THE SCHOOL OF AMMONIUS, SON OF HERMIAS,
ON KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVINE
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A Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
to the Department of Philosophy, Arts Faculty,
University College London

London 1994
To my parents
The thesis undertakes a reconstruction and critical assessment of the theory of the Neoplatonic school of Ammonius, son of Hermias, on the presuppositions for the acquisition of knowledge of the divine and also on the contents and the purpose of this knowledge.

The metaphysical position of the human soul between the intelligible and the sensible worlds allows it to know the intelligible world and the divine, in particular, provided that the cognitive reason-principles in the human intellect are activated. The purpose of such knowledge is the assimilation to the divine and is achieved by means of a personal struggle with the help of theoretical and practical philosophy. The school of Ammonius compared its philosophical attempt at knowledge of the divine to previous similar methods.

Since the One is unknowable, the members of this school believed that man can know to some extent the Demiurge, who belongs to the second level of the intelligible world. The members of the school had different views on affirmative and negative theology. The intelligible ante rem universals, the most fundamental of which is Substance, constitute the cognitive and creative reason-principles of the demiurgic Intellect. The eternal activation of these principles result in the Demiurge's omniscience and the creation of the world, which is coeternal with the Demiurge. The Demiurge is incorporeal and exercises providence for what He has created, but He is not omnipotent.

The theory of the school of Ammonius on knowledge of the divine is shown to be broadly consistent, though not necessarily convincing.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Robert Heinaman, of the department of Philosophy, UCL. I thank him for his comments as well as his patience and kindness.

For the knowledge of ancient philosophy I shall be always indebted to my teachers at the University of Athens. I would like here to mention specifically Prof. Grigorios Kostaras, who is still a source of inspiration for me. I also feel fortunate to have consulted Prof. Gerard J.P. O'Daly and Dr. Robert Sharples, thus having benefited from their knowledge of Greek philosophy. During my postgraduate studies, I had the privilege to attend the seminars in ancient philosophy organized by Prof. Richard Sorabji at the Institute of Classical Studies.

As I had the opportunity to consult some of the best libraries in the world, I am indebted to the Librarians and Staff of the following: Library of the Societies for the Promotion of Hellenic and Roman Studies (Institute of Classical Studies), University College London, Senate House (UL), Warburg Institute and British Library.

My studies in England would not have been possible without a three-and-a-half year scholarship which was awarded to me by the Greek State Scholarships Foundation (IKY). The very least I can do on this occasion is to thank the Administrative Board of the Foundation.

To my parents, Ioannis and Erifyle Tempelis, I owe more than I can say for their encouragement and financial support. I am grateful to Christina Manolea for the useful discussions we have had on several philological matters. To Philip Pilkington, Margaret Gullan - Whur and Colin Annis goes credit for their appreciative comments and critiques.
Last but not least, I would like to thank my brother George for the proof-checking of my work.
INTRODUCTION

The present thesis undertakes a reconstruction and critical assessment of the doctrine of the Alexandrian school of Ammonius, son of Hermias, on the presuppositions for the acquisition of knowledge of the divine and also on the contents and the purpose of this knowledge. The study concerns their methodology for apprehending the intelligible world. By this I mean here not merely a statement of their method, but also a presentation of its theoretical foundation. The doctrines which are examined may seem antiquated and irrelevant to present concerns. I think, however, that if we devote a sympathetic but critical study to them, we may adjust our own arguments regarding the knowability of the ultimate principles of the universe.

The factor which determined the choice of the subject-matter is the scant scholarship devoted to it and, more generally, to the final expressions of late antiquity. Much of the lack of interest may be due to the aversion caused by the untranslated volumes of this school's Greek commentaries. It is hoped that more recent scholarship may contribute to a drastic change of the persistent preconception about the decline and fall of classical thought by the time of Ammonius and his students.

a) METHOD

The question, then, arises: What is the theory of the school of Ammonius on knowledge of the divine? The problem is that the members of this school did not have the advantage of writing a systematic work in
which one could find a complete and coherent metaphysics or a full and complete presentation of such a theory. Their metaphysical beliefs are scattered amongst their commentaries on Plato, Aristotle, Porphyry, Nicomachus, Hippocrates and Paulus, which take the form of school treatises. As happens with similar cases in late Neoplatonism, the same author repeats his ideas in his different works, even in places where the context itself would not normally allow such speculations. Moreover, they tended to return to a topic on various occasions. Reference to knowledge of the divine can therefore be found in nearly all the lectures they gave to their listeners rather than in a particular book devoted to it. In reading the corpus of the commentaries of the school of Ammonius one cannot fail to notice the copious references to knowledge of the divine. Thus, we have more than sufficient evidence for the existence of this theory in their works.

Consequently, such a theory must be a matter of reconstruction: in some cases one simply has to make explicit what is merely implicit in the writings of the members of this school. In order to speak of a theory of knowledge of the divine, it is necessary not only to give an account of the fundamental principles of such a theory, but also to explain the relation of these principles to the most general principles of their epistemology and metaphysics. I shall be arguing that Ammonius and his students had a theory on knowledge of the divine in just this sense, giving an account of what this theory says and examining whether it is a sound one.

In order to examine the principles of this theory, I shall be following two theoretical routes: one from the general (their overall epistemology and metaphysics) to the specific (their theory on knowledge of the divine), the other from the specific (the contents of this
knowledge) to the general (their theory on knowledge of the divine). This seems to be the most appropriate procedure, mainly because their reader is nowhere presented with a fully constructed theory. Nevertheless, because it remains one of the main topics of their commentaries, it can be claimed that such a theory is implied. This makes the task of their critic more difficult; he has to reconstruct the implied theory.

Since my aim is to reconstruct and criticize their theory on knowledge of the divine not in relation to modern philosophical problems, but in relation to the more general notions of their epistemology and metaphysics, the mere enumeration of the constituents of such a theory will not suffice. I am not interested only in what Ammonius and his students said. I am interested, too, in why they said what they said, whether what they said is sound and what its importance is for a theory on knowledge of the divine in general.

In this study Ammonius and his students (Asclepius, John Philoponus, Zacharias, Gessius, Olympiodorus, Ps.-Heliodorus, and the anonymous author of the commentary in de Interpretatione) are not referred to in their chronological order. The same applies to Olympiodorus' own students, namely, Elias, David, Stephanus, Ps.-Elias or Ps.-David and the anonymous author of the Prolegomena philosophiae Platonicae. Additionally, it is sometimes useful to refer to Neoplatonists like Damascius and Simplicius, who attended Ammonius' courses in Alexandria, but did not remain there to become members of his school. Since in most cases no single author provides the complete picture concerning the discussion of the topics under examination, the position of the school is given by the arrangement of the arguments of more than one author. Full details are provided in the notes.
It is evident that in this subject any philosopher is influenced by his own religion. Due to the necessary restrictions imposed by the character of a dissertation, I shall exclude the examination of Christian views found in writings of certain members of this school. I am primarily interested in the views of Ammonius, Asclepius, Gessius, Olympiodorus, the anonymous author of the commentary *in de Interpretatione* and Ps.-Heliodorus, who remained pagans all their lives. The pagan philosophy was the prevailing one in the school of Ammonius. Of Olympiodorus' views relevant to theurgy and guardian angels, however, I have kept mostly silent. As theurgy was a system of magic practised to procure communication with beneficent spirits and produce miracles, I think it has no place in a philosophy book, even though it has some place in a complete picture of Olympiodorus as a thinker.

I should point out here that since the school of Ammonius flourished in Alexandria in a historical transition (485 A.D. onwards), it is not surprising that one of its members, John Philoponus, did not remain pagan all his life. His philosophy was pagan in his commentaries written until the year 529 A.D., when he began expounding exclusively Christian beliefs. Therefore, I accept K. Verrycken's distinction between an early Philoponus, who adhered to his teacher Ammonius and pagan Neoplatonism in general, and a later Philoponus, who shared Christian views. I shall not examine the second phase of Philoponus' philosophy.

Zacharias was among the members of the school who were Christian all their lives. However, his report of Ammonius' arguments on the coeternity of the world with its Demiurge is more or less objective and very important. The cases of Elias, David, Stephanus, Ps.-Elias (or Ps.-David) and the anonymous author of the *Prolegomena philosophiae*
Platonicae are different. Even if Elias was a Christian, in his philosophical commentaries he did not allow his religion to interfere. Thus, in his philosophical theology his voice is a pagan one. In contrast, David, Stephanus, Ps.-Elias (or Ps.-David) and the anonymous author of the Prolegomena philosophiae Platonicae allowed their Christian religion to interfere in their philosophical commentaries, but not consistently; I therefore limit myself to an examination of the views of theirs which were not affected by their creed.

One of the more persisting misconceptions concerning the metaphysics of the school of Ammonius was initiated by K. Praechter who suggested that Ammonius was not free to engage in pagan metaphysical speculation, because he had to take into account the presence of Christians among his hearers. Given the continued effect of pre-Plotinian theism on the Alexandrian school after Hierocles, K. Praechter argued that Ammonius' aim was to diminish the distance between Platonism and Christianity. Furthermore, K. Praechter thought that as Ammonius concentrated on the study of the Aristotelian Organon, his school eventually lost its positively Platonic character, thus becoming an institute for general philosophical education.\textsuperscript{3} L.G. Westerink,\textsuperscript{4} following K. Praechter, thought that the school of Ammonius attempted an adaptation of Platonism and Aristotelianism to Christianity, by rejecting the Neoplatonic One and the theory of the divine henads. Moreover, K. Oehler\textsuperscript{5} was of the opinion that "the Alexandrians did not further develop the speculations of the Athenian school and, indeed, did not indulge in any autonomous metaphysical speculation whatsoever". Connected with these views are the doubts expressed by M.V. Anastos\textsuperscript{6} as to the philosophical identity of David. Anastos considers him a Platonist, but hardly in the mainstream of Neoplatonism, as he finds that David did not deal with any
of the characteristic Neoplatonic philosophical terms and concepts. He accepts, however, that David did have some affinity for the Neoplatonists.

The aforementioned misconceptions persisted because the latest period of Alexandrian philosophy had been neglected for too long. Seemingly to recognize the need for a better study of this period, A.C. Lloyd argued: "(...) when the simplicity and hard-headedness of the Alexandrians' Neoplatonism is contrasted with the elaboration and 'speculative' character of Athenian metaphysics, a simple but hard fact must be remembered. We have not got their metaphysics." R.T. Wallis found it "exceptionally difficult to form an overall picture of the Alexandrians' metaphysical views."

The situation changed recently after K. Verrycken's well documented study on the Neoplatonic elements of Ammonius' metaphysics. The only fact that he conceded to Praechter's views is that Ammonius simplified Proclus' doctrine on the henads and the triads. In his metaphysics, however, the highest principle remains the Neoplatonic One and the second principle is the demiurgic Intellect. Ammonius and his students adopted a simplified version of the metaphysical system of Proclus, who was their spiritual father. Yet they did not adhere to the Neoplatonic orthodoxy expressed by either the Athenian or the Syrian branch. This does not mean of course that they were not Neoplatonists. As a matter of fact, many elements of their doctrines cannot be explained without reference to the elaborations of Plotinus' and Proclus' metaphysical systems. Hence Anastos' view seems to be extreme, because it exaggerates the differences between David and Neoplatonists such as Plotinus and Proclus.

Even though most members of this school wrote commentaries on Aristotle, a careful reader often observes that they ascribed to
Aristotle doctrines which significantly deviated from his own, if they were not quite foreign to them. It is generally accepted that they were taking extensive liberties when commenting on Aristotle, so that it is often to a large extent their Neoplatonic philosophy that they exposed. They were not interested in correctness, as is shown by the fact that there were times when they did not distinguish their Neoplatonic beliefs from those of Aristotle. Indeed, the understanding of their arguments hardly requires any reference to Aristotle, since they were trying to find in the Aristotelian works the thought of Plato from the Neoplatonic viewpoint. Aristotle's philosophy was never studied for its own sake by the pagan Neoplatonist commentators. What they sought was to prove that Aristotle was in a doctrinal agreement with Plato and that both thinkers were mutually complementary. This is most evident in the case of Asclepius who published Ammonius' commentary on the *Metaphysics*. When Ammonius' Neoplatonic exegesis has been completed, he feels free to cite in his *in Metaphysica* passages from Alexander of Aphrodisias' commentary on the same work. These citations may be useful for the preservation of Alexander's text, but they are not dealt with in this study because they do not clarify Ammonius' views at all.

In Alexandria it was normal for Neoplatonism to be taught through commentaries on Plato as well. However, the late Neoplatonic interpretation of Plato has been judged, if not false in every part, at least grossly mistaken on general points.

In the thesis I will not further examine the problem of the differences between the metaphysical doctrines of the philosophical schools in Athens and Alexandria, as recent scholarship has dealt with it and established that the sharp distinction between them, as suggested by K. Praechter, is not valid. As I. Hadot has shown, the schools of
Athens and Alexandria were tied closely together by a uniformity of tendencies.

b) CONTENTS

The first chapter gives an account of the presuppositions and the purpose of our knowledge of the intelligible world and of the divine in particular. For the school of Ammonius the metaphysical position of the human soul between the intelligible and the sensible worlds allows the human intellect to acquire this knowledge. What is necessary for the gradual acquisition of knowledge of the divine is the activation of the cognitive reason-principles in the human intellect (section 1.1). This knowledge is achieved by means of a personal struggle with the help of theoretical and practical philosophy (section 1.2) and aims at the assimilation of man to the divine (section 1.3). Section 1.4 is devoted to the evaluation the school of Ammonius made of previous philosophical attempts at the acquisition of knowledge of the intelligible world and of the divine in particular. In this respect what is shown are the reasons for the inadequacy or efficiency of methods followed by previous philosophers. As expected, a method was found inadequate if it deviated from the Neoplatonic one.

The second chapter focuses on the contents of our knowledge of universals. The school of Ammonius showed that they are knowable and attempted to classify them (section 2.1). The ante rem universals are the cognitive and creative reason-principles in the demiurgic Intellect and our knowledge of them is dealt with in section 2.2. The school of Ammonius argued for the incorporeality of these universals (section 2.3), the most fundamental of which is Substance (section 2.4).
The third chapter is about our knowledge of the divine. Section 3.1 deals with the possibility of coming to know the divine through reason. Section 3.2 examines the positions of the school of Ammonius about affirmative and negative theology. As the One is unknowable, the rest of this chapter defines the contents of our knowledge of the Demiurge, who belongs to the second level of the intelligible world (section 3.3) and is knowable, at least to some extent. First, we need to know whether He is incorporeal (section 3.4) and omnipotent (section 3.5). Divine omniscience (section 3.6) and the creation of the universe (section 3.7) are known as effects of the eternal activation of the cognitive and creative reason-principles in the demiurgic Intellect, respectively. Section 3.7.1 is about the doctrine of the school of Ammonius that the world is coeternal with the Demiurge. Section 3.8 examines what can be known about the ways the Demiurge exercises providence for what He has created.

It is shown that the theory of the school of Ammonius on knowledge of the divine is broadly consistent, though not necessarily convincing.
CHAPTER 1
PRESUPPOSITIONS AND PURPOSE OF OUR KNOWLEDGE
OF THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD

1.1 THE COGNITIVE REASON–PRINCIPLES IN THE HUMAN INTELLECT

In traditional Neoplatonism it is a commonplace to argue that knowledge of the divine is not a matter of sense–perception, but rather a matter of superior intellectual powers. Plotinus stressed that knowledge of the divine is to be sought in our souls after we are freed from all evil, all passions and from the influence of our bodies and the material world in general. When a human soul turns to itself, it turns to the divine which is not only present in it, but, also, at the same time, prior to and beyond it. Thus, the soul is able to have an immediate contemplation of the divine and assimilate itself to the divine to the extent that this is possible. Plotinus sees real self-knowledge as knowledge of the divine, which is both our origin and ultimate principle. Such was the outline of Plotinus' theory of knowledge of the divine, i.e. without particular details either as to the mental functions which need to be activated for its acquisition, or as to the particular contents of this knowledge.

The elaboration of the Plotinian theory was made by Ammonius and his students. Their starting point was that the divine entities, which constitute the intelligible world, are not perceived by the senses and are therefore less manifest to humans. He who wishes to know them, must first know the capabilities of the human intellect itself, when it operates without data supplied by the senses.
The school of Ammonius stressed that the human intellect is capable of gaining knowledge of the intelligible world by means of its own comprehending capacity. The proper object of knowledge when we talk about knowledge of the intelligible world is the divine; something for which human beings have a natural desire anyway. Indeed, the ability of the human intellect to know the divine is both a sign and a justification of this desire. Pure intellection makes mankind capable of learning whatever it is possible to learn about the divine. In this uncompromising rationalism there is no place for authority or mystery. Simplicius, however, ascribed to Philoponus the view that the human intellect is unable not only to express, but also to think about timeless entities, like the divine. Philoponus is thus reported to be saying that our minds can only think about matter. However, we are sure that this view was not held by Philoponus, because in his own writings he explicitly expresses his belief in the ability of the human intellect to acquire knowledge of the intelligible world. A decisive indication is his definition of the human intellect as "a power of the soul which perceives the divine and intelligible beings" (δύναμις ψυχῆς ἀντιληπτικῆ τῶν θειῶν καὶ νοημῶν). With the exception of Olympiodorus, the school deviated from Proclus' theory that the "one in the soul" is the special faculty in the human soul distinct from and superior to the intellect as the peculiar organ of mystical and supra-rational cognition which allows the union of inspired persons with the One.

The proper objects of human thinking are the divine entities, which remain immutable, because they are immaterial. If the human intellect can think about mathematical objects, which are inseparable from matter, by reflecting on them independently of their material composition, all the more it is capable of comprehending entities actually separate from
matter. As the knowledge of these entities is superior to any other science, they are thought about by the most honourable part of the human intellect. Its activity is superior to those activities of the soul which aim at the nurture, growth and reproduction of man, because it does not need and should not have any relation with the body when it thinks about immaterial entities. Even if the human intellect resides in a body, it does not consist of matter, and, therefore, it is different and independent from all other psychical powers which are related to the body. Therefore, it is independent from the body both in operation and in the sense that it survives apart from it. Since for the school of Ammonius reality and necessity in the strictest sense are identified with immateriality and immutability, the inferior faculties of the soul which relate to the body are considered to be less real and less necessary.

Knowledge of the intelligible world takes place in the intelligible part of the soul, not simply because this part is separate from matter, but mainly because it a priori contains the cognitive reason-principles of all intelligible and material entities created by the divine. If the human intellect by nature aspires to knowledge of the intelligible world and if no natural aspiration can be in vain, then the cause of this longing can only be the presence of cognitive reason-principles. A hypothetical lack of cognitive reason-principles would not allow the soul to know either the Forms or the demiurgic Intellect in which they are contained. In order to provide knowledge of these entities, the cognitive reason-principles only need to be activated by sense-data from the material world. Sense-perception is necessary for the beginning of the process which leads to the acquisition of knowledge of Forms. To comprehend the intelligible Forms "Beauty" or "Equality", for example, we have to activate the cognitive reason-principles of these Forms,
which, lying dormant in our souls, are awakened by the beautiful or equal things we perceive. So we can evaluate that which is perceived as imperfect, because our cognitive reason-principles of these Forms provide us with standards for all perceivable instances of Beauty and Equality. However, the role of sense-perceptions or external appearances is limited, because by themselves they do not lead us to intuition of the non-material. As the activity of the intellect is determined by the cognitive reason-principles it has within itself, it does not act solely as a result of bodily impulse. Sense-perceptions are useful to the extent that they are interpreted by the intellect as indications of the existence of the immaterial. For example, when one sees the order of the heavens, one comes to the notion of the incorporeal causes of this order. The empirical element itself does not show us the causes of phenomena, only their effects. Thus its role in the knowing process is simply to activate the latent a priori cognitive reason-principles in our souls. Otherwise, these principles would not depend on our sense-perception at all. The senses may not perceive the intelligible Forms, but this does not mean that the intelligible Forms do not exist. For example, the impossibility of direct sense-perception of the intelligible Form "Man" does not imply the non-existence of this Form. What is directly perceived is particular men. Sense-perceptions of particular men are necessary, but not sufficient by themselves to provide knowledge of the intelligible Form "Man". This aim will be fulfilled after the use of the cognitive reason-principles of "Man", which reside in our souls and are activated after we have perceived some particular men. The human intellect comes to know the intelligible Forms, only by thinking without relation to the senses, for the senses are not receptive of intelligibles. Furthermore, they are deceptive.
According to the standard Neoplatonic theological epistemology, before their descent and union with their bodies the souls had an immediate knowledge of the intelligible world and were able to signify everything by means of concepts only. In that mode of existence the souls did not need either names or definitions or language in general. As they were free from matter, they could be united and interpenetrate, just like the intelligible Forms in the demiurgic Intellect. They could also, like them, create intelligible entities. These entities are not further clarified by the school of Ammonius; but it is beyond doubt that they are inferior to the entities created by the Demiurge.

The situation differs after the descent of the souls and their union with bodies. An oblivion of the immediate knowledge of the intelligible world is caused by the bodies the souls are in; the souls cease to know things as they are by nature and are not conscious of having known anything before. When a man is born he knows nothing actually, but is said to know potentially. Recollection, I think, is not an adequate explanation of the acquisition of knowledge of the intelligible world. Recollection, in fact, does not make cognitive contact with its object directly, but rather revives the content of a previous cognition of it. This criticism amounts to saying that learning which derives from recollection is an inferior knowledge. A recollection of Forms once contemplated in another life is dim and cannot therefore be defended as the proper method for the acquisition of knowledge of the intelligible world and of the divine in particular. Learning is a process that ends in the rational soul and in order to take place it needs the use of language, which, however, is inadequate to express realities in the intelligible world. Therefore, the use of language to express the contents of knowledge of the intelligible world is a symptom
of human weakness caused by the descent of the soul. Man may seek omniscience, but his comprehension is always partial and subject to oblivion.\textsuperscript{36}

A human soul, however, is able to acquire knowledge of the intelligible world, because after its descent its position is intermediate between the sensible and the intelligible. In other words, it is a mediating entity between the things which are completely involved in matter and those which completely transcend matter (i.e. the divine).\textsuperscript{37} This means that a human soul engages in the following three kinds of activities:\textsuperscript{38}

(a) A human soul contemplates and purifies itself. That it is able to reflect upon itself and act in isolation from the body, proves that is shares characteristics of eternal and immortal entities.\textsuperscript{39} A human soul acquires knowledge of itself by means of reflection.\textsuperscript{40} The self-knowledge of the soul amounts to the apprehension of the cognitive reason-principles of all natural beings. By knowing them, the soul automatically knows all natural beings and need not strive for their knowledge any more. To reach this point one needs to purify oneself of one's passions and turn towards oneself.\textsuperscript{41} Since the human soul is the most inferior of all divine and intelligible entities,\textsuperscript{42} its self-knowledge contributes to the knowledge of the divine and vice versa: when a human soul reflects upon the divine and the intelligibles, it also reflects upon itself.\textsuperscript{43} The theological way of self-knowledge takes place when one knows things by referring them to the intelligible Forms in the demiurgic Intellect and, finally, to the divine itself. This kind of self-knowledge aims at the knowledge of the divine and is accomplished when a man is assimilated to the divine. As the human intellect ascends from the particulars to the level of the divine, it realizes both that
the plurality diminishes in the intelligible world and that the intelligible entities have an increased power compared with that of the material entities.  

(b) A human soul turns to the multitude of the material world and to the intelligible Dyad, which is the metaphysical principle of all multitude. To turn to the material world is the exclusive ability of the souls of the irrational animals and of the souls of the plants. It is also an ability of the human soul, which also seeks the metaphysical principle of all multitude. The human soul strives to know the intelligible efficient causes of the material, movable and imperfect things which are posterior in Nature, but prior for our knowing process, because they are more proximate to us. Thus, the human soul knows that the way an intelligible cause finds expression in the particulars falls short of the intelligible cause itself.

(c) A human soul contemplates the divine. This is the proper activity of the intellect, which is the immaterial and indivisible part of a human soul. He who has dedicated himself to the purification of his soul, pays attention to the body as to a talkative neighbour, so as not to be disturbed in his thoughts. This means that it is possible for someone, while "imprisoned" in his body to possess knowledge of intelligible entities, because he could not have been created with a vain longing for something actually unattainable. Thus, his soul is freed from any relation with the body and by contemplating the intelligible Monad, the metaphysical principle of all unity, comes to know the indivisible principle of all things. When a human intellect in actuality directs itself towards the intelligible entities, it becomes contemplative by enquiring into the causes of the universe.
Despite the fact that for the late Neoplatonists there is no part of the soul remaining in the intelligible world, after its union with a human body, the faculty of the soul which aims at knowledge of the intelligible world can still know it.\textsuperscript{49} This is possible because of the kinship between the cognitive reason-principles of the intelligible Forms and the Forms themselves, which are objects of knowledge as we shall see in chapter 2. Both are intelligible substances.\textsuperscript{50}

As substance, life and power are unified in the soul, it is similar to or rather an image of the divine. Furthermore, the soul is the cause of its own motion and, given its immortality, it does not perish. The divine is present in the soul and this is shown by its indivisibility,\textsuperscript{51} its capacity for discursive thought and its mastery over the body. The divine in the human soul is, like the divine itself, free from any material composition. As the human soul has a divine incorporeal substance,\textsuperscript{52} and given that it acquires knowledge by similarities,\textsuperscript{53} it directs itself towards knowing the intelligibles which are as proximate to the One as possible.\textsuperscript{54}

A human soul is an image of the demiurgic Intellect, which is the archetype of all natural beings, because it possesses within itself the cognitive and creative reason-principles of them. A human soul receives from the demiurgic Intellect, and hence contains within itself, images of the original cognitive reason-principles in the demiurgic Intellect.\textsuperscript{55} Since prototype and image are correlatives and correlatives cannot be known by a human intellect independently of each other, the discussion of the cognitive reason-principles in the demiurgic Intellect inevitably turns out to be a discussion of the cognitive reason-principles in the human soul and vice versa.\textsuperscript{56} The intelligible Forms in the demiurgic Intellect (vonτα εφόνη) are objects of thought, but do not think, because
they are prior to intelligence. They acquire their actuality when they are known by an intellect. The intellective reason-principles in a human soul (νοεῖν ἑαυτοῦ) think and can be objects of thought as well.\(^57\) By using them a human soul acquires knowledge of the intelligible Forms.\(^58\) God creates and knows all that exists, human beings can only know, but not create, what has been created by God. There is an analogy\(^59\) between the cognitive reason-principles in the demiurgic and the human intellects. A human intellect creates and knows things in a certain way, while the demiurgic creates and knows everything in all ways.

The theory about the use of cognitive reason-principles by the soul for the acquisition of knowledge of the intelligible Forms can be clarified by the following examples,\(^60\) in which heaven, the arts of optics and harmonics, and medicine are considered as objects of our knowledge.

With reference to heaven, we distinguish:

(i) its intelligible Form in the demiurgic Intellect,
(ii) the sensible heaven which is in motion, and
(iii) the cognitive reason-principle of heaven in the human soul.

The latter is an object of human reason and is unmoved.

Similarly, with reference to optics and harmonics, we distinguish:

(i) their creative and cognitive reason-principles in the demiurgic Intellect which are responsible for the existence of the sensible optics and harmonics under the influence of the divine,
(ii) the sensible arts of optics and harmonics, and
(iii) the cognitive reason-principle of optics and harmonics in the human soul.

Finally, with reference to medicine we distinguish:
(i) the intelligible medicine in the demiurgic Intellect, i.e. the creative and cognitive principle of the object of medicine according to which the world as a whole is unaging and free from ill,

(ii) the sensible medicine, which in the form of health pertains to bodies with a certain symmetry and composition, and

(iii) the intellective medicine, which is present in our souls as the cognitive principle of medicine.

According to the aforementioned theory, in each of these triads we can know (i), by using (iii) after the sense-perception of (ii), but without the pre-existence of (iii) we could not have the apprehension of (ii). The intellective cognitive principles of heaven, optics, harmonics, medicine and of all other perceptible natural beings reside in our souls, and do not exist in their own right or independently. They are intermediate between the Forms, as intelligible principles of all natural beings, and the natural beings themselves. The intellective cognitive reason-principles in our souls do not perish with the corresponding sensibles. Thus, the intellective principle of medicine is not concerned with the health of one particular body, and, consequently, it is not influenced by the destruction of any particular body. No intellective principle derives from sensibles. This is clear from the fact that when we pass judgements on sensibles, we find them defective compared to their corresponding intellective reason-principles; this would not be so, if sensibles themselves were the paradigms of their cognitive reason-principles in our souls. The intermediate intellective reason-principles are thus not products of abstraction. Nor are they to be posited in the corresponding sensibles.

With reference to the activation of the cognitive reason-principles in it, a human intellect can be either in potentiality or in actuality.
In the first case, it knows the intelligible Forms potentially.\textsuperscript{62} It is like a sleeping geometer who cannot exercise geometry, because he is hindered by sleep. Similarly, a human intellect needs something to remove the impediment which prevents it from becoming an intellect in actuality. The impediment consists in the absurd opinions which derive from sense-perception and imagination. In the second case, a human intellect is able to comprehend not simply itself, but, more importantly, the intelligible world. Consequently, as it needs neither sense-perception nor imagination at all,\textsuperscript{63} the absurd opinions it has need to be purged by means of refutations. This task may take time, but, when it is accomplished, the treasure of the cognitive reason-principles is brought to light and the transition from potentiality to actuality is over. Our intellect is perfected when the cognitive reason-principles in it are active.\textsuperscript{64}

However, a human intellect is not always in actuality, because if that were the case, it would always operate intellectually; this is the privilege of the demiurgic Intellect alone.\textsuperscript{65}

For the transition from potentiality to actuality no substantial change in our intellect is needed. What is needed is the stimulation of our intellect to actual knowing, either by sense-perception or by a human teacher or by relevant discussions or by illumination from the demiurgic Intellect. These are not exclusive alternatives, but aspects of a single process.\textsuperscript{66} In the writings of the school of Ammonius we do not find details about the last three aspects of this process, apart from a couple of analogies which are supposed to clarify the role of a teacher or of the demiurgic Intellect. The first analogy is that just as the sun does not provide the existence of colours, but makes manifest colours which are not evident, so an intellect in actuality (i.e. that of a teacher) perfects an intellect in potentiality (i.e. that of a student) by
bringing it to actuality. It does this by bringing to light principles which are not evident because of the state of swoon, which is the affect of birth. The cognitive reason–principles are joined essentially with the soul; but because of the soul's descent to the material world, they have been overwhelmed.67

If the intellect of an experienced man can perfect the intellect of an inexperienced man, this can a fortiori be achieved by the demiurgic Intellect which perfects human intellects. The latter acquire the reason–principles of all particular sciences by receiving illumination from the demiurgic Intellect.68 As the sun produces light, so the demiurgic Intellect, which is actuality without potentiality,69 gives existence to human intellects in actuality by which things intelligible in potentiality are made intelligible in actuality, as things visible in potentiality are made visible in actuality by light.70 When a human intellect – previously in constant contact with sensible things – begins to know intelligible entities, like the intelligible Forms, it initially takes them to be corporeal and extended.71 In the end, however, it understands that they are most real, though lacking any material composition. This cognition is always true and is the only true cognition of the intelligible Forms. In general, a human intellect either knows the intelligible world well or not at all. The acquisition of this knowledge marks the transition of a human intellect from potentiality to actuality.72

A human intellect, however, can neither be united with the intelligible objects of its knowledge nor grasp all intelligible objects at once and simultaneously. To be more specific about the first impossibility, the school of Ammonius taught that the substance of the human intellect never becomes identical to that of the intelligible
entities the human intellect knows.\textsuperscript{73} For example, it may have the cognitive reason-principle of the Form "Justice", but it can never be identical with this Form. Similarly, it is impossible for our intellect to become identical with the demiurgic Intellect, when it understands the demiurgic Intellect. Philoponus argued that the accounts of superhuman objects in the human soul are representations of these objects. When the human soul produces the accounts which are in it, it actually becomes what they are in a representative way. The human intellect is receptive of the intelligible because of its relation to the intelligible Forms. Therefore, even if it is none of the intelligible things it apprehends in actuality, it is all of them potentially.\textsuperscript{74} Philoponus' position that the human intellect cannot be identical to the intelligible objects it knows may be plausible, but the arguments supporting his view are open to criticism. Concerning its very last point, I think that a potentiality which by definition cannot be actualized is odd. Commenting on the core of Philoponus' argument, W. Charlton persuasively argued that knowledge of the intelligible world is not easily explained in terms of representation, because a superhuman object is not representable at all.\textsuperscript{75}

On the other hand, our contemplation of the intelligible world remains partial, because the human intellect cannot automatically grasp all intelligible objects at once. As long as it resides in a body, it apprehends the intelligible objects successively one by one.\textsuperscript{76} The transitions a human intellect experiences during the contemplation of the intelligible world are not from something known to something unknown by means of similarities common both to the known and the unknown, because this applies to knowledge of things in the material world only.\textsuperscript{77} The transitions during the contemplation of the intelligible world are from
the contemplation of one intelligible object to the contemplation of another. This passage, however, is not in the sense of a physical movement, because it is outside time. Our souls are immortal anyway and exist by themselves without needing the bodies in order to exist.\footnote{78}

The proper activity of the soul, which apprehends its objects one at a time, is reasoning. Human reasoning, as we have seen, distinguishes its objects in contrast with the demiurgic Intellect, which apprehends the objects of its knowledge in a unified way, i.e. as if they were one.\footnote{79} Since reason is directed to the cognitive reason-principles in the human intellect, it is to be used for the acquisition of knowledge of the intelligible world.\footnote{80} Discursive reason, a truly intellectual activity between apprehension by means of unreasoned beliefs and intuition, is peculiar to the human soul. Since discursive reason and intuition do not require either body or sense-perception or imagination, they are \textit{çòiâi ëvëýëiâi} of the soul,\footnote{81} the essence of which is separable from the body. Discursive reason trains the soul to liberate itself from the influence of imagination in its effort to know intelligible objects. In other words, discursive reason is an elevative psychical power which allows the soul to be lifted up to the divine.\footnote{82} The starting point of all discursive reasoning is the self-evident truths, which everybody knows without teaching or the need of any proof. These common notions are present in every man as appearances of the demiurgic Intellect within us, and are actually our first steps towards comprehension of the world. They are acquired by means of a continuous illumination from the divine, and their existence aims at the preservation of human life.\footnote{83}

A human intellect becomes genuinely and absolutely perfect when it is completely removed from the body or when some illumination from the divine lifts it up away from the state of being affected along with the
body. It is very important, but very difficult as well, for a human intellect to be wholly pure and free from any bodily or material affection. When this happens, the human intellect will have been liberated from the impact of senses and imagination. Only then will it be a contemplative intellect in actuality and contemplate the intelligible world intuitively. A human intellect can be liberated from bodily affections not necessarily by death, but also by means of Dionysian ecstasy, or prophetic inspiration, when it is still in the material world. Under such circumstances it acts without imagination, and is able to reflect upon itself, the intelligible entities, the divine, the universals and generally upon everything it knows without the need of the senses. These are cases of "contemplations without an instrument". The divine, and generally all intelligibles, should be known by the intelligible and indivisible element of the human soul grasped in an indivisible time, i.e. in an eternal present, and understood qua indivisible entities. The greater the intelligible entities it perceives, the more easily it perceives lesser intelligibles. But it must be emphasized that after a human intellect has become perfect, it does not deal with the sensibles any more, since they are obstacles to its perfection. If an intellect reflects exclusively on sensible things or aims at the satisfaction of the needs of the body, it is in no position to take care solely of its perfection, which, as we shall see in section 1.3, takes the form of an assimilation to the divine.

At the utmost point of purification and knowledge, a human intellect does not need either sense-perception or imagination or any syllogism or any transition from one intelligible entity to another. Then it gets to know the intelligible world by means of simple
This event is very rare indeed as it may take place once, if at all, even in the lives of those who have ascended to the highest level of philosophy. This level is attained only by those very few people who have freed their souls from all passions and emotions. Their lives have to be high moral ones, the product of the prolonged practice of discursive reason. When they are able to contemplate, they will be able to know the intelligible entities in the internal world of their consciousness. The reason for the rarity of this event is that during life in the material world the intervention of imagination does not allow the human intellect to grasp the intelligibles as they really are. We are unable to comprehend the gods as pure intelligible entities eternally in actuality, though they are by nature prior and most manifest. Similarly, the sun, most manifest by itself, cannot be seen by bats because of the weakness of their eyesight.

No human being can acquire perfect knowledge of the intelligible world. Knowledge in general may be an ideal for any intellect, but depends on its cognitive capacity. Human nature allows the acquisition only of small portions of knowledge. A combination of the contributions of all thinkers results in a considerable amount of knowledge. The conquest of knowledge is, therefore, not impossible for the human race as a whole. This of course is not a persuasive argument on behalf of the school of Ammonius. Given the interconnectedness of knowledge, it is not plausible to argue that all knowledge can be conquered, as a result of the fact that each man sees a bit of it. The problem is still that there is no single man who can see the whole. And, of course, it is needless to refute the argument that the human race as a whole does not exist as an independent knowing subject.
1.2 THE ROLE OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD

The general subject of philosophy is knowledge of beings qua beings and its particular subject is knowledge of the divine and human things. The belief common to the school of Ammonius is that philosophy is divided into theoretical and practical. By being divided into physics, mathematics and metaphysics, theoretical philosophy perfects the contemplative powers of the soul which deal with these sciences. Imitating God's omniscience, theoretical philosophy provides man with the knowledge of all beings and of the intelligible world. Practical philosophy, on the other hand, perfects the vital powers of the soul, which direct the soul to the material world. Imitating God's providence, practical philosophy exercises a concern for humans, by leading them from ignorance to true knowledge. Since our sources are more informative about mathematics and metaphysics, we shall examine the role of these sciences in the knowledge of the intelligible world.

It is impossible to pass directly from the cognition of the material world (physics) to the cognition of the immaterial world (metaphysics) without the cognition of mathematics. It would be as if someone were made to look at the sun after having been kept for long in a dark place: he would immediately be blind. Knowledge of the immaterial is acquired gradually, as in the case of someone in a cave (material world), who, by looking at a small, symmetrical and bright house outside the cave (mathematicals), prepares himself to look at the sun rays (immaterial world). It is a methodological dogma of the school of Ammonius that the process of our knowledge starts out from sense-perception of the natural world, a world which is subject to time and
change. Via mathematics, which serves as a bridge between the material and the immaterial, we are led to knowledge of the heavens. Finally, metaphysics allows us to acquire a non-spatial and atemporal knowledge of the intelligible substances culminating in knowledge of the supreme cause of the universe. This is conceived as a process from the imperfect and composite to the absolutely simple and perfect. For Plato mathematics is analogous to the shadows of real objects outside the cave or their reflections in water. For the school of Ammonius, however, the knowledge of mathematical forms is absolutely precise, because it takes place by means of demonstrations, which cannot be said of knowledge of either material objects or of immaterial entities. The former are in a continuous flux and therefore too obscure for a human intellect; the latter are too clear to be perceived by our senses. Hence, in both cases we are obliged to resort to guesses when we try to know them.

There are neither intelligible Forms of mathematical forms, nor is there an intermediate sphere of Being located somewhere between the material and the immaterial worlds to which sphere mathematical forms belong. Actually, geometrical shapes have their subsistence only in matter, but human imagination can conceive them as if they were without any material composition at all, unmoved and qualitatively immutable. The representatives of the school of Ammonius were abstractionists, referring to geometrical shapes as abstractions from material objects (τα ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως). Their teaching on mathematical objects is related to their views regarding the post rem universals. The mathematician deals with forms which are in fact inseparable from matter, but can be separated only in thought. Therefore, the mathematician gives definitions of the per se forms which are the product of abstraction and does not take matter into account. The intermediate role of mathematics in the
ascent towards the apprehension of the intelligible world is shown by the fact that the mathematician deals with forms which can be separated from matter in thought.\textsuperscript{108} Mathematicals are the objects of intelligence, which is a mental faculty between intellect and opinion (δόξα).\textsuperscript{109}

This doctrine of the school of Ammonius is radically different from what Iamblichus and Proclus had taught about mathematical objects. They were convinced that mathematicals as well as intelligibles are self-subsistent. They conceived them as a kind of mixture of the two realms (sensible and intelligible) between which they mediate. Thus they assumed a tripartite structure of Being.\textsuperscript{110}

Metaphysics (or first philosophy or theology) as a science originated with and was developed by Proclus. Due to the systematic character and the coherence of its method, metaphysics became an intellectual process, essentially different from other types of philosophy, such as that of myth, of public cult and that of the philosophy of Nature.\textsuperscript{111}

H. Reiner\textsuperscript{112} was the first to seriously examine the commentaries of the school of Ammonius in search of the original meaning of the term "metaphysics". According to Asclepius the term denotes a single science the subject of which is knowledge of the divine. The divine is unmoved, immaterial, eternal and constitutes the first cause of all beings. It is prior in Nature, but posterior for our knowing process.\textsuperscript{113} As a part of theoretical philosophy, metaphysics has a philosophical character, as distinct from a purely religious one.\textsuperscript{114}

Metaphysics, for the school of Ammonius, is the sovereign and most precise of all sciences.\textsuperscript{115} It allows man to know God as much as this is humanly possible, given that the absolute knowledge of God is possessed exclusively by God Himself. The knowledge of the demiurgic Intellect is
the subject of a theologian. No particular science proves the principles of metaphysics. This could be the task of a science superior to metaphysics, but actually there is no such science, as metaphysics speculates about what is perfect, i.e. the divine. The indemonstrable principles of metaphysics prove the principles of all other sciences; therefore, they are more or less related if not subordinated to metaphysics. All other sciences need metaphysics as their absolutely necessary presupposition. Metaphysics itself, however, does not need them in order to exist. Metaphysics strives to know divine goodness, for the sake of which everything exists. Therefore, metaphysics is the art of arts and the science of sciences and is studied for its own sake.

Since it is above all sciences which concern a limited range of subjects, it is commensurate with God. The principles of all natural things are proven by metaphysics, which examines the ultimate causes of all natural things. These causes are immobile and separate from matter both in thought and in existence.

Metaphysics also examines universals, unformed matter, final and formal causes, sameness and otherness, similarity and dissimilarity, priority and posteriority, and generally all beings qua beings, their eternal causes and their substances. Metaphysics teaches about that which is above Nature (ύπερ τά φυσικά πραγματεία). It is the science which knows things by examining not the effects, but the ultimate causes, the superiority of which consists in their immateriality and in their higher degree of existence.

The first and supreme task of metaphysics is to know both the number and the character of the intelligible Forms in the demiurgic Intellect as well as their relation to the material things. This task could have been easy in the sense that the divine, the object of its
knowledge, is immutable both in substance, power and activity. However, it becomes difficult for us because by being corporeal and full of passions, we are too dissimilar to apprehend the divine easily.\textsuperscript{129} The second task of metaphysics is the examination of the soul, as it has unchangeable substance, but not an immutable activity.\textsuperscript{130} To enquire into Being and particularly to examine whether it is one or many,\textsuperscript{131} is the third task of metaphysics.

Even when reflecting on God, a metaphysician includes sensibles in his discussion, since the Forms in the demiurgic Intellect are Forms of sensibles.\textsuperscript{132} When, however, the metaphysician turns to himself, he acts purificatorily. By using the cognitive reason-principles in his soul, he knows the substance of his soul. Thus he learns that the soul is the place of Forms and that whatever it learns, it learns from acquiring their knowledge.\textsuperscript{133}
1.3 ASSIMILATION TO THE DIVINE

For Proclus\textsuperscript{134} knowledge of gods is the first stage of a process which aims at union with them. The second stage is the act of making oneself resemble the divine through personal purity, chastity, education and good behaviour. The third stage is the act of entering into contact with the divine essence through the summit of the soul. Fourthly, one comes into close encounter with the gods. And, fifthly, one unites oneself with them. The school of Ammonius elaborated a doctrine concerning the role of philosophy during the first stage of this process.

For the school of Ammonius knowledge of God is possible by means of a gradual ascent, beginning with the cognition of material objects by means of the senses. Immediately thereafter, one knows by abstraction the Forms of material objects, with the help of reason. Without knowing the Forms it is impossible to comprehend superior immaterial substances, like the demiurgic Intellect, the angels and the soul. They are not accessible by the senses, but only by reason.\textsuperscript{135} The purpose of the knowledge of the divine is the Platonic ideal of assimilation to the divine as much as this is possible.

The highest reaches of human potential are achieved by philosophers. By transforming his befogged material life into a life divine and immaterial, philosophy is the highest calling of man. Both theoretical and practical philosophy aim at the assimilation of man to the properties of God to the extent that this is humanly possible. As the highest subject of philosophy is the divine, its ultimate purpose becomes the assimilation to the divine through the purification of all passions.\textsuperscript{136} Philosophy enables man to attain spiritual perfection in order to be like God,\textsuperscript{137} or, in other words, transforms man into "a god
Thus, philosophy was understood not only in terms of its subject-matter, but also in terms of its goal. It aims at the realization of wisdom and thereby to attain likeness to God. The assimilation to the divine is the ideal towards which the whole natural world aims in order to attain being and perfection. It is also the aim of the human soul, as it is an image of the divine.

There is a relationship between God and the philosopher like that between a paradigm and its image, or between Socrates and an image of him. When the true philosopher actualizes this relationship, the attributes by which God is distinguished, i.e. goodness, omniscience and power, are also those of the philosopher. The fact that God and man have different essences does not mean either that they must have different perfections or that a philosopher cannot become similar to God. The true philosopher achieves his resemblance with the divine provided that, by means of a mortification of his emotions, he is not affected by the irrational faculties of his soul.

A philosopher becomes similar to God to the extent that the divine characteristics are also characteristics of the philosopher. Yet a reunion with God is not possible. The philosopher still differs from God as the inanimate differs from the animate. A true philosopher knows the weaknesses of his human nature and, particularly, the fact that the differences between God and man are many. One of these differences relates to goodness. Goodness is the essence of the divine. Man, however, can only acquire it by practice over a long time, given that he is also capable of evil. The doctrine of the assimilation to the divine is a moral one and it is supposed to become a reality in the case of the ideal sage who imitates the divine goodness. This he does when he exercises providence for the imperfect souls of other people, as when engaged in
the political activities of jurisdiction and legislation. Regarding the extent to which a philosopher can imitate divine omniscience, David was convinced that the perfect philosopher professes to know everything and knows that which is useful. Elias added that the philosopher professes to know everything, though neither all at once nor at all times. But certainly, he can know the causes of all things. Regarding human power, David taught that the perfect philosopher can do everything that is within his power and that he desires. Yet never does he desire anything beyond his limits. David, however, is not clear whether or not the philosopher's desires and abilities are equal in extent.

The achievement of the assimilation to the divine requires the active and conscious participation of the human intellect in the demiurgic Intellect. Man needs to appropriate the intellectual light with which the Demiurge illumines his soul. Because all human souls have a natural desire to imitate the divine, they participate in the illumination emanating from the demiurgic Intellect according to their susceptibility to receive it.

Even though Philoponus believed that humans need to receive emanations from the divine in order for them to be perfect, in some of his passages he seems to hold that a human intellect needs nothing external in order to become perfect, because the universal reason-principles are already in it; therefore, reflection of a human intellect upon itself is enough. I think that he does not actually mean what he appears to be saying here, because the very existence of reason-principles within the soul should itself be understood as an emanation from the divine. Thus, Philoponus' point seems to be that after one has
received these emanations from the divine, then one needs nothing external in order to be perfect.

When the assimilation to the divine has been achieved, the philosopher will contemplate the orderly arrangement of the universe by the Demiurge together with all creations of the Demiurge and their nature. But this acquired knowledge is inferior to the object known. At this stage the soul becomes similar with the source of its illumination, which is also the object of its knowledge. As our intellect is separable from matter, its substance then is actually separated. The philosopher reduces everything he knows to the unity in the intelligible, which unity is itself reduced to that which characterizes God. The second reduction is necessary so that the philosopher can avoid the plurality which also exists in some way in the intelligible world below the level of God.
1.4 NEOPLATONIC EVALUATION OF PREVIOUS PHILOSOPHICAL ATTEMPTS
AT KNOWLEDGE OF THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD

In describing the history of human thought, the school of Ammonius taught that the need to know the intelligible world arose because of the incomprehensibility of the numerically infinite particular things. Individual particulars may become known, but their infinite number makes knowledge of all individual particulars very difficult. Furthermore, particulars are subject to generation and destruction. Therefore, it is not possible for a human being to know all past, present and future particulars.

Having become conscious of this, mankind concluded that the natural world cannot possibly be the whole of what exists. It is able to exist only because it has derived from, and depends upon, a source which is independent of space, time, matter, change and contingency. As a consequence, it was realized that true science lies in knowledge of eternal universals. Universals are not infinite in number and are known as a unity, in the sense of being one. From the perception of that which is common in particulars, mankind wondered where these similarities derive from, and thus arrived at the notion of universals. This, of course, is distinct from making statements about the universals derived from the knowledge of particulars, a mistaken method. All universals are imperishable entities, eternally the same. Therefore, by knowing the universals, one knows all past, present and future particulars. Universals are also considered as generalities somehow including all perishable particulars and preserving their form.

Mankind started asking questions pertaining to biology or sense-perception. As a result of their discursive reasoning, they continued by
raising questions about what lies beyond sense-data, i.e. the universals. Philosophers arrived at the notion of the universal "Incorporeal", after a generalization from the concepts of soul, angel and similar entities. Whatever is incorporeal, is characterized by indivisibility and continuity. Another example of their progress is their discovery that the category of Substance is common to both the incorporeal and the corporeal; hence this category is common to everything which does not need a subject in order to exist.

In this section I will focus on the methodological mistakes which Ammonius, as reported by his student Asclepius, found in the attempts of previous philosophers to come to know the intelligible world. Ammonius, I think, was consciously striving for a method free of such mistakes. He therefore thought it appropriate to criticize other philosophers, distinguishing the respects in which they failed from the respects in which they succeeded. This exposition may seem doxographical to a modern reader, but it has to be made here in full. First, because it shows us the way Ammonius conceived the right method of acquiring knowledge of the intelligible world, and secondly, because it has been neglected in the secondary bibliography.

The criticism of the previous thinkers is particularly severe against those who, like Antisthenes, do not recognize the existence of the genera in any way. It is argued that they live at the level of sense-perception thinking that there are neither genera nor species, because such entities are not perceived by the senses. People like Antisthenes do not realize that not all existent things are sensible. Nor are they aware that the senses can be deceptive.

Hesiod and Parmenides were for Asclepius the first to enquire into the principle of the orderly motion of the world. In order to
explain it, they argued that "Love" is its metaphysical principle. They called this principle by the name of "Love", because of its desire for the Good. Thus, the metaphysical principle of the orderly motion of the world was the desire for the Good. They also taught that the divine "Love" was created first, before all else. In this theogony Hesiod placed "Love" as the first among the gods, whose work is to give motion to the world and to hold everything together. Despite the allegorical terminology he used, Hesiod was understood by Asclepius as having rightly taught that the divine is perfect in its substance. Perfect is also the creation of the world by the life-giving divine energy which reaches right down to the level of matter.

Some among the Presocratic philosophers posited material principles as ultimate causes of reality and suggested that these principles are self-existent and endowed with form. They explained all change by means of what a Neoplatonist would regard as accidents of the material principles. Their theory, for Asclepius, fails to give the reasons for the generation and destruction of the particulars, because it does not recognize that matter has its ultimate cause in something immaterial. On the other hand, the Presocratics may have tried to achieve a notion of the incorporeal causes, but without success, because they could not understand that no immaterial entity can be derived from a material principle. Asclepius thinks that if the Presocratics had actually dealt with the whole of reality, they would have had no reason for not adopting an immaterial principle. One could answer to Asclepius that the Presocratics did not adopt incorporeal principles, of course, but also did not make it explicit that they were concerned with anything less than the whole of reality.
Of all the Presocratics Asclepius thinks that the Pythagoreans described best the principle of the world. Understanding their philosophy, he says, is somewhat difficult due to the symbolism of their language, a manifestation of their desire not to make their wisdom clear. By referring to Numbers, the Pythagoreans actually indicated the intelligible Forms, according to Asclepius, since both Numbers and Forms are determinative and limitative principles. Asclepius was persuaded that the theory of numbers was the best symbolic expression of the Neoplatonist metaphysical system in the previous philosophy. The Pythagorean terminology seemed to be very useful to refer to the Neoplatonic cosmic principles, as well. However, when applied to the Neoplatonic metaphysics, the original Pythagorean terms acquire a totally different meaning.

Let us now examine what the Pythagorean theory of Numbers actually meant for Asclepius. Oddness and evenness symbolize species and matter, respectively. The species which are separate from matter are intelligible substances and, therefore, indivisible, because they are not reified in examples yet. Once they are enmattered, they are forms of inanimate things; consequently, by their reification they become divisible and define matter. Matter is divisible thus becoming the cause of the division of the species.

The Pythagorean principles Henad, Monad and Dyad have their equivalent both in the sensible and the intelligible world as perceived by the Neoplatonic philosophy as follows:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sensible world</th>
<th>Intelligible world</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Henad</td>
<td>creative Nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monad</td>
<td>species</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyad</td>
<td>matter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>primary cause (the One)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>limit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>infinite</td>
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</table>
Asclepius himself justifies the validity of this equivalence by giving the Neoplatonic interpretation of the three Pythagorean principles. They are incorporeal, immobile and, therefore, intelligible. The Pythagorean Henad was interpreted by Asclepius to be the ultimate principle of all unity, division, similarity, dissimilarity and of the formation of all beings. It is prior to the other two cosmic principles because it produces everything.\textsuperscript{175} The Pythagorean Monad was interpreted by Asclepius as the principle of unity, similarity, formation, identity and continuity of beings. The intelligible manifold consisting of monads defines matter, just like the species define it. The Pythagorean Dyad was understood as the cosmic principle of division and dissimilarity and corresponds to matter and the infinite.

The creation of the world for the Pythagoreans takes place by means of rational principles.\textsuperscript{176} That they posited one principle for the good things (the principle of the species) and one for the evil ones (i.e. the principle of matter), seems to conflict with the Neoplatonic ethical monism, which accepts no metaphysical principle of evil.\textsuperscript{177} Asclepius was aware of this conflict, but tried to underestimate it by granting the Pythagorean principles of good and evil a purely symbolical function.

Asclepius seemed to agree partially with Empedocles claiming to understand what he meant rather than what he actually said. Asclepius thought that the Empedoclean principles "Love" and "Strife" are not physical. Like the Pythagoreans, Empedocles used symbols for metaphysical principles. "Love", as principle of unity, corresponds to the Neoplatonic Henad or Monad, and "Strife", as principle of progression, to the Dyad.\textsuperscript{178} Plotinus,\textsuperscript{179} too, considered the Empedoclean "Love" to be the incorporeal One and the "Strife" to be the principle of division. According to Asclepius, Empedocles was right in conceiving "Love" and
"Strife" as imperishable principles which create material things. Empedocles may not have had in his mind the Neoplatonic One, but Asclepius recognizes that he was right in positing an intelligible pair of opposites as the principles of all beings. Empedocles was incorrect, however, in assuming that "Love" is always the cause of aggregation and "Strife" of separation. Asclepius says that quite the opposite is also often observed: Fire, for instance, makes the burning things one, but "Love" distinguishes the species from matter to create the Sphere. Otherwise there would be no change in the world and all beings would remain the same. It should be noted here that the first of Asclepius' examples seems to deal with direct sense-perception, while the other seems to be a metaphysical belief only. And, evidently, the reference to species as things that could be separated from matter is Neoplatonic, not Empedoclean at all.

Empedocles was the first among the Presocratic philosophers to have introduced a cause of the evil on earth, which he called "Strife". Asclepius' view was that "Strife" cannot be the transcendent cause of Evil, because no absolute evil exists. Evil is only related to particular souls only. Additionally, if "Strife" is the cause of the material world, which is not something evil after all, Empedocles could not have considered "Strife" to be the cause of Evil as opposed to "Love".

Empedocles shared Pythagorean beliefs in the sense that by "Love" he meant unity and by "Strife" the separation from which both unity and manifold derive. According to Asclepius, "Strife" causes the universe to perish and generates the sensible world, while "Love" causes the sensible world to perish and produces the universe. It is understood that Asclepius refers to the universe as opposed to the sensible world, which exists in periods of transition, as we know it. He assimilates the
universe to the Neoplatonic level of Intellect. In the universe, thus conceived, there is separation as well, since the intelligibles are many, but this separation is covered by their unity, which is not describable by any human language. Unity exists in the sensible world as well, but it is separation which prevails. "Love" causes the destruction of the particulars by uniting them to become one, while "Strife" can be perceived as a cause of generation as it produces all sensibles.  

His theory on the primary causes, however, was insufficient and unscientific, because he also introduced material principles which he mistakenly described as imperishable.  

Asclepius thinks that Empedocles did not understand the necessity of there being one single transcendent cause of formation, unity and definiteness, as well as of separation and aggregation in the universe. Furthermore, he did not provide a theory about unformed matter. When he said that something cold becomes hot, he seems to have accepted the existence of unformed matter which receives all opposites. But more important is that he did not speak about the one ultimate creative cause of everything, "Love" and "Strife" included. Empedocles was criticized because of all the causes he spoke only about the material and the efficient ones, and these in an unscientific matter.

Parmenides taught that Being is one, unmoved and definite. According to Asclepius he was correct in teaching that Nature defines and specifies beings. Parmenides, however, did not posit the One as the ultimate principle and cause of beings. Moreover, he introduced only material causes.  

Parmenides is also understood by Asclepius to ascribe plurality to beings. Asclepius comes to this conclusion after a brief examination of the verses "οὐ γὰρ ἐν, οὐκ ἐσται ὁμοί πᾶν ἐστι ὁμοίον" and "μεσσοῦν ἴσοπάλες". Asclepius argues that since
Parmenides talked about "the all" and "the centre", he certainly must have known that if something has a centre, it also has ends as well. Therefore, he concludes, Parmenides was aware of the manifold. For Plotinus, too, Parmenides was open to criticism because the one and unmoved Being he postulated as identical to Intellect actually turned out to be many. According to Asclepius, Parmenides was right in assuming that pairs of opposites are the principles of beings. Such a pair was that of fire and earth, corresponding to hot and cold respectively. But, for Asclepius, Parmenides' account of the causes, was neither clear nor sufficient. For although he considered fire to be the efficient cause and earth to be the material one, he failed to mention the formal cause.

Xenophanes was among those who perceived Being to be one, but he did not posit a cause or a principle corresponding to the Neoplatonic One. His theory about God, whom he considered to be one, was inadequate, because he did not conceive Him as the creator of the world.

Melissus considered the universe to be one, but Asclepius argued that his explanation of change and motion was inconsistent with this belief. It may be that Asclepius failed to see the irony in Melissus' fr. 8 where he denies motion, because it would involve a void.

Protagoras argued that all science derives from the sensibles. It is evident for Asclepius that this view is mistaken. Complete knowledge of all sensibles cannot be acquired, he argues, because their number is infinite.

Anaxagoras considered the principles of beings to be infinite. This again makes the knowledge of Being impossible, because, again, the infinite, for Asclepius, cannot be known. From Asclepius' Neoplatonic standpoint Anaxagoras was found inconsistent, because he did not mention the demiurgic Intellect when examining the derivation of the particulars.
Even though he introduced Nous to explain the derivation of the world, he referred to material principles, which he called "homoeomeries" (ὁμοιομέρεια), in order to explain the generation of the particulars. The only relation between Anaxagoras and the Neoplatonic metaphysics is that his Nous, which is a cause of good things, could be something analogous to the One. At this point it is worth mentioning that Asclepius' criticism of Anaxagoras is less sympathetic than that of Plotinus. The latter admitted that by saying that Intellect is pure and unmixed, Anaxagoras was proposing both that the first principle is simple and that the One is separate. Nevertheless, Plotinus did not find Anaxagoras' account accurate, attributing this fact to Anaxagoras' antiquity rather than to his inadequacy or mistakes, as did Asclepius. For Asclepius Anaxagoras failed to realize that it is impossible for his principles to be material from the beginning without their being derived from an immaterial cause. These material principles should have been considered simply as accidents, which, for Asclepius cannot be self-subsistent, as Anaxagoras mistakenly claimed. Furthermore, Asclepius complains that Anaxagoras did not examine particular incorporeal entities, like the souls. I think that Asclepius failed to recognize that in general the Presocratics did not have to talk about the immaterial in order to talk about the soul, since they regarded the soul as material. And as a matter of fact Anaxagoras did talk about sense-perception. Asclepius also remarks that Anaxagoras did not specify the exact composition of the homogeneous materials in the primary mixture. He understands them to be in actuality, but this could not have been possible according to Asclepius.

The atomists Leucippus and Democritus posited material principles to explain the nature of things. Their doctrine, according to Asclepius,
did not provide an account of the cause of the differences of shape, order and position among the atoms. Nor did they discuss the cause which forms matter in their theory. Democritus should have invoked the factors of potentiality and actuality. Asclepius' criticism here is similar to Aristotle's criticism of Parmenides and of those persuaded by him that whilst Being can come from not-Being (when the actual comes from the potential), it cannot happen the other way round. Contraries, according to Asclepius, coexist potentially, but not in actuality.

Thales and Anaximenes introduced corporeal ultimate causes for all beings. Their theories are most inadequate when it comes to the problem of generation and destruction. Water and air are material things, but they are not the most fine-grained or subtle bodies. The most fine-grained and subtle body is fire, which Heraclitus introduced as the principle of all things. Fire is prior in order of generation and posterior in Nature, but Asclepius could not seriously consider it to be the ultimate cause of everything. Again, it should be mentioned that Plotinus is more sympathetic to Heraclitus than Asclepius. Plotinus thought that Heraclitus knew that the One is eternal and intelligible.

In his discussion of Plato, Asclepius taught that he was right in his doctrine that the Good is the final cause of everything; that is, it makes everything move towards it. Plato was successfully led to the notion of the intelligibles by using dialectic, and, in particular, the methods of division and definition. The method of division was applied to genera and species. The method of definition was applied to the universals, because what can be defined is the universal, not the particular. Asclepius held that Plato followed the Pythagorean philosophy completely, with the difference that in his methodology he made use of myths, something which the Pythagoreans did not do.
Plato, considered by Plotinus\textsuperscript{207} to believe in the doctrine of the three Hypostases, was praised by Asclepius, too, for his doctrine that the One and the Forms are beings in the most proper sense; that is, they are the causes of the being of everything that exists. The Henad, the productive principle of everything, produces the Forms, which, in turn, produce the species, i.e. the substances of the material beings. The Monad is for Plato the principle of unity and the Dyad is the principle of progression. Plato also discussed the formal and the material causes. According to Asclepius, the formal cause was analyzed by him better than anybody else. This is the species which itself does not produce anything, but is the cause of immobility. It also defines matter, which is termed "large and small" because of its capacity to acquire quantity and quality.

Plato did not really identify Forms and Numbers, as Numbers for him were only symbols of the Forms. He did not consider Numbers to be material causes, because he could not accept that the sensible objects consist of numbers. He taught that sensible things are generated from numbers which are supposed to exist between the Forms and the sensible things. The principles of the intelligibles are the separate and transcendent "eidetic numbers", which, even if they are responsible for the particular character of each sensible object, are separate from them.

For the school of Ammonius in general, Aristotle's philosophy leads to the knowledge that the common principle of everything is one, incorporeal, indivisible, uncircumscribed, boundless, of infinite power, the goodness-in-itself. This is the universal Substance and Being in which the particular good things participate.\textsuperscript{208} Plotinus,\textsuperscript{209} on the contrary, criticized the Aristotelian doctrine of the Unmoved Movers and found that Aristotle makes assumptions which have no philosophical
necessity. He considered that for Aristotle the intelligible realities are many, and that it is not clear in his writings whether or not he thought them to derive from one, primary intelligible reality. Ammonius and his students, however, thought that the end of Aristotelian philosophy consists in the knowledge of the one, incorporeal principle which creates everything and remains eternally the same. It is obvious that this view cannot be correct, because actually Aristotle did not examine the creation of the world at all. They also ascribed to Aristotle the doctrine that the intelligible Forms are objects of contemplation, even though again such an idea is absent from the Aristotelian works.
CHAPTER 2
THE KNOWLEDGE OF UNIVERSALS

2.1 THE THEORY OF UNIVERSALS

For Neoplatonism the term "Universals" denotes the eternal intelligible Forms in the demiurigc Intellect, and their examination is one of the central tasks of the Neoplatonic metaphysics. According to the school of Ammonius, philosophy posited (they say "ἐπενόηταν", invented) universals, because particulars lacked immutability. The existence and knowledge of a universal depends on the existence and knowledge of its species, just like a man is not known as father before the birth of his child. The immutability of the universals allows them to have standard definitions. A universal is defined as "one in number with regard to its form, but shared by many things" (ἐν τῷ ἀριθμῷ καὶ τῷ εἴδος, ὑπὸ πολλῶν ὑὲ μετεχόμενον), which means that a universal is indivisibly participated. All living beings participate in the universal "Animal" indivisibly; it is not as if some participate only in "Substance", some only in "Animate", others only in "Sensation". But since the definition of a thing refers to its genus and its constitutive differentiae, the most universal genera cannot be defined, because there is neither a genus superior to them nor any constitutive differentiae for their derivation. For this reason, "Substance", the most universal genus with regard to the degree of Being it has, cannot be defined in any way. The notions we have of it, can be expressed only by means of descriptions and references to the particulars which participate in it and are more manifest to us than this genus.
Porphyry wondered whether thing-universals, like the universal "Animal" or the universal "Man", really exist and what they are. A profound examination of the problem was undertaken by Ammonius and his students. Like Porphyry, they saw the problem as a metaphysical, and not as a logical one. Rephrasing Porphyry's question, David asked whether genera and species really exist or are merely concepts in our minds. If they are mere concepts, they begin to exist when one thinks of them and cease to exist when one forgets them. But if they are real entities, their existence is not affected either by one's thought about them or by one's oblivion of them. Additionally, if they really exist, their real existence presupposes their creation by Nature.

Ammonius and his students adopted a trichotomy of universals, thereby defining them in relation to the sensible particular things and to the knowing subject. They distinguished the following kinds of universals:

(a) the universal prior to the particulars (ante rem). This is the intelligible Form existing in the demiurgic Intellect without needing actually existent exemplifications. It is known by a metaphysician.

(b) the universal in the particulars or composed of them (in re). It consists in what is predicated of each and every particular, which is an image of the same ante rem universal. It is the material form in real things and is known by a physicist.

(c) the universal said of or posterior to the particulars (post rem), which exists only in our conceptions, it being formed when we subtract all properties and accidents from the particulars of a certain species. Its apprehension necessarily derives from the perception of the corresponding particulars. It is examined by the dialectician.
The technical term which denotes the ante rem and the post rem universals is ἀνεκτάκτως ἐδον, i.e. unallocated genera or species. They exist neither in the species nor in the particulars. In contrast, the in re universals are κατασταμένα ἐδον, i.e. allocated genera or species, because they exist respectively in the species or in the particulars. When we proceed from the knowledge of in re universals to the formulation of post rem universals in our minds and then to knowledge of the ante rem universals the process is called an "erotic analysis" as it is meant to be motivated by the love of what is lower for what is higher. The reverse process is called "synthesis" and ends at the examination of perishable particulars.

The threefold universal was favoured by Proclus’ doctrine regarding the triad of wholes. For Proclus a whole can be either (a) a whole-before-the-parts or, in other words, a whole in its cause, or (b) a whole-of-parts or a whole as existence, or (c) a whole-in-the-parts or a whole by participation. Whole (a) belongs to the intelligible world and corresponds to the ante rem universal. It is the Form of each thing pre-existing in its cause. This whole has a unity in the sense that it has constituents into which it cannot be further analyzed. Whole (b) is seen in all the parts of a material particular thing provided that they are taken together. The withdrawal of any single part of this particular diminishes the whole. Whole (c) is an organic unity participated by the parts of the particular things and is a whole in so far as it imitates the whole-of-parts. It is implicit in the existence of each part of a particular thing severally, in the sense that even the part has become a whole by participation of the whole, which causes the part to be the whole in such fashion as is proper to a part. Before Proclus, Hermias had already written about post rem universals within the human intellect.
This universal exists only in our conceptions as a generalization after the elaboration of the sense-impressions we have from many particulars of the same kind. Influenced probably by his father Hermias, Ammonius in his theory of universals omitted Proclus' elaborations with reference to the whole (c), by replacing it with the post rem universal. Therefore, L. Benakis is not right in his claim that the theory of the threefold universal was elaborated for the first time in the school of Ammonius.

The theory of universals of the school of Ammonius was inspired by the Neoplatonic principle that the degree of each thing's participation in the divine is in proportion to the degree of universality it possesses. K. Kremer, however, seems to have failed to understand that this school believed in the Neoplatonic doctrine of gradation of Being, a doctrine which suggests that Being is present at each level of reality, to a different extent. K. Kremer claimed that the school of Ammonius believed that in the intelligible world there is a distinct degree of reality called Being from which reality things are more or less distant. K. Kremer thought that for the school of Ammonius intelligible substances, like the ante rem universals, are different and separate from material substances, and that there is a polarity between the intelligible and the sensible worlds.

However, Neoplatonists in general viewed reality as a continuum from lower to higher strata, a series or shining forth downward from the One, matter being the last step. Since the Neoplatonic universe is arranged hierarchically, things are differentiated by being more or less subordinate (κατὰ ὑποταγήν) according to the order in which they proceed from the One. The susceptibility of each creature to receive the divine emanation determines the degree of its existence. If something does not have the susceptibility to receive the divine emanation, it is
not a being at all. An example of this theory was given by Philoponus who claimed that a quality is a self-existing entity, independent from the particulars which participate in it, but present in them according to their susceptibility. A quality resembles a source of warmth, in the sense that its intensity remains the same, independently of the fact that the objects close to the source are warmer than the objects which are far from it. When a subject acquires a quality, the degree according to which it enjoys this quality depends exclusively on the subject itself.

Ammonius and his students proposed a theological solution to the ontological problem whether the ultimate source of all substances, universal and particular, is common. They suggested that both kinds of substances have some sort of communion between them, because of their ultimate derivation from the divine. All particular substances acquire their being according to the degree of susceptibility they have to participation in the divine, viewed as the primary substance. Material objects are images of their intelligible principles on account of their having sufficient similarities with them, but they enjoy only a limited degree of existence. Asclepius uses the Aristotelian term "δφ' ἔναγκα τὸ πρῶτον ἐν" to express the Neoplatonic idea that reality displays itself as a cyclical process in the sense that everything flows from the first principle and, finally, returns to it.

For the school of Ammonius there is also another relation between universal and particular substances and this time K. Kremer understood it correctly. They are inter-related, in the sense that our thinking of either the universals or the particulars depends on awareness of the other. Knowledge in general is possible provided that one activates the knowledge of the ante rem universals qua causes of things. The
knowledge of these preexists in the human soul and is prior and superior to any other kind of knowledge. Our knowing process is gradual starting from the particulars moving up to the most universal genera. By showing the universality and generality of the intelligible entities, it reveals to us the depth of reality of all things. The apprehension of the ante rem universals is purely rational and indemonstrable. The majority of people cannot, therefore, have it because of their weakness. If one knows the ante rem universals as ultimate causes of all particulars, one simultaneously knows all particulars. Thus, a special study of the particulars is not necessary, since one who knows the causes of the particulars does not need first to perceive the particulars and then know them. Sense-perception, however, is absolutely necessary for the beginning of the process of activation of our knowledge of the universals, as we have already seen. It is inappropriate, though, to form opinions about the universals on the basis of what we know of perishable particulars. As the ante rem universals are not in a subject, it is also inappropriate to try to know them in the way we know material forms.

The main contribution of Ammonius and his students to the theory of universals was the pedagogical formulation they gave to the psychological law concerning the way a human intellect acquires knowledge of them. According to this law, the universal, which is prior in Nature, is posterior with regard to our knowing process and the particular, which is posterior in Nature, is prior with regard to our knowing process. The school of Ammonius insisted that investigation must proceed from the particulars, which are immediately cognizable and clear to us, to the universals, which, in their own nature, are clearer and more immediately cognizable. We first know particular men and then the
universal "Man". Knowledge of universals is acquired after a long practice of discursive reasoning, which liberates our intellect from the influence of sense-perception and imagination. Because of the fact that the particulars are known by us before the universals, the particulars are called "first substances" and the universals are called "second substances". This terminology does not refer to the ontological order of things, as it does not imply anything regarding the degree of existence enjoyed either by the particulars or by the universals. Actually, the existence of the universals is ontologically superior compared to that of the particulars, because the particulars owe their existence to the universals. The pedagogical formulation of the school of Ammonius thus aimed at distinguishing between two orders of beings:

(a) the ontological, i.e. the order of the being of things, which is identical with their natural order and independent of human knowledge. On the top of the pyramid are posited the universal and immaterial beings. These are the causes of the material particular beings, which are placed at the basis of the pyramid.

(b) the cognitive order, which starts where the ontological order ends, i.e. from the material particular beings, and follows an inverse course in search of knowledge of the universal and immaterial causes.

In the rest of this chapter I will concentrate on a closer examination of the ante rem universals, since they were thought to belong to the intelligible world. It is therefore of great interest to see what can be known by a human intellect about them.
2.2 THE ANTE REM UNIVERSALS IN THE DEMIURGIC INTELLECT

A considerable part of the school of Ammonius' theory on knowledge of the intelligible world deals with the nature of the demiurgic Intellect. They taught that it "contains" the ante rem universals, or, in other words, the intelligible Forms as cognitive and creative reason-principles.

That the Forms exist in the demiurgic Intellect as the blueprints or models for the universe is the standard view of Platonists from at least the second century A.D. and may go back to Xenocrates. The first clear and full statement of this doctrine, which seems to have derived from Platonic and Aristotelian elements, is found in Alcinous. He argued that the Form is God's thought, the prime object to human intellection and the model for the creation of the world. Apuleius also claimed that God takes from the Forms the models for the creation of the world. For Philo the Logos, i.e. the sum total of the Forms in activity, is the instrument of God in the creation of the world. Through the influence of Logos the Forms in the divine Intellect become seminal reason-principles and serve as the models and creative principles of the material world. Seneca recorded a doctrine according to which God creates the world by using the paradigmatic causes He contains within Himself. Like Platonic ideas, they are immortal, unchanging and not subject to decay. Plotinus, too, accepted the Middle-Platonic view that Forms are the thoughts of God. Their number is finite, but the Forms themselves have an infinite power to produce particular beings.

Since Ammonius and his students considered the Forms to be in the demiurgic Intellect, they regarded the self-subsistence and self-determination claimed for Platonic Forms as misinterpretations of
Plato, argued that Aristotle had attacked such misinterpretations. According to the school of Ammonius, Plato considered the Forms to be in the mind of the Demiurge who creates by looking at them as exemplars. I think that this view is mistaken, because Forms were in fact conceived by Plato as self-subsistent. The Forms as conceived by the Middle-Platonists and the Neoplatonists were taught to be in the Intellect of the Demiurge, who uses them during the creation of the particular natural beings. Elias alone among the members of the school of Ammonius, claimed that not all Forms are creative of particulars. For him, the most universal Form does not give existence to any species at all.

Ammonius and his students cited isolated Aristotelian passages in order to show that Aristotle, too, considered the Forms to be creative reason-principles within the demiurgic Intellect. Even if it is not within the purposes of this thesis to deal with the inaccuracies of the Neoplatonic interpretation of Aristotle, it needs to be mentioned that even a superficial examination of the Aristotelian passages themselves and of the context in which these passages appear, does not show that Aristotle ever believed in the existence of Forms in the demiurgic Intellect. It is still interesting, however, to examine the points Asclepius (or rather Ammonius), Philoponus and David tried to make by appealing to Aristotelian authority.

First, Asclepius compares the immanence and the transcendence of the Good in relation to the world with the presence of order both in an army and in the general who commands it. The point of the argument is that as the general imposes on the army the order he has in himself, so the Good is responsible for the order of the universe.

Secondly, he calls the soul "the place of Forms". The argument is that if at the level of soul the Forms are contained within the unity
of a "place", this is true a fortiori for the Forms in the demiurgic Intellect.

Thirdly, Asclepius claims that "the intellect in act is things". Asclepius refers to the demiurgic Intellect, which is identical with the objects of its thought.

Fourthly, Asclepius claims that "the intellect in act is productive". The point of this argument is that the demiurgic Intellect produces, by using the Forms it has.

Philoponus, too, tried to show that Aristotle accepted the existence of transcendent ideas as creative reason-principles inherent in the demiurgic Intellect. He attributed to the Stagirite the views that:

(a) the order of the world is not by chance, but due to the order existing in the Demiurge;

(b) the demiurgic Intellect contemplates the reality by means of self-contemplation;

(c) the intellect is composed of Forms and

(d) the soul is the place of Forms.

Philoponus seems to have accepted Ammonius' metaphysics (as expounded by Asclepius) according to which for Aristotle the Platonic Forms are immanent in the demiurgic Intellect. If a creature exists, Philoponus argued, the pre-existence of its creative reason-principles is necessary, because it is according to them that the Demiurge creates. The order of the universe has derived from the order of its Demiurge since the Platonic Forms are present as creative reason-principles in His Intellect. In the Forms as creative reason-principles there exists the Universal, which is the principle and
cause of the natural species. The reason-principles of beings in the Demiurge and the Forms as conceived by Plato are ante rem universals.

Finally, David attributed to Aristotle the belief in the existence of ante rem universals in the demiurgic Intellect. His arguments are as follows:

a) David argued that for Aristotle God does not need sense, i.e. matter, because this would make Him weak. The universals in His Intellect are therefore not corporeal, since they are not objects of sense-perception.

If David actually believed that Aristotle was against the hypothetical notion of a corporeal One prior to the many, his interpretation of Aristotle is indeed mistaken. Aristotle himself was not consciously concerned to reject the idea of a corporeal universal prior to the many. Furthermore, the divine for Aristotle does not contain any universals. But, on the other hand, Aristotle's actual reason for restricting God's thought to God Himself, was that God must not think of anything inferior to Himself or changeable.

b) According to David, the Forms in Aristotle may not be self-subsistent, but they are incorporeal archetypes, coeternal with the divine, in the image of which God creates the world with reason. David also claims that, for Aristotle, universals are at first in God and later in matter, in the sense that at first God knows them and later Nature activates them, without having any knowledge of them.

This is another mistaken interpretation of Aristotle, because the notion of any sort of creation by God is absent from his philosophy. What is more, Aristotle did not discuss the nature of coming later in time. Anyway, the real problem is how Nature incorporates and activates the universals without knowing them, a problem David seems to ignore.
H. Khatchadourian argued that S.S. Arev§atyan's claim that for David universals "pre-exist in the divine mind, which creates nature" conflicts with David's own explicit statement that "they [sc. the universals] do not exist in mere concepts, (...) but they exist in reality, and they do not exist by themselves, but in our thought". H. Khatchadourian argued that the implication of David's own statement is that the universals do not exist anywhere except in physical things and in our thoughts, as concepts. I think that there is no conflict regarding the pre-existence of universals in the demiurgic Intellect, provided that existing in the demiurgic Intellect, in contrast to existing in our minds, must have been regarded by David as a kind of existing in reality. My impression is that from David's scattered and incomplete references to universals, one can plausibly assume that he accepted the existence of ante rem universals in the demiurgic Intellect, of in re universals in physical things and of post rem universals in our thoughts, as concepts.

A possible conclusion of this discussion so far is that for the school of Ammonius the demiurgic Intellect contains the system of the intelligibles within itself. In this the school follows the Middle-Platonic tradition which diverges from Plato's teaching on the self-subsistence and self-determination of the Forms. Thus, the Forms "Man", "Horse" etc. are in the demiurgic Intellect, but not an ideal man or an ideal horse "αὐτῷ χαθ' αὐτό ἐν ὑποστάσει". This is the overall impression one gets from the writings of the school of Ammonius, with the exception of a unique anomalous passage, in which Asclepius argues that the Demiurge in his Intellect has only the reason-principles of the Forms, but not the Forms themselves.
For the school of Ammonius the existence of the Forms in the demiurgic Intellect is proven by four arguments which also purport to show that it is impossible for the Forms to have derived from the sensible world.

Argument (a)\textsuperscript{276} is that in the sensible world everything is relative, because of the mutability of material objects. Therefore, the Forms cannot have derived from the sensible world, but from a reality which has to be both free from matter and absolute in the sense of eternally immutable. This reality has neither composition nor any relationship to what is other than it. The apprehension of the intelligibles is equivalent to the contemplation of their real truth, the source of which is the One.

Argument (b)\textsuperscript{277} is that in contrast with the flux observed in the material world, in the immaterial world and particularly in the demiurgic Intellect there is real permanency and eternal and pure stability.

Argument (c)\textsuperscript{278} refers to the necessity of the existence of "immaterial numbers", the symbolic term for the intelligible Forms in the demiurgic Intellect. As the "sensible numbers", the symbolic term for the material Forms, set the limits of the material particular beings, it is a fortiori necessary for "immaterial numbers" to exist. They are in the Intellect of the Demiurge and define the species from which the particular countable things derive. The species would not preserve their purity, if they were counted by "sensible numbers" which are enmattered.

Argument (d)\textsuperscript{279} refers to the definitions of things. Definitions cannot be given of the particular material things, because they are mutable and subject to destruction. A definition is possible only of what remains eternally the same and such are the Forms in the demiurgic Intellect.\textsuperscript{280} The degree of susceptibility the particulars have does not
allow them to enjoy the eternity of the Forms and, subsequently, makes them subject to generation and destruction.

As creative reason-principles (δημιουργικοί λόγοι) the Forms are timelessly used by God for the creation of all natural beings, and as cognitive reason-principles (γνωστικοί λόγοι) the Forms provide Him with omniscience, granting Him perfect knowledge of what He creates. To show that the Demiurge cannot but have Forms both as cognitive and creative reason-principles within Him, Ammonius argued that if He did not know what He creates, He would be similar to Nature which does not know the beings it creates. He would also be inferior to men, as they know the things they make themselves.

In the commentaries of the school of Ammonius we find many more doctrinal assertions about the intelligible Forms as creative reason-principles than about them as cognitive reason-principles. As creative reason-principles the Forms are the exemplary images at which the Demiurge looks when He creates the world. There is no particular being which has not been created according to the intelligible Form of its species. The Forms as creative reason-principles are indivisible by themselves merely in so far as they are limits and actualities, but, in so far as they can only exist in a substrate, they are not.

The creative reason-principles in the demiurgic Intellect are unified exemplars of the corporeal beings they give existence to. They exist also irrespectively of the physical components of the material beings. For instance, the creative principle of "Man" does not have either two legs or two hands. These are only components of a particular man, but not of the creative principle of "Man". Genera contain their own species which contain their own particulars. Thus, the genera, understood as wholes containing what is subordinate to them, embrace
their own realizations, i.e. all particulars, and give them a common name. For example, the ante rem universal "Animal" includes the universal "Man" and the latter embraces the individual man. The existence of species is not independent of that of genera, as species are incorporated, so to speak, in the genera at least before they derived from them. Something similar is supposed to apply to the existence of the particulars in relation to that of the species. A divided genus gives existence to all its species simultaneously, so none of them is prior or posterior in time to the others. It is, of course, due to Platonic influences that the generic form is said by the school of Ammonius to embrace the subordinate Forms. To use an analogy from the material world, a Form is like a whole which embraces its parts. Thus, the most universal Form is the richest in content. The use of the analogy, however, does not imply that what is embraced by a Form, is part of it. The Forms in the demiurgic Intellect are not generated together with any particulars at all, nor are they united with them. A creative principle remains always the same, independent and separate from the perishable sensibles whose substance it defines and produces. The substance of a creative principle should not be expected to be found in a particular creature. What the latter actually has of it is only an emanation. As determinative principles, Forms define the sort of substance a corporeal particular being has, but they do not have in themselves the accidents belonging to the particulars they produce. This, of course, does not mean that there are no Forms of accidents, like health or blackness, for example; only that the creative principle of "Man" is neither healthy nor black. The eternity of the Forms explains the everlasting character of the subordinate species of the natural beings. The creative reason-principles, themselves immobile, are the causes of the motion of sensible
Even if this claim is not adequately explained, it is somewhat clarified by means of the following analogy: A living body is moved by its soul, which in turn has been created by the unmovable principle of the universe.

The Forms in the demiurgic Intellect create sensible particulars, the differentiae of which they encompass. These differentiae are responsible for the division of a Form into species. For example, the differentiae "Rational" and "Mortal" divide the Form "Animal" into rational and irrational, on the one hand, and mortal and immortal, on the other. These differentiae are constitutive of the species "Man", to which they give existence. Therefore, they are prior to it.

The Forms seem to be many in number. Some are entirely distinct from one another, like "Knowledge" and "Animal". Others are distinct but not entirely, like "Bird" and "Fish" which have "Animal" as a common genus. Finally, there are forms subordinate to others, like "Body" which is subordinate to "Substance". Even so, however, all Forms are one, in that they receive the illumination from the divine, the unity of which is unutterable. From these pure the in re universals derive their existence. The ultimate causes are somehow present in their effects, because otherwise it would not be clear how the in re universals derived from what is absolutely immaterial and perfect.

The Forms in the demiurgic Intellect interpenetrate, but not in a spatial sense. United as they are, they pervade one another with no change in their nature, due to the fact that they are not composed of matter. Examples of interpenetrating Forms, are the two triads of Forms, namely, "Good" - "Just" - "Beautiful" and "Magnitude" - "Health" - "Strength".
In the demiurgic Intellect there are Forms of perishable natural beings and of eternal beings, like the heavenly bodies. There exist no Forms either of unnatural perversions or of what is artificial or evil. Moreover, it is not the case that each particular material thing has its own individual Form, because in that case the Forms would be infinite in number.\(^{302}\)

In the Forms in the demiurgic Intellect the opposites are in actuality, but can none the less coexist without difficulty or disruption of the unity of the divine. Therefore, in the demiurgic Intellect, they do not act as opposites after all. This explains two facts. First, that God created not only things like Himself, but also things dissimilar and unlike. For example, the Forms in the demiurgic Intellect, rational and immortal as they are, give existence to beings irrational and mortal. Secondly, that the immaterial soul can judge good and evil at the same time.\(^{303}\)

Apart from the substantial principles of all things, the demiurgic Intellect also has the principles of the accidents which perfect material substances. Because of this function, these accidents are themselves close to being substantial; as is the case with heat and whiteness, which themselves may be accidents, but characterize the substances of fire and snow respectively. It may be possible to distinguish in notion between heat and fire or between whiteness and snow, but still heat and whiteness are integral to the substances fire and snow respectively.\(^{304}\)

The system of Ammonius and his students rests on the identification of logical with metaphysical priority; the ante rem universals are therefore prior both in logic and metaphysically.\(^{305}\) They derive from the One and contribute to the creation of all beings by means of the participation of particular beings in them.\(^{306}\) All ultimate similarities
in the particulars can be reduced to ante rem universals. If Socrates, Alcibiades and Plato have something in common, then it has to be either (a) the same thing or (b) some sort of similarity among them. If (a), then what they have in common is that they participate in the same universal, i.e. the universal "Man". If (b), then there may be either one similarity or many similarities which they have in common. If the similarity among them is one, then again it is the case they participate in the universal "Man". If the similarities among them are many, then the enquiry has still to continue until we reach the one ultimate source of the many similarities. Otherwise, the regress will continue fruitlessly ad infinitum.

Even if an ante rem universal belongs to the intelligible realm and, therefore, is superior to the particulars, it is always manifest in them as an in re universal. Thus, the in re universal is posterior both ontologically and in time to the ante rem universal. It is neither definite (δομωτον) nor articulated (δοιματοτον), because it may apply to many particulars. The ante rem universal "Man", for example, cannot be expressed but through particular men; therefore, the in re universal "Man" is present in all particular men.

A particular for the school of Ammonius is supposed to have a true existence within its corresponding ante rem universal. Yet a particular cannot be either identical with its ante rem universal or part of it. Nor can it receive all its properties, even if the ante rem universal is present in it as an in re universal. Particulars are only imperfect copies of the ante rem universals they derived from and exist due to their participation in them. But, of course, to say, like David, that particulars "have a share" in a universal, does not explain how a universal is observed in many particulars, while it is one and uniform.
in each of its species and particulars. The school of Ammonius taught that in every one of its particulars a universal is observed to the same degree, but a universal cannot be in just one particular (otherwise, it would not be a universal). An ante rem universal is similar to the particulars in the way that a creative cause is similar to its effects. Species function as limits defining matter. They are responsible for the wholeness and perfection of the particular beings. Each species is itself indivisible, but when applied to matter it is divided into many particulars; not because of itself though, as it is separate from matter, uniform and dimensionless. The cause of the division of a species is the matter the species is applied to.

Particular concrete objects constitute the subject or substratum for the universals, so that predications can be made of them. The substance of the ante rem universals transcends the particulars, since it is the incorporeal cause of the particulars and remains eternally the same. The ante rem universals need the particulars not for their own subsistence, but in order to have something they can be predicated of. If there does not exist a species including the particulars, then there is nothing for the universal to be predicated of. The particulars, however, need the universals in order to exist; Socrates and Plato would not exist if the universal "Man" had not pre-existed. The existence of a particular man presupposes the universal "Man", but given the existence of the latter, the subsistence of the former is not necessary. The same applies to the relation between substance and accidents.

Each particular participates in genus, differentia and species, all three being the necessary and immutable constituents of its substance. As the particulars exist by participating in the universals, and are
assimilated to them, the definition of each universal is somehow extended to the particulars it gives existence to. Strictly speaking, however, definitions are only of the universals and do not apply to the participating particulars, first because the particulars are not characterized by any intelligibility at all, and secondly because a universal transcends all particulars which are images of it.

In any hypothetical absence of particulars, the existence of the ante rem universals of course would not be affected at all. What would cease to exist would be the in re and the post rem universals. One cannot have a conceptual apprehension of ante rem universals, if one is ignorant of any particulars by means of which the ante rem universals are expressed. This kind of mutual interdependence between these universals and the particular occurs not only in our way of thinking about them. No particular being can exist but as an expression of the corresponding ante rem universal.
2.3 THE INCORPOREALITY OF THE ANTE REM UNIVERSALS

Our intellect knows the ante rem universals in the demiurgic Intellect as efficient and final causes, entities with no contrarieties at all, intellects and intelligible substances.\textsuperscript{325} They are not mental perceptions of the Demiurge, but intelligible substances in His Intellect. Their existence, however, can neither be proven by means of syllogisms nor perceived by the senses.\textsuperscript{326} The demiurgic Intellect comes to be the Form of all Forms as all Forms exist in it.\textsuperscript{327} The Forms are understood as a multiplicity contained in or embraced by a self-subsistent intellect.\textsuperscript{328} Our apprehension of God includes apprehension of the Forms in His Intellect.\textsuperscript{329} He who knows the divine Forms is a perfect man, a view which becomes plausible when combined with the doctrine of assimilation to the divine.\textsuperscript{330}

As the demiurgic Intellect is indestructible,\textsuperscript{331} timeless, and incorporeal,\textsuperscript{332} it has a pure actuality, innate in its substance, which has not been preceded by potentiality at all.\textsuperscript{333} Eternal actuality is indicative of perfection, because any hypothetical inactivity in an eternal being, like the demiurgic Intellect, would show that during such an inactivity, its existence would be imperfect and without purpose.\textsuperscript{334} This doctrine shows that the Forms in the demiurgic Intellect are eternally pure actualities. They are both intelligible in actuality and intellects in actuality. They therefore eternally understand themselves in actuality.\textsuperscript{335} The eternal immaterial beings, like the Forms in the demiurgic Intellect, can receive the divine emanation completely, because, being perfect, they are subject neither to formation nor to change nor to time.\textsuperscript{336} The differentiae in the divine creative reason-principles are in actuality unpreceded by any potentiality; if their
actuality were preceded by any potentiality, some other being, with its differentiae already in actuality, would be necessary for their transition to actuality. But such a superior being does not exist. If the differentiae in the divine Forms were in potentiality, the Forms would suffer imperfection. Consequently, even a most specific species or any particular with its differentiae in actuality would then be superior to the Forms. The effects would then come to be more perfect than their causes.\textsuperscript{337}

The incorporeality of universals was evident for the school of Ammonius, but David, followed by Elias, felt it necessary to advance arguments to refute the Stoic doctrine that everything which exists — genera and species included — is corporeal. David's arguments are as follows:\textsuperscript{338}

1. Corporeal or natural beings instantiating the same universal vary in size (e.g. an elephant's head is bigger than an ant's head). But there is no variation in the degree of presence of the universal "Animate" between an elephant and an ant. Since a universal and its species are the same both in larger and smaller beings, they must therefore be incorporeal.\textsuperscript{339}

2. Universals and species must be incorporeal, because they are observed to be complete in every material being which has derived from them. The universal "Man", for example, is complete in all particular men. On the other hand, no particular body can ever be shared completely by everything.\textsuperscript{340}

This is not an orthodox Neoplatonic argument, since David seems to ignore the theory of the participation of the particulars in the universal according to the degree of each particular's susceptibility.

3. When attributed to particulars, universals and species do not
grow, diminish or change, in contrast to something bodily (e.g. the pouring of the measure of one cup into another cup). Qualities, too, are incorporeal. Neither whiteness nor any other quality has any enlarging effect on the particulars to which they are attributed.\textsuperscript{341}

4. Universals and species are observed to be in many things at the same time, but this does not apply to material objects. Unformed matter, which is Plato's "pure matter", is also incorporeal as it exists at the same time in all things or, rather, encompasses them.\textsuperscript{341}

H. Khatchadourian remarks that David's argument stands to reason since for anything to be corporeal it must have matter. But matter itself cannot be meaningfully said to have matter. Also the idea that unformed matter is therefore incorporeal is a self-contradictory claim.\textsuperscript{343}

5. Universals and species preserve their own nature and essence when they are divided into particulars. This is untrue of physical things, since a pound, for example, divided into many parts, does not preserve the form it had, when it was in its original size.\textsuperscript{344}

To support his argument David here points out the differences between quantitative division and the logical division of a universal into species etc.

6. If, following Aristotle, every body is composed of matter and form and if, following the Stoics, universals and species are corporeal, one could not avoid the absurdity that species, too, would be made up of matter and form. It cannot be said that species is composed of form.\textsuperscript{345}

Elias, too, advanced arguments against the Stoic claim that the universals are corporeal. Elias\textsuperscript{346} attributed to the Stoics the doctrine that even God has a body, composed of small particles though, so that He can pass through all beings. But Elias is mistaken here. The Stoics may have regarded the divine pneuma as rare, but not as made of small
particles. They explained the omnipresence of the divine by the doctrine of two bodies in the same place. Elias' reply to these positions could be formulated in the following syllogism concerning the universal "Animal":

(a) If the universal "Animal" is a material body, and

(b) if a material body loses its unity by existing in small and large spaces, then

(c) the universal "Animal" loses its unity if it exists in small and large animals.

Since (c) is absurd, Elias concludes that a genus has to be immaterial, because in fact it is uninterrupted in different particulars.
2.4 SUBSTANCE AS THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL ANTE REM UNIVERSAL

To the discussion of the category of Substance Ammonius and his students brought a metaphysical orientation. They taught that this category is prior to all other categories and self-subsistent; it neither needs any other category in order for it to exist, nor has it been created by Nature. It is manifest in all particular beings, as they have their substance by means of participation in it. Yet the universal Substance conserves its oneness. This oneness is not numerical, but specific. If it were numerical, the universal Substance would be divided into parts. Therefore, it would lose its oneness and it would not be present in its fullness in all particulars. As the most universal Form, Substance has subordinate genera which contain the species as well as the particulars to which they give existence. We cannot think of the universal Substance without contrasting it to the particulars deriving from it and vice versa.

All other categories are accidents to Substance in that they exist and are contemplated in it. The other categories may not be parts of the category of Substance, but still, they cannot exist independently of it. If Substance did not exist, it would be impossible for all other categories to exist. Elias alone unexpectedly deviates from this view, by claiming that Substance may be naturally prior to the other categories, but it is not more universal than them, because they are not predicated of it.

Substance participates more in Being and gives existence to all other categories. Substances are ranked according to their proximity to pure Form, degree of actuality, unity and identity with the transcendent causes of the world. Furthermore, the divine substances
have no accidents and thus they are not subjects for any accident. Given that there is no genus superior to them, they are not subjects for any classification at all.\(^{355}\)

Substances are divided into simple and composite. Simple substances can be either inferior or superior to the composite ones. A simple substance is inferior to a composite when it is employed by the Demiurge for the sake of composite substances.\(^{356}\) Unformed matter or the species "Man", for example, are simple substances, but inferior to the composite substances of particular men, because they are mixed for their sake.\(^{357}\) Unformed matter derives from the universal Substance. By receiving quantitative dimensions, unformed matter becomes informed. It then becomes quality, so that the particulars can exist.\(^{358}\) Simple substances, like God, the angels and the souls, are superior to the composite ones, because they are not employed for their sake.\(^{359}\)

The composite substances, however, are necessary for a human intellect to come to the notion of the universal Substance.\(^{360}\) Of the composite substances, some are eternal, e.g. the heavenly bodies, and some are subject to generation and destruction.\(^{361}\) Substance admits opposites, but not at the same time and in the same part.\(^{362}\)

The category of Substance is eternally immutable and contains the multitude of the particular intelligible and material substances it gives existence to.\(^{363}\) Substance is present more in the ante rem universal "Animal" than in the universal "Man" and more in the latter than in particular men. Intelligibles have a substance superior to that of the particulars in the material world. For example, a divine soul is more of a soul, and the demiurgic Intellect more of an intellect compared to the angelic one, which is an intermediate entity between the intelligible and the material worlds. These differences are due to the degree of
participation of each entity in the primary term of its order. Thus, one
sees once again the Neoplatonic notion of ordered procession from a
primary term, or, in A.C. Lloyd’s terminology the "notion of series which
were ab uno".  

The school of Ammonius adopted the following fourfold
classification of beings. There are

(a) universal substances, e.g. the universal "Man", which are said
of a subject, but are not in a subject.  

(b) particular accidents, e.g. this white or this knowledge, which
are not said of a subject, but they are in a subject. They are
ontologically posterior to the universals, but necessary for their
predication.  

(c) universal accidents, e.g. white, which are said of a subject
and are in a subject and

(d) particular substances, e.g. particular men, which are not in
a subject and are not said of a subject.  

Olympiodorus thinks that Aristotle correctly says that Substance
can be either first or second, without contradiction with the rule
that of things in which there is a first and a second, the common
predicative is not a genus. In particular, according to the division of
Substance in depth, "Substance" is first, "Body" is second, "Animate" is
third and "Animal" is fourth. But "Animal" in width is divided into
"Rational" and "Irrational", and in such a division there is no first or
second. The Aristotelian description of the primary Substance as
something which is neither asserted of nor can be found in a subject,
is also true of the one principle of everything.
CHAPTER 3
THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVINE

3.1 THE KNOWABILITY OF THE DIVINE

It is a view generally accepted by the school of Ammonius that man ascends to the summit of his intellectual capacity in his effort to know the intelligible world. The object of this knowledge is exactly how things issue forth from one and the same principle and how they are individually determined and specified. Such knowledge is possible for man, but within the limits of his capacity to comprehend. A man cannot avoid his inferiority in all aspects when compared to the divine, no matter if he may be able to become similar to it. Given the inadequacy of man as knowing subject, the conclusion is evident for the school of Ammonius, that, man is inevitably unable to comprehend the divine in its fullness.

Essentially God is not a possible object of experience, as He cannot come under human observation. If man is to learn anything about the divine, he has to learn it indirectly, by inference from other objects which are observable. Of course, the school of Ammonius did not hold Porphyry's extreme view according to which a human soul does not have any criterion for, or any way of verifying, the knowledge of the divine. The philosophical background in the teachings of the school of Ammonius concerning the knowledge of the divine can be found in Proclus, who argued that God, Himself ineffable and unknowable, may be apprehended and known from the beings which participate in Him. Only the first principle, i.e. the One, is completely unknowable as being imparticipated. The school of Ammonius, too, considered that the One
cannot be known, because we can know only those things which are conceived as effects of certain causes. The One is absolutely causeless, because it has not had any creator at all. Therefore, it is meaningless for them to discuss the knowledge of it. The One cannot be known either by affirmative or negative theology, because it transcends not only the demiurgic Intellect, but Being as well. This primary cause is one, because there cannot be a plurality of first causes. Thus, because of its uniqueness, the first cause is called "Monad" or "Henad". Given, however, that the One transcends all attributes and that names denote certain attributes, there can be no name to call it by. This is why it is referred to as being "beyond all things" (πάντων ἐπέκεινα). The One is not in relation to anything else. Therefore, regarding the One a Neoplatonist can only have indications, but no proofs. Plotinus argued that we cannot say what the One is, because we can only speak about the radiance from the One. This radiance is of course neither better nor the same as the One, but rather deficient. The One is greater than anything said about it, because it is superior to human speech, thought and awareness. Something true about it is that it is beyond all things. When it is called "One" or "indivisible" it is not meant to be a point or a unit. When it is said to be the cause, this is not to predicate something incidental of the One, but of the creatures which have derived from it. They have something from the One, while it is in itself.

Ammonius and his students argued for the possibility of a cognitive approach to the lower divine entities. They insisted on showing some mistakes which are consequences of a false method and on proposing a method appropriate for the acquisition of this knowledge to the extent that it is humanly possible.
Among the undesirable mistakes due to unsuitable methods of knowing the divine, the school of Ammonius lay emphasis on the consequences of relying on anthropomorphism and syllogisms. First, they argued that by judging from what is applicable to humans only, we cannot but draw misleading conclusions about the divine. Social projection aims at finding some ground of likeness between humans and the divine. But one of the common mistaken beliefs to which the projection of a human way of living onto the divine may lead, is the supposition that the life of gods is difficult and without leisure or idleness, because they are busy dealing with particular beings. Anthropomorphism of the divine, therefore, is denied by Ammonius. He does not see anthropomorphism as a means of assimilation of the divine to humans in order for the real differences between them to become clear; on the contrary, he teaches that it leads to deceptive myths and very superficial approaches, which do not give any hints to understanding what is actually true about the divine. Myths do not give any proof for what they mean and often lead to a confusion as to the causes of all entities, eternal and perishable. The only positive attitude to myths among Ammonius' students is that of Olympiodorus, according to whom myths lead us from the phenomena to those things which are not manifest in our search for truth.

Secondly, the school of Ammonius stresses that a theologian cannot use syllogisms to talk about the divine itself. Syllogisms are only appropriate for the knowledge of mathematical entities and the knowledge of effects with reference to their causes. The divine, however, is prior to all causes and more universal than anything existing in the world. Therefore, it cannot even be defined, since a definition has to refer to both species and matter, or the results of the division of a genus into
its own species and differentiae. Such a definition cannot be given of what is most primary or of the extremes. When conceptually apprehended, the divine cannot be thought of in terms of predicates or division. This means that a logician cannot help in the knowledge of the intelligible world. But certainly this view of the school of Ammonius is open to criticism. One can say, for example, that God is eternal. Obviously, this is a predicate.

After the exposition of what is wrong in certain methods, comes the proposal of the suitable method which can be followed for the acquisition of knowledge of the divine. Our initial concept of God is constructed after a selection and combination of elements from the empirical world. The worshipping of idols is an acceptable use of material objects for this purpose. As humans live in a world of sense-perception, they need something material to help them to attain the level of the intelligible world. Idols have been invented to remind men of immaterial powers in order that by beholding and worshipping them, men may be put in mind of these powers. The role of idols is over after they have reminded men of the existence of the divine.

When the mind turns its attention upon the divine, then comes the rationalistic approach to the divine. In a first phase of such a study, the metaphysician, according to the school of Ammonius, can only use analogies between the material and the intelligible worlds, but not projections of the former onto the latter. The actual contemplation of the divine is an activity of our intellect without the need either of the senses or of imagination. This, of course, does not mean that our imagination remains inactive during the attempt of our intellect to apprehend the divine. Even though the divine is simple and unitary, our imagination leaves us with the impression that the divine has some sort
Finally, however, we shall apprehend the divine provided that we do not allow our imagination to intervene any more.
3.2 AFFIRMATIVE OR NEGATIVE THEOLOGY?

In traditional Neoplatonism\textsuperscript{394} we find arguments for the superiority of negative to affirmative theology. In particular, it was taught that affirmative theology was exercised by people who transpose on the divine characteristics of the material world. Negative theology was preferred to affirmative theology, because the human soul was considered as lacking the natural faculty to know the divine, even if men can speak about it.

Among the members of our school, Asclepius, David and the author of the commentary on the third book of the \textit{De Anima} (Philoponus or Stephanus) are supporters of affirmative theology, while Ammonius, Philoponus and Elias are supporters of negative theology.

Asclepius\textsuperscript{395} held that the divine by itself is clear and most manifest. The fact that we continuously deal with the sensible world is a major hindrance in our effort to apprehend immediately and without difficulties something totally separate from matter.\textsuperscript{396}

Since knowledge is acquired by means of similarities, it is by analogies that we know the divine. The order of the sensible world and the unutterable beauty of the heavens lead to the conclusion that an immaterial power rules the universe. Furthermore, the fact that our bodies, when alive, are moved by an incorporeal power, leads us to assume the existence of a similar power which moves the heavenly bodies.\textsuperscript{397} In support of the principle that what is not manifest becomes known by means of that which is manifest, Asclepius argued that by seeing the movable bodies we come to comprehend the intelligible cause of movement, i.e. the divine.\textsuperscript{398}
Among our senses, sight gives us more indications about the existence of the divine. By giving us impressions of the order and beauty of both the sublunary and the celestial worlds, it enables us to come to the concept of God, who is responsible for that order. But actually God is apprehended by our intellect by means of intuition, which does not require either sense-perception or syllogisms or application of any concepts at all. For Asclepius the divine is accessible in a suprarational unio mystica, which is not knowledge proper.

In David's philosophical theology, too, the existence of the invisible Demiurge can be inferred from the contemplation of His works and the orderly movement of the world. There is no possibility of a world that has not been created by the Demiurge. Only by comprehending the natural world as a whole, is it possible to comprehend its Demiurge. That which is invisible may become known through that which is visible. The divine, however, remains in essence unknowable.

The perception of God, according to David, is achieved through a series of successive stages, starting from the material objects in our environment. Then follows the comprehension of the in re universals, the third stage being the perception of God, the angels, the Intellect and the Soul, which are impossible to conceive in a material state. The divine lies at the extreme limit of the Intelligible and when the philosopher contemplates it, the divine regulates him and leads him to perfection. This happens because, since man is the shadow of the supreme being, he must accompany God and assimilate himself to God.

Philoponus(?) / Stephanus(?) claimed that the divine is not to be known by means of privations. If one uses affirmations, like "God was" or "God is" or "God will be", one always says the truth. From the
contemplation of the good order of the world we are led to the notion of the divine, the existence of which cannot be doubted.

As mentioned above, in Ammonius, Philoponus and Elias there are arguments in support of negative theology.

Ammonius claimed that when he wants to refer to the divine, he does not affirm anything of it, but rather resorts to negation. The divine is completely unrelated and transcends everything material or immaterial.

Philoponus considered the divine to be magnified when defined by means of negations. In this way the divine is separated from all inferior beings. We know what the divine is not, but not what it is, because the eminent mode of divine attributes escapes us. Thus the divine is defined as something neither body nor intellect nor angel nor colourful and so on infinitely, because it transcends everything. Negations and abstractions are used for knowledge of the extremes of the intelligible and the sensible worlds, i.e. God and matter. The end of negative theology for Philoponus is the assimilation of our souls to the divine, after our souls have separated themselves from their bodies. The analogy between the One and the sun can be the only affirmative expression, so to speak, about the One. As the sun is superior to everything in the material world, so the One has an incomparable superiority to all beings in the universe. As the sun gives light to everything, similarly the One emanates Good to every being, but each being participates in the emanation from the One according to the extent it is able to.

Philoponus marks off the first cause from the things which it is not. In this way he somehow delimits it, but he does not argue that thus the first cause becomes known in a sense. It is generally acknowledged
by the school of Ammonius that human language is inadequate to refer to
the unlimited. A name or a predicate should not be taken at face value.

Elias argued that God can be defined as a being which is neither
intellect nor soul nor genus nor corporeal nor incorporeal. He is the
most superior among the eternal beings and His existence is totally
independent of our knowledge of Him.

Certainly, however, no matter if one is an advocate of negative or
affirmative theology, there will be a moment when one realizes that all
attempts at systematic conceptualization of the divine fall short of the
truth. There exists no name to denote it, but only signs which we make
to ourselves about it. Anyway, the formulations we utter concerning the
divine will always remain unclear because of the lack of our ability to
express such concepts properly. There is only one exception to this
tendency. The anonymous author of the Prolegomena Philosophiae
Platonicae ascribed to Plato the doctrine that the One is identical
with the Good. It is the principle of all things, but it is neither body
nor life nor soul nor intellect nor being.

It is clear, I think, that for the school of Ammonius the reasoning
process allows us to have some knowledge of the intelligible world. But
we can only know the deities which are inferior to the One and belong to
the second level of the intelligible world. As to the One, human reason
can merely give us indications as to what lies at the extreme limit of
the intelligible. Anyway, the actual knowledge of the divine essence is
left to intuition, when the soul acts separately from the body. The role
of the senses is limited to just an awakening of our minds towards a
rational exploration of the intelligible. After that, our language, by
means either of negations or affirmations, will allow us simply to
"touch", but not to embrace the object known, which is the divine, in its
fullness. This is because the ontological status of the divine is far superior to that of a human being. Therefore, our rational process enables us to speak about the intelligible causes only by revealing to us the similarities between the sensible and the intelligible worlds. Reason can merely lead us to the knowledge of the beings which have issued from the intelligible principles and not to the knowledge of these principles themselves. The character of the secondary gods - not to mention that of the One - is inexpressible and is expected by the philosopher's soul to be the subject of a mystical experience. However, no representative of the school of Ammonius has described his own experience of mystical union with the divine. So it seems that they are more like "mystical theorists" rather than mystics themselves.
3.3 THE METAPHYSICAL SYSTEM OF THE SCHOOL OF AMMONIUS

Because of the limitations imposed by the very nature of commentaries, in their extant texts Ammonius and his students included only scattered references to their metaphysics. The position an entity has in the pyramid of their ontological hierarchy is determined by its degree of perfection which is in proportion to its degree of participation in the emanations from the divine. As the divine is the creative agent of everything, participation of an inferior being in the emanation from the divine determines the capability of this inferior being to create.\(^{420}\) In the Neoplatonic universe only the intelligible wholes are perfect, original, indissoluble, non-composite, eternally invariable, immobile and without parts. The essences of such entities are identical with the entities themselves. As they are free from any admixture, with substances different from their own, they are entirely free from matter. Reversion upon themselves is their proper activity, and it is so because they transcend all material beings.\(^{421}\)

The orders above the natural substances are three: the psychic, the intellectual and the divine. The relation between the natural substances and the superior orders is the following: Natural substances are created by the divine, conceived by the human intellect and expressed in words by the rational souls which are separate from all bodies.\(^{422}\) The most real order is the divine which gives existence to the subsequent ones. Its degree of existence is incomparably superior to the last order, that of natural substances.\(^{423}\)

Ammonius and his students considered the One or the Henad as the highest principle in their polytheistic system, the first God through whom all others are gods as well. Relying on the Platonic *Timaeus*, they
argued that the intelligibles are unified, immobile and finite, because they are closer to the One.\textsuperscript{414} The One fills everything with goodness by means of one application. Each particular partakes of goodness according to the extent it is able to.\textsuperscript{415} Everything depends on the One in order to have its appropriate degree of reality.\textsuperscript{416}

The discussion regarding the derivation of the eternal beings from the Henad is necessary for the construction of the metaphysical system of the school. Above the intelligible gods, each of which has his own specific character, there are "secret causes" which are also the final causes of all things.\textsuperscript{427} This terminology recalls Proclus' doctrine about the Henads in general, and his theory that, because of its specific character, each Henad is one particular excellence. Gods for Proclus are "functions of a first cause",\textsuperscript{428} so that there is one \emph{πατρικόν αἰτίαν} among the "intelligible" gods, another among the "intellective" gods and so forth. These causes possess certain powers which transcend the subsequent grades of deity and are incomprehensible to them.\textsuperscript{429} Under the influence of Syrianus and Proclus, the school of Ammonius claimed that the Henad is not a combination of many principles.\textsuperscript{430} The oneness of this principle, however, is not numerical as it is immaterial and transcends all universals.\textsuperscript{431} Despite the participation of everything in it, the Henad remains with no relation to anything. It is immutable and with an infinite power with no diminution whatsoever, even though it produces from its creative power, in the same way that a man is not diminished if numerous pictures are painted of him.\textsuperscript{432} Every particular being necessarily participates in the Henad in order to acquire its oneness.\textsuperscript{433}

With reference to ontological superiority, the hierarchy in the intelligible universe below the Henad is as follows: Being, Life, Intellect.\textsuperscript{434} The emanations of the superior entities are stronger than
those of the inferior ones. The Henad and Being are predicated of all universals and all beings, because of the participation of all beings in them. Thus, the emanation from Being extends further and is more desirable than that of the Life-principle and the same thing applies to the emanation of the Life-principle compared to the emanation of the demiurgic Intellect. If a particular entity participates in any ontologically inferior sphere, it does not necessarily participate altogether in all the ontologically superior ones as well. But if a particular participates in any ontologically superior sphere, it participates also in the inferior spheres as well. Let it be here clarified that the doctrine of emanation is used only as a metaphor by all Neoplatonists in general. Thus it remains at the level of a superficial description of a process, but cannot explain how in this process a lower intelligible being or a material being is finally inferior or essentially different compared to the divine from which it has derived.

Being has not been created by Nature. It is self-subsistent as it needs nothing else for its existence. Being exists independently from all particulars both in the intelligible and the material worlds, to which particulars it gives existence. It has a generative power of its own, for it creates the Intellect, the angels, and the particular beings. Being is also contemplated in the category of Substance and all other categories, though not equally. Substance participates in it more than the secondary categories do. Being is not a mere concept in our minds with no correspondence to any reality in the intelligible world. Being is not predicated univocally, because all things which are univocally predicated belong equally in degree to a common genus, from they derived simultaneously. With reference to the chain of Being,
intelligibles are temporally prior to sensibles and the latter are temporally prior to accidents. Being is not predicated equivocally either, because what equivocally predicated things have in common is only a name and nothing else. Being is predicated in a way which is between the univocal and the equivocal predications, because it is named after an efficient cause and aims at an end. It is predicated as something ἐνός καὶ πρός ἐν and is participated in according to the susceptibility of the recipient. The existence of Being cannot be analogically explained by means of the existence of any particular being, because each particular being participates in the primary Being according to its susceptibility. As the primary Being is not merely equivocal, i.e. it is not a mere name indicating many different things, it can be studied by a single science, which is metaphysics.

The Henad produces, among other things, the intelligible Monad and the intelligible Dyad. Both are immutable and exist in the demiurgic Intellect, as the principles of the intelligible Forms in it. Thus the intelligible Henad becomes the cause of continuity in the world, since everything exists by means of participation in the Forms the Henad produces. The intelligible Monad symbolizes the limit and the unutterable union of the intelligible entities. Unity, equality, similarity, identity and the positive part of any pair of the lower-level oppositions derive from the Henad and the Monad.

The Dyad is the principle of procession, divisibility and differentiation and responsible for the infinite emanation and power of the intelligibles, the otherness and the plurality in the universe and for the negative part of any pair of oppositions. Yet there is no ethical colouring regarding the Dyad, as it cannot be considered an evil principle. It simply represents the intelligible plurality which
consists of indivisible units and participates in the One. From this plurality derives the sense-perceptible manifold. The heavenly bodies are analogous to the Monad and the gods of the earth to the Dyad. All pairs of opposites fall under the One and the Manifold or under Being and not-Being.

Below the intelligible Monad and Dyad follow the Forms in the demiurgic Intellect. They are creative of the species, which are simple substances, i.e. separate from matter. Each species is one and has one substance. The species are in actuality not preceded by a potentiality and are the causes of the immortality of the beings as wholes. They constitute the perfective agents of the unformed matter, which potentially contains all its different forms. The species set boundaries to the unformed matter, thus leading it to actuality and to its existence in the material world.

We can now examine the place of the divine entities in the metaphysical system of the school of Ammonius. The demiurgic Intellect does not belong to the first level of reality, i.e. that of the One, but to the second level, i.e. that of Being and of intelligible entities. The divine ranks are considered as having been produced by the One. The demiurgic Intellect is between the One and the souls. Similarly, Porphyry had identified the Demiurge with the second Hypostasis.

K. Verrycken offered an illuminating examination of the Neoplatonic character of Ammonius' teaching on the demiurgic Intellect. First of all, he has shown that there is no clear evidence in the commentaries as to the relation of the Demiurge to the Intellect as a whole. In Ammonius one can find two incompatible doctrines: a) The Demiurge creates the sensible world on the basis of the creative reason-
principles, which flow from the Henad and b) The Intellect is to be identified with the One as the supreme God.

The solution K. Verrycken suggests is that the term θεός is ambiguous as used by Ammonius, since it indicates either the highest principle alone or the Demiurge or both together. Ammonius did not necessarily identify the supreme God and the Demiurge, but was not always careful to draw a distinction between the two principles. The overall impression is, however, that Ammonius identified the Demiurge and the Intellect. We, too, accept Verrycken's conclusions as the best possible answer to K. Praechter's suggestion that the school of Ammonius adhered to a pre-Plotinian theism. K. Verrycken first established that Ammonius unfolds or telescopes the concept of God according to the needs of the context and that, even though his terminology may sound theistic, his metaphysics is clearly Neoplatonic. Asclepius seems to combine the Neoplatonic doctrines with a theistic view that the transcendent Intellect is to be identified with the One and the supreme God.

The theory with regard to the place of transcendent intellects in the order of the creation is also of interest. These intellects are divided into angels, heroes, daemons and long-living nymphs. The angels are eternal pure activities and cannot be thought of as not immortal. The daemons, however, are of inferior order, excluded from everything and excommunicated as they chastise the good souls. Their immortality is dubious.

Nature and matter are at the bottom of the ontological hierarchy. The latter accepts the creative reason-principles by means of illumination and divides them to form the composite things. As most things exist for the Neoplatonists on more than one level, Nature, apart
from being the natural world as a whole, is also considered to be the
intelligible principle of motion and rest.\textsuperscript{474} Asclepius argued that the
intelligible Forms as creative reason-principles only have been "sowγ" by God in Nature and as cognitive reason-principles only they have been
"sowγ" in the human souls. Nature creates without knowing either the
Forms of the creatures, or the creatures themselves.\textsuperscript{475} It does not
reflect either upon itself or upon anything else, but creates
irrationally, by transferring the illumination deriving from the divine
Forms onto natural beings, like plants and irrational animals.\textsuperscript{476} This
illumination is identical with the substantial creative reason-
principles. They serve as exemplars of which the particular created
beings are mere images.\textsuperscript{477} For Plotinus,\textsuperscript{478} too, Nature, an image of the
world soul, is an illumination, which derives from the intelligible Forms
and contains the creative reason-principles of every natural entity.
Ammonius and his students argue that Nature prolongs the orderly
creation by the Demiurge, which means that Nature and its products depend
upon Him. In this they followed Proclus'\textsuperscript{479} doctrine that everything
which is produced by secondary beings is in a greater measure produced
by the prior and more determinative principles from which the secondary
themselves derived.
3.4 GOD: INCORPOREAL OR NOT?

The majority of the members of the school of Ammonius believed in the incorporeality of the One, the demiurgic Intellect and all other secondary deities. God was considered to be an unmoved cause which is absolutely simple, in the sense that He is absolutely separate from matter. God's ἐνέργεια follows closely His essence which transcends all other essences, as it does not consist of any material components. If God were material, then He would be both the primary principle of the world and something particular at the same time, which is absurd. As He never unites with a body, He is free from the limitations necessarily involved in such a union. The simplicity of the divine is unutterable, because of the inadequacy not only of our language, but of our reason as well.

God is neither indivisible nor divisible, because these attributes apply to material beings only. Indivisibility characterizes only material elements provided that they have occurred after the last possible division of a material body. Because of His omnipresence God is not divisible either, because if that were the case, He would not be everywhere, but one part of Him would be here and another there and He would lose His oneness. As division is division into parts, it follows that as God is partless, He is not subject to divisions or alterations at all.

God's intelligibility is also shown by the fact that He transcends the universals, which He placed either in Nature as creative reason-principles or in the rational souls as cognitive reason-principles. If something intelligible is transcended by a superior entity, this entity
cannot but be intelligible as well. Therefore, God is superior to all beings, either material or intelligible.

In contrast with the above mentioned views comes Elias' self-contradiction concerning this matter. On the one hand, there are passages where he argues that the "Divine" and the "Angelical" are differentiae of the genus "Immaterial" and that God transcends all natural substances, i.e. He is not a subject. The self-contradiction arises when Elias claims that it is not an absurdity to say that God is corporeal. His arguments for this view rest on (a) logic and (b) etymology, and are as follows:

(a) Logical argument: "Rational" is divided into human and divine, and itself is a division of "Animal". "Animal" is a division of "Animate" and the latter is a division of "Corporeal". Therefore, "Divine" comes to be a species subordinate to the genus "Corporeal".

(b) Etymological argument: The heavenly bodies are called gods (θεοί), because of their perpetual motion (θεότης δείξται και νεότης).

It is difficult to understand why Elias did not use purely metaphysical arguments to support his maverick thesis. At least such arguments would not be refuted as easily as those which he actually used.

His logical argument rests on the assumption that "Rational" is more universal than the species "Man", because it also exists in God and the angels. It is Elias himself who also says, however, that the rationality of God and the soul transcends reason and is also different from the imperfect rationality which falls under the genus "Animal" and needs premisses and conclusions. Elias should have held that divine rationality is not simply superior to the human, but so unique, as well, that it cannot be compared to the human. Divine rationality should not be understood as a species of the genus "Rational", because the divine
transcends all genera. Divine rationality, as Pseudo-Elias correctly puts it, is timeless and not a result of learning; human reasoning, on the other hand, is in time and is something which is learnt. Elias seems to approach the matter rather superficially judging from the logical argument he had advanced.

Concerning the etymological argument, one need not say that nowadays it is hardly worth any discussion. Pseudo-Elias claimed that it is a matter of dispute whether the heavens are animate or not, but, having considered that the heavens were called divine, he concluded that it is difficult to determine (with reference to this argument) whether God is corporeal, like the heavens, or not.

One should finally ask whether Elias really believed that God is something corporeal. As C. Wildberg observed, Elias may not have been a brilliant philosopher, but he certainly was not a boring lecturer, because he spent much effort turning dry subject matter into delectable food for thought. Judging also from the occurrence of other passages where he argued for the intelligibility of the divine, one may plausibly assume that in his lectures for first-year students, Elias referred to the theoretical possibility of the divine's being corporeal with a very poor argumentation, which does not convince us that he actually believed in this possibility.
God was believed to be the one intelligible being which governs the world. His emanation is omnipresent, but actually no place contains Him, so it cannot be said that God is somewhere with respect to His substance. Therefore, the demiurgic Intellect is not substantially innate even in the human souls.

God's ruling character is shown in the description of His powers: they are theoretical in that He knows all that exists and practical in that He is the creator of both the intelligible and the material worlds. The intelligible world is divine in the sense that it is directly dependent on God. The material world, too, depends on Him, but in a more or less indirect way.

The discussion regarding divine omnipotence involves the interrelated topic concerning the whole nature of God and, particularly, the necessities to which He is subject. As He is eternal and perfectly actual, they are always present to Him. The school of Ammonius argued that the divine necessities are to be understood in a mystical way, because it is beyond the limits of human reason to acquire knowledge of the divine in its fullness. It can be said, however, that the necessities governing God are not imposed from any accident outside Him. As God is self-sufficient and needs nothing from outside, all necessities exist in Him by means of His own existence. It is also a commonplace in late Neoplatonism that whatever characterizes God, as for example that He has the Forms in His Intellect, cannot be called an accident, because accidents belong to substances which are subjects as well. God is substance, but not a subject. These necessities must be differentiated from those which are effects of external forces and, consequently, occur
only in the material world.\textsuperscript{510} As God is simple, eternal and immobile, nothing is violent in Him.\textsuperscript{511} Nonetheless, it is impossible for Him to transcend His eternal necessities, the source of which is the One.\textsuperscript{512} David\textsuperscript{513} tried to show this by arguing that God can accomplish everything that is most seemly and that He desires as much as He is able and is able to do as much as He desires. David's position is not consistent with reference to the necessities God is subject to, because, as we shall see, the divine is consciously subject to them and is able to do what they require, but it is not a matter of His will to be subject to them or not. One possible implication deriving from David's position seems to be more correct than David's position itself. This implication is that the things which God is said not to be able to do are things which, although it is logically possible that some beings do them, God cannot do them while retaining His essential properties.

First among the necessities of the nature of God is that which requires that He is good. As His goodness is a necessity joined with His essence, God lacks the ability to do evil, since this would be contrary to His nature which necessitates His goodness.\textsuperscript{514} God's goodness is ineffable,\textsuperscript{515} and plays the role of a final cause of our actions, since everybody and everything desires God and turns towards Him.\textsuperscript{516} God is unable to be evil because there is so much goodness in Him; similarly the sun is unable to be dark, because there is so much light in it.\textsuperscript{517} On the same grounds, God cannot sin\textsuperscript{518} or be jealous.\textsuperscript{519}

The doctrine that God cannot but be the source of all goodness,\textsuperscript{520} led the school of Ammonius to the conclusion that the cause of evil has to be somewhere else and certainly not in an intelligible principle, since all intelligible world depends directly on God. Plotinus and Proclus\textsuperscript{521} had already denied not only moral but also physical dualism.
in the sense that there is no absolute or unmixed evil, as everything proceeds from the primary Good. But, on the other hand, the existence of God does not entail the non-existence of evil; neither does the existence of evil entail the non-existence of God. These considerations make it more interesting to see how, if God, by definition perfectly good, created the world, there is evil in it. The school of Ammonius claimed that evil has a quasi-existence.

In fact, the school followed the Neoplatonic tradition that there are no intelligible Forms of evil or base things, since such things arise as by-products in Nature, through deprivation, rather, and separation from the Good. The roots of evil are neither in matter nor in any body, but in the weakness and feebleness of Nature and of particular souls, which are not susceptible enough to receive the continuous emanation the divine sends forth. As Syrianus and Proclus would say, evil is like the side-effects of a beneficent drug, but, unlike them, evil arises because of the object affected. It also depends on deliberate choice, which is defined as the spontaneous activity of the soul by which it is able to act on the body. Evil is understood as some sort of immoderateness, if virtue is conceived as some sort of symmetry.

The only exception among the views shared by the members of the school of Ammonius is that of Ps.-Heliodorus, who based his astrological commentary In Paulum on the distinction between beneficent and maleficent stars and, at the same time, considered astrology to be an exact science.

After it has been established that God can only be good and not evil, one would expect Him to be able to do something against evil. Among the members of the school of Ammonius, we find two contradictory views. Both Asclepius and Stephanus agree that God can prevent evil. Where they
disagree is as to whether He actually prevents it. Asclepius believes that God actually prevents it, because failure to do so would amount to causing it. Stephanus thinks that God never prevents the evil outcome of a human action, even if His omniscience knows whether a human action is going to have an evil outcome; the reason is that He creates free agents and allows them to harm each other. God respects the freedom of our will when we are alive, but every man will be rewarded according to his merits after death. The exposition of these views is unfortunately incomplete. Asclepius did not explain whether God prevents evil sometimes or whether He always does so. (The latter would be most difficult to reconcile with experience). Stephanus, on the other hand, did not clarify whether God can put the evil actions of human beings to good use, even if the actions remain evil.

The second necessity to which God is subject is connected with His eternity. If it is accepted that as an eternal being, God is changeless and perfect in all aspects, He cannot be said to have degrees of susceptibility, mainly because there is nothing for Him to receive from outside. If so, then the following question arises: Namely, where does an eternal being, like God, derive its power from? Ammonius' doctrine is that according to a supreme necessity governing eternal beings, they possess all their power by their own essence. In other words, this necessity requires that eternal beings do not acquire their power in some way or another, but that they have it as concurrent with their substance (ςυνόδομον της ουσίας). This necessity, however, is absolute freedom at the same time: only God is free, because He does not need anything outside Himself, whereas everything else needs Him.

The third necessity God is subject to is expressed by the school of Ammonius, and traditional Neoplatonists as well, in the form
of a conclusion which, according to K. Verrycken, is aporetic. Namely, on the one hand God is not dependent on anything outside Himself; He does not need anything, not even the things He creates, because He is perfect without them. On the other hand, however, it is by necessity that He continuously gives existence to all beings. Ammonius and his students do not explain why and how divine causality breaks out of God's self-sufficiency. It is clear, however, that the creation of the world by the Demiurge is considered to be conscious, but not willed. This doctrine seems to be a justification for Ammonius' belief in the immutability of the divine. It was impossible for him to conceive of a God who passes from non-action to action, because this would imply that God undergoes some sort of change. Passing from non-action to action would presuppose the existence of some deliberations in God's Intellect and would also imply that this transition takes place in time. To avoid such implications, Ammonius had to admit that by necessity God continually creates both the intelligible and the sensible worlds by sending emanations forth. When Ammonius talks about the immutability of the divine he refers to the inner being of God, and not to His effects ad extra, i.e. the course of events, the movements and changes with reference to the material world. God has the power to create good things, not the power not to create. Because the Forms as creative reason-principles are immanent in His Intellect, He eternally contemplates Himself. Hence, creation is the product of the demiurgic Intellect's reflection on itself. The relation between the demiurgic Intellect's reflexive thinking and its creativity is also problematic. The fact remains that God on the one hand is free from everything external, but, on the other hand, He is not free to do things which transcend the necessities imposed by His own nature. It is not known if Ammonius and
his students would think that this is also a mysterious truth which can only be apprehended in a mystical way. Given these necessities, however, they considered God to be a perfect being. In Him they recognized two perfections. The first one, symbolized by the solidity of ambrosia, is absolute freedom and pertains to His essence, i.e. to what God is in Himself. The second perfection, symbolized by the fluidity of the nectar, is necessary emanation.\textsuperscript{540}

The fourth necessity God is subject to is that He has an undivided and unextended knowledge of things divided, a unitary knowledge of things pluralized, an eternal knowledge of things temporal and an ungenerated knowledge of things generable.\textsuperscript{541} In other words, this necessity refers to divine omniscience, which will be examined in section 3.6.

Such were the arguments in the writings of the school of Ammonius concerning the limitations of divine power. It should be observed that the way in which divine omnipotence is asserted or denied is affected by the way this term is defined. Ammonius and his students seem to understand omnipotence as the power to do anything. As soon as they realized that there are things which God cannot do while retaining His nature, they denied Him omnipotence. God is perfect, with a great power\textsuperscript{542} which makes Him the ruler of the world, but does not allow Him to transcend His own nature by doing things which impair His perfection. Therefore, this "inability" derives from His very nature. Among previous writers, Seneca\textsuperscript{543} was closer to the line of thought of the school of Ammonius, by claiming that God is not free to do anything because by necessity He has to want the best.

Other writers, though, attributed omnipotence to God, because they understood it as the power to do logically possible actions. A logically impossible action does not actually occur and is impossible for any being
at all. Therefore, the fact that God cannot do logically impossible actions, does not deny Him omnipotence. Simonides, Pindar, Plato, Lucian, Agathon and Horace, for example, had argued that it is impossible for God to alter the past. Lists of things God cannot do are also found in Pliny the Elder and Pseudo-Plutarch (Aëtius). Galen argued that the divine will only is not enough for something to be done, because there are things impossible even for God; therefore, He simply chooses the best of the possibilities available.

The views of the school of Ammonius on divine omnipotence were closer to those of Porphyry, who was reported to have ridiculed the Christian doctrine that God is absolutely omnipotent, by arguing that if everything were possible for God, then He could lie. He also argued that God cannot recall the deceased, cannot make Homer not to have existed as a poet, cannot cause twice two not to be four but five. Even if He did want it, God could not be evil or sin, because according to His essence He is good. This fact is not due to some sort of weakness, because weakness occurs in those beings which are prohibited to do that for which by nature they have a limited or no capacity at all. Thus, even if nothing external to God prevents Him from being evil, He cannot be evil.

On the other hand, the views of the school of Ammonius on divine omnipotence deviate from those of Plotinus, who argued that the Intellect is omnipotent and it is a sign of omnipotence and not powerlessness that it does not go to the worse. Both Plotinus and the school of Ammonius, however, would agree that the Intellect does not go to the worse, not because it is held fast by an external necessity, but because it is itself the necessity and law of the inferior beings. Thus, it can be assumed that the impossibility (in terms of God's own nature)
of doing evil would be taken by Plotinus not as a limitation of His power but, on the contrary, as a sign of it. One could argue that to say that it is impossible for God to lie is not to say that He lacks the power to lie. The exercise of such a power, if it existed in God, would violate His perfect goodness.\textsuperscript{557}
3.6 DIVINE OMNISCIENCE

So far there has not been an exhaustive examination of the views of the school of Ammonius as a whole on divine omniscience. In most cases several scholars have dealt with Ammonius, but within the framework of an attempt to determine Boethius' dependence on him regarding this metaphysical problem. As a consequence, similar or parallel ideas of other members of this school, like Stephanus or the Anonymous author of the commentary *in de Interpretatione*, have received practically no attention.

The school of Ammonius offers a possible account of God's experience of the world, which is, I think, conceptually defensible. Even though the views of Ammonius, Stephanus and the Anonymous on the subject are expounded in their commentaries *in de Interpretatione*, they argue that the laws of the Aristotelian syllogisms are superficial and not founded upon facts. Thus they cannot apply to the Neoplatonic solution to the problem, which includes not only metaphysical, but also epistemological, ethical and physical considerations as well. Nevertheless, this does not mean that what can be said about divine omniscience violates the laws of human logic in general.

Ammonius' and Stephanus' arguments should be conceived within their attempt to define the relation between the God and the world. The answer to the inquiry about how God knows the world in a determinate way is to be sought on a metaphysical level with the assistance of the Iamblichean theory about the relation between the knowing subject and the object known. The discussion leads also to the formulation of a theory as to the conditions of possibility in the material world.
To start with, Ammonius and Stephanus examine the truth value of two opposing beliefs:

Belief (a): The world is governed by fate or the providence of the divine. Therefore, everything in the world occurs determinately and by necessity. This is something which applies also to all eternal realities.562

Belief (b): Some things are produced by particular causes and happen by contingency. Human beings have a free will and, therefore, they ought to cultivate their education and virtue in order to act in a better way.563

Although Ammonius and Stephanus do not state it from the beginning, their main concern is to reconcile the two opposite views. Their argumentation will be pointing to the conclusion that even if God exercises providence, nothing in the material world occurs determinately and by necessity.564 Furthermore, the events which involve human beings are contingent, because they may equally well occur or not. These events are matters of human responsibility and choice.565

The discussion continues with the introduction of three hypotheses, which are as follows:566

Hypothesis (a): God knows determinately the outcomes of contingencies.567

Hypothesis (b): God has no knowledge of contingencies at all.

Hypothesis (c): God has, like humans, an indeterminate knowledge of contingencies.568

Hypothesis (b) needs hardly any argument to be refuted as impious, absurd and impossible. God is superior in that He creates and ordains all secondary beings and intellects. How, then, could He be ignorant of, or neglect, what He creates by indolence?569 It is true that neither
Ammonius nor Stephanus insisted on examining the consequences of this hypothesis.

Hypothesis (c) seems to argue that, like humans, God cannot know for sure that a future event will actually take place. This hypothesis is somewhat impious but as absurd as hypothesis (b), because divine knowledge is transcendent and superior to the human. If divine knowledge were identical to ours either in nature or in capacity, God would not be in a state of intelligent quiet, since He would have to deal with particular things. To support this view, Ammonius draws attention to the long treatises on the divine acts and to everyday facts which are significant to those people who can note them. Unfortunately, he does not become any clearer than that.

Ammonius refutes the argument that the fact that God generally gives His oracles in an ambiguous form proves His indefinite knowledge of the future. Influenced by Syrianus, he argues that divine knowledge is distinct from the quality of a prophet. What enlightens is not identical to what is enlightened. Prophetic talk remains human, partial and ambiguous, because God respects our ambivalent nature. Any prediction in general cannot have an unqualified, i.e. a determinate, truth before the predicted event actually takes place. Even so, however, prophetic talk may be to the advantage of those listening to it, since it may exercise their intellectual qualities.

The main fact which Ammonius and Stephanus use in order to refute Hypothesis (c) is the immutability of the divine. If God is to remain immutable, His knowledge cannot be variable. An indefinite knowledge is being continuously altered. If such were the case of divine knowledge, it would follow that part of the contents of the demiurgic Intellect, which is the knowing subject, would continuously be altered. The afore-
mentioned traditional philosophical and theological view is founded on
the belief that in a perfect, and therefore immutable being, any change
would have to constitute deterioration. The principle of immutability
is supported by the argument referring to the complete actualization of
a perfect being's capacities. Consequently, it is absolutely necessary
that God's capacity to know everything is completely actualized. In its
absolute actuality, His Intellect knows everything by reflecting upon
itself, because it has in itself the exemplars of all beings, i.e. the
Forms as cognitive and creative reason-principles. God generates
everything from the intelligible, indivisible and eternal Forms and
thinks of what He creates in that manner. The activity of the
demiurgic Intellect, anyway, does not extend outside itself.

God's knowledge of the future cannot be vague or conjectural,
because He does not undergo any change in Himself. This means that He
does not acquire a knowledge which He did not previously have,
because if that were the case, then He would undergo some sort of change in His
Intellect. A man may know an event after it has happened to be, but God
knows it eternally. What for humans belongs to the future and is
contingent was examined by the school of Ammonius exclusively from the
point of view of an immutable entity. For God, in whom coming-to-be
is unacceptable even as a hypothesis, there is neither past nor
future, but an eternal present which incorporates all three dimensions
of time, is distinct from temporal images and signifies divine
immutability and stability. When "is" is applied to God, it is not
meant in the temporal sense, because it actually denotes existence.
Since God necessarily is the principle with regard to all that exists,
everything is placed near Him and is unified in an eternal present.
As the category of time does not apply to His omniscience, the latter is
of a timeless eternity. For the school of Ammonius the doctrine of
timelessness provides a backing for and an explanation of the doctrine
of God's immutability. If God is timeless, He is totally immutable. It
also allows the claim that God is omniscient. God outside time knows our
free actions, no matter if they may sometimes be in the future from our
point of view. Since they are never in the future for God, He sees them
as present and this does not endanger their free character.

Divine thinking is the indivisible, simultaneous and incessant
cognition of all things that are, have been and will be, both universals
and particulars as a whole. God knows particulars without having the need
to perceive them. This may be impossible for a human being, but perfectly
normal for God. As He knows particular things, even though He does not
have in His Intellect any Forms of particular things, He also knows
privative states even though there are no privations in Him. What is
understood as the future by human beings is the present in God, because
nothing can be posterior for Him. His thinking is conceived as a static
thinking of all things at once. God's knowledge does not take anything
from the characteristics of the divisible or movable things He knows.
Furthermore, He contemplates at once the totality of the intelligible
world. For Him all intelligibles are constantly present and there is no
transition from one object to another. All other intellects, which are
below that of God, cannot simultaneously admit of two thoughts together;
they understand one thought after the other. Discursive thought is
connected with change in time, which is not attributable to God.

Since God knows the present, He knows the outcome of His own
creation and whatever springs from His creatures in any possible way.
The use of the notion of an eternal present by Ammonius and his students
eliminates from God all past and future and hence eliminates from Him
anything resembling human memory and anticipation. Thus, consistent with their exclusion of any kind of anthropomorphism, they successfully avoided inadequate anthropomorphisms in describing God.

Even though it is necessary for God to know determinately the outcomes of contingencies, yet there are certain difficulties as to the acceptance of Hypothesis (a). On the one hand, it is true that God knows the outcomes of contingencies not only completely, but also in conformity with His own nature, i.e. in a determinate way. On the other hand, however, universal determinism is introduced if we believe that contingencies necessarily conform to the knowledge God has of them.

In addition, nobody can doubt that contingent things, which develop in multiplicity and change, can neither be organized nor ordered in themselves, were it not for the creative and providential divine causality. But then, if one claims that contingent things do not necessarily conform to the divine knowledge of them, one may come to the unacceptable conclusion that the things of our world are neither known nor foreseen by God.

At this point the position of Ammonius, Stephanus and the Anonymous writer of the commentary *in de Interpretatione* cannot be defended by purely metaphysical arguments. Their thesis remains that God knows contingencies in a determinate way, yet they do not necessarily conform to the knowledge God has of them.

To reach the desired solution they apply the Iamblichean doctrine of the threefold relation between knower and known. The content of knowledge is derived from the known object, but the knower is he who determines the degree of completeness of knowledge. Therefore, knowledge is a mean between the operation of the knower upon the known object, on the one hand, and the known object, on the other hand, and need not have
the same status as the known object. The same thing, a triangle for example, is known by God as one, i.e. without the phenomenal multiplicity perceived by a human. An intellect would know it as a whole, i.e. with all its constituents together at the same time. Discursive thought would know it as a universal, representation would know it as a triangular shape, and sensation would know it as an affection.\(^{598}\) It should be observed here that even if the school of Ammonius, like Plotinus and Porphyry,\(^{599}\) distinguished between the knowledge God has of the world and God as the knowing subject, they did not introduce some sort of duality into His Intellect. There can be no subject-object distinction in the knowledge attributed to God. This means that He does not know the objects of His knowledge as something external which His Intellect has to approach cognitively. God knows everything internally, so to speak, as beings created by Him. The divine cognition of everything else is presented as analogous to the sun's light when still in the sun. God has an exact knowledge of all things with constant reference to His own nature. This is possible not because He has perceived all things, but rather because He possesses their cognitive and creative reason-principles.

The part of this theory which is of particular interest to the problem of divine knowledge is that if the knower is superior to the known, then he has a knowledge of it which is superior even to the knowledge the known has of itself, provided that the object known is itself a knower.\(^{600}\) Applying this doctrine to our case, Stephanus says that God knows the generated things in a way which is superior to the indeterminate nature of the generated things, that is to say that He knows them in a definite way.\(^{601}\) God's knowledge of contingencies corresponds to the kind of knowledge which is superior to the object
known, because God realizes contingent things better than contingent things themselves do. Even if the latter have an indeterminate nature and may either occur or not, God possesses a determinate knowledge of them.\textsuperscript{602} The divine science of contingencies is single and immutable. To know divisible things in an indivisible and dimensionless way, manifold things in a unitary way, temporal things atemporally and generated things in an ungenerated way is not only appropriate, but also necessary for God.\textsuperscript{603} The possession of perfect knowledge was attributed even to lower gods, nymphs, angels and daemons. They possess this knowledge eternally because of the cognitive reason-principles in their intellects, without the need of any gradual process involving learning or intellection.\textsuperscript{604}

God ordains all possibilities,\textsuperscript{605} but epistemically there is no possibility for Him, as He knows the outcome of everything beforehand.\textsuperscript{606} Possibilities exist metaphysically with respect to particular beings only, but their definite outcome is not caused by God's knowledge of it; the nature of things themselves is exclusively responsible not only for their outcome, but also for the contents of the knowledge God has of their outcome.\textsuperscript{607} Since God transcends all ambivalence and contingency, the reason for His omniscience is that the outcome of what is indefinite is included in the possibilities He has arranged. Divine knowledge renders actual what for us is in potency.\textsuperscript{608} From our point of view in the world, free future decisions appear as not yet made;\textsuperscript{609} nevertheless in reality they already have been made and exist in God timelessly in their full concreteness.

The outcome of contingencies cannot be thought necessary on the ground that God knows it in a determinate way. When it occurs, it will be only because a contingent thing will have this or that outcome. God must simply know which this outcome will be.\textsuperscript{610} Since divine knowledge
is not understood by the school of Ammonius to be a foreknowledge, it no more necessitates an event than our seeing of an event necessitates it. If God knows that a certain particular will come to be at some time, the particular will come to be at that time, because the existence of things follows the truth of the cognitive reason-principles in His Intellect. In other words, it is argued that necessarily, if God knows anything, it will come to pass. The only things which God can rightly be said to know are those which in fact come to pass. This does not entail that if God knows anything, it will necessarily come to pass. Such a claim would yield the conclusion that man does not have free will.

Ammonius himself did not examine the role of free will in this scheme. Its existence is justified by the Anonymous commentator on the de Interpretatione and Stephanus. The former argues that men have been made by Nature to have free will with reference to contingencies, and this is not in vain on behalf of Nature. If everything in the world were subject to necessity, free will would be purposeless. The latter justifies the existence of free will as the only possible answer to the question why God does not prevent evil actions, even though He knows a priori how men will choose and what the outcome of their choice will be. Stephanus holds that even if God has the ability to prevent evil actions, He does not wish to do it, because He has bestowed on man free will. The fact, however, remains that God freely allows evil to occur. Stephanus did not pose the question if this is somehow evil after all.
3.7 THE CREATION OF THE WORLD

In the previous section we examined the doctrine that the divine knowledge of the outcome of contingent entities does not determine this outcome at all. Things are different, though, with respect to the generation, i.e. the beginning, of contingent entities. At the level of generation of beings by the Demiurge there is a strict interdependence between intellection and causation. The Demiurge knows what He creates and creates what He knows. The creation of the world depends on His activity of intellection as He generates by means of His thought. The creative reason-principles in His Intellect are acts of thinking and when He creates, He gives existence to His thoughts. The world is an image or an imitation of the archetypes in His Intellect. A particular man, for example, has only a similarity to the universal "Man" in the demiurgic Intellect.\(^{616}\) The creation by the Demiurge is the total, integral and transcendent causation of the existence of all beings; therefore it is incomparably superior to that by Nature.\(^{617}\) The responsibility of the Demiurge is not restricted to qualitative changes, as these take place when something receives its species on its way from becoming to being.\(^{618}\)

Ammonius was reported by Simplicius to have shown that the Aristotelian Unmoved Mover is both the efficient and the final cause of the universe. Ammonius thought that Aristotle recognized God as the demiurgic Intellect, identical to the Good, which is causally responsible for the beginningless existence of the natural world and for the eternal movement of the universe as well. This interpretation of Aristotle's God is offered at the level of natural philosophy.\(^{619}\)

Asclepius, on the other hand, presented Ammonius as holding that Aristotle's God contains both a supreme principle (identical to the
Neoplatonic One) and, distinct from it, an intellect subordinate to the supreme principle and responsible for the orderly motion of things. The Unmoved Mover is said primarily to be the Good, the first origin and the final cause of all reality. It is clear that for Asclepius the Aristotelian unmoved Mover is not identified by Ammonius with the demiurgic Intellect. Aristotle's God was also similarly interpreted by early Philoponus as the efficient and the final cause of the universe which is identical to the Neoplatonic One. Elias, too, ascribed to Aristotle the transcendence of the Good with respect to the demiurgic Intellect. 620

K. Verrycken 621 suggested that both Asclepius' and Simplicius' versions should be considered as two complementary variants of the same theory. It is simply a shift of emphasis: Asclepius, as a commentator of the Metaphysics, referred to the level of the supreme cause, the One, while Simplicius, as a commentator of the Physics and the De caelo, referred to the level of the demiurgic Intellect.

Ammonius' philosophical discussion on the creation of the world is based on the necessities to which the Demiurge is subject. It is among His integral characteristics, as we have seen in section 3.5, that by necessity He is the source of all goodness and that He continually creates. It was difficult for Ammonius to believe that the Demiurge has not always been productive and that He might have refrained from creating anything. If the eternal creation of the world is good and desirable, then for the Demiurge to have refrained from creating, while having the capacity to do so, would be a defect or imperfection. 622

Following Proclus, Ammonius was a monist in his ethics as he accepted the existence of one ultimate cause of everything. 623 Whatever exists, derives from the Demiurge, who is necessarily good. It is because
of His goodness that He creates the world, which is something good.\textsuperscript{624} The Demiurge has always to be creating in order to be the absolute good actually and not potentially. In the Neoplatonic tradition one finds the belief in the necessity according to which the sensible world is a consequence of the intelligible in the way that light is reflected from a source of light.\textsuperscript{625}

The Demiurge does not undergo any alteration when He creates. When the incorporeal beings act, they do not move or change, in the proper sense, because their acting does involve any destruction at all.\textsuperscript{626} Alteration proper is a characteristic only of the material objects when one of their properties is destroyed and another is acquired.\textsuperscript{627} The creation is not to be considered even as a quasi-alteration, for the Demiurge is an actuality not preceded by any potentiality at all. This means that in Him there is no actualization of any potentialities, in which case, even if no destruction were involved, one would be justified to talk about a quasi-alteration.

When the Demiurge creates He gives substance and existence to creatures by extending His energy outside Himself,\textsuperscript{628} but not all creatures have a substantial relation with Him. The substances He creates with no other intervention are similar to His own. The material world is created after the intervention of the heavenly bodies; therefore, it has a substance different not only from that of the Demiurge, which is immaterial, but also from that of the heavenly bodies, which is less material than that of the sublunary world.\textsuperscript{629} There is nothing which does not have the Demiurge either as its immediate or its prior cause.\textsuperscript{630} Since He creates the essence of all things, nothing can escape His causality which is superior to all other causalities.\textsuperscript{631} The world depends on the Demiurge absolutely and in a radical way. Thus creation
should be understood as a beneficence to the world by the eternal entelechy of the Demiurge. The constant relation between the efficient cause and the things created is that the latter participate in the goodness of the former.  

The existence of some sort of communion among all creatures proves that everything has been created by one principle. The generative causes of the world are not many, because if that were the case, they would be equally valued. But even then, one among them would have to be generative of the rest.

Everything derives from a pre-existing cause (i.e. the Forms in the demiurgic Intellect) and there is no creation ex nihilo. For the school of Ammonius a creation ex nihilo would presuppose that not-Being would be in actuality prior to Being and, therefore, something non-existent would become superior to something existent. If the creation of the world were ex nihilo, not-Being would have pre-existed Being. If so, not-Being either

(a) would have the power to generate, or

(b) would not have this power at all.

If not-Being had the power to generate matter, then not-Being would be matter itself, given that everything which is generated is material. But by definition not-Being cannot be matter. Therefore, (a) is not valid. In conclusion, if not-Being pre-existed Being, then there would be no generation at all, which means that the creation of the world was not ex nihilo.

Another argument as to the derivation of the world from one and the same principle is that the order of the world cannot be attributed to mere chance. The omnibenevolent Demiurge projects His purposes upon Nature and works them out there. The order and the continuous
succession of beings is to be connected to a certain purpose executed by Nature. It creates that which applies to the majority of beings, so what happens by chance is per accidens, not eternal, nor by necessity, nor defined and somehow without cause. A monster, for example, is a mistake of Nature and is not created either for its own sake or for the sake of something else. Despite the fact that in the works of Ammonius and his students many are the assertions that neither the Demiurge nor Nature creates anything superfluous or evil or at random, few are the references as to what exactly the general purpose of creation is. Since providence manages the universe, everything happens for the sake of some good. The most purposive work of Nature is to allow natural beings to participate in the eternity of the divine as much as this is possible. Particular natural beings, however, are subject to generation and destruction. Therefore, Nature preserves their specific eternity by means of reproduction. The circular motion of the heavenly bodies and of the elements of the world is also another sign of providence exercised by Nature, which aims at the restoration of the duration and composition of the world. Mankind, which constitutes the dregs of the universe, had to exist or the world would be imperfect. Man exists in order to embellish the tangible world, but no other clues are given as to the general purpose of the tangible world. Even when Ammonius and Gessius discuss the necessity according to which the Demiurge continually creates, they do not incorporate this necessity into the services of a general plan.

Creation starts from the perfect beings. In the first place, the Demiurge creates the eternally unchangeable beings, the intelligible substances, which need no external place. To create the material world, He uses as an instrument the unformed and composite matter.
Thus, He secondly, gives existence to the heavenly bodies. Thirdly, He creates the natural beings, which numerically are generable and perishable, but specifically are eternal.\textsuperscript{647}

It is important to stress that, according to Ammonius and his students, the Demiurge does not create the whole world directly. They transferred part of the divine causality to the heavenly bodies in order to explain the origin of destruction in the material world. God is the cause of generation as such and ensures that generation is everlasting.\textsuperscript{648} Destruction does not occur in the eternal beings created by the Demiurge Himself (e.g. the souls or the heavenly bodies), but in the beings created after the intervention of the heavenly bodies.\textsuperscript{649} Sublunary substantial change is a perpetual process of generation, the efficient cause of which is the perpetual motion of the heavenly bodies.\textsuperscript{650}

To formulate their theory, one could probably say that the Demiurge either Himself brings about or makes or permits some other being to bring about the existence of all beings that exist. When other beings bring about the existence of things, the Demiurge makes them do so, or permits them to do so. The beings which have been generated directly by the Demiurge are eternal; perishable are the beings ultimately derived from the Demiurge, as well, but with the intervention of the heavenly bodies, which are more proximate causes of generation of the particulars and the causes of their destruction.\textsuperscript{651} A creation of the world directly by the Demiurge would be contrary to the natural order of things which requires that the effects have to be as similar to their causes as possible. Since such a similarity does not exist between the Demiurge and the material world, it is assumed that the latter has been created with the intervention of intermediate powers. These powers do not have an
independent existence. One clearly sees here the influence of Plato's *Timaeus* in the theory that the Demiurge does not create mortal creatures directly. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that in their metaphysical system the later Neoplatonists preferred to multiply the levels of Being by interposing a third entity, whenever the relation between two entities seemed to be unclear. The third entity usually had elements in common with the initial two entities.

Our sources are no more informative regarding the exact role of the intervening efficient causes of the world. What becomes more than evident, however, is the elimination of the role of the Demiurge in the creation of the particular beings.
Eternity is the most important, I think, of the set of characteristics traditionally attributed to the Demiurge, because it is logically connected to claims concerning other attributes. In particular, the claim that He is necessary, the claim that He is immanent in the world, that He knows or cares about human existence and so forth. On the other hand, however, the belief in the eternity of the Demiurge without certain modifications would collapse the distinctions between past, present and future in the material world and would lead to the conclusion that time and history are illusions. Such modifications are found in the doctrine of the school of Ammonius concerning the coeternity of the world with the Demiurge. This doctrine advanced the view that the world as a whole is eternal, but its parts are in time, and, consequently, subject to generation and destruction.

To begin with, pagan Neoplatonists believed in the eternity and self-sufficiency of matter and that the world is eternal though in all aspects dependent on the Demiurge. The problem is one of natural philosophy involving, however, arguments as to the relation of the world to the Demiurge in the way Ammonius and his students see it. They ascribed to Aristotle the view that God is causally responsible for the existence of the universe, but not in the sense of giving it a beginning.

They used the belief in the eternity of the world to show that theological speculation is possible. In particular, it was argued that the cause of the eternal movement of the heavens is one and immaterial. No material cause could be responsible for such a movement, because material causes have limited power and are perishable. Consequently, they
would make the heavens perishable, too. The cause of the movement of the heavens is one, incorporeal, infinite and imperishable. These are exactly the characteristics of the divine.

The background of this discussion is the passage in Plato's *Timaeus* where it is stated that the universe was generated in time. Some Platonists, like Plutarch and Atticus, argued that its generation is temporal. Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus and Proclus interpreted this passage as expressing Plato's belief that the divine is only causally and not temporally prior to the world. Proclus attributed infinite duration to the universe which he conceived as generated, but with no temporal end. Therefore, the world does not enjoy the eternity of the divine.  

Ammonius was reported to have written a book on the causes of the world. In this book the fundamental hypothesis must have been the eternity of the Demiurge. Deviating from Proclus, the school of Ammonius subscribed to the metaphorical interpretation of the *Timaeus* as asserting the creation of the world ab aeterno. The Demiurge supplies being to everything, but creation does not start from a particular time; it occurs from eternity. The structures of the heavens, of the rational human soul and of the world soul, which causes the movement of the heavenly bodies, are eternal. The creation of the world is not a temporal process and, therefore, it has neither a beginning nor an end. Despite the fact that the universe has no beginning or end, it still is not true being, because its parts are not imperishable; they are subject to generation and destruction no matter if the universe is imperishable as a whole.

The main thesis, on which Ammonius was reported to have based his argumentation regarding the coeternity of the world with its Demiurge, is the immutability of the Demiurge. The hypothesis that the universe had
a temporal beginning undermines such a thesis, because it implies that the Demiurge changed His purposes and then created the universe.

The claims (a) that the Demiurge had once been ignorant of the Good and acquired knowledge of it afterwards and (b) that it was because of envy that He did not create the world eternally are totally unacceptable. It is inconsistent to believe that He was first inactive and then proceeded to the creation of the elements of the world. This view is incompatible with His immutability.

As the Demiurge does not undergo any change at all, the only possible solution for Ammonius was to accept that the world is coeternal with the Demiurge. If the case were different, one would have to attribute deliberation to the Demiurge in the sense that He some time wanted beings to subsist. This in turn would mean that there was a time when He did not have such a deliberation. Ammonius believes that since deliberation itself requires some time, it introduces change in the Demiurge.

The Demiurge cannot have begun the creation of the world at a certain point in time. He needs no time at all to produce all things by His generative power. The creation of the world, therefore, has to be non-temporal. What is in time concerning the world is, presumably, its present order. The world is coextensive in time with the Demiurge, so long as He is only causally prior. The subordination of the world to the Demiurge should not be understood as a chronological posteriority, but as an eternal ontological dependence. Therefore, the world is eternal and the heavenly bodies are indestructible with an eternal substance. By virtue of the creative reason-principles in the demiurgic Intellect, the world is free from disease and ageing.
Having shown that the coeternity of the world with the Demiurge is the only plausible possibility, the school of Ammonius advances the claim that the world is eternal by being imperishable as a whole.\textsuperscript{674} This does not mean of course that destruction is not a phenomenon in the world, but that it applies to the particulars only. As the Demiurge cannot be said to be evil, destruction of the particulars is attributed to His goodness. But certainly it is not in vain, nor because of something evil outside the divine.

If the world were to perish as a whole, then one would have to admit that such a destruction is in conformity with the divine will. Otherwise, it would be implied that the Demiurge is weak.\textsuperscript{675} To prove that the Demiurge does not wish the world to perish as a whole, Ammonius proceeded to the rejection of the three possible explanations of the hypothesis that the world is to perish as a whole in conformity with the divine will:

a) First, the world would perish as a whole, if the Demiurge wished to create something better afterwards.

For Ammonius this possibility has to be excluded, because he understands this world to be the best of all creatures.

b) Secondly, this world would perish as a whole, if the Demiurge wished to create something worse afterwards.

This possibility is hardly refuted by Ammonius. He simply says that it is not right for such a belief to be held.

c) Thirdly, this world would perish as a whole, if the Demiurge wished to create something similar afterwards.

This is equally unacceptable for Ammonius, because it implies that the Demiurge labours in vain and destroys His good works to create something similar.
Consequently, the Demiurge has no plausible reason to allow the destruction of the world as a whole. That the world is imperishable as a whole implies, as well, that it was not generated in time. Ammonius did not argue that what is indestructible is not created in time — this was actually the view of the Presocratics, Plato and Aristotle —, but that the indestructible world was not created in time.\(^675\) Destruction is only of particulars, because their immediate cause is not the Demiurge. His goodness and immutability explain why the world does not perish as a whole. The Demiurge does not allow the destruction of the world which by definition is good.\(^677\) Like a good general, He preserves the harmony of the world by creating new individuals to replace those which have perished.\(^678\) Thus sublunary living substances, e.g. human beings, are specifically eternal, by way of creation and destruction.\(^679\)

That the world has a spherical shape was used by Gessius\(^680\) as an additional proof that the world has no beginning or end in time. It is self-evident, of course, that this claim is not persuasive at all. Gessius' proper arguments as to the eternity of the world have as their starting point two premisses.\(^681\) The first is that everything generated comes to be in time. The second (obviously fallacious, because it confuses time as measure and time as duration) is that measures are by nature contemporaneous with that which is measured, as they are related to each other. Gessius' argument then runs as follows: if we suppose that time was generated, it has to be accepted that time was generated contemporaneously with the heavens. But if so, one comes to the absurd conclusion that time was created in time, i.e. that there pre-existed a time for the subsistence of time, or, in other words that the world pre-existed its own existence. Therefore, Gessius concludes, neither time nor the world was generated in time; they are coeternal with the Demiurge.
Philoponus(?) / Stephanus(?) simply mentioned Aristotle's belief in the eternity of the world, and some people's belief in the eternity of the fifth substance. Similarly, Pseudo-Elias referred to the doctrine of the eternity of matter. The point is, however, that nowhere did they accept or refute these beliefs.

The conclusion which probably derives from this discussion is that Ammonius' own position regarding the eternity of the world differs from that of Proclus in the following point: Proclus maintained that the world has a temporal beginning but no end in time, while Ammonius was presumably the first to argue for the coeternity of the world with the Demiurge. Ammonius' modification of the doctrine of the eternity of the world became possible, because it was grounded in the immutability of the Demiurge. He understood immutability in the strong sense that the Demiurge cannot change at all. The doctrine of divine immutability in this sense is combined with the doctrine of divine timelessness. The perfection of the Demiurge consists in His being in a certain static condition. As to the rest, Ammonius was in accordance with the pagan tradition that this world has no end in time.
3.8 DIVINE PROVIDENCE

Based on the belief in the immutability of the divine, the school of Ammonius taught that the Demiurge does not act according to any deliberations when He exercises providence. Since the existence of any deliberations in the Demiurge would introduce change in Him, they understood divine providence to be a conscious work, but not a willed one. This idea is traditional in Neoplatonism, since Proclus had argued that divine providence operates automatically and without deliberation at all. From the very fact that the Demiurge has created the world, it is concluded that He exercises providence. The school of Ammonius could not conceive of the existence of a Demiurge who does not show concern for what He has created. An inferior deity, which is patron of motion and procession, stimulates the Demiurge to providential care of all beings. Even if stimulated by some patron deity, He exercises providence without any thought or notion of His, just as the sun fills everything which can participate in it with its light.

The facts that the Demiurge transcends all beings inferior to Him and eternally contemplates Himself are not incompatible with the providence He exercises for the beings He transcends. His transcendence is accomplished by means of His elevative powers, which allow Him to revert upon Himself. Neither does His providence involve any remission of His pure and unitary transcendence, nor does His separate unity annul His providence in the direct acts of which, miracles are also included. There is not a being small enough to be ignored by the omniscient providence, nor so large as to escape its ordaining incorporeal power, which is simultaneously near all beings and near each one of them. Providence is another name to denote divine goodness.
According to a law of correspondence, providential care is much more of wholes than of parts, just as in a particular living being the best part of it has the better part of its activity. The power of the Demiurge extends not only to unformed matter, but also to privations, negations and even to not-Being. It reaches even those men who want to be deprived of it, bringing them back to conformity with Nature by means of deserved punishment. Even though the Demiurge is equally and constantly concerned with everyone per se and not per accidens, it is because of their weakness that some people think that He has separated Himself from them. In order to know how the Demiurge exercises providence, one needs the purification of one’s passions. Thus one realizes the wisdom with which His providence gives the order of beings.

Of all entities the eternal ones are taken less care of than the things which are in a flux. Having received their changeless substance immediately from the Demiurge, eternal beings hardly need any providence at all. The underlying view was better expressed by Saint Augustine who argued that God granted more Being to some of His creatures and less to others and, therefore, ordered natural entities according to a system of degrees of Being.

The indeterminate entities, in contrast, could not exist or be organized or ordered in themselves without the transcendent and the particular causality of the providence of the Demiurge. When He exercises providence, He treats the material world as something mutable, subject to becoming in time. However, He acts in accordance with His own nature which is one, simple and wholly invariable.

With respect to humans, the Demiurge is believed to take care of all of them equally. They receive the illumination of His providence with
the intervention of the heavens, but it depends on their susceptibility to benefit from it as much as possible. Normally the Demiurge takes care not only of man's being, but also of his well-being. If the recipients are not purified of their passions, it may seem to them that He has separated Himself from them; this is only an illusion, with the exception of clearly unworthy people.

The Demiurge exercises providence on humans also by giving them free will in order that they can make their own decisions with respect to contingencies. Since men are self-motivated, this entails for them the capacity to sin. Their actions are not determined by prior states of the world; their choices are up to them. It also entails that the Demiurge is not responsible for their wrongdoing, because, in addition, they have also been given common notions to recognize and avoid evil. Common notions are supposed to provide men with criteria to judge their own actions. Men are free to act either in accordance to common morality or not, so that they are morally responsible for their actions. Common notions are also useful for enabling them to speculate about the Demiurge and the rational souls. The possession of the latter kind of notions is irrespective of faith in God.

The justice of the providence of the Demiurge is also seen in the fact that human souls have immortal substances. If they were mortal, after their withdrawal from the body, the souls of good persons would not differ from those of evil persons. The texts available do not provide any details as to the awards given to good souls after death. Concerning the punishment of bad souls, we are informed that it consists in the expiation of every sin. Then, the souls are set free to return to life in their natural station. Owing to divine providence, each man gets what he deserves according to his merits and his deeds; therefore, the
punishment of the souls is not inflicted because of divine wrath. This necessity is realized after the death of the body, since the soul is immortal. Punishment may be among the things the Demiurge is said to do, but it should be mentioned that the school of Ammonius did not pay any attention to the consequence that the doing of punishment at one time carries entailments of things being true at later or earlier times. If God brings about punishment of one's sins after one's death, then necessarily the punishment of one's sins comes into existence simultaneously with, or subsequently to, the action of the Demiurge. So, the supposition that the Demiurge could bring things about, like punishing, without His doing these things at times before or after other times seems incoherent. In the terminology of the school of Ammonius the noun "punishment" (κόλασις) is not used in a sense different from the normal, in an analogical sense, for example.
Ammonius and his students were persuaded that in the divine we find ourselves immeasurably transcended. The divine is beyond the limits of our comprehending capacity. We may speak of it in terms of personal attributes, but such terms cannot properly describe it. Between what we say about God and what God is, there is an analogy or a correspondence or a partial agreement. However, after we exhaust the resources of language in pointing the soul toward the transcendent, in the end we realize that what we mean is beyond anything that we could ever say.

Of the six different senses in which God may be unknown in Neoplatonism, according to E.R. Dodds, the following five were expounded in the writings of the school of Ammonius.

(a) God may be unknown to mankind in general owing to the necessary limitations of human nature.

The school applied this sense to the unknowability of the One, the supreme God.

(b) God may be unknown to all who have not enjoyed a special revelation or initiation.

The school applied this sense to the case of people who need an active intellect to make their potential intellects actual either by means of illumination from the demiurgic Intellect or by means of teaching.

(c) God may be unknown and unknowable in His essence, but partially knowable by inference from His works or analogy with other causes.

For the school of Ammonius this corresponds to the case of our knowledge of the Demiurge.
(d) God may be unknown and unknowable in His positive character, but definable in negations.

This is the view of those members of the school of Ammonius, who advanced arguments in favour of negative theology.

(e) God may be unknown and unknowable, but accessible in a unio mystica which is not properly speaking knowledge, being supralogical.

This is the case applied to the unknowability of the One, which is and will be unknown to all human beings if they try to know it by means of a rational approach.

Nevertheless, Ammonius and his students were of the opinion that we should perform the labour of understanding the Demiurge through His manifestation in Nature. We learn that He is omniscient, omnibenevolent, productively perfect, self-existent, eternal, not subject to laws of space and time, impassive, purely actual, absolutely necessary and simple and with a huge power. Notably, Ammonius and his students had no views as to the transmission of this knowledge of the divine to others.

Even if they argued that man can be united with the divine by means of intuition, they considered such an experience as non-philosophical and, with the exception of Olympiodorus, limited themselves to a purely philosophical knowledge of God, to the rational processes for a natural knowledge of God.

With reference to the doctrine of the school on the cognitive and creative reason-principles they constructed a consistent theory based on the similarity between the Demiurge and man. Thus it was reasonable to argue that both know what they know due to the activation of the cognitive reason-principles in their intellects. The activation of the cognitive reason-principles in the human intellect in time makes it able to acquire knowledge of an intellect which may be superior to, but still similar
with the human to some extent, at least. There are of course things about
the divine which cannot be known by the human intellect because of the
fact that the latter resides in a body. What is known about the Demiurge,
however, is consistent with the position of the Demiurge in their
metaphysical system which requires that the Demiurge is subject to some
unsurpassable necessities.

The theory of the school of Ammonius has not survived either in
contemporary or in modern philosophy. It is defensible, though, within
its historical framework as a Neoplatonic theory in late antiquity. Thus
it has a considerable coherence, even if its constituent parts are in the
form of scattered references appearing in commentaries on Platonic,
Aristotelian, Porphyrian, mathematical and astrological works.
NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION


3. Commenting on the Christian students in the school of Ammonius, K. Praechter (1910, 152-153) argued: "Was die jungen Christen in der Philosophenschule suchten, war nicht die Wahrheit über die höchsten Dinge - diese glaubten sie in ihrer Religion gegeben - sondern die Kenntnis des Platon und Aristoteles als wesentlicher Bestandteil allgemein hellenischer and als Grundlage philosophischer Bildung. So trat auch für den Exegeten an die Stelle des spekulativen das gelehrte and pädagogische Interesse". See K. Praechter (1912), 5 n. 5. Similar was the view of Ph. Merlan (1968), 200-201.


8. R.T. Wallis (1972), 144.


12. F. Susemihl (1891), 97.


15. I. Hadot (1990b), 278.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1: PRESUPPOSITIONS AND PURPOSE OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD


24. Philoponus, *in An. Post.* 308.19; *in de An.* 183.17-20, 194.16-18. Philoponus (*in An. Post.* 439.5-11) claimed that the human intellect (νοῦς) is properly so called when it reflects upon eternal beings, as they are the proper objects of its thought. For Simplicius (*in de An.* 240.21, 240.25, 240.29, 244.2, 244.40, 245.8) this part of the soul is called the ἀκρατᾶτος νοῦς (i.e. the excellent mind) or the ἀκρατής of the soul.


33. Olympiodorus (*in Gorg.* 255.17-27) argues that it is impossible for an incorporeal and divine rational soul which descends on the earth to be immediately connected to a body. When the soul descends, it has an illumination from the divine, similar to the illumination emanated during the creation of the world. In order to be able to be united with a body, the rational soul is first connected to the irrational soul.


35. For Plato (*Phaedo* 94d) verbal knowledge is an imperfect way of grasping intelligible entities. Since words and names are drawn from the sense world, they are only images of the Forms and cannot exactly reproduce them or express their essence. A Form cannot be subject to predicates in their everyday sense. See R.T. Wallis (1986), 462-471; P. Kotzia - Panteli (1992), 207.

36. Asclepius, *in Metaph.* 114.4-9; Ps.-Elias (Ps.-David), *in Isag.* 17.10-11; David, *Def.* 84.10-20; A. Sanjan (1986a), 104. If there were no oblivion at all, the human intellect would be as privileged as the demiuric Intellect to have an eternal memory of everything. Memory, for Olympiodorus (*in Phaed.* 11 § 4), is secondarily found in the human souls, insomuch as they pass from one object to another and do not know all things simultaneously and timelessly. A third mode of memory exists also in the human souls, in which there are also interruptions by oblivion. Memory is superior to recollection, because of the fact that it is always directed at the same object. Cf. L.G. Westerink's note on pp. 154-155 of his edition of Olympiodorus' *in Phaedonem*; P. Kotzia - Panteli (1992), 207.

38. Ammonius, *in Cat.* 37.13-20; Asclepius, *in Metaph.* 98.5-17, 166.1-5, 276.4-6; Philoponus, *in An. Pr.* 66.7-9; *in de An.* 15.9-16.25, 118.12-20, 119.17-19, 119.22-24, 121.5-9; Olympiodorus, *in Phaed.* 4 § 2; Philoponus (?) / Stephanus (?), *in de An.* 530.1-2, 530.23-26, 541.20-542.5, 542.28-543.4, 550.20-21, 550.28-32, 551.4-6, 563.27-31; K. Verrycken (1991), 221; A. Segonds (1992), 472-473.

39. Olympiodorus, *in Alc.* 10.5-7; Philoponus (?) / Stephanus (?), *in de An.* 466.18-27; W. Bernard (1987), 159. Yet Olympiodorus (*in Gorg.* 17.11-14) makes the important distinction that the rational soul is of eternal essence and activity, but does not remain unchangeable.


41. Philoponus, *in de Intell.* 21.7-10; cf. 21.16-18; Olympiodorus, *in Alc.* 10.8-10, 198.20-199.2; *in Phaed.* 4 § 2, 5 § 10, 6 § 2, 8 § 1, 11 § 6; Philoponus (?) / Stephanus (?), *in de An.* 533.32-34.


46. Olympiodorus, *in Phaed.* 6 § 3, 6 § 10.

47. Philoponus, *in de Intell.* 20.90-21.95, 37.75-76, 40.50-52, 41.54-60, 59.6-10.


51. Asclepius (*in Metaph.* 102.17-19) attributes this doctrine to Plato who used the symbolic term "indivisible lines" to denote the indivisible principles of the soul (cf. Olympiodorus, *in Alc.* 142.15-143.1; *in Phaed.* 13 § 3-4, 13 § 6).


53. Philoponus, *in de An.* 75.27-31. A gnoseological axiom for the Neoplatonists, as well, is that all knowledge is of what is similar to the already known. The human soul knows both the intelligible and the sensible worlds by means of the reason-principles of all things it has in itself and knows by similarities (Empedocles, fr. B 109; Aristotle, *Metaph.* 1000b5-9; Porphyry, *Sent.* 25, p. 11.5; Plotinus, *Enn.* I.8.1.8;
Iamblichus, Comm. math. sc. 38.6-8; Proclus, in Tim. II 298.27, III 160.18; Philoponus, in de Intell. 44.25-38, 50.91-98, 55.00-7; in de An. 121.30-5; Olympiodorus, in Alc. 217.18-19, 218.4-5). Cf. C. Zintzen (1965), 77 n. 29.

54. Philoponus, in de An. 73.30-31.

55. Asclepius, in Metaph. 86.16-20, 89.17-20, 439.23-28; Philoponus, in de An. 120.10-13; A. Segonds (1992), 475. On David's view of the soul as an element of divine origin in the human body, see A. Sanjian (1986a), 107.

56. Olympiodorus, in Phaed. 13 § 5.


59. Asclepius, in Metaph. 80.30-81.4; Philoponus(?) / Stephanus(?), in de An. 539.36-39; K. Kremer (1961), 186-188; H. Khatchadourian (1986), 54. It was a common practice of Iamblichus, Proclus and the school of Ammonius to use analogies in order to represent something on a higher level of reality by something on a lower level which is like it. See K. Praechter (1910), 131-134; W. Beierwaltes (1965), 171 n. 23; A.D.R. Sheppard (1980), 197-199.


61. Philoponus(?) / Stephanus(?), in de An. 539.16-19.


63. ibid., 98.36-43, 115.60-116.65.

64. ibid., 9.11-12, 10.25-27, 10.40-43, 11.72-12.75, 32.70-72.

65. ibid., 47.19-21, 84.79-85.81.

66. Asclepius, in Nic. Isag. I.γ.50-53; Philoponus, in de Intell. 9.14-10.21, 31.39-32.64, 33.80-94, 43.11-13, 45.53-56, 48.27-49.54, 50.77-81, 51.96-98, 52.19-27, 55.7-14, 56.31-37, 58.99-01, 59.16-21, 90.38-91.49, 91.58-62; Cf. Aristotle, de An. 429b5-7; See G. Verbeke (1985), 460. The views of the Neoplatonist philosophers as to the nature of the transcendent intellect which perfects human intellect vary according to the way they interpret Aristotle's active intellect. Plotinus taught that it is the cosmic intellect emanated from the One and it is near the top of the hierarchy of being. Marinus viewed the active intellect as something daemonic or angelic, while Philoponus (in de Intell. 44.25 ff.) reported that some thinkers identified it as an intellect which is inferior to God and close to the human intellect and
radiates upon human souls in order to make them perfect. See also H.A. Davidson (1992), 14-15.


69. *ibid.*, 56.45-47.

70. *ibid.*, 57.57-61. Similarly for Plato (*Resp.* 508e-509b) in the sensible world the sun is the cause of light, which enables things to be seen, and of sight, which enables the eye to see. In the intelligible world the Form of the Good is the source of truth, which enables the Forms to be known, and of knowledge, which enables the mind to know, though it itself is neither truth nor knowledge. See R.C. Cross and A.D. Woolzey (1964), 202; S. Gersh (1978), 94.


74. *ibid.*, 8.84-86, 9.91-00, 47.9-15, 83.37-48; Philoponus (?) / Stephanus (?), *in de An.* 541.1-3; R. Vancourt (1941), 56.


83. One such notion, for example, is that everybody desires good and rejects evil (Ammonius, in Int. 256.11-13; Philoponus, in de An. 3.16-31, 5.16-20). See G. Verbeke (1985), 467.

84. Philoponus, in de Intelli. 20.82-88; in An. Post. 286.9-10; Olympiodorus, in Alc. 4.15-5.10.


86. Olympiodorus, in Phaed. 5 § 1; Philoponus (?) / Stephanus (?), in de An. 490.20-28, 498.4-11, 517.16-19, 526.3-5, 541.20-31, 542.9-14, 560.3-4, 563.36-564.14, 567.2-4, 578.7-9; J.M. Cocking (1991), 54.

87. Philoponus, in Cat. 32.17-20; in de Intelli. 75.9-13.


89. Asclepius, in Metaph. 5.37-6.13, 21.3-6, 195.31-34; Philoponus, in de An. 16.4-25; cf. Philoponus (?) / Stephanus (?), in de An. 555.39-556.5. See W. Bernard (1987), 161.

90. Iamblichus, Protr. 4.21, 22.4, 118.29; Plotinus, Enn. V.3.17, V.5.10; Proclus, De Prov. 30.4, 30.4-18; in Tim. I 400.20 ff., II 61.16 ff.; Ecl. de phil. Chald. 3 ff.; O. Sbhrgen (1923), 50 ff.; R. Klibansky and C. Labowsky (eds.), Plato Latinus III (Procii in Parmenidem), London 1953, 92-94; W. Beierwaltes (1975), 173, 185.

91. Asclepius, in Metaph. 11.34-36, 15.10, 374.8; Philoponus, in de Intelli. 67.14-15, 75.19-20, 86.30-32, 91.53-55; in de An. 78.10-11; in An. Post. 324.5-6; Ps.-Elias (Ps.-David), in Isag. 17.19.


93. Olympiodorus, in Phaed. 8 § 3, 8 § 6; Philoponus, in de Intelli. 33.80-93, 57.68, 61.79-92, 89.96-99; in de An. 126.29; G. Verbeke (1985), 468-70.

94. Philoponus, in de Intelli. 61.84-62.87; Cf. Plato, Phaedo 66d.

95. The sun dispenses its light equally, but bats, because of their unfitness for the sunlight, fly from it and are not enlightened. They think, however, that the sun is darkness (Elias, Prol. 15.28-30). The above mentioned simile is found in a text which Elias (Prol. 15.23 ff.) attributes to Plotinus. L.G. Westerink (1964b, 31), however, persuasively concluded that the original argumentation occurs in Proclus (Inst. Theol. props. 122, 140, 143, 189; Theol. Plat. I 15 pp. 76.10-77.4). Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. 993b9-11, 1029b1 ff.; Phys. 184a16-26; Alexander, in Metaph. 142.16-23; Asclepius, in Metaph. 3.22-25, 3.30-31, 4.30-35, 11.35-36, 13.24-29, 14.32-15.2, 114.3-16, 114.30-37, 381.19-22, 382.24-27, 382.32-383.1, 383.9-13; in Nic. Isag. 1.y.35-53; Philoponus, in An. Post. 332.5-24; in Nic. Isag. I 1.1.4.8-11, I 1.1.y.33-40; Olympiodorus, in Gorg. 156.16-22; David, Prol. 46.3-25; Elias, Prol. 24.5-7; Ps.-Elias...


100. *Ibid.*, 5.36-6.1, 6.23-24, 7.2-3; Ps.-Elias (Ps.-David), *in Isag.* 23.3-6, 23.18-20, 28.7.


106. Ammonius, *in Isag.* 10.15-11.5, 11.30-12.8; Asclepius, *in Metaph.* 47.26-35, 98.5-17, 104.13-17, 108.9-11; Olympiodorus, *Prol.* 9.31-10.2; David, *Def.* 124.18-22; Elias, *Prol.* 27.35-28.12; Ph. Merlan (1960), 69-70, 82; S. Gersh (1978), 365; M. Rapava (1982), 219. David (Procl. 57.26-58.25) and Elias (Procl. 27.37-28.5) distinguished things that are material both in reality and in thought (wood, stone, bone) from things which are material in reality but immaterial in thought (mathematical objects). On the top of this scale are the entities which are immaterial both in reality and in thought (angel, god, soul). See C. Wildberg (1990), 49 n. 46.


121. *ibid.*, 21.10.


133. Philoponus, *in de An.* 58.7-23. For Olympiodorus' (*in Phaed.* 1 § 4) hierarchical division of virtues into contemplative, purificatory, political and natural ones, see L. Brisson (1992), 490.

134. Proclus, *in Tim.* I 211.8-212.1; H.-D. Saffrey (1986), 256.


\[
\text{θεοὶ δωρθεὶς ἔδων (Od. VIII 325)} \\
\text{θεοὶ δὲ τὲ πάντα θαυσίν (Od. IV 379 = 468)} \\
\text{θεοὶ δὲ τὲ πάντα δύνανται (Od. X 306)}
\]

à propos of the triad goodness, omniscience and power.
143. David, Def. 80.8-12, 82.6-18, 82.32-35; A. Sanjian (1986a), 103-104.


146. David, Def. 82.32-35.

147. ibid., 84.1-9.

148. Ammonius, in Isag. 3.8-19, 4.7-14; Elias, Prol. 17.13-21. From Plotinus onwards, political life is a first stage for the individual in the process of divination. Political virtues are inspired by the divine model and this means that virtues like justice and moderation prepare the soul for its proper assimilation to the divine. The best political circumstances for allowing a philosopher to practice the political virtues successfully are those of an aristocratic constitution, provided that the philosopher has fellow-citizens worthy of his discipline. Otherwise, he has to withdraw (Olympiodorus, in Gorg. 3.17-20, 3.23-24, 4.11-5.9, 64.23-65.2, 89.24-26, 129.3-5, 133.12-17, 178.10-11, 221.2-17). See D.J. O'Meara (1992), 503, 508-509; R.F. Hathaway (1969), 20; P. Brown (1992), 117.

149. David, Def. 40.19-29.

150. Elias, Prol. 17.9-13; cf. Plato, Leg. 653a; Cicero, De Fin. V.21.58.


152. See David's apparently contradictory passages at Def. 40.30-35 and 42.1-7; cf. Elias, Prol. 17.13-21.


154. Philoponus, in de An. 7.7-19, 265.30-34, 270.27-38.

155. Ammonius, in An. Pr. 24.31-35; Philoponus, in de An. 120.19-24. Three claims are fundamental to the Neoplatonic emanatory theory: a) The flow of the emanent from a source, b) The continued dependence of the emanent on that source and c) The lack of any diminution of the source as a result of the emanent flowing from it. The point of the emanatory theory is to illustrate the dependence of one kind of continuous existence on another. The world, for example, is for ever dependent on the Demiurge's continuous generative power from within himself alone. In the fundamental cosmic generative process all material and intelligible beings come forth from the divine. The term "susceptibility" denotes the inherent or induced capacity of these beings for the reception of divine power. Cf. E.R. Dodds' commentary on Proclus' Institutio Theologica (1963), 344-345; R.B. Todd (1972), 25.
156. Philoponus, *in de An.* 291.37-292.3 (ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς ἐμπεριέχων τὸ γνωστὸν κύριος ἐστὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ ἐνέργειας, καὶ ὑπ’ οὐδὲνς ἐμποδίζεται, ὅταν βουλήτης τὴν οὐκείαν προβάλεσθαι ἐνέργειαν, ἐν ἐαυτῷ, διότι ἐς τοὺς ἔχον τὰ νοητά αὐτὸς γὰρ εἰς ἐαυτὸν ἐπιστρέφει πάντα ὤψι); *ibid.*, 307.3-5 (ὁ δὲ νοῦς τῶν καθόλου ἀντιλαμβάνεται, τὰ δὲ καθόλου λόγοι, οὗτοι δὲ οὐκ ἔχοθεν, ἀλλ’ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ διὸ οὐ δέσται ὁ νοῦς ἔξωθεν τίνος τοῦ τελειοῦσας).

157. Ammonius, *in Int.* 135.14-32; cf. Plotinus, *Enn.* I.6.9. Ammonius follows the Iamblichian doctrine that knowledge is an operation between the knower and the object known. According to this doctrine, knowledge would correspond to its object if an intellect turned upon itself and contemplated its own substance. In this case there is no difference in the ontological status between the knower and the object known. On the contrary, such a difference is evident when the knower is a human intellect and the object of knowledge is the divine. This is the case when an intellect is inadequate for acquiring complete knowledge of the object known.


159. Ammonius, *in Isag.* 17.7-8; Asclepius, *in Metaph.* 184.31-33, 261.21-29, 263.25-26; Elias, *in Isag.* 71.29-72.25; Philoponus, *in de Gen.* et Corr. 164.17-18; *in An. Post.* 4.28, 44.5-6, 45.21, 234.26, 255.11, 256.11; *in Phys.* 476.7.


164. In contrast, accidents need a subject in order to exist (Ammonius, *in Isag.* 18.23-19.12).

165. Ammonius, *in Isag.* 40.6-10; David, *in Isag.* 109.13-20; Elias, *in Isag.* 47.14-23; *in Cat.* 220.28-29; Ps.-Elias (Ps.-David), *in Isag.* 29.11-12; M. Rapava (1982), 224.

166. Asclepius, *in Metaph.* 29.11-36, 54.4-6.


168. *ibid.*, 211.1-5.


170. *ibid.*, 56.18-27.
171. For a similar view, see Plotinus, *Enn. V.1.9.27-30.


175. Asclepius, *in Metaph.* 35.2 ff., 198.25-31; W. Burkert (1972), 36.


177. *ibid.*, 30.11-12, 30.16-17.

178. *ibid.*, 30.2-9, 30.25-27, 43.3-5, 148.15-18, 201.40-202.12, 233.36-37, 243.37, 247.6-7.

179. Plotinus, *Enn. V.1.9.5-7.

180. Asclepius, *in Metaph.*, 54.21-23, 197.5-6.

181. *ibid.*, 54.21-23, 233.36-38, 243.34-244.1.

182. *ibid.*, 32.7-26, 197.5-198.6.


184. *ibid.*, 197.5-198.6, 198.19-23.

185. *ibid.*, 60.2-7.

186. *ibid.*, 60.21-24; cf. 33.32-36.

187. *ibid.*, 31.16-26, 60.15-61.2.

188. *ibid.*, 27.20-26, 40.25-41.5, 205.24-25.

189. The original text of this line is "οὐδὲ ποτ' ἐν οὐδ' ἔστατι, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοῦ πάν, ἔν, συνεχείς". A.H. Coxon (1986, 36) remarks that Asclepius quotes Parmenides' fr. 8, line 5 clearly from memory in a mistaken form which shows that neither Ammonius nor his students Asclepius (*in Int.* 136.24-25), Philoponus (*in Phys.* 65.9) and Olympiodorus (*in Phaed.* 13 § 2), who quoted the same line, appear to have read the original poem. On the other hand, J. Whittaker (1971, 21-24) advanced a cautious plea on behalf of the text of the above mentioned commentators and argued that the doctrine of non-durational eternity, associated with versions of this line, was not taught by the historical Parmenides. Cf. J.H.M.M. Loenen (1959), 76 ff.; L. Tarán (1965), 181; L.G. Westerink's note on p. 167 of his edition of Olympiodorus' *in
Phaedonem, 13 § 2.12. What the school of Ammonius tried to do was to give a Neoplatonic adaptation of a Parmenidean verse in the form of a quotation made out of context and from memory. Even though no knowledge of the historical Parmenides can be safely derived from the quoted versions of this line, Parmenides himself seems simply to have denied that Being ever was (i.e. that it has perished) or that it will ever be.

190. Parmenides, fr. 8, line 44.
193. Asclepius, in Metaph. 27.20-21, 43.1, 243.34-36.
194. ibid., 40.27, 41.26-35.
196. ibid., 184.5-9.
198. Plotinus, Enn. V.1.9.1-3.
199. Asclepius, in Metaph. 61.4-62.2.
200. ibid., 63.17-19.
201. ibid., 61.4-19, cf. 298.30-34.
202. ibid., 33.29-32, 377.27-30. In this remark Ammonius follows Aristotle. Both, however, have failed to see that for Democritus the whole point is that there is no cause of this — it has just always been happening.
203. ibid., 275.18-28.
205. Plotinus, Enn. V.1.9.3-5.
206. Asclepius, in Metaph. 44.10 ff., 49.12-25, 52.2-7, 54.6-26, 55.11-15, 64.20-24, 92.29-36, 96.10-13, 103.9-12, 104.35-37, 108.27-29, 111.19-27.
208. Ammonius, in Cat. 6.9-16; Asclepius, in Metaph. 148.10-13; Simplicius, in Cat. 6.6-15; Olympiodorus, Pro1. 5.16-18, 9.14-30; Elias, in Cat. 119.26-121.4; I. Hadot (1990a), 97-103; (1991), 181-182; C. Steel (1987), 218. It should be mentioned, of course, that this principle was not believed by Aristotle to be incomprehensible.


**NOTES TO CHAPTER 2: THE KNOWLEDGE OF UNIVERSALS**


228. L. Benakis (1982), 76 ff.


230. Influenced by K. Kremer, and consequently mistaken, was also L. Benakis (1982, 82-83) who claimed that for the school of Ammonius the universal substance is something distinct from the particular substance. L. Benakis held that the school believed in a kind of separation of the intelligible from the natural, because the degrees of ontological fullness between them are different.


234. On the derivation of this doctrine, see: P. Aubenque (1987), 246-248.


236. Asclepius, *in Metaph.* 71.13, 71.18, 82.32 ff., 227.5-6; J.P. Anton (1967), 318.


240. Ammonius, *in Isag.* 68.14-16; David, *in Isag.* 87.16-17, 147.1-8, 148.3-5.


242. *ibid.*, 110.31-111.4. It is a commonplace in Neoplatonism that the causes are always greater than the effects and do not start or end
along with them. The effects are inferior to their causes with respect to the qualities they have from them, as the causes are considered to be more perfect. Cf. Plotinus, *Enn.* V.1.6, V.5.13; Proclus, *Inst. Theol.* props. 6, 7, 18, 57; Olympiodorus, *in ALC.* 109.18-21; K. Kremer (1961/2), 49-50; A.C. Lloyd (1976), 148-149.


245. There are two rules which determine what is prior in Nature: Prior is that which (a) if destroyed itself, its subordinate will be destroyed too, but not vice-versa and (b) is presupposed for the subsequent to exist (Ammonius, *in Isag.* 120.15-25; *in Cat.* 35.15-16, 74.19-26). See K. Kremer (1961/2), 57.


251. Apuleius, *De Plat.* 1.6, 6, 12; J. Dillon (1977), 314-315.


256. Asclepius, *in Metaph.* 166.29-35.

257. Elias, *in Isag.* 98.5-6.


263. As Ammonius (in Int. 250.2-5) had taught, the well-ordered generation starts from the superior to the inferior.


267. *ibid.*, 81.31-82.1, 240.1-5.


270. H. Khatchadourian's (1986, 56-57) translation of the Greek "δημιουργεῖται [sc. Nature] ὁ γὰρ τὸν θεόν οὐδὲν λανθάνει" (David, *in Isag.* 115.32-116.2) attributes to David the interpretation that for Aristotle Nature activates the universals "without God's being aware of it". In reality, however, it is clear from the Greek text that David meant that God does have knowledge of what Nature creates.


277. Asclepius, in Metaph. 72.4-9, 73.1-5.

278. ibid., 72.9-13, 73.6-14, 92.29-39.

279. ibid., 72.13-17, 73.14-25; cf. 227.5-6.

280. Philoponus (in de An. 38.13-17), however, believed that the ante rem universals in the demiurgic Intellect cannot be defined. See R.M. Jones (1926), 326.


282. Ammonius, in Isag. 41.23-42.10.

283. ibid., 42.16-19, 43.25-44.4; Asclepius, in Metaph. 81.2-3, 194.13-14; Olympiodorus, Prol. 19.30 ff.; in Cat. 62.37-63.7; David, in Isag. 113.15-16.


285. Asclepius, in Metaph. 89.17-28, 165.31-166.1.

286. ibid. 89.33-35; Ammonius, in Isag. 17.1-20.14, 32.2-5, 97.1-25; in Cat. 39.14-40.2, 54.7-8; Philoponus, in Phys. 19.20-24, 66.25; Proclus, in Parm. 650.26 ff.; K. Kremer (1961/2), 50-52. It is not explained, however, how the Form "Animal" and the species "Man" contribute to the creation of particular men.

287. Ammonius, in Isag. 28.10-12; Ps.-Elias (Ps.-David), in Isag. 21.1-2.


289. Asclepius, in Metaph. 70.1-5, 165.31-37.

290. ibid., 73.19-25, 433.30-434.5, 435.10-12, 440.15-21.

291. ibid., 218.1-7.

292. ibid., 434.23 ff.; Philoponus, in An. Post. 47.24 ff., 324.8-9; cf. Aristotle, Cat. 3b20 ff.; C.G. Steel (1978), 125 n. 10.

293. Asclepius, in Metaph. 142.38-143.5.

294. ibid., 87.28-32, 89.6-9, 90.6-10, 108.12-13.

295. ibid., 105.30-35.

297. David, in *Isag.* 99.10-18; Elias, in *Isag.* 38.9-10, 50.10-12, 55.27-30, 60.28, 75.25-31, 76.11-16, 96.12. It was also argued by Asclepius (in *Metaph.* 52.5-7, 56.28-31, 178.11-15, 178.39-179.4) and Elias (in *Isag.* 50.21-51.1, 93.33-94.2) that species, differentiae, properties and accidents exist, given the pre-existence of genera. For H. Khatchadourian (1986, 49) it is inexplicable why for David the species are among the predicables, since the species are defined by Elias (in *Isag.* 87.29-88.6), for example, in terms of genus and differentiae. Cf. Asclepius, in *Metaph.* 385.5-10.

298. Ammonius, in *Isag.* 35.4-16, 55.8 ff., 58.2-15, 96.12 ff., 118.11-18.


300. Asclepius, in *Metaph.* 197.21-23, 439.16-440.2; in *Nic. Isag.* I.1a.34-43. The divine entities are close to unity and sameness, because of their proximity to the One (Philoponus, in *de An.* 119.22-24).


302. Asclepius, in *Metaph.* 71.20-24, 80.30-81.4, 91.20-26. As Syrianus (in *Metaph.* 107.5-108.7; cf. Proclus, in *Parm.* 811.32 ff., 831.27-832.1) had taught, there are no Forms of evil or ugly things, of negatives, of things mutable due to mobile causes, of parts, of accidents, of things which participate in more than one species, of beings deriving from heterogeneous combinations, of artificial things in general, and of acts depending on human will or resulting from the concatenation of many causes. The Forms are of universal substances and of the perfections within them. On the subject, see S. Gersh (1978), 88-90. For the view that there are no Ideas of what is contrary to Nature or of artificial things, see Xenocrates, fr. 30; Alcinous, *Epit.* 163.21; J. Dillon (1977), 28.

303. Elias, in *Isag.* 84.22-86.2. On this point, Aristotle (de An. 426b17-25, 431a20; cf. Alexander, *Quaest.* 3.9) argued that a single faculty apprehending both good and evil is necessary for the awareness of the difference between them. See D. Ross (1961), 280.


317. *ibid.*, 391.28-392.5.


321. Ammonius, *in Isag.* 33.2-7. Differentiae are in the middle between genera and species, as they are more particular than the former and more universal than the latter (*ibid.*, 32.5-22, 69.16-17, 118.11-18, 119.5-6). Genera are analogous to roots, differentiae to the bottoms of trunks, species to branches. The remaining two predicables, i.e. properties and accidents, are analogous to suckers, as they subsist coordinately with self-subsistent entities (Elias, *in Isag.* 50.15-19).

322. Asclepius, *in Metaph.* 46.11-12.

323. *ibid.*, 72.14-17, 73.14-25, 75.13-16, 75.31-35.


325. Asclepius, *in Metaph.* 165.31-166.1; Philoponus (?) / Stephanus(?), *in de An.* 547.16-22, 552.28-553.12.


327. Philoponus(?) / Stephanus(?), *in de An.* 568.2-4; Philoponus, *in de Intell.* 22.21-25.

328. Syrianus, *in Metaph.* 106.31-34; Proclus, *in Parm.* 818.37-38; S. Gersh (1978), 86 ff. Plotinus additionally argued that the divine intellect apart from the Forms, potentially contains all the particulars, even if each exists actually as a particular. The idea of plurality in
unity was understood by Plotinus (Enn. II.6.3.10 ff., III.7.3.6, III.7.5.10 ff., IV.8.3, IV.9.5, V.8.4) as being inaccessible to normal reasoning, because it needs the employment of intuition. See A. Smith (1981), 100–101, 105.

329. Plotinus, Enn. V.5.4.1; Syrianus, in Metaph. 119.27–30; Cf. S. Gersh (1978), 95; P. Hadot (1981), 126–129. For the origins of this doctrine, see: R.M. Jones (1926); A.H. Armstrong (1960).


331. Philoponus, in de Intell. 5.82–83.

332. ibid., 4.74–76, 45.61–66.

333. Philoponus, op. cit. 43.16–17, cf. 41.64–65; in de An. 34.33–35.3, 94.18, 216.33–35, 227.8–11; Philoponus (?) / Stephanus (?), in de An. 535.28–29, 536.11–13, 538.19–21; Anonymous, in Int. 62.13. This pure actuality, however, is not attributed to the One itself, because it transcends actuality (Ammonius, in Int. 247.15–19, 248.8–10; cf. Aristotle, De Int. 23a22–24).

334. Ammonius, in Int. 151.16–27.


337. Ammonius, in Isag. 102.3–104.26; Philoponus, in de Intell. 65.68–66.71; Olympiodorus, in Cat. 142.12–15; Elias, in Isag. 84.19–86.1; A. Smith (1981), 106 n. 12; A.C. Lloyd (1990), 90–91. Given that differentiae are activities of substance, they are actual in the ante rem genera. In order to reconcile the relevant Platonic and Aristotelian doctrines, Elias (in Isag. 86.2–20) discusses the Aristotelian distinctions between potentiality and actuality. The former can be either according to fitness (e.g. a baby with long arms and legs is a potential boxer) or according to an actuality which is not present (e.g. grammar cannot be exercised by a sleeping grammarian). The latter can be either according to disposition (e.g. a perfect grammarian, who does not exercise grammar) or according to actualization (e.g. a grammarian who is now making grammatical expositions). Potentiality according to fitness is never combined with, and, therefore, is contrary to, an actualized actuality. Potentiality in the sense of an actuality not present is combined with actuality in the sense of disposition. So, Elias concludes, in the Platonists' claim that the differentiae are in actuality in the genera, actuality should be understood in the sense of disposition; and in the claim of the Peripatetics that the differentiae are in potentiality in the genera, potentiality should be understood in the sense of an actuality not present, and this can either be called actuality (if compared with potentiality in the sense of fitness) or potentiality (if compared with an actualized actuality). Ammonius (in Isag. 104.27–105.14) reconciled the two views about the mode of existence of differentiae by arguing that Peripatetics discussed those genera which are in the many. Nature proceeds from the more general to the more
particular and the particular preexists in potentiality in the more universal. So, the genera which are prior to the many have within them the differentiae in actuality and the genera which are in the many have within them the differentiae in potentiality.

338. David, in Isag. 111.21-24; K. Khatchadourian (1986), 52-53. Plotinus (Enn. VI.1.27.5-10) also found Stoic materialism absurd, because it brings in a god who has his being from matter and is matter in a certain state. See A. Graeser (1972), 92-94.

340. ibid., 112.8-17.
341. ibid., 112.17-27.
342. ibid., 112.27-113.1.
344. David, in Isag. 113.1-5.
345. ibid., 113.5-8; H. Khatchadourian (1986), 53.
346. Elias, in Isag. 47.29-32.
348. Elias, in Isag. 48.8-14.
349. Asclepius, in Metaph. 255.13-20, 302.26-303.1, 376.30-34; Ammonius, in Isag. 70.8-10; Philoponus, in Cat. 49.23-51.21, 53.9-12; in Phys. 137.1-2; Olympiodorus, in Cat. 56.4-8.
350. Asclepius, in Metaph. 433.21-30; Aristotle, Metaph. 1038α12 ff.
351. Ammonius, in Isag. 70.10-13; in Cat. 35.12-18; Philoponus, in Cat. 49.8-22, 51.24.
353. Ammonius, in Isag. 82.10-24; K. Kremer (1961/2), 55-56.
354. Philoponus, in Cat. 49.23-51.21.
356. Ammonius, in Isag. 70.13-20, 77.16-79.14; Olympiodorus, in Cat. 57.36-58.4; P. Kotzia - Panteli (1992), 171 n. 178.
357. Philoponus, in Cat. 49.23-27, 50.23-51.21, 67.7-10; Elias, in Cat. 162.10-15.
358. Elias, in Cat. 154.34–37. Particulars are determined by their species (εἴδος) and not by their matter (ibid., 161.4–6).

359. Ammonius, in Cat. 34.3–4, 35.18–27, 45.17 ff.; Philoponus, in Cat. 50.23–28; Ps.-Elias (Ps.-David), in Isag. 17.8.

360. Elias, in Cat. 165.7–8.

361. Ammonius, in Cat. 45.17–21.

362. ibid., 64.6–13.

363. Olympiodorus, in Cat. 69.5–12.

364. A.C. Lloyd (1990), 78, 84–85.

365. Philoponus (in Cat. 67.18–68.9) also distinguishes between differentiae which are prior to and in the many. The former are universal substances said of a subject (καθ' ὑποκείμενου) and not in a subject (μὴ ἐν ὑποκείμενῳ). The latter are particular substances. Cf. G.B. Matthews (1989), 93; K. Kremer (1961/2), 47.

366. Olympiodorus, in Cat. 44.31–34.

367. There is no division of a universal accident (e.g. whiteness) because in itself it is without a body. It is the body in which whiteness is contained that is divided (David, Def. 136.30–33, 138.1 ff.).

368. Ammonius, in Cat. 25.9–14; Olympiodorus, in Cat. 43.3–29, 62.13–16; See G.B. Matthews (1989), 91–104; K. Kremer (1961/2), 47.

369. Olympiodorus, in Cat. 58.35–37.

370. ibid., 58.39–59.10.


372. Olympiodorus, in Cat. 59.14–16.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3: THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVINE

373. Ammonius, in Int. 135.14–32; Stephanus, in Int. 35.19–29.


376. Olympiodorus, in Gorg. 7.12–17; in Alc. 51.16–17. The following Neoplatonic hymn quoted by Asclepius (in Metaph. 20.27–28, 123.15) and Olympiodorus (in Gorg. 7.15, 93.8–9) is also relevant: "Ἐκ σεο πάντα πέφηνε, σὺ δ' οὐδένος εὖνέκα μοῦνος".


379. Olympiodorus, *in Phaed.* 4 § 3, lines 10-11; *in Alc.* 42.16, 44.9, 51.16-19; *in Gorg.* 32.16-24; Philoponus, *in Cat.* 103.28-29; Philoponus (?) / Stephanus (?), *in de An.* 537.14-16. When Asclepius (*in Metaph.* 147.5-11) claims that, with respect to God, there is neither monad nor dyad, since God creates both the one and the dyad, it must be clarified that he refers to monad and dyad only as numbers and not as metaphysical principles.

380. Olympiodorus, *in Cat.* 44.8-11; *in Gorg.* 32.16-33.3, 243.16-22.


384. Ammonius (*in Int.* 249.1-25) quotes Empedocles' censure of anthropomorphic gods (Fr. 134) where in particular Apollo is referred to and, in the quoted lines, all divine beings. Ammonius argues that the fragment is Empedocles' definition of God. The first line of the fragment is also given by Olympiodorus (*in Gorg.* 33.14) on Empedocles' anticipation of Plato's denial of anything bodily to God, and the whole fragment without line 2 is in the margin. See M.R. Wright (1981), 131, 253-255.

385. Asclepius, *in Metaph.* 196.31-197.2.


387. Ammonius, *in Isag.* 35.4-16, 57.18-25.

388. E.g. the ante rem universal "Substance" (Ammonius, *in Cat.* 44.8-11).


392. Philoponus (?) / Stephanus (?), *in de An.* 492.15–16, 541.20–31, 564.7–14.

393. *ibid.*, 515.24–29, 542.10–12. Whenever human intellect thinks about the divine, it does so through imagination (*διὰ φαντασμάτων*) and not together with it (*μετὰ φαντασμάτων*). Thus from the good order of the sensible world we are led up to the notion of the divine (*ibid.*, 564.10–14).


396. *ibid.*, 114.31–115.9, 117.26–32.


400. Asclepius, *in Metaph.* 6.20–21, 11.34–36, 15.7–10, 140.29–32. The Greek term used by Asclepius to denote intuition is "δηλαδή ἐπιβολή". See also: Plotinus, *Enn.* I.6.2, IV.4.1; Damascius, *De princ.* I 64.8.


403. David conceives them to be material in their composition in the sense that they cannot exist apart from matter, but abstract as images independent of material objects. The perception of immaterial images is the necessary preparation for the perception of God. See A.K. Sanjian (1986a), 106–107.


407. Philoponus (?) / Stephanus (?), *in de An.* 552.15–16. On the use of the term στερωμα (privation), see Aristotle, *Cat.* 11b17 ff.; *Metaph.* 1011b; Chrysippus, *SVF* II, 407; II, 179; Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Phys.* 1.406–408. For Plotinus (*Enn.* VI.7.38.37) the logic of privation as a form of negation, is considered to be inappropriate to reasoning about the One in the sense that it implies that the subject in fact possesses a function, though it is momentarily "dormant". See R. Mortley (1975), 374.

409. *ibid.*, 564.7-14.

410. *ibid.*, 563.36.

411. Ammonius (*in Cat.* 36.25-37.10) ascribes the view to Plato. A. Busse, however, suggested that Plotinus (*Enn.* V.3.14) rather was meant. I think that Ammonius was right in ascribing the view to Plato, since it can be located in the *Parmenides*, 142a. Cf. E.R. Dodds (1928); K. Verrycken (1990a), 215 n. 129.


417. Elias, *Prol.* 11.21-24; *in Isag.* 46.6-47.3.


419. The touch/contact model for the relation of the mind to the object known is common to Epicurean epistemology, Plotinus and Clement of Alexandria. See R. Mortley (1975), 368-369; J.M. Rist (1967), 50 ff.; (1972), 32-37. The same goes for Plato (*Resp.* 490b).


433. ibid., 100.3-4, 106.33-107.4, 202.2-8.

434. The One, in its creative aspect at least, serves as the first element of a triad of Being, Life and Intellect in Porphyry's metaphysical system. For Proclus the ontological hierarchy is in the following order: One, Limit-itself, Unlimitedness-itself, Henads, Being, Life, Intellect. Cf. A.C. Lloyd (1976), 154; J. Dillon (1992), 366. The technical term that denotes the dependence of the successive lower levels in any vertical series on the Henad is the verbal form "εξημπαλ". (Plotinus, *Enn.* V.3.16.36, VI.5.7.9; Hermias, *in Phaedr.* 136.4; Proclus, *in Tim.* I 314.18-19, II 24.23-29, III 162.15; Olympiodorus, *in Gorg.* 265.1). On this term, see L.G. Westerink's note on p. 166 of his edition of Olympiodorus' *in Phaedonem*, 13 § 2.2.


438. ibid., 204.19-23, 255.21-28; cf. 243.38-244.24.

439. ibid., 225.23-226.4.

440. ibid., 227.36-37.

441. ibid., 358.9-11; Elias, *in Isag.* 71.11-23.


the ab uno notion of a genus and its attribution to Plato. This derives perhaps directly from Proclus. See A.C. Lloyd (1990), 35.


446. Asclepius, *in Nic. Isag.* I.μβ-μγ. Asclepius' theory on the Monad and Dyad is very reminiscent of that of Syrianus and Proclus. The terminology used is based on Aristotle, the Platonists of the Old Academy and Plato himself. For further details, see A.D.R. Sheppard (1980), S2–S4; (1982); E. Tempelis (1992).


451. *ibid.*, 98.28–37, 176.10–20. Parallels can be found in Speusippus (fr. 48 = ap. Proclum *in Parm.* 38.31–41.10) and Plutarch (*Def. Or.* 428f); See J. Dillon (1977), 12, 199. For Plotinus' doctrine on the indefinite Dyad as the cause of the element of multiplicity in the second Hypostasis, see J.M. Rist (1962).


455. *ibid.*, 48.5–7, 48.18, 52.5–7, 416.6.


458. Ammonius, *in Int.* 135.28–32. The doctrine that the One is unrelated and generative of everything by means of emanation was ascribed by Asclepius (*in Metaph.* 201.4–26) to Plato, the Pythagoreans and Aristotle. To Plato and the Pythagoreans he also ascribed the symbolic name "One" as denoting the productive principle of the Universe. The oneness of the One is neither numerical, since the numerically one is enmattered, nor due to a hypothetical one species. The One produces and transcends all species. The derivation of the manifold from one principle is considered to be the admirable fact in the creation of the world (Asclepius, *in Metaph.* 147.5–11, 176.10–20).

460. Cf. Proclus, *in Tim.* I 322.20 ff. For Speusippus (fr. 58) the divine seems to belong to some lower stage of being, but it is certainly an Intellect. See J. Dillon (1977), 17-18.


462. Asclepius, *in Metaph.* 48.5-7, 52.6-7, 70.2-4, 73.21-23, 75.32-33, 76 passim, 80.30-31, 81.2-4, 88.4-7, 89.21-22, 142.38-143.1, 145.17-18, 165.35-166.1, 166.29-31, 167.32, 168.34-35, 173.22-23, 173.31-33, 175.16-18, 183.21-23, 209.35-37, 216.24-26, 218.3-5; Gessius ap. Zachariam *Amm.* 11. 383-385; See K. Verrycken (1990a), 208-209.


465. *ibid.*, 81.2-4.

466. *ibid.*, 77.8-17, 122.25-26, 147.32, 148.30-34, 158.27-28; K. Verrycken (1990a), 209.

467. K. Praechter (1912), 14-17.

468. K. Verrycken (1990a), 209-211.


472. *ibid.*, 99.15-20, 100.16-20.


475. Asclepius, *in Metaph.* 19.1-2, 80.30-81.4, 148.29-31, 165.35-166.1, 166.27-30; Ammonius, *in Cat.* 37.10-12; Philoponus, *in de An.* 120.10-12. Cf. Syrianus, *in Metaph.* 82.16-18, 82.29-32. Two deviations from this standard view should be mentioned: first, Simplicius (*in Cat.*
12.16 ff.) argued that before its union with a body a soul has both cognitive and creative reason-principles. After its union, it remains only with images of these principles. See P. Kotzia – Panteli (1992), 121–122. Secondly, Philoponus (in Phys. 14.27–30) argued that Nature has some sort of knowledge without making it clear whether it is due to some cognitive reason-principles it has. In particular, he argued that Nature knows what it creates and creates what it knows. This meant for him that Nature has knowledge of the particulars, but not of the universals, because the latter are not created by Nature. To show that Nature creates what it knows, Philoponus added that if Nature had knowledge of the universal, it would be able to create it as well.

476. Asclepius, in Metaph. 70.23–29, 91.20–26, 146.31–32, 439.23–25; David, in Isag. 115.24–116.2; cf. S.S. Arevšatyan (1981), 42. Plotinus (Enn. IV.4.13) had already discussed the unreasoning creativity of Nature, which does not know but only makes. On the subject, see J.M. Cocking (1991), 55.

477. Asclepius, in Metaph. 84.21–24, 85.23–28, 88.4–9, 171.21–32; in Nic. Isag. I.ἈΕ.


483. Asclepius, in Metaph. 313.23.


486. Asclepius, in Metaph. 148.28–34.

487. Philoponus, in Cat. 29.14 ff., 49.23–27.


489. ibid., 173.1–5, 176.15–16.

490. Elias, in Isag. 66.4–12.

491. ibid., 66.2–5.

493. C. Wildberg (1990), 41–42.

494. Elias, *in Isag.* 86.30–87.2. Angels are supposed by Elias to have ἐννοιαθέτων λόγον only (*ibid.* , 95.29–30).

495. *ibid.*, 66.7–12.

496. Ps.-Elias (Ps.-David), *in Isag.* 34.29; cf. 41.29, 51.5.

497. *ibid.*, 34.26–27.

498. C. Wildberg (1990), 38.

499. To justify this Neoplatonic belief Ammonius (*in Int.* 96.23) and his students (Simplicius, *in Phys.* 250.26, 256.21, 1254.14; Zacharias, *Amm.* 11. 320–321; Olympiodorus, *in Gorg.* 221.9; Elias, *in Cat.* 119.30–33, 138.2–3; cf. Aristotle, *Metaph.* 1076a4) often cited the Homeric verse: "οὐκ ἄγαθον πολυιορκὴν, εἰς κοίρανος ἔστω" (*II. B* 204–205). See also: P. Courcelle (1948), 287; (1967), 167 n. 4; I. Hadot (1990a), 98–103; E. Peterson (1935), 13, 14, 101 n. 3. E. Peterson (*ibid.*, 119 n. 63) argues that Zacharias uses the Homeric verse against the Neoplatonic dualism. This interpretation is not correct with reference to Ammonius and his students, who were monists, since they considered that the One is the ultimate principle of all reality.


505. As Ps.-Elias (Ps.-David) (*in Isag.* 14.19) says, the angels and the rest of the heavenly powers are governed by the divine, but, at the same time, they govern the material world. Cf. Proclus, *Theol. Plat.* I 26, p. 114.5–116.3.


508. *ibid.*, 309.10–15; Olympiodorus, *in ALC.* 42.16; Stephanus, *in Int.* 38.26–27. For Proclus (Inst. Theol. props. 9, 31, 127; *Theol. Plat.* I.19, p. 91.16–21) a being is self-sufficient if it is not in need of its
own elements from which it is composed and can possess its good from itself. The divine is such an entity. See J. Barnes (1983), 179. According to Ammonius (in Int. 247.15-16, 248.13-19), necessity together with self-motion and priority in Nature apply to eternal and divine beings.

509. Asclepius, in Metaph. 76.10-20; Philoponus, in Cat. 29.14-19; Elias, in Isag. 68.29-30; Ps.-Elias (Ps.-David), in Isag. 35.40.

510. Asclepius, in Metaph. 309.24-26, 368.13-15; Stephanus, in Int. 38.27.

511. Asclepius, in Metaph. 313.21-24. Άπαθετον is proper to God, and since hastiness is incompatible with his majesty, he begins slowly and ceases slowly (Olympiodorus, in Meteor. 150.1-2; in Alc. 47.21-22). The idea that God is slow to punish is also common in Solon, Plutarch and the Old Testament as well.

512. Asclepius, in Metaph. 309.14 ff.


514. Asclepius, in Metaph. 28.6, 41.31-32, 309.12-14; Philoponus, in Cat. 171.1-4; Olympiodorus, in Gorg. 65.24-66.3; cf. Plato, Tim. 25e; Seneca, Ad Luc. Epist. 68.24, 89.9.14-16; Nat. quaest. 1, Pr. 1. Eternal beings and angels are always good (Olympiodorus, in Gorg. 52.27-53.4). According to the school of Ammonius (Ammonius, in Int. 240.5-11; Asclepius, in Metaph. 148.32-4; Philoponus(?)/Stephanus(?), in de An. 536.11-13; Olympiodorus, in Phaed. 2 § 5; in Alc. 47.26 ff., 103.15-16) whatever is good comes from God, who is the continuous source of goodness with no intermission as he is always actuality without potentiality. The divine lavishes good to mankind according to the fitness or unfitness of the recipients. God has divided good into primary and secondary. The former is to be enjoyed by the really prosperous people, i.e. prosperous in children, esteem, riches etc. The secondary good is the punishment of souls for their sins (Olympiodorus, in Alc. 47.26-48.9; in Phaed. 10 § 14; regarding the punishment of sins as something good, see Plato, Gorg. 480c). As the divine does not do anything evil, man should not shrink back from the punishment of sins (Olympiodorus, in Alc. 47.26-48.9). The cause of evil is the lack of power acquired by participation in the goodness of the divine (ibid., 88.17-21). Even though Elias, too, believed that evil is the result of want of goodness (Prol. 16.33-34), elsewhere (in Cat. 249.28-31) he expresses the view that good and evil are two different genera. The latter doctrine of his is contrary to the ethical monism of the school of Ammonius, according to which everything that exists is good and derives from the One.


518. Olympiodorus, in Gorg. 131.5-6.
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519. ibid., 66.3-4.

520. Relevant is the meaning Olympiodorus gave to the terms δαιθὸν, εὗ and χαλὸν (in Gorg. 39.14-20; in Alc. 109.15-110.13; in Phaed. 122.5-7; cf. Proclus, in Alc. 319.12, 322.17). He held that the δαιθὸν is of a superior existence, because it emanates from the divine. The εὗ consists in the emanations of the δαιθὸν and contributes to the creation of the world. The χαλὸν is the end of the emanations of the δαιθὸν and extends to matter which is actually something base. Genera are considered by Olympiodorus to be χαλὸν as well. The εὗ, which is between δαιθὸν and χαλὸν, participates in both.


523. Syrianus, in Metaph. 107.9, 185.21; Proclus, De mal. sub. XVIII; Dec. dub. 30; in Remp. I 117.3-6; cf. Iamblichus, De myst. IV.8; A.D.R. Sheppard (1980), 59, 61.

524. Asclepius, in Metaph. 30.5-6, 30.17-30, 70.29-31, 77.2-7, 144.28-34, 146.23 ff., 185.13-16, 189.12-15, 335.35-336.2; Olympiodorus, in Int. xxxi.4-11. Cf. Plato, Theaet. 176a; Gorg. 468e, 470a; Proclus, De mal. sub. 37.5-7; Syrianus, in Metaph. 8.22 ff., 184.18 ff.; See also: F.P. Hager (1962); H.J. Blumenthal (1981a), 220. For Ammonius (in Isag. 24.4-6), however, nobody desires evil as such and those who seem to do so follow an irrational opinion, considering evil to be something good.


526. Philoponus, in Cat. 190.22-191.5.


529. Stephanus, in Int. 35.34-36.8.

530. Degrees of fitness are first to be found in the heavenly bodies (Ammonius, in Int. 243.35-244.4; cf. Aristotle, Metaph. 339a26).

531. Ammonius, in Int. 242.7-9. The ὁνωμις of eternal beings is identical with their ἐνέφεια, because in them there is no case of a ὁνωμις without its ἐνέφεια, as Stephanus teaches in agreement with Aristotle (Stephanus, in Int. 62.34-37; cf. Aristotle, de Int. 23a28).

532. Ammonius, in Int. 242.34-243.3. Philoponus(?) / Stephanus(?) (in de An. 535.24-29, 538.19-21) argues that this applies to the divine only.
533. Philoponus (in Cat. 106.7-10) argued that since God needs nothing outside himself, he is immobile.

534. Asclepius, in Metaph. 20.25-28; Philoponus, in Cat. 166.9-10.

535. For Plotinus (Enn. I.8.2.2-9), too, the Good is self-sufficient, but gives from itself intellect, being, soul, life and intellectual activity.


537. Cf. Philoponus, in Cat. 145.8-11; Olympiodorus, in Gorg. 12.1-5. This view is contrary to the Plotinian theory that the nature of the One/Good is the will of itself. Plotinus (Enn. VI.8.13, VI.8.15.19-24, VI.8.18.38-43, VI.8.20.17-19 and 28-39, VI.8.21) taught that by necessity the choice and willing of itself is included in the existence of the One, or it would hardly be possible for any particular being to find itself satisfactory; particular beings are satisfied with themselves by their participation in or imagination of the One. The will of the One to be itself by its own agency is concurrent with its being what it wills. The will of the One and the One itself are considered to be identical. The One is the first in authentic mastery and purely self-determined power and is altogether at its own disposal in itself. Plotinus does not explicitly deal with the problem of whether the creation of the world by the divine is a result of deliberation. Even if the idea could seem familiar to him, the whole topic was not examined. For Proclus (in Tim. I 362.6-9, 366.2-4, 366.18-20, 367.2-6, 372.13-19, 378.3-8, 379.26-380.2, 394.12-25, 396.5-25, 412.1-10; III 209.15 ff.) creation is a willed process. As the divine is good, it wishes to bestow Good on all creatures. See K. Kremer (1965), 250-251, 254-255.

538. Gessius ap. Zachariam Amm. 11. 369-370, 383-385; Olympiodorus, in Gorg. 12.1-5. According to Asclepius (in Metaph. 196.5-10) the fluidity of the nectar in Hesiod symbolizes God's perfection as to the creation of the world by means of the necessary emanation of his life-giving power.

539. Philoponus, in Cat. 145.10-146.2. Cf. Ammonius, in Int. 134.8 ff. The divine is also characterized as absolute prudence (μητηροφόρης) in the sense that it does not need any deliberation at all, because such a need would denote lack of prudence.

540. Asclepius, in Metaph. 196.1-5. Both Syrianus (in Metaph. 41.30 ff.) and Proclus (in Remp. I 138.4-15) accept that ambrosia symbolizes the pure and undefiled nature of the gods and the divine power of raising above all impurity of the material world. See A.D.R. Sheppard (1980), 70.

541. Ammonius, in Int. 136.15-17.

542. Ammonius, in Isag. 3.9-15; Olympiodorus, in Gorg. 65.20-24; Elias, in Isag. 16.20-25. It is characteristic that Ammonius did not refer to the divine as being omnipotent at all.

543. Seneca, Nat. quaest. 1, pr. 3.

544. Simonides, fr. 98.
546. Plato, *Leg.* 934a; *Prot.* 324b.
547. Lucian, *De conscrib. hist.* 38.
548. Agathon, fr. 5.
552. Ps.-Plutarch (=Aëtius), *Plac.* I 7.3-4.
557. N. Kretzmann (1966), 418-419.
558. Ammonius (in *Int.* 122 ff.) was firstly mentioned by J. Orelli (1824, 335) as a source for Boethius' metaphysics with regard to the concept of necessity. F. Klingner (1921, 111) repeats the argument. H.R. Patch (1935, 401) and P. Courcelle (1935, 208) refer to Ammonius' distinction between simple and hypothetical necessity. P.(T.M.) Huber (1976, 52-53) correctly argues that the doctrine of the twofold necessity was not applied by Ammonius to his own discussion about divine providence and free will. Cf. R.W. Sharples (1978b).

For a detailed examination of the parallels among Proclus, Ammonius and Boethius, see P. Courcelle (1935; 1948, 268 ff.), P.(T.M.) Huber (1976) and L. Obertello (1981). The latter does not contribute much, mainly because he does not seem to have taken Huber's study into consideration at all.

559. Ammonius, in *Int.* 128.15-135.25; Stephanus, in *Int.* 34.5-36.38, Anonymous, in *Int.* 55.6-56.14. On Stephanus' dependence on Ammonius I quote R. Vancourt (1941, 38): "Son commentaire sur le *de Interpretatione*, en particulier, a été reproduit, résumé, on oserait presque dire: pillé, par les professeurs qui lui ont succédé. Étienne d'Alexandrie a fait comme tout le monde; non seulement dans les passages où il se réfère explicitement à Ammonius, mais dans toutes ses interprétations, il se contente de reproduire l' exégèse du maître". Even though the conclusion is generally correct, there are three passages in Stephanus' discussion on divine omniscience (in *Int.* 35.17-19, 35.34-36.8, 36.35-38) which have no parallel in Ammonius.

With reference to the anonymous author of *in de Interpretatione*, L. Tarán (pp. xv-xxv of his edition of Anonymous' *in de Interpretatione*)
persuasively argued that he must have belonged to the Alexandrian school of Neoplatonism. His commentary, which must have been written in the late sixth or the seventh century A.D., is closely dependent upon Ammonius, because he must have been closely acquainted with Ammonius' commentary in de Interpretatione. Nevertheless, the Anonymous has some independent value.

560. P. (T.M.) Huber (1976), 28. Even if this remark of Huber's refers to Ammonius only, it applies to Stephanus as well. See Ammonius, in Int. 131.23, 132.8-10; Stephanus, in Int. 34.35-36.

561. L. Obertello (1981), 139.

562. Ammonius, in Int. 131.5-8, 131.11-16; Stephanus, in Int. 34.24-25.

563. Ammonius, in Int. 131.8-10, 131.17-19; Stephanus, in Int. 34.24-25.

564. In their commentaries Ammonius and Stephanus draw on Proclus' relevant doctrine, the main themes of which, according to L. Obertello (1981, 154), are: "That divine knowledge is determinate but does not determine (in the sense that it does not necessitate) the future of the entities depending on it— and this is because their nature is contingent, i.e., polyvalent and open to many outcomes". It is known that Proclus lectured on the De Interpretatione (Ammonius, in Int. 1.6-11, 181.30-32; Stephanus, in Int. 46.25-47.12), but there is no record of these lectures. Nevertheless, A.D.R. Sheppard (1987, 143) has "no doubt that Ammonius attended Proclus' lectures on the De Int., took assiduous notes and used these notes together, perhaps, with other material when he came to lecture on the De Int. himself." (cf. A.D.R. Sheppard, op. cit., 141-142, 146-147).


566. Ammonius, in Int. 132.11-13; Stephanus, in Int. 35.11-14; Anonymous, in Int. 55.6-16.

567. A similar view, namely that God has determinate knowledge and that necessity applies to everything that comes to be, was attributed by Proclus (De Prov. 63) to the Stoics. F.P. Hager (1975, 180 n. 6) refers to Chrysippus (SVF II, 280 n. 963) following H. Boese (p. 10 of his edition of Proclus' De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam 6.4). But I think that closer to the truth is P. (T.M.) Huber's argument (1976, 22) that: "Stoisches und Peripatetisches dient als Disputiegerät einzig der Abgrenzung und Klärung der eigenen neuplatonischen Position". See also W. Theiler (1966), vii. In fact, the Stoics did not say that the divine has determinate as opposed to indeterminate foreknowledge, because that distinction had not yet been formulated. It is also true that the formulation "all things happen by necessity" is one that the Stoics would have found questionable, at least, though the situation is complex. However, the substantive points that everything is predetermined and that the gods have foreknowledge of it would have been accepted by them. The foreknowledge of the divine for the Stoics would rest in their belief

568. This hypothesis was mentioned by Proclus (De Prov. 63) as shared by the Peripatetic schools. In his own words: "οἱ μὲν ψευδὸς εἶναι ἐὰν γίναι τὸν θεὸν φιλοσόφως εἰθέναι πᾶν, ἀλλ' ἀφιλοσοφήν καὶ αὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς δορίστως γνωμονεῖς, ἴνα φιλοσοφικὸ τὸ ἐνδόξομενον". At the time of Proclus there were no independent Peripatetic schools (P.(T.M.) Huber 1976, 22 ff.), but it is true that Alexander of Aphrodisias (De fato 201.16–18) held that "ἄκτε καὶ οἱ θεοί τὰ ἐνδόξομα ἄν ὡς ἐνδόξομα προγιγνώσκειν, ὅ οὐ πάντως ἀκολουθοῦσα τὸ ἀναγκαῖον διὰ τὴν τοιοῦτην πρόγνωσιν". Cf. P. Courcelle (1948), 292; F.P. Hager (1975); H.R. Patch (1935), 399. Similar views, however, had previously been shared by the Platonic school of Gaius (J. Dillon 1977, 249–298, 320–326). Cf. R.T. Wallis (1981), where Alexander is presented as defending free will against Stoic determinism.

569. Ammonius, in Int. 132.13–19, 134.3–7, 135.10–11, 136.4; Stephanus, in Int. 35.12; cf. Cicero, Div. 2.104; W. Theiler (1946), 50 n. 70.


573. ibid., 137.12–23, 145.9 ff. See R.W. Sharples (1978a), 263.

574. L. Obertello (1981, 145) mistakenly renders the Greek word "ὁμονοιαν" (Ammonius, in Int. 137.21) as "intuitive qualities", instead of "intellectual qualities".

575. Philoponus (in de Intell. 19.48–55) argues that God has a cognition which remains always the same.

576. Plato, Resp. 381b.


579. ibid., 136.26–32.

580. Ammonius, in Int. 133.13 ff.; R. Sorabji (1983), 261–262. Stephanus (in Int. 35.14–15) does not explicitly refer to the immutability of the divine, but this remains a necessary presupposition for his criticism of the third hypothesis: "τι γὰρ διαφέρει [sc. divine knowledge] τῆς ἡμετέρας γνώσεως; ὅν δὲ αἶ ἐνέργεια αἰ αὐταῖ, ὅτι ὅτι καὶ αἱ οὕτως αἰ αὐταί".


583. ibid., 133.22-23.

584. ibid., 136.17-25; Asclepius, in Metaph. 38.17-18, 42.30, 202.16-17; Philoponus, in Phys. 65.9; in de Gen. et Corr. 211.30-31; Olympiodorus, in Phaed. 13 § 2; Philoponus(?)/Stephanus(?), in de An. 536.24, 545.25-28. For the school of Ammonius divine knowledge of all events is fixed and stable, because God is outside time. Divine knowledge of an event does not develop along with the duration of the event. God knows everything ab aeterno and ante factum. See M. Mignucci (1985), 242-245. At in Int. 133.13-26 Ammonius cites similar views in the philosophical tradition: he refers to Parmenides (fr. 8, line 5), Plato's Leges (905a), Parmenides (141e), Timaeus (37e-38b) and Aristotle's Metaphysica (1072a25). Regarding Ammonius' references to the Parmenides and the Timaeus I think that neither A. Busse (CIAG IV.5, p. 133) nor P.(T.M.) Huber (1976, 46 n. 32) has located them accurately. R. Sorabji (1983, 99 ff., 262 n. 38) argues that the attribution to Parmenides need not be taken as historical. In fact, Ammonius interprets Parmenides' quoted line as referring to a sizeless present, since the past exists no more and the future does not yet exist. R. Sorabji persuasively argues that Parmenides gropes towards the idea that his subject exists, but not at any time, neither at any point, nor over any period of time.


587. Cf. P.(T.M.) Huber (1976), 46. Temporal measures for Ammonius show themselves simultaneously with the subsistence of the universe. A knowledge which is bound to time and its distinctions of past, present and future is conjectural and, therefore, not attributable to the gods (Ammonius, in Int. 133.27-30; Stephanus, in Hippocr. Progn. 46.8-17). Cf. L.G. Westerink (1964a), 171. Philoponus (ap. Simplicium in Phys. 1156.28-1158.29; cf. G. Verbeke 1982, 49) expressed the view that the characteristic property of divine thinking alone is the indivisible, simultaneous cognition of all things that are, have been and will be. It does not follow that divine knowledge is temporal, because God exists over and above time and contemplates temporal things atemporally. For Olympiodorus (in Gorg. 249.8-13) as well, neither past nor future applies to the divine, but only the eternal present. According to Elias (Prol. 17.9-10; in Cat. 219.19-30) God can know everything at the same time and always, and he is not in want of anything there is to know. David (Def. 40.19 ff., 84.10 ff.) holds that God knows everything at once and there is never a moment when he does not know. For Stephanus (Opusc. Apotel. 271.19-21) divine knowledge is perfect and most unerring.

588. Philoponus, in de Intell. 82.31-36; Olympiodorus, in Phaed. 7 § 6.

306. For Asclepius (in Metaph. 16.2-3, 20.21-22, 21.23-25) God alone has perfect knowledge which is superior to and transcends all other kinds of knowledge. Regarding divine knowledge of the particulars Asclepius seems to be influenced by Proclus' (Dec. Dub. 79; Inst. Theol. prop. 120) position that the gods or henads know and exercise providence for materially differentiated individuals. Cf. R.T. Wallis (1981), 226-227.

590. Ammonius, in Int. 134.3-7.


592. Ammonius, in Int. 134.24-135.2; Philoponus(?) / Stephanus(?), in de An. 547.9-10; cf. 547.15-16; Anonymous, in Int. 55.11-15.

593. Ammonius, in Int. 135.7-9; Anonymous, in Int. 55.15-16.


595. ibid., 135.10-11; Stephanus, in Int. 35.10 ff.

596. See A.C. Lloyd (1990), 155-156.

597. Ammonius, in Int. 135.12 ff., 136.1 ff.; Stephanus, in Int. 35.19 ff.; Anonymous, in Int. 55.16 ff. Cf. Iamblichus, Testimonia et Fragmenta exegetica, frs. 147-149. The same doctrine is found in Proclus (De Prov. 64.1-4; De dec. dub. II, 7.1-29; Inst. Theol. prop. 124; in Tim. I 352.11-16; in Parm. 956.10-957.40), too, without an ascription to Iamblichus. Proclus' point is that knowledge of the contingents is not necessarily contingent and that knowledge of something mutable is not necessarily mutable. The properties of what is contingent or mutable do not become necessary because of the fact that they are known by the divine. So, Proclus secures not only the contingency of the world, but also the omniscience of the divine as well. Cf. P. Courcelle (1967), 221; P.(T.M.) Huber (1976), 42 n. 18; R.T. Wallis (1972), 150; (1981), 226-228; R. Sorabji (1980), 124; (1983), 255, 262; R.W. Sharples (1978a), 260-261; M.J. White (1983), 61; M. Mignucci (1985), 238-239; L. Obertello (1991), 11 n. 23.

598. Proclus, in Tim. I.352.15-19; De prov. 64; A.C. Lloyd (1990), 154. Similarly when Asclepius (in Metaph. 171.21-22) argues that "as known is to known, so is knowledge to knowledge", he affirms the correlation between the properties of the known and the properties of knowing. Cf. Plato, Resp. 509d-511e; Tim. 51c-52c; A. Madigan S.J. (1986), 165.


600. Ammonius, in Int. 135.19-25.

601. Stephanus, in Int. 35.31-33. Stephanus (Opusc. Apotel. 271.19-21) also says that divine knowledge is perfect and most unerring.
602. Ammonius, in Int. 136.11-15; Anonymous, in Int. 56.9-14; R. Sorabji (1983), 255. Plotinus (Enn. VI.7.1) had argued very simply that
the future is present with the divine. Proclus (De Prov. 65) was far more
precise: "Oυ καθ’ ουν γινώσκουσιν το έσόμενον, ε’ξ ανάγκης επάνεται τούτω
ή έξωβασις, άλλα το μεν διορίστην εκ τοις φαιμένοιν την γένεσιν ..., τοσ’
prop. 124; H.R. Patch (1935), 399.

603. Ammonius, in Int. 136.1-4; Philoponus, in de An. 126.26-27,
132.30-31; Philoponus ap. Simplicium in Phys. 1158.29-1159.7. The
discipline that divine foreknowledge does not take on the character of its
object is also found in Proclus (in Tim. I 352.5-8) who held that "αυτοί
δε ο’ θεοί και τ’ ενεπηδον αγενήσις και τ’ ενδιαφήμων αγενήσις
και τ’ εμπροσθόν διεξείστως και τ’ εγχέρων διαμωσίας και τ’ ενδέχομενον
αναγκαίως". Cf. F.P. Hager 1975, 178-179. Proclus (De Prov. 63)
justifies this doctrine theoretically: "τάν γάρ εν τοίς αποτελείμενοις διηρομένων
και υπεναντίως αλλήλους οίνων, ε’ν τοίς θεοίς κατά τ’ ερείπτων μονόν εστίν
ή πρόδηλης, ο’ λέγω δ’ ο’ οίνον τάν γινομένον ή αδιαμότων οίνων ή συμβάντων,
αδιαμότως εστίν άμορφον τά ατίτι παρ’ εκείνοις, άμορφως δε και η γνώσις
αδιαμότως και πάλιν νοούντων και ανοίγτων οίνων άμορφοι παρά θεοίς γνωστικώς
κατά την οπαρχία κατά την ενδέχησιν. γινώσκουσιν γάρ και τ’ μη
γνωστικά γνωστικάς, κάθεθεν αδ τάν γινομένον εν χρόνῳ ή χρόνως, χρόνως
η τα ατίτι και η γνώσις εστίν παρ’ αυτοίς. άμετ’, εκείνη και αφόρμηνα και
άριστα αττά γίνεται, άμορφοι κατά τ’ ερείπτων, τ’ άφρομένων λέγω, την
τούτων προειλημμα γνωθίσιν". (comp. Proclus, De dec. dub. 2.2, 2.8, 7.28,
8.9; Inst. Theol. props. 93, 124; in Tim. I 352.5-27; in Parm. I 956.10-
Sharles (1978a), 261 n. 188; R. Sorabji (1983), 255, 261-262; M.
Mignucci (1985), 239.

604. Philoponus, in Phys. 755.8-15; David, Def. 4.32, 36.29-31,
38.10-12; A. Terian (1986), 29.

605. Ammonius, in Int. 134.24-26. Without paying attention to
Ammonius' text "δήλων οτι και διατάτασθαι υπο των θεων τα ενδεχομενα
ηττεν και φαιμενους γινωσκεθαι αυτων την έξωβασιν", P. (T.M.) Huber
(1976, 32-33) came to the mistaken conclusion that: "Ammonios geht von
der Voraussetzung aus, dass in der erfahrbarer Welt nicht die abstrakte
Natur des Möglichen existiert, sondern immer nur ein seiner Natur nach
Mögliche, das sich konkret realisiert hat. Es gibt nicht, um es am
Beispiel zu verdeutlichen, die abstrakte Natur des Gehen-Könnens, sondern
nur den konkreten Menschen, der geht oder nicht geht. Gehen und
Nichtgehen sind die konkreten Realisationen der real verstandenen Natur

606. Ammonius, in Int. 135.7-9; Ph. Merlan (1968), 199-200.

P. (T.M.) Huber (1976), 53, 58. Stephanus' view is differentiated from
that of Proclus' (Dec. dub. 8.32-35) according to which divine
foreknowledge is assimilated to causing. Cf. R. Sorabji (1980), 122.

Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. 43, 129.26-130.1: "ημεν μεν γάρ ουδέν τῶν
éσομένων εἴδώτες, πρὸς τά παρόντα δὲ μόνα βλέποντες, οὐκ ὡς τά συμβαίνοντα κρίνομεν' τῷ δὲ θεῷ καὶ τά μελλόντα ὡς παρόντα ἐστίν.'

609. Cf. Olympiodorus, in Int. xxxi.4-11; xxxviii.9-12; Anonymous, in Int. 60.16–61.6.


612. Stephanus, in Int. 35.15-19. Cf. Plotinus (Enn. IV.4.8.1-8, 30-33) according to whom the sensible world is a fragmented image of the causal principles within the divine mind. See R.T. Wallis (1981), 225.

613. There are passages, though, where Ammonius (in Int. 38.28-39.10, 137.22-23) explicitly accepts that man has been created as a rational and self-moved being and therefore is the master of his own actions. The power of deliberation is a peculiar characteristic of man (ibid. 142.17-20) and has been given by nature; therefore, it is not in vain (ibid. 148.11 ff.; cf. Anonymous, in Int. 60.16–61.6). See R.W. Sharples (1978a), 259 nn. 166, 168.


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620. Asclepius, in Metaph. 28.20-27, 103.3-4, 148.10-11, 225.15-17; Philoponus, in de Gen. et Corr. 50.1-5, 136.33-137.3, 152.23-153.2; in Phys. 189.13-17, 298.6-10, 304.5-10; Elias, in Cat. 120.23-30; cf. Aristotle (de Gen. et Corr. 315a1-5, 336b31-34) as discussed by Philoponus (in de Gen. et Corr. 50.1-5, 297.15-24); K. Verrycken (1990a), 218-220, 224-225.


623. Proclus, De mal. subst. X, 35; cf. Ph. Merlan (1965), 150 ff. Criticising the dualism of the Manichaeans, Asclepius (in Metaph. 271.30-272.12, 292.25-29) says that since they accepted the existence of one cause for the good and one for the evil, they have been under divine wrath. Simplicius (in Ench. Epict. 69.46-70.27, 164 ff.; cf. Proclus, De mal. subst. 31.6) also refutes the two principles adopted by the Manichaeans. His main argument was that two contrary principles cannot be so without the pre-existence of an anterior cause to which they must be considered as subordinate. See K. Praechter (1912), 9 ff.; I. Hadot (1978), 40-41.


625. Plotinus, Enn. V.8; P. Hadot (1981), 125.


628. Philoponus, in de Intell. 57.2-3.

629. ibid., 526.34-38. According to Ammonius (in Int. 136.8-11), however, God generates not only the substances of all things, but also their capacities and operations - both those in conformity with and those contrary to Nature. "Ὑπὸ ἀρχής" for Ammonius denotes that which appears together with the necessary abasement of the declension of beings. This declension takes the character of a coordinate existence (παραπόστασις) in the beings. This is the case of something existing alongside X, being secondary or inferior to X.

630. Philoponus(?) / Stephanus(?) (in de An. 537.22-24, 537.27-29, 537.32-33, 539.31-32) argues that when God creates, he does not need imagination at all.

632. Asclepius, *in Metaph.* 108.23–26, 151.15–32. All qualities in the intelligible world are multiplied, and everything that comes after the One participates in them. Nowhere in the sensible world, however, can there be an identity with the One (cf. Proclus, *Inst. Theol.* prop. 152).

633. Elias (*in Isag.* 93.23–28) adds that created beings do not have everything in common, because if that were the case, otherness (also created by God) would be superfluous.


635. Asclepius, *in Metaph.* 103.6–12, 140.35–141.5, 158.25–27, 441.23–27.

636. Philoponus, *in de An.* 264.20–24; *in Cat.* 128.8–28, 131.5–6; *in Phys.* 312.26–313.27.

637. Asclepius, *in Metaph.* 28.15–17. The eternal existence of the divine explains why there could not have been disorder first and then order in the world, or absence first and then presence of the world itself (Ammonius, *in Int.* 250.11–19).

638. Asclepius, *in Metaph.* 365.23–366.1. Asclepius' example to illustrate this point is as follows: In the case of man, God is the cause of the eternal human characteristics, e.g. to be an animal. Nature gives the characteristics which apply to the majority of particular men, e.g. to have five fingers in each hand and foot. Finally, it is by chance that some people have six fingers in each hand and foot. Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.* 197b33–198a14.


641. Philoponus, *in de An.* 7.7–19; *in Phys.* 312.26–313.27.


649. ibid., 147.28–148.4, 194.13–41; Zacharias, Amm. 11. 209–211, 215–216; Cf. Plato, Tim. 41a, where the Demiurge assigns to the secondary gods the fashioning of living creatures by means of an imitation of their own generation by Him. For the school of Ammonius the heaven represented a divinity of lower rank, interposed between the One and the sublunary world, or, in other words, between the Forms in the intelligible world and those in the material world (Philoponus, inMeteor. 11.20–37; in Nicom. Isag. I.y.46–54, I.6.4–5; cf. Syrianus ap. Simplicium in de Cael. 397.29–32;). The heavenly bodies have divine characteristics, but they are not gods (David, Prol. 28.34, 151.13–17; C. Wildberg 1990, 44). The heavenly entities (and the universals as well) are made of a physical substance more divine and prior to the other four (Olympiodorus, in Meteor. 21.25–27; cf. Aristotle, De Caelo 269a30 ff.).

To explain the circular movement of the celestial bodies, the school of Ammonius cites Plotinus' answer that they imitate the divine Intellect, which, by returning upon itself, thinks all things and itself. In particular, they are supposed to aspire to reach the immortality that belongs to the demiurgic Intellect. The rationality of the heavenly bodies is shown by their circular movement, which cannot be caused otherwise than by reason (Philoponus, in Meteor. 9.31–32, 12.24–32, 117.13–19; in de An. 56.19–34, 138.30–139.5, 141.3–4, 260.14–25; Philoponus (?) / Stephanus (?), in de An. 595.33–598.7; cf. Plotinus, Enn. II.2.1; Syrianus ap. Simplicium in de Cael. 397.29–32; Simplicius, in de Cael. 382.8 ff.). Cf. Ph. Merlan (1935); R.L. Cardullo (1986), 121. The celestial spheres are supposed to acquire knowledge by one application of their Intellect without experiencing any need of knowledge (Philoponus, in de An. 260.18–25).

The heavenly bodies are considered to have eternal substance, but perishable energy, consumed during their circular motion. Their continual circular motion is attributed to an incorporeal and superior power of the world-soul which directly acts upon them by moving its own body in order to imitate the noetic activity. So this is not merely an irrational and natural tendency, but, on the contrary, a mark of omnipotence. The heavenly bodies are composite, i.e. they are material, but remain always the same as they have the susceptibility to receive divine emanation and thus replace their lost energy. Their only change is that of place. The heavens are closer to the unchangeable beings and participate more in divine emanation (Asclepius, in Metaph. 151.7–12, 185.28–186.10, 194.24–41, 450.20–28; in Nic. Isag. I.y.55–68; Philoponus, in de Gen. et Corr. 1.9–13, 136.31–137.3; in Nic. Isag. I.y.46–54; cf. Plato, Tim. 34a, 41a ff.; Aristotle, de An. 417b19; Phys. 259b31–260a10; Alexander, in Meteor. 35.20–23; Proclus, in Tim. I 294.28–295.12, II 131.4, 262.5 ff., III 21.2 ff.). See also, É. Évrard (1953), 313–315; (1965), 593–594; S. Sambursky (1962), 164; L. Tarán, pp. 11–12 of the introduction to his edition of Asclepius' in Nicomachi Arithmeticae (1969). The heavenly bodies may be perishable by nature (because they themselves cannot maintain their own
being), but immortality comes to them as a continuous influx from the divine. Proclus' relevant doctrine is that the world is dissoluble in so far as no finite body can have infinite power, but is also everlasting by a continuous stream of power deriving from the Demiurge (Proclus, in Tim. III 209.27-214.35; Olympiodorus, in Phaed. 13 § 2). The number of the heavenly bodies is eternally the same (Philoponus, in de Gen. et Corr. 1.9-12, 3.1-4, 134.4-5, 206.2-4; in de An. 18.27, 24.27-29, 141.2-4, 259.9-10, 324.15-16; K. Verrycken 1990b, 255 n. 138). For Plotinus' belief in the numerical eternity of the heavenly bodies, see G.H. Clark (1949).

The heavenly bodies are alive and have sight and hearing. These senses are active rather than passive in perceiving, contribute to a superior mode of existence and, further, are more appropriate to the special kind of immutability the heavenly bodies enjoy (Olympiodorus, in Phaed. 4 § 9; cf. Ammonius, Prol. 10.7 ff.). See C. Wildberg (1990), 36. In them nothing is disorderly and there is no place for any contrariety because unity dominates there (Philoponus, in Meteor. 5.17-20; in Phys. 56.6-14; in de Gen. et Corr. 283.11-13). The heavens are a solid and rigid body with no quality different from those of the terrestrial bodies (Philoponus ap. Simplicium in de Cael. 35.28-33, 44.15-18, 75.30-31, 76.4-9, 77.23-27, 88.29-32, 89.25-36, 133.28-29). They are the most important physical part of the universe, analogous to the heart of the living beings and less corruptible than the other parts of the world (Philoponus ap. Simplicium in de Cael. 73.4-15; cf. Plotinus, Enn. II.1.4.6-11). See C. Wildberg (1988), 155.


651. That God is the immediate cause of the eternal substances and the prior causes of the mortal substances is a doctrine held by Ammonius (in Int. 136.4-6; Asclepius, in Metaph. 199.33-35, 218.9-11, 250.20-21, 255.12-13). Cf. Aristotle, Phys. 194b13; P. Courcelle (1967), 223-224. Philoponus (in Phys. 402.5-20, 403.12-15) makes it a bit clearer: divisibility and destruction, he argues, are caused by the progression in matter.


653. See M. Baltes (1976).


656. This doctrine was developed by Crantor, Alcinous, Taurus, Plotinus, Porphyry and Iamblichus. See C. Wildberg (1988), 196; S. Sambursky (1962), 157.

657. The unmoved mover, which is among the transcendent causes of natural things, is examined by the physicist (Philoponus, in de An. 55.11-17).
658. Since Ammonius himself wrote nothing about his own beliefs on the eternity of the world, we have to rely on secondary sources. Such a source is Zacharias' polemic dialogue *Ammonius vel De opificio mundi*, where Ammonius is presented as having understood the Christian positions against the theory of the eternity of the world, but not as having been converted to Christianity. For the purpose of this dialogue, see É. Évrard (1965), 597-598; Ph. Merlan (1968), 197; R. Sorabji (1987), 2. As to the historicity of this dialogue, Ph. Merlan (1968) proved that the dialogue can be dated to 486 or 487 A.D. when Zacharias was among Ammonius' students in Alexandria. See also P. Courcelle (1935), 216; G. Bardy (1950); M. Minniti Colonna, pp. 23 and 39 of the introduction to her edition of Zacharias' *Ammonius* (1973); K. Wegenast (1967); K. Verrycken (1990a), 210-211. On the whole, given that Ammonius actually adhered to the doctrine of the eternity of the world, Zacharias' report is essentially historical. See P. Courcelle (1967), 227-228; Ph. Merlan (1968), 194; M. Minniti Colonna, pp. 38-44 and 52 of the introduction to her edition of Zacharias' *Ammonius* (1973); cf. M.A. Kugener (1900), 205. K. Verrycken (1990a, 211-212) argues that Ammonius' theology, as exposed in this dialogue, is not theistic, but, on the other hand, it is not possible to find much in the dialogue to prove positively the Neoplatonic character of Ammonius' teaching on God and creation. Furthermore, Verrycken assumes that the dialogue would only have pertained to metaphysics, if it had examined the Neoplatonic articulation ad intra of the creative principle. I think that the dialogue is based on Ammonius' belief in the immutability of the divine; therefore, it cannot but involve Ammonius' metaphysics.


660. David, *Prol.* 6.2-21; C. Wildberg (1990), 44.


663. Asclepius, *in Nic.* Isag. I.y.68-79; Philoponus, *in Nic.* Isag. I.y.54-58; *in de An.* 95.9-26, 118.38 ff.; Olympiodorus, *in Meteor.* 115.11-13, 118.5-119.8, 120.13-14 and 20-21, 153.19-21; *in Gorg.* 65.24-66.4; Philoponus(?) / Stephanus(?), *in de An.* 537.6; R. Vancourt (1941), 56 n. 3; L.G. Westerink (1990), 333 n. 45; his introduction to his edition of the Anonymous' *Prolegomena Philosophiae Platonicae*, p. xxv, n. 58; K. Verrycken (1991), 219 ff., 221 n. 63.


666. L.G. Westerink (1990, 327; his introduction of the Anonymous' Prolegomena philosophiae Platonicae, xiv) suggested that "Ammonius pledged himself to silence on certain essential doctrines contrary to the Christian faith (especially the eternity and divinity of the world)" as a consequence of the pact he is reported to have made with the patriarch Athanasius II (Damascius, Vita Isid. 250.2, 251.12-14). Actually, however, there is no evidence to support this view, and both R. Sorabji (1990, 12) and R. Verrycken (1990a) discard it. In addition, by reporting Ammonius' doctrine Asclepius (in Metaph. 89.4-5, 90.27-28, 171.9-11, 186.1-2, 194.23-26, 226.12-15) proves quite the opposite.

L.G. Westerink (1990, 328; his introduction of the Anonymous' Prolegomena philosophiae Platonicae, xv) referred to the dialogue Ammonius as reflecting "the reaction of at least one Christian student to his [sc. Ammonius'] persistent belief in the eternity of the world. This seems to indicate the position of the Hellenes had become easier towards 520 than it was a quarter of a century ago". Apart from the fact that there is an evident contradiction in the same article as to whether Ammonius actually taught the doctrine on the eternity of the world (see previous paragraph), L.G. Westerink mistakenly refers to the year 520 in connection with this dialogue. It is known that the actual conversation took place between the years 486-7.

P. Courcelle (1948, 295-298; 1967, 225-228) argued that Ammonius did not actually believe in the co-etuinity of the world with the Demiurge, because (a) Proclus (in Tim. I 238.15 ff., 286.20 ff.) distinguished between infinite duration (Διοικήτης), which he attributed to the universe, and divine eternity (αλόντος) which is outside time and (b) Simplicius (in Phys. pp. 1154-1155) argued that even if Aristotle and Plato may have used different terms, they both agree that the world has a cause, but not a temporal end. Simplicius was introduced to this argumentation because, according to P. Courcelle, he must have copied Ammonius' commentary on Aristotle's Physics. I think that there can be no objection to the claim that such views were held by late Neoplatonists. Olympiodorus (in Meteor. 146.15-25), too, like Proclus, distinguished between the terms Διοίκης and αλόντος. The former, attributed to matter, is said of things that are of infinite duration but exist in time and are mutable. Matter receives different species in time since they, too, perish. The αλόντος is attributed to God, and is said of entities outside time, in an eternal present. Ammonius, however,
deviates from the above-mentioned tradition. For him the material world is co-eternal with the Demiurge, and Zacharias' reports are correct. The first to hold this view was M. Minniti Colonna (p. 52 of the introduction to her edition of Zacharias' Ammonius) who argued that: "Io credo che gli argomenti dei due discepoli [sc.: Zacharias and John Philoponus] di Ammonio sulla coeternità dell' universo con Dio non siano arbitrarie deformazioni del pensiero di Proclo, ma rispecchino in realtà le tesi di Ammonio sull' eternità dell' universo e sulla sua coesistenza ab aeterno con Dio. Allo scolarco ateniese, infatti, rimase sempre estraneo il concetto di συναντών, sostenuto presumibilmente per primo da Ammonio, e poi ripreso e confutato da Zacaria nel suo dialogo e da Giovanni Filopono nel De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum". It should be mentioned that Philoponus (Aet. 14.10, 14.21, 18.13, 23.3 ff., 79.10, 126.9, 273.2, 566.3) attributed to Proclus the view that the world is co-eternal with the divine. In addition, Asclepius' and Elias' references are more than clear as to the coeternity of the world with the divine (see nn. 670 and 671 below). Therefore, P. Courcelle's (1967, 228; 1948, 297) conclusion that "as Philoponus did with Proclus, Zacharias shamelessly changes Ammonius' thought and makes him maintain the theory of coeternity" cannot be accepted.


670. Asclepius, in Metaph. 226.12-15: "εἰ γὰρ πάντα, φησὶ, προφαίρεται διὰ τὴν γόνην αὐτοῦ δύναμιν καὶ οὐ δεῖται χρόνον, ἀλλὰ χωρὶς πάσης μεταβολῆς, τί, φησὶ, δεῖ λέγειν δῆται ἁρματο ἀπὸ τίνος χρόνου παράγειν; οὐ γὰρ καλῶς λέγοις, ὡς δὲδεικται, φησιν, ἐν ἄλλοις".


672. Asclepius, in Metaph. 89.4-5, 194.23-26; Philoponus, in Phys. 1.17, 1.23-24, 9.23-10.2, 15.29-30, 16.2, 16.8, 152.5-7, 156.10-12, 219.19-22, 220.20-25, 340.31, 362.21-25, 438.9-10, 497.8-9, 601.12-13, 777.11-12, 898.2-4; in de An. 18.27, 24.27-29, 141.2-4, 259.9-10, 324.15-16; in de Intell. 78.2-4; Elias, in Cat. 120.15-19, 187.6-7. Cf. A. Busse (1892), 11; É. Évrard (1953), 324-325; R. Sorabji (1983), 196 n. 25, 202; L.G. Westerink (1990), 339; his introduction to his edition of the Anonymous' Prolegomena Philosophiae Platonicae, xxxvi; C. Wildberg (1990), 42; K. Verrycken (1990b), 235 n. 10, 245 n. 60, 255 n. 143.


675. On the arguments against God’s changing His will, see Aristotle *De philosophia*, frs. 16, 18, 19; R. Sorabji (1983), 281.

676. As to this conclusion, Ammonius was reported to have used Porphyry’s formulation, which is also found in Proclus as well (*in Tim.* I 293.17 ff.; cf. Philoponus, *Aet.* 126.12, 145.3, 148.7, 148.26, 149.12, 149.19, 154.5, 154.23, 161.18, 163.21, 164.13, 165.7, 166.4–7, 189.10, 200.4, 200.10, 201.28, 224.20, 521.25, 522.18, 546.6, 546.25; *in Gorg.* 65.24–66.4, 303.18–25, 405.3–7, 484.15–19). See also R. Sorabji (1983), 281; K. Verrycken (1990b), 245 n. 61.


682. Philoponus (?) / Stephanus (?), *in de An.* 540.27.

683. *ibid.*, 448.6–7.

684. Ps.–Elias (Ps.–David), *in Isag.* 42.20.


689. Olympiodorus, *in Phaed.* 1 § 2; cf. L.G. Westerink (1964b), 27, 30. The belief that the Demiurge is both provident and transcendent at the same time is found in Proclus (*in Remp.* I 135.17–136.14) as well. See A.D.R. Sheppard (1980), 64, 66.


692. David, *Def.* 94.1–4. For Proclus (*Inst. Theol.* prop. 57; cf. Olympiodorus, *in Alc.* 109.18–21; See also L.G. Westerink’s note on pp. 154–155 of his edition of Olympiodorus' *in Phaedonem,* 11 § 4.16, where it is referred that the influence of the higher powers extends farther downward than that of the lower ones.


700. Augustine, *De civ. Dei,* XII.ii.


702. *ibid.,* 134.8 ff.


704. *ibid.,* 28.30–32, 195.25–37, 364.26–27; Olympiodorus, *in Phaed.* 1 § 2 ff.; Ps.–Elias (Ps.–David), *in Isag.* 12.11–12; L.G. Westerink (1964b), 27 ff. God is always present to all beings and everywhere by means of emanation, but the degree in which each being participates in him depends on its own fitness according to the limitations of its own nature (Ammonius, *in Int.* 38.28–39.10, 137.15–23; Olympiodorus, *in Alc.* 14.1–2; cf. Proclus, *Inst. Theol.* prop. 122). Among the manifestations of divine emanation are prophetic dreams, and the fact that there is not
a moment when nobody in mankind thinks, even though each particular man thinks once now and then (Philoponus(?) / Stephanus(?) in de An. 486.36-487.1, 539.1-7).


706. David, Def. 68.23-32, 70.1-3; Olympiodorus, in Gorg. 223.17-19.

707. Ammonius, in Int. 142.17-20; Stephanus, in Int. 36.4-9; cf. R.W. Sharples (1978a), 259. Free will, according to Stephanus (in Int. 36.21-29), applies neither to necessary nor impossible things.


709. Ammonius, in Cat. 78.20-28; Philoponus, in An. Post. 135.9-11; in Cat. 126.24-127.15; in An. Pr. 243.25-32; cf. in Phys. 80.8-12.


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PLOTINUS


PLUTARCH


PORPHYRY


PROCLUS

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PSEUDO-HELIODORUS (OLYMPIODORUS ?)


PSEUDO-PLUTARCH (AÊTIUS)


SENeca


SEXTUS EMPIRICUS


SIMONIDES


SIMPLICIUS


SPEUSIPPUS

STEPHANUS


SYRIANUS


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