BRITISH POLICY AND BULGARIA

1918-1919

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ABSTRACT

The period from the conclusion of the Armistice of Salonika until the signature of the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine (roughly September 30, 1918 to November 26, 1919) saw complete turnabouts in both British policy toward Bulgaria and Bulgarian domestic politics. British policy toward Bulgaria during this period, as since at least 1876, was derivative of Britain’s policy toward the Turkish Straits, was the main factor in shaping the Treaty of Neuilly and therefore exercised an important influence on the simultaneously unfolding Bulgarian power struggle and on setting that country’s political agenda for years to come. Britain was determined to use the results of the Great War to establish the peace of Europe and the security of the Empire on a lasting basis. In the Balkans, Britain’s primary security interests were focused on the Straits, which she sought to utilise as both a waterway for her fleet and a barrier to German expansion toward lands controlled by her further east. British policy towards the Straits had long had a major impact on that towards the Balkans in general and Bulgaria in particular. By the end of the war, British official thinking on a post-war settlement with Bulgaria, which had entered the war against the Allies in order to achieve her territorial aspirations, centred on the idea of creating a Balkan bloc to defuse the region as a powder keg and form a bulwark protecting the Straits. In the British analysis, the formation of such a bloc was dependent on territorial concessions to Bulgaria by her neighbours, some of whom were Britain’s allies. At the Paris Peace Conference, however, the British Delegation, under the influence of Lloyd George’s desire to back Greece as Britain’s surrogate in the Near East, decided to support that country’s territorial claims in the Balkans and Asia Minor. This required taking rather than giving territory to Bulgaria and ended all thought of attempting to form the projected bloc. At the same time, political forces were coming to power in Bulgaria favouring peaceful development and co-operation with the country’s neighbours rather than military means to achieve her national aspirations at their expense. Ironically, while the territorial losses inflicted on Bulgaria with British support may have promoted this process, they represented a heavy legacy for the new Agrarian government of Alexander Stambolisky which he recognised he had to overcome if his party was to remain in power.
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PREFACE

This study traces the development and implementation of British policy toward Bulgaria immediately after the Great War and the concurrent evolution of Bulgarian domestic politics. The focus is on the period from the conclusion of the Armistice of Salonika until the signature of the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine (roughly September 30, 1918 to November 26, 1919). Neither subject has yet been treated in a systematic fashion.

While scholarly articles and monographs on British foreign policy before and during the Great War are legion, general works of course devote the limited space available to them for the Paris Peace Conference to major issues such as those connected with Germany and Russia. Similarly, Britain’s involvement in the Eastern Question has been the subject of extensive research; but works touching on the Peace Conference, which was perhaps her crowning moment in the Near and Middle East, not unnaturally focus on the partition of the Ottoman Empire, generous portions of whose territory then became British. On the other hand, Lloyd George’s fixation with Greece has received due attention in Michael Llewellyn Smith, Ionian Vision: Greece in Asia Minor, 1919-1922, and Montgomery’s, “Lloyd George and the Greek Question, 1918-22.”

As for the literature on the Paris Peace Conference itself, even works such as Dockrill and Goold’s Peace without Promise and Goldstein’s Winning the Peace, which filled an important gap by studying Britain’s particular role, have little room to devote to the Bulgarian settlement. Temperley’s general History of the Peace Conference of Paris is still very useful since many of its contributors actually participated in the Conference. Although it has been joined in recent decades by other general studies, it may well also still contain the best published treatment of the Bulgarian question at the Conference even
though it only scratches the surface. Each of Bulgaria’s neighbors now has at least one monograph devoted to its tribulations in Paris, such as Helmreich’s *From Paris to Sèvres* on the Ottoman Empire, Lederer’s *Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference*, Petsalis-Diomidis’ *Greece at the Paris Peace Conference* and Spector’s similarly named book on Rumania. All these works deal with the place of Bulgaria and Britain in the particular story they tell but they rarely put the two together (Petsalis-Diomidis probably doing the best job though his primary relevant concern is Thrace) since their focus is on their own country of interest. Drake’s unpublished dissertation “Bulgaria at the Paris Peace Conference” does analyze the discussions concerning Bulgaria based on the minutes and other official reports of the various councils, committees and commissions, but it does not delve into the policies underlying the positions taken by the victorious Allied Great Powers (except, to a limited extent, the United States) let alone into Bulgarian foreign policy or internal affairs during that period. In short, it is not a study comparable to the aforementioned monographs on Bulgaria’s neighbors. Similarly, there are good articles on some of the relevant individual questions considered by the Peace Conference but they are generally not concerned with British policy. The only work of this type which must be mentioned in that regard is Andonov-Poljanski’s *Velika Britanija i makedonskoto prasane na Pariškata mirovna konferencija vo 1919 godina*, which draws on British Delegation and other Foreign Office records.

Even general histories of Bulgaria devote little attention to this particular period and the same is true of the two standard histories of political parties, Rothschild’s *The Communist Party of Bulgaria* and Bell’s *Peasants in Power: Alexander Stamboliski and the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, 1899-1923*. Most of the glory here and in the rest of the literature goes to the Radomir Rebellion in any case. Khristov’s *Revoljutsionnata kriza v Bulgarhija prez 1918-1919* is a major work on the period but is marred by its ideological slant and emphasizes socio-economic issues and the activities of the Narrow Socialists. Kumanov’s short article “On the Problem of the Balkan Policy of
Bulgaria (October 1918-October 1919) addresses some of the foreign policy aspects but is too brief to go into much depth. Like all other works dealing with Bulgaria during this period, it suffers from lack of access to the most important primary sources.

Although all the works mentioned above proved very useful as did the others entered in the bibliography, especially for the historical background on both the British and Bulgarian sides, the main sources for this study are unpublished and published documents and other published primary sources such as memoirs and diaries. The Cabinet and Foreign Office records preserved at the Public Record Office, supplemented by official publications such as the Peace Handbooks, were indispensable, giving insight into official thinking and its development from wartime through the Peace Conference. This makes it possible to trace the changes in the views of not just, say, the Foreign Office but even of various individuals. What they do not shed much light on is why those views changed. Strategic and diplomatic conditions, of course, were different after the end of the war but circumstantial evidence points to Lloyd George as the indispensable catalyst for the change in British policy. A careful reading of Harold Nicolson’s published diary in *Peacemaking 1919*, of the records of the British Delegation, of which he was a member, and of those of the Peace Conference itself supports this conclusion by documenting the chronology of that change and the consistency with which its ramifications were pursued. An interesting supplement here are the American records published in Link, *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*. Lloyd George’s own memoir, *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*, and the memoir portion of Nicolson’s *Peacemaking* are chiefly remarkable for the indirect evidence they provide of the bad consciences which their authors suffered in later decades about Bulgaria.

It is also difficult to penetrate the heart of Bulgarian politics during this period. With only very limited access to the most important unpublished primary sources, I have relied primarily on the published proceedings of the National Assembly and the vociferous press organs of the most relevant Bulgarian political parties: *Mir* (National),
Pryaporets (Democratic) and Zemledelsko zname (Agrarian). While it is hard to imagine that any Bulgarian statesman at that time could have really expected anything other than the “Balkan” peace which in fact proved to be their country’s lot, they had to keep up a front for the electorate, which with the abdication of Ferdinand could resume playing a real role in political life. The press clearly shows the manner in which, aside from scapegoating Ferdinand, they sought to position themselves in order to be able to lay the blame on their rivals. The diary of one of the members of the Bulgarian Peace Delegation published by Khristov in “Dnevnikat na Mikhail Sarafov za sklyuchvaneto na mirniya dogovor v N’oi prez 1919g” is a very useful addition for both the politics and diplomacy of the period. The documents published by the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Diplomaticheski dokumenti po namesata na България v evropeiskata voina and Dokumenti po dogovora v N’oi and the few unpublished ones I was able to see are more tantalizing than anything else in both regards.

The emphasis in this study, as it was at the Peace Conference and in Bulgarian political rhetoric, is on territorial questions. At Paris the Allies did consider some alternative approaches to the problems posed by the scrambled ethnography and overlapping national aspirations of the Balkan peoples and states, namely international protection of minorities and voluntary reciprocal migration. Interesting material on these approaches has been left out, however, due to limitations of space. They have also been treated to some extent by other authors such as Andonov-Poljanski, Lederer and Petsalis-Diomidis as well as by those of older works such as Ladas’ The Exchange of Minorities.

The activities and views of local British representatives in the Balkans and of British Bulgariophiles such as Noel Buxton and J. D. Bourchier are likewise noteworthy but proved as expendable to this study as they were nugatory in effect.

Finally, I would like to express here my indebtedness to the late Academician Nikolai Todorov, who as director of the Institute for Balkan Studies in Sofia, oversaw and encouraged the beginnings of this project so many years ago, and to Dr. Leslie Collins,
who has seen it through to completion as my adviser at SSEES. I am also extremely grateful to the staff of the Public Record Office going back to the days when they were still on Portugal Street in central London and to the Library of Congress in Washington, which contributed more than it knows. The greatest burden over the years, however, has been borne by my Judith, without whose patience and encouragement this work could not have been completed.

P.J.T.

May 1999
The Hague
NOTE ON PROPER NAMES AND TRANSLITERATION

All Balkan proper names in the text are given in the forms and spellings generally used in Britain around the time of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. Hence, Üsküb rather than Skopje and Pashitch rather than Pašić. Since this usage was not entirely consistent, in cases of doubt the Peace Handbooks of the Foreign Office Historical Section have been consulted for geographical names and The Official Index to The Times for personal names. Anomalies may still occur, however, in quotations.

In all bibliographical citations, on the other hand, the actual Romanian spellings used in the given work and the system of Cyrillic transliteration used by the British Library are employed. This also gives rise to some inconsistencies: Alexander Stambolisky in the text but Aleksandar Stamboliiski in the footnotes and bibliography.
## ABBREVIATIONS FOR DOCUMENTARY SOURCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>BDIA</strong></td>
<td>Records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Religious Sects, Bulgarian State Historical Archive, Bulgarian State Historical Archives, Sofia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BFSP</strong></td>
<td>Great Britain, Foreign Office, <em>British and Foreign State Papers</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DBFP</strong></td>
<td>Great Britain, Foreign Office, <em>Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939</em>, first series (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1947-).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DD**


**DDI**

Italy, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Commissione per la Publicazione dei Documenti Diplomatici, *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani*, sesta serie (Rome: Liberia dello Stato, 1956-).

**DDN**


**FRUS, 1918, Supp. 1, I**


**FRUS, 1919, PPC**


**GSJD**


**LGP**

Lloyd George Papers, House of Lords Record Office, London.

**MD**


**MSDM**


**OS**


**OTIMN**


**PDIB**

Bogdan D. Kesyakov and Dim. Nikolov, eds., *Prinos kâm diplomaticheskata istoriya na*
PRO
Public Record Office, London.

PV

PWW

RAC
Conférence de la Paix, 1919-1920, Recueil des Actes de la Conférence (8 parts; Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1922-34).

XVIII ONS
Bulgaria, Narodno sâbranie, Dnevnitsi (stenografski) na osemnadesetoto obiknoveno Narodno sâbranie (Sofia: Dârzhavna pechatnitsa za Narodnoto sâbranie, 1919).

ZDSMD

ZSDKSHS
INTRODUCTION

The period between Bulgaria’s exit from the Great War and the final signature of peace between her and the Allied powers some fourteen months later witnessed a complete reversal in British policy toward that country and a virtual revolution in Bulgarian politics. The latter was itself heavily conditioned by the treatment of Bulgaria by the victorious Allies and thus by Britain’s policy towards her.

During the war itself, British official thinking on a postwar Balkan settlement had been very favorable toward Bulgarian national aspirations. The Treaty of Neuilly, however, eventually embodied territorial arrangements accepted and even advocated by British delegates to the Paris Peace Conference that were virtually antithetical to those previously contemplated. Foreign Office records clearly show the evolution of British policy in regard to particular territorial questions and much of the context within which they were considered, but British policy was not made only, or even perhaps primarily, at the writing tables of Whitehall and the conference tables of Paris. The guiding, albeit usually hidden, hand of Prime Minister David Lloyd George was the determining factor in setting a new British course more favorable to Greece, although he was ably assisted by pliant career officials.

Following the armistice, Bulgaria, by contrast, lost virtually all ability to influence the Allied Great Powers as they set about defining her new place in the international arena and drawing her borders. The debate over the best way to do so, however, played an important role in the struggle for domestic political power which was simultaneously unfolding. The abdication of King Ferdinand two days after the armistice and the eventual appointment of his nemesis the Agrarian leader Alexander Stambolisky as prime
minister exactly a year later were only the principal milestones along a path largely determined by Bulgarian perceptions of the best way to gain Allied favor. Defeated and desperate, the Bulgarians did not realize, or at least could not admit, that it was fruitless to try to propitiate the Allied leaders on their Olympus, but the decisions the latter handed down from on high did not fail to have their impact on Bulgaria's politics.

Part of this period's interest lies in the fact that neither Britain's nor Bulgaria's new course persisted for long. A year after the signature of the Treaty of Neuilly, Eleftherios Venizelos, the intended beneficiary of Britain's new policy toward Bulgaria and now her main prop in the Near East, was driven from office as prime minister of Greece. Two years later, it was Lloyd George's turn to lose office after most of what remained of his policy collapsed when Greek forces were defeated in Anatolia by the Turks and compelled to withdraw from Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace. When Stambolisky proved unable to retrieve anything from the wreck for Bulgaria, he was murdered during a coup supported by King Boris, Ferdinand's son, in June 1923.
I: BRITAIN, BULGARIA AND THE GREAT WAR

By the summer of 1918 Britain and Bulgaria had been engaged in hostilities with one another for almost three years, but the aims that each country was pursuing in the Great War were by no means mutually exclusive. This was a fact which at least some policymakers or politicians in the two countries recognized and indeed hoped to exploit in order to surmount the crises which both were at that time experiencing by making peace with each other.

After four years of war in which she herself had already lost around three quarters of a million men,¹ Britain and her major allies France and Italy and their American "associate" could still see no early end to the carnage. Their great ally Russia had collapsed in revolution the year before, and their own forces were still reeling from the blows of enemy troops thus freed from the Eastern Front. A German offensive opening on March 21, 1918 had reached the Marne only sixty kilometers from Paris by May 30, and on July 15 the Germans launched another attack and crossed that river. To be sure, three days later French and American forces managed to start pushing the Germans back, and on August 8, which later came to be called "the Black Day of the German Army," the British began a successful offensive around Amiens. Nevertheless, Allied leaders remained focused on their own distress and did not realize that of their enemies, who were still uncomfortably close to the French capital.²

¹For British casualties and losses, see Bogart, Direct and Indirect Costs, p. 272; and Taylor, English History, pp. 120ff.; the total for the Empire was around a million: ibid., p. 120.

²In fact, political authorities in both Germany and Austria-Hungary now began considering an offer of peace: Temperley, History, I, 89ff.
The fronts in the Near East were at this time relatively quiet. British forces fighting the Ottomans in Mesopotamia and Palestine had made spectacular gains in 1917, taking Baghdad in March and Jerusalem in December, but over a thousand kilometers of rugged terrain still separated them from Constantinople and the Straits. After the failure of an Anglo-French attempt to force the Dardanelles in 1915, the closest British troops to the Ottoman capital were bogged down with French, Italian, Serbian and Greek forces around Salonika some five hundred kilometers away. Here the Bulgarians had been blocking their path for almost three years, preventing their advance either to the Straits or into Central Europe.\(^3\)

On her part, Bulgaria had also made a tremendous effort in the conflict, mobilizing 20% of her manpower, more than any other belligerent.\(^4\) But the result now seemed likely to be a second "national catastrophe" of even greater magnitude than that suffered in 1913 at the hands of her neighbors in the Second Balkan War. Aside from damage to the economy, there were now about 225,000 killed and 300,000 seriously wounded on top of the 58,000 dead and 105,000 wounded from the Balkan Wars and there was no end in sight.\(^5\)

The mounting toll in lives, increasing shortages and dissatisfaction with the government's management of the war effort had eventually aroused opposition to the fighting. After riots and mutinies in 1916 and 1917, morale both at home and on the front deteriorated rapidly during 1918. The number of desertions increased month by month. By summer, the whole nation was in the grip of profound war-weariness. Months of drought and the failure of promised supplies from the now independent Ukraine to

\(^3\)On the military situation during the last two years of the war, see Liddell Hart, *History*, pp. 383ff.

\(^4\)Out of a population of around five million, by August 1, 1918, 877,392 men had been put in uniform; by the end of the war the total reached 1.1 million including militarized workers: Crampton, *Bulgaria*, p. 479; Khrisov, *Revolyutsionnata kriza*, pp. 12-13.

\(^5\)Crampton, *Bulgaria*, p. 473; Rothschild, *Communist Party*, p. 75; Sugar and Lederer, *Nationalism*, p. 139.
materialize made it clear that there would be no amelioration of the food situation, and rations, both civilian and military, were in fact reduced. Moreover, many soldiers and civilians could see no point in continuing the war, for Bulgaria had already occupied all the territory she could have hoped for. It seemed that further fighting could only benefit Germany, with whom there was already irritation and disappointment due to her requisitions of supplies and the failure of the Russian collapse and of the subsequent victories on the Western Front to bring peace.6

A Personal Regime

Bulgaria's leaders had entered the war in 1915 still smarting from her defeat two years earlier. They wished not only to reverse the results of that conflict but also to complete the realization of the country's "national ideal." This entailed expanding, especially in Macedonia, to borders that had been first defined by the Treaty of San Stefano, which Russia dictated to a defeated Ottoman Empire on March 3, 1878, but that had been redrawn by the other Great Powers at the Congress of Berlin a few months later (see Map 1).7 Bulgarian participation in the Great War, however, had as much to do with domestic politics as national unification. For the struggle for independence and unity had-dominated Bulgarian national life since the mid nineteenth century and was one of the main factors shaping her political development.8 Ever since 1878 the struggle to reestablish San Stefano Bulgaria, leading to war with neighboring states on more than one occasion,9 had been the focus of national energies, and the success or failure of alternative

6On Bulgaria during the war in general, see Búlgarska akademiya na naukite, Istoriya, II, pp. 290ff. and III, pp. 5ff; Crampton, Bulgaria, pp. 432ff.; Grinberg, "Pervaya mirovaya voina,", pp. 202-21; and Stanev, Istoriya, pp. 318ff.; on the growth of unrest in the country, see especially Birman, "Narastanie," p. 5-77; Khristor, Revolyutsionnata kritsa; and Stojanov, "Antiratno raspoloženje," pp. 35-45.

7On the Near Eastern crisis of the 1870s and the Treaties of San Stefano and Berlin, see especially Sumner, Russia.


9With Serbia in 1885, Turkey in 1912; Greece, Rumania, Serbia and Turkey in 1913; Serbia in 1915; Rumania in 1916 and Greece in 1917.
strategies to that end had played a key role in the acquisition and consolidation of domestic political power. Moreover, the support of one or more of the Great Powers was a major element of all these strategies. In the context of the Great War, this meant that picking the winning side was just as essential to domestic rule as to foreign expansion.

Both Stefan Stamboloff and then Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, the dominant political figures since the early years of Bulgaria's establishment as an autonomous principality within the Ottoman Empire, had been able to build their power by taking the lead in the struggle for San Stefano. Most Bulgarians looked to their Russian liberators for assistance in this task, but in the early 1880s Stamboloff and his Liberals gained a decisive advantage over their main rivals, the mutually feuding Prince Alexander and the small army of Russian political agents and military advisers seeking to control the country, by engineering the unification of the Principality with the neighboring province of Eastern Rumelia in September 1885. The next year, when Bulgarian Russophiles kidnapped the Prince, the immensely popular Unification gave Stamboloff the popular backing necessary to face down renewed pressure from Russia after that power had finally forced Alexander's abdication. Stamboloff's pursuit of friendship with the Sublime Porte (the Ottoman government), however, only added Macedonian extremists to his list of enemies. He finally responded with executions to assorted conspiracies by Russophiles and Macedonians.

This provided an opening for Ferdinand, who was but a minor German prince living in Vienna when Stamboloff, looking for a man willing to ascend his country's throne in defiance of Russia, brought him to Bulgaria in 1887. But Ferdinand was also ambitious. He was eventually able to supplant his mentor by engineering Stamboloff's

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10See Beaman, Stambuloff, passim; Българска академия на науките, История, II, 57ff. and 94ff.; Crampton, Bulgaria, pp. 85ff.; and C. Jelavich, Tsarist Russia, pp. 205ff.


12On Ferdinand, see Mado, Ferdinand.
resignation in June 1894 (and possibly his murder the next year) and began to work for a rapprochement with Russia, who was now expected to renew her support for Bulgarian aspirations. This initially paid off with his international recognition as Prince of Bulgaria in 1896. The following year, however, Russia and Austria agreed to put the Balkans "on ice," and Ferdinand long had to content himself with sponsoring raids into Ottoman territory by extremist Macedonian émigrés organized in the so-called Supreme Committee and Bulgarian officers. On October 5, 1908 he finally took a more concrete step by proclaiming himself "Tsar of the Bulgarians," renouncing the bonds of suzerainty still linking Bulgaria to the Ottoman Empire. With Russian support, he was recognized as King of Bulgaria early the next year.

Ferdinand now began preparing for his next project: a final war of national unification. This entailed a build-up of the army financed by foreign loans and construction of a Balkan alliance system directed against the Porte, something which Russia encouraged for her own reasons. Making use of newly acquired constitutional authority to conclude secret treaties, Ferdinand made an alliance with Serbia in early 1912, and treaties with Greece and Montenegro soon followed. The First Balkan War initiated by Bulgaria and her allies in October 1912 was in fact a spectacular success for them as Ottoman power virtually disappeared from Europe and Bulgarian forces advanced practically to the gates of Constantinople. Ferdinand was riding a tiger, however, and now he nearly fell off. Embroiled in a quarrel with Serbia and Greece over the division of the spoils in Macedonia, he ordered an attack on their forces there in June 1913. The

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13 Bălgarska akademiya na naukite, Istorinya, II, 118ff. and 135ff; Crampton, Bulgaria, pp. 161ff.; Madol, Ferdinand, pp. 76ff.


16 Bălgarska akademiya na naukite, Istorinya, II, 238-40 and 244ff.; Crampton, Bulgaria, pp. 319ff. and 401ff.; E. Helmreich, Diplomacy, pp. 3ff.; Stavrianos, Balkan Federation, pp. 159ff.
Rumanians and Ottomans promptly joined the fray, and the result was national catastrophe rather than national unification. Bulgaria lost the Southern Dobruja to Rumania and her gains from the first war were reduced to a small slice of Macedonia and an Aegean seaboard in Western Thrace between the Maritsa and Mesta with a second-rate port at Dedeagach (see Map 2). As a consequence, Ferdinand now faced the most serious challenge yet to his personal regime.

For Ferdinand had taken advantage of Bulgaria's economic backwardness and the resultant intense competition for the spoils of office among the growing number of party and faction leaders to build on his growing reputation as a diplomat and concentrate power in his own hands. While cultivating the goodwill of the army and Macedonian émigrés, he sought to forestall the rise of another Stamboloff by deliberately encouraging the fragmentation of the old, established political parties, which were based on little or no difference in principle. One contemporary British observer described Ferdinand's skill in using his constitutional prerogative to name the prime minister and calculating "the psychological moment for driving each batch of swine away from the trough of power and still more in supervising their diet." Governments installed by him provided themselves with popular mandates through elections, the results of which were guaranteed by their recently acquired control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Ferdinand was thus able to corrupt and compromise successive groups of politicians, including men who enjoyed reputations for integrity before accepting office from the cynical Prince.

One respect in which the parties did differ was in their attitudes toward the Great Powers. This was a factor which Ferdinand found convenient when seeking to reorient

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17 On the Balkan Wars, see especially, E. C. Helmreich, *Diplomacy*.


20 Crampton, *Bulgaria*, 325ff.
his foreign policy. The touchstone was Russia, who had liberated but then sought to dominate the country. The most anti-Russian were three parties which were all heirs to Stamboloff’s powerful tradition of the Unification: The Liberals, Young Liberals and National Liberals.\textsuperscript{21} The Democrats, on the other hand, represented the mildly Russophile part of the Liberal tradition of the pre-Unification Principality.\textsuperscript{22} The National Party was also Russophile but had its origins in Eastern Rumelia.\textsuperscript{23} The most extreme Russophiles were the Progressive Liberals, who were the political descendants of Stamboloff’s Liberal opponents.\textsuperscript{24}

During the first decade of the century, however, new political forces began to arise in Bulgaria. Parties of the Left, starting out as tiny splinter groups in the late 1890s, were gradually tapping the electoral strength of the growing number of industrial workers and public employees and the still overwhelmingly preponderant peasantry. The Broad and Narrow wings of the Bulgarian Workers Social Democratic Party and the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BZNS), while sharply divided on many issues, all bitterly opposed Ferdinand’s personal regime and favored a peaceful solution to Balkan national problems through the formation of a federation of republics rather than wars of conquest. The prospective ascendancy of these parties (and their counterparts in the other Balkan states) thus promised to substitute cooperation for rivalry with the neighboring states and focus attention on the problems of internal development rather than external expansion.\textsuperscript{25}

In 1911 the Left showed surprising strength by winning one sixth of the mandates to the V Grand National Assembly, which had been summoned to ratify the constitutional

\textsuperscript{21}Stanev, \textit{Istoriya}, pp. 116-17.
\textsuperscript{22}Stanev, \textit{Istoriya}, pp. 117 and 119.
\textsuperscript{23}Българска академия на науките, \textit{Istoriya}, II, 135ff.
\textsuperscript{24}Stanev, \textit{Istoriya}, pp. 117-19.
amendments required by Ferdinand. Although, or perhaps because, it unsuccessfully opposed those amendments, the Left reaped the political benefit from the disastrous results of the Second Balkan War. For after this defeat, Ferdinand, forsaken by Russia because of his attack on his erstwhile allies, sought to reorient his foreign policy and appointed the Germanophile Liberal Vasil Radoslavoff as prime minister. But the same combination of ecstasy and despair which the nation had experienced in 1878 now produced an increased readiness to abandon military adventures in favor of alternative solutions to the problems posed by conflicting Balkan nationalisms. Elections to the National Assembly in November 1913 thus failed to give Radoslavoff a majority, the Left (including the small Radical Party) garnering 45% of the vote (see Appendix I). Such an occurrence was unprecedented but Ferdinand rose to the occasion by simply proroguing the new chamber. Fresh elections were held in February 1914, and through increased pressure and chicanery, Radoslavoff finally managed to secure a slim majority for his Liberal coalition.

The outbreak of war that summer had presented Ferdinand with the chance he needed to reverse the defeat of the Second Balkan War. During the first year of the war, he bided his time and negotiated with both warring camps. The Entente and the Central Powers proved willing to pay roughly the same high price in other countries' territory for Bulgarian assistance, but in the summer of 1915 German victories on the Eastern Front and the failure of the Allies to take the Dardanelles finally convinced Ferdinand and

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26Bell, Peasants, 95ff.; Crampton, Bulgaria, pp. 319-21.

27Crampton, Bulgaria, pp. 421-22.

28Българска академия на науките, Istoriya, II, 246, 283 and 289; Radoslawoff, Bulgarien, pp. 83-84.

29Българска академия на науките, Istoriya, II, 286.; Bell, Peasants, p. 110; Sugar and Lederer, Nationalism, p. 137.

Radoslavoff of the ultimate victory of German arms.\textsuperscript{31} On September 6, Bulgaria signed a series of agreements with Germany and Austria-Hungary. In return for attacking Serbia within five days of their own planned offensive, they promised to immediately grant Bulgaria all of Serbian Macedonia as well as Serbia proper east of the Morava and some Serbian territory west of that river, plus the Southern Dobruja if Rumania subsequently joined the Entente and the Kavalla region if Greece did so.\textsuperscript{32} Moreover, Germany compelled her Ottoman ally to make a frontier rectification to Bulgaria's advantage along the lower course of the Maritsa in Thrace on September 8.\textsuperscript{33}

Ferdinand and his government announced mobilization on September 23 and declared war on Serbia on October 14. The Central Powers completed the defeat of Serbia in early December, and Bulgaria occupied all the Serbian territory her allies had promised and even part of Kosovo as well. Radoslavoff declared to the National Assembly later in the month that the country's borders would extend to wherever a Bulgarian soldier set foot.\textsuperscript{34} And Bulgarian soldiers in fact continued to advance. In May 1916 Bulgarian forces occupied the strategic Rupel Pass dominating the Struma valley in Greece, whose neutrality had already been violated by the Allies; and in August they took all of Greek Macedonia east of that river, including Kavalla. Later that month, another opportunity for expansion arose when Rumania joined the Allies and attacked Austria-Hungary in Transylvania. Bulgaria declared war on Rumania on September 1. The combined forces of the Central Powers soon overran most of that country, and by the end


\textsuperscript{34}Bălgarska akademiya na naukite, \textit{Istoriya}, II, pp. 303ff. and 310-11; Crampton, \textit{Bulgaria}, pp. 449ff.
of the year the Bulgarians, with some German support, had taken the Northern as well as the Southern Dobruja. By the end of 1916 Bulgaria’s gains were thus even more spectacular than during the First Balkan War, and she had not only realized but exceeded the ideal of San Stefano.

But Ferdinand had had to ride roughshod over the opposition in order to bring Bulgaria into the war. When at the end of August 1915 his course was becoming clear, the opposition parties, which were either Ententophile (i.e., Russophile) or neutralist, issued a joint statement protesting against the conclusion of an alliance with the Central Powers and demanding the convocation of the National Assembly. On September 4, Ferdinand had to endure a personal confrontation with the leaders of the non-Socialist opposition parties during which he and the Agrarian Alexander Stambolisky each threatened the other with the loss of his head. Stambolisky later manifested continued resistance to the war by distributing a pamphlet calling on the peasant soldiers to refuse to take part. Scattered mutinies did in fact mark the mobilization, but they were quelled by force and on October 10 Stambolisky was arrested for subversive activities. A military tribunal condemned him to death but the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment.

Ferdinand and Radoslavoff circumvented further resistance by the simple expedient of not summoning the Assembly until after the defeat of Serbia. The string of easy victories then turned opposition into support from virtually all political leaders other

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35 Balgarska akademiya na naukite, Istoriya, II, pp. 307ff.; Crampton, Bulgaria, pp. 450-51; on Bulgarian military operations during the war in general, see Nedev, Balgariya.


38 Balgarska akademiya na naukite, Istoriya, II, 300; Bell, Peasants, pp. 119-20; Stanev, Istoriya, pp. 375-77; Stamboliiski, Dvete mi sreshti, pp. 13ff.

39 Bell, Peasants, p. 121; on opposition to mobilization, see Balgarska akademiya na naukite, Istoriya, II, 303; and Crampton, Bulgaria, p. 448.
than Narrow Socialists and the imprisoned Stambolisky. Dissatisfaction with Radoslavoff's management of the war, however, eventually led the opposition parties, except the Narrows, to form a united bloc in the spring of 1918. Shortly thereafter, the conclusion of peace with Rumania in May led to a diplomatic dispute with Germany and her allies over the final allocation of the Northern Dobruja. At the end of that month, the leader of the National Liberals, one of Radoslavoff's coalition partners, resigned from the government because of dissatisfaction with Bulgaria's share of the Rumanian spoils. Under the pressure of the general discontent, Radoslavoff finally offered his own resignation in the middle of the next month. Now that his gamble seemed to be going badly, Ferdinand seized the opportunity to deflect criticism from himself and bolster the war effort by getting rid of Radoslavoff and installing a more capable government. On June 21, he therefore entrusted power to a new coalition headed by Alexander Malinoff, the leader of the originally Ententophile Democratic Party, and including the Radicals.

At this point the principal difference between the Malinoff government and its predecessor was the prospect of a more efficient prosecution of the war. For while Malinoff and his colleagues may have wanted peace, they wanted to keep the hard won gains of war even more. They therefore declared their determination to continue the war to a successful conclusion. Moreover, Ferdinand's loyalty to the German alliance remained unshaken. Nevertheless, despite official denials, it was widely believed that the replacement of Radoslavoff by Malinoff heralded Bulgaria's early exit from the war. Indeed, with their old patron Russia having collapsed and their new one Germany stalled, it may have seemed to many Bulgarians high time to look for a new foreign protector as the best way to avoid catastrophe and preserve their conquests. Moreover, their options

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40 Bălgarska akademiya na naukite, Istoriya, II, pp. 303ff. and 310-11; Crampton, Bulgaria, pp. 449ff.

41 Bălgarska akademiya na naukite, Istoriya, III, 19-20; Stanev, Istoriya, p. 470.

42 Bălgarska akademiya na naukite, Istoriya, III, 20; Stanev, Istoriya, p. 471.
were no longer limited to the traditional Great Powers, for the United States had not declared war on Bulgaria and still maintained diplomatic relations with her.\textsuperscript{43}

**The Balkan Bloc**

Britain’s overriding aim in the summer of 1918 was simply to inflict such a defeat on Germany that she would recognize aggression had failed and never again be tempted to use it to achieve her objectives.\textsuperscript{44} Only then would the way be clear for the creation of adequate guarantees for the two perennial, and to most minds synonymous, goals of British foreign policy: peace for the prosperity of the Empire and security for the home island and its imperial outposts should peace fail. Peace meant, above all, peace in Europe, where any international disturbance, as Germany’s actions in 1914 had shown, might produce a conflagration from which Britain could not escape. Security meant, after that of Great Britain itself, security for India, the approaches to which had been under constant threat for a century past, first by Russia and more recently by Germany as well.\textsuperscript{45}

The British government had already adopted several long-discussed solutions to the problem of attaining universal peace and security, including the establishment of a permanent organization of states, or “League of Nations,” to provide collective security in place of the prewar alliance systems and the introduction of general disarmament to prevent the types of arms races which were also believed to have helped cause the war.\textsuperscript{46} When it came to territorial arrangements, the principle of national self-determination was beginning to gain wide acceptance in the Allied camp, especially in the Anglo-Saxon countries, where British statesmen had been championing the rights of small nations ever

\textsuperscript{43}See especially Mamatey, “United States.”

\textsuperscript{44}Rothwell, *British War Aims*, p. 24.


since the start of the war and American President Woodrow Wilson had emerged as the chief prophet of a "New Diplomacy." 47

The importance this principle assumed can be seen from the fact that in his most important speech on war aims, Prime Minister David Lloyd George declared to the British Trade Union Congress on January 5, 1918:

... The settlement of the new Europe must be based on such grounds of reason and justice as will give some promise of stability. Therefore it is that we feel that government with the consent of the governed must be the basis of any territorial settlement in this war. ... 48

Three days after Lloyd George spoke, President Wilson made his own most famous war aims speech to a joint session of the U.S. Congress. He adumbrated "Fourteen Points" as "[t]he program of the world’s peace ... the only possible program." These points provided for open covenants of peace openly arrived at, freedom of the seas, lowering of economic barriers, reduction of national armaments, a general association of nations and territorial adjustments in specific areas, including Austria-Hungary, Russia, the Ottoman Empire and the Balkans. As Wilson noted:

... An evident principle runs through the whole program I have outlined. It is the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak. Unless this principle be made its foundation no part of the structure of international justice can stand. ... 49

Wilson’s speech, while more systematic as a statement of war aims, was couched in terms similar to Lloyd George’s, and Lloyd George and other British leaders received it with both publicly and privately expressed enthusiasm. 50 Indeed, in view of the remarkable effect on world opinion of this and later speeches, Britain and the other Allies

47See Calder, Britain, pp. 12ff.; Hinsley, British Foreign Policy, pp. 482 and 531; and Rothwell, British War Aims, pp. 18ff.

48Text in OS, pp. 225-33 (the quote is on p. 229).

49Text in OS, pp. 234-39 (the quotes are on p. 237 and 239).

thereafter left the public definition of war aims largely to Wilson. The “principle of national self-determination” (a phrase used by Lloyd George in his speech but not by Wilson in his) thus became one of the chief and most public ideological underpinnings of the Allies’ “war to end all wars.”

British policymakers, however, never understood nationality or self-determination to be the only, or even paramount, criterion to be applied in resolving the myriad issues which would be raised by the postwar settlement. Nowhere was this more true than in the Near East. And nowhere had the two problems of European peace and Imperial security so overlapped in the decades prior to the war as in these vast regions encompassing the current and former domains of the crumbling Ottoman Empire in Africa, Asia and the Balkans, of which Bulgaria formed a part. The struggle over control of these regions among the European Great Powers, the so-called Eastern Question, had proved to be the most durable and intractable diplomatic problem of the preceding century and the cause of many wars. The Great War itself had been sparked by a dispute between Russia and Austria-Hungary involving just such lands in Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Eastern Question was accordingly not the least of the problems whose solution seemed essential to a durable peace.

But Britain also had her own security interests in the Near East, which had long centered around the Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. Less than a mile wide at the narrowest point, the Straits were not only a choke point along both the waterway between the Mediterranean and Black Seas and the overland route from Southeastern Europe to Asia Minor (see Map 3) but also the site of Constantinople, the Ottoman capital. For most of the nineteenth century British statesmen had accordingly feared that

51Woodward, Great Britain, pp. 400-01.
52See Calder, Britain, pp. 9-10.
53See Marriott, Eastern Question, p. 444.
54Great Britain, Foreign Office, Historical Section, Turkey in Europe, p. 3.
military or naval control of the Straits or even decisive political influence at Constantinople by one of the other Great Powers would have a major impact on the naval balance in the Mediterranean and Black Seas and on the independence of the Sultan’s far-flung and still potentially powerful empire. Such a state of affairs could present a serious threat to the entire balance of power and potentially even to India itself.\textsuperscript{55}

Especially sensitive about the implications for India of Russian expansion to the south, Britain originally sought to safeguard her complex of interests at the Straits by attempting to keep the Sultan both strong and friendly, in effect making the Ottoman Empire her surrogate both at the Straits and throughout the Near East. Britain in fact became the staunchest defender of the political independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{56} Seeking to strengthen it from within as well, she was also the warmest foreign advocate of the Ottoman internal reform movement.\textsuperscript{57} But Britain was more successful in protecting her security interests than in advancing the cause of peace, and ever more frequent crises and wars in the Near East during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries produced an accelerating shrinkage of Ottoman territory.

In the face of what seemed the inevitable demise of the “Sick Man of Europe,” the focus of Britain’s attention began to shift even before the turn of the century from Constantinople and the Straits toward the periphery of the Ottoman Empire and her policy from one of seeking to maintain the status quo in the Near East to one of preparing for the expected eventual scramble for Ottoman territory.\textsuperscript{58} At the same time, broader changes were taking place in Britain’s foreign policy as she sought to end her diplomatic isolation from the other Great Powers and Germany began to replace Russia as the chief threat to


\textsuperscript{56}Clayton, \textit{Britain}, pp. 17 and 35; see also Cunningham, “Wrong Horse,” pp. 56-76.

\textsuperscript{57}See Temperley, “British Policy,” pp. 156-91; and Lewis, \textit{Emergence}, pp. 73ff.

\textsuperscript{58}Grenville, \textit{Lord Salisbury}, pp. 27, 82-84 and 94-95.
the balance of power and the security of the British Empire in the minds of most British policymakers. A special concern here was growing German economic and political influence in the Ottoman realm. One of the results of these trends was the conclusion of a string of agreements with both the Sublime Porte and other Great Powers, including ententes with France in 1904 and Russia in 1907 and a direct understanding with Germany in June 1914, recognizing her special position in areas of the Ottoman Empire strategically important to her such as Egypt and the Persian Gulf region. By this time Britain had gone a long way toward preparing for the final division of the Sick Man’s estate. The Straits question, however, was one issue which had not been settled, but in the years before the Great War British policymakers began to view “neutralization” as the solution most likely to safeguard trade and preserve peace among rival claimants.

When the Great War began as yet another round in the Eastern Question, British policymakers quickly decided that it should be the last, and they accordingly seized the opportunity it provided them to decisively implement the partition for which they had long prepared. In fact, gaining control of those areas of the Ottoman Empire which she regarded as strategically most important became the first of Britain’s war aims to be precisely defined. Later, the War Cabinet of David Lloyd George, whose Liberal-Conservative coalition came to power in December 1916, was dominated by men who considered the strengthening of the Empire a main object of the war.


63 Howard, *Partition*, p. 25; Mulligan, “Great Britain,” p. 82.

64 Rothwell, *British War Aims*, p. 25.

members such as Lord Curzon, Lord President of the Council and former Governor-General of India, and Lord Milner, Secretary of State for War and former Governor-General of South Africa, had strong views about the importance of strengthening Imperial communications and the security of India. For them, the fight against the Ottomans was what the war was all about and not simply a diversion nor even a means of breaking the deadlock on the Western Front. The last two years of the war thus saw an increased emphasis on the military operations against the Ottoman Empire in Mesopotamia and Palestine.  

Meanwhile, Britain came to secret agreements with her major allies, France, Russia and Italy, for a virtually complete partition of Ottoman territory. The first was the so-called Constantinople Agreement in 1915, under which Britain and France finally acceded to Russia's age-old ambition to possess Constantinople and granted her the right to annex the city, after the successful conclusion of the war, along with the adjoining territory in Europe up to the Enos-Midia line, the Ismid peninsula on the Asian side of the Bosphorus and the islands of the Sea of Marmora (see Map 4). This understanding was followed by others which sought to define the gains of the other three Allied Powers: the Treaty of London of April 26, 1915 between Britain, France and Russia on the one hand and Italy on the other, the Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 1916 between Britain and France and the Saint-Jean de Maurienne Agreement of August 18, 1917 among Britain, France and Italy (see Map 4). Under these agreements, backed up by the military operations in Mesopotamia and in Palestine, Britain would create a great arc of her own territory from Suez to the Persian Gulf and guarantee that the Ottoman demise would not threaten the balance of power through the disproportionate gains of any one claimant.


Moreover, the agreements’ goal of ending both Great Power rivalry and Turkish rule over other peoples was intended to eliminate a perpetual threat to peace by bringing stability to the Near East. Finally, while Constantinople would be stripped of its significance as the capital of a great, albeit crumbling, empire, the Straits themselves, in possession of a Russia allied with Britain, would act as a barrier across the path of any future German push to the East and shield Britain’s new acquisitions there.68

By the summer of 1918, however, the Straits Question had been reopened by the Russian Provisional Government’s renunciation of the secret agreements in May 1917.69 This action was not entirely unwelcome to Britain for, by removing one of the claimants, it made possible a more congenial distribution of the spoils. In particular, Lloyd George, his Foreign Secretary Lord Balfour and other high government officials had never been happy with the idea of giving Russia Constantinople and the Straits,70 and they now had the opportunity to establish a regime at the Straits more beneficial to Britain than the Constantinople Agreement by opening them to the warships of all nations, which would be of greatest advantage to her as the greatest naval power. The idea soon surfaced of a League of Nations mandate for the region under the United States, whose power and prestige could break the political and military lines of any renewed German advance to the East as well as guarantee freedom of navigation in the Straits.71 This was not to say that Constantinople itself could not remain the capital of a rump Turkey, but even if it did Britain could now hope to be able to finally reconcile the interests of peace and security in the Ottoman domains.

68Clayton, Britain, pp. 221ff.; Rothwell, British War Aims, pp. 198ff.
69Howard, Partition, p. 196.
70Gottlieb, Studies, pp. 93ff.; Mulligan, “Great Britain,” pp. 279 and 289; Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, p. 56.
71"Turkey in Europe and Asia,” memorandum by Tyrrell, October 22, 1917, FO 800/214, PRO; Howard, Partition, pp. 193ff. and 202; Rothwell, British War Aims, pp. 123ff. and 137-38.
Of all the Balkan states, aside from the Ottoman Empire, British policy toward the Straits had the greatest impact on Bulgaria, whose territory lay astride the main overland routes from Central Europe and Russia to Constantinople and formed the strategic hinterland to the Straits on the European side.\(^7^2\) This circumstance had been the major factor in determining British policy toward Bulgaria from the time of her rebirth as a state in 1878, although its impact varied with international conditions. British policy in turn proved to be one of the major forces shaping Bulgaria's power politics, centered as they were on the achievement of her national aspirations.

For Britain's fears of a Russian-dominated Bulgaria so close to the Straits\(^7^3\) had led her to seriously object to the Treaty of San Stefano.\(^7^4\) The most prominent feature of this treaty was the creation of a large, autonomous Bulgarian state under an elected Prince, which stretched from the Black Sea in the east to beyond Lake Okhrida in the west and from the Danube in the north to the Aegean in the south (see Map 1).\(^7^5\) This was precisely what made it an obsession for Bulgarians, but it was also its worst feature in British eyes since the projected principality cut Constantinople off from direct territorial contact with the remaining Ottoman provinces in Europe.\(^7^6\) At the Congress of Berlin a few months later, Britain succeeded in reducing San Stefano Bulgaria to a rump principality in the north and a province south of the Balkan range, eventually dubbed "Eastern Rumelia" (see Map 1). Under the Treaty of Berlin, signed on July 13, the principality, with its capital at Sofia, was to enjoy political autonomy under a Christian

\(^7^2\)See Pantev, Angliya, 17ff.

\(^7^3\)See R. W. Seton-Watson, Disraeli, pp. 345ff.

\(^7^4\)R. W. Seton-Watson, Disraeli, p. 447.

\(^7^5\)Sumner, Russia, pp. 399ff. and, for the text of the Treaty of San Stefano, pp. 627ff.

\(^7^6\)Marriott, Eastern Question, pp. 24 and 30; R. W. Seton-Watson, Disraeli, p. 500.
Prince with the Sultan as his suzerain, while Eastern Rumelia was to have only wide administrative autonomy under a Christian governor and no outlet to the Aegean.  

When it became clear, however that Bulgaria, especially under Stamboloff, would by no means be a tool of Russia, Britain’s attitude to her national aspirations began to change. Britain actually became the most energetic foreign backer of the unification of Eastern Rumelia with the Principality in 1885.  

Even after the fall of Stamboloff, Britain did not actively oppose the next steps taken toward the realization of the ideal of San Stefano: Ferdinand’s declaration of Bulgaria’s independence from the Ottoman Empire in October 1908 and the formation of the Balkan Alliance in 1912. Although British policy was by then no longer preoccupied with Ottoman territorial integrity, this more passive attitude may have been partially due to the activities of the Balkan Committee, organized in the first decade of the century by Britons who felt their country was responsible for the plight of the Balkan Christians still under Ottoman rule. Indeed, in 1911 Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey had remarked that public opinion made it impossible for Britain to join any policy directed against Bulgaria. In any case, Britain made no protest when Bulgarian and her allies achieved the virtual expulsion of Ottoman power from Europe at the end of 1912. By now her overriding goal in the region was to

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77 The Treaty of Berlin also recognized the complete independence of Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro, cut down the latter two states’ territorial gains under the Treaty of San Stefano, promised Greece a rectification of her frontier with Turkey (see Map 1), transferred Bosnia-Herzegovina to the administration of Austria-Hungary and allowed that power to occupy the Sanjak of Novibazar: Hyde, *Diplomatic History*, pp. 87ff.; Medlicott, *Congress*, pp. 45ff.; R. W. Seton-Watson, *Disraeli*, pp. 446ff.; for the text of the Treaty of Berlin, see Sumner, *Russia*, pp. 658ff.


81 On the Balkan Committee, see especially Stavrianos, “Balkan Committee.”

make sure that yet another crisis in "the powder keg of Europe" did not engulf the Great Powers.  

Be this as it may, since the Congress of Berlin, Britain had at best defended Bulgarian faits accomplis but never taken the initiative in promoting her (or any other Balkan state's) expansion. The outbreak of war among the Great Powers in August 1914 and, especially, the Ottomans' entry into the conflict in November changed that. For the British immediately recognized that the Balkan states, lying between the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, occupied an important position both militarily and geographically within the context of the war. United, their influence could be decisive; divided, their efforts could cancel each other out. Within the Balkans, Bulgaria not only dominated the internal lines of communication and had the largest army but was expected to have a perhaps decisive impact on the policy of her still uncommitted neighbors. Her participation, or even neutrality, in the war was therefore regarded in some British quarters as decisive.

In these circumstances, the reconstitution of the Balkan alliance of 1912 or a "Balkan bloc" centered on Bulgaria and oriented toward the Entente became an early goal of British war diplomacy. The foundation on which such a bloc was to be built was simple: Bulgaria would acquire territory from her neighbors, who (provided they sided with the Allies) would receive compensation at the expense of the enemy Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires. Such an arrangement was first proposed in 1915 by Noel Buxton, a Liberal Member of Parliament and a founder and leading light of the

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83 Claryton, Britain, pp. 209 and 212; Crampton, Hollow Detente, passim; E. Helmreich, Diplomacy, pp. 146ff.; Mulligan, "Great Britain," p. 167.


Balkan Committee. In fact, Britain and the other Allied Powers made Bulgaria an offer along these lines in 1915. In return for attacking Turkey, Bulgaria was promised the immediate cession of Eastern (Turkish) Thrace to the Enos-Midia line and the postwar cession of the line Kriva Palanka-Sopot-Okhrida in Serbian Macedonia (provided Serbia obtained Bosnia-Herzegovina and an outlet to the Adriatic). The Allies also pledged their influence in securing the cession of Kavalla in Greek Macedonia, Greece receiving compensation in Asia Minor, and help in solving the problem of the Southern Dobruja with Rumania. As has been seen, however, Bulgaria at this time accepted a not very dissimilar offer from the Central Powers.

Even after Bulgaria entered the war against them, British policymakers continued to be attracted by the policy of territorial concessions through which they had unsuccessfully sought to gain her alliance. There were two reasons for this. First, as a result of the deadlock on the Western Front and setbacks elsewhere, especially the collapse of Russia, Britain was more than willing to consider a separate peace with one or more of Germany's allies in order to facilitate a conclusive victory over her chief opponent. There was, in fact, a strong feeling in government circles that a separate peace with at least one of the lesser enemy powers was essential for such a victory. Bulgaria was in an excellent position to benefit from this situation. Indeed, Bulgaria was perhaps the only enemy state that could have had a separate peace satisfying her territorial ambitions merely for the asking at almost any time. Given her geographical situation,
Bulgaria’s defection from the Central Powers had the potential to deal a severe moral and material blow to Germany, put Constantinople at the mercy of the Allies and open the lifeline to Russia through the Straits. As has been seen, Britain and the other Allied Great Powers had major territorial ambitions in the Ottoman Empire, whereas they wanted nothing from Bulgaria.91

Thus, although British political and military leaders may have differed on the exact combination of military pressure and territorial and other inducements to be used, they virtually all agreed on the desirability of detaching Bulgaria from the Central Powers. No sooner had the Central Powers occupied Serbia in late 1915 than the idea surfaced in London of bribing Bulgaria out of the war with offers of Serbian, Greek and Ottoman territory. This idea found favor with Lloyd George, Grey and his successor Balfour as well as Foreign Office officials and Sir William Robertson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.92 Britain, however, refused to make the first move toward any of Germany’s allies,93 while up to the summer of 1918 such Bulgarian peace feelers as had been made came from political émigrés with rather dubious credentials.94

Moreover, the idea of a Balkan bloc eventually came to assume importance in connection with the development of British war aims.95 Although the British government never adopted the creation of a Balkan bloc, or any of the other recommendations of its experts on specific postwar desiderata, as official policy, such a bloc was expected to contribute to two ends directly related to the main goals of British policy: defusing the Balkans as an international powder keg and forming a first line of defense complementary

91Rothwell, British War Aims, pp. 50 and 123.
92Guinn, British Strategy, p. 132; Rothwell, British War Aims, pp. 50, 79, 121, 140 and 219.
93See Rothwell, British War Aims, p. 82.
94See Leontaritis, Greece, pp. 295ff.; and Rothwell, British War Aims, pp. 139ff. and 215ff.
95Calder, Britain, pp. 93ff.; Howard, Partition, pp. 203-04; Leon, Greece, p. 101; Marriott, Eastern Question, pp. 35 and 443; Rothwell, British War Aims, pp. 42ff.
to the Straits against any renewed German push to the East. By a happy coincidence, it also found sanction in the now fashionable principle of national self-determination. For it was precisely the application of this principle to the Balkans which bade not only to make old quarrels disappear but also to enable the Balkan states, once reconciled, to unite in a solid bloc. This would create both a real guarantee of lasting peace and an effective barrier to German expansion toward the Straits and Britain’s own projected territorial acquisitions in the Ottoman Empire. The formation of a Balkan bloc thus promised to finally reconcile Britain’s interests in peace and security in the Balkans just as she hoped the partition of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of a new regime at the Straits would in the Near East as a whole.

To British minds, confronted with the conflicting aspirations, intractable quarrels and shifting alliances of the Balkan states, territorial concessions to Bulgaria leading to the creation of a Balkan bloc therefore had everything to recommend it: peace, security and, above all in the desperate summer of 1918, victory. What seemed like a good idea to many people in British policy circles, and to at least some Bulgarians, did not, however, to Lloyd George or, for different reasons, to Ferdinand. It certainly did not to Britain’s Balkan Allies, and this was the factor that seems to have most influenced Lloyd George.

The Balkan Allies

Most of the contemplated concessions to Bulgaria would, of course, have to be made at the expense of the Balkan Allies, but the leaders of Greece, Rumania and Serbia were determined to achieve their own countries’ territorial aspirations, not contribute to the realization of Bulgaria’s. In face of this situation, the British had been careful in 1915 to avoid making any definite offers of territory to Bulgaria over the heads of current

96 See further p. 45 below.
(Serbia) or prospective (Greece and Rumania) allies and later sought to avoid making any commitments to them which might have equally complicated the formation of the type of Balkan bloc they wished to see.

A temporary exception had been made in the case of Bulgaria's neighbor to the north. The then Rumanian prime minister, Ion Bratiano, managed to conclude a political and military agreement with the hard-pressed Allies on August 17, 1916 which recognized Rumania's claims in Transylvania, the Banat and the Bukovina as well as guaranteed the integrity of her prewar territory, including the Southern Dobruja.\(^7\) By January 1917, however, most of the country, including Bucarest, had been overrun by the Central Powers and a new government signed the Treaty of Bucarest on May 7, 1918, making a separate peace with the Central Powers and thereby casting into doubt the previous obligations of the Allies toward Rumania.\(^8\) Indeed, although British leaders vowed to overturn the new treaty,\(^9\) the Foreign Office felt that the 1916 treaty had been seriously undermined.\(^10\)

The Serbian government of Nikola Pashitch also had a far-reaching national program calling for unification with Montenegro and all the lands of Austria-Hungary inhabited by South Slavs (i.e., Serbs, Croats and Slovenes).\(^11\) Support for such a project came from the Paris-based Yugoslav Committee of South Slav exiles from Austria-Hungary\(^12\) as well as friendly Britons.\(^13\) The British government, however, was

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\(^10\)"Synopsis of our Obligations to our Allies and Others," memorandum by Nicolson, February 6, 1918, 31930, FO 371/3440, PRO; "The Broad Outlines of a Balkan Settlement," memorandum by Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, Bulgaria/002, August 2, 1918, in *MD*, XX, 273ff.


obligated under the Treaty of London to agree to the cession of much of the Adriatic coast to Italy (see Map 5), and the furthest it ever formally went to endorse these goals was to promise support for some of Serbia’s aspirations in Austria-Hungary in exchange for concessions to Bulgaria in 1915. These obligations regarding Serbia’s claims lapsed with the Serbian offer to Bulgaria, which had been voided by the Bulgarian attack on her. Thereafter, consideration for their Italian ally prevented the British government from supporting the Yugoslav program or even extending official recognition to the Yugoslav Committee. Moreover, in view of the dim prospects of renewed Serbian agreement to concessions to Bulgaria, British leaders never gave their Serbian counterparts anything beyond vague personal assurances regarding even the restoration of Serbia’s prewar frontiers.

Greece, whose King Constantine I was Kaiser Wilhelm’s brother-in-law, had joined the Allies late and only after they forced Constantine to abdicate in June 1917. This event resulted in the return to power of Eleftherios Venizelos, prime minister almost uninterruptedly since 1910. He had already presided over his country’s expansion to his native Crete as well as to Macedonia and the Aegean islands but, with large Greek irredentas still living in Epirus, Asia Minor, Thrace, and Constantinople, his ambition went even further. The complementary goals of his foreign policy—unifying as much of

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103 Banac, National Question, p. 119; Calder, Britain, p. 26 and passim; Seton-Watson and Seton-Watson, Making of a New Europe, passim.


105 “Synopsis of our Obligations to our Allies and Others,” memorandum by Nicolson, February 6, 1918, 31930, FO 371/3440, PRO.

106 Banac, National Question, p. 318.

107 Lederer, Yugoslavia, p. 38.

108 Rothwell, British War Aims, pp. 139-40.

109 Calder, Britain, pp. 117 and 125ff.; Rothwell, British War Aims, pp. 53, 73 and 119.

110 Leontaritis, Greece, pp. 3ff. and 45ff.

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the scattered Greek people as possible and making Greece a major Mediterranean power—harked back to the heyday of the “Megali Idhea” (Great Idea), the quest for the revival of the Byzantine Empire.\(^1\) Venizelos saw the war as a unique opportunity to realize them (he had even been prepared in 1915 to sacrifice Kavalla to Bulgaria for the sake of larger gains elsewhere\(^2\)), and to his mind this could be done only by actively participating on the side of Britain. The support of the world’s greatest naval power would be necessary for the fulfillment of the secular dreams of Hellenism, and a Greece dependent on the sea for her livelihood had in any case to cultivate British friendship.\(^3\)

It had been due chiefly to Venizelos’ efforts, which brought the country to the brink of civil war, that Greece had eventually joined the Allies,\(^4\) and even detractors who impeached him as devoid of principle were willing to concede that his charm, tact and powers of persuasion cast a spell over all who came into his presence.\(^5\) He could also draw on the long tradition of British Philhellenism, dating back to the days of Byron\(^6\) and the fact that by the summer of 1918 Greece also had one of the largest Allied contingents on the Macedonian Front, larger even than Serbia’s.\(^7\) Despite all this, Venizelos too had been unable to obtain any formal commitments from Britain and her major Allies recognizing Greek aspirations. He never tired of reminding the British that he had staked everything on bringing Greece into the war on the Allied side and that the smallest concession to Bulgarian ambitions would be absolutely fatal to his

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\(^7\)Dakin, *Unification*, p. 217; for details, see p. 63 below.
position. On their part, while undertaking no formal obligations, British statesmen recognized his many claims on their loyalty.

In the summer of 1918 Britain accordingly had, or no longer had, any formal, binding commitments to any of the other Balkan states that would interfere with the type of peace settlement with Bulgaria considered necessary for the formation of a Balkan bloc. Moreover, the diplomatic position of these states was weak inasmuch as Rumania had been defeated by the Central Powers, Serbia was almost totally occupied, and the relevant portions of Greek territory were in Bulgarian possession. However, the military contribution of Greece and Serbia still had to be considered. And the Balkan Allies had not hesitated to make known their objections to negotiations with Bulgaria: at the end of 1917 they united to protest the idea of a separate peace with her at their expense. Although their attitude met with little but impatience at the Foreign Office, British policymakers were conscious of the risk of alienating Greece and Serbia (and Rumania, while she was still in the field) without gaining Bulgaria.

Lloyd George’s and Wilson’s speeches in early January 1918 were especially displeasing to the Balkan Allies. In the former case, the War Cabinet had deliberately

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118 See Grenville to FO, telegram No. 617 Secret, Athens, July 3, 1918, 117931, FO 371/3148, PRO; Frangulis, La Grèce, II, 11.

119 Minutes of Imperial War Cabinet, IWC 23, July 9, 1918, CAB 23/41, PRO; Minutes of Imperial War Cabinet, IWC 30, WC 457, August 13, 1918, CAB 23/7, 42 and 43, PRO; Churchill, Aftermath, p. 380; on the failure of Venizelos’ efforts to obtain Allied commitments to support Greek expansion or at least to guarantee the integrity of her prewar territory, see “Synopsis of our Obligations to our Allies and Others,” memorandum by Nicolson, February 6, 1918, 31930, FO 371/3440, PRO; and Leontaritis, Greece, pp. 287ff.; Leontaritis debunks as Venizelist propaganda the view, found in Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, p. 58, that the Allies gave a guarantee of territorial integrity in April 1918: Leontaritis, Greece, p. 290.

120 Rothwell, British War Aims, p. 142; on the attitudes of Greece and Serbia to a separate peace with Bulgaria, see also Katardziev, “Makedonsko pitanje, pp. 397ff.; and Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, p. 44.

121 See Rothwell, British War Aims, p. 142.

122 See Rothwell British War Aims, p. 219 and “Some Notes on Peace Arrangements--The Balkans,” memorandum by Balfour, November 1917, FO 800/200 and 214, PRO; for similar fears regarding negotiations with Austria-Hungary, see Calder, Britain, p. 123.

123 For these speeches, see p. 28 above.
decided to stick to generalities, and Lloyd George only spoke somewhat vaguely of "the restoration of Serbia, Montenegro and the occupied part of France, Italy and Roumania." He did not mention Greece at all. Potentially more alarming for the Balkan Allies was his statement, "Nor are we fighting to destroy Austria-Hungary or to deprive Turkey of its capital or the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in race." Similarly, the eleventh of Wilson's Fourteen Points dealt with the Balkans (see Appendix II). While it contained no more specifics than Lloyd George's speech, Wilson's reference to "historically established lines of allegiance and nationality" did seem to hint directly at the need for concessions to Bulgaria. Wilson also appeared to frown on the territorial aspirations of the Balkan Allies by speaking only of the "autonomous development" of the subject peoples of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires. The failure of both Britain and the United States to explicitly endorse their national aspirations in such a public manner caused political problems for their governments. They all made their objections known in London and Washington and continued, unsuccessfully, to seek definite acceptance of their own war aims by the British and American governments. They would have been even more displeased had they known precisely what territorial concessions to Bulgaria the British were contemplating.

**Disputed Territories**

While Britain's top political and military leaders were concentrating on winning the war and articulating general principles for the peace, it was left to officials much lower down the bureaucratic ladder to work out the details of a projected settlement in the

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125 The text of the speech is in *OS*, pp. 225-33 (the quotes are on pp. 229 and 227 respectively).

126 The text of the speech is in *OS*, pp. 234-39 (the quotes are on p. 238).

Balkans and elsewhere. Although other departments of state made their contribution to the formulation of British war aims, it was the Foreign Office that came to play the main role in preparations for an eventual peace conference.\textsuperscript{128} At one time this would have seemed perfectly natural, but after the beginning of the war and especially after the advent of Lloyd George to power at the end of 1916, the Foreign Office steadily lost influence in the making of foreign policy to other parts of Whitehall, not only to the military departments but particularly to the Cabinet Secretariat and even Lloyd George's personal secretariat. Sir Charles Hardinge, Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, who reassumed his old position as Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office in June 1916,\textsuperscript{129} was determined to combat this trend, and it was principally at his initiative that his department was able to get control of the most important elements of the machinery established to prepare for peace.\textsuperscript{130}

Much more directly responsible for actually fitting the idea of the Balkan bloc within the framework of British war aims was Sir William Tyrrell. Tyrrell had been private secretary to Sir Edward Grey from 1907 until June 1915.\textsuperscript{131} Together with Sir Ralph Paget, an Assistant Under-Secretary and a former minister to Belgrade,\textsuperscript{132} he submitted an important memorandum in August 1916 in response to a Cabinet request for proposals for future peace negotiations. Its wide-ranging recommendations rested on a pragmatic application of the principle of national self-determination to European problems.\textsuperscript{133} They included the eventual creation of a Balkan bloc:

\textsuperscript{128}Goldstein, \textit{Winning}, p. 58.

\textsuperscript{129}Hardinge was originally appointed Permanent Under-Secretary in February 1906; from 1910 to 1916 he served as Governor-General of India: Hertslet, \textit{Foreign Office List, 1924}, pp. 234-35; Goldstein, \textit{Winning}, p. 23; see also his memoirs, Hardinge, \textit{Old Diplomacy}.


\textsuperscript{131}Hertslet, \textit{Foreign Office List, 1924}, pp. 382-83.

\textsuperscript{132}Hertslet, \textit{Foreign Office List, 1921}, pp. 481-82; Goldstein, \textit{Winning}, p. 81.

\textsuperscript{133}Goldstein, \textit{Winning}, pp. 10ff.
The clearest British interest in the Balkans would appear to be the existence in the future of some combination of Balkan States sufficiently strong to serve as a counterpoise to the Germanic Powers on the one hand and eventually to a greatly enlarged Russia on the other. Although the creation of a Balkan bloc, including Serbia and Bulgaria, may be impracticable for at least a generation to come, we should at any rate avoid territorial rearrangements which would make a reconciliation between these two States entirely impossible. For that reason and also with the more general object of arriving at a durable settlement, we must bear in mind the two principles of nationality and reasonable economic facilities to which reference was made at the commencement of this report.\textsuperscript{134}

A little over a year later, after Russia had denounced the secret agreements, Tyrrell wrote another paper, devoted exclusively to the Balkans. He now saw the creation of a Balkan bloc as a more urgent task in order to assure Britain a new barrier against Germany’s Drang nach Osten. “Therefore,” he concluded, “we may go so far as to maintain that a Balkan bloc is not only in the interest of general peace but is also an essential British interest.”\textsuperscript{135} Tyrrell, and Paget, also made detailed recommendations, some of which will be considered below, regarding the territorial arrangements which lay at the heart of the proposed settlement.

Tyrrell’s projects soon received a bureaucratic boost, which helped carry them into the immediate postwar period and then to the Paris Peace Conference. In early 1918 Hardinge, as part of his campaign to reassert Foreign Office influence, oversaw the creation of a special Political Intelligence Department (PID). To staff it, he filched most of the personnel of the Department of Information’s (i.e., propaganda) Intelligence Bureau (DIIB), which was itself about to be transferred to the newly created Department of Propaganda in Enemy Countries (EPD), and put Tyrrell at its head. The DIIB had been set up in April 1917 to provide information on conditions in foreign countries for use in British propaganda. Under Tyrrell the new PID continued this reporting function but also

\textsuperscript{134} “Suggested Basis for a Territorial Settlement in Europe,” memorandum by Tyrrell and Paget, P.5, August 7, 1916, CAB 29/1, PRO (also in Lloyd George, \textit{Truth}, I, 31ff.).

\textsuperscript{135} “Balkan States,” memorandum by Tyrrell, September 28, 1917, FO 800/200 and 214, PRO.
became a focus of preparations for peace. In August 1918 it produced the last wartime project for a Balkan bloc.

Another initiative by Hardinge likewise had implications for the Balkan settlement. In 1918 he also had the Historical Section of the Naval Intelligence Division transferred to the Foreign Office Library. Under George Prothero, a former professor of modern history, past president of the Royal Historical Society and the editor of The Quarterly Review, the Historical Section had been engaged since May 1917 in the preparation of handbooks to provide basic information for peace negotiations. Between then and the end of the war, it produced one hundred seventy-four “Peace Handbooks” on all parts of the world, which were published in 1920. Nine of them dealt with the Balkans. These book-length studies provided historical, political, economic, geographical and other background on individual countries or areas. While it is doubtful that future British plenipotentiaries at the Peace Conference read any, let alone all, of these works, their contents were certainly known to Tyrrell and his staff as they pursued their more policy-oriented work.

By the end of the war, Foreign Office experts had assembled a series of more or less consistent and precise proposals for a final Balkan settlement and an impressive body of information on which to base its negotiation. As far as Bulgaria was concerned, they accorded her national aspirations in Serbian and Greek Macedonia, the Dobruja and Eastern (Turkish) Thrace at least partial acceptance within the framework of a Balkan bloc. Their recommendations and views on these areas will now be surveyed.


137 "The Broad Outlines of a Balkan Settlement," memorandum by Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, Bulgaria/002, August 2, 1918, MD, XX, 273ff.

138 Goldstein, Winning, pp. 26ff.
Macedonia

Foreign Office experts recognized the geographical vagueness of Macedonia, which had never comprised a single administrative unit, and defined it roughly as that portion of European Turkey before 1913 which lay west of the river Mesta and the Rila Mountains, south of the Kara and Shar Mountains, east of the Albanian frontier and the Pindus range and north of the pre-1912 Greek frontier, an area of approximately 25,000 square miles encompassing all of the former Ottoman Vilayet of Salonika and parts of those of Kosovo and Monastir.¹³⁹

The Serbo-Bulgarian alliance of 1912 had provided for a partition of Macedonia into "contested" and "uncontested" zones separated by the line Kriva Palanka-Sopot-Okhrida (see Map 2). According to this agreement, Bulgaria was to receive at the least the uncontested zone, that is, the territory to the south and east of this line, while the disposition of the contested zone was to be determined by the Emperor of Russia.¹⁴⁰ Greece was not a party to the agreement and it defined no southern limit to the uncontested zone. After the Balkan Wars the southern limit of the uncontested zone was generally taken to be the newly established common frontier between Greece and Serbia.

The Serbo-Bulgarian plan proved abortive. As a result of the Second Balkan War, Macedonia was partitioned among the three adjoining states, Bulgaria receiving about 10% of the area, Greece just over 50% and Serbia the remainder.¹⁴¹ The Foreign Office was duly cautious about population statistics. Its working estimate was that the population of Macedonia before 1912 was over 2.5 million, with 1,150,000 in what became known as Aegean (Greek) Macedonia, 1,020,000 in Vardar (Serbian) Macedonia and only 120,000 in Pirin (Bulgarian) Macedonia.¹⁴²


¹⁴⁰E. Helmreich, Diplomacy, pp. 55ff.

¹⁴¹Rothschild, East Central Europe, p. 326; see also the figures for population and population density in Great Britain, Foreign Office, Historical Section, Macedonia, p. 17.

¹⁴²Great Britain, Foreign Office, Historical Section, Macedonia, p. 17.
The Foreign Office was even more conscious of the difficulty of estimating the numbers of the various nationalities inhabiting Macedonia, especially in view of the migrations since the Balkan Wars. Nevertheless, its estimate of the situation before 1912 was that there were 1,150,000 Slavs, 400,000 Turks, 300,000 Greeks, 200,000 Vlachs, 120,000 Albanians, 100,000 Jews and 10,000 Gypsies. The overwhelming majority of the Greeks (250,000) and Vlachs (150,000), the majority of the Turks (250,000) and virtually all of the Jews (110,000) lived in Greek Macedonia along with 380,000 Slavs.

However inexact and outdated these figures might have been, the principal question in dispute concerned not numbers but the national identity of the Macedonian Slavs. During the war official opinion on this subject was initially favorable to Bulgaria, but toward its end the Foreign Office began emphasizing the view that Bulgarian, Greek and Serbian national consciousness were all to be found, sometimes within the same family, and that such consciousness was subject to change according to circumstances, propaganda and pressure. In Vardar Macedonia, which was predominantly Slavic, the Foreign Office saw events since 1914 (presumably having in mind Serbia’s defeat and Bulgaria’s occupation of the area) as spoiling any chance Serbia may have had of gaining the undivided sympathies of future generations, if not the...
present one, and as establishing a permanent ascendancy of Bulgaria over those of at least a section of the inhabitants. In Aegean Macedonia, the Foreign Office recognized a prevalence of Hellenic culture but did not hesitate to describe the Slavs there as Bulgarians, who predominated in the area east of Salonika and north of a line through Seres-Saranukakli-Alistrati to the Mesta, including Drama but excluding Kavalla and the coast.

Such was the official view of the ethnography of Macedonia. Policy prescriptions were fundamentally in accordance with it, although, as has been seen, ethnographic considerations per se were not necessarily paramount. After the Second Balkan War, Grey originally thought that Bulgaria should have Kavalla, the natural outlet for the southwestern part of the country, as well as the lower Struma valley, but was willing to accept Dedeagach as a compromise. During the first year of the Great War, the negotiations with Bulgaria largely turned on the Macedonian question. As has been seen, Britain joined her Entente partners in offering Bulgaria the uncontested zone in Serbian Macedonia and their good offices in obtaining Kavalla from Greece. At one point Lloyd George (then Minister of Munitions) even told the Bulgarians that they could take Kavalla any time they liked.

After Bulgaria’s entry into the war, the Foreign Office continued to favor Bulgarian possession of at least the uncontested zone in Serbia and, less consistently, Kavalla in Greece. In August 1916, Tyrrell and Paget strongly favored the cession to

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148 Great Britain, Foreign Office, Historical Section, Serbia, pp. 7-8.
150 See p. 29 above.
151 Great Britain, Foreign Office, Historical Section, Macedonia, pp. 53-54.
152 Crampton, Hollow Detente, p. 106; Dakin, Unification, p. 199; E. Helmreich, Diplomacy, p. 391.
153 See p. 37 above.
Bulgaria of the uncontested zone, bounded on the west by the line Kriva Palanka-Sopot-Okhrida and on the south by the Greek frontier of 1913. They recognized, however, that if Serbia were in possession of all her prewar territory at the time of negotiations, it would be manifestly impracticable to call on her to surrender part of it to Bulgaria. They also thought that the British government, who they said was already suspected of Bulgarophilism in the Balkans, should avoid any appearance of initiating such a proposal. Should, however, the situation be such at the close of the war that Serbia herself admitted the necessity of compromise on this basis with Bulgaria, Britain should do her best to promote it.155

In a memorandum of his own on the future peace settlement three months later, Balfour also believed Bulgaria should have the uncontested zone on the basis of the principle of nationality. He observed, however, that whether she “deserved” it and whether Britain could give it to her in view of Serbian sentiment was another question.156

The following year, Tyrrell emphasized the importance of the Macedonian problem for any Balkan settlement aiming at the creation of a Balkan bloc. It could, he said, be assumed that a settlement which did not recognize Bulgaria’s right to the greater part of Macedonia would not achieve the first objects of establishing settled conditions in the Balkans or weaning Bulgaria away from Germany. But if, on the other hand, her Macedonian aspirations could be satisfied, the first essential step toward achieving the objects in view would have been taken. Tyrrell now believed that it ought not to be very difficult to secure the acquiescence of Serbia, noting, as he and Paget had the year before, that she had been ready to give most of (Vardar) Macedonia to Bulgaria in 1912 and that there was reason to believe that she would have yielded to Allied pressure to cede both

155“Suggested Basis for a Territorial Settlement in Europe,” memorandum by Tyrrell and Paget, P.5, August 7, 1916, CAB 29/1, PRO.

the uncontested and contested zones to Bulgaria before the latter's entry into the war. It was, however, necessary to obtain for Serbia compensation elsewhere, and he mentioned Bosnia, Herzegovina, Cattaro and Montenegro in this connection. Greece, moreover, should cede to Bulgaria the Kavalla, Drama and Seres districts of Greek Macedonia. In return, she would receive the islands of Imbros, Tenedos and Thasos and have her occupation of the other Aegean Islands confirmed, subject to any arrangements necessary to assure freedom of navigation through the Straits.\textsuperscript{157}

In August 1918, the PID thought that Bulgaria should still have at least the uncontested zone in Serbian Macedonia but only perhaps receive Kavalla from Greece.\textsuperscript{158} By this time, these two areas had become the constants in all proposals for concessions to Bulgaria in Macedonia. At the end of 1917 the Foreign Office estimated the population of the uncontested zone, with an area of 6-7,000 square miles, at about 500,000 of mainly Bulgarian nationality and that of the contested zone, with an area of around 3,000 square miles, at 120-150,000 with Bulgarians the largest element south of Üsküb, although here nationality was said to depend on that of the occupying power. In Aegean Macedonia, the Foreign Office had less definite information about the Kavalla area. Greece had divided this region administratively between Seres and Drama. The Foreign Office did not know the area of these two districts but gave the populations in 1913 as 132,841 and 174,091 respectively with the ethnographic advantage going to the Bulgarians, the Greeks being largely confined to the coast.\textsuperscript{159}

\textsuperscript{157} "Balkan States," memorandum by Tyrrell, September 28, 1917, FO 800/200 and 214, PRO.

\textsuperscript{158} "The Broad Outlines of a Balkan Settlement," memorandum by Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, Bulgaria/002, August 2, 1918, MD, XX, 273-80.

\textsuperscript{159} Appendix to "Some Notes on Peace Arrangements--The Balkans," memorandum by Balfour, November 1917, FO 800/200 and 214, PRO.
The Dobruja

The portion of the Dobruja the Rumanians had acquired in 1913 (see Map 2), which they referred to as the Quadrilateral, had an area of 2,983 square miles and a population of some 273,000. Like many areas in the Balkans, the population was a rich ethnographic mixture and undisputed statistics as to its precise composition were impossible to come by. The situation was further complicated by the emigration of many Bulgarians, Serbs, Albanians and Turks after the Balkan Wars. Available Bulgarian figures from 1906 gave a population of 130,000 Turks, 120,000 Bulgarians and 6,000 Rumanians, and although it was recognized that the Rumanians disputed these figures, the Foreign Office thought it at least clear that the chief element was Turkish.

In any case, Britain's position on the question had as much to do with politics as ethnography. Rumania had felt aggrieved at the original boundary drawn by the Treaty of Berlin and raised the issue after the First Balkan War, demanding compensation for the expansion of the other Balkan Christian states. At that time, the Entente was interested in weaning Rumania away from the Triple Alliance. Following Russia's lead, Britain and France, while refusing to admit Rumania's right to compensation, were accordingly ready to recognize her grievance and felt certain frontier rectifications could be granted. The change in the frontier made after the Second Balkan War, however, may have seemed to

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160 Great Britain, Foreign Office, Historical Section, Rumania, p. 12.
162 See appendix to “Some Notes on Peace Arrangements--The Balkans,” memorandum by Balfour, November 1917, FO 800/200, PRO (also in FO 800/214, PRO); and “Explanatory Memoranda” to “South-Eastern Europe and the Balkans,” memorandum by Nicolson and Leeper, December 1918, P. 66, CAB 29/2, PRO.
163 Great Britain, Foreign Office, Historical Section, Rumania, p. 55.
164 E. Helmreich, Diplomacy, pp. 300ff.
the British to have gone too far,\textsuperscript{165} and in 1915 the Entente offered Bulgaria its assistance in settling this issue with still neutral Rumania.\textsuperscript{166}

Later, when winning Rumania over to the Entente had seemed more important, or at least more feasible, than getting Bulgaria to desert the Central Powers, Britain had been willing to give her a guarantee of territorial integrity in 1916, but her exit from the war severely undercut any inclination to honor this commitment.\textsuperscript{167} Tyrrell and Paget did not mention the Southern Dobruja in their August 1916 memorandum, which they wrote just before the conclusion of the 1916 agreement. In September 1917, however, with Rumania facing military collapse, Tyrrell recommended the return of the Southern Dobruja to Bulgaria, Rumania being compensated in Bessarabia and, if possible, Transylvania and Bukovina.\textsuperscript{168} In August 1918 the PID thought Bulgaria should receive at least part of the Southern Dobruja.\textsuperscript{169} On the other hand, Britain never contemplated offering Bulgaria any portion of the Northern Dobruja, which had become an object of dispute among the Central Powers.\textsuperscript{170}

**Thrace**

During the war period, the term “Thrace” was used to refer to the Ottoman Vilayet of Adrianople as it had existed prior to the Balkan Wars (see Map 6). As a result of those wars, the area eventually came to be divided into Eastern and Western Thrace along roughly the line of the river Maritsa. But the real dividing line was political. For Bulgaria acquired Western Thrace in two stages, most of it in 1913 and the remaining

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\textsuperscript{165}In his memoirs, Grey said the settlement with Bulgaria after the Second Balkan War was dangerously harsh, calling it “not one of justice but of force”: Grey, *Twenty-Five Years*, I, 253-54.

\textsuperscript{166}See p. 37 above.

\textsuperscript{167}See p. 40 above.

\textsuperscript{168}“Balkan States,” memorandum by Tyrrell, September 28, 1917, FO 800/200 and 214, PRO.

\textsuperscript{169}“The Broad Outlines of a Balkan Settlement,” memorandum by Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, Bulgaria/002, August 2, 1918, *MD*, XX, 273-80.

\textsuperscript{170}See pp. 26 above.
portion along the right bank of the Maritsa as well as another tiny slice on the left bank of the Maritsa in 1915. She also obtained a small part of Eastern Thrace in 1913 (see Maps 2 and 8). The area of Western (Bulgarian) Thrace was about 7,200 square miles in 1913,\textsuperscript{171} to which approximately another 400 square miles were added in 1915.\textsuperscript{172} The area of Eastern Thrace (the rump Vilayet of Adrianople) was about 3,337 square miles at this time.\textsuperscript{173}

Determining the ethnographic composition of either half of Thrace was more complicated than usual even for the Balkans, because religion was the main category of population classification in the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{174} Not only was the population extremely mixed but determining the political allegiance of Moslems, adherents of the Greek Patriarchate or Bulgarian Exarchate, Armenian Gregorians and Catholics, Jews and others was by no means as simple as equating the first three categories with Turks, Greeks and Bulgarians. The question of the Pomaks (Bulgarian-speaking Moslems) in Western Thrace was especially contentious.\textsuperscript{175}

Moreover, to an extent even greater than in Macedonia or the Dobruja, since 1912 various segments of the population had experienced mass flight, expulsion or voluntary migration as a result of the wars and boundary changes.\textsuperscript{176} In addition to the problems of the accuracy and interpretation of population figures, there was thus an issue as to which

\textsuperscript{171}See Great Britain, Foreign Office, Historical Section, \textit{Bulgaria}, p. 58 (giving 25,257 square kilometers [9,752 square miles] as the area acquired from Turkey in 1913, from which 2,500 in Macedonia have been subtracted yielding 7,252 for Western Thrace and a bit of Eastern Thrace).

\textsuperscript{172}Montague Bell, \textit{Near East Year Book}, p. 111 (giving 1,000 square kilometers).

\textsuperscript{173}Great Britain, Foreign Office, Historical Section, \textit{Turkey in Europe}, p. 8 (giving 8,644 square kilometers).

\textsuperscript{174}For Ottoman census categories, see Shaw, "Ottoman Census System," pp. 325-38.

\textsuperscript{175}See Buxton and Conwell-Evans, \textit{Oppressed Peoples}, p. 91.

time period should be taken as the ethnographic norm: the years before the Balkan Wars
or those after the territorial changes to which Greece, at least, had freely assented.

While there was much room for doubt about the exact ethnic composition of
Thrace, there is little doubt that, for its part, the Foreign Office found a Turkish majority
in both Eastern and Western Thrace at the outbreak of the war, Greeks comprising the
second largest element in the former area and a strong third in the latter and Bulgarians,
with or without Pomaks, being insignificant in the former and the second largest group in
the latter.\footnote{Great Britain, Foreign Office, Historical Section, *Bulgaria*, p. 8; idem, *Turkey in Europe*, pp. 7-9; the Foreign Office believed the population of the portions of Eastern Thrace not promised to Russia in 1915 (i.e., west of the Enos-Midia line) to be mostly Turkish with Greek colonies and scattered Bulgarians, the latter probably slightly outnumbering the former: “Suggested Basis for a Territorial Settlement in Europe,” memorandum by Tyrrell and Paget, P.5, August 7, 1916, CAB/29/1, PRO; according to Ottoman figures for 1914-15, the population of Adrianople Vilayet at that time totaled 631,094, of whom 360,417 were classified as Moslems, 224,680 as Greeks, 2,502 as Bulgarians and 23,607 as others: McCarthy, *Arab World*, pp. 68-69; according to an official Bulgarian census of December 1914, the population of those portions of Adrianople Vilayet annexed by Bulgaria in 1913 totaled 434,536, of whom 210,336 were Turks, 185,524 Bulgarians (including 115,509 Christians and 70,015 Pomaks), 32,377 Greeks and 6,299 others: Bulgaria, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Bulgarian Question*, p. 268.}

There is equally little doubt that British policy toward Thrace was never governed
by ethnographic considerations. On the one hand, in 1915 Britain joined her Entente
partners in offering Eastern Thrace up to the Enos-Midia line to *Bulgaria*.\footnote{See p. 37 above.} On the
other, immediately after Bulgaria’s intervention on the side of the Central Powers later
that year, she briefly considered offering *Greece* the coast of Western Thrace up to
Dedeagach.\footnote{Leon, *Greece*, pp. 251-53; Petsalis-Diomidis, *Greece*, p. 41; Leon says that the offer was never actually made although it was known to the Greek government, which had already rejected Cyprus; Petsalis-Diomidis says an offer of Western Thrace was made but gives no source.} However, the idea of depriving Bulgaria of any territory in Western
Thrace received no further consideration during the war.

In 1916, moreover, when Greece was still neutral and the Constantinople
Agreement was still in force, Tyrrell and Paget were of the opinion that Eastern Thrace
west of the Enos-Midia line should still go to Bulgaria and not Greece or Russia, two
other possible claimants. If it went to Russia, they thought, she would acquire complete
domination of the Balkans. This was detrimental to British interests and therefore
merited strenuous opposition. If it went to Greece, on the other hand, she would
inevitably also claim Bulgarian Thrace to establish direct connection with the rest of the
country. This would deprive Bulgaria of access to the Aegean and make a conflict
between her and Greece a matter of certainty sooner or later. There accordingly
remained, in the eyes of Tyrrell and Paget, only a third solution: to allot Thrace west of
the Enos-Midia line to Bulgaria. This was open to the objection that Bulgaria, having
sided against the Allies, would receive practically the same territory (in combination with
their recommendation for Macedonia) as she had been offered to join them. They
dismissed this objection as

... in part sentimental and it should not be allowed to outweigh the consideration
that looking to the future, it will be to our interest to leave Bulgaria after the peace
settlement so far contented and strong as to encourage her to emancipate herself
from German influence.\textsuperscript{180}

By the next year, however, as the British commitment to national self-
determination deepened, Tyrrell proposed that Bulgaria retain her frontier with Turkey as
fixed in their agreement of 1915. Eastern Thrace, he now thought, should remain Turkish
but be placed, along with Constantinople and the Straits, under a League of Nations
mandate to the United States.\textsuperscript{181} Nevertheless, in the critical summer of 1918 Balfour and
Hardinge again discussed the possibility of large gains for Bulgaria in Eastern Thrace in
return for a separate peace.\textsuperscript{182} The PID at this time also thought Bulgaria should receive
the Enos-Midia or even the Rodosto-Midia line.\textsuperscript{183}

\textsuperscript{180}"Suggested Basis for a Territorial Settlement in Europe," memorandum by Tyrrell and Paget,
P.5, August 7, 1916, CAB 29/1, PRO.

\textsuperscript{181}"Balkan States," memorandum by Tyrrell, September 28, 1917, FO 800/200 and 214, PRO;
"Turkey in Europe and Asia," memorandum by Tyrrell, ibid.

\textsuperscript{182}Hardinge to Balfour, Foreign Office memorandum, July 31, 1918, 132087, FO 371/3148, PRO;
Rothwell, \textit{British War Aims}, p. 218.

\textsuperscript{183}"The Broad Outlines of a Balkan Settlement," memorandum by Political Intelligence
Department, Foreign Office, Bulgaria/002, August 2, 1918, in \textit{MD}, XX, 273ff.
Born of wartime necessities, the idea of the Balkan bloc and its attendant territorial concessions to Bulgaria thus evolved in Foreign Office thinking into an integral part of the vision for the postwar world. The Balkan bloc, of course, fit in with the old idea of Balkan federation. Providing at one and the same time for peace and security in the Near East, national ideals and international cooperation in the Balkans as well as British interests and Bulgarian aspirations, this conception seemed to combine all the strands of British and Bulgarian policy. For Britain, however, this conception was still subordinate to her Near Eastern policy as a whole, and her attitude toward Bulgaria's national aspirations had always been dependent on their compatibility with her own interests, especially at the Straits where a new regime had yet to be devised. It thus remained to be seen whether an idea engendered by the war would survive the peace. All that seemed lacking to get things moving was a peace offer from Bulgaria.
II: A SEPARATE PEACE

The dividing line between war aims, even unofficial ones, and terms to be offered for a separate peace was a thin one, especially given the British fixation on the latter. Inasmuch as Bulgaria had already come into occupation of virtually all the Serbian, Greek and Rumanian territory she desired (though much more of Serbia than just the uncontested zone, which was all the British really wanted to give her), a tacit assumption of Britain's Balkan policy may have been that the territorial concessions to Bulgaria necessary for the realization of the Balkan bloc would be made in negotiations before rather than after the end of the war. Moreover, in view of the stance adopted by the Balkan Allies, there was general recognition that what Britain could regard as a satisfactory settlement with Bulgaria would have to be imposed on them, although they might also be offered, aside from territorial compensation, postwar financial aid and other economic inducements.1

For one, however, Balfour, who in 1916 had backed concessions to Bulgaria as part of a peace settlement even before becoming Foreign Secretary,2 was loath to actually use coercion.3 In early July 1918, for example, Venizelos' rejection of a meeting with a certain Doctor Bomboloff, a Bulgarian Social Democrat, to discuss the latter's idea for a revolution against Ferdinand to be followed by a separate peace produced exasperation at

1Nicolson, Peacemaking, p. 223; see also Rothwell British War Aims, pp. 50, 79, 82, 140-41 and 219.

2See Lloyd George, War, II, 877ff.

3See "Some Notes on Peace Arrangements--The Balkans," memorandum by Balfour, November 1917, FO 800/200 and 214, PRO.
the Foreign Office and expressions of the need to enforce a settlement. Balfour, on the other hand, told the Imperial War Cabinet a few days later that it would be fatal to do anything to cool the zeal of Greece and Serbia, especially with no security of getting any result.

But that was before the Germans crossed the Marne (July 15). By the following month, Balfour was finally willing to take the bull by the horns. On August 13, he spoke to the Imperial War Cabinet on the subject of war aims and went over the whole Balkan question ("the perplexity of statesmen"). Against the sensibilities of the Serbs and Greeks he now emphasized the "overwhelming effect" on the results of the war of peace with Bulgaria. He concluded that it therefore required the most cautious diplomacy imaginable and that the best way of dealing with the problem was to privately confront Venizelos and the Serbian leaders and get them to propose a solution. But he had little hope for the success of this approach:

Ultimately I think we shall have to force a solution on them, and a just solution. I think the time will come, or may come, when we will have to say to them that something must be settled and we shall have to make the best solution we can whether they like it or not.

For all his acknowledgment of the debt owed the Balkan Allies, or at least the two still in the field, Balfour seemed desperate enough at this point to be ready to see Britain enforce her will against them in case of a Bulgarian offer of peace.

Lloyd George's reaction to the events of that summer was quite different however. As a practical politician, he was undoubtedly more aware than most of the difficulties such an offer could cause for both the Allied leaders in the Balkans and the Allied camp

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4Grenville to FO, telegram No. 617 Secret, Athens, July 3, 1918, 117931, FO 371/3148, PRO; minutes by Lord Robert Cecil (deputy foreign secretary), Hardinge and Nicolson, ibid.; Leontaritis, Greece, pp. 299ff.; Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, p. 59; Rothwell, British War Aims, pp. 217ff. and 220.

5Minutes of Imperial War Cabinet, IWC 23, July 9, 1918, CAB 23/41, PRO.

6See p. 16 above.

7Minutes of Imperial War Cabinet, IWC 30, WC 457, August 13, 1918, CAB 23/7, 42 and 43, PRO.
as a whole. But his position must be more especially seen against the background of his ripening support for Greece, or at any rate Venizelos’ Greece. The importance of Greece in Lloyd George’s thinking went at least as far back as the Balkan Wars, when as Chancellor of the Exchequer he had been keeping in touch with his old acquaintance and Greek consul general in London, John Stavridi. The victories of the Balkan allies had aroused all the Gladstonian passions of British Liberals, and at a dinner for Stavridi Lloyd George called for the complete expulsion of the Turks from Europe. More concretely, the two men discussed an idea originating with Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, for a naval agreement between their countries. Lloyd George even insisted that Venizelos come to London in December 1912 to pursue the project. He immediately fell under the Cretan’s spell and proposed an entente on the same lines as that with France. Prime Minister Herbert Asquith and Grey sidetracked such projects, but as a result of these secret talks “the idea of an Anglo-Greek entente in the Eastern Mediterranean took root in Lloyd George’s fertile mind, and never left it thereafter.”

Indeed, after the outbreak of the Great War he took up the idea of creating a strong Greece on both sides of the Aegean.

To be sure, Lloyd George was a man of many enthusiasms, and both before and after Bulgaria’s entry into the war he did not shrink from advocating territorial bribes to her at Greece’s, and Serbia’s, expense. But such a stance was not necessarily anti-Greek, since support for at least some of the claims of all the Balkan Christian states was consonant with the British conception of the Balkan bloc as it had developed during the

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war. Nor did it necessarily mean that he favored the Balkan bloc idea. Indeed, now in 1918, while Foreign Office officials were fulminating against Venizelos’ refusal to meet Bomboloff, Lloyd George gave Venizelos a private assurance, through the Greek minister in London on July 8, that he would oppose any propositions from Bulgaria for a separate peace as well as Bomboloff’s idea of an autonomous Macedonia. This was a bit of the personal diplomacy that Foreign Office professionals found so disconcerting about Lloyd George, or at least would have in this instance had they known about it.

Lloyd George probably saw little prospect of getting a Bulgarian offer for a separate peace in any case and may simply have considered encouraging the Greek war effort a more important contribution to victory at that time, but this was part of a pattern of actions which showed a more fundamental difference in attitude toward the two nations. Around the same time (the middle of July), Balfour himself was certainly not very optimistic about Bulgaria. He had been unsuccessful in trying to get the United States to at least threaten war against Bulgaria as a means of pressure, and as a result did not think Bulgaria or any of Germany’s other allies would make a move until the German offensive had definitely failed. A month later things did not look any better. For, despite the fall of Radoslavoff in June, his successor Malinoff seemed to the British just as determined to prosecute the war. A memorandum prepared by the PID on August 28 and circulated to the Cabinet concluded that the discrediting of the most pro-German party in Bulgaria, that of Radoslavoff, was in itself of little advantage to the Allies as the new Malinoff government had ostensibly a “more chauvinistic” program. British

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12Leontaritis, Greece, pp. 304-05; for Venizelos’ personal appeal to Lloyd George on this issue, see “Translation of a Telegraphic Despatch from Mon. Venizelos,” Athens, July 4, 1918 (received July 6, 1918), F/55/1/8, LGP.


14Minutes of Imperial War Cabinet, IWC 23, July 9, 1918, CAB 23/41, PRO.

15“Memorandum on the Turco-Bulgarian Boundary Dispute,” Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, Turkey/005, Bulgaria/003, August 28, 1918, CAB 24/63, PRO; this assessment may have caused the British to abandon the idea of using Iosif Angelov, former Bulgarian consul general in Manchester, as an intermediary with Bulgarian representatives in Switzerland: Danev, Memoari, p. 272.
leaders accordingly turned their attention to the Allied Armies of the East in Macedonia, where the French command had been pressing for an offensive.

**The Armistice of Salonika**

On September 4, Lloyd George, along with Milner and Sir Henry Wilson, the new Chief of the Imperial General Staff, met with French representatives in London to discuss the idea. General Marie-Louis Adolphe Guillaumat, who was the originator of the proposal as Allied commander in Macedonia earlier in the year, was present at the meeting and acted as its chief advocate. The Foreign Office had been opposed but the Allied Supreme War Council's military advisers had then made a favorable recommendation, although stipulating that no men or materiel must be diverted from the Western Front for a Macedonian offensive. Lloyd George now gave Britain's final assent. Ten days later, General Louis Félix François Franchet d'Espérey, who had arrived in Salonika on June 18 to replace Guillaumat, launched the operation.

By this time, Franchet had under his command a multinational force of twenty-eight divisions—eight French, four British, nine Greek, six Serbian and one Italian—with about 650,000 men. The major tactical components of the Allied Armies of the East were also mixed. On the extreme right of the Allied front (see Map 7) was the British Army of Salonika under General Sir George Milne, which comprised Greek as well as British units. To his left was a French corps, which contained two Greek divisions. Next were the Serbian Second and First Armies, the former of which included two French divisions. On the left was the French Armée d'Orient, which had the one Italian division, one Greek division and even a few Albanians.

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To oppose this force, the Central Powers could now muster only fourteen divisions in a force of around 400,000 men, albeit in strong defensive positions in mountainous terrain and with a slightly larger rifle strength at the front than the Allies’. From right to left were the German Eleventh Army and the Bulgarian First, Second and Fourth Armies (see Map 7). The two armies on the right were subordinate to the German Army Group Scholtz, named after its commander, with headquarters in Üsküb. The armies on the left were under the direct command of Bulgarian General Headquarters in Kustendil. Despite the German presence at the command level, the troops were almost all hungry, demoralized Bulgarians. For the Germans had been reducing their strength in Macedonia all year and by the end of August there remained only 33,000 men organized in no unit larger than a battalion.

Franchet began his offensive with artillery preparation commencing on September 14. An assault by the Serbian Second Army followed early on the fifteenth. The mixed Serbian and French force achieved a breakthrough at Dobropolje the same day. Milne launched a subsidiary attack around Lake Doiran three days later. By September 22, the Allies had reached the Vardar at Gradsko (see Map 7). Most of the Eleventh Army was now in danger of being cut off west of that river as the Allies continued to advance on Üsküb. Bulgarian troops on the eastern side of the Vardar began a general retreat on the twenty-fifth and the way to Sofia seemed open.

On September 26, a Bulgarian parlementaire crossed the British lines. He bore a message from Brigadier General Christo Burmoff, the Chief of Staff, with a request for a

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forty-eight-hour cease-fire to permit the arrival of two delegates authorized by the
government to arrange the conditions of an armistice and perhaps of peace. Milne simply
sent him on to Salonika in accordance with previous instructions from Franchet and
dispatched word of the proposal to Whitehall.²²

The news, of course, found the British government more than ready to negotiate. The War Cabinet met at noon the next day to consider the Bulgarian request. Andrew
Bonar Law, the Conservative leader, was in the chair in the absence of Lloyd George, who was ill.²³ He opened the meeting by saying that he had been in communication with
the prime minister, who was suitably circumspect and had expressed the opinion that it
would be inexpedient to grant an “armistice” (undoubtedly meaning a cease-fire) “as this
would mean stopping our victory” but that it would be unwise to refuse to discuss terms.
Bonar Law next read out a message which Milner, also kept away that day by ill health,
had written to Balfour. Milner likewise believed it would not do to suspend military
operations but thought it unwise to be too uncompromising and lose any chance of getting
Bulgaria out of the war and so driving a wedge into the heart of the enemy bloc. Unlike
Lloyd George, he broached the subject of terms. Agreeing that the Bulgarians should be
invited to send peace emissaries, he suggested they be told that the Allies could not
consent to an armistice until they had withdrawn completely from Serbian and Greek
territory. This, without giving away any military advantages, would leave the way open
for a deal if the Bulgarian peace move was, as Milner thought, genuine. He reminded his
colleague how often they had wanted to get Bulgaria out of the war during the last two
years and warned against laying themselves open to just criticism if, under the influence
of an unexpected victory, they were to throw away an opportunity of getting her out “on
our terms.”

We have no object in reducing Bulgaria as she was before the war, but only in completely restoring Serbia and Greece. Indeed, it is worth considering whether it would not pay us, if Bulgaria is now prepared to come over to our side, to promise her Adrianople and the Enos-Midia line and her original portion of the Dobrudzha.

Apparently fearing the French would reject the Bulgarian proposal out of hand, Milner concluded by recommending that if the War Cabinet agreed among themselves, they should at once let the French government know their views, as “[i]t would be like them to send a flamboyant ‘you be d-d’ answer without consulting us.”^24

The War Cabinet concurred in the main with Milner’s views but made a significant exception with regard to the withholding of British consent to an armistice until the Bulgarians had withdrawn completely from Greek and Serbian territory. It therefore decided, General Wilson agreeing, that a telegram should be sent in the prime minister’s name to his French counterpart Georges Clemenceau to the following effect: the Allied commander in chief (in Macedonia) should be informed that it was impossible to agree to an armistice until it was known the enemy were prepared to accept terms which would form the basis of peace but that Bulgarian delegates should be given all facilities for crossing the lines and discussing terms, including the necessary military guarantees, as a preliminary to a possible armistice; meanwhile, the Allied offensive should be pressed with all vigor; finally, a copy of the telegram was being sent to Milne. During the meeting the importance of secrecy was emphasized, but the Cabinet then learned that Bulgaria had already publicized her peace proposal.^^

While the official summary of this Cabinet meeting is as usual rather cryptic, in this case giving a better idea of the views of the absent Lloyd George and Milner than of

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^24Minutes of War Cabinet, WC 479A, September 27, 1918, CAB 23/14, PRO; Rothwell, British War Aims, pp. 234-35; emphasis in original.

^Minutes of War Cabinet, WC 479A, September 27, 1918, CAB 23/14, PRO; see also Callwell, Wilson, II, 127; and Elcock, Portrait, pp. 24ff.; a copy of the telegram of September 27 is in British Embassy to Department of State, Washington, September 30, 1918, FRUS, 1918, Supp. 1, I, 330; the published Bulgarian announcement is in OS, p. 398.
those members who were present, it does indicate a difference of opinion on the related questions of the demarcation of the armistice line for military purposes and the delimitation of the territory to be included in Bulgaria in final peace terms should she accept them at this stage. It was generally agreed that an armistice would have to ensure the Allies a sufficient degree of military superiority over Bulgaria to permit them to prosecute the war against her allies without hindrance. Discussions were necessary to find out whether Bulgaria was ready to concede the Allies the guarantees required for such supremacy without further fighting, it being presumed she would do so only after at least preliminary agreement on the final terms of peace. The War Cabinet therefore seems to have assumed that an armistice agreement would embody both military guarantees and preliminary terms of peace.

The Cabinet could not agree, however, whether Bulgarian withdrawal to the prewar Greek and Serbian frontiers was a necessary military guarantee, and the telegram to Clemenceau accordingly made no mention of such a condition. Nor did the telegram specify the terms which the Cabinet thought would be acceptable as the basis of peace, pointing to possible disagreement on this issue as well. The main purpose of the demarche to the French was to insure consultation on the armistice agreement, and the Cabinet may have been understandably reluctant to tackle the questions of the armistice line and preliminary peace terms, especially in the absence of Lloyd George and Milner, until concrete Bulgarian proposals were before it.

More direct evidence of a divergence of views on Bulgaria’s frontiers is found in a letter which Leo Amery, a protégé of Milner working in the War Cabinet Secretariat, sent to Balfour on September 27. In 1915 Amery had opposed forcing Serbia to make concessions of her own territory in Macedonia to Bulgaria.²⁶ News of the Bulgarian

²⁶Guinn, British Strategy, p. 303; Robbins, “British Diplomacy,” p. 577; in April 1917, however, he favored concessions to Bulgaria to detach her from the Central Powers: Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, p. 47; Amery, a long-standing follower of Milner, had served earlier in the war as an intelligence officer, including service at Gallipoli and Salonika, until Milner had him appointed to the War Cabinet Secretariat after himself joining Lloyd George’s government in December 1916: Louis, In the Name of God, pp. 61ff.
proposal now prompted him to recommend that the Strumitsa salient in southwest Bulgaria (see Map 2) be made an exception to any promise that might be made of the integrity of her prewar territory. Amery obviously thought it was Bulgaria who should make the territorial concessions. But Eric Drummond, Balfour's private secretary, disagreed with this whole approach. While doubting whether it would be wise at that time to come to more than a preliminary arrangement on Balkan boundaries, Drummond felt Bulgaria ought ultimately to be given the uncontested zone in Macedonia, if Serbia realized her Yugoslav ambitions, but that decisions on such points would have to await the final peace conference. Meanwhile, he thought, it was clear that Bulgaria could not be allowed to continue in occupation of territory which was not hers before the war. Occupation of the uncontested zone by a small number of troops from the Allied Great Powers would probably be necessary pending the final settlement, "otherwise I fear our Allies [i.e., Greece and Serbia] may seek to revenge themselves on the Bulgarian population." Drummond made explicit the basis of his remarks: "To insist on Bulgaria abandoning what may be deemed her legitimate national aspirations would mean that Balkan unity could never be attained."^27

Drummond's views were presumably close to those of his chief at this time, since they followed the line advocated all along by Balfour and the Foreign Office. Although perhaps disagreeing over Strumitsa, Amery and Milner were also taking similar approaches.^28 Two schools of thought were thus emerging within the War Cabinet with the fault line running along the frontiers established in 1913 between Bulgaria and her western and southern neighbors. Balfour sought changes at the expense of Serbia and Greece with a view to promoting the formation of a Balkan bloc, while Milner held these

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27 Amery to Balfour, September 27, 1918, FO 800/200, PRO; minute by Drummond, September 27, 1918, ibid.; Rothwell, British War Aims, p. 221.

frontiers to be inviolate with the possible exception of Bulgaria's loss of Strumitsa. Milner, moreover, may have attached more decisive significance for the success of his policy to the armistice line being fixed along the 1913 frontier. Both sides, on the other hand, were willing to contemplate Bulgarian gains in the Southern Dobruja and Eastern Thrace.29

In the event, the War Cabinet did not have to thrash out these issues at this time. Milner's apprehensions regarding the conduct of the French, to whom possession of the supreme command in Macedonia gave the upper hand in negotiations with the Bulgarians, were more than justified: neither the British government nor even General Milne were consulted about the armistice terms.30 This fact produced some irritation in London, but the British put the precedent to good use as an excuse to exclude the French from the Turkish armistice negotiations a month later.31

To be sure, Franchet, fearing a ruse, acted in accordance with British desires on September 26 by rejecting the Bulgarian proposal for a cease-fire but inviting the Bulgarian government to send plenipotentiaries to accept Allied terms.32 He immediately informed the French government of these developments and also submitted to it the conditions which he planned to set as indispensable from the military point of view.33 These included immediate evacuation of all prewar Serbian and Greek territory still

29For Balfour's position on Eastern Thrace, see pp. 57 above.

30Clemenceau, who had been visiting the front, did not inform Lloyd George of the proposed terms until he returned to Paris on September 30, i.e., after the armistice was signed: Derby to FO, No. 1177, Paris, September 30, 1918, F/52/2/33, LGP; and Derby to Balfour, Paris, September 30, 1918, F/52/2/34, ibid.; see also Nicol, Uncle George, p. 178; Rothwell, British War Aims, p. 235; see also Callwell, Wilson, II, 128; Milne warned London on September 28 about the lack of British representation at Franchet's headquarters: Nicol, Uncle George, p. 178.

31Maurice, Armistices, p. 23; Roskill, Hankey, I, 624.

32Azan, Franchet, p. 196; Callwell, Wilson, II, 127; Khristov, Revolyutsionnata kriza, pp. 325-27; Poincaré, Au service, X, 362-63; Temperley, History, IV, 20; for Franchet's reply, see DD, II, 1067; Falls; History, II, p. 250; and OS, p. 398.

33Franchet to Minister of War (Clemenceau), Salonika, September 27, 1918, AF, VIII(3), Annexes 2, 913-14; Azan, Franchet, p. 197; Poincaré, Au service, X, 362-63.
occupied, immediate demobilization of the army, transfer of all means of transportation to
the Allies, storage of arms and ammunition in depots under Allied control, occupation and
use by the Allies of railways, ports and Danubian shipping; expulsion of “Austro-
Germans” from Bulgarian territory, and free passage for the Allies across Bulgarian
territory for the development of operations and communication with their agents in
Rumania. In addition, Franchet asked that he be sent a Rumanian envoy authorized to
have his country enter an alliance in order to support the Allied march north.34

After consulting President Poincaré and other French civilian and military leaders,
Clemenceau sent the government’s approval of the proposed terms with the suggestion
that a stipulation be added for the occupation of the strategic points necessary to
guarantee the execution of conditions which would arise later. Franchet was also advised
to abstain, at Poincaré’s instance, from discussing Rumania with the Bulgarians but to
establish contact with French agents in Jassy.35 French leaders thus wanted an armistice
with purely military terms but ones which would permit the subsequent imposition of any
desired political conditions. They feared negotiation of even preliminary terms of peace
at this stage could cause a rupture with Greece and Serbia and also recognized the
connection between eventual peace terms and the extent of an Allied victory over Austria-
Hungary. Clemenceau later told Poincaré that he had resolutely rejected the British idea
of immediate negotiations for a separate peace.36

Clemenceau’s message reached Salonika on the night of September 27-28.37

Thus, the Allied (i.e., French) decision as to the armistice terms had already been taken by

34Franchet to Clemenceau, Salonika, September 27, 1918, AF, VII(3), Annexes 2, 913-914; French
leaders were anxious to bring Rumania back into the war and re-establish the Eastern Front in Russia
against Germany with Rumanian assistance: Hovi, Cordon Sanitaire, p. 148.

35Clemenceau to Franchet, Paris, September 27, 1918, AF, VIII(3), Annexes 2, 934; Poincaré, Au
service, X, 362-64; see pp. 106-108 below for one such condition.

36Derby to Balfour, Paris, September 30, 1918, F/52/2/34, LGP; Poincaré, Au service, X, 369
(entry for October 1, 1918).

37Azan, Franchet, p. 197.
the time the Bulgarian delegation arrived. The two plenipotentiaries were Minister of Finance André Liaptcheff and commander of the Second Army General Ivan Lukoff. The French understood that the former had a reputation as an Ententophile and that the latter, a one-time military attaché in Paris, passed as anti-German. With them were Simeon Radeff, a career diplomat, as technical expert, the original parlementaire and another officer. American Consul General Murphy accompanied them as far as the front, while Archibald Walker of his staff had preceded the party and actually crossed the lines.

The Bulgarian plenipotentiaries left Sofia on the twenty-eighth and reached the British advanced headquarters at Vanish at 1 p.m. that day. Walker had crossed the front early the day before, carrying a letter of introduction for the delegation from Murphy to Milne. In a short conversation with Milne, Liaptcheff did his best to ingratiate his government with Britain and the other Allied Great Powers and at the same time to treat them to a bit of bluff, implying that the Bulgarian army would be willing and able to join them in the continuing campaign against the Central Powers. He said that when Malinoff took office, he had felt unable to break Bulgaria’s engagements to Germany but that the defeat of the Bulgarian army had restored freedom of action. It was now hoped that an immediate armistice would be granted and territorial questions deferred until the peace conference. If an armistice were granted, the government would oblige Bulgaria’s former allies to leave the country, resume full liberty of action (i.e., in relation to Germany),

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38 Azan, Franchet, p. 197.

39 Report by the First Delegate for the Conclusion of an Armistice with the Commander in Chief of the Eastern Army of the Entente in Salonika, October 18, 1918, DD, II, 1087ff.; Azan, Franchet, p. 197; Falls, History, II, 232.

40 Consul General at Saloniki (Horton) to Secretary of State (Lansing), Saloniki, September 29, 1918, FRUS, 1918, Supp. 1, I, 329; Azan, Franchet, p. 197; Birman, “Kontrrevolyutsionnaya rol’,” p. 29; Mamatey, “United States,” pp. 253-54; on the American role, see pp. 77ff. below.

41 Consul General at Sofia (Murphy) to Lansing, No. 270, Sofia, October 10, 1918, FRUS, 1918, Supp. 1, I, 476ff.; Nicol, Uncle George, p. 177.
reconstitute the military forces, which were not yet seriously damaged, and be in a position to follow the advice of Britain.42

The Bulgarian delegation arrived in Salonika at 4 p.m. that same day, again preceded by Walker.43 Franchet was in no mood to brook any American interference with the armistice negotiations. Walker gave him a letter from Murphy, asking that an enclosed message from the Bulgarian government be transmitted to Washington.44 This message, probably intended as much for the French in Salonika and Paris, contained an appeal for American mediation with the Entente Powers on the basis of the Fourteen Points.45 Franchet had the message cabled but at the order of Clemenceau, who was indignant at American interference, refused to have any further dealings with the American,46 and Walker quickly returned to Sofia.47

Shortly after the Bulgarians' arrival, Franchet met with them briefly at his headquarters, coincidentally installed in the premises of the former Bulgarian consulate. He sternly told them they would have to pay for their mistake in marching against the Allies for what he regarded as no reason; since he did not want a revolution, he would not touch the government but would demand everything necessary in order to end the war quickly. He then gave them the conditions prepared and set the next meeting for nine o'clock the following morning at his residence. The Bulgarians for their part did not hide

42 Falls, History, II, 232; Nicol, Uncle George, pp. 177-78.

43 Franchet to Clemenceau, Salonika, September 29, 1918, AF, VII(3), Annexes 2, 959; Azan, Franchet, p. 197; see also Report, October 18, 1918, DD, II, 1087ff.

44 Horton to Lansing, Saloniki, September 29, 1918, FRUS, 1918, Supp. 1, I, 329; Birman, "Kontrrevolyutsionnaya rol'!", p. 29.

45 Horton to Lansing, Saloniki, September 29, 1918, FRUS, 1918, Supp. 1, I, 329; Report, October 18, 1918, DD, II, 1087ff.


47 Horton to Lansing, Saloniki, September 29, 1918, FRUS, 1918, Supp. 1, I, 329; Azan, Franchet, p. 197; see also Murphy to Lansing, No. 270, Sofia, October 10, 1918, FRUS, 1918, Supp. 1, I, 476ff.
the state of dissolution in the country and the attendant rebellion, which made it difficult for the plenipotentiaries to speak in its name.\textsuperscript{48} Meanwhile, Prince Alexander, the Serbian Regent, and Venizelos had arrived in Salonika at about the same time as the Bulgarians. Seeking to facilitate matters, Venizelos told Franchet that in order to achieve peace as quickly as possible in the Balkans, he would waive the participation of Greek troops in the occupation of Bulgaria. Alexander hastened to make a similar pronouncement.\textsuperscript{49}

The next day Franchet met twice with the Bulgarian plenipotentiaries, who now affected to consider the war a short-lived misunderstanding. He had to firmly remind them that they represented a defeated nation and had to submit to the conditions of the conquerors. The French conditions, to which Franchet had added a demand for the surrender of all Eleventh Army troops west of Úsküb, served as the basis of negotiation. The Bulgarians countered by asking for permission to keep five divisions mobilized for security in the Dobruja and on the Turkish frontier, restoration of Bulgarian administration in those areas of the prewar kingdom already occupied by the Allies and release of the troops west of Úsküb. Liaptcheff also protested against the projected passage of Allied troops through the country as contrary to what he evidently hoped would be Bulgarian neutrality for the rest of the war (thus partially contradicting his earlier remarks to Milne\textsuperscript{50}). Franchet brushed aside the suggestion that his forces should not be able to use the means of transportation and communication of a defeated ally of Germany and, evidently still fearing a ruse and requiring labor for road repair, also insisted on the surrender of the Bulgarian units. The Bulgarian negotiating position was further weakened in the course of the day by the entry of French cavalry into Úsküb, thus completing the cut-off of the bulk of the Eleventh Army.\textsuperscript{51}

\textsuperscript{48}Franchet to Clemenceau, Salonika, September 29, 1918, \textit{AF}, VII(3), Annexes 2, 959; Report, October 18, 1918, \textit{DD}, II, 1087ff.; Azan, \textit{Franchet}, p. 197; on the rebellion, see pp. 77ff. below.

\textsuperscript{49}Azan, \textit{Franchet}, p. 197.

\textsuperscript{50}See p. 72 above.

Nevertheless, Franchet eventually made some minor concessions, including the retention by Bulgaria of three divisions in the eastern part of the country to protect against Turkish attack and oppose passage of the Danube by the Germans and the maintenance of Bulgarian administration for any parts of the country that might actually be occupied by Allied troops. He also gave assurances that the condition regarding the surrender of units would be relaxed in time and expressed the conviction that there would be no change in the position of the Dobruja before the end of the war. Finally, Franchet decided to keep the clauses regulating the passage of Allied troops secret in order to prevent the Central Powers from learning of them and to avoid undermining the Bulgarian government. The Allied commander in chief, who undoubtedly wanted to see order maintained across the lines of his planned advance and eventual communications, was clearly concerned on the latter score. Hence his reply when Liaptcheff objected that the secret clauses were unnecessary because when the time came they would be fulfilled by force of circumstances: he could not expose himself to chance and needed something in black and white, especially since in view of events in Sofia he could not even be sure Liaptcheff would still be a minister the next day.

Bulgaria's exit from the war was not the only topic of discussion in Salonika. Franchet had spoken openly to Walker, whom he doubtless considered well placed to make his views known in Sofia, about the desirability of the abdication of Ferdinand and indicated that Crown Prince Boris was alone able under the present circumstances to merit the confidence of the Allies. With the Bulgarian delegates, Franchet was more circumspect. He remarked, without insisting, that in the present situation Bulgaria had a King whom the Allies could in no way trust. Liaptcheff, however, refused to be drawn

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52By this time Allied forces had barely crossed Bulgaria's prewar frontier: see Map 7; for Allied troops in Bulgaria after the armistice, see p. 129 below.

53On the day's negotiations, see Franchet to Clemenceau, Salonika, September 30, 1918, AF, VIII(3), Annexes 2, 1003; Report, October 18, 1918, DD, II, 1087ff.; Azan, Franchet, pp. 198-200; Birman, "Kontrrevoljutsionnaya rol'," p. 30; Falls, History, II, 250-51; Khristov, Revolyutsionnata kriza, pp. 325-27; and Temperley, History, V, 20; on political developments in Bulgaria, see pp. 81-87 below.
and said he could not express opinions on Bulgarian internal affairs, pointing out that he was, after all, one of Ferdinand's ministers.54

The French may have had an even greater dislike than the rest of the Allies for Ferdinand, who aside from being a German prince was also a grandson of their own King Louis Philippe.55 But Franchet's evident desire to see him depart from the scene may have had less to do with revenge than with its expected calming effect on the Bulgarian internal situation and the hope of obviating any last-minute tricks by "Foxy" Ferdinand. Nevertheless, the French government, like the British, was not prepared to insist on this as a condition of the armistice.56

The Armistice of Salonika (see Appendix III for the text) was signed at 10:50 p.m. on September 29 and came into force at noon the next day.57 Its terms were purely military and in no way represented a preliminary peace settlement.58 Franchet immediately ordered the deployment of the Serbian Second Army along Bulgaria's western frontier to be ready to enforce execution of its terms.59 However, he had in fact already achieved his main goal of rendering Bulgaria powerless and facilitating further operations against the other enemy powers, and his terms had been comparatively light.60 The most onerous clause was probably that requiring the surrender of Bulgaria troops.

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54Gentizon, Drame, pp. 23-24; Madol, Ferdinand, pp. 254-55.
55See Néré, Foreign Policy, p. 5; and Poincaré, Au service, V, 429 and 470.
56Clemenceau to Franchet, Paris, September 30, 1918, AF, VIII(3), Annexes 2, 1000.
57Franchet to Clemenceau, Salonika, September 29, 1918, AF, VIII(3), Annexes 2, 980; Azan, Franchet, p. 199; the terms of the Armistice of Salonika are printed in paper W39/211787/157260, FO 371/3447, PRO and are published in: AF, VIII(3), Annexes 2, 1003-05; BVI, III, 242-44; FRUS, 1919: PPC, II, 241-42; PDIB, I, 80ff.; Maurice Armistices, pp. 84-85; OS, pp. 405-6; and Temperley, History, I, 493-95 and IV, 511-13.
58Azan, Franchet, p. 199.
west of Üsküb. As a result, 62,000 more prisoners joined the 15,000 taken by the Allies in the course of the offensive before the armistice.\(^{61}\)

The Bulgarian delegation nevertheless secured its immediate aim of saving the country from desolation by stopping hostilities and the advance of Serbian and Greek troops at the prewar frontiers. It was less successful in realizing its principal political objective: acceptance by the Allies of the Fourteen Points as the basis of the future peace settlement. Political and territorial questions were left for a future peace conference by default, but there was no stipulation that they would be settled in conformity with Wilsonian principles. Nevertheless, Liaptcheff expressed the hope in his report to the government that at the general peace conference Bulgaria would be re-established in her “national” frontiers.\(^{62}\)

Although the British had not been consulted by the French, the War Cabinet was generally satisfied with the armistice terms from both the military and political points of view. On the morning of October 1, the War Cabinet considered the report from Paris about the Bulgarian surrender and the conditions granted. Bonar Law, again in the chair, said there was no other news about Bulgaria and observed, incorrectly, that events had moved so quickly that the conditions had been laid down by the French commander in chief before communicating even with Clemenceau. The question was raised whether the French had any authority from the other Powers to act in this manner. Balfour told his colleagues the conditions were practically a military convention and carried with them no powers of peace. On questions of peace terms all the Allies were equal but in regard to a military convention the commander in the field must necessarily be in a position to act promptly. While emphasizing that the armistice decided nothing about the future peace terms, Balfour had to admit it certainly might affect them. He pointed out, however, that

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\(^{61}\)Falls, History, p. II, 251.

the terms of the telegram sent to Paris on the twenty-eighth were almost identical to those actually adopted in the armistice. General Wilson feared the terms on demobilization might even be too harsh, leaving Bulgaria at the mercy of the Central Powers while the Allies prepared to continue their advance.

The Radomir Rebellion

The Allied advance found Bulgaria on the verge of political as well military collapse. For during August and September the number of deserters continued to grow with men now leaving the front in groups, arms in hand. Many of those who remained vowed not to fight after September 15. Like some of the German and Austro-Hungarian leaders, Malinoff now saw the urgency of peace. Although the idea of Bulgaria’s making contact with the Allies separately from the other Central Powers never got beyond the talking stage, on August 7 his government advised Ferdinand that only peace could save Bulgaria from disaster and a few days later sent a note to Germany emphasizing the desperateness of the Bulgarian situation. These moves strained relations between the King and his government, and Ferdinand now began looking for some means to rid himself of Malinoff.

For the King continued to place his faith in the Kaiser’s arms, perhaps calculating that the risks of attempting to switch sides were too great. His new prime minister, on the

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63 Minutes of War Cabinet, IWC 34, WC 480, October 1, 1918, CAB 23/42, PRO; Rothwell, British War Aims, p. 235.
64 Callwell, Wilson, II, 130.
65 Bulgarska akademiya na naukite, Istoriya, III, 21; Birman, “Narastanie,” pp. 24ff.; Rothschild, Communist Party, pp. 74-77; Temperley, History, IV, 12; cf. the August 17 report from the German headquarters in Macedonia on agitation within the Bulgarian army to lay down arms and go home by September 23, when the treaty between Bulgaria and Germany was said to be due to expire: Mühlmann, Oberste Heeresleitung, p. 223.
67 Gentizon, Drame, p. 11; for an extract from the letter to Ferdinand, see Malinov, Pod znaka, pp. 51-53; the note to the German and Austro-Hungarian ministers plenipotentiary, dated August 12, 1918, is in DD, I, 991ff.
other hand, soon began to pin his hopes on Wilson’s Fourteen Points, possibly viewing America as a convenient half-way house between the two camps. Although there had been no official Bulgarian response to Wilson’s program, Wilsonian propaganda disseminated by Allied forces in Macedonia and American representatives in Sofia was having an effect both at home and on the front. On September 12 Pryaporets, the organ of Malinoff’s Democratic Party, declared, “Bulgaria is not afraid of the word of Europe and America because her cause is just.” The next day the opposition Nationals’ Mir endorsed the Fourteen Points as a basis for a lasting peace and noted with approval the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister’s expressed desire for discussions with the enemy.

On September 15, Austria-Hungary in fact made a proposal to all belligerents calling for confidential and non-binding discussions among them on the basic principles for the conclusion of peace. The Bulgarian reply to the Austrian proposal caused a rift between Ferdinand and the government. For with the front in Macedonia collapsing, the government made known its acceptance of the proposal on September 20. In a reply addressed to all belligerents and publicized through the press, it emphasized that the claims which Bulgaria was pursuing in the war were based on the principle of nationality, which President Wilson, whose ideas the other Allied powers had repeatedly endorsed, recognized as essential in settling the quarrels among the Balkan states, and accepted Wilson as “the arbiter of the Balkans.” A copy of this note was sent to Washington but due to bad communications did not arrive there until September 25. Ferdinand opposed

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69Mühlmann, Oberste Heeresleitung, p. 225; Muir, Dimitri Stancioff, pp. 197-98.


71“Po patya kam mira,” Mir, September 13, 1918, p. 1.


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this readiness to make peace on the basis of the Fourteen Points and had demanded the elimination of the relevant passage. The government nevertheless issued the note as originally drafted and from this time on began to act on many points without the knowledge, much less approval, of the King.  

By now, the Bulgarians were also sending urgent appeals for German and Austro-Hungarian reinforcements and making fruitless efforts to rally their disintegrating army. Moreover, Malinoff sought to turn the situation at the front to account by requesting and then demanding that Bulgaria’s allies recognize her claim to the Northern Dobruja. At a Crown Council on the evening of the twenty-fourth, Burmoff, the Chief of Staff, gave an optimistic report, saying that the front could be held if the Germans sent reinforcements. The meeting therefore adjourned without any definite decision, resolving to strengthen the front and continue working for an “honorable peace.”

A greater spur to action than the swiftness of the Allied advance proved to be the rebellious nature of the Bulgarian retreat. Even as Bulgarian leaders were conferring in Sofia, a group of rebels occupied General Headquarters in Kustendil and arrested all the officers there. News of this event did not reach the capital until after the Crown Council had broken up. An urgent meeting of the Council of Ministers was called for early the next morning, and orders were immediately given for the defense of Sofia against the

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74 Gentizon, *Drame*, p. 12; Malinov, *Pod znaka*, p. 117.


76 Malinov to Minister Plenipotentiary in Berlin (Kolushev), September 22, 1918, *DD*, II, 1050-51; Mamatey, “United States,” pp. 252-53.

77 For Burmoff’s optimism, see Burmov to Malinov, September 23, 1918, *DD*, II, 1055-56; for the results of the meeting, see Malinov to Ferdinand, September 25, 1918, ibid., p. 1062; Krhistov, *Revolyutsionnata kriza*, p. 271; Malinov, *Pod znaka*, p. 118.

approaching rebels.\textsuperscript{79} When it met, the Council of Ministers decided, without Ferdinand's consent, to seek an armistice.\textsuperscript{80}

Two avenues of approach to the Allies were followed, one via Washington, the other straight to Salonika. That same day, desperate to enlist American support and having received no response to his first bid on September 20, Malinoff addressed a fresh note directly to Wilson asking for his good offices in the conclusion of an armistice but making no reference to eventual peace terms.\textsuperscript{81} This message reached Washington two days later and was immediately relayed by telephone to Wilson, who was in New York. Wilson drafted a reply on the spot in which he agreed to urge an armistice on the Allies if Bulgaria would accept among its terms evacuation of prewar Serbian and Greek territory pending the final peace settlement and permission for Allied troops to enter the country if necessary to defend it against the Central Powers. Wilson's closest adviser, Colonel Edward House, arguing that they did not know enough about the local situation to specify terms, feared that no Bulgarian government would accept those laid down in the draft. Wilson therefore amended it to simply require the Bulgarian government to leave the armistice conditions to him.\textsuperscript{82} This reply was too late to have any impact on events.\textsuperscript{83} As

\textsuperscript{79}Khristov, Revolyutsionnata kriza, p. 271-72.

\textsuperscript{80}Malinov to Ferdinand, September 25, 1918, DD, II, 1062; “11-to postanovlenie na Ministerskiya Săvet vzeto v zasedanieto mu ot 25 septemvri 1918 god., protokol no. 114,” ibid., p. 1087; Khristov, Revolyutsionnata kriza, p. 272-74 and 324; Madol, Ferdinand, p. 253; Malinov, Pod znaka, p. 119; Dimo Kazasov, a Broad Socialist, later claimed that at the time of the Crown Council the previous evening, Ferdinand secretly ordered the arrest of Malinoff and the whole government but canceled the order when the news from Kustendil arrived: Kazasov, Vidyano, p. 186.

\textsuperscript{81}The request to Wilson went, in turn, through two different channels, via The Hague and Berne: Chargé in the Netherlands (Bliss) to Lansing, No. 4587, The Hague, September 27, 1918, FRUS, 1918, Supp. 1, I, 323; Malinov to Charge d'Affaires in Berne (Grekov), Sofia, September 25, 1918, DD, II, 1061 (also in Malinov, Pod znaka, p. 119n); Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to Lansing, No. 4946, Berne, September 27, 1918, FRUS, 1918, Supp. 1, I, 325-26; the Bulgarians also asked the Americans to transmit to the British their desire for a cease-fire: Bliss to Lansing, No. 4585, The Hague, September 26, 1918, ibid., pp. 321-22; Bliss to Lansing, No. 4586, The Hague, September 27, 1918, ibid., p. 322; Khristov, Revolyutsionnata kriza, pp. 325-26; Mamatey, “United States,” p. 253.


\textsuperscript{83}Lansing to Bliss, Washington, September 27, 1918, FRUS, 1918, Supp. 1, I, 324; Mamatey, “United States,” p. 254.
has been seen, the Allies would in any case have undoubtedly rejected such an American attempt at mediation at this stage.\footnote{See p. 72 above; for Lloyd George’s opposition, see Roskill, Hankey, I, 606.}

In any case, undoubtedly already realizing that long-distance negotiations with Washington would probably be too slow, on the twenty-fifth the Bulgarians also named a delegation for direct negotiations with the Allied command in Salonika.\footnote{Khristov, Revolyutsionnata kriza, pp. 272-74 and 324; the text of the telegram to Bulgarian General Headquarters announcing the appointment of delegates is in Malinov, Pod znaka, p. 119n.} This did not mean, however, that they were willing to forego American support, and the head of the delegation, Minister of Finance Liaptcheff, a Democrat, called on American Consul General Murphy at 7:30 that evening with a request to accompany him on his mission to Salonika.\footnote{Murphy to Lansing, No. 270, Sofia, October 10, 1918, FRUS, 1918, Supp. 1, I, pp. 476-80; Mamatey, “United States,” p. 253; see also Malinov to Ministers Plenipotentiary in The Hague and Berne, September 26, 1918, DD, II, 1063.}

That same day, German, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman representatives in Berlin signed a protocol conceding, as Malinoff had recently demanded, Bulgarian claims in the Dobruja.\footnote{Nikoforov to Malinov, September 25, 1918, DD, II, 1061; Anderson, Eastern Question, p. 349; Mamatey, “United States,” p. 253.} Although at this point Malinoff was already seeking negotiations with the Allies, Ferdinand, still relying on German assurances of more troops, continued to oppose his government and did not hide his intention of replacing it with one which would carry on the war.\footnote{Khristov, Revolyutsionnata kriza, pp. 272-74.}

In addition, in an attempt to persuade the peasant soldiers to return to the front and check the Allied advance by exploiting his authority with them, the Agrarian leader Alexander Stambolisky was released from prison on September 25 and summoned to confer with party leaders and the King.\footnote{Bell, Peasants, p. 131; Khristov, Revolyutsionnata kriza, pp. 276ff.} Thus re-emerged onto the scene the man who
was to prove the dominant figure in Bulgarian politics until his murder almost five years later.90

Stambolisky had been born into a peasant family in Slavovitsa in southern Bulgaria in 1879. After illness cut short his studies in Germany, he returned to his native village in 1897 and became a school teacher and organizer for the incipient peasant movement. A national congress of peasant organizations held at Plevna founded the BZNS in December 1899, and within a few years Stambolisky became editor of its official organ, Zemledelsko zname. From this platform he helped turn the BZNS into a powerful political organization and provided it with a distinctive ideology based on the concept of “estates,” groups of people with the same occupation and similar economic interests.91

According to Stambolisky, Bulgaria’s old, establishment parties were unable to sustain political democracy or economic progress because their members came from different estates. Stambolisky believed that the various estates—farmers, workers, entrepreneurs, artisans, merchants and bureaucrats—should each be represented by their own “estatist organizations” rather than the old “political parties.” He advocated an economic parliament based on the proportional representation of the estates as the best hope of directing the country’s resources into the channels of economic development and political reform. As the organization of by far the largest estate, his own Agrarian Union would of course dominate such an assembly and use its position to advance hitherto neglected peasant interests.92

Stambolisky considered one of the chief faults of the political parties to be that they promoted imperialism and militarism and deluded the people with false nationalism.

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90 On the coup in 1923 which overthrew Stambolisky’s government and resulted in his assassination, see especially Bell, Peasants, pp. 233ff.

91 Bell, Peasants, pp. 55ff.

92 For Stambolisky’s main theoretical work, see Stamboliiski, Politicheski partii; Bell, Peasants, pp. 59ff.; Rothschild, Communist Party, p. 85.
in order to retain the favor of the monarch and distract attention from domestic problems. Stambolisky did not reject the national ideal of San Stefano but his approach to its realization was entirely different from that pursued by Ferdinand and the establishment parties. He saw the solution to the problem of conflicting Balkan nationalisms in a federation of Balkan states rather than in wars of national unification, whose burdens in blood and treasure fell primarily on the peasants. The basis for such a federation would be estatist organizations extending beyond the boundaries of individual states, and he even looked forward to an Agrarian or Green International comparable to the Socialist International as a basis for a broader unity among all the peasant nations of Eastern Europe. A more immediate and practicable goal, however, was the maintenance of friendly relations with all states, especially Bulgaria's neighbors.93

Stambolisky had consequently opposed the mounting war fever before the Balkan Wars,94 and when the Great War broke out he feared a new disaster for Bulgaria and demanded strict neutrality as the only way to assure the welfare and even survival of the country. This did not mean he and his party were indifferent to either Bulgarian aspirations or the outcome of the conflict. They favored accepting offers of concessions in Macedonia or the Southern Dobruja, but only in exchange for neutrality. Too much blood, they believed, had already been shed for the sake of national unification for it to be worth another war. On the other hand, the bond of affection for the Russian liberators was still strong among the peasants, and Stambolisky extended this sympathy to the Serbs, who were, after all, also Slavs. But he and other Agrarian leaders were chiefly concerned to keep Bulgaria out of the war and, although Ententophile in spirit, generally

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93Bălgarski zemledelski naroden sayuz, Ustav, p. 42; Stamboliiski, Printsipte, p. 12; Rothschild, Communist Party, pp. 85-86; H. Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe, p. 71; Stavrianos, Balkan Federation, p. 209; Stavrianos, Balkans, pp. 610 and 647-48.

94Stavrianos, Balkan Federation, pp. 206-07.
strove for impartiality in their statements lest open support for one side be taken as advocacy of intervention.  

As has been seen, Stambolisky paid for his opposition to the war with a jail term. Nevertheless, he continued to urge other Agrarians to work against it from his cell, whence he also had to deal with an attempt by a rival, Dimitri Dragieff, to claim the party leadership. Stambolisky was convinced (or at least later so claimed) that Britain and America would fight their way to victory, and all through the summer of 1918 he had been urging Malinoff through intermediaries to take steps toward a separate peace. He apparently considered that a government-led coup against Ferdinand and the Germans could at least secure for Bulgaria the Southern Dobruja, the Enos-Midia line and a small portion of Macedonia. As the situation deteriorated on the eve of his release, Stambolisky decided that such a coup was all the more necessary in order to show the Allies that the nation had broken with those guilty of Bulgaria’s intervention on the side of the Central Powers. He hoped that those such as himself who had suffered in the struggle against that intervention would then be able to gain better peace terms if they threw out Ferdinand and punished those they held responsible for the national catastrophe. However, Stambolisky believed that Bulgaria’s leverage with the Allies depended on the ability of her army to fight. The first task in his opinion was therefore to stop the retreat, organize defenses and in this way get a more favorable armistice from the Allies, who he thought would otherwise probably demand a return to the 1915 frontiers. Malinoff could then lead the coup against Ferdinand under conditions of domestic order rather than anarchy.

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95Bell, Peasants, pp. 113ff.; Stavrianos, Balkan Federation, pp. 207 and 209.
96See p. 25 above.
97Bell, Peasants, pp. 124ff.
98Stamboliiski, Dvete mi sreshti, p. 36.
99Todorov, Politička istorija, pp. 292ff. and 301; see also “Koga shte doide mirat?,” Zemledelsko zname, September 7, 1918, p. 1; “Nov svet se sazdava,” ibid., September 18, 1918, p. 1; and “Kam kogo da apelirame?,” ibid., September 21, 1918, p. 1; Stamboliiski, Dvete mi sreshti, p. 32.
At the conferences on the twenty-fifth, Stambolisky accordingly agreed about the necessity of returning the mutinous troops to the front and warning them that otherwise they would harm the national cause since peace was already being offered. However, probably still wary of Ferdinand and desirous of avoiding too close association with what would in any case be a defeat, he rejected immediate participation in a new government. The next afternoon Stambolisky set out for the front in the company of Minister of War General Savoff and a group of politicians. With him was his chief lieutenant, Raiko Daskaloff, whose release from prison he had obtained the previous day. The party met the rebels’ advance guard at Radomir, on the rail line twenty-five miles south of Sofia. When the rebels finally agreed to let themselves be harangued early the next morning, Stambolisky urged them to return to the front, but without success. Savoff then proposed that they at least lay down their arms and go home peacefully. This gambit also failed and the party proceeded to Kustendil, arriving about noon. Stambolisky again addressed the soldiery, but by this time Daskaloff apparently realized the futility of these efforts and decided to try an entirely different approach.

Daskaloff now returned to Radomir and took charge of the rebellion. The insurgents proclaimed Bulgaria a republic with Stambolisky as President of the Provisional Government; Ferdinand, his dynasty and his government were declared deposed. The new government’s manifesto called for the immediate conclusion of peace and outlined an Agrarian program in domestic and foreign affairs. Daskaloff also

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100Stamboliiski, Dvete mi sreshti, pp. 25ff.; Bell, Peasants, p. 131; Българска академия на науките, История, III, 25; Khristov, Revolyutsionnata kriza, pp. 277.

101Damyanova, “Belezhnik-dnevnik,” p. 243; Bell, Peasants, p. 134; on Daskalov, see Bell, Peasants, pp. 132-34; Tadzher, Nova България, pp. 51ff.; and Tishev, D-r Raiko Daskalov; Daskalov was a reserve officer and had been arrested shortly after the mobilization in 1915 and sentenced to a prison term in 1916 with other opposition politicians in connection with the so-called “de Closier affair,” which involved Entente efforts to buy Bulgarian grain in 1915: Tishev, D-r Raiko Daskalov, pp. 45ff.

102Bell, Peasants, pp. 134-35; Khristov, Revolyutsionnata kriza, pp. 279ff.

103Circular of Provisional Government, Radomir, September 27, 1918, BVI, III, 241 (also in Malinov, Pod znaka, p. 129); Damyanova, “Belezhnik-dnevnik,” p. 246.
established telegraphic contact with Stambolisky and attempted to obtain his assent to these developments. In a letter to him, written in the early afternoon of September 27 almost immediately after the proclamation of the republic, Daskaloff argued the Allies would not stop their advance as long as Bulgaria was ruled by those who either were guilty of or had participated in the conduct of the war; it was therefore necessary to form as quickly as possible a popular government which not only would be free of the sins of the past but might have protected Bulgaria from them.  

Nevertheless, Stambolisky was not happy about this turn of events. After a brief and not entirely amicable meeting with Daskaloff in Radomir the next morning, he returned to Sofia and went straight to the Council of Ministers to try to dissociate himself from the rebellion. The government still ordered his arrest, but not before he had a chance to go into hiding. Stambolisky, his hesitations now over, then tried to organize an uprising in the capital in support of the approaching rebels. But the other Agrarian leaders denounced the whole rebellion; and Dimitri Blagoeff, the leader of the Narrows, also spurned participation in what he dismissed as a bourgeois revolution after a personal appeal from Stambolisky for the cooperation of his party, which had been the most consistent opponent of the war.  

Meanwhile, Daskaloff, now commander in chief of the republican force, was moving on Sofia. The rebels penetrated to the very outskirts, but the 6-7,000 men on hand for the decisive engagement on September 30 were no match for troops still loyal to the government, largely Macedonians, supported by artillery and elements of the German 217th Division, which had just arrived expecting to fight their enemies rather than their allies. The rebellion was also undermined at the last hour by arrival of the news of the
Armistice of Salonika. Politically isolated and deprived of crucial support in the capital, the rebels were defeated and scattered, Stambolisky staying underground and Daskaloff eventually making his way to Salonika.  

It was to this situation that the Bulgarian delegation returned from Salonika on October 1. Liaptcheff immediately informed the Council of Ministers of the course of the negotiations and then went to the palace to report to the King. After hearing his minister’s report, Ferdinand asked whether nothing had been said of him. Liaptcheff reluctantly admitted that the Allies had been full of praise for the Crown Prince and that certain statements had been made to Walker, a fact which the American later confirmed. The next morning leaders of all the parties met at the National Assembly. It was by now clear to most of those present that their best hope of placating their enemies, whether external or internal, lay in getting rid of Ferdinand. This step must have appeared all the more efficacious as he could with justice be regarded as something more than a mere scapegoat. Without even waiting to hear all the opinions, Malinoff hurried to the palace in order to apprise the King of the situation. After brief resistance, Ferdinand made known his decision to abdicate in favor of his son Boris the following day.  

Bulgaria’s exit from the war opened a new competition for power in the country and left Malinoff and Stamboliskys as the initial main contenders. The coincidence of mutiny and armistice enabled both of them to claim credit for stopping the fighting and toppling Ferdinand. For the moment, Malinoff, who was already in power, had the upper hand. Indeed, on October 2 a field court martial in Sofia ordered the re-arrest of...
Stambolisky and Daskaloff for their roles in the rebellion.\textsuperscript{108} This marked the beginning of the development of a "stab-in-the-back" theory holding Agrarian and other agitators responsible for Bulgaria's defeat, an interpretation of events that would dog Stambolisky for the rest of his days and beyond.\textsuperscript{109} Be this as it may, final political judgments on the manner of ending the war would likely depend on the nature of the peace.

In this respect, as Balfour's remarks to the Cabinet on October 1 indicate he realized, a decision with major implications had been made almost by default at Salonika.\textsuperscript{110} The establishment of the armistice line along Bulgaria's 1913 frontier on the south and west, something on which the British government might not have insisted, created a fait accompli which would be all the harder to reverse in that it reestablished the status quo ante bellum. Whether the British government succeeded in doing so would have a greater impact on the power struggle in Sofia than recriminations about the collapse of the front.

\textsuperscript{108}Tishev, \textit{D-r Raiko Daskalov}, p. 83.

\textsuperscript{109}See, for example, Petkov, \textit{Vinovnitsite}; and Zhekov, \textit{Balgarskoto voinstvo}, pp. 418ff. and 498ff.; Zhekoff, the Bulgarian commander in chief, was safely out of the country at the time of the Allied offensive undergoing medical treatment in Vienna and could thus absolve himself of all blame.

\textsuperscript{110}See p. 76 above.
Bulgaria's exit from the war marked the start of the Central Powers' collapse. It accordingly justified many of the hopes originally placed in it by British policymakers. With Allied troops moving forward on other fronts as well, their remaining opponents sued for peace one by one in the course of the following month. This process culminated in the signature of the Armistice of Compiègne between Germany and the Allies on November 11. Shortly thereafter, the Allied and Associated Powers decided to assemble in Paris in January for a preliminary Peace Conference to settle among themselves the final terms to be offered their enemies. British preparations for peace now moved into their final phase.

During this period, the Straits remained central to British thinking. As long as the war lasted, it was still necessary to prosecute operations to fend off the Turco-German threat to India through territories accessible via that waterway. Moreover, the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia in November 1917 had presented Britain with a related set of problems. For during 1918 she and some of the other Allies sent their own troops to peripheral areas of the Russian Empire as well as aid to the anti-German foes of the Bolsheviks in an effort to reopen an eastern front against the Central Powers. While the approaching end of the war promised to eliminate the initial motive for intervention in Russia, there was still the fear that a hostile, revived Russia would renew the traditional Anglo-Russian rivalry and, more immediately, a feeling that Bolshevism and other

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disturbing influences had to be kept out of Persia and Afghanistan. Curzon, the General Staff and others were therefore inclined to see the situation at the end of the war as a unique opportunity to roll back the frontiers of Russia in the Caucasus and elsewhere and erect a barrier of independent or autonomous states under British influence. Nor could Britain suddenly become indifferent to the issue of the Russian Civil War with the advent of peace. As Balfour told the War Cabinet on October 18, if Britain withdrew from Russia, she would suffer a serious loss of prestige and be letting down her friends there.

Opening the Straits was crucial to all these projects. Faced with uncertainty as to the future status of the Straits region and the immediate need to support wartime operations through the Black Sea, British leaders could therefore take no chances once Bulgaria’s surrender on September 30 opened the road to Constantinople. On October 1, the War Cabinet decided to consider what terms to offer Turkey should she also ask for an armistice and to call for a meeting of the Supreme War Council to consider the situation created by Bulgaria’s exit from the war. It also ordered the strengthening of British naval forces in the Aegean preparatory to operations in the Black Sea.

At the session of the Supreme War Council in Paris a few days later, Lloyd George obtained virtual recognition of Britain’s right to exercise supreme authority over the entire region of Constantinople and the Straits after the apparently imminent defeat of Turkey. For, while accepting the French contention that the Allied armies in Macedonia should continue their drive north in order to penetrate the heart of the Central Powers, the Council also decided, at Lloyd George’s insistence, on an overland advance on Constantinople and stipulated that the forces designated to undertake this operation should be under the command of a British general and be composed principally of British

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4Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations, I, 326 and II, 14.
troops. The Council likewise adopted the British draft of armistice terms with Turkey with some modifications. The French, however, contested the British claim to naval command in the Aegean, and this dispute was not settled in Britain’s favor until October 25. By design or not, this meant that it was the British Admiral Calthorpe who eventually negotiated and signed the Turkish armistice on October 30.

The very first article of the Armistice of Moudros with the Ottoman Empire opened the Straits under guarantee of Allied occupation of the forts on their shores. The following articles regulated the demobilization of Ottoman forces, use of Constantinople as an Allied naval base, Allied occupation of strategic points and other questions. Hostilities were to cease at noon local time on October 31. Twelve days later, after the forts had been secured, Calthorpe’s fleet passed the Dardanelles and proceeded to Constantinople, where British troops landed on November 14.

By now, for Britain at least, the execution of the wartime secret agreements was already a virtual fait accompli, inasmuch as by the end of the war British troops held all those portions of the Ottoman Empire deemed critical to the defense of India. No decision, however, had yet been made about whether Constantinople should remain the Turkish capital nor any commitment obtained from the United States on accepting a

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14Howard, *Partition*, p. 213.
mandate there. The future of Constantinople and the Straits therefore occupied an important place in the final British preparations for the Peace Conference.

On October 17 the War Cabinet had discussed preparations for an eventual peace conference and decided to have a "brief" drawn up as a basis for the negotiations. Four days later, Lloyd George asked General Jan Smuts, a member of the War Cabinet as well as of the South African government, to be responsible for the brief. Smuts, of course, had to rely on already existing bodies for substantive contributions on most areas. Principal among these other bodies was the PID, which was reorganized on November 15 specifically to help Smuts following an offer of assistance from Hardinge. Another such was the Eastern Committee, an inter-departmental group set up in March 1918 to coordinate policy on the Ottoman Empire and adjacent areas, including the Balkans. In late November Lord Curzon, the chairman of the Eastern Committee and also a member of the War Cabinet, got the War Cabinet to give it control over policy towards its areas of competence. At this time, Smuts was himself also attending the committee's meetings, at least until his resignation from the War Cabinet on December 14. His so-called brief actually consisted of the papers submitted to him by the other bodies for the use of future conference delegates and experts.

In December, the Eastern Committee received papers on the future of Constantinople and the Straits from such interested departments as the Foreign Office, War Office and Admiralty. Curzon himself summed up the results in a paper for the Cabinet on January 2. The views expressed adhered to the general features of those

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19Goldstein, *Winning*, pp. 95 and 156.
formulated during the latter part of the war. The War Office and the Admiralty dismissed the idea of turning the Straits over to either a minor power or one of the other European Great Powers as incompatible with British interests and recognized the opposition of other powers to British control. They also opposed putting Constantinople ("the keys to the gate") in the hands of a strong naval power such as the United States and argued instead that the Empire's military and naval interests would be best served if the Straits were internationalized and Constantinople left to a Turkey friendly to and hopefully under the tutelage of Britain.\textsuperscript{21} Curzon himself supported Sir Eyre Crowe of the Foreign Office, however, in favoring international guarantees combined with administration by the United States acting as mandatory of the projected League of Nations.\textsuperscript{22}

Balfour set forth this view of the question during a conversation with Allied representatives in London on December 3,\textsuperscript{23} and Lloyd George, Balfour and Curzon finally tackled President Wilson himself at the end of the month. The President, however, proved extremely reluctant to contemplate an American mandate at Constantinople or anywhere else.\textsuperscript{24} Nevertheless, British leaders were not to be discouraged, and the idea of the American mandate continued to be the centerpiece of their policy for almost another year.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{21} "The Strategic Importance of Constantinople to the British Empire," memorandum by the General Staff, December 12, 1918, E.C. 2824, CAB 27/39, PRO; Memorandum by the Admiralty, December 21, 1918, E.C. 2823, ibid.


\textsuperscript{23} "Notes of Allied Conversation," I.C. 101, December 3, 1918, CAB 28/5, PRO; Lloyd George, \textit{Truth}, I, 189ff.

\textsuperscript{24} Lloyd George, \textit{Truth}, I, 189ff.

\textsuperscript{25} P. Helmreich, \textit{From Paris}, p. 15.
Opinion was sharply divided, however, on the Constantinople question. Curzon was the leading advocate of ending Turkish rule in Europe altogether.\(^26\) The adherents of this policy pointed out the United States might be reluctant to undertake responsibilities at the Straits if the Sultan’s government simultaneously exercised authority over Constantinople and its hinterland.\(^27\) The India Office headed the opposition to expelling the Sultan from his capital, arguing that this was liable to provoke Moslem opinion in India and elsewhere.\(^28\) The issue, however, remained undecided until such time as America should make up her mind.

Insofar as the rest of the Ottoman Empire was concerned, Britain was already bound, and benefited, by the secret agreements, and the occupation of large stretches of Ottoman territory in Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine now backed her claims. Lloyd George was even able to improve on the Sykes-Picot Agreement by securing Clemenceau’s consent in December 1918 to the transfer of the Mosul region to the British sphere and the establishment of British rather than international administration in Palestine.\(^29\) Britain’s peace delegation could thus proceed to Paris with every confidence of obtaining the agreement of her allies to her claims in the Ottoman Empire and of enforcing them on her enemies.\(^30\)

**Towards a Balkan Settlement**

Bulgaria had not left the war in the manner in which at least some British policymakers might have preferred—a separate peace embodying a new Bulgarian


\(^{27}\)“Turkey in Europe,” memorandum by Crowe, E.C. 2822, December 21, 1918, CAB 27/39, PRO.


\(^{30}\)See Clayton, *Britain*, p. 16.
settlement to serve as the basis for a Balkan bloc. The Armistice of Salonika did, however, leave their hands free for the Peace Conference, for its terms committed Britain to nothing as far as the future settlement was concerned. In fact, the British and other Allied governments heartily shared the American view, expressed shortly after the armistice, that the question of the final peace with Bulgaria must be reserved for the general settlement at the peace congress.\(^{31}\) While Balfour may have hoped to eventually use this freedom of action for the benefit of Bulgaria, such a standpoint avoided complications with the Balkan Allies while the war was still on. But ultimately it could cut either way: Britain's hands were as free toward Bulgaria as toward her neighbors and she was at liberty to seek to secure her interests in any manner she chose. Indeed, British thinking on a peace settlement with Bulgaria continued to evolve in the weeks prior to the Peace Conference.

After the discussions in the Supreme War Council at the beginning of October on plans for further operations by Franchet's armies, British leaders turned their attention to more pressing foreign affairs, such as the armistice negotiations with Turkey, Austria and Germany and the questions of intervention in Russia and arrangements for the peace conference.\(^{32}\) The problems of the Balkan settlement thus became the concern principally of experts in the Foreign Office and to some extent in other departments such as the EPD.\(^{33}\)

The EPD under Lord Northcliffe actually made a bid to challenge the Foreign Office's primacy in the peace preparations. Just after the Armistice of Salonika, on

\(^{31}\)Lansing to Ambassador in Great Britain (Page), No. 1738, Washington, October 2, 1918, FRUS, 1918, Supp. 1, I, 334; Simić to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 65, Washington, October 9, 1919, GSJD, I, 347-48; minutes of meeting of British, French and Italian Ministers of Foreign Affairs, J.C. 86, November 1, 1918, CAB 28/5, PRO; Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to Lansing, No. 3473, London, November 6, 1918, FRUS, 1918, Supp. 1, I, 474; Hrabak, "Stanje," p. 34; Leontaritis, Greece, pp. 315ff.; Poincaré, Au service, X, 311; Walworth, America's Moment, p. 183.

\(^{32}\)See pp. 89 above; for final operations toward the Danube and Constantinople, see Falls, History, II, 254ff., and Maurice, Armistices, pp. 15 ff.

\(^{33}\)Rothwell, British War Aims, p. 235.
October 4, an inter-departmental committee was formed on the initiative of the EPD to study the whole question of terms of the final peace settlements. Five days later the committee accepted a slightly amended EPD draft program based on the Fourteen Points. Lloyd George, not wishing to tie his hands, opposed its use even as propaganda. But Balfour accepted it with minor modifications, and the War Cabinet sanctioned its use as propaganda. The committee adopted the final text on the nineteenth.\textsuperscript{34}

The program was published in \textit{The Times} on November 4. In the Balkans, it called for the abrogation of the Treaty of Bucarest (of 1918), the "evacuation" and "restoration" of Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro and Allied assistance to the Balkan states in reaching a final settlement of the Balkan question on a equitable basis.\textsuperscript{35} Although officially considered propaganda, this program undoubtedly reflected the actual views of at least Northcliffe and Balfour. Lloyd George, however, had already selected Smuts to coordinate preparation of the British negotiating brief and rejected any participation by Northcliffe in the Peace Conference, sparking the latter's resignation and the abolition of the EPD soon after the war's end.\textsuperscript{36}

The demise of the EPD left the field of Britain's Balkan policy almost entirely to Foreign Office experts. The PID received added manpower and was reorganized on November 15 specifically to assist Smuts with the peace brief.\textsuperscript{37} Sir Ralph Paget, just returned from two years as minister to Copenhagen, became head of the South-Eastern Europe Section.\textsuperscript{38} Another newcomer assigned to this section was Harold Nicolson, who was destined to play a major role in the Balkan settlement at the Peace Conference.


\textsuperscript{35} Steed, \textit{Thirty Years}, II, 246; for the text see Lord Northcliffe, "From War to Peace," \textit{The Times}, November 4, 1918, pp. 9-10; and Stuart, \textit{Secrets}, pp. 218ff.

\textsuperscript{36} Seton-Watson and Seton-Watson, \textit{Making of a New Europe}, p. 321; for Northcliffe's letter of resignation see \textit{The Times}, November 12, 1918, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{37} Goldstein, \textit{Winning}, pp. 79ff. and 96.

\textsuperscript{38} Goldstein, \textit{Winning}, p. 81.
Nicolson already had ample experience in Balkan affairs, beginning with a period of residence in Bulgaria as a child. For his father, Sir Arthur Nicolson, who had retired as Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office in 1916, was the British representative in Sofia at the time of Stamboloff's assassination and was later ambassador in St. Petersburg during the early stages of the negotiations leading to the Anglo-Russian Entente. The younger Nicolson built on his youthful experiences in Bulgaria and Russia with an assignment to Constantinople after himself joining the diplomatic service in 1909. Early in the war he was transferred to the Foreign Office and served in its newly created War Department, where he played a role in the formulation of some of the wartime projects for a Balkan settlement. Though still of junior rank, he soon made himself indispensable to his superiors, including Balfour, and by 1918 his papers on the Balkans were being circulated to the War Cabinet. Indeed, Nicolson was one of the most successful pioneers of serious staff work at the Foreign Office, profiting from prewar reforms giving even junior clerks such as himself a role in the formulation of policy for the first time.

Nicolson was a proponent of the Foreign Office views on a Balkan settlement favorable to Bulgaria and professed deep sympathy for the Wilsonian principles with which they seemed to be in such harmony. By the close of the war, he was in charge of Near Eastern affairs within the War Department. In November he was detailed to the PID and was at work on peace terms for Austria, Turkey and Bulgaria even before the armistice with Germany on November 11. Aware of his own influence, he wrote to his

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40 Steiner, *Foreign Office*, passim.
wife on that last day of the war that his recommendations were likely to be accepted. At the same time, however, obstacles in the path of any Balkan settlement based on concessions to Bulgaria must have been becoming more distinct.

**Public opinion**

One of these obstacles was a growing desire for revenge against the Central Powers, a sentiment which had been notably lacking in the Allies’ wartime pronouncements. As late as September 27, 1918, in a speech delivered even as Bulgaria was frantically suing for peace, President Wilson emphasized as the first of his “five particulars” for the peace settlements that “. . . the impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just.” But the exhilaration of victory now gave way in Britain, as in the other countries of the Allied camp, to loud calls for a harsh peace and punishment of the aggressors. Only certain segments of the Left refused to join the chorus. Such demands found expression in the campaign preceding the British elections of December 14, 1918, which produced an overwhelming Conservative majority in the House of Commons. Though perhaps not himself in sympathy with this clamor, Lloyd George, whose Liberal faction was the junior partner in the coalition he led, was forced during the campaign to pay at least lip service to the calls to “Hang the Kaiser!” and “Make the enemy pay!”

Most of the vindictiveness was naturally directed against Germany and, to a lesser extent, Austria. Near Eastern questions played no real role in the agitation and were of comparatively little concern to public opinion. Nevertheless, Bulgaria too came in for

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44Lees-Milne, Nicolson, I, 104.

45“Address of President Wilson in Opening the Fourth Loan Campaign,” September 27, 1918, OS, pp. 399-405 (the quote is on p. 402).


47P. Helmreich, From Paris, p. 11.

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her share of the odium attached to the aggressiveness and barbarism attributed to the enemy nations and was blamed for prolonging the war by two years. And Noel Buxton of the Balkan Committee was one of the advocates of a peace of reconciliation who went down to defeat in the elections.

A parallel development was increased enthusiasm for the cause of the Balkan Allies. No sooner had the Armistice of Salonika come into force than Pashitch and Venizelos hastened to Paris and London, where they received heroes' welcomes. Without the pressure of wartime necessity, it would now be difficult for anyone to advocate leniency, let alone concessions, to a former enemy. By the end of October, Nicolson was already noting with regret that public opinion was not likely to tolerate the cession of Serbian or Greek territory to Bulgaria. President Wilson alone, he thought, could "cut the Gordian knot."

**Britain and the Fourteen Points**

This comment indicates that Nicolson recognized another difficulty in the ambivalence of British statesmen, caught up in the tangled skein of their own secret commitments and public utterances, about the Fourteen Points. Just at this time, British and other Allied leaders were under great pressure from Wilson to formally accept his program. During direct German-American negotiations in October, Germany had agreed to accept an armistice obligating the parties to make peace on the basis of the Fourteen Points, and the United States had agreed to recommend such an armistice to the other

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51 Minute by Nicolson, October 28, 1918, 179302, FO 371/3448, PRO; Rothwell, *British War Aims*, p. 235.
Allies. During inter-Allied discussions on October 29, Colonel House, acting as Wilson's personal representative, presented a commentary on the Fourteen Points drawn up by two aides in order to reassure Lloyd George and Clemenceau regarding what they might be committing themselves to. The next day, Wilson signified his approval of the commentary as a "satisfactory interpretation of the principles involved," although the details of their application which it contained were to be regarded as merely illustrative and open to consideration by the Peace Conference. On November 5, Britain, as well as France and Italy, formally agreed to make peace with Germany on the basis of the Fourteen Points and Wilson's subsequent addresses.

The American commentary gave detailed consideration to the issues raised in Point XI (see Appendix II). It took as given the unification of Serbia with the South Slavic lands of Austria-Hungary and the acquisition by Rumania of the Northern Dobruja, Bessarabia and possibly Transylvania. Serbia and Rumania, with eleven or twelve million inhabitants each, would, it was pointed out, then be far greater and stronger than Bulgaria. Also seen as a possibility was a Greek mandate on the coast of Asia Minor. Bulgaria, according to the commentary, should have her frontier with Rumania in the Southern Dobruja as it stood before the Second Balkan War and also be given Thrace up to the Enos-Midia or perhaps even the Enos-Rodosto line as her new frontier with Turkey. Macedonia should be allotted after an impartial investigation, which might take the southern boundary of the "contested zone" as its basis (i.e., for the boundary between Bulgaria and Serbia). Such a settlement was very much in line with Foreign Office

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53 House, Intimate Papers, IV, 153; on the origins of the commentary, see Walworth, America's Moment, pp. 54ff.

54 They recorded reservations regarding two subjects: reparations and, at special British insistence, freedom of the seas; Elcock, Portrait, pp. 26ff.; Northedge, Troubled Giant, pp. 43ff.; Temperley, History, I, 133-35; Tillman, Anglo-American Relations, pp. 50ff.; Woodward, Great Britain, pp. 428-29.

thinking. Nevertheless, leading members of the government did not even now feel themselves unreservedly committed to the Fourteen Points in this or indeed in any other particular.

To be sure, shortly after the German armistice, Lloyd George assured Wilson of the identity of their two countries' ideals regarding the task of international reconstruction before them.\textsuperscript{56} Ideals, however, were one thing, commitments another. In the American view, Britain and the other Allies accepted Wilsonian principles as the legal basis of an agreement with Germany and had thereby agreed that all the peace treaties were to be based on them.\textsuperscript{57} British statesmen took a more pragmatic view of the problems of making peace. Balfour later questioned whether the Fourteen Points could be treated in a legal manner even as regards Germany,\textsuperscript{58} and Lloyd George expressed similar reservations about them in his memoirs, noting as well that they constituted no part of the armistice conditions with Austria or Turkey.\textsuperscript{59}

The same, of course, could be said of Bulgaria. Indeed, it was questionable whether the Fourteen Points could be extended in a legal sense to a power such as Bulgaria with which the United States had not even been at war and whose armistice terms contained no mention of them.\textsuperscript{60} The British were willing to concede, at most, that the armistice of November 11 had bound the Allies morally, but not legally, only toward Germany and each other to base the settlements with the other enemy powers on Wilsonian principles.\textsuperscript{61} The British government accordingly never acknowledged a legal

\textsuperscript{56}Tillman, \textit{Anglo-American Relations}, p. 37; see the correspondence between Wilson and Lloyd George occasioned by the latter's speech to Liberal Party leaders on peace terms on November 12, 1918: Wilson to Lloyd George, November 14, 1918, \textit{FRUS 1919}, PPC, I, 3-4, and Lloyd George to Wilson, London, n.d. (received November 19, 1918), ibid., p. 5; an excerpt from the speech is in \textit{OS}, pp. 472-73.


\textsuperscript{58}Lloyd George \textit{Truth}, I, 695-96.

\textsuperscript{59}Lloyd George \textit{Truth}, II, 786.

\textsuperscript{60}Lowe and Dockrell, \textit{Mirage}, I, 274; \textit{MD}, II, 133, cited by P. Helmreich, \textit{From Paris}, p. 21.

\textsuperscript{61}Memorandum by British Delegation, Paris, February 18, 1919, No. 39, FO 374/20, PRO; see Temperley, \textit{History}, I, 418-19 for a contrary view.
obligation to apply Wilson’s Fourteen Points, much less Colonel House’s commentary, to Bulgaria. In any case, the victorious Allied and Associated Powers were to be the sole judges of their interpretation as they concerned both themselves and their defeated enemies. Wilsonian principles were about nothing if not morality, and Nicolson, obviously fearing such legal nit-picking, apparently did not expect British leadership in their application.^^

**Balkan Developments**

The national aspirations of Britain’s Balkan allies were just as central to the peace settlement and the idea of the Balkan bloc as Bulgaria’s. At the end of the war, however, none of them had any binding commitment from Britain regarding their realization. Nicolson was well acquainted, of course, with the attitudes of these states toward Balkan problems and the obstacle they represented for British hopes of establishing a Balkan bloc. And, as will be seen, the Balkan Allies and other emerging successor states of Eastern Europe were already busy trying to forge a bloc of their own; and, despite their mutually conflicting claims, one thing they could agree on was opposition to concessions to Bulgaria.

Developments in the region between the Armistice of Salonika and the opening of the Peace Conference did not brighten the prospects for such concessions. For one thing, all the Balkan Allies managed to regain control of those portions of their respective territories occupied by Bulgaria during the war, precisely the areas in which the British hoped to see them make concessions to their enemy. Serbia and Greece moved quickly in September and October, with French encouragement, to reassert their authority in the

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63See also Nicolson, *Peacemaking*, pp. 35ff.

64See pp. 39-43 above.
areas evacuated by the Bulgarians, which their own troops quickly reoccupied. Rumania had to wait until December to be able to restore her prewar frontier in the Dobruja, also with French assistance.

However, for Rumania as well as Serbia, the reoccupation of prewar territories was the least of the gains made at this time. For both states, within the period of a few short weeks, saw the fulfillment of their national aspirations to a degree previously barely imaginable. The attendant mood of national euphoria was hardly conducive to the surrender of territory to an enemy. Rather, a refusal to compromise on the territorial aspirations of their own nations formed a common political and diplomatic imperative for the Greek, Serbian and Rumanian governments even though their situations varied domestically and within the Allied camp.

**Serbia**

After the Bulgarian surrender, military and political developments quickly outstripped the diplomatic efforts of the Serbian government and the Yugoslav Committee to gain Allied recognition of their claims. By the beginning of November, virtually all of prewar Serbia, including South Serbia (as the Serbs called Vardar Macedonia), had been reoccupied, Belgrade itself having been liberated on November 1.

Serbian authorities almost immediately became concerned by the return to South Serbia of Macedonians, including suspected Bulgarian agents, from across the eastern frontier. An order was issued on October 31 to prevent the passage of suspicious persons and to

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67 See pp. 106-108 below.

68 See p. 44 above.

69 Falls, *History*, II, 276-77.
monitor the activities of those already in the country with supposed Bulgarian sympathies,
and another order on public security in South Serbia from 1913 was revived.\textsuperscript{70}

Even more dramatic were events elsewhere. On October 31, a National Council at
Zagreb in Croatia, representing the South Slavs of the disintegrating Habsburg empire,
declared for union with Serbia, and an assembly in Montenegro issued a similar
proclamation and deposed King Nicholas on November 26. Prince Alexander accepted
the regency of the new state in Belgrade on December 1 and three days later the Kingdom
of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was formally proclaimed.\textsuperscript{71}

Alexander, no less ambitious though no less committed to Serbian aspirations than
his prime minister, took the opportunity of the formation of a joint government to try to
rid himself of the triumphant Pashitch, and on December 20 he confirmed a cabinet with
representatives from all the constituent parts of his new kingdom under Pashitch’s
erstwhile deputy, Stojan Protitch. Pashitch, however, could not be denied the position of
head of the delegation to the Peace Conference, a good platform from which to reclaim
his old position by championing Serbian interests.\textsuperscript{72}

Indeed, although much had been accomplished, the task ahead was still daunting.
None of the Allied Great Powers with the exception of the United States recognized the
new state, and boundary disputes on virtually every side demanded their adjudication.
Potentially the most serious such dispute was with one of those powers, Italy, who had a
treaty commitment from two others. Meanwhile, the internal structure of the Yugoslav
state was far from settled, Serbian expectations of playing the dominant role in a
centralized polity clashing with Croatian and Slovenian demands for a federation.

\textsuperscript{70}Hrabak, “Stanje,” pp. 13 and 40; Katardžiev, “Makedonsko pitanje,” p. 415; for a French
translation of the “Ordonnance sur la sécurité publique dans les nouveaux territoires” of September 21,


Diplomatically, the Yugoslavs, of whatever national stripe, had no choice but to found their claims on the principle of nationality and could not abandon the Serbian claim to Macedonia based on this principle without casting doubt on their claims in other areas. Politically, the leaders of each of the constituent nations had to be seen by their own people to advocate maximum claims in their own region and had to back the claims of the other peoples in theirs lest the whole fragile edifice of the new state collapse amid mutual recriminations. Serbia's fearful losses during the war, amounting to almost 20% of her prewar population, only increased her leaders' determination to achieve their goals at the Peace Conference. For them, the retention of South Serbia was especially important in order to buttress political with demographic predominance within the new Yugoslavia.  

Rumania

Ironically, while under her (unratified) peace treaty with the Central Powers Rumania lost the whole Dobruja and Bulgaria gained only the southern portion, the Allied victory in Macedonia at first actually led to a deterioration of Rumania's position vis-à-vis Bulgaria. For on September 25 Germany, no doubt hoping to stiffen her ally's will by settling the dispute over the Northern Dobruja, finally agreed to its cession to Bulgaria. The Armistice of Salonika did not explicitly relate to Rumania, although it did implicitly recognize the Bulgarian occupation of the Southern Dobruja by permitting the continued stationing of Bulgarian troops there. When German troops withdrew from the Northern Dobruja on November 5, the Bulgarians began moving into that area too.

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75 See pp. 26, 79 and 81 above.
76 Report for December 1918, AA, I, Iff.
Franchet, however, learned of the Bulgarian advance and on November 9 informed the Bulgarian government that its troops must withdraw to their previous positions as soon as Allied troops (in this case, actually British) arrived to take their place. Meanwhile, the pro-German government in Bucarest resigned on November 8, and two days later Rumania rejoined the war on the Allied side.

The armistice with Germany on November 11 changed the situation even further in Rumania's favor by nullifying the Treaty of Bucarest, which had in any case never been ratified. This raised the question of the evacuation of the Southern Dobruja as well, and there now followed a period of bargaining between Franchet and the Bulgarian government: the former willing to specify that the occupation of the entire Dobruja would be only by Allied and not Rumanian troops and would not prejudice the decisions of the Peace Conference, and the latter asking for the maintenance of the Bulgarian internal administration in the Southern Dobruja and other concessions to Bulgarian public opinion.

On November 16, Franchet received instructions from Paris for the complete evacuation of the entire Dobruja by the Bulgarians and occupation by French troops pending the decision of the Peace Conference. On the nineteenth, General Chrétien, commander of Allied occupation troops in Bulgaria, relayed these dispositions to the

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77 Report for December 1918, AA, I, 1ff.; Bernachot, Armées françaises, I, 34.
78 Spector, Rumania, p. 63.
79 Spector, Rumania, pp. 55 and 65; the text of the armistice with Germany is in Temperley, History, I, 459ff.; the relevant provision is in Article XV.
80 Bernachot, Armées françaises, I, 34-35; Genov, Bulgaria, p. 29.
82 See p. 129 below.
Bulgarian government. Three days later, the Malinoff government resigned after failing to obtain concessions on the maintenance of at least Bulgarian administration.

Franchet was, however, prepared to relent on this issue and referred the question to Paris. This soon led to a clash with his new nominal subordinate, General Henri Berthelot. Berthelot had been the head of the French Military Mission in Rumania from October 1916 to March 1918. In that position, he had played a major role in Rumania's ultimately unsuccessful war effort. On October 1, he was summoned from a field command on the Western Front to confer with Clemenceau in Paris about a new mission to Rumania. His task was to organize a new French army in the Balkans, take it across Bulgaria, bring Rumania back into the war and eventually take action in South Russia as well. Berthelot was to be under Franchet's command except as concerned his operations in Russia, regarding which he reported directly to Clemenceau. This arrangement was not well calculated to improve Berthelot's relations with Franchet, whom he already disliked. In any event, on October 13 Berthelot arrived in Salonika, whence he began to urge the Rumanians by telegraph to re-enter the war.

Berthelot's new command, the Army of the Danube, was activated on October 28, and he established headquarters at Trnovo on November 7. As has been seen, Rumania finally did get back into the war the day before it ended. Berthelot then moved

\[83^\text{Report for December 1918, AA, I, 1ff.; Bernachot, Armées françaises, I, 36.}
\[84^\text{Report for December 1918, AA, I, 1ff.; "Ostavkata na kabineta," Pryaporets, November 25, 1918, p. 1; Malinov, Pod znaka, p. 133; Malinov's letter of protest to Chrétien of November 20, 1918 is in ibid.; on the internal Bulgarian aspects of this situation, see pp. 131-132 below.}
\[85^\text{Bernachot, Armées françaises, II, 37.}
\[86^\text{Torrey, Berthelot, pp. xivff. and 3ff.}
\[87^\text{Torrey, Berthelot, p. xxxv; on Berthelot's second mission to Romania in general, see ibid., pp. 175ff.; and idem, "Berthelot," pp. 277ff.}
\[88^\text{Bernachot, Armées françaises, II, 18ff.}
\[89^\text{Torrey, Berthelot, p. 185.}
\[90^\text{See p. 106 above.}
his headquarters to that country, arriving in Giurgiu on November 15.\textsuperscript{91} He was obviously much more attuned to Rumanian concerns than Franchet. After being approached by the Rumanians on the subject of the Dobruja,\textsuperscript{92} he protested to Clemenceau on November 25 against his superior's decision to in fact allow the Bulgarian administration to remain in the Dobruja as seriously compromising French influence in Rumania.\textsuperscript{93}

Berthelot's point of view prevailed.\textsuperscript{94} On November 26, the same day that Franchet actually issued Berthelot the order for the provisional maintenance of Bulgarian administration,\textsuperscript{95} the latter received a telegram from Clemenceau giving him carte blanche in Rumania and adjacent areas of Russia.\textsuperscript{96} On December 3, Berthelot himself ordered Chrétien to make the necessary arrangements for the replacement in stages of Bulgarian by Rumanian civil administration in the entire Dobruja, starting at Tulcea in the extreme north. The operation was supposed to be completed by December 24. No Rumanian troops, however, were to be permitted to enter the region until the Peace Conference definitively settled its status.\textsuperscript{97} Rumanian gendarmes, on the other hand, did begin to evict Bulgarian administrators on December 8 with Berthelot's permission, and by the end of the month Rumania had for all practical purposes restored her sovereignty and silenced local Bulgarian opposition.\textsuperscript{98}

\textsuperscript{91}Torrey, \textit{Berthelot}, p. 188.

\textsuperscript{92}Torrey, "Berthelot," p. 280.

\textsuperscript{93}Bernachot, \textit{Armées françaises}, II, 37 and 42; Torrey, \textit{Berthelot}, pp. xxxv and 191.

\textsuperscript{94}Torrey, "Berthelot," pp. 280-81; Torrey, \textit{Berthelot}, p. xxxv.

\textsuperscript{95}Bernachot, \textit{Armées françaises}, II, 42.

\textsuperscript{96}Torrey, \textit{Berthelot}, pp. 191-92.

\textsuperscript{97}Bernachot, \textit{Armées françaises}, II, 42-44; Berthelot also gave personal instructions on December 2 to the commander of the regiment that was going to carry out the operation: Torrey, \textit{Berthelot}, p. 194.

\textsuperscript{98}Spector, \textit{Rumania}, p. 72.
Developments in other territories claimed by Rumania came to a head more swiftly. The National Council of Bessarabia voted for union with Rumania on November 27, followed by Bukovina on November 28 and Transylvania and the Banat on December 1. Rumania, thanks to the simultaneous disintegration of the Austrian and Russian empires, thus achieved her national aspirations to an extent practically beyond all expectation even before her defeat. A new government headed by Iuliu Maniu, a peasant leader from Transylvania, took office the next day, but Bratiano, the author of the 1916 agreement with the Allies, his policy vindicated, was back in power by the fourteenth. Like Pashitch, he recognized the political importance of the upcoming Peace Conference and also assumed leadership of his country’s delegation.\(^9\)

Bratiano did not face the problems relating to international recognition or internal structure that Pashitch did, but the new Rumania did have unsettled frontiers on virtually every side, including the Banat where her claims clashed with those of Serbia. In seeking the support of the Allied Great Powers for these and other claims, Bratiano could in many cases appeal to the principle of nation self-determination. But he also had the 1916 treaty and now argued it was still binding since the Allies had been the first to break it by not providing adequate military support in 1916.\(^{10}\) A stand based on integral fulfillment of the treaty ruled out any idea of concessions to Bulgaria in the Dobruja, where it guaranteed the prewar frontier. Obtaining at least the frontiers stipulated by the treaty was also politically necessary for Bratiano, for that was precisely why he had taken the country into a war which had brought it such misfortune, including about 400,000 dead.\(^{11}\) His political rival Take Ionescu, who had been much more outspokenly Ententophile during the war, was at its end already active in Western capitals promoting


\(^{10}\)Spector, *Rumania*, pp. 63-64.

\(^{11}\)Bogart, *Direct and Indirect Costs*, p. 272.
Rumania’s cause with Allied powers great and small. Bratiano could not afford to share the glory of being the author of Rumania’s unification.

**Greece**

Unlike Serbia and Rumania, Greece was not so fortunate as to occupy most of the new territory she coveted even before the Peace Conference began, but her aspirations were not the less sweeping. In 1913, after agreeing to let Bulgaria keep Western Thrace, Venizelos had made it clear that Greece’s claims to Thrace and expansion to Constantinople were only being postponed until she should have gathered her strength. Now, with the war against Bulgaria concluded and the end of that against Turkey approaching, the time seemed to have come. Greek forces re-occupied Kavalla on October 6 and the Greek press began to give increasing voice to claims in Asia Minor, Thrace and Northern Epirus. Direct references to Constantinople were avoided only due to censorship.

Although Greece’s most important claims were directed against Turkey, Venizelos did not hesitate to make it clear not only that there could be no question of Greek concessions to Bulgaria but that he expected rather the reverse. Typically, he clothed his claims in the language of moderation. In regard to Bulgaria, he stated on October 8 that the punishment which would be inflicted on her and the guarantees which would be demanded would not go beyond what was indispensable and would not be in contradiction to the war aims of the Allies.

With the war on the battlefronts coming to an end, he fully recognized the importance of the continuing war of words and devoted ample resources to it. On

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105 Chester, *Life*, p. 311.
October 9, he set out for Paris and London to start the campaign in favor of Greek claims. Obviously attaching the greatest importance to winning the backing and sympathy of the British government and public, he went on to London after only a day in the French capital and spent most of October and November there. Aside from supervising propaganda, an activity in which the Greeks had already gained some wartime experience, Venizelos personally canvassed political figures, journalists and local Philhellenes. He neglected neither Opposition figures such as Asquith nor such relatively minor but influential officials such as Maurice Hankey, Secretary of the Cabinet, and even Harold Nicolson.

Nor did Venizelos miss the main mark in his campaign. He had lunch with Lloyd George in London on October 15. The conversation largely turned on Constantinople and Venizelos' desire to see it and both sides of the Straits taken away from Turkey and placed under the administration of a future League of Nations or the Great Powers. On October 31, Lloyd George invited him to lunch again in Versailles. Two days later he wrote, again at Lloyd George's request, a memorandum setting forth Greek claims. Here, citing Wilson's Point XII, Venizelos called for the annexation of Smyrna and most of western Asia Minor by Greece and for the creation of an independent state at Constantinople under the auspices of the League of Nations or interested powers. He noted that Bulgaria would become such an interested power (i.e., with only a Black Sea coast) if she were cut off from the Aegean. In a covering letter, Venizelos recalled his

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111 Interview with M. Venizelos, October 15, 1918, F/92/10/1, LGP; Petsalis-Diomidis, *Greece*, p. 72.

and the Greek people’s services in the Allied cause and maintained that Greek claims in western Asia Minor corresponded with the principles for which the Allies were still fighting, emphasizing that expansion in this area or in Thrace along the coast to the Black Sea (i.e., Western and Eastern Thrace) was the sole method by which Greece would be able to appreciably extend her territories at a moment when Serbia and Rumania were both completing their national unity.\(^{113}\)

No one could represent Greece at the Peace Conference as well as Venizelos, who like Pashitch and Bratiano had to turn the opportunity to political account. With only some 15,000 dead,\(^{114}\) she had suffered less in material and human terms than the other Balkan Allies, but the war had nevertheless exacted a high spiritual and political price. While still neutral, Greece had suffered the indignity of the occupation of portions of her territory by first the Allied and then the Central Powers, the deportation of tens of thousands of people from Aegean Macedonia by Bulgaria and finally blatant interference in her internal affairs by the Allies, especially France. The whole experience left the country bitterly divided between Venizelists and Royalists still loyal to the exiled Constantine.\(^{115}\) Although by the end of the war there was no one approaching his stature left on the Greek scene, Venizelos still felt, or at least claimed to feel, pressure to gain more territory through having sided with the Allies than Germany had offered Constantine for mere neutrality.\(^{116}\) Like Pashitch, Venizelos faced his major obstacle in

\(^{113}\)Emphasis added; Venizelos to Lloyd George, Paris, November 2, 1918 with enclosed memorandum of the same date, F/55/1/11, LGP (published in Frangulis, *La Grèce*, II, 21ff.); Petsalis-Diomidis, *Greece*, pp. 73-74; M. L. Smith, *Ionian Vision*, p. 71; on September 17 the Greek minister in London had already informed the Foreign Office of Greek claims, but he had botched his instructions, claiming Eastern instead of Western Thrace (Venizelos now claimed both) and omitting Cyprus (which Venizelos had now, in any case, dropped): Petsalis-Diomidis, *Greece*, pp. 63-64; Leontaritis, *Greece*, p. 312.

\(^{114}\)Bogart, *Direct and Indirect Costs*, p. 272.

\(^{115}\)Leon, *Greece*, passim.

\(^{116}\)See Balfour’s remarks in Minutes of Imperial War Cabinet, IWC 30, WC 457, August 13, 1918, CAB 23/7, 42 and 43, PRO; in October 1915 Germany had guaranteed Constantine, in return for Greece’s benevolent neutrality, the country’s territorial integrity (including the Aegean Islands), and the future acquisition of southern Albania and the Geygeli-Doiran salient in South Serbia: Howard, *Partition*, p. 151; Leon, *Greece*, pp. 200ff., 216ff. and 232-33; Leontaritis, *Greece*, pp. 89ff.
Italy, with whose claims those of Greece clashed in Asia Minor, the Aegean Islands and southern Albania (Northern Epirus).117

Bulgaria occupied an important place in Venizelos' plans for the peace settlement. In his letter to Lloyd George, he raised his claim to Bulgarian territory in Western Thrace almost casually and without emphasis and seemed to pose his claim to Thrace, Eastern and Western, as an alternative to the acquisition of western Asia Minor, itself a highly problematic venture. In one sense, Thrace may have been a *pis aller*, but Venizelos actually wanted both areas, which he claimed equally on the basis of nationality. Modestly refraining from claiming Constantinople, possession of Eastern Thrace would nevertheless make Greece contiguous to the ancient capital of Byzantium and thus a major contender for ownership in the not unlikely event that its status changed again. Western Thrace with its east-west rail line was the land link to Eastern Thrace and it too had a substantial Greek population. Obtaining it was therefore of great diplomatic and strategic importance. Concessions to Bulgaria, especially in the Kavalla area, were strategically and politically out of the question as this would threaten the route to Constantinople and be unacceptable to Greek opinion. Acquiring Western Thrace also had the political attraction of being a relatively sure and swift thing inasmuch as Greece's other claims touched on the interests of one or more of the Allied Great Powers.

By the spring of 1918, the Serbs at least had begun to look forward to cooperation among the smaller Allies at a future peace conference.118 During the final months of the year, Pashitch, Venizelos, Ionescu and the Czech statesman Edward Benes did in fact hold talks, of which they kept the Foreign Office informed, in London and Paris on the future of Eastern Europe. Ionescu, already captivated by Venizelos in 1915,119 began to

119Ionescu, *Impressions*, p. 239.
emerge as the main champion of an entente among the newly created or enlarged national states in the whole region stretching from the Baltic to the Aegean. A more immediate aim of the discussions, however, was to present the Great Powers with a united front at the Peace Conference, and to that end Ionescu and Pashitch came to an understanding dividing the Banat.  

Such a front would serve to facilitate the achievement of the aspirations of the several smaller Allied powers and, as far as the Balkan Allies were concerned, thwart concessions to Bulgaria.

**Final Proposals**

British official discussion in December of the impending Near Eastern settlement demonstrated the extent to which the diplomatic necessities of negotiating peace had now replaced the strategic imperatives of winning the war. Although the claims of Greece, Rumania and Serbia affecting Bulgaria by no means met with unreserved British support and Bulgarian claims still enjoyed some backing, a marked decline nevertheless became noticeable in the scale of concessions contemplated for Bulgaria and in the readiness to urge them on the Balkan Allies. As has been seen, before the end of the war, British officials were advocating the cession to Bulgaria of the uncontested zone in Vardar Macedonia by Serbia, Kavalla in Aegean Macedonia by Greece, the Southern Dobruja by Rumania and Eastern Thrace up to the Enos-Midia line by Turkey. They were, moreover, convinced that such a settlement would have to be imposed by force (which is not to say that any decision had been made to do so).

A memorandum on European peace terms prepared by James Headlam-Morley, the assistant director of the old DIIB and Tyrrell's assistant at the PID, reflected the

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121See p. 59 above.

122Goldstein, *Winning*, p. 68.
new emphasis. While this paper recognized the balance of power, the safety of the opposite shore of the Channel and open facilities for trade as all necessary for Britain, it saw as the general object of the settlement the establishment of stable conditions in order to guard against the great danger of anything which would again threaten to entangle her in a great continental war. The memorandum located the great threat to peace squarely in Eastern Europe and identified the territorial struggle there as one of the chief causes of the war just concluded. No League of Nations could avoid future wars until a situation was created which made it possible for states to mutually guarantee their frontiers, and the future peace of the world would thus depend on the way the Peace Conference settled the territorial problem in Eastern Europe. No settlement could be stable and permanent unless it was just, and it was of the highest importance that no well-founded sense of injustice be allowed to remain. Quoting Wilson's words, "We must be just to those to whom we should not wish to be just," the memorandum saw Britain as being in a strong position in this regard as she had no direct and immediate interests at stake and could assume the role of impartial mediator, hopefully in cordial cooperation with the United States. This also presented Britain with an unprecedented opportunity for the legitimate extension of her influence. Her object should be for all the nations, even the Bulgarians, Magyars and Germans, to feel that she had honestly attempted to carry through a disinterested policy in the best interests of all, for in the long run the interests of each were not, so Headlam-Morley averred, antagonistic to those of the others. Britain should not, however, take the initiative in proposing schemes of settlement but only mediate when the parties themselves could not come to agreement. The individual states should be invited to enter into negotiations to that end. The final decision, of course, rested with the Peace Conference. But if such an agreement were reached, it would only have to ratify it; otherwise, it would arbitrate and, if necessary, impose decisions by force of arms.\footnote{"Europe," Foreign Office memorandum, December 13, 1918, P. 52, CAB 29/2, PRO; for the}
One of the most comprehensive papers produced by the PID considered British desiderata in the Balkans within this framework. It was written by Nicolson and Allen Leeper, also of the South-Eastern Europe Section, and incorporated papers by Lewis Namier, of the same section, and R. W. Seton-Watson, formerly of the DIIB and EPD.\(^{124}\)

This paper was the last attempt to make comprehensive recommendations for a Balkan settlement as an interrelated whole. It ranged over territorial, economic and internal political questions but, like Headlam-Morley’s memorandum, focused on the territorial problem as the key to the whole.

In general, Nicolson and Leeper endorsed the primacy of a just and permanent settlement based on the principles of national self-determination, security and free economic opportunity for the peoples of the region. They wanted to see the settlement framed in such a way as to prevent the formation of competing blocs by leaving no avoidable causes of friction and to lay the foundation for a customs union. Aside from territorial adjustments, this would entail protection of the rights of national minorities in the new states. The whole settlement also had to be sanctioned, if not actually guaranteed, by the League of Nations, and public opinion in the Balkan states would have to realize that it would be permanent.

The provisions of Nicolson’s and Leeeper’s suggested territorial settlement were along familiar lines: the Allied and Associated Powers should secure to Bulgaria concessions in Macedonia, the Southern Dobruja and possibly Eastern Thrace, the necessary concessions to her by Serbia and Rumania being predicated on their own achievement of national unification within certain limits. Serbia could look forward to unification with the Southern Slavs of Austria-Hungary and possibly Montenegro. In regard to the Adriatic, Britain was bound by the Treaty of London, but the authors hoped

\(^{124}\)Goldstein, \textit{Winning}, p. 133.
Italy would agree to modifications. Rumania was also expected to benefit from the right of self-determination of the Rumanian populations of Bessarabia and Austria-Hungary, although her frontiers with the latter state were to be fixed as far as possible on ethnographic lines rather than those of the 1916 treaty. An amicable understanding between Serbia and Rumania on the Banat was expected. Greece was to receive an enclave around the purely Greek districts of Smyrna or, if this proved impractical, the Greek portions of Thrace. She should also have all the Aegean islands, including arrangements with Italy on the Dodecanese and Britain, if strategically possible, on the cession of Cyprus. Albania south of the Voyussa (Northern Epirus) would likewise go to Greece if the inhabitants so desired. Albania was otherwise left to Italy, who was to have an enclave at Valona and the rest of the country under a League of Nations mandate and possibly an Italian prince. The economic aspect of the recommendations centered around freedom of international communications with provisions for free ports at Constantinople, Kavalla, Salonika, Fiume, Trieste and Smyrna as well as freedom of transit on railway connections to those ports and a new convention to regulate traffic on the Danube.\(^{125}\)

Explanatory memoranda discussed the thinking behind these proposals in detail, stating that they were based on the principles of Wilson’s Point XI. These principles were seen as the best prospect for a permanent settlement in Southeastern Europe and therefore as the most desirable and advantageous from the point of view of British interests. For, the authors maintained, unlike Germany, Russia or Austria, whose policy had been to sow discord and dissension among the Balkan states in order to prevent their union and the erection of a barrier to their own grasping designs, Britain’s object should be to give these states unity, independence and strength. British and American influence should be sufficient to overcome such obstacles as Italy’s apprehensions about Yugoslav unity or France’s doubts about the advantages of Balkan unity for her own economic interests and

\(^{125}\)"South-Eastern Europe and the Balkans,” memorandum by Nicolson and Leeper, December 1918, P. 66, CAB 29/2, PRO; see also Goldstein, Winning, pp. 133ff.
to realize the principle of "the Balkans for the Balkan peoples." But the first step was the encouragement of a good understanding among those peoples themselves. Such encouragement had already been given and the Serbs and Rumanians and the Serbs and Greeks, not to mention the Serbs and Yugoslavs, were well on the way toward an understanding. In the matter of territorial division, Nicolson and Leeper advised against following too pedantic a formula based wholly on racial and linguistic affinity. The desires of the inhabitants themselves should rather be ascertained so far as possible, although economic considerations and in some cases urgent political or strategic necessities should not be left out of account. Britain's freedom of action in directly supporting wholly justified national claims was, they pointed out, fettered in one direction only--the eastern littoral of the Adriatic, where Italy's claims were inadmissible from the point of view of nationality but Britain was bound by her signature.

In regard to frontiers, Nicolson and Leeper cautioned against penalizing Bulgaria for her role in the war. This would be poor policy for the simple reason that it would leave in the Balkans a center of discontent which would most certainly result in a disturbance of the peace at some future date. It should rather be the aim of the Peace Conference, while being careful not to offend the Balkan Allies, so to adjust matters that Bulgaria would not be left under a sense of injury and that there might be some prospect of gradual reconciliation with her neighbors. The authors called "chauvinism" and "nationalism" the causes of Bulgaria's being a source of unrest. The former, which they saw as due to the megalomania of Ferdinand and the ideas of some of his ministers about hegemony in the Balkans, would hopefully disappear with the altered balance of power there. It remained for the peace conference to allay Bulgarian nationalism, which had found expression in a constant agitation in support of claims to certain regions in Macedonia, Thrace and the Dobruja.126

126"Explanatory Memoranda" to "South-Eastern Europe and the Balkans," memorandum by Nicolson and Leeper, December 1918, P. 66, CAB 29/2, PRO.
Nicolson and Leeper gave detailed consideration to Bulgaria’s frontier with each of her neighbors. On the basis of the general principles they advocated for the Balkan settlement, they believed that the entire uncontested zone in Serbian Macedonia could be ceded to Bulgaria “on grounds of justified nationality,” but found “good” reasons for not doing so. First of all, Serbia would be cut off from Salonika since the railway to that port, a very important artery for her, ran along the right bank of the Vardar. Furthermore, she would lose her common frontier with Greece unless some arrangement were made for the partition of Albania, which would itself be unjust. It would therefore not be “fair” to override the natural resistance of Serbia, who was again in possession of the area. As a compromise, they suggested the cession to Bulgaria of part of the uncontested zone east of the Vardar, her new frontier to follow the course of that river northward from the Greek border to its junction with the Pchinya and thence to rejoin the old frontier by following the course of the Kriva. Serbian objections regarding the dangerous proximity of even the current Bulgarian frontier to the Üsküb-Salonika railway could be met by Allied assistance in constructing a new line, economically promising in its own right, from Üsküb to Monastir, which was already linked to Salonika. Bulgarian objections to Serbian occupation of a large part of the uncontested zone could likewise be met through an agreement, along the lines of the successful experiment in Thrace after the Balkan wars, to facilitate intermigration of those of the inhabitants who did not wish to remain under foreign rule. To be fair to Britain’s ally, however, the cession should be dependent on Serbia gaining complete access to the Adriatic, and until the new railway was built it would probably be necessary for the Powers to guarantee the security of the old one. Nicolson and Leeper pointed out that Serbia and Greece were violently opposed to another proposed solution to the Macedonian question—an autonomous state under the League of Nations, and this seemed impractical to them “for other reasons” as well. They made no mention of Bulgarian acquisition of Kavalla or any other territory in Greece.127

127a "Explanatory Memoranda” to “South-Eastern Europe and the Balkans,” memorandum by
Nicolson and Leeper also raised the possibility of claims by Serbia against Bulgaria, although aside from minor frontier rectifications they expected her to seek only Vidin on the Danube and, along with Greece, reduction of the Strumitsa salient in the south. They thought any such claims would have to be judged on their merits once made but proposed a possible Serbo-Bulgarian compromise in the north on the basis of the cession to Bulgaria of the Pirot enclave, to which she had some ethnographic claim. Their approach was thus to advocate “compromise” by balancing gains and losses in the north and giving Bulgaria the right bank of the Vardar in the south.\(^{128}\)

In Thrace, Nicolson and Leeper saw some ethnographic justification for the expected Greek claim to not only the southern portion of Western Thrace but also Eastern Thrace up to the Enos-Midia line. They noted that there was, or had been, a considerable Greek population, especially along the coast, although it had to a certain extent been cleared from the whole region as a result of the deportations and massacres of the preceding five years. On the other hand, even with provision for Bulgarian access to the Aegean by means of transit rights and a free port at Dedeagach, Nicolson and Leeper saw several objections to the cession of Thrace to Greece even under such conditions. Firstly, it would still cut Bulgaria off from free access to the Aegean and perpetuate her resentment. Secondly, it would leave Greece with a long and extremely vulnerable frontier, which would be a continual temptation to Bulgaria. Finally, it would bring Greece into direct contact with the Straits zone, and the resulting unrest and irredentism among the numerous and powerful Greek elements in Constantinople and Rodosto could only tend to complicate the task of its future administration. Nicolson and Leeper thought that the whole question of Thrace would depend largely on the recognition of Greek and

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\(^{128}\) Explanatory Memoranda” to “South-Eastern Europe and the Balkans,” memorandum by Nicolson and Leeper, December 1918, P. 66, CAB 29/2, PRO.
Bulgarian claims in Smyrna and Macedonia respectively but urged that from the political point of view the satisfaction of the former would offer fewer disadvantages than Greek expansion in Thrace. As an alternative for Eastern Thrace, they foresaw that Bulgaria might, on fixed conditions, obtain that area up to the Enos-Midia line or at least the towns of Adrianople and Kirk Kilisse.129

For the Dobruja, Nicolson and Leeper reverted to the idea of rectification, recommending the return of the major portion of the Southern Dobruja, less the town and fortress of Silistria, to Bulgaria if Rumania united with her co-nationals in Hungary and Bukovina. They thought the return of the whole or greater portion of the area would be an act of wisdom as well as justice on the part of Rumania and claimed that authoritative Rumanians (Ionescu?) had proposed the cession of rather more than half. Under this scheme, the boundary would run along a line from a point on the Danube west of Silistria to the Black Sea at Cape Kaliakra, giving Rumania Silistria, which was not ethnically Bulgarian, and Bulgaria Tutrakan, which was Rumanian, and Dobrich and Balchik, which were Bulgarian. Nicolson and Leeper were ready to leave the exact frontier to a delimitation commission but thought the important point was to revise the 1913 treaty in Bulgaria’s favor and give her as far as possible the most Bulgarian districts.130

These recommendations, however, represented a reduction in Bulgarian gains in comparison with wartime proposals on all these areas. Nicolson and Leeper now hoped to satisfy Bulgaria’s aspirations in Macedonia, the ethnographic justice of which was not disputed, with only part of the uncontested zone. Moreover, in dropping all idea of concessions by Greece in Aegean Macedonia and considering Eastern Thrace and Smyrna as alternatives for her expansion, their recommendations clearly reflected the influence of


130a. South-Eastern Europe and the Balkans,” memorandum by Nicolson and Leeper, December 1918, P. 66, CAB 29/2, PRO.
Venizelos, whom Nicolson and Leeper described as having merited Britain’s complete confidence and support and whose continuance in power they saw as a guarantee of good Anglo-Greek relations.  

Venizelos’ influence was even more apparent in the discussion on the future of the rump Ottoman Empire by Curzon’s Eastern Committee, where the question of Greek claims to Eastern Thrace and Smyrna was at this time giving rise to acute dissension. Consideration of these Greek claims affected Bulgaria’s position in Thrace, the former directly and the latter indirectly, since the claim to Smyrna could be balanced against that to Eastern Thrace, whose status affected Constantinople and the Straits. Like Nicolson and Leeper, the War Office and Admiralty wanted to keep Greece well away from that sensitive region by denying her any territory in Eastern Thrace. Nicolson and Leeper, at least, wanted to give Greece Smyrna instead of Eastern Thrace, thus leaving scope for Bulgarian gains there.

Sir Eyre Crowe and Sir Louis Mallet, a former ambassador in Constantinople, took the opposite tack, however. Crowe, and following him Mallet, favored giving most of Eastern Thrace to Greece on ethnographic grounds, believing that the population was predominantly Greek and that the Turks would probably migrate to Anatolia. Crowe’s main argument, however, was that British interests demanded the ending of Turkish sovereignty in Europe in order to facilitate the establishment of effective international control over the Straits. Whether the Sultan was expelled from his capital itself or not, the question of the rest of Turkey-in-Europe would therefore remain. In advocating its assignment to Greece, Crowe emphasized, in the first place, that the task of the Great

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131"Greece" in “Explanatory Memoranda” to “South-Eastern Europe and the Balkans,” memorandum by Nicolson and Leeper, December 1918, P. 66, CAB 29/2, PRO.

132Memorandum by the Admiralty, December 21, 1918, E.C. 2823, CAB 27/39, PRO; “Strategic Importance of Constantinople to the British Empire,” memorandum by the General Staff, December 22, 1918, E.C. 2824, ibid.

133"South-Eastern Europe and the Balkans,” memorandum by Nicolson and Leeper, December 1918, P. 66, CAB 29/2, PRO.
Powers in dealing with the Balkans would be greatly facilitated if they accepted the agreement Venizelos was understood to have made with Serbia and Rumania on a territorial settlement, under which Eastern Thrace minus Constantinople went to Greece, and, secondly, that Venizelos had confidentially made it known that if Greece's claims in Thrace were allowed, she would cease urging her pretensions in Smyrna, where a free hand would be of inestimable value to Britain as long as she was under the shadow of the 1917 agreement with Italy. Crowe did not directly consider the fate of Western Thrace in his memorandum but seemed to leave open the possibility of its acquisition by Greece, noting that Bulgaria would presumably in any case become mainly a Black Sea power like Rumania and that if perpetual freedom of the Straits were definitely secured, this would entirely safeguard her access to the sea, quite apart from any subsidiary outlet she might "obtain" on the Aegean at Dedeagach or Porto Lagos (both of which she already in fact possessed).  

Although the War Office and Admiralty did not specifically consider the question of Eastern and Western Thrace (beyond denying the former to Greece) at this time, the military and political logic of their argument about the Straits would have dictated leaving most if not all of the former region to Turkey and the latter to Bulgaria.  

Curzon favored the establishment of a sharp demarcation between Europe and Asia along the line of the Straits, expelling the Sultan from Constantinople and Eastern Thrace and keeping Greece out of Smyrna. An internationalized Straits zone centered on Constantinople would safeguard freedom of navigation. The creation of such a zone would also, he thought, promote a pacific solution of the problem of Eastern Thrace on ethnographic lines that would satisfy the great majority of the population. The Bulgarians

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135 See p. 122 above.  

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might then receive the territory north of the Enos-Midia line, which they had "so stupidly forfeited" in the Second Balkan War; and the Greeks, who constituted the majority in Gallipoli and Rodosto, might be allowed to occupy these areas. Curzon was under the impression, mistaken, that Venizelos' reported bargain with Serbia and Rumania was along these lines. Although they otherwise disagreed, both Curzon and Nicolson/Leeper would, by implication at least, have left Western Thrace to Bulgaria.

Even in Eastern Thrace, where there was some disagreement about the ethnic makeup, ethnography played only a secondary role in these conflicting recommendations. It did, however, seem to provide the basis for a compromise between Greek and Bulgarian claims there, with attention shifting from the Enos-Midia line to Adrianople and Kirk Kilisse as prospective gains for Bulgaria. No disagreement was evident about the ethnography of Western Thrace, but Crowe did not even adduce a Turkish majority as a reason for taking it from Bulgaria. The problem of clashing Greek and Bulgarian claims was less tractable here than in Eastern Thrace, for the British no longer foresaw gains by Bulgaria at Greek expense in Macedonia and recognized the seriousness of depriving her of an Aegean coastline. Aside from such comfort as Bulgaria might find in Adrianople, it was argued that guaranteed commercial access to Salonika, Kavalla and Dedeagach would, along with the opening of the Straits, afford her all necessary economic outlets if she did lose Western Thrace. But the balance of opinion weighed heavily against such an option.

As British statesmen and their advisers got ready to go to Paris during the first days of 1919, their ideas on the Balkan settlement to be achieved at the Peace Conference were perceptibly different from the days when the Entente had been trying to unite the Balkan Christians against the Central Powers. The desire to reconcile them and create a lasting peace on the basis of nationality was still manifest as was the recognition that this

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would require concessions to Bulgaria by her neighbors. The idea of striking the Balkan balance at the expense of the peripheral empires remained very much alive and seemed more feasible than ever. Peace in the Balkans, moreover, was still seen within the framework of the general peace, disturbance of which had been peculiarly likely to occur there.

Gone, however, was the talk of a Balkan bloc as a bulwark of Imperial defense in the East. Discussion of British security interests in the Balkans now focused entirely on the regime to be established at Constantinople and the Straits. The only definite role now conceded to Balkan Christian states (especially Greece) in their security was to keep away from them. Creating a lasting peace was, to be sure, no small matter and the most general of Britain's interests, but peace, rather than both peace and security, was now seen as the only such interest to be served in the Balkan hinterland of the Straits.

Somewhat paradoxically, though no one seemed to notice, attendant on this shift in perspective on the Balkan settlement was a striking reduction in the extent of the territorial concessions thought necessary to allay Bulgarian resentment and dampen her inclination to break the peace. In Macedonia, such concessions were now limited to some Serbian territory on the eastern bank of the Vardar. The Enos-Midia line in Eastern Thrace was still mentioned but Kirk Kilisse and Adrianople seemed more likely gains there. Even in the Southern Dobruja, the British were only talking of returning most, but by no means all, former Bulgarian territory. Moreover, losses of prewar territory, to Greece in Western Thrace and even to Serbia in northwestern Bulgaria, were for the first time definitely admitted as possibilities. Bulgaria was thus to be partially mollified with, at best, greatly reduced satisfaction of her aspirations for new territory accompanied by, at worst, loss of some of the old. For the rest, such devices as free ports, internationalized waterways and customs unions would, it was hoped, foster Balkan unity while guarantees for the rights of minorities undercut nationalist agitation.
These changed ideas of the Balkan settlement reflected the new international situation after the end of the war. The collapse of German as well as Russian power in Europe seemed to obviate the need for a bloc to guard the European approaches to the Straits and Asia. The fixation with this security aspect of Balkan problems had provided a powerful incentive, now gone, for concessions to Bulgaria. On the other hand, the rising popular demands for the severest punishment of the major enemy power was a definite disincentive to attempting to placate a minor one. The attraction of the principle of nationality for British statesmen, if not all of their advisers, had always been utilitarian; and the end of the war relieved them of the necessity of giving it any further endorsement. It also relieved them of the prospect, now hardly less unwelcome, of wrangling with their Balkan allies. Rather, the convenience of accepting whatever the latter agreed among themselves gained belated recognition. The British could in any case take satisfaction in the fact that a great part of their Balkan program, that relating to the periphery, had already been realized, even as they had to recognize that this would not increase the readiness of Bulgaria’s neighbors to acquiesce in the rest of it.

It is therefore a tribute to the British desire for a just and lasting Balkan settlement that any concessions at all to Bulgaria could still be contemplated. However, none of them were fixed policy and the factors that had led to the scaling back of those concessions even before the Peace Conference began would still be operating in Paris. Two aspects in particular of official thinking about the Balkan settlement threatened what remained of the former British program for the region.

First of all, while the British were still trying to view the impending Balkan settlement, if not the wider Near Eastern settlement, as an interrelated whole, the tendency was becoming more and more manifest to see the various parts of both settlements as interchangeable. Despite Wilson’s strictures against bartering peoples and provinces and

\[137\] On the effect of the end of the war on the development of British policy toward national self-determination, see Calder, Britain, p. 213.
compromising claims, even those officials who most emphatically insisted upon the harmony of their recommendations with the Fourteen Points were wont to balance gains and losses, actual or potential, in one area with suitable adjustments in another. In British thinking, the satisfaction of Bulgarian aspirations had always been dependent on the broad realization of those of the Balkan Allies. That this approach made better psychological and political sense than Wilson's is perhaps not to be doubted, but the discussion of Greek claims in Smyrna and Thrace showed that while the principle of compensation was originally intended to work in Bulgaria's favor, it could also work to her disadvantage. The necessity of finding some "compensation" in the center for unfulfilled aspirations on the periphery could undermine the whole original idea of the settlement.

This was especially the case as the British program was still based on free acceptance by the Serbs, Rumanians and Greeks. The idea of coercing these allies to make concessions for the benefit of an enemy was naturally even more repugnant after than during the war, but the idea that they would now volunteer to surrender in the hour of victory what they had once been forced to part with in the hour of darkest defeat was hardly more credible. For the results of the war had strengthened the very forces in those countries which were least inclined to concessions to Bulgaria, were least interested in cooperation with her and were having difficulty cooperating even with each other. Britain, in any case, was not even going to propose schemes of settlement. There was still talk about the Peace Conference arbitrating disputes and, if necessary, imposing its decisions by force of arms. But the Conference was technically a preliminary, strictly inter-Allied gathering. Bulgaria would not even be represented, and there could be little doubt about the nature of any agreement which the Balkan Allies might come to insofar as Bulgaria was concerned. The expediency of accepting such an agreement ("the Balkans for the Balkan peoples") was nevertheless apparent to the British. Ever since August 1914, despite good intentions toward Bulgaria, Britain had been willing to
contemplate forcing concessions on her Christian neighbors only for the sake of carefully considered interests. During the war it had at least been clear where those interests lay, but after it ended British interests in the Balkans became more vague as they began to undergo a process of redefinition.

The Politics of Defeat

Both Malinoff and Stambolisky, each in his own way and with different results, had tried to end the war and get rid of Ferdinand and thereby gain popular and Allied support. The Armistice of Salonika and Ferdinand’s abdication had created a new political environment in which these were now the most important factors. For, though the monarchy survived, the debacle at least temporarily reduced the political role of the throne. Ferdinand’s successor, Boris III, although popular with the army, was only a young man and without political experience. The army itself, another potential contestant for power, was demoralized by defeat and rebellion and had to contend with Allied control.

For the first time since the days of Stamboloff, the party leaders thus had the field to themselves in a contest for the support of the still unsettled masses and the victorious Allies. The two were interrelated. The Allies were in a position to confer many benefits on their defeated enemy, and the perceived ability to obtain such benefits for the starving and still blockaded country was crucial to winning popular backing for any party. On the other hand, the ability to unite the country behind the Allies was key to gaining the latter’s goodwill since popular attitudes could still affect their planning and operations, especially while the war still lasted.\footnote{Letter from Chief of Staff to Minister of War, No. 11725, Sofia, September 30, 1918, BVI, III, 246-51; letter from Chief of Staff to Minister of War, No. 11729, Sofia, September 30, 1918, ibid., pp. 251-52.}

\footnote{For the effect of the ill will of Bulgarian railway personnel on Allied transport, see Report for December, 1918, AA, I, Iff.}

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occupied a central place in this nexus. The Allies could grant no greater favor than to recognize Bulgarian claims, and nothing could be expected to rally the people behind a political party better than the prospect that it would be able to induce them to do so. The final judgments would be pronounced at the Peace Conference and future elections, although it could only be expected that the outcome of the former would influence the latter more than the other way around.

Under these conditions, the leaders of the governing parties and Stambolisky each enjoyed the strength of their respective positions as rulers or outsiders. In the final analysis, they all threw themselves on the mercy of the Allies, but Stambolisky hoped, or at least professed to hope, to elicit the appropriate response by promising to change Bulgaria while the governing parties promised to restore order and combat "Bolshevism." After the expulsion of Ferdinand, the establishment parties accordingly had the advantage as long as the Allies were primarily interested in avoiding further domestic disturbances.

Malinoff strove to cooperate in every way with the occupation authorities. The latter were most immediately concerned about control of the railways inasmuch as Franchet was concentrating troops in Bulgaria for operations north of the Danube. However, the arrival of French troops in Sofia on October 8 and the establishment there of headquarters by General Chrétien as commander of the *Troupes Alliées d'Occupation en Bulgarie* facilitated political interaction between the government and the Allies. On

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140 On the Allies’ fixation with the Bolshevik threat at the end of their war, see Mayer, *Politics*, pp. 7ff.


142 Birman, “Kontrrevolyutsionnaya rol’,” p. 30; on these operations, see p. 107 above.

143 Birman, “Kontrrevolyutsionnaya rol’,” p. 30; Petsalis-Diomidis, *Greece*, p. 85; Chrétien formally assumed this command on October 26: “Ordre général No. 90,” October 22, 1918, *AF*, VIII (3), Annexes 3, 336; on October 24 the Allied occupation forces consisted of one French battalion at Sofia, the French 30th Infantry Division in northern Bulgaria, the British 228th Brigade along the Black Sea coast and one Italian battalion at Philippopolis: “Note concernant les troupes alliées d’occupation en Bulgarie,” October 24, 1918, *AF*, VIII (3), Annexes 3, 372..
October 17, Malinoff reconstructed his government and included an Agrarian and a Broad Socialist, undoubtedly hoping to broaden its popular base and impress the Allies with his ability to control the situation. But the change lacked much substance since the new members entered the government as individuals and not as representatives of their parties. Stambolisky, who seemed to harbor a special grudge against Malinoff, made known his opposition to Agrarian participation in his government through *Zemledelsko zname*, whose publication he continued to direct from hiding. Nevertheless, Malinoff’s strategy seemed to be paying off when in early November Franchet decided, after intercession by Chrétien, to allow some of the Bulgarian prisoners of war in Macedonia to return home.

Unfortunately, the release of prisoners of war probably only exacerbated the internal crisis. The economic situation was already bad, although not as bad as in Serbia and Rumania. With the blockade still in effect and the harvest extremely poor, it was impossible to replenish exhausted supplies of food, raw materials, and manufactured consumer goods through either imports or domestic production. The shortages were most keenly felt in the cities, where unemployment also grew as industry, which had become wholly oriented toward war needs, ground to a halt. Inflation continued unabated. The return home of soldiers and a flood of refugees from Macedonia and later the Dobruja made all these problems worse.

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144 *Balgarska akademiya na naukite, Istoryia, III, 36; Kazasov, Burni godini, p. 24; Khristov, Revolyutsionnata kriza, p. 342.*

145 *See, for example, “Pak za novoosnovane banki i druzhestva prez voinata,” Zemledelsko zname, November 19, 1918, p. 1; “Padna kabineta na bezvolieto i partizanshtinata,” ibid., November 29, 1918, p. 1; and “Koi igrae na dolno partizanstvo?,” ibid., December 31, 1918, p. 1.*

146 *Khristov, Revolyutsionnata kriza, pp. 368n., 404 and 406; Stambolisky’s rival Dragieff had been prepared to participate in the government as early as September 23: Damyanova, “Belezhnik-dnevnik,” p. 243; Daskaloff had made his way to Salonika, where he arrived on November 15: Tishev, D-r Raiko Daskalov, p. 90.*

147 *P. Stainov, “Sled primirieto,” Mir, November 9, 1918, p. 1.*

148 *Report for December 1918, AA, I, 1ff.*

149 *Balgarska akademiya na naukite, Istoryia, III, 31ff.; Khristov, Revolyutsionnata kriza, pp. 311ff.*
Protest meetings throughout the country demanded not only relief of the people’s immediate wants but the confiscation of war profits, the punishment of those guilty for the “national catastrophe” and amnesty for the participants in the late rebellion. Voices also began calling for the dissolution of the National Assembly and the holding of new elections. As Stambolisky pressed his attack against the establishment parties through the pages of Zemledelsko zname, their press urged everyone who called himself a Bulgarian to work with all his strength for the completion of the “sacred and pure task of unification.”

Under these conditions, Malinoff jumped at the chance in early November to complete the “unification” in the Dobruja. As has been seen, this attempt backfired. The French command, especially Berthelot, was more concerned about Rumanian than Bulgarian opinion. Malinoff resigned rather than comply with Franchet’s order on November 19 to evacuate not only the recently occupied Northern Dobruja but the Southern Dobruja as well. Stambolisky gloated at Malinoff’s fall and tried to take some of the credit. The Democrats tried to put the best face on the matter by claiming that if previous Bulgarian governments had acted the same way in similar situations, the country would certainly not be in its present plight.

After prolonged negotiations, Theodore Theodoroff of the National Party, Minister of Foreign Affairs in Malinoff’s reconstructed cabinet, managed to form a new
one on November 29. Theodoroff at least brought a new face to the helm, and he took care to include in his cabinet only personalities who could be presumed to be agreeable to the Allies. The Council of Ministers now included official representatives of the BZNS and all other parties in the former opposition bloc, and for the first time a civilian (the Democrat Liaptcheff) occupied the post of Minister of War. In the end, however, the Theodoroff government was compelled to give proof of Bulgaria’s loyalty to the Allies by evacuating the Dobruja.

Nor did the restructuring of the coalition lead to a halt in domestic political strife. Stambolisky seemed content to rely on constitutional methods once the appeal to violence had failed, perhaps because his nemesis Ferdinand had departed the scene. He expressed confidence that the BZNS would soon take power and looked forward to new elections, but he himself was still debarred from openly participating in politics because of his role in the rebellion. When the Agrarians reserved one of their three places in the new cabinet for him, the amnesty question thus became especially acute.

The BZNS and other parties of the Left wanted an amnesty for all military and political crimes connected with the war. The Agrarians thought such an amnesty should include both the politicians responsible for the war and participants in the rebellion, and they advocated it as a means of restoring calm to the country and healing the wounds of the past. Tsanko Bakaloff, who had been the lone Agrarian in Malinoff’s second

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159See p. 108 above.


government, declared that he had entered the cabinet to realize this and other measures for
the transition to peace, but the Democrats and Nationals still remained opposed.\footnote{Nie napılıno udobryavame," Zemledelsko zname, November 19, 1918, p. 1.}

The main issue in the amnesty debate was the rebellion, to which Stambolisky not
unnaturally gave the credit for driving out Ferdinand.\footnote{Zemledelsko zname, November 2, 1918, p. 3.} On November 20, the
Progressive Liberals came out in support of an amnesty, saying that the rebels "have
merits before the all-powerful arbiters of our national fate."\footnote{B. Vazov, "Velichaene na izmyanata i predatelstvoto," Mir, November 22, 1918, p. 1.} The Nationals, however,
decried the idea of amnestying "enemies of the fatherland," who by betraying their duty
had facilitated the country's fall, and denied that it would win the sympathy of Bulgaria's
arbiters.\footnote{B. Vazov, "Velichaene na izmyanata i predatelstvoto," Mir, November 22, 1918, p. 1.} After they came to power, the Nationals, to whom Stambolisky continued to
refer as "national bloodsuckers,"\footnote{"Platformata na bloka," Pryaporets, February 18, 1919, p. 1; Khristov, Revolyutsionnata kriza, pp. 342-43 and 406-07.} joined the Democrats in calling for the cessation of
party strife "at a time when all energies must be devoted to defending the rights of
Bulgaria before those who will decide the fate of the nations." They accused Zemledelsko
zname of continuing to preach partisan struggles and thinking only of Stambolisky and
not Bulgaria and charged that Stambolisky was perhaps thinking of new revolts and
Bolshevism instead of offering his services for a good peace.\footnote{"Ostavkata na kabineta," Pryaporets, November 25, 1918, p. 1; "Starite porochni politicheski
nravi v Bšlgariya," Zemledelsko zname, November 27, 1918, p. 1; "Mislete za Bšlgariya," Mir, December 2, 1918, p. 1.} Nevertheless, under
increasing pressure from his own coalition partners as well as the Narrows, Theodoroff
was finally compelled to give in. Shortly after the Assembly resumed its sessions on
November 29, the government introduced an amnesty bill, which passed at the beginning
of January.\footnote{Khristov, Revolyutsionnata kriza, p. 353.}
The amnesty controversy itself was part of the broader debate over who was best suited to govern Bulgaria at this critical period. Stambolisky attacked all the establishment parties for their roles in the country's successive catastrophes and blamed Liberal and Democratic politicians and not rebellious soldiers for the latest defeat. Ferdinand had disappeared but the instruments of his personal regime, "his pupils in this vicious political life," had not and true democracy was incomprehensible to them. New times must come and it was the Left which insisted on the new, while the Right stood for the old. This being the case, a government headed by Democrats and Nationals was most inconvenient for the task of coming to an agreement with Serbia and Greece, and the loss of the Dobruja was eloquent proof that relations with the Entente had deteriorated since the armistice.

Pryaporets (Democratic) and Mir (National), on the other hand, branded as harmful to the national interests the Agrarian thesis that the "old" Bulgaria did not deserve to be treated according to Wilsonian principles but must be wholly reborn before there could be any hope of brighter days; this was wrong as Bulgaria would be evaluated by the qualities and virtues which her people had shown during their short independent life. Both parties naturally laid all the sins of the past, especially the late war, on Ferdinand and Radoslavoff and proclaimed that the armistice had been followed by an

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172. "Dvete vâini," Zemledelsko zname, November 12, 1918, p. 1; the quote is from "Nai-noviyat kabinet," ibid., December 1, 1918, p. 1.


irreversible and sincere reversal in the country's foreign policy, based on the people's previously suppressed sympathies for the Western Powers. Pryaporets accordingly hoped that all good Bulgarians, especially those who repeated the charges of imperialism made by Bulgaria's neighbors, would take into account how much statements which went to support, even indirectly, the aspirations of enemies harmed the common cause.

In approaching the issue of the coming peace, the Democrats and Nationals, unlike the Agrarians, were at great pains to justify Bulgaria's role in the war and her immutable claims, explaining away the defeat. Bulgaria's neighbors, they claimed, were as much to blame as Ferdinand, for if Serbia, Greece and Rumania had recognized, or been forced to recognize, Bulgaria's just claims, the war would not have spread to the Balkans and might have ended much sooner. It was only by chance that they were on the Allied side and that Bulgaria was therefore tragically compelled to fight against the Western Powers. It was precisely their feelings for Britain and France that finally led the Bulgarian soldiers to refuse to fight any more, thus contributing to the Allied victory. Besides, Bulgaria had only been fighting for those lands her title to which had been recognized by the Ottoman government, international diplomacy and Allied statesmen themselves. Although no precise definition was now given to Bulgarian claims, they were said to be known to the Great Powers and to correspond completely to Wilson's Point XI. Attempts to deny


the reality of defeat even went so far as the claim that Bulgaria had ranged herself on the side of the Allies because they had decided under American pressure to recognize her rights. Bulgaria accordingly only insisted on the application of the principle of nationality. She did not envy her neighbors their unification and would not oppose it just because they would then be much larger than herself; she would be content to be unified and leave the balance in the Balkans to the Great Powers and the League of Nations.

However, solving the questions between the Balkan peoples in accordance with the Wilsonian program was not simply a matter of justice. For, it was in order to establish lasting peace in the Balkans and to create the basis for rapprochement and even federation among the Balkan peoples that Balkan problems had to be settled without prejudice. Britain, France and Italy were therefore called upon to play the role of arbiters and America that of superarbiter in dispensing impartial justice among all the Balkan peoples. This was all the more necessary since, just as Radoslavoff had once gone too far by saying that wherever a Bulgarian had set foot would remain Bulgarian, Bulgaria’s neighbors were now going too far by demanding that she be punished for her mistake and that the Fourteen Points not be applied to her; they insisted not only that she not be given even another scrap of territory but that parts of her territory be cut off. The Great

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183 Milne to Wilson, No. 1311 “I,” Salonika, November 16, 1918, F/47/7/51, LGP (transmitting a report by an “unbiased officer” who refers, inter alia, to the “somewhat insolent aplomb” of the Bulgarians; Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, directed this report to Lloyd George’s attention: Wilson to J. T. Davies, December 2, 1918, F/47/7/51, LGP); Report for December 1918, AA, I, 1ff.; Hrabak, “Stanje,” p. 35; Keserich, “George D. Herron,” pp. 44-45; Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, pp. 85-86.


Powers themselves were urged not to be swayed by feelings of revenge: Bulgaria had been punished enough and, even if she had not, it would not befit the Powers to inflict another injustice on her similar to that of 1878.\textsuperscript{188}

Adopting the language of Wilsonianism and Balkan federation, the Nationals and Democrats professed to believe that Bulgaria, having lost the war, could win the peace and refused to see any cause for undue alarm in the return to the 1913 boundary in Macedonia mandated by the armistice.\textsuperscript{189} They were positioning themselves to get the credit should the Peace Conference recognize Bulgarian aspirations; if not, they had already assigned the blame to Bulgaria's foreign enemies and own domestic agitators. The Agrarians, on the other hand, although claiming that their program corresponded to his ideals, did not make as much of a fetish out of Wilson\textsuperscript{190} and, perhaps wisely, made no predictions about the final peace terms. Stambolisky concentrated instead on attacking the establishment parties and the suitability of any of them to represent Bulgaria in the days ahead, thus laying the groundwork for making political capital in case of her aspirations' disappointment.

Under these circumstances, one of the main preoccupations of the Malinoff and Theodoroff governments was making sure Bulgaria's (i.e. their) voice reached the Allies and was not drowned out by her neighbors.\textsuperscript{191} Since the establishment of normal diplomatic relations, except with the United States, would have to await the formal conclusion of peace, the necessity of creating alternate channels of communication quickly became apparent. As early as October 10, \textit{Mir} pointed out the importance of this task:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{188} "Nashata zadacha," \textit{Mir}, October 10, 1918, p. 1; "Nepravi iskaniya," ibid., December 13, 1918, p. 1.
\item \textsuperscript{189} "Mirat," \textit{Pryaporets}, October 2, 1918, p. 1; "Nashata zadacha," \textit{Mir}, October 10, 1918, p. 1.
\item \textsuperscript{190} "Kuriozi," \textit{Zemledelsko zname}, November 20, 1918, pp. 1-3.
\item \textsuperscript{191} Report for December 1918, \textit{AA}, I, 1ff.
\end{itemize}
Now that we have expiated all that the Allies can consider a sin with the Armistice, we must elucidate with factual material the questions which separate us from the Greeks, Serbs and Rumanians in support of our just demands. Since peace has been reestablished, we can reestablish direct relations with the Entente states and send eminent statesmen and scholars to propagate our cause and counteract the deceptions of our neighbors during the last three years. The war of arms is over and the war of words with our small neighbors is just now beginning. We do not want to widen the chasm which separates us but to convince them too that harmony among the Balkan states is the condition of the future well-being of them all.  

A Bulgarian propaganda center in Switzerland began producing publications for Allied consumption on an extensive scale, and well known Ententophile political figures such as former prime minister Ivan Gueshoff lobbied abroad personally. Nevertheless, the arrival of the first civilian Allied representative, the Italian Baron Aliotti as "High Commissioner," was greeted with some relief at the end of December, as getting into contact with the Allied states was still seen as a top priority. It was hoped that other Allied journalists and diplomats would also come before the opening of the Peace Conference and inform themselves about Bulgaria's sincerity since the armistice and the true situation in the Balkans.

The Nationals and Democrats continued to see America as their salvation. Their party papers called unceasing attention to the great role in world affairs awaiting the Americans, whose sympathies for Bulgaria were not doubted, and to the growing power of Wilsonian ideals. They showed relatively little interest in France and Italy.

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Indeed, although Mir appeared convinced that at least some Allied soldiers in the Balkans had been won over to the Bulgarian cause, the experience with the French command had been disappointing. The attitude displayed by British leaders, on the other hand, was cause for considerable satisfaction. Both Pryaporets and Mir eagerly seized on statements by Lloyd George during the British election campaign about Britain giving an example of justice in the solution of the questions connected with the peace and about the spirit of revenge not being allowed to dictate its terms. Perhaps even more encouraging was Lord Robert Cecil’s statement in the House of Commons that the British government had undertaken no obligations with regard to the future distribution of Balkan territory and would not do so before the Peace Conference. Pryaporets saw it as proof that “... for the British prime minister and for all friends of the Balkan peoples the question of the future boundaries of the nations in Southeastern Europe has not been decided by military facts—it is open.” Its conclusion was that the banner of Wilson, under which all the wronged and oppressed peoples were gathering, “... is fortunately for mankind the banner of England as well...”

This confidence in the Anglo-Saxon sense of fair play was still tempered, however, by apprehension lest everything be decided by the preliminary inter-Allied conference and the final terms then imposed without the defeated states being given the chance to defend themselves at a general peace conference, a possibility raised in certain sections of the Allied press. Although the Nationals still professed to be expecting justice at the Peace Conference, a note of desperation had entered Mir’s commentary by the end of December:

... We are all awaiting with the greatest impatience the summoning of the inter-
Allied conference, which will open the doors to the general congress at which will
be sealed the great and just principles of humanity and civilization which we have
catched on to like drowning men. . . .

Indeed, the Peace Conference must have seemed, and not only to the Democrats and
Nationals, the last chance to salvage something from the wreck of the war. As has been
seen, their confidence in Britain was at this stage not entirely misplaced. Nor,
however, were their fears completely unjustified, fears whose realization would have just
as much impact on their conflict with their internal as with their external enemies.

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203 See pp. 114-125 above.
IV: ENTER LLOYD GEORGE

Clemenceau, as President of the Peace Conference, officially opened its labors during what was to be a rare plenary session on January 18 at the Palace of Versailles. Only delegations of the Allied and Associated Powers participated in its work, and even they were unequal in size and influence. Britain, France, Italy and the United States dominated the proceedings and had in fact already resumed sessions of their wartime Supreme Council six days earlier. Meeting first with their foreign ministers and Japanese representatives as the Council of Ten and later alone as the Council of Four, the leaders of these Great Powers had to grapple with a wide range of issues, and they almost at once began setting up a host of councils, commissions and committees to deal with them.

The question of peace with Germany was overriding, but aside from the terms to be offered her and the other enemy states, problems such as world-wide economic and financial reconstruction, emergency relief for vast areas of Europe and Asia, relations with the warring factions in Russia and armed clashes between rival claimants to numerous territories demanded urgent attention. Almost all of these issues were productive of varying degrees of conflict among the victorious powers great and small, and it was only after they had gone a fair way toward settling their own differences that they summoned the defeated powers one by one to receive the verdicts of their deliberations. The various treaties which embodied them featured territorial rearrangements, financial and other forms of reparation, disarmament and guarantees of the rights of national minorities. The new League of Nations buttressed the whole
framework, in a grand effort to create what the Allies considered a just and hoped would be a lasting peace.¹

Among the problems confronting the statesmen in Paris, the issue of national self-determination, especially in Eastern Europe, seemed most fundamental.² Long before the war was over, the Allies had recognized its centrality to the establishment of a just and lasting peace.³ As if to emphasize its importance, by the time the Peace Conference opened, conflicting national aspirations were already contributing to a situation bordering on chaos over large areas between the Baltic and the Aegean.⁴ President Wilson came to fear the results of the inevitable disappointment of many of the expectations that had been aroused.⁵ On January 24, at his proposal, the Supreme Council issued a public warning against the armed seizure of disputed territory, threatening to hold such action against the title of the offending claimant.⁶ This declaration produced little effect however, providing an early example of the Council’s lack of control over even small powers.⁷ The Peace Conference’s work was made no easier by the fact that some of the most acute territorial conflicts were between members of the Allied camp rather than between victors and vanquished.⁸

¹On the Paris Peace Conference in general, see Elcock, Portrait; Mayer, Politics; and Temperley, History; on organizational and procedural questions, see especially Marston, Peace Conference; on Britain’s role, see especially Dockrill and Goold, Peace.

²Mantoux, Carthaginian Peace, pp. 33ff.

³See pp. 27-29 above.


⁵Walworth, Wilson, p. 90.

⁶"Secretary's Notes . . .," January 24, 1919, FRUS, 1919, PPC, III, 715 (quoted in Spector, Rumania, pp. 79-81 [where the date is incorrectly given as January 25]); Walworth, Wilson, p. 91; two days earlier, Wilson had complained to the other members about actions by the Poles, Hungarians, Rumanians and Serbs, none directed against Bulgaria: "Procès-verbal . . .," January 22, 1919, FRUS, 1919, PPC, III, 673.

⁷Spector, Rumania, p. 81; Walworth, Wilson, p. 91.

For Britain, the Peace Conference was a major milestone on the way to exploiting her victory to assure peace and security for the Empire.\textsuperscript{9} In the Near East, as has been seen, the war had by no means altered the fundamental lines of her policy in this regard.\textsuperscript{10} Churchill, who was Secretary of State for War in Lloyd George's new Cabinet, was undoubtedly correct in noting, "Compared to Germany, Russia is minor: compared to Russia, Turkey is petty."\textsuperscript{11} But the fact remains that at the Peace Conference Britain proceeded to formalize her domination of the portions of Ottoman territory of strategic interest to her.\textsuperscript{12} She became the Sultan's chief heir only through the totally unexpected outcome of the war, which saw the defeat of both Germany and Russia, two of the other principal contenders for the Ottoman inheritance. Squaring the other Great Powers, who were her allies, proved relatively easy. In spite of difficulties over some of the details of the wartime agreements, neither France nor Italy contested Britain's claims in the Arab portions of the Ottoman Empire. The United States, on the other hand, represented a potentially considerable obstacle to the implementation of the secret agreements, which Wilson refused to recognize. The device of mandates under the auspices of the League of Nations, however, eventually satisfied the requirements of his New Diplomacy, and British control of the southern approaches to India was secured through the assignment of mandates for Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq.\textsuperscript{13}

Britain, of course, now also aspired to dominate the northern approach through Transcaucasia, access to which was afforded by the Straits.\textsuperscript{14} By a happy coincidence this policy, too, could be reconciled with Wilsonian principles. The assertion of self-

\textsuperscript{9}Medlicott, \textit{British Foreign Policy}, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{10}Medlicott, \textit{British Foreign Policy}, p. 46.

\textsuperscript{11}Churchill to Lloyd George, March 29, 1919 in Churchill, \textit{Aftermath}, pp. 377-78.

\textsuperscript{12}Clayton, \textit{Britain}, p. 20; P. Helmreich, \textit{From Paris}, pp. 12 and 324.

\textsuperscript{13}P. Helmreich, \textit{From Paris}, p. 14.

\textsuperscript{14}See p. 90 above.
determination by Russia’s border nationalities provided an ideal cover for the extension of British influence from the Baltic to the Caspian. After decades of attempting to check the expansion of the Russian Empire, one of the leitmotifs of Britain’s Russian policy in 1919 became the desire to break up that empire. This policy was completely independent of the result of the civil war then raging. In fact, Britain’s involvement in the effort to overthrow Bolshevik power, which was greater than that of any other foreign power, went hand in hand with a quest to exercise the dominant foreign influence over the various White regimes which were confidently expected to replace it. In its relations with White Russian leaders, one of the British government’s chief concerns was to induce the likes of Admiral Kolchak and General Denikin to recognize the aspirations of the border nationalities. In Transcaucasia, the influence of other Great Powers was also to be feared. The idea of mandates seemed applicable here too, especially in Armenia, and the General Staff was opposed to letting any power other than Britain, particularly France, have responsibilities in the region. In the meantime British troops were sent to occupy Batum, Baku and the railway in between.

As early as January 1919, however, it was becoming obvious to even the most ardent Imperialists that Britain would not be able to shoulder all the burdens associated with her extensive gains from the war. After the armistice with Germany there arose an immediate clamor for speedy demobilization, reinforced by mutinies among British troops in France and at home. The pressure of public opinion and the threat of a complete breakdown of discipline in the armed forces as well as the desire to be rid of ruinous war

15Mayer, Politics, pp. 308-09.
16Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations, II, 69, 86 and 147.

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expenditures compelled the government to rapidly disband the vast British war machine. This swift reduction in military power was not matched by a proportionate reduction in the demand for troops. The occupation of the Rhineland, intervention in Russia and troubles in Ireland, Egypt and India, not to mention the new responsibilities in the Near East, all made large calls on the country's dwindling military resources. Churchill warned his colleagues of the contradiction between the size of the aims of British policy and the shrinkage of her military strength, especially in the Near East, and urged that commitments be contracted and obligations selected.

Retrenchment was clearly necessary. Some of the more ambitious projects of the first exuberant days of victory had never commanded unreserved support in any case. Balfour, for example, had complained in early December that the General Staff was always pushing the gateways of India further west and had opposed a British role in the Caucasus. British forces were in fact almost immediately pulled out of Transcaspia, and in January 1919 it became one of the chief aims of British policy to place Armenia as well as the Straits under an American mandate as the most acceptable alternative to direct British control. When this failed and efforts to get the Italians to take her place proved equally vain, Britain eventually evacuated most of Transcaucasia by mid October 1919 and Batum too in July 1920.

The strain on British resources had its effect in other areas as well. In the Near East this was nowhere more true than at the Straits. Here the rapid decline in British strength added a new dimension to the persisting internal debate over the future of Constantinople and the American hesitation about accepting a mandate for the region.

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21Chaput, Disarmament, pp. 272-73.
Indeed, the General Staff felt that the expulsion of the Sultan from Constantinople would call for an increase rather than a decrease in British military power. Even if the United States received the mandate, something both the War Office and Admiralty opposed, the continuing importance of the Straits for access to Russia and the Caucasus and the need for a buffer between Europe and Britain’s newly expanded empire in the East would still require Britain to be in a position to defend her security interests in the region.  

The General Staff’s solution to the problem was to revive Britain’s traditional policy by leaving the Turks at Constantinople, bringing their rump state under her tutelage and thus acquiring a ready-made Turkish garrison in the Near East. Such an approach would have found a natural complement in the Balkan bloc. But Lloyd George, who was the British Empire’s chief plenipotentiary at the Peace Conference, was contemptuous of the opinions of experts, especially soldiers and diplomats. For him it was impossible to contemplate any settlement which would have left the Straits to be dominated by Turkish guns after the disastrous experiences of the war.

Lloyd George also had his own ideas about other aspects of the prospective settlement in the Near East, based upon his preconceptions about the peoples contending with each other in this region. After the war, he reverted to the historical British preoccupation with Russia and in Disraelian fashion feared her links with the Balkan Slavs:

... [T]he Teuton was largely done for. The nation he feared was the Slav, which was an incalculable factor, capable of following the instructions of a dictator or becoming Bolshevik. If some powerful, capable, ambitious man arose in Russia

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26 "The Strategic Importance of Constantinople to the British Empire," memorandum by the General Staff, December 12, 1918, E.C. 2824, CAB 27/39, PRO.

27 Craig and Gilbert, Diplomats, pp. 27ff.; Steiner, Foreign Office, p. 171; Seton-Watson and Seton-Watson, Making of a New Europe, p. 373.

28 Lloyd George, Truth, II, 1251-52.
the Slav race might become a great danger. Moreover, there was a very close feeling between Russia and the Southern Slavs. . . .

His Gladstonian sympathies were reserved for the Greeks, whom he regarded as a "rising" people. The Turks, on the other hand, he loathed as "barbarians" who had proven themselves "unreliable" as masters of the Straits.

Such views were largely in keeping with the traditions of his party, and they could not have failed to be known to his Greek counterpart. Venizelos was therefore undoubtedly confident of a sympathetic reception for his letter and memorandum to Lloyd George of November 2, 1918, in which he proposed, inter alia, the cession of Western Thrace to Greece. Indeed, Lloyd George later claimed that Venizelos' letter faithfully represented his own attitude toward Greek claims and compared the vistas which the war had opened out to Greece to those of the days of the Byzantine Empire. Indeed, by the end of the war his ideas on the future of the Turks seemed to have been fulfilled. With Russia still to be feared, it must have made good sense to him, with the Ottoman Empire virtually at an end, to cultivate the friendship and support the aspirations of the state which he believed would one day control the Eastern Mediterranean with its myriad islands. By strengthening Greece's strategic position in the Aegean, Britain could guarantee military and naval domination of the Straits (no matter what the actual fate of Constantinople), reinforce Imperial communications and at the same time prevent the domination of the Near East by any other Great Power. Rather, Britain's ascendancy would be assured through her traditional policy of indirect control. Only now, this

29"Notes of a Meeting . . .," June 6, 1919, FRUS, 1919, PPC, VI, 212.

30Churchill, Aftermath, p. 391; see also P. Helmreich, From Paris, p. 45; Jones, Lloyd George, p. 197; Lloyd George, Truth, II, 1002 and 1354 ff.; Mulligan, "Great Britain," p. 305; Nicolson, Curzon, pp. 95-96; Roskill, Hankey, II, 149 (diary entry for March 27, 1919); Rothwell, British War Aims, p. 126; M. L. Smith, Ionia Vision, p. 84; Walder, Chanak, pp. 66-67.

31Lloyd George, Truth, II, 1251.

32See pp. 111-112 above.

33Lloyd George, Truth, II, 1202 and 1232.
ascendancy would be even more secure than in the days of the unregenerate Ottoman Empire through friendship with a liberal and Christian Greece.\textsuperscript{34} In short, Lloyd George was now placing Britain's money on a different horse.

This approach, however, had the potential of totally displacing the idea of a bloc including Bulgaria as the basis of British policy in the Balkans. For Bulgaria could hardly be expected to reconcile herself to the loss of Western Thrace, and a Greece preoccupied with new territories in Asia Minor would need allies to cover her Balkan flank. It would, accordingly, be politically inexpedient as well as morally inconsistent to seek to reconcile Bulgaria with her other neighbors. There would in any case be even less chance of persuading Yugoslavia and Rumania to cede Bulgarian lands already in their possession if Greece was to acquire territory still in Bulgarian hands. In fact, a logical corollary to Lloyd George's approach to the Near East was the possession of Bulgarian irredenta by all her Christian neighbors.

\textit{The Other Players}

Nothing could be easier than getting the Balkan Allies to support such a policy. Indeed, it had that advantage. But Lloyd George, who seems to have kept his own counsel before the opening of the Peace Conference while making sure his hands remained untied,\textsuperscript{35} still had to bring at least some of the key members of his own delegation around to his standpoint and then get the delegations of the other Allied Great Powers to accept it.

\textit{The British Delegation}

Some members of the British Delegation might indeed have appeared to require some convincing. For, as has been seen, Greek claims by no means met with unreserved


\textsuperscript{35}See p. 96 above.
support in official circles. But things began to change once Lloyd George got a small
select group of colleagues and officials together in Paris where he and Venizelos could
work on them in the hothouse atmosphere of the Peace Conference. This was important
because Lloyd George, with much greater problems such as Germany and Russia to
occupy his time and attention, would have to leave many, if not most, of the minor issues
to less senior officials. Even junior members of the Delegation would have to shoulder
much of the day-to-day burden of pushing through the British program in the
commissions and committees of the Peace Conference. Moreover, the Bulgarian peace
treaty did not come up for final decision before its new supreme body, the Council of
Heads of Delegations, until after Lloyd George's own departure from Paris immediately
following the signature of the Treaty of Versailles with Germany on June 28.

In seeking to win his own countrymen over to support of Greek claims, Lloyd
George could count on not only Greece's contribution to Allied victory and Venizelos'
reputation but also a general tradition of British Philhellenism that had far deeper cultural
and historical roots than Bulgarophilism ever could. In the case of Greece, the impact of
a classical education on members of the British elite was often heightened by personal
visits to a country at once so inviting and so accessible to members of other sea-faring
governments. The political influence of British Philhellenism had declined since the days of
Byron and the Greek War of Independence, but the idea of supporting Hellenism as an
alternative to Ottoman and a counterweight to Slavic power had survived.

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36 On the organization of the British Delegation in general, see Dockrill and Steiner, "Foreign
Office," pp. 55-86; Goldstein, Winning, pp. 110ff.; and Marks, "Behind the Scenes," pp. 154-80; on the
role of the experts, see Kitsikis, Rôle, pp. 192ff.

37 For a contrary view, see M. L. Smith, Ionian Vision, p. 84, who considers the sympathy of
Balfour, Crowe and Nicolson for Greek aspirations as a given but not very important factor for the success
of Lloyd George's policy.

38 On these points, see Goldstein, Winning, p. 243; Lees-Milne, Nicolson, I, 219; Roskill, Hankey,
I, 42ff.

between Britain and Greece had nonetheless been cool in the years before the Great War and grew stormy during it as a result of King Constantine’s German sympathies. But the triumph of Venizelos and the performance of his army on the Macedonian Front now permitted unembarrassed expression to venerable sentiments.

The only other British plenipotentiary to play an important role in Near Eastern questions was Balfour. Lloyd George and he enjoyed good relations and he continued as Foreign Secretary in the new Cabinet. As such he was a member of the Council of Ten, later of the foreign ministers’ own Council of Five and later still, after Lloyd George returned to London, of the Council of Heads of Delegations. He therefore participated in the discussion and decision of most of the issues coming before the Conference. Balfour coupled a general sympathy for Bulgaria and support for the idea of a Balkan bloc with a keen appreciation of the claims of the Balkan Allies to the loyalty of the Allied Great Powers and their sensitivity to any suggestion of concessions to their mutual neighbor. During the war, at least, he saw the advantages of dictating a Balkan settlement, but at the Peace Conference he failed to even advocate the idea of a bloc let alone the imposition of a solution. Contemporary observers in fact commented on Balfour’s general lack of effectiveness at the Conference as compared with his knowledge of affairs.

One member of the Delegation who was already a safe bet to support Greek claims was Sir Maurice Hankey, the Secretary of the Cabinet, who became Secretary of

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40Hinsley, *British Foreign Policy*, p. 166.
41Leon, *Greece*, passim.
43See pp. 51 and 59-60 above; as early as 1904, when he was prime minister, Balfour had called the Bulgarians the only people in the Balkans with the makings of a nation in them: Monger, *End of Isolation*, p. 156.
the Delegation. He also continued his role as Secretary of the Supreme War Council by becoming the English-language secretary of the Supreme Council at the Conference. Officially he played no role in policy making, but he was privy to the most confidential discussions among the Allied leaders and probably spent more time in Lloyd George’s presence than any other member of the Delegation. Inevitably, his advice was proffered if not solicited, and Balfour may have been jealous of his role. During the war, he had been one of the earliest advocates of guaranteeing “fair play” to all the Balkan nations. But he had become infatuated with Greece and the Greeks early in his career as a Marine officer, and came under Venizelos’ spell long before the end of the war. He could thus provide Lloyd George with reinforcement, if any were required.

Lord Hardinge, the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office, was the “Organising Ambassador” of the Delegation. Although he admired Lloyd George for his dynamism, he considered the prime minister exceptionally ignorant of foreign lands. The latter had passed him over as the Delegation’s secretary in favor of Hankey, perhaps seeking to sidetrack him. Indeed, his relations with the government had been strained ever since a commission of inquiry had been critical of his role in the Mesopotamian campaign as Governor-General of India. Early in his career Hardinge had been the

45Nicolson, Peacemaking, p. 46; Roskill, Hankey, II, 48.
46Nicolson, Peacemaking, p. 109; Roskill, Hankey, II, 89.
48Roskill, Hankey, I, 42ff.
49Roskill, Hankey, I, 456; for Venizelos’ continuing effect after the war, see ibid., II, 143; for Hankey’s early support for Greek claims at the Peace Conference, see ibid., II, 72.
50Hardinge, Old Diplomacy, p. 230; Nicolson, Peacemaking, p. 46; Roskill, Hankey, II, 48.
51Hinsley, British Foreign Policy, p. 525; Hardinge, Old Diplomacy, p. 205.
52Roskill, Hankey, II, 24 and 47ff.
53Hardinge, Old Diplomacy, p. 215; Hinsley, British Foreign Policy, p. 525.
British representative in Sofia, and during the war he had been much more enthusiastic about bribing Bulgaria out of it than about getting Greece in. In his memoirs, he was bitterly critical of Lloyd George and the sway exercised over him by Venizelos, whom he acknowledged as in many ways by far the cleverest man at the Conference. Although he himself had recommended offering Eastern Thrace to Bulgaria late in the war, he denounced the idea of taking both Smyrna and especially Adrianople from Turkey for the benefit of Greece as ignorant and grotesque and standing in complete opposition to the advice of the Foreign Office. He must have been referring to his own advice for, as will be seen below, other Foreign Office officials in Paris did not share, or at least did not persist in, such views.

One of these was Sir Eyre Crowe, who was Balfour's right-hand man as chief of the Foreign Office contingent centered in the Delegation's Political Section. Before the war, he had been a rising star in the Foreign Office, dealing with both European and Near Eastern affairs. But he quarreled with other officials, including the elder Nicolson, and eventually even with Grey in the autumn of 1914. He was subsequently transferred from the all-important War Department to the Contraband Department. Although Hardinge did not like him, Crowe's career got back on track at the end of the war, perhaps due to the influence of Balfour, with whom he had close relations. He had shown some

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54 Hardinge, *Old Diplomacy*, pp. 33ff.
55 Hinsley, *British Foreign Policy*, p. 525; Rothwell, *British War Aims*, pp. 82, 142 and 218.
56 See p. 57 above.
60 Hinsley, *British Foreign Policy*, pp. 63, 518 and 538; Steiner, *Foreign Office*, p. 165.
61 Hinsley, *British Foreign Policy*, p. 525.
ambivalence about Greek claims before leaving for Paris, but the Peace Conference was a chance, perhaps his last, to fully reestablish his position within the Foreign Office by making himself indispensable. At any rate, although he was temperamentally opposed to Lloyd George, Crowe managed to avoid incurring his displeasure until the end of 1919. But he had himself already assumed leadership of the British Delegation from Balfour on September 18, and his later advancement does not appear to have suffered from his role in Paris.

Another who differed with Hardinge was the indefatigable Harold Nicolson. Although still a relatively junior official, he was part of the small Foreign Office team selected to go to Paris and became one of the workhorses of the Delegation. He continued to attract the attention of superiors. His idol Wilson had wanted to see him in London in December 1918, and Hankey later called him the best Foreign Office man on the Delegation. He also had close relations with Balfour and Crowe, who both eventually gave him a free hand. Although he found some of Lloyd George's ways exasperating, Nicolson's relations with him were easy-going. Even more importantly,

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63 See pp. 122-123 above.
64 See Steiner, Foreign Office, p. 166.
66 Walworth, Wilson, p. 461.
67 See Butler, "Beside the Point," p. 12.
68 For a comment on his prodigious output, see Hinsley, British Foreign Policy, p. 520.
69 Lees-Milne, Nicolson, I, 109ff.
70 Lees-Milne, Nicolson, I, 107.
73 Lees-Milne, Nicolson, I, 118; Seton-Watson and Seton-Watson, Making of a New Europe, p. 398.
the two soon recognized a common interest. For Nicolson was one of those for whom a love of the classics had turned into a love of Greece. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that before coming to Paris he had been acutely conscious of the danger of leaving Bulgaria dissatisfied.

Another junior official who had worked on Balkan affairs during the war and went to Paris was A. W. Leeper. Leeper had worked for the DIIB and went over to the PID in 1918. He had had direct responsibilities for Bulgaria but had been more uncompromising than Nicolson. He was opposed to any negotiations with the Bulgarian government about a separate peace and in August 1918 leaked information on the subject to Seton-Watson, to whom he was close and who was of a similar mind. Leeper also contributed to Seton-Watson's journal, *The New Europe*, under the pseudonym "Belisarius." Here he purveyed the view of the Bulgarians as "the Prussians of the Balkans," faulting both nations for arrogant contempt for other peoples, ruthless efficiency and even "worship of material progress." He did find a sane element in the Socialists and Agrarians but thought a just settlement must be predicated on Bulgaria restoring the territory seized during the war. While disclaiming any Allied desire to amputate "real" Bulgaria lands

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74 Lees-Milne, *Nicolson*, I, 118.


76 See pp. 60, 97 and 99 above; Rothwell, *British War Aims*, pp. 220 and 235.


79 Belisarius, "Bulgaria and Prussia," pp. 82-86; see also idem, "False and True Issues," pp. 247-51.

80 See Belisarius, "Bulgaria;" and idem, "New Bulgarian Government," pp. 4-5.

and proclaiming justice for all, Belisarius emphasized loyalty to the Balkan Allies and cautioned that the fruits of victory would rightly fall to those who helped win it.\(^{82}\)

Sir William Tyrrell, who had been closely identified with projects for a Balkan bloc, was also a member of the delegation.\(^{83}\) Tyrrell was another one of those with whom Crowe had quarreled and he himself had also quarreled with Sir Arthur Nicolson.\(^{84}\) An enmity likewise seems to have developed between him and Harold.\(^{85}\) More importantly, his work on the Polish commission was to show that he was not afraid to stand up to Lloyd George, but Tyrrell did not work on Near Eastern affairs at the Peace Conference.\(^{86}\)

The Great Power Delegations

The fact that Lloyd George had to win over his own subordinates was only due to the last-minute change in signals. He would in any case have had to contend with the other Allied Great Powers, each with its own ideas about and interests in the Near Eastern settlement.

The United States

The American Commission to Negotiate Peace (ACTNP), led by President Wilson himself, was expected to play a leading, if not predominant role in the negotiation of the various peace treaties. After the armistices, the United States was not merely the creditor of her British, French, Italian and other associates, but was also the only power of any significance whose human and material resources had not been exhausted by the war. It seemed that the countries of Europe, Allied and enemy alike, would be dependent on

\(^{82}\)See Belisarius, "Bulgaria;" idem, "Sidelights;" idem, "False and True Issues;" and idem, "New Bulgarian Government."

\(^{83}\)See pp. 45-57 above; Rothwell, British War Aims, pp. 42 and 118; in 1918, however, he opposed a separate peace with Bulgaria as stupid and immoral: Keserich, "Herron," p. 43.

\(^{84}\)Hinsley, British Foreign Policy, pp. 52-53 and 63.

\(^{85}\)It is not clear when this occurred: Lees-Milne, Nicolson, I, 227.

\(^{86}\)On Lloyd George and the Polish commission, see p. 291 below.
American capital for the restoration of their war-shattered economies, and large parts of the continent were already dependent on American grain for their daily bread. As the vast armies melted away, American economic might could well become the determining factor in international relations.⁸⁷

To the extent that the British were determined to cooperate with the Americans, this situation could be to their advantage, something the British Delegation was not slow to realize. Close contacts in fact quickly developed between the British and American experts with the encouragement of both Wilson and Lloyd George.⁸⁸ Wilson at one point remarked that Lloyd George was better acquainted than himself with the views of his own advisers.⁸⁹

The British, of course, were already familiar with American ideas on the Near East through Wilson's Fourteen Points and House's commentary⁹⁰ and had to assume they were unchanged coming into the Peace Conference. Like Britain, the United States had begun formulating its views on the peace long before the war ended. In the autumn of 1917, Wilson created an organization, known simply as The Inquiry, to collect data and make recommendations on the myriad problems of a future settlement. One of its first tasks was to help Wilson prepare for his Fourteen Points Speech. In December 1918, The Inquiry, its staff largely composed of American scholars, was incorporated into the Division of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence of the ACTNP.⁹¹

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⁸⁸Headlam-Morley, Memoir, p. 18; Nicolson, Peacemaking, pp. 105-07 and 221ff. (diary); Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, pp. 121-22; Tillman, Anglo-American Relations, pp. 76-77 and 212; Walworth, Wilson, pp. 92-93.

⁸⁹Walworth, Wilson, p. 278.

⁹⁰See pp. 100-100 above.

⁹¹Drake, "Bulgaria," pp. 52ff.; Gelfand, Inquiry, passim and p. 183; on The Inquiry and American preparations for the Peace Conference in general, see Gelfand, Inquiry; and Goldstein, Winning, pp. 99ff.
Before the Peace Conference, the Americans took much the same approach to Near Eastern problems as the British. They favored international control of the Straits, while leaving open the question of Turkish sovereignty at Constantinople, and of predominantly Greek areas on the coast of Anatolia, perhaps with Greece as mandatory. In the Balkans, they believed that no just or lasting settlement could be based on the arbitrary Treaty of Bucarest of 1913. The final recommendations of the American experts at Paris, submitted on January 21, followed this line. In regard to Bulgaria, they called for cession of a modified Enos-Midia line, restoration of the Southern Dobruja and retention of the Serbian-Bulgarian border as it was before the Balkan Wars, and they explicitly opposed cutting Bulgaria off from the Aegean for the sake of a “shallow fringe of Greeks along the coast.” They believed a settlement of the Macedonian problem could be found in accord with the frontiers established in 1913 through the establishment of a federated Yugoslav state. Moreover, American Protestant missionaries in Bulgaria, who had been influential in preventing an American declaration of war against her, continued to lobby on her behalf in Paris.

Instead of cooperation, the British therefore had to expect American opposition to much of their Near Eastern program, especially as it touched Bulgaria, once they themselves had changed front. At that point, in late January, the differences related to

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96 Hall, Puritans, p. 263; see also Ostrander, Woodruff and King to Wilson, December 11, 1918, in Mikhailov, Spomeni, p. 339 (Bulgarian translation).
Thrace and, to a lesser extent, Bulgaria’s frontier with Serbia, but divergence soon emerged over the Southern Dobruja as well. Moreover, Wilson’s remark in April that it was not reasonable to have one basis of peace with Germany and another for peace with Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey showed the potential for a clash between Britain and the United States over the binding nature of the Fourteen Points.  

Italy

American opposition would be serious enough in itself, but the British position was not made any easier by the fact that on Bulgarian questions, at least, the Americans could expect Italian support. This was not due to any particular devotion to Wilsonian principles. On the contrary, Italy’s chief plenipotentiaries until June 1919, Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando and Minister of Foreign Affairs Baron Sidney Sonnino, were determined to secure the fulfillment of some of the very secret agreements which Wilson so vehemently denounced. Indeed, the struggle which developed between them and the American President over the Treaty of London and Fiume, during which Wilson made the statement about the bases of peace cited above, became one of the epics of the Peace Conference.

By the time the Conference began, Italian irredentist passions were running high and political necessity drove Orlando and Sonnino to stubbornly demand what had been promised during the war and even what had not, notably the Adriatic port of Fiume. The origins of their policy, however, were strategic. In the Eastern Mediterranean, they sought to preserve an equilibrium. Any extensions of British or French control must be balanced by concomitant Italian gains. But these two Great Powers were not Italy’s only rivals in the region. Greece too aspired to play a major role there after the collapse of the

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97Lloyd George, Truth, II, 812; Gelfand, Inquiry, p. 320; Walworth, Wilson, p. 343.

98See Albrecht-Carrié, Italy, passim; Lederer, Yugoslavia, passim; and Walworth, Wilson, pp. 49ff.

99Lowe and Marzari, Italian Foreign Policy, p. 164.
Ottoman Empire, and her claims were in direct conflict with the pledges Italy had obtained from Britain and France during the war, especially regarding Smyrna and the Dodecanese. The presence of native Greek elements, but not Italian, in the areas claimed by the two countries only enhanced the potential threat to Italy's position.

Italy also had ambitions closer to home. Orlando and Sonnino were particularly anxious to secure their country against what during the war had seemed the inevitable growth of either Austrian or Russian power by obtaining a defensible frontier in the north and naval control of the Adriatic. This brought Italy into conflict again with Greece over Albania in Northern Epirus and even more sharply with Yugoslavia (and Wilson) over Fiume and Dalmatia. For the Italian plenipotentiaries still feared a rival power in the Adriatic and saw in Yugoslavia a successor to Austria-Hungary in that respect. On their part, Britain and France were willing to honor the wartime treaty but wanted Italy to chose between the Treaty of London line in the Adriatic or Fiume, which had not been part of that bargain. This is precisely what she refused to do; and since Britain and France also refused to recognize the Saint Jean de Maurienne Agreement (because Russia had not acceded to it), Italy never did obtain complete satisfaction of her claims in the Adriatic, Fiume or Asia Minor.

Being in dispute with both Yugoslavia and Greece, Italy not unnaturally supported their common foe, Bulgaria. Sonnino even admitted this in the Council of Four. From

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100See p. 32 above.


104Lowe and Marzari, *Italian Foreign Policy*, p. 165.


106See p. 32 above.

107Albrecht-Carrié, *Italy*, p. 476 (extract from English translation of diary of Count Luigi Aldrovandi for April 20, 1919); "Conversation entre MM. le Président Wilson, Clemenceau, Lloyd George, 159
Sofia, British officers reported that the Italians there regarded themselves as watchdogs for Bulgarian interests and assumed that they were aiming at securing the sympathy and support of Bulgaria in order to strengthen their position vis-à-vis Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{108} The War Office claimed to be in possession of secret and positive evidence of direct attempts by Bulgaria to secretly establish friendly relations with Italy, attempts which the latter was encouraging.\textsuperscript{109} More public evidence of such a tendency was not lacking. On Christmas Day 1918, Baron Aliotti arrived in Sofia as the first civilian representative of the Allied Powers. Aliotti styled himself “High Commissioner” and was not loath to accept the hospitality of King Boris, who was still technically an enemy monarch.\textsuperscript{110} Shortly after the baron’s arrival, an “Italo-Bulgarian Society” was established for the purpose of developing relations between the two countries. The Italians also made special efforts to win contracts for the supplies which Bulgaria so badly needed.\textsuperscript{111}

The British did not take Italian intrigues in themselves very seriously, believing that the Italo-Bulgarian rapprochement gave no promise of a “fruitful” future.\textsuperscript{112} It was obvious, however, that Italy would oppose Greek and Yugoslav claims in Bulgaria as elsewhere. By supporting Bulgaria, Italy would gain an ally in the confidence that whichever way the decisions of the Peace Conference went on the conflicting claims of Bulgaria and her western and southern neighbors, the enmity between them would still


\textsuperscript{109}Proposed telegram from Director of Military Intelligence to Napier, enclosed with DMI to Under-Secretary of State, 14/940, January 10, 1919, W19/6558/6558, FO 371/3586, PRO.

\textsuperscript{110}Sir Harry Lamb to Sir George Clerk, Sofia, February 19, 1919, W19/38536/12486, FO 371/3588, PRO (also in 81/1/9/4415, FO 608/32, PRO).

\textsuperscript{111}Lamb to Curzon, No. 2, Sofia, February 21, 1919, W19/39496/12486, FO 371/3588, PRO.

\textsuperscript{112}Minute by A. Leeper, March 17, 1919, 81/1/9/4415, FO 608/32, PRO.
remain. There was, however, more than a little irony in Italy’s support for Bulgaria since Italian claims in Dalmatia and Albania had forced Serbia and Greece to focus on Macedonia during the Balkan Wars and complicated the Entente’s efforts to persuade them to make concessions to Bulgaria during the Great War. Things stood differently as regards Rumania. The Italians, unlike the British, did not contest the validity of their 1916 treaty with that state, fearful lest its disavowal adversely affect her own secret treaty. Moreover, the Rumanians too were in conflict with Yugoslavia, over the Banat, and there was the possibility of winning these fellow Latins as allies against the Yugoslavs. On February 1, Orlando, wishing to prevent Italy’s own claims from being subject to examination by subordinate officials, only agreed to have Rumanian claims referred to an expert commission on condition that it would not be considered a precedent. This would not, of course, prevent the Italian experts on the commission from maintaining their interpretation of the Allies’ obligations toward Rumania.

France

The main preoccupation of Clemenceau at the Peace Conference, as for the previous half century, was Germany and French security on the Rhine. The other French plenipotentiaries, such as Minister of Foreign Affairs Stéphen Pichon and Marshal Ferdinand Foch, shared this outlook, and they had the even more irreconcilable President Poincaré looking over their shoulders. None of these men showed any enthusiasm for the Fourteen Points, and Clemenceau entered into bitter controversy with Wilson and Lloyd George about France’s desire to separate the Rhineland from Germany.


114Albrecht-Carrié, Italy, p. 105; Spector, Rumania, pp. 55, 88-89 and 94-95; Temperley, History, IV, 227; see also p. 189 below.

115Elcock, Portrait, passim; Hovi, Cordon Sanitaire, pp. 31ff.; Néré, Foreign Policy, pp. 11ff.; Walworth, Wilson, passim.
French security interests extended beyond the Rhine however. By the end of the war, the idea had taken shape of forming the emerging nations of Eastern Europe into a “Barrière de l'Est” to replace Russia, who under the Bolsheviks now herself seemed a threat, as allies against Germany and to prevent German-Bolshevik cooperation from robbing France of the fruits of victory in the west. In the Balkans, Rumania was to play an especially important role. After the conclusion of the wartime Treaty of Bucarest, France had assured Rumania that she would keep the promises made in 1916. The new Yugoslavia could also play a part in this scheme, but concern about Italy made support for her more problematic. On the one hand, Italy was a more important ally against Germany. On the other, France was traditionally apprehensive of a strong Italy and was bound to oppose any undue strengthening of the Italian position either in Europe or further east.

France’s fixation on Germany placed her policy in the Near East at a disadvantage. For Clemenceau, who in any case had little interest in the East, was determined to preserve the alliance with Britain and willing to make sacrifices in order to obtain a favorable European settlement. France, of course, wanted her fair share of the spoils, as specified in the wartime agreements, in any solution of the Eastern Question. She had strong emotional and historical links to certain areas of the Ottoman Empire such as Syria and her cultural influence was felt through the Near East. More concretely, French investors were the Sultan's principal foreign creditors. France was thus a potential rival of Britain in respect of the Ottoman domains, but Clemenceau really only made a

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116 Hovi, Cordon Sanitaire, pp. 71ff. and 144ff.
117 Hovi, Cordon Sanitaire, pp. 75ff.
118 Hovi, Cordon Sanitaire, p. 111; Spector, Rumania, p. 55; see also Hovi, Cordon Sanitaire, pp. 177-78.
120 Albrecht-Carrié, Italy, p. 113; Vinaver, “Ugrožavanje,” pp. 131ff.
stand on the question of Syria and was otherwise relatively accommodating to British desires.  

France's attitude toward the claims of Greece, however, was colored by the fact that she had at one time hoped to make that country the instrument of her own policy in the Near East in much the same way as Lloyd George now did. This was one of the factors which had made the French so keen on the Salonika expedition and so willing to meddle in Greek internal affairs during the war. Yet they had only succeeded in alienating the Greeks through their tactics leading up to the ejection of King Constantine, and they now tended to look on Greece as the tool of Britain. But Italian claims, only vaguely spelled out in the Treaty of London for Asia Minor, also entered into the equation, and blocking Italy in that region eventually proved more attractive to France than spiting Greece.

After the war, the position of the French in the Balkans was actually stronger than in the Ottoman Empire, where their own territorial claims were. For they had the advantage of the presence, initially at least, of appreciable numbers of their own troops and, more importantly, the exercise of the Allied command. The British as well as the Italians had cause to complain of the blatantly pro-French manner in which Franchet performed his duties. British representatives in Bulgaria even thought they detected signs that France was competing with Italy for favor there. The French command, however, was probably just trying to counter Italian intrigues against Yugoslavia, and, in Bulgaria at least, London was content to leave the French in control. When, at the end of

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125Sir Harry Lamb to Sir George Clerk, Sofia, February 19, 1919, W19/38536/12486, FO 371/3588, PRO (also in 81/1/9/4415, FO 608/32, PRO).
1918, the French command ordered the Italian occupation contingent in Bulgaria to move its headquarters from Sofia to the northwestern part of the country, Whitehall did not object. The Italians were much upset however and rejoined with a proposal to change the system of Allied control by conferring equal status on the three Allied commanders in Bulgaria. This was rejected in London as being “open to grave objection.”

The French attitude toward Bulgaria was probably best symbolized by the fact that Franchet, unlike Aliotti, refused to visit King Boris as long as the state of war existed. For if there was one thing the French understood, it was mistrust of one’s enemy. Herself adamantly opposed to concessions to Germany fearing they would only be taken as signs of weakness, France could sympathize with the attitude of the Balkan Allies toward Bulgaria. Indeed, in July 1918 Pichon had called Bulgaria an inveterate aggressor who could be taught the ways of peace only by crushing defeat. The work of the Comité d’études, the French version of The Inquiry, was very much in this spirit. Replete with references to Bulgarian strivings for hegemony in the Balkans, its reports recommended against concessions to her in either Macedonia or the Dobruja and suggested consideration of Serbian claims to a great part of eastern Bulgaria. The Comité made

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127Azan, Franchet, p. 242.

128On French distrust of Germany, see Clemenceau’s statement on the futility of trying to placate her in “Notes...” June 2, 1919, FRUS, 1919, PPC, VI, 142; Néré, Foreign Policy, p. 23; and Wandycz, France, p. 44.

129Rothwell, British War Aims, p. 219; on French suspicion of Bulgaria, see French Ambassador (Jusserand) to Secretary of State, Washington, November 29, 1918, with enclosure, FRUS, 1919, PPC, I, 365-71 (also in Baker, Woodrow Wilson, III, 55-63; and quoted in Albrecht-Carrié, Italy, p. 75); see also Churchill, Aftermath, pp. 115-16.

no recommendations regarding Thrace beyond the attribution of a portion excluding Adrianople to an international state at the Straits\textsuperscript{131} and favored the cession of the Aegean Islands and Smyrna with a small zone around it to Greece.\textsuperscript{132}

The British Delegation could therefore expect general French support for the claims of the Balkan Allies against Bulgaria but opposition from the United States and Italy (except in relation to Rumania).

Venizelos

Philhellenism could provide only part of the foundation for the success of Greece’s claims, whether in Bulgaria or elsewhere. Much would depend on the skills of her chief plenipotentiary. Venizelos had already doggedly pursued the opportunity which the war had provided to make himself and his country useful to Britain and her allies and which had already borne fruit in the mind of Lloyd George. The Peace Conference now gave him the opportunity to bring to bear on an international Areopagus all the force of his personal magnetism, powers of advocacy and adroitness in exploiting the weaknesses and mutual antagonisms of his opponents in the attempt to gain sanction for his version of the \textit{Megali Idhea}.

Numerous participants and other contemporary observers have testified to the extraordinary prestige and influence which Venizelos enjoyed at the Peace Conference out of all proportion to the strength of his country.\textsuperscript{133} Churchill thought he occupied a position almost equal with that of the leaders of the greatest of the victorious states.\textsuperscript{134}

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{131}A. Damangeoni, “Formation territoriale d’un état international des Détroits,” France, Comité d’études, \textit{Travaux}, II, 753ff.
\item \textsuperscript{134}Churchill, \textit{Aftermath}, p. 383; Walworth, \textit{Wilson}, p. 61.
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Venizelos won Wilson's sympathy, if not unreserved backing, during their first meeting on December 16 in Paris by tactfully showing more interest in discussing the League of Nations than Greek claims. Clemenceau said of him, "Ulysses n'était qu'un petit garçon à coté de lui." Venizelos devoted himself to cultivating delegates low as well as high. Even fourteen years later, Nicolson had not entirely freed himself from the effects of supping and partying in Paris with the great man. While believing in retrospect that Venizelos was an "imperialist" and that the Greek's confidence in his own country was probably misplaced, he still saw "a man humane above all others, an intelligence always ready for the assault, a gentleness almost virulent in its applicability." At the time of the Conference itself, Nicolson wrote his father, "I can't tell you the position that Venizelos has here! He and Lenin are the only two really great men in Europe." Even Hardinge called him "almost the cleverest statesman in Europe."

Some came to be wary of Venizelos' charm and to believe his influence harmful, and he himself was wise enough to realize the dangers of overdoing it. But Venizelos was not all charm. He realized that the Great Powers were exhausted by the war. While they were demobilizing, he took advantage of the enthusiasm in Greece

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135See "Diary of Josephus Daniels," PWW, LV, 266-67 (entry for February 25, 1919); "Remarks to Members of the Democratic National Committee," ibid., pp. 309-24 (Wilson's expression of affection and admiration for Venizelos is on p. 315); Dillon, Inside Story, pp. 74-75; Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, pp. 115-16; and Walworth, Wilson, p. 61.

136Walworth, Wilson, p. 61 n. 111.

137Dillon, Inside Story, p. 74; Walworth, Wilson, p. 61.


139Nicolson, Peacemaking, p. 271 (diary entry for February 25, 1919); see also ibid., p. 251 (diary entry for January 28, 1919).

140Hardinge, Old Diplomacy, p. 246.

141Bonsal, Suitors, pp. 175ff. (diary entries for December 4, 1918 and January 22, 1919); Lansing, Big Four, pp. 142ff.; in 1963 Charles Seymour made a marginal note on his letter of December 20, 1918 cited above: "Venizelos--'Moderation' !!?": Seymour, Letters, p. 56n.

142Walworth, Wilson, p. 61 n. 110.

143Gibbons, Venizelos, p. 354.
over the victory to have another class of conscripts called to the colors and actually increase Greek forces by two divisions. He wanted to go to Paris with the most efficient fighting force in the Near East, and he intended to use it.\textsuperscript{144} This could only increase his influence with the Supreme Council since the Greeks appeared to be the only ones ready to do anything. His first step was to send a contingent to Odessa in January to assist the French in their intervention in South Russia. Although the whole expedition was soon withdrawn, he had already secured Clemenceau’s support for Greek claims in Thrace and, to a lesser extent, Smyrna.\textsuperscript{145}

Even before the Peace Conference was fairly under way Venizelos had accordingly made substantial progress in securing American and French, not to speak of British, support. He was less successful with the Italians. In 1916 Italy had in fact sought to frustrate Allied efforts to put Venizelos back in power, fearing Greece’s entry into the war and consequent claim to a share in the spoils.\textsuperscript{146} In his campaign to win support in Western Europe for Greek aspirations, Venizelos had sought to come to an agreement with Sonnino in Rome in early December 1918. The latter, however, preferred to keep his hands free for the Peace Conference, where Italy’s status as a Great Power and her treaty rights would put her in a strong position. But Italy’s advantages over her smaller rival were not as great as they appeared: Britain and France contested the validity of the Saint Jean de Maurienne Agreement on the Smyrna region and refused to let Italy occupy the areas in Asia Minor she coveted; Greece’s campaign on behalf of her own claims grew ever more intense; and Italy would need all the support she could get in the duel over Fiume. Negotiations were therefore resumed in Paris later in December, on Italian initiative. This time Venizelos refused an agreement, deciding that in the atmosphere


\textsuperscript{146}Leon, \textit{Greece}, 372.
developing over Fiume more could be gained by leaving his case in the hands of the Conference than by treating directly with Italy. The British were of course kept informed of these conversations.

Greece's principal disadvantage at the start of the Conference was the fact that unlike Serbia and Rumania she was not at that time in occupation of any of the territory which Venizelos claimed. Repeated efforts by Greece to join the Allied occupation of Western Thrace failed, and she was finally allowed to send only one battalion to Eastern Thrace to guard a section of railway. Venizelos was much more successful in Asia Minor, where Greek claims ran into American as well as Italian opposition at the Peace Conference. Indeed, Italy had begun asserting her own claims in Asia Minor by landing troops there after the beginning of the Conference without the assent of the other Allied Great Powers. His negotiations with the Italians already stalemated, Venizelos turned to the Americans in order to secure at least diplomatic progress for Greece in that region. Venizelos tackled Wilson himself as soon as the latter returned to Paris from a visit to America on March 14, and the ACTNP in fact soon became much more accommodating toward Greek claims there. Lloyd George was then able to make

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149 Petsalis-Diomidis, *Greece*, pp. 91ff.; in early May both the Foreign Office and War Office opposed giving Greece permission to immediately occupy Eastern and Western Thrace as likely to lead to serious trouble in Bulgaria and perhaps Turkey as well: Director of Military Intelligence (Thwaites) to Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 15/1159 (M.I.2), London, May 6, 1919, 385/4/2/10130, FO 608/118, PRO; Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Graham) to Director of Military Intelligence, London, May 14, 1919, ibid.; Nicolson presumed that the Greeks would be allowed to occupy these territories as soon as the Council had come to a decision as to their attribution (i.e., to Greece): minute by Nicolson, May 19, 1919, ibid.


153 See p. 206 below.
adroit use of Wilson’s indignation over Italian claims in the Adriatic and the general annoyance caused by Italy’s unilateral actions in Asia Minor to secure a foothold there for Greece. On May 6, during Orlando’s temporary absence, the Supreme Council accepted Lloyd George’s proposal to forestall anticipated Italian action at Smyrna by allowing Greece to land troops there.154

By this time even Nicolson was beginning to have some doubts about Greek expansion in Asia Minor, but Lloyd George brushed all protests aside.155 Indeed, he was now conceiving a Greece encircling the Aegean, commanding the Straits and including even Constantinople and Cyprus.156 Three days after the Council’s decision, Lloyd George and Venizelos dined together, and the Greek prime minister recorded some of his British counterpart’s remarks:

Greece has great possibilities in the Near East and you must be as powerful as possible in the military sense in order to take advantage of them. We are trying to get America to take the mandate for Constantinople, and her presence there will in no way prevent Constantinople from coming under Greek sovereignty in the fullness of time. President Wilson is not against the idea, but he doubts whether American public opinion and therefore the Senate will approve it. If they don’t approve it the only solution which England will accept for Constantinople is for it to go to Greece.157

The Greek landing at Smyrna took place on the morning of May 15 amid assurances that it would in no way prejudice the final decision of the Peace Conference as to the city’s fate.158 The dissatisfaction of some of Lloyd George’s colleagues with his Turkish policy


155Nicolson, Peacemaking, p. 335 (diary entry for May 13, 1919); M. L. Smith, Ionian Vision, pp. 76 and 83-84; Hankey soon did also: Roskill, Hankey, II, 88-89.

156M. L. Smith, Ionian Vision, p. 84.


led to a stormy special meeting of the Cabinet in Paris on May 19, but it was already too late to turn back in Asia Minor.159

**The End of the Balkan Bloc**

The adoption of the Greek cause by the British Delegation was paralleled by, in fact intimately connected with, a change in attitude toward Bulgarian claims. On January 2, the PID outlined and evaluated the various alternatives for the territorial settlement at the Straits and in Thrace in a paper which went to Lloyd George but was apparently not available to Curzon's committee. On the question of the conflicting Greek and Bulgarian claims in Thrace, they at last took a definite stand which represented a compromise between the views hitherto expressed.160 After asserting that the best solution to the Straits problem would be for a zone to be separated entirely from Turkey and formed into an independent state as a League of Nations mandate, the experts recommended that Eastern Thrace outside that state be assigned to Greece.

The international record of Bulgaria, and the fact that the population of Eastern Thrace is almost entirely Greek, Turkish, Jewish, and Armenian, with no more than a few Bulgar villages close to the northern frontier, rules out Bulgaria as a claimant.

Greece was seen as the only other possible claimant (Turkey being pushed out of Europe altogether with the creation of the Straits mandate), and since the whole of Eastern Thrace up to the Bulair and Chatalja lines (as opposed to the Enos-Midia line) could be considered a geographical and administrative whole, it could be assigned to Greece as it stood. But in return, Greece "should be induced to renounce her claims to Smyrna," an exchange of populations being foreseen for the Turkish inhabitants of Eastern Thrace and

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160 See pp. 115-124 above.

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the Greek of western Asia Minor. Moreover, Eastern Thrace would form “an island like Crete” as far as Greece was concerned.

... The claim to Western Thrace should be resisted strongly, since there are few Greeks in Western Thrace (the bulk of the population being Turkish or Bulgarian-speaking Moslems), while (what is still more serious) the assignment of this corridor to Greece would cut off Bulgaria territorially from the Aegean.

While noting Venizelos’ reported willingness to make Dedeagach, Porto Lagos and even Kavalla and Salonika free ports for Bulgaria, the PID still felt that if Western Thrace went to Greece, Bulgaria would be too much at her mercy and would never forget that she herself once had direct access to the Aegean. The memorandum then went on to consider the difficulties in drawing a defensible frontier if Greek strategic claims for contiguity with Eastern Thrace were in fact satisfied in view of Bulgaria’s “record.”

The settlement advocated by the PID was still compatible with the Balkan bloc. Indeed, the desire to effect a permanent pacification and reconciliation of the Balkan peoples on the basis of reasonable compromises of national aspirations found expression in the Peace Handbooks now provided to the British Delegation. The intentions of the Delegation’s experts followed the same line during their first three weeks in Paris.

That close cooperation with the Americans which the Foreign Office had foreseen and counted on began practically before the delegations had unpacked their bags. On January 6, Nicolson and Leeper sought out their American counterparts, Professors Clive Day, Charles Seymour and Albert Lybyer, all former members of The Inquiry. Although the discussion did not get down to details, Nicolson had the “feeling, however,

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161 The “international record of Bulgaria” is apparently a reference to her attacks on her neighbors in 1913 and 1915; for Foreign Office views on the ethnography of Thrace, see p. 56 above; “Memorandum on the Alternative Territorial Settlements in Thrace and the Straits,” PID, January 2, 1919, P.C. 1018, F/92/12/1, LGP (excerpts, from which the quotes are taken, in Lloyd George, Truth, II, 1233-34); P. Helmreich, From Paris, p. 44.

162 See Great Britain, History, pp. 49-50.

163 On the personnel of The Inquiry, see Gelfand, Inquiry, pp. 32ff. and 340-42; the Greeks considered Lybyer, an eminent historian of the Ottoman Empire, to be ardently pro-Bulgarian even before he joined The Inquiry: ibid., p. 77.
that our general views are identical."¹⁶⁴ There was more time to compare notes the next
day over lunch at the American headquarters in the Hotel Crillon. Nicolson later noted in
his diary that the Americans had "[s]ome idea of giving Kavalla to the Bulgars" and were
"[u]nimpressed by Serbian claims to Pirot and Vidin." Moreover, they "[a]ppear to have
same idea as us as to giving Istip and Kochana" to Bulgaria and were "[v]ery opposed to
Greece taking Western Thrace—where I am with them." As to the Straits, the Americans
wanted the Turks out of Constantinople, but were vague on the question of the future
mandatory power. They wanted to give Bulgaria a modified version of the Enos-Midia
line in Eastern Thrace but were "very keen on a Greek zone at Smyrna"¹⁶⁵ It was
arranged that the Americans should visit the British at their headquarters at the Astoria
two days later. On this occasion, the two countries' experts went over the ground
thoroughly in what Nicolson called "a most satisfactory discussion." The only new point
he noted was that the Americans wanted to restore to Bulgaria the Southern Dobruja to
the "1913 line without Silistria and with certain minor rectifications."¹⁶⁶

Thus far, the British experts had adhered to their original conception of the Balkan
settlement: concessions to Bulgaria for the sake of a just and lasting peace. This, as
Nicolson observed, was in complete harmony with American views. There was some
disagreement, however, on the details. The Americans wished to give Bulgaria Kavalla
and the Enos-Midia line, leaving her Western Thrace and "compensating (sic) Greece in
Asia Minor."¹⁶⁷ The British had long since given up the idea of ceding Kavalla to
Bulgaria but were equally opposed to Greek claims in Western Thrace. Although they
were apparently as yet undecided on Smyrna, they did advocate giving almost the whole

¹⁶⁴Nicolson, Peacemaking, p. 223 (diary entry for January 6, 1919).

¹⁶⁵Nicolson, Peacemaking, pp. 225-26 (diary entry for January 7, 1919); Seymour, Letters, p. 94
(letter of January 7, 1919).

¹⁶⁶Nicolson, Peacemaking, pp. 228-29 (diary entry for January 9, 1919).

¹⁶⁷Nicolson, Peacemaking, p. 228 (diary entry for January 9, 1919; emphasis in original).
of Eastern Thrace to Greece, and there had been a strong tendency in British thought to regard these two areas as alternatives for Greek territorial expansion. The British case for giving Eastern Thrace to Greece as an “island” up to the Bulair and Chatalja lines rested on its viability as a unit, but this solution was obviously dependent on the limits of the Straits zone. The Americans favored an extended zone with a modified Enos-Midia line as its western boundary. Nicolson, at least, believed that this was “a far better line than ours.”

Since the British experts admitted that Eastern Thrace up to the Enos-Midia line would not make a suitable “island,” an Anglo-American compromise on the basis of Smyrna and Kavalla to Greece and Western and Eastern Thrace to the Enos-Midia line to Bulgaria, might have seemed in the offing. Such a deal at the expense of Turkey might not have been exactly in keeping with the Fourteen Points, but Nicolson for one would soon come off his Wilsonian cloud and the Americans, as he noted with surprise, were already talking about “compensation.” More importantly, such a settlement was still well within the bounds of previous British thought and had the added attraction of accommodating the Americans’ views in the areas closest to the Straits, where the British wanted them to accept the mandate.

At this point, however, on January 13 the Political Section of the British Delegation received the official written statement of Greek claims, *Greece before the Peace Conference*. Venizelos himself had written this exposition of the Greek case at Wilson’s request, completing it on December 31. It was immediately printed and a

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168 Nicolson, *Peacemaking*, pp. 228 (diary entry for January 9, 1919) and 234 for the quote (diary entry for January 14, 1919).

169 See pp. 288-290 below.

copy was sent to the Foreign Office in London by the Greek minister on January 6 at Venizelos' "urgent request." Another copy was directly provided to the British Delegation in Paris a week later.

At the heart of this document lay sets of figures relating to the ethnic composition of various current and former provinces of the Ottoman Empire. These statistics, purportedly based on prewar censuses which in fact never took place, were entirely fraudulent and thus belied the entire Greek case at the Peace Conference. For Venizelos claimed, on ethnographic grounds, a large enclave in western Asia Minor around Smyrna, Northern Epirus and all the Aegean Islands, including Cyprus. Although he maintained that Constantinople was a Greek city, he supported an international administration for it and the Straits in view of the important interests involved. Venizelos, of course, had no thought of surrendering Kavalla; and in Thrace he demanded the line of the Arda to the Maritsa and then the old Turkish-Bulgarian border to the Black Sea, with minor modifications in Bulgaria's favor (see Map 6; for the Arda river, see also Map 8).

This claim to virtually all of Western and Eastern Thrace was likewise based primarily on ethnographic arguments. Venizelos combined the two areas and claimed that, together with Constantinople, they had a Greek population of 730,822 against 112,174 Bulgarians. He admitted that the majority of the Greeks were concentrated in Eastern Thrace and that the Turkish element was predominant in Western Thrace but maintained that the Turks would prefer Greek to Bulgarian rule. Venizelos met the objection to cutting Bulgaria off from the Aegean by saying that all the necessary economic outlets would be secured her by possession of Varna and Burgas on the Black

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171 Caclamanos to Mallet, London, January 6, 1919, 92/1/1/775, FO 608/37, PRO.

172 "Greece before the Peace Conference," memorandum by Venizelos, received January 13, 1919, 92/1/1/19, FO 608/37, PRO (also in W.C.P. 33, CAB 297, PRO).

173 McCarthy, Muslims, pp. 89ff.; see also idem, "Greek Statistics," pp. 66ff.
Sea and international guarantees of the freedom of the Straits, but he also offered to grant her commercial facilities in a free port at Dedeagach. He further argued that retention of Porto Lagos by Bulgaria would enable her to build a submarine base there and threaten vital Greek and international communications in the Aegean.

Venizelos added considerations of a political nature to his ethnographic, economic and strategic arguments. He emphasized the fact that Bulgaria had ranged herself on the side of the Central Powers and asserted that she sought “to play the part in the Balkan peninsula that Prussia played on the vast European stage.” He claimed that the only reason for his willingness to let Bulgaria have Thrace in 1913 had been his desire for her cooperation in the creation of a federation of the Christian Balkan states. This policy of reconciliation had now been proven a failure. Nor could the idea of the Balkan balance be invoked in Bulgaria’s favor. Yugoslav and Rumanian national unification had irrevocably upset the balance, and any attempt to redress it was impracticable. Finally, Venizelos made it clear that his own position in Greece would depend on his obtaining Thrace and the other areas which he had promised his people as their reward for their sacrifices during the war.¹⁷⁴

Two days after receiving what he later called this “maximum” statement of Greek claims, Nicolson, apparently on his own initiative, paid a visit to the Greek delegation at its hotel for discussions.¹⁷⁵ In the course of a long talk which covered the whole gamut of Greek aspirations, Venizelos made it quite clear that he desired and expected all of Bulgarian and Turkish Thrace and that this claim was in no way alternative to union with the Greek territories in Asia Minor. Nicolson put to him a number of objections. The most obvious one was that the satisfaction of the Greek claim would cut Bulgaria off from the Aegean and perpetuate her discontent. In reply, Venizelos could only reiterate the

¹⁷⁴“Greece before the Peace Conference,” memorandum by Venizelos, 92/1/1/19, FO 608/37, PRO; Petsalis-Diomidis, *Greece*, pp. 123-25.

¹⁷⁵Minute by Nicolson, January 15, 1919, 92/1/1/19, FO 608/37, PRO.
points he had made in his written statement. Nicolson then indicated on a map the long strip of strategically indefensible territory which Greece would acquire if she expanded to the Black Sea. To this Venizelos replied that, in the first place, the heights of the Arda constituted a defensive line admirably suited for all ordinary purposes and that, at any rate, in case of war the vital points would always be Sofia and Salonika, not towns such as Enos or Rodosto. Nicolson next pointed out the danger of irredentism among the Greek population of Constantinople if the Greek border were in such proximity. His interlocutor entirely dismissed the word “irredentism” and substituted “sympathy.” He argued it would surely be preferable for the Straits zone to be coterminous with a friendly and reliable country rather than an unfriendly one such as Bulgaria and maintained it was impossible that Greece would ever take aggressive action against a Constantinople guaranteed and administered by the League of Nations. Finally, Nicolson questioned Venizelos on the ethnography of the claimed regions. The latter laid much stress on the fact that the great majority of the population of Western Thrace were Turks or at least Pomaks and that the Bulgarians came out a very poor third. Therefore, if the region were in any case taken from Turkey, it should obviously go to Greece on the principle of nationality, and not to Bulgaria. Venizelos was so sure of the wishes of the population that he was prepared for a “discreet” commission to go to Thrace to ascertain them, convinced that the great majority of Turks and Pomaks would wish for inclusion in Greece.

Nicolson also spoke with Venizelos’ foreign minister, Nicholas Politis. The only major difference was an elucidation of the exact nature of the port and transit rights which Greece was ready to accord Bulgaria at Dedeagach as well as Kavalla. Nicolson gathered that the Greek government was perfectly prepared to consider some arrangement with Bulgaria similar to that concluded with Serbia regarding Salonika. This implied the lease of a zone at the port and special regulations for the rail links with the interior. Nicolson objected that although this had worked quite satisfactorily between Greece and Serbia,
who were allies, it was questionable whether it would be equally successful in the case of Greece and Bulgaria, or between Greece and Turkey regarding Smyrna. Politis refused to admit this possibility, saying that if the League of Nations had power of supervision, no misunderstandings would be likely to arise.¹⁷⁶

Venizelos repeated much the same arguments to Crowe on the eighteenth.¹⁷⁷ Nicolson, at least, does not appear to have been entirely convinced at this time. After the talks on the fifteenth, he noted in his diary that the submarine danger, for example, "leaves me cold."¹⁷⁸ But his views slowly began to change. Two days after their meeting, Venizelos sent him his commercial expert to explain the Serbo-Greek arrangement on Salonika. The two went into it "very thoroughly as it may serve as a useful analogy for Fiume and Smyrna."¹⁷⁹ About this time, Nicolson's sympathy for Greece was being aroused over the Cyprus question. As a good Wilsonian, he thought the island should go to Greece, but British leaders thought otherwise. On January 19 Nicolson confided to his diary:

I am distressed about Cyprus. The British Empire Delegation have decided to retain it on strategical and other grounds. They are wrong entirely: its retention compromises our whole moral position in regard to the Italians.¹⁸⁰

By the twenty-second he was giving advice to Venizelos on how to handle the Italians,¹⁸¹ and the next day he acted as intermediary with the Americans:

¹⁷⁶Memorandum by Nicolson, Paris, January 16, 1919, 92/1/1/161, FO 608/37, PRO; Nicolson, Peacemaking, pp. 238-39; Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, p. 126; on the Serbian zone at Salonika, see Foreign Office, Macedonia, pp. 89-90.

¹⁷⁷Minute by Crowe, January 18, 1919, 92/1/1/161, FO 608/37, PRO; Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, p. 126.

¹⁷⁸Nicolson, Peacemaking, p. 239 (diary entry for January 15, 1919); on Venizelos' concern about Bulgarian submarines, see p. 175 above.

¹⁷⁹Nicolson, Peacemaking, p. 240-41 (diary entry for January 17, 1919).

¹⁸⁰Nicolson, Peacemaking, p. 242 (diary entry for January 19, 1919); see also ibid., p. 246 (diary entry for January 22, 1919); and P. Helmreich, From Paris, p. 60.

¹⁸¹Nicolson, Peacemaking, pp. 246-47 (diary entry for January 22, 1919).
Venizelos lunches. I ask Day, Carpenter, and Lybyer to meet him, as he is not yet in personal touch with the American experts. He has a fierce argument about Bulgarian Thrace with Lybyer, who is a Bulgarophil [sic]. He is moderate, charming, gentle, and apt. A most successful luncheon.182

More concrete evidence that Nicolson had been almost totally converted to the Greek cause was soon forthcoming. On January 25, the copy of Venizelos’ memorial which had been sent to the Foreign Office finally caught up with Hardinge. He asked Crowe to have a précis drawn up for distribution to the plenipotentiaries indicating where the Greek claims diverged from British policy. This task was assigned to Nicolson, who had a draft ready by the next day. Crowe went over this with him, introduced a few “minor modifications” and presented the revised document for Hardinge’s approval on January 28. Hardinge instructed that it be printed as quickly as possible.183 This haste was probably due to the imminence of a meeting of departmental representatives to discuss the position the British Delegation should take on the Straits and Asia Minor. Nicolson’s recommendations formed the basis of this discussion.

In his commentary on Venizelos’ statement, Nicolson on the whole supported the Greek claims. He even went so far as to assert that Venizelos would be justified in claiming Constantinople, “as it would certainly go to Greece if international considerations permitted.” He did think that Venizelos’ line in Asia Minor was excessive, but in Thrace he concluded that Greek claims were justified. He accepted that the Greeks had, at least before 1913, a majority over all other elements except the Turks, “who ex hypothesi will not be given these districts.” From the economic point of view, Nicolson believed that if the Bulgarians were given guaranteed outlets at Kavalla and Dedeagach, they could not complain of being strangled. Strategically, he admitted, Venizelos’ line was obviously insecure but it was better than that held by the Turks until 1913. Nicolson

183Hardinge to Crowe, Paris, January 25, 1919, 92/1/1/775, FO 608/37, PRO; Minute by Hardinge, [January 28, 1919], ibid.; Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, p. 126.
also believed there was considerable force in Venizelos' political arguments. In particular, he stated, "it is a direct British interest that Venizelos' personal influence in Greece should be maintained and strengthened."^{184}

Thus, in the space of something like two weeks, Nicolson had completely reversed his views on Western Thrace and now almost completely identified himself with Venizelos' standpoint on all his claims. This conversion did not lack its celebration: on the evening of January 28, the very day Hardinge received his recommendations, Nicolson was the guest of Venizelos at dinner.^{185} Crowe's defection from the position he had taken but a month before on Asia Minor is likewise striking.^{186} He was more consistent on Thrace, at least to the extent of modifying Nicolson's draft to provide for the cession of Adrianople and Kirk Kilisse to Bulgaria.^{187}

Lloyd George's influence must also have begun to be felt by this time. The departmental representatives met on January 30 and decided that the Delegation should support the expulsion of Turkey from Europe and control of Constantinople and the Straits by an international commission rather than any one power such as the United States. This was a compromise between the views of the Foreign and War Offices but was fully in accord with Lloyd George's attitude toward the Turks, and he himself continued to advocate an American mandate for the Straits zone. Greek claims in Asia Minor were not susceptible to such a compromise. A meeting the following day decided, against the vehement opposition of the military, to support a Greek zone around Smyrna. The prime mover in this decision was Crowe, who based his case on Nicolson's

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^{184}“Summary of a Memorial Presented to the Peace Conference by M. Venizelos (with Commentary),” memorandum by Political Section, British Delegation (Nicolson), Paris, January 28, 1919, 92/1/1/775, FO 608/37, PRO (also in W.C.P. 58, CAB 29/7, PRO, and No. 22, FO 374/20, PRO); reproduced in Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, pp. 126ff.

^{185}Nicolson, Peacemaking, pp. 251 (diary entry for January 28, 1919).

^{186}See pp. 122-123 above.

^{187}Minute by Crowe, January 28, 1919, 92/1/1/775, FO 608/37, PRO.
recommendations and carried his point even against his own superior, Hardinge. Lloyd George's backing for the Greek cause is the most likely explanation for Crowe's victory, if not his change of mind, which marked a sudden and far-reaching departure.\(^{188}\) From this time on, the British Delegation was the chief supporter of Greek claims at the Peace Conference and Venizelos remained in close touch with its members.\(^{189}\)

Eastern and Western Thrace were not the subject of decisions at these meetings, and discussion of these questions, once again pitting the War Office against the Foreign Office representatives in the Delegation's Political Section, continued. On January 18 the General Staff had drawn up some "Notes on Greek War Aims," which did not reach the Political Section in Paris until early February. In the main, this paper confined itself to outlining Greek claims and stating the various arguments for and against them without making any recommendations. It contended, however, that in Eastern Thrace including Constantinople there had been a Turkish majority in 1912 and that therefore Greece could not claim sovereignty on ethnographic grounds. On the other hand, it saw Greek opposition to any concessions to Bulgaria in this area as justified.\(^{190}\)

On February 7, the General Staff expanded its views in a reply to Nicolson's memorandum of January 28. It once again took Turkish claims to self-determination in Eastern Thrace as its point of departure. It therefore in the first place objected to the separation of Adrianople and Kirk Kilisse, saying this would lead to their decline as they geographically and economically belonged to Thrace and not Bulgaria. Bulgaria's ethnographic claim was in any case negligible, and strategically such a cession would be

\(^{188}\)Petsalis-Diomidis, *Greece*, p. 131.

\(^{189}\)Petsalis-Diomidis, *Greece*, pp. 131-32.

\(^{190}\)"Notes on Greek War Aims," memorandum by General Staff, D. 12, London, January 18, 1919, 92/1/1/1242, FO 608/37, PRO (also in W19/15527/1458, FO 371/3577, PRO; and F/92/12/2, LGP; an excerpt is published in Lloyd George, *Truth*, II, 1235-38, where the date is wrongly given as January 16, 1919); Helmreich, *From Paris*, pp. 44; Petsalis-Diomidis, *Greece*, pp. 131-32.
of considerable advantage to her. As for Eastern Thrace as a whole, the General Staff believed it doubtful whether the Turkish population would, as alleged, migrate. To avoid a cause of friction in the Balkans, it accordingly recommended the inclusion of the whole area in the internationalized state of Constantinople. If this were impossible for political reasons, Adrianople and Kirk Kilisse should at least not be separated from those portions of Thrace given to Greece.\(^1\)

Perhaps lest it be misunderstood, the General Staff emphasized a fortnight later that strategic requirements made it preferable for Eastern Thrace to remain Turkish. But if both sides of the Straits with a sufficient hinterland were internationalized, all of it, including Adrianople and the left bank of the Maritsa, should be included in the international state. The General Staff classified this question as one with direct strategic bearing on the military security of the British Empire.\(^2\)

By this time, however, the British Delegation had already reached another compromise.

The General Staff's views had found little favor in the Political Section. Nicolson could not see how the international administration of the Straits could possibly accept responsibility for so large an area as that proposed by the General Staff on February 7. "Moreover," he contended, "Eastern Thrace is ethnically Greek if we exclude Constantinople."\(^3\) Crowe qualified his agreement with Nicolson only by noting that the military considerations would be borne in mind.\(^4\)

On February 18, it was decided that the settlement in Eastern Thrace should depend on the extent of the Straits zone. If it were to include the whole littoral of the Bosphorus, Sea of Marmora and Dardanelles, part of Eastern Thrace would necessarily be

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\(^1\)"Memorandum on Greek Claims by the General Staff," memorandum by Gen. William Thwaites, Military Section, British Delegation, Paris, February 7, 1919, 92/1/1/1575, FO 608/37, PRO; Petsalis-Diomidis, *Greece*, pp. 131-32.

\(^2\)"General Staff Desiderata regarding Territorial Adjustments," memorandum by Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Chief of the Military Section, British Delegation, Paris, February 19, 1919, No. 40, FO 374/20, PRO.

\(^3\)Minute by Nicolson, February 7, 1919, 1919, 92/1/1/1575, FO 608/37, PRO.

\(^4\)Minute by Crowe, February 9, 1919, 92/1/1/1575, FO 608/37, PRO.
attached. In such a case, the whole province might possibly be thrown in, a few frontier districts being assigned on geographic and to a lesser extent ethnographic grounds to Bulgaria. If, on the other hand, the zone were limited to the city of Constantinople and the immediate littoral of the Bosphorus, the rest of the Asian littoral would naturally remain Turkish and the least objectionable solution for the European littoral of the Sea of Marmora and its Thracian hinterland would be its assignment to Greece.\(^{195}\)

After its sharp turn toward Greece, the Political Section left the military even further behind on the question of Western Thrace. On January 18, the General Staff had been most definite:

The proposal to deprive Bulgaria of the Aegean coast is economically indefensible, and the Greek population here is very small. Strategically the coastal strip could not be held by Greece against a Bulgarian attack.\(^{196}\)

Nicolson limited himself to remarking that the Bulgarians in Western Thrace were also small in number,\(^{197}\) but Crowe reacted more sharply to this challenge to the policy his section was now putting forward:

No action on this is required. This War Office paper discusses the territorial problem not from a military or strategic but from a purely political point of view. There is no fresh contribution in this to the discussion, which really concerns the Foreign Office.\(^{198}\)

The relatively unimportant question of Western Thrace was not thrashed out within the Delegation like those of Smyrna, Constantinople and the Straits and Eastern Thrace. But while the General Staff persisted in pointing out that Greece’s acquisition of Western

\(^{195}\)Memorandum by British Delegation, Paris, on British Policy in the Middle East,” February 18, 1919, No. 39, FO 374/20, PRO.

\(^{196}\)Notes on Greek War aims,” memorandum by General Staff, D. 12, London, January 18, 1919, 92/1/1/1242, FO 608/37, PRO (also in W19/15527/1458, FO 371/3577, PRO).

\(^{197}\)Marginal note by Nicolson on “Notes on Greek War aims,” memorandum by General Staff, D. 12, London, January 18, 1919, 92/1/1/1242, FO 608/37, PRO.

\(^{198}\)Minute by Crowe, March 4, 1919, 92/1/1/1242, FO 608/37, PRO.
Thrace, and Smyrna, would weaken her strategic position\textsuperscript{199} and Hardinge may not have regarded the views of junior officials as the last word on British policy, it was Nicolson and Crowe who would speak for Britain on the territorial commissions charged by the Supreme Council with the examination of the claims of the Balkan Allies.

The British turnabout on Greek claims could not but affect the Delegations's attitude toward Rumanian and Yugoslav claims, whatever its view of their intrinsic merits. The logic of the type of Balkan settlement which the British had originally been seeking might have seemed to demand even greater concessions to Bulgaria at the expense of Serbia and Rumania to assuage the loss of Western Thrace. But, even aside from the question of whether it would have been successful, such a course was probably psychologically impossible. The frame of mind which had produced the acceptance of Greek claims could hardly allow the demand of sacrifices from the other two Allies. What is more, close contact with Rumanian and Serbian leaders in Paris must have convinced the British, if convincing was still necessary, of the utter futility of expecting such sacrifices to be volunteered, especially in view of the generosity being shown to Greece. The ingrained British reluctance to coerce the Balkan Allies was reinforced by the rapid dissipation of the armed strength of Britain and the other Great Powers, making it impossible for them to enforce a decision on their small and remote partners even had they wanted to. On the other hand, equally logical and politically more expedient was the opposite course. If fresh Bulgarian resentment was to be aroused and directed against Greece, it would be well to keep Bulgaria's grievances against her other neighbors alive and cement the common interest of the Balkan Allies in opposing Bulgarian revisionism. This would promote the maximum diffusion of Bulgarian energies and the maximum concentration of forces against her.

\textsuperscript{199}"General Staff Desiderata regarding Territorial Adjustments," memorandum by Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Chief of the Military Section, British Delegation, Paris, February 19, 1919, No. 40, FO 374/20, PRO.
From the point of view of providing support for, or at least taking the pressure off, Greece, the treatment of Yugoslav claims was especially important. Bulgaria's most long-standing aspirations and most keenly felt sense of injustice lay in Vardar Macedonia. Since the only rail link between Greece and her Serbian ally ran through the Vardar valley, keeping Bulgaria out of this part of Macedonia and acquiescing in Serbian claims for additional slices would not only increase the security of an important railway but also deepen the abyss between Bulgaria and Serbia. By the same token, the idea of Bulgarian-Yugoslav cooperation could only be alarming. Bulgaria's prospective entry into a Yugoslav federation, rumors concerning which were circulating at the beginning of 1919, seemed to be a Bulgarian device to gain a hold on Macedonia and break up the cohesion of the Balkan Allies. The ramifications for Greece of such cooperation went even further since the importance for Yugoslavia of an economic outlet on the Aegean at Salonika was heightened by the dispute over Fiume, which cast a potentially permanent shadow over that port's usefulness as a debouchment for Yugoslav trade. It is therefore not surprising that by early February the British experts were more favorably disposed to Yugoslavia than Rumania. This was perhaps also to some extent a reflection of the different roles played by the two countries in the war and of the negative personal impression created at Paris by Bratiano, who contrasted so sharply with Venizelos. But, even if the threat to Greece of a Bulgarian combination with Rumania was nowhere nearly as serious as one with Yugoslavia, it would nevertheless be desirable to preclude the possibility of a rapprochement between Bulgaria and her northern neighbor, who was still in dispute with Yugoslavia over the Banat.

200 Brigadier General E. L. Spears to Wilson, Paris, March 2, 1919, 81/1/8/3485, FO 608/32, PRO; unsigned and undated minute, ibid.; Nicolson thought Bulgaria's entry into a Yugoslav confederation all to the good but doubted whether the moment was ripe: minute by Nicolson, March 5, 1919, ibid.

201 See Chapter V.

202 Bonsal, Suitors, pp. 176-77 (diary entry for December 4, 1918); Nicolson, Peacemaking, pp. 137, 248 and 254; Walworth, Wilson, p. 102.
In short, so far from seeking to reconcile Bulgaria with her neighbors by satisfying what had been recognized on the basis of the principle of nationality as just claims, Britain's interest now seemed to lie in depriving her of further territory for strategic and political reasons and in perpetuating and even sharpening Balkan antagonisms for the sake of a new surrogate in the Near East. The abandonment by the British Delegation of the idea of the Balkan bloc was of supreme importance for Bulgaria at the Peace Conference, where a directorate of the four Allied Great Powers made all the decisions. The addition of British to French support for the Balkan Allies produced a political majority in their favor. For the Allied Great Powers were not of equal weight. As Italy learned to her cost, her influence was limited even where her own interests were directly concerned. America could hardly tip the balance against Britain and France in a region where she had not even been at war. The change in policy which occurred within the British Empire Delegation under Lloyd George's influence during the latter half of January 1919 was therefore the decisive event in the evolution of the Balkan settlement at the Paris Peace Conference.
V: THE TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENT

The best proof of the significance of the change in British policy is seen in the fact that the territorial clauses of the Bulgarian peace treaty were eventually framed almost entirely in accordance with British wishes. The procedure of the Peace Conference facilitated the achievement of this goal. Although the Supreme Council could not avoid the task of sitting through wearying expositions of the claims of the many lesser Allies, it decided to establish special commissions to study them and make recommendations. These commissions were authorized only to examine and pronounce upon the particular claims of these nations, all of which were Allies, and not to make their own general proposals regarding the settlements involving the various enemy powers.

The division of the problems associated with the Balkan settlement between two separate commissions discouraged a general approach here even further. Bulgaria fell precisely on the line of cleavage between the work of the Commission on Rumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs and the Commission on Greek and Albanian Affairs. These commissions themselves worked independently of each other and could not frame their recommendations as part of an overall settlement applying to the region as a whole or even Bulgaria alone. Although individual members may have known what was going on in both commissions, this increased the procedural bias against Bulgaria.

The British members of the Rumanian and Yugoslav commission were Crowe and Leeper and of the Greek commission, Crowe and the Canadian prime minister Sir Robert Borden, with Nicolson acting as the latter's secretary and actually doing most of the

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work. Lloyd George himself, recognizing Nicolson’s Greek sympathies, specifically recommended him for this position. Such representation was a guarantee that the commissions would not favor any proposals that might prove embarrassing to the new orientation of British policy. The chairmen of both commissions were French plenipotentiaries: Jules Cambon, senior diplomat and Philhellene for the Greek commission until July, and André Tardieu, a confidant of Clemenceau, for the Rumanian and Yugoslav commission and later the Greek commission as well.

Moreover, the possibilities for review at a higher level were limited. Implicit in the Supreme Council’s instruction to the commissions “to reduce the questions for decision within the narrowest possible limits” was the assumption that whatever could be agreed upon by the experts would be adopted by the Council without further discussion. Lloyd George may have been counting on this when he took the initiative in proposing the creation of the Greek commission, believing that Greek claims would have a better chance if they were approved on a lower level before being considered by the Council. The Council did appoint a Central Territorial Committee (sometimes also referred to as the “Co-ordinating Committee”) on February 27 to draw up frontiers for the consideration of the Conference based on the reports of the subordinate territorial commissions, but it

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3"Composition and Organization of the Preliminary Peace Conference," April 1919, FRUS, 1919, PPC, III, 1-90 (the members of these commissions are given on pp. 83-84); “Organization of the Peace Conference,” October 1, 1919, ibid., pp. 91-153 (the members of these commissions are given on pp. 122-24); Nicolson, Peacemaking, p. 267 (diary entry for February 22, 1919); Temperley, History, I, 503 (for the presidents and vice-presidents only); on the work of the Greek commission in general, see Kitsikis, Rôle, pp. 35ff.; on Borden’s Philhellenism, see ibid., p. 44.

4Lees-Milne, Nicolson, I, 118.

5“Composition and Organization of the Preliminary Peace Conference,” April 1919, FRUS, 1919, PPC, III, 1-90 (the members of these commissions are given on pp. 83-84); “Organization of the Peace Conference,” October 1, 1919, ibid., pp. 91-153 (the members of these commissions are given on pp. 122-24); Marston, Peace Conference, p. 122; Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece p. 139; Temperley, History, I, 502-03; see also Walworth, Wilson, p. 104; on Cambon’s support for Greece, see Driault and Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique, V, 357; Kitsikis, Rôle, pp. 43-44; and Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece p. 139.

6Nicolson, Peacemaking, pp. 128-29.

7P. Helmreich, From Paris, p. 46.
considered these reports separately and did not in fact coordinate their recommendations. Britain’s representative was Crowe and the chairman was Tardieu.

**The Southern Dobruja**

The first of the Balkan Allies to present its case to the Supreme Council was Rumania. Bratiano arrived in Paris on January 13 and immediately began lobbying. On January 24, the National Assembly in Bucarest reaffirmed the unification of the Kingdom with the new territories, but this maneuver may have hurt more than helped the Rumanian cause in the eyes of the Great Powers. The Council was getting fed up with faits accomplis and that very day it issued its warning to the small nations. Bratiano was already making a bad personal impression and his appearance before the Council on January 31-February 1, which commenced with a row with Serbian delegates over the Banat, only confirmed the negative feelings about him.

On February 1, Bratiano claimed all the territories promised to Rumania in the treaty he had signed with the Allies in August 1916 plus Bessarabia on the basis of nationality. The treaty also guaranteed Rumania’s territorial integrity, and Bratiano ended his exposition by saying that insofar as the Southern Dobruja was concerned, he would

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9“Composition and Organization of the Preliminary Peace Conference,” April 1919, *FRUS, 1919, PPC*, III, 1-90 (the members of this committee are given on p. 81); “Organization of the Peace Conference,” October 1, 1919, ibid., pp. 91-153 (the members of this committee are given on p. 117); Temperley, *History*, I, 502.

10“Composition and Organization of the Preliminary Peace Conference,” April 1919, *FRUS, 1919, PPC*, III, 1ff. (the members of this committee are given on p. 81); “Organization of the Peace Conference,” October 1, 1919, *FRUS, 1919, PPC*, III, 91-153 (the members of this committee are given on p. 117); Temperley, *History*, I, 502; Walworth, *Wilson*, p. 104.


13See p. 142 above.

oppose any attempt "to wrest a portion of territory from an Allied State, without such State having consented to an alteration of the frontier line." While theoretically leaving open the possibility of a compromise with Bulgaria, this statement actually sought to close the door on the issue by excluding any dictation by the Allied Great Powers.

The latter, of course, were far from unanimous in accepting the 1916 treaty as binding. Balfour had questioned its validity in the Supreme Council on January 12 and the question of treaty rights was at that time reserved at Sonnino's suggestion. Immediately after Bratiano's presentation, Clemenceau referred to the earlier discussion and said the Council had decided the treaty was void. Orlando could remember no such decision. The Council then went on to approve Lloyd George's proposal for an expert commission to study the Rumanian claims. The question of the treaty was apparently never settled at this meeting or later.

As has been seen, by the time the Peace Conference had begun, the Southern Dobruja was already under Rumanian civil administration, but Franchet was still preventing the entry of Rumanian troops. The area was in fact occupied by British forces, and the Rumanian government apparently held Britain responsible for this infringement of what it regarded as its sovereign rights, accusing the British government in general of showing undue favor to Bulgaria at Rumania's expense and British troops in particular of fraternizing with the enemy. Although instructions against fraternization were issued, the Foreign Office was firm on the matter of the entry of Rumanian troops.

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15"Secretary's Notes . . . ." February 1, 1919, FRUS, 1919. PPC, III, 840-55 (the quote is on p. 851); see also "La Roumanie devant le Congrès de la Paix," Mémoire de la Délégation Roumaine, RAC, IV, C(4), 427-40; and "Les revendications territoriales." Mémoire de la Délégation Roumaine, RAC, IV, C(4), 441-50; Spector, Rumania, p. 94.

16"Secretary's Notes . . . ." January 12, 1919, FRUS, 1919. PPC, III, 486.

17"Secretary's Notes . . . ." February 1, 1919, FRUS, 1919. PPC, III, 851ff.

18See pp. 105-108 above.
and recommended that if, as the Rumanians averred, the number of Allied troops was insufficient for the maintenance of order, it should be increased. ¹⁹

Such an attitude could only confirm Rumanian suspicions as to the British position on the future of the area. Indeed, a few days after Bratiano laid his case before the Conference, Crowe and Leeper continued to define this position in a sense favorable to Bulgaria. They generally favored Rumanian claims but recommended that after these had been satisfied,

...at a moment deemed suitable by the Allied Powers, it shall insistently be urged on the Rumanian Government that the readjustment of the frontier with Bulgaria in the Southern Dobrudzha is in the interest of the population concerned and the future good relations of Rumania and Bulgaria.

The proposed frontier would leave the Danube west of Tutrakan and run east, reaching the sea at the pre-1913 boundary. Crowe and Leeper pointed out that this would be the one instance of an Ally being asked to cede territory to an enemy but that, although Rumanian opinion was naturally sensitive on the subject, Rumania had no ethnographic claim to the area except in the towns of Tutrakan and Silistria, which would be left to her for strategic reasons. Moderate Rumanian opinion, they felt, would probably not oppose the suggested cession, but the manner in which the Allied Powers would urge its desirability had to be carefully considered. ²⁰ The General Staff concurred in this recommendation. ²¹

¹⁹Bridges to D.M.I., T 6345, Salonika, January 6, 1919, W19/4610/4610, FO 371/3582, PRO; D.M.I. to Under-Secretary of State, 14/904 (M.J.2), January 8, 1919, ibid.; F.O. minutes, January 9, 1919, ibid.; F.O. to D.M.I., January 11, 1919, ibid.; Misu (Romanian Minister) to Balfour, No. 2126/18/50, London, January 8, 1919, W19/5134/4610, FO 371/3582, PRO; F.O. minutes, January 16, 1919, ibid.; General Greenly to W.O. and G.H.Q. Constantinople (General Bridges), Bucarest, January 13, 1919, W19/9793/392, FO 371/3568, PRO; Wratislaw to F.O., Salonika, January 17, 1919, W19/10864/392, ibid.; F.O. to Barclay (Bucarest), January 24, 1919, ibid.; F.O. to Derby (Paris), February 1, 1919, ibid.; D.M.I. to Under-Secretary of State, 14/904 (M.I.2), January 20, 1919, transmitting Greenly to W.O., W.G. 66, Bucarest, January 16, 1919, 87/1/1/1473, FO 608/34, PRO; Acting Secretary of State to D.M.I., January 28, 1919, ibid.; minute by Leeper, n.d., ibid.; minute by Nicolson, February 8, 1919, ibid.; minute by Crowe, February 9, 1919, ibid.

²⁰"Future Frontiers of Rumania," memorandum by Crowe and Leeper, Political Section, British Delegation, Paris, February 8, 1919, 79/1/1/1646, FO 608/30, PRO.

²¹"General Staff Desiderata regarding Territorial Adjustments," memorandum by Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Chief of the Military Section, British Delegation, Paris, February 19, 1919, No. 40, FO 374/20, PRO.
A moment deemed suitable by the British Delegation for urging such a compromise never arrived. The question of the Southern Dobruja came up at the very first meeting of the Commission on Rumanian Affairs on February 8, the same day Crowe and Leeper made their recommendations. This occurred in connection with the issue of the Allies’ 1916 treaty with Rumania, which immediately arose. Laroche, the only French representative present, pointed out the interest presented by the 1916 treaty for the work of the commission and said that whatever the value of this treaty, the delegates could not forget the promises made to Rumania, who now demanded their fulfillment. Crowe said the commission should discuss the merits of Rumania’s territorial claims and not concern itself with the validity of treaties. Martino, Secretary General of the Italian foreign ministry, who was in the chair in Tardieu’s absence, stated that in examining Rumanian claims the commission had to take account of juridical as well as economic and ethnographic considerations. He noted that in the Dobruja Rumania’s frontier had been fixed by a prewar treaty (the Treaty of Bucarest of 1913) which was uncontested but that other treaties were and suggested that the commission’s members get the instructions of their delegations on this point. Day, for the United States, said his country would be embarrassed to comment on the validity of treaties to which it was not a party. Crowe then observed that the commission had been established to examine Rumania’s claims and that she had not indicated she had any grievance over the Southern Dobruja. Martino thereupon proposed to leave the question of the 1916 treaty in suspense.

The commission next discussed the matter on March 3 in connection with a telegram from the Dobruja National Council, a Bulgarian organization in Switzerland, protesting against the return of the Southern Dobruja to Rumania. Day now proposed the
adoption of the pre-1913 frontier with slight modifications in Rumania’s favor. Crowe was still of the opinion, in which he was supported by Martino and Laroche, that the commission was without authority to recommend such a cession, although they all recognized the justice of the American proposal. As the discussion became increasingly favorable to the idea of modifying the frontier, Tardieu was at last moved to openly disagree with Laroche. He said that the American line was too close to Constanza and flatly declared that the French delegation was opposed to changing the frontier “for military, political, economic, and general reasons.” But the reaction had been generally favorable to a proposal by Crowe to present the Council with the ethnographic facts in case Bulgaria and Rumania should discuss their mutual frontier. Two days later the commission decided to include the Dobruja frontier in the work of a sub-commission.

A week later the commission considered the sub-commission’s recommendation for a new frontier line. Tardieu said France had no objection to the line itself but was against any change in principle. Crowe was more positive, saying Britain accepted the line if any change were made. Major Douglas Johnson unequivocally stated America’s support for the change. The commission decided to include a note about the sub-commission’s recommendation in its report and, after another discussion of the 1916 treaty on March 13, to make no pronouncement as to that treaty’s validity.

In a report submitted to the Central Territorial Committee on April 6, the commission therefore merely described a line which it believed would insure a good defensive frontier to both countries and restore to Bulgaria territories in which the

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25CARY, “Procès-verbal no. 11,” 5 mars 1919, RAC, IV, C(4), 105; on the sub-commission, see also pp. 350-51 below.


Rumanian element was very small compared to the Bulgarian and in which economic interests tended to link the population with Bulgaria (see Map 9). The commission recognized it was not authorized to recommend a cession of territory to an enemy state on the part of an Ally but noted the existence of the possibility of such a cession if Rumania, of her own accord, so desired. The report specifically noted the French members' opposition to any modification of the frontier as a threat to the security of Constanza.28 On April 15, the Central Territorial Committee simply forwarded these observations along with the rest of the report to the Council of Five,29 thus putting the responsibility for any action on the matter squarely on the foreign ministers.

By this time, the question of voluntary Rumanian concessions to Bulgaria was becoming progressively more complicated. On the one hand, the British troops who had been occupying the Southern Dobruja had to be withdrawn at the beginning of April on account of unrest in Egypt. For a while there seemed no alternative but to invite the Rumanians to send in their own troops to police the area, which was already under their civil administration. Both Hankey and Crowe favored this course.30 On the other hand, the advent to power in Budapest on March 21 of the Hungarian Bolshevik Bela Kun put the Rumanians in a potentially critical military situation. Although the Russian Bolshevik threat in Bessarabia had been neutralized by Polish and White Russian forces, Rumania now faced the prospect of attack in Transylvania by the Russians' Hungarian comrades,31


31 Spector, Rumania, 113ff. and 167-68.
while there was still a good deal of tension with the Serbs in the Banat. Hence, the Rumanians were understandably nervous about a sudden Bulgarian attack in case of a Bolshevik offensive. The British envoy in Bucarest in fact urged King Ferdinand to placate Bulgaria by returning the Southern Dobruja forthwith. But both Ferdinand in Bucarest and Bratiano in Paris professed to believe that such a sacrifice would not suffice to buy off the Bulgarians, whom they accused of coveting the whole Dobruja.

When the question of the Southern Dobruja finally came before the Council of Five in the middle of May, there was general agreement as to the wisdom of encouraging Rumania to negotiate with Bulgaria. Balfour best expressed the prevailing mood when he admitted that the American line was a better ethnographic frontier and that if it were a question of taking territory from an enemy state, there would be no problem; but since an Allied Power was involved, he thought an appeal should be made to Rumania to revise the frontier of her own accord in the interests of good relations with her neighbor and the general peace of Europe. But Pichon observed that Bratiano would probably refuse to make any concessions in the Dobruja without being assured of receiving the Banat. It was therefore decided to postpone further discussion of the Southern Dobruja until the question of the Banat had been resolved.

A week later, on May 23, the Five took up this question. Lansing, who had not attended the meeting the previous week, said he understood a connection had been established between the Banat and the Southern Dobruja, contending that since the United States had not been at war with Bulgaria, he could not participate in the discussion of the latter question except in connection with the former. He warned against creating a situation in the Southern Dobruja analogous to that in Alsace-Lorraine before the war.

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32Lederer, Yugoslavia, p. 235.

33Rattigan to Curzon, Bucarest, April 23, 1919, W19/64589/392, FO 371/3568, PRO.

Tardieu tried to disconnect the two questions, claiming they were connected only insofar as the Rumanians had unofficially said they might make some concessions to Bulgaria if Serbia could be induced to forgo her claims in the Banat by receiving Vidin from Bulgaria; now that the Serbian-Bulgarian frontier had been settled, no such bargain was possible. Sonnino kept trying to have discussion of the Dobruja deferred. Balfour, while expressing sympathy for Lansing's views, again brought forward the argument that they really had no business discussing the Rumanian-Bulgarian frontier. Pichon finally proposed accepting the line recommended by the experts in the Banat and reserving the Dobruja question. He reminded his colleagues that the principle of accepting unanimous recommendations of the commissions had been adopted. Lansing retorted that he would agree to the proposal but not the principle, and the proposal was carried.

Apparently around this time, a French source told Lansing that France's opposition on the Southern Dobruja was dictated by her opposition to giving an enemy any territory belonging to a friendly power. Wilson protested such a standpoint as a violation of Allied principles to Lloyd George and Clemenceau on May 28. This had no impact on the issue at hand however, and it was not until the beginning of July, after Wilson's departure from Paris, that the Central Territorial Committee resumed discussion of the Southern Dobruja as part of the general review of Bulgarian frontiers.

By this time the British had reason to be even more sympathetic to Rumanian sensibilities. They had for some time been trying to get Bratiano to release for the use of General Denikin, the anti-Bolshevik leader in South Russia, war material which the Russians had left in Rumania in 1918, and in July negotiations were taking place on an

35See pp. 227-232 below.


Anglo-French plan for the development of the Rumanian petroleum industry.\(^{38}\) The British were also at least as anxious as the other Allies to oust Bela Kun in Hungary. Here the Rumanians had already seized the initiative, advancing to the Tisza and remaining there in defiance of an order from the Supreme Council on June 13 to evacuate eastern Hungary. Bratiano refused to withdraw his forces until Hungary was disarmed. Before he left Paris on July 4 to return to Bucarest, where he threatened to resign because of non-fulfillment of the 1916 treaty, Balfour expressed to him understanding for his position in this regard. In any case, it soon became clear that most of the troops required for operations against the Kun regime would have to be Rumanian since the major Allies had no troops to spare. Balfour proposed that military advisers work out a plan to eject Kun by using forces of the small powers, and on July 9 the Military Representatives reported that 100,000 men would be needed for the move on Budapest, simultaneously pointing out the usefulness of the 84,000 Rumanian troops already on the Tisza. Balfour moved the immediate adoption of this plan but a decision was deferred pending consultation with the small powers. The importance of the Rumanian contribution was emphasized two days later when the Serbs and Czechs declined to participate in the projected campaign.\(^{39}\)

In this situation, the British Delegation must have been more reluctant than ever to see the Dobruja question raised. They had little reason to believe Bratiano would be willing to make concessions to Bulgaria and were suspicious of his motives when a report arrived that the previously desired direct negotiations might actually be in the offing. Early in June General Baird, the British Military Representative in Sofia, had heard that an officer from the Rumanian Military Mission at Varna had approached Malinoff

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\(^{39}\)The Yugoslavs feared, or said they feared, a Bulgarian attack during a campaign against Hungary but were perhaps more concerned with disputes on the borders with other countries, including Rumania; Lederer, *Yugoslavia*, p. 235; Mayer, *Politics*, p. 835; Spector, *Rumania*, pp. 159ff.
(although out of office, still the leader of the Democratic Party) with a proposal for negotiations on the Dobruja, it being suggested that Rumanian and Bulgarian representatives meet in Sofia before the conclusion of peace in order to come to an understanding. Theodoroff confirmed this information and told Baird that Malinoff had been asked to tell the Rumanian that the Bulgarian government was agreeable to the proposal. Theodoroff was not optimistic however and thought it unlikely that any Rumanian political leader would be willing to accept the responsibility of ceding territory. In Paris, where this intelligence did not arrive until almost a month later, Leeper took a similar view and expressed his belief that if the Rumanian government were considering concessions to Bulgaria, it would be only with the object of securing support against Yugoslavia.

The Delegation accordingly tried to kill the issue of the Southern Dobruja with a stratagem similar to one later used even more successfully in regard to Western Thrace. In the Central Territorial Committee on July 9, the Americans continued to support the frontier line put forward in the report of the Rumanian commission. Leeper reaffirmed the British position that no territory could be taken from Rumania unless she herself came to an understanding with Bulgaria. The Italians supported this view and Tardieu reiterated French opposition to any change in the frontier. Nicolson then proposed adopting the existing frontier for the purposes of the treaty with an accompanying note to the effect that Rumania might arrange with Bulgaria to adopt the American line. But there was no agreement on even this innocuous proposal, and the various views were simply passed on to the Council.

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40 Baird to Bridges, No. 67 Secret, Sofia, June 10, 1919, 87/1/1/14345, FO 608/34, PRO; minute by Leeper, July 7, 1919, ibid.; Baird to Curzon, Sofia, June 12, 1919, 81/1/9/14344, FO 608/32, PRO; Foreign Office officials in London were more positive about such a concession: Foreign Office minute, April 21, 1919, W19/64589/392, FO 371/3568.

41 See p. 222 below.

42 CCQT, "Procès-verbal No. 15," 9 juillet 1919, RAC, IV, C(8), 83-85; CCQT, "Procès-verbal No. 18," 17 juillet 1919, ibid., 102-03; "Rapport au Conseil Suprême relativement aux frontières bulgares," ibid., pp. 110-14 (also in DBFP, I, 169-74; English version in 81/1/14/16105, FO 608/33, PRO;
The British chargé d'affaires in Bucarest, William Rattigan, was bolder than the diplomats in Paris. On July 18, he urged on Bratiano the wisdom of conciliating Bulgaria, the latter having said he was staggered by news of the “Italian” proposal\(^43\) to return the Southern Dobruja. Rattigan also pointed out that it was the function of the Peace Conference to make a fair and lasting settlement. Bratiano thereupon claimed to have “made a proposal at Paris.”\(^44\) He denied having made one at Sofia, however. For, the next day, Rattigan received instructions to inquire about the reported discussions with the Bulgarians. Bratiano replied “with some vehemence” that if such discussions had taken place, they had had neither his authorization nor approval.\(^45\)

If Bratiano did in fact approach the Bulgarians, it may have been only with the intention of keeping them quiet while the Hungarian emergency lasted and this was not for much longer. American hesitation protracted the discussions on the adoption of the Military Representatives' plan, but eventually Kun himself forced the issue. On July 20, Hungarian forces attacked the Rumanian lines in an effort to seize the grain harvest needed to feed Budapest. The Rumanians were initially caught off guard but quickly rallied and by August 4 were in Budapest, having put Kun to flight.\(^46\)

The occupation of Budapest also strengthened Bratiano’s hand vis-à-vis the Allied Great Powers. For although neither this nor the plundering and other subsequent Rumanian actions in Hungary had the approval of the Council, the statesmen in Paris had done much to encourage the Rumanians’ advance, were obliged to them for having taken care of Kun but now wanted them to go back home. For a time, Rumania’s refusal to

\(^{43}\) Such an Italian proposal would indeed have been surprising; it was in fact made by the Americans: see pp. 191 above.

\(^{44}\) Rattigan to Curzon, Bucarest, July 18, 1919, W19/108696/392, FO 371/3569, PRO.

\(^{45}\) Rattigan to Curzon, No. 362, Bucarest, July 19, 1919, 87/1/1/16946, FO 608/34, PRO.

promptly withdraw put a serious strain on her relations with the major Allies. The latter's only hope of making her more receptive to their wishes in Hungary lay in their power to draw frontiers, but the difference in approach to utilizing this power persisted: the British, French and Italians thought it expedient to award Rumania the Southern Dobruja and other areas in the hope of making her less recalcitrant, while the Americans insisted that Rumania must give proof of good faith before her claims to areas such as Bessarabia and the northern Bukovina were recognized and wanted to make recognition of those claims dependent on the retrocession of the Southern Dobruja.47

The Council of Heads of Delegations did not take up the Dobruja question until September 3, after the Drafting Committee, charged with the technical task of producing the texts of the various treaties and now working on the Bulgarian peace treaty, asked it whether there was any decision. Balfour, now head of the British Delegation, summed up the situation:

... [T]he Council had decided that Roumania could not, as she was an Allied Power, be asked to yield any territory to Bulgaria. This decision had been taken some time ago and had never been cancelled. The Council, however, had not concealed its feeling that Roumania ought to give up a piece of the Dobrudja which was clearly not Roumanian. Strained relations with Roumania would not, he thought, justify a change in this policy. If the Powers were to go to war with Roumania, the situation would doubtless be altered. He thought that, for the purpose of the Treaty with Bulgaria, it might be assumed that the old frontier in the Dobrudja was maintained, though this might be neither equitable or conducive to peace in the Balkans.

Clemenceau and Tittoni agreed with this formulation of the matter. Polk reserved his opinion for the next day.48

The Americans now decided to seek to leave the question open in the treaty. This would make it possible to set the retrocession of the Southern Dobruja as one of the


conditions for the recognition of Rumania's other claims. At the Council meeting on September 5, Polk accordingly proposed a statement in a covering letter to the Bulgarian treaty reserving the Allies' right to consider at some later time the ultimate disposal of the Southern Dobruja and inviting Rumania to come to an agreement with Bulgaria on a modification of the frontier. He believed Rumania would not be averse to this proposal as she

... stood a chance of receiving considerable accessions of territory in Transylvania and in Bukovina. Her acquisition of these might be made contingent upon her yielding ground in the Dobrudja.

Clemenceau did not think such a statement would mean much nor that there was any basis for a bargain. Tittoni did not believe the question of the Southern Dobruja could be linked with that of Transylvania or the Bukovina. Polk finally agreed to a proposal made by Balfour:

... namely, first, that in principle, it was accepted as desirable that Roumania should yield a part of the Southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria; second, that no clause to this effect should be inserted in the Treaty with Bulgaria; third, that the means of obtaining this result should be considered at the time of sending the covering letter to the Bulgarians.

Polk merely stipulated that his acceptance of this proposal did not commit the United States to an offer of Bessarabia to Rumania in exchange for the retrocession of the Southern Dobruja. The Council thereupon agreed that for the purpose of the Bulgarian treaty no change would be made in the frontier between Bulgaria and Rumania.50

**Thrace**

Venizelos appeared before the Council of Ten on February 3 and 4 to make an oral statement of Greek claims, in which he embellished upon his memorial to the

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In regard to Thrace, he repeated his claim to virtually the whole area on ethnographic grounds, asking for that portion of Western Thrace south of a line following the course of the river Arda to its confluence with the Maritsa near Adrianople and all of Eastern Thrace, i.e. the rump Vilayet of Adrianople (see Map 8). Although he naturally did not reveal the dubious nature of his own figures, Venizelos did not seek to conceal from the Council the difficulty of obtaining reliable population statistics for Thrace and used various sets of confusing if not contradictory population figures. He was able to found his main argument that Thrace held 730,000 Greeks against a mere 112,000 Bulgarians only by including the population of Constantinople with its large Greek community.

Although at one point he apparently also referred to two and three-quarter million Greeks in the claimed territory, Venizelos finally asserted that it was inhabited by 442,000 (213,000 in Eastern Thrace; 229,000 in Western) Turks, 348,000 (267,000; 81,000) Greeks and 70,000 (35,000 in each half) Bulgarians but that Turks formed a majority only in Western Thrace which would not go to Turkey in any event. He expressed his willingness that the inhabitants of Western Thrace be consulted as to its future status, certain that the Moslems would prefer Greek to Bulgarian rule and disingenuously suggested confidentially ascertaining the views of the Moslem deputies from that area in the Bulgarian National Assembly. He also confirmed his readiness to grant Bulgaria a commercial outlet at either Kavalla or Salonika to compensate her for the loss of territorial access to the Aegean. He concluded his remarks by referring to Bulgaria's militarism and insatiable ambition as the Prussia of the Balkans.

51See pp. 173-175 above.
52"Secretary's Notes . . .," February 3, 1919, FRUS, 1919, PPC, III, 864-65; Venizelos, Greece, p. 19.
Immediately following the completion of Venizelos' presentation of Greek claims, Lloyd George proposed the creation of a commission “to reduce the questions for decision within the narrowest possible limits and make recommendations for a just settlement,” and the Council appointed the Commission on Greek Affairs that same day.\(^{54}\)

As has been seen, the British Delegation had already decided to back Greek claims in both Western and Eastern Thrace.\(^{55}\) At first it seemed that getting the other Great Powers to go along with Britain’s new stance might be easier than could have been expected. For the Americans on the Greek commission failed to insist on their own previous point of view, also perhaps the result of Venizelos’ assiduous lobbying.\(^{56}\) The commission considered Thrace at a meeting on February 20. Day asserted that the United States assumed that an international state of Constantinople would be carved out of Eastern Thrace and that as it was understood there would be no Turkish rule in Europe, only the claims of the non-Moslems should be considered in the rest of Thrace. On this basis, he maintained, it was clear that the claims of the Greeks were stronger than those of any other people. In response to a question from Borden, he replied that this included Western Thrace and that his delegation did not think the question of Bulgaria’s outlet to the Aegean sufficiently important to counterbalance the ethnographic claims of Greece. He took note, however, of the Greek promise to afford Bulgaria access to one of the Aegean ports and said this should be subject to League of Nations sanction. He did express the opinion that the northern frontier of Thrace should be the subject of further discussion and proposed the Enos-Midia line or something like it as the western frontier.

\(^{54}\) "Secretary’s Notes . . .”, February 4, 1919, FRUS, 1919, PPC, III, 875; Drake, “Bulgaria,” p. 83.

\(^{55}\) See pp. 177-183 above.

\(^{56}\) See Bonsal, Suitors, pp. 177-79 (diary entry for January 22, 1919).
of the international state. Otherwise, Day joined the British and French in agreeing in principle to the cession to Greece of all of Thrace.\(^{57}\)

Venizelos appeared before the commission on February 24 to answer general questions about his population statistics and guarantees of religious freedom. He gave assurances of such guarantees in any areas that might be ceded to Greece and defended his statistics although admitting their Greek origin. To back up his assertion about the sympathies of the Moslems in Western Thrace, he now read a letter dated December 31, 1918 sent by eight Moslem deputies of the Bulgarian National Assembly separately to Franchet and himself asking for an Allied and Greek occupation of Western Thrace.\(^{58}\) However genuine the dissatisfaction of the deputies with Bulgarian administration may have been, they had in fact submitted their petition to the Allies only at the instigation of the Greek military representative in Sofia, who even drafted it. Venizelos had known the letters were on the way and was angered when they did not arrive in time for use during his presentation to the Supreme Council. A few days later, the Italians partially countered the effect of this petition by submitting their own letter from Moslem deputies.\(^{59}\) On February 26, Venizelos presented a new set of statistics for Thrace as well as other arguments to justify Greek claims there and stated his willingness to accept the decision


\(^{59}\)Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, pp. 90 and 156; the signatories later left Bulgaria and repeatedly shifted their views: ibid., pp. 162-63, 168ff. and 280ff.; see also the statement by ten Moslem deputies, five from Thrace, in the Bulgarian National Assembly in Sofia on March 5, 1919, protesting against Greek claims that the Moslems preferred Greek rule: Buxton, Black Sheep, pp. 182-84; Venizelos also ordered that the Greeks of Asia Minor send petitions to the Allies to support his claims: Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, pp. 100-01.
of the Powers as to which port or ports would provide Bulgaria an economic outlet to the Aegean. 60

The commission again deliberated the disposal of Thrace on March 4 and agreed on the Enos-Midia line as the approximate frontier of the international state. The British, French and Americans also accepted the rest of the Greek claim to Thrace, recommending only a slight modification of the Greek line in the north, principally in Western Thrace. The Italians maintained that Bulgaria should be left at least a narrow corridor to Dedeagach. 61 Two days later, the commission met to discuss a draft report drawn up by Nicolson embodying all its recommendations, including the Italian reservation on Thrace. Day now shifted ground again and proposed that the frontier in Western as well as Eastern Thrace depend upon those eventually established for the international state. With Italian support a reservation to this effect was also inserted into the final report. 62

The Greek commission’s report was the only one which met the March 12 deadline originally set by the Central Territorial Committee. 63 The majority recommended that Greece acquire territory in both Eastern and Western Thrace, the exact frontiers to be determined at later date. The Italian reservation called for making all of the Greek-claimed territory in Eastern Thrace part of the international state and leaving Bulgaria a corridor to the Aegean. The British and French also recommended the satisfaction of Greek claims in Asia Minor, the Aegean Islands and Northern Epirus.

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60 CAG, “Procès-verbal no. 7,” 26 février 1919, RAC, IV, C(5), 64-68; Drake, “Bulgaria,” pp. 99-100; Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, p. 155; see also Nicolson, Peacemaking, p. 272 (diary entry for February 26, 1919).


62 CAG, “Procès-verbal no. 11,” 6 mars 1919, RAC, IV, C(5), 123-33; Drake, “Bulgaria,” 101-02; Nicolson, Peacemaking, p. 278 (diary entry for March 6, 1919); Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, pp. 157, incorrectly gives the date as March 11.

while the Americans and Italians by and large opposed these claims although not agreeing between themselves.\textsuperscript{64}

The Greek commission's report marked a considerable success for the Greek program at the Peace Conference. The British contribution to this success cannot be overestimated. Nicolson had no doubts about the importance of the British role in general and his own in particular:

\ldots Crowe, who is very busy on other committees is apt to rely on me for preparing our statements and lines: Borden relies on Crowe: the Committee generally accept the views of our delegation. Thus the responsibility is great.\ldots

But Greek claims ran into immediate difficulty in the Central Territorial Committee. At this time, the possibility of an American mandate for an international state at the Straits and even the whole of a rump Turkish state in Anatolia was under consideration, but on March 11 the Council of Ten decided, on Lloyd George's recommendation, to adjourn discussion of the whole Turkish question until Wilson's return to Paris.\textsuperscript{65} When the report of the Greek commission came before the Central Territorial Committee on March 17, Sidney Mezes, Colonel House's brother-in-law and the former head of The Inquiry, maintained that in view of the Council's decision the Committee was without authority to act upon the report's recommendations. In a discussion that finally became heated, the Italian member joined him in arguing that no decision could be made on Greek claims until the Council had reached one on the related question of the future of Turkey, while the British and French members advocated acceptance of the report. Mezes also said that no decision could be made on Western

\textsuperscript{64}{"Rapport (avec annexes) présenté au Conseil Suprême des Alliés par la Commission chargé d'étudier les Questions Territoriales intéressant la Grèce," n.d., RAC, IV, C(5), 143-63 (also in \textit{PV}, IX.2, 13-27; English version in 92/14/3931, FO 608/37, PRO); Drake, "Bulgaria," pp. 102-03; P. Helmreich, \textit{From Paris}, pp. 84-86; Petsalis-Diomidis, \textit{Greece}, p. 158.}

\textsuperscript{65}{Nicolson, \textit{Peacemaking}, p. 267 (diary entry for February 22, 1919); Frangulis, \textit{La Grèce}, II, 35ff.}

\textsuperscript{66}{"Secretary's Notes . . . .," March 11, 1919, \textit{FRUS}, 1919, \textit{PPC}, IV, 325-26; Drake, "Bulgaria," p. 103; Petsalis-Diomidis, \textit{Greece}, pp. 175.}
Thrace since it was intimately connected with the question of Eastern Thrace. To this the Italian also agreed but Crowe lamented that they were destroying the work of the Greek commission. The Central Territorial Committee was thus split down the middle and could take no action on the report.⁶⁷

Although the Americans and Italians took the same stand on this matter of procedure, the American position on Greek claims as set forth in the report of the Greek commission was actually much closer than the Italian to that of the British and French. The British accordingly sought an accommodation with the Americans. The principal differences centered on Asia Minor and Northern Epirus, and Nicolson had already submitted to Crowe on March 15 the outline of a possible compromise based on the idea of Greek mandates in both regions, except the Sanjak of Smyrna, which would be directly annexed. On March 24, on instructions from Balfour, Hardinge asked Nicolson to negotiate directly with the Americans. Within five days he reached an agreement with Mezes on the basis which he had himself proposed.⁶⁸ Apparently Wilson himself dictated Mezes’ surrender.⁶⁹ As a result, on March 30 the Central Territorial Committee passed the report of the Greek commission on to the recently created foreign ministers’ Council of Five, which had just been entrusted with the preparation of draft treaties of peace with the minor enemy states. In the committee’s own covering report, Mezes merely made a reservation to the effect that he did not believe the commission could consider itself authorized to make recommendations on the subject of Greek claims in either Europe or Asia in view of the decision of March 11. This left the decision on accepting or rejecting

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⁶⁷CCQT, “Procès-verbal No. 5,” 17 mars 1919, RAC, IV, C(8), 17-21; “Rapport du Comité central des Questions territoriales au Conseil Suprême relativement aux frontières éventuelles de la Grèce avec les pays ennemis (Bulgarie),” ibid., pp. 46-50 (the report itself, without the annex, is given in Frangulis, La Grèce, II, 48-49, where the date of the report is incorrectly given as June 1); Drake, “Bulgaria,” pp. 103-04; P. Helmreich, From Paris, pp. 86-87; Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, pp. 158-59.

⁶⁸P. Helmreich, From Paris, pp. 87-88; Nicolson, Peacemaking, pp. 284-85 (diary entry for March 16, 1919) and 288ff. (diary entries for March 24-28, 1919); Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, pp. 183-84.

⁶⁹P. Helmreich, From Paris, pp. 89ff.; Lloyd George, Truth, II, 1249; Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, pp. 172; Walworth, Wilson, p. 352.
the Greek commission’s recommendations to a higher level without letting the Italians know of the recent agreement.\textsuperscript{70}

On May 14 and 16, the Council of Five discussed all the Bulgarian frontiers. On the latter date, it confirmed on Sonnino’s initiative the American reservation in the Central Territorial Committee’s report and agreed to postpone consideration of Western Thrace until the fate of Constantinople and its hinterland had been decided by the Supreme Council.\textsuperscript{71} The Supreme Council agreed in turn to postpone discussion of the future of Turkey pending clarification of the American attitude on mandates, and no decision was forthcoming before the heads of the American, British and Italian governments left Paris after the signature of the Treaty of Versailles with Germany on June 28.\textsuperscript{72}

The problem of the southern frontier of Bulgaria would not wait however. The drafting of the Bulgarian peace treaty was otherwise almost complete, and the Peace Conference’s new directing body, the Council of Heads of Delegation, was anxious to dispose of it as well as the other treaties. The Council therefore referred the whole matter of Bulgaria’s frontiers back to the Central Territorial Committee on July 2.\textsuperscript{73} Eight days later, it directed all commissions dealing with Bulgarian peace terms to submit final reports by July 25 and agreed to invite the Bulgarian government to send a delegation to Paris on that same date.\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{70} Rapport du Comité central des Questions territoriales au Conseil Suprême relativement aux frontières éventuelles de la Grèce avec les pays ennemis (Bulgarie),” n.d., (English version in 92/1/4/8017, FO 608/37, PRO; P. Helmreich, From Paris, p. 88; Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, p. 159.

\textsuperscript{71} Secretary’s Notes . . . ., May 16, 1919, FRUS, 1919, PPC, IV, 716-17; Drake, “Bulgaria,” pp. 113-14; Nicolson, Peacemaking, p. 340 (diary entry for May 16, 1919); Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, pp. 170-71.

\textsuperscript{72} Notes . . . ., June 27, 1919, FRUS, 1919, PPC, VI, 729; P. Helmreich, From Paris, p. 123; Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, p. 237.

\textsuperscript{73} Notes . . . ., July 1, 1919, FRUS, 1919, PPC, VII, 5-6; “Notes . . . .,” July 2, 1919, ibid., p. 14; Drake, “Bulgaria,” p. 116; Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, p. 257.

\textsuperscript{74} Notes . . . ., July 10, 1919, FRUS, 1919, PPC, VII, 89; Drake, “Bulgaria,” pp. 116-17.
The Central Territorial Committee encountered unexpected difficulties over Western Thrace. Although the Americans had maintained all along that no final decisions on any part of Thrace could be taken until the fate of Constantinople had been definitely settled, they had never challenged the principle, unanimously accepted by the Greek commission, that most of Western Thrace should go to Greece. Mezes' reservation to that commission's report was designed to open the way for a compromise on Greek claims in Asia Minor and Northern Epirus, but the refusal to either accept or reject its recommendations could be extended to Thrace as well. In any case, Mezes was no longer the American member of the Central Territorial Committee. Archibald C. Coolidge had taken his place and Major Douglas W. Johnson, chief of the ACTNP's Division of Boundary Geography and influential with Wilson, acted as special spokesman on Bulgarian problems.

On July 9, the Americans agreed to an Italian suggestion that would have pushed the southern frontier of Bulgaria recommended by Britain and France further south and left her a corridor to the Aegean. Two days later, however, they refused to agree to the cession of any of Western or Eastern Thrace to Greece and advocated the retention by Bulgaria of the 1915 frontier. Johnson pointed out the future threat to peace involved in such a cession of Bulgarian territory and said the American delegation "cannot admit that it would be wise to deprive Bulgaria of an outlet to the Aegean." The Italians fully supported the Americans and reversed their own previous position, claiming that Venizelos' letter from the Moslem deputies had in fact proved to be a forgery. Nicolson, who handled the Anglo-Greek case at the meeting, was aghast. He energetically protested against the new American proposal and especially against the principle involved in the

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75P. Helmreich, *From Paris*, pp. 89 and 154.


American representative on one commission repudiating an agreement come to with the American representative on another. He then went on to declare

Bulgaria was not at war with the United States, but she was the enemy of France, Great Britain, and Greece and it would be absolutely unjust for these three Powers to confer these advantages on their former enemy.

Coolidge could only reply, "It is not a question of giving to, but taking from, Bulgaria."

Nicolson now tried a new tack, indicating that British policy on reparations and other economic questions had been largely determined by the consideration that Bulgaria would be punished by cessions of territory; if Western Thrace remained Bulgarian, Britain might revise her opinion on the other clauses.\(^\text{78}\)

On the fifteenth, Venizelos again laid his case before the Committee but this did nothing to bring the opposing viewpoints closer together.\(^\text{79}\) It was obvious that unanimity could not be achieved and two days later the Committee drafted its report to include both the proposed frontiers and the considerations on which they were based. The Americans and Italians argued that economic, political and historical factors as well as the present ethnography all favored the maintenance of the existing frontier in the south. The British and French, in upholding the Greek commission's original recommendation, sought to rebut these arguments, insisting in particular that Bulgaria had lost all moral and historical title to Western Thrace by her abuse of the generosity shown her by her former allies in

\(^{78}\)CCQT, "Procès-verbal No. 16," 11 juillet 1919, RAC, IV, C(8), 90-95; Nicolson to Crowe, Paris, July 11, 1919, 120/6/1/15321, FO 608/55, PRO; Drake, "Bulgaria," pp. 120ff.; Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, pp. 257-58; Walworth, Wilson, p. 465; Nicolson's threat to hold the reparations and other economic clauses of the Bulgarian peace treaty hostage to the cession of Western Thrace to Greece was not acted upon; by the end of July unanimous reports on these clauses had been submitted by the relevant commissions and approved by the Council without much further ado; at this time the Thracian question was still far from resolution: Drake Bulgaria, pp. 194ff.; nor does the basis of this threat—a linkage in British policy between the territorial and other clauses—appear very real; Nicolson did not mention this factor in his exhaustive memo of July 15: see pp. 294-295 below; but cf. Dockrill and Goold, Peace, p. 100, who seem to accept Nicolson's statement at face value; they appear to misattribute it to Crowe however, while the memo in question only informs him of what went on in the commission that day; they also quote Balfour's statement in the Council on August 1 that it was generally agreed that Bulgaria should pay as much as she could but that her capacity would be exhausted long before her moral responsibility.

1913 and that she should not be rewarded with an actual increase in territory by retaining the additional portion gained in 1915. Accepting the "Turkish" statistics of 1910 at face value, the two delegations also decried taking account of the exodus of Greeks from the area since then as putting "a premium on persecution." As for the aspirations of the Moslem population, they adduced the evidence of the letter of the eight Moslem deputies.\(^{80}\)

Just when the deadlock seemed complete however, Venizelos was finally able to reach the long-sought accommodation with Italy. The Greek landing at Smyrna had been accompanied by atrocities against the Turks\(^{81}\) and further Greek advances resulted in friction with the Italians, who also had troops in Asia Minor. Venizelos had to accept a commission of inquiry into the former\(^{82}\) but managed to turn the latter to better account. A new Italian government led by Francesco Nitti took a much more moderate view of the country's capabilities and ambitions than its predecessor. The contrast between the conciliatory new foreign minister Tommasso Tittoni and the highly nationalistic and imperialistic Sonnino was especially marked. Arriving in Paris on June 27, Tittoni quickly sought out Balfour, Clemenceau and Lansing and expressed his desire for a complete and friendly understanding with Britain and France. Although unwilling to withdraw Italian troops from Asia Minor, he made clear his disapproval of their dispatch in the first place. He recognized that the Italian occupation of portions of Asia Minor did

\(^{80}\)CCQT, "Procès-verbal No. 18," 17 juillet 1919, RAC, IV, C(8), 103-05 (see also the annex "Projet de rapport sur les frontières bulgares, ibid., pp. 105-07); CCQT, "Procès-verbal No. 19," 19 juillet 1919, ibid., pp. 108-09; "Rapport au Conseil Suprême relativement aux frontières bulgares," ibid., pp. 110-14 (also in DBFP, I, 169-74; a portion of the section on Thrace is also in Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, pp. 261-64; English version in 81/1/14/16105, FO 608/33, PRO; W19/108133/12486, FO 371/3588, ibid.; and No. 61, FO 374/21, ibid.; English translation in FRUS, 1919, PPC, VII, 242-48); Drake, "Bulgaria," pp. 122ff.; the discussions in the Central Territorial Committee during July are also summarized in P. Helmreich, From Paris, pp. 153-55.


\(^{82}\)P. Helmreich, From Paris, p. 120; Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, p. 250; M. L. Smith, Ionian Vision, pp. 111ff.; Walworth, Wilson, p. 355.
not prejudge the final territorial dispositions and pledged that no further advance would be made. At a meeting on July 1, Balfour encouraged him when he expressed a desire for talks with Venizelos.  

After an affray on July 10 between Greek and Italian troops in the vicinity of Aidin, a town which itself was the scene of bitter fighting and mutual atrocities between Greeks and Turks, Italy and Greece both lodged protests with the Peace Conference and asked for a delimitation of their respective zones of occupation. On the fifteenth, Venizelos accused the Italians in a letter to the Council of encouraging the Turks. He had long been complaining of Italian intrigues with everyone from the Albanians to the Turks, including the Bulgarians, and information on Italian partiality toward the Bulgarians as well as the Turks continued to arrive in the first half of July. At the Council's meeting on July 15, Clemenceau produced a telegram from the head of the French military mission in Athens purporting to contain a report from a Bulgarian envoy in Rome on an interview with Nitti, during which the latter said that he and the Italian representatives at the Peace Conference would do everything possible to defend Bulgarian interests. Clemenceau gave copies of this telegram to Balfour and Henry White, now head of the American delegation, remarking to Tittoni that he would not give one to him too "parce que je ne veux pas vous faire de chagrin." Clemenceau suggested, perhaps half in jest, that Italy mediate between Greece and Bulgaria.

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85 Clemenceau to Balfour, Paris, July 15, 1919, enclosing Chef Mission à Guerre, Athens, July 12, 1919, 81/1/11/15503, FO 608/33, PRO (a slightly different version of the latter is also in 81/1/11/15431, ibid.); see also "Notes . . . ," July 15, 1919, FRUS, 1919, PPC, VII, 136-38 (no mention of the particular message from Athens is made in the minutes of the discussion); British Delegation minute, July 17, 1919, 81/1/11/15431, FO 608/33, PRO; Albrecht-Carrié, Italy, 233ff.; P. Helmreich, From Paris, pp. 159-60; Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, pp. 251ff. and 259.
The next day, Balfour proposed that the staff of British Field Marshal Allenby, the commander in chief of Allied troops in the Asian part of the Ottoman Empire, work out the lines of demarcation. The Italians were not anxious for the pro-Greek British to be responsible for this task, and Tittoni suggested that Italy and Greece try to solve the problem by themselves. Two days later, Tittoni and Venizelos reported to the Council an agreement establishing the boundary between the Italian and Greek zones and leaving the decision as to the other limits to Allenby.86

This arrangement overcame the crisis which had been the immediate occasion for the Greek-Italian conversations, but the negotiations continued, culminating in the signature of a supposedly secret agreement on July 29. The so-called Tittoni-Venizelos Agreement embodied a broad settlement of all the points of discord between the two countries. Italy promised to fully support before the Peace Conference Greek claims in Eastern and Western Thrace and Northern Epirus. In return, Greece undertook to support Italian claims to a mandate over Albania and sovereignty over Valona; the Corfu Channel was to be neutralized. Further, Greece would renounce in favor of Italy a small area in Asia Minor if her own claims in Thrace and Epirus were recognized, while Italy renounced in favor of Greece all the islands which she occupied in the Aegean with the exception of Rhodes. Both countries reserved the right to resume complete freedom of action if Italy did not secure her claims in Asia Minor or Greece hers in Thrace and Epirus. Tittoni thus succeeded where Sonnino had failed for the simple reason that he was willing to give up some of Italy's more ambitious claims and, as a corollary, drop support for some of Bulgaria’s. The preliminary arrangement on occupation zones, however, constituted recognition by the Council of the Italian fait accompli in Asia Minor, and by disposing of other quarrels with the agreement of July 29, Italy was better able to concentrate her energies on the Adriatic dispute with Yugoslavia. Greece stood to

gain much more under the agreement, which was a written recognition of her many claims. Indeed, its first, and only, concrete effects were felt in the inter-Allied controversy over Thrace.

The British, who were kept fully informed of the negotiations by Venizelos, could only welcome his agreement with Tittoni. This was particularly true in regard to Thrace, for while the Greeks were settling with the Italians, the British were making only slow progress with the Americans. Even before the Central Territorial Committee had drafted its report, Venizelos urged the British, in what Crowe called a “most moving” appeal, to have Balfour speak to the Americans and take a firm line in support of Greek claims in Thrace. He said it would be a calamity to merely cede Western Thrace to the Allied Powers as a group with its ultimate fate left open until the whole Turkish question was settled (a solution which had been mooted by Tardieu on July 11). He had to return to Greece after the signature of the Bulgarian treaty at the latest, and he could not go absolutely empty-handed. None of the other Greek claims would have been settled by this time, and he would therefore be in an impossible situation and almost certainly have to resign. This in turn would produce a real danger of the restoration of Constantine. And all this to please, or not offend, the Bulgarians! Crowe thought these views deserved the utmost consideration. As early as July 11, in fact, he had himself suggested to Balfour a direct appeal to Wilson in Washington.

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88 Clemenceau was as well; P. Helmreich, *From Paris*, p. 165; Petsalis-Diomidis, *Greece*, pp. 253.


90 Minute by Crowe, July 16, 1919, 120/6/1/15322, FO 608/55, PRO.

91 Crowe to Balfour, July 11, 1919, 120/6/1/15321, FO 608/55, PRO.
Balfour tried to “speak to the Americans” on July 21 in the Council. Tittoni, who was known to be in contact with Venizelos, reported to his colleagues that the Greeks would in no way abate their claims in Thrace; the question would have to be settled by the Council. Balfour proposed to do just that, emphasizing the imminence of the Bulgarian delegation’s arrival and the dependence of the whole treaty on the frontier question. The Council, already in receipt of the Central Territorial Committee’s report, thereupon decided to set aside its agenda to discuss the Committee’s recommendations. Tardieu even gave a none too impartial exposition on the alternative proposals for Bulgaria’s southern frontier. But when Balfour and Clemenceau wished to continue the discussion, White said he would need further instructions from his government before he could discuss Western Thrace. It was agreed this should be the first item on the agenda for July 25.\(^\text{92}\)

White had still not received his instructions by this date, and Balfour now decided to make the appeal to Wilson. Perhaps unfortunately, he chose to do this via Colonel House, who had worked closely with the British throughout the Conference but had now fallen out of Wilson’s good graces.\(^\text{93}\) In a long letter to House, who was then in England,\(^\text{94}\) Balfour reviewed the history of the question of Western Thrace at the Peace Conference and reiterated the British standpoint. He asked that, in view of the urgency of the matter, his views be transmitted to Wilson so that the American delegates could be instructed “to maintain the decision of March on the Greco-Bulgarian frontier.”\(^\text{95}\)

\(^{92}\)Notes . . . ,” July 21, 1919, FRUS, 1919, PPC, VII, 233-35; White to Wilson, 3240, Paris, July 20, 1919, PWW, LXI, 566-68; White to Wilson, 3256, Paris, July 22, 1919, ibid., pp. 588-93; Drake, “Bulgaria,” pp. 128ff.; P. Helmreich, From Paris, p. 155; Tillman, Anglo-American Relations, p. 387; White also told Wilson that the American Commissioners and experts were against the cession of Western Thrace: White to Wilson, 3240, Paris, July 20, 1919, PWW, LXI, 566-68.


\(^{94}\)Walworth, Wilson, pp. 537ff.

In any case, this appeal was unnecessary for on the same day, July 25, Wilson finally dispatched White instructions which, while not countermanding the stand taken on the eleventh, changed the terms of the dispute sufficiently to open the way for a compromise. For Wilson did not entirely agree with his subordinates. He now expressed his concern that the assignment of Western Thrace to either Greece or Bulgaria would cause great bitterness between them. He therefore instructed the American delegation to insist that both Western and Eastern Thrace be made part of the international state at the Straits.\(^\text{96}\) White and his fellow plenipotentiaries in Paris were extremely reluctant to consider such a solution. Their determination not to give Western Thrace to Greece was strengthened by the violence which had accompanied the Greek landing at Smyrna. Plenipotentiary General Tasker H. Bliss noted in his diary on July 28, "We all believe that to give Western Thrace to Greece will result in even worse conditions than have resulted by giving Smyrna to Greece."\(^\text{97}\) On the other hand, they were convinced that to demand the inclusion of so much territory in the international state, the mandate for which was earmarked for the United States, would be regarded as a sign of American greed. They therefore decided to try to seek a solution which would leave at least part of Thrace to Bulgaria.\(^\text{98}\)

After a clash between White and Venizelos over the letter of the Moslem deputies,\(^\text{99}\) the Council resumed its discussion of Western Thrace on July 31. Tardieu


\(^{97}\)P. Helmreich, \textit{From Paris}, p. 155.

\(^{98}\)P. Helmreich, \textit{From Paris}, p. 155.

started off with a defense of Greek claims in a statement more remarkable for its enthusiasm than its cogency. He concluded by saying there was nothing to be gained from rewarding Bulgaria for aggression, violence and crime. White adhered to the position that Western Thrace should remain Bulgarian. He defended Bulgaria’s legal, ethnographic, and economic claims, stressing the obstacle to the reconciliation of the Balkan peoples and the threat to future peace which would be created by depriving her of this area. He asked whether the purpose was to punish her for joining the Central Powers and reminded the Council that punitive annexations of territory were in flagrant contradiction to the principles upon which they had agreed to make peace. Balfour agreed that it was wrong to cede territory for solely punitive reasons but stated that when other circumstances equalized one another, it had been the policy of the Peace Conference to give the benefit of the doubt to friend rather than foe. Furthermore,

...[i]n the whole war there had been no action more cynical and more disastrous than that undertaken by the Bulgarians. Had the Bulgarians not behaved as they had, Turkey would not have entered the war; the disastrous Gallipoli Campaign would not have taken place; the war would have ended years sooner, and needless suffering would have been saved.

Balfour recognized the validity of the objection as to the danger to peace which would result if Bulgaria lost Western Thrace but thought if she obtained the Southern Dobruja, which he hoped she would, she would actually be larger than before the war. The rest of Balfour’s remarks were a repetition of familiar arguments, and the majority of the other interventions in the discussion were of a similar nature. Tittoni, of course, now did nothing to come to the Americans’ aid. He tacitly accepted the cession of Western Thrace to Greece and confined himself to proposing a partition of Eastern Thrace west of the Enos-Midia line between Bulgaria and Greece. Deprived of even this support and seeing no other way out of the impasse, White finally revealed Wilson’s suggestion to transfer Western Thrace to the international state. Clemenceau immediately objected to this
proposal on the ground that it would make the Constantinople mandate too diverse and unwieldy.100

Nevertheless, Wilson’s suggestion proved to be the turning point in the dispute. The Americans having retreated from the principle that no change should be made in Bulgaria’s southern frontier, it remained only to work out a compromise solution which would put as few Bulgarians as possible under Greek sovereignty and guarantee Bulgaria’s access to the Aegean. Little progress in this direction was made in the Central Territorial Committee on August 5 when it considered the new American and Italian proposals as the experts clung to their positions.101 But on the same day Balfour again “spoke to the Americans” and proposed to Frank Polk, the new head of the American delegation,102 that the Bulgarian hinterland of Western Thrace be “restored” to Bulgaria and the Greek coast ceded to Greece as a line of communication with Eastern Thrace. It was Venizelos, however, who blocked Balfour’s proposal, suggesting instead an autonomous Thrace under Greek sovereignty.103

Neither of these proposals provided for Bulgarian access to the Aegean, and the British were becoming hard pressed to meet American arguments in this regard. At a meeting together with their experts on the morning of August 7 devoted to the Thracian question, Balfour seemed to Polk much impressed by the objections to cutting Bulgaria off from the Aegean. Afterwards Nicolson and Johnson jointly prepared a solution

100 “Notes . . . ,” July 31, 1919, FRUS, 1919, PPC, VII, 439; Drake, “Bulgaria,” pp. 133ff.; P. Helmreich, From Paris, p. 156; Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, pp. 265-66; White was undoubtedly reluctant to put forward this suggestion as he had recently hotly denied Clemenceau’s contention that the United States had an appetite for mandates: White to Wilson, 3240, Paris, July 20, 1919, PWW, LXI, 566-68.


102 Walworth, Wilson, p. 439; Polk was also against the cession of Western Thrace to Greece: telegram from Polk, No. 3441, Paris, August 1, 1919, PWW, LXII, 110-11.

providing for a corridor to the Aegean including Dedeagach under full Bulgarian sovereignty, some of Western around Porto Lagos and much of Eastern Thrace going to Greece. Venizelos, however, refused to accept the experts' scheme when they presented it to him that afternoon, because it left most of Western Thrace to Bulgaria. But he said Greece would make no trouble if this solution were imposed upon her. Balfour, on the other hand, approved the idea but was unwilling to press it against Venizelos' wishes. The deadlock seemed complete, but, as will be seen, the idea of a "Bulgarian corridor to the sea" lived yet awhile longer.

By this time the Americans were getting a bit suspicious. During the meeting with Nicolson and Johnson, Venizelos made certain remarks which confirmed Johnson in his belief that there was a secret agreement on Thrace. After they left Venizelos, Johnson "drew" from Nicolson the "admission" that early in the war Lloyd George had promised Venizelos Western and Eastern Thrace up to the Enos-Midia line and the Vilayet of Aidin in Asia Minor if he brought Greece in on the Allied side. Nicolson was evasive as to whether the French and Italians were similarly committed, but he said that because of this agreement Britain could never impose on Greece a frontier which Venizelos would not accept. Although the agreement was secret and purely informal, and not binding in the same sense as the Treaty of London, Greek leaders knew of it and Venizelos would fall if it were not fulfilled. When Johnson said he could not see how America could consent to a solution based on a secret agreement, Nicolson replied that Britain would sign the treaty without her. The next day Polk had Johnson ask Nicolson about this last point again. Nicolson said that Balfour thought it would be a disaster for America not to sign but that if she insisted on a solution Venizelos could not accept, Balfour was certainly prepared to sign without her.

104 "Notes . . .," August 7, 1919, FRUS, 1919, PPC, VII, 608; Polk to Lansing, No. 3547, Paris, August 7, 1919, PWW, LXII, 207; Polk to Wilson, No. 3582, Paris, August 8, 1919, ibid., pp. 238-40; Drake, "Bulgaria," pp. 147-48; Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, p. 268; Walworth, Wilson, p. 466.
Polk did not take this threat seriously but was now prepared to believe that British "military and technical experts" as well as French experts, including General Le Rond, who had also just confirmed to Johnson the existence of an oral agreement between his country and Greece, "were personally strongly opposed to giving Thrace to Greece." It seemed clear to him that the British, at least, recognized "the strength and justice of the American position and would welcome a compromise" acceptable to the Americans but were embarrassed by their agreement with Venizelos. The American experts were now convinced that the arguments of their British and French counterparts regarding ethnography and Moslem wishes were designed to give the appearance of conformity with Wilsonian principles.\(^{105}\)

Venizelos, Balfour and Nicolson, it seems, had put on something of a charade for the Americans, the Greek feigning willingness to accept an "imposed" settlement and the Britons pretending to be sympathetic to the American viewpoint but to have had their hands tied by Lloyd George's agreement with Venizelos. For there can be no doubt that there was no "agreement." Britain, it is true, had considered offering Greece territory in Thrace after the fall of Venizelos in 1915 but had not actually done so.\(^{106}\) Nicolson, indeed, "understood that the agreement regarding Thrace was verbal and not written and he added Lloyd George had made it impulsively and 'on the sly.'"\(^{107}\) But Venizelos did not mention any "agreement" in his letter to Lloyd George in November 1918,\(^{108}\) nor did Nicolson adduce it in a memo to Balfour in July 1919.\(^{109}\) Nicolson undoubtedly made the story up out of whole cloth, possibly with the connivance of at least Venizelos. But the

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\(^{105}\)Polk to Wilson, No. 3582, Paris, August 8, 1919, \textit{PWW}, LXII, 238-40; Petsalis-Diomidis, \textit{Greece}, p. 268.

\(^{106}\)See p. 56 above.

\(^{107}\)Polk to Wilson, No. 3582, Paris, August 8, 1919, \textit{PWW}, LXII, 238-40.

\(^{108}\)See pp. 111-112 above.

\(^{109}\)See pp. 294-295 below.
whole show produced the desired effect for it fed the darkest American suspicions about the Old Diplomacy, secret agreements and the wily Lloyd George. Polk, if not Johnson, was now forced to recognize that it was useless trying to argue the case on its merits and that most of Thrace would have to go to Greece. It only remained to try to save what he could for Bulgaria.

In the Council on August 7, the French also tried to block the corridor idea. Tardieu did not think much of the idea, and Clemenceau declared his determination that no territorial reward be given Bulgaria. Tardieu brought forward an alternative plan for securing Bulgaria's access to the Aegean: the whole of Western and Eastern Thrace would be placed under Greek sovereignty but Dedeagach would be made a free city and administered, together with its rail link to Bulgaria, by an international commission. Polk rejected this solution. "His instructions from President Wilson were very clear that a large Bulgarian population was not to be handed over to Greece." He then proceeded to combine the ideas of a corridor and international administration into another international state, which would encompass Adrianople and a portion of Western Thrace including Dedeagach and the railway. The rest of Western Thrace and the part of Eastern Thrace between the two international states would go to Greece. Polk immediately asked Wilson for approval of his proposal. Here the American played a little game of his own, telling Wilson that the idea, which he now saw as almost the last hope for an agreement, was Tardieu's rather than his own.

The British and French accepted this compromise. Venizelos, who had been criticized in January by the Greek press for the moderation of his claims and now foresaw

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10See Polk to Wilson, No. 3582, Paris, August 8, 1919, PWW, LXII, 238-40.


112Polk to Wilson, No. 3582, Paris, August 8, 1919, PWW, LXII, 238-40.
an adverse public reaction to his failure to realize them in Western Thrace, was brought along somewhat reluctantly.\textsuperscript{113} The Central Territorial Committee failed at its meeting on the twelfth to agree on exactly which districts should be given to Greece rather than the projected international states in Thrace.\textsuperscript{114} But later the same day the Council was again able to arrive at a compromise. It decided that Greece should obtain at least the districts of Xanthi and Gumuldjina in Western Thrace and all of Eastern Thrace, with the exception of Adrianople (which would go to the new international state), between the existing Turkish-Bulgarian frontier and a line from the Gulf of Xeros to south of Midia. Furthermore, it was agreed that Polk would confer with Venizelos, explain both his own and Tardieu's proposals to him and submit them to Wilson, informing Venizelos that he was also free to communicate directly with the President.\textsuperscript{115}

That same day, Lansing cabled Polk that Wilson was determined that Eastern Thrace should be part of the Constantinople state, with either Bulgaria getting a corridor between it and Greece or the state extending all the way to Kavalla as a Bulgarian outlet.\textsuperscript{116} Polk nonetheless submitted the two proposals to Washington after consulting with Venizelos\textsuperscript{117} and recommended acceptance of the second international state as the best solution so far proposed.\textsuperscript{118} No reply had been received from Washington when


Venizelos addressed a letter to the Council on August 24 stating his preference for the Tardieu scheme. In order to facilitate a settlement, however, he was prepared to accept the other plan on condition that Greece be accorded the right of commercial and military transit across the international state and through the port of Rodosto in time of war as well as peace and that the Greek and Moslem refugees from Western Thrace be allowed to return to their homes in the international state. Wilson’s response to the Council’s proposals was sent on the twenty-eighth. He rejected both schemes and reiterated his view that both Western and Eastern Thrace should be incorporated into the international state of Constantinople. He, however, was willing to recognize Greek claims to the extent that this would not impair the interest of formulating a permanent peace and agreed to the cession of the western part of Western Thrace to Greece.

When the Thracian question finally came before the Council again on September 1, it therefore seemed as if they were back to the old impasse. Clemenceau rejected Wilson’s solution outright, saying that it would be extremely dangerous “to ask the Commissioner at Constantinople to take charge of an area containing 700,000 Greeks and 700,000 Turks who would be in a continual state of warfare.” Tittoni moved for adjournment, but Balfour reminded his colleagues of the Bulgarian delegation waiting for its treaty. He refrained from expressing an opinion on the final disposition of the area but now formally made the proposal which would at least settle the matter as far as Bulgaria was concerned. Proceeding from the fact that everyone was in any case agreed that Bulgaria would not retain Western Thrace, he suggested that a line be adopted as the southern frontier of Bulgaria and Bulgaria obliged to surrender all territory to the south of

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it to the Allies for eventual disposition. This scheme was acceptable to the Americans, who could regard it as a first step toward the creation of the Constantinople state. The Council therefore agreed that the Central Territorial Committee should delineate a boundary line as the southern frontier of Bulgaria. The ceded territory would be occupied by Allied troops, Greek forces being kept in the portion which now by general agreement was to be assigned to Greece. The treaty was to stipulate, however, for Bulgarian access to a port on the Aegean.¹²¹

The Central Territorial Committee completed its report on the southern frontier of Bulgaria the very same day. It was able to act with such alacrity because the line which it now unanimously recommended was, with but slight modifications, the same as that originally proposed by the British and French delegations as the frontier with Greece (see Map 8).¹²² This line was unanimously adopted by the Council as well the following day. At the same time the Council also assigned the Committee the question of assuring Bulgaria “free economic access to the Aegean Sea.”¹²³ This matter had already been considered by the Peace Conference’s Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways, which in June accepted an Anglo-Greek proposal for an international commission to guarantee Bulgarian access to the port of Dedeagach should Western Thrace be ceded to Greece.¹²⁴ But in view of the fact that this contingency was not now to arise, on


September 5 the Council accepted without discussion the Central Territorial Committee's draft of an article which simply provided for Bulgarian recognition of the future settlement in regard to the ceded territories in Western Thrace and an Allied guarantee, the conditions of which would be fixed at a later date, of "freedom of the economic outlets of Bulgaria to the Aegean Sea" (see Appendix IV for text).\footnote{Notes . . . , September 5, 1919, FRUS, 1919, PPC, VIII, 124 (the text of Article 48 is in DBFP, I, 642; English translation in Appendix D to HD-48, FRUS, 1919, PPC, VIII, pp. 126-27); Drake, "Bulgaria," pp. 174-75.} \footnote{Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, p. 274.}

This seemed to end the problem for the purposes of the Bulgarian treaty. But Venizelos was dissatisfied,\footnote{Supplementary Remarks on the Peace Conditions With Bulgaria, Greek Delegation to the Peace Conference, Paris, September 13, 1919, Appendix C to HD-55, FRUS, 1919, PPC, VIII, 242-43; Drake, "Bulgaria," p. 157 (where a supposed discrepancy in the date of this request is also discussed); Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, p. 276.} and on September 13 he addressed a letter to the Committee requesting further rectifications of the old Greek-Bulgarian frontier in Greece's favor.\footnote{CCQT, Sous-Commission de la Thrace, "Procès-verbal No. 24," 15 septembre 1919, RAC, IV, C(8), 134-36; "Note au Conseil Suprême," le 15 septembre 1919, Annexe, ibid., p. 137; Drake, "Bulgaria," pp. 157-58; Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, pp. 276-77.} The Committee recommended acceptance of this request, which it found ethnographically justified.\footnote{Notes . . . , September 17, 1919, FRUS, 1919, PPC, VIII, 235; Drake, "Bulgaria," p. 158; Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, p. 277.} This occasioned one last passage of arms in the Council. On September 17, the Italians made a suggestion of their own for a modification of the new frontier in Western Thrace in favor of Bulgaria. Polk countered even more effectively by observing that it would be inconvenient to alter a line already unanimously adopted. The Council rejected both the Greek and the Italian proposal.\footnote{Notes . . . , September 17, 1919, FRUS, 1919, PPC, VIII, 235; Drake, "Bulgaria," p. 158; Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, p. 277.}

Meanwhile, the inter-Allied struggle over the final disposition of the Bulgarian territory to be ceded in Western Thrace continued. On September 1, Tardieu sent Polk a
note after the Council meeting setting forth the objections of Clemenceau and Balfour to Wilson’s proposed large international state, emphasizing the injustice to Greece of such a solution. Tardieu addressed another note to Polk on September 4 containing an alternative: Greece to acquire all the ceded territory in Western Thrace plus Eastern Thrace up to a line running north from the eastern end of the Gulf of Xeros, with the areas of mixed nationality to be given autonomy and Dedeagach to be a free city under the League of Nations. The international state would thus be greatly reduced. Polk told Tardieu he did not think Wilson would accept this arrangement.

Wilson, however, never got to consider it. When the proposal reached Washington, he was away touring the country to rally support for the Treaty of Versailles. Polk agreed that its submission could await his return, but Wilson was paralyzed by a stroke in early October while still on the road and his involvement in affairs greatly diminished. Venizelos, of course, was the most disappointed of all with Wilson’s position, but an appeal from him to the President on September 27 likewise remained unanswered.

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131 Polk to Lansing, No. 4104 Confidential, Paris, September 8, 1919, PWW, LXIII, 120-22; Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, pp. 275-76.


133 Walworth, Wilson, p. 541.

134 According to Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, pp. 273, Wilson’s proposal of August 28 “threw the Greek delegates into panic.”

135 Venizelos to Wilson, Paris, September 27, 1919, PWW, LXIV, 157-64; this letter, which was given to House for personal transmittal, did not find its way to Wilson for over two months and was then returned to the State Department for future reference: Phillips to Tumulty, Washington, December 8, 1919, ibid., p. 157; Tumulty to Lansing, The White House, December 11, 1919, ibid., p. 182; see also Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, p. 278; on Greek lobbying in the U.S. Congress, see ibid., p. 275.
Venizelos was more successful in reassuring himself of high-level British support. During the second week of September, he visited Lloyd George, absent from the Peace Conference since the end of June, while the latter was on vacation in Normandy. On the ninth, they discussed Greece's claims before the Conference during a conversation at which Lloyd George's old friend Stavridi acted as interpreter and at which Hankey was also present. After talking about Smyrna, the two prime ministers moved on to Western Thrace. Venizelos recounted the history of Greece's intervention in the war, emphasizing her military contribution to the Allies both before and after its end. He dwelled on the point that his own position would become impossible if Greece were not given Western Thrace after so many sacrifices. He criticized both Polk's proposal for a Bulgarian corridor to Dedeagach and Wilson's idea that Western Thrace would be necessary to the mandatory power at Constantinople. Venizelos told Lloyd George about his own offer to put Dedeagach and the railway under the League of Nations and, in reply to a suggestion by Lloyd George, said he was prepared to make Western Thrace an autonomous province of Greece and that he thought Clemenceau would make such a proposal. Venizelos also reviewed the ethnographic and strategic aspects of the question, assuring Lloyd George that the Greeks were multiplying faster than the Bulgarians and that they would be able to defend the frontier they claimed in the north.\footnote{Notes of a Conversation between the Prime Minister and M. Venizelos at the Manoir de Clairfontaine, Hennequeville, Normandy on Friday, September 9, 1919 at 2 p.m., CAB 21/153, PRO.}

Lloyd George does not seem to have given Venizelos any renewed commitments on this occasion, and the two of them went over much the same ground at the end of the following month in London. At this time, Lloyd George said that he understood Venizelos' position and that it was the policy of Britain to assist and support Greece and especially Venizelos as a close and friendly ally.\footnote{Note of an Interview between the Prime Minister and M. Venizelos at 10, Downing Street, October 31, 1919, F/92/125, LGP; Lloyd George gave a similar assurance in writing on November 17, 1919: Kitsikis, Propagande, p. 372; this message is wrongly attributed to late 1918 in Montgomery, "Lloyd George," p. 259.}

The strength of this support in
Western Thrace was not tested for some time however, as the Allies did not take up the question of its ultimate disposal until after the signature of the peace treaty with Bulgaria.

**The Western Frontier**

On February 16 it was the turn of the Yugoslavs to present their claims to the Council of Ten. Like Venizelos, the Yugoslav delegates had submitted to the Peace Conference a memorandum on their claims prior to their oral presentation. They sought for their new state extensive frontiers uniting Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Slovenian provinces of Austria, the Banat and other parts of southern Hungary with prewar Serbia and Montenegro. They rested their claims primarily on ethnographic grounds but also advanced strategic and economic arguments. The Council immediately decided to turn Yugoslavia’s claims over to the same commission considering Rumania’s, which then became the Commission on Rumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs.

Although Serbian experts regarded the Shops of northwest and west central Bulgaria and the Macedonian Slavs of the southwest as Serbs, Serbian statesmen were mainly concerned about strategic requirements on the eastern frontier. Pashitch would have liked to eliminate Bulgaria entirely as a political and military factor by amputating her western portions but was willing to settle for strengthening Serbian rule in Vardar Macedonia (South Serbia) and securing vital rail lines in the Vardar, Morava and Timok valleys by rolling back the frontier. As early as 1917, the Serbian Supreme Command had prepared plans at his behest for a new eastern frontier. In Paris, after discussions

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139. Secretary’s Notes . . . ,” February 18, 1919, *FRUS, 1919, PPC*, IV, 54-55.

140. See Belitch, *Quelques remarques; Cvijić, Péninsule balkanique; Banac, National Question*, pp. 311-12; and Trgovčević, “Jovan Cvijič,” pp. 209ff.

which pitted the Serbs of the prewar kingdom against the South Slavs of Austria-Hungary, the Yugoslav delegation claimed a strip of territory along the entire Bulgarian frontier from Rumania to Greece up to twenty kilometers wide, including Vidin and the Dragoman Pass and eliminating the Strumitsa salient (see Map 10).

As has been seen, British experts had given some consideration to Serbian claims against Bulgaria in the north, but British thinking on the Serbian-Bulgarian border had long primarily revolved around the idea of satisfying Bulgarian claims against Serbia in the south, i.e. Macedonia. At the beginning of the Peace Conference the Political Section still favored this idea, but quickly began to lose interest in it under the impact of the change of direction at the end of January. In this instance, the Political Section found support in an unaccustomed quarter. The day after the Yugoslavs presented their case to the Council, the General Staff advocated the elimination of the Strumitsa salient by partitioning it between Yugoslavia and Greece at a point east of Yenikeui, a recommendation which precluded any concessions to Bulgaria in Macedonia. Nicolson and Leeper’s proposal in December 1918 for a compromise along the northern sector of the frontier through reciprocal cessions of territory was not taken up by the British Delegation.


143See pp. 50-52 and 120 above.

144Nicolson, Peacemaking, p. 226 (diary entry for January 7, 1919).

145“General Staff Desiderata regarding Territorial Adjustments,” memorandum by Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Chief of the Military Section, British Delegation, Paris, February 19, 1919, No. 40, FO 374/20, PRO.

146See p. 120 above.
The Commission on Rumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs took up the Yugoslav claims against Bulgaria on March 3 and disposed of the matter without much difficulty. This is not to say that the usual cleavage among the Powers did not quickly emerge but it took a greatly attenuated form. Both Day and Crowe thought the line proposed by the Yugoslav delegation went too far. Crowe agreed with Day that the population of the claimed territory was predominantly Bulgarian and also pointed out that the line would leave Sofia strategically exposed and cut the Bulgarian capital’s rail link with Salonika. Martino agreed with these views. Tardieu raised no objection but emphasized Bulgaria’s past treachery and Serbia’s need for greater strategic security. A sub-commission, on which Leeper was assisted by Nicolson and other British experts, was charged with examining the whole question of Yugoslavia’s frontiers.\(^{148}\)

In the sub-commission the only difficulty centered around the area of Tsaribrod and the Dragoman Pass. The French advocated a change giving the town to Yugoslavia but leaving the pass in Bulgaria. The Americans and Italians opposed any change. When the full commission next met on March 5 to consider the sub-commission’s report, Crowe said Britain’s position was still undecided.\(^{149}\) After a further meeting of the sub-commission three days later, Crowe announced on the tenth that Britain accepted the French line. The Americans were now ready to accept the French line if any change were in fact to be made, while the Italians were more definite in reiterating their opposition to such a modification but reluctantly adopted the American view.\(^{150}\)

In its report of April 6 to the Central Territorial Committee on Yugoslav claims, the commission based its recommendations for Bulgaria’s western frontier mainly on

\(^{148}\)CARY, “Procès-verbal no. 10,” 3 mars 1919, RAC, IV, C(4), 93-97; on the subcommission, see “Travaux de la Sous-Commission,” ibid., pp. 425-26; Drake, “Bulgaria,” pp. 94-95; Lederer, Yugoslavia, pp. 178-79; Todorović, “Pitanje,” 94-95 (where the date is incorrectly given as March 2).

\(^{149}\)CARY, “Procès-verbal no. 11,” 5 mars 1919, RAC, IV, C(4), 98-103; Todorović, “Pitanje,” p. 95.

strategic considerations. While recognizing that the territory to be ceded contained a Bulgarian majority, it felt the war had revealed that the existing frontier gave Bulgaria an unfair advantage over Serbia in the facilities which it afforded for cutting the Belgrade-Nish-Üsküb-Salonika railway. Due to the aggressiveness which Bulgaria had shown since 1912, this disadvantage would continue to exist despite the inequality of forces which now prevailed after the creation of Yugoslavia. On the other hand, acceptance of the Yugoslav claims in their entirety would render Bulgaria politically and economically subordinate to Yugoslavia and jeopardize the prospects for a lasting peace. The commission therefore recommended three modifications in the existing frontier (see Map 10). There was unanimity on the elimination of the Strumitsa salient and a rectification in the Bosilegrad sector. The British and French experts felt that the change around Tsaribrod would give the maximum security to both Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, making Pirot less vulnerable but not threatening Sofia. The Americans and Italians thought such a change would in fact expose Sofia and contended the existing frontier should be maintained. They did, however, admit that if any change were made, the line proposed by their colleagues was the best alternative.\footnote{Rapport No. 2 (avec annexes) présenté au Conseil Suprême des Alliés par la Commission pour l’étude des questions territoriales relatives à la Roumanie et à la Yougo-Slavie, Frontières de la Yougoslavie,” 6 avril 1919, RAC, IV, C(4), 221-56 (also in PV, IX.1, 423-58); Drake, “Bulgaria,” pp. 95-96; Lederer, Yugoslavia, pp. 180-81; Todorovic, “Pitanje,” p. 96.}

The Central Territorial Committee approved this report as it stood on April 15 and left it to the foreign ministers to resolve the difference of opinion over Tsaribrod.\footnote{CCQT, “Procès-verbal No. 13,” 15 avril 1919, RAC, IV, C(8), 69; Drake, “Bulgaria,” p. 104.} These recommendations, the rejection of the demand for Vidin in particular, as well as those for Yugoslavia’s other frontiers fell considerably short of her claims. The Serbian members of the Yugoslav delegation were especially dissatisfied and intensified their lobbying. While General Peshitch, the Serbian Chief of Staff, worked on American,
British and French generals, Pashitch appealed to the political leadership. His efforts culminated in a personal meeting with Wilson on April 17.\textsuperscript{153}

The Serbs’ entreaties were not entirely in vain. When the Council of Five considered the matter on May 16, Pichon and Balfour endorsed the recommendations of their subordinates, the latter commenting that “strong frontiers made for peace.” Sonnino evinced concern at this violation of the principle of nationality and wanted to know how many people would be affected. White, however, now gave American assent to the proposed change in the Tsaribrod sector, and the Council accepted the recommended frontier with only Italy dissenting.\textsuperscript{154}

The Yugoslav delegation nevertheless continued to press its case. On May 20, it appeared before the Commission on Rumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs in connection with the Austrian frontier but was invited to review other frontier issues. It modified its claims against Bulgaria only to the extent of reducing them in the Vidin area to a strip of territory six kilometers wide along the river Timok.\textsuperscript{155} Meeting again later on the twentieth, the commission unanimously confirmed its original recommendations on the frontier with Bulgaria after Day rejected even the reduced claim.\textsuperscript{156} On July 9, however, during the Central Territorial Committee’s final review of Bulgarian frontiers, Johnson reluctantly accepted a British and French proposal that Yugoslavia be given a strip three kilometers wide and twenty long on the right bank of the Timok in order to protect the railway on the


other side (see Map 11). Otherwise the original recommendations stood. On August 20, the Council of Heads of Delegations rejected a final attempt by Pashitch to reopen the frontier question.

**Macedonia**

Another casualty of the turnabout in British policy toward Greece was the treatment of the perennial Macedonian question. Despite lingering mutual jealousies and suspicions, the Greek and Yugoslav delegations cooperated on this issue by refraining from raising claims against each other in Macedonia. Pashitch and the Serbs, though determined to get hold of as much of Bulgarian Macedonia as possible, were especially anxious lest the question be reopened in a wider sense. As the British could have foreseen, it was therefore up to the Allied Great Powers to take the initiative in removing what had served as the very fuse of the Balkan powder keg. At the start of the Peace Conference, it looked as though the British Delegation might in fact take, or at least support, such an initiative.

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160 Avramovski, “Nekoi aspekti,” p. 70; Todorović, “Pitanje,” pp. 73 and 101; see also Lederer, Yugoslavia, p. 92; on Greco-Serbian cooperation in propaganda against Bulgaria, see Kitsikis, Propagande, pp. 315ff.

161 Todorović, “Pitanje,” p. 128.


163 See p. 59 above.
For, as has been seen, Foreign Office experts arrived in Paris with the idea that at least the Ishtib and Kochana areas of the uncontested zone should go to Bulgaria. By the end of January, however, any thought of territorial concessions to Bulgaria in Macedonia had evaporated. The British Delegation here proved itself more careful of Yugoslav than Rumanian sensitivities. The fact that the territorial commissions were authorized only to pass judgment on the claims of the smaller Allies did not prevent the question of the Southern Dobruja from being raised. But the British Delegation neither made its own proposal on Kochana and Ishtib nor encouraged direct negotiations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The only modification eventually made to the 1913 territorial settlement favored Yugoslavia rather than Bulgaria.

The British were able to avoid discussion of the wider territorial issue in Macedonia largely because the Americans quickly dropped whatever idea they had had for concessions to Bulgaria in favor of some sort of autonomy for at least Serbian Macedonia within a federated Yugoslav state. Foreign Office experts at Paris, however, continued to dismiss any solution of the Macedonian problem on the lines of autonomy as “impracticable” and became exceedingly hostile to the idea as proposals for such a solution poured into the Conference from Macedonian émigré organizations and other sources. The fact that some of these proposals emanated from Macedonian organizations in Bulgaria or British Bulgarophile circles hardly increased their

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164 See p. 172 above; on the need for taking full account of Bulgaria’s “legitimate” claims in any final settlement of the Macedonian question, see also Great Britain, Foreign Office, Historical Section, Jugo-Slav Movement, p. 3.

165 See pp. 188-200 above; for the treatment of Macedonia at the Peace Conference within the context of the international protection of minorities, see especially Andonov-Poljanski, Velika Britanija and Hristov, “Macedonia;” such protection for the Macedonian Slavs in Yugoslavia was frustrated by the Yugoslav delegation’s position that they were not a minority at all but Serbs: see p. 227 above.

166 Wilkinson, Maps, p. 233; see pp. 227-232 above.

167 See p. 157 above.

168 Minute by Nicolson, January 17, 1919 (initialed by Crowe, January 18, 1919), 104/1/1/210, FO 608/44, PRO; minute by Leeper, March 3, 1919, 104/1/1/3259, ibid.; minute by Crowe, April 4, 1919, 104/1/1/6006, ibid.; Andonov-Poljanski, Velika Britanija, p. 37; Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, p. 66.
attraction. Such an attitude was also partly due to a natural reluctance to open another controversy and "worry" the Yugoslavs even more at a time when their rights in other areas, particularly the Adriatic, were being denied or contested. But even beyond such practical considerations, it must be remembered that any settlement of the differences between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, whether on the basis of autonomy or territorial cessions in Macedonia, could have been perceived as a threat to Greece while the perpetuation of tension between the two Slavic states was a guarantee of Hellenic security. Indeed, the Foreign Office was quick to check on rumors of a Bulgarian-Yugoslav rapprochement.

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169 For appeals from British Bulgarophiles, see, for example, the documents in FO 608/30, 31, 38 and 44; FO 800/215 and 217; and Andonov-Poljanski, Velika Britanija, pp. 74-75, 88-89; for appeals from Macedonian émigré organisations, see pp. 242 and 245 below; for British public support for an autonomous Macedonia, see also Vinaver, "Angliškoto javno mislenje," pp. 29-63.

170 Minute by H. W. V. Temperley, Military Section, June 18, 1919 (initialed by Nicolson), 104/1/1/12749, FO 608/44, PRO.

171 See Paul Mowrer to Chicago News, Paris, June 22, 1919, W19/95522/95522, FO 371/3598, PRO (the Foreign Office received this news dispatch on June 30 and sent copies to the British Delegation, the Director of Military Intelligence, the embassy in Rome and the legation in Belgrade); and de Graz to Curzon, No. 128, Belgrade, July 19, 1919, W19/107145/95522, ibid. (discounting such rumors and reporting Yugoslav denials).
VI: STAMBOLISKY AND THE TREATY OF NEUILLY

The British Delegation followed internal political developments in Bulgaria during 1919 with some satisfaction. For the policy which it was pursuing toward Bulgaria at Paris seemed to be contributing to the political demise of the establishment parties, a prospect which it found in no way disturbing. Just before the Peace Conference, Nicolson and Leeper had recommended that any movement in Bulgaria for placing the country’s institutions on a broader democratic basis should be welcomed and that the permanence of Ferdinand’s abdication should be insisted upon. The Political Section in Paris preferred Daneff and Stambolisky to the “deeply compromised Malinov regime,” and perhaps for this very reason met with equanimity reports from Sofia on the expected political consequences of the projected peace settlement. A British intelligence officer found public opinion “ridiculously optimistic” about the peace terms and believed that the government allowed this false optimism among the people in order to keep itself in power. Sir Harry Lamb, political adviser to the British Military Representative in Sofia, and others confidently predicted that if the terms were unfavorable, the government would

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1“South-Eastern Europe and the Balkans,” memorandum by Nicolson and Leeper, December 1918, P. 66, CAB 29/2, PRO.

2Minute by Leeper, February 3, 1919, initialed by Nicolson on February 3 and Crowe on February 7, 81/1/4/1244, FO 608/31, PRO.

3“Conditions in Bulgaria on 15 March 1919,” report by Capt. Norton Breton, Intelligence Corps, Paris, April 16, 1919, 81/1/9/7607, FO 608/32, PRO (also in 81/1/9/9281, ibid.); Breton had just left Sofia, where he had been since October 1918: minute by Heywood, Military Section, April 18, 1919, 81/1/9/7607, ibid.

4Lamb, who had extensive experience in the Near East, was sent by the Foreign Office in February 1919; on his career, see Hertslet, Foreign Office List, 1924, pp. 271-72.
be forced to resign and that this might lead to anarchy.⁵ The Military Representative himself, Brigadier William Baird,⁶ reported King Boris as saying that if the rumors regarding the decisions of the Peace Conference on Serbian and Greek claims were true, he would probably have to abdicate as the son and direct successor of the King whose reign had brought this final disaster on the country.⁷ The Political Section, however, was not about to abandon its chosen path merely to avoid domestic unrest and keep Boris on the throne and Theodoroff in power.⁸

Theodoroff, on his part, did not fail to play the Bolshevik card with the Allies. While admitting the local Communists were not very numerous, he emphasized to Allied representatives the intensity of their activity and their contacts with Russia.⁹ But the Allies did not take the Bolshevik menace in Bulgaria very seriously.¹⁰ A widely circulated British intelligence report asserted that Bolshevism had no chance in a country the overwhelming majority of whose population were landowners and “in an extraordinarily prosperous condition” due to the high price of grain then prevailing.¹¹

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⁵ "Conditions in Bulgaria on 15 March 1919," report by Capt. Norton Breton, Intelligence Corps, Paris, April 16, 1919, 81/1/9/7607, FO 608/32, PRO (also in 81/1/9/9281, ibid.); Lamb to Oliphant, Sofia, April 19, 1919, 81/1/9/9693, ibid.

⁶ Baird replaced Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Napier, who had been recalled on February 11, 1919: Napier, Experiences, p. 242; on Napier’s recall, see also Napier to Balfour, Paris, March 18, 1919, 81/1/6/5135, FO 608/31, PRO.

⁷ Baird to Bridges, Sofia, June 7, 1919, 87/1/1/14345, FO 608/34, PRO; Baird to Curzon, Sofia, June 12, 1919, 81/1/9/14344, FO 608/32, ibid.

⁸ Minute by Leeper, May 12, 1919, 81/1/9/9693, FO 608/32, PRO; minute by Nicolson, May 13, 1919, ibid.; minute by Crowe, May 14, 1919, ibid.; minute by Leeper, July 7, 1919, 87/1/1/14345, FO 608/34, ibid.

⁹ "Conditions in Bulgaria on 15 March 1919," report by Capt. Norton Breton, Intelligence Corps, Paris, April 16, 1919, 81/1/9/7607, FO 608/32, PRO (also in 81/1/9/9281, ibid.).


¹¹ "Conditions in Bulgaria on 15 March 1919," report by Capt. Norton Breton, Intelligence Corps, Paris, April 16, 1919, 81/1/9/7607, FO 608/32, PRO (also in 81/1/9/9281, ibid.); the former copy of the report was seen by Heywood, Gibbon and Temperley of the Military Section, Leeper and Crowe of the Political Section and Keynes of the Economic Section; the latter copy was forwarded by the DMI to the Foreign Office and thence to Paris on May 6, where it was seen by Nicolson, Crowe and Hardinge.
The advance of the moderate Left was, however, welcomed. The Political Section thought that changes in the Council of Ministers which strengthened it at the beginning of May were all to the good, as Stambolisky and the other Agrarian and Broad Socialist members were expected to do something to clean up the corruption prevalent in Bulgarian politics. It was recognized in both Paris and Sofia, however, that all such changes were purely provisional and that the future would largely depend on the manner in which the peace treaty was drawn up and carried out. If anything, this recognition seemed to confirm the wisdom of punishing Bulgaria and the establishment parties.

**Winning the Election**

In a sense, Stambolisky may have been counting on just this, no less than Theodoroff was counting on Allied favor and on translating it into favorable peace terms and, hence, a continued hold on political power. Exploiting the disturbing rumors coming out of Paris would have been neither good patriotism nor good politics, but Stambolisky could attack the establishment parties for their past role and concentrate on the need for internal reform and a complete break with the days of Ferdinand. The Nationals and Democrats, now the leading establishment parties, could only stress the need for domestic order and national unity during the critical hours through which Bulgaria was passing as the only way of gaining the goodwill of the Allies. As it became increasingly plain that such goodwill as existed did not extend to the conference table, what was left of their position was fatally undercut.

Almost immediately after the amnesty, Stambolisky and Daskaloff both resurfaced in Sofia and began meeting with Theodoroff and other members of the government as well as Agrarian leaders. Pleading the necessity of settling affairs within the Agrarian

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12Lamb to Curzon, No. 26, Sofia, May 14, 1919, 81/1/9/12746, FO 608/32, PRO; minute by Leeper, June 17, 1919, ibid.


parliamentary group, Stambolisky declined Theodoroff's proposal on January 12 that he take up the place on the Council of Ministers reserved for him. Instead, he and Daskaloff continued to attack the government for not going fast enough in carrying out its program and decried the lack of progress on issues such as punishing those responsible for the war or guilty of war crimes, lifting the state of war and censorship, ending the blockade and the food crisis and obtaining the return of prisoners of war. Once dissension within the Agrarian Union had at least been papered over, however, Stambolisky took up the post of Minister of Roads, Public Buildings and Public Works on January 23, apparently without having obtained any concessions from Theodoroff.

Indeed, his entry into the government did not signify any cessation of the political struggle.

Although Stambolisky continued to press for specific measures, his central demand now became the dissolution of the chamber elected in 1914 and he refused to re-enter the Assembly chamber until the holding of new elections. This reflected his overarching theme that the current regime was still dominated by elements responsible for

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15 "Dnevni," Zemledelsko zname, January 14, 1919, p. 3.


19 See the defensive "Ne nie, a vlastta se kachi varkhu nas," Zemledelsko zname, February 6, 1919, p. 1; Zemledelsko zname denied rumors as late as January 21: "Dnevni," ibid., January 21, 1919, p. 3.


the disasters of the past and hence unfit to represent Bulgaria in the present. At a time when the fate of Bulgaria was being decided in Paris entirely by her neighbors and the Great Powers, the government was doing nothing to rehabilitate her name by punishing war criminals and those guilty of dragging her into the war in the first place.\(^{22}\) On the contrary, Bulgaria was isolated and slandered and the whole Bulgarian people could plausibly be held responsible for the crimes of Ferdinand, the Liberals and his other tools because only the Agrarian Union had fought against him and when it tried to catch and punish him and the others in September 1918, all the other parties of both the Right and Left rallied against it.\(^{23}\) For Stambolisky, the conclusion was obvious: elections would remove the compromised government and all traces of the former bloody regime\(^{24}\) and once Bulgaria’s conquerors saw that she too was embarking on the path of true democracy, it was unlikely they would maintain their hostile attitude towards her.\(^{25}\)

Meanwhile, Stambolisky refrained from commenting on the territorial questions under consideration in Paris\(^{26}\) and tried his own hand at personal diplomacy by meeting with Chrétien, Napier and other foreign representatives in Sofia.\(^{27}\)

Theodoroff, in fact, was not making very much progress with the Allies. The government tried to gain entry to the Peace Conference by commissioning Gueshoff and a diplomat to proceed from Switzerland to Paris but they were unable to obtain the

\(^{22}\) "Dnevni," *Zemledelsko zname*, January 21, 1919, p. 3.


\(^{24}\) "Izyavleniya na m-r Stamboliiski," *Zemledelsko zname*, February 20, 1919, p. 1.

\(^{25}\) "Seriozna obnova e potrebna," *Zemledelsko zname*, February 25, 1919, p. 1; see also "Ne nie, a vlastta se kachi värkhu nas," ibid., February 6, 1919, p. 1; "Te samo v Bălgariya se krepjat oshte," ibid., March 1, 1919, p. 1.


\(^{27}\) "Dnevni," *Zemledelsko zname*, January 16, 1919, p. 3; "Dnevni," ibid., February 13, 1919, p. 4.
necessary visas. In the middle of January, they appealed to the Allied leaders to be allowed to plead the Bulgarian case on an equal footing with the other small states, but without result.\textsuperscript{28} The Allies did raise the blockade on February 12,\textsuperscript{29} and it was announced that Bulgaria would receive ten million kilograms of food per month.\textsuperscript{30} These developments had little to do with efforts by the government, however, and the shipments of American grain, the first of which arrived in April, had to be paid for in gold.\textsuperscript{31}

Even more alarming were reports reaching Sofia from Paris about the reception being accorded to the claims of Bulgaria's neighbors, but the establishment parties did their best to put on a brave face.\textsuperscript{32} At the end of March, \textit{Pryaporets} maintained that Wilson and Lloyd George would never allow Bulgaria's neighbors to impose their unjust demands on the Great Powers.\textsuperscript{33} A week later, Theodoroff assured the Assembly that the Allies would not cut Bulgaria off from the Aegean, if only in their own interests.\textsuperscript{34} Nevertheless, his government naturally tried to present Bulgaria's case to the Peace Conference and to refute the claims of Bulgaria's neighbors.

In the middle of March, Janko Sakazoff, the Broad Socialist Minister of Trade, Industry and Labor, submitted a memorandum to the Conference in which he claimed for

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Gueshoff and Tsokoff to Lloyd George (copy of telegram received on January 18, 1919), W.C.P. 22, CAB 29/7; report for February 1919, AA, II, 8.
\item "Minutes . . .," February 12, 1919, \textit{FRUS. 1919. PPC}, III, 10008.
\item "Dnevni," \textit{Zemledelsko zname}, February 11, 1919, p. 3.
\item "Dnevni," \textit{Zemledelsko zname}, February 11, 1919, p. 3; report for April 1919, AA, II, 166; Khadzhinikolov and Todorov, "Politikata na SASht," pp. 345-73; Khristov, \textit{Revolutsionnata kriza}, p. 394; cf. "Conditions in Bulgaria on 15 March 1919," report by Capt. Norton Breton, Intelligence Corps, Paris, April 16, 1919, 81/1/9/7607, FO 608/32, PRO (also in 81/1/9/9281, ibid.), claiming that there was no real food shortage since the government was permitting the peasants to hoard grain out of fear lest it be seized by the Allies.
\item Kumanov, "Problem," pp. 236-37.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Bulgaria Thrace up to the Enos-Midia line, the entire Dobruja and 7,000 square kilometers of eastern Serbia in a strip along the Bulgarian frontier north of Vranye. In Macedonia, where he claimed that in 1912 there had been 1,103,111 Bulgarians, 267,862 Greeks and no Serbs in a total population of 2,332,524, he demanded that the people be consulted about their future and said Bulgaria accepted in advance whatever territorial status they chose. He seemed prepared, however, to see only some southern and coastal areas go to Greece, the rest joining Bulgaria.  

At about the same time, Gueshoff, claiming to speak semi-officially for the Bulgarian government, produced two memoranda in reply to the Greek and Serbian claims laid before the Conference. He defended Bulgaria’s right to all of Macedonia, where he claimed approximately 1,172,136 Bulgarians lived in 1913—81% of the Christian population, which also included 370,000 Greeks. He also asserted that prior to the Balkan Wars there had been 296,926 Bulgarians in Western Thrace as against the 88,000 Greeks claimed by Venizelos.  

Macedonian émigré organizations also attempted to put their views before the Allies. In Bulgaria, there were two such rival national organizations. In October and November 1918, former Supremists led by Alexander Protogueroff and Todor Alexandroff formed the Executive Committee of the Macedonian Brotherhoods in

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35Sakazoff to Clemenceau, Berne, March 18, 1919, 81/1/7/6260, FO 608/31, PRO (published in Bulletin No. 146, April 5, 1919, MD, XVII, 413-17; and as J. Sakazoff, Mémoire relatif à la question bulgare [Berne: n.p., 1919]; Temperley, History, IV, 449-50; Todorović, “Pitanje,” p. 86.  

36Memorandum by Gueshoff and Tsokoff, enclosed in Bourchier to Crowe, Paris, March 14, 1919, 81/1/7/4581, FO 608/31, PRO (published in Gueshoff and Tsokoff, Memorandum, pp. 2-9); memorandum by Gueshoff and Tsokoff, received March 28, 1919, 81/1/7/5597, ibid. (published in Gueshoff and Tsokoff, Memorandum, pp. 10-16); Temperley, History, IV, 449-50; Todorović, “Pitanje,” p. 86; Leeper’s comment on Gueshoff’s second memorandum is typical of the response elicited by such missives:  

MM. Geshoff and Tsokoff and apparently all other Bulgarian politicians fail to realise that the time for propagandist activity has passed. It is Bulgaria’s own action which has led to the solution of the Macedonian question which they protest against.  

(minute by Leeper, March 28, 1919, 81/1/7/5597, FO 608/31, PRO).
Bulgaria. Inasmuch as both men were notorious for their wartime activities,\textsuperscript{37} public leadership was left to others. On November 24, the first meeting of representatives from brotherhoods around the country called for the indivisibility of Macedonia and its unification with Bulgaria.\textsuperscript{38} In January, the Executive Committee produced a lengthy memorandum defending the Bulgarian character of Macedonia. Although calling for a plebiscite, the memorandum made it clear that the Executive Committee favored the union of Macedonia “entire and undivided” with Bulgaria.\textsuperscript{39} On March 1, representatives of the Executive Committee asked Clemenceau to permit its delegation to appear before the Peace Conference.\textsuperscript{40}

Also at the end of 1918, followers in Bulgaria of the Supremists’ late rival Yane Sandanski joined together in the Temporary Representation of the Unified Former IMRO. On November 25, they sent Paul Christoff, the head of the Bulgarian Uniate church, to Paris with the mission of getting the Peace Conference to establish an undivided, autonomous Macedonia as part of a Balkan federation.\textsuperscript{41} The Temporary Representation issued a program on March 9 advocating an independent, unified Macedonia under


\textsuperscript{39}Executive Committee of Macedonian Brotherhoods to His Majesty’s Government, No. 53, Sofia, January 5, 1919, enclosed in McConnel to DMI, Salonika, January 25, 1919, 104/1/1/3259, FO 608/44, PRO (published as \textit{Memoir Presented to the Governments of the United States of America, of Great Britain and Ireland, of France, of Italy and of Japan by the Executive Committee of the Brotherhoods of the Macedonian Emigration in Bulgaria} [Sofia: n.p., February 1919]); Andonov-Poljanski, \textit{Velika Britanija}, pp. 20-21; Paleshutski, “Makedonskata emigratsiya,” p. 56.

\textsuperscript{40}Memorandum from the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization to the representatives of the Great Powers in Paris, March 1, 1919, \textit{MSDM}, pp. 626-32; Paleshutski, “Makedonskata emigratsiya,” p. 56; see also Executive Committee of Macedonian Brotherhoods to Baird, No. 130, Sofia, May 26, 1919, enclosed in Lamb to Curzon, No. 31, Sofia, May 27, 1919, 104/1/1/12749, FO 608/44, PRO; Paleshutski, “Makedonskata emigratsiya,” pp. 56 and 58.

international protection. Paul Christoff sought to present this program to the Conference and challenged the right of the Executive Committee to speak in the name of Macedonia. He denounced Protogueroff and Alexandroff as friends of the Kaiser and Ferdinand and said his own organization was the only one free of Bulgarian influence and representative of all Macedonians irrespective of language or religion.

Organizations of Macedonian émigrés in other countries were also politically active. The most important, the General Council of Macedonian Societies in Switzerland, tried to follow a middle line. Created at a meeting of delegates in Lausanne on December 15, 1918, it took as its goal the application of Wilsonian principles to Macedonia. It thus sought to avoid taking a stand on a specific solution to the Macedonian question. The General Council initially confined itself to protesting the partition of Macedonia and

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42 Appeal to the Macedonian people, signed by G. Petrov et al., March 9, 1919, OTIMN, II, 470-74 (extract in DBMN, I, 607-08); Paleshutski, “Makedonskata emigratsiya,” pp. 53-54.

43 Archimandrite Paul Christoff to Secretary General of the Peace Conference, Paris, March 24, 1919, enclosed in Secretary General of the Peace Conference to Secretary of the British Delegation, Paris, March 24, 1919, Andonov-Poljanski, Velika Britanija, p. 90 (Macedonian translation; original in FO 608/44, PRO); Archimandrite Paul Christoff to Clemenceau, Paris, April 10, 1919, ibid., pp. 92-93 (Macedonian translation; also in DBMN, I, 610; partial English translation in Hristov, “Macedonia,” p. 171; original in FO 608/30, PRO); Andonov-Poljanski, Velika Britanija, pp. 20-21; Hristov, “Macedonia,” p. 171.

demanding that it be accorded the right of self-determination. On March 14, it likewise asked to be allowed to send representatives to Paris.

None of these various appeals drew any response from the Peace Conference. The silence from Paris must have been deafening, and this, combined with the struggle within the emigration, apparently had some effect on the Bulgarian government's strategy in pursuing its claims, especially in Macedonia. As the spring wore on, it became increasingly obvious that the Allies were not going to give any more of Macedonia to Bulgaria and that the Macedonian emigration leaned toward support of the line taken by the Temporary Representation. As early as March, Allied observers noted that the idea of demanding autonomy rather than annexation for Macedonia was beginning to gain ground. On March 25, the Central Council decided to change its goal to working for a cantonal Macedonian state similar to Switzerland under the protection of a disinterested

45 Memorandum by General Council of Macedonian Societies in Switzerland, January 11, 1919, enclosed in Rumbold to Derby, Berne, January 20, 1919, Andonov-Poljanski, Velika Britanija, pp. 79-84 (Macedonian translation; also in ZDSMD, pp. 319-23; and Lape, "Aktivnosta," pp. 151-53n.; original in FO 608/44, PRO); General Council of Macedonian Societies in Switzerland to Lloyd George, Lausanne, January 23, 1919, Andonov-Poljanski, Velika Britanija, pp. 84-85 (Macedonian translation; original in FO 371/3591, PRO; identical telegram to Balfour in FO 608/44, PRO); General Council of Macedonian Societies in Switzerland to Clemenceau, February 7, 1919, Lape, "Aktivnosta," p. 154n. (Macedonian translation; different translation in ZDSMD, pp. 318-19); General Council of Macedonian Societies to Secretariat of British Delegation, Lausanne, February 23, 1919, Andonov-Poljanski, Velika Britanija, pp. 87-88 (Macedonian translation; original in FO 608/44, PRO); see also Macedonian Society in Zurich to Clemenceau and Dutasta, Zurich, February 14, 1919, ibid., p. 87 (Macedonian translation; also in DBMN, I, 605-06; original in FO 608/44, PRO); Andonov-Poljanski, Velika Britanija, pp. 22-23; Hristov, "Macedonia," pp. 180-81.

46 General Council of Macedonian Societies in Switzerland to Balfour, Lausanne, March 14, 1919, Andonov-Poljanski, Velika Britanija, pp. 89-90 (Macedonian translation; original in FO 608/47, PRO); see also Andonov-Poljanski, Velika Britanija, pp. 22-23.


Great Power and began sending petitions in this sense to the Allies. At the beginning of April, the Executive Committee said in a memorandum to the Peace Conference that it too now favored the creation of an independent Macedonia if for some reason it could not all be attached to Bulgaria.

Theodoroff was not willing to go this far, but at the end of May he made a request to the Allies for plebiscites in all territories contested between Bulgaria and her neighbors instead of simply advancing claims to them. In view of the attitudes of Greece and Serbia, such a request was hardly more realistic than demanding annexation or independence for Macedonia, but it may have seemed to provide better political cover at home. Nevertheless, on June 2, the Temporary Representation addressed an appeal to the Bulgarian government and the political parties to support the independence of Macedonia under the protection of the League of Nations as the surest way of saving the Bulgarians there from foreign rule.

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53Paleshutski, “Makedonskata emigratsiya,” p. 58.


At the end of June, Theodoroff made another demarche to the Allies, this time asking for commissions of inquiry. Although the government was obviously still not backing the idea of an independent Macedonia, the Executive Committee decided on July 6 to direct its work exclusively toward that goal. This shift may have been merely tactical, however; and efforts over the summer by the brotherhoods combined in the Executive Committee to unite with their rivals in the Temporary Representation foundered on the latter's distrust.

Meanwhile, an attempt by Theodoroff to turn the issue of relations with the Allies to political advantage had backfired. On March 4, Zemledelsko zname announced that the XV Congress of the BZNS would convene on April 27. Preparations for the conclave took place in an atmosphere of mounting tension with the other members of the governing coalition, the Narrows and even within the Agrarian Union itself. Stambolisky

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57 Theodoroff to Chrétien, No. 485, Sofia, June 23, 1919, 81/1/7/15886, FO 608/31, PRO; Theodoroff to Baird, No. 486, Sofia, June 23, 1919, 81/1/7/16145, ibid.


60 Dnevni, Zemledelsko zname, March 4, 1919, p. 2.


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continued to concentrate his fire on the Democrats,\textsuperscript{64} emphasizing their failure to make a separate peace the year before\textsuperscript{65} and accusing them of now fomenting the discord among Agrarians.\textsuperscript{66} At the last minute the Democratic Minister of Internal Affairs, Nikola Mushanoff, in agreement with Theodoroff and Liaptcheff, effectively banned the congress by forbidding the travel of delegates to Sofia. This step was taken without the knowledge of the rest of the cabinet and provoked a ministerial crisis. Stambolisky and Bakaloff immediately tendered their resignations and the Broad and Radical ministers protested.\textsuperscript{67}

The Democrats accused the Agrarians of disregarding the urgent need for solidarity and order by seeking to bring masses of people to the capital just when the government’s efforts to win the confidence of the Allies were beginning to yield valuable results—the announcement on April 30 of Franchet’s decision to release another four thousand Bulgarian prisoners of war. This was seized upon as proof positive that restraining the political activity of the Left was in the best interests of the nation. Chrétien was said to have already told the government that the Allies would not tolerate any disorder and to have now declared that Franchet’s gesture was a token of gratitude for its efforts in that direction.\textsuperscript{68} The Agrarians, however, had been pushing the government


\textsuperscript{66}“Prestapleniyata na demokraticheskata partiya (Izyavleniya na Al. Stamboliiski),” \textit{Zemledelsko zname}, April 28, 1919, p. 1.


to do more to obtain the release of POWs\textsuperscript{69} and had sent its own six-member delegation to see Chrétien on April 29.\textsuperscript{70} They could accordingly claim some of the credit as well.

Be this as it may, if the Nationals and Democrats had been counting on Allied support against the Agrarians, they were to be disappointed. Stambolisky unleashed another barrage against the Democrats in the pages of \textit{Zemledelsko zname}\textsuperscript{71} and a rump congress of delegates who managed to assemble in Sofia forbade Agrarian participation in any new cabinet which included the Democrats and called for a government purely of the Left.\textsuperscript{72} The crisis produced some signs of increased solidarity among the Agrarians, Broads and Radicals on this basis,\textsuperscript{73} but it dragged out and Stambolisky settled for simply excluding the Democrats from the coalition and forming a new government on a satisfactory platform.\textsuperscript{74} On May 7, the parties reached agreement on the composition of the cabinet--two Nationals, one Progressive, three Agrarians, two Broads and two Radicals. Theodoroff and Stambolisky both retained their previous posts. The National Michail Madjaroff replaced Liaptcheff as Minister of War and the Broad Socialist Krastyu Pastouchoff, Mushanoff as Minister of Internal Affairs. The first two points of the program were the immediate dissolution of the chamber and the holding of elections

\textsuperscript{69}"Ne gi zabravyaite," \textit{Zemledelsko zname}, April 9, 1919, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{70}"Belezhnik," \textit{Zemledelsko zname}, May 3, 1919, p. 2.


\textsuperscript{72}"Malkiyat zemledelski kongres (Izyavleniya na Al. Stamboliiski)," \textit{Zemledelsko zname}, May 5, 1919, pp. 1-2.


\textsuperscript{74}"Novoto pravitelstvo (Izyavleniya na Al. Stamboliiski)," \textit{Zemledelsko zname}, May 13, 1919, p. 1.
by the beginning of July. The next day the Agrarian congress was announced for June 1.

The scheduling of elections was in fact the signal for intensified political activity across the political spectrum. On May 14, active and reserve officers of the Sofia garrison held a meeting to organize a fight against the Left. Eleven days later, the Narrow Socialists’ XXII Congress began. The Narrows had already joined the Communist International at its founding in March and now renamed their party the “Bulgarian Communist Party (Narrow Socialists)” and adopted a new program. The Agrarian congress on June 1-5 was a triumph for Stambolisky. It accepted his nomination of Daskaloff, “the hero of Radomir,” as its chairman and passed a resolution approving all Stambolisky’s actions during the war, including the September revolutionary events. A special commission put most of the blame for the split in the Agrarian parliamentary group on Draghieff, who finally walked out of the congress on the last day when it packed the Standing Committee of the Governing Council with Stambolisky and his followers, among them the trusty Daskaloff. Closing the congress, the latter declared that the BZNS would conduct its electoral campaign in the name of its program of Agrarian self-help and the economic, political and educational liberation of the rural population and in the name of its legal and illegal struggle against the wars which had brought ruin and for


79 See the published records of the sessions: first session (June 1), Zemledelsko zname, June 8, 1919, p. 1; second session (June 2), ibid., June 12, 1919, p. 1; third session (June 2), ibid., June 14, 1919, p. 1; third session (June 2), ibid., June 18, 1919, pp. 1-2; fourth session (June 3), ibid., June 24, 1919, pp. 1-2; see also “Kongresnite resheniya,” ibid., June 8, 1919, pp. 1-2; and “Dnevni,” ibid., p. 4; Bell, Peasants, pp. 141-42; Khristov, Revolyutsionnata kriza, pp. 408-09.
extracting Bulgaria from the blind alley into which Ferdinand and the establishment parties had pushed her.80

Unlike Stambolisky with his single-minded drive for power, Draghieff had been sincerely interested in cooperation with the other members of the governing coalition.81 Once he had been removed from the inner councils of the BZNS, Stambolisky began attacking Madjaroff as an old servant of Ferdinand82 and accused Pastouchoff of continuing the bad old tradition of using the police to partisan advantage.83 The Democrats, however, were still his best target of opportunity. The election campaign was in fact shaping up as a duel between Stambolisky and Malinoff with the events of September 1918 providing the ammunition. Malinoff, clearly on the defensive, had to explain why he had failed to conclude a separate peace in good time. He now claimed that Germany and Austria-Hungary had been ready to overthrow his government at short notice and would also have used Turkish and even Rumanian troops against Bulgaria.84 Stambolisky, faced with allegations that the breakthrough at Dobropolje was due to treachery and that he and Daskaloff had themselves had contacts with the enemy, said that Malinoff was a liar and that only the rebellion had foiled Ferdinand’s plan to continue the war even after the armistice and finally driven him from the country.85

81 Bell, Peasants, p. 140.
82 "Star tabnet?" Zemledelsko zname, June 18, 1919, p. 2.
83 "Belezhnik," Zemledelsko zname, June 18, 1919, p. 2.
84 Malinov, Pod znaka, 55.
General Chrétien threw a bomb into the middle of all this with a letter to Theodoroff, received on June 13, foreseeing the early summons of a Bulgarian delegation to Paris and inviting the government to draw up a list of delegates.\(^66\) This touched off a wrangle about the composition of the delegation. There could be no question of including any Liberals but the Democrats took exception to the idea that they too should be excluded.\(^67\) Within ten days, the government had decided that the following political leaders should go to Paris: Theodoroff (National), Sakazoff (Broad Socialist), Stambolisky (Agrarian) and Ganeff (Radical).\(^68\) At the end of June, Theodoroff notified Chrétien that these four members of the cabinet as well as Michail Sarafoff, a long-time public servant and diplomat and a former minister himself, would be the Bulgarian plenipotentiaries.\(^69\) But still the debate raged as to who was best qualified to represent Bulgaria—establishment parties with their experienced statesmen or parties of the Left with their record of opposition to Ferdinand.\(^70\) This question now provided Stambolisky with another slant to his major electoral theme of responsibility for the war.\(^71\)

The elections themselves had to be postponed until August 17 in order to allow time for the completion of electoral rolls.\(^72\) Toward the middle of July, Theodoroff was informed of the Council’s invitation to Bulgaria to send a delegation to Paris by the


\(^{72}\)“Dnevni,” *Zemledelsko zname*, June 20, 1919, p. 4.
twenty-fifth. This meant that some of the country’s leading political figures would be absent for the closing phase of the electoral campaign and the elections themselves. Indeed, prior to the departure on July 19 of the plenipotentiaries, who were accompanied by about forty experts and other assistants, Stambolisky had to fight off an attempt to have the elections postponed yet again on just this ground among others.

The French command reported that the Bulgarian Peace Delegation departed in an atmosphere of excessive optimism, the greater part of public opinion believing that Bulgaria would receive territorial concessions. During the run-up to the elections, the establishment parties in fact continued to express confidence that the Allies would give justice to Bulgaria and berated the Left, calling the Narrows traitors, for not ceasing their agitation at least while the Peace Delegation was in Paris. The Narrows’ protests against persisting economic difficulties culminated in a call for mass demonstrations in Sofia and other towns and cities on July 27. This action took place in the face of a government prohibition, and a number of demonstrators were killed in resulting clashes with troops and police. Pastouchoff, as Minister of Internal Affairs, played an especially active role in this repression, and it could be expected that his responsibilities for organizing the elections would be of further benefit to the Broad Socialists.

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93 Message from Col. Henry, No. 142, Sofia, July 14, 1919, M. 371, CAB 29/26, PRO.
95 “Dnevni,” Zemledelsko zname, July 15, 1919, p. 2; Genov, Bulgaria, p. 17; for a complete list of the members of the delegation, see DDN, pp. 2-3; and Balfour to Curzon, No. 1355, Paris, July 19, 1919, W19/105191/12486, FO 371/3588, PRO.
96 The continued absence of many POWs was also adduced: “Koi shte smee da gi otlozhi?,” Zemledelsko zname, July 19, 1919, p. 1; see also “Da bâde, ili da ne bâde?,” ibid., July 28, 1919, p. 1.
100 Bûlgarska akademiya na naukite, Istoriya, III, 46; Rothschild, Communist Party, pp. 95-96.
While the Agrarians had not been totally immune to the general sense of optimism, even before the delegation's departure \textit{Zemledelsko zname} had warned of the economic slavery awaiting the country after the peace and dismissed as naive the belief that Bulgaria would still get Macedonia. It came out in favor of an autonomous Macedonia as the most rational and patriotic solution and berated the other newspapers as chauvinistic for not taking the same position. Later, Agrarians cited the British and French press to bolster their claim that amid the generally hostile reception accorded the Peace Delegation upon its arrival in Paris, only Stambolisky was able to achieve positive results. After the events of July 27, they accused the Narrows as well as the parties which had supported Ferdinand of seeking power through terror. Stump speakers such as Daskaloff emphasized that the results of the elections were not a matter of indifference to those who were drawing the frontiers of Bulgaria and that their behavior would be different if the supporters of Bolshevism or Ferdinand won than if those who had fought against Ferdinand and the war did. The Agrarians, however, did not fail to caution that Bulgaria would in any case be punished harshly for the insanity of the Democrats and the others. Their election manifesto issued on August 7, among other reforms, called for the introduction of "full democracy," the punishment of those guilty for the war, the

\begin{itemize}
\item See "Dnevni," \textit{Zemledelsko zname}, July 4, 1919, p. 2.
\item "Da zhivee avtonomna Makedoniya!," \textit{Zemledelsko zname}, July 4, 1919, p. 1.
\item "Da zhivee avtonomna Makedoniya!," \textit{Zemledelsko zname}, July 4, 1919, p. 1.
\item "Dopiski," \textit{Zemledelsko zname}, July 19, 1919.
\item "Nie sme protiv terora ot lyavo i dyasno," \textit{Zemledelsko zname}, August 2, 1919, p. 1.
\item "Nai-vazhnata zadacha na blizkoto bâdeshte (Iz rechta na Raiko Daskalov dârzhana na 10 avgust 1919 god. v gr. Plovdiv)," \textit{Zemledelsko zname}, August 15, 1919, p. 1.
\end{itemize}
confiscation of war profits and a clear declaration to the world that the Bulgarians had no intention of warring with anyone but would withdraw into their shell and begin their cultural, economic and spiritual rebirth.10

The elections proceeded in absolute calm.11 The results reflected the conflicting currents in the country but their general thrust was clear. Due to the virtual elimination of the three parties of Radoslavoff's Liberal coalition, all the other major parties increased their share of the vote in comparison with the benchmark 1913 elections. Parties of the Left (including Draghieff Agrarians and the Radicals), however, captured fully two-thirds of the vote as compared to 45% in 1913. Although the Narrows registered the most spectacular increase, the BZNS continued its steady electoral advance and now had by far the largest parliamentary group. The Narrows and the Broads formed the next two largest. Among them, these three parties took almost three quarters of the seats. Among the establishment parties, the Democrats made the best showing, trailed by the Nationals and the Progressive Liberals (see Appendix I).

The Agrarians were a bit disappointed with the results since they failed to gain a majority,112 but it was clear, as Zemledelsko zname rather modestly pointed out, that no government could be formed without them.113 The significance of the results was heightened by the fact that, whatever the differences among the three major parties, they were all traditional supporters of a Balkan federation.114 As long, however, as Stambolisky and other political leaders were still in Paris waiting for the Allies to finish the peace treaty, the inevitable domestic political adjustments had to wait.

10"Vazvanie kam b'lgarski narod," Zemledelsko zname, August 7, 1919, pp. 2-3.


113"Iz koi p'?," Zemledelsko zname, August 26, 1919, p. 1.

114See Stavrianos, Balkan Federation, p. 208.
Meanwhile, the Agrarians immediately proclaimed that the election results would have a favorable impact on the terms of peace.\(^{115}\) No one could have hoped so much than the members of the Peace Delegation in Paris, where they had made no perceptible progress since their arrival on July 26. They had been taken straight to the Château de Madrid in the Parisian suburb of Neuilly-sur-Seine and practically incarcerated there. They were allowed to communicate with no one in the French capital except the Peace Conference, and then only in writing through Allied liaison officers. Having been joined by Gueshoff and Bulgarian diplomats who had been abroad, they received that first day pessimistic appraisals of the support to be expected from America and Britain against France.\(^{116}\)

The delegation brought with it a printed statement of the Bulgarian case of over 300 pages, *The Bulgarian Question and the Balkan States*, which it sent to the Conference on July 29.\(^{117}\) It then decided to prepare memoranda on individual issues, especially the Thracian question.\(^{118}\) Concerned about the report of an inter-Allied commission on

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\(^{116}\) Khristov, "Dnevnikāt," pp. 315 and 323-24 (diary entry for July 26, 1919); Genov, 244ff. (who incorrectly gives the date of arrival as July 28); on members of the Bulgarian delegation, including Gueshoff, who had been in Switzerland and The Netherlands, see telegram from Henry, No. 148, Sofia, July 15, 1919, M. 372, CAB 29/26, PRO.

\(^{117}\) Theodoroff to Clemenceau, July 29, 1919, transmitting Bulgaria, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Bulgarian Question*, W19/111243/1300, FO 371/3572, PRO.

\(^{118}\) Khristov, "Dnevnikāt," p. 325 (diary entry for July 19, 1919); Theodoroff to Clemenceau, No. 30, August 1, 1919, transmitting exposition on the question of Western Thrace, *DDN*, pp. 7-25; Theodoroff to Clemenceau, No. 73, August 8, 1919 (transmitting petition from refugees from Eastern Thrace), ibid., p. 26; Theodoroff to Clemenceau, No. 114, August 10, 1919 (transmitting ten copies of exposition on Western Thrace), ibid., p. 31; note by Peace Delegation (on the importance of the tobacco industry of Western Thrace to Bulgaria), August 16, 1919, ibid., pp. 32-33, Theodoroff to Clemenceau, No. 129, August 20, 1919 (transmitting memorandum on the position of minorities in Bulgaria), ibid., pp. 34-41; Theodoroff to Clemenceau, No. 144, August 23, 1919 (transmitting memorandum on Serbian claims against Bulgaria), ibid., pp. 42-51; Peace Delegation to Secretary General of the Peace Conference, No. 203, September 3, 1919 (note on the attitude of the Moslems of Western Thrace toward Bulgarian rule), ibid., pp. 92-93; Theodoroff to Clemenceau, No. 236, September 10, 1919 (transmitting memorandum on Bulgarian claim to Enos-Midia line in Eastern Thrace), ibid., pp. 94-123; Khristov, *Revolyutsionnata kriza*, pp. 455-56; Muir, *Dimitri Stancioff*, pp. 209-10.
Bulgarian atrocities,\(^{119}\) it also sought to refute these allegations.\(^{120}\) More generally, the delegation submitted requests for plebiscites in all the territories liberated from the Ottoman Empire during the Balkan Wars.\(^{121}\) Although members of the British Delegation had earlier been able to dismiss Bulgarian submissions to the Peace Conference by telling themselves that the Bulgarians would have an opportunity to present their claims once their own delegation had been invited to Paris,\(^{122}\) none of these later missives drew a reply either. At the beginning of August, the Bulgarian delegation saw a glimmer of hope when Gueshoff received permission to proceed to London, where he hoped to see Lloyd George.\(^{123}\) But the only British plenipotentiary he managed to meet there was George Barnes,\(^{124}\) a former Laborite who had remained in the War Cabinet after his party left the coalition in November 1918.\(^{125}\) The Bulgarians were quickly disabused about his influence.\(^{126}\)

Under these circumstances, the Peace Delegation hastened to inform the Conference of the election news. It stressed the elimination of the pro-German parties, while the government bloc, all of whose members were said to favor of a policy of close collaboration with the Allies and good understanding with the other Balkan states with a

\(^{119}\)Khristov, "Dnevnikat," p. 327 (diary entry for August 2, 1919); see also "Bulgarian Atrocities," pp. 115-21; Delta, "Bulgarian Atrocities," pp. 42-55; "Reports of the Inter-Allied Commission," pp. 74-83; and p. 295 below.

\(^{120}\)Note by Peace Delegation, No. 106, August 14, 1919, \(DDN\), p. 30; Peace Delegation to Clemenceau, No. 198, September 1, 1919 (transmitting memorandum refuting allegations against Bulgaria of atrocities), ibid., pp. 63-84; see also Bulgaria, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, \textit{Verité}.

\(^{121}\)Theodoroff to Clemenceau, No. 99, August 12, 1919, also enclosing Theodoroff to Clemenceau, No. 430, May 29, 1919, \(DDN\), pp. 27-29; Theodoroff to Dutasta, September 2, 1919, ibid., pp. 85-91.

\(^{122}\)Minute by Adam, April 5, 1919, 81/1/7/6260, FO 608/31, PRO; minute by Temperley, June 18, 1919, 104/1/1/12749, FO 608/44, ibid.

\(^{123}\)Khristov, "Dnevnikat," p. 327 (diary entry for August 2, 1919).

\(^{124}\)Khristov, "Dnevnikat," p. 332 (diary entry for August 14, 1919); for Lloyd George’s refusal to meet with him, see ibid., p. 342 (diary entry for September 6, 1919).


\(^{126}\)Khristov, "Dnevnikat," p. 334 (diary entry for August 18, 1919).
view to satisfying the legitimate desires of the various Balkan peoples, had gained an incontestable majority. The appreciable increase in Communist strength was a temporary success explained by the general uneasiness in the country engendered by the uncertainty and apprehension regarding the conditions of peace.\(^{127}\)

This combination of carrot and stick had no more effect on the decisions of the Peace Conference than the delegation's other communications. To be sure, the Political Section of the British Delegation regarded the election results with some satisfaction, considering the advance of the Left to be a hopeful sign of peace and remarking "the crushing defeat" of the Radoslavoff and Malinoff parties.\(^{128}\) It did not, however, propose any changes in the treaty on this account. Lamb, on the other hand, was a bit dubious about Stambolisky. He noted that "most people" regarded him as "an ignorant and unscrupulous demagogue" and that he was credited with the ambition of becoming the first president of a Bulgarian republic. Lamb accordingly feared that flagrantly unjust peace terms might give Stambolisky the opportunity to stage a republican coup.\(^{129}\) This was a prospect which the Political Section, at least, contemplated with equanimity.\(^{130}\)

The truth was that there was little the Bulgarians could say or do that the Allies had not discounted already. In Sofia, where the prolonged deliberations over Western Thrace and American opposition to Greek claims attracted much attention and aroused a last flicker of optimism,\(^{131}\) public opinion seemed to sense this and put its remaining

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\(^{128}\) Minute by Leeper, August 29, 1919, 81/1/2/18295, FO 608/31, PRO; minute by Nicolson August 30, 1919, ibid.; minute by Leeper, September 28, 1919, 81/1/4/8389, ibid.

\(^{129}\) Lamb to FO, Sofia, August 19, 1919, W19/121633/12486, FO 371/3588, PRO; Lamb to Curzon, No. 19, Sofia, August 24, 1919, W19/124352/12486, ibid.

\(^{130}\) Minute by Leeper, August 23, 1919, 81/1/7/18116, FO 608/31, PRO.

hopes in Wilson, clutching at the belief that at least he would not permit Bulgaria’s prewar territory to be violated.\footnote{See “Amerika i Bălgariya,” Pryaporets, September 2, 1919, p. 1; and “Tsyalostta na Bălgariya,” ibid., September 6, 1919, p. 1.} Indeed, on September 12, Zemledelsko zname announced that Wilson’s long-awaited reply was negative and that the Thracian question had therefore been postponed but that the Peace Conference recognized Bulgaria’s right to access to the Aegean. It also cited information from Paris according to which the Conference wanted to return the Southern Dobruja to Bulgaria but the Rumanians were energetically opposed.\footnote{Iz chuzhbinia, Zemledelsko zname, September 12, 1919, p. 2; on the latter question, see also “Iz chuzhbinia,” ibid., September 16, 1919, p. 2.}

It was the measure of Bulgarian despair that such news was reported in a positive vein. The plenipotentiaries in Paris had, of course, a more realistic appreciation of the situation. They had learned from Gueshoff on the sixth that a meeting with House had left him with hope of little support from that quarter.\footnote{Khristov, “Dnevnikat,” p. 342 (diary entry for September 6, 1919).} They were prepared for the loss of Western Thrace but found the loss of parts of the original Principality of Bulgaria to Serbia especially exasperating.\footnote{Khristov, “Dnevnikat,” pp. 340 (diary entry for September 2, 1919, citing reports in the Paris press), 343 (diary entry for September 7, 1919, recording reaction to information on the new frontiers from Castoldi) and 346 (diary entry for September 12, 1919, recording final disappointment in the American position on Western Thrace—an autonomous province in part with the rest going to Greece).} Reports that Franchet had granted permission for the stationing of Rumanian guards on the 1913 frontier\footnote{Khristov, “Dnevnikat,” pp. 340 (diary entry for September 2, 1919) and 346 (diary entry for September 12, 1919).} must have destroyed any last hopes about the return of the Southern Dobruja.

The Allies finally presented the draft peace treaty to the Bulgarian Peace Delegation during a plenary session in the Salle de l’Horloge at the Quai d’Orsay on the morning of September 19, the thirty-fourth anniversary of the Unification of Eastern

\[^{132}\text{See “Amerika i Bălgariya,” Pryaporets, September 2, 1919, p. 1; and “Tsyalostta na Bălgariya,” ibid., September 6, 1919, p. 1.}\]

\[^{133}\text{Iz chuzhbinia, Zemledelsko zname, September 12, 1919, p. 2; on the latter question, see also “Iz chuzhbinia,” ibid., September 16, 1919, p. 2.}\]

\[^{134}\text{Khristov, “Dnevnikat,” p. 342 (diary entry for September 6, 1919).}\]

\[^{135}\text{Khristov, “Dnevnikat,” pp. 340 (diary entry for September 2, 1919, citing reports in the Paris press), 343 (diary entry for September 7, 1919, recording reaction to information on the new frontiers from Castoldi) and 346 (diary entry for September 12, 1919, recording final disappointment in the American position on Western Thrace—an autonomous province in part with the rest going to Greece).}\]

\[^{136}\text{Khristov, “Dnevnikat,” pp. 340 (diary entry for September 2, 1919) and 346 (diary entry for September 12, 1919).}\]
Rumelia with the Principality. In accepting the draft treaty, Theodoroff admitted the
guilt of the Bulgarian state in the war but invoked the right of the Bulgarian people, who
had never desired anything more than unity, to justice. He laid special emphasis on the
nefarious role of Ferdinand and the fact that since October of the preceding year Bulgaria
had been free to pursue a democratic course of development and become a mainstay of
peace in the Balkans. Clemenceau, who was struck by the correctness and sincerity of the
Bulgarian delegation, gave them twenty-five days to submit written observations on the
draft terms. Theodoroff and Stambolisky had already decided to return to Sofia in
order to work out a reply in consultation with the National Assembly, and the next day
most of the delegation departed for Sofia, leaving Sarafoff and Ganeff behind with a small
staff.

Aside from its territorial clauses, most of the draft treaty was directly modeled on
the German and Austrian peace treaties. It contained the Covenant of the League of
Nations and various political, military, financial and economic clauses as well as
provisions relating to prisoners of war and war graves, punishment of war criminals and
freedom of international transit. The most important of these other clauses related to

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137 The Bulgarians had expected to receive it on the eleventh or twelfth: Khristov, "Dnevnikat," p.
343 (diary entry for September 7, 1919); Zemledelsko zname announced the event had taken place on the
fourteenth: "Iz chuzhbina," Zemledelsko zname, September 16, 1919, p. 2; for a correction, see "Iz
chuzhbina," ibid., September 17, 1919, p. 2; the Council had in fact postponed a decision on the date of
presentation on the tenth and finally decided the issue on the seventeenth: "Notes . . . ," September 10,
1919, FRUS, 1919, PPC, VIII, 179; and "Notes . . . ," September 17, 1919, ibid., 240; it was decided only
at the last minute, on Polk's initiative, to allow representatives of Allies other than the Great Powers to

138 Mordaqa, Le ministère Clemenceau, IV, 104-05.

139 "Peace Congress (Paris), Protocol No. 1, Plenary Session of September 19, 1919," FRUS, 1919,
PPC, III, 435-41; Khristov, "Dnevnikat," p. 348 (diary entry for September 19, 1919); Muir, Dimitri
Stancioff, p. 211; the Bulgarians had asked for thirty days: Khristov, "Dnevnikat," pp. 343 (diary entry for
September 7, 1919) and 344 (diary entry for September 8, 1919); and "Notes . . . ," September 10, 1919,
FRUS, 1919, PPC, VIII, 179; for Theodoroff's speech, see also DDN, pp. 124-27; and Bulgaria, Peace
Delegation, Conditions of Peace, pp. iii-vii (also in CAB 29/4, PRO).

140 Khristov, "Dnevnikat," p. 343 (diary entry for September 6, 1919).

141 Khristov, "Dnevnikat," pp. 343 (diary entry for September 7, 1919) and 348 (diary entry for
September 20, 1919).
disarmament and reparations. The military clauses stripped Bulgaria of the right to maintain either a navy or air force and limited army effectives to 20,000 officers and men, specifying the composition and armament of even this truncated force. They likewise limited the number of customs, forestry and police officials armed with rifles to 10,000. Inter-Allied commissions of military, naval and air control were to supervise the execution of these clauses. An innovation of the Bulgarian draft treaty was the specification of a precise sum for reparation payments—2,250,000,000 gold francs. It also called for the return of property stolen from neighboring states during the war and deliveries of livestock to them by way of restitution.¹⁴²

The returning members of the Peace Delegation did not reach Sofia until September 26,¹⁴³ but news of the contents of the draft treaty preceded them.¹⁴⁴ Bulgarian opinion, of course, had a good idea of the general outlines of its provisions but was apparently not prepared for their full force.¹⁴⁵ In Lamb’s words, “the almost universal effect has been stupefaction followed by depression.”¹⁴⁶ The draft treaty was condemned by all parties and a day of national mourning proclaimed for September 30. Attention naturally focused on the territorial clauses. The Allies were accused of flouting the very principles for which they professed to have fought. The claim was again advanced that the Bulgarians had only stopped fighting and thus facilitated the Allies’ victory a year before because they believed they would receive justice. All Wilson’s and Lloyd George’s talk about national self-determination and the rights of small people’s was now

¹⁴²Drake, “Bulgaria,” pp. 167ff.; for a text of the final Bulgarian peace treaty comparing it with the German, Austrian and Hungarian treaties, see Temperley, History, V, 305ff.

¹⁴³Dnevni,” Zemledelsko zname, September 27, 1919, p. 4.


¹⁴⁵See, for example, “Iz chuzhina,” Zemledelsko zname, September 6, 1919, p. 1, reporting the amount of reparation payments as 1.25 rather than 2.25 billion francs.

¹⁴⁶Lamb to Curzon, Sofia, September 27, 1919, W19/140606/1300, FO 371/3572, PRO.
seen to be merely a trick to win the war. The cession of some of the territory of the original Principality was especially keenly felt. And the disarmament of Bulgaria raised fears that she would be defenseless against any future demands of her neighbors, who were left armed to the teeth. There was a certain amount of satisfaction that Western Thrace had not yet been explicitly ceded to Greece, and some sections of the press held out the hope that part of Western Thrace and the Southern Dobruja would eventually be returned to Bulgaria and that the Allies would see their folly after receiving the observations of the Bulgarian delegation. All in all, however, the draft treaty was branded as a conqueror’s peace, satisfying only the Balkan Allies and taking account of neither considerations of justice nor the necessities of a lasting order in the Balkans.147

The Agrarians, who were celebrating the anniversary of the Radomir Rebellion,148 saw the tragedy of their own position. They could claim that the Allied terms were the punishment of a people for the criminal policy of its rulers for the last forty years but had to recognize that they had come to power just when its results were being liquidated and that they were left to deal with the difficult heritage of a policy against which they had fought. Although Zemledelsko zname also pointed out that the last word had not yet been said on the peace terms, it emphasized that Bulgarians had to find the courage to face those terms calmly.149 Stambolisky shared the general bitterness, telling the Agrarian

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148 See, for example, “Istoricheskite dni,” Zemledelsko zname, September 26, 1919, p. 1; “Posestvava se na padnalite bortsi na septemvriiskata revolyutsiya,” ibid., September 27, 1919, p. 1; “Edna godishnina,” ibid.; “Denât na bezmârântite bortsi,” ibid.; “Prichinite na septemvriiskata revolyutsiya (Sâkrasheni senograficheski belezhki iz rechta na Raiko Daskalov dârzhana v gr. Razgrad na 18 yuli t.g.),” ibid.

Parliamentary Group after his return that he had never believed the draft treaty would be so cruel and unjust.  

Lamb partly ascribed the general dejection to "the self-concentrated naiveté and unimaginativeness of the national character," which led the Bulgarians to persist in believing in the innate justice of their cause and in thinking that the judgment could therefore not be essentially unfavorable to them. He noted, however, that Theodoroff and the other members of the government could not be freed from responsibility for allowing and encouraging the growth of this excessive optimism, which could only have led to a more cruel disillusionment in the end. Whatever the faults of the Bulgarians, Lamb did not refrain from expressing his own misgivings about Allied policy. While not going so far as to criticize the draft treaty as unjust, he remarked that the views voiced on it in Sofia corroborated his own frequently aired opinions. Britain had now lost the opportunity to prevent Bulgaria from siding with her enemies and to gain political and commercial pre-eminence in the country. The terms were a disappointment to the pro-Allied and especially pro-British and pro-American elements and would tend to rehabilitate the previously discredited Radoslavovists. The country would have to look to Germany or Russia and might one day be a tool of Britain's enemies. Lamb was particularly impressed by the notion of a "Bolshevik" peace. Although he had originally regarded the country as one of the most immune in Europe to Bolshevism, the course of events now appeared to him to be tending to impel Bulgaria more and more in that direction. The thousands of refugees would increase the discontent and strengthen the local Communists, who might also seek to infiltrate the small volunteer army.


151Lamb to Curzon, Sofia, September 27, 1919, W19/140606/1300, FO 371/3572, PRO; see also "Dumi i dela," Pryaporets, September 27, 1919, p. 1; and "Silata nad pravoto," Pryaporets, October 11, 1919, p. 1.

152Lamb to Curzon, No. 44, Sofia, October 3, 1919, W19/141488/12486, FO 371/3588, PRO.
Meanwhile, an extraordinary session of the XVIII Ordinary National Assembly opened on the morning of October 2. Theodoroff announced the resignation of the cabinet and the session immediately adjourned until further notice to permit the formation of a new government.\(^{153}\) That afternoon, King Boris formally charged Stambolisky with that task and the latter at once began negotiations with representatives of other parties.\(^{154}\)

There had, of course, already been ample opportunity for informal soundings in Paris. The Agrarians' most natural coalition partner would have been the Broad Socialists, but they recognized that coming to an agreement would be difficult and never excluded the possibility of a coalition with an establishment party.\(^{155}\) While cooped up in the Château de Madrid, Stambolisky had taken Sakazoff to task on account of the Broads' policy during the war\(^{156}\) but given Theodoroff assurances on the subject of the monarchy.\(^{157}\) This seems to indicate a trend even before the party leaders returned to Sofia.\(^{158}\) In fact, it now proved impossible to come to an agreement with the Broads and the Narrows refused in principle to join Stambolisky's government just as they had refused to join his revolution a year earlier.\(^{159}\)

A coalition with the Democrats being out of the question, Stambolisky turned to the next two largest establishment parties. The government announced on October 6 thus

\(^{153}\) *XVIII ONS*, l. i.s., 1. z. (October 2, 1919); "Iz Narodnoto Sabranie," *Zemledelsko zname*, October 4, 1919, p. 1; Khristov, *Revolyutsionnata kriza*, pp. 461-62.


\(^{155}\) "Iz koi pat?," *Zemledelsko zname*, August 26, 1919, p. 1; "Razbiratelstvoto li?,” ibid., September 16, 1919, p. 1.

\(^{156}\) Khristov, "Dnevnikat,” p. 344 (diary entry for September 7, 1919).

\(^{157}\) Khristov, "Dnevnikat,” p. 330 (diary entry for August 12, 1919).

\(^{158}\) See also Khristov, "Dnevnikat,” p. 348 (diary entry for September 20, 1919).

included the Nationals Michail Madjaroff and Atanas Buroff as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Trade, Industry and Labor respectively and the Progressive Liberal leader Stoian Daneff as Minister of Finance. Aside from becoming President of the Council of Ministers, Stambolisky himself took the portfolio of Minister of War and retained that of Minister of Public Domains. Daskaloff became Minister of Agriculture and Alexander Dimitroff, who had proved himself as leader of the parliamentary group during the war, Minister of Internal Affairs. Theodoroff remained head of the Peace Delegation. The new coalition was five votes short of a majority in the Assembly but the opposition was sharply fragmented and the Democrats and Radicals promised to support the government.

The Agrarians declared that their rather strange bedfellows would not prevent them from making every effort to carry out their program. The government’s program, presented to the Assembly by Stambolisky on October 10, indeed provided for extensive reforms aiming at the moral, social and economic regeneration of the country, but it made only oblique references to the question of the peace. Although deputies received private briefings on the draft treaty, the Assembly itself did not discuss the reply shortly due the Allies. Theodoroff, however, consulted with the party leaders and four commissions consisting of representatives of all parties except the Narrows worked

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161 Muir, Dimitri Stancioff, p. 212.

162 Khristov, “Dnevnik,” p. 355 (diary entry for October 22, 1919); Bell, Peasants, 146.

163 "Novoto pravitelstvo,” Zemledelsko zname, October 9, 1919, p. 1.

164 XVIII ONS, 1. i.s., 2. z. (October 10, 1919); “Deklaratsiya na pravitelstvoto,” Zemledelsko zname, October 13, 1919, p. 1.

165 For complaints about this by deputies, see XVIII ONS, 1. i.s., 3. z. (October 13, 1919) and 6. z. (October 16, 1919); on the briefing of Agrarian deputies on October 5, see “Vårkhu dogovora za mir,” Zemledelsko zname, October 10, pp. 1-2, October 18, pp. 1-2, October 25, pp. 1-2, and October 28, 1919, pp. 1-2.
separately on different portions of a draft reply. Thedoroff took their uncoordinated products with him back to Paris, where he arrived on October 15. Sarafoff had already obtained a ten-day extension for the Bulgarian reply, originally due on the fourteenth.

By this time, Bulgaria had already received two new shocks. October 7, Franchet informed the government that the Council of Heads of Delegations had decided that the area in Western Thrace to be ceded to the Allies should be occupied by Allied troops. The next day, General Claudel, now commanding Allied occupation troops in Bulgaria, specified that the evacuation of Bulgarian troops was to be completed by October 15 but that the administration would continue until further orders under the direction of General Charpy, who had been appointed inter-Allied commander in the portion of Western Thrace to be ceded to the Allies. On the thirteenth, Claudel informed Stambolisky of a parallel decision on Strumitsa, which was to be occupied by Serbian troops under the same conditions as in Western Thrace as soon as the provisional boundary had been traced.

The announcement of the decision about Western Thrace caused especially bitter disillusionment, provoking a new round of denunciations in the press and demonstrations in Sofia. But now it was the Agrarians' turn to urge the necessity of maintaining

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167Khristov, "Dnevnikat," p. 353 (diary entries for October 7, 10 and 12, 1919); Drake, "Bulgaria," p. 216 n.8; Khristov, Revolyutsionnata kriza, pp. 460.

168Bernachot, Armées françaises, I, 245; Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, pp. 286 (where the date is given as October 6).


170Bernachot, Armées françaises, I, 245-46.

171Le général Claudel, commandant les troupes alliées en Bulgarie, à Monsieur le Président du Conseil des ministres de Bulgarie, Sofia, 13 octobre 1919, Bernachot, Armées françaises, I, 418; see also ibid., p. 281.

172VIII ONS, 1. i.s., 3. z. (October 13, 1919) and 6. z. (October 16, 1919); Khristov, "Dnevnikat," p. 354 (diary entry for October 14, 1919); Bernachot, Armées françaises, I, 245.
order. Madjaroff immediately protested the order for the evacuation of Western Thrace even before the signature, let alone ratification, of the peace treaty and particularly the use of Greek troops, and he instructed Sarafoff to do the same. The Bulgarians offered no resistance, however, as the Allies swiftly carried out their will, and in view of the fait accompli the Council saw no reason to reply to the protests.

It was amid these extremely ill portents that Theodoroff submitted the Bulgarian reply to the draft peace treaty on October 24. The bulk of this document addressed territorial questions. It recapitulated all the ethnographic, historical, economic and other arguments in favor of Bulgaria’s claims to the territories in dispute between her and her neighbors. Of all the questions connected with the peace terms, the Peace Delegation stated that the cession of Western Thrace was that which most closely affected the existence and future of Bulgaria. Not only did it shatter the unity of the Bulgarian people and gravely injure the essential conditions of its economic development but it cut the country off from the influence and support of the Western Powers. It was true that the draft conditions guaranteed Bulgaria an economic outlet to the Aegean, but experience proved that the only real access to the sea for any state was that which was guaranteed by its own sovereignty, a fact said recognized by the Peace Conference itself in other instances. The Peace Delegation therefore repeated the call for a plebiscite in Western

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173 "Da zapazim Balgariya!,” *Zemledelsko zname*, October 18, 1919, p. 1.

174 Madjaroff to Claudel, No. 1,003, Sofia, October 8, 1919, Bernachot, *Armées françaises*, I, 413; see also ibid., p. 246; and Petsalis-Diomidis, *Greece*, p. 286; the order to evacuate Strumitsa was also duly protested: Theodoroff to Clemenceau, No. 431, Neuilly-sur-Seine, October 23, 1919, 81/1/7/19895, FO 608/32, PRO.

175 Sarafoff to Clemenceau, No. 387, Neuilly-sur-Seine, October 12, 1919, 81/1/7/19609, FO 608/32, PRO (also in Appendix E to HD-75, *FRUS, 1919, PPC*, VIII, 760-61); Khristov, "Dnevnikâit,” p. 353 (diary entries for October 12 and 13, 1919); Drake, "Bulgaria,” pp. 179-80.


177 Khristov, "Dnevnikâit,” p. 355 (diary entry for October 24, 1919).
Thrace as well as in the Southern Dobruja and Macedonia. It also reaffirmed its endorsement of the idea of an autonomous administration under a League of Nations mandate for the latter region and proposed the retention by Bulgaria of areas to be ceded to Yugoslavia on the western frontier.

The Peace Delegation likewise commented on the other sections of the draft treaty. In regard to the main points, it accepted the principle of and the specific provisions for the protection of minorities and the principle of reciprocal voluntary migration. It noted, however, that provisions for the protection of minorities in the other Balkan states were not included in the treaty, which, moreover, invited only Greece, and not Serbia and Rumania, to accept the principle of the protection of minorities. The Peace Delegation hoped that the protection of minorities would be made to apply to all these states, for, if her territorial claims were not recognized, at least such protection would somewhat reduce future emigration from neighboring territories to Bulgaria, a problem from which she already much suffered. In this connection the Peace Delegation also raised the problem of the “unfortunate” refugees, 400,000 of whom it claimed were already living in the country. It asked that those persons previously resident in Macedonia, the Dobruja or Thrace who had taken refuge in Bulgaria before, during or after the war be given the right of opting for the nationality of the state in whose territory their former homes now lay. If they were refused permission to go home, the Peace Delegation feared that the increased discontent among them would “constitute a constant obstacle to the calming of people’s minds.”

The Peace Delegation also begged the Allies to take the social and economic conditions of the country into consideration and make certain changes in the military clauses by permitting, most notably, the retention of compulsory short-term service, an increase in the size of the army by 5,000, the creation of a corps of frontier guards 5,000 strong and a change in the proportion of officers from 1/20 to 1/15 of the total number of effectives. Finally, it accepted the principle of reparation but requested that the sum be
reduced to the level of Bulgaria’s capacity to pay or fixed in leva if this should prove impossible, with the value of war material to be delivered to the Allies in any case credited to her reparation account.\textsuperscript{178}

The Council of Heads of Delegations entrusted the Central Committee on Territorial Questions with collecting responses to the Bulgarian observations by the relevant commissions of the Conference and submitting a comprehensive draft reply by November 1.\textsuperscript{179} The Committee itself, on which Leeper and Charles Tufton of the Foreign Office now represented Britain,\textsuperscript{180} considered territorial matters on October 28. Discussion centered on the western frontier. The Americans and Italians now proposed the retention of the 1914 frontier in the Tsaribrod and Bosilegrad sectors. The British and French of course objected and the dispute was left for the Council to settle. The Americans, with Italian support, also insisted on inserting a reservation about the Southern Dobruja into the Committee’s report but agreed with the others that the question of Western Thrace could not be reopened.\textsuperscript{181}

Even before the Council discussed the Committee’s report on the Southern Dobruja, the issue came up on October 30. The Council had decided on September 5 to deal with the matter in a covering letter to the peace treaty but Pichon now said that France was absolutely opposed to any solution contemplating the transfer of the region to Bulgaria. Polk contended that the major difficulty was that Rumania had been given everything she demanded without any concessions being demanded of her in return, but


\textsuperscript{179}“Notes . . . ,” October 25, 1919, \textit{FRUS, 1919, PPC}, VIII, 764 (the decision on this procedure is also in \textit{MD, XIII}, 488-89); Drake, “Bulgaria,” pp. 231-32; Petsalis-Diomidis, \textit{Greece}, p. 289.

\textsuperscript{180}On Tufton, see Hertslet, \textit{Foreign Office List, 1921}, pp. 560-61.

he eventually agreed to a proposal by Crowe that the Bulgarians simply be told the question could not be raised in a treaty with Bulgaria.\textsuperscript{182}

Two days later, the Council had before it the Committee’s reports on territorial questions and the draft reply to the Bulgarian observations. It too saw no reason to reopen the Thracian question but did have a spirited discussion on the western frontier. The Americans emphasized that virtually all of the over 42,000 people involved in the cessions of the Tsaribrod and Bosilegrad sectors were Bulgarian, that the disarmament of Bulgaria removed any threat of attack on Yugoslavia and that these cessions would only unnecessarily increase mutual hostility between the two countries and prevent a rapprochement in their relations. Crowe observed that it was a bit late to insist on the sacredness of the principle of nationality and that Bulgaria would sign the treaty in any event, while Yugoslavia would not if these cessions were not granted. Pichon immediately endorsed the latter view. Polk finally retreated saying that the American delegation did not wish to complicate a difficult situation. He agreed that the proposed line should not be changed but made it clear that the United States had opposed the original decision and would not henceforth be responsible for any complications arising therefrom. The Italians, who were at least as interested as the British in preventing a Yugoslav-Bulgarian rapprochement, perhaps disingenuously adhered to the American viewpoint. Thus concluded the settlement of the western frontier, but one more exercise in futility remained. For Polk also returned to the charge over the Southern Dobruja in view of the reservation in the Committee’s report. He was ready to accept the merest phrase in the covering letter but this time failed to receive Italian support. The Italian interest in upholding the secret treaties had evidently definitely reasserted itself over the


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position taken in the Committee four days before. The Council's decision of October 30 accordingly stood.\textsuperscript{183}

British representatives thus played an important role in killing the last faint hope for even minor gestures to Bulgaria in the territorial settlement. Crowe, however, did eventually go along with some slight modifications in the military clauses.\textsuperscript{184} The final Allied terms delivered to the Bulgarian Peace Delegation on November 3 therefore contained no concessions on the territorial terms. The most important military concession was permission to create a corps of frontier guards of no more than 3,000 volunteers. With regard to minorities, the Allies, alluding to the minorities treaties they were concluding with the successor states of Eastern Europe, noted that all provision had been made for their protection in all the Balkan states and promised to take all necessary steps to secure the right of option for refugees. The Allies similarly assured the Peace Delegation that the provisions of the draft treaty were adequate to permit a reduction of the sum due for reparations should the economic condition of Bulgaria in the future so require.\textsuperscript{185}

\begin{footnotes}

\item[184] "Notes . . . .," November 1, 1919, \textit{FRUS, 1919, PPC}, VIII, 874-78; Drake, "Bulgaria," pp. 245ff.

\item[185] Enclosure to Clemenceau to Theodoroff, Paris, November 3, 1919, in "Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Observations of the Bulgarian Delegation on the Conditions of Peace," Appendix A to HD-81, \textit{FRUS, 1919, PPC}, VIII, 883-901; see also Appendix B, ibid., pp. 901-02 (final version of Part II relating to frontiers) (Bulgarian translation of complete final version in \textit{DDN}, pp. 231-46); Drake, "Bulgaria," pp. 233ff.; the commitment regarding refugees was made despite the finding of the Committee on New States in its report on the Bulgarian Peace Delegation's observations on the minorities clauses that "among these refugees is found a considerable proportion of active Bulgarian agitators whose return to Macedonia, Thrace or Dobruja would, in the interests of general tranquility, be highly dangerous": "Report of the Committee on New States to the Central Co-ordinating Committee," Annex (B) to Committee on New States, "Fifty-Fifth Meeting," PV, XIII, 350-51 (also in MD, XIII, 494-96; and Appendix D to HD-78, \textit{FRUS, 1919, PPC}, VIII, 820-21); Ladas, \textit{Exchange}, pp. 37-38.
\end{footnotes}
In the much-discussed covering letter, the Allies referred to Bulgaria's responsibility for prolonging the terrible evils of the war but disclaimed any desire to impose a peace of vengeance, seeking instead “to ensure the peaceful development of Bulgaria and to allow her to re-establish her normal economic existence within a short period of time.” The modified conditions were final and had to be accepted or rejected within ten days. If Bulgaria had not indicated her willingness to sign the treaty by the end of that period, the Allies would consider the armistice no longer in force and take whatever action they deemed suitable.186

Meanwhile, Theodoroff had been doing some last-minute lobbying, including bribes to journalists and appeals to Ignace Paderewski and Thomas Masaryk, the prime ministers of Poland and Czechoslovakia respectively.187 By November 2, however, it was already clear from the Parisian press that the final Allied terms would be essentially unaltered.188 Theodoroff had declared that he would not sign the treaty if Tsaribrod were lost and, understandably depressed, immediately after receiving the terms decided to leave for Sofia and not return. He told the Allies he would urge acceptance of the treaty.189

Theodoroff’s decision took Stambolisky by surprise, the Peace Delegation having already been informed that the latter would be going to Paris to sign with the other plenipotentiaries.190 Only now did Stambolisky undertake his own efforts to influence the

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Allies. The delay may have been partially due to disagreement with the Agrarians' coalition partners. Be this as it may, the night of November 3-4 saw the commencement, by a decision of the government supported by one of the Agrarian Supreme Council, of a wave of arrests of former members of the Radoslavoff government and others considered responsible for the war itself or war crimes, such as certain officers and members of the previous Assembly. Within a few days, the number of arrests climbed to over sixty. The government's program had foreseen such measures, but the National Assembly did not pass the relevant legislation, including provisions for life imprisonment and the death sentence, until November 22. The principal culprits, of course, had long since fled and the government immediately asked the Allies to intervene with the German and Hungarian governments to obtain the extradition of Ferdinand, Radoslavoff, Zhekoff and others. Better late than never, Stambolisky told the Assembly, since it was for their crimes that Bulgaria was being crucified in Paris, and the arrests would check Bolshevism.

The moral effect of these steps did not remain unmarred, however. Among those arrested for war crimes were Protogueroff and Alexandroff. Shortly after his arrest, Alexandroff managed to escape and suspicions that government officials, if not the government itself, were in connivance with the Supremist wing of IMRO were not stilled by news of the escape of Protogueroff and another officer a week or so later.

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192 "Arestite (Otgovora na ministr-predsedatelya, g-n Stamboliiski, na interpelatsiyata na B. Boev)," Zemledelsko zname, November 12, 1919, p. 1, and November 13, 1919, pp. 1-2.

193 Neate to DMI, November 25, 1919, W19/162431/12486, FO 371/3588, PRO; Lamb to Curzon, No. 69, Sofia, December 11, 1919, W19/163766/12486, ibid.

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If Stambolisky could accomplish anything at this late date, it had to be in Paris but first certain formalities had to be taken care of in Sofia. Theodoroff returned on the eighth\textsuperscript{194} amid great disappointment at the final peace terms, even though they had not been generally expected to be much of an improvement.\textsuperscript{195} The National Assembly reconvened the same day and, at Stambolisky’s proposal,\textsuperscript{196} devoted the next day’s sitting, which neither Stambolisky nor Madjaroff attended, to hearing a report by Theodoroff. Theodoroff recounted the activities of the Peace Delegation, emphasizing its isolation before the presentation of the draft treaty and the difficult atmosphere created by Bulgaria’s neighbors. He refused to offer any opinion on the action to be taken regarding the final terms but condemned them as unjust and not even in conformity with the principles proclaimed by the Allied Great Powers. He concluded by saying that he was sustained by the hope that if Bulgaria showed herself to be an element of peace and order, her just cause would make its way into the conscience of freedom-loving peoples and she would live to see happier days.

Speakers from all parties then rose to denounce the treaty in similar terms and engage in mutual recriminations. Many suspected that further pieces of Bulgarian territory were being cut off only in order to prevent reconciliation between Bulgaria and her neighbors, especially Yugoslavia. The Agrarians, however, expressed confidence in the future, saying that the Bulgarian people would find the strength to get their country out of the present situation, and not through war but by peaceful means. They also made it clear there could be no question of not signing the treaty and that it was not he who would take up the pen to do so who deserved condemnation. There was in fact no serious

\textsuperscript{194} XVIII ONS, 1. r.s., 2. z. (November 9, 1919).

\textsuperscript{195} Neate to DMI, Sofia, November 11, 1919, W19/155925/12486, FO 371/3588, PRO; see also “Okonchatelnite usloviya,” Pryaporets, November 5, 1919, p. 1; “Da podpishem li?,” Zemledelsko zname, November 8, 1919, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{196} XVIII ONS, 1. r.s., 1 z. (November 8, 1919); “Iz Narodnoto Sabranie,” Zemledelsko zname, November 10, 1919, p. 3.
call for the treaty's rejection and the matter was not put to a vote. The Assembly did
adopt, however, a resolution of protest to the British Parliament and American Senate. 197

Zemledelsko zname had already pointed out the obvious, that Bulgaria had no
choice but to sign the terrible peace, on the eighth and announced that Stambolisky would
be leaving for Paris any day. 198 He did not depart until November 12, 199 and the same day
Sarafoff, informing the Supreme Council that the Bulgarian government was prepared to
sign the peace treaty without any conditions, requested a delay in the ceremony until
Stambolisky could reach Paris. 200 The Council immediately granted this request and on
the eighteenth decided that the treaty should be signed at Neuilly-sur-Seine on November
27. 201

This did not leave Stambolisky much time for the personal diplomacy by which he
set such great store. Indeed, he had already more realistically set his sights on the period
after the signature of the treaty. On the eve of his departure to Paris, Stambolisky had
expressed his disappointment at not having had the opportunity to meet prominent Allied
statesmen during his first visit and the hope that this situation would be remedied in the
near future. According to information reaching British officers in Sofia, his plan was to
visit the various Allied capitals in Europe after signing the peace treaty and seek
interviews with the chief figures. Lamb learned from reliable sources that in London

197 XVIII ONS, 1. r.s., 2. z. (November 9, 1919); these proceedings were later published separately
as Nai-silniyat protest protiv N'ovskiya dogovor za mir—edin isticricheski dokument (Stenografskiyat
dnevnik na XVIII. Obiknoveno narodno sâbranie za zasedanieto mu na 9. noemvrii 1919 godina, posveteno
na obsâzhane proekta za miren dogovor, predlozen ot dûrzhavite-pobeditelkite--dokladat na pârviya
bûlgarski delegat--rechte i protestite na narodnite predstavители) (Sofia: Vsebûlgarski sayuz "Otets Paisii,"
1935); "Iz Narodnoto Sâbranie," Zemledelsko zname, November 10, 1919, p. 3; "Da zhive Bûlgariya!"

198 "Da podpischem li?," Zemledelsko zname, November 8, 1919, p. 1; "Dnevni," ibid., p. 2.

199 Neate to DMI, November 25, 1919, W19/162431/12486, FO 371/3588, PRO; Khristov,
"Dnevnikât," p. 360 (diary entry for November 13, 1919).

360 (diary entry for November 13, 1919); Drake, "Bulgaria," p. 253.

Stambolisky would be prepared to offer far-reaching economic privileges and, if need be, a virtual protectorate in return for a British undertaking to endeavor to secure a modification of the treaty. Lamb believed this was the last chance to prevent Bulgaria from again becoming the tool of Berlin but felt that unless the Foreign Office were in a position to hold out some hope of assistance, it would be almost better to refuse Stambolisky a visa in Paris than present him with a personal rebuff in London. Given the feeling of hostility toward the Allies prevailing since the publication of the peace terms, Stambolisky might not find it easy to maintain a British orientation in any case.\(^{202}\)

Stambolisky arrived in Paris on November 19 after stopping in Geneva for two days.\(^{203}\) He carried with him drafts prepared by diplomat Simeon Radeff of letters to Clemenceau as President of the Peace Conference and the presidents of the Greek, Rumanian and Serbian delegations and immediately broached to the delegation his idea of meeting French leaders to apprise them personally of the new orientation of Bulgarian policy and then going to London for the same purpose, a project which Sarafoff opposed.\(^{204}\) Nevertheless, the letters were ready by the twenty-second when Stambolisky, Ganeff and Sarafoff, the only plenipotentiaries in Paris, decided that Stambolisky would sign the peace treaty alone and so informed the Peace Conference.\(^{205}\) This decision was based on the fact that Sakazoff, like Theodoroff, had declined to return to the French capital, and the Radical Party had refused to let Ganeff sign the treaty as its

\(^{202}\) Neate to DMI, November 11, 1919, W19/155924/12486, FO 371/3588, PRO; Lamb to Oliphant, Sofia, November 21, 1919, W19/157008/12486, ibid.; Neate to DMI, November 21, 1919, W19/160024/12486, ibid.; Neate to DMI, November 25, 1919, W19/162431/12486, ibid.

\(^{203}\) Khristov, “Dnevnikat,” p. 360 (diary entry for November 19, 1919).

\(^{204}\) Khristov, “Dnevnikat,” p. 361 (diary entry for November 19, 1919); for Sarafoff’s opposition, see also ibid. (diary entry for November 20, 1919); for an unsympathetic appraisal of Radeff as a “jackal” see “Enemy Portraits: (II) Simeon Radev,” The New Europe, I, No. 7 (November 30, 1916), 215-16.

\(^{205}\) Khristov, “Dnevnikat,” p. 362 (diary entry for November 22, 1919); see also ibid., p. 361 (diary entry for November 21, 1919).
representative.\textsuperscript{206} Stambolisky thereupon signed the reworked letters\textsuperscript{207} and began to make arrangements that same day to see Allied statesmen.

Through Clemenceau, Stambolisky addressed himself to all the Allied Great Powers. His letter protested against the treaty as a cruel disappointment of the hopes with which Bulgaria had entrusted her future to the Allies but, expressing his realization that its clauses were already fixed, said Bulgaria would of necessity accept even a bad peace. The only thought which now animated Bulgaria was to regain the esteem of the Powers by exemplary execution of her obligations, and Stambolisky was sure that in determining the treatment of Bulgaria considerations of justice would in the end prevail over those attaching to the past. But if Bulgaria asked her former adversaries to forget the past, it was because she herself had begun to destroy that past. It was thus a new, resurrected Bulgaria which spoke to the Conference. Not ignoring the doubts cast on the sincerity of this new Bulgaria, Stambolisky invoked the record of the new leaders and outlined the tasks which his government had set for itself. He specifically mentioned the recent arrests as another proof that the parts of this program which depended on Bulgaria would be accomplished. But the new Bulgaria needed help and her future was largely in the hands of the victorious Powers. Stambolisky therefore concluded by appealing for their support through a more just solution to the territorial problem in the Balkans and material economic assistance.\textsuperscript{208}

Stambolisky’s letters to Bratiano, Pashitch and Venizelos, which had to be sent by post after being returned by the Secretariat of the Peace Conference as unrelated to peace

\textsuperscript{206}On Ganeff’s position, see Khristov, “Dnevnikâ,” pp. 355 (diary entry for October 22, 1919) and 360 (diary entry for November 19, 1919); on Sakazoff’s position, see ibid., p. 360 (diary entry for November 19, 1919).

\textsuperscript{207}Khristov, “Dnevnikâ,” p. 362 (diary entry for November 22, 1919); see also ibid., p. 361 (diary entries for November 19 and 20, 1919).

\textsuperscript{208}Stambolisky to Clemenceau, No. 530, Neuilly-sur-Seine, November 22, 1919, 120/3/7/20665, FO 608/54, PRO (also in f. 176, op. 4, a.e. 58, l. 5, BDIA, where a notation indicates that Stambolisky dictated the letter to Radeff, who then translated it into French, between November 12 and 15); Bulgarian version in Petkov, Aleksandar Stamboliiski, pp. 53ff.
negotiations, were couched in similar terms. He asserted that experience, especially that of recent years, had shown the necessity of an entente among the Balkan peoples and recalled his own unswerving devotion to that ideal. But, he emphasized, the peace about to be imposed on Bulgaria would determine whether it would be realized soon or only after long years. He therefore begged the other Balkan states not to deepen the abyss between themselves and Bulgaria by taking Bulgarian lands and frustrating her national unity and depriving her of access to the Aegean. Stambolisky concluded all three letters, however, by declaring he would remain faithful to the idea of Balkan understanding even if his present appeal were not heard.

Venizelos was the only one of the recipients to vouchsafe Stambolisky a reply, and it was none too conciliatory. To be sure, the Greek paid tribute to the sincerity of his Bulgarian counterpart but flatly declared that it was impossible for Greece to renounce Western Thrace. He recalled that in 1913 Bulgaria had rejected compromise and attacked her allies. After Bulgaria's defeat, Greece returned Western Thrace in the spirit of conciliation, but this was of no use. Bulgaria soon attacked Greece again and the events of the Great War showed that the responsibility for these aggressions rested, with certain notable exceptions, with the whole Bulgarian people. Virtually admitting the whole Bulgarian case, Venizelos adduced the fact that Bulgaria had rejected the Entente's offers and joined the Central Powers as proof that she did not want a just distribution of territory according to nationality but hegemony in the Balkans. After the events of the previous seven years, Bulgaria could not expect any benevolence from her neighbors, who could only show themselves just and inspired by the principles for which they had fought.

209 Khristov, "Dnevnikiat," p. 362 (diary entry for November 24, 1919); Secretariat General to Secretariat General of British Delegation, Paris, November 25, 1919, 81/1/11/20725, FO 608/33, PRO.

210 Stambolisky to President of Rumanian Delegation, Neuilly-sur-Seine, November 21, 1919, 81/1/11/20725, FO 608/33, PRO; Stambolisky to President of Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation, No. 532, November 22, 1919, ibid.; Stambolisky to Venizelos, No. 533, Neuilly-sur-Seine, November 22, 1919, ibid. (also in W19/168800/1300, FO 371/3574, PRO, and published in "Venizelos-Stamboulinski Correspondence," pp. 131-33); Bulgarian version in Petkov, Aleksandar Stamboliski, pp. 56ff.; Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, p. 289; Stavrianos, Balkan Federation, p. 210; Todorov, Politička istorija, p. 313.
Turning again to Western Thrace, Venizelos repeated his ethnographic and historical arguments. As for Bulgarian access to the Aegean, he pointed out that the Bulgarians themselves had admitted the inadequacies of Dedeagach as a port when they had demanded Kavalla in 1913 and promised to offer Bulgaria every facility for an economic outlet at a more suitable port such as Kavalla. Finally, Venizelos reaffirmed that he too looked forward to an understanding among the Balkan states but said that it was for Bulgaria, not her neighbors, to give proofs of her desire to live in peace and friendship.211

An approach was also made to the British embassy in Paris on November 22 with a view to obtaining a visa for Stambolisky. The reports from Sofia on Stambolisky's intentions in this regard did not reach Whitehall until early December, but it must have been obvious to the Foreign Office what he was up to and the matter was referred back to Paris, to Crowe.212 Meanwhile, becoming anxious, Stambolisky had Kosta Todoroff, a friend from his days in the Sofia Central Prison,213 make inquiries at the embassy and finally made an attempt on November 26 to appeal to the British Delegation for support.214 Crowe, however, was of the opinion that such a visit at that time might have unfortunate effects. He pointed out that Venizelos was that very day (November 27) returning to Greece, where his position would be exceedingly delicate, especially in view of the unsettled Thracian question. Crowe had no doubt that Stambolisky’s chief motive in going to London was to create an atmosphere favorable to Bulgaria, particularly on that very question. He had equally little doubt that Stambolisky’s intentions to renew friendly relations with Britain were perfectly sincere but recommended that until the treaty had


212Derby to FO, telegram No. 1188(R), Paris, November 22, 1919, W19/154690/12486, FO 371/3588, PRO; Curzon to Crowe, No. 1409, n.d. (November 25, 1919), ibid.

213Todorov, Balkan Firebrand, pp. 92ff.

214Khristov, "Dnevnikâi, pp. 362 (diary entry for November 25, 1919) and 363 (diary entry for November 26, 1919).
been ratified and definite territorial arrangements made in the Balkans, no encouragement
be given to Bulgarian overtures calculated to cause trouble with Britain's own allies.
Stambolisky's request for a visa was accordingly refused.\textsuperscript{215} He was told that a visit
would be possible after the peace treaty had been ratified.\textsuperscript{216}

The only Frenchman Stambolisky got to see was Dutasta, who came to see him for
twenty minutes on November 26 in his capacity as Secretary General of the Peace
Conference.\textsuperscript{217} The French government would only accede to his request to visit the
devastated lands in the north.\textsuperscript{218} The Italian government, on the other hand, gave
Stambolisky permission to go to Rome after the signature of the peace treaty.\textsuperscript{219} This was
entirely in keeping with the Italian attitude toward the Bulgarian Peace Delegation, which
had throughout been obliging. The Italian liaison officer had been a constant source of
information about the inner deliberations of the Peace Conference, information which not
coincidentally highlighted Italy's support for Bulgaria.\textsuperscript{220}

During a ceremony lasting thirty-five minutes beginning at 10:30 a.m. on
November 27, Stambolisky was ushered into the Hall of Festivals of the city hall of
Neuilly-sur-Seine to sign the peace treaty as the lone representative of Bulgaria together

\textsuperscript{215}Crowe to Curzon, No. 1624, Paris, November 27, 1919, W19/156476/12486, FO 371/3588; on
Venizelos' concern about the political situation in Greece, especially in view of the many questions
affecting Greece which still remained unresolved by the Peace Conference, and his departure three hours

\textsuperscript{216}Stambolisky to Council of Ministers, No. 601, Paris, December 5, 1919, f. 176, op. 4, a.e. 2, l. 4, BDIA; Stambolisky to Council of Ministers, No. 603, Paris, December 5, 1919, ibid., l. 5; Stambolisky to Council of Ministers, No. 622, Paris, December 8, 1919, ibid., l. 2.

\textsuperscript{217}Khristov, "Dnevnikat," p. 363 (diary entry for November 26, 1919); Muir \textit{Dimitri Stancioff}, p. 213.

\textsuperscript{218}Stambolisky to Minister in The Hague, No. 601, Paris, December 5, 1919, f. 176, op. 4, a.e. 2, l. 4, BDIA; Stambolisky to Council of Ministers, No. 603, Paris, December 5, 1919, ibid., l. 5; Muir, \textit{Dimitri Stancioff}, pp. 215-17.

\textsuperscript{219}Stambolisky to Council of Ministers, No. 593, Paris, December 2, 1919, f. 176, op. 4, a.e. 2, l. 3,
BDIA; Stambolisky to Council of Ministers, No. 603, Paris, December 5, 1919, ibid., l. 5; Muir, \textit{Dimitri

\textsuperscript{220}See Khristov, "Dnevnikat," pp. 343 (diary entry for September 6, 1919), 348 (diary entry for
September 18, 1919), 357 (diary entry for October 29, 1919), 359 (diary entry for November 4, 1919), 360,
(diary entry for November 15, 1919); Muir, \textit{Dimitri Stancioff}, p. 212.
with Clemenceau, Pichon, Tardieu, Cambon, Crowe, Martino, Polk, White, Venizelos, Politis, Pashitch, Trumbitch and assorted other representatives of Allied states large and small. Stambolisky, Venizelos and Politis also signed an agreement on migration. One American observer, describing Stambolisky as “scared and wall-eyed,” said, “It looked as if the office boy had been called in for a conference with the board of directors.” But Clemenceau, at least, seems to have been struck by Stambolisky’s dignity, tact and sincerity.

Three costly wars launched within the span of three years in the name of national unification had brought Bulgaria little gain in territory (see Map 12). This was a legacy which the Agrarian government, any Bulgarian government, would have to attempt to overcome. For all attention was already focused on the question of how the country could gain a reduction of the sentence passed on it, or even a reversal of the verdict, and the feeling was almost universal that the treaty would not be lasting as it was unjust. Perhaps for this reason, the news of the treaty’s signature created no excitement in Sofia, although there was a certain amount of disappointment in some quarters that Stambolisky


222Isaiah Bowman in House and Seymour, What Really Happened, pp. 163-64.

223Mordacq, Le ministère Clemenceau, IV, 200.

224Neate to DMI, Sofia, November 11, 1919, W19/155924/12486, FO 371/3588, PRO.
had not been able to get a last-minute revision of some of the terms, especially the cession of Tsaribrod.\textsuperscript{225}

A division of opinion did exist, however, on the all important issue of the manner in which the nation might best seek its salvation. On the one hand lay the expectation that the injustice of the treaty would become apparent to the Allies themselves once more tranquil conditions were reestablished in the world. Even before the treaty had been signed, \textit{Zemledelsko zname} had, perhaps not entirely tactfully, summed up this approach with the German proverb “Geduld bringt Rosen.” It was believed, in particular, that the future Inter-Allied Commission would be able to convince itself of the inability of Bulgaria to execute the financial clauses, and special hope was attached to the fact that the treaty had not definitely settled the fate of Western Thrace. In the meantime, it was necessary to cooperate with the Allied Great Powers, especially in the League of Nations, maintain good neighborly relations with Bulgaria’s former Balkan enemies and concentrate on raising all the intellectual and material forces of the Bulgarian people. The advocates of patience reckoned on an increase in the influence of the Allied Left and even more on Russia, who had not yet had her say.\textsuperscript{226}

On the other hand lay a return to the policy of Ferdinand. \textit{Pryaporets} predicted that the complete disillusionment with Wilsonian principles produced by the draft treaty would result in the resurrection, more terrible and vengeful than ever, of militarism and the cult of force. Force begot force and a league of the defeated and wronged would soon be created against the League of Nations, which was nothing but a league of victors to perpetuate the conquerors’ rights. Since the Allies had shown that might still stood above right, Bulgaria must create a strong authority to save herself and make herself respected in

\textsuperscript{225}\textit{Baird to DMI, Sofia, December 9, 1919, W19/168082/12486, FO 371/3588, PRO.}

\textsuperscript{226}\textit{Neate to DMI, Sofia, November 11, 1919, W19/155924/12486, FO 371/3588, PRO; “Iz koï păt?,” \textit{Zemledelsko zname}, November 19, 1919, p. 1.}
the future. After the presentation of the final terms, the organ of the Democrats proclaimed that the Bulgarian people would not submit to the decisions of the all-powerful victors: today it was defenseless but its conviction that right would triumph would become ever stronger and, in spite of everything, it would again get on its feet in order to occupy that place in the Balkans which history had set out for it.

Ominous in this regard was the fact that the escape of Alexandroff and Protopogeroff had given the Supremists a new lease on life. By contrast, the Temporary Representation, which had definitively rejected unification with the Executive Committee in early October, dissolved itself shortly after the signing of the Treaty of Neuilly. The General Council in Switzerland had issued a final appeal to the Peace Conference on November 18, denouncing Bulgarian irredentism and Bulgarian diplomacy and now asking for an autonomous Macedonia attached to Yugoslavia. It likewise voted to dissolve itself on November 27.

Stambolisky made his personal view of the path to follow clear in an article published in Zemledelsko zname while he was still abroad. He started out by recalling that in July one delegate from almost every party had set out for Paris but in November, when the time came to finally liquidate a shameful and disastrous policy, he remained alone. The treaty was still valid though, as through his hand the whole Bulgarian people

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231 General Council of Macedonian Societies in Switzerland to Peace Conference, November 18, 1919, Lape, "Aktivnostta," pp. 190n. (Macedonian translation; also in ZDSMD, pp. 316-17; different Macedonian translation in DBMN, I, 619-20); see also General Council of Macedonian Societies in Switzerland to Stambolski, November 18, 1919, Lape, "Aktivnostta," p. 189n. (Macedonian translation; also in ZDSMD, p. 315).

232 Protocol No. 18 bis, Lausanne, November 27, 1919, Lape, "Aktivnostta," pp. 188-91; see also ibid., p. 143.
had signed. However cruel and unjust, it had to be signed—about that he would let there
be no argument. Any refusal would have meant a continuation of the war, which was
unthinkable: there was no guarantee that it would not have been the troops of Bulgaria’s
neighbors who would have entered the country. In any case, the treaty was already signed
and further speculation on that question was superfluous. Stambolisky said, however, that
it was his duty to record a coincidence and make a prophecy which might provide a ray of
hope for the Bulgarian people. When he signed the treaty, he was painfully aware he was
affixing his signature to the terrible results of someone else’s policy, against which he had
fought at personal cost. But he had been able to sign calmly and confidently because at
the same time he had a deep faith in the triumph of right and truth. He remembered that
in November 1915, when he was sentenced to life imprisonment, he had told his family
and friends not to worry because he would be in prison only between three and five years.
He was firmly convinced of this when he signed the receipt of his sentence, and this
premonition proved correct: he remained in prison just three years. On his way to Paris
in November 1919, he had a similar premonition. So he signed the terrible peace treaty in
perfect calm, believing it would not last for more than three years. But he was fully
convinced that it would not be torn apart by the sword: his prison chains had been broken
by the indignation of the people and the chains of Bulgaria would be broken by the
indignant conscience of the world. Of this, he was completely certain.233

The Democrats attacked Stambolisky for even mentioning the obvious fact that
Bulgaria would have had to sign the treaty whatever it was like.234 Although Theodoroff
had expressed hopes similar to Stambolisky’s, he declined to bind himself to anything
with his signature.235 The difference between Stambolisky and the old leaders seemed

233Sam podpisakh. (Korespondentsiya na m-r predsedatelya g. Al. Stamboliiski),” Zemledelsko
zname, December 10, 1919, p. 1; also in Petkov, Aleksandar Stamboliiski, pp. 140ff.


235See pp. 271 and 273 above.
clear: while the establishment parties had already lost faith in the Allies and were turning toward a policy of revanche, Stambolisky alone had signed the treaty and now excluded any but an appeal to conscience for its revision.

The advent of Stambolisky and the BZNS to power was thus a major development in Near Eastern politics. The program which they sought to realize offered both an implicit guarantee of peace in the Balkans through domestic reform in Bulgaria and a direct promise of reconciliation with her neighbors. Stambolisky had, however, staked his own political future and the whole idea of the peaceful adjustment of Balkan problems on the fulfillment of his prophecy. The Agrarians could still refuse to accept any blame for a “cruel and unjust” peace, but they would have to accept responsibility for ameliorating its provisions. Every step in Stambolisky’s rise to power had been preceded by some decline in Bulgaria’s national fortunes. With the signing of the peace treaty, they seemed to have hit bottom just after Stambolisky had reached the top. In order to stay there, he would have to secure their reversal.

For Stambolisky the Treaty of Neuilly was thus to be a turning point, but for Britain it was merely a milestone along a path leading toward further humiliation for Bulgaria: the final cession of Western Thrace to Greece. From the moment of Stambolisky’s advent to power, otherwise so congenial to British interests, British policy was in conflict with the policy he aimed to pursue and thus had the potential to fatally undermine his position. As Stambolisky was to learn to his cost, in the end it really did not matter to Britain who was in power in Sofia.

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VII: British Policy and Bulgaria

The interpretation of the dictates of British interests in the Near East reflected in the Treaty of Neuilly spelled the end of virtually any hope of the formation of a Balkan bloc and thus differed fundamentally from the one so cogently defended in the Foreign Office until the first days of the Peace Conference itself. The British still accepted the strength of Bulgarian ethnographic claims to Macedonia and the Southern Dobruja, but the Delegation made no effort to raise the former question and did practically everything it could to prevent meaningful discussion of the latter. The idea of a plebiscite or commission of inquiry for either area was not even considered. Indeed, such consultations were hardly necessary and could only complicate matters in British eyes because the Delegation seemed to have no serious doubts about the outcome. But self-determination was also denied to Western Thrace where doubt did exist as to the national character or at least political desires of the inhabitants. Not only was there no sort of consultation, apart from the much disputed letter of the Moslem deputies, but the British Delegation actually emphasized the cession of the area as punishment for Bulgaria. The boundaries of Bulgaria drawn at Paris were based on anything but “the principle of government with the consent of the governed.” Not only was the settlement in conformity with few of the principles for which the Allies professed to have fought, but there could hardly have been one better calculated to introduce new and perpetuate old elements of conflict.¹

This new interpretation nowhere found coherent and comprehensive expression in black and white. Indeed, members of the Delegation seemed reluctant to admit that any change had taken place at all. As has been seen, that change had been initiated in the second half of January through the inspiration of Lloyd George. In later years, Lloyd George claimed to be well satisfied with the peace treaties, in whose framing he had taken such an active part, as embodying the high ideals for which Britain and her allies had fought. In his memoirs of the Peace Conference, he was at pains to refute the view that the provisions of the peace settlements had been determined "in the frenzied hour of triumph." Rather, he argued, the main outlines were fixed during the years of struggle when the issue was still in doubt.

The Armistice [with Germany] was an intimation to friend and foe alike that the settlement which followed the War would be drawn up on lines with which the world had been familiarised by the repeated declarations of the men who spoke authoritatively on behalf of the victors.

Except for the demand for the punishment of those responsible for the war or guilty of offenses against the laws of war, the assurance of victory and the exigencies of electioneering had, Lloyd George averred, effected no changes in the terms of peace. In particular, "the principles upon which the map of Europe was to be redrawn had been repeatedly laid down by the Allies and were not departed from." Rather, "[f]or the first time boundaries were fixed on the principle of government with the consent of the governed, and after taking evidence as to the wishes of inhabitants, shifted from one allegiance to another." Lloyd George emphasized the special difficulties which had had

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2See Chapter IV.
3Lloyd George, Truth, I, 19-20 and 22.
4Lloyd George, Truth, I, 89.
5Lloyd George, Truth, I, 93; Northedge, Troubled Giant, p. 111.
6Lloyd George, Truth, I, 89.
7Lloyd George, Truth, II, 1405.
to be overcome in Eastern Europe to achieve this happy result. In connection with the
former Habsburg lands, he noted that the task of the peacemakers had been "not to decide
what in fairness should be given to the liberated nationalities, but what in common
honesty should be freed from their clutches when they had overstepped the bounds of
self-determination."^8

Lloyd George’s defense of the peace treaties as reflecting the consistency of
Allied policy and principles is not surprising in view of the fact that he himself, during
both the war and the Peace Conference, had consistently and repeatedly affirmed publicly
and privately his resolve to make a peace in strict conformity with those principles and to
resist the impulses of greed and revenge. He laid special stress on the necessity of placing
as few people as possible under foreign rule and avoiding the creation of new Alsace-
Lorraines which would disturb the peace of the world in the future. Professing his belief
that frontiers should be drawn to the utmost extent practicable in accordance with ethnic
majorities, at the Peace Conference he frequently accepted or himself made the demand
for plebiscites in cases where serious doubt existed about the wishes of the population.9
His goal was that the terms of peace, while severe, should be "so just that the country on
which they are imposed will feel in its heart that it has no right to complain."10

Lloyd George, like other statesmen, was primarily concerned about Germany and
his defense of the work of the Peace Conference rests mainly on the settlement with that
power. Whatever may be the validity of this defense with respect to the German or other
peace treaties, it bears little relation to the terms of the Bulgarian treaty or the process by

8Lloyd George, Truth, I, 90-91.

9Lloyd George, Truth, I, 136, 159, 162-63, 384ff. (for his opposition to French claims against
Germany), 687ff. and II, 828ff., 751ff. and 761ff. (for his opposition to Italian claims); Elcock, Portrait,
pp. 16, 165, 196, and 312; Mayer, Politics, pp. 72 and 473; Rothwell, British War Aims, pp. 31-32 and 283-
84; Tillman, Anglo-American Relations, p. 37.

10As he stated in his famous “Fontainebleau Memorandum” of March 25, 1919 to French leaders:
Lloyd George, Truth, I, 404-12 (the quote is on p. 405).
which they were formulated. Even aside from the question of the interpretation and binding force of the Fourteen Points and other public declarations of Allied war aims, Lloyd George must have been aware that the policy so successfully pursued by the British Delegation was the very antithesis of the treatment projected for Bulgaria within British official circles until the first days of the Peace Conference. He quotes at length in his memoirs from the Foreign Office memorandum of August 1916 in his effort to prove the consistency between Allied intentions during the war and the final peace treaties but significantly omits the section dealing with Bulgaria, and he later dismisses the Bulgarian treaty in one sentence as “a simple proposition.”

Nicolson was more forthright in his later appraisal of the results of the Conference’s, and his own, labors:

... We came to Paris confident that the new order was about to be established; we left it convinced that the new order had merely fouled the old. We arrived as fervent apprentices in the school of President Wilson: we left as renegades...

We arrived determined that a Peace of justice and wisdom should be negotiated: we left it, conscious that the Treaties imposed upon our enemies were neither just nor wise.

In his analysis of the reasons for the hypocrisy of the peace treaties, Nicolson devoted much attention to psychological factors, putting most of the blame for the rapid deterioration in moral awareness at Paris on President Wilson. He emphasized, in particular, the impact of the realization from the first days of the Conference that Wilson himself had already sacrificed the principle of nationality by agreeing to the cession of the

12Compare “Suggested Basis for a Territorial Settlement in Europe,” memorandum by Tyrrell and Paget, P.5, August 7, 1916, CAB 29/1, PRO with Lloyd George, Truth, I, 31-50, especially p. 36.
13Lloyd George, Truth, II, 1001-02.
14Nicolson, Peacemaking, p. 187.
15Nicolson, Peacemaking, pp. 186ff.
German-inhabited South Tyrol to Italy. Nicolson called the consequences of this concession “disastrous”: “If Wilson could swallow the Brenner, he would swallow anything. The moral effect of this discovery can scarcely be exaggerated.” But Nicolson also faulted some of the procedural arrangements of the Peace Conference. He especially regretted the lack of adequate coordination of the work of the various territorial commissions examining the boundaries of the same enemy state with a view to more balanced general territorial settlements:

... True it is that, at the last moment, a “Co-ordination Committee” was appointed to remedy just this sort of overlapping. Yet by that time it was difficult to revise decisions arrived at after weeks of exhaustive and exhausting argument, and members of this Committee, although they effected much, were not in fact able to introduce any very sweeping revision of the terms as already contrived.

Nicolson noted as well that the members of the territorial commissions were unaware of the extent to which the Council would rely upon their reports and adopt virtually all unanimous recommendations without further discussion.

Nicolson did not explicitly apply his analysis to the Bulgarian settlement, and however well-founded it may be in relation to the other peace treaties, it does not go very far toward explaining the Bulgarian treaty and obscures his own role in its making. Although the original intensity of his Wilsonian fervor is not to be doubted, Nicolson eventually came to harbor some very un-Wilsonian sentiments toward Bulgaria:

For the Bulgarians I cherished feelings of contempt. Their traditions, their history, their actual obligations should have bound them to the cause of Russia and the Entente. They had behavedtreacherously in 1913 and in the Great War they had repeated this act of perfidy. Inspired by the most material motives of acquisition they had joined with Germany, and by so doing lengthened the War by two whole years. In the hour of their victory they had behaved in Serbia and Macedonia without pity and without foresight. They had joined our enemies for purely selfish purposes: their expectations had proved erroneous: and they were now endeavouring to cast upon King Ferdinand the blame for what had in fact been a movement of national egoism. I did not feel that Bulgaria deserved more

16Nicolson, Peacemaking, pp. 164, 170 and 203.

17Nicolson, Peacemaking, pp. 127-28; see also ibid., p. 117.

18Nicolson, Peacemaking, pp. 128-29.
mercy than she would herself have been prepared, in similar circumstances, to accord.19

Whatever the merits of this bill of particulars, and they are few, it certainly bespeaks an attitude, which Nicolson believed to be typical, subversive of the justice and wisdom of any settlement.20

What is more, this attitude was very different from his frame of mind prior to the Peace Conference when he was warning of the dangers inherent in punishing Bulgaria21 and hoping Wilson would cut the Gordian knot of conflicting claims in the Balkans.22 It is unclear precisely when Nicolson hardened his heart toward Bulgaria, and Wilson’s apostasy over the South Tyrol may have been a factor. What is clear, however, is that Nicolson made his crucial recommendation on the cession of Western Thrace on January 26,23 four days before Wilson retreated to the Brenner.24 Nicolson admitted that, as he put it, he deserted Wilson for other teachers such as Venizelos, Lloyd George, Balfour and Crowe, but he did not admit that he began deserting his positions even before Wilson had.25 Nor did he admit to his own role in applying the principle of nationality. As early as March 5, 1919, James Headlam-Morley, formerly of the PID and now a member of the British Delegation, observed that self-determination was quite démodé: Leeper and Nicolson determined for them what the various nations should wish.26


21See pp. 118 above.

22See p. 99 above.

23See pp. 178-179 above.


26And he thought they did it very well too: Headlam-Morley, *Memoir*, p. 44.
Likewise, the Central Territorial Committee was in fact established only three weeks after the Rumanian and Greek commissions. True, it was July by the time the Americans, pointing out that it was responsible for taking a broader view than the special commissions, sought to reopen the question of Western Thrace, but it was Nicolson himself who protested against this procedure. If the Committee had any difficulties in revising this recommendation of the Greek commission, they were certainly not unwelcome to Nicolson and the British Delegation. Nicolson, in fact, argued that Britain’s attitude toward Bulgaria’s other frontiers and the economic aspects of the peace treaty with her and even toward the question of Constantinople were all based on the assumption that she would lose Western Thrace and might have to be revised if the Americans persisted. This statement indicates that the British Delegation already had a satisfactory, and satisfied, overview of the Bulgarian settlement as a whole.

As for the Council, Nicolson had long experience of staff work and knew perfectly well the reliance which senior officials, including members of the Cabinet, placed on their experts. By the time of the Peace Conference, he was confident rather than surprised that his own recommendations would be followed. More likely to have surprised him was the fact that members of the Council could and did occasionally raise objections to even unanimous recommendations by the experts. Lloyd George himself set the pace in this regard by repeatedly vetoing unanimous reports of the Polish commission. When, on

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27See p. 187 above.


29See p. 208 above.

30See p. 209 above; see also minute by Crowe, July 11, 1919, 120/1/6/15321, FO 608/55, PRO; and “Bulgarian Frontier in Thrace,” minute by Nicolson, Paris, July 15, 1919, 120/6/1/15322, ibid.

31See p. 97 above.

32Elcock, Portrait, pp. 154ff.; Lloyd George, Truth, II, pp. 978ff.; Tillman, Anglo-American relations, pp. 204ff.; Walworth, Wilson, pp. 258ff.; interestingly, the British member of this commission was Sir William Tyrrell: see p. 252 above; on the general question of the role of the British Delegation’s experts, see Kitsikis, Rôle, pp. 192ff.
the other hand, White and Polk tried the same thing with the far from unanimous Greek committee, Balfour did not hesitate to express his indignation. As far as the Bulgarian treaty is concerned, Nicolson's explanations thus miss the essential point: he, Leeper and Crowe knew exactly what they were doing and told their respective superiors exactly what they wanted to hear.

Major Harold Temperley of the British Delegation's Military Section later adduced another reason for the nature of the Bulgarian settlement. He claimed that President Wilson "several times made clear that his principles applied only to the territory of the defeated Powers, and were not meant to 'inquire into ancient wrongs.' " Wilsonian principles, therefore, did not apply to Bulgarian territories acquired by Serbia and Rumania in 1913. A cursory glance at Point XI alone reveals that this was not the case. At the beginning of the Peace Conference, both British and American experts advocated the transfer of at least some Rumanian and Serbian territory to Bulgaria. Later, Wilson himself supported the position of Mezes in the Central Territorial Committee that although Rumania was a friendly state, the Allies had a right to require the retrocession of part of the Quadrilateral in return for the territories which she would obtain as a result of the common victory. If Wilson did not believe the Great Powers could demand outright cessions of their smaller allies, he at least recognized the desirability of fostering adjustments among all the Balkan states. Moreover, the treaty of 1913, which had not been recognized by the Great Powers before the outbreak of the war, was hardly an "ancient wrong," certainly not as ancient as the 1871 treaty under which

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33See pp. 214-214 above.

34Temperley, History, V, 433.

35See pp. 44 and 100 above and Appendix I.

36See pp. 172 and 190 above.

France had lost Alsace-Lorraine to Germany. In fact, the American delegation itself decided to adopt an even more distant cut-off date—1648!\textsuperscript{38} It was accordingly not Wilsonian principles which prevented the revision of the Treaty of Bucarest, and the British in fact saw no difficulty in revising it in a sense unfavorable to Bulgaria.

Temperley was closer to the mark when he noted in the middle of May, "No partial concessions are ever likely to satisfy the Bulgarians."\textsuperscript{39} Having changed the whole basis of their Balkan policy just as the Peace Conference was getting under way, the British had every interest in preserving the already fraying unity of the Balkan Allies against Bulgaria by leaving Bulgarian irredenta under Rumania and Serbia as well as Greece and could have seen little point in still trying to complete the Balkan bloc through what could at best have been little more than token satisfaction of Bulgaria’s aspirations by her neighbors. For, on the one hand, the Balkan Allies would have had to be forced to cede any territory at all to Bulgaria. Even if France had been willing to cooperate in such an effort, the whole Bela Kun episode had convincingly demonstrated that the Allied Great Powers, with virtually no troops of their own in Central and Southeastern Europe by the summer of 1919,\textsuperscript{40} were in no position to enforce compliance with their decisions on recalcitrant junior partners. They were even concerned about being able to enforce their peace terms on Bulgaria.\textsuperscript{41} On the other hand, British sympathy for Bulgaria had already been considerably cooled by the war, and moral indignation was further fanned at Paris by the propaganda of the Balkan Allies and the results of inquiries into Bulgarian war crimes.\textsuperscript{42} One can imagine the effect of stories about Bulgarian atrocities on

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Bonsal, Suitors, p. 59.}
\footnote{Minute by Temperley, May 15, 1919, 81/1/9/9693, FO 608/32, PRO.}
\footnote{Report for August 1919, AA, IV, 153ff.; Polk to Wilson and Lansing, Paris, August 5, 1919, MD, XX, 378-80; Bernachot, Armées françaises, II, 220; Spector, Rumania, p. 168.}
\footnote{Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, pp. 160ff., 266-67 and 274-75; Todorović, "Pitanje," pp. 108ff.}
\footnote{Churchill, Aftermath, p. 157; Dillon, Inside Story, p. 466; Driault and Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique, V, 359; Genov, Bulgaria, pp. 46ff.; House and Seymour, What Really Happened, p. 172; Temperley, History, IV, 411-12n.; Todorović, “Pitanje,” p. 115; Greece had demanded an international

\end{footnotes}
Nicolson, who as a boy in Sofia had seen the severed fingers of Stamboloff swimming in a jar.\footnote{Lees-Milne, \textit{Nicolson}, I, 5.} It was thus easy for British delegates to accept at least tacitly the view of Bulgaria as naturally aggressive and permanently hostile.\footnote{See Temperley, \textit{History}, IV, 411 and 444ff.}

Indeed, it was Nicolson himself who best articulated the underlying motives of British policy toward Bulgaria at the Peace Conference, at least in relation to Western Thrace. In a minute written in July at the height of the crisis with the American delegation over that region, he adduced reasons why Bulgaria had no right to it which reflected both moral indignation and geopolitical calculation. Nicolson divided these reason into four sets: ethnographic, economic, geographic, and moral and political. As far as ethnography was concerned, he swallowed Venizelos' statistics and the letter of the Moslem deputies whole. The latter he considered very important since he admitted that under the Fourteen Points the fate of Western Thrace should be determined by the wishes of the majority and saw the petition as a definite expression of Turkish wishes.

Nicolson considered the economic arguments about cutting Bulgaria off from the sea fallacious: she already had Burgas and Varna, whose value would be increased by international guarantees of the freedom of the Straits, and her real Aegean port was not Dedeagach but Kavalla or Salonika, the secure utilization of which ports it was likewise proposed to guarantee.

From the geographic point of view, claiming that even the Americans had to admit that Eastern Thrace should go to Greece on ethnographic grounds, he pointed out the obvious absurdity of separating this Greek territory from Greece by "giving" Bulgaria an inquiry into Bulgarian crimes in Eastern Macedonia on October 11, 1918: Petsalis-Diomidis, \textit{Greece}, p. 86; the Yugoslavs demanded that Bulgaria be obliged to deliver some two dozen alleged war criminals even before the signature of peace: note from Delegation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, No. 1718, Paris, May 19, 1919, with enclosure, \textit{MD}, XVIII, 406-09.
enclave in Western Thrace. Giving Western Thrace to Greece was therefore dictated by
the necessity of connecting her with Eastern Thrace.

But Nicolson thought that the moral and political considerations were strongest of
all. Referring to Bulgaria's entry into the war against the Allies and her conduct of it, he
pointed to a recent international inquiry, which unanimously concluded that Bulgaria had
violated every article of the Hague Convention. If Bulgaria did not lose Western Thrace
she would be the only enemy power to emerge from the war with practically no loss of
territory and, if the extreme American position (on the Southern Dobruja) were adopted,
would actually be paid for having fought the Allies.

Nicolson further argued that Bulgarian possession of a naval base at Porto Lagos
on the Aegean would be a grave menace not only to Greece but to the security of the
Straits. An Italy ensconced in Albania and allied with Bulgaria would thus secure a
complete stranglehold on Greek development. The American attitude, by contrast, was
based on what Nicolson called a most disputable thesis: that Bulgaria would bitterly
resent being treated with severity and that this resentment would endanger the peace of
the Balkans. Even if this were admitted, it could not justify the Americans in repudiating
the agreement come to four months previously and giving Bulgaria not only what she had
in 1914 but what she had gotten in 1915 for fighting the Allies.45

Nicolson's arguments show how far attitudes had changed at the Peace
Conference in the course of just a few months. In February, speaking of conflicting
Rumanian and Hungarian claims, Crowe told the members of the Commission on
Rumanian Affairs that the balance must be inclined to their ally if it was found impossible
to do justice to both sides but that this principle must not be carried too far as it was their
ultimate duty to produce a state of affairs likely to lead to permanent peace.46 Now, in

45"Bulgarian Frontier in Thrace," minute by Nicolson, Paris, July 15, 1919, 120/6/1/15322, FO
608/55, PRO; see also Temperley, History, IV, 456.

46CARY, "Procès-verbal no. 3," 13 février 1919, RAC, IV, C(4), 24-25; see also Lloyd George,
Truth, II, 919-20, where the date is incorrectly given as February 25.
July, Nicolson was arguing that an enemy deserved to lose territory regardless of the threat to peace. Nicolson regarded such moral and political arguments, which he saw as closely linked, as the strongest in relation to Western Thrace. Indeed, his other arguments, aside from the geographic, do not appear to have weighed very strongly with the British Delegation. For even after the authenticity of the letter of the Moslem deputies was challenged,\(^47\) it never advocated any closer inquiry as to the wishes of the population, and Nicolson’s economic reasoning provided more basis for giving Kavalla to Bulgaria than Dedeagach to Greece. Such a solution, however, would have flown in the face of Nicolson’s geographic and moral and political arguments. His point about the submarine base, a danger which neither the General Staff nor he himself had perceived six months earlier,\(^48\) indicates that he took it as given that even a Bulgaria in possession of Western Thrace would be hostile and present a threat to the Straits, Greece and, presumably, Yugoslavia if not Rumania as well. Nicolson, therefore, did not really think the American thesis, which had been the British thesis as well, was so disputable. Rather, Nicolson saw this consideration as outweighed by the moral and geopolitical imperatives for depriving a wicked foe of strategically important territory and giving it to a favored friend.\(^49\)

Ignoring the threat to peace from Bulgaria in favor of strengthening Greece’s position in relation to the Straits could only be justified, however, on the assumption that she and the other Balkan Allies would be strong enough to resist any threat from not only

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\(^47\)See pp. 203 and 208 above; it should be noted that in June one of the signatories sent a letter to Lloyd George referring to the original communication and another from him to the president of the Greek commission on May 15 and requesting that Western Thrace be “delivered” from Bulgaria and united with Greece, although it is not clear whether these letters reached the Delegation: Ismael Hakki to Lloyd George, Paris, June 12, 1919, F/49/6/3, LGP.

\(^48\)See pp. 177 and 183 above.

\(^49\)Somewhat ironically, around the time Nicolson was writing his minute in July, his father, now Lord Carnock, was co-signing a letter to The Times criticizing the “hasty” and “ill-informed” decisions at Paris on territorial disputes in the Balkans and elsewhere in the Near East as offering no prospect of permanent peace and suggesting the establishment of commissions of experts; other co-signatories were George W. Buchanan (another former British representative in Sofia and ambassador in St. Petersburg), Lord Crewe, Lord Bryce, Frederick Kenyon, Arthur J. Evans and W. M. Ramsay: letter to the editor, The Times, July 5, 1919, p. 8.
Bulgaria but also Germany, Russia and Turkey. Even in July 1919, when the new arrangements in the Balkans had yet to be tested, the final settlement with Turkey was not even close to completion, the domestic and international positions of Russia had yet to be clarified and the wisdom of the German peace treaty was already being doubted by Nicolson himself,\(^{50}\) such an assumption might have seemed hasty to say the least. By October, Venizelos was in fact expressing fear of a combination of just these powers (and Hungary) if Turkey were left in possession of Constantinople.\(^{51}\)

The most striking characteristic of British policy toward Bulgaria at the Paris Peace Conference, then, was its divergence from the ideas current in official circles before, during and even immediately after the Great War. Almost as striking is the fact that the new policy nowhere found comprehensive elucidation. The change was due not to the inadequacies of the Conference's procedure, the shortcomings of Wilson and his Fourteen Points or even primarily the opposition of allies 'great and small but to the crystallization of British policy toward the Straits and Bulgaria's geographic position in relation to them. The original conception had been to win Bulgaria's friendship and promote the formation of a Balkan bloc by reconciling her with her Christian neighbors. It was based on the parallel thoughts that a Balkan bloc would provide military strength in a region where Britain had none of her own and that a stable settlement there was itself a guarantee of not only the general peace but the security of the Straits as well. The new idea seemed to be to secure these interests by promoting the cooperation of the Balkan Allies as a substitute for the Balkan bloc: while Greece guarded the Straits themselves,

\(^{50}\)Nicolson, *Peacemaking*, pp. 365ff. (diary entry for June 28, 1919); for Lloyd George's view of German impotence, see p. 146 above; and Wandycz, *France*, p. 29; for a similar view, see Keynes, *Economic Consequences*, p. 272; and Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, p. 60; for the retrospective view that Lloyd George had underestimated the dangers of a resurgent Germany, see Jones, *Lloyd George*, p. 178; for the contemporary fears of Balfour, Churchill and others of German domination of Eastern Europe, see E. Mantoux, *Carthaginian Peace*, p. 178; and Mayer, *Politics*, p. 516.

Yugoslavia and Rumania would bar the road from Germany and Russia respectively and all three together would hold Bulgaria in a vice. Indeed, the old approach survived to the extent that it seemed to be assumed that Bulgarian ambitions would survive. Disarmament, a common feature of all the peace treaties, could also help to keep these in check. Both peace and British interests at the Straits could thus have appeared secure but the whole structure was in fact weighted toward the Straits, and its stability rested on the ability of the Balkan Allies to resist not simply Bulgarian revanchism but the possible encroachments of a revived Germany, Russia or Turkey, all of whom would still be able to look to Bulgaria for support.

Britain’s policy toward Bulgaria at the Paris Peace Conference was analogous to that at the Congress of Berlin forty years before. In both cases she aimed at diminishing the strategic importance of Bulgaria and curtailing her military power. In 1878, this seemed the only way to counter Britain’s rival and Bulgaria’s patron Russia. The alternative of actually supporting Bulgarian nationalism did not prove practicable until some years later. By 1919, Bulgarian nationalism had once again ranged itself on the side of Britain’s enemies, but there was now a third alternative, the formation of a Balkan bloc, which she originally contemplated encouraging. Ironically, the British Delegation abandoned this alternative and chose to exasperate Bulgarian nationalism once again at precisely the moment when those forces in Bulgaria which advocated peaceful cooperation among the Balkan states finally gained political ascendancy. Britain thereby once again played a major role in shaping Bulgaria’s domestic power struggle for years to come as the revision of the Treaty of Neuilly now joined the restoration of San Stefano as a major theme in her politics.

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52 On this aspect of British policy, see Chaput, Disarmament; and Jaffe, Decision to Disarm.

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1. The 1875-8 Balkan Crisis

Boundary of the San Stefano Big Bulgaria

Boundaries of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia according to the Berlin treaty

Territory gained by Montenegro, Serbia, Rumania and Russia (Dobrudja to Rumania, Southern Bessarabia to Russia from Rumania)

Bosnia, Herzegovina and the Sanjak of Novibazar, occupied by Austria-Hungary

THE 1875–8 BALKAN CRISIS
2. The Balkan Settlement of 1913

3. The Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles


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The Straits of the BOSPHORUS and DARDANELLES
To illustrate the crises of 1833, 1840-1, 1849 and 1853

The Narrows are doubly shaded, thus:

Adrianople
Midia
The Narrows
Bujuk Liman
Bujuk Dere
Unkiar Skelessi
Beikos
Anatoli Phanar
Therapia

Constantinople (STAMBUL)

Marmara I.

Gulf of Ismid
(Marmora)

Tenedos
4. Partition Schemes, 1915-17

Source: Clayton, Britain, p. 228.
5. The Line of the Treaty of London

Source: Lederer, Yugoslavia, p. 8.
The Line of the Treaty of London, 1915
6. *Thrace*

Source: Venizelos, *Greece*, p. 34.
7. Macedonian Front

NOTE: The rifle strengths given are approximate.

REFERENCE

Battle line on September 15th

Scale 1:1,666,666

Macedonian Front
Showing Allies Advance in 1918

Vol. 14
8. Political Boundaries in Thrace

Political boundaries in Thrace. Boundaries established by the following treaties are shown: San Stefano, 1913; Berlin, 1878; London, 1913; Bucarest, 1913; Constantinople, 1913; Sofia, 1915; Neuilly, 1919; Sèvres, 1920.
9. *Frontiers in the Dobruja*

Source: *RAC, IV, C(4), following p. 220.*
LÉGENDE

- Revendications de la Délégation Roumaine
- Frontières de 1914.
- Propositions de la Commission des Affaires Roumaines
- Frontières nouvelles d'États voisins
- Frontière de 1878 (Dobroudja)
11. Timok Valley

Source: Bowman, New World, p. 386.
New boundaries of Bulgaria

Former

All the geographical features mentioned in the treaty text to define the boundary are shown on the map.
12. *The New Boundaries of Bulgaria*

Territorial losses of Bulgaria as a result of the World War. From the Geographical Review, June 1920.
### I: Bulgarian General Elections of 1913 and 1919

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Number of Votes</th>
<th>Percentage of Votes</th>
<th>Deputies</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1913</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage 1913</td>
<td>Percentage 1919</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agrarians</td>
<td>113,761</td>
<td>180,648</td>
<td>20.9</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>48</td>
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<tr>
<td>Narrows</td>
<td>54,217</td>
<td>118,671</td>
<td>10.1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broads</td>
<td>55,171</td>
<td>82,826</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>42,971</td>
<td>65,267</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nationals</td>
<td>24,344</td>
<td>54,556</td>
<td>4.5</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Liberals</td>
<td>11,863</td>
<td>52,722</td>
<td>2.2</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Liberals</td>
<td>207,763</td>
<td>42,024</td>
<td>38.2</td>
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<td></td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>95</td>
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<tr>
<td>Radicals</td>
<td>24,007</td>
<td>33,343</td>
<td>4.4</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dragieff Agrarians</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>17,796</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>---</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>--</td>
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<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>9,333</td>
<td>8,462</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>543,430</td>
<td>656,315</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II: Woodrow Wilson's Point XI

XI. Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan States should be entered into.

Source: OS, p. 238.
III: Armistice of Salonika
(September 29, 1918)

Military Convention regulating the conditions for the suspension of hostilities between the Allied Powers and Bulgaria.

1. Immediate evacuation, in accordance with an arrangement to be concluded, of the territories still occupied in Greece and Serbia. No cattle, grain, or food stuffs of any sort shall be removed from these territories. No damage shall be done on leaving them. The Bulgarian administration shall continue to operate in the districts of Bulgaria at present occupied by the Allies.

2. Immediate demobilization of the whole Bulgarian Army, except for the maintenance on a war footing of a group of all arms of three divisions (of 16 battalions each) and four cavalry regiments, which shall be employed, two divisions for the defence of the eastern frontier of Bulgaria and the Dobruja, and one division to guard the railways.

3. The arms, munitions, and military vehicles belonging to the demobilized elements shall be deposited at points to be fixed by the High Command of the Armies of the East; they will be stored by the Bulgarian authorities under Allied control. The horses will also be handed over to the Allies.

4. Return to Greece of the material of the Greek IV Army Corps taken from the Greek Army at the time of the occupation of Eastern Macedonia, so far as it has not been sent to Germany.

5. Bulgarian troops at present west of the meridian of Üsküb (Skoplje) and forming part of the German Eleventh Army shall lay down their arms and shall be considered until further notice prisoners of war. The officers will retain their arms.

6. Employment until the signature of peace of the Bulgarian prisoners in the East by the Allied Armies, without reciprocity as regards Allied prisoners of war. The latter will be handed over without delay to the Allied authorities, and civilians who have been deported will have complete liberty to return to their homes.

7. Germany and Austro-Hungary will be given a time limit of four weeks within which to withdraw their troops and military organization from Bulgaria. Within the same period the diplomatic and consular representatives of the Central Powers, as well as their nationals, must quit the territory of the Kingdom.

Orders for the cessation of hostilities will be given on the signature of the present convention.

SECRET ARTICLES

1. The future passage of Allied military forces through Bulgarian territory and the use of railways, roads, rivers, and ports will be the subject of a special convention between the Bulgarian Government and the High Command of the Army of the East.
Discussions to this effect will be begun within a period of a week at most. They will take into consideration also the control of the telephone, the telegraph, and the wireless stations.

2. A certain number of strategical points will be occupied in the interior of Bulgarian territory by the Great Powers of the Allies. This occupation will be provisional and purely as a guarantee. It will not occasion any coercion or arbitrary system of requisitioning. The Commander-in-Chief of the Armies gives the assurance that, except in extraordinary circumstances, Sofia will not be occupied.

3. The Commander-in-Chief reserves to himself the right to demand the complete cessation of intercourse between Bulgaria and her former Allies in case of need.

4. Opening of the Bulgarian ports to Allied and neutral ships.

FRANCHET D'ESPÉREY.
ANDRÉ LIAPCHEFF.
GENERAL LUKOFF.

IV: Article 48 of the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine

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SECTION III--THRACE

48. Bulgaria renounces in favour of the Principle Allied and Associated Powers all rights and title over the territories in Thrace which belonged to the Bulgarian Monarchy and which, being situated outside the new frontiers of Bulgaria, as described in Article 27 (8), Part II (Frontiers of Bulgaria), have not been at present assigned to any State.

Bulgaria undertakes to accept the settlement made by the Principle Allied and Associated Powers in regard to these territories, particularly in so far as concerns the nationality of the inhabitants.

The Principle Allied and Associated Powers undertake to ensure the economic outlets of Bulgaria to the Aegean Sea.

The conditions of this guarantee will be fixed at a later date.

*****

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