The Ethics of Dutiful Faith

Individuated Quest and Kantian Imperative

A thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the Degree of
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This thesis develops an ethical theory that is designed to address central problems in Kant's ethics in a manner compatible with a phenomenological interpretation of being human. To carry out this task, the work is divided into three parts. In Part One, a critical examination and reconstruction of the central tenets of Kant's ethics is undertaken. This leads to the identification of three related problems. These concern the indeterminacy of moral action, the nature of moral motivation and the grounding of Kant's ethics. The phenomenological investigation presented in Part Two assesses critically, and draws upon, some of Heidegger and Sartre's existential insights, to construct a new interpretation of what it is to be human. The key concepts of the Quest for absolute meaning, and constructive committed faith in an absolute featuring a rôle for a notion of self, are here introduced. In Part Three, these concepts guide the development of a modified Kantian ethics, the Ethics of Dutiful Faith. This theory is first elaborated on the basis of a fundamental questioning about the grounds for action. This leads to the identification of the same concept of committed and constructive faith as has been developed in Part Two, as providing the only satisfactory answer to the demand for justification of one's action. This notion of faith can however only be directed at a transcendent absolute insofar as it entails the normativity of the constraints of duty. By properly understanding the intersubjective implications of this fact, the basic principles of the Ethics of Dutiful Faith can be formulated. This theory provides answers to the problems in Kant's ethics identified in Part One. It is moreover both in line with the spirit of Kant's critical philosophy, and coherent with the phenomenological interpretation presented in Part Two.
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It has been good to have friends such as Leslie, Meade and Derek, who value philosophical endeavour, as well as to have been encouraged to pursue this project by David Wiggins.

I wish to offer this thesis to the fond memory of Dimitri, my cousin (1973-2001), whose life enriched all those who knew him.
# Contents

## Part One

**CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF SOME PROBLEMS IN KANT'S ETHICS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>The Categorical Imperative</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Inclinations, self and moral worth</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Kant's foundation of morality</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Part Two

**A DIRECTION FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Uncovering the Quest</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>The pursuit of authenticity</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Part Three

**THE ETHICS OF DUTIFUL FAITH**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>On the foundation of morality:</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Purposefully meaningful action</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>On the foundation of morality:</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Absolute meaning and action</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>An ethics based upon dutiful faith</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Conclusion

198

## References

201
Introduction

How do we stand on the issue of why one ought to do what is good? An examination of this central ethical issue is not independent of how one understands the notion of the good and its practical relevance for human agents. There are many approaches to these questions that have a long tradition which survives or even thrives in the contemporary philosophical scene. Chief among these are virtue ethics, the Humean approach, utilitarianism and Kantian/neo-Kantian perspectives. Kant's answers to these questions still exercise a powerful appeal today, as witnessed by the many attempts to reconstruct his arguments or develop theories based upon key Kantian notions. There is thus a long list of contemporary philosophers, ranging from O'Neill, Herman, Baron, and Korsgaard, to Rawls, Apel and Habermas, and also including such names as Ferry and Renaut, whose work belongs to the Kantian tradition. This thesis represents a new attempt to reconstruct and develop the core of Kant's ethics so as to address its central problems. Its aim is to build an ethical theory that preserves the spirit and objectives of Kant's practical philosophy, while elaborating concepts drawn from a critical interaction with subsequent developments in the history of philosophy.

To achieve this objective, the thesis has a tripartite structure. The first part is based upon a discussion of central tenets of Kant's ethics which leads to the identification of three key problems. In the second part, I draw upon Heidegger and Sartre's writings to develop a phenomenological interpretation of being human. With the guidance of this interpretation, I develop a new ethical theory in the third part. I thereby show that it provides an extension to the core of Kant's ethics, while dealing with the three key problems.

1. Part One
Part One is an analysis of certain key issues in Kant's ethics and proposes reconstructive interpretations to exhibit both the way in which his ethics can tackle these issues, and where its limitations lie. The methodological basis for the
developments in Part One is related to Korsgaard's (1996b, p.10-11) distinction of the three main tasks of moral philosophy as being the provision of:

1. a theory of moral concepts dealing with the following questions: what do they mean? to what do they apply - i.e. 'which actions are right or obligatory' (ibid.)? and where do they come from?
2. an account of the way in which these concepts affect human practice and psychology, i.e a theory of their practical relevance;
3. a justification of the way in which these concepts affect agents, i.e. a theory of their normativity.

The tasks I propose to tackle loosely fall under these headings, but are also interconnected. The first task is to examine the notion of the good and provide a means of deciding what is morally obligatory or permissible. The second task involves understanding the way in which this notion of the good impinges upon the agent's psychology and practice. This task has two dimensions. One is practical and normative: to what extent does our common understanding of moral worth map onto this notion of the good? The other is psychological: how is this normative dimension experienced by the agent? This involves in particular an examination of the nature of moral motivation. The third task is to examine the foundation of morality. This is related to the previous task since the grounding of morality must take account of the nature of the moral motive.

The first three chapters of the thesis follow this structure by applying it to Kant's ethics. Chapter I examines the categorical imperative and proposes a reconstruction of it and its derivation, while pointing to its limitations as a criterion of the morally good. Chapter II examines three issues of Kant's ethics which concern the practical and psychological implications of the identification of our duty. In particular, I shall exhibit the extent to which Kant's ethics can do justice to the phenomenal aspect of motivation and some of our intuitions about moral worth. Chapter III tackles the issue of the grounding of Kant's ethics, and indicates in what way it ultimately fails.

These chapters are instrumental in setting up conceptual tools that will be used throughout the thesis. In chapter I, a framework is developed to represent the different levels of principles involved in applying the text of the Formula of Universal Law. The Categorical Imperative is identified as a third-order principle. It follows that the indeterminacy of first-order principles, or maxims, of duty, indicates a need for second-order principles of further determination of ethical action. Chapter II extends this three-tiered framework to the different accounts that can be given of agency. Between Kant's deterministic description in terms of
the empirical character, and his explanation of action which involves the freedom of the intelligible character, I wedge in a second-order motivational account, and with it, a notion of agent-self is defined. In chapter III, the moral requirement for the intelligible character to make the third-order choice of the incentive of duty, is shown to be insufficiently grounded. The problems raised in these three chapters will in fact be shown to converge in suggesting the need to rethink the unconditionally good beyond the concept of the universally binding.

2. Part Two
In Part Two of the thesis, a new direction of investigation is explored so as to provide some groundwork for an ethical theory which can address the objections examined in Part One.

Chapters IV and V focus upon the possibility of complementing the purely rational framework of Kant's Ethics with an examination of phenomenological interpretations of what it is to be a human being. We thus move beyond the agent's rational core to seek a further determination of morality and provide a grounding for it. To do so, in chapter IV we shall critically examine how the existential phenomenologies of Heidegger and Sartre can shed light on what it is to be human and why much human practice ignores this. A proper grasp of what an authentic life consists in is the object of the discussion of chapter V.

These two chapters are therefore composed of critical presentations of Heidegger and Sartre's ideas, together with a new approach to the issues they raise. This approach is motivated by certain shortcomings that I identify in their interpretations and which relate to problems discussed in the secondary literature. By criticising the centrality of the notion of falling in Heidegger's analysis, I suggest a positive interpretation of being human as a quest for absolute meaning. To complement this, I critically develop Sartre's account of bad faith to explain an individual agent's inadequate interpretation of this key notion. In line with this, chapter V shows what is involved in such a proper understanding. It requires the agent to adopt a constructive committed faith in an absolute. This notion of faith and that of the quest for absolute meaning are key concepts which this phenomenological investigation provides to inform the developments of Part Three.
3. Part Three

The interpretative nature of the phenomenological results of Part Two cannot, however, provide the kind of foundation required to show that moral reasons are overriding. The question of the grounding of morality is therefore re-examined in chapter VI by going back to the simple question 'What shall I do?', without any presupposition beyond the rôle of a notion of purposeful meaning. The two previous chapters will here be used to guide the enquiry rather than provide any assumptions. Chapter VI does not lead to any final conclusions to this enquiry, but rather identifies options which are either shown to be justifiable in terms of purposeful meaning, or potentially so. In the former case, the further issue of the purposeful meaning of that which is adduced as justification has to be addressed, thus leading to strings of questions about the grounds for action. In the latter case, a deeper examination is required to ascertain whether the proposed form of action is purposefully meaningful.

Chapter VII tackles these questions by extending the scope of the concept of purposeful meaning to cases of unconditional justification. In terms of the notion of absolute meaning which is thereby defined, only a certain type of action from faith can be seen as justified. This is the committed constructive faith identified independently in the phenomenological analysis of Part Two. We also locate a key rôle for duty in relation to this faith, thus leading to the definition of the Ethics of Dutiful Faith. This provides a direct answer to the foundational problem raised in Part One.

The question of indeterminacy from chapter I, is addressed anew in chapter VIII by showing how this ethical system, once the rôle of intersubjectivity is properly understood, provides Kant's Ethics with further determination. This system is shown to avoid the criticisms directed at Kant's theory from the point of view of our common intuitions about moral motivation. The unity of the thesis is ensured insofar as the results of our phenomenological interpretation in chapters IV and V are re-constructed on the basis of the proposed system, and also by showing that this system conforms to the spirit of Kant's critical enterprise. Finally, the thesis's implications for the relation between theoretical and practical issues are discussed.
Part One

CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF SOME PROBLEMS IN KANT'S ETHICS

The task of this first part of the thesis is both to mount a defence of core elements of Kant's ethics and to show where its limitations lie. This involves Kantian exegesis informed by an examination of an abundant literature, with an emphasis upon recent commentators' work. But the aim of this part lies in providing a cornerstone for the development of an ethical system which I claim to be a development of Kant's ethics required by its limitations.

In line with the breakdown of tasks presented in the introduction, the three chapters in Part One examine the following issues. In chapter I, the investigation focusses upon developments leading to the derivation of the first formulation of the Categorical Imperative in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. This chapter presents a defence of this core of Kant's ethics by developing an interpretative framework within which this derivation is reconstructed. By thus providing a firm ground for Kant's claims, it also exhibits an important limitation, that of the indeterminacy they do not resolve at the level of actions.

The defence of this essential core is then followed in chapter II by the discussion of three problems for which Kant provides some materials we can use to formulate an answer. These concern the notion of moral worth, the rôle of inclinations and self in ethics and the understanding of moral deliberation. The discussion of these issues will enable us to clarify the psychological dimension of Kant's ethics and how it relates to our intuitions.

Chapter III examines Kant's claim that moral obligations, as he specifies them, override any other motive for action. The proof of this claim will be found to be lacking. This chapter concludes by summarising and examining the links between the three key problems identified in Part One which are to be dealt with by the ethical theory presented in this thesis.
why not practical reason?

FUL Formula of the Universal Law
CHAPTER I

The Categorical Imperative

Introduction

Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals sets out to analyse our common understanding of morality so as to identify that which constitutes the moral good. This leads Kant to formulate a moral law with the status of categorical imperative, which takes several forms. The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the validity of the Formula of the Universal Law (FUL) which is the first form of the imperative. Without dwelling upon the details of the analysis of popular morality, we shall focus upon the derivation of this formula. In particular, we shall identify two problematic moves in the derivation. Having clarified the vocabulary and levels of principles involved, a reconstruction will be proposed, leading to a new version of the formula. This has been published as 'A framework for the derivation and reconstruction of the categorical imperative' in Kant Studien (Onof, 1998). This reconstruction will next be shown to have a variety of advantages both for the understanding of Kant's text, and the validation of his claims. The upshot of this reconstructed formula is that the locus of the indeterminacy of Kant's ethical prescriptions is apparent. The chapter concludes by specifying the nature of this indeterminacy and pointing to a way in which it can be addressed.

1. Kant's Formula of Universal Law

The unconditional good

In section I of GMM (abbreviations are given with the references), Kant is seeking that which is unconditionally good. If morality is not a chimerical idea (GMM, 444), it will certainly define a supreme moral principle, since the pursuit of that good, will, by definition, override the pursuit of any merely conditional good. The notion of that which is 'good without qualification' (GMM, 393) is that of something whose goodness does not depend upon anything else. This means that
what is external to what bears the predicate 'good', does not form part of the content of its goodness, or indeed a condition of its being good. In other words, this is something which is good in itself and irrespective of how anything else stands. A knife may be good for cutting irrespective of all other considerations, but not good in itself. Happiness, on the other hand, is good in itself, but its goodness is not independent of how it is attained, as Kant reminds us (ibid.). An analysis of our common moral understanding reveals that only the good will fulfils both conditions (GMM, 393-396).

In this way, Kant is providing a new perspective upon the ethical question which underpins Plato's Republic. Plato (1955) has Adeimantus identify the problem of morality as follows: although it is clear that 'justice' (or that which is right) is good in itself, can we also show that it is good for the agent who obeys its prescriptions? Rather than answer this question in its generality, Kant seeks that which is good irrespective of all other states of affairs. If it is not an empty concept, it is necessarily good for the agent, in a sense, and thus is one way of answering Plato's question.

Some definitions
Before examining how Kant unpacks the notion of the good will, a few definitions are useful. I call maxim a subjective principle of action, i.e. one of the form:

M: When I am asked a question, I shall tell the truth.

This principle reflects the agent's intention (Korsgaard, 1996a, p.57-58; O'Neill, 1989, p.84) and is thus not just a description of the agent's action such as those considered by Mackie (1990) in his critique of universalisability in ethics.

I shall also use higher-order principles such as the second-order principle:

[P]: One ought to act upon maxims of truth-telling/One ought to tell the truth and say that maxim M falls under principle [P]. This means that M is a maxim of action fulfilling the requirements of [P]. Note that [P] and M could be presented in an imperative form. Thus for [P]:

Act upon maxims of truth-telling/Tell the truth.

The argument of the Groundwork
In section I of GMM, Kant suggests that the concept of duty 'contains that of a good will' (GMM, 397). This means that the good will acts according to and from

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1 More generally, a maxim has the form: 'I shall do action A to achieve purpose B' (Korsgaard, 1996a, p.57-58).
duty. To establish what one's duty is, Kant says, involves finding a moral law. A moral law is a universally valid requirement which is binding. In so doing, Kant is identifying *unconditionally good* with *universally (valid and) binding*. Let us examine this point.

The universal is that which is independent of any particular perspective. Universal validity thus satisfies the requirement that the goodness of the act be independent of any other consideration. Since the bindingness of a law translates the notion of goodness in itself, universal validity and bindingness do indeed define a form of the unconditional good. In other words, the universal validity and bindingness of a requirement is sufficient for it to be a feature of the notion of unconditional good. We must however note that this feature does not necessarily define all that can be grasped under the concept of unconditionality. In other words, what Kant's procedure will identify is a feature of the good will, but the latter may not be entirely encapsulated in Kant's result. We note, additionally, that Kant's focus upon universality is in keeping with his take on Plato's question. The latter is however more generally concerned with what is good for the agent - and the same things are not necessarily good for all.

What sort of law could this be? A first derivation of such a law is given in section I. Then, in section II, the problem is reframed in terms of identifying categorical imperatives. The question is now, how is such an imperative possible? Kant's answer to this question will have to await section III, as he explains that it is useful to first tackle the problem of identifying the content of such an imperative (GMM, 420). This takes the form of the derivation of the FUL. This is the first form in which the moral law is expressed as a categorical imperative.

The two derivations of the moral law also have different emphases. In section I, the moral law is examined as a potential law of a human will and the motivational issue is given prominence (GMM 394-402) as Korsgaard (1996a) points out. On the other hand, the content of such a law is only clearly stated in section II in the form of the FUL (GMM, 421). In this paper, we shall focus upon the section II derivation, but examine separately the issues of the motivation and the content.

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2It is worth noting that when Kant says that the concept of duty 'contains that of a good will' (GMM, 397), he may be interpreted as not committing himself to an adequation of the two. Taking this notion of 'containment' to refer to the intension of the concept, this means that the concept of duty contains that of good will as mark, i.e. that duty is characterised by being a feature of the good will. And if we take Kant to define duty in terms of universality, then we can conclude that Kant is not strictly committed to the notion of universal bindingness as fully defining the good will - i.e. the extension of the concept of good will could be larger than that of universal bindingness. This corroborates the point made here.
1. Act 1 (imposition)
2. No measure
3. Obligatory, objective, necessity
4. Universal, practical law

Hypothetical
Action required to fulfill a purpose or goal

Content of moral law
The motivational issue

If we consider a categorical imperative, we find the following in terms of the incentive:

(1) There is no incentive originating outside the imperative, else it would lose its categorical nature.

(2) A categorical imperative directly defines that which is obligatory in morality and thus corresponds to a practical notion of objective necessity.

(3) From (1) and (2), if all that is required of the imperative is its objective necessity and the absence of an incentive exterior to it, then the latter can only be found in the objective necessity of the imperative, i.e. its property of being a universal practical law.

(4) This means that the incentive to act according to a categorical imperative must lie in its representing a universal practical law.

This reconstruction is based upon Kant's claim in section II that in the case of a categorical imperative, 'the will is (...) determined by the law alone without any other incentives' (GMM, 419). It appears relatively unproblematic, and translates the result obtained in section I by analysing the concept of duty (GMM, 400), namely that if I do my duty, I do it because it is my duty.

The derivation of the content of the moral law

But we are still left with the crucial issue of the content. An agent knows the content of a hypothetical imperative insofar as she knows how to determine an action to fulfil a certain purpose. With a categorical imperative, however, there is no such purpose and thus no such content. What therefore is the content of such an imperative? To examine this issue, let us look at Kant's text in section II. We find that two things happen in Kant's derivation of this content as the FUL.

In what I shall call move (A), Kant changes from talk of categorical imperatives (GMM, 417, 419) to talk of a categorical imperative (GMM, 419) and then to talk of the categorical imperative (GMM, 421) without explanation. The other move -

\[ \text{Gaut and Kerstein (1999) however take issue with Korsgaard (1996a) in her reconstruction of this part of the deduction. They claim that it would be possible for the motivation to have a grounding originating outside the imperative (e.g. God's command), as long as the external source of normativity is understood to be necessarily identical with one's duty. However, this objection does not exclude the motivation being described as internal since, here, duty necessarily refers to the same motivation as the external source of normativity.} \]

\[ \text{Let us note that Gaut and Kerstein (1999) show one can reconstruct a strong argument for the FUL from the material in section I. This argument considers different candidates for the moral law and eliminates three, keeping the FUL as the one which fits the requirements identified in section I. However, this is a weaker argument since other candidates could be examined, and moreover, the authors do not follow Kant on the motivational issue which is central (see previous footnote).} \]
move (B) - is that by which Kant makes a transition in GMM (421) from the claim that 'For since the imperative contains besides the law only the necessity that the maxim should accord with this law' to stating that 'there is nothing remaining in it but the universality of law'. This however is to say that because a maxim is determined by a law which is not constrained in any way, therefore all that determines the maxim is this legal form. This is an invalid inference insofar as the law in question here changes from having no specified content to having one, namely one which is passed on (somehow) from its form. So there is apparently both equivocation on the law in question and a lack of justification of the way in which form passes over into content. This accounts for two related important criticisms of Kant's strategy that identify the apparently illegitimate move from two slightly different points of view.

Spelled out, these criticisms of move (B) are that: either the derivation only validly leads to a principle that is empty but is then illegitimately interpreted as yielding substantive moral principles; or it moves illegitimately from the requirement for a maxim to conform to a universal law to a more substantial constraint, that of the maxim's conforming to the FUL.

The first type of criticism is of Hegelian origin (Acton, 1970) and a recent version is in Wood (1990) who also makes the related claim that rational (universal) egoism cannot be ruled out by the FUL. The second is found in Aune (1979), Bittner (1989) and Allison (1996). Both amount to the claim that Kant cannot derive any non-empty constraints upon maxims of action from mere considerations of the universal form of a law.

The first criticism locates the invalid move in the way the notion of universality actually derived is allegedly misinterpreted in its use as one which can yield substantive moral principles (Wood, 1990). With the second criticism, Aune attempts a reconstruction of the argument, but claims that it fails because it requires that a maxim is consistent with universal law if and only if 'its generalization could be willed to be a universal law' (Aune, 1979), although these

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5 Schopenhauer (1965) in particular notes that it is incomprehensible 'how something is to come from nothing' (p.70). The invalidity of this move can also easily be seen by taking any example of non-universalisable maxim which however clearly represents an implementation of a universal moral requirement. Thus, the maxim 'Give £1,000 a year to Amnesty International' is not universalisable - both for non-morally relevant (I may only be able to pay in Kroners if I am in Sweden) and morally relevant reasons (I may not dispose of that much money). It however falls under the principle of charity, which is a moral principle in Kant's ethics. So the legal form of such a principle does not entail the universalisability of maxims falling under it.

6 This inference is enabled by Kant's loose use of the word 'contains' in GMM, 421.

7 Thus Allison (1996) claims that Kant establishes that maxims must conform to a Principle of Rightness, and that one cannot get from this to the FUL.
are not logically equivalent. Allison (1996) corrects Aune's reconstruction, locating the mismatch as being between a maxim consistent with universal law and one which 'includes itself as universal law'. As he indicates, there are clearly maxims, such as that of false promising, which may be viewed as fulfilling the first condition, but not the second.

Reconstructing the FUL
The dense paragraph in which the problems with move (B) occur is worth quoting in full:

'(...) if I think of a categorical imperative, I know immediately what it contains. For since the imperative contains besides the law only the necessity that the maxim should accord with this law, while the law contains no condition to which it is restricted, there is nothing remaining in it except the universality of the law as such to which the maxim of the action should conform; and in effect the conformity alone is represented as necessary by the imperative' (GMM, 421)

A proper interpretation of it involves clarifying the levels of principles involved. There is a maxim which must accord with the categorical imperative in question. This means that the maxim M is a first-order principle falling under a second-order categorical imperative [C]9. But after that, the text is more confused. For the law which this imperative [C] is required to represent is first described as having no condition which restricts it. What remains however is its universality. But this means there is a constraint upon this second-order categorical imperative [C] after all, namely its universality. The text, however, presents the constraint as applying to maxim M.

It therefore appears that to reconstruct a valid argument from Kant's text involves taking care to express the requirement upon the form of the categorical imperative [C] as a constraint upon this principle [C] rather than upon the maxim which falls under it10. Insofar as [C] is said to be a law, [C] has to have a universal form. A principle expressing a requirement upon second-order principle [C] is a third-order principle. Such a principle is itself categorical as it is a requirement upon the form of any categorical imperative to which a maxim of action should conform. It is a unique requirement which we shall call the Categorical Imperative. It

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8For it is reasonable for any agent to act on that maxim. But an agent cannot thereby simultaneously will that it become a universal law, for this conflicts with the purpose of the maxim of false promising itself.
9So far, this agrees with Allison's analysis (Allison, 1990).
10This reconstruction therefore necessarily moves away from Kant's text wherein the FUL is more properly interpreted as being a second-order principle, as Allison (1990) presents it.
Three Tiers Reconstruction

C1 - Act around two second-order principles
1. Unique --> many categories
2. Undetermined --> teleological
3. Formal --> additional gives content
commands to act upon second-order principles which are universally valid principles for maxims of action. We may now combine this result with the result obtained above that the incentive for acting upon a particular categorical imperative must lie in its thus being universally valid. This leads to formulating the following third-order principle which is a reconstructed version of the FUL:

\[
\text{[CI]: Act according to a second-order principle that you thereby will to be universally valid}^{11}.\]

Let us show that move (B) is indeed avoided with this framework. First, a distinction has been made between, on the one hand, the categorical imperatives upon which the only constraint is their lawful form and this form's being the incentive to act upon them, and on the other hand, [CI]. In this way, the content of the first does not get directly specified, while that of the second does. Moreover, this contentful principle yields specific duties when it is applied to second-order principles since all such principles do not pass the test of the formula [CI]. Indeed, we observe by applying Allison's (1996) or Korsgaard's (1996a) arguments to the second-order principles, that [CI] does allow us, e.g., to reject the principle of acting upon maxims of false promising. This is because in willing that all agents promise falsely, one is willing a situation in which promises will no longer be accepted, and thus contradicting oneself. The possibility of thus obtaining substantial moral results from [CI], a principle derived from the mere consideration of duty, blocks Hegel's criticism.

Second, and correlative, the constraint upon the form of the second-order categorical imperatives does not pass illegitimately into their content, but forms the content of [CI]; this blocks Aune's criticism.

Apart from allowing the derivation to overcome the criticisms of move (B), this proposal can be seen to have other immediate advantages. First, the principles which fall under [CI] remain to be determined. With the proposed reconstruction, the principles which will be derived from [CI] have the status of categorical imperatives (at the second-order level). This is in keeping

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\[^{11}\text{One could give a more comprehensive, but equivalent formula: [CI]: Act according to a second-order principle on the grounds that you thereby will it to be universally valid.}\]
with the way in which they are actually presented by Kant (e.g. as practical laws in CPrR, 19-20).

Second, this proposal can be seen to deal with the problem associated with move (A). For, at the second-order level, we have a potential multiplicity of categorical imperatives, while there is only one at the third-order. Moreover, although Kant does make this unjustified move (A), his text at least suggests a distinction between two types of categorical imperatives which would explain this move, a distinction which requires the proposed three-tier structure. Indeed, he discusses a multiplicity of possible categorical imperatives whose content is empirical (in that they refer to particular forms of action or purposes) in GMM, 419. It is not possible to know whether such imperatives are indeed categorical by mere examination. Thus Kant discusses the difficulty of assessing the nature of action upon an imperative of keeping one's promises. Kant concludes that the investigation into the possibility of categorical imperatives has to be pursued a priori (GMM, 420), which leads to the derivation of a unique a priori imperative in GMM, 421. This derived principle \( \{C\} \) is therefore meant by Kant to serve as principle for all empirical categorical imperatives (such as that of promise-keeping). Since the latter govern our maxims of action, they are second-order, and \( \{C\} \) a third-order principle.

Third, insofar as obligatory second-order principles are to be obtained through the test of \( \{C\} \), the maxims which fall under these principles are themselves permissible. For they represent ways in which that which is obligatory is implemented. If there is more than one maxim to choose from, these maxims are permissible and not obligatory. If only one such maxim falls under a second-order principle, it is thereby obligatory. Thus \( \{C\} \) is a principle for both obligatory and permissible maxims of action. This therefore provides Kant's ethics with a criterion for permissibility. On the contrary, Kant's text only delivers fairly general statements about permissibility such as the criterion that the permissible action has to be 'compatible with the autonomy of the will' (GMM, 439). This is not satisfactory, as Singer (1963) points out, all the more so that the distinction obligatory/permissible is at the same time central for Kant (Allison, 1990).

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13It is worth noting that Kant's text (e.g. section I of GMM) suggests a distinction between the maxims that we do indeed will to be universal law and thus are obligatory, and those which could be thus willed and are merely permissible. But he gives no justification for thus distinguishing between obligatory and permissible.
Fourth, in relation to the previous point, if a maxim $M$ is obligatory, this means that the second-order principle:
One ought to act upon maxim $M$
is also obligatory.
Therefore, $[\text{Cl}]$, when applied to such a principle is equivalent to a second-order principle applied to the maxim directly, where this principle states:

**[ci]**: Act according to a maxim that you thereby will to be universally valid

which is very close to Kant's formulation (GMM, 421), albeit with the requirement that the maxim actually (and not potentially) be willed to be universally valid. This means that $[\text{Cl}]$ is in keeping with the spirit of Kant's formula.

Fifth, the proposed framework reflects concerns raised by Bittner (1974), Höffe (1979) and O'Neill (1989) about the distinction between the specific description of an action and the more general intention which is thereby implemented. According to them, only the latter should be included in the maxim. This avoids, in particular, the standard type of objection that such a maxim as:

$M_i$: To offer a cup of tea to any afternoon visitor

would appear to be forbidden as it cannot be universalised, since in some cultures, this gesture may contradict one's aim to make the visitor welcome. Rather than introduce such a distinction between such specific rules and maxims, our framework allows any amount of detail to be included in the maxim (as long as it includes a representation of the agent's intention). This is because the test is to be applied to the second-order principle(s) of action which are at work. These principles abstract from empirical conditions irrelevant to the agent's purpose, and include a representation of this purpose. Thus, the principle $[P_w]$:

$[P_w]$: One ought to make guests feel welcome

is such that $M_i$ falls under it. It is obligatory as a particular form of the principle of charity:

$[P_c]$: One ought to help those in need.

This formalises the solution proposed by these authors in terms of levels of principles, while keeping the maxim as the subjective principle the agent acts upon.

Sixth, this three-tier structure provides an explanation for the use Kant makes of the terminology categorical/hypothetical(prudence)/hypothetical(skill) instead of the more appropriate distinction apodictic/assertoric/problematic (Beck, 1957-8), i.e. one which uses the categories of modality. As Beck notes, a maxim which is
not morally obligatory can be expressed in a categorical form (e.g. M₄: (For the sake of prudence,) one ought not put all one's eggs in one basket) and, vice-versa, a maxim expressing a moral requirement can take a hypothetical form (e.g. M₅: If someone is in need of assistance, one ought to provide some form of help). According to Beck, these maxims are best viewed as representing respectively assertoric and apodictic statements about what is required of a (rational) human being.

However, if we look at the second-order principles enjoining one to act on these maxims, we find the following. The principle commanding one to act on maxim M₄ is hypothetically binding as it only applies if one is seeking one's happiness. That stating one ought to act on maxim M₅, on the other hand, is categorically binding. This means that, if one considers the end and/or ground of the action, i.e. if one takes a second-order perspective, one finds categorical and hypothetical principles (implicitly if the ground is not stated explicitly). This is because, in the case of a maxim, since it describes an action aimed at a given purpose, a condition is always included (explicitly or not) - namely the pursuit of the purpose. In the case of second-order principles, on the other hand, this pursuit itself is at stake. If there is a condition, it pertains to the validity of this pursuit. And therefore, at this level, the distinction hypothetical/categorical is morally relevant. This provides further justification for differentiating between the first and second-order levels of principles.

2. Indeterminacy of Kant's ethics

Indeterminacy of action

The proposed structure allows to clearly formulate the indeterminacy of Kantian ethics. We can use the methods of universalisability and universalisability in the will (e.g. Korsgaard, 1996a; O'Neill, 1989) to identify second-order principles which fall under {CI}. The first method identifies narrow duties and the second broad ones. Korsgaard (1996a) examines the way in which such criteria can be applied and shows that the first criterion is best understood as rejecting those principles whose universality leads to a practical contradiction. Thus, for instance, if I adopt the principle of not telling the truth when it is convenient for me, I am simultaneously relying upon the fact that others do tell the truth. When I universalise this principle therefore, I am both willing that everyone tell the truth,

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13This is brought out in M₅, but only implicit in M₄.
14Korsgaard applies these tests to maxims. They remain however valid when their domain of application is translated to the second-order level of principles.
and willing that they do not. This is a practical contradiction. This interpretation has the advantage of exhibiting the continuity with the criterion of universalisability in the will. Here, the contradiction results from willing a principle which, when universalised, will *practically* contradict another (non-specified) object of my will.

What kind of principles are thereby established? If there is a contradiction in the universalisation of a principle, this must be the consequence of the other agents' implementing the same principle as mine and a conflict arising either with what I will through my very action or what I will otherwise (insofar as I have ends). These are, respectively, the cases of contradiction in conception and in the will. As a consequence, using these procedures, a duty is derived which concerns my behaviour towards the other; for if I consider an aspect of my behaviour which does not affect the other, universalisation cannot lead to any conflict. This conclusion is in line with Korsgaard's observation that the FUL's contradiction in conception criterion is chiefly useful to establish duties relating to inter-subjective conventions (Korsgaard, 1996a, 97) arising from what Rawls calls 'practices' (Rawls, 1955). Certain duties relating to "natural" acts (e.g. killing) additionally require that certain ends be assumed (ibid.), but again the derivable duties are intersubjective. Kant (e.g. GMM, 422-423) also examines duties to oneself, but they are either not derivable from the FUL (e.g. the case of suicide - Korsgaard, 1996a, p.88 - or the development of one's talents - Henrich, 1993, p.24-25) or only derivable from FUL conditionally upon other duties having been derived (e.g. the case of happiness - GMM, 399).

How does a second-order principle of duty lead to action? To be able to act, one must first have identified maxims of action. Let us examine this issue. Clearly there are no established procedures for moving from a second-order principle to a maxim falling under it. This is because the principle defines a type of action, no more. Thus, for instance, the principle of charity \([P_c]\) does not determine what help is to be provided. This is an observation which has in fact led to a considerable disagreement with O'Neill’s (1989, p.99) endorsement of the derivation of the duty to develop one's talents from FUL, since all that can be obtained from her argument is a hypothetical imperative to develop talents required for specific ends.

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15. This result will be a key component in the argument developed in the final chapter.
16. Korsgaard (1996a, p.125-6) shows how the Formula of Humanity establishes the duty. However, this assumes the validity of this formula. There is no space to examine this, but I agree with Korsgaard (1996a, p.106) that there is a progression in Kant's argument in FMM, from popular morality through the different formulations of the CI, so that the Formula of Humanity is not derivable from FUL. Kant (GMM, 428) proposes a separate derivation of the Formula of Humanity which I take to fail in the attempted derivation of Humanity as a necessary end.
17. I disagree with O'Neill's (1989, p.99) endorsement of the derivation of the duty to develop one's talents from FUL, since all that can be obtained from her argument is a hypothetical imperative to develop talents required for specific ends.
amount of literature on the topic of how to understand the content of broad duties (Baron, 1995, p.88-107). Without examining the points of contention, I note that there is widespread agreement as to the need for more determinacy before one can be said to be in a position to constitute a maxim of action.

Three responses may be made to this point. The first would consist in claiming that, in fact, there are many second-order principles which are determined by \( C \) and that by jointly applying several principles, one could in fact determine a maxim of action. To see that this is not the case, consider \( P_c \). If I decide to apply it by helping an elderly person across the road, which principle is supposed to determine whether I should then stay with this person to help her carry her shopping, etc.? One may retort that in fact, I have duties to others, including myself, which account for my deciding to attend to other matters once the road is crossed. It is indeed possible to show that Kant's FUL leads to such principles, but the point is that, even given all these principles, there is an issue of how one weighs the different dutiful requirements. These weights are not prescribed by Kant's principle, hence the indeterminacy.

A second response would be to claim that the extra determinacy is in fact not within the purview of morality. Although this may seem to have some plausibility in certain cases, such as in the case of how to make a visitor feel welcome, it does not in others. For instance, the amount of help I provide is surely not a morally neutral matter.

A final and weaker response would consist in accepting the point in the case of broad duties, but not of narrow ones. There is much, *prima facie*, to commend this view since broad duties are, by definition, in need of further specification. However, let us consider the principle \( P_i \) of truth-telling. Although it enjoins to tell the truth, there are many ways to do so. To show this, does not require entering into the subtleties of jesuitic casuistry. It is also not a matter of being economical with the truth. Rather, it is clear that the truth can be *presented* in different ways, some of which may be, e.g. hurtful, encouraging, ... all which differences are morally relevant.

**Second-order underdetermination**

What is missing from Kant's moral requirements to enable the identification of maxims of action? The answer is suggested by the first objection above. Were further principles available at the second-order level, the indeterminacy at the first-order level would be eliminated. The problem which Kant's ethical principle
leaves open is therefore that of the underdetermination at the second-order level of ethical principles.

We can specify the nature of the underdetermination by examining the example of the principle of charity, \( P_c \). As we saw on the example above, there is an issue as to how much help one should provide to the person in need. This is an issue of \emph{quantity}. Such underdetermination applies exclusively to broad duties.

But the nature of the help provided is also not fixed. Helping someone across the road may involve physical assistance, psychological reassurance. Of course, the nature of the assistance provided depends to a certain extent upon what is required. However, if physical assistance is needed, there are still many forms it could take. This is a matter of the \emph{quality} of the type of action.

Next, insofar as a maxim describes an action directed to a purpose, a second-order principle involves determining this type of purpose\(^\text{18}\). When one acts upon such a principle, one is implementing a way of achieving this purpose. However, one has to take account of the fact that achieving this purpose will come at a cost for the agent, involving his investing some effort. But this effort is perceived as such with respect to other purposes of the agent which are thereby given less importance. The question is then that of knowing how involved the subject will be, i.e. how far is she prepared to invest herself (time, energy, ...) to achieve \( Y \) through \( X \). This determines the importance of the pursuit of this purpose \emph{relative to} the agent's other purposes. I shall refer to this as the \emph{involvement} characteristic of the type of action.

Finally, there are cases where duties prescribed by \( \{C_l\} \) conflict\(^\text{19}\). \textit{Pace} Kant, I take it that there can be a conflict between the duty to tell the truth and that to help, for instance when the truth will be immediately used to harm (e.g. murder) someone (Kant, 1976c, 431). I therefore take it that although \( \{C_l\} \) can pronounce on the deontic modality of any principle, this does not resolve all normative issues. For two mutually exclusive forms of action may be required, even when the choice

\(^{18}\)The purpose of an action is simply what is to be achieved by doing it. It may thus be distinguished from the notion of an end, which is a state of affairs to be brought about through the action as means. Thus, if I act according to the principle of truth-telling, my purpose is simply that I should manage to utter the truth. I may do this on the grounds of duty, or out of some reverence for the notion of truth. In the latter case, the state of affairs in which the truth has been told is one which forms part of the end of my action.

\(^{19}\)This is a controversial issue, as some commentators (e.g. Herman, 1993; Korsgaard, 1996a) try to show such conflicts do not arise because a maxim describing the specific situation is all that is at stake. This, however, conflicts with the need to consider more general principles so as to be able to actually obtain a meaningful result from the \( \{C_l\} \) test. My interpretation of \( \{C_l\} \) as applying to principles, leads to conflicts. Kant's theory has the resources to defuse them, I believe, although I cannot show this here. But his theory cannot fully resolve them.
between them is not morally irrelevant. There is therefore a normative issue of an agent's ranking of duties which emerges here.

These four forms of second-order underdetermination correspond to four groups of categories under which an action can be considered. Analogously to the categories of the pure understanding (CPR, A77-80), there are ethical categories which emerge from this analysis. They are four: quantity, quality, relation to other purposes and normative value in the realm of practical action. The first two forms of determination are those of quantity and quality, the third, that of the agent's involvement, and the fourth, that of his ranking of duties.

Whence this underdetermination?
Is it just a contingent feature of Kant's theory that it leaves us with a gap to be filled at the second-order level of principles? I would like to show that it is not, and to suggest it is connected to the point raised earlier about the difference between unconditionality and universal validity.

First, let us show that the above sources of underdetermination are connected with choices that do not ultimately fall under (CI), because of the very nature of (CI). Remembering that the Categorical Imperative has three components, namely universalisability (in conception), universalsibility in the will, and identity of the

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20To attempt to give a firm grounding to this categorial theory would lead us away from our purpose.
21This meaning of the word 'quality' appears quite distinct from Kant's in the Transcendental Analytic (CPR, A80). However, what I refer to as the quality of an action can be cognised precisely by using the categories of reality, negation and limitation applied to the action's empirical characteristics.
22These are modelled on those of the first Critique. Kant does present a table of categories in the second Critique, which has the fourth group in common with this classification. The aim of his table appears however distinct as the categories are described as 'categories of freedom with reference to the concepts of good and evil' (CPR, 66). It must also be said that the role of these categories is not well circumscribed by Kant.
23Unlike the categories of CPR, the CPR should deal with another type of categories than the purely practical or ethical. This is because our agency has effects in the empirical world. This link is definable in terms of categories determining the relation between the projected effect of an action and the actual one. These are the categories of risk (quantity, quality, involvement of the agent in risk, acceptability of risk) and the latter two define a corresponding indeterminacy we shall not deal with here.
24We note that instead of 4 x 3 categories, we only have 4. This is because the theoretical categories are to be applied to an indeterminate manifold which is given, while the practical ones determine an action viewed wholly as the product of the agent's will. Consequently, if we take the categories of alethic modality, when applied to the manifold, existence is clearly more than possibility, but with the deontic categories, there is complete interdefinability: I can think of my action as permissible or think of its negation as not obligatory.
25The latter two categories could also be termed categories of differential quantity and differential quality. For the agent's involvement in pursuing a particular purpose reveals how much more effort (time, energy, ...) he is prepared to invest in this, given his other duties. It therefore tells us how much more important this particular purpose is, at this point in time, than any other. The ranking of duties gives us the order in which any duty takes precedence over any other. It therefore tells us, in particular, which type of duty could be seen as taking precedence over the one under consideration.
will to act on a principle and to take the principle as universal law, we shall show
that universalisation under each category leads to infringe one of these conditions.
Considering the quality of an action, it is not possible, for instance, to consider a
world in which a certain type of help would be universal. This is for the trivial
reason that there is no single type of help which applies in all cases. Therefore,
universalising any particular type of help is in effect not possible - i.e. the help
cannot in some cases be provided as it does not apply. The contradiction in
conception thus results from the one-sidedness of the ensuing actions while help is
by definition supposed to be agent oriented.
Similarly, the universal provision of a certain quantity of help in all circumstances
would probably be detrimental to the pursuit of many ends that would ultimately
be more beneficial in terms of providing assistance for instance. Here the problem
is straightforward: if one tries to maximise a principle of limited help, one can run
an argument analogous to that against the universalisation of the principle
enjoining one not to provide help. That is, it would contradict my will, were I to
need a large amount of help, but were to simultaneously will the universality of a
principle of provision of a smaller amount of help.
Finally, if I consider the agent's involvement in her action, if I will a certain level of
involvement to be universal, this is not on the grounds that it is universalisable -
for surely, I could universalise any level of involvement. It is rather as a result of
other considerations (e.g. 'there would be fewer wars were everybody not to take
their convictions too seriously'). Hence, the third requirement of {CI} cannot be
fulfilled.

Second, we note that this means that universally binding principles require a
further source of determination which is not universally binding. This result can
now be considered in the light of the doubts expressed at the start of the chapter
about the identity of the good will and universal (validity and) bindingness. In
seeking that which is unconditionally good in the form of a universal law, Kant
has closed off the option of considering that which may be unconditional but not
universalisable as a binding constraint upon human action. If we now assume
there is something unconditionally good which is not universally binding, we
have a possible explanation for the underdetermination. For this other notion of
unconditional good could provide a source of extra determination to the principles
of morality.
Let us note, however, that this explanation can only work if that which is
unconditionally good but not universally binding is grasped, not as a separate
form of unconditional good, but as another feature of the one unconditional
good\textsuperscript{26}. For what is needed is an underdetermination of the concept of
unconditional good by that of universal law. This underdetermination then
trickles down through Kant's system to its outlet, i.e. the principles of morality or
categorical imperatives.
But what does this mean? That the notion of the unconditional good contains more
than one component. So the notion of universal bindingness is just one dimension
of the unconditional good and the full determination of an action requires that the
other dimension(s) be specified simultaneously. This is of course only a possible
explanation, but it will receive further support and development in the next
chapters.

Conclusion
In this chapter, a framework for the formulation and derivation of the Categorical
Imperative has been defined. In this way, important objections against Kant's
ethics of duty have been addressed. This moral law is the principle defining that
which is universally and thus unconditionally good. Insofar as it is a third-order
principle, it is not sufficient to determine maxims of action. The indeterminacy is
connected with an insufficient determination at the level of second-order
principles of action. The search for further determination in Part Two will be
guided by the observation that there is potentially more to the unconditional good
than what is universally binding.

\textsuperscript{26}This is necessary for a coherent notion of unconditional good. Else, we would find potential situations of
conflict between two distinct notions of the unconditional good.
CHAPTER II

Inclinations, self and moral worth

Introduction

In this chapter, the relation of Kant's ethical principles to the agent's psychology is examined. Three problems are discussed which all have a common thread, namely that they address the relation of Kant's morality to inclinations and the agent's self. For this purpose, the supreme principle of morality is taken to be the FUL examined in chapter I.

The problems under consideration are the issue of the moral worth of action, the place of the emotions and the self, and the understanding of moral deliberation in Kant's Ethics. To resolve the problems raised, we shall show it is necessary to develop a conception of the acting agent, or agent-self, and to distinguish the moral worth of this agent and of her particular actions. Apart from clarifying the rôle of inclinations and defining an appropriate notion of self, it also clears the ambiguity involved in Kant's notion of moral worth. Although this defuses some of the problematic issues connected with the emotions in Kant's ethics, we shall show that an important problem remains.

1. Three problems

First problem: the moral worth of actions

Kant's GMM addresses the problem of how one ought to act. An issue which is not dealt with by Kant is that of the truth of such propositions as 'John was wrong to do X on Thursday'. This is the problem of what is required for an action to be morally worthy. It is a theoretical problem for practical reason. The question is

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1 Other formulations of the categorical imperative are not derivable from FUL (Korsgaard, 1996a, 106). Further developments of Kant's ethics in CPRR and the MM, are assumed not to be derivable from the FUL - chiefly because they presuppose the problematic rôle of the Highest Good (Beck, 1960, 244-55)
whether Kant's solution to the practical problem of practical reason (i.e. 'what is good?'), is sufficient to deal with it.

Remembering that the Good Will is that of an agent who does his duty because it is his duty, this suggests that, when examining the moral worth of a particular action, one should find out (GMM, 399-400) whether the motivation is indeed duty, whether there is conformity to duty, and for both these conditions whether they are the product of the agent's freedom or just a matter of luck. In other words, what needs to be established is: first, whether the agent deliberately acted out of duty as opposed to an agent who would happen to do that which is right, but for other reasons; and second, whether the agent deliberately acted in conformity with the moral law.

Kant gives us examples of agents whose acts do not satisfy one or both these conditions (GMM, 397-398). Thus, the friend of man's actions are driven by his sympathy for others and not necessarily in conformity with the moral law. The honest shopkeeper on the other hand, who does what is right but out of self-interest, only fails to fulfil the first condition. Let us examine how to establish, for a particular action, what it means for the agent to fulfil these conditions.

A standard approach to making judgements of moral worth and which has its roots in common moral thinking consists in considering counterfactual situations. They provide a conceptual tool encapsulating the question: 'what would the agent have done if circumstances had been less favourable?'. The thought is that if the agent did indeed deliberately fulfil the stated conditions, he would have done so even had the situation not been so favourable. Else, his motivation and the lawfulness of his action would have been the result of the contingent circumstances he was in.

One however encounters problems in specifying the relevant counterfactuals - and there has been much debate around this topic: should we be looking at weakening the effect of supporting inclinations, or actually consider strongly antagonistic ones? Let us briefly survey some of the arguments.

Henson (1979) presents two models for the attribution of moral worth: the battle-citation and fitness report models. According to the fitness report model (chiefly found in MM) it is essential that, given a certain action done out of duty while certain inclinations were present, 'respect for duty would have sufficed by itself'.

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2Kant thought that the first condition entailed the second (GMM, 397). This is probably true, but we shall not examine this question here and thus keep the two conditions.
(Henson, 1979). Second, the battle citation model (in GMM) only assigns moral worth to an action if there are no supporting inclinations involved. The latter is clearly inadequate as Baron (1995) points out: it is possible for action to be from duty when there are supporting inclinations, for else Kant would not point to the difficulties in assessing the moral worth of such action in GMM, 397. Herman (1981) shows that the fitness report model can be viewed in either a weak or a strong form. In its weak form, it suggests one only consider the absence of favourable inclinations. Herman points out, however, that there are relevant inclinations, such as the shop-keeper's, which could actually incline the agent to act undutifully in other circumstances, even though in the actual circumstances, there is no reason for him to act undutifully. One would therefore wish to examine what would happen were the profit motive to provide an incentive for him not to do his duty. This suggests the strong model. On this reading, one should consider situations in which motives conflicting with duty are present. But this in turn is problematic because it would seem to require moral heroism of the agent. The upshot of these difficulties is the first milestone in this debate, namely Herman's conclusion that counterfactuals are in fact irrelevant: the action has moral worth as long as it is only motivated by duty.

In another important step, Allison (1990) responded by defending the rôle of counterfactuals. According to him, Kant thinks that an incentive can determine the will only if it is 'taken up' into a maxim as sufficient ground for action. This is the Incorporation Thesis which is essential to grasping Kant's notion of rational agency. It implies that a proper identification of the maxim is also required. But does Allison's proposal provide an answer to the question of how to use counterfactuals? Since Allison does not dismiss the rôle of counterfactuals, he is therefore suggesting that by properly identifying the incentive and maxim of an action, one is therefore able to decide the truth of the relevant counterfactuals. Allison's solution enables us to see, for example, that if I am an honest person in all situations apart from those in which I am very hungry, this means that the principle I am acting upon is:

To be honest when one is not hungry

which is clearly not dutiful since it is of the general form: 'To be honest when one is so inclined' which is not universalisable (on Korsgaard's, 1996a, practical

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3Following chapter I, the second-order principle is relevant. However, in fully identifying the maxim and the incentive, one identifies the principle it falls under.
contradiction interpretation for instance). This example illustrates the equivalence between circumscribing the relevant counterfactuals and identifying the maxim: the identification of the subject's choice in relevant counterfactual situations will determine what conditionals will go into the maxim. So, Allison's solution is correct as it provides a Kantian understanding of the rôle of counterfactuals. The answer provided so far is therefore: first, identify the maxim (and thus the course of action in relevant counterfactual situations); second, identify the unique motivating incentive, i.e. that incorporated into the maxim^4.

This does not, however, yield a solution to defining the scope of the counterfactuals, but reformulates this problem in terms of maxims. This is conceptually not fully satisfactory and suggests Kant has not provided the materials required for an answer to the theoretical problem of practical reason. Additionally, it raises a related epistemological problem. We shall just note that the conceptual problem which is the topic here, is intimately related to this epistemological question. Indeed, to establish the meaning of the conditions for moral worth will provide guidance as to how to recognise moral worth. Leaving the epistemological issue aside since it is not relevant to our purpose, let us indicate in what ways the scope of counterfactual situations is to be specified.

First, there are situations such as those corresponding to the strong readings of the rôle of counterfactuals for which an extension of the approach in the previous example is counterintuitive. Thus, if I were an honest person, but would not be prepared to be honest when tortured for more than 2 hours, then, I would apparently be acting on the maxim:

To be honest as long as one is not tortured for more than two hours

which is arguably not morally worthy for the same reasons as the previous maxim^5.

It seems to run counter to our moral intuitions to require of an agent a readiness to all but die for duty so as to assign full moral worth to a particular action. The problem is not caused by any Kantian rigorism, but by the apparent irrelevance of

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^4 It should be noted that these conditions are not independent, the full identification of the maxim imposing constraints upon possible motivating incentives: some purposes clearly indicate that duty is not the motive.

^5 Here, a case could be made for accepting his maxim as permissible & even morally worthy on the grounds that the practical contradiction to which its universalisation gives rise supposes a world in which such torture has a non negligible probability. If the agent's world does not fulfil this condition, the agent may argue that, with a perfectly acceptable level of risk, the maxim at stake is identical to that of being honest without condition. This would involve examining the rôle of risk in decision-making, which is beyond the scope of this thesis. In any case, the argument does not rely upon the non moral worthiness of this maxim in all possible worlds.
the latter counterfactual. It implies that the range of counterfactual circumstances is to be circumscribed.

Second, apart from irrelevant counterfactuals, there are some which one cannot actually formulate. Indeed, there are inclinations so deeply embedded in who I am as a person, and such that I cannot understand my action as mine were they not present. Thus, inclinations related to my upbringing and certain deep convictions are not all explicitly known to me: even assuming I were to introspect and experiment with the alteration of some of them, I could only understand some of them against the background of other inclinations, which in turn would not therefore be explicitly formulated. The problem is therefore to decide which inclinations are to be made explicit.

Third, even explicit inclinations are not such that I am able to formulate fully explicit maxims which account for the way in which I act upon them. This is because I arguably cannot grasp explicitly all of the circumstancial reasons that at times predispose me to act on a given incentive, and at other times do not. What is at stake is the existence of moods reflecting the interaction of inclinations and circumstances. The problem is that of establishing to what extent one has to identify explicitly how inclinations interact with circumstances.

Second problem: inclinations and self

This problem concerns a particularly important strand of criticism of Kant's notion of moral worth. Williams has, in several publications, developed attacks upon Kantian morality which question the notion of moral worth it stands for. We shall focus in particular on two important forms of such criticism.

First, Williams claims that Kant's deontological ethics leads to a devaluation of emotions which we would be right to view as morally worthy (Williams, 1981). This is a criticism which has roots in Schiller's joking (Paton, 1958, p.48) that in Kantian ethics, one ought to pay attention that one not be inclined to do that which is good, else one's action would not be morally worthy. Although this is clearly a false interpretation as we have just seen, there are many statements in Kant's texts corroborating the view that inclinations have no moral worth.

The other important, and related, criticism is Williams's (1981) claim that all rule-based (deontological, utilitarian, ...) moral systems conflict with the subject's integrity and overlook what is morally worthy in the self. This criticism is related to Hegel's attack upon the self-alienation contained in Kant's categorical imperative, which has been revived by Allen Wood (1990).
The purpose here is not to provide an answer to the breadth of Williams's criticisms - a task already undertaken with some success by Barbara Herman (1993). The aim is rather twofold. First, I shall identify those aspects of the valid concerns these criticisms raise about Kantian ethics that it has the materials required to respond to. Second, this will lead me to emphasise the remaining unresolved issues and their meaning for Kantian ethics.

Third problem: the notion of deliberation

The final problem concerns the dual picture Kant provides of rational agency. The proper interpretation of the empirical and intelligible characters which form this picture, and their interrelation is the object of ongoing discussion (e.g., see Allison, 1990, p.29-53). I wish however to focus upon a somewhat distinct issue, that of whether this dual picture is able to provide an understanding of the process of deliberation.

At the empirical level, the agent is determined to act on subjective maxims which characterise her empirical character according to a belief-desire model (CPR, A549-550/B577-578). This model operates in a deterministic empirical world. At the intelligible level, the agent exhibits a pure spontaneity (ibid., A802/B830), as expressed in the Incorporation Thesis. This is an incompatibilist model.

One problem with this dual presentation is that it does not provide a model for the process of deliberation which leads to the choosing of a particular motive as the ground of action. For the intelligible picture presents us with a pure will which can spontaneously opt for an inclination or duty. This gives no understanding of what the basis for the choice is, whereby this understanding is meant to shed light upon the phenomenology of the process. In other words, we have no grasp of the purchase inclinations have upon the agent if the latter is viewed as an intelligible character. The empirical picture provides an understanding of the pull of inclinations, but we then lose the sense of spontaneity characterising choice in Kantian ethics.

The insufficiency of this dual picture for our grasp of the process of deliberation can be seen from the fact that there is no account of why certain inclinations rather than others could exert a motivational pull upon this particular agent's free decision. Note that this complaint is related to one of Williams's (1985).
2. Towards a common solution

*Strategy*

Taking these related problems in a different order, the last problem suggests we need to clarify the notion of self to grasp the phenomenon of deliberation. This notion will then allow us to distinguish between the moral worth of a self and that of an action. The definition of the relevant counterfactuals for each of these notions will then address the first problem.

The notion of self I shall propose will serve to provide a conception of self lacking in Kant's practical philosophy and that accommodates inclinations insofar as they contribute to making persons into who they are. Using the analysis of moral worth, this will serve the purpose of providing an answer to some of the concerns in the second problem.

*The agent-self*

What is needed is to view in a single picture the agent as affected by the pull inclinations exert on him, and making decisions against that background. We thus propose to define the *practical agent-self* as characterised both by inclinations and a freedom to choose the incentive for action. This amounts to a thickening of the intelligible character with its inclinations attached to it.

The role of this notion is to provide a model for the phenomenology of deliberation which is consistent with Kant's empirical and intelligible pictures. Importantly, it can be seen as the bearer of the property of practical freedom. Indeed, the notion of agent-self develops material from Kant's first Critique, insofar as Kant talks of the 'pathologically affected will', a will both independent of pathological necessitation, and able to act on the basis of reason and thus practically free. But this will is not individuated by particular inclinations or principles of action. It is therefore only through individuation that this will can be understood as agent-self. We shall see below how to understand this individuation in terms of inclinations.

That Kant should not have further developed such a notion is in keeping with his main interest lying in the identification of transcendental conditions of moral agency. These are, basically, first that it be possible for the agent to act from duty,

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6. We follow Allison (1990) in understanding this freedom as an incompatibilist one. The practical orientation of the notion of agent-self accounts for the remaining uncertainty as to the theoretical nature of this incompatibilist freedom (Allison, 1990, p.65).

7. The absence of a discussion of the genesis of a particular action is analogous to that of the genesis of particular empirical experiences in the first Critique. This analogy can be specified by considering the parallel between the duality empirical/transcendental character in the CPrR and the understanding of the
and second, for his action in the empirical world not to contradict the conditions of experience of the first Critique. The intelligible and empirical pictures respectively are sufficient for these purposes. But there is a further question it is legitimate to put to Kant's theory, but which Kant does not address, namely whether it provides a coherent account of the agent's practical self-conception.

3. Two notions of moral worth
To analyse the moral worth of choices, we return to the intuition that an examination of counterfactual cases is required to get a better grasp of the subject's maxim. The notion of agent-self now allows us to differentiate between moral worth of action and agent and thus find a place for both the weak and strong counterfactuals. To examine the use of counterfactuals, let us note that relevantly less favourable circumstances can be one of the following. First, they may be circumstances objectively less conducive to the action's fulfilling the requirements of duty, and perceived to be so by the agent. Second, they may be circumstances only perceived by the agent to be that way.

Moral worth of actions
Considering particular actions first, an alteration of the objective circumstances would appear to alter the nature of the action. This translates the sense in which it is irrelevant, in assessing the nature of an agent's keeping his promise, to examine whether he would do so were he thereby to suffer intense physical pain for instance. This is a different action altogether.

On the other hand, an action is also carried out by a specified agent so that counterfactuals should not involve alterations in the nature of this agent. From the definition of the agent-self, this implies the inclinations which constitute the agent-self (and the principles which characterise his freedom) should remain fixed. This leaves room for an alteration of what has been described as moods resulting from

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notion of self in the CPR, where a non-empirical conception, the I of the transcendental unity of apperception that stands as the ultimate condition of knowledge, is differentiated from the inner self which is the self accessible to psychological introspection. The latter is characterised by the representations that constitute the subject's experience, while the former is the condition of such experience. Between these notions, the empirical unity of apperception, which is meant to represent the synthesising activity of the subject with his representations, is only mentioned in passing. Similarly to the agent-self, this empirical unity of apperception fills in the picture of the I/will in its rôle of condition of knowledge/freedom by adding the actual representations/inclinations which make it into a real subject of knowledge/agent.

8 This excludes objectively different circumstances for which the agent is not aware of the difference, e.g. cases of irrelevant differences or of unnoticed alterations in the agent's rational capacities.
the way in which external circumstances affect the force of different inclinations. It is thus legitimate to consider the friend of man on a bad day - e.g. when he is depressed or disillusioned - but not to consider what he would do, were he suddenly to turn into a serial killer. This notion of moral worth satisfies the intuition requiring us to consider unfavourable circumstances in a weak sense.

**Moral worth of agents**

In the case of agent-selves, on the other hand, what must be at stake is the choice of the fundamental inclinations which constitute one's agency. Consequently, the evaluation of the moral worth of one's agency will involve considering any possible alteration of one's inclinations.

In so doing, however, the fact that inclinations are not acquired instantaneously must be considered. They are the result of a more or less extended process of development. The changes to be considered as constituting valid counterfactual states of affairs are therefore those that would result from the agent's developing different inclinations as a result of external circumstances. Any of the agent's characteristic inclinations could be submitted to such scrutiny, whereby the inclinations thus altered are to be considered against a background formed by the remaining inclinations.

We may therefore say that to examine the moral worth of an agent, it is not relevant to consider how the agent would respond were he suddenly to be threatened with some form of torture, but it is relevant to consider how the agent would cope were he to be sent to a concentration camp for instance. We therefore have a stronger counterfactual requirement than for the moral worth of actions insofar as it involves considering objective changes of circumstances, albeit with these restrictions.

**The requirement of duty**

Once the counterfactual situation is specified, the requirement for the attribution of moral worth is that the choice be made out of duty and in conformity with it. How is this expressed in the case of actions and agents?

In the case of actions, this simply means that the action must result from the incorporation of the incentive of duty into a dutiful maxim of action\(^9\). In the case of agents however, it is the choice of the agent's defining agency which is submitted to this requirement. This is a higher-order issue. This does not appear to

\(^{9}\)This means that the maxim is that of an obligatory action: its corresponding second-order principle is dutiful.
require that individual actions be morally worthy. Such a result may appear
counterintuitive. For it entails that a morally worthy agent's action may be less
worthy than the morally worthy action of a non-morally worthy agent.

Dispelling these concerns involves a small detour via a proper consideration of the
nature of action. Let us also note that the issue of the rôle of higher-order
principles has arisen here. This means that we shall be led to look in a new light at
this issue which was central to the framework set up in chapter I.

Two claims about the nature of action will be made. First, it is claimed that most of
our action is non deliberative and organised in *behavioural structures*. Second, it is
claimed that these are characterised by complexes of inclinations.

It is important to view the notion of a deliberative choice between two incentives
as a restrictive understanding of the reality of agency (Dreyfus, 2000). Much of our
agency consists of behaviour which is not the result of any deliberation. However,
it is arguably governed by deliberative action (Searle, 1991): all the movements I
make while skiing are not the results of individual deliberations, but are governed
by a general intention and its appending structural control of the behaviour: thus
it is that this behaviour is always directed towards certain goals and an array of
more immediate tasks which are required to achieve them\(^\text{10}\). Importantly for our
present purposes, such a *behavioural structure*\(^\text{11}\) does not however exist without
any moral implications. The simple consequence of its existence for the agent is
that she is prepared (in certain circumstances) to pursue the goals implied by the
behaviour. In other words, the agent has adopted (explicitly or not) a principle of
the type:

One ought to act in ways controlled by X

where X stands for a behavioural structure of non-deliberative actions.

This is a second-order principle, since it governs the use of a range of possible
actions that are controled by the behavioural structure. This second-order status is
confirmed by the genesis of such a structure: it is through acting upon certain
maxims (first-order principles) that one develops skills (as one can see from
learning how to drive)\(^\text{12}\).

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\(^{10}\)This picture is given only the briefest of supporting description here. However, a proper phenomenological
grounding will be provided for it in Part Two.

\(^{11}\)This is similar to what Dreyfus characterises as a nexus of equipmental reality, but differs insofar as we are
- following Searle - giving prominence to subject-object intentionality through the end-directedness realised
by the controlling second-order principle.

\(^{12}\)The claim that these behavioural structures are not reducible to sets of rules (Dreyfus, 1995, p.75) amounts
to the claim that second-order principles are *irreducible* to collections of maxims.
But what does such a behavioural structure amount to? Inclinations are here understood as dispositions to act in ways that appear appropriate in some sense, i.e. with respect to a background of understanding 'unified' by the purpose governing the behavioural structure. This implies a broader rôle for inclinations than Kant would have allowed, in line with the broader understanding of action. The important distinctions are the following. First, inclinations, as we have defined them, do require that a background be specified, and this entails the impossibility of total explicitness, both in the formulation of maxims and of the inclinations' conditions of mutual interaction with the environment. Second, one can act non-deliberatively upon such inclinations.

This brief analysis of action thus establishes the two claims about action and inclinations. This, in turn, provides us with a clearer picture of the agent-self: what we have described as her inclinations are those involved in her behavioural structures and her freedom is correspondingly characterised by the second-order principles controlling such structures.

If we now return to the issue of the morally worthy agent, his choice of his own agency is what is at stake. Since this has to be from, and in accordance with, duty, the second-order dutiful principles governing his behaviour must be acted upon out of duty. When we consider the non-deliberative actions structured by what I shall call the inclinations to the good that are left to operate under these dutiful principles, we find they are not separately morally worthy (they are not from duty). But, and this provides the answer to our worry above, these actions are jointly morally worthy, as forming a behavioural structure guided by a principle, the choice of which is morally worthy.

In this way, we have a rôle for these inclinations which goes beyond the mere permissibility which, Herman (1993) showed, belongs to inclinations corresponding to our personal attachments for instance. This also echoes interesting recent developments in virtue ethics: thus Hursthouse (2001) finds that Kant and Aristotle's notions of moral worth are not that far apart. What Kant lacks, is an adequate 'picture of the emotions' to enable him to accommodate Aristotle's continence/full virtue distinction. The notion of an agent's moral worth

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13 We should here be careful to specify that the second-order principles describe the free choices made by the agent. At any one time, this set is incomplete.
14 This term can be used in the plural to describe the token inclinations, or in the singular to refer to the type of inclination implementing duty.
15 They are permissible actions.
developed above does, on the contrary, rely upon a different view of inclinations. It would correspond to a notion of Aristotelian full virtue, as interpreted by Hurthhouse. On the other hand, an agent carrying out morally worthy acts (without inclination), would represent a Kantian implementation of Aristotle's continence.

Let us conclude this section with two remarks. First, we have in effect answered the questions about which inclinations are to be made explicit and how explicitly one is to grasp how inclinations interact with the environment, to ascertain whether a choice of action/agent-self is from duty. The notion of moral worth of an action requires that one grasp the limits set by this interaction for the agent-self's inclinations as they stand, i.e. that one be able to say how far one would be prepared to go to do one's duty if one's mood were to change. The notion of moral worth of an agent requires that one examine the dutifulness of behavioural structures under progressive alteration of the inclinations operating within them. Alterations of inclinations are to be examined in context and the task is therefore a potentially endless one. A consequence is that, to be able to ascertain the moral worth of one's action or oneself, one must fulfil a requirement of pursuit of self-knowledge which follows from the requirement of duty examined in chapter I. In other words, if I ought to do my duty, then I ought to investigate the issue of how to do it, and how to recognise I am doing it.

Second, and in connection with the last point, we note that the moral worth of an agent, so defined, will admit of degrees, for the inclinations forming the agent's actual behavioural structures will be to a greater or lesser extent under the control of second-order principles which are dutiful.

4. Inclinations and the self

The inclination to the good

The important result which has been obtained is that moral worth for an agent is indeed characterised by the existence of inclinations to the good, and that such inclinations therefore contribute directly to the agent's moral worth. Let us emphasise why this is the case.

In the case of deliberative action, an inclination is incorporated into a maxim. Thus, to act on the maxim 'I shall help the poor' out of inclination, is characterised by a purpose, the provision of help, and a motivation, the benevolent inclination. To act from such an inclination is equivalent to taking it as a sufficient ground for
Control of melmalum
as a generic browser
action. In the non-deliberative case, this step disappears: for, in non-deliberative action, inclinations are no longer operative as motives. Action within a behavioural structure is triggered by the second-order principle governing it. Assuming the latter is chosen out of duty, as is required for the attribution of moral worth to the agent, we therefore have inclinations implementing the moral law.

This therefore gives a new rôle to the inclinations characterising the agent-self which contrasts with Kant's refusal to bestow moral worth upon any inclinations.

The inclination to the good is the result of a developmental process insofar as inclinations are progressively brought under the control of dutiful second-order principles, as we suggested above. Let us briefly analyse the way in which this development takes place. The first, most obvious, form of development, corresponds to a strengthening of the grip which the specific inclinations to action required by duty exert upon the agent. But the inclination can also develop in the sense of the inclusion of more and more types of dutiful action in this inclination: one may become inclined not to lie, to help people in need, ... There is a third way in which it evolves: the agent's ability to identify that which is required by duty in the diverse empirical situations to which she may be confronted, will also grow. As a consequence of this evolution, action governed by the corresponding behavioural structures will be more and more grounded in the actual goodness of the bringing about of these states of affairs. Indeed, although such a structure may, at the outset, be directed towards providing help whenever it is needed, the identification of circumstances where this might not be good (e.g. when the other person is carrying out an evil deed), and the development of this and other structures to include other dutiful acts, will lead it to become (approximately) an inclination towards doing that and only that which is good. Another way of looking at it is to say that the behaviour will develop in such a way as to correctly

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16This result can be compared with Fichte's view that 'freedom is affirmed in nature which is thus recognised as essential to it' (Bourgeois, 2000, my transl., p.24). Fichte saw nature as a tool for the realisation of the ends of reason. Part Three will show how our view diverges from Fichte's.

17The notion of inclination to the good provides a solution to the problem identified by Guevara (2000). Guevara notes that, given that action from duty is accounted for in terms of the incorporation thesis, which is an intelligible model, the parallel description of the act in terms of the empirical character is problematic. This prompts him to have recourse to over-determination of action from duty. This is avoided here insofar as the inclination to the good starts operating from the very first dutiful act and can thus be used to fill in the empirical account.

18This suggests an understanding of moral salience as essentially non rule-governed, pace Herman (1993), since the abilities in question develop in a way which exceeds their reducibility to rule-governed behaviour (Dreyfus, 2000).
fit one or more dutiful second-order principles of action. In this way, such behaviour becomes action directly controlled by such second-order principles. In all cases, the schema is the same: maxims of action are determined by second-order principles and through acting upon them, habitual inclinations form and are altered as the action becomes more fluent and is less reliant upon an appeal to these maxims. Thus, the second-order universal dutifulness of the principle will approximately correspond to a feeling of appropriateness which represents the ground at the first order level for action upon the behavioural structure. The latter therefore stands as a plausible substitute for Kant's notion of respect as subjective ground for action in the case of the implementation of duty by the inclination to the good.

Answering Williams's first criticism

Does the inclination to the good provide an adequate response to Williams's criticisms? To address this question, we shall consider several objections. Firstly, insofar as this inclination is a tool in the service of duty, one may object that it no longer is a proper empirical inclination. Certainly, insofar as inclinations to the good are formed by the constraining mould of duty, they are the result of a process of transformation. This does not mean, however, that nothing remains of the agent's original inclinations. On the contrary, inclinations such as that of compassion, have been altered so as to fit the requirements of the moral law. This allows us to provide a strong reading of Kant's observation that the actions of the friend of man 'deserve praise and encouragement but no esteem' (GMM, 398). It is thus not only insofar as this agent's inclinations reduce the pull of inclinations which conflict with duty, but also because they provide the seeds out of which the inclination to the good can develop, that they are praiseworthy.

Second, a related objection is that acting upon an inclination is grounded in emotions that are completely foreign to action from duty. But, as we have seen above, we are considering inclinations operating as part of behavioural structures. The upshot is that action does not require the practical reasoning (of the incorporation of the incentive into a maxim) which draws upon an emotional grounding as opposed to duty. The inclinations can therefore operate as part of a structure which is altered so as to implement a second-order dutiful principle.

\[19\text{In action upon a behavioural structure, the ground is not a motivation, but rather simply the conscious representation accompanying the elementary action: the skier leans more to this side as it feels appropriate given the background formed by his general aim, i.e. a certain destination.}\]
Genesis
Thus the strength of my original inclination can be put to the service of duty - this inclination is transformed, not destroyed, in the process.

Third, the inclination to the good is however essentially universal in nature and therefore can apparently not be directed to particulars so that my inclinations are properly mine as opposed to yours. Here, a common misunderstanding of the universality of dutiful principles must be dispelled. The fact that our principles of action ought to fulfill certain universal conditions does not entail that they should have no particular features. And indeed, chapter I has shown that it is the second order principle which must fall under (CI), not the specific maxim. This leaves room for the further determination of action on the basis of extra non universal considerations (chapter I). These aspects of further determination will be reflected in the inclination. What this means in practice is that, what constitutes my attachment to my wife, for instance, accounts for my attaching a different weight to her needs in implementing the principle of charity [Pc].

Fourth, even with the answers to the first and second objections, Williams (1981) would argue that I will not be helping my wife because she is my wife, but because it is my duty. A partial answer to this has already been given above: the inclination operates at a non-deliberative level, without any interest associated with the inclination being involved in understanding the action. But this also brings out the remaining problem: where is the role of the love for my wife which is at the core of the emotive power of the inclination? It must surely be part of the motivational story at some level - and yet we find no place for it either at the second-order level (dutiful principle) or at the first (behavioural structure). The problem would only vanish if it were the case that the love for my wife which gives her a central role in my action, were to have some motivational function. Correlatively, we would expect the further determination of duty which gives her a privileged position to be understood as more than just a contingent way of further determining my maxims of duty. This is clearly a question which Kant's ethics cannot answer.

But the suggestion at the end of chapter I was indeed that it is through understanding another facet of the unconditional good, namely a non-universally binding one, that further determination can be provided. If we now view that which is not universal as involving a degree of individuation, we see that this idea is crucial in a further sense. For it points to a way of providing an ethics of duty with a fully satisfactory account of the role of inclinations. This account will however only succeed if it also makes room for the non-universal in the motivation for acting out of duty. To find out whether such a move makes sense,
Developmental account
the related question of the grounding of the moral law will be addressed in the
next chapter. For by understanding what makes the moral law valid, we shall
have a better grasp upon what motivates morally worthy acts.

The self
To respond to Williams's second criticism, i.e. the one concerning alienation, let us
examine the relation between the moral worth of an agent and her actions. There
is in fact a link between action from duty and the development of inclinations to
the good. This can be seen by understanding this type of inclination as developing
precisely through habituation. Let us examine this.

Habitual inclinations resulting from action motivated by inclination may lead to
action in conflict with these original inclinations: thus, repeatedly indulging one's
greediness, can lead to disgust with, and rejection of its object. On the contrary,
the inclination to do charitable acts will develop so that it leads to acting in a
charitable way when this does not infringe other moral constraints. A particular
feature of fully-formed habitual inclinations arising from dutiful action is thus that
they are necessarily directed towards the realisation of what duty commands:
there is indeed nothing else which could form the content of this inclination than
the form of duty. And therefore the growth of the moral worth of an agent is a
necessary consequence of carrying out morally worthy acts. This echoes Kant's
observation in the Metaphysics of Morals that 'Whoever often exercises this [i.e.
acts from duty according to the principle of charity] and sees his beneficient
purpose succeed, comes at last really to love him whom he has benefited' (MM,
402). But we differ from Kant in viewing the inclinations thus developed, as
constitutive of moral worth and of the makeup of a morally worthy agent.

This means that the perfectly morally worthy agent-self (whose inclinations are all
to the good) could serve as an end for action from duty in the sense of a regulative
idea (CPR, A671). In this way, action from duty does not alienate the agent-self; on
the contrary, the regulative idea of the morally worthy agent stands at the heart of
action from duty by constituting a possible end for it.

To this notion of the development of the agent-self, an objection inspired by
Williams's approach would seem to be that, on the contrary, what is central to
being a self is the existence of certain inclinations which are taken as 'categorical'.
Therefore, the point is, allegedly not to transform them, but to take them as the
core of who it is to be oneself.
Becoming who one is
1. Being who one is
2. Not being who one is
3. Being who one is not
4. Becoming who one is

Tries to stratify between emp. Intell
I would appeal to
° Pre empirical ontological
° Embraced
° Intellectual
° Post intellectual / ontological
What would Kant say to that? He would question the ground for taking these inclinations as unconditional. Williams would say there is none and that the burden of explanation stops here. If pushed, however, he may claim that, were we not to accept such 'categorical desires', what makes life meaningful would be lost (Williams, 1981). For the moment, we shall just conclude that such an answer has little force against Kant, given the fact that Kant insists a central task of GMM is to justify that the moral law is normative. However, we shall see that Kant's proposed justifications are not successful (chapter III) and, on other grounds, will show that Williams's type of answer has some truth to it (Part Two). That it however does not succeed in providing a satisfactory foundation of ethics will be shown in chapter VI, and indeed, in Part Three, we shall see that for a notion of self to be taken as foundational of one's action it must conform to the requirements of duty. This answer, as that to Williams's first criticism, will be based upon recognising the existence of individuated features of the unconditional good.

To conclude on the issue of the self, the notion of agent-self stands between the empirical and intelligible characters in a three-tier structure of agency. This maps onto the structure of chapter I. The empirical character is characterised by maxims of action (CPR, A549-550) and, as we have now seen, behavioural inclinations. Through these, the empirical character is the 'law of causality' (CPR, A539) which determines action. It is not free (CPR, A549-550). The agent-self is characterised by second-order principles of action and the behavioural structures they organise. These define the maxims and behavioural inclinations the agent will act upon. It is free in the practical sense. The intelligible character is characterised by the third-order principles or decisions by which an incentive is incorporated into a second-order principle. These principles define the nature of the agent-self. The intelligible character as a power of noumenal causality is transcendentally free²⁰.

Conclusion
To conclude, the specification of a notion of agent-self which I have argued to be in the spirit of Kant's writings, allows for a distinction between the attribution of moral worth to an action and an agent. Each is defined in terms of the counterfactual situations to be considered for the identification of the relevant

²⁰This is no dogmatic assertion. Rather, insofar as there is an intelligible character, it has to be thought of as transcendentally free. It is a conceptual connection which is at stake, with no metaphysical implications.
maxim (action) or second-order principles (agent) and they correspond to a weak and strong understanding of counterfactual situations respectively\textsuperscript{21}. By enlarging Kant's understanding of action beyond deliberation and by correspondingly grasping the central rôle of behavioural structures in an agent's action, we have exhibited the moral worth of structures that implement the moral law. This further confirms and enriches, at the first- and second-order levels, the framework presented in chapter I. A consequence of these notions of moral worth is that a requirement of self-knowledge accompanies the moral law.

The presence of inclinations to the good characterises the morally worthy self and, since these inclinations grow with the performance of the agent's duty, they can provide Kantian Ethics with an end that does not involve the problematic notion of the Highest Good. I take the proposed rôle for the inclination to the good to respond to much of the substance of Williams's criticisms, but not to his emphasis upon the motivational function of such emotions as personal attachments and a fundamental sense of one's self.

In response to this, I have shown how chapter I's proposal of finding further determinacy for Kant's ethics through a non-universalistic dimension of the unconditional good is here given further support if we understand the non-universal as involving a form of individuation, in that it potentially provides a way of identifying a satisfactory rôle for inclinations such as personal attachments as well as for a notion of self in an ethics of duty. This, however, would require uncovering a motivational rôle for these inclinations and a rôle for the self in defining a notion of end for moral action.

A way of understanding how an individuated slant can be given to the proposed regulative idea of the perfectly morally worthy agent-self whose inclinations are all to the good, will emerge from the discussion in Part Two. But first, we must note that the proposed regulative ideal only stands as end for action from duty if the latter has been shown to be mandatory. For, in the developments of this chapter, the notions of moral worth we examined assume that a moral system is in place, i.e. that the pursuit of the unconditional good is indeed required of an agent. The question thus arises as to whether Kant's ethics can deal with this foundational issue on its own terms. This, the topic of chapter III, will also shed more light on the motivational issue.

\textsuperscript{21}They also map onto purely obligatory, and permissible (including obligatory) actions respectively.
CHAPTER III

Kant's foundation of morality

Introduction
In the previous chapter, we carried out an analysis of some of the practical and psychological implications of the conceptual core of Kant's ethics. This has shed light upon aspects of the normativity of Kant's theory. So far, however, in the two previous chapters, we have analysed and applied the analytical content of Kant's GMM, and thus left open the issue of grounding this normativity. But, the theory of the Good expounded in sections I and II of GMM is not sufficient to convince the moral sceptic, since it does not set out to show that one ought to act in a morally worthy fashion. After these 'merely analytical' (GMM, 445) sections, Kant addresses the issue of whether 'a synthetical use of pure practical reason is possible' (ibid.) in section III. This topic is re-addressed in CPrR. It is to this issue of Kant's grounding of morality and its shortcomings that this chapter is devoted.

I shall successively examine the foundational arguments of GMM and CPrR. In the latter case, after discussing the nature of the fact of reason, I shall present the reconstructions of Kant's argument proposed by two leading commentators. These will be discussed, and conclusions will be drawn as to the consequences for the related themes of this first part of the thesis.

1. Kant's approach to the grounding of morality
Kant presents two types of proof of the bindingness of the moral law, which is the requirement to act out of duty, by adopting the moral law as principle of action. According to Allison (1990), both use the Reciprocity Thesis (GMM, III, CPrR, §6) according to which an agent is free if and only if she stands under the moral law.

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1This is understood not only to mean that the propositions of the ethical theory are normative facts, but also they have 'a grip on the agent' (Korsgaard, 1997, p.240). Indeed, in Kant's analysis of morality, the normativity of moral judgements consists in their being both binding and motivating (Korsgaard, 1996a, p.43).
The first then tries to prove the freedom of the will by appealing to a distinction between two standpoints, the theoretical and the practical, which is seen as underwritten by that between the sensible and intelligible points of view (GMM, 459). The second adopts a very different strategy, claiming rather that fact that we stand under the moral law is ensured by a fact of reason (CPrR, 47).

The Reciprocity Thesis and the deduction in GMM

Let us examine the Reciprocity Thesis which arguably underpins both strategies. Allison (1990) presents a cogent reconstruction based upon the observation that the argument can only work if the notion of agent 'is not the thin concept of a rational being, or even a rational agent simpliciter, but the rather thick concept of such an agent with a free will (in the transcendental sense)' (Allison, 1990, p.207), i.e. of an agent who is causally and motivationally independent of the natural order. According to this concept, 'the ground for the selection of a maxim can never be located in (...) anything "natural"; rather it must always be sought in a higher-order maxim and therefore in an act of freedom.' (ibid., 207-208). The central argument for the necessity of moral bindingness for freedom essentially relies upon the need to find a set of rules which justify the selection of maxims, and this, independently of any particular end. This means that it is based upon looking for principles determining the maxims and justifying the ends chosen by the agent. The requirement that they be rational principles implies that they are universal and the requirement that they be independent of particular ends entails their being formal. This means that these are unconditional rules. The conclusion then follows from GMM, I (see chapter I): the agent stands under the requirement of a full justification which is in accordance with duty. This means that the agent must act according to permissible maxims. Apart from the use of the notion of permissibility which is not clearly accounted for by Kant (chapter I), this argument is essentially based upon the need for justification of one's choices. There is however an issue as to exactly what this argument proves, which will be examined with the fact of reason below.

The important question which remains is that of our freedom. For the previous argument requires an independent proof of transcendental freedom to ground the

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2 These are not necessarily higher-order in the sense in which I have used the word in this thesis. Rather, they correspond to more general maxims/principles which provide the grounds for more specific ones. Thus, with second-order principles, the move to a more general principle is one towards a principle which grounds the purpose aimed at in the given principle. With maxims, the specialisation leads to the expression of 'Vorsätze' and 'Lebensregeln' (Bittner, 1974; Höffe, 1979).

3 In the sense that they would be rational grounds for any rational agent.
Defaul is a failure
moral law. Kant attempts to derive this freedom from the conception of an intelligible self one has insofar as one is a rational being. Without going into details, even the most sympathetic commentators judge Kant's enterprise of deduction in GMM III as a failure (e.g. Allison, 1990; Henrich, 1975).

There is, according to Allison, a reason for the failure of this attempted deduction: Kant is attempting to derive a moral obligation from non-moral premisses. This also follows from Henrich's (1975) analysis of Kant's deduction strategies. This is a standard kind of objection to a way of grounding morality, as Bittner (1989) observes: many philosophers who tackled the question of why one ought to be moral, viewed the question as meaningless, either because an answer to it would itself have to be moral (e.g. Sidgwick, 1922), or because such a question presupposes that moral action is only acceptable if it is viewed as a means to something else (e.g. Bradley, 1927, McDowell, 1978); both these views are summarised by Brock (1977) in the form of the following dilemma: either the justification for being moral is itself moral, which begs the question because it is morality which is to be grounded, or it is extra-moral, in which case the moral demands could no longer be seen as having the final say in the decision process leading to action.

But, as Bittner (1989, p.18) rightly points out, the latter part of this argument relies upon the moral demands sometimes being in conflict with action guided by these extra-moral grounds, for in such cases it would indeed appear that moral demands do not have ultimate authority. This cannot, however, be the case if the deduction of the moral claims from the extra-moral grounds is a successful derivation of the moral requirements from the extra-moral grounds. Thus, in Part Three, we shall derive moral requirements from certain basic features of human agency⁴, but there is no conflict between the two when the latter are properly understood. What the absence of conflict reveals is a connection between morality and the extra-moral grounds. That these extra-moral considerations can be shown to ground morality entails that this connection is not contingent and therefore a priori⁵ while the extra-moral character requires it to be synthetic⁶.

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Kripkean distinctions (Kripke, 1981) between a priori/a posteriori and necessary/contingent do not apply here because of the synthetic nature of the connection.

The notion of a priori will be based upon p-meaning (see further) instead of truth, and thus broader than Kant's own in CPR. This notion is used again below and in Part Three. For the purpose of the argument, we take on board Grice and Strawson's (1956) criticisms of Quine's views on the concepts of analytic/synthetic (Quine, 1961), while observing that the connection between p-meaning-based, and moral facts, is synthetic as a result of the definition of these words.
Although unsatisfactory, one cannot therefore conclude that Kant's enterprise in GMM III is fundamentally wrong-headed. We shall however see that the attempt at a deduction of morality on the basis of a fact of reason is far more appropriate.

2. Fact of reason and grounding of morality

The second approach consists in claiming that the bindingness of the moral law is grounded in a fact of reason. It has been criticised for many reasons (e.g. Shopenhauer, 1965; Beck, 1960-1; Henrich, 1960; Bittner, 1989) but in particular for parachuting a fact to solve a problem, in a way which seems to attempt to dispense with a proper argument. What constitutes one strong strand among the objections to it is that, if for Kant the fact of reason 'forces itself upon us as a synthetic a priori proposition based on no pure or empirical intuition' (CPrR, 31), Kant's procedure apparently consists in 'simply cut[ting] off criticism' (Bittner, 1989, p.90). Bittner even suggests that it 'endangers discussion of morality and moral philosophy' (ibid.). He points out that, on the contrary, 'the rational cannot be the sort of thing that forces itself upon us' (ibid.), invoking a broadly Hegelian notion of rationality.\(^7\)

Below, we shall successively examine the nature of the fact, and how it is supposed to provide a deduction of morality.

What is the fact of reason?

Beck (1960, p.166-168) distinguishes two types of textual accounts of the fact of reason: the first identifies the fact either with the moral law or freedom, and the second with a consciousness of the moral law. Identifying it with the first leads to the problems mentioned above (i.e. there is arguably no requirement for a deduction, hence no possible discussion) while the second option leaves it open how a mere consciousness can prove moral obligation. Another distinction which Beck makes, is between a fact for and a fact of reason, where the first refers to a value which would be apprehended by an intellectual intuition and the second is taken to refer to the fact that pure reason is practical (i.e. that it can provide a motive and determine principles for action). He concludes that it is rather the second.

\(^7\)This leads him to shift the focus of attention from the fact of reason and the derivation of the bindingness of the moral law to the weaker recognition of the validity of a principle of autonomy from the notion of 'one's own yet universal legislation' (GMM, 432): Bittner does not think that the Categorical Imperative follows from this principle of autonomy (Bittner, 1989, p.76-79).
Focussing upon the first distinction, those authors who have provided a reconstruction of the proof opt rather for an interpretation of the fact as a consciousness. The choice of the latter interpretation can be justified as follows.

1. If the fact of reason is to be able to ground morality, it must also underpin the motivational power of the moral law.\(^8\)

2. The agent must therefore be aware of this fact.

3. Were this awareness not a certainty, it would not be sufficient to ground morality, because of scepticism about its object.

4. Were this certain awareness to have as object a truth that is not a transcendentally justified synthetic a priori one\(^9\) according to the CPR, such certainty would clash with the limits of knowledge identified by the Analytic of the CPR. For an agent would be certain of something for which he knows he has no epistemic warrant\(^10\). This is not a contradiction, but a tension which can be resolved in one of two ways.

   4a) the awareness is accepted as a given feature of the agent's practical consciousness, much as space and time are for knowledge, or,

   4b) the impossibility of any warrant leads to recasting the object of the awareness as a feature of the agent's consciousness, rather than of reality itself.

5a) In case a, the awareness of the fact of reason is actually a consciousness of a practical truth, namely freedom or the existence of moral constraints, so that the fact of reason is seemingly best interpreted as this practical truth. This accounts for certain statements made by Kant (CPrR, 6; CPrR, 47). But we note that what will be used in the argument is the consciousness the agent has of this practical truth.

5b) In case b, the awareness is one of a feature of consciousness, so that the fact of reason is itself a consciousness. This interpretation is consistent with many of Kant's statements (CPrR, 31; CPrR, 42; CPR, 91), and for Allison (1990, p.223), is faithful to the 'bulk of the evidence'.

6. From (5a) and (5b), it becomes clear that, whether we interpret Kant's use of the term 'fact of reason' as referring to a consciousness or not, it is the consciousness of a certain practical truth which is relevant to the argument, and it makes sense to stipulate that the fact be defined as such a consciousness.\(^11\)

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\(^8\)Since moral action for Kant is determined by the nature of the motive for action, normativity must involve establishing both that the moral law is binding and that it is thereby motivating (Korsgaard, 1996a, p.43).

\(^9\)The truth in question must clearly be a priori as pertaining to reason, and is not analytical.

\(^10\)This could also be expressed in non-Kantian terms by pointing out that the reasons for the belief are not conclusive (Dretske, 1971), or that the belief cannot be shown to track the truth (Nozick, 1981; Dancy, 1984).

\(^11\)Note that the distinction between 'fact of' and 'fact for' consciousness is hereby blurred; Beck is able to make this distinction because he does not view the fact as a consciousness (Beck, 1960).
The next question is: what is this a consciousness of? The texts (e.g. CPPr, p.31; CPPr, p.48) certainly indicate that it is a 'consciousness of this fundamental law' (CPPr, p.31) which is the moral law. This is the interpretation adopted by Allison (Allison, 1990, p.233), specifying however that it is the consciousness of standing under certain constraints which correspond to the moral law in its typified form, i.e. a sort of ordinary language translation of the spirit of Kant's categorical imperative. Korsgaard (1996a) concurs in interpreting the fact as a consciousness of the 'reality of moral obligation' (Korsgaard, 1996a, p.26), but adds that it is also a consciousness of the law's 'capacity to motivate us' (ibid.). This latter claim has limited textual support (e.g. CPPr, p.43), for when Kant talks of the consciousness of freedom being identical with the fact of reason, this must mean that originally, one considers them as separately defined. The texts therefore rather point to a consciousness of the constraints of the moral law, thus defining it as a fact of reason but one which lies beyond Beck's second dichotomy of fact off for reason.

If we adopt this interpretation how then is the deduction going to function?

**Deductive strategy**

Allison (1990, p. 235) reconstructs the proof approximately as follows:

1. The fact is indeed one of reason since the moral law can have no other origin but a rational one. This is for the following two reasons. First, because it makes universal and necessary claims that are not the product of empirical practical reason (it is rather an ingredient of moral experience, much as space and time are for perceptual experience). Second, because it is a principle of autonomy while empirical principles are heteronomous.

2. Moreover, insofar as the agent takes this law as governing his will, he has a pure interest in it.

3. The presence of such an interest entails that the law is a possible incentive, which gives a practical grounding to *positive freedom*, i.e. the capacity to act on the basis of self-imposed principles.

4. To establish freedom practically, it is however also necessary to show independence from causal determination, i.e. *negative freedom*. This is achieved by observing that the pure interest in the moral law is an interest in a 'merely intelligible or ideal order of things' and that the consciousness of the law as a constraint entails a consciousness of the independence of the mechanism of nature (negative freedom).
(5) The Reciprocity Thesis is now invoked to show that, insofar as the agent is conscious of freedom, he is conscious of the overriding force of the moral law. It is thus not only a possible incentive, but the one we ought to act upon.

Korsgaard's reconstruction (1996a, p.170) concurs in effect on points (1) to (3), and then her argument develops as follows:

(4') 'Our ability to act on the moral law teaches us that we are (negatively) free';

(5') Consequently, we are (practically speaking) members of the intelligible world and 'have a higher vocation than the satisfaction of our desires' insofar as we belong to the ground of the world of appearances.

(6') We therefore have an incentive to be free in the positive sense of the word, i.e. to act from duty which represents an overriding incentive.

There are differences between these two strategies. Firstly there is the inversion by which, for Korsgaard, negative freedom entails our membership of the intelligible world, leaving unclear the justification for negative freedom - for, as Kant points out, we don't know if there has ever been a morally worthy action (GMM, 407). This is presumably a consequence of her taking a practical point of view, together with her richer interpretation of the fact of reason as a consciousness that one could be morally motivated. Secondly, and relatedly, Korsgaard dismisses the theoretical issue of the agent's spontaneity which Allison, on the contrary, views as central. Thirdly, Korsgaard uses a teleological sense of our membership of the intelligible world, in that she assumes the Highest Good as a rational end. However the nub of the difference between these two strategies, which both remain close to Kant's text, is that each uses a different aspect of the Groundwork proof and thereby each resolves the motivational issue differently. Let us examine this point.

Allison makes use of the Reciprocity Thesis to show that, since positive and negative freedom have been established (practically), the moral law is binding. Morality is thus grounded in the requirements of rationality. Korsgaard views the rôle of our existence in the intelligible world, as presented in CPrR, as similar to

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12Note that this reconstruction differs from Allison's earlier views on the deduction (Allison, 1989). For instance, Allison then took the fact of reason to show that the agent can act out of respect for the moral law. He changed his mind on this partly as a result of Herman's (1989) criticisms.

13Korsgaard develops an Argument from Spontaneity grounding a purely rational will's choices in the moral law. This entails that a human will has an interest in the moral law (GMM, 448).
that in the GMM proof (Korsgaard, 1996a, p.170), although in CPRR, this existence is grounded in the consciousness which is the fact of reason as opposed to our 'mere theoretical capacity to formulate theoretical ideas' (ibid.). She concludes that 'the function of the idea of our intelligible existence (...) is essentially the same in both books'. On the contrary, Allison insists that 'the line of reasoning is diametrically opposed' (Allison, 1990, p. 242-3) on the grounds that in GMM, positive freedom was deduced from negative freedom, itself derived from the membership of the intelligible world.

The reason for Allison's emphasis upon a difference which Korsgaard does not see as essential is that the motivational issue is dealt with by our intelligible existence for Korsgaard and this is the crucial feature which links GMM and CPRR, while Allison focusses upon the different groundings of freedom, respectively in intelligible existence and in the fact of reason in GMM and CPRR respectively.

Thus Korsgaard brings in teleological considerations (intelligible existence as a higher vocation) to bear upon her understanding of the motivational aspect, clearly suggesting that she does not think that considering the nature of rationality of a free agent, as such delivers the required overriding incentive.

**The problems with the deduction**

In the following developments, we shall require a notion of p-meaning which will be examined in detail in chapter VI. For the moment, it suffices to observe that a requirement of any agent's action is that it should be understood as contributing to at least one of what it understands as being its ends. Such actions are referred to as purposefully meaningful (p-meaningful). The requirement may then be formulated as that of being able to provide p-meaningful justifications for one's action. Such a requirement is moreover clearly implied by many statements in Kant's ethical writings, such as 'there can be no action without an end' (MM, 190).

This notion of p-meaning will be useful below in examining whether action from duty is justified.

Let us now critically examine the interpretations of Kant's deductive strategy presented in the previous section.

Allison's argument is a very impressive reconstruction of Kant's deduction, but it ultimately relies upon the Reciprocity Thesis which we have seen to link a strong conception of freedom, the transcendental one, with morality. More specifically, it

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14This is a view shared by Ameriks (1982, p.226).
establishes in particular that if we consider an agent whose motivation is his own to choose (positive freedom) and who additionally is not causally determined (negative freedom), then this agent can, and can only ultimately, justify his actions by conforming to the dictates of the moral law (at least by acting permissibly).

Allison's justification in rational terms could be viewed as a special case of justification in terms of p-meaning for a purely rational being. This would make it methodologically consistent with the type of foundational analysis I shall be arguing for in Part Three. The argument would first consist in observing that, insofar as one shows that a form of action is rational for a purely rational being one is in effect showing that it serves the purpose of rationality. Now chapter I has shown that the concept of the unconditional good can be analysed as containing that of action from [CI], which entails that a purely rational being acts from [CI]. Such action is thus p-meaningful for such a being in the sense that it contributes to any end which springs from reason (the only type of end a purely rational being can have). Consequently, given that there is a basic requirement for p-meaningful justification of action, it follows that action from the moral law (and only such action) is properly justified for a purely rational being, hence the normativity of the moral law for such a being.

But, the question of the extension of this justification to human as opposed to purely rational beings arises. If Kant had proven there were indeed rational ends which are shared by all human-beings, then an argument on this basis could perhaps be extended to all human beings, a point we shall examine below with Korsgaard's argument. But we have not been shown there are such ends on the basis of the sole hypothesis of a free agent. This leaves us with a lack of p-meaningfulness for action grounded in Kant's notion of duty alone. This would mean that, for a human agent, i.e. a non-perfectly rational being, acting from duty is, by this argument, not justified any more than other forms of action.

At this point, a proponent of Allison's argument may reply that, in fact his rational justification is of a different type which abstracts from any notion of human beings' ends. It is the justification that is required of a rational being for her actions insofar as they are free in a transcendental sense. It is indeed clear that, insofar as nothing predetermines such an agent's action, any choice she makes has to be explainable. This amounts to a requirement for justification insofar as any such explanation is submitted to constraints of rationality.

But what does this requirement mean? That the statements constitutive of the justification are rationally grounded upon one another, so that if they are of the type 'I did X because of Y', Y is indeed a reason for X. It is not however the
stronger requirement that Y should itself spring from reason alone, i.e. that it be an entirely a priori rational ground. The advantage of such a purely rational ground would of course be that it appears to require no further justification. The justificatory power of the moral law lies precisely therein that it appears complete, thus purportedly showing that the moral law is a sufficient ground for action for a transcendentally free agent.

The problem is that, a justification which thus appeals to the moral law can be questioned for the very rationality of the grounding of the action in the moral law. Clearly, for a rational agent, it is true that to do X because X is his duty as determined by (CI), is indeed a rational justification insofar as (CI) determines that which is right for all purely rational agents, as we saw above. In the case of a non-purely rational agent however, this has not been established: we do not know that acting from the universal requirement of duty is rationally justified for an agent qua agent in situation. Is it sufficient for this justification to observe that X is required by the moral law which applies to all purely rational beings? Not insofar as the agent is in a situation and already acting in the pursuit of particular ends. Sufficient grounds do not appear to be available since the agent, with her particular ends, may perceive the point of view of universal rationality (a point of view she can freely adopt, and from which the moral law is an ultimate justification of action) as remote.

The situation is therefore the following. (CI) has been shown to be the rational principle of action (chapter I) which determines the unconditionally good. Allison shows that the intelligible point of view - from which the moral law overrides any other incentive - is one which presents itself to the agent as determining a possible incentive for action. What he does not succeed in establishing is that this point of view itself is one he, as a situated agent with ends, ever ought to consider. He thus does not show that the moral law is right for the agent (qua situated).

This means that the sufficiency of the moral law as final justification is, contrary to Allison's (1990, p.209) claim, not only not 'unproblematic', but question begging. The objection I have constructed can usefully be transposed to the theoretical domain. Galileo (Merleau-Ponty, 1974, p.42) established that the force of gravity pulls all bodies down with the same acceleration. This means that, when one abstracts from the situatedness of bodies in the atmosphere (by considering a perfect void), they will indeed fall with the same acceleration and thus follow the

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15Interestingly, the necessity of the moral law is not the stumbling block here (chapter VII), although most commentators agree it is the thorny issue. This is, however, mostly due to a confusion between the rôles of the permissible and the obligatory (e.g. Beck, 1960, p.122).
universal law of free falling bodies. However, for real objects, the law he discovered is not sufficient to account for their trajectory, as can be seen by comparing a falling leaf and the drop of an apple. The occurrence of a strong wind may be sufficient to completely override the effect of gravity (for a while). This is of course but an analogy\textsuperscript{16}, but an apposite one in view of Kant's frequent use of comparisons between the theoretical and practical domains. It serves to show the problem encountered when a certain aspect of human-beings, e.g. rationality, is isolated, to the neglect of others, just as a physical law describing the way in which a constant force acts on bodies may be privileged to the detriment of crucial circumstantial factors.

Finally, let us note that the problem we identified can be seen as that of a law which presents itself as a possible incentive for a rational agent, but of which a human agent does not necessarily ever have a grasp of as an actual incentive for him\textsuperscript{17}. This relates to the Hegelian-inspired criticism that the moral law is both external to and imposed upon the agent, as it is 'only in the idea, in representation' (Hegel, 1970, I, p.300). On the contrary, for Hegel 'the moral consciousness is autonomous when its relation to the good is not something foreign to it and also does not lead it into an obstruction or alienation of its freedom' (Henrich, 1994, p.118; Hegel, 1974).

A way forward from the shortcoming of the Reciprocity Thesis would involve showing that the fact of reason can provide the situated agent with a ground for taking the intelligible point of view, so that the fact of reason and transcendental freedom together would entail that the moral law is sufficient as a final justification, and indeed could be shown also to be necessary. This requires that a bigger argumentative burden be assigned to the fact of reason. Some of the spirit of this argument is to be found implemented in Korsgaard's reconstruction, in a way which further develops the suggestion made earlier that the moral law must be shown to be p-meaningful. Indeed, Korsgaard is sensitive to the issue pointed out above in that she does show an understanding of the issue of 'situatedness', albeit expressed in terms of our inclinations (Korsgaard, 1996a, p.167-9). Indeed, she stresses that what is lacking in the argument up to point (4') is 'an incentive for us to identify with the free and rational side of our nature'. This agrees with the points made above. And with her point (5'), she is reconstructing Kant as using

\textsuperscript{16}It is limited in that there is no proper theoretical equivalent to the notion of an overriding practical law.

\textsuperscript{17}Kant's scepticism about whether any agent has ever acted on the moral law (GMM, 407) may be related to this point.
our understanding of our 'higher vocation' as the motivating force that can address the situated agent and bring him to understand that his moral action can contribute to producing the Highest Good.

This would provide Allison with the required argument for showing that the moral law is sufficient as a final justification, as long as certain claims about the Highest Good are accepted. Setting aside the issue of whether the Highest Good is given as a rational end, a problem remains for Korsgaard's reconstruction. For it is not clear how the motivation of one's higher vocation really relates to the agent in situation. He may think this higher perspective should prevail in normal circumstances, but when some crisis is to be handled, he may drop this high-minded point of view for the sake of some other more immediate ends.

To this, Korsgaard would respond that this may well be the case, but that it would not be rational for the agent to do this in view of the fact that the Highest Good is an end, and this is precisely why the moral law represents a universal obligation.

As a rejoinder, one may respond in the following manner. Even if it has been shown that acting by adopting the point of view of our intelligible nature is indeed rational, it is also the case that responding to the situation following certain inclinations is rational just as any purely rational requirement, according to our analysis of a rational justification. The issue is then whether the consideration of the end which is the Highest Good ought not override that of any other end. It is indeed the case that the Highest Good is presented as overriding in that it is the highest end grounded in reason. But for a non purely rational being, there are other ends, not grounded in reason. From an intelligible perspective, the Highest Good takes precedence - but nothing shows it ought to from the perspective of a situated agent\(^\text{18}\). And, in crisis situations in particular, the pursuit of other more immediate ends may appear to be the more appropriate course of action. So a situation related to the problem with Allison's argument emerges, albeit transposed in terms of ends and to the issue of the necessity of acting from the moral law. The moral incentive is here a real incentive and we can now understand action from duty as p-meaningful, but the priority of the Highest Good among other ends is only grasped from the intelligible perspective. Thus, for all her awareness of situatedness, Korsgaard has not shown that the agent cannot

\(^{18}\)The claim that we have to think of the Highest Good as an overriding end even from our situated point of view could not be substantiated from a Kantian perspective, unless transcendental freedom were established - see below.
opt for courses of action which he may perceive as appropriate although they are not dutiful. The problem, otherwise formulated, is that the agent may not view herself as a unity, but rather be able to opt for the moral law in some cases and for the principle of self-love in others for instance. In other words, the proof has not succeeded in showing that all the agent's ends should be subordinated to a single one such as the Highest Good. The problem is related to Hegel's claim that the moral law threatens the individual's sense of self (Wood, 1990, p.128).

The problem encountered in Korsgaard's proof would not have arisen in that form had she been able to make use of transcendental freedom in her argument. This theoretical dimension which she dismisses, is available to Allison in his reconstruction. The moral law would thus be overriding with this assumption because it provides the transcendentally free agent with a proper justification of his actions, the only one that is complete - as long as we assume that the Highest Good is a given end (without which this justification does not work, as we saw in our examination of Allison's argument). This completeness is thus only achieved if one is able to show that the pursuit of the Highest Good is an end given through the fact of reason (or some other feature of the faculty of reason). This is too large a topic to do proper justice to in this thesis, but I shall refer to an abundant literature to suggest that it is widely thought that the pursuit of Highest Good has not been shown by Kant to be derivable from the mere consideration of rationality (e.g. Beck, 1960, 244-255). This should not come as a surprise given the rôle it assigns to the concept of happiness. What this suggests is that, Korsgaard's introduction of the Highest Good into the argument is too thick a notion, and that a thinner concept would be needed to fill the gap identified in Allison's reconstruction of the Reciprocity Thesis. And that is where the problem lies: there is no such concept available in Kant's ethics.

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19 We note that this problem recurs in Korsgaard's important attempt to refute scepticism about obligation (Korsgaard, 1996b). In her chapter 4, she develops a transcendental argument which shows, successfully I think, that if we value anything, we must value humanity. But, this only establishes the minimal conclusion that we must attach some value to moral considerations, thus refuting complete scepticism about obligation. Her argument is roughly that, if I value X, and X is a partial consequence of Y, then I must value Y. This is true, but I may well attach very little value to Y in comparison with X. I may thus hold that human beings have mostly distinguished themselves in their destructive power and do not, as a whole, have much to commend them. Therefore, she has not established anything like the required overriding obligation of duty. She is, moreover, sceptical about this overriding quality (ibid., p.125).

20 This sense in which the Highest Good is one of the agent's ends, but only really his as the overriding end of all human action when he adopts the intelligible point of view, is at the core of this lack of unity.
gap between uncorrected perspective and individual situation
The justification of the moral law which is carried out in Part Three can be seen as making use of concepts introduced in Part Two precisely to fill the gap needed to make action from the moral law sufficiently justified, while its necessity will be grounded, as in Allison's argument, on a requirement of justification.

Moral motivation

Where does this leave the status of moral motivation? We saw that the problems with Allison's interpretation left us with a doubt as to the reality of the moral incentive for a human agent. Korsgaard uses the notion of the Highest Good to prove it is an actual incentive, but cannot show it has overriding force with an assumption of transcendental freedom. Adding this assumption, we would find the success of the proof hinges upon grounding the pursuit of the Highest Good. This means we are left with doubts about the reality of the moral incentive. These doubts can be seen as echoing the concerns about the absence of a place for certain inclinations in the motivational story, namely those which constitute one's sense of self (see chapter II). These are two aspects of what constitutes the motivational problem of Kant's ethics. The motivational theory we shall propose in Part Three, on the contrary explicitly addresses these issues.

The link between the foundational problem discussed in this chapter and this motivational problem suggests that the proposed approach to the latter (chapter II) may be useful here. And indeed, the foundational problem is a result of the gap between a universalistic perspective and that of the individual agent. Therefore, were another dimension to the unconditional good and the correlative notion of duty to be identified, one that is not universalistic but oriented to what is individuated, the unified notion of the unconditional good would provide a bridge between the universal and the individual. This would however require that the universalistic and individuated dimensions of this notion of the

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21The pivotal role of the concept of the quest for absolute meaning will replace that of the Highest Good, and a full understanding of the consequences of the requirement of p-meaning will be substituted for the assumption of transcendental freedom.

22This is insofar as Kant's account of the Highest Good is 'widely regarded as the most problematic part of his moral theory' (Allison, 1996, p.165).

23The arguments presented above against the derivability of the normative power of duty from the fact of reason should not be understood as directed against the claim of internalism that reasons can motivate. We shall briefly return to the issue of internalism in chapter VII.

24We have already emphasised the need for internal links between the dimensions of such a notion of unconditional good (chapter I). We can add that the universally binding and the other, individuated, dimension must be integrated into one notion of unconditional good. For, were these to represent two distinct conceptions of unconditional good, this would imply potential conflicts and thus contradict the unconditionality.
unconditional good be interlinked. This might be sufficient to overcome the problems encountered in Kant's attempts to ground morality, if the individual-oriented dimension were to carry a normative requirement.

3. Conclusions

Conclusion to this chapter
The examination of the two reconstructions of Kant's attempt to ground the moral law in CPrR leads to the two following conclusions. First, the moral law does not appear to address itself to me as an agent in situation and thus particular. Second, it may do so if the agent has a teleological understanding of her intelligible existence, but such an understanding has not been sufficiently grounded to convince the sceptic.

In other words, the analysis of Kant's attempts to ground morality has shown that even if the existence of a fact of reason is accepted, this does not give a human agent an incentive for acting on the moral law which has the overriding force required to provide a foundation for morality for actual human agents who are situated in the world with ends which constitute part of their self-understanding. Moreover, the introduction of a teleological aspect to the motivation to act morally could resolve the issue, but is not sufficiently grounded.

This foundational problem for Kant's ethics has been shown to be intimately related to a motivational problem first addressed in the last chapter. As a result, the proposed solution to the indeterminacy problem of chapter I, namely the identification of a non-universalistic dimension to the unconditional good, receives further support here. This chapter puts the emphasis upon the integration of the universalistic and individual-oriented dimensions, whereby the latter carries the burden of the foundational rôle.

Conclusion to Part One
In these first three chapters, we have identified a series of problems in Kantian ethics. Part Two will define the elements of an approach to solving them. These problems are the indeterminacy (chapter I), the motivational (chapters II and III) and the foundational (chapter III) problems. We have already seen how they are linked in terms of a proposed solution, the first suggesting the existence of a non-universalistic dimension(s) of the unconditional good, the second, the individuated nature of this/these dimension(s), and the third, the link between this/these and
the universalistic dimension. Let us now also indicate how the problems are related qua problems, so as to determine the strategy to be adopted in Parts Two and Three.

We may first observe that the motivational problem which has been exhibited in the grounding of Kantian ethics is directly related to that of indeterminacy of moral choice from chapter I. Indeed, on the one hand, we have just shown that although the doctrine of the fact of reason establishes Kant's notion of duty as a possible incentive it does not provide the human agent with a real incentive. On the other hand, the recognition of the moral law as that which determines the unconditional good does not provide the agent who wishes to act upon it with the ability to fully determine his action because of the underdetermination of second-order principles. And yet only a full determination will allow a maxim of action to be formulated which can be translated into action.

If the latter problem is to be given a solution, it is necessary that a motive be identified which provides an incentive for the agent to choose the fully determined maxims of action. Moreover, it must additionally be the case that this motive is nothing beyond that which provides the incentive to act out of duty. For otherwise, it would not be possible to do one's duty without this extra motivation, in which case it would not be required to do one's duty, which contradicts the definition of duty.

But the first problem shows that, far from Kant's incentive of duty having been revealed to exhibit the potential for motivating more determinate maxims that those prescribed by [CI], it has not even been shown to have a real motivating force. The motivational problem is therefore in a sense broader and deeper than the indeterminacy issue. This entails that the motivational problem must be dealt with if a solution to the indeterminacy problem is to be found.

At the same time, however, solving the motivational issue is not guaranteed to provide a solution to the indeterminacy problem. This suggests that, if solving the first is to be able to deliver the elements for the resolution of the second, we must be aware of both problems simultaneously in developing a solution. Remembering that the motivational problem is intimately linked to the foundational one, this determines the following strategy for Parts Two and Three.

The foundational problem will be examined (chapters VI and VII) once we have explored directions for the investigation of these three problems of Kantian ethics (chapters IV and V). The solution to the foundational problem will be used to
provide an answer to the motivational issue. And this will also yield much of the material required for the further determination of an ethics of duty (chapter VIII).
Part Two

A DIRECTION FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION

The task ahead involves identifying a direction in which to seek for solutions to the problems identified in Part One. These are the problems of the indeterminacy and the grounding of Kant's ethics, and the nature of the moral motive. As indicated in the conclusion to Part One, it is necessary to consider the indeterminacy problem in conjunction with the other two in searching for a solution.

We have found that Kant's moral law is a third-order principle, (C), and that ethical indeterminacy results from the lack of second-order constraints to determine maxims of action. Further determination of such constraints therefore requires a new third-order principle. Let us call this (F). What kind of principle might this be? (C) is a principle that is claimed to apply to human agents insofar as they are rational beings (GMM, 409; CPR, 32), and its content is derived from the nature of rationality (chapter I). Is principle (F) also of this kind? In deriving the content of (C), we found it to express all that is rationally required of an agent's action, i.e. all that is contained in the notion of a law of practical reason. This is why Kant can claim that the categorical imperative is the supreme (GMM, 409) and sole (CPR, 33) principle of practical reason. Were (F) also a rational principle, it would therefore not add anything to the determination of principles of action by (C). The search for a source of further determinacy must thus be directed beyond the sole consideration of the rational nature of the human agent.

That such a direction is indicated is moreover implied by the suggestion that emerged from the consideration of each of the three problems of Part One, namely that a specification of the unconditional good beyond a purely universalistic determination is required.

A dimension of the unconditional good which is not purely rational could be found either in an ontologically transcendent source or within an understanding of what it is to be a human being (aside from one's rational nature). The idea is that this dimension of the unconditional good may have an ideal reality or be
Two humble scenes
1. Tranquility
2. Imminent Nature
defined in terms of human nature. Both these alternatives however present difficulties. In the first case, the issue is that the proposed notion of good is external to the agent and the question of the source of its normativity arises. In the second case, it is a feature of human reality and the question of how this can lead to moral constraints similarly arises.

Let us examine this more closely. The first option as it stands is instantiated by something like a Platonic Idea of the Good. The problem confronted by Plato is that of justifying acting upon such an idea - a topic examined in the Republic in the case of the idea of justice. It is interesting to observe that the answer provided by Plato is one which addresses the concern raised. This is done by showing that this idea allows the soul to be unified and properly governed, in the same way as the ideal city (Plato, 1955, 444a). Therefore the normativity of the Idea of the Good rests upon a conception of human nature, so that this solution is actually an instance of the second option. More generally, without a link between the transcendent good and human nature, no normativity can arise from such a purely external notion of good.

If we now examine the second option, we find that a simple appeal to human nature still leaves us with a gap between facts and normativity. In Plato's case, this is dealt with by showing that a properly governed soul is advantageous. This presupposes certain ends are assumed to be basic to all humanity. This example shows that the second option can thus take on one of two forms. Either the 'is/ought' gap is mitigated by appealing to a teleological dimension of human nature. Or, the gap remains, but the facts which are uncovered cannot be used without further ado to ground ethical principles.

The first possibility must involve combining the identification of natural or obligatory ends with the requirements of duty. A first variant would be that of Aristotle's virtue ethics combined with the Kantian deontology. It has the particular feature that the natural ends identified are closely related to a conception of the functionality of human beings. The second variant is that of Kant's Doctrine of Virtue in which he seeks to derive obligatory ends. A third

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1Such Platonic approaches to ethics are still around today, as Adams's 'Finite and Infinite Goods' (Adams, 1999) proves, with his Christian Platonic theory. It has been pointed out (Zagzebski, 2002) that Adams's notion of obligation, which goes beyond that which he identifies as the Good, is not well defined. Moreover, the issue of the normativity of the theory is not really addressed, as the author prefers to focus upon the genesis of ethical beliefs.
variant involves drawing upon relevant Kantian materials beyond his practical philosophy. An important source here is the Critique of Judgement. Taking these variants in the reverse order, Kant's third Critique presents a notion of reflective judgement and thus a teleological dimension of rational agents. This can be used to identify sources for further determinacy of moral judgement (Félicitas Munzel, 1999). But the faculty of judgement in its reflective use cannot provide a firm basis for a law of the faculty of reason. This means that this way of introducing a teleological dimension would leave the foundational problem unresolved.

Looking at the second variant, let us observe that although Kant first derives the two obligatory ends he identifies by using the problematic notion of the Highest Good (Beck, 1960, p244-255), he also provides independent arguments for them (Allison, 1996, p.164-5). However, the proof of the claim that there are obligatory ends relies crucially upon the grounding of morality upon the fact of reason which we criticised in chapter III (ibid.). Insofar as we are setting out to deal with the foundational problem as one of our tasks, it therefore does not seem open to us to make any use of the sources of further determination of morality which Kant offers in the Doctrine of Virtue.

The first variant is more promising. Aristotle examines the question 'Why do anything at all?' and by a series of questions 'why?' which end with the question as to why we run cities the way we do, he provides the final answer that it is to enable citizens to lead fulfilled lives (Aristotle, 1985; I, 2). The problem is that it is not clear what fulfilment is. There are different interpretations, the dominant (Kraut, 1989) and the inclusive (Ackrill, 1980) which argue respectively for one and several ways of leading fulfilled lives. Aristotle's argument is based upon the notion of a connection between our nature as human beings and our fulfilment. In the function argument (Aristotle, 1985; I, 7), he attempts to show that we will know what fulfilment is when we can identify the function of a human-being. But this appears to lead him, on the one hand, to consider that a life of contemplation constitutes fulfilment (ibid.; X, 7) - this is the dominant interpretation - and, on the other (ibid.; X, 8), that it is the life of a good citizen which is fulfilling - as in the inclusive interpretation. There are ways in which these views can be reconciled.

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2A related possibility here would be to give a grounding to the priority of the rôle of something like reflective judgement (or Aristotelian phronesis). Ferrara (1998) takes this line. He uses results from psychoanalysis to justify the need for one's action to be directed to the development of a notion of authenticity. But this position (which he describes as emanating from a 'post-metaphysical standpoint') is incompatible with Kant's universalistic requirement of duty.
but this suggests that it remains a question worth examining further, what exactly the nature of a human-being is - we return to this below.

Aside from that, Aristotle requires an independent characterisation of virtue for the derivation of ethical truths from human nature. He thus proposes the doctrine of the mean (ibid.; II, 6). Whatever the precise nature of such a 'virtue ethics', the problem is these virtues are defined independently of duty. However, one could in principle, arguably, provide an analysis of human nature which is in harmony with the requirements of Kant's ethics, and thus overcome this problem.

The next question is that of the motivation for acting according to such virtues. It seems that it is, broadly speaking, a type of inclination which is involved, since it is human nature (Hume) or culture (Williams) which accounts for virtuous action. Following this type of approach would therefore lead us to a motivational problem since the motive of duty could not operate unless it were supplemented by this inclination. In Aristotle, the emphasis upon moral habituation similarly suggests inclinations born from moral training. This does not, however, settle the whole motivational issue: Aristotle shares with Kant the claim that there are motives which do not spring from our 'animal nature'. For Aristotle, a human being can act from reason understood as the ability to deliberate (Aristotle, 1982; 1224a25-30). A case can thus be made for viewing Aristotle's virtuous agent as acting 'from (a sense of) duty' (Hursthouse, 2001; chapter 6).

Finally, another problem is the lack of universal normativity for such virtue ethics. Indeed, Aristotle (1985; I,3) destined most of his theory for students 'whose desires and actions are directed in a well-ordered way'. Hume also finds it difficult to provide reasons for someone with the mentality of a free-rider to change his ways (Hume, 1978). Consequently, this option does not seem designed to deal with the foundational issue. This is where virtue ethics appears to falter for our purposes; we shall therefore not explore it further in this thesis.

Finally, there remains the possibility of broadly looking at what it is to be human without presuming any teleological features. As indicated above, this cannot, alone, lead us to grounding any ethical principles. It will therefore have to be

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3 On the contrary, Hume's account of the virtues is entirely based upon analysing human nature.
4 We note the many convergences which authors such as Korsgaard, Herman, Baron and Hursthouse have emphasised between Aristotelian and Kantian ethics. There is not enough space to discuss these issues here. This thesis illustrates some points of convergence, in particular with the notion of the morally worthy self which relies upon an inclination to the good that is the result of moral training. Important divergences remain, however, on issues of motivation and the normative power of ethics.
5 Williams does not seek universal normativity since he does not think there is a universal standpoint from which to ground a universal morality.
complemented by other arguments to contribute to this and the other two related
tasks. Exactly what is understood by 'complemented' is specified below.

To make a contribution to an understanding of how to solve the three problems of
Part One, the proposed investigation into what it is to be human will have to
distance itself from any scientifically objective and value-free investigation. It is
thus not by examining our nature as the products of an evolutionary process or by
using any other purely naturalistic framework that such a result can be obtained. Rather, it is by examining who we are, upon the basis of the first-hand evidence of
the phenomena we experience in our everyday lives, that we can hope to make progress. Insofar as Part One has suggested that the problems identified in Kant's
ethics can be addressed by uncovering that which is unconditionally good beyond
a universalistic perspective, the focus upon one's own phenomenal experience
would seem appropriate.

Additionally, insofar as this is to provide material suitable for dealing with
Kantian practical issues, it is apposite to take as starting point for our
investigation, philosophical enterprises which are, broadly speaking, consonant
with certain features of Kant's philosophy. The phenomenologies of Husserl and
Heidegger present continuities with Kant's transcendental enterprise. We shall
focus upon the latter because of the central rôle played by an interpretation of
what it is to be human in his early philosophy. The other great exponent of
existential phenomenology in the 20th century, Jean-Paul Sartre, will also be the
object of our investigation insofar as his grounding in the philosophies of Kant,
Hegel and Fichte is explicit and more direct than Heidegger's. This follows from
the fact that Sartre proposes a metaphysical system (with a projected ethics
centred around categorical imperatives) rather than a hermeneutic enterprise.

The examination of the understanding of what it is to be human that will be
obtained from a critical reading of Heidegger and Sartre, will not take the form of
a presuppositionless enterprise. Rather, Heidegger's hermeneutic turn and Sartre's
ontology imply the existence of assumptions. Although these are examined
critically, the result remains an interpretation. A foundation for morality, in
particular, cannot be obtained on this basis. Rather, this interpretation serves the
purpose of exhibiting concepts that will be useful in grounding morality,
identifying the nature of the moral motive and further determining ethics. These
concepts will thus enable us to identify in which direction the foundational task

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6 There is no space to argue this in more detail. But given a description of humanity which is value-free, the
onus is on its proponent to show how it could generate moral constraints.
ought to proceed in Part Three. The latter will then unfold so that the sense these concepts have acquired through the interpretation of Part Two yields a deeper understanding of the derivations therein. A full defence of the choice of approach chosen for Part Two will, moreover, consist in its ability to provide such an understanding.
CHAPTER IV

◊

Uncovering the Quest

Introduction
The phenomenological investigation in this chapter involves both a presentation of relevant material from Heidegger and Sartre and the development of alternative interpretations as a response to perceived weaknesses of these analyses. The task of analysing two such authors is an enormous enterprise to which a couple of chapters certainly cannot do justice. Apart from a first general overview of their philosophical enterprises, I shall therefore focus upon specific issues insofar as they are relevant to the purpose of identifying directions to answer the questions raised in Part One. Thus Heidegger's structure of falling provides the impetus for the development of the notion of Quest which designates the directedness of human beings to absolute meaningfulness. Armed with this notion, I shall then provide an account of the possibility of what is the generic form of inauthenticity, namely bad faith. This involves stressing the rôle of a grasp of the temporal dimension of existence that is faithful to the nature of the Quest. The concept of authenticity will be examined in the next chapter.

1. Heidegger and Sartre's philosophical projects

Heidegger's fundamental questioning
Heidegger's project is to address the question of Being. Our notion of Being is 'naive and opaque' (BT, 31) and he asks 'on what basis do we understand beings as beings?' (Polt, 1999, p.2). This most fundamental of questions is 'ontological', as opposed to 'ontical' investigations which deal with beings in their plurality. It requires that a methodology be conceived to address it properly. But 'the very asking of this question is an entity's mode of Being' (BT, 7). And this entity is Dasein, i.e. the human being, where however Heidegger purposely uses another
term to distinguish it from the way the philosophical tradition generally thinks of human beings.

Daseins are entities which, in their being, 'comport themselves towards their being' (BT, 41) in the sense that, to be a human being implicitly involves taking a stand on what it means to be a human being. This self-interpretation is existence. No truth about this interpretation is given, so that Dasein has no essence as such, or as Heidegger puts it: 'The "essence" of Dasein lies in its existence' (BT, 42). Moreover, apart from this ontical priority of Dasein in examining the question of Being, there is an ontico-ontological one: 'with equal primordiality, Dasein also possesses - as constitutive for its understanding of existence - an understanding of the Being of all entities of a character other than its own' (BT, 13). This understanding is a pre-ontological understanding of Being. It is embedded in our practices and represented by an understanding of the possibilities available to Dasein.

But this understanding is accompanied by a pre-ontological misunderstanding consisting in Dasein's understanding itself as having a specific nature. This tendency to misunderstand itself is Dasein's falling. Faced with it, Dasein has the choice between either being inauthentic by covering up this falling, or being authentic by choosing to understand its Being in the sense of grasping it as an awareness of Dasein's lack of essence, i.e. its groundlessness. These are choices open to individual Daseins and referred to as 'existentiell' by Heidegger, by contrast with the 'existential' structures (also called 'existentiale') charactering Dasein. Authenticity is of crucial importance to Heidegger's project and he devotes the whole of Division II of Being and Time to analysing it.

Mention must be made of Heidegger's hermeneutical methodology. Interpretation is always carried out on a certain background of shared understanding which can be elucidated in terms of the fore-structure: 'interpretation is grounded in something we have in advance - in a fore-having' (BT, 150). 'Interpretation is grounded in something we see in advance - in a fore-sight' and 'it is grounded in something we grasp in advance - in a fore-conception' (ibid.). Helpfully, Dreyfus (1995, p.199) applies this structure to BT itself. The fore-having is our pre-ontological understanding of being, i.e. that understanding of being Dasein already possesses in virtue of being Dasein (Dasein's ontico-ontological priority). The fore-sight is that the interpretation should proceed by analysing the 'being whose way of being (existence) is to take a stand on its own being' (ibid.), i.e. Dasein has an ontical priority. The fore-conception is that 'one can make sense of the system of existentiales in terms of temporality' (ibid.).
Construction
On Property
Ready to hand

Candidate
Transfers
Noche - menudo and

Affection - ?
Let us finally note that, when we talk of groundlessness or nullity of Dasein, we mean that the existential interpretation (ontological analysis of existence) reveals it as being without any essence. *This does not entail, however, that there may not be other ways of grasping Dasein.*

**Being-in-the-World**

Heidegger characterises Dasein's existence as essentially involving a world in which it is *there*. Thus Dasein is essentially *Being-in-the-World*. Division I of BT therefore involves a description of articulations which characterise the world and then focusses upon Dasein's way of being in that world, i.e. the existentiale of *Being-in*.

Heidegger first opposes the way in which Dasein's world is constituted, from an objective reality made up of entities that are 'present-to-hand', located in three-dimensional space (BT, 54). Rather, one way in which a world is constituted is with 'ready-to-hand' entities. To describe this, Heidegger uses the famous example of the hammer (BT, 84-85). In our use of a hammer to drive in a nail for instance, we are operating inside a nexus of equipmental reality with *in-order-to's* which serve *towards-which's*, themselves directed towards a *for-the-sake-of-which*. These correspond to different levels of directedness of an activity for which traditional teleological vocabulary is not used so as to emphasise the lack of explicitness of this directedness. The *for-the-sake-of-which* refers to a possibility of Dasein. These articulations of the nexus of equipmental reality are what constitute significance.

Beyond the *for-the-sake-of-which* lies a void corresponding to the absence of any further grounding of the *for-the-sake-of-which*: we are not able to exhibit an ultimate justification for our *concerned* behaviour by making the nexus of equipmental reality appear explicitly grounded. This is the sense in which we are groundless. As Heidegger puts it: 'Being-a-basis means never to have power over one's ownmost being from the ground up (...) being a basis is a nullity of itself' (BT, 284).

Heidegger next identifies four aspects of Dasein's way of being in the world: Affectedness, Understanding, Discourse and Falling. Understanding for Heidegger, is not a cognitive process but rather a know-how which is 'the condition of possibility for all kinds of comportment, not only practical but also

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1 The behavioural structures of Chapter II are based upon this notion of a nexus of equipmental reality, together with a rôle for deliberative intentionality.

2 Language is the way in which the intelligibility of the world is articulated. It is an 'occasional theme' in BT (Polt, 1999, p.75) which is not essential to the further developments of this chapter.
Salin's Ontological Proof
In itself - For itself - Ontology?
cognitive' (Heidegger, 1982b, p.276). Understanding is 'our most basic ability to live and cope skilfully with our world' (Couzens-Hoy, 1993, p.173). It reveals certain courses of action as possible: 'the understanding has in itself the existential structure which we call "projection"' (BT, 145). This means that to understand is to project oneself onto one's possibilities and in so doing, Dasein is its possibilities, i.e. Dasein is taking a stand on itself. Indeed, first, insofar as I am coping with my immediate environment, I show an understanding of it; for in so doing, I am projecting myself onto certain possibilities, i.e. my activity is defined by a certain for-the-sake-of-which. But, second, the possibilities which I could project onto are defined by the local background, i.e. by my situation, my world: 'with equal primordiality the understanding projects Dasein's Being both upon its "for-the-sake-of-which" and upon significance, as the worldhood of its current world' (BT, 145). The question then arises as to whether the self-understanding is 'perspicuous', in the sense that the activity reveals what it is to be a Dasein. If so, it is authentic self-understanding.

Now the fact that Dasein is already in a world where possibilities are defined for it constitutes Dasein's **thrownness** - it is essentially a manifestation of Dasein's facticity and is characterised by Dasein having certain moods (Affectedness) determining its relation to these possibilities. And when Dasein chooses a possibility to project upon, this necessarily excludes others.

Next to the existentiale of projection (ex-istence) and thrownness (facticity), Heidegger also identifies that of falling, to form what Dreyfus calls the three-fold structure of Being-in (Dreyfus, 1995, p.163). We shall discuss this in detail further.

### Sartre's Metaphysics

Although Sartre's philosophy is sometimes seen as a re-reading of Heidegger's, its concerns are very different. Towards the beginning of 'Being and Nothingness' Sartre discards the question of Being. His aim is an existential analysis of what it is to be human. And he constructs a metaphysical system around the fact that to be human is fundamentally different from being anything else. Sartre thus distinguishes between the way an entity is, which is in-itself\(^3\) and the way in which a subject transcends this realm of being by being for-itself. The for-itself essentially lacks self-identity. This manifests itself in three ways. First, in temporal terms, there is the difference between the self which is always already projecting itself beyond itself into the future and that which is rooted in its past. Second,

\(^3\)This is distinct from Kant's In-Itself which I refer to by capitalising the two I's.
there is also the difference between the facticity of the human condition - we are thrown into a world with certain objective characteristics - and the transcendence of our free choices which characterises existence. Finally, the for-itself's lack of identity is manifested in the way in which reflective consciousness cannot turn its attention to itself without transforming its object so that the 'circuit of selfness' is incomplete: no identity is achieved between the knower and the known.

The first problem is a Sartrean version of the Heideggerian notion of time as the meaning of care, where care is the name Heidegger gives to the Being of Dasein (BT, 364) while the second problem takes up two fundamental existentiale exhibited by Heidegger's analysis of the Being of Dasein, namely facticity (being-already-in) and existence (being-ahead-of-itself) in the context of Sartrean metaphysics. But the third problem is specifically Sartrean and is a consequence of the analysis of consciousness that is central to Sartrean metaphysics. Here is an essential feature of the Sartrean approach: there is an immediate awareness that every human-being has of herself; it is non-thetic, but rather a pre-reflective self-awareness.

The notion of authenticity then emerges as that of a proper understanding of these problems of our condition. This human condition is however not easy to bear as it is accompanied by the constant anguish of choice, the free choice which characterises every instant of our lives. To avoid this, the for-itself may seek to deceive itself it is a kind of in-itself, i.e. that it has an objective nature. This is bad faith.

Authenticity has a central role in Sartrean philosophy, both because of the pre-reflective self-awareness that implies a transparency of consciousness bringing the subject into immediate contact with a reality, and because there is an ethical dimension to the authentic attitude, which is that of taking responsibility for the limitless freedom which we are.

Having sketched Heidegger and Sartre's philosophies, we shall explore the structure of falling, and its rôle in Dasein's choice of inauthenticity. This will lead us to suggest the need for a new existential. The existentiell analysis of inauthenticity will be guided by Sartre's analysis of bad faith which we shall interpret in the light of this new existential. These analyses will bring out the rôle of an essential directedness of Dasein which Part Three will build upon to guide our ethical investigation.
2. Falling

The tri-partite nature of falling

Falling, as we have introduced it above, corresponds to a feature of Dasein which tends to draw it away from a primordial understanding of what it is to be Dasein. It is drawn away towards what is closest to it, the world, and thus tends to interpret itself in terms of the world and the possibilities it finds there, namely the possibilities which are those of the One. Dreyfus (1995) identifies three ways in which this occurs; namely, by being absorbed in the world, through language and through a form of reflexivity. Let us analyse these so as to grasp their unity.

When Dasein is involved in coping with ready-to-hand entities, it is absorbed. If, however, this leads Dasein to forget the conditions for this relation of absorption in the world, Dasein succumbs to fascination. This phenomenon is experienced by anyone who becomes involved in an activity in such a way that nothing else counts, so that the termination of the activity leads to a sense of being lost. This can, e.g., just as well apply to a sportsman's involvement in a competition as to a wage-earner's attachment to her work. The first leads to feelings of anticlimax after the event and the second to a sense of disorientation at retirement.

The other two forms are related to this. A primordial understanding of a piece of equipment is achieved in using it. However, one may lose this primordial understanding and still have some understanding. Heidegger suggests that 'what the talk is about is understood only approximately and superficially' (BT, 168). Thus one might express opinions as to how the transport system is managed, ... with a limited and sometimes quite banal understanding of it. However, it seems necessary to be able to express opinions about what we are not experts in. This is idle talk. Curiosity may however lead Dasein to leave a primordial understanding of Dasein behind completely: 'Curiosity is characterized by a specific way of not tarrying amidst what is closest' (BT, 172). Thus, I shall let my attention be distracted by items in a newspaper, never focussing too much upon any issue. This means that I act as though everything were equally important or irrelevant and it were only up to me to decide what I wish to be concerned with.

Finally, given that we already know that Dasein is the kind of being which takes a stance upon its being, Dasein 'has a tendency to do so in terms of that entity towards which it comports itself primarily (....) - in terms of the world' (BT, 15). Dreyfus focusses upon the implications for the way in which Dasein will grasp itself as a self, soul, ..., on the basis of an understanding of entities as present-to-hand. However, on a ontic level, this tendency can also be tied together with
Dasein's tendency to be fascinated. For fascination will *de facto* suggest that the for-the-sake-of-which of the coping activity provides the materials for an identification of what Dasein's self is. Thus I can define my self through my work, my hobbies, my relationships, ... and use this as an interpretation of who I am.

The consequence of this tri-partite aspect of falling is that absorption appears as fundamental while the other two forms of falling are connected with the other existentiale of being-in, namely thrownness (affectedness) and projection (understanding). Indeed, we have seen that Dasein has a tendency to be fascinated by that which it is coping with. This leads it to *understand* itself in terms of some for-the-sake-of-whichs (reflexivity); correlatively, this involves Dasein's tendency to avoid letting itself be concerned by anything of substance (idle talk), thus leading it to deny that it is *affected* by what it has not chosen. These links are reflections of the complex structure of the temporal ecstases which Heidegger analyses in section II: even within the present, the past and the future are referred to. Here, within falling which is the present of being-in, we find links to the future and the past, through the central notion of absorption. This brief analysis of the three-fold nature of falling enables us to focus upon absorption in the development below.

**Falling: a problematic structure**

Heidegger's structure of falling is central to Heidegger's analysis of Dasein, but at the same time, 'of all the existentiales, falling is the hardest to get a focus on' (Dreyfus, 1995, p.224). The first question which arises is whether falling is the absorption in one's activity, or the fascination with it. If the latter, it would not seem possible for Dasein to be authentic since a basic structure of Dasein would involve an inauthentic way of being. Choosing this option, we find Tugendhat (1970) interpreting falling as an inauthentic 'modality of thrownness and projection' (p.316, my transl.), and therefore not to be set on a par with those two other structures as it is an existentiell modality. Similarly, Mulhall (1996, p.70) observes: 'Heidegger seems to be claiming that Dasein's being is somehow inherently inauthentic'. As for what would have to accompany thrownness and projection in constituting the structure of care, Tugendhat (1970, p.216-7, fn) suggests it could be Being-alongside, 'in the sense of being absorbed in the world' (BT, 54). The same suggestion is made by Dreyfus (1995, p.227): 'absorption is, indeed, equiprimordial with affectedness and understanding and deserves to be regarded as an existentiale'. This interpretation would apparently provide a
existential - not confused
For Sartre, impossibility of being self in the
immediacy of consciousness
clearer picture of what characterises Being-in, with each existentiale clearly mapped onto temporal ecstases and unified in the notion of care.

Instead of choosing this option, however, we find that Heidegger hesitates between the two and often confuses the existential structure with an existentiell sense of falling which is inauthentic (ibid.): 'In falling, Dasein turns away from itself' (BT, 185). Why does this confusion happen?

Let us first observe that it is prima facie easy to overlook the problem. Indeed, to be constituted as Dasein, involves being socialised. This means that the possibilities that become one's own are those of the One. From there, it may seem a small step to move to the claim that Dasein understands itself in terms of the One. This step involves taking over the possibilities of the One as such, instead of making them one's own. The difference is that between conformism and conformity. However, Heidegger is not guilty of confusing these terms.

To explain the confusion he makes, we must rather observe that what distinguishes falling from 'simple' absorption is that falling is rather a property of absorption, without being an existentiell determination of it. It is thus described by Heidegger as a 'tendency' towards interpreting Dasein in inauthentic terms. Insofar as Heidegger is trying to give a structural account and therefore avoid any motivational analysis, he finds it quite difficult to distinguish between absorption itself and being attracted by fascination. That this leaves us with a problem to solve is an issue which Dreyfus does not consider as central. Below, we shall suggest it is.

Whether or not absorption and the attraction of fascination are distinguished, the related issue of how Dasein's falling leads to fallenness, i.e. the yielding to fascination, is also left unaccounted for by Heidegger, as Dreyfus points out.

Aside from these two problems, there is the issue that the structural account of this phenomenon is not the only one which is to be found in BT. Heidegger also provides a psychological account which draws upon the notion of anxiety. Dasein experiences anxiety when it is confronted with nothingness, and therefore, when it understands its groundlessness (as thrown and projecting). Dasein is therefore motivated to flee from such a confrontation. This leads to a third problem problem: 'the shifting place of falling in the overall architectonic of BT is a sign of Heidegger's hesitation between a structural and a motivational account' (Dreyfus, 1995, p.226). Dreyfus opts for a radical strategy of choosing one of the two accounts and rejecting the other. Aside from the fact that it represents a clear move away from Heidegger's intention, we shall suggest it is not the best approach here.
The first two problems: the need for a structural account

Many commentators (e.g. Mulhall, 1996; Guignon, 1993) do not see that there is a particular problem here. Thus Tropea's (1987, p.90) statement 'Is it any wonder (...) that Heidegger's Dasein tends to lay nearly-exclusive priority on falling existence', is typical of the apparently obvious link between absorption and fascination.

Dreyfus recognises that in providing his structural account of falling, 'the tendency towards fascination remains unaccounted for'. This issue is however dealt with briefly in a footnote where he suggests that an account could be provided. Moreover, he points to how the materials for such an account could be found in Heidegger's "What is Metaphysics?", in Merleau-Ponty and Nietzsche. The first source points to the fact that 'The nothing in its nothingness refers us directly to beings', so that 'the more we turn to beings... the more we turn away from the nothing' (Heidegger, 1972-1988, Vol. 9, 116). This however leaves it open why Dasein cannot relate directly to the clearing within which it would encounter nothing, but has to go via beings.

The other two sources have probably been included by Dreyfus to provide the missing explanation. And indeed, Merleau-Ponty suggests that the tendency Dasein has of overlooking the conditions for its involvement in absorbed coping can be accounted for insofar as treating things or people as stable entities increases the ability to control. Similarly, Nietzsche explains how the use of the categories of cause and substance is not true to the phenomena, but leads to an increase of power.

So the ultimate account is a pragmatic one. It is satisfactory if one accepts that efficiency is an overriding consideration. But why should we do this?

What this suggests is that a satisfactory structural account is lacking in Heidegger's philosophy and materials for its construction are not readily available. Moreover, this problem is not just a point of detail. Rather, as we have shown above, it is closely related to the other two problems, namely that of how falling leads to fallenness and the issue of the co-existence of the structural and psychological analyses. This means that dealing with the first could lead to finding paths solve the other two.

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4Dreyfus (1995, p. 234-6) proposes an account of why Dasein yields to fallenness, but it is only partial. It essentially relies upon the fallenness of the One. It explains why that which obscures Daseins' real being is omnipresent and hence goes much of the way to accounting for why Dasein generally yields to fallenness. Apart from not fully bridging this explanatory gap, it also relies upon the unaccounted-for fallenness of the one.
Be who you are

I have to be who I am. I have to know who I am.

In order to know who I am, I have to just not be who I am.

Only genetic accounts can resolve what otherwise would be a contradiction.
If a further structural account is required, a structural feature has to be identified. The fact that falling appears so tied in with existentiell interpretations of Dasein suggests that in identifying falling as an existentiale, Heidegger himself got caught up in the ontic/ontological confusion he often reproaches others for falling into. I therefore suggest that a more primordial structure can be identified to deal with these problems. This means that absorption, rather than falling, is set on a par with thrownness and projecting, and that the new structure has to account for why, in being absorbed, Dasein is attracted by fascination. This approach echoes concerns expressed by Macann and Tugendhat.

We thus find Macann commenting upon falling as 'the most serious structural defect to be found in Being and Time' (Macann, 91) and suggesting that if the existentielle of falling were indeed to lead to an inauthentic existentiell modality 'then there would be a mode of being of Dasein prior to Falling' (ibid.). A further analysis of this point is beyond the scope of Macann's book. Tugendhat, on the other hand, who has concluded that falling cannot be on a par with thrownness and projection, points to a more fundamental tendency of which falling is a manifestation. Insofar as falling is a tendency to conceal ('Verdeckungstendenz', Tugendhat, 1970), it reveals an 'interest in untruth' (ibid., p.315, my transl.). But Tugendhat also points to the way in which a 'positive' tendency underpins this interest. This, Tugendhat calls an 'interest in truth' (ibid., p.319). His explanation is that, insofar as I am interested in the truth, when something is shown to be true, it simultaneously makes the demand upon me to recognise it as such. Therefore, if this truth is such that it is 'uncanny' (as Heidegger describes the truth of Being-in), an option is to cover this truth, i.e. to prevent it from being revealed, precisely because the interest in the truth would oblige me to recognise this uncaniness, were it to be revealed.

This account goes a step further in locating the source of that which is a falling and of the possibility of the inauthentic mode of being Dasein, simultaneously as the source of its authentic modalities. It however relies upon the uncaniness of the truth of Being-in for Dasein to account for why Dasein has a tendency to avoid it. Thus, although this explanatory route goes further than Dreyfus's account, it still leaves us with this explanandum. For a structural account is what is required, i.e. not an appeal to a notion of anguish which dresses up the issue in psychological terms.

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5 Tugendhat seems to present this option as self-evident. But more will have to be said as to how it is that this is an option and why one often chooses it. These are existentiell matters examined further.
Absolution in Fascination will

Quest
E.F.W. No Truth
Making me whom Truthfulmen
Uncovering the Quest

A structure will therefore be proposed which answers the question: why is absorbed Dasein drawn towards being fascinated? We shall see that it also provides an answer to the further question of why Dasein yields to fallenness. To identify such a structure, we draw upon Tugendhat's methodology of attempting to identify what lies at the root of both authentic and inauthentic modes of Dasein. To identify such a structure, we must ask what is attractive about fascination and more generally a self-interpretation in terms of the One? Well, these options present Dasein with an interpretation which is readily available, does not need reworking and is self-contained. This means that such an interpretation does not present Dasein as having to be interpreted, but rather as already interpreted without any foreseeable requirement to revisit this interpretation.

What kind of meaning is such that it is not open to reinterpretation? It is a meaning such that however anything else comes to be understood, it will not be affected. But what is it that leads an interpretation to be revisited? It is the fact that given a new understanding, the way in which things were grasped now appears inadequate. In other words, it is the fact that a shift in the background of understanding of the interpretation has been triggered. Therefore meaning which is not open to reinterpretation is meaning that is independent of any framework of understanding. Insofar as it is not relative to any such background, this meaning is absolute.

Dasein is therefore attracted by what can be viewed as absolute meaning. But what is the nature of this 'attraction'? Clearly it is such that Dasein considers interpretations which make phenomena appear absolutely meaningful (as in falling) and is prepared to actively embrace such interpretations (as in fallenness). There are two moments here: that of identifying the seemingly appropriate interpretation, and that of embracing it. These two moments are encapsulated in the concept of a quest. For a quest involves identifying the object of the quest and then engaging in its pursuit. Thus a quest for truth is both an identification of that which is true and an adoption of this truth as one's own. These two moments are, moreover, not independent, so that the concept of quest is not a composite of two simpler ones. For the identification of the object of the quest implies the move to adopt it as one's own. Thus, once the truth has been identified, one will acquire the knowledge, i.e. a belief in that truth will be integrated among one's beliefs. Conversely, one can only adopt it as one's own if one has identified it as what it is. Thus, something true is integrated among one's beliefs if and only if it has been
Quest for absolute meaning
grasped as true. In comparison with this concept of quest for truth, the concepts of (re)search and of acquisition are deficient ones. The first involves the mere identification of an object and the second the mere making one's own of an object. Thus in the case of truth, the identification of the truth as it is carried out in research and the acquisition of truths as it is carried out in encyclopedic learning are instances of such deficient modes. With this concept of the quest, we can now state that if the phenomenon of the attraction exerted by the state of fascination is to be interpreted in a way which also prepares for an understanding of the yielding to this fascination, the following structure is therefore required as primordial existentiale of Dasein. Dasein is to be understood as a quest for absolute meaning (hereafter, the Quest). This is defined as an orientation to and a movement towards meaning which is independent of any particular background of understanding. The Quest thus accounts for falling insofar as it is an orientation: it provides an account of the attraction exerted by that which is apparently interpretable as absolutely meaningful. It is not that fascination of itself provides absolute meaning. Rather, in fascination, Dasein is absorbed in the pursuit of a for-the-sake-of which it interprets as absolutely meaningful. The Quest also accounts for fallenness insofar as it is a movement: to be a Quest involves pursuing that which has been identified as absolutely meaningful. This means that Dasein will often yield to fascination and become fallen Dasein.

Heidegger, Sartre and the Quest

How does such a structure fit in within Heidegger's interpretation? It is first interesting to point out that Dreyfus (1995, p.334) notes, in his psychological account of fallenness, that an answer to the question as to why Dasein has a constant tendency to flee into an inauthentic understanding of its own being is that 'human beings seek secure meaning'. But in arguing this is an unsatisfactory answer, Dreyfus relies upon the claim that 'Heidegger does not have a Christian conception of the self as needing a meaningful world of its own' (ibid., p.335). We note that this statement about Heidegger's fore-conception is not given much support. Although there is a sense in which Being and Time deliberately breaks away from Christian tradition, this may not be a fundamental thrust of Heidegger's thought (Sichère, 2002). Another objection to the Quest is the claim that Heidegger would view such a notion as having no place in his hermeneutic approach. Indeed, to talk of absolute meaning seems to overlook the fact that in everything that is understood, there is
Limitations of meaningfulness
1. Concurred background = 0
2. Projection = M
something in the background which must remain concealed. And this places limitations upon the conditions for meaningfulness. But what exactly are these limitations? They are that when Dasein expresses meaning, it can only understand it with respect to a background which it cannot fully grasp. This, however, says nothing as to whether that which is expressed is not also meaningful against a different background. Thus a religious practice is carried out in a particular cultural environment. But it is possible for an ethnologist from another culture to grasp some of its meaning by viewing it against a broader background. If one then repeats this 'broadening of the background', one may arrive at the limits of Dasein's world. But these are not necessarily final. One could consider that which is meaningful for any such background, and thus absolutely meaningful.

Having suggested it is not contradictory, we can also motivate the introduction of absolute meaning more positively, independently of Being and Time. Consider a given meaning and the background of understanding required to grasp it. Is this background not itself meaningful? Well, if any aspect of this background were found not to be meaningful, it could be dropped from the background. So, the background as a whole must be meaningful, although this meaning needs to be brought out to be grasped. This latter disclosing will however require a new background (Taylor, 1993, p.329), and the process of revealing the meaningfulness of the background can be repeated. This leads to a regress which can either go on indefinitely, or be accounted for by a residual meaning which underpins all these expressions of meaning. The first solution is unsatisfactory in that one is left with the unanswered question as to how meaning got into the regressive chain in the first place, i.e. where does meaning originate? The second requires us to introduce the singular notion of absolute meaning. Both solutions therefore have their problems. This suffices to show that the notion of absolute meaning is not a convoluted construction, but rather the identification of the locus of a mystery, that of the 'origin' of meaning⁶ - and thus a sort of 'logos'.

One should then ask whether there is anything in the fore-structure of Heidegger's interpretation which suggests this interpretation? The foreconception of Being and Time is that the meaning of Being is related to time. But time practically only appears explicitly in section II. It is thus not clear that this fore-conception fully accounts for section I. In particular, when we see Heidegger taking falling as a primordial structure, we see not only a 'directional structure', such as time, but

⁶The later Heidegger's understanding of Being may, I think, be interpreted as such an origin. But Dasein remains external to it, as a shepherd to his herd (Heidegger, 1998, p.251).
one which "points downwards". This is only possible if Dasein is viewed as confronted with some insurmountable problem, i.e. some limitation. Heidegger would say it is Dasein's groundlessness (facticity or thrownness). But this is only a problem for Dasein if Dasein is seeking a ground. Now Sartre explicitly builds such a claim into his ontological assumptions. His duality in-itself/for-itself enables him to state that 'consciousness is in fact a project of founding itself' (BN, 620). Similarly, Heidegger must therefore have it built into his fore-conception that Dasein seeks a ground for section I to make sense. Such a fore-conception is moreover germane to the overall fore-conception of Being and Time. For both are aspects of the Quest which involves a search and a temporal movement towards that which has been identified.

But then one need only ask what this says about Dasein that it seeks such a ground? There are two possible answers here: either claim that Dasein, as the source of negation, tries to negate its own condition, or understand this as revealing a quest for something absolute which is not given. The first option is Sartre's. It does not really seem open to Heidegger in that he has not set up the kind of Sartrean ontological duality which prepares the way for this. To revert to such an ontological assumption would, moreover, be to overlook the questionability of the exhaustiveness of this duality. The second option therefore offers itself as a more adequate interpretation.

Let us, to conclude, briefly expand the point we have just made about Sartre. For him, the for-itself is always haunted by the in-itself which it posits as value in its projects insofar as it is the lacked (BN, p.93). This, is in many ways, close to the notion of man as a quest. However, Sartre's premiss is the exhaustiveness of the duality of in- and for-itself. This means that Sartre's understanding of value amounts to a "mere" recognition by the for-itself that it lacks the solidity of the in-itself. On the contrary, the Quest points to a notion which is apparently excluded from Sartre's ontology as impossible (e.g. as for-itself-in-itself, BN, p.90), namely absolute meaning. By diverging from Sartre on this point, I am endorsing the spirit of some of Marcel's (1981) criticisms.

The coexistence of a psychological and a structural account of falling
The final problem identified in the analysis of falling was that of the two accounts that are given of it. Dreyfus (1995) and Rubin analyse the psychological account of

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7Sartre arguably runs into a problem here which he seems to recognise without tackling it: namely, value 'possesses being in some way at least' (BT, 93). But this does not seem to fit in with the exhaustive duality of the in- and for-itself.
Dasein as motivated to flee to escape anxiety, as a secularised version of Kierkegaard's existentialist Christian philosophy. Dreyfus claims that, although this interpretation mostly fits Heidegger's text, Heidegger has clearly not completely rid himself of a certain Christian conception. For he 'inexplicably holds on to the antipathy' (Dreyfus, 1995, p.335) of Dasein towards meaningfulness. Without such an antipathy, 'if anxiety is the truth of Dasein's condition and the truth sets it free' Dasein would 'seek anxiety rather than flee it' (ibid.).

Dreyfus concludes that it is best to drop the psychological account of falling altogether as he argues that Heidegger should have abandoned such notions. The structure of the Quest does not require us to do this however. On the contrary, the Quest provides the materials for a psychological account, since anxiety can be understood as the natural corollary of the lack of meaningful ground for a being characterised as a quest for meaning. Clearly, such a being would be motivated to flee the absence of ground revealed in anxiety. But, if the Quest is to successfully account for this fleeing, it must be shown that fleeing is a real existentiell possibility - i.e. the possibility of such a motive must be demonstrated and its nature revealed.

In Heidegger's analysis, the fact that the anxiety in the face of groundlessness motivates Dasein's flight is taken for granted. And the possibility of thus fleeing is grounded in a general feature of Dasein's encounter with its world, namely that it involves both an uncovering and a covering up of the truth (BT, 129). This suggests (Tugendhat, 1970, p.325, fn) that Heidegger has the materials required for such an existentiell analysis. We shall follow this clue in the analysis below. However, Heidegger's neglect of the issues of deliberation and motivation (Tugendhat, 2001) makes it impossible to identify the motives involved on the basis of his text alone.

Further clues are to be found in Tugendhat's interpretation of the fundamental rôle of an interest in untruth involved in falling, as examined above. For this leads us to the detailed analysis which Sartre made of the ambiguous relation to the truth that is involved in bad faith. This, I shall argue, will enable us to identify the motivational structure of inauthenticity.

3. Fallenness
Bad faith is defined as a feature of consciousness such that 'instead of directing its negation outward [it] turns it toward itself' (BN, 48). Sartre describes this negation as a form of lying, but this can only be done 'on condition that one distinguish the lie to oneself from lying in general' (BN, 48). The problem is that lying is precisely characterized by the discrepancy between the truth which is known and the untruth told to the recipient of the lie. In the case of bad faith, 'the duality of the deceiver and the deceived does not exist' (BN, 49). Moreover, the translucency of consciousness implies that bad faith is accompanied by an awareness of this bad faith. As Macann (1993, p. 122) points out, 'How can I, the deceiver, deceive myself with regard to the very deception I am engaged in perpetrating'. Let us examine these issues.

The use of examples in the description of bad faith

Since bad faith is such a complex and 'evanescent' although 'frequent' attitude (BN, 50), it is best approached using examples. Thus Sartre considers the case of the café waiter whose 'movement is quick and forward, a little too precise, a little too rapid' (BN, 59). The waiter is in effect attempting to escape the anguish characterising the for-itself in the recognition of its freedom by being in the mode of the in-itself, i.e. by attempting to realize a 'being-in-itself of the café waiter' (BN, 60). Sartre also gives the example of the homosexual who attempts to deny his facticity as for-itself by refusing the label "homosexual". In both cases, the solidity of the realm of being constituted by the in-itself is sought by the for-itself as a refuge from anguish. This is because what the for-itself (which is both freedom and facticity) lacks is the firm ground. The anguish Sartre refers to can be understood as the experience of anxiety described by Heidegger as belonging to the confrontation with the meaninglessness of Dasein's lack of ground. And bad faith therefore appears to be the inauthentic existentiell mode we are seeking to identify.

By examining such examples, we learn that the "identification with an in-itself" is however not a straightforward belief that one is an in-itself. For it is striving in some way to preserve the temporary state of so-called "identification" or perfect it: the for-itself can only interpret its project of identification to an in-itself as the

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8 It is not equivalent to inauthenticity for Sartre, since the latter also seems to think that good faith, like sincerity, is inauthentic at least in its goal. But sincerity is 'conscious of missing its goal inevitably' and this is what gives birth to bad faith (BN, 66), and 'in order for bad faith to be possible, sincerity itself must be in bad faith' (BN, 67), which suggests that ultimately, all inauthenticity is characterised by bad faith. Thus, Santoni (1995, p.124): 'It is the (...) authentic life that marks for Sartre the mode of being that is opposite to living in bad faith'.
coming-to-itself (as a "coming into its own") of an in-itself which is an in-itself-for-itself. This, we shall call the project of the "in-itself life".

The problems raised by bad faith
There are two main problems involved in understanding bad faith as a manifestation of inauthenticity: how is it bad faith is a possible project - i.e. how are we to understand this lie to oneself? and why is it chosen as a means to avoid confronting anguish - i.e. why is it effective? These problems both spring from an examination of Sartrean examples: in bad faith, there are conflicting beliefs, e.g. on the one hand that one is an in-itself, on the other, that one is a for-itself and therefore not an in-itself. In other words, 'the person in bad faith lies to himself about the twofold dimension of human reality as both freedom and facticity at the same time that he is prereflectively aware of both' (Anderson, 1993, p. 15).

It thus appears that 'either bad faith is non-self-deceiving muddle over the two-facedness of being, or it is engineered and hence self-deceiving muddle and the element of self-deception has been left completely unanalysed' (McCulloch, 1994, p.68). The first does not square with Sartre's claims that bad faith does involve some form of self-deception (BN, 68). If bad faith is just a muddle, it would seem not to be within the subject's power to grow out of it, which is hardly compatible with Sartre's ultimate ethical interests - bad faith is imputable (Sartre, 1971). The second would seem to imply it is a form of cynicism (Santoni, 1995). Aside from Sartre's explicit denial of this identification (BN, 70), this overlooks the fact that since there are differing attitudes to different beliefs in bad faith, to give the label cynicism does nothing to clarify these. It has also been rejected by many commentators as a phenomenologically incorrect interpretation (Catalano, 1996, p.113; Bell, 1989, p.35). If bad faith is not cynicism, then the self-deception involved remains to be identified.

Mc Culloch's challenge to interpretations of the notion of bad faith cuts across the 'how?' and 'why?' questions. To answer the first question, we are left with the connected issues of shedding light on how incompatible beliefs can co-exist within the project of bad faith and of the nature of the apparent self-deception involved; the latter will in turn lead to understanding why bad faith provides an escape from anguish by shedding light upon the motivational issue.

Next, an analysis of the rôle of the key features of Sartre's model of consciousness, namely the distinction between 'reflective' and 'pre-reflective' consciousness, together with the metastability of consciousness, will provide elements of an
account of the 'seeming' self-deceiving muddle and thus a lead to examine the 'how?' question.

An approach to the question 'how?'

Sartre himself in BN gives indications of the importance of properly grasping the type of consciousness involved in bad faith when he points out that 'there is no question of a reflective (...) decision' (BN, 68) but sheds little light upon this issue (BN, 49). Catalano (1996, pp.128-147) makes an important contribution to the recognition of the different types of consciousness and the latter's metastability by showing how one can in effect operate a form of self-deceit. He examines the "translucency" of consciousness and observes that although 'nothing can be perfectly hidden from my consciousness, (...) this awareness does not have to be a thetic comprehension' (Catalano, 1996, p.134). Rather, conceptualisation is required to make it objective, although this will not be carried out 'unbiasedly' (ibid., p.135). It is not "objective" in the common sense of the term.

This important observation is that which allows Catalano to show how we can be aware of something, but through an inadequate conceptualisation of the pre-reflective, we are "deceived" into thinking it is something else. He thus considers the rower who sees himself as rowing skillfully and thus impressing the girlfriend he is taking for a boat ride. The tension he feels is interpreted by him as that of his efforts at rowing whereas 'to an unbiased observer, [the] rowing exhibits a tension that is [his] effort to sustain an effortlessness that is not present' (Catalano, 1996, p.137). The interpretation is clearly not adequate, but in what sense? Since we are dealing with a system of beliefs, an essential requirement is that of coherence and this brings out the need for compatibility of the standards used in interpretation. As Sartre points out: 'Bad faith does not hold the norms and criteria of truth as they are accepted by the critical thought of good faith' (BN, 68). Catalano's analysis thus creates the conceptual space for a notion of bad faith between confusion in good faith and cynicism: the interpretative standards of good faith are not upheld uniformly. The appearance of incompatible beliefs has been resolved by separating pre-conceptual awareness from the conceptualisations of reflective consciousness. The inconsistency is now between standards of truth within the project of bad faith.

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9This is the lack of identity between subject and object of self consciousness.

10Rather, it is objective in the sense of CPR, in that it is a conceptualised manifold. But its meaning, i.e. the way in which the empirical concepts have been applied, cannot claim any impartiality.
1. Fundamental authenticity: spontaneously being self
2. Bad faith: function, not being self, while aware of the impossibility of not being self
3. Not being self = self - detachment

4. Question ceases to be one of the two by being, not being self 1 → 2
   but alleged - detached 3 → 4
Towards the question 'why?'

What Catalano's analysis lacks however, is a bridge which takes us from the 'how?' to the 'why?' question in terms of an analysis of how to escape anguish. The problem of escaping anguish as the experience of anxiety is a difficult one: if I know something allows anguish to come to the fore, I may try to avoid it; but in avoiding it, I am anxious not to encounter it and therefore apparently I cannot really flee anguish. So it is not clear why bad faith could provide a way out.

That this problem remains is no surprise. Tugendhat (1970, p.325, fn) dismissed Sartre's ability to account for the concealment involved in bad faith because of his essentially transparent concept of consciousness. There must be concealment in consciousness to begin with, if some targeted concealment is to be achievable deliberately. This means that something like Heidegger's understanding of the revealing of truth as a simultaneous concealing is called for. We thus need to identify what ought to be hidden in the background of understanding to enable a self-interpretation of the for-itself concealing its nature as facticity and freedom. Importantly, the separation of the pre-reflective and reflective levels enables us to have such concealment while holding on to pre-reflective transparency, so that the above answer to the 'how?' question remains valid. Finally, this appeal to reflective concealment moreover appears called for by some remarks in Sartre's text, in particular that 'the project of bad faith must itself be in bad faith' (BN, 67-68).

To identify that which is concealed, our clue is the existentiale of the Quest as the key to Dasein's being tempted by fascination. Insofar as the Quest is an existentiale characterising Dasein as such, what must be involved in inauthenticity is a concealment of the real nature of the Quest which would be constitutive of our background understanding. But what aspect of the Quest has to be concealed if we are to keep anguish at bay? We have seen that anxiety is a correlate of the movement towards meaning (away from meaninglessness) of the Quest. Therefore, if the Quest were to cease to be movement, anxiety would have no foothold. And this means we should be looking at our understanding of time and how it can take on a form constituting a background congenial to the required interpretation.

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I do not accept meaninglessness (lack of growth) as source of anxiety.

1. Anxiety is it's episodes
2. Calling in greater self in light of recognition of not being self
The understanding of time

To begin, a very simple point can be made: if the motivation is one of avoiding anguish, then since anguish is an existential experience in time, the first and most obvious move is to attempt to delay it in some way. In fact, since anguish is always a possibility for the future, such delaying is required, to 'keep it at arm's length'.

This will however not be very effective since anguish may well resurface through the experience of fearing the original experience of anguish. However, this "second-order anguish" is conditional upon the likelihood of an onset of the original anguish. This "second-order anguish" can be much defused if one knows that this onset is to be delayed by a time extending beyond the horizon of one's daily concerns.

So a strategy of escape from anguish must use this temporal dimension in such a way that one views the confrontation with that which is our anxiety, i.e. the issue of our meaningless lack of ground, as postponed to an indeterminate future. What is required here is an understanding of time whereby time is seen as a dimension which is as space, in the sense that one can distance oneself from certain experiences in time by postponing them to a distant future, or relegating them to a remote past.

With this concealment of the temporal dimension of the Quest, absolute meaning is therefore interpreted as given and this is where the project of "in-itself life" becomes a real possibility: one can interpret one's life as the perfecting of one's nature as 'in-itself', that which defines who we are (a "waiter" or "rower", as described above).

Before we can use these insights to answer the 'why?' question, we must briefly address the issue of how something like a choice of some of one's own background of interpretation is possible. In Chapter II, we have seen that the agent-self is constituted on the basis of inclinations developed through habituation. And we pointed to the sense in which I make myself into an agent inclined to duty through acting out of duty. The notion of agent-self can be understood as constituted by what one takes as background to one's actions, in the broadest sense of the word, and therefore, in particular, by one's interpretations. This therefore gives us a minimal grasp of how deliberate habituation can lead to choosing one's background of interpretation.
**Answering the 'why?' question**

Let us fill in the answer to the 'why?' question. There are three parts to the required explanation: one must first give a reason for choosing this project, second the reason for pursuing the project and third an account of how the decision to opt for this project gets "interpreted away".

The first issue involves explaining how it is that the criteria used for the bad faith interpretation of oneself, although not adequate in terms of the critical thought of good faith (BN, 68), are nevertheless utilised here. The answer lies in observing that what is to be interpreted is not simply a mundane event; it is rather the pre-reflective awareness of the ultimate groundlessness of one's action. Thus an adequate interpretation of this pre-reflective reality is one which speaks of an abyss, of the infinity of nothingness. Because the content is of such an extraordinary nature in contrast to our everyday involvement with things, the interpretative norms may be questioned. A widespread point of view is expressed in the sentence: 'But it is of no use to think of these things', implying that our power of thought is here uncertain and one ought rather think about that which is 'useful' to our life. However, insofar as the pre-reflective content is salient in our consciousness, we cannot simply abstain from interpreting it. We can however interpret it so that the result is more germane to everyday experience. This involves simultaneously developing the background of, and providing a content to, the interpretation: the spatial understanding of time will become part of the background understanding against which we view our lives as set in stone with the solidity of the in-itself.

The second issue arises because bad faith is not pure cynicism and therefore does not discard truth as such. There are situations of breakdown\(^{12}\) in which new evidence emerges which, in good faith, would lead the subject to reject the inadequate interpretative structure he is using. Thus, the waiter confronted with an earthquake will find nothing in his 'waiter-behaviour' repertory to guide his action and will have to resort to freely acting in a new way. However, the understanding of time he has adopted in bad faith makes it possible for him to postpone the examination of new evidence. And this postponement will precisely not be a source of anguish because it is understood as putting this examination out of reach in an indefinite future, one which can comfortably be kept at arm's length. As this spatial understanding of time also relegates past events to a convenient

\(^{12}\)This word is used by Heidegger to describe interruptions in coping behaviour. This brings out a parallel with Heideggerian ontology (Catalano, 1990): pre-reflective consciousness sheds light on that which is ready-to-hand, while reflective consciousness guides action among entities present-at-hand.
remoteness, all actual confrontations with anguish are viewed as no longer relevant, and therefore neutralised.

We thus have an answer to the third issue. For if past decisions are treated as irrelevant to my life, any moment in life at which I would have made a decision to adopt the interpretative structure (background and content) of bad faith is excluded from the horizon of my concerns. This provides an answer to McCulloch's question: bad faith is neither muddle nor cynicism, but is made possible as an in-itself life project through a background spatial understanding of time.

This concludes our account of the 'why?' question. The integration of the confrontation with the abyss of nothingness within our everyday experience leads to a rejection of one's interpretation of it as an abyss. The possibility of interpreting it away and thus making it harmless is however available. For if the dynamic dimension of the Quest is concealed, and a spatial understanding of time therefore prevails, one's life can thus be interpreted as in-itself life project. This neutralises threatening evidence by postponing its examination to an indefinite future and viewing choice-making as belonging to an indefinite past.

This answer may not satisfy McCulloch in that it ultimately relies upon a hermeneutic notion of background understanding. However, if we accept the necessity of such an approach in line with Heidegger's understanding of the task of phenomenology, this account goes deeper than Sartre's recourse to the meta-stability of consciousness as it shows to what extent an interpretative framework is involved in bad faith and how this framework comes to be established. Since, within an interpretation, that which is in the background is not under examination, this leads to the possibility of incompatible beliefs. In this way, we see that a demand for an account of bad faith that is not set against an interpretative horizon is precisely excluded. For it is only through having an assumed belief clashing with one which is explicit in a given interpretation, that incompatible beliefs can be held together. This means that it is the very hermeneutic nature of our self-understanding that underpins the possibility of the project of bad faith.

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13In terms of the understanding of the Quest which is implied by the structure of bad faith, we note that it involves reducing what is a quest to its deficient modes, (re)search and acquisition. With the proposed interpretation, one acquires an understanding of oneself one can hang on to. That it is a matter of acquisition is illustrated by the fact that what is interpreted as absolutely meaningful is represented as objects which must be acquired. At the same time, discovering the truth is then relegated to a matter of (re)search which does not affect one's life. Here, the issue is rather one of acquiring objective knowledge of the world.

14Additionally, the habituation leading to this interpretation of time is achieved through bad faith.
Conclusion

In this chapter, we have therefore exhibited certain basic characteristics of what it is to be human by drawing chiefly upon Heidegger's interpretation of Dasein's way of being in the world. The very structure of Being-in has led us to distance ourselves somewhat from Heidegger's account by viewing the basic existentiale as thrownness, projecting and absorption, and identifying the necessity for a more fundamental existentiale, the Quest. This avoids the problems associated with the dual and problematic account of Heidegger's notion of falling. It additionally explains the possibility and nature of the motive to flee into fallenness i.e. inauthenticity, as we saw through a detailed interpretation of Sartre's analysis of bad faith.

The position of the Quest in the existential analysis of Dasein is however unclear. In the next chapter, we shall show how this existentiale unifies Dasein's ontological structure and provides the key to the possibility of Dasein's authenticity.
CHAPTER V

The pursuit of authenticity

Introduction

The focus of this chapter is authenticity. If inauthenticity derives its importance from its being a widespread way of being, authenticity in turn is crucial as it is a way of being in which Dasein understands what it is to be Dasein. The investigation of the previous and current chapters is premised upon the idea that an understanding of what it is to be human can provide guidance in filling in the indeterminacy of an ethics of duty, as well as setting a direction for an investigation into the foundation of ethics. In this chapter, we shall see how viewing the choice of an authentic mode of existence as an ethical requirement enables us to sketch the outline of an answer to the first question.

If authenticity is to play this key rôle, the issue of how Dasein can become authentic is crucial. I approach this problem by linking in the existential analyses carried out in chapter IV with Heidegger and Sartre's views on this topic. A first step consists in completing the picture Heidegger gives of authenticity and analysing it critically. This will, in particular, enable us to identify more precisely the rôle of the fundamental structure of the Quest. It will also reveal the basic attributes of an authentic self-interpretation. I then examine the cogency of this notion and whether it represents a real life-option. The chapter concludes by indicating how this could help with the indeterminacy problem.

1. Authenticity and wholeness

In the previous chapter, we confined our exploration of Heidegger's notion of authenticity to that which could be exhibited by analysing everyday Dasein. This provided a grasp of this notion sufficient to explore Dasein's inclination to move away from authenticity. When authentic Dasein is the focus, however, an ontological understanding that is deeper than that obtained by interpreting Dasein
Isn't humble to sentiment to accept and good faith as a project in what it is not, is not what it is.
as Being-in is required. This is because that which is to be examined is Dasein insofar as it can interpret itself as Dasein. Dasein has been introduced as that which is self-interpreting. What we now need to establish is whether/how it can interpret itself in a way which brings out its character of Dasein, i.e. that which we have analysed in the previous chapter. If it interprets itself in this way, it can be said to have made its own that which constitutes it as Dasein. That is why this way of being is described as authentic or 'eigentlich', where 'eigen' means 'own'.

What does Dasein need to be able to interpret itself thus? In the last chapter, we examined Dasein's strategy of inauthenticity in which it interprets itself as having the solidity of the Sartrean in-itself. We saw that the key to the success of such an interpretation was the integration of a background of understanding and a project with a clear focal point. The background was that of the spatial understanding of time and the project that of the in-itself life which is a process of identification with an in-itself. If we are to have an authentic interpretation, we need an interpretative background against which we can rather bring Dasein as it is into view. This requires that we find a way of grasping Dasein as a whole against a background involving an understanding of time adequate to the phenomena.

_Sartre and sincerity_

Before examining how Heidegger deals with this problem, we note that it does not arise for Sartre. For the latter, authenticity involves using the same standards of truth for all one's conceptualisations of the pre-reflective material from our consciousness. There is therefore no issue of adequate interpretation as such. This, we saw to be a weakness in Sartre's account of bad faith. In the case of authenticity, it would, on the other hand seem to make matters simpler: the normativity of truth is what requires authenticity of us. It would therefore appear to be a matter of coherence of our standards of truth. However, the story is in fact more complex since the effort to be sincere is another form which can be taken on by bad faith (BN, 63). For the belief that the compliance with certain norms of truthfulness defines who I am is a form of the in-itself life project. What appears to be required is to take such norms as imposed, but not do this with the 'spirit of seriousness' (ibid.). But could one not argue, in turn, that this must involve a form of self-deception which is that one 'pretends' not to be serious, while seriousness is surely required if one is to uphold certain standards. Without going further into the details of the problematic notion of sincerity for Sartre, it is clear this leaves us with an apparently very unstable notion of authenticity.
Death & Whistlenen
Heidegger’s conception of authenticity

In division II of Being and Time, Heidegger re-interprets Dasein, but with a different fore-having: it is no longer Dasein with its average understanding of Being. Rather, it is Dasein understood in terms of the notion of wholeness (BT, 233). The problem is that Dasein has been defined in the structure of Care as ‘already-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in-a-world’ (BT, 192). So how can Dasein ever be whole? Heidegger looks to the phenomenon of death to shed light on this problem.

Death is an end, but in death, Dasein is no longer. So it cannot represent a state of wholeness of Dasein. However, to anticipate one's death as one's own possibility is to grasp it as one which is absolutely certain and also one's 'ownmost possibility' (BT, 263). By the latter, Heidegger expresses the sense in which my death belongs entirely to me and, unlike other possibilities which may or may not belong to one's world as a contingent fact, death necessarily is one's possibility, and in it, one's own Being is at issue. In anticipating one's death therefore, one anticipates the 'closest' possibility one has as a certainty. Insofar as it is the closest possibility, it 'discloses also all the possibilities which lie ahead of that possibility', so that the anticipation of death 'includes the possibility of taking the whole of Dasein in advance in an existentiell manner' (BT, 309). In other words, in anticipating this final possibility, Dasein lets all other possibilities which lie before it appear as a whole. And this, Heidegger takes as the wholeness which defines authenticity¹. Let us examine this.

When one considers a person's life, the notion of the wholeness of the person's life might seem anchored in the idea that her death provides a certain rounding-off of it; or indeed that her premature death, on the contrary, robs her of this sought-after wholeness. In either case, this suggests indeed that who the person actually is, can be encapsulated in a view of her life as seeking a completeness to be reached by the time of her death. This is of course not the wholeness Heidegger is interested in, since it is that of a human life viewed externally. It is however related to Heidegger's since it takes death as defining its focal point: externally, it is a focus of (in-)completeness; from the existential point of view of Heidegger's analysis, it is a focus of all Dasein's projections onto its possibilities. The question

¹This move has been criticised by L.A. MacAvoy (1996). She shows how anxious Being-towards-death reveals Dasein as abandoned to its death, but does not reveal the rest of Dasein's thrownness: 'the scope of the disclosure [in Division II] is thus narrower than in Division I' (ibid., p.70). Her solution is therefore to give more importance to the neglected phenomenon of birth, a move which has its roots in a certain strand of feminist philosophy instantiated, e.g., by Held (1989).
closer versus whistening
is whether, in thus moving from the external to the existential perspective, the focus upon death retains its ability to define Dasein's wholeness.

The doubt is the following. From the external point of view, the obvious completedness of Dasein's lifetime is used as a basis for viewing Dasein as having been a potentially complete being, i.e. now, as a matter of fact, either complete or not. This basis is, however, not that upon which individual Dasein considers her life. And indeed, Heidegger does not mean that we should consider our lives as they would be viewed from an external perspective. The basis for considering death as providing the key to completeness can thus only be found in its being the last possibility Dasein has, one which he is certain to have. So that ultimately, it is just the notion of the constant proximity of the end which is to provide the key to its wholeness. But the wholeness of a conversation between two people is not grasped by constantly keeping its termination in view. This will never provide a grasp of that characteristic of the conversation that makes it into a whole. This analogy, although necessarily distant (how can one compare a human life to anything else?), brings out the fact that the thin notion of closure does not obviously provide a sufficient ground for the thick notion of wholeness. Rather, the concept of closure apparently only defines a formal sense of wholeness, not a substantive one. It is necessary, but apparently not sufficient. Heidegger however claims this formal sense identifies the substance of a life's wholeness. Let us examine this move.

**Critical assessment of Heidegger's account**

The first point to emphasise is that, in view of the above, the underlying assumption of Heidegger's move is that there is, for Dasein, no stronger notion of wholeness than that obtained from the thin form sense of closure. For on this assumption, form itself can be used to define substance. This assumption is however not forced upon us by the phenomena.

Let us revisit these. Chapter IV identified the key to authenticity to lie in an adequate understanding of time. But what must be true about human life for such an understanding to be possible? This is a grasp of time which lets our groundlessness appear. Now, assume human life were unlimited in time. A consequence is that, when deciding upon whether to project itself onto any particular possibility, Dasein would always be faced with the question 'Why do it today rather than tomorrow?'. To this, no answer would be available. Further, a spatial understanding of time would thus become adequate insofar as one could postpone any confrontation with one's groundlessness to an indeterminate future.
I don't have proof to become who I am.
Thus, if such an understanding is not adequate, time must be finite and humans mortal. In other words, Dasein's Being-towards-death is a **transcendental condition** for the meaning of authentic time - not just a contingent fact about humans. Consequently, grasping time authentically involves an awareness of death as an inevitable outcome. This so far agrees with Heidegger's conclusions, although from a different perspective.

In chapter IV, we also found that to understand Dasein's inauthenticity, Dasein must be grasped as a Quest for absolute meaning. And anxiety reveals the quasi-paradox of human life that it is such a quest for a meaning which is not there to be found. This can however now be seen to indicate where Dasein's wholeness lies. Indeed, suppose there is an existentiale, X, which defines the wholeness of Dasein. Chapter IV has shown the Quest to underpin that which tempts and leads Dasein away from authenticity, and thus from a grasp of X. What is then the relation of the Quest to X? Clearly the Quest must be constitutive of X. This is because it is an existentiale characterising Dasein's Being-in and so must be constitutive of the whole of Dasein just as Care is, for Heidegger, what is to be unified in the existentiale characterising Dasein as whole. As a consequence, Being-towards-death is not appropriate to characterise Dasein's wholeness.

This leaves us with an unclear rôle for the existentiale of the Quest. Is it just an existentiale constitutive of what it is to be Dasein as a whole, or does it have a more fundamental position in the existential analysis? We shall show that the Quest *defines* the wholeness of Dasein. This means that the structure of the Quest is the fundamental existentiale characterising humanity, i.e. to be a human being is to be an instantiation of it.

This can be achieved, as in BT, by exhibiting how this structure reveals Care as a whole. In BT, this means to reveal Dasein as Being-already-in, Being-amidst and Being-ahead-of-itself. The critique of the structure of falling in chapter IV means that the three modes of Being-in are thrownness, absorption and projecting. The task is therefore to show these are encompassed in a whole defined by the Quest. This will, however, differ from Heidegger's approach to exhibiting the wholeness of Dasein by emphasising that wholeness is only exhibited primordially if the components constituting the whole are shown to be interconnected. That Heidegger does not do this with Being-towards-death, is a further consequence of this structure not being the most primordial one to reveal Dasein's wholeness.

The concept of quest requires first that one understand that there is nothing given to ground the direction which is chosen. In going on a quest, I am setting out to find something but also to find out how to find it. Thus, I may not know what it is.
Wholemen achieved by making certain unity.

1. Project
2. Absorption
3. Transparency
I am looking for, how I will know if I have found it, ... This means that my projection onto possibilities is essentially infused with a lack of ground, and thus with my thrownness.

Conversely, insofar as I am on a quest and find myself groundless, I am constantly engaging in projects which provide me with some meaning. In so doing, my thrownness is expressed and fully realised through my projections.

Finally, the activity which is ungrounded and which brings meaning, can only do so insofar as I am involved in it in the sense of an absorption. Thus the Quest informs activities not explicitly defined by it. Else, it would not properly represent a quest I am engaged in and not deliver meaning to my whole life.

We thus find the notion of quest providing a link which ties projection, absorption and thrownness together. Since the Quest is directed to absolute meaning, these three structural features of Dasein are thereby drawn together into a single whole, whereby Dasein is viewed in its wholeness. As a consequence, we can state that for Dasein to interpret itself authentically, is for it to do so in terms of an instantiation of the Quest.

But, moreover, this analysis of the Quest as defining the whole of Dasein brings out some existential features of authenticity. Authenticity for a particular Dasein is the choice of a self-interpretation as a particular quest towards absolute meaning. First, the relation to that which is absolutely meaningful must involve a recognition that one is a thrownness and therefore that what is absolutely meaningful can by no means be given to me. For if I were to establish that there is some absolute meaning which I can take to define my whole life, this would of course entail that I am not thrown into my present condition, but that I am necessarily the way I am. Hence, if thrownness entails that absolute meaning is not given to me, and if I am to be involved in a quest for it, this quest must not be understood as delivering absolute meaning as an object for my knowledge. It can therefore only be grasped as providing absolute meaning as a task, i.e. the quest is a practical one which is not grounded in any relation of knowledge.

Second, since this meaning is not given, my projection must involve a form of action which is a creation of what is to be viewed as absolutely meaningful. Furthermore, since the wholeness of Dasein unfolds in time, Dasein's projection onto its possibilities must, as a whole, be viewed as an ongoing creation. This entails that, in time, the whole of Dasein's authentic life amounts to a constructive process. The relation to absolute meaning picked out by an authentic way of living my quest is thus a constructive relation.
Learn who you are

1. Originally I am who I am but without the possibility of being & conscious of who I am

2. Objectively, I can never be conscious what I am but without the possibility of being who I am

3. Reflectively, self does not recognize itself in question at not-being itself calls its self in question and does the thing for authentic being self which

4. Requires a movement of return as the realization of the ideal self disclosed reflectively.
Finally, the relation of a particular authentic Dasein to that which is absolutely meaningful must be such that one interprets all one's actions as contributing to one's particular instantiation of the Quest. Therefore, insofar as Being-in-the-world takes the form of an absorption in one's activity, Dasein's absorption must be entirely guided by the particular pursuit of absolute meaning. This can only be achieved by a commitment to this pursuit which fully recognises my freedom in choosing it. It is Kierkegaard who first proposed an in-depth analysis of such a commitment, that of Religiousness B (Kierkegaard, 1968, 555-556).

It is therefore as a constructive committed practical relation to some absolute meaning which is not grounded in knowledge that the choice of an authentic way of life is to be understood. This defines authenticity as an existentiell choice. The question which must now be addressed is whether such a way of life is a real possibility for Dasein. Since we know that inauthenticity is an existentiell option, the following questions arise. They concern the origin of this existentiell choice of directedness to absolute meaning, the specification of its goal of absolute meaning and the nature of the relation itself. We must thus first establish how it is possible for Dasein to tear itself away from inauthenticity. Second, what kind of absolute meaning could thus be the target of this existentiell choice? Third, there is the issue of explaining how such a constructive committed practical relation is possible. Let us examine these questions in turn.

2. The conversion to authenticity

*Heidegger's notion of conscience*

Heidegger gives an existentiell dimension to falling by claiming that, as falling, 'everyday Being-towards-death is a constant fleeing in the face of death' (BT, 254). Similarly, authenticity is fleshed out by the notion of resoluteness and Heidegger introduces the notion of 'the voice of conscience' by presenting it as a 'preparation for the theory of resoluteness and authentic being-self' (MacCann, 98), showing how anxiety can lead to resoluteness in which Dasein is authentic. In resoluteness, Dasein 'brings itself back from the one (...) so that it becomes authentic being its self' (BT, 268). This modification enables Dasein to understand itself as such. This transformation to resoluteness is the Augenblick (moment), a theme borrowed from Kierkegaard's (1967-78, VII, p.12) Oieblik: it is an unconditional commitment defining my world - past and future.
Conscience — summoned to unmask indelicacies.
A being guilty — regret of not having been oneself.

Conscience — the me in the self.
The voice of conscience is what calls inauthentic Dasein to resoluteness. For although, in anxiety, Dasein faces its groundlessness, a further step is required for Dasein to realise its ownmost potentiality for being-self. Here, Heidegger confronts the issue of choice: when Dasein tears itself away from fallenness in the One, it is 'making up for not choosing' (BT, 268). Thus Heidegger claims there was no proper choice when the who of Dasein was the One. Choice for him is about the decision to select for oneself as opposed to following received opinions, i.e. about a decision to be the author of one's actions.

The choice which is discussed here is indeed a fundamental one, which bears some resemblance to Sartre's radical choice which we shall examine further. But in fact, with this notion, Heidegger is tackling what brings one to choose to make the choice - i.e. to choose to be the author of one's actions - an issue Sartre does not deal with. 'In choosing to make this choice, Dasein makes possible, first and foremost, its authentic potentiality-for-Being' (BT, 268). It is this choice which involves the intervention of the call of conscience. This is a voice calling Dasein to realise that it must choose. The call of conscience is meant to 'summon one to Being-guilty' (BT, 287), whereby to 'own up to our guilt' is 'to make our actions our own (...) and thus to exist authentically' (Polt, 1999, p.90).

Critical examination of Heidegger's call of conscience
Although this account succeeds in showing the shortcomings of the everyday interpretation of conscience which result from the error of viewing the call, the guilt, ... as present-at-hand, it fails to show this 'unusual' (Polt, 1999, p. 91) interpretation is appropriate. This is particularly problematic since the everyday experience of conscience is not obviously acquainted with "getting summoned 'to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-guilty'" (BT, 289).

This means that Heidegger is, in a sense, using the notion of conscience as providing an account of how one can escape authenticity by appealing to our common understanding of guilt, while on the other hand claiming he has a more adequate interpretation of these notions, although we will in fact not recognize it from our common experience. He thus appears to be both using and rejecting a common notion. This suggests that he rather requires a new existential structure to provide an account of how Dasein can escape from inauthenticity. Meanwhile, other problems emerge which pertain both to the 'how?' and the 'why?' of the choice of authenticity.

First, how does the call of conscience reveal our inauthenticity? There is indeed a problem in understanding how, within an inauthentic way of being, the call of
Descartes' being called to itself in conscious can be represented as

the reflective aspect of conscience

of anxiety calling in question

built in German 'Schuld'

linked to debt

therefore to what is wanting
conscience can show Dasein that it is being inauthentic, or in Heidegger's words, how is it that we can understand whether we are Dasein in a way which is compatible with our guilt?

Second, there is a related problem. The call of conscience emanates from somewhere; if this somewhere were clearly differentiated from that which it calls, it would make the source of the call into a present-at-hand since it would become an object which can be differentiated by a subject of reflection. This is however explicitly denied by Heidegger who is keen to reject the cogency of appeals to a call from God or a biological instinct as drawing upon the 'dogmatic thesis that what is (...) must be present-at-hand' (BT, 275). The origin of the call must thus not be clearly differentiated from that which is called. 'Dasein is at the same time both the caller and the one to whom the appeal is made' (BT, 277). The difference between caller and called is described by Heidegger as 'the thin wall by which the "they" is separated, as it were, from the uncanniness of its [i.e. Dasein's] Being' (BT, 278). This double rôle of Dasein, as the One and as itself, is however not further explained in BT (Sichère, 2002).

Third, another issue is that Heidegger's account does not provide us with an understanding of why Dasein chooses, at any point(s) in time, to relinquish bad faith. One type of account which could be sought is one which, as we saw in chapter II, sheds light upon the inclinations at work in this choice. This would, in particular, provide an explanation which we could, in Kantian terms, refer to as empirical, insofar as it brings out the empirical inclinations (and, implicitly, the corresponding subjective maxims) accounting for the choice.

Finally, let us note a problem with Heidegger's account as it emerges from the above. This is that his notion of authenticity is chiefly defined negatively, in that it presents Dasein as a nullity and the recognition of this nullity as the key to Dasein's being authentic. But a purely negative form would only tell us that authenticity involves a move away from a way of being, not that towards which one should go. Polt (1999, p. 91) quotes the joke among Heideggerian students: 'I am resolved, only toward what, I don't know'. In fact, Heidegger claims there is also a positive aspect: 'Though the call gives no information, it is not merely critical; it is positive, in that it discloses Dasein's most primordial potentiality-for-Being-guilty' (BT, 288) and further 'when the call is rightly understood, it gives us that which in the existential sense is the "most positive" of all' (BT, 294). But this positivity is still defined in terms of guilt which is itself presented in negative terms. Is this a real positive definition of the existentiell manifestation of authenticity? This last point connects with the next issue we shall be examining.
i.e. that of the target of the relation to absolute meaning. Let us first examine the above three issues.

**The call to authenticity**

Insofar as we saw, in chapter IV, that a deliberate choice is involved in being in bad faith, another deliberate choice is needed to take one out of this state. This, in turn, requires some form of consciousness which can "tell" one that one is not being authentic. Because this consciousness must not be caught up in the state of inauthenticity, it has to be beyond the reach of any conceptual framework. This means it must be a pre-reflective consciousness, a key notion in Sartre's ontology. Such a notion is not, moreover, far removed from the spirit of Heidegger's notion of conscience: first, because Heidegger, in his etymological awareness, cannot ignore the fact that conscience and consciousness have a common origin (as testified by the French 'conscience'), and second, since the notion of conscience as that from which one can hide nothing is in keeping with the idea of the immediacy of a pre-reflective level of consciousness.

In this immediacy of pre-reflective consciousness (which is not knowledge), I am directly aware of that which is presented to me. In particular, the kind of experience of breakdown in which the given for-the-sake-of-which is relinquished to deal with another problem (see chapter IV and the example of the waiter and the earthquake), is one which makes the world visible so that its limits appear to me. In inauthenticity, I shall interpret the pre-reflective material so as to avoid anxiety. But I have, nevertheless, been exposed to the whole of the evidence of what an authentic interpretation would grasp as revealing of anxiety. This is an experience, although not that of anguish: in it, the limits of the world are visible to me, but not as such, since I have not conceptualised them. This experience which contains the raw material for anxiety, I shall refer to as the experience of the 'unheimliche', the not-being-at-home or the uncanny (BT, 188, footnote). The uncanniness of my pre-reflective awareness is therefore, in inauthenticity, "disguised" in a form which prevents it from bringing up anxiety. But, it is available as raw material for other possible (e.g. authentic) interpretations: this is how my conscience can speak to me.

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2Note that anguish is an extreme form of the experience of the uncanny, since it is not only limits of my world which are exposed, but the totality of my world.
self awareness

2. Intermediate - awareness

2. Intermediate (Intermediate) self knowledge

3. Ultimate - reflection

Mediary ultimate

Absolute immediate
The source of the call

The examination of the call of conscience must now address the issue of the origin of the call. For that, we have to seek further clarification about the Heideggerian view that Dasein is the caller although it is lost in the inauthenticity of the One. Heidegger seems to imply that 'for the most part, [Dasein's] (...) mood is such that its thrownness gets closed off' (BT, 276). He does not provide any further explanations, but this suggests that, ontically, Dasein has moments of lucidity about the 'depths of its uncanniness' (BT, 276), while it is mostly absorbed in ways of being defined by the One. A solution which would appeal to the real nature of Dasein underpinning its way of being in the world is clearly excluded on the grounds that Dasein is a nullity. Therefore some ability to go beyond (Heidegger describes the caller as being also 'beyond me', BT, 275) one's current state of mind is required, i.e. an ability to distance oneself while remaining oneself. This seems to require a point of view upon the pre-reflective material, a point of view which is always available. A condition for the existence of such a point of view is that there be an 'I' (e.g. Wittgenstein, 1922, 5.632/3).

This is the case although Sartre is at pains to explain that such an 'I' cannot be grasped since the subject is always beyond itself. But the account of the for-itself as an accident encountered within the fabric of the in-itself, at least defines a place for the subject. This is outside the in-itself, whereas Heidegger's Dasein is spread out in its world.

Sartre's anchoring in a traditional subject-object metaphysics, rooted in particular in Kant and post-Kantian philosophy provides us with the space for an 'I'. This can be filled, e.g., by considering one source of the dual notion of an 'I' and pre-reflective consciousness, namely Fichte's intellectual intuition. Fichte characterises it as 'the immediate consciousness that I act and of what I do when I act' (Fichte, 1994, 463(217)). He moreover claims that: 'without self-consciousness there is no consciousness whatsoever' (ibid., 466(219)). An important distinction from the pre-reflective notion is that this is an intellectual, and therefore conceptual unity. However, the Fichtean insight is crucial since it places a practical self-consciousness at the centre of philosophy. We shall therefore simply conclude that materials are available for locating the call of conscience in this way.

Thus, although in the midst of an inauthentic way of being, pre-reflective consciousness is beyond any objectifying consciousness which governs an immersion into inauthenticity through interpretation, and thus, as such, is not caught up in this inauthenticity. It is by means of the 'I' which is thus conscious, that the call of conscience is heard.
The inclination to opt out of inauthenticity

As we saw in chapter IV, insofar as inauthenticity requires an understanding of time that is strengthened by the inauthentic project of bad faith it sustains, it seems that it is not easy to account for how, within this framework of understanding, a subject may be inclined to opt for authenticity. However, as pointed out in the last chapter, there are breakdowns in experiences of bad faith corresponding to the need for the subject to make a decision going beyond the scope of a particular for-the-sake-of-which. We thus saw the case of the waiter and the earthquake. But there is also an important type of breakdown within such a project which is simply that of the attainment of a goal, beyond which the issue of setting new tasks will emerge. We need an account for all types of breakdown.

The general feature of breakdowns is that they have not been forecast so that the response to the new situation cannot smoothly be integrated within the previous activity. Consequently, it cannot easily be interpreted as part of the coming-to-itself of an in-itself. Rather, an external "source of control" is evident and revealed through the lack of predictability inherent to the temporal dimension of the breakdown. Such lack of predictability means that time is not actually as space, i.e. such that we control whether we go to a certain point in it, but rather forces events upon us which we must respond to. This evidence which is available to the subject in pre-reflective consciousness, thus accounts for the inclination to abandon the spatial interpretation of time that sustains the interpretation in bad faith. This inclination can of course be resisted, since the subject can, in bad faith, indefinitely postpone the examination of the nature of any evidence. But the inclination is there and will grow just as the solidity of the interpretative structure of bad faith increases.

This explanation may appear far-fetched, particularly in the case of the type of breakdown involving the attainment of a goal for instance. For here, surely, it will be said, it is the dissatisfaction with the achieved aim of one's desire, which allows an inclination to abandon bad faith to develop. Sartre in particular (BN, 87) identifies the ambiguity of the nature of desire underpinning this. Although I desire to drink when I am thirsty, drinking does not actually satisfy me, because part of my desire is directed at desiring itself - hence the lack of satisfaction. Sartre's powerful analysis is based upon understanding human existence as a lack.

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3However, it is a contingent matter whether the breakdown is so extensive that it forces such an examination upon the subject, e.g. as in the case of an earthquake destroying our waiter's café.
This understanding is derived from the nature of the for-itself as the source of negation (chapter IV). Such an interpretation is actually quite close to one in terms of an understanding of Dasein as a Quest\(^4\). However, it does not shed light upon how the failure of desire to satisfy, could, of itself, lead to an inclination to eschew bad faith since further desiring feeds upon this desire. On the contrary, I propose to view the lack of satisfaction that accompanies the realisation of an aim as the consequence of the absence of the sense that the achievement of this goal is one's own. For this success is only made possible by certain contingent circumstances which the subject has no control over. And this, in turn, is a feature of the temporal dimension insofar as it is the lack of predictability of this achievement which accounts for the sense of a lack of control. Indeed, such a lack of control implies that it is difficult to interpret the experience of this achievement as belonging to a project of in-itself life (chapter IV). Rather, there is an otherness that escapes one in these situations, as in all cases of breakdown. This otherness is characteristic of some in-itself we are alienated from. Its existence is revealed to us through time in a way indicating the inadequacy of the spatial understanding of time. This thus corroborates the substance of our explanation of the move away from inauthenticity.

The alienation thus revealed, points at more than the mere inadequacy of the structure of the interpretation in bad faith. To see this, consider how things would be were the subject, \textit{per impossibile}, truly part of the realm of the in-itself. It would happily let the all-encompassing laws of nature determine its becoming, safe in the notion that it has a place assigned by them in the world. The alienation felt is therefore only possible if Dasein seeks a meaning not given to it. This means that it reveals Dasein's nature as a quest for meaning that is not satisfied by any determination of this nature. Therefore, the inclination to relinquish bad faith is also one to adopt an authentic interpretation of what it is to be Dasein, i.e. to recognise oneself as being a Quest\(^5\).

Let us note that, when grasping the insufficiency of this understanding of time, one is in effect reflecting upon one's life and the place taken by such breakdowns in it. This means that one has to reflect beyond the specific purposes one pursues.

\(^4\)The crucial difference is that for Sartre, the for-itself is a lacking which seeks that which is lacked and which is value, while the Quest is towards an absolute meaning which is not possessed by the in-itself any more than by the for-itself. It is therefore not just a ground which is sought by a groundless being, but an understanding of this ground as being an absolutely meaningful one.

\(^5\)We have not shown here why this quest is indeed directed to absolute meaning. This could be achieved by pointing to the dissatisfaction derived from any relative meaning, a dissatisfaction related to that discussed above when examining desire.
I share his view.

One can never call
out this other must be experienced
by self.
In terms of the levels of principles examined in Part I, this reflection is one which will lead to considering a third-order level, i.e. a level higher than that of the principles of implementation of one's purposes. It is at this level that the decision to be authentic is located and that the general organisation of one's life as a constructive commitment to absolute meaning is to be understood.

A reservation
Finally, we must concede that, even though we have exhibited the way in which an inclination to shun inauthenticity develops with time, the motivational situation is one in which this contends with the inclination to remain protected from anxiety within bad faith. How it is that the subject actually chooses to commit himself to authenticity is not fully elucidated. In Kantian terms, although an empirical account has been given⁶, there remains the issue of understanding the commitment in terms of the incorporation of an incentive into a principle of action - and thus provide an intelligible account (see chapter VII).

Correlatively, we also have not fully shed light upon the origin of the call - for why does the I actually take this new perspective upon the materials of his pre-reflective consciousness, which reveals the inadequacy of his interpretation? This is a question about the explanation of deliberative action, as discussed in chapter II. What remains to be explained is certainly part of what Heidegger's call of conscience is about. But Heidegger gives it a name, without further explaining how it comes about. Paul Ricoeur speculates about this call and concludes that its source has to lie in some notion of the Other. Mulhall identifies this as another Dasein (Mulhall, 1996, p.133). Ricoeur on the other hand suggests that further elucidation is not possible as 'this is where philosophical discourse comes to an end' (Ricoeur, 1990, p.409). It is however an issue which deserves further analysis (Sichère, 2002) although this would lie beyond the scope of this thesis⁷.

3. The goal of authentic ways of being
The analyses of the previous section leave us with the issue flagged up above, of what authentic direction to give Dasein extracting itself from inauthenticity. This

⁶Strictly speaking, we have an empirical account of the departure from inauthenticity, not of the actual adoption of authentic ways. However, becoming authentic is a third-order transformation, so that no extra empirical story is required.

⁷Let us note that we shall establish a central rôle for intersubjectivity in becoming authentic in chapter VIII. Other understandings of the call could be derived from spirituality (e.g. Verhack, 2002).
issue was identified as a problem with Heidegger's notion of the call of conscience. This problem is also relevant for the notion of authenticity this chapter has been developing. For when Dasein opts for authenticity, this is because light has been shed upon the inadequacy of the interpretative structure characteristic of the project of bad faith and the need to recognise that Dasein is a Quest. If Dasein is to choose an authentic way of life, it must live in a way which reveals an understanding of this nature as Quest, and therefore view its life as the pursuit of some absolute meaning. This requires a positive direction.

To tackle this issue, we shall first examine what the existential phenomenologies of Sartre and Heidegger can provide in terms of a positive direction. This will lead us to consider in what sense the idea of absolute meaning can provide such a direction. In other words, we shall ask what kind of absolute meaning this is if it is to provide a direction for authentic ways of being. Finally, we must examine whether such a directedness towards a notion of absolute meaning is indeed a coherent notion.

The problem of a positive direction in Sartre and Heidegger's phenomenologies

Although he extensively examines the project of bad faith, it does not appear that Sartre has much to present in the form of a positive notion of authenticity. To understand why, we shall briefly examine his notion of value. In BN, value is characterised by a dual nature, as both being unconditionally and not being (BN, 92), which J. Simont (1992, p.180) describes as a 'stumbling block in the elucidation of value'. Indeed, if value is to be considered as being-in-itself, then we are led to the inauthenticity of the attempt to identify a for-itself (the agent) with an in-itself (the lacked, i.e. the value), i.e. of making the lacked into the lacking and thus the achievable goal of agency. On the other hand, Sartre argues that if it is not endowed with such being, then it will collapse for lack of being. This ontological dilemma thus accounts for the problem with any form of Sartrean ethics (Sartre, 1983): there is on the one hand 'a total contingency of being-for-value', since it is not an in-itself and thus not grounded, and on the other hand 'a free and absolute necessity' (BN, 94) since it is the lacked with respect to being-for-itself, and thus a necessary feature of the for-itself.

Let us now look at whether a positive direction can be gleaned from Heidegger's BT. Heidegger presents authenticity as defining a new world in that the disclosure of Dasein is different when Dasein is being 'resolute' (BT, 297), i.e. when Dasein understands itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. Importantly, Heidegger
Absolute meaning must be linked to a notion of self. 
Absolute self.
claims that the "world" does not become another (BT, 298). Thus Dreyfus (1995, p.157): 'Even when Dasein becomes authentic, it does not arrive at totally new ways of manifesting its self-interpretation. It must take over the average for-the-sake-of-whichs one has in one's culture just like everyone else. It just takes them over differently'. This would mean that the world in the ontical-existentiell sense remains the same. But what we are not told is why certain ontical-existentiell possibilities are chosen rather than others?

A Heideggerian answer to this will be that it is an ontical question and thus not ontologically relevant. Apart from generic problems with such a response (Tugendhat, 2001), we also note that insofar as resoluteness is all about how the world is disclosed to Dasein, one is actually looking into an ontical problematic because one is dealing with existentiell possibilities. Thus, one can hardly separate the examination of how Dasein projects itself upon given possibilities from that of why Dasein does so. To take an example, suppose a particular Dasein starts a career in the world of fashion because this is a world in which it feels it has certain talents which could be used for some purpose. Here, the situation vis-à-vis authenticity is quite different from that of Dasein who seeks to make itself at home in a way of being and finds the world of fashion appropriate to this purpose. The first may be authentic, the second probably not (depending on the details of Dasein's attitude). But to recognise that the question 'why?' is relevant to the issue of authenticity, is to introduce the notion of deliberation and related ethical considerations as to the value of certain types of possibilities, which are precisely issues Heidegger avoids.

**Absolute meaning as providing a positive direction**

We have presented authentic existentiell possibilities as involving a constructive and committed relation to an absolute meaning. However, the latter cannot be explicitly fully disclosed since it is not knowable, as we saw above. Additionally, the commitment requirement suggests that it betokens a strong emotional attachment. What is the nature of the absolute meaning thus characterised?

What is required to make further progress here is to recall that, since we are dealing with the authentic way of life, the absolute meaning in question must be revealing of Dasein. Additionally, if a committed relation is required, this meaning has to include that which forms Dasein's self-interpretation: indeed, I can only be committed to that to which I can identify myself in some sense.

The last point indicates that the absolute meaning in question must feature a rôle for a notion of self which I understand through an interpretation of who I am, an
Absolute meaning to oneself?

Become who you are!!

1. Dynamic Heidegger
2. Genetic MacCann
3. Proven Whitehead
interpretation drawing upon my past, present and future. Since this self partakes of absolute meaning, we shall refer to it as the absolute self. However, for such a notion to be revealing of what it is to be Dasein, it is important that it should not be a set of attributes of who one wants to be. For that would be to ignore the fact that Dasein is not essentially in any particular way, but rather is towards something (absolute meaning) in a particular way. This would seem to lead to a vicious circle, since that towards which the quest is oriented is defined by the nature of the orientation. Let us examine the apparent paradox.

First, let us observe that by thus understanding the absolute meaning in question, we eliminate any misunderstanding of the Quest as a movement towards something which would be focussed upon the aim to the detriment of the means of achieving it. Since Dasein is essentially temporal, the way itself is crucial here. This is revealing of the nature of the authentic commitment.

Second, this important connection does not, however, capture the whole of what is to be understood as absolutely meaningful. For Dasein's temporality is directed, as disclosed in the fact that the Quest is directed to absolute meaning. This reveals the constructive nature of authenticity.

The first point illustrates the fact that authenticity is all about becoming, while the second stresses that one is to become something. From the committed nature of the relation to absolute meaning, we know that this something has to feature a notion of one's self, and from its constructive nature, that this is not an antecedently given notion, but rather one's self insofar as one is thus involved in becoming it. These constraints can thus be captured in the formula:

**Become who you interpret yourself to be absolutely in so becoming.**

This may not have removed the appearance of paradox. However, the two notions of becoming in this sentence should be understood as having different, albeit connected, rôles. Let us explain this in the light of our understanding of agency. The absolute self is defined in terms of certain ways of acting. However, as shown in chapter II, acting is always also developing inclinations and this means to transform what we defined as the agent-self. This entails that acting is becoming for this agent-self. Therefore, this absolute self is defined in terms of a way of becoming. This accounts for the second instance of 'becoming' in the formula, one which is essentially passive. That the formula has an imperative form means that it requires the agent to make a decision, namely that of becoming such a self which is chosen through his self-interpretation. This is the first instance of 'becoming' in the formula, an essentially active notion here, which is also found in Heidegger's slogan 'Become what you are' (BT, 186) and has a long history (Couzens-Hoy,
This becoming cannot, however, be a single decision in time, but must correspond to a higher-order act. And indeed, as we saw above, the decision to be authentic is a third-order one which presides over specific purposes and related principles of action which will be implemented through the agent-self's inclinations, and are thus the process of becoming in the passive sense - hence the link between the two notions of becoming. This means that the formula enjoins one to take charge of one's process of becoming. This can now be seen as the way of being a Quest which exhibits an understanding of this nature as Quest.

The constraints upon this authentic way of being bear upon the nature of the self-interpretation. They have been flagged in chapter IV: the interpretation must avoid the temptation of the spatial understanding of time which supports bad faith. On the contrary, it must grasp the material to be interpreted, namely Dasein's past, present and future, as a Quest. Given this core stipulation, there is the further practical issue of the content of a notion of absolute self. Drawing out the practical consequences from this core stipulation is an issue that will be examined after revisiting the grounds for this requirement in chapter VII.

4. Authenticity as a real possibility

We must next ask whether that which has been identified as the authentic way of being is indeed a real possibility for Dasein. So far, we have shown that it is possible for Dasein to make the choice of relinquishing an inauthentic way of being and that one can stipulate what direction the authentic path should take. The issue of whether this path can indeed be followed by Dasein has however not been dealt with: it has been presented as a mere theoretical possibility. The question of its being a real possibility remains open. How does one show that an existentiell possibility is real? By exhibiting the way of life in which this existentiell choice is made. This question subdivides into two more specific ones: first, is the choice to be authentic a real possibility for an inauthentic Dasein? second, is being authentic a sustainable way of being? The first question in turn raises the issues of the nature of and motivation for the choice.

A non-explicit or a radical choice?

Heidegger characterises the choice to be authentic through Dasein's resoluteness. The nature of the choice by which Dasein becomes resolute is not one in which Dasein can 'get clear about its life so as to make an explicit total choice' (Dreyfus,
This follows, for instance from Heidegger's analysis of understanding: in projecting, Dasein is its possibilities; it does not explicitly grasp its for-the-sake-of-which's. Indeed, if it did, so the argument runs, there would be no difference 'between that which we choose and that on the basis of which we choose' (Dreyfus, 1995, p.189). That is because if everything were up for choice, since a proper choice always draws upon a background in which other choices are already made, we would have an infinite regress. There therefore are aspects of our purposes that are not explicitly grasped, insofar as they structure the background to that which is explicit.

The Sartrean notion of a radical choice is important because it brings out the rôle of freedom neglected by Heidegger. Sartre gives the famous example of a young man in occupied France having to choose between looking after his ailing grandmother or join the French Resistance. This dilemma has to be solved, for Sartre, by making what he calls a choice which is radical in that it involves opting for a certain set of values. And Sartre also wants it to be radical in the sense that it is an act of original creation by the free agent in which his freedom consists in being able to make a decision from scratch: it is therefore not a judgment as to what would be preferable given other considerations.

For the notion of authenticity we are proposing, it is essential that the choice made by the subject be a free one, but also that it identify a notion of absolute self based upon its past, present, as well as future. This entails that any instantiation of the third-order choice, i.e. any choice of a second-order principle of action, must not be totally explicit. However, since that which is in the background for this choice can be the object of the choice of another second-order principle, nothing is excluded from the scope of the third-order choice.

The problem of motivation

The absolute self is something one obviously cannot relate to as part of one's world, since one is a groundless Dasein. On the other hand, if a relation to an absolute self is to be possible, some motivation must be found to account for the I's committing itself to a constructive relation to it.

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8Dreyfus, is in particular keen to show the difference between the Heideggerian notion of choice and the Kierkegaardian notion of lucid choice in the ethical sphere (Dreyfus, 1995, p.317): the Heideggerian choice of individuality is not a fully cognitive ethical choice.

9For Sartre, we cannot avoid choosing. To pretend one is not choosing is to be in bad faith. The choices made by an individual can in fact be seen as part of a fundamental project which forms a sort of autobiography of that individual. Our proposed notion of construction of an individuation of the absolute self can then be understood as involving a steering of this fundamental project towards an absolute.
Actualisation = Realisation + an Idea
Can this provide motivation without a question of the being of that very
permanence being which one is.
Heidegger talks of resoluteness (BT, 270) to describe the choice to be authentic, but issues of the grounds for such choices do not arise in his ontological analysis. This is because he does not clearly distinguish an agent from the circumstances in which he is acting. Consequently, Heidegger does not have to address the issue of motivation. Having exhibited the necessity of considering the rôle of an 'I' however, we do have to deal with this question. For this 'I' defines a perspective upon the possible choices, so that for us, the issue of a ground arises.

Sartre, stands in a sense at the opposite end of the spectrum of attitudes to choice from Heidegger in that the agent is able to detach himself completely from his background\(^{10}\) to choose one or the other option. This notion of radical choice leaves the issue of motivation untouched however, insofar as identifying a motivation would amount, for Sartre, to destroying the radical nature of the choice. Indeed, that which constitutes the motivation is, together with all other options, up for evaluation in this all encompassing notion of choice. Hence, Sartre also has no further question to answer on the issue of motivation.

That these authors need give no further account of the motivation to be authentic is consistent with the nature of their philosophical enterprises. We might criticise Heidegger for not giving a greater place to deliberation in his phenomenological analyses (Tugendhat, 2001), and question Sartre's use of a barely intelligible notion of choice (Taylor, 1982), but our purpose is not exegesis. Rather, the motivational issue concomitant with the proposed notion of authenticity is outstanding. We shall draw upon Sartre and Heidegger's analyses to address it.

What is needed is to introduce the concept of the actualisation of a relation to an absolute meaning as a possible motive. This may appear rather removed from what one usually understands by motivation, but I would contend it is in fact of a nature continuous with any motivation. Indeed, whenever one is motivated to carry out an action, one is in effect in the business of actualising what is so far only a representation in the mind. The motivation is that which takes one from the potentiality to the reality of a certain state of affairs that it is in our power to bring about. The difference here is that insofar as Dasein is inauthentic, it has no representation of the potential of a relation to absolute meaning. In that sense, Dasein is 'blind'. But, it can be brought to understand formally the potentiality it has. All that the motivation will then consist in is a blind leap towards this absolute

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\(^{10}\)This is true of Sartre's view at the time of writing BN, but not of his later emphasis upon social conditioning restricting the range of choice (Sartre, 1976).
meaning which is only grasped formally. The power of the motivation is simply the power of that which is posited as absolute over any merely relatively meaningful options. It is the most powerful motivation that can exist; we shall refer to such a motivation as motivation in faith. At the core of this motivation lies a cognitive element, namely the belief that there is absolute meaning and that this takes on a certain form instantiated in a type of action for instance. However, the term 'faith' is used to indicate the motivational force and the lack of grounding characterising the belief.

We note that this rôle of faith fits in with the Sartrean idea that authenticity involves good faith as opposed to bad faith. But on the issue of good faith, Sartre has little to say: 'This which I define as good faith is what Hegel would call the immediate. It is simple faith' (BN, 69). In particular, Sartre does not therefore investigate the motivational issue which is crucial to my notion of faith.

The notion of faith we have introduced to account for the motivation to become authentic, has the advantage of also explaining the possibility of remaining in a state of authenticity. The force of the motivation of faith is such that it presents an absolute meaning as overriding in a sense which differs from the way in which an inclination is presented as overriding in a particular situation. The former must necessarily be independent of particular circumstances, and among them, temporal location, for faith involves a commitment to its object. The consequence is that the leap of faith towards authenticity is one that ensures the perdurance of this state through the commitment.

Again, we note that this is akin to Sartre's notion of the commitment which he sees as the only way of properly relating to our freedom. That such a commitment is required, however, is not demonstrated in BN. This is arguably a result of the exhaustive partition of being into the in- and for-itself. Beyond and between them, there is but nothingness. The commitment then appears as the only alternative to Camus's absurdity.

This notion of commitment, finally, is not an additional requirement, since we have seen that authentic Dasein is engaged in a constructive committed relation to an absolute meaning. As such, it is therefore a feature of the primordial interpretation of what it is to be authentically human, which is now viewed as an essential aspect of the motive of faith.

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11The notion of faith is analysed in greater detail in chapter VII.
What notion of faith?

By appealing to such a notion of faith as motive, we are not opposing it to rational forms of decision-making. The situation is rather that, given the inclination to abandon inauthenticity has made its presence felt through experiences of breakdowns of the interpretative structure of bad faith, what is required is that the subject actively embrace an authentic way of life. This is a further step which, if not taken, amounts to a delaying/dithering which itself is a form of bad faith. To take this step requires a full commitment whose object is beyond any possible experience. This could be seen as requiring something like Kant’s notion of rational faith. This would certainly agree with the constructive nature of authenticity. The comparison is apt insofar as the notion of a quest for absolute meaning implies that human reason seeks the unconditioned.

However, there are three essential differences. The first concerns the fact that the unconditioned which is aimed at in authenticity, involves an interpretation of the absolute self. The subject has to choose this path. This is no radical choice, but one involving self-interpretation and therefore constrained in ways which will be specified later. However, it is not a process which can receive any kind of confirmation, for the very reason that Dasein is groundless. Therefore it requires an unsupported belief. This is the first feature of our proposed notion of faith.

Secondly, it is freely that Dasein must opt for the absolute which it posits. And although pointers are there, it is still up to it to make the decision, one which must truly involve the whole of his being. The only possible source of motivation is therefore the belief in absolute meaning itself. Thus, the belief involved in the positing of some absolute meaning operates as a motive, which is the second feature of our proposed notion of faith.

Thirdly, the act of faith is directed to absolute meaning which is not only unknown, but unknowable. In that sense, we are not just making a move which commits us, but this move is a leap, since its target is wholly different from what we are acquainted with. This is the Kierkegaardian sense of the leap, albeit without the appending notion of paradox (Kierkegaard, 1968, 63-T25).12

12Many commentators have emphasised the fact that the Kierkegaardian leap cannot, on a proper reading of Kierkegaard’s statements on the issue (Kierkegaard, 1968, p.91) be interpreted as an act of the will on a par with the kind of volitionist willing of an autonomous will (Jackson, 1998, p.237; Ferreira, 1998, p.227). It is better understood as involving a shift in perspective (Ferreira, 1998, p.227). But this is precisely what the distinction of levels allows us to formalise. A given perspective on the world is defined by a set of second-order principles representing policies of action, and therefore a third-order principle determining them. Thus (CI) defines the disengaged universalist perspective of a purely rational outlook. To change perspective means to consider a different third-order principle, as in a commitment to a notion of absolute self.
This means that faith is a \textit{groundless motivating belief involving a leap}. What it is a leap towards will be governed by rational rules and constraints connected with the agent's interpretation. What it is a leap from has been abandoned as a consequence of a primordial interpretation of the phenomena. But between the 'from' and the 'to', there is the leap which must be accomplished by the subject. Although this bears some resemblance to the notion of radical choice, it is different in that the choices which characterise the authentic way of life involve \textit{interpretations} of who I am. This reflects the non-explicitness emphasised by Heidegger. Because of our freedom, all is ultimately open to revision, but not within one choice. This might seem to imply that what we have amounts to a radical choice at a higher-order level. However, the commitment inherent to the leap is very different from that which characterises the total freedom of radical choice. It is this which gives faith its particular character of providing a motive over time. Finally, by calling such a motive 'faith', we do not claim to have explained it. This leads back to the point at which we left the discussion of the call of conscience earlier in the chapter, namely to the limit of non-speculative philosophical investigation.

\textit{The project of authenticity}

To summarise, authenticity amounts to a project of \textit{choice of one's self}. This is the instantiation of an agent's \textit{constructive commitment to an absolute with a rôle for an absolute self} (hereafter absolute [self]). So, authentic behaviour can be summed up as action guided by the \textit{principle of constructive commitment to a notion of self viewed as absolutely meaningful}:

\begin{align*}
\{CA\}: \text{I ought to understand my action as contributing to my choice of an absolute [self] to which I am constructively committed in faith.}
\end{align*}

The "ought" in this principle is to be understood in the following way: insofar as this principle is to provide guidance towards authenticity for Dasein which seeks to escape a state of inauthenticity, it is an imperative which translates the way in which an understanding of the fundamental structure of Quest can guide action. Indeed, at the first-order level, the subject's actions are represented in terms of maxims or of coping behaviour. Second-order principles specify how to achieve certain purposes. As we saw in chapter II, through habituation, action upon
Is choice of who I am compatible with
H - groundless of self
S - No ground of self?
certain principles becomes engrained\textsuperscript{13}. This corresponds to the development of inclinations characterising the agent and defining a notion of agent-self. As we saw above, it is at the third-order level that the choice of the authentic way is made. For it to be borne out of my becoming, it must be an interpretation of who I am (past, present and future). This choice of a certain idea of who I am (a choice not located in time), will then be implemented by determining aims and corresponding principles of action at the second-order level. These give rise to the immediate development of inclinations defining my agent-self and guiding action at the first-order level. In this way, that which I am related to constructively is an absolutely meaningful self which I aim to become, and therefore am becoming insofar as I act upon the corresponding principles of action. The development of this agent-self is evidence of this process of becoming. Since I am instigating the process, it is indeed a case of my becoming my absolute self as I have interpreted it. The emphasis upon the process is clear since it is the decisions I make through my commitment that lead to the development of my agent-self. However, the whole process amounts to a construction aimed at a notion of absolute self. It represents a self-interpretation that displays a proper grasp of the nature of Dasein as Quest.

Principle \{CA\} would thus appear to provide a basis upon which the further determination of one's ethical choices could proceed. Alone, such a principle cannot lead to the identification of maxims of action, because everything depends upon the nature of the absolutely meaningful choice of self made by the agent. What the principle could provide, is a template for particular principles of further determination. It is a third-order principle that could play the rôle of determining second-order principles to eliminate the indeterminacy of duty in Kant's Ethics. This issue is revisited in chapter VIII: we shall see how \{CA\}, translated into practical form, addresses the indeterminacy problem.

In identifying this notion of faith and principle \{CA\}, we have thus shown what is necessary for the reality of authenticity as a way of life. Whether this is sufficient, is a question which a phenomenological interpretation cannot answer, but that will be addressed in chapter VII.

\textsuperscript{13}The analysis of this and the previous chapter provides strong phenomenological grounds for the picture of agency which was sketched in chapter II.
Conclusion

This chapter has examined the notion of authenticity by taking its cue from Heidegger's conception of the wholeness of Dasein. Heidegger's account has been criticised for having too narrow a focus upon Being-towards-Death to define wholeness. By drawing upon the previous chapter, we showed how to use the Quest for that purpose. This simultaneously brought out the main existentiell characteristics of authenticity as a constructive committed relation to some absolute meaning. This interpretation of authenticity in terms of the Quest has the advantage of being parsimonious in comparison with Heidegger's existential analysis, since that which drives Dasein to adopt inauthentic ways is precisely that which is to be grasped and made Dasein's own in authenticity.

Given a conception of authenticity, the questions of the possibility of escaping from inauthenticity and of the direction into which this is to take Dasein, have to be answered. By drawing upon Heidegger's notion of the **call of conscience**, Sartre's conception of **pre-reflective consciousness** and Kant's notion of 'T', the first question was addressed. The second was dealt with by appealing to a conception of absolute self.

This left us with the problem of explaining how the proposed relation to an absolute self is possible. The examination of these issues led us to the identification of the motivating rôle of constructive committed faith in an absolute [self], and a general third-order principle of further determination of an ethics of duty.

The principle as it stands does not, however, enable us to show how further second-order principles of action could be derived for this task. The issue of understanding how constraints can be obtained from the requirement to be authentic, as we have interpreted it, will be tackled in the final chapter. Before doing that, however, we must address the following issue. We have developed an interpretation of what it is to be human, and the requirement to be authentic is thus internal to this interpretation. Although it is a primordial interpretation, the kind of grounding one requires for an ethical principle is stronger. We shall therefore devote the next two chapters to providing a foundation for ethics and, using some of the concepts developed here as guides, show how we obtain similar results as unconditionally normative within human practice.
Part Three

THE ETHICS OF DUTIFUL FAITH

Three related problematic areas of Kantian Ethics have been brought to light in Part One, namely that of the indeterminacy of dutiful action, of the rôle of inclinations and self in moral motivation, and of the foundation of morality. In Part Two, a path was cleared leading beyond these limitations of Kant's doctrine. The direction was shown by existential phenomenology's investigation into what it is to be a human being. The notion of humanity as a Quest provides the cornerstone for a conception of authentic life. This involves a relation of constructive and committed faith to an absolute featuring a notion of absolute self. As indicated in the introduction to Part Two, this interpretation serves a dual purpose. First, it defines a direction in which to pursue the investigations of Part Three through the definition of guiding concepts. Second, it will provide these investigations with a deeper understanding through the sense of these concepts. More specifically, concepts will be derived in Part Three whose full grasp is aided by the sense of the phenomenological concepts of Part Two.

However, the results of Part Two are not required to ground the analyses of Part Three. One reason, as has already been indicated, is that Part Two is a hermeneutical exercise which does not obviously have the epistemological status required to provide a solid foundation to morality. But there is another reason. The requirement expressed in the form of a third-order principle, [CA], is grounded in the normative force of authenticity. A further question as to why one ought to be authentic looms and has no immediate answer within the interpretative scheme. Consequently, the method adopted here will rather be to start from minimal assumptions in founding morality.

In view of this, we therefore now have to return to where the path set out in Part One left off, i.e. to tackle the original questions raised by Kant's ethics. As indicated in the conclusion to Part One, the foundational task will be addressed first. This will allow for a better understanding of moral motivation, since the
ultimate ground for acting morally will have been identified. As a consequence, it is hoped that more can be said about the relation between moral motivation and the individual's psychology. Also, with a full picture of what motivates moral action, the indeterminacy issue can then be tackled conclusively. This sets out the tasks for the next three chapters.

Finally, an unclarity as to the exact nature of the purpose of the enterprise must be dispelled. For, insofar as we have identified shortcomings in Kant's ethics which it does not have the materials to remedy, that which will be proposed necessarily represents a distinct ethical theory. This is moreover suggested by the theme running through Part One, namely that a wider understanding of the notion of unconditional good is required. If such a new theory is our main aim here, we must also see to it that the proposed theory is shown to be the candidate most suited to represent a development of Kant's ethics. In this way, the shortcomings of Part One are not to be seen as objections to Kant's ethics, but the springboard to a theory which aims to be its direct development.
CHAPTER VI

On the foundation of morality:
1. Purposefully meaningful action

Introduction
Since the purpose of this and the next chapter is foundational, they must seek to achieve broad assent by asking questions commonly encountered by any agent and by using a conceptual framework that is immediately recognisable by her as describing certain basic features of the terms of the questions. This chapter starts by asking the most general type of practical question as to what the agent will do. This will lead to the central questions to be examined, namely ones concerning the reasons, i.e. the justification, for an agent's action.

Such questions only make sense if there already is a notion of normativity in the picture, as Tugendhat recognised1. This is why the concept of purposeful meaning, briefly introduced in chapter II, will be useful. This key notion is given a rigorous presentation in terms of a basic understanding of action. The structure of the chapter then consists in successively examining different possible answers to the question of justification, on the basis of their satisfying the requirement of purposeful meaning. A set of potentially adequate answers is identified and will be taken forward to the next chapter for re-examination.

1. A central concept in human praxis: purposeful meaning
Circumscribing the concept
The notion of purposeful meaning may first be approached by an examination of language2. Let us introduce this notion intuitively and then attempt a precise definition of it from which certain properties will be seen to follow. The purpose

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1 In the 'foundational question, there is already an implicit relation to something normative' (Tugendhat, 1994, p.71, my transl.).
2 In this sense, our enterprise is in agreement with Tugendhat's observation that semantic analysis is a method 'to which there is, as far as I can see, no alternative' (Tugendhat, 1994, p.62, my transl.). Language is however used here to bring out what I prefer to describe as characteristics of agency.
fulfilled by this notion may be understood as circumscribing the nature of the answer which is sought to a question of the type Q: "so what is that to me?", which means "how is this relevant to my ends as I understand them to be mine?". This is an important question because it represents a condition of interest in any other question R about states of affairs: for any such question R which may be put to a person, insofar as he is an agent with his own ends, the question will only be answered if the agent believes an answer to the question Q has been implicitly or explicitly provided. There is a motive to any form of intellectual endeavour towards the formulation of an appropriate answer: this motive may be some standard of politeness which the agent endorses, an acquiescing to forms of social interaction or the value of truth, but it may also be one which pertains more fundamentally to the agent's ends if the question is ethically important for instance. Even so-called disinterested enquiry is motivated by curiosity which seeks to satisfy a need of the enquirer's. Therefore, a belief that there is an answer to Q is a condition of any form of inquiry. The answer may be wrong: I may not, in fact, agree with the standards of politeness, the rules of social interaction or the purpose of the enquiry which I am getting involved in, but not have thought it over correctly. If I have, i.e. if it is true for me, the sense of the answer to Q constitutes its purposeful meaning or p-meaning.

For clarity, we must specify the notions of agent-related truth and sense used here. The notion of truth is that of correctness of the answer Q against some background which is required for the question to make sense to the agent. This background must capture all the agent's ends within their meaningful contexts. This amounts to identifying an agent-self (chapter II). Truth is then characterised by the agent-self's finding the answer correct whatever the circumstances. This means it is based upon coherence of the answer for an agent-self, over time and between physically possible worlds. The notion of sense is to be understood as Wittgenstein in the Tractatus (Wittgenstein, 1922, 4.461) uses it: 'The proposition shows what it says, the tautology and the contradiction that they say nothing'. In other words, an account of how R is relevant to my ends is one which shows this

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3It is important that the ends involved should be mine in a way which I understand; Dr Jekyll does not understand his compulsive Mr Hyde behaviour and therefore Mr Hyde's actions are not purposefully meaningful for Dr Jekyll.
4This represents one sense of the notion of priority of the practical over the theoretical (Bienenstock and Crampe-Casnabet, 2000).
5Variable circumstances ensure that answers in bad faith are excluded from being true (see chapter V).
6The relevance of this quote will appear further with an example of tautologous justification.
relevance. This is the kind of account required because it provides the understanding sought in $Q$.

There is another, more obvious requirement which must be mentioned, namely that, were no language available, there could be no rational enquiry since the questions could not be formulated. The requirement that there be a language is also a requirement on the one or more persons participating in the enquiry, that they should be able to grasp the *linguistic meanings* involved. The requirements of purposeful and linguistic meaning thus complement one another insofar as, for a given enquiry, the further question as to how it relates to a person is to be answered by giving the linguistic meaning of the content of the enquiry and the purposeful meaning of the linguistically interpreted content.

*Definitions*

Extending these ideas to the state of affairs which is a possible object of enquiry, we may therefore define a state of affairs or series thereof, $S$, as having have-p-meaning for someone if the person can understand $S$ in terms of her ends, and the belief that $S$ is relevant to those ends is true. The p-meaning of a state of affairs or series thereof for a person is then naturally defined as the implication it has for this human agent's ends as she understands them.

These definitions lead to understanding a question (or answer) to be p-meaningful if it is about the nature of such a state of affairs (or exhibits such a state of affairs) and an end to be p-meaningful if and only if the pursuit of this end is a state of affairs (or series thereof) which is (or are) p-meaningful.

Finally, we may differentiate positive p-meaning from negative p-meaning which correspond to the implications a state of affairs, or series thereof, have respectively for the furthering or hindering of the agent's ends (as she understands them).

With these definitions, the notion of p-meaning has been specified. Let us simplify matters by focussing upon positive p-meaning. Indeed, if a state or series of states of affairs is negatively p-meaningful, its avoidance by the agent amounts to defining a positively p-meaningful state of affairs or series thereof, so that all p-
meaning is related to positive p-meaning\(^7\). Because of this, we shall use the term p-meaning below to refer to positive p-meaning\(^8\).

*Purposeful meaning and agency*

We shall make two claims about the relation between agency and p-meaning.

**Requirement of p-meaning.**

*A human agent requires that her action should exhibit p-meaning for her.*

Let us show this. It may seem obvious that, insofar as we are beings with ends, since our action is precisely what is involved in carrying out these ends, we should require that our actions make sense in terms of those ends, even if these are not fully grasped by the agent. This view, which assumes the action is deliberative, can indeed be taken as a fundamental feature of our agency.

However, as we first saw in chapter II, much human behaviour is not constituted by actions requiring some form of deliberation, i.e. a representation of an end and the way to achieve it. The individual actions which make up such behaviour are thus not carried out *because* they further the end: they are indeed not voluntary actions, i.e. not "about the achievement of an end", but rather they are "right" in the given circumstances: this belongs to what Heidegger calls comportment (Heidegger, 1982b, p.58) and Merleau-Ponty, in his critique of Husserl, calls motor-intentionality (Merleau-Ponty, 1979, p.139). Nevertheless, the situation which we are in, is partly the result of our deliberate free choices. This gives a teleological priority to the intention (Dreyfus, 2000, p.291) of the voluntary action, but not necessarily any ontological priority as Searle proposes (Searle, 1990, pp. 603-604). The p-meaning of these choices is then conferred upon the resulting situational behaviour. This means that all behaviour can thus be referred to voluntary actions involving some form of deliberation so that the result obtained for the latter carries over to all action.

The second claim considers the case of an agent's choice between two courses of action A and B which have both been found to be p-meaningful when considered in isolation. The question is whether their p-meaningfulness in isolation entails the

\(^7\)This does not mean that the distinction between avoiding to act and acting is overlooked, but rather that it can be accommodated within positive p-meaningfulness.

\(^8\)Having a p-meaningful justification for doing X entails that a motivation to do X exists, since at least one of the agent's ends has been identified as furthered by X. This entails what one could call p-meaning-internalism, which is a variety of reasons internalism, as argued for by Williams (1981, pp.101-113).
p-meaningfulness of the agent’s choice when presented with these options. We can state the following rule.

**Rule of p-meaningful precedence.**

If $A$ and $B$ are courses of action which are p-meaningful in isolation and $B$ is such that, all other things being equal, we have one of the following:

(i) **priority ranking:** it contributes to the advancement of an end which is more important to the agent than that (those) towards which $B$ contributes;

(ii) **quality ranking:** it goes further in contributing to the agent's end(s) than $B$;

(iii) **quantity ranking:** it contributes to a greater proportion of the set of the agent's ends than $B$.

Then $B$ is the only p-meaningful choice for the agent.

These rules are a consequence of the definitions and the requirement above, together with O’Neill’s Principles of Rational Intending (1989) - hereafter, PRI. Indeed, the pursuit of an end implies that, given two courses of action between which there is no prior preference, that which is better able to realise or further the end is preferable. To prefer the other would be to make a choice which, insofar as it is not the better option for that end, actually hinders its advancement, thus contradicting PRI. This establishes (ii). (i) can be derived by considering that the pursuit of an end which has priority should take precedence over the pursuit of another end; this is pretty much a direct consequence of the definition of priority, together with the requirement of p-meaning. Similarly, (iii) can be established by observing that if $B$ contributes to $n+1$ ends and $A$ to some or all of the first $n$ ends, but not to the $(n+1)$-th end, $B$ must be chosen, according to PRI.

Having established the required connections between p-meaning and agency, we may now examine the central topic of this chapter, namely reasons for acting. To start our foundational analysis of reasons for action, one question can uncontroversially be recognised as universally relevant to human action: 'What shall I do?'.
2. Justifying action: why and how?

The agent's problem of choosing what to do could apparently be solved in two different ways: either by directly deciding that any form of action is acceptable; or by first seeking to answer the question "what ought I do?".

To the question "what shall I do?", the first possible answer thus consists in saying there is in fact no problem and that any answer could be given without any further question arising. This may appear to be a solution but in fact what emerges is that, even if anything goes, the problem of what indeed is going to be done remains. An objector may argue that a choice of action based upon the outcome of a random experiment may finally deal with the problem; but it is clear that any appeal to some random selection will require both that the decision be made to resort to a certain type of random selection (e.g. coin tossing), and, more importantly, select a set of alternatives available to be chosen from. So that in effect, two new questions of the type "what shall I do?" have emerged. The repeated choice of this first possibility thus leads to an infinite regress and does not represent a real option.

The second possibility brings us to consider what is required of the agent. Before examining the possible answers to this question, we may already assert that whatever the answer, it will beg the further question "why?" which demands a justification, and moreover, this must be the right sort of justification. Let us examine these two issues.

The need for further justification

That this question "why?" is indeed one which the agent will feel required to provide an answer to, is a consequence of the claim that a human agent requires that her actions exhibit p-meaning for her. Let us show this.

First of all, to satisfy the requirement of p-meaning, an answer to the question "what ought I do?" will have to be provided. This is because this question is obviously p-meaningful in that answering it may provide guidance about furthering some of the agent's ends since it calls for an answer which takes the

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12 This view is put forward by L. Rhinehart (1999) for instance.
13 This is a result that Korsgaard (1996a, pp.163-166) effectively makes use of without proof.
14 The questioning is considered in ideal circumstances so that no issue of not wanting to answer the question because of specific circumstances arises. Should it be objected that such issues are relevant, then an explanation of why they are will lead us to answering the question "why?" indirectly.
15 Note that this argument relies upon the first answer to the string of questions providing some determination of the agent's ends. This tight relation to the ends trickles down to further 'why?' questions in the form of
form of a description of a particular action A or indicates an end E to be pursued. In the first case, the carrying out of action A will be p-meaningful only if it is understood as contributing to at least one of the agent's ends. Let us also call E the end to which A contributes. In both cases, the fact that E is one of the agent's ends must be understood by the agent (for this is one of the requirements of p-meaning as we defined it). What does it mean to understand something as one's end? Minimally, that this defines an aim of one's agency.

But this understanding can be probed further. In particular, the question of the p-meaningfulness of the pursuit of E can be raised. The question about the actual p-meaningfulness of the original answer (i.e. the question 'why?') thus leads to that of whether the pursuit of end E contributes to one of the agent's ends. The agent must be able to answer this question. Else the pursuit of E is not properly understood, and the p-meaningfulness of the answer to the original question only brings out the lack of p-meaningfulness of the end it points to, and thus a lack of justification overall.

An apparent answer to this question of the p-meaningfulness of pursuing E is the trivial one that, insofar as E is one of the agent's ends, the pursuit of E has been shown to be p-meaningful. But, from the consideration of the notion of sense used in defining p-meaning we see that such an answer is not p-meaningful since it is based upon a tautology and thus exhibits no p-meaning. One can also see this is true by observing that, if the state of affairs which is to be shown to be p-meaningful is the pursuit of end E, the agent cannot simultaneously consider that this is given as one of his ends, and that this end is to be probed: the answer can therefore not lie in that which is the problem. On the contrary, what is required is a proper ground to exhibit the p-meaningfulness of the pursuit of E. This can be written symbolically as the requirement that:

requirements of p-meaning for any grounds adduced to support it. The burden of providing p-meaning remains as long as the questioning continues.

For any other type of p-meaningful question, there is a requirement to provide an answer, but this does not stand under any further requirement of p-meaning since one already knows how it relates to the agent's ends. Thus to the question 'how will my taking sick-leave affect my work?', the answer which shows how my absence will delay the achievement of certain aims of mine displays all the required relevance to my ends. Any further question, e.g. as to why this is the case, requires as answer an account of how certain states of affairs are causally related to others and this is not a p-meaningful question, but one of clarification. The burden of providing p-meaning is carried by the first answer.

A consequence of the distinction between the two types of questions is that an 'is' cannot imply an 'ought' since the questions about why one 'ought to do X' require more than facts as answers: they require answers which are either unconditionally p-meaningful or which are followed by further p-meaningful questions which can be answered.
\[(\exists E, F \neq E) \rightarrow M(E,F)\]

where \(M(E,F)\) denotes that the pursuit of end \(E\) contributes to that of end \(F\)\(^{16}\).

There is a possible exception to the lack of sense of justifying \(E\) using \(E\), and this is the special case where \(E\) is an unconditional end. At this stage of the investigation, we do not need to decide how to deal with this particular case for which the tools presented in the next chapter are relevant. Otherwise, the answer to the question 'why?' is, for instance, one which exhibits in what way end \(E\) is related to another end \(E'\) (or other ends). Does this satisfy the requirement of p-meaning? The question as to the p-meaningfulness of the pursuit of \(E'\) can in turn be raised. To this question "why pursue \(E'\)?", the agent has to provide an answer. For otherwise, the understanding of the pursuit of \(E'\) would be insufficient and a lack of p-meaning would have been exhibited.

This argument can moreover be reiterated to show that p-meaning requires that the agent provide an answer to any further question "why?" which may arise\(^{17}\).

What has thus been shown is, in particular, that the view held by Bittner (1989) is not tenable. Bittner objects to Allison's (1986) reconstruction of a Kantian argument\(^{18}\) in the following terms: 'for when people justify their actions, they often do so with reference to their maxims. It is unrealistic to suppose that they always regard their maxims as justifiable in turn. In this way, Allison ascribes to rationality itself a need for "Letzbegründung" - which all may be very Kantian, but is implausible'. But, the claim of implausibility in Bittner's objection does not square with the analysis above. There is a requirement to provide further justification for any reason adduced to explain one's actions\(^{19}\).

We note, finally, that the series of answers to questions of justification of action does not have to lead to the identification of a single unconditional end. Rather, it may lead to a set of ends which is coherent in the sense that they mutually justify one another, which set would then have to be examined for unconditional

\(^{16}\)This requirement does not extend to the case where there is no other end \(F\).

\(^{17}\)The notion of p-meaning introduces a relativity to ends. But, the end is to be found - it is not given - and therefore, this is not a justification relative to an end. This means our enquiry does away with the presumed limits which Tugendhat (1994, p.71) claims are imposed upon foundational enterprises, namely that one can only ground action with respect to an end (or the well-being of the agent).

\(^{18}\)Namely the Reciprocity Thesis; this is an issue which was raised in chapter III and to which we may now return.

\(^{19}\)It is worth noting two points here. (1) Firstly, a policy to systematically dismiss questions of further justification implies a belief that they are not relevant to my ends although they are clearly about them. It therefore implies that my ends are such that they are untouchable by any reflection: here we have a standard form of bad faith which views the agent's action as though set in stone, as though the agent were a Sartrean in-itself, as we saw in chapter IV. (2) Secondly, if no answer is found to a string of questions, the threat of nihilism looms, a nihilism which Nietzsche (1968, p.9) defines as a situation in which 'the highest values devalue themselves. The aim is lacking; "why?" finds no answer'...
justifiability. Thus, if end $E_i$ is justified by appeal to end $E_2$, and the latter by $E_3$, it is not impossible that $E_3$ should be justified by appeal to $E_1$ for instance. For in examining the p-meaning of having an end $E_3$, we saw that we are required to relate it to other ends of ours, but this means to any end but $E_3$. In such a situation, this set of ends has to provide the unconditional justification.

The right sort of justification

The other issue raised about further justification pertains to its nature. It emerges in connection with the last remark in the previous section. There is indeed an objection which could be made in the spirit of an important strain of thought which is broadly Humean (Williams, 1981) and has been mentioned in chapter II. This would claim that there is indeed an end to the string of questions 'why?' insofar as one gets to basic grounds of action to which the agent has an emotional attachment and without which the person would not be a practical agent. And therefore the knowledge of such an end suggests that our examination need not be pursued any further.

Does Williams's claim constitute a self-justificatory - and therefore final - answer to this string of questions about the agent's course of action? Williams's answer has the right form to provide a sufficient explanation for an observer examining the agent's practical choices. But it will only be self-justificatory, and thus unconditional in the sense of p-meaning, if the further p-meaningful question about why these basic emotions determine the agent's action is answered by the same answer and determines an unconditional end. In a way, a self-justification is indeed apparent here: these basic emotions determine the agent's action because basic emotions are basic in the sense that they characterise her existence as a practical agent.

But this does not provide the agent with all the p-meaning required here since we do not have a link between her existence as a practical agent and her particular basic emotions. In other words, there is another p-meaningful question which can be asked here and this is 'Why do these particular basic emotions characterise her practical agency?'. Now to this question, the answer cannot be that basic emotions are basic. It must be something like: 'These emotions are basic to her'. But this leads to other p-meaningful questions such as 'why these?'. Therefore, we have not arrived at a self-justificatory answer in that p-meaning requires that further questioning be pursued: we still do not know in what way these particular basic emotions are related to the agent's ends. The following are possible ways in which these emotions are related to her ends. First, they may have formed them, in
which case, the grounds for accepting these emotions as grounds for the choice of one's ends arises. Second, they may have been at least partly formed by them, so that the choice of one's original ends is thrown open. Third, they may have evolved independently and then the question arises as to why one acts according to them, given one's ends.

In all these cases, and in particular the first one (the most plausible answer) a p-meaningful question remains unanswered. What this means is that, just as one cannot simply provide a fact as answer to the string of questions without further explanation of its p-meaningfulness, the addition of philosophical considerations about the nature of what it is to be a human agent does not provide an answer\(^{20}\). This defines constraints upon the type of strategy which can provide an appropriate justification.

3. A first examination of possible justificatory strategies

Having established the need for the agent to address the question of what he ought to do (hereafter referred to as question \(Q\)), let us examine the possible answers which could be provided. These will be grouped into 5 categories which define 8 types of answers. Each of these will then be scrutinised for p-meaningfulness.

Since action starts with a motive and is directed towards an outcome, and it has its own intrinsic nature while being part of the world and a product of a rational agent, one may distinguish five forms of answers:

A- answers based upon the outcome of the action;
B- answers using the motivation to carry out the action as justification;
C- answers focussing upon the nature of the action;
D- answers which ground the action either a posteriori (i.e. in facts), or a priori;
E- answers which discard the need for a justification.

These are not mutually exclusive categories, but correspond to the possible options which offer themselves as candidates for the form of the justification. By examining each of these, eight possible answers may be distinguished. They are listed below, together with the form of answer they represent:

A: 1. I ought to do X so as to achieve a certain empirical state of affairs B (purpose).
   2. I ought to do X to make me happier.

\(^{20}\)The thrust of the argument in this chapter is rather to use basic considerations about human agency as a way of filtering the possible answers to the question of justification.
3.1 I ought to do X because I feel inclined to do X.

C: 4.1 I ought to do X because it is good to do X.
5. I ought to do X because I value what X represents.

D: 6. I ought to do X and this is not dependent upon the realisation of any particular aim, but rests upon a fact.22

E: 7. There is no reason to do Y.

D: 8. I ought to do X and this is unconditional since it is my duty.

We shall examine each of these answers in turn to see if it satisfies the requirements of p-meaning. This means we shall address the question of the p-meaningfulness of the action, and of any end which is thereby uncovered. In this way, the overlaps and connections between these answers will be exhibited. This will lead us to isolating a set of (possible) justifications which will require further scrutiny in the next chapter.

Case 1: Consequential justification

The answer 'I ought to do X so as to achieve a certain empirical state of affairs B (purpose)' gives rise to a further question as to why state of affairs B ought to be brought about. This then leads to the same set of alternative answers. Always choosing an answer under the heading of case 1 does not enable the choice of action X to be related to our purposes since all that the answers contain are references to empirical facts. This does not therefore provide us with a p-meaningful answer to our original question. Should it be argued that B does not require any further explanation, this means that B is self-evidently related to my purpose as a human-being. This can only mean that B is something that I would, insofar as I am human, wish to achieve - all other things being equal.23 Minimally, this is my survival. More substantially, this is my well-being. This latter notion may be encompassed in the broader one of happiness and this is the next case to be examined. Survival may either be viewed as a necessary condition of other aims examined here, such as happiness, and no more; on the other hand, if

21There may be other types of motivation than inclination, but inclination is the only one which offers itself as a justification.

22We here assume at first, as in ordinary language and for the purpose of this argument, that one can differentiate between fact and value. This distinction is of course much fuzzier than it appears (see, e.g., Putnam, 1990).

23The answer that B is something that I, as a distinct individual, would wish to achieve, would be equivalent to a claim that there are features specific to me explaining my decision. The further question as to why I ought to decide according to them is again a question of the same type as Q, since we have dismissed the claim that such features could provide a final answer.

123
understood as an unconditional requirement, it falls under a case to be examined further. All these putative answers thus eventually reduce to other cases. However, a fundamental objection can be raised to providing a justification which takes the form of case 1. If the achievement of the purpose is indeed the whole justification, then this relies upon the realisation of the state of affairs aimed at. This means that the action could only be p-meaningful conditionally upon this successful outcome. Should the state of affairs not come about, the action taken is in fact not in any way connected to the advancement of any of my purposes.

The problem of the uncertainty of the outcome can be set out as follows:

1. Assume that an agent is doing Y to achieve Z.
2. There is no p-meaning to be found in action Y itself: all meaning it may have is to be found in the possible outcome, Z.
3. As we saw above, Z may or may not, however, follow from the carrying out of action Y. This is a contingent fact.
4. In action, I have to consider myself as free to do what I undertake to do: this is a condition of my action making any sense to me.
5. From (3) and (4), natural contingencies however make me unable to consider myself as the agent of an action which is the achievement of Z through Y.
6. From (5), I may therefore only consider myself as the agent of Y.
7. From (2) and (6) I am the agent of an action which carries no p-meaning.
8. Step (7) however contradicts an essential feature of human agency exhibited above.

This speaks in particular against any form of consequentialism: the intended consequences of an action do not provide sufficient justification for an action.

An immediate objection to this argument would consist in observing that we often - indeed most of the time - act without certainty about the information we use in our action (whether this concerns the future or present/past but inaccessible information). This lack of certainty does not, surely, prevent our action from being

\[\text{Were I not to consider myself as free, I might just as well act randomly, since the processes of deliberation would be irrelevant to my action. This option has been examined above as leading to other questions which in effect reveal a sense of freedom of action (even if only, e.g., a compatibilist one). The necessity of viewing oneself as free in acting is underlined by Kant (GMM, 448).}\]

\[\text{All that is involved in this proof is a reflection upon the way in which events are separated in moral evaluation. If a causal link between empirical states of affairs A and B were to carry approximately 100\% predictability, then the moral evaluation of the cause A would involve a moral evaluation of the effect B, and in some cases be reduced to it (e.g. A=the pulling of a trigger; B=a bullet leaving the gun in the direction it is pointing and thus hitting the victim, so that one will judge the rightness of A in terms of that of B). When the predictability is smaller, the events are morally clearly distinguishable, but then one cannot justify the one through the other. It is this latter case which is assumed here.}\]
p-meaningful? For otherwise, there would be very few p-meaningful actions...

This is correct: in acting p-meaningfully in the empirical world, we operate with a level of risk. But in so doing, we are simply recognising a fact about the world. The problem arises only for the consequentialist who seeks to reduce the choice between 'doing A' and 'doing B' as one between 'achieving C(A)' or 'achieving C(B)'. And the problem then is that the issue of risk is viewed at the wrong level: for the risk now is that there are situations where there is no justification for what one does if the desired consequence does not obtain, and thus there is no satisfactory justification available.

This does not mean that the consequence C(A) may not be adduced as part of a justification for doing A. But the fact that the act is justified cannot rest solely upon the nature of the purported consequences.

This may seem a strange reason for attacking consequentialism, given there are standard objections which could have been used here. However, this argument brings out the sense in which the agent is isolated from the empirical course of affairs, or at least has to view himself thus, both upstream and downstream of her action. Upstream since the agent has to view herself as free to act. Downstream, because of the uncertainty of the outcome. The symmetry is in fact deeper.

For one obvious source of uncertainty is human behaviour, as a result of the agent's freedom or, more precisely, the ability the agent has of implementing that of which he first forms a mental representation, since the lack of access to these representations leads to lack of predictability for an observer. Now justifying one's actions exclusively in terms of their consequences amounts to ignoring this source of uncertainty. Therefore the lack of justification for the consequentialist's action is, in particular, a lack of justification for action that overlooks the self-determinability of human agents.

A consequentialist who would wish to resist this description of the choice would endow A with a value not reducible to the consequence C(A). This is however incompatible with the definition of consequentialism.

In other words, the goodness of an act does not derive from that of its consequences. In fact, goodness is here presented as primarily applying to acts. The thesis that the goodness of states of affairs is only derivative could be defended, but this is not required here.

This is a psychological freedom, that which enables the agent to take his action as his.

More broadly, we see that this lack of justification applies to any action impacting upon systems which are such that their behaviour is non-predictable in principle. Chaos theory teaches us that simple dynamical systems can exhibit such behaviour, but it does not exclude the possibility of circumscribing the range of behaviour owing to the presence of a 'strange attractor'. However, being able to identify the attractor might be beyond our capacity when we are dealing with large complex systems (such as the atmosphere) or with living organisms. This would imply that we here have the grounds for a moral attitude towards the environment and life which is quite opposed to both naturalistic (Leopold, 1966) and consequentialist theories (Taylor, 1981) without drawing upon any substantial conception of the value of life (Schweitzer, 1923).
A standard argument made by Nagel and Williams against consequentialism (Scheffler, 1988, 2-4), according to which one may be required to commit a horrible act involving the "use" of others as means only, is analogous to this one. In the argument proposed above, the issue is the disregard for the (unlikely) situation in which no justification is available. In the Nagel-Williams argument, it is the disregard for evil effects that are 'outweighed' by the positive consequences which is at stake. In both cases, the victims of my unjustified action or of such evil consequences are treated as means only. The difference is that, in the first argument, the evil is potential, but of unlimited magnitude, while in the second, this magnitude is circumscribed, but the evil is certain.

**Case 2: The pursuit of happiness**

'\textit{I ought to do X to make me happier}' represents X as a form of action which is part of a general policy to seek happiness\textsuperscript{30}. There are two ways in which this may be intended: either the successful outcome of the action alone is such that it contributes to happiness, or the carrying out of the action is also operative in bringing about happiness. The first option reduces to case 1 examined above since all the justification is carried by the outcome of the action. So, happiness will also have to result from the actual action. But, moreover, the success of the outcome must not be a necessary condition for the action's ability to contribute to happiness. Given these considerations, we may thus view the "happiness-bestowing" nature of the action as apparently constituting a justification for carrying it out. This case is analysed in more detail in the next chapter.

**Case 3: Following one's inclination**

The answer 'I ought to do X because I feel inclined to do X' is distinct from the two preceding ones for the following reason: I may follow my inclination as a motive for action without the purpose of my action being either an empirical outcome or any notion of happiness.

The distinction between cases 2 and 3 is made by Kant (GMM, 397) between the merchant who does not 'overcharge an inexperienced customer' because it is good business, and persons who are 'so sympathetically constituted that (...) they find an inner satisfaction in spreading joy' (ibid., 398). The merchant is motivated by the achievement of some happiness (to be attained through the success of his

\textsuperscript{30}Because all notions of happiness are experiential, they are not subsumed under the section on values: happiness is an individually subjective matter while value is not: the latter is at least inter-subjective and may be viewed as partaking of a form of objectivity (Putnam, 1990, p. 178).
business). The sympathetically inclined person is not, but is inclined to do certain good deeds. The purpose of these actions is not happiness, but exactly what these actions set out to do, i.e. 'spreading joy'. The distinction with case 1 is that the successful outcome of the action is not required to provide the reason: should the benefactor's action fail to achieve its purpose, this may sadden her, but not make the action meaningless.

Is this answer then a satisfactory one? Well, it certainly points to a link between the action and the agent's ends. But these are immediate ends of satisfaction of certain inclinations. In fact, there are, at any point in time, many conflicting such inclinations. On what basis does the agent choose upon which inclination to act? Clearly more is required to provide a p-meaningful account of the grounds of one's action. A first possibility is that this could be a selection of inclinations which provide more satisfaction than others (e.g. long term as opposed to short term). This then points to a policy of search for maximum satisfaction which thus forms a notion of happiness for the agent. A second possibility is that of a selection of inclinations which have some other property that is not connected with satisfaction and generally subsumable under the word 'good'. The choice of such a policy is then motivated by a notion of 'good' and is therefore an action (here a second-order one) instantiating the next case.

Case 4: The good as justification

'I ought to do X because it is good to do X' is the kind of justification provided by the agent who is acting according to some notion of good. If this reason is to provide an end to the probing into the agent's grounds for action, this good has to be a good in itself. If not, it would be good only for a certain end, i.e. its worth would only be meaningful together with some presupposed aim: thus a good way of mowing the lawn is good only insofar as one is clear about what the aim of lawn-mowing is. But the questioning would then have to go further into examining this aim, i.e. that the lawn should be mown, to relate it to one of the agent's ends, which would lead us to a similar set of choices as here.

There are two possibilities for a good in itself: either that it should only be good conditionally; or that it should be intrinsically good, i.e. good irrespective of how anything else is. The first possibility implies there is a condition to the action being called good and the answer to the question "why?" is thus not complete. To

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31 As Korsgaard points out (1996a, p.56), this shows that Kant does not in fact subscribe to a 'hedonistic theory of the purpose of all actions done from inclination'.

127
complete it would lead to a new set of alternative answers with this particular option excluded if an infinite regress is to be avoided.

The second possibility identifies that which is good in itself and intrinsically. Chapter I has examined this good will as one which acts from duty - a case examined further - and duty has been identified through the moral law. But Part One has also suggested there is more to the good will and this involves the individual's evaluation *qua* situated particular agent. This is an instance of the next case.

**Case 5: Action grounded in value.**

If we answer 'I ought to do X because I value what X represents', there is some value which we respect and which is viewed as sufficient to motivate our action. If this is the case, this value is, in some sense, placed above others. Thus one may, for instance, claim that one places aesthetic beauty above all else and devote oneself to its pursuit, production and preservation.

This value may be viewed as a notion of good. If it is unconditionally placed above all else, this will necessarily be a notion of Highest Good. If this were not the good will, this highest good would not be good without qualification. This means it would not be good in all circumstances, and therefore not the highest good. Therefore, *ad absurdum*, such a notion of value is one of unconditional good\(^2\). Note however that we act upon it as the value of the Highest Good, which distinguishes it from the case of the unconditional good examined further.

The sentence 'I do X because I value what X represents' can also be transformed by noting that the value X defines ends to be pursued, a point we shall return to (in a particular case) in chapter VII. This means that the sentence now reads 'I do X because I am pursuing the ends defined by what I value'. We may therefore infer that to do X is p-meaningful in terms of these ends. The question of p-meaning will then be asked about the decision to adopt the value as defining ends for me, since this underpins the p-meaning of the act itself. This decision is a higher-order act involving the adoption of a belief, for which the issue of p-meaning is related to its rational justification, i.e. to its being epistemically justified. If the belief is fully justified, p-meaning will have to be derived from this justification, and all eight options examined here are in principle open. The knowledge of the unconditional good which would result from a justification of the belief in

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\(^2\)If the unconditional good were action from duty, this result would simply expand Kant's notion of the highest good as supreme good (CPrR, 110) together with the results of the Analytic of Practical Reason (CPrR, 30-31).

128
question is however excluded by Kant's work in the CPR. For this would amount to knowledge of something which is neither empirical knowledge nor a transcendental condition thereof. This option is therefore excluded.

If the belief is not fully justified, i.e. if the justification is lacking but possible in principle, the action cannot be p-meaningful - we would be dealing with a whim. If the belief cannot be (fully) justified (or shown to be false) because of its nature (this will be termed an essentially non-(fully) justifiable belief), it involves a leap of faith. I shall refer to the motivation to act upon it as faith. These properties of the belief adopted in the leap of faith are passed on to the belief underpinning the particular action, namely the belief that 'doing X is valuable (e.g. unconditionally good)'. Action upon faith can thus be characterised as action upon a belief that is essentially non-(fully) justifiable, the content of which is the value of the action.

We conclude that action upon a value is p-meaningful and that it leads to ask the question of p-meaning of the decision to adopt the value itself, for which one potentially p-meaningful case has been identified, that of the leap of faith. The issue of whether this leap could be p-meaningful can only be answered by further examining the notion of faith, a topic we shall return to in chapter VII.

Case 6: Action grounded in fact.

If we 'ought to do X because of a fact', we assume there is a fact of which it is claimed that it entails certain imperatives which the human will has to comply with. As illustration, one may consider the way in which religion (e.g. in fundamentalism) or science (e.g. in the gay gene issue) are seen by some as a source of moral knowledge which binds any agent. There are of course many unjustifiable claims made for the possibility of knowing the objects of religious belief or deriving moral obligations from scientific facts. The core problem is that a statement of fact about the world, a statement which has no value content, is not the right sort of statement to ground an obligation. For, as far as human knowledge is concerned, facts entail more facts. If, therefore, a statement of the form 'Since F is true, one ought to do X', is appealed to as justification, it will either have to be a statement of fact not pertaining exclusively to the empirical world or a satisfactory justification for some unknown reason.

If it is the first, it is only tenable on the basis of a belief which grounds the 'ought'. If this belief must also thereby provide a motivation to carry out this action (else

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\(^{33}\)In line with the announced strategy, I am not using the discussion of faith in chapter V in the argument.

\(^{34}\)This is related to Hume's claim that 'ought' cannot be derived from 'is' (see footnote 15).
the justification is insufficient), it may be described as faith - as introduced above.
If not, no source of motivation seems available for such a fact (e.g. no broadly
Humean motivating emotions). Such an action is thus not a real possibility.
If the second, one may observe that to accept such a justification is to compensate
for a lack of knowledge by endowing this reason with value (else one could not be
said to understand the justification in any way). Since it is this value which really
grounds the action, this reduces to case 5 examined above.

Case 7: No justification
If the answer is that there is no reason to do X, this should be seen as
unsatisfactory as it stands. Even if, when asked for justification, the agent may
well decline, he is only going to satisfy the requirement of p-meaningfulness of his
actions if he has a reason for not providing a justification.
The first reason which could be adduced here would be that the action is one
which is not justifiable by the agent insofar as it is not under his control. An
example would be a denial of freedom which amounts to considering actions as
ultimately determined and therefore not requiring any particular justification. But,
as indicated in the argument developed under case 1 (of justification based upon
the outcome), the agent has to consider herself as free in her deliberate actions
(point (4)). So the denial of freedom cannot provide a satisfactory explanation.
The second reason would amount to a pragmatic claim of the lack of usefulness of
any type of justification. Even if one accepts that justification is required by our
need for p-meaning, one may nevertheless simultaneously reject the call for it to
be provided on the grounds that it is so useless that it is really the last thing one
should worry about\textsuperscript{35}. But this claim that the requirement for p-meaningful action
ought to be abandoned would require a justification. And the problem is that there
is no basis upon which it can be justified, given that the most basic requirement of
p-meaning has been rejected.

Case 8: Unconditional justification
Finally, we have the answer which appeals to the requirement to do something
unconditionally, i.e. the imperative of duty: having identified that X is the right

\textsuperscript{35}This is an attitude to decision-making which may e.g. be based upon a fascination with the infinity of one's
freedom which outweighs any other consideration (Camus, 1962) or the lack of repeatability of real-life
situations which makes attempts at justifying behaviour futile (Kundera, 1984).
thing to do, one ought to do it because it is the right thing\(^\text{36}\). A categorical imperative will represent an end to the chain of hypothetical imperatives describing the requirements for action. The question then arises as to whether there are any such categorical imperatives. Kant's Categorical Imperative, reconstructed in chapter I, was found to be insufficiently grounded (chapter III), a problem connected with the motivational power of his notion of duty (chapters II and III). From the examination of Kant's ethics in Part One, it is therefore not clear how such an unconditional requirement can be related to an individual agent's ends. On the contrary, it appears rather to ignore them insofar as it overrides any other considerations which may be brought to bear upon the agent's decisions. This problem is re-examined in the next chapter.

### Conclusion

This chapter has set the method to be used in identifying grounds for action. The notion of p-meaning and its fundamental properties have been presented and shown to lead to strings of questions about the justification of one's action. By using this notion of p-meaning, the investigation only makes assumptions which can command assent in that they are minimal characterisations of core features of human agency.

The first examination of eight possible candidates for the reason for which the agent ought to do X has enabled us to identify one form of p-meaningful action. This is action directed to a notion of Highest Good. The adoption of such a value as action-grounding must however be examined for p-meaning like all other actions. Only the case of the adoption of the value in faith was found to be potentially p-meaningful. Since this excludes value-guided action on grounds other than faith from further investigation, it is possible to reduce the remaining potentially p-meaningful grounds of action to three fundamental ones. These are the pursuit of happiness, the guidance of faith and unconditionally binding duty.

The other cases examined either involve, or can be reduced to, one of these, or are clearly to be excluded for their lack of p-meaning. In each of these three cases, we have found a candidate which was not clearly to be rejected at this stage of the investigation. In terms of the original set of possible justificatory strategies, A to E, \(^\text{36}\)Note that the motivation to do what is right can only come from it's being right. Else, there would have to be another ground for doing X beyond its property of rightness and this would invalidate the unconditionality.

131
we thus reduced category B to others and eliminated E, leaving one main candidate in each of the categories A, C and D.

That these three options should be in contention is not surprising. For categories A, C and D correspond to grounding action in what it brings about, in its nature, and in a priori facts. In terms of the phenomenological analysis of chapter IV, this means that the foundation for action can be sought in that which lies ahead of it, in that which it is presently, or in that which forms the background to it and any other action. This brings out the tri-partite nature of Dasein, with the temporal correlates of past, present and future.

There is however more to the understanding of what Dasein is, as chapters IV and V have shown. In the next chapter, the results of Part Two will provide further guidance to our investigation when the potential grounds for action identified above are submitted to further scrutiny.
CHAPTER VII

On the foundation of morality:
2. Absolute meaning and action

Introduction
The preliminary examination of reasons for acting in chapter VI was based upon the notion of p-meaning. This led to a set of (potentially) p-meaningful grounds of action. These and their grounds have to be further examined for p-meaning.
To have p-meaningful foundations requires a string of p-meaningful answers to the 'why?' questions which arise when investigating the ground for any action. This leads us to consider if and how such a string of answers comes to an end.
As suggested at the end of the last chapter, guidance can be sought from the results of the phenomenological investigation of Part Two. One of the main outcomes of that analysis is that the whole of Dasein can be understood in terms of the Quest. Analogously, the notion of absolute meaning which is proposed in this chapter to provide completeness to the string of p-meaningful justifications, is motivated by the observation that completion can only be provided by considering the whole of the agent's ends.
As in the structure of chapter VI, we shall start by defining this notion before examining the three possible grounds for action in terms of p-meaning and absolute meaning. Importantly, although the latter notion guides the investigation, the results obtained in this chapter will ultimately be shown to depend solely upon the requirement of p-meaning obtained previously.

1. Absolute Meaning
As we answer questions about p-meaning, an issue arises, namely that of how the sequence of questions and p-meaningful answers can come to an end. This is because, were this sequence not to terminate, we would always be left with unanswered p-meaningful questions and therefore with a deficit of p-meaning. As indicated in chapter VI, there are two ways in which such a sequence could
could absolute end not be defined as
End that brings the self back to itself
self as its own unconditioned end?
terminate. Either an end is exhibited as being unconditionally p-meaningful, or a set of ends is exhibited such that these ends mutually p-meaningfully support one another. Since, in the second case, further questioning will terminate only if the set of ends thus constituted is p-meaningfully unconditional, the two cases can be summarised in the general case of the existence of a set of ends whose pursuit is jointly p-meaningfully unconditional. But do we have an understanding of what this means with the definition we have given of p-meaning in chapter VI? The problem is that to exhibit the p-meaning of a state or series of states of affairs (e.g. the pursuit of one or more ends), one has to exhibit an end towards which that state of affairs contributes. In the case of the pursuit of an unconditional end (or set of ends), that end is not pursued because of some further end, but on unconditional grounds. This means we cannot exhibit p-meaning by showing the pursuit of this end as contributing to another end. To infer from this that there is no such thing as a p-meaningful unconditional end would be to make it impossible for the requirement of p-meaning to be satisfied. But the investigation started in chapter VI has taken this requirement as central to human agency. If p-meaningful unconditional ends were therefore not possible, it would point to an inherent shortcoming of human agency that is necessarily frustrated by its own unfulfilled requirements.

I shall assume there is no such shortcoming. This means I shall broaden the scope of the concept of p-meaning so as to allow for p-meaningful unconditional action. This introduces a type of p-meaning I refer to as absolute meaning. Absolute meaning (hereafter a-meaning) is unconditional p-meaning and thus p-meaning that does not depend upon any particular end.

This is but a formal definition. Our first task will be to identify conditions for a-meaning. The rest of the chapter will then examine the three forms of action identified in chapter VI for p- and a-meaning. The eventual identification of a possible a-meaningful option will provide the justification for introducing the concept of a-meaning. Finally, the proof that the requirement of p-meaning leads

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1 The requirement for a completion of the string of p-meaningful justifications is comparable to Kant's categorical imperative of pure reason according to which the faculty of reason always searches for the unconditioned for any conditioned. This makes the requirement for completion regulative, while that of p-meaning is constitutive for human agency. However, since these requirements are not assigned to two different faculties as in the epistemic case, the distinction constitutive/regulative is not a strict one and we shall find that what is regulative is constitutive of action within a certain type of faith, c-c-faith.
to a requirement of a-meaning, will provide a posterior vindication of the way in which the scope of the concept of p-meaning is here broadened to a-meaning\(^2\).

Let us therefore begin with the task of circumscribing the conditions for a-meaning. Since a-meaning is designed to broaden the applicability of the concept of p-meaning, it is required not to clash with the narrower use of the concept. The latter has been defined for cases where ends can be identified such that the agent understands the contribution made to the pursuit of those ends by the state of affairs. We have also specified that such an understanding can only be achieved if it is not a tautology that the state of affairs contributes to this end. This concept of p-meaning is thus only defined for states of affairs such that there are ends the agent is aware of, whose pursuit cannot be analytically inferred from the state of affairs itself\(^3\), i.e. ends "external" to the state of affairs. Our task is to define the applicability of p-meaning to cases with no such ends.

I suggest that, to remain in the spirit of the definition of p-meaning from chapter VI, we stipulate a state of affairs or series thereof, S, has a-meaning for an agent, if the agent pursues no ends external to S and the agent can understand the contribution S makes to something which is valuable independently of any of her ends, and therefore to something transcending them\(^4\).

Note that this characterisation refers to the ends being pursued by the agent, i.e. "active" ends. When S is not located in time, as is the case when S is a second- or third-order action, the requirement on active ends to be included in S applies over time. Since there may be "dormant" (unconscious) ends which will become active, the requirement entails that the agent should seek to ensure that such ends are included in S. A-meaning will thus be said to accrue to a non temporally located state of affairs S if the agent aims to include the pursuit of all her ends in S. This definition is therefore in tune with the understanding of the notion of authenticity examined in chapter V, i.e. a grasping of the whole of Dasein.

In the following, we shall thus focus upon a closer examination of the p-meaning (henceforth this refers to the narrow use of the concept) of actions in pursuit of

\(^2\) That such a vindication may be useful, is explained in footnote 4.
\(^3\) In so doing, I am proceeding as though analytical statements could be assimilated to tautologies. This amounts to saying that when two ends are distinct, this means that one is not analytically derivable from the other. P-meaningful accounts of the pursuit of one end in terms of that of another which is analytically contained in it are ignored here as they only lengthen the sequence of p-meaningful justifications.
\(^4\) It could be argued that the claim that absolute meaning requires that the agent's ends contribute to something transcending those ends, is not part of the scope of the concept of p-meaning's natural extension to the unconditional case. Instead of seeking to respond directly to this objection, in section 6, I shall show that the type of action identified as a-meaningful has p-meaningful precedence over any other.
happiness, or motivated by faith, and when relevant, consider their participation in a-meaning\(^5\). Duty as the third possible ground of action will also be examined in relation to these ends. In each case, issues of p-meaning are considered first since any lack of p-meaningful justification entails that there is no a-meaning.

2. Happiness

*Combination of action and outcome*

In the preliminary examination of grounds for action (chapter VI), we found the following: the contribution of an action to happiness can only provide a p-meaningful justification, if the eventually successful outcome is not the only source of this contribution. Hence the action must also contribute to happiness through its very nature. Moreover, we showed that the success of this outcome cannot be necessary to happiness. The issue of the p-meaningfulness of the pursuit of happiness is not, however, settled by simply giving the end of happiness as justification. For the two other conditions of p-meaning are that the agent understand the contribution he makes to happiness, and that the claim that there is such a contribution be true. Unlike the other justificatory options examined in chapter VI, these conditions are not trivially fulfilled in the case of happiness because of the fuzziness of the notion of happiness itself. I shall examine if these conditions are fulfilled, and when not, what other p-meaningful accounts of the agent's action are available. To do so, I shall divide the investigation according to whether the success of the outcome has a rôle to play at all. In the following, I shall consider both positive and negative answers to this question and examine the p- and a-meaningfulness of the corresponding choices.

*Happiness through entertainment*

Let us start by asking how the outcome can be relevant if its success is not necessary to happiness, before identifying conditions for the p-meaning of such action. Starting with three observations, I shall show that an understanding of this type of action enables us to reconstruct key insights of Pascal's, and thereby provide an answer to this initial question. First, the projected outcome of the action must not be to achieve or increase one's happiness - else a successful outcome would clearly be necessary. Second, if the success of the outcome is not

\(^5\)I use the expression 'to participate in a-meaning' to refer to an action which contributes to delivering a-meaning by defining a strategy directed at an a-meaningful goal.
necessary, but not irrelevant, there must be different degrees to the state of
happiness. This gradation extends to the success of the outcome itself, which
generally does not have to be an all-or-nothing state of affairs. I shall therefore
refer to a positive outcome as one meeting with a degree of success. Third, if a
positive outcome is not necessary but nevertheless relevant, its actuality is not
required, but it is relevant through its possibility.

We therefore have the following conclusions in terms of the contribution made by
the action to happiness: happiness is a state which is characterisable in degrees,
such that it can only be achieved through the pursuit of another aim, a pursuit
which is only required to be potentially successful. These characteristics can be
seen to correspond to a certain understanding of happiness: that happiness should
come in degrees is a commonly held belief, while the other features coincide with
Pascal's findings on the issue of 'entertainment' ("divertissement", Pascal, 1972).
Pascal considers a man who everyday gambles with a small amount of money:
'Give him every morning the money he can gain each day, on the condition that he
does not gamble: you will make him unhappy. One might say that it is the fun of
the game he is after, and not the gain. Make him play for nothing and he will not
become engrossed and will get bored' (Pascal, 1972, Pensée 133, p.71 - my transi.).
We thus have an activity defining a purpose which is not a contribution to
happiness as such, but rather such that gain must be a possibility and is not
necessary. As Pascal points out, such activities define what is widely held to be
happiness (ibid.), so that it appears to be true that a certain form of happiness
derives from this type of activity.

A consideration of necessary conditions for p-meaning has thus enabled us to
reconstruct the key results of Pascal's analysis. In so doing we have shown how a
pursuit of happiness whereby the action's outcome is not irrelevant, is indeed
possible and coincides with entertainment. The question is now that of this
action's p-meaning. Insofar as it can be described as the pursuit of an end E such
that pleasure is derived from the pursuit, the remaining issue, as flagged above, is
that of whether the agent understands the pursuit of E as contributing to her
happiness. Since I do not want to prejudge the nature of happiness, this issue is
grasped as that of whether the agent understands the pursuit of E as contributing
to an end of hers. To examine this issue, we shall summarise the above analysis of
the activity of pursuing E by describing it as the partaking of a form of
entertainment - which in effect amounts to a game-like behaviour (Berne, 1968).
The question then is: why does entertaining oneself contribute to an agent's ends?
Answers to this question would seem to require appealing to an end lying beyond the entertaining activity, or endorsing a claim that entertainment is a meaningful end, or invoking a value that accounts for the pursuit of the ends defined by the entertainment. More specifically, there are four possible options.

First, the entertainment's contribution to happiness might be justified through its contribution to the pursuit of an end lying beyond it, called 'happiness'. This must be happiness involving a rôle for the outcome. This, however, leaves wholly unexplained how the action is to contribute to happiness, and does not, therefore, satisfy the requirement of p-meaning.

Second, entertaining oneself may be seen as contributing to an end which is the positive meaning of entertainment. For this activity would be seen as a positive diversion which is to help the agent, e.g. be more relaxed and more effective in tackling certain ends of his. This is a complete explanation if one appeals to O'Neill's (1989) Principles of Rational Intending (see chapter VI). This allows for p-meaning to accrue to the pursuit of E.

Third, we have the negative meaning of entertainment that is the focus of Pascal's observations. Namely, entertainment allows for the issue of the pursuit of other ends, and its justification, to be set aside so that entertainment appears as though it were self-justifying. In other words, entertainment enables one to forget other concerns. There is a slippery path which leads from the positive to this negative meaning of entertainment and which is the path of bad faith, as analysed in chapter IV. Insofar as this is based upon the identification of end E as requiring no further justification, it is not a p-meaningful account.

Fourth, the actual pursuit of end E may be understood in terms of a value held by the agent. Thus, the practice of a sport may be taken to be a form of the pursuit of excellence, to exemplify courage or fair play, ... This explanation would provide a p-meaningful account of the pursuit of E.

The examination of the issue of the p-meaningfulness of happiness dependent upon the outcome has identified the second and fourth options as p-meaningful by showing how the agent understands his contribution to happiness. This understanding however leads to further questions relating to the ends and values

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6Note that this corresponds to a postponing of the confrontation with one's facticity and/or freedom and this is precisely what characterises bad faith (chapter IV). This type of bad faith is more specifically that of Kierkegaard's aesthetic stage (Kierkegaard, 1987), as for instance instantiated in the myth of Don Juan who 'shun[s] the satiation of pleasure, (...) keep[s] [himself] (...) fresh for beauty' (Lenau, quoted in R. Strauss, 1932).
which are referred to in the above justifications. In the case of the second option, this may be addressed using any of the options of chapter VI. With the fourth option, the pursuit of ends defined by a value could be justified with any one of these options, and more specifically, by the motive of faith. Of the possible justifications which can be p-meaningful, only happiness, faith and duty are possible candidates (chapter VI). And note that if happiness were used again, it would have to be happiness that is independent of outcomes, else an infinite regress would ensue. This type of happiness will now be examined.

Happiness irrespective of outcomes
A negative answer to the original question means that happiness accrues to the agent, whatever the outcome of the act. To secure p-meaning, we have to establish whether there is indeed a way in which the action can contribute to happiness and whether the agent understands this.

The answer to the first question is that the spirit in which the action is performed must be what is crucial. There might be a certain way of using one's body and a mental disposition involved in the action, that are all (normally) under the agent's control, and which ensure that the action contributes to her happiness. An example is the notion of well-being associated with certain bodily positions and movements as well as simultaneous mental concentration according to the discipline of Yoga, or the fairly rigorous advice given by Epicurus. A case can therefore be made for the belief that such action will contribute to one's happiness, and one may indeed experience a feeling of well-being which lends support to this view.

Such doctrines also provide an account of how the contribution to happiness is made. Thus Yoga describes it in terms of the furthering of one's absorption in Brahman and Epicureanism as one's approaching a state of ataraxia. The agent's understanding of how a form of action contributes to happiness requires that such doctrines be appealed to. The agent's belief in the validity of such an account provides her with an understanding, in terms of the doctrine which underpins it, of how increased happiness ensues as a result of certain practices. We can therefore conclude that action in pursuit of happiness irrespective of the outcome can be a form of p-meaningful action.

The further question of the p-meaningful justification of the doctrine which underpins the agent's understanding is an issue which is directly relevant to the a-meaning of this option, since such doctrines make absolute claims. Such doctrinal accounts are however only justifiable on a certain view of what it is to be an
embodied human being. The belief in such views is not ultimately justifiable: although there is no space to deal with specific doctrines here, I take the onus to be on the proponent of such a doctrine to justify it. I claim that one can always identify assumptions which have to be taken on faith in any such arguments. This claim can further be supported by the observation that a possible interpretation of being human (Part Two) has shown that it is not to be characterised by any fixed essence, but rather is a Quest. This means that the adoption of such a doctrine as ground for action can only be p-meaningful conditional upon faith in a certain idea of what it is to be human, i.e. the motive of faith is required for justification.

Together with the conclusions of the previous sub-section, this shows that happiness can be p-meaningful as a pursuit both in the form of happiness dependent upon, and happiness irrespective of, the outcome. From the results obtained in terms of the further justification of the action, we find that a-meaning could only be achieved if the actions involved were grounded in another p-meaningful option, i.e. potentially in faith or duty.

3. Faith

We have found that some of the options envisaged previously (chapter VI) could only lead to p-meaningful explanations of action if faith were assumed as motive. Faith has been characterised as a motivating essentially non-(fully) justifiable belief\(^7\), the content of which is the worth of a value as action-guiding. Such a notion has been proposed on the basis of an analysis of possible grounds for action justified by appealing to a value (a notion of Highest Good). We have already found that action on such a value is p-meaningful. This means, in particular, that the notion of faith as it has been defined is p-meaningful, which leads to the issue of the p-meaning of the leap underpinning it. A further examination of this notion for p-meaning and a-meaning must begin by clarifying what is involved in holding a belief that is both motivating and essentially non-(fully) justifiable. The structure of faith which emerges will clarify the respective rôles of faith and the leap of faith. After examining the p-meaning of the leap of faith, the question of whether the set formed by ends in faith together with the leap is a-meaningful must be addressed. This analysis of faith could be criticised for assuming a definition of it, and drawing conclusions that depend upon the assumption that

\(^7\)The non-justifiability is an essential property of the belief insofar as its nature makes it such that no justification can validate or invalidate it.
this motive is real. Grounds for scepticism on this score are examined at the end of this section.

A motivating belief
Let us shed light on the first important property of faith, which is that it is a motivating belief. That there are beliefs which motivate is a claim made by belief internalism (Stratton-Lake, 1999), or more specifically moral belief internalism, if the beliefs in question are taken to be moral ones (Parfitt, 1997). Belief internalism is a claim about the motivating property of normative beliefs. This is because belief internalism is a theory designed to enable reasons internalism to be compatible with normative claims. For reasons internalism, which claims that moral reasons are motivating (ibid.), is viewed by some (Williams, 1981, chapter 8) as requiring that such reasons spring from the agent's desires. Since this would make claims of normativity problematic, the solution proposed by belief internalists is that the belief in the validity of the moral reason is what motivates action from moral reasons (Korsgaard, 1996a, p. 43).

In the case of the belief in faith, an action-guiding claim based upon a value forms the content of the belief. A form of action is thus endowed with value through faith instead of being claimed to be normative as in belief internalism. The situations are thus analogous, and we can therefore grasp the motivational power of the belief in faith by analogy with the motivating power of the normative belief in belief internalism.

A non-justifiable belief
The main difference between faith and the belief of belief internalism lies in the fact that a justification underpins the latter's normativity claim, while in faith, the belief is essentially non-justifiable. What feature of the content of a belief ω accounts for its being essentially non-(fully) justifiable? There are two cases: either justification/invalidation as such is not possible, or complete justification/invalidation is not possible. The first refers to a content beyond our epistemic grasp; the second, to one that is not a propositional truth/falsehood.

The first case is that of a content referring to that which is neither empirical nor a transcendental condition of empirical knowledge. This means, it concerns the way things are independently of our capacity to know them, i.e. the realm of the In-Itself. The second case describes a content not reducible to a propositional truth/falsehood. How could a statement not be an object of truth? Only if it can be understood in different ways. But if ambiguity is to be avoided, this
understanding must be part of the content of the belief. This means that this content must be an interpretation. In line with the investigation of Part Two, we are thereby using a notion of understanding which exceeds propositional knowledge (insofar as assertions must be viewed against a background), and of which 'theoretical' assertion is a derivative impoverished form (BT, 158).

To act from a belief $\omega$ that a certain form of action is of value, is therefore to stake a claim about a transcendent or an interpretative truth. These claims amount to a belief $\Omega$ whose content is a propositional attitude directed at the truth of a proposition about transcendent reality or the validity of an interpretation.

Since we have identified two options, it may look as though we have two types of faith. In fact, we shall show that these options are complementary. To do so, it is essential to remember that the belief $\omega$ is both endowed with value and action guiding. Let us show that this requires that belief $\Omega$ simultaneously be a belief about a transcendent reality and about an interpretation.

If we start by assuming that $\Omega$ is a belief about a transcendent reality, the question of its ability to guide action must be answered. By definition, if this reality is transcendent, it is external to the world of the agent's experience. A claim about the way in which the transcendent reality impinges upon the latter, amounts to a claim about how the agent ought to understand it. This means that such a claim is one about the valid interpretation of this transcendent reality.

Conversely, if we assume $\Omega$ is a belief about an interpretation, this can be taken as an action-guiding interpretation. However, if it is endowed with value so as to ground the content of belief $\omega$, a claim about a truth transcending experience is being made. For the interpretation is not simply taken as more adequate than other known ones, but rather as having a distinctive value. The claim is therefore one about a transcending reality. The content of belief $\Omega$ is therefore of the form: 'X is an In-Itself which is to be interpreted as implying $\omega$ is practically normative'.

Finally, in this sentence, we must specify in what sense the interpretation is the agent's. Although, clearly, an interpretation is not produced by a particular agent irrespective of her belonging to a certain linguistic-cultural community, it is the agent who, through her practical choices, endows it with a distinctive value. Therefore, although the interpretation may have components that are viewed as normative for all, or a group or agents, the interpretation as a whole applies to the agent in her specificity. Therefore, $\Omega$ is the belief that:

There is a transcendent ground $G$ that I rightly take to mean I ought to act on $\omega$.

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8This will be illustrated below in the form of the claims of universal duty, as well as in the next chapter.
In conclusion, faith is therefore a motivating, essentially non-(fully) justifiable and action-guiding belief \( \omega \), whose ground lies in the adoption of belief \( \Omega \). The adoption (and further holding) of belief \( \Omega \) can be described as the *leap of faith*, since it is the adoption of the value which guides action through \( \omega \). We have thus given further specification to the notion of leap introduced in chapter VI. Before pursuing, let us note how the notion of faith presented here relates to some conceptions found in the literature. The idea that justification is inherently impossible for the belief in faith is strongly emphasised by Kierkegaard (1962, p.40-44), and was introduced into theology by Barth (1961) as a consequence, in particular, of his reading of Kierkegaard\(^9\). The term 'leap of faith' was originally coined by Lessing (Kierkegaard, 1968, p.65) and is used by Kierkegaard to describe the agent's adoption of faith. This influence of Lessing upon Kierkegaard is crucial, although that of Kant should not be overlooked (Ferreira, 1998, p.212; Hannay, 1991). Kant characterises his enterprise as making room for faith by limiting the claims of knowledge (CPR, Bxxx). However, his notion of faith is firmly placed within the bounds of reason (CPrR, 153). Thus, the fact of reason analysed in chapter III provides the basis for a practically justified belief in the truth of the existence of God for instance (CPrR, 125; CJ, 450). Our leap of faith takes us further, beyond the bounds set by Kant for theoretical reason\(^11\).

**Faith, the leap, and p-meaning**

We have already established the p-meaningfulness of action in faith in the previous chapter, insofar as it is a special case of action upon a value. This p-meaning is the consequence of the value's defining a notion of end for the agent. In the case of faith, we may examine more specifically what notion of end is involved. Since the adoption of the value as action-guiding constitutes the leap of faith, let us look more closely at the leap to identify the end of action in faith.

To do so, we shall first specify the nature of the leap in terms of the framework set up in Part One. I claim that the leap is a third-order action. This is because it involves the adoption of action-guiding principles such as the content of \( \omega \). Such principles are not maxims, but *second-order* principles, as can be seen from their

\(^9\)Note that, although \( \omega \) would appear to be included in \( \Omega \), one must not overlook the distinct rôles played by the third- and second-order levels respectively. For \( \Omega \) is a theoretical belief playing the rôle of a justification. On the contrary, \( \omega \) is practical belief which corresponds to the implementation of a policy of action. Certain inclinations may stand in the way of the 'full' adoption of \( \omega \) as a policy, even if the agent holds belief \( \Omega \).

\(^10\)This is not to say that the tradition which seeks to prove the transcendental claims such as the existence of God, is not alive today. We note, in particular that Plantinga (1974) has a version of the ontological argument and Swinburne (1979) a version of the argument from design.

\(^11\)This amounts to pushing the bounds of practical reason beyond those of theoretical reason.
being presented in the form of categorical imperatives that provide rules to be followed when acting. It is thus from the perspective of a third-order leap determining these principles, that actions motivated by faith are to be grasped. This corroborates Ferreira's (1998, p.227) characterisation of Kierkegaard's notion of leap as a 'qualitative transition' or 'shift in perspective'.

To see what end the leap defines, we may now use an analogy with the only third-order principle we have so far come across, namely \{Cl\}. Chapter II showed that action on this principle contributes to the development of a morally worthy agent self (assuming \{Cl\} is normative). This is the result of the habituation of acting on the second-order categorical imperatives falling under \{Cl\}. In the same way, the transcendent ground \(G\) posited by the adoption of belief \(\Omega\), is such that a *faithful agent-self* is 'constructed' through action on second-order principles of faith. Therefore, just as the idea of the perfectly morally worthy agent-self was proposed as regulative for action from duty, this notion of *perfectly faithful agent-self* can be an end for action in faith\(^{12}\).

There is however a difference between this and the case of duty, namely that in the case of faith, action is motivated by a value and therefore is directed to an end. What we have shown is that the agent may view his action as contributing to the development of a perfectly faithful agent-self. This can only be the case if the end of action in faith indeed includes a notion of perfectly faithful agent-self.

This result must be reflected in the nature of the leap of faith. In other words, the Idea of the perfectly faithful agent-self must - as part of the end of action in faith - be given as a result of positing the transcendent ground \(G\) of faith. This entails that \(G\) includes an In-Itself that defines this notion. This In-Itself, I shall refer to as the *absolute self*. The examination of the ends of action in faith has thus exhibited the fact that ground \(G\) has the character of comprising an absolute self - I shall thus refer to \(G\) as an *absolute self*.

The analogy we have used with the case of duty to bring out the notion of faithful agent-self must not let us overlook an essential difference which is that belief \(\Omega\) is defined for a particular agent, while duty is universal. Thus the interpretation which identifies second-order principles of action in faith is particular to the agent, and therefore so is the notion of faithful agent-self\(^{13}\). As a consequence, the

\(^{12}\)Note how this conclusion depends upon the leap of faith corresponding to a third-order principle of action, since as such, it has a whole set of second-order principles falling under it. This leads to the development of the perfectly faithful agent-self, through the growth of the inclination to act according to the faith.

\(^{13}\)This point is important because it seems to disqualify a certain type of religious faith from falling under the category of faith as we have defined it. This is what Kierkegaard describes as Religiousness A (Kierkegaard, 1968). It is a response to the contradiction of the aesthetic and ethical spheres described through the
absolute self is interpreted in terms of individuated features. That there are universal features of the absolute self that inform such an interpretation will be shown later.

We have shown that the p-meaningfulness of action in faith reveals that the transcendental ground of faith comprises an absolute self which the agent interprets in individuated terms. Since faith involves viewing action in faith as constructing its end (at least part of it), it is referred to as a **constructive faith**.

The p-meaning of faith is however dependent upon there being a leap of faith, and the justificatory question is now transferred to the leap itself, as we observed in chapter VI.

The p-meaningful justification of the leap involves identifying ends to which the adoption of belief $\Omega$ contributes. But this belief represents a shift which cannot therefore be understood in terms of the ends held before it came about. This would seem to make the issue of its p-meaning problematic. Moreover, the end defined by the leap, namely that of the perfectly faithful agent-self cannot be used to establish p-meaning of the leap itself: other ends (chapter VI) must be appealed to. Are there any such ends?

It would be mistaken to view action motivated by faith as directed exclusively to the end $F$ of constructing a perfectly faithful agent-self. The second-order principles which are normative for the faithful agent define immediate ends of these actions. Thus it may be the case that developing one's talents is an end of action in faith. As we saw above, the pursuit of such an end $E$ contributes to the development of the agent-self in ways characterised by end $F$.

But conversely, since the pursuit of $F$, which is the end defined by the leap of faith, is characterised by its sustaining faith and its motivational power, it therefore contributes to any one of the individual ends $E$ defined by the particular action in faith. Moreover, the agent understands this contribution. It is indeed characteristic of faith that the agent will seek to keep his faith strong (i.e. sustain the leap) so as to ensure the successful pursuit of ends which he is pursuing in pseudonymous authors of Either/Or (Kierkegaard, 1987). This response consists in concluding that the attempt to become a self is doomed to failure: despair plagues the aesthetic sphere while the ethical one runs into the problem of the choice of the ethical standards adopted which this point of view sees as necessarily arbitrary. The conclusion of this mode of existence of religiousness A is that a human being 'arrives at the highest pitch of perfection when he becomes suited to God through becoming absolutely nothing in himself' (Hannay, 1991, p.92). This type of religious attitude leads to internal contradictions since the agent both has to pursue an ideal of perfectly faithful agent-self, but also has to view his annihilation as a goal.
faith. In this way, for any particular end \( E \) defined by faith, the pursuit of \( E \) can be invoked as p-meaningfully justifying the leap of faith. We therefore have mutual p-meaningful support between the ends \( E \) in faith and end \( F \). A reservation must however be made. End \( E \) can only serve for the justification of the leap insofar as end \( E \) is one of the agent's ends in faith. But this is only the case because the agent has already "made" the leap of faith, i.e. has adopted the leap at the third-order level. So the leap of faith, as third-order commitment, is only p-meaningfully justifiable insofar as it has already been adopted\(^1\). That is, once the agent has first made the leap, its further justification is ensured. We shall thus say that the leap is \textit{p-meaningful modulo the leap}. This results from the leap's being a shift of perspective, as pointed out above.

This unusual situation in which a third-order decision (i.e. the leap) is justified by appeal to a second-order end, and no further justification is available, is characteristic of faith insofar as it involves beliefs which are motivating and non-justifiable. This is a situation discussed at the start of the chapter in which a set of mutually justifying ends provides a termination to a string of p-meaningful questions about a form of action. We have thus identified a (modulo the leap) mutually p-meaningfully justifying set of ends, those of constructive faith\(^2\).

\textit{Faith and a-meaning}

The next step of this investigation is the issue of the a-meaning of this (modulo the leap) unconditional set of ends. In line with the definition of a-meaning, it is essential for a-meaning that the agent pursue no other end than those defined by this set. A faith such that all the agent's "active" ends are defined by it is a \textit{committed faith}\(^3\).

It may seem that the pursuit of the perfectly faithful agent-self which characterises all constructive faith already demands such a commitment. This is not the case because constructive faith does not require that all one's "active" ends be brought into the scope of faith. In constructive faith, an agent could pursue other ends. An example would be that of an agent who pursues ends which are antagonistic to those of faith at certain times, and ends in faith at others. This apparently extreme

\footnotesize{\(^1\)The decision to adopt belief \( \Omega \), i.e. to "leap" or shift one's perspective, is a temporally located act which is, in effect, not p-meaningfully justified. The leap, on the other hand, as third-order, is not temporally located. Rather, the agent's faith is sustained through the leap. \(^2\)The stability which emerges from this set of mutually justifying ends is characteristic of the religious life. \(^3\)This characterises Kierkegaard's Religiousness B for instance (Kierkegaard, 1962).}
Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde situation\textsuperscript{17} is not uncommon. It obviously leads to tensions, just as contradictory beliefs do. Another, less extreme instance, is that of the pursuit of ends that are not antagonistic to the aim of the perfectly faithful agent-self - in the sense that they are permissible. Again, tensions will emerge as the faithful agent-self develops. The emergence of such tensions only indicates that a constructive faith "naturally" tends to develop towards a committed one. With the notion of commitment, not only the acts, but also the agent's "active" ends are brought within the scope of faith. Note that, in line with the observation made in the first section of this chapter, if faith is to be a-meaningful, the agent must simultaneously aim to bring \textit{all} his ends within the scope of faith\textsuperscript{18}.

What needs to be examined next is the second requirement for a-meaning, namely whether the set of ends in faith can be understood by the agent to contribute to something absolute. A first observation is that all the ends in faith contribute to the construction of a perfectly faithful agent-self. To this, one may object that this end is but a regulative idea, and thus does not involve an existence claim about an absolute. But we have seen above that, as a result of the adoption of belief $\Omega$, an In-Itself is posited which is the absolute self and which is interpreted in terms informing the agent's idea of perfectly faithful self. Since the agent contributes to the construction of a perfectly faithful self, she can be understood as related to the In-Itself which is thereby posited in faith. This relation can be characterised as a constructive relation to the absolute self. Though one cannot fully grasp what this means, it is enough for a-meaning, to understand it as entailing that the agent's constructive action in committed constructive faith makes a contribution to something absolute, namely the absolute self\textsuperscript{19}. We note that the understanding of this contribution of faith can only exist in faith. For to understand the possibility of such a contribution is already to accept a claim about the absolute.

In conclusion, we have shown that action motivated by constructive faith, as we have defined it, is p-meaningful. It defines a set of ends which are mutually p-meaningfully supportive, modulo the leap. When all of the agent's ends are defined in faith, we have an a-meaningful option, modulo the leap. We have thus

\textsuperscript{17}We thus learn from Arendt (1964, p.17) that Eichmann, undeterred about the task of the mass gassing Jews in Auschwitz, also sought to avoid causing unnecessary suffering in his dealings with others.

\textsuperscript{18}This entails a requirement of self-knowledge to identify them.

\textsuperscript{19}Henceforth, committed constructive faith is understood as a construction contributing to the absolute self.
reconstructed the notion of committed constructive\textsuperscript{20} faith (c-c-faith) first encountered in chapter V on the basis of an interpretation of being human.

**Confronting the motive of faith with reality**

Three concerns have to be addressed before pursuing our examination of other potentially p- or a-meaningful options for action. They all pertain to the covertly hypothetical nature of the previous developments. For what has been described as the motive of faith has not been shown to be a real motivational force. Rather, we have constructed a notion of faith and shown that certain varieties of this faith fulfil conditions for p- and a-meaning. The issue of whether the motive thus described can be a real one has not been addressed. And yet, it is not simply an empirical matter. Rather, it is a matter of how reality bears upon the possibility of such a motive. This raises questions about how to understand the relation between how things are in relation to beliefs $\Omega$ and $\omega$, and about how a motive such as faith can be real.

The first issue leads to the following objection. Since faith posits a transcendent ground $G$, the possibility of $G$'s non-existence raises the specter of this faith's being no more than an illusion. In such a case, what the agent in faith wrongly grasps as a relation to $G$ would not have been shown to be p-meaningful. Since no other grounds for p-meaning are available, this would be p-meaningless action. This lack of p-meaning spreads to all action from faith, regardless of the facts. For such action involves taking the risk of a lack of p-meaning, which is not p-meaningful.

This objection is one to which an answer already exists. However it is raised here because it seems to bring out a problem akin to that of justifications based upon outcomes. Indeed, as we showed in chapter VI, to act only to achieve the realisation of an outcome is not p-meaningful because it may fail to happen.

However, the situation with faith is different. The object of faith is such that no justification of it is relevant to the attitude of faith. This means that the absence of a justification does not affect the motivational power of faith. Thus, facts of the matter about what is essentially an unknowable state of affairs cannot be compared to facts about the as-yet-unknown outcome of an action. This neutralises the force of the analogy underpinning the objection.

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\textsuperscript{20}Constructive' is here understood as implying a belief in a constructive relation to the absolute self. Therefore, $\Omega$ is now best translated as the belief that: *There is a transcendent ground $G$ that I rightly take to mean I ought to act on $\omega$, and I am constructively related to it through my faith.*

148
This is the question:

How can a guardian be any basis for the committed faith?
The second issue is related to the first. Although facts cannot provide any justification which impinges positively or negatively upon faith, there are grounds for being concerned that the interpretation at the core of faith should prove incompatible with the phenomenology of what it is to be human. This concern results from the observation that, although Part Two has interpreted being human as being a *groundless* entity, the interpretation of ground $G$ which is at the core of faith implies there is an *absolute ground* with an individuated dimension the agent is related to (constructively). The mystery that what interprets itself as meaningless should also act from faith in the absolute meaning of its action would appear to involve incompatible interpretations. For how could something groundless be involved in a relation to absolute meaning?

A first answer to the problem of compatibility is that it has already been solved within the context of the interpretative scheme of Part Two. Indeed we saw, in chapter V, that the notion of the Quest provides a link between the facticity of Dasein and the absolute self which is set as task. There is however a need to show compatibility without appealing to this interpretative scheme. The argument runs as follows. The object of c-c-faith features an absolute self to which the relation of the agent in faith is a constructive one. Were the construction of the perfectly faithful self to be complete, the agent would no longer be in this relation with an absolute self since the relation is defined as constructive. This means that, were the object of faith realisable in the world, c-c-faith in an absolute would be a self-destructive motive. The object of faith can therefore not define an end that is realisable in the world\textsuperscript{21}. Since it is not incompatible to interpret oneself as groundless on the one hand, and on the other, to understand oneself as in a process of becoming, a becoming directed to an absolutely meaningful unrealisable end, the agent can interpret himself as groundless but simultaneously constructively related to an absolute self\textsuperscript{22}.

The third issue is that of understanding how faith, with its belief $\Omega$ and beliefs $\omega$ can come about, i.e. can become operative in an agent. This important issue of the *reality* of faith is outstanding insofar as it remains to be shown how a belief $\Omega$ involving an interpretation of ground $G$ can emerge where previously no such belief was held. And when trying to give an account of this, a vicious circle looms.

\textsuperscript{21}As in Kierkegaard's Religiousness B, this indicates the gulf between the 'finite' and 'infinite' selves (Kierkegaard, 1962).

\textsuperscript{22}This notion of task can provide a concept of moral progress which replaces that of progression towards the Highest Good. We shall return to this notion of progress in the final chapter.
For it does not seem possible to act from the motive of faith unless one has an interpretation of ground \( G \), i.e. the absolute [self]. But, such an interpretation is only available for the agent in faith. It therefore seems that the leap cannot become operational since no such object is available prior to the leap.

Considering first the case of purely p-meaningful (modulo the leap) faith, the agent only need choose an interpretation. Since p-meaning is all that is required, any interpretation of the absolute self would enable the leap to be p-meaningful. This does not amount to showing the reality of such faith, but this is an empirical matter. There is no further theoretical problem about the reality of such faith.

In the case of a-meaningful faith, however, we encounter a problem in showing the reality of such a motive. For, recall that the definition of a-meaning contains a requirement that the agent be able to understand his action as contributing to something that transcends his ends. This we found to be fulfilled if faith was understood as involving a constructive relation to ground \( G \). Although the agent has no epistemic access to \( G \) insofar as it is an absolute, this constructive relation to it must translate in terms of constraints upon it. The very nature of that which is thus posited defines constraints for action that contributes to it, in the same way that the construction of a house is constrained through the laws of gravity. Were there no constraints, the agent could posit anything as a-meaningful and the claim that he is related to something external would be invalidated by this arbitrariness. This would be a situation in which, although possible in principle, c-c-faith could not be implemented since reality would not lend itself to the understanding required by a-meaning. Hence there must be constraints upon action, and therefore upon the interpretation of \( G \) which informs it, i.e. constraints that follow immediately from positing \( G \). These will define policies of action (second-order principles) for the agent to implement. The development of an interpretation can then follow with these policies as starting point. That such crucial constraints can be identified for c-c-faith will in fact be seen from examining the next option for p- and a-meaningful action, i.e. duty.

This concludes the theoretical issue of the reality of c-c-faith. Although philosophical argument can only address objections and not show the reality of c-c-faith since it is an empirical matter, we can draw support on this issue from the phenomenological analyses of Part Two. These have identified authenticity as involving c-c-faith in an absolute [self]. This means that such a leap of faith is interpretable as that which defines a proper grasp of one's humanity: this provides strong phenomenological support for the claim it is real.

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4. Duty

We observed, in our brief analysis of chapter VI, that giving an unconditional requirement does not obviously seem able to provide p-meaning to our action, let alone a-meaning therefore. Before examining these issues, let us first clarify the notion of duty as introduced in chapter VI.

**Duty: universal and particular**

Duty has been defined as unconditionally justified action, whereby the nature of the unconditional requirement is not specified. One case of duty is that of action justified unconditionally and universally. This is _u-duty_ and chapter I has shown that, should such a universal practical norm exist, it amounts to action defined by a second-order principle falling under {CI}. Another case of duty would be that of an unconditional requirement specified individually for each agent.

P-meaningful justification for action instantiating the latter type of duty would involve accounting for why the unconditional requirement in question applies to this particular agent. And for this, all options for p-meaningful justification are potentially open. Below, we shall identify an instance of such a justification when examining the link between duty and a-meaning. First, we must examine the issue of the p-meaning of _u-duty_.

**U-duty and p-meaning**

Chapter III has shown that the mere recognition of an action as right in terms of _u-duty_ does not constitute a ground for action. Moreover, we specified what is lacking: it is only insofar as I understand that the action is right for me as agent in situation with ends, that I shall have a p-meaningful ground for action. This is the key to the foundational and motivational problems of chapters II and III.

P-meaning could be demonstrated, were action out of _u-duty_ to define an end for the agent. This would lead to a situation akin to that of action out of faith, so that an argument analogous to that showing the p-meaning of action from faith could be constructed\(^{23}\). Chapter II has shown that a notion of end for action from _u-duty_ can be identified, that of the morally worthy agent-self. This does not, however, define a determinate end because of the indeterminacy shown in chapter I.

\(^{23}\)The purported end for action from duty, i.e. the perfectly dutifully good agent-self would of course play the rôle of the perfectly faithful agent-self in the leap of faith, and the purposes of each dutiful action would play the rôle of the ends defined in faith. These ends would mutually p-meaningfully justify one another.
However, it does point to the solution to the ultimate justification of action that will emerge in this chapter. Namely, grounds have to be found for the identification of an end that can further determine the notion of perfectly dutiful agent-self. The resulting form of duty would additionally be endowed with a-meaning, were this end a-meaningful. A preliminary step in constructing a solution will now be examined. It involves establishing a connection between u-duty and a-meaning.

Duty and a-meaning

If one acts a-meaningfully, this act contributes to at least one of a set of ends whose unconditional justification provides an end to the sequence of p-meaningful justifications of the act. Therefore, the whole of the agent's action in pursuit of all these ends can be viewed as an instantiation of duty as unconditionally justified action. What does this say about the particular a-meaningful act? It is a-meaningful insofar as it is carried out because of the rightness of the whole of the set of a-meaningful ends. Therefore, the maxim representing it can be viewed as falling under a second-order principle encapsulating the requirement to act towards one of the a-meaningful ends. This principle has the particularity of being one of duty and therefore the maxim is that of an implementation of duty. A-meaningful action therefore represents an implementation of a principle of duty.

Let us now examine the link with u-duty. For this, let us recall the other feature of a-meaningful action, namely that it contributes to an absolute. This, therefore defines a notion of unconditional good. From chapter I, we know that, if there is an unconditional good, a universal dimension of this unconditional good can be identified as the will of an agent acting according to a second-order principle falling under \{CI\}. We can therefore infer that \{CI\} is one of the laws of a-

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24 The motivational issue must be clarified. The good will is that of an agent acting from a motive which is the universalisability of the type of action. If that is all that is involved in the motivation to act, we have a case of u-duty (the only case considered by Kant who equates unconditional good and universally unconditional good). But there could be more to the agent's motivation. If we consider a-meaningful action, in general, it is easy to show that the motivation involved has to be the unconditionality of the form of the action as such - else the action would depend upon contingencies defining the motivation (we have already come to the same conclusion for action from duty in chapter VI). Therefore, if we assume there is a-meaningful action, and therefore an unconditional good, the motivation may first take the form of a motive to do that which is universally unconditionally good because it is so. But, and this is where the motive is distinct from u-duty, the motivational story is not exhausted by this universal dimension - and we shall see an instance of this with the case of dutiful faith. Note that, in principle, the order in which the components of the motivation operate could be reversed. We shall however see, in chapter VIII, that this is not feasible for the only possible a-meaningful form of action identified in this chapter.
meaningful action. Therefore the present argument entails a justification of the validity of the Categorical Imperative as principle of action, conditionally upon the requirement that action participate in a-meaning.

5. Dutiful faith

P- and a-meaningful options for action

Let us summarize the options available for p- and a-meaningful action.

1. The pursuit of happiness, dependent or not upon the outcome, can be p-meaningful. It however leaves open the further justification of the agent's choices (and a fortiori is not a-meaningful).

2. Constructive faith is a p-meaningful option which defines a set of mutually p-meaningfully justifiable ends, from the perspective of the leap of faith. The further issue of the p-meaning of this set of ends is not thereby addressed.

3. Committed constructive faith is a fortiori p-meaningful, but additionally, potentially a-meaningful for the agent in faith. The potentiality would become actuality were the problem discussed above of the reality of such a notion elucidated. Let us return to this issue.

Duty and faith

The identification of \{Cl\} as a principle of a-meaningful action is an important result, given what we have so far obtained in terms of a-meaningful options. Only action from c-c-faith has been found to be a-meaningful (from the point of view of the agent in faith). But, as we saw previously, the issue of the reality of such a motive is an unsolved problem. We have shown the need to identify constraints which could guide the interpretation central to c-c-faith. The result we now have, however, is that, insofar as c-c-faith is a-meaningful (modulo the leap), action in c-c-faith must respect the constraints defined by \{Cl\}. In other words, \{Cl\} provides the constraints required for the interpretation of the absolute [self] at the heart of c-c-faith. This is a key rôle which \{Cl\} - and therefore u-duty - plays, since it meets the condition for the reality of the motive of c-c-faith. Without it, c-c-faith would still be a mere theoretical construct. We shall return to the implications of this rôles of u-duty in chapter VIII.

What this entails practically is that the process of interpretation of the absolute [self] can be used to address the indeterminacies discussed in chapter I. How this might be achieved is a question we shall answer in chapter VIII. By thus
presenting the interpretation of the absolute [self] as contributing to the further
determination of the principles of u-duty, the resulting determinate action will be
a form of action characterised by its involving doing what is right for all and
additionally right for the agent in her particularity. The notion of duty which is
instantiated in this a-meaningful action is thus more specific than u-duty. Because
it is operative within faith, it will be referred to as dutiful faith.25

We can moreover specify in what sense this notion of duty differs from u-duty.
For in the requirement of duty, the formula 'do what is right because it is right'
leaves it open in what sense the agent is epistemically related to the rightness of
the act. If this link is fully justified belief, then the formula amounts to 'do what is
right because it is fully justified'. In the case of dutiful faith, we have the only other
option we know of, which could be substituted for such a link, that of the
essentially non-justifiable rightness which is an object of faith. The formula then
amounts to: 'do what is right because it is grounded in faith'.

Motive of duty and incentive of faith
This clarification of the rôles of faith and duty within the notion of dutiful faith
can be presented in terms of the three-tier structure of principles at the core of Part
One, by distinguishing between an incentive and a motive for action.
The incentive is, as the term has been used in chapter I, that which is incorporated
into the second-order principles of action.26 It is at the third-order level that the
choice of the incentive takes place. This may involve a principle, such as (Cl), or
none (in the case of action from inclination). A third-order principle's being
operative means a corresponding incentive is being chosen. This third-order level
provides the justification for an action, insofar as an agent chooses an incentive
because it is a sufficient ground for action. In the case of c-c-faith, the incentive
involved is the leap of faith which posits the existence of an absolute ground,
featuring the absolute self, which I am constructively committed to. We shall refer
to it as the incentive of (c-c-)faith.

25U-duty, in of itself, does not lead to positing any notion of absolute self as hypostatisation of the regulative
idea of the morally worthy self. In CPrR (pp122-126), Kant's claims that reason formulates postulates
concerning the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, represent such a positing. But this step is
only taken insofar as action from u-duty has, for Kant, been given a grounding in the fact of reason: it is
reason which leads the agent to adopt such beliefs which constitute what Kant calls 'rational faith'. A key
claim of this thesis is the need to invert the explanatory rôles of duty and faith, whereby the proposed notion
of faith is sufficient for dutiful requirements to be derived.

26Allison (1990, 1996) uses the word 'incorporation', employed by Kant (1960, p.19) in his Religion book,
but which is already present in the idea of action on the conception of law in GMM (412). This is defined as
the agent's choosing an incentive (e.g. desire) as ground for action, by incorporating it into his principle or
maxim.
The issue of the principles which are operative when this incentive of faith is activated will be dealt with in chapter VIII - although one is already known: it is (Cl). In Kantian terms, the choice of incentive to act is an intelligible one. As pointed out in chapter II, however, we have no understanding of the reasons for acting upon one incentive rather than another at this intelligible level. The notion of agent-self was introduced to remedy this. At this second-order level, an explanation of the action is provided. One talks of the motivation to act, a term which presents the incentive with a background to it, namely the background of the agent-self and her characteristic behavioural structures and principles. In choosing duty in c-c-faith, the agent-self is determining the incentive of c-c-faith in an absolute [self] as that to be incorporated into the principle of action. This determination against a given background, is an interpretation, namely one of the idea of the absolute [self], object of c-c-faith, in terms of second-order principles of action. The motive of duty has thus been given roots in the incentive of c-c-faith. And the distinction incentive/motive thus maps onto that between justification and explanation corresponding to third- and second-order principles of action respectively. In chapter VIII, we shall examine the consequences of this duality of incentive and motive for the motivational problem discussed in Part One.

*Internalism of faith*

An immediate consequence of the above discussion must be mentioned before returning to the issue of grounds for action. Kant's intelligible story of the agent choosing to act from duty because it is rational is an internalist one in that it assigns a key rôle to the belief in reasons for action (Korsgaard, 1986, p.8-11). Kant also has another story about the genesis of an action, i.e. that involving the empirical character. And Kant presents it in such a way that 'it is only in the light of this character that man can be studied - if, that is to say, we are simply observing' (CPR, A550). This story is an externalist account of action. That it is not a sufficient account (CPR, A534), amounts to saying that an internalist story is required. This is clear, for Kant, when considering action from duty. Here, the intelligible story is that a reason (duty) is freely taken as sufficient for action. We have however suggested in chapter II that these two stories are not able to adequately represent the agent's deliberation.

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I take it that this is indeed the usual meaning of the concept of motivation: when one asks about why an agent is motivated to do X, the issue is that of explaining how a certain incentive appears from this agent's perspective, to see whether it promotes action in line with his past behaviour or adopted principles.
We have now wedged an account in terms of an agent-self and the individuated motive of duty between the intelligible (third-order) and the empirical (first-order) accounts. This is internalist insofar as it operates with a motive chosen by the subject. However, this motive is not a reason for action in the sense in which the incentive of faith is. It is a ground which makes sense to the agent-self against a background of behavioural structures and principles characterising the agent-self in faith. In other words, it is faith which sustains the p-meaningfulness of this ground, i.e. which makes it a reason for action. This suggests that this account is best represented as describing an internalism of faith. In other words, in faith, it is the case that the belief in a reason for action motivates an agent-self. It is a form of internalism which differs from belief internalism in that it only makes the claim that beliefs in faith have motivational power.

6. The ultimate ground of action
To identify the ultimate ground of action, we must examine whether, given the possible p-meaningful grounds for action identified previously, any one form of action has p-meaningful precedence, as defined in chapter VI. This means that, although several options have been found to be p-meaningful when considered in isolation, the issue now is that of the p-meaningfulness of the agent's choice when faced with these options.

The requirement of a-meaning
A form of action which has p-meaningful precedence over any other determines an ultimate ground for action. The options of the pursuit of happiness and a non-committed but constructive faith leave p-meaningful questions unanswered, and are therefore not what we are seeking. It can therefore be claimed that the only option left, namely that of c-c-faith in an absolute [self] as it has now been enriched in the form of dutiful faith, is the only candidate left. For this provides, at least from the perspective of the leap, full justification for action. And therefore c-c-faith in an absolute self is the ultimate ground of action.
However, this conclusion may need strengthening for two reasons. First, the problem is that a-meaning is achieved, but only from the perspective of the leap. Since there is a potentially unjustified leap that needs to be "made", it could be

28That this internalism of faith is compatible with the internalism of Kant's intelligible picture follows from the identification, in chapter VIII, of the act of taking an incentive as sufficient for action, as an act of faith. In this way, faith underpins the taking of reasons as motivating.
argued that it is not p-meaningfully clear that we are better off opting for this leap than living with unanswered issues of p-meaning. Second, although the notion of p-meaning is uncontroversial and provides a solid ground to the foundational analysis of these two chapters, the extension of its scope to a-meaning may encounter more resistance (see footnote 4).

Our task is therefore to show in what sense the existence of an a-meaningful option represents a vastly superior option in terms of p-meaning itself. The argument is as follows.

1. I choose a form of action because it is p-meaningful insofar as it furthers the ends I have. These ends are not fixed in time and it is possible for an action which furthers an end which I now have, not to be p-meaningful with regard to the ends I shall have in the future.

The situation is however different with action participating in a-meaning. Indeed, we know from c-c-faith's being the only a-meaningful option (modulo the leap) that, since my current action is viewed as participating in a-meaning, it serves in a constructive relation to a self posited as having absolute value. This construction, as a-meaningful, is a fortiori p-meaningful for the agent-self in its future development, since a-meaning is unconditional p-meaning. More specifically, I am now acting in a way which contributes to the development of an agent-self that will further certain future ends it considers p-meaningful. Therefore, my current a-meaningful action's participation in a-meaning is p-meaningful for possible future p-meaningful ends.

We have therefore established that mere p-meaningfulness for my current ends does not carry into the future and only a-meaningfulness of my current action is p-meaningful for potential future ends.

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29This can be expressed formally. Let us use the relational notation A(E:S) to indicate that the pursuit of end E is absolutely meaningful, and thus contributes to the development S of a perfectly faithful agent-self. If we now denote D any form of the development of the agent self, with the notation from chapter VI, we can write M(D,F) to indicate that this development is p-meaningful with respect to the pursuit of any end F which it adopts subsequently. This is because it contributes to it at least in the minimal sense that it enables it to become an end, which is the first step towards pursuing it. Considering the case of D = S, insofar as S is a-meaningful, the p-meaning of the contribution to F is simply the a-meaning of S viewed against the background of the pursuit of F. This results from the fact that insofar as an a-meaningful pursuit includes all the agent's ends, there can be no p-meaning beyond it. Therefore, the pursuit of end E contributes to the pursuit of F, and we can write M(E,F). We therefore have the following result:

\[(\forall F) [A(E:S) \land M(S,F)] \rightarrow M(E,F).\]

We note that the A relation could not be replaced by an M relation here, i.e. M is not transitive.

30This may appear puzzling insofar as one can easily imagine becoming a rather different type of person disapproving of one's former decisions. However, it remains the case that, insofar as one's action contributed to constructing an a-meaningful self, it is p-meaningful with respect to any new active ends one has now.
2. In seeking to act p-meaningfully, I consider the consequences of my action in the future to see if the proposed action furthers my ends. Of future ends of mine, I however have no knowledge, except that they will be mine. If there is an a-meaningful form of action, it is the only one I can know to further those ends which I shall have in the future. Consequently, with regard to the time which lies ahead beyond the conclusion of my current action, it cannot be p-meaningful to act in a way which is not a-meaningful. Finally, let us now lift this condition of taking the perspective afforded by the time lying ahead.

3. Action which participates in a-meaning is such that it is p-meaningful with respect to the large number of future ends which I know nothing about at present, except that they will exist; this is not necessarily the case for merely p-meaningful action. On the basis of quantity ranking, a-meaningful action thus has p-meaningful precedence.

Action that participates in a-meaning is p-meaningful with respect to an end, regardless of how it may evolve in the future, and therefore will further such an end to a greater degree than non a-meaningful action. On the basis of quality ranking, a-meaningful action thus has p-meaningful precedence.

It follows that, with regard to the many options one has for action, one is p-meaningfully required to act a-meaningfully. This confirms the notion of a-meaning as providing the required extension of p-meaning. Moreover, insofar as the range of ends which account for the quantitative and qualitative priorities identified above, is a vast one indeed, these priorities outweigh the lack of p-meaning involved in first making the leap, so that action in c-c-faith is the only p-meaningfully grounded form of action.

This argument has established the p-meaningful precedence of a-meaningful action (and of action which is a-meaningful conditional upon a leap) by showing that a-meaning is required for p-meaning over time. That the temporal dimension of choices should be the key to the argument is not surprising given the conclusion reached in chapter IV which states that an inadequate understanding of time is a pre-condition of inauthenticity. The latter can thus only be eliminated as an option by focussing upon the rôle of time.

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31 Here we see how bad faith attempts to find a way out by seeking to behave so that one never reaches the end of the current action in an endless process of completion of an in-itself, thus imitating the construction of a self but without the leap of faith sustaining it and allowing for absoluteness to be posited, as it replaces this with the reassuring immobility of the in-itself.
An objection could be made to drawing future ends into the argument. This consists in claiming that we have applied the criterion of p-meaningfulness beyond its domain of validity, namely to ends which we can know nothing about now and therefore cannot in any way seek to further now. In fact, we do know that these ends will exist - barring immediate death of the agent. The thrust of the argument has then precisely been based upon showing that one can act in a way which furthers them now, if one is acting in a way which participates in a-meaning. This is therefore compatible with the observation that other p-meaningful action need not take these ends into account. But when comparing p-meaningful actions, any relevant ends (e.g. future) can be used. This implies a limited sense of responsibility for the future. Another objection would involve pointing out that, although the requirement of p-meaning commands broad agreement, this requirement of a-meaning is only derived from it as result of a philosophical argument and this suggests that it may not be possible for the non-philosopher to know how to make the right choice, i.e. that which ultimately fulfils the requirement of p-meaning. This is where the understanding gained in Part Two is crucial: this shows that we are best interpreted as Quest for a-meaning. In other words, without philosophical argument, a-meaning will still be sought since that is what it is to be human.

In conclusion, we may formulate the following:
The only form of action with an ultimate justification satisfying the requirement of p-meaning is that grounded in a faith involving a dutiful commitment to a notion of absolute [self]. The empirical reality of an individuated interpretation of the absolute self is constructed through the action this faith motivates. This fully defines ethical action and characterises an ethical theory, the Ethics of Dutiful Faith. The requirement to act from second-order principles falling under (CI) follows from this conclusion together with the requirement conditional upon a-meaning stated earlier. This solves the foundational problem. Although the notion

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32It is limited in comparison with, for instance, the kind of principle of responsibility proposed by Hans Jonas (1994) which has regard to the consequences of our actions upon future generations. And it is distinct from that and other views about responsibility for the future which are consequentially based.

33Let us note how this compares with Korsgaard's teleological reconstruction of Kant's grounding in the fact of reason (chapter III). There is a certain convergence insofar as the quest in c-c-faith guided by a-meaning is comparable to the rational agent's pursuit of a higher vocation given by her intelligible nature. My proposed grounding is not based upon any fact but requires a stronger bond: one is required to commit oneself to a notion of self whose absolute nature implies that one is committed to acting out of duty. Nothing can therefore ever appear more important to me in any circumstance since this is that in which any action of mine ultimately finds its grounding insofar as it is my action.
of moral motivation has thereby been clarified, the motivational problem can only be fully addressed once the issue of further determination has been dealt with in chapter VIII.

The notion of duty involved in ethical action is 'thicker' than Kant would have it. It is endowed with an end determined through the individuation of the absolute self. This end of the perfectly faithful agent-self coincides with a 'thickening' of the concept of the morally worthy agent self (chapter II). The notion of unconditional good attached to it is thus no longer only universally binding, but has individuated features. It thereby provides a confirmation of the diagnosis in Part One of the common source of the problems identified in Kant's ethics. In chapter VIII, we shall see how this understanding of ethical action leads to the further determination of an agent's dutiful choices.

Dutiful faith and happiness

The notion of absolute self which defines a goal for c-c-faith encapsulates the idea of that which is right for the agent. Now, since action from such faith is a construction of a practical agent-self, the further action the agent engages in will become more and more fitting to the self which is being constructed as the process of construction is carried on. As we saw in chapter II in the case of universal duty, this means that through the process of becoming herself, the agent's inclinations will be altered so that she develops the inclination to do that which she is committed to doing. Acting out of one's commitment will thus become more congenial to the agent. What results from this feeling of adequacy is a form of well-being which serves as a notion of happiness.

The aim of perfectly faithful agent-self defined by the individuated notion of absolute self is unrealisable, as pointed out earlier. This implies that the full happiness accruing from the commitment is also an unrealisable end. But the specific rôle of happiness among the ends which are those of the ethical agent is to constitute an object of hope. For this hope is for a state in which the actions one is performing are in complete harmony with the interpreted notion of one's absolute self; and the ethical agent is committed to this latter notion as the right one for him. This conclusion brings the agent in a hopeful relation to a certain state of happiness, as opposed to one which he can postulate on rational grounds as in Kant's Dialectic (CPrR, 122).
Conclusions

Summary of the main results of the foundational investigation

In this chapter, three types of action were examined for p- and a-meaning. Both the pursuit of happiness and action motivated by faith can define p-meaningful action, although only constructive faith can provide an end to a string of questions of p-meaningful justification (modulo the leap). Action in c-c-faith emerges as the only a-meaningful type of action (modulo the leap), whereby the reality of this motive as a-meaningful is theoretically ensured by the fact that the agent in faith ought to act according to [Cl]. This defines dutiful faith whose a-meaning makes it the ultimate ground for action.

This chapter has thus defined ethical action: it is the good will of the agent who makes the leap of c-c-faith in an absolute [self]. This is in accordance with the substance of Kant’s Ethics in that the good will acts from duty, but it also fleshes out the notion of duty through that of c-c-faith. It thus defines a broader conception of the unconditional good.

A key claim of this thesis is that this broader conception of the Ethics of Dutiful Faith, can deal with the problems in Kant’s ethics identified in Part One. That this is the case involves solving the indeterminacy, motivational and foundational problems. In this chapter, we have seen how the individuation of the notion of duty provides a grounding for action falling under [Cl], and thus addresses the foundational problem. The indeterminacy problem requires that we examine how the good will makes practical choices. This is a task for the next chapter. The complete motivational problem is also best addressed in chapter VIII insofar as the principles of further determination of duty shed light on the nature of this moral motivation. By addressing these issues, the nature of the concept of the unconditional good will be further specified.

A methodological remark

Finally, the methodological meaning of the results of this chapter should be brought into focus as it impinges upon the tasks of chapter VIII. A notion of quest directed towards an absolute self, and involving an interpretation of it, has hereby been identified in the form of the construction involved in c-c-faith. This fulfills a rôle related to that of the Quest for a-meaning in Part Two and the next chapter will briefly address the task of specifying the link between the two.
Individualism - Realisation
While Part Two was an enquiry into the nature of what it is to be human, in these last two chapters, we have sought to understand human action by identifying the basic characteristic of p-meaning and examining which actions possess it. The two approaches complement one another: starting from an enquiry into what I am, I am led to interpret myself as a Quest and thus identify a normative praxis, the goal of which is a-meaningful. Starting from an enquiry into human praxis I am led to a requirement upon my actions, namely that they contribute to a process of committed construction which relates my agency to an absolute. They both lead to the conclusion that what it is to be an *individuated* human being is to be involved in c-c-faith in an absolute [self], where the notion of *individuated* human being is here taken as having a normative dimension: it is an authentic human being in Part Two, and a human being acting p-meaningfully here. The complementarity of these approaches is further analysed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER VIII

An ethics based upon dutiful faith

Introduction
In the last chapter, a new ethical theory, the Ethics of Dutiful Faith (hereafter, EDF) has been characterised in three ways: in terms of its normative properties; in terms of its basic motivational features; in terms of its core set of concepts, those of c-c-faith in an absolute [self], hope and duty. Insofar as this includes the Kantian notion of u-duty, the key results of the analysis of Kant's ethics in chapters I and II (formulation of [CI], notions of moral worth, ...) are valid for the EDF.

Of the questions raised by Kantian Ethics in Part One, the foundational problem has been addressed in chapter VII. To tackle the indeterminacy and motivational problems, a further development of the key concepts of the EDF, together with an understanding of how they impinge upon our practice, are required.

In the first section of this chapter, the conceptual framework of the EDF is developed by deriving third-order principles of c-c-faith which address the indeterminacy problem. The second and third sections are aimed at further developing an understanding of the relation between the EDF and human practice. In the second section, the connections we have already indicated between the core concepts of the EDF and the phenomenological interpretations of Part Two, are analysed. This serves both the purpose of ensuring the unity of the claims in Parts Two and Three of the thesis, as well as providing a grasp of the contribution of the EDF to the understanding of human practice. The third section sets out the answer provided by the EDF to the motivational problem of Kantian Ethics. This also provides a clearer understanding of the way in which the key principle of the EDF is to be implemented in practice. The chapter concludes with an attempt to better circumscribe both the notion of the unconditional good and the meaning of the key principles of the EDF in terms of Kant's critical philosophy. This chapter thus aims to contribute to a deeper grasp of the EDF's notion of
responsibility of the ONE
unconditional good while answering the questions raised by Kantian Ethics in Part One.

1. The Principles of the Ethics of Dutiful Faith
To define the principles of the Ethics of Dutiful Faith, the only material available are the definitions of the motive and the incentive characterising ethical action, and a set of constraints, those of u-duty, which are required by the a-meaning of this action. A first observation is that the principles which are to characterise dutiful faith cannot simply be a set of principles that are independent of the Categorical Imperative. For this would lead to potential conflict. Insofar as these principles are thus necessarily related, it seems reasonable to take \{CI\} as our starting point and to further reflect upon the rôle of action on principles falling under \{CI\} - i.e. u-dutiful action - at the heart of dutiful faith. This will lead us to identifying the central source of determinacy of the EDF. Understanding the notion of responsibility for one's other that is thus identified, is presented as involving a form of moral progress. The practical implications of this central source of determinacy are then given a first outline at the end of this section.

Duty and the other
As shown in chapter VII, what makes it possible for a motive like c-c-faith to be a real a-meaningful motive, is the fact that the existence of constraints of duty allows it to be viewed as contributing to a transcendent goal. Reflecting upon the meaning of this rôle of u-duty, we may first observe that u-duty is to be understood as that which manifests itself through the faculty of reason as a dimension of the unconditional good. This dimension is revealed once the leap of faith has been made. It is therefore not the case that c-c-faith is blind. Rather, the unconditional good manifests itself through the constraints of universal duty. This manifest dimension of the unconditional good will therefore define the core of the ethics of the agent in c-c-faith. Insofar as the unconditional good is not a collection of unrelated parts, but all dimensions must be interlinked to ensure the unity of the notion, the principles of the EDF must be based upon a proper understanding of this central rôle of the universalist dimension of the unconditional good.
To achieve such an understanding, we may use the ethical categories suggested in chapter I\(^1\). These categories identify basic forms of the determination of action, just

\(^{1}\)The argument does not rely upon the validity of exactly these ethical categories.
as the categories of pure reason correspond to the different ways in which the unity of a judgement can be determined. They are the categories of quantity, quality, relation to other purposes and practical normative value. These categories can only determine action if applied to principles of action. This is where the results of chapter VII about the central rôle of u-duty can be used. For we know, first, that some principles must be given as constraints if there is to be a-meaningful action, and second, that action in c-c-faith must fall under (CI). This means that we have second-order principles to further determine under the different categories: they are those of u-duty. These ensure the reality of c-c-faith by representing a universally binding component of the constructive contribution the agent in c-c-faith makes to the absolute self in the same way as the constraints of gravity are constitutive of what it is for a pile of bricks to be a house. The constraints of u-duty can then be further determined according to the ethical categories in the same way as those of gravity are in a house, through its geometrical and material properties, in terms of the objectives (safety, cost, aesthetics...) defining the design of supporting columns, beams, etc. Just as it is the relation to an absolute independent of the agent's ends which led us in chapter VII to identify the necessity of constraints - those of u-duty - for the reality of a-meaningful faith, it is the fact that a pile of bricks is to be transformed into a house in the real world that imposes constraints - those of gravity. Inasmuch as gravitational parameters constitute the fabric of the house, the constraints of u-duty, by making c-c-faith real, are constitutive of the a-meaning of an action in c-c-faith.

The issue can be seen as analogous to that which characterises the transcendental conditions for empirical experience. For, as Kant says, epistemic categories without intuition are without significance (CPR, B298-299). This means that no (new) knowledge can be derived from simply forming judgements using the categories. To obtain knowledge about the empirical world, synthetic judgements are required and it is only through a manifold given in intuition that such syntheses are possible. In the moral domain, principles are required which can form the focus of further determination that comes about when the ethical categories are applied. These principles are the moral equivalent of the manifold in intuition insofar as they result from applying a third-order principle, the Categorical Imperative, which plays the rôle of the pure forms of intuition of space & time, to a practical situation (e.g. a situation involving a promise, truth-telling,
This means that the practical situation corresponds to the matter of sensation, i.e. the practical situation is the *matter of morality*, or the content of the moral manifold. The analogy can be summarised in the following schematic:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical domain</th>
<th>Practical domain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Epistemic categories</td>
<td>• Ethical categories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Intuition</td>
<td>• Second-order principle of u-duty(^3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>= Manifold <em>in Space and Time</em></td>
<td>= {Cl} applied to a situation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With this analogy, Kant's claim that, without intuition, epistemic categories are without sense corresponds to the claim we are making, namely that without second-order principles of duty, there is no *real* p- or a-meaning of ethical action (in c-c-faith)\(^4\). But this analogy further brings out the fact that what constitutes the reality of this p- and a-meaning is the practical situation which is the matter of morality, together with \{Cl\}\(^5\).

What is now needed is to remember a key feature pointed out in chapter I about the nature of the principles falling under \{Cl\}. We saw that all direct duties are duties applying to situations defining our relations with others - e.g. promise holding, truth-telling, helping... In other words, the matter of morality is a practical situation involving another agent. In the table above, we can therefore replace the last entry by: "\=\{Cl\} applied to a situation involving the other".

In summary, situations involving other agents, together with \{Cl\}, are the conditions for the reality of the motive of c-c-faith. They are thus necessary, *qua* constitutive of the reality of the p- and a-meaning of faith, and thus of a-meaning as such (since only action in c-c-faith is a-meaningful - modulo the leap). It is these conditions which will yield the principles of the EDF. \{Cl\} is already in place as

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\(^2\)The difference with the theoretical case is that there is nothing corresponding to a pure manifold of intuition such as that which Kant claims to be involved in geometry for instance. In the practical case one cannot derive any principle of duty from \{Cl\} alone, i.e. without considering a practical situation.

\(^3\)This is a principle of u-duty and thus in an under-determined form, i.e. identified purely on the basis of \{Cl\}.

\(^4\)We note that the analogy does not say that there is no p- or a-meaning without the principles of u-duty, rather that there is no reality to this p- or a-meaning. This corresponds to the claim in (CPR, A329/B385) that there can be meaning when the epistemic categories are used alone, although this dispenses no knowledge of the world.

\(^5\)Using this analogy with the epistemic situation, we can see the need for constraints of u-duty to be analogous to the need for the matter of sensation. In the first case, it ensures one can indeed understand one's a-meaningful action as contributing to something independent of one's ends (chapter VII). In the second, it ensures one is indeed making judgements about the world as opposed to speculating without truth-criteria.
Absolute self \rightarrow \text{ other self}

What about Kantian
Free in itself

Has he given good reasons for responsibility?
one of its third-order principles. The new ones are therefore to be obtained from understanding the necessary constitutive rôle of situations involving the other.

The interpretation in c-c-faith

Such an understanding can only be obtained within an interpretation. As c-c-faith involves an interpretation of the absolute self, let us examine how this can provide the required understanding. We have just identified the rôle of the other as necessary condition for the reality of the a-meaning of ethical action (c-c-faith). But the interpretation of the absolute self characterising c-c-faith must be compatible with these conditions, else it would not be adequate to providing a-meaning. It must therefore be compatible with the rôle of the other. More precisely, since by constituting the reality of a-meaning, situations involving the other are necessary conditions of a-meaning, the interpretation of the absolute self must take the other qua potentially involved in a situation of mine, as contributing a necessary condition to the a-meaning of my interpretation.

To progress further, we note that the other, as she features in my duty, is an agent, i.e. has ends, and is thus herself potentially in c-c-faith, and therefore potentially committedly and constructively related to the absolute self in her own interpretation of it. From the above, situations involving the other constitute the a-meaning of my action while the other is potentially involved in her own constructive process. This means I must interpret the other as an agent who simultaneously contributes to the a-meaning of my interpretation and potentially is thereby engaged in a-meaningful action. In other words, the other's constructive process in a-meaning may contribute to the a-meaning of my a-meaningful constructive process. And because the same argument can be developed from the other's point of view, my a-meaningful constructive process potentially contributes to the other's. This entails that the action in c-c-faith of the other and myself must be understood to form a single constructive process. In other words, my interpretation of the absolute self in c-c-faith must be such that it understands the other as potentially involved, as constructor, in the same construction as I.

What are the moral implications of this requirement? Insofar as I am in c-c-faith, I am responsible for all aspects of my constructive relation to the absolute self. This is because this relation is my construction and I am responsible for my action, and thus for this constructive process. But since this is also potentially the other's constructive process in c-c-faith, I am responsible for the other qua potentially involved in my construction in c-c-faith. I shall refer to this as responsibility for my other.
This responsibility means that the other is to be viewed in c-c-faith as the object of the same concern as that which I have for myself. To further understand what this entails in terms of moral practice, we should examine the relation between my and the other's c-c-faith. We shall do this in three stages. Note that these will not amount to a re-derivation of the notion of responsibility for my other, but rather a re-construction of this notion through an examination of what the notion of responsibility involves.

Responsibility vis-à-vis the other
First, insofar as the other is indeed potentially in c-c-faith, I must respect him in my c-c-faith. This means, not only that I must treat the other in accordance with the requirement of u-duty, but also, that I must respect his potential choice of interpretation of the absolute self as individuated for him. This defines a notion of responsibility vis-à-vis the other. It is a recognition of the validity of the other's potential constructive process in c-c-faith. This means that my choices must be compatible with the other's being able to choose his individual interpretation of the absolute self. This weak notion of compatibility may be expressed as a requirement of tolerance of the other's choices:

**Principle of Tolerance**

\[
\{P_T\}: \text{One ought to formulate principles that respect the other's setting his own a-meaningful ends (i.e. the other's construction of his self).}
\]

Thus one's judgements of others (which determine our attitude towards them) should be characterised by the tolerance we display when confronted with that which is different. Note however that this tolerance has limits insofar as it is for the other's potentially acting in c-c-faith. Action which is contrary to u-duty for instance, would therefore not be tolerated, i.e. there is no requirement to act in such a way as not to interfere with the undutiful doings of others. But in all cases, the agent has to be tolerated, since he is always potentially in c-c-faith. This means that any form of prevention (whether defensive or through punishment) can indeed be enforced with respect to an agent's actions, as long as it does not inhibit his potential for c-c-faith.

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6In what follows, the notion of responsibility for one's other is therefore already assumed to be required by c-c-faith: the stages correspond to different facets of this notion being brought to light.

7This requirement has a rôle akin to the intersubjective dimension of the Formula of Humanity in Kant's ethics.
Responsibility to the other
Second, the constructive process that the other is potentially involved in must be compatible with mine insofar as it is also claiming to be a-meaningful, and that a-meaning is by definition unconditional. In terms of the notion of responsibility, this brings out the condition of compatibility between the actions in c-c-faith of two agents, in the strong sense of the requirement of coherence of their constructive processes. This defines a notion of responsibility to the other. It is the recognition of the coherence of the other's potential constructive process in c-c-faith and mine.

One way of ensuring that this required compatibility is achieved is to verify that my choices in c-c-faith are such that I can justify them to the other. For, insofar as the other is able to take an a-meaningful point of view, that which I am engaged in in c-c-faith, will make p-meaningful sense to her. Thus the responsibility I have to the other defines a justification requirement expressed in the principle:

\[ \text{Principle of Justification} \]

\[ \{\mathcal{P}_J\}: \text{One ought to act so that, inherent to one's purpose, is the aim to be able to justify one's choices p-meaningly to any other agent.} \]

\{\mathcal{P}_J\} provides further determination of the purpose of the action. This principle finds its expression in Rousseau's moral motivation for writing the Confessions (1968). For this book aims to give an account of the author's actions that the reader will fully grasp, so that the author literally becomes an 'open book' for the reader. Before pursuing, let us pause to examine how such a principle contributes to the further determination of ethics. For instance, if my further determination of the principle of charity involves giving more financial aid to people who are blind than to those who are paralysed, I must be confident I am able to explain this, both to blind and paralysed people. The way in which this explanation would unfold is, first, to show how this preferential choice fits in to the notion of self I am committed to (i.e. how it results from an interpretation of the object of my c-c-faith), and second, to provide an account of how this fits into the broader picture

\[ \text{This also illustrates an aspect of Rousseau's theory of the good, according to which the latter is to be found in the openness and simplicity which characterise pre-civilised human beings. The other famous Confessions, those of Augustine (1992), do not reflect such a theory of the good, but can be seen as another illustration of the moral importance of accounting for one's acts, insofar as it is formalised within a religious practice.} \]
of the community or communities I belong to. Similarly in the case of a conflict of duties: if we take Kant's case of the agent who is questioned by a potential murderer and has the choice between not lying to the murderer and helping the potential victim (his master in the example) by lying, the choice to be made is one which the agent must be confident of being able to explain to both the murderer and the victim (MPV, 431; Kant, 1976, p.427). The prima facie impossibility of achieving both is a consequence of the conflicts in these agents' ends. But a successful explanation does not require a convergence of purposes. Thus we could well imagine the murderer failing to understand why the agent told him the truth while professing to love the victim for instance, and thus disapproving of his behaviour even though it served his purpose. And the reason why our intuitions tend this way in this example, is that contemporary society provides a background against which not lying has a lesser value than providing help to those in need of assistance. What is thus at stake is the whole of the agent's notion of absolute self in the context (e.g. socio-cultural environment) in which it determines action. Communicating this must form the core of the potential explanation. Below, we further examine how this can be done.

**Responsibility for my other**

Third, the different individual constructive processes in c-c-faith are not only required to be coherent. For they are all constructive contributions to an absolute independent of agents' ends, from the definition of a-meaning. An understanding of the notion of responsibility this implies under the assumption of c-c-faith, involves grasping the coherence between agents' constructive processes in c-c-faith as a feature of their all contributing to a common constructive process, as we showed earlier. In this process, the individuated interpretations form a whole in that they fit together as different (individuated) perspectives relating to one (non-individuated) absolute self. This defines my responsibility for my other. It is a recognition of the necessity of the other's potential contribution to the a-meaning of my action in c-c-faith.

9I therefore disagree with Korsgaard's conclusion that Kant has a warrant for privileging strict duties (Korsgaard, 1996a, 133-154). This is, in any case, an account that relies upon the Formulas of Humanity and the Kingdom of Ends. Moreover, her defence of the right to lie if only FUL is used, is not convincing in its treatment of the casuistical issues at stake.

10The choice of values is carried out against a socio-cultural background, but this leaves the individual the option to respond in whatever way she deems appropriate to the prevailing value system.
To fulfil this requirement of responsibility involves extending to the other that which is the responsibility I have for myself insofar as I am free. This concern for the other defines all the responsibility that is required of the agent in c-c-faith. It stops short of a stronger responsibility for the other which treats the other as an infinite task towering above any other end. This is Levinas’s notion of responsibility for the other which is grounded in the phenomenology of the encounter with the other’s face (‘le visage’). This goes beyond what can be required of an autonomous being, and indeed, Levinas’s claim is incompatible with Kantian autonomy. The weaker notion of ‘responsibility for my other’ we have developed here converges however with some of Levinas’s key moral concerns (Levinas, 1974).

We may therefore state the principle:

**Principle of Responsibility**

\[ \{R\} : \text{One ought to act in such a way that one's motivation involves an understanding of one's responsibility for one's other}^{11}. \]

Let us observe the meaning of the difference between the requirement of \{CI\} and that of a principle such as \{R\}. We have no guarantee that agents who obey the requirements of u-duty, together form a notion of absolute. But what is involved here is a strong notion of *community*. Each agent is responsible for the integration of her individuated notion of self into a whole, the community, which comprises the others’ individuated notions of self.

Insofar as we have introduced three principles, we must specify in what way they are related. Let us first observe that in moving from \{T\} to \{R\}, we have been tightening the constraints upon the notion of responsibility involved, so that \{R\} entails \{T\}, which in turn entails \{S\}. However, although these principles define increasingly stringent constraints upon action, I claim they are actually equivalent in c-c-faith. Indeed, first, tolerating the other’s faithful constructive process requires that one assume this is coherent with one’s own in its absolute meaningfulness, even if one does not understand how this is possible. And second, coherence between faithful constructive processes directed to an independent absolute amounts to defining a common constructive process, under the assumption of c-c-

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11This notion of responsibility for my other differs from that of compassion as found in Schopenhauer - and which provided the inspiration for Wagner’s Parsifal - in that it does not rely upon any metaphysical assumptions (Schopenhauer, 1965, §18).
moral program
solved genetically

Three conditions

1. Tolerance - allows gap
2. Coherence - with limits
3. Integration - make necessary common
faith\textsuperscript{12}. Hence, in c-c-faith, the compatibility constraint of \{\Psi_T\} requires coherence, which, in turn, requires a commonness of processes, that spells one's responsibility for one's other.

Since acting from c-c-faith requires a total commitment, it is in practice not an 'all or nothing' state. Rather, the agent grows in c-c-faith with her commitment. And indeed, the logical progression from \{\Psi_T\} to \{\Psi_R\} can be used to illustrate this growth insofar as the agent moves from a notion of responsibility vis-à-vis the other to one of responsibility for her other. This is because these principles are actually equivalent in c-c-faith so that this logical progression is in fact only a deepening of the understanding of what is involved in each principle in c-c-faith. These three principles thus define a notion of \textit{moral progress} insofar as they represent a growth of one's grasp of the responsibility one has for one's other in c-c-faith\textsuperscript{13}, with \{\Psi_R\} explicitly capturing its full meaning\textsuperscript{14}.

Although the above has shed some light upon the notion of responsibility, its implementation in practice and thus its contribution to solving the \textit{indeterminacy problem} of Kant's ethics, need to be further specified. What one can construct as explanatory account, on the basis of the existing three-tier framework of principles, is the following. First, we note that each of these principles is of the third-order. Together with an interpretation of the idea of the absolute self, it must determine second-order principles, say \{\mathcal{P}_1\}, \{\mathcal{P}_2\},...\{\mathcal{P}_n\}, which, jointly with a second-order principle of duty \{\mathcal{D}\} form a fully determinate second-order principle of duty \{\mathcal{F}\}. This in turn gives rise to maxims of action when empirical circumstances are specified. This is the proposed schematic solution to the indeterminacy problem.

\textsuperscript{12}Although only sketchy, these are, in effect, summaries of the reconstruction we have given of these principles above: in moving from one principle to the next, we have merely further exploited the implications of the a-meaning of c-c-faith for the notion of responsibility.

\textsuperscript{13}At this point, there is little one can say about the relation between this notion of moral progress and that corresponding to the development of the agent-self (chapter II). It seems plausible that both support one another as two paths towards the perfectly faithful agent-self, whereby the further exploration of the meaning of c-c-faith is brought about by the development of the inclination to the good which alters the background of understanding.

\textsuperscript{14}Typical models for these three types of attitude can be found in the way in which one differentiates between the community one belongs to, one's circle of friends and one's immediate family (partner, children, eventually parents). With regard to the community, one finds out about what goes on and feels concerned by it, but a certain idea of tolerance presides over one's attitude. With respect to the circle of friends, one makes judgements and feels answerable to them for what one does. The immediate family gives one the sense of a responsibility for one's other. This loose classification points to the actual instantiation of these attitudes to the other in one's life.
Principles \( \{P_1\}, \{P_2\}, \ldots, \{P_n\} \) in this picture must represent the determination of action under the different headings defined by the ethical categories\(^{15}\). They therefore enable the fixing of a certain quantity, quality, degree of the agent's involvement and ranking of the duty \( \{D\} \). If we assume \( \{D\} \) is the principle of charity, \( \{P_1\}, \{P_2\}, \ldots, \{P_n\} \) will in particular involve the determination of the quantity of help of different types that is to be provided under the understanding the agent has of her responsibility for her other (if principle \( \{P_R\} \) is the EDF principle which is applied here). They will also determine how involved the agent sees herself as having to be for each type of help and for each quantity of aid provided\(^{16}\), and how these types and increments of help rank among other duties\(^{17}\).

What has however not been made clear in this account, and is required for a full solution to the indeterminacy problem, is how principles \( \{P_1\}, \{P_2\}, \ldots, \{P_n\} \) are determined as a result of the application of a third-order principle such as \( \{P_R\} \) to a notion of absolute self under headings defined by the ethical categories\(^{18}\). A first way in which progress can be made is by expanding our understanding of the common constructive process in c-c-faith - this is examined below by introducing the notion of a life story. Further understanding will be gained later in this chapter by bringing together the EDF and the phenomenological interpretation of Part Two, as well as by grasping the rôle of the EDF in providing an extension of Kant's ethics.

Writing one's story

We have seen above that we understand the implementation of the principle of tolerance \( \{P_T\} \) insofar as this involves negative forms of action. The individuated notion of absolute self is used in the following way to specify how to obtain second-order principles from the third-order principle \( \{P_T\} \). This notion specifies how much value is to be assigned respectively to the respect for the other agent and to the judgement of the other agent's action. For we may judge the action wrong, but still ought to tolerate the agent \textit{qua} potentially in c-c-faith. On this

\(^{15}\)These principles correspond to the determination of quantity, quality, etc..., but there could be many (i.e. more than 1 for each category) since there are issues of joint determination under different categories. Thus, there may be different quantities for different types (quality) of action.

\(^{16}\)One may thus view the successful provision of some basic aid as crucial, while one's involvement may be reduced with the extra aid which is provided.

\(^{17}\)The issue is not the feasibility of determining all such principles for a given agent, but rather that this is possible in principle and thus represents a model accounting for action in c-c-faith.

\(^{18}\)The general third-order principles and the interpretation of an idea of self interact as follows. Insofar as they both determine 2nd order principles of action, they also contribute to the constitution of behavioural structures. These in turn alter the background for the interpretation of the notion of absolute self. Hence the necessarily dynamic nature of this interpretation.
basis, and under the headings of the different ethical categories, second-order principles of duty can be provided with further determination. With the two other principles, \( \Psi_J \) and \( \Psi_K \), the issue is more complex. Here we have to specify how to ensure, respectively the coherence and integration into a whole, of our choices with those of the other agent. The problem is that the agent has no knowledge of the other's moral choices. In the case of principle \( \Psi_J \), this issue has partly been addressed by envisaging coherence as requiring an ability to justify one's choices. Insofar as another agent understands the explanation, it has been made clear in what sense the choices made fit into a view of the world in which this other agent's self construction is coherent with them. Were there no such space for the other in this view, understanding would not be possible. Consider Eichmann: he could not have explained his actions to an Auschwitz survivor, or even any 'neutral party' who has seen/read an account of the horrors of Auschwitz, with any hope of being understood\(^\text{19}\). A minimal condition for such an understanding is the agent's ability to make sense of the other's point of view insofar as it can be interpreted as coherent with his own (even if he would not necessarily make the same choices as the other), and the absence of such an ability is, according to Arendt, precisely the source of the kind of thoughtlessness which leads to evil in Eichmann's case (Arendt, 1964, p.49). But, being able to take the other's point of view is clearly not sufficient. For consider now the case of the torturer who was himself a victim of torture. There may be complicating psychological aspects to this, but we may simplify the case to that of a torturer who survived being tortured without much damage, physical or mental. Such an agent is clearly able to understand his victim's point of view, but he blocks out the impact it would have upon his decisions. Therefore, the other's point of view must be allowed to take its proper place in one's decision making. This can be achieved if the agent displays a real will to make her choices communicable to the other. What can the basic structure of such an explanation be if understanding is to occur? Since the key feature of justification in practical life identified in chapter VI is the principle of p-meaning, this will form the basic requirement for the explanation. I suggest that an explanation of how an agent goes about working towards an end using certain means, and how this impinges upon others, is a story. To show that my choices of action fit in with my notion of self, I can describe them as forming a story for an agent personifying this notion of self. The only constraints upon such a story are that it should represent a possible life-story for

\(^{19}\)Obviously, in terms of an Auschwitz survivor, there is a clear breach of the principle of tolerance.
an agent such as I, i.e. that it is appropriate to my circumstances as well as internally coherent. In fact, since my understanding of my self is one which is a constructive process, the use of a narrative is the only way in which my choices can be explained. \( \{ \mathcal{P}_R \} \) can therefore be reformulated as:

\[ \{ \mathcal{P}_R' \} : \text{One ought to act so that part of one's purpose is that one's actions contribute to forming a story of oneself which the other agent could understand.} \]

With the notion of p-meaningful explanation in terms of a story, \( \{ \mathcal{P}_R \} \) is just the requirement that each be able to write her own story in c-c-faith. \( \{ \mathcal{P}_R' \} \) (or \( \{ \mathcal{P}_J \} \)) is the constraint that the story which each agent develops in c-c-faith is able to include the other as a story writer and to account for his story in c-c-faith. Principle \( \{ \mathcal{P}_R \} \) can then be seen to be the constraint that each agent develop a story which is understood as being the same story that all agents are potentially developing\(^{20}\). This notion of life-story therefore enables us to identify the way in which the notion of absolute self which is the agent's interpretation can serve to determine principles of further determination of action under a given third-order principle of the EDF. There is no recipe for how such a story is to be conceived. However, we shall see in the next two sections that the examination of the implications of the EDF in terms of the remaining Kantian problems of Part One and the phenomenological interpretation of Part Two yields useful indications that will further our understanding of this issue.

### 2. The Ethics of Dutiful Faith and phenomenology

The fundamental principles of the EDF are grounded upon the minimal premisses of the requirement of p-meaning. The development of this grounding in chapter

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\(^{20}\)More could be said about the meaning of these three principles in terms of the consequences of our actions. Briefly, they define different levels of responsibility. Let us consider actions that are detrimental to another agent. A basic understanding of \( \{ \mathcal{P}_R \} \) requires that I do not deliberately act so as to have negative consequences. If I act from a basic understanding of \( \{ \mathcal{P}_J \} \), I accept the burden of justification to the other. It is not enough here to say 'I did not deliberately harm you', as can be seen from the case where my reckless driving caused me to crash into another car and hurt its owner. Rather, I must be able to say 'I did not, deliberately, or out of negligence, make decisions contributing to negative consequences for the other'. This means that all foreseeable consequences (and appending risks) are to be considered. When I act from \( \{ \mathcal{P}_R \} \), I fully accept that all my actions are to be judged by an absolute standard. If I omitted to do what is morally required, I accept the simple, but crucial, fact that, had I not so acted, some of the negative consequences which occurred to other agents might have been avoided. Such consequences may be remote in the future and unforeseeable, but by not ignoring them, I exhibit responsibility for my other in the form of a total responsibility for the consequences of my action.
VII was however guided, and its understanding enriched, by using the phenomenological interpretations of Part Two. An issue which therefore arises is that of the compatibility between the principles—obtained—and the phenomenological interpretation. This issue can, moreover, be dealt with in such a way as to exhibit this interpretation as that which is called for by the EDF. We shall therefore sketch an argument for the claim that, given that the conceptual fabric of the EDF as ethical theory requires an understanding of what it is to be human that is coherent with it, the phenomenological interpretation of Part Two can be shown to provide this understanding. In this way, the normativity of the EDF will be seen to function analogously to the background of understanding of the interpretations of Part Two.

The key issues from Part Two of being-in-the world, being human as being a Quest, being inauthentic and being authentic are examined here. First, the constructive development of the self in c-c-faith is examined as revealing of a human being’s behaviour in her world. Second, we investigate the links between the notion of quest associated with the EDF, and the Quest. Third, the inadequate understanding involved in non-moral choices is identified in relation to inauthenticity. Finally, we shall return to the issue of the identity between the moral prescriptions of the EDF and the notion of authenticity by further analysing the notion of faith so as to give a different perspective upon why authenticity involves c-c-faith.

**Coping behaviour and the self**

C-c-faith involves the construction of a self characterised by the fact that it acts according to principles corresponding to the values inherent in a notion of absolute [self]. What is the nature of the self that is being constructed? As chapter II has shown, it is an agent-self defined both by behavioural structures and second-order principles. The evolution of this self is characterised by the further development of the inclination to the good, in ways described in chapter II.

Given this notion of self, its rootedness in the world is described by the fact that any action marks the (further) development of inclinations organised within behavioural structures. This is the result of habituation. This fact that habituation is the mechanism by which the agent-self further develops is of course key to the commitment requirement of c-c-faith: all our actions are important insofar as they contribute to altering who we are as agent-selves - i.e. there are no moral holidays.

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21 There is no space for an exhaustive examination of this issue.
And the construction requirement expresses this alteration as the development of the agent-self - i.e. the absence of moral holidays is not a negative static inevitability, but a positive dynamic reality.

But this fact of habituation is at the same time essential to understanding how the agent develops her rootedness in her environment. There is only a world for the agent insofar as she knows how to get around in it, and this means she is equipped with a certain tacit understanding expressed in such behavioural structures. This can also be seen in the following way. The non-deliberative action which is the result of habituation indicates what the agent has fully espoused in terms of practical beliefs: insofar as no 'ought' is required here, this form of action is part of what it is to be this particular agent. It therefore means that the agent is at home in the world within which this type of action operates.

So the requirement of commitment of the EDF is one which brings out the way in which there is a world for the agent. Since through the agent's actions, this relation to the world evolves, the world is not a given 'containing' structure, but rather an organic structure which is there for the agent. The agent's behaviour within it takes on the form of a 'coping' which knows its way around things, but not things which are present-at-hand and therefore essentially detached, but rather things which appear in their ready-to-handedness as the agent reaches for them. This is but a brief sketch which however indicates how the primordial ontology uncovered in Heidegger's BT is suggested by the EDF. This moreover brings out its dynamic nature in a way which the focus upon ontology in BT does not allow.

The Quest for a-meaning

Let us examine the relation in which the notion of quest in c-c-faith stands to the core existentiale of the Quest for a-meaning. Chapter VII has shown that an agent who acts in c-c-faith in an absolute [self] has understood this to be the option called for by p-meaning, and therefore that there is no given ground which could provide him with an ultimate justification to his action. He has therefore grasped his agency as, in this sense, groundless. Moreover, he has also understood that anything which may be grounded about his agency is not given to him (and therefore not knowable) as he can only enter in a relation of faith to it and, in this,

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22 In BT, although time is identified as the key to understanding Dasein's being, the issues of the alteration of Dasein, of the transition between ways of being, ... are not examined since they are ontic matters. The extensive use of the ontological/ontic distinction has already been criticised (chapter IV). It certainly relegates notions of ethical progress as of minor importance next to ontological issues, a view which is clearly at odds with the metaethical thesis I am defending here.
construct this self. From this, it follows that the agent has a grasp of his facticity as defined in chapter IV.

Second, in seeing that the p-meaningful answer to the question of what she will do is one which involves an act of will that is entirely up to her, the agent recognises that she is not determined, i.e. that she is not practically determined in the Kantian sense. Moreover, the construction of her self is one which is hers through her committed faith in its absolute worth. Therefore, this practical freedom cannot be viewed as such that 'that which, in relation to sensuous impulses, is entitled freedom' is 'in relation to higher and more remote operating causes (...) nature again' (CPR, A803/B831). Rather, the agent views herself as transcendentally free through her c-c-faith. This is the strong (e.g. Sartrean) notion of freedom examined in chapter IV.

Third, the quest of c-c-faith is one which involves a construction of the agent-self that is essentially characterised by coping behaviour and second-order principles. When engaged in coping, the agent is absorbed (chapter IV). This is because it is in the nature of coping to lead to such absorption when no breakdown occurs. This shows that the three time-related existentialie of chapter IV contribute to an interpretation of what it is to be human that coheres with an ethics of c-c-faith. Additionally, we note that the grasp the agent has of her p-meaningful choice identifies it as p-meaningful insofar as it contributes to a quest aimed at something a-meaningful. Therefore, since this is a quest directed at a-meaning involving an understanding of the three time-related existentialie identified in chapter IV as central to being human, this is the Quest itself and, moreover, in a form which involves an understanding of it. This means that the quest involved in c-c-faith in an absolute [self] can be grasped as the fundamental existentialie of the Quest in its disclosure, or, it is the self-conscious Quest. The moral choice can thus be seen as the choice of the option that makes what we are, namely a Quest, be conscious of itself as such.

Inauthenticity, bad faith and time

Insofar as the normativity of the EDF coincides with that of the notion of authenticity, inauthenticity represents the refusal to commit oneself in c-c-faith.

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24 The Sartrean and Kantian notions of freedom in the practical sense appear comparable in that they are incompatibilistic notions. No comparison of the theoretical notions of freedom is suggested here: it would not be a straightforward task insofar as Kant's notion of transcendental freedom is inseparable from his empirical/intelligible character distinction, while Sartre explicitly rejects the claims of any deterministic view of the world.
Since the agent cannot ignore the requirement of p-meaningfulness, he is therefore deceiving himself in thinking/assuming that his action is fully p-meaningfully grounded in some way. This, however, involves an inadequate understanding of the situation which can take on one of two forms.

First, it may be that the action is p-meaningful "in isolation", so that there is a lack of p-meaning in a related decision - e.g. in a supposedly foundational act of faith. This means it could be a form of action identified as in chapter VII as p-meaningful, but leading to unanswered p-meaningful questions. One is in effect relying upon the p-meaning of the act which is actually being performed, ignoring its relation to other supporting decisions. The fact that these (past) decisions are indeed involved in support of it is overlooked. This is a form of bad faith involving a misunderstanding of time as constituted by separable discrete unrelated instants, modelled upon the independence of spatial locations.

Second, the lack of p-meaning can be more blatant. This simply means that the agent is not troubled with the justification of his action. If the question of justification arises, however, the agent cannot dismiss it out of hand because of the requirement of p-meaning. All he can do is dismiss it as relevant now. This means he can claim the issue has already been dealt with in a disconnected remote past, or will be examined in a distant future. In this form of bad faith, time is also treated as spatial, but more specifically in the sense that one can distance oneself as one wills from certain (potential) events.

The EDF thus enables us a reconstruction of the interpretation of inauthenticity as bad faith resting upon a misunderstanding of time\(^{25}\). It moreover brings out a distinction between two forms of this spatial understanding. The first emphasises the way in which space can be cut up into parts which are only related insofar as they are juxtaposed. The second puts the emphasis upon the way in which spatial distancing is transposed to time.

In terms of the decisional framework of principles, these forms of bad faith amount to a neglect of the need, respectively, for third-order and second-order principles of action. For the first assumes that policies of action can be isolated and require no coordination, while the second ignores the need for such policies. These forms of bad faith can therefore respectively be referred to as second- and first-order bad faith. The understanding of time which reduces it to a type of spatial dimension is thus also a misunderstanding of the central rôle of policies of action in decision making and the constructive progression which is involved in an

\(^{25}\)We now have a complete account of how the EDF allows for the rôle of the Quest to be identified.
authentic grasp of one's humanity. This means that the understanding of time may be one that does not grasp that making decisions involves a commitment over time through the adoption of principles of action (first-order bad faith): only with such a commitment does the agent properly grasp time as his own by imposing the mark of his commitment to a span of time. Or, this understanding of time has no place for the directionality given by the construction of the self (second-order bad faith) which coordinates policies: only through the evolution thereby implied does the agent properly seize time in its specificity by grafting the progression towards an absolute on to the arrow of time.

These interpretations can now be exploited to yield a specification of the general principles of further determination presented above. The key rôle played by time and the Quest can be used in this respect. The principle of justification requires that one be able to justify one's actions meaningfully to the other agent. Since the authenticity of one's actions must therefore be communicable, it means in particular that one be able to convey one's proper understanding of time as the dimension of the Quest, i.e. the dimension in which the construction of one's self is pursued. A necessary (not sufficient) condition for this is that one be pursuing a constructive aim in intersubjective time which is not realisable in finite time, insofar as the process is essentially constructive and can therefore never be completed.

This therefore entails the following principle:

**Principle of Time**

\[
\{\mathcal{P}_A\}: \text{One ought to act in such a way as to aim to use the objective time one is alive to constructively pursue a goal which cannot be completed and is understood as such.}
\]

Note that an inauthentic behaviour involves a misunderstanding of the meaning of time so that, in objective time, the progression towards the completion of the agent's aim becomes the pursuit of an unattainable aim, the basic principle of desire. The differences are that the process cannot be grasped as a construction and that the goal is not understood as unattainable\textsuperscript{26}.

**Authenticity, faith and incentives**

Insofar as authenticity has been identified in chapter V as involving action from c-c-faith, there is, strictly speaking, nothing to show here: the phenomenological

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\textsuperscript{26}Note that real satisfaction may be unattainable as Sartre points out (BN, p.101), but it is not understood as such. An object of desire grasped as unattainable is thus best redescribed - e.g. as the adoration of that object.
interpretation of Part Two is clearly coherent with the normative requirements of the EDF on the issue of authenticity. We can however shed further insight upon the claim that authenticity involves c-c-faith, by probing the rôle of incentives in agency.

To do so, we shall make use of an assumption which lies at the core of the moral psychology of the EDF, namely the validity of the Kantian conception of an 'incorporation act' by which an incentive operates by being taken as sufficient ground for action upon a given principle (e.g. Allison, 1990, p.40). Such an intelligible act rests upon no further ground. Rather, we have seen that it may be accompanied by third-order principles (as in the case of c-c-faith in an absolute [self]) under which the second-order principle in question falls. But these third-order principles simply express the nature of the incentive itself. That one chooses to act upon a certain incentive may be justifiable on p-meaningful grounds, but even then, insofar as one chooses to do that which is thus justified, one places one's faith in this justification's sufficiency for this action. That faith is involved here should come as no surprise. For that is the very correlate of an incompatibilistic positive notion of freedom: if I could have done otherwise than I did, this means that so doing is not inconceivable. Therefore all my agency is thus characterised by intelligible acts of faith.

If, therefore, I am to understand myself as a whole - which is what authenticity requires - then these singular acts of faith must be grasped as constituting a whole, i.e. as integrated in a unifying leap of faith. This will be the case if the incentive which they involve is itself that of faith. For this would imply that the singular acts of incorporation are just instantiations of the leap of faith made by the agent. Additionally, these incorporation acts are forms of self-determination (ibid.) insofar as the agent determines her action in this way. To grasp them all as a whole therefore amounts to a self-determination covering the whole of the agent's self, i.e. a self-construction. Further, the fact that this incentive calls for all action to be from it, is indicative of the committed nature of the faith. Finally, if the whole of the agency is thus to be encompassed, there is no room for the consideration of the relative nature of the object of faith. For the latter would inevitably amount to making a practical judgement, and therefore to a form of action that stands outside

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27 Of course, this justification may in turn be justified, as we have seen in the last two chapters. However, at whichever level of justification one stops, one requires faith, and if one fully justifies an act, this can only be done in c-c-faith (chapter VII).

28 Taking the incentive as sufficient is properly referred to as the leap of faith, while the incentive itself is that of faith. The two are however two aspects of a single act of faith, hence the lack of a need for a strict distinction.
1935 Lecture material - 1953-54 Philosophy
Hegel/Arrow F. Meier in Philosophy

Introduction to Metaphysics

Chapter 4: Logical A. Bemny

Section 4: Bemny's Thought

A. For Hegel, F. Meier moves in the wrong direction

B. For Genesis, F. Meier is an aphorist

I agree with A in mentioning that

If Metaphysics is more fundamental,

I disagree with B in mentioning that F. Meier is and has to be ambivalent

with
the domain of the faith in question. The object of faith must therefore be an absolute.

This provides an account of authenticity as faith in an absolute [self] borne out of the consideration of the rôle of incentives which is involved in an understanding of action within the EDF. Inauthenticity therefore involves an inability to grasp the particular acts of faith as linked together in a whole. Since these acts of incorporation are the intelligible dimension of actual actions, this means that the corresponding actions are not properly integrated. Since time is the dimension within which this agency can be unified, this suggests again that a misunderstanding of time is crucial to inauthenticity.

**Ethics at the centre of philosophy**

In conclusion, our ethical investigation can be used to identify metaphysical truths which are in tune with the normative claims of the EDF. If this approach is used as the basis for a metaphysical investigation, it can be seen as representing a way of doing philosophy which places ethics at the centre and views other branches of philosophy as defined through their coherence with the results of ethical enquiry. This is analogous to the way in which Heidegger sought to define phenomenology as the method to be used to guide metaphysical enquiry.

This central rôle of ethics is close in spirit to the priority of the practical as propounded by German Idealism. It however stops short of the claims of this Idealism - as instantiated by Fichte's philosophy for instance - in the following respect. As can be seen from the developments above, the metaphysical insights obtained from the normativity of an ethical theory such as the EDF are not strictly derivable insofar as what is sought is a metaphysical framework that is coherent with the normativity of the theory. This could, however, be seen as a first step towards making the stronger claim that it is the only metaphysical framework which could thus cohere with the normativity of the EDF. I believe that such a claim would require further grounding, e.g. in a successive elimination of other possible candidates, and thus cannot be derived directly. Aside from this issue, given the more modest claim made here, the ethically grounded metaphysical picture developed above is potentially useful in challenging those views which ignore this central rôle of ethics, to account for the features it identifies as core to its conceptual framework - e.g. the Quest for a-meaning

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29 It follows that the general principle {CA} from chapter V has here been translated into practical forms.

30 In this sense, the argument being developed is consistent with what Rauscher (1998) understands as the covert priority of action in Kant's writings, and indeed underpins O'Neill's and Korsgaard's interpretations of
The extended rôle assigned to faith in grounding the EDF, and the appending metaphysical picture, can be seen as useful in dealing with the motivational issue left open from Part One. For, rather than an opposition between duty and inclination, as is central to Kant's GMM\textsuperscript{31}, we find that incentives are unified insofar as faith is involved in the incorporation act. We shall see below how this impinges on the motivational problem.

3. The Ethics of Dutiful Faith and Kant

In this section, we first return to the motivational problem, to show in what way the EDF addresses the concerns raised in chapters II and III. We shall show how the EDF - either as such, or together with the correlative phenomenological understanding of human beings - provides solutions in the spirit of Kant's approach. We next return to the issue of the indeterminacy of Kant's ethics to complete the proposed solution, and then re-examine the implied notion of unconditional good. Finally, to strengthen the case for the EDF as the required extension of the basic tenets of Kant's ethics, it will be set in the wider context of Kant's philosophy by relating it to his theoretical philosophy.

The motivational problem

The problem, as summarised in chapter III, is two-fold. First, and in connection with the justification problem for Kant's ethics, we were left with doubts about the force of the moral incentive and even its very reality. Second, these doubts echo concerns about the absence, in the motivational story, of a rôle for inclinations constituting one's sense of self.

The force of the motive of duty has been established within the context of c-c-faith. Now this is not the same as the motive of u-duty since, in the latter case, it is the mere consideration of the universalisability of the principle which motivates. However, as indicated in chapter VII, acting upon the incentive of c-c-faith involves doing what is right because it is right, given the agent has made the leap of faith. This is action from duty. It also has the feature that, in seeking to do what is right, the agent considers that which is universalisable, and acts according to a second-order principle that is universalisable because it is universalisable. There is of course more to the motive of dutiful faith, but essentially it has a motivational

\textsuperscript{31}This is arguably not true of Kant's later ethical writings (see Korsgaard interview in Pauer-Studer, 2000).
In order for milletun to be compatible with duty, the self must be individualized or there has to be a real part of the ideal of duty.

content

What about contentment as reward? Ethical felicity needs contentment as punishment.

Desire as a problematica rather than contentment as reward.
component which accounts for action being governed by $\{CI\}$, and this is what had to be proven.

Let us now turn to the second issue, dealing first with the sense of self and then focussing upon the motivational rôle played by inclinations. In chapter II, a regulative ideal was introduced, which can serve as an end for action from u-duty, namely the ideal of the absolutely morally worthy agent-self. We did not, however, find the tools to demonstrate that this is indeed an end for action from u-duty since these would have required at least that the foundational issue be resolved\(^3\).

By grounding duty in faith, the regulative idea of the perfectly faithful agent-self is indeed defined as an end for action in c-c-faith by the very nature of c-c-faith. This is achieved insofar as the end in question has been transformed from the notion of a perfectly (u-dutifully) morally worthy self in the sense defined in chapter II, to that of a perfectly faithful agent-self. It is a notion of self individuated in accordance with the interpretation of the notion of absolute self that is at the core of the agent's c-c-faith. Consequently, the individual agent-self can now be seen as involved in a process of becoming which is guided by this end. This provides us with a clear rôle within ethics for the notion of the agent-self as an individual, one which can ward off criticisms of alienation of the type examined in chapter II. But the rôle of this end must be further specified. For the regulative rôle of the end in question implies that what the agent's process of becoming does not terminate with the realisation of the end. Also, c-c-faith is defined as a construction that is a-meaningful. As a result, what is the object of the becoming is the agent-self in its further becoming. So that in c-c-faith, the agent can be understood as becoming that which he is in the process of so becoming. This characterisation is that first encountered in chapter V as a result of the phenomenological interpretation.

Let us now focus upon the rôle played by inclinations in the motivation for action from u-duty. With the EDF, we have introduced a broader notion of duty. Because of the ground upon which this rests, namely one of faith, the emotional dimension of the motivational story differs from the Kantian one. Kant presents a notion of respect as the subjective dimension of the motivation to act from u-duty. This is a problematic notion which stands uncomfortably between rational ground and inclination (Henrich, 1993). With the broader notion of duty, the motivational

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\(^3\)Another observation is that finding an end for action from u-duty is a task at which Kant arguably failed. This suggests, and I would argue that a case can be made to show, that it is impossible to find an end for action from the thin notion of u-duty as defined by the Formula of the Universal Law.
Moore's good in it self
Beauty
Personal Relations

How is action from inclinato
compatible with duty
My relations
Others' well-being is my good
story involves a stake in the notion of absolute meaning which informs it, as a result of the leap of faith. In c-c-faith, I do what it is right because it is right, where this is a notion of rightness upon which I have staked everything.

The other aspect of the motivational story to keep in mind is that action upon duty leads to the development of an inclination to the good. As seen above, the transformation of the notion of duty from its purely universal form, has been translated in terms of a substitution of the regulative idea of the perfectly faithful agent-self, with its individuated aspect, for the thinner, purely universal, idea of the perfectly (u-dutifully) morally worthy agent-self of Kant's ethics. As a result, the corresponding inclination to the good is a broader one, in line with the broadening of the notion of unconditional good. It has non-universalistic features corresponding to one's interpretation of the absolute self. As we have seen earlier in this chapter, this interpretation defines an understanding of one's life as a story. This story articulates the features of what constitute one's deepest emotional commitments insofar as they are expressions of the value with which one endows one's interpretation.

With these results, we can address Williams's concern for the rôle of personal attachments and other inclinations in moral motivation. Let us assume that for a set of circumstances, inclinations are available as to how to act. If the proposed course of action conforms to the requirements of duty, as can be checked by finding a second-order principle of duty the corresponding maxims fall under, then it is these inclinations which directly steer action. Thus, if my wife is in need of help, I shall respond by going to help her, and indeed, this will have a priority over many other tokens of the inclination to the good. The motivation to do so is an inclination to provide help to those in need and in particular my wife, an inclination which has been shaped by the practice of action from my c-c-faith in a notion of absolute meaning I interpret in such a way that my relationship to my wife has this privileged part to play.

The distinction from Williams's position remains the fact that there are constraints which, if not fulfilled, would imply that one ought not follow such inclinations. This is in accordance with our moral intuitions (Herman, 1993). Moreover, it reflects the Kantian response to action that would seek ultimate justification in certain fundamental inclinations, which latter position we have rejected in chapter VI. Therefore, we may conclude that, insofar as Williams's position does justice to
Two Becoming

1. Third misplaced reflection stage
2. Inclination to the good Return
the rôle of certain inclinations *within morality*, the notion of dutiful faith provides an answer to the criticism he levels at Kant's ethics\(^3\).

There does, finally, remain a criticism which could be made of this solution to Williams's view on the rôle of inclinations. This is that the inclinations I am proposing are not of the same type as the ones he had in mind. In particular, to return to the case of one's being moved to assist one's wife, the motivating inclination to the good is apparently not a form of love. It does not, therefore, provide a full response to Williams's concern for the importance of certain key attachments. To deal with this objection, we first have to summarise the proposed solution to the indeterminacy problem which will bring out the central rôle of a notion of love.

*Further determination of the end of moral action*

Towards the beginning of this chapter, three principles have been presented which, together with a notion of absolute self, constitute the basic framework for the further determination of second-order principles of ethical action. The notion of responsibility for one's other, which is at the core of the highest principle of further determination of the EDF, has however still not been fully examined insofar as its implementation is concerned, as we observed above. In fact, the discussion above about the broadening of the inclination to the good in the EDF, can be useful in addressing this question. This is insofar as the nature of the inclination that is developed through action in c-c-faith, may be helpful in understanding what type of action is required by the principle of responsibility. Indeed, in c-c-faith, the agent becomes a *way of becoming*, where the first becoming is the third-order leap and, the second is characterised in particular by the development of the inclination to the good. Since the two becomings are coincident in time, either can be characterised in terms of the other. Here, we suggest characterising \(\mathcal{P}_R\) in terms of the development of certain inclinations.

\(\mathcal{P}_R\) states that one ought to act out of an understanding of one's responsibility for one's other. The inclination to the good will therefore be further determined by being directed to one's responsibility for one's other. But what could be the nature of such an inclination? Recall that the principle of responsibility enjoins one to act as though one's life were part of a story that is potentially also co-written by the

\(^3\)We therefore have a picture of the relation between action from duty and that from personal attachments that is very close to Korsgaard's (1996a, p.193-4): they are both aspects of our commitment to a notion of self which defines our 'sense of identity' (ibid.). However, her approach involves the use of other formulations of the categorical imperative than the FUL.
other agent. The habit of acting in such a way will lead to an inclination to take
care of one's other as one does of oneself, since the other is a potential co-author of
that which one cares about, i.e. the story one's life describes. A lengthy analysis of
the phenomenology of the care involved is beyond the scope of this thesis.
However, it seems reasonable to understand the care for she who may be co-
responsible for what is the object of my full commitment, as a form of com-passion,
i.e. as defining a notion of love\textsuperscript{34}. This means that action from second-order
principles determined by principle \([\mathcal{P}_R]\) together with a notion of absolute self, is
action conducive to the development and strengthening of love for the other. We
may therefore state that in c-c-faith, the following principle of further
determination is central:

\[\text{Principle of Love}\]

\[\{\mathcal{P}_A\}: \text{One ought to act so that one's action is directed towards the development of an inclination to the good centered around a feeling of compassionate love for the other.}\]

This conclusion coincides with the central tenet of Christianity given as Jesus's
final command to his disciples: "A new command I give you: love one another"
(Prickett, 1991: John, 14:34)\textsuperscript{35}. This shows in particular how the EDF provides an
extension of Kant's basic ethics of the Formula of Universal Law that echoes his
attempt to show that his moral system coincides with the commands of Christian
morality (CPrR, 129)\textsuperscript{36}. In this way, the EDF echoes Kant's belief in the 'spiritual
context of morality' (Ward, 1992, p. 246).

In terms of the implementation of such a principle for the further determination of
the ethics of duty, principle \([\mathcal{P}_A]\) can, for instance, easily be seen to provide

\textsuperscript{34}In particular, a key term in motivating the introduction of a notion of love is the concept of 'giving'. The
co-authorship between the agent and his potential other is not a symmetric relationship, as the other is only
potentially in c-c-faith. It requires that the agent give (time, energy, resources, ... ) without expecting anything
in return. A case can be made to interpret the inclination that develops from this giving as a form of love.

\textsuperscript{35}It is specifically seen as the way in which the individual agent loves God (Prickett, 1991: Luke, 10:27),
similarly to the way in which the relation to the absoluteness of meaning is only possible through the other in
c-c-faith. Finally, as obligatory end, it occupies the highest position in the EDF, similarly to Paul's claim:
'And now these three remain: faith, hope and love. But the greatest of these is love' (Prickett, S., 1991:
Corinthians, I 13:33). In EDF, therefore, the incentive, faith, and the Quest which it reveals and that animates
our hope, all serve the end of love.

\textsuperscript{36}Kant does not fall foul of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche's critiques on this point since he clearly states that
'the Christian principle does not make the knowledge of God and his will the basis of these laws (...) it places
the real incentive for obedience to the law (...) in the conception of duty alone' (CPR, 130). Kant's notion of
rational faith, which is central here, is however characterised by beliefs whose necessity is derived from
practical reason's requirement to pursue the Highest Good, which we have already mentioned as a
problematic notion (Part One). Moreover, the rôle of this notion of faith is not well defined and Kant himself
talks of the 'unusual concept of a pure practical faith' (CPrR, 144).
In her line of work,

Alcibrias

determined self-through human structures
determinations of quality and quantity. Thus, in the case of the principle of charity, it is through the development of the inclination of love for the other that the nature of the help will be progressively determined. This process characterises quality, while quantity is then altered simultaneously with the alteration of the inclination, as it develops. More generally, the principle of love provides the agent with a focus for the development of his life-story in c-c-faith, and thus allows for a deeper understanding of the way in which such a story can be conceived. Finally, let us draw the consequences of the identification of for the final objection to our proposed solution to the motivational problem discussed above. The individual nature of the interpretation of the absolute self implies that the love referred to in principle has features particular to the individual agent. It will therefore take on a form shaped by individual attachments. As such, it provides the final answer to the Williams-inspired objection raised above: the inclination to the good developed through action in c-c-faith is a type of inclination, tokens of which are inclinations such as personal attachments which are viewed as praiseworthy in common moral thinking. Although they differ from Williams's understanding of personal attachments, the tokens of the inclination to the good are the right kind of inclinations to address criticisms inspired by his approach.

The unconditional good
As a whole, and in keeping with Kant's insight, the unconditional good is the good will understood as a will acting out of c-c-faith in the absolute self. Since action out of c-c-faith is constructively related to the absolute self, the unconditional good is therefore the realisation of the absolute self through human practice. What constitutes this realisation? In chapter I, we identified the problem involved in Kant's identification of the universally binding with the unconditional good. This led us to suggest that the indeterminacy of Kant's ethics is a consequence of the fact that the notion of the unconditional good contains more than the notion of universal bindingness. But we also saw in Part One that this account can only work if these parts of the unconditional good are not logically independent, so that each one requires the others for completeness.

37The principle of love enables us to answer to the question raised in footnote 13 about the relations between two notions of moral progress. For with , we have a principle of action which is defined in terms of the inclination it gives rise to. This means that a deeper understanding of this principle, and therefore also of , is likely to be reached through the growth of this inclination. But since this is the inclination to the good for the EDF, this means that the notion of moral progress involved in the growth of this inclination (first defined in chapter II for Kant's ethics of duty) coincides with that defined in this chapter in terms of a deeper understanding of one's responsibility for one's other.
We can now clarify in what sense these parts are linked. First, in chapter VII, we saw how the fundamental problem exhibits the dependence of duty - and thus in particular u-duty - upon c-c-faith in an absolute [self], in terms of its being properly grounded. Second, chapter I identified the indeterminacy problem as the notion of universal bindingness's need for further determination. This chapter has shown that this determination is made possible by an understanding of the dependence of c-c-faith upon duty, which provides it with constraints for ethical action. Further, the consequences for intersubjectivity of this dependence bring out the relation between different potential individual interpretations of the absolute self within c-c-faith, insofar as they unfold as part of the same story. Finally, the motivational problem was dealt with by identifying the link between the incentive of c-c-faith and a motive of duty which has both universal and individuated features. Action from this motive contributes to the development of an inclination to the good that is a form of love for the other, a compassionate inclination that possesses both universal features and features particular to the individual's interpretation of the absolute self. Thus, each of these problems has led to further understanding the links of interdependence, both between the universally binding and the non-universalistic aspects of the unconditional good, and between the latter aspects, as represented by different individual interpretations of the absolute self.

What does this mean in terms of our representation of the unconditional good? The above shows that the unconditional good is given as a whole whose constituent characteristics are interlinked (as suggested in Part One). This means that the unity of the notion of unconditional good is logically prior to our analysis of it into its universalistic and non-universalistic features. This representation is therefore a totum analyticum and its parts can thus be described as dimensions of this totum. The relation between the totum and these dimensions is distinct from that of a concept to either its intension or extension. For, from the links we have discovered between these dimensions, they cannot be said to form independent parts of the unconditional good as the marks\textsuperscript{38} of a concept form independent parts of its intension. But equally, they are not related to the representation of the unconditional good as the extension of a concept is related to that concept. This is because they each encapsulate a different aspect of the concept, whereas the extension of a concept is a set constituted of elements each of which instantiates the whole of the concept.

\textsuperscript{38}Marks are the broader concepts a given concept falls under.
Since a concept cannot be a totum analyticum, a concept of the unconditional good will necessarily be a purely "formal" one which does not convey this fundamental structure of totum analyticum, in the same way as one can have a "formal" concept of space. If a representation of the unconditional good is to capture its nature, it must itself be must be a totum analyticum.

The only type of representation we know from theoretical philosophy (CPR) to have such properties is an intuition - and space and time are the two a priori instances of this. Indeed, the representation of space is such that the parts of space are thought in the one all-embracing space, i.e. by delimitation of this space (CPR, A25/B39). Clearly, however, the intuition of the unconditional good is not a sensible intuition\(^\text{39}\). It is best described as an intellectual intuition.

To understand this term which has been used in different ways by Kant and German Idealism\(^\text{40}\) (Horstmann, 2000, p.134), I propose an approach which is germane to the structure of interpretation instantiated in Part Two. An important result of Heideggerian hermeneutics is that grasping a truth involves an interpretation against a given background. What we therefore have when interpreting a notion such as the unconditional good, is that different backgrounds are potentially fruitful in approaching it. Our interpretation of Part Two brought out the notion of c-c-faith in an absolute [self]. If, however, we had taken as background the universality of reason, we would in effect have been led to the notion of universal bindingness. Are there therefore only two possible backgrounds? No, for the interpretation in terms of the notion of c-c-faith in an absolute [self] is in fact a multiplicity of interpretations. C-c-faith is indeed the authentic way of being a Quest, but each human being is potentially a different instantiation of it. So, the different dimensions we find in the unconditional good are different perspectives upon the one notion.

This yields an account of the sense in which the representation of the unconditional good might be said to contain dimensions which it is prior to, since these are the result of interpretations from certain perspectives. It does not, however, tell us why these dimensions are interlinked. To understand this, we

\(^\text{39}\)This does not mean that the EDF is a form of ethical intuitionism. This is chiefly because the intuition in question provides no knowledge, and also because it is only in c-c-faith that such an intuition is available. However, it is worth noting that the notion that the good always exceeds any attempt to analyse it reductively into simpler concepts is a key idea of intuitionism (Warnock, 1967).

\(^\text{40}\)The usage of it made here links up with that made by Fichte and Schelling insofar as the unconditionally good can only be experienced through one's own will, i.e. in the act (and more specifically in the incentive of c-c-faith), so that intellectual intuition involves a grasp that lies beyond the subject-object distinction.
must remember that the unconditional good is an absolute, as the realisation of the absolute self through human practice. This means that the dimensions exhibited in finite frameworks of interpretation are such that they point to their essential limitation and thus, at least negatively, beyond these limits to that which is not encapsulated in them. This is the mark of the adequacy of these interpretations. In other words, the unity which is that of the absolute can only be found in a finite interpretation in terms of a pointer beyond the incompleteness of this finite interpretation.

The unconditional good can therefore only be grasped as such through an intellectual intuition, while conceptual representations are necessarily finite interpretations of it whose incompleteness always points beyond them. This gives us a hermeneutically oriented understanding of the notion of intellectual intuition. That such a notion of intellectual intuition cannot be a source of knowledge is a consequence of the CPR, and is also a condition for the possibility of c-c-faith. Rather, it is the representation of the absolute which the agent forms in c-c-faith. Moreover, this is to be understood as meaning that it is only in a practical sense that one can have something like a representation of the absolute: only through acting out of c-c-faith does one have a representation of the unconditional good with its universalistic and individuated dimensions. This follows from the fact that action upon c-c-faith entails a grasp of one's responsibility for one's other, as we saw in the first part of this chapter, which is a pre-condition for understanding the multiplicity of interdependent individuated dimensions of the unconditional good. Thus, the very reality of this intellectual intuition is as an object of belief entailed by c-c-faith.

*The meaning of the EDF in terms of Kant's philosophy*

We now have an understanding of how the principles of further determination of the EDF are to be applied, together with (Cl) and a notion of the absolute self, for the determination of ethical action. The development of the EDF has been motivated by the problems identified in Kant's Ethics and their relatedness. The EDF has been independently grounded with minimal assumptions in chapters VI and VII and can therefore claim to be the extension required by the core of Kant's ethics which has been validated in Part One. Moreover, the developments of Part

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41 Since c-c-faith involves a representation of the absolute self, there is a cognitive link with the absolute in the intellectual intuition of the unconditional good, in line with its meaning for Schelling (1978) as a grasp of the absolute.

42 This means that, that to which one is related in intellectual intuition, is that which one is in the business of actualising in its empirical reality: intellectual intuition involves a production of its object (CPR, B145).
Two provide phenomenological grounds for accepting the validity of the core claims of the EDF. This however leaves open the issue of how the EDF fits into the broader Kantian project. In particular, since the rich notion of Kant's Highest Good, with its teleological implications, does not feature in the EDF, the result of the construction of the EDF may seem rather more destructive than constructive in terms of Kant's general enterprise.

A first response would consist in drawing attention to the parallels between the principles of the EDF and aspects of Kant's ethical theory which were not discussed in this thesis. This would be interesting even though Kant has not given them a satisfactory grounding, insofar as they give a fuller picture of Kant's views on ethics (Wood, 2000, p.63-72). These are, in particular, the developments of Kant's ethics beyond the Formula of Universal Law (FUL) in section II of GMM, as well as beyond the GMM and the material we examined from the CPrR. In particular, the connections between \( \mathfrak{P} \) and aspects of the Formula of Humanity could be brought out, and the links between the notion of the perfectly faithful agent-self and the Highest Good could be emphasised. However, insofar as this thesis is concentrating upon a core of Kant's ethics, at the centre of which lies the FUL as the only version of the moral law derivable from the nature of rationality, we shall not pursue the examination of these links.

Rather, I shall here sketch a defence of the claim that the EDF does in fact enable a new perspective to be taken upon the meaning of the \( \{\mathfrak{C}\} \) and of ethical action, which perspective is coherent with Kant's general critical perspective.

Let us first recall that, in the first section of this chapter, we established that without second-order principles of duty, there is no real p- or a-meaning of ethical action (in c-c-faith), by analogy with the impossibility of obtaining (new) knowledge through the use of epistemic categories alone without intuition. We thus drew a parallel between the realms of the theoretical and the ethical which one can now fruitfully expand upon.

In theoretical philosophy, one starts with intuition which is unstructured and given as a manifold in the faculty of sensibility. This manifold is structured by the categories, but only through the mediation of a schematisation which enables two essentially distinct types of representation to cohere.

43 Additionally, the requirement of responsibility for my other and that of self-knowledge implicit in the EDF, could be related to the two ends that are duties in the MM, namely the other's happiness and my perfection (MM, 6:385).
In the ethical realm, we have shown that it is reason which provides a manifold for possible action, i.e. something constraining which is the material to work on. The ethical categories are then applied to this material which is the constraint introduced by the universal dimension of the unconditional good, through the existence of the other. That which plays the rôle of the schemas is the application of a principle of the EDF ($\Psi_A$) to a notion of absolute self (the individuated interpretation of the absolute self) to yield second-order principles of further determination of u-duty. As ethical schemas, the different facets of this interpretation provide different specifications of how a category is to be applied to that which is an underdetermined form of action.

How does this understanding of the analogy between the theoretical and the ethical help us? It enables us to grasp the determination of action as a form of intentionality that is constitutive of its object, the fully determined ethical action, in the same way as empirical knowledge constitutes an empirical object.

The external input to the constitution of the empirical object is the matter of sensation, i.e. that which is given to our senses as material constraints. It defines the material. The external input to the constitution of the ethical action is the matter of the constraints of duty, i.e. that which is given to me as dutiful constraints. A key point discussed in the first section of this chapter is that this is characterised in terms of the others.

Empirical experience is concerned with the world. The relation between subject and object is one of knowledge of what is the case for the world. So in empirical experience, I know something (object) about the world. From the above, ethical experience is concerned with my other, i.e. the other as object of my ethical concern. The relation between subject and object is one of responsibility for what ought to be the case for my other. So in ethical experience, I am responsible for my other.

The following table summarises the terms of the analogy:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical intentionality:</th>
<th>Ethical intentionality:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of an object</td>
<td>Responsibility for my other</td>
</tr>
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</table>

For simplicity, I concentrate here upon knowledge acquired through the outer senses.
Let us examine what this means in terms of Kant's Copernican Revolution. The empirical world is, as a result of the Copernican Revolution of the CPR, constituted both by the structures of the transcendental self and the matter of sensation. That is, certain transcendental features are required to account for the very possibility of objectivity. This replaces the previous transcendental realist view of the world as already constituted independently, which leaves open the problem of how to know it through sensation. The ethical world is, on the picture suggested by the EDF, analogously constituted both by individuated fully determined second-order principles of c-c-faith in an absolute [self], and by the others who are given as the matter for dutiful constraints.

This could be seen as representing an ethical dimension of the Copernican Revolution which is not fully realised in Kant's ethical philosophy. This is, first, because he does not have a real notion of the ethical self beyond that of an agent who acts from duty, a remark which has already been made in chapter II and is fundamentally related to the problems identified in Part One. But correlatively, it is also because Kant has no place for a proper consideration of the other beyond the universal dimension within which the other is present alongside me. As a consequence, Kant's ethics of u-duty are in a state similar to transcendental realism in the theoretical domain. The first two sections of the GMM set out the nature of dutiful constraints independently of any consideration of the ethical self.

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45Two important remarks can be made about the ethical correlate of schematism. First, we find, just as Kant did for the epistemic schemas, that the 'ethical schemas' are types of intuitions - they are constructed in an analogous way to the 'ethical intuitions', as second-order principles. Second, the 'ethical schemas', as their epistemic counterparts, rely upon applying the category to time. For in the ethical case, the key to schematism is the development of a life-story, i.e. an essentially temporal representation of one's notion of absolute self under the principle in question which is determined according to the ethical categories.

46We note an important difference between the theoretical and moral domains here, namely that there is one transcendental self for all possible human agents, but one notion of the absolute self for each possible ethical agent.
Can interobjectivity feature in Kantian mind?

Does Hume overcome empiricism?
In so doing, the problem of accounting for their normativity, i.e. for why the agent should feel a sense of responsibility to do his duty to the other, is left open just as the problem of knowing the empirical object is left open by the transcendental realist's view of independent objects. The EDF identifies the responsibility for one's other with that which constitutes the normativity of u-duty through the notion of c-c-faith in an absolute [self]. This is analogous to the CPR's identification of knowledge of an object with that which constitutes objectivity through the identification of the transcendental structures of the self.

It is important to remark that in the correspondences I am drawing, instead of considering the realms of the theoretical and the practical as Kant and much post-Kantian philosophy does, I am considering the theoretical and the ethical as the two terms of the analogy. And this, I take to represent the meaning of the Copernican Revolution in the realm of the ethical. That is, just as the theoretical realm in transcendental idealism does not consist of a raw domain of objects simply given to the epistemic subject, the ethical realm of the EDF does not consist of a raw practical situation in which there are other ethically relevant agents already given to the practical agent. Rather, others as objects of one's responsibility are constituted within ethical experience, just as objects of one's knowledge are constituted within empirical experience.

Finally, let us note that this point is not simply an observation about an ethical dimension of the Copernican Revolution which is realised through the EDF. Rather, this parallel reveals a way in which intersubjectivity can find a more well-defined place in Kantian philosophy. On the one hand, Kant's ethics are implicitly premised upon the existence of others. On the other, it has been correctly argued (e.g. by Husserl, 1974, p.52 and Sartre, BN, p.225-229) that Kant does not, in the metaphysics which emerges from the CPR, have a place for the other. As Sartre points out (BN, p.233), philosophy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has sought to redress this lacuna in Kant and pre-critical philosophy, by presenting it as a theoretical problem resulting from an 'understanding of myself and the Other as two separate substances' (ibid.). What the EDF enables one to do, according to the above, is to find a well defined and central place for the other in ethics, in a more primordial way than any purely theoretical account. This results from not considering the other as the matter of dutiful constraints, and the ethical self engaged in c-c-faith, as two separate substances, but rather inextricably linked within the notion of responsibility for my other. With this picture, the existence of

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47 I would argue that Kant's strategy of the fact of reason in CPR suggests an awareness of this problem, and is an attempt to solve it by claiming that the ethical is in some sense already given in this fact.
the other is implied as a raw fact constitutive of the a-meaning of my action, as matter of this ethical action. Insofar as I am a Quest for a-meaning, I represent a requirement for the existence of the other: my very being is a demand for the other. This does not, therefore, solve the issue of the existence and recognition of the other in theoretical terms, but rather approaches it within ethics. And in so doing, we find another strong source of support for the contention that ethics is best viewed as located at the centre of philosophy as it provides a promising approach to the understanding of intersubjectivity which, to this day, remains a key philosophical problem.

Conclusion
In this chapter, the central concepts of the EDF have been further developed on the basis of an examination of moral practice. An investigation into the central ethical rôle of situations involving the other reveals them to be constitutive of a-meaning. The implication for my interpretation of the absolute self in c-c-faith is that it ought to reflect the fact that the other potentially contributes a necessary condition to the a-meaning of my interpretation and therefore my action in c-c-faith. The moral dimension of this observation takes the form of a responsibility for the other who is potentially involved in the same constructive process as I. This notion of responsibility has been analysed in three stages, each of which reveals a deeper understanding of this concept, thus defining a form of moral progress. Three principles were accordingly formulated: the principles of tolerance, justification and responsibility. Further understanding of the implications of the EDF in terms of the phenomenological interpretation of Part Two and Kant's ethics has led to the formulation of two further principles, those of time and love respectively. These two principles provide the agent with a better grasp of the practical implications of her responsibility for her other. Together with an interpretation of the absolute self, such principles enable the agent in c-c-faith to identify her individuated further determination of the second-order principles of Kant's ethics of duty in terms of each of the ethical categories (quantity, quality, degree of involvement, ranking). This solves the indeterminacy problem of Kant’s ethics.

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48 This also brings out the way in which the constraints of duty can be understood as perceived by a "moral sense" just as the constraints of material reality are perceived by our senses, whereby this moral sense is defined as a correlate of the requirement of p-meaning.

49 What it additionally suggests, is that a theoretical account that is in tune with this ethical approach - e.g. which derives the recognition of the other from the demand for the other in c-c-faith - would provide the full solution to the problem of intersubjectivity in theoretical philosophy.
Apart from the indeterminacy problem, this chapter has brought to a close the discussion of the motivational problem in Kant’s ethics. First, the force of the motive of duty has been established within c-c-faith. Second we have shown how the notion of compassion can be seen to be central to the inclination to the good that develops with action in c-c-faith. The third result is that in c-c-faith, one can grasp one’s agent-self as engaged in a non-alienating process of becoming, guided by the regulative ideal of the perfectly faithful agent-self.

This chapter has shown that the claims of the thesis are coherent and form a unity. First, in relation to Part Two, a grasp of the phenomenological meaning of the central concepts of the EDF has been obtained by showing how this ethical theory can form a background of understanding from which key interpretations of what it is to be human can be reconstructed. In this way, the concepts of being-in-the-world, the Quest and the notion of bad faith have been shown to emerge from an interpretation of the material from the EDF. Additionally, a new perspective upon authenticity as c-c-faith in an absolute [self] has been uncovered from an understanding of the rôle of the incentive of faith in the moral psychology of the EDF. All these interpretations illustrate the sense in which an ethical theory such as the EDF can be used as guide for the development of metaphysical theories which cohere with its key concepts.

Second, in relation to Part One, two issues guiding the developments of this thesis have been addressed. These are that of bringing to a close the interrogation which started off the investigation of chapter I, about the nature of the unconditional good, and that of setting out our general answer to this question within the wider context of Kant’s critical philosophy. The unconditional good is multidimensional, its universal dimension being complemented by individuated ones, all which dimensions are inextricably linked, as shown by the issues raised in Part One; our grasp of the unconditional good is through an intellectual intuition in c-c-faith. Finally, by showing how the EDF can be viewed as extending the Copernican Revolution to the ethical, I have given strong support to the claim that the EDF is the extension of the core of Kant’s ethics called for by the problems we identified. Insofar as the EDF thereby provides a place for the other that is arguably lacking in Kantian philosophy, it gives additional credence to the claim that metaphysical issues are best approached on the basis of an ethical theory as first philosophy.
Conclusion

An analysis of the core of Kant's Ethics has identified an indeterminacy and a motivational problem by developing a three-tier framework for ethical principles and moral psychology. At the first-order level, the empirical character is a component of a causal account of action: action is represented by maxims. At the second-order level, which, I have argued, is not properly accounted for by Kant, the practically free agent-self contributes to an explanation of the agent's motivation: moral action is characterised by second-order principles of universal duty which fulfil the requirements of the moral law. At the third-order level, the transcendentally free intelligible character accounts for the justification of action. It is at this level that a new version of the Formula of Universal Law, (CI), has been formulated and derived, thereby addressing certain concerns about the Categorical Imperative found in the secondary literature.

A lack of determinacy at the first-order level of maxims of action has been identified in chapter I and related to the need to identify new second-order principles. Problems arising from an understanding of the notion of moral worth, of practical deliberation, and from the identification of a rôle for inclinations and self in Kant's ethics, have been discussed in chapter II. By developing concepts such as that of the agent-self and the inclination to the good, the difficulties can be unravelled and partly dealt with within the framework of Kant's theory. But this leaves unresolved important issues relating to the nature of moral motivation, such as those raised by Williams's critique. Chapter III has tackled a closely related issue, that of the grounding of Kant's ethics. The analysis of Kant's text and major commentators' reconstructions, has led to the conclusion that Kant's attempt to provide a foundation to his ethics fails. The discussion in Part One of these problems of indeterminacy, motivation and foundation has suggested that a broadening of Kant's conception of the unconditional good beyond a purely universalist notion is needed.

To define a direction and develop concepts instrumental to solving these three related problems, an analysis of the phenomenology of what it is to be human has been carried out. I have critically discussed key concepts of Heidegger's project in
Being and Time, namely Being-in-the-world, the existentiale of falling, the notion of fallenness and the understanding of authenticity in terms of Being-towards-death. Important concepts from Sartre's Being and Nothingness, such as the for-itself, in-itself and the notions of bad faith and desire, have also been critically assessed. The outcome is the construction of a phenomenological interpretation of being human which avails itself of both these authors' insights, while developing in a different direction. Thus chapter IV has introduced the concept of a Quest for absolute meaning as a more fundamental existential structure than absorption, projection or throwiness. It is first uncovered as accounting for Dasein's falling. A further understanding of Dasein's fallenness, i.e. of its following inauthentic ways, draws upon Sartre's notion of bad faith. This concept has been analysed in detail and explained in terms of a misunderstanding of the nature of time as key dimension of the Quest.

In chapter V, the Quest is also found to provide the key to understanding Dasein as a whole, in a way which ties together the main existentiale defining it. This account of authenticity replaces the exclusive focus upon death in Heidegger's account. To be authentic is moreover shown to be achievable only through a leap of faith that I present as related to Kierkegaard's understanding of that concept. By drawing in particular on an analysis of Heidegger's call of conscience and Sartre's understanding of pre-reflective consciousness, an account of the adoption of authentic ways is given. The resulting constructive committed faith in an absolute, with a rôle for a notion of absolute self, is the way in which that which is a Quest can grasp itself in its wholeness. This phenomenological interpretation has also enabled the formulation of a generalised third-order principle which is a candidate for the further determination of Kant's ethics.

Using this interpretation as a guide and an aid to deeper understanding, I have examined the foundational problem in ethics on the basis of a grasp of human agency expressed in the form of the requirement of purposeful meaning. Chapter VI has identified action upon faith, defined by a value standing for a conception of Highest Good, as p-meaningful. This in turn raises the issue of the p-meaning of the leap sustaining this faith. Other options for action have been identified as requiring further examination in terms of p-meaning, namely action in the pursuit of happiness and action from duty. In chapter VII, the notion of a-meaning has been proposed, to enable the question of unconditional p-meaning to be addressed. Only committed and constructive faith in an absolute [self] is found to be a-meaningful, and only from the perspective of an agent in faith. The reality of this
a-meaningful option is grounded in the constraints of universal duty around which the interpretation of the absolute self can be constructed. Importantly, we have shown that, its extension to include a-meaning aside, the original requirement of p-meaning is sufficient to show that the proposed faith defines the only fully justifiable form of action.

Since this conclusion effectively provides a direct answer to the foundational problem of Kant's ethics, chapter VIII has focussed foremost upon providing third-order principles of action, namely those of tolerance, justification, responsibility, time and love to guide the further determination of dutiful action. Together with an individuated interpretation of the notion of absolute self, these determine the second-order principles of further determination of dutiful action under different ethical categories. The motivational problem has been addressed in chapter VIII, through an interpretation of the nature of the inclination to the good developed through moral action. This has provided a central rôle for the notion of compassionate love, thus completing our reply to Williams's criticisms.

This thesis has thus transformed the concept of unconditional good from a purely universal notion in Kant's ethics, to a multi-dimensional one with individuated dimensions sprouting off a universalist backbone. In so doing, it has altered the rôle of the concept of universal duty from Kant's rational requirement of action to a constraint through which the other agent is properly grasped as other. This understanding is the first stage of the development of an interpretation of the absolute self by the agent in faith, which expresses one's responsibility for one's other.

Chapter VIII has also shown in what sense the Ethics of Dutiful Faith developed herein, calls for a grasp of what it is to be human, such as that provided by the phenomenological investigation of Part Two. If the core of Kant's Ethics of duty has been extended in line with this phenomenological interpretation, this is not to say it is not in the spirit of Kant's enterprise. Rather, a case has been made for seeing the development of the Ethics of Dutiful Faith as fulfilling the programme of the Copernican Revolution in the ethical sphere. Moreover, it is, in two respects at least, not out of tune with the concerns of German Idealism that sought to take Kant's work further. First, it identifies an absolute as the only possible ground of all purposeful meaning, and second, it illustrates the central rôle of ethics in philosophy.
The following abbreviations are used throughout the thesis:

- **BN** Sartre Being and Nothingness
- **BT** Heidegger Being and Time
- **CJ** Kant Critique of Judgement
- **CPR** Kant Critique of Pure Reason
- **CPrR** Kant Critique of Practical Reason
- **GM** M. Kant Groundwork / Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals
- **MM** Kant Metaphysics of Morals

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Time is the medium of narrative as it is the medium of life

Thomas Mann, 'The Magic Mountain'

When reason abandons itself to love's wish, and love consents to be forced and held within the bounds of reason, they can accomplish a very great work

Hinewicz, 'Letters'

One of the characteristics of the Journey to the East was that although the League aspired to quite definitive, very lofty aims during this journey (they belong to the secret category and therefore cannot be revealed), nevertheless each member could have his own private aims and indeed without them he would not have been included in the party

Hermann Hesse, 'Journey to the East'

Glaubens-Motiv
Sehr langsam

Richard Wagner, 'Parsifal'
Typus

P. 2

P. 45 the money

P. 58 or

p. 146