Catana, Leo; (2002) The concept of contraction in Bruno's philosophy. Doctoral thesis (Ph.D), UCL (University College London).

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Abstract

The first part of this thesis describes the concept of contraction, in its ontological and noetic interpretations, as it is used in the philosophy of Giordano Bruno (1548-1600). Bruno denied the efficacy of the several psychical, psychological and medical states traditionally thought to aid contemplation and noetic ascent. The only means in his view was philosophical contemplation. Philosophical contemplation elevated the mind from the fragmented multiplicity of sense impressions to an understanding of the principles governing the sensible world. He denied that the human mind could attain ecstasy and transcend the plurality of the Mind or World Soul in the senses in which he understood those terms. Noetic ascent followed in reverse order the ontological descent from the intelligible to the sensible realm. The multiplicity of the intelligible and sensible universe occurred by virtue of the contraction of the infinite, universal, substance. The two principles of the universe, form and matter, were 'contracted' to produce sensible multiplicity. Matter was individuated or contracted through form, and form through matter. In this ontological sense of the term, 'contraction' is an integral part of Bruno's principle of individuation. In Bruno's philosophy, contraction in the noetic interpretation denotes a concatenating function of the human mind. The objects of this concatenation are concepts and intentions, which are likenesses of the sensible world as perceived via the senses or summoned by memory. In both instances intentionality is important. One of the most important methods of noetic ascent was memory. Bruno's memory theory derives largely from Plotinus (ca. 205-270) and the interpretation of Plotinus given by Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499). His account of contraction in relation to memory reflects these sources. The second part of this thesis discusses the sources for Bruno's ideas of contraction. Frances Yates, Alfonso Ingegno and other scholars have suggested various sources for Bruno's concept of contraction as a method of noetic ascent, notably, in relation to physiological contractions of humours and spiritus. This interpretation does not, however, take into account Bruno's reservations towards noetic ascent facilitated through medical contractions, and it ignores his insistence on defining contraction in the noetic interpretation in parallel with the ontological interpretation of the term. More persuasive is the argument proposed by Franz Clemens, Sandro Mancini and Filippo Mignini, who propose that Bruno derived his concept of contraction, in its ontological sense, from Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464). Contraction was an important concept in Cusanus' philosophy and theology. Bruno certainly knew the works, notably the De docta ignorantia, in which Cusanus uses 'contraction'. But this interpretation ignores the possibility that Bruno and Cusanus might have drawn on common sources, namely, medieval scholastic commentaries on the Liber de causis. One probable common source is Giles of Rome, also called Aegidio Romano or Aegidio Colonna (ca. 1243-1316). Several features of Bruno's discussion of 'contraction' suggest strongly that he drew on these medieval sources, in particular Giles. Bruno adapted the interpretations of contraction that he found in Cusanus and these medieval commentaries to the needs of his unorthodox philosophy.

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