Lillehammer, Hallvard; (1994) The content of moral judgements. Masters thesis (M.Phil), UCL (University College London).

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Abstract

The thesis deals with issues within the theory of content for moral judgements. A theory of content should specify what kinds of judgement moral judgements are and what is necessary in order to grasp and to make a moral judgement. In Chapter I I specify what kinds of judgements I will deal with. I call these Moral Evaluative Judgements. In Chapter II I argue that a theory of content for moral judgements must observe the constraint that moral judgements are essentially practical and that moral beliefs are intrinsically motivational. In Chapter III I argue that moral judgements are subjectively dependent in a way which places restrictions on any notion of objectivity which might account for what moral judgements claim. In Chapter IV I examine the claim that moral judgements are assertoric and minimally truth-apt. I argue that this does not show that moral judgements are essentially cognitive judgements. In Chapter V I examine an attempt to further substantiate the claim that moral judgements are cognitive and factual. I argue that this attempt is underdetermined by the evidence. In Chapter VI I examine an account on which moral judgements are non-cognitive and express subjective mental states. I claim that this account is along the right lines.

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