Ethical understanding and ethical concepts in Aristotle

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To my parents
ABSTRACT

This Thesis is an attempt to answer two connected questions in Aristotle's philosophy: (a) how the concepts are acquired and incorporated in each person's understanding, and, (b) in what sense and on what basis we can speak of fundamental, universal and objective ethical truths. The conclusions of the consideration of the relation of Language to Thought and Reality, and of concept acquisition generally, topics which have been dealt by others, are examined in their application to Aristotle's Ethical Epistemology in particular.

The initial consideration of the general background includes a reconstruction of Aristotle's Theory of Meaning in the De Interpretatione and the Categories, together with his general framework concerning the acquisition of concepts and universals in Posterior Analytics B.19. Discussion of the function of νοος in B.19, in relation to that in the De Anima is also given. Our discussion of Aristotle's Epistemology examines where he, rejecting as he does Platonic recollection, stands in the debate between Chomsky and the empiricists. We then examine to what extent the stages of the acquisition of the ethical ἀρχαὶ/ νοηματα are analogous to that of the sciences, and
the part played by νοῦς in ethical and non-ethical Epistemology. The relevance of Θεωρία to our ethical development and quality of life is also considered.

Concerning the second question, we deal with the nature of Aristotelian ethical concepts, examining to what extent they are cases of ὀμονομα, πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενα, or ἀνάλογα. Examination of the structure of Aristotle's concept of δικαίοσύνη involves the distinctions between Καθόλου-Ἐν μέρες δικαίοσύνη, and Ὀσιο-Νόμῳ δικαίον, the latter raising the issues of the universality and objective basis of an ethical concept. Discussion of the concepts of ἀνάρεξια and φιλία provides further information concerning the structure of complex ethical concepts for Aristotle and the way in which they are progressively acquired by the individual understanding.
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INTRODUCTION

From the early period of Ancient Greek Philosophy, people were very much concerned with the origins of human language, and, generally, of human thought and understanding. Parmenides first explicitly introduced the question about being, though this seems implicit for others earlier. Later, Plato examined the issues concerning the acquisition of knowledge, its innateness and universality, and he discussed the question as to whether moral virtue is an inborn disposition, or is acquired by instruction and experience, or is taught (Meno 70a). Also, in Meno, he sets the problem known as the Meno’s paradox, namely: "it is not possible for a human being to seek to know either what one knows or what one does not know; for one would not seek what he/she knows—for one knows it already, and has no need to seek it—nor would one seek it—for he/she does not know what he/she will seek" (Meno 80d-e). (Translation by Paul Woodruff).

This philosophical paradox that raised the interest of ancient and modern scholars, gave us the stimulus to start research on this issue and the ones related to it. We have related the above question to an ethical inquiry, that is, examining to what extent we can speak of innate and universal ethical truths and how
they are incorporated in the individual understanding. But though this philosophical paradox implying the poverty of the perceptible data (given the limitations of those data available) as opposed to the richness and complexity of our shared knowledge, was the stimulus for our present Thesis, the context has been Aristotle.

Now, the reasons for which we have chosen Aristotle are the following: (a) Generally, in his work, we find a distinctive and problematic discussion of the questions of how the human understanding is constructed and functions, as encountered in his treatises of Posterior Analytics, De Anima, and Metaphysics. And even more important, (b) he is a leading figure on Ethics and provides us with one of the fullest and most detailed treatments of discourse on ethical questions surviving from antiquity, (c) he does not clearly relate the acquisition of ethical understanding to his treatment of the acquisition of understanding generally in the Posterior Analytics B19, and (d) he is clearer than anyone before him with regard to the issue of universality in Ethics. Thus, for all these reasons, we find the Aristotelian approach worth examining.

Throughout the present research, we will be dealing
with two general issues concerning the relation of Language to Thought and Reality in Aristotle, and its application to Ethics. In fact, we will be concerned with answering two interconnected questions on Aristotle: (a) how the Aristotelian ethical concepts are acquired and incorporated in each person's understanding, and (b) in what terms we can speak of universal ethical truths.

Now, in order to answer those questions, we will be dealing with separate issues in Aristotle, like: the acquisition of conceptual knowledge according to Aristotle's Epistemology, the way that ethical reasoning functions as part of the acquisition of the ethical ἀρχαι/νοηματα which takes place in a process equivalent to that of the sciences— with some further qualifications, of course—, the part played by νοῦς in ethical and non-ethical reasoning, the nature of the Aristotelian ethical concepts— examining some of them in detail—, and in what terms we can speak of universal ethical truths. And all those issues would stand close to the issue of innateness, that is, to what extent the universal ethical truths and the faculties involved with their acquisition could be innate.

Of course, the issues concerned with Aristotelian Epistemology in general have been already discussed.
by previous scholars, so our discussion will be confined to offering a preliminary grounding for what follows later in the discussion of the Ethical Epistemology. For, although much has been said in connection with Aristotelian Epistemology, less has been done with reference to how this discussion relates to Ethics. As Dominic Scott (2) indicates in his Thesis: "in order to develop a similarity between Aristotle's Epistemology and his Ethical Epistemology, we need a very careful study of how Aristotle thought ethical ένδοξα develop in us." That is a task that we are concerned with in the present Thesis.

The relation of the general epistemological theories of Aristotle to his Epistemology of Ethics in particular is unclear, and few scholars have dealt with it. Taylor (3), indicates that "Aristotle sees no special problem in the thesis that there is such a thing as objective truth in the practical realm; for him the task of practical Epistemology (of which moral Epistemology is a species) corresponds to that of theoretical epistemology" (4). Irwin (5) has also argued that the practical first principles are analogous to the first principles of theoretical sciences in being beyond reasoning and argument. Similarly, DeMoss (6) also takes deliberations to be the
practical equivalent to deductions, and stresses that in all these deductive forms the first premise is learnt by induction. According to him (7) "induction provides the universal starting-points from which one may begin to deliberate. But the inductive process requires its own starting-points, and the particular starting-points (first premise) must be accepted on faith in one's moral educators and applied in the formation of good habits, while the second premise, which is the universal one, requires the perceptive power of νοὸς to reveal the means-end connection between the particular things to be done and the universal goals to be pursued".

Our approach too, is that the fundamental ethical reasoning is acquired in a process analogous to that of the theoretical sciences, with some qualifications. And we will discuss the process of ethical reasoning as part of the process of the acquisition of the ethical ἀρχαὶ/νοηματα and their gradual incorporation into man's ethical understanding. That is, we see the gradual stages of the acquisition of the ethical concepts as analogous to the process presented in a more general context in the Posterior Analytics B.19. And even further, we examine in what terms we could speak of the objective reality of the universal ethical
truths that these complex concepts possess. And, here, we should indicate that we have chosen the ethical concepts of δικαιοσύνη, ἀνέρεια and ἰλία in particular, because: (a) they are particularly complex concepts, and Aristotle has interesting things to say about the relation between the different kinds, (b) he treats them differently from one another as far as a focal analysis is concerned, (c) δικαιοσύνη, in particular, raises the question of νόμος and ἰδεία, (d) in the case of ἀνέρεια and ἰλία there is a clear distinction between a type concerned with virtue and inferior types, and (e) the link with virtue makes it possible to discuss in which way the various concepts are natural and objective.

Thus, throughout the present Thesis, we will be concerned with issues that refer to the relation between Language, Thought and Reality and its application to Ethics. At the very least, we hope to have contributed some further understanding to what extent the Aristotelian discussion contributes to the evolution of human ethical knowledge.

Nevertheless, before starting our examination of the above philosophical issues, we would consider it important and useful to refer to the philosophical positions that were current before and after Aris-
totle's time, with regard to the above issues. The leading figures are Aristotle's predecessor and teacher Plato, and later, the Stoics. Our consideration of them will be confined to general remarks on their theory of knowledge and Ethical Epistemology in contrast to Aristotle.

ENDNOTES

(1). With reference to the poverty of the data available and the richness of our shared knowledge, we paraphrase Chomsky, (1986), p. 7.
(4). Ibid., p. 130.
(6). DeMoss, (1990), pp. 61-75.
(7). Ibid., p. 75.
TERMINOLOGY

"Meaning"; the semantic components of a word.

"Derivative meaning"; the meaning that derives from the primary one.

"application"; a different usage of a concept(1).

We shall distinguish the following applications of the term within the Aristotelian philosophical framework:

[A]: in general, this applies to ἀρχαῖ that are chronologically prior. In the process of our acquisition of concepts, they are what we start from; what is most knowable to us. And in Ethics in particular, it would refer to the ἐνδοξά, that is, the moral agent’s first apprehension of the data coming from his/her political community.

Cf. NE A.4, 1095a31; "οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίν λόγοι", 1095b3-5; ἀρχέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων", 1143b4; ἀρχαὶ γὰρ τὸ δὲ ἐκεῖν ἂν κάλλιστα ἔκαστον γένοιτο, ὅθεν καὶ μαθήσεως οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρῶτου καὶ τῆς τοῦ πράγματος ἀρχῆς ἐνίοτε ἀρχέον ἂλλ’ ἔχειν πρόστ’ ἂν μάθοι", Cf. Metaphysics A1 1013a1-4; "ἡ δὲ ὢθεν τὸν κάλλιτα ἔκαστον γένοιτο, ὅθεν καὶ μαθήσεως οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρῶτου καὶ τῆς τοῦ πράγματος ἀρχῆς ἐνίοτε ἀρχέον ἂλλ’ ἔχειν πρόστ’ ἂν μάθοι", Cf. Phys. A.1., 184a16-21; "πέφυκε δὲ ἐκ τῶν γνωριμώτερῶν ἡμῖν ἡ δόδος καὶ σαφεστέρων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφεστέρα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμάτερα, οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα ἡμῖν τε γνωρίμα καὶ ἀπλῶς, διότι ἀνάγκη τῶν τρόπων τούτων προάγειν ἐκ τῶν ἀσαφεστέρων μὲν τῇ φύσει ἡμῖν

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In the sciences, this would apply to the starting-points of arguments, in general. In Ethics, in particular, this would apply to the ethical end taken by each person as the starting-point of our ethical reasoning.

It would also refer to a developed level of ethical understanding.


This applies to the actual, fundamental axioms in the sciences. In Ethics, in particular, it applies to the fundamental starting-points of ethical reasoning. In the process of the acquisition of ethical ἀρχαί/ νοηματα, it applies to a very advanced level of
ethics of understanding(4).

For example: Post. Anal. B, 19, 100a8: "τέχνης ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμης".

Cf. EE B, 9, 1227b23: "ἡ ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ τὸν σκοπόν ἢ τὰ πρὸς τὸν σκοπόν". Here, of course, there is no reference to ἀρχὴ but the word "σκοπόν" refers to the true (because of ἀρετή) starting-points of ethical reasoning, Cf. NE H, 8, 1151a15-17: "ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ καὶ μοχθηρία τὴν ἀρχὴν ἢ μὲν θείερει ἢ ἢ σάξει, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ σῶτα ἐνεκα ἀρχῆς, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς αἰ ὑποθέσεις", where it is very significant that wickedness makes what is actually bad appear to be good, and to be an ἀρχὴ[B].

For Aristotle, there is no matter of corrupting the true ἀρχὴ, or ἀρχὴ[C], once it has been gained, but if it has not been gained, and a person has grasped only an ἀρχὴ[B], then wickedness can also prevent it from becoming an ἀρχὴ[C](5).

[D]: this applies to the starting-point of the action. Cf. NE Γ, 3, 1112b23-24: "καὶ τὸ ζηχατον ἐν τῇ ἀναλόσει πρῶτον ἐν τῇ γενέσει" (here, he uses πρῶτον instead of ἀρχή, which also means "starting-point").

However, in the Eudemian Ethics, the word ἀρχή is apparent: B, 9, 1226b12-13: "βουλευόμεθα δὲ τοῦτο πάντες ὡς ἐν εἰς ἡμᾶς ἀναγάγομεν τῆς γενέσεως τὴν ἀρχὴν".

And in EE B, 9, 1227b32-33, "τῆς μὲν ὁδὸν νοησεῖς ἀρχή
τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ πράξεως ἢ τῆς νοήσεως τελευτή" (by implication from the first half of the sentence). Cf. Metaph. Δ.1, 1012b34-35: "ἀρχὴ λέγεται ἢ μὲν θεῖεν ἢν τις τοῦ πράγματος κίνησιν πρῶτον".

[E]: this applies to the starting-point of generation, or the cause of movement. In fact, ἀρχὴ[Δ] is what ἀρχὴ[E] does first. For example, we refer to the Nicomachean Ethics Γ.3, 1112b31-32: "ἐνθρωπος εἶναι ἀρχὴ τῶν πράξεων". We would also refer to Metaphysics Δ.1, 1013a7-10: "ἡ δὲ θεῖεν γίγνεται πρῶτον μὴ ἐνυπάρχοντος καὶ θεὶεν πρῶτον ἡ κίνησις πέφυκεν ἀρχεσθαι καὶ ἡ μεταβολή, ὥστε τὸ τέκνον ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῆς μητρὸς καὶ ἡ μάχη ἐκ τῆς λοιδορίας", although, ἀρχὴ is here being defined more widely than "ἀρχὴ[Δ] is what ἀρχὴ[E] does first", for "λοιδορία" itself hardly does anything.

Καθόλου.

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(i): this is the logical universal, the universal as opposed to the particular, the universal proposition as opposed to the particular one. In this application of the universal, we would also include the universal judgements (καθόλου ὑπολήψεις), regardless of whether they are true or false.

Cf. NE Ζ.11, 1143b5: "ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἔκχαστα γάρ τὰ καθόλου";
(ii) this application of "universal" would relate to the distinction between Καθόλου and Ἐν μέρει ἀδικία as discussed in the Nicomachean Ethics E.2(6). The sense of universal/particular in NE E.2, is more like the sense in which "animal" is a more universal term than "human being", though both are universals.

(iii) this application of "universal" refers to the cross-cultural similarities that exist despite the different conventions in the various societies. That is, it would be a distinction of natural as opposed to a conventional case. And the most relevant discussion of this kind of universal and the distinction that is drawn is given in the Nicomachean Ethics E.7(7), where the distinction between Ἀθάνατος διάκαιον and Νόμος διάκαιον is made. And "universal" in the application (iii) can apply even to propositions singular in form, at least, in the sense that they may be universally accepted: e.g., "Anaxagoras and Thales are wise men" (Cf. NE Z.7, 1141b3-4)(8).
(iv) this would apply to the actual universal as opposed to what the individual apprehends. This universal is to universal(i) as $\phi\chi\eta[C]$ is to $\phi\chi\eta[B]$, and it can be regarded as the equivalent in Aristotle's system of the Platonic universal, as we shall see later.

ENDNOTES

(1). However, we have to indicate that Aristotle does not make the distinction between meaning and application.

(2). Cf. chapter 2, pp. 98-100.

(3). Cf. chapter 3, pp. 210-211.


(5). Cf. chapter 3, p. 212.

(6). The discussion of Καθόλου and Ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνη in E.1, is more complex; cf. chapter 5, pp. 350-365.


(8). However, we should also point out that Aristotle does not use "universal" for either (iii) and (iii)α.
Plato on the theory of knowledge.

Aristotle's position is opposed to Plato's in that Aristotle disagrees with him on innateism, but resembles it in that both are realists. Plato's theory of knowledge is based on the World of Forms (or Ideas). According to Plato (Phaedo 72e3-77a5), the capacity of learning (μάθησις), is, in fact, the capacity of remembering (ἀνάμνησις) or recollecting the Forms, knowledge of which we acquired in a previous discarnate existence and forgot at the moment of birth. Socrates, in this argument in the Phaedo, refers to the example of Equality, and argues that we know it, and that we cannot derive our conclusion of it ultimately or originally from sense-perception (74a9-75a7).

According to Socrates, we recognize that two things are equal, only if we had previous knowledge of the Form of Equality, which was lost when we were born. However, later on in our lives, we recollect such knowledge by using our senses, in a process called ἁνάμνησις (recollection). A person recalls memory of Equality, every time he/she thinks that two allegedly equal physical objects are not equal (1). So, for Plato, the faculty of perception is the means to grasp the
preexistent knowledge, the recollected knowledge(2). His theory of acquisition of knowledge is a process of attaining knowledge of Forms, or as Gulley (3) observes: "Plato interprets conceptual apprehension as being reminded of an archetypal Form by any one of its sensible copies".

Furthermore, the theory of recollection reappears at 249c ff of the Phaedrus, in connection with metaphysical and psychological ideas, as Woodruff (4) also points out. Plato wants to distinguish between those characteristics, which the soul apprehends by means of the sense-organs, and those characteristics which are called "common to everything" (5). In fact, his main point is to show that knowledge is preexistent and cannot be equated with φύσης. And although in the Theaetetus, he speaks of the soul perceiving (Theaet. 184e8-185a2) (6), when he talks about the particular objects of various senses, nevertheless, even in those cases, for Plato, knowledge resides in reasoning about objects of the senses, it is not perceiving but rather reflecting (8). So, knowledge is not perception (9), but we would think that perception is a means to recol-
lect the preexistent knowledge. However, we should also indicate that there is no reference to recollection in the *Theaetetus*, and that it is believed that the theory of Forms has there been abandoned, though it is true that neither Forms nor recollection are ruled out explicitly either.

In *Republic* V-VII, Plato, speaks of the four states of mind, or levels of thought in his description of the true philosopher who alone is able to distinguish clearly in his/her thinking between Forms and particulars as being wide awake (μάλα ἑπαρ; 476δ)(10). Those levels of thought consist of the two lower states of mind, those being: ζήτησις (imagination) and πίσις (conviction), and the higher ones, those being: διάνοια (thought) and νόησις (understanding), and the distinction between ζήτησις and πίσις is analogous to the distinction between διάνοια and νόησις. In fact, his allegory of the Sun, the Line and the Cave, is used to express the transition from the sensible to the intelligible world. And the first level of mind that of ζήτησις (belief, imagination)—let us call it L1(11)—is what characterizes an early period of mental development. It is a stage at which the mind is not able to make any distinction between reality and unreality; it is not consciously aware of the difference
in reality between physical objects and their images. However, it is not suggested either that people actually confuse physical objects and their images (12).

On the other hand, at the second stage, that of πίσις, or stage L2, which characterizes a normal grown up man, the mind is aware of the fact that physical objects are "μᾶλλον ὁντό" (more real) than their shadows. In the same way, at the stage of διάνοια, stage L3, the mind reasons about the Forms. In fact, it is arguable as to whether the mathematicians at the level of διάνοια fail to realize that their real concern is not with the sensible diagrams (13).

In 510c2-d8, Socrates provides a mathematical illustration of stage L3, saying that the students of geometry and the like, use the visible forms, and make their arguments (λόγοι) about them, although they are not thinking of them, but of those things they are like, making their arguments for the sake of the square itself, and the diagonal itself.

In fact, this reference to the mathematicians could be used as a point of distinction between stage L3 and stage L4: in the former, a person uses sensibles as images of Forms, although he/she is thinking of Forms,
not of the sensibles, while, at L4, he/she thinks of Forms directly, not by means of their images (14). In addition, at L3, he/she proceeds from a hypothesis to conclusions, while, at L4, he/she proceeds from a hypothesis to an unhypothetical first principle, that is to a definition of the Form of the Good.

Now, in what way would the Platonic theory of mental development differ from and/or resemble the Aristotelian theory of knowledge? The Platonic theory of mental development could be thought to have certain similarities with the Aristotelian one, although they also have substantial differences, concerning the theory of ἀναμνήσις. The similarities could be concerned with the fact that during the first stage of εἰκάσια, the mind likens (εἰκάζει) images to the original physical objects (15), in a way similar to the one in which the Aristotelian person forms images of the physical objects, after he/she has grasped them by means of sense-perception (16). But the act of forming images of physical objects is not the same as that of likening images to physical objects.

That is, the Platonic εἰκάσια is not the same as the Aristotelian process of induction, and, to be more specific, the Platonic εἰκάσια is not the same as the Aristotelian ἀναμνήσις. For Aristotle, πίσις (conviction) is a state of mind that is higher than imagination, since he asserts (17) that many of the
beasts have imagination, but no beast can reach conviction. Also, for Aristotle one must reach the ultimate stage of thought, that of grasping the ἀρχή, and the universal ἀρχή, in order to have reached the truth of a principle, its perfect understanding, just as for Plato, one has to pass through the above states of mind in order to become a true philosopher.

However, there can be no exact correspondence between the two processes of the mental stages between the two philosophers, but only some similarities can be detected. After all, both for Plato and Aristotle their account of human development leads towards the philosopher: Plato's man could be a member of an élite—at least in the Republic—while, for Aristotle it is the person that reaches the universal truths, in the case of Ethics, the συνοόξιος one(18). As for ethical conceptual knowledge and ethical understanding, Plato does not make any distinction between it and general knowledge, whereas Aristotle provides us with a separate account of ethical knowledge and understanding, which we examine in the following chapter.

Moreover, what is important for the Platonic theory of knowledge in its relation to the Aristotelian one, is that Plato is a clear innativist, whereas Aristotle is
not. Plato's theory of recollection shows that the main point of his theory is that there is preexistent knowledge of the Forms, that was lost at the time of our birth and that we become aware of it gradually by means of the senses. By this theory, Plato seeks to find an answer to his question asked in the *Meno*—as we saw in the Introduction—in an enquiry as to what virtue is, namely: "In what way will one seek to know something that he/she does not know at all"? Plato tries to answer the above eristic paradox by means of the theory of recollection, that is, what we know, or what we call learning is actually the re-collection of previous knowledge learnt before and lost at the moment of birth. So, when one is seeking to know what virtue is, he/she is seeking something of which he/she is neither completely unaware, nor, is completely aware. And throughout his/her life he/she is seeking to regain the forgotten knowledge.

Thus, by his theory of recollection, Plato appears as the great innativist; the philosopher who above all taught of innate, even prenatal knowledge, which is triggered by the perceptual stimuli during one's life, and which justifies why we seek what we seek, or why we possess knowledge that surpasses the data of the external world. For Plato, knowledge is prenatal,
and also universal, since it is latent in all people, regardless of whether they reach the state of a true philosopher or not.

Now, the innateness and universality of the Platonic theory of knowledge, was the theoretical stimulus of a modern psycholinguistic theory, that of Chomsky, who in fact restated the above eristic paradox as the following question: "How come we know so much when we experience so little?" (19). However, Chomsky's concern with linguistic knowledge is different from Plato's with ethical understanding. So, Chomsky argues that the linguistic knowledge that we possess is actually part of our universal syntactic knowledge, known as Universal Grammar. That is, there is a system of grammatical and semantic rules that exist in the mind of every person once born, and which are triggered by the linguistic data of a particular language, so that the child gets to formulate the grammatical and semantic rules of that language, namely its native one (20).

The Universal system of rules is that from which the rules of a particular language generate, hence called generative (or transformational) grammar, based on "fixed parameters" (21), which function according to purely logical formulae (22), and on the fact that there is an interaction of the faculties of the mind.
responsible for that knowledge and its performance. And those "fixed parameters" possess a grounding in the physical structure of the mind, which is called mind/brain. Thus, Chomsky, as a pure modern innativist based his cognitive and linguistic inquiry on the Platonic theory of knowledge, though depriving it of the prenatal character which Plato used in order to explain the immortality of the soul.

In fact, what we notice in the Chomskyan theory is a tendency to explain the acquisition of linguistic knowledge as purely innativist, and opposed to any previous psycholinguistic theory based on imitation and analogy. According to his theory, the child possesses the Universal Grammar, as a fixed set of rules in his/her mind/brain, that is innate in origin, and formulated according to the set of grammatical rules of a particular language according to the linguistic data that will trigger this innate endowment. That is, we notice a strong innativism in the Chomskyan theory which is to be distinguished from the pre-nativism (if we are allowed to call it) of the Platonic theory of knowledge in general.

According to Plato, the child passes through mental stages in order to resurrect the preexistent knowledge that was lost once he/she was born. For Plato,
pre-nativism is what leads to the theory of the immortality of the soul. And for both Plato and Chomsky, pre-nativism and innativism respectively, is what answers the eristic paradox, and what puts them in contrast to the Aristotelian position, since for Aristotle there is a combination of empiricist and innativist views, as we shall see below.

At this point, it would also be very interesting to see how the Platonic Ethical Epistemology would relate to or differs from the Aristotelian one. As we have indicated, Plato does not distinguish between knowledge in general, and ethical knowledge in particular. However, we could derive some clues from what he says with regard to his theory of Forms. First of all, we would think that the stages of the ethical development would follow the same route as that of knowledge in general. That is, in L1, the moral agent possesses moral beliefs, which are like the prisoners' beliefs about physical objects (23). We would think that in the Republic 439a6-c8, and 515b4-c2, Plato speaks about "the shadows of justice", that is, about ordinary, unreflective beliefs about justice which—we would have thought—can also be false. And it is a stage of ethical reasoning at which most moral agents remain, perhaps, for ever (515a), in contrast to
Aristotle(24),

Now, the prisoners advance to stage L2, when they are released from their chains and gradually learn to distinguish between the physical objects and their images. As for the prisoners—moral agents, the transition from L1 to L2, is more difficult, and applies only to those that possess a higher epistemic standard of ethical knowledge, or, awareness of their ethical epistemic ignorance. So, unless a moral agent can give a justification of knowledge (αιτίας λογισμοῦ), he/she can not be said to reach that stage. Or, as Plato says: "καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ δόξα αὐτῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ήσον μὲν οὖν χρόνον οὐκ ἐπέλυσα παραμένειν, ἀλλὰ δραπετεύσας ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἤστε οὐ πολλοὶ ἄξιοι εἰδών, ἔτις δὲν τις αὐτὰς ἔθη αιτίας λογισμῷ" (Meno 97e—98b).

As for the transition from L2 to L3, the prisoner—moral agent needs to get out of the Cave, and turn his/her attention to non-sensibles, that is to Forms, and thinks of them through their images, until he/she reaches L4, when he/she can attain the Form of the Good. At L3, the moral agent proceeds from a hypothesis to conclusions, and at L4, he/she proceeds from a hypothesis to a definition about the form of the Good.
Thus, what we notice in the Platonic Ethical Epistemology, is a hierarchy of levels of understanding of a preexistent knowledge, that of the Form of the Good. According to him, the moral agent very often does not go further than the stage L1, and he/she can reach stage L4, if and only if he/she not only knows the definition of the Form of the Good, but also, knowledge of the Form of the Good enables one to explain everything else, itself being beyond explanation. For Plato, a moral agent possesses ethical understanding, if he/she can explain why it is so.

Now, this theory of acquisition of ethical knowledge would differ from the Aristotelian one, first of all, in that for Plato there is a hierarchy of levels of understanding the preexistent knowledge, and re-surrecting it, achieved by very few people, notably the philosophers. For Aristotle—as we shall see—there is also a hierarchy of mental stages for the acquisition of ethical knowledge, in terms of both the contents of reality and of levels of understanding, but there is no preexistent, pre-natal knowledge to be regained. There is, of course, a natural faculty/capacity of acquiring knowledge in general, and ethical in particular (25), and a natural tendency to acquire virtues or vices (26), but the acquisition of ethical knowledge
and virtues, is a combination of innate faculties/capacities and of habits acquired by experience, teaching and instruction.

Moreover, they both consider it to be very difficult for a moral agent to grasp the universal ethical truth, although, we would think that for Aristotle, it is very probable that more agents proceed beyond the first stage of mere apprehension of the ἀρχή. Also, they would differ in that for Plato, the method in ethical reasoning is not mathematical but dialectical in terms of the way he uses the terms, whereas for Aristotle, ethical reasoning is equivalent to the mathematical one—as it will be shown—employing both syllogisms/deductions and the method of induction. And, here, we should indicate that dialectic for Plato is conceived on a mathematical model none the less, and that's the important aspect that carries over to Aristotle. However, for Plato dialectic is superior to Mathematics, for reasons given in the Divided Line passage, whereas, for Aristotle it is inferior, and that is because it means something different for him, based on the fact that the distinction that he draws between dialectic and mathematics is a different one from Plato's.

A further issue concerning the two philosophers is
the universality of ethical truths.

For Plato, in his early dialogues, the εἴδος or ἴδεα (Form) is a universal, the same in all its instances and something the instances have (Euthyphro 5d). So, in asking for the Form of holiness, Socrates expects to be told that it is the same in every holy action; it is the nature of the form they all have (27). The Forms, as universals, are themselves the names in all their instances, and something all instances have. They are also essences and causes by which things are what they are, since their existence is a condition for the existence of their instances. So, the Form of Justice as a universal appears in all its instances, and it is a condition for their existence.

However, in the middle-period dialogues with the Theory of Forms proper, the Form is not in its instances, for they are inferior to it and only aspire to it. In the Phaedo (74a9), the forms are types (παραδείγματα) to which particular sensible things approximate more or less closely. According to this view, particular sensible things are μορφα or εἰκόνες of the forms. A given triangle is never what we really mean by triangle, nor a right action what we mean by right. What we really mean when we speak of "triangle" or "right" are not perceptible by the senses, but can
be apprehended by thought. And this kind of reality, is "αὐτὸ ὁ ἐστὶν" (the what it is by itself) (74b2), or, "what (actually) is the right".

However, Aristotle in criticizing the theory of Forms, argued that a universal cannot be individual and what is predicated of many things cannot itself be one thing among the many (Cat. 1b6-7). He also says that the Platonists, at the same time make Ideas universal, and again treat them as separate and as individuals (28).

This is to say the Platonic Form as universal rests on the confusion of universal (i) and universal (iii), that is, for example, whether the Platonic Form of Justice is a universal (i), the property that all the examples have in any degree. On the other hand, the Aristotelian form may not be universal in the same way that the genus is, but it is not to be equated with the Platonic Form as a separate individual either (29).

Now, the importance of the universality of ethical truths for Plato, is great, since he reacted against the Sophists and those who believed that morality was purely a matter of convention. It is indeed the desire for universality and objectivity in ethical truths that largely prompts Plato's concern to establish his views for all truths. And by doing so, he sets the
scene for Aristotle's discussion in the *Nicomachean Ethics* E.7. At the same time, this brings in the relation between universal(iv) with universal(iii), in that the former as the real, objective existent and starting-point reflects a reality whose property all the examples of something have in some degree.

(B). The Stoics on the theory of knowledge.

Diametrically opposed to the Platonic inquiry for truth stands the Stoic theory of knowledge. According to their Epistemology, knowledge is empirical; it is based on sense-experience(30). That is, we start with the appearances, with how the world appears to us and impinges on through the senses(31), hence the way things appear to us makes a kind of "imprint" on us, on our mind, the cognitive part of the soul. For the Stoics, the process of acquiring knowledge is a gradual one, based-as every empiricist theory-on how we acquire knowledge through the senses. And the Stoic notion of καταληπτική φαντασία (apprehensive presentation)(32) is responsible for the imprint of the physical object on our mind.

In fact, the notion of καταληπτική φαντασία, is certainly ambiguous(33). It is formed from the verb "καταλαμμβάνειν", which means to "grasp", or "apprehend", and may have an active or a passive sense. We would
think that καταληπτικὴ φαντασία possesses both these senses. It is active, since it implies a sort of cognition taking place; it is that by means of which we grasp the presentation of a physical object, which becomes apparent to our mind. And, at the same time, it is passive since it is a presentation itself that occurs in the ψυχή, it is what displays both itself and what has caused it. More specifically, it is a presentation that grasps us.

So, the Stoics are concerned with both the act of perceiving and the act of apprehending of a presentation (34). And in any perception, there is going to be not only an appearance, but a sort of συγκατάθεσις (assent) by the person's mind to the propositional content of the appearance (35). And this assent, strictly speaking, is neither opinion nor knowledge.

As for the latest stage in their theory of knowledge, it is that of ἐπιστήμη (knowledge) (36). Knowledge proper, is certainly, a further stage and involves not only apprehension, but also incorporation of this knowledge into a whole system that constitutes one's understanding, a task that is achieved only by the "wise person". And although Aristotle does not attach the same importance to the apprehension of a single impression, the point concerning the achievement of
proper knowledge only by the wise, is similar to the point expressed by Aristotle that the wise grasp the absolute truth.

However, the processes that they follow are not exactly the same. For the Stoics, there is a building-up of beliefs, as a structure leading towards proper knowledge. That is, apprehension of particular facts happens instantaneously, when a καταληπτικὴ φανερωθεὶς occurs. So, according to the Stoics, we understand individual things, rather than grasping universal truths. The apprehensive presentations (or appearances) of normal people—that is not the madmen or drunk people—are the criterion of truth.

Moreover, the notions in the Stoic theory of knowledge that are the starting-point of every ἐπιστημόν (as object of knowledge) are "ἐγνώκαι" (conceptions) and "προληπτείς" (preconceptions). These were discussed by Plutarch in his De communibus notitiis 1059c, although it has to be indicated that he set out to prove the Stoics inconsistent rather than to clarify their views.

Now, in Diogenes Laertius (37), we find a definition of προληπτείς as: "ἐγνώκαι φυσική τῶν καθόλου" (a natural conception of the universal characteristics of a thing). That is, προληπτείς is a natural ἐγνώκαι, which is
differentiated from ἐννοια in general in the sense that the former is immediately acquired by a mental operation that employs the senses, while the latter is acquired through the senses and by means of instruction and education.(38). Preconceptions are universal, and so are some other conceptions.

Furthermore, the notion of προλήψεις and their role in the process of conceptualization is very fundamental in that they are the criteria of truth. According to the Stoic theory(39), the basic criteria of truth are ἀγάπης, καταληπτική φαντασία, and προλήψεις as natural conceptions of universals. As Diogenes Laertius points out(40), "it is by sense perception that we get cognition of white and black, rough and smooth, but it is by reason that we get cognition and conclusions", and "ἀγάπης... extends from the commanding-faculty to the senses, for the cognition of which they are the instruments". And the "natural accumulation of experience or perceptible objects, through many memories of a similar kind results in generic impressions or conceptions of man, horse", as Long and Sedley observe(41). As for those naturally acquired conceptions (or generic impressions), they are the προλήψεις.

Consequently, we have seen that the preconceptions
develop automatically in human beings, and they are among the criteria of truth, the basis naturally developed in order "to accommodate further human knowledge" (42). That is, what we notice by πρόληψις is that the Stoics tried to make a sort of a "marriage" between their empirical model for acquiring knowledge, and the necessity for a natural, or inborn disposition that would serve for the basis of acquiring every kind of knowledge, and most particularly ethical knowledge. And any such inquiry for philosophical truth has to include at least one inborn characteristic, because the philosophical truth relates to a reflection of reality, hence, of Nature, as well.

Now, the point related to our concerns, is the notion of the moral preconceptions and how they arise, an issue that has caused a dispute as to whether the Stoics had spoken of innate ethical πρόληψις, or of an empirical basis. So, with regard to this point we will refer to the basic passages that discuss the issue of the acquisition of the ethical πρόληψις.

The first passage is: Epictetus, Discourses I, 22.1-3, 8-10(43): "αὕτη προλήψεις κοινὰ πάσιν ἀνθρώποις εἶσι καὶ πρόληψις προλήψις οὐ μᾶχεται, τίς γὰρ ἡμᾶς οὐ τίθησιν, διὰ τὸ ἄγαθὸν συμφέρον ἐστὶ καὶ αἵρεσιν καὶ ἐκ πάσης αὐτὸ περιστάσεως δεῖ μετίναι καὶ διακεῖν; "and "μανθάνειν τὰς φυσικὰς προλήψεις ἐφαρμοζεῖν ταῖς ἐπὶ
mērous oússias katalhlwos tē fýseis kai loipon διελεῖν, ὥστε τήν θντιν τά μὲν ἐστιν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, τά δὲ οὖν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν", where we are told that preconceptions are common to all men, and one preconception does not conflict with another, since the good (for example) is expedient and choiceworthy and we should pursue it.

By the "προλήψεις κοιναὶ πᾶσι ἀνθρώποις εἰσίν", Epictetus has in mind the ethical προλήψεις by implication from the text, and he considers them to be common to all people. And here we would disagree with Sandbach (44), who indicates that there must be many preconceptions that cannot possibly be universal, for, if preconceptions arise naturally from experience, then they are considered to be universal, since they relate to Nature, thus they possess universal validity. It’s the experience that triggers them, the one that differs from man to man.

Another passage that informs us of the acquisition of the ethical προλήψεις, is one by Diogenes Laertius whom we quote in the original: "ὁφθήκας δὲ νοεῖτας δι’ ἡμῖν τι καὶ ἀγαθόν" (the idea of something just and good is acquired naturally) (45). Concerning the meaning of "ὁφθήκας", Sandbach (46) says that the meaning simply is that a conception arises "naturally", that is, that there is something just and good. Examining this phrase in connection with Aetius 4.11.1-4 (47), where we are informed that προλήψεις arise naturally and undesignedly, while ἔννοιαι are acquired through
instruction and attention, we derive that ethical
προλήψεις must arise naturally in the sense that they
are not directly acquired by sense-perception, or by
resemblance, or by analogy, or by transposition, but
acquisition is guided by a natural generative power
in us.

In fact, the above phrase: "φυσικὰς ὑποδεικνύει δίκαιον
tι καὶ ἀγαθόν", is very important for our concerns
here, with regard to the notions of universality and
innateness of ethical knowledge. So, the ethical προ-
λήψεις of "justice" or "goodness" arise naturally,
that is, not directly by sense-perception, and they
should be considered to be common to all people,
hence universal. And this point would resemble very
much the Aristotelian conception of "φυσικὸν δίκασιν"
—as we shall follow in the fifth chapter below—in
the sense that there is a generative power in us,
that leads us to develop our inborn endowment, that
cultivates our natural tendencies, and this is in
accordance with Nature.

Similarly, in another passage, by Plutarch, St. rep.
1041E(48), we are told that "τὸν περὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν
λόγον, ἂν οὗτος εἰσάγει καὶ δοκιμάζει, συμφωνᾶται εἰ-
ναι ἂπο τῇ βίῳ καὶ μᾶλιστα τοῦ ἐμφυτουν ἄπεισθαι προ-
λήψεων", where we receive further information concer-
ning the natural character of the preconceptions. Now, the above passage of Plutarch in connection with his passage of ἄνεσις ἐκ τῶν ἀγαθῶν (generally emended to ἀρχῶν) τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν συμφύτων ἔχει τὴν γένεσιν", at Comm. not. 1070c, suggest that there must be a generative power, existing in us (σύμφυτον).

So, which is this generative, connate power that is responsible for the προλήψεις to be acquired φυσικάς? The answer is the notion of ὁικείωσις (appropriation), which appears to be a leading notion in their Ethics. As an approach to ethical evaluation, οἱκείωσις implies empiricism—because of the general epistemological theory—and also implies innativism, since it refers to a natural endowment.

According to the notion of οἱκείωσις, nature has made an animal or human being well-disposed towards itself and its own preservation as something οἱκείον. He/she/it possesses a concern for self-preservation, and is conscious of that, hence avoiding what is bad, and pursuing what is good. This endowment acts like a starting-point that channels human activities to morally good actions, to proper moral functions which are in accordance with Nature (49). Thus, since οἱκείωσις is appropriation to a certain moral evaluation and moral actions in connection with consciousness of
this state, it must also be appropriation and consciousness to the higher level of morality as well. It is the seeds from nature that can be developed further and lead to a good life. It is a moral drive that can lead a person to moral perfection.

For the Stoics, the ethical virtues are directly or indirectly (like courage and temperance) traceable to the natural impulses. And, if the moral agent wants to live in accordance with justice and wisdom, then, he/she wants to live in accordance with nature. In fact, the virtue of justice is defined as "ξις απονεμητικη το φαεις αξιων έχαστη" (in S.V.F., 262, 263), that is, "a disposition to assign to each his/her share according to his/her worth", which invites the notion of "what ought to be done" in order to preserve (or restore) the balance. It also reminds us of the Aristotelian notion of equality in sharing goods.

The natural origin of Stoic justice is justified further by the fact that it is a natural tendency guided by this natural impulse and the social conventions in order to be a fully developed ξις in accordance with nature. Justice, as every Stoic virtue is led to a full development of Virtue, hence to
a full development of human nature. And this Stoic account of the relation between justice and virtue in general, would remind us of Aristotle's view of the relation of General Justice to Moral Virtue in general. As the notion of a natural code that prescribes the development of our natural tendencies in connection with principles of social conduct, would also remind us of the Aristotelian distinction of natural and conventional law.

Thus, by οἶκειωσις, the Stoics display an example of the "marriage"—we referred to above—between their empirical model and the innate characteristic needed for the inquiry for ethical truth. We shall find νοῦς in Aristotle playing a similar role in the acquisition of ethical concepts to that played by the natural power that generates the ξύψωσις προλήψις in us, for the Stoics.

Moreover, the Stoic theory resembles the Aristotelian account in that there are different contents of reality (knowledge goes beyond apprehension), and levels of understanding (οἶκειωσις is a developmental process) that the moral agent passes through towards his/her attainment of the universal ethical truth. But most of all, for the Stoics, we simply: "ipsum bonum non accessione neque crescendo aut cum ceteris com-
parando, sed propria vi sua et sentimus at appellamus bonum" (perceive this actual good and name it good not as a result of addition or magnification or comparison with other things but its own specific power) (50).

Nevertheless, as Aristotle's Ethics is an investigation of virtue and what belongs to it, since the ethical end is connected with a sort of life that is in accordance with τελεία ἀρετή (NE A.8, 1098b12-18, A.9, 1100a4-5), so Stoic Ethics, is an inquiry of what it is to live in accordance with nature (51).

After all, in both ethical theories what seems to be taken for granted is the notion of a τέλος, as the goal of life, that is what Aristotle calls εὐδαιμονία in the Nicomachean Ethics I.1, and what the Stoics defined as "what all actions in life are appropriately referred to, while it itself is not referred to anything else" (52).

On the other hand, we would draw a contrast between the Stoic κοιναὶ ζυγοὶ and the Aristotelian καθόλου (i), since the former are inborn (when they are προλήψεις) and develop automatically; there is a natural tendency for them to develop in a particular way whereas the latter is instilled by a process based on the faculty of perception and by means of
induction.

But even more, the Stoic ἔννοιας are κοινα in two senses: (a) they are shared in by all the people, and (b) they are general, that is, there is a generalization based on data introduced by φαντασίας and πρόληψις (52). We would think that the Stoic κοινα ἔννοιας would be similar to the Aristotelian καθ' ὅλον (i) in terms of (b), and to καθ' ὅλον (iii), in terms of (a).

However, where universals are concerned, we have to differentiate the Stoic theory of knowledge, as based on nominalism, from the Platonic and Aristotelian one which are based on realism. For the Stoics, we understand individual things rather than universal truths, whereas for Plato and Aristotle we understand universal truths. And in order for the Stoics to grasp the truth of the individual things, they based their inquiry on certain criteria of truth.

(C). Language, Thought and Reality in the Stoics

The important issue that certainly indicates the contribution the Stoics made to the progressive development of philosophy, is the distinction between Language and Reality. The Stoics spoke of ἔννοιας as the concepts acquired after a gradual process involving sense-perception, experience and reason. They
also spoke of "λεκτόν", as what words signified, and which is not only an explicit reference to the content of linguistic knowledge, but it also relates to the connection between Language and Reality (or Ontology). In fact, the Stoics, unlike Aristotle, made the distinction between meaning and reference, and they spoke both of the linguistic item and of its referent. Sextus Empiricus says: "λεκτόν δὲ ὑπάρχειν φασί τὸ κατὰ λογικὴν φαντασίαν ὑπεστάμενον, λογικὴν δὲ εἶναι φαντασίαν καθ' ἕν τὸ φαντασθέν ἔστι λόγῳ παραστῆσαι" (54), that is, λεκτόν is that which subsists according to a rational representation, and such a presentation can be shown by means of speech (55).

Now, the important point between the Stoic theory of Language, Thought and Reality and the Aristotelian one, is that for the Stoics there is a distinction between thought and the things, the objects of thought, and a connection between speech and thought (which is internal speech) signifying (λεκτά) about things. On the other hand, Aristotle does not distinguish between thought and the objects of thought (things that are thought). For, the Stoics, the λεκτόν is a mediator between words considered to be significant utterances and things; it is the significatum, though it is distinct from
the thing referred to, whereas for Aristotle the νόημα (as πάθημα τῆς ψυχῆς) is what is signified, but it is not distinguished from the thing referred to, being the same as it in form, though in the soul rather than in its own matter.

So, the Stoics, unlike Aristotle do not identify the mind with the thing thought. λέκτά are not thoughts, but are coexistent with thoughts (56). And thoughts are not the same as λέκτα, for thoughts, as much as things said aloud, are physical phenomena, whereas λέκτά are not, and whether one thinks something or says it, the λέκτόν is what the spoken (or silent) λόγος (57) means. Thus, the thought is like an utterance, the λέκτόν is what λόγος or διάνοια signify.

And, it is also noteworthy, that the Stoics use one word, namely "λόγος" in order to render both "reason" as implied in the notion of "λογικὴν φαντασίαν", and "speech", as it is encountered in "ἐνδιάθεσιν λόγος" and "προφορικὸς λόγος".

Moreover, the Stoics first spoke of the "σημαίνων" (significans) and the "σημαίνόμενον" (significatum), the former applying to the utterance, and the latter referring to what is expressed by means of the utterance: "σημαίνον μὲν εἶναι τὴν φανήν, ὃιν τὴν ἀλήν, σημαίνόμενον δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ πράγμα τὸ ὑπ’ αὐτῆς δηλοῦμεν..."
Another important point that should be indicated, is that "πράγμα" here is the meaning ("μετέρω τὸ σημαίνόμενον πράγμα"), not the physical thing "Δίων" himself. Again, we notice that the Stoics, unlike Aristotle, made the distinction between meaning and reference.

Thus, in the Stoic theory of meaning, we notice that there is a distinction between Language and Reality, a distinction between the significans and its significatum, between meaning and reference, and a connection between Language and Thought and Reason (Λόγος).

(D), Language, Thought and Reality in Plato

For Plato, thought (διάνοια) is the discourse (λόγος) of the soul with itself (Theaet. 189e6-7, Soph. 263e), while we apply truth or falsity not to αξία, but when we make judgements about something, that is, when our διάνοια, by affirming or denying is discoursing with itself.

In the Sophist 263e, we encounter the idea of thought as silent speech: "οὐχ οὖν διάνοια μὲν καὶ λόγος ταύτων, πλὴν ὁ μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν διάλογος ἄνευ φωνῆς γίγνομενος τούτ' αὐτὸ ἡμῖν ἐπανομάσθη.
διάλογο;", a point that is shared with the Stoics as we have seen. For Plato, thought and speech are not the same, but there is a connection between the two, and this is evident from the very fact that thought is the internal discourse of the soul with itself. In Aristotle, we do encounter such a connection, and even more, an identity between the thoughts and the things, they correspond to.

Now, the above point concerning thought as internal speech is very important, because it shows a close connection between Language, Thought and Reality, for Plato. It also provides us with further information concerning the underlying capacities of the human mind, according to Plato. Those capacities would include an internal psycholinguistic code based on logical formulae, in the form of propositions, and a continuous discourse of the soul with itself.

Another issue that it is worth mentioning for Plato's relation of Language to Thought and Reality, is the treatments of words as names for things, whether natural or conventional. In the Cratylus 389d-390b, Plato discusses the εἴδη proper in connection with the theory of names. According to his view, in more general terms, there is only one εἴδος of something, but there
are as many προσήκοντα εξήνη of that εἴδος as there are different kinds of ἔργα to be performed. However, although we can say a priori that there is only one εἴδος, we cannot say how many προσήκοντα εξήνη there will be of the εἴδος(59). So, the point is that, for example, the εἴδος of shuttle: different material realizations :: names in different languages :: shuttle-maker :: dialectician.

In the Cratylus, the topic of discussion is whether names are "correct" by nature, or by mere convention and custom. In 439a-440b, Plato refers to the ονόματα as names of referents. And a referent of a linguistic item must be an entity which actually exists. According to Schofield(60), Plato's view is that names will teach us the essences of their nominata if they define or describe, hence explaining implicitly the natural correctness of names. They are naturally correct, for they describe the essences of their nominata, that is, the essence of the real referent that being, for example, the Form of Beauty(61).

However, it is controversial(62), as to whether Plato himself endorses the view that names by being capable in themselves of conveying knowledge, are also capable of providing us with the right means of dialectic—a method essential for the attainment of truth in the
Platonic theory of knowledge. But even though we cannot definitely say that names convey knowledge, we can say that if words are names for things, then they should assign a kind of signification to the thoughts, those things correspond to, or rather represent. That is, the words as names should provide us with some kind of semantic information concerning the essence of their nominata. So, we would think that names serve us in our search for the truth, in our mental development towards the attainment of truth, that is, the recollection of the preexistent knowledge of the Forms. They serve the dialectician, but they can never replace the Ideas as the subject-matter of genuine inquiry (63).

Thus, for Plato, there is an ontological status assigned to language, since λόγοι as statements of things partake of truth, and can more adequately present the perfect city (Rep. 472e-473a), and assigned the task of bringing the soul to harmony with the "untroubled periods" of cosmic reason (Tim. 47b), in terms of speech. There is also a connection between reason and speech, expressed by the same word "λόγος" which shows that language, for Plato, is both a mental activity, as an internal discourse of the soul with itself, and a physical activity as an external speech...
Conclusion: What we have noticed in the brief exposition of the Platonic and the Stoic theories of Language and thought and Reality, is that the main points of comparison with the Aristotelian one are the following relations of (a) ἡ τοῦ λόγου and διάνοια, (b) διάνοια and πράγμα, and (c) ὑνωμα, διάνοια and πράγμα. Now, concerning the Platonic and the Stoic theories of knowledge, the main points of comparison between those and Aristotle, are the issues of innateness and universality. The Platonic one bases its account on a purely innativist model, while the Stoic one emerges from an empiricist model combined with some innativist elements with regard to the ethical knowledge in particular.

So, comparison of Plato and the Stoics with Aristotle shows that the innateness and universality of knowledge in general, and of ethical knowledge in particular, was a philosophical issue both for Aristotle's teacher and for an important group among his philosophical successors. Through our exposition of the two accounts, we have realized that innateness of a capacity for ethical understanding and the existence or not of objective ethical truths are what explicitly or implicitly the Platonic and the
Stoic theory have been concerned with. This suggests that an investigation of Aristotle's views on the acquisition and universality of the ethical concepts is both necessary and illuminating, in order to clarify his position, and to see in what way this differs from his predecessors and successors.
ENDNOTES

(4). Woodruff, (1990), p. 82.
(5). This distinction is also indicated by Bondeson (1969), p. 111.
(6). However, as it is indicated in the text, in the Theaetetus, Plato has abandoned the theory of Forms.
(7). Theaet. 186c7. Modrak (1981), p. 38, says that she calls the account of sense-perception, specifically in the Theaetetus "phenomenalist", because the existence and character of the object of perception are dependent on the act of perceiving as well as upon the structure of the external object.
(8). Theaet. 186a10.
(9). Theaet. 187a1-6. We follow the conclusions stated by Hicken, (1957), p. 48.
(12). Perhaps, what Plato has in mind here, are second-hand opinions.
(15). Republic 509e1-510a3. We use the verb "εἰκῇ ἔνει"
by implication from "εἰκασία".


(19). Further discussion of the Chomskyan approach is offered by himself in Chomsky, (1988), and Chomsky (1986), where between pages 51 to 220, he discusses Plato's problem (as he calls the Socratic paradox), and tries to solve it in its application to the understanding of grammatical structures.


(22). In the sense of not being tied to particular language or particular utterances.


(24). Cf. chapter 3, pp. 212-214, where is argued that the moral agents can reach stage 4, though not all of them can reach stage 5.

(25). We imply the "δόνωμι σώματον κριτικήν" (Post. Anal. B. 19, 99b35), in its application to the acquisition of ethical concepts.


(28). Cf. Metaph. Z.14, in general, and 1039a24-26, in
particular.

(29), Cf. chapter 2, pp. 101-102.

(30), As Julia Annas also points out, (1990), pp. 184-203.


(32), Sandbach, (1971), p. 9, translates it by "cognitive presentation".

(33), The ambiguity of the term is also indicated by Sandbach in his article above, p. 10.

(34), Following Diogenes Laertius 7.49 in Long and Sedley (1987), vol. II, p. 288, 33D.


(36), Long and Sedley, (1987), vol. II, p. 257, indicate the possibility of using the English word "knowledge" to render "κατάληψις".

(37), In Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta VII 54, The notion of πρόληψις was in fact introduced by Epicurus who used it in order to refer to a general notion which could serve as a criterion of truth on which a further inquiry can be based (cf. Cicero's De natura deorum 1.45). Cf. Glidden, (1985), pp. 212-3, who considers the Epicurean πρόληψις of Justice, for example, to be "a kind of ἐπιβολή τῆς διονοσίας which grasps what justice is, but, unlike Plato, this is to be a kind of sensual vision, not a kind of visionary λόγος, or defi-
nition".


Concerning the innate characteristic and the Stoic framework of the formation of concepts, we also refer to Lucullus, as presented in Cicero's Academica B. 30, "For the mind itself, which is the source of the sensations and even is itself sensation, has a natural
force which it directs to the things by which it is moved. Accordingly, some sense-presentations it seizes on so as to make use of them at once, others it as if were stored away, these being the source of memory (cf. Tarrant, 1987, p. 32), while all the rest it unites into systems by their mutual resemblances and from these are formed the concepts which the Greek term sometimes ἔννοια and sometimes προληψις" (translation by Rackham, in Loeb, ed., 1933, 1951), p. 505. It has to be indicated that here Lucullus presents the position of Antiochus of Ascalon; cf. Cicero, Academica A, 30-33, where, Varro states the views of Antiochus, according to which, Plato and the Peripatetics have both considered the senses to be a weak source of knowledge, and "knowledge", they thought, was nowhere other than in the thoughts and reasonings of the mind; for this reason, they approved definitions of things and applied these to all things about which there was a dispute" (A, 30).

We would think that Antiochus attaches less weight to the senses as such than the Stoics did, and even more he considers a natural power of the mind to be also responsible for the acquisition of knowledge. Cf. Striker, (1991), p. 51, who also indicates that Antiochus was "the man, who tried to put an end to the sceptical era in the Academy and to reinstate what he
saw as the original doctrines of its founders, Plato and the Peripatetics".


(49). Epictetus in his Discourses 2. 10. 1-12, discusses the notion of proper functions which denote all those activities that are "appropriate" or "natural" to a living being's constitution, and, thus, lead it to a moral life that is in accordance with nature; cf. Long and Sedley, (1987), vol. I, pp. 364-368, 59Q.


(51). As also observed by Striker, (1991), p. 3.

(52). Todd, (1973), p. 57, adds also (c) it serves as the proof for a theory.


The idea of thought as silent speech is also encountered in Plato's *Sophist* 263e: "οὐκοῦν διάνοια μὲν καὶ λόγος ταὐτόν, πλὴν ὡς μὲν ἕντος τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὐτῇ τὴν διάλογος άνευ φωνῆς γιγανόμενος τοῦτ' αὐτό ἦμιν ἐπωνομάσθη διάνοια;"


(61) Kretzmann, (1971), pp. 126-138, explains why Plato would argue for a natural correctness of names. Also, Bestor, (1980), argues both for the natural correctness of οὐνοματικα, and for the fact that the referent of a linguistic item must be an entity which actually does exist, and the real referent of the word "beauty" must be the Form of Beauty, to which a term is referred every time that it is used.

(62) Guthrie (1988), vol. 5, p. 30, points out "that there are two theories of naturally correct names in the *Cratylus*, but also, though not formally inconsistent themselves, they rest on inconsistent assumptions. The
proper conclusion of the first is that a name is only correct if it makes clear the nature of the things it makes; of the second, that a name is only correct if its letters and syllables imitate the nature of the things named. The validity of the second theory depends on the assumption that correctness of name is equivalent to correctness of vocal sound. Although, Guthrie indicates that these two theories rest on inconsistent assumptions, we would think that at least the first one can have a bearing on Plato's views in that the names of referents, that is, of entities which actually exist (that is, the Forms), are meant to make them clear, since every time we use them (the names), they refer to the Forms. If they were not clear, they would not refer to the real referents. (63). Levinson, (1971), p. 263.
CHAPTER 2: THE ARISTOTELIAN EPISTEMOLOGY

The term Epistemology(1) includes the issues of: the nature of concepts, the acquisition of concepts, the cognitive faculties responsible for that acquisition and, most of all, the question of the status and validation of our beliefs (and, hence, our concepts), of whether there exist objective truths that we can apprehend. That is, it includes the study of thought, and, hence, also of the language in which thought is expressed. It examines the notion of ἔπιστημη (knowledge) in all its manifestations and functions, either scientific, or, linguistic, or, moral. For that reason, in our examination of the Aristotelian Epistemology, all of those issues will be considered.

The discussion of the acquisition of the ethical concepts, brings in the general discussion of the acquisition of concepts, and that of the notion of concept and its meaning; so, it joins the issue of Ethical Epistemology with that of the general theory of Epistemology, as presented by Aristotle. And that, in its turn, leads us to attempt to discover what concepts would be in the Aristotelian theoretical framework, together with his theory of meaning.

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Let us then start with the place of "concepts" in Aristotle's scheme, and the Language-Thought relation in the *Categories* and the *De Interpretatione*.

The work *Categories* is relevant to the question of the relation of language to the world. The discussion is primarily concerned with things and not with names and it is the ontology of things about which our language speaks. To say anything is to affirm or deny something of a subject. And by supporting the principle of contradiction, Aristotle accepts that contradictory predicates cannot be true of the same thing. He also assumes an ontology of things that language describes. And since what is predicated of an object, is a "property" which possesses an ontological status, and the predication is expressed by means of a sentence whose meaning depends on its relation to a claimed state of affairs with ontological import, hence, for Aristotle, the law of contradiction would imply an ontology.

In other words, his theory of Language is not detached from his theory of substance, hence establishing a close relation of Language to Reality (or Ontology).
However, in the *Categories*, Aristotle has no explicit term that is the exact equivalent of the modern "concept" (5), although, he does say that thoughts cannot be independent of their thinkers, possibly regarding the thoughts as of things (secondary substances) that are thought of, being still affected by Platonism at this stage of his philosophical growth (6).

On the other hand, in the *De Interpretatione*, Aristotle says: "νεστι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τὰν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ παθημάτων σήμβολα, καὶ τὰ γραφόμενα τὰν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ", (16a3-4). In this sentence, we would discern two points: (a) the reference to the "affections of the soul", which might serve for an equivalent to the modern "concept", and, (b) we would consider the spoken and written symbols as possessing meaning, because, according to their definitions, they are φωναί σημαντικαί (semantic utterances), a phrase shared by all the definitions of the linguistic items (7). And, according to the latter point, we would consider the terms " USERNAME " and " ΡΗΜΑ " that he mentions in 16a1, to be words that possess meaning, while all the rest that he mentions in 16a2: " ΑΠΟΦΑΣΙΣ, ΚΑΤΑΦΑΣΙΣ, ΑΠΟΦΑΝΣΙΣ, ΛΟΓΟΣ " are considered to be verbal expressions that also possess meaning. As for "ΛΟΓΟΣ", we would
consider it, here, to refer to the notion of Language in terms of performance, every act of speech (8).

So, ὄνομα is a φωνή σημαντική, a semantic utterance carrying a sign, made up conventionally (9). What he means by σημαντική, is that the ὄνομα carries a σήμα or σημεῖον, that is, a sign, which is allotted to it. So, a name is an act of speech, a phonetic act, that carries a semantic property, and hence is a semantic utterance made up conventionally. This "κατά συνθήκην" implies that the name does not exist by nature, which is more explicitly expressed some lines below (10), whereby he says that none of the names exists by nature, but only when it becomes a symbol.

Now both ὄνομα and ρῆμα are assumed to be words that possess meanings, and if their parts are detached from one another, then each part does not signify anything on its own (11). So, the names are φωναί σημαντικαί (phonetic representations possessing meaning, or semantic utterances) as long as they form part of a λόγος. On the other hand, ἀπόϕασις, κατάϕασις, ἀπόϕανσις, are phonetic representations possessing meaning, that is, they form a λόγος, which also a φωνή σημαντική, but functions as a φάσις (12); a phonetic representation which consists of parts that signify even on their own, and which possesses truth or falsity with the exception

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of a wish(13), which is a λόγος, but neither true nor false(14).

So, going on with our examination of the Language-Thought-Reality relationship in Aristotle, in our attempt to discover his theory of "concept", and its equivalent meaning, we would focus our attention on the passage at 16a3-8, in his De Interpretatione:

"Εστι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολα, καὶ τὰ γραφόμενα τῶν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ. καὶ ἕσπερ οὐδὲ γράμματα πάσι τὰ αὐτὰ, οὐδὲ φωναὶ αἱ αὐταί, ὅν μέντοι ταῦτα σημεῖα πρᾶτων, ταῦτα πᾶσι παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὅν ταῦτα ὑμοιόμετα πράγματα ἡ ἐκ ταυτά".

Here, Aristotle uses various terms: "σύμβολα", "σημεῖα", "παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς", "ὑμοιόμετα", and the equation: "τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ" = "σύμβολα τῶν παθημάτων ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ", and also the phrase "φωνὴ σημαντική". The meaning of each of those terms is exemplified by himself, whilst using them in order to present his linguistic doctrine, and, in their description, they could suggest some more modern linguistic terminology.

So, what he means by σημαντικὴ is that a φωνὴ (ὄνομα, ῥῆμα, or, generally every kind of λόγος), carries a σήμα or σημεῖον, that is a sign, a conceptual property that is assigned to it. And what he means by the above
equation is that what is included in a ὑΩνή, in every phonetic act, are symbols of the affections of the soul, they symbolize the cognized object, the object that the soul cognizes once it has grasped it, and it is finally identified with it. For, the soul by means of perception (ἀντήσησίς) grasps the perceptible object and it is affected by it (πάσχει) (15), and after retaining its mental image in a process that we will follow later (16), it ends up cognizing it, becoming in a sense, identified with the thought of that object (17).

Now, these affections of the soul, are ὕμοιραματα (likenesses) of the cognized things, the same realities as what the soul accommodates in the end, once it has been affected by the perceptible objects. In fact, in those lines, Aristotle refers to four distinct points: (a) the existence of the significant vocalized sounds, (b) the written marks, (c) the affections of the soul, and, (d) the realities (18). However, what appear to be four separate points of his discussion, are very much interconnected with one another. Every ὄνομα and ῥῆμα or any other kind of ὑΩνή σημαντική, is, in fact, a being itself, and at the same time, the phonetic representation that carries semantic properties as symbols of the affections of the soul which are likenes-
ses of a certain being.

Relevant to the above passage, is the one at 16a27: "τὸ δὲ κατὰ συνθήκην, οὕτω φῆσαι τὰν ονομάτων οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἐστιν γένηται σῶμαλον", which suggests that all names are conventional symbols which possess written representations, since we have many different languages and scripts in the world, but a lot of similarities in the various things that exist and the thoughts of people. If not to mention what Aristotle says in 16a6-8: "καὶ γὰρ ὁ τραγελάφος σημαίνει μὲν τι, οὐπω δὲ ἀληθές ἢ ἑσθός, ἐὰν μὴ το εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι προστεθῇ ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ κατὰ χρόνον", concerning the meaning that something fictional like the goat-stag possesses regardless of whether it is true or false. This suggests that a goat-stag is in some sense a reality with a cross-cultural status (one could say).

Moreover, the point concerning the similarities in the various things that exist and the thoughts of people would be relevant to Ethics as well. We all know that there are various scripts and different language-families, but, all of those, in fact, describe similar situations in world affairs, while they also represent similar thoughts amongst human beings, otherwise there would be no communication among people of different religious and sociopolitical backgrounds.
So, what we might conclude is that names exist by convention and that we come to name something after we have thought about it, and that name signifies this thought. So, what the names represent are abstract entities, mental representations or symbols of the affections of the soul (τὰ νοηματα), and those affections are likenesses of actual beings.

And, here, enters the controversial issue (19) of whether Aristotle applies the affections of the soul to images (ἔννοια) or to the thoughts (νοηματα). We would consider the affections of the soul to apply both to νοηματα and to ἐννοια, since there cannot be thinking without images (20), the mediator entities between percepts and concepts. On the other hand, we do not think that Aristotle would have confined the notion of the παθήματα τῆς ζωῆς only to ἐννοια, for his theory of cognition is only then fulfilled when he discusses thoughts. How, then, are we to understand his doctrine concerning the connection of ἐννοια as mental representations of perceptible objects with νοηματα?

According to his theory of Cognition, there is a close connection between the faculties of ἐννοια and νος and αἴσθησις, and the images as mediator entities serve the cognitive function that starts with
the percept and ends up a νόημα. The idea is that images require perception and perception in turn requires physical sense organs, hence if thought requires images (De Anima Ε, 8, 432a1-15), then νοῦς will acquire those by means of perception. We have seen that the images are αἰσθήματα, but without any matter, hence, in a way, they are representations of the forms of the things, which the soul grasps by means of its cognitive faculties (Γ, 4, 429a27-29).

In the meantime, in De Memoria 1.450a10-11, Aristotle states that the image is an affection of the common sense; it is not an affection of the mind—at least not yet—although it is involved with the mind incidentally (κατά συμβεβηκός).

Furthermore, as Philoponus indicates: "ἐπειδὴ εἶπεν ὅτι τὰ ἐξή τῶν νοητῶν ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐστὶ, διὰ τοῦτο, ἡ σίν, ἐπάναγκες ἐστὶ τὸν νοῦν ἤμα φαντασμά τι θεωρεῖν, τοῦτος τε ὅργανος τῇ φαντασίᾳ ἐκ' ἕγε καὶ ποιητική ἐστίν αύτῆς ἢ αἴσθησις", adding also: "ἐπειδὴ γὰρ εἶπεν ὅτι κἂν φαντασία κἂν αἴσθησις εὑ- πῆς κεχρήσαθα τὸν νοῦν, ταῦταν ἐστὶ, ἡ σίν ὅτι πλὴν ὁ νοῦς τὸ ἄνευ ὑλῆς γινώσκει", and "ἐστέον δὲ ὅτι ὁ νοῦς καὶ ἡ φαντασία καὶ αἴσθησις ὑπερτερικὴν ἔχουσι τὴν ἀληθείαν καὶ ὀρθὰς γινώσκουσιν" (21). What Philoponus says, implies an interactive process going...
between the faculties of νοῦς with ἀνωτάτητά and ἀξιόητητά, with the qualification that each of those functions in its own way, at the same time (22).

Moreover, the important point that we derive from Philoponus is that ἀνωτάτητά can represent either truth or falsity, which suggests that it produces ἀνωτάτημα as mental images which are like the percepts they represent, and hence it tells the truth, otherwise, there is a case of falsehood. Concerning this point, Sheppard (23) discusses Simplicius' treatment of ἀνωτάτητά, and says that according to him (24) if ἀνωτάτητά "depicts" a mental image like the object, then it tells the truth.

On the other hand, ἀνωτάτητά can produce mental images even without the existence of ἀξιόητητά (De Anima Γ.3, 428a7), as happens in dreams. Simplicius (25) points out on that: "ἀξιόητητά μὲν γὰρ θεὸς ἄνεμος ἢ ἐνέργεια,ὁδὸν θεῖς καὶ θρασίς,φαίνεσαι δὲ τι καὶ μηδετέρου ὑπάρχοντος τοῖς,ὁδὸν τὰ ἐν τοῖς ψυχοῖς," that is, there can be mental images even without the existence percepts, grasped by means of the senses.

In fact, this point would strengthen the importance of the mental images for the cognitive processes of the soul, since that shows that there are mental ima-
ges as representations of perceptible objects, which are depicted in our memory and are stored in our world of imagination which is activated during our dreams. For, even if dream images do not correspond to perceptions in the way the other images do—since they are ψυχόµενα— they still have their origin in perceptions. The mental images as representations of perceptible objects are cognitive stored information that can be triggered with or without a perceptual stimulus. Thus, there would not be memory of objects of thought without images, even if those are involved only incidentally, hence there cannot be thinking without images(26).

Moreover, the cognitive status and validity of the ψαντάσµατα as mental representations, would prove Aristotle to be an early cognitivist. As Wedin(27) has also indicated, Aristotle is regarded as a cognitivist in terms of the way that the mental faculties function in his doctrine. What we mean by "cognitivist", is that in Aristotle's doctrine, the mental faculty of ψαντάσµατα is presented as a capacity for generating ψαντάσµατα, which are the representational structures required for cognitive activities, including thinking, remembering, and dreaming(28). For Aristotle, the mental images seem to
represent internal structures that are extended to

Also, the sameness of an act of thinking and its ob-
ject(29), would strengthen further the assumption
that Aristotle argues for a cognitivist account, that
is, his theory of thinking requires internal struc-
tures (which, have, of course, a perceptual origin). As
Wedin says, if the mind thinks itself insofar as the
object of its thinking is a conceptualization or
thought (De Anima Γ, 4, 430a2-9), then the actualization
of the noetic capacity must have a source in addition
to our per-
ceptions of the external world (30). But even if, the
origin of the stored internal information is per-
ceptual, but after conceptualization has taken place,
it is our cognitive capacities that do all the
work (31).

Thus, we would consider Aristotle to be a pioneering
figure in the theory of cognition, and we would not
actually agree with Sorabji (32) that Aristotle is
not at his strongest with regard to his theory of
thinking. Sorabji, bases his view on the fact that the
Aristotelian theory of thinking has proved very
difficult to understand. This may be true, but it does
not necessarily mean that Aristotle failed to produce
an adequate theory of thinking. But even more, a further justification could be brought in by means of comparing Aristotle's views with modern cognitive theories. For instance, in the modern theory of Cognition, it is accepted that the human mind works in a computational way in terms of the internal structures in it, which, in fact, are internal representations within specific domains (33).

And this would be very similar to the Aristotelian way of conceptualization from the input-perceptual information to an output-νόημα, although, of course, Aristotle did not speak of modularity of the mind explicitly. He spoke of the actualization of our noetic capacities based on mental representations whose source is perceptual. And he also spoke of άντικείμενα as internal representations required for thought, because in their own right, they are particular representations (34). In addition, Aristotle distinguishes between the intelligible form in its potential state and in its actual state, and it is the actualized form that Aristotle declares identical with the act of thinking (35).

So, what we notice in our discussion of the connection between the percepts, the άντικείμενα and the νόημα, is a close interaction of all those in the process.
of thinking. Human thinking will always involve physiological process, if it is accompanied by imagery (36). The objects of thought need a sensible vehicle, and this is provided by the image in which the thought resides (37). And by that Aristotle wants to react against Plato who held the view that the objects of thought are ideal forms which exist separately from the sensible world. Aristotle does accept Plato's view that forms are objects of thought, but he rejects the view that intelligible forms of sensible things can exist separately from the sensible world (38).

Thus, the images are important not only for the process of thinking in Aristotle, but also for providing a link between the soul and the body, hence requiring a state of inseparability of those two (see further below). So, if thought requires images as it does, then it definitely depends on the sense organs, and, following from this, it depends on images.

Moreover, the point concerning the fact that the object of thought, or intelligible form, is thought within an image, shows that σωτισματα are distinguishable from νοηματα, and the νόημα is the νοησόν as the state of an individual mind. The νοησόν is a universal (i), and the corresponding νόημα is that
universal(i) apprehended in thought. Thus, in the apprehension of the universal, the mental images, play an equal role, by being the input-information in our conceptualization process. However, it has to be indicated that this does not allow the ἐπαναλεγματικά to be universals, whereas, the νοηματα as νοητα can be, in that they represent the universal features of things of a certain type.

Now, in the De Interpretatione 14,24b1-3, Aristotle says: "εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ ἐν τῇ ἄνωθεν κατανάλωσις καὶ ἀποφάσεις σύμβολα τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ(39), that is, assertions or denials—referring, therefore, to the sentence-meaning—are symbols of the affection of the soul. Then, in De Anima 1.8, 432a10-12, Aristotle says: "ἐστι δ' ἡ ἐνοχὴ ἐπερον ἁσθενος καὶ ἀποφάσεως συμπλοκη γὰρ νοημάτων ἐστί τὸ ἀλήθες ἢ πεπόθος", where Aristotle distinguishes between imagination and discursive thought by saying that the latter involves a combination of thoughts, adding also that the assertions or denials are nothing else than the "συμπλοκη τῶν νοημάτων" assigning those to the critical mental faculties of the soul. Thus thought is essentially discursive, hence propositional (40). In Aristotle, Language mirrors Thought (which reflects Reality), and every kind of Thought (a νόημα, as a concept, or
συμπλοκή τῶν νοημάτων, as proposition) is propositional in that it involves contemplation of the λόγος (definition).

Concerning the above points, Philoponus says: "περὶ γὰρ τὰ ἀτέλλα καταγίνεται, θειὸν καὶ άμερῆς ἔστι περὶ ὅρους καταγινομένη, διὸ ὑπαρκτικὴ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῇ ἀλήθεια, οὐκ ἐν συνθέσει, εἰ οὖν μήτε ἀληθεύει μήτε ἑσδέται ὅς μήτε καταψάχκουσα μήτε ἀποψάχκουσα", adding: "Θέσε διὰ φάντασίας γίνονται τὰ νοηματα, οὐ μήν ταύτον ἔστι φάντασία καὶ νοὸς... ἀλλ’ οὖν οὐ ταύτον ἔστι φάντασμα καὶ νόημα (41). The point here is whether a φάντασμα is the sort of thing that can even admit of being true, or false, while he goes on to add that even if there is a close relation of images to thoughts, they are not the same. Hamlyn (42) commenting on the Aristotelian passage, says that Aristotle wants to emphasize that there is a distinction between imagination and discursive reasoning by saying that the latter involves a combination of thoughts, and even if it is dependent on images, thought is always thought.

So far, we have seen that Aristotle would not have confined the παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς only to φάντασμα, or only to thoughts, but rather to both of them. So, we have accepted that a being acts upon the soul which becomes likened to what it cognizes, what the mind
grasps is the form without the matter, the form of the object which acts upon the soul (its mental faculties) so that the soul is able to cognize it, while there is also a sort of likeness between cognized and the actual object, hence letting us speak of νοηματα as ἐμοιάματα of the perceptible objects that are cognized. Of course, the νοηματα cannot be formed before the mediator faculty of φαντασία (imagination) produces the φαντάσματα (mental images) which are immaterial αἰσθήματα.

Thus, for all the above reasons, we would take ἐκτὸς that the νοηματα as παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς are cognitive elements, or, as we would say in Psycholinguistics "concepts", which are expressed by means of the σημαντικαί φωναί, the symbols of the παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς. Ammonius (43) considered the completion of thoughts to be the grasping of things, and, also, the likenesses of them, while the φωναί are "ἐξαγγελτικαί τῶν νοημάτων" (announcing the thoughts), again presenting these as phonetic representations carrying semantic properties: "τὰ μὲν γὰρ νοηματα τέλος ἔχει τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων κατάληψιν, καὶ τὸτε άντως νοηματα ἐστίν... εἰκόνες γὰρ εἰσίν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τῶν πραγμάτων, αἳ δὲ φωναὶ τῶν νοημάτων εἰς ἐξαγγελτικαί καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δίδονται ἡμῖν ὑπὸ τῆς φόσεως πρῶς τὸ σημαίνειν ἡμᾶς τὰς ἐν-
νοίας τῆς ψυχῆς”.

Thus, in our discovery of the Aristotelian "concept", we would conclude that the Aristotelian term closest to the modern "concept", would be that of νόημα, which also shows the close combination of Ontology and Semantics in the Aristotelian Epistemology.

(2) "Λόγος τῆς οὐσίας" (an account for "meaning").

Now, the above combination of Ontology and Semantics, could lead us to examine what would be the notion of meaning (semantic properties, or components, in the modern theory of Semantics), in the Aristotelian framework. And this combination would also lead us to assume that actually his reference to λόγος and most particularly, to the λόγος τῆς οὐσίας (44) could be identified with the notion of the semantic properties. But let us examine first the notion of λόγος (definition, or, account). His linguistic doctrine is so much related to the ontological one, that he takes two things (beings) to be ὀμάνυμα in terms of the name that is ascribed to them, the accounts (or definitions) of their nature being different (45).

So, could the Aristotelian "account of the nature" refer to the meaning of a word? Definition, for Aristotle, is a function of the διάνοια (intellect), and it
is essentially discursive (Metaphysics Z.10,1034b20-24). In the Posterior Analytics B.8,93a30-34, Aristotle also speaks of definition as the analysis into cause and effect, or genus and difference. In fact, Aristotle's discussion of the definition is focused on his point that parts of the definition are not just any parts (Metaphysics Z.10,1034b33), but they are connected parts that form an intelligible whole. That is, for Aristotle, a definition is characterized both by analysis into its parts, and by the intelligible unity of those parts that constitute its unity, its main characteristic.

Consequently, the answer to the question concerning the meaning of a word (that names a being) for Aristotle, would be closely related to the definition of the thing this word refers to, the parts that the definition consists of. And these parts, or semantic properties signify the nature of the thing. So, the Aristotelian account of the meaning of a word would refer to the nature of the thing signified by the word. That is, for Aristotle, what is meant or defined is interpreted in terms of the parts that constitute its substance, and its nature.

Finally, we would say that definition is not a verbal equivalent, but a conceptual-ontological equivalent.
to the substance of a thing (a conceptual analysis of its substance) (46). And this Semantics-Ontology connection in terms of "λόγος", shows even more the relation of Language to Thought and to Reality in the Aristotelian Epistemology, since he also says in the De Sensu 437a12-13 that λόγος is the cause of learning, not audible in its own right, but incidentally, for it consists of words each of which is a symbol. The passage suggests that we do not directly hear the λόγος, but nonetheless, we can grasp it, since we hear the words (its parts) that symbolize it. And, in fact, this point is important for it looks like an anticipation of the Stoic contrast between the sounds and the λεκτόν (47).

For this reason, we should think that another sense can be applied to "λόγος", that of "linguistic competence" (48) which refers to knowledge of language, or to propositional thought, as we have seen above. And, perhaps, this development of linguistic competence could be assumed to emerge in a person at the same time that the child reaches the age of reason, or acquires the other cognitive capacities of judgement (γνώμη), understanding (σέλεσις), practical wisdom (φρόνησις) (49).

So far, in our examination of his possible theory of
meaning, we have viewed the notion of λόγος, and we have assumed it to be the account of the nature of a thing, its conceptual analysis, hence its meaning. Nevertheless, Aristotle uses also the phrase "λόγος τῆς οὐσίας" (50), which, in fact, elucidates further the notion of λόγος. So, concerning that phrase, we will be following the tradition of the commentators (51), and use the whole phrase "λόγος τῆς οὐσίας" as a terminus technicus, possessing the meaning of "the account of the nature of the secondary substance (52).

However, what would appear to be essential later to our treatment of the nature of the ethical concepts, is that the "λόγος τῆς οὐσίας" can also, presumably, apply to non-substances like the ethical concepts (in terms of the Categories, 5, 3b15-18). Those are non-substances, but they also have essences and definition (Metaph., 7, 4, 1030a23). So, the "λόγος τῆς οὐσίας" of a non-substance, like a moral concept, would be considered to be the statement of the meaning of an ethical concept, in terms of defining its essence.

So, from all the above, we would think that the phrase "λόγος τῆς οὐσίας", should be considered to refer to the account of the nature of the substance, and definition of its essence, hence, a conceptual-ontological account for "meaning".
Acquisition of the Aristotelian concepts (Posterior Analytics B.19).

After having attempted a discovery of the Aristotelian equivalent to the modern "concept", and having introduced a possible theory of meaning for him, we go on to the theoretical framework of the acquisition of the Aristotelian νοηματα. But, before we examine the locus classicus of this framework, that is, the Posterior Analytics B.19, we will start with the notion of theoretical reasoning, as part of the process of the acquisition of concepts and/or propositions.


Generally, the notion of reasoning is connected with the notion of syllogism/deduction, a process of logical inference that includes propositions, which act as premises and yield a conclusion. So, the reasoning is a route from the premises to a conclusion, a presentation of inference, a performance of a syllogism. The syllogism is defined (Post. Anal. B.12, 77a35-40) as a form of speech (λόγος) in which after certain things have been assumed, something other than the assumed follows of necessity on account of the assumed, that is, an inference from assumptions immediately preceding.
Now, the notion of syllogism is connected with that of the demonstrations in the sciences. The aim of demonstration is to establish by syllogism the universal connections between substances and their propria; such a strictly universal connection is reflected in the conclusions of the demonstrative syllogism. In this way, we know (ἐπιστήμη) the universal scientific truths which are eternal and unchangeable, in contrast to those of τέχνη and φρόνησις, whose objects are contingent and changeable.

The main discussion of demonstration is found in the *Posterior Analytics* A.2, 72a25-b4, where Aristotle presents it as the method of reasoning by means of which we proceed step by step from the premises to the conclusion. Ἀπόδειξις is a method of proof from the ἀρχαί, whereas ἐπαγωγή (induction) is a method of reaching the ἀρχαί (*Post. Anal. A.*, 18, 81a40-81b3, B.7, 92a34-92b3). So, in demonstrations/deductions, the scientists must have knowledge of the true axioms, the ἀρχαί (*Post. Anal. A.*, 72a27-29).

In fact, Aristotle goes on to explain more: "μάλλον γὰρ ἀνάγκη πιστεύειν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἢ πάσαις ἢ τισὶ τοῖς συμ-
περάσματος, τὸν δὲ μέλλοντα ἔξειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην τὴν δι' ἀποδεικτέος οὐ μόνον δὲ τὰς ἀρχαῖς μάλλον γνωρίζειν καὶ μάλλον αὐταῖς πιστεύειν ἢ τῷ δεικτομενῷ, ἀλλὰ μηδενε.
ἄλλο αὕτη πιστότερον εἶναι μηδὲ γνωριμάτερον τῶν ἀντικειμένων ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐξ ἄν ὡσει συλλογισμός ὁ τῆς ἐναντίας ἀπάτης, εὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν ἐπιστάμενον ἀπλῶς ἀμετάπειστον εἶναι" (For, it is necessary to be better convinced of all the principles or of some of them than the conclusion. Anyone who is going to have understanding through demonstration must not only be more familiar with the principles and better convinced of them than of what is being proved, but also there must be no other thing more convincing to him or more familiar among the opposites of the principles on which a deduction of the contrary error may depend—if anyone who understands simpliciter must be unpersuadable) (53).

Now, concerning the need for the premises to be more knowable than the conclusion, Themistius says: "φαμέν τοίνυν ὧτι πρῶτον μὲν εἰκότως εἰρήκαμεν γνωριμάτερα εἶναι ταῖς προτάσεις ἐν ταῖς ἀποδείξεις τοῦ συμπεράσματος, εὑπὲρ δὲ πιστεύειν τε καὶ εἶδέναι τὸ συμπέρασμα δὲ ἐκεῖνας" (54); one should first possess knowledge of the premises of the syllogism, if he/she is to reach knowledge of the conclusion by means of them.

According to Barnes (55), Aristotle's argument is that: "if a has demonstrative knowledge that $P$, then $P$ is
known to a, because $\Pi$ is known to a'', where P is the conclusion and $\Pi$ its principles. Hence, if a has demonstrative knowledge that P, then $\Pi$ is more known to a than P is. Themistius says on that: "ημείς μὴν γὰρ οἴσομεθα δεῖξαι εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἀπόδειξις, τὰς προτάσεις ἐπισημάτως μᾶλλον τῷ συμπεράσματος'' (56). That is, we must possess knowledge of the principles (as expressed in the προτάσεις) in order to reach knowledge of the conclusion in a demonstrative syllogism.

So, what we notice is that scientific demonstration gives us strict information (as opposed to mere opinion), hence the first principles, the initial premises from which demonstration starts, must have the following characteristics: (a) they must be true, (b) they must be primary and immediate (or indemonstrable) (c) they will also be necessary (74b6, 71b3), (d) they must be more intelligible and prior to conclusions drawn from them, (e) they must be causes of the conclusions (57). In fact, Aristotle has borrowed the notion of axiom, from Mathematics (Metaphysics Γ.3, 1005 a20), and the most frequently quoted one is, the:

"οὐκ ὁμολογεῖται ἀπὸ ὑπὸ ὑπὸν ἢν ἁπλως ἢ ὡσα ἢ λοιπὰ" (if equals are taken from equals remain) (Post, Anal. A, 10, 76a41).

Moreover, the demonstrative syllogism is a categori-
cal syllogism that produces ἐπιστήμη, and it usually consists of two premises, one of which is a θέσις and the other (placed under it) a ὑπόθεσις. The θέσις is usually a definition, an indemonstrable axiom, while the ὑπόθεσις is capable of proof (A.2, 72a14-24, 72b13-17). Actually the use of ὑπόθεσις in the Posterior Analytics is technical and it does not refer to a conditional statement (58). It refers to truth, or rather to an apparent axiom that is demonstrable.

But, let us see an example of demonstrative syllogism, in order to see how it works:

(Major premise A): "When one body passes in front of another, the latter is obscured".

(Minor premise B): "The Moon passes in front of the Sun (as seen from the Earth)".

(Conclusion C): "The Sun is obscured (as seen from the Earth)" (Cf. Posterior Analytics B.8, 93a30ff, where the eclipis of the Moon is discussed, and B.2, 90a12-18).

In this demonstrative syllogism, the major premise is an ἀρχή [C], an axiom in the science of Physics, and the minor premise describes a certain physical phenomenon and has as a conclusion a true proposition that describes the eclipse of the Sun. Themistius on that says: "ὁ δὲ λέγων ἀντιφατίζεσθαι τὸ σῶς ὑπὸ γῆς, μεταξὺ τινὸς πτωτοσης ἐν τῇ πανσελήνῳ αὐτῆς τε καὶ τοῦ ἥλιου,
καὶ διὰ τοῦτον ἔκλείσειν, ἡμα τε ἀκριβῆς καὶ οἰκείως διδάσκει, σελήνης ἔκλεισαι εἶναι" (59).

So, we have seen that for Aristotle, the notion of demonstrative syllogism is the method by means of which we reach from the ἄρχαι (the true axioms), the conclusions. By that, the scientist can check the validity of the ἄρχαι, or reconfirm the truth of the ἄρχαι. Now, we need to examine how the scientist reaches those ἄρχαι, or which the general theoretical framework of the acquisition of knowledge, is, for Aristotle.

(2). The acquisition of the Aristotelian concepts (Posterior Analytics B.19).

The well-known passage for this examination is for many ancient and modern commentators, Posterior Analytics B.19. In this chapter, Aristotle’s main concern appears to be the ἄρχαι (first principles), and how they become familiar to us. He is here involved with the issue of what these scientific principles are, and which faculty captures and retains them. In fact, Aristotle himself starts this chapter by posing two questions at 99b17-19. The first question is concerned with the principles, asking how they become familiar, and, the second, asks what the faculty is with which we become familiar with them.
Now, what the Aristotelian text says, is: "καὶ πότερον σοῦ ἐνοδοσίας αἰς ἐξεῖς ἐγγίνονται καὶ ἐνοδοσία λεληθασίας. εἰ μὲν δὴ ἔχομεν αὐτὰς, ἀτοπον, συμβαίνει γὰρ ἀκριβεστέρας ἔχοντας γνώσεις ἀποδιδόμεναι λανθάνειν, εἰ δὲ λαμβάνομεν μὴ ἔχοντες πρότερον, τὸς ἄν γνωρίζομεν καὶ μανθάνομεν ἐκ μὴ προϋπαρχόσθης γνώσεως ἀπὸ δόνατον γὰρ, ἀσπέρ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἐλέγομεν, ἀνεφόν τοῖς ὅτι οὖτ' ἔχειν οἷον τε, ὅτι ἁγνοοοῦσι kai ἡμὲρν ἔχοντας ἡν οἷον ἐν ἐν ἐγγίνονται ἀνάγκη ὧρα ἔχειν μὲν τινα δόναμεν, μὴ τοιαύτῃ δ' ἔχειν ἡ ἦσται τοῦτον τιμωτέρα κατ' ἀκριβείαν, φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτο γε πᾶσιν ὑπάρχον τοῖς ἔωσις ἔχει γὰρ δόναμιν σύμφωνον κριτικήν, ἤν καλούσιν αὔσθησιν." (And also whether the states are not present in us but come about in us, or whether they are present in us but escape notice. Well, if we have them, it is absurd; for, it results that we have pieces of knowledge more certain than demonstration and yet this escapes notice. But, if we get them without having them earlier how might we become familiar with them and learn them from no pre-existing knowledge? For that is impossible as we said in the case of demonstration too. It is evidently impossible, then, both for us to have them and for them to come about in us when we are ignorant and have no such state at all. Necessarily, therefore, we have some capacity, but do not have one of a type which will be more valuable than these.
in respect of certainty. And this evidently belongs to all animals; for they have a connate judgemental capacity called perception)(60).

We will take its question separately and follow its answers, discussing the first one here, and the second one in the third section of this chapter. So, with regard to the question of how the principles become familiar, Aristotle, initially, says that we possess some knowledge of the principles(61). But, if we suppose knowledge of the principles is innate, then, we have knowledge, which is more certain than that given by demonstration. And yet, we would think, this knowledge remains non-observational. Barnes(62) considers the issue of whether knowledge of the principles is innate or not, to presuppose knowledge of the principles as stated earlier at A.2, 72a25-b4, where Aristotle argued that if we have demonstrative knowledge, then, we know the principles. So, Aristotle presupposes knowledge of those principles, as it becomes more evident in B.19, 99b20-22: "όχι ἐνάχεσι τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ δι' ἀποδεξέως μὴ γιγνάσκοντι τὰς πρῶτας ἀρχὰς τὰς ἑμέσους" (It is not possible to acquire knowledge through demonstration without possessing knowledge of the first, immediate principles, at first).
In fact, we would agree with the above assumption by Barnes, and we would also state that such a presupposition of knowledge of the principles of the demonstrable science does not necessarily imply presupposition of innate knowledge. However, although Aristotle does not presuppose innate knowledge, he does speak of some kind of an innate "capacity" or "faculty" (99b32), which is an ἐξίς, present in us, and whose function and interaction with the world results in acquisition of the principles (63).

What we mean by "present in us", following Barnes' translation for ἐνοςάκι, is that those capacities have some innate background. For, if something ἔνοςτι (<ἐνοςμι>, it must be an inside, internal capacity that implies pre-existence. But even more, the word "σύμφυτον" (connate) that Aristotle uses in order to characterize the capacity by means of which we grasp the first principles, shows better the innate element. The meaning of the word "σύμφυτον" (64) is: "born with", "innate", and it does possess this meaning in Aristotle, but this does not necessarily mean that it is the only word that Aristotle uses to express innateness. It mainly means connate, and it is particularly used in his biological and physical treatises in order to show the connate capacities.
of the body during its growth. Thus, we would keep Barnes' claim that innatism of capacities in this chapter, is uncontroversial (65).

Of course, the Aristotelian innate capacity differs from the Platonic preexistent knowledge of the Forms, a point that Aristotle attacks in this very chapter. And, the "δύναμιν σύμφωνον κριτικὴν", elucidates further the "ἐνοδόσαι ἔξεις" at 99b38, and shows more evidently the innate element in Aristotle's Epistemology. So, for Aristotle the infants may not possess reason as an inborn capacity, but they are endowed with some innate cognitive capacity that enables them to grasp the environmental data, and after repetition of those and experience has taken place, they yield acquisition of knowledge later as adults. And from the exercise of this connate capacity of the intellect (or cognizing perception), people become able to grasp and acquire the principles.

Now, the genetic account is presented in the following lines: "ἐκ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεως γίνεται μνήμη, ἄσπερ λέγομεν, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης πολλάκις τοῦ αὐτοῦ γνωμένης ἐμπειρία, αἱ γὰρ πολλαὶ μνήμαι τῷ ἄριθμῷ ἐμπειρίᾳ μὲ ἐστίν, ἐκ δὲ ἐμπειρίας ἢ ἐκ παντὸς ἡρμηνειασαντος τοῦ καθόλου ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τοῦ ἕνος παρὰ τὰ πολλά, ὡ δὲ ἀπασιν ἐν ἑνῇ ἐκείνοις τὸ αὐτό, τεχνης ἀρχή
So, from perception there comes memory, as we call it, and from memory (when it occurs often in connection with the same thing), experience; for memories that are many in number form a single experience. And from experience, or from the whole universal that has come to rest in the mind (the one apart from the many, whatever is one and the same in all those things), there comes a principle of skill and of understanding—of skill if it deals with how things come about, of understanding if it deals with what is the case (100a3-9)(66).

But let us follow the stages of this acquisition:

1st stage: (αύθησις). The above connate cognitive capacity in its initial exercise. It grasps the percepts, the environmental data, and it "χρίνει" (judges)(67), and discriminates the one percept from the other; it acts in the sense of a receptory mechanism which judges the percepts that it grasps, but it cannot really affirm or deny the essence of an object, apart from the reality of its existence. That is, perception grasps the object of table, and it can distinguish this object from another object, namely a chair.

2nd stage: (μνήμη): During this stage, the percepts that
have been grasped, are retained by the capacity of μνήμη (memory), that a person possesses. Now, memory retains something which is not just a percept, but what has been imprinted on the mind (68), that is an imprint of the percept, the so-called ἀναμνήσεως (mental image), which rests in the mind (100a6), in the faculty called imagination, which animals also possess, and according to which, they can also exercise memory (69). So, memory is the ability to "ἀναμνήσειν" those imprints, every time it is triggered by the relevant perceptual stimuli (70).

3rd stage: (ἐμπειρία): the third stage involves the repetition of many memories (or occurrences of the same imprint) which results in ἐμπειρία (experience), which depends on the existence of many memories of the same things (71). However, the man who possesses experience, is capable of nothing more than just being able to recognize whether a certain person is Callias and not Socrates, or, to retain memory of propositions like: "if you eat contaminated food, you will damage your health". But, that man cannot really speak of the truth or falsity of the above statements, he cannot assert a universal proposition, since he has not grasped universal truth yet (72).

4th stage: we would agree with Barnes (73), that the
fourth stage contains some puzzles, and, that, above all the language of 100a6-8 suggests a process of the acquisition of concepts (scientific or not). It refers to the percept that has been imprinted as a mental image in the faculty of imagination, and, after repetition of the occurrence of this mental image, experience of it has been achieved, and the mind (νοῦς), while experiencing that percept, also grasps the immaterial form of it; it possesses the thought within it, hence it acquires the καθότατον of it.

Now, at this stage, the scientist acquires the starting-points of arguments, the ἀρχαί [8], which are not the true axioms, and their validity has to be proved. They would be the "apparent" or "supposed" axioms in the sciences. And, for that reason, a science based on those axioms, would not be a science at all, for Aristotle.

So, the cognitive process would be: from a percept we pass to a mental image, and from experience of it to the acquisition of a καθότατον, and in order to grasp the καθότατον, we employ the method of induction. The person uses experience as a means to acquire the καθότατον. So, experience is a mediatory capacity, non-inborn, but acquired in the above way, and which together with the method of induction, grasps the uni-
However, the cognitive process may not stop here. Of course, Aristotle does not speak explicitly of a fifth stage, although he does so implicitly when he speaks of the ascent from more specific to more general universals, as we shall see below. The distinction between the fourth and the fifth stage has to do, not primarily, with universality as such, but with the distinction between principles and other universals, or with the distinctions between more and less generic universals. The process we described above is the account found at 100a3-9 and which discusses the acquisition of principles (particularly, of the demonstrative science, if we think of the context of the whole treatise). Aristotle thinks of an account that would accommodate the grasping of the ἀρχὴ of science, and what the lines at 100a6-9 say is that not everything in a science can be proved by demonstration.

But, let us take sentence by sentence in order to see the transition from stage three to four and then five. So, by "ἐκ δὲ ἐμπειρίας", we move on from the third stage, and by "η ἐκ παντὸς ἡρωμήσαντος τοῦ καθολοῦ ἐν τῇ φυσι", we have the fourth stage referring to the apprehension of the universal, that is universal.
sal more or less, and it rests in the soul. And here, he refers to καθόλου in general that are not ἀρχαί.

In fact, he runs together the two stages three and four. At stage three, it is by means of ἐμπειρία that a person acquires ἀρχή[Β]. So, the ἀρχή in 100a8: "τεχνη̣ς ἀρχή καὶ ἐπιστήμης", is not the ἀρχή[Σ] of a developed science, but the ἀρχή[Β], the apparent axiom, and the starting-point for us (not, of course of the first perception, for this is ἀρχή[Α]). It is the grasp through experience of the universal concept of, say, an eclipse, which is our "starting-point" for trying to develop the science of astronomy and explain eclipses, without being specialized physicists.

Now, in the lines 100a6-9, we also notice a contrast between καθόλου in general and ἀρχαί (74). This overall notion of καθόλου, can be discerned by the phrase: "τοῦ ἕνος παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ", the one over many, which would also suggest the notion of universal as that which is predicated of many. But, because Aristotle writes this treatise in general, and as a result, also B.19, with reference to the scientific principles, he regards them both as ἀρχαί and καθόλου—although the converse is not true, since not all καθόλου are ἀρχαί—and whilst by writing this account which serves both as an account of the grasping of the principles of
the demonstrative science, and as a general theoretical framework, he has also to refer to the universal, that is the universal as the extract of the observation based on perception and instilled by means of ἐπαγωγή. This universal, or reference to the universal principle acquired by means of perception and induction, is found in the phrase: "ἡ ἀλήθησις τοῦ καθόλου ἐστὶν, ὅτι ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλ' οὗ καλλίου ἄνθρωπον" (perception is of the universal—e.g., of man but not of Callias the man). But still the "στάντος γὰρ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων ἐνός, πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καθόλου" (when one of the undifferentiated things makes a stand, there is a primitive universal in the mind), is a modification of the transition from the third to the fourth stage, the apprehension of our first specific universal.

And then at 100b1-3, Aristotle says: "πάλιν ἐν τοῖς ζητοῖς ἡστάται, ζωῆς ὡς ἄν τα ἀμερη στὶ καὶ τα καθόλου, οὗ τοιοῦτο ζῶον, ζωῆς ζῶον, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀμακτεις" (again a stand is made in these, until what has no parts and is universal stands—e.g., such and such an animal <stands> until animal does, and in this <a stand is made> in the same way). What these lines presuppose, is that if something is true of καθόλου, then it must be true of the ἀρχαί. So, at 100a14ff, Aristotle supposes that
the more generic ἀρχαί will be more fundamental, so
that this is actually an account of the transition
from stage four to stage five. There is a transition
from more specific universals to more generic
ones (75), which is, however, followed by the argument
at 100b3-4 that discusses the apprehension of all
καθόλου(i).

In fact, by making this transition from stage four
to stage five, Aristotle wants to emphasize the
move from ἀρχαί[B] to ἀρχαί[C], from more generic
ἀρχαί to the more fundamental ἀρχαί. The ἀρχαί[C] are
more fundamental than ἀρχαί[B], in that they are the
true axioms of a science, the true starting-points
of theoretical reasoning.

Now, by saying: "δὴ λοιπὸν ἐπιγνωσθῆναι τὰ πρῶτα ἐπαγγελλόμενα
ἀναγκαίον, καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀξιοθετίας οὕτω τὸ καθόλου ἔμποιεῖ" (thus, it is clear that it is necessary
for us to become familiar with the primitives by in-
duction; for perception too instills the universal in
this way), he refers to καθόλου in general. And he
also refers to his distinction between καθόλου in ge-
genral and ἀρχαί, by saying that because we apprehend
καθόλου in this way, we also apprehend πρῶτα (meaning,
here, ἀρχαί, a class of καθόλου). So, in this way, he ap-
plies the account to all καθόλου(i).
Moreover, concerning the five stages of the genetic account, we have to make the distinction between the levels of understanding and the contents of knowledge that one acquires at each stage. So, at stage one, a person grasps the αρχαί [A] by means of αμφιθεωρίας. These are what we start from; and we start from what is more knowable to us (76). And they are chronologically first in the process of the acquisition of our conceptual knowledge. At stage three, after repetition of many occurrences, a person results in ζυμπερία, while at stage four, he/she acquires knowledge of the αρχαί [B], the axioms in understanding in general, which can be used as the starting-points of scientific reasoning, but with some reservations. And they would apply to a more developed level of understanding of arguments, which, however, is not considered to be science proper. At stage five, a person has acquired ἀρχαί [C], that is, the true axioms, the true starting-points of scientific reasoning, and possesses an advanced level of understanding, that would be attributed only to a specialized scientist.

Moreover, another important reference in this chapter, is the method of induction. At Posterior Analytics A.2 Aristotle referred to the method of demonstration, or demonstrative syllogism, by means of which we reach
the conclusions, and, here, in B.19, he refers to the method by means of which we apprehend the universal(i) in general. Thus, the method of ἐπιστήμη is essential for the acquisition of knowledge, but "it is no good using ἐπιστήμη unless the human mind is such that it can grasp it and make use of what is revealed to it by that means; it must be shown that people have the capacities that make appeal to ἐπιστήμη in their case relevant; they must be capable of seeing the relevance of a number or a particular as an instance of a universal"(77).

Therefore, in this chapter, Aristotle is committed to certain distinctions, namely: (a) between initial observations and the universal derived from them, (b) between the first principles of science (ἄρχαί) and καθόλου(i) in general.

Nevertheless, there is also another distinction that Aristotle does not make explicitly or implicitly, in this chapter; this concerns the differentiation between universal(i) and universal(iv). That is, a distinction between those statements or concepts that correspond to reality and so are logically universal, and those statements or concepts that correspond to the more fundamental reality, the ἄρχαί[C].
However, there are two other points that have to be discussed with regard to B.19. The first point refers to the controversy as to whether, here, he discusses grasping of the first principles of demonstrative science, or provides us with a framework of the acquisition of conceptual (or propositional) knowledge (78). Aristotle is not explicit on that. Is it the fact, then, that Aristotle was confused?

In fact, here, we face two separate questions: (a) whether we are concerned with scientific ἀρχή or universals generally, and, (b) whether we are concerned with concepts or propositions. As we have stated above, Aristotle's main concern in this chapter appears to be the ἀρχή (principles) and how they become familiar to us. And, although, he does not explicitly spell out that his framework applies generally (that is, to all kinds of knowledge: of scientific principles, of ethical principles, of concepts, or, of propositions), his argument about principles of demonstration depends on doing so. He does not seem to make the above distinctions, since his aim is to provide us with a theoretical framework that describes how knowledge of the first principles is acquired.

So, his primary concern here is not to make the above
distinctions (a) and (b), or of the various kinds of knowledge. In fact, concerning the distinction (b), we would take for granted Barnes' claim (79) that the question whether we are talking about propositions or concepts is unimportant for Aristotle, because the propositions he has in mind are simple definitions of concepts. Thus, we would accept that this chapter is concerned with the first principles of demonstrative science, but it is also a theoretical framework with a general scope.

Now, the second point that arises here, is that Aristotle plays indifferently with the notions of "ἀρχαί", "πράτα", and "καθόλου". But why? Does he imply that these are different terms serving different purposes in his framework, namely applying to different processes, or are they different words with one meaning? As an answer to this, we would say that we would not accept all these words as having the same meaning, because, Aristotle in this treatise, is interested in the study of the acquisition of knowledge and understanding, that is, how we apprehend and comprehend the first principles. In fact, we would discern a synonymy in the two words: "ἀρχαί" and "πράτα", since he states that "it is not possible to understand through demonstration if we are not aware of
the primitive, immediate principles (80).

However, we have to indicate that both terms are ambiguous (a thing can be first a principle in time or in deductive order in an established science), and "πράσιν" is used in both ways in this chapter: "πράτων μὲν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καθόλου" (100a16), and "τὰς πρῶτας ἀρχαῖς τὰς ἀμέσως" (99b21). We would accept that the πρῶτα and ἀρχαί are both initial and immediate, whether the states that accommodate them are present in us, but escape notice, or come about in us (99b25-26). On the other hand, we cannot say that πρῶτα or ἀρχαί are semantically synonymous to καθόλου, when we talk about ἀρχαί [A]. But, there are principles prior by nature that we come to grasp by means of the process of the intuitive (or cognizing) perception, after which we recognize them as καθόλου (but not all καθόλου are ἀρχαί). And those principles are initial in time, and not just initial in the order of demonstration once understanding has been achieved.

For example, when a person observes the phenomenon that each time he/she drops something that falls down, or, generally, everything is attracted by the earth, he/she retains that in the memory and finally grasps the physical law of the gravity of the Earth,
which is an αρχή, the initial point of demonstration for any further physical observation, once understanding of it has been achieved. And in order to grasp the notion of καθόλου of this phenomenon of gravity, we start from the perceptual data on gravity and by means of induction we grasp the universal notion of "gravity."

So, our assumption would be that Aristotle uses the above terms with slight semantic differentiations, while we would assume further that when he talks about "τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς ἀκίνητους" (99b21), he refers to the definitions, the axioms, the scientific first principles, the αρχές of demonstrations. In the Posterior Analytics, he is generally concerned with the first principles of scientific demonstration, and these are both αρχές and καθόλου, although the converse is not true— not all καθόλου are αρχές.

Nevertheless, the fact that αρχές are a sub-class of καθόλου means that in discussing them Aristotle says things that are relevant to our grasping of καθόλου generally. And this has a bearing also to our first point above, of whether these αρχές are related to universal propositions or to concept formation. It is true that he does not distinguish, but it is also true that, while concept acquisition in general is not his
primary concern, what he says has a bearing on it. After all, for Aristotle, the knowledge of ἀρχαὶ may be expressed propositionally. That is, for example, we come to know that there are four elements, and this proposition that we know is a first principle, an ἀρχὴ[C], and it is prior and better known by nature(81).

So, the first principles will be prior by nature, and when we have grasped them, they will also be prior for us. People grasp fundamental principles, without realizing that they are principles, but there are principles prior by nature that we come to grasp by means of intuitive perception and induction, after which we recognize them as καθόλου.

Now, the νοήματα, as thoughts, affections of the soul, and not just mental representations, are also output of this intuitive perception. They are the ἀρχαὶ[C], we come to know by following the process that we are going to examining, although not all νοήματα are ἀρχαὶ[C]; many νοήματα could very well be ἀρχαὶ[B]. And, since the ἀρχαὶ are also prior for us, by being known by nature, we would think that the νοήματα and the ἀρχαὶ are related to one another, and the knowledge of them is acquired after a certain process has taken place. Presumably, everything we know, whether an ἀρχὴ
or not, is a νόημα.

Ultimately, the positions we have taken concerning B.19, and what we would conclude are: (a) this chapter is concerned with the first principles of demonstrative science, since the whole of the treatise studies those, but it is also a theoretical framework with a general scope, applying to the acquisition of universal concepts and universal propositions as well, since the ἀρχαί[C] are a sub-class of καθόλου(i) in general.

(b) in the account described at 100a3-b4, there is a fifth stage which shows the contrast between the ἀρχαί[C] and καθόλου(i) in general.

(c) Aristotle gives an empirical account, which is very much based on innativist elements, like the reference to the "δύναμιν σώματον κριτικήν".

(d) there is no explicit or implicit reference to the distinction between καθόλου(i) and καθόλου(ιν).

(e) in this chapter, he does not distinguish between concepts and propositions, and clearly, he is not interested in doing so. In the De Interpretatione, he spoke of thoughts (νοηματα) that are true or false and those that are not, but even there he used the word νοηματα, for both cases, "Νοηματα" (thoughts), for Aristotle, covers both concepts and propositions (82).
And, now, we come to the second issue in the *Posterior Analytics* B.19, concerning the faculty that is responsible for the acquisition of the first principles. The answer is νοῦς, a word which has a rather complicated background. In *De Anima* B.2, νοῦς seems to apply to the whole intellectual faculty of the soul, so that ἐπιστήμη and δόξα will not be distinct faculties but parts of νοῦς. On the other hand, in the *Posterior Analytics* B.19, we notice that it is contrasted with ἐπιστήμη. So, what is the relation of νοῦς in different Aristotelian works?

What we first notice is that Aristotle gives two separate treatments of νοῦς as a cognitive faculty of the ψυχή, the one found in the *De Anima* Γ.4, and the other in the *Posterior Analytics* B.19. Aristotle considers νοῦς to be a mental faculty of the soul, which exhibits certain mental functions, one of which is the apprehension, hence comprehension of the ἀρχαί. But, is the apprehension of ἀρχαί, as we followed it in B.19, a process that is encountered in the *De Anima* Γ.4, as well?

(1) Νοῦς: *De Anima* Γ.4 - *Posterior Analytics* B.19.

What we notice in the treatment of νοῦς in the *De*...
Anima is that Aristotle refers to it as a mental faculty of the soul, serving various functions, one of which is the grasping of the νοηματικα. And what we also see is that there is no reference to the notion of ἀρχαι of the Posterior Analytics, but, what De Anima says is that νοησις grasps the universal concept of a horse, for example; it deals with what a horse is (83). Now, a universal νοημα, as a word, would apply to both the simple concepts as well as to the complex ones, which are not distinguished in the Posterior Analytics B.19, either. So, is really then the νοησις of the De Anima very much different from that in the Posterior Analytics B.19, in terms of its function of grasping universal principles? We should think that there is no sharp contrast between the two treatments of the two treatises in terms of the processes that νοησις accommodates.

However, there is a slight differentiation, in terms of the fact that in B.19, the function of νοησις is in the sense of an intuitive perception, the ἐγκειμα with which we apprehend and finally comprehend the universal concepts or propositions, or, generally all the ἀρχαι. However, Aristotle also speaks of another mental faculty that of ἐπιστήμη, which is ἐγκειμα of the ὁλονοησια, and with which we can exercise truth or fal-
sity. In fact, we should think of νόθος as a state which stands to induction, as ἐπιστήμη stands to demonstration (84). This supremacy and accuracy of νόθος is also shown in the Nicomachean Ethics, where σοφία (theoretical wisdom) is the ἐπιστήμη (understanding) combined with νόθος, of the things that are highest by nature (85). So, although νόθος is related to ἐπιστήμη in terms of the grasping of universal principles, scientific or not, it is also distinguished from it in terms of being ἀληθεύεται both in terms of what it grasps and what follows from them. That is why νόθος compares and contrasts with ἐπιστήμη (86); νόθος is ἀρχιβέβαιον and ἀληθεύεται (87), and by means of the inductive method grasps the ἀρχαι [C].

However, we must keep in mind that both νόθος and ἐπιστήμη are the states in which we grasp theoretical truth, and there can be no ἐπιστήμη of first principles, and that ἐπιστήμη has to be derived from principles which are better known than the conclusions which follow from them.

It is true, though, that Aristotle is not explicit whether νόθος is responsible for grasping concepts other than those of the first principles of ἐπιστήμη. We should think that it is, but even in that case, the fact remains that ἐπιστήμη is the theoretical coun-
terpart (both involved with the acquisition of theoretical knowledge) of νοῦς, and in his theory of scientific knowledge and demonstration, it pays an important role. Thus, we should think that νοῦς as intuitive perception is the faculty that grasps the universal concepts and propositions, while ἐπιστήμη is concerned with the grasping of scientific knowledge.

So, what we notice is that the role of νοῦς in the cognition of the first principles in B. 19, is a complex one: an interaction of innativist and empiricist aspects. The innativist aspect is implied by the δύναμιν σύμφωναν κριτικήν, which applies to ἀναθεόσις, presented here as a connate judgemental capacity to grasp the ἀρχαί[A]. The empiricist aspect is implied by νοῦς ἂν εἰ θαν ἀρχάν (here ἀρχαί[C]), in that there is a gradual process in the apprehension of those ἀρχαί and during this process ἐμπειρία of many occurrences is required, in order for a person to acquire ἀρχαί[C]. That is, there is a development of an ξίς required for the acquisition of (a) ordinary conceptual knowledge achieved by every human being, and of (b) knowledge of scientific principles.

Noůς in B. 19, is as Kahn says (88): "understood as an intellectual virtue or ξίς, that is, a natural capa-
city perfected by training", and it is best translated as "intuitive perception". And, in fact, this also shows that the function of νοὸς in B.19, is concerned with both acquiring the ἀρχαὶ and storing them, but it does not reason about what follows from them.

Thus, we would think that, although there is no great differentiation between the two treatments of νοὸς in the De Anima Γ.4, and the Posterior Analytics B.19, in the De Anima νοὸς is concerned with both the apprehension of the principles and reasoning about what follows from them. So, νοὸς in the De Anima possesses a wider sense than that in either the Posterior Analytics B.19, or in the Nicomachean Ethics Z.6.

(2). De Anima Γ.5.

The most puzzling distinction made by Aristotle in De Anima is that between the παθητικὸς νοὸς (passive intellect) and ποιητικὸς νοὸς (active intellect). The former is concerned with the process of thinking, and it is perishable since it is inseparable from the body, whilst the latter makes everything, and it is separable, unaffected and unmixed, being in its essence activity (89). The first one being passive can become everything, whilst the second being active can do everything.
Now, concerning the topic of the Active Intellect and of the separability of the soul from the body, there has been a great deal of discussion. However, we would not proceed into a profound examination of the issues, but to the extent that it illustrates the issue of the relation of the different treatments of the Aristotelian ψυχή in the various treatises. Many scholars (90) have tried to see his connection of mind (as part of the soul) and body in terms of the Cartesian concept of consciousness, a point that Heinaman (91) considers to be irrelevant to the issue. Instead, he argues for a dualism on the mind-body problem. According to him (92), the soul is a form, and it is the kind of form that is not an immediate structural or physical feature of matter, but is supervenient and dependent for its existence on immediate physical features of matter, as, for example, would be the power of a drug: an interpretation with which we would agree.

Furthermore, we would suggest a possible answer to the mind-soul problem in terms of the connection of thinking with άντικα, since by means of this faculty, the percepts become images and by means of reason, the intellect apprehends the forms of the images of the perceptible objects, which are received by perception a faculty that possesses a bodily organ. However, is it
only the παθητικός νοῦς that takes part in this process of the acquisition of conceptual knowledge, as it is examined in the *Posterior Analytics*. We should think that νοῦς acts as a combined, developed intellect, which is connected with the body by means of the connection between thinking and images (since the νοηματα apply to both thoughts and images) (93), so, it is assumed indirectly to require a bodily organ. And this organ would be the heart for Aristotle, and the brain for the modern Cognitive Psychology.

Moreover, as another clue for our argument, we would bring in the fact that as a "combined intellect", "νοῦς" receives the forms, which are the "essences of things", and also it apprehends every sort of quality, since everything is a possible object of thought, but in order to perform such cognitive tasks, Aristotle would need an entity that would be both separable from the body, and at the same time, inseparable from it. He would need an entity that would be inseparable from the body, in order to: (a) justify the notion of inheritance, (b) justify how this can grasp the percepts by means of the senses, and after retaining their images, it can produce the concepts of those following the process described above. And he would need such an entity to be also separable from the
body, so that he: (a) can provide further evidence for the innatist aspect of his theory, (b) can have a basis for his theological argument, and (c) can justify the power of the human ethical understanding to cognize ethical truths.

Now, even further clues that would justify our point of what we call "combined intellect", its function and its relation to the body, can be incorporated into a parenthetical discussion of the Active Intellect. So, regarding the single activity of the ποιητικός νοῦς (creative or productive intellect) (94), we notice that it is separable from the body, and comes from the outside (95), so that it can produce everything.

So, what is it then that the ποιητικός νοῦς produces? The answer would be thoughts. And it does this by actualizing the potential intellect hence, everything that is thoughts in the mind. So, the above answer provides us also with two further answers concerning the respective questions: (a) how can the Active Intellect be combined if it's active? And, (b) how does the Active Intellect relate to God (the Unmoved Mover) on the one hand and to the individual human being on the other? The answer to the former question would be that exactly because the Active Intellect actualizes the potential intellect, and everything that are
thoughts in the mind, the νοηματα that are the developed mental images of perceptible objects grasped by sense-perception (hence bodily organs), it functions as a combined unity with the passive intellect. Otherwise, how can it act upon it and actualize it, hence actualize the acquired thought, if it is irrelevant to it?

As for the answer to the second question, concerning the relation of the Active Intellect to the human understanding, we would adopt Kahn's (96) position, according to which the Active Intellect is interpreted in terms of the collective understanding of a human society. And concerning the relation of the Active Intellect to God, we would think that since the Active Intellect actualizes everything, it should relate to a higher noetic capacity, the Supreme Intelligible that creates everything. That would also remind us of Alexander's position, according to which the Supreme Intelligible is identified with God who only then produces everything, and in the physical sense, it is identified with the Unmoved Mover of the whole universe (97).

Now, this divine aspect of the πνευματὸς νοὸς in De Anima, is closely connected with the Theological discussion in the Metaphysics Α 7,9 (98), where νοὸς is
the divine intellect, and reference is made to human happiness, and, in this way, the productive intellect of De Anima would relate to the self-thinking of the Metaphysics (99).

(3). De Generatione Animalium B. 3.

Now, we would come again to the issue of the combined intellect, and we face ourselves with the question of how it is acquired by human beings; that is, we view the whole issue of the separability of the soul from the body, in terms of its mental faculties, as connected with the account of heredity as it is presented in the Generatione Animalium B. 3. Of course, we will confine our discussion to the extent that this argument supports our assumption of the universality and semi-innateness of the mental faculties, and so of the universal principles they acquire (100).

So, in the above treatise, Aristotle refers to the πνεύμα carried in the semen, that possesses a quality to act on the material in order to make it an embryo, and, to act on the natural material, making it into a matter form compound, and making it capable of perception and intellect. In fact, the semen is the formal contribution of the father, and responsible for the πνεύμανός νοῦς. It is equipped to impart all the the higher noetic faculties, which exist potentially
in the embryo, even while still in the womb (735a9-13) (101). Of course, an interesting question would be of how far the mother contributes to the quality found in the embryo. Concerning this point, Aristotle starts off his account of heredity by attributing the formal contribution to the father and the material to the mother, but becomes less dogmatic on this point as the discussion proceeds (102).

Aristotle used this account in order to explain how parental resemblance comes about, and how the soul is transmitted. So, concerning the question of how the intellect is acquired by human beings, he says that the answer in this question is very difficult, and that human beings must try hard to grasp it according to our capabilities and to the extent that it is possible (736b5-8). The nutritive faculties of the ψυχή are the ones that are immediately activated, since they are involved with processes of nutrition, growth and "κύηνσις" (736b6-15). In a way, the embryo develops, or even actualizes these capacities, even inside the uterus of its mother, when its growth to a human being has started, while the perceptive and intellective capacities should exist potentially in the embryo before being actualized (736b15-16) (103).

And when are those capacities actualized? This ques-
tion is concerned with the one above referring to the soul faculties that require bodily-organs, and those are: ἀγάπη, φαντασία, δόξα, ἐπιστήμη (although, Aristotle does not here mention δόξα and ἐπιστήμη as distinct faculties; presumably, if all thinking requires images, all actual thinking requires organs.

However, the Active Intellect in itself does not require bodily organs (even if passive intellect does, so that without passive intellect to act upon, the active intellect cannot produce; and here, we should also point out that Aristotle does not make the distinction between Active and Passive Intellect in the De Generatione Animalium). So, since the Active Intellect does not require bodily organs, it (the Active Intellect) is not in the semen, and it is called "θεραμενον τε λεοντος", for it enters the semen from the outside (736b29-30), and alone is divine. That is, when Aristotle says that the Active Intellect comes from the outside, he wants to say that it does not come from the father. And when he says that it alone is divine, he implies a divine noetic spirit that enters the semen like a pneuma (104), and it could be thought to be Nature's intervention for the creation of human being, hence it relates to God. Finally, it is the Active Intellect that acts upon the Passive one in
order to actualize the potentiality of the intellec-
tive and perceptive capacities.

Now, this argument of "στηρίζων νομα" (105) would pro-
vide us with some further clues for our argument of
the universality and quasi-innateness of the Aristo-
telian νομα. If this part of the combined intellect
comes from the outside, and it is the same for all
human beings, then, we would think that it is univer-
sal, hence part of the combined intellect is univer-
sal, and it is actualized after a process being the
same for all people, takes place. The basis for the
assumption that the intellect is the same for all
people would be the fact that it originates from
Nature, and Nature distributes its qualities equally
to all people, in principle.

And if there is a universal intellectual process, and
a universal aspect in the combined intellect of each
person (the other characteristics are subject to
parental heredity) that brings about the process of
the acquisition of νοηματα; all people should form
concepts that are almost the same, and possess some
common semantic features.
At the same time, the combined intellect is not only universal, but also quasi-innate, for it exists in the soul from the very conception of the person, and together with the other connate capacities of the combined intellect, leads the person to the acquisition of knowledge. We use the term "quasi-innate" since the capacity to acquire knowledge is innate, but the developed intellect is not (by contrast with the Platonic memories already in the mind and just waiting to be recollected).

Thus, concerning our examination of the various treatments of the Aristotelian νοῦς, we would say (106) that there is no discrepancy between the treatments in the Posterior Analytics B.19, and that of De Anima Γ.4-5. In the Posterior Analytics B.19, νοῦς is presented as a natural faculty/capacity that is perfected by training, and as a trained ξειά enables the human beings to acquire the ordinary concepts, or even more (serving the scientific tasks of this treatise) the universal scientific ἀρχαί. In De Anima Γ.4-5, now, there is a fuller discussion of the Aristotelian νοῦς, concerning how the Active Intellect actualizes the Passive one and enables it to abstract νοητά and so receive them. And in both treatments, it is very evident that for the development and perfection of νοῦς, ἀληθήσις and
φαντασία play also an important role.

So, for the Aristotelian νοὸς, we would say that it is a unity consisting of:

- a passive part that applies to all the intellective capacities of the soul,
- an active part that actualizes these capacities and as a noetic capacity which comes from the outside and relates to God.

Conclusion: In this chapter, we have accepted that the notion of "νόημα" in the Aristotelian Epistemology, would be equivalent to the modern "concept", and it applies to both concepts and propositions.

Also, his notion of "λόγος" - or to be more consistent (as we shall see in chapter 4) with the relation of Semantics to Ontology - his notion of "λόγος τῆς οὐσίας", serves as a theory of meaning.

Moreover, we have accepted that Aristotle's genetic account in the Posterior Analytics B.19, applies to the ordinary concepts and propositions in general, and to the scientific principles in particular.

And concerning the various treatments of νοὸς in his treatises, we accept the case for there being no differentiation, and that the De Anima treatment presents a wider sense of νοὸς than the Posterior Analytics B.19, and the Nicomachean Ethics Z.6.

As for indirect conclusions derived from our treat-
ment, we would state:

(a) that Aristotle is not a clear empiricist or a clear innativist, for his account of the acquisition of ἀρχαῖα/νοηματα is very much based on innate elements (faculty/capacity) by means of which the further cognitive development is built (the notion of θέρατον νοσὸς contributes to the quasi-innateness and universality as two characteristics of the Aristotelian doctrine).

(b) that there are objective realities of universal (iv) truths, whose understanding is achieved by a faculty/capacity that is universal, common to all people.
ENDNOTES

(1) The term "Epistemology" is derived from ἐπιστήμη, which means knowledge, in its wider sense, and as a term is used to refer to philosophical investigations aiming at the division of the arts and sciences (ἐπιστήματα, in a narrow sense), and, generally, a theory of knowledge. Cf. Dockas, (1980), pp. 69-70.

(2) The issue of the relation of Language to Thought is also discussed in the fourth chapter of the Thesis with reference to ὑμονομία.

(3) Cat. 1, 1a20-24.


Lucasiewicz, (1979), p. 51, examines the law of contradiction, also in logical and psychological terms.

(5) "Concept" in modern Semantics could be defined as an idea, a thought, or mental construct by means of which the mind apprehends or comes to know things. Cf. Lyons, (1977), p. 110.

(6) Cat. 1, 1a20ff. Rist, (1989), p. 259, indicates that the Platonism of the Categories is only very marginal in that Aristotle is tempted to think of forms as explaining the nature of particulars; and that appears rather in his account of secondary substances.

(7) De Interpretatione 1, 16a19-20, 16b3-7, 16b25-28,
17a6-10, a23-24.

(8) Here, we refer to the notion of language both as linguistic performance (λόγος as φάσις), every act of speech, and as linguistic competence, that is knowledge of language. Cf. pp. 38-40. Also, cf. Smith-Wilson, (1979), p. 44.

(9) Ibid, 16a19-20, Ammonius on that says: "αἱ ὁταών νοημάτων εἶσιν ἐξαγγέλλονται καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δὲδονται ἡμῖν ὑπὸ τῆς φόσεως πρὸς τὸ ὤν τὰ σημαίνειν ἡμᾶς τὰς ἐννοιας τῆς ψυχῆς, ὃνομα καὶ δυνάμεθα συμπολιτεύομαι", in C.A.G. (IV.5), p. 18.30-33, thus, indicating both the innate characteristic of the ὁνας as a capacity of speech, and the fact that they are semantic utterances that help us to communicate with each other. However, although as a capacity of speech, they are given by nature, as semantic utterances, they are made up conventionally and differ from one another in the various languages: "ὁνας δὲ καὶ γράμματα οὐ παρὰ πᾶσι τὰ αὐτὰ (ὁνας γὰρ ἀλλαίος μὲν Ἑλληνεις, ἄλλως δὲ Ἡοῖνικας...,") p. 19, 13-14.

(10), De Interp., 2, 16a27.
(11), Ibid, 2, 16a20, 3, 16b6.
(12), Ibid, 2, 16b26-27.
(13), Topica Z, 8, 146b36-147a5.
(14), De Interp., 4, 17a1-4.
(15), De Anima B, 5, 417a1-417b1.

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On this issue, Simplicius says:


However, it is worth noting that in the De Anima B.5, 417b2ff, Aristotle himself says that the actualization of the capacity for θεωρεῖν is "not ἄλλοισις, or is another sort of thing", and does so in the context of discussing in what sense p εἶχεν is πάσχειν. Also, in Γ.7, 431a4-5, he denies that this is πάσχειν. (16). Cf. below. Concerning the mental image, we receive information from De Anima Γ.3, 428a1-3, 428b11-17, 7, 431b1-4; cf. De Mem. 1, 450a31-b3, 450a10-11, 450b12-451a3, 450b24-26. Concerning this point, Simplicius says:

"...ἀληθεύει γάρ ἡ πειθοῦσα, ὅτι οὐκ ο ++) τὸ ἑντάςμα ἀνακηρυξάσθαι τῇ πράγματι... ἐφ' ἡμῖν γάρ καὶ τὰ μὴ ἔντα ἀναπλάττειν ἑντάςματα", in C.A.G. (XI), p. 208, 13-17, which actually contradicts our claim below (pp. 79-80) that ἑντάςματα as opposed to νοηματα cannot be true or false.

Here, we must also note that ἑντάςματα can be unreal (cf. De Anima Γ.8, 432a10-12). Similarly, Philoponus says, "...ἰδοὺ ἄτενίζει εἰς τὸν ὄλιον καὶ ἀναπέμπε τὸν τόπον τῇ ἑντάσις καὶ ἐπιμένει θεωράν τὸν ὄλιον ἐπὶ θλήνην μὲν ὄραν, καὶ ἡ ἑντάσις ἐνεργεῖ... τὸ εἰδός ἦ-
πεμψα την Φαντασία επαφάσατο", in C.A.G. (XV), pp. 508, 32-509.1, where he speaks of the Φαντάσματα as copies written in memory.


(17). De Anima Γ.4, 430a3-5.


(19). Kretzmann, (1974), holds that Aristotle here refers to Φαντάσματα and not to thoughts. However, we would support the opinion that he refers to both for reasons that are stated in the text. Sorabji, (1979b) p. 50, says that thinking cannot take place without Φαντάσματα (cf. De Anima Γ.8, 432a13-14).

(20). De An. Γ.7,431a16, b2; 8, 432a8, a13; De Mem. 1, 449b31.


(22). See further on that below.


(24). Simplicius, in C.A.G. (XV), p. 208, 14-15, Concerning this point, Gallop, (1990), pp. 18-19, says that according to Aristotle, to dream is not to be perceiving anything in the ordinary way (De Somno, 458b3-9). During the sleep, the sense-organs are affected by traces from waking perception, internal movements that pro-
duce ψυχικὰ ματά within us. Thus, dreams are a sort of replay of previous waking experience; it is a kind of awareness during sleep, while all normal sensory activity is suspended.

(26) De Anima, Γ, 8, 432a13-14; De Mem. 1, 449b31-450a1.

Wedin, (1988), p. 109, says that the thesis that images are required for thought is part of a more general argument concerning the dependence of mind on body, a point with which we would agree. However, we would disagree with the functionalist account that he ascribes to the Aristotelian notion of imagination, since the faculty/capacity of ψυχικὰ ματᾶ for Aristotle is not confined only to its isolated function of producing ψυχικὰ ματᾶ, but it requires an interactive process with both perceptive and noetic faculties. Heiman, (1990), p. 83, also disagrees with functionalism in the mind-body problem, and proposes a dualist account. On that cf. below, p. 127; Granger, (1990), pp. 28-30, says that the central idea of functionalism is that mentality is specifiable in purely functional terms, that is, a causal entity is identified with the causal role it plays in the system in which it participates. However, he dismisses such an interpretation in terms of the fact that it considers Aristotle's soul to be a set of "powers", that are dispositional properties.
(29). De An. Γ. 4, 430a3-5.
(31). De An., Γ. 4, 429a24.
(34). De Anima Γ. 8, 432a13-14.
(37). Cf. previous note; De An., Γ. 2, 432b2.
(39). De Interp., 14, 24b1-3. However, we have to say that the affections of the soul that he has in mind here are related to the δόξα, that a person has with reference to the assertions that he/she makes. We would think this not only because the preceding context suggests so, but also since in De Anima he accepts that assertions or denials can be attributed to δόξα as a critical faculty (428a2-5), while in De Interpretatione 14, 23a33, he points out that the pho-
netic representations mirror what exist in the διά-
νοια.
(40). Another question would also be as to whether thought is always propositional. Concerning this
question we would confine ourselves to saying that it would be non-propositional in cases of people who have not entirely recovered from unconsciousness, or they are under the influence of drugs, hence their mind cannot really produce any logical inference with a factual validity. Cf. Sorabji, (1983), pp. 138-140, who discusses the above point of an unconscious thinking, but goes on (pp. 140-145), to offer his own interpretation, by arguing that the thought of incomposite objects is propositional on the ground that such thought involves their definitions (λόγοι), hence it must be propositional. We would agree with this point, but we would also maintain the position that thought can be propositional in the above cases. (41). Philoponus, in C.A.G. (XV), pp. 569.16-19, 561.31-562.1. (42). Hamlyn, (1968), p. 150. (43). Ammonius on the De Interpretatione: "τὰ μὲν γὰρ νοήματα τέλος ἔχει τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων κατάληψιν, καὶ τόσε ὄντως νοήματα ἔστιν . . . , εἰκόνες γὰρ εἶσιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τῶν πραγμάτων, αὐτῶν δὲ φαναὶ τῶν νοημάτων εἰς ἐξαγγελτικαί καὶ διὰ τόσο τὸ δοκεῖ ἢμῖν ὅπως τῆς φύσεως πρός τὸ σημαίνειν ἡμᾶς τὰς ἐννοίας τῆς ψυχῆς", in C.A.G. (IV, 5, 6), p. 18.28-32. (44). Cf. chapter 4, pp. 279-283. (45). Cat., 1, 1a4-6, a10-12.
(46). Now, if we want to see the connection of this with the notion of essence, we would confine ourselves to saying that what is important for the essence of an entity, is that it is considered to be a set of features specified in the definition (Metaph. Z.5, 1031a12) of an entity; it is the analysis of the parts that its nature consists of; by defining the nature of a substance, we define its essence.

(47). I am grateful to Dr Sharples for drawing attention to this point.

(48). Cf. note (8).

(49). As Aristotle informs us in his Nicomachean Ethics Z.11, 1143a25-28, where one would follow the development of linguistic and cognitive capacities and the interrelation of language and thought.

(50). Cf. note (44).

(51). Cf. Simplicius in C.A.G., VIII, p. 30, 2-5. Ammonius in C.A.G. (IV, 4), p. 15-24, uses the term "λόγος", and not "ὁρισμός", because according to him not all things can be defined, and "λόγος" means both definition and description. Also, Simplicius uses "λόγος" with reference to the substance and what it signifies. As for Porphyry, in C.A.G. (IV, 1), p. 63, 6-8, each thing has a name and description, but although he lists diverse uses: σπερματικός, προφορικός, ἐνδιάθετος (p. 63, 28-30), ὁριστικός (p. 63, 7) (a non-
Aristotelian list, Stoic in origin), this does not involve a deviation from Aristotle's doctrine, since those words would apply to the notions of linguistic performance and competence that the Aristotelian λόγος (as a term) is assumed to refer to.

(52) Cat, 5, 2a11-16 makes the distinction between primary and secondary substances so that when we speak of "Peter", "George", "Ann", we refer to the primary substances, while when we speak of "human being", we refer to the secondary substance.


says: "Ὀρα ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐνοθασαί διαλειήθασιν ἡμᾶς ἡ ἕστερον τελειομένοις ἐγγίνονταί".

(64) Reference to the Greek-English Dictionary of
Liddell&Scott, p.1469.
(65), Barnes, (1975a), p.250.
(66), Ibid., p.81.
(70), De Mem. 2, 452a10-11.
(72), Cf., Barnes, (1975a), p.253; cf., NE Z.7, where only the σοφὸς possesses knowledge of the principles, and has also grasped the truth of the universal principles (1141a17-18).
(74), We should indicate that Barnes does not make any reference to a fifth stage, or to any of the distinctions stated above. However, we would commit ourselves to such a supposition, for Aristotle runs together two stages, as we stated, and also two accounts, feeling no need of further explanation, a task, though, that we think we should ourselves engage in. Themistius also does not make the distinction and in paraphrasing Aristotle, he runs more stages together: "Ἠς συναυξομένης τε καὶ προσλαμβανόσης αξιοθησιν

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"ομοίαν καὶ μνήμη πῆγανται ἄδη τὸ καθόλου τὸ ὁμοιον
ταύτων ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστον καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς
πολλοῖς, καὶ τὸ τό τεχνῇ ἀρχῇ καὶ ἐπιστήμῃς,...".,
(75), As Engberg, (1979), p. 316, also observes.
(76), Cf., Terminology, p. 16
(77), As Hamlyn, (1976), p. 182, points out.
250.
(79), Barnes, (1975a), p. 260; Kahn, (1980), p. 385, says:
"there is no place in this theory for a set of axioms
independent of the essential definitions of the sy­
stem, and hence no real dichotomy between a conceptual
and a propositional view of the principles".
(81), Ross in his commentary on the Posterior Ana­
lytics, assumes that these "primitives" are axioms,
that is, propositional principles, But Aristotle in
B.19, does not make any explicit distinction between
primitive concepts and primitive propositions.
(82), De Anima Γ, 4, 430a6; cf., Posterior Analytics B.19,
100a7.

(87), Post. Anal., B, 19, 100b8-14.
(89), De An., Γ, 5, 430a25, 430a15, 430a18.
(91), Heinaman, (1990), p. 83.
who has objected the position that the soul cannot be an efficient cause of physical events, because any such cause must have extension, and magnitude and be
divisible.
Also, we would not interpret the notion of \( \phi \alpha \nu \tau \alpha \varepsilon \varepsilon \sigma \theta \alpha \) with "imagining", but with "imaging".
(94). We adopt Wedin's translation for the \( \pi \omega \eta \tau \tau \iota \chi \omicron \varsigma \) \( \nu \omicron \omicron \varsigma \), (productive intellect), since it produces or creates an actual object. (Wedin, 1989, chap. V).
(95). As the expression "\( \theta \omicron \rho \alpha \theta \varepsilon \nu \nu \omicron \omicron \varsigma \)" indicates in the De Generatione Animalium B.3, 736b29.
(96). Kahn's position on the Active Intellect was described in his paper on the Aristotelian \( \nu \omicron \omicron \varsigma \), presented in the Philosophy Seminar at the Institute of the Classical Studies in May 1991.
Concerning the point of the relation of the Active Intellect to God, we would also cite Patzig, (1979), p. 43; cf. Elders, (1972), p. 23, and Norman, (1979), p. 95, who all assign a divine element to the Active Intellect, as coming from the outside and being immaterial. However, since the issue of the theological argument is not immediately relevant to our concerns, we will not be involved further with it.
(98). In Metaphysics A, Aristotle gives a synoptic account of three types of substance: the two natural substances of which one is transitory, the other
eternal; and the unmoving and immaterial substance that is God; cf. Dancy, (1975), pp. 338-340. For the relation of soul to God, Simplicius says: "ἔπει καὶ τὸ σῶμα τοῦτο ἔτι ζωοῦσα ἢ ψυχὴ χωριστὰς πότε ἐν καὶ νοεῖ... χωριστὰς δὲ ὁ θεὸς... ἢταν ἢ ψυχὴ ἄσχέτως πρὸς τὸ σῶμα διατεθεῖ", in C.A.G. (XI), p. 248. 12-16. However, in reporting Simplicius, we must indicate that being a Neoplatonist, he is not exactly reliable on this sort of issue. On the other, Alexander would be more reliable on this issue (although, not necessarily a totally reliable guide); "ἄλλοι ἡκαθεν γενόμενος ἐν ἡμῖν, ἢταν αὐτὸν νοοῦν εἰ γε κατὰ μὲν τὴν τοῦ εἴδους λήψιν τὸ νοεῖν γίνεται, το δὲ ἐκ τιν εἴδους ἁλυὸν αὐτῷ ὡς μεθ᾽ θυλῆς ἐν ποτε οὐδὲ χωρισόμενον αὐτῆς ἐπειδὰν νοῆται", in the Supplementum Aristotelicum 2.1, p. 108. 23-26.

(99). Cf. next chapter on how the Active Intellect relates to human happiness, in section (C).


(101). For pneuma, cf. Balme, (1972), pp. 161-162, where it is indicated that Aristotle at 736b29-737bl makes explicit the distinction between generative heat and other heat, and connects πνεῦμα with soul.

Concerning the notion of θύραθεν νοῦς, Alexander also says: άλλ' ὀ ἐνεργείᾳ τοῦτῳ θυε ἐννοεῖ αὐτῷ, ὃ αὐτὸς γυνόμενος... καὶ ξύστιν οὖς ὃ νοῦς ὃ θύραθεν τε ἐν ἡμῖν γυνόμενος καὶ ἐροτότους, θύραθεν μὲν γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα νοήματα, ἄλλ' οὐ νοῦς βντα, ἄλλ' ἐν τῇ νοεῖσθαι γενόμεναι νοῦς", in the Supplementum Aristotelicum 2.1, p.90.16-21. And, in fact, the last phrase on the θύραθεν νοήματα that are actualized once they are thought of, shows even more the notion of quasi-innateness of the Aristotelian νοῦς, as presented by Alexander, since, it is only in the process of developing understanding that the innate capacity for intellect is actualized. And since the intellect is its contents, to say that the capacity is actualized and that the contents are, is indeed the same thing.

In fact, in the question asked by Huby, (1991), p.143, as to "whether Aristotle had a fully worked out theory of νοῦς, which he did not pass on to even his closest pupils, or he worked on νοῦς in a piece-meal fashion and never succeeded in bringing the pieces together", we would answer that Aristotle, first of all, did not have a limited noetic vocabulary, but a well-defined one that served its purposes by explaining the various noetic capabilities of the
Aristotelian intellect. And, secondly, we would find her suggestion that the pupils of Aristotle were so perplexed about his theory, perhaps, because they were all too busy to discuss the questions, simply implausible.
CHAPTER 3: ETHICAL EPISTEMOLOGY.

Introductory note: In this chapter, we will be concerned with the Aristotelian Ethical Epistemology, and, particularly, with the acquisition of the ethical concepts. Our examination will be based on the preceding examination of the Aristotelian Epistemology, and it will focus on the acquisition of the ethical νοηματα/ἀρχαι. We will try to show that there can be discussion of the acquisition of ethical concepts that draws on what Aristotle says about the acquisition of other concepts. And as a means to achieve this end, we will try to show that there are similarities between ethical reasoning and theoretical reasoning in the Aristotelian Epistemology. That is, part of our examination will be the attempt to establish how far practical knowledge is similar to theoretical knowledge in terms of the acquisition of the ethical νοηματα/ἀρχαι.

(A). Acquisition of the ethical νοηματα/ἀρχαι (NE-EE).

1/. Ethical reasoning - theoretical reasoning.

(a). Modern views on the above relation.

Concerning the relation of ethical reasoning to theoretical reasoning, opinions are divided. Fortenbaugh (1) argues that ethical reasoning and the acquisition of ethical ἀρχαι are related to the ethical development of the agent within the πόλις. By accepting such an
approach, he provides us with a more observationist (or empiricist) account of the ethical development of an agent, based entirely on the sociopolitical data he/she collects by means of his/her education (physical-mental). Certainly, we would accept this criterion as necessary, but not adequate for the acquisition of ethical knowledge. And, although such an approach does not deny the parallel between ethical and theoretical reasoning, it does not accept it explicitly either.

The leading figure amongst those who have accepted an analogy between the two reasonings, and even more between Epistemology in general and Ethical Epistemology, is Taylor(2), who indicates that "for Aristotle the task of practical Epistemology (of which Moral Epistemology is a species) corresponding to that of theoretical Epistemology". We wish to go even further than this suggestion and examine to what extent such an analogy can take place and why.

Woods(3) accepts the above analogy in terms of the way we perceive a geometrical construction and a certain ethical case. And that includes both perception of the construction as analogous to calculating the means towards the ethical end, and the final construction as analogous to the conclusion.
of the practical syllogism, the first action we should perform. However, we would disagree with him—as it will be more apparent below—on the way he sees the notion of universal(i) in Ethics. He accepts that the universal(i) in Ethics is composed of particular cases. We will argue against this basing our account on the fact that such a position as Wood’s would not enable a moral agent to grasp the objective reality of a fundamental ethical truth, say of justice.

Irwin has argued that the practical first principles are analogous to the first principles of theoretical sciences in being beyond reasoning and argument. He says that Aristotle considers the moral ends to be hypotheses which are not grasped by deductive reasoning or inference. However, he does not consider Aristotle to mean that the ethical ends are grasped by the intuitive intellect, for then, they would be first principles, and according to him they are not. Irwin simply considers that what is analogous in practical reasoning to the intuitive intellect is desire and deliberation, as expressed by the notion of ἐπιθυμία and presupposes a grasp of correct or incorrect ethical ends. His conclusion is that "Aristotle is attracted by the demonstrative structure of a science as a model for ethical deliberation, and re-
cognizes no deliberation which violates the model, but he also realizes the limits of demonstrative science both as a general account of knowledge and as a model for rational deliberation"(6). We wish to go even further than this and examine the understanding of the ethical ends as \( \rho \chi \alpha \[C] \) by the intuitive intellect.

Another scholar, who argues for analogy is DeMoss(7), who claims that deliberations can be given a syllogistic/deductive form in the same way as demonstrations in which the first premise is a universal starting-point for scientific knowledge, and that such a starting-point must be learned by induction.

(b). Our position on the issue of analogy.

Now, concerning the issue of analogy between ethical and theoretical reasoning, we will be arguing that the former is indeed analogous to the latter, in terms of employing syllogism/deduction, ethical perception, and induction (with reference to the grasping of the universal as generalization from particulars). Of course, we do accept that some differentiations are involved, related to the types of knowledge that each of those reasonings serves. That is, the nature of Ethics is practical, and that of Mathematics, Physics, Metaphysics, Theology, is theoretical, but their aim is knowledge and truth, and the methods they use are similar; they
differ in that in theoretical sciences we aim at a disinterested contemplation of truths which are independent of human volition, while in the practical ones, we aim at knowledge that is a guide to human flourishing (8).

But, let us explore further the above analogy in terms of the syllogistic/deductive forms, of perception and of the acquisition of the universal. Our examination will be based on the discussion of certain problems as they arise from the Aristotelian text.

(c), Syllogistic/deductive forms (NE Z, 3, 1139b26-35).

Concerning the notion of syllogism, we would first refer to the Nicomachean Ethics (1139b26-35), where it is discussed in connection with theoretical reasoning: "ἐὰν προγνωσκομένων ἐὰν πᾶσα διδασκαλία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς λέγομεν. Η μὲν γὰρ ἡ ἐπαγωγὴς ἡ ἐν συλλογισμῷ, ἡ μὲν δὲ ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχὴ ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ καθόλου, δὲ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν καθόλου, εἰς ἀρα (ἀρα) ἄρχαι ἐκ δὲ τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ, δὲ συλλογισμοῦ, ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρα, ἡ μὲν ἀρα ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἔξις ἀποδεικτική, καὶ ὁσα ἄλλα προσδιοριζόμεθα ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς, ἔτοι γὰρ πος πιστεύῃ καὶ γνώριμοι αὐτῷ δειν αἰ ἄρχαι, ἐπιστηται. εἰ γὰρ μὴ μάλλον τοῦ συμπεράσματος, κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἔξει τὴν ἐπιστήμην, περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐπιστήμης ἐιμωρίσθω τῶν τρόπων τοῦτων." So, what we notice
here, in Z.3, Aristotle discusses the notion of syllogism as part of theoretical reasoning, without referring to its connection to the syllogistic/deductive form encountered in ethical reasoning. However, his reference to syllogism in the sciences in the middle of an ethical treatise, is perhaps a sign of an analogy between ethical and theoretical reasoning, that he implicitly suggests.

That is, Aristotle, on the one hand, says that ἐπιστήμη is an "established power of demonstrating", hence fulfilling all those conditions which were explained in detail in the Posterior Analytics, as Joachim rightly says as well (9). And the aim of demonstration is to establish by syllogism the universal connections between substances and their propria; such a strictly universal connection is reflected in the conclusions of the demonstrative syllogism (10). In this way, we ἴδια τὰ μὴ θεωρῆται (know) the universal scientific truths which are eternal and unchangeable, in contrast to those of τέχνη and φρόνησις, whose objects are contingent and changeable (11).

However, on the other hand, Aristotle refers to the notion of syllogism in theoretical reasoning, within an ethical treatise, since he wants to imply a possible analogy between the two. After all, the notion of rea-
soning, in general, is connected with the notion of syllogism/deduction; it is a process of logical inference that includes propositions (προσέγγισις) (12), which act as premises and yield a conclusion. In fact, assertions or negations of the propositions are considered to reflect psychic pursuit and avoidance (13), a point that has further implications for the significance in the theory of Aristotle of the combination of desire and intellect or intellectual desire. In NE Ζ, 2(14), the function of desire is parallel to that of the intellect, just as the latter accomplishes pursuit and avoidance.

Now, a syllogism is defined (15) as a form of speech (λόγος) in which after certain things have been assumed, something other than the assumed follows of necessity on account of the assumed, that is, as inference from assumptions immediately proceeding. A syllogism consists of a major and a minor premise, of which at least one must be universal; typically in the ethical context, the major premise is a universal supposition (καθόλου ὑπόληψις), and the minor one(s), describe(s)—though not always—particular cases (16).

So, what we are informed of in the above passage and in the definition of the syllogism/deduction, is that, reasoning, in general, is a route from the premises to
a conclusion, a presentation of inference, a performance of a syllogism.

Having established the general idea of an Aristotelian syllogism, we are now in a position to focus on the ethical syllogism, by using some examples of syllogistic/deductive form. So, in NE H.3, Aristotle provides us with some examples of practical syllogisms: "οἱ ο̑ν ο̑τι παντὶ ἄνθρωπος συμφέρει τὰ ξηρὰ, καὶ ο̑τι σο̑τος ἄνθρωπος, ἢ ο̑τι ξηρὸν τὸ τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον, ἢ ο̑κ ξέκει ἢ ο̑κ ἐνεργεῖ" (1147a5-7). The practical syllogism formed, would be:

(A). (Major premise): "Dry food is good for all men".

(B). (Minor premise): "This food is dry".

(C). (Minor premise): "I am a man".

(D). (Conclusion): "This food is good for all men" (17).

Now, Aristotle offers this example of a practical syllogism in connection with the way of thinking of the ἀκρατής person. So, the ἀκρατής is the kind of person who knows the two different kinds of universal premises: "διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ καθόλου, τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' ἔσεσθαι τὸ, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ πράγματος ἔσεσθαι" (one type referring to the agent himself, and the other referring to the object); but, he/she either does not have or does not activate the knowledge that this particular thing is of this sort (18). That is, the ἀκρατής is said to act wrongly, although he "knows" the right principle. How-
ever, he/she knows the right principle, but is not actually realizing its meaning (19). That is, although he/she possesses knowledge of the major premise (A), and of the minor premise (B), he/she may not actualize this knowledge; he/she may not relate the two premises in a rational way (of a practical syllogism), so that he/she can derive the right conclusion (C). So, because of the distinction between "ἐκτίου ἐπιστήμην" (to possess knowledge) and "θεωρεῖν" (consider), it is possible for the ἄρση to have knowledge but fail to apply it ("διοίκει τὸ ἔχοντα μὲν μὴ θεωροῦντα δὲ καὶ τὸ θεωροῦντα ὧ μὴ δεῖ πράττειν", 1146b33-35).

The fullest and final treatment of ἄκρασις is given by Aristotle at 1147a24-b19, and it presupposes the doctrine of the practical syllogism, as Wiggins points out (20). And it presupposes the existence of a practical syllogism, in order to show even better the differentiation between the thinking of a temperate man and that of an incontinent man. The process of the syllogism is such that it deductively concludes or asserts the performance of an action. Thus, what matters for a moral agent not to be an ἄρσης person is to relate the two premises together in a way that the conclusion is the expected one. That is, he/she does know the major premise that sweet food is bad for
every human being, therefore for him/her, but he/she fails to realize that food of such and such a nature is sweet, hence bad for him/her.

Having discussed briefly the notion of a practical syllogism in connection with the notion of ἐκποιεία, we can see further what Aristotle says concerning practical reasoning. His notion of a practical syllogism consists—as we have indicated above—of the major premise which is always a sort of a universal judgement, and the minor one, which deals with particular cases, and is a particular statement(21), and a conclusion. In addition, both of the major and the minor premises are grasped by means of perception but they relate to it in different ways. The major one is the universal, hence it is what perception has grasped by means of the method of induction, while the minor one is perceived as a particular case, in that when someone perceives (B) as a minor premise, that "this food is dry", he/she perceives that there is an instance of what the notion of a dry food relates to. And this happens in the same that when one perceives Socrates, he/she perceives the notion of a human being. So, in the case of the minor premise, we would think that it relates to a certain instance of the universal notion of something, a uni-
versal in a particularized form, as an instantiation of the universal.

Now, in terms of the point of universality, the two premises both differ from one another, on the one hand, and they relate to each other, on the other. They differ in that the major premise is universal, in the sense of universal(i). It is a universal judgement regardless of whether, it is true or false. A universal judgement like that would be: "One's nourishment affects one's state of health". And it is also grasped by means of perception and induction.

On the other hand, the two premises relate to each other in that the minor premise is a perceptual judgement concerned with the apprehension of the sensible particular, which, in this case, is the instantiation of a specific universal(i), as Modrak also argues(22). In this case of perceptual apprehension, the sensible particular is at the centre of the cognitive experience. So, when the moral agent perceives the sensible particular "this is dry food", he/she apprehends the universal(i), but in its instantiated form, hence without violating the rule that perception is of the universal(23). After all, ἄρωνηςίς also apprehends its objects as instantiations of universals (NE 2.11, 1143a35–b6, see below), and it is
because of the failure to recognize the particular as an instantiation of a specific universal that \( \alpha \pi \rho \alpha \sigma \iota \alpha \) takes place.

Moreover, it is also interesting that many major premises possess the element of a deontic modality, like: "One should be concerned about one's state of health." For example, in \( \Delta,1,1121a3-4 \), Aristotle says: "\( \tau \eta \varsigma \ \alpha \rho \varepsilon \theta \epsilon \varsigma \ \gamma \alpha \rho \ \kappa \alpha \iota \ \eta \xi \varepsilon \sigma \theta \alpha \iota \ \kappa \alpha \iota \ \lambda \nu \pi \varepsilon \iota \sigma \theta \alpha \iota \ \varepsilon \phi \' \circ \varsigma \ \delta \varepsilon \iota \ \kappa \alpha \iota \ \\varsigma \varsigma \ \delta \varepsilon \iota \)" (for, it is proper to virtue to feel both pleasure and pain in the things that we ought to (feel pleasure and pain) and in the way that we should (feel pleasure and pain)). This could be an example of a major premise that possesses an element of deontic modality (24), a point which Aristotle does not discuss. He does not tell us about this different kind of major premises. An explicit reference to the point of deontic modality is found in the De Motu Animalium where (25) the expression: "\( \omega \delta \, \delta \varepsilon \omicron \mu \alpha \iota \xi, \pi \omicron \iota \varsigma \tau \epsilon \omicron \nu, \iota \mu \alpha \iota \omicron \nu \delta \varepsilon \omicron \mu \alpha \iota, \iota \mu \alpha \iota \omicron \nu \pi \omicron \iota \varsigma \tau \epsilon \omicron \nu \)" (I ought to create what I need, I need a cloak, I ought to make a cloak), implies it. And, it has to be indicated that this reference applies to the conclusion—\( \pi \rho \alpha \xi \iota \varsigma \), and to the major premise. And not only does he not provide us with any discussion of those, but also, he says that the premises of a practical syllogism are "of the good and of
the possible", and classes them as universal (καθόλου) and particular (καθ' ἔχωςτον). He considers the initial premise to be of the good, while the ultimate one (ἐκχαρτον) will be of the possible (De Motu Animalium 701a32-33). In fact, the ἔχωςτον premise referred in the De Motu Animalium applies to the conclusion.

However, the minor premises: "This is dry food", or "I am a child", are hardly possibilities. In fact, Aristotle does not provide us with such an example, or does not clarify what he might have meant. What he means is surely that the minor term, which is what the minor premise brings into the conclusion will turn out to be something one cannot do, or at any rate, as you go on to say later, something one cannot do at once. This unclarified point by Aristotle together with the previous one suggest that he did not have as unified and consistent an account of ethical reasoning as we might have expected.

Nevertheless, the Aristotelian ethical reasoning is something more than just the performance of a syllogism. It is a whole cognitive process of ethical rational thinking that yields a moral action. It starts with deliberation and finishes with the moral action. Ethical reasoning is a means-end relationship for the inquiry of truth just as theoretical reasoning is, but in a broader sense (26). In the theoretical sciences, we
do not have actions to perform (another point of differentiation), but we must also be aware of the "end" we want to achieve and try to construct a hypothetical analysis that would lead us to this "end", which will be an ἀρχή itself (but not necessarily πρῶτον) (27).

Now, the broader sense implied in the means-end relationship as encountered in ethical reasoning lies with the fact that it expresses nothing else than the "λόγος ἔννοια τινός", the inquiring for the truth of means-end relationship and the final output of that, which is the moral action itself. For this reason, we would join the notion of ethical reasoning with that of προαίρεσις (28). We would define προαίρεσις as:

(a) the ethical intention of the moral agent, achieved under a state of ἡγέσις, and,
(b) what prescribes the capacity for the selection of the appropriate means for the achievement of an aim.

We derive the two subparts of the Aristotelian notion of προαίρεσις from the fact that Aristotle uses the word with slightly different implications each time; the reference of the word at A.1, 1094a2 is that of a moral intention, but, later on, at B.6, 1107a4-6, he defines ethical virtue, as an ἔξις προαίρετική, a state of a human being acting with moral intention.
ascribing to it a more technical usage. So, we would think that it is a terminus technicus of the Aristotelian ethical reasoning, and it involves desire, \( \text{διέξεις} \), a rational \( \text{ζητος} \), an expression of a man's \( \text{ἐθικός} \), \( \text{Βούλευσις} \) (deliberation), and that of the final cause of moral action.

In fact, \( \text{προσέρεσις} \) is a deliberating desire (\( \text{Γ.3, 1113a10-11} \)), and Aristotle himself stresses the fact that \( \text{διέξεις} \) is one of the main presuppositions of both action and truth, and that \( \text{προσέρεσις} \) is necessarily a combination of cognition and desire (\( \text{ΝΕ Ζ.1-2,1139a17-18, a23-24,ΕΕ Β.9,1227a4} \)). It is what urges a moral agent to set up a whole process of discursive reasoning that is involved in \( \text{προσέρεσις} \). Deliberation would never start if we did not also have \( \text{Βούλευσις} \) for the end, and \( \text{Βούλευσις} \) expresses the volitional wish for the end. And when deliberation starts, we deliberate about means and not ends (\( \text{τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος} \)) (\( \text{ΝΕ Γ.3,1112b11-12} \)). In other words, \( \text{προσέρεσις} \) is the selection of appropriate means for the attainment of a desirable end. So, deliberating terminates in \( \text{προσέρεσις} \) and precedes moral action, the end of moral reasoning. And that is why we consider it to be \( \text{Βούλευσις} \), a deliberative desire of things to an end.
Thus, what we notice concerning προαιρεσις is indeed a marrying of desire and cognition. Desire is the extra quality of ethical reasoning in comparison with theoretical reasoning, since, it is the motive of moral action, its first stage. The fact that proves the existence of desire is that the origin of action is choice, and that choice is desire and reasoning towards an end (Z.2, 1139a31-33). After all, we notice that the assertions or denials of propositions (as premises of a syllogism) are related to psychic pursuit or avoidance. In De Anima Γ.7, 431a8-14, he makes a similar approach to the notion of desire (or emotion or passion), regarding it as an activity of the soul in respect of objects conceived of as pleasant and painful, or good and bad. In both cases, desire is psychic assertion or denial, firstly connected with belief, and later linked with action. Finally, the notion of desire is closely connected with that of voluntary action, since as he says in NE Γ.3, 1112a22-24, the voluntary would seem to be that of which the causal principle is within the man, provided he/she knows the particular features of the action and its circumstances.

And reason is what accompanies the whole of this process of ethical reasoning, and what decides the outcome of a practical syllogism, that is, the conclusion.
We would think that the best description of the com-

bination of reason and desire would be given in the

following words of Irwin(31):"a virtuous man's ends

are chosen by rational desires resting on delibera-
tion about components of the final good(call these
deliberating desires)".

So,according to the above,we can offer two examples

of ethical syllogisms,like:

(A),(Major premise):"We ought to help our friends

unconditionally when they need help".

(B),(Minor premise):"X is my friend and needs finan-
cial help".

(C),(Conclusion):"I ought to help X financially and

unconditionally".

Here,reason requires that a certain person has to

help his/her friend financially, but, it may be the

case that this person is unable to help his/her

friend financially,because that person's financial

situation is also very bad. That is, even if reason

requires certain action, the circumstances are not

the appropriate ones for its performance.

Another ethical syllogism would be:

(A),(Major premise):"All children ought to obey their

parents".
(B), (Minor premise): "I am a child".
(C), (Conclusion): "I ought to obey my parents".

Now, the final stage of the process of ethical reasoning is the output of the practical syllogism, which is performed as an action. In De Motu Animalium, and particularly, in chapter seven, Aristotle supposes:

What we notice in the above passage, is that Aristotle starts with a practical-theoretical parallel, concerning the conclusions of the syllogism respectively. In theoretical reasoning, the premises themselves objectively imply the conclusion, whereas in ethical reasoning, there is a πράξις. And he goes on to explain what he means by the conclusion-πράξις. In fact, in a
passage whose purpose is to compare and contrast the two types of reasoning in terms of their conclusions, Aristotle provides us with a discussion of the relation of the conclusion on the one hand, to the result of the conclusion on the other (32).

So, in the above passage, we would draw attention to the phrase: "ἐν δότο προτάσεων τὸ συμπέρασμα γίνεται πράξις", to which various interpretations have been ascribed (33). Kenny (34) suggests that what is discussed in the above passage is a contrast between syllogisms with positive and those with negative conclusions, hence the conclusion need not always be an action. We would think that he does not answer the question and misinterprets Aristotle's intentions in this chapter.

An extended discussion of this phrase, has been given by Nussbaum (35), who says that Aristotle uses the conclusion "ἐμάσιον ποιήσεων" as an intermediate step, and then goes on to claim that the conclusion that counts as such is the action. That is, there may or may not be a verbalized conclusion (in this case, there is), but what is important is that the "ἐμάσιον ποιήσεων", is the action and qua action follows directly from the two premises and actually begins to happen. However, we would think that "τὸ ποιεῖν τὸ
ιμάτιον" is the action and not "ποιητέον το ιμάτιον" and in any case, we cannot see why the conclusion should be regarded as only intermediate.

Anscombe (36), in discussing the above passage, suggests that Aristotle wants a "must" in the conclusion in the verbalized form in which he gives, though each time he gives a conclusion he adds: "and that's an action". Most probably Anscombe is right to suggest such a thing, since Aristotle, as we indicated above speaks of a deontic modality for both the major premise and the conclusion. A further point she makes is she accepts two strands in Aristotle's thought:
(a) the explanation of how a human being is set in motion by thought, and (b) the idea of the thing wanted as the starting-point for such thought (37).

Hardie (38), in discussing the above phrase, suggests that the verbal formulation of the conclusion, when there is such a formulation, is an element in the action rather than an episode which precedes it, and that to syllogize in action is to apply a rule of the form that "such and such a man should act in such and such ways" with a view to realizing an end, and ultimately, the supreme end, happiness (39). According to Hardie, a man sometimes formulates the prescriptive conclusion but he does not do the
action, as it happens with the ἄρσις man, considering this point as a difficulty that Aristotle has to face. We would agree with the first point concerning the realization of the end, but with reference to the latter, we have accepted above that the case of ἄρσις takes place because of the failure of this person to recognize the minor premise as an instantiation of the universal, and to combine it logically with the major one.

So, concerning the above phrase, we would confine ourselves to saying that what Aristotle means by the above phrase is not that the conclusion of a practical syllogism is identified with πρᾶξις, because the conclusion is a proposition, and the proposition differs from πρᾶξις at least in their matter. What he might have meant here is that the conclusion of every ethical practical syllogism, as the end of the ethical reasoning possesses the potential capacity of becoming a πρᾶξις. And we consider it to be potential in that the desired act might be hindered. That is, the notion of πρᾶξις actualizes what the conclusion-proposition says. In fact, the whole of the reasoning is an actualization of a potentiality.

Now, whether the performance of the action is going
to take place immediately, after some delay, or never, it is a different point. This depends on the appropriate circumstances for this action to take place. We have to think of the possibility of this action (τὸ δόνασθαι γενεσθαι, NE 1.3.1112b24-25), that is, whether we are able to perform the action or not, regardless of what reason requires.

To sum up, concerning the parallel between theoretical and ethical reasoning, in terms of the syllogistic/deductive forms, we would say that certain analogies can be drawn. First of all, the notion of deliberation is related to that of demonstration in the way that they both employ syllogisms/deductions. This parallel between the reasonings in terms of syllogisms/deductions should not be violated by the Aristotelian definition that φρόνησις is τὸ τὸ δοξασθαι (an ability to act) in accordance with excellent deliberations (NE 1.2.5.140b20-21), since the aim is the inquiry into the truth, and only their subject-matter is different (40).

However, the main differentiation between the two reasonings is in terms of the conclusion of the syllogisms/deductions, which in the sciences, is implied by the premises, while in Ethics, there is a πράξις. A theoretical major premise via an appropriate minor yields a proposition, while an ethical major premise
via an appropriate sensible particular yields an action\((41)\). However, the \(\alpha\rho\chi\eta\) in action is the goal, just as in Mathematics, the hypotheses are \(\alpha\rho\chi\alpha\zeta\) (see see further below).

(d). Analogy in terms of perception; \((i)\) \(\text{NE Z.8,1142a23-30}\).

In order to examine the analogy of the two forms of reasoning in terms of perception, we will examine certain passages and try to solve the problems they raise. So, in the \text{Nicomachean Ethics Z.8,1142a23-30}, Aristotle states: "\(\theta\tau\iota\ \delta^\prime\ \phi\rho\omicron\nu\eta\sigmai\varsigma\ \sigma\omicron\chi\iota\omicron\ \pi\epsilon\iota\sigma\gamma\tau\omicron\mu\mu\iota\nu\varsigma\ \phi\alpha\nu\epsilon\iota\varsigma\rho\omicron\nu\omicron\), tov \(\gamma\alpha\chi\omega\rho\ \iota\varsigma\chi\alpha\tau\omicron\nu\ \iota\varsigma\tau\iota\nu\), \(\delta\sigma\gamma\epsilon\epsilon\nu\iota\alpha\rho\iota\varsigma\eta\iota\varsigma\iota\)."  

What Aristotle suggests in the above passage is that \(\phi\rho\omicron\nu\eta\sigmai\varsigma\) (practical wisdom) is opposed to \(\nu\omicron\omicron\varsigma\), since the latter apprehends the primary premises of demonstration, that is, the definitions (\(\alpha\rho\omicron\omicron\omicron\)), which cannot be proved of what they define, but must be grasped immediately as true, whereas the former apprehends the ultimate fact as coming under a principle of action,
and this apprehension must be immediate or intuitive, ἐφόνησις is essentially πρακτική (practical) and it is mainly concerned with the particular (or ultimate, ἕσχατον), hence it is distinguished from επιστήμη too. Now, these ἕσχατα must be apprehended by a kind of perception (ἀπόθεσις), what we will be calling as intuitive perception, which is analogical with the one by means of which the mathematician grasps the immediate principles. In addition, at present υοῖς has to be restricted to the immediate apprehension of the universal immediate premises of scientific proof (42), although Greenwood suggests otherwise by translating "αντίκειται" by "correspond" and not by "is opposed" (43) believing that the relation between υοῖς and ἐφόνησις is a likeness and not a difference. Concerning this point, we will stick to the traditional interpretation, believing that in this passage, Aristotle explicitly contrasts the two faculties.

And, then, comes the problem: how can we justify that in this passage Aristotle considers υοῖς, which apprehends the immediate principles of the sciences, to be distinguished from ethical reasoning which is involved with conduct and actions, and, hence requires ἐφόνησις, and, at the same time, considers them to be analogous in terms of the way they apprehend
something by means of \( \alpha\xi\sigma\theta\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma \). Is Aristotle inconsistent with his views, or does he want to imply that despite the differences between \( \nu\omega\varsigma \) in theoretical reasoning, and \( \nu\omega\varsigma \) and \( \phi\rho\nu\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma \) in ethical reasoning, there is a case of analogy both in the way we grasp the \( \Upsilon\sigma\chi\alpha\tau\alpha \) and in the \( \Upsilon\sigma\chi\alpha\tau\alpha \) themselves?

So, in terms of \( \alpha\xi\sigma\theta\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma \), Aristotle says that we see (\( \alpha\iota\sigma\theta\alpha\nu\omicron\mu\epsilon\theta\alpha \)), but not in the sense of an ordinary sensation. We would agree with Joachim (44) that the "see" here is metaphorical and that Aristotle compares this to the seeing that the \( \Upsilon\sigma\chi\alpha\tau\omicron \) in this problem of Geometry is a triangle. What we are informed of in this passage is that the intuitive perception of the \( \phi\rho\nu\iota\mu\omicron\varsigma \) (prudent person) is analogous to that of the geometer or the mathematician. Aristotle's point here seems to be about seeing the particular as an instance of the universal, and this is what the "\( \sigma\upsilon\chi \; \hat{\eta} \; \tau\alpha\nu \; \dot{\iota}\dot{\iota}\omega\nu \)" applies to (45).

At this point, we would differentiate our position from that of Joachim, who says (46) that the intuitive perception of the \( \phi\rho\nu\iota\mu\omicron\varsigma \) is specifically distinct from that of the mathematician for, according to him, the latter is a genuine act of sense-perception. Our disagreement with his view is supported by the fact that
the αἰσθητῶν in Mathematics is not really perceived through the senses, both because the three-di mensio nal figures in Stereometry, the two-dimensional figures in plane geometry and the abstract mathematical principles are perceived only in an intuitive sense; we cannot really "see" them.

And the sort of perception described here is analogous to that of the sciences, in the sense of an intuitive perception, or intelligence. In fact, the Greek at 1142a30 is ambiguous; it could mean "mathematical perception is more perception than φρόνησις is" or "this observation of the ἔσχατον in Ethics is more perception than φρόνησις" (47). The way we would interpret this phrase is that Aristotle accepts here that αίσθησις is not identical with φρόνησις, being different faculties, but related to one another in the sense that the φρόνιμος has αίσθησις. That happens, because φρόνησις apprehends the ultimate fact as coming under a principle of action, and this apprehension too must be intuitive; the ἔσχατα (particulars) must be apprehended by αίσθησις (48).

Concerning the above point of analogy, Irwin (49) considers it not to be complete, basing his position on what Aristotle says in 1140a30. We would think that in this line, Aristotle accepts that αίσθησις is not
identical with \( \phi \rho \nu \eta \sigma \iota \varsigma \), being different faculties, but related to one another in the sense that the \( \phi \rho \omicron \nu \mu \omicron \varsigma \) has \( \alpha \varsigma \theta \eta \sigma \iota \varsigma \). That happens because \( \phi \rho \nu \nu \eta \sigma \iota \varsigma \) apprehends the ultimate fact as coming under a principle of action, and this apprehension too must be intuitive; the particulars must be apprehended by \( \alpha \varsigma \theta \eta \sigma \iota \varsigma \) (50).

So, what we are informed of here, is that the \( \phi \rho \omicron \nu \mu \omicron \varsigma \), that is, the moral agent that thinks and acts according to reason (51) \( \delta \rho \theta \omicron \delta \omicron \omicron \omicron \epsilon \iota \nu \pi \zeta \rho \iota \tau \varsigma \ delta \chi \varsigma \varsigma \) with a view to acting well, hence with a view to a happy life, apprehends the \( \varepsilon \sigma \chi \alpha \tau \alpha \) in a way analogous with that of the mathematician or the geometer. That is, despite the fact that there is a differentiation between theoretical \( \nu\omicron \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \) and \( \phi \rho \nu \nu \eta \sigma \iota \varsigma \), the way they apprehend the immediate principles is by means of intuitive perception, a point that shows the analogy between the two kinds of reasoning. After all, what is regarded here as scientific \( \nu\omicron \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \) is the intuitive perception that apprehends the immediate first principles of the sciences in the Posterior Analytics B, 19.

Moreover, the analogy that is detected in this passage, is also in terms of the \( \varepsilon \sigma \chi \alpha \tau \alpha \) themselves. Here, Aristotle compares this kind of immediate ap-
prehension to the seeing that the τετραγωνον is a triangle; that is, the last step in the geometer's inquiry and the first step in the construction is a triangle (52). In fact, what the construction of the triangle corresponds to is rather the realization that the means to a desired end is $X$, which can do now, and the doing of it.

Our point of the analogy between the ethical and theoretical reasoning in terms of this could be further illustrated with the following example: let us think of a Geometer who stands at a given point, say $G$, and he wants to examine six other points topologically, namely $A, B, C, D, E, F$, which constitute a definite total. Also, we presuppose that he knows the distance between his standing point $G$ and that of each of the other points. In order to examine those points, he thinks of a possible way to do it, and he decides to draw a circle with $r$, the distance between $G$ and $A$, the most distant of all the points, namely the circle $(G, r)$, where $GA = r > GB, GC, GD, GE, GF$, and $(G, r) > (G, ri)$.
In this way, the Geometer is now able to examine those points by constructing a circle that includes all of them, so that he can see further their interrelations, like the fact, that points within the circle of radius GA are closer to G than A is; those within that of radius GB are closer to G than B is, and those outside it are further away and so on. So, the circle is the end and at the same time it can be used further in order to examine more the notion of a circle or use it in more complicated geometrical schemata, in the same way that one practical syllogism and action succeed another in the process of ethical reasoning.

The above geometrical example is reinforced further by parallel references in the Eudemian Ethics, that suggest even more strongly such a position. In EE(53), Aristotle states that the end is the starting-point and a hypothesis, in the same way that it is in theoretical sciences: "περὶ μὲν τὸν τέλος οὗθεις θυγατέρως, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' εστὶν ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις, ἂσπερ ἐν ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς ἐπιστήμαις ὑπόθεσις (εἴρηται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ βραχέως, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς διὰ ἀκριβείας...). Then, in 1227b28-30, he adds: "ἄσπερ γὰρ ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς αἱ ὑπόθεσις ἀρχαι, οὕτω καὶ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς τὸ τέλος ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις". Similarly, in the NE H.8,1151a15-17: "ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ καὶ
Concerning the point of analogy of theoretical reasoning to ethical reasoning from an already accepted goal, Woods (55) suggests that it is only partial, since according to him, other factors interfere with the achievement of that goal. In fact, we agree with this point but we also wish to say even further that the analogy we seek to make between the two kinds of knowledge—in our attempt to answer why Aristotle here distinguishes νοῦς from φρόνησις, and at the same time, relates the one to the other in terms of ἀξιοσθήσις—is concerned with the similar methods used, and not the detailed points on which they differ due to the different nature of their subject-matter.

However, there are three technical barriers that block off our assumption of analogy, and which need to be explained. Those are: (a) in mathematical reasoning, the axioms are not the goal, even if the demonstration of
a particular property is; we reason from the axioms to the solution of the problem, whereas in ethical reasoning, the starting-point is our notion of the moral end at which we also aim; we seek to relate the ethical axioms to the means in order to act to achieve the end—(b) the ζητεῖν in mathematical reasoning is of the highest universals, whereas in Ethics, it is of the particular moral action—(c) in theoretical sciences, Aristotle speaks of necessary assumptions (ὅμοθετικός) (56), but he does not assert the same thing for Ethics.

First of all, concerning (a), we have already given the answer, and that is, the differentiation takes place, due to their different subject-matters. This answer would also apply to (c), for in Ethics, we do not presuppose necessary assumptions, but we just make assumptions over particular cases.

In the light of this answer and of the above distinction, we would answer for (b): drawing of the circle above, or in an ethical case jumping into the river to rescue a drowning man, are the ends of the reasoning and the starting-point of doing something. They are ἀρχαί[54]. But the apprehension of the particular circle (57), is also an ἀρχή [8], for it is the starting-point for arriving at the end, and is what stands in
analogy with the particular observation of "saving a drowning man" under the condition, of course, that in apprehending the particular circle, we perceive the universal notion of what a circle is. The ὁφ τού διστικτον in NE Z.8,1142a28 shows the comparison between this kind of apprehension and seeing that the ἑσχατον in this problem in Geometry is a triangle. However, in this case, the ἑσχατον is not in the sense of the highest universals and it is in those terms that we have stated our problem (b), which shows that this barrier remains together with the fact that in Ethics a certain length of experience for the apprehension of the ἑσχατον is required in a way that in Mathematics is not. Nevertheless, they do not affect our case of analogy, since they take place due to the different subject-matters of Ethics and the sciences, and the point here is the analogy in terms of the apprehension of any kind of ἑσχατον.

So, as a conclusion to the above problem, we would say that indeed there is a case of opposition of νοος to ἀρνησις, due to the different subject-matter of the two reasonings; in the reasoning of the ἀρνησις, there is a passage from the sphere of deliberation and choice to the sphere of action, which is accompanied by the apprehension of particulars by means of
In the reasoning of the mathematician, one starts from the axioms and works in a deductive/syllogistic way in order to reach the strict deductive proof. However, despite the apparent opposition, there is also an analogy case that we detect between the two reasonings both in terms of the ἕχων and in terms of the way they are apprehended, that is ἁσθησίς.

Moreover, we should also indicate that in 1142a23-30, Aristotle compares three types of ἁσθησίς (58): (a) the perception of qualities peculiar to one sense (1142a27), (b) the perception by which we perceive that the ἕχων before us in a geometrical analysis is a triangle (1142a28), and (c) that perception is ὑπονομή but still it is something more than just ὑπονομή (1142a30). In fact, this last clause "ἕξείνης δὲ ἄλλο ἔδος", shows that the notion of perception described here is something that involves ὑπονομή, since it is concerned with ethical issues, but it is more than that.

This shows, in fact, that he has a unified account of ἁσθησίς and the kind of ἁσθησίς involved here (in (b) and (c)) is that of qualities peculiar to one sense, but this kind of practical ἁσθησίς which involves cognitive dimension. In addition, the practical ἁσθησίς involves ὑπονομή, hence a true and reasoned...
capacity to act with regard to human needs (according to the NE Z.5,1140b20-21), in that it is a natural δύναμις implied in the φρόνιμος. And, finally it is analogous to the αἴσθησις by means of which we apprehend the scientific ἀρχαί, that is, the notion of intuitive perception that νοῦς employs here for the apprehension of the scientific ἀρχαί, hence showing one aspect of the relevance of νοῦς to ethical reasoning.

(ii) NE Z.11,1143a35-1143b5

Nevertheless, there is a second problem for us to deal with, as it appears in another passage of Nicomachean Ethics Z.11,1143a35-1143b5: "καὶ οὗ νοῦς τῶν ἔσχάτων ἔπιγράμματα, καὶ γὰρ τῶν φρόνιμων δεῖ γινόσκειν αὐτά, καὶ γὰρ τῶν πράττων θρών καὶ τῶν ἔσχάτων νοοῆς ἔστι καὶ οὗ λόγος, καὶ ὁ μὲν κατὰ τας ἀποδείξεις τῶν ἀκινήτων θρόνων καὶ πράττων, ὁ δὲ ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς τοῦ ἔσχατον καὶ ἐνδεχομένου καὶ τῆς ἔτερας προτάσεως ἀρχαί γὰρ τοῦ οὗ ξένηκα αἰτια, ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἔσχαστα γὰρ τὰ καθόλου, τούτων οὖν ἔχειν δεί αἴσθησιν, ἄτις δ' ἔστι νοοῦς (59).

The problem that arises here refers to the distinction between the objects of theoretical and practical νοοῦς. The former is concerned with the first and undemonstrated principles, the latter with the particular practical instances, the possible and the
minor premise. However, a few lines above, in 1143a26-28, he states: "λέγομεν γὰρ γνώμην καὶ σένεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ νοῦν ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτούς ἐπιφέροντες γνώμην ἔχειν καὶ νοῦν θῆν καὶ φρονίμους καὶ συνετοῦς" (60), speaking of νοῦς in the sense of νοὸν ἔχειν (to be sensible, to possess common sense), that is, νοῦς is considered to be a natural δύναμις implied in φρόνησις and developed in the φρονίμος.

That is, Aristotle in 1143a35-b5 makes the distinction between the objects of the two reasonings that νοῦς apprehends, and at the same time, the notion of νοῦς he talks about is that of apprehending intuitively the undemonstrated principles, on the one hand, and of the ultimate particulars, on the other. But then in 1143a26-28, he speaks about νοὸν ἔχειν as a sort of ethical perception. However, if νοῦς here is a sort of ethical perception responsible for the moral conduct of the person, then that contradicts with the previous passage in 1142a23-30, where that very faculty was contrasted with νοῦς on the ground that the latter is concerned with undemonstrable principles. Is this then a case of an inconsistency of Aristotle, or the absence of a unified account that would say that there is νοῦς of ethical and of theoretical ἀρχαί as well?
Concerning this point, the commentators have suggested various solutions (61). Stewart (62) says that the sharp contrast here between the νοῦς θεωρητικός and the νοῦς πρακτικός is very misleading, since they both apprehend the highest universals for the former, and the ultimate particulars for the latter, intuitively. That is, according to him, if we take νοῦς in its generic sense, we can say that it is concerned with "ultimates at both ends of the series": with universals at the top, and particulars at the bottom.

Joachim (63) suggests that we are said to possess νοῦς so far as we apprehend intuitively or immediately the primary truths, with reference to the sciences, while, in Ethics, so far as we apprehend immediately or intuitively the ultimate particulars we are said νοῦν ἔχειν or to have αἴσθησις, since this kind of perception that apprehends the ultimate particulars is νοῦς.

Taylor (64) points out that a resolution of the apparent contradiction is suggested by 1143b4-5, where Aristotle says that particular instances of conduct are "principles of that for the sake of which (we act), for universals come from particulars; so we must have perception of the latter, which we call νοῦς", and this seems to describe the inductive process found in
the *Posterior Analytics*. And he acknowledges the fact that Aristotle does not have a unified account that would say that both kinds of *votē* are acquired inductively and that perception of morally significant instances is another kind of *votē*, but rather gives emphasis to *votē* in its perceptual role.

DeMoss (65) says that although *votē* has a role to play in both practical and non-practical inductions, those roles are not exactly the same. He takes *votē* in a non-practical demonstration to be intellection of a first and unchanging definition, and *votē* in practical reasonings to be of the last and contingent things, which Aristotle describes as the "other proposition" and the starting-point of that for the sake of which. So, for DeMoss, *votē* in the non-practical arena, grasps what would be the major premise in a demonstration, and in deliberation, what would serve as the minor premise (the "other proposition"). He argues further Aristotle recognizes two other starting-points in practical affairs (66): "the universal conclusion of a practical induction which provides the first premise of a practical syllogism and the particular first premise of a practical induction which corresponds to the conclusion of a practical syllogism". And DeMoss bases that on the fact that it is
not just cold reason that teaches the moral agent the starting-points in practical matters (that is, what ends to pursue), but rather good habits offer a reliable guide to good ends. By saying that, he does not, of course, reject any "reasonableness" in the acquisition of ethical \( \alpha \varphi \chi \alpha \), but he suggests that the postulates in geometry are not in the same way right that a moral action would be. However, he does accept that Aristotle offers "a rational non-demonstrative path to starting-points: induction".

Nevertheless, we are not so happy with the phrase "practical induction" that he uses, and we would think that "practical inference" would have described the case better. After all inductions are not supposed to have premises. As for his point that the conclusion of one syllogism can be the first premise of another syllogism, it needs some further qualification in the case of Ethics. For, in Ethics, the conclusion of a syllogism is the particular thing to be done, while the major premise is a universal supposition that possesses the element of a deontic modality, as we have seen. It is only when the moral agent after certain habituation and performance of certain actions learns how to induce from the conclusions-propositions (the particular actions to be performed),
the universal starting-points of a practical inference.

As for DeMoss' point on the "reasonableness" involved in the acquisition of ἡρχώμενη, we would think that this also raises the issue of the naturalistic basis of Aristotle's Ethics, and hence to the issue of universality in the sense of universal (iii), of θεός as opposed to νόμος, which is discussed in the fifth chapter. According to this distinction, there are certain laws that are conventional and differ from one society to another, hence every society accepts different ethical norms of evaluation, but even though, there are certain laws of naturalistic origin that are common everywhere and suggest the existence of a "naturalistic reasoning" (if we can use this expression).

So, it is no doubt that Aristotle would not have inferred that the "right" in geometrical postulates is the same as that in Ethics. They cannot be since the two kinds of knowledge (sciences-Ethics) have different subject-matters. However, what he could have inferred is that the "right" in the former is analogous to that of the latter, but not in the same sense. They are both "right", in that in Geometry we have to use the correct postulates, hence it possesses the sense
of "correctness", while in Ethics, the sense of "morally righteous".

In addition, concerning the passage in question, DeMoss argues for a dual function of ποδός in practical reasonings (67): "in the practical induction it(ποδός) perceives a starting-point[A], namely that those particular acts one should perform are all means to doing something. After concluding from this induction doing is what one should pursue as an end, one again engages ποδός during deliberations (which can be presented in practical syllogisms) in order to perceive in various circumstances "the other proposition", namely, that A'ing, B'ing, C'ing, are appropriate means to Z'ing (the end)".

Concerning his point of the two-fold function of ποδός, that is, recognizing means-end connections in both deliberations and practical inferences, which DeMoss bases on the fact that "τοῦ ἐθέλου καὶ ἐν ἀποφθέγματοι καὶ τῆς ἐπιθέμευσις" to refer to the minor premise (68), we would think that it is not exactly indicated by Aristotle himself in order to be adopted as a solution, and although we would not entirely disagree with him on that, we will try to use different materials by which Aristotle's position can be reconstructed. However, we would keep his point
that the "ἕτερος προτάσσως" refers to the minor premise. In fact, the whole of 1143b3 refers to the minor premise, and the last phrase "καὶ τῆς ἕτερος προτάσσως" is an explanation of "τοῦ ἔσχατον καὶ ἑνδεχομένου". And this would be the ἄρχαι[A](the καθ' ἔκκαστα)(69) from which we derive the ἄρχαι[B], through a process which takes them(ἄρχαι[A] and [B]) as starting-points in our developing ethical reasoning, explained in the following line 1143b4: "ἄρχαι γὰρ τοῦ ὅπε ἐνεχαί ἀθήναι".

So, with reference to our question above concerning the apparent contradiction between the three passages, we would think that (a) there is no unified account in Aristotle saying that there is νοῦς of ethical and of theoretical ἄρχαι, and (b) Aristotle's answer comes a few lines below, in 1143b5 (as we shall see). In fact, Aristotle runs two points together: (i) the apprehension of the universal from the particulars by means of perception and induction, that is, what he has discussed in the Posterior Analytics, but applied here specifically to Ethics(ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἔκκαστα γὰρ τὰ καθόλου), and (ii) because here he discusses the universal ethical ἄρχαι[A], he also refers to the performance of practical syllogism that is initiated by the desire for an ethical end(τοῦ ὅπε
and which possesses particular premises which are of the ultimate and of the possible, that justifying "τῆς ἐξέρας προσάσως".

That is, Aristotle here sees (i) from its ethical point of view, hence it requires (ii), for in Ethics νοῦς deals with particular cases from which, in order to yield ἀρχαὶ[B] and ἀρχαὶ[C], we need to employ practical syllogisms. We can learn ethical ἀρχαὶ[C] by observing particular instances, and at the same time our νοῦς is of the ἔσχατον and ἐνέκεχομενον and τῆς ἐξέρας προσάσως. Aristotle simply wants to say that in Ethics νοῦς is concerned with ethical ἔσχατα—the particulars of action—and in sciences with another kind of ἔσχατα—the highest universals (70).

However, the fact that theoretical νοῦς is concerned with one sort of ἔσχατον, and ethical νοῦς with the other sort, does not violate the analogy, for, the analogy does not function as an one-to-one correspondence, but as a general analogy in terms of induction of the universal and by means of perception. The differentiations that take place because of the different functions of theoretical and practical νοῦς, are due to the different natures of Ἑπιστήμη and Ethics; due to their different subject-matter. So, even if in Ethics we have an ethical end, whereas in the

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sciences we do not (instead, something must be the case
given certain premises), this ethical end can function
as a starting point as well, an ἀρχή [C] that would be
analogous to that of demonstrative sciences. The
differentiation is that in Ethics, this is contingent
and changeable, while in the sciences, it is eternal
and changeable.

Thus, the answer to the above question would be that
Aristotle does not have any unified account that
would explain how each kind of οὐδὲν, theoretical or
practical functions. Instead of doing that he raises
various issues, like that in 1142a23-30, or in 1143a35-
b5, which seem to contradict each other, but in fact,
show more evidently the absence of a unified account.
Most probably, he would have suggested an account that
draws the analogy between the passage in 1143a35-b5
and that of the Posterior Analytics B.19, and, at the
same time to differentiate the ethical function of
οὐδὲν from the theoretical one, since in Ethics, there
are other requirements. However, we also have to remember that
Aristotle writes in a dialectical way, that is, by raising questions and considering
possible positions. And this might justify his presentation of the account of οὐδέν.

Nevertheless, why would we consider the Posterior Ana-
lytics B.19, to be relevant here? This question is
also related to another problem discussed in 1143a35-
b5, that of the acquisition of the universal in
Ethics. In B.19, Aristotle provides us with a general

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framework of the acquisition of the universal principles, regardless of whether they are scientific, ethical or any other kind, although we have to admit that his main concern in that treatise is the scientific \( \phi \rho \chi \alpha i \). There, he discusses the "universal in general", and, here, he wants to apply it to Ethics, and that is our position that we wish to emphasize in this very passage.

What Aristotle accepts in 1143b4-5, is that "\( \varepsilon \chi \tau \eta \nu \chi \alpha \o t \iota \gamma \delta \rho \tau \alpha \chi \theta \o l \o u \) i\), that is, the apprehension of \( \chi \alpha \theta \o l \o u (i) \) is connected with the notion of the particulars, in that the particular is considered to be an instance of a universal. Concerning this issue, Woods (71) takes Aristotle to imply in those lines that the universal in Ethics is composed of particular cases. Woods says that to grasp what the good is in general is nothing more than the ability to produce correct identifications of the individual virtuous actions that constitute happiness. In fact, he argues this because of the problem of the roles of \( \nu o \delta \zeta \), and the apparent lack of a faculty to perceive the universal apart from the particulars.

So far so good. But, if we accept this interpretation then it is difficult to speak of a prescriptive moral theory that Aristotle tries to introduce in his
Ethics; everything that would constitute the requirements for moral behaviour. If we see universal in Ethics as a combination of particular instances, we then cannot speak of grasping the objective reality of a fundamental ethical truth, say of friendship. And there would be the question where exactly those particular instances should stop occurring so that we will be able to grasp the universal notion, say of a happy life. A process like this would be an infinite one.

On the other hand, DeMoss says that "ethical principles (practical universal starting points) from which the practically wise person can deliberate about what is to be done are in a sense fallout from the particulars; for the universals are inductive generalizations about what is to be done. In order to induce these universal starting points, you are required to see particular acts as the fulfilment of more general ends" (72).

So, with regard to the Aristotelian phrase in 1143a4-5, we would consider it to mean that the universal in Ethics derives from the particular cases. That is, we grasp the minor premise, the particular, by means of perception, and because, perception is of the universal, we, in fact, grasp the instantiation of a
specific universal, its instantiated form. So, the particular instance that we grasp is not just a particular deprived of its universal form, but an instantiated universal. And these particular instances are further used as particular judgements to which the major premises apply.

And it is very significant that although Aristotle contrasts the two roles of νόθς in this passage, concerning the way they function, with regard to the universal he says: "ἔχετεν καθ' ἐκκαστα τὰ καθόλου". This phrase shows that even if Aristotle is linking νόθς with particulars, he has the universal in mind. The καθ' ἐκκαστα here are the ἀρξαί[A] from which we derive the ἀρξαί[B] through a process that considers them to be the starting-points in our developing ethical reasoning, and by means of induction we grasp the universal ethical ἀρξαί[C]; we achieve full understanding of the ethical ἀρξαί.

But then, why does he seem to confine νόθς in Ethics to particulars? Because, of the role of understanding of particulars in ethical development, we can learn moral ἀρξαί by observing particular instances. The moral agent must have particular cases to which he/she can apply ethical judgements, which also happen to be generalizations from particular evalua-
Indeed, though this is a point that Aristotle does not actually assert anywhere—he/she can test the validity of those ethical evaluations, whenever he/she employs practical syllogisms for the performance of a certain action. In this way, the moral agent can see whether these evaluations are justifiable, and possess some kind of truth, or even fundamental truth, hence adjust his/her moral behaviour according to the results of his validity-test. He/she can test his/her own character; and his/her ethical knowledge.

Of course, one would ask: how can we simultaneously deliberate about what to do, using a universal premise about the end as a starting-point[C], and test the validity of that premise? We would answer that we can, in the case of a conclusion that it is impossible to follow, and which shows the falsity of the premise; the possibility of doing something to achieve an ethical end is not the only criterion of the validity of that end, but it is, at least, one of the criteria. So, if the conclusion orders to jump into the river in order to save the drowning man, and the conditions of weather are such that any attempt would be extremely dangerous, it is not possible to follow what it orders. Saving drowning people is indeed a way of being courageous, of learning what the ἀρχη[B], or even
the ἀρχή[...] is; it is a criterion of the validity of that end, but requires further criteria in order to validate the truth of this ethical end.

Now, does Aristotle give us any resolution concerning the sort of νόος that plays the protagonistic role in his Ethics? Again, despite the fact that he does not have any unified account stating that there is νόος of ethical as well of theoretical ἀρχαί, and that both kinds of νόος grasp the ἀρχαί by means of perception and induction, he does refer to the sort of νόος that he regards as the faculty that acts as an ethical perception, and relates to the νοῦν ἔχειν at 1143a26-27 (73).

In this way, Aristotle identifies νόος with αἴσθησις, in the sense that the φρόνιμος has αἴσθησις, and by means of this νόος apprehends the ultimate particulars. In fact, we would consider φρόνησις to be in close connection with νοῦς and αἴσθησις. The ἔσχατα that φρόνησις grasps as we are informed in 1142a24, are not like the ἔσχατα αἴσθησις perceived by the special senses, but rather perceptions analogous to those of the geometer. We would agree with Stewart (74) that the ἔσχατον here means both the particular and the goal of the κήτησις: the φρόνιμος like the geometer ζητεῖ till he/she reaches an ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ ἀναλόγει.
So, ἄνθρωπος by means of ἀνθρωπος is said to grasp the particulars, as we are informed in 1142a23–30. And in the following passage in 1143a26–b5 that we examined, we are also informed that ἀνθρωπος is that by means of which νοὸς apprehends the ultimate particulars. And that is why we call ἀνθρωπος intuitive perception, since it acts in the sense of νοὸν ἔχειν. In fact, the expression νοὸν ἔχειν deserves some attention. Eustratius (75) says: "τὸ δὲ θὸν προσέθηκε τῷ νοὸν ἔχειν, νοὸν ἔχειν θὸν εἰπὼν, δηλονότι μετὰ τὴν τὸν πραγμάτων πολυπείριαν ὁ περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ νοὸς τῇ ψυχῇ περιγένεται, καὶ θὴ νοὸν ἔχειν λέγεται ὡς πολλὰ ίδέαν καὶ παθῶν καὶ διὰ μεγαύρ χρόνου δεξάμενος". So, according to him, the expression "νοὸν ἔχειν" implies a state of νοὸς that has been achieved after a lot of experience and performance of moral actions, that is, a sort of νοὸς that is characterized with experience in perceiving the moral cases, performing moral actions throughout the passage of time.

Having achieved such a state of moral performance and habituation, νοὸς enables the moral agent, and particularly the ἄνθρωπος to be involved further with moral issues, and to exercise his/her capacities on perceiving the ultimate particulars: "διὸτι γὰρ, ἄνθρωπος, ἀνθρωπος (sc. α ἄνθρωπος) πάσαι τῶν ἐσχάτων εἰσὶ.
Moreover, a better explanation of those connections between νοῦς, φρόνησις and αξίωμα is given at 1143b5: "τούτων οὖν ξέχειν δει αξιωθειν, αὕτη δ' ἐστι νοῦς. In fact, the phrase "ξέχειν αξιωθειν" would remind us of the one above "νοῦν ξέχειν", hence showing even more the interrelation of νοῦς to αξιωθεις as exercised in the φρόνιμος, what we called "intuitive perception". So, concerning 1143b5, the commentator Eustratius says: "τάν καθ' ξάκασταν πραττομένων δει, φησιν, ξέχειν αξιωθειν, ἢγον λόγον, τόν ἐν πολιτεῖα πράττειν θέλοντα τά καλά καὶ τά δίκαια. αξιωθειν γάρ φησιν ἐνυπαθθα τήν γνώσιν τάν καθ' ξάκαστα, αὕτη δ' ἐστι νοῦς. τι το διά τούτων τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει δηλοῦμεν; τι δει πολυπειρότατον εἶναι τόν ἄνδρα τόν κατά τόν ὄρθον λόγον ἐν πόλει τι πράττειν βουλομένων, πολλά τε ἰδεῖν πολλά τε παθεῖν" (77). Here, again, Eustratius indicates that νοῦς is related to αξιωθεις, since it is that by means of which the moral agent grasps the ultimate particulars as a member of a political community. It is also characteristic that he stresses the idea of continuous striving for a morally virtuous life, in accordance with the ethical norms of a certain poli-
tical community, and that this continuous exercising of our intuitive perception reaches a state that only the πολυπειρότατος moral agent possesses.

Now, this faculty and capacity of intuitive perception is compared with and contrasted to the theoretical νοῦς, as we have seen above, and it is stressed by Eustratius, who indicates further that the ethical practical νοῦς differs from the theoretical one in terms of "ἐνέργεια" (activity), but is identical with it in terms of "οὐσία" (substance):

"ὁ αὐτὸς μὲν ἄν κατ' οὐσίαν τῇ θεωρητικῇ, διαφέρων δὲ κατ' ἐνέργειαν, συναγόμενος ἢμιν ἐν τῇ καθ' ἕκαστα γνώσεως καὶ ἀρχάς ἐαυτῷ συνιστῶν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, πολυπειρία καὶ γνώσει πολυτρόπῳ γενόμενος ἐν ἔξει τε καθίσταται καὶ φρόνησις καὶ λογισμὸς ἥ νοῦς πρακτικὸς ὀνομάζεται" (78).

Stewart (79), commenting on 1143b5, suggests that the practical νοῦς is here presented as "a sensibility to certain particular impressions, and the cumulative effect of such particular impressions is a certain bent of character...the objects from which the impressions are received". In other words, he sees νοῦς as a faculty and capacity that grasps the objects, retains its impressions on the faculty of φαντασία and works on its final acquisition, a process that
would remind us of the Posterior Analytics B.19, together with the fact that νόθς in 1143b5 is identified with the αὔσθησις of the bodily senses, which involves a perception of the καθόλου(ι)(as in B.19 100a16).

In fact, Aristotle himself goes on to explain even more what he meant in 1143b5, in the following lines at 1143b6-14, and 1144b10-12, where νόθς is presented as a sort of an "eye of the soul", pointing out that it cannot see without excellence of character:

"σημειον δ' ήτι καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις οἴδομεθα ἀκολούθειν, καὶ ήδε ἡ ἡλικία νοθίν ἔχει καὶ γνώμην, ὡς τῆς φύσεως αἰτίας υύθης" (1143b7-9), and "ἥστε δεῖ προσέχειν τὸν ἐμπειρῶν καὶ πρεσβυτέρων ἡ φρονιμῶν ταῖς ἀναποδείκτοις φάσεσι καὶ δόξαις σὼς ἂν ἰστὸν τῶν ἀποδείκτεων. διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας θύμα ἑρείσιν ὀρθάς" (b11-14), and even more in "πλὴν τοσοῦτον ἐσθεν ὀράσθει, ὦτι ὡσπερ σάματι ἵσχυρῷ ἄγνω θεώς κινούμενης συμβαίνει σφάλλεσθαι ἵσχυρὸς διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν θεῖν, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταθα" (Z.13, 1144b10-12) (80).

What all of these passages denote, is the existence of a faculty-and-capacity of νόθς that acts as a moral vision, and which reaches its most perfect and complete state of exercising its capacity, when the moral agent has reached a chronological stage that...
realizes his/her ability to grasp ultimate particulars, perform virtuous actions and generally plan his/her life in terms of ethical understanding and of the manifestation of this understanding. So, it is like a moral vision trained by experience that enables the moral agent to grasp the particular instances of ethical ἄρχαί, and acquire the universal ethical concepts/ἄρχαί by means of induction. Or as Eustratius says: "καὶ τοῦτο ἔστι ὁ φασίν ὅμως λαμβάνει τὸν ἐν ἡμῖν λόγον ἐξ ἀρχῶν ἐπιγίγνομενον, συνεισταμένων ἐκ τῶν καθ’ ἑκαστὰ καὶ καθολικὴν θεωρίαν λαμβανομένων", and, "ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ἐμπειρίας, ἤσσον ὑπὸ τῆς πολυπειρίας καὶ τριβής ἐν τοῖς καθ’ ἑκαστὰ, ὅμως ἐκτῆσαντο τῇ τευχῇ, ἤσσον νοῦν διορατικὸν τὸν ἀρχῶν, τοῖς τῶν προτάσεων ἐκ πολλῶν τῶν πραττομένων καθ’ καθ’ ἑκαστὰ ποριζόμεθα, καὶ ὅρομεν ἐξ αὐτῶν τὰ ἀποθεομένα" (81).

By the notion of vision that Aristotle ascribes to the practical νοῦς, he wants to say that the φρόνιμος ὁ ὃς what is really good for him/her, in the same way that the person who has power (or sense) of sight can see where he/she is moving to, or even plan his/her future ethical activities. This notion of vision that is attributed to the soul is concerned with the natural capacity to discern the good and virtuous action;
a capacity that is developed further by means of habituation to virtuous actions (Z.12,1144a29-31).

Of course, we have to distinguish the capacity for moral vision from its development to ἀρετή, since the former is pre-natal, or innate, whereas the latter is post-natal: "ἡ δὲ τοῦ τέλους ἔφεσις οὐκ αὐθαίρετος, ἀλλὰ φέοναι δεῖ ποιητὴν ἐκονταὶ, ὃ κρίνει καὶ τὸ καὶ ἀληθεύειν ἁγαθὸν αἴρησται, καὶ ἔστιν εὐφύς ὃ τοῦτο καλὸς πέφυκεν. τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον, καὶ ὃ παρέτερου μὴ ὅν τε λαβεῖν μηδὲ μαθεῖν, ἀλλὰ ὅν ἔστω τοὐστον ἔξει, καὶ τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ καλὸς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ἡ τελεία καὶ ἀληθεία ἄν εἶ ἐὑφία" (82).

What we mean by pre-natal, is not that it is a pre-existent capacity, but that it is a natural ready-made capacity to discern the good and the vicious, since the latter is also a distortion of our moral vision; voluntary in the same way that good is (Γ.5,1114b16-21). So, the moral agent must by nature have a sort of inborn capacity and its natural character determines his/her later condition. Thus, there is a contrast between the ready-made natural capacity of moral vision and its consequent development to ἀρετή. As Aristotle points out: "ἡ δ' ἔφεσις τῆς ἑμματί τοῦτο γίνεται τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς" (1144a29-31).

Thus, it is up to us whether we guide our natural en-
dowment of our moral "eye" towards a conception of the good end in accordance with truth or towards a certain vice, depending on how we commit ourselves to certain virtues or vices, hence becoming good or bad accordingly. Irwin (83) in his commentary also points out that until someone is virtuous he has only an aptitude for intelligence (translating ἐρωτήμα), not intelligence itself. However, it is difficult to say that only a virtuous person is intelligent, because there are many vicious people that are intelligent too. Δεινότης and Ἐρωτήμα do not necessarily go together.

So, a person is endowed with the capacity of moral vision, by means of which he/she can discern the ethical ends and deliberate over their achievement, but it is not until he/she is actually becoming virtuous that he/she has really developed his/her moral cognition (ἐρωτήμα). And only by means of it, can he/she be said to be fully virtuous. Thus, Aristotle uses the "ἡμα τῆς ψυχῆς" in order to express this capacity of νοώς as faculty of the soul to discern the ethical end. And this continually improving discernment of the ethical end is accompanied by the development of good habits so that the moral agent can reach the ultimate happiness (εὐδαιμονία).
Furthermore, the idea of a moral vision is also encountered in Alexander of Aphrodisias, in his *Ethical Problems* (84), where he refers to it as a capacity that is responsible for the acquisition of our ethical conceptual knowledge. In fact, Alexander's concern is with moral responsibility, and with the problem that lack of such an "eye" could mean one was not responsible for one's behaviour. His solution is that everyone was not corrupted has this "eye". And this reminds us of the passage in 1114a5-15, where it is argued that even though nature by means of this moral vision makes the ethical end appear, it is up to the person that exercise this capacity in order to achieve the appropriate moral end (85). That is, the acquisition of virtues or vices is voluntary and dependent on us as well.

The literature (86) on the issue of the acquisition of the ethical ἀρετή, has been concerned with the issue of the formation of the ethical virtues, and, generally the development of character, providing us with excellent accounts of the Aristotelian views. However, little specific reference has been made to the acquisition of the ethical concepts themselves, as differentiated from the acquisition of the ethical
virtues. Also, most of the interpretations of the Aristotelian Ethics—and its interaction with the Politics—have regarded Aristotle as a clear empiricist (or observationist), a point that we would only accept up to a certain extent.

We are well aware of the fact that Aristotle has not made any explicit reference to the issue of the acquisition of the moral concepts, but his discussion of the formation of principles and that of the ethical function of νοῦς, would help us with our reconstruction of his assumptions. The reconstruction will rest its weight partly on the ethical treatises of the Nicomachean and the Eudemian Ethics, together with the Politics, and partly, on the epistemological treatises that we have examined in the previous chapter.

So, the position we would take, is that the acquisition of the ethical concepts as part of ethical reasoning is analogous to the acquisition of concepts as part of reasoning in the theoretical sciences, as encountered in the Posterior Analytics B.19. But, let us see in what way that analogy takes place.

(a). Perceiving the ἕνδοξα.
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(i) And we start with the point of analogy in terms
of άμαι (perception). That is, the ethical άρχαι are grasped by means of perception; by perceiving the particular moral actions performed by people, or experiencing one's own performance of a moral action or a moral discussion. It would be like observing the ethical άειν tráchς(87), which act as ethical percepts imprinted in our minds, hence producing ethical images (NE A.13,1102b8-11), from which the ethical νοηματα are later formed.

By speaking of ethical άειν tráchς, we mean the άντοξα, that is the common beliefs, concerning ethical issues and/or ethical νοηματα which are shared by the moral agents(88). In his Topics(89), Aristotle defines άντοξα as the common beliefs that are opined by most people or the wise men. Similarly, close to this notion is that of λεγόμενα, since άντοξα are common beliefs which are considered to be descriptions of moral actions(90).

After all, what is a λεγόμενον might be either a common belief or an established form of language(91). So, what is said, is perceived and it functions as an ethical Δροχή[9A]. That is, the άντοξα is analogous to what is better known to us, what is closer to perception(92), and from what is perceived we move to what is explanatory by means of induction(93).
In EE A.5, 1216b26-35, Aristotle indicates what the aim of ethical enquiry must be. In particular, in b26-28, he says: "πειραστεύον δὲ περὶ πάντων τούτων ζητεῖν τὴν πίστιν διὰ τῶν λόγων, μαρτυρίοις καὶ παραδείγμασι χρόμενον τοῖς φαινομένοις" (we have to try to seek conviction through the arguments, using τὰ φαινόμενα or ἐνδοξον) as pieces of evidence and examples). Here, Aristotle discusses the notion of dialectical argument and its contribution to ethical development. We would think that the role of dialectical argument in ethical development is connected with moral education, to the extent that moral discussion reinforces the idea of living in accordance with ethical norms, and sharpens one's intuitive perception by being a good ethical verbal exercise.

In addition, dialectical method has for its goal the arrival at truth. As Aristotle points out in EE 1216b 30-35: "ἐξεῖ γὰρ ἔκαστος οἶκεῖον τι πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἐξ δὲν ἀναγκαίον δεικνύοντας πῶς περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ἀληθῶς μὲν λεγομένον οὖ σφάζες δὲ, προσοθείν έσται καὶ τὸ σφάζες, μεταλαμβάνοντας ἄντος τὰ γνωριμάτερα τῶν εἰσθότων λέγεσθαι συγκεκριμένως". That is, each person seeks for truth through the arguments, starting from the φαινόμενα that possess an element of truth, and, then, he/she proceeds into the attainment of
But, in order to start from what is better known to us, and to proceed to what is better known to truth, we need the method of induction.

However, how can we reconcile the previous statement with what Aristotle says in the *Topics* A.1-2, and particularly, in 100a27-100b26, where he makes a sharp distinction between principles of demonstration, which are known through themselves, and the putative ones that are accepted by most people, the former applying to the scientific method and the latter to the dialectic method? Our answer is related to the function of dialectic, which is (i) to find supporting arguments already grasped inductively, (ii) to check the validity of the *ενσια*, even by providing arguments against them, (iii) to seek for the universal truth, a task that necessarily employs perception and induction (95).

Thus, it may be true that scientific method starts from experience or an item of experience, according to the *Posterior Analytics* B.19, and an item of experience need not be an *ενσια* (96), but it is also true that in ethical inquiry, the dialectical method, starts from induction and perception—since, the arguments are already grasped inductively—and ends up in induction—since, in order to grasp a universal ethical principle, induction and perception are needed.
In fact, we need to make a clear-cut distinction between the two methods of induction and dialectic. For Aristotle, induction and dialectic are two different stories, but although he has a clear-cut position on induction (as we have seen in the Posterior Analytics B.19), he does not have one for dialectic. DeMoss argues that induction may be one type of dialectic, but that the dialectical arguments employed in the Nicomachean Ethics itself would not be a way of acquiring ethical ends as a part of one's character (97). And, here, we should also point out Bolton's position who says (98) that it is wrong to suppose that the recommended method in Aristotle's Physics is dialectic, since dialectic is not based on a process starting from what is most knowable to us, to what is more intelligible by nature. And there is no Aristotelian discussion that would justify that dialectical reasoning or any of its rules guarantee or make it likely that the conclusion of some reasoning is not only more intelligible by us, but also more intelligible by nature.

Thus, we would hold the view that indeed dialectic is not a sufficient method in our inquiry for the universal ethical truths for the same reasons that it is not an adequate method for the Physics. By that
we do not suggest that the method in Physics is not dialectic. In fact, the method is a dialectic, but it is not because it is a dialectic that is recommended. And here, we wish to make an application of Ethics to Nature; the same method of dialectic in the Physics applies to Ethics, but it is not an adequate one. Ethical development does involve dialectic, since it involves ethical discourse, and, most of all, a practical syllogism is by definition dialectical. However, it requires the further assistance of induction, which by means of perception, leads the moral agent to the acquisition of universal ethical truths.

(b). Induction
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(ii) If by means of perception we are able to grasp first the particular and the universal, in order to form a universal judgement, or grasp the universal truth of the ethical ἀρχαί, we would need the method of induction (99), which is the second point of our analogy between the acquisition of ethical ἀρχαί and that of those of demonstrative science. Of course, one might ask why it is necessary for a universal ethical ἀρχή to be grasped by means of induction. We would answer that in Aristotelian Epistemology, hence in his Ethics, we need to start from the ἴσαξάκα, and by means of induction and/or dialectical argument, we grasp
an ethical ἡγεμονία. Even more, the true universal judgement must be grasped by the intellect (νοῦς). And as it is implied in the NE 2.11, the function of the intellect, ethical or not, is always taken to employ induction for the attainment of the universal truth.

So, we need induction in order to grasp the universal principle, the only philosophically true principle, which is then used as a major premise in the ethical reasoning that precedes any moral action.

(c) Syllogisms/deductions.

(iii) And the third point in which the above analogy applies, is that of the syllogisms/deductions. Both theoretical and ethical reasoning are syllogistic/deductive in form, and syllogisms require ἡγεμονία, which are grasped by induction and perception. In this way, we grasp the ένδοξα, and at the same time the universal notion of an ethical percept, say "People ought to love and respect their parents".

Now, the above analogy can be further illustrated with some examples. So, in the case of an eclipse, a person X observes that phenomenon, or learns about other eclipses from other people and written records (stage 1), then X imprints the image of an eclipse in Ενδοξα.
that is, X remembers what an eclipse looks like (stage 2), X keeps observing eclipses at different times and places or the written records of eclipses (stage 3); X by means of induction grasps the general notion of an eclipse (stage 4), and, finally X grasps the scientific ἀρχή of what an eclipse is (stage 5). Of course, in order to grasp the universal truth of an eclipse, or the scientific principle of an eclipse, a person must be a physicist; he/she must possess well-qualified knowledge of this phenomenon. And then a person can perform a syllogism like:

(Major premise A): "When a body passes in front of another, the latter is obscured".

(Minor premise B): "The Moon passes in front of the Sun (as seen from the earth)".

(Conclusion C): "The sun is obscured (as seen from the earth).

Now, eclipse is the name we give to this occurrence; therefore, the syllogism gives its definition: "a solar eclipse is the obscuring of the Sun when the Moon passes in front of it (100).

Similarly to the above example, we could construct one in ethical reasoning: a person observes people speaking about courageous deeds, or he/she experiences such moral actions, either by seeing other people do-
ing them, or by himself/herself doing them. Then that person imprints the memory of those cases on his/her mind, and recalls every time he/she experiences such a case. And after the occurrence of many of them, then he/she becomes aware of a general notion of courage. He/she grasps the ἐνδοξον of courage, which as a mere ἐνδοξον is an ἄρχε[Α] and an ἄρχε[Β](but [Α] before becoming an ἄρχε[Β]), in the sense of being the starting-point of a practical syllogism. And by means of induction, he/she ends up grasping a general notion of courage being able now to perform syllogisms based on the commonly accepted moral beliefs which possess some kind of moral truth, but not necessarily objective ethical truth.

So, if an ἐνδοξον is something like: "A courageous man should save a fellow human being if he/she is drowning", then, the person that has grasped it, can now perform a syllogism of the type:

(Major premise A): "One ought to be courageous".

(Minor premise B): "It would be courageous for me to save that drowning person".

(Conclusion C): "I ought to save that drowning person".

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Stages of the acquisition of the ethical ἀρχαῖα/νοήματα.

So, having examined the above analogy, we can continue presenting the possible stages of the acquisition of ethical ἀρχαῖα/νοήματα:

Stage 1: (ἀρχηγοί). The moral agent perceives the ἀρχαῖα, the common beliefs that are the λέγομενα by people, the other moral agents of a political community, since we think of every moral agent as a separate individual who grasps the ἀρχαῖα, the common opinions that are established by all the moral agents of the πόλις. So, these ἀρχαῖα are the ἀρχαῖα[A] of the moral development of a moral agent, and ἀρχαῖα[B] (of course, they are [A] before they become [B] in the development of each individual), as the starting-points of ethical reasoning, and are based on conventional factors, like: culture, religion and general sociopolitical ideas of this community.

And the moral agent grasps those ἀρχαῖα by means of ἀρχηγοί, which as we have seen above, as an ethical perception possesses a judgemental role.

Moreover, Aristotle's account in Physics A.1, would be very relevant here. At this stage, the moral agent receives data that are most knowable to him/her, most obvious to him/her, as in Physics 184a13-21, we are told to start from what is most knowable to us, to
what is most knowable by nature. Now, because what is most obvious to us is also rather confused masses (συγκέχυμένον)(184a22-b14), we must advance from generalities to particulars, in the same way that a child calls all men "father", hence making an overgeneralization, in the beginning, and later, being able to distinguish each person.

So, in the same way the moral agent perceives various courageous actions, or ethical λέγομενα concerning courage, and regards them all as courageous actions, regardless as to whether they reflect true courage, or political courage (101). He/she has overgeneralized the notion of "courageous actions" and applies it to every manifestation of such an action. As Philoponus points out (102): "ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ οὖν καθόλου καὶ συγκέχυμένα σαφέστερα ἡμῖν καὶ πρότερα, ἀναγκαῖον δὲ τοιαύτα καὶ ἑν τοῖς περὶ τῶν ἄρχων λόγοι ἐκ τῶν συγκεχυμένων τε καὶ κοινοτέρων, ἡμῖν δὲ σαφεστέρων, ἀρξάσθαι.

So, at this stage we are aware only of the καθόλου or the συγκεχυμένον, we are not able to distinguish whether a case of a friendship between a bank manager and a businessman is a true or a utilitarian friendship. The moral agent apprehends the universal (i), perceived as something that is still συγκεχυμένον. However, it must be indicated that the moral
agent has not grasped the universal yet, since this one not only applies to a different degree in the process of our understanding, but also it reflects a different level of ethical understanding, hence it is different in content.

Stage 2: (Mnēmē). Once the moral agent has perceived the ἐνδοξα, then he/she imprints those on ἄνθρωπικα and he/she can remember those every time the agent experiences them. At this stage, the moral agent has formed the mental image of a moral ἐνδοξα.

Stage 3: (Ενθυμός)(NE A.7, 1098b4-5). In Ethics, we will be using the term ἐνθυμός as an equivalent for "ζυγείρια" in Aristotle's general Epistemology.

At that stage, the moral agent becomes familiar with the various Ἴχθυμενα and actions that he/she experiences or performs himself/herself. In other words, the moral agent becomes habituated to various ethical ἐνδοξα, which are further developed by means of experience and habituation, and contributing more to the development of his character (B.1, 1103a15ff).

Stage 4: (Στρέψη[B]): At this stage, the person has now come to possess ethical knowledge and can perform ethical practical syllogisms concerning ethical
cases. In other words the moral agent has acquired ethical ἀρχή[B] as starting-points of ethical reasoning, and not as being the absolute ethical ἀρχή[C]. At this stage, he/she possesses some understanding of what (for example) ἰλίξα is, but he/she cannot speak of the interrelations of the various kinds of ἰλίξα, until he/she has understood what true friendship is. It is also the stage, at which, he/she can proceed into derivation and justification of further applications of an ethical ἀρχή/νόημα; he/she can enrich his/her ethical knowledge with new ethical vocabulary. The moral agent may acquire the derivative meanings, or derivative applications of an ethical ἀρχή/νόημα, say that of ἰλίξα, that is, that there is a kind of "ἰλίξα διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον", or another kind of "ἰλίξα διὰ τὸ ἔδω", but, he/she cannot work out the interrelations the various applications of ἰλίξα, yet. At this stage, he/she understands what ἰλίξα as ἀρχῆ[B] is (103). What the moral agent acquires is different in content both from ἀρχή[B] and from ἀρχή[C].

Stage 5: (ἀρχή [C]). At this stage, the moral agent acquires full understanding of the primary meaning of an ethical ἀρχή/νόημα. He/she realizes that true ἰλίξα, or true ἀνδρεία are the primary meanings of the ethical concepts: ἰλίξα and ἀνδρεία respectively,
and can now make the interrelations between the primary meaning and the other derivative meanings, and/or derivative applications. At this stage, the moral agent has acquired $\alpha\rho\chi\eta[C]$, as the true starting-point of reasoning, and this is an ethical axiom, analogous to the scientific axioms, in that they are both the true starting-points of reasoning.

However, there is a point to be clarified, and that is concerned with the following distinction: (a) $\alpha\rho\chi\alpha\iota[C]$ as differentiated from $\alpha\rho\chi\alpha\iota[B]$ by what they are, and (b) $\alpha\rho\chi\alpha\iota[C]$ as differentiated from $\alpha\rho\chi\alpha\iota[B]$ by our degree of understanding of them. According to (a) $\alpha\rho\chi\alpha\iota[C]$ are differentiated from $\alpha\rho\chi\alpha\iota[B]$, in the sciences in general, in that $[C]$ are the axioms, and the like, as opposed to what derives from them ($[B]$).

Similarly, in Ethics, the ethical axioms, $\alpha\rho\chi\alpha\iota[C]$ are the true starting-points as opposed to the apparent good ($\alpha\rho\chi\alpha\iota[B]$). Also noteworthy is what Aristotle says in 1151a15-17: “Nothing else makes a moral character as the $\alpha\rho\chi\eta$ is by nature and by habit, in that it is by nature to be held, in the same manner as the mathematical sciences, as hypotheses", that is, wickedness destroys the $\alpha\rho\chi\eta[B]$, or makes what is actually bad appear to be good, as an $\alpha\rho\chi\eta[B]$. Thus, the $\alpha\rho\chi\alpha\iota[C]$ are, first of all, differentiated from the $\alpha\rho\chi\alpha\iota[B]$ in terms of their content.
Furthermore, we ought to differentiate ἀρχαί[C] from ἀρχαί[B], also in terms of how we apprehend them. And, how this would work in Ethics. We have to emphasize that what we apprehend in stage 1, the συγγενεμένον ξύνοξον, is different from what we come to know in stage 4, as an instilled universal(i) - in its primary form -, and from what we come to know at stage 5, as the universal(iv).

In stage 5, we grasp ἀρχαί[C] as the universal (粢), as the most fundamental knowledge, both in terms of its content and in terms of our understanding of it. The moral agent has reached a higher level of understanding of what reflects the objective reality of a certain universal ethical truth, say of ἀνάρτεια. That is, at this stage, the moral agent has fully acquired καθόλου(iv), as a fundamental ethical truth, which is to καθόλου(i) as ἀρχη[θ] is to ἀρχη[B]. And it is a higher universal in that it reflects the fundamental truth of an ethical ἀρχη/νόμῳ.

Furthermore, it is significant to say that at this stage, the moral agent has grasped the universal ethical truth of the ethical ἀρχη/νόμῳ, but it does not mean that he/she stops there. If not to mention that not all the moral agents even reach this stage! So, once someone has realized the universal ethical truth
of ἀνέρεία, μεγαλοψυχία, φιλία, or ἡδονή, he/she is closer to a full understanding of human happiness, since being truly courageous, or being truly friendly contribute to the full understanding of the highest good, of reaching ultimate happiness, εὐδαιμονία, which would be the ultimate Aristotelian level of ethical understanding, and well-being.

Aristotle points out in NE Τ. 4, 1113a29-31: "ὁ σπουδάιος γὰρ ἔχει τις ὀρθῶς, καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις τάληθες αὐτῷ φαίνεται, καθ’ ἑκάστην γὰρ ἢξιν ἴδια ἔστι καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα, καὶ διαφέρει πλείστον ἴσως ὁ σπουδάιος τῷ τάληθες ἐν ἑκάστοις δράν, ἔσπερ κανὸν καὶ μέτρον αὐτὸν ἔχει" (For the excellent person judges each sort of thing correctly, and in each case what is true appears to him. For each state [of character] has its own special [view of] what is fine and pleasant, and presumably the excellent person is far superior because he sees what is true in each case, being a sort of standard and measure of what is fine and pleasant) (105). That is, the person who reaches understanding of the ethical truth is the σπουδάιος, the one who is able to discern the truth in everything. And the σπουδάιος is the one who understands the truth in everything, because he/she has understood the ultimate axiom in Ethics, that of εὐδαιμονία. If in Posterior Analytics.
B.19, we have seen how the scientist passes from the knowledge of the specific universal to the knowledge of the more general one. Of course, in Ethics, the story is not just this, since there is a whole movement from subjective to objective truths as well. In Ethics, we seek to understand the fundamental, universal and objective ethical truths.

Thus, in stage 5, the moral agent acquires the $\delta\rho\chi\alpha\iota[C]$, not only as an advanced understanding of [B] for, then, they would be a sub-class of [B], but they are not. They are different from [B] both in terms of their content; they are fundamental ethical axioms, the higher universal, and in terms of our understanding of them: we know them in a more advanced, or fundamental way that $\delta\rho\chi\alpha\iota[B]$, once we know them at all, as a consequence of their content. Thus, at stage 5, the $\sigma\pi\omicron\sigma\alpha\iota\omicron\varsigma$ acquires $\delta\rho\chi\alpha\iota[C]$, the true starting-points of reasoning, which are universals (iv), as fundamental ethical truths, and at the same time, he/she knows them, he/she possesses the most fundamental understanding of them.

Now, considering the above stages, we also need to take into account the involvement of three factors: (a) an innate endowment for the acquisition of ethical $\delta\rho\chi\alpha\iota$ and virtues (NE B.1, 1103a24-27), (b) the ethical
function of νοος, and, (c) sociopolitical influences from religion, education and culture (see below).

So, in order to give a synoptic account of the similarities and differences between the acquisition of the ἄρχαι of demonstrative science and that of the Ethics, the similarities are:

(a) there exists an innate endowment of a capacity for the acquisition of the ἄρχαι, and of the virtues in Ethics (NE 1103a24-25).

(b) the process of the acquisition consists of similar stages.

(c) there is also a starting point of type [B] in Ethics (say habit), which is analogous to the stage 4 of the Posterior Analytics B.19, the universals that are not yet ἄρχαι [C], in that it is the starting-point of the reasoning of those still developing their ethical understanding, as scientists also develop understanding. And in its developed form, as ethical (ἄρχη [C]), is analogous to the axioms of the sciences, in that they are the true starting-points of our reasoning.

(d) the notion of ἀλήθης ἴς in Ethics as ethical perception, is analogous to that of the sciences, in the way it apprehends the ἴδιος ἴς.

(e) We employ syllogistic/deductive forms both for
demonstrations and for deliberations, as part of the process of the acquisition of axioms [B] and [C], and ethical \( \rho\chi\alpha\iota \) [B] and ethical axioms [C].

Now, concerning the differences:

(a) In Ethics, our understanding of the starting-points [C], depends on our actions and habits, whereas, in the sciences are not the cause of the processes and activities, in Nature, and we do not have to be virtuous in order to make scientific decisions (the point of our scientific experiments and their relevance or not to the well-being of humanity, is a different one). And it is because of our understanding of the \( \rho\chi\alpha\iota[C] \) that we can reach \( \theta\varepsilon\omega\rho\iota\alpha \) as the acme of human achievement (106).

(b) there is a moral action that takes place, after the end of our reasoning, and this action serves as a starting-point [D] (end of reasoning and beginning of action), whereas in the sciences, there is no \( \pi\rho\xi\varsigma\iota\varsigma \).

(c) the ethical function of \( \nu\omicron\omicron\omicron\varsigma \) concerning the acquisition of \( \rho\chi\alpha\iota[B] \) and [C], differs from that of the sciences we have also seen above. It is an intuitive perception that acts as a sort of a moral vision.

(f) Relation of ethical \( \rho\chi\alpha\iota \) to ethical \( \nu\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\alpha\tau\omicron \)

Now, a reasonable question is what the connection between the ethical \( \rho\chi\alpha\iota \) and the ethical \( \nu\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\alpha\tau\omicron \) is. In
in the previous chapter, we have accepted that every kind of ηονή σημαντική is a phonetic representation that carries semantic properties, as a symbol of a πάθημα τῆς ψυχῆς which is a likeness of a certain being. Similarly, names which are phonetic representations of the perceptible characteristics that actions have, refer to the mental representations or symbols of the affections of soul (τὰ νοηματα). Thus, we speak of the ethical νοηματα as παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς.

So, we start from what is familiar to us (τὰ γνώριμα) (NE A.4,1095b1-8), the ethical ξανόμενα which trigger the natural capacity that we possess, our intuitive perception, and our natural tendency to perform moral actions, so that αἰσθήσεις as intuitive perception plays an important role in the acquisition of those ethical νοηματα. The cognitive part of the soul is affected by the ethical percepts every time that it experiences them.

After triggering of the cognizing natural capacity, which could be thought of in terms of a conceptual reservoir, also natural (that is, ready-made to accommodate concepts), and by means of education and habituation to performing ethical actions, the moral agent develops his/her ethical vocabulary; he/she acquires basic and derivative meanings and appli-
cations that describe the ethical νοηματα, which in their turns are named by ethical words (what constitutes the vocabulary).

Now, if one would ask what sort of entities the ethical νοηματα are, we would answer that they are cognitive correspondents of the perceived πραξεις. So, if the νοηματα are concepts that accommodate the perceived realities which are expressed by means of ωνης σημαντικη, then the ξυλοξα by being ethical λεγομενα, hence ωναι σημαντικαι, should involve νοηματα. The νοηματα are involved with ξυλοξα by being the cognitive material (as concepts or combination of concepts: propositions) that constitute those beliefs, the correspondents of those being ωναι σημαντικαι. In natural language semantics, the ethical νοηματα constitute an underlying ethical knowledge that characterizes the internal state of every moral action, hence they characterize every ethical reasoning and emotion that is implied in such an action.

So, concerning the relation between the ethical ἁρχαι and the ethical νοηματα, the immediate answer that we give is that not all the ethical νοηματα are ethical ἁρχαι, but all ethical ἁρχαι are ethical νοηματα. We do not consider the ethical ἁρχαι to be a sub-class of the ethical νοηματα, since ethical ἁρχαι [B] and [C]
are only ethical νοηματα in that they correspond to certain qualities of πραξεις. And the ethical axioms, the ethical  ἀρχαι[θ], acting as the true starting-points of ethical reasoning, are the proper understanding of the ethical qualities of actions, and, at the same time, they are propositions that express ethical requirements. And these propositions as assertions or denials are combinations of νοηματα(107). In terms of the process of the acquisition of the ethical νοηματα, we would think that we possess a νόημα once we have reached the fourth stage and it is actualized as ethical knowledge, once it is actually thought of, identified with the cognized case, in the case of Ethics, the moral actions. At the end of the chapter, we present a schematic representation of the acquisition of ethical ἀρχαι/νοηματα.

What we mean in this diagram Z, is that, at the first stage, the moral agent receives the ζνόως, as the immediate environmental stimuli; he/she has to start from the things that are most knowable to him/her and proceed to those which are clearer by nature. Then the moral agent keeps perceiving reoccurrences of ethical expressions and moral actions which are imprinted on his/her memory, until he/she reaches the point of being habituated to performing virtuous
actions. That habituation is guided by the factors of Nature, education and instructions (108), and, at this stage, the person has formed a habit, an ὑπέρ-χη[β], analogous to that of the sciences, possessing still an imperfect understanding of the end.

Meanwhile, all this cognitive-ethical development employs αγάθησις, μνήμη, φαντασία and νοῦς in its ethical function, as a moral vision. In fact, we would also add—and since Aristotle does not make the distinction between Language and Thought and Reality)—that in the cognitive faculties, there is also included a language faculty in which, we suppose that a conceptual reservoir exists. In that, we store our initial ethical knowledge; we would think of it as an initial concept of good. And after some time of maturation has passed, the moral agent reaches the stage 4 of a more developed state of ethical knowledge. At this stage, he/she has a more developed ethical understanding, but it is only at stage 5, that he/she has acquired the ethical axioms, and can give their definitions, or see the interrelations between the various meanings that describe them. He/she has grasped the universal ethical truth, and every time he/she cognizes an ethical case, he/she actualizes it as a developed ethical understanding.
Acquisition of \( \text{ἀρετή} \)

1/ By nature or taught by education (or both)?

Our suggestions of the acquisition of the ethical \( \text{ἀρχαί/νοηματα} \) can be justified further by the analysis of the Aristotelian doctrine of the development of character. In fact, although Aristotle was not very explicit concerning the formation of the ethical concepts, he has provided us with a very good account of the acquisition of the moral virtues, or, the development of character. He also gives an answer to the problem asked by Plato in his \textit{Meno} (109), of whether virtue can be taught, or, it is acquired by practice, or, whether it is innate, and so not acquired at all.

Aristotle gives the answer to the above question in his Ethics, and not in one passage only, but in scattered ones, which, however, contribute to a whole. As we have seen, in NE A.4 he says that there is an open question (NE 1095a31-33), whether we start from the \( \text{ἀρχαί[C]} \), and the answer is that we do not. According to his answer in 1095b2-4, we start from what we know, what is familiar to us, that is, from a good moral habit (110). A person must possess some noble initial qualities, in order to become good, for our judgements are influenced by our habits (1143b3).
In the light of what has already been argued concerning the process of acquisition of ethical concepts, there is an implicit reference in A.4 to the initial notions that we possess, the ἐνδοξα that we have about what actions are good, noble, just or bad; and this knowledge is not available to anyone but only to those who had a good upbringing(111). We speak of such a knowledge, because Aristotle presupposes its existence for the further development of the person's character.

But, how do these ἐνδοξα end up as being virtues, and a person good, noble and just? In his second book, he states that virtue does not exist ἑφόσον in us, but develops by means of habituation(112). And he goes on to say that the formation of the ethical virtues is not like that of the senses, which we already possess and use and do not acquire by using them, but in the case of the ethical virtues, we acquire them by performing actions that fulfill the conditions for the virtues to be formed.

For Aristotle, one cannot be virtuous—in the sense of acting on rational judgement of what is good—until you know what is good; but one cannot know what is good (possess full understanding of the concept) unless he/she has experienced such actions, has per-
formed good actions, and has tested the validity of the judgements preceding those actions, which will lead him to a virtuous life. So, good behaviour and habituation in good moral actions (that presuppose desire and deliberation) is what decides the formation of a virtuous character, while, at the same time, one's character guides his/her behaviour.

Also, a trait of character is a disposition with respect to a feeling (113), an emotion, since, by performing certain actions, we also expose ourselves to certain pleasures. By practising noble actions, we develop the sort of character that means we find them pleasurable; then we are virtuous. And, since passions are expressions of a man's ἡθος (114), this involves a state of a rational desire, since psychic pursuit and avoidance involve the faculty of desire, while assertion or denial involve the faculty of νοτος. That is why Aristotle speaks of ὀρεξις διανοητική and διάνοια ὀρεξική. So, the psychic faculties that determine the formation of the ethical virtues are: desire, by means of which we are affected so that the particular virtuous ethical action causes us pleasure (115).

2/. Relation of virtue to emotion.

But let us pursue further the relation between virtue
emotion and reason. By emotion, Aristotle refers to all the kinds of feelings that are forms of pleasure or pain (116). In the *Eudemian Ethics* (117), he states that ethical virtue is a διάθεσις (disposition) of a certain sort that is formed by the most virtuous movements (κινήσεις) of the soul, which yield the best Εψιγα and πάθη, while he calls παθητικοί (passive) the persons that are the receivers of the πάθος, those who are being acted upon (118). Similarly, in NE Γ.1, Aristotle makes clear that the activities for which virtues are dispositions are of two kinds, actions and emotions, πράξεις καὶ πάθη (119).

On the other hand, the moral virtues should not be identified with the passions (Β.5, 1105b28-30), since we are not regarded as good or bad with respect to the passions, but according to our virtues or vices. The passions are the elements that move us to practical reasoning ἀπροσκρέτως, while we are said to be virtuous or vicious in relation to our wills and choices, from which dispositions result (1106a1-5). So, ethical virtue is not a passion, but it may presuppose the existence of a passion, since a moral action involves the existence of a passion (120), for a person tends to pursue the pleasant as something good, while he/she tends to avoid the unpleasant as something
Thus, for Aristotle there is a hidden potentiality inside the human being that makes it disposed to be acted upon, and to be moved by a certain emotion. So, to say that alcohol is burnable is to say that under the appropriate circumstances it can be set on fire, it possesses the potentiality of being set on fire (121). Similarly (122), we suppose that a person possesses the potentiality of being acted upon by emotions (or passions), like anger, fear, jealousy, friendship, hatred (B.5, 1105b21-23), and when the appropriate situation is given, the relevant emotion is activated and actualized. After all, one cannot imagine the moral agent not being prompted by emotions, since those are the ones that move him/her towards a certain action, which is finally committed after a process of deliberation and practical choice takes place.

Moreover, it is only the practical emotions that contribute to the acquisition of an ethical virtue, for if a moral agent is under the emotion of fear or anger (123), then we would consider this to be the emotion-motive, since it could move him/her to perform a courageous action, hence eventually coming to be disposed (διάκεισθαι) to the ethical virtue of ἀνε-
But the emotions are relevant to virtue, not just because they initiate action, but even more because they reveal our dispositions.

So, a point that we suggest for Aristotle, is that passion is to a large extent what motivates action. Aristotle recognizes that many are motivated by pleasure or pain to perform a moral action, although it is not the same for all of them; others are motivated more, some less. After all, in \( \Gamma,3,1112b31-32 \), he says that man is the principle of the moral actions, and the moral agent as a human being, possesses feelings that prompt him/her to pursue or avoid something.

Consequently, the Aristotelian ethical virtue should be considered to be acquired by means of habituation to the relevant moral actions. According the moral agent establishes a moral goal in his/her life, and performs actions that pursue that goal. So, both passion and reason are responsible for the attainment of that goal, which for the Aristotelian man should be virtuous.

And how does one become disposed to a certain ethical virtue? Is it only by means of habituation to the
performing of the relevant moral actions, or is something else also needed? Aristotle's answer to this question comes from the interaction of his Ethics with his Politics. In his *Nicomachean Ethics* I.9., he refers to the notion of education, and emphasizes its importance for the moral development of the young person. Education by means of teaching cultivates the qualities of the young moral agent, while habituation prepares the soul of the person as the soil is prepared in order to receive the seed:

"τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως ἡμῖν ἀλλὰ διὰ τινὰς θείας αἰτίας τοῖς ἀληθῶς εὐχέσι υπάρχει, ὡς λόγος καὶ ἡ διδακὴ μὴ ποτ' οὐκ ἐν ἰσχεῖ, ἀλλὰ δεῖ προδιειργάθαι τοῖς ἐκείς ἔχεις τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ ψυχὴν πρὸς τὸ καλὸς χαίρειν καὶ μισεῖν, ἔσπερ γην τὴν θρέψουσα τὸ σπέρμα" (126).

The importance of education is great, since the Aristotelian man cannot be fulfilled or become fully developed and self-sufficient (αὐτάρκης), unless he/she grows up within the social community (πόλις) and needs the requirements of political and moral growth, which would be thought to be nature, instruction, habit (127).

As Michael of Ephesus indicates (128):

"ἐσται δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἡθος ἐκ τῆς ἀρθῆς ἀγωγῆς. ἢρθος..."
δ'ἀξηθήναι χαλεπόν ἔστι τὸν μὴ ὑπὸ νόμοις ὀρθῶς ἔχουσι καὶ πολιτείᾳ τοιαύτη τραφέντα", and "ὅτι δὲ εἰ νόμους τετάχθαι προστάττοντας τὴν ἀγωγὴν εὐθὺς ἐκ βρέφους τὴν ἐπιτήδεια ποιήσωσαν τὰ ἄθη αὐτῶν μὴ ἀποχεραίνειν ἐν ταῖς τῶν ἰσίλων ἡδονᾶν ἀποτυχίαις", the importance of education within the political community, and the discipline instructed by means of the written laws. That is why he points out that the instructions given by laws should be taught to the children even when they are infants, so that they will be able to discern the virtuous route in life and not be deviated towards a hedonistic attitude of living. And only by means of education and instruction within the πόλις, the citizens can be virtuous and reach εὐδαιμονία: "ἐπεὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης καὶ πολιτικῆς σοφίας τὸ σκοπιμέτατον τέλος ἐστὶ γενέσθαι τοῦς πολίτας ἀγαθῶς καὶ εὐδαιμόνως ἦν, τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται ἐκ τοῦ τραφῆναι καὶ ἀναχθήναι καλῶς καὶ μὴ πράττειν ἰσίλον μηδὲν μὴ θ' ἐκόντα μὴ τ' ἄκοντα" (129).

In the Nicomachean Ethics we are told that we possess a natural capacity to be disposed to a certain moral virtue after some habituation and training. Habit refers mainly to physical and emotional training, hence in order for a person to develop certain capacities, a great amount of practice concerned with physical
and psychological activities is required. A person may carry seeds of the qualities of certain ethical virtues, but after some habituation through the appropriate actions will cultivate those to είσιν.

On the other hand, the notion of instruction aims at cultivating the tendencies of the person through a certain prescription, mainly guided by mental training and education, in order to cultivate the inner capacities and channel the activities of a person to the correct route. Particularly, in the context of Education, Aristotle is not concerned with philosopher-rulers in his Politics, as Plato is in the Republic, although, the magnanimous men (Pol. Γ, 13, 1283b37-1284a3, Δ, 11), ruling in the best regime may be said to resemble philosophers in many respects (130).

They are not, however, with the philosophers qua philosophers aiming at theoretical studies, but rather the most prominent men in evaluating persons, things and situations.

Moreover, the element of instruction provides the person with norms or criteria according to which it can adapt its moral actions, and activate them aiming at the formation of the appropriate excellences. So, the young person must be trained in a certain type of character, which corresponds to the demands of the
State upon the individual(131), and for that reason the education must be adapted to the constitution, since the laws are what it establishes as the most appropriate nurture and instruction, and also to the demands of its era.

In fact, this point would remind us of the cross-cultural similarities between the various political communities that widely differ from one another, and which would relate to the point of the alleged universality, in the sense of universal(iii). So, the various legal systems and moral education of widely differing communities are similar since human nature is everywhere the same and requires the same necessities in life, or shares similar problems. Everywhere people steal, commit crimes, or are deprived of important needs, and the legal system of every community tries to restore balance in a way that is similar everywhere in principle.

Now, all this process of nurture, and instruction should start even before the education by the πόλις takes place when the child is still part of the household and learns the traditions of the family so that they acquire the notion of obedience to the laws written or unwritten(132). In this way, the young person becomes habituated towards the most fundamental
ethical virtues of justice, goodness and friendship, derived from his/her initial steps towards the moral development within the πόλις, and the ones on which the other ethical virtues are based.

Furthermore, in 1180b3-7, Aristotle says: "Σπερ γάρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐνισχύει τά νόμιμα καὶ τὰ ἡθος, ὅτε καὶ ἐν οἰκίαις οἱ πατρικοί λόγοι καὶ τὰ ἡθος, καὶ ἔστι μᾶλλον ὅσα τὴν συγγενείαν καὶ τὰς εὐεργεσίας, προδότηκατο δὲ γὰρ στέργοντες καὶ εὔπεπτεις τῇ φύσει". By these words, he wants to emphasize the importance of education as it starts within the family circle, before the young person is entrusted to the instructions of the πόλις. As there are laws that prescribe the education of the young moral agent, hence his/her moral development, written or instructed by the legislators, in the same way, the paternal instructions are what prescribe the behaviour of the young agent within his/her family.

Actually, the phrases "ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐνισχύει τά νόμιμα καὶ τὰ ἡθος" and "ἐν ταῖς οἰκίαις οἱ πατρικοί λόγοι καὶ τὰ ἡθος", imply the existence of the ἐνδο-ξο(133), the common views that are the ethical perceptions that the young person receives, and apprehends, and finally understands, when by performing the appropriate moral reasoning he/she ends up doing the
virtuous moral actions. That is, the conventions of the city and the traditional habits of the family provide the young moral agent with the major premise of every moral judgement, which combined with the minor premise derived from a particular case, E.g., in the following syllogism:

(Major premise A): "People ought to nurse their parents when they are old".
(Minor premise B): "My parents are old".
(Conclusion C): "I ought to nurse my parents".

So, the child grasps the sociopolitical environmental data (the moral νόμος), and by means of intuitive perception and after a maturation process has taken place, it acquires the ethical νόματα. And, only after having performed virtuous actions, can we say that the child has been habituated to certain virtues, hence the adult is habituated to a virtuous life.

For these reasons, the πατρικοὶ λόγοι are very essential for the moral development of the young agent. After all, because of the close relation between the father and the child, the latter obeys and respects the former who happens to be both his/her generator and his/her εὐεργέτης. As Michael of Ephesus says (134) "πειθόμεθα οὖν τοῖς συγγενέσι καὶ εὐεργέσις ὡς ἄνθισσι ἡμᾶς, συγγενεσιάς δὲ πάντων ὁ πατήρ, ἀλλὰ καὶ
That is, according to Michael of Ephesus, the instructions prescribed by the political community are not enough for the moral development of the young person and should be reinforced by the paternal guidance. And this is not accidental, since as Aristotle says in 1180b7-8: "Ὣτι καὶ διαφέρουσιν αἱ καθ' ἔκκαστον παιδείας τῶν κοινῶν, ἃς περ ἐπιστρικής", each young person requires a different treatment in the same way that each patient is treated according to his/her needs.

By nature, all the moral agents have the tendency to become virtuous or vicious, and they also possess the appropriate faculty-and-capacity of moral vision that enables them to apprehend the ἔνδοξα, employ ethical reasonings and perform moral actions. However, beyond the education provided by the πόλις and which is in accordance with the universal and natural characteristics encountered in every moral agent, each person is a subject, and is characterized by certain idiosyn-
ematic elements, often of a hereditary origin. Thus, the paternal guidance is closer to him/her, and is in accordance with the special needs of him/her. We would think that what is implied in the texts of Aristotle and Michael, is that the parents possess better knowledge of the idiosyncracies of their children, hence they can adapt their instructions to the needs of the young agent.

That means, of course, that the instruction of the parents will not be tailor-made to satisfy the wishes of the young agent, but it will be tailor-made for him/her to help him/her with the special problems a child can have, and to teach him/her the requirements for virtuous ethical behaviour, which is acquired gradually and reaches the final stage during his/her adult years.

(ii). Politics H-0

In the seventh book of his Politics and particularly, in chapter 14 and 15, Aristotle discusses the question of "the end of the best life", and the practices by means of which the best life is to be realized (Pol. 1333a14-16). The young person is to be guided and ruled by the older ones, the former being the subjects and the latter being the rulers. In 1332a38-b10, as we have seen above, Aristotle has established the view
that there are three things that make people good, those being nature, habit and reason. First of all, one must be born a human being, a rational animal, so that one can have a certain character, both a body and a soul. And some qualities of the character are acquired by habit, and it is by habit that we become virtuous or vicious, in combination with reason, of course. So, the work of the legislator is to issue proper instruction and education that would determine the moulding of the young agents' character (135).

But, if nature, habit and instructions are the prerequisites and the necessary preconditions of the moral development, which are the stages that a young moral agent must undergo in terms of his/her education? After having discussed in chapter 16 of book Z, the regulations concerning marriage, procreation and generally the conditions of the well-being of the person, Aristotle goes on to state the stages of the education of the children. So, throughout chapter 17, he discusses those stages by starting from the period of infancy, when the children have only physical growth. He suggests that children up to the age of five are not to be exposed to "learning" (μαθησις) of any sort (1336a23-26).

During the years of puberty, the young moral agent
must have reached the stage of being "\( \dot{\alpha} \pi \alpha \theta \eta \zeta \)" (immune) to any kind of harm(1336b20-23), so that he/she can attend theatrical performances after the age of twenty one. That is, the young moral agent must first learn how to be habituated to certain passions that lead to virtuous actions, and also must tame the irrational desires. After having done this, and after having acquired certain skills like that of drawing or painting or playing a musical instrument, and having being habituated to "\( \lambda \omega \gamma \omega \varsigma \)" (reasoned speech), the young moral agent, will be able to attend performances of tragedy or comedy, comprehend the moral values they refer to, and achieve the "\( \chi \dot{\theta} \omega \rho \sigma \iota \varsigma \)". After all, even if Aristotle must have thought of drama as part of entertainment and leisure, we cannot imagine his theory of education to be devoid of the importance of the tragic \( \chi \dot{\theta} \omega \rho \sigma \iota \varsigma \) in the ethical and political development of the young moral agent of the fourth century.

In fact, the above point of the tragic influence on the young moral agents, is also connected with the parallel existing between the ethical and the cognitive development of the young people. It is commonly accepted(136) that the notion of "\( \dot{\alpha} \mu \rho \alpha \tau \iota \alpha \)" (error) applies to mental and not to ethical error.

However, we would think that the author of such
ethical treatises that stress the importance of the intuitive perception (as a sort of a moral vision) in the ethical conceptual development of a young moral agent, could not have failed to see that the tragic error, is also an ethical one. Oidipous might be excused when he was told that "το φλός τα ζε δεια τον τε νοσιν τα ζεμπατ'ει", in the Oidipous Tyrannos tragedy, for he acted in complete ignorance, but still there is a metaphorical ethical blindness that characterizes his deeds. What we mean is that his ignorance of the particular facts is a metaphor for ethical blindness, in that even though he was ignorant, he could have used his ethical perception to discern the problems before causing enough trouble to his own family. And this, in fact, shows lack of ethical understanding, perhaps, caused by his thirst for power.

Thus, we would think that throughout the years of διαφη, λόγος and θος, for the preparation of the moral agent to be habituated to proper actions, hence virtues later, the Aristotelian account of ethical development should be considered to be a gradual one. The education starts from the physical development and then is concerned with an ethical-conceptual one which is connected with the acquisition of virtues.
The Aristotelian young moral agent learns how to apprehend the ἔνδοξα presented either as παιδικοί λόγοι, or as διάδοχαι of any origin prescribed by the παιδονόμοι. Then, he/she tames the irrational passions of the soul and concentrates on the development of the rational ones, by employing practical syllogisms, performing moral actions, becoming habituated to certain ἔξεις.

And only after has he/she reached the fourth stage of the ethical-conceptual development later as an adult, can he/she then proceed from ethical ἀρχη[Б] to ethical ἀρχη[С], and be able to notice the interrelations of the meanings of the ethical ἀρχαι/νοηματα. Then, he/she is also able to grasp the objective realities of the universal ethical truths, and make his/her progress towards ultimate happiness within the πόλις. In order for someone to be fully virtuous later in his/her life, the ethical-conceptual development must have been completed, or, at least, he/she must have reached the fourth stage. If the ethical-conceptual development goes beyond that, until the moral agent possesses full understanding of εὐδαιμονία. First and above all, the Aristotelian young moral agent is endowed by nature and is taught by habit and instruction how to reach this desirable...
stage of happiness.

1/Ex δέ τάν εἰρημένων δῆλον, ὅτι ἡ σοφία ἐστι ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς τῶν τιμιωτάτων τῇ φύσει" (Z.7, 1141b2-3).

Concerning this phrase, Eustratius explains: "ὅτι ἡ σοφία ἐπιστήμη ἐστι καὶ νοῦς τῶν τιμιωτάτων τῇ φύσει, ὡς μὲν τῶν ἀρχῶν οὖσα ἀληθευτικὴ νοοῖς, ὡς δὲ τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἀποδεικνύουσα ἡ σοφία τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπιστήμη" (137) and he goes on to explain: "νοοῖς μὲν ὡς νοεραῖς ἐνεργοῦσα καὶ τῶν νοητῶν, ὡς ἐφικτῶν ἀνθρώπῳ ποιουμένη κατάληψιν, ἐπιστήμη δὲ ὡς τῶν ἐμμεσον συναιροῦσα γνώσιν καὶ προβαλλομένη καὶ ταύτην, ὅτε δέει διὰ συλλογισμοῦ παριστάν τὰ γνωστά" (138). According to those lines, Aristotle considers σοφία to be νοῦς in that it contemplates τὰ νοητὰ, the objects of νοῦς, and is a level of knowledge attainable by the human beings, while, it is also ἐπιστήμη in that it participates in theoretical reasoning by logically joining the indirect γνώσιν (the whole syllogism) with τὰ γνωστά (its conclusion).

So, σοφία is considered to be the combination of νοῦς and ἐπιστήμη, with reference to things that are the most exemplary in nature. That is, the σοφός does not-like the Ἰφόμιμος does-contemplate what is decent in
itself to do, but he/she seeks for the most perfect in his/her search for the attainment of truth. His/her contemplation is more philosophical and theoretical in the way that it is more elevated or lofty than any political or practical thinking. After all, in 1141a18, we learn that the θος not only knows the deductions from the fundamental principles, but also the principles themselves.

But which are those that are the τιμωτας τη θοςι? Aristotle is not clear as to whether here he implies the scientific principles (as he does in Metaphysics K.1, 1059a18-34), or the highest principle God. Concerning this point, Eustratius (139) does not give us a straightforward answer implying that Aristotle could have meant either the one (scientific principles), or the other (divine element). Parallel to the above distinction we would refer to the reference to the scientific principles as assigned to το θεωτα, in Metaphysics B.2, 996b8-9 (το θεωτα as knowledge of the scientific principles), and Metaphysics A (το θεωτα as knowledge of God). We would think that Aristotle presents two applications of "το θεωτα": (i) as knowledge of the highest principles, and (ii) as knowledge of the highest principle, that of God.

However, it is not the case that Aristotle wanted to
present two applications of σοφία. In the *Metaphysics*, the definition we get for "σοφία" is that it is a science that investigates the first principles and causes, since the Good, as an end, is one of the causes, and in the *Nicomachean Ethics* we are informed that it combines both νοῦς and επιστήμη of the most exemplary things by nature. In fact, this very line gives the answer: "σοφία" includes both scientific knowledge (because of επιστήμη) and Theology as knowledge (because of επιστήμη) and Theology as knowledge of God (because νοῦς is a combined intellect possessing also a divine element found in the human beings once they are born).

The issue of the relation between Theology and Ontology, is in fact a very controversial one (140), but because it is not central to our theme, we will confine ourselves to the following points: we would consider σοφία to be a hierarchy of the knowledge of beings (Ontology) culminating in the knowledge of the Supreme Being=God (Theology). There are stages of the attainment of the Pure Wisdom; through the study of beings in general, we are led to understanding of the Supreme Being, and this will be so as long as Aristotle has a belief in divine beings which are the highest sort of beings.
Only with a hierarchy of stages of the attainment of Pure Wisdom, can we solve the conceptual differentiation appearing in the *Metaphysics*, since what is found in Λ,10,1075b19-20: "καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ἀνάγκη τῇ σοφίᾳ καὶ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ ἐπιστήμῃ εἶναι τι ἐναντίον, ἣμῖν δ᾽ οὖν", is a parallel reference to the "τιμώτατα" in NE Ζ,7,1141b3. That is why Aristotle goes on to examine the concept of σοφία in the *Nicomachean Ethics* as a purely theoretical wisdom, being the ἀκριβεστάτη τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, in that it knows not only what it is concerned with the principles, but also the principles themselves (1141a16-20).

Σοφία is concerned with universal entities approached theoretically. And either in its primary stages of attainment of the truth, or as knowledge of God, it remains a concept with purely theoretical implications. Even if we take the first definition of σοφία as the supreme science we notice that the relative status of the sciences is judged according to their subject-matter, and not just according to the benefits one could gain in practising science. Hence, for σοφία what is important is that its object is knowledge first, of the scientific principles, and then of the Supreme Principle. And even more important is its role in the achievement of εὐδαιμονία. Α σοφὸς is
qualified to have a very good theoretical knowledge upon scientific and metaphysical issues, not because of encyclopaedic studies, but of an intellectual excellence activated through theoretical reasoning.

2/ Relation of ἡρόνησις to σοφία.

After having discussed what σοφία is, we can go on to examine why it is important and examine its relevance to living a good life. But before doing that, we might review some points concerning ἡρόνησις, what we will be calling moral cognition and its relation to σοφία. As we have seen, ἡρόνησις is the link between moral excellence and the intellectual virtue that participates in the development of character. Etymologically, the word derives from the word "ἡρίω" meaning the intellect. Aristotle also uses the derived adjective ἡρόνιμος regarding as such the person with the ability to deliberate and syllogize the things that are right for his/her personal happiness.

However, for Aristotle, ἡρόνησις is not an art, or science, since as far as the former is concerned, there is a generic difference between doing and creating, and as far as the latter is concerned, whatever is done can vary, while the objects of scientific knowledge cannot. And, most important of all, is that ἡρόνησις is concerned with the attainment of truth in
the context of moral πρᾶξις. It cannot be art, since τέχνη is used in two senses: (a) πρᾶξις μετά λόγου ποιητική, (b) πρᾶξις μετά λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική, that is, in one sense, it may be regarded as an activity or process of someone in his/her attempt to create something: a τεχνίτης, and in another, it is a virtue that refers to ἐπίτεχνια. And this, we would think, is analogous to the difference between ἀρχαί[ ] and [ ] in Ethics, the true and the apparent good.

So, since there is a difference between doing and creating something, in no way could φρόνησις be τέχνη. On the other hand, it cannot be ἐπίστημη, since the latter refers to things that exist by necessity and what is scientifically known can be grasped by means of demonstration. However, φρόνησις is concerned with ἀνθετίας, since by means of the latter we are considered to grasp the first percepts from our immediate environment. In fact, the best description of the job ascribed to φρόνησις is given by Hardie(141), who says that Aristotle describes φρόνησις "both as discerning means to an end determined by moral virtue (NE Z.13,1145a5-6) and as involving a true understanding of an end(Z.9,1142b31-33)".

On the other hand, σοφία is the theoretical activity. It could be considered to be the theoretical counter-
part of φρόνησις, but it is a different term than it in semantic terms. In NE Z.12, 1143b19-21, Aristotle says: "ἡ μὲν γὰρ σοφία οὐδέν θεωρεῖ εἰς ἀνθρώπον ἄντι καὶ ἐστὶ εὐδαιμονίας ἀνθρώπους, οὐδὲν ἔστι γενεσίας, ἢ ἐν ἑτεροσιάς τούτο μὲν ἔχει. In those lines, and throughout chapter 12, Aristotle presents σοφία as a superior intellectual virtue than φρόνησις. He acknowledges, of course, that φρόνησις is concerned with apprehension of the end and with the end itself, which is "τὰ δι- καία καὶ καλά καὶ ἄγαθα" (b22).

Concerning the above relation, Eustratius (142) says: "ὅτι δέ η̣ σοφία εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν ὑπὸ συντελεῖ, δείκνυσι διὰ τοῦ μὴ περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα αὐτὴν καταγγέλλοντος μὴ- δὲ περὶ τὰ τῆς ζῆλης ἔχομενα, ἥ γενεσία προσαγόρευσέν". At this point, σοφία is presented as a higher intellectual activity that is irrelevant to any practical activity, to any πράξεις, or anything that is concerned with γένεσις, whereas φρόνησις does. Thus, it is φρόνησις and not σοφία that contributes to εὐδαιμονία.

However, Aristotle's speculation over which of the two intellectual virtues contribute to εὐδαιμονία does not stop here. In 1144a3-5, he says: "ἄμετα καὶ ποιοτικὸς μὲν, ὅ όν ἢ ἰστρικὴ δὲ ἐνεσίαν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅς ἢ ὑ- γεία, οὕτως ἢ σοφία εὐδαιμονίαν", which suggests that σοφία is what contributes to happiness, in the same
way that Medicine contributes to health. Eustratius commenting on that says: "何必имяр ἵατρικὴ ὡς ὑποργοῦσα τῇ φώσει καταρθοῦν τὴν ὤγειαν, ὥς ὑγεία ὡς κρείττων ὁδὸν τῶν ἁγαθῶν τῶν τοῦ σῶματος ἀναπληροῖ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὡς μέρος αὐτῆς, καὶ ἥ μὲν ἵατρικὴ τῆς ὤγειας ἔνεκα, ἥ δὲ ὑγεία τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἱατρικῆς, μέρος γὰρ ὁδὸς τῆς ὠλής ἀρετῆς τῇ ἕχεσθαι ποιεῖ καὶ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, οὕτω ποιεῖ, ἴδιον, ἡ σοφία τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ὡς μέρος ὁδὸς τῆς ὠλής ἀρετῆς, ἡ δὲ ὠλή ἀρέτη ἑστὶν ἡ συνισταμένη ὡς ἔλον τῇ εἰκονεύον τῶν θεωρητικῶν ἀρετῶν καὶ πρακτικῶν, ὁδὸς οὖν ἡ σοφία ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ ἱθομένη ὑπʼ αὐτῆς, ήτοι διότι συνισταμένη ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ ἐνεργοῦσα, ποιεῖ τὸν ἀνθρωπὸν εὐδαιμονίαν, οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις, μέρος γὰρ καὶ αὐτῇ τῆς ὠλής ἀρετῆς, καὶ συμπληροῖ καὶ αὐτῇ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τῇ ἕχεσθαι τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ" (143).

By saying that Eustratius wants to reconcile the distinction between theoretical and moral cognition suggesting that both σοφία and φρόνησις contribute to the acquisition of εὐδαιμονία, since they both are part of the whole of virtue. Their difference is that the former does it in theoretical terms, whereas the latter in practical terms. As Stewart (144) indicates, σοφία produces εὐδαιμονία, not as the doctor (efficient cause) but as the principle of health (formal cause).
produces a healthy state. By that he corrects Eustro-
tius and suggests that σοφία is just a μέρος or for-
mal element, in the ἡλεον of the virtuous character and
has as a function εὐδοκιμονία. In fact, Stewart is not
right to suggest such a thing, and by saying that he
is adopting the NE I, view of theoretical wisdom as an
alternative to practical virtue, rather than the EE
view that both can be parts of a single whole. Con-
cerning this point, Rowe (145) holds the view that in
NE, the distinction between theoretical and practical
thinking is complete, while in EE, which he considers
to be earlier than NE, there is a merger of the two
kinds of thinking into a whole.

We would think that the two kinds of thinking are
indeed distinct, but they can coexist, since each of
them has a different function: moral cognition is
concerned with the moral excellence of the agents
within the πόλις, and "σοφία" is a hierarchy of
theoretical knowledge—once a state of practical
excellence has been developed and established—
activated through theoretical reasoning, and most
of all, through metaphysical ζήτησις, which can lead
the person to knowledge of God, hence to εὐδοκιμονία.
In fact, we could use the following words from a
Scholium on Aristotle's NE Z, 13, 1145a10-11 (146),
-248-
in order to describe the relation of ἁρματείον to σοφία: "ὁ δὲ ὁ θεόφραστος παραπλησίως λέγει τὴν ἁρματείον ἔκχειν πρὸς τὴν σοφίαν ὡς ἔχουσιν οἱ ἐπιτροπεδοντες δοῦλοι τῶν δεσποτῶν πρὸς τοὺς δεσπότας. ἔχεινοι τὸ γὰρ πάντα πράσσουσιν οὐ δεῖ γίνεσθαι ἐν τῇ οικίᾳ ᾧν οἱ δεσπόται σχολὴν ἀγωστὸ πρὸς τὰ ἐλευθερία ἐπιτηδεύματα, ἢ τῇ ἁρματείοις τὰ πρακτὰ τάττει ἵνα ἡ σοφία σχολὴ ἀγνὸ πρὸς τὴν θεωρίαν τῶν τιμιωτάτων" (Theophrastus at least says that moral cognition is related to theoretical wisdom in a way similar to the way in which slaves actings as stewards of their masters are related to their masters. For they do everything which must be done within the house, in order that their masters may have leisure for the pursuits appropriate to free men. And moral cognition arranges what must be done, in order that theoretical wisdom may have leisure for the contemplation of things most valuable).

3/ Σοφία in human Ethics

Concerning the relation of σοφία to human ethics, we would think that there are three ways in which this might be stated: (i) σοφία as θεωρία is relevant to the Aristotelian Ethics, because of the analogy we have established between ethical and theoretical reasoning, and which is implied in various places of the
Nicomachean Ethics, and in few ones of the Eudemian Ethics. And this is emphasized by the fact that in the Nicomachean Ethics Z.6, in the middle of an ethical treatise, the issue of theoretical νοος is raised, or by the fact that in the Eudemian Ethics B.5, 1222b20-31, and B.9, 1227b28-30 (147), there is an analogy between the hypotheses in the sciences and those in Ethics.

(ii) The second way we might view the relation of σοφία as θεωρία to Ethics, is that there can be θεωρία that has Ethics as its object of study. That is, Ethics can be a theoretical study, and that would be the case of the Pure Ethics, or theorizing over ethical issues. In fact, the reference to theoretical reasoning in Aristotle's Ethics could be justified by part of human excellence to contemplate theoretical issues, and that is why the notion of σοφία is in his Ethics, after all (148).

(iii) And the third relation would be that engaging in theoretical contemplation is itself an ethical decision. For this reason, the decision of the σοφός to be concerned with the highest by nature is itself a manifestation of ethical excellence, a point that would show again the relation of σοφία to φρόνησις. Moreover, once the person has grasped the τιμιότατα
in his/her life, he/she can lead his/her own life according to a life-model that satisfies him/her completely. In that case, the person is happy, because he/she is neither ignorant of the possible misfortunes that he/she might face, nor unaware of his/her insight, power and determination. And this metaphysical and theoretical contemplation leads a person to a happy life, by leading him/her to a more sophisticated consideration of his/her existence and way of living.

Now, this state of eudaimonic (in Aristotelian terms) life, starts with the acquisition of material goods, but even more important, self-sufficiency is achieved because of spiritual and mental goods. After all, as Aristotle says in I.7,1177a12-17, εὐδαιμονία is the best activity in accordance with moral excellence, and this—as we have seen in this chapter—can be achieved after an ethical-conceptual development has taken place. For, the σπουδαστής who has reached the fifth stage, and has acquired knowledge of the universal ethical truths can then lead himself/herself to the attainment of the highest good of all, of εὐδαιμονία.

And this kind of εὐδαιμονία is more perfect than the political one, in that it is characterized by the divine element. As Michael of Ephesus indicates (149): "εἴτε δὴ νοον χρή λέγειν τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν ἄριστον εἴτε
that is, the political happiness, or the εὐδαιμονία achieved in the political and practical reasoning, is an end, but the one concerned with the divine element is the highest end. In fact, εὐδαιμονία is the proper exercise of the actualized potentialities of the soul, since actualizing them is living the best life, the one that gives contemplation its best display (150).

So, the relevance of σοφία as θεωρία to good living is absolutely essential to it. It teaches the moral agent to see the analogy between theoretical and ethical reasoning, and to proceed hierarchically from knowledge of the principles, to knowledge of the highest principle, that of God. And, in this way, by following this hierarchy in the attainment of σοφία as knowledge of God, our νοῦς becomes aware of the fact that there is something in us that is most akin to God, and whatever this is, for happiness to be complete it must include this activity (151).

Thus, either in terms of ethical reasoning as being
analogous to theoretical reasoning, or in terms of studying θεοπία as leading to a happy life, or in terms of σοφία's place in a hierarchy in the attainment of truth, the relevance of θεοπία to a good living is as important as the ethical one is. After all, θεοπία contributes to a happy life, because it is in the happy life.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stages:</th>
<th>content of reality</th>
<th>degree of our understanding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Receptive faculty of ( \nu\delta \omega \alpha ) grasped by means of ( \alpha \gamma \theta \eta \sigma \varsigma )</td>
<td>( \acute{\alpha} \rho \chi \alpha [\mathcal{A}] ) (( \xi \nu \delta \omega \alpha ))</td>
<td>Knowledge of a συγχειχνυμένον ethical καθόλου(ι).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mental images of ethical ( \acute{\alpha} \rho \chi \alpha [\mathcal{A}] ) in ( \phi \alpha \nu \tau \alpha \sigma \alpha ) exercised by μνήμη</td>
<td>mental images of ethical ( \acute{\alpha} \rho \chi \alpha [\mathcal{A}] )</td>
<td>Μνήμη of ([\mathcal{A}]) triggered by the appropriate stimuli.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. ( \varepsilon \θισμός )</td>
<td>undifferentiated notions of λεγόμενα, πράξεις.</td>
<td>knowledge of undifferentiated notions of λεγόμενα</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. ( \acute{\alpha} \rho \chi \alpha [\mathcal{B}] )</td>
<td>Ethical ( \acute{\alpha} \rho \chi \alpha [\mathcal{B}] )</td>
<td>Knowledge of ethical ( \acute{\alpha} \rho \chi \alpha [\mathcal{B}] ).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Ethical ( \acute{\alpha} \rho \chi \alpha [\mathcal{C}] ) as fundamental ethical truths.</td>
<td>Ethical ( \acute{\alpha} \rho \chi \alpha [\mathcal{C}] ) (true good)</td>
<td>knowledge of the true and fundamental truths(( \chi \alpha \theta \delta ) - λου(ιν)).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Now, during all the above stages, there is an interaction between the language faculty of \( \nu \delta \omega \alpha \) (as moral vision) and the faculties/capacities of \( \alpha \gamma \theta \eta \sigma \varsigma \), \( \phi \alpha \nu \tau \alpha \sigma \alpha \), μνήμη. And the content of the stages 3, 4, and 5 forms the Lexicon (of the language faculty), what contains the ethical conceptual information subject to revision.
ENDNOTES

(2) Taylor, (1990), pp. 117-142.
(4) Ibid., p. 160.
(6) Ibid., p. 265.
(7) DeMoss, (1990), pp. 63-75.
(8) Louden, (1991), p. 161, gives a parallel to this discussion concerning the different subject-matter of Ethics, the productive sciences and the theoretical sciences, and the similar methods they all use in apprehending the universal.
(10) Cf. previous chapter on demonstrative syllogisms.
(11) Although, in both cases of scientific and ethical reasoning, we employ syllogisms for the attainment of their respective universal truths.
(13) NE Z, 2, 1139a21-22.
(14) Cf. Irwin, (1985), p. 150, who also draws such a parallel.
(16) NE Z, 3, 1139b29, H, 3, 1147b5.
(17) Actually Aristotle's example is more complicated bringing in also "I am a man". So, here, we are
simplifying the example.


We have to point out that we will focus on the discussion of ἄρχοςία, only to the extent that it provides us with further information concerning the practical syllogism and its relation to action.

(21). Cf. NE Z, 7. Also, in NE Γ, 8-9, 1117a24-29, Aristotle states that in a particular syllogism the major premise is a universal judgement and the minor one is a particular statement. Cf. Broadie, (1974), p. 75.
(23). Cf. chapter 2, on Posterior Analytics B, 19.
(24). Lyons, (1977), pp. 823-831, refers to the notion of deontic modality as the logic of obligation and permission. That is, it is concerned with the moral necessity or possibility of acts performed by morally responsible agents (p. 823).
(25). De Motu Animalium, 701a16-20; cf. NE H, 3, 1147a1-1147b20.
(26). Cf. Hutchinson, (1986), p. 139, who also indicates the idea of the "broader sense" in terms of the fact that ethical reasoning usually results in action.
(27). That is explained further below.

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If we look at the etymology of the word, we see that it consists of two parts: (a) πρό: the ancient Greek proposition meaning before, and, (b) αὐθεσίς: meaning choice, selection and also the act of electing someone. Generally, for the Ancient Greek authors, the concept of προαιρεσις, takes the meanings of selection of means or choice, but, for Aristotle it requires a deeper analysis, and a broader scope of semantic properties. Some of the attempted translations are: choice, moral purpose, will and even commitment. Now, if we accept the translation of "choice" as the most appropriate one, it means that we have not understood the meaning of Aristotle's words, in 1.2, 1111b4-11, where he assigns the ability to have προαιρεσις only to human beings, and the ability to have ἔχοναι πρᾶξις also to children and to other, non-human, creatures, making the distinction between ἔχοναι and προαιρεσις. If the latter meant simply choice, he would not exclude children or animals from possessing that capacity. In fact, children do have choice, but they do not have a developed moral cognition, hence they cannot yet discern the moral end and deliberate over the appropriate means in order to achieve it.

strictly applying it to means and not to ends, but later in Z,H,and in De Anima Γ.7, Aristotle discusses two distinct modes of deliberation: means-end deliberation, rule-case deliberation. However, although we consider Wiggins’ discussion to be very plausible, we will stick to the traditional interpretation of the Aristotelian notion of deliberation Tuozzo, (1991), p.194, argues that deliberation as a form of reasoning is not the province of the moral virtues, but is an activity of practical wisdom in the virtuous person. And that activity takes some end to be achieved as its starting-point.

(33).Charles,(1986),p.133, takes the goal of an action to be different from the statement of what needs to be done, although he does not discuss the relation between the conclusion and the action in particular.

(40).Cf. note (8).


(45). Cf. Metaphysics M.10, on studying "this A".

(46). Cf. note (44).


(50). Cf. note (42); Greenwood, (1909), pp. 198-199; Stewart, (1892), vol. II, p. 91, discusses αισθησις as referring to the perception of the καθόλου, and p. 93 points out that this perception of καθόλου is at first dimly seen in the material setting of the καθ' ξεκίσια. Cf. Gauthier-Jolif, (1970), vol. II, pp. 537-539, speak of a sort of intellectual perception that apprehends the qualities of the moral cases.

(51). NE 8.9.1151a17-19.


(53). EE B.9, 1227b4, b25-30.

In fact, EE B.5, 1222b28-31, and 7, 1223b41ff, are two references in Aristotle's Ethics, where the analogy between the two sorts of hypothesis is made explicitly. Woods, (1982) considers "the most natural analogue the fact that the ultimate goal in the practical sphere is not within the scope of reasoning.
to be the status of the basic axioms in theoretical sciences", Cf.,NE H.8,1151a15-17.

Aspasius on the above mathematical analogy, says:
"οὐκέτι πρόεσθι ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς εἰσὶν ἀρχαὶ τινες, οἷς ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ καὶ ἀριθμητικῇ ἀς ὡς μὴ παραδεξάμενος

That is according to Aspasius, in both mathematical reasoning and in ethical reasoning, without knowledge of axioms (for the sciences), or of ἀρχαί (for Ethics), a person cannot proceed into further understanding; we would think of further proofs for mathematics, or for the ultimate happiness for Ethics).

(54). Cf., Terminology, p. 18.
(57). In perceiving the diagram of a particular circle, we perceive the universal notion of "circle".
(59). We translate: "And the intellect is concerned with the last things in both directions, since the prudent person must also know those (the last things).
For there is νοῦς, not a rational account about both the first principles and the last things, and in demonstrations, νοῦς is concerned with the unchanging first and immediate definitions, while in the practical sphere, (it is concerned with) the ultimate and the possible and the other proposition. For these are the starting-points of the end to be aimed at, since universals are reached from particulars. Therefore, we must have perception of those ultimate particulars, and this is νοῦς (intuitive perception). Cf., translation given by Irwin, (1985), pp. 165-166.

(60). We translate: "For we ascribe judgement, comprehension, moral cognition and νοῦς to the same people, and say that these have consideration, hence possess are νοῦς and they prudent and comprehending". Cf., Irwin, (1985), p. 165. However, we do not agree with him in translating ἰδρόνησις as intelligence, since ἰδρόνησις implies both an ethical and a cognitive element, and not just the latter. We will be calling it: "moral cognition".

(61). Concerning the ancient commentators, we do not find any resolution with regard to the above problem. Eustratius suggests that we have a dual function of νοῦς: "ἐπεὶ οὖν ὁ τίττος ὁ νοῦς, ὃ μὲν περὶ τὰ καθόλου καταγίνωμενος, ὃ δὲ περὶ τὰ καθ' ἑαυτὰ", which is rather a further exposition of Aristotle's account.


(65).Demoss,(1990),pp.70-72.

(66).Ibid.,p.70.

(67).Ibid.,p.68.

(68).Thus Demoss considers the "καὶ" in "καὶ τῆς ἐπέρας προτάσεως" to be explicative,pp.68-9,in his article,Sorabji,(1973-4) and Cooper,(1975,pp.41-44) agree with him,whereas Dahl,(1984,p.280) does not.

(69).Cf.Terminology on the applications of ἀρχαί.


(71).In terms of the fact that it is this by means of which that the ἰφόνιμος apprehends the particulars(cf,NE Z.7,1141b14-16),Cf,Woods,(1986),p.160.

(72).DeMoss,(1990),p.73.

(73).Cf,Shiner,(1979),p.79,where he also stresses the importance of perception as implied in the voϊν ἔχειν when making ethical judgements.

(74).Stewart,(1892),vol.II,.,pp.76-77.


(79).Stewart,(1892),vol.II,pp.91-93.
We would follow Irwin's (1985) translation: "At any rate, this much would seem to be clear: just as a heavy body moving around unable to see suffers a heavy fall because it has no sight, so it is with virtue", p. 170.


"His/her aiming at the end is not his/her own choice; rather, he/she must by nature have a sort of inborn sense of sight to make him/her judge finely and choose what is really good. Whoever by nature has this sense in a fine condition has a good nature. For this sense is the greatest and finest thing, and one cannot acquire it or learn it from another; rather, its natural character determines his/her later condition, and when it is naturally good and fine, that is true and complete good nature", Irwin, (1985), p. 69.


Alexander of Aphrodisias, Ethical Problems translated by Sharples, (1990), (No, 29), pp. 76-82; cf. ibid., pp. 158, 8-18.

Cf. NE B. 1, 1103a26-b2, where we are informed of the fact that we have the sense-perception, and all the senses, before using them, while the virtues (or vices) and the arts are acquired by exercising them.
Cf. Hardie, (1980), pp. 101-102, who says that "a moral virtue is itself a disposition to desire or choose and not merely a capacity to know;... on its cognitive side, indeed, it might be held, although Aristotle does not say so, to be a power of opposites for the same reason as Aristotle gives the ambivalence of an art;... unless a man knows which road is right he cannot point infallibly to the wrong road".

Apart from Irwin and DeMoss, already discussed, we also cite Allan, (1977), pp. 72-78, who together with Ando, (1958, 1971), and Gauthier-Jolif, (1970), in their commentary on the NE, assign all the task of the acquisition of the ethical principles to ἓρμηνευτικός as apprehension of the ultimate particulars. Burnyeat, (1980), pp. 69-92, discusses the ethical development of the Aristotelian man as one over time, emphasizing that "what is exemplary in Aristotle is his grasp of truth that morality comes in a sequence of stages with both cognitive and emotional dimensions" (pp. 70-71), basing his account on that "in Ethics, we first learn what is noble and just and not by experience of or induction from a series of instances, nor by intuition, but by learning to do noble and just things, by being habituated to noble and just conduct" (p. 73).

We use the word "ὑλικόμενα" according to the
second sense in which it is equated with ἔνδοςια and λεγόμενα, in Owen, (1975), p. 116. A single perception can give rise to ἄναθεσία, and an individual ethical perception is involved when we are told that a certain action is good. Cf. Nussbaum, (1982), p. 268, who also uses ἄναθεσία as the substitute for the word ἔνδοςια in Ethics, and goes on to say that "ethical concepts grow out of and get their sense only in connection with ways of life", p. 275.

(88), Top. A, 1, 100b20—21, Cf., Rhet. A, 1, 1355a16—18.
(89), NE A, 8, 1098b12—18, and Z, 1, 1145b4—5, Cf. Gauthier-Jolif, (1970), p. 588, from whom we consider ἔνδοςια to be exposition of opinions, related to the notion of ἄναθεσία since they are perceived and not grasped by inference. Cf. Stewart, (1892), who regards ἔνδοςια as accidental and parts of the rational world, p. 123.

(91), Topica A, 10, 104a8—11.
(93), Topica 0, 1, 156a3—7.
(94), Top. 0, 5, 159b12—14, Cf., Le Blond, (1939), pp. 30—37, who has shown that the dialectical method has for its goal the arrival at truth. Cf. Irwin, (1981), p. 206, with whom we would agree that Aristotle allows some analogous sort of non-inferential grasp of ethi-
cal αρχαι.


Themistius on the issue of definitions as derived from propositions says: "ὁ γὰρ ὀρθὸς ἡ ἀρχὴ ἀποδεξέως, ἡ ἀποδεξίας θέσει διαφέρουσα, ἡ συμπέρασμα ἀποδεξίας... θέσει καὶ διαφέροντες ἀποδεξίεσθαι, ὅπε τὴν αἰτίαν ξυνοντες ὀρθὸς οἶδον, τι ἦσσι ἐκλεισμοὶ ἡλιοῦν". C.A.G.V.1, p. 21.25-29.

(101). Cf. chapter 6, on ἀνάρεσια.


(103). Cf. chapter 6, on φιλία as ethical ἀρχὴ[8].


(106). Cf. section (C).

(107). De Anima Π. 8, 432a11-13.


Burnyeat, (1980), pp. 73-75, particularly emphasizes the role of habituation and of good upbringing in ethical development.


Or the non-virtuous one, pain, or, when we are not yet virtuous but only self-controlled, the virtuous action will cause us pain, although, Aristotle would also accept that pain is also included in many virtuous actions.

For further discussion of the issue of reason and feeling, cf. McDowell (1979), p. 344, who says that "knowledge of how to live interacts with particular knowledge: knowledge namely of all the particular facts capable of engaging with concerns whose fulfillment would, on occasion, be virtuous". Also, cf. our discussion in chapter 6, in connection
with the ethical virtue of ἀνθρεία,
(117), EE B.1, 1220a23-26,
(118), EE B.2, 1220b7-10, Woods in his commentary on the Eudemian Ethics B, takes Aristotle here to imply that since character results from habituation, it belongs to the non-rational part of the soul (1982, p. 105).
(121), NE Γ.4, 1113b1-2.
(122), We say similarly, since it is not entirely in the same way. What we have in mind is not the general capacity that all people have for feeling emotion, rather the particular and varying capacities of different individuals.
(124), Cf. NE B.3, 1105a3-5, MM 1206b18-19.
(125), Cf. Bedford, (1990), who generally argues that the overlap between virtues and emotions is not complete. The point here is that not every Aristotelian virtue seems equally closely linked with passions. Cf. Sherman, (1989), pp. 164-174, who presents Aristotle’s account of the acquisition of ethical virtue, as one that starts with perception of the circumstances and a recognition of its morally sa-
lient features, and then after cultivation of emotions which she considers to be cognitive and emotional, and habituation to virtuous actions, the person learns to see aright.

(126), NE I, 9, 1179b23-26. For the role of Education in the development of character, cf. Sorabji, (1980), p. 217, who argues that the child is first told to listen to the judgements of his elders who have experience or practical wisdom, and, in time, experience will enable him/her to make these particular judgements for himself/herself. Carnes-Lord, (1982), pp. 59-67, who stresses the importance of education for the political growth of a person. For the role of music in education, cf. Poet. 1, 1447a18-19, Politics H, 16, 1335b30.

(127), NE I, 9, 1179b4-31. Cf. Politics H, 13, 1332a40-b11, Z, 14, 1334b6, 0, 3, 1338b4; cf. Barker, (1906), pp. 207-222-3, who analyses further the notion of nature, nurture and instruction. Cf. Donini, (1989), pp. 3-21, indicates that Anglo-Saxon scholars have been particularly aware of the problem of how we can be responsible for our own upbringing, while Italian and German scholars have emphasized the role of the social context in the ethical development.


(130). Cf. chapter 5, where the notion of the best re-
gime is discussed further (pp. 362-365).
(134) C.A.G., XX, p. 612.12-14, Cf. Sorabji, (1980), pp. 266-9, accepts the view that the ethical development of the child does not depend only on the parent's discipline, but also the child must contribute something; "as a minimum he/she contributes the will to comply or the refusal". Thus, Sorabji concludes that the discipline of the parents is not an external cause in NE I, I, because it requires a contribution from the child.
(136) Bremer, (1969), considers ἡμαρτία to be a mental and not an ethical error. On the other hand, Stinton, (1975), pp. 221-254, says that ἡμαρτία can be either mental or ethical, varying on different occasions.
Carnes-Lord, (1982), pp. 166-170, sees ἡμαρτία from its legal point of view.
(138) Ibid., pp. 330.36-331.3.
(139) Ibid., p. 330.24-27.
stotle, starting with paronymy towards an analogical ontology, Ackrill, (1991), p. 64, who says that the theological argument of Aristotle—in which a deductive proof to establish the existence of the Unmoved Mover is central—is very different from that of general metaphysics, since the former purports to establish a fundamental truth, that there is an Unmoved Mover, while the latter starts from nature, seeking its causes and principles: matter, form, essence and so on, (p. 57).

(144). Stewart, (1892), vol. II., p. 98.
(147). Cf., note (47).
(148). However, it must be indicated that we cannot justify it with any explicit reference from the Aristotelian text, but with the general approach of Aristotle’s Ethics.
Cf. Kenny, (1991), p. 79, who says: "Virtuous action consists in executing choices about the right amount of things—of the passions and external goods which are the field of operation of the moral virtues of the intellectual part of the soul as well as of the passional part. What particular behaviour in concrete circumstances counts as virtuous living cannot be settled without consideration of the contemplation and service of God".

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CHAPTER 4: "ARISTOTLE ON OMONYMIA—FOCAL MEANING—ANALOGY AND THE NOTION OF CORE MEANING.

In the fourth chapter, we wish to examine the issues of ambiguity, focal meaning and analogy, in our attempt to suggest that we can apply the notion of πρὸς ὑν καὶ μίαν τινὰ φύσιν λεγόμενα (focal meaning), to most of the Aristotelian apparent cases of ὀμωνυμία, and, at the same time, we will examine, to which cases, we can apply the notion ἀναλογία, as well. Discussion of the notion of core meaning, and its application to certain ethical concepts will also be given; the topic will be discussed further in subsequent chapters.


"Συνωνυμία" (1): according to Aristotle, two things are homonymously said if they share the same name, but the account of their nature of being, is different.

"Συνωνυμία" (2): two things are συνώνυμα when they share the same name and the same account of the nature of being. By "ὑποένος γένους λεγόμενα", we will be referring to cases of related (or unclear) συνώνυμα.

"Λόγος τῆς οὐσίας": we have accepted this phrase (3), as a terminus technicus for an account of meaning, and we will also examine it in relation to two issues: a minor one, that being whether this phrase applies to the secondary or primary substances, and a major one, that being, the application of "λόγος τῆς οὐσίας" to non-substances.
"πολλαχῶς λεγόμενα": we will be distinguishing two applications of this phrase: (a) the one applying to the notion of ὀμωνυμία, (as it is encountered in Metaphysics Δ, 7, 1017a24-27, and Ζ, 1, 1028a10), and (b) the one applying to the notion of πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενα (as it is encountered in Metaphysics Γ, 2, 1003b33, and as we shall see in the case of "δικαιοσύνη"). Here, we should also indicate that there has been debate (4) about whether ὀμωνυμία too had a wider sense in which it included (b) as well as (a).

"Πρὸς ἐν καὶ μίαν τινὰ φύσιν": we will be referring to this as focal meaning. However, we will distinguish it into: (a) focal meaning 1, using it in the narrow sense of the Aristotelian discussion of the word "healthy" in the Metaphysics Γ, 2, and (b) focal meaning 2, using it in a wider more flexible sense.

But let us examine, now each of those is presented.

In the Metaphysics Γ, 2, 1003a33-1003b4: "Τὸ δὲ ἐν λέγεται μὲν πολλαχῶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἐν καὶ μίαν τινὰ φύσιν καὶ σοῦ ὀμωνύμως, ἀλλ' ἔσπερ καὶ τὸ ὑγείαν ἢ παν πρὸς ὑγειεῖαν, τὸ μὲν τῷ φυλάττειν τὸ δὲ τῷ ποιεῖν τὸ δὲ τῷ στημέουν εἶναι τῆς ὑγείας τὸ δ' ἔστι δεκτικὸν αὐτής, καὶ τὸ ἰατρικὸν πρὸς ἰατρικὴν (τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ἤχειν ἰατρικὴν λέγεται ἰατρικόν τὸ δὲ τῷ εὔφυες εἶναι πρὸς αὐτήν τὸ δὲ τῷ έργον εἶναι τῆς ἰατρικῆς, ἐμοιοτρόπως δὲ καὶ

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According to the Aristotelian words, to call things healthy, is to relate them to health; to say that a climate is healthy is to say that it produces health, or contributes to the promotion or maintenance of health; to say that a person is healthy is to say that he/she has health. And, he goes on to say that there are many senses in which a thing may be said to "be", but all that "is" is related to one central point, one definite kind of thing, and it is not said to "be" by mere ambiguity (1003b5-14), drawing the conclusion: καθ' θάπτερ οὖν καὶ τῶν ἰχθεινῶν ἀπάντες μία ἐπιστήμη ἔσ-
In the Metaphysics Z.4, 1030a35-b3, Aristotle also states: "αλλ' ἐπερ τὸ ιατρικὸν τῇ πρώς τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν καὶ ἔν, οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ καὶ ἔν, οὐ μέντοι σοῦδε ὁμολογῶς. οὐδὲ γὰρ ιατρικὸν σῶμα καὶ θρήγον καὶ σκεῦος λέγεται οὕτε ὁμολογῶς οὕτε καθ' ἔν ἀλλὰ πρῶς ἔν", that is, being is not said homonymously, but "πρῶς ἔν", since definition of anything, refers to the notion of substance, substance is the common semantic ingredient in all cases of being. However, our interest here is to examine "πρῶς ἔν καὶ μίαν τινὰ φύσιν λεγόμενα" in its application in contexts other than being, and to see it in connection with the distinction between ὁμολογία and συναφνόμενα and what lies between them.

So, with reference to the above Aristotelian example
in the *Metaphysics* Γ.2, a word such as "healthy" is not ὀμόνυμον, but it possesses various definitions answering to its various meanings. Also, with regard to the distinction of ὀμόνυμα to a wider and a narrower application (7), what is being denied here is ὀμόνυμα in its narrower application. Now, one of the meanings of "healthy" is primary, so that its definition reappears as a component in each of the other definitions (8).

As for the wider notion of the term of focal meaning, this is the one that Owen introduces in his famous article: "Logic and Metaphysics in some earlier works of Aristotle", where he states that "to establish a case of focal meaning is to show a particular connection between the definitions of a polychrestic word" (9). That polychrestic word might possess various senses/applications or secondary meanings, and it is to such cases that we will try to establish the application of "πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενα".

"ἀφ' ἔνός": refers to a logical-semantic derivation of a meaning, from the primary meaning. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* A.4, 1096b27-28, Aristotle mentions the notion of derivation from one thing to another, but he does not provide indications as to whether it differs in any way from πρὸς ἐν (10). Concerning this point, we
would consult Ammonius, who says: "δὲν τὰ καὶ ἀλλῆλοις εἰσὶν ὑμῶνα <καὶ> ἄφ' ὕπ παράνυμα λέγεται, καὶ ἐκ τούτων τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ ποιητικοῦ λέγεται αὐτῶν ὡς τὸ ἡσυχικόν σμίλιον ἢ βιβλίον (ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶ τὰ ἄφ' ἐνός καὶ πρὸς ἔνν. ἄφ' ἐνός μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ, πρὸς ἔνν δὲ πρὸς τὸ τελικόν), τὰ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ τελικοῦ οὖν τὸ διατελεῖνον φάρμαχον" (11). Here, Ammonius discusses the various types of ὑμῶνα, and when he talks about the notion of παράνυμα (see below), he divides them into those that are concerned with the cause of something, calling them "ἄφ' ἐνός", and those that contribute to something, calling them "πρὸς ἔνν". Thus, for him, the ἄφ' ἐνός as a term indicates the notion of derivation—of a grammatical dependance, in particular—and it is contrasted with the term of "πρὸς ἔνν". And, here, we would add that "ὁμώνυμα" is used in its wider sense.

Alexander of Aphrodisias, does not contrast the two terms of "ἄφ' ἐνός" and "πρὸς ἔνν" and he states: "ἐξίσοι γὰρ μεταξά ἀυτῶν (sc., τῶν τε ὑμῶν καὶ τῶν συνώνυμων) τὰ ἄφ' ἐνός καὶ πρὸς ἔνν λεγόμενα, δὲν ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ἔνν" (12). That is, he places the two terms between those of ὑμῶνα and συνώνυμα. And he goes on to say: "τὰ δὲ ἄφ' ἐνός τε καὶ πρὸς ἔνν λεγόμενα οὕτως τὴν τῶν συνώνυμων ἴσοτιμίαν πρὸς τὸ κατηχορούμενον

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According to him, the "α'ένος τε και πρός ἐν λεγόμενα" are different both from the συνάντυμα and the ὀμνώμα, and what characterizes them is that they both indicate the notion of a common nature; their differentiation is in terms of the fact that the "α'ένος λεγόμενα" denote derivation, while the "πρός ἐν λεγόμενα" denote reference.

Thus, we would consider the term of "α'ένος λεγόμενα" as one that denotes semantic derivation, or more generally, logico-semantic dependance, and whose relation to the term of "πρός ἐν λεγόμενα" is presented in a vague way by Aristotle, perhaps, due to the fact, that they do not really differ very much from one another. And, of course, he could have shown their distinction more explicitly by means of examples. In fact, we would hold the view that he uses α'ένος in the sense of the focal meaning2 and πρός ἐν in the sense of the focal meaning1, or in that of the focal meaning2.
According to Luna(14), Aristotle and Alexander do not distinguish between ἀφ' ἐνός and πρὸς ἐν (citing *Metaphysics* Γ.2,1003a32-b3, and NE A.6,1096b26-28), while Ammonius, Philoponus and Olympiodorus do so(15). As for the question of whether πρὸς ἐν and ἀφ' ἐνός are πολλαχῶς λεγόμενα but not strictly ὁμόνυμα, Simplicius explains them by derivation from a single source(16), a point that would resemble our view that ἀφ' ἐνός has a wider sense than the "medical" example.

So, let us have a few examples in order to make our discussion of the terms clearer. Following the Aristotelian discussion of "ἡγίστεινόν", we would speak of "a healthy mind", "a healthy house", or "a healthy atmosphere", where "ἡπαν ἡγίστεινόν προς ἡγίστεν θεία" (according to *Metaph.* Γ.2,1003a35), that is, all the phrases are "πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενα". They all refer to a common nature—in this case, the notion of "health"—but in a different way, as we shall see below. Now, the notion of "health" is also an "ἀφ' ἐνός λεγόμενον", in terms of the fact that from this one, we derive all the other semantic forms, and we form words in a logico-semantic dependance. And it is worth noting that there is no explicit indication in the text of Aristotle that this is what he meant by ἀφ' ἐνός.
Another example would be with the word "lively" in the phrases: "lively personality", "lively department", "lively atmosphere", are all referred to a common nature, the notion of "being full of life". As for the term of "ἀγάπη λεγόμενα", this would apply to the notion of "life", which is the logico-semantic origin of the word "lively" in the above phrases.

Ἀναλογία: is the general way according to which the various applications, or the derivative (or secondary) meanings of a concept whose logic and semantics we examine—are formulated. This notion of Ἀναλογία in Modern Semantics, is based on the notion of proportion which is the main notion that characterizes the notion of Ἀναλογία in Aristotle (17). That notion of mathematical proportion and particularly the proportion involving an even number of terms, is the prototype notion of the Aristotelian Ἀναλογία that we wish to explore in the Semantics—Logic of his ethical concepts.

Analogy proper: this is a special case of Ἀναλογία in general in Modern Semantics. It would be: \(a_1 : a_2 :: b_1 : b_2\).

And at this point, we should also indicate that we would agree with Owen (18) on that not all cases of
analogy are cases of focal meaning, and also with the point that the two terms are not mutually exclusive. An example of the first case would be the Aristotelian argument in *Metaphysics* A.4, 1070b10-21, that all things can be said to have the same elements by analogy. And an example of the second case would be the ethical word "*λαίκος*" for which an extended discussion is offered in chapter 6.

"*παρώνυμοι*": a thing is paronymous if it has a name derived in a certain way from another name. And this dependence is a grammatical one(19).

Core meaning: is a further semantic term that we introduce. First of all, we have to say that the focal meaning refers to the relation that characterizes the meanings of a concept, the fact that they are all "*πρός έν*", that is, in relation to one, while the core meaning refers to the common semantic properties that the various applications and secondary meanings of a concept might possess. This implies that two meanings can have something but not everything in common. It is not the same as two things that can be *συνόνυμοι* in terms of one name but not of another, for here it is not a question of the application of different words. Moreover, the notion of core meaning is differentiated
from the notions of "Ἄφ' ἑνός λεγόμενα", "πρὸς Ἐν λε-
γόμενα" (focal meaning), and of primary meaning, in that
it is universal in the sense that it applies to all
the meanings in a way that the others do not. And
in terms of the process of the acquisition of ethical
concepts, the focal meaning (or the primary one) is
prior to acquisition. Their main difference is that,
while the focal meaning is not common to the other
meanings in the way the core meaning is, the focal
meaning is arguably a principle in a way the core
meaning is not (cf. pp. 316-7, where an example is provided).

So, if we think of a conceptual scheme in our mind,
regardless of the context of a chronological process
of acquisition, but in the context of timeless onto-
logical priority, we would support the view that the
focal meaning, and the notion of ῎Αφ' ἑνός, would hold
a central position in that scheme, and the core
meaning a peripheral one (see schema M, below).

primary meaning": the primary meaning of a concept, is
what describes the ἀρχή[şe], that is the true ethical
axiom that the moral agent acquires at stage 5, and,
it is the same as the focal meaning2.

The following tree-diagrams show the relations be-
tween πρὸς Ἐν (focal meaning) - core meaning - ῎Αφ' ἑνός,
and those of meaning-applications. 

As we mentioned above, Aristotle considers as ὁμωνύμα things that share the same name, but have a different "λόγος τῆς ὁσίας". In fact, we would adopt the logical formula (20): $X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_n$ are homonymous, if and only if there is some term $A$ such that (i) "$X_1$ is $A"$, "$X_2$ is $A"$, \ldots, and "$X_n$ is $A$", and (ii) the meaning of $A$ is different in each of the sentences "$X_1$ is $A"$, "$X_2$ is $A"$, "$X_n$ is $A"$. 

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Furthermore, as we have mentioned above, the notion of ὀμωνυμία has a wider sense, which is more evident in Simplicius commentary on the Categories. He states:

"καὶ λέγουσι ήτι κατὰ τοὺς ἀνωτάτους τρόπους διχὰς λέγεται τὰ ὀμώνυμα: τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τύχης, ὡς Ἀλέξανδρος Ἐτε Πάρις καὶ ὁ Μακεδών, τὰ δὲ ἀπὸ διανοιάς, ἔταν διανοηθεῖς τις αἰτίας ἦνεκέν τινος τὰ αὐτὰ ὀνόματα ἐπιτηθῆ..." (21). And he divides further the ὀμώνυμα ἀπὸ διανοιάς into: "καθ' ὁμοιότητα, κατ' ἀναλογίαν, ἀπὸ τινος κοινῆν ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ διαφόροις πράγμασι γενέσθαι κατηγορίαν... ὦταν διάφορα πρὸς ἐν ἄναφηται τέλος". That is, Simplicius reports a classification of types of ὀμωνυμία: those due to chance, to resemblance (person and picture), to analogy (point the ἂρχη of a line, spring of a river, etc.), ἀφ' ἑνός (the medical knife, etc.), and πρὸς ἐν (healthy service), which would show a wider sense of the notion of ὀμωνυμία.

Now, with reference to the ancient commentators, we would indicate two points relevant to the issue of ὀμωνυμία. The first one concerns the fact that they all apply the Aristotelian ὀμωνυμία to things and not to words (22). The second point refers to the fact that opinions differ concerning the phrase "λόγος τῆς ὁμοσίας", encountered in the Categories:
"ομώνυμα λέγεται δὲν άνομα μόνας χοινόν, ὧ δὲ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ξέρος...". Most of the commentators have accepted the above phrase(23), apart from Boethus and Andronicus(24), who omit "τῆς οὐσίας". Concerning this point, we have given our answer in our chapter on Epistemology, by accepting the whole phrase "λόγος τῆς οὐσίας" as a technical term for meaning, the "account of the nature" of both substances and non-substances.

Now, there are three problems that arise concerning the Aristotelian discussion of ὁμώνυμα. But, let us state each problem separately and follow its solution. So, the first problem concerns the relation of secondary to primary substance, since we have accepted the phrase "λόγος τῆς οὐσίας" as the terminus technicus for meaning, interpreted as "the account of the nature of secondary substance". The notion of "οὐσία" as part of the above phrase should be paid at least a brief attention. Aristotle makes the distinction between primary and secondary substances(25), so that when we speak of "Peter", "John", "Ann", we refer to the primary substances, while when we speak of "human being", we refer to the secondary substance.

The primary one is what is primarily meant by "substance", not predicated of any subject, and it is not
included in a subject, whereas the secondary substances are said of the primary subjects (26). Even where there is only one member, there may still be a species, and the definition will be of that rather than that of the individual (27). And even more, in the Categories 3b17, he refers to the (more typical) cases where the species has many members, by stating that secondary substance is said of many primary substances ("οὐ γὰρ ἐν ζῷοι τὸ ὑποκείμενον ζῷος εἰ πρῶτη οὐσία, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πολλὰν ἡ ζωήρωπος λέγεται καὶ τὸ ἐξὸν").

However, we would not follow Anton's (28) view, that the notion of οὐσία in the "λόγος τῆς οὐσίας" should be restricted to secondary substances, on the ground that only those are at once definable and predicatable. We do not accept such a view, since the definition we give to secondary substance "human being" would also apply to the primary substance "John". That is, the definition will also indicate the nature of the primary substances in so far as they do fall under the species.

On this point, Matthews-Cohen (29) add that if we have the secondary substance of "Catness", there must also be at least one primary substance which is a cat; "Fennimor", "Felix", and there would not be a cat
without there being some individual cat or other. So, in a way, the notions of primary and secondary substances are correlative, and we would interpret the phrase "λόγος τῆς οὐσίας" as the account of nature of the primary/secondary substance.

Moreover, we come to the second problem concerning the application of the "λόγος τῆς οὐσίας" to non-substances, which is of major importance since we are concerned with the moral concepts, which are non-substantial. We would think that the "λόγος τῆς οὐσίας" as the account of nature of the primary/secondary substances, applies also to non-substances as an extension of that. That is, if we think of a non-substance, like a moral quality, say "ἀνδρεία", the λόγος τῆς οὐσίας would be the account of nature of this primary non-substance—since, in this case, the secondary-substance would be that of "Moral Virtue"—in the same way, that "λόγος τῆς οὐσίας" is the account of nature of the primary substance, say that of "George" or of the secondary substance "human being" (30).

Concerning the issue of the non-substances, Aristotle says in the *Categ.* 5.4a11-17: "οἶον ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων οὐδενὸς ἄν ἔχωι τις προενεγχείν ἢ σα μὴ ἔστιν οὖσία, ἢ ἂν ἀπερεμφ ἄν τὸν ἐναντίων δεκτικόν ἔστιν. ὁ οἶον

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In no other case could one bring forward anything, numerically one, [whatever is non-substance], which being numerically one it accepts the opposites. For example, the colour, which is numerically one and the same, will not be black and white, nor will numerically one and the same action be bad and good; and similarly with everything else that is not substance), going on to say that a substance, however, numerically one and the same is able to receive contraries, presenting as one of the examples, that of an individual man, one and the same, who becomes bad at one time and good at another (31).

So, according to the information we receive, we can speak of non-substances and their contraries. Hence, we can define both a non-substance and its contrary. That is, we accept that if its "λόγος τῆς οὐσίας" is q, then the account of nature of its contradictory will be -q. And according to the implicit information we receive, we can speak of a non-substance P with a "λόγος τῆς οὐσίας" q, and that P is a qualitative property of another substance "F".

As a further justification that the "λόγος τῆς ο"
σίκς" applies also to non-substances, we would indicate (a) that ὁσία means being and substances are not the only beings, as it is implied by the phrase "πολλάκις λέγεται τὸ ὅν" (Metaphysics Z.1 (1028a10), A.7, 8, 18), and (b) in Metaphysics Z.4, 1030a21-27, Aristotle says: "ζησπερ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἔστιν ὑπάρχει πάσιν, ἀλλ' ὁδὲ ὁμοίως ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν πρῶτῳ τοῖς δ' ἐπομένας, οὐτω καὶ τῷ τὶ ἔστιν ἀπλάς μὲν τῇ ὁσίᾳ πᾶς δὲ τοῖς ἁλλοίς, καὶ γὰρ τὸ ποιὸν ἐρομεθ' ἄν τι ἔστιν, ἔστε καὶ τὸ ποιὸν τάν τι ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ὁδὲ ἀπλάς, ἀλλ' ἔζησπερ ἐπὶ τοῖς μὴ ὁντος λογικὰς ὑπερ τίνες εἶναι τῷ μὴ ὅν, ὁδὲ ἀπλάς ἀλλὰ μὴ ὅν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ποιὸν" (For as "is" belongs to all things, not however in the same sense, but to one sort of thing primarily and to others in secondary way, so too "what a thing is" belongs in the simple sense to substance, but in a limited sense to the other categories. For even of a quality we might ask what it is, so that quality also is "what a thing is"—not in the simple sense, however, but just as in the case of that which is not, some say, emphasizing the linguistic form, that that which is not is—not is simply, but is non-existent; so too with quality). And he adds further: "καὶ τὸ τὶ ἢν εἶναι ὁμοίως ὑπάρχει πρῶτῳ μὲν καὶ ἀπλάς τῇ ὁσίᾳ, εἶναι καὶ τοῖς ἁλλοίς, έζησπερ καὶ τῷ τὶ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἀπλάς τῷ ἢν εἶναι ἀλλὰ ποιῆ ἢ ποιῆ τῷ ἢν εἶναι" (and so now also, essence
will belong, just as "what a thing is" does, primarily and in the simple sense to substance, and in a secondary way to the other categories also—not essence in the simple sense, but the essence of a quality or of a quantity)(1030a29-32). And all this part we have quoted shows that non-substances can have being and definitions.

So far, we have accepted three points: (i) that the notion of "οὐσία" in our Aristotelian phrase, applies to both the primary and secondary substances, since both of them are correlative to one another, (ii) that we take the above phrase to be a terminus technicus, applying to it the notion of the account of nature of primary/secondary substances, and (iii) that the "λόγος τῆς οὐσίας" applies also to the non-substances as an extension of the fact that it applies to substances.

And, because the "λόγος τῆς οὐσίας" is a term for meaning, and as we have seen in the chapter on Epistemology(32), for Aristotle, the meaning is closely connected with how a thing is defined, hence the meaning of a word, would be closely related to the definition that is given to this word, the parts—in the sense of parts of its essence and definition—that what it indicates consists of. These parts are things that are
signified, and reference to them provides an account or definition of its nature. So, the Aristotelian account of meaning would explain what the word signifies. That is, for Aristotle meaning and definition are closely connected with the analysis of the nature of a thing into its parts.

Finally, we would say that definition is not a verbal equivalent, but a conceptual-ontological equivalent to the substance of a thing (a conceptual analysis of the nature of its substance). It is an account of the nature of the thing that the word indicates. And that is why we differentiate our position from Irwin (33) who does not consider Aristotle's concept of signification to reflect an interest in meanings and concepts on the ground that names signify essences and essences are not meanings, but belong to non-linguistic reality.

So, when Aristotle says in Topics A.5, 101b38 that the definition of F signifies the essence of F, he implies that the essence is a set of features (or properties) specified in the definition of F, which, in its turn, is the account of the nature of the primary/secondary substance. Hence, the signification of the essence of something is the description of its semantic properties, of its meaning and senses (or applications, see
Aristotle could not have spoken of a theory of meaning very explicitly, exactly because he does not refer to linguistic properties but to non-linguistic ones (the things in the world), which, however, have definable properties, their essence, which has to be signified with linguistic expressions in effect. After all, definition is a function of διάνοια, and it is essentially discursive: to define is to break down a unitary concept into a multiplicity (34).

Moreover, the fact that essences belong to non-linguistic reality does not mean that they are not "meanings", or rather that the essence cannot be what a word in virtue of its meaning signifies. It is just the point that for Aristotle linguistic and non-linguistic realities are not distinguished; Ontology and Semantics go together. However, the fact that Aristotle does not have a unified and consistent theory of meaning does not imply that he has no theory of meaning (35). The absence of a distinction between Ontology and Linguistics (and Semantics) meant that Aristotle made no further explicit distinctions between meaning and reference, use and mention. After all, Aristotle was interested in non-linguistic entities. However, he was aware that by defining a non-linguistic reality, we define its essence. And by defining
its essence we make a conceptual analysis of the components that the essence consists of, since the essence is conceptual in that it has to be abstracted from the concrete reality by thought. So, by discussing the ὁμονομακα of things, possibly without realizing it, he was simultaneously concerned with the conceptual components that constitute the essence of a thing. He just did not regard the distinction between linguistic-logical and factual truths (36) as necessary, as a modern semanticist or philosopher would do.

Following from the above discussion, we should pay some brief attention to the relation of the nature of substance to the notion of "essence," and that of the relation of the account (λόγος) of nature to "τὸ τί ἢν εἶναι." In *Metaphysics* 2.4, Aristotle discusses the essence (τὸ τί ἢν εἶναι). His assumption (37) is that white and surface have different essences from one another, for the being for white is different from the being for a surface (39). Now, what is important for the essence of something is that it is considered to be a set of features specified in its own definition (38).

However, we have to make the distinction between the notion of λόγος and that of τὸ τί ἢν εἶναι. "Τὸ μὲν γὰρ τί ἢν εἶναι λέγεται καθ' αὐτό" (39), that is, the es-

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sense of surface is said "καθ' ἀφτό", and all the parts of the surface are included in its individual unity, while the "λόγος" or ὑρισμός is what defines the essence by analyzing the conceptual components it consists of (40). Thus, the essence is a set of features specified in the definition of the thing, and since the definition of a thing is the analysis of the parts that its nature of a substance, we, in a way, define its essence (41).

Consequently, with reference to our first problem, we have accepted that the phrase "λόγος τῆς οὐσίας", should be taken to refer to the account of the nature of the secondary/primary substance, and analogously in other categories. Hence, it is a definition of the nature of the substance, and definition of its essence hence a conceptual-ontological term for meaning.

Now, at a later stage of his thought, Aristotle, while retaining the element of ὑμωνομία, developed his theory further and finally became engaged in the science of being qua being and discovers further contents of this science, which is identified with the science of substance. In fact, the point that he is later concerned with the nature of being qua being, and the possible existence of a unified science of being, is foreshadowed in his early work of the Categories.
5.2a11-12, where he points out that while things from all the categories can be said to be, only those things in the first category of οὐσία are in the fullest sense; all other οὐσία are attributes, processes and other elements of the primary substances (42).

And, finally, his development of thought with the introduction of "πρὸς ἐν" is possibly a way to reconcile the earlier approach to Being said in as many ways as the categories, and a later one concerning the ontological primacy of οὐσία.

Αγαθόν,
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The sense in which "πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον" renders ὁμονομία in Aristotle is shown by the discussion of Ἀγαθόν in the locus classicus of *Nicomachean Ethics* I.6, 1096a23-24: "ἐπὶ δὲ ἔπειτα τὰ γονέαν ἐσχάλης λέγεται τῷ ὑπό τοῦ τρίτου". This phrase says that Good is said in as many senses as being, while in the *Metaphysics*, we see that "τὸ ὁν πολλαχῶς λέγεται", Aristotle enumerates a number of cases, each of which, in different ways is called a being (*Metaphysics*, Δ.7: "τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηχός", "τὸ καθ' αὑτό", "τὸ ὄνταμεν", "τὸ ἑντελεχεία", or the explicit expression of the categories of being: "ἐπεί ὁμοῖον τὸν κατηγορούμενον τὰ μὲν τι ἐστὶ σημαίνει, τὰ δὲ ποιόν, τὰ δὲ ὁσόν, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι, τὰ δὲ ποιεῖν ἢ πᾶσας-χειν, τὰ δὲ πού, τὰ δὲ ποτέ, ἕκαστῳ τούτων τὸ εἶναι"
Based on this enumeration, Brentano (43) makes a further one, by listing four kinds: "(a) being which has no existence whatever outside the understanding (privation, negation), (b) the being of movement and of generation and corruption, (c) being which has complete but dependent existence (πάθη φύσις, ἐπιστήμη, γεννητικά), and (d) being of the substance.

So, from the two phrases: "τὸ δὲ πολλαχῶς λέγεται" and "τὰ γὰρ ἔν τῷ τι λέγεται, οὗν ὁ θεός καὶ ὁ νόος, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιητῇ αἱ ἀρέται, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιητῇ τῷ μετρίων, καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τῷ τῷ χρήσιμον, καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ καιρῷ, καὶ ἐν τῷ διαίτῃ καὶ άσεμα".

So, from the two phrases: "τὸ δὲ πολλαχῶς λέγεται" and "τὰ γὰρ ἔν τῷ τι λέγεται, οὗν ὁ θεός καὶ ὁ νόος, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιητῇ αἱ ἀρέται, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιητῇ τῷ μετρίων, καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τῷ τῷ χρήσιμον, καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ καιρῷ, καὶ ἐν τῷ διαίτῃ καὶ άσεμα.

But, the question is, what does Aristotle mean by the claim that "Good is said in as many ways as being is said", which is elucidated further by the following parenthetical clause: "καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τι λέγεται, οὗν ὁ θεός καὶ ὁ νόος, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιητῇ αἱ ἀρέται, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιητῇ τῷ μετρίων, καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τῷ τῷ χρήσιμον, καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ καιρῷ, καὶ ἐν τῷ διαίτῃ καὶ άσεμα.

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to the TOC. As God and the intellect; in quality, as the virtues; in quantity, as the measured amount; in relation, as the useful; in time, as the opportune moment; in place, as the [appropriate] situation; and so on.

First, concerning the interpretation of the parenthetical phrase, people have made various suggestions to which, we will refer briefly. So, Kosman interprets the terms as predicates, so that we get the following sentences: "Good is God," "Good are the virtues," "Good is the moderate," "Good is the useful." That is, the items of all the categories are predicated of Good; in the first case, two entities in the category of substance, those of God and intellect, are predicated of Good; in the second, virtues are predicated of Good; in the third, an entity of the category of quantity is predicated of Good, and, in the fourth case, the useful is predicated of Good.

Looking at this interpretation, we would say that it is not so obvious in Aristotle that the entities: "God," "intellect," "virtues,"..., are used as predicates of sentences. Aristotle speaks of "good" as said in many ways, but this is not to be equivalent to saying that Good is to be identified with the things predi-
Another interpretation is given by Ackrill (45), who considers something to be "good", if the criteria for commending it are "Good". So, we get the sentences: "......is Good because (in that it is) God", "......is Good because (in that it is) virtuous", "......is Good because (in that it is) useful". As we notice, according to this interpretation there are various reasons for which something can be good.

However, we would follow the most obvious approach one could have in terms of this parenthetical clause (καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τῷ λέγεται, ὁδόν ὁ θεός καὶ ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιήσεται, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῇ τὸ μέτριον, καὶ ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ διακατα καὶ ἄλλα δοκεῖα), and this would be: "God is good", "Virtues are good", "Moderate is good", "useful is good", so that "good" is predicated of some entities in a certain category each time.

As for the former phrase: "τὰ ἀγαθὰν πολλὰ ἀρχῶς λέγεται" the most common interpretation that people have employed is the so called "multiple-senses interpretation" (46), according to which there is no single common quality, which corresponds to a single Platonistic Idea, hence there is more than one meaning that it can employ. Aristotle's claim is that good must
have many meanings if it is used with a different meaning in each of the categories.

However, Scott-McDonald (47) regards this interpretation as a non-satisfactory one and employs his so-called "multiple-natures interpretation". His reason for adopting this interpretation is the definition of όμωνυμία in the Categories 1, 1a1-4, according to which two things are όμωνυμία if they have the same name but the account of being corresponding to the name is different for each entity. And, since for Aristotle an account or definition of what is to be a thing of a certain sort signifies the essence of that sort of thing, and essence is a real nature or property, the account mentioned in the definition of όμωνυμία should be considered to signify a real nature. Then to say that good is όμωνυμον is to say that there are at least two good things, X & Y such that the account of X's goodness and the account of Y's goodness are different, that is a different real nature or property is signified by the two accounts.

It seems at first sight to make a considerable difference which interpretation we accept, but in fact it does not. We should think that again the phrase that determines the acceptance of any possible interpretation is "ίσοςχάρις τῷ Ὀντῷ" which is put in order to
introduce the δύναμις of Good, but, if we want to exemplify its ambiguousness, we could say that it means either: (a) as many senses as being is said, or (b) as many ways or natures as being possesses.

So, if we interpret the phrase under (a) then the implication that we get is that of the multiple-senses interpretation; it possesses many senses. But, if we interpret the phrase under (b) then the implication we get is that of the multiple-natures interpretation that is, good is said in as many ways or natures as being possesses. However, we have seen that for Aristotle what is meant, or defined, is closely connected with parts that constitute its essence, its nature. For this reason, it is not so important which of the two interpretations we accept, since, in the end, for Aristotle every sense or meaning of a word that names a thing, signifies the real nature of this thing. Again we have to remember that Aristotle was interested in non-linguistic entities. He did not—like a modern philosopher, or semanticist—make the distinction between Ontology and Semantics.

So, what Aristotle wants to say by "τὰ γαθόν ἔσσαι λέγεται τῇ ὀντί" is that Good is a case of πολλάκις λεγόμενον in terms of being an ὀμάνωμον word(in the wide sense of the term). By that, Aristotle tried to
reject the Platonic notion of Good, and based his rejection on metaphysical considerations that also underlie his treatment of ἔμωσμα.

However, despite the strong parallel that Aristotle draws here between the ἄγαθον and the ἀρετή, and the apparent rejection of good being universal and one (δῆλον ὡς σοφί ἐν εὐθείᾳ κοινῶν τῷ καθόλου καὶ ἐν) (NE A. 6, 1096a28-29), we notice that throughout the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle concerns himself with the notion of good as an end (by that we do not mean to imply that this notion of good covers all the different category-types of good mentioned in A. 6). Even from the outset of this treatise, he says that every art and method seeks for something good, which is the desirable end of every activity. The object of a rational action, and of desire is an actual or apparent good (48).

A similar type of "πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον" approach to Good appears in the Topics A. 15, 107a5-12: οἷον τῷ ἄγαθον ἐν ἐξέσματι μὲν τῷ ποιητικῶν ἡδονῆς, ἐν ἀφθινῇ κῃ δὲ τῷ ποιητικῶν ὑγίειας, ἐπὶ δὲ ψυχῆς τὸ ποιῶν εἶναι, οἷον σάφρονα ἢ ἀνέρθειαν ἢ δικαιαν, ἀμοιβὰς δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ἀνθρώπων, ἐνιαχοῦ δὲ τὸ ποτὲ, οἷον τὸ ἐν τῇ καιρῷ ἄγαθον, ἄγαθον γὰρ λέγεται τὸ ἐν τῇ καιρῇ, πολλάκις δὲ τῷ ποσὸν, οἷον ἐπὶ τῷ μετρίου, λέγεται γὰρ.
καὶ τὸ μέτριον ἄγαθόν, ὥστε ὁμόνυμον τὸ ἄγαθόν· (49).

(As the good in food is what causes pleasure, in Medicine, what causes health, in the soul what determines its quality, that is, whether it is prudent, or brave or right, in the same way it applies to the human being. Sometimes it signifies what happens at a certain time, as (e.g.) the good that happens at the right time: for what happens at the right time is called good. Often it signifies what is of a certain quantity, e.g. as applied to the proper amount: for the proper amount too is called good. So then the term "good" is ambiguous).

In this passage, Aristotle displays another discussion of ἄγαθόν considering it to be an ὁμόνυμον word, basing his account on the fact that the ἄγαθόν is different in each case: what is good for health is different from what is good in pleasure, or what is good as a moral virtue.

Moreover, at NE A.7, 1097a32, Aristotle distinguishes two types of good, the intrinsic, which is self-sufficient, and the instrumental that is desirable for it promotes something else (50). And he goes on to say that such an intrinsic good is ἔδακμον, since we seek that for its own sake, and it is the sort of good that it is self-sufficient, and by achieving it,
we are self-sufficient. This state of self-sufficiency is achieved by a person, if he/she lives a fulfilled life personally and socially (1097b5-11).

However, the two classes of intrinsic and instrumental good are not mutually exclusive. That is, even in cases of goals that are commended for their own sake, and they are evaluated in virtue of their performance, there will be characteristics that either contribute to the quality of this performance, or cause a further good outcome. For example, let us consider a good that is both intrinsic and instrumental, that being to keep fit by exercising very often. It is instrumentally good, because we lose weight and we are slim and fit throughout our lives, while it is also intrinsically good, for we exercise because exercising is part of a means to a good life. And to be good intrinsically, an exercise must not last longer than it should, and we must be psychologically calm and physically not tired. Also, we must not suffer from any serious health problem. Aristotle indicates the importance of those cross-referential circumstances that promote the function during the performance of something good (NE A, 8, 1098b31ff). Thus, the intrinsic and the instrumental goods are not mutually exclusive.

Now, similar to the NE A, 6, is the discussion by the
Stoic Arius Didymus in his account of the Peripatetic Ethics(51), where he asserts that the Peripatetics say that good is applied in three different ways: (a) it is the cause of preservation of all beings, and it is choiceworthy for itself, (b) the end to which we refer everything, and, (c) of things choiceworthy for themselves, some are of nature of ends, others are productive (like virtues, and the materials to acquire virtues). This classification of the Peripatetic conception of good, starts with Theology, then moves to an ethical end, and then widens in order to include other forms of good in Ethics. What he goes on to say is that there are many divisions of goods, because there is not a single genus of goods but they are according to the ten categories; for the good is uttered homonymously, and such things have nothing in common but the name(52).

However, what we notice is that in all cases, either good things are choiceworthy for themselves, like pleasure and freedom, or they are productive, like wealth, or, both choiceworthy for themselves and productive, like virtue, friends, health(53), they are said with reference to a notion of good, either by being conducive to it, promoting it, or being choiceworthy for the sake of it. That is, one could say that there
is a case of "πρὸς ἔν" that would apply to the ἀγαθόν(54).

Nevertheless, Aristotle does not assert any such position. What he does in the *Nicomachean Ethics* A.6, and *Topics* A.15, explicitly, and in the *Nicomachean Ethics* A.7, implicitly, is to reject the Platonic notion of Good, and to base his rejection on issues like that of ὑμωνομία of things in terms of their λόγος τῆς οὐσίας. In fact, both NE A.6, and A.7, involve metaphysical assumptions, the former in practice negatively by rejecting Platonism. And in A.6, we would think that metaphysics dominates over Ethics.

However, this attempt to reject the Platonic Form of the Good does not entail that Aristotle would totally reject the notion of a "πρὸς ἔν λεγόμενον" applying to the ἀγαθόν. Or, at least, it does not exclude the possibility that he might implicitly have spoken of various things that are good with reference to one nature. A further evidence that we have for a case of focal meaning of ἀγαθόν, is his discussion of it in the *Eudemian Ethics* Z.2, 1236a7-15, where Aristotle examines the forms of good in terms of which friendships are explained. Those forms of good are: "τὸ ἀπλάτο ἀγαθόν" (of simple good), "ἀγαθόν πρὸς τί" (of useful or relative good), "φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν" (good of pleasure.
or apparent good), and "\( \alpha \gamma \alpha \theta \omicron \nu \tau \iota \iota \iota \)" (good for someone). And, we would take good here to be a word with focal meaning, since it is by reference to it that "\( \phi \iota \lambda \iota \alpha \)" has focal meaning as well (55).

Aristotle here again does not speak explicitly of a focal meaning; he speaks of the various applications of \( \alpha \gamma \alpha \theta \omicron \nu \) that "\( \pi \lambda \epsilon \omicron \nu \sigma \chi \delta \varsigma \lambda \gamma \omicron \nu \tau \omicron \alpha \)" (said in many ways), and he lists those senses in which good can be applied. Moreover, those applications of good can actually be reduced to two distinctions: (i) between intrinsic and instrumental good, and (ii) between what is good absolutely (in fact, for everyone) and what is good relatively (for a particular person). But in general terms, what we notice in the first distinction is that the goodness of instrumental goods derives from that of intrinsic ones (and not vice versa), and that does not conflict with the fact that the instrumental good may be a necessary condition for the achieving of the intrinsic one. Thus, intrinsic and instrumental good may be confined to one meaning in the end, that which causes a desirable end. As for the second distinction, we notice that in both cases, the notion of good is also that which causes a desirable end. So, we see that all the applications of
good are said with reference to a certain meaning.

\( \text{άναλογία-core meaning (\text{άγαθόν revisited})} \)

We saw above that despite the apparent rejection of the Platonic Form of the Good, and the fact that Aristotle tries to present it as an \( \text{δμάνυμον word in the Nicomachean Ethics A.6} \), the list of goods he presents there, and his discussion of it in the Eudemian Ethics Z.2, would lead to a case of focal meaning, and not that of \( \text{δμανυμία}, \) in the strict, chance sense.

Moreover, Aristotle himself appears to reconsider further his discussion of \( \text{άγαθόν} \) as we see in the following textual evidence: "\( \text{άλλα ποὺ δὲ λέγεται; οὐ γὰρ ἐσκε τοῖς γε ἀπὸ τόχης δμανυμίοις. ἀλλ' ἄφα γε τῇ ἀφ᾿ ἕνως εἴναι ἢ πρὸς ἐν ἀπαντα συντελεῖν, ἢ μᾶλλον κατ᾿ ἀναλογίαν. ὡς γὰρ ἐν σῶματι θητὶς ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦς, καὶ ἀλλο δέ ἐν ἀλλῷ} \) (NE A.6, 1096b26-29) (But, how, indeed is \( \text{άγαθόν} \) said? For, it does not seem at any rate to be a case of chance equivocation. Is it then by being derived from one \( \text{άγαθόν} \), or by everything contributing to one, or is it rather by analogy? For, just as sight is in a body, intelligence in a soul, so also is another accordingly in another) (61).

The passage above seems to set a light on our problem concerning the identification of \( \text{άγαθόν} \), with a case
of ὑμωνύμια, or a case of πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενα. Aristotle here poses further questions, which shows that he is not happy himself with the preceding discussion in A.6, and he endorses three options that one can choose, that of derivation from a certain origin or source (that is of a strict ἀφ' ἔνος case), together with a case of focal meaning, or a case of ἀναλογία. In fact, what Aristotle implies here is that the strongest option would be that of ἀναλογία, although not disregarding the other options, at the same time. And we shall see why.

Now, we have to answer two questions:
(i) how the various senses of good are related to one another, and, (ii) how we can reconcile the fact that Aristotle has not actually spoken of a focal meaning with the fact that his discussion would point towards such a suggestion.

The answer to the first question would be by means of ἀναλογία. Analogy, as Owen says (57): "is the safest general way of characterizing the logic of a word whose senses are interconnected but not confined to one genus". By analogy, we do not commit ourselves to an analysis of meanings, but we seek to see their relations in a proportional way. So, a "good argument", a "good politician", and a "good typewriter" are three diffe-
rent senses of good, which in each case describe the various criteria for an argument to be good, for a politician, and for a typewriter. But, all these senses are formed in analogy with the primary meaning: "ἄγα-thén ἀπλάγ", and, at the same time, in analogy with one another, all with reference to a focal meaning, that being the instrumental notion of good.

What is good in the "good politician" is analogous to what is good in the "good typewriter", in that a good politician struggles for the interests of the citizens, he/she represents in the parliament, seeking for good results, while a good typewriter is the one whose function results good work. In each case, the two senses of good are applied differently, but there is a common nature they all refer to, which would point out a case of focal meaning.

But then, we come to the second question, we stated above, that being: how can we suggest a case of focal meaning, when Aristotle has not done so? Well, we would think that he does so implicitly.

In order to resolve such inconsistencies, and to explain the cases in which Aristotle does not give us any solution, we have introduced another term, that of core meaning. In the context of ἄγαθόν, this term...
would share a great resemblance to the notion of focal meaning, though not being the same. So, the core meaning of ἀγαθόν would be the common semantic properties that all the senses of the word possesses. That is, the core meaning of ἀγαθόν would be:

"function of something either for its own sake or for something else that causes desirable or positive results to the one concerned". If we make a componential analysis (59) of ἀγαθόν, we receive: ("desirable for its own sake, or for something else", "causing desirable results"), which would constitute the core meaning, as expressed above in a form of a definition.

So, the function of good in the "good man" is different from the function of good in the "good weather", but both senses of "good" possess the above common semantic components (or properties). In fact, the notion of good in the "good weather" is analogous to the good in the "good man", but in a different way, due to the different functions each of them is employed for. But even if they are two different senses of the same ethical concept, that of ἀγαθόν, they share some common semantic properties, the core meaning.

Thus, concerning ἀγαθόν, we would conclude that the Aristotelian terms and that of the core meaning
would apply to it in the following way:

It is concerned with the semantic origin of all the applications of "δυνατόν", and in its wider sense, it is identified with focal meaning2.

Focal meaning2: "a function with desirable results", and it is identified with the notion of the primary meaning.

Core meaning: "what is desirable for its own sake, or for something else", "what causes desirable results".

Primary meaning: the true good, as opposed to the apparent good, and the intrinsic good as opposed to the instrumental good. That is, it describes the ethical άρχη[Ç]. The primary meaning of good would also apply to "God", because He functions with positive results for himself (and for others, though not as his own concern, for Aristotle). And this is relevant to Ethics too, for the desirable goal for man is, in NE I, 7, 1177b33-34: "έφ' ήθον ένδέχεται άθανατίζειν καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρός τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ".

(C), "Πρός ζν καὶ μίαν τινά θόσην" (focal meaning), focal meaning2.

Having attempted an application of the focal meaning in its wider sense, to the ethical concept of δυνατόν, we can examine its application to other ethical con-
cepts. However, before bringing in some further examples, we could remind ourselves of the strict notion of the Aristotelian "πρὸς ἔν καὶ μίαν τινὰ ἄφιες" (focal meaning).

So, our model example of focal meaning, would include:

primary meaning I: "health", as encountered in the

"healthy body".

applications: "healthy mind" IIa, "healthy house" IIb,

"healthy food" IIc. Now, the application of IIa, is that

a mind (i) is healthy in itself, in that it makes logical inferences, (ii) does not suffer from any mental or physical disease, (iii) promotes the health of the person; that of IIb, is that a house is (i) one that has a very good construction, (ii) one that promotes the health of the occupants by being clean, full of fresh air and light; that of IIc, is that food is (i) made of fresh, natural ingredients, (ii) it promotes the health of the person who eats it. Now, the "healthy" in the "healthy argument" (an application IId) is analogous to the "healthy" in the "healthy body", and this ἀναλογία takes place in the following way:

Good balance of powers; body; good logical structure; argument; so: A : B : : C : D, that is A is to B, as C is to D.

Also, the healthiness of a mind in that it reasons
soundly is a case of ἀνάλογος in the following way: sound reasoning; mind; good physical functioning; body. Now, its healthiness as a good state of being that promotes its owner's health is focal meaning1. focal meaning1: all the above senses/applications refer to a common nature, that being: health as a good construction/state of being.
core meaning: there simply is not a common element that applies to all the examples of the "healthy" in the way that "functioning with good results" does to all the cases of "good" (leaving aside the fact that in the categories of place and time may strain "functioning" a bit); rather, the meaning of "healthy" in "healthy house" will involve reference to the meaning of "healthy" in "healthy person".

Now, let us use further examples in order to see how the notion of focal meaning2 applies to non-substances like the ethical concepts: ἀνάρεχα, ἀνίκλικα. In the ethical concept of ἀνάρεχα, the primary meaning would be that of "ἀνάρεχα ἐνεκα τοῦ καλοῦ", that is, what the moral agent acquires at the fifth stage of his/her acquisition of the ethical concepts. It is what describes the ethical axiom, or ἀρχή[?] of
The core meaning of the ethical concept of ἀνδρεία consists of the common semantic properties as encountered in other manifestations of the concept like the political ἀνδρεία, which is a derivative meaning from the primary one. And political courage is a derivative meaning and it implies the existence of ἀνδρεία that enables the citizens to endure all the dangers that they might encounter in their political life within a certain sociopolitical constitution.

At the same time, the moral agents are characterized by respect and obedience to the Law of this political community for the sake of honour (διὰ τὰς τιμὰς). But even in this case of political ἀνδρεία, there are further secondary (or derivative) senses, those being: "διὰ ἀνάγκην", "διὰ ἀμόσα", "διὰ νόμον", which share the same common semantic properties with political courage and the true courage.

Let us now follow the logic and Semantics of the concept more clearly:

primary meaning I: true courage (identified with focal meaning 2).

derivative (or secondary meaning) II: ἀνδρεία πολιτικῆ, applications of the derivative meaning:

IIa: ἀνδρεία πολιτικῆ διὰ νόμον,
IIb: ἄνδρεία πολιτικὴ διὰ αἵδω,
IIc: ἄνδρεία πολιτικὴ διὰ ἀνάγκης
all IIa, IIb, IIc, are applications of the derivative meaning of ἄνδρεία πολιτική.

Now, they all refer to a common nature, that being the μεσότης between cowardice and rashness. So, they relate to one another, although they function in a different way:

Core meaning: ("μεσότης between cowardice and rashness", "being courageous because of (true courage, necessity, law, shame,...)"), which are the semantic components that constitute the core meaning (62).

άφ' ένδος is identified with the focal meaning.

Our second example of focal meaning, would be on the ethical concept of ἴλικα. So, we have:

primary meaning I: "ἵλικα ή τῶν ἀγαθῶν" (true friendship), that also being the focal meaning (see below EE H. 2).

derivative (or secondary) applications:

"ἵλικα ή διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον" II: derivative meaning.
"ἵλικα ή διὴδονήν" III: derivative meaning.

focal meaning: concerning the case of a focal meaning, we would cite the reference to the Eudemian Ethics H. 2, 1236a 16-18: "ἀνάγκη ἥρα τρία ἴλικας εὔδη εἶναι, καὶ μῆτε καθ' ἔνν απάσας μηδ' ὄς εὔδη ἐνδὸς γένους.
Thus, what we have seen in this chapter, is that Aristotle does keep "πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενα" as one of the options, hence rejecting by that the narrow sense of ὀμονομακρύνων, and accepting a wider sense in the examples we have followed. So, he seems by implication to refer to the cases of πρὸς ἐν καὶ μίαν τινά φύσιν (as focal meaning 2) if not to mention again the case of φιλία in the Eudemian Ethics, where the reference to it (as πρὸς μίαν) is explicit. In the following chapters, we will pay further attention to concepts that have not been discussed yet (like "διακοσμοῦμεν"), and to those that were only briefly discussed here ("ἀνέργεια", "φιλία"). And this discussion is an attempt to see
how the notions of primary meaning, of πρός καιν structure, and of core meaning could enable us to formulate an Aristotelian doctrine of universal ethical truths.

### EXAMPLES OF UNIVOCITY AND MULTIVOCITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Τὰ μοναχῶς λεγόμενα</th>
<th>Τὰ πολλαχῶς λεγόμενα</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀπλὸς</td>
<td>ἀπὸ τῆς κατὰ ἀνάλογα</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>καθ' ἴνα</td>
<td>&quot;duck&quot; (fabric)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>τρόπον</td>
<td>&quot;duck&quot; (being)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>καθ' ἴνα</td>
<td>&quot;bird&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>εἶδος</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>κατὰ μίαν</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἰδέαν</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>τὰ συνύνομα</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἰδῶν</td>
<td>(man, animal)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ENDNOTES

(1).Cat, 1,1a1-3.
(2).

The terms "διωνυμία", "συνωνυμία", are differentiated from the modern terms in Semantics, where two lexemes are absolutely homonymous, if they are formally identical in both the phonic and the graphic medium. For example, "bank": side of a river, and "bank": the financial institution. "Synonymy" applies to two lexemes, when they have the same sense. So, "bachelor" and "unmarried man" are synonymous. Lyons, (1977), vol. 2, pp. 512, 562.

(3). Cf. chapter on Epistemology, where the "λόγος τῆς σοφίας" as referring to a theory of meaning has been analyzed more fully (pp. 82-85).

(4). Cf. below on (B). διωνυμία.


(7). Cf. note (4).


(13). Ibid., p. 241.14-21
(17).Metaphysics A.6,1016b34-35.The notion of mathematical proportion is analyzed further by Hesse, (1965),p.61.
(19).Cf.note (15).
(23).Porphyry above in p.61.10ff,and Ammonius in p.18.3ff.
(25).Cat. 5,2a11-16.
(26).Cat. 5,3a7-20.
(30).We are adopting this view and not the one based on the contrast; courage/white in this individual.
courage/whiteness generally, in order to be more consistent with the Aristotelian distinction between primary and secondary substances.


(32) Cf. chapter on Epistemology for the connection of the "λόγος τῆς σοφίας" with the notion of definition in Aristotle, pp. 82-83.

(33) Irwin, (1982), pp. 240-266.

(34) Metaph. Z. 10, 1034b20.

(35) Concerning a theory of meaning in Aristotle, we cite Hamlyn, (1977-8), pp. 1-18, who speaks of a connection between meaning and reference, saying that Aristotle's theory of meaning is a realist one.

Cf. Haller, (1962), pp. 65-75, who thinks that Aristotle has a concept of meaning but fails to distinguish between meaning and signification. The Aristotelian discussion of meaning differs from a modern approach in the sense that the former is more ontological-semantic, whereas the latter is exemplified by that of Dummett, (1975), who gives a more cognitive conceptual account of meaning.

(36) Quine, (1960), presents as his main point that no sharp distinction can be drawn between logical and factual truth. A point that we ascribe to Aristotle as well.

(37) Metaph. Z. 4, 1029b16-18.

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Aristotle in his earlier works is still under the Platonic influence and constructs a science of Metaphysics that is very much related to the Platonic one and only later does he realize the existence of a unified science, that of being qua being, which establishes the general metaphysics. Similar views are also held by Thorp, (1989), pp. 101-103, who accepts three stages in Aristotle's development of thought: the non-existence of a single science of being, the science of being qua being, and the identification of this science with Theology.
(48). De Anima Γ, 10, 433a28. Also, Roche, (1988), p. 56, points out that there are several ἔνδοξα about the good: (a) the good is that at which all things, or all things with intelligence aim (NE A. 1, 1094a2-3, K. 1, 1172a14-18), (b) the good is a complete end, an end we choose for its own sake and never for something else (NE A. 7, 1097a25-34), and, (c) good is self-sufficient, attainment of good implies attainment of everything essential to living well (NE A. 7, 1097b6-21, I. 9, 1169b5-6, K. 2, 1172b26-35).
(49). Lesz1, (1970), considers this discussion of ἄγαθον being said in many ways, as equivalent to "with many senses" according to the form (τῷ εἴδει), p. 361. And he goes on (p. 394), to point out that the discussion of ἄγαθόν in the Eudemian Ethics would suggest a case of focal meaning since "paraphrases can be provided which show the dependance of the secondary uses on the primary one".
(50). We adopt the terms from Kraut, (1989), p. 162.
(53). Ibid., Arius Didymus, p. 137.4-7.
(54). Ibid., Arius Didymus, p. 135.1ff.

(56), Gauthier & Jolif, in their commentary, consider a different syntactic structure to apply here, namely:

"[object] [relation] (to [object]) the [property] is [relation] to [object]."

In their commentary, they propose a different syntactic structure as follows:

"[object] [relation] (to [object]) [property] is [relation] to [object]." 

This points out that there is an extension of the term "property," but, at the same time, it does not affect the fact that there are four options: [category] [property], [category], [property], and [property].

What it does do, though, is affect whether cases of focal meaning are described as "property" or not.

(57), Owen, (1979), p. 25.

(58), Fortenbaugh, (1975), p. 61, treats analogy and focal meaning as different. We would think that this applies chiefly to focal meaning 1, since analogy and focal meaning 2 can be regarded both as alternatives or as two cases that are not mutually exclusive. Fortenbaugh (above), and particularly (of 1966, pp. 185-194) argues for a single case of analogy concerning the interrelations of the various senses of "[object]."

We would think that in the case of "[object]," both analogy and focal meaning 2 can apply, under the condition that the latter is identified with the primary meaning of "[object]."

(59), Further on the notion of componential analysis; cf., chapters 5 and 6, pp. 403-408, and pp. 431-433.

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(60). Cf. chapter 6, pp. 405-6.
(61). NE Γ, 7-8, 1116a11-20.
(62). In the sixth chapter, we will try to see how the notion of core meaning applies to ἀνάρεξια and ἄξια, in order to reconstruct the cases in which Aristotle did (like EE Η.2, 1236b27) or did not speak of a πρὸς ἐν structure explicitly.
CHAPTER 5 : ON ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΥΝΗ.

In this chapter, we will continue the examination of the structure of Aristotelian ethical concepts with reference to one particular case, that of justice, which raises both issues that have already been considered and new ones. We will be concerned with the following distinctions: (A) that between Καθόλου and Εν μέρει δικαιοσύνη (General and Particular Justice), or as we shall see, between genus and species, and (B) that between Θόσι and Νόμι δικαιον (Natural and conventional Justice). Let us take then each of those distinctions and examine them separately and then in connection with the problem of the objective reality of the universal ethical truth of δικαιοσύνη.

But before doing that we can remind ourselves of the distinctions made in the general discussion in the beginning of this Thesis, namely καθόλου (ii), that is the distinction between General and Particular justice, καθόλου (iii), concerning the cross-cultural similarities, and καθόλου (iv), our quasi-Platonic Aristotelian universal of logical-factual truth (1) and particularly the ethical truths.

(A), Καθόλου - Εν μέρει δικαιοσύνη.

So, concerning the first distinction of the Aristote-
liam justice, that of General Justice as opposed to Particular, we will be dealing with the *Nicomachean Ethics*, book E, and chapters 1-4 in particular, in our attempt to answer three questions: (1) whether we should talk about ὀμονομα or συνονομα concerning the relation between General and Particular Justice, and (2) what the relation between General Justice and Moral Virtue is.

(1). Aristotle's apparent contradiction: ὀμονομα or συνονομα? (statement of the problem)

In the *Nicomachean Ethics* E.1, Aristotle says: "ὥσπερ ἐξ πλεοναχὸς λέγεσθαι ἢ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀδικία, ἀλλὰ ὅπο τὸ σόνεγγυς εἶναι τὴν ὀμονομίαν αὐτῶν λανθάνει καὶ σὺν ἐπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πόρρω ὥλη μᾶλλον, ἢ γὰρ διαφορὰ πολλὴ ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἱδέαν ὧδ᾽ οἶκον ὅτι καλεῖται κλεῖς ὀμονόμως ἢ τε ὑπὸ τῶν αὐχένα τῶν ἱδέων καὶ ὁ τοῖς θύρας κλεῖον σιν (1129a26–31) (now, it would seem that justice and injustice are both spoken of in many ways, but since those different ways are closely related, the homonymy remains unnoticed, and it is less clear than it is with distant homonyms (where the distance in appearance is great), for example, the bone below an animal's neck and what we lock the doors with are called keys homonymously).

On the other hand, in E.2, he says: "ὑπὸ τε φανερὸν ὅτι
So, what we notice above is an apparent contradiction between the statement in 1129a25-26, which presents the distinction between law and fairness (a pair correlated with General/Particular Justice/injustice) to be πλεοναχός λεγόμενοι, but because it is a case of σύνεγγυς δημονιμία, it escapes our notice, and that in 1130a32-1130b1, where he accepts a case of συνωνιμία. Now, we will try to answer the problem of this
apparent contradiction by starting with Aristotle's own exposition of his doctrine on Law and Justice, in our attempt to find the semantic properties of the concepts in question. Then, we will proceed into how the ancient and modern scholars have tried to solve the above problem; what Aristotle's real position is; and what he might have said (as our interpretation).

(a) Law and Justice (General and Particular justice/injustice)

So, in NE E, 1-2, 1129a6-10, Aristotle defines καθόλου δίκαιοσύνη as the state which makes us able to perform just acts, and wish what is just, while a corresponding definition applies also to injustice: "δρόμουν δὴ πάντας τὴν τοιαύτην ἔξιν βουλομένους λέ­γειν δίκαιοσύνην, ἀφ' ἕν πρακτικῶν τὸν δίκαιον εἰςί καὶ ἀφ' ἕν δίκαιοπραγόσσι καὶ Βοῶλοντας τὰ δίκαια".

And since the just man is the man who (i) observes the law and (ii) is fair (2), and since law covers all forms of human conduct, and most of all the virtues or vices, General justice is also taken to be virtue as a whole (1129b26-30). The δίκαιος is the kind of person that seeks the equal and the proper, since δίκαιοσύνη is identical with legal and equal action (1129a34), whereas the ἁδίκος is the kind of person that seeks illegal and unequal actions, being greedy with refe-
reference to material goods. In addition, δίκαια are considered to be the reasons responsible for the cause and preservation of happiness within the political community with regard to its constituents (1129b17-19).

So, Aristotle considers General justice and injustice in the sense of conformity to the public laws of the state and violation of those laws, while he also explains their relation to goodness and badness of character in general and their difference from these (3). In other words, he takes General justice to be the manifestation of all ἀρετές, as Stewart states (4).

Aristotle in NE E.1, seems to present the Καθόλου δικαιοσύνη as obedience to law, or even more as a principle that guides the administration of a City-State. And this administration should be guided both by the fact that laws aim at the preservation of order and happiness in the political community, and by the fact that they prescribe ethical principles in accordance with the other virtues. So, Καθόλου δικαιοσύνη as a virtue must include all these and it must apply to a reality of a combination of political uniformity and balance of the ethical excellence as well, and that is manifested as a relation between the State
and its citizens, and vice versa, or amongst the citizens themselves. After all, General justice is above all a case of a "πρὸς ἔτερον" relation (1130a4).

As for Particular justice/injustice, it is concerned with social position, money and other external goods, which men take pleasure in, in contrast to General Justice which is concerned with everything that the morally and intellectually (5) excellent agent takes pleasure in (1130b1-5). And as an example of General Justice, we could refer to the moral agent that acts in accordance with the laws written or unwritten, that is, the person that is characterized both by obedience to laws and by moral excellence. As for the Particular Justice, we could refer to a father who divides his fortune between his two children so that both of them will receive equal shares.

Moreover, the distinction between General and Particular justice has raised the question whether (6) the former applies to a moral rather than a legal conception of it, and the latter to a legal conception of it, further distinguished into the two kinds of distributive and rectificatory justice. At a first consideration of the two conceptions of δικαιοσύνη one would say that they are different, hence we would speak of two different concepts, two
homonymous words. But let us look at their semantic properties:

Καθόλου δικαιοσύνη:"a state of righteousness" + "application of it πρὸς ἔτερον based on legal parameters".

Εν μέρει δικαιοσύνη:"a state of righteousness" + "application of it πρὸς ἔτερον based on equality".

We have seen how General Justice is linked with the notion of Law, and we will follow now why Particular justice should be linked with the notion of equality. In fact, the answer is given by Aristotle himself when he presents his doctrine of the various kinds of Particular justice. So, the first kind is the "ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς" (distributive justice), and refers to the application of equal share in terms of money, things and honour, and whatever can be distributed to the citizens of a political community.

Aristotle's treatment of distributive justice is a reflection of the political institutions of his time and place. It is the distribution of honour and wealth to citizens of the state, and as an example we could refer to the distribution of profits of the revenues from the Empire in fifth-century Athens. And, in its modernized version, it would be concerned with the distribution of tax burdens by the state, and the
distribution of honorary rewards.

The second kind of particular justice is that of δικαίωσις (rectificatory justice), and it is concerned with application of equal, fair restoration of a situation (the Greek δικαίωσις means both "equal" and "fair" in English). That is, according to rectificatory justice, if a person A has gained an unfair advantage over B, he who administers rectificatory justice must restore the just situation (1132a6-7). So, if A borrows £5 from B, the rectificatory justice orders that it should be returned if it fails to be returned otherwise. It sounds like the restoration of a damaged fairness, so that balance can be regained between two parties of a transaction intended or unintended.

So, what we notice is that the analysis of General justice is one that refers to acting according to the Law, that is in terms of judicial capacity, while that of Particular justice is one that refers to the equal share of goods and restoration of the damaged fair situation (9).

Following from the above semantic properties as stated, we would think that the General and Particular justice/injustice share some common semantic properties (or components), those being: "a state of
righteousness", and "application on righteousness πρὸς ζερον". Now, the additional semantic properties would be those of: "application of righteousness based on legal parameters", and "application of righteousness based on equality" (we translate δικασθεινή both by "justice" and by "righteousness"). That is, the notions of law and ἴσθενη seem to be added semantic properties that characterize the General and Particular justice respectively.

But let us examine further those two semantic properties, starting with that of ἴσθενη. We notice that Aristotle tries to adapt ἴσθενη as derived from Mathematics (the ζερον being the middle between the excess and the defect of an arithmetical analogy (1132a 29-35, 1132b1-10)), to the discussion of δίκαιον, even trying to draw an etymological link between δίκαιον (division of two equal parts) and δίκαιον by saying "δίκαιον", and "δικασθεις" (1132a30-32) (10).

Now, if one reciprocates by means of money for something that he/she has bought, he/she also acts not only in proportion to what he/she has received, but also seeks to achieve a fair and equal transaction. So, ἴσθενη deriving from Mathematics, and adapted to the notion of δίκαιον, is also one of the main semantic properties of it, exhibited either as equal share.
of goods (distributive justice), as restoration of damage (rectificatory justice), or as equal transactions in terms of money as a means of the transactions (in the ἀντιπέπονθος δίκαιον).

As for the other semantic component, that of Law, Aristotle in 1129b14-17, says that Laws determine the actions of a moral agent within a political community. In fact, we would consider the notion of Laws here to imply a general system of rules and ethical norms that aim at the regulation of our lives and the achievement and preservation of happiness (11). This "εν μὲν τρόπον" refers to how Law defines justice by ordering people to perform virtuous actions, which lead to virtuous dispositions and the whole of Ethical Virtue, hence of General Justice (12). Thus, the notion of Laws is encountered in General justice, referring to both the written and unwritten laws of a society. Following from that, we would accept that both law and fairness are taken to be two properties which are distinct (one in General justice and one in Particular justice), but semantically interrelated. So, the only semantic differentiation between General and Particular justice, is that the application of righteousness in the latter is in accordance with a certain written legislation, and
that in Particular justice the application of righteousness is according to ἴσότης.

Moreover, in 1130b22-24, Aristotle says that many issues concerning legal matters are ordered by the whole of Moral Virtue (that is, issues of particular justice are guided by General Justice), since Law serves the whole of virtue by both urging towards moral actions (which yield ἄρετήν), and rejecting bad ones (which yield μοιχήρια). This phrase reveals an interaction between the Law (written and unwritten) and Moral Virtue, in a way, that is further illustrated by the following sentence (13):

"τὰ δὲ ποιητικά τῆς θλης ἄρετῆς ἐστὶ τῶν νομίμων ὃσα νεμοθέτηται περὶ παιδείαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινόν".

What follows is that Laws are generally in accordance with what is right or fair. And that is true, since even unjust societies have laws against murder (Further discussion of these interrelations is provided in ρ. 344b).

Hence, in terms of their meanings, General and Particular Justice are in a relation of an inclusion of the one concept (particular justice) to the other (General justice); they share common semantic properties, they possess interrelated meanings, hence they are not ὀμάνυμα, or even σύνεχος ὀμάνυμα.
But which is their relationship then?

Further clues can be derived from the discussion of the antonym (or opposite) term of "Δίκαιον-Δίκαιοσάνη" that of "Υδίκον". Concerning the issue of the opposites, there is a whole discussion about whether one of a pair of opposites had to be πολλαχάς λέγομενον if the other one was (14). So, the principle (P) if one of a pair of opposites has several senses so does the other, is refuted in the case of Υδίκον, since to say that there are two reasons for calling something or someone Υδίκον (because of evilness and because of performing illegal actions), does not imply that one is saying something different in both cases. That happens, because in both cases, there is a violation of ἰσότης as an application of righteousness, but not a change of the meaning of the concept of Υδίκον; it is rather a different application of the concept, which, however, possesses the common semantic properties in all its applications.

And this very statement contradicts what he had previously said in 1129a25-26, that justice and injustice are δμόνωμα, because one type of each is associated with lawfulness, and the other type with fairness, but because it is a case of a σύνεγγυς δμωνυμία, it escapes our notice (15), hence bringing
us again to the problem stated above.

(b). Ancient-modern views on Aristotle's apparent contradiction.

Concerning this apparent contradiction in Aristotle, the Anonymous ancient commentator says: "Εστιν άρα ης παρά την κοινή ἀδίκτια ἐν μέρει σωσα ἐκείνης ἀναλογίαν ἔχουσα πρὸς αὐτὴν ὡς καὶ ἀκολασία δειλία τῶν άλλων ἐκάστη κακίαν ἐκάστη συνάνυμος, άτι δ' ὀρισμὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένεις, τῆν ἐν μέρει κακίαν τῇ καθόλου ἀδίκτια σωσαν ἀδίκτιαν, ἐπὶ τοσούτον φησιν αὐτὴν ἀδίκτιαν εἰναι καὶ λόγον πως τοῦ αὐτοῦ κοινωνείν, καθόσον ἐκατέρα αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένεις ἐστί, πῶς δὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένεις καὶ ἐν τίνι, αὐτῶς ἐδήλωσε εἰπὼν ἄμφω γάρ ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἄτερον, καὶ εἰ κατὰ πλεονεξίαν, ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἀλλης ἀμαρτάνειν τὸ εἶναι αὐτῇ κακίας ἔχουσιν, εἰπὼν δὲ κοινῶν γένως αὐτῶν καθ' οὐδοσι συνάνυμος, ἔφεξῃς πάλιν διαφορὰν αὐτῶν λέγει καθ' ἕκα καμάν υμῶν γίνεται, ἢ μὲν γάρ ἐν λέγεσιν ἀδίκτια, ἢ κατὰ πλεονεξίαν, περὶ τιμῆς, φησίν, ἐστὶν ἡ χρήματα (εἷς δ' ἐν λέγων τὰ τυχηρὰ τῶν ἁγάθων ἐν οἷς ἐίθ' ἡδονήν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ κέρδους ταῦτα γίνεται), ἢ δ' ἀτέρα περὶ θ' ὁ σπουδαίος πρακτικὸς, καὶ τοῦτο ἐστὶν τὸ ζημπροσθὲν εἰρημένον, ἀλλ' ὅσα τῷ σόνεγγυς αὐτῶν εἶναι άτη' ἐμμωνυμεῖαν λανθάνειν δύναται καὶ κατὰ τὸ μῆ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένεις εἶναι λέγεσθαι, ὅτῳ γάρ ὑπ συνάνυμα ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ ἐναντία, ἀλλ' καθόσον ἀμφότερος ἡ αὐτῶς λόγος κοινῶς, ἔξεις γὰρ πρακτικὰς ἄμφω, διαφέρονσι δὲ ὅτι αὐ
μὲν τὸν αἱσχρῶν πρακτικαὶ, αἵ δὲ τῶν περὶ ὧδ᾽ ὁ σπον-
δαῖος’ (16).

So, according to the Anonymous' report of Aristotle, the two ἀδίκια "δοξοσὶ συνώνυμοι" (they seem to be), which implies that in fact they are not. And, then, he goes on to say that the ἀδίκιαι do not belong to the same genus, since there is one of "τὸν αἱσχρῶν πρακτι-
καί", and another one, that of "τῶν περὶ ὧδ᾽ ὁ σπον-
δαῖος", and because of their close relation their ὁμωνύμια is not apparent. That is, for the Anonymous, there is no contradiction in Aristotle, but a case of ὁμωνύμια. And then, by saying that, the Anonymous actually preserves the Aristotelian principle that genus and species are συνώνυμα, according to the: "σκέπτεσθαι δὲ καὶ εἰ ὁμώνυμον τὸ ἔτιδος τῇ γένει, στοι-
χείοις χρῶμενον τοῖς εἰρημένοις πρὸς τὸ ὁμώνυμον,
συνώνυμον γὰρ τὸ γένος καὶ τὸ ἔτιδος" (Top., Α. 3, 123a a27-29), while denying that General and Particular injustice are either συνώνυμα or genus-and-species.

Another ancient commentator who is concerned with the problem of the Aristotelian self-contradiction, is Michael of Ephesus (17), who says: "ἔστι τίς ἀδίκια ἐλλη
παρὰ τὴν ὡς ἄδικαι ἐν μέρει, συνώνυμος τῇ ὁλῇ ἀδι-
κία, ἔθος δὲ Ἀριστοτέλει συνώνυμα λέγειν καὶ τὰ ἄθροι
ἐνὸς καὶ πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενα, ὅς ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ τῶν Μετὰ

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In all the above passage, and generally, throughout his discussion of the Aristotelian passage in 1130a28-b5, we notice that this is a different argument than the Anonymous above, who ended up going for ὁμονύμια. Now, what Michael of Ephesus suggests is that it is a commonplace in Aristotle to call συνάνυμα even cases of ἀφ` ἑνός and of πρὸς ἔν λεγόμενα, that belong somewhere between συνάνυμα and the clear ὁμονύμια. However, in strict Aristotelian language, this is a false statement and cannot be accepted. We would think that Michael of Ephesus is wrong to suggest that Aristotle applies the term "συνάνυμος" to the "πρὸς ἔν λεγόμενα".

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By that Michael of Ephesus violates the Aristotelian terminology, for speaking in Aristotelian terminology, he is making a violation (two concepts cannot be both συνώνυμα and πρός ἐν λεγόμενα), while he also contradicts himself, when he goes on to say that they are "τρόπον τινα ὁμόνυμα". So, on the one hand, the two concepts are συνώνυμα, since they "ἀμφότεροι γὰρ αἷδικται ἐν τῷ πρός ἐτέρους ἑμαρτάνειν τὸ εἶναι ξοῦσι", and, on the other hand, he considers them to be ὁμόνυμα in terms of "ἡ μὲν ἐν μέρει ἄδικται ἡ κατὰ πλεονεξία περὶ τιμήν καὶ χρήματα... ἢ δὲ καθόλου ἄδικται περὶ πάντα θαν αὐτὸν ὁ νόμιμος σπουδαῖος". Thus, Michael's clear errors are: (i) in saying that the ἀνόσον and the πρός ἐν λεγόμενα can be called συνώνυμα, and using as a basis the passage in Metaphysics Γ.2, hence misinterpreting Aristotle, and (ii) in trying to combine the fact that they are συνώνυμα with making them ὁμόνυμα.

Of the modern commentators, Joachim (18) takes Aristotle to conclude that there are two distinct forms of injustice, "which fall under the same genus, and their definitions are generically the same, but since particular injustice is distinguished by its motive—since the agent is characterized by the fact that his object is to secure an unfair advantage—this distin-
guishing characteristic must be added to the generic definition". That is, what Joachim says, in fact, is that the passage in E.2, 1130a28-b5 corrects that of E.1, 1129a26-31. He says that "the common name covers a generic identity; the two kinds of justice or injustice have so much in common that both issue in actions advantaging or disadvantaging another".

Stewart (19) in discussing the passage in 1129a26-30, had accepted that Universal and Particular injustice should more properly be said to be "πρὸς Ἑν λεγόμενα" than "ἔμωνυμα" if one wants to speak in strict Aristotelian language. He also says: "in fact, the two kinds of δικαιοσύνη (or ἀδίκια) are said to be ὀμώνυμα with as much or as little right as the things called ἡγαθὸς are said in Top. 1.15.107a3-17, to be ἔμωνυμος λεγόμενος", and he goes on saying that "the kinds of justice (like the various ἡγαθοῦ) are only called ἔμωνυμα by an exaggeration, perhaps justified by the circumstance that the points in which they differ are very apt to be overlooked". Then, concerning the passage in E.2, 1130a33-b5, he suggests (21) that the two concepts in question can be called συνώνυμα, in terms of belonging to the same category that of Relation.

However, what Stewart's account does is to leave
Aristotle in a self-contradiction, while further problems are created by the suggestion of the "πρὸς ἔν λεγόμενα", since there is no indication as to whether he implies the focal meaning1 (in the strict sense of the *Metaphysics* Γ.2), or the focal meaning2, in the wider sense. And, if what he means by "in strict Aristotelian language"(22), is the focal meaning1, then he is not in accordance with the Aristotelian terminology. On the other hand, he goes on to say that the two concepts in question can be called συνώνυμα in terms of belonging to the same category that of "πρὸς ἔτερον"—although he starts off with the point about the category of "πρὸς τι"—is a more convincing correction both of Aristotle's and of his own self-contradiction, since it is not clear that being in the category of Relation(πρὸς τι) makes two terms συνώνυμα; the most it could show is that the name of the category is applied to them synonymously. Nor, however, is the best solution that being in the category of "πρὸς ἔτερον" makes two terms συνώνυμα, unless that is the definition of the allegedly synonymous term[for, vicious πρὸς ἔτερον is something the two types of injustice share qua types of injustice(23)], but this would not be a complete definition of συνώνυμα in Aristotelian terms. Thus, Stewart tries to justify both passages, while Joachim regards E.2, as a technical
correction on the part of Aristotle.

(c). What the real position of Aristotle is (an interpretation).

So, the problem remains that in 1129a26, Aristotle states that it seems that Δικαιοσύνη and ἁδίκια are πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον, but because of the connection between the homonyms, this homonymy escapes our notice. On the other hand, in E.2(1130b1), he states that there is another kind of ἁδίκια, that of Ἐν μέρει, which is συνώνυμον with the Καθόλου, for they are species of one genus, or belonging to the same category. But, if the two types of ἁδίκια are synonymous, so must the corresponding types of Δικαιοσύνη be.

Now, in order to answer the above question concerning the apparent conflict in Aristotle, we could start with certain dichotomies concerning the distinction between General and Particular justice/injustice:

E.1: "Righteousness" and "Lawfulness" taken to be συνώνυμα within the conception of "Καθόλου Δικαιοσύνη".

E.2: "Καθόλου ᾽Ἐν μέρει Δικαιοσύνη/ἁδίκια": as συνώνυμα in terms of their semantic properties (righteousness, Lawfulness), that is, species of the same genus, as implied by the passage in 1130a32-b1 together with the principle that one opposite is συνώνυμον, if the other
is.

So, the initial question of to what extent "δικαίοσύνη" is an ὁμόνυμον word, is reformulated into the following subquestions:

(a) What the πολλαχῶς λέγεσθαι in E.1, and its relation to ὁμόνυμα is.

(b) What the notion of συνώνυμα, concerning the relation between "Καθόλου - Ἐν μέρει Δικαίοσύνη/ἀδικία" is, or in what terms they are synonymous, and,

(c) Does Aristotle finally concern himself with σύνεγγυς ὁμόνυμα, or with related synonyms (ὁ ἐνοχ γένους λεγόμενα), and how this can be justified by certain lines from the Aristotelian text?

But let us take the first question, and see which the relation between πολλαχῶς λέγεσθαι and ὁμόνυμα is, in terms of Δικαίοσύνη. In fact, Aristotle, in this chapter by speaking of πολλαχῶς λέγεσθαι makes the distinction of homonymous words between those that are ἀι δέ τὸ σύνεγγυς and those that are ἐπὶ τὸν πόρρω, assigning to the first type, words like δικαίοσύνη and its opposite ἀδικία, and to the second type, words like collar-bones and the keys used for closing doors.

So, πολλαχῶς λέγεσθαι in this chapter, is like ὁμόνυμα but in terms of σύνεγγυς ὁμόνυμα, since he states that
δικαιοσύνη and its opposites are such. And which is the σέμεχος δικαίωμα? He states that the δίκτυας is unlawful and greedy, and unrighteous, so, in the same way, the word δικαίωμα is used to refer both to "legal" and to "righteous"; it is equivocated of both, it assigns a different meaning, that of "Lawfulness" (as obedience to the Law), and "righteousness". But this kind of equivocation between "righteousness" and "lawfulness" is not only within the conception of General Justice. In Particular justice, we have seen that a semantic property is the application of righteousness by means of ἴσότης. So, δικαιοσύνη in E.1, is πολλαχὸς λεγόμενον, that is ὁμόνυμον in terms of being σέμεχος ὁμόνυμον by means of referring to the two connected homonyms of "righteousness" and "lawfulness".

As for the second question, concerning συνεχεία, he considers Ἐκλογὴ and Ἐν μέρει δικία (and according to our discussion above, δικαιοσύνη, as well) as συνανωμα since they belong to the same genus. They both refer to the application of "Justice" to another person (πρὸς ζεύγον), with the only differentiation that the Ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνη is concerned with honour, money and every pleasure derived from wealth, while the other is concerned with what the
σημείωσις person is concerned with.

So, what we notice here is that Aristotle, on the one hand, assigns ὀμωνυμία to δίκαιος και ἄδικος in terms of the meanings of "righteousness" and "lawfulness" as they are encountered in καθόλου δίκαιος και ἄδικος, considering them to be σύνεχες ὀμωνυμία. And, on the other hand, he discusses the relation between καθόλου-Ἐν μέρες ἄδικος in terms of συνωνυμία. And this would apply to καθόλου-Ἐν μέρες δίκαιος και ἄδικος as well, according to our principle above, and also, because, in E.2, Aristotle starts discussing ὘ὐκ ἔτι δίκαιος και ἄδικος, first, and immediately after introducing it he passes into its opposite: ἄδικος (24).

But let us examine further whether his treatment of πολλὰχῶς λεγόμενον in E.1, is in fact one of ὀμωνυμία, or, at least of σύνεχες ὀμωνυμία, or not, and whether we can speak of unclear συνωνυμία (if we are allowed to use this expression) or not. In order to answer the first question, we have to show first that his treatment of καθόλου δίκαιος και ἄδικος as being ὀμωνυμία, is not actually such.

So, in his discussion of καθόλου δίκαιος και ἄδικος, what he claims to be πολλὰχῶς λεγόμενον is that we can assign to δίκαιος και ἄδικος the meanings of "righteousness" and
"lawfulness". But, then in 1129b11-14, he states that since the lawless is ἄδικος then the lawful (νόμιμος) is δίκαιος, and it is clear that all the lawful are just, since everything that is defined by the art of legislation (νομοθετική) is considered to be just. And he goes on to say that the laws order everything concerning the society, so that they preserve the balance and happiness of the constituents of a certain political community (1129b16-19). As we said above, this "ἐνα μὲν τρόπον" refers to how law defines righteousness by ordering people to perform virtuous actions, which lead to virtuous dispositions, and the whole of virtue, the καθόλου δικαιοσύνη. As Aristotle says in the Nicomachean Ethics I.9, 1179b34-35, 1180a14-18: "διὸ νόμοις δεὶ τετάχθαι τὴν τροφὴν καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα", "τὸν ἐσόμενον ἁγαθὸν τραφῆναι καλῶς δεὶ καὶ ἐθισθῆναι, ἐὰν ἐκτὸς τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματι ἐπιεικέσι δὴν καὶ μὴ 'ἄχονται μηθ' ἐκόντα πράττειν τὰ φαῦλα, ταῦτα δὲ γίνοιτ' ἰδίως ἰσόμενοις κατὰ τινὰ νοῦν καὶ τάξιν ὀρθῆν, ἔχουσαν ἰσχόν" (25). That is, the notion of laws is closely connected with that of a virtuous life, for it guides the moral education of the young moral agents. Moreover, we could point out that Aristotle here is not clear whether he refers to the written law, which
we see in the conception of *Καθόλου Δικαιοσύνη* or to the unwritten law. In fact, we could infer both, that is, law as both written and unwritten norms that determine the moral principles to which people should obey. In other words, *νόμος* could be ambiguous as much as *δικαιοσύνη* is! Our reasons for regarding law here as both written and unwritten, are based on the fact that Aristotle speaks of it, as an ordering capacity that prescribes virtuous activities (1129b19-25), like one performing courageous, prudent actions, and, generally, according to every moral virtue. But the notion of law that he refers to when speaking of *Ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνη*, is slightly different from here, for there he specifies what kind of law it is, which is the written one.

So, we would notice that in his treatment of law in *Καθόλου Δικαιοσύνη*, Aristotle uses *νόμος* interchangeably to refer both to written and unwritten law, but in his treatment of law (as we could infer by implication of the semantic interrelation between *δίκαιον* [δίκα and ἴσος] in *Ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνη*, he speaks specifically of *διορθωτικόν* and *διανεμητικόν δίκαιον* and what they order (26). Because of their semantic interrelation, and of their relation to righteousness (or justice), law and fairness are con-
sidered to be just, but in different terms: the former in terms of the application of judicial capacity, the latter in terms of the application of ἴσοτης (for, application of justice in judicial terms does not necessarily mean that it is application of ἴσοτης; on the other hand, ἴσοτης is exhibited by means of law).

Consequently, what he does, is to imply that law as written or unwritten, initiated by righteousness leads to the performance of a moral action and finally to the acquisition of Moral Virtue, which, in turn, leads someone to perform legal actions (in both notions of νόμος). So, we would notice a semantic interrelation between νόμος and δίκαιοσύνη (lawfulness and righteousness), or even a semantic identification of δίκαιον, hence of δίκαιοσύνη with νόμος, and a semantic interrelation between νόμος and ἴσοτης.

The following tree diagrams show the dichotomies of the above semantic relations:

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Consequently, we notice that "righteousness" and "lawfulness" are interrelated by means of νόμοι as ἀγορεύουσι περὶ ἀμάντων, since we interpret law here as a universal sovereign which either by means of strict legal terms or education as moral terms, is related to "righteousness", is initiated by it and yields it. And law as a sovereign in a state relates to the notion of Nature, since Nature is the generator of righteousness, and an ideal society should be built according to it, hence, in this case also, law and fairness (as ἴσοτης) are interrelated.

In fact, the notion of Nature is the generator of the legal systems and generally of the ethical norms and values of a society. Nature is present everywhere as the agent of things or situations. It is present both in the primary material, and in its movement, and in the form in which the movement ends. In this way, Nature is what causes the human movement towards political association and the creation of the State and the integration of every human being into the system of a certain State is also by means of the agency of Nature. And since every state is a community of some kind, and every community is established with a view to some good, law itself as an extension of the notion of Nature (in terms of primary material,
movement and the end of the movement), is characterized by righteousness and aims at some good. As Barker says (31), "law is natural because it is moral; as slavery is proved to be natural for the same reason, and as private property is proved to be natural by its moral uses."

So, law should be both naturally and legally just; its righteousness is guided both by social norms and natural ethical parameters. And such a concept of δικαιοσύνη would remind us of the Ἰούνιον Ἰουπτικόν, since it consists of the two interrelated semantic properties: "righteousness πρὸς ὑπερον" and "lawfulness", which we would consider to be συνάνωμα.

Now, this further clue can be shown better by means of adapting the following logical formula to δικαιοσύνη:

(i) If καθόλου δικαιοσύνη is synonymous with Ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνη, then every part of the definition of the former is synonymous with every part of the definition of the latter (and vice-versa).

(ii). a/ "Righteousness" is part of the definition of καθόλου δικαιοσύνη and part of the definition of Ἐν μέρει.

b/ "Law" is also part of the definition of καθόλου δικαιοσύνη and— as we have seen— by implication of
It is also part of the definition of Ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνη.

(iii) Then, we take: a/ "Righteousness" is synonymous with "Law" in Καθόλου δικαιοσύνη, and,
b/ "Righteousness" is synonymous with "Law" in Ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνη.

It is important to keep in mind that from all our above clues, we derive "righteousness" and "law" as συνώνυμα, though not always clearly so. In other words, we reject σύνεγγυς ὀμωνυμία at E.1, and we accept with some misgivings συνωνυμία in E.2.

Moreover, before we draw any conclusion, we should have a look at Aristotle's terminology in NE E. He uses "πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον" in order to render ὀμωνυμία in the conception of Καθόλου δικαιοσύνη, while he uses "συνωνυμία" in order to show the interrelation between Καθόλου-Ἐν μέρει ἀδίκια. But, in strict Aristotelian language, if a word is "πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον", then it is case of ὀμωνυμία [in its narrow, strict sense (32)], requiring different definitions in different uses (Top. 106a1-8), unless the πολλαχῶς λεγόμενα are cases of ὀμωνυμία in its wider sense, that would include the case of πρὸς Ἐν λεγόμενα (33).

As for the interrelation between Καθόλου-Ἐν μέρει ἀδίκια (and δικαιοσύνη), he speaks of συνωνυμία, whose
definition, is that two things are συνάνυμα if they have a common name and a common nature (Cat., 1, 1a1-8). Alexander of Aphrodisias commenting on Metaphysics Z, says that "καθ' ἐν μὲν λεγόμενα λέγει τὰ συνάνυμα καὶ ὅφ' ἐν τῷ κοινόν τεταγμένα γένος" (C.A.G., I, p. 243, 31-32). But again, Καθόλου and Ἐν μέρες διίκες (and διίκοςθον) are not regarded clearly as συνάνυμα (or better, it is not clear that they are), as we see from their treatment in NE E, since they are distinguished into different types of application. That is, it is difficult to consider them to be συνάνυμα in a genus-species-relation.

So, is actually Aristotle playing with his terminology, or, perhaps, he is not absolutely clear himself as to whether Διικοσθόνη is a πολλάχως λεγόμενον, hence an ὁμόνυμον word, in terms of being σύνεχης ὁμόνυμα, or related (or unclear) συνάνυμα, hence not συνάνυμα in strict Aristotelian terminology. Or, did he rather mean, as we would accept, that it is a πολλάχως λεγόμενον in its wider sense of "πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενα"?

(d). What Aristotle might have said (Justice revisited)  

So far, we have seen that every interpretation suffers from the disadvantage of either leaving Aristotle in a self-contradiction, or showing that his terminology is not consistent and interchangeable. Perhaps, one can-
not do any better. Or, is there a way to erase any contradiction and show that Aristotle's terminology is, in fact, more flexible than we would have thought it to be, but not inconsistent? Thus, we would think that Aristotle could have escaped any contradiction by applying a case of a proç én structure to διακατοσύνη and its conceptions.

In fact, at this point, we would find Owen's remark very appropriate: "if focal meaning is to count as a convincing extension of synonymy—if, from his point of view, it is to carry the weight of argument he lays on it—then it is not a strong enough position of focal meaning that the bearers of a predicate should exhibit some "physical" resemblance and that this resemblance should be used to define one sense of the predicate. (34). Then, Owen goes on to say that Aristotle does not define the criteria for focal meaning "he has given only the necessary, not the sufficient conditions for its use."

The whole discussion of διακατοσύνη concerning the various dichotomies and the contradictions applying to the nature of its semantic relations, could be another cryptic display of Aristotle's "πρὸς ἐν καὶ μίαν τινὰ φόσιν λεγόμενα". In order to work out those problems, we have distinguished this term into two con-
ceptions: a narrow one (focal meaning 1), and a wider one (focal meaning 2) that we wish to apply here.

So, first of all, we would consider the πλεονάξως λέγονται in 1129a25, to be in the sense of "πρὸς ἐν καὶ μίαν γίνα φύσιν λεγόμενα" (35), thus justifying once again, the fact that Aristotle did not specify concerning the term of "πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενα". But let us see in what way, the πρὸς ἐν relation would apply in E.1 and E.2:

primary meaning I; Καθόλου δικαίουσιν ὡς ἁγγεία πρὸς ἐπερυθρον and moral excellence (that is identified with Ethical Virtue (see below). And this is the same as focal meaning 2.

derivative application Ia; Καθόλου δικαίουσιν ὡς ἁγγεία πρὸς ἐπερυθρον and application of this by means of law (the same applying to Καθόλου δικαία, in its opposite sense). That is, for Aristotle, something is legal because it is virtuous and the function of the law is to promote virtue, a point that would be useful for the process of the acquisition of δικαίουσιν, as we shall see. So, Καθόλου δικαίουσιν as such is the derivative application of Καθόλου δικαίουσιν as identified with Ethical Virtue.

derivative meaning II: Ἐν μέρει δικαίουσιν ὡς ἁγγεία πρὸς ἐπερυθρον and application of this by means
of ἴσότης.
derivative sense IIa: διανεμητικόν δίκαιον.
derivative sense IIb: διορθωτικόν δίκαιον.
derivative sense IIc: ἀντιπεπονθός δίκαιον.

Now, I, IIa, II, IIa, IIb, IIc, all refer to a common nature, that being the focal meaning2.
core meaning: "application of righteousness,"

And this is shared by all the meanings and applications of the ethical concept of δίκαιοσόνη.

So, Ἔν μέρες δίκαιοσόνη is mainly application of righteousness πρὸς ζετοῦν by means of ἴσότης (which, of course, implies the notion of law, but in a particular sense: of διανεμητικόν, διορθωτικόν, ἀντιπεπονθός, in the attempt to restore the damaged fair situation while Καθόλου δίκαιοσόνη is the application of righteousness πρὸς ζετοῦν by means of Law. In the latter, law is the sovereign, exhibited either as written legislation or as unwritten ethical norms. However, despite their different function, they both refer to a common nature, that of focal meaning2.

Thus, by means of the focal meaning2, we can see that δίκαιοσόνη/δίκαιον in E.1, and E.2, is a case of πλεοναχος λεγόμενον in its wider sense of a πρὸς ἠν λεγόμενον (focal meaning2). In this way, we could possibly
solve Aristotle's contradiction, since we consider the πλεονάξας λέγεσθαι E.1, which is further exemplified by the "σύνεχος ὁμονομία" to imply ὁμονομία in its wider sense that would include the notion of a πρὸς Ἐν structure, and the notion of συνονομία in E.2 to be not a clear one in strict Aristotelian terms.

2/ Καθόλου Ἐν μέρες ὁικοσύνη

So far, we have tried to see how the apparent Aristotelian contradiction can be solved. However, there is also another point that would concern us and this relates to the question of whether the above distinction of General-Particular justice is a genus-species distinction. We have accepted that the two conceptions of justice belong to the same genus (ἐν τῷ ἅθι γένει).

So, the question that arises is which that genus is and which its species might be. The answer is given by Aristotle at 1129b26-7, b31-33, 1130a4, and 1130b1, that being the fact that justice either as particular virtue or as a whole, refers to the relation towards other people, and as an answer to what kind of genus this is, we answer that it is the whole of Ethical Virtue, as being equivalent to General Justice, with the exception that although they are
the same they are conceived differently: as a relation to others, the state is Justice, and as an ethical and intellectual state, it is Ethical Virtue (see further below).

Thus, the genus that we are concerned here is that of General Justice = Ethical Virtue, with the above qualifications. And the definition of this genus refers to what signifies its essence, namely: "righteousness προς τετρον" + lawfulness", which would reflect the universal (ii). And a species of that genus is that of Particular Justice, together with its subdivisions to the distributive and corrective justice and the δικαιοποιηθὸς δίκαιον that serve as further species of the above genus.

So, General Justice as Ἱαθόλον ἁρετή is the genus that serves as the universal notion of Ethical Virtue, and whose definition is shared by all the correspondent species that belong to this genus, namely: Particular Justice, which is a particular species as opposed to the universal genus of Ethical Virtue, and which in turn is a genus including species.

So, this type of universal (ii) is concerned with the genus-species distinction, and in the case of Ethics,
it is considered to apply to the notion of Καθόλου δικαιοσόνη as being equivalent to Ethical Virtue.

And since Καθόλου δικαιοσόνη as καθόλου ἀρετή is the genus that serves as the universal notion of Ethical Virtue, then the species that belong to this genus, should be not only the various other conceptions of Justice, but every other manifestation of an ethical virtue as well.

3/ Relation of Καθόλου δικαιοσόνη to Ἡθικῆ Ἀρετῆ.

We have seen in our discussion above that Καθόλου δικαιοσόνη is related to the notion of Ἡθικῆ Ἀρετῆ as Aristotle states in E.1, 1130a8-10. However, even if δικαιοσόνη is considered to be equivalent to Ethical Virtue, and its activity: ethical action, it is not to be identified with it, because as Aristotle points out, they do not have the same essences: "τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ", since δικαιοσόνη applies to πρὸς ἔτερον, while Ethical Virtue is just an ἔξεσθαι.

Concerning this point, the Anonymous (37) ancient commentator says: "ἐστι μὲν γὰρ κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἢ αὐτὴ... κατὰ δὲ τὸν λόγον καὶ τὸ εἶναι διαφέρει ἀλλάζων, καθόσον ἢ ἡλικία ἀρετῆ, ἐστὶν ἔξεσθαι ψυχῆς λογικῆς ἀρίστη, ὡς δὲ δικαιοσόνη χρήσις ἐστὶ τῆς τοιαύτης ἔξεσθαι πρὸς ἔτερον". According to the Anonymous, the two concepts differ from one another in terms of the "λόγον"
definition, or account of the nature of them, but not in terms of the "ὑποκείμενον" (subject). Their difference is based on the fact that Ethical Virtue is the most excellent state of the logical part of the soul, while δικαιοσύνη is the application of this state to our social relationships within the political community.

Stewart (38) considers Ethical Virtue and General Justice to be the same state, but conceived from different points of view, in the sense that the former is conceived simply as a state, while the latter is conceived as putting its possessor in a certain relation to society. Moreover, Joachim (39) follows the view that the two concepts in question differ from one another in terms of their definition. That is, the definition of being just would differ from that of "μὴ ἡθικὴ ἡμετη, because it would include the "πρὸς άτέρον" relation.

So, it is commonly accepted by the commentators that the two concepts in question do not possess the same meaning, or the same essence, since the essence is a set of features specified in its own definition. Hence by defining the nature of a substance, we define its essence (40). The two concepts might share some semantic features, but not all, since their "λόγος τῆς οὐ-
σιάς" (as a theory of meaning) differs from one another:

"Καθόλου δικασίασόνη": "a state of righteousness as τε-λεία ἄρετη (1129b30ff)" + "application of this righteousness πρὸς ἔτερον (1130a12-13)", the Ia, we have seen above.

"Ηθική ἄρετή: "a habitual state being a μεσότης be-tween two extremes (1106b36)" + "guided by reason and φρόνησις (1107a1)" + "a habituated state (1106b36)".

So, even when Aristotle says (1130a9-10) that General justice is not part of Ethical Virtue, but the whole of it, he does not imply any interpretation of the former with the latter, but interaction between them, clarifying his position immediately after it, by saying that they do not have the same essences (1130a12-13). Since they reflect different realities, the names that describe those realities possess different meanings. In fact, we would think that Καθόλου δικασίασόνη and Ηθική ἄρετη, reflect different realities not in that the events-elements that constitute these realities are completely different from one another—for, after all, they share some resemblance to each other—but, mainly, in the sense that the former is just one manifestation of the latter. It is a τελεία ἄρετή ὧν τῆς τελείας ἄρετής χρήσις ἐστὶν.
That is, it is a perfect virtue in that it is a performance of the perfect Virtue in relation to others; that is the important point and the suggestion in his text that justice is to virtue as performance is to disposition is not very fortunate since both justice and virtue are dispositions which must be expressed in activity if they are to be of any value.

Thus, Ἐνθὸλον δίκαιοςόνη is a manifestation of Ἱθική Ἁρετή, and it shares some interactive points with it. For example, let us consider the case of someone who is virtuous since he/she lives according to written and unwritten laws of Nature and of Society, and, generally he/she is virtuous in every way by being prudent, brave, or even magnanimous. That is, that person has developed certain ἡξίως (habituations) that refer to certain realities, those that constitute the reality of the Ethical Virtue.

In fact, we would agree with Hardie(41) that Aristotle on the one hand seems to identify the former with the latter and on the other, he distinguishes their meanings. However, we must also point out—as we said above—that his main concern in E.1, is to show that Ἐνθὸλον δίκαιοςόνη is manifested as obedience to law, and such a principle should be guided both by the fact that

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laws aim at the preservation of order and by the fact that they prescribe ethical norms in accordance with other virtues in order to achieve balance in the political community. That is, General Justice is ex definitione manifested as a πρός ξίρον case, while Ethical Virtue, is mainly considered to be a habituation of moral excellence manifested as Καθόλου δίκαιοσόνη (as righteousness πρός ξίρον). And, as we have seen above the latter is the primary meaning I, while the former is the derivative application Ia of this meaning.

Thus, Aristotle needed two different conceptions in order to express those distinct details of the two realities in question. And he actually made their ontological distinction quite clear, hence their semantic one too.

(B), Ἐοςικτὴν Νόμο δίκαιον (NE E, 7)

In the Nicomachean Ethics E, 7, Aristotle refers to the notion of Political justice, whose subdivisions are the natural right and the legal right (1134b18-21). In fact, according to Joachim (42), Aristotle begins by claiming absolute (universal) validity for natural (political) right, at 1134b18-24: "ευσίχων μὲν τὸ πολυτάχος τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον δύναμιν, καὶ ὅτι τῷ δοκεῖν ἡ μῆ, νομικὸν δὲ θὲ ἐκ ἀρχῆς μὲν οὐδέν διαφέρει οὕτως ἢ ἐξ—
That is, that which is ἰσός right, is right in itself, as opposed to what is in itself neither right nor wrong but has been made right by the legislation of a certain community (43).

Then, at 1134b24-27, he states the opposite view, according to which all right is relative and variable, since all that is νόμω is contrasted with what is ἰσός: "ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἰσός ἀξίωμα τοῦ καὶ πανταχὺ τὴν αὐτὴν ἰσότητα ἔχει δύναμιν.... τὰ δὲ δικαία πίνακέμενα δρόμων". But, then, at 1134b27-30: "παρ' ἡμῖν ἰσός μὲν τι καὶ ἰσός, ἀξίωμα μὲντι πάν, ἀλλ' ἰσός ἰσός τὸ μὲν ἰσός τὸ δ' οὖ ἰσός", where he takes the extreme view that all rights in human society are variable, but as Joachim says (44), "there is sufficient difference of degree in their variability to justify the distinction between ἰσός and νόμω δικαίων" (Aristotle himself points that out in 1134b30-33). And, here, we should also state that this latter statement by Aristotle is not in contradiction with the notion of one constitution that is best everywhere, since there is a question as to whether Aristotle says that such a constitution would be best for everyone. In fact, he does not imply that (see below).

So, for example, according to a law of nature both all people are potentially ambidextrous and most
people are naturally inclined to use their right hand rather than their left (1134b34-35). This is a natural law that applies universally to all people regardless of their race, colour, age, sex, sociopolitical background and religion. And, at the same time, this right shows the variability that Aristotle wants to apply even to the natural right, although there are also cases of the natural law that is universally invariable, like the example that he uses concerning fire, which is the same everywhere. Another example would be the natural law of gravity that applies the same everywhere. What this shows is that analogy between "natural law" as applied to Physics and "natural law" in Ethics is not a complete one.

As for the conventional right, Aristotle takes it to be the one that is variable everywhere, and it is according to the ruling system of a city-state, its sociopolitical status. So, measures for wine and for corn are not of equal size everywhere, but in wholesale markets they are bigger, and in retail smaller (1135a 1-3). What Aristotle's point would be is that (i) the actual size of the measures varies from one state to another, and so is conventional, but (ii) it is still the case that wholesale measures are everywhere bigger than retail, because of the (general) utility.
of this being so, Another example would be the way that a criminal is judged is according to the Criminal Law of a state, and the application of punishment as rectificatory justice, is based on this law as well. But there is a distinction between (i) the fact that thieves are punished in (all, perhaps) societies and (ii) what the penalty in each society is. And such a law is always subject to the sociopolitical conventions of this state, and even more to the conception of morality that a certain society holds. That is, law written or unwritten is affected by both the sociopolitical conventions of a society and by the ethical norms that govern the morality of the citizens of this political community, because law aims at righteousness, hence it is affected by the ethical norms as well. And here we should also emphasize the fact that Aristotle's examples are very arbitrary.

But, even if the particular cases of the application of Justice are subject both to the ethical norms and the conventional right of each society, there is an ideal πολιτεία, which is by nature the ἀριστη, and it is manifested in various ways, as imperfect reflections of it, in every application of justice (as a general rule) to particular instances. That is, the ideally best πολιτεία acts like a κόσμος as
opposed to the \( \chi\alpha\theta\varepsilon\chi\alpha\sigma\tau\omicron\nu; \) the best \( \pi\omicron\lambda\iota\zeta\zeta\iota\alpha \) is imperfectly represented in every particular society, and this applies to the way justice is applied in this society.

The way that Aristotle thinks of the organization of the ideal constitution of a State in his \textit{Politics}, could be very relevant to his discussion of political justice. He suggests\(^{45}\) that the functions which have to be discharged in the State are six: the provision of food, the practice of arts, the profession of arms, the acquisition of wealth, the cult of gods, and the determination of what is right and expedient for the whole society\(^{46}\). And the discharge of all these functions is the attainment of complete "independence". Of course, each kind of a constitution would manifest differently those functions, namely, in democracy all men share the same function, in others we take the right man in the right place\( (\textit{Pol.} \Delta, 3-9) \).

Now, the best constitution is the which is based on moderation and the mean, for those are the elements according to which a citizen can achieve the happy life, the life of excellence without impediment\( (\textit{Pol.} \Delta 11, 1295\alpha 36-41, \textit{NE} A, 10, 2, 13) \). That is why he considers the most vigorous class of the ideal state to be the middle one, where there is both quality and quantity.
of the goods and of the number of people that share them equally. So, the moderate and democratic character of the Aristotelian ideal state, would be another manifestation of the notion of political justice, as application of righteousness according to the conventions of a society and its ethical norms. For the legislators of this constitution and its people are all guided by these moral principles and by nature aim at righteousness as citizens of a political community.

Furthermore, the discussion of the best constitution and whether it applies everywhere or not, is closely connected with the question of how far Aristotle thinks that universal rules apply in practice. What we should make clear is that for Aristotle-as implied by NE E.7, 1134b29-30-the best constitution would not apply the same everywhere. In fact, Politics A.2, suggests that Aristotle would not regard his Ideal State as appropriate for those barbarians whose society "consists entirely of slaves", and, he suggests so because none of them are fitted to be anything else. And, after all, in Politics A.11, 1296b 3-11, Aristotle talks about the best constitution for most states and people, but not for everyone. And that would mean that it is variable, for, the notion of the
best constitution could be one of the examples of the "rapper is MVP of the game" (NE E.7,1134b31).
And, it is noteworthy that Aristotle does not give examples of invariable natural right.

So, for Aristotle, there can be universal rules that do not apply in the same way in practice, and such an example would be the notion of the best constitution. This does not mean that for every society there should be a different form of a best constitution, because, then, we would not speak of a natural law that can be variable, but of a conventional law that is variable, anyway. What we want to emphasize is that, for Aristotle, there can be a best constitution that can be universally accepted in practice, to the extent that it is the best for the most people, and which would not apply to a society of slaves, or barbarians, possibly implying a society that is bereft of any unified cultural identity. And this best constitution is the one composed of middle-class (people who possess everything in moderation) "in respect of the elements of which we say the fabric of the state naturally consists" (Politics A.11,1295b28-29), hence justifying the point that for Aristotle the notion of best constitution is universally accepted (for it is a natural law), and applies only
to the most people, but not to everyone.

Now, the above point brings in the question of how exactly the distinction of Θόσσω-Νόμω δίκαιον applies to cases in Ethics. So, for example, according to the old Islamic law, if a person stole anything, he/she would be punished by being deprived of his/her hand. In another society, like the Christian, it would still be an unjust action, but the punishment would be different, often based on the circumstances the incident happened, what led a person to perform such an action, and various other criteria, that are examined by the judges, whose punishment will be according to the Rectificatory Law of this society. Of course, there are various societies reflecting various beliefs, but even in that case, they must share some common characteristics in their legal systems. The diversity of the beliefs is promoted by religion which affects the legislation of a society. So, the punishment of the thief will be different from one society to the other subject to the conditions of Law that each society has.

However, despite the differences that exist due to the variability of the conventional right, there is a universality in the notion of justice itself, and in the meaning of the word of Justice as well, So, everywhere
there is a legal system and some unwritten norms that serve as a guide of morality in a certain society; that is, everywhere the notion of justice exists and it is connected with the preservation of balance within a political community, but it is applied differently in each society. Perhaps one can distinguish the following levels: (ia) the universal belief that there is such a thing as justice, (ib) shared beliefs not just that such a thing exists but also about some aspects of its content, (ii) as a consequence of (ib), shared beliefs about certain actions being unjust (theft, for example), (iii) differences between societies over justice or otherwise of certain actions and certain punishments.

Moreover, even if there are various conceptions of the word "Justice", and various applications that it employs within a certain language and amongst various languages, there are some universal semantic properties that all of those applications of justice share. And these semantic properties constitute the so-called core meaning, which is universal, and in the case of justice would consist of:

("application of righteousness πρὸς ἔτερον" + "restoration of balance"). Now, the way this meaning applies, is according to the conventional right of a
If the application of Justice in a certain community is to imprison the thieves, in another to kill them, then this is justice for a certain society but injustice in another. They seek righteousness in a different way, but they all possess some kind of universal (iii) truth of what justice is. That is, there might be universal notions of what constitutes a crime, even more universal than notions of the just punishment for a particular crime, and these exist because of the nature of the human beings and human society, which is (up to a point) the same everywhere.

Similarly, in certain African tribes, it is right and proper according to custom that the most powerful warrior of the tribe becomes the chief of it, the one who governs all. On the other hand, in other European and non-European countries, the leader of a government is elected by the citizens of a community, and he/she together with the other members of a government seeks for a well-established community. Thus, in both cases, there is a tendency to establish a well-governed and well-preserved community that seeks the happiness and well-maintenance of its citizens. And, in fact, this is a natural law itself: it is such that every society seeks for the preservation of balance.

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of its citizens by means of a good-governing system; it is a natural right universally accepted. That is, the notion of the best constitution is a natural right universally accepted; the way that this is exhibited in each society varies and it is up to the conventions of those. The origin, however, is natural, hence universal, in the sense of καθόλου (iii).

Furthermore, we have seen that this universal (iii) in Ethics, would relate to the notion of core meaning which in the notion of δικαιοσύνη would have two tasks: (a) to show the cross-linguistic (cultural) similarities in terms of justice and its application, and (b) to refer to the common semantic components that all the meanings and senses/application of the ethical concept of Justice share, within a certain language.

And, at this point, we could also see how the notion of political justice would relate to that of General Justice. We have seen above in our discussion of a πρός ζήν structure applying to the concept of δικαιοσύνη, that General Justice as application of righteousness πρός ζτερον and moral excellence is the primary meaning. Then, we also have:

derivative meaning III: political justice.
derivative sense/application IIIa: ἄθαντες δίκαιον

derivative sense/application IIIb: νόμῳ δίκαιον.

And, here, we should also remind ourselves of the other derivative application and meanings of the concept of δίκαιοσόνη:

derivative application Ia: Καθόλου δίκαιοσόνη as righteousness πρὸς ἔτερον and application of this by means of Law.

derivative meaning IIa: Ἐν μέρες δίκαιοσόνη as righteousness πρὸς ἔτερον and application of this by means of ἴσος (or fairness).

derivative application IIIa: δικαιεμητικόν δίκαιον.

derivative application IIIb: διορθωτικόν δίκαιον.

derivative application IIIc: ἀντιπεπονθός δίκαιον.

So, concerning the various derivative meanings and applications of δίκαιοσόνη, we would say that the "just" in the "just person" who lives in accordance with the laws of his/her community and exhibits righteousness towards a fellow human being in every activity of his/her life is related to the "just" in the "just merchant" who tries to sell his/her goods at a fair price and in accordance with the regulations of the market, in order to achieve a profit for himself/herself and also to be fair to his/her customers. However, it would function in a
different way. Similarly, the "just" in the above "just person" would relate to the "just" in the "just law" which prescribes that there should be a state of "ἀντιπραγματισμός" (as a medium of exchange) that should accompany all the transactions. This would be a natural law, applying universally to be part of the Ethics of commerce, and it refers to the natural agreement on a medium of exchange (whose value would differ from place to place) for all the business transactions. So, here we have an example of General Justice by the "just man", an example of Particular Justice by the "just merchant", an example of natural right by the "just commercial law" referring to the notion of a medium of exchange accompanying all the transactions, and the notion of ἀντιπραγματισμός would be an example of "justice" in terms of a conventional right.

(C). The development of our understanding of Justice

So far, we have been examining the distinctions concerning the ethical concept of δίκαιοςόνη, and the kinds of universals that Aristotle distinguishes with regard to it. Now, a question relevant to our concerns would be how the above ethical concept is acquired by the moral agent. We would think that during the first stage, the moral agent apprehends
all the ἔνδοξα concerning the concept of δικαιοσύνη, either they are moral actions of ethical λειτουργία and acquires an understanding of the δικαιοσύνη as ἀρχὴ[Α]. And, in fact, those ἔνδοξα are formulated by the laws of a society, but this does not mean that the ἔνδοξα would lead an individual to a knowledge of conventional justice sooner than to that of natural justice, since the laws of a society will include some of what is naturally right. And this process of understanding the ἔνδοξα would continue in stage 2, when further experience is added, until the individual reaches stage 3, when he/she has acquired experience of what δικαιοσύνη in general is, and has performed various just actions. Throughout these stages, the moral agent acquires a vague understanding of what fairness (as ἴσοςτης) is.

At stage 4, the moral agent has achieved a further understanding of what δικαιοσύνη as an ἀρχὴ[Β] is, and this would apply to understanding of the Καθολοῦ δικαιοσύνη both as primary meaning I and as derivative application Ia, of the Ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνη as application of righteousness πρὸς ζεσφόν by means of ἴσοςτης, of its derivative applications, and of the derivative meaning III (and its applications...
Illa, IlIb). However, what have to indicate here is that the ethical concept of δικαίοσύνη[as opposed to ἀνάρξια, and to some extent to Ἰς (47)], is not concerned with different realities. Where δικαίοσύνη is concerned degrees of realities are not concerned, since we cannot speak of apparent justice or inferior justice as opposed to the true one described by the primary meaning I. So, in the case of the acquisition of the ethical concept of δικαίοσύνη, the notions of ἀρχαὶ [A], [B] and [C] would apply only to a different degree of understanding of those conceptions of δικαίοσύνη and incorporation of those in the individual's understanding.

So, at stage 4, the moral agent acquires ethical understanding of what General Justice is, which would promote his/her understanding of Particular Justice as well, since the former (at least in its primary meaning I) is connected with the notion of moral excellence, and then with law-abidingness (in its derivative application Ia), and for Aristotle virtue (at first) and law (secondly) must be the culmination of the process. So, understanding of General Justice is presupposed for understanding of the Particular Justice in the same way that the understanding of virtue as a whole is needed for that of
any particular virtue.

At this stage, the moral agent also acquires further understanding of the notion of fairness which had acquired vaguely at an earlier stage, and which, would precede the understanding of law-abidingness. Even if understanding of General Justice is presupposed for that of the Particular Justice, and the former is connected with law-abidingness while the latter with fairness, we have seen that some understanding of fairness comes first in the process of the acquisition, since fairness is also connected with the notion of virtue, and virtue comes first. And, here, we should also indicate what Aristotle says in the Politics Γ.12,1282b18: "it seems to everyone that ΤΟ ΔΙΧΟΙΟΝ IS ΤΟΝ ΤΙ", hence identifying the notion of justice with that of ΤΟΙΟΥΣ, and implicitly accepting that for every moral agent the development of the understanding of justice is connected with that of the notion of ΤΟΙΟΥΣ (as fairness). After all, fairness is concerned with the restoration of balance which then takes place by means of law. And this would not mean that understanding of the derivative meaning II, and its applications IIa, IIb, IIc, would precede that of the derivative application I, for it is only some understanding of fairness that we acquire first.
and which is fully acquired later.

At stage 5, the moral agent comes to acquire full understanding of the primary meaning I, and of all the derivative applications and meanings. It is when he/she acquires full understanding of the focal meaning 2, the common reference of all, which justifies the claim that understanding of General Justice should precede that of Particular Justice. Also, at this stage, the moral agent acquires understanding of the notion of the core meaning, that is, of the common semantic components that all the conceptions of justice share, and is able to see the semantic interrelations of the various meanings.

Furthermore, at this stage, the moral agent possesses full understanding of what is objectively real and universal in terms of the ethical concept of δικαιοσύνη. All the conceptions of δικαιοσύνη reflect objective realities, but it is only the primary meaning I that is the only one that is objectively real and universal, in the sense of καθόλου (iv). So, at stage 5, the moral agent possesses full understanding of the objective reality of the universal truth of δικαιοσύνη. That is, he/she possesses understanding of δικαιοσύνη as universal (iv). Thus, the notion of καθόλου δικαιοσύνη as application of righteousness
πρὸς ἔργον (by means of law-fulness) and by being equivalent to moral excellence would be what describes the universal (iv), the objective reality of the universal ethical truth of δικαίοςόνη. And such an ethical understanding of the ultimate happiness for a human being, for, by knowing what justice as a real and fundamental truth is, he/she can attain his/her personal happiness.

(D), The basis for universal (iv),

Having accepted the existence of universal ethical truths, we must also examine another underlying issue connected with the question of their existence, and that is the reasons for believing that there are universal ethical truths in his doctrine. There must be grounds on which Aristotle in his system can justify asserting the existence of ethical universals (iv), what we call the "quasi-Platonic Aristotelian universals". If Plato's answer to Protagoras was the existence of a transcendent world of Forms that he could appeal to, what the Aristotelian foundation would be. We would think that there are two main candidates for explaining this: (i) on the one hand, there are common facts of human nature concerned with the notion of ἔργον of human beings, and (ii) the possible role of the Active Intellect. Let us examine
each of those separately.

According to Aristotle, the notion of the human εὐδαιμονία is closely connected with the notion of human ἔργον. And the notion of human ἔργον is a natural law that applies to all the human beings everywhere, with some variation, of course, owing to the different circumstances in which it is motivated or performed. That is, the notion of a human ἔργον would be a universal (iii), with variations. But why is the human εὐδαιμονία derived from the human ἔργον? The answer is not a difficult one, thinking of the fact that the Aristotelian doctrine is a teleological one, hence every human activity should aim towards an end.

In fact, this connection between the human ἔργον and the human εὐδαιμονία as the best for man, is explicit in the Nicomachean Ethics A.7, 1097b26-28:

"ὅπερ γὰρ σάλληται καὶ ἀγαλματοποιή καὶ παντὶ τεχνίτη, καὶ ὅλως ἐν ἔστι ἔργον τι καὶ πράξις, ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ εἶναι τῷ ἔργῳ αὐτῷ" (for, just as the good, i.e. [doing] well, for a flautist, a sculptor, and every craftsman, and, in general, for whatever has a function and [characteristic] action, seems to depend on its function, the same seems to be true for a human being, if a human being has some function) (48) Now, in 1098a 3-5, Aristotle says: "λείπεται δὲ πρακτικὴ τις τοῦ λό-
the remaining possibility, then, is some sort of life of action of the [part of the soul] that has reason. Now, this [part has two parts, which have reason in different ways], one as obeying the reason [in the other part], the other as itself having reason and thinking — we have accepted that the human function is the soul's activity that expresses reason or requires reason, and the same function belongs to a thing of a certain kind and to an excellent thing of that kind).

So, for Aristotle the human function is an activity in accordance with reason and it expresses the best activity of the human soul, hence it is connected with virtue, and is presupposed for the attainment of the human ευδαιμονία. As Plato in the Republic, shows that justice is a necessary condition of human flourishing, in the same way, Aristotle accepts that a thing's excellence is the essential condition of its performing well its ἔργον, hence, the excellent activity of the soul will produce human flourishing. And if the function is the same, the activity will be the
Now, this state of human εὐδαιμονία is what the universal ethical truths reflect, since they refer to the ethical axioms, the ἀρχαί[π], described by the primary meaning; and understanding of all those primary meanings is what constitutes the ethical understanding of human flourishing. If a person possesses ethical understanding of all the possible ethical universals (iv), then he/she is a συνεκτόνος, and also he/she knows what the ethical requirements for living a good life are. And if he/she produces such a living, then he/she finally attains εὐδαιμονία.

Thus, the human function that leads someone to knowledge of the ethical universals (iv), and finally to the highest of all, justifying why for Aristotle these ethical universals (iv) should exist.

Another justification for their existence in the Aristotelian doctrine, would be the notion of the Active Intellect, which is an inborn endowment common to all the people. Alexander of Aphrodisias' view on the Active Intellect is that it is not peculiar to each individual, but it is the same for all, and it is identified with God (49). However, it is not clear how the existence of a single Active Intellect would guarantee that the same truths would be apprehensible.
by all the people. Alexander is not explicit on this point. He accepts that the Active Intellect is a pure form not embodied in matter; it is the cause of the \( \xi \) of our intellect (50). And this pure form is considered to be identical with the Unmoved Mover of the *Metaphysics* A, in that it is the first cause (51).

So, concerning the above point of whether the same truths are apprehensible by all people, opinions are diversified. Norman (52) has suggested that "thought of oneself" as attributed to the Unmoved Mover in *Metaphysics* A.9, indicates abstract thought (human or divine) directed to forms that are already present in the mind, hence they do not require to be abstracted from matter. Sorabji (53) has suggested that non-discursive thought—such as that of the Unmoved Mover—includes all thought of definitional truths. That is, he accepts that the Unmoved Mover will possess knowledge of the definitions. Merlan (54) suggests further on Alexander as interpreting Aristotle, that our intellect by apprehending the divine intellect, also apprehends its eternal objects.

However, we must indicate that it is difficult to build more on these foundations, since neither Alexander nor Aristotle are explicit on the above...
point. What we would accept concerning this point is that, both Alexander and Aristotle would have accepted that the same truths are apprehensible by all the people since the Active Intellect is identified with the first cause, which is the same for all the people, and with the collective human understanding or culture. That is, in the sense that the Active Intellect possesses a divine element common to all the people and is the cause of all our knowledge, and in the sense of being identified with the collective human understanding, and since there exist objective realities everywhere that the Active Intellect actualizes in our mind, then we should think that there are objective realities of ethical universals (iv) that are apprehensible by all people.

But then, why a single Active Intellect should imply objective, universal truths? As we have seen, the Active Intellect is concerned with cognition, and then the immediate question would be why we should have the faculty of cognition and practice of it, if there are not real and fundamental objects for us to cognize accurately. In other words, Nature does nothing in vain. And the Active Intellect is one of Nature's interference with our cognitive and ethical development, since the Active Intellect gives us the
power to cognize ethical truths, hence there must be such objective, and universal truths to be cognized. If Nature has endowed the human being with the capacity to develop cognitive-ethical understanding, it must have done it because there has been a reason, and that is teleological: to understand the underlying fundamental ethical realities, to understand the objective and universal ethical truths. And why should we understand those truths? Because, unless there is a collective human understanding (originating in Nature and guided by it) we cannot achieve communication with each other and be happy within our community.

And, in any way, Aristotle is essentially a realist and a rationalist. He would need a ground for justifying that there must be universal ethical truths, since there should be a way for prescribing the requirements for moral behaviour, and for human morality in general. And he would also need a ground for justifying why, after all, we get to possess such an advanced ethical understanding given the limitations of the data available. If Plato's answer would be the Forms, Aristotle's as a realist would be the universal ethical truths, the ethical universals (iv). And, since, those reflect a higher degree of underlying, objective
reality, we call them "quasi-Platonic Aristotelian universals". Those are justified by the fact that the human έργον towards εὐδαιμονία is universal (iii), and Active Intellect functions in the same way in all people. And, at the same time, the ethical universals (iv) constitute the universal ethical truths, which as ethical axioms prescribe the human morality.
ENDNOTES

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(1). Cf. terminology p. 21, and section (D) of this chapter.


(5). Stewart, (1892), pp. 404-5.

(6). Concerning this point, Vinogradoff, (1922), pp. 57-59, considers Aristotle's scheme of Justice to be based on juridical categories, like crime and punishment. Shorey, (1924), p. 274, in criticizing Vinogradoff's position, says that Aristotle's scheme of Justice seems to be an ethical rather than a legal conception and that the legal reference is only brought in illustration of the ethical idea.

(7). NE E.2, 1130b31-32.


(9). Hofmann, (1950), p. 69, says that δίχα means division into two equal parts.


(12). Cf. section (A.3) of this chapter.
(13). Here, Aristotle connects the notion of a lawful upbringing with the habituation to a virtuous life, although, a few lines later in 1130b29, he distinguishes between a good man and a good citizen. Irwin, (1985), p. 333, argues that not every good citizen is a genuinely good man. We would agree with him, and we could refer to various reasons for that such as, the goodness of this man is a matter of habit, an ἀρχή[B] as opposed to ἀρχή[C], or that he/she is good according to the standards of the state he/she lives in, so, if the state is not good then his/her morality will be affected. Or, even one is a good citizen in terms of obeying the laws, pays his/her taxes, this does not mean that he/she has a morally virtuous life (he/she might be bad to his/her family, betray his/her friends or cause unhappiness to his/her companion).

(14). Discussion of the issue of ambiguity of the opposites is given by Sharples, (1985), pp. 109-111, with reference to the involuntary as not being πολλαχῶς λέγόμενον.


Also, concerning this point, Heliodorus says in C.A.G. (XIX, 2), p. 86.17ff: "δοκεῖ δὲ ἐν τῇ σημαίνειν τὴν δι-
κασιστώνη καὶ τὴν ἀδικίαν διὰ τὸ τὰ σημασιόμενα μὴ σφόδρα διαφέρειν ἄλληλαν".

(21). Cf. note (19).
(22). Cf. previous chapter on focal meaning1 and focal meaning2, pp. 274-277.
(23). That is, to be συνόνυμα things must share the definition relating to their common name.
(24). That becomes obvious in the text, where the transition from ἀδικοστή to ἀδικία takes place almost immediately: "ἀδεσποτως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀδικίας τῆς κατὰ μέρος" (NE E.2, 1130a15-16).
(25). "Hence laws must prescribe their upbringing and practices", "As we have said, then, someone who is to be good must be finely brought up and habituated, and then must live in decent practices, doing nothing base either willingly or unwillingly. And this will be true if his/her life follows some sort of understanding and correct order that has influence over him/her".
(26). Concerning the notion of Law, Heliodorus in C.A. G. (XIX, 2), says that what is defined by legislation is νόμιμον (legal) and are called δικαία; and whatever
law is concerned with, so is δικαιοσύνη; and that law gives orders about everything: "ἐκαστὸν γὰρ τὰν νομὶ-μων καὶ δίκαιον ἔστιν διὰ μὲν τὸν νόμον περὶ ταῦτα καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην εἶναι συμβαίνει, ἀλλ' ὁι νόμοι περὶ ἀπάντων ἀγορεύουσι στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ συμ-φέροντος τῆς πολιτείας ἀπάσης", p. 87, 11-14. Anonymous in C, A, G, (XX), says that law is concerned with vir-tuous activities and the preservation of the vir-tues: "ποιητικὰ τῆς θλής ἀρετῆς ἔστι τὰν νομὶμων θοα-νεμοθετηται περὶ παιδείαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινόν", 214, 22-25. In addition, Stewart (1892), pp. 390-1, says that Law is represented as a positive system aiming at the regulation of the whole of life, while νόμος has a wider meaning than law, and also includes all that we understand by custom as sanctioned by public opinion. Gauthier & Jolif, in their commentary on NE, refer to νόμιμον and δίκαιον as related under the condition that conformity to law is justice, law being sovereign and universal, pp. 385-392.

(27). Cf. previous note, and section (B), pp. 365-371.
(28). Phys, A, 1, 193a28, 193b12, 193a30; Pol, A, 2, 1252b32.
(29). Politics, A, 2, 1253a1-5.

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(35) Cf. chapter 4, p. 274.
(36) NE E 1, 1129b26-30.
(38) Stewart, (1892), p. 401.
(40) Cf. chapter 4, pp. 293-4.
(49) Alexander's De Anima 89, 9-19.
(50) Ibid., 88, 24-89, 8.
(52) Norman, (1979b), pp. 100-1.
1. True courage

Aristotle presents the ethical concept of ἀνέρεια (courage) as a μεσότης between two extremes, which are "cowardice" and "boldness" (μεσότης έστι περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρους) (NE Γ.6, 1115a6-7). According to him, the ἀνέρειος is the kind of person who does not fear anything (1), on the one hand, he/she does not also feel excessively bold, on the other. That is, he/she is the kind of person that has the capacity of superseding difficult situations, and never being overwhelmed either by fear or by excessive confidence. For example, deaths that occur during a war, that is, during the greatest and finest danger, are the concern of a courageous man (Γ.6, 1115a29-31, a34-35).

Now, what people seem to be frightened by are all bad things, like: bad reputation, poverty, sickness, friendlessness, death. But, fear of some bad things, like bad reputation, is actually right and good, and lack of fear is disgraceful (1115a10-13).

However, the ἀνέρειος should not be considered to be a person without fears at all. After all, the ethical
virtue of ἀνάρεξις is concerned with fear by means of being the μέσον περὶ φόβους (a man in respect of fears). And as a virtue that also expresses a psychological state, it is linked with our feelings of fear more than with those of confidence, since "fear is the painful emotion excited by the expectation of a bodily injury, which is painful and dangerous to life, and which is imminent" (3). This would apply to the greatest object of fear, that being death since it is the end and nothing is thought to be any longer either good or bad for the dead (NE 1115a26).

So, what Aristotle means by saying "ὁ δὲ ἀνάρεξις ἀνέχεσθαι ὡς ἄνθρωπος" (4), does not mean that he/she is fearless, but that he/she is not overwhelmed by fear. After all, since the ἀνάρεξις is an ἄνθρωπος, he/she must be affected by the feeling of fear; he/she must feel fear somehow, particularly during those situations that impose imminent danger, otherwise he/she is not a normal human being. In fact, what the phrase "ὡς ἄνθρωπος" means is that the ἀνάρεξις is not overwhelmed by fear and feels it only to the extent that a rational human being would do. That is, it is reasonable for a human being to feel fear of certain things, but it is even more rational and morally virtuous to be able to endure the dangers to
the extent that the ἀνήρειος ὁ ἄνθρωπος should do, for this will happen ἔνεκα τοῦ καλοῦ towards which all human beings should aim.

The Aristotelian ethical model for every human being is to be a person performing virtuous actions that will lead him/her to acquire certain habituations which are necessary for the attainment of his/her end, and even more of εὐδαιμονία. Thus, the ἀνήρειος is also the person who ὁ ἄνθρωπος must endure dangers because it is a fine thing (τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα) (Γ.7, 1115b12-13), and it is part of the process of the attainment of the desirable end. In Aristotle's ethical theory, the end of every moral action is identical with the end of the formed habit (1115b20-21); the end of courage is "τὸ καλὸν".

So, as an answer to Aristotle's rhetorical question in 1115a25-26 concerning the criteria for things to be "ὑποβερᾶ" (fearful), we infer that the courageous person is willing to act accordingly, that being endurance of the most fearful thing of all; death. And the ἀνήρειος is presented as the person who, although he/she is aware of the perils he/she might be entangled with, is willing to face all the possible obstacles, even if his/her life is endangered for the sake of what is fine.
(2) ἀνόρεξία: virtue or emotion (or both)?

Now, there is a question as to whether ἀνόρεξία is an emotion (or feeling) or a virtue. We do know that for Aristotle (5) every moral virtue necessarily involves some feelings, which are materials for it, and which accompany it, since the moral virtues are acquired by means of performing virtuous actions and of habituating to certain ἐξερευνάται. For in order to perform moral actions we are urged by certain desires, which act as psychic pursuit and are, in fact, the initial stages of our προσέρεψις (6).

So, as an answer to the above question, we would say that ἀνόρεξία is an ἐξερευνάται relating to the two emotions of fear and confidence which are emotions in that they are expressions of a man's ἔθος (7) and they are connected with the particular desire of avoiding something, in the case of fear, or the desire of earnestly seeking something in the case of confidence. Concerning the notion of ἀνόρεξία as a μεσότης, Hursthouse in her article (8), says that according to Aristotle, ἔθική ἀρετή is an excellence of character, a disposition in virtue of which we are well disposed in respect of feelings (πάθη). And, "what it is to be well-disposed in respect of feelings is, apparently, specified by saying that excellence of character is a dis-

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position (concerned with feelings) which is in a mean".

So, according to her, we are well disposed in virtue of feelings, hence one possesses ἀνόρεσις as a μεσότης in virtue of the feelings with which it is concerned. One is courageous to the extent that a human being should feel fear or confidence, those being the feelings-parameters for our disposition. So, ἀνόρεσις is in fact an ἔξως related to the two feelings of fear and confidence. A courageous person feels enough fear and enough confidence to the extent that a human being would do. Thus, what we would suggest for ἀνόρεσις is that it is regarded as a virtue in that it is the μεσότης of two excesses by definition, and it is also a state of character that involves emotion since it is also a μεσότης of two emotions, what brings emotional balance between the two emotions.

Since according to the definition of ethical virtue (B. 6, 106b36-B. 7, 1107b2), reason is what guides virtue as a μεσότης, and what balances certain πάθη, ἀνόρεσις is both a virtue guided by reason and a rational desire (9). It is an important characteristic of a courageous person, that his/her actions are guided by reason (Γ. 7, 1115b19-20). Reason is the initiator and the final factor in the process of ἀνόρεσις: an ἀν-
δρείος chooses to act in accordance with his/her courageous character, being aware of what he/she is going to face, and always aiming towards the noble, since the ἰνδρείος "πάσχει" (is affected) and "πράτει" (acts) according to reason. After all, ἰρο-
νηςίς is what guides the human being towards excellence, moral perfection. As Fortenbaugh (10) points out: "perfection demands the presence of both moral virtue and practical wisdom", and goes on to discuss how the two parts relate to each other (11). Of course, we speak of both a character-development and a development of cognition—both driven by the idiosyncratic characteristics of a moral agent and his/her moral education—but the past development of both is needed for cases of courageous actions during which one has no time to deliberate (Γ, 8, 1117a17-22).

However, even in those cases of impulse-actions, reason as a cognitive process is still there, though in a less vigorous performance. Even during the most dangerous situations that impulse-actions occur, there is an amount of rational thinking that accompanies those actions, otherwise we cannot speak of true courageous actions, but of irrational actions. After all, one does not rush to save a drowning man, if he/she does not know how to swim, or if it is impossible to do so.
unless he/she is an insane person.

(3) Political courage.

Apart from the notion of true courage, Aristotle describes also another type of ἀνέρεια, that of political courage (πολιτικὴ ἀνέρεια) (1116a17), according to which the citizens possessing it are able to endure all the dangers that they might encounter in their life in fighting for their community. It is quite possible that the notion of political courage originates from Plato's Republic (430c), but it is there used in a different sense from the Aristotelian one (12). Plato used the term "civil courage" in order to distinguish the true courage of a civilized man from the various brutal instincts.

As for Aristotle, the notion of political courage stands in relation to brave actions performed by the citizens of a community with a view to reputation, dignity and award by the society. In fact, it is noteworthy that, for Aristotle, political courage is an inferior version (see below). Now, the various kinds of political courage, that Aristotle recognizes are:

(i) πολιτικὴ ἀνέρεια διὰ τιμῆς (1116a31, EE Γ.1,1229α13),
(ii) πολιτικὴ ἀνέρεια διὰ νόμον (NE 1116a19, EE Γ.1,12-29α29), and (iii) πολιτικὴ ἀνέρεια διὰ τάς τιμᾶς (1116
As we notice, political courage is initiated by various motives, which do not characterize a true courageous action. The motives of political courage are either because of law, or of necessity, or of shame, or of honour, which can be "διὰ καλὸν ὀφελίζον" (1116a31). In fact, this last kind of political courage initiated by nobility seems to relate to nobility as a motive of true courage. We would think, however, that it is not the same, for in the case of political courage the notion of nobility is connected with that of honour, and honour, though noble, is not the true good (cf. NE A, 5, 1095b24-29). So, Aristotle introduces both fear and honour as motives for citizen courage, initially, and then draws a distinction into those kinds of political courage that are initiated by nobility and those initiated by force or compulsion (1116a31-b2). Thus, we would distinguish two groups of politically courageous actions: those initiated by nobility, and those by force. In both cases, though, the courageous citizen performs actions that are guided by intuitive reason (13).

Moreover, here, we should also refer to inferior notions of courage, such as that of Ignorance, of the Sanguine, of the Irrational emotion (θυμός), and mili-
tary courage (στρατιωτική ἀνδρεία, NE Γ, 8, 1116b5-15),
all various other types of ἀνδρεία(14). A similar
group of various types of courage is also found in
the Eudemian Ethics Γ, 1, 1229a12ff: πολιτική ἀνδρεία,
στρατιωτική (δι’ ἐμπειρίαν) - ἦ δι’ ἄπειραν καὶ ἀγνοο-η≤διά πάθος ἀλόγιστον οἶνον διὰ ἐρωτα καὶ θυμόν, and in
the Magna Moralia 1190b21ff: "ή κατ’ ἐμπειρίαν-ή διά
tῆν ἀπειρίαν-ή διά τὰ πάθη οἶνον οἱ ἐραντες καὶ οἱ ἐν-
θουσάζοντες-ή δι’ ἀισχόνην τῆν πρὸς τοὺς πολίτας-ή
dι’ ἑλπίδα.

Having mentioned the various kinds of ἀνδρεία, we can
see in what way the true one relates to the political
one. We mentioned above that the true courageous per-
son will exercise his/her action in accordance with
reason, and at its (the action’s) best performance. That
is, ἀνδρεία as a concept is closely related to the no-
tion of a rational desire, that of acting courageously
and aiming towards good. However, political courage is
initiated by various motives, which do not characte-
rize a true courageous action, as we have seen.
A manifestation of a political courage would be
a citizen who is forced to fight against the enemy,
because his governor has ordered him to do so. Such a
courageous action would be διά τῆν ἀνάγκην. The same
would apply to a citizen who is forced to pay heavy

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financial contribution to a military expedition.
He/she pays δίδ [διὰ τὴν ἀνάγκην or διὰ τὸν νόμον], because he/she is afraid of being prosecuted legally or being disgraced. Of course, people seem to have different motives for displaying such a case of civil courage, or, perhaps, mixed motives, and each motive is what characterizes the kind of political courage they display. In fact, the above example could be used as a manifestation of true courage, in two ways: (a) a person who refuses to pay such a heavy taxation will only be courageous, if genuinely, he/she supposes that the law is wrong, and at least has reasonable grounds for doing so, or, (b) someone showed courage in paying for the best possible reasons.

Furthermore, the discussion of the political courage and its manifestations together with the other inferior types of ἀνέρεια as related to the true ἀνέρεια, would remind us of the discussion of natural virtue as related to the full virtue. In the Nicoma- chean Ethics Z. 13, 1144b14–17, Aristotle says: "Χάστε καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ δῆος ἐστὶν εὔθη, ἀεινότης καὶ φρόνησις, οὔτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἡθικοῦ δῆος ἐστὶ, τὸ μὲν ἀρετὴ φυσική τοῦ δ' ἁρμία, καὶ τοῦτον ἡ κυρία ὑπὸ γι- νεται δίνει φρονήσεως" (and so as there are two sorts of conditions, shrewdness and practical wisdom in the
part of the soul that has belief, so also there are
two in the part that has character, natural virtue
and full virtue).

So, all the manifestations of courage are manifes-
tations of a natural virtue, that develop throughout
one's life, but it is only the true courage that
is the fully developed state of the natural virtue
of ἀνερτεία. And this can be achieved by means of
ὁρθὸς λόγος and φρόνησις (1144b23-24), which will
lead the moral agent towards virtuous actions, in
this case, courageous actions that will be based on
reason, since full virtue cannot be acquired without
reason and practical wisdom. So, we are all prone to
become virtuous (just, brave, prone to temperance)
immediately from birth (1144b5-6), but it is up to
the development of our ethical understanding that we
are led to performance of virtuous actions, and we
become fully just, brave, and similarly.

4/. Semantic analysis of ἀνερτεία.

So far, we have been following the analysis of the
Aristotelian text concerning the analysis of the
concept of ἀνερτεία, and we are able now to formulate
the semantic properties of the concept in question.
What we notice is that not all of the types of
ἀνερτεία share the same semantic properties, although
there are some common ones that all of them share. But let us take each of the types of ἀνδρεία, and examine its semantic features. So, according to the theory of componential analysis, we would consider the notion of ἀνδρεία τοῦ καλοῦ ζήσα to be the primary meaning consisting of the following semantic features:

Primary meaning I: ("goodness", "reason", "μεσότης be-
tween cowardice and rashness"), which is also the focal meaning 2.

Now, we would consider the notion of political courage to be a derivative (or secondary) meaning II, and the components or semantic features it consists of are:

("μεσότης between cowardice and rashness", "on account of a reason different from the noble", "application of ἀνδρεία within the πόλις"). Also, the notion of political courage possesses some derivative senses (or applications), which have the same semantic features as political courage, but with a different reason each time.

So, where we have put "on account of a reason (different or not) from the noble", we put in IIa: "διὰ νόμον" in IIb: "διὰ κίδδη", in IIc: "διὰ τὰς τιμᾶς", and all IIa, IIb, IIc, IId are applications of the derivative meaning II of πολιτική ἀνδρεία. The "courageous" in courage is different from the one in political cou-
rage. The "courageous" in the "courageous man" who has saved a man from drowning, because it is a noble thing to do, is different in meaning from the "courageous" in the "courageous citizen" who decides to fight against the enemy for the sake of honour and reward from his society. They also have different connotations: in the former, the connotation is that of "manliness", while in the latter, it is that of "obedience to the requirements of a political community".

Also, the relation between II and IIabcd is also different from that between I and II, in terms of meaning since the IIabcd are applications of the same meaning II, which is a derivative—and not exactly the same—meaning from I. It is derivative in that it is semantically related to it, but it possesses a different meaning in that the two notions of 

\[ \text{something} \]

possess different connotations. So, the "courageous" in the "courageous doctor" who shoulders the responsibility for the outcome of a very difficult operation he/she is about to perform, because it is the noble thing to do, is not the "same" as the "courageous" in the "courageous minister" who tries to justify the wrong tactics of the government he/she represents during an interview on television, and he/
she is doing that because of shame and of necessity to win the next elections. And, here, we should also point out that Aristotle does not in the *Nicomachean Ethics* explicitly discuss questions of difference in meanings or synonymy in connection with courage, in the way he does with justice and friendship. We would think that this happens, possible because, he does not consider the inferior types of courage to be really courage.

So, what is "courageous" in true courage is not the same as what is "courageous" for political courage, since they are not the same meanings, for the meanings are descriptions of realities, and in the case of inferior courage, there is no reality of courage at all. On the other hand, the reality of a true courageous action, is reflected by a νόημα whose meaning describes the account of its nature.

Similarly, the inferior notions of courage, that we mentioned above, would possess the following semantic features:

III: ("μετάτητις between cowardice and rashness", "ignorance"),

IV: ("μετάτητις between cowardice and rashness", "sanguine"),

V: ("μετάτητις between cowardice and rashness", "irration-
Having performed the componentional analysis of the various types of *ἀνόρεξια*, we notice that the primary meaning I, the derivative meaning II, the applications IIabcd, and the applications III, IV, V, VI, all of them share a common semantic feature, that being the "μεσότητις between cowardice and rashness". This common semantic feature, is what we have been calling the core meaning, and it is shared by the various types of *ἀνόρεξια*.

However, we should point out here that for Aristotle not all types of *ἀνόρεξια* are real *ἀνόρεξια*. Actually, where courage is concerned, Aristotle does seem to say that the inferior types are not, or are not real courage. And this, in fact, becomes evident from the text, when he uses expressions like: "ὑποκομπεῖται δὴ ἄνορεξια, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχειν οἷς ἔχειν ἠδὲ ἔστιν" (NE Γ.8, 1116b8), "ἀνόρεξιος γὰρ εἰναι δοκεῖσαι καὶ οὐ δικὰ θυμόν" (1116b24). Similar implications are encountered in NE Γ.7-8, 1116a15-17, Γ.8, 1116b34, 1117a6, 9, 22, 28. Also in EE Γ.1, 1229a30: "κατ’ ἀλήθειαν δὲ οὐδεμία τούτων", and 1230a21-22: "...καὶ ἔστιν ἡ πολιτικὴ ἄνορεξια σχέτη, ἡ δ’ ἀληθῆς οὔτε σχέτη οὔτε ἐκείνων οὐδεμίᾳ, ἀλλὰ ὑμοίᾳ μὲν...". That
is, in both treatises, political courage and other inferior types of courage are not really courage.

Moreover, there are connected issues that arise concerning the notion of ἀνεργία, those being: (a) how the concept of ἀνεργία is acquired by and incorporated in each person's understanding, and (b) the relation of all those meanings of ἀνεργία to the objective reality of its universal ethical truth.

The development of our understanding of ἀνεργία

As we said in the third chapter, when discussing the possible stages of ethical truths, the moral agent starts in the first stage by grasping the ἐνέργεια concerning the notion of ἀνεργία. These ἐνέργεια are either ethical phrases that include the notion of courage, or descriptions of courageous actions of all kinds, or perceptions of such actions. In fact, what people first understand is a vague notion of what ἀνεργία is, according to the ἐνέργεια they receive in the linguistic and sociopolitical environment they live in. However, at this stage, the moral agent cannot differentiate the various kinds of ἀνεργία from one another. He/she will not understand how the core meaning relates to all the others, but will have an undifferentiated notion of what courage is. People early on in their ethical development will not
indeed have grasped the Aristotelian mean-doctrine in terms of which we have stated the core meaning of courage. In fact, courage may be a special case here, because also of the fact that most people tend to understand it, initially, as an opposition only to cowardice, whereas in the case of Justice, the moral agents do have a sense of fairness (in terms of the notion of proportion in ἴσότης, even if not of Aristotle's elaborate mathematical formulae). So, at this stage, the moral agent perceives (in the sense of the Posterior Analytics B.19), the courageous action qua ἐνδοξον-type courageous.

In the second stage, the moral agent, after reoccurrence of the events that had taken place in the initial stage, grasps the images and imprints on his/her memory, and he/she can remember those every time he/she experiences similar ἐνδοξα. That is, at stage one, the moral agent grasps the application of a term to a particular action in virtue of other people's ἐνδοξα, but it is not until stage two that he/she has formed a mental image of courageous action as it is defined by popular beliefs. In the third stage, the moral agent becomes habituated to the ethical λεγομενα and πραξεις concerning ἀνορεία, which are developed further by means of experience and habi-
Now, at this stage, the moral agents do confuse courage and rashness, and it is not necessary that they understand its definition: ("μεσότης between cowardice and rashness"), since most people often connect courage with the one opposite, that of cowardice. As Aristotle points out in the *Nicomachean Ethics* B.8, 1109a5-19, in some cases the deficiency, in other cases the excess, is more opposed to μεσότης; that is, it is cowardice, the deficiency, not rashness, the excess that is more opposed to courage. And he goes on to explain that this happens because one extreme is closer and more similar to μεσότης, hence we oppose to the most contrary extreme. Since, rashness seems to be closer and more similar to bravery, we oppose cowardice more than rashness to courage. Another reason he offers for that, is according to the natural tendencies of people to oppose the extreme of rashness or that of cowardice(16). We would think that some people are naturally inclined to be cowardly, and others to be rash, so the connection they will make with courage will be according to their natural tendencies.

In the fourth stage, the moral agent acquires understanding of the ἀρχή[Β], that is, the apparent courage as opposed to the true courage. He/she possesses more
advanced ethical understanding of what courage is, but still has not acquired knowledge of the ethical truth of courage. At this stage, the moral agent has acquired ethical knowledge of the various secondary meanings and applications of ἀνδρεία. That is, he/she acquires understanding of what is not really courage. And, for this reason, in the case of courage, we will be referring to the ἀρχή[B] as apparent rather than real. Also, he/she understands what ἀνδρεία is, but he/she cannot speak of the interrelations of the various kinds of ἀνδρεία, because he/she has not understood what true courage is. It is also the stage, at which he/she can enrich his/her ethical knowledge of ἀνδρεία with new ethical vocabulary semantically related to ἀνδρεία, and he/she can perform ethical syllogisms concerning ethical cases of ἀνδρεία (though not of real courage).

In the fifth stage, the moral agent acquires full understanding of the ethical concept of ἀνδρεία. That is, he/she acquires understanding of the ethical ἀρχή[C], the ethical axiom, of what true ἀνδρεία is. And, he/she can perform practical syllogisms concerning ethical cases of ἀνδρεία, using the ἀρχή[C] as the true starting-point. Thus, at this stage, the moral agent has acquired knowledge of the primary meaning I
of courage, and can then examine the semantic interrelations of the various meanings and senses/applications. This is to say that he/she can understand why the derivative meaning II is derived from the primary meaning I, and that all the meanings I, II, its applications IIa, IIb, IIc, IID, and those of III, IV, V, and VI, share common semantic features that constitute the core meaning.

Now, the acquisition of the primary meaning I will on its own contribute more to a better understanding of the derivative meaning in the sense that one will realise its limitations. Of course, he/she receives simultaneously Υνομοζητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητητηtau
has not grasped full understanding of all the inter-reations and the semantic distinctions of the various types of courage, he/she possesses, at this stage, an understanding of the ethical implications of each ethical word, without necessarily being a well-educated man, or a prominent scholar of Ethics. Aristotle does not have the elitist account of Plato according to whom, very few people possess conceptual understanding, hence acquire ethical knowledge of a concept.

On the other hand, Aristotle does accept that it is only the σπουδαίος, the morally best person who acquires full understanding of the notion of ἀγαθόν. In the Nicomachean Ethics Γ.4, Aristotle says that the end is the object of θυσίας, that is, the moral agent's attitude to the end is that of wish or desire (17), and for some people this is the good, while for others, this is what seems to be good (τοῦ ἡμιο-μένον ἀγαθόν) (1113a15-16). And here comes the question relevant to this: how can we speak of the real best with the view that this varies from person to person; for some people a certain thing is good or seems to be good, while for others, there is something else which is good? For Aristotle, the answer is that the ἀγαθόν, or the real best is one, that which is desi-
rable for its own sake, the objective real best of all the possible \( \phi \alpha \nu \omicron \mu \epsilon \nu \alpha \gamma \alpha \theta \).

Thus, the people that are morally virtuous and are guided by \( \phi \rho \omicron \eta \sigma i c \) in their moral actions are those that desire the real best, and they are the \( \sigma \pi o u \delta \acute { \alpha } i o c \).

In the same way that the sweet is that which tastes sweet to the healthy man, so the good is what fulfills the desires of the morally virtuous person(113a25-29), who is the \( \kappa \alpha \nu \omicron \) and \( \mu \acute { \iota } \pi \rho o n \) (norm and measure).

So, for Aristotle, the end is \( \beta o u \lambda \eta \tau \omicron \omicron \) (desirable), but it is also \( \nu \omicron \tau \omicron \omicron \) or \( \phi \alpha \nu \tau \omicron \sigma \tau \omicron \), that is, it is revealed in our intelligence as the best end to desire and deliberate over its attainment(18). Here, we would also make a connection between the stages as described in the Posterior Analytics B.19, and those here, since in the sciences, as we have seen, we start by perceiving the \( \phi \alpha \nu \omicron \mu \epsilon \nu \alpha \), and after repetition of many occurrences of those, we imprint the mental images of those in our mind, and then by means of experience and induction we perceive the \( \kappa \alpha \theta \omicron \lambda \omicron \omicron \) (i) and at the fifth stage, we reach knowledge of the \( \nu \omicron \eta \mu \alpha \)\( \alpha \rho \chi \eta [C] \), of the true scientific axiom, the true starting-point of a demonstrative syllogism. And this end would differ from the one in Ethics(19) which is \( \beta o u \lambda \eta \tau \omicron \omicron \) and desirable for its own sake.
Now, the conception of this end is the one that applies to the ethical knowledge of the σπουδαίος, when he/she reaches the fifth stage of his/her acquisition of ethical knowledge. The objective best correlative to his/her desire is the true courage, true courage, as primary meaning I in the case of ἀνδρεία. The other moral agents that are not exactly "σπουδαίοι", though not "ψυχλοι" either, will acquire ethical knowledge of ἀνδρεία, at stage four, but because of their false conception of the ἀγαθόν, they form a rather false conception of ἀνδρεία (1113a33-34), or, they will not be able to distinguish between the ethical implications of the various interrelations of ἀνδρεία, at stage five, because they will never reach it. Of course, there might be a case of a moral agent who, although possesses ethical knowledge of a certain concept, and he/she is fully aware of the implications of this or of a moral action relevant to it, acts as if he/she had a false conception of it. And such would be the case of the ἀρχατής man (20).

In fact, we could also refer to the Metaphysics A.1, 981a21-b6, and draw an analogy between the χειροσέχνης and the ἀρχιτέκτων there, and the moral agent at stage four and the σπουδαίος (of stage five) here. So,
as the τεχνίτης or the χειροτέχνης does not know the αἰτία of something, whereas the ἀρχιτέκτων knows it, possesses full knowledge, say of why a house has to be constructed in a certain way in order not to be destroyed during an earthquake, in the same way, the σοφός possesses full knowledge of the ethical truth of ἀνάρξεια, since he/she knows the αἰτία of it, by being a σοφός. Knowledge of the objective reality of the universal ethical truth of ἀνάρξεια presupposes knowledge of the αἰτία underlying this intelligible objective reality, or as Alexander says (21): "ἀπαιτεῖν τὴν γνῶσιν τῶν πρῶτων ἀρχῶν καὶ αἰτίων, ἀλλὰν ἐνεκταὶ οὗτος συν ἀρχαί, διὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ πρῶτα καὶ κυριώταται σοφίαν".

Now, the objective reality of the universal ethical truth of ἀνάρξεια is reflected by the primary meaning I, that is the true courage as opposed to the apparent courage, or any inferior type of courage. The primary meaning I describes the essence of the objective reality of the universal ethical truth of ἀνάρξεια, and it is what we have been calling universal (iv), the quasi-Platonic Aristotelian universal. By saying that the primary meaning, as ἀρχή[C] reflects the ethical universal (iv), we mean that where courage is concerned, at least, the primary meaning I is con-
sidered to be the real and objective ethical truth of courage. And by possessing knowledge of the universal (iv), we possess knowledge of its *αἷμα*, since we do not really understand something until we know what its primary *αἷμα* is (Physics, B.3, 194b20-195a5). So, by knowing that true courage is the necessary and adequate conception of ethical truth, that is opposed to any inferior previous knowledge of ἀνδρεία, and contributes to the attainment of the highest human good (εὐδαιμονία), we possess full understanding of what true courage is.

This implies that previous understanding of the inferior types of courage, and the meanings that describe them is required. For this reason, we would not agree with Moravcsik (22), when he says that Aristotle's theory of explanation does not refer to linguistic or mental entities. We cannot see how the notion of νόημα/ἀρχή, which is a mental entity and reflects the objective reality of the universal ethical truth of ἀνδρεία, and is described by the primary meaning (a linguistic-ontological entity) is not related to the theory of explanation; how it is not concerned with the *αἷμα* of this intelligible reality. If we are "in search for elements of reality and their interrelations rather than for
explanations interpreted as mental or linguistic items", as he says (23), then we are concerned with how these realities and their interrelations are reflected in the human mind, and how they are described in terms of meaning. After all, Aristotle did not distinguish between meaning and reference, and spoke of realities and their interrelations in Nature, with regard to what people referred to in their ethical (or not) discourse. And even more, in our attempt to understand Nature, we pass through various layers of understanding, and each layer has a different content, which is both a mental entity (imprinted in the mind), and a linguistic-ontological entity: described by means of a meaning. And in the case of the objective reality of a universal ethical truth of ἀνθρώπινα, this is reflected by the universal (iv). For, by means of ethical universal (iv) we can account in a realist way for that in virtue of which some explanations are adequate and possess truth.

(B), φιλία

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17, NE H-0.

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In the eighth and ninth books of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle discusses the ethical concept of φιλία. He presents three main kinds of φιλία based on the three kinds of φίληται: "τριῶν ὀντων
The first kind of φίλης is the utilitarian one, which is based on mutual benefits, called "φίλης διὰ τὸ κρήσιμον". The second kind of φίλης is based on mutual pleasure, called "φίλης διὰ τὸ ἐδῶ", and the third one is based on a mutual recognition of love and moral goodness, called "φίλης διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν".

Concerning the first two kinds of φίλης, Aristotle says: "οἱ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ κρήσιμον φιλοσόφις ἀλλήλους οὐ καθ' ἑαυτοῦς φιλοσόφειν, ἀλλ' ὃ γίνεται τι αὐτοῖς παρ᾿ ἀλλήλων ἄγαθόν, δμοίως δὲ καὶ οὐ δι᾿ ἡδονήν; οὐ γὰρ τὸ ποιοῦσ’ τίνας εἰναι ἁγιασμὸν τοὺς εὐθραπέλους, ἀλλ’ τὴν ἡδείς αὐτοῖς, οὐ τῇ δὲ διὰ τὸ κρήσιμον φιλοσόφις διὰ το αὐτοῖς ἐδῶ, καὶ οὐχ ὃ δ φιλοσόφων ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὃ κρήσιμος καὶ ἡδῶς, κατὰ συμβεβήκος τῇ δὲ αὐτῇ φιλιᾶς αὐται εἶσιν" (1156a10-17). So, the notion of φιλής (affection) for some people is shown as a desire to have a useful company by means of which one gets the material goods that beautify their lives or create more prosperous living for them, hence make it easier. In this kind of φιλιᾶ, it is not the fact that the φίλοι are totally uninterested in one another, since there is a mutual affection and recognition, but this hap-
pens because of a certain usefulness the one can derive from the other.

So, two people can be regarded as friends even if their ἡσιος is based upon interpersonal temporary interests. The same would apply to the second kind, that of friendship because of pleasure. According to Aristotle (1156a35-1156b1, 1156b14-15), two persons are regarded as friends if they share a mutual affection and recognition to each other, this based on pleasure, either bodily, psychological or mental, while the friendship ceases to exist when the ἡσιος does not exist either. And he applies this kind of friendship to young people who are overwhelmed by passion. "Ἡ δὲ τὰν ἐν αὐτῷ ἡσιόδονὴν εἶναι δοκεῖ... Ἑμιω γὰρ τῷ ἡσεῖ ἡ ἡσία μετατίθεται, τῆς δὲ σοιαστῆς ἡδονῆς ταχείᾳ ἡ μεταβολή", For example, two young lovers will be friends as long as they maintain the relationship. Or, concerning utilitarian friendship, two partners who own a company will be friends as long as there is necessity for a coalition for increased productivity and bigger profits. However, such friendly feelings may cease to exist if this mutual benefit ceases to exist.

On the other hand, Aristotle states that the true friendship is the one that is initiated by goodness.
hence it is the most perfect of all: "τοιούτον μέγατέρον ἦ τὸν ἄγαθον φίλον καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν ὁμοίων. οὐδεὶς γὰρ τἀγαθά ὁμοίας θέλειν ἄλληλοις ἢ ἄγαθοι, ἄγαθοι δὲ εἰσὶ καὶ ἀντικτοῦσιν" (1156b7-9). That kind of friendship is encountered only between people that are both ἄγαθοι and their feelings are based upon mutual love, recognition and well-wishing out of concern for one another, and for that reason it is permanent, as long as they remain ἄγαθοι: "διαμένει οὖν ἡ τούτων φίλια ἐς ὃν ἄγαθοι τὸς ἢ ἄγαθοι τὸς, ἢ ἀρετή μόνιμον" (1156b11-12). Exactly for that reason the Aristotelian notion of φίλια sounds very difficult to encounter, because most people usually possess a certain interest out of which they create friendships, but very few succeed in maintaining them. Perfect φίλια involves all the aspects of human relationships, thus including good and pleasure of the primary type (1157b25-27).

In the Politics, notion of φίλια is also discussed and is considered to be essential so that in connection with δικαιοσύνη, it contributes to the construction of communities with people that preserve the political balance, hence they are happy citizens (24). Nothing can remove φίλια from the spirit of the political community, since community depends on φίλια, and when there is enmity instead of friendship, men will
not even share the same path. Once again, Aristotle emphasizes the importance and the need for the existence of θυσια in the community.

The same point of interconnection between Ethics and Politics in terms of θυσια is also encountered in the Magna Moralia (1193a20), where the author, very briefly, presents θυσια as the μεσότης between "ξολαξεία" (flattering) and "ἐχθροί" (enmity) (25), with reference to words and actions of the citizens of a political community. And, generally, what we notice in Aristotle's discussion of θυσια in the various treatises, is his great concern to establish the point of interaction where the ethical principles of each individual are best realized within a political community. Thus, this point of interaction and the notion of "κοινός" (common) particularly expressed in the Rhetoric (26), are the main characteristics of the Aristotelian discussion of θυσια.

2/ Semantic analysis of θυσια
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(a) Aristotle's contradictory views in NE and EE.
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Having given a synoptic analysis of the notion of θυσια and its three kinds, we can deal with the issue that has concerned various scholars (see below), as to whether θυσια is a case of πάμπον ὅμωνμια, or a case of πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενον. Concerning the question of
a προς ἐν structure, the Nicomachean Ethics treatment of friendship is not very clear, Aristotle only says that "πάσα γάρ φιλία δι' ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν ἢ δι' ἡδο-
νὴν, ἡ απλῶς ἢ τῇ φιλοδινῇ, καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα τῆς" (1156b19-21), and "...τελεία ἐστὶ, καὶ κατὰ πάντα ταύτα γίνεται καὶ θυμοὶ ἐκατέρθη παρ' ἐκατέρθου, ὥσπερ δεῖ τοῖς φιλοις ὑπάρχειν, ἢ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἦδο δομοίωμα ταύτης ἐχει, καὶ γὰρ οὐ ἀγαθοὶ ἡδεὶς ἀλλήλοις, δομοὶς δὲ καὶ ἢ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, καὶ τοιοῦτοι γὰρ ἀλλήλοις οὐ ἀγα-
θοὶ" (1156b33-1157a2) (27). That is, what Aristotle sug-
gests is that the various types of friendship are si-
milar to one another and are formed in resemblance to the primary and true friendship, but without explai-
ning how and in what terms this resemblance occurs.

The second evidence that we receive concerning φιλία is its treatment in the Eudemian Ethics. There, he exa-
mines it in the seventh book, in a treatment similar to the one in the Nicomachean Ethics. The only diffe-
rence is that he starts by stating that: "ἀνάγχων ἥρα-
τρία φιλίας εἴδη εἶναι, καὶ μήτε καθ' ἔν ἄπασας μηδ' ἔς
eἴδη ἐνὸς γένους, μήτε πάμπαν λέγεσθαι ὁμοφομος, πρὸς
μίαν γὰρ τίνα λέγονται καὶ πρότην, ὥσπερ τὸ ἑατρικὸν" (EE 1236a16-18) (28). What he does accept here is that the concept of φιλία is not a case of ὁμοφομος (at least, not in its narrow sense) (29), but a case of προς.
Thus, what we notice between the two treatments of \( \phi i l i a \) in the two treatises, is that there are two different approaches, namely, in the *Nicomachean Ethics* he talks about a case of resemblance and in the *Eudemian Ethics*, he talks about a case of \( \pi o c c \), which would remind us of a \( \pi o c c \) \( \varepsilon \nu \) \( \lambda e g \o m e n a \) structure. Is then Aristotle inconsistent or has he changed his mind concerning the semantics and and logic of \( \phi i l i a \)? Before trying to answer this question ourselves, we will follow the interpretations of other scholars, in connection with the general point of the chronological priority between the two treatises.

(c). Ancient and modern commentators on Aristotle's contradiction - views on the priority of NE, EE.
δὲ ταύτων πως ἔστι, πρῶτη μὲν γὰρ ἔστι φιλία καὶ κυρίως, ὡς προελθὼν δηλώσει, ἢ τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν ὁμοίων, αἱ δ' ἄλλα καθ' ὁμοιότητα ταύτης λέγονται καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης ἔχουσι τὴν κλησιν, ὅστ' οὔδὲν κελάει τόπῳ λόγον κοινὸν λαβεῖν αὐτῶν" (30), which, in fact, refers to the notion of ἀφ' ἐνός and in any case, it favours a focal analysis of the concept of φιλία.

Another earlier scholar who favours a focal analysis of φιλία is Michael of Ephesus, who says: "οὔτε δὲ οὔδ' ὃς γένος κατηγορεῖται η φιλία τῶν μερικωτέρων, ἀλλ' ἔστι τὸν ὃς ἀφ' ἐνός καὶ πρὸς ἐν λεγομένων, διόρθωσται τῷ Αριστοτέλει ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ τῶν Μεγάλων Ηθικῶν" (31).

From the modern commentators, we would refer to Rowe (32), who argues that there is no disagreement between the two treatments of the Nicomachean Ethics and of the Eudemian Ethics, and that they both argue for a πρὸς ἐν relation, but in a different way: the EE treatment describes friendship as an example of focal meaning (citing Owen) and the NE describes friendship as a πρὸς μίαν (we would think, rather than πρὸς ἐν) relation of the resemblance-type. That is, he distinguishes two types of a πρὸς ἐν relation, that of what we have been calling focal meaning 2, and another one which is a resemblance-type.
and is based on the fact that if the two lesser types of \( \text{tXioct} \) are called as such because of their resemblance to the first, they are still called \( \text{tXioct} \) by reference to it. And he goes on to assume further that the Eudemian Ethics is prior to the Nicomachean Ethics, in general. Although, this last point is not in our immediate concerns, his discussion of the two treatments of \( \text{tXioct} \) in the two treatises is. So, we would like to agree with him that there is no disagreement between the two treatments, but we would base our assumption on a different basis, as we shall see further below.

We would think that focal meaning is not very distinct from resemblance, and neither resemblance nor focal meaning is strict, chance \( \text{tXia} \). In fact, resemblance can be an instance of the former. Rowe explains how this happens with \( \text{tXia} \), but we would think that it is not simply because something is called \( \text{tXia} \) because of a resemblance to a primary type that has a common reference to it. There is a further underlying point behind the notion of the common reference—when resemblance is involved—and that is concerned with the understanding of the various types of \( \text{tXia} \). If we understand that they are the inferior types, then we have understood that
there is a primary one to which they all refer.

Another approach to the discussion of ἓν ἐκ ἑς in the two treatises, is given by Owen (33), who considers this treatment of ἓν ἐκ ἑς to be parallel to the treatment of "equal" in the Academic proof of relatives, both being supposed to show the focal meaning of these concepts. He says that in each case we have a definition which, when taken without qualifications, applies to the primary instance only, and when taken with qualifications, applies to the secondary instances, hence accepting that there is one meaning for the primary instance, others for the derivative ones. By that, he also indicates that the Aristotelian discussion has not solved the problem of focal meaning fully, and he has given only the necessary and not the sufficient conditions for its use.

In fact, we would very much agree with Owen in his last remark, and apply it also to the treatment of ἓν ἐκ ἑς. However, Aristotle is not inconsistent in the way he treats the two discussions of ἓν ἐκ ἑς, in the Nicomachean and the Eudemian Ethics. He just does not provide us with sufficient criteria in his discussion for how a πρὸς ἐν structure would apply to ἓν ἐκ ἑς, on the one hand, and he does not also
present a unified account of what he thinks \( \tau \Xi \) in its ontological-semantic analysis would be, on the other hand.

Moreover, Fortenbaugh (34) examines the problem by dividing it into three issues: first, he interprets the \( \tau \Xi \) in terms of a relationship of analogy between its different functions; then he considers resemblance as opposed to analogy, and finally he rejects a focal analysis in the *Eudemian Ethics*. From these three views, he supports the first two which he links with the NE and he rejects the third view linked with the EE.

Concerning his treatment of \( \tau \Xi \) we would agree with him that there is a case of resemblance between the various types of \( \tau \Xi \), in that friendship based upon utility resembles that of morally good men, for good men are also useful to one another (NE 6.4, 1157 a1-2, 1158b6-8). Also, we would accept his point (35) that in 1157a31-33, "Aristotle seems to be thinking about resemblance by analogy, but when he speaks of resemblance and then explains himself by referring to a common feature such as pleasure involved in both friendships based upon pleasure and friendships based upon moral goodness" (1157a1-2, 1158b6-8), and that this is "a mark of a rich analysis and not of
confusion".

However, we would not agree with him on rejecting the case of focal analysis in EE. It is surprising to find him recognizing common features as logically necessary for the occurrence of friendship in the NE, and rejecting the idea that there is a focal definition in EE on the ground that if such a definition is to be established, it is a focal connection between things good and pleasant, but this is never established in EE (36). However, we would think that the failure of Aristotle to expand his account further is not an indication that such an account cannot apply to the case of ἡ ἐλεον.

So, what we would argue against Fortenbaugh is that in fact, Aristotle offers a consistent account of the concept of ἡ ἐλεον, which, however, is not given a single systematic expression, and as a result it causes misunderstandings. Thus, we would not agree with him when he claims that the definitions of the inferior types of ἡ ἐλεον do not involve reference to the primary one. In fact, understanding that these are the inferior types does involve reference to the primary one, since we cannot understand that these are the inferior ones, and why they are inferior unless we have understood what the primary type is. And in this
case, any kind of resemblance where one thing is inferior to another would also employ a case of focal meaning 2.

According to Thorp's interpretation (37), there are four cases in which a single term like ἡλίξα is applied to a variety of subjects, stretching between the extremes of συνωνύμια and ὁμώνυμια, those being: (i) "καθ' ἔνν"—the ordinary case in which a predicate belongs in the same sense to different subjects, (ii) "ὅς εἰς ἐνός γένους"—the special case where the predicate is the genus term predicated of several of its species, (iii) "πρὸς μίαν γάρ τινα (ἡλίξαν) καὶ πρὸς την"—the case of πρὸς ἐν predication, where the predicate has different senses, but one semantic element common to those different senses, and, (iv) "πάμπολον ὁμώνυμος"—out and out homonymy. And he also wonders how in a case of πρὸς ἐν predication the primary ἡλίξα is present in the definition of all the others. We would answer to him that it is present, since in fact the primary meaning is the focal meaning 2. We would also say that the fact that Aristotle does not have a unified account of a πρὸς ἐν structure and its application, does not mean that there are not various cases that this can apply to.

For the second point by Thorp, we would say that
the πρός ἐν predication in ἴλια is applied in terms of the primary meaning in that ἄγαθὸν of some sort is present in the definition of each type of ἴλια, and that ἴλια can have a focal meaning, because ἄγαθὸν does so. After all, what Aristotle implies by "τὰ ἄγαθὰ πλεοναχῶς" (EE H.2, 1236a7–10), is a reference to a case of ὀμωνυμία in its wider sense that could include the notion of focal meaning. Also, it is clear in the Aristotelian text that the definition of the primary case should be present in the definition of all: "πρῶτον δὲ οὗ λόγος ἐν πᾶσιν ὀπάρχει" (1236a20–21).

Furthermore, we would think that in the case of ἴλια, Aristotle is not clear as to whether all the types of ἴλια are real or not. Unlike the case of courage, where the inferior types were not real courage, here, his answer falls in between. Indeed, in EE H.2, 1236b13–22, he rejects the view of those who claimed that the inferior types of friendship are not friendship at all. On the other hand, he does not assert their reality explicitly. And this is a further reason for us to think that the notion of focal meaning is relevant here.

(d). "πρῶς μίαν τινά ἴλιαν"

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Following the logical semantics of the concept of ἴλια, we can give its componential analysis:
primary meaning I: "ἡ διὰ τὴν ἄρετὴν φιλία" (true friendship), which consists of:

{"a reciprocal affection by both parties","good: on its own sake, as intrinsic good","awareness of the mutual feelings by both parties"}.

And the derivative meanings:

II: "ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλία": "a reciprocal affection shared by both parties","awareness of the mutual feelings","good instrumental: utilitarian goal" (the good at which utilitarian friendship aims is instrumental),

III: "ἡ διὰ τὸ ἀξίον φιλία": "a reciprocal affection shared by both parties","awareness of the mutual feelings","good instrumental: pleasant goal".

So, what we notice is that amongst the semantic features of φιλία, the notion of ἄγαθον is what determines the function of the concept of φιλία, in the two Ethics. And from the primary meaning, we derive the secondary meanings, of utilitarian friendship and that of pleasure (EE 1236b20-21). As for the way that the various meanings of friendship relate to one another, implies a case of focal meaning 2, in that understanding that they are inferior types involves reference to the primary type.

Now, both this "πρὸς μίαν (φιλίαν)" that Aristotle
uses in 1236a16, and the "πρὸς Ἐν" in "οὔτε οὗ δύμανυμοι καὶ οὗ ξυνοῦν ἔχουσαι πρὸς ἑαυτὰς, οὔτε καθ' Ἐν εἰδός, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πρὸς Ἐν" (1236b25-26), would refer to focal meaning2, which is identified with the primary one (1236b19-26).

That is, what we notice is that Aristotle provides us with a rich but non-unified account of φιλία, according to which in the Nicomachean Ethics, there is the application of a resemblance to the concept of φιλία to the extent that it relates it to the notion of the focal meaning2. And in the Eudemian Ethics, he concentrates more on a case of a πρὸς Ἐν structure in order to show that understanding of the inferior types of φιλία contribute to the understanding of the primary one, and that understanding of the primary one helps one to understand the limitations of the inferior types. Thus, we have:

focal meaning2: {"a reciprocal affection", "a form of good", "awareness of this affection by both parties"}.

And when he says that "πρῶτος δ' ὁδ' λόγος ἐν πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει", he implies that the definition of true friendship exists in all the other kinds, but he denies any universality by "διὰ δὲ τὸ καθόλου εἶναι τὸ πρῶτον λαμβάνουσιν καὶ πρῶτον καθόλου, τούτῳ δ' ἐστὶ ψεῦδος", since the true friendship cannot be
universal; it cannot apply to all the other kinds. And this does not violate our assumption that the primary meaning would reflect the universal ethical truth of ξιλία, because this refers to another kind of universality, the universal(i), which are the highest ethical universals, whereas Aristotle would have meant here a different notion of universal, the universal(ii).

However, there is a term that would serve for the notion of the universal common semantic components of all the types of ξιλία, that of core meaning. So, what we notice concerning all the kinds of ξιλία, both in the "κατά συμβεβηχός" (incidental friendships) (NE 1156a17), or in the perfect friendship, is that there are some common semantic features, those being: the notion of reciprocal feeling, the notion of awareness of such a psychological state, and the notion of good, which all constitute the core meaning of the concept of ξιλία. This would differ from the above focal meaning, in that there is not a case of logical dependance of all the meanings on the primary one, but a case of common semantic features that are universal, shared by all the meanings. And by core meaning we can solve Aristotle's problem that primacy does not confer universality (1236a23-24), since...
the core meaning implies universality and it is not primary.

5/. The development of our understanding of ἀληθᾶ

The pattern of the acquisition of the concept of ἀληθᾶ would be a similar one to the acquisition of ἀνδρεία. So, in the ordinary usage of every day life, people perceive the friendly actions qua ἔνδοξον-type friendly. That is, they perceive the ἀρχαί[A]; what is most knowable to them. In this way, they apprehend a vague understanding of the notion of ἀληθᾶ, and also possess an undifferentiated understanding of the notion of ἀληθῆς, and of the ἀληθόν. Even from the period of infancy, a person starts expressing a tendency to give and receive affection(ἀληθῆς), first by his/her mother, and we could perhaps say that the infant’s ἀληθῆς towards the mother is rather of a utilitarian sense, whereas the mother expresses a true ἀληθῆς. After all, as Aristotle says: "φύσει τ' ἐνυπάρχειν ἐν οίκε πρός τὸ γεγενημένον τῷ γεγενήσαντι καὶ πρός τὸ γεγενημένον τῷ γεγενήθεντι" (NE θ.1,1155a16-18), which shows that the human being possesses an innate tendency to express ἀληθῆς, without, though, indication what kind of ἀληθᾶ this would be. Of course, the moral agent comes to apprehend the various manifestations of ἀληθῆς, and its types during child-

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hood and even more at the age of puberty, when he/she is considered to possess the undifferentiated understanding of ἔλησις.

At the second stage, the moral agent forms images of the various perceptions that have reoccurred and imprints those on his/her memory, and he/she can remember similar cases whenever he/she experiences them. At this stage, the moral agent has formed the mental image of the ethical ἔνδοξον of ἰλία. In the third stage, the moral agent becomes habituated to the ethical ἄγομενα and πράξεις concerning ἰλία developed further by means of experience. At this stage, the moral agent possesses knowledge of the notion of ἔλησις, but he/she cannot differentiate the various types of friendship. However, by that stage, he/she understands that not everything is an object of affection, but only what is lovable, and this is either good or pleasant or useful, for what is useful is the source of some good or pleasure; so, what is good and pleasant are lovable as ends (1155b117-21). At this stage, he/she also understands that there must be a mutual goodwill, so that a relationship is that of friendship (1155b34-1156a5); for friendship is said to be a reciprocated goodwill (1155b33-34).
At stage four, the agent can perform practical syllogisms concerning ethical cases that involve ἄλλος, based on ἄλλος, as ethical ἀρχή, that is, the inferior types of ἄλλος, which serve as the starting-points of reasoning, and can enrich further his/her ethical vocabulary with further inferior types of ἄλλος or any word semantically related to it. At this stage, the moral agent possesses an advanced level of ethical understanding of ἄλλος, but does not know what the true ἄλλος is. However, the fact that a friendship may only be aimed at an apparent (as opposed to the true) good, does not mean that it is not a real friendship. Inferior types of friendship are not exactly the same as the inferior types of courage, which are not real courage. In fact, in 1155b 25-27, Aristotle says: "Ἱλεῖ ὅστις δ' ἑαυτοῖς οὗ τὸ ἀδικόν ἀγαθὸν ἄλλα τὸ ἂμονόμενον, ἔχειν ἐστι τὸν ἄλλην ἢτον ἂμονόμενον" (each person loves not what is good for him/her, but what appears good for him/her; but there will be no difference, for [what appears good for him/her] will be what appears to be the object of affection). So, the fact that a person loves what appears to be good for him/her, that being the object of affection, does not mean that there is no real friendship. Actually, there is one, but it is just called "κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἄλλος" (0.3, 1156a16-17).
And this point concerning the reality of the inferior types is reinforced further by what Aristotle says in EE H.2,1236a26: "οὐ γὰρ ἐξαρμόττοντος ἕνὸς λόγου οὐκ ὁμοτάι <τάς> ἄλλας φίλιας εἶναι, ὥδ' εἰσὶ μὲν, ἀλλ' οὖν δομοῖας εἰσίν, οὐ δ' ὅταν ἡ πράτη μη ἐξαρμόττη, ὡς οὖν καθόλου ἄν, εἰπέρ ἡν πράτη, οὕτ' εἶναι φίλιας τᾶς ἄλλας φιλίαν" (since one kind of friendship is not able to express its other conceptions, many people do not consider them to be friendships; however, those are real friendships, but they do not exist in the same way; so, because the primary type does not apply to the other types of friendship, for it is primary and universal, they think that the other types do not exist).

At the fifth stage of the acquisition of φίλια, the moral agent acquires understanding of the ἀρχή[ε], that is, the true starting point of ethical reasoning which is described by means of the primary meaning I. At this stage, he/she can understand that the inferior types of φίλια are interrelated to the primary one, in that they resemble its λόγος, and he/she can also understand the interrelations of all the possible meanings of φίλια, and realize that they all share some common semantic components that constitute the core meaning. Thus, the acquisition of
focal meaning2 (as primary meaning), is prior to that of the core meaning. One has to acquire understanding of the true friendship first, in order to understand the limitations of the inferior types, and also to understand their interrelations.

So, the kind of person who would acquire full understanding of the primary meaning, is the morally virtuous person who is able to distinguish between the ἀγαθόν and the φιλόμενον ἀγαθόν. The one who creates friendships that are based on mutual well-being, support and understanding and last throughout the years. And in order to reach this point of ethical understanding, the moral agent must possess the appropriate inclination to form true friendships, and must be guided by his/her moral education from the community he/she grows up in. That is, the moral agent must, first of all, perform actions that involve true friendship and be habituated to creating such friendships in order to reach a point of having acquired full understanding of what this is. And to create such friendships, one needs time, experience and patience, since it is "παγχάλεπον" (NE 0.6, 1158a15).

Thus, we have seen that not all of the moral agents reach stage 5, in terms of hierarchy of acquired ethical knowledge, but only those who have achieved
full understanding of the fact that each meaning of \( \ast \iota \lambda \iota \alpha \) describes a certain reality, say that of utilitarian friendship, and they can realize that the primary meaning I, is what describes the objective reality of the universal truth of \( \ast \iota \lambda \iota \alpha \). By that, we do not mean that the primary meaning is more objective, or more real than the derivative ones, but it is the one that is more fundamentally universal. It reflects the highest ethical truth of \( \ast \iota \lambda \iota \alpha \).

So, the acquisition of \( \ast \iota \lambda \iota \alpha \), and the incorporation of its meanings into one's thought, is a chronological and logical process that requires a certain time and various internal and external factors that affect the ethical conceptual development of a person and its morality.

\textit{6/ Universai(iv).}

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A problem that would now arise, is how can we reconcile the fact that the primary meaning I of \( \ast \iota \lambda \iota \alpha \) that reflects the objective reality of the universal ethical truth of \( \ast \iota \lambda \iota \alpha \), is not consistent with the view that primacy confers universality as we have seen above? We would think that in terms of the fact that the primary meaning I, is what describes the logical-factual truth of the ethical \( \alpha \rho \chi \eta / \nu \omicron \omicron \mu \alpha \) of \( \ast \iota \lambda \iota \alpha \), which reflects the objective reality
of such a truth, it must confer a sort of universality, that of the type(iv). It has to be universal in the sense that it reflects the objective reality of the ethical truth of \( \phi \kappa \lambda \kappa \alpha \), as opposed to any other objective reality that reflects the apparent \( \phi \kappa \lambda \kappa \alpha \), or any inferior type of it. However, this type of universality is not affected by the above rule that primacy does not confer universality, since this rule applies to universal(ii), as a distinction between genera and species. And not all the \( \ddot{\alpha} \rho \chi \alpha \iota \iota [C] \) are going to be genera of species.

So, the universal(iv) is what reflects an intelligible objective reality and is above any other kind of universal in that it reflects the absolute truth of this reality. Again, by saying that we do not mean to imply that the ethical \( \ddot{\alpha} \rho \chi \alpha \iota \iota [C] \) are universal in a way that what follows from is not (that is, the derivative meanings, or applications), but that it is a higher ethical universal; it is an ontological universal(i) in the same way that what follows from it, is a universal(i), but it is more fundamental in that it reflects the underlying truth of an ethical concept. Neither is it to be related to the higher universals described in Posterior Analytics B.19, for (a) not every detail in B.19 can be carried in non-

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demonstrative contexts (that is, we cannot demonstrate truths about utility-friendship from those of virtue-friendship), and (b) the type of higher universal referred to there is universal (i).

Furthermore, knowledge of the ethical universal (iv) of ἴδεια, is an important presupposition of the attainment of the ultimate truth, that of human ζωομονία. The moral agent who has grasped the ethical truth of ἀνάρτησις or of any ethical concept is able to see what the prescriptive ethical norms are, and lead his/her life according to these ethical axioms. For, in this way, he/she will be able to achieve such a state of morality, in terms of both ethical understanding and performance of virtuous actions, that will enable him/her to reach the desirable ultimate end: ζωομονία.
ENDNOTES

(1) The word ἄνδρεία is etymologically related to the ancient Greek word "ἄνηρ", meaning the human being in general, and the male human being, in particular. So, the connotation of "manliness" that is included in semantic analysis of the concept of ἄνδρεία, derives from the origin of the word, its etymology.

(2) Irwin, in his commentary on NE, also says "that the courageous man should not be supposed to be fearless, and he/she will not fear the danger less than it warrants. Nor does he/she force himself/herself to act despite a strong desire to run away (a point that would make him/her analogous to a continent person", p.322. The same view is shared by Pears, (1980), pp. 171-187.


(4) The Anonymous commentator says; "εἰ πάντι ταῦτα φοβερά, καὶ τῷ ἄνδρείῳ, καθό ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος καὶ μὴ ἀναίσθητος... ὁ φοβεῖται γάρ καὶ θαρρεῖ ἡ σιν, δὲ κἂν ὁ λόγος ὑπαγορεύῃ", in C.A.G. (XX), pp.163,3-12, implying that the courageous man will feel fear or confidence to the extent that his/her reason allows him/her. The same view is shared by Stewart, (1892), p.287.

(5) NE B, 3, 1105a13-14.
(6). Cf. relevant discussion in the chapter on Ethical Epistemology, pp. 156-158.
(12). Stewart (1892), p. 292. In Plato's Phaedo 69b, there is reference to an inferior type of virtue, which is described as σκιαφραστής τις, but not a true virtue.
(13). We adopt the term "intuitive reason" from Cooper, (1986), p. 74, where the notion of intuition is connected with the end to which a moral action is directed.
(14). This kind of ἀνδρεία includes the notion of προαιρεσις (NE Β. 3, 117a4-5) and the οὔ ἔνεκα, but it should not be identified with true courage, since its end is not necessarily good. This happens, because, in the case of διὰ θυμὸν ἄνδρεια, both the motives and the results do not always relate to those of true courage.
We follow the categorization made by Mills, (1980), pp. 198-218.
(15). In EE Γ.1, 1229a12-13, he speaks of "καθ' ὀμοιότητα".
(16). We note that there he applies the second reason to pleasure, and we apply it to courage.
(18). De Anima Γ, 10, 433a9-30.
(20). Cf. book 2 of the Nicomachean Ethics. Rorty, (1980), p. 271, says that a person's knowledge may be at different stages of actualization for various types of intellectual activity.
(23). Ibid., p. 34.
(24). Pol. Δ, 11, 1295b20ff, where φιλία is related to the social structure of a political community.
(25). There is no exact reference in the Nicomachean Ethics where φιλία is presented as a μεσότης between ξύρα and κολάκεια. References to those extremes would be, NE Θ, 1, 1155a23-26, Θ, 115912-16.
(26). Rhet. II, chap. 4, where he refers to friends as two parties having common feelings, common affection and common enemies, so what is good or bad for oneself, is good or bad for the other party's self, and therefore both parties wish common things.
(27). Aspasius in C.A.G. (XIX, 1), p. 164.8-11, says: "πρώτη μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ φιλία καὶ κυρίως, δὲς προελθὼν δὴλοισε, ἦ τὰν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν ὄμοιων, αἱ δὲ
άλλας καθ' όμοιότητα τάσης λέγονται καὶ ἀπὸ τάσης ἔχουσι τὴν κλήσιν".


(30). Aspasius in C.A.G. (XIX, 1), p. 164.5-11. It is also worth noting that he has transferred the "medicine" example from the EE.


(35). Ibid., p. 54.

(36). Ibid., p. 57.

(37). Thorp, (1989), pp. 119-120, as a reply to Fr. Owens question, "Is there any Ontology in Aristotle"? published in Apeiron 1988, pp. 127-137. Another scholar who also favours a case of "focal homonymy" as he calls it, is Walker, (1979), p. 181, who cites passages: NE 1156a18-24, 1157a14-16, 1159b10-11, 1162b16-17, in order to support his position. He bases his position on the claim that Aristotle regards the three goals of friendship enumerated in 0.2, ἀγαθόν, χρήσιμον, and...
as sufficient and necessary conditions, and doubts as to whether all three kinds of \( \phi \) satisfy the requirements of the common definition (1155b33-34) as discussed in 0.2. We would not agree with him for reasons that become evident in the text. On the hand, we would agree with the focal analysis that Leszl (1970), pp. 390-394, offers for \( \phi \).

(38), Cf. chapter 4, pp. 274, 285.

(39), We use the word "affection" not in its modern English meaning, but in its etymological link with the Latin "affectio": a tendency to relate towards another person.
CONCLUSION

Throughout the present Thesis, we have been involved with issues of Language, Thought and Reality and their application to the case of Ethics, and we have tried to answer two questions: (a) how the Aristotelian ethical concepts are acquired, and, (b) to what extent we can speak of universal ethical truths. According to what has been argued above, we would draw the following two major conclusions, accompanied by other minor ones:

1. In the Aristotelian theoretical framework, the ethical concepts are acquired in a process analogous to that of the sciences, with the qualifications explained above. And, at each subsequent level of understanding the moral agent apprehends a different content of reality, until he/she reaches the fifth stage that only the στονάξιος does, and is able to understand the universal ethical truth of an ethical concept, the ἀξιός, described by the primary meaning of this concept. And, for Aristotle, the development of the ethical understanding is closely connected with the understanding of universal ethical truths that lead the moral agent to acquire the ultimate ethical end, that of the human ζωάςμονωθά.

We have also seen that the acquisition of the ethical
concepts, and the development of the ethical understanding involves also sociopolitical factors that are irrelevant to that of the sciences, where the final state of our conceptual understanding is unaffected by such considerations. That is, why Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics* E.7, spoke of the natural right as "κινητόν μένσιν". In addition, the role of ethical νοῦς in the ethical conceptual development is very important and the faculty/capacity that pays the protagonistic role in Aristotle's Ethics is that of the "ὁμμα της ψυχῆς" (eye of the soul), which acts in the sense of a moral vision, and it exists in all human beings. For Aristotle, νοῦς is very important for the acquisition of ethical understanding and the practice of this understanding for the attainment of the human happiness.

As a further minor conclusion, we would say that Aristotle is not a clear empiricist or a clear innativist. His theoretical framework would suggest that the acquisition of understanding, and particularly of the ethical one, is based on both innativist and empiricist material. He accepts that there is a connate critical faculty/capacity, which acts in the sense of an intuitive perception from which further knowledge is generated. In the case of ethics,
this is the moral vision that apprehends the \( \varepsilon \nu\delta\omega\xi\alpha \) as \( \acute{\omega} \rho\chi\alpha\iota[A] \), and in its developed state, it is either the moral eye of a virtuous person, or the distorted moral vision of a bad man. And since \( \nu 0\delta\varsigma \) in every function (that of Ethics, as well), is a combined unity consisting of the Active and the Passive Intellect, its origin is by definition inborn.

Now, for Aristotle this inborn endowment has to be triggered by the environmental data that are concerned with the various sociopolitical phenomena and which affect the development of the ethical understanding of every moral agent. If the moral agent performs virtuous actions, then he/she becomes habituated to virtuous dispositions; if he/she performs bad actions, then he/she becomes a \( \acute{\phi}\alpha\delta\lambda\omicron\varsigma \) person. So, both for the acquisition of the ethical concepts and the development of the ethical understanding, and in the acquisition of ethical virtues, the intervention of circumstantial factors takes place. And this would show that for Aristotle the acquisition of ethical knowledge is based on both innativist and empirical elements.

2. The second major conclusion that we would draw here is that in the Aristotelian doctrine, we can speak of universal ethical truths, what we have been calling
the quasi-Platonic Aristotelian universal[or universal(iv)]. These truths, known as ethical ἀρχαῖα[C], reflect the respective objective ethical realities, and are described by the primary meaning of an ethical concept. And the relation of the primary meaning to the other applications or other derivative meanings, is elucidated further by means of the notion of the πρὸς ἔν structure that we have tried to apply to some of the Aristotelian ethical concepts.

We have also seen that this relation of the various meanings within a certain language, or cross-culturally/linguistically, could be described by means of the core meaning that expresses the common semantic components that all the possible meanings, or applications of an ethical concept share.

In fact, the notion of the core meaning would be related to another type of universality, that which has been discussed in the Nicomachean Ethics E.7, with reference to the distinction between the natural and the conventional justice. This discussion shows that according to Aristotle there are certain universal rules, existing everywhere, regardless of social class, religion, language and sociopolitical situation. Now, this type of universal(iii) applies also to Ethics, to the extent that there are common ethical rules.
that exist everywhere, but whose actual application in practice differs from place to place due to the intervention of other conventional factors, which, however, are in some cases objective, natural ones. Thus for Aristotle, there are universal ethical rules that originate from Nature itself, hence they have universal value, and which are manifested different in each place. Similarly, in the political context, he also thinks of a universal constitution that is considered to be the best everywhere (with certain limitations), and it is manifested in the same way everywhere.

For Aristotle, there are universal ethical rules, in the sense of universal (iii), and this would suggest that for Aristotle there are objective realities that apply everywhere and people apprehend them after they have reached a developed stage of ethical understanding, and of ethical discourse. These ethical objective realities are reflected in the same way in the minds of the moral agents everywhere, and they are described by the core meaning. People around the world use different ethical vocabulary, which, however, name ethical concepts that are common to all people, since they reflect the same realities, and the objective reality of those is described by the core meaning.
And even more, for Aristotle there is also the primary meaning I; what describes the objective realities of the universal ethical truths of every ethical concept. That is, for Aristotle there are universals (iv), for there are universal ethical truths that have an axiomatic value and prescribe the human morality.

Every theory of human Ethics prescribe certain ethical axioms concerning the performance of ethical actions that lead us to development of our ethical understanding, as part of the attainment of the human ἐνθέασκος. And the Aristotelian ethical universals (iv) would serve such a task. By that, Aristotle achieves not only a philosophically stimulating display of ethical prescription, but also teaches us what truth in Ethics is, and how this can help us have a better living in our society. The Aristotelian person must learn how to live in accordance with Nature, Reason and Virtue, for the sake of his/her fellow citizens and for the sake of himself/herself, and understanding of the ethical universals (iv) as understanding of the universal ethical truths will teach him/her how to achieve the best of such a living.
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