A dissolution of the problem of the explanatory gap

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A dissolution of the problem of the explanatory gap

Pepp, Jessica Alden; (2003) A dissolution of the problem of the explanatory gap. Masters thesis (M.Phil), UCL (University College London). Green open access

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Abstract

This dissertation argues that the so-called 'explanatory gap' does not present a problem for physicalism. Following Frank Jackson, I define physicalism as the thesis that any possible world which is a minimal physical duplicate of the actual world is a duplicate simpliciter of the actual world. I define the explanatory gap as the non-deducibility of facts about conscious experience (such as the fact that seeing red is like this) from physical facts. I argue that the existence of the explanatory gap amounts to the non-deducibility of a certain kind of fact - the kind of fact which one can only know if one has a particular experience - from facts that can be known without any experience in particular, such as facts given in terms of physics. I then argue that since this non-deducibility is a gap between different kinds of knowledge (that which we can have without particular experience, and that which requires particular experience to have) and not a gap between different kinds of objects or properties, it does not, prima facie, present a problem for physicalism. For physicalism, as defined, is a thesis about the objects and properties of the actual world, and is not a thesis about knowledge. I next address arguments from Jackson and David Chalmers that if there is an explanatory gap, despite the prima facie compatibility of physicalism with the explanatory gap, then physicalism is false. I reply that their arguments for this conclusion depend on the use of the two-dimensional semantic framework, which cannot account for the kind of facts that require their knower to have a particular kind of experience. Thus, arguments such as Jacksons and Chalmers's, which use the two-dimensional framework to show that physicalism requires the deducibility of these kinds of facts from physical facts, cannot succeed.

Type:	Thesis (Masters)
Qualification:	M.Phil
Title:	A dissolution of the problem of the explanatory gap
Open access status:	An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
Language:	English
Additional information:	Thesis digitised by ProQuest.
Keywords:	Philosophy, religion and theology; Physicalism
URI:	https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10105649