:

> We are aware that any argument which briefly and in condensed form outlines a thought as complex, controversial and much contested as Michel Foucault’s can only end up complex, controversial and much contested! (p. 13)

It has not been the case, however, Soyland and Kendall’s short article aside, that such contestation has emerged in psychology. A relatively homogeneous reading of ‘Foucault’s position’ seems to have become accepted and assumed in the discipline with little debate, but with often quite drastic consequences for the assumptions underlying established research.

There are also problems that should not be underestimated in the extraction of this work from its larger context. Foucault’s arguments are clearly of relevance to the Anglo-American traditions of the social sciences, but they are borne of a very different intellectual context. Foucault’s early training was in the canon of continental philosophy centred on Kant, Hegel and Marx (Eribon, 1991). Throughout his writings he subtly but consistently refers back to these philosophers. He follows, however, more directly in a different tradition, of the history and philosophy of science of Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem. His own contribution to this tradition was strongly influenced by other thinkers, particularly Heidegger and Nietzsche. The period in which he was working must also be considered since it provides the dominant traditions of the time to which his critiques were directed. In the 1950s and 1960s it was the intellectual arena dominated by Marxism, first in conjunction with the phenomenology of Sartre and
Merleau-Ponty, and later neo-Freudianism and Structuralism. None of these figures or movements is a part of the Anglo-American tradition of psychology. Yet these are the philosophers whose thought underlies Foucault's writings: providing basic assumptions, inspiring his critiques, and acting as their mostly covert targets. There is likely to be some difficulty, and therefore considerable grounds for dispute and debate, transferring the ideas of this continental philosopher and historian into the intellectually distinct discipline of psychology.

Finally, especially towards the end of his career, it was evident that Foucault himself was becoming increasingly frustrated with some of the more widely held interpretations of his work. In his final years, he became quite direct in his criticisms, for example:

What I tried to do was a history of the relationships that thought maintains with the truth, the history of thought insofar as it is thought about the truth. All those who say that for me the truth doesn’t exist are simple-minded. (Foucault, 1989b, p. 456)

In conclusion, though popular interpretations of Foucault in psychology today mostly propose and have led to the rejection of traditional approaches to research like the dominant tradition in the field of values, the complexity of interpreting Foucault should give pause for thought before assuming these are the only possible conclusions of his arguments. Soyland and Kendall (1997) have presented one critique of existing readings of Foucault. The remainder of this chapter will develop a broader perspective on Foucault’s project and oeuvre that will contribute two further critiques. They will then be used to guide and provide the context for the more specific analyses of subsequent chapters.

**Foucault: Theorist or immanent critic of the present?**

The preceding section raised doubts about the received interpretation of Foucault in psychology. Nonetheless, notwithstanding Soyland and Kendall's critique, it is also clear that popular accounts of his work in psychology do seem to incorporate much of what is central to Foucault. The positions discussed earlier of psychologists like Malsom and Hepburn do indeed appear to be consistent with much of what might be assumed to be Foucault's basic assumptions. He surely does propose a central role for discourse; he does question the existence of an unchanging essence of human nature;
and he does focus on the intricate relations between power and knowledge. Soyland and Kendall may be right that discursive psychology does not properly employ Foucault’s historical methods, but surely they can nevertheless claim to be following Foucault and to find their justification in his work by drawing on his conclusions about knowledge, subjectivity, and power?

The argument of this section continues the critique begun by Soyland and Kendall by proposing that this rebuttal is not so easily available to discursive psychologists. It will be argued that there is a subtle but crucial distinction that stands in the way of this argument. A distinction needs to be made between Foucault’s development of these themes through his historical analyses, and subsequently accepting these themes as an implicit theoretical foundation on which to develop a new approach to psychology. Foucault, it will be argued, was an ‘immanent critic of the present’, not a theorist of discourse, subjectivity, or power. His approach suggests new forms of engaged critique, not a foundation for a new mode of theorisation. Moreover, his own late re-assessment of his project supports and clarifies this view. The conclusion is that if one is to draw on Foucault’s work, it must be on these terms, and that they present a fundamentally different view of the consequences of Foucault’s thought for psychology.

Theories or analytics?

It is tempting to draw from Foucault, and even more so from the summaries of his work found in secondary texts, a set of basic conclusions asserting Foucault’s substantive position. These might then allow one to say that ‘discourse is constitutive of knowledge’, that ‘the subject does not have a pre-discursive existence’ or that ‘Truth becomes untenable’. Summarising Foucault in this way, however, accords these statements the status of a justified description of the way the world is, a form of meta-theory, making foundational claims about knowledge, human subjectivity or power. Indeed, Foucault is often said to have contributed new ‘theories of discourse’ (Parker, 1995, p. 503) or to post-structuralist ‘theory’ more generally. In the light of such theories, it then seems reasonable to develop an alternative form of psychology that builds on this meta-theory to offer a form of research consistent with Foucault’s account of the world.
However, attending more closely to Foucault’s own writings, it is not so clear that Foucault is indeed offering us anything like a theory. Indeed, in contrast to many Foucault commentators in the social sciences, he very rarely uses the term ‘theory’. Even in the text in which he comes closest to offering us a grand theory, ‘The Archaeology of Knowledge’, he is almost always much more conservative in his claims. He speaks instead, for example, of ‘the possibility of a description’ (Foucault, 1972, p. 85). Or in the more informal context of an interview, he talks of a ‘descriptive experiment’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 53). The ‘Archaeology of knowledge’ he suggests, ‘only ever means a certain mode of approach’ (Foucault, 1980b, p. 66). Describing later work, he describes it as ‘a ramified, penetrative perception of the present, one that makes it possible to locate lines of weakness, strong points’ (Foucault, 1980a, p. 62). Or again, towards the end of his career, his claim for his work is that it offers ‘a fairly fruitful kind of intelligibility’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 74). So what is lost in translation between Foucault’s own carefully circumscribed accounts of his contribution, and the common claim in psychology that he contributes to ‘post-structuralist theory’. What is the difference between ‘the possibility of a description’ and a ‘theory’, and why is it consequential?

The differences are subtle but significant. They also depend on how one chooses to define the term ‘theory’. However, there are certain common associations with the notion of a theory that highlight why Foucault might not have wanted to present his conclusions as such, and that therefore also provide an insight into the nature of his project.

First, it is typically implicit in theories that they generalise. Scientific research does not aim to describe the properties of the particular object being studied, but to the general class of objects it belongs to. Theories constitute claims about the universal, generally understood outside everyday contexts of space and time. Such implicit goals of scientific thought, embedded in the notion of a theory, are central to the growth of science. But they are in many ways antithetical to Foucault’s aims. In contrast, it can be argued that his work has the opposite objective: to expose all that is not universal and transcendent. His work focuses precisely on that which is particular, historically contingent, and not generalisable. Hence:
I wouldn’t want what I may have said or written to be seen as laying any claims to totality. I don’t try to universalize what I say. (Foucault, 1991, p. 73)

Second, theories do not exist in isolation, but form part of a larger theoretical system, and it is through their existence in a wider technical context that they hold claims to validity. They properly have intricate, and theoretically derived modes of justification and testing. Hence, as a scientist, one naturally asks for the grounds on which claims are to be taken seriously. But as ‘the possibility of a description’, the objective is not to achieve ‘validity’ in the same way as a theory. Foucault’s claims, as descriptions, rather than formal theories, do not aim for the latter’s status. For good reason, they offer more limited claims that may then stand outside the restraints of more highly specified systems of thought. They often presuppose technical arguments, of particular philosophical positions for example, but as a description, their ultimate appeal is not to be considered as worthy of theoretical status in the context of a discipline, but to our more general notions of what is justifiable as a plausible description. Hence their tentative nature, is it possible that this might be a coherent perspective one can take.

Third, Foucault’s ‘descriptions’ also present a different relationship to alternative accounts. The classic conception of theories is that they compete. At least as science is commonly understood, two theories cannot both be correct. In classic textbook accounts, the foundation of proper scientific theories is to pit one theory against another, through an imaginative and carefully designed experiment that is able to test competing predictions and so distinguish between them. One theory, ideally, should be made to triumph over others or be refuted. This is not the case for the sort of description offered by Foucault. On the contrary, his accounts presuppose partiality. They do not encourage competition to be a more accurate representation, but further description, each illuminating something else that may or may not be of value. His texts are never intended to be definitive or complete. Thus:

What I say ought to be taken as ‘propositions’, ‘game openings’ where those who may be interested are invited to join in; they are not meant as dogmatic assertions that have to be taken or left en bloc’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 74)

Finally, it is clear from closer consideration of Foucault’s texts, rather than the brief summaries more often discussed in psychology, that the typical mode of
presentation of theories is very different from Foucault's development of his descriptions. One will not find in Foucault's historical accounts the presentation of a theory of the (non-essential) nature of the human subject, for example. They achieve their effects through a simple description of the details of particular historical transformations. More precisely, they operate through placing disparate elements into new and preferably disturbing juxtapositions that challenge the way we tend to conceptualise and theorise some aspect of the world. But they do not themselves offer alternative theories. Hence the objective commonly found in Foucault's texts of demonstrating significant continuities, discontinuities, and dynamic relationships between apparently unconnected historical phenomena. These ambitions divide and relocate the elements of a familiar conceptual landscape to reconstitute them in a transformed image. In doing so, they may offer plausible perspectives on an otherwise taken for granted part of our social world, but they do not directly present pictures that gesture toward representations of an underlying reality. To summarise these four points, it can be argued that Foucault's texts do not present theories that make foundational claims about the nature of the world, but 'analytics', new ways of identifying, dividing, and configuring a set of surface elements.

The emphasis on Foucault as innovator of analytics rather than theories has important consequences for how his work is used. It can be argued that his analyses do not compete with the theoretical formulations of social scientists. They do not, for example, form representations of the way the world is, outside of specific descriptions. Their very substance, the juxtaposition of specific features of our socio-cultural history, constitutes their claims. They are, therefore, tied to these circumstances. They are intrinsically contingent, historical, and non-universal. So, to take a popular representation of Foucault, he does not actually make overt claims that there is no essential human nature. It is not presented as universalisable truth, as is generally the case for theories. Rather, his analyses focus on specific aspects of 'human nature' that are taken to be essential qualities at specific times and in certain places. In that way, certain features thought to be essential, like 'sexuality', may come to be seen as contingent on aspects of our present society. But this may only be taken to be the case as far as a specific analysis is plausible and makes this apparent. Foucault, unlike some of his commentators and those using his work to justify their research, is not prone to
more problematic blanket claims about the nature of knowledge, the subject, or power. Foucault's analytics, then, achieve their force only through their continual re-application. One cannot simply abstract from them, generalise to an ahistoric truth, and apply these lessons universally. Generalisations made on behalf of Foucault are not valid in themselves but must be constantly and carefully reconstructed in the context of particular, contemporary cases. It is only through the on-going reconfiguration of facts in different domains that we might see where there might be contingencies masquerading as consequential truths. In other words, for Foucault, there is not philosophy, as a body of arguments, but 'philosophical activity' (Foucault, 1984c, p. 9). He is not a 'metatheoretician', but a 'thinker', understood in a very specific sense as someone engaging in 'the critical work that thought brings to bear on itself' (ibid, p. 9). Foucault does not develop a philosophical system, but in the same way as the late Wittgenstein, draws attention to a philosophical practice, an activity.

This interpretation of Foucault's work finds support and clarification in one of the last papers he wrote in which he offers his own reformulation of the aims of his project. Since it both offers further evidence for the interpretation presented in this section, and will guide the overall perspective on the psychology of values adopted in the thesis, it will be discussed here in some detail. It concerns Foucault's response to the question, 'What is Enlightenment?' (Foucault, 1984c).

**What is Enlightenment?**

The question 'What is Enlightenment?' was posed as a challenge to its readers, 200 hundred years ago, by the German newspaper 'The Berlinische Monatschrift'. It was a pertinent question of the time, for which there was no agreed answer. Foucault's paper first discusses the response submitted to the paper by the great German philosopher, Immanuel Kant. At the heart of Kant's suggestion was the familiar Enlightenment notion of the use of reason to empower social progress, to challenge illegitimate authority and dogmatism. As Voltaire, best known of the French Enlightenment thinkers, had stressed, our confidence in beliefs and political systems should be measured by the extent to which they could be justified through reason. Kant's response, for Foucault, offered a unique elaboration of these familiar ideas. Kant proposed that the Enlightenment could be summed up in a 'Wahlspruch', the heraldic
device: ‘aude sapere’- ‘dare to know’. It was the challenge to find the truth available to reason, in the face of dogma. The result Kant described as an ‘ausgang’, an exit. This was a transition from a state of immaturity to ‘maturity’, defined as the autonomous employment of reason.

Two features of Kant’s argument were especially important to Foucault. First, the nature of Enlightenment for Kant was not purely philosophical or political. It combined the institutional or political, with the spiritual or ethical. Thus Kant required certain conditions to be in place within a society, but also that people be engaged personally, by choice, in the appropriate use of reason. The Enlightenment was understood to demand the involvement of the populace.

Second, the nature of Kant’s response marked a new development in the practice of philosophical inquiry. He answered the question of the Enlightenment by opening a new relation to history. It was not considered as a new social epoch, or as an analysis of the point to which humanity was moving. It was a comment whose focus was purely on the present, and on the difference it introduced from the immediate past: ‘What difference does today introduce with respect to yesterday?’ (ibid, p. 34). The effect, according to Foucault, was to introduce a transformation in philosophical reflection that was to be taken up by a number of others since. It indicated the crossroads between critical philosophical thought and reflection on history: ‘it is in the reflection on “today” as difference in history and as motive for a particular philosophical task that the novelty of this text appears to me to lie’ (ibid, p. 38).

A further point is particularly relevant for the present thesis. We may see in this mature paper a remarkable realignment in Foucault’s understanding of his work. Kant was a long-standing figure of critique, in the background of many of Foucault’s texts. However, in this paper, we find Foucault apparently now situating his work in the heritage of Kant’s critical philosophy, and thus in the Enlightenment tradition. Caution must be exercised in interpreting this. It must be stressed that Foucault also distinguished strongly between the Enlightenment and Humanism. He also distanced himself from the construal of the Enlightenment of Kant, offering a reformulation incorporating some of its more central qualities. Nevertheless, this alignment by Foucault casts doubt on interpretations of his work suggesting he is as ‘postmodernist’.
Elaborating Kant's idea that the Enlightenment is a task people must engage in, Foucault argues that we should consider it not as an epoch, but as an attitude, what the Greeks would have referred to as an 'ethos'. Foucault's difference with Kant is expressed in his alternative choice of figure as exemplar of this attitude: the 19th Century French poet, Baudelaire. Several aspects of the ethos manifest in Baudelaire appeal to Foucault. Similarly to Kant, he shares an intense interest in the present, in what today offers that is different from yesterday: 'the will to "heroize" the present' *(ibid, p. 40)*. But this for Baudelaire involves neither a pure celebration of the present, or a critique. Rather, it is a will to see in things, without judgements of 'good' and 'bad', what is especially characteristic about their current moment. It is understood, moreover, with inherent irony:

> For the attitude of modernity, the high value of the present is indissociable from a desperate eagerness to imagine it, to imagine it otherwise than it is, and to transform it not by destroying it but by grasping it in what it is. *(ibid, p. 41)*

It is particularly in this aspect of the attitude of modernity, that we find the link to Foucault and his difference with Kant. Both are ultimately concerned with the possibility of the illegitimate use of reason. Both also believed that identifying such uses was a potential consequence of the Enlightenment reliance on reason, and a danger it must similarly be bound to attempt to overcome. But for Kant, this was expressed in the aim of finding the limits proper to reason, of fixing those limits that reason could, and should not hope to overcome. Foucault on the other hand, saw in retrospect that this approach, despite sound intentions, could produce its own brand of rationalist dogma. It would lead to the very dangers that it was the aim of the Enlightenment to overcome. For Foucault, the heritage of the Enlightenment must be found today in a different project, a matter of finding and exploring the possibilities of going beyond limits, that could then be seen to be unfounded. Hence, the crucial question that underlies much of Foucault's work:

> If the Kantian question was that of knowing the limits knowledge has to renounce transgressing, it seems to me that the critical question today has to be turned back into a positive one: in what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints? *(ibid, p. 45)*
In summary, in this neglected final work of Foucault may be found his own understanding of the motive behind his writing, and through it a formulation of the central task of his project. It presents a careful and clear discussion of what Foucault understood to be the purpose of his analytics. They aim toward the discovery and questioning of historically contingent limits, a process that Foucault believes to be at the heart of the spirit of the Enlightenment. It is the very challenge and the task of the enlightenment, for Foucault, to identify but then also explore and experiment with going beyond the limits of contemporary reason and knowledge.

The argument developed in the present section has important implications for the relationship between Foucault and psychology, and for how his work might be used in the context of the Rokeach-Schwartz tradition of the psychology of values. First, it contributes further to doubts raised in the previous section about the most popular interpretations of Foucault in psychology. Foucault’s texts do not offer the sort of meta-theory about language, subjectivity, or power that common uses of his work presuppose. Rather, he presents analytic tools that may be used in the service of a specific form of critique. The argument thus adds to the work begun by Soyland and Kendall that is critical of the claims made by discursive psychologists that the justification for their approach may be found in the thought of Foucault. Second, the argument brings a different perspective to the interpretation of Foucault as a postmodern philosopher. Contrary to the popular view Foucault is found to be siding in ‘What is Enlightenment?’ with the philosophical tradition inaugurated by Kant, a markedly contrary figure to postmodernity. There is, then, further ground for rejecting accounts of Foucault blended into postmodern or post-structuralist cocktails, and considering specifically and in more depth Foucault’s own arguments about relevant issues. Finally, this section suggests new possibilities for how Foucault should be used in the context of the psychology of values. Rather than simply dismissing the existing tradition, the more appropriate challenge for readers of Foucault would appear to be to attempt to use his thought to inquire more deeply into a tradition from within, and attempt to identify at a detailed level those limits that are unnecessary, and to experiment with the possibility of going beyond them. This is the approach that will be pursued in the thesis.

The next section presents a second argument offering an alternative to the received ‘Foucault’, contributing further to the interpretation of the present thesis. It
discusses development in Foucault’s thought, and the importance of emphasising the different analytics in his work.

**One ‘Foucault’ or three?**

It is common to cite a number of Foucault’s texts in support of a particular argument, for example, about the centrality of discourse to knowledge. Often it is not even particular texts that are cited, but a more general reference to the ‘Foucaultian perspective’ (e.g. Wetherell, 1998). This seems reasonable given that in most of his work, discourse and knowledge are central elements. However, references to ‘Foucault’ can be deceptive in so far as the name is understood to represent a homogeneous body of thought. The previous section discussed a way in which one could, at an abstract level, offer a unifying account of the nature of Foucault’s project as a whole. But at the level of specific arguments, it is clear that Foucault’s oeuvre does not advance a unitary position. Moreover, this would go against the very character of his work. As he demanded in a famous passage in ‘The Archaeology of Knowledge’:

> Do not ask who I am and do not ask me to remain the same: leave it to our bureaucrats and our police to see that our papers are in order. (p. 17)

In other words, Foucault is offering a warning that he has no qualms about changing direction and developing new perspectives and positions. This section will show how Foucault was true to his word, and did indeed introduce a number of different perspectives into his project. It will then briefly consider some of the implications of this understanding of Foucault’s oeuvre as heterogeneous for its interpretation and use.

**Transformations in the thought of Foucault**

The summary of Foucault’s major texts at the start of the chapter demonstrated the diversity of his research in terms of substantive topics: from Madness, through Prisons, to Sexuality. His oeuvre clearly includes numerous changes in content. But beneath the obvious substantive changes, can also be identified shifts of a different kind. The notion of power in Foucault has become a central part of the representation of his work in psychology. But power, at least explicitly, was notably absent from his early work. Especially in the period from ‘The Birth of the Clinic’, to ‘The Archaeology of Knowledge’, Foucault’s interest was not in power, but knowledge. More specifically,
his concern was with the foundations and vicissitudes of the fields of investigation constituting the sciences of Man. In order to reveal an alternative perspective in the developments of these fields, he developed a new analytic. It was implicit in 'Madness and Civilization', and made increasingly explicit following 'The Birth of the Clinic'. It is this perspective and these analytic concepts of this period that he referred to as archaeology.

However, it is commonly accepted amongst commentators (e.g. Deleuze, 1988; Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982; Rajchman, 1985) that Foucault changed direction after writing 'The Archaeology of Knowledge'. Having concentrated his analyses on the development of systems of knowledge, he began to pay more attention to the non-discursive, to the historical development of social institutions. His inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, 'The Order of Discourse' (Foucault, 1981), introduced a change of emphasis from the argument of archaeology. The autonomy he had accorded discourse in the earlier work made way for potentially greater involvement for individuals and social groups in shaping the development of discourse. In a second important paper, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History' (Foucault, 1984d), he announced a new historical approach. Expressing at this mid-point in his career his debt to Nietzsche, he spoke of employing a 'genealogical' method, after Nietzsche's 'Genealogy of Morals' (Nietzsche, 1969). Instead of focusing purely on regularities in the transformations of discourse, the method paid greater attention to social circumstances, the imperatives for change they produced, and the dynamics of relations of power. Thus issues of power came to the forefront of his thought. It was then only after a break of seven years from the archaeology that Foucault published 'Discipline and Punish' and the first volume of the History of Sexuality. Both were very different books to those of the archaeological period.

Soon after, a further transition began to take place in Foucault's thinking. There was another long break in his output of major texts, punctuated by influential lectures and papers. Yet again it seemed he was preparing the way for a new direction. His lectures on 'Governmentality' (Foucault, 1991) at the Collège de France moved a stage further from the focus on power of the genealogy books. From this first attempt to reconceptualise power relations as existing through forms knowledge and the distribution and organisation of institutions, this paper considered the more specific
notion of 'government' – the 'conduct of conduct'. It changed topic from the discourse of 'sexuality' to 'population'. It argued that the notion of 'population' was central to both the expansion of the social sciences, and the increasing distribution of apparatuses of power in modern societies. Significantly, it began to emphasise the idea that power was something also involved in the relationship one had with oneself: the same processes could be seen in the government of a population, as in the government of one's family, and of oneself.

Concentrating on this more personal dimension of power, exercised over oneself, opened the way for what we can see as a final transformation in Foucault's thought. The last two books introduced a number of changes. They brought a profound chronological shift in his work. From the familiar domain of the Renaissance, the Classical Age, and the beginning of the 19th Century, they turned to ancient Greece, and the first two centuries of Christianity. They also introduced a change in the underlying concern. It was no longer with power, or knowledge, but 'ethics'. Characteristically, the term was understood differently to the conventional sense, recasting 'ethics' as a form of ascetics, a way of relating to oneself. He also adopted yet another mode of analysis from archaeology and genealogy. He claimed that he was now interested in the study of 'problematizations', the transformations through which objects or practices come to exist as targets of scrutiny: as 'problems' requiring attention.

One may, then, identify not only changes in substantive topics but also in the methods, underlying rationale, and aims of analysis. In conclusion, it could be argued that if the name is used to refer to a philosophical position, then there is not a single 'Foucault', but three different 'Foucaults', each presenting a different axis of the philosopher's thought. The positions advanced by Foucault on key dimensions of the three major periods that have been distinguished are summarised in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Summary of Foucault's oeuvre according to his major axes of thought.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Analytic Texts</th>
<th>New perspective revealed by analysis:</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963 ~ 1969</td>
<td>Knowledge</td>
<td>Archaeology</td>
<td>The steady accumulation of scientific knowledge</td>
<td>Continuities and discontinuities in the discursive practices of science</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Birth of the Clinic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Order of Things</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Archaeology of Knowledge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970 ~ 1977</td>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Genealogy</td>
<td>The operation and legitimisation of sovereign power, embodied in the law, in the context of rights</td>
<td>Institutional practices, knowledge, norms, constraints manifest in prisons, factories, schools, religion, medicine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Discipline and Punish</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The History of Sexuality Vol. I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979 ~ 1984</td>
<td>Morality</td>
<td>Problematization/Ethics</td>
<td>The content, changes, philosophical justification of moral codes</td>
<td>The substance, mode of subjectivization, ethical work and telos of the relation to self, proposed, suggested or imposed by one's culture or society.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The History of Sexuality Vol. II</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The History of Sexuality Vol. III</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Consequences of a multiple-axis interpretation

Most researchers drawing on Foucault would probably acknowledge these distinct stages in the development of his thought. This feature of his work is, however, rarely discussed, especially in psychology. Yet there are a number of important consequences that follow from the recognition of multiple dimensions in his work: it raises questions about mixing different periods of his work; it draws attention to large parts of his oeuvre that have been neglected; it changes the way the individual parts are interpreted; and, of particular consequence to the thesis, it suggests how Foucault’s work may be especially relevant to the issue of social change. Each of these points will now be discussed.
First, the existence of multiple axes of thought suggests some care needs to be taken when citing Foucault. It is problematic to use arguments from one period to support a more general point that is part of another. For example, when quotations are taken from a text from his early period, like the Archaeology of Knowledge, and used to defend a conception of discourse drawn more generally from the work of the middle period, as is often the case in psychology (e.g. Hepburn, 1997; Malson, 1998; Parker, 1989a). Arguably, the term ‘discourse’ does not have the same meaning between the two periods, and the quote from the early work may attribute properties to the term that are not warranted in the same way in the later conception. If these differences are taken seriously, it becomes just as problematic to refer to ‘Foucault’s perspective on language’ as it does to refer to ‘Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language’. No one would enter into a serious discussion of the latter without at least acknowledging what was being assumed about the differences between the views expressed in Wittgenstein’s early (Wittgenstein, 1922) and late work (Wittgenstein, 1958), even for those commentators who stress the similarities between them (e.g. Baker & Hacker, 1983). In contrast, it is unusual for authors to note, let alone stress the importance of the differences between the three axes of Foucault’s thought.

Second, acknowledgement of these three axes of Foucault draws attention to the neglect that has been shown of large parts of his writing. Foucault has become in some respects a victim of the success of the books from his genealogical period. He is now probably best known for his notion of Power/Knowledge and some commentators continue to emphasises this as his most important contribution (e.g. Prado, 1995). It is the work of his middle period that has likewise been used to greatest effect in psychology by, for example, Parker (1989a). There is, however, also Foucault’s archaeology and ethics to consider. In contrast to the popularity of the work on power, there have been few studies on Foucault specifically focused on the archaeology, and fewer still on his notion of ethics. This trend is now changing with studies appearing in philosophy of science that focus on archaeology (e.g. Gutting, 1989) and political philosophy developing Foucault’s concept of ethics (e.g. Davidson, 1994; Ransom, 1997; Simons, 1995). The present thesis will continue this trend into psychology, also focusing on the neglected early and late periods of Foucault’s work.
Third, there are also issues of interpretation raised by the existence of multiple axes of thought. It can be argued that one cannot interpret a single axis without presupposing an interpretation of its relationship to the others. For example, it is logical to read the genealogy as surpassing the archaeology. It thus seems reasonable to suggest, as Parker (1995) does, that 'Foucault came to reject the archaeology' (p. 503). This is the position taken in the influential commentary by Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982). However, it is clear that at least towards the end of Foucault's career, this was not how he understood his own project. As he wrote in a pseudonymous summary of his work for a dictionary of philosophy, the final texts added 'the third panel of a triptych' (Florence, 1984, p. 316). Whilst admitting to posing himself in a 'slightly fictive coherence' (Foucault, 1989a, p. 220), Foucault was nonetheless very clear about the importance of the contribution of all three periods of his work. Thus, he refers clearly to:

Three axes whose specificity and whose interconnections have to be analyzed: the axis of knowledge, the axis of power, the axis of ethics. (ibid, p. 48)

To these three axes, he associates distinct questions. Respectively:

How are we constituted as subjects of our own knowledge? How are we constituted as subjects who exercise or submit to power relations? How are we constituted as moral subjects of our own actions? (ibid, p. 49)

There are then three axes that need to be analysed, both individually, and in terms of their interconnections. This raises a number of issues that may be problematic for existing interpretations of Foucault. For example, it suggests as mentioned earlier that archaeology was not dismissed by Foucault. Also that the later work on ethics may serve to moderate the role of power as revealed through genealogical analysis. Whilst the latter is used alone, it is not clear that its importance is not being overstated without also considering the role of the other dimensions provided by Foucault's analytics as a whole. This point will not be pursued further in the thesis, though a perspective that does emphasise an overall understanding of his oeuvre will be.

The fourth reason for emphasising the three axes in Foucault is of particular relevance to the concerns of the present thesis. It can be argued that Foucault was not in any simple sense a 'postmodern' philosopher, but that in the transformations of his
work can nonetheless be found his analysis of what he saw as the important changes occurring in contemporary society. It has already been shown how, contrary to popular interpretations, Foucault’s thought seems to reject the notion of postmodernity by his alignment with a philosophical tradition begun by Kant. It is not clear therefore, that Foucault should be understood to be a postmodern thinker, or what his relevance is exactly to an analysis of the postmodern condition. Indeed, it goes against the character of his thought to make such all-embracing generalisations as are implicit in the notion of a postmodern turn. Similarly, it suggests an undue importance of our contemporary period, when, as an historian, it was abundantly clear to Foucault that every era has reason to consider itself an important turning point. However, also characteristic of Foucault, though an historian, was an intense interest in the present.

The question I start off with is: what are we and what are we today? What is this instant that is ours? Therefore, if you like, it is a history that starts off from this present day actuality ... I would hardly conceive of a properly speculative history without the field being determined by something happening right now. (Foucault, 1989f, p. 411)

Foucault, therefore, may not be a postmodern philosopher, but he nonetheless can be seen to have commented on the so-called postmodern condition. For a thinker so intently focused on the present, it must be important to appreciate what the particular present, the specific socio-historic context, for each text was. ‘Madness and Civilization’ was written in the late 1950s and ‘The Care of the Self’ in the early 1980s. If we take Foucault at his word, these texts must comment on very different periods of social history. This perspective is, however, rarely discussed in the Foucault literature and even less so in Psychology. Yet, adopting this view raises important questions about the sudden transformation to an analysis of ethics. Given his previous emphasis on what others can do to us, why now the apparently peculiar interest in what people do to themselves? Foucault was plain about the fact that while writing the first volume of the history of sexuality, he realized if he limited it to the intended period from the 16th to 19th centuries, ‘it wouldn’t work.’ (Foucault, 1989c, p. 472). The problem was that this period presupposed a certain relationship with oneself. The reason it was a problem, it may be surmised, was only becoming evident as a result of recent social changes. In one
of very few acknowledgements that this may have been the motivation for this turn to ethics, he suggests that for him:

It's a fact that people's everyday lives have changed from the early 60's to now, and certainly within my own life. And surely, that is not due to political parties but is the result of many movements. These social movements have really changed our whole lives, our mentality, our attitudes and the attitudes and mentality of other people — people who do not belong to these movements. (Foucault, 1989d, p. 390)

In a later interview, he suggests furthermore how these changes relate to shifts in morality and ethics:

From antiquity to Christianity one passes from a morality that was essentially a search for a personal ethics to a morality as obedience to a system of rules. And if I have taken an interest in antiquity, it is because, for a whole series of reasons, the idea of morality as obedience to a code of rules is now disappearing, has already disappeared. To this absence of a morality, one responds, or must respond, with an investigation which is that of an aesthetics of existence. (Foucault, 1989a, p. 451)

Notwithstanding, therefore, the rejection of the notion of postmodernity, it can be argued that Foucault was interested in and cognizant of the changes that have been happening in broad social structures in recent years. Furthermore, that the final development in his work was his response to these changes. The introduction of the third axis in the constitution of subjectivity, the dimension of ethics, was therefore prompted by and was Foucault's response to the changes that characterise our contemporary moment at the end of the 20th Century. It is here that one needs to turn to appreciate what Foucault really did have to say about postmodernity, rather than the broader and more general claims that may be made on his behalf in the postmodernity literature. This final axis will, moreover, prove highly useful in thinking through the potential consequences of these changes for the Rokeach-Schwartz tradition of values.

**Summary**

The thought of Michel Foucault has been highly influential across the social sciences and humanities, and also in psychology. One of the tasks of the thesis, however, is to consider whether there might be other ways of interpreting the relevance and consequences of Foucault for the discipline. The chapter first presented an overview of his oeuvre and summary of the most influential reading of his work as a general
justification for discursive approaches to psychology. It was then shown that there were reasons to doubt these interpretations. Two further reasons were added. Drawing on Foucault's later characterisations of his project and of his oeuvre overall, it was argued that his work needs to be understood as offering analytic tools to be used, rather than as a meta-theoretical foundation for a new approach to psychology, and that three distinct axes of his thought should be emphasised. Both these points raise further questions for existing interpretations of Foucault as well as guiding the alternative perspective developed in the thesis. Consistent with the arguments of the present chapter, the thesis will draw on Foucault's oeuvre as a source of analytics that might be interpreted, elaborated, and put into practice in psychology, with the aim of distinguishing and exposing that which is contingent from that which is necessary. It will also use the neglected dimensions of archaeology and ethics, using the latter to explore Foucault's analysis of changes due to our contemporary social conditions. The next chapter considers first Foucault's analytic of archaeology.
Chapter 3

The analytic of archaeology: Foucault’s conception of knowledge

Underneath what science itself knows there is something it does not know ... I have tried to unearth an autonomous domain that would be the unconscious of science. (Foucault, 1972, p. 69)

Introduction

Drawing on the introduction and general perspective on Foucault presented in the last chapter, the current chapter now considers a specific aspect of his work. It will discuss what has been described as the first axis of Foucault’s thought: his archaeology. This is the analytic he developed in his early writing, from ‘Madness and Civilization’ (1967) to ‘The Archaeology of Knowledge’ (1972). The chapter will concentrate especially on the latter text, where he presented his final elaboration of this approach and his attempt to elucidate the archaeological perspective on knowledge.

It was in the ‘Archaeology of Knowledge’ that Foucault most comprehensively articulated his notion of the discursive foundation of knowledge. Hence archaeology provides a key to Foucault’s understanding of the concept of discourse that has become so influential in psychology and, as it has been widely interpreted, so problematic for the traditional approaches to the psychology of values. Through the detailed examination of this text, therefore, the chapter will be able to offer a re-assessment of the notion of discourse and its implications for the Rokeach-Schwartz tradition of values.

Foucault has been cited in psychology many times over the past decade, and there have been numerous short summaries of his central arguments. However, there have been few detailed analyses of individual works, specifically conducted by or for psychologists. Though his texts have already proved highly influential, there is therefore considerable work yet to be done in basic exposition of his arguments, and in consideration of how, exactly, they might be interpreted in the context of psychology.
As Alexander (1987) has argued, where the meaning of a text is not self-evident, as is the case for most of the works of complex thinkers like Foucault, exposition becomes in itself a valuable and necessary form of theorisation, and therefore constitutes a significant contribution in its own right.

The present chapter is therefore divided into three main sections. It begins with a basic exposition of the key aspects of Foucault's archaeology as it might be applied in psychology. It emphasises the importance of setting the text in its intellectual context in order to appreciate central features of its arguments. The second section will then consider, in the light of this reading of Foucault, an influential interpretation of the notion of discourse that raises problems for the psychology of values. It will be argued that the archaeology does not support the rejection of the validity of scientific knowledge or the general use of the concept of discourse, as is widely assumed. Rather, the archaeology presents a very specific account of the complex enabling as well as constraining properties of systems of knowledge, and their intricate relationships with broader social institutions. It may lead to the detailed questioning of scientific practices, but not to their dismissal. The final section then uses the archaeology in exactly this way to analyse the historical emergence of the Rokeach-Schwartz values tradition, and suggest ways in which the conception of values embedded in this research approach may be limiting further developments of the field.

The Archaeology of Knowledge

The intellectual tradition of archaeology

The texts from Foucault’s archaeological period are especially prone to the problems noted in the last chapter created by reading them out of their academic context. ‘The Archaeology of Knowledge’ follows directly in a specific tradition of French thought, yet Foucault does very little in the text to explicitly draw the reader’s attention to this, or to introduce or explain the numerous assumptions he draws from earlier work. The text presupposes acquaintance with, if not acceptance of, the basic positions proposed by the Annales School of historians, and the historians and philosophers of science, Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem. This introduction therefore begins with a brief review of central features of their work in order to present
the necessary background to Foucault's reformulation of their arguments in the archaeology.

The historians of the Annales School, long before Foucault, had already begun to develop a new perspective on historical change. Their aim was to turn the attention of the historian away from traditional foci of analysis: the significant events that were conventionally understood to be responsible for the movement of history, and the protagonists that participate in them. Changes in history are often explained via key events interpreted as initiating complex causal chains. Accounts of the First World War focusing on the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the heir to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, are an example of this type of history. In contrast, the Annales historians analysed the much broader context in which these events took place, attempting to identify instead those factors that provided their necessary conditions. Influenced by the structural linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure (1974), they saw these factors in structural terms, through the systems of relationships between elements operating at multiple levels of analysis. They combined, for example, knowledge of geography, demographics, transportation and agricultural systems. It was the patterns of events in these disparate systems that lead to the establishment of the necessary conditions of possibility for the progress of history.

Consequently, the Annales School also introduced a radical shift in chronology. Changes in such systems naturally developed very slowly over time, until suddenly there might be a convergence of factors, providing the conditions for the events later reconstructed as having triggered the change. As Braudel (1972), one of the founders of the Annales School explains the impact of this view on the relevance of time and, in this case, the relationship with the apparently unrelated field of Geography:

Geography in this context is no longer an end in itself but a means to an end. It helps us to rediscover the slow unfolding of structural realities, to see things in the perspective of the very long term. Geography ... helps us to discover the almost imperceptible movement of history, if only we are prepared to follow its lessons and accept its categories and distinctions. (p. 23)

The perspective of the Annales School therefore involved several transformations: a change in emphasis from causal accounts to an analysis of structural conditions of possibility; from the interpretation of purely historical documents, to analyses using the
methods and distinctions of multiple disciplines; and a change in chronology from the short to the very long term. There was then a further consequence: a lessening of the importance of the actions of individuals. In the context of these slow and complex stratified analytic schemes, the contribution of any one actor became much less significant. It was no longer necessarily what people thought, said or did, that was of primary importance, but rather the larger transformations at altogether different, non-human levels and periods. A counter-intuitive development introduced by this historical approach, therefore, was the displacement of the powerful individual from the progress of history.

At the same time as the Annales historians, Gaston Bachelard (1984) was developing a similar perspective in the history and philosophy of science. He, too, was interested in the broader conditions in which the practices of science took place, rather than the traditional concern with the work of individual scientists. Unlikely as it might seem in the context of scientific thought, he began the same move away from explanations based on the work of significant thinkers in favour of analyses of larger systems existing distinct from individuals. He also turned to longer time periods for his analyses, but rather than drawing attention to continuities, as the Annales School had done, he focused on previously ignored discontinuities. Where there had previously been understood to be steady progress in a field, he showed that, from a broader perspective, radical breaks could occur in the larger structures of a science.

Central to the position introduced by Bachelard is a reformulation of our assumptions about rationality. The analysis of Reason is traditionally the realm of philosophy, typically studied as an abstract property of the human mind. In contrast, Bachelard argued that we should understand reason not in the abstract, but as it is expressed in situated practices proving themselves to be rational. Moreover, given the success of science at providing increasingly powerful descriptions of the world, Bachelard considered the most rational practices to be those embedded in the norms of Physics. A number of important implications follow from this notion of rationality. If reason is not an abstract property of the mind, it must be understood as existing in some form in larger communities. It must, therefore, be both dispersed and regional. Furthermore, reason as found in concrete embedded practices, rather than transcendent mental properties, is open to change. Such fundamental transformations, for example,
had recently been demonstrated through the work of Einstein, at the time Bachelard was writing. Contrary to Kant’s view that the categories of Time and Space were irreducible and unchangeable faculties of the mind, they were found to be mutable. From this possibility of discontinuity followed a special interest of Bachelard concerning the potential existence of constraints. If it is possible for there to be radical breaks in the rationality manifest in the practices of scientists, then what is it that holds our practice back from further breakthroughs? Moreover, how might such blocks be overcome? Bachelard proposed a set of concepts to clarify these questions, of ‘epistemological breaks’, ‘obstacles’, ‘profiles’, and ‘acts’, to characterise, respectively, important discontinuities in the limits of reason, the practices and modes of theorising that tend to stand in their way, and the sort of scientific developments that might overcome them.

To summarise, Bachelard offered an instantiation of the general perspective of the Annales School of historians in the field of the history and philosophy of science. He similarly turned to wider underlying structures and longer periods of time, and showed how events could be understood as resulting from more than the input of significant individuals. He presented a view of rationality as embedded in regional and fallible practices, and stressed the importance of potential blocks in the transformation of these rational practices. Variations on all these ideas became incorporated into Foucault’s archaeology. Also influential was the work of Georges Canguilhem, and especially his reformulation of the notion of a concept.

Bachelard’s conception of reason introduced the idea that there was a wider set of implicit assumptions at work in the development of science. It is related to the idea now common among philosophers of science that observations are dependent on a broader theoretical framework. Canguilhem’s work extends this idea to include a further layer, in addition to the level represented by theory. Working in the history of the Life Sciences he argued that one should take note of the central role played by the scientific concepts that are employed, independently of theories. One of the clearest examples of what he means by a concept and its independent importance is found in his own analysis of the concept of the ‘reflex’ (Canguilhem, 1977).

Prior to Canguilhem the discovery of the reflex was commonly attributed to Descartes. He discussed how one’s arm or leg was automatically retracted by the body
when, for example, it was placed to close to a fire. He employed a mechanistic theoretical framework in order to offer an explanation for this phenomenon. In contrast, the 17th century physician, Thomas Willis, was also working on this problem. He employed a theoretical perspective influenced by notions of vitalism, however. Hence, by modern standards, his work was much less sophisticated than Descartes, and much further from a proper understanding of the reflex. However, Canguilhem argued that the crucial feature in the development of the concept of the reflex was not the validity of the theory used to explain the phenomenon but the conceptualisation of the reflex as operating without reference to an organ of central control. Though vitalistic, Willis was right about this according to modern science, whereas Descartes believed reflexes to be controlled by a mechanism in the heart. Thus, concepts must be understood independently of theories, and just as it was of interest for Bachelard, concepts also were a different way in which the advancement of theories might be restrained.

The work of the Annales historians and of Bachelard and Canguilhem introduced a number of changes of perspective to the analysis of historical development and of scientific progress. They changed the emphasis from single developments producing causal chain reactions, to broader, underlying structures, whether they consisted of socio-historic or geographical conditions, or prevailing norms of scientific rationality. They broadened the chronology of history to take into account long periods, highlighting both unexamined continuities and discontinuities. Finally, they offered a conception of reason in which it was situated in historically contingent, regional practices rather than universal and ahistorical properties of individual minds, and in which it harboured limits and was open to radical ruptures, at the level of both theories and concepts. The thesis now turns to Foucault’s more radical extension of the trend these ideas initiated.

The analytic of archaeology

Foucault’s archaeology brought a number of innovations to this tradition of thought. First, he distanced himself from the residual progressivism and realism that remained in the work of Bachelard. Bachelard presupposed that later forms of rationality were superior to those they superseded. Implicit in this understanding was the notion that there was a purer description of nature, one that was a more accurate
reflection of nature as she is in herself, and against which scientific norms could be judged. Foucault, following the logic of the philosophy of Phenomenology of Husserl (1982), circumvented this potentially problematic assumption by bracketing the aconceptual existence of the objects of scientific knowledge, the thing-in-itself, from his analysis. Thus, Foucault simply excluded certain questions, about progress for example, for which one needed to posit non-human experience of the ultimate nature of things. Secondly, he moved even further than Canguilhem from the highly advanced rationality of physics. Foucault deliberately chose those sciences that he, along with most historians of science at the time, regarded as the most 'dubious': the human sciences. The adoption of this new domain offered the possibility, thoroughly exploited by Foucault, of combining more closely the fields of investigation of the historians of the Annales School and the historians of science. He thus found an especially fertile ground in the relationship between the scientific rationality of the human sciences, and the broader socio-historic conditions in which they are situated. It was the rich relationship between the two, rather than the use of a particular method or theoretical framework that he was to argue was the feature that properly distinguished the social from the natural sciences. Finally, Foucault pushed to its limit the focus on systematic relationships between distributed structures and the tendency that had emerged in this tradition to see historical and scientific development as non-intentional; i.e. to advance by means other than the thoughts and actions of individuals. The unlikely objective of archaeology, in short, is to offer a way of describing the history of scientific thought that is not a history of scientific thinkers.

The idea of a subject-less, non-intentional history of science is counter-intuitive. It goes against deep-seated assumptions about the nature of science. In the familiar picture, scientific advances are the result of the best scientists coming up with ever improving ideas. Initially vague formulations are refined into theories, and tested using shared methods. But fundamentally, as Kuhn (1970) suggests: 'any new interpretation of nature, whether a discovery or a theory, emerges first in the mind of one or a few

1 Though Foucault maintained, with good reason, that his work should not be interpreted as a branch of structuralism (cf Parker, 1995). As he said in an exasperated footnote: 'is it necessary to point out yet again that I am not what is called a 'structuralist'? (Foucault, 1991, p. 72)
one or a few individuals' (p. 144). Kuhn's remark describes what must surely be the starting point for an historian of scientific progress.

At one level, archaeology does nothing to contradict this basic idea that it is in the minds of scientists that new ideas first appear. However, this observation can too easily lead to thinking that it is therefore 'the mind of one or a few individuals' that is wholly responsible for new ideas in science; that the thoughts of great thinkers are all that need to be taken into account. It is this interpretation that the archaeology challenges. Its aim is to describe a domain that is commonly ignored, yet which plays a, perhaps the dominant role in the development of a science. In other words, 'underneath what science itself knows there is something it does not know ... an autonomous domain that would be the unconscious of science' (Foucault, 1972, p. 69). Archaeology aims to reveal through its idiosyncratic form of description the 'unconscious of science'.

Since the objective of archaeology is a perspective that is missed by conventional perceptions of science, the argument is naturally one most people are already strongly inclined to reject. Hence, Foucault at first develops the perspective through a process of negative argumentation. He appears to spend more time proposing ideas and then arguing that they are not the concern of archaeology, than developing a conception of what it does entail. The objective of this seemingly perverse strategy is to unravel the tightly woven subject-centred presuppositions with which most readers will embark on the text. Thus, Foucault raises and then immediately challenges the idea that one can say, simply, what is to count in the realm of ideas as 'influence', 'tradition', 'spirit' or 'evolution'; or in terms of the work of an individual: a 'book' or an 'oeuvre'. In each case, he demonstrates that these categories, though readily used in everyday practice, are not as unproblematic as they may at first seem. They are reflexive categories used to organise our understanding of phenomena, without challenging the assumption of intentionality they presuppose. The term 'oeuvre' for example, is casually used to unify a collection of writings, implying that the most important feature that binds them is their origin in the mind of a particular thinking subject. This category has currency in the present time and culture where the system of thought accords primacy to the intentional subject. But it would be problematic if writing was understood to issue primarily from a particular context of socio-historic circumstances and contingent modes of thought, for example. Categories might then be privileged that establish writings in relation to the
specific times in which they are written, rather than by the hand that wrote them. While there is any doubt about this, Foucault suggests one should at least, in the name of rigour, consider such possibilities and bracket presuppositions long enough to subject them to scrutiny.

**Discursive formations**

The master category that Foucault most wants to be placed in suspension is the familiar and apparently unproblematic idea of the discipline: Psychology, for example. The discipline of concern in the present thesis provides a good example of the problematic nature of the concept. The question is, simply, what is it that unifies the range of practices referred to as ‘psychology’? What makes the category of a ‘discipline’ meaningful? Foucault makes four suggestions. Applying them to psychology, it might first be suggested that it is the discipline that studies a particular type of object: it is the study of the mental life of human beings. But this is clearly too simplistic. Psychology is currently the study of ‘attitudes’, ‘discourses’, ‘perceptual’ or ‘attentional systems’, ‘mental disorders’, and so on. In the past, however, some of these objects of study did not exist, and for a large period in the history of the discipline it was restricted to the study of ‘behaviours’. There is no simple group of objects that provides a rational foundation for the category ‘psychology’. As a second suggestion, one might propose a shared perspective that is employed by ‘psychologists’, on the basis of which the ‘discipline’ coheres. A good candidate might be ‘the scientific method’. Naturally, one would expect a range of different topics to be included, and even fundamental changes to occur in what is studied, where cognitions are studied, for example, instead of behaviours. But again, it is clear that even here there are different perspectives taken in psychology. Some researchers promote the perspective of ‘social science’ rather than ‘natural science’; some reject traditional scientific aims completely (Potter, 1996). A third possibility might be the choice of concepts used. But again, as for objects, these vary considerably: ‘cognitive processes’, ‘stimuli-response’, ‘social representations’, ‘discursive practices’, and many others, demonstrating the diversity rather than coherence of ‘psychology’. Last, Foucault suggests a yet broader organising principle, a general theme or strategy that unites a discipline. An example might be the aim of distinguishing the influence of ‘nature’ from ‘nurture’, but it might also be
between 'automatic' and 'controlled' processes, or between the 'material' and the 'discursive'. There are, then, evidently problems for the category of the 'discipline'.

A key argument of the archaeology follows from a deft reversal of the logic implicit in these attempts to define the discipline. Problematising the most obvious possibilities gives Foucault the opportunity to offer a new conception of the organizing principles underlying a set of research practices like those of psychology. It is clear that the four elements that seemed at first to be possible foundations for the discipline represent central elements of a science. Any science must have objects of investigation, a perspective employed by researchers, a set of concepts, and a number of themes or strategies that generate research. Yet it can also be seen that none of these elements individually provides the coherence to define a discipline. Rather each consists of a finite range of possibilities, of different objects, perspectives, concepts and themes that are currently associated with a discipline. The basic analysis of these elements therefore provides the beginnings of the perspective of archaeology. If the foundation of a discipline cannot be found in these elements, then maybe it is because it is the wrong type of organising principle that is being sought. Perhaps one should be looking for a level of analysis from which these elements might be understood not as a foundation for the discipline, but as an emergent property of some other entity. The set of objects, perspectives, concepts and themes that are recognised in a science, are perhaps not primary, but merely the possibilities afforded by an underlying system that produces and conditions the dispersion of these surface features. Thus Foucault proposes in place of the familiar, but problematic category of the discipline, the alternative notion of a 'discursive formation'.

To learn to see research practices not as 'disciplines' but at this new analytic level of the 'discursive formation' requires a leap of the imagination. It does, however, offer a way of understanding the practices of science that is both novel and potentially of value. Progressing further into the archaeological analytic requires a shift of attention from the content of a science, to the relationships between the elements through which it is constituted, and through which its content emerges. Only then may one begin to see what for Foucault is the positive unconscious of science, the generative system through which that people generally are conscious of comes to exist in the form it does. Thus, one can see how the four previous suggestions for the basis of the discipline are bound
to fail. It is not possible to turn to pre-existing, concrete, 'objects' of psychology, as a foundation, for 'they' are inseparable from each of the other elements: the perspectives, concepts and themes employed by psychologists. It is not what is recognised consciously as the objects of the discipline that come first, but the position that potential concrete 'objects' can come to occupy, as defined through the sets of relations that exist between these four central elements of the discursive formation. The basic idea is similar to, but extends much further than the vague but commonly agreed idea of the 'theory dependence of observations'. Foucault's position expands and becomes clearer as he offers more detailed analyses of each of these 'elements' of the discursive formation, in terms of the relationships that give rise to their substance, rather than any pre-existing content. Objects, perspectives, concepts and themes are not only interdependent, but in Foucault's scheme, are also partially constituted by their own internal set of 'rules of formation'. Each will be discussed in the following sections.

**Objects**

Though it is goes against expectations to think that a science does not follow the identification of a set of objects of investigation, but is partially constitutive of them, it can be seen that what are considered to be the 'objects' of science change dramatically as a science develops. Hence, Foucault attempts to offer a way of describing the space in which objects arise and are formed, based on the relationships between elements of a discursive formation, rather than the properties of the objects themselves. He thus identifies 'systems of differentiation' that transform a featureless social field into a domain of identifiable objects of potential investigation. Foucault suggests three systems of differentiation that work in combination to produce objects of discourse. First, there must be a 'grid of specification', a basic framework for intuiting phenomena. The cognitive formulation of mind might be an example. Given this fundamental grid, distinctions can be drawn, and so objects differentiated, for example, 'beliefs', 'attitudes', and 'values'. Foucault's other systems of differentiation refer to social, rather than scientific or discursive factors. They provide the link in his analytic between the practices of science and the wider socio-historic circumstances in which science operates. He proposes the concept of a 'surface of emergence'. Human sciences require not only a broad 'grid of specification' but an extra-discursive social locus, a node in a broader social network at which point objects suitable for social scientific investigation
become differentiated and thus visible. ‘Surfaces of emergence’ form primarily out of normative social practices and institutions. Cyril Burt’s (1925) study of the ‘Young Delinquent’ is a good example. It is clear that Burt’s project depended on more than just the theories and methods of psychology to study the ‘young delinquent’. It required human beings that were already constituted into recognisable group in society. There are many social systems and practices that needed to be in place, and which are in some ways historically peculiar to our society, for such a noticeable and coherent group to stand out. For example, the normative practices of the family, the expansion of the school system, and the existence of social deprivation. The third system of differentiation, that Foucault calls ‘authorities of delimitation’, also relates to these broader social factors. Objects become available for investigation as people contravene a social norm, or appear at the limits of a statistical normal distribution. There are, moreover, numerous social agents in a position to differentiate objects directly; for example, judges, social workers, educational or clinical psychologists. These three systems of differentiation, then, may be seen to perform part of the function of establishing objects of study. Scientific objects, therefore, do not precede a ‘discipline’, understood as a discursive formation, but are partially constituted as objects through it, as a result of the existence of certain grids of specification, surfaces of emergence and authorities of specification.

Enunciative modalities

Foucault employs the same strategy, of developing a content-less description, to the second element in a discursive formation: the range of perspectives employed. In archaeology, the ‘perspectives’ that define a discipline are identified with the modes through which practitioners speak in their legitimate capacity *qua* practitioner. They constitute the ‘enunciative modalities’ of the discursive formation, or the ‘subject positions’ one is able to take as a scientist operating in a discipline.

Again, one must avoid conventional forms of understanding the idea of a scientist in order to follow Foucault’s argument. When people think of ‘scientists’, even more so than ‘objects’, they might naturally think in terms of specific people, like Albert Einstein. Archaeology aims to describe ‘scientists’ not in terms of individual, flesh and blood human beings, but through the range and defining limits of the positions in which
3. Foucault's analytic of archaeology

any individual could be seen to be occupying the role, or enunciative modality of scientist.

Einstein is, therefore, a classic exemplar of a scientist. But this assumes that what it is to be a scientist is somehow a property of the person. It could be questioned whether Einstein would have remained an example of a scientist when at home relaxing with his family. In the world of the archaeology, he would not. It is not people that are scientists, but the enunciative modalities available to a discursive formation that gives rise to the possibility of the description of certain people as scientists. Thus, one can only strictly occupy the position of scientist when running an experiment in a laboratory, or working through a theoretical calculation in a way that is part of a discursive formation. In fact, it can be seen that a more cogent way of defining the scientist might do without reference to a human practitioners altogether. It would be an exact description of all the positions from which one could legitimately act in ways that constitute the practice of a scientist in a particular discipline. Archaeology thus describes the conditions that define these positions.

Examples can be suggested for the specific case of psychology. Foucault proposes three key factors that establish the limits of the enunciative modalities of a discursive formation. First, there are the 'rights to use a mode of discourse'. For example, one needs to possess appropriate qualifications in order to legitimately practice as a psychologist. Secondly, one can only communicate a legitimate contribution to scientific psychology through an official institutional site: the appropriate journals, conferences, lectures, and seminars. Each of these sites also has conditions limiting what may be said in that context, and the seriousness with which its contributions should be taken. Finally, there is what Foucault calls the appropriate 'position of the subject vis-a-vis the object'. There are also strict conditions that determine the relationship one should adopt with respect to an object of investigation. For example, theoretical physicists occupy a position in relation to their object constituted and described by accepted mathematical operations and conventions. Such theoretical analyses do not commonly form part of psychology. In contrast, the primary position for the enunciative modality of the psychologist is usually defined in relation to empirical data collected in controlled conditions, with observations mediated by agreed forms of statistical analysis. In sum, it is possible to describe the 'practitioners' of psychology
without reference to individuals, but rather through the positions and relationships any person can potentially occupy in relation to other elements in the discursive formation.

**Concepts**

The notion of 'concept' as understood by Foucault can also be described in these terms. Again, one needs to attend, not to recognisable substantive aspects of a science, but to those key features that are implicit in the practices of science. Hence as Foucault understands the element of the concept, it is in terms of those aspects of a discipline that condition the operation of its substantive qualities; those that determine the systematic relationships between elements. He suggests three such dimensions of concepts. First, there are those that establish 'logical or methodological' relationships. In psychology, this might be the standards and conventions of argument employed, and the key aspects involved. For example, the existence of the .05 level of significance. Though it has been widely criticised on purely statistical grounds (e.g. Cohen, 1994; Henkel & Morrison, 1970) it nevertheless plays a major role as one of a number of important 'rules' governing what is accepted as a psychological fact, and what is dismissed as merely an idiosyncrasy of a sample. Second, there are the implicit rules that embody the concepts 'establishing acceptance or memory'. This may be interpreted as referring to the conventions for allowing new material to become accepted within the domain of the existing knowledge of a discipline, and older material to be 'remembered'. The role of citation is a good example. There are clearly important conventions governing how a previous finding comes to be incorporated in a current contribution to psychology. Referencing, in the form of names, dates, and the location of the publication, is an important part of the acceptance of a claim. It may be noted how these conventions differ between discursive formations, for example, in philosophical writing, where it is through on-going exposition and interpretation of the canon of a discipline that embodies practices of memory, rather than through the reproduction of summaries of arguments, supported by frequent citation. Finally, one may identify the 'procedures of intervention' that constitute the concepts of a discipline. In psychology, a number of forms of analysis might be suggested as establishing acceptable means through which a new finding comes to be accepted. An example might be randomised control trials in clinical psychology, or multi-trait multi-method analyses in personality psychology.
Themes

The final element in Foucault’s schematic outline of the elements of a discursive formation is the notion of ‘themes’, or ‘strategies’. The themes of a discursive formation are divided into theories and ‘points of diffraction’. They are intended by Foucault to replace traditional understandings of the function of theories and high-level disputes. As an example from psychology one might suggest as a theme the issue of nature vs nature in human development as an on-going theoretical concern. It serves a specific function in archaeological terms of giving impetus and direction to the advancement of the discursive formation. It provides a strategy through which the other elements, the objects, enunciative modalities, and concepts come to be employed. Similarly points of diffraction arise and coordinate the evolution of a discipline where different theoretical possibilities come to exist that may simultaneously describe the same discursive objects. One might give as an example of a point of diffraction the alternative perspective on traditional psychological concerns offered by discursive psychology, at issue in the present thesis.

To summarise, in this sketch of the key elements of archaeology, and through its exemplification in the field of psychology, can be seen the beginnings of a new perspective on knowledge. Rather than focus on the overt, substantive features of a science, it can be seen how one could consider instead, purely the relationships between elements through which the more obvious aspects of science come to exist. Moreover, one can see how Foucault extends in the archaeology many of the basic ideas from his intellectual tradition. The archaeology manifests the conception of Reason as embodied in scientific practices rather than individual minds, proposed by Bachelard. It clearly incorporates the distinct levels of concepts and theories introduced by Canguilhem. He adds, furthermore, the broad appreciation of the movement of social formations discussed by the Annales School. Common to all three, is the shift away from the primacy of the thinking agent. Foucault takes this idea further still through his concepts of the ‘statement’, ‘archive’ and ‘historical a priori’.

The statement, archive, and historical a priori

The rules of formation that describe the elements of discursive formations have been described here in some cases through instances of limits. For example,
institutionally recognised qualifications may be understood to be examples of aspects of enunciative modalities. The emphasis on limits draws attention to a key aspect of archaeological analysis: it is an attempt not merely to offer an alternative description of a discipline, but to articulate the conditions of existence of knowledge. Archaeology aims to reveal the set of relations that are the enabling limits of new contributions to knowledge. Only enunciations that emerge from these systematic relations can be taken seriously as contributions. Those enunciations that contribute to this system, Foucault refers to as 'statements'. It is the repository of statements, labelled the 'archive', that thus ultimately governs what can exist as knowledge.

The archaeology aims therefore to describe a new analytic domain that has previously not been articulated: the unconscious of science. This domain, constituted by the statements of the contemporary archive is described by the 'discursive relations' that exist between the range of discursive formations practiced at any one time. There are a number of crucial factors to note of the field Foucault describes. First, that it does not exist at an intentional level. The relationships that are discussed in Foucault's account are dispersed between various institutional and discursive elements. They are discursive and normative regularities that are beyond the control or immediate recognition of individuals. Second, this domain exists neither at the level of 'things', the nature of the world, nor at the level of 'words' or 'representations'. It attempts to reveal a different analytic level that exists, so to speak, 'between' 'words' and 'things'. It thus conditions how we are able to represent or 'know' the world. Third, therefore, the field of discursive relations offers a parallel to Kant's *a priori* categories of understanding (Kant, 1998). Though at this stage of Foucault's writing, Kant was an on-going figure of critique, the same idea is found here that there are limits on what we are able to know, imposed by the very faculties through which we are able to know. Thus, Kant's famous resolution to the debate between empiricism and rationalism was that we could have knowledge of the world, but never of the 'thing-in-itself', since we could only have knowledge always already intuited as 'objects' in time and space, and understood through the transcendental faculties of the mind, such as 'substance'. Foucault's argument presented in the archaeology is similar, but, by creatively extending the work of Bachelard, he situates the conditions of knowing not in the limits of the mind, but in the limits distributed in the changing, regulated practices through which we are able to
know. Hence, the ironic use of Kant’s terminology, re-christianed as the ‘historical a priori’. Fourth, Foucault stresses that these rules of formation are not, also contrary to Kant, transcendental, they do not exist outside of time and space as universal and unchanging requirements, or in some other plane than the one that is evident in rule-governed practice. Thus, he introduces a second ironic reversal, this time of the imperative of the positivists. Foucault also asks that one observe what can be seen happening in practice, rather than hypothesise theoretical entities, and thus refers to the ‘positivities’ through which analysis should be approached. Finally, though the focus must be on limits, it needs to also be understood that limits are not only constraining but are enabling. Current practices of science are built on the basis of the limits of discursive formations, but equally, without those limits, it would not be possible to ‘know’ anything at all.

A schematic model of the central features of the argument of the archaeology, demonstrating the four main elements, their inter-relationships and a summary of the key concepts is presented in Figure 3.1. Having presented this detailed exposition of the archaeology, the next section can begin to address some of the more popular interpretations in psychology of this part of Foucault’s oeuvre and then go on to consider an alternative reading of the implications of archaeology for the psychology of values.
Figure 3.1: Schematic model of the elements and key terms in Foucault’s analytic of archaeology, demonstrating their inter-relationships and roles in the representation of knowledge.

**Key concepts of archaeology**

- Elements of discursive formations
- Role in representation

**Elements of discursive formations**

- *Things* The nature of the world: the world as it is
  - *Primary Relations*
  - Comprising the *Archive*
  - *Discursive Relations*
  - *Discursive Formations*
  - *Secondary Relations*
  - Representing the world: the world as we know it
- *Words* Representation of the world: the world as we know it
  - *Statement Modalities*
  - *Enunciative modalities*
  - *Discursive Formations*
  - Generating a *System of dispersion*

**Elements**

- *Objects*
  - i) 'Surfaces of emergence' - Social Loci
    - e.g. normative social practices, social institutions
  - ii) 'Authorities of delimitation'
    - e.g. judges, doctors, social workers, educational psychologists
  - iii) 'Grids of specification'
    - e.g. theoretical frameworks of cognition, gestalt

- *Enunciative modalities*
  - i) 'Rights to use modes of discourse'
    - e.g. appropriate training and qualifications
  - ii) 'Institutional site'
    - e.g. journals, conferences, lectures, seminars
  - iii) 'Position of subject vis-a-vis object'
    - e.g. experimental manipulation, analysis of questionnaire

- *Concepts*
  - i) 'That establish logical or methodological relations'
    - e.g. standards of argument and inference, significance testing
  - ii) 'That establish acceptance or memory'
    - e.g. conventions for citations and quotations
  - iii) 'Procedures of intervention'
    - e.g. Randomised control trial, Multi-trait multi-method

- *Themes / Strategies*
  - i) 'Theories, organising strategies'
    - e.g. nature/nurture, automatic/controlled, material/discursive
  - ii) 'Points of Diffraction'
    - e.g. choice points in the discursive formation
Archaeology and Discursive Psychology

Just as the general themes associated with Foucault in psychology were recognisable from the summaries of his work presented in the last chapter, so many of the claims that have been made in discursive psychology can be seen to be immanent in the more detailed examination of archaeology in the previous section. As it has been presented here, the archaeology seems to offer strong support for the idea that science does not merely describe pre-existing objects in the world but, in a sense, constitutes the world through the non-intentional operation of discursive formations. To cite a quote from ‘The Archaeology of Knowledge’ often used to support this position:

Discourses are practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak. (Foucault, 1972, p. 49; cited in e.g. Parker, 1989a, p. 102, and Malson, 1998, p. 38)

This single recurring statement in the psychological literature seems to justify two key aspects of the criticisms made by discursive psychologists. First, the question of truth: if science is constructing, ‘systematically forming’, rather than describing the world, then surely it cannot be understood to be offering an account that can be considered to be true. That is to say, science does not offer objective facts, only social constructions. Second, there is the concept of discourse. If the world is constructed through the ways people speak about it, through language or discourse, then psychologists should be mapping the discourses currently available, and analysing how they are used. These two key ideas will now be considered in the context of the account of the archaeology of the present chapter.

The question of truth

The question of whether the aim of science is to discover the truth about phenomena of interest has led to a vociferous debate in psychology. The issue is often framed as a debate between relativist, social constructionist or discursive psychologists, and realist psychologists, either mainstream or those drawing on Bhaskar’s (1989) ‘critical realism’ (e.g. Parker, 1990). Foucault’s archaeology does at first sight appear to challenge the idea that science offers True representations of reality. It would thus seem to challenge the notion of truth per se, as has been debated in this literature. However, it can be argued following the examination of the context and details of Foucault’s
archaeology, that this is not the point at issue, at least for Foucault. Archaeology is not concerned with the epistemological question of whether a particular scientific theory is, or is not true. Thus, referring to his work on the medicalization of madness, he says that it 'in no way impairs the scientific validity of the therapeutic efficacy of psychiatry' (Foucault, 1987, p. 16). Neither is it, then, a direct critique of scientific procedures.

This may seem a strange claim given the apparent thrust of the archaeology, with its emphasis on science as a set of discursive practices constructing the world in ways consistent with discursively regulated limits, rather than merely in accordance with the way the world is in itself. Yet it can be argued that contrary to some interpretations, Foucault is not interested in debunking science, or the notion of truth; indeed, his work would have no meaning without the common acceptance and centrality in our culture of truth as a potential attribute of referential language. His concern is, rather, with finding new ways of understanding how such accounts come to exist, what constraints there are on them, and, in the work of his middle and later periods, on the broader social effects they introduce. Thus Foucault is careful to distinguish between the lay notion of truth, and his carefully circumscribed concern with 'games of truth', understood as:

An ensemble of rules for the production of the truth ... which lead to a certain result, which can be considered in function of its principles and its rules of procedures, as valid or not. (Foucault, 1987, p. 16)

The complex task of unravelling this 'ensemble of rules' is the purpose of the analytic of archaeology. Foucault’s work, therefore, should not be associated with debates cast in epistemological terms. It also does nothing to suggest a critique or dismissal of scientific accounts simply because they are dependent on a language or a conceptual scheme, and hence cannot describe the world independently of this scheme. The latter position is, after all, a basic assumption of post-positivist philosophy of science. The importance of conceptual schemes in scientific accounts is accepted today by a wide range of philosophers of science (Chalmers, 1982) and is a view to which even many natural scientists would subscribe. The unique contribution of Foucault’s account is not therefore simply that science does not provide a simple description or reflection of reality. Many thinkers have argued that this is the case, and it does not stand in the way of the practice of science. Foucault does, however, stress the
importance of discourse more than other philosophers of science, and so it would still seem reasonable to cite Foucault as an originator of this concept.

The concept of discourse

The notion of discourse does indeed play a central role in Foucault's archaeology. It has been shown how it is both implicit in the production of knowledge of the world, and in some ways autonomous with respect to the conscious thoughts of scientists. But it is a rigorously conceived and defended notion of discourse that Foucault presents, and clearly some care must be taken generalising the concept. It is a much broader notion of discourse that has become popular in discursive psychology and it will be argued here that, though it may have foundations in the work of other thinkers, the use of discourse in social psychology is generally contrary to, rather than supported by, Foucault's argument in the archaeology.

Key differences between the notion of discourse that might be attributed to Foucault and the concept of discourse widely used in psychology can be drawn out through a careful analysis of a recent project in discursive psychology that has very similar aims to archaeology. Potter's (1996) 'Representing Reality' is also concerned with how particular accounts come to be accepted as knowledge, as representing reality. He uses a concept of discourse, however, that can be seen to differ significantly from Foucault's though it is often confused with Foucault's thought. The slippage can be most clearly seen in Potter's own critique of Foucault's archaeology.

Potter (1996) credits Foucault with introducing the idea that both objects and subjects are constituted through discourse, in a similar sounding account to that of the present chapter. Thus:

Forms of speaking about objects relate closely to particular identities ... the doctor is brought into being as a particular subject through drawing on the varied discourses that make up medicine. (p. 86-87)

Potter argues, however, that there are important limitations in Foucault's work. These are that:

By treating discourses themselves as objects he draws attention away from the practices and contexts in which they are embedded. (p. 87)

There are problems associated with this:
What [Foucault's] approach is not sensitive to is the way discourses operate in, say, any particular doctor's surgery ... if Foucault's account is to be convincing it should help account for actual interaction. (p. 87)

For Potter, Foucault offers much of value, including the central idea incorporated in discourse analysis that discourse underlies the construction of subjects and objects. But Foucault's position is also 'rather abstract and ill specified' (p. 88). The archaeology does not account for the details of specific situations or show how individuals construct particular accounts as factual. It provides support for the view that knowledge of the world is constructed, but requires a supplementary analytic, that Potter finds in a form of conversation analysis:

What Foucault's approach has not developed is what I am attempting in this book; that is, an account of the sorts of devices and procedure that contribute to the sense that a discourse is literally describing the world. (p. 88)

Potter's text has been singled out both because his work has been highly influential in social psychology and because it demonstrates well the shift away from Foucault's own conception of discourse that has become characteristic of discursive psychology. It is exactly the analysis of the details of everyday encounters Potter recommends that has provided the substance of much discourse analysis, often with Foucault cited as an influence and justification of the approach. Yet this form of research represents a move away from the concerns that are clearly evident in Foucault's writing. Moreover, as Potter shows to his credit in 'Representing Reality', this departure from Foucault depends on a critique of Foucault's own position. The critique, however, is based on a reading of the archaeology that is hard to sustain. It can be argued that it relies on the projection of Potter's own formulation of discourse in order to find the weakness to be overcome in Foucault. For example, he speaks of 'the medical discourse of examination, questioning, diagnosis ... the varied discourses that make up medicine' (p. 86-87). It is by drawing on these discourses that 'the doctor is brought into being as a particular subject'. On this basis he argues that Foucault makes the mistake of treating discourses as objects, and removing them from their context of use. But this criticism does not sit comfortably with the way that Foucault usually writes about discourse. Surprisingly perhaps, he rarely uses the term. He refers instead to 'discursive formations', or 'discursive practices', as in the commonly used quote noted
earlier. Contrary to Potter's critique, it could be argued that it is in discursive psychology, not by Foucault, that discourses have come to be treated as objects; for example, the 'have/hold discourse' identified by Hollway (1989). Indeed, it seems often to be the very aim of the analytic enterprise to identify 'discourses'. The key difference for Foucault's conception of discourse, and the reason why he rarely uses this term, is the inherently systematic nature of his thinking. There are not distinct nodes that might be referred to as 'a discourse' in the world of the archaeology. Rather, the whole purpose of the analysis is to make plain the complexity of the distributed relations that comprise a 'discursive formation'. This subtle change of perspective has important consequences. Thus, a doctor cannot 'be brought into being as a special form of subject by drawing on a discourse': there are neither special forms of subject, nor such objects as 'medical discourses'. There are only transitory enunciative modalities, and conceptual and theoretical systems, each of which can only be understood by virtue of the other and the relationships that form between them. The claim that Foucault does not take into account context then also becomes problematic. It is not clear how, for Foucault, one could meaningfully use the term discourse, or more accurately, 'discursive formation', without specifying the details of the context to which it owes its existence.

To summarise these differences and emphasise their main consequences, the example used by Potter to show how his approach of discursive psychology improves on Foucault's own will be considered. Foucault, he claims, does not explain 'the way discourses operate in, say, any particular doctor's surgery', he does not show how 'the sorts of devices and procedure' used by the doctor contributes 'to the sense that his discourse is literally describing the world'. It is true that Foucault does not help to analyse the words, tropes, and conversational strategies used in a surgery. But as will be clear from this chapter, this is because it is not 'discourse' in this sense elaborated by Potter, that Foucault argues is constitutive of what is taken to be knowledge. These dimensions of language use may be important for the success of the doctor/patient interaction, and may have an impact on judgements about the competence of a doctor. But for Foucault, it is the existence of the much larger, dispersed, discursive formation of modern medicine that is the most important factor in the acceptance of the doctor's account as an accurate representation of one's medical condition. Drawing on
Foucault's own detailed account of this very example in the 'Birth of the Clinic' (Foucault, 1973) one could point out furthermore, contrary to Potter, those aspects of the interaction, in any particular doctor's surgery, that Foucault does consider to be important. It could be predicted with some confidence what training the person would have received, the symptoms they would attempt to identify, the way they would approach the patient's body, the nature of the repository of previous findings they would employ, the formalities through which they would prescribe treatments, and many other factors constitutive of the discursive formation of modern medicine.

In conclusion, Potter's critique of Foucault's archaeology offers a useful way of distinguishing Foucault's conception of discourse from that which has become influential in psychology. It has been argued that there are important differences in how Foucault proposes discourse plays a constitutive role in knowledge, and the more general understanding employed in discursive psychology. Rather than emphasise text and language in general, it is the distributed elements that constitute a discursive formation that Foucault suggests underlie representations of the world understood to be knowledge, and it is these larger discursive and institutional systems that should be the focus for analysis. Furthermore, it was argued that this mode of analysis does not in itself offer grounds for promoting relativism. It is not the truth of scientific statements that is of concern to Foucault, or that is questioned by his perspective. His arguments are therefore not properly understood to be about epistemology or as contributions to debates about relativism and realism.

It must also be stressed, however, that this is not in itself a critique of discursive psychology, or the concept of discourse it employs. Clearly there are other influences on discursive psychology that might be shown to offer a justification for the approach. But the present section of the thesis does suggest serious doubts about claims that it is Foucault who legitimates this form of discursive psychology. Moreover, this section has begun to answer some of the criticisms that might be made of the Rokeach-Schwartz tradition in the psychology of values. At least as far as Foucault is concerned, it is not the scientific aims per se of traditional psychologists that are rejected. Moreover, there do not seem to be grounds in the archaeology for the replacement of the scientific object of values with the analysis of the everyday use of the term.
The final part of the chapter will now use the present reading of Foucault to propose a new understanding of how the analytic of archaeology might be applied to the psychology of values.

**An archaeology of values**

The thesis began with a traditional literature review of the psychology of values. This section now considers what an archaeological analysis of this literature might reveal, and of what use it might be to future work in the field. As has been stressed in the present chapter, both the capabilities and limits of knowledge are embedded in the discursive practices of science. The task for the Foucaultian project, therefore, is not to use a discursive account of knowledge to simply reject existing research, but to draw out any unnecessary constraints that might exist, through the identification of what is contingent, masquerading as necessary. Following this guiding principle, the analysis develops in two parts. First, the historical development of the conceptualisation of values will be traced. It will be argued that there are four distinct forms that can usefully be identified through which the concept of values has become an object of discourse in the social sciences. Rokeach introduced the fourth through his interpretation of the concept of values within the discursive formation of psychology. This conceptualisation of values will be shown to have embedded a number of specific properties in the way the notion of values is understood. The second part of the analysis will argue that the discursive practices of psychology have served to crystallise this conceptualisation of values and the properties of the concept of values it entails. Finally, it will be suggested that though they may have been valid when the theory was first presented, they might now need to be re-examined.

**The emergence of Rokeach’s conceptualisation of values**

The general notions of values and value clearly existed in human affairs long before they became of interest in the academy, as topics of philosophy, the humanities, or social sciences. But in order to play a role in these disciplines, to become an object of knowledge, notions such as values must be incorporated within a field of study. Values must acquire some technical formulation that embeds them within the research practices and concerns of a discipline. In the development of current knowledge of values, four
distinct forms can be identified in which the concept has come to be known. Each of these will be introduced, with examples, highlighting the relationship of the particular conception of values to broader discursive practices.

1. 'Value' as a property of objects

The earliest conceptions of values were developed in philosophy and economics. In both fields, the use of the term followed its etymology from the Latin, valere: 'to be worth'. This construal located the quality of 'values' in the realm of objects. Values were to be found dispersed in the world, associated with the worth of objects, rather than with the judgements of people. While this seems a particularly apt formulation for a discipline like economics, studying as it did the production and exchange of goods, it was also the understanding of values first used in the other social sciences. It can be seen in the definition of values of Park and Burgess (1924), for example: 'anything capable of being appreciated (wished for) is a 'value'' (p. 488). Likewise, it is implicit in a definition given in an early dictionary of sociology, where a value is described as 'the quality of an object which causes it to be of interest to an individual or group' (Fairchild, 1944, p. 331). This understanding extends to Carey's (1958) conceptualisation of a measure of value: 'the resistance to be overcome in obtaining those commodities or things required for our purposes' (p. 158).

Value was understood as a property of objects even in psychology. For example, in studies by Bruner and colleagues (e.g. Bruner & Goodman, 1947) this conceptualisation of values is exemplified through its operationalisation using coins as experimental stimuli. To investigate the relationship between need, perception, and value, two groups of children, one poor, one rich, were asked to draw a picture of a coin from memory. It was found that both groups over-estimated the size of the coin, but that this effect was greater for the poor children than for the rich. Thus a demonstration of the relationship between need, as a quality of the person, perception, as a process within the person, and value, conceived as an objective property of objects.

2. 'Values' as a property of people

There was, then, a conceptual leap involved when values began to be theorised as a property of people. Talcott Parsons was one of the first to have a major impact with this new formulation. Parsons' (1939) 'Structure of social action' introduced an
expanded conception of values, shifting their location from objects, to constitutive properties of cultures and people. At the centre of Parsons’ functionalist theory were norms, and most important to this system of norms were values. Behaviour should not be conceived as orientated to the values of social objects, but to shared norms for behaviour, grounded in systems of human values. The concept shifted, therefore, from objects to people.

It is this second conceptualisation of values that is found in psychology in Allport and Vernon’s early ‘Study of values’ (revised with Lindzey, 1951). In their understanding of values as basic ‘interests or motives’ in personality, values are clearly conceptualised within the person, rather than in objects. Hence drawing on the philosophy of Spranger (1928), they proposed six basic types of values: ‘theoretical’, ‘economic’, ‘aesthetic’, ‘social’, ‘political’, and ‘religious’. These different evaluative attitudes were the foundation for personality differences. Values were thus conceived as the basis from which people responded to items on their questionnaire, such as: ‘Do you think it is justifiable for great artists, such as Beethoven, Wagner and Byron to be selfish and negligent of the feelings of others?’ The ‘aesthetic’ type would answer yes, and the ‘political’ type no.

In this simple development a qualitative shift can be noted in the form in which the concept of values was constituted as a theoretical object, that is, as an item knowledge. From an archaeological perspective, two factors are evident in this development. First, it can be seen that this reconceptualisation of value depended on more than just a new insight. It could be argued that it was a change at a different level of the discursive formations of the social sciences that provided the conditions of existence for this reconceptualisation. In order to have such ideas taken seriously a shift needed to occur, in Foucault’s terminology, at the level of strategies. It was the result of a shift in broader theoretical strategy from behaviorism to cognitivism. To posit values as human properties required theoretical constructs not reducible to behaviour. This condition for the second conceptualisation is most evident in the writings of the critics of this development, for example, Adler (1956), an advocate of behaviourism, who vehemently objected to the idea of values as theoretical constructs arguing that it was superfluous to the direct analysis of behaviour.
A second consequence of this development was the problem of establishing the relationship between the construct of values and other theoretical constructs that might be considered to be properties of the person. Values is a term with wide scope. As Pepper argued in his 'Sources of Value', (Pepper, 1958) values might refer to interests, pleasures, likes, preferences, duties, moral obligations, desires, wants, needs, aversions, attractions and many other modes of selective orientation. Thus Catton (1959), fully embracing this broad understanding of the concept, posited an n-dimensional value space determining all selective behaviour. But such formulations cannot easily exist in wider discursive formations. They threaten the validity of other established constructs. The more feasible task, therefore, that set the aim of most values theorists of this period, was to find a way of distinguishing the values construct from its closest alternatives. Interestingly, the concept of values existed in relationship to a wide and varied range of alternative constructs across the disparate discursive formations of the social sciences. Thus values needed to be distinguished in sociology, from norms, mores, obligations, and aspirations; and in anthropology from themes, ethos, cultural patterns, lifestyles, or cathexes. In Psychology the problem was especially acute. If values were understood, as properties of people, to be 'acquired behavioural dispositions', then as Campbell (1963) argued, there were already 75 similar constructs in circulation. These included needs, interests, preferences, motives, valences, conditioned reflexes, habit, expectancy, personality traits, cognitive structures, convictions, determining tendencies, opinions, beliefs and attitudes. The next development in the conceptualisation of values can be seen to have arisen partly as a result of this problem.

3. 'Values' inferred from conceptions of the desirable

It was Kluckhohn (1951) who emphasised the idea that values could not simply be inferred from observations of what people desired. The concept of values, he argued, was only properly applicable in the context of that which was conceived to be desirable. We might exhibit a preference for one choice over another, but nevertheless believe, on some other grounds, that the actions we chose were not those that were preferable. Our actions and desires clearly often express baser motives distinct from our conceptions of what is desirable.
The distinction was further elaborated in the work of Morris (1956). He followed Kluckhohn in distinguishing between ‘operative’ and ‘conceived’ values. The former being those values that could be inferred from what we do, the latter from what we believe to be desirable. From this distinction follows a series of oppositions that demonstrate the distinctive conceptual leap between the second and third conceptions of values, described respectively by: the preferred and the preferable, the valued and valuable, the desired and desirable, and the esteemed and estimable. Morris argued that it was the former, operative values that were implicit in the work of Allport, Vernon and Lindzey (1951). Respondents to their survey were instructed only to indicate what they desired, not necessarily what they thought was desirable. In contrast, Morris investigated ‘professed conceptions of the good life’ (p. 14), and aimed to find the dimensions of value underlying these conceptions. In his studies, participants ranked 13 ‘Ways to Live’ (Morris, 1942), short descriptions of different conception of the good life. Subjecting the resulting data to factor analysis, as well as a basic form of multi-dimensional scaling, Morris found 5 factors underlying participants’ selections.

In this new approach to values, therefore, it can be seen that the theoretical object now under investigation, though discussed using the same term ‘values’, had shifted. The transformation brought with it a number of other changes. First, it partially solved the problem of the breadth of the construct: The domain of values could begin to carve out a distinctive field under the more restricted guise of ‘conceptions of the desirable’. More subtly, since there must be some other, non-base motive for something to be conceived as desirable, this conception of values introduced a more clearly moral dimension to the notion of value. It introduced a realm of higher ideals to the literature. The new conception also changed the role that values might play. Before, they were considered to be the driving force for behaviour, in the same way as the previously associated constructs need and habit. The third stage in the development of the concept of values changed their function to incorporate the opposite quality, of restraint. Thus Kluckhohn was keen to differentiate values from constructs such as cathexis, an unconscious energy invested in another person or object. He considered cathexis to be ‘a short-term and narrow response’ in contrast to the ‘broader and long-term view’ (p. 399) implied by a value.
A value or values restrain or canalize impulses in terms of wider and more perduring goals. (p. 399)

This distinction between the desired and the desirable, therefore, introduced more than just a more distinctive domain; it added the unique function to values of regulating one’s behaviour with respect to larger goals. Values thus played a vital role in:

Impulse satisfaction in accord with the whole array of hierarchical enduring goals of the personality, the requirements of both personality and sociocultural system for order, the need for respecting the interests of others and of the group as a whole in social living. (Kluckhohn, 1951, p. 399)

Finally, a new relation to the symbolic became important. Since values in this understanding are based on what is conceived to be desirable, they must involve representations of some form. Values are mostly implicit, but for Kluckhohn (1951), it must be possible to express a value verbally. Hence: ‘implicit values remain “conceptions” in the sense that they are abstract and generalized notions which can be put into words by the observer and then agreed to or dissented to by the actor. Verbalizability is a necessary test of value’ (p. 397). And so for Morris (1956), ‘what is conceived to be preferable (conceived values) can be studied through the symbols employed in preferential behaviour and the preferential behaviour directed toward symbols’ (p. 12).

Against the background of these developments introduced with the third conceptualisation of values, can be seen some of the conditions of existence for the development introduced by Rokeach. It additionally becomes clear how his psychological contribution to the values literature also brought with it a further reconceptualisation of the notion values. It is a different theoretical object yet again that is found in Rokeach’s ‘The nature of human values’ (1973).

4. ‘Values’ as guiding principles

As noted earlier, Rokeach offered a careful consolidation of the preceding interdisciplinary literature. But from an archaeological perspective, much more was involved. His contribution to this literature, as a psychologist, was inseparable from the discursive relations through which psychology was constituted as a discipline at this period in the mid-1960s. Thus, the grids of specification that formed Rokeach’s
perspective consisted of the broad theoretical frameworks provided by psychodynamic, gestalt, and the newly emerging cognitive theories. All three not only provided the discursive foundation through which a construct could be articulated, they also played a role in substantive aspects of the theory. It was on the basis of psychodynamic theory and ego-defence as a function of values that Rokeach found support for the idea that values were central to the maintenance and enhancement of self-esteem. Rokeach also drew on gestalt theory and especially Heider's (1958) reading of Kohler (1938), to explain the feeling of 'ought' associated with values:

A person phenomenologically experiences “oughtness” to be objectively required by society in somewhat the same way that he perceives an incomplete circle as objectively requiring closure.

(Rokeach, 1973, p. 9)

Finally, the new perspective of cognition was crucial in offering a natural relationship between Kluckhohn's idea that values must be verbalizable, and thus representable in some way, and the role in psychology of cognitive representations. The notion that values operate in the symbolic domain thus took on a more direct and important role than in the work of Kluckhohn. The science of psychology was increasingly becoming the study of cognitive representations. Hence, there was the discursive space for the construct of values as a form of cognitive representation. This new way of theorising values also entailed, therefore, a new way of conceptualising values. Allied to this new cognitive field for the construct was the need to differentiate values in this psychological plane from the main alternative forms of representation: attitudes and opinions. It was in the service of this function that the work of several other theorists became incorporated into the theory, including Williams's (1968) notion of criteria, Scott's (1965) 'absoluteness' and Lovejoy's (1950) distinction between terminal and adjectival values.

It is therefore possible to give an account of the development introduced by Rokeach's theory, without referring to, or denigrating, Rokeach's intellectual contribution to the literature. Instead the discursive possibilities can be emphasised that provided the possibilities for psychological theorisation at this point in the evolution of the discipline. One can therefore also draw attention to the way these larger elements enabling and constraining the rationality of psychological research shaped the form that
Rokeach's innovation was to some extent bound to take. Drawing out this possibility of a description presents a first attempt to think through in concrete terms, and in the context of psychology, some of the details of Foucault's complex analytic. It also draws attention to some interesting features of this literature that may be relevant to how it is developed in the future.

First, having identified 'values' with a particular type of entity, situated in the theoretical plane of cognitive representation, values become a distinct type of theoretical object. In the RVS, moreover, we find the substantive nature of these objects, represented by symbols like 'Honesty', 'Courage' and 'Freedom'. In previous work, values were not addressed or exemplified so directly. They were inferred from processes of valuing. Hence, as Catton (1960), says of Morris's study:

The assignment of ratings [to the 13 Ways of Life] was an action which expressed preference. To be sure, the factor matrix could only be known from these actions, but the factors obtained cannot in any sense be equated with the ratings. The factors constitute, in my view, the nearest empirical referent for 'values'. (p. 87)

In the conceptualisation of values prior to Rokeach, therefore, it is not what is being rated, nor the ratings that are found for some value-laden object that are understood to be values. It is, rather, the dimensions that may be revealed through the process of valuing that are understood to be 'the nearest empirical referent for 'values''. Rokeach's identification of 36 specific, empirical referents clearly introduces a significant transformation from previous work.

Secondly, existing as objects, as 'special types of belief', introduces the burden of specifying the nature of values. Surprisingly, and perhaps with good reason, Morris was able in his study to avoid this problem. As he is careful to note:

A definition of the term 'value' has not been presupposed in this investigation. (Morris, 1956, p. 186)

In contrast, one finds in Rokeach a highly specific definition. Values are conceptualised not only as a specific set of 36 objects, but ones that possess specific qualities: of being absolute, abstract and enduring. It was in this way, therefore, that values came to be conceptualised in this fourth form as a delimited set of 'guiding principles' with carefully defined properties.
The crystallisation of the properties of values

Adopting the perspective offered by the analytic of archaeology has emphasised the different forms in which the concept of values has been conceptualised as an object of scientific discourse up to and including the contribution introduced by Rokeach. It has been argued that the emergence of these specific forms was inseparable from the broader constitution of the discursive practices of the social sciences. Thus, in psychology, values came to be conceptualised as a specific form of cognitive representation serving the function of absolute, abstract, and enduring guiding principles. It can also be argued that the nature of psychology, conceived as discursive formation, has led to the embedding of this conceptualisation of values in our knowledge of this field, and hence to the crystallisation of these properties as a central, but perhaps problematic assumption of contemporary theory.

Archaeology stresses the productive dimension of discursive practices. It is only through them that one can come to have knowledge. But it also emphasises the quality of rarefaction that is inherent in discursive formations. A driving force for Foucault for the development of the archaeological analytic was the observation that given all the possible ways of conceptualising, theorising and thinking about a particular domain, there are only a very limited number of ways of understanding a field that come to be taken seriously at any one time. Hence, Foucault argues that it is only those that are presented using the appropriate enunciative modalities, properly following the system of concepts through which new constructs may be developed and used, and in accordance with dominant theoretical themes. Likewise, it is in these ways that the theory of values has been tested, employed and modified in psychology. Rokeach's theory has been subjected to the procedures associated with the validation of cognitive constructs, and the results presented in the major outlets of the psychological literature. For example, the RVS has been tested for test-retest reliability, order effects and social desirability. On these grounds it has then been extensively used in many contexts, as reviewed in the introduction to the thesis.

However, the accepted discursive practices of psychology can be seen to subject certain aspects of the theory to scrutiny, whilst easily admitting others. Thus, the psychometric properties of the RVS were rigorously tested, while as Ng (1980) argued,
the assumption of the hierarchical structure of values was not, since it was incorporated as an assumption of the instrument. The concepts and broader perspective of archaeology shows how the discursive formation of psychology has allowed significant progress in the field of values, whilst creating an aporia over certain aspects of this domain through the very practices through which psychological knowledge is produced. As Foucault argues, research only comes to be known and shared in a discipline, i.e. to constitute knowledge of any area, when it is disseminated through an institutional site. In psychology, the most influential sites in this respect are the main journals. Their status is justifiably based on the review process they follow, through which rigorous research practices are ensured in line with accepted procedures. Hence, in Foucault’s terms, the rules of formation for a research approach are enforced. In psychology, particularly given the current state of diversity of approaches, it is clear that these limits sustain the rigorous standards of particular approaches, whilst denying the alternative possibilities and potential critiques of others. For example, the most influential American journals through which values research has mostly developed, present research almost exclusively based on the grid of specification of cognitive psychology. Psychological knowledge of values thus has rapidly advanced without needing to attend to the critiques suggested by discursive psychology, or the challenges that occupy other disciplines, like those raised by the postmodernity debate. Moreover, these sites instantiate a rigorous but limited set of concepts establishing logical and methodological relations between theoretical constructs: those associated with experimental and questionnaire methods. In contrast, other disciplines studying values continue to employ a range of techniques, including interviews, content analyses, philosophical analyses of value terms, and theoretical analyses situating the notion of values in wider contemporary debates. The exclusion of the use of such alternative techniques as a primary method for mainstream psychology fulfils some of the implicit scientific postulates of the discipline, at the same time as it shelters theories like Rokeach’s from the sort of development these more diverse and open methods afford.

In conclusion, it can be argued that the discursive practices of psychology not only played a substantive role in the form of the conceptualisation of values presented by Rokeach, but they have also played a crucial role in the continuing acceptance and use of central features of this work in contemporary research. Specifically, the
conceptualisation of values introduced with Rokeach's theory is related to aspects of research methodology, rather than being open to scrutiny using them. Furthermore, since this concept of values, as discussed in the last section, incorporates the specification of important properties of values, the operation of the discipline can be said to have led to both the emergence and the crystallization of these properties in the current psychological theories of values.

Summary

This chapter set Foucault's 'Archaeology of Knowledge' in its intellectual context and offered an account of his analytic of archaeology. Based on this reading, it was argued that the notion of discourse employed in psychology was very different from that of discursive formation proposed by Foucault. It was argued that the constitutive nature of discursive or conceptual systems was not a critique of science or truth in itself. Neither could everyday language use be attributed with the constitutive properties commonly accorded them by discursive psychologists. It is the operation of dispersed discursive systems that enable as well as constrain those accounts that are accepted as knowledge. Applying this interpretation of the archaeology to the theory of values drew attention to the conceptual development that has taken place in the social science literature as a whole, and the unique contribution made by the psychological theory of Rokeach. A particular conceptualisation of values as guiding principles with specific qualities emerged in the literature and continues today.

The final chapter on Foucault now turns to his later work in order to consider some of the possible problems with the conceptualisation of values of contemporary research and hence to some alternative ways of understanding the domain of values.
Chapter 4

The analytic of ethics: Foucault’s conception of morality

I now had to undertake a third shift, in order to analyze what is termed “the subject”. It seemed appropriate to look for the forms and modalities of the relation to self by which the individual constitutes and recognizes himself qua subject. (Foucault, 1984a, p. 6)

Introduction

This chapter continues in the vein of the last, presenting an exposition of a specific aspect of Foucault’s oeuvre and considering its relevance for the psychology of values. It addresses the third axis of his thought: his reformulation of traditional conceptions of morality using the notion of ‘ethics’. Foucault characteristically reinterprets the usual meaning of this term as the ‘relationship one has with oneself’, presenting the final dimension of his thought in the last two books published before his death, the second and third volumes of the History of Sexuality ‘The Use of Pleasure’ (1984a) and ‘The Care of the Self’ (1984b).

It was noted earlier that Foucault introduced a number of changes in the concluding phase of his oeuvre. He offered an account of his project as an extension of the Enlightenment tradition; he undertook ‘a third shift’ of perspective; and in his conception of ethics he presented an analysis of the consequences of the social changes that have become associated with the idea of postmodernity. A detailed examination of this aspect of his thought thus allows the present chapter to consider the potential implications of changes in contemporary society for the psychology of values, at least in so far as they have been discussed by one so-called postmodern philosopher.

The chapter is in three parts. It begins by discussing some of the central themes of traditional debates in moral philosophy. They provide the background to Foucault’s reformulation of this domain, as well as an introduction to ideas that will reappear later in the empirical part of the thesis. The second part of the chapter then presents a reading of key features of Foucault’s analytic of ethics. It shows how Foucault transforms
conventional perspectives on morality by switching the focus from the content and justification of moral action to the mode of self-relationship through which moral codes are recognised and adhered to. It is the latter that constitutes, for Foucault, the field of ethics, understood as the modes through which people come to form themselves as ethical subjects. Finally, the chapter will suggest that in the same way as the domain of ethics illuminated by Foucault’s analytic has been neglected in moral philosophy, so it has not to date been addressed in the psychology of values. It will be argued that it thus suggests a new way of understanding the notion of change in values, and the beginnings of a new conceptualisation of values.

**The philosophy of morality**

A classical definition of Philosophy of introductory texts is that it is the study of justification (e.g. Hospers, 1990). Moral philosophy can then be understood as the attempt to justify a particular, enigmatic class of statements, such as ‘murder is wrong’. This is not a factual claim, like a statement describing the molecular composition of water. Hence it is not a question of epistemology. It is also, as commonly understood, more than simply the statement of a preference. On what grounds, then, can such statements be justified? In everyday life, it might seem that the immorality of murder is self-evident. As a philosophical problem, however, even such clear cases have proved to be remarkably difficult to justify on the basis of philosophical principles. Since the 18th Century, two approaches to the problem have been particularly influential.

The first is the deontological moral philosophy of Kant (1925; 1963). It argues that people have a duty to behave morally; that there are clearly right actions people can learn to recognise and so be morally obliged to obey them, irrespective of their consequences for ourselves or for others. Kant’s aim was to find a way of justifying moral behaviour that was independent of factors that were either contingent or social. One is often faced with situations in which there is a temptation of a short-term or purely selfish gain, but which are morally questionable. Similarly, one might live in a society with conventions or laws that are immoral, that should not be followed. Thus, Kant’s foundation for morality must exist in a realm distinct from both personal inclination and the conventions of a community. He found a solution in deliberation using ‘pure practical reason’. The question of whether an action is moral is answered by the formal test of logical adequacy provided by the ‘categorical imperative’: ‘act so that
the maxim of your action can be willed as universal law'. Kant therefore defends a rational principle as the foundation for morality. Kant's moral philosophy argues that people have a duty as autonomous rational agents to act in accordance with the absolute and enduring principle of the categorical imperative, and to apply this mode of deliberation irrespective of personal desires, cultural norms, or the particular circumstances of the situation.

The main alternative to Kant's moral philosophy is the Utilitarianism of Bentham (1983), elaborated later by Mill (1998). Instead of focusing on one's absolute moral duty to follow a rational principle, whatever the circumstances and whatever the consequences, Utilitarianism emphasises the implications of one's actions, and thus is a 'consequentialist' philosophy. The morality of an action is not dependent on rational deliberation and the motives one harbours, but on the social effects of the action. A rational principle is also invoked, but one of 'utility', simply: 'act so as to maximise the happiness of the greatest number'. Utilitarianism thus leads to complex calculations assessing the relative costs and benefits in terms of how much happiness is generated to how many, at the cost of how great a loss of happiness to others. If an act, or the rule underlying the act, depending on the form of utilitarianism, maximises happiness, then it is understood to be the morally correct action.

There are many problems for both these central positions in moral philosophy, especially when applied to specific situations, and these complications have led to extensive elaborations of the basic positions. At the beginning of the 20th Century, however, a number of much more problematic arguments were proposed raising issues that undermined the whole project of the justification of morality. These will be discussed next.

Moore's (1903) challenge to the traditional view is captured concisely by his open question argument. It asks of any claim, simply, 'Yes, but is it good?' He argued that 'good' was an indefinable non-natural property that could only be known by intuition, so the question could not be answered by reference to any rational principle or appeal to facts. Thus, one simply knows whether something is good or not, but cannot prove it in the ways traditionally demanded in philosophy. Though Moore's 'intuitionism' was not widely followed, the open question argument, with its troublesome conclusions, did
become popular, finding further justification in the language-based philosophy of logical positivism. Ayer (1945) argued in this tradition, echoing Hume (1965), and now supported by the fact-value-nonsense triad of the positivists, that ethical statements must be understood to be no more than expressions of emotion. Hence, was borne the moral philosophy of 'emotivism'. Variations on this theme continue today, referred to as 'noncognitivist' moral philosophy, suggesting ethical statements are not cognitive in the philosophical sense: they are neither true nor false, and so cannot be known or justified.

Simultaneous with these developments in analytic philosophy, a very different set of arguments was being proposed in the continental tradition, with similarly pessimistic conclusions for the project of the justification of morality. The most vehement critique has been made by Nietzsche (e.g. 1969). Proclaiming through his character Zarathustra that 'God is Dead' (i.e. no longer commonly believed in, though people refuse to live as though this were the case) he argued that there are no ultimate foundations for truth or morality; both must be unveiled for they ultimately are: the product of human beings. For truth this is not necessarily a problem, but for morality, it is a serious critique of what Nietzsche considered the piety of Christian morality and particularly the philosophy of Kant. He argued that the justifications of moral action they offered were illusory and that they should be replaced with a more honest basis for morality, in the manifestation of an individual's virtues. If there is to be a foundation for 'good' behaviour it must be contrasted with 'bad', not with 'evil'. Aspects of Nietzsche's thought have been combined with the existential phenomenology of Heidegger (Heidegger, 1962) and popularised by Sartre (e.g. 1995), the most influential spokesperson for the movement of 'existentialism'. Without a solid foundation for morality, either in reason, human nature, or religion, then 'we are condemned to be free'. People must come to acknowledge that how we act is ultimately the result of a free choice. For Sartre, therefore, our obligation is to be 'authentic', to recognize our intrinsic freedom and take responsibility for our actions based solely on the grounds that that is what we have chosen.

Moral philosophy in more recent years has consisted of a number of attempts to recover from these two traditions of fundamental critique. Some have maintained the aim of universalism. Most important has been Habermas's (1984-88) discursive reformulation of Kant's principle of universalizability. Rather than rely on the formal
test of the individual cognizer, deliberating in accordance with rational principles, Habermas has argued for a form of justification grounded in dialogue and debate, with the aim of reaching consensus between people, under specified conditions and in accordance with a set of discursive principles. Thus Habermas incorporates the linguistic turn in philosophy, and situates rationality in modes of communication and debate, rather than individual cognitions.

Others, however, have responded to the critiques of universal justification by moving away from such aims altogether. Communitarian philosophers, like MacIntyre (1985), Walzer (1983), and Sandel (1984), suggest that the problem for morality arises when moral action is abstracted from the particular communities through which the moral dimensions of behaviour become meaningful. Communitarians and virtue ethicists have returned to the philosophy of ethics of Aristotle (1954), with his emphasis on ‘virtue’. Such approaches to morality introduce an important change of perspective. They shift the focus from ‘morality’, understood as ‘right actions’, to ‘ethics’, understood as the ‘good life’, the life well lived, in terms defined by a particular culture. This important distinction remains a crucial line of difference in moral philosophy dividing those for whom it is morality that should be emphasised from those for whom it is ethics.

Finally, feminism has introduced a further critique and reconstruction of morality. The psychologist Carol Gilligan (1982) has made an important contribution to the field, subsequently adopted by feminist philosophers (e.g. Benhabib, 1992). She presented what has become a widely accepted critique of Kohlberg’s seminal work on the psychology of moral reasoning. She showed how his model of the psychology of morality, incorporating the central tenets of Kant’s moral philosophy, presented a view that was distinctly alien to women. In contrast to the principle of autonomous deliberation favoured by Kant and Kohlberg, Gilligan argued that this reflected a male world-view. In contrast, women understood morality in terms of a sense of self embedded in relationships and the complex on-going narratives that constitute them. Hence, Gilligan and others have defended a foundation for morality based on care for others, rather than abstract principles like Justice.
In summary, the project of the justification of morality is one that has seen vigorous debate and dramatic change over the years. The basic positions of Kant and the Utilitarians defending a rational basis for morality have been subjected to fundamental critiques from disparate sources in the analytic and continental philosophical traditions. Since then, there have been various attempts to salvage or recast moral philosophy, presented by Habermas and discursive ethicists, communitarians, virtue ethicists, and feminists. There is, therefore, a diverse range of forms of thought about morality, that in some cases abandon the term in favour of the notion of ethics. The next section considers Foucault's novel alternative perspective on this domain.

**Foucault's analytic of ethics**

Foucault's writings address topics traditional to philosophy, for example knowledge, subjectivity, power, and ethics. His analyses, however, typically recast rather than contribute directly to existing fields. This also is the case for his analytic of ethics. In contrast to the philosophies reviewed in the previous section, Foucault does not attempt to offer new grounds for the justification of moral action, and only indirectly proposes an 'ethic', or conception of 'the good life'. Rather, Foucault recontextualises the domain of morality by incorporating it as an aspect of his central project of analysing the constitution of modern forms of subjectivity.

The earlier axes of his thought emphasised the role of knowledge of human beings, and the related domains of normative and political power in the formation of subjectivity. In addition to these modes through which others affect us, the third axis acknowledges the role played by people themselves in constituting themselves as particular forms of subject. It is not enough, for example, for particular discourses of sexuality to exist, with their related forms of normative power. People must also recognise themselves as 'sexual' subjects. The final axis introduced by Foucault is an attempt to elucidate the key dimensions through which this occurs, focusing on the relationship one has with oneself. This relationship centres on an 'ethical' understanding, the ways in which people understand themselves to be moral or ethical subjects. In other words, the task for Foucault's analysis of ethics becomes one of identifying 'the forms and modalities of the relation to self by which the individual constitutes and recognizes himself *qua* subject' (Foucault, 1984a, p. 6).
To illustrate the new domain of analysis and identify its main elements, Foucault employs the usual method of analysing previous configurations of the field to distinguish the contrast implicit in current conceptions. However, in order to find such differences, Foucault was forced to turn from his familiar historical territory to the writings and forms of life of antiquity. This is the period analysed in the final two volumes of the History of Sexuality.

‘The use of pleasure’ and ‘The care of the self’

Foucault’s final texts continued the history of sexuality begun nine years previously. In the final volumes, the focus changes from the role ‘sexuality’ played in multiplying the forms of power people can exercise over others, to the way in which it becomes a site through which power is exercised over oneself. The texts thus begin with modes of self-control over one’s sexual behaviour, and, as the analysis develops, they consider equally forms of self-regulation over one’s diet, health, and daily regimens.

The argument begins by challenging a common myth about antiquity. Important differences are usually recognised between the morality of the ancient Greeks and that of Christianity. Some elements were shared, like the prohibition of incest, but many aspects differed. For example, the meanings of sexual acts changed, with positive symbolism being replaced by associations with evil and sin; the acceptance of multiple sexual partners was replaced by a strict monogamy; chastity became valued; and sexual acts between members of the same sex became disallowed. In short, it is usually understood that sexual relations were much more liberal in the ancient Greek polis than under the codes of Christianity. Foucault’s first aim is to show that it is only at a superficial level that this characterisation is adequate. Though, for example, sexual relations between men and boys were indeed a part of Greek culture, he notes that care needs to be taken not to interpret it as the ‘tolerance’ of ‘homosexuality’. Neither of these terms, he argues, can be used unproblematically to describe such practices as they were understood in the forms of life of antiquity. Furthermore, though they were permitted, introducing a difference from Christian morality, relations between men and boys were nonetheless a focus for concern and ethical debate. Foucault cites in support of this claim, evidence in Classical writing of commonly held fears about the effects of sexual relations, of ideals of conduct, negative images, and models of abstention.
Moreover, these concerns applied not only to relations between men, but also to relations with their wives, their more general relationship with their body, and their relation to wisdom. All these domains of life were potentially objects for reflection. Contrary to popular belief, therefore, many aspects of life in antiquity were subject to regulation, and were not quite the sites of moral freedom it is often thought. Moreover, Foucault argues that many of the codes of behaviour that were to find their way into Christian morality, were based on ideas worked out in the so-called permissive pagan societies.

But these societies clearly did not share an identical morality. Having drawn attention to these underestimated continuities, Foucault argues that there were, simultaneously, also certain important discontinuities. To highlight the ways in which they differ, he draws attention to the ambiguity of the term 'morality'. It refers to the specific behaviours that are thought to be immoral. These may be characterised as a set of rules of conduct, a 'moral code'. But morality is understood to refer to the behaviours of individuals in relation to this code, the conduct as measured by the rule, or the 'morality of behaviours'. There is additionally, however, a central domain omitted by this common division in the understanding of the concept of morality. One can also analyse the domain that must exist between a moral code and the compliant behaviours that people may or may not perform in relation to the code. Foucault conceives of this domain as consisting of the modes through which people come to recognise the moral code and put it into practice, hence establishing oneself as the subject of a moral act. This forms the ways in which one becomes obliged to conduct oneself, constituting, for Foucault (1984b):

The manner in which one ought to form oneself as an ethical subject acting in reference to the prescriptive elements that make up the code.
(p. 26)

The domain of ethics is thus construed as the mode of relationship one has with oneself. It is in this neglected field that Foucault considers the crucial differences to lie between the forms of morality practiced in antiquity and Christianity, extending through to the present day. Foucault offers an analytic identifying this field through the identification of the four key elements that constitute it: 'ethical substance', 'mode of subjection', 'ethical work', and 'telos'.

132
Ethical substance

The first element of one's self-relationship is the nature of the object of one's moral reflection, the 'ethical substance', or ontology of the field of problematization of behaviour. Differences may be observed here, as in the other elements of ethics, between the moralities of Christianity and antiquity. For the former, the emphasis came to be on one's thoughts and desires as they relate to specific acts. There are correct or allowable sexual behaviours, canonical forms, and feelings of immorality are invoked in relation to desires about acts that lie outside this canon. Foucault argues that for the Greeks, the substance of ethics was not particular acts, but the dynamics of what was referred to as 'aphrodisia'. The texture of the ethical experience of aphrodisia was created not from the existence and morphology of desires, but through the relationship between erotic acts, the pleasure they produced and how they were used. So, for example, moral judgements were not directed toward the nature of particular acts, but the quantity one engaged in, and the role that was played in carrying out the act, for example, whether it represented excess or passivity. Thus analogies describing the morality of engaging in aphrodisia were drawn from diet and the regulation of eating behaviours. Just as the pleasures of food could lead to the undesirable effects of gluttony, so it was a similar model that for the Greeks was applicable to aphrodisia.

Mode of subjection

The second element in Foucault's analytic of ethics is referred to as the 'mode of subjection' to a moral code, or its 'deontology'. Given the same moral code, there may be different ways in which one comes to recognise one's obligation to that code. What sort of validity do the principles guiding conduct have, that might enable one to justify obeying them? In this element of ethics Foucault sees the greatest difference introduced by Christianity. With the emergence of rigid codes of prohibitions, there was a move away from the notion that is the title of the book, 'chresis aphrodisia': 'the use of pleasure'. For the Christians, the emphasis on a range of canonical acts brought with it the implication of a strict obedience. For the ancient Greeks, with a greater flexibility in the range of pleasures that one might engage in, there was a different emphasis on the particular way in which such pleasures were used. The invitation was to adhere to a set of conditions and modalities of use, that is the giving of a particular style to one's use of
pleasures. This entailed far greater flexibility. What was important were the strategies employed and the effectiveness with which they took into account various dangers. These included the appropriate satisfaction of basic needs, the timeliness with which this was done, and the importance of particular strategies for those holding a certain status in the polis. Hence, there was no emphasis on a universal law, rather on a techne or practice:

The few great common laws – of the city, religion, nature – remained present, but it was as if they traced a very wide circle in the distance, inside of which practical thought had to define what could rightfully be done. (ibid, p. 62)

The formation of oneself as an ethical subject was therefore dependent in antiquity on giving style to one’s life. In contrast, it became in early Christianity an obedience to a system of rules.

**Ethical work**

Third, Foucault introduces the notion of ‘ethical work’, the on-going activities one engages in to constitute oneself as an ethical subject. Foucault finds for the Christians in this respect a form of decipherment, a ‘hermeneutics of the self’. One must practice awareness of one’s hidden thoughts and feelings, interpreting them as our deepest, usually concealed, desires. The ascetics of the Greeks on the other hand, was characterised by the notion of enkrateia. This implies an agonistics, a battle, the task of achieving self-control and dominance over oneself. Metaphors of war and wrestling were commonly used, similarly entailing a victory, defined as the achievement of a relationship of domination and submission within oneself. This coincided with the principle of the rational soul being separate from, and able to control, though reason, the forces of nature.

**Telos**

The last element of self-relationship Foucault refers to as the ‘telos’, the implicit goal of ethical behaviour. It concerns the kind of being to which we aspire when we behave morally. Foucault identifies four aspects of the telos of the ethics of antiquity. First, there is the importance of freedom. This was a central aspect of Greek society, at least for the small section of the population whom were granted freedom. This was
interpreted in a special way in the context of one's self-relationship, however, in terms of the control over oneself that was necessary in order for one to be free. How could a man be free if he was ruled by bodily pleasures? Second, there followed an irony concerning the virility of moderation. To regulate one's behaviour was a sign of strength. The test of one's power was the extent to which it was expressed in dominance over oneself, rather than over others. The latter was, moreover, an extension of the relationship one had with oneself. It was conceived as isomorphic with the relationship one had with others. Hence, one had first to take charge of oneself, before being fit to take charge of a household, or to play a role in civic duties. There was therefore a relationship between 'ethical virility', formulated as control over oneself, 'sexual virility' and 'social virility'. Third, there was a particular relationship to truth that one attained in the course of developing an ethical self-relationship. For it was reason that was to take control over one's desires, hence the emphasis on 'knowing oneself', of achieving the right relationship between truth and bodily needs and pleasures. Fourth, there was the notion of an aesthetic of existence, the culmination of these different elements. Moral value was achieved through the ontological structure and visibly beautiful shape of one's life that might be achieved through the right application and distribution of the formal principles in the use of pleasure:

The individual fulfilled himself as an ethical subject by shaping a precisely measured conduct that was plainly visible to all and deserving to be long remembered. (ibid, p. 91)

A summary of the four elements of ethics as formulated by Foucault is presented in the form of a schematic model in Figure 4.1.
**Moral Code**
e.g. the prohibition of incest, murder, extra-conjugal relationships.

---

**2. 'Mode of Subjection’**
The way in which people are invited or incited to recognise moral obligations
e.g. through God’s word; the demands of practical reason; through convention; out of care; out of loyalty to one’s group; authenticity; an aesthetics of existence.

---

**1. 'Ethical Substance’**
That part of ourselves that is taken to be the relevant domain for ethical judgement
e.g. one’s innermost thoughts and desires; one’s intentional acts; the intentions behind one’s actions.

---

**3. 'Ethical Work’**
The means through which we transform ourselves in order to become ethical subjects
e.g. monitoring one’s actions; deciphering divine words; checking oneself against rules; on-going reflection on one’s struggle; reading of ascetic manuals.

---

**4. 'Telos’**
The kind of being to which we aspire when we behave morally
e.g. pure; respectable; immortal; free; admirable; masters of ourselves.

---

**Behaviour**
e.g. acting honestly, loyally, in accordance with the code.

---

**Figure 4.1:** Schematic model of the elements in Foucault’s analytic of ethics.
In summary, Foucault argues that there are both continuities and discontinuities in the morality of antiquity and the early years of Christianity. The similarities at the level of the moral code allow the recognition of the differences in the ways in which this code is acknowledged and followed. These differences arise in the domain of one’s self-relationship. This involves four elements through which individuals form themselves as ethical subjects in relation to a moral code. In Foucault’s words:

For an action to be “moral,” it must not be reducible to an act or a series of acts conforming to a rule, a law, or a value. Of course all moral action involves a relationship with the reality in which it is carried out, and a relationship with the self. The latter is not simply “self-awareness” but self-formation as an “ethical subject” ... there is no specific moral action that does not call for the forming of oneself as an ethical subject; and no forming of the ethical subject without “modes of subjectivation” and an “ascetics” or “practices of the self” that support them. (Foucault, 1984a, p. 28)

The analytic of ethics identifying the different facets of the relationship with oneself is developed in ‘The use of pleasure’ through analysis of the different styles of existence prescribed in the key domains of the regimen of the body, one’s role in marriage and in the household, and in the relationship between men and boys.

The third volume of the history of sexuality turns to the theme of the ‘care of the self’ that is characteristic of ethical self-relationships of the first two centuries of Christianity. Foucault explores the transformations between the Hellenistic, Greco-Roman and Christian forms of ethics, showing how emphases at the level of the code concerning monogamy, for example, begin to take shape. There remains, however, a discontinuity in the form of ethics that gives this prescription its existence. There is an intensification of the relationship one has with oneself relative to the 4th century BC, discussed in ‘The use of pleasure’. But it is still organised around the ‘care of the self,’ as opposed to the decipherment of the self in relation to an elaborated code of prohibitions. Yet Foucault argues that one can also see the beginning of a transition to the ethical substance that will become prominent in Christianity as a result of changing relations between men and their wives to one of reciprocity and equality, and the development of a more complex political system. The importance of the dominance over oneself, as the essential form of relationship that needed to be adopted in order to hold in check one’s power over a subordinate wife, and a freer polis, became no longer
so essential. Ethical substance remained an art of existence, but one related more and more to universal principles of nature or reason, observable by everyone regardless of status or position; it involved practices that depended more on an epistemological conception of self-knowledge.

Foucault argues moreover, that in this transformation can be seen the origins of Christian morality, some of which continue today. And that it is aspects of these early transformations in ethics that fed into modern philosophical projects that have had as their aim, ultimate justifications for universal moral prescriptions. This explains, therefore, what Foucault understood to be the changes occurring in contemporary morality: a shift from obedience to a system of rules to a search for a personal ethics.

Thus Foucault presents a new perspective on morality to the more traditional moral philosophy discussed at the beginning of the chapter. It can be seen how he reframes concerns over moral actions and conceptions of ethics in terms of the modes through which moral obligations come to be recognised, and the practices through which one forms oneself as an ethical subject. Foucault thus effects a characteristic transformation of a ‘game of truth’ – in this case regarding moral behaviour – into a constitutive facet of subjectivity.

The next section considers how Foucault’s analytic of ethics might be relevant to the psychology of values, and therefore how it might suggest a new way of addressing the question of change in values raised by postmodernity.

**Foucault’s analytic of ethics and the psychology of values**

In Foucault’s work on ethics, he generally does not refer to values as such, and certainly not to an understanding of values resembling the psychological literature discussed in the thesis. It is far from clear, therefore, how these arguments may be applied to the very different context of the psychology of values. Moreover, Foucault’s analysis of the relationship one has with oneself is conducted with respect to prescriptions of what is considered moral behaviour. It is specifically concerned with prohibitions, and with morality. Hence it may seem that this work of Foucault’s is neither clearly related to, nor relevant to the field of values. However, it can be argued that these concerns are insubstantial.
First, though the analytic of ethics is primarily focused on people's understandings of interdictions, rather than the intrinsically positive phenomena of values, it is important to consider the broader perspective of Foucault's argument. Its objective, just as it was in the analysis of power, is partly to overturn the assumption that morality has only negative effects, those of prohibition. As his analysis aims to reveal, the conception of morality as primarily the prohibition of certain acts is itself a historically contingent idea introduced with Christianity. In contrast, morality for the ancient Greeks was more of a positive process; it was about the limits one willingly imposed on oneself in order to form or produce oneself in a particular style. Hence, though moral codes themselves may be negative, the field of ethics the analytic identifies is inherently positive, and may be equally applicable to the positive notions conveyed by the concept of values.

Second, though Rokeach distinguishes between moral and competence values, and so it may also be argued that values, though positive, are not necessarily moral, this may again presuppose too narrow an understanding of values. It was argued in the previous chapter that the third conceptualisation of values, found in the work of Kluckhohn and Morris, introduced developments that in a sense attributed inherently moral properties to the concept of values. The emphasis on 'conceptions of the desirable' brought with it a sense of values as higher ideals. Values in this conceptualisation are, by definition, revealed not by what is merely desired but by what people aspire to. This formulation also changes their function to one that mirrors the traditional role of morality: values are not just motivating, but involve constraint. Even positive values like Rokeach's 'Intellectual' might entail the negation and overcoming of other behaviours that tempt one against this value.

Hence, apparent differences between the fields of values and morality, as analysed by Foucault, can be seen to be deceptive. In the context of the larger arguments about Foucault's notion of ethics and Rokeach's notion of values, the apparent differences cease to be a concern. It is possible, therefore, to apply the analytic of ethics to the field of values.

Drawing parallels between Foucault's analysis of morality and the psychology of values it can be seen that the latter have been studied, in Foucault's terms, at the level of
the moral code. The values proposed by Rokeach, e.g. ‘Freedom’, ‘Honesty’, or ‘A World at Peace’, operate at the same level in Foucault’s analytic as moral prescriptions in moral philosophy. Hence the same domain of ethics identified by Foucault is missing from values research as it has been from moral philosophy. Indeed, there is much that can be discussed without consideration of the field of ethics. So, in the psychological literature, Rokeach’s main concern was initially with defining what ‘values’ are, delimiting the boundaries and properties of the mental objects that, in the terms of the present discussion, occupy the level of the moral code. His second objective was to measure commitment to these objects, and then to explore how these commitments might be changed. Similarly, Schwartz has studied the structural relations between these elements, still at the level of code, and his concern has been to infer underlying dimensions on the basis of these relations. Neither has considered qualitative differences in the field of ethics, the ways in which people position themselves as subjects of actions carried out in relation to the moral code. The question is, therefore, what consideration of the field of ethics adds to our understanding of values. Two proposals will be made. First, continuing the analysis of the previous chapter, it will be suggested that it is not just a particular conceptualisation of values that has become crystallised in the literature, but also a conception of ethics. Second, that it is in this domain of ethics that in contemporary conditions one might need to investigate the possibilities of change.

The crystallisation of a conception of ethics?

Though it may not have been openly theorised and investigated, it can be argued that a substantive conception of ethics has, nonetheless, become incorporated into the dominant theories in the psychology of values. While Rokeach’s work has directed attention to the priority accorded values, the constitutive elements of the moral code, it has simultaneously masked and in some cases presupposed positions in the four elements of Foucault’s conception of ethics. Whether or not it is recognised, an action cannot be considered to be following a value without, as Foucault suggests, the simultaneous ‘forming of oneself as an ethical subject; and there is no forming of the ethical subject without “modes of subjectivation” and an “ascetics” or “practices of the self” that support them’. So, each of the four elements of Foucault’s analytic of ethics
can be considered in the context of the theory of values to see how they have implicitly become a part of the theory.

The notion of ethical substance highlights the aspects of behaviour that are considered relevant to values. This is not explicitly articulated in Rokeach or Schwartz's work, but it may be inferred that it is primarily actions that are the focus for values. It is attitudes and subsequently behaviours that are determined by values. In Foucault's terms, it is whether acts are consistent with the prescriptions of values. It is not, for example, so much feelings or thoughts about an action, irrespective of whether actions are consistent with values.

The mode of subjection is more clearly discussed by Rokeach, though not in terms of ethics. Adherence to values is discussed as explicitly following an experience of 'oughtness', felt especially strongly for values that are moral and social. Recall the strong sense of obligation that Rokeach implied with the idea that oughtness is experienced to be objectively required by society in the way that an incomplete circle is perceived as objectively requiring closure. This may be read as a form of obedience to one's values, closely related to a felt sense of social duty.

The notion of ethical work can be seen to be instantiated in Rokeach's theory through the deliberation that is involved in one's choices. Our choices follow from our values, and as a result of the process of weighing up the relative importance of different values. Finally, the telos in Rokeach's work recurs through the aim he considers to be inherent in human beings, of being considered 'competent and moral', or 'good and great'. Ethics is not, therefore, explicitly discussed in Rokeach's theory, but a particular form of ethics is nevertheless incorporated. Moreover, in the same way as the previous chapter showed how a particular conception of values, as abstract and enduring principles, became embedded in the psychological literature, so the same argument can be made of this conception of ethics. It is not simply that ethics has not been discussed in the psychological literature on values, but that a particular form of ethics has become crystallised in the dominant theories of values.

Having thus situated the concept of values in the larger framework offered by Foucault's analytic of ethics, the substantive question posed of the theory of values,
whether values in contemporary society have in some ways fundamentally changed, can now be reconsidered.

**Postmodernity as a transformation of ethics?**

In ‘The use of pleasure’, Foucault first draws attention to the importance of one’s self-relationship for moral behaviour through discussion of continuities and discontinuities in morality. Contrary to popular belief, he argued there were many similarities between the moral code of antiquity and Christianity. Ignored in common understandings, however, and far less visible, were transformations at the level of ethics. Foucault’s argument raises the question of whether the same may be true of values. As Schwartz has shown, many similarities can be found in people’s commitments to values across cultures. In the content of values, there appears to be a universal structure. However, it has already been argued that values have been studied in this sense only at the level of code. It was at this level, of a basic set of prescriptions and interdictions that Foucault found there were remarkable similarities extending from antiquity, through early Christianity, into our present society. Yet this is no guarantee that there are not simultaneously major changes occurring in ethics.

Furthermore, it was argued in this part of the thesis that Foucault introduced this final axis of his thought, the emphasis on ethical self formation, precisely because he thought there was a change of ethics occurring in contemporary western societies. From antiquity to Christianity, he argued there was a transition from a search for a personal ethics to a morality as obedience to a system of rules, implying at the same time that his present analysis was a response to a reversal in this form of morality. It was a return to a personal form of ethics that he saw re-emerging in contemporary forms of life. It is, therefore, in the neglected domain of ethics that it can be concluded from Foucault’s writing that changes might be expected as a result of the changing social conditions suggested by the notion of postmodernity.

**Summary**

The present chapter began with a brief review of traditional themes in moral philosophy. It then introduced Foucault’s alternative perspective on this domain, switching focus from the content of the moral code and its philosophical justification, to the forms of ethics through which people come to constitute themselves as ethical
subjects in relation to a moral code. It was argued that just as the domain identified by Foucault has been ignored in moral philosophy, so it has been neglected in the psychology of values. Hence, a particular conception of ethics has become embedded in the dominant theories of values. Since Foucault introduced the field of ethics as a way of addressing changes in contemporary society, it can be taken from Foucault that the concern for values theorists should be to go beyond the analysis merely of changes in value priorities to consider the implications of such changes in the field of ethics. Foucault's analytic of ethics, substituting the psychological notion of values for his notion of moral code, provides a conceptual framework for this investigation. That concludes the exposition and analysis of Foucault and provides the foundation for the empirical studies that make-up the remainder of the thesis.
Part 2 Summary

This part of the thesis has presented an introduction and analysis of the thought of the influential French historian and philosopher, Michel Foucault. Two of the initial aims were to consider whether there might be any other ways of interpreting his work than the most popular discursive accounts in psychology, and to consider what he has argued, as a postmodern philosopher, relevant to the question of changing values. After a brief introduction to his oeuvre and review of how it has been commonly used in psychology, doubts were raised about some of the established readings. A broader framework was then proposed for interpreting Foucault, emphasising first, the nature of his project as offering a set of analytics with the objective of an Enlightenment inspired form of immanent critique, and second, the importance of addressing all three axes of his thought. These abstract analyses provided the context for the subsequent chapters and for the thesis as a whole. Expositions were then presented of two specific aspects of Foucault’s work: his analytics of archaeology and ethics. The former addressed the discursive critiques of some newer forms of psychology, the latter, Foucault’s analysis of postmodernity. For the psychology of values, the archaeology was used to highlight the ways in which the enabling and constraining nature of psychological discourse has embedded a particular conception of values in the literature. The analytic of ethics drew attention to a neglected dimension in the field of values that has similarly become incorporated into the literature through Rokeach’s conceptualisation of values. This part of the thesis, therefore, has addressed at least some of the major issues raised by discursive psychology and by theorists of postmodernity. In the process, it has offered a possible alternative formulation of the concept of values. This reconceptualisation will form the basis of the empirical investigation reported in the next part of the thesis.
Part 3

An empirical investigation into the psychology of values
Chapter 5

An investigation into changing priorities of values

Introduction

The empirical studies presented in this part of the thesis explore and attempt to clarify, using traditional psychological methods, the conceptualisation of values that has begun to emerge from the analysis of Foucault presented in the thesis so far. They thus continue the project of developing a new way of reading and using Foucault to reframe existing approaches to the psychology of values. Following the interpretation of the archaeology of Chapter 2, it is assumed that research methods inevitably reproduce a rationality that enables as well as constrains, that in the present case discloses certain aspects of the nature of values whilst concealing others. Hence, in contrast to previous uses of Foucault in psychology that have begun by rejecting existing methods, the first two studies begin the empirical investigation into changes in values by initially adopting the most widely accepted approaches to the analysis of value change. The first studies therefore begin with established methods, considering what they do and do not offer, and how the findings the generate may be understood in the context of the specific concerns of the thesis and the analysis developed so far from the writings of Foucault. The current study thus adopts as closely as possible Rokeach’s method of investigating changes in values.

Rokeach acknowledged that any theory of values must be capable of accounting for both the enduring quality of values, and the fact that what is valued clearly changes over time. Change is theorised by Rokeach in terms of the priority, or relative importance of values. Over time, the values of both individuals and cultures can be seen to change place in a value hierarchy. This change in value priority might explain some of the changes taking place in contemporary society that have been of concern in the thesis. Rokeach and Ball-Rokeach’s (1989) investigation of changes in American values between 1968 and 1981 produced results consistent with this idea. Among their findings
was a fall in the importance of the value of equality, and a more general trend that they described as ‘a shift away from a collective morality value orientation to a personal competence value orientation’ (p. 783). The present study will extend their work to consider the changes in values observable in a contemporary sample and the issues raised by postmodernity.

There are several ways of studying value change, for example, by content-analysing the values implicit in a set of key publications over time. Rokeach’s theory and values instrument introduce a new method. Since the RVS allows the direct measurement of people’s values, it can also be used over time to record changes directly. There is, however, an important limitation. As Hoge and Bender (1974) clearly documented, values change not only within society over time, but within an individual over the lifecycle. One cannot, therefore, simply measure the same sample twice, as in a traditional longitudinal design. It would not be possible to distinguish shifts in values in society generally from differences in the particular sample due to changes in stage of life, with the associated transformations of responsibilities and concerns. In Rokeach’s method, therefore, comparisons are made between random or representative samples selected from the population as a whole or from a particular segment of society. In the latter case, the comparison is thus between two different, but comparable groups measured using the same instrument at different times. This is the method that will be used here to provide an initial analysis of the possible changes due to the postmodern turn.

A diffuse and varied set of developments has been discussed in the postmodernity literature, and there is no distinct moment when these changes can be said to have started. However, it could be argued that it is particularly over the past 30 years, since the late 1960s, that the key aspects of social change discussed in the postmodern literature have taken hold, like the expansion of consumerism, media, and new technologies (Seidman, 1994). The data to be used for comparison with a contemporary sample, therefore, will ideally have been collected at the beginning of this period, in the late 1960s. It might also be argued that the changes related to the postmodern condition would be most likely to be reflected in the values of young adults, whose values have formed in more recent years, and without direct exposure to previous values. Hence, a contemporary student population is an appropriate group for the present comparison.
Finding appropriate values data for comparison with a contemporary sample poses some problems, however. Rokeach (1973) has shown that values vary according to age, gender, class, education, race and culture. Thus, in order to investigate only the effects of changing social conditions, it is necessary to match these other variables. However, the values data must also have been collected using the RVS, and in this early period of its development nearly thirty years ago. The only data readily available, therefore, is from Rokeach’s own study. Since results are reported individually for a wide range of groups, it is possible to choose the one that is most appropriate. This is a group of University of Michigan students attending an introductory Psychology course. They are reported as being about evenly divided in sex, and mostly in the age range of eighteen to twenty-one (Rokeach, 1973, p. 73). As Rokeach states, this group is far from representative of young people. However, it has much in common with a group of contemporary University students also studying Psychology. Excluding mature students from the contemporary group, it may be assumed they are matched relatively closely for age, sex, class and education. But there remains the unavoidable problem of cultural differences. Since this is the only available data set, it is the one that will be used for comparison in the present study, even with this limitation. The potential influence of culture will be taken into consideration in the interpretation of the findings.

In summary, the study presents an analysis of changing values, inspired by the concept of postmodernity, but using the traditional research methods of Rokeach. A direct comparison will be made between the value rankings of two student groups over nearly a thirty-year time period during which the postmodern condition has supposedly unfolded. If there have been significant changes in society and people’s values, it would be expect that they are reflected in changes in values measured by the RVS.
Method:

Participants:
The sample consisted of 102 participants, 47 male (46%) and 55 female (54%). All were aged 18-25 and were psychology undergraduates at the University of London. All respondents to the survey volunteered for the study and were not paid for their time.

Measures:

Rokeach Value Survey (RVS). Values were measured using the Rokeach Value Survey. The version used in the present study combined elements from two of Rokeach's instruments. The instructions and format were taken from Form D, in which participants write the rank they assign to each value, rather than using gummed labels. The list of values was taken from the most recent version, Form G. This version of the survey introduces two new values, 'Health' and 'Loyal', in place of 'Happiness' and 'Cheerful'. These values were included in the later version on Rokeach's (Rokeach, 1982) admission that important values had been excluded in the original instrument. Hence, they are included in the present study. The resulting instrument consists of a short set of instructions followed by two lists of eighteen values, one instrumental and one terminal. Participants are required to rank the values in order of importance to them as guiding principles in their lives (see Appendix A).

Demographics Questionnaire. Participants also completed a short demographics questionnaire, recording their gender and age.

Procedure:

Volunteers for the study were given a copy of the RVS and the demographic questionnaire. They were asked to read the following instructions printed at the top of the RVS, and confirm that they understood how to complete the survey:

"Listed below are 2 sets of 18 values, in alphabetical order. Your task is to arrange them in order of importance to YOU, as guiding principles in YOUR life. Study each list carefully and mark in the box beside each value its priority for you, with 1 as the most important and 18 the least. Work slowly and think carefully. If you change your

---

2 The topic of values is not taught in the department attended by the students. In the present study, and all other studies in the thesis involving psychology students, they were naïve, therefore, as to the nature of the measures used and about the theory of values.
mind, feel free to change your answers by crossing out the original number and writing another. The end result should show how you really feel.”

The survey took 15 to 30 minutes for most participants to complete. Surveys were returned to the author on completion and participants were thanked and debriefed as to the aims of the study. A sample of those participating in the present study was asked if they would take part in a second, follow-up study, involving a short interview. This further investigation is reported in Chapter 5 of the thesis.

Results:

The demographic data was first checked to ensure that all the participants in the study were aged between 18 and 25 years, and thus were comparable with Rokeach’s student sample. None were excluded on this criterion.

Following the procedure specified by Rokeach (1973), the median rank for the sample was computed for each value. Rokeach suggests this is the most appropriate measure of central tendency given the skewed nature of the data typically generated by the RVS. The overall rank order of the values for the sample as a whole was then calculated by ranking each value according to its median. In Rokeach’s terminology this is referred to as the ‘composite rank order’ (CRO). The results for the instrumental values are reported in Table 5.1 and for the terminal values in Table 5.2.

The tables include the data for comparison reported by Rokeach (1973). The first column is the CRO for a representative national sample of adult Americans collected for Rokeach by the National Opinion Research Centre of the University of Chicago in 1968. The second column reports the CRO for the Michigan psychology students, also collected in 1968. The four remaining columns report the results from the present study. These include the CRO, the median rank, and the standard deviation. Also included is an indicator of change, relative to the 1968 student sample. Since the raw data were not available for the comparison sample, it was not possible to compute statistical tests of significance for these changes. To aid interpretation, therefore, a criterion of a difference in CRO of four places or more was used to highlight the most significant changes, representing a difference of over 20% in rank relative to the scale as a whole. Values exhibiting this change have their CRO printed in bold, with an arrow indicating
the direction of the change. Differences of this magnitude between the university and national samples from 1968 are printed in italics.

Between the two student groups, according to this criterion, three of the instrumental values decreased in importance: 'Responsible', 'Self-controlled' and 'Ambitious', the latter the most, falling eight places. The values 'Loving' and 'Imaginative' increased in relative importance. For the terminal values, 'Wisdom', 'A sense of accomplishment' and 'Salvation' descended, and 'True friendship', 'Inner harmony' and 'Pleasure' all ascended in rank, 'Pleasure' gaining most, valued eight places higher. The two new values introduced by Rokeach in the more recent version of the survey both were ranked highly: 'Loyal' fourth, and 'Health' third.

Comparisons can also be made between the two groups of University students relative to the findings of the 1968 national sample. Compared to the differences over time, there were considerably more differences between the two samples from 1968. For 10 of the 18 terminal values (56%), and 7 of the 18 instrumental values (39%), there were differences between the 1968 student and 1968 national samples. By contrast, of these 17 values, 12 (71%) were found to be of similar rank for the 1968 students and contemporary students. In other words, for almost a third of the total set of values, there were differences between the students and the national population measured at one point in time, where in contrast these values remained stable for students measured over the two time periods.
Table 5.1: Composite rank order (CRO) for instrumental values, with comparison samples from 1968.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrumental Values</th>
<th>1968</th>
<th></th>
<th>1996</th>
<th></th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CRO</td>
<td>CRO</td>
<td>CRO</td>
<td>Change</td>
<td>Median</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HONEST (sincere, truthful)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESPONSIBLE (dependable, reliable)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>↓</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BROADMINDED (open-minded)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMBITIOUS (hard-working, aspiring)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>↓</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOVING (affectionate, tender)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDEPENDENT (self-reliant, self-sufficient)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COURAGEOUS (standing up for your beliefs)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELF-CONTROLLED (restrained, self-disciplined)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>↓</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTELLECTUAL (intelligent, reflective)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPABLE (competent, effective)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORGIVING (willing to pardon others)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOGICAL (consistent, rational)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HELPFUL (working for the welfare of others)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHEERFUL (lighthearted, joyful)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMAGINATIVE (daring, creative)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLITE (courteous, well-mannered)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLEAN (neat, tidy)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBEDIENT (dutiful, respectful)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOYAL (faithful to one's friends, group)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Data from 1968 are reported in Rokeach (1973).
Table 5.2: Composite rank order (CRO) for terminal values, with comparison samples from 1968.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terminal Values</th>
<th>1968</th>
<th>1996</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National (n = 1,409)</td>
<td>University (n = 298)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CRO</td>
<td>CRO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FREEDOM (independence, free choice)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAPPINESS (contentment)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WISDOM (a mature understanding of life)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELF-RESPECT (self-esteem)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATURE LOVE (sexual and spiritual intimacy)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT (lasting contribution)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRUE FRIENDSHIP (close companionship)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INNER HARMONY (freedom from inner conflict)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A WORLD AT PEACE (free of war and conflict)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAMILY SECURITY (taking care of loved ones)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQUALITY (brotherhood, equal opportunity for all)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN EXCITING LIFE (a stimulating, active life)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A COMFORTABLE LIFE (a prosperous life)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALVATION (saved, eternal life)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL SECURITY (protection from attack)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCIAL RECOGNITION (respect, admiration)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A WORLD OF BEAUTY (beauty of nature and the arts)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLEASURE (an enjoyable, leisurely life)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEALTH (physical and mental well-being)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Data from 1968 are reported in Rokeach (1973).
Discussion:

The aim of the present study was to investigate the claim that values in contemporary society have changed, as suggested by the idea of postmodernity, using the established methodology developed by Rokeach. Focusing therefore on value priority, it was found that relative to the most equivalent comparison group available, and using the criterion of a difference of 4 or more places in CRO, several values were indeed ranked differently between student groups over a 28 year time period. Amongst both terminal and instrumental values: 'Responsible', 'Ambitious', 'Self-controlled', 'Wisdom', 'Sense of accomplishment' and 'Salvation' were all found to be of less importance; 'Loving', 'Imaginative', 'True Friendship', 'Inner Harmony' and 'Pleasure' were found to be of more importance.

The findings differ in some respects from those of Rokeach and Ball-Rokeach (1989) for their comparison of representative samples from the national population between 1968 and 1981. They found that 'Equality' ranked lower, and 'Comfortable Life', 'Sense of Accomplishment' and 'Exciting Life' ranked higher. For the groups in the present study, 'Sense of Accomplishment' was the only one of these values found to have changed in rank, and in the opposite direction to that found by Rokeach and Ball-Rokeach.

However, similarities can be seen with Rokeach and Ball-Rokeach’s more abstract conclusion that there has been a change from a collective morality value orientation to a personal competence value orientation. Moreover this interpretation, already suggesting a postmodern theme, may be further extended in the direction of a ‘postmodern’ reading, using the results found for this more specific, younger group, analysed over a longer time difference. Attending to the values that changed in rank, it could be argued that the decline in importance of ‘Responsible’ and ‘Self-controlled’ are indicative of a more general decrease in the importance, not simply of a collective morality, but of the monitoring or regulation of one’s behaviour. This might be contrasted with the increased importance of ‘Inner Harmony’ and ‘Pleasure’, representing a greater focus on oneself and the achievement of one’s personal goals. It could be said there has been a change of emphasis from ‘self-regulation’ to ‘self-satisfaction’. Similarly, the decrease in ‘Ambitious’ and ‘Sense of Accomplishment’ might be interpreted as a decline in the importance of values relating to ‘personal achievement’, and this might be contrasted.
with the more highly valued ‘Loving’ and ‘True Friendship’, values related to ‘interpersonal relationships’. Finally, the decline in ‘Salvation’ and ‘Wisdom’ and the ascendancy of ‘Imaginative’ might be interpreted as a change in the relative importance of ‘traditional knowledges’ compared to ‘personal creativity’. This interpretation of the observed changes in values is summarised in Table 5.3.

Table 5.3: Summary of changes in values for two student samples over the period from 1968 to 1996 with suggested interpretations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Less important</th>
<th>More important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘Responsible’ &amp; ‘Self-controlled’</td>
<td>‘Inner Harmony’ &amp; ‘Pleasure’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-regulation</td>
<td>Self-satisfaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Ambitious’ &amp; ‘Sense of Accomplishment’</td>
<td>‘Loving’ &amp; ‘True Friendship’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal achievement</td>
<td>Interpersonal relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Salvation’ &amp; ‘Wisdom’</td>
<td>‘Imaginative’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional knowledges</td>
<td>Personal creativity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The interpretation is consistent with a number of the ideas associated with conceptions of postmodern changes to morality, values and the self. Giddens’s (1991) account of the self ‘after tradition’, for example, though he prefers the term ‘late modern’ to ‘postmodern’, is particularly pertinent. He emphasises the replacement of traditional social roles and forms of knowledge by the more flexible social arrangements and ‘expert systems’ of modernity. These have the effect of displacing people’s sense of self from established, shared norms, and one might add, values. For Giddens, people understand themselves instead through a reflexive narrative of self, integrated with our on-going, and constantly changeable relationships with others (Giddens, 1992). Thus, one does not need to be responsible or controlled in the same sense of regulating oneself against norms; one may not value ‘public’ success to the same extent; and will turn away from traditional forms of knowledge. In their place, one might expect to find greater emphasis on setting one’s own standards, measured through a sense of inner harmony; on developing mutually supportive relationships; and on personal creativity.
There is, therefore, evidence in the findings of this study to support Giddens's account of the transformational effects of contemporary society.

It is also important to note, however, the stability displayed by the value rankings. Of 34 values available for direct comparison, 23 (68%) were ranked by the two student groups within three places over a 28-year period. This would indicate, in Rokeach's terms, relative stability in the overall value systems, even where there are differences in the priorities of specific values. It would appear to dampen the more extravagant claims of postmodernists that there has been a fundamental shift in values. The findings suggest there has been both some stability and change in values.

There are, however, also some problems inherent in the approach adopted in the present study that must be taken into account in the interpretation of these findings. First, the raw data is not available for the comparison sample. It has therefore not been possible to compute statistical significances for the differences that have been discussed. It may be that these differences exist only for the particular samples under consideration, and that there is so much variability within the groups that the generalizability of the findings cannot be safely inferred to the respective student populations. Moreover, the standard deviation, varying from 3.1 to 5.4, indicates that there is indeed considerable variability of rank for each value, within the group. But on the other hand, the only differences that have been discussed are those of four ranks or more, and given the sample size of over a hundred, it is likely that these would constitute statistically significant differences.

A second issue is potentially more problematic. An advantage of standardised measures like the RVS and the Schwartz Value Survey is that they allow direct and precise comparison of values between groups. However, they require the same instruments to be used, on comparable samples. In the present case, completely equivalent data sets are not available. Hence, although major factors known to have an influence on values have been controlled, notably age, one important factor, culture, has been allowed to vary systematically between the comparison groups. It is not clear, therefore, whether the observed differences are a result of the social values prevalent at these two points in time, or due to differences between American and British cultures. A case can also be made, however, that this is not as much of a problem as it may at first
seem. It is revealing to note the similarities between the groups as well as the differences. There are in fact greater differences in values between the two American groups, one a student sample, the other a representative national sample, measured at the same time (1968), than between the American and British student groups at different times. So, for example, 'Mature Love', 'An Exciting Life', 'Independent' and 'Intellectual' are considered more important for both student groups than the 1968 national American sample; and 'A World at Peace', 'Family Security', 'Equality', 'Forgiving', 'Helpful', and 'Clean' are all considered less important by the students. This suggests that the factors entailed in being a student may be more powerful determinants of values than culture. It may then also be that culture is similarly a less important factor than social change. Nonetheless, in the final analysis, this inherent limitation in this approach severely limits the confidence with which the observed differences that have been found can be claimed to be due to changes in society.

Finally, there is a third problem with this approach the study clearly demonstrates. The use of the RVS to measure value change is based on a particular conception of the nature of possible changes in values. Consistent with Rokeach's theory, 'change' is operationalised using only a single parameter: value priority or rank. The problems of this conceptualisation are two-fold. First, it presupposes a theory in which values exist on a hierarchy of importance. Although this aspect of Rokeach's theory is still in dispute, there have been convincing critiques of this theoretical structure (e.g. Heath and Fogel, 1978; Ng, 1980), and it has been excluded, for example, from the more recent model of Schwartz (1992). If this aspect of the theory is problematic, then it raises doubts about the nature of the changes being mapped with this technique.

Second, the conception of change, purely in terms of value priority, does not seem to fully capture the broader differences discussed by contemporary social theorists. Though the analysis of the changes in priority of values of the present study provides an initial data set and, moreover, is interpretable using Giddens's theory of social change, it is questionable whether the findings fully encompass the transformation in values that are implied by the theories of Giddens and postmodern social theorists. It is not clear, for example, how one is to understand the notions of plurality and fragmentation solely in terms of changing priorities of values. More particularly, in the context of the Foucault derived analysis developed earlier in the thesis, Rokeach's conception of
values and hence of value change, can be seen to systematically neglect the domain of ethics identified and elaborated by Foucault (1984a; 1984b). There might well be changes in value priority in the ways identified in the present study, but as Foucault argued, such changes at the level of moral code are distinct from changes in the modes of ethical self formation through which these abstract goals become values for people.

In addition to the pragmatic problems caused by the lack of an ideal data set for comparison, therefore, the study also highlights inherent limitations of this method that raise more serious theoretical issues. Rokeach’s method, comparable data permitting, provides a straightforward way of making the question of changing priorities salient, and offers a starting point for addressing the concerns of the thesis. But it simultaneously excludes analysis of other forms of change the thesis aims to explore.

Summary and Conclusions

In order to investigate postmodern claims about the changing nature of values, the present study adopted the existing methods for measuring value change developed by Rokeach (1973). Rather than reject existing methods, the aim of the present study was to first consider the extent to which this supposed phenomenon of postmodernity could be studied with the extant method. A comparison of two student groups over almost a thirty-year time span suggested that there were indeed changes in values, and that they could be interpreted in ways consistent with Giddens’s (1991) influential view of changing conceptions of the self. There were, however, also important limitations with the approach. First, the lack of a completely equivalent data set limited the confidence with which inferences could be drawn from the study. But more importantly for present concerns, the study demonstrated the restricted sense in which ‘change’ in values could be studied with this approach. Though the method highlighted changes in priority it also systematically excluded any other notion of change. Later studies will investigate what this method has neglected. The next study considers the postmodern theme of plurality in the context of a second major values theory in psychology that postulates the opposite: a universal foundation for values. The second empirical study considers Schwartz’s (1992) theory of the universal content and structure of values.
Chapter 6

An investigation into the universal structure of values

Introduction

The theory developed by Rokeach (1973) established the concept of values as a distinct social psychological phenomenon, and introduced self-report questionnaire methodology as the main mode of investigation. Despite the widespread success of the theory and the associated values instrument, however, both have also been subject to ongoing critique (see pp 32-38). The refinement and elaboration of Rokeach’s basic theory of values by Schwartz (1992) offers the most coherent response to the major criticisms and further advances the general theoretical perspective. Hence his extension of Rokeach’s theory currently represents the most advanced theory of values in this tradition, and is therefore the focus for the present chapter.

Schwartz changed the emphasis of values research from the measurement of the priorities accorded individual values, to the analysis of the relationships between values revealed by ratings of values. Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) followed Rokeach in suggesting values were cognitive representations of a special kind. They then focused, however, on three universal requirements of human existence that they argued values represent. These concern the needs of individuals as biological organisms, the requisites of coordinated social interaction, and the survival and welfare needs of groups. On the basis of these requirements, Schwartz (1992) proposed 10 distinct motivational types of values.

Schwartz has made extensive use of the statistical technique of smallest space analysis (Guttman, 1968) to explore and demonstrate these relationships. This form of analysis allows the similarities and differences between values, expressed in participants’ ratings of their importance, to be represented as distances in space. The result is a multi-dimensional scaling space, in which those values rated similarly are placed close together, and those for which there is a negative correlation are represented
in distant parts of the space. The semantic space can then be differentiated into regions identifying groups of similar values, as well as demonstrating the more abstract relationships between these groups. In comparisons with over 88 samples from 40 countries (Schwartz, 1994), Schwartz found that the same regions almost invariably appear in the semantic spaces. These findings therefore lend considerable support to Schwartz’s claim to have found the underlying universal content and structure of values.

Schwartz’s extension of Rokeach’s theory raises a different set of issues in the context of the notion of postmodernity and changing values. Rokeach offered a method for the analysis of value change, and in his own work reported findings that have been shown here to be consistent with central themes of postmodernity. As discussed in the Chapter 5, it is only in the more subtle implicit limits to the potential for change imposed by Rokeach’s theoretical framework that issues arise. In contrast, Schwartz’s addition to the theory seems entirely contrary to the claims of the postmodern literature. In contrast to the idea that we live in an age of fragmentation and plurality, in which ‘grand narratives’ have been replaced by ‘petit recues’ (Lyotard, 1979), Schwartz’s theory defends the notion of universality. Moreover, the universality is grounded, it is claimed, in human nature, the result of universal requirements of human existence, again contrasting with postmodern claims about non-essential selves (e.g. Hepburn, 1998). Furthermore, Schwartz has not simply suggested a universal foundation but in extensive empirical work, has consistently found the near universal structure of values hypothesised by the model. Hence in the context of the discussion about social change and the postmodernity debate of concern in the present thesis, Schwartz’s theory presents something of a paradox. How can values be both plural and fragmented as postmodernity suggests, whilst possessing universal characteristics grounded in essential features of human nature and social and group interaction?

The present study continues the investigation into the idea of changing values in contemporary society by focusing on the theory of Schwartz and addressing this apparent paradox. It follows in the spirit of the previous study, consistent with the earlier reading of Foucault’s archaeology, first replicating Schwartz’s approach and analysing its results and implications before considering any alternatives. In response to postmodern claims about fragmentation and changing values, therefore, the study attempts to first replicate the universal model of values proposed by Schwartz (1992). It
will use the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS; Schwartz, 1992) and analyse the data using multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) closely following the procedures set out by Schwartz.

The first aim of the study is to investigate the claim that there is a universal structure underlying values. The study will provide a further test of the replicability and robustness of Schwartz's model. So far, amongst the many replications, there has only been one reported using a British sample (Schwartz, 1994). The present study will therefore provide a second data set collected in Britain. The second aim is to then offer an analysis of this data in the context of the specific concerns of the thesis about change raised by postmodernity. It will consider the extent to which this major psychological theory supports a universal conception of values in contrast to claims about plurality and fragmentation. A third aim is for the data from the present investigation to serve as a preliminary stage to a subsequent study presented in Chapter 7. This next study will go on to explore other aspects of values and value change. It will consider, moreover, whether these dimensions are independent of those aspects of values contributing to Schwartz's model. Hence, some of the participants used will be a sub-sample of those taking part in the present study. It will thus already have been demonstrated whether their value priorities are structured according to the model outlined in Schwartz's theory.

The principal research question for the present study is therefore straightforward. It is to test whether the scaling solution found previously by Schwartz can be replicated with a contemporary British sample. Consistent with previous findings, it would be expected to find 10 motivational types of value revealed in the semantic space, arranged according to the structure reported by Schwartz (1992).

**Method:**

**Participants:**

One hundred and five participants took part in the study. Thirty-seven were male (35%) and 67 female (64%). One participant did not report their gender. They ranged in age from 18 to 63 years (mean age 29.61 years, SD = 11.88). Three respondents withheld their age. Approximately half the participants in the study were students in the Psychology department at University College London. The remainder were employed in
a wide range of occupations. Volunteers for the study were recruited via advertisements posted around the college and were paid a nominal sum for their participation.

**Measures:**

*Schwartz Value Survey (SVS).* A version of the SVS was produced using the set of values, response scale, and instructions specified by Schwartz (1992). It consists of a list of 56 values, each combined with a short defining phrase. Participants are required to rate each of the values on a scale from -1 to 7. Scores on this scale are defined as: -1, 'against my values'; 3 'important'; and 7 'of supreme importance'. The version of the SVS used in the study is included in Appendix B.

*Demographics Questionnaire.* A short demographics questionnaire recording gender, age, and occupation was also administered.

**Procedure:**

Volunteers for the study were given a copy of the SVS and the demographic questionnaire. They were then asked to read and confirm that they understood the following instructions printed at the top of the SVS:

'This questionnaire is a list of values. Please rate each of them according to how important they are to YOU, as a guiding principle in your life.

Use the scale at the top of the page, from -1 'Opposed to my values' to 7 'Of Supreme Importance'.

As this is a questionnaire about values, you may find that many of the items seem important. Please be careful to think about each one, and rate highly only those values that are especially important to you. It may help to quickly read through the complete list first and pick out the few that are most important, before you begin rating the others.'

The survey took 10 to 20 minutes for most respondents to complete. Participants were then debriefed as to the aims of the study. A sample of those taking part was then also asked if they would participate in a follow-up investigation involving a short interview. This study is reported in the next chapter of the thesis.
Statistics:

The data were subjected to multi-dimensional scaling analysis using the ALSCAL programme in SPSS for windows version 7.5.

Results:

The screening procedure suggested by Schwartz (1992) was first used on the data. Participants were excluded who use the ‘7’ response option, ‘of supreme importance’, for more than 22 of the 56 values. They were considered to have not sufficiently differentiated the values. Also excluded were those who responded 35 times or more using any one option on the response scale, indicating an acquiescent response bias. Of the 105 participants in the study, eight (7.6%) were excluded on these criteria.

The remaining data were then analysed using MDS. It involved the computation of Pearson product moment correlations for the 56 values. The correlations were then transformed into Euclidean distances between values, which were mapped using the ALSCAL programme to represent them as points in semantic space. This space may employ anything from 1 to 56 dimensions, with anything less than the latter likely to subject the data to imperfect representation or ‘stress’ (Kruskal & Wish, 1978). Typically in multi-dimensional scaling the stress of different solutions is plotted in order to find the point at which there is an ‘elbow’, indicating a marked reduction in the stress of the plot, and hence the most appropriate number of dimensions required by the data. However, in Schwartz’s recent work, 2-dimensional solutions have been employed regardless of stress. Hence a 2-dimensional solution was used here. The resulting scaling solution is reproduced in Figure 6.1.
Schwartz (1992) provides detailed criteria for deciding whether sets of values form bounded regions confirming the presence of the \textit{a priori} motivational types. The region must include at least 60\% of the postulated values; no more than 33\% of the values of any other single type; and at least 70\% of all the values in the region have to have been judged \textit{a priori} as potentially reflecting one of the meanings of the goals of the motivational type. According to these criteria, nine of the 10 value types could be confirmed on the basis of the results of the present study. The missing type was 'Benevolence', for which only five of the nine values postulated as belonging to this motivational type appeared in the same region in the space. Overall, 45 of the 56 values (80.4\%) appeared in the hypothesised regions.

Regarding the overall structure between motivational types, two of the 10 types needed to be moved to conform to the model postulated by Schwartz. Hedonism appeared in the partitioned space between Stimulation and Self-direction rather than
between Stimulation and Achievement. Security appeared between Tradition and the cluster of values usually associated with Benevolence, rather than between the Tradition and Power. Thus, both motivational types needed to be moved only one place in the structure to fit the hypothesised model exactly.

Discussion:

The immediate aims of the study were to further test the replicability of Schwartz's model of the universal content and structure of values, and to place the findings in the context of the idea of a radical change of values in contemporary society. The predictions of the theory were largely found in the present data. The existence of nine of the 10 postulated motivational types was indicated by the presence of distinct regions in the scaling space. Moreover the motivational types were arranged as theorised, with only minor modifications needed to fit the model precisely. The findings are therefore consistent with the initial hypotheses made on the basis of Schwartz's (1992) theory. They seem to suggest, in addition, that the claims of the theory may be held with even further confidence, since the study used data from a culture under-represented in previous cross-cultural analyses.

The findings therefore reproduce the paradox discussed in the introduction. Contrary to postmodern notions of fragmentation and plurality in contemporary society, they show further evidence for a universal underlying structure of values, theorised by Schwartz as a product of universal human requirements. There are three main responses: either the claims made for postmodernity are exaggerated or not applicable to values, and so there is no sense in which there is a postmodern plurality of values; or there is an underlying problem that has not been discussed with Schwartz's universal theory; or the universality posited by Schwartz and the fragmentation suggested by postmodernity are somehow unconnected. Each of these three possibilities will be discussed.

First, then, it may be that the postmodern turn has been overstated and there has not been a fundamental shift in values. It would be simplest to accept the findings of the study as a refutation of the overly bold claims made under the rubric of this very loosely grounded idea. For the time being, however, with no additional empirical
evidence to support or refute the idea of a postmodern transformation in values, this option does not go any further toward addressing the concerns of the thesis.

The second possibility is a critique of Schwartz’s theory. There are indeed a number of ways in which the theory might be criticised. Although the present study has provided an additional corroboration of the theoretical predictions, it could first be emphasised that many of the findings reported by Schwartz have diverged from the model. For example, in data sets from Zimbabwean and Slovakian teachers, and from Israelis living in a Kibbutz, only four of the 10 types appeared as distinct regions. Moreover, for 24 of Schwartz’s 88 samples (27%), only six or less distinct types were found (Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995). However, as Schwartz and Sagiv (1995) recently defined motivational types, as ‘fuzzy sets arrayed on a motivational continuum’ (p. 98), it could be argued that considerable variability is to be expected in the placement of individual values and in the emergence of the distinct regions. Given this inherent variability in the phenomenon and the multiple replications of the theory, including that of the present study, it seems fruitless to argue that this basic structure does not generally exist in values data generated and analysed using the techniques developed by Schwartz.

A second, more productive line of critique might focus on the indeterminacy of the relationship between the data generated by these methods and the theory through which they are interpreted. It could be conceded that the structure in the data found by Schwartz does exist, yet nevertheless question both the specific interpretation of the scaling space and the underlying theory. Schwartz argues that invariant relationships exist between values because they are cognitive representations embodying distinct types of motivation, ultimately derived from universal requirements of the nature of human beings, social interaction, and societies. Consistent relationships are thus found between certain values: if one values ‘Social Power’, for example, it is likely one will also value ‘Authority’ and ‘Wealth’. Similarly, if one values ‘True Friendship’, one is also likely to value ‘Honest’ and ‘Forgiving’. Furthermore, people valuing the former group of values are likely to hold the latter in lower regard, and vice versa. It is clear, however, that there is a significant gap between the structure in the data and the interpretation that these relationships exist on the basis of their grounding in universal requirements. For example, the fact that ‘Honest’ and ‘True friendship’ are commonly
found to be rated similarly is not incontestable proof that this is because both values satisfy the motivational goal of 'preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people whom one is in frequent personal contact' (Schwartz, 1992, p. 11) and that this motivation derives from the universal need 'for positive interaction in order to promote the flourishing of groups' (ibid, p. 11). With no incontrovertible link between the observations and the theory, the interpretation remains open to suggestion of alternatives. A legitimate possibility for resolving the current paradox might thus be to offer a new interpretation of the scaling space consistent with Schwartz's many empirical findings yet also with postmodern themes of changing values. With no compelling way of distinguishing between the two interpretations using only currently available empirical findings, the next task would then be to collect data that might distinguish between the two views. There is, however, also another option.

A third possibility is that there might be a universal dimension of values as proposed by Schwartz, as well as an element of plurality suggested by postmodernity, but that the two are unrelated. This is the possibility suggested by the analysis of values that has been developed in the thesis from the work of Foucault. Foucault drew attention to the emphasis in morality on prohibitions and interdictions, at the level of the moral code. It is, however, for Foucault, at the level of ethics that there have been important changes in contemporary society. It can be argued that the level of analysis addressed by Schwartz is at an equivalent level to the moral code. Hence, if what has been discussed as postmodernity does indeed refer to changes in ethics, then it may be that these developments will not register using the techniques employed by Schwartz, or be relevant to his theoretical aims and interpretation of the data. It is therefore possible, in Foucault’s framework, to find both a universal structure of values, as appears to be the case in the present study, whilst there nevertheless exists a change to a plurality in values at a different level of analysis.

In sum, there are three main ways of addressing the paradox posed by Schwartz’s theory and extensive empirical findings in the context of the literature on postmodernity. It could be that ideas about postmodernity are exaggerated, that Schwartz’s theory is either flawed or represents only one interpretation of the data, or that there is a disjuncture between these two perspectives. One possibility for the thesis would be to attempt to reinterpret the widely replicated scaling space and then collect
data that distinguish between interpretations. However, the thesis will continue by considering an option that exists whether or not one challenges the specific interpretation of Schwartz. Carrying on with the exploration of the conceptualisation of values suggested by the work of Foucault, the thesis considers the possibility that there may be changes in values toward plurality whilst there may remain a universal dimension of values as posited by the successful theory of Schwartz. The next chapter thus uses the analytic of ethics of Foucault to highlight other dimensions of values and other ways in which values might change.

Summary and Conclusions

The present study has further demonstrated the replicability of the model of values proposed by Schwartz’s theory. Nine of the 10 hypothesised domains emerged in the scaling space computed from the sample participating in the current study. This finding, adding further support to a universal model of values, seems contrary to the suggestion by postmodern theorists of trends in contemporary society toward increasing fragmentation and plurality. However, Foucault’s analytic of ethics makes it clear that there may be other dimensions of values which can change at other levels of analysis. The next study now turns to more open qualitative methods in order to investigate the notion of value change and to explore the possibility that there may be differences in the field of ethics that need to be taken into account in analyses of values.
Chapter 7

A qualitative study of values: What do people understand by ‘values’?

Introduction

The first two studies began the empirical part of the thesis using the established methods in the values literature. The Rokeach Value Survey (RVS) afforded the comparison of value priorities amongst students over a thirty-year period leading to a qualified conclusion that the priority of some values has indeed changed. Combining the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS) with the statistical technique of multi-dimensional scaling revealed the relationship between values at a more abstract level, suggesting a universal underlying structure to the content of values. These first studies replicate the methodology most commonly used today in values research, and demonstrate how these tools and analytic methods enable research into the psychology of values.

The previous studies, however, have also demonstrated the close relationship between the contributions made by these approaches to our knowledge of the psychology of values, and certain intrinsic constraints they introduce. Value change is revealed by the RVS only in terms of shifts in value priorities. Schwartz’s methodology affords the replication of his empirical findings, but not the production of data that might contribute to the investigation of fields that may change independently of his model. Both instruments codify precisely elements of the theories from which they are derived. Hence, central aspects of the theories are not open to scrutiny using the instruments themselves. As suggested by Foucault’s analytic of archaeology, discussed in Chapter 3, they introduce enabling limits to values research that disclose new knowledge of values, while simultaneously constraining what can be known of the domain by Psychology.

The later writings of Foucault (1984a; 1984b), introduced in Chapter 4, suggest, furthermore, that there may be other dimensions of values of importance. Moreover, that it is in these other dimensions that there have been changes in recent years. Since
changes in this domain are postulated to be in principle independent of values conceived as they have been in dominant psychological theories, acknowledgement of Foucault's analytic of ethics raises a number of questions for this tradition. Value priorities may have changed in recent years, but might values have also changed in other dimensions? It might also be accepted that there is a near universal structure in the content of values, but are there aspects of values independent of this structure in which there might be difference and diversity?

These questions are the topic of the present chapter. In order to address these issues, to further investigate the conceptualisation of values developed by Rokeach that remains at the centre of contemporary research, and to explore the existence and consequences of the notion of a more radical change in values, a more open and exploratory approach must be adopted. For this reason the present study turns to qualitative methods.

As part of the diversification of the discipline in recent years, there has been a renaissance in qualitative research in social psychology. There is now a range of different qualitative methods available and in current use. Amongst the variety of approaches might be included: 'discourse analysis' (e.g. Potter and Wetherell, 1987), 'conversation analysis' (Potter, 1996), 'thematic decomposition' (Stenner, 1993), 'interpretative phenomenological analysis' (Smith, 1996) and 'grounded theory' (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). All these methods take qualitative, usually textual data as their primary material for analysis. They also offer a less constrained, more open-ended mode of investigation than most research based on quantitative data and statistical analyses.

The main qualitative approaches in psychology, however, differ from quantitative approaches in more than simply their method and type of data. As Billig (1997) notes, they are part of a broader 'theoretical approach' (p. 39). Thus discourse analysis, for example, uses qualitative data in the context of the larger goal of analysing the forms of language or discourse through which our everyday world is constructed and lived. It offers a significantly different perspective on social psychological phenomena from more traditional approaches, and has its own assumptions and research objectives. To use qualitative methods in psychology, therefore, is often to adopt more than simply a new technique.
The present study similarly introduces, with the adoption of qualitative methods, a partial change of perspective. It does not follow exactly any of the specific approaches listed earlier. It does however introduce a more general shift in emphasis from a causal account of values to an interpretative understanding. It draws on the distinction between empirical-analytic and historical-hermeneutic forms of knowledge, to use the terminology of Habermas (1968; 1971) and a distinction common in the social sciences (e.g. Bauman, 1976; Bernstein, 1976; Giddens, 1976). Empirical-analytic knowledge, exemplified by the natural sciences, emphasises the prediction and control of phenomena, modelled as a deterministic system. Hermeneutic knowledge, more commonly associated with the interpretative social sciences, treats people as social agents acting according to reasons. Hence it has the aim of elucidating shared semantics of action, i.e. understanding why people act as they do, from their own perspective. The objective is the expansion and meeting of hermeneutic horizons in order to make intelligible the reasons and justifications that guide people's intentional acts. The investigation of values reported here will now continue, for the present study and the next, by drawing on the historical-hermeneutic perspective and with an emphasis on participants' own understanding of the notion of 'values'. The thesis will return to an empirical-analytic perspective for the final study.

There are, consequently, slightly different aims for the present study to those intrinsic to the research of Rokeach and Schwartz. Their work has followed the empirical-analytic tradition, conceptualising values as a specific form of theoretical variable. Their research has then analysed the empirical operation of this variable, measuring the variable itself for different populations, and its inter-relationship with others. The priority in the current study changes from the theoretical demarcation and definition of values to the generation and analysis of people's own experience and understanding of values. The objective is to uncover, in participants' own terms and from their own perspective, what the concept of values means to them, the impact values have in their lives as they understand it, and the limits on acceptable ways of using the concept revealed in their talk. This hermeneutic analysis of values may then be compared with the theoretical conceptions proposed by Rokeach and Schwartz.

In the case of theories of values, there is some overlap between the interpretive approach taken here, and Rokeach's account. An important part of Rokeach's argument
is that his conceptualisation of values is consistent with the way people understand values in their everyday lives. Hence, he defends the idea that values are ipsative on the grounds that people are used to making decisions that involve weighing one value against another. The RVS is thus cleverly designed to mirror the phenomenological experience of values as presented in the theory. If Rokeach's conceptualisation of values is an accurate portrayal, one would therefore expect to find an interpretative analysis of values that matches the formal description of the 'value' variable proposed by Rokeach.

Braithwaite and Law (1985) and Hague (1993) have both previously used qualitative methods in conjunction with the RVS. Braithwaite and Law interviewed participants in their study immediately after completing the RVS. They addressed concerns about the 'comprehensiveness and representativeness' of the values included in the instrument. They also noted some general comments about participants' experience of the survey. These included problems with the task of placing values in order of priority. Respondents in Hague's study provided concurrent verbalization recording their experiences of the RVS. Hague similarly reported problems with ranking the values as well as with the acontextual presentation of the values.

The basic method of the present study follows that of Braithwaite and Law. Participants first complete a value survey, either the RVS or the SVS, and are then interviewed. They are asked a wide variety of questions about their experiences of completing the survey and about their values more generally. The study differs from previous research in two respects. First, it reports a more detailed analysis of the qualitative data. Second, it addresses a different set of theoretically derived questions. They concern three main areas.

First, the more open possibilities afforded by qualitative methods are used to explore the theory and key conceptualisation of values of Rokeach (1973). Since the same basic formulation of values continues today almost unchanged in the work of Schwartz (1992), the chapter will focus on the original work of Rokeach. It will consider the extent to which the conceptions of values revealed in the way people talk about their values is consistent with the conceptualisation Rokeach proposed. The analysis will consider both cases where people talk about their values as one would
predict from Rokeach's theory, as well as comments relating specifically to the four areas previously criticised in the literature, specifically: the choice and number of values; the notion of terminal and instrumental values, and the implicit underlying structure they imply; the open nature of the meaning of values; and the problem of ranking values.

The second set of questions addresses the problems raised by the idea of value change in a different way from the earlier studies. Having considered changes only in terms of priority, the present study explores a broader sense in which values might change, and investigates in more depth the issues the idea raises in the more radical form discussed by postmodernist theorists.

Finally, the chapter will consider the extent to which Foucault's analytic of ethics can be shown empirically to apply to the field of values, and so open up new areas of concern for values research. Foucault suggests there are four key elements constituting one's ethical self-relationship: ethical substance, modes of subjection, ethical work and telos. The interviews will consider whether these aspects of ethics are relevant to, and may be identified in the way people talk about values. To the extent that they can, the study will also consider the potential impact of this dimension on the nature of values as theorised in psychological research.

In summary, the present study use qualitative methods to conduct an exploratory investigation aiming to go beyond the constraints implicit in current approaches to values. It takes a hermeneutic rather than empirical-analytic perspective to study the ways that people report their experiencing and understanding of values in contemporary society. It addresses questions specifically about the conceptualisation of values proposed by Rokeach embedded in contemporary research; issues raised by the idea of changing values; and the relevance and use of the analytic of ethics offered by Foucault.

**Method:**

**Participants:**

Interviews were conducted over an extended period of time over the course of the thesis. Over a three-year period, four distinct samples were recruited.
Sample 1. The first sample was drawn at random from the participants of the study reported in Chapter 5. Ten of those who took part in the study were approached and all agreed to participate in a short follow-up interview. Four were male (40%) and six female (60%). Ages ranged from 20 to 22 years (mean age 20.90 years, SD = .88). All those in this sample were psychology students at the University of London. Participants were not paid for their time.

Sample 2. The second sample consisted of a further 10 participants. Four were male (40%) and six female (60%). Ages ranged from 22 to 55 years (mean age 33.00 years, SD = 10.19). They also completed the RVS prior to the interview. This sample was recruited from outside the University of London, to broaden the diversity of the backgrounds of the interviewees. They were employed in a variety of occupations: three were nurses; the remainder included an artist, a computer programmer, a policewoman, a salesman, and an advertising executive. One was a housewife. This sample and the following two were all paid a nominal sum for taking part in the study.

Sample 3. The third group was a randomised sample drawn from the participants of the study reported in Chapter 6. Seventeen participants were asked and all agreed to take part in the follow-up study. Five were male (29%) and 12 female (71%). Ages ranged from 20 to 55 years (mean age 31.76 years, SD = 12.69). This group were from mixed backgrounds. Six were psychology students at the University of London. Two were housewives and two were shop assistants. The remainder were employed as an assistant editor, chef, lecturer, marketing consultant, researcher, and typist. One participant did not report their occupation.

Sample 4. The fourth sample consisted of 10 participants, six male (60%) and four female (40%). The age range was from 22 to 70 (mean age 43.40 years, SD = 19.08). Three participants were psychology students at the University of London. The remainder were from a disparate range of backgrounds including: an administrator, a barman, a chef, a housewife, the managing director of a software company, a retired forklift operator and a reverend.

A summary of the age, gender, and occupation of all 47 interviewees is reported in Appendix C.
Measures:

Samples 1 and 2:

Rokeach Value Survey (RVS). Values were measured with the version of the Rokeach Value Survey used in Chapter 5 (see Appendix A).

Samples 3 and 4:

Schwartz Value Survey (SYS). Values were measured in the remaining samples using the Schwartz Value Survey produced for Chapter 6 (see Appendix B).

Both samples:

Demographics Questionnaire. Participants completed a short demographics questionnaire recording gender, age, and occupation.

Procedure:

Interviews were conducted immediately on completion of the values survey. Participants were either asked if they would be willing to take part in a follow-up study (in the case of samples 1 and 3), or had been told in advance that the study would involve both questionnaires and a short interview (for samples 2 and 4). The interview was described to participants as being about their experiences of completing the survey, and their views on values more generally. Consent was obtained for audio taping the conversation. Interviews were then conducted using the interview schedules outlined in the following section. During the interview itself, the participant's completed value survey was placed on a table in front of them and used as a prompt and focus at various points in the discussion. Interviews varied widely in length, from 10 to 45 minutes, with an average interview being approximately 20 minutes. On completion, participants were thanked for their time, paid a nominal sum (except those in sample 1), and debriefed about the aims of the study.

Interview schedules:

Interviews were semi-structured and followed one of two schedules. The first was used with the first two samples and the second with samples 3 and 4. The schedules were developed in advance to address the specific theoretical concerns of the thesis. The over-riding concern, however, was to encourage participants to talk naturally about their
everyday experience of values and to attempt to elicit their personal understanding of the concept. The aim was to elicit their perspective, in their own words. The schedules were therefore used only as a general guide, in two senses. The interviews were allowed to develop as spontaneously as possible, particularly given the intimate way in which values were understood for many participants. Hence, questions in the schedule were asked in the order in which they arose in the discussion, and in most cases, not all questions on the schedule were asked. The interviews are therefore exploratory, not standardised. Secondly, particular care was taken not to lead interviewees in discussions of technical concepts derived from the theoretical concerns of the thesis, rather than from participants' own conceptions. One of the aims of the interviews was to see which, if any, of the new concepts being explored related to aspects of values people recognized. Hence, most questions were deliberately offered initially in an open and sometimes ambiguous form, with little explanation of exactly what was required. Increasingly specific prompts were then used only as it became clear the participant did not recognise the part of their experience the question was designed to address. For example, participants were asked first, simply whether they did anything to remind themselves of their values. Only after they had been given a chance to answer with minimal prompting were they offered suggestions given by others of the sort of activities they might engage in. Where prompts were given, care was taken later with the interpretation before assuming responses were not simply acquiescence or the result of the demand characteristics of the interview.

Schedule 1. The first schedule was organised around four main themes. First, participants were asked about their general reactions to the survey on completing the RVS (question 1). Second, they were asked to account for their choices, to say why they chose particular values as the most, and least important (questions 2 and 3). Third, participants were prompted to discuss their experience of the aspects of the RVS that have recurred as problems in the literature. These included: whether they recognised two distinct types of values, and if not, whether they were understanding the values according to any other themes or structure (question 4); the clarity and appropriateness of the definitions of the values, and whether they interpreted the values differently (question 5) (cf Gibbins and Walker, 1993); whether the list of values was complete, questioning the comprehensiveness and representativeness of the values (question 6) (cf
Braithwaite and Law, 1985); whether there were any items that were not thought to be values, raising the issue of the potential for decay in values (question 7); and finally, whether participants would change their choice of value rank during the course of the interview, questioning the assumption of the stability of values (question 8). The fourth theme was how people understood and related to values more generally (questions 9 and 10). Prompts were used where there was no response to the initial question (reported in Table 7.1 preceded by an ellipsis). After question 6, concerning the completeness of the list of values, participants who did not suggest any additional values were given a list of possible choices in the same format to the survey. These were taken from previous studies in the literature where values have been spontaneously generated (e.g. Braithwaite and Law, 1985), or were suggested in pilot work with University students prior to the study. They were intended to serve merely as a further prompt to see how interviewees would treat the idea of additional values, rather than as a definitive list of excluded values (see Appendix D for the list of suggested values).
Table 7.1: Themes, questions, and prompts used in Interview Schedule 1 (Samples 1 and 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Question ( ... prompt)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Experience of</td>
<td>'How did you find ranking the values?'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the survey</td>
<td>... was it easy, difficult?'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Accountability</td>
<td>'So what made you choose the values you picked as the most important, ... made you put (value ranked first) as the most important value?'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- presence</td>
<td>... and what about (value ranked second) as the next most important?'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 - absence</td>
<td>'And what about those you thought were least important, ... made you put (value ranked last) as the least important value?'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>... and what about (value ranked second last) as the next least important?'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Rokeach</td>
<td>'Did you see a difference between the types of values in the two lists?'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- two types?</td>
<td>... did you notice any themes running through the lists?'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - interpretation?</td>
<td>'What did you think about the definitions given for the values?'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>... did they represent what the values mean for you?'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 - representative?</td>
<td>'Are there any values that you would have put on the list that were not included already?'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>... some values that other people have suggested are: (see Appendix D)'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 - decay?</td>
<td>'Are there any items in the list that you don’t consider to be values?'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 - stability?</td>
<td>'Would you rank the values any differently now you have had more time to think about them?'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 General</td>
<td>'What role do you think your values play in your life?'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>experience</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>'Has completing the value survey made you think further about your values?'</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Schedule 2. The items included in the second schedule address some of the same issues as the first, adjusted to take account of the differences in design between the two surveys, but also introduces more directly the ethical framework of Foucault. Participants were again asked first about their general reactions to the survey (question 1). They were then asked to comment more generally on what, for them, is distinctive about values (question 2). Participants were also asked to account for their choices (question 3). Three questions were included interrogating the notion of transcendence, closely associated with values since Rokeach, but found to be problematic by Hague (1993). They were designed to reveal the extent to which people believed their values should guide their behaviour irrespective of the situation (question 4), and the extent to which they felt their values were likely to change over time (question 5), or as a result
of events (question 6). The remaining questions aimed to illuminate people's self-understanding of aspects of values relevant to Foucault. Interviewees were asked what they thought it meant to act in accordance with their values, whether, for example, thoughts or desires clearly contrary to their values would count as transgressions, or if one had to actually act against one's values (question 7). This was an attempt to elaborate the notion of ethical substance. Three questions were asked in an effort to reveal modes of subjection. Participants were asked what, for them, gave values their importance in order to clarify the sense of obligation they felt (question 8). The same issue was then approached from the opposite direction by raising the question of participants' experience of transgression of their values, and to whom or what they felt the transgression was against (question 9). Finally, the extent of the universality of their mode of subjection was raised, by asking whether the obligation experienced was felt as personal or applying equally to everyone (question 10). The ideas of ethical work and telos could be addressed more directly. The first by asking whether participants did anything to remind themselves of what their values are (question 11). The second, by questioning the ultimate goals to which their values were related: what they might ultimately achieve by acting in accordance with them (question 12).
Table 7.2: Themes, questions, and prompts used in Interview Schedule 2 (Samples 3 and 4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Question (... prompt)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Experience of the survey</td>
<td>‘How did you find the questionnaire?’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2 General understanding | ‘What is it, for you, that makes values special?’  
... what makes a value, a value?  
... as opposed to just an ‘opinion’ or an ‘attitude’, for example?                                                                                                                                 |
| 3 Accountability       | ‘What made you rate the values you did as ‘Of supreme importance’?’  
... (value rated 7), for example?                                                                                                                                 |
| 4 Transcendence - situation? | ‘Do you think your aim is to act as (value rated 7) as you could, no matter what the particular circumstances are?’  
... do you think it is sometimes better to act in accordance with your other values, even if it goes against the values you put as most important? |
| 5 - time?              | ‘If I asked you to sort the cards again in a couple of months time, do you think you would rate the values the same?’  
... what about in a couple of years?’  
... or in 10 years time?’                                                                                                                                 |
| 6 - events?            | ‘Do you think your values would be different if you had a major change in your life, like having children, or starting a new career?’ [as appropriate]                                                                 |
| 7 Foucault - ethical substance | ‘What does it actually mean, in practice, for you to be (value rated 7)?’  
... for example, if you had thoughts that were not (value rated 7), but you didn’t act on them, would that be alright?’  
... are there times when it’s not clear exactly what it means to be (value rated 7)?’ |
| 8 - mode of subjection (obligation) | ‘What is it do you think, that gives (value rated 7) its importance?  
... why does it make you feel good about yourself?’                                                                                                                                                             |
| 9 (transgression)       | ‘What happens if you are not (value rated 7)? How do you feel?’  
... you might feel ashamed, guilty, like you have ‘sinned’, like you haven’t been true to yourself                                                                                                                                 |
| 10 (universality)       | ‘Do you think (value rated 7) is something everyone should be equally?’  
... or is it just something that’s important to you?’                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 11 - ethical work       | ‘Do you ever do anything to remind yourself of what your values are?’  
... for example, take time out alone, read books, go to a church, or anything like that?’                                                                                                                                 |
| 12 - telos              | ‘If you were to always act in accordance with your values, what would you achieve?’  
... what sort of a person would that make you?’  
... how would you characterise someone who didn’t act in accordance with their values?’  
... what sort of person does that make them?’                                                                                                                                                                      |
Results and method of analysis:

The interviews were transcribed in full. The emphasis of the study was on participants' understanding and experience of the notion of values. It was not on the structural features of the conversational turns, or the rhetorical devices used to construct participants' accounts, notions that have become important in recent years in qualitative research in psychology (cf Potter, 1996). Hence a straightforward transcription schedule was used that did not include technical details such as timed pauses or detailed transcription of overlaps between turns. The transcript includes only minor additions to the text where they significantly change the meaning of the quote, for example, laughter indicating irony is denoted '[L]'. The transcription schedule is included in Appendix E.

The analysis was assisted by the software package for qualitative research, 'Atlas.ti' (version 4.1) (Muhr, 1997). This analytic tool allows the researcher to create and attach codes to lines of text. All instances of text relating to a particular category within and between interviews can then be easily collated, compared, and illustrative examples extracted. The package allows multiple codes to be attached to the same lines of transcript.

The objectives of the analysis were set within limits to the type of claims that can be made on the basis of the research design. The data available for analysis was not naturally occurring conversation, since it was clearly, though loosely, guided by the interviewer. Neither did it result from the administration of standardised interviews. Hence, no claims can be made about the frequency with which people naturally talk about values in particular ways. Likewise, there is no firm basis from which to state the proportion of the sample understanding a particular aspect of values in any one way, since not all participants may have been given the opportunity to express a view. Hence the analysis is not a content analysis and no attempt at quantification of responses is made. The objectives are explicitly exploratory and focused on the identification of diversity of understanding expressed in conversation with a minimum of prompting or imposition of theoretical concepts by the researcher. In the context of theoretical conceptualisations like Rokeach's, proposing a highly specified definition of values, the main aim is thus to document the range of talk that seems to reveal conceptions inconsistent with this model. As Popper (1968) recognised, in response to the claim that 'swans are white', any observation of a swan of a different colour is of value; it is not
necessarily important in the first instance to enumerate the prevalence of the new phenomenon. Similarly, in the context of Foucault's abstract schema of ethical self formation, the primary aim is to identify compelling examples of the sorts of phenomena Foucault discusses, as expressed in people's everyday discourse. The objective is not at this stage to establish how many participants employ a specific form of ethical self formation, but to first demonstrate that the analytic categories are meaningful.

With these objectives in mind, the analysis proceeded through a cumulative, layered process. The transcript was initially coded according to a basic set of categories covering the main areas of theoretical interest in the chapter: Rokeach's conceptualisation of values; critiques of Rokeach's theory; lay theorisation of values; postmodernity and social change; Foucault's analytic of ethics; and, key values. For example, any remarks echoing themes discussed in the postmodern literature were coded 'Plurality/Fragmentation'; all comments involving change in values were categorised into one of the three codes to do with changing values depending on whether the comment referred to major events, general circumstances, or stability of values. Text relevant to more than one category was multiple coded. Having identified all the extracts relevant to these general categories, they were then collated, and using a method akin to the 'constant comparative method' of grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), different instances of talk relating to the same topic or concept were compared for consistency and variability between responses and respondents. In this way, finer distinctions were drawn and new codes created. The complete set of transcripts was then reanalysed using the refined coding schedule. The process was repeated until no further distinctions of theoretical relevance to the thesis could be discerned, and all interviews had been analysed using the most detailed schedule. The full set of 49 codes is included in Appendix F. The codification of the transcript formed the basis for the analysis reported in the next section.

It is important to note when interpreting the text that the questions were designed to elicit qualitatively different types of data, and the responses read appropriately. For example, some questions asked participants to comment on their experiences of completing the survey. Responses were taken at face value as reactions to the survey instrument as well as perhaps indirectly revealing something about their conceptions of
values. Other items asked participants to articulate their experience of values, including how they understood their values in relation to the past and future. These answers were not read as indicators of what might actually happen in the future, for example, whether people's value priorities might actually change. However, they can be read as an indicator of the participants' sense, at the present time, of what is possible and likely in the future, i.e. their perceived sense of stability of their values. In response to some questions, participants commonly offered their own theories of values, or perceptions of what was happening to values in the world more generally. These remarks were also treated with caution. They were understood to be expressions of participants' theorised understandings, or lay theories about values and developments in society, rather than direct contributions to psychological theory or reflections of actual social change.

Quotes from interviews are identified by interview number and conversational turn; e.g. '(25.3)' refers to the third conversational turn in the interview with participant number twenty-five. The first question was always asked by the interviewer and has been notated as turn 'O'; all even turns are therefore those of the interviewer, and odd turns those of the participant.

Analysis:

The analysis is presented and discussed in four sections. The first reports findings relevant to Rokeach's theory, his conceptualisation of values, and the most common critiques; the second, the idea of postmodernity and changing values; and the third, examples of the elements of Foucault's formulation of ethics as identified in the interviews. The final section begins to draw these findings together. It suggests a possible reconceptualisation of values that attempts to make sense of some of the problems found for Rokeach's conceptualisation of values, drawing on Foucault's analytic, and suggesting a new way of thinking about the issue of changing values in contemporary society.
1. Rokeach’s conceptualisation of values

Rokeach’s theory as expressed in interviews

As Rokeach (1973) has found in the past, almost all respondents in the present study commented that the task of completing the survey was interesting and engaging. This was particularly the case for those who had completed the RVS, rather than the SVS, and had been required to rank rather than rate the values. Interviewees also spoke about values in a way that was consistent with major facets of Rokeach’s theory. In response to questions eliciting people’s conscious understanding of the concept of values, several offered conceptions similar to Rokeach’s. For example, the idea was mentioned that values serve as criteria, or as a ‘guide’, against which one judges situations:

A value is something which you can set against how you operate on a day to day basis. It’s how, you know, a value you place on something. It’s a benchmark you draw when making decisions and conducting normal life. (34.5)

It’s something that you adhere to, almost like a guide. (25.3)

Additionally for Rokeach, values are not just criteria for judging the actions of others, nor merely a ‘guide’ for one’s own actions; they are intimately linked to the judgements one makes about oneself. They serve as a ‘yardstick’ for the evaluation of how one performs in relation to one’s own standards. They are therefore also related to one’s identity. One’s own standards, reflecting one’s values, decide what is and is not acceptable for us as individuals, whether or not it is acceptable to others. Hence, our values relate closely to who we are. The following participant closely expresses this idea:

Well, one likes to think that it is probably the basis of your character, but also it gives you a place of judgement. That’s the whole point, it gives you a level at which you can decide whether your own behaviour is the correct behaviour or not. Even when sometimes you are not behaving in the right way, it gives you something, a ‘yardstick’, to say, ‘well, yes I acted badly, yes I shouldn’t have said this or done that.’ ... It gives you some basis for how you should be, because that is who you are. Somebody else may act quite differently and feel quite happy about it. (24.53)
When further defining values, asked to differentiate them from mere 'opinion' or 'attitude', participants drew on other qualities of values that were also used by Rokeach to make the distinction between 'values', 'attitudes' and 'opinions' in the technical sense of these terms. For example, values are different because they are universally shared:

... if you believe it to be true for all people. An opinion is what you think, but a value is considered a value by everyone. (29.3)

They were also defined, as by Rokeach, as being transcendent across situations:

A value, in general, is something against which you judge a situation. Something that is applied universally to your actions. (27.3)

And to be enduring across time:

It is something that you anchor yourself to in life. It is something that absolutely sets your basic instincts and direction. It is not transitory. (32.3)

These are all central qualities of values incorporated into the conceptualisation of values of Rokeach. Concerning the role values play in people's lives, participants on several occasions discussed their role in decision-making. It is particularly at moments when difficult decisions have to be made that people become aware of their values. For Rokeach, this reflects the inherently ipsative nature of human life. People are constantly forced to make choices between actions that may seem equally desirable. It is in such circumstances that one is led to a closer examination of one's values, in order to select the right choice. So, in response to the question, 'what role do you think values play in your life?':

I suppose it's not something that you think about consciously... but it might be something that you have to consider when you're faced with a decision, whether to take one path or another... then, I suppose values will pretty much guide your choice of decisions. (4.31)

Well, on an everyday basis, you don't really think about them, but there come points in your life when you have to question your values... if you can't see a real direction or that you've got a lot of directions that you need to choose from, and you've got to make a choice, you know, that you've got to take your life in a certain direction. (5.29)

It is this process of assessing one's values at important choice points in one's life that leads to the emergence of a cognitive hierarchy of values. Through such decisions,
one comes to learn what values are really important to us, and which are not. Thus, one comes to learn from one's experiences of life, and build a stable understanding of values. This conception was also a feature of some participants' understanding of their values. Responding to the question of whether the participant thought their values might change over time:

No, because they're not career based, they're to do with self-development, and they are long held values. They are a distillation, a culmination of thought over a long period of time. I don't think changing my life would change them. I think once you've established your values, you live by them, and you don't allow them to be swayed by events. (26.15)

When asked to account for their choices, a common response was to speak in terms of another central feature of Rokeach's theory: the role of values in relation to self-esteem. As criteria against which we judge actions, especially our own, they form the basis on which people can see whether they are doing well or badly, behaving morally or immorally, whether one is 'good' or 'great'. The achievement of this ultimate sense of positive self-understanding is the foundation of self-esteem. Hence, it is understandable that many respondents regard self-esteem as the basis for their values. Simply, values are important, because they give you self-esteem:

Because that's really important (L) ['An Exciting Life']. It's the sort of thing that gives you self-esteem really, you know.. and an interest in living basically. (1.5)

So what about the other list, why did you put 'Capable' as No 1? (6.8) Because I find it difficult not being able to do things. I find it really annoying, so if I can't do something, then I won't do it at all (L). Yeah, so, I think it's quite important to me.. and I think it's quite important to self-esteem, that you're capable of doing things. (6.9)

The first ones were 'Intellectual' and on the other 'self-esteem' ['Self-Respect'], and I get all my self-esteem out of my thinking. (7.3)

I feel that in my life it is very important to feel that you have succeeded at something. If I felt that I had not accomplished anything, I would have a very low self-esteem. (21.5)

It is noteworthy that in these four quotations very different values have been chosen as the most important to the interviewee: 'An Exciting Life', 'Capable', 'Intellectual', and 'Successful'. Yet in each case, the values operate in the same role, as
postulated by Rokeach, as a criterion that must be achieved in order to maintain or enhance self-esteem. Thus it is the enhancement of self-esteem that is understood to underlie the value's importance.

Finally, the interviews echoed the theory underlying Rokeach's concept of value self-confrontation. The basis for the method of value change is that people are generally unaware of both their own values, at least in detail, and of people they might admire. It is through the dissatisfaction one feels when confronted with this information that lasting change occurs. Reference groups were not provided in this study, but there were numerous comments consistent with an understanding of the survey as a powerful means for revealing something about oneself. Some participants saw the survey as a 'tool', or 'technology' for 'finding out what they thought':

I would say that I was not really aware of my list of things before I'd done that... my list of... whatever they are... what are they?.. values, that's the one (L)... If I kept a sort of photocopy of it and put it on my wall, and look at it everyday... Maybe I'd know myself better. (7.35)

It's made me admit to being so selfish (L). (13.35)

I like this idea of words like that, popped into your attention, and then try to... give your lifestyle, your world theory, through these words, you know? (37.1)

I think it was a good idea. (46.3)
In what way? (46.4)
Well, answering the questions, so that you can find out what you believe and what you don't believe. (46.5)

In sum, the interviews provided data that characterise well some of the basic assumptions and principles of Rokeach's theory of values. Respondents understood values as criteria, for judging themselves and their actions, that develop over time, and that intimately relate to the maintenance and enhancement of their self-esteem. Discovering one's values through completing the survey, as Rokeach argued, was seen to be a powerful form of self-discovery. Since the theory is supposed to reflect the phenomenological experience of values, these comments offer some support for the conceptualisation of values proposed by Rokeach. However, there were also aspects of the interviews that were seriously inconsistent with what would be expected from the theory.
Problems for Rokeach’s theory

The areas of Rokeach’s theory that have been regularly criticised in the past were also found to be problematic in the present interviews. These will be raised briefly in this section and discussed in more detail following the subsequent sections of the analysis.

First, there is the long-standing issue of whether values should be ranked or rated, and the associated idea that values are hierarchical. In both Braithwaite and Law’s (1985) and Hague’s (1993) interviews, participants experienced difficulty trying to arrange values in a hierarchy of importance. The problem was also one of the first comments made by participants in the present study, for example:

Sometimes it’s difficult to put them into order, because some of them I valued at the same level. (5.1)

Very difficult to do. A lot of them I wanted to put equal first, or, equal last. with some of them there’s, like, 4 numbers between them, but they don’t have 4 numbers difference in them. (11.1)

Such difficulty, however, is not necessarily a problem. The theory predicts that it will be hard to distinguish the relative importance of each value, after all, ‘each one is a different ray of sunshine’. The effort involved mimics actual value choice situations, and makes the survey a powerful and valid measure. The survey ought, therefore to present some difficulty, if it is ecologically valid. One participant illustrated well this process of distinguishing values in the survey:

When I first looked at them, I was instinctively thinking ‘Oh yes, one must absolutely be honest, one must do this, or that’, but then you begin to look closer, and you realise that certain things are actually more important to you. (24.19)

Such remarks, however, were uncommon. For the majority of interviewees, the question of hierarchy seemed to present a more fundamental problem.

A second problem concerned the meaning of values. In Gibbins and Walker’s (1993) comprehensive analysis of this issue, they argue that each of the values in Rokeach’s list have at least two different meanings. Since one does not know how participants are construing the values when completing the survey, it is not possible to say what value they consider important. In the informal interview structure employed in
the present study, this problem became apparent in a number of ways. First, the value terms were considered to be vague, for example:

It’s also difficult to know exactly what’s meant by each value. (8.1)

It was clear, then, that as Gibbins and Walker have argued, there is extensive interpretative work required in completing the survey, as acknowledged by respondents. Asked about the appropriateness of the definitions of each value, replies included:

They were OK. Well, I didn’t really need them. (10.21)

Yeah, I did read them, but I can’t remember them. Yeah, I had my own definitions of each one. (7.21)

A lot of these things have got different meanings ‘out there’ to the way I might want to interpret them for myself. (17.23)

Consistent with the findings of Gibbins and Walker, therefore, participants understood there to be different ways of interpreting the values. A related problem was that some of the values were defined in ways that did not match participants’ understanding:

Well the ‘Family Security’ one that’s not particularly right. ‘Taking care of loved ones’. You like to be taken care of as well, and it might not even be ‘taking care of’, but it’s like, responsibility. ‘Being part of a family’, I think, is more appropriate than ‘taking care’. I don’t take care of anyone. (12.29)

In some cases, this led to the value being placed in a different order than it would otherwise:

‘Pleasure’. near the bottom. because it’s an ‘enjoyable, leisurely life’. well, I don’t know, I should have put that further up. I wanted to put that further up, but because it’s a ‘leisurely life’. I like the pleasure bit, but the actual definition here is a ‘leisurely life’. enjoyable is good, but I also like a stimulating active life, I don’t just want to be doing nothing all the time. (12.19)

For most of the values in the RVS, Rokeach provides two further definitions of the value. In some cases, these two descriptions were not just different from the participant’s understanding, but contradictory:

They’ve coupled together things which to my mind didn’t go together. The classic one, ‘hard work’ ['Ambitious'] which I’m in favour of, being brought up to the Protestant Work Ethic, but the other half was

190
‘aspiring’, and I’m not the aspiring kind. I have no driving ambition to become a Bill Gates or a Prime Minister. (41.38)

Hence, the issue was raised again about the openness of the interpretation of the values as well as about the appropriateness of the particular definitions provided in the survey.

The third question concerned the idea of two distinct value systems. It has been argued in the past that one cannot make such a clear distinction between instrumental and terminal values (e.g. Heath and Fogel, 1978). Interviewees completing the RVS in the present study were asked directly whether they noticed or could see a difference between the values in the two lists in the survey. It was not expected that participants would be aware of Rokeach’s exact theoretical explanation. However, some recognition might be anticipated of the key distinction for Rokeach between values relating to ways of behaving, and those relating to the end goals. This might be expected to follow both from the existence of different hierarchies, as well as from the strong cue providing by the grouping of values into lists presented to respondents. However, this was not how the two lists were understood. Commonly an alternative distinction was offered, a variation on the idea of ‘self’ / ‘world’, ‘internal’ / ‘external’, or ‘about me’ / ‘about others’, in place of instrumental values (hereafter ‘IV’) and terminal values (hereafter ‘TV’):

I don’t know, I think the second one [IV] is more of an ideal self, where the first one [TV] is more, I don’t know, something more of a world view, what should be, but not specifically about me. (10.3)

This [IV] was more like a state of mind, whereas that [TV] is more like an environmental thing.. yeah that’s internal, and that’s external. (16.31)

This [IV] is more, really, for an individual, and a few things in there [TV] regarding other people like a ‘World at Peace’, and things like that.. ‘National Security’. they concern a lot of people, whereas these concern just me. (20.11)

At least in participants’ conscious understanding of the values, therefore, the difference between values relating to being, and values related to goals was not salient.

The fourth existing issue about the choice and number of values, the comprehensiveness and representativeness, of the values was also explored. This area
Part 3

was not found to be so problematic in the present study. Most participants did not complain about there being a limited selection of values. In response to the extra set of values suggested as possibilities, only rarely were any thought to be missing from the original list. A more common response was that they would fit under the meaning of one of Rokeach's values, hence:

I suppose if you take a slightly broader definition of each of those words that would cover it all I think. (2.25)

It was not found, therefore, that the range of values was particularly limited, but the way in which this issue was found to be resolved raises further concern about the question of the meaning and potential range of interpretation of the values.

Finally, there was a further problem prominent in the interviews, that has received less attention in the literature in the past. Hague (1993) noted that his participants questioned the abstract nature of values as operationalised by Rokeach. This was a particular issue for participants in the present study. Though some, as mentioned earlier, volunteered definitions of values as transcendent across situations, i.e. universally applicable, others spoke of values as if they depended fundamentally on the circumstances:

It's difficult, I suppose, to rate one value against another, and, this is a very general thing, and choices may be different, for example, for different conditions and for different situations. (4.3)

Similarly, some participants spoke of values as enduring through time, as being a stable part of their sense of self, as Rokeach theorised. But values were also understood as varying in time, sometimes over very short periods:

I mean it depends how I feel on a particular day, I suppose. I ordered this to this time of my life. I mean, I might want 'National Security' [No.18] as my main thing, if a major thing happens in my life. I don't know. (3.5)

That was a problem I felt with this because a lot of my answers were things I thought right now, but if you asked me a month ago my answers would have been different. (13.5)

Yeah, it was really interesting, but, it's difficult to say one's more important than the other 'cause some of them were the same, sort of.. equal .. or my mind would change sort of .. from day to day (L). (1.1)
Contrary to two of the formal defining features of values, therefore, that they transcend situations and are enduring over time, values were discussed in ways that presupposed a different conception.

In conclusion to the first section of the analysis, focusing on the relationship between Rokeach's conceptualisation of values and the conceptions of values revealed explicitly and implicitly in interviewee's talk about values, it was found that there was some support for Rokeach's theory, but also considerable data that was inconsistent with his theory. Problems were found that reflecting the critiques that have been an ongoing part of the values literature. An additional problem concerned the abstract nature of values and their postulated qualities of transcendence.

The next section now considers the question that prompted the thesis, the idea of postmodernity and the issues it raises for value change.

2. Postmodernity: Changing society, changing values?

The less structured methods of the present study allow a broader interrogation of the notion of change than has been investigated so far using the methods of Rokeach and Schwartz. Hence, several different aspects can be discussed.

First, there is the nebulous idea of 'postmodernity' itself. It can first be asked whether there was any evidence from the interviews of the broader social changes mooted using this concept, and if so, whether these changes are related to some form of transformation of values. Though it cannot be inferred from the interviews directly whether there have been changes in social organisation, there was evidence to suggest that at least the idea of a changing society is prominent for some participants. Several of the issues that have been the focus for discussions of the postmodern condition in the theoretical literature were raised in the course of the interviews. So, first of all, there was recognition of the plurality of contemporary society:

Because we are a divided nation now, to what we used to be, we have so many different religions and different people who follow their own way, but there you are. (46.117)

Do you think it's changed a bit with the multicultural, multi-religious society that Britain has tended to move towards? (42.11)
There was also talk directly about changing values with respect to previous times, perhaps in terms of priority, as theorised by Rokeach:

You need to be able to adapt to suit the circumstances or the people around you. And also the social times, the sorts of values my grandparents had were completely different to those that I have. (25.39)

However, there was also talk of a more general feeling of a loss of values, of a more diffuse degeneration of standards. Particularly from the two eldest participants, there was the feeling that things are not as they used to be:

They don’t do religion like they used to, we used to go to Sunday school more, but all that’s finished now, nobody cares. (46.35)

Well because people’ve got no respect for each other, and the things that happen, and you wouldn’t believe that would happen.. well, it wouldn’t happen in our day, this is the trouble today, people don’t respect their parents, you hear kiddies using bad language with their mums, their language is fowl, you never swore in our day, didn’t even know what swearing was. (46.75)

Oh, definitely. It’s gone down to a lower edge all the time, the values, they’ve not got all the values we had years ago. ‘Cause years ago, you could walk the streets and leave your key in the door, and no one would come and burgle you, and no one would rape you, or hurt the elderly, which they are doing now. So values in some people have changed. (47.73)

There was, then, data in the interviews that picked up on themes common to the postmodernity debates, in far as they have concerned social change and its effect on values. Some participants spoke, unprompted, about the plurality of society today, about changing values of contemporary times, and about a general degeneration of values. In one of the previous quotes, the sense of a change of values discussed by Wilson (1985) was noted, a change in the language people use. There were also more specific references to different dimensions in which one might think about changing values. One was the idea of a lack of commitment to values in contemporary society:

I’m quite surprised I forgot about the environment one actually, ‘cause that’s quite important. But in everyday life I do tend to forget about it, because that’s the sort of society we live in, isn’t it? People don’t generally take care of it. It’s, you know, convenience.. often, for convenience, you forget your values in that sense. (1.49)
This is the trouble, I stick to my values, but other people don’t, this is the thing. (46.107)

A different sense again, was the idea that the value itself had changed. Thus social change could make values dated:

Yes, because ‘Equality’ is such a broad thing, isn’t it. I mean ‘Equality’ is also a bit of a cliché. You know, when I went to write that down I thought “you should be equal, everyone should be equal” I mean that’s real sixties type stuff. So perhaps these [terminal values] are better, because they’re more specific and more meaningful. (17.33)

This introduces, therefore, the idea that values might decay. This is not possible in Rokeach’s theory. Values might not only become dated, they may cease to be values. This seemed to be the case for certain values in particular:

A lot of things seem a little bit out of place, like ‘Cleanliness’. (13.19)

‘Clean’, clean is a bit odd. I don’t know I just find it a bit odd. as compared to the other things. and, I didn’t really know where to put it. cleanliness. I suppose cleanliness is important but it’s difficult to compare, I suppose, cleanliness with things like ‘Obedience’ and ‘Loyalty’, they’re just not really on the same level. (4.19)

The issue of the meaning of values has already been raised. It also has further relevance in the context of change. It was found to be another way in which values might change. The value ‘Comfortable Life’ is a good example raised several times in the interviews. Rokeach defines the value as ‘a prosperous life’. But this was not how several participants understood it:

I think people who describe their lives who say they’ve got a comfortable income or something like that, that doesn’t necessarily make your life comfortable. Life can be comfortable from having things like respect or health and inner harmony, it depends how you define it. (5.23)

‘A Comfortable Life’ is just like, well, I suppose, yeah, it does equate, comfort, with prosperity, it means you’re not worrying about anything, and in order not to worry about anything. well, it depends what your values are, some people, like travellers, don’t need any objects or steady income to make them any more comfortable than they are, they’re comfortable in what they do. and that’s a prosperous life for them. I suppose that’s a value judgement thing. (16.27)
The definition of the value 'Comfortable Life' was thus interpreted as itself a value judgement. However, it could also be argued that this is a further effect of value change. The notion of a 'Comfortable Life' may well have been dependent on wealth thirty years ago, but with improving standards of living, it may well not be the case to the same extent today. For example, consumer goods that may once have been 'luxuries' come to be seen as 'necessities' (Lunt & Livingstone, 1992). Luxuries associated with prosperity today, for example, expensive hobbies or exotic holidays, might be more likely to be associated with 'An exciting life' than a 'Comfortable life'.

Other comments by participants highlighted ways in which other values might be understood to be historically contingent. For example:

Well I don’t believe in Nations, so ‘National Security’ is not important at all. I don’t believe that any one Nation is any more important than any other Nation.. I’m not sure they really exist. (6.13)

This quote could be read as a comment on globalization as discussed by Giddens (1991), for example. A second comment by the same participant could also be understood through issues raised by Giddens (1992), particularly his notion of the 'pure relationship'. He argues that there has been a shift in people’s understanding of family. From once having strong ties, based on tradition and one’s upbringing, people today feel less attached to their family. Thus:

Well I don’t particularly believe in Families. I believe in people, but I don’t really think my family has any more claim to my respect than any one else I know. I just know them better than some other people. I don’t believe that just because I have blood ties to them, they should be more important to me. (6.17)

Giddens (1991) discusses this break with the traditional conception of family, in conjunction with wider changes in people’s sense of community. This may introduce another different way in which values might change. Given the understanding some people have, it seems likely that the foundation for values they presuppose is likely to be eroded given current conditions:

I mean, I know loads of people, and they respect me. When people talk to you.. I mean, I can walk round the town and have twenty to thirty people speak to me. If you’re not respected, then people would just walk past you, wouldn’t they? (46.121)
Giddens argues that with the loss of tradition in contemporary society, such social networks can no longer be relied on. Several other comments could be understood in terms suggested by Giddens, as a break with tradition, community and a sense of belonging:

Yeah, well, being helpful, that’s quite important, because it’s going with um… friendships. true friendships, and being ‘Loyal’ and things like that. I mean, it’s quite isolated in this world. Yeah, you have to think about each other. (1.11)

Not actually ‘Independent’, but more like self-reliant, self-sufficient. I mean that’s important, because when it comes to the crunch, basically, in this life, you’re on your own, you are.. there’s no one else that’s always going to be there for you. (18.15)

In summary, there was awareness amongst some people of the themes that have occupied social theorists about changes in contemporary society. Moreover, there were a variety of ways in which values were understood to have changed. It might be in terms of a simple change of priorities, as theorised by Rokeach. But it might also be in a number of other ways: a fall in standards; a loss of commitment to values; the dating of specific values; the ‘loss’ of some values; a change in the meaning of certain values; a loss of the concepts they relate to, as is possible in the case of the Nation; and a loss in the foundation for values, in family or community. Thus, analysed with a concern for change, it can be seen that there are numerous ways in which transformations in values might occur. These issues will be discussed again in the context of the dominant theories of values in the final section, after first considering the findings in the context of Foucault’s analytic of ethics.

3. Foucault’s analytic of ethics.

Psychology has yet to take up in any depth Foucault’s final work on ethics. Hence, there have so far been no empirical investigations framed specifically in terms of the analytic Foucault offers. The main aim of this part of the study was therefore to find ways of bringing the analytic concepts to bear in a contemporary empirical context. A number of questions were asked to encourage participants to discuss aspects of their values relevant to the elements Foucault proposes as belonging to the field of ethics. In the order in which they will be discussed, these are the ethical substance, telos, mode of subjection, and ethical work.
1. Ethical substance

Ethical substance concerns what aspect of oneself is the focus for ethical judgement. Participants were asked directly what part of themselves they considered relevant to their values. For example, if they valued 'Loyalty', what did being 'loyal' actually mean in practice: what aspect of themselves came under scrutiny with respect to this value? A key distinction suggested by Foucault is between one's thoughts or desires, and one's actions. In the strongly Catholic French context in which Foucault worked he was particularly interested in the status and function of desire. Desire would in itself, if inappropriate, constitute a transgression of one's moral commitments; hence, one of the key role of the Confessional. The question was interpreted by a number of participants in terms of the value 'Loyalty', and in the context of relationships. In this sense disloyal desires were commonly not seen as a problem:

No, as long as they are not acted upon. You know, look but don't touch, whatever. It doesn't really matter. (23.27)

In other words, it is not desires that are the substance of one's moral gaze on oneself; it is only one's actions. It can be inferred that in Foucault's terms, for these participants, actions, rather than merely thoughts constitute the ethical substance. There were other cases, however, where it was not one's actions either that came under scrutiny, but one's understanding of the correctness of the act. As long as one was clear about the meaning of the act, that one knew an immoral act had been committed, it was deemed to be acceptable:

Yes, at the end of the day if it doesn't hurt anyone, and it wasn't harmful to me or to someone else. It's all right, because it's only thoughts. And even if I carry out them it's all right ... As long as it doesn't hurt anyone, and it doesn't hurt me. As long as I know I shouldn't have done it. (29.17)

A different conception of ethical substance is apparent in this quote, where it is an understanding of one's motives behind an action that is important. The prime focus of moral attention is thus the existence of a pact of honesty with oneself. A similar understanding was apparent for another participant. Asked whether one had to act dishonestly or merely think dishonest thoughts in order to transgress a value, they replied:
I can have dishonest thoughts about actions, does that make sense? I think that’s normal. That’s different from what I perceive ‘Honest’ as. Dishonest, as in telling a lie, that’s ‘dishonest’. But mostly, not pulling the wool over my own eyes, especially about my motives behind something. I have to be honest with myself, and ask myself what my motives are. Maybe it’s less important being honest with other people. I know that sounds awful. (36.27)

Again, therefore, a form of ethical substance could be seen to emerge based not necessarily on one’s thoughts, or actions, but focused specifically on a certain part of the domain highlighted by Foucault, the relationship one has with oneself, and the state of this relationship.

In sum, it can be seen that there are aspects of values and the relationship one has with oneself that it makes sense to discuss in terms of Foucault’s concept of ethical substance. Moreover, there was some variability in the understanding of this element between participants.

2. Telos

The telos, as an aspect of one’s self-relationship, concerns the ultimate goal one holds in relation to one’s ethical practices. That is, in this context, what does one achieve through acting in accordance with one’s values; to what aspirations does the fulfilment of one’s values relate? As for the notion of ethical substance, the concept of telos could be applied to participants’ discourse and a range of modes of telos observed. For example, for one participant who rated ‘Helpful’ highly:

Hopefully, I will feel that I am glad that I have done everything that I have done, and that there is nothing else I would like to do, and also I wouldn’t like to feel that there was something that I could have helped with that I didn’t. (21.33)

A different form of telos involved the concrete relationships one might achieve:

That’s hard. I hope to have a close relationship with my family, as I grow older. I hope to settle down, and have family of my own, and have a stable group of friends that I can always rely on. (22.31)

And differently again, as a feeling of contentment, with the understanding that one had done the best they could in their particular circumstances:

It means that, given a certain set of circumstances, if you act in the way that is satisfactory to you, then you feel OK about yourself, and
that means that you can feel OK about people, that you have done the best you could have in the circumstances. (24.55)

Also as a final state of 'harmony with others':

What these values do, in my view, is that they give other people the benefit of a doubt. And that had to bring harmony. And, just for myself, it is important to work towards harmony with others. (31.17)

Thus examples of what can be seen as the telos of values were evident in the interviews. The elements proposed by Foucault that were most apparent, however, were the concepts of mode of subjection and ethical work, discussed next.

3. Mode of subjection

A further factor for Foucault in the understanding and performance of moral behaviours is the issue of how one recognises one's obligation, for example, not to commit adultery. In the present context, what modes of understanding exist through which we feel obliged and justified in acting in accordance with our values, even when they might go against what may be, for the moment at least, a more desirable act. Several questions related to this far-reaching element of ethical self formation, but it was revealed most clearly in the ways people accounted for their value choices. Interviewees were asked directly why they chose a particular value as the most important (when the had completed RVS) or rated a value highly (in the case of the SVS). This was generally a difficult question to answer. It was common for participants to respond, for example:

Yeah.. don't ask me to explain that (L)... that's just, I don't know.. something of a high priority. (10.13)

It was also common to suggest that the choice was due to the existence of relationships between values, for example, that one value led to the next. This response did not directly reveal any differences in modes of subjection, and will be discussed in more detail in the next part of the analysis.

Some participants, however, found it easier to justify their choices. There were, moreover, a number of forms of justification offered. They can be read as different modes of subjection for the recognition of one's values. It can be seen that these
different ways in which obligations are recognised in some cases recapitulate the major themes of moral philosophy introduced earlier in Chapter 4.

‘Divine Law’

The interviewees who in general found it easiest to speak about their choices and the obligation they felt toward their values were those for whom values were grounded in religious beliefs. Asked why they chose a particular value as the most important:

Well.. religious beliefs I suppose.. simple answer (L). (2.7)

It’s as a result of my Christian beliefs. (27.5)

A reverend expressed the religious foundation for values especially clearly:

Why do I follow my values? It’s not to make me a better person, and it’s not to benefit my friends and family. It’s to obey the Lord, because this is what God says in His Word. I do it to glorify God. (44.41)

One way in which one’s moral obligation to follow one’s values is recognised, therefore, is through religion or ‘Divine Law’.

‘Personal faith’

Some interviewees expressed a variation of the idea of Divine Law. It also drew on a notion of ‘faith’, as the underpinning of values:

Because it is something you believe in, a sort of a faith if you like. (24.5)

But it was clear that for some this need not be a faith in God. Several participants spoke of a ‘personal religion’:

‘Freedom from inner conflict’ ['Inner Harmony']. I mean, that extends to having some kind of philosophy that guides your life, so that.. at the moment I don’t have any kind of philosophy, I’m not religious.. a lot of people need some kind of framework that underpins their life, some purpose, and for most people that’s religion, but I think you can have your own personal religion, and that doesn’t even need to be a conventional form of philosophy, in terms of Buddhism or whatever, but some kind of belief in why you do things.. and so the end result of that, obviously, is ‘Inner Harmony’. (5.25)

A second justification for values was, therefore, analogous to religious beliefs, but might be referred to as a ‘personal faith’.
'Practical Reason'

Some participants introduced rational arguments in support of values. They discussed values in terms of principles that have a rational justification:

Well, the world would simply not survive without 'Honesty'. Life has to be based on some principles. (30.7)

The explanation of this principle often took the form of some wider benefit to the common good, as rationally demonstrated, for example, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma scenario used by game theorists (e.g. Axelrod & Dion, 1988):

Yeah, same sort of lines really, you have to be honest. It’s a case of, what’s it, Prisoner’s Dilemma, I suppose, really.. ‘Honesty’, not cheating on the other people.. I mean being honest with yourself and being honest with other people.. it’s good. (2.17)

‘Responsible’.. I think responsibility, again, responsibility is a value that relates to other people. It’s not so much something for our own personal gain, or our own personal benefit. It’s something which is necessary in society in which you deal with other people, and other people deal with you. (4.13)

This view has clear affinities to the philosophy of Kant, with its emphasis on rational principles one should follow irrespective of circumstances. One participant took this idea further by picking up on the idea emphasised by Kant that one cannot rely on convention, but must be capable of deliberating by oneself:

Ideally everyone’s got values that have something in common, that society benefits from, because everybody’s living from a moral standpoint. And it’s not an obligation because it says so in writing, so you have to do something. It’s because you’ve thought something through, and you can see that it’s for the benefit of yourself, and for the good of everyone else. Which is not the same as just following a rule without understanding why it’s been made. (38.21)

A mode of subjection can be identified, therefore, that situates the obligation to follow values in rational principles, or in Kant’s terminology, that is in accordance with 'Practical Reason'.

'Discourse ethics'

Given that some of the justifications can be interpreted as reflecting elements of Kant’s moral philosophy, it was considered whether there might be evidence of people
using the modern day revision of this philosophy based on discourse and communication. For example, the following quote introduces some aspects of the necessity of argumentation emphasised by Habermas:

I think it's really important to argue about values. We can't all just be sheep and follow things, because something might happen to be wrong and we'd all believe it. You've got to argue about things. (39.15)

But there were few examples overall of what might be called a mode of subjection reflecting 'discourse ethics'.

'Care'

More common was another of the alternatives to Kant that has emerged primarily through feminist theory. The psychologist Carol Gilligan (1982) has been influential with the idea that women use different modes of justification in moral dilemmas. Rather than finding their ideal in rational principles, similar to the mode of subjection of practical reason, she suggests that if one attends to the voice of women, it will be found that women have a different sense of moral obligation. Rather than principles, it focuses on 'care' for others. This form of ultimate responsibility as a justification for moral behaviour was also found in the context of these interviews concerning values. For example:

Because it must follow on that if the most important people in your life, for instance, are your children, your partner, 'Loving', is a part of how you want to be with them, they are the thing that you care about most. (24.9)

For this participant, 'Loving' was one of the values rated highest, and it is justified ultimately through the primary importance of relationships with others. 'Care', then, could be posited as another mode of subjection.

'Integrity'

A further form was closely related to one of the values, 'Inner Harmony'. It is demonstrated in the following extract, where the concept serves three distinct roles. It is the value that was rated most highly hence it is something to value. But it can also be seen to be understood as the imperative through which one is obliged to follow one's values. Finally, it is also the criterion against which one's actions are measured:
Why did I choose ‘Inner Harmony’? Because having inner harmony appears to me to be the most important thing, otherwise you must be going against your own beliefs and you would be lying to yourself about something, fooling yourself, and you can't. At the end of the day you have got to follow what you believe in. So, going back to the fact that it is almost a faith, it’s something so deeply ingrained in you, that you have to do what is consistent with having Inner Harmony. (24.7)

‘Inner Harmony’ serves the function here of an indicator as to whether one is acting in accordance with one’s own beliefs. Hence, it could be suggested that there was a different mode of subjection labelled ‘Integrity’.

‘Virtue’

Other participants demonstrated some of the ideas that have become popular through another alternative to Kant’s philosophy, Virtue ethics. One acts in accordance with one’s values in so far as they represent what one can contribute to a society, the ‘virtues’ one has. One participant in particular expressed a clear version of virtue ethics in support of his value choices, construing them as a duty, based on being unreasonable:

There’s an interesting quote, ‘a reasonable man shapes himself to fit the world, the unreasonable man shapes the world to fit himself, therefore all progress depends on unreasonable men’, which is kind of true. So, in a way, I see it as my total duty, to be myself to the nth degree, because that will be the best for the world. I mean, it might sound arrogant, but I kind of believe that’s true, to be the kind of flame, and burn as bright as possible, so everyone who’d want to be influenced by you will look and go ‘that’s inspiring’, or ‘God, yeah, he’s sure of what he wants, and I believe what he believes to be a good way to go about living’. So it’s more a kind of owing it to yourself, and, hopefully, it’ll affect all those around you. It’s about the strength of belief as well, if you look at all the people who stand out in history, social reformers, Martin Luther King etc., I’m sure it started in his inner belief that the inequalities he saw around him were unfair, but in believing in it himself, he was an inspiration to those around him. (43.21)

To summarise, it was found both that the notion of mode of subjection as an element of ethics could be identified in participants’ interviews and that there were a variety of different forms. These findings have a number of important consequences for Rokeach’s theory that will be discussed in the next section of the analysis. First, the final element of Foucault’s formulation of ethics will be considered.
4. Ethical work

Ethical work refers to the practices people actively engage in to constitute or shape themselves as moral subjects. It was interpreted in the present context of values, at first broadly, as whether people did anything to remind themselves of what their values are. The inquiry prompted a wide range of responses and opened a number of issues for values theory. First, it was clear that some people did not do anything to remind themselves of their values. It became apparent, moreover, that ethical work was closely linked first to how aware one was of one's values:

I do spend a lot of time by myself and that doesn't bother me, it gives me time to think about where I'm headed. But as to whether I remind myself of my values, I wouldn't say I consciously make an effort, you're not really aware of your values, they're so intermingled with how you conduct and live your life, that you're unaware of them really. (25.35)

I don't really give much thought to them. If you don't make the effort it is quite easy not to think about them. You try to stick to them, but you are not continuously thinking about them. (28.21)

No. I don't think I have ever really thought about it. (21.31)

For one participant, a lack of on-going awareness of their values was linked to them becoming well established over time.

I used to, but I do not feel that I need to anymore. I think that they are very entrenched. (32.37)

This was also related to the idea that values were simply the way one was:

I don't think that is really possible. I mean that unless someone brings up the questions. But I don't really think about it, that's the way you are. (45.33)

The first issue the idea of ethical work raised, therefore, was one of awareness. For some people questions about ethical work, whether one does anything to remind oneself of one's values, simply led to acknowledgement of a lack of awareness of one's values. Others, however, readily acknowledged practices related to values. In the same way as for modes of subjection, and in some cases related to this other element there were a variety of practices engaged in. Some were clearly related again to religious beliefs, for example:
Do you ever do anything to remind yourself of what your values are?
(27.18)
Yes, I go to church. (27.19)

It was the religious interpretation of values that was of particular interest to Foucault. He contrasted the strict monitoring of oneself in relation to a code with the earlier, but in some ways equally rigorous, practices of the Greeks. This mode of self-interrogation, as ethical work, was clearly described by the reverend interviewed in the study:

Oh, they need to be reflected on. Whether I do or not is a different issue (L). I do it, I do it often, and any time you pray, or read the Scriptures, that’s all part of it. When you pray and read the Scriptures you are examining yourself, and the Bible tells us to examine ourselves and so, yeah, it’s important that we examine ourselves and examine our lives to see whether or not we are consistent in keeping our values, and whether or not we sin, or whether or not we obey the Lord... so it’s important that we examine ourselves, daily. (44.35)

For the religious participants that were interviewed, therefore, there are a number of practices one engages in to monitor whether one is following one’s values. As described here, these include going to church, reading the Scriptures, praying and, as Foucault stressed, a close and on-going examination of oneself.

For those participants who were not religious, a number of other practices were discussed. They included thinking through situations on one’s own, in order to resolve conflicts over values:

Sometimes, if you have had a bad argument where a conflict of values has arisen, you may take time to think it over and reflect on this conflict. (22.29)

Yes, I think about things. I think how I have handled different situations and if I handled it wrongly, one, do I care about putting it right, all depending how important it is, but if it is important, I think about something until I can resolve it satisfactorily to my own conscience, whatever. (24.65)

I do lots of things. If I think that I’m thinking thoughts that go against the way I am, I’ll sit down and try and work it out. (35.31)

This might include writing down where one stands in relation to one’s values:

I think I have to remind myself... I think maybe occasionally, if I was in a situation and I was uncertain what I was going to do, I might try
and write what it was my values and priorities might be, in order to think about what to do in a situation, if that makes sense, to organise a situation. Yeah, I think I constantly monitor, things like self-esteem, how I’m doing, I think on a daily basis. Self-monitoring. Just watching myself. Because I sometimes can have low self-esteem, so I have to watch myself. (36.35)

It can be noted that these secular practices, also as stressed by Foucault in relation to the ancient Greeks, can be no less rigorous in some senses than their Religion based equivalents. Hence, they may also involve a constant monitoring, ‘on a daily basis’. Other practices were also discussed, some still more active, involving visiting special places, meditation and ‘development groups’:

Well, I visit, you know, I visit the odd place which has some sort of sentimental value to me, which reminds me of my values and why, why I do what I do, and why I have set these values for myself. (34.43)

Yes I do. I’m really into my own spiritual development. I meditate regularly and I go to a development group, and I have been training in Reiki healing that works on all the loving principles. (31.21)

There is, therefore, a distinct contrast between those who seemed not to be consciously aware of their values, and others engaged in a variety of practices designed to remind them of what is important to them.

A different set of practices again also emerged. They entailed challenging what it is that is valued. Some practices of ethical work seemed to be designed specifically to instantiate a process of re-evaluation of values:

Very, very conscious of them. And conscious of a continuous juggling around trying to work out the right strategy basically, which are the best attitudes to have ... Someone might do something to you, and you have to adjust to change your values somehow. (19.21)

Yes, definitely an active thing that you learn, they’re not ingrained, and by discussing them, then you can change them ... I do think they’re important to being happy, for making you happy, perhaps something to move towards. But you’ve got to be able to change them as well. (39.5)

If I’ve ever gone against my value system, I have to analyse why I’ve done it. If I find I’ve done it for a good reason, I have to look at my value, and think, ‘was that a good value to hold?’ You have to challenge it. (43.23)
This then, introduces a second concept in the context of ethical work, the notion of revaluation: the process of re-assessing whether one's values are the right ones, and potentially changing them.

Finally, the last concept that became apparent concerned not just knowing what one's values were, or assessing whether they are the right values, but the extent to which one ensured one was following one's values; the idea of self-regulation against one's values. Ethical work can be understood to also relate to practices through which we enforce our values. Kluckhohn (1951) introduced the idea that values were a constraining force acting to guide us toward what was desired, rather than merely desirable. This was a prominent feature of the interviews. The following extract captures well the distinction Kluckhohn emphasised:

Say with this thing about 'Self-controlled'. I mean I might want to do something, but because of my values, I might go against it. Because values, aren't something um.. instinctive.. they're almost like Ten Commandments, either abide by them or, you know.. and I think “I shouldn’t really be doing this because I should be doing this”. (10.31)

In the following case, it is a fundamental requirement of their larger project in life:

To carry out that role ['Responsible'], you can’t really be subject to other things, otherwise you don’t carry it out in the best way. So you’ve got to be controlled in the way that you do it. (8.19)

This form of self-monitoring was also related by one participant to conformity to a Divine Law, but suggested that the discipline involved in this aspect of ethical work was not necessarily tied to a Religious foundation:

[cf 'Intelligence'] I just think it is the ability to keep your mind open to the way people are really. The way the world is arranged in a sense, I mean it goes hand in hand with, I think, enlightenment and some sorts of religions, I am not conforming to a particular religion, but the kind of discipline involved with some of them. (33.21)

In the same way as for the other elements of ethics, however, it was also apparent that there was considerable variability in the practice of regulation. For example, while some stressed the importance of keeping oneself in check with one's values, others emphasised that it was unnecessary to monitor one’s actions in this way:

Well, in a way, that ['Self-controlled'] is a form of respect for others. But I don’t.. I suppose, I’m just a bit more instinctual than that really. I
don't think I really think about it. I don't think being too self-disciplined has too much of an influence on what I'm actually like. I don't think you should have to regulate yourself that much really.

(15.17)

In sum, the notion of ethical work could also be seen to be relevant to the context of values. It raised the issue first, of the awareness people had of their values. Some were not aware of what their values were, others were very clear about them. Related to this basic difference were two practices that presuppose awareness of one's values. First, there was the idea of revaluation, the process of questioning and possibly consciously altering one's values. Second, there was the process of regulation, monitoring that one was acting in accordance with one's values.

The final section of the analysis now integrates some of the findings discussed in the previous sections to suggest a possible new conceptualisation of values incorporating the work of Foucault, and a new way of addressing the concern of the thesis about changing values in contemporary society.

4. Changing conceptions of values in contemporary society?

It has been argued that Rokeach's theory introduced a qualitatively new development to the social science of values. It brought a notion of values as 'guiding principles' with special qualities: values as universal, absolute, hierarchically ordered, and transcendent across time and situations. These qualities distinguish values from other objects of cognitive architecture. The defining features of values also became embedded in values theory more generally in Psychology, through the main values surveys and subsequent developments of the theory. It was then argued that, while neither Rokeach nor Schwartz specifically addressed the domain of ethical self-relationship, both nevertheless could be understood to have incorporated certain features of a particular form of ethics into their theories of values. In Rokeach, for example, there is an implicit mode of subjection grounded in a form of social duty, the obligation one feels to society to follow one's values, comparable to the experience of the closure of an incomplete circle; and a telos characterised by the desire to see oneself as 'good and great'.

While the analysis developed so far has offered some support for Rokeach's theory, it has also highlighted some problems for the position he proposed. It showed
participant understandings of values that are significantly inconsistent with what might be expected from Rokeach's conceptualisation of values. It also demonstrated a number of meaningful ways of thinking about 'changing' values other than simply in terms of priority. Finally, the elements of ethics proposed by Foucault were shown to be demonstrable in the context of the domain of values, and a number of different forms of ethical self formation became apparent.

The central argument of this section is that these findings can be understood to be closely related: that some of the key problems for Rokeach's theory found in the interviews are the result of differences in people's conceptions of values, and that they are related to differences in modes of ethical self formation as suggested by Foucault. More specifically, key problems identified in the interviews can be attributed to the rejection by some participants of the conception of values as principles, central to Rokeach's conceptualisation. Adding Foucault's analytic, moreover, suggests that this rejection is consistent with the adoption of different forms of ethics. Since, for Foucault, it is the emergence of new forms of ethics that is characteristic of contemporary society, the analysis thus highlights a new way of understanding the idea of changing values in contemporary society.

The final part of the analysis therefore focuses on two key aspects of values that are proper to values understood as principles: that values are abstract and enduring rather than contextual and transitory. The fact that these aspects of values were commonly criticised in the interviews may be interpreted as the rejection of the conception of values as principles and can be related to the adoption of different modes of ethical self formation, along with other factors.

**Values: Abstract or contextual?**

Though not a major feature of the critiques of Rokeach's theory, the idea that values may be rated or ranked in the abstract raised problems for Hague's (1993) participants as well as for those in the present study. It can be argued first, that this is a reflection of particular conceptions of values, that sees them as contextual, and second, that this is the result of alternative experiences of self-relationship, particularly of modes of subjection.
Principles, by definition, are abstract: they are general rules that can be applied to specific situations. This understanding of values as abstract is consistent with notions such as Kant’s practical reason that rely precisely on judgements that are independent of any specific context. However, the present study showed that when accounting for value choices, people revealed commitment to a variety of other modes of subjection, for example, to ‘care’. In this case, there can be seen to be a problem conceiving values in the abstract. Care, by definition, leads not to abstract principles but to concrete others. Thus, the importance of specific values, when understood through a relationship with oneself based on care, depends inherently on the circumstances. It is therefore unsurprising that there are numerous instances in the interviews where people are rejecting, often subtly, the notion of values as abstract principles. For this participant, for example, the idea of ‘Helpful’ in the abstract has no importance in itself, though it may in concrete circumstances:

‘Helpful’, ‘working for the welfare of others’.. I’d work for the welfare of my friends, but not everyone really.. that’s why I put it there [No. 16].. not for ‘Joe Bloggs’ on the street, I don’t think I would (L). (3.27)

Similarly, ‘Obedient’, cannot be understood by the following participant as important in its own right, only as it might be manifest in a particular concrete relationship:

I don’t know whether being ‘Obedient’ is being ‘respectful’.. to who really? (L). (1.21)

It may be argued then, that, rather than being a formal property of values, the conception of values as abstract principles is an emergent property of certain forms of self-relationship. Values, for some people, may be properly understood as abstract principles, but for others, with other modes of subjection, they must be considered inherently contextually bound.

Values: Enduring or transitory?

A second problem for the theory that arose in the interviews was the idea that values were transcendent across time: that they were enduring. As for the idea that values are abstract, this formal definition of values may also be recast as an emergent property of one’s ethical self-relationship. Several of the elements of ethics are relevant.
The notion of ethical work elaborated in the last section must clearly be implicated in the constitution of this aspect of values. For those people for whom ethical work is focused on regulation, primarily a process of checking one's behaviour against a code, to see the extent to which one is living in accordance with it, one would not expect their values to change, or for them to understand their values as changeable. On the contrary, for those focused on revaluation, for whom discussion about one's values is of primary importance, one would be more likely to expect them to change, and that they would themselves see their values as open to change in the future.

Similarly differences would depend, in Foucault's terms, on the mode of subjection that was employed. For people whose values are based on integrity, and whose sense of self is bound to a reflexive, changeable yet coherent biographical narrative (Giddens, 1991), values would naturally be expected to be experienced in a state of flux. For example:

It's not 'Loyalty' that's the guiding principle in my life, but loyalty is important, but at the moment, I've been thinking of these things as at the moment, and loyalty is not important. 'Health' I've put as 12 on the list, but obviously, if I was in ill health, it would be a lot more important.. the maximum level of health is obviously very important, but at the moment, I'm OK, so it's not important in my life.. in theory it should be, but I just did it as what I felt at the moment. (7.7)

But then it does change over time, but not day to day, but maybe three or four years ago, say, this thing about Mature Love [4], that would have been completely different, that would have been quite low down.. but then that's just me.. three years ago, and the fact that I've worked hard during my degree and I never did during 'A' level or GCSE, probably effects my need for 'Wisdom' or 'Sense of Accomplishment. (10.35)

Values are thus tied to the current state of one's life, and the maintenance of a sense of coherence in what one values, and what is currently happening in one's life.

The conception of values as enduring, therefore, whether or not values are perceived to be likely to change, is also related to the form of ethical self formation that is practiced. That is not to say that participant's values are more likely to change. Rather, it is a matter of the perceived stability of values, or participants' conceptions of values, which may or may not relate to an increased likelihood of changes in value priorities themselves.
As for the contextuality of values, the sense of stability of values is by no means a simple phenomenon. It relates to one’s mode of ethical work and mode of subjection, but also to a variety of other factors. For example, it was evident that some values were thought to be likely to change, whereas others were perceived to be more stable:

It depends because, there was one value on intimacy and mature love, because, it’s not important to me now, but because, because I’ve got it, it’s maybe less important to me. So maybe something like that changes, but ‘Self-respect’ and ‘self-esteem’ should be there no matter what happens in your life. (36.23)

Age was also an important factor in the perceived stability of values. Several comments were made relating the likelihood that one’s values might change, with one’s age, and the length of time over which the values had developed.

How about in a couple of years time? (32.16) [might you rate the values differently?]
I would not think so either, I mean, I have developed these over many years, I am not a spring-chicken. (32.17)

In sum, the conception of values as enduring can be seen to not be a formal property of values, but an emergent property of particular practices of ethics, also related to various other factors including the nature of the value under consideration and the age of the participant.

**Discussion:**

The central aim of the study was to explore the diversity of interviewees’ qualitative understandings and experiences of values, and to relate them to a set of theoretical concepts and concerns. Taking a different approach from the previous studies and following the conceptualisation of values suggested by the work of Foucault, the main questions addressed were whether there might be dimensions in which values can change other those considered by Rokeach, and in which, notwithstanding Schwartz’s universal model, one might find diversity and difference.

Adopting less constrained, qualitative methods generated richer data than the quantitative methods of the first two studies. It revealed some problems for Rokeach’s conceptualisation of values, a number of ways in which one might understand values to have changed, and demonstrated the relevance of Foucault’s analytic of ethics to values. Combining the findings of the interviews, it was argued that key problems that became
apparent for Rokeach's theory could be interpreted as the rejection of the conception of values as principles, and that this was a product of variation in modes of ethical self formation. A summary of the findings of the analysis as a whole is presented in Table 7.3.
### Table 7.3: Summary of the findings of the qualitative analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analysis</th>
<th>Key findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>In support of Rokeach's theory:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Cf Rokeach (1973) | • Values were thought to be a 'yardstick' serving as criteria for decision-making.  
• They were closely tied to self-identity and to self-esteem.  
• The relative importance of values develops and becomes more stable over time.  
• Understood to be universal and transcendent across time and situations by some. |
| **Problems for Rokeach's theory:** | |
| • Hierarchy – difficulty of putting the values into hierarchical order.  
• Meaning – some definitions were ‘wrong’, in general they were unclear.  
• Two types of value – two were recognised, but not ‘terminal’ and ‘instrumental’.  
• Contextual – priorities were thought by some to depend on the situation.  
• Changeable – priorities were understood to change, sometimes rapidly over time. |
| **Values were understood to have changed in several ways, beyond simply priority:** | |
| Changing Society - Postmodernity | • Some felt society had changed generally e.g. towards multi-culturalism.  
• Values as general ‘standards’ were thought to have fallen e.g. a lack of respect.  
• People were thought not to stick to their values so much e.g. ‘for convenience’.  
• The meaning of some values had changed e.g. ‘Comfortable Life’.  
• Certain goals were thought no longer to be values e.g. ‘Clean’.  
• A loss of a wider social basis for values e.g. in community or religion. |
| Cf Foucault (1984) | **All the elements of ethical self-relationship discussed by Foucault could be identified, and distinctions made within them:**  
• Ethical substance – distinctions were made between thinking about a transgression and acting on it, and between unaware and conscious transgressions.  
• Mode of subjection – was seen to exist in a variety of forms e.g. ‘Divine Law’, ‘Practical Reason’, ‘Care’, ‘Virtue’.  
• Ethical work – varied from a complete lack of awareness of values to regular engagement in practices re-evaluating or monitoring one’s values.  
• Telos – several versions were evident e.g. harmony with others, fulfil one’s goals. |
| **Summary: Toward a new conception of values?** | • Rokeach introduced a new conceptualisation of values as principles that has become embedded in the psychology of values (Chapter 3).  
• Rokeach also presupposed a certain form of ethical self-relationship (Chapter 4).  
• Rokeach’s conceptualisation of values was partially inconsistent with people’s understandings of values, and a number of different forms of ethics were found.  
• It was argued the two are related: the conception of values as principled (abstract and enduring) is dependent on one’s mode of ethical self formation.  
• One has to constitute oneself as an ethical subject using certain practices in order to understand values as principles.  
• Following Foucault, it can be argued that a characteristic feature of contemporary society is the emergence of multiple forms of ethics.  
• Hence, it may be that not only have the priority of values changed, but also people’s conceptions of values, as a result of the emergence of new ethics. |
The study suggests, therefore, that there are indeed important dimensions for the field of values excluded from contemporary research, and that it is here one might find the sorts of changes characteristic of the postmodern condition, at least as the idea is discussed by Foucault. It is in these dimensions that one finds diversity rather than universality. The study provides a first demonstration of the utility of Foucault's analysis of ethics, suggesting a new way of thinking about values research in psychology.

Some qualifications need to be made to these conclusions. First, the nature of the qualitative methods used mean that it is only a limited, and not clearly representative sample that took part in the study. It is not possible to generalise on the basis of this study alone. However, the aims of the study were in the first instance exploratory. Moreover, such a study has further importance in the context of the theoretical approaches of Rokeach and Schwartz. The conceptualisation of values proposed by the former is implicitly universal, and the model of values of the latter explicitly so. Hence, even the data derived from the limited sample of individuals participating in the present study should to be consistent with their theories. Though one cannot theorise with great confidence based only on the present findings, they are strongly suggestive that there are important dimensions excluded from the currently dominant approaches to values.

A rebuttal is possible of the claim that values research ignores certain dimensions. It could be argued that what people say about values is different from how they operate in practice, and it is the latter that is included in the existing theories of values. However, there are problems with this alternative explanation. First, as noted in the introduction, it is an important part of Rokeach's conceptualisation of values that it should matches people's phenomenological experience of values. Hence, there should be some congruity between the way people speak about their values, and the qualities of values explicit in the theory. Secondly, it was shown in the archaeological analysis of values of Chapter 3, that an important development in the concept of values that was adopted by Rokeach was the idea that values are symbolically represented. The crucial distinction was made between conceptions of the desirable and what is merely desired. If it was argued that the conception of values was based on how they operated rather than how they were explicitly understood, then there is the risk of regressing to an understanding of values as 'operative' rather than 'conceived values', to use Morris's
(1956) terminology. Again, therefore, there are grounds for supporting the present findings that the discrepancies between how people speak about values and how they are theorised are significant.

The present study therefore can be seen to have introduced the beginnings of a new way of conceptualising values based on the work of Foucault. Rather than having fixed, formal properties as theorised by Rokeach, it has been shown that people have meaningful differences in their conceptions of values and that variation is related to differences in the domain, that has been excluded in contemporary values research, of ethical self formation. The present, qualitative study, however, has only introduced and provided some empirical support for this conceptualisation. It has not presented a systematic study, or made the connection between specific modes of ethical self formation and specific conceptions of values. The next study continues with this approach to values by adopting a different method that combines aspects of qualitative and quantitative methods. In order to explore more systematic relationships between values and ethics as defined by Foucault, it uses Q methodology.

Summary and Conclusions

The present study has opened up new directions for the psychological theorisation of values. Adopting qualitative methods rather than the highly codified quantitative methods of previous studies has allowed a new appreciation of problems for Rokeach’s theory and of the notion of value change. It suggests a new conceptualisation of values in which people’s conceptions of values vary with the forms of ethics they practice. The next study expands the current investigation in a more systematic way by adopting Q methodology to further enquire into the relationship between conceptions of values and modes of ethical self formation.
Chapter 8

A Q methodology study of understandings of values

Introduction

The thesis has focused on the field of values research in psychology dominated in recent years by the tradition begun by Milton Rokeach (1973). Values in his distinctive conceptualisation are a special type of belief having the properties of abstract guiding principles. The qualitative study presented in the previous chapter contributes to the growing body of research that has been explicitly or implicitly critical of this fundamental conceptualisation (e.g. Hague, 1993; Seligman and Katz, 1996). Chapter 7 showed how values were understood by some to function as abstract guiding principles operating across situations and enduring through time, but for others to be intrinsically dependent on the situation and likely to change across even very brief periods of time. They were not conceived, therefore, as abstract and enduring principles. Foucault’s (1984a; 1984b) analytic of ethics revealed other basic axes of difference in participants’ sense of values. Variability was revealed in the foundation of values, or the mode of subjection discussed by Foucault. For some, for example, values were grounded in their religion; for others, it was seen to emerge from having proper principles, or from a sense of relationship with others.

The qualitative methods used in Chapter 7 provided a rich and detailed exploration of conceptions of values. They presented an empirical instantiation in the field of values of the phenomena discussed by Foucault, and showed key dimensions of difference in conceptions of values. However, while qualitative methods generated a number of important distinctions, they did not show how these dimensions of difference might be systematically related. For example, it was suggested, but not clearly demonstrated, that there was an association between a sense of values based on care and relationships, and the idea that values were context dependent. It was shown to be reasonable to expect that these aspects of values might indeed be related as part of a
larger, coherent understanding of the notion of values, but this remains to be established.

The present study aims to extend the investigation begun in Chapter 7 into the different ways people might understand and conceptualise values. A key objective will be to investigate how different conceptions of values might be systematically related to certain modes of ethical self formation, creating coherent patterns in ways of thinking about values. If this were found to be the case, it would contribute further to our understanding of the critiques of Rokeach’s and Schwartz’s construal of values as abstract principles. It would suggest first, that there are indeed other coherent ways of understanding the notion of value, and secondly that these differences are closely related to variations in ethics, or forms of self-relationship. In order to pursue these goals, the study turns to an old method that has been revitalised in recent years: Q methodology.

Q methodology

Q methodology offers a way of identifying shared patterns of understanding of a particular topic or issue. Generally in Q studies, participants sort a pack of cards printed with a range of views or opinions according to a rule, typically whether they agree or disagree with them. The resulting correlation matrix between these expressions of participants’ points of view is then subjected to by-person factor analysis to identify shared understandings. Q methodology was originally developed by William Stephenson in the 1930s (1935; 1953). He pioneered the by-person or ‘Q’ factor analytic procedure as an alternative to the by-item or ‘R’ approach to factor analysis that has come to lead contemporary research. In both cases, mathematically identical factor analysis techniques are used. Factors or components are extracted, and factor solutions are usually rotated prior to interpretation using an established technique like Varimax rotation. The two crucial differences are first, that Q subjects a correlation matrix of variables, averaged across persons, to factor analysis. Whereas R analysis reveals the underlying dimensions of a set of variables, typically objective measures of ability like intelligence or self-report measures of personality, Q identifies underlying similarities between persons, or, more precisely, between the points of view they express through their Q sort on a particular issue. This highlights the second important difference, about
which there was some controversy during the development of the method (Burt & Stephenson, 1939). For Stephenson, the two matrices, R and Q, are not equivalent. Whereas R matrices consist of objective measurements of people, Q matrices contain subjective judgements by people. Thus the object of judgement rather than the person judging becomes the focus of the analytic procedure. When the correlated items relate to subjective judgements, therefore, it is sets of judgements together in their interrelatedness across different people that are revealed by the analysis. Rather than analysing, or breaking down, variables to reveal underlying dimensions, the technique highlights distinct yet coherent patterns of understanding. The pertinent questions answered by a Q study therefore are: what are the different ways in which a diverse group of people might understand this topic? What is the range of meanings they have to draw on?

Having initially developed Q methodology in psychology, working alongside pioneers of statistical techniques like Burt and Spearman, the technique has been used much more widely in other social sciences, particularly political science (Brown, 1980). There has, however, recently been a resurgence of interest in Q methodology in social psychology (Curt, 1994; Stainton Rogers, 1995). It has been employed effectively to analyse different ways of understanding health and illness (Stainton Rogers, 1991), chronic pain (Eccleston, Williams, & Stainton Rogers, 1997), and the concepts of rebelliousness (Stenner & Marshall, 1995), jealousy (Stenner & Stainton Rogers, 1998) and independence and maturity (Stenner & Marshall, 1999).

Given its utility in identifying patterns of understandings of topics or concepts, Q methodology represents a useful technique currently used in psychology for achieving the objectives of the present study. It continues in the more hermeneutic vein of Chapter 7, aiming again to explore people’s understanding of the concept of values. However, the analytic process of Q will this time allow the identification of coherent wholes or patterns of understanding the concept, and highlight more clearly the relationships that exist between different forms of ethics and conceptions of values.

Q analysis overview:

The present study adopts the standard practice of Q methodology used in recent research. There are two main stages. First, a set of items is generated that will allow
participants to express different ways of understanding a topic, in this case, the notion of values. An assumption of the Q approach is that there is a finite number of ways of making sense of, or speaking about a particular topic or concept. Q researchers refer to this as the 'concourse' (Stephenson, 1978). The first part of the study involves sampling the concourse to produce a set of items. In the second part of the study, a different sample of participants sorts or ranks the items. Most commonly the items are sorted according to the rule 'agree' and 'disagree', as in the present study. The data is submitted to by-person factor analysis and the resulting factors interpreted as distinct yet coherent ways of interpreting the issue of concern.

**Part 1: Sampling the concourse and producing the Q-set**

The set of Q items aims to allow participants maximum freedom to express their view of the concept under investigation. It therefore should include statements relating to multiple dimensions on which understandings of the concept might differ, and a range of views along each of these dimensions. The main sources for items typically used in Q studies were used in the present study in an attempt to achieve the required diversity. Often, interviews or focus groups (e.g. Stenner and Marshall, 1999) are conducted to offer an initial exploration of a topic with a sample of relevant participants, and to elicit language that is used by participants themselves. In the current study, the combined set of forty-seven interviews conducted in the course of the thesis was available as a resource. The interview transcripts were reread to extract statements suitable for use as Q items. The sample was already recruited in order to reflect a diversity of socio-demographic standpoints, so the interviews offered an appropriate and powerful resource for extracting a range of understandings of values. The interviews were also conducted using a schedule semi-structured by theoretical concerns, as outlined in Chapter 7. Hence, the data included items influenced by the model of ethics suggested by Foucault (1984a; 1984b). A second source for items was the academic literature on values reviewed for the thesis, including work on values and morality from psychology, sociology, anthropology and philosophy. These sources were trawled for statements that might reflect different ways of conceiving the notion of values. Finally, to include aspects of popular culture, items were derived from mass and popular media, including the daily newspapers 'The Times' and 'The Mirror', and the popular
Part 3

8. A Q study of understandings of values

magazines, 'Hello', 'Cosmopolitan' and 'FHM'. In total, 120 Q statements were generated in the first phase of production of the Q set.

Just as for the development of a personality or attitude scale, items were checked and re-written as clearly as possible, avoiding ambiguity, technical expressions, double-barrelled statements, repetition, and truisms (Oppenheim, 1992). Items were thus refined with a view to their eventual contribution to the expression of a point of view about the nature of values. The initial stock of potential items was reduced to 55 statements comprising the completed Q-set. The complete set of items is reproduced in Appendix H.

Part 2: The Q sort

Method:

Participants:

Sixty-one participants provided Q-sorts, 26 male (42.6%) and 35 female (57.4%). Ages of participants ranged from 19 to 58 (mean age 27.54 years, SD = 9.95). Thirty-one were students at the University of London, reading a range of subjects. One participant was unemployed, three were housewives, two failed to record their occupation. The remainder were employed in a diverse range of occupations. Participants were recruited through two sources. First, advertisements were posted in common parts of the university. Second, to attract a more diverse sample, a snowballing recruitment technique was used. Participants responding to the advertisements were asked if they knew people unconnected with the university, who might like to take part in a study on values. Willing participants then distributed the materials for the study to these people. Respondents were paid £4 for their time, on receipt of a properly completed Q-sort and questionnaire.

Materials and Measures:

Materials used in the study included the pack of Q cards, with instructions and a response grid, and two questionnaires. They were combined in a single booklet, divided into three sections. The booklet was prefaced with the following general instructions:
Thank you for helping with this research.

This study is about values. It is in three parts, and should take about 45 minutes to an hour to complete.

The questionnaire is anonymous – you do not need to give your name. Also, there are no right or wrong answers to any of the questions. We are only interested in your point of view. So please answer as you really think.

Please answer all the questions and complete each section before moving on to the next.

The general instructions were followed by a values questionnaire.

SVS. The first section consisted of the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS: Schwartz, 1992; Appendix B). The survey is a set of 56 values rated according to their importance to the participant ‘as a guiding principle in their lives’. It was prefaced by the standard instructions suggested by Schwartz (1992).

Q sort. The second section of the booklet included the materials for the Q analysis. The section was headed ‘Statements about values’ in order to distinguish it from the preceding questionnaire in which participants had assessed value priorities. It began with the following instructions:

To complete this section, you have been given a set of cards. Each of these cards is printed with a statement about values that you may or may not agree with. Please spread the cards out on a table, and arrange them according to how much you agree or disagree with each statement. Sort them into 11 piles as shown in the grid below, so that the 2 statements you agree with most are in the first pile, then the 3 statements you next most agree with in the second, 5 in the third and so on, leaving you with the 2 statements you most disagree with in the leftmost pile.

At any time you can rearrange the cards so that by the time you have finished, they represent how you truly feel about these statements.

After the instructions a quasi-normal response grid (see Figure 8.1) was printed. The grid served two functions. First, it guided participants to sort the cards according to the distribution specified for the study. Second, the grid was used to record the participants’ Q-sorts by asking them to write the number of each of the cards into the grid in the pattern in which they finally sorted them.
Space was also provided in this section of the booklet for participants to comment on individual items. They were asked to write comments on the two items they rated as most important, the two they thought least important, and any that were particularly of interest.

**Figure 8.1: Participant response matrix.**

![Participant response matrix](image)

**Demographic Questionnaire.** The last section of the booklet was a demographic questionnaire (see Appendix G). In addition to respondents’ gender, age and occupation, it recorded education, ethnicity and religion. Two further items were included relating to religion and politics.

**Religion.** Having obtained qualitative data about their religion, participants were asked two items assessing their interest and perceived commitment to religion. First, a simple behavioural operationalisation of commitment to religion: ‘How often do you attend religious meetings?’ followed by the response options: ‘Never’ (scored 0), ‘Less than once a year’ (1), ‘Yearly’ (2), ‘Monthly’ (3), ‘Weekly’ (4), and ‘More than once a week’ (5). Second, a self-report measure of commitment to religion was included: ‘How committed are you to your religion?’ A 7-point response scale was provided with endpoints ‘Not at all’ (1) and ‘Extremely’ (7).

**Politics.** Items were included to gauge political interest and commitment, in a similar way to Religion. After indicating the political party they would be most likely to vote
for, participants were asked: 'How interested in politics are you?' and 'How committed to politics are you?'. Both items were followed by a 7-point scale with endpoints 'Not at all' (1) and 'Extremely' (7).

Procedure:

Respondents to the recruitment advertisements were informed that the study was about values and would involve two short questionnaires and a card-sorting task. They were asked to read the instructions to the Q-sort part of the study while still with the author. Their understanding of the task was then elicited to ensure they were clear about what was required to sort the cards, that they knew which end represented 'most agree' and which 'most disagree', and that they understood how to complete the grid afterwards. Any questions were answered and problems with the study clarified. Volunteers then took the booklet and a Q pack to complete the study in their own time. On their return, booklets were checked to see that they had been completed correctly before paying the respondent. Q packs were restored to the quasi-random ordering of their identification numbers to check they were complete and unsoiled, and to prevent any biases in response before being issued to subsequent participants in the study.

Data analysis:

The 61 completed Q sorts were analysed using the statistical package SPSS for windows (version 7.5). The arrangement of items was converted to numerical data by scoring each item according to its position in the grid as shown in Figure 8.1. Thus, items in the leftmost column were scored -5, and so on up to 5 for statements placed in the rightmost column. To identify factors in the participants' Q sorts, rather than the Q items as in conventional factor analysis, the 61 x 55 matrix was transposed to form a 55 x 61 matrix, with items as rows, and Q sorts as columns. The resulting Q (or transposed R) matrix was then subjected to factor analysis. Principle components were first extracted, and eigen values plotted as a scree slope (Cattel, 1965). There was an elbow after the 6th component. Six factors were therefore extracted, accounting for 53.6% of the variance. Varimax rotation was used to aid interpretation of the factors. The resulting rotated component matrix consists of the loading of each Q sort (generated by individual participants) on each factor (see Appendix I). The factors can then be interpreted by reference to the Q sorts that load most strongly and cleanly on each
factor. This process mirrors that used in conventional factor analysis where underlying factors are labelled according to the questionnaire items that load on them. In Q studies, however, it is Q sorts, generated by individual participants that relate to each factor. These individuals are referred to as ‘exemplars’ of each factor. In the present study, participants were considered exemplars of a factor if they satisfied two criteria: a positive loading greater than .45; and, no loading on any other factor greater than .30. (Exemplars are indicated in the table in Appendix I by boldface participant numbers.) Using these criteria, thirteen Q sorts were found to be exemplars of factor 1, nine of factor 2, six of factor 3, five of factor 4, six of factor 5, and four of factor 6. The 61 Q sorts were thus reduced using factor analysis to six distinct sorting patterns.

**Factor interpretation:**

Three main sources of data are available for the exegesis of the factors. First, a Q-sort is generated, referred to as a ‘Factor array’, representing the configuration of the items closest to the ideal sort for that factor. Through factor loadings, the factor analysis indicates the Q sorts that relate to each factor, rather than directly revealing the arrangement of the items closest to the factor. The latter can be estimated by combining, or ‘merging’, the Q sorts of the exemplars of the factor. The factor arrays can also be found through factor scores. They represent the scores of every item on each factor. The table of factor scores for all six factors is shown in Appendix J. The arrangement of the Q items most closely representing the factor can then be found by ranking the items according to the factor loadings from the largest negative to the largest positive score, then arranging the items in the sorting grid in this order. The best estimate of the Q sort relating to factor 1 is shown in Appendix H. Factor arrays were likewise calculated for the remaining five factors and these were used to aid their interpretation.

A second source of information was the comments made by exemplars for individual items. Comments were given for items participants agreed and disagreed with most strongly, and for any that were particularly noteworthy for them. They offered an expansion of the summary of the viewpoints constituting the Q as expressed in the factor array, as well as indicating where the re-contextualisation of any one Q item amongst a group of others in the array changed the way it was understood.
The final aid to interpretation is provided by demographic factors. Rather than include demographic variables as predictors following an a priori logic, in Q, demographic details are typically used as an interpretative resource, only after the analysis, if they emerge as relevant to the constitution of a factor. Thus, if the exemplars of a factor are all found to share a particular demographic characteristic, e.g. they are all religious, this fact can be used as an additional resource for interpreting the factor, since it was not assumed prior to the analysis that religion was a potential predictor.

The following section offers an interpretation of the six factors based on these three sources of information. Where key items in the factor array are used, their position in the ideal sort is indicated in brackets after the relevant part of the interpretation. Thus ‘(3; +5: FA)’ indicates that item 3 is placed in the ‘+5’ (most agree) pile in the factor array, the best estimate of that factor. Where comments are made about individual items by exemplars of the factor, the item number, its position, and the participant number are indicated in brackets. Thus, ‘(43; -5: P20)’ indicates the comment is being made by participant number 20, about item 43, which was placed in the ‘-5’ (most disagree) position of their Q sort.

**Factor by Factor report:**

**Factor 1: Post-traditional**

Factor 1 formed the largest group, with 13 participants serving as exemplars (see summary in Table 8.1). The group comprised more women (8) than men (5). Compared with other groups it also contained a larger number of older members (aged 30, 32, 49, 58 years). It was the least religious factor. Ten participants never attended religious meetings, three attended less than once a year. At least half the group expressed some interest in or commitment to politics. This commitment was divided equally between the Labour and Liberal Democrat parties.
Table 8.1: Summary information including participant number, age, gender, self-reported occupation and loading on the factor for the 13 participants whose Q sorts exemplify factor one.

1  20 years, male, psychology student; loading 0.61  
5  20 years, female, laws student; loading 0.65  
6  21 years, male, psychology student; loading 0.52  
13 58 years, female, housewife; loading 0.66  
16 26 years, male, classics student; loading 0.61  
20 20 years, female, English literature student; loading 0.58  
37 32 years, female, researcher; loading 0.61  
38 25 years, male, chef; loading 0.65  
42 22 years, male, salesman; loading 0.54  
51 49 years, female, researcher; loading 0.54  
54 26 years, female, researcher; loading 0.64  
57 30 years, female, psychology student; loading 0.72  
59 21 years, female, psychology student; loading 0.48

There are two key characteristics of factor 1. First, values are understood to be an ongoing target of scrutiny and fundamentally open to revision: the notion of value is fused to the possibility of revaluation. The factor is defined most by the importance of regularly taking stock of what it is you truly value (3; +5: FA). This carries with it a responsibility to reconsider even one’s most important values (35; +3: FA), and closely related, the necessity of actively thinking about one’s values rather than simply taking them for granted (11; -4: FA).

I think everyone should be responsible for how they value things and realise what is worth something to them. (43; -5: P20)

The potential to change one’s values also forces one to challenge value commitments that come to be problematic or outmoded:

To avoid bigotry and becoming set in one’s ways. (35; +5: P5)

The understanding of values as immanently open to change alters the very nature of what a value is and the function values serve. They would appear to become both transient across time and flexible between particular circumstances:

If I changed the way I felt about something I wouldn’t hesitate to alter my values, I don’t see them as being fixed or rule-like. (21; +5: P59)
The source of this inherent openness and increased personal responsibility is clear from the items that were rejected in factor 1. They describe a systematic abandonment of traditional social institutions. Thus, more emphatically than for any other factor, values are not grounded in Religion (5; -5: FA, and 43; -5: FA). Neither are they based on tradition (17; -4: FA). Tellingly, the notion of tradition itself was found to be problematic by one exemplar:

A tough one. I’m not sure what ‘tradition’ is. (17; -2: P16)

Likewise, values do not come from one’s elders (51; -4: FA). Even those of our parents must remain open to question:

Many of our values are instilled in us by our parents, but we should examine our parents’ values, and essentially make up our own minds about what is important to us. (31; -1: P13)

Understood as inherently open to change, and detached from established institutions, contemporary society is not thought to have seen an erosion of values (27; -3: FA).

I don’t agree with it, but so many old people say it. (27; -4: P57)

I don’t think values ‘erode’ – they just change. Saying that there has been a decline in values is a disingenuous way of saying one’s own personal beliefs are less widely held than they once were. (27; -5: P54)

From the rejection of broader social institutions emerges the second key characteristic of factor 1, the pivotal role of friends and relationships for one’s values. Items most closely defining factor 1 described the intimate connection between relationships and a variety of features of values. For example, values form the criteria for selecting one’s friends (15; +5: FA):

I think my values are very important in influencing who I spend time with, and who I can relate to. At the same time, my priorities and values may also be influenced by the people I spend time with. (15; +5: P54)

And as is evident from the second part of the above comment, one’s friends can become the foundation for one’s values (6; +4: FA):

My important relationships are strongly influential to me, if I like/respect those I have a relationship with, then I am also influenced by these people’s values. (6; +5: P6)
Thus one can learn from people one admires about how best to prioritise one’s own values (38; +4: FA). The notion of relationships as a foundation for values is reinforced by the importance of doing what is best by one’s close friends, rated more highly in factor 1 than any other (29; +2: FA):

My friends are the most important thing in my life. (29; +5: P57)

It is most important to me to support those whom I care about. Life has few other goals compared to this. Supporting those I love makes me most happy. (29; +5: P16)

Finally, friends are also available in factor one for the discussion of one’s values. Friends offer a way of clarifying and consolidating the values one holds (41; +4: FA). To summarise, factor one presents a conception of values in which they are detached from tradition and traditional social institutions like Religion. They are thus open to choice and change, and pose a new responsibility for the values one chooses. The key alternative basis for one’s values is found in one’s close relationships. This understanding of values can be labelled ‘Post-traditional’.

**Factor 2: Principled**

Factor 2 formed the second largest group (see summary in Table 8.2). They were mixed demographically. Three were male, six female. Just over half were single, the remainder married or in a relationship. One participant did not report their occupation, two were students, and the remainder employed in a variety of occupations. The group was notable for being the most interested in politics, and the second most committed to politics. Their political commitment was mixed, however, including three who would vote Tory. Three of the groups attended religious meetings monthly, the remainder once a year or never.
Table 8.2: Summary information including participant number, age, gender, self-reported occupation and loading on the factor for the 9 participants whose Qsorts exemplify factor two.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Loading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Advertising</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Accountant</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Psychology student</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Shop assistant</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Medical statistics postgraduate</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Speech therapist</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Factor 2 presents a stark contrast to factor 1. From being fundamentally open to revision, values are understood to be inherently stable (1; +5: FA). This sense of stability, as for factor 1, is not linked to religion:

I believe in what is right and wrong irrespective of whether or not there is a God. (43; -5: P25)

This is the case even for those exemplars of the factor that are religious:

Although I do believe in God, each person is responsible and is the only one to know if their values are being deceived. No values should be based on Divine punishment or gratification. (43; -5: P19)

There is, however, an important role for tradition in this conception of values. Parents are a particularly important source of values. For factor 2 many of their values were instilled in them as a child (31; +4: FA). Likewise, it is important as parents to transfer one’s values by bringing up one’s own children with the right values (14; +4: FA). Implicit in this idea is not just that one passes on one’s values, but it is in some sense the ‘right’ values that are being transmitted:

Obviously based on the assumption that the right values were instilled. (31; +5: P41)

The values learnt through one’s upbringing, therefore, are given the status of a basic set of values. They are thus something worthy of pride:

I would like to alter this statement to the following: ‘the ultimate test of your values is whether they make you proud’. Pride is very important to me. (32; +4: P4)
It seems to be the threat of soiling these basic values that makes the mass media a danger. The conception of a proper set of values gives the media the potential to manipulate people’s values (34; 5: FA). The same applies to self-help books and magazines (26; -4: FA):

No, they ‘brainwash’ and reintroduce dominant patriarchal ideological ‘glossing’ over important issues and standards. (26; -5: P10)

Self-help books and magazines, I feel, are generally media propaganda intended to brainwash society into believing they aren’t ever doing anything wrong. (26; -4: P11)

In contrast again to factor 1, but consistent with the notion of basic values, is the endorsement of the claim that we are experiencing an erosion of values (27; +3: FA). Likewise, factor 2 more than any other thought it was relevant to compare values today with those of previous times (18; -3: FA):

Values do change along with time, but most of them would be kept regardless of time. Good values would be the same no matter if it were previous times or today. (18; -5: P52)

There are consequences for the role values play in this conception. Understood as basic and unchanging, values become a strong source of one’s identity. Values are conceived as a fundamental part of oneself:

Those values that I hold most dearly will never change, because they are part of who I am. (1; +5: P25)

Despite the fact that experiences clearly shape your values, I have central values that are instinctive and will never change. (1; +5: P10)

As values are a guide to being a true, good, human being, going against them would be like going against my inner self. (48; -5: P41)

A further interesting contrast can be made here with factor 1. It is clear in the present case that one first has values, and that these then form one’s sense of self. By contrast, for factor 1, one’s source of self is more closely tied to one’s relationships with others. It is this foundation that then appears to precede one’s choice of values. Values thus form around one’s identity and sense of self in relationship with others, rather than one’s values providing the centre for the expression of one’s identity.
Accompanying a basic sense of one’s values being the right ones is a strong commitment to following them through. Thus, having values when it is convenient is probably worse than having no values at all (30; +4: FA). Sticking to one’s values invokes a moral imperative:

Treating one’s values as something that can be abandoned when it is not easy or convenient to keep them should be regarded as wrong. (30; +2: P52)

These are whims not values. If you drop a value because it is inconvenient, or will lead to personal unhappiness, then you are probably being selfish, immature and weak. (30; +5: P31)

To be consistent with one’s values (whether they are right or wrong in the eyes of other individuals) is, to me, the most important thing. (30; +5: P19)

And it is part of the very nature of a value:

As values are a guide to life, they are deeply rooted – it would be against their very nature to change them with changing circumstances. (46; -5: P41)

Hence, one should stick to one’s values, even ‘though it may be at some cost’ (37; +4: FA):

Sticking to values may lead you to feel displeasure, so sticking to your values may be at some cost to yourself. (37; +4: P31)

Values for factor two are secular, but grounded in tradition. One’s values tend to be understood as the right values. They form the centre from which one’s identity emanates and become principles one cannot take lightly. Conception of values as basic also implies that they are followed through. This understanding of values can be characterised by the notion of ‘Principled’ values.

Factor 3: Spiritual

The 6 exemplars of factor 3 were equally divided by gender (see summary in Table 8.3). Four of the six were students in their 20s. The other two were older, one a housewife, the other a management consultant. Five of the six were interested in politics. The most distinctive feature of this group, however, was that they were all religious. Three were Catholic, one Islam, one Christian, and one a born again Christian.
Half the respondents reported attending religious meetings at least once a month, and the remaining half, once or more a week.

Table 8.3: Summary information including participant number, age, gender, self-reported occupation and loading on the factor for the 6 participants whose Q-sorts exemplify factor three.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Loading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>20 years</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>psychology student</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>21 years</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>town planning student</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>58 years</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>housewife</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>20 years</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>geography student</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>22 years</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>psychology student</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>42 years</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>management consultant</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values for factor 3 are intimately linked to their religious beliefs. Second most important in the factor array was the item 'It is God who knows whether or not I am following my values' (43; +5: FA). As two respondents explain:

Human being is incapable of discerning his or others' behaviour accurately and conclusively. There are so many limitations to human understanding that only resort to God can solve the problem. (43; +5: P55)

God is all-knowing, He has knowledge of everything, whether it is following my values or whatever. (43; +5: P17)

The only more important item is: ‘My values are central to who I am as a person’ (16; +5: FA). This item might be expected to be important for all groups. However, its factor loading stood out for this current group. It seems to follow from the centrality of religion for exemplars of factor 3, the close connection between values and religion, and thus the strong relationship between values and who one is as a person. Other qualities of values follow from the foundation of values in religion. Values clearly play both a central and a visible role for factor 2. They are in the forefront of one’s mind (20; +4: FA) and they demand that they are followed. There is a belief in sticking to one’s values (37; +4: FA), and this is again inseparable from one’s faith:

As I am a Christian, this phrase is something I try to stick to. It can often be extremely hard and challenging though! (37; +5: P47)

Because almost all my values stem from my religion and I follow them as a part of following my religion. (5; +5: P28)
It is in factor 3 that there is the greatest chance of values being understood as rules. Values are based, after all, on something higher than merely transient feelings.

It seems so fickle if one were to go on their emotions all the time. It’s always changing and unstable. (21; -5: P17)

This strong sense of value is linked to a strong sense of guilt if one does not follow one’s values (52; +4: FA). Regarding the suggestion that one could act not according to one’s values without it being a problem:

It does bother me and I try very hard to follow my values and feel guilty if I don’t. (48; -5: P28)

Finally, it is important to appreciate that values are based on something other than worldly affairs. In the context of the item suggesting that self-help books and magazines can help one find one’s values (26; -3: FA):

These books are just based on the opinions of the authors who have no connection with and no 'supreme' knowledge about life or how you should live your life. (48; -5: P28)

In sum, the key characteristic for the conception of values of factor 3 is religious faith. The less obvious feature brought to light by this factor is the thorough-going influence the foundation of values in religion has for the way multiple aspects of values are understood. It leads to their central place in one’s identity and to a strong commitment to following through one’s values. It provides a firm and enduring foundation of values, and takes values out of the realm of the merely everyday.

Factor 4: Hedonist

The five exemplars of factor 4 were all young women, aged 20 to 22 (see summary in Table 8.4). Three were single and two were in relationships. They were the least political of all the groups. Only one was religious, attending meetings at least once a week.
Like factor 2, values are understood to come from one’s family and upbringing. The most strongly endorsed statement in the factor array was the idea that the most important values are those one grew up with (4; +5: FA).

My MAJOR values are those instilled in me by my parents. (4; +5; P8)

I couldn’t decide whether or not my parents had actually instilled in me any values explicitly. They very much let me find my own way. But I do attribute most of my values as coming from my parents, in some way. (31; +2: P3)

Next most important was a characteristic of this factor that distinguished it from factor 2 and which provided it with its defining feature: that the ultimate test of one’s values is whether or not they make you happy (32; +5: FA). Happiness in this sense is not simply selfish, however. It is linked to a deeper understanding of what is right and wrong with respect to oneself and others. As one exemplar says:

I feel good if I feel I’ve done right with respect to others and I feel bad if I think I haven’t. Values guide you to do right by others, I guess, so if they make you happy then they must be alright. (32; +5: P3)

The idea that values were linked to others is important. It is where one gains one’s sense of values (6; +4: FA). By contrast it is most definitely not due to a duty to society (53; -5: FA).

Notable for this group is a lack of monitoring of oneself in relation to one’s values. On this point, they differ from factor one, values are not something you need to think about, they are just there (11; +4: FA). Similarly, they should not be treated as rules (47; -4: FA), but are rather dependent on how one feels (21; +4: FA). Thus, they shouldn’t necessarily be followed: one should take into account the details of the
situation (33; +3: FA). They are also likely to change, at least in their details, depending on the way one’s life is going at the moment (13; +3: FA):

I change my mind a lot depending on my mood. (13; +5: P8)

Finally, they don’t depend on self-help books.

Self-help books are worthless unless you’re the one who has written it. To read what someone else thinks your values should be does not help you determine what they actually are. (26; -5: P39)

Values in factor 4 are thus understood to have come from one’s parents. They are ultimately grounded in doing what makes one happy. They have an inherent sense of flexibility and depend on the situation. They are not something one should feel too compelled about sticking to. They can be characterised as ‘Hedonist’.

**Factor 5: Existentialist**

There were six exemplars of factor 5 (see summary in Table 8.5). They were equally split between men and women, and besides two in their 30s, were relatively young, aged 19 to 23. Four of the six were students, the other two a secretary and website designer. Four were in a relationship or married. Five of the six were not religious. Idiosyncratically, those in factor 5 were relatively interested in politics, but compared to other groups reporting a similar interest, did not report being committed to politics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Factor Loading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>law student</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>astronomy student</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>psychology student</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>website designer</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>secretary</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>linguistics student</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Factor 5 can be labelled after its remarkable similarity to the existentialist moral philosophy of Sartre discussed in Chapter 5 (p 128). For all but one of the
existentialists, ‘God is dead’, therefore, one has an obligation owed only to oneself (55; +5: FA):

If my religion could be said to be my Atheism, then it is what I value, rather than an influence upon my values. (5; -5: P43)

It is not healthy to feel guilty over whether an external force knows that you have not followed your ‘values’. You should know whether you follow your values or not and if you have not it is you who should take responsibility for them. (43; -5: P2)

One is not only responsible for watching over one’s values, but necessarily responsible for choosing what they are. Acknowledgment of one’s moral freedom is the only ‘essence’ for the existentialist:

I’m an independent free spirit. (17; -5: P9)

Without Freedom, Life has little value. (22; +4: P50)

Thus, working out one’s own values is one of life’s great freedoms (22; +4; FA). Freedom has other consequences: it leads to the inevitability of change in one’s values. For factor 5, this amounts to a radical acknowledgement of the likelihood of change in one’s values. This is defined negatively, even beyond a rejection of Religion, through items 8 and 10, ‘I would expect to rate the values the same in 5 years (and 6 months) time’, both of which are rated -5 in the factor array.

I suppose I just feel that life is an adventure in ‘relativity’ and we have to judge each situation on its merits. (33; +5: P43)

Having said that for 33 though, we are individuals making our way through this world and it’s up to us to create our own life. (22; +5: P43)

In contrast to the other factors, values are something that should be part of one’s development. They are something deep inside you waiting to be discovered (28; +3: FA); are about fulfilling one’s potential (49; +4: FA); and are part of one’s development towards doing things exceptionally (36; +3: FA). Thus:

Any belief should encourage and positivize yourself to living life the best you can. (36; +5: P56)

Finally, values for the existentialist are not only founded on a debt to no one else, but are an altogether solitary part of life. You can only really think about what your true
values are on your own (45; +4: FA). Values for the self-actualising existentialist, therefore, are without external or social foundation. They are highly individualistic, grounded only in one's inherent personal freedom. They entail high demands on oneself both to choose one's values on one's own, and in terms of the responsibility of seeing them through. They are bound to one's personal growth and development, and hence are understood to be intrinsically open to change.

**Factor 6: Traditional**

The last factor formed the smallest group of exemplars, and also the most distinctive demographically (see summary in Table 8.6). It was equally split across gender. In contrast to other factors, it was an older group (ages 26, 31, 33, 43) and three of the four were married. It was also the only group than was not principally white. It included one Pakistani, one Bangladeshi and one Chinese. Three of the four expressed an interest in politics. For two participants this was in Labour, one Tory, the last reported not being likely to vote. All exemplars of factor 6 were Religious, one attending religious meetings monthly, two weekly, and one more than once a week. One was Protestant, one Greek Orthodox, and two Islam.

Table 8.6: Summary information including case number, age, gender, self-reported occupation and their loadings on the factor for the 4 participants whose Q-sorts exemplify factor six.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Age, Gender, Occupation</th>
<th>Loading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>43 years, female</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>26 years, female, ancient history student</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>31 years, male, geological science student</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>33 years, male, theology student</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values for factor 6, like factor 3, were grounded in one's religion, which is a strong influence on what one values (5; +5: FA).

Religion and moral beliefs can give some objectivity to one's rules of life, behaviour and thinking. Some of those beliefs are timeless. (5; +5: P58)

I believe in God and I think He created us for specific reasons. His wisdom is far, far better than us. (5; +5: P53)
Like factor three, the strong emphasis on religion gives values a transcendent foundation that exists over and above everyday concerns and human fallibility. Values thus achieve a sense of objectivity. However, in contrast to the other religious factor, there is also a greater emphasis for factor 6 on one’s community, in addition to religion. Thus, it is most characteristic for this group that one’s elders should be an important influence on one’s values (51; +5: FA). Right values are not just based on Religion, but communicated through senior members of one’s community, and through one’s parents:

If children are brought-up with the right values, it would probably lead to the world being a better place. (14; +5: P32)

In this sense, then, it is also important that one discusses one’s values (41; +3: FA) and that one’s sense of values comes from important relationships with others (6; +3: FA). Consequently, a further difference from the Religious based values of factor 3 is an emphasis on the commitment that then follows to one’s society. More than for any other factor, people have a duty to society to follow their values (53; +4: FA). This complements the rejection of the idea that the only obligation to follow your values is that which you owe to yourself (55; -5: FA):

What about the rights and feelings of others? If everyone does what is good for themselves, does the community descend to anarchy? (55; -5: P58)

Moreover, the duty felt to others in one’s community is a strong one. It requires considerable self-discipline in order to live up to one’s values (39; +4: FA). It is expressed in a strong rejection of the idea that one should not treat one’s values as rules, but go by what one feels (21; -4: FA), and that one should only have values when it is convenient:

It is dangerous. It is an opportunistic and self-interest based approach and attitude and I hate it. (30; -5: P53)

Factor 6 was thus least related to the idea that one should take into account the details of the situation (33; -1: FA). Fundamentally, one should stick to one’s values because they are grounded in tradition, be it elders and/or religion, and hence they are the right values:

Subjective feelings can change according to influences such as media, peers, social values - some of which are not necessarily right. (21; -5: P58)
This grounding of values in tradition, more strongly than any factor other than 2, lead to a feeling that there had been an erosion of values in recent years (27; +3: FA).

In sum, factor 6 also presents a conception of values in which their foundation is in religion. However, it is not the key characteristic. Religion seems itself to be part of a larger factor that is one’s tradition, the label given to this factor. Values are grounded in community and the important relationships one has with one’s elders within that community. There is, then, a vital responsibility and duty felt not only to one’s God, but to one’s social group. It carries a strong burden to live according to one’s values that endure through time and should be applied across situations.

The Q factors and value priorities

The analysis of the factors presented so far has identified different ways of conceptualising the notion of values. The groups of exemplars that have been discussed were identified on the basis of judgements of statements about values, for example, whether values should be applied across situations, or whether values are manipulated by the mass media. There has been no discussion of the traditional concern of value researchers with value priorities. This section considers the relationship between understandings of what values are, and the priorities of what values are considered important as measured using the SYS.

To take into account variability within each factor and to consider the confidence with which one might infer that these differences in value priorities generalise to others holding the same conceptions of values, statistical tests of significance were computed. So as not to capitalise on chance, multiple testing was limited by computing scores on the 10 Schwartz value types, and testing differences on the value types rather than individual values. When comparing the ratings of different groups, Schwartz (1992) recommends entering the total score across the scale as a covariate to take into account differences due to scale usage. Hence, a series of 1-way ANCOVAs were conducted with membership as exemplar of one of the 6 factors as independent variable, total score on the SVS as covariate, and mean score for each of the value types as the 10 dependent variables. To correct the family-wise error rate, a bonferroni correction was made, thus a significance level of .005 was used. Given that group sizes were unequal, Levene’s
test for homogeneity of variance was calculated but was not significant for any of the 10 types.

For six of the 10 types there was no significant difference between exemplars of the different Q factors. These were the types: Power, Achievement, Stimulation, Universalism, Benevolence, and Security. Hedonism approached significance $F (5, 36) = 2.89, p < .05$, but was not statistically significant when the Bonferroni correction was applied. The remaining three types were significantly different. These included Self-Direction, $F (5, 36) = 4.25, p < .005$; Tradition, $F (5, 36) = 7.56, p < .001$; and Conformity, $F (5, 36) = 7.63, p < .001$. For those value types for which there was a significant difference, pairwise comparisons were calculated, also using a Bonferroni correction. For the Self-direction value type, the Spiritual factor rated it significantly lower than either the Post-traditional ($p < .01$) or Existentialist factor ($p < .05$). The Tradition value type was rated higher by the Tradition factor than by the Spiritual ($p < .001$), Principled ($p < .001$), Hedonist ($p < .05$), and Existentialist factors ($p < .01$). Additionally, Tradition was rated lower by the Post-traditional factor than either the Spiritual ($p < .01$) or Principled ($p < .05$) factor. Finally, Conformity was rated lower by the Post-traditional factor than by the Principled ($p < .001$), Spiritual ($p < .001$), or Traditional factors ($p < .01$).

Discussion:

The aim of the present study was to investigate how people understand the notion of values. More specifically, the objective was to ascertain whether there is a range of coherent patterns of understandings possible, and if so, to identify the key characteristics of the different forms. Applying factor analytic procedures to participants' Q sorts revealed six such factors. In accordance with their most distinctive features, they were labelled: Post-traditional, Principled, Spiritual, Hedonist, Existentialist, and Traditional. It was also found that there were significant differences in value priorities between exemplars of the different forms. The importance of the Schwartz (1992) value types Self-Direction, Tradition, and Conformity differed between the groups. The findings of the study were therefore consistent those of the previous chapter that there are substantial differences in how people understand the
notion of values, and, moreover, the present study provides further evidence for the idea that there is systematic variation between the many dimensions in which understandings differ.

The findings like those of the previous study contrast with the conceptualisation of values introduced by Rokeach (1973). Participants were given the opportunity to express their own understanding of the notion of values by sorting a set of statements about values. If there was broadly a single, shared understanding of the notion of value, then one would expect to find the majority of participants would agree and disagree with the same statements, thus largely sort the cards in the same way. Principle component analysis of the resulting data would then reveal a single factor accounting for a large percentage of the variance. However, this was not what was found. The fact that six components were identified and could be meaningfully interpreted is evidence instead for a number of different, coherent forms of understanding of values. In addition to the face value of this inquiry into the diversity of points of view about values, the theoretical significance lies in the contrast between the singular conceptualisation of the concept embedded in modern values research, and the multiple conceptions of values found in the empirical study.

The Q analysis extends the qualitative study reported in Chapter 7 in two main ways. First, it provides further evidence using a different method for the existence of a diversity of understandings. Rather than having differences identified through a close analysis of interview transcript by the analyst, in the present study, participants were given the materials to express a viewpoint for themselves. The patterns were therefore allowed to emerge with less involvement by the researcher.

Second, the study offers support for an idea that was only suggested in previous research, that the potential points of difference in conceiving of values did not simply differ in random ways, but formed distinct and coherent patterns. In theoretical terms, the existence of holistic perceptions of values therefore suggests that there are not only differences in conceptions of values, i.e. whether or not values are understood to be abstract principles as proposed by Rokeach, but that these differences are systematically related to other axes of difference, most notably to aspects of values related to the domain of ethics emphasised by Foucault.
A number of clear examples of the relationship between conceptions of values and modes of ethical self formation can be taken from the position of key items in the factor arrays. It was argued in Chapter 7 that central qualities of values for Rokeach's conceptualisation of values as guiding principles are that they are enduring, they transcend time, and that they are abstract or acontextual, that they do not depend on the circumstances. There was, however, considerable variability in the degree of agreement with items concerning these qualities, and this coincided with factors central to ethical self formation. For example, the item 'those values that I hold most dearly will never change' was agreed with most in the second factor, in which the understanding of values was indeed very much like Rokeach's conceptualisation. Values were understood to be basic principles that by definition are unlikely to change. The opposite was the case, however, for the existentialist factor, characterised by disagreement with items about the enduring nature of values, and agreement with items concerning the importance of the freedom to choose one's values. Likewise, an item closely related to the abstract nature of values, like 'You shouldn't necessarily follow a value you believe to be true. You have to take into account the details of the situation' varied systematically with factors incorporating different forms of ethics. The Traditional factor disagreed most with this item, consistent with the abstract nature of values proposed by Rokeach. The Hedonist factor agreed with the item, however, with it appearing in the third most agree pile of the factor array. A key implication of the study is, therefore, that the field of ethics as discussed by Foucault, but neglected to date in values research, has important systematic consequences for the conceptions people have of values.

The results of the study must be balanced against a number of limitations of the approach. First, the number and type of factors revealed clearly depend on the range of statements provided for participants. It is possible that there are other descriptive statements about values that some participants would have agreed with even more than those rated most favourably in the present study. Additional items may have produced further factors and hence yet other ways of understanding the notion of values. The number of factors was similarly limited by the diversity of participants taking part in the study. It is possible that the inclusion of other participants would lead to different ways of sorting the cards. In both case, precautions were taken against these eventualities.
The statements used in the study were drawn from an extensive body of interview data and a broad review of popular and theoretical literatures. Likewise, efforts were made to attract as diverse a range of participants as possible. Nonetheless, the factors identified in the present study cannot claim to exhaust the possibilities. However, the aim of the study was not so much to map the domain in its entirety, a task that would require a much broader range of studies conducted across cultures, but in the first instance, to merely demonstrate the existence of multiple patterns of understanding of the concept of values, and show systematic relationships between the components of understanding constituting the factors. The six readily interpretable factors identified here are thus evidence enough for present theoretical purposes.

There are also alternative explanations to that proposed in the present section. As suggested previously in Chapter 7, it could be argued that people's conscious understandings of values are unrelated to the unconscious operation of human values, and hence to the principle theories in psychology. However, as argued previously, these theories are intended to map the phenomenological experience of values, and to describe symbolically representable, explicit, 'conceptions of the desirable', rather than merely the observed functioning of behaviour oriented toward the desired.

A second alternative explanation is more complex. It was found in the present study that the factors were related to value priorities. Hence, an apparently simpler interpretation of the findings is that the factors are simply expressions of values. Rather than having the centrally important role attributed them in the current discussion, 'understandings of values' represented by the Q factors could themselves be understood simply as differences in values. In the general sense of the term, this account may be acceptable. The Hedonist and the Traditional factors could be said to differ in terms of their 'values'. Care must be taken in such statements, however, over the term 'values'. This response works when it is used in an everyday sense, but it does not when 'values' is used in the more specific technical sense used here. The term has a special meaning referring to a specific type of belief when used in the context of the theoretical literature derived from Rokeach (1973). One cannot then argue that understandings of values are expressions of values, since the very existence of the latter is dependent on the former. As discussed here, statements about values are expressions of ethical practices that led to the emergence of certain goals as values. These ethical practices, therefore, can
undoubtedly be said to be 'value-laden' in the general sense of the term, but not to be the result of 'values' in the technical psychological sense. It is current contention that the Foucaultian notion of ethics is the foundation for the existence of values, and is closely tied to the resulting conception of the nature of values. The second alternative explanation therefore is not acceptable. This argument will be further developed in the next chapter.

There are a number of options for further research in the light of the present study. It has been suggested that the research reported here is dependent on the items used and the participants taking part in the Q sort. Pursuing the opposite approach to that of Schwartz and colleagues who have attempted to demonstrate the universality of Schwartz's model of values, one option would be to seek further diversity in understandings of the notion of values. Q items for the present study could be refined, removing items that did not distinguish between the factors, and different samples could be used from multiple cultures. It would valuable to discover both the extent to which the forms of understandings of values found here are shared across cultures, and the extent to which new forms emerge.

In the next, final study of the thesis, however, a different approach will be taken. The present study and the last have both drawn on a hermeneutic perspective, emphasising participants' own perceptions. They have thus focused on holistic perceptions of values, looking at different dimensions of values as they interrelated. They have offered a rich, contextualised picture of diversity of points of view. The next chapter will return to a study closer to the 'empirical-analytic' approach used in the Rokeach-Schwartz tradition. The aim will be to further clarify the relationship between conceptions of values and modes of ethical self formation. It will, however, operationalise these constructs as psychological variables, employ a much larger, representative sample, and attempt to establish a generalisable statistical relationship between these variables.
Chapter 9

Ethical Self Formation and Conceptions of Values

Introduction

To explore the possibilities for changes in values beyond those studied by Rokeach, the focus of the thesis has moved from the investigation of changing priorities of values to an analysis of understandings of values and their relationship to modes of ethical self-relationship. Following the work of Foucault, it has been argued that contemporary society is characterised by a transformation in ethics, defined as the ethical relationship one has with oneself. Evidence was found in the previous studies for a diversity of forms of ethics and for the idea that they are related not only to value priorities but to people’s conceptions of the nature of values. The two previous studies adopted exploratory approaches generating hermeneutic accounts that emphasise people’s own understandings of values. The present chapter now extends previous findings by adopting an empirical-analytic perspective (Habermas, 1971) more like the approach used in the Rokeach-Schwartz theoretical tradition. It presents an operationalisation of the concepts distinguished so far, ethical self-relationship and conceptions of values, to provide a formal statistical test of the relationship between them.

The aim of the chapter is to further assess the empirical evidence for a Foucault inspired conceptualisation of values. The chapter thus focuses on the use of the notion of ethical self-relationship in the context of the psychology of values. However, in order to develop the concept of ethical self formation into a theoretical variable, a major part of the present chapter is devoted to the construction and validation of an Ethical Self Formation Scale. To do so it is necessary to locate the concept further in the existing psychological literature. The chapter therefore draws on established measures of individual differences from the field of moral psychology as a point of reference from which to validate the notion of ethical self formation. Though the emphasis remains on
values, the chapter therefore begins with a brief introduction to some key approaches to moral psychology, showing how they relate to the notion of ethical self formation. The chapter then describes how items were generated for the new scale, how its structure and psychometric properties were analysed and the scale partially validated, and finally, reports the results of the test of the hypothesis that conceptions of values are systematically related to modes of ethical self formation.

The development of a measure of Ethical Self Formation

Psychology has produced a number of explanations for moral behaviour. Freud (1922) linked the moral conscience to psychodynamic development and the super-ego. Mischel (1976) theorised moral behaviour using social learning theory. Most influential in recent years, however, has been Kohlberg’s (1976; 1984) cognitive developmental theory. Extending Piaget’s (1965) structural account of cognitive and moral development, Kohlberg proposed six distinct cognitive stages through which people develop. Kohlberg analysed the reasoning processes used to resolve moral dilemmas and found that the grounds for justification followed a sequence of successive transformations in the way people view cooperative social arrangements, ranging from simple punishment and reward to the use of formal, abstract principles of justice.

Kohlberg’s model was influenced by the moral philosophy of Kant, and the research programme developed by Kohlberg is premised on fundamental assumptions about his conception of morality. The focus, therefore, has been on processes of cognitive deliberation in response to moral dilemmas, and has held notions of autonomous, practical reason as the highest stage of moral development. There have, however, been many critiques of Kant’s position in moral philosophy and various alternatives proposed (discussed in Chapter 4). In recent years, these critiques have found parallels in moral psychology.

Haan (1978), for example, drew on Habermas’s (1984-88) highly influential discourse ethics as an alternative to Kant’s universalist, deontological philosophy. Following Habermas, she looked not only at people’s individual cognition, but the way they performed in discursive encounters with others in which moral questions were at issue. More widely discussed in psychology and a contribution in its own right to philosophical debates has been Gilligan’s (1982) feminist critique. She attacked
Kohlberg’s theory for privileging a biased, masculinist conception of morality, in which autonomy is unproblematically assumed to be superior to inter-related conceptions of self and moral judgements based on Care. Others have presented critiques based on conceptions of morality from other philosophical traditions, for example, focusing on character and virtue (Hogan, 1973; Punzo, 1996). The latter perspective changes the emphasis from autonomous and abstract principles to a concern with dispositions, behaviour in specific circumstances, and the importance of different qualities of character in specific socio-historical contexts.

A diversity of views has emerged in moral psychology, therefore, as in moral philosophy. It has produced a situation where it is now less clear, compared to the long period dominated by the approach of Kohlberg, which model of morality should serve as the basis for a psychology of moral behaviour. Compelling arguments can equally be made that morality is primarily cognitive (Kohlberg, 1984), discursive (Haan, 1978), based on virtue (Punzo, 1996) or Feminist alternatives (Gilligan, 1982).

One resolution adopted by some theorists is to suggest that any moral philosophy must include multiple criteria or forms. Hogan, Johnson and Emler (1994), for example, argue that models of morality must include not only the ability to reason and operate autonomously, but also a developed sense of empathy and care, as well as a proper respect for established rules. Wren’s (1993) approach goes further to identify six different forms of morality. For Wren, these alternatives should not be opposed to each other, in a search for a single, properly justifiable account, but be understood to co-exist. Not only do they all have a claim as a form of morality, people might subscribe to different forms simultaneously. The notion of Ethical Self Formation draws from the analytic framework of Foucault (1984a; 1984b) a philosophical account that is consistent with this multiple-model perspective of morality characteristic of some contemporary psychological research.

Re-framing the moral domain through the concept of Ethical Self Formation

Foucault’s analytic framework suggests a way of conceptualising morality that naturally incorporates multiple forms of morality and ethics. He argues that moral philosophy has been too concerned with the identification and justification of certain interdictions and prohibitions. Foucault draws on morality as understood in antiquity to
highlight an alternative conception. In Foucault’s framework it is not what is and is not allowed and whether or not it is justified as a universal law that is important. Rather, it is the ways in which certain moral standards are understood, and from this derives the qualitatively distinct modes through which one forms oneself as an ethical subject. (See Chapter 4 for a fuller description of Foucault’s account.)

Comparing Foucault’s approach to Kohlberg’s reveals certain similarities. For the latter, it is likewise not the content or outcome of one’s decision that is important, that is indicative of one’s stage of moral development. It does not matter, for example, whether one advocates stealing or not stealing a medicine to save Heinz’s dying wife in Kohlberg’s well-known moral dilemma. For Kohlberg, it is the type of justification used in making the decision that reveals one’s moral judgment stage. Similarly for Foucault, it is not the content or nature of the prohibited behaviours that is important, but the position one adopts as a subject in relation to those behaviours. However, there is a subtle shift of perspective in Foucault’s approach that introduces two critical differences.

First, Foucault studies what is and is not understood to be morally acceptable, and is interested in moral behaviours. But central to his attempt to move away from an emphasis on interdictions and moral codes, is a change in the aspect of morality that he takes as the focus for concern. There is indeed a moral or ethical issue at stake in the case of Heinz and whether or not to steal the medicine, for example. However, for Foucault the importance of one’s understanding of this dilemma is not so much its moral implications, as typically understood, but the importance of the way one understands this issue for one’s relationship with oneself. Rather than emphasising ethics in the sense of how one’s actions affect others, ethics is understood in a new sense focusing on the implications for the understanding and formation of oneself. Hence, the focus for the concept developed in the present chapter is not on morality, *per se*, but on *ethical self formation*.

Second, as critics have argued, Kohlberg’s schematic outline of moral development incorporates a specific model of morality (e.g. Haan, 1982; Simpson, 1974; Sullivan, 1977). It presupposes an ideal against which one’s development can then be judged. By contrast, Foucault’s analytic framework serves as a shell for a
multiplicity of models, each of which is understood to constitute a different mode of ethical self formation. Thus, from the latter perspective, Kohlberg's highest form of morality, as abstract reasoning culminating in principles of justice, represents only one possible form of ethical self formation; Gilligan's alternative emphasising care and responsibility toward others is another. Foucault's notion of ethics therefore intrinsically subsumes at least this aspect of the major debates that have occupied philosophy and psychology. It can do so, however, only because it does nothing to resolve the issues in the terms in which they have been cast. Foucault's analytic avoids the debate because it alters the perspective from the justification of one view over another, to an analysis of their co-existence and consequences.

The notion of ethical self formation thus offers the potential for a new way of thinking about individual differences in conceptions of morality. Considerably more work needs to be done to integrate a Foucault inspired approach with the large body of work in moral psychology using more traditional conceptions of morality. However, the concern of the present study is more limited. The subsequent sections therefore consider the moral psychology literature further only in so far as it assists with the validation of the scale based on the new perspective. The next section thus proceeds to consider how one might construct a psychological instrument for the measurement of different modes of ethical self formation, so that it can be used to test specific hypotheses about the nature of values.

**Measuring Ethical Self Formation**

There are four key elements in Foucault's analytic of ethics. The ethical substance is the focus of one's ethical gaze. The mode of subjection is the way in which people are incited to recognise a moral obligation. Ethical work refers to the means and modes through which one works on oneself or transforms oneself in order to become an ethical subject. Finally, the telos is the kind of being to which one aspires when behaving morally. There is the potential for variation in all these elements in how they are understood in different forms of ethics. For example, the ethical substance in Catholicism might be one's deep-seated desires, whereas in Kant's moral philosophy it might be one's conscious motivations.
The aim of the present chapter is not to map the rich variety possible in these four elements. Rather it is a first attempt to develop a psychological instrument that draws on Foucault’s analytic to make it available to more traditional forms of psychological investigation. Hence, the objective is to design a scale that fulfils established psychological criteria of coherent structure, reliability, and validity, that measures broad differences in the modes people use to form themselves as ethical subjects.

It was found in Chapter 7, that there were multiple forms of both ethical substance and ethical work. However, it was not clear that any one form of either of these elements was likely to be systematically related to the others. For example, ethical work consisting of the on-going revaluation of one’s values might be consistent with a number of different modes of subjection. The scale formulated in the present chapter therefore focuses on only two of the four elements, that from the pattern analytic of Q methodology could be seen to be more highly related: mode of subjection and telos. Hence, the process of ethical self formation is operationalised here in terms of the mode through which one perceives oneself as obligated to act morally, and the kind of being to which one aspires. For example, one might experience an obligation to act ethically through Religious faith, and one would expect this to relate to a telos of being spiritually fulfilled.

The Q analysis reported in the previous chapter found six different ways of understanding values. They were moreover, related to a number of key positions in moral philosophy. The scale presented here therefore begins from these earlier findings. It initially proposes six basic forms of ethical self formation that serve as the starting point for the design of the instrument. First, is a mode of ethical self formation founded in Care. Consistent with Gilligan's critique and a key characteristic of the first Q factor is a mode of subjection, a felt obligation to act morally, based on the relationship one has with one’s family and friends. Likewise, it can be suggested that the telos would be a self-understanding as someone who had been caring towards their loved ones. A second mode of ethical self formation, derived from the next Q factor, is that which has dominated modern thinking on morality, drawing on reason and abstract principles. It is how Kant’s and Kohlberg’s positions might be understood through Foucault’s analytic. The mode of subjection is through the demands of practical reason, or more simply, through adherence to proper principles. The third mode is that which was of particular
concern to Foucault, based on Religion or Spirituality. The mode of subjection is through God's glory or Divine Law. The fourth is based on Hedonism, in which one's sense of morality is founded principally on enjoying oneself, or making the most of one's life. The fifth was described as Existentialist, and approximates most closely to what has been discussed in the philosophical and psychological literatures as virtue. It is about manifesting one's potential, or expressing one's natural abilities and valued dispositions, or virtues. Finally, the last Q factor also involved religion, but was distinctive through the importance placed on one's community. It involved a sense of commitment to one's social group, and will be discussed in the present context in terms of tradition. These are the six forms of ethical self formation that the scale will set out to measure.

The aim of the present study, therefore, is to first develop and test the reliability and validity of a psychological instrument to measure different modes of ethical self formation. It can then be used with some confidence to test the relationship between different forms of ethical self-relationship and conceptions of values. The following sections first describe the structure of the proposed instrument and how the items were generated through a pilot study. They then report how the resulting scale was completed by a large sample of respondents in conjunction with a number of other tests. The study was therefore able to test a number of hypotheses concerning the usefulness of the items, the reliability and validity of the instrument, and its relationship to the field of values. The following hypotheses were tested:

1) The scale was designed to measure six different modes of ethical self formation. A six-factor structure was therefore predicted. Since the present analytic of ethics assumes that one can simultaneously adopt more than one mode of ethical self formation (ESF), it was also expected that an oblique rather than orthogonal model would provide a better fit for the data.

2) Different modes of ESF are understood to be relatively coherent phenomena that entail enduring endorsement. Measurements of ESF were therefore expected to demonstrate high internal and test-retest reliability.

3) Though ESF provides an alternative perspective on morality to that of Kohlberg and Gilligan, components of the scale would be expected to demonstrate
convergent validity with measurements of these established conceptions. In particular, endorsement of Kohlberg’s principled level of moral reasoning would be expected to correlate positively with a mode of ESF based on principle. Gilligan’s ethic of care would likewise be expected to correlate with the forms of ESF based on care. On the other hand, the different components of the scale should all possess discriminant validity with social desirability.

4) In the light of the suggestive evidence from the Q study, ESF would be expected to demonstrate statistically significant relationships with measures of conceptions of values and value priorities.

Method:

Structure of the Instrument:

The Ethical Self Formation Scale (ESFS) was designed to closely follow the analytic of ethics as theorised by Foucault. Hence, after the general instructions, the design concentrates directly on the two key elements of ethical self formation discussed above: one’s mode of subjection and telos.

Mode of subjection is operationalised in two ways, using the same method already successfully employed in Chapter 7. First, respondents are asked directly about the focus of their experience of ethical or moral obligation. The first set of items begins with the statement: ‘My sense of moral or ethical obligation comes from:’. This is followed by an inventory of options, for example, ‘my spiritual beliefs’. For each option, there is a 7-point response scale with end-points ‘Not at all’ (1) and ‘Very much’ (7). The same format is repeated for the second measure of mode of subjection, which assesses respondents’ sense of transgression. They are presented with the statement: ‘If I thought I had not been living a moral or good life, I would feel that I had:’. Options might include, for example, ‘turned away from God’, also rated on a 7-point response scale with end-points ‘Not at all’ (1) and ‘Very much’ (7).

Telos is measured following a similar structure using the third and final part of the instrument. In order to assess the kind of being to which one aspires, the section begins with the statement: ‘To act morally or live a ‘good’ life is ultimately to be someone
who'. This is followed by a number of options like, 'Was spiritually fulfilled', each with a 7-point response scale with end-points 'Strongly disagree' and 'Strongly agree'.

**Item Development:**

The basic structure of the scale described above is a straightforward operationalisation of the relevant parts of Foucault’s analytic framework interpreted in Chapter 4. What should constitute the substantive content of the scale, however, the items to include, is an empirical question. It depends on the range of currently practised forms of ethics. It is the contention of Foucault’s argument that ethics are socio-historically specific and open to variation and change. The primary source for the generation of items, therefore, was the empirical data collected for the present thesis, including the transcript from 47 exploratory interviews, and participants’ comments and sorts made during the Q study. In addition, a group of 70 students (24 male (34%) and 46 female (66%), mean age 22.48 years, SD = 5.64) took part in an open-ended preliminary task designed to generate material in a form relating specifically to the design of the scale. They participated in a sentence completion task using sentence stems based on those used in the ESFS. That is, they completed the following sentences: 'I feel a sense of moral or ethical obligation to ...'; 'If I thought I had not been living a moral or good life, I would feel that I had ...'; 'To act morally or live a 'good' life is ultimately to be someone who ...'. Responses to these questions were collated and used in conjunction with the existing material. The original pool of items was then reduced as usual in psychometric studies to exclude those that were ambiguous, unclear, double-barrelled, or repetitious. Thirty items were generated and included in a provisional version of the scale tested in the present study.

**Participants:**

Eight hundred and thirteen participants completed questionnaire packets for the study. Three hundred and seventy-nine (46.6%) and 426 female (52.4%). Eight participants (1.0%) did not report their gender. Ages of participants ranged from 18 to 93 (mean age 30.55 years, SD = 13.87). Twenty-four participants (3.0%) did not have O’ levels or GCSEs and eight (1.0%) had reached only this level of education. Of the remainder 275 (33.8%) had also completed A’ levels, 328 (40.3%) degrees or professional qualifications, and 107 (13.2%) postgraduate qualifications. Three hundred
and seventy-three (45.9%) were undergraduate or postgraduate students at the University of London, reading a variety of subjects. Of the remaining participants, three hundred and sixty-seven (45.1%) were employed in a wide range of occupations, 13 (1.6%) were unemployed, 23 (2.8%) retired and 15 (1.8%) housewives. Twenty-two (2.7%) participants did not record their occupation.

Respondents were recruited for the study from two sources. First, a class of psychology undergraduates completed the survey as part of their participation in a practical class on questionnaire design. Second, to obtain as large and diverse a sample as possible, students taking part in the class then recruited a further nine participants each, drawn from their family and friends. All respondents were volunteers and were not paid for their time.

To provide a means of assessing the test-retest reliability of the scale, a subgroup (n = 42) of the original group of students was recruited to complete a revised version of the ESFS a second time, after a 12-week interval.

Questionnaire Measures:

All respondents completed the ESFS, a version of the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS; Prince-Gibson & Schwartz, 1998), and a demographics questionnaire. Other questionnaires completed in the study included: a set of items measuring conceptions of values (CVS); Crowne and Marlowe's (1960) widely used measure of social desirability; and three scales measuring constructs from different perspectives in the moral reasoning literature. The focus of the study was the relationship between the ESFS and related measures, rather than the intercorrelations amongst the extant moral reasoning scales. It was therefore unnecessary for every respondent to complete all the questionnaires, only that the ESFS was completed in conjunction with all others, by at least some members of the sample. To limit the burden on respondents whilst maximizing the range of questionnaires that could be studied, questionnaire packets were therefore constructed with the ESFS, SVS and demographics questionnaires, and only one other.

The choice of measures from moral psychology was made to reflect the key positions in the literature, expected to relate to and so assist in the validation of the factors of the ESFS. Since the study was questionnaire rather than interview based, pencil and paper
measures had to be used. Hence, to measure a principled level of moral judgement according to Kohlberg’s criteria, a reduced version of the Defining Issues Test (DIT; (Rest, Cooper, Coder, Masanz, & Anderson, 1974) was included. Endorsement of Gilligan’s ethic of care was measured using Forsyth, Nye and Kelley’s (1988) scale, in preference to alternatives like Jensen, McGhie and Jensen’s (1991) ‘World View Questionnaire’ since it is short, covers the main aspects of Gilligan’s (1982) position, and possesses adequate psychometric properties. Finally, as an alternative to either Kohlberg or Gilligan’s conception of morality, Forsyth’s (1980) scales were included, measuring the ethical ideologies of Idealism and Relativism.

**Ethical Self Formation Scale (ESFS).** The ESFS comprises 30 items divided into three sections, as described in the previous section. It was designed to tap six different modes of ethical self formation.

**Schwartz Value Survey (SVS; Prince-Gibson and Schwartz, 1998).** The SVS was used to measure value priorities. To make the overall number of questions manageable, the study used a reduced version of the SVS, as suggested by Prince-Gibson and Schwartz (1998). The version of the scale maintains the same format and instructions, but uses a sub-set of 37 of the original 56 values. The sample of values was chosen by Prince-Gibson and Schwartz to represent all of the 10 value types included in the complete scale.

**Demographics.** The same demographic questionnaire used in Chapter 8 was used in the present study. In addition to basic demographic data concerning age, gender, educational background, occupation, marital status and ethnic origin, two, two-item scales were also included to measure degree of involvement with politics (Cronbach’s alpha = .85) and religion (Cronbach’s alpha = .80).

**Conceptions of Values Scale (CVS).** A scale was developed specifically for the purposes of the present study to operationalise participants’ conceptions of values. Based on the findings of Chapters 7 and 8, the scale focuses specifically on the extent to which people understand values to be guiding principles, defined as abstract and enduring, rather than more transitory and contextual goals. Ten items were included in the scale, each rated on a 7-point response scale with end-points ‘Strongly disagree’ and ‘Strongly agree’. Five items were included to tap an understanding of values as being enduring or
stable over time, rather than transitory and liable to sudden change. These were: ‘The values I hold most dearly will never change’; ‘If I rated the importance of different values to me again in 5 years time, I would expect my answers to be almost exactly the same’; ‘What is most important to me changes almost day by day’ (reversed); ‘If I rated the importance of different values to me again in 6 months time, I would expect my answers to be almost exactly the same’; ‘The priority of my values changes depending on the way my life’s going at the moment’ (reversed). The remaining 5 items measured a conception of values as being abstract and transcendental across situations, rather than contextual and dependent on the circumstances: ‘What is most important to me depends on the situation’ (reversed); ‘You should act according to the same set of values in every area of your life’; ‘It is hard to say one value is more important than another’; ‘I would rate the importance of my values differently depending on what aspect of my life I was thinking about’ (reversed); ‘You should not always follow the values that are important to you. You have to take the circumstances into account’ (reversed). (The CVS is included in Appendix L.) Reversed items were included to prevent acquiescent response bias. Cronbach’s alpha for the 10 items found in the present study was .77, suggesting that they relate to the same underlying construct. They were therefore treated as a single scale, a measure of the degree to which values are conceived as abstract and enduring principles. The mean score for the 10 items was used.

Social Desirability (Crowne and Marlowe, 1960). The social desirability scale comprises 28 items designed to measure socially desirable responding. It includes items like ‘I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble’, and reversed items like ‘I sometimes try to get even, rather than forgive and forget’. The coefficient of internal consistency found in the study was .74. The mean score was computed after reversing the appropriate items.

Defining Issues Test (DIT; Rest et al., 1974). The DIT measures the importance individuals attribute to a range of potentially important issues in moral dilemmas. Consistent with Kohlberg’s conception of a moral stage as a conceptual framework for interpreting social interrelationships, Rest et al. (1974) found that there was a correlation of .68 between scores on the DIT and qualitative assessment of stage of moral reasoning using Kohlberg’s scoring system. The scale is not therefore an identical measure, but a strong indicator of a principled level of moral reasoning as
conceptualised by Kohlberg. The DIT presents respondents with a series of six moral dilemmas each followed by twelve possible defining issues. One option is a nonsense item, one irrelevant, five represent levels one to three, one represents the stage four 'Law and Order' level, and four are designed to tap a principled level of moral reasoning. As recommended by Rest et al. (1974), only the latter were used in the present study. Respondents selecting one of the four options as the most important issue in the dilemma were classed as adopting principled moral reasoning. Given potential time constraints on the participants in the present study, the DIT was restricted to one moral dilemma involving Heinz and his dying wife.

Ethic of Care (Forsyth, et al. 1988). Forsyth et al.'s scale is designed to measure the extent to which individuals endorse an ethic of caring. The scale is based on Gilligan's (1982) work. The instrument consists of 10 items drawn from interviews with respondents and descriptions of the moral viewpoint of care presented by Gilligan. They are designed to cover issues such as responsibility to others, selflessness, and resolution of conflict, for example, 'Morality is based on responsibility to people'. Item analysis indicated that the 10 items formed a unidimensional scale with an internal reliability measured by Cronbach's alpha of .85 (Forsyth et al. 1988). The coefficient of internal reliability obtained in the current study was .87.

Ethics Position Questionnaire (EPQ; Forsyth, 1980). A third measure of morality was provided by Forsyth's EPQ. It operationalises Schlenker and Forsyth's (1977) conception of individual differences in morality as differing on two dimensions, 'idealism', the extent to which one will accept compromises in morality; and 'relativism', the extent to which one believes in a single framework for morality. The EPQ comprises 10 items to measure each of these constructs. Idealism is tapped with items like 'A person should make certain that their actions never intentionally harm another even to a small degree', and Relativism through items like 'There are no ethical principles that are so important that they should be a part of any code of ethics'. Cronbach's alpha for the two scales was found to be .80 and .73, respectively, with test-retest reliabilities of .67 and .66. The coefficients of internal reliability obtained in the current study were .87 for Idealism and .80 for Relativism.
Procedure:

The questionnaire booklet began with the following general instructions:

Thank you for helping with this research. This questionnaire is about values, morality, and ethics. It should take about 10 to 15 minutes to complete. It is anonymous – you do not need to give your name – so please answer as you really think. Answer all the questions and complete each section before moving on to the next.

Each of the scales included in the booklet was then also prefaced by the particular instructions for each scale. Respondents completed the questionnaire in their own time.

Results:

The study involved several stages in the development of a new psychometric instrument as well as its subsequent use to test a series of specific hypotheses about values. There are thus a range of analyses and hypotheses to report. This section begins by discussing the psychometric properties of the ESFS: first its structure, then its reliability, and finally validity. It then considers its relationship to conceptions of values and value priorities.

Exploratory Factor Analysis:

A principal components factor analysis was conducted to determine which of the 30 initial ESFS items were useful for measuring the posited range of modes of ethical self formation. To provide two independent groups, one for the present exploratory analysis and another for a later confirmatory analysis, the total sample was first randomly divided into two groups (n = 404 and n = 409). The first of these was then subjected to principal components factor analysis using SPSS for Windows (version 9.0). The design of the scale included items relating to six basic modes of ethical self formation. A six-factor solution was therefore expected. The scree plot presented in Figure 9.1 depicts a pattern of eigen values with a clear elbow after the sixth component consistent with a six factor solution.
The factor loadings using Varimax rotation also closely reflected the design of the scale. The five items generated to tap each of six modes of ethical self formation all loaded on a single factor, with a loading of at least .51. Two items, however, loaded highly on more than one factor. The obligation item 'A sense of duty to society' loaded (.51) on the same factor as other items related to tradition, but also on a factor related to principle (.45). The telos item 'Cared for other people' likewise loaded on a factor related to Care (.53), but also on the Principle factor (.48). These items were therefore dropped from the scale. Since it was proposed that one might experience more than one mode of ethical self formation simultaneously, it could not be assumed that the factors would be orthogonal. Hence, an oblique (Promax) rotation was also used to verify the item selection. The results of the second analysis were consistent with the first. A total of 28 items was therefore selected for the final scale. Table 9.1 shows the factor loadings for a Varimax rotation of the 28 final items (with the two multiple loading items removed). The relationship between the design of the scale and the factors resulting from the exploratory analysis is clear. Items loading on the first factor are those designed to measure ethical self formation through Spiritualism; on the second factor, 'Hedonism'; the third, 'Virtue'; the fourth, 'Principle'; the fifth, 'Care'; and the
sixth factor, 'Tradition'. Cronbach alpha reliabilities were calculated for the six sub-scales after removing each item in turn to test their contribution to the internal consistency. None was found to substantially reduce the Cronbach's alpha and all were acceptable, ranging from .76 to .92. The six factors together accounted for 64.00 % of the variance.
Table 9.1: Exploratory principal components analysis (with Varimax rotation) for the ESFS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethical Self Formation Scale items</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Factor 3</th>
<th>Factor 4</th>
<th>Factor 5</th>
<th>Factor 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The teachings of my religion (O)</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Had maintained a relationship with God (Te)</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My spiritual beliefs (O)</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turned away from God (Tr)</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was spiritually fulfilled (Te)</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enjoyed their lives to the full (Te)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wanting to get the most enjoyment from life (O)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was happy (Te)</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doing whatever makes me most happy (O)</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not been enjoying life as I should (Tr)</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The desire to fulfill my goals in life (O)</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focused on and achieved their aims (Te)</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A drive to express my potential (O)</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failed to be as successful as I should (Tr)</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was successful in life (Te)</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Had lived a life that was true and just (Te)</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acted with principle (Te)</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A fundamental sense of right and wrong (O)</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behave responsibly (O)</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betrayed proper principles (Tr)</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An obligation to friends and loved ones (O)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A sense of care and concern for the people I know (O)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Let down those who were close to me (Tr)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looked out for the needs of others (Te)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Had been true to their upbringing (Te)</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The traditions I grew up with (O)</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.69</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failed in my responsibilities to society (Tr)</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Had been an admirable citizen (Te)</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Eigen values  
7.12  4.42  2.28  1.45  1.39  1.28

Percentage of explained variance  
14.31  11.54  10.70  10.25  8.61  8.59

Cronbach's Alpha  
.93  .82  .76  .82  .79  .77

Note. i) Loadings below |.15| are not shown and loadings above |.45| are shown in boldface.

ii) (O) = Obligation; (Tr) = Transgression; (Te) = Telos
Confirmatory Factor Analysis:

To provide a second, independent test of the structure of the ESFS a further analysis was conducted using the second of the randomly selected sub-groups of the total sample (n = 409). A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was undertaken using Lisrel 8.30. CFA is a special form of structural equation modelling, a type of analysis used for investigating the plausibility of different theoretical models proposed to explain the interrelations among a set of variables.

In the present case, the analysis was first used to compare two models of the structural relations between the items of the ESFS to see which was the better fit. Following the design of the scale and the results of the exploratory analyses, both models posited six factors, one an orthogonal model, where correlations between the six underlying factors were constrained to 0, and the other an oblique model, in which correlations between factors were freely estimated. In a second stage, CFA was then used to assess the overall fit of the better fitting six-factor solution for the ESFS.

The estimation method used to test the models was maximum likelihood. This is the most frequently used estimation method and is recommended for small sample sizes. It is also robust against moderate departures from normality (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1989, p. 24). The analysis begins by estimating parameters and then the maximum likelihood function attempts to find a value for the fitting function that cannot be made smaller by making further minor adjustments to the parameter estimates. Though CFA is generally conducted with covariance matrices, the correlation matrix was analysed in the present case since the variables under investigation have scales with arbitrary units, and there was no a priori reason to assume inequality in variance between variables.

The results of the analysis are reported in Table 9.2. A significant change in $\chi^2$ between the two models, $\Delta\chi^2 (1) = 541.2, p < .001$, indicates that the fit of the oblique model, $\chi^2 (335) = 1162.23$, is better than that of the orthogonal model, $\chi^2 (350) = 1703.43$. 
To assess the absolute fit of the oblique model, there are a number of indices that can be used although no widespread agreement currently exists about which is the best (Maruyama, 1998). For both models the $\chi^2$ value is significant, indicating a statistically significant discrepancy between the sample and fitted matrices. However, this indicator of goodness of fit is highly dependent on sample sizes, with a larger sample more likely to produce a significant discrepancy. Sample size can be taken into account by dividing by the degrees of freedom, in which case the $\chi^2$/df value of 3.47 for the oblique model falls well within the range of acceptable values of 2 to 5 suggested by Marsh and Hocevar (1985), though does not reach the ideal value of 2 proposed by Byrne (1989).

In a recent paper testing the performance of a variety of fit indices, Hu and Bentler (1999) suggested using a two-index presentation strategy for evaluating model fit. They found this strategy minimized Type I and Type II error rates because different fit indices are sensitive to different aspects of model misspecification. They argued that one of the indices should be the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR), an indicator of how much error there is between the estimated parameters and the actual parameters taken from the data, and that this should be supplemented by an index such as the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), also a measure of discrepancy of fit but one that takes into account the number of degrees of freedom. Furthermore, they presented evidence that conventional cut-off criteria of, for example, 0.90 for GFI and 0.05 for RMSEA, result in the over-rejection of adequately specified models and hence were too strict. The fit indices and cut-off criteria of Hu and Bentler were therefore used in the present study. For two-index strategy they recommend a cut-off value close to .08 for SRMR in conjunction with a cut-off value for RMSEA in the range .06 to .08.
For the oblique six-factor model tested in the present analysis, the SRMR was .07 and the RMSEA was .08. According to Hu and Bentler's criteria, therefore, it can be concluded that there is an acceptable fit between the matrix predicted by the theoretical model of the ESFS and the observed interrelations between items. Hence, the six-factor oblique model provides a plausible account of the observed relationship between items of the ESFS.

Reliability:

On the basis of the factor analyses, the ESFS was understood to comprise six, correlated sub-scales each related to a different mode of ethical self formation. Internal reliabilities were computed for the individual scales for the group used in the confirmatory factor analysis. The results reported in Table 9.3 show findings equivalent to those for the first sample, all in an acceptable to good range of .76 to .92. Test-retest reliabilities over a 12-week period were also acceptable for each of the sub-scales, though less good for the Hedonism, Principle, Virtue, and Tradition factors than for Spiritualism and Care.

Table 9.3: Reliability of the sub-scales of the ESFS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Spiritualism</th>
<th>Hedonism</th>
<th>Principle</th>
<th>Virtue</th>
<th>Care</th>
<th>Tradition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Test-retest reliability (over 12 weeks)</td>
<td>.91***</td>
<td>.50**</td>
<td>.52**</td>
<td>.50**</td>
<td>.70***</td>
<td>.49**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal reliability (Cronbach's alpha)</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001.

Validity:

There are a number of indications that the ESFS is a valid measure of modes of ethical self formation. First, the scale has high face validity. The instructions inform respondents that the questionnaire is about their personal views of morality and ethics. The items then clearly ask about participants’ experience of these aspects of their lives. Hence, the ESFS has the appearance of measuring what it claims to.
Secondly, the scale relates directly to the characteristics that define the constructs it aims to measure. Ethical self formation as conceptualised in the scale is derived from Foucault's notions of modes of subjection and telos. Drawing on earlier pilot work, these concepts have been found to relate closely to the questions concerning moral obligation, transgression, and aspiration that constitute the scale. Thus the ESFS adequately covers the relevant domain it is designed to measure and has high content validity.

Thirdly, there is evidence from the relationships between the sub-scales of the ESFS and other established measures for the convergent and discriminant validity of the new scale. Ethical self formation offers an alternative perspective on human morality and ethics, that reframes but maintains a close relationship to current thinking. It was therefore expected that there would be high, positive correlations between established measures and the appropriate components of the ESFS, indicating convergent validity for the new scale. To examine the relationship between the individual sub-scales and other measures, independent of response patterns for the scale as a whole, partial correlations were computed taking into account the mean score on the ESFS (see Table 9.4). As predicted, there was a strong correlation between Care, defined by Gilligan and measured by Forsyth et al.'s (1988) scale, and Care reconceptualised as a mode of self-relationship \( (r=.30, p<.001) \). There were also high negative correlations with forms of ethical self-relationship least related to a concern with others, that is Hedonism \( (r=-.67, p<.001) \) and Virtue \( (r=-.30, p<.001) \). Scores on the dimensions of Idealism and Realism, proposed by Forsyth, also related in convergent ways with the ESFS. Idealism, the extent to which one should not compromise was positively correlated with Spiritualism \( (r=.30, p<.001) \). Relativism was positively correlated with Hedonism \( (r=.27, p<.01) \) and Virtue \( (.19, p<.05) \). Convergence was not obtained, however, for Rest et al.'s measure of principled moral reasoning, for which there were no significant relationships with the sub-scales of the ESFS.

Discriminant validity was shown between the ESFS and socially desirable responding by the lack of statistically significant relationships between the ESFS and Crowne and Marlowe's (1960) measure of social desirability for all the sub-scales but Spiritualism. For the latter, there was a negative relationship \( (r=-.26, p<.05) \) indicating
that the greater one’s endorsement of Spiritualism as a mode of ethical self relationship, the less one was likely to respond in a socially desirable way.
Table 9.4: Partial correlations and descriptive statistics (means, SDs) for factors of the ESFS and other related scales, controlling for mean ESFS score.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Spiritualism</th>
<th>Hedonism</th>
<th>Principle</th>
<th>Virtue</th>
<th>Care</th>
<th>Tradition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spiritualism</td>
<td>811</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedonism</td>
<td>813</td>
<td>4.76</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>-.54***</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.19***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principle</td>
<td>813</td>
<td>4.88</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>-.29***</td>
<td>-.12***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virtue</td>
<td>813</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>-.41***</td>
<td>.25***</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.17***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care</td>
<td>813</td>
<td>5.14</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>-.41***</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.17***</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>813</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>.09*</td>
<td>-.42***</td>
<td>-.08*</td>
<td>-.37***</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.16***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIT (Principled)</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethic of Care</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>4.57</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.67***</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>-.30**</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idealism</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>4.53</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>.30***</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relativism</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>.27**</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.19*</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Desirability</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>-.26*</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note.
Alpha coefficients are in parentheses.
* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.
Ethical Self Formation and Conceptions of Values:

To test the relationship between ethical self formation and conceptions of values, the six sub-scales of the ESFS were regressed on the mean score of the CVS, \( F(6,467) = 15.55, p<.001 \). Mode of ethical self formation was therefore shown to be a significant predictor of conceptions of values. Of the individual sub-scales, Spiritualism (Beta = .23, p<.001), Tradition (Beta = .05, p<.05), and Principle (Beta = .25, p<.001) were all positively related to a principled conception of values. Hedonism (Beta = -.26, p<.001) was negatively related to a principled conception of values. There was no relationship with Virtue and Care. Hence, the more one’s ethical self-relationship was based on Spiritualism, Principle, or Tradition, and the less on Hedonism, the more one had a conception of values as abstract and enduring principles.

Ethical Self Formation and Value Priorities:

Before analysing the relationship between the ESFS and value priorities, the values data were first screened using a procedure adapted from Schwartz (1992). Schwartz recommends excluding respondents using the ‘7’ response option more than 20 times, or any of the other response options 35 times or more. The present study used a reduced version of the SVS with 37 items, so the respective cutoff values were adjusted accordingly to 14 and 23. This procedure screened out 99 respondents from the original sample of 813.

Internal reliabilities were computed for the subsets of values relating to each of the 10 different types of values proposed by Schwartz. Cronbach’s alphas for the 10 value types were: Power .67, Achievement .59, Hedonism .54, Stimulation .65, Self-Direction .65, Universalism .59, Benevolence .67, Tradition .50, Conformity .73, and Security .54. Internal reliabilities for half of the 10 value types were thus quite low, though just acceptable, in the range .5 to .6. They did not, moreover, improve when recomputed with each value comprising the value type removed one at a time. To retain consistency with Schwartz’s theory, the items were therefore treated as scales representing the value types hypothesised by Schwartz. The mean score was computed of the values comprising each of the 10 types.
To analyse the relationship between ethical self-relationship and value priorities, each of the value Types was then regressed on the six factors of the ESFS. The results are presented in Table 9.5. The table shows a statistically significant relationship between value priorities and mode of ethical self-constitution for all 10 of the value types (p<.001). Moreover, for all but two of the value types, three or more of the subscales of the ESFS independently accounted for variance in participants' ratings of the priority of the value type. Of particular note were the relationships between Spirituality as a mode of ethical self formation and the priority of Tradition as a value type (Beta = .50, p<.001); Virtue as mode of ESF and the value type of Achievement (Beta = .54, p<.001); and between Hedonism, understood as mode of ESF and value type (Beta = .49, p<.001).

Table 9.5: Regression of Value Type priorities (SVS) on Factors of the ESFS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Types (SVS)</th>
<th>R²</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Ethical Self Formation (β where p ≤ .05)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Spiritualism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>19.12*</td>
<td>-17***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>45.53**</td>
<td>.54***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedonism</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>49.40***</td>
<td>.49***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stimulation</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>21.02***</td>
<td>.34***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Direction</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>22.32***</td>
<td>.15***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>28.52***</td>
<td>.18***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>39.18***</td>
<td>.22***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>83.37***</td>
<td>.50***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conformity</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>49.26***</td>
<td>.21***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>23.01***</td>
<td>.12**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note.  
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.

Discussion:

The aim of the present study was to offer a formal test of the impact of different types of ethical self-relationship on people's conceptions of values and value priorities. It involved the development and partial validation of a new individual difference measure to operationalise aspects of Foucault's conceptualisation of ethics, and the
subsequent test of its relationship with conceptions of values operationalised as a bi-
polar scale, and with value priorities as measured using an established value survey.

The study thus began with the development of the Ethical Self Formation Scale. Based on previous research reported in the thesis, it was initially designed to measure six forms of ethical self-relationship. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis techniques showed that all but two of the proposed items did indeed load on distinct factors, and that the best fit for the observed matrix, as expected, was an oblique six-factor model. Analysis of the six sub-scales thus understood to comprise the ESFS, showed that they possessed adequate internal and test-retest reliability, and to demonstrate several forms of validity, including face, content, convergent and discriminant. On the basis of these findings, the scale was assumed to be a reliable and partially validated measure of ethical self-relationship and so capable of testing with some confidence the relationship between different modes of ethical self formation and values. It was found that there were, as hypothesised, statistically significant relationships between the ESFS and both conceptions of values and value priorities.

The results of the present study are consistent with the findings reported in the thesis so far, and move a step further in the investigation of the concept of values begun in previous chapters. First, they show that Foucault’s abstract analytic framework for conceptualising ethics might be successfully operationalised as differences in forms of ethical obligation and aspiration, the focus for the ESFS. The study thus shows how this part of Foucault’s work might be conceptualised in a way that leaves it open to traditional forms of psychological investigation, in this case, to the methods of individual differences research. The study also provides evidence that conceptualised in this way there are six distinct and coherent modes of ethical self-relationship. As suggested by previous research, these are: Spiritualism, Hedonism, Virtue, Principle, Care, and Tradition. The results therefore provide a foundation for further investigation of ethical self formation as a topic for research into individual differences.

In the more specific context of values, the principal focus of the thesis, the results demonstrate through the relationship between variables what has only been previously shown in the thesis in more exploratory research. First, the operationalisation of the notion of conceptions of values as a scale, found to be both internally reliable and
normally distributed, provides further evidence for the importance of considering differences in people’s conceptions of the nature of values. The fact that there was considerable variance in the scale, with a mean falling approximately in the middle of the scale, shows there is significant variability in the extent to which people understand values as abstract and enduring principles, and that it is possible to measure this variation. More importantly, it was shown by using the ESFS that this variability in understandings of values was systematically related to differences in preferred modes of ethical self-relationship. In sum, one is more likely to understand values as guiding principles the more one has a conception of oneself as an ethical subject grounded in Spiritualism, Principle or Tradition, and the less one’s ethical self-relationship is based on Hedonism.

The study therefore adds further weight to the alternative conceptualisation of values inspired by the work of Foucault advanced in the course of the thesis. The most influential theoretical tradition in values research in psychology has been based on a singular conceptualisation of values as a special type of cognitive representation serving as guiding principles in one’s life. By contrast, Foucault’s analytic of ethics shows how this notion of values focuses attention on the content of values, rather than on the forms of ethics, understood as self-relationship, through which certain goals come to exist for people as values. Moreover, for Foucault, it is the diversity of ethics that is characteristic of contemporary society. The implication for the psychology of values is that ethics is an area of potential significance that requires investigation. The present study completes the research begun in this area by the thesis. It shows that contrary to the theorisation of Rokeach, there is indeed variability in people’s conceptions of values, and as suggested by Foucault, this variance is related to differences in forms of ethics, as well as value priorities. The conclusions of this research for the psychology of values generally will be discussed in the final chapter, in conjunction with the findings of the thesis as a whole. The current chapter concludes by noting two important limitations with the present study that need to be raised.

First, the chapter has presented only a first attempt to develop and validate a measure of the notion of ethical self formation. Any formulation of a domain that is discussed only in abstract terms by Foucault is likely to warrant further refinement. There are several areas where the current scale requires elaboration. The focus of the
thesis is the re-evaluation of the concept of values in terms drawn from Foucault, not the field of moral psychology. Hence, given that the latter is already a highly developed area, there is clearly considerable additional work required to integrate the notion of ethical self formation with established work on moral reasoning, moral orientations, and ethical ideologies. The more modest objective the present chapter can claim to have achieved is the operationalisation in psychological terms of a conceptualisation based on the work of Foucault. Any claim for the contribution of the ESFS to the field of moral psychology in general must be more limited. In particular, contrary to expectations, the current study failed to establish a relationship between Kohlberg’s notion of principled moral reasoning, as measured by Rest et al.’s (1974) scale, and the mode of ethical self formation based on principle posited in the ESFS. It may be that the reduced version of Rest et al.’s scale was inadequate, that the items included in the ESFS need further refinement, or that the constructs differ more than has been discussed here. The current validation of the scale has, moreover, clearly lacked a predictive or behavioural component. Before the ESFS is accepted as a valid and useful individual differences instrument in general, therefore, outside of the specific and more limited aims of the present project, further scale development is required.

Secondly, the study has demonstrated differences in participants’ conceptions of values and a relationship with forms of self-relationship. It has not, however, demonstrated predictive or behavioural implications of conceptions of values, though several can be suggested. It clearly raises the question of whether people who have a low score on the scale measuring a principled conception of values do indeed change their value priorities more than those who do not. Likewise, it has not been tested whether people with a low score on the CVS are more likely not to follow their values; to allow their value priorities, in practice, to be swayed by the circumstances. These issues will be discussed further in the final chapter.

Summary and Conclusions

The present study concludes the series of empirical investigations into the psychology of values drawing on the work of Michel Foucault. His analytic of ethics drew attention to the forms of ethics that underlie people’s experience of moral codes, extended in the present thesis to include their values. The present chapter provides a third, distinct form of empirical evidence for a relationship between how one
understands and forms oneself as an ethical subject, and how one understands the notion of values. In conclusion, people's conceptions of values have been shown to have clear and distinct relationships with their preferred modes of ethical self formation. The next chapter draws the thesis to a conclusion by summarising the argument as a whole, and considering both the implications of the reconceptualisation of values based on Foucault for the existing psychological literature on values, and the consequences of the research presented in the thesis for the larger questions with which it began concerning social psychology in the context of social change and changes in the discipline.
Part 4

Conclusion
Chapter 10

General Discussion and Conclusions

Introduction

The thesis has presented a review, analysis, and new approach to the established field in the psychology of values. The introductory chapter presented a critical review of the key developments in the values literature dominated by the pioneering work of Rokeach (1973) and more recently Schwartz (1992). The thesis then introduced two general sets of issues raised by recent developments. They concerned the consequences of broad social changes, especially as discussed by theorists of postmodernity, and changes in social psychology, particularly the emergence of newer discursive approaches to the discipline. It was suggested that both present a challenge to established psychological theories, like the current theories of values. It was also noted, however, that the postmodern and discursive psychology literatures were too broad and problematic to address directly. Hence, to engage with some of the issues they raise the thesis took the approach of focusing on the work of a single thinker who has been highly influential in both these domains. Thus the central research problem for the thesis became how one might reconceptualise the psychology of values using the thought of Foucault. From this problem were derived a number of more specific research questions: Are there other ways of interpreting Foucault than the reading that has become common in discursive psychology? What does Foucault say about the postmodern condition of contemporary society? How might his work be applied to the specific domain of the psychology of values? And, finally, what empirical evidence can be found to support a Foucault inspired conceptualisation of values?

The final chapter first summarises how the thesis addressed this research problem and reviews the answers reached for the specific research questions. It then considers the contribution of the thesis to the established values literature in psychology, as well as its relevance to broader debates about postmodernity and discursive psychology.
Finally, the chapter discusses the limitations of the present research, reflects on what has been learnt in the course of the thesis, and suggests directions for future work.

**Re-thinking Foucault**

The research began with an overview of Foucault followed by a close analysis of some of his key writings. The concern with Foucault was two-fold, involving his influence on the notion of postmodernity and his neglected later work on changing ethics, and his influence on the concept of discourse, as popularised in psychology. Hence, Foucault was approached simultaneously from two perspectives: with a view to a reanalysis and alternative reading of familiar material to psychology, combined with an uncovering and interpretation of less well-known work. Having introduced Foucault and discussed some current understandings, the thesis thus began to develop a new interpretation of this influential thinker.

Chapter 2 first delineated the general approach taken to Foucault. Though his analytics need to be considered at the level of specifics provided only by the primary texts, it was argued that to properly appreciate this complex body of work one needed also to have a grasp of the overall context and aims of the project. Thus the thesis emphasised Foucault’s own contribution to a holistic assessment of his oeuvre, found in the posthumously published ‘What is Enlightenment?’ (Foucault, 1984c). It was argued that Foucault was not a postmodern nihilist as sometimes suggested (Merquior, 1991), but following his own interpretation, is better understood to be following, while partially reformulating, the project of the Enlightenment. His work is likewise a challenge to dogma, but rather than relying solely on reason, cautiously opens rationality itself up to scrutiny. The importance was then emphasised of reading Foucault’s writing in the context of both this final interpretation of his project as well as the developments in his oeuvre as a whole. It was argued that one must take into account the three ‘Foucaults’ represented by his three different axes of thought, rather than the too-easily simplified singular ‘Foucault’ of summaries and secondary texts.

This framework for reading Foucault was then adopted to guide the more detailed examination of two of his specific analytics, of knowledge and of ethics, subsequently applied to the specific concern of the thesis with social change and the psychology of values. Chapter 3 presented an exposition and application of Foucault’s ‘Archaeology of
Knowledge’ (1972). It suggested first a different view of the notion of discourse from that commonly used in discursive psychology. Though discourse was indeed interpreted in the archaeology as constitutive of knowledge, this was not read as a critique of scientific validity (cf Potter, 1996), but as an analytic tool for exploring both the enabling and constraining functions of scientific rationality, and the relationship between knowledge producing practices and specific socio-historic circumstances. This perspective then opened the way for an archaeology of the psychology of values that did not simply dismiss the dominant theoretical tradition pioneered by Rokeach, but highlighted the potential problem of embedding a particular, historically contingent conceptualisation of values in ongoing theorisation.

Chapter 4 then examined Foucault’s alternative framework for the analysis of morality. It showed how conventional moral thought had concentrated on the identification and justification of codes of behaviour, to the neglect of the forms of ethics, or modes of self-relationship, through which certain codes come to be recognised as moral obligations. It was argued that there are parallels between Foucault’s analytic of moral thought, and the structure of the psychology of values, in which the content and consequences of value priorities have become the focus for research, to the neglect of the forms of ethical self-relationship through which values gain their importance, or more pertinently, through which general goals come to exist as ‘values’. Moreover, acknowledging this domain raised questions about the very conceptualisation of values that the archaeology had shown to be embedded at the centre of values research.

A reconceptualisation of values was thus presented, drawing on a broad perspective on Foucault combined with specific details from his analytics of archaeology and ethics. This alternative perspective on values then formed the basis for the empirical investigation conducted in the subsequent part of the thesis using a range of established and new psychological methods.

**An empirical investigation into the psychology values**

The empirical research began, following the interpretation of the archaeology, by employing rather than rejecting existing approaches to values. Chapter 5 thus adopted the methodology of Rokeach to address the question of changing values in contemporary society by comparing value priorities of equivalent groups over time. It
showed that Rokeach's methodology offered some insight into these important social psychological changes. Notwithstanding practical limitations with the availability of comparison data, it was tentatively suggested that a number of changes were evident in the results of the analysis consistent with the abstract analysis of social change provided by Giddens (1991). However, it was also clear from the study that there were fundamental limitations inherent in Rokeach's approach. Analysis of changing value priorities systematically precludes analysis of other ways in which values might change. In particular, it ignores changes in the field of ethics identified by Foucault.

Chapter 6 reported a second study using an approach that has been important in more recent research developed by Schwartz (1992). The study attempted to replicate Schwartz's widely established finding that there are 10 universal types of values. Contrary to the fragmentation emphasised by theorists of postmodernity, the 10 value types were found, almost exactly as predicted by Schwartz's model. However, it was clear having replicated this result that, as for the method of Rokeach, the approach enabled certain aspects of the analysis of the content of values whilst simultaneously excluding analyses of other dimensions of values. The latter included the areas suggested by Foucault's analytic, at the centre of an alternative conceptualisation of values.

The following two studies introduced a change of perspective. Drawing on the distinction between the empirical-analytic approach used in the Rokeach-Schwartz tradition and a hermeneutic approach in which people's understandings of phenomena assume central importance (e.g. Habermas, 1971), the third and fourth studies reported analyses of people's experience and conceptions of values. A qualitative approach was adopted in Chapter 7, allowing a more open investigation of people's conceptualisations of values, of changes related to ideas of postmodernity, and variation in the field of ethical self-relationship discussed by Foucault. Interviews with 47 participants from a wide range of backgrounds produced findings that supported the notion of values used in contemporary psychological research. However, interviewees also showed a variety of ways of talking and thinking about values clearly inconsistent with the Rokeach-Schwartz conceptualisation. Moreover, a number of different ways of thinking about value change were identified. Finally, empirical data was reported illustrating the applicability of Foucault's analytic of morality to the field of values. As Foucault
proposed, it was suggested that people differ in the mode through which they understand and so form themselves as ethical subjects, and that this affects the way they understand the notion of values. A key distinction was suggested between values as abstract and enduring guiding principles, as theorised by Rokeach, and values as contextual and transitory, as interviewees commonly discussed them.

Chapter 8 described a Q methodological study, conducted to explore more systematically the patterns of understanding that exists for the notion of values. The opportunity to express different ways of thinking about the concept was provided for participants by a series of cards describing aspects of values, sorted according to the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with each of the statements. Factor analytic methods then showed them to be sorted into six distinct, coherent patterns of understanding. Following key features of these conceptions of values, they were labelled Post-traditional, Principled, Spiritual, Hedonist, Existentialist, and Traditional. In contrast to the theory of Rokeach, therefore, the Q study suggested there was not one, but a range of foundations for different conceptions of values.

Chapter 9, the final empirical study, presented a more formal, empirical-analytic investigation of the central hypothesis that emerged through the interview and Q study: that conceptions of values are related to the type of ethical self-relationship one has. To operationalise these concepts as variables available for statistical analysis, a new psychometric instrument was developed and partially validated to measure individual differences in ethical self formation. The Ethical Self Formation Scale (ESFS) was shown to have adequate reliability and validity, and to measure endorsement of six modes of ethical self formation. All but two of these different forms of ethical self-relationship were then found to be statistically related to conceptions of values, operationalised in terms of the extent to which values were understood to be abstract and enduring, or contextual and transitory. Relationships were found, moreover, between the ESFS and the priority of value types as measured by the Schwartz Value Survey.

Summary

The central research problem chosen for the thesis was how to conceptualise the psychology of values using the analytics of Foucault, partially addressing in the process
concerns about changing values and the critiques of traditional approaches implicit in discursive psychology. Through a combination of theoretical and philosophical argumentation and empirical research the thesis has gone some way toward a resolution of this problem. It has examined Foucault’s analytics as they relate to the discursive constitution of knowledge, and to the changing nature of morality, and found a way of applying Foucault’s reconfiguration of traditional thinking in these areas to an established area of psychology. The thesis thus presents a reconceptualisation of values using the analytics of Foucault. More specifically, it offers answers to the four research questions raised in the introduction.

First, it has suggested that there are indeed other ways of interpreting the notion of discourse than that most commonly used in psychology. Though conceptions of discourse have become popular in recent years as a critique of traditional approaches and as an inspiration for the analysis of language, it has been argued, at least as far as Foucault is concerned, that there are other ways of thinking about discourse and knowledge. Foucault’s work may lead us to see knowledge differently, but not to simply dismiss scientific research or traditional approaches to psychology. Neither does it lead necessarily to the analysis of everyday language in place of other forms of inquiry.

Second, the thesis has explored and proposed a reading of Foucault’s analysis of the postmodern condition of contemporary society. It has shown that Foucault was not a postmodern philosopher in any crude sense of the term. Indeed, it was suggested that his work was best understood in relation to the central tenets of modernity proposed by Kant. However, it was also argued that through Foucault’s final axis of thought he did offer a comment on some of the more subtle changes emerging in the late 20th Century, focusing on the shift in the relationship one has with oneself that, for Foucault, was the essence of ethics. This, then, was what Foucault’s writings suggest about the special conditions of contemporary society.

Third, the thesis showed how these arguments might be applied to the psychology of values. They were first used to investigate the details of the constitution of existing theories of values. Rather than dismissing these theories, Foucault’s archaeology, his analytic of knowledge, showed how substantive elements of values theories could be produced by and become embedded in formal aspects of psychological research. The
applicability of the analytic of ethics was then demonstrated in the context of values, highlighting the parallels between the psychological field of values and Foucault's distinction between moral code and ethics, and the importance therefore of ethics for the understanding of values.

Finally, the question of the empirical support for this reconceptualisation of values was answered through a series of empirical studies using established, exploratory, and new methods for the field of values, to generate data submitting Foucault's observations and analytic framework to empirical investigation. It was shown that there was indeed compelling empirical evidence for the Foucault inspired conceptualisation of values developed in the thesis.

Given these resolutions to the central objectives of the project, the next two sections consider the contribution of the findings to the existing psychological literature and more generally to debates about postmodernity and discursive psychology.

**Social change and the psychology of values**

The key question about values addressed in the thesis was framed in terms of change: have values in contemporary society changed? In an attempt to answer this deceptively simple question the thesis makes three distinct contributions to the psychology of values literature.

First, it contributes to work on value change based on the major technique for measuring changing values pioneered by Rokeach (1973). The thesis reports a new data set using the Rokeach Value Survey and offers a comparison with a previous sample. It also provides a record of values for a student sample at the end of the 20th Century that can be compared with other populations from previous or future times. Moreover, it adds an interpretation of the changes discovered with this technique using a theory from a different field, specifically Giddens' (1990; 1991; 1992) theory of reflexive modernity. It thus contributes a new understanding of recent changes in values situating social psychological findings in the context of a broader social theory. The thesis introduces a new perspective to previous analyses offered in the past in social psychology by, for example, Rokeach and Ball-Rokeach (1989).

Second, the thesis contributes a new understanding of value change. The aim was not just to consider changing values as previously conceived in the literature but to
consider the possible implications for values of the sorts of radical changes discussed by theorists of postmodernity. They suggest current frameworks may not be adequate for theorising values in contemporary social conditions. Though the thesis began with the premise that the more general claims about postmodernity were problematic, through the writings of Foucault it was possible to propose a more grounded and detailed analysis of changing values in contemporary society. It was thus argued that there are indeed important dimensions of values open to change in addition to value priority. The thesis contributes the idea that it is important to also consider people’s conceptions of values, and the modes of ethical self formation through which goals come to exist for us as values.

There are, however, some important caveats. The argument of the thesis is first, Foucault’s analysis of changing morality can equally be applied to the field of values: just as there has been an emphasis on interdictions in morality, so there has been too much a focus on the content and priority of values. Secondly, consistent with Foucault’s claim that new forms of ethics have emerged, it has been shown that there is currently a diversity of ethics. Moreover, this diversity was found to lead to a range of understandings of values, and in particular, whether they were understood to be abstract and enduring principles, or contextual and transitory goals. However, these findings can only offer support for the applicability of Foucault’s analysis. They do not provide evidence that this is the result of a change in values. It may well be that there was similarly a diversity of ethics when Rokeach first developed his theory in the 1960s. The present study is not longitudinal and there are no psychological investigations of ethics, in the sense defined by Foucault, for this period. Hence, as far as the question of change is concerned, the thesis can contribute only the more modest claim of identifying an important new dimension in which values might change, not the stronger claim that an actual change has been found.

Notwithstanding this limitation, the thesis nonetheless offers a third contribution of a more generally applicable reconceptualisation of values. By addressing the problem of change through the work of Foucault, the thesis has presented a new way of thinking about values in psychology that potentially has broader implications for values research. The literature review began by emphasising some of the inherent difficulties with the concept of values, one of the ‘Great words’ whose meaning is inherently multiple and
complex. Though a range of psychological theories was briefly reviewed, the introduction then stressed the importance of Rokeach's conceptualisation of values and its enduring influence today. But it also drew attention to some of the critical undercurrents evident in recent research, expressed most clearly by Gibbins and Walker (1993) who argued that 'research on values requires reconceptualisation after principles in research on values have first been re-examined' (p. 804). The present thesis has offered an in-depth analysis of the dominant theoretical tradition in the field of values, and so contributes to this task of re-examining some of the fundamental assumptions of values research. It offers an historical analysis placing the concept of values in its socio-historic context, and a theoretical analysis situating values in a broader framework that includes conceptions of ethics and the self. The thesis thus contributes the beginnings of a new way of thinking about values for psychology. It presents a view that casts doubt on the strong claim of Rokeach that values are a particular sort of cognitive representation, conceptualised as universal, absolute, and transcendent across time and situation. The thesis offers a broader view, situating values in the context of one's understanding of oneself as an ethical subject. From this perspective, Rokeach's conceptualisation of values reflects a single conception of values. The thesis has shown, furthermore, that it is a conception relating to an ethical self-relationship founded in Spiritualism, Tradition, or Principle, but not in Hedonism.

The conceptualisation of values developed in the thesis has not been presented before in psychology, and certainly not through the concepts of Foucault. However, it is not inconsistent with certain developments in the more traditional values literature. Most pertinently, it contributes to the theory of multiple value systems proposed by Seligman and Katz (1996). They have argued, barely concealing the deep criticism of existing approaches to values, that values must be understood in the context of specific issues. Values in the abstract are simply an idealisation potentially without real application or relevance. This is consistent with the view that people's conceptions of values as being abstract or contextual varies in systematic ways following their ethical self relationships, and raises a number of questions for future research discussed in the final section. The reconceptualisation of values presented in the thesis thus offers a new way forward for values research in psychology.
Postmodernity and Discursive Psychology

The thesis began with concerns about the implications of postmodernity and discursive psychology for the psychology of values. It did not address these issues directly, instead focusing only on Foucault. However, by using his thought as a specific point of reference for an analysis of some of the key issues raised by social change and the notion of discourse, the thesis nevertheless suggests some more general conclusions that can be drawn about postmodernity and discursive psychology.

First, the detailed exposition of Foucault's work clearly demonstrates the dangers inherent in simple summaries and abstractions of complex thinkers. As discussed in the introduction, it is often collections of such summaries that constitute the category of postmodern philosophy. Whilst there may be certain family resemblances between some recent philosophers, French thinkers in particular, the thesis has shown the danger of taking the label postmodern too seriously. It has emphasised the strong continuity, for Foucault, with the attitude of modernity, and the problems inherent in treating his analytics as part of a general postmodern theory. The thesis thus contributes in this way to the recent problematisation of the postmodern rubric (cf Rorty, 1991).

Second, however, the thesis has shown how certain aspects of the postmodern sensibility toward social change are of value. In so far as the term focuses attention on key shifts occurring in contemporary society, it may orient social science toward potentially significant phenomena. The thesis has used the notion of postmodernity in this way, focusing on a particular analysis of a specific domain, so drawing attention to the field of ethics, that for Foucault at least, is a key phenomenon for contemporary society. This conclusion, though, must be understood in the context of a further point.

Third, by contrast with the more extravagant claims found in the postmodern literature, a close examination of Foucault's conception of discourse and of changing values in postmodern conditions showed how subtle, rather than dramatic, transformations may be involved. Postmodernity as discussed in psychology has most commonly been associated with a change of approach, rejection of traditional understandings of science, and the adoption of radically different methods (e.g. Curt, 1994; Kvale, 1992). However, a different set of conclusions drawn from Foucault's archaeology suggest a much more subtle shift of perspective, that by no means
dismisses scientific validity. Similarly, the shift in values the thesis aimed to identify, beyond the changes in priorities previously documented in psychology, was characterised by a subtle not dramatic change. Though there have indeed been radical developments in recent years, like the widespread collapse of communism, a conclusion of the thesis is that the manifestations of importance to social scientists are likely to be much less obvious and more difficult to identify.

Fourth, whilst arguing that Foucault's archaeology does not imply the rejection of more traditional methods for psychological research, it was proposed that it does draw attention to limitations of scientific methods. The thesis thus sheds light on Roiser's (1997) critique of postmodernity that if there are such dramatic changes taking place, one ought be able to detect them using the humble psychological experiment. This general idea was pursued in the present research. Two problems can now be seen however with Roiser's seemingly straightforward claim. First, as just discussed, the changes that might be expected may be far from dramatic and not necessarily clearly available to psychological investigation. Second, more subtly, the thesis has shown how it may be the very design of the instruments and methods used to detect changes that prevent the proper analysis of the shifts introduced by contemporary social changes.

Finally, the thesis contributes to an understanding of discursive psychology and its role in the discipline. The first chapter introduced two themes that have been central in discursive accounts of psychological phenomena: a critique of scientific claims to validity and of essentialist conceptions of subjectivity; both have been replaced by an emphasis on social construction and the importance of language. The thesis has certainly not offered a comprehensive review of the various forms of discursive psychology, or even an in-depth account of the main approaches. It has, however, presented a detailed analysis of a key influence on discursive psychology: Michel Foucault. By focusing on the work of the thinker himself, rather than the widely received understandings of his work and its relevance for psychology, the thesis has cast some doubt on the implications of at least this one thinker for Psychology.

Consistent with the recent critique of Soyland and Kendall (1997), the conclusion from the thesis is that Foucault's writings do not necessarily support the discursive interpretation of his work. At the least, there are other ways of understanding his...
arguments that, as the current project has demonstrated, lead to alternative forms of analysis and research of psychological phenomena. In the present case the topic has been values, but the same arguments can be applied more generally. The implication of the thesis, therefore, is that discursive psychology is a more complex construction than it might at first appear, or be presented as. There is considerable scope for further, critical analysis of this new approach to the discipline, with the likely result that it must be understood to be another perspective on psychological research, rather than a superior or more critical alternative. The final section now considers some of the limitations of the present project and some possibilities for future research.

Limitations, Reflections and Future Research

In assessing the conclusions presented in the previous sections and in evaluating the thesis as a whole, there are a number of limitations of the research that need to be considered. First, there are some straightforward methodological limitations, the most important of which have already been noted in the discussion of the empirical chapters. These include the lack of an ideal comparison data set for the first study; the limits to the diversity of the sample used in the qualitative and Q studies; and the lack of a behavioural validation of the measure of ethical self formation. The implications of these potential problems for the empirical research constrain but do not invalidate the conclusions of the project overall, as has been discussed. There are also, however, further factors to consider related to the theoretical and philosophical dimensions of the thesis. First, there is the stance adopted toward the work of Foucault; second, there are the problems that arise combining work from philosophy with the aims and methods of psychology. Both of these more general issues will be discussed.

The thought of Foucault has played a central role in the thesis, and so the particular reading of his work that has been used is very important. Two potential criticisms of the thesis might be that it has presented only a partial interpretation, and that it has insufficiently addressed the criticisms of Foucault. These issues, however, must be understood in the context of the specific approach to Foucault the thesis has pursued. It could be argued that it was the very objective to present in some sense a partial account of his work. The thesis is not a direct contribution to Foucault scholarship in general, or to the majority of the existing literature using Foucault in psychology. It is, rather, a deliberate attempt to develop a new reading, with the specific
aim of generating a perspective with novel implications for a particular field of psychology. Hence the reading is partial in the sense that it is directed toward a clearly defined set of objectives, focused on psychology and the psychology of values. With this explicit context in mind, the interpretation of the thesis can nonetheless be evaluated using standard criteria of scholarship, including the validity of the exposition of arguments, context setting, reference to key texts, and illustrative quotations. It could, however, also be argued that the thesis has not responded to the major critiques of Foucault. Again this criticism must be understood in the context of the specific aims of the thesis. They were, first of all, to attempt to unravel Foucault’s oeuvre in its own terms, distinct from the received reading in psychology, or even the way it has come to be understood in the different context of the concerns of contemporary philosophy. It was therefore important to focus first on what is argued in the texts, rather than on what others have considered to be their limitations. For reasons of relevance, the thesis has moreover not tackled the major criticisms of Foucault in the philosophical literature that have mostly concentrated on the limits of his thought as a coherent philosophical project. Notably, Habermas (1984) has criticised the lack of a positive programme in Foucault; and Fraser (1989) has criticised the neglect of women in Foucault’s writing. These critics raise issues worthy of a response, but they are not so important in the case of the present project, of which the aim was to first understand and unravel what might be valuable in Foucault’s work for psychology. It can thus be conceded that the reading of Foucault of the thesis is not complete, definitive or incontestable, yet nevertheless argue that it does succeed in contributing to and advancing the dialogue about the use of this body of thought for the discipline of psychology. This leads to the final limitation of the project that will be considered.

The thesis has, then, been pursued under the burden of a central underlying principle: to take seriously the writings of Foucault, and to understand them first of all on their own terms. It has also, however, simultaneously applied this principle to a second domain: the psychology of values. Only through a sympathetic understanding of both fields has the thesis attempted to forge an innovative rapprochement between them. They are, moreover, radically different: the work of a French intellectual working in the tradition of continental philosophy, and a long-standing domain of Anglo-American
empirical psychology. Reflecting on the project on its completion, a number of opportunities and problems inherent with this approach can clearly be identified.

First, it is only by drawing on both these very different perspectives that the thesis has been able to offer the insights it has. It has presented a new perspective on the history of the psychology of values and the research tradition of Rokeach, and a new conceptualisation of values linking the concept to ethics and the self, suggesting a number of ways forward for future research. It has, furthermore, produced a new contribution to debates about the use of Foucault in psychology, and shed light on aspects of discursive psychology and the importance to the discipline of the notion of postmodernity.

These opportunities, however, have come at a cost to what might have been possible focusing on one or the other domain alone. The thesis has only begun to draw out an approach to Foucault that sets it firmly in its philosophical context whilst rethinking its consequences for psychology. The present reading of Foucault could be elaborated further: extending and making more readily available the analytic of archaeology; and setting his view of morality more clearly in the context of other approaches. Focusing more closely on Foucault in this way, however, might then reduce the relevance of the work to psychology more generally. It might make a better contribution to Foucault scholarship, but not to empirical psychology. It could be argued that the real challenge with such work of interpretation is to show how it can be made to apply and contribute to an established discipline that is primarily empirical, and based on the application of clearly defined research methods.

Likewise, drawing on the very different work of Foucault has in some ways inherently limited the extent of the direct contribution of the thesis to the psychological literature on which it focused. Rather than being able to draw on established techniques and materials refined through many years of development, the introduction of a new perspective has entailed the development of new concepts, analytic frameworks and psychological measures. Moreover, in so far as a Foucaultian perspective has broadened the scope of traditional approaches to values, it has also introduced major new fields of psychology to be integrated. For this reason, the thesis has only been able to touch on the moral reasoning literature, and has not addressed the extensive literature on the self,
whilst the perspective that developed from the work on Foucault suggested these would both be relevant literatures to consider in the course of future work on values. It could again be argued, however, that it was only by drawing on Foucault that it became evident these literatures might be of importance. To conclude, the use of Foucault in the present project can be seen to have offered new insights, but also to have brought new challenges and problems that leave more areas open to further refinement than would be the case if an existing approach to Foucault or values alone had been adopted. The final section now considers some possibilities for future research suggested by the thesis.

The exposition of Foucault provided an overview of his oeuvre and detailed examination of two axes of his thought. The present project has not, however, discussed the second, genealogical axis. His work on power has been almost as influential in psychology as his writings on discourse (e.g. Parker, 1989b). There is therefore considerable work yet to be done to extend the current project of re-examining and offering alternative readings of Foucault, focusing on his work on power. A crucial question raised but not answered by the thesis concerns the role of Foucault’s work on power considered in the context of the three axes of his thought emphasised in the thesis. A suggestion for future research is to consider how this reading might highlight problems for current understandings of power, at least in so far as they are consistent with Foucault’s own final view. It could be argued that for Foucault the third axis, of ethics, moderates the relationship between knowledge and power discussed in ‘Discipline and Punish’ and the first volume of the History of Sexuality. If this could be shown to be the case, it could be argued that the implications of Foucault’s conception of power for psychology has been over emphasised by some writers in the discipline (e.g. Richer, 1992). The thesis has also deliberately dealt only in passing with the secondary texts on Foucault published by philosophers (e.g. Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982). This follows the strategy to read Foucault from the perspective of contemporary psychology, and with the concerns of psychologists in mind. There clearly is, however, the possibility of further extending the research to integrate it with current debates in research in continental philosophy and sociology. Other possibilities for further research within psychology include the further refinement and use of the analytic of archaeology, as begun in the thesis. The basic framework drawn from Foucault’s texts provides a more accessible introduction to the constituent concepts of archaeology. Moreover, the
application of this framework in the field of values has shown how these concepts can be applied to a concrete case in psychological research. The techniques are, however, generalisable and could be applied to a range of topics in psychology in order to unravel the details of the socio-historic and discursive constitution of key psychological concepts and theories.

The reconceptualisation of values also presents many possibilities for future research. Most closely related to recent work in values are questions raised by the introduction of the potential importance of conceptions of values. Following the proposal of Seligman and Katz (1996), that there are multiple value systems relating to different content domains, the present thesis suggests that the importance of the idea of multiple value systems may vary depending on the mode of ethical self formation and conceptions of values people hold. Future research might explore whether conceptions of values, an understanding that they are either abstract and enduring or contextual and transitory, might moderate the relationship between a reliance on one single value system, rather than multiple value systems. Other work might include the further validation and subsequent use of the concept and scale to measure modes of ethical self formation. Behavioural studies need to be conducted to provide a more compelling validation of the construct than has been presented here. Finally, as discussed in the limitations, there is considerable scope for further integration of the findings of the thesis with the literature on the self and moral reasoning. In both areas there are considerable problems posed by the range of conceptualisations used in these domains. The thesis extends the trend begun, for example, by contributors to the Noam and Wren (1993) edited collection looking to combine literatures on morality and the self, to additionally include work on values. This project remains, however, a challenge for the future for psychology.

Summary and conclusions

The thesis has presented a reconceptualisation of values using the analytics of Michel Foucault. Beginning with concerns about changes in contemporary social conditions and in the discipline of social psychology, the thesis argued for a re-examination of the thought of Foucault. Recasting his perspective as a development of the Enlightenment tradition, Foucault's archaeology was interpreted as offering an alternative to the readings of his work by discursive psychologists, suggesting a
different understanding of the conceptualisation of values of Rokeach. Foucault's analysis of ethics then showed how he understood there to be changes in ethics in contemporary society raising new hypotheses for values research. An empirical programme was reported offering a view of values in which they are intimately linked to the modes of self-relationship through which people form themselves as ethical subjects. Empirical data showing relationships between modes of ethical self formation and both value priorities and conceptions of values were interpreted to offer new directions for future values research.
References


References


References


References


302


Appendices
Appendix A: Rokeach Value Survey (RVS)

Listed below are 2 sets of 18 values, in alphabetical order. Your task is to arrange them in order of importance to YOU, as guiding principles in YOUR life. Study each list carefully and mark in the box beside each value its priority for you, with 1 as the most important and 18 the least. Work slowly and think carefully. If you change your mind, feel free to change your answers by crossing out the original number and writing another. The end result should show how you really feel.

| A COMFORTABLE LIFE | AMBITIOUS |
| A PROSPEROUS LIFE |
| AN EXCITING LIFE | BROADMINDED |
| A STIMULATING, ACTIVE LIFE |
| A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT | CAPABLE |
| A LASTING CONTRIBUTION |
| A WORLD AT PEACE | CLEAN |
| FREE OF WAR AND CONFLICT |
| A WORLD OF BEAUTY | COURAGEOUS |
| BEAUTY OF NATURE AND THE ARTS |
| EQUALITY | FORGIVING |
| BROTHERHOOD, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL |
| FAMILY SECURITY | HELPFUL |
| TAKING CARE OF LOVED ONES |
| FREEDOM | HONEST |
| INDEPENDENCE, FREE CHOICE |
| HEALTH | IMAGINATIVE |
| PHYSICAL AND MENTAL WELL-BEING |
| INNER HARMONY | INDEPENDENT |
| FREEDOM FROM INNER CONFLICT |
| MATURE LOVE | INTELLECTUAL |
| SEXUAL AND SPIRITUAL INTIMACY |
| NATIONAL SECURITY | LOGICAL |
| PROTECTION FROM ATTACK |
| PLEASURE | LOVING |
| AN ENJOYABLE, LEISURELY LIFE |
| SALVATION | LOYAL |
| SAVED, ETERNAL LIFE |
| SELF-RESPECT | OBEDIENT |
| SELF-ESTEEM |
| SOCIAL RECOGNITION | POLITE |
| RESPECT, ADMIRATION |
| TRUE FRIENDSHIP | RESPONSIBLE |
| CLOSE COMPANIONSHIP |
| WISDOM | SELF-CONTROLLED |
| A MATURE UNDERSTANDING OF LIFE |
| SELF-CONTROLLED |
| RESTRANDED, SELF-DISCIPLINED |

315
### Appendix B: Schwartz Value Survey (SVS)

This questionnaire is a list of values. Please rate each of them according to how important they are to you, as a guiding principle in your life.

Use the scale at the top of the page, from -1 ‘Opposed to my values’ to 7 ‘Of Supreme Importance’. As this is a questionnaire about values, you may find that many of the items seem important. Please be careful to think about each one, and rate highly only those values that are especially important to you. It may help to quickly read through the complete list first and pick out the few that are most important, before you begin rating the others.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.</strong></td>
<td><strong>EQUALITY</strong> (equal opportunity for all)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2.</strong></td>
<td><strong>INNER HARMONY</strong> (at peace with myself)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3.</strong></td>
<td><strong>SOCIAL POWER</strong> (control over others, dominance)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4.</strong></td>
<td><strong>PLEASURE</strong> (gratification of desires)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5.</strong></td>
<td><strong>FREEDOM</strong> (freedom of action and thought)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6.</strong></td>
<td><strong>A SPIRITUAL LIFE</strong> (emphasis on spiritual not material matters)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>7.</strong></td>
<td><strong>SENSE OF BELONGING</strong> (feeling that others care about me)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>8.</strong></td>
<td><strong>SOCIAL ORDER</strong> (stability of society)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>9.</strong></td>
<td><strong>AN EXCITING LIFE</strong> (stimulating experiences)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>10.</strong></td>
<td><strong>MEANING IN LIFE</strong> (a purpose in life)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>11.</strong></td>
<td><strong>POLITENESS</strong> (courtesy, good manners)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>12.</strong></td>
<td><strong>WEALTH</strong> (material possessions, money)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>13.</strong></td>
<td><strong>NATIONAL SECURITY</strong> (protection of my nation from enemies)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>14.</strong></td>
<td><strong>SELF-RESPECT</strong> (belief in one's own worth)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>15.</strong></td>
<td><strong>RECIPROCATION OF FAVORS</strong> (avoidance of indebtedness)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>16.</strong></td>
<td><strong>CREATIVITY</strong> (uniqueness, imagination)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>17.</strong></td>
<td><strong>A WORLD AT PEACE</strong> (free of war and conflict)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>18.</strong></td>
<td><strong>RESPECT FOR TRADITION</strong> (preservation of time-honoured customs)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>19.</strong></td>
<td><strong>MATURE LOVE</strong> (deep emotional and spiritual intimacy)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>20.</strong></td>
<td><strong>SELF-DISCIPLINE</strong> (self-restraint, resistance to temptation)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>21.</strong></td>
<td><strong>DETACHMENT</strong> (from worldly concerns)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>22.</strong></td>
<td><strong>FAMILY SECURITY</strong> (safety for loved ones)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>23.</strong></td>
<td><strong>SOCIAL RECOGNITION</strong> (respect, approval by others)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>24.</strong></td>
<td><strong>UNITY WITH NATURE</strong> (fitting into nature)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>25.</strong></td>
<td><strong>A VARIED LIFE</strong> (filled with challenge, novelty, and change)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Score</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>WISDOM (a mature understanding of life)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>AUTHORITY (the right to lead or command)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>TRUE FRIENDSHIP (close, supportive friends)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>A WORLD OF BEAUTY (beauty of nature and the arts)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>SOCIAL JUSTICE (correcting injustice, care for the weak)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>INDEPENDENT (self-reliant, self-sufficient)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>MODERATE (avoiding extremes of feeling and action)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>LOYAL (faithful to my friends, group)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>AMBITIOUS (hardworking, aspiring)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>BROAD-MINDED (tolerant of different ideas and beliefs)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>HUMBLE (modest, self-effacing)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>DARING (seeking adventure, risk)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT (preserving nature)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>INFLUENTIAL (having an impact on people and events)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>HONORING OF PARENTS AND ELDERS (showing respect)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>CHOOSING OWN GOALS (selecting own purposes)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>HEALTHY (not being sick physically or mentally)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>CAPABLE (competent, effective, efficient)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>ACCEPTING MY PORTION IN LIFE (submitting to life's circumstances)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>HONEST (genuine, sincere)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>PRESERVING MY PUBLIC IMAGE (protecting my &quot;face&quot;)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>OBEIDERENT (dutiful, meeting obligations)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>INTELLIGENT (logical, thinking)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>HELPFUL (working for the welfare of others)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>ENJOYING LIFE (enjoying food, sex, leisure, etc.)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>DEVOUT (holding to religious faith and belief)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>RESPONSIBLE (dependable, reliable)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>CURIOUS (interested in everything, exploring)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>FORGIVING (willing to pardon others)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>SUCCESSFUL (achieving goals)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>CLEAN (neat, tidy)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix C: Summary information including age, gender and self-reported occupation of interview participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview</th>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Nurse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Psychiatric nurse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Social worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>Policewoman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Artist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Pediatric nurse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Advertising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Salesman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Computer programmer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Shop assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>Typist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>Study</td>
<td>Sample</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Assistant editor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>English lecturer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Shop assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Marketing consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Chef</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Researcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Managing director, software company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Kitchen assistant / Barman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Reverend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Chef</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>Retired forklift operator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix D: Additional values used as prompts during interviews

COMMITMENT
(seeing things through, perseverance)

EMPATHY
(understanding another's viewpoint)

HARD WORK
(doing a good day's work)

HUMAN DIGNITY
(respecting your own and others' sense of worth)

INTEGRITY
(keeping to your agreements)

OPENNESS
(free expression of yourself)

PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT
(respecting nature/the planet, being 'green')

PROTECTION OF WILDLIFE
(helping endangered species, preventing cruelty)

RESPECT
(valuing others' rights, views and qualities)
### Appendix E: Transcription schedule used for interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(16.27)</td>
<td>All quotations are followed by a code. The first number refers to the Interview / Participant number, the second to the conversational turn in the interview. Even numbers are thus always the discourse of the respondents and odd numbers of the interviewer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>Encloses information not part of the interview discourse, for the reader’s information only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Unclear]</td>
<td>Missing word or words due to inaudibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/</td>
<td>Indicates a word started and interrupted before completion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>{ }</td>
<td>Encloses a word whose transcription cannot be guaranteed due to inaudibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>,</td>
<td>Short pause in participant’s speech.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>Long pause in participant’s speech.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(L)</td>
<td>Denotes laughter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'italics'</td>
<td>Italics denote emphasis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Inner Harmony’</td>
<td>Value names in Capitals with inverted commas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'a prosperous life'</td>
<td>Value definitions or part of a definition taken directly from the Rokeach Value Survey or suggested supplementary values sheet</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix F: Categories and list of 49 codes used in Chapter 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A) Responses to specific questions:</th>
<th>E) Social change and 'postmodernity':</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General experience of the surveys</td>
<td>Plurality/Fragmentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability (presence)</td>
<td>‘In the old days’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability (absence)</td>
<td>Differences today</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Types of values</td>
<td>Stick to values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitions of values</td>
<td>Taken for granted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional values</td>
<td>Tradition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value decay</td>
<td>New meanings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value stability</td>
<td>Reflexive modernity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General experience of values</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transcendence (situation)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transcendence (time)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transcendence (events)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B) Rokeach’s conceptualisation of values:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision making criteria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-esteem</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principles</td>
<td>Ethical work (awareness)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-confrontation</td>
<td>Ethical work (revaluation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C) Critiques of Rokeach’s theory:</td>
<td>Ethical work (regulation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple meanings</td>
<td>Telos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited choice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy (problems)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy (strategies)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change (events)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change (circumstances)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change (stability)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D) Lay theorisation of values:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is a value?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What role do they play?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F) Foucault’s analytic of Ethics:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transcendence (events)</td>
<td>Ethical substance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoS [Mode of subjection] (Care)</td>
<td>MoS (Virtue)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoS (Spiritualism)</td>
<td>MoS (Principle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoS (Integrity)</td>
<td>Ethical work (awareness)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethical work (revaluation)</td>
<td>Ethical work (regulation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G) Key values:</td>
<td>Telos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honesty</td>
<td>Inner Harmony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy (strategies)</td>
<td>Comfortable Life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change (circumstances)</td>
<td>True Friendship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change (stability)</td>
<td>Social Recognition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix G: Demographic questionnaire used in Chapters 8 and 9

Please complete the following questions about you generally.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Your sex:</th>
<th>Male □</th>
<th>Female □</th>
<th>Your Date of Birth: / / 19 ....</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Your occupation:</td>
<td>..........................................................</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education:</td>
<td>O’ levels / GCSEs □</td>
<td>A’ levels □</td>
<td>Vocational Qualifications □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree / Professional Equivalent □</td>
<td>Postgraduate Degree □</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status:</td>
<td>Single □</td>
<td>In a relationship □</td>
<td>Co-habiting □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married □</td>
<td>Separated/Divorced □</td>
<td>Other .................</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your ethnic origin:</td>
<td>White □</td>
<td>Black-Caribbean □</td>
<td>Black-African □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani □</td>
<td>Bangladeshi □</td>
<td>Chinese □</td>
<td>Other .................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How would you be most likely to vote?</td>
<td>Labour □</td>
<td>Tory □</td>
<td>Lib Dems □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apolitical □</td>
<td>I would not vote □</td>
<td>Other .................</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How interested in politics are you?</td>
<td>Not at all - 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 - Extremely</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How committed to politics are you?</td>
<td>Not at all - 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 - Extremely</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is your religion?</td>
<td>C of E □</td>
<td>Catholic □</td>
<td>Protestant □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam □</td>
<td>Sikh □</td>
<td>Not religious □</td>
<td>Other .................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How often do you attend religious meetings?</td>
<td>Never □</td>
<td>Less than once a year □</td>
<td>Yearly □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly □</td>
<td>Weekly □</td>
<td>More than once a week □</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How important is religion to you?</td>
<td>Not at all - 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 - Very Important</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix H: Complete list of Q items, configured as the Factor array for Factor 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>-5</th>
<th>-4</th>
<th>-3</th>
<th>-2</th>
<th>-1</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/  Values are not something you need to think about, they are just there.</td>
<td>27/ In recent years, there has been an erosion of values.</td>
<td>47/ I like values to be a set of rules whereby people know how to behave.</td>
<td>17/ My values are grounded in tradition.</td>
<td>5/ My religion is a strong influence on what I value.</td>
<td>43/ It is God who knows whether or not I am following my values.</td>
<td>41/ Discussing your values with other people can be a good way of clarifying and consolidating what they are.</td>
<td>42/ If a value is that bothers me.</td>
<td>26/ Self-help books and magazines can help you find values that are right for you.</td>
<td>28/ My values are often in the forefront of my mind.</td>
<td>30/ To have values when it is convenient and abandon them when it is not is probably worse than having no values at all.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/ The only obligation to follow your values is that which you owe to yourself.</td>
<td>14/ It is important that parents bring up their children with the right values.</td>
<td>48/ Whether or not I act according to my values is not really something that bothers me.</td>
<td>42/ If a value is important to you, it should be obeyed without question.</td>
<td>49/ Values are about stimulating you to explore and discover yourself, and fulfill your potential.</td>
<td>9/ Sometimes do things like writing a journal or reading a book to help me clarify my values.</td>
<td>37/ I believe in values that are true. I have to treat my feelings.</td>
<td>40/ I often monitor myself to check I’m living in line with my values.</td>
<td>53/ People have a duty to society to follow their values.</td>
<td>29/ Many of my values are based on doing what is best by my close friends</td>
<td>39/ Living up to your values requires considerable self-discipline.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55/ The only obligation to follow your values is that which you owe to yourself.</td>
<td>22/ Working out one’s own values is one of life’s great freedoms.</td>
<td>33/ You shouldn’t necessarily follow a value you believe to be true. You have to take into account the details of the situation.</td>
<td>1/ Those values that I hold most dearly will never change.</td>
<td>6/ My sense of values comes from the important relationships I have with others.</td>
<td>12/ What values are important in a society should be an on-going topic for public debate.</td>
<td>5/ My values are central to who I am as a person.</td>
<td>32/ The ultimate test of your values is whether they make you happy.</td>
<td>21/ I don’t treat my values as rules or anything like that, I just go by what I feel.</td>
<td>16/ My values are the priority of my own values that are important.</td>
<td>38/ One can compare values to me. values come</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/ Those values that I hold most dearly will never change.</td>
<td>24/ It is clear what the priority of different values is for me.</td>
<td>52/ If I find I have acted against my values I feel very bad about it.</td>
<td>46/ I would hope the youth of today grow up to appreciate the same values I have found to be important.</td>
<td>35/ One has a duty to society to follow their values.</td>
<td>34/ The mass media play a large role in manipulating people’s values.</td>
<td>50/ It is hard to ignore your values.</td>
<td>28/ Your values are something deep inside you that need to be discovered.</td>
<td>25/ Major life events like having a child, getting married, or changing career, inevitably lead you altering your values.</td>
<td>31/ Many of the values I have are those important to you, really something according to my values.</td>
<td>2/ Values are what your true values are.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/ My values are the priority of my own values that are important.</td>
<td>7/ You have to put yourself in the position of other people to know whether your values are the right ones.</td>
<td>44/ I often monitor myself to check I’m living in line with my values.</td>
<td>13/ The priority of my values changes depending on what aspect of my life I was thinking about.</td>
<td>19/ Values are demands I make of myself that I also expect from other people.</td>
<td>45/ One has a responsibility to reconsider from time to time even one’s most important values.</td>
<td>51/ One’s elders should be an important influence on one’s values.</td>
<td>38/ I choose friends who have similar values to me.</td>
<td>10/ I don’t think it’s relevant to compare values today, with those of previous times.</td>
<td>18/ I choose friends who have similar values to me.</td>
<td>33/ You shouldn’t necessarily follow a value you believe to be true. You have to take into account the details of the situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/ I choose friends who have similar values to me.</td>
<td>1/ Those values that I hold most dearly will never change.</td>
<td>49/ Values are about stimulating you to explore and discover yourself, and fulfill your potential.</td>
<td>12/ What values are important in a society should be an on-going topic for public debate.</td>
<td>35/ One has a duty to society to follow their values.</td>
<td>19/ Values are demands I make of myself that I also expect from other people.</td>
<td>1/ Those values that I hold most dearly will never change.</td>
<td>32/ The ultimate test of your values is whether they make you happy.</td>
<td>18/ I choose friends who have similar values to me.</td>
<td>15/ I choose friends who have similar values to me.</td>
<td>38/ One can compare values to me. values come</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18/ I choose friends who have similar values to me.</td>
<td>12/ What values are important in a society should be an on-going topic for public debate.</td>
<td>35/ One has a duty to society to follow their values.</td>
<td>19/ Values are demands I make of myself that I also expect from other people.</td>
<td>35/ One has a duty to society to follow their values.</td>
<td>38/ One can compare values to me. values come</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/ I choose friends who have similar values to me.</td>
<td>35/ One has a duty to society to follow their values.</td>
<td>35/ One has a duty to society to follow their values.</td>
<td>35/ One has a duty to society to follow their values.</td>
<td>35/ One has a duty to society to follow their values.</td>
<td>38/ One can compare values to me. values come</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix I: Varimax rotated factor solution (exemplars marked in bold)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>1.00</th>
<th>2.00</th>
<th>3.00</th>
<th>4.00</th>
<th>5.00</th>
<th>6.00</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q Sort 57</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Eigen values 12.29 7.26 4.65 3.43 2.67 2.41
Variance (%) 20.15 11.90 7.62 5.62 4.38 4.00

Note: Loadings less than .45 not shown
Appendix J: Numerically ordered list of items and their factor scores on the six factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q Number</th>
<th>Q Item</th>
<th>Post-traditional</th>
<th>Principled</th>
<th>Spiritual</th>
<th>Hedonist</th>
<th>Existentialist</th>
<th>Traditional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Those values that I hold most dearly will never change.</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>-0.55</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>I would hope the youth of today grow up to appreciate the same values I have found to be important.</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>-0.47</td>
<td>-1.63</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>It is important to regularly take stock of what it is you really value.</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>-0.79</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>-0.83</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Experience has influenced my values, but the values that are most important to me are still those I grew up with.</td>
<td>-1.15</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>My religion is a strong influence on what I value.</td>
<td>-1.90</td>
<td>-1.74</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>-0.96</td>
<td>-1.57</td>
<td>1.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>My sense of values comes from the important relationships I have with others.</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
<td>-0.81</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>-0.62</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>You have to put yourself in the position of other people to know whether your values are the right ones.</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>-1.20</td>
<td>-1.25</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>If I rated the values again in 6 months time, I would expect my answers to be almost exactly the same.</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>-1.86</td>
<td>-1.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>I sometimes do things like writing a journal or reading a book to help me clarify my values.</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>-1.90</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-1.02</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>If I rated values again in 5 years time, I would expect my answers to be almost exactly the same.</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.92</td>
<td>-1.84</td>
<td>-1.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Values are not something you need to think about, they are just there.</td>
<td>-1.73</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>What values are considered important in a society should be an on-going topic for public debate.</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>-0.62</td>
<td>-0.87</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>The priority of my values changes depending on the way my life’s going at the moment.</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>-2.41</td>
<td>-0.88</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>It is important that parents bring up their children with the right values.</td>
<td>-1.11</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-0.87</td>
<td>1.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>I choose friends who have similar values to me.</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>-0.60</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>-1.52</td>
<td>-0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>My values are central to who I am as a person.</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>My values are grounded in tradition.</td>
<td>-1.69</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
<td>-0.52</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>-1.47</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>I don’t think it’s relevant to compare values today, with those of previous times.</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-1.09</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>-0.97</td>
<td>-0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Values are demands I make of myself that I also expect from other people.</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>-0.89</td>
<td>-1.07</td>
<td>-1.09</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>My values are often in the forefront of my mind.</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>-0.95</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>I don’t treat my values as rules or anything like that, I just go by what I feel.</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
<td>-0.70</td>
<td>-1.23</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>-1.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Working out one’s own values is one of life’s great freedoms.</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>The benefit of one’s values to others, should always be considered first.</td>
<td>-0.44</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>-1.42</td>
<td>-1.23</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>It is clear what the priority of different values is for me.</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>-0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Major life events, inevitably lead to you altering your value.</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>-0.96</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Self-help books and magazines can help you find values that are right for you.</td>
<td>-0.56</td>
<td>-1.57</td>
<td>-1.10</td>
<td>-1.48</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>In recent years, there has been an erosion of values.</td>
<td>-1.39</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>-0.48</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Your values are something deep inside you that need to be discovered.</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
<td>-0.77</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Many of my values are based on doing what is best by my close friends</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>-2.57</td>
<td>-0.73</td>
<td>-1.19</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

329
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q Number</th>
<th>Q Item</th>
<th>Post-traditional</th>
<th>Principled</th>
<th>Spiritual</th>
<th>Holistic</th>
<th>Existentialist</th>
<th>Traditional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>To have values when it is convenient and abandon them when it is not is worse than having no values at all.</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>-0.45</td>
<td>-0.87</td>
<td>-2.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Many of the values I have are ones my parents instilled in me as a child.</td>
<td>-0.78</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>The ultimate test of your values is whether they make you happy.</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>-0.65</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>-0.47</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>You shouldn’t <em>necessarily</em> follow a value you believe to be true. You have to take into account the details of the situation.</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>-0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>The mass media play a large role in manipulating people’s values.</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
<td>-0.72</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>-0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>One has a responsibility to reconsider from time to time even one’s most important values.</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>-0.59</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Values should not just be about doing nothing ‘wrong’, but part of development towards doing things exceptionally.</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>I believe in sticking to values, though it may be at some cost.</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>-0.71</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>One can learn from people you admire in some way, about how best to prioritize your own values.</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>-0.52</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Living up to your values requires considerable self-discipline.</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>-0.51</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>1.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>It is very difficult to live according to one’s own values in today’s consumer culture.</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td>-0.59</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>-1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Discussing your values with other people can be a good way of clarifying and consolidating what they are.</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>-0.66</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>If a value is important to you, it should be obeyed without question.</td>
<td>-1.29</td>
<td>-0.51</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>It is God who knows whether or not I am following my values.</td>
<td>-1.79</td>
<td>-2.01</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>-1.00</td>
<td>-1.58</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>I often monitor myself to check I’m living in line with my values.</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>-1.54</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>-0.44</td>
<td>-0.65</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>You can only really think about what your true values are on your own.</td>
<td>-0.82</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>-0.54</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>-1.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>I would rate the values differently depending on what aspect of my life I was thinking about.</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>-1.51</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>I like values to be a set of rules whereby people know how to behave.</td>
<td>-1.70</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>-0.75</td>
<td>-1.44</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Whether or not I act according to my values is not really something that bothers me.</td>
<td>-1.33</td>
<td>-0.78</td>
<td>-2.30</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Values are about stimulating you to explore and discover yourself, and fulfill your potential.</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>-0.90</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>It is hard to ignore your values.</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>One’s elders should be an important influence on one’s values.</td>
<td>-1.44</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>-0.91</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>1.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>If I find I have acted against my values I feel very bad about it</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>People have a duty to society to follow their values.</td>
<td>-0.60</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>-1.30</td>
<td>-1.52</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>1.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>If someone suffered as a result of my not following my values, I would go out of my way to make it up to them.</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>The only obligation to follow your values is that which you owe to yourself.</td>
<td>-1.11</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>-0.66</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>-2.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix K: Ethical Self Formation Scale (ESFS)

This questionnaire is aimed at understanding how people think about morality and ethics. It is about the different ways in which people might experience a sense of obligation to act morally or to live a ‘good’ life. It is also concerned with the different aspirations we have when we behave morally. There are no right or wrong answers to these questions as there might be to a maths problem: we are interested only in your view. Please indicate the extent to which the answers to the following questions apply to you.

1. **My sense of moral or ethical obligation comes from:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Very much</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The desire to fulfil my goals in life</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A sense of care and concern for the people I know</td>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>Very much</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My spiritual beliefs</td>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>Very much</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A sense of duty to society</td>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>Very much</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doing whatever makes me most happy</td>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>Very much</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A fundamental sense of right and wrong</td>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>Very much</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A drive to fulfil my potential</td>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>Very much</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An obligation to my friends and loved ones</td>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>Very much</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The teachings of my religion</td>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>Very much</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The traditions I grew up with</td>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>Very much</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wanting to get the most enjoyment from life</td>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>Very much</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behaving responsibly</td>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>Very much</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. **If I thought I had not been living a moral or good life, I would feel that I had:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Very much</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Let down those who were close to me</td>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>Very much</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turned away from God</td>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>Very much</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failed in my responsibilities to society</td>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>Very much</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not been enjoying my life as I should</td>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>Very much</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betrayed proper principles</td>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>Very much</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failed to be as successful as I should</td>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>Very much</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To act morally or live a ‘good’ life is ultimately to be someone who:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Was spiritually fulfilled</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Had been an admirable citizen</td>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enjoyed their lives to the full</td>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Had lived a life that was true and just</td>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was successful in life</td>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cared for other people</td>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Had maintained a relationship with God</td>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Had been true to their upbringing</td>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was happy</td>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acted with principle</td>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focused on and achieved their aims</td>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looked out for the needs of other people</td>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix L: Conceptions of Values Scale (CVS)

The following questions ask you about your understanding of values generally. Please indicate for each item the extent to which you personally disagree (1) or agree (7).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The values I hold most dearly will never change.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>What is most important to me depends on the situation.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>If I rated the importance of different values to me again in 5 years time, I would expect my answers to be almost exactly the same.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>You should act according to the same set of values in every area of your life.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>It is hard to say one value is more important than another.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>What is most important to me changes almost day by day.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>I would rate the importance of my values differently depending on what aspect of my life I was thinking about.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>If I rated the importance of different values to me again in 6 months time, I would expect my answers to be almost exactly the same.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>The priority of my values changes depending on the way my life’s going at the moment.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>You should not always follow the values that are important to you. You have to take the circumstances into account.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>