Forms of (collective) life: thinking the ethics of inhabitation

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Is there space for an ontological urban design? or better still, following the words of Elisabeth Grosz, is there space for an ‘ontoethics’ of the urban? While contributing to the reflection on the role of ethics as a relational practice, this paper is digging back into the notion of forms of life in Agamben’s political reflections, aiming to foreground a possible ethics of the city. This aims to highlight the implications that ontology and ethics have in constructing a politics of life as they bring differences in how we live, act, what we value and how we produce and design. Particularly, to substantiate such ethics, three key characteristics of an affirmative life are put forward: the capacity to care and to connect, the capacity to repair, endure and hold together, as well as to imagine and experiment alternatives life-forces to oppose politics of oppression and capitalist extraction of values.

Keywords: forms-of-life, ontology, collective life, ethics

Introduction

Ouzaii, Beirut, Lebanon has been a destination for multiple displaced groups over different periods of time. Currently it is hosting approximately 10,000 Syrian refugees. The salient informal structure and the existence of a series of social networks and infrastructures in Ouzaii offered the displaced an alternative access to the city, allowing them to escape the gaze of the humanitarian aid apparatus that reduces them to a statistic and further contributes to their vulnerability. Refugees are engaged in the production of makeshift housing in two forms, firstly, between owners and former Syrian refugees and secondly, between the refugees themselves. The resultant imperfect collective safeguards Syrian refugees from possible social discrimination or political threats.

Ouzaii grants them sufficient ‘opacity’ to protect relationships and their being in the city. The township of Hlaing Thar Yar in Yangon, Myanmar has the highest informal population in the city: an unplanned arrangement of bamboo shacks without
basic services, precariously constructed on swampy, low-lying land under a patchwork of tenure conditions ranging from insecure renters to squatters and slum lords. In the mid-2000s, inhabitants started mobilising to claim their housing rights and subsequently established saving groups to collectively purchase large plots of (‘vacant’ or ‘empty’) farmland for the purpose of building their own houses. Collective savings develop financial and social capital and capabilities for collective decision-making and action. A collective life that allows them to become urban and assert their existence in the city. A collective, although precarious, form of living. Ouzaii and Hlaing Thar Yar are distant places, both geographically from each other and from ongoing architectural debates. They could be considered margins, peripheries, souths. For the argument of this paper they should not be treated as cases, nor as exceptional spaces. Rather they demonstrate, as do many other places of that kind, the salient feature of our living in the city in the presence of others and the perennial tension of dwelling practices in uninhabitable conditions. Spaces that - in their geopolitical significance - are configuring spatial imaginaries and spatial objects deeply relational. The reference to Ouzaii and Hlaing Thar Yar is simply to allow for a situated reflection on the notion of collective life, its relationship with ethics and to allow for an expeditionary foray, an attempt to connect with ontology. The starting point is that collective life is the salient feature of any urban thinking. A condition of ‘throwntogether’ that - even if imperfect, precarious, at the margin – represents how we dwell, how we inhabit with the other. Said otherwise, the ontology of the urban is its collective life or better in the words of Azoulay “a certain form of human being-with-others”. Thinking the collective dimension is thinking different modes, forms, attitudes of life or simply as Povinelli suggests “arrangement of existents” in which humans and non-humans orient and attempt to stabilize, endure and hold together. The politics of collective life is about articulating ways of being
and living together which open onto a dynamic process of formation and imagination of space in which many meanings, bodies and materials operate in motion. Forms of life encountered in Ouzaii and Hlaing Thar Yar, and in many other marginal sites of the urban world, bring to the fore the necessity to consider the creative force entailed in such politics where making life, collectively, is a continuous affirmation confronting the negative. They bring a discussion on ethics and politics and their imbrications to the material surface of the city and highlight the implications constructing a politics of life as they illuminate differences in how we live, act, what we value and how we produce our collective space.

While contributing to the reflection on the role of ethics as a relational practice\textsuperscript{ix} this paper digs back into the notion of form-of-life in Agamben’s political reflections, aiming to foreground a possible ethics of the city. The intellectual trajectories of affirmation and the centrality of life in their forms, in their commonality and vitalistic dimensions\textsuperscript{x}, that are the centre of any urbanism, led me to project the rubric of inhabitation that was elaborated in previous works.\textsuperscript{xi} Particularly, to substantiate such ethics, three key constituents of an affirmative life\textsuperscript{xii} are put forward: the capacity to care and to connect; the capacity to repair, endure and hold together; as well as the capacity to imagine and experiment with alternatives life-forces to oppose politics of oppression and capitalist extraction of values. A focus on life and living (collectively) suggested by Agamben - central to any serious discussion on urbanism – is extended beyond anthropocentrism to embrace a more vitalist materialism in order to avoid a relativist idea. Inhabitation could possibly become the territory where practices of care, repair and imagination forge renewed politics and an ontology of the living.

The paper is organized in three parts. The first offers a brief excursion into the ontological dimensions of the city, interpreted as being together. The second elucidates
Agamben’s forms-of-life as an ethics that presupposes inhabitation, as a conceptual dispositive to think how we live together. The third, and concluding part, outlines inhabitation as the possible territory where practices of care, repair and imagination forge renewed politics and an ontology of living collectively.

**The being of the city: being together.**

Ontology here has a twofold meaning: firstly, it identifies the vital character of urban material processes, and secondly, it relates to concerns regarding the character of urban existence and conceptions around critical issues associated with the inhabitation of urban territories. There is no space to summaries the vast literature but for the sake of the argument and simplicity, an ontology focusses on the nature of being and the real and, - when coupled with a political stand that interests me – brings the complex ‘political’ effects of such realities. An ontology according to Abbott is to “study the political stakes of the question of being […] to think the political through the exigency of the ontological question”.\(^{xiii}\) For the progress of the argument the ontological turn refers to Holbraad, et. al\(^{xiv}\) an expansion of interests across a number of disciplines that increases attention to a “more-than-human agency [and] a reinvigorated engagement with radical alterity”.\(^{xv}\) A trajectory inspired by Deleuzian assemblages, now popular in urban studies\(^{xvi}\), stressing a distributed agency and the challenges of modern assumptions of dual categories, more recently that problematise anthropocentric and constructivist orientations.\(^{xvii}\) This rationale has been largely inspired by various strains of post-structuralism, feminism, postcolonialism and decolonial thinking and in architecture are well represented by the works, among others, of Rawes\(^{xviii}\) and Frichot.\(^{xix}\)
Arturo Escobar in a recent article embeds the notion of un/inhabitability within a decolonial political ecological framework. In his writings, inhabitability is intended as being in the world and as being in relation. Inhabiting is a condition whose fundamental aspect is relationality. Yet, interactions do happen not only between humans, but also between human and non-human. Here is the novelty. The essence of inhabiting and the single fundamental condition for the habitability of the earth consists of “the radical interdependence of everything that exists, the indubitable fact that everything exists because everything else does, that nothing pre-exists the relations that constitute it”.

In *Design for the Pluriverse* he extends his critique to modern civilisation which he sees as a hegemonic regime of truth built on binaries (human/non-human, culture/nature, subject/object, reason/emotion). The current crisis of habitability is precisely generated by the separation of culture and nature, nature and society, urban and rural, and ultimately ascribed to the rise of cities in lieu of the dominant “hetero-patriarchal capitalist colonial model of civilisation”. The only way to counter such crisis is to act upon inhabitation itself, meaning our way of being in the world. Escobar reflects on the collective, calling for a new notion of the human, a new way of life that is relational, that relates to all forms-of-life and plural sociocultural configurations. The work of Elizabeth Grosz can be also of use as she suggests the need to develop an ontology in which “things, whether bodies or ideas, are not inert beings that simply exist in themselves or are caused from outside”. This ontology is therefore to be seen as separate from the conventional existence of a perfect and always real truth or, aligning with the ontological turn in anthropology, where “the multiplicity of forms of existence enacted in concrete practices, where politics becomes the non-skeptical elicitation of this manifold of potentials for how things could be”. Mario Blaser added to this version an explicit political adjective - a ‘political ontology’ – that “on the
one hand, it refers to the politics involved in the practices that shape a particular world
or ontology. On the other hand, it refers to a field of study that focuses on the conflicts
that ensue different worlds or ontologies to sustain their own existence as they interact
and mingle with each other”. xxvi This idea, fits perfectly with the messiness, the
emergence, the multiplicities of possibilities that exists in Ouzaii in Hlaing Thar Yar or
any other urban realities where ‘being’ is constantly stressed and contested and
reformulated in and across spatial objects and thoughts.

Living together, collectively, is ontological and therefore political as it emerges
from the complex political effects and when it does happen in the margin, life is a
‘political ontology of affirmation’ or “arrangement of existents” xxvii in which humans
and non-humans are oriented and attempt to stabilize, hold and make sense of their life.
What is important to notice is that collective life, as I intended, is bound to the material
relations and their potentials allowed by being in the city. Such praxis, that resonates in
the philosophy of Deleuze and Simondon, is a praxis of enduring positivity by
propelling social conditions, relations and arrangements and to actualise alternatives.
For Elizabeth Grosz ‘onto-ethics’ connotes “our manner of living in the world with
others” xxviii. In her own words “understanding ontology in terms of “something,” rather
than “being,” shows us the processes of becoming are inherently an ethical dimension.
For Grosz politics is an ethic and is “about collective life, life in common, life made
with and perhaps against others. In this sense, it must address past, present, and future
(as does any ethics worthy of the name)” whereas ethics “is about how a subject, a
human subject, addresses its being and becoming in relation to its actions and their
place in a larger world. Ethics, […] is not only about individual well-being, […] it is
about addressing and living with the conditions of one’s own existence, an existence
dependent on a great chain of others on whom one’s existence depends and which one’s
existence affects”. In other words, “with an immanent ethics […] ethics is not separated from being or becoming it is the modality or the manner of becoming, how and in what directions becoming occur”. To push the reflection further, the notion of “ethico-onto-epistemology” coined by Karen Barad point to the inseparability of ethics, ontology and epistemology when engaging with reality as human and non-human beings interactively co-constitute the world. When thinking on collective life the idea that one cannot but ethically engage with the world, Barad’s new feminist materialist theory, that she calls “agential realism” is of great utility. Her observations never “simply disclose pre-existing values or properties but, in fact also always plays a role in constituting them”. According to Barad’s point of view, “[e]ntanglements are relations of obligation” and hence our ethical debt towards the other is interwoven into the fabric of the world.

Seeing it from Ouzaii, Hlaing Thar Yar or anywhere else from the global south east, the urban conditions and the pressuring dimensions of unsustainability and inequality are calling for a revision, reflection and critique of the fundamental assumptions about the meaning and nature of our being in the world. As such, collective life and its ontology, is re-centered. However, thinking the urban in its relational existence, as we attempted to highlight above, its ontology cannot be separated from its politics. If as Roberto Esposito reminds us “every political thought implies a conception of space, of time, of the world, of human”. On the one hand, every philosophical definition of being necessarily has political effects. On the other hand, any mode of being - starting from its very 'being able' to be - is what expresses the political tension of the relationships from which it is generated and which it tends to modify. In order to continue the reflection, rather than staying with a Deleuzian and Simondonian ontology expressed by the different authors above, to be able to engage explicitly in a
renewed notion of inhabitation that shares the same vitalist approach and important ontological challenges of thinking being and being together as struggle of becoming, I wish to suggest a reflection using the rubric of affirmative politics of Agamben and his notion of forms-of-life as constitutive of a collective life that is an inhabitation intended as a territory where practices of care, repair and imagination forge renewed politics and an ontology of the living. xxxvi

Positioning ‘inhabitation’ as relational ontology

Thinking life and inhabitation is therefore a tension between politics and ethics. Thinking inhabitation in this way allows a de-centering of the human, re-positioning it in its ecosystem and, while remaining attentive to difference, fosters the thriving of all instances of life. Probably seen as unusual for conventional readers of Agamben, he offered an interesting reflection on inhabitation. Agamben xxxvii develops a further philological reflection of the well-known concept of dwelling that Heidegger established in the 1950s, connecting with Benveniste’s xxxviii interpretation of Indo-European etymological roots of the Latin words domus (home/heim) and aedes (house/haus). Agamben explains that the first refers to the place where we dwell, while the latter refers to the physical building. The distinction between home and house well captures the complexity of the social and material construction of dwelling, as well as its subjective and objective nature. This distinction is also problematic. If domus and aedes do not coincide in space, it means we dwell in places other than the house. Indeed, we dwell in places that are not homely at all. The meaning of dwelling exceeds the notion of house and home, and comes to mean ‘being’, ‘being in a certain condition’, ‘belonging’ (to a group, a status, a nation) and also ‘being in relation’.

Contrary to Benveniste’s arguments, Heidegger argues that building (bauen/edificare)
means dwelling (*buan/habitare*) because we build to dwell. According to Agamben however, building and dwelling have ceased to be an identity, since the birth of professionalism, when building was institutionalised as discipline, and the architect as builder became detached from the inhabitant as dweller. This reading is problematic, as it ignores the vast auto-constructed urban environments in the world. Yet the idea of a rupture of the original identity of dwelling and building is indeed important to understand the current condition of uninhabitability. Such a condition is exemplified through the paradigm of the camp: a place that can be built, but where we cannot dwell. Building uninhabitable places is the negation of the historical a priori of architecture: to inhabit.  

An exemplary start is Agamben’s affirmative biopolitics with his concept form-of-life, hyphenated in order to stress the inseparability of life and its form: “bare life must itself be transformed into the site for the constitution and installation of a form-of-life that is wholly exhausted in bare life and a *bios* that is only its own *zoë*”. Since his *Homo Sacer*, biopolitics includes the unqualified life of “*zoë*, which expressed the simple fact of living common to all living beings…, and *bios*, which indicated the form or way of living proper to an individual or a group”. As Abbott posits, “form-of-life is an attempt to think the condition of a life that would escape the metaphysical image of bare life”. Such a concept could be considered as a truly “strategic ontological intervention.” It designates a life that is “an intelligible singularity” that renders inoperative any attempt of the modern political to divide the human from the being, a life “in which the single ways, acts, and processes of living are never simply *facts* but always and above all *possibilities* of life, always and above all power” and thus an eminently political life. The concept of form-of-life, translated from Wittgenstein's *Lebensformen*, is intended to be eminently political, a life beyond the control of any
biopolitical machines, that allows emancipation and enables a project of affirmation. Through acts of disengagement, deactivation, subtraction, inversion and suspension, Agamben’s notion of life is experienced as a threshold “between speech and noise, political life and nude life, human and animal and a new ethics is to be found”. xlvi This is a life, without a biological vocation, but a life “in which the single ways, acts and processes of living are never simply facts but always and above all possibilities of life, always and above all power”. xlvii Embracing form-of-life, and thinking of it as inhabitation highlights the ethical relationship with space, as space of and for life – materialised in acts of repairing, caring and of course, imagining “new ethics, reversing its status as a productive and active force”. xlviii The forms-of-life that presuppose inhabitation, become the central idea to help us think how we practically live together and also how the norms and the tactics of such life get formed in and through space. A territorial, spatial outlook of such forms-of-life casts cities, neighbourhoods and communities, not only as sites of refuge, but as spaces where rights can be produced; spaces where the ‘struggle’ for inhabitation takes place.

Inhabitation means re-centring the affirmative dimension of enduring relations and develops an idea of collective life that tenaciously responds, non-negatively, to aspects of life and to modes of living and extractive practices, and constructs different horizons of hope. However, when connecting with materialism and specifically with ontology, it strips anthropocentrism and humanism of the notion of life to expand it and re-position it as an ethic. Agamben’s form-of-life is an explicit philosophy of life, in its continuous tension between politics and history, where living and being in the world is an “industrious activity not aimed to survival and obedience but to the creation and the individual or collective autonomy”. xlix
Towards inhabitation as forms-of-collective-life

The focus on life and living suggested by Agamben - central to any serious discussion on housing and urbanism - and extended beyond anthropocentrism to embrace a more vitalist materialism – helps to consider inhabitation as the possible territory in which to think collective life. To do so we can think of forms-of-caring, forms-of-repairing and forms-of-imagining, as elements that constitute inhabitations. While some are allusive and almost immediate to grasp in any collective existence, their articulation can be made more specific and political when inspired by the works of Puig de la Bellacasa, Tronto, Graziano and Trogal, Bahn, Mercier and Escobar. When caring practices are at play in inhabitation they make collective life visible, where care as a process of holding together (materialities and temporalities) is conducive to notions of maintenance, repair and imagination. Inhabitation becomes another infrastructure of care, allowing “the emergence of an ontology that is intrinsically pragmatic and performative”. Mattern suggests that “we are never far from three enduring truths: (1) maintainers require care; (2) caregiving requires maintenance; and (3) the distinctions between these practices are shaped by race, gender, class, and other political, economic, and cultural forces”. In other words the relational dimension infused in such practices constitute political ontologies that relate to the political question of being and becoming affirmative, allowing the possibility of different ways of living and forms of life to have the potential to transform or resist modes of dominance over life, generated by the rupture and the obsolescence of the world. Inhabitation is not only endurance in the present but the difficult task of imagining a possible future that supports the emergence of new affirmative forms-of-life, re-composed in response to an “uncontainable materiality” in an “ontological multiplicity” across past, present and future. Inhabitation is thinking and imagining the future.
“Bodies, ideas, identities of all kinds are the provisional alignment of a physics of forces, which gives ‘blood,’ that is power, energy, to all things”.\textsuperscript{lx} A more dynamic process of formation and imagination becomes a space in which many meanings, bodies and materials operate in public, in motion. Inhabitation as imagination is where both ethics and politics coexist. The practices of inhabitation support the ethics of collective life as a form-of-life with care, repair and imagination and allow for the expanded immanence of existence that have emerged in the struggles of recognition and materiality. Paraphrasing Agamben, processes of living are never simply facts but always and above all possibilities of life. This is precisely because potentiality, or being able to, counts as a key-departure “for any discourse of ethics;” it opens the possibility of regressing prior to will (choice) and taking a different path.\textsuperscript{lxi}

Conclusion

Collective life and its relationship with ethics allowed an expeditionary foray into ontology as it is the salient feature of any urban reflection. When thinking on collective life the idea is that one cannot but ethically engage with the world. Reflecting on such collective dimensions is to engage with an “arrangement of existents”\textsuperscript{lxii}, inhabiting time and space. Inhabitation, being in a place together, is therefore where both ethics and politics occur. In other words, thinking on inhabitation - and thinking specifically of places like Ousaii and Hlaing Thar Yar, where dwelling practice and collective life emerge in inhabitable conditions - becomes in essence an ontological and an ethical operation. Less about fixed being, more about the affirmative potential to create life and its possibility. Within this perspective, ethics – intended as relational practice and therefore political – becomes available when we use inhabitation, not as an instrument at hand, but as pure means. That is, when we experience it as the fact that we
all live together. Architecture has to offer an unresolved open reflection between the project and its ability to stay within what escapes, inside the negative without transforming itself into a desire for omnipotence, without simply transforming itself into a strong sense of belonging (whether disciplinary or geographic), in guilt and compassion incapable of feeling the real and of being where something fails, and obviously without breaking through into absolute immanence. Inhabitation and collective life are an “ethic that addresses being and becoming in relation to action and place”. They constitute a productive relationship that allows activating – according to Esposito – “being and politics (political ontology) in a mutually affirmative relationship”, establishing life, remaining in the precarious “without deactivating it by saving it, nor dissolving it in the name of a creativity so accelerated as to destroy what has just been created”. [yes this is my translation] Inhabitation in Ousaii and Hlaing Thar Yar - where practices of care, repair and imagination are forging renewed politics and an ontology of living, collectively - are therefore a territory. There, both ethics and politics - that are respectively “our manner of living in the world with others” and “our mode of collective contestation of the ways in which such forms of living occur, and their costs, in the world” - allow us to think “not only what is, but how what exists or is might enable what doesn’t (yet) exist but could exist”. In other words, thinking on inhabitation becomes in essence an ontological and an ethical operation: less about fixed being, more an affirmative potential to create life and its possibility.

Acknowledgements: thanks to reviewers who helped with comments to sharpen the argument and Lorens Holms for the help on editing the paper. Thanks to Jane Rendell, David Roberts and Yael Padan with whom we shared discussion on ethics and architecture.

ii There is no space enough to develop differences, nuances and to delve sufficiently in this vast literature. I do suggest to see: Parnell and Robinson, 2012; Watson, 2009; Yiftachel, 2006.

iii This paper was written many months before the COVID-19 crisis and the resultant urban discourse and its effects on the city, bound by an epidemiological vision of space, in which attention is placed on the system of relationships that define our practices of dwelling and space production, rather than on the inhabitant or society as a whole. The paper does not consider this scenario as it would have resulted in a very different reflection although the centrality of collective life is way more important now than ever.


xii The word affirmation is used in the direct reference to Esposito and Agamben thinking, dependent upon the possibility of life beside the negative capture of powers. As Noys suggests “the contemporary dominance of affirmationism in continental theory can be read as a sign of […] the political ability to disrupt and resist the false transcendental regime of capitalism. It is the affirmation of immanence, particularly as the locus of power and production, which is supposed to deliver the re- establishment of the grandeur of philosophy and the possibility of a new post- Nietzschean ‘great politics’ (2010:1). I used the term in the text to reaffirm an articulation of agency, of possibility and potentials as a point of orientation that allows a life to emerge as difference. This is important as with Noys “it challenges the notion of difference as constituting a possible counter-ontology to capital, insisting on the need for a positive point of orientation to truly disrupt the void or absence of determinations at the heart of capitalism” (2010:15) and it can be traced back to Deleuze’s suggestion of continual engagement with the political problems of the present. Negativity is thought as the dismissal of possibility (eg: marginalization, violence and capitalism) and therefore as the condition for re-thinking agency.

xiii Michael Abbott, “No life is Bare, the ordinary is exceptional: Giorgio Agamben and the question of political ontology”, Pharressia, n.14, (2012), p.24.


xxii Es
cobar, “Habitability and design: radical interdependencies and the re-earthing of cities”, p.132.


xxviii Elizabeth Grosz, “The Incorporeal. Ontology, Ethics and the Limits of Materialism”, p. 11

xxix Elizabeth Grosz, “The Incorporeal. Ontology, Ethics and the Limits of Materialism”, p. 11


xxxv Esposito, “Pensiero Istituente. Tre paradigm di Ontologia Politica”, p.24

xxxvi Boano, Astolfo, “Inhabitation as more-then-dwelling. Notes for a renewed grammar”, forthcoming

xxxvii Giorgio Agamben, Abitare e Costruire, 9 July 2019. Available at https://www.quodlibet.it/giorgio- agamben-abitare-e costruire

xxxviii Emile Benveniste, Indo-European Language and Society (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1973)


xlii Abbott, “No life is Bare, the ordinary is exceptional: Giorgio Agamben and the question of political ontology”, p.24.
Abbott, “No life is Bare, the ordinary is exceptional: Giorgio Agamben and the question of political ontology”, p.24.

Abbott, “No life is Bare, the ordinary is exceptional: Giorgio Agamben and the question of political ontology”, p.24.


Boano, The ethics of a potential urbanism, p.163.

Giorgio Agamben, Means Without End, p. 3.4.

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Mercier, “Uses of “the Pluriverse”, p.6.


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http://culanth.org/fieldsights/465-geontologies-of-the-otherwise
Elizabeth Povinelli, Povinelli, Geontologies: A requiem to late liberalism (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016)


Figure 1. Ousaii, Beirut, Lebanon. Boano

Figure 2. Hlaing Thar Yar, Myanmar. Boano