Ethics and embodiment in racialised, ethnicised and sexualised practice

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Abstract

The research considers practices in night-time leisure spaces, such as bars, pubs and nightclubs, in London. Through participant observation in conjunction with group and individual interviews, I engage with the emergence of race, ethnicity, sexuality and gender as they are specifically enacted in everyday practices. I investigate how sociable practice and sexualised affect and desire are organised to recuperate specific distributions of bodily social relations. Yet, although such practices are riven with an embodied social memory – the immanence of machinic formations of power – desire can always overspill these constraints, as the practical negotiation of social situations is always simultaneously indeterminate.

Through practices such as dancing, drinking, gossip and banter an embodied memory specifying which bodies can desire which other bodies becomes performatively instantiated. Which bodies are attractive, and who can desire whom, are emergent properties of how a body is encountered as simultaneously and specifically racialised and sexualised. Yet, this memory only becomes specifically encountered as it is modulated and enacted by bodily styles and rhythms. Expressive practices can perform an ordering, a territorialisation that reverberates with powerful forms of organisation. Yet, to become expressive can also open up new arrangements between bodies.

My research also considers the influence of racialised, ethnicised, gendered and sexualised affect upon the relations that can be enacted between differently embodied individuals within friendship groups in informal and leisure situations. The ethical questions to arise from this analysis surround how bodies might increase their affects or the ways in which they relate to and connect with others. Friendship is explored as an ethical project in which the pleasurable arts of becoming-sociable together can cultivate an accommodation with the bounds of Desire, or even an exploration of a more nomadic friendship ethos.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

1. Night-time

It’s been a long week, but work is over for today. It’s time to go out! Friends are called, or maybe they get sent an e-mail or text message. ‘Which pub?’ ‘Do you want to go clubbing?’ Not long to go. It’s going to be a great night.

Maybe it’s a case of heading home first and getting changed. Having a bite to eat (got to line that stomach!). Music up a little higher than usual to help get into the mood. Away at last from the stresses and tedium of work. Time to play, to relax, to get away from it all.

It is usually on a Friday or Saturday night that many young adults - and many not so young - converge on town and city centres to head to a pub, bar or nightclub. Often their evening takes them to more than one, or might take them from one type of space to another. These night-time leisure spaces are spaces of enjoyment. They are places to go and have a good time, to spend some time with friends, to be sociable. Dancing, becoming entrained in a rhythm, swept along in a crowd of other clubbers; drinking, smoking, chatting, laughing, gossiping; going out ‘on the pull’, trying to pick somebody up: these activities all seem to offer some respite from the monotony and dreariness of everyday life. Yet, these activities, each in their own way, are also mundane: they too belong to everyday life. They might not literally be performed everyday, but they are often engaged in often enough to be taken for granted, to be performed without thought.

Maybe we would like to think that we do not need to think, that we could just get on with enjoying ourselves. These people who have a few drinks at the pub, just let them be! These clubbers, let them
dance! It might be thought that a public bar is a public space, a
democratic space. But, it is not. There is all this drinking and all this
dancing, but there is also an Unconscious that arranges these
activities. There are norms of behaviour, and specified ways of being
the right kind of person in these spaces. Yet, these norms and
specifications are unthought. They are part of the fabric of the
everyday lives and activities played out in these spaces, part of the
fabric of everyday sociality. The only time one might confront the
heteronormativity of how one is expected to behave in a pub is when a
couple of lesbians walk in (c.f. Valentine, 1993). We live in a
postcolonial world, especially in our cities, but there are many who
cannot participate in this supposedly public culture of drinking and
dancing. It is all too easy to blame the Other for this state of affairs.
‘Well, you know, those Muslims don’t drink so, of course, they won’t go
down to the pub. And those Asian women aren’t allowed to go clubbing
– they might get chatted up!’ Blaming the Other puts them in their
place, but it can also unveil the normative organisation of practice in
these pubs, bars and clubs. There are many people of colour who do
participate in these modes of sociality. What happens to them when
they go to the pub or when they go out clubbing? Can they establish a
relation of belonging in such places?

The starting point for belonging must be our practices. We must be
able to practise a sociality that allows people to become connected, to
establish relations with one another. Belonging cannot be first and
foremost about identity. Identity is about stability and unity. To invoke
an identity is to claim a unity of the self, defined by a relationship to a
collective. The definition becomes stifling. The collective and the
individual claim their unity by invoking an insurmountable difference
from other individuals, other collectives. To maintain this identity,
then, it becomes necessary to defend how absolutely fundamental this
difference from these others is. Very quickly, to belong becomes a
matter of meeting certain criteria: are your practices the same as
ours? Does your body conform to our ideals? On which side of the line
- this fundamental difference - does your body and your practices fall? It is not a good basis on which to become sociable.

For a long time now, academics and commentators have attempted to leave identity behind. Identity has been broken apart as something that is constructed, that is practised and talked into being. Identities only persist because of formations of power, enacting differences among populations through social institutions and prevailing discourses. Many, for example, have argued against race (c.f. Gilroy, 2001) because there is no such thing. It is only through our practices that these differences - these definitions of what a thing is - are brought into play, are made to be important and real. It is precisely because of our practices, and those of others, that such phenomena as race, sexuality, ethnicity and gender remain so important in our everyday lives. So, how are we to think of these phenomena if we are not to take them as identities?

Race, sexuality, ethnicity and gender are all processes: they have to be continually enacted and enforced in (institutionalised and everyday) practice. This thesis takes them as interactive, yet indeterminate, achievements that emerge in social and embodied practice. Racialised, ethnicised, gendered and sexualised differences are examined as becoming enacted through each other in everyday activity. Specifically, this research focuses on such practices in the pubs, bars and nightclubs of London. To this end, ethnographic research was conducted with three groups of participants, principally involving participant observation, backed up by group and individual interviews.

I am concerned with how affect (that is, how bodies can affect and be affected by other bodies) and desire become organised in practice. This is a distribution of what bodies can do, and to engage with it is to engage with a politics of how agency is distributed in action. Bodies become distributed, for example, in a specification of which bodies can desire which other bodies. Often such a specification brings together a racialisation and a sexualisation: a white male body must only desire a
white female body. Or, in another field of sociality, maybe a white female body can desire a black male body, but not an Asian male body. These specifications are embodied social relations that become enacted performatively. A social memory of what bodies can do is made to live again in the very performance of these actions.

There are many different modalities of interacting in pubs, bars and nightclubs. There are encounters, fleeting and ephemeral, meeting new people. These might become more than just desiring, but sexualised too: flirting, dancing sensuously, chatting someone up. Belonging to a crowd maybe demands different embodied and social skills, and maybe offers different kinds of pleasures. Such crowds might be dancing crowds in a club, or they might be thronging crowds in a bar. Getting to the bar, getting served, also makes its own demands, especially if it’s really busy: how to negotiate your way past all of these people? And there are modalities of interacting within a group of friends. The roles that individuals can take up have to be negotiated. So, too, do the repertoires and potentials for action and affect. These are the narratives and the ways that the group repetitively embody and perform their relationships. Pubs, bars, and nightclubs each have their own modes of sociality - developing all the time, of course – but so do groups of friends. They are familiar with each other, and this familiarity becomes enacted through their repetitive modes of sociality.

There is a line to be negotiated here, as much in the writing and reading of such practices, as in the practices themselves. On the one hand, while resisting a collapse down to identity, we must interrogate how practices enact power relations between bodies, repeating an unequal distribution of their capabilities for action and affect. We must be mindful about the judgements implicit within everyday practices that transform other bodies into Others, thereby constraining their agency and subjectivity. This thesis attempts to develop a theory of social bodily memory, inspired by, but with crucial differences from Bourdieu’s (1977; 1998) concept of the habitus. Such a bodily memory
is a memory of how to act within a mode of sociality. It is the immanence of formations of power to practice.

On the other hand, however, such memories must be taken as always potential, to be enacted. Such memories are not rules for behaviour, to be followed automatically. They are multiple, beyond even the contingencies of the immediate situation in which they are encountered. The other side of the line, then, is to allow space for the indeterminacy of practice and interaction. Each moment is a new one, and thus brings forth some new arrangement of bodies. Desire can always overspill the constraints placed upon it. Bodies can act creatively, expressively. When you encounter an embodied social memory, say of how to dance with someone who is flirting with you, this memory is modulated by the styles and rhythms of your bodies and your mutual territory. How attractive somebody is is an emergent property. Their body is encountered as racialised and sexualised (a potential memory of an economy of attractiveness), but simultaneously as expressive of something beyond these memories, reaching out and trying to connect.

More than this, there is always a negotiation to be made, sometimes spoken, but more often unspoken. Groups of friends negotiating their repertoires of affect open up a space for relating to each other in new ways. Racialising, ethnicising, sexualising, and gendering practices that distribute friends into differently affective relationships with one another can become contested or circumvented. This is a question of ethics, an ethics of how bodies might increase their affects, or the ways they relate to and connect with each other. Friendship can be an ethical project, a pleasurable art of becoming-sociable together, cultivating an accommodation with the bounds of desire, or even a nomadic friendship ethos that transcends such bounds.

Crucial to developing such an understanding, is the influence this research takes from the philosophies of Gilles Deleuze (and Felix Guattari) (Deleuze, 1990; Deleuze and Guattari, 1988). Two ideas, in
particular, that are indebted to Deleuzian thinking, will be developed throughout the thesis. The first of these is the idea of performativity. While this concept has a much longer and broader heritage than I can do justice to here, it is Deleuze and Guattari’s take on it that I seek to develop. Performative actions have immediate effects on those who carry them out and on those bodies and objects upon which they are carried out. The performative is doing something. Yet, a singular performative action can both usher in a new arrangement of bodies, and repeat a dominant organisation, a power relation. Related to this idea, that of potential or virtuality is also developed. Fields of potential are taken to incorporate both social bodily memories (the potential to act in a familiar, prehensile way), and all the emerging relations and opportunities for new relations between bodies as they interact. Such virtual fields, then, afford the potential for social action, and the potential for becoming-different. These two concepts - performativity and potential - are developed to help negotiate that line between, on the one hand, recuperating formations of power and comfortable modes of sociality, and, on the other, desiring anew, becoming something different.

Another major set of influences on this research are what Nigel Thrift calls ‘nonrepresentationalist’ styles of thinking (Thrift, 1996; 1997; 2000). Not only do such styles of thinking already move us away from thinking in terms of identity, but they also challenge the centrality of a thinking, knowing subject as the origin of action. Rather, it becomes necessary to acknowledge that both thought and action arise as part of territories of activity. That is, action and thought both require assemblages of bodies, discourses, institutions, particular situations, objects, technologies, and many other elements in order to come about. At its very minimum, an action is a connectivity between an active body and a tool, or a set of objects, and a situation – a conjunction of these elements. Our actions and interactions are part of a practical ‘grasp’ we have in the world – a knowing how to get along (socially), a knowing how to connect into other assemblages of things that work. This approach emphasises the importance of thinking in
terms of embodied action and practice. Yet, here bodies are not merely
docile, to be implanted into systems of power, into assemblages that
work. Bodies can be creative and expressive too.

This research attempts to develop a theory of the body that is
sociological but that does not presume what ‘the social’ is. Thrift
(1996; 1997) terms such an approach ‘modest theory’. It does not
presume a particular order of society. The reproduction of order, of
structure, of the Other, is not assured, because events are always
unfolding (Thrift, 2000: 216, after Phelan, 1993). The crucial question
is that of how structures, organisation, and the Other become
reproduced. Thrift (1996; 1997) makes it very clear that this is not an
apolitical mode of thinking. On the contrary, drawing on the ‘modest
sociology’ of John Law (1994, cited in Thrift 1997), he asserts that
such a style of thinking should be all about the process of distribution
of inequality, unfairness, and hierarchy. Not adhering to a particular
theory of exploitation is not to say that exploitation does not exist. It is
just that if you take a particular theory of exploitation as your starting
point for thinking about the actualities of inequalities, then these
particular forms of exploitation tend to become inevitable. You start
seeing them everywhere, as your theory commands. Rather than
commit to the inevitability of an already proscribed process, we should
look to how we enact these hierarchies day by day. This not only opens
up our political understanding to how we change, develop and deepen
these hierarchies day by day, but also opens up a potential for a
politics or mode of living that moves beyond these particular
inequalities.

Yet, this does not mean that we cannot acknowledge what potentials
there are for re-enacting relations of power. It does not mean that we
have to deny where we have been. Let’s be clear about this: such a
modest sociology only denies the *inevitability* of particular relations of
power. It denies the *inevitability* of racialisation, ethnicisation,
gendering and sexualisation. It does not deny that they happen, or
that they happen in particular processes. It does not presume that
these processes will necessarily operate in the same ways in different places or at different times, or that they will operate as our theories tell us they will. Rather, denying the inexorability of any particular form that such processes might take makes it imperative that we carefully investigate how these processes come to be enacted and institutionalised in specific places and times. It is to keep up with the forever changing world that we live in, and the forever mutating forms of power and organisation.

By denying the inevitability of particular racialised, ethnicised, sexualised and gendered modes of power, this research looks to how these modes of differentiation are interactive achievements, emerging in social and embodied practice. This thesis is not about identity as such, but about sociality. It is about doing things. It makes no claims to representativeness. Some kinds of bodies (white, South Asian, heterosexual) feature more than others. It is the practices and the processes that are important. Moreover, by denying the inevitability of particular modes of ordering, this thesis opens up a space to move beyond those modes of ordering it does encounter. This is a practical politics, a movement towards an ethics of becoming-different, or at least connecting with others in different ways.

Research problematics

Although this research follows an exploratory line, there are five problematics that can be thought of as guiding the research.

(1) How do bodies become gendered, sexualised, ethnicised and racialised through everyday practices that transform these bodies and what they can do (how they can affect and be affected by one another)?
(2) How do these gendered, sexualised, ethnicised and racialised distributions take place through practices that are simultaneously singular and differential?
(3) How might the role of social bodily memory in these performative actions be understood?
(4) How might elusory practices or encounters suggest ways of becoming-other in the face of everyday recuperations of racialised, ethnicised, gendered and sexualised differences?
(5) How might groups and individuals engage in ethical processes by which they can rearrange their relations with others, beyond these racialised, ethnicised, gendered and sexualised differences?

2. Organisation of the thesis

The thesis maps an oscillating movement, back and forth, between two necessary tensions. It moves towards an interrogation of the modalities by which power and organisation become enacted. And then it follows a line of flight, seeking out modes of connectivity, pure affect and becoming. Chapter two starts this oscillation in the process of exploring some theoretical ways of thinking about these two directions. In fact, its first section commences with just such an oscillation, working together the threads of different trajectories within sexualised and racialised practice, with other trajectories within night-time leisure spaces, all the while tensing these threads between orders of power and becoming something different. Yet, this first section ultimately dwells on how bodies are apprehended with a bodily memory of skin colour, and how such a memory opens up to a whole panoply of bodily distributions. It would not do, after all, to leave our ordered territories altogether, not yet, not before the various techniques of ordering have been broken open.

The second section of chapter two concerns itself with problematising conceptions of identity and identification, noting in particular how such logics insinuate themselves into thinking about race and sexuality. This is counterpoised against a concern with a practical politics of how to develop strengths and social connections, and even the ability to struggle, without the need for recourse to identity. The third section of chapter two affords a more thorough introduction to thinking about the
body and what it can do. The question of the reproduction of practices is placed firmly in the body and its practices, but Bourdieu's notion of the *habitus* is critiqued. Section four explores the concept of performativity. The body becomes understood as machinic – always working dynamically in connection with other bodies – yet this machinism makes the body select its organs. Bodies enact modes of organisation. Yet these same modes of organisation become applied to bodies themselves, tending to tie notions of selfhood to particularly racialised (as well as sexualised, gendered etc.) bodies. A suggestion of how to escape such stratification is made before moving onto section five. Section five provides an interpretation of several ethnographic texts, reworking them so that the classed, gendered, sexualised and racialised practices they speak of become understood performatively. The sixth section of chapter two continues this ethnographic interpretation, but does so through a particular lens: that of the judgements immanent to our everyday practices. These judgements are applied to bodies, transforming what they can do and how they can affect one another along lines that differentiate and organise. Finally, section seven cranks up the tension again. It suggests ways of thinking beyond the recuperation of bodily memories and distributions of bodies into relationships of power. It explores Deleuze's notion of *potential*, in particular its suggestion of a temporality that always throws bodies into new arrangements. It concludes with a brief suggestion about the directions the thesis will take in thinking about ethics and an emancipatory politics.

Chapter three discusses the methodology and data analysis techniques used in conducting the research for this thesis. After chapter three, there are four chapters that consider the themes discussed so far through the empirical research material. These chapters start predominantly oriented to the reproductive organisation of bodily relations through practice, but from chapter to chapter the proliferation of different modes of connection increases. Chapter four, then, is concerned with power, desire and sexuality. It considers heterosexuality as a way of organising our desires, a consideration that
necessitates thinking about the nature of immanence: desire or power? The second section of chapter four considers the enactment of heterosexual norms as interactive collaborations, for instance, performing injunctions to be monogamous. The chapter progresses with an interrogation of bodies becoming organic. It looks at how bodies enter functional relationships, and the role that the practical regulation of affect plays in making such relationships introduce divisions of ethnicity. Such regulation evinces itself as an order of what bodies can do, and how attractive they might be considered. Examples of this kind of regulation include the policing of ‘Indian’ women’s sexuality in the name of their proper ethnicity; the policing of relationships with ‘black’ people, male and female, within families and peer groups; and the ordering of bodies such that ‘Asian’ masculinity is often taken as problematic, unattractive, and, indeed, even contradictory. The latter parts of chapter four consider bodily memory and the role that it plays in practices that transform the affects of others. By taking the distribution of bodily capabilities and affects as performatively enacted through social practices, sex, sexuality and the body become fully socialised. An empirical example is provided of the transformation of affect in an instance of sexual harassment on a dancefloor.

Chapter five considers in more detail the techniques by which practices become effective. It starts with breaking open the practices of some young men talking about the attractiveness of differently racialised women. This enactment of an economy of attractiveness can be seen to rest on a double ordering whereby an order of bodies is invoked, but an implicit command is also followed so as to obscure the practical and arbitrary nature of this ordering. The chapter then moves on to consider practices of becoming popular among a group consisting mainly of white young women. Here, differentiations and relations of power become enacted through bodily and sociable practices, including bodies becoming expressive and modes of embodied style. Similarly, practices of white masculinity rely on particular forms of embodiment, but these often involve what is asserted by these men to be an
alcoholic excess. Chapter five concludes with developing a conception of ‘bodily sense’. This idea helps us to work through the eventfulness and expressiveness of bodies becoming related to each other, and an example of the racialised judgements implicit in embodied practices of flirting is provided.

Chapter six moves on to examine expressive bodily practices more closely. These bodies go clubbing, and they dance and enter into intensive relations with one another. By becoming expressive, these bodies inflect the spaces around them, giving them character. Rhythm plays an important part in this process, establishing an order. Such territorialisation, however, can experience an increase in the level of organisation, and these territories might start to reverberate with expressions of organisations elsewhere. An inflection of space through dance - becoming cool and attractive – might easily become a territorialisation process that makes that dancefloor a space of sexual menace. Groups of friends also create their own territories by inflecting their mutual spaces through their shared repertoires of sociality. Such repertoires, however, might infold wider machinic differences, gendering or ethnicising these spaces, for example. Nevertheless, the nature of a social field is never unified. There are always mistakes, mismettings and disjunctures. The multiplicity of space-time is suggestive of how there might arise potentials for action that escape the application of power.

Finally, chapter seven is the culmination of this movement towards the potential for relating to others in different ways. Most of the chapter is devoted to friendship, and to exploring how friends negotiate moral and normative differences between them in ethical ways. The contradictions for men of colour of trying to perform to white masculine heterosexual expectations is tackled first. With respect to one group of participants, in particular, I discuss these problems as they are confronted by a Muslim man who cannot drink and is celibate. The ways in which these contradictions are explored within the group are considered, as are the problems all of the group face in
accommodating a friendship one of their members has with a gay man. Within the same group, there are also interesting ways in which a space is made for other Asian masculinities to become expressed, eliding the dominance of white masculine modes of performing. Of course, transforming one’s relations depends on the territory from which one travels. Yet, we must also bear in mind the importance of the total potential for relating to others that subsists within groups. These considerations are explored with respect to women becoming boisterous in night-time leisure spaces.

The ethics of friendship injects the process of becoming-related back into the friendship itself. Thus, friendships are discussed in which those involved transform their affects and modes of expression together and between themselves. Some such friendships multiply sexualities, but others deterritorialise from sexuality, enacting a pure ethics of care. Finally, chapter seven concludes with some indeterminate encounters, the opening up of a time and a space into which all sorts of potential ways of connecting to others can flood.
Chapter 2

From the inside out

1. Sex crime

Across the city’s night-time spaces, differences proliferate for our consumption and our pleasure. We hunger for this difference, we crave sublimity. We are told that we can remake ourselves over and over again. We can be anything we want to be. Our practices are multiplicitous, and our every performance ushers in the new (Dewsbury, 2000). Every moment is different. Look around and engage with the diversity of cool new clubbing scenes, beyond sex, beyond the drunken violences of alcohol, just an intensive intermingling of sweaty dancing bodies. Even amongst the drunken hordes that still rampage through the city in pursuit of excitement and gratification, you will find a dynamic monstrosity. No longer the preserve of the ‘lads’ night out’ - ‘on the pull’, ‘chattin’ up the birds’ - Friday and Saturday nights see young women in search of the very same things as the lads: alcohol, fun, sex, a laugh, delirium, connection (friendship), territorialisation (a good atmosphere), vomit, and maybe a fight. A disruption of gender roles, it might seem. Or a becoming-masculine (as moralists also point out, pejoratively), an actual social increase in levels of testosterone. We are always an assemblage.

More accurately, we are always a multiplicity. Who bears the uneven brunt of reprobation for the alcohol-testosterone complex? What judgements insinuate themselves into the most innocuous of our actions? What sort of Unconscious haunts our ways of territorialising in the city, in our pubs and clubs? To treat the world as if it is only there
for our excitement and pleasure might be a movement of reterritorialisation as well as one of deterritorialisation. A ghost haunts our pubs, an imprint of a bourgeois Victorian sensibility (Rojek and Urry, 1997; Harrison, 1973; Kneale, 1999) 

(a reverberation).

Public space crawls with criminality

(so it affords adventure).

It is a space of menace

(so, at night there is an extra edge).

The only women here are ‘women of the streets’

(but now both women and men can take their pleasure from a sexualised Other).

Become a flâneur, take one’s pleasures here. Encounters are to be consumed, without an impact, the body of the other taken as a surface (Bauman, 1996)

(but who still has to bear the responsibility for contraception, or the censure for their wantonness?).

But the flâneur is such an old fashioned figure. He strolls sedately, not able to keep up with the cut and thrust of the modern party. Today, enjoyment comes from fast pleasures, from coming quickly. You’ve got to be a ‘player’ in this town. If you ‘play your cards right’, you might ‘get lucky’. There is no room for pity or compassion, just the personal pleasure of that ephemeral mismeeting. But don’t worry, it’s only a game. Time becomes divided into discrete segments. Each game has no consequences beyond its own time (Bauman, 1996: 31-32). It’s as if there were no HIV, as if there could be pleasure without affect.

It’s a strange landscape, this,
where all these bodies are just their skins.
Black skins, other skins, all of them women, whether male of female.
You think I’m conflating one set of processes with another? The production of gender and sexual differences with the production of racial and ethnic difference? And you think I’m proposing
representational figures in place of the complexity of practice? You are right, of course. Yet a reverberation often summons up an ersatz nostalgia, a memory taken as a representation even though it is not. Just as the white skinheads that Nayak (1999) talked to practised an overpowering racial and sexual differentiation, so they convinced themselves that they yearned for an (imagined) authenticity, in the process erasing their own practice.

But still you are right, it is the complexity of our practices that is important. This, however, is why it is dangerous to treat all of our encounters as instances of consumption. There are many who travel from pub to club, endlessly repeating encounters in search of the perfect climax, not interested in the encounter with the other as such, but only with the personal pleasure of the mismeeting (Jokinen and Veijola, 1997: 47). This is to take the bodies of others as their surface. To do so is to adopt a particular mode of approaching the world, of approaching others, of relating to others. Taking other bodies as their surface is a practical attitude to these others, a kind of social prehension (Thrift, 1997: 128), a 'grasp' on the world. The senses of the body become arranged around a visuality. In our practical activities with these others, our visuality relates us to them in particular ways. “Seeing becomes seeing something” (Dewsbury, 2000: 486, note 8, after Nietzsche) an engagement that organises what both the one who gazes and the one who is gazed upon can do. Visuality is a technique. It makes sense of the world (Urry, 1999). A detached observation as a way of approaching the world acts out a Cartesian dualism: mind and body again become ascribed, reverberating with a distribution of male and female, colonialist and Other.

OK, so women can now be voyeurs, too. Black and Asian people, as well. Everyone who isn’t blind can gaze, can’t they? Yet, even if this were the case, it would still not be a universal becoming masculine, let alone a becoming-different. For our practices to mark a more thoroughgoing deterritorialisation, we must become aware of the
potentials of our entire body. As it is, our reliance on our eyes is still riven with lines of morality that discriminate along classed, gendered, sexualised and racialised axes. Implicit within our predominant visuality is a division of bodies, an uneven pleasure to be derived from entering these already constituted relations of gazing and being gazed upon. We are still haunted by ways of territorialising in our cities, in our pubs, our clubs that makes us relate to others again on a gendered, racialised, and sexualised basis. We enact our institutions.

When all else is eschewed, and when all that is left for us to sense is that which can be seen, bodies become impoverished. Our bodies are reduced to their surface. Our skins become just the dead cells of their surface, not the living, porous interface that expands and contracts, facing different ways. Our leering eyes scan and ogle nature and the female body, the body of the Other. A black skin does not allow us voyeurs to merely pass by. One might think that the voyeur could typically pass by an Other without seeing more than their typicality. There is, after all, always more than the skin. But with a black skin, as with a female skin, “to see black is to see a typicality that is epistemologically conclusive .... [T]o see black is to see all that needs to be seen” (Gordon, 1997: 126).

2. Travelling without moving

Sometimes it seems as if, no matter how hard academics try to capture the dynamism of cultural processes, they always end up recuperating culture as static, as given. Maybe this is because they are trying to capture these cultural processes. They hold them hostage. You would think that the study of transnationalism, for example, might follow a line of flight. This is, after all, what it is supposed to be doing, following movements and deterritorialisations. Why is it then, that so many scholars in this field find it difficult to think beyond the racialised nation or individual? For example, Portes et al (1999) frame the
problem of immigrant adaptation in a homogenising and exclusionary logic.

For immigrants involved in transnational activities ... [successful adaptation] does not so much depend on abandoning their culture and language to embrace those of another society as on preserving their original cultural endowment, while adapting instrumentally to a second (Portes et al, 1999: 229).

Portes et al seem only able to imagine immigrants practising two cultural ‘endowments’ side by side. Practices are taken as the direct expressions of ethnicity as content, the signifier of ethnicity as essential signified. It is a dubious manoeuvre, making practice indicative of a discrete and originary culture (Das Gupta, 1997). It doesn’t allow for translation, for a movement. It doesn’t allow for practice to be emergent, to emerge from an intermingling of bodies, bringing memories to the fray, rememorialising, translating what came before (Trinh, 1994). There is travelling but no movement. Instead, all we get is an unyielding ‘host’, reluctant to allow these undeserving poor to cross the threshold: they might be contagious, you know. If somebody, standing in their doorstep, talking in a heavy working class accent, was to say: ‘When they come over here, they should be like us. Make an effort to fit in. But they just stand around in groups talking in Bengali or whatever language it is they speak in. Why don’t they learn English?’ they’d be condemned as a racist. If an American academic talks about legitimate and illegitimate modes of assimilation by immigrants (Portes, 1999), this is a measured contribution to an important debate. It doesn’t matter that a standard, homogenous and stable ‘American’ culture is presupposed. It doesn’t matter that an inside/outside division is reinstated and the inside is white. Race becomes conflated with ethnicity. Ethnicity becomes conflated with nationality.

Maybe Ulf Hannerz’s (1996) notion of ‘cultural creolization’ would offer a suggestion of translation, of a real modification, a real movement? Hannerz, after all, is attempting to contextualise the production of hybrid cultural forms within the interconnectedness of transnational
flows. No such luck. The operation of creolization is to take place along multiple, but linear continua. Despite the possibility of the mobile and differential positioning of individuals along various continua; and acknowledging the multiplicity of forces that produce the positionings along these continua, Hannerz does not countenance the production of these continua themselves. The illusion of the given nature of ethnic and cultural forms is reproduced. There is only mixture of what came before: these forms are immutable, they cannot be modified. An origin is returned by a quantitative measure of difference. A proper place is a precise divisibility. No remainders.

Logos as a logic of opposition. Black or white, insider or outsider, citizen or immigrant (asylum seeker - the undeserving poor), self or other. You might want to add male or female, heterosexual or homosexual to the list. You might think that it was naive to think that ethnicity or cultural belonging would just operate along lines of colour, that gender or sexuality, for instance, would modulate and particularise belonging. But if you were merely to add another axis of opposition to the first, you would not end up with a multiplicity. If you combined axes of race and sexualised gender, this would only provide you with a rough guess at a phenomenology for racists and sexists. So Gordon’s (1997) ‘antiblack’ world does not provide a phenomenological explication of the lived world of ‘the Black’ as he claims. It merely provides the slightest glimpse of representational operations of subsumption; it provides an insight into incorporeal transformations as they might be applied to bodies, because that is all Gordon’s schema is. At best, a heuristic, and then only for an American politics of black and white. Gordon presents continua to show their effects, but does not question how those continua are enacted and reproduced. In effect an origin is posited and then occluded. The terms are as follows. Where it is an advantage to be raceless and genderless, and where to be white is to be unmarked and to be a man is to be unmarked, then to be black is to be doubly cursed. This is a modern phenomenon. To be a white woman, however, is to mix whiteness and blackness,
because femininity becomes colour-coded. To claim power in a phallic political-economy, White Woman must deny her femininity, her femininity as blackness. She must appeal to her white skin. The phallus becomes white skin.

Among the many dimensions missing from Gordon’s antiblack world is class. The late-nineteenth century prostitute is the archetype of a white woman in an antiblack world. In both scientific and artistic literature of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century, the prostitute is an amalgam, an infolding of both a specifically classed femininity and of blackness (Gilman, 1985). During this period in Western Europe, concern over the working classes, specifically their ability to reproduce labour and the Imperial armies, combined with the fear of potential revolution and became transformed into a problem of morality, hygiene and sexuality (Skeggs, 1997). The supervision and surveillance of working class men, the making of a nation of workers and conquerors, was entrusted to white working class women. Suddenly, their fortunes were no longer in work, but in a poor reflection, a strong inscription, of a middle class home (Skeggs, 1997). To the middle classes, the sexuality of working class white women became excessive, not in keeping with their new roles as guardians of the moral order. In particular, this excessive sexuality was seen, by Freud amongst many others, as a potential, a seed waiting to germinate, in working class girls (Gilman, 1985). The working classes were degenerate, and prostitution was an immanent danger.

At the same time, blackness was being reconstructed within scientifically racist discourse: blacks were closer to the apes, therefore black sexuality was apelike. In the scientific literature especially, this set of attributions was mainly applied to black women. It was the genitalia of black women that became the centre of fascination, the centre of dissection and museum display (cf. Gilman, 1985 on the life and afterlife of Saartje Baartman). In an aesthetic sense, a scale of beauty was applied to the races. Gilman discusses Long’s The
Babylonian Marriage Market (1882) but he might as well be talking about the use of face powder, make up, hair straightening by black women, or the distinctions drawn in the fashion industry, today.

The late-nineteenth century prostitute, however, was both the actualisation of the working class woman’s potential degeneracy, and the internalisation of the pathological sexuality of the Black. These two antecedents became conflated in the body of the prostitute. Her genitals suffered from acquired pathologies such as abscesses and tumours, a sure sign of degeneracy. She was seen as polluting and contaminating at the same time as social controls on slaves focussed on controlling them as sexual objects. Her buttocks shared a steatopygic profile with that of the Hottentot. She occupied the lower end of the continuum of facial aesthetics along with the Hottentot (Gilman, 1985). Witness the disappearance of the black servant between Manet’s Olympia and his Nana (Gilman, 1985). Redolent of the black servant pervading Western art from the eighteenth century onwards who marks the excessive sexuality of the white mistress, Olympia (1862-63) is accompanied by a black female servant. In Nana (1877) the servant disappears, only to reappear in the form of the white mistress herself. Her sexually provocative pose, her voluptuous exhibitionism in front of a gazing flâneur, her steatopygia, all internalisations of the figure of the black female servant or slave in Western art. Nana marks the hidden black within the sexualised female.

How is this to be reconciled with Gilman’s observations of the depiction of black men in modernist literature as hysterical? What about Gilman’s observations of the exemption of black male genitalia from medical scrutiny in the nineteenth century? How can the seeming incongruity with the macabre contemporary fascination with the black penis be reconciled or understood? We need to return to Gordon’s antiblack world, and to Strange Fruit. Fly into the American South, even in the early twentieth century, and have your body marked, scarred. You see
them there, but at first you don’t know what they are. Then the horrific truth dawns. The strange fruit dangle lifelessly from the trees. Their strangeness as fruit compounded by their lack of fertility: no more trees can spring from these fruit. These fruit bear the scars of excision. Castration. They are marked by the White Man’s homophobia, and by his entrepreneurial orgasm. The Black Man as rapist is the projection of the White Man as rapist, and as breeder of livestock (Zack, 1997a).

If the White Woman’s power resides in her whiteness, then the rape of a white woman by a black man becomes a rape of whiteness, an overpowering of whiteness, of white power. If the phallus is white skin, then the rape of whiteness by a black man becomes a rape of white masculinity. And the White Man, homophobic to the core, cannot stomach that. In fact, he doesn’t even wait for the rape to happen, because he knows that in an antiblack world, desire is constructed so that black must desire what is more desirable than itself: whiteness. No, the White Man doesn’t wait, he acts (because he can). Lynching, the castration of Black Man, these are in anticipation of the rape of White Women. The Black Phallus must be denied, obliterated. It is always excessive. It is a demand for power, for masculinity, for a movement up the continuum. To the White Man, the Black Man’s penis always seems larger than it should be, because it should not be at all. To the White Man, the Black Man is always threatening because of the violence meted out upon the Black Man by the White invites its revenge.

The Black Woman, on the other hand, is unrapable. In Gordon’s matrices of desire, to be black and female is to be at the bottom end of the race/sex/gender scale of advantage and desirability. Nobody could desire the Black Woman, but the Black Woman must desire all others. Beyond Gordon’s mere heuristics, there are again concrete historical precedents for this constitution of relations. Slavery was a capitalistic system: blacks were livestock that could be bred for monetary profit (Zack, 1997a). White American men experienced entrepreneurship as
pleasurable, veritably orgasmic. When this is combined with the legacy of the monetary function of marriage in the early modern period, it becomes possible to construct white male desire for black women on the basis of the pleasure gained from reproducing slaves and hence capital. The corollary: black male sexuality is rendered excessive. Simultaneously, maternity became the site of the inscription of a crucial difference, a difference that persists quite palpably. The sexuality of white mothers became a matter of ‘spirituality’, a denial of the embodiment of reproduction. For black women, however, maternity is read as proof of strong female sexuality: “Motherhood is somehow able to spiritualize white women while at the same time it reveals what *whores* black women really are....” (Zack, 1997a: 151, emphasis in original). Today, this association slides into a classed association of black mothers as selfish benefit scroungers and immoral single mothers. In the nineteenth century, this association met up with the orgasm it was believed necessary for conception, to insist upon the sexual pleasure taken by the Black Woman from her lascivious encounters with White Men. The legitimation of the white rape of black women, and the construction of the black male as potential rapist, are both central to the American enactment of Western racial distinctions: the ‘One Drop Rule’. A solitary drop of black blood (as if there were such a thing) in an otherwise white ancestry, and you are black in the eyes of the Law. It doesn’t matter how many generations ago such a solitary drop became entangled in your descent, but you have descended. Asymmetry: the logic of constitution. Race is built upon the stony ground of sexuality. Miscegenation is the destruction of race, and it can only occur between a black man and a white woman. No wonder that even as late as 2000 an American state (Alabama) outlawed intermarriage between blacks and whites.

Yet, we remain hostage to a history of identity, a history of representation that elides a different kind of history, one of multiplying desires and bodies (e.g. Weeks, 1985). We are left floundering in a morass of essences. Logos as a logic of opposition. Logos. It is one
thing to break open the reductions and overcodings which trace how we think and feel. It is quite another thing to do anything about how we think and feel, how we speak and act. Gordon (1997) presents his ‘matrices of desire’ as bad faith worlds. Essence is placed before the messiness of existence. Responsibility needs to be taken, says Gordon: incorporeal differences must not be taken as given, as etched in stone. Bad faith is a denial of human agency. There are so many things wrong with Gordon’s position that I’m not sure where to start. I think I’ll just say two things. Firstly, a logic of opposition, even when combining multiple lines of differentiation, fails to meet the complexity of even reductionist and essentialising thinking. Posing the differences of race and sexuality as between black and white elides the multiple (but not multiplicitous) differentiations instituted amongst populations, even in the US. Why might it be that several different constructions of Asian sexuality would not fit into Gordon’s matrices? What about white women’s assigned role in the moral preservation of nationhood (Skeggs, 1997)? Secondly, Gordon takes as given the agency of our choices among the extant contextual options. What transformation would be necessary to suddenly come to realise our agency? Or to understand the constructed nature of essential reality? This seems to be a particularly liberal interpretation of agency. Agency is not something we are born with, nor something we are automatically given once we turn eighteen. There are capitals involved. Bodies are distributed. Agencies are external and they are produced. Relations to positions of agencies are the result of machineries of distribution (Grossberg, 1996a). To think and act past racism and sexism, it is not just a matter of agency. Machineries of power, discursive positions and the relations to them, the reproduction and re-enactment of relations, of constitution, all these need to be confronted. What can a body do? This is a question about power. Essences don’t exist outside of history. They have to be re-enacted, practised, re-memorialised. A vector of attack is needed, aimed at that smallest of intervals between moments of the re-enactment of bodies (Dewsbury, 2000), their recuperation into the Same, the logic of opposition.
How are we to supersede essentialist notions of identity? What weapons are needed in the battle against the idea of fixed and organic relationships between individuals and the authentic cultural and biological properties of the group or community to which these individuals belong? The very problem of cultural identity poses the social relation of bodies to other bodies as an identificatory relation between self (already an identity of the self) and culture as discursive positions. Logics of representation insinuate themselves into the problematic. This may occur at a supplementary level of a classificatory system that applies principles of difference to populations (Woodward, 1997). The relation between such a symbolic system of representation and the constitution of bodies (individuals, groups, communities, for example) would be achieved through social technologies of application or inscription. Populations are divided into self-other dualisms, each part of which is constituted by the Other - its ‘constitutive outside’ (Hall, 1996).

Alternatively, logics of identification, akin in their binary relationality to representational relationships, are posited between individuals and discursive positions. Hall (1996) explores the operation of this kind of relationship in attempting to articulate a concept of identity with a Foucauldian notion of subjectification. “Identities are thus points of temporary attachment to the subject positions which discursive practices construct for us” (Hall, 1996: 5-6). No longer a single stable relation, identification is a process that continually remakes relations between individuals and the positions constructed by discursive formations for occupation by these individuals. These positions are both identity and subject positions. The position not only prescribes a purported content for the self (identity), but also sets out the possibilities for understanding and experiencing the world, for speaking and for acting. Identity as a temporary attachment to a position denies the possibility of a unified, centred self. Moreover, the human individual no longer can be seen as an originary subject, one who
authors meaning. Rather, individuals are subjectified. Disciplining and normalising technologies make bodies occupy subject positions that have been created by discursive and social formations of power/knowledge. The interiority of individuals is an illusion, a construct.

According to Grossberg (1996a), however, recourse only to discursive construction elides the materiality of power and the practices which enact identifications. Furthermore, such conceptualisations reside within a modernist ‘logic of difference’. Discursive identity positions remain reliant upon a difference from another term. Seen in this way, identities are constituted out of a difference, a difference which is assumed as given. This returns all identities to a binary logic that sees the Other always recuperated into the Same. It is the Same old story: the Other as the negation of the Self within the Self. The Other has no positivity of its own. This theory of otherness is blind to the construction of difference itself, how difference, across which self/other(s) distinctions are made, is itself produced within structures of power.

Concomitant to this elision of the production of difference, is the conflation of the various processes producing individuals (‘individuation’) (Grossberg, 1996a). In the face of the poststructuralist critique of the unity of the self, and despite the decentring of the subject, such a conflation returns individuality to a single, simple structure. This conceptualisation is inadequate to meet the constitution of the individual as a production that takes place on three different planes: “(1) the subject as a position defining the possibility and the source of experience and, by extension, of knowledge; (2) the agent as a position of activity; and (3) the self as the mark of a social identity” (Grossberg, 1996a: 97-98). Subjectivity relates to positionality within a produced field of subjectivity. The position of a body within such phenomenological fields governs that body’s access to experience and, thus, to knowledge about the world and itself.
Identity, on the other hand, is about the organisation of subject positions by the construction of cultural codes of difference, and the imposition of these codes upon the socius. These codes differentially value particular subject positions. “[T]he self as the material embodiment of identities, the material points at which codes of difference and distinction are inscribed upon the socius, exists only after the inscription of historical differences” (Grossberg, 1996a: 99).

Just as important as the distinction between subjectivity and identity, however, is the distinction between each of these and the question of agency. Agency does not spring from a unified subject. Nor is it found in a unified self. Agency is not a matter of acts of will, but merely about change and action stripped of some supposed volitionary connotation. For Grossberg, agency is related to the production of positions which have a differential potential for action and access to power.

A concern with agency should remind us that identity is not just a matter of cultural difference, but that it matters sociologically too. Questions of agency are political questions, ones relating to social action. They ask what individuals and groups can do. The logic of identity, however, still continues to pose problems, even in sociological approaches to it as sophisticated as those of Weeks (2003) and Jackson (2003). Both of these concern themselves with the very practical political problems facing sexual minorities and women. When Weeks (2003) discusses such a politics, it becomes clear that these are practical issues relating to abortion, parenting, sex education, and sexual practice. Similarly, Jackson’s (2003) engagement with the intersection of heterosexuality and gender relations addresses itself to systematic material inequalities. This is a concern not only with the concreteness of institutions, but also the concreteness of practice and experience. It is, in part, a sociology of the body, about women’s difficulties in attaining sexual pleasure, their bodies in service to the pleasures of men. A gesture is made to the need to be able to talk of physical pleasures, emotions and sensations.
Yet, in meeting head on relations of domination, Jackson returns a nebulous proposition of identity. A critique of queer theories: they do not fulfil their promises. Jackson muses on a queer proliferation of differences - an opposition to all unified identities (p. 70) - and on the lines of attack opened up by thinking of gender and sexuality as performative (Butler, 1993; 1997; 1999). If we can ‘do’ gender and sexuality in our everyday practices, then surely we can ‘undo’ them, too (Jackson, 2003: 80)? Ultimately, Jackson takes queer theory to disappoint: it does not disrupt hierarchies of power constructing binary divisions (gender, sexuality) because all it ends up doing is multiplying these genders and these sexualities. It is an affirmation of difference rather than a vision of a world less opposed, without material inequalities. Yet, despite a vision of a world beyond gender and heterosexuality, Jackson remains mired in an oppositional mode. “[H]eterosexuality cannot ... form the basis of a political identity – and certainly not an oppositional political identity – precisely because it represents conformity with the institutionalized norm” (Jackson, 2003: 73, emphasis in original). If we are to fight, we need an identity from which to do so. It is from here that we will launch our attacks against these “macro level structures and institutions” (p. 81). But, leaving aside Jackson’s macro and micro division of power, does not an oppositional identity play into the hands of those powerful machines that define what are significant differences? If we really need identities from which to struggle, then why not those disruptive and provisional positions afforded by queer theory?

Weeks (2003) also struggles with identity, distracting himself from struggling with the practical and material inequalities running throughout our social bodies. Weeks feels a tension between a proliferating diversity of sexual identities and the moral attacks upon those differently identified. Yet, there is another tension immanent to this one, a tension between proliferation itself, and the powers of identification. Weeks invokes hybridity as a process of becoming
something different, yet still returns to a categorisation. Identity becomes a way of recognising ourselves and others, always eventually a proper distribution. Another move: categorisations do not exhaust lived experiences or desire. Although we may seek the truth of our bodies (‘Oh, Body, what kind of other can I desire?’) (c.f. also Butler, 1999), we can yet always change our sources of pleasure. We can always change what our bodies can do.

But then a sleight of hand: while the body quite rightly becomes denied an originary identity, another kind of individualism returns identity to an originary subject. This individualism is sneaky. It cloaks itself in the act of construction, the contingency and activity of narrating a self from a multiplicity of socially available discourses, experiences, technologies and memories. Nevertheless, this activity becomes located in the individual. It becomes a personal activity, a practice of auto-constitution, as if a subject can exercise a fully volitional intentionality towards themselves. The machines Grossberg (1996) invokes, the power of institutionalised social norms and practices enacted through the actions of others, and through technologies and bureaucracies, all become effaced. Their role in producing positions of subjectivity, agency and identity disappears. This seems particularly dangerous given Weeks’ concern for the possibilities for social action upon the part of those commonly Othered within such normalising machines. Moreover, it is only through machinically produced collective identities that Weeks can envisage social action. It is a sense of collective identity that provides the strength for lesbian and gay communities to combat the spread of HIV, he asserts. Yet, such strength is at least as much to do with practical social networks, practices of support and campaigning, and the activities of creating and maintaining social connections, as it is to do with a categorical identity. Rather than look to an a priori identity for our strength, we should look to what strengths we can develop between us, through the very activity of struggling.
3. Organs

Bodies become territorialised onto produced spaces. Capitalism needs bodies. It needs workers and consumers, managers and mothers. It also needs spaces, a “contradictory terrain” (Hall, 1991, cited in Grossberg, 1996b) not only for the production of bodies, but for the circulation and reproduction of capital itself. Nations and neighbourhoods are constructed; private and public spaces become gendered. There are also global spaces, transnational spaces, spaces that are constituted by flows of capital, commodities and bodies.

The nationalisation of space enacted through technologies of nationhood such as education, birth control, language, operates paradoxically. It attempts to produce a homogenous, contiguous national space, yet requires neighbourhoods to produce subjects through the practicable operation of surveillance, discipline and mobilization (Appadurai, 1996). So, while neighbourhoods are produced under signs of allegiance to the nation, they also develop in contrast to other neighbourhoods. Conditions of alterity particular to neighbourhoods develop, and these are not necessarily consistent with the demands of the nation. A ‘neighbourhood nationalism’ negotiates national racist discourses alongside a syncretic youth culture (Back, 1996). White working class youths teeter on the edge of becoming-other as they practise becoming-different with their black friends. Yet, their black friends end up inscribed as Other, and so both black and white ultimately become-the-Same, they become opposites. A spatialisation is necessary for this move, for this territorialisation: on the particular estate Back is discussing here, blacks become honorary nationals, nationals of the neighbourhood, of the estate, but only on the say-so of their white friends. Blacks outside the estate become the new foreigners. They become the new threat.

This is not to say that bodies are subordinate to space, or that they are merely docile bodies, there to be inscribed upon (Radley, 1995;
Bodies are parts of machines. They connect to other bodies, be they discursive bodies, technological bodies, institutional bodies, commodified bodies. They become entrained in the flows of the machine’s operation. Swept along by the machine’s various currents, they are more than just a part of machines: they instantiate machines. When Buchanan (1997) writes about bodies, he is not tracing them. For him, they are neither inscribed upon, nor subordinate to the mind. Rather, Buchanan maps bodies. The body is a problem. It forever needs to be enacted and practised because it is no more than the sum of its capabilities, “an a posteriori product of newly connected capacities” (Buchanan, 1997: 75). A body cannot be reduced to some already given functions. Its activity depends on its connection with other bodies, forces and sources of energy. A body is not merely organs, or rather organs become selected through a body becoming stratified.

Bodies are machines, are parts of machines, and are comprised of machines. Certain sets of relations are brought into interconnectivity to allow things to be done:

- Machines harness forces and are always purposeful, they must be able to do something, must be doing something. Machines are the site of activation of a certain relation. The alimentary machine, for example, which makes the mouth an input socket and food energy, is the instantiation of one type of relation between body and food. The digestive system is another machine. Its output, in turn, feeds into other machines, which means it must constantly engage new relations. (Buchanan, 1997: 83)

A body, insofar as it is machinic, must establish relations extensively with other elements in order to be able to act. Callon and Law (1997) introduce us to “Andrew”, an “active, commanding and energetic” (p. 176) director of a large laboratory. The possibility of Andrew’s strategic action, however, rests upon the combination of things in an actant-network: the fax, the telephone, his PC, his secretary, the reports from the laboratory, the substances in the laboratory, the train to take him...
to ‘Head Office’, ‘Head Office’ itself, and, of course, a set of organs enclosed in a skin that calls itself ‘Andrew’. “The capacity for strategy is an effect of a more or less stable arrangement of materials” (Callon and Law, 1997: 177). The stability of the relations is the measure of the organicization of the body, the body becoming-functional.

Still, however, we are not ready to answer the question ‘What can a body do?’ The problem with organic bodies is that they appear to be unalterable, the reification of a model or coding. If the body is a problem to be enacted and practised, how are its practices reproduced? How do bodies know what to do? The repetition of practice is not a matter of mental representation, of acting upon the understanding of a cultural meaning. What would happen if one supposed that rules are representational in their operation? That is, that people consciously followed them by thinking first about the rule so that they may act in accordance with it? In this case, the misunderstanding of the rule, say by a stranger from a very different cultural setting, would require an explanation. In any such explanation there are many possible further points of misunderstanding which, in turn, would require further explanation. To follow a rule one would either need to have an infinite number of thoughts in our heads, a whole network of explanations and assumptions that support previously articulated ones; or one would need to have resolved all doubt. As explanations often are often previously unarticulated, Wittgenstein concludes that ‘[u]nderstanding is always against a background of what is taken for granted, just relied on’ (Taylor, 1993: 47). Following a rule is a practice, something that relies upon one’s involved and embodied action in the world. Knowledge is carried in patterns of appropriate action: it is an embodied social understanding. A rule does not exist outside of its application (Bourdieu, 1977).

Getting along with people, acting appropriately in a situation, relies on repetition, on a memory that is embodied. Bourdieu (1977) would
describe such a memory as the *habitus*: a system of durable, transposable dispositions that function as principles of the generation and structuring of practices and representations which can be objectively "regulated" and "regular" without in any way being the product of obedience to rules [and] ... without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them... (Bourdieu, 1977: 72).

The habitus is a taken for granted sense that underwrites intelligibility and people's ability to engage with the world and others. The division of the world into male and female, future and past, top and bottom becomes embedded in the body. The habitus is acquired through the repeated performance of practices and through repeated injunctions regarding appropriate bodily activity and practice. The very readiness of the body, its stance, its ways of looking or standing, its tensing, ready to react, become sedimented and ineffable. Practice, however, is not predetermined: the habitus is not the reduction of practice to rules that have merely been rendered ineffable. The habitus is also the possibility of regulated improvisation. Timing is crucial. The effect of an action can be manipulated by the subtleties of its timing. The slightest delay in reacting to an interlocutor could be an insult. Giving a gift to one from whom you have just now received one could be a refusal, especially if the gift is similar to or the same as the one you've just received. We should all be diplomats (but we are not). Time can be deployed skillfully or stylishly. It can be deployed strategically. There is always a certain indeterminacy to action. Until an interaction is completed, uncertainty remains as to its outcome (Bourdieu, 1977: 9).

The habitus does not exist in a vacuum. It does not replicate itself independently. It is formed within, and constrained by, the objective conditions of the social field. But these objective conditions that structure the production of the habitus are themselves reproduced through repetitive practice: for Bourdieu, social and cultural formations are produced reiteratively. Does this witness the return of inferiority, however? Is there a sense in which the social field with which the
habitus is in reciprocal presupposition is ascribed the status of a homogenous and objective ‘culture’? De Certeau (1984) exposes the anthropological conceits upon which Bourdieu’s house is built. The exoticised Other cultures Bourdieu bases his work upon present to the Western outsider a certain homogeneity and hermetically sealed sameness. Bourdieu’s theory of practice speaks nothing of an Other, but only of the Same, and thus returns us to a centring, this time not discursive nor in the individual, but rather in an essentialised and foundational socius. What of the indeterminacy that emerges in the encounter with the Other? Where Bourdieu speaks of ‘strategies’, de Certeau speaks of ‘tactics’. The former invoke an ‘inside’ because they play on the limited possibilities offered by “an economy of the proper place” (de Certeau, 1984: 55; emphasis in original). All practice becomes subordinate to the maximisation of capital and to the development of the body. De Certeau’s ‘tactics’, on the other hand, operate on the ‘outside’. They play on the bringing together of heterogeneous elements, the particular trajectories of bodies and elements.

Practising a body - becoming-connected or sociable - infolds multiple temporalities. The body becomes a memory that opens up onto its external constitution, a site of practice and periodicity, the inscription of difference, that is always open to reconnection, reconstruction. A body territorialises onto more than a locality. There are so many times and spaces for a body to connect to: work, home, pub, restaurant, supermarket, bridge club. These spaces are transnational, as they are criss-crossed by flows, images, commodities and bodies that make the social field truly a field of becoming. Images sweep across the globe at close to the speed of light. They reterritorialise in our living rooms. Our bodies, in turn, reterritorialise onto a transnation. Every deterritorialisation implies a reterritorialisation, a new set of connections and flows or rates: substances come into being. Matter or bodies are organised. They are connected and enabled. Multiple periodicities are held together by the body. Or they infold together to
produce the body. The seemingly ephemeral periodicities of modern consumption (the ephemerality of fashion, the dynamism of media and marketing images) are necessarily tied to periodicities of repetition (Appadurai, 1996). This is because consumption tends first and foremost to be centred around ‘techniques of the body’: to work or play we have to eat and drink. At a certain level, these techniques of the body tend to be repetitious because the body organises itself into organs in order to be able to work. Bodily organs, in turn, presupposes bodily disciplines that are at once bodily and social.

The inertia of the body gives a temporal rhythm to consumptive practices upon which more complex patterns can be built. Not only do the periodicities of consumption constitute the style or effect of that event or practice, but periodicity itself is constructed, increasingly through the commodified circulation of globalised marketing images. Sit in front of the TV, listen to the latest manufactured pop sensation, buy the latest ‘80s revival jacket. Contemporary mass marketing evokes among consumers nostalgia for events of which they have no experience or memory. “[M]ass advertising teaches consumers to miss things they have never lost .... they [advertisers] create experiences of duration, passage and loss that rewrite the lived histories of individuals, families, ethnic groups, and classes” (Appadurai, 1996: 77). Memories are provided by the merchandiser. They do not belong to a remembering subject.

The present is marketed as if it has already become past. The consumer experiences a “nostalgia for the present” (Appadurai, 1996: 77). When the present becomes historicised, the consumer becomes primed for the ever increasing velocity of fashion. The marketing and consumption of the present uses ersatz nostalgia to create simulacra of periods, and hence constitute the flow of time (Appadurai, 1996: 78-79). Repetition, in this scenario, becomes an artefact of imagined ersatz nostalgia. Bodies and places, their histories and genealogies, become produced through the circulation of images and imagination.
across mediascapes. Repetition is based on a particularly spatial differentiation, one of commoditised images, divisible in value.

4. Performativity and machines

The very utterance of a performative speech act fulfils an action that has an effect on the bodies of the speaker and the interlocutor (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988; Massumi, 1992; also c.f. Butler, 1993; 1997). The performative transforms bodies. It can alter the capabilities of a body to negotiate cultural space. This holds out the possibility that the performative speech-act might not only recuperate bodies into an economy of the proper place, a becoming-the-same, but might allow new combinations, new connections to be made. There might be a chance to re-constitute the corporeal and practical sense of the body. A body more than docile.

Butler (1997) follows Bourdieu by considering the force of the performative - the force by which it can transform bodies - to rest upon the relation of the speaker to legitimising positions of authority within a relatively stable social formation. Bourdieu, however, does not allow for the performative to produce a change in legitimacy and power formations, not even as an effect of the utterance rehearsing conventional formulae in unconventional ways. Such a transformation of legitimacy would require the possibility of a break with the originary social context from which the utterance and its legitimacy arose. Here, Butler turns to Derrida to provide a theoretical basis for this break. Derrida considers the reiterative aspects of the performative. To the extent that it is conventional, the performative must be repeated in many different contexts. Within a logic of the iterability of its enactment, then, the force of the performative arises from the structural necessity of a break from its originary context.
Central to Butler’s reading together of Bourdieu and Derrida, is the body. The body brings together the social and the discursive elements of the speech act. The divide between the speakable and the unspeakable is a discursive separation of the possibility of being a subject from not being a subject. It is a separation of being able to speak from the discursive preclusion of speech. Yet, the speech act cannot be reduced to its discursive dimension. The body, in its bearing, its stylistics, its expression of a way of being, an attitude to the world (Radley, 1995), exceeds linguistic meaning. The speech act does not just enact a discursive expression. The speech act is performed bodily, and the body “does not represent what it performs, it does not memorize the past, it enacts the past, bringing it back to life” (Bourdieu, cited in Butler, 1997: 154). The bodily excess, the body’s elusory nature (Radley, 1995) that is excessive to the logic of power/knowledge, entails a certain contingency that opens a space to reconstitute formations of power.

The danger here is that the body, while no longer taken as docile, is now merely taken as its opposite, excessive. The body becomes the site of all resistance because it offers a movement beyond the totalising grids of discursive formations. We should be wary of such a move. The body has its own powers. Its machinic nature means that it is always potentially caught up in intricate webs of technology and power. The habitus is testament to the body’s imbrication within machinic assemblages of power. A body could not act without its connection to and constitution by power. The problem that persists within Butler’s argument is the return of an originary locus. To say that the force of the performative rests on its break from an originary social context is still to posit that origin. There is still a centre of legitimacy, arising in discourse, or in some particular institution of the social.

So, bodies in the machine, bodies of the machine, bodies as the machine. We need to think of bodies as simultaneously emergent from formations of power and yet able to find a line of flight. Such a way of
thinking should avoid attributing power to any particular locus whether 'society', 'language', 'the individual subject', or 'Capital'. Power works through assemblages of elements, forces, technologies and bodies. It is an arraying of relations, making an assemblage work as a machine. Language cannot be communicational because it is part of a continually reapplied and self-organising apparatus for the application of power. Deleuze and Guattari (1988) assert that the basic unit of language is the order-word. Order-words are not just commands, but "every act that is linked to statements by a 'social obligation'" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 79). As such, order-words are tied to dominant and established orders of actions in a given society. Not only do order-words impose the semiotic co-ordinates of grammar, but they effectuate a transformation of bodies. Saliently, as well as through the extrinsic relations between action and speech, this is achieved through the intrinsic relations between action and speech such as the performative and the illocutionary. Thus, the effectuation of the act immanent to every order-word rests on the implicit or nondiscursive presupposition intrinsic to that order-word.

That this intrinsic relation necessarily rests on a 'social obligation' points to the repetitive nature of discourse. Language, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is not representational and does not fundamentally operate through trope, signification or metaphor: "narrative consists not in communicating what one has seen but in transmitting what one has heard, what someone else said to you" (1988: 76). Whereas signification can be thought of as complications upon a basic binary relation (the mirror of nature), language is necessarily about indirect discourse. It is about the transmission of order-words from a second party to a third party, from a third party to a fourth party and so on. Discourse depends on imposition, on the order. It depends on a repetition of the organisation of orders and transformations, a repetition that itself requires those orders to enact its circulation: "[l]et people say..." (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 76).
Order-words can be seen as deployments, not by individuals, but by machinic collective assemblages of enunciation (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988). Order-words are applied to bodies, they have effects. Order-words are part of a machinery of distribution and organicization. In this sense, when Deleuze and Guattari say that order-words impose the semiotic co-ordinates of grammar, this is concomitant with a transformation of bodies. Even saying ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘it’ transforms bodies and distributes capacities and agencies along demarcations constructed by machines that are at once social and political. This is especially apparent in statements that not only transform a body into an enunciative body, but that transform other bodies, possibly those of an interlocutor, into an object, one who cannot speak. The deployment of subjects, for example, occurs within an established order of subjection. This invokes the reciprocal presupposition between collective assemblages of enunciation and concrete machinic assemblages of power. Deleuze and Guattari cite Foucault’s work on delinquency and the prison.

The prison is a form, the “prison-form”; it is a form of content on a stratum and is related to other forms of content (school, barracks, hospital, factory). This thing or form does not refer back to the word “prison” but to entirely different words and concepts, such as “delinquent” and “delinquency,” which express a new way of classifying, stating, translating, and even committing criminal acts. “Delinquency” is the form of expression in reciprocal presupposition with the form of content “prison”.... Moreover, the form of expression is reducible not to words but to a set of statements arising in the social field considered as a stratum (that is what a regime of signs is). The form of content is reducible not to a thing but to a complex state of things as a formation of power (architecture, regimentation, etc.). We could say that there are two constantly intersecting multiplicities, “discursive multiplicities” of expression and “nondiscursive multiplicities” of content. It is even more complex than that because the prison as a form of content has a relative expression all its own; there are kinds of statements specific to it that do not necessarily coincide with the statements of delinquency. Conversely, delinquency as a form of expression has an autonomous content all its own, since delinquency expresses not only a new way of evaluating
crimes but a new way of committing them.... At most, along with other contents and expressions, they imply a shared state of the abstract Machine acting not at all as a signifier but as a kind of diagram (a single abstract machine for the prison and the school and the barracks and the hospital and the factory...). (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 66-67)

Order-words bring into play the whole force of a practical and technological apparatus with which statements are in reciprocal presupposition. A distribution of bodies and their becoming-organic is enacted. On the other hand, remember the body as the instantiation of the machine. Utterances, speech-acts, order-words spew forth through the body. The body is the enactment of the machine and the body enacts the machine. To say 'is' is already a political action. It is not just who has the power to attribute an identity or objectivity to another body. It is an instantiation of an objectifying machine that differentiates bodies. For instance, the Other of colour becomes reduced to precisely that distanciated difference from speech and thought that says that a black body is just their sex, their animal nature. A whole machinery, a whole bodily memory of History, the academy, even of so-called meritocracy, and of representational democracy, is mobilised, is immanent to merely saying 'is'. Do we try to think beyond 'is'? What is the politics of the identity of being? How do we resist it when it is so diffuse?

Bodies become transformed. Say 'the', say 'it', say 'you'. Say 'community', say 'people...', say 'out of place'. A criminal is an institution. A 'community' is an imagining, a circulation, and a spatialisation. Yet, 'community' is too often an repetition of an origin, a territorialisation onto that origin. Someone who says they are 'mature' deploys a machinery of institutionalised practices that modulates the access to cultural and symbolic capital. Who can legitimately say that they are 'mature'? What multiplicities of classifying and speaking relate to what multiplicities of talking, of sociality, of complicity in the world? There are statements of expression specific to concrete practices of 'maturity': injunctions to career, to family, to 'responsibility', to
network, these all connect to other institutions and capitals. Which bodies can be made to be middle class? A machine is always inhabited by the multiplicity of potential others immanent to it. In many ways, it is that very inhabitation.

What does the deployment of ‘the self’ do? With what techniques does it normalise certain modes of individuation? It exercises a pressure to conform. Be a self, do not be contradictory! Attraction-repulsion to those that oppress you, surely a self can’t do that! Who’d be a self? Gangsta rap and misogyny, an infolding of oppression. It shouldn’t be a self, yet there it goes again, that machine, that school, those parents institutionalised in a Modern Black Atlantic, telling them incessantly to ‘be yourself’. Some who are Othered, made to be not white, or rather made to be the negation of whiteness, desire whiteness. Power has a certain allure. You can be a self too, you know, just exercise power over another, just put them in their proper place (the kitchen, the bedroom). The visibility of whiteness is obliterated by living it through a sense of self. Whiteness, a ridiculous concept, posts its border guards every 6 inches. But it becomes normalised when its differential constitution is subsumed within the self to produce the illusion of an interior and autonomous authenticity. The unconscious is a machinery of extensive and external practices. We are already a crowd (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988). No one body can know the entirety of the practices it partakes in. The trick of the self is that it promises that all that a body can do can be brought to consciousness. Our racist bodies demand we face the visceral and affective disjuncture and connectivity of our bodies. Our desires are not those of our-selves. Scary.

‘Squark!’ The subaltern seems to be a parrot, only able to speak in her Master’s voice (Spivak, 1988). She screeches, but cannot express her intense pain, the pain of subjugation. She opens her mouth but finds it is a beak, incapable of anything but repetition. She can’t take flight, because she is in a cage. The subaltern is not a subject. There is little else to do. Just dance, and maybe sing (become-nightingale). If you
don’t have a His-tory, then there are other ways of memorialising (Gilroy, 1993). If pens and paper, or chalk and blackboard are kept locked away from you, then you dance and wait. When you get the opportunity, then you strike: open up the metropolis to its externality (Schwarz, 1996). Reason, civilisation and whiteness - open them up onto dancing bodies, onto the bloody violence of bodies hanging from trees. That is reason. Lynching is civilised. Open up the West to the rape at its heart. The Other/female as object to be penetrated. Courts putting British rape victims on trial; condemnation of the oppression of Women in the Islamic world; then condemnation of Islamic men leering at Western women sunbathing; a conservative modernism that circulates and circulates.

Don’t pity the Master for fooling himself into thinking he is a subject. Knowing himself through History, he thinks that he can talk to anyone, and that anyone can talk to him. But to speak is to reverberate with racial and gendered terror. How has blackness become being-without-knowledge (Gilroy, 1993)? It is not a matter of not being able to speak to each other, of black dialects and white language being incommensurate. Modern machines separate knowledge and being (or experience) to allow for experience centred knowledge claims. The ideal subject invoked, however, become racialised and gendered. Knowledge and being become gendered as the body becomes female. Knowledge and experience become colour-coded as blacks are excluded from History. An apartheid of chalk and blackboards. Such a separation, then, becomes the prerequisite for the modern White Master with whom Hegel was so well acquainted to come to know himself through the progress of History.

For Gilroy (1993), to reincorporate blacks into History, to recognise black interlocutors in modern conversations, does not mean confronting universal rationality or language with parochial dialects or with different modes of thinking. We can’t work with knowledge and being (or experience) as if they are not already themselves produced.
To talk of bodies is not to talk of desire as being, or as merely a function (Witz, 2000). Bodies are sociable, they are thoroughly riven by forces and technologies. But, given half a chance, they can be more promiscuous than you could even imagine. Bodies can become beyond sex and race, beyond gender, beyond even knowledge and being. I am not saying there are but two directions: either keep desiring as if racy-sexy were the only things a body can do; or explode out onto a promiscuity of bodies and pleasures (Butler, 1999). To deterritorialise absolutely would be to approach light speed, to send oneself hurtling out onto the chaos of the cosmos. Either that or to die, to take one’s own life. Rather, it is better to draw a map, to become nomadic (Braidotti, 1994). A nomad does not abandon everything, there is always a potential memory, be it a horse, a saddle, a knowledge of edible roots (always a connection). Relocation rescues the parts of the past we need “in order to trace the paths of transformation of our lives here and now” (Braidotti, 1994: 6). Draw a map to think differently. Redraw the map every step of the journey. But a useful map, one that allows us to know where we want to go, also allows us to know where we have been.

Feel the tension. A tensor stretches a line of potential variation between an atypical cutting edge and the repeated practices of the majority (who are always a numerical minority - don’t ever vote!) (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988). A white youth in South London passes between Creole, black American speech, ‘Black London English’ and what might pass as ‘standard’ English, a multitude of times in a few minutes (Back, 1996). Who draws the borders between these types of speech? Why trace when you can place in variation, place in tension (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988)? This not to say that the use of styles is not checked, for Back makes clear that the affective relations between bodies regulates the variation. There is an immanent politics in every tensing of the vocal cords, every tensing of the lips. There is a logic of conflict and dependency that intertwines black and white (Gilroy, 1993). Black and white could not exist without each other. Concrete
machines produce them and oppose them in reciprocal presupposition. Black and white are not signifiers, not identities. They are both multiplicities of content and multiplicities of expression. The sound system, the call-and-response of the dance hall are Modern phenomena. Immanent to becoming-other is a multiplicity of imbrication and implication, a whole politics of violence and loving.

5. Bodies

Bodies against bodies. Sometimes these encounters are violent, a body shouting, shooting a look to kill, standing over another body, menacingly, dominating. Sometimes these encounters are sensual, a gentle caressing, fingers barely brushing another's (skin shivers, a tingling ripples like a wave), a nestling, a nuzzling, a snuggling up to each other, safe and warm. Sometimes bodies sit relaxed side by side or facing each other, laughing. Maybe they are intently working together, both concentrating on a computer screen, oriented and re-oriented by a set of figures or a body of text on the screen.

Body against body, bodies instantiate machines. A body issues an utterance, and a placing of bodies, the speaking body and other bodies, occurs. A professional woman walks onto a trading floor, her workplace. One of the 'skirts' has arrived. Her male colleagues start joking, putting her in her place. ‘Of all the girls on this floor, I’d like to screw her the most...’ ‘It’s only a bit of banter,’ they claim. A heterosexualising of women, a reduction to sex, nothing but body (McDowell, 1997). Women on this trading floor are either ‘available’ or a dyke. Lesbianism becomes recuperated into a heterosexualising machinery. Is blackness the absent Other, hidden within the lesbian (Skeggs, 1997) or within the ‘skirts’? What about the South Asian faces deployed on television by these merchant banks, as if to say, ‘hey, we are an equal opportunity employer’? Where do these bodies fit into the scheme? How many of these Asian faces peer over the screens
on the trading floors? Or are they restricted to their media image of
the rational, desexualised apologists for the bourgeois, much like the
‘Asians’ in Willis’s (1977) ethnography were bullied for their
conformity, their lack of bodily ‘experience’ or libido? The business
news presents a world where every other City economist or analyst is
‘Asian’.

Bodies are machines and are linked into machines. They operate by
connection. Connections are continually being made in order to do
something. Organs are selected in the context of a milieu, and they
memorialise a repetition of structural coupling (Watson, 1998). A team
is a body. The smooth running of the team rests on its organs
remembering how to work together. It is not always about co­
operation and communication. How does a investment bank work?
How are its deals completed? The male bodies McDowell (1997)
discusses perform their white heterosexual masculinity through their
performance of a deal. Completing a deal becomes a spectacle of
libido. Even more than this it is a libido-ising of the deal, a
reproduction of masculine trading. Gesticulations, unusual for the
middle classes (but it’s alright, there’s still an element of control), a
certain embodied activity, this is how work gets done. But for women,
no matter how hard they try, they can never be man enough. Every
way of dealing with the constant pressure of other bodies, all their
cloying attention, all their dismissive actions, seems to be trapped
within a logic of either/or. Letting it wash over you doesn’t challenge or
change anything; ‘batting it back’ merely legitimises the jokes and
banter. Dress smartly and you’re seen as feminine and available; dress
conservatively and you are a frumpy lesbian. It is difficult to work, to
make connections with other bodies when the sexualising-gendering
machine only provides you with limited roles.

A male body shouts down the phone at another body, the periodicities
of their bodies all important to not only clinching the deal, but to
speeding up the circulation of penetrative capital. Shouting in this
‘team’, in this machine, establishes a relation between bodies (male, corporate, legalistic) and makes the organic machine work. The working of the machine, its organicisation, is made to be masculine. The substances of the organs, the very texture and feel of the practices involved, involve a coding - a forming of matters (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988) or, in this case, bodily practices. The transition from coding to overcoding, to the superlinearity of the code that enables its deterritorialisation, its repetition and application to other settings, is not only discursive, but embodied. As bodies circulate and connect, they enact the same codings elsewhere, they form similar organic bodies. How might this overcoding come about, involving but not limited to the enactment of discursive order-words, unless bodies against bodies can re-enact a particular set of relations and connections? A repetition and superlinearity through bodily acts, maybe this is what connects McDowell’s traders with Willis’s (1977) working class lads. Just as the temporality of discursive statements is crucial to its ability to deterritorialise, so might the all important timing or periodicities of practices and bodily acts (Bourdieu, 1977; Appadurai, 1996). A formation of power (techniques of sexualised and raced masculinity) is in reciprocal presupposition with an established order of expression, an order of bodies expressing an invariance. A machine cuts across strata of class, and the lads become lads through “coming out of [their] shells” (Willis, 1977: 15). But a code needs to be popularizable, its needs to become territorialised. Working class masculinity becomes embodied as it becomes practised within a particular classed milieu.

The lads Willis (1977) spent time with perform a coming out of their shells within a classed logic of opposition, a logic that sets them apart from the supposed barrow boys of the trading floor. The lads make their own time, they expand their own space. They punch and kick, and blag and shoplift. They’re funny, they make the other kids laff. The group becomes a body more important than the individual body. They won’t grass, you know they won’t, because they are organs of the
group body; this is where they learn how to talk, how to walk, who to diss. This body has a set of flows all its own, an atmosphere, an infectiousness: you can’t help just laughing, getting caught up in the reaching out, the becoming-other, of having a crafty smoke. It is a rejection of the knowledge offered by school, a rejection of a meritocracy which promises an equality of opportunity yet privileges ways of being, structures of feeling, of a select group. But, this rejection is not resistance. It offers no opposition. All the lads end up doing is inverting the valuation of knowledge and being. They don’t struggle so much as stamp on those even less empowered than themselves. If you have access to one dimension of capital, then you use it against all those who don’t have this access. Just as slavery was a plantation of misogyny and homophobia directed against blacks (hooks, 1994; Gordon, 1997; Zack 1997), so a parallel misogyny and homophobia against the working class might have been assimilated into white male working class practice. To the extent that white capitalist patriarchy (hooks, 1994) approves misogynist and homophobic violence, so the repetition of such violence by working class men, black or white, is a measure of their subjugation.

A genealogy of bodies becoming Asian needs to be inserted here. What history of individuation underwrites their attribution to desexualised bodies in the contemporary West? How has a transformation from the lascivious Oriental (Said, 1995; Kabbani, 1994) to contemporary des-sexuality been enacted? I say that the Asian has become desexualised rather than effeminised (a process that can apply to men and women) because the difference ascribed to Asian bodies puts them beyond the pale of Western desire as sexually constructed. This is not to say that Asian bodies are outside of the heterosexualising machine. No, it is merely to say that ‘Paki-bashing’ and ‘queer-bashing’ share more than just a syntactical arrangement. They’re both a new bashing of the Other bishop. Anti-pathology! You see, Pakis, like queers, are constituted as the beyond of heterosexuality: they’re just too smelly (Willis, 1977; Back, 1996; Nayak, 1999). ‘They’re unclean, I wouldn’t
want to have sex with one of them, you never know what you might catch!’ Those Vietnamese, they carry their shopping on their heads, and their cooking stinks (Back, 1996)! Vietnamese men are weak and soft: “My black mates wouldn’t let people walk over them the way the Vietnamese do .... If you said things to dem [black people] you’d get nuff licks....” (Chas, quoted in Back, 1996: 69). There is always a story of bodies against bodies. The Vietnamese on the ‘Riverview’ estate were vilified because they kept themselves to themselves; yet their white neighbours controlled their access to spaces where they might connect with others on the estate as black youths had been allowed to do (Back, 1996). You can’t forge connections when you’re being punched or pissed over, kicked or set on fire.

6. Proceedings (or: why ‘Asians’ aren’t funny)

Asian people can’t make others laugh, either. Or at least, with their quaint self-deprecation, they can only make the middle classes laugh: the Goodness Gracious Me Effect. The lads in Willis’s (1977) account had a particular dislike for their Asian peers. Just as they characterised conformist white youths as desexualised, so they characterised Asian youths as conformist. A web is spun, and the Asians are caught right in the middle: they can’t claim what is not rightfully theirs. ‘Everyone has rights!’ bleat liberals all the time. Subterfuge, just like elections and meritocracy.

Laughing, sexual intimacy, policing, juridical proceedings - all linked in some way. ‘American’ women, whose bodies are (asked to) memorise India, practise a mapping as desire stirs them (Das Gupta, 1997). They make a nonsense of the sense of culture as discrete, imposed upon them by both the white centre and the Indian homeland. Their desires, spilling over the edges of Desire, make a mockery of Identity, or practices as the representation of culture. A machine is a multiplicity, and upon their bodies a very forceful policing machine works. This
machine memorialises a colonial past, the imposition of a middle-class Victorian moral sexual economy through the Raj. The machine connects this memory to parents and kin, and to a desire to reterritorialise on a lost homeland - the India of a generation ago. Parents and kin are mobilised as the authoritative guardians of a heritage in need of reproduction. A double and reciprocal racism is infolded into the machine, for America is white, don’t forget, and to adopt their decadency is to lose yourself in the violence of a re-whitening. The memory of Victorian propriety becomes a clinging on to the past. Their daughters’ virtue becomes, for the parents, a clinging onto an ‘authenticity’. Parents become the police of ethnicity as they become the police of sexuality. Resistance by these Indian-American women, however, is not to flee into the arms of ‘America’, for they know that America doesn’t exist. They look for tactics that do not mean choosing one or the other, ‘Indian’ or ‘American’, but, rather, open up a space for embracing a multiplicity, for turning the ambivalence accompanying incompatible frames into something else (Das Gupta, 1997: 589). ‘Indianness’ and ‘Americanness’ are both modified. They become something else, other than themselves.

The ‘respectability’ of white working class women in north-west England is subject to a similar policing, a similar set of juridical proceedings (Skeggs, 1997). Somebody sits in judgement at every step of these women’s lives. From the classroom, to their own bedrooms, to picking the kids up from school, to the nightclub, there is always a judge, there is always a little death sentence. You may think your feelings are your own, but the lesson here is salutary. The caring courses Skeggs’s participants were enrolled on were machines for producing caring bodies: caring for became conflated with caring about. Evaluation on the courses was an evaluation of the women as caring beings. The courses were a technology for producing affect, for producing the appropriate organs of affect. But it wasn’t just on the courses that such technologies were enacted. Caring about was caring about an-other; these women were made to feel guilty for having
pleasure of their own. More than this, they were made to take pleasure in caring for others: productive power. In many cases the judges were themselves, as they instantiated a discursive and practical machinery of working class femininity. Getting ready to go out for a night on the town was a sociable experience. Pleasure was taken, laughs all round. But judgements were made: 'Do I look OK in this?' 'Is this skirt too short?' 'Does this top go with these shoes?' 'Ooh! You don’t want to wear them. White stilettos!' Both on the dancefloor and in the classroom the judgements of others confronted them with a spectre of what they were supposed to be: slags. So, on the dancefloor a self-policing was enforced: mustn’t be too easy, don’t want a reputation. Or in the classroom: an appropriate indignation when a teacher asks about a boyfriend; a shrugging him off as he puts his arms round her. ‘Who does he think he is?!?’ is always accompanied by an unspoken ‘What does he think I am?’

Laughing, or rather joking, is an examination, is a set of proceedings. Banter and humour on the investment bank trading floor is an enactment of a difference (McDowell, 1997). But the recuperation of an already inscribed difference - what it is to be male, what it is to be female (the tyranny of 'is') - operates as an exam, one that it is impossible for the female bankers to pass. 'If you can take the joke then you can be one of the lads, because that is what we do - we take the piss. You’d only be an honorary lad, mind you. But if you can’t take the joke then you must be some sort of prude or some sort of dyke.'

The structure of taking the piss is quite clear. The lads make each other, and others, laugh. Others either join in, at their own expense, or they can get lost. But, if they join in, they can’t expect to make the lads laugh, oh no. This structure of taking the piss is almost exactly the same as the lads structure of 'having a laff' in Willis’s observations. Here, not only women, but conformist boys, and, without it being spoken, Asians, were most certainly not allowed to make the lads laugh. Jaw muscles were clenched, breathing controlled, a straight face kept. No. Actually, they probably didn’t even need to do that: a
habitus, a body stance, of not being ready to laugh as soon as a conformist opens his mouth. What is there to lose for the lads? In the investment bank women face a sense of loss in the confusion of an impossible performance. The men, they have to perform a heterosexuality. The slightest whiff of being gay, the obvious appearance of being Asian, and you’ve already lost your appeal. A fear of loss underwrites the enactment of the proceedings, ensures that white, male bodies instantiate the machine. These bodies are richly rewarded for their services to the machine, of course. The differentiations that are drawn by the machine and that are applied to bodies favour these bodies. It is these bodies that are revalidated.

Order-words attribute incorporeal transformations to bodies. A judge’s sentence transforms the accused into a convict:

what takes place beforehand (the crime of which someone is accused), and what takes place after (the carrying out of the penalty), are actions-passions affecting bodies (the body of the property, the body of the victim, the body of the convict, the body of the prison); but the transformation of the accused into a convict is a pure instantaneous act or incorporeal attribute that is the expressed of the judge’s statement.

(Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 80-81).

What makes a sentence effective? The judge’s power is not her/his own, but is an assemblage: the court machinery, the police, the prison, the government, each of these already interlocking assemblages. There is a whole set of circumstances immanent to the statement: to say “I swear” in a courtroom is different from saying it in a secret society or a love affair (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 82). That instantaneous transformation enacted by the sentence brings the whole force of the machines pitching bodies against bodies (relating bodies to bodies) into play. Bodies and their workings, their connections are immanent to language, to statements. What precedes the sentence, what follows it, their repetition of previous proceedings, of previous distributions of bodies, these are the conditions for the transformation of bodies. The difference between expression and
content is only the condition of their insertion into one another. In a way, we could see the instantaneous incorporeal transformation as merely the pivotal moment of the proceedings. That is, the proceedings transform the affects of bodies, their capacities to relate to other bodies, to do things (which is why the proceedings presupposes prison, or the death sentence). But it is the whole process of the proceedings, the prolonged series of judgements, a Kafkaesque world where every intermingling of bodies is a trial: this is what transforms the body.

White working class women, and the rest of us, undergo a continuous set of proceedings, judgements as to our desirability (Skeggs, 1997). Whether it is the judgements of your friends that are actively sought, so that you know you’ve still got what it takes; or whether it is the validation of a man’s lust as you pull him from dancefloor to coffee, your body is being transformed. A distribution of bodies is enacted. A classed marketisation of female heterosexuality (Skeggs, 1997); but also a stratified economy of spectacular libido, male and female. The transformation is indeed incorporeal in one sense. Insofar as the judgement pronounces a death sentence upon the body, it proscribes the limits of that body’s capabilities. The limit of the body is death. Beyond the skin is only death. This is why, to extend the capabilities of the body, to increase our potential to make new connections, it is necessary to extend the skin, to push back death as far away from you as possible (Buchanan, 1997). An incorporeal transformation is a potential one, it is about the body’s limits, its death. Gender, sexuality and race, in the sense of the limits imposed on bodies by power, is death: it is beyond bodies, is incorporeal, is sociable (Witz, 2000).

In another sense, however, the transformation of bodies by statements is far from incorporeal. Proceedings implement physical technologies, throw bodies against bodies, and change the physical capabilities of bodies. They produce bodies, they atrophy old organs and produce new ones. Racist attributions may not always be applied to bodies
instantaneously. The Vietnamese on the ‘Riverview’ estate were kept apart (Back, 1996), were pushed away as if they were death. Attributions were made in their immediate absence, but this was not an absolute absence. The racial machine would very much like us to return space-time to unity, but neither space nor time is primarily extensive. It is only us that make it like that. We divide up space-time; we make it quantitative. Space-time is not a container, it is a connectivity between bodies. It is the very multiple constitution of bodies. The smelliness of the Vietnamese may not have been applied directly, but it was still applied to their bodies, still transformed their bodies, through violent attacks and urine through their letter boxes. It is the very prolonged and repetitive nature of proceedings which make the statement hurt bodies so very directly. To be called a paki, a chink or a coon is to be hurt bodily; it is to be chained to the continuing nature of the proceedings.

7. Imprecise geometries

A body encounters its memories on the outside. Proceedings are other bodies constantly reminding you of what you can do, which other bodies and territories you can connect to. Time is pure difference (Deleuze, 1990; May, 1996). It is not only the compacted bodily memory, but it is the instantiation of the throwing together of bodies in a sociability. ‘What can a body do?’ It might seem as if every time we face this question we face a recuperation into the strata. If bodies are machines, if machines distribute bodies - if a bodily memory is the sedimentation of a body’s repetitive extension and connection with other bodies, its imbrication in the machine - then how might a body increase its affects? If the sociability of the body is its subjection, then what hope do we have? Well, strangely enough, the sociability of the body, as well as being the imposition of a death sentence, is also precisely the means for the body to take flight. Every encounter brings together a whole memory of capabilities of the bodies involved. But as
Bourdieu (1977) reminded us, the outcome of an encounter is never certain until it has been completed. For Deleuze and Guattari (1988), every encounter is the actualisation of a particular potential. An encounter is characterised not just by what relations were connected (actualised), but the ones that could have been but were not (potential). Just as every body is an envelopment of difference (its extension and connection to a multiplicity; in fact, the body’s very multiplicity), so an event is also an envelopment of difference. Out of the pressing crowd of potential outcomes, only one was selected and actualised (Watson, 1998; Dewsbury, 2000). But, the potential forces, the external relations immanent to the actualised event, still constitute that event. They are the event’s outside, its other possibilities of becoming that make the actualised outcome so poignant, so joyous, so painful. To meet a stranger and to encounter their prejudice is painful because immanent to this encounter is the potential of meeting a stranger and making an untrammelled connection, falling in love.

Memory - what is brought to the encounter, what is encountered - is not a finite set of capabilities. To say that memory is encountered is to say that it is potential. This is also to assert the exteriority of the relations between bodies; the exteriority of bodies, of memory. Perhaps this might be clearer if we merely concentrate on capabilities. Following Merleau-Ponty and Michel Serres, Massumi (1997) takes a game of football and merely looks at what allows things to happen. The action on the field, the flow of the game, is not a mere result of the rules of the game or the sum of the decisions of the individual players, no matter how good they are. Rather, the flow of the game emerges from of the relations between its elements - players and their capabilities (bodily memory), ball, weather and rules. It is the arraying of the play - the distribution of each of the teams across the pitch; the position of the ball; the relation of these to each other and to the goals etc. - what is happening in-between all these elements, and the emergent, what could be just about to happen, potential that determines the play. Michael Owen does not make a particular run.
unless the rest of the elements are in a fortuitous relation to him. It is the relations, given the situation, of how things could affect each other - the 'field of potential' (or 'virtual' field) - that is the momentum for change. Modifications of the 'field of potential', which continually happen on the actual field, is the 'subject'. As actual events affect the field of potential, so the changes in the field of potential (re)constitute the actual through defining what it could become. What a body can do, then, is the exteriority of its relations. A body is forever becoming as it constantly comes into new relations with a re-arrayed outside. Its organs are remade, always different, as constitutive relations are made anew. The question then becomes how is it that organs persist or exist at all (Dewsbury, 2000); and we have already seen something of how memory, how the potential of bodies, is restricted, is clamped down.

Here there is a line to be carefully trodden, between, on the one hand, bodies as produced effects, constantly reinserted into structures of power, and, on the other hand, bodies constantly deterritorialising and becoming-different. Bodies are not *just* effects in assemblages (Thrift, 1997), but rather are *elusory* (Radley, 1995). That is, bodies have the capacity to configure relations as well as becoming produced by a combination of forces and materials. Again, this resonates with the Deleuzian idea of bodies as the *active* instantiation of machines. Bodies can improvise creatively. Moreover, there are unintended consequences to their actions. Mistakes are a commonplace in everyday life. And the messiness of bodies arguing further belies the possibilities of their determination (Thrift, 1997).

Our bodies are central to our becoming-different, but this becoming-different can only occur through our bodies’ practical engagement in the world. Thrift (1996; 1997) borrows Merleau-Ponty’s idea of the *flesh*, a dynamic interleaving of the body and the world, to gesture towards the nature of our practical involvement with others and objects. Our bodies transform as they connect to other bodies in the world, transforming those other bodies too. Together, these bodies
work together, forming a prehension (a grasping between hand and tool, one human and another) but this assembling is a process, an event. It has to be acted out. Our bodily senses develop and transform as our bodies become connected with others. Bodies affect one another, becoming expressive in the process, deploying imaginary sensory distinctions, for instance in “the way a dancer touches her partner with a lightness that signifies (that is opens or invites) gentleness rather than distance” (Radley, 1995: 15).

The body is a verb, an activity. The body is eventful. It might be part of an assemblage, but these dynamic connectivities are made and practised (Dewsbury, 2000). Our performative actions construct the world, but they are the art of the live, the art of now (Thrift, 2000: 233). The performative unfolds the next moment allowing change to happen (Dewsbury, 2000: 475). Performative action gathers in heterogeneous substantial elements, constituted abstractions, and other forces, and produces something new out of them (Dewsbury, 2000: 490). We measure out our time (Chronos), organising it as an expectation of what we expect to come. A bodily memory of a prehension is encountered as we arrange our actions in response to those of others around us. As each body participates in this incessant arrangement, each attempting to anticipate the actions of the other, the time between them comes to be ordered, an ordering of their (inter-)actions. Yet, the very incessant nature of time, its flow (Aion) constantly disrupts this unfolding order, opening up other potentials of what might have been (Dewsbury, 2000; Foucault, 1977)

The reproduction of order, of structure, of the Other, then, is not assured, because events are always unfolding (Thrift, 2000: 216, after Phelan, 1993). Again, we return to the question of how structures, organisation, and the Other become reproduced. It is the eventfulness of the performative actions by which we live our lives that necessitates a ‘modest’ theoretical approach (Thrift, 1996; 1997) to the political and the social. It is time as the flow of a pure and constant differentiation
that ensures that the distribution of inequality, unfairness and hierarchy is a process. We constantly re-enact our hierarchies day by day in our practices. Whether these practices are those of the multitude of employers and employees, customers and suppliers that combine to make a multi-national corporation work; or whether these practices enact the more diffuse or informal institutions that inflect our everyday interactions, the eventfulness of these practices guarantees the mutation of these structures. A structure of power comprises a multiplicity of local relationships of force (Foucault, 1979). These relationships constantly rearrange themselves, expressing the forever shifting balance between the strategies by which technologies of control are brought to bear, and the tactics deployed to resist them. The tactics used to resist or negotiate with institutionalised modes of power are forever proliferating. Moreover, heterogeneous elements forever find new ways to relate themselves. To adapt to these constantly emerging challenges – tactics and desire – structures of power are required to perpetually renew themselves.

A ‘modest’ theory concerns itself with precisely this process of distribution of inequality, unfairness and hierarchy. Such theoretical approaches do not subscribe to the inevitability of any particular form of structure or theory of exploitation. Neither, however, does it deny such processes as exploitation. Rather, it understands them precisely as processes, processes that are practised and that admit change. While taking a modest theoretical approach, one can still be cognisant of structures or hierarchies previously encountered and previously theorised. Yet, one cannot take these structures or hierarchies as given. The cognisance of these structures and hierarchies must be used only in the process of getting to grips with what is going on here and now. So, rather than commit to the inevitability of an already proscribed process, we should look to how we enact these hierarchies day by day. Such an approach opens up our political understanding to how we change, develop and deepen the mechanisms by which populations of bodies become unequally distributed and related. By
insinuating itself into the constant eventfulness of practice, however, such an approach also opens up a potential for a politics and a mode of living that moves beyond these particular inequalities.

One way to become political, then, is to create an ethics that supersedes particular machinic relations producing bodies and their capacities for action and affect. But, how to act ethically? Buchanan (1997) says it’s all about health. To be healthy is maximise the body’s affects, its capacities to affect and be affected. ‘What can a body do?’, not ‘what is a body?’ Attending to the health of the body is to make relations that further maximise the new relations that the body can make. Don’t look for a return (to a homeland, to an origin). Don’t try to think what a body is (male, female, white, black, sexy, unsexy). All this achieves is to relocate the body in a grid of identification, in a machinery of subjection, of violence, of telling bodies that they can’t do this, they can’t do that. Instead, think with an and: link up, connect unexpectedly, open up onto the multiplicity between us.

Be friendly says Goodchild (1997). Be open. Open up your body, extend it. Supersede either/or and head out onto the exciting plane of and ... and .... To deterritorialise is not just to leave a territory. It is to react back on that territory, to effect a decomposition. A territory is substantial. It brings together certain relations; it is a selection of these relations. A useful deterritorialisation breaks down the enforcement of quantitative space; it brings a connective ethics closer. So don’t just make any old connections. Certain connections are better to be made than others. Heed Buchanan’s warning: certain connections should carry a government health warning. Literally. Anorexics flee from a certain machinic connection of organs to food (a repetitive relation). But their line of flight does not push the limits of the body - death - further away (Buchanan, 1997). A pure intensity, a connection to the body-without-organs, but to the exclusion of other connections.
A useful politics is not always about jumping into the abyss. Sometimes death is the only political option. Gilroy (1993) recalls the suicide of slaves: death presented a more promising political option than a life lived as a slave. Being a slave was hardly being alive, anyway: it was merely having being, for only the Master had consciousness, knowledge of his own life. In the long run, however, the tyranny of the opposition between knowledge and being needs to be broken. Gilroy invokes Foucault’s recognition that both knowledge and experience are constituted by machineries of power. Experience has been constructed as the way we come to recognise ourselves (Skeggs, 1997). It is a political act to insinuate oneself into this very constitution, to question it and challenge it at every step of the way: “The critical ontology of ourselves ... has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them” (Foucault, 1984: 50).

This is already beyond mere bodies and pleasure, yet does not recuperate us back to desire as already constituted, as constituted as bodies (Butler, 1999). Rather, it is drawing a map as a nomadic becoming (Braidotti, 1994). Some mappings might end up being a naming and conquering, an instrument of colonialism. A nomad, on the other hand, never stays long enough in one place to conquer. Nomadism is making connections to a place and moving on. It is about forever redrawing the map, the map as the cutting edge of deterritorialisation. This is not a precise geometry. Yet, a useful map also shows where you have been: this is the measure of your deterritorialisation. Freedom does not abandon the organicised body completely, but reconstitutes it, extending its capabilities (Watson, 1998). Quantum evolution dips into chaos to bring back the new.
Chapter 3

Methodology

This chapter discusses the methodological issues arising from attempting to carry out empirical research into the political and practical problems discussed in the previous chapter. It consists of five sections. The first section presents the research problematic. Here, I set out the research objectives and questions. I also attempt to justify some of the choices made in setting out these objectives and also in specifying units of analysis in the research process. Secondly, the research design is set out, and its construction justified. The third section deals with the recruitment process and the issues that arise therein. In the fourth section, I detail the research process itself, discussing how the fieldwork was actually carried out, the problems that arose in doing this, and the techniques of analysis used. Finally, I conclude with a consideration of the dangers of deploying ‘identities’ within the research process itself.

1. Research problematisation

Race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality and class will be investigated as emergent cultural processes, not static categories. My concern with the production and emergence of these differences through embodied practices is tied to five explicit problematics for this research project.

(1) How do bodies become gendered, sexualised, ethnicised and racialised through everyday practices that transform these bodies and what they can do (how they can affect and be affected by one another)?
(2) How do these gendered, sexualised, ethnicised and racialised distributions take place through practices that are simultaneously singular and differential?
(3) How might the role of social bodily memory in these performative actions be understood?

(4) How might 'elusory' practices or encounters suggest ways of becoming-other in the face of everyday recuperations of racialised, ethnicised, gendered and sexualised differences?

(5) How might groups and individuals engage in ethical processes by which they can rearrange their relations with others, beyond these racialised, ethnicised, gendered and sexualised differences?

These research problematics are designed specifically not to reinscribe identificatory concerns into understandings of everyday practices, but rather to shift the bases by which each complex of practices and understandings comes to relate to itself and others. So, recent discourse and research on the construction of identification in concrete situations becomes shifted to engage with the operation of the reflexive distribution of bodily and political capabilities. Similarly, recent discourse and research on everyday practice becomes reconfigured to engage with the mundane ways differential orientations and relations can be enacted and emergent, yet also memorial. The problematics posed seek to provide a framework for encountering activity and practice.

The translation of these research problematics into research questions is quite difficult. Primarily, this difficulty arises because the research needs to establish the efficiency of the processes by which practice differentiates, organises and memorialises. This necessity seems to demand its own set of research questions, separate from the specificity of the interrogation of these processes within racialised, gendered and sexualised practice. The research questions become tied to two different impulses within the research problematics. It would be quite possible to have two sets of questions, the first set on the nature of differentiation, organisation and memorialisation being immanent to a second set relating specifically to how these processes work in relation to everyday racialisation, gendering and sexualisation in night-time leisure spaces.
For the sake of brevity, however, I will set out a set of questions focusing on the specific enactment of embodied difference and organisation along racialised, sexualised and gendered dimensions in night-time leisure spaces. It remains important that these questions are seen to encapsulate an attempt to establish the modes by which orders and organisation become efficient, and how bodies are transformed, corporeally and incorporeally. Those modes of ordering and becoming are interrogated through the research questions but also alongside them, in their own right. This reflects the exploratory nature of this research project. The attention given to attractiveness and desire is best thought of as a way to focus upon both the modes by which differentiation emerges and can become organised and the memorialisation of specific identifications.

(1) How do affective relations or desires become sexualised through practice?
(2) How does a body become sexually desirable? Or, how does desirability express a bodily memory?
(3) What unspoken cultural understandings or social bodily memories are necessary in order to know how to interact within an emerging set of relations (e.g. to flirt with somebody, or “chat them up”)?
(4) What role does expression and expressiveness play in becoming-desirable or undesirable (in sexualised/gendered/racialised relations)?
(5) How do the practices within night-time leisure venues spatialise? What effects do this spatialisation have, in terms of the organisation of emerging affective relations?
(6) How do modes of sociality become negotiated ethically? How do group socialities become opened up to change and difference?

Although these questions may appear imprecise, they are constructed in order to be able to engage with the ambiguity and multiplicity of the practices under scrutiny. Furthermore, they are already precisely
situated within a complex of specific constructions of experience, affective relations and sexual relationships. These specific constructions are highly pertinent to the relations of night-time leisure spaces. In particular, the specific sexualised-racialised organisation of bodies-in-spaces in many ways constitute those spaces, and the experience of those places. At the same time, there are many shared embodied memories relating to the forms of sexualised relationships able to be practised in such spaces. Moreover, whilst I am wary of following certain applications of Bakhtin’s notion of the carnivalesque, leisure spaces populated by young Westernised people present good opportunities for the ethnographic engagement with overtly sexualised embodied practice in public.

As I shall discuss in the following sections, much of the fieldwork depended on working with groups of participants. The central strand of the fieldwork was to conduct participant observation on nights out with groups of participants, and then to follow this up with group and individual interviews, one function of which was to talk about practices on the nights out. Working with pre-formed groups of friends for this purpose was important for two reasons. The first reason is that people tend to go out on nights out in groups of their friends anyway. I would, therefore, be participating in a context which was close to how the group would encounter and be encountered in a pub, bar or nightclub in a non-research situation. The second reason is that the group interviews worked better with pre-formed groups who were comfortable with speaking in each other's company. Pre-formed groups provided a setting where individuals were more likely to be able to talk about potentially delicate issues than if the individuals were taking part in groups with people who had hitherto been strangers. Furthermore, the pre-formed groups would be able to draw upon a repertoire of shared or participatory memories in order to make sense of the questions being posed. The deployment of these repertoires was, in itself, interesting from the point of view of the research as this deployment was part of the process of everyday sense-making and distribution of bodies.
A proviso must be made with regard to working with groups, however. Throughout this project runs a strong commitment to allowing the relevant bodies to emerge as an efficient effect of practices of embodiment. This presents problems for defining units of analysis for methodological purposes. The boundaries and definition of a group is fluid and the group may destabilise itself as an entity. On the nights out with the participant groups there were many times when people from the group would come and go, arrive late or leave early. They would bring other friends who had varying relations to the rest of the group. On some nights out, a member from the core group (those who took part in the focus groups) would not be present. The group would interact with others in the spaces they were inhabiting, sometimes opening the boundaries of the group altogether. Sometimes, when there were a lot of people on the night out from the friendship group, they would splinter into smaller sub-groups whose formations and relations would change during the evening.

In addition to the fluidity of groups, the units of analysis for the fieldwork were not tightly specified throughout the entire work because much of the fieldwork consisted of participant observation carried out during nights out I just happened to be on. On such occasions, I would attempt to make an effort to tell all those I was out with in advance that the night out would play some part in my research, although this was not always possible. During this participant observation, my orientation as a participant and observer would be variable, making the relevant units of analysis variable. The important point is that the units of analysis were not too tightly specified in advance: how the relevant units of analysis emerged was part of what was being investigated.

Before the fieldwork commenced, I was particularly resistant to the designation of individuals as units of analysis. Following a selection of individuals would pose questions regarding how these individuals would be defined for ‘sampling’ purposes. Furthermore, one of the
themes of this research has been to look beyond the continuing academic preoccupation with individuals as the locus of action or subjectivity. It would be an easy move to make to use units of analysis derived from already constituted discursive (subject) positions with the full expectation of these categories being disrupted and transgressed by the research participants. This would allow a proclamation of the meaninglessness of the identity categories underlying the specification of the research in the first place. Such a move not only obscures how the academic helps to reproduce the conditions for recuperating the machinery of identification, but it detracts from the real impacts that non-meaningful differentiations have on people’s everyday lives. It also obscures the construction of knowledge and experience by invoking a meaningful explanation.

Starting with a sample of individuals based on ethnicity and/or gender seems to me to preclude the openness to the interactive and practical production of ethnicity, gender, race and sexuality that I am concerned with. Defining the participants involved in the research by their ethnic, racial, gendered, class or sexual identity is often done in longitudinal ethnographies as a way to assert a consistency of comparison across time. It posits the practices being observed as belonging to an already defined cultural group, precluding the possibility of understanding the conditions for the definition of culture. It also reduces the relational constitution of culture to either a discursive accounting of such relational constitutive acts, or to an interaction with a totalised Other (Other groups than those taking part in the research). Taking such a sample is, in my view, paramount to (again) saying that race is a non-whites’ problem and that gender is a problem only for women. The risk of the common move is that an exclusive and taken-for-granted relationship is set up between the methodologically conceptual categories of the individual, the attributes defining that individual (e.g. race or ethnicity), and, in turn, the characteristics defining the attribute (e.g. ethnicised practices, racial appearance). In this way, the academic practices her or his own rarefied kind of racialisation, sexualisation, gendering. If our methodologies are to meet the
challenges set by our theoretical rhetoric, processes by which identities are attributed, taken up and/or rejected must be treated as just that: processes, practices.

How do you work with practices by which people become racialised, gendered and sexualised, while not identifying the bodies involved in terms of their race, ethnicity, gender or sexuality? My central concern is the emergence of bodies, whether they become racialised, gendered, and sexualised, or take shape in ways outside of these categories. A body can be a group, after all, as Willis’s ethnography has shown (Willis, 1977). How do these bodies emerge? What practices at the present juncture, in particular contexts, constrain bodies, make them organic? What practices are used to live life beyond categories or even the embodied and memorialised injunctions to not make certain connections, to not do certain things? How are these concerns to be operationalised? From a political point of view, what is most important are the relations between bodies. The imperative is to attempt to operate in the in-between in order to try to find a series of different ways of engaging with these relations at a practical methodological level.

To this end, I start by thinking of relations as affects within social and cultural practice. At a practical level, this might mean talking about sensual likes and dislikes of hair or food, prejudices and preconceptions of attractiveness, the constitution of desire. Additionally, affects can be felt and engaged with by the researcher. They do not just have to be talked about. Talking about affects may already return affects to an identity, to discourse - what can be spoken about feeling, what is a legitimate feeling to have? Affect exists in-between. Ethnographers have always researched highly charged or emotive situations. An engagement with affects in data collection needs to resist too quick an attribution to either the individual (X was feeling angry; or Y was displaying disgust) or to the group or context (the restaurant had a certain vibe). These feelings do not appear out of thin air. This is not to say they are not spontaneous, but it is to say
that the researcher should be able to map the affect as it flows and emerges: how are bodies connecting, who is doing what to who; what music is being played; how did that camaraderie spread around the pub or club? Of course, affect is immanent to any relation of bodies. It needs to be broken down: relations of violence and force; relations of sociability; relations of bodily intimacy. How are each of these negotiated? Are there signs (embodied, gestural) that have direct affects on other bodies, which remove the hesitancy from interactions? Nevertheless, I am not sure that one can do away with identification entirely, not least because to do this would present a whole host of practical challenges in the field. I will return to these practical challenges in the final section of this chapter, and then again in chapter five.

Before getting into the field, however, I had to come to some sort of useful understanding of this very phrase: how was the field to be defined? In the broadest sense, the leisure spaces the fieldwork was conducted in were pubs, bars and nightclubs in London. The ways that these spaces were conceptualised within the research planning was very important because, as I have already discussed, spaces are taken to be constituted through spatialising practices. Just as events are taken to be efficient effects, so their spatiality is too. Conventional understandings of the ‘contextual’ role that spatiality plays in the constitution of practice and affect must be understood in embodied terms. Bodies have their own spatiality, or rather space-time, which is both a material contraction or memorialisation of difference, and a proliferation of trajectories. A spatiality of bodies not only has its own rhythms, but reverberates with other territories. The constitution of practice and affect, then, is immanent and reflexive (in the ethnomethodological sense): bodies and their affects are multiply spatial.

This requires care with regard to the specification of the spaces of the ethnography. If the ethnography is a mapping, it cannot very easily be a sited ethnography, bound to particular sites defined in advance. This
ethnography to a great extent followed the actants as it was left up to the participants to decide the venues for the nights out. These venues very often changed in the course of the night out itself. Moreover, insofar as practices of distribution invoke a spatial memory then there is a need to upset the ideal specification of the parameters of sited ethnographies. The boundedness of any putative site is always overspilled by everyday practice. This points to the need to interrogate the construction of sites as material spatialisations.

2. Research design

In chapter two, I discussed how the incorporeal transformation of bodies through judgement is merely part of a longer set of proceedings through which corporeal transformations are made. Similarly, the speech-acts through which sense is made of social situations in a quite material sense, are part of a use of language which itself is only part of a larger behavioural order (Wittgenstein, 1980). While interviews or other retrospective or representational forms of data collection are already part of another behavioural order, participant observation is a more direct engagement with the behavioural order of concern. There is more to social interaction than just talk or language use. A concern with affective relations as they are practised can be met by participant observation. Participant observation provides engagement with feeling and affect, with embodied interaction, as well as with the elements of interaction comprised of speech-acts. It also allows for participation in the situated practices of spatialisation, including, in this research, the production of drinking spaces, dancing spaces, flirting spaces, or desiring spaces. Although, as with any empirical technique, carrying out participant observation places the researcher in specific relations with the research participants, these relations are already multiple and dynamic, and the researcher is always being affected and repositioned by the actions of other bodies.

This is not to say that because interviews are part of a different behavioural order that they are invalid. Rather, it is merely to say that
interview techniques provide a different way of articulating bodily relations. In addition to participant observation, group interviews (focus groups) and individual interviews were used in the fieldwork. These interviews provided a focused exploration on selected issues, in particular the relationship between attraction, attractiveness, desire, and the differentiation of bodies and what they can do. In this way, the interviews could be thought of as a complementary process to the participant observation, a process of distillation and concentration. This is not entirely accurate, however, as a characterisation of the use of interview techniques alongside participant observation. Although interviews provide a more time-efficient engagement with dialogical practices enacting incorporeal differentiations, the operation of these practices will not necessarily be comparable with or representative of the practical multiplicity of night-time leisure spaces. Rather, interviews can provide a forum for the participation in sense-making through dialogical language use. Such sense-making can often enact and reproduce a set of shared understandings based upon the organisational logics immanent to language use. These logics are a more transcendental Sense that organise sense-making within dialogical speech. Interviews, then, can provide access to aspects of sense-making that draw more explicitly on overcoding systems of organisation.

Each of the group discussions will provide a new and different set of narratives in which to embed the practices taking place – a sense-making strategy for the effectuation of actions – and will alter the sense in which the previous discussion or participant observation is encountered. Moreover, the efficiency of specific practices of narration can be encountered and interrogated. Furthermore, immanent to each event and the practices that take place during that event are already multiple differences in the potential ways in which bodies can connect with one another. The use of interviews alongside participant observation provides the opportunity to write through several different and contradictory takes on the practices and events observed and
analysed. In this way, the fact that the dataset is relatively small should not prevent finding multiplicitous and rich data to analyse.

The research strategy, then, consists of three interlinked components: participant observation, focus group interviews and individual interviews. To some extent the participant observation data can stand by themselves in the sense that many of the nights out during which I conducted participant observation were not tied to the focus groups and individual interviews. There were, however, several nights out conducted with friendship groups, where this group would subsequently take part in group and individual interviews. The group interviews were used to firstly explore and interrogate some of the practices and events that took place during the nights out shared together; and, secondly, to explore wider senses of embodiment, practices and affective relations. The individual interviews, which were conducted some time after the group interviews, were designed primarily to provide an opportunity for participants to say things that were difficult to say in a group situation, a difficulty that will be discussed in section four.

To summarise, the three levels of data collection complement each other by providing (1) direct observational and participatory data regarding social practices in "night out" situations; (2) data regarding socially negotiated and discursively constructed sense making of sexualised, gendered and ethnicised practices; (3) data about the nuances of differential inflection of memories and encounters.

3. Recruitment

In some ways, I recruited participants for my research almost every time I went out to a pub, bar or nightclub. Being quasi-public spaces, it would have been impossible to tell everybody in the space that I was conducting research "with" them. I did, however, attempt to tell everybody who was a member of the group I was out with what I was doing. Nevertheless, the main strand of my research involved
conducting participant observation, focus groups and individual interviews with groups of participants. For this I needed to recruit groups who would be committed to taking part in all three parts of the methodology, able to come together at specified times and not just on an ad hoc basis.

Three groups of participants were recruited for this purpose. For two of the groups, recruitment was achieved through friends, so that there was at least one person in the group whom I knew, while the others in the group were either new acquaintances, or were people whom I knew, but not so well. I knew all the members of the third group of participants to varying degrees. All of the participants were aged between 21 and 30 years of age, which, I felt, satisfied the design requirement of conducting the research with ‘young’ people. The three groups who took part comprised of five, six and four people, respectively. The membership of each of the groups was not restricted or defined upon the basis of ethnicity or gender. It was ensured, however, that the total sample included a significant range of ethnicities. None of these groups were single gender groups, although one group included only one woman compared to five men. In the third of the main groups, all of the participants described themselves as ‘white’ (or ‘White British’). See Appendix A for a full breakdown of the composition of the groups, and for short profiles of the participants.

The variation in the ethnic and gendered composition of the groups was important. Although I did not want to specify bodies in advance, as this would reify the codings that I wanted to interrogate, I had also wanted to ensure that there would be some potentially interesting ethnicised, gendered and sexualised relations within the group as well as with others outside it! Again, this creates a tension between these two dynamics, a tension I will return to in section six of this chapter. As it happened, the first two groups to be recruited each had at least three individuals with self-described ethnicities different from the rest of their group, which made the ‘whiteness’ of the third group less
problematic. I would note at this point that I consider the pressure to write about the ethnic composition in such a way is underpinned by a residual difficulty within the social sciences to seriously consider ‘white’ as ethnically or racially marked or significant (Frankenberg, 1993; Bonnett, 1997). This is tied to a desire to make comparative judgements about identifications and practices that do not stand up to the rigours of a dynamic and process-based understanding. Furthermore, I would add that even if the groups had each or all been of a single self-described ethnicity, there would have been interesting data collected on the groups’ exterior relations with others around them, especially in as differential a space as London’s night life, and on their interiorisation of ethnicised relations within the group.

One of the questions posed to me during the planning of the fieldwork by one of my supervisors was the appropriateness of conducting research, in particular, focus groups, with mixed gender groups where the participants would be expected to talk about sexuality. Related to this question was a supplementary one regarding the propriety of a male researcher questioning sexuality with female participants. The bases for these question were several. Firstly, there was the possibility that the female participants would feel uncomfortable talking about their sexuality with male participants and a male researcher. Secondly, considering the critique of the voyeuristic exploitation inherent in ethnographic research, a male researcher questioning female participants about their sexuality could be taken as doubly voyeuristic. In the individual interviews the female participants may have felt pressured or compelled to talk explicitly about sexual matters. Thirdly, the dynamics of a dialogical process within the focus groups may have reproduced a set of relations through the discussion of sexuality that may have placed the women in the group in a disadvantaged position.

While these concerns are important, I did not, and do not think that they preclude the kind of research I have carried out. On the contrary, I feel that these concerns are all the more reason to carry out this kind of research. The concerns with appropriateness are based within
particular constructions of gendered relations through sexualised relations. It is precisely these constructions that are the focus of the research. The fact that these relations structure the discussion of sexuality between genders or in public as taboo is precisely why these relations should be interrogated and broken open (Rabinow 1986). The taboo speaks of the application of micropolitical technologies in the service of specific forms of Western, bourgeois, masculine power. Academic silence upon or neglect of such issues leaves the public construction of sexualised and gendered relations to a mass media and everyday practised moral economy that reproduces powerful relations of gendered exploitation. This research is a mode of political interference, an ethical becoming. That is not to say that it is unproblematic; it is merely to say that there is mapping to be done. There is a certain symmetry between the participatory nature of the exploration of gendered and sexualised relations in the research process, and the emergent, enacted processes of these relations in everyday practice. Sexualised and gendered relations are not necessarily reproduced, and a mode of interference, an ethical project can practice becoming anew.

It is important to remember that everyday practices of the enactment of gendered relations through sexuality takes place between individuals and groups consisting of men and women. Single sex group interviews would have missed the practised and dialogical production of sexualised positions that becomes enacted through practice and that distributes bodies, male and female. Moreover, it would have been methodologically difficult on other counts to construct single sex participant groups, especially for the purposes of the nights out. In the context of leisure cultures in ‘young’ pub, bar and nightclub spaces, women and men participate in sexualised practice and overtly sexualised talk. Participants are robust, but their robustness also often works upon repeated practices of sexualised tactics - humour, mockery, diversion, flirting, the forging of alliances. Furthermore, and especially within the remit of this project, it must be remembered that this is not just a gendered issue. Sexualisation and gendering are
racialised. White women may not automatically be in a position of disadvantage when they come into a sexualised relation with a Black or Asian male (researcher). Above all, however, the group interviews were conducted as much as could be with a care to making them a ‘safe’ activity, one owned by all of the participants.

4. Research practice and analysis

The research depends on and develops from ‘nights out’ at pubs, bars or nightclubs. The organisation of these nights out varied from night out to night out. Sometimes I just tagged along on nights out organised by the participants themselves. On other occasions I would ask the person whom I knew or knew best in the group to organise the arrangements for venue(s) and meeting place (if different from the venue) and time. The nights out themselves would usually start with meeting the other people in the group at the predesignated venue. On some nights out we would be coming from work, while on others (weekends mostly) we might be coming from home. Although I cannot be entirely sure regarding every single person who came on these nights out, I got the sense that most of the people who came on these nights out did not meet up before coming to the designated venue. Notable exceptions were Meera and Neil from group 1 who are partners and live together; Alison and Anthony from group 2 who are partners and live together; and Chloe and Penny from group 3 who are flatmates. The night out, then, would involve meeting up at the designated venue, usually a pub or bar. Sometimes the plan, usually arranged beforehand but sometimes decided during the course of the night, was to stay at this one venue; on other occasions we went on to other venues, sometimes a nightclub. Very occasionally we would eat a meal at some point during the course of the evening.

The first focus group with each group was only carried out once I had been on at least one night out with that group. A second focus group was conducted with each of the groups and then follow up interviews were conducted with some of the group members. Subsequent nights
out with the groups also occurred during the course of the research process (i.e. after the first focus group with that group had been conducted). Appendix B lists the details of the nights out and group interviews, their chronology and venues, and who was present. The remainder of this section discusses each of the methodological techniques used in more detail.

**Participant observation.**

With each of the groups, at least two ‘nights out’ were undertaken during which I acted as a participant observer of the practices of the group. Attention was focused particularly on any comments, conversations, judgements and embodied actions that enacted attractiveness as a differentiation of bodies. I tried very much to position myself as just another member of the group. This proved to be something of a challenge as I was meeting many of the participants (in groups 1 and 2) for the first time and these participants had been told in advance that I was to be conducting research during the night out. In these groups, however, I did at least have the advantage of being the friend of one of the group members who would have already persuaded the other members to participate in the research with an open mind. I also had the opportunity to make a good account of myself upon the first meeting with participants who had hitherto been strangers. A lot of the time for me, then, was spent trying to get to know people in the group, trying to make a good impression, and trying to speak to all the people in the group for a considerable length of time during the evening. The management of impression was, in itself, an interesting task because it draws the attention to the practised construction and reproduction of methods of being sociable and of individuation. Making a good impression speaks of the enactment of a memory, a set of relations for the validation of belonging and placement within a sociable situation.

Generally, I did not take notes during the night out as I felt that this would be too intrusive and draw attention to my role as a researcher.
This would have put the participants ill at ease, perhaps unduly influencing their performances. As it was, my role as a researcher was remembered and remarked upon by participants on occasions during the nights out, so they were periodically conscious of their behaviour being observed. How this would have influenced their behaviour is difficult to gauge (see Appendix E for a further discussion of my role within the research and this thesis).

I would also be concerned with observing my participation within the group, the interaction of the group around me with each other and with non-group members. I was also keen to observe what was happening in the venue more generally. This observation tended to be more periodic as my attention to what was going on with the group occupied much more of my time during the evening. This meant that I had to be conscious about setting aside time to observe beyond the group, although sometimes I would switch my attention to what was going on more generally because of sensed changes in the ambience or atmosphere.

Having to constantly remember my data, in lieu of taking notes, meant that I was not able to drink a lot of alcohol on these nights out. This was problematic as alcohol featured as an important part in the night out practices of the vast majority of the participants. Not consuming very much alcohol curtailed the extent of my participation in the practices and emergent affective relations of the night out. I would argue, however, that one of the features of such emergent affective relations is that, although alcohol facilitates the trajectory of their development, the intensity is not beyond a body-without-alcohol. Becoming-drunk can be affected without (much) alcohol. As I am a 'lightweight' I've been doing this for years anyway. As it is, I often did have one alcoholic drink at the beginning of the evening, primarily to present myself as just another member of the group.

Not taking notes during the evening, however, entailed that I would have to make extremely detailed scratch notes when I got home after
the night out, ready for writing up into my research diary the next day. Over the course of the fieldwork, my skill as a participant observer increased. This was not only to do with the amount of data I could remember, or the detail I could remember it in. Additionally, it was to do with my ability for apprehension and the immediate interpretation of practices, affects and events. This change in apprehensive skill occurred because of a number of reasons. One reason was that I was reading theoretical work which pointed to areas of practice and ways of engaging with them that were new to me. Another was the accumulation of a bodily memory of affective or connective potential during the course of the research. A third reason was the process of reading over the research diary entries and noting lacunae in the data that I could potentially be ‘on the look out for’ on subsequent nights out. Crucially, all these reasons point to the specifically organised and constructed nature of experience and experiencing.

Before the first night out at which I conducted participant observation, I constructed a preliminary research guide as a tool to make me open to the various and multiple kinds of practices and affects that I was seeking to encounter. This guide was just that – a guide – and was never an exhaustive or prescriptive resource. It also changed during the course of the fieldwork as I amended it in the light of my growing experience. Ironically, however, I needed it less and less the longer the research went on, partly because the techniques had insinuated themselves into my habitus. The earliest guide that I produced is included as Appendix C.

*First group interview*

The first group discussion with each group was held within two days of a ‘night out’ with that group. Each of these discussions lasted roughly ninety minutes. The primary purpose of these group discussions was to use the events of the night out as a springboard from which to jump to an in-depth discussion thinking about the multiplicity of practices that take place during different nights out. Also, the events of the night out
were used as a starting point for thinking about the sexualised nature of many of these practices and the practical inflection of these sexualised practices. Where possible, I tried to recall events from the night out to try to make the participants consider and discuss how the actions taken by themselves and others, the comments made and conversations held, might relate to particular kinds of effects and affects. The relation to other people in the sites of the 'night out' but not in the participant group also came into consideration. Practices and sociabilities before and after the night out, such as getting ready to go out, making oneself look good, were discussed. In particular, talking about preparing to go out tended to be a good way of getting participants to start thinking about the constitution of their embodiment.

Many of the questions in this group discussion were more general questions concentrating on the theme of desiring practices in nighttime leisure spaces. The facilitation guide for both sets of focus groups are included in Appendix D. Note that these questions were a guide for my facilitation of the focus groups, not a schedule that had to be adhered to. These questions included talking about meeting people in different types of spaces; how the encountering of other people is modulated by their bodily appearance; the various distinctions in practice surrounding flirting, chatting people up, and 'pulling' (this might be kissing somebody or it might be finding or attracting a sexual partner). Part of the reason why these questions were kept at a general level was so that the participants would be able to come up with stories about these issues from their broader experiences, rather than merely from the night out conducted with them. These stories should not be thought of as merely examples. Rather, they were a means of thinking through the issues being discussed in a deliberative way, one that potentially opened up that thinking to the multiplicity of the group’s take on the event in the story. Again, the fact that each group were already friends with each other was crucial for this to work, as they needed to share some common experiences and stories, even if their perspectives on the stories might differ. From a methodological
point of view, the construction and deliberation of these stories in a joint fashion, coupled with the deliberation more generally, helped to further disrupt and complicate the narrative understanding of events during the nights out as constructed through the participant observation notes.

Each of the group discussions were conducted in the home of one of the participants from that group. This choice of locations was intended to help put the participants at ease within an environment that they might consider ‘friendly territory’. The informal nature of the setting was increased by us sharing food and drink before each of the discussions. I considered this familiarity and informality to be particularly important for enabling the participants to talk around themes of attraction, attractiveness and bodies with and in front of others, especially those of the opposite sex, and in front of me, a male researcher.

Although I was nervous about both having couples amongst the participant groups, and about the difficulties that might arise from participants finding it difficult to discuss sexuality with members of the opposite sex, I felt that there were a number of factors that would act to counteract such difficulties, in addition to those discussed in the previous section. Firstly, the fact that the participant groups were good friends with each other enabled them to feel comfortable in trusting other members of the group with their feelings, views and experiences. Secondly, the members of the group who had not known me previous to the start of the research had had a chance to get to know me during the nights out and so, hopefully, become comfortable talking to me. Third, I felt that the respondents would be fairly robust about managing what was said in the focus groups. If the discussion was becoming uncomfortable, the group or individuals would either draw the boundaries of what was acceptable discourse, or would shift the discussion onto safer ground. This proved to be the case, although this also threw up other problems. For instance, there were moments that eluded my understanding where group members would talk in code or
give other members a look to stop them talking about certain events or personal information. Some of this would later be confided to me in the individual interviews (see below), so that these moments suddenly became clearer to me.

Second group interview: prompting devices

A second group discussion was held with each of the participant groups a week after the first group discussion held with that group. These discussions focused more squarely upon racialised, ethnicised and gendered notions of attractiveness. A series of images was presented to the participants. These images were taken from the contemporary media, in particular from magazines marketed at the age groups from which the participants were taken. The images consisted of varying representations of bodies, covering a wide range of ethnicised bodies, differently gendered bodies, varying sartorial styles, poses, facial expressions, and cropping of the images. This is not to say that the images were representative. They were not chosen to present a balanced representation of British society in numerical or identificatory terms. Neither were they chosen to represent a balanced representation of media images of variously racialised and sexualised bodies. Rather, their selection was partial. On the basis of theoretically informed insights, and empirically informed guesses (from the participant observation and the first set of focus groups), I selected images that I thought would connect with certain racialised, ethnicised, gendered and sexualised registers. That is, the images were selected for the reaction they might prompt, the discussion they might stimulate. Some of the images were chosen because they ostensibly drew on very particular repertoires of style that were gendered, sexualised and ethnicised. I suspected that the deployment of such images would have organised the participants in certain ways. Sometimes this would be an Othering of the image; sometimes this would divide the participants among themselves. Sometimes the participants surprised me; sometimes their distribution was impressively dynamic. Other images were chosen because they offered
a stylistic repetition recognisable to the participants, but to which they found themselves in an ambiguous position. In particular, I was concerned with how the participants would organise the attribution of attractiveness to a complex consisting of the images, themselves, others that they know, and groups specified by this very act of attribution. The images, along with questions orientating the talk to these potentials, played a central role in facilitating this kind of attribution and incorporeal transformation.

It should be clear from this discussion that the images and the talk about them should not be considered from a semiotic approach. Rather, the distribution of bodies, and the resistance to and flight from received registers of attractiveness is to be engaged with at a particularly practical and political level: that is at the level of the transformation of bodies. This is also true of the discussion that spilled over from the discussion of the images. The discussion at this point was steered to return to the subject of the racialised and ethnicised dimensions of sexual relationships. Unlike the discussion in the first focus group, which centred on sexualised relationships in the often fleeting situations of night-time leisure spaces, this discussion was focused on ‘long term’ sexual relationship. By ‘long term’ I mean (and specified within the groups) anything from ‘going out’ with somebody – being able to call them a ‘partner’, ‘boyfriend’ or ‘girlfriend’ – to being married to somebody. Also, in contrast to the first focus group, the questioning was much more explicitly addressed to the racialised and ethnicised dimensions of these relationships. While in the first set of focus groups I was concerned to be more relaxed about the emergence of racialised and ethnicised differentiations, I felt that the end of the second focus group would be a good time to address the issues that had arisen in this respect throughout the research with the participant groups. This would foreground the dimensions of racialisation and ethnicisation for the participant group, giving them some sense of achieving this trajectory of discussion. This chronological ordering evolved because it seemed during the discussions that the participants could more readily talk about the gendered and sexualised nature of
leisure practices than the racialised and ethnicised dimensions. I was concerned that it was important to get them talking first, and then talking within the dimensions at stake in the research after this.

The discussions again took place in the home of one of the participants and usually took about two hours, although one group lasted three hours. This latter group had become so engrossed in the discussion that they resisted my attempts to bring the focus group to a conclusion - they just wanted to keep talking!

**Individual interviews**

In-depth one-on-one interviews were conducted with most of the participants in order to add further depth to my research. The participants were chosen for the individual interviews on the basis of certain questions relating to these individuals arising during the group interviews or participant observation that I wanted to address. The in-depth interviews were designed to provide material so that the links between personal and group histories and the inflection of cultural processes and production could be fleshed out. Although many of these personal, group and cultural histories were discussed during the focus groups, the individual interviews enabled these histories to be constructed in different ways.

The in-depth interviews allowed me to do several things. They enabled access to ideas, information and views that the participants might not have felt comfortable talking about in the group discussions, or which they might not have felt were appropriate to the group discussion format. These interviews also allowed participants to voice thoughts that, possibly provoked by the group interviews, they had had since those group interviews. Furthermore, some sense of their personal history, their individual relation to ethnicity, gender, sexuality (etc.) separate from their relation to and within their friendship groups could be brought out through the interviews. This is not to say that the interviews focused only on individualistic aspects of the participants’
lives and experiences. There were occasionally things that the participants wanted to say about the roles various individuals play within the friendship group that they might have felt uncomfortable talking about in front of other members of the group. It was envisaged that this might raise ethical issues about conflicting and controversial opinions, but many such views were merely things that had not been validated by discussion within the friendship group previously.

Alternatively, there was the possibility that such talk may have portrayed or placed themselves or individuals in lights that, while not of themselves culpable or wrong, may be seen as culturally unfashionable or less desirable. It is precisely this type of view that the individual interviews were crucial for helping me to interrogate. Finally, depth interviews provided an opportunity for participants to come up with accounts of experiences that may have had a bearing on the group and socialising context enacted on the nights out or in the focus groups. What the in-depth interviews were not intended to do, however, was to provide material suggestive of how participants construct a sense of self. Not only is this beyond the scope of the thesis, but much of the rest of the material problematises any conception of the construction of selfhood.

The questions included in the individual interviews were of three types: (a) questions eliciting whether there were things the participant wanted to follow up on after the group discussion; (b) personal historical questions regarding the participant’s ethnicity, their relation to their ethnicity, their upbringing and schooling, their family, their history of relationships; (c) more detailed discussion on views about ethnicity and sexuality as it affects their and others’ lives. This final type of questioning included questions about the roles and relationships taken up by members of their friendship group and their own role and relationships within the group.
Analysis

While the fieldwork might be taken as an effort to multiply one’s relations with the practices of those ‘in the field’, the process of analysis always seems to run the risk of closing things down too quickly. The danger is of a specification of bodies and relations that, while not reflecting distributions of bodies and relations in actuality, enact another moment of organisation, restricting what bodies can do. The process of ordering, indeed, starts in the field. Throughout the fieldwork, I accumulated a bodily memory of new skills of apprehension. My abilities to encounter and connect with other bodies, and my sensitisation to engage with various activities or just to observe all changed. Moreover, my orientation to the field was altered by attempting to learn the lessons of a ‘sequential analysis’ (N. Fielding, 2001, after Becker, 1971). What all of this points to is the partiality of all the participant observation data, because of the specific sensitisation of the researcher’s body. A qualitative ordering of every encounter or observation occurs during the participant observation process. The presence of the researcher is not synonymous with a primary hermeneutic (c.f. Keith, 1992). Rather, a specific bodily framework is applied through joint construction with the research participants. Understanding something during the participant observation was an application of an analytical framework, a framework that is consistent with the constructed nature of experience.

Writing up the participant observation notes imposes its own order on the events participated in during the fieldwork, and hence constitutes a second level of analysis. Principally, the incorporation of the events into a narrative imposed a fictive and structural temporality upon the events, with the risks that might entail of positing causative relations. In addition to the problems of temporality, the citational nature of narrative constructions can be productive but also problematic, placing the ethnographic data into an overcoding framework. It becomes
imperative to multiply the data, to play with jarring juxtapositions, anachronical contradictions, and to analytically open up the relation between narrative chronologizing and the chorologizing of identification. The fictive unity of the dataset needs to be disrupted and dechronologised.

Such an analytical project remains difficult. Despite Clifford’s (1986) brief critique of the taxonomic impulse within much ethnographic analysis (c.f. Spradley, 1980), many researchers still apply a categorical coding to their ethnographic data, whether participant observation or interview data. Even when we are exhorted to use open coding, this is usually only a first step before an eventual imposition of categorical groupings, divisions and relations (c.f. Cook and Crang, 1995). The researcher’s implicit organisation of bodies into representational categories becomes insinuated into the analysis by looking for what is ‘meaningful’ or ‘significant’ in the data (c.f. J.Fielding, 2001). Some researchers try to get around the problems of imposing the theorist’s concerns and categories on the data by using ‘grounded theory’ (N.Fielding, 2001, after Glazer and Strauss, 1967) or by ‘coding up’ (J.Fielding, 2001). Yet, these procedures merely end up using other forms of organisation – those of the participants – while making invisible the presuppositions of the researcher. Moreover, and especially with interview data, there is a problematic relation between informants’ narratives and actual ‘social patterning’ (Gubrium and Holstein, 1999). What do these narratives do? What are the conditions of storytelling, and of being able to narrate?

In analysing the data gathered through the fieldwork that I conducted, I attempted to minimise the categorical impulse within the coding process. For both the participant observation and interview data, I started with an annotative open coding. These annotations were copious, and attempted to multiply the potential of the data. They made explicit the theoretical techniques that I brought to bear on the data. Indeed, the annotations did do things to the data, in some cases detailing a sequence, in other cases bringing it into contact with
implicit machinic assemblages. By conducting such an analysis, I took insights from ethnomethodology (Holstein and Gubrium, 1998; Lynch, 1993) and conversation analysis (Myers and Macnaghten, 1999). In particular, my analysis was non-meaning based, and focused on embodied actions and with the endogenous or ‘reflexive’ constitution of ordered relations through those actions. The analysis also attempted to interrogate the unspoken and implicit presuppositions immanent to speech and action. In eschewing a taxonomic analysis, instead I pursued a sequential (but also non-linear) and practice based analysis. The initial annotation, then, attempted to multiply the virtuality of practices, for instance, by making explicit the sequential accumulation of sense through practice, or the distribution of bodily affects and capabilities. Of course, it could be argued that one kind of cut is merely being replaced by another more surreptitious kind, but at least the ethos of a concern with everyday methods and practices leans towards a resistance of objectification. The annotations attempted to explicate processes that practices instantiate. The annotations relating to these processes were then juxtaposed in a multiple and reiterative technique, not to instigate categorical differences between them, but to look to what could be said about the specific singularity of each process.

5. Conclusion: Practical problems in speaking of racialisation, ethnicisation and sexualisation

The consideration of different political moments or impulses comes up against the practicalities of interrogating the application of distributive problematics, opening up possibilities beyond such distributions, and interacting with participants in a way that is comprehensible. Perhaps controversially, I used the term ‘ethnicity’ with participants, in focus groups, interviews and more general conversation, rather than ‘race’, even when I was referring to racialised appearances or stereotypes. In part, this was because ‘ethnicity’ is the term used by liberal middle classes in public discourse as a euphemism for ‘race’. As most (but not all) of my respondents were fairly liberal, middle classed people, I felt
that they would understand and feel more comfortable with the term ‘ethnicity’ than with ‘race’.

Race (and sexuality, gender and ethnicity, but I will talk about race for ease of exposition) can be a structure of thinking and feeling, an economy of relations, within which events or experiences can be placed in order to make sense of them: a sense making complex. Of course, such a structure of thinking and feeling needs to be mobilised, but this mobilisation may be unconscious. Within specific contexts of tension, a racialised memory or undertone (prejudicial presumption) can become operationalised. This triggers a process by which subsequent events and experiences in a series become understood through the racialised structure of thinking and feeling. Where this process does not emerge within a research context, there may be good political reasons for it to be provoked so that there is a subsequent placing of events, experience, conversation etc. into the racialised framework. Such a provocation can, hence, help the researcher to encounter racialised presuppositions. This is useful not only to see that these presuppositions and feelings exist, but to see what they are and how they work, how they become mobilised. The conceptualisation of this racialised structure of thinking and feeling must be clear. To say that such a structure may be unconscious is not to say that there is a structure underlying practice. It is not even to say that the unconscious underlies practice. It is merely to say that immanent to practice, as part of its organisation and effectiveness, are racialised memories of the organisation of bodies. These racialised codes are not necessarily spoken, but can be expressed through embodied action. They are immanent in that they are implicit (presuppositions) about others, about action, and about bodies: they are an embodied memory, a potential for practice and action.

So, the question about whether to use images of stylised bodies, for example, in the practice of fieldwork, meets the question as to whether the organisation of bodies this mobilisation sets in motion is emergent. Leaving aside the fact that all bodies are stylised, and that the
encounter with any image of a body might witness that body becoming racialised, there is still a tension here. If the point of the research is to investigate the emergent nature of practices organising bodies into racialised relations, and if I have resisted the a priori definition of participants by race or other dimensions of identity, then how can the provocation of identificatory practices be justified? Although I do not pretend that my answer to this problem does not present its own difficulties, I do believe there is a political need for this move in the here and now. The basis of my recourse to or provocation of ‘identificatory’ frameworks lies in the belief that the specific enactment of such a framework is a practised deployment, an achieved interactive collaboration to solve practical political problems. Participants apply such differentiations to manage and organise their engagement and involvement with different bodies in everyday situations. The deployment of specified bodies and talk within the fieldwork, such as through the use of the photographs within the focus group, can be seen as an attempt to see what practices of organisation emerge after prompting within specific contexts of conversation. This is not just a tautologous exercise where an already ‘identified’ image is being presented to merely prompt a response that takes the original ‘identification’ as truth (repetition of meaning). Rather, because the context for the talk or practice of organisation is specific and singular, this organisation is emergent and not just a generally and homogeneously underlying structure that has been enacted and ‘brought to the surface’. The singularity of the talk or practice of identification is enacted temporally and multilogically which guarantees the purely differential nature of the organisation. There is something to research: the negotiated and practised modalities of organisation and differentiation.

Political problems always come before theories and concepts used to deal with them. The nature of the political problem matters, however. If we are talking about the recruitment of participants, the sampling of populations, or the selection of research sites (research design), then it is best to be as open minded about who to specify as participants.
Here, this is because race is not about one group or another: race is certainly a problem that involves whites. Similar arguments can be made in respect to sex and gender. So it becomes important to look at the interactive and emergent production of race/ethnicity/sexuality/gender relations within interaction and social practice between bodies that are conventionally and commonly transformed to become different. These practices must not be precluded. So, conceptualising these ‘identifications’ as emerging through interaction is not to say that we cannot talk about ‘identifications’ until the participants do. Neither is it to say that we can’t ‘identify’ bodies in fieldnotes. The important thing is the effect – what use is this ‘identification’ being put to? Bringing up and explicitly dealing with these practices of distribution is being done for a specific political purpose. For instance, ‘identifying’ bodies in fieldnotes might be for tracking whether these bodies are ‘identified’ like this by others, by themselves or through interaction between themselves and others. This is a tracking of the potential enactment of a memory, attempting to break open what seems to be a process of identification.
Chapter 4

Sexuality and race; power and desire

1. Introduction

Out of all the things we could become, out of all the ways of assembling, we still Desire (Foucault, 1979; Butler 1999). We still do sex. Heterosex. We do not escape. As our bodies socialise, as they become friendly, become organised, they face different ways. Our bodies multiply their affects. Yet, amidst this proliferating sociability, amidst all this new and singular desire, we still Desire with forelock tugged in obeisance to the proper forms of sociality, the proper forms of affect. This needs explanation, or rather intervention. So, do we start by supposing that proper Desire repeats itself despite the incessant unfolding, the running away of potential modes of becoming sociable? Or, do we suppose that the emergence of desire as singular and eventful unfurls despite the overpowering application of proper forms? Well, I suggest, neither and both. As I said, bodies - their affects, their relations - face different ways. As bodies become a body, they become adventurous and create their own sense. Yet, in a sense, they are also haunted. A ghostly memory inhabits the body, encountered in the body’s inhabitation, echoing in its fabric, reverberating in the flesh. Hauntings, yes. An inhabitation on the outside, the social act of inhabitation, virtual and real. These ghosts are not images but rather obligations written into the flesh. They evince themselves in-between. When you judge there is a concrete effect, an impact on arrangements, on the assemblage.

It is very easy to think of Desire representationally. This is not necessarily just in terms of images or discourses of Desire, but more to do with the codified logic of representation. It is a logic that distributes bodies within a system of exclusive differences. To think of Desire
representationally would invite consideration of questions such as ‘which racially defined bodies are desirable?’ or ‘which racialised bodies can desire which other racialised bodies?’ Such lines of questioning can be useful, but in this chapter, I want to start moving away from such questions. Rather, I want to stake out an embodied and non-representational consideration of desiring bodies where racialised, ethnicised, gendered and sexualised differences emerge through sociable and desiring practice. This is not to say that representation is not important in the enactment of systematic differences, or in terms of the propriety of Desire. Nor is it to assert an opposition between representational systems and bodies somehow excessive to these codifications. Instead, it is to sketch out a corporeal sociology adequate to the demands of intervening politically and acting ethically in our everyday lives. It is to say that everyday our lives are animated by and riven through with desire, and that here the body matters. There is a political and ethical dimension to our desire, and that we must attend to this.

The next section is a theoretical launch pad for the empirical sections that follow. The empirical sections are outlined at the end of this next section.

2. Immanence: desire and power

How to act? How to proceed? In the face of a pervasive policing of desire and practice, what can be done to free ourselves? Michel Foucault (1979), at the end of the first volume of *The History of Sexuality*, sounds a clarion call: turn away from “sexuality”, turn towards “a different economy of bodies and pleasures” (p. 159). Sexuality is produced through the complex machinations of power, what Judith Butler (1999) paraphrasing Foucault, calls the regime of ‘sex-desire’. Sexuality, for Foucault, is the regulation of bodies in uniform ways. There is so much discourse about ‘sex’. There are so many technologies to produce this discourse. Yet, within this discourse, even the most intense desire or the most quicksilver of pleasures
distracts from the sound of shuffling as the interlocutors turn to face the outside disciplinarian. Pleasure is only recognised if its form is ‘sex-desire’. Bodies can only be recognised as long as they occupy a proper place within a heterosexual distribution; or, if not a proper place, then an improper place, just so long as it is recognisable within the established order. Bodies become always-already sexed and gendered; desire proceeds from these sexed bodies. In other words, through a complex of discursive, technological, institutional and practical means, bodies become produced as sexed, and desire becomes constrained to be in the service of this ideal. Desire presupposes a heterosexual difference between already male and already female bodies. Power, then, is productive; but, despite its diffuseness, despite its principle of immanence, it is also constraining. It normalises all bodies by pathologising many. This is why Foucault calls for a turn towards “a different economy of bodies and pleasures”. Foucault holds out the possibility of affect that is unconstrained and excessive, and of bodies that do not have to become recuperated into a heterosexual and gendered schema.

Butler (1999), however, sees Foucault’s rendering of these ‘bodies’ as overly idealised. She interprets Foucault as appealing to an excessiveness of the body, the body always yet to be constructed. For Butler, without its prior construction a body has no powers, no abilities: it cannot do anything. So instead of turning to, as she sees it, ‘bodies and pleasures’, she takes as a point of departure Foucault’s revision of his problematic in the early parts of the second volume of The History of Sexuality (1986). Here, Foucault attends to how, in late nineteenth century Europe, the historically constituted experience of sexuality came to be the basis for individuals to recognise themselves as subjects. Desire again draws attention to itself, because it is only through desire that an individual can come to recognise themselves as a subject. “Desire becomes the phenomenological register of sexuality” (Butler, 1999: 19).
For Butler, it is a question of allowing a certain kind of politicised methodology to proceed. There is much at stake, and to act within such a politicised field we cannot abandon the field. By turning back towards the productive power of the regime of ‘sex-desire’, especially at the phenomenological and subjective level, Butler delimits the field itself. ‘Sex-desire’ cannot be abandoned because, actually, it continues to shape the ways in which we differentiate and recognise ourselves. It continues to shape the very ways in which we feel. To turn away from ‘sex-desire’ would be to turn away from questions that interrogate and challenge how gender remains implicated in heterosexual desire, or how heterosexual identities are implicated in homosexual desire. Butler takes Foucault’s reworked concerns to ask “who is it who is able to recognise him or herself as a subject of sexuality, and how are the means of recognition controlled, dispersed and regulated such that only a certain kind of subject is recognisable through them?” (1999:19). Who bears what costs for their recognition as subjects of sexuality? Who is made to bear sexuality in such a way that they are denied the possibility of becoming a subject of sexuality? (Butler, 1999: 19).

This is where I want to intervene. I want to pose similar questions, but to consider what roles race and ethnicity play in modulating and distributing the costs of becoming a subject of sexuality. I want to ask what roles race and ethnicity play in denying access to becoming such a sexual subject. There is a sociology of these sexualities, these racialisations, these ethnicities. Questions of becoming a sexual subject are not just historical, cultural, linguistic or semiotic, although they are these things as well. Becoming a sexual subject is also a matter of social organisation. It is a matter of the politics of sociality. What forms does power take in the practical disciplining of bodies? How does this disciplinariness enact repetitive forms of social organisation? These questions direct us to the concreteness of social interaction, and they beg us to face different directions. There are practical techniques for disciplining bodies in the intricacies, subtle and not so subtle, of social interaction. To face different ways upon the
field of social interaction is to be directed to the situatedness and
singularity of these techniques, but simultaneously to look to the force
of repetition immanent to these techniques. Social relations become
enacted between bodies in the unfolding of sociable practice, yet these
instantaneous relations enfold and embody a multiplicitous outside.

There is a crucial question here as to the nature of the outside, the
plane of immanent relations: Foucault’s power or Deleuze’s desire
(Foucault, 1979; Deleuze, 1993; Goodchild, 1996)? While this question
will further developed throughout the thesis, for now it is enough to
point out the essentially social nature of the plane of immanence. This
is not to say that the plane of immanence is society, for society, in
terms of its flows and breaks, its organisations and distributions, its
differentiations and difference, emerges from the plane of immanence.
The outside is, more precisely, sociable. On the outside new
connections are made; new desires create new relationships. For
Deleuze, the plane of immanent relations must consist of desire first
and foremost. Whereas any absolute boundaries or values would need
to be justified by some arbitrary transcendental order, desire
potentially crosses all boundaries and so requires no transcendental
order as an explanation (Goodchild, 1996: 74).

Foucault has a more convoluted relationship with the outside. It is the
outside of thought and knowledge that occupies much of Foucault’s
thinking on the outside (Goodchild, 1996; but c.f. Foucault, 1977 for
an engagement with Deleuzian planes and surfaces). When it comes to
the principle of immanence, Foucault concerns himself not with desire,
but with power. Relations of force and resistance are immanent in a
double sense. They are both the immediate effect of divisions and
inequalities of other kinds of relations (economic processes, knowledge
relations, sexual relations), and the internal condition of these latter
relations (Foucault, 1979: 94). Power, then, is not exterior to these
other kinds of relations. At least for this stage of Foucault’s oeuvre, the
only sense in which power is both immanent and outside is that it is
not something that can be possessed. It cannot be seized. It belongs
not to individuals, nor bodies; neither to organisations nor the state. Rather, power arises and becomes exercised at a multiplicity of local points. Power is strictly relational. It is not a teleology of History. It is not a distributed property of some a priori Structure. Power proliferates as a series of relationships of force and resistance. Each of these relationships of force, specific and local, however, can enter into an overall strategy: they are the basis for divisions and relationships of power that traverse the social body as a whole. Yet, at the same time, these more general lines of force organise and link these local oppositions, realigning them, making them converge (Foucault, 1979: 94, 99). Saliently, the general strategy does not come before the local multiplicity. There is, in fact, no distinction in level between them - this is the principle of immanence – and neither is one the homologue of the other (Foucault, 1979: 100).

Rather, the immanence of power relations to other forms of relations is at once multiplicitous and machinic, and it is at this point that Foucault’s conception of power and immanence converges with that of Deleuze. Multiplicitous relations may proliferate locally by a principle of difference, but they converge to work together. The mark of the social is the complexity of the assemblages, and the interactions of these assemblages, whence it emerges. For Deleuze, the complexity of the social requires a certain degree of invariance. All relatively fixed orders of society, be they institutions, conventions, modes of organisation, or modes of Desire, are encounters between assemblages where one of the assemblages preserves a part of itself. These institutions, these conventions, provide a framework for social relations but retain a certain constancy about themselves (Goodchild, 1996: 74). This invariance is concomitant with the immanence of power relations to social relations. Interactions and practices, modes of affect or forms of work, ways of consuming or exchanges of finance, these all continually unfold and become enacted. Yet, they are also each the multiplicity of points at which machinic assemblages work. That is, a practice or an instance of interaction works as it does because implicit within its mode of unfolding is the concrete machine in which it operates, and
without which it would cease to make sense. As was discussed in chapter 2, not only are speech acts in reciprocal presupposition with concrete machinic assemblages of power, but so are concrete practices enacting modes of organisation. And so are modes of affect, feelings of sexual desire.

The social emerges, then, when multiplicitous powers gather to work in repetitious way. Machines are always working, always doing something (Buchanan, 1997: 83). As far as power is a machinic assemblage of immanent relations, it is productive. It can make things work. Bodily agencies are distributed, organisations become capable. The nature of this productivity, as we have seen, however, is repetition, the preservation or encoding of parts of the machine. To a degree, this routinisation, this arrangement of relations, may be necessary for the machine to work. A regularisation of forms, and a routinisation of practice might in some ways increase the efficiency of the system. Much as a human body works by becoming organic, by working to achieve the consistency provided by function, so social bodies have a trajectory towards becoming organic and functional.

This moves us towards a theory of power that is not structural, but can still be considered sociological. What is often taken as 'structure' is an effect or outcome of machinic assemblages of power. What is taken as social is also emergent. Relations become social relations as they become repetitive and organised, as they have distributive effects upon groups and bodies. Some bodies become defined as people, and, more specifically, as types of people. It is more than that, of course, more than just the types of people that bodies become, as we shall see. It is also a matter of what bodies can do, how they can desire. It is a question of how the distribution of bodies into a codified system of racialised difference is performed practically in interaction as a distribution of different capabilities to desire and be desirable. Society and its phenomena - the 'social' - emerge as functional assemblages, as organised flows and connections. Social norms and institutions, social conventions and types of capital, are all various manifestations
not just of codification, but of the continual reinvestment into these codifications. These norms, institutions, conventions and capitals are the expression of many lines of force accumulating and repeating the organisation of transformations of bodies and flows of materials. It is not just that the social is repetitive, but that it is machinic: it brings together various elements and makes them work together. Relations become social relations as social machines produce themselves, that is, as these machines organise elements into relationships and connections that work. Of course, you might argue that many social relations do not ‘work’ in that they are problematic, that they are heading towards a breakdown – the conservative argument; or you might say that many social relations do not work because they disadvantage, exclude and make unproductive various fractions of society – the progressive argument. Here, however, ‘work’ merely denotes doing something, even if this something is antiproductive or destructive. It is not surprising, in fact, that many such social relations are unproductive given that relations of force are immanent to their becoming social.

Relations only become social relations, of course, through the machinic organisation of other relations immanent to them. Relations become repeated and start doing something because immanent to their specific enactment is a machinery of enforcement making things just so. Sexualised practice and desire, for example, are social to the extent that their enactment recuperates conventions and norms, and take place in organised ways or institutionalised forms. A sociology of these practices and desires would interrogate the ways that these conventions, norms, organisations and institutions are already multiplicitous. Recuperations of race, gender, sexuality and class, rest upon the immanence of concrete machinic assemblages of power that enforce these complex social relations exactly as such things as conventions, norms, organisations and institutions.

Questioning the processes of becoming a subject of sexuality and ethnicity is also a sociology because it needs to attend to embodied
social interaction. As well as making room for an encounter with power, such a sociology needs to be situated. The social becomes defined through processes of stratification where assemblages meet, but such stratification is enacted in specifically situated social practices and interaction. Such a sociology intersects bodies meeting other bodies, be these bodies already individual humans, groups, racialised bodies, sexualised bodies, or non-human bodies. These bodies are themselves assemblages. They are themselves multiplicitous. Immanent to these bodies are a multiplicity of power relations and other relations. To say that this multiplicity of forces is immanent to ‘these bodies’, however, does not just refer to individual bodies, but to social assemblages, the proliferating collectivity of bodies in a bar space, for example.

So far, questions of structure have been reformulated to become questions of power and repetition. But what of questions of agency? These are yet to be reformulated. Rather than questions presuming the individual as the locus of agency, or agency as an essence of the individual but somehow constrained by structure or power; and rather than questions of agency which seek to trace the effects of the fulsome exercise of this agency, we need to ask something different. To presume that individuals have agency, but that this agency is constrained by or produced by an external structure, is to see power as given before action. This risks seeing power merely as the structure, or at least as residing in the structure, which is, in fact, the effect of multiplicitous relations of power. It risks leaving us powerless to intervene in our own everyday lives. Moreover, taking agency to be the inalienable potential of individuals to act (if only they free themselves from their structural shackles, or their existential bad faith), elides differences in bodily social capabilities, the capability to act, to be effective in social situations.

Achieving a mode of sociality that in itself achieves something, say, the inhabitation of a space, or the ability to chat someone up, or to dance sensuously or with abandon on a dancefloor, is to act socially.
That is, it is to act as a social body more than an individual. The action enfolds its own multiplicity, the immanence of machineries of power and multiplicities of desire that are the conditions for this action. This immanent multiplicity is the potential to act. The question I want to ask is, how does the potential to act socially emerge as a distribution of agency? How does the ability to act socially – agency – become a distribution of what a body can do? How is it that this distribution of agency becomes performed as differential relations and capabilities for relating amongst bodies? Such questions change the territory on which we encounter with race, gender, ethnicity and sexuality. Race, gender, ethnicity and sexuality emerge as distributed effects, or, more precisely, distributed modes of affect - the ability to act, affect and be affected.

The sociability of bodies is desirable, but desirability and the ability to express desire are distributed properties that define a sociality. Power is immanent to action and agency, not external to it. As will be seen later, the same is true of desire. Desire is immanent to action and agency. It places bodies in relation. It is the force of the sociability of bodies. But in practical and concrete situations, the immanent and unspoken sociality regulating what bodies can do tends to organise this placing in relation. This sociality is enacted performatively in social interaction.

To desire or to be desirable, then, is, on the one hand, to become affectively entangled with another. On the other hand, however, to desire or to be desirable comes into relation to diffuse forces of organisation. In practical terms, this requires a recognition of the difference between desire and the distributed ability to express desire. This distinction should not be thought of as a choice between power as immanence or desire as immanence, between power and desire as the two multiplicities of force allowing things to happen, to be done. I do not want to install a division between sociality (the immanence of power) and sociability (the immanence of desire). Rather, I just want to return to the question, what can a body do? In this sense, we can
trace specific multiplicities of power and desire, and their interrelations, and attend to their specific effects.

One aspect of what a body can do is how it can desire. If affects and desire are organised in the process of sociality, so that there are proper forms of desire, then this speaks of the immanence of multiplicitous power relations to desire. It also speaks of the necessity of the singular enactment of power relations through and as forms of sociality. As we shall see in the rest of this chapter, bodily capabilities – bodily affects – are regulated in social interaction. Heterosexuality, as a particular complex of proper affective relations, rests crucially on the regulation of bodily affects and desire. It signs up desire under the banner of sexuality, but it does so unequally. This is why it is important to interrogate who can recognise themselves as subjects of desire, as subjects of sexuality. When desire is controlled and organised so that bodies are differentiated and placed regularly in differential relations, then there are profound implications for the ways in which individuals and groups can come to recognise their subjectivity. These individuals and groups become organic - they become bodies that work - in some part because they emerge with different abilities to express desire or to be seen as desirable.

The rest of this chapter will work through these considerations using empirical material about talk, embodied interaction and other practices in pubs, bars, and nightclubs in London. Section three will consider heterosexuality as a regime for inserting bodies into proper relations with each other. This is a moral economy of bodies, an economy of what they can do and what they should do. The discussion will focus on the enactment of such a moral economy through the sociality of talk. Such talk is taken not just to be the activity of individuals, but is rather an in-between process of the construction of sense. Section four will move on to discuss heterosexuality and heterosexism as a series of practical transformations that enact these proper relations, transformations that enrol bodies into an immanent machinism. This section, then, focuses on the way that the regulation of sexuality is
enacted in practice. Concurrently, the ways that desire and practice become sexualised is also interrogated, as well as how these mutual processes of sexualisation and regulation are achieved through the ethnicising, racialising and gendering of these practices.

The fifth section of this chapter also looks at the immediate and situated regulation of sexuality in practice. Here, practice is expanded to encompass more than just talk. Rather, talk is just one part of a whole panoply of techniques for performatively transforming affective relations. Such techniques regulate the potential for subjectivity and objectivity within a heterosexual moral economy. This pertains to questions about who is able to desire and have their desire recognised; and questions about whom can become the object of desire. The conditions for such capabilities to become actual are organised in social interaction. Bodily styles and various modes of the interactivity of bodies are crucial to the emergence of these capabilities. In particular, the distribution of what a body can do is intimately tied up with the enactment of racialised and ethnicised difference across the sociality of bodies. Yet, such sociality is also shown to be desiring and eventful.

Section six takes up the themes of performativity and corporeal transformation that emerge from section five. Here, signposts towards a theory of what a body can do are more explicitly staked. This theory engages with the performative arrangement of affect through embodied action. It attends to transformations that recuperate an encounter with a social bodily memory. This is not to say, however, that bodies are taken to be docile. As we shall see, the body is very active in such processes. Neither is it to say that embodied action is about the actions of individuals. Rather, sexuality and race come to be reproduced as immanent organisations of affect become enacted in singular processes and interactions. Crucially, this section will outline how desire and power can be held together in the concepts of ‘potential’ and ‘memory’.
3. The propriety of heterosexual relations

Heterosexuality relies on strangeness. Its diffuse techniques create a strangeness of sense out of all sorts of promiscuous desires. In this it is not unusual. It shares with many other powerful systems of organising social relations a method of sustenance that starves some bodies of the recognition, legitimacy, resources and capital they need to thrive, or even to survive.

More than just the carnal moments of organs becoming-tumescent in relation to one another, many other forms of affective relations come to reside under the sign of sexuality. This is a process involving a number of mutual and implicit presuppositions. It is also a process that, because it constructs what is normal, produces an insidious conflation of sexuality and heterosexuality. The normativity of heterosexuality in its organic sense, a sense in which only gendered bodies and copulative desires can be recognised as normal, rests on other forms of sexuality. That is, gendered bodies and copulative desires rest on the construction of ‘perversions’. Foucault (1979) has shown, for example, how various ‘techniques’ of power have been deployed throughout Western Europe during the late modern period in the service of heterosexuality. We come to know what heterosexuality is by knowing what it is not, the things that it is said not to be. Hence such techniques of power are deployed through schools, or by doctors and psychiatrists, in the biological, medical and psychological sciences, and by criminal justice systems and other state institutions, in order to generate various phenomena of perversion. All this in the service of heterosexuality.

Thus, the medicalisation of various ‘perversions’ during the nineteenth and much of the twentieth century, for example, involved the increasing specification of various sexual problems, and the development of techniques by which people were made to confess these perversions to their doctors. By such means, what counted as the truth about such phenomena was set up in order to further the
intrusion of surveillance and official control into people’s lives. It was not just a question of the truth about perversions, however, but rather the very constitution of these phenomena themselves. Foucault (1979) describes, for instance, how throughout the nineteenth and much of the twentieth century, homosexuality became specified and defined in various medical and juridical understandings as something that defines an individual person. This differed from pre-modern Western understandings of sodomy, in which the focus was entirely upon the forbidden act. The modern construction of homosexuality set up homosexuality as something that saturated a person’s entire being (Foucault, 1979). It connoted an inversion of masculinity and femininity in the body, an inversion still current today in stereotypes of butch lesbians and camp gay men. Of course, the impropriety of the balance of masculinity and femininity within the homosexual body rests upon the presumption of the normality of heterosexual definitions of male and female. In turn, the constitution of homosexuality becomes essential to that of heterosexuality, because heterosexual desire becomes defined, in part, by its difference from the ‘perverted’ desires of homosexuals.

The unfolding constitution of homosexual desire, however, is not just about the construction of the understanding or ‘truth’ about certain forms of desire (c.f. Weeks, 1985). The very ability to recognise homosexual desire required the proliferation of various technologies of surveillance and subjection, and various institutions through which such technologies could be applied. It was through these technologies that homosexuality was made concrete as a form of desire that defined the very being of the individual. It was through subjection to medical treatments, to juridical processes, to policing at school or on the streets, that homosexuality materialised in the being of the individual.

While the constitution of the ‘perversions’ has proliferated improper affects and desires, a further proliferation of affects and desires provides the substance for the varying degrees of heterosexual propriety. This is not an invocation of a clear cut distinction between
perversion and heterosexuality. There is no inside and outside to heterosexuality, much though it often seems to be the case. Rather, impropriety lurks within proper affect. We have already seen in chapter two, for instance in the work of Skeggs (1997), that research in a sociological vein can engage with the spectre of shame and otherness that lies within even the most concerted efforts to conform to the respectable norms of heterosexuality. The white working class women on the caring courses suffered under the tyranny of shame, the fear of their own improper affect, the otherness haunting their caring selves. To be caring was to care for others. The care of oneself was only to this end. One’s own pleasures only invoked the shame of truly being a working class woman. This was particularly true of sexual pleasure. For many of the women in Skeggs’ study sexual pleasure for themselves was beyond contemplation, beyond the pale. They were unable to recognise their own sexuality, their own sexual desires. The judgements of others, institutionalised at college, or informally amongst their family and friends, performed the injunctions to this disavowal.

What is interesting for the present argument, however, is that Skeggs’ work points towards the manifold relationships between forms of sociality and the ability to become a subject of sexuality (and a subject of gender, class and ethnicity). The individuation of these women as social selves - as white, working class and heterosexual - involved subjection to systems of judgement that applied a pressure towards feeling certain kinds of affect and action. It was also a pressure towards certain ways of experiencing the world, and certain ways of experiencing and knowing themselves and their desires. Their individuation took place on three planes: social identity, agency, and subjectivity (Grossberg, 1996a). Saliently, the judgements enacting such injunctions towards these proper affects were not only made in formal institutional settings, but also in the more informal sociality of everyday life.
Yet further proliferation is always needed. Heterosexuality in its various guises, meeting up with particular relations of gender, race and ethnicity, needs constant enactment. It needs its proper forms and relations to be performed, to be enforced. In many cases this places a restriction on copulative desires. There may be several proper contexts for the (supposedly) ultimate expression of heterosexual desire – sexual intercourse between a man and a woman – but none so proper as a long-term monogamous relationship. Within such a relationship, the potential for enacting an economy of proper heterosexual affect might instantiate an ideal of affective commitment. While heterosexuality is an extensive and multiplicitous complex of relations, in this section I will draw upon just two empirical examples: the first regarding the enforcement of the norm surrounding long term monogamous relationships; the second about enacting ideal forms of affective commitment. Through these two examples, I hope to start examining the techniques by which heterosexual norms are enacted and performed in social interaction. Such an interrogation will confront the technical conditions enabling certain forms of heterosexual relations to become instantiated through the social regulation of affect and desire – what a body can do. It will also start to interrogate some of the implicit presuppositions immanent to such heterosexual relations, and the processes of legitimation by which they again become recuperated.

The empirical material in this section relates to the construction of economies of proper affect through talk. The relationship between talk about how people should act, feel and affect each other, and how bodies actually enter into relations with one another is complex and not necessarily direct. Later sections will deal with the more direct performative transformation of bodies and their relations through sociable interaction. Nevertheless, in dealing with talk here, I hope to draw attention to how talk occurs in-between as a way of negotiating a moral and social order of bodies, and, moreover, of reinforcing already established orders. Sexualised talk effects itself as an institution, with its own discursive force, its own customs, norms and procedures. And
while the empirical material in this section arises in night-time leisure situations, sexualised discourse is not only institutionalised within such leisure contexts, but rather across myriad other institutionalised contexts.

At the same time, sexualised talk is emergent, contextual and multiplicitous. It proliferates difference at the same time as it recuperates a moral order. And it is performative of such order: there are transformations and ‘cuts’ taking place in talk too. These ‘cuts’, instantaneously producing a boundary and placing something on the other side of it, produce a type of strangeness. Such activity can be seen to recuperate other ways of organising affect into the moral order: these other ways of organisation become the ways of the Other. This is not to say that strangeness, the marginal, or the minor equate with something laudable or progressive. Strange ways of organising affects might not be a promiscuity of bodies in the sense of allowing these bodies to increase their affects over the longer term. The punitive regulation of strange ways might be seen to be necessary. It might be that the intensity of these strange ways reduces the ways the bodies involved can connect with others. It is indeed often the tendency of the regulation of social affective relations towards conservatism. This is hardly surprising. Machinic assemblages tend to preserve their organic functions because the organisation of their constituent bodies works. Some strange ways might not promise any connectivity between bodies. The conservatism of social regulation, however, does not discriminate between such intensities and those of desires that offer new and proliferating ways of bodies becoming sociable.

*What makes a good boyfriend*

Amongst the participants in this research, in one way or another, much talk in pub contexts would be sexualised. A regular staple of such conversations would be the topic of sexual relationships, usually those of one or more of the interlocutors, or those of their friends.
Occasionally the love lives of celebrities featured, but this was less common. What these conversations achieved was particular to each one. Sometimes, talk about relationships took place as part of something more general: ‘small talk’. Maybe this small talk was ‘catching up’ with one’s friends. What had they been up to recently? What had been happening in their relationships? Had they heard what had been happening in the relationship between two of their friends? Often such small talk was an increase in intensity. It was letting each other know what was going on in their own respective lives, and in their shared personal worlds. In doing so it helped maximise the affect and potential between these friends. It increased their knowledge about each other and their friends. When this happened, small talk became a minor way of becoming more intimate with one’s friends, perpetuating the intensity of the connections between them. The friends became entangled, and their potential for caring for, and hurting, each other, their potential for further conversation, further co-involvement, improved.

At the same time, such conversations would often be a making sense of feelings. It would be a construction of a sense of feeling between the members of the group, a construction achieved through their conversation. Immanent to these emergent senses of feeling would be a multiplicity of implicit presuppositions. These implicit presuppositions might relate to the legitimacy of the pronouncement being made in the conversation, or the legitimacy of the individual doing so to make such a pronouncement. Implicit to these distributions would be a typology of bodies, already differentiating those who were speaking as well as those who they were speaking about. This would be a distribution of their proper affects – a sense of what these bodies could and should do and feel - and this sense would be enacted in the course of the conversation. Such implicit presuppositions might be conceived of as socially available – a broader, transcendent Sense – but they were singularly enacted. Each conversation was unique and produced its own context. The sense of feeling emerging in the conversation, then,
would also be contextual, but might re-enact, in a new variation, a social Sense of feeling.

One of the ways in which normative sexualities become acted out is through such conversational processes. For example, on one evening out at a pub with some of the members of group three, a certain sense about the appropriate affects become expressed. In this case, the propriety of the affects relate to a ‘serious’ heterosexual relationship between a white, middle-class couple in their mid-twenties. On this particular evening, there were only three friends from the group present: Paul, Matt and Alice. They had chosen to go out to a local pub that was part of the Wetherspoons chain. I joined them as they were busily chatting sitting at a table situated in its own booth. Not long after I arrive, the topic of the conversation turns to the relationship between Ken and Michelle, friends of some of the members of this group. Matt and Alice, who are a couple themselves, say that they think that Ken is very odd. Paul concurs and joins in to talk about how Ken does not treat Michelle very well. They all agree that he is moody and unsociable. It is clear from their talk that they do not like Ken very much.

They elaborate by recounting a story about Ken’s treatment of Michelle. From the flow and orientation of their conversation, and the orientation of their bodies, I am sure this elaboration is not for my benefit. Rather, it seems to be a way of making accountable their emergent feeling for Ken. The story they tell is how Ken had told Michelle that he would rather spend New Year’s Eve with his “mates” than with her and her friends. Alice and Matt remark, disapprovingly, how “laddish” Ken’s “mates” are. Despite Michelle not being happy with this situation, Ken had proceeded to spend New Year’s with his friends rather than with her, but had much later turned up at Michelle’s place very drunk and somewhat disruptive. Paul, Matt and Alice then discuss how upset Michelle was in response to the way that Ken treated her that day. They sum up Ken’s unlikeable nature by saying that Michelle “could do so much better” than him, especially as he is
not very good looking. They all agree that Michelle, on the other hand, is attractive. She is not only nice, but “sociable”, “funny” and “lively”.

In their talk, Paul, Matt and Alice make a series of differentiations between Ken and Michelle that enact a particular normative sexuality. They attribute certain affects to Michelle, and others to Ken. Immanent to these attributions, however, are a series of judgements that perform the differentiation between Ken and Michelle. These judgements validate the affects attributed to Michelle, and devalue those attributed to Ken. It is not the attributes themselves that are being judged, however. Rather, their application to Ken and Michelle enable each to become validated themselves as subjects of sexuality and desire. It becomes Ken who is laddish and lacks consideration or, it is implied, commitment, and thus it is Ken who is judged on the basis of his desires and affects. It is Michelle who is validated on the basis of her sense of humour, her sociability and her liveliness.

Of course, to talk about such affects is not necessarily to talk about sexuality. Although there is a typologising of bodies and their affects going on, why is this to do with a normative sexuality? Yes, there is a moral distinction being made between affects that are properly validated and those that are not, but is this morality a sexualised one? Well, these affects are made to become sexualised in the process of translating these affects into the language of sexual attractiveness. In particular, implicit to their talk seemed to be an idea of a relationship ‘market’. In saying that Michelle could do so much better than Ken, they are making judgements, judgements that enact a grading of bodies and the non-equivalence of their valuation. Ken and Michelle come to be evaluated in terms of how good they are at being partners, heterosexual partners at that. This is the measure of their attractiveness. Through the valuations implicit to their differentiation of Ken and Michelle, Paul, Matt and Alice enact a partial and local form of heteronormativity. A good partner in their schema should be considerate and committed, lively and funny, not to mention good looking.
Here, heterosexuality subsists as a set of presuppositions regarding a sense of bodily or affective propriety. It comes to be acted out in this event, this conversation, but only as an incredibly partial and contextual instance of what might be understood as normative sexualities, or a regime of 'sex-desire'. In this conversation, for example, Ken’s laddishness is disparaged. It is made to stand in for a lack of consideration, a lack of sensitivity. It is notable that it is Ken’s masculinity that has become marked and derided, while Michelle’s gender remains unmarked. As we shall see later, in other circumstances or for other groups and individuals, laddish masculinity can become validated and normalised within a gendered and heterosexual regime. It is the singularity of heterosexual, as well as gendered, relations, as they are enacted in myriad local events, that is the condition for such differences.

The differentiation between Ken and Michelle that Paul, Matt and Alice carry out through their conversation is a social and collaborative activity. As such it rests upon a construction of a sense of feeling between the interlocutors. Affective criteria are negotiated and selected for application. Through their talk, Paul, Matt and Alice grasp their way towards a shared sense of affect, an agreement about how they feel about both Ken and Michelle. Probyn (1996) picks up on the distinction Deleuze makes between belonging based upon representational criteria, and belonging as an in-between process of becoming. Here, it might seem at first that Paul, Matt and Alice are unfolding a shared sense of feeling, an in-between connectivity. It might seem that they are creating a sense of belonging together through an activity of joining up their mode of affect. It is quite clear, however, that in the process of achieving this, they have recuperated a set of social differentiations. Their sense of belonging rests upon a series of pronouncements that pass judgement on the desirability of others. This activity is the very production of an other, and an imposition of a set of criteria.
Furthermore, the implicit presuppositions underpinning the legitimacy of these pronouncements are an institutionalisation of a distribution of bodies. Through these pronouncements such a distribution of bodies becomes re-enacted in their talk. These implicit presuppositions, however, also rebound onto those that speak. The interlocutors are also implicated in the distribution of bodies. This becomes clear during Paul, Matt and Alice’s conversation. It is Paul who says that Michelle is funny. He recalls a time chatting to her in another pub in North West London when he had found her funny, lively and interesting. He also says that Michelle is nice looking. Alice immediately makes some teasing comment, something like “Ooh, do you like her then, Paul?!?” In her surprise, Alice not only performs an identification of Paul as gay, but also performs an expectation of what a gay body is supposed to be able to do. The comment enacts a memory, a politicised and distributive social memory of legitimate speech and affect. Gay men are not supposed to find women attractive. They are not supposed to make these sorts of judgements. The performative force of the comment is an injunction upon Paul not to overspill his bounds. It reduces his ability to have these sorts of affect.

In this instance, then, heterosexuality enacts itself as a demarcation of who can gaze upon female bodies, and the form that gaze is able to take. Paul immediately replies to Alice: “I hate it when people automatically think that because you’re gay you can’t look at a woman and say that she’s attractive.” He is not angry, and there is no harshness in his voice, but he is being very serious in his challenge. Alice and Matt are quickly on the defensive, denying that this is what they meant. Paul is very popular in the group, so perhaps this is an urgent papering over of the cracks. Perhaps the active maintenance of a common sense is imperative. More likely, however, is the fact that Alice has realised that she has possibly hurt a very good friend, and Matt, also realising this, joins her in trying to undo the damage. Nevertheless, Paul goes on to elaborate on his point. He says that he can look at women and think that they are good looking. He compares this to a (heterosexual) woman being able to look at another woman
and make a judgement as to whether she is attractive. This, he asserts, is something they do all the time, something that is presumed to be normal. In contesting the normative bodily capabilities applied to gay men, Paul claims a similarity between the gaze of a gay man and that of a straight woman, when gazing upon a female body. Yet even here the complexity and difficulty of being able to contest dominant forms of judgement and institution become apparent. Paul’s claim works at a representational level – that of sexuality. It elides the interwoven differences of gender, ignoring, for example, the distributive effects of the male gaze, or the work that a female gaze might do in producing a recognition of differently valued female bodies and selves.

*Monogamy and strangeness*

On another evening, at another pub – this time one that is part of the O’Neill’s chain – Paul and another member of group three make Matt, who is elsewhere this evening, the topic of their conversation with me. I had been talking to another member of the group, Chloe, but she had become distracted by some of her work colleagues who were also there on this evening. I turn to start talking to Ben, making small talk by asking him what he has been up to recently. Very quickly he gets onto recounting a story about Matt and his ex-girlfriend Nicoie. Paul is quickly drawn into our conversation as the story relates to a night out he has spent with Matt and Nicoie this week. Paul had been out at another pub midweek with Tina, a colleague of his from work. Matt and Nicole had also turned up at the pub. After spending some time drinking together, during which Nicole had remained very quiet, Tina had said something – something fairly innocuous according to Paul – that had offended Nicole. Paul and Ben already knew that Nicole did not like Tina, but were quite unprepared for her reaction to Tina’s comment. Nicole suddenly stopped talking altogether, not just to Tina, but to everyone else present too, and then, a minute or so later, told Matt that she was leaving and then proceeded to storm out, not saying goodbye to anybody else.
Throughout the story, Matt is talked about as "strange"; but he is, to Ben and Paul, not nearly as strange as Nicole. Matt's strangeness is attributed to him by Ben and Paul because he keeps seeing Nicole despite having been in a relationship with Alice for over a year. Moreover, his strangeness is intimately linked with that of Nicole. Paul and Ben cannot understand why Matt would want to keep seeing her. This is especially so as Nicole makes no secret of her desire to get back together with Matt. Nicole's strangeness rests partly on the nature of this desire to restart a sexual relationship with Matt. For Paul and Ben, this is odd considering that it was her who ended their relationship. Now, however, they consider her to be increasingly obsessive about Matt, as demonstrated by what they take to be her growing paranoia about his friendships with other women such as Tina. Nicole's desire to get back together with Matt, however, is only one part of the puzzle as far as Paul and Ben are concerned. There are many other elements to Nicole's strangeness, and these elements are bodily and affective. She is quiet, and does not participate very much in group conversations when she has been out with Paul and Ben, who recall that it has not always been this way. When they had first got to know Nicole, she had been really friendly, really gregarious. Now she hardly acknowledges them, let alone other women who might be socialising with the group. There is little consideration on Paul and Ben's part as to why this change in Nicole's affects has come about. They acknowledge that she is unhappy with her lot, but they cannot see any reason for her to have connected this to them. To them, she is just the unsmiling face of misery: unhappy with herself, unhappy with her company.

Paul and Ben's conversation is a collaborative narration, but one that they have to negotiate. This narration achieves things. It is deployed to certain effects. Here, it achieves a construction of individuals, their selves and their bodies. More precisely, it produces the individual as a self and as a body. In talking about Nicole, Paul and Ben blur the boundaries between her affective self and her body. They punctuate their commentary with references to Nicole's weight and body shape,
which are added to the weight of her strangeness. It is clear that this is a social activity. Not only is their narration a social activity between Paul and Ben, it is a social activity shared by other group members. Paul and Ben are drawing upon, and adding to, a repertoire of understandings about Matt and Nicole’s relationship, a repertoire deployed by other group members on other occasions. Moreover, this deployment works its effects along lines of normativity. Nicole’s body is narrated into gendered abnormality. Nicole’s selfhood, or at least the group’s understanding of it, is constructed in relation to norms of affect and behaviour. It is in this respect, also, that Nicole fails to observe the norm. Strangeness, it become apparent, is a practical and relational mode of becoming. Nicole acts strangely because she does not conform to norms regarding the affective abilities or the affective willingness to perform sociable relations with the people she goes to the pub with. She enters what is supposed to be a space of sociability, but does not partake in its modes of sociality. Furthermore, she is a threat to another affective norm – that of the monogamy of a heterosexual relationship. This is complicated by her previous relationship with Matt, but this complication also invokes the proper time of a relationship, the time that it ends - its limit. Matt, also, becomes strange. He too is seen to be endangering the heterosexual norm of the exclusivity of his relationship with Alice. There is a feeling that, in spirit at least, he is not being ‘faithful’. Again, heterosexuality becomes enacted as the normativity of proper affect implicit to practical relations and senses of feeling. Heterosexuality lives as each singular distribution of bodies in social and sociable practice.

4. Practical Transformations

Heterosexuality normativity, of course, becomes recuperated as more than just the talk of others. That is, it is not just in talking about others that bodies become distributed. Heteronormativity is not just about people talking to construct a sense of feeling about absent bodies. While it may become reproduced as an in-between sense of proper bodily affects, this reproduction does not only take place
through talk. And where it does take place through talk, its effects do not remain at the level of talk, enacted only as a virtual sense of propriety applied to bodies not present. Rather, it manifests itself through the immediate transformation of actual relations. The relations between bodies become organised practically in social interaction, a process of organisation that is made to take place in accordance with the norms of sexualised sociality.

*The machinism of expected sexualised roles*

It was slowly approaching five in the morning on a tired Sunday morning and the night bus wound its way through London’s suburbia. It was more than half empty as it reached Wembley, the crowded bustle of party-goers in Central London having subsided into the slowly diminishing number of coming-down clubbers and weary night-shift workers. Not entirely unexpectedly, though, those on the back seats upstairs were not so weary. There were three lads sitting here, all in their late-twenties, all short cropped hair, all dark jackets and coats over white shirts, all bravado and bragging, banter and brio. They chatted and joked about “the birds” (women), about sex, about “shagging”, and as they did so they expanded, they were expansive. You didn’t need to be listening to them to notice this: you could see it. They spread out and owned the space, colonising it as their own little piece of territory - their space. This bus had separate seats, padded and moulded for each bottom, but these lads each took over two of these seats, their arms spread along the seat tops. One lad, the one facing back towards the other two, had one of his legs resting idly on the seat beside him. And it all seemed so easy, this relaxed occupation, this confident air. They were loud and they were Esturine, yet they seemed to own this space effortlessly.

After a long conversation amongst themselves (see chapter 5), the three lads got talking to one of the two young women sat in front of them. One of them asked the woman where she had been that night. She had been to a club, she told him. The lads then started to brag
about being nightclub bouncers. Come down to the “Tune Bar”, they told her, and we’ll let you jump the queue. The woman wasn’t convinced. How will they remember her when she appears in the jostling crowd? How will they remember her from amongst all the other girls they have told that to, she questioned? She seemed to have cottoned on very quickly: the lads’ offer was a cynical chat up line. It was not particularly hard to have spotted. Yet, the lads tried to reassure her that she was special: they would remember her, how could they forget! The banter continued for a while, but then the woman tried a different tack. She told them she had already tried getting into the Tune Bar, but that the bouncers had said she did not look old enough. The lads asked how old she was; seventeen, she replied. At this, the lads started laughing incredulously. The woman was not impressed, and when the lads’ laughter died down there was a pause, and their faces dropped as they realised the woman’s already tenuous interest in talking to them was fast running out. The lads tried to resuscitate the situation. They asked her where she was from. Amsterdam, she replied tersely. There was another pause. I could almost hear the cogs turning as the lads struggled for something witty or at least interesting to say about Amsterdam, but they failed. They asked her about her stay in Britain - what was she doing here - but she gradually became less and less interested and turned away from them to face the front.

The relations between the lads and the woman became organised practically in their interaction, and this organisation recuperated immanent forms of gendered and heterosexual machinic relations. This is an instance of bodies becoming enrolled into a specifically gendered and heteronormative machine; and of the instantiation of forms of gender and heterosexuality that subsist as an immanent machinism. This is not to invoke a double machinism, however. Rather, it is to follow Foucault in insisting upon the contiguity of the plane on which power operates. Local machineries of force are multiplicitous, but they can add up to, and become aligned within, a set of relations and machines that work throughout a social body. Also, to reiterate, the
idea of machinism is not supposed to connote some clockwork mechanism, but merely a living and dynamic working of materials and bodies as they come into connection with each other. A machine is merely an assemblage of these materials and bodies that does something. A living social machine constantly needs the bodies and materials that it encounters to join in, to participate in it, in order to make it live. This participation might be temporary, and bodies and materials are always heading off elsewhere, perhaps to become parts of other machines, or other parts of this machine. In any case, machines themselves are multiplicitous, and such machines are always partial, always tentative, and always open to contestation.

This potential for contestation is evident in the case of the lads’ conversation with the young woman sitting in front of them. They attempt to enrol the woman into a particular gendered and heterosexual machinism. This is a specific machine operating around a nightclub queue. One of the ways in which this machine works is in reproducing and validating a particularly classed and heterosexual form of masculinity. The lads try to enrol the woman into a machine where the lads’ jobs as bouncers mean that they are in a powerful position to grant some women permission to jump the queue to get into the nightclub. The lads are the arbiters of entrance to a ‘cool’ space. Moreover, this is a peculiarly sexualised form of power. The attractiveness of the women presenting themselves to the lads in an attempt to jump the queue is one of the key criteria for the lads’ selection. This is not usually an instantaneous process at the front of the queue. Like this particular case, it may often involve male bouncers remembering women they have seen before, although this would more often be women who the bouncers have remembered talking to previously at the front of the queue. Nevertheless, such bouncers get to make a judgement, one that confers the cachet of attractiveness on the women made suppliant in front of them. This is the other side of the machine’s work, the other side of these bouncers’ power: women become sexualised, reduced to the surface of their bodies.
Of course, this is not the only thing that the machine does for the women trying to jump the queue. While the offers of these male bouncers might be seen as a cynical attempt by some working class men to boost their own limited power, some women clubbers might take up such offers with a cynicism of their own. After all, who wants to be standing in a queue for an hour? Moreover, the potential sexualised rewards of entering into the machine are considerable. A positive judgement of one’s attractiveness from a bouncer offers a recognition of one’s body as appropriate for a sexy and sexualised self, a recognition of one’s ability to have a sexualised affect on another. So, there is an incentive to perform. The performance necessary to impress the bouncers often involves hamming it up or fawning for the bouncers’ attentions, although sometimes this is coupled with taking the piss out of the bouncers. It would not do to be seen to be too easily enticed into a flirtatious gambit. The risks, then, are also apparent. On the one hand, be seen to be too willing to flaunt one’s body, to sexualise it. On the other, it is the humiliation of being rejected, of not being attractive enough, or, at the very least, not being remembered.

This sort of thing does not go on in every queue, or with every male bouncer. Bars and clubs with bouncers and a queuing system differentiate themselves in many different ways, and their entrance procedures are kept in check to match the particular cultural cachet the venue is trying to attain. During the fieldwork for this thesis, I encountered situations where male bouncers would indeed be swayed by the ‘charms’ of young women, and I also encountered male bouncers being assiduous in only letting those at the front of the queue in. I encountered well regulated queues, and teams of bouncers who body searched every individual entering the venue. What was notable, however, was how many different participants, male and female, of different ethnicities and sexualities, remarked upon the common expectation that most bouncers (usually assumed to be male) let attractive young women jump the queue.
This particular machinism of the queue has particular distributive effects. It places the male bouncers as subjects of sexuality, able to pass desiring judgements upon the sexual attractiveness of others. Upon the thronging crowd eager to gain entry to the club, it applies a hierarchy. Some women (and all men) are losers and have to wait until they get to the front. Other women’s bodies become sexualised with particular and relational affective agencies. Their attractiveness works contextually to enable them to affect these male bouncers into letting the jump the queue, yet this attractiveness only emerges in the process of the becoming subject to their judgement. It is conferred upon these women in the process of judgement and supplication. This is the dynamism of the machine. It works – it is a process – only in its articulation in practice. For their part, the bouncers’ also become attractive. They become the centre of attention, and have women fawning over them, trying to manipulate them, because of their power over entrance to the venue. Their masculine attractiveness is distributed in a particular form – that of a specified and circumscribed power.

The machine does not work, of course, just at that moment at the front of the queue. In the case of the lads on the night bus, this much is clear. It is not only on some later occasion in which they were trying to make this machine work. They were trying to get it operating in their present, to enrol the young woman into the machine right there and then on the night bus. If they had been successful, the way their relations would have worked would have validated the lads’ ability to sexualise, and thus would have distributed them as subjects of sexuality in the process. Linking this present and their future, however, was a virtual mechanism upon which the machine depended: remembering. It was offered by the lads as a conferral of status, but the woman saw through this ruse. The lads’ promise to remember her was a futures option, to be bought into for the possibility of certain rewards at a later date. She was not convinced of this future, however. She was sceptical of the offering. Moreover, she did not buy into the
implicit presuppositions about the gendered and sexualised machinic relations she was being asked to enter. In issuing their invitation, the lads presumed that she would be willing to be chatted up, that she would slot effortlessly into the machine. For her, however, these implicit presuppositions were not so implicit. She undermined the machine itself by deploying doubt about the virtual mechanisms by which it works (memory), and what she would get out of it. She refused the functionality - the organicism - of the machine. She refused to give the expected response. Rather, she interrogated the mechanisms of the game, drawing attention to the opportunism of the lads’ advances and the rewards offered by the machine to the men for this opportunism.

Transformations of affect within an ethnicised moral economy

The lads, then, had been trying to assert the force of particular forms of proper sexuality, particularly proper sexualised and gendered relations. Through their practical interaction with the woman, they attempt to enforce a machinic set of relations through the enactment of certain affects felt as sexual desire. In this case, they were only partially successful. The woman may have resisted their ploy, but their action still had performative and reflexive effects that relationally sexualised her body. Such processes of the regulation of sexualised affects and relations are racialised and ethnicised as well as gendered. This can be seen more clearly in the following example.

Some members of group one were on an evening out with some of their friends at a bar in Farringdon, London. After sharing a meal together, the group had moved to the downstairs bar where they had broken up into smaller groups to chat. Late in the evening one of the women in the group, Jasbir, to whom I had not yet talked, came to sit next to me. As we had only just met, our initial exchanges were of the kind where we swapped information about ourselves that enable us to form a judgement about the other. A kind of getting to know each other, sounding each other out. Soon, however, Jasbir lights up a
cigarette. She offers me one, which I decline, but continues to talk about smoking and the ability to do so in this company. She complains that she would not be able to do so in the presence of “Indian” lads of her age (mid-twenties). If there were “Indian” lads around, especially if she was at an “Indian” social event, then she would face disapproval for smoking. She tells me that “Indian” lads would actually come up to her to tell her to stop smoking. They would tell her that she was like a “white girl”. Jasbir makes it clear that, by this, the “Indian” lads would mean that they would consider her to be some sort of ‘loose’ woman. In contrast, amongst her friends here in this group, and especially in venues such as this bar, places where the group commonly met up on an evening out together, she enjoyed the freedom to smoke whenever she liked.

The “Indian” lads Jasbir talks about attempt to regulate what a body can do. They try to insert women’s bodies into their proper affective relations. This assertion of power-in-interaction or power-in-practice is exercised by the lads through injunctions. Through these injunctions, they hope to exert a force. They hope to force women like Jasbir to make their bodies and their affect conform to a set of machinic relations. The “Indian” lads’ disapproval of ‘Indian’ women smoking relates to the appropriate gender roles for women within their community. In the process of deploying their injunction, however, these lads enact this very community. They reproduce the community as ‘Indian’, as ethnicised, because their focus on smoking brings to bear a differentiation of ‘Indian’ women from ‘white’ women. By enacting this difference they are enacting their community as an ethnicised entity, distinct from a ‘white’ Other. It is through the multiplicity of such actions of differentiation, and their agglomeration into a machinic alignment, that such communities can come into being.

The “Indian” lads, as Jasbir points out, might make this process of differentiation quite explicit by making a comparison to “white girls”. To apply this comparison to Jasbir would transform her incorporeally, but this would not be a transformation into a “white girl”, but rather,
into a bad ‘Indian’ woman. This works through the invocation of a complex host of implicit presuppositions. Smoking becomes associated with ‘decadent’ and ‘Western’ sexualised behaviour, probably because it is associated with the perceived independence of white Western women from systems of familial and kinship regulation of their practice, particularly in a bodily and sexual sense. Of course, this perception is itself a construction of experience that occurs through differentiating practice, that is, through the application of specifically moral differentiations upon bodies that are merely different. The conflation of smoking and ‘Western’ sexual decadence is concomitant with the conflation of what is perceived to be the proper behaviour of ‘Indian’ women in general, and their imagined sexual behaviour in particular. What is implicit to the transformations, then, is a moral economy, a moral economy that is the institutionalisation of a typology of bodies and what they can properly do. Such a typology precludes other readings and enables a distribution of bodies according to their affects. Here, behaviour becomes translated into sexual behaviour. Sexual morality, as embodied in the actions and affects of women, becomes translated into the nation.

The policing of ethnicised and gendered boundaries, then, takes the form of policing bodily affects and actions. The power relations between Jasbir and many ‘Indian’ lads of her age is peculiar to ‘Indian’ social events. This would suggest that the morality sustaining the community is itself sustained by a form of masculine power. The policing of ethnicised and gendered boundaries, however, is also exercised by women, especially along a generational basis. More generally, then, the control of ‘Indian’ women’s bodies occurs in their insinuation into the connected institutions of the family, the extended kinship group, and the social community network. What is interesting is that, in a British context, the regulation of women’s bodies and their insertion into systems of sexuality is a process of nationalisation. These women, and their ‘community’, come to understand themselves as ‘Indian’ and not Sikh, in Jasbir’s example, because of the specificities of how the other is constructed in a British context.
Whereas Jasbir and the lads who might come to police her become ‘Indian’, however, their other become ‘white girls’, not ‘British girls’. It seems to be a strange sleight of hand, making a nation (‘Indianness’) face onto a race (‘whiteness’), but this process can only be understood in terms of a concrete machinic assemblage in which belonging to a nation (‘Britishness’) becomes defined in terms of a race (‘whiteness’). The nationality ‘Indianness’ becomes a racialised ethnicity for an Other.

5. The ethnicised regulation of sexuality and desire

The regulation of sexuality takes place through the distribution of the recognition of subjectivity and selfhood. By regulating the sociality of bodies - that is, their affects and what they can properly do in interaction - this distribution of subjectivity and selfhood emerges. As we have seen, such processes of regulation in practice are racialised and ethnicised as well as gendered. As we have also seen, these processes enact themselves as a variety of forms of sociality, from rules about who can smoke where, to the sociality of flirting and chatting up. The regulation of proper forms of affect also, however, applies directly to sexualised desire. This goes beyond the affects proper to sexualised relationship, such as faithfulness, commitment, humour or consideration. It also relates to the very bodies that can enter into desiring relations with each other. These proper forms of sexualised desire divide up bodies. Certain bodies can desire certain other bodies, but still other bodies are beyond the realms of their desire. Such divisions of which bodies can desire which other bodies enact racialised and ethnicised differences amongst these bodily populations. Considering these proper forms of desire returns us to questions about who can recognise their desire, who can become a subject - and who can become an object - of desire?
A body’s ability to desire another is a complex multiplicity, an embodied memory of a whole history of forces and relations, injunctions and subjections, connections and intensities. Outside forces, past and present, play a major role in unfolding the potentialities of sexual desire. During the second group interview with group one, one of the participants, Neil, spoke of the social undesirability of black women as it has manifested itself in his life. Neil had spent most of his childhood in a rural village in southern England, an upbringing and social environment that he described as incredibly white. He has seldom found black women to be attractive, and it is partly a lack of contact with black individuals, now, but also especially when he was growing up, to which Neil ascribes this. In the group interview, he spoke of only being exposed to black women as the mainly negative stereotypes found in the media. Yet, he also described a childhood where Asian women were similarly encountered as surfaces, in the corner shop or the takeaway. Now, Neil is happily explicit about how attractive he finds South Asian women, and he is married to Meera, a woman of Indian ancestry; yet he had previously dated a “black” woman and a mixed race (“half-black”) woman.

I am not sure what place representations of women of colour have in the system of affect in which Neil is embroiled. Neither, in fact, are Neil’s friends. During this second group interview with group one, the participants discussed at length the influence of media representations on how bodies are taken to be differently racialised, and differently attractive. Another of the participants in this group, Jack, was adamant in his refusal to believe that media representations played any major role in who he found attractive. Instead he argued for the primacy of friends and peers in influencing who one finds attractive. The others in the group agreed that peers played a major role, but argued that representations were also important. This is a complex debate. Here, I will merely point out that representations and stereotypes cannot operate by themselves. They need to be actualised within a social
context; what is of concern in this research is how they become actualised within specific contexts of sociality, how they become reified in the meeting of bodies. The intensity of desire between bodies coming into relation with one another might be thought to make redundant the fear and aversion based on representations or stereotypes. Neil makes an argument in this vein. He claims that one of the reasons that he does not find black women attractive is that he has not had much social interaction with black women. Yet, he has ‘gone out’ with two black women, and has at least one black female friend who regularly socialises with the rest of this friendship group.

Clearly, while representations of racialised and ethnicised others are important in Neil’s understanding of the racialisation of his sexual desire, there are many other factors at work. Why is it that Neil had grown up with limited and surficial impressions of both black and South Asian women and yet had only been able to overcome his affective sexual aversion to the latter? In the group interviews, Neil talks about the important things that are looked for in a long-term sexual partner. Already, the criterion of a long-term relationship suggests a certain moral economy. This moral economy takes shape as Neil describes who is doing the looking for important things in a partner: it is not only himself, but his family.

Neil I think my – it’s quite weird my family, something like a professional middle class family to kind of bring home like a working class half-caste girl, and then bring like a working class black girl home. And Meera, in a way, culturally her family goes hand in glove with mine because they’re both middle class professional backgrounds. One of the – whoa – [...] it’s raising the class point, I suppose. Shows how obsessed we are with class in this country. Er, yeah. Didn’t realise that one. But, er, it’s kind of like... I think ‘cause my – my mum she’s doing the GP – she’s met loads of people like that. My dad was kind of [quieter voice] “Ooh ooh! Black person! Ooh!” [normal voice] It’s always a bit sort of - it was – it wasn’t quite...
Later in the same group interview, Neil elaborates:

Neil ...Yeah, well, my dad – my dad was like really happy when Meera, well I just said – “What does her dad do?” “Dentist.” [brief pause] /That was it!

Meera /[…]

[laughter]

Neil I swear! [laughter continues, especially Tariq] “Dentist! Oh, that’s fine! [Meera: …] And it just – just “Dentist,” the magic word. “Oh professional!” [makes ‘posh’ sound in deep ‘masculine’ voice, indicating approval] But, the stereotype – a big deal – and my dad’s very kind of [makes ‘posh’ sound in deep ‘masculine’ voice]. And that’s like very, very weird…

There is a practical regulation of sexual desire by Neil’s family in an actual and immediate sense. Sexual attractiveness and the desire proper to a body becomes a matter of enacting social relations as differently desirable bodies. The injunctions by which the family as an institution is brought to bear, in this case, enact the family as one of the ways in which class becomes lived. But it is more than just class that becomes enacted through the family; it is also belonging within a community. In the group interviews, Neil situates his parents firmly within their rural English community, a place that, in some ways, he feels he has left behind. Although his desires can encounter attraction in different bodies, however, Neil still recuperates the community his family embody in his lack of attraction towards black women. Nevertheless, this sense of community itself is intimately tied to distinctions of class. The passages above show that there is an implicit judgement as to whether a potential partner is ‘good enough’ for a member of the family, or a member of the community. The judgement is to whether the potential partner will enable Neil to maintain his class position. This becomes evident as the judgement regarding Meera shifts from her ethnicity to her family’s middle class professional background. In the schema immanent to these judgements, then, blackness comes to stand in for class.
These differently desirable bodies embody the differential effects of a class machine. That is, in myriad instances, such as with Neil’s family, relationships of force become applied which enact a distribution of bodies and their potential relationships. These myriad relationships of force accumulate and become aligned. As they do so they start to work as a machine, and class effects start to emerge as prevailing or systematic differentials in the relationships of force throughout a population. Of course, such a machine linking up class, sexuality and ethnicity is only a small part of a greater machinic assemblage that works to produce class effects. Yet, this is not to say that such a machinic assemblage would be all pervasive, or would overdetermine every aspect of sexualised desire. On the contrary, the processes of regulation and reproduction exemplified by Neil’s and his family are highly specific. Moreover, any machine enters bodies into particular working relationships with other bodies, but there are a multiplicity of other machines into which bodies also enter. Power is multiplicitous. As we shall see later, it is also the nature of desire to be multiplicitous. Bodies also become entered into multiple singular connections, and these new connections may modify the machines of which bodies are already a part, or they might deterritorialise a body to varying degrees.

Anyway, Neil talks about his family and the social environment in which he grew up as important influences on his experience of what bodies he can enter a proper relationship with. I am not sure how straightforward a link can be made between these elements of his life and Neil’s own affects. Certainly, Neil has extended his capabilities for affect beyond that which he felt he had inherited from his upbringing. I will return to this extension of capabilities in chapter 7.

It is not just middle class white men who find black bodies beyond the proper social possibilities for their desire. Meera, for example, also asserted that she would not have wanted to have a relationship with a black man, and that she did not find them attractive.
Meera I think I'm the same, though. I'm - think [...] with a white person, been out with an Indian person, [Tariq: Chinese.] a Chinese person. I've never been out with a black person, 'cause I don't know if I would have before. I don't think I would have wanted to. I don't find them attractive. I haven't, you know - maybe only a bit ... I have seen some in magazines and think "quite attractive" but I wouldn't think of going out with them or wanting to.

In the second group interview with group two, one of the participants, Darren, who is of Indian and Anglo-Indian ancestry, is interrogated by his friends about the nature of the racialised regulation of sexual desire amongst members of his family. Darren talks about how his mother disapproved of his sister Letitia entering into a relationship with a black man. There are a number of interesting things that go on during this discussion, so I include a lengthy section of the passage.

Darren ...I think there's a bit of - well, I think my parents are a little bit - they do have, still, ahem, views on race, but, no, in a - in a bizarre way, like my mum's actually, even though she's married an Indian man, my dad, she's actually a bit kind of, uh reverse racist like against Indians, heh, because she's - she was, ahem, brought up as an Anglo-Indian [Hassan: Oh yeah.] in India, and therefore there was that kind of er traditional resentment, but, then, you know, she's obviously not racist marrying my dad. But, there's more of - more of that thing and - I think - I think my mum would have been more concerned if - actually, she probably wouldn't have been concerned about me at all, but it's [...]...; Anthony mutters something in background] my sister. Not [...]-

Hassan [...] very confusing [...]  
Anthony [chuckles] yeah, you are.
Darren No, no but there is – /there is some kind of-

Hassan /No, you’re contradicting yourself immediately.

Darren -no no, 'cause there is some kind of things at play here with race, like, say, Letitia, once started going out with a – a black
guy, and my mum really flipped. And was like saying "Oh, you
know, it's a different culture, blah blah blah."

HassanYeah, but that's fair enough, though.

[Anthony laughs]

Hassan[pause]Yeah, but that's - that's a bit bizarre.

Anthony[laughs] That's just not normal.

DarrenAnd, I think my mum is happier - I think my mum is maybe a
little bit-

HassanWhat? By default, you mean?

Darren-she's kind - she's just - you know, prejudiced against - not - I
don't know if they are prejudices or views on different cultures
and whether they'll [Anthony: What-] click together.

AnthonyWhat was this, ahem, this Afro-Caribbean bloke that Letitia
went out with - what was he like? What was his-

DarrenOh what - I suppose his job was he worked in kitchens of...

[Hassan: Ahh... Well, that might have been...]

Darren.../this place, so that kind of added to the fact that he was black.

Hassan/Ahh... Well, that might have been...

AnthonyI know, but what he - was - was - did he - was he having like
the whole - was he - this is the whole sort of rap attitude and
stuff like this, or /was he just like a...

Darren/I don't think my mum - I don't think my mum

AnthonyNo.

Darren-And he's-

HassanOh right.

AnthonyOh ok, /so it was - it was just-

Darren/ [...] it's just - it's just /he was black and-

Hassan/Because of the stereotype, yeah.

Henry[?Surely] part of the problem.

DarrenYeah.

AnthonyMm.

DarrenBut, ahem, I mean, so, but, you know, so yeah, I think it could
be a bit a - rever-then [...] like I say, I think my mum, in that
sense, was happy me going out with a - a white girl, [Hassan:
But is-is it-] but if I came home with ahem er maybe an Indian
girl who was very - from a very strict Indian family, I think my
mum would have questioned-
Hassan: No, but does your-
Darren: -you know, me on that. /Or the-
Hassan: /-Darren, does your – does your mum
like Kirsty [Darren’s partner] by default, then, or does she like
her because she’s who she is?
Darren: [...] she likes her ‘cause of who she is. And-
Hassan: But you’re suggesting it’s by default there.
Darren: No! [Alison says something quietly in background] I’m saying,
I’m saying – no! All I’m saying [Hassan: Alright!] is that if I
came home with a – with maybe an Indian girlfriend [Hassan:
Yeah.] who’s from a strict Hindu family then she would question
/[/me about that. But...]
Alison: /Well, I guess you’ve got a lot in common, haven’t you? Just,
kind of, the way you were brought up and things like that, and
the jobs you do, and [...] /aspirations [...] and-
Darren: /Yeah, I felt it.
[sniggering then laughter]
Darren: Well, it’s – it’s the Western culture.

Darren’s description of how his mother had disapproved of his sister’s
relationship with a black man is somewhat reminiscent of Neil’s
description of how his father passed judgement on his relationship
partners. Whilst neither Darren nor Neil mention any physical or
embodied restraint on their (or their siblings’) relationships, a social
force of regulation is apparent in these judgements. Each of these
judgements effect an injunction; they each demand that those subject
to the injunction toe the line of the social order. The social order of
bodies becomes enacted through a plethora of implicit injunctions.

In common with Neil’s account of his family’s regulation, Darren also
testifies to his mother’s invocation of cultural commonality as a basis
for approval or rejection of a potential partner. The contrastive
structure within which Darren speculates about his mother’s antipathy
to a black male partner for her daughter suggests that Darren is
offering this cultural explanation for her antipathy as some sort of
mitigation. Darren makes this cultural explanation stand in for what he
understands as “prejudice”. When Anthony starts to ask Darren what Letitia’s partner was like, however, Darren immediately responds by situating Letitia’s partner in terms of his job. As with Neil’s family, class seems to make a difference, something that Hassan seems ready to pick up on before the conversation is swept away from him elsewhere. Darren, however, enacts an additionality of class to race, rather than an immanence of class to ethnicity. The machinic relations brought to life through Darren’s conversation with his friends, then, are singularly different from those similar machinic relations enacted by Neil.

That such machines work without bodies necessarily being present is apparent from Darren’s mother not having met Letitia’s partner. Here, injunctions are made and a machinery swings into action upon the encountering of a representation. The representation is enacted in the action of the judgement and applied to the surface of the body. The surface itself becomes something – it becomes black. The body’s blackness - the blackness of its surface - is enough to sentence it, because the sentence has already been carried out in the judgement. As Hassan says, it is a matter of liking or disliking someone “by default”.

Hassan further interrogates the nature of this process by asking Darren whether his mother likes Kirsty, Darren’s partner, “by default”, that is by virtue of her whiteness, or because she likes her as a person. Hassan has picked up on Darren saying that his mother is “happy with me going out with a ... white girl...” This not only appears to reduce Kirsty to a racialised surface, but it seems to make this surface the basis for Darren’s mother’s acceptance of Kirsty. Darren’s rejoinder is that his mother’s affect for Kirsty is on the basis of Kirsty’s personality. Later, however, in response to Alison’s intervention, he connects what he and Kirsty have in common to their shared participation in “Western culture.” The invocation of this shared culture is a movement away from the surface of race, but reinstates another set of machinic relations in its place. Again, the classed nature of what
is claimed to be a shared culture, or even a shared ethnicity, is enacted by Alison reintroducing the concepts of common career and life aspirations.

Much of this section of conversation involves Hassan and Anthony winding Darren up. This is a common practice amongst this group of friends, or at least among the male members of the group. Over and above the playful joshing, however, an interactive production of difference is going on. This is a policing of boundaries amongst friends, achieved in the very sociality of the social group. Certain judgements are being made and deployed in conversation. Anthony, for instance, deploys a stereotype about black men which produces a unity of identity, reducing black men to a unitary and invariant being. This is a stereotype about rappers, one that had already been developed amongst the participants earlier in the group interview. In their talk, they had already made the stereotype to be pejorative: black male bodies became transformed into violent, aggressive and arrogant bodies, without exception. As the stereotype became re-enacted here, it operated as a ready made judgement. The sentence of becoming violent, aggressive and arrogant did not even need to be said again. The sentence becomes meted out tacitly in the very deployment of the stereotype, the guilt of the accused already presumed.

As well as black men and white women becoming racialised in this passage of conversation, Indian people, especially Indian women also become embroiled within a complex web of racialisation. Darren remarks upon his mother’s “racism” towards Indian people, and alludes to her resentment at the loss in status she experienced as an Anglo-Indian living in India after Independence (Interview with Darren, 11 Sept. 2001). Moreover, Darren also remarks that his mother might have questioned any sexual relationship he might have started with an “Indian girl”. It is interesting that talking about an Indian woman as a potential sexual partner should invoke the idea of a strict Indian family. This allusion is reminiscent of Jasbir’s lament about the regulation of sexuality by her ‘Indian’ kin and community. For Darren,
though, the “strict” regulation of sexuality is an Other Indian family. To start a relationship with an Indian woman might well be to start a problematic relationship with her family. To enter into such a relationship with such an Indian woman would be to enter into a relationship with more than just an individual. Her body would be more than just an individual body. Rather, it would bring into the relationship its own sociality and its community’s regulation. Such a body would be a social body; it would be a body entangled in a machine. From the point of view of the “strict Indian” family, however, the difficulties in such a relationship might not primarily be a problem of sexuality. As I have argued earlier in this chapter, the problem of sexuality is one peculiar to certain Western assemblages or machines. Certainly, these modern Western forms of sexuality have infected virtually every other society and culture globally. Nevertheless, for such a “strict Indian” family, or, as Darren later says, a “strict Hindu” family, the problem might, for example, be of relationships differently conceived, or of religion.

5. Embodiment, attraction and antipathy

The testimony of both Darren and Jasbir seem to suggest that, at least within a British context, South Asians often enter into a relationship with Western formations of sexuality in a problematic way. Race and ethnicity intervene in the ability of these bodies to enter into certain affective relations with others. This is not only indicative of how sexuality as a specific formation overcodes certain affective relations, but of how the enactment of sexuality as a formation relies on being able to insinuate racialised and ethnicised difference into singular affective relations. Despite their singularity, these relations become an expression of an invariance, a way of repeating sexuality as a mode of organising these affects. So far, however, the discussion of these processes has been all talk. It has concerned itself with either the policing of sexuality through talk, or talk about policing through social institutions such as the family. Now, I want move onto engage with embodiment in practice and interaction, a theme that I signalled in the
first section of this chapter. Through interaction, bodies act to transform other bodies. Judgements are made, but they are implicit to this interaction. What becomes transformed are bodies’ abilities to affect others, to enter into different kinds of desiring relationships. As bodily capabilities to affect and be affected are distributed in social and embodied interaction, so sexuality, race and ethnicity emerge as forms of organised difference.

Reject

I was buying a round of drinks, so I was at the bar. The pub was part of the O’Neill’s chain, and it was in suburban London, which meant that I was on an evening out with group three. Despite their protestations to the contrary, they love going to O’Neill’s pubs. So, I was at the bar in this O’Neill’s on a busy Friday evening, trying to get served. The crowd of pushing and swaying bodies here was almost exclusively young and white. Yet the man who, rather drunkenly, decided to start talking to me at the bar seemed to me to be of a South Asian appearance. He was gregarious and rather loud, rather demonstrative. Interestingly, he seemed to have adopted certain embodied styles of white masculinity. His clothes made a particular statement about a claim to belonging here, in this very pub perhaps. They were not the adaptation of black street style adopted by many young South Asian youth in the area. Nor were they one of the various permutations upon the smart-casual shirt and trouser combination sported by many other young middle class South Asian men in the area. Rather, he wore medium blue boot cut jeans, and a somewhat battered and old-fashioned brown leather jacket. Moreover, he spoke with a pronounced mock cockney accent, an accent whose inflections marked him out as affecting a white, working class bodily style. Later on in our conversation, he would take up an anti-education viewpoint, instead extolling the virtues of practical experience, and “real” life, a stance quite congruent with his bodily suggestions of white, working class affiliations. After talking for a while, he introduced himself as Minesh. I found out that he was of “Indian” ancestry – his family were from the
Gujarat - and that this mattered to him. He valued the work ethic he claimed his cultural inheritance, through his family, had provided him; and it was clear he had managed to reconcile middle class South Asian expectations with a white working class emphasis on “real” work.

Throughout our conversation, Minesh would make a show of knowing lots of other people in the pub. He performed a display of familiarity with one of the barmen, continually asking the barman to get him a pack of cigarettes. By asking for a favour, something the barman might only be expected to do for someone he liked, Minesh performed a familiarity with him. Later, one of Minesh’s friends also came to the bar to get some drinks, and Minesh introduced him to me. Later still, another young man approached the bar for drinks, and Minesh started talking to him. They also seem like good friends. It was more than the openness of their bodily stances towards each other, but rather a whole embodied performance. The way they talked to each other was not only informal, but spilled over into loud vulgarity in the way that many close friendships between certain white British men do. They joked and chatted and exchanged banter; but then Minesh let slip: he called the other man Ed, but actually his name was Tom. They were not that good friends after all. Still, Tom did not seem to mind that Minesh had got his name wrong, and Minesh’s performance of popularity remained intact.

Soon after Tom had left to go elsewhere in the pub, a young white woman pushed her way past us to join the throng at the bar. Minesh thought he knew her. He tried to talk to her, and tapped her on the shoulder, but she ignored him. He continued trying to start up conversation, but she remained poker faced, avoiding eye contact, trying not to respond. She seemed to think that Minesh was trying to chat her up, to harass her. He gave it one last shot: “Aren’t you a friend of Ryan Gardner’s? Weren’t you at his party last weekend?” Yes, she replied, but she still did not recognise Minesh, nor have any intention of talking to him. The conversation ended abruptly, but Minesh remained unfazed.
This encounter between Minesh and the young woman at the bar raises some interesting questions. Minesh takes his previous meeting with her as reason enough to try to strike up conversation again. For her, however, it is not. She closes up her bodily stance, turns away from him, and remains poker faced. She is discomfited by Minesh and her body performs this feeling. Moreover, her body performs a social distanciation between them, erecting a virtual barrier to any potential affective contact. Is it that she thinks he is not worth talking to, or does she think he is a sexual threat? A bar situation presents to young women the potential for many encounters with men making sexual advances, and these might be a hazard, an opportunity, or merely a mild or amusing distraction. Regularly, any hint of openness by women in their embodied performance, as much as in what they say, might be seized upon by men as a sign of sexual interest. A social memory subsists, enacted in such interactions, of these bodily performances and relations. This is a memory that, as it is brought into existence, distributes bodies into their relations. In this particular encounter, it is in the minutiae of her embodied action that the woman seems to enact a sexualised relationship with Minesh, one in which she defends herself against his sexual advances. In response, Minesh introduces a legitimising factor – a common contact. Even though he has reintroduced the possibility of a non-sexualised relation, however, she still takes him as someone to be wary of. She enacts another social and bodily memory, that of how to end a conversation.

The woman reacts as if Minesh is making an unwelcome sexual advance towards her. She, of course, has not been witness to his continuing efforts to talk to anyone he has had even the most fleeting of acquaintances with as they walk past. That the woman ignored Minesh is suggestive of how the interaction of bodies in such spaces relies on an apprehension of surfaces. All the woman can apprehend is a young man, slightly drunk, trying to make contact with her. She precludes this contact in case what is desired is sexual (a transformation of her into an object), by transforming herself by a
reduction of affect. This is desexualising work, not applied necessarily to a person, but to the relation between her and Minesh. By taking Minesh as a surface, I suggest, she may also reduce what is taken to his skin colour. A fear – a memory - of problematic Asian sexualities might come into play. An unconscious and pre-reflective bodily memory of how to deal with unwanted bodies emerges as it is needed. Within a machinic set of gendered and sexualised relations in pubs and bars, women often need recourse to bodily techniques of rebuff.

Nevertheless, if it had been a white man who had been making the advance, would she have made the rebuff in the same way? Maybe she was having a bad day, or had had an argument with her friends. Maybe she just did not want to talk to anybody. Maybe she was just rude to everybody she met. Just as in spoken interaction, and perhaps more so, there is always a multiplicity of potential affects and effects to embodied interaction. This ambiguity precludes the possibility of being conclusive. It does not mean that we cannot say anything about such interactions. Rather, I want to suggest that the social memories that haunt this interaction, that distribute bodies into certain regularised positions, place Minesh firmly within a trend.

Darren talks about how he has found it difficult to embody himself appropriately in pub and bar situations, especially when it comes to performing an appropriately gendered and sexualised masculinity (Interview with Darren, 11 Sept. 2001). Making contact with women in a pub, bar or nightclub situation, especially with the intention of making a sexual advance, becomes particular difficult for Asian men. Darren would find himself unable to perform the proper forms of bodily sociality in order to ‘pull’ (that is, to find a partner with whom one can have some kind of bodily sexual intimacy with, from kissing, to sexual intercourse). Henry, who is of Chinese ancestry, speaks of the way that ‘Asian’ men are taken as quiet and effeminate (Interview with Henry, 9 September 2001), affects that would prevent them from embodying themselves as fully masculine. Bhattacharyya (1999) remarks upon how South Asian women in the UK have for many
decades been taken to be desexualised, or beyond the realm of sexual desire. Ranjana, a woman of Bengali-Indian ancestry and one of the participants from group one, remarks how she had never ‘pulled’ in a nightclub either (Interview with Ranjana, 15 February 2002).

These are themes that will recur throughout the thesis as we meet Darren and Minesh again, plus some others, but perhaps a tentative outline of these repetitive relations can be offered at this point. It would seem that Asian men and women are often placed in a problematic relationship to Western sexual formations that are immanent within the sociality of everyday practice. Entering into sexualised relations with white British individuals, or performing within spaces dominated by a white British sociality, can present difficulties. Not to be able to recognise oneself and one’s desire, nor to have one’s desire recognised by others, Asian men and women often encounter difficulties becoming subjects of sexuality. Asian men often encounter problems of bodily performance: they become not masculine, not virile enough. This is not a problem that arises in the individual and their performance, nor in their culture. It is a problem that is becomes re-enacted purely in-between bodies as they enact the forms of sociality that distribute bodies and their capabilities. The problem of bodily performance is a machinic one.

Asian men, then, encounter not their own inadequacy, but a process by which their modes of expression become limited. They repetitively become placed within a relation where the potential for them to express sexual desire is already precluded. Asian women become placed beyond the bounds of normal sexual desire by virtue of the burden of moral regulation they are taken to bear. Within a white Western normative sexuality, Asian families and kin are taken to overdetermine Asian women’s abilities to form sexual relations with white men. These Asian women are again placed beyond sexual desire, unable to express this desire. And again, this is not a process that can be located solely on the doorstep of the Asian family. Rather than Asian families and kin overdetermining Asian women’s sexuality, Asian
women become taken as a surface. They become placed in a set of relations from which there is a diminished scope for being taken as a desiring body. In short, they become Asian Women Living in Britain.

*The singularity of desire*

Desire, of course, is not just sexualised, or it does not have to be, not in any conventional sense. Just as sexuality is not the only thing that a body does, not the only way it expresses itself, so sexual desire is not the only form of desire a body can do. What does desire do? Thinking about desire cannot be restricted to thinking of it as a yearning for something lacked. It cannot just be thought of in terms of an affect oriented towards an other, an object. As we have seen, others and objects are outcomes. They are the outcomes of particular relations of force. It is through these relationships of force that bodies become implicated within machinic assemblages that distribute, amongst other attributes, subjectivity and objectivity, selfhood and otherness. Nor can desire be reduced simply to some sort of liberatory driving force. Rather, desire places bodies in relation to each other. It is the very process by which bodies become related. And as such, desire is eventful and singular.

In the course of everyday social interaction, bodies encounter each other and come into desiring relations. In these everyday situations, normative sexuality enacts itself in little and mundane ways. The regulation of desire, the process by which desire is made to take certain sexualised forms, is an everyday banality. Sex-desire, to use Butler’s (1999) phrase, insinuates itself into the everyday encounters between bodies through forms of sociality. Within a social field, bodies tend to act organically, mainly because it is easier. A social and bodily memory, enacted as the forms of sociality between bodies, allows social interaction to proceed without being thought about. Bodies enter into regularised and ‘to-hand’ relations with each other, machinic relations, which allow things to get done, to work. Socialising and sociability proceeds with an everyday kind of order. The proper forms
of affect are expressed, and so the proper forms of sexuality, the proper forms of desire. Yet, the social interaction of bodies remains eventful. Desire remains excessive, because as it emerges in the singularity of interaction, it cannot be fully captured by the machinery of sexuality.

A Friday night out with group one at a DJ bar called ‘Nature’, and the bar was heaving. The trendy media types of North Soho had long since been joined by many other young people on a big Friday night out. The DJ’s set was in full swing, the volume was pumped up, and in the spaces between the tables, the swollen crowd had started dancing. A woman of South Asian appearance in another group catches my eye. Her group is quite a large one – about four men and three other women – and has people of several different ethnicities in it. The South Asian woman has been drinking quite a lot, and is playfully flirting with the men in her group. She leans back onto the chest of one man, swaying slightly, looking upwards, head askew to look back up at him. Then she rolls sensuously off him, onto the chest of another man. She runs her hand down his chest, and places her other hand around the back of his neck. The group seems to have wrapped itself around her. She is the centre of attention, the attractor organising the group. While the other women in the group may only be looking, some of the men get to pay her physical attention. Her flirting may only be play, but there is a thrill of a sexual edge to it. The way she leans onto the chest of the first man, or the way she puts her hand around the back of the second, these are bodies becoming organic, bodily organs becoming sexual. A social and bodily memory of bodies connecting to each other, in a playful, flirting way, springs to life, but in a singular enactment.

Later on, she is dancing with one of her black male friends, the first man she had been flirting with earlier, but now just these two have come to dance quite near where I am standing with group one. Unlike most of the few other black men in the bar, who seem to be wearing fashionable ‘urban’ styles, this man is dressed more formally, and yet more flamboyantly. He has a very shiny deep red shirt on, with a black
waistcoat and trousers. They dance flirtatiously, caressing each other. There is a frission between them, an intensity. It is constantly emerging, on the cusp, never a spent climax. A series of action and response between them maintains this heightened tension, an interactive tantalisation. There is a rhythm to their activity, but with this rhythm, their bubble seems to expand, to maybe encroach. The woman keeps leaning back as she dances, pushing on the people around her. Eventually, Tariq (one of the participants in group one) places a hand squarely in her back and pushes her away.

Later still, she is returning from the far end of the room, from near the DJ booth. This time she is alone. Coming the other way is a young man, also of South Asian appearance, not in her group. The people on either side are standing so that they form a sort of corridor, which mean the two have to find a way past each other. The man takes one look at her and decides he is not moving. He stands there square on to her, looking her directly in the eye. She, meanwhile, has also sized this bloke up, and is also standing there square on to him, staring back at him. Neither will back down. Each of them has a look of utter hostility and contempt on their faces. This lasts several seconds. In the end, they each turn slightly side on so that they can pass each other. They move very slowly past one another, still looking each other in the eye before turning their heads away to ignore and maybe reject the other person.

Perhaps this encounter is haunted by the memory of an ethnicity. A middle-class Victorian ethnicity being sought in the sexual morality of a daughter of the nation? Certainly, the young South Asian man’s look, and the way that this look brought into play the whole force of his body, performed an assessment, a judgement. The woman’s body was encountered, but it was only apprehended as a surface. It was unspoken, but it was still social, this confrontation, this challenge. It was an attempt to impose a set of social bodily bounds on another body. It was an attempt to distribute that body into its proper place, its proper organisation of affective relations. It was an attempt to
regulate, to subject. The man sought from the woman a proper way of performing and embodying herself. A memory was sought, but not found. The man had encountered another way of becoming sociable, of connecting. The woman entered into desiring relationships with her group of friends, and with her dancing partner. Yes, this desire was still sexualised, but it was beyond at least one machinic set of sexualised relations. It was singular and intensive; sexualised, and yet extending this sexuality beyond its proper bounds.

The actions of the young South Asian man attempt to enact what, for him, are normal ways of relating to one another. He felt that this normality had been violated, so, in this fleeting little encounter, he tried to enforce it. Like with the lads on the night bus that we met earlier, and their masculine banter, or, later, their chatting up techniques, here we see how the normality of sociality is gendered, sexualised, racialised and ethnicised. These learnt and non-representational practices, these modes of embodiment in interaction, are the ways in which people get on with each other normally. If these modes of sociality become disrupted, so does the maintenance of ‘normality’.

One of the best recent geographical works to deal with the lived experiences of night-time leisure spaces – Ben Malbon’s (1999) work on clubbing – counterpoises the sociality of bodies against the antagonisms of racial, sexual and gendered difference. Malbon inherits from the works of Maffesoli and Shields, a view of sociality as learned and non-representational practices. Or, as Glennie and Thrift (1996) put it, the “everyday ways in which people relate to one another and maintain an atmosphere of normality, even in the midst of antagonisms based on gender, race, class or other social fractures…” (p.225). In Malbon’s work, the way this “even in the midst of” works its way out is through a distinction between ‘ecstatic flow’ and these structuring antagonisms. So on the one hand you have the ecstasy of being unshackled from your individuality in dancing crowds (it helps if you drop an E). While on the other hand there are social antagonisms
that keep these clubs mainly populated by select bands of white, middle class people.

What the incidents in the Nature bar and on the night bus show us, however, is that immanent to forms of sociality are differences of race, ethnicity, gender and sexuality. Moreover, it is through these very practices of sociality that racialised, ethnicised, gendered and sexualised differences can become enacted. These differences emerge in the very fabric of our interaction. This is to see the non-representational dimensions of these differences. They are non-representational in the sense that we do not have to conceptualise of these differences being enacted through reference to absolute and consciously articulated criteria of difference. It is also to see these differences as performatively. Practices of sociality normalise bodies and hence performatively enact these differences. Through practices of sociality, a distribution of what bodies can do takes place. The affects and desires proper to normally differentiated bodies emerge. Bodies conform to proper modes of embodiment, proper modes of expressing sexual desire. By looking at the work done to maintain the normality of modes of socialising, or by looking at what happens when these everyday ways of maintaining normal social interaction break down, we can interrogate the intersections of race, ethnicity, gender and sexuality in everyday sociality.

6. Performativity and corporeal transformations

Bodies, memory and potential

Moves over the past decade or so towards developing a sociology of the body have not gone uncontested. Howson and Inglis (2001) question whether conceptions of embodiment that owe a particular debt to phenomenological philosophies can adequately account for politics (power) and social structure. On the other hand, Witz (2000) has questioned whether the adoption by sociologists of theories of performativity and other theories imported from feminist philosophy
has undercut the concerns of feminist sociologists. Specifically, she reads much feminist philosophy as collapsing the distinction between the corporeality of sex and sociality of gender, hence erasing the latter, through its privileging of the body. Saliently, Butler (1999), one of the feminist philosophers identified by Witz, raises two not too dissimilar concerns in the paper discussed at the beginning of this chapter. Firstly, she remarks warily upon the possibility offered by what she interprets as Foucault's call to 'bodies and pleasures' that bodies could be thought of as unmarked by 'sex'. Secondly, by returning to 'sex-desire' she draws attention to the sociality of sexuality as well as gender, and to the need to investigate the multiplicity of relations between these two concepts. It is at this point that I want to return to Butler's (1999) discussion of 'sex-desire' and 'bodies and pleasures', and to take my own distance from Butler's conception of the body. In doing so I hope I can address some of the specifically sociological concerns that have been voiced surrounding the way that agency and structures of power (Howson and Inglis, 2001), and the sociality of bodies in relation to sexuality and gender (Witz, 2000) are accounted for in theories of the body and the performative.

Although I agree with Butler that we should not turn away from 'sex-desire', I am not so sure that we should abandon what is offered by "a different economy of bodies and pleasures". Butler does not like Foucault's rendering of the body when he gestures towards different 'bodies and pleasures' because she sees these bodies as outside of the time of their own production. That is, Butler sees these bodies as having no ontological status because they are just an idealised excess, always yet to be constructed, a site of resistance conjured up in order for Foucault to stage a break from 'sex-desire'. This reading of Foucault, however, only works within a philosophy of identity where time is linear and where difference is deferral (Baugh, 1997). This is perhaps not surprising in the context of Butler's attempt to incorporate Derrida's thought, alongside that of Bourdieu, into her concept of performativity (Butler, 1997). Derrida's take on the force of the
performative statement as arising from its iterability, is used by Butler (1997) as a deferring counterweight to Bourdieu’s position where the social power of actions is linked to their originary context.

If one reads Foucault in a Deleuzian way, however, then bodies take on some sort of ontological consistency, although this is always in the process of being worked out. Bodies become their capabilities, their practices, their substances, and, most importantly, their ability to affect and be affected (Buchanan, 1997). All of these aspects of the body are political because this conception of the body incorporates an idea of a bodily memory of the body’s production and constraint, a memory that is a contraction of the body’s own time, the body’s sociality. This bodily memory is somewhat akin to Bourdieu’s notion of the habitus (Bourdieu, 1977; 1998), in that it is a memory of the body’s produced capabilities that are brought back to life through its practice. It is a memory of what a body can do: for instance, of what ways and whom a body can desire. As we have already seen, the body incorporates a set of capabilities and affects produced by discursive, institutional and technological machines, machines through which the modalities of normative sexuality or ‘sex-desire’ become applied. The bodily memory is also the condition of the body’s ability to constrain and apply productive power on other bodies, thus popularising these powerful systems of differential relations. Nonetheless, the bodily memory, as the body’s capabilities, is also a condition of the body becoming-different, especially in its sociability.

We have also already seen how bodily affects are organised and distributed through social and sociable practice and interaction, and how such distributions are enacted performatively. Deleuze and Guattari (1988) tell us that the force of the performative rests on a social obligation, one that repeats an organisation of orders and transformations. So a performative act repeats a distribution of bodies. But, this repetition is never absolute. If the sociability of bodies is the instantiation of the organisation of these bodies, then the question arises: how does each event of sociability become actualised?
Immanent to every event is a multiplicity of potential outcomes. There are many potential ways that the relations between bodies in sociable situations could become established. But, only one potential organisation is actualised. This organisation is external and immanent. It depends on the bodily memories that bring to the event a multiplicity of different ways to connect with other bodies. Furthermore, because we are considering social and sociable situations, the potentials for connecting and organising the relations between bodies are in-between, never actually a property of bodies, and are constantly shifting as the relations between bodies change in the flow of interaction (Massumi, 1997). This external and immanent constitution of sociable events means these events are multiplicitous, and that their outcomes are indeterminate. Yet, this multiplicity of potential rests upon the capabilities – the potentials – brought to the encounter by bodies as bodily memory.

So, in the terms of Deleuze and Guattari (1988), the body is both organic and faces a body-without-organs, where the body-without-organs is the limit of the organisation and distribution of bodily capabilities and practices. Thinking in Deleuzian terms allows us to hold together the constraint and the production of the body with becoming-different because these different moments of the body are in the same time. This enables us to think of ‘sex-desire’ (Desire) and pleasurable desires together because, if we take them to be different ways of bodies entering into relations with each other, then the establishment of these relations can be both constrained (reproduced) and the establishment of something new. In this way, sexuality does not become the only thing that a body can do. As Elspeth Probyn (1999) has suggested, there are other ways of feeling the desire of becoming connected to other bodies than just sexuality. At the very least this presents us with the possibility of thinking sexuality outside of its existing forms and repetitions.

Thinking of bodies and desire in these terms allows a focus on the liminal practices of outsiders, a recognition of the intensity of those not
able to be recognised as sexual subjects with the ‘sex-desire’ regime, and the ability to be able to think of desire beyond its constraint. It also allows the continued interrogation of the regime of ‘sex-desire’. The two political moments that Butler (1999) identifies can be held together. The urgency of addressing the problems and oppressions of ‘sex-desire’ can be held alongside the gesture towards difference and thinking anew - thinking ethically - that is offered by, as Foucault more precisely puts it, “a different economy of bodies and pleasures” (1979: 159).

Furthermore, thinking of bodies and desires like this allows a new path to be charted through many of the pitfalls of trying to reconcile philosophical and sociological conceptions of the body, power and sociality (Witz, 2000; Howson and Inglis, 2001). The body is not given, nor immutable, but is fully social. It can be made to do different things in its life and its interactions. A body can enter different relations or enter into different machinic assemblages. Its affects and capabilities, the very constitution of a body, are dynamic and emergent properties that become worked out in the process of sociality. The concept of bodily memory invoked here is crucial. This is a social and bodily memory of how to practise – a memory of sociality. It points us to the practical nature of the body. Moreover, it allows power and desire to be held together. By conceptualising bodily memory as something that only becomes encountered in singular events, something that only lives in practice, it does not take on the role of an overdetermination. There is plenty of room for indeterminacy. Yet, the bodily memory allows the recuperation of machinic relations, for it is a material readiness of the body to fit into certain relations.

As such, the bodily memory is a memory of capabilities. But these memories are themselves multiplicitous and can be encountered in many ways. The bodily memory is not proper to individual bodies as such, but depends on how these memories are encountered. It depends on what other bodies and machines a body meets. The bodily memory is in-between and as such, the capabilities for action it offers
are dynamic and indeterminate. This potential field is the immanence of bodily memory to action; it is also the immanence of machines to action. In many ways, bodily memory is the immanence of machinic assemblages of power, as discussed in the second section of this chapter, to practice. This is at the same time as bodily memory also becoming immanent to desire, as the set of capabilities from which a tensor is stretched.

As far as bodily memory is the immanence of machinic assemblages of power to practice, it allows for a conceptualisation of power to be applied to a sociology of the body. Invoking immanent machinic assemblages, however, does not return us to the problem faced by Bourdieu (1977; 1998) in his conception of the habitus. A conception of the bodily memory such as the habitus does not need to be overdetermined by ultimately being subject to an economistic structuralism. Although class power is often one of the most important ways for organising relationships of force into machinic assemblages of power, not everything can be reduced to it. Moreover, class power is not exactly a determination, but an alignment of relationships of force to work together machinically. Machines must be thought of specifically. They are specific formations of relations of force and power, bodies coming together to work in particular social assemblages, in particular social institutional settings or particular social encounters. Machines can combine in various and singular ways. This is a flexible mode of thought that is adequate to engaging with the multiplicitous nature of power. Nonetheless, the immanence of power to practice, its operation on a field of potential, leaves us possibilities for a desiring and differential politics. There does not have to be a choice between power-as-immanence or desire-as-immanence, as the forces allowing things to happen, to be done. Rather, there is just a question: what can a body do?
Corporeal transformations: judgement and practice

Desire, then, can become captured. Entering into singular relations with other bodies can become repetitive. This is a problem of the organisation of affect, that is, the organisation of bodily capabilities. This organisation of affect is an emergent property of sociable practices. To the extent that such a process of organisation can enact differences in these capabilities in normalised and systematic ways, one can see that bodies can emerge as racialised, ethnicised, gendered and sexualised through their engagement into specific relationships with other bodies. This conceptualisation, then, is precisely concerned with problems of agency and power as they are enacted in social situations. What is at stake with racialisation, ethnicisation, sexualisation, and gendering is, very simply, the ability to act, to do things.

I am going to work through some of these ideas in the context of one specific event, although the ideas could be worked through many other parts of my data. The event was the sexual harassment of two women, Pam and Pauline, on a crowded dancefloor in a pub in West London. I was introduced to these women on the evening itself by a friend of group three, whom I had joined that evening. It was a Friday night, a DJ was playing ‘cheesy mainstream’ music, and the dancefloor was heaving. Pam was the subject of unwanted attention from the man dancing behind her. This was apparent from the stances, movements and postures of Pam and Pauline relative to each other and to several of the men dancing around them. The man behind Pam, and several of the men dancing around us were of a certain appearance. I couldn’t quite place them. They could have been from the Middle East, they could have been North African. Pam and Pauline were white.

Pam was moving away from the man behind her, her body leaning away from him. The man pursued, his gaze fixed on her, his face unsmiling, intent and intense. His gaze already enacts a certain relation between them, attempting to transform Pam into a sexual
object. The man put his arms around Pam, and danced pressing himself against her. She attempts to tell him that she is not interested. At first he goes away, and while he is away Pam says to me “Why can’t they understand that we just want to come and dance in peace?”. Soon, however, he returns and starts pressing himself against her again. This cycle of advance and rebuff happens several times and each time the man becomes more physically intrusive and overpowering. This transforms both Pam and himself. He enacts his own overpowering sense of masculinity. Pam resists his advances. She does not want to dance with him. Between his advances and her resistance a potential emerges, a potential for the instantiation of a particular power relation, a distribution of bodily affects. He attempts to constrain and force Pam’s abilities to affect and be affected. She cannot escape from his grasp, and she is subjected to an attempt to force her to desire him, a transformation of her affects. An organisation of her body into a desiring body in relation to his. His hand on her bottom. Another change in bodily affects. A transgression of Pam’s bodily bounds, changing her body into a source of pleasure and gratification.

The relevant bodies here are not necessarily just this first man’s and Pam’s. Considering the other human bodies immediately involved, the organisation of these bodies is reflexively achieved through these bodies acting together as more than individuals. Three of the men gang up and surround Pam and Pauline, transforming the space into one of containment and threat. They play different roles, a second man supporting the first. More than this, however, the men’s bodies become-the-Same as particular embodied memories are performed though their interaction with Pam and Pauline.

This becoming-the-Same enacts a gendered and racialised differentiation of bodies through a distribution of these bodies’ sexual affects. Those men, for example, encounter and enact their memories in Pam and Pauline’s dancing. But this is a social memory, and it is unspoken. These men’s interpreting of and acting in response to
seeing these women dance is based on a memory of elsewhere. Seeing female bodies dancing in a certain context, in a certain way, is seen as bodies being open and responsive to one another. The men gaped transfixed by particular movements of the women’s dancing, in particular as they became tactile with each other. But the memory encountered by the men is of a certain stratification of gender relations. It conflates the openness between female-bodies-just-dancing, with an expectation of an openness to a particular kind of male advance. The openness of women’s bodies is closed down to sex. This memory is re-enacted in the sense that the men, through what they do, re-enact a particular memory of how to connect to other bodies. Specifically, how to relate to women dancing. How to try to ’pull’. And how to be masculine.

But this is not just a distribution into bodies become masculine and bodies becoming feminine. It is also a distribution of bodies becoming-ethnicised. In the context of a specifically racialised dancefloor crowd, it might be suggested that the memories the men were attempting to enact were encountered in what they took to be white women, the whiteness perhaps connoting a certain relation to sexuality. For their part, the women looked around and thought why can’t “they” leave us alone, gesturing towards the whole group of men who looked a certain way. They were speaking about all of these men – a racialised lumping together of “predatory Arabs”. This is despite two out of the five men not taking part in ganging up on them, in fact dancing a couple of metres away and facing the other way. Pam and Pauline see a way of approaching that is certainly overpowering and that implicates a whole group of individuals as an ethnicised body. In the interaction, in the distribution of affect, ethnicity emerges: the women become white women; the men become Arab men.

The embodied interactions between the men and Pam performed corporeal transformations of their bodily affects. I want to contrast this with Deleuze and Guattari (1988) because when they discuss performativity, they talk mainly about incorporeal transformations
enacted through speech-acts. They do talk about the corporeal transformation of bodies through speech-acts, but this is through a reciprocal relationship with concrete machinic assemblages. Here, however, we see that corporeal transformations have been performatively enacted both instantaneously and directly through the accumulated actions and reactions of the event. The affects of the bodies involved are transformed as the bodies become organised and distributed. In the situation, what these bodies can do, their very capabilities, become constrained. The body is an expression of a relation of forces (Goodchild, 1996: 29), and here forces are being applied. For Deleuze and Guattari (1988) a performative speech-act incorporates a judgement that incorporeally transforms a body much like a judge passing judgement in a courtroom. The technical effects of the corporeal transformation of the defendant into a prisoner are achieved through institutional technologies applied to the body. What I am trying to draw attention to, however, is how speech-acts and corporeal acts can both have technical and forceful effects that transform other bodies corporeally. Especially considering how actions and events build up and accumulate in order to effect these transformations, such non-representational actions may be better conceived of as (court) proceedings.

7. Conclusions

The sociability of bodies is desirable, but desirability and the ability to express desire are distributed properties that define this sociality. Power is immanent to action and agency, not external to it. The same is true of desire. Desire is immanent to action and agency. It places bodies in relation. It is the force of the sociability of bodies. But in practical and concrete situations, the immanent and unspoken sociality regulating what bodies can do tends to organise this placing in relation. This sociality is enacted performatively in social interaction.

Fundamental to the unfolding of this sociality is the multiplicity of potential and memory. A memory that is social and bodily, and which
is immanent to the particularities of practice and action, is the condition of the recuperation of immanent relations into which these bodies become organised. Yet, because of the virtual nature of such a memory, it is simultaneously one of the conditions for bodies to open up towards becoming different. Such a conceptualisation enables desire and pleasure to be held together, reconciling Butler (1999) and Foucault (1979) by bringing together the ideas of Deleuze and Bourdieu.

This allows us, on the one hand, to deal with extant regimes of sexuality. In this case, we have seen how the distribution of the costs of becoming a subject of sexuality, or even the denial of recognition of one’s ability to desire, becomes enacted as an emergent distribution of race and ethnicity, as well as gender. This is a theme that I will pick up again in the next chapter. Sexual affects and the ability to desire become distributed in practice, and such regulation is an interactive and eventful process. In addition to becoming worked out through talk, such regulation can take place through embodied performative action. Yet, on the other hand, this framework also allows an engagement with pleasurable desires, fleeing from regimes of sexuality. I shall pick up on these themes in chapters six and seven.
Chapter 5

Bodies, proper and eventful

1. Introduction

Bodies are often thought to have a proper place. To reside within such a distribution, it is commonly thought, bodies should behave appropriately, according to the etiquettes and modes of sociability proper to the occasion. And this is taken to represent not only the means by which society functions best, but more or less the natural order of things. In this chapter, I show that such economies of the proper place (de Certeau, 1984) are built upon the differentiation of bodies, a differentiation that itself operates across a series of relationships of force. Indeed, such differentiations are only possible on the basis of a series of power relations. Moreover, this chapter shows that the propriety of bodies is not a natural order of how things should be, an order in danger of erosion or loss, but is enacted, practised and performed in tenuous and fragile interactions, open to contestation.

I start the chapter by interrogating the techniques by which a transcendental memory becomes made concrete, and made to place bodies into relations that differentiate their capabilities for action and affect. Specifically, I discuss the enactment of racialised systems of sexual attractiveness. Through an analysis of empirical material, I will show why such systems of attractiveness cannot be reduced to explanation in terms of representational difference or identity. Rather, such systems of attractiveness are practised, and it is this practical nature that invites a consideration of the regulation of modes of desire. In the first section, I discuss primarily spoken techniques for distributing bodies and their relations, an enactment of a particularly racialised and sexualised microsociology. The second section moves on to consider embodied techniques, with particular reference to the
forms of white power that such techniques can engender. These two sections provide a precise theorisation of the operation of these techniques through such practices as the attribution and distribution of proper affects, processes of ordering, the production and accumulation of sense, the use of the body in judgement, sociability and performance, and various modes of transformation. In the final section of this chapter, I attempt to rework Deleuze’s (1990) philosophy of sense and event, applying it more directly to the sociality of bodies. Such a theory of bodily sense – a surface of the virtuality of the body – stands at the point of divergence between the re-enactment of proper bodily memories, and singular and intransitive processes of desire that open up the potential for becoming-different.

2. Enacting systems of attractiveness

Techniques

Remember the three lads in chapter 4, the ones sitting on the top deck of the night bus? Before they started trying to chat up the young woman sitting in front of them, they were sitting there chatting amongst themselves. They were already spread out occupying the seats, owning the space, confidently, languorously. I might add at this point, that two of these men were of South-Asian appearance, while the other was white; but maybe stating this is to already overdetermine practices much more subtle that were taking place.

These lads were talking about Watford, or rather they were talking about the people they had encountered there: what were the “blokes” [men] there like? What were the “birds” [women] there like? Were they “all right”? A series of differentiations develops. Black and Asian “blokes” in Watford were “all right”, but for some tacit reason white blokes were not. At this stage, the lads happily agree that Watford “birds” are “all right”. Their talk ventures through the nightclubs in Watford, dwelling on those they rated as good. My suspicion, based on their appearance, that these lads were nightclub bouncers was
confirmed when they mention a particular club in Central London. With a strangely good natured indignance, they bemoan not being able to get into this club. The indignation arises from the irony of working for the same firm of bouncers who supply that club’s door staff.

Then the talk returns to the women of Watford. Pronouncements and attributions, sexualised and racialised, are the means by which further differentiations are made. One of the men starts talking about various “birds” he knows. He embarks on a typology of their qualities and attributes. He talks about in which bars he thinks the “fittest” “birds” are found. He says he’s gone out with quite few “girls”, but that the “best” one he knows at the moment is this “really fit” “bird”, a member of the bar staff at a particular bar. Apparently, he thinks she has a really nice figure – a “best bod”. One of the other men asks him a question about her appearance, to which he immediately replies that she is black. Then, more generally, he remarks that, as far as the women of Watford are concerned, both “black birds” and “white birds” are really nice: he likes “shagging” [having sex with] them.

There is quite a lot of repetition in their conversation. Still, through questioning the first lad, the other two, who happen to be the two of ‘Asian’ appearance, move the talk onwards to include also “Asian birds”. The two ‘Asian’ lads agree about only “shagging” white women and black women, but say that they “don’t shag Asian birds”. The ‘white’ guy agrees, and reminisces that he once went out with an “Asian” girl at school but did not “shag” her. He does not elaborate why: it is taken as read. The other two concur: “you don’t shag Asian birds.” There is a very brief pause. Then the ‘white’ lad interjects that some of them are “really fit”. One of the others says that Asian birds are “improving”. Overall, their deliberations are summed up by one of the ‘Asian’ lads who concludes that “Asian girls” just “don’t want to shag.”

Immediately, the lads move on to talking about “American girls”: “The best girls are American girls.” One of the lads claims to have met a few
recently. He says there was something really “nice” about them. He also goes on to talk about American girls as “easy”, saying that they were “easy going, nice to talk to, really open.” Of course, the double meaning of “easy” does not escape these lads. As soon as it is settled that American girls are easy to get along with, it is immediately implied that they are “easy” lays as well. Nice company and accessible!

What I want to first draw attention to, here, is the way that these lads’ talk enacted one of the most explicitly racialised systems of sexual attractiveness and antipathy that I encountered during my fieldwork. Black women and white women in pubs and bars were constructed as attractive, especially if they worked behind the bar. “Asian” women, on the other hand, were objectified as beyond the bounds of sexual desire (c.f. Bhattacharyya, 1999). As one of the ‘Asian’ lads put it, “You just don’t shag Asian birds!” The lads enacted a clear distribution of bodies, differentiated by race and gender. Within this distribution of bodies, sexualised properties, such as having a “fit” body, were attributed through their talk to these white and black bodies, but not to Asian bodies. The judgements made in the course of the conversation associated attractiveness with certain bars and clubs and with the cultural styles of those spaces, and with race. Part of this process of distribution was the production of a more visceral sense, of the lads’ own sexual prowess. They achieved this in relation to the women they were objectifying, or more specifically, through the embodied and pleasurable performance of their capability - among themselves - to assign status to women through their own desire. In this, there was an almost rhythmic repetition. These drunken refrains resist reduction to meaning. Here, the construction of a sense involves the emergence and maintenance of a visceral feeling between the lads.

It is this in-betweenness that denies a representational understanding of the practical construction of sense. This is evident in the lads’ building an affective sense of masculinity between themselves. It is also evident in the social activity of their speech. Talk is a kind of action – it does things (Thrift, 2000). Not only does the quite visceral
sense produced by the lads exceed representational conception, the lads also develop an accumulated sense through the open-ended interaction of their speech. This in-between and negotiated social activity has its own unfolding complexity, quite apart from the establishment of identificatory relations between individuals and shared cultural properties. The concepts of identity and identification are not really adequate to the complexities of social activities distributing bodies. In their speech, the lads do not merely deploy or enact 'identifications'. What the lads are doing in their talk is not merely the straightforward application of principles of difference. Their talk has sequential effects that rebound on the accumulation of their in-between sense. Moreover, what they say, what they do, has concrete effects on the agency of bodies, both theirs and others’. What they do distributes bodies. Rather, then, than saying the lads were deploying ‘identities’ or ‘identifications’ in their talk, I will tentatively say that they were deploying certain techniques.

To think in terms of techniques opens up space for intervention. No longer would we be faced with the frightening prospect of monolithic identities. Nor even would the gap for intervention be restricted to the sliver of light offered by representational work – the activity of applying relational principles of difference, invoking identities. To intervene we need to be practical. Our actions need to have effects. It is precisely at points of activity that intervention can be made. To think in terms of techniques proffers room for intervention because it opens up multiplicitous dimensions of practice and affect, in addition to the representational. A concern with techniques demands an engagement with how things work, and that is where we intervene: in the very workings, the very practicalities of social techniques.

So, how might such techniques work? When one of the ‘Asian’ lads says that “Asian” women were “improving”, how is this term “improving” being deployed? Well, its deployment, or rather its technical effect, does not rest solely on some putative meaning of the word. These techniques are social. That is, they are actively enacted in
the multiplicity of lived social practice. In part, they rest on a connective accumulation or memory of sense within the conversation. When one of the lads says that “Asian” women are “improving” this is in response to one of his friends saying that some ‘Asian’ women are really “fit”. “Improving” thus becomes linked to bodily appearance. Already, the attractiveness of ‘Asian’ women is being opened up to question.

The lads continue by talking about how ‘Asian’ women generally “don’t want to shag.” Any suggestion of cultural process, however, becomes reduced to an attribution of a property to the women involved. It is not so much that in the lads’ talk it is an attribute of British South Asian women that they don’t want to shag. Rather, through their talk, the lads attribute this unwillingness to have sex to these British South Asian women. This is an important difference. It is the difference between conceiving of a static attribute and its static presuppositions, and conceiving of an active and indeterminate practice of attribution. The lads enact this attribution in their practice. It is only through instances such as this that such attributes become re-enacted and repeated.

This practice of attribution ascribes these properties as proper. Moreover, the attribution becomes an attribute. What is an act, an event, becomes taken for granted as a necessary property of the object (Deleuze, 1990: 97). The act of attribution is blushful about its own eventfulness. This act of attribution accomplishes a double ordering, and it is through this double ordering that the act both essentialises and makes proper the attributed property. On the one hand, the act of attribution creates an order, an economy of the proper place (de Certeau, 1984). Bodies become distributed within such an order, inserted into their proper place, defined by their proper attributes. Such an order defines what a body is supposed to be able to do: Asian women are supposed not to “want to shag.” In this way, the very distribution of bodies is simultaneously the production of difference. The order itself, however, only becomes enacted through
the (multiplicitous) action of ordering. Yet, all too often, as with these lads, the style of speech, the assurance of the interlocutors’ bodies, evinces a lack of doubt about this ordering. They are so certain that this order is as it is given. It doesn’t seem to them like they engage in the action of ordering: the order is just the way things are. This is the doubleness of the ordering taking place within the practice of attribution. This second sense of ordering is an implicit and performative order – a command – within the act of attribution. It is a command to forget that the order is an eventful accomplishment. This order within the order makes it appear that the attribute is essential to what it has been assigned to. Any sense of social or cultural process, either with regard to their own talk or to the subjectification and desire of the women they talk of, becomes lost to these lads. That “Asian girls don’t want to shag” becomes an essential and proper attribute, rather than a sense in which this might be to do with, on the one hand, an external and social attribution or, on the other hand, a system of prohibitions or judgements. In a way, this otherness of sense, unavailable to, or excluded by, the lads, is a kind of relationality within the sense emerging in the lads’ talk.

There is also another, more commonly understood form of relationality being enacted. After talking about how ‘Asian’ women “don’t want to shag”, the lads continue by talking about “nice” and “easy” “American girls”. On the face of it, both “nice” and “easy” take on a ‘double meaning’, but, again, I think it would be more useful to think of this deployment in terms of technique, rather than meaning. The doubleness of “nice” is used simultaneously to connote that one particular lad found these American women pleasant to be with, and to place these women within an order of bodily attractiveness. Similarly, “easy” is deployed as “easy going, nice to talk to, really open,” but the lads simultaneous use of “easy” with regard to these women’s sexual availability already structures desire unequally along gendered and ethnicised lines. The lads create a sense in which they assert a certain connectivity between one of their number and these American women. At the same time, this connectivity is already recuperated within a
specific complex regulating bodies’ desire. The term “easy” carries an unspoken assumption about a challenge overcome. There is an implicit presupposition that proper female bodies resist sexual advances. This not only places a certain distance between these lads and the American women, but it places the burden of being open and easy to connect to, as well as the regulation of bodies’ heterosexual intercourse, on women. Connection, in this instance, becomes conquest, an easy conquest by the lads whose sexual agency is both assured and unconscious. Without wanting to stretch the analogy too far, I might suggest that the lads’ sexual agency takes a particular form: a gendered and liberal free-marketeering that overcomes feminine regulation in its conquest of new lands or bodies. Whatever, there is a specific distribution of sexual agency and subjectivity between these lads and the American women. These lads create a sense of their potency through distanciating themselves from “American girls”, and assigning a different form of agency - the regulatory burden of ‘consent’ - to these women. For the lads, though, everything comes easy: they don’t have to even demonstrate their masculine potency because these “American girls” are just so damned “easy”.

A relational distribution is achieved in the lads’ talk, differentiating and specifying the particular desiring agencies of themselves and these American women. As I have already alluded to, in some ways, these lads become white through becoming heterosexual men. This is about laying claim to a sexualised power and agency, rather than being about skin colour; but it is not a becoming-different, merely a becoming-the-Same. If they become anything other than their skins, these lads merely become some other existing organs, machinically plugged into a wider assemblage regulating their bodies and others’. And this only lasts as long as they talk amongst themselves. But whilst they talk amongst themselves, they not only have the power to relationally specify the sexual attributes of American women, they also differentiate British South Asian women from these American women. Within the conversation there is a sequential accumulation of sense, an
accretion of a relational memory. We have already seen how the sexual attractiveness of Asian women was thrown into doubt by the lads through their linking of attractiveness and improvement. This is in contrast to American women who are talked of as straightforwardly “nice” in both a physical and personal sense. “Improving”, though, was also linked with the Asian women’s desire or willingness to have sex. I take from this that the lads, without making it explicit, are invoking a wider and more concrete panoply of changes in cultural codes as pertains young South Asian women in Britain. These changes would apply to the regulation of appearance, of ways of making oneself attractive, of ways of carrying oneself, of what one is allowed to do, or how one talks, as well as of ways of being judged. It is clear, however, that with respect to both British South Asian women and American women, the lads are conflating attractiveness and the moral regulation of sexual desire.

The distribution achieved through the lads’ talk not only (re-)produces or (re-)enacts the lads’ own agency and subjectivity, it (re-)produces the very categories ‘Asian women’ and ‘American women’. It is not only, however, that these categories are produced across differences in properties, but, rather, that the very differences between these categories are produced in the process of attribution in talk (Grossberg, 1996). This is concomitant with the performative action of attributive talk. The lads accomplish the production of difference in their acts of attributing qualities to these different women.

The concepts of bodily memory and potential, which were developed in the previous chapter, allow for a conception of the immanence of machinic relations to practice. The operation of power to place bodies in a repetitive relation of force, and to thereby recuperate repetitive forms of difference, becomes potential. Bodily memory is encountered or enacted singularly in practice, in the in-between. Its enactment is the bringing of a sociality of bodies and their differences to life, but this enactment occurs in the purely differential unfolding of practice. Such a memory is about the potential of what bodies can do. We can
see this here, in the sense that the lads enact the difference between ‘Asian women’ and ‘American women’ as different capabilities for sexualised action, desire and affect.

Even though one might argue that the lads’ speech does not enact a bodily memory per se, in that a memory becomes enacted in speech rather than in embodied action, this memory is still a social memory of what bodies can do. It operates in a similar way to bodily memory, as conceived in chapter four. So, in a similar way to bodily memory being the material readiness of bodies to fit into certain relations, or to perform certain corporeal transformations, this form of social memory is the readiness of bodies to perform certain incorporeal transformations. As with the enactment of difference in the lads’ speech, it can be the potential to reimpose a set of machinic relations upon bodies, making them organic, constraining their affects, or, in this case, their attributed affects. Yet, as it is a living and dynamic potential that unfolds in the process of interaction and practice, it can open up towards pure difference. It can become the capability, that is, for bodies to do something different from what they could have done before. Such a social memory, whether bodily or not, is the potential to face different ways. It is the immanence of pure difference to practice, and the immanence of becoming-organic to bodily relations. The singular production of difference, then, can both recuperate powerful relations of force, and can open up towards new and mutating difference. The lads, however, recuperate a set of differences which place bodies in repetitive and subjected positions.

The techniques used in the lads’ talk, then, are distributive and productive of difference. This deployment is a social and interactive achievement. It may be intentional, but neither is this intentionality necessarily consciously realised by the lads, nor is it necessarily a relation proper to individuals. The intentionality of their deployment is, as we have seen, an accumulated and collaborative achievement. It takes place over time, building up a sense. Moreover, it involves interactive and responsive participation in-between the lads. The
distribution of bodily capabilities and properties through the ongoing production of difference is social and eventful. It follows, then, that intentionality is an emergent state, performatively enacted through the social practice, in this case, speech. The “Asian birds” and “American girls” that the lads talk about only emerge through an objectification process in their speech. This emergent and social intentionality is the first important way in which the techniques deployed in the lads’ talk can be understood.

The other ways these techniques can be understood are also, crucially, about the way these techniques work. So, to recap, secondly, we have seen how these techniques work through the accumulative and sequential construction of sense. Third, the process of attribution is seen to be a specific and singular activity. It has particular effects in the process of producing a specific sense. It also performs a double ordering that effaces its own enactment of a proper order, an effacement that makes the act of attribution seem like a referencing of an essence. And, fourth, the relational production of difference distributes bodies and their different capabilities or agencies, at least within the lads’ talk.

This list provides an indication of the social character of the techniques deployed in the lads’ speech. To reiterate, by saying that these techniques are social is not to say that concepts of identification and meaning are not social, but merely that they are not enough to adequately engage with the complex and indeterminate activity of these techniques. Furthermore, in describing the efficacy of these techniques, it is important not to overdetermine their singularity. The way that these techniques work in the lads’ speech in this particular event is singular and will not be precisely repeated in other social events or encounters. At other times, in other places, and/or with other participants, even the broad processes characterised here might not apply, or might be accompanied by, and work with, other processes. What is important, though, is the way in which we
understand these techniques. That is, that we understand these techniques in terms of their specific machinism.

Each of the four techniques described above are in reciprocal presupposition with concrete machinic assemblages. They each and together presuppose an implicit invocation of concrete regimes regulating what bodies can do, specifically those enacting sexualised, gendered, ethnicised and racialised differentiations in these capacities. Ultimately, what these techniques do is make such machines work. But, if, for the time being at least, we accept that only bodies have causal or affective force, and that events do not (Deleuze, 1990), then how are we to understand how eventful techniques in speech have effects? At the very least there is a question to be addressed about how speech works or acts. It might seem that while speech does things, what it does is the organisation of bodies only in sense. If speech was treated as merely an instance of discourse – an event – then it would only be properly quasi-causal. This, however, would present the danger of invoking a common and, I would argue, mistaken presupposition about the originary nature of intentionality. Rather than supposing that intention requires a mentalistic origin, however, this formulation would exactly substitute bodies in the role of the mind.

Instead of treating speech as eventful instances of discourse, however, separate from uttering bodies, speech can be thought of with the body. Speech, as I have discussed it so far, is a technique, or rather an instantiation of techniques, used by the body, propelled by bodily force. This is not exactly to say that speech is of the body and can therefore have real effects – I am not sure that this presupposes the most pertinent question. To think of bodies, we must think beyond the body. Speech is part of a machinic assemblage, albeit facing outwards towards sense. If it is bodily, it is in-between, in the constant emergence of what works as a body. I have already posed a question about the relationship or difference between the immanence of machinic relations to speech, and the enactment of these machinic
relations through speech. By looking at speech and bodies in the in-between, the immanence of machinic assemblages to speech is the enactment of those machinic relations through speech because speech is part of the process by which the machine enacts itself.

The question of causality, however, is still not resolved. It is important now because, amongst all of the incorporeal effects of the techniques deployed in the lads’ speech, it is also evident that the lads created an affective, visceral, and thus bodily, sense between them through their conversation. Furthermore, the sociality of their conversation organised their bodies, enacting a group subjectivity and agency. So, what sort of effects might speech acts have? As mentioned in chapter four, Deleuze and Guattari (1988) discuss the performative action of speech in terms of the incorporeal transformations of bodies. Does this mean that the sexualised, gendered, racialised and ethnicised differences we are concerned with here can only be understood as incorporeal? Does ‘the social’ more broadly, when we are concerned with its enactment in speech, have to also only be understood as an incorporeal effect? I do not think so. In the previous chapter, I reworked the concept of transformations to be able to engage with direct corporeal transformations by embodied action. This reworking, I suggest, might open up space for the possibility of direct ‘technical’ or machinic effects of speech, if speech is considered with the body.

Consider the lads on the night bus again. It is through their speech, their conversation, that they enact a visceral and felt sense of masculinity between themselves. Their speech enacts an immanent machinism. It is a point of instantiation of a concrete machinic assemblage, one which not only distributes bodies according to gender, sexuality, ethnicity and race, but does so by distributing their affects. We can see the effects of speech even more clearly if we consider when the lads started talking to one of the two women sitting in front of them. Their conversation with the woman actively placed the woman and themselves in a set of affective relations. Their speech had affective effects. It impacted directly upon the woman’s body, not
only changing her emotions, but her potential to affect and be affected. She was forced into reacting, into resisting the desiring affects that were expected of her.

Or consider, for example, the effect of a racist insult hurled by a stranger in a public place. It has a visceral effect upon the body. It affects the one being insulted, immediately impacting upon her body and what it can do. It affects her emotionally, and it affects her potential for bodily action. It can provoke fear and a fleeing; or fury and a fighting back. Or perhaps a staying silent, hoping the storm will pass. An insult impacts upon what a body can do. Such an impact is the performative effect of the insult, the very action that is carried out by the utterance of an insult. It is the immediate instillation of fear and anger, but it only works because speech operates in the in-between of bodies. It is not just a matter of a speaking body (an insulting body) and an affected body (an insulted body). For a start, the person doing the insulting is also affected by their actions. This person enacts their own affects, both in terms of their emotions, and in terms of what they can do. Moreover, the insult establishes an affective relation between these bodies within a wider field of potential. Are there other people around? Who are these people, and what is their likely reaction to the insult or to any given reaction? Is there a place to run? Is it dark here? Is there a marked territory onto which one of the bodies has strayed? The insult cites a history of affective relations, relationships of force and machinic assemblages of power. It is encountered as an immanent bodily memory of how to feel, what to do. It is the return of fear and anger. But such a remembering is also a remembering of what territory these bodies are territorialising upon. This is a different sort of citation within bodily memory, but nonetheless it is still about what a body can do.

Rejoinder

I should think that Ranjana and Meera, two participants from group one, might have liked to have argued with the lads on the night bus
about whether Asian women can become desiring bodies. In doing so, however, they might not themselves have avoided enacting systems of attractiveness. Meera is married to Neil, a middle class white man, while Ranjana also finds a particular normative version of white masculinity attractive:

Ranjana OK. My type is, it’s this – it’s the typical tall, dark and handsome [sniggers] and that usually means like... Well, I suppose Kieran was my type. He was, he had black hair or dark brown hair, well he was dark haired and tall. Umm... [long pause] I suppose I’m hesitating ‘cause, ‘cause erm, this is kind of interesting bit for you. [chuckles] Er, no, I just, ‘cause I’m trying to think, ‘cause I do, like, especially prefer women, like I find the contrast of like fair skin but jet black hair really striking. And I think with men as well, but no, that’s doesn’t make sense, ‘cause [pause] ‘cause the sort of Spanish Mediterranean look’s kind of like darker skin, it’s not, it’s not, erm... With women, though, I don’t know why, but with women I think it looks really. You know, like Andrea Corr from the yeah, like I think she looks really striking, like dark hair, fair skin. But then I don’t know with men... [long pause] Dunno.

Jason I don’t know, but, with men it’s a bit more a range of, you were saying, [Ranjana: Yeah.] a Mediterranean sort of contrast of hair and skin is not so, the contrast is not so great, but that’s still, I mean, very attractive?

Ranjana Definitely black, dark hair on men, I like. Erm, no, what I was just trying to think of was like whether I, you know, have the same with men, that they have this like fair skin and jet black hair. And I suppose, you know, see I can’t remember even what shade Kieran was now. But he’s obviously Irish so he’s like fair skin and dark hair and I suppose that is my type. But I don’t know.

[pause]

Jason I mean, I mean at the risk of sort of taking ther- erm... or reading too much into it, but, erm, does it seem a particularly sort of, I suppose, commercialised appearance?

Ranjana Yeah, well, it’s difficult to say because I mean like you know, I have, like there’s Indian blokes that I know that I’ve fancied.
Erm, and I obviously went out with a fair skinned... Erm, but like, but I suppose my ideal type is like kind of like that just because recently, like I’ve - don’t really, well, I don’t think I do fancy blonde people - but rarely though.

(Interview with Ranjana, 15 February 2002)

Ranjana says she finds men who are “tall, dark and handsome” attractive. Yet, as she elaborates, it becomes apparent that to become handsome within this category, it usually helps to be white. Being “dark” then, is only to be a darker shade of white.

For Ranjana, her potential for sexualised desire is not bounded, but does exhibit a predilection for certain kinds of white men. As such, Ranjana speaks a form of sexual regulation into existence. She instantiates a common system of racialised sexual attractiveness, and in doing so, inserts herself into a schema of sexual subjectivity. She becomes a desiring subject by finding desirable a recognisably attractive type of body – an acceptable object of desire. However, such is the gendered nature of finding a proper place when entering into such sexualised relations, that Ranjana, on another occasion becomes challenged. This occurred during the second group interview with group one. Neil had been talking at length about what heterosexual men might find attractive about women. He had been concentrating on a variety of different physical body parts, body parts being made to become organic. Yet, when Ranjana interrupts to contribute her feelings about finding attraction in certain aspects of male physicality, certain presumptions emerge.

Neil  Yeah, I’m a- I’m a big face man. I /like expressions.
Ranjana Yeah, for me, actually, the face is absolutely-
Neil Like Cat Deeley, she has no expressions. She has no face, no personality in there. It’s like-
Tariq [to Ranjana] That’s strange coming from a girl. [sniggers]
Ranjana: What? What did you think I was going to like arses or something?

[laughter]

Tariq: No! Personality! I thought you girls went for, isn’t it?

[laughter]

Ranjana: Oh no!

[laughter]

[change of tape]

[...]

Ranjana: Tariq was taking the piss out of me.

[laughter]

Tariq: I was just surprised because lots of girls go on about it’s personality more than anything.

Jack: Yeah. [brief pause]/ [sarcastic] ’Cause most people are just being honest.

Meera: /Oh yeah, but-

[laughter at what Jack has said]

Jack: [...] The reason I say that [Ranjana: no-] is because girls go on about personalities because they think it’s the right thing to say.

[laughter]

Jack: It’s true. Girls don’t give a piss about personality. They just go for good ti- go for looks.

Ranjana: /I know, I am quite [...]-

Neil: /They both-they both, it’s like blokes who do vaguely going for blondes-

Tariq: -and afterwards, and afterwards they think, does he have a big one?

[laughter]

Ranjana: No! No!

[laughter increases]

Jack: “Has he got a nice arse?” Hit the nail right on the head!

Neil: Yeah!

[laughter dies down]

Ranjana: No, it- No, it’s face and personality. I never look at bloody what size dick they are, or something like that.
[laughter]

Neil But if a bloke’s – say a bloke said “Nah! I don’t think, like, it’s - can only talk to them about personality,” girls would say, [deep, thuggish voice] “Urghh! He’s got a nice arse, a nice face!” But just ’cause blokes go “Whoa! She’s a bit of alright!” girls have to make themselves different by saying, “Oh! But I like your personality.” [brief pause] As Jack said, it’s to mark themselves different from the men. But they have their cake and eat it in the girls’ toilets: [High pitched voice] “Oooh! You’ve got a lovely arse!” [Tariq laughs] “Ooh! He’s a lovely face [...]!”

[brief pause then Jack and Tariq laugh loudly while Ranjana tries to start speaking]

Ranjana I’ve never gone into the toilet and gone “He’s got a lovely arse!”

[Meera and Tariq laugh]

Ranjana’s first contribution in this passage is to concur with what Neil has been saying. She signals her concurrence by starting off with a “yeah”, and it is clear that her comment is deployed to continue and reinforce the particular sense of how bodies can desire that Neil has been constructing. What is more, she is already starting to make a claim about what her body can do, how she can desire. This claim, however, is disturbing. It disturbs the proper distribution of bodies’ capabilities for desire. In this section of conversation, this distribution had hitherto been dominated by men speaking their desire for women’s bodies. Tariq enacts this sense of propriety by at once making Ranjana’s desire “strange”. There are presuppositions to their speech, to who can say what, to who can desire in specific ways. Ranjana attempts to enter into relation with this machine, this organism, but Tariq stops this relation. He brings to life the organism in a slightly different formation from that expected by Ranjana, with its organs configured so as to work as they were already doing, but only for male desire.

Female desire is given a different object. “Girls” are supposed to go for “personality”. Perhaps, it might be argued, such a move enables women to enter into connective desiring relations, a multiplicity of
entanglements between persons, rather than just a consuming gaze. What is certain, however, is that there is a norm, an expectation, being cited, and that it is men who are dictating the terms of engagement. As the talk proceeds further, it becomes clear that it is the men in the group who are talking for women. Nevertheless, these men think that they are citing women. “Girls go on about personalities,” they claim. Jack complicates this claim, by adding that “girls” only do this “because they think it’s the right thing to say.” A number of interesting things are achieved by Jack in saying this. Firstly, he continues Tariq’s generalisation, so that these men talk not only for women, but for all women. When Jack continues to claim that women find objectified bodies (“looks”) rather than personality attractive, he is making a claim for all women based upon Ranjana’s desire. Ranjana is made to stand in for all women. This technique of synecdoche enforces the rule because it applies the burden of observing the rule to all women: if one strays, they have all strayed – there can be no exception.

Secondly, Jack’s speech does not modify the enacted propriety and normativity of women’s desire for personality over objectified bodies. Rather, his complication merely claims that women’s desire is regularly improper; it makes no modification to Tariq’s claims as to what is proper female desire. Indeed, a number of implicit presuppositions – the immanence of this moral economy to the conversation - come into play here. Jack’s claim that women “go on about personalities because they think it’s the right thing to say,” implies that women performatively enact this moral economy of proper desire through their own talk. Implicit to Jack’s claim then is a complaint that women berate men for focusing on women’s bodies. Not only is Jack constructing a situation where he appears to have uncovered the dirty secret of women’s desire, he is constructing their hypocrisy in relation to men.

These implicit presuppositions, however, only become actualised through the interactive and accumulative social activity of the
conversation. Neil immediately makes the link to male desire by comparing Jack’s description of female desire to men who like blonde haired women. Tariq increases the hyperbolic trajectory necessary to the conversation by implying that women’s desire is conditional on the size of a man’s penis, hyper-sexualising this desire, and making it into an objectifying desire. Despite Ranjana’s attempts at interjection, Neil continues by mobilising two sets of contrastive structures within a normalising structure. He asserts that women differentiate themselves from men along an axis of desire. His assertion already normalises masculine desire—it is women who are contrasted to men, and male desire that is already taken as given—and spells out exactly the forms which these gendered and sexualised desires are expected to take. Moreover, in pronouncing that women “have their cake and eat it in the girls’ toilets,” he is completing the accumulating construction of women’s hypocrisy that Jack had started. Women, it is implied, affirm the propriety of their attraction to personality, and, by marking themselves as different from men, censure men for their attraction to female bodies. By going to the toilets to eat their cake, these women can themselves partake of the guilty pleasures of desiring men’s bodies free from the censure of men for their hypocrisy.

Of course, the group do not take these constructions very seriously. There is an element of winding up Ranjana in the proceedings, and the group’s laughter is testament to a degree of humour with which most of these constructions are deployed. Nevertheless, this is not to say that the group does not make any investment in these economies of proper affect, nor that they are not ambivalent about the distributions being achieved. I do, however, want to point out the techniques by which such distributions were being made, for they resonate with those deployed by the lads on the night bus. The sense of proper affect and desire was a social and accumulative achievement that required collaboration among several group members. A double ordering took place: constructing an order of proper affect, and ordering that this proper sense be taken as the way things are. And this order achieved a
relational distribution of attributes and capabilities for affect and sexualised desire.

3. Embodied techniques and attractiveness

This section will consider the practical enactment of what many would consider ‘mainstream’ white femininities and masculinities within particular British economies of attractiveness.

*Attractiveness and social power*

We have already considered a range of techniques that can be deployed in talk to distribute bodies and their capabilities. Here, I want to move on to discuss more embodied and sociable techniques that transform affective and social relations. These techniques are the practical ways of enacting a sociality of what bodies can do, an organisation of affect. As we are concerned with specific practices and specific socialities, these practices and socialities will be situated. Specifically, in this section, I am concerned with the practices of sociality amongst young middle class white people in pubs. There are racialised, ethnicised, gendered and sexualised micropolitics to practices in such spaces. Such micropolitics involve talk, but cannot be reduced to it.

In chapter four we met Paul and Ben talking about the strangeness of Matt and Nicole. Paul and Ben had been having this conversation in an O’Neill’s pub – an Irish theme pub – on a Friday evening. In total, four members of group three were there that evening on this particular night out: in addition to Paul and Ben, Chloe and Penny were also there. They had all joined a larger friendship group, a group of fourteen of Chloe’s colleagues. This cobbling together of groups took place near the front of the pub, by the doors, around a very large table that managed to accommodate most of these people. For Chloe and her colleagues, there was a special reason to all be out together: it was Jessica’s leaving party. Probably because it was a special event,
most of the group was planning to go on to a nightclub later in the evening, a ‘cheesy’ seventies night at a cavernous local venue. With this combination of reasons – it being Jessica’s leaving do and the plan to go to a club later – most, although not all, of the group had ‘dressed up’. Certainly, many of Chloe’s colleagues seemed to have been in what might be called ‘glamorous’ outfits, and must have changed out of their work clothes. None, however, had opted for a seventies look.

While the impression given by the group as a whole was that they had ‘dressed up’, this was not true of all the individuals within the group. Chloe’s colleagues were mostly women (ten out of the fourteen), but out of the four men amongst them, only one seemed to have made an effort to dress up. Sure enough, later in the evening, two of the other men left while the rest of us were still in the pub. Even amongst the women, however, there was a considerable variation of how far people had gone to dress up. Jessica, for example, was wearing a distinctive gold and red embroidered top. It was sleeveless, and was cut so that it had a fashionable excess of fabric at the front that could drape down and create the effect of a flowing material. With this top, however, Jessica was wearing mid-blue jeans and tidy flat shoes. Her jeans, in particular, while fashionable, were casual, and in contrast to her ‘dressy’ top. It was in the subtleties of how these jeans worked in combination with the rest of the outfit that made them appear casual and possibly incongruous: the cut, the colour, how they were worn.

Chloe, like many of the other women in the group, had dressed up in clothes that marked her out as trendy, twenty-something and more middle class or ‘discerning’ than someone who would buy ‘run of the mill’ ‘high street’ fashions. This is not to say that her clothes did not come from high street stores, but rather to say that the high street proliferates a series of distinctions to facilitate the consuming process. Even within the same high street chain there are subtle variations in the styles sold that allow distinctions in taste and class to be made. Moreover, there are also subtle variations in the ways that such clothes can be combined and worn that also allow such distinctions to
be made. Anyway, Chloe was wearing a black short sleeve ‘peasant’ top with a scrunched up neckline and sleeve ends, a style that was fashionable that summer. She also had a black skirt on. She had styled her hair, tying it up in a rather complex manner, and she was wearing quite a lot of carefully applied make up.

There were two women from amongst Chloe’s colleagues, however, who seemed to stand out as the most ‘glamorous’. Lisa was wearing a sparkly blue top, fairly tight black trousers and strappy, high-heeled evening shoes. Her top was so sparkly, that at first I thought it was covered in sequins. Upon closer inspection, however, I saw that the beadiness was part of the weave of the fabric. Lisa’s hair was in a bob, and she was wearing quite a lot of make up, although it was subtly applied. She spent a lot of the night talking with the other ‘most glamorous’ woman, Claire. Claire was wearing a black skirt and a colourful top with diagonal stripes of different pinks and reds. Over this top, she wore a thin black shirt, designed to be worn open to show off the top being worn underneath. Claire also appeared to have put considerable care into how she had applied her make up and done her hair. Ben later remarked to me that he thought Claire and Lisa were also, because of their glamorous appearance, among the most attractive women from amongst Chloe’s friends.

To say that Lisa and Claire were looking glamorous, or to say that Jessica’s jeans were casual next to her top, or even to say that Chloe had applied her make up with care, is to make a series of judgements. It is to transform those whom are judged. With what power, and upon what authority, do I make such judgements and such transformations? It is the same authority with which similar judgements are made by people in everyday life. This is not to say that everybody could make such a judgement about Claire, Lisa or Jessica’s appearance. Rather, it is to point out the machinism of becoming able to make such sartorial distinctions. Of course, within this machinism there co-exists a variety of relations to the bodies being gazed upon and judged. My relation to Claire, Lisa, or Jessica’s appearance – my ability to see something
distinctive – is my encounter with a social memory of visual sartorial distinctions between bodies. It is an enactment of my place within the machine, as well as being one amongst many moments enacting Claire, Lisa and Jessica’s potential entanglement within the machine. Although I would probably share much of this visual prehension with, say, the other women in this group, there would also be differences between each of us in the ways we would enact our gaze and our judgements. Significantly, our relations to Claire, Lisa or Jessica’s appearance – expressed as our judgements, spoken or unspoken – might differ along gendered and sexualised lines. Such differences express differences in what these judgements do in the complex of machinic relations surrounding the appearance of bodies.

Wearing particular styles of clothing and make up is to engage in machinism of sartorial distinctions. What does the wearing of particularly fashioned and fashionable clothes do? Of course, it can enable the person wearing such clothes to enact a set of distinctions, perhaps to set themselves apart, perhaps to fit in, and often both. Such distinctions enact a set of classed, sexualised, ethnicised and gendered power relations and differentiations. More than this, however, wearing particular styles of clothes can only enact these distinctions by working within the forever proliferating machinery of fashion. Wearing ‘glamorous’ clothes cites what is already taken to be ‘glamorous’. Even wearing clothes at the ‘cutting edge’ of fashion, something apparently new, cites something nostalgic, because to be taken as stylish requires being recognisable as such within a given visual register. This memory is not located in the individual. The machine encompasses not only the ‘fashion industry’ – the shops, the manufacturers, the designers, the fashion media, the celebrities and the ‘trendies’. It also works the differentiations and relations emerging in the fashion industry into the sociality of the everyday.

From another direction, then, dressing glamorously might be to insert one’s body into a machinic sociality. To become glamorous is to fit in, to observe a sociality, yet, at the same time, find a style of one’s own
to mark oneself out as distinctive. The social milieu and the particular machinic sociality operating within it are important. A glamorous outfit in one situation might not pass muster in another. It might be inappropriate, overdressed, or not dressy enough. It might be deemed tacky and too mainstream; or too vulgar and tasteless. Becoming glamorous, then, depends on the judgement of others. And the judgement of others depends on their participation in a particular and shared form of sociality. The style in which one dresses does something: it places one in a relation to a particular mode of sociality with other bodies, and thus with a machinery of proper bodily relations and performances. To dress glamorously signals a bodily ability to wear a particular style convincingly, an awareness of the subtleties and skills needed to ‘pull off’ an outfit. It signals an awareness of the demands of the form of sociality proper to that territory – what can be expressed in that territory. It is the ability to fit in distinctively.

Some people dress to stand apart, to stand outside of the present territory. Yet, even to stand apart in such a way is usually to signal an affiliation to another sociality, a desire to belong elsewhere. In contrast, what Lisa and Claire did by dressing glamorously, especially as they planned to go clubbing later, was merely to make themselves distinctive within a given sociality of dress. This action established their place in the group, not just in terms of belonging, but, as we shall see in a moment, in terms of their popularity and their power, too. What they were doing by dressing glamorously was to employ a set of bodily techniques, techniques that resist a simple reading as meaning. Not everybody in the group deployed such techniques to such effect, or was even able to deploy such techniques at all. The specificity of these techniques and the subtleties of their variation make it impossible to generalise about what these techniques achieve. Dressing glamorously in a pub before going to a nightclub is to act differently from dressing up to go to a trendy bar, or dressing glamorously to go to a dinner party. Moreover, the outcomes of these techniques are social and interactive, as we shall see. They were part of a broader set of
performative techniques that effected a social distribution of bodies at the group level.

About twenty minutes after I arrive, I look around the table and notice that there is a group of four women standing around Jessica. Jessica is sitting down on one of the tall chairs suitable for this table and has her back turned towards the table in order to face this group of four women. All four of these women seem to be looking at Jessica. It almost seems like they are looking to her for inspiration or leadership, at least as far as the conversation is concerned. A couple of these women look quite ordinary, although somehow ineffably meek, but the other two look somewhat out of place. They look even quieter than the first two, hardly saying anything, just listening to the conversation. One of them is dressed in what might have been taken as very unfashionable clothing. The other is a fairly large woman in a smart and stylish suit, but who has very long, curly, bushy and unkempt, unstyled hair. She has very thick glasses on. She comes across as something of an outsider, but this is just as much to do with the look of timidity on her face, as with the way she is dressed or the size and keeping of her body.

Meanwhile, Chloe is sitting next to me, just smiling and listening to Lisa and Claire who are sitting on the other side of the table from her, and who are conversing with each other. Chloe is rapt with attention and even chuckles when Lisa and Claire laugh at something humorous they are talking about, even though she cannot possibly hear what they are saying. Sometime later, Chloe accidentally knocks her glass over and spills the greater part of a pint of lager over the table. In an instance, the beer has run over the edges of the table. It spills onto both Chloe’s lap and that of another woman called Jenny, who is sitting nearby. Jenny gets up quietly and goes off to the bathroom to dry herself off. I give Chloe a couple of tissues for her to dry her skirt. As she is doing so, she moans that her clothes are soaked and that they are going to smell of beer. More than this, however, she is embarrassed and worries aloud about what the others in the group will
think of her. She must look an idiot, she says. Indeed, as soon as she had knocked over the glass, her eyes had darted up towards Claire and Lisa. She glances worriedly up at them again a couple of times more over the next minute or two. Eventually, Chloe asks where Jenny has gone. I tell her that Jenny has gone to the toilets to dry herself off. Chloe is surprised, saying that she had not realised she had "got" Jenny as well, and then whines "Oh no!"

As the evening progresses, I note that Claire and Lisa have moved around to the other side of the table, nearer the window. They seem to be 'circulating' a lot more now than earlier in the evening. They move round the group to talk to different people, and are sometimes not even talking with each other, but have separated to do this circulating. Everybody they go to talk to seems to be more than happy to talk to them. They seem very popular and very confident. Jessica also starts 'circulating' a little bit later, although she does not have quite the same air of confidence. She is, nevertheless, popular, and although I cannot be sure, I do not think this is merely down to it being her leaving party. Three of the un-glamorous looking women who were standing around Jessica earlier stay there when she gets up to circulate. They look bored. While everybody else seems to be engaged in conversation, these three stand there in silence for a long time, not engaging with the rest of the group. They stare into space or look vaguely at their colleagues, their faces impassive.

One member of the group, a colleague of Chloe's called Owen, is sitting by himself reading a newspaper at a separate table in a corner next to the larger table. Paul and Chloe start to talk about Owen, even though he is sitting really close to them. As they are doing so, Claire and Lisa come over to talk to Owen, and stay talking to him for quite a long time. I get to thinking that Owen must be more popular and confident than he had at first made himself seem. Both Claire and Lisa seem to be really engaged in their conversation with him, their smiles genuine and spontaneous. Soon Jenny comes over to join in the conversation, and then Jessica also joins this party in the corner.
Meanwhile, Chloe and Paul continue to argue about Owen. Paul says that he is boring and a “twat” for sitting in the corner, reading a newspaper. Chloe, who obviously knows Owen better than Paul does, maintains quite strongly that he is merely “different.”

Claire and Lisa’s ‘circulating’ to socialise with different members of their group could be thought of as a social ‘technique’. It certainly has specific effects upon the relationships amongst the group. While such a technique is likely to be deployed unthought, its effects nonetheless benefit Claire and Lisa considerably. For them, circulating is a kind of maintenance work. It maintains their popularity in the group by (re-)enacting social connections with many other group members. This is an achievement, and one performed bodily. Claire and Lisa are particularly skilled in the almost ineffable nuances of becoming popular bodies. When they approach others, these others are immediately opened to them. Claire and Lisa embody themselves to make themselves engaging and interesting, confident and lively. They organise the affects of others in the group by organising their own affects, by becoming-sociable with others, becoming-affective with others, drawing these others in, entering them into their affection. These are quite formidable skills to have.

Claire and Lisa are not afraid of drawing attention to themselves, as long as it is for the right reasons. To become popular, it is important to be seen to be popular. To draw attention to oneself would seem to demand a lot of confidence, but to circulate successfully is a great boost to this confidence. Claire and Lisa may be the most skilled in their group at ‘circulating’ and increasing their affective relations with others, but these skills are expressive. Their forms of embodiment are appropriate to the setting and express the forms of sociality shared by the group. Claire and Lisa are taken as friendly and interesting because, in their mode of embodiment, they cite ways of being gregarious that are familiar to their friends. Not only that, but they do things with style. This is important, because it marks their distinction, and by doing so, it contributes to distributing everybody’s place within
the group. Claire and Lisa’s circulation and embodied style are part of an unfolding sociality, but as this sociality becomes enacted amongst and between the members of the group, it also differentiates them, placing them into uneven relations. When Claire and Lisa circulate, they are not only acting in a manner appropriate to the forms of sociality they share with their friends. The way they embody themselves as they circulate also sets them apart within this sociality, and places them into varying relations with the rest of the group. They appear popular and cool, the centre of attention. It is no coincidence that the two women who circulate the most are the ones who appear to be the most attractive, within the modes of embodiment and sociality shared by the group. Dressing glamorously can now be seen to be deployed as part of a broader set of embodied and practical techniques for becoming popular.

The distributive practices that Claire and Lisa are engaged in work across the group. That is, the sociality that Claire and Lisa bring to life also encompasses and also places other members of the group. A machinic distribution takes place. While Claire and Lisa become popular, the four women who had been gathered around Jessica become placed on the margins of the group. They literally stay standing at the edge of the group, talking very little, and talking to few other than themselves. Even when they were talking to Jessica, they took on supporting roles, those of followers. In chapter four we saw how the ability to embody or perform oneself properly becomes concomitant with a body becoming a subject and a self. On the other hand, becoming a subject and a self – being recognised as such within a given sociality – becomes difficult for a body that cannot perform as expected or demanded. It may well be that the four ‘meek’ women standing around Jessica at the beginning of the evening are happy as they are, interacting as they do. Yet, a potential and surreptitious tyranny subsists within the sociality they are drawn into as part of the group. This is the tyranny of having to socialise and be ‘lively’ in a manner recognised as such. They, like the others, are subject to judgement. So, even though these women might well shine in other...
circumstances, and be adept at expressing the nuances of a sociality outside this kind of pub, here they seem to be 'meek'.

Their embodiment of 'meekness', then, only makes sense in the specifically situated sociality that the group brings to life. This returns a question about what a body can do. As the whole group socialises and, in doing so, enacts a shared mode of sociality, so they distribute their affects. The 'meek' women encounter their bodily memory on the outside, in terms of the bodily techniques of socialising expected from them. Or rather, they encounter their bodily memory as the disjuncture between what is expected of them and what they are able to do. In this particular situation, they find themselves incapable of fully connecting with others in the ways demanded by the prevalent forms of sociality. A misconnection, and the social field starts to fracture. Their stillness betrays the paucity of affect between them and the others: they are finding it hard to affect the others or be affected by them. Once Jessica leaves them, they do not encounter anything that inspires them, nor that entrains them in the flow of sociability. They become bored and excluded, looking into space rather than orientating towards the group. And when the rest of the group leave the pub to go on to the club, they say their goodbyes and apologies to Jessica.

The modes of expression by which these various distributions emerge are proper to a specific sociality, one relating to how to socialise in this kind of pub. Such a mode of sociality is quite clearly gendered and sexualised. If Claire and Lisa were the most popular people in this predominantly female group, it is because they knew how to socialise effectively with these particular women. The distinctions they enacted through the way they dressed and presented their bodies were also demonstrative of what their bodies could do socially. They dressed to be seen - to be seen as exciting and interesting, glamorous and attractive. Dressing so is obviously gendered, but it also invokes a heteronormative attractiveness. Their attractiveness and, moreover, their cool, invokes a certain complex of social and bodily memories,
memories that are classed and ethnicised, as well as gendered and sexualised. The forms of sociality in which Claire and Lisa excel, and their modes of embodiment and dress, are specific to the propriety of socialising in particular kinds of pubs, with particular groups of people. Claire, Lisa and the rest of the group enact a sociality and an aesthetic that start to converge with those enacted by other groups in the pub. Although across the space of the pub these various ways of socialising are differentiated, they work closely enough for certain forms of whiteness and class to emerge. Together, these forms of sociality also converge with the ‘architecture’ of the pub – the chain’s marketing strategies made concrete as material citations. The segmented materiality of the pub is practised too, but these practices are enacted in a different time. Nevertheless, they meet up with what might be understood as a sociality proper to this kind of pub.

This is not to say that any sociality of the pub is necessarily distinct from, or independent of, the group’s sociality. Chioe’s group of colleagues do not practise, or belong to, two or more forms of sociality. Rather, a singular sociality becomes enacted that is proper to the group, proper to the space, and that also enacts gendered, sexualised, ethnicised and classed propriety. This singular sociality is expressive of various machinic assemblages. A classed machine, an ethnicised machine, a marketing machine, a fashion machine, an attractiveness machine – several machines converge to work together, immanent to each other, and immanent to the sociality that expresses them.

On the other hand, these formations of power emerge from the micropolitics practised in everyday situations. For Claire and Lisa, attractiveness and popularity are ‘power’. A set of relationships of force subsist between the women in the group, often manifesting itself through judgement. When Claire and Lisa go to talk to Owen, this confers some sort of status upon him. While Paul may still disapprove of Owen’s behaviour, the fact that Claire and Lisa see Owen as worthy of spending time with opens Paul’s scepticism up to contestation from
Chloe. Moreover, when Chloe had spilt her drink over Jenny earlier, her first thought had turned to Claire and Lisa. The lager trickling all over the table was a potentially unacceptable spillage, a loss of bodily control to the messiness of alcohol. Chloe’s concern with their judgement indicates that it is Claire and Lisa who are the arbiters of what is acceptable and what is not. Chloe’s is a concern about being judged, about the judgements circulating in the group. In this respect, it is important that her position in the group was unsure, having only been working with her colleagues for a couple of months. Given her relatively unsure position within the group, Chloe looked to have her relationship with the group validated by those who were able to do so – the most *ostensibly* popular and attractive people in the group.

Chloe desired to be approved of and included, yet this demands belonging on the basis of a judgement. This desire to belong, however, is not to demand a judgement, but rather involves a concern with the judgements that will enter circulation anyway. Chloe worries about what Lisa and Claire think about her because they are, in some ways, the centre of the group. As such, they have a certain amount of control over how the others in the group judge individuals within it. They are thus able to exercise considerable influence over the regulation of whether and how these individuals socialise with the group. Of course, it may well have been that once Chloe’s position in the group had become consolidated through closer affective ties with a few other members, these ties may have afforded more resilience against the effects of such judgements. If Chloe had been working with her colleagues for, say, a year, she might not have been quite so concerned about what Claire and Lisa thought about her spilling her beer. Nevertheless, on this occasion, Chloe’s concern with Claire and Lisa’s judgement suggests a need for members to ingratiate themselves with those most popular within the group because of their crucial role in mediating the group’s sociality. This is so at least until members are more established within the group. Moreover, the techniques deployed to become popular often mean that those most popular seem to be the coolest and most attractive, too.
A number of bodily techniques, then, become deployed, unthought on the most part, as part of a practical sociality. Through judgemental practices and practices such as circulation, a distribution of group roles and bodily and social capabilities takes place. Again, there is a double ordering, enacting an order, and ordering a citation that becomes unthought. The embodied practices within the group are performative of difference, enacting relationships of force. Unlike with the lads on the night bus, these other processes do not all work through processes of attribution. Nevertheless, there takes place a similar process - the conferral of status in practice – and it is still an important part of the distributive processes within the group. Saliently, all of these processes point to the way that the eventfulness of sociability, and the intricacies of sociality, unfold between bodies and their actions. Bodies become more or less energetic, their connectivity more or less intense, their sociality being precisely what they encounter as a social and bodily memory, the externality of what a body can do.

White masculinity

The practices by which white heterosexual masculinity come to be enacted, although producing very different forms of sociality, work in ways that have some commonalities with these modes of enacting white heterosexual femininity. Affect becomes organised through an accumulating process of judgmental proceedings. Embodied practices are performative of differences. The intensity between bodies relates to their energy and their material memory or potential. Among the research participants for this thesis, several of the men in group two performed a specifically classed group masculinity that enacted certain ethnicised differences across their group of friends. Such a masculinity was a particular version of 'laddishness'. These were ex-public school boys, now all working professionals, conservative and affluent. They actively thought of themselves as “lads”, and revelled in the mischievousness of it. Laddishness was a playful kind of naughtiness. It was to exceed, ever so slightly, the normal bounds of the body,
what in most circumstances would be proper behaviour. Once they were together at the pub, however, these lads became men behaving badly.

Their conversation, for example, became what they proudly termed "obscene". It was not merely that they peppered their talk with profanities, nor that it became overtly sexualised. Rather, they thought of their talk as transgressive, beyond all bounds of propriety. As Alison asserted, however, during the first group interview with group two, conversations between women in pub or bar situations were not so dissimilar: "blokes wouldn’t realise ... they’d be quite surprised ‘cause they like to think that they, they’re the ones who discuss things that you wouldn’t normally discuss.” Women, as much as men, transgress what are taken as proper topics of conversation. There is, however, an implication of a difference in expectation: men are expected to be transgressive, while women are expected to avoid such indecencies. That is why it is a surprise, to men at least, that women can talk so. Given that men are expected to be transgressive, Alison’s assertion begs the question of how ‘transgressive’ men’s conversations really are. Moreover, given that women also engage in such conversations, is there anything distinctive about the conversations between the lads?

This challenge, predictably, prompted the lads in the focus group to leap to the defence of their conversations. It was imperative to outdo the women. It was imperative to go to the extreme. So, they tell us, their drunken pub conversations would involve prolonged bouts of banter, deploying jokes and insults about rape and rohypnol, paedophilia, necrophilia, transvestitism, and homosexuality. It might seem ironic, but by invoking the profane, these lads mark their own heterosexuality. What their pub talk does is to perform a boundary marking, a delimitation of heterosexuality by constituting what is other to it. The lads, then, do not talk beyond the bounds of sexualised propriety. Rather, they enact what is proper by talking a constitutive other that is crucial to, and very much part of, this propriety.
Yet, despite cross-examination from the men, Alison maintained that, bar rape, these topics would also be “up for a girls’ night out.” The men had to find some other way of defending and defining their heterosexual masculinity. They found it, in a fashion, in the performance and performativity of their talk. In effect, they found it in their talk’s affect. In the group interview, Anthony, Stuart and Alison eventually agree that while both male and female groups of friends will “bitch”, men will tend to “bitch” amongst themselves – ribbing, in other words – rather than about those not present. They suggest that both straight women and straight men may joke about necrophilia or homosexuality, but the ways they deploy these complex ideas differ. They doubted, for instance, whether a group of women would perform a chant in public accusing one of their number of being a paedophile. While their solution is perhaps a little too neat and a little too categorical, what it does point to is an awareness of the importance of the techniques and performances of conversation. There are particular ways of deploying techniques within conversation, particular interactive constructions, and particular subtleties in performance that all make a difference. For the men, such “obscene” talk was part of a more general set of performances, performances that enacted their own specific brand of heterosexual masculinity as a set of affects between them. Their drunken pub conversations are not improper: they are what is expected of them. Slugs and snails and puppy dogs’ tails, after all.

More than conversation, then, but incorporating talk, the lads’ embodied practices are performative of their heterosexual masculinity. They told many anecdotes of their escapades, their behaving laddishly. Invariably these would involve various stages of drunkenness and scrapes with authority. Urinating in public was another favourite pastime. There was also the story of Stuart being chucked out of a bar in France for trying to steal a sign. He was especially annoyed by the fact that the owner of the bar had also confiscated all the glasses he had hidden in his jacket, particularly as he had stolen them from other bars. During the same trip to France, a woman had chucked a bucket
of water out of her window over Darren. Unfortunately for Darren, he had just been made the butt of a laddish joke: Stuart had been making a lot of noise outside the woman’s window, but had moved on. When Darren turned up, the woman had thought it was him making the noise, and so she threw the water out of the window, leaving him standing there dripping and trying to apologise for his friends. And then there was the story of when Anthony, Darren, Stuart and another of their male friends were in Edinburgh and after a long evening’s drinking had set off home on foot. Anthony and the other lad had gone on ahead, and as they walked along the street they started tipping over the dustbins of the houses they passed. After a while a police car pulled up alongside Darren and Stuart and asked them if they had been tipping bins over. They denied everything, but took great glee in directing the officers in the right direction. Anthony describes how, when the officers had caught up with them, he was made to turn back and clear up the mess. Upon turning around, he reeled from the revelation of the scene of devastation before him. The revelation, however, becomes an admiration of his handiwork, the carnage an index of his masculine prowess.

These stories may have been retold, the ones from France during group two’s first group interview, the one from Edinburgh during a night out at a pub, but the lads’ performances exceed the narrative. Their bodies disturb the order of the space around them, but, in doing so, enact a peculiar set of affects between them. Their embodied practice performatively enacts an affective sociality, recuperating what is expected of masculine bodies – playfulness and a feeling of mischief. Of course, such bodily performances were energetic. Their playfulness may not have been open-ended, nor exploratory. It may have enacted a particular laddishness. Nonetheless, it required an openness to the others in the group, an ability to participate inventively in the unfolding interaction between them. It also demanded activity, liveliness, a certain amount of force. It required a fuel, and this fuel was alcohol.
One member of the group, Adam, was held in particularly high regard by the others for his relation to alcohol. He was considered the archetypal lad. He would commonly drink to excess, but even before he was very drunk, alcohol would have turned him into a lecherous pest. In bar or nightclub situations, he would often perform his own heterosexuality quite forcefully, physically pestering any attractive white women who came to his attention. More generally, he would be at the heart of any laddishness with the others, involving himself in pranks and sexualised conversations. On one summer evening standing drinking outside a bar, Anthony taunted Adam by reminding him how he had once been a “quiet” “spod” – a bit of a “nerd” – who Anthony and the others had merely put up with. Now, of course, Adam had transformed himself: he was “hard”, he was a lad. In something of an inverted valuation, considering their professional success and their ex-public school backgrounds, being academic (a “spod”) was considered truly reprehensible. Of course, implicit to this contrastive structure, is the association of certain affects with masculinity: assertiveness, being loud and outgoing, and being funny. Moreover, belonging amongst the lads rested upon the correct gendered, sexualised and ethnicised performance of these affects. When, on the same evening, another member of the group, Peter, arrived with some bottled beer, he had forgotten to bring a bottle opener. In an almost forlorn manner, Peter asked whether anybody else had one, and sure enough Adam whipped one out of his pocket. The other members of the group gawped in amazement at Adam’s profound readiness for beer. He was, Anthony commented admiringly, a “beer drinking slob.”

What are the effects of such techniques of embodiment and performance? What do such performances perform? The effects of the performance of such techniques of sociability are often most acutely encountered by those who cannot easily or properly perform such techniques themselves. These techniques become ways of enacting power relations through the embodiment of a distributive sociality. Among the lads in group two, the embodied sociality that they shared and enacted, in turn, places members in certain repetitive relations
with each other. One night at a Wetherspoons pub in South London was typical of such a dynamic. Anthony, Stuart, Darren, Henry and Alison were there that evening. Anthony and Stuart dominated the group’s conversations. Not only would they say more, but they started and led more lines of conversation. They also dominated by the sheer volume of their voices, and by their presence, their embodied domination of space. Alison, although literally quieter than Anthony or Stuart, also took on quite a prominent role in the conversation making. She started off quite a few topics of conversation, and also contributed quite a lot in terms of the amount being said by the various interlocutors. This does not mean that Darren and Henry, the latter of whom was of Chinese ancestry, were not fully involved in the group’s sociality. Rather, Darren and Henry played their part as supporting roles, their performances just as crucial to the emergence of the group’s relations as those of the white lads. These supporting roles have their own techniques, too. Darren, for example, although seldom leading the conversation, at least when the whole group was talking together, would make certain important contributions. He would tend to agree with what was being said by others, reinforcing their opinions or anecdotes with anecdotes or comments of his own. He would also laugh a lot at other’s jokes, not only validating their humour, but in effect popularising it by demonstrating that it is shared. Most of all, Darren and Henry listened. They were the necessary interlocutors for those dominating the group, sustaining the flow of conversation through back-channel utterances and gestures.

Minesh, who we met in chapter four, and who I had met in an O’Neill’s pub, was all too aware of the effects of white heterosexual masculine embodiment. During our conversation, we talk briefly about my research. I suggest that white men might act in certain embodied ways. Minesh immediately launches into an impersonation of an exuberant white male. He shouts in a very cockney accent, “Alright, me ol’ mucker!” Then he makes some sort of growling noise, a noise that reminded me of a football fan, puffs out his chest, punches me hard on the upper arm, and then slaps me on the back. He tries to
more generally impose himself physically, standing close to me and making himself tall, trying to look down at me.

Of course, Minesh is offering a stereotype, albeit a parodic one, but in doing so he mobilises a social and bodily memory. This is a memory of the style of a performance, a memory of a technique by which proper affects are brought back to life. There is a citation of an immanent classing machine, one that underwrites heterosexuality through the cachet of a working class masculinity, a becoming-Cockney. Minesh’s bodily style performs an invocation, the force of his punch the force of an immanent heterosexuality. One has to be certain when it comes to a tactility between men. A touch too gentle, and you’re a wimp or you’re gay. But the force of the punch works as part of the force of the performance; or, the force of the performative. In this brief impression, Minesh unleashes a bodily force capable of a kind of domination. It is the force necessary to dominate an immediate bodily and social space, to impact directly upon other bodies. The force is one of a memory, a citational power, an ordering of obeisance from others. The force is performative and bodily: it effects a corporeal transformation of the affects of those present. The affective relations between bodies become organised and distributed.

Yet, although the memory enacted is one of how to act, how to become a forceful body, this memory does not belong to the individual. It may be a memory of a set of bodily techniques, but these are techniques by which an immanent machinism becomes instantiated. The memory is in-between, a potential memory, one of a forcefulness that a body can become, a set of affective relations that a body can enter into. The lads of group two show this more clearly. They enact a memory of how to insert themselves into embodied relations. Yet this memory only becomes enacted through their very practice. To talk about white lads dominating group interaction, their bodies exerting a hold over the group’s social space, is not exactly to say that they can dominate because they are white. They are white only insofar as they can still enact these relations, only insofar as they can still place
themselves in a powerful position. Their whiteness and their heterosexuality are emergent properties.

4. Bodies, eventfulness and sense

How sociable is the body? It sometimes seems as if the body becomes separated from sociality, and hence from its own sociability. The body often figures as docile, to be inscribed upon. Sometimes the body is figured as modifiable, but within specific representational cultures, a surface upon which different material signs can be placed. Other researchers suggest an ineluctable difference between bodies and sociality, a difference where bodies remain ultimately overdetermined, and where the social becomes a realm of virtual relations (c.f. Witz, 2000). Yet, when bodies are considered in terms of their sociality, they often risk becoming overdetermined. When Bourdieu (1998:vii) writes of the "potentialities" of the habitus, for example, these potentialities become "inscribed in the body". There is an implication of a prehensive ability to engage with others, but a sense of potential subsisting in-between bodies becomes effaced, and along with it the potential for untrammelled desire and deterritorialisation. In this section, I want to reaffirm the sociality of bodies, through developing a richer conception of their sociability, their capability for desire. I attempt to show how a conception of a 'bodily sense' might be developed, a conception of the virtuality of the body. Such a sense might enable us to better engage with the ways that embodied social action can performatively enact the organisation and distribution of social and political relations, while engaging with this action as eventful and singular, opening up the potential for doing something else.

In Logic of Sense (1990), Deleuze concerns himself with pure sense, that which is immanent to language, and, in particular, to propositional speech, a sense that is virtual and transcendental (c.f. also Kazarian, 1998). Sense, as Deleuze understands it, is a pure becoming, beyond the dualism of model and copy. It takes us beyond the opposition of Ideas and matter, or Ideas and bodies. Deleuze reworks a Stoic
philosophy of causality, so that bodies are taken to proliferate along one series, that of causes, while language develops on a series of incorporeal effects. Sense, meanwhile, continues to multiply in-between. Sense is eventful, and, in fact, it can be conceived of as a surface, one side of which (sense) faces towards language, while the other side (event) faces towards bodies. When a proposition is spoken, sense is what is expressed by the proposition. Sense is what is expressed in language. It is immanent to propositional speech, yet it cannot be reduced to the proposition. “To use Deleuze’s example, the phrase ‘the tree greens’ expresses in language the sense which corresponds to the event of ‘becoming-green’ which happens to a physical thing, the tree,” (Kazarian, 1998: 105).

As we have already witnessed in this chapter, however, it is not only that things merely happen to bodies. Bodies having a sense attributed to them is not the only show in town. Nor is thinking of bodies in terms of causes, especially when elsewhere Deleuze himself thinks of bodies in terms of affect. Bodies affect other bodies, and they interact on a potential and transcendental field, one that is immanent to their actual relations. The virtual process by which bodies become placed into relations with each other (desire) meets the process by which heterogeneous elements become arranged (agacement). These are processes in which bodies become involved, processes which bodies involve themselves in. These processes suggest a virtuality of the body, a plane of immanent affect that develops between them. We have already discussed in chapter four how bodily action becomes worked out in-between bodies on a plane of potential, and how bodily social memory can become encountered as the potential for specified action. Here, however, the potential that develops between bodies is not a bodily memory as such (although, as we shall see, it stands in relation to bodily memory), but is rather the virtual eventfulness of bodies forever becoming arranged.

It is not only that living bodies can sense each other and adjust their affects accordingly. For human bodies, at least, there is a sociability to
their sense. As bodies interact, and become-sociable, desire places them in relation with one another. This is an eventful process. As we have seen, there are techniques by which bodies place themselves in these relations. Consider flirting, for example. Even without language, a body can proposition another. A proposition becomes made and, in the process, what might be considered bodily signs become deployed. Such a bodily proposition expresses a sense of an event that is happening between these bodies. Bodily sense, then, is a feeling or set of affects between bodies. It is the particular quality of intensity between them. It is a sense of the body, a sense of bodies and how they are arranged affectively. As this arrangement is dynamic, with bodies constantly entering relations with one another, or subtly shifting their relations, so these bodies interact. They do things to express this desire, this coming into relation. A bodily proposition expresses the sense of this arrangement, yet it also changes the arrangement. As we saw in chapter four with the corporeal transformation of affects through bodily action, a bodily proposition can have affective causation. Additionally, earlier in this chapter, we encountered the force of the insult, a force that impacted directly upon bodies. In each case, a proposition emanates with its own force to alter the arrangement of bodies and their affects. How can we account for such force when the sense (bodily or otherwise) that such propositions express is not causative, but virtual?

Deleuze (1990: 94-108) discusses the seemingly paradoxical ‘double causality’ of sense. As well as being different from the propositions that express it, sense is different in nature from states of affairs, the actual mixing of bodies. Sense is caused by bodies and their mixtures: it is an effect. Yet, we have already talked about sense being a dynamic arrangement of bodies. What is going on? An arrangement of bodies is an event, and as such is virtual. It is caused by a mixture of bodies – an actual state of affairs – but is more than just a particular mixture. It cannot be localised as a specific set of bodies or their mixtures (a thing or some things), but is rather the arrangement of these mixtures (something) (Deleuze, 1990: 157). If you like, the
arrangement is the process of mixing these bodies; it is the dynamic emergent relations that this mixing produces. Moreover, sense may be caused by mixtures of bodies, but it is *produced* by immanent 'quasi-causes' (Deleuze, 1990: 95). This is the second dimension of the causality of sense. These quasi-causes are the immanence to sense of various formations, memories and institutions. Deleuze’s later work with Felix Guattari (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988) develops more fully the idea of the citationality of previous actions and orders at the heart of sense. It also further develops upon the way material assemblages of power are implicitly presupposed in the process of making sense. Sense, then, takes its force from its productivity. Sense is not only produced, but it is productive. Sense has the ‘power of genesis’ over propositions and states of affair.

Perhaps this will become clearer if we think about it through an example. Deleuze uses the example of a battle (1990: 100-101). A battle is an event: it has its own pure sense. The battle is real as it takes place, and to describe it is to describe something actual (Piercey, 1996: 273-274). Yet, the battle cannot be isolated as a specific state of affairs. The battle "is actualised in diverse manners at once, and … each participant may grasp it at a different level of actualization within its variable present" (Deleuze, 1990: 100). To say that the sense of the battle is an arrangement of bodies is to invoke a virtual sense ‘hovering over’ the actual field. The battle cannot be specified in terms of an exhaustive list of individual actions or mixtures of bodies. Its sense is an event irreducible to each of these actions or mixtures.

A soldier engaged in the battle is engaged in the actual mixture of bodies – in the combat. Yet, this soldier sometimes surges forward, all guns blazing; at other times the soldier flees. In this courage and cowardice, the sense of the event – *how the battle is going* – incarnates itself in the soldier’s very body (Deleuze, 1990: 101). The soldier is not only engaged in particular actual mixtures of bodies, but participates in a potential field – a field beyond the particular. The battle is neutral with respect to particular participants, whether they
are victor or vanquished. The sense of how the battle is going is a sense of how the battle has already gone, and also what is yet to come. Although this sense is neutral with respect to its actualisations, it can, however, be grasped from a specific vantage point. It is also produced. Immanent to this grasping is a specific knowledge of military strategy, training, a field of perception of particular markers of different actual combat mixtures. Yet the sense itself remains irreducible to what the soldier brings to grasping it. The sense (the battle) develops as all the bodies on the battlefield continue to rearrange themselves. The soldiers might act on their grasping of the sense of the battle, and hence sense becomes expressed in action. Sense has an effect on states of affairs. Yet, making sense cannot be reduced to an individual or even a transcendental subject. Rather, sense and events have their own principles of unification.

Given all this, we can take ‘bodily sense’ to be a kind of sense that expresses itself without recourse to language or even mentalistic ideas. It is a pure sense in that it is the continual unfolding of pure difference, and it relates to an arrangement of bodies that also proliferates. Bodily sense is the felt intensity of bodies becoming arranged, a sense that corresponds to this unfolding arrangement, and becomes expressed as a series of bodily propositions that performatively alter the arrangement of these bodies, and hence their sense. Bodily propositions, then, are performative. As bodies can affect other bodies, such bodily action arranges these bodies, placing them in a desiring relation.

Of course, a proposition does not often stand by itself. Especially if we are concerned with the spoken proposition, the proposition becomes part of a conversation. Sense unfolds as a transcendental field immanent to the conversation. Developing during a conversation, sense is a process. It is the always changing outcome of an eventful activity. It is making sense. As conversations are interactional, sense accumulates or accretes. Moreover, if sense is the process of the arrangement of bodies, a process subsisting between interlocutors,
arranging their relations, then making sense must not only place these bodies in relation to each other, but it must place them in relation to immanent assemblages of enunciation, power and desire. Beyond the model and the copy, sense is transcendental. Language does not represent, but relies on a transcendental field of citationality, a field of sense between a multiplicity of second and third persons (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988).

Deleuze (1990) contrasts pure sense against what he calls 'good sense' and 'common sense'. These can be made to correspond with syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations, respectively. The former organises differences into a fixed and linear order. The latter, takes the diversity organised by good sense and subsumes it within the unity of particular forms of objects or the identity of individualisation. It determines the concept to attempt to unify the subject or object world. Deleuze, however, expresses dissatisfaction with these two axes of sense. Good sense and common sense are supposed to be the foundation of meaning, yet each relies on the other for its own successful operation in an ever decreasing circle of repetition. Good sense can only impose order on diversity by relating this diversity to a purported form of identity or object; common sense can only determine the identity of the subject, object or world by differentiation amongst an already distributed diversity (Deleuze, 1990: 78). With only a little translation, these axes can be applied to more than just the linearity of a proposition. They can also become applied to a conceptual terrain, a representational grid of social and cultural identities. Here, good sense organises diversity across a space that is at least two-dimensional. Good sense distributes bodies or subjects within this space upon the basis of a common sense that applies a unity of proper affects, desires, subjectivity and bodies. Any such unity, in turn, only makes common sense because of a differentiation from other affects, desires, and bodies, those that good sense tells us are not proper to the identity under consideration.
Although ‘good sense’ and ‘common sense’ are problematic, there are other forms of sense that are common. The idea of a bodily sense requires a conception of the immanence of a transcendental field of bodily memory to bodily practice. Bodily memory can be understood as an external potential for arranging bodies into specified affective relations. As bodies become arranged in the process of their sociability, so this continual arrangement stands in relation to bodily memory. The bodily sense that subsists between bodies is a sense of their arrangement. This bodily sense ultimately becomes expressed as further arrangement because it becomes expressed as bodily interaction. Bodily sense, however, also stands in relation to bodily memory. Bodily memory is immanent to bodily sense because it is also a memory of how to sense, how to feel. It is a field of affect that can be cited when feeling the intensity of becoming arranged, the intensity of desire. Bodily memory is, thus, also a sense making memory, the potential of a way of feeling about an arrangement of bodies, immanent to, and, in some ways, common to a multiplicity. But, just as sense only emerges in relation to the proposition that expresses it, so bodily memory remains immanent only to the sense in which it becomes encountered.

A sense of the flirtatious

To flirt is to use situated and socially specific bodily techniques. Flirting can involve a considerable amount of skill. One has to act appropriately, but what is appropriate is different for different people and in different circumstances. A bodily memory of such propriety becomes invoked, a memory of what a body can do, a memory of how to be sexy. To flirt is to transform one’s own body and its affects, to become sexy. As we have seen, from one direction, sexiness is an emergent property of a multiplicitous machinic assemblage. Yet, to flirt is to become sexy in a singular event, or at least to try to. It is to attempt to enact an embodied sense. That is, it is to attempt to enact an arrangement of potential between bodies, an arrangement of their potential affects. Of course, there is always another person involved,
and they are not an object, despite how some people treat others they desire. Flirting is done in-between, to try to establish a relation of bodies, and because it is in-between it is an open and indeterminate activity. It is eventful. Flirting is to try to move bodies towards becoming organised into desiring relations with each other. It is an expression of a yearning to get closer to another, but it is also an attempt to draw the other closer. Yet, nothing has yet been achieved. Flirting always takes place on the cusp: on the cusp, perhaps, of a rebuff, or, perhaps, of becoming more intimate.

It was the first of June and it was still light as I arrived at the 'traditional' Wetherspoons pub in the heart of lower middle class suburbia. I was first there, but was shortly met by Ben and Alice. We went in, and, being a Friday night, the place was heaving. I looked around to see a few groups of thirty- and forty-somethings, but mainly the clientele comprised of groups of 18 to 22 year olds. At the front of the pub, by the bar, most of the customers were men, and most of these were dressed in a particularly suburban, lower middle class style. Several of the young men had cropped hair, brushed forward and slicked with gel. Some of the older men had grade one haircuts.

Once Ben had eventually managed to get served, he suggested that we push our way through the crowd towards the back of the pub. As we got to the steps that divided this front bar area from the rest of the pub, it became a bit less busy. The atmosphere here, towards the back of the pub, also changed. There were a few black and Asian people here, although mostly they were one amongst groups of white people. Again, most of the people at the back of the pub were young (18 to 24 year olds), but here there were a lot more people dressed up as if they were going to go on to a club later. As Ben, Alice and I were heading towards the back of the pub, I see a young white woman, probably about 19 or 20 years old, walking in the opposite direction. Later, having walked through the rest of the pub, I note that, in terms of appearance, this woman stands out, although she was not out of place. There is something about the combination of the blondness of her hair,
the amount of make up she was wearing, carefully applied, of course, and her tight fitting black top and tight black trousers, both of which clung to her body to accentuate her figure, in particular her breasts and bottom. Like Chloe’s friends, Claire and Lisa, at the O’Neill’s pub, this woman had inserted herself into a machinic sociality, and had deployed certain bodily techniques to do so. She had become attractive by citing a bodily memory of a particular attractiveness, one slightly different from that enacted by Claire and Lisa.

Anyway, as the woman was walking towards the front of the pub she was stopped by a young white man, who seemed to know her. He was standing drinking with his friends near the steps. From their body language, I could tell that he was keener to talk to her than she was to him. His body performed a familiarity with her, a sense of an arrangement between them that he was trying to enact. In a way, it was an embodied proposition, a flirtatious one at that, but it was not taken up. The sense was encountered by the woman, and resisted. Of course, this bodily sense emerged between them, so it could never be exhausted by a bodily proposition. The woman had her own relation to this sense, and it was not that comfortable a one. The man was talking quite loudly, in a fashion that suggested he was bragging by telling anecdotes, performing in order to impress her. It was a performance of becoming-humorous, becoming-interesting, trying to bring to life an embodied and social memory of what it is to be masculine and attractive. Trying to impress her, however, transformed their respective subjectivities. They entered a relation, one where a female court sat in judgement of a masculine performance. Of course, he had already judged her by becoming flirtatious. Their subjectivities arrived as they became sexual. As a sexual relation became instantiated between them, they became distributed, their subjectivities, their sexualities mutually differentiated. The woman stayed a good step away from him. Even though she was smiling, she remained unusually upright. After a while, I realised why her rigidity was unusual: the pub was so loud that almost everybody else who was standing that distance apart from their interlocutor was having to lean in towards
them. This woman had deployed her own proposition, expressing her modification to the bodily sense developing between them. In response, there was one last gambit from the man. He extended his arm to touch her on her arm. It may have signalled an interest, but it also overpowered. It stopped her from making an immediate getaway, making it awkward for her to back away without the embarrassment of shunning him. It was a transformation of her affects performed bodily: a corporeal transformation.

Sometime later, as Ben, Alice and I stood just inside the back doors that led out to the beer garden, I watched the people nearest to us. There were two young white women and a young white man sitting at a table, on the side nearest the wall. On the other side of the table, in the aisle, was a young mixed race man who was turned around to talk to two other black men who were standing near the table. I was not sure whether all six were a group of friends, but they did interact on a couple of occasions. The two men who were standing were being very vocal and energetic. They were speaking very loudly – shouting really – and seemed to be in very good spirits, smiling and being playful. They seemed to be exchanging jokes quite a lot, the two men standing up laughing particularly loudly at each other’s jokes. These two also kept moving around. One of them moved forward towards the other two, said something apparently humorous, then turned around and walked away in a wide circle behind the other man standing up, his knees lifting noticeably. It looked as if he was creeping away, having said something mischievous.

On a few occasions, one of the men who were standing up would stop a woman who was walking past. Each time, it was one of two particular women who would be stopped. The two women were both white, but they both stood out in the pub because of their appearance. One of the women was the one whom I had earlier seen been accosted by the white man near the steps. The other woman was similarly presented. She was wearing a tight black top which showed off the curvaceousness of her body, and tight black trousers, too. She had
long, straight blonde hair, blue eyes and blue eye shadow. Other women in the pub were also wearing black lycra-rich trousers, or tight black tops, but there was nobody else with the same combination of both of these kinds of clothes, plus the combination of hair colour and hair style, eye colour and make up. Many of the other women in the pub were wearing strappy tops or t-shirt tops, but few were wearing tops as tight fitting.

It seemed, then, that there was a selection going on. Judgements were being made by the men. It was not as if the women who they stopped were the only ones walking past. The women’s toilets were here at the back of the pub, so, in fact, there was a steady stream of them walking past. The women were dressed to place themselves in a particular mode of sociality. Their clothes expressed a potential openness to becoming-sociable with particular kinds of people. The men took this to mean them, and whether it did or not, the men enacted a Desiring-sociality by which it came to anyway. Their judgement was performed in practice, a concrete judgement that instantiated not only desire, placing bodies into relation, but a Desiring relation. That is, it transformed themselves into sexual subjects, and transformed the women objects of sexual desire. Moreover, this transformation relied upon a placing of their respective bodies into their proper places, a racialised and stylised economy of attractiveness. Such an economy only exists in its expression, and this was such an instance. Their bodies entered machinic relations, each element of which were becoming-organic. Clothes, make up, hair, territorialising practice, an arm outstretched to stop someone, trying to charm them with humour: all these elements, practices and deployments were the emergence of a machine, each of the elements contributing to an assemblage working together, perpetuating its specific sets of relations.

The economy becoming instantiated here resonated with instances elsewhere. For instance, later in my research, on one of the nights-out at the Nature bar, I witnessed something similar. On this occasion,
rather than stop the women involved, the man merely wolf-whistled as they walked past. It was notable, however, that it was a black man expressing desire for two young white women of a particular appearance. These women had long, straight blonde hair, lots of make up, and were both wearing one-piece dresses of light blue, slightly shiny, satin-like material. These dresses were knee-length, sleeveless and figure-hugging. On this occasion, however, the women kept walking.

Despite the Nature bar being an ostensibly ‘cooler’ space than a Wetherspoons pub, and despite there being more ‘glamorous’ women in the Nature bar, these women were still recognised as different. It was a particular embodiment of glamour, a particular ‘look’ that seemed to be selected by the men in each case. Moreover, it seemed to be that it was what the women were wearing that was important. In both the Nature bar, and the Wetherspoons pub, the men making their advances, or wolf-whistling, were dressed in a fairly smart, yet nonetheless casual, fashion, not particularly standing out from the rest of the men in their respective venues. Still, back at the Wetherspoons pub, it appeared that the selection of the women who were stopped did not rest solely on their appearance. From their interaction, it appeared that there was some familiarity, or at least some acquaintance, between the men and each of these women.

When one of the men stopped one of the woman (not the one who had been stopped on the steps), he did so by putting an arm out into her path, and saying something to her. He smiled and talked to her; she stopped and talked to him. He seemed to be flirting with her a bit, but she did not seem uncomfortable with this, and continued smiling. Perhaps the sense of familiarity between them that was becoming expressed bodily put her at ease. Perhaps there was also an ambiguity: was he really making a pass at her? His flirting seemed to be quite playful: he quickly became as playful as he had been with his male friends, laughing at his own jokes, and moving around quite a bit as if to act out what he is talking about. Maybe this element of play
introduced something of an open-ended process into his flirting and into their relation. Despite the transformation performed in the initial judgement, now there was a process, and it was not becoming collapsed to some sort of consummation. Rather, it perpetuated itself for itself, a singular development of pleasurable intensity.

When he stopped the other woman, however, he did so by means of an outstretched arm to place a hand on her arm. In one smooth movement, this arm moves to become placed around her back so that his hand can rest on her the side of her waist. He then places his other arm around her other side, outside of her arm, drawing her close to him. There was only a matter of centimetres between their bodies. On her face, there was something resembling a smile, but she did not seem comfortable. Her head inclined, chin to chest, so that she was looking upwards towards him, from under her eyebrows. It could have been a seductive look, but her body seemed ineffably tense, in contrast with the confidence she showed walking through the bar.

The man may seem to have been messing about, and, certainly, his actions occurred within a series of playfulness, yet, nonetheless, the woman seemed at the very least uncertain as to how to proceed, and quite probably uncomfortable. Through his flirtatious actions, the man asserted a certain power. He recuperated a certain form of Desire, instantiating a sexualisation of bodies. An outstretched arm, an invasion of space. A hand on a waist and an emerging bodily schema, a social bodily memory of becoming a sexualised body. By entangling the woman in his arms, he literally placed her in a sexualised relation to himself, corporeally transforming their mutual ability to affect and be affected, and limiting her potential for action. This corporeal transformation is performative of a judgement. The woman is not only judged to be sexually attractive, but is sentenced to live the social and bodily consequences. Through desire, the placing of bodies in relation to each other, Desire as a major form of sexualisation becomes performed. Moreover, in this particular case, this Desire was racialised and ethnicised. These bodies entered themselves into a particularly
racialised desiring machine, one that distributed an immediate corporeal power to the man in this interaction.

The man’s actions might be taken as an expression of bodily sense, a feeling of becoming-flirtatious. Similarly, the woman’s tension might be taken as a body sign, one expressing her feeling, her sense of their unfolding relation. But the sense that emerges between this couple is only a moment in an accumulating sense that accretes over the duration of the event. The event in question is the set of proceedings by which women become judged by the two men standing up. The sense that was becoming accumulated was that of the attractiveness of the women in the pub, a sense enacted through the prolonged judgement and selection of which women were attractive enough to make a pass at. This was a process of the organisation of bodies, but it required a territory. By becoming active, and by inhabiting a space expressively, the men produced a territory over which they could exercise power, a territory in which these sexualised and racialised relations could become expressed.

Things were even more complicated than this, however. The participants in this event were enacting a machinism that cited a complex set of social relations. The women stopped by the men were not just passive bodies, ‘victims’ to the lascivious whims of these men. The second woman stopped could be taken to be resisting by enacting an ambiguity as to her response to this man’s flirtatiousness. Was she becoming seductive, or was she becoming tense? The uncertainty might have bought more time. Or it might have kept proceedings at a level of play, of process, where the man still has to do things. He does not get his own way yet, or perhaps ever. Moreover, these women have in some ways entered themselves into the machine. By dint of their embodiment, deployed in a specific style, they invested in the judgement process, even if ultimately they were to be discomfited by it. Yet, they did not enter only to be judged. Rather, they entered to do their own judging, to enter into a mutual judgement of attractiveness, as one of them had achieved earlier with the white man who had
stopped her on the steps. Such a validation works for men too: men also become validated by the approval of others. For the black men, however, this validation may have taken on a particularly unconscious poignancy. A racialised memory of sexual excessiveness or pathology may have been at play. When a potential History subsists, a virtual and unconscious memory of being accused, of only being capable of raping white women, not making love to them, of being too much of a man, and yet not really a man, then validation from a white woman may become increasingly poignant. Perhaps becoming overpowering was to overcompensate, to try to ensure their own attractiveness, their own masculinity.

The risks of identification

I had become quite worried by the way that I took this account to perpetuate stereotypes of racialised behaviour. It seemed to pick out a particular type of black masculinity: loud, sexually aggressive, spectacular, bodily and expansive. Was I already attributing these behaviours to a blackness, an identity that overdetermines everything a body can do? Well, the risk is in the writing, or perhaps the reading, so lest there be any confusion, I will reiterate and clarify.

Rather than taking behaviour to be the purported ‘content’ of some racially defined culture, I stress the emergence of cultural differentiation through practice. There was a series of practical techniques between the men and the women which enacted a distribution of their affect. Earlier, when the men had been talking and joking amongst themselves, this practice is not a becoming-black, but a becoming a group. It does enact a particular style of interaction, one differentiated from the groups around them. Yet it is not spectacular. It is not designed to set them apart, but rather to instigate an intensity of belonging between them. They are having fun for and as themselves. They become a group together, through the use of a style of interaction that they can all participate in. If later the territory that is produced allows the expression of other powerful relations, then this
is an emergent effect. All such effects are potential, and are irreducible.

Neither these men, nor anybody else for that matter, should be reduced to their behaviour, any more than they should be reduced to the colour of their skin. A white man had earlier tried to chat up one of the women later chatted up by these men, and, as that incident demonstrated, the practices of white men are just as embodied as those of anybody else. The behaviour of individuals should not be taken as representative or expressive of any pre-given identity. Rather, their behaviour is part of a set of practices that are effective (they do something), and are affective (they are open to affecting others, and being affected). These practices effect a functional connectivity with others in the field, and must therefore be taken as co-extensive with a wider fabric of racialised and sexualised differentiations. These differentiations should not be assessed morally. To attribute excessive sexuality to these black men is to participate in a moral discourse attributing danger to black men. It is a conflation of race and morality. Rather, to call a man black, or even a man, to say that he is sexually aggressive, these are all modes of tracking a potential, of attempting to gesture towards a set of relations that emerge through practice.

5. Conclusions

Resisting identity is a tactic, but, like all tactics, it needs to be useful. It is a tactic that I hope to have deployed in an exploratory spirit and in a critical vein. I also hope that such a tactic works both politically and ethically, within a broader emancipatory project. A resistance to identity may take the form of an interrogation of the practices which seemingly recuperate identities, or seem to impose an identity on others. This is to become concerned about the horizons of freedom, the potential to become something more than one already is, the potential to belong without excluding others. Resisting identity need not be about the separation of bodies from a heritage. If it provides
strength, then re-create that heritage: live it. But, do not make it an origin to which one must always return. That route only leads to strength on the basis of a power relation. Rather, make heritage a resource with which to become exploratory, a line of tension along which one constantly evolves. A heritage can be a field of potential. It can enable connection, and not just to others that claim that heritage. Heritage should enable a becoming-different, a claiming of agency and subjectivity as a liminal process. Rather than becoming subject to a multiplicity of points at which power becomes applied, subject to an economy of the proper place, a heritage can be a critical potential for ethical and political thought. It can become a project by which one remembers how not to become subjugated.

In this chapter, I hope to have developed a theory of technique and reworked Deleuze’s (1990) philosophy of sense. Immanent to each of these is the multiplicity of a social and bodily memory. Such a memory is a potential for subjugation, yet it is also the potential for becoming-different. It is the bodily virtuality of a memory, and thus asks for a choice: how is this memory to be used? How is it to become actualised? The final section of this chapter witnesses the actualisation of the potential between bodies as the expression of their sense. This is a bodily sense, a sense that stands in relation to embodied social memories, and that becomes expressed as embodied action and interaction. This conception of sense remains virtual or in-between, an openness to the constant flux of desiring bodies, a junction between bodily memory and the body without organs (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988).
Chapter 6

Territory and expression

1. Introduction

We have been feeling around, working up a sense, and this sense has been one of bodies and their arrangements. We have encountered corporeal transformations and embodied techniques, but also a virtual sense. We have desired too, but as we also know that there is more to desire than race or sexuality. There is also dancing, which has its own intensities. So it is time to go to a nightclub, to mix bodies with others, to mix music with intoxication, and to mix style with expression. This chapter is about the levels of organisation of assemblages. More than that, it is about space. The chapter starts by marking out a distance. Territories, however, are more than just the staking out of their limits. We must get a sense of the characters of territories. Space becomes inflected, or, rather, spaces are modes of inflection. Such inflection is combinatory: music, alcohol, action and citation; human and non-human materiality operating in a system with virtual events. Dancing rhythmically to music establishes an order and inflects space. Individuals or a collective can start to dance expressively. As they do so, they increase the level of organisation of the territory. The third section of this chapter, then, is about territorialisation as an expressive process. Territorialisation is to do with the texture of interaction, the texture of sociality. Territories are vibratory regions, reverberating with a multiplicity of other milieus and other territories. If territories express a certain repetition – that of particular modes of sociality – then we return to the question of the immanence of the organisation of affect to those modes of sociality. The fourth and fifth sections of this chapter are concerned with these further increases in organisation, returning the echoes of sexuality, gender and ethnicity to the expression of space. Yet, although this chapter seems to move from
the smooth to the striated, it maintains that there are various degrees of machinism, from a simple working of molecular particles, to more complex and vibratory molar machines of power. Moreover, it maintains that these different levels of organisation intersect and co-exist as spaces, multiplying them, and defying the assertion of a unified social field.

2. The Limit

Paul and his trainers

On a Saturday night out in Central London with Paul, Matt, and Alice from group three, we had tried to get into a trendy bar called The Montague. The company that runs the bar describes it as an environment styled with ‘classic retro’ design, a particularly modern turn revisiting the seventies for a generation whose major memories of the seventies are themselves previous versions of reminiscence. The bar is huge, with two enormous bar spaces, other large bar seating areas, and a restaurant. We dodge our way through the crowds of revellers thronging the streets until we get to the quieter side street on which The Montague resides. As we approach, I warn the others that there may be a dress code and even an entry fee because it is a Saturday. Their response is muted. I approach one of the bouncers and ask him if there is a dress code. Sure enough, he replies that there is one in operation “tonight”. I ask him if that means that trainers are forbidden. The bouncer hesitates then asks me to show him which ones. I point out Paul, who along with Matt and Alice, has hung back a bit, away from the entrance and the bouncers. As I point him out, Paul takes a step forward, presenting himself and his trainers for the bouncer’s scrutiny. The bouncer looks Paul up and down, and then says in a tone more sincerely apologetic than I was expecting, that he cannot really let Paul in. We do not even bother to stay and argue, but just turn and go. Paul, possibly embarrassed, and probably annoyed, says in a haughty tone, “if our custom’s not good enough for them, we’ll just take it elsewhere!”
The bouncer here is the enforcer of the limit. He is its embodiment. To pass through the limit, to reterritorialise onto a different expressive social space inside, we knew that we had to negotiate the limit. The bouncer had to be engaged with. The limit operated spatially, temporally and bodily, yet common to all three dimensions of its operation was the imposition of a set of coordinates. Space, time and the bodies in which they find their measure or their difference, were all subsumed within a representational framework, an application of good and common sense, if you like.

Here it is: the limit, the boundary between inside the club and the street. Yet, it would not exist without a door, a doorframe, a change in architecture, colours and materials from outside to in, and, most of all tonight, without this bouncer enacting it. It is tonight that there is a dress code, not Tuesday or Wednesday, but tonight (and maybe Friday night, too). The timing becomes insinuated into a working machine, dividing up the week so that the crowds only come out to play on a Friday or Saturday evening. So there we are, standing in front of the bouncer, this grid about to be imposed upon us, its timings, its spatialities about to be applied to our bodies. The limit demands that we present ourselves for inspection. At first, Paul hides, hanging back, trying to worm his way out from under the authoritarian gaze he knows is coming. In the end, though, he knows that to traverse the threshold, he has to submit himself to a judgement. He has to accept the criteria about to be imposed upon him.

And the judgement is ‘guilty!’ The sentence is exclusion. The judgement is performative of this sentence, performative of an exclusion. As such it does not apply to the trainers, but rather to the sociality of the body as marked by the trainers. It might appear that it is merely a stylistic difference that has become instantiated upon Paul’s body, an incorporeal transformation. But, the effect of the judgement is to bar him, and, by association, the rest of the group, from the bar. A corporeal limit to the body’s mobility and its potential
for making a connection here has become enacted. There is a set of presuppositions implicit in the judgement. It is presupposed that a body that incorporates such trainers cannot belong here. A combination of these trainers and other sartorial choices is taken to express a sense of sociality, a sense of how this body is able to socialise, what affects it might be capable of, and where it can belong. By enforcing the limit, the bouncer becomes the point of application at which, in actuality, particularly marked bodies cannot effectively socialise here. The implicit presuppositions immanent to the judgement become actualised through this application of force. Moreover, by performing an exclusion and performing the limit, the bouncer also expresses a spatial sense, a sense of exclusivity. This bar becomes exclusive, a territory that expresses a certain social organisation, a stratification.

On another night later that summer - the night that several members of group three had joined Chloe’s colleagues at an O’Neill’s pub before decamping to a nightclub – Paul’s trainers had again become a cause for concern. After leaving the pub, most of the group headed off towards The Forum nightclub for a themed seventies night. The Forum is a huge and cavernous venue, based in an old town hall. Outside the club crash barriers had been placed to demarcate where the clubbers should queue. On a raised area, four or five steps up, in front of the main doors, about six bouncers were stationed. There were two male bouncers body-searching men before they entered the club, and two female bouncers body searching women. The other two stood right in front of the doors. There were a further two bouncers, one male, one female, at the bottom of the steps at the front of the queue.

When we arrived, the queue was quite short. Immediately, Chloe’s colleague Claire started raising her voice and telling the group that they did not need to queue because they had advance tickets that privileged the bearer to jump the queue. After repeating this several times, Claire finally managed to round up all those who had already been given one of these special tickets. These people left the queue
and went directly to the entrance to be searched. This left Chloe, Paul, Ben, myself and two women from amongst Chloe’s colleagues in the queue. Paul was nervous because he was wearing jeans and trainers. I tried reassuring him by telling him that I had jeans on too. Ben also tried to reassure him, pointing out that it was a “cheesy seventies” night so they must let people in with jeans and trainers on: jeans and trainers could well be part of a seventies outfit.

Chloe, meanwhile, looks on, towards the bouncers and the people being searched. She mutters to Paul that it will be all right. Paul, however, keeps repeating that he will not be let in, and then starts saying that it is going to be really embarrassing. He is smiling while he says this, but at one point doubles over holding his stomach in what is probably only a slightly exaggerated show of anxiety. The rest of the time, he keeps lifting his head and moving to the left or right so as to see past the people in the queue to the bouncers and the searches. From time to time, he’ll turn away as if he cannot bear to watch, as if he wants to go. Ben says that Paul should be the first to be searched. He reasons that if Paul is the most likely out of us to be turned away, none of the rest of us should go first and risk Paul being stranded outside with us inside not knowing what has happened. Chloe tells Paul that if the bouncers tell him he cannot go in, she will persuade them to let him in. By the intonation of her voice, it is clear that she means that she will use her ‘feminine charms’ to flirtatiously persuade the male bouncers to let him in. As it turns out, Paul’s jeans and trainers are not a problem, and he is let in without even a passing remark.

Again, as outside The Montague, an instituted set of technologies regulates the bodies of the clubbers. The clubbers face a ritual of queuing, but now with crash barriers demarcating their proper place. Again, there is a judgement to be faced, a transformation of the body to become subjected to. Paul worries about his trainers, so much so that he expresses his anxiety physically. Yet his concern about his possible exclusion is based on a misapprehension, not yet understanding the judgement that he is about to face. He thinks it is
going to be about style, but it is in fact going to be about security. Power is being exercised by the operators of the club, but it signals the potential excessiveness of some of the bodies that want to get in.

Interestingly, Chloe mobilises another set of presuppositions that she takes to be implicit about the operation of the threshold. She thinks she can charm Paul’s way in. This presumption of her powers of persuasion rests on an invocation of a heterosexualising machine, one that distributes agency, an ability to act within the machine. Chloe presumes her own agency because she presumes that any interaction between herself and the male bouncers will be heterosexualised by the operation of such a machine, as if this follows automatically from their gendered difference and this being a queue to get into a nightclub. While, as we have seen with the lads on the night bus in chapter five, this presumption might be shared by many bouncers, I am not sure that this would have been the case here. Perhaps Chloe thought that she could *make* any interaction between herself and a bouncer heterosexualised by flirting, but I think that, like Paul, she had misread the situation. Not only were these a mixed gendered group of bouncers, but they exuded an air of cold professionalism. They were unsmiling, and kept their interaction with the people in the queue to a bare minimum. These bouncers were serious.

*Sociality and clubbing cultures*

Once inside The Forum, clubbers are confronted with a series of functional machines. Firstly, there is the front desk at which the clubbers pay, a machine for extracting money and transforming the clubbers into customers, the whole point of the club from the operators’ point of view. Then there is a cloakroom, serving the function of letting the clubbers become just that – those who can dance together, unencumbered by bags and coats. Beyond the cloakroom, one can make one’s way straight to the dancefloor, but to the left of the main entrance, and where Chloe and her colleagues had headed, was a bar area. Not only was the bar another machine for the
extraction of money, but it was a machine for the supply of alcohol, for
the increasing of collective and pleasurable consumption. (But, of
course, supplying alcohol was always going to have other effects...).

A certain order was being adhered to here, by Chloe’s colleagues, an
order Paul, Ben, Chloe and myself joined in with. That was a particular
bodily sequence: the ‘need’ for a drink before dancing. Alcohol was
crucial to the working of the body, to enabling its organs, its limbs, to
arrange themselves ready for dancing. A certain relaxation was
needed, and alcohol intervened to help bring it about. Moreover,
alcohol was crucial to the working of the club itself. This was not a club
night fuelled mainly by ecstasy or other non-alcoholic drugs. The
particular genre - a citation not only of music but of the associated
performances expected of the body - specified a particular kind of
affect, a particular kind of fun to be had on such a night. Seventies
‘cheesiness’ did not just mean nostalgic kitsch; it also almost insisted
upon getting drunk. Perhaps this was because seventies nights were
thought of as replete with bad dance moves. Alcohol became
necessary to wash away the embarrassment of the cheesiness, leaving
a body free to embrace this cheesiness, a mode of sociality, becoming
related to other bodies.

The alcoholic inebriation sustaining the mode of sociality at many such
seventies nights, sustains it, in part, as a sexy intensity. A sexualised
feeling, an atmosphere of expectation, permeates between bodies, a
potential for flirtatious connections to happen. This feeling of
sexualised tension between bodies is virtual, but it has its actual
correlate in terms of the ways in which bodies practise their entry into
desiring relations. These sexualised bodily affects, however, tend to
become arranged into particular socialities, often re-enacting particular
heterosexual modes of desire, and citing particular bodily memories of
flirtatious practice. The process of arrangement is the process by which
a set of elements becomes an assemblage that works machinically.
The materiality of bodily organs combines with the libidinal effects of
alcohol. Together, these territorialise onto a particular architectural
and cultural space, along with other drunken bodies. These drunken bodies together cite particular embodied social memories, encountered in their meetings with other drunken and libidinous bodies. And then there is the music. It provides a rhythm for becoming expressive and a flow to entrain bodies into becoming energetic.

Bodies move together to music, yet music also works as part of a genre, suggesting a bodily memory of how to dance, a style of the body and its affects. The music at The Forum suggested an ironic parody of disco dancing fever, and it suggested that this style should be sexy. Yet, strangely, while there were certainly several people in the club who managed to ‘pull’, the dancefloor was so big that the proximate sexualised intensity between strangers sometimes broke down. The physical distances between them were sometimes simply too great. In these cases, what often happened was that groups of men would end up standing nearer to the edges of the dancefloor. From here they would gaze inwards towards groups of dancing women, as if they were weighing up whether they were going to make a move. Nonetheless, there was still a lot of sexy dancing going on, people flirting with one another, catching each others’ eye, maybe brushing the other’s hand or hip as they dance, maybe getting a response – another touch, or a sensual movement of hip or shoulder, and eventually turning to dance with them.

In the group interviews, several participants from each of the groups spoke of the distinction between “serious” clubs where various genres of cool dance music would be played, and “cheesy” clubs where “tacky” “mainstream” “chart” music or seventies or eighties disco were the staple. The former were associated with the consumption of non-alcoholic drugs, in particular ecstasy, and as such were taken to be de-sexualised spaces. In contrast, the latter were often characterised by being “meat markets”, alcohol sodden places where many of the people there were intent on picking up a casual sexual partner for the night, or at least on getting to kiss somebody. Such a distinction, of course, is an application of good and common sense. In actuality,
things are more complex and more messy. The Forum itself was a case in point. The tacky music might have suggested it was going to be a "meat market", yet the architecture of the space meant that this was not consistently the case. Moreover, practice is not overdetermined by some purported meaning attached to a place: there were plenty of other things going on at The Forum, not least just dancing for dancing's sake. Many people may have 'pulled', but yet more did not.

In 'cool' clubs, too, events overtake the proper imagination of meaning. As we shall also witness later, supposedly cool spaces can degenerate into a highly sexualised arena. In the first group interview with group one, Tariq recalls an incident where two of the group's female friends had received sexualised advances from men in a club. Tariq notes that the club was Fabric, a place he thought was relatively 'cool', where people were supposed to be interested only in dancing and in being serious about their music. He expressed surprise that such an incident had happened in Fabric, yet then supposed that it was not uncommon. Moreover, at the time this research was being carried out, the discourse in the music press, and even the talk amongst many clubbers, was dominated by the phenomenon of 'the death of the superclub'. Very large clubs such as Fabric were becoming superseded by a proliferation of different types of smaller venue. One type of venue in the ascendancy was the 'DJ bar', usually relatively small bars with little or no dancefloor space, that yet hosted different 'club nights', inviting different DJs to put together a 'set' of intentionally cool tunes. Notably, such spaces engendered different kinds of sociality and different kinds of assemblage. Alcohol and 'cool' music come together to move bodies and make them dance. Bodies find ways of becoming tactical, moving chairs and tables out of the way, or dancing in what small spaces there are. They flirt and talk, and dance when the time is right, and encounter their memories differently, but adjust them to the new circumstances. The Capital of club and bar owners find bodies wanting something different, and so capitalism remakes itself again to meet this bodily desire for new pleasures. Bodies find a proliferation of
new spaces, capitalism remade, and they adjust their modes of sociality and affect in order to consume in new ways.

_Cultural capital_

Back at The Montague, Paul’s trainers had failed an aesthetic test. The boundary of the bar’s territory may be demarcated along the lines of an aesthetic, a set of distinctions of taste, but this aesthetic is one that is deployed and enacted to make differentiations in the moment. In chapter five, in particular with Chloe’s colleagues, we saw how aesthetic distinctions became deployed to enact particular machinic relations. Bodies became placed into various relations to a certain form of sociality in pubs, a sociality by which modes of socialising became regulated, and by which power relations became distributed amongst those participating in this sociality. Now, Paul, Matt and Alice’s very possibility for belonging at this bar is at stake, and rests on a deployment of an aesthetic machinism. Here, though, the deployment is made by the bouncer. The bouncer is the embodiment of authority. The bar works as a field - or rather a machine, an organisation of relations that works - but the bouncer is not a body within the field, but, rather, an embodiment of the field: he is the point of application of the power of this capitalist organisation.

Could Paul’s trainers have been taken by the bouncer to mark a lack of cultural capital? In Bourdieu’s terms, embodied cultural capital only becomes symbolic capital, through its legitimation, its recognition as valuable within a distribution of values (Bourdieu, 1998: 47). Institutionalised contexts are required for such processes of capitalisation to occur (Bourdieu, 1998: 22; Skeggs, 1997: 10): the threshold of a bar or nightclub operating as a process of selection (Bourdieu, 1998: 20). Under such principles of selection, cultural capital can only provide a return (in the form of other kinds of capital) if it is recognised as legitimate. At The Montague, marks of distinction, that is, relational markers of cultural capital, become subject to a process of selection that enables or precludes its bearers to
territorialise inside. Acts of division, placing bodies in their proper social position, enact cultural capital as relational differences in social capabilities. Here, these capabilities relate to the ability to become sociable with the others in this space.

To invoke Bourdieu in such a way would provide certain insights, but would also be problematic. It would not, however, necessarily be to reduce an invocation of cultural capital to a simple economic instrumentalism. Cultural capital does not operate within a logic that requires it to become transformed into economic capital. Indeed, in Distinction, Bourdieu develops an analysis that suggests a bifurcation between forms of economic capital and forms of cultural capital (c.f. Bourdieu, 1998: 5-7). Cultural capital becomes expressed as a predisposition towards an investment in an “other pole of the field of power” (Bourdieu, 1998:25). Bourdieu’s work heralds “an economy of the proper place”, but such an economy is concerned not only with the maximisation of capital, but also “the development of the body” (De Certeau, 1984: 55).

In the bar or the club, the development of the body might be thought of as an increase of its intensity, through establishing affective connections with others in socialising with them. This is concomitant with the transformation of cultural capital into social capital in the form of social relationships. The experiential consumption taking place in bar and club spaces might be analogous with a process by which a habitus of such consumption becomes developed. This process would involve a further imbrication of the developing body into the distinctions, orientations and expectations of a particular social and cultural position. Although not returning us to a logic of the development of class positions defined solely in terms of economic capital, such a view would invoke the analysis of cultural capital and class that Bourdieu developed in his research into the institution of the school. Translated into the bar or the club, the development of a habitus of experiential consumption – an acquisition of a kind of cultural capital – involves learning the subtleties of how to dress, how
to socialise and how to consume. It is to develop the ability to distinguish oneself, and to develop certain dispositions relating to the mode and location of consumption.

The problems with such an approach are numerous. Most fundamentally, this approach invokes a unity of the social field. It provides a grand theory of a closed iterative system of reproduction. Structures become interiorized through learning. They become sedimented in the body as the habitus, a set of dispositions that afford the possibility for acting strategically. Such strategies are an adjustment to the conjunctures of situations, but these situations are themselves the very instances or particular states of the structure of the social field (De Certeau, 1984: 57-58). The reproduction of the class, defined along cultural dimensions as much as economic ones, is assured. The structure of capital produces systems of preferences (habitus) towards the further acquisition of cultural capital. Of course, such preferences are appropriate to the classed position of the individual within the social field. These interiorized preferences ensure the practices, outcomes and choices that reproduce differences in cultural and economic power (Bourdieu, 1998: 25).

To invoke cultural capital in such a way would be quite inappropriate to Paul’s difficulties in getting into The Montague. The distinctions becoming enacted by the bouncer are not so much about class, whether defined economically or culturally. Paul did not look scruffy, nor did anything he was wearing necessarily indicate that he could not occupy similar social and cultural positions to those who might have passed the judgement. Moreover, the bouncer gave no indication that any of the others in the group would have been barred. Surely Paul’s association with such others marks his capability to occupy a specifically validated social position. No, the distinction was not about class, but about style. It is most certainly about the exercise of power, but this is the power to proliferate pure distinction within an aesthetic field. Barring entry to those not abiding by a dress code invests in a distinction for itself. Moreover, it suggests that what might be thought
of as cultural capital belongs not so much to Paul or any of the others trying to get into the bar, but to the bar (or its operators) itself. The bar owners or operators are investing in their own distinction, an investment they expect to bring rewards: a transformation into economic capital through defining a niche image.

For Paul, Matt and Alice, the judgement about their appearance is about the possibilities for socialising and about a sociality. It is about what a body can do, and the styles it does it in. Territorialising in a bar – if one is allowed to – is about increasing the body’s affective connections, an increase in intensity. It is about consumption and belonging. Facing up to a judgement at the limit is to face up to the texture of that consumption, the price of that belonging. Yet, in approaching the limit, Paul, Matt, Alice and myself multiply what might have been taken as a social field. A theory of the habitus would suggest that we should have anticipated the judgement to come: there should have been a unity of structure, predisposition and practice. Instead, there was no coherence or territoriality to the field or to the habitus (De Certeau, 1984: 58). The differential and multiple nature of social fields runs throughout this research: from the differences in expectation and orientation evinced by Chloe’s colleagues in O’Neill’s; to Paul and Chloe’s misapprehension of the basis of the bouncers’ judgements about them at The Forum; to other events that will be discussed later in this chapter. Rather than a habitus, then, a bodily memory, one that is enacted singularly and is itself a multiplicity of potential even as it reverberates with various levels of organisation.

3. In-between: intensity and self-organisation

On the dancefloor

Back to The Forum, and despite his worries about his trainers, here Paul was able to make it inside. After a couple of drinks Paul, Ben, Chloe and myself joined Chloe’s colleagues on the dancefloor. By now there were only two men left amongst Chloe’s colleagues, but still
about ten or eleven women. This was somehow fitting, as across the
dancefloor as a whole, there seemed to be many more women dancing
than men. Dotted around the edges of the dancefloor were many small
groups of men who were stood drinking and talking and watching
those who were dancing, some of them, perhaps, women they had
come with. Some organisation had already taken place: a self-selection
process, a relation to the genre, which had already constituted the
dancefloor as incredibly white. This organisation became further
expressed in dancing, as an array of embodied social memories
became performed. A certain sense of irony became expressed in the
dance, a collective embodied unwillingness to take this dancing too
seriously. It was nostalgic consumption made fun, and it was
drunkenly differentiated from the relatively ‘serious’ intensity of
‘cooler’ forms of clubbing. Bodies, hence, became silly, but this was to
dance appropriately to music served up as kitsch.

Certain dance moves were performed, drawn from a socially available
repertoire, yet singularly enacted in the flow of dancing, territorialising
upon a particular section of music. Imitations of John Travolta in
Saturday Night Fever were spontaneous, and yet they were also
responsive to the flow of the music and to the dancing activity of those
around them. Such imitations were enacted as bodies became
expressive of the sociality of the dance. These moves expressed a
collective becoming-kitsch between the bodies, these bodies no longer
merely individual bodies, but rather a crowd activity of cheesy dancing.
The crowd itself, however, also developed its own level of organisation,
expressing the social relationships – the friendships – between
individuals as the production of their own territories. Groups of people
dancing organised themselves into a circle, usually all facing towards a
collective inside, although this became a little more complicated for a
group as big as Chloe’s colleagues. Forming a circle was difficult
because it left a big, gaping space in the middle, one that non-group
members would walk through or invade. There were ways of dealing
with this: try to buttress the perimeter of the group, closing ranks,
backs facing outwards; or, more effectively, change the circle into something more squiggly, placing bodies into the void.

On a different night, I had accepted an invitation from a friend to go to ‘Hexagonal’, a warehouse party he and some associates were hosting in East London. The warehouse party was in effect a club night held at a private venue (an ex-industrial property), the clubbers finding their way there by invitation or by word of mouth. Significantly, entry to Hexagonal was free. Also in contrast to the night at The Forum, Hexagonal was understood by both the promoters and the clubbers as cool. But what was Hexagonal? What was this ‘club night’ that was understood as cool? The club night was more than just the DJ’s and the Sound (sound system crew) who were collaborating and performing that night, and more even than an amorphous idea of their respective reputations. A reputation circulates via word of mouth, a social network, building its own concrete social life. The club night was more than the image or branding of the Hexagonal name. Not only does the Hexagonal name also build its own reputation, its own word of mouth, in association with the DJs and Sounds connected with it, but it cites a virtual collective of other bodies and ideas. The club night was more than the particular kinds of music being played, and more even than the improvisation of compiling a set, mixing tracks, or performing break beats. It was more than this, and more than the ‘whole experience’ of the evening, or the physical setting, or the people there – the crowd.

All of these elements work within a citational cultural landscape, invoking a whole multiplicity of spoken and mediated orders, actions and differentiations. Genres of popular music, for instance, come to be defined through such a citational landscape, yet such genres are also constantly mutating with almost bewildering rapidity. Those who try to write down what defines a particular emerging genre, or even to speak it, are engaged in an endeavour that can only ever be partially successful. Some might say that such music can only be sensed, listened to, felt and danced to. Yet to invoke an experiential knowledge
is to invoke that which is necessary for experience, the construction of modes of experience, a knowledge of what a particular genre sounds like and feels like. In short, a social and bodily memory. Moreover, a citational landscape is a conversational landscape, and many of these conversations are discordant. Definitions are open to interpretation and contestation, not least because they tend to take place through disputes about which genealogical lineage new music should be assigned to. Of course, such disputes are often competing revisionist views on these very genealogical lineages. It is little wonder there is so much disagreement. The definitions that attempt to pin music down and create an order for understanding and experiencing it have difficulty trying to place it. This is because emergent forms of music do not have a proper place: music forever mutates, just beyond that which can be recognised.

Hexagonal cannot be reduced, then, to the genres of music played there: it is more than the house, old soul and funk, the breakbeats and hip hop played by the DJs; it is more than the reggae, roots and dub played by the sound system. Nor can it be reduced to any of the other elements discussed above. Rather, all of these elements combine in a complex assemblage, one that becomes practised and lived. Immanent to the assemblage is a complex multiplicity of citations and conversations, bodily memories and social networks. These are all brought to life as they meet in a concrete setting and in concrete practice. A sense of what the evening is about – a feeling or vibe – develops as an array of affect unfolding between bodies. This is an embodied sense, involving bodies affecting and being affected by each other so that those present become entrained in a sense of enjoyment. They might also, perhaps, become entrained in a sense that they are participating in something ‘cool’, an expression, not only of an ‘experience’, but of the assemblage and its immanent multiplicity of citations, memories, networks and relations.

I arrived at Hexagonal quite early, before 11:00pm, before the party had really started kicking. This had its advantages, as I was able to
observe the crowd building up over the next couple of hours, from a sparse gathering of small groups talking amongst themselves, to a thronging mass of over one hundred and fifty bodies squeezed into this relatively intimate space. It was a fairly particular crowd, as marked by their appearance, their surfaces of relation to a sociality. Most of the crowd were in their mid-twenties, white, and dressed in a particularly trendy East London fashion. The men amongst the crowd were, in the main, fairly casually, even scruffily, dressed. The women, too, seemed mostly to be in jeans and trainers, cool, but most distinctly casual, although a lot of the women paired these jeans and trainers with a more dressy top, and were wearing a lot of make up, their hair done up.

As more and more people kept arriving, they added to an escalating intensity. At a certain threshold, the crowd reached a certain density of bodies, sparking off a different level of intensity. The crowd transformed itself, the affective connections between its bodies working through an immediate bodily proxemics. Of course, this transformation could not have happened without the crowd territorialising upon the dancefloor space in front of the sound system, and territorialising upon the music that reverberated across and in the very fabric of the space. The music itself escalated during the evening, starting from an almost cursory filling as the crowds first started arriving, to the DJs building up some energy, and then to the Sound cranking up the volume, the MC working up the crowd. As the music intensified it became almost impossible not to dance: stood near the speakers, the bass was so loud, yet so low, that it was felt in the flesh rather than heard in the ears, interrupting muscles, literally and rhythmically moving the body.

While most of the crowd seemed to be quite happy letting the music do the work for them, dancing happily but not extravagantly, there was one group that stood out as dancing more energetically. The group comprised two white women and one black man, and they were dancing right in front of the decks. One of the women was really
moving, twisting a lot, and flinging her arms about. She dances with abandon, using the space about her expansively – so expansively, in fact, that her arms keep hitting me, even though I am not dancing that close to her. To an extent, she has let herself be overtaken by the music, but she is also a good dancer. Hers is not a body becoming random, but one that remembers its bodily techniques in order to territorialise upon the rhythm provided by the music, in order to become expressive. The re-membering of technique insinuates repetition into the performance, the invariance immanent to expression. Yet, what is becoming expressed is a bodily sense, that of a becoming arrangement, various deterritorialisations and reterritorialisations. Her body travels along a vector, deterritorialising from the rigidity of technique, or even the steady pulsing of the crowd, and reterritorialising upon the music in a differential relation. As the discipline of technique transforms into the development of style, so these techniques-becoming-styles enable her to do different things, to open up her body towards a dancing body without organs.

The man in the group is probably the best male dancer on the dancefloor, at least as far as I can see. At one point, he finds himself given a little more room, and really launches into a dance routine that moves his whole body, arms and legs moving in creative harmony with the rhythm of the music. He is quite spectacular, yet, in contrast to the self-consciousness of dancers at The Forum, for example, he does not seem to be concerned with the spectacle of himself. At no point does this man, for example, look around at anybody else, not even his two friends. He is only concerned with dancing, with moving. Of course, he knows that his friends are there, but this is a proximate and embodied sense. Also in contrast with a commonplace on some other dancefloor spaces, there seems to be absolutely no sexual overtones to the dancing of this group. Rather, their frisson comes from their shared enjoyment of taking their bodies to the edges of their expressiveness. They are putting their all into their dancing, a shared intensity of dancing for themselves.
Blowing bubbles

Earlier, in chapter four, we visited the Nature bar on a Friday night. As befitting a DJ bar, there was good, funky music, and, later on in the evening, there was dancing as well. It had been quite busy in the bar since we had arrived – just before 7:00pm – but the dancing did not get going until about 9:30pm when suddenly the volume of the music increased significantly. The members of group one and myself were standing quite near a small raised area at the end of the room furthest from the bar itself. On this ‘stage’ was the DJ booth. The first people to start dancing are a group of people standing between us and the stage. At first this is a bit half-hearted: a bit of swaying on the spot, some shoulder and arm movement, but nothing too extravagant. It is only a couple of the men in the group who are dancing, while a couple of other men, and the two women in the group, are not. There is also another group of people, standing on the stage, who look like they might be about to break into dancing.

Soon a couple – a man and a woman – get onto the stage and start dancing. Although they are in a very prominent position visually, nobody in the bar seems to be looking at them, and they themselves seem somewhat oblivious to the rest of the people in the bar. Their bodies are turned towards each other, side on to the rest of the bar. Their eyes are fixed – transfixed – on one another’s. They dance sexily, sensually. The woman, especially, swivels her hips as she moves rhythmically, closer and closer to her partner. He simultaneously moves closer to her, also in time to the music. She puts her arms over his shoulders, her arms straight, so that her forearms are resting on his shoulders. He puts his hands on her waist. They are smiling, enjoying the music, enjoying dancing.

It takes time before more people start dancing, but this area on and around the stage seems to be the place to do it. The dancing is slowly infectious, taking its time, but nevertheless spreading to nearby groups. It also attracts people from elsewhere in the bar who come to
dance here in front of the DJ booth, and so within half an hour, this area is busy with a dancing crowd. When the drunk South Asian woman from chapter four faces off against the South Asian man, it is here, a bit later, once the dancing crowd has already built up. She has moved from where she had started dancing nearer the bar, to come to join the throbbing mass. This mass is quite drunken, and it is also quite sexy. There are a lot of heterosexual couples here, their dancing expressing a sexual frission between them, although often in a drunken, messing about kind of way.

The increase in the volume of the music at 9:30pm was crucial in this change of tempo, in this emergence of a different kind of territory. Yet, this change would have achieved nothing if it had not also met with alcohol, a concrete architectural space, and with bodies and their memories and expectations, their potential. As it was, the change in the music helped effect a transformation of affect, a change in the ways of connecting to and affecting others prevalent across this social space. This was an insidious and subtle process that crept up on those in the bar, ensnaring them: before they knew it, they were gently swaying, and were susceptible to a further increase in intensity. It was a cascade process, one that relied on a proxemics of bodies, bodies affecting each other without speech or conscious sign. As with most new territories, there are always trailblazers needed. These are social tensors, if you like, stretching a line outwards from an existing territory, a line that rearranges elements along itself, between where it is going, and where it has come from. These trailblazers can be seen here: the two men who were the first to start dancing in their group; the couple who got up onto the stage. Their activity was expressive, and this expression was built on a rhythm, the rhythm of their dancing, their dancing to the music. Their rhythm, the timing of their movements, established an order. It produced a space – their space – inflected and organised by this rhythm: a milieu. At first, these milieus were little bubbles, enveloping just the two swaying men and the couple on the stage, but they grew. Moreover, these milieus were the seeds of a new territory.
Territory is a marking of distance (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 314). Acts of state power, of imposing borders or boundaries – limits – are acts of territorialisation. The cultural space of a nation might be thought of as a territory; but so might the cultural space of a neighbourhood. Regulars at a pub might have their territory there, but it needs marking. A gang might mark their territory with graffiti or through enforcement by attacks on strangers, turning them into outsiders. The home is a particular and multiple kind of territorialisation. It is stratified with relations of gender, structuring its space as a private one, one of labour and reproduction, or one of leisure. Yet, it can also be a becoming – an active production of comfort (Wise, 2000). In both cases, as in all of these territories, a territory needs to be enacted. Territory is an act, or a series of actions: territorialisation.

As the swaying men and the couple on the stage dance, they inflect a space about them with rhythm, an order. They create a milieu. It takes time for others around them to join in, and for others to come from elsewhere in the bar to dance. The swaying men or the couple might have felt embarrassed and stopped, but they did not. They kept on dancing, compounding their effects on the space, as the space; slowly, others joined in, further compounding this inflection of space. There is an accretion of milieu effects: the space becomes increasingly textured, increasingly organised. The space is made characterful by these actions, inflected with a sense. The effects of these actions and their rhythms upon the space express a social and bodily arrangement. A territory emerges as a series of acts of territorialisation, an expression of an arrangement, a becoming organised; an expression of milieu effects, borrowing from these milieus, building upon them.

The Nature bar as a whole (although a territory in its own right in relation to other milieus) was the exterior milieu of (not exterior to) the developing territory of dancing (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 49). The dancing territory needed to spread throughout its exterior milieu.
The territory needed to be populated, to attract people from elsewhere in the bar, which, in time, it did. It also needed to popularise this modification of the forms of expression able to be enacted in the bar (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 52). This is perhaps why the swaying men started dancing so tentatively: they wanted to take those around them with them. The others in the group, and those in another group nearby, look like they might break into dance at any moment, and, indeed, later they do. But, before they do, they spend a long time on the cusp, at a moment of potential, an array of potential memories available to be encountered or grasped. Bodies, materials, music and rhythm could potentially be thrown together in a new arrangement, making the remembered capabilities of all of these elements combine in a singular fashion. These material and bodily memories are the virtuality of the milieus from which the territory borrows, into which it grows.

For the dancers, dancing involves repetition. It repeats behaviour learnt before, on other occasions, but this repetition is not a conscious one, but rather based on a sedimented dispositional formation, a habitus or bodily memory. Its expression in the act of territorialisation performs an increase in organisation. Territorialisation is expressive, and stratified expression is the basis for a relative invariance (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 43). Dancing expresses bodily techniques, a memory of how to dance. Yet, "[o]ur habits are not necessarily our own" (Wise, 2000: 303). A bodily memory is a social and cultural memory, and its expression is the expression of cultural assemblages. A bodily memory of how to dance appropriately with others, how to participate in a mode of sociality. Matter and bodies becoming ordered and rhythmic constitutes a content, a form and substance of concrete social relations. Yet, these embodied social relations also express formations of power brought to bear as bodily social memories of cultural formations (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 43-44). ‘Culture’ is a difference in the mode of territorialising, the different ways milieus effect an inflection of space (Wise, 2000: 299-300).
Although what binds a territory together is repetition, it is not the repetition of an essence ad infinitum (Wise, 2000). It is not meter, an exact divisibility of bodies and their time, but rather rhythm, or, even more precisely, the refrain, that binds a territory. Dancing bodies are not exact; in fact, they are very messy, especially after mixing with lots of alcohol. Their memories are not reducible to a technique. A technique only comes to life in its singular enactment, an enactment with a difference. Memories are a potential to do something, to dance, and although they are in the body – in the hands or the feet, the arms and the legs – they are also encountered outside of the body. Bodily memories are encountered in actions, as a process of ‘grasping’ or ‘prehension’ (Thrift, 2000), or getting to grips practically with what the body is doing. They respond to a space: they are social not only in recuperating organisations of social relations, but in participating in the unfolding sociability of bodies in the here and now. A territory is vibratory. It reverberates with an echo of elsewhere. An expression opens up to other spaces. A series of dance moves opens up to a series of bodily memories, a series of other spaces where this body danced. A body is a virtual spatialisation, a communication between spaces, or a contraction of these spaces and these times. In the rhythm of repetition there is always a difference, the singularity of a dance move, the difference that insinuates itself into the gap in the vibration between two series.

4. Organisation, Sexualisation and Territorialisation

In this section, I seek to relate modes of sociality – the textures of sociality, if you like – to processes of territorialisation, processes of expressing a textured space. Both of these processes are ones by which degrees of organisation increase, even as difference also proliferates. An ‘etiquette’ of how to behave at the bar, for example, subsists as a multiplicitous and potential social memory, a sociality. Such an etiquette is the constantly emerging moment of relations becoming organised, keeping things orderly at the bar. It is a
machinism of bodies, making these bodies work together in an organised fashion.

Socialities of getting served at the bar might vary from bar to bar, or at the same bar from day to day, or minute to minute. It might be different at this end of the bar from the other end. On a Saturday night at the Nature bar, I was surprised by how polite those waiting at the bar were being. I was expecting things to be like they had been on the Friday night that I had been there with group one. Then, as like many other busy evenings at many other bars and pubs, getting served at the bar was something of a scrum. Bodies, male and female, would be pressed up against one another, arms, elbows and shoulders jutting into each other. They would search for any little sighting of the bar itself, seeking out a way to insinuate themselves into the tiniest of gaps; and once these bodies had squeezed themselves into an advantageous position they stubbornly clung on to it. All this would be complicated by the almost inevitable groups of individuals who would decide to stand at or near the bar to chat. Now that they had their little space, they would stand there, backs facing outwards, blocking the way, but immovable. Not only would such groups block access to the bar, but they would also hinder getting away from the bar smoothly, without spilling some of the three or four drinks you would be carrying if you were buying a round (another bar and pub etiquette). There is always movement - a bodily shuffle as someone laughs at a joke, or an elbow swung backwards in the midst of gesticulating – and it always gets you as you turn to carry your drinks back to your friends. And if they don’t get you, then those waiting to take your place at the bar would. These people are engaged in a race, eyeing up your place at the bar, raring to go, waiting to pounce: who would be next? They watch you pay for your drinks and they position themselves. As you turn away from the bar, they angle their bodies, trying to make you go the direction that best suits them. They need you to leave a path open for them to get to the space you have just vacated, and preferably to block the path of the person waiting beside them while you are at it. Of course, as they both try to push past you,
one or both of them knocks you, spilling some of your drinks. If you are lucky, more of it will be spilt over them than over yourself.

Yet it is not a complete free-for-all. There is an order, a sociality, albeit a minimal one. There is the habitus, the bodily memory, of making a bodily suggestion: ‘go to my left’ or ‘go to my right.’ There is also an order at the bar, the order in which the customers get served. It evinces itself in the becoming irate at being passed over for those who have arrived at the bar after you; or in the occasional choice to point out to an uncertain member of the bar staff that the person beside you has been waiting for longer than you. On this particular Saturday at the Nature bar, however, things were slightly different. As I approach the bar, I notice that people are maintaining their distance from each other. Those who want to get to the bar can do so with relative ease, and when they turn back, laden with their newly acquired drinks, the people behind them move willingly out of the way. Not only that, but several of these people even smiled at the person going past. A bit later on in the evening, when I went to the bar again, the same sort of things were happening. People were waiting patiently behind those at the bar: it would have been possible to squeeze their way into the little spaces between those in front of them, but, no, they just waited. And still people were smiling cordially at strangers. The strangers were even pausing to thank them for moving out of their way.

Then, suddenly, a smartly dressed young man comes whizzing through the bar area. He walks briskly, and slides smoothly through the middle of a group of people standing at the bar but not being served. By doing so, he manages to get straight to the bar, leapfrogging those waiting more patiently, including myself. At first, I am slightly annoyed with this man’s forcefulness; but his tactic was effective, and it did not trouble anybody to move out of his way. This movement, its velocity and its style, are another way of negotiating the organisation of bodies and spaces. Its vector of deterritorialisation shows up the politeness of those around him as a particular modality of organising bodies. As far as it is somewhat surprising, this politeness is also deterritorialised,
but from the usual push and shove of getting to the bar. It is
reterritorialised here as a specific structuring of social space. This
territorialisation is an enacted mode of organisation, expressing a
particular set of bodily social memories. That it is participated in by
several groups of strangers, without conscious or explicit deliberation,
suggests that territorialisation here proceeds not through the actions
of individuals, but through those of groups and collectives.

When I do get to the bar, the man who is serving nearest me soon
finishes serving the previous customer. He then looks at me and asks
“Who’s next?” I open my mouth to speak immediately, but I am still
too slow, for he has spotted the woman to my right. She has made a
very small gesture with her hand that she wants to be served. The
man behind the bar instantly turns to her and she places her order. In
a split second I had been gazumped, although I am not sure whether I
was there before her or not. Nevertheless, this resonates with an
imbrication into a gendered and sexualised machinism. Is it an
expression of such a machinism, a recuperation of the organisation of
other spaces, and its enactment here? Although many men, and many
women too, talk about women getting served first by male bar staff, is
this merely a discursive construction, a way of transforming and
reducing women to a sexualised body? No doubt such discourse does
sometimes enact such a transformation, but in the practical
interactions of getting served, perhaps such actions also enact a
transformation, a distribution and differentiation of bodies, and a
placing into machinic relations. Again, women become sexualised, but
so do the male members of bar staff who act in such a way. Through
performing a judgement, they perform their own sexualised power to
transform these women. They also express a proper desire, a social
formation.

Sexualised territory

In contrast to the bar, the dancefloor might seem to be a place where
dancers interact in a singular fashion, subject primarily to what
Deleuze and Guattari (1988) call ‘molecular’ modes of ordering or organisation. Such ordering would inflect a milieu, but would hardly organise relations into a functional social formation. Yet, as we have already seen, a territory incorporates both milieu effects (the effects of a molecular order) and the expression of a synthetic habit or memory (molar organisation). While the distinction in levels of organisation is a real one, it is also a virtual one: the difference between the emergence of a rhythm on an interactive field of potential, and the immanence of machinic assemblages of power to that field. As we have already seen in previous chapters, a field of potential incorporates potential memories or habit. Such a repetition, such a contraction of time, can be organised to varying degrees, and thus varying degrees of organisation can be immanent to acts of territorialisation. In practice, territorialisation involves simultaneous processes of ordering and organisation, molecular and molar. Dancing may be singular and intensive, but an intensity is not only the flux of pure difference. An intensity is also the difference between this flux and its occurrence in an arrangement, an arrangement that involves a repetition, a serialisation into a rhythm or synthesis (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988; Goodchild, 1996). The singularity of dancing on a dancefloor can be creative and inflective, yet, in the very same set of practices, fold a territory and express machinic social relations.

It was a Thursday night and Miss Lulu’s nightclub in the West End of London was not very busy. The club night had attracted a particularly dedicated crowd, attracted by a specific style of hip hop and breakbeat to which several of them liked to breakdance. Although the club was not very large – its dancefloor could probably accommodate eighty people at a squeeze – it still seemed rather sparsely populated on this night. At its busiest, there were probably no more than about thirty-five people in the club. Considering the smallish size of the dancefloor, the bar area, where there are seats and tables as well as an open area in front of the bar, is quite large.
On the dancefloor, there are three white men, two of whom are breakdancing. They are dressed in casual clothes: loose fitting, hooded sweatshirt tops, trousers and trainers. At first, they have the dancefloor to themselves, but as the night progresses, the dancefloor begins to become occupied by others who are not breakdancing. Even so there are never more than about twenty-five people on the dancefloor, and during the earlier parts of the night, the number is usually between eight and fifteen. Perhaps because of this sparseness, those on the dancefloor spread out to occupy the space available. This applies to heterosexual couples as well as to small groups of friends. For much of the time, those on the dancefloor dance quite far apart from their friends or partners, often not even facing or even responding to each other. The clubbers are just part of a crowd. This orientation towards the crowd makes it quite difficult to tell which people have arrived together. Unless you watch them initially coming onto the dancefloor together, the only clues to their friendship, or even sexual relationship, might be the occasional smile at each other, or a brief period when they will dance facing each other, mirroring each other’s moves.

Things change somewhat later in the night. By about 1:00am the club has got about as busy as it is going to that night. There are quite a few heterosexual couples in the club, a few groups of men, usually in twos or threes, and several larger groups of four or five women and one or two men. Amongst all of these larger groups, there appear to be one or two heterosexual couples, including all the men in each of these groups, while the only people in such groups not in a heterosexual couple would be some of the women. On the dancefloor, it has become a little busier, and some of the heterosexual couples start to dance more intimately with each other.

Just before the dancefloor reaches its busiest, however, the three men who had been breakdancing earlier decide to do so again. For them to do so, however, the dancefloor must become reterritorialised. The men start breakdancing gradually. One of their number would start moving
with a characteristic swaying of the hips and shoulders, coupled with a rotation at the waist, as he moves from the edge of the dancefloor crowd to the centre. Here, he would do a little breakdance move, and then quickly move back towards the edge again. This procedure is repeated a number of times, each time the moves in the centre becoming a little more complex, and the other people on the dancefloor giving them a little more room to dance. One of the three breakdancers takes on an interesting role. He tentatively makes his way to the centre a number of times, increasing the complexity and energy of his moves each time, but does not do any of the more difficult moves performed by his two friends that involve spinning on the shoulders, hands or head. His role, however, is important, for he plays his part in opening up a space in the centre of the dancefloor, the centre of the crowd, for his two friends. It is his two friends that then take it in turns to move into this newly created space to dance spectacularly.

Between themselves and the rest of the dancing crowd, the breakdancers instigated a particular kind of territorialisation. The rhythm of the breakdancers’ movement, from the edge to the centre of the dancefloor and back again, patterned the space, drawing the crowd into the same rhythm. This was a tentative process, slowly establishing the rhythm so as to bring the crowd with them. The increasingly energetic breakdancing in the centre further invoked a particular sub-cultural style, a certain texture to the sociality. A set of bodily memories became deployed, to be encountered by both the breakdancers and the crowd, drawing them all onto the music and into a potential proliferation of breakdancing. Together, the breakdancing and the movement back and forth established a centre and periphery to the dancefloor. The breakdancers had wrapped the crowd around themselves, transforming them into an audience. The crowd participated in this joint activity of organisation and distribution by becoming oriented to the breakdancers, turning inwards to face the centre, looking on in expectation and awe, admiring and smiling. The rhythm established a space as well as a time for a particular kind of
A bodily sense accumulated rhythmically between all these bodies on the dancefloor, an emergent ethical sense, responsive to the field of potential between them, the unfurling arrangement of their relations. This affective sense building up between bodies, a sense accumulating rhythmically, was thus a sense of expectation, a sensitivity to what was emerging, what was being built up.

A territory had become established through interactive and embodied practice. A shared etiquette had become enacted, this sociality becoming worked out between those present. The breakdancers had needed the crowd as an audience, as a territory, so they had to show them respect. They had to establish their trajectories so that they emerged from the crowd. Yet, they also performed their difference from the crowd through their use of space in relation to the crowd, and through what their bodies could do. The space was established as an infolding, an inside created for an expressive spectacle. This expression was danced in relation to a repertoire of recognisable moves, yet it was also in tension with this repertoire. The performance was singular and inventive, the tension between the repertoire and its enactment placing the repertoire in variation to itself.

Eventually, the two spectacular breakdancers decide to end their performance. They do their swaying strut of a dance away from the centre of the dancefloor, half-walking, half-dancing around the centre for while before working their way outwards. Without their continued input of energy, the dancefloor quickly returns to its previous level of intensity. Nevertheless, their performance has acted as a marker, leaving a potential trace, a reverberation of their territorialisation in the club. This reverberation echoes throughout other processes of territorialisation that occur within the club, instantiating further levels of organisation.

About twenty minutes later, two women made their way back onto the dancefloor from the bench of seats they had been sitting on for much of the night. Although there were about equal numbers of women and
men in the club, these two women were the only women there who did not arrive in the company of at least one man. This, combined with their appearance – both were young, white and blonde, each opting for the colour co-ordination safety of wearing black strappy tops, black trousers and boots – seemed to have attracted the attention of some men. Each of the women had a man trying to dance with them. I recognised the men as two of the breakdancers, one of them the one who had first opened up the floor for the other two. Each of these men had approached these women tentatively at first, but proceeded to try to dance closer and closer to them, without, at this stage, touching them. The men looked a little menacing, dancing so close to the women. They stared at them, wearing very serious expressions on their faces, less than half a metre from the women’s faces.

It was an attempt to entangle the women, an expression of desire that deployed a bodily memory of an active and assertive male body as attractive. As they got closer and closer, a bodily sense accumulated between the men and the women. Yet, this bodily sense was divergent: the men expressed not only a set of implicit judgements about the women’s attractiveness, but their own arrangement of bodily affects attempting to become attractive, attempting to draw the women in. The women, however, did not seem to be interested. They expressed their affective relation within the sense emerging between themselves and the men. They avoided looking at these men too much, and seemed to be trying to get on with their own dancing, at least as far as was possible. They did not move away, however. Perhaps the men took this as a signal, for they each started trying to put their arms around the respective women, an attempt to corporeally transform these women’s affects. At this, one of the women recoiled. She strode quickly across to her friend and shouted, “Do you want to go now?” The other woman just nodded, and they immediately, without acknowledgement to the men, walked straight out of the club. The two men walked away from where they were dancing to dance elsewhere.
The space of the dancefloor was becoming striated by the breakdancers’ masculine and heterosexualised activity. Their activity, their movement was an oscillation, a vibration. It opened up this space onto others, reverberating with a particular machinism of sexualised bodily relations. It was also a movement between a smooth and striated space (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988). A relatively smooth spatiality of affect, of potentially desiring bodies coming into a relation with one another, was becoming subject to properties, or rather proprieties: a particularly heterosexualised Desire. A haptic sense between the bodies on the dancefloor became transformed into an optical perception as the breakdancers objectified the women, seeing only a surface, a reflection of elsewhere (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 479). The only women by themselves, their gender became implanted into a grid of proper differences, a divisibility of the number of bodies. An increase in the level of organisation was becoming enacted, the breakdancers becoming organisms trying to operate a machine. Again, between the smooth and striated, an increase in the level of organisation: from a merely repetitive machine, the power of things flowing and working, to the machinism of a sexualised formation, a symmetry between Desires (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 498). Of course, as this became enacted, the women resisted: an asymmetry between a heterosexual Desire and a dancing desire.

The space was becoming territorialised, and it had been for some time. The breakdancers had already placed their markers, staking out their ownership. Their dancing was a way to create milieu effects: this is our space! The markers already placed, a sense had been accumulating. The rhythm of the breakdancers’ earlier spectacular performances had established a certain level of organisation. Now, the level of organisation was being increased, yet this increase could not have occurred without the earlier establishment of a rhythm. The breakdancers’ perception of their own desirability, was an expression of the territory they had performatively brought into existence. The repetition inherent within their earlier rhythm had reverberated with a modality of attractiveness and cool. Now, this social and sexual
organisation of affective relations, immanent to their earlier territorialisation, was becoming more fully expressed. The women, however, tried to keep dancing to their own rhythm, their own level of organisation. They deterritorialised from the sociality of the dancefloor and reterritorialised upon their own internal milieus, staked out by their own rhythm, enabling them to remain resistant to the breakdancers’ advances (Deleuze and Guattari, 1998: 54).

For the women, there was already a thicker accretion of a sense, a sense that became expressed as the territory of the club more generally, turning the club into a space of heterosexualised harassment. Earlier on in the evening, they had already been chatted up by two different men. The two women had been sitting on the seats along one of the walls. One of two men sitting further along the wall then came to sit next to the woman nearest him. His movement closer to the woman in itself performs his sexual interest in her. It brings to life a particular bodily memory of such sexualised advances, but throws this memory into a specific field of potential: a precise context of this being a nightclub, there being nobody else around, and there being plenty of other places to sit. The woman also performs her disinterest in this man’s advances bodily and spatially. Although she smiles politely, she does not turn to face him but remains facing the dancefloor. When the man’s friend comes over to talk to the other woman, this other woman also deploys a social bodily memory of disinterest in her potential suitor. She slumps down in her seat, looking bored and miserable, ending up looking like she is going to fall asleep and fall off the seat. While an increase in affect between bodies – increasing their intensity – can require a set of social bodily memories to develop in the sense between these bodies, so can a decrease in the potential between bodies. The women perform a judgement on their suitors through their embodied use of space. The judgement is performed as a judgement on whether these men can stay here, an enactment of the women’s incumbency in this space. The judgement is a transformation: these potential suitors were, in fact, supplicants; now they have been transformed into sad losers.
I digress, however. The point is that, for the women, this encounter had already inflected the space of the club. The space had already been flavoured as one of unwanted sexualised advances. Moreover, the longer they stayed in the club, the more they would have noticed the territorialising effects of other heterosexual couples. There were couples by themselves, and couples amongst larger groups. Earlier in the night, for the first hour after I had arrived, only one of the couples in the club had acted intimately, and this was only after the rest of their group of friends had left them at a table to go and dance on the dancefloor. As the evening progressed, however, more and more couples started dancing together on the dancefloor, and dancing closer together, flirting more, and generally expressing their desire for one another.

Although very normal, these practices still have the effect of territorialisation (c.f. Valentine, 1993). A sense accumulates over the evening of what this place is like. This sense is participated in by all those present, although their participation is differential. Actual and bodily social interactions have a virtuality, but this virtuality can become structured and accumulated into a kind of virtual memory of the event. This is the immanence of an accreted sense of previous events to emerging, unfolding events. When the breakdancers make their moves on the two blonde women, then, this new event makes sense to the women in terms of this virtual memory, the reverberation of the territory. The space is felt again to be heterosexuality, but, more than that, it is felt to be a space of sexualised harassment. The territory has been marked, and the women can no longer territorialise upon it. Falling back onto their interior milieus serves no purpose when the reason they have come to a club is to territorialise. The women are not being allowed to do what they want to do, so they leave.
5. Sociality and Repertoires

The fun of a night out is often thought to be the people you are with. The sociability of being with a group of friends, and the affective connections between you, afford their own pleasures. A group of friends who know each other well will have a sense of togetherness, camaraderie and relatedness amongst themselves. As this sense becomes expressed in practice, these practices become the expression of friendship. This feeling of camaraderie is brought back to life every time the group goes out together to a pub, bar or nightclub. It is a feeling not easily participated in by newcomers or others outside the group. It is not always easily shared by all those within the group, however. What comprises a ‘group’ of friends, or rather, ‘the group’, is often hard to specify. The group is amorphous, changing with the circumstances. It is not so much a membership, nor to do with boundaries, as it is to do with the texture of the relations between people, enacted in practice. There are specific expressions of the texture of friendship between bodies, enacted in their practice. These are ways of relating to each other, modes of familiarity as expressed in in-jokes, stories about past shared activities, or the roles members take up in conversation. Of course, participating in such practices requires an enrolment into these repertoires of interacting, a social memory between members of the group. Thus, the composition of ‘the group’ depends on an ability to partake in such repertoires of interaction.

By repeating a texture of sociability such practices smooth the course of interaction, opening up the group to a machinic flow, a working of relations. This repetition relates to the group’s sociality, its little embodied rules and machinic ways of organising its affects. A group sociality can be thought of as an inflection of the connectivity between its bodies, this connectivity becoming expressed through rhythmic behaviour and interaction. Repertoires of interaction between friends provide the rhythm for establishing a group milieu. Moreover, the level of organisation achieved through the practising of these repertoires is
easily increased to become expressive of the group’s shared history, shared camaraderie and shared sociality. Such group socialities, then, simultaneously enact a molecular machinic connectivity, and re-enact this connectivity with a territorialising rhythm, an expression of the texture of their friendship. Moreover, the vibratory nature of such territorialisation is testimony to their abutting other territories. The sociality of a pub becomes infolded into a group sociality when that group goes to the pub. Gendered, sexualised, racialised and ethnicised modes of practice echo in group socialities as these territories abut others. This is the machinic immanence of such modes of practice to everyday life, a social memory of what relations to enter into, and how to do so. It is the machinic immanence of formations of power, organising relations into gendered, sexualised, racialised and ethnicised lines, to territories. Even though singularly enacted, such organisation striates these territories, drawing these lines across the landscape.

*Losers and weakness*

All of the groups of participants for this research had interesting repertoires of interaction. In group three a running joke was made of Penny’s purported ‘weakness’. This joke is a repertoire available to several members of the group. It becomes singularly deployed in different situations. For instance, when Penny arrives at the O’Neill’s pub on the night that Chloe’s friends were going on to The Forum nightclub, she asks Paul, Ben and myself whether any of us were going to go to the bar. Paul tells her that she should not be so cheeky and should go to the bar herself. Penny plays on the group joke about her weakness, by protesting that she is too weak to go to the bar. This joke also comes up later in the evening, this time deployed by Chloe. During some banter between Penny, Chloe and Paul, Chloe asserts that Penny is weak. To demonstrate, she picks up Penny’s forearm, putting one hand near Penny’s wrist and the other further up Penny’s forearm. Chloe then makes a motion as if to easily snap Penny’s arm in half. She does this a couple of more times during the evening, and for that
night at least, this act has become part of the group’s repertoire, a performance that modulates the relationship between Chloe and Penny in particular.

Penny’s ‘weakness’, although a narrative deployed singularly, repeats an order or a rhythm between Penny, Paul and Chloe. The order it achieves is a placement of these individuals within a recuperated relationship. An assertion of Penny’s weakness transforms herself and her friends, in particular Chloe, her ‘best friend’. It is an expression of the affection and closeness of their relationship, but also of an invariance of their affective potential – an occasionally getting frustrated with one another. Other repertoires shared by the group fold social and cultural influences from a broader territory into that of the group. Mediated bodily repertoires, for instance, become incorporated into the group’s own repertoire. One of group three’s favourites at the time was ‘the loser sign’, as seen on MTV pop videos and Hollywood films, an ‘L’ shape made with the thumb and forefinger of one hand placed in front of the forehead. The loser sign may have cited a set of mediated images and narratives, but, deployed within the group it takes the piss. Its use organises the affective relations between those in the group, expressing a particular sense of playful banter, teasing and antipathy.

Some parts of the group’s repertoire are expressive of machines organising bodies into social relations. Such distributed bodies have a differential potential for affective relations amongst themselves. Again, we face the limits of what a body can do, its organisation into vibratory organs concomitant with an emergent sociality of proper selves and subjectivities. These subjects and what they can do, these selves and their emergent potential for social relation, are expressions of a territory. The repertoires of the group, then, enact the group’s territory as an instantiation or infolding of a social territory. Or rather, the group’s territorialisation – a process – becomes the very process by which territories of striated social space become instantiated. Both Penny and Chloe, for instance, shared a particular embodied repertoire
with Paul, a repertoire that was beyond Ben and the others in the friendship group. This repertoire was a set of sexualised dance moves and other modes of tactility between Paul, Chloe and Penny. Drawn into this repertoire are Paul’s own techniques for becoming-sexy, deployed when on the pull. Within his sexy relations with Chloe and Penny, however, these moves and this becoming-sexy become parodied. Penny, Chloe and Paul would act out becoming-flirtatious with one another, sometimes Paul playing the role of a heterosexual male seducer, sometimes one of either Penny or Chloe becoming a seductress. They might dance sexily together, or Chloe or Penny might become tactile with Paul. Certain parts of the body would become vibratory, one of the women’s hands touching the back of Paul’s neck, or one of their fingers run seductively down the middle of his chest or back.

This tactility was playful but it was also performative. It was acted out in a particular style, enacting a familiarity between Paul, Chloe and Penny – their familiarity. It was an ordering of their relations, a rhythm to get along to. Although these modes of tactility, or these styles of dancing together or flirting would appear to be socially available styles of interaction, they become acted out within a particular affective and relational context. They express a certain sense between Paul, Chloe and Penny, a particular arrangement that subverts the citationality of the embodied actions they engage in. Paul, Chloe and Penny may act as if they are flirting with one another, but they are just playing. Nevertheless, through such a parody of flirting, they do still distribute themselves into sexualised roles. Chloe and Penny flirt with Paul, yet they can do this safely, without risk, because they know that Paul is gay, and, moreover, he is their friend. Paul performs the role of a heterosexual male seducer, but in the context of his relation to Chloe and Penny this becomes a playful parody. The two women can act flirtatiously with Paul because they know that such flirting will not become collapsed to a proper sexualised Desire. Yet, such play still depends on a bodily memory of Chloe and Penny becoming-female. Moreover, it also suggests the pervasiveness of heterosexualised roles,
or, rather, the demands to occupy them performed in everyday interaction. Although Paul, Chloe and Penny mess around with these differences, their actions still performatively enact a social bodily memory. They bring to life a distribution of bodies, a social differentiation along sexual and gendered lines, enacted as differences in expected performances and affects. Yet, folded into their own repertoires, these social repertoires become singularly enacted, and tactically played with.

*Double take: territories of gender and ethnicity*

The flow of interaction, then, often relies on the effect of repertoires of repeated or rhythmic interaction in order to proceed smoothly and without thought. The unthought nature of such proceedings, however, is often built upon a machinism that enacts social formations. In this way, race, gender, ethnicity and sexuality can become immanent to the territorial expression of recreational socialities. Group repertoires comprise of social memories of how to interact and what relations to enter into; they are simultaneously the in-between potential for expression and the invariance towards which events and sense face. Many of the events that we witnessed earlier could be considered again in terms of the processes of territorialisation necessary for the emergence of racialised, ethnicised, gendered and sexualised difference. Here, however, I will briefly consider just one.

In chapter five, we met some of group two as they were engaged in conversation at a South London Wetherspoons pub. Here, ethnicity and gender emerged through differences of what bodies could do within the modes of sociality participated in by the group. This sociality was, in part, a texture to the group’s modes of social interaction, an inflection of the spatiality of their relations. There was a certain rhythm to their talk, established, on the whole, by Anthony and Stuart, who provided changes in topic and the main thread of the group narrative, in the process becoming white men. Much of the group’s talk was structured around narratives, usually humorous anecdotes of previous events.
These anecdotes were, themselves, a repertoire shared (unequally) by members of the group, deployed singularly with the effect of achieving certain results. They provided an affective sense to the proceedings through shared humour. Yet, the anecdotes were often part of a process of banter that placed members of the group into differential relations with one another.

The banter and the anecdotes expressed a particular sense of the group’s arrangement, the character of the social space they were creating. This territory became striated: a playful conversation about an email sent to Alison about the behaviour of a proper heterosexual female partner. Stuart teases her about whether she irons her partner Anthony’s shirts. Then he asks her whether she had received an email he had sent her, before detailing what is in it: ‘Housekeeping 1955: ... A woman should plan the dinner during her journey home, so that it can be timed to be on the table as her husband arrives home from work.’ Alison responds, with embarrassment: “But I do that anyway…” The humour encountered by the group in the email hides the act of enacting this gendered difference in propriety. The humour provides a defence for those who are embarrassed to subscribe to such a view: we’re only joking; don’t take it so seriously! Yet, such anecdotes provide the texture to the group’s interaction. During the evening, Alison had already attempted to make accountable her presence here, on what she feared might be taken as a ‘lads’ night out’. She had been on the way home, indeed thinking about doing the housework, but had decided that she could not face it and so would join the otherwise all male group that evening in the pub. What was the nature of their territory? Was this indeed a ‘lads’ night out’ into which she had intruded? The men maintained that it was not. It was not drunken enough; there was not enough misbehaving. That would have been a different territory from this. Nevertheless, their anecdotes had indeed enacted a grid of differences in the very texture of their sociality, placing Alison both within and without the flow of their banter. The group’s interaction expressed a territory, and it vibrated with an immanent machinism of gendered differences.
The conversation moved on with Anthony and Stuart asking members of the group what housework they do. Stuart asked Darren whether he did the cooking. Darren replied that he did, although he immediately wonders aloud how come he had ended up doing this. In response to Stuart’s puzzlement, Darren clarifies that he means that he often cooks when he goes to visit his partner, Kirsty, in Leicester. There is a moment during this exchange when Darren’s position within a conservative propriety of gendered roles is under question. Immanent to this question is the citation of a problem: what is the gendered nature of an Asian man? It is asked implicitly by Stuart, who again becomes white through exercising the authority implicit in the question, enacting a machinism of gendered and ethnicised power. Darren has to reaffirm his masculinity, and, in doing so, reaffirm the possibility for Asian and masculinity to coincide. His masculinity is under too much threat for him to be able to embrace what he actually does: the cooking. We return to territory as a marking of distance. Subjects and selves are expressions of a territory, but a striated territory such as this expresses selves unequally across its lines of differentiation. Such lines throw belonging to such a territory into question. It is not only an uneven terrain, but for some, a contradictory one. There is nothing wrong with contradiction, of course, except that the organisation of such a territory demands conformity to a fictional unity of expression. The distance between Asian and masculine – the cited contradiction – sometimes becomes too great, and bodies that are caught out or not recognised become forced to deterritorialise.

6. Conclusions

Social spaces become differentiated one from another. Some become cool, while others become kitsch; some resound to house, others to funk and soul. Spaces become bounded, a distance set up between them; but their differences are also a matter of organisation, a matter of territorialisation. Space becomes inflected with rhythms, order and
various levels of organisation. In many ways, space is, in fact, such inflection and organisation. Territorialisation takes place as the style in which this inflection becomes organised, this organisation expressing an openness to other milieus, other territories. A social field is never a unity; rather, a territory is always a multiplicity. It is an organisation of an assemblage of elements - music, alcohol, dancing bodies, sexualised memories, modes of sociality, reputations of cool, various materials (tables, chairs, the surface of the dancefloor) - an arrangement of these elements as an event. Territorialisation expresses a multiplicity of friendships, of a rhythmic dancing to music, of nostalgia, of the expected performances of drunkenness or attractiveness. A territory can be comprised of repertoires of performance, infolding other spaces, ways of relating recuperated. A territory reverberates with elsewhere, a hundred other places. It is vibratory. Bodily memories become encountered and re-enacted, opening up these potential worlds, here and now.

What is the nature of difference? Rather than a unified social field, and rather than a coherent habitus, what should we think? Stuart’s questioning of Darren’s masculinity, the striation of a territory through the performance of a repertoire. Yet, this striation throws up a contradiction and a disjuncture; a territorialisation that prevents some from territorialising fully upon it. Or, perhaps, Paul trying to get in at The Montague but not expecting what he encountered: a disjuncture between a bodily memory and the distance interposed between it and the territory, a very process of territorialisation. Similarly at The Forum, Paul and Chloe misapprehended the nature of the judgements they were submitting themselves to. Each encountered their bodily memories (of) elsewhere. Moreover, bodily memories are an accumulation of time, of pure difference. They virtually incorporate a history of events. At Miss Lulu’s, the two blonde women accumulate a bodily sense of the territory. Another disjuncture occurs when the breakdancers make their advances. An assertion of a symmetry of Desire comes face to face with the certainty of an asymmetry. These are different territories, divergent processes of territorialisation,
Territorialisation now becomes the infolding of a multiplicity of lines. What is the nature of an event? Time accumulates; a sense accumulates rhythmically. Yet, the pure difference of time unfolds as a spatial difference. Time and space may be relative, but this is not only a quantitative relation: it is also a qualitative one. Movement has a quality, a spatial inflection. Without movement and velocity, without at least the smallest oscillation of a subatomic particle, time - pure difference - would cease. A subatomic oscillation is not the same as the vibratory nature of the territory, but it does suggest that the smallest interval should be thought of as space-time. Events, then, unfold as a qualitative multiplicity. They are singular, but not only that, this singularity rests on the unfolding of the event as purely differential. Yet, this difference already presupposes a qualitative movement, at least a subatomic oscillation, and a proliferation of difference presupposes a proliferation of flows and trajectories, some combining, some becoming lines of flight. From this chaotic spatiality, a smooth space emerges as ordering and repetition occur. The intensity of particles and bodies communicating requires a pure difference; an order or series; and the difference between the pure difference and the series. A smooth space is already vibrating with other spaces. As things become more organised, then, a territory emerges as an infolding of colliding trajectories, of movements, some that clash, others that work together, and become thrown out again and that explore a line of deterritorialisation. All this is merely to say that the accumulation of difference that is a transcendental bodily memory is also spatial, and can only come to live again as a vibration. It is to say that the event, its pure difference, rests on at least the smallest of movements.
Chapter 7

Ethics as the art of living

1. Friendship: ethics and morality

Let’s put more desire into our friendships. And more pleasure too!

How to be friendly? Or, more specifically, how do we become friends with others when morality gets in the way?

Friendship is a problem of ethics and morality. It is a practical process, one that often involves coping with the problems of difference and power. Friendships are often acted out through particular modes of sociality, for instance, those that we have already encountered in various pubs, bars and nightclubs. Affects become regulated in the little actions and interactions of becoming-sociable with others. ‘Sex-desire’ (Butler, 1999) makes its return: heterosexual norms often reverberate through pub, bar and club spaces. Here, women become expected to run the gauntlet of being chatted up by leering men. Men become expected to perform their masculinity as certain styles of activity; but ethnicity emerges as it becomes easier for some men to do so than others. Judgements start to circulate, and as these judgements become performed they enact a distribution. Attractiveness, sexiness, popularity, belonging: these are all distributions performed through situated social action. Transformations - corporeal and incorporeal - acts of differentiation and attribution, acts of organisation and acts of ordering: these acts of distribution express immanent structures of differentiation.

“But we’re friends! Surely all this doesn’t come into it? Our friendship goes beyond all these expectations, doesn’t it?” Well, yes and no. The ‘yes’, I shall come to later; the ‘no’, I will tackle now. We have already
witnessed groups of friends being divided up by their own modes of sociality. Chloe’s colleagues at the O’Neill’s pub, for instance, became divided into various levels of ‘cool’ and differing degrees of attractiveness. The group’s sociality became deployed to enact these divisions through judgements (Chloe’s anxiety about what Lisa and Claire thought of her) and circulation (Claire and Lisa maintaining their pre-eminent social position). The friends in group two become distributed along gendered and ethnicised lines. The white men come to dominate their group’s sociality, talking the most and talking the loudest. Their banter and laddishness provide a certain texture to their nights out, sometimes making their female friends such as Alison feel a little out of place. Their domination of proceedings means they sometimes come to sit in judgement of the masculinity of the Asian members of the group. Individuals come to occupy the same old roles that they always do. Their relationships with their friends fall into the same old pattern. Socialities are ways of relating, modes of familiarity.

We see this again between Penny and Chloe: the running joke about Penny’s weakness recuperates a familiar relation between the two friends. These women’s ability to act flirtatiously with Paul recuperates a specification of individuals: what are you? A woman, a gay man. It is ‘sex-desire’ all over again.

These modes of sociality are a social memory of how to interact. They often, but not always, demand a proper economy of values, an insistence on a differential evaluation of bodies. Much of Western thought, in a Platonic mode, would characterise such an evaluation as subjecting the intuitions, intentions, actions and consequences of the body to the mind and its moral principles (Goodchild, 1997). At a stroke, a representation is invoked: the interiority of the mind representing the moral principle. This can also be taken to invoke a field of perception, a field of possible experience with a proper self and a proper subject at its centre (Kazarian, 1998: 101). In this case, becoming a subject of sexuality, for example, is a matter of finding a place within the perception of others: do others find you attractive? It also becomes a matter of self-identification – how you perceive
yourself and your abilities. Of course, there is no guarantee that the mind regulating morality will itself be moral. In this case, a moralistic way of thinking might turn to the idea of a disembodied ‘view from nowhere’, a pure idea of justice, a transcendental morality (Goodchild, 1997: 39-40).

Whether such a morality is taken to be about proper representation or about a transcendental moral economy, it is often understood in terms of absolute principles. Morality becomes a matter of the Word, the Law: it is taken to apply to every time, everybody, everywhere. The Word might be religious, but it might equally be to do with the nation, or sexuality. More likely, it will be a conflation of many intersecting moral economies. As these economies become applied actions become judged, right or wrong. It is not only actions that become judged, but also the bodies that carry them out. This is the difference Foucault (1979) talks about between sodomy and homosexuality (c.f. chapter four). Modern moral economies rely upon a typologising of bodies, turning them into individuals so that they can be specified: ‘you are a homosexual’. Such typologies also objectify these bodies so that they cannot do anything more than what they are supposed to be able to do, as specified by the moral economy. Bodies become evil without complication. They become sexualised or pathologised, without any sense of why this might be. Bodies become reduced, without any potential for difference or connection. There is no negotiation.

Of course, things are never this straightforward in everyday life. Some people do cling to such an absolute vision. Most, however, would probably be willing to admit of changes to their moral principles, often in a temporal sense, or perhaps with regard to having encountering circumstances that confounded an attempted recourse to an inflexible principle. Yet, our practice often has the effect of objectifying and typologising bodies. Our language often implies that moral difference is about abstract principles accessible to mentalistic judgement and representation. This view is difficult to reconcile with the need most people face in their everyday lives to account for difference. Nor does
it stand up to an interrogation of the historical construction of moral technologies and their typologies.

Furthermore, the assertion of an individualised moral judgement implies that the subject making such a judgement has a free choice. It implies that s/he is not subject to economic, social, cultural or contextual pressures. Yet, as we have now seen on many occasions, representation has a duration. To represent is to attempt to recapture the past. A moral judgement or principle is an obligation. Once the original flush of love has long since dissipated, the act of representation brings forth an obligation: “You must continue to love.” A moral obligation is an order to do something as a matter of principle; but it is empowered by the death of the original impetus to act in this way (Deleuze, 1988; cited in Goodchild, 1997: 41). A moral economy, then, works by citation. As well as explicit judgements, there are implicit judgements and presuppositions immanent to practice. There are performative acts that distribute bodies according to a proper and moral economy of differentiation.

A moral economy is an immanence of orders and obligations to performative action. It works implicitly more than it does explicitly. Lines of striation traverse modes of sociality, drawing lines through groups of friends. Bodies become differentiated and specified through talk and other forms of social practice. Paul becomes gay and he can enter into a playfully flirtatious relationship with Chloe and Penny (group three). Yet, another evaluation subsists, a prohibition: Ben cannot flirt with Paul, at least not if he is to remain heterosexual. Bodies must act properly! Other evaluations circulate: those relating to the attractiveness and popularity of Chloe’s colleagues. Popular bodies not only appear attractive, but they perform a particular kind of sociality. Or the Asian men in group two. Darren’s relationship to masculinity becomes difficult. Asian and masculinity are divided within the typologising practice of his friends. A proper Asian body becomes pathological.
Modes of sociality, of course, are about what a body can do. As these modes of sociality become riven with moral and proper forms of difference, the problem becomes one of what bodies can properly do. When becoming-sociable makes such demands, it divides friends into different types of selves and different types of subject. Their relations – the relationships between friends – become subordinated to these already specified individuals. These distributions, however, are more than just about perception. Becoming a subject of sexuality (becoming gendered, becoming attractive), for example, is more than just about how one is seen by others. It is also about how bodies can express sexual desire through their actions. The distributions enacted through the practices of sociality are distributions of affect. This is a specification how bodies can properly affect and be affected by others in everyday practice.

But, there is so much more that can be done. Even as we express particular forms of repetition, our rhythms insinuate pure difference into our dancing. Even if our modes of sociality are often the re-emergence of sex-desire, our friendships will always mutate and throw us into differently desiring relationships. Our desires will never be fully determined because they are already multiplicitous. Desire is more than racialised, ethnicised or even sexualised. It is eventful and singular. As well as affording the potential for a recuperation of identity, desire signals an ambiguous opening for other ways of relating. Desire is the process of bodies becoming related, of bodies becoming arranged in forever proliferating connections. Rather than turning towards the demands of a proper system of values underpinning friendship, our friendships can be put back into contact with the conditions of real life and real experience – the various aspects of the process of arrangement (c.f. Kazarian, 1998: 101). In this way, the process of negotiating friendships can become a movement towards “a different economy of bodies and pleasures” (Foucault, 1979: 159).
I use Deleuze’s conception of ‘perversion’ (Deleuze, 1990; Kazarian, 1998) to suggest how the pleasures of friendship can themselves act as an ethical attractor. Deleuze discusses Freud’s understanding of desires and actions being perverse if they deviate ‘with respect to aims’. For Freud, every desire and every action has a proper or normal aim, defined within a classificatory schema. The mutual expression of desire between a couple is expected to lead to a deepening of their relationship; but their expressions of desire are expected to become normatively sexual. This would be a proper ‘aim’. It is an ‘aim’ insofar as each expression of desire is like a question begging an expected answer: normal heterosexual activities - the missionary position, please. So, for Freud, a pervert is one who desires with the wrong aims in view. Maybe s/he would aim for a different mode of gratification; maybe her/his expressions of desire all become expressed with the ‘aim’ of eventually taking pleasure from humiliating the Other.

Deleuze, however, takes Freud’s conception of perversion and gives it his own twist. Unlike Freud, Deleuze does not take desire to be a property of an already formed individual. If desire was to belong to the individual, then the individual could become defined by it. Freud’s conception of perversion relies upon a proper or moralistic framework for understanding both desire and the Other that one desires and that guarantees the coherence of the perceptual field with the individual subject at its centre. Given such a framework, the possibility for difference - for desiring in different or novel ways - become collapsed to an-Other place within this already determined framework. There is no longer any possibility for true difference.

Instead, Deleuze prefers to think of desire as becoming-related in new ways. Desire is about the arrangement of bodies. What would be really perverted would be to desire without any aim at all, to step outside all proper expectations and moral schemas. Such a pervert would be concerned only with the pure process of desire, with arrangement itself. If we add this kind of perversion to our friendships, this would be
to say that the desire among friends would not be concerned with what these friends should do, or how they should relate. The desire among friends would not have an ‘aim’ of only establishing friendships with those who are loud enough, or who one can get horrendously drunk with. Moreover, it would not be the establishment of the same old proper relationships. Friends would not be confined to their usual roles or relations. The quiet ones could sometimes become those most popular, those most connected with. The sexualities implicit within our friendships could be multiplied, or even left behind. This is to conceive of friendship as a process; to be concerned with what connections can be made, what affects can be established.

Why is this an ethical problem? Well, if we are to understand desire in terms of the arrangement of bodies, we have also to understand that bodies make evaluations. These are not moral judgements. These evaluations are made without reference to economies of value or to an a priori or transcendental absolute. Nevertheless, the body evaluates: it expresses emotions of love, hatred, like, dislike, joy and sadness. It performs ethical acts, making certain connections and disjunctions, and not others (Goodchild, 1997: 46). But, how can the body and its evaluations escape from determination? After all, we have already seen how embodied action recuperates proper forms of sociality. We have already seen that bodily actions perform judgements that transform themselves and others, placing them into proper social relations. The body is a social institution, a site of the relation of forces. Immanent to bodily evaluations are a host of cultural, economic, social and contextual formations and forces.

It is true that a body is a way or style of expressing the world. Its actions – an evaluation, for example – are an expression of the way it is affected. Bodily actions and thoughts express an ethos, a connectedness with a multiplicity of assemblages, but as a particular mode of existence. This ‘infolding’ of the outside might be thought of as being in communication with the plane of immanence. Of course, this returns us to the question posed in chapter four: what is the
nature of the plane of immanence: Foucault’s power or Deleuze’s desire? From the previous chapters, it should be clear that power is immanent to action, thought and affect. Yet, thought and action are not determined by these networks of relations. Rather, thoughts and actions are an expression of a territory of implicit presuppositions: they are not part of a chain of determination, but, instead, reverberate with other forces, orders, institutions and formations.

Moreover, ethical action and ethical thought escape literal representation and meaning, because, as we have seen, such action and thought make different connections on a virtual field. This virtual field is the field of events, sense, singularities, intensities and ideas. It is a field of in-between potential, so it not only allows a recuperation of memory or territory, but also offers the potential for different kinds of action. This difference is offered by the very unfolding on the virtual field of all the different potential connections that can be made, or the different potential actions that can be taken. The virtual communicates with pure difference, with the plane of immanence as desire bringing bodies into new relations and connections. The eventfulness of this virtual field is the necessity of its openness to the future. The virtual is to do with process - the unfolding of the event - and is thus constituted by the directionality of time. Time as pure difference, the future as the unknowable difference that constitutes temporality: living is to face the future. Yet, to face the unknown is not merely to face the void. The future is heterogeneous, and conditioned by the plane of immanence. To face the future is to accept its actualisation in the sensible, to accept its effect of deterritorialisation on one’s implied territory (Goodchild, 1997: 48).

A body evaluates beyond any system of representation: this is already to become ethical because it is to open the body towards a process of communication with other bodies in a virtual field. To become more ethical still would be to face the pure process of desire, and to communicate with it. It would be to engage fully in the potential of producing new modes of existence. Yet, an ethics also demands
attention to the repetition we face in our social lives. To live ethically is not only a conduct of time, but also a conduct of relations – a socius. Our friendships can be judged from the point of view of its friendliness, its own power to affirm and reproduce itself (Deleuze, 1984, cited in Goodchild, 1997:48). This is the test of the eternal return. Becoming friendly is to become receptive to new connections, and to enable a multiplication of modes of co-existence. It is to allow friendship to repeat itself, to increase the power of acting amongst all the friends. An ethical friendliness concerns itself with its own pure process. Such a friendliness opens itself up towards desire and thus injects this process of becoming-related back into itself.

Introduction

This chapter will turn towards friendship as it becomes played out amongst the participant groups who took part in the research for this project. It will explore a line through several different groups of friends to search for an ethics of friendship that opens up towards 'a different economy of bodies and pleasures'. It will seek friendships as they become non-intentional and become emphasised for themselves. Such an ethos takes on the utmost importance in relation to the constitution of the very fabric of our socialities. What is at stake is the ability to belong within a socius, to be able to practise an increasingly nourishing relation to those one lives with.

Section two of this chapter will look at the intersection of ethnicity, religion and sexuality within a specific friendship sociality. It will consider the potential for ethical conduct between the members of the group when confronted with the reproduction of moral differences between them. This potential for ethical conduct opens up towards exploration, but in the end stabilises at an accommodation of difference within social relations. Section three will consider what would constitute deterritorialisation from the reproduced norms of sociality. As in section two, a movement towards ethical sociability becomes confronted with the limits to an acceptable distribution of
bodies and their relations. Section four, then, will attempt to push beyond such a limit. Taking each of the three main participant groups who took part in this research, it will present the ways in which at least some members of the group become different.

Finally, there also have to be ways of conceptualising ethical encounters beyond friendship. Section five, then, will present three short tableaux taken from the participant observation research, each of which suggests an indeterminacy in establishing relations with others. Again, becoming ethical in such encounters is about trying to maximise the potential and affect between the participants. Yet, to make an ethical evaluation about such encounters runs the risk of the problems faced by trying to prescribe conditions for an ideal communicative situation. It is hoped that by facing indeterminacy, by trying to write about it without determination, another kind of gesture can be made towards an ethics of different bodies and pleasures.

2. Accommodating friends

How does one live with those from whom one is separated within a moral economy? How does one relate to another across a moral difference? Maybe this is an old fashioned question, but it still seems of the utmost importance in the contemporary post-colonial world. The post-colonial is, first and foremost, a desiring ethic. It proliferates lines of ethics, a loose convergence of trajectories. The post-colonial is an asking of questions, questions about new belongings and new relations but always with a memory of past and continuing machineries of power. If we are to become ethical, if we are to practise an openness without categorical difference, how do we relate to those divided from us by a re-enacted moral economy? How do we practise an ethics in the face of moral determination? There are, of course, no solutions to these questions. All I am going to try to do in this section is work through some aspects of the problem, to see how it applies to friendship, and to see how friendship might help us to think ethically.
In particular, this section considers the friendships among the men in group two. We have already met several of these men: Anthony, Stuart and Adam – the white men who often seem to dominate within the group’s specific sociality – and the two Asian men, Darren and Henry. We have only briefly encountered another of the men in the group, Hassan, but it is time to be more properly introduced. Hassan, who is of Egyptian ancestry but who grew up in Britain, is a practising Muslim who does not drink and who is celibate. When the group went to the pub, however, he would be there, drinking soft drinks, but performing and embodying a very similar version of ethnicised masculinity to most of the white men in the group. On first impressions, he seemed to have successfully inserted himself into a white and masculine dominated sociality. Yet, although he was as similarly loud and dominating of the talk as the white lads in the group, and would also take up similar roles to them in humorous and sexually risky banter and ‘piss-taking’, there was one crucial difference in this performance. That is that Hassan could do it while sober. For the rest of the group this form of interaction only really took off with the aid of alcoholic stimulation. In fact, this meant that many of the rest of the group had a certain admiration for Hassan, although the norm was made apparent when the others would also refer to Hassan as somewhat “mad” for being able to perform as he does without alcohol. Middle class white masculinity behaves badly with impunity: the alcohol provides the excuse for the loss of reason or control. Without this excuse, any similar behaviour becomes excessive.

Hassan also performs his masculinity through heterosexual practices of flirting with women while on nights out with the group. Many of the others in the group comment on how women find him attractive and charming, despite knowing or finding out about his celibacy. The relational transformation of bodies through Hassan’s heterosexualising practice brings back to life a memory of gendered and sexualised difference. Yet, this repetition is enacted across other categorical differences that might seem to problematise it, namely those of race, ethnicity and religion. Hassan prevents himself, because of his belief,
from taking his flirting beyond just that. He prevents himself from fully consuming a relation to heterosexuality. Heterosexuality itself becomes enacted as specifically ethnicised in the group’s problematisation of Hassan’s practice. During the first group interview with the group, Alison comments on how lots of women find Hassan attractive. Yet, almost as soon as she has said this, she throws doubt over Hassan’s attractiveness. Hassan becomes othered and ethnicised as Alison suggests that maybe the attraction is because these women know he is unavailable, or because they see him as exotic.

During another conversation, this time at a Wetherspoons pub, Alison remarks that Hassan is “saving himself” for a “nice Muslim girl.” A moral and absolute principle is recognised as intervening in what a body can do. Yet, how different is the Islamic morality in which Hassan participates from the contours of a conservative moral economy into which most of the rest of the group insert themselves? Despite their bravado, and despite the self-proclaimed depravity of much of their talk, many of the men in the group had been in long-term relationships for several years, and were planning to marry these long-term partners. The ideal of ‘saving oneself’ could apply even more aptly to some of the women in the group. So, even if this ideal did not match the practice of group members in an absolute sense, it could hardly be said that there was such a gulf in either practice or aspiration between Hassan and his friends. Even to point out that Hassan wants to marry a Muslim woman merely indicates the unspoken normativity operating within the group. Most of the others also aspire to marry somebody with whom they can imagine belonging to a common moral community. The rest of the group seem to think that they are not so bound by moral or religious principles as Hassan is, when, actually, their principles are merely rendered invisible by virtue of been taken for granted. This is not to say that there is no difference between Hassan’s adherence to religious doctrine and the moral principles invoked by the rest of the group. It is merely to say that the difference is not a chasm.
Hassan’s problematic relationship with masculinity and heterosexuality plays itself out in other interesting ways. Perhaps it is because of this problematic relationship to heterosexuality that Hassan repetitively proclaims his disgust with homosexuals and homosexuality. This homophobia is also a practice that he attributes to his religious beliefs. The other male members of the group performatively enact this problematic, thus ethnicising Hassan, by teasing him about his sexuality. They often accuse him of being homosexual, even though, or rather because they know that his beliefs would make that possibility morally reprehensible.

On the one hand, this ‘piss-taking’ performatively establishes a relation between Hassan and the masculinity sustaining the camaraderie of the male members of the group. Hassan becomes tied into this masculine practice of piss-taking. On the other hand, he becomes the object of the piss-taking, its other. The other men tease him about his sexuality precisely because of the difference of his religiously-inspired practice from their normative practice. This may seem to recuperate the difference of the group’s practice into a heterosexual and racialised norm: the Muslim man as sexually attractive and yet simultaneously deficient, with something to prove.

All this can be seen in the following example. While the group was drinking outside a bar one evening, I joined a conversation between Hassan, Stuart, Henry and Kirsty. Hassan was sitting down on a bench next to Henry. Stuart and Kirsty were standing in front of them. As I turn to face them, Hassan was accusing Kirsty of being a hypocrite for something she had just said. He says that at least he has said that he thinks “homosexuality” is wrong. As the conversation progresses, it becomes apparent that they had been discussing whether they would like to be kissed by a person of the same sex. Kirsty seems to have said that she would not. Hassan’s accusation of hypocrisy is based on what he sees as a contradiction between Kirsty’s unwillingness to kiss another woman and her saying that she does not think there is “anything wrong with” homosexuality. Hassan is asserting an
intolerance of a difference between what one would permit one’s own body to do, and what one would permit others to do. This is the universalising tendency of morality, and it purports a relation between an individual subject and a transcendental subject.

After Hassan’s accusation, there is a pause for a fraction of a second. Then Stuart volunteers the fact that he has kissed another man. He says this with the particular glee of someone who has just set up a situation to which he can eagerly anticipate a response. Indeed the reaction comes. Hassan parries, loudly and laddishly: “What? With tongues?” and gestures and smiles lasciviously at Stuart. Stuart and Kirsty laugh. Stuart replies that it was not with tongues, but that it was on the lips. Hassan then asks Kirsty whether she had been kissed on the lips before by another woman, to which she replies that she has not. There follows a brief discussion about the differences in the ways that men and women can appropriately interact with one another. Hassan asserts that it is “ok” for women to hug and kiss one another: it is more “natural” for them to do so. Kirsty disagrees, but Stuart pipes up with, “yeah, it would be really odd if a bloke came up to you and started hugging you. Blokes just don’t do that sort of thing.” I interject that maybe some men do, offering the stereotype of Americans greeting one another in the movies as an example.

Hassan then returns to how come Stuart had kissed a man. Stuart seems to want to wind Hassan up a little bit more. But, it is all in good humour and there seems to be nothing at stake between them. Rather than tell us anything about the social context within which he kissed this man, Stuart instead acts out this kiss bodily with an imaginary man. Hassan reacts with a disgusted laugh, narrowing his eyes and turning away slightly. A moment later, Stuart leans over and playfully strokes the back of Hassan’s head. Hassan immediately leans away, still smiling, but telling Stuart not to do that. He calls Stuart “gay”, an injunction as much as an insult. Stuart then strokes the back of Henry’s head, and Henry, laughing, pushes him away but does not protest as forcefully as Hassan does. Soon, Henry joins in with winding
up Hassan by also stroking the back of his head. Despite such a wind up, however, all of the friends were relaxed. They trusted each other enough to take one another’s mutual provocation in good humour.

In this situation, the playful ribbing of Hassan’s views on homosexuality enacted, albeit briefly, a more tentative and exploratory interrogation of the way that members of the group related to one another, as well as their views and how these express machinic forms of desire. The others’ mockery of Hassan’s sexuality becomes accompanied by ‘piss-taking’ that took up positions challenging his homophobia. This was despite the same members of the group expressing homophobic positions themselves on other occasions. On this occasion, as on others, there were times when the group seemed to express a genuine curiosity about each other and about others outside of the group. A playful ribbing quickly transforms into a more serious interrogation about the justifications and logic behind each other’s views. Despite their occasional homophobia, many members of the group, who have only socialised as a group and on a regular basis with one openly gay man, also expressed a curiosity about homosexuality and gay and lesbian people more generally. Now, while much of this interrogation would end up with moral and categorical differences being repeated, as in this instance with regard to Hassan’s views on homosexuality, at least the potential for difference had been opened up.

So, even though this potential may not have been fully exploited, it still became exploited in some ways. Other members of the group would occasionally rethink their own views on homosexuality in the course of these playful interrogations. More than this, however, these tentative and exploratory moments reached towards new ways of accommodating each other. These new ways of relating to one another were not reducible to a repetition of dominant ways of organising bodies. Hassan’s place in the group could not be reduced to a problematic relation to an ethnicised heterosexuality, because his practice made an accommodation with this regime, and because the
group expressed a willingness to explore and be interested in each other’s difference.

Of course, more significant accommodations had to be made during those nights out when the group was socialising with D’Sousa, the one openly gay man with whom they socialised on a regular basis. D’Sousa was the central character of many of the group’s shared stories, and seemed to be a source of much fascination, if a little consternation. D’Sousa was of Portuguese and Singaporean Chinese ancestry, and he was a university friend of several of the men in the group, who had attended the same university as well as the same school. When he socialised with the group, the other men would be friendly towards him. They would be accommodating in the sense that they regulated their talk, which might otherwise have included homophobic remarks and jokes. Behind his back, however, these remarks still proliferated, and D’Sousa was sometimes talked of disparagingly.

D’Sousa’s relationship to the group was complicated by the fact that he was the only openly gay person that most of the group members socialised with, whether with this group or not. As D’Sousa adopted a markedly camp persona when with the group, they took his campness to be representative of all gay men. This often became problematic when the other men in the group would discuss gay men, using D’Sousa as the exemplar. On such occasions they would express puzzlement and misunderstanding, and maybe a trace of disgust. Most often, this puzzlement accompanied a particular kind of extrapolation. Certain presuppositions were made to circulate implicitly. The men understood the bodily styles by which one expresses oneself and one’s desire to be tied to some fixed identity of the body. This identity of the body was defined in terms of a heterosexual distinction underlying the gendered difference between male and female. So, in other words, for these men, there is a proper way for a male body to express itself, and this belief is based upon a presumption of masculinity being defined by its heterosexuality. Being camp was taken to be an unnatural inversion of sex roles. It was taken as a mixing up of male and female that upset
these men’s ideas about the natural order of heterosexual bodies and how they can express themselves.

As might be expected, it was D’Sousa’s relationship with Hassan that was most fraught. Hassan’s religious beliefs made it impossible for him to even admit the possibility of D’Sousa having any redeeming features. Yet, they would socialise in the same group of friends. D’Sousa made no accommodation for Hassan, and on his part, Hassan made little accommodation for D’Sousa. But a little accommodation is not no accommodation. While Hassan did not like D’Sousa’s presence within the group, he tolerated his presence for the sake of their mutual friends. Hassan even talked about this as being very “tolerant”. D’Sousa’s relationship to this group of friends, and to Hassan in particular, then, is indicative of the problems of finding a place in a mainly heterosexual group. It is indicative of the problems of trying to negotiate ethically between the moral ideas that become mobilised around sexualities, different ethnicities and different religious beliefs. That Hassan’s own relationship to the heterosexuality emergent within the group’s sociality is problematic speaks of the complexity of such negotiations. Even though he becomes placed outside the heterosexual norm, Hassan still plays a vital role in reproducing it. This account is hardly inspiring, but it does suggest a glimmer of hope. This hope is the willingness to work through seemingly irreconcilable differences and to find some mode of accommodation, no matter how tenuous, because of a mutual claim to friendship and belonging within a multicultural group.

3. Playing at becoming different

Ben in group three was celebrating his birthday at an O’Neill’s pub (of course) on a Saturday night. Including Ben, there were nine people from the group celebrating with him that evening, five women and four men. By eight o’clock, several members of the group were already starting to relax into a becoming-rather-loud. Even this early in the evening, much of the interaction was raucous and sexualised. This was
in part because of the high spirits surrounding Ben’s birthday, but just as important was the rapid consumption of alcohol. Moreover, there was another catalyst in the form of some of the presents that the others had brought for Ben. A blow up plastic sheep, complete with its own vaginal orifice, was being passed around. It starts off with Kate, who proceeds to examine its orifice. Next, it gets passed to Paul who simulates having sex with it, going so far as to undo his belt as if to take off his jeans. This simulation provokes a noisy response mixing laughter, screams of outrage, and vociferous encouragement. After the sheep has recovered from its ordeal, it gets passed on to Matt and then Ben, before finally ending up with Chloe. She inserts a finger all the way inside the orifice. Then, taking a little bit of hair from another of Ben’s presents – a wig that came as part of a disguise kit – she places this hair so that it is sticking out of the orifice. It all demands further attention from the rest of the group, provoking more laughter and exclamations of disgust.

Not long after this, Kate gets up and takes the wig to the toilets. When she returns, she appears with the wig transformed into a chest wig. She has placed it under her top so that hair sprouts over the top of it, and from between an opening in the top designed to show a bit of cleavage. The whole show draws everyone’s attention to Kate and especially to her chest. She performs an interesting play on gender and sexual roles, roles that are implicitly ethnicised. Kate thrusts out her chest towards the rest of the people around the table, and then launches into an impersonation of a chauvinistic male, replete with deep voice and a distinctive Yorkshire accent, hands on hips, imposing her presence. She makes a few comments while doing this impersonation to play up her persona’s masculinity, pointing out bodily features such as chest hair, bragging about how hard she is, and about how much she can drink. She then makes some comments about ‘pulling’, as if to demonstrate male sexual virility. The rest of the group are laughing at her, and play along with the act by responding to her comments as if they are impressed, complimenting her on her markers.
of masculinity. The raucous interlude comes to an end with Kate removing the wig from her top.

It might seem that Kate’s practices here of becoming-sociable with her friends exemplify the kind of ethical practice that we are attempting to explore. It practises a disruption, and it opens a space for the contestation of heterosexual, gendered and ethnicised norms of performance and embodiment. It seems to create a space for becoming something different, but is this really the case?

Kate’s playfulness with gendered and sexualised roles is performed by enacting particular bodily schemas. These schemas are social bodily memories, a reverberation with a territory of properly gendered and sexualised sociality. Here, however, Kate juxtaposes elements from this virtual memory that, within a good and common bodily sense, would be kept quite separate. A bodily sense develops as a sense of humour: the incongruity of chest hair sprouting over two large breasts thrusting forwards. Incongruous perhaps, but still these body parts become organic. Kate’s breasts become sexual, or at least mark her sex, as they form a surface of contrast with the masculinised chest hair. As her breasts become thrust forward, a machinic relation establishes itself between them and the vision of those around her. Yet, Kate controls this process of objectification, subverting it, twisting its lines of vision around to her own trajectory.

Her embodiment deepens in its performance – a deeper accent and her hands on her hips giving her presence, making present a bodily memory of masculinity. And it is an ‘authentic’ masculinity, nationalised and ethnicised: Yorkshire, a heartland of Englishness, antithesis of the soft, effeminate Southerner. Kate summons up a sense of what a body can do. A proper man – an Englishman – is heterosexual and virile; his body enables him to dominate – it is hard and violent, and sodden with alcohol. Kate’s persona delivers stereotyped lines, but these only work as part of the sense of the performance. Moreover, this performance, or rather its sense, is an
interactive process in-between the group. The others play along, acting as if they are impressed by the Yorkshireman’s masculinity, while really they are participating in the mockery.

It cannot be disputed that the group, with Kate as their ringleader, disrupts a proper distribution of bodily affects and capabilities. Kate’s very practices of attribution invite a ridiculing of these very masculine traits. Yet, this disruption only opens up the space for a becoming-different. Does the group’s practice take the step into this space? Do they inject a purely desiring process into their practice? It seems to me that, on this occasion at least, their practice is not altogether transgressive. Rather, it merely redraws the lines of a contemporary gender and sexual politics. Their humour pokes fun at a relatively hyperbolic masculinity, leaving untouched more unthought and acceptable distributions of bodies, capabilities and power. A crucial question at this point is: what is the nature of the territory that a pure process of sense making deterritorialises from? To some other groups – the men in group two, for example – Kate’s performance might act as a deterritorialisation. Or perhaps performances such as Kate’s might be thought to mark a process of deterritorialisation over a longer time period, or from different social territories. For this group, however, this performance does not achieve much of a becoming-different. Like many of their contemporaries, they are young enough to have always been part of a mixed gender sociality of pubs and clubs. Within such socialities, there are marked distributions of gendered, sexualised and ethnicised roles, as we have seen throughout this research. Yet, within this group at least, these roles do not necessarily tally with the particular kind of laddishness invoked by the figure of the authentic and chauvinistic Yorkshireman. This is not to say that laddishness does not reverberate within the group. Rather, it is to say that other bodily memories and potentials also become regularly enacted that act to destabilise such a laddish performance, and multiply others’ relations to it.
Foucault (1977, cited in Kazarian, 1998: 97) writes that transgression passes beyond a limit that is constituted by this very movement. Transgression forces the appearance of a virtual limit where there is not one, a limit which can have no objective place in the order of things. Such a limit only appears in the process of being overstepped, and, hence, transgression is an activity independent of object or end, an affirmation of process in process (Kazarian, 1998: 97). Kate enrols the rest of group three into producing a new sense, a new arrangement; but immanent to their arrangement are limits that reverberate elsewhere. These limits have a territoriality and a place within ‘the order of things’. Kate’s performance with the wig, then, is not a becoming-different. It does not stretch the lines of politics or ethics beyond what is already, within the territory of the group, an acceptable distribution of bodies. Moreover, at the end of the performance, Kate returns to normal and returns to the audience.

The territoriality of the gendered and sexualised roles within group three can already seen from their earlier play with the plastic sheep. In common with much of young adult culture within contemporary Britain, many (although certainly not all) of the traditional gender differences regarding raucous or sexualised behaviour do not apply. To assert, as many commentators – especially those in the mass media - persist in doing, that women such as Chloe or Kate are disrupting gender roles by adopting masculine roles or traits is to place them into a retrospective grid of proper affects. It is to apply to them gender roles that are irrelevant to their proprietary potential. Certainly, women such as Chloe and Kate may often encounter others who, like these commentators, do try to impose these grids of proper affect onto them. These others, however, will also find that Chloe and Kate will simply ignore them and get on with their lives. Maybe this would mark a line of flight.

What are important here are the processes of territorialisation. Chloe and Kate territorialise upon a different territory from those in group two, although, considering Alison’s earlier assertions about the raucous
and transgressive nature of ‘girl’s nights out’, neither are these territories streets apart. The relative deterritorialisation, then, enacted through Kate’s performance with the wig did not constitute a line of flight from the group’s existing territory. Nevertheless, the total potential for different kinds of relations among this group is higher than that for, say, group two. If, for instance, a laddishness becomes encountered by those in group three, this laddishness can potentially be confronted with, and confounded by, other modes of relating to one another within the sociality of the group.

4. Ethical practice and friendship

Confessions of masculinity

Amongst the lads in group two, we have already seen that the distribution of racialised, gendered and sexualised roles required a great deal of negotiation. The two men of Asian ancestry in the group - Darren and Henry - repeatedly occupied particular roles. While the white men in the group tended to dominate the group in an embodied sense - they were louder, often more raucous, as well as usually taking the lead in conversation, often by interrupting others - the two Asian men were usually quieter. Henry, in particular, was often referred to by the others as “thoughtful”. Both Darren and Henry linked this socially negotiated difference in the performativity of gendered roles, to their abilities to occupy social roles enabling them to be seen as sexually attractive by women. When Darren describes “pulling” (attracting a sexual partner in bars or nightclubs) as “a white Man’s game,” he is commenting in some ways about his place within the sociality of this friendship group. By this, he expresses not only the social and embodied memory that equates a performance of white masculinity with a certain heterosexual attractiveness, but also his own inability to perform these bodily styles. Within the group, there was a certain repertoire of roles and performances, enacted through modes of embodiment and speech, in-jokes and punchlines. The memory, then, was not just of what individual bodies could do, but how these
bodies were to be organised in relation to one another in a sociable situation. This memory was made to live again each time the group met up to go to the pub or to a bar.

Yet, there were ways in which the members of this group did act ethically that go beyond the accommodation that was made with Hassan’s moral beliefs, or that Hassan made with D’Sousa when he socialised with the group. Such an ethics entailed the negotiation and tactical modification of the social roles that could be acted out within the group. For instance, several of the white men in the group, even as they tended to dominate the flow of the conversations in the group, did make a separate space for Darren and Henry to speak. The white men would bring them into conversations by asking them questions or by other means of eliciting a contribution. On his part, Darren would contribute to the group’s repertoire of masculine narrativising by means of a particular rhetorical device: his “confessions”.

Darren contributed (or was part of an assemblage of contribution to) one of his confessions on the night out with group two in a South London Wetherspoons pub. The confessions themselves had become a topic of conversation amongst the group. They seemed to be a running joke, part of the repertoire of the group. At first, the actual confessions remain obscure. The men amongst the group made oblique references to “that time when...” that did not divulge any of the details of those events to those who did not already know them. Darren fully colluded in this slow build up, laughing at the references, and making references of his own. It was left to Henry to expound on the import of Darren’s confessions to me, and to start one of them off on this occasion. This was one about Darren’s eighteenth birthday. Henry started relating how the group had gone to a bar-restaurant to celebrate with Darren. The other members of the group also started chipping in with the storytelling, until eventually, Darren took over completely. So, the group was at this bar-restaurant, and some time after the group had sung happy birthday to Darren, he had stood up on a table and signalled to the whole bar-restaurant that he wanted
quiet so that he could say something. He managed to silence the entire restaurant, including the man who had been playing the piano the entire evening. Darren was quite drunk by this stage, and suddenly announced that he thought that the pianist “was really good.” Unfortunately – for his embarrassed friends as much as for Darren – he was being sarcastic. The comment was met by an embarrassed silence.

Darren’s confessions seemed to offer a way for him to contribute to the masculine sociality of the group. The confessions allowed Darren to contribute his own tales of drunken antics, playing on a particular ‘laddish’ ability to make others laugh and to generally act badly but humorously (c.f. Willis, 1977), a performance of masculinity that might otherwise remain hidden. Not only does Darren get to be able to relate conventionally laddish anecdotes, but he also gains some control over the construction of his selfhood. His confessions also enact and re-enact a shared memory. Through this memory, and through the enjoyment of a shared set of affects, the relationships within the group, and Darren’s place within them, become cemented. The friends start to take pleasure in the pleasures of becoming-friendly amongst themselves, injecting the very process of desire into their friendship process.

Yet, the very structure of the confession recuperates a problematic of expressing a reconciliation between Asianness and masculinity. The confessions are necessary because of the hidden masculinity of an Asian man. Stories about Darren’s drunken masculine performance need to be controlled and drawn to the group’s attention in a way that the white members of the group do not need. The white men in the group are adept at maintaining a performance of masculinity: this is what their bodies can do. The confessional repeats the secrecy and subsequent revelation of hidden activities and desires. The hiddenness is also repeated in the very telling of the confession: it is Henry (another Asian man) who starts making the confession, before Darren takes over.
The confessions also invoke a shameful, as if an Asian man should not have these desires. This shame is a relation between Darren and the group, enacted through the moral differences of a proper distribution of bodies and their capabilities. Moreover, the story itself, on this occasion at least, has its own shame, one that seems to be the double of the shame enacted in its very telling. The confession is not a story of bravado, or of being funny to make a connection with other men. Rather, the humour arises at Darren’s own expense, although perhaps this establishes another relation to Britishness: self-deprecation. It is a story, not of making an organic connection to ‘the lads’, but of social incompetence. It is a tale of misjudgement, of not fitting in.

The narrative involves drunken excess, but this excess is not impressive. Tales of the drunken excesses of the white men in the group tended to be free of embarrassment, even if many others might think that they should be embarrassed. Whereas these white men use their own stories to construct themselves and their masculinity through transgression (here reproducing a line that territorialises them, not a transgression in Foucault’s sense (Kazarian, 1998: 97)), Darren’s story is one of impropriety. He falls outside of an economy of the proper place, beyond the white, heterosexual, masculine norm. The shameful of the confession is that of an improper race and an improper gender, and perhaps most shamefully, an improper sexuality.

Nevertheless, these confessions still gesture towards an ethics of friendship. They are a tactical modification of the process of friendship, intervening in the proper relations between ethnicised, gendered and sexualised bodies. Darren’s confessions made a space for his unconventional relation to heterosexual masculinity, and the white men in the group made space to accommodate Darren’s modes of embodiment and speech. The hidden desires of an Asian man do become revealed in these liminal moments so that they are hidden no longer. Darren’s confessions also suggest an ethical movement
because of the particular deterritorialisation in progress. In group three, the normality of the sociality of the group incorporates women such as Chloe or Kate behaving badly, becoming raucous and becoming sexual. The territory of group two, however, is not so accommodating to Darren becoming-masculine. In this context, the confessions mark a relative deterritorialisation. Darren does not become reduced to the Other of masculinity, yet he does not meet up with masculinity completely. Rather, Darren’s difference is his own line of flight from both masculinity and Asianness. Not just a misjudgement, then, but a mismeeting.

Different sexualities

Earlier, with D’Sousa’s relationship to the men of group two, we witnessed how difficult it can be for an openly gay man to find a place within a predominantly heterosexual group of friends. Such relationships, however, can reach beyond the mere accommodation achieved in group two. Tariq from group one, for instance, had ‘come out’ to the group when they were at university together. In doing so, he contributed to a process of ethical becoming and belonging between the group members. In particular, Tariq’s relationship to Neil had had to become open to different forms of desire. Neil, had, when he had first arrived at university, been a devout Christian. He had also come from an almost entirely white community in rural England. In chapter four, Neil spoke about a childhood in an environment where black and Asian people were only encountered as surfaces. His feelings towards those who were made to become ethnicised Others were influenced by media stereotypes, or by a conflation of these stereotypes and the limited contact he had had with them in his everyday life. So, when Neil arrived at the large metropolitan university where he met the rest of group one, his understanding of people of colour could be summed up by the idea of ‘Asians’ only owning corner shops. At that time, he also quite firmly believed that same-sex (and other sexual) desire was morally wrong, a belief rooted in his Christianity.
Neil himself, Tariq, and many of their other friends, all describe the transformation that Neil underwent at university. The group of friends whom both he and Tariq became parts of comprised of people of different ethnicities, and was fairly evenly balanced in terms of male and female members. Tariq himself is of Muslim Indian and Puerto Rican ancestry, and had spent most of his childhood growing up in Kenya. Confronted with the sheer difference of his new friends – the fact that they could not be reduced to his stereotypes – Neil started to face the need for a re-evaluation of his feelings.

When Tariq came out during university, this re-evaluation was forced to step up a gear. Eventually, Neil met the challenge full on, even going so far as to experiment with his own modes of expressing desire. When I first meet Neil, early one evening at the Nature bar, Tariq is with him, and Neil’s partner Meera has not yet arrived. My first impression is that Neil and Tariq are partners, and I have to remind myself that I have already been told who each of these men’s partners are. Neil experiments, but as a modality of himself, a becoming-different. He can express bodily intimacy and tactility, styles of touching and embodiment, and modulations of his voice and speech, that all suggest an ambiguity of sexuality, or even perhaps, an ambiguity towards sexuality itself as it is given in its proper forms.

Yet, Neil has inserted himself into a very heterosexual institution – marriage – a relation he feels very fulfilled by. Even in this dimension of his life, however, a rearrangement of his affects has taken place. He is married to Meera, a woman of Indian ancestry. Indeed, during the second group interview with group one, Neil contrasted his inability to find women of colour attractive before he came to university against his increasing attraction to South Asian women since starting university. This ethnicisation and racialisation of desire, however, itself applies a grid of proper differences across bodies and desires. Neil is not oblivious to this. On the contrary, during the group interviews, he worries whether he is “an ethnic trophy hunter”, attracted by the exotic Other. Although Neil’s desires become defined by an ethnicised
and racialised bodily ideal, his worry indicates that he has started a process of ethical thought about the different relations of power that establish these ideals. It would seem that this process of ethical thinking is part of a wider process for Neil, one of internalising a desiring ethic. Such a desiring ethic is a postcolonial process of developing lines of flight that unpick the power relations sustaining territories of proper differences in capabilities, affect and capital. Neil himself situates his own personal trajectory within a wider process of social changes, a development of what he calls “a multicultural-multisex society.” Both the modes of affect operating within this society, and those engaged in by Neil himself, he describes as “open to different ... possibilities.”

Tariq also situates himself and changes in his ability to express his desire to the particular trajectories that have entrained him, and the contrasting deterritorialisations and reterritorialisations that has involved. A movement from Kenya to the UK was characterised by a potential for territorialisation. It was not exactly that Tariq was able to come out in Britain when he could not have done so in Kenya. To come out Tariq needed to territorialise, a process, not a foregone conclusion. This process was an actualisation of potential and a making of affective connections to others, to a group sociality. It was to shape that very sociality as it developed. Tariq made a home in Britain through a process of making a self. His trust in his friends necessarily shifted those around him, in this case deepening their affects. Yet, Tariq’s ability to express his desire sexually underwent further shifts from a territorialisation into a varying multiplicity of British socialities. When he was in Kenya, he says that he mainly found white and sometimes black individuals attractive. Now, he finds himself attracted to individuals who he describes as more “ethnic”, that is, those whose ethnicities are more complex and multicultural. Again, Tariq relates this to a territory, in this case the role of a shifting mediatised environment.
So, although the process was not easy, Tariq, despite his concerns about coming out, found acceptance amongst his friends. There are, of course, still many heterosexual assumptions underlying Tariq’s relations with his friends. That night at the Nature bar, for instance, called upon Tariq to participate in several laddish conversations with Jack, another of the group. At one point, Jack starts discussing, in an appreciative way, the breasts and bra of Sophie, another of their friends. Tariq easily, maybe even enthusiastically, joins in with Jack in their light-hearted but markedly heterosexualised chat about Sophie, becoming entrained in the enactment of an expectation, a bodily memory. Nevertheless, Neil’s willingness to engage with Tariq’s sexuality on Tariq’s terms is indicative of how far his friends have gone to renegotiate their mutual roles and how they deal with differences of race and sexuality. They often join Tariq in going to gay bars and clubs, thus having to transform, if only temporarily, the assumptions upon which their behaviour and talk in such spaces is based. This willingness to renegotiate their different roles arises because their friendship has emphasised the connection and the pleasure found in the friendship itself, rather than the heterosexual and racialised organisations that reverberate in friendship socialities.

The ability of Tariq and Neil to desire others has spilt over the constraints of conventional racialised systems of attractiveness and antipathy. Moreover, this is not a process confined to Tariq and Neil. Meera’s desire for Neil must be added into the process. And so too, must be the friendly desires of all of the other members. The group have collectively become-different, enacting an ethic as an in-between process of friendship. They each shift the possibilities for relating to each other, opening up the potential for multiplying their affects. Such a movement marks both a deterritorialisation from the racialised, ethnicised and sexualised propriety that reverberates in their sociality; and a reterritorialisation as they construct a new sociality. This new sociality is one that multiplies itself, increasing the potential for different kinds of connections between them.
Desiring beyond sexuality

Back at the O’Neill’s pub where group three are celebrating Ben’s birthday, it is getting late, and events are becoming increasingly intoxicated. Several of the group get up to go and dance, leaving me sitting at the table with Penny. Penny tells me that she has just split up with her boyfriend, a relationship that had lasted a couple of months. Very quickly, however, Penny becomes more concerned with talking about Chloe, her best friend. Penny seems to think that their relationship is, and is seen by others, as unusually close. She makes the point that they are not lesbian lovers, even though she must have known that I did not think that they were. The burden of a taboo, the weight of a moral principle bears down on Penny and Chloe. It is an order that they must appear to be heterosexual, an anticipation of the judgement of others.

Yet, Penny has as estranged a relationship with heterosexuality as she does with other forms of sexuality. Even though she had just been in a relationship with a man, and had had other relationships with men, at other times she expresses a dislike for ‘sex’ and relationships. Now, she says that she could never settle down with anybody – she could never marry anybody, for instance – until Chloe had also found somebody special. To devote all of her attentions to a male partner would be to “leave” Chloe. Penny expresses a care for Chloe that extends beyond feeling to become an affect – an activity.

It seems, at first, like Penny is instantiating an opposition between heterosexuality and her friendship with Chloe. This impression emanates from a tyranny of the Same, an insistence upon ‘sex-desire’ and a return of all other affects and relationships to a relation to sexuality. Perhaps this is why Penny denies that she is having a lesbian relationship with Chloe. Penny’s relationship with Chloe becomes imbricated with the sexual relationships that either of them might enter into with men. It is made to seem that the relationship between Penny and Chloe competes with heterosexuality. Their friendship
already becomes sexualised, because it can become the other of heterosexuality: it can become homosexual.

It might seem, then, that all other relationships have their contexts in sexuality. All relationships take place within the multiplicity of our lives, and thus demand a distribution of our activity, our time, and our affect. A romantic ideal circulates, holding up the model of marriage and heterosexual relationships within that institution. The ideal circulates as a discursive order, but becomes institutionalised within practice as the basis on which affection becomes given. The heterosexual frames other kinds of relationships. Yet, if this is the case, then it is equally true to say that sexuality has its contexts in other kinds of relationship.

But it is not an opposition between sexuality and friendship. Or, rather, the opposition is imposed upon a differential and desiring process of friendship. Penny here is merely asserting a care and an affection. She would rather sexuality did not come into it at all. As things stand, however, the care between Penny and Chloe has to deterritorialise, to struggle out from under sexuality. It is a becoming tactical, a standing outside. Moreover, as Penny talks about it, an ethic of care between herself and Chloe is not an alternative to having a heterosexual relationship. Rather, it is a struggle against the all-consuming demands of an exclusive relationship, a heterosexual relationship that would demand too many affects. Penny can have a relationship with a man, but as long as this relationship was not so demanding that she did not have enough time for a still single Chloe. What Penny is expressing is an active entanglement. It is a statement of care, and an ethics of friendship. Penny and Chloe explore a friendship ethos that increases its own intensity by reinserting its own desiring process into itself. They start to edge forwards towards deterritorialising into a smooth space where they do not need to plummet to the depths of sexual morality.
5. Indeterminate conclusions: the subtlety of styles of looking

An ethics of friendship stretches a tensor from present formations to somewhere beyond. Friendship offers its own pleasures, its own processes of connection. An ethical friendship follows a line of deterritorialisation, the pure process of the friendship itself. Becoming-different implies the modes of sociality and performance from which one takes flight. It implies that what a body can do is subject to a distribution by powerful machines instituted into technologies and instituted into the flesh. A moral friendship, while often affording its own rewards, traps bodies within an economy of proper relations, a determination of their affects. Becoming different, however, is not to become Other to a proper sexuality or a validated whiteness. To become Other would be to become a specified but denigrated target of power. Rather, becoming-different charts its own path, while never forgetting from whence it came.

Reverberation, then, is important to an ethical friendship. To understand an ethos, one must remember the territory it leaves behind. Of course, these are only movements. Territories are never left behind; it is merely that a movement marks a deterritorialisation from one territory, making a reconfiguration, reterritorialising as another. Socialities shift and accommodate the proliferation of difference, while trying to make relations functional. Becoming-different cannot be helped, but it can be crushed underfoot. Yet, there is always the space for a mismeeting.

More than a mismeeting, the ability to increase the affective potential between friends is the ability to place a friendship in contact with its very conditions of existence. An increasingly desiring ethics incorporates the power to affirm itself, the repetition of a pure process of desire. Care should be an activity, and it should be one that looks after itself.
We live in a postcolonial world, but London, the postcolonial city *par excellence* still reproduces its little divisions of the world in its own public sphere of leisure provision. The informal socialities here striate the space, dividing up bodies and territories by sex-desire, race, ethnicity and gender. This is a politics of everyday life, and it plays itself out in the desiring and affective relations of bodies out on the town. Amongst friends, you might not think that such considerations enter the picture, but you would be wrong. Moral-political differences need to be negotiated, otherwise an economy of proper relations will reproduce itself to the detriment of many. This is where ethics enters the frame. A friendship ethic suggests an art of how to proceed, how to connect with, or at least to get by with others. Such an ethics maximises the potential between bodies, throwing bodies into new arrangements without prescribing an organisation. It is an increase in affect through placing bodies in communication with a pure process of desire.

Being an ethics, it cannot be overly prescriptive. There is no ideal communication. The potential between bodies opens up an indeterminacy of outcome – an eventfulness. It is to face up to the future in our meetings with other people. Do we worry about meeting those who are different? About entering a desiring relation with them? Indetermination makes for ambiguous situations, the potential of a quantum superposition, not yet fallen one way or another. Yet, just because we cannot know about the indeterminate does not mean that we should not try to write indeterminately.

*Mismeeting and ambiguity*

At the Nature bar again, this time with Paul. A group of two young white lads, fashionably dressed, but with grade one haircuts, and a young white woman are at the table next to us. A tall man of South Asian appearance, also quite young, walks by, but as he passes this group, he slows. As he slows, his head turns to his right and he starts staring at the two lads. His expression is difficult to fathom. There is a
hint of a frown to his eyebrows, but his eyes are wide and staring. Is he disgusted, affronted, or merely curious? This is more than just a glance: he holds his head and his gaze for too long, and he keeps looking back even after he has passed their table. The lads have noticed and also turn around to look at him. They watch him anxiously as he goes off towards the bar. I am confused. So, it would seem, are the white lads. The one nearest to me turns back to his friends appearing puzzled and perhaps slightly affronted. Or perhaps slightly worried. From the look on his face, the slight movement of his shoulders, the slight raising of a frowned eyebrow, he seems to be expressing some kind of bewilderment. He starts discussing the incident with his two friends, saying something along the lines of “What was all that about?”

An encounter occurs, desire arranging bodies and their affects. Yet, the emergence of a distribution is not precise. Rather, it multiplies the differences between the bodies. Why did the Asian lad stare at them? Did he think that the two men were gay? It is possible: the Nature bar is in Soho, not that far from the gay bars of Old Compton Street. Yet, it is a predominately heterosexual space, and these lads, despite their grade one haircuts, look more heterosexually laddish than gay skinhead. Maybe the Asian lad thought that they had said something to him or about him, or even that they were racists. His stare was perhaps performing an accusation, one way or another: gay, troublemakers, or racist.

But no, the event is too ambiguous to make such assertions about. The emergence of a distribution does not place the white lads as gay or racist because they express their own set of affects, which mismeet those of the Asian man. Neither side encounters a set of bodily memories that enables a precise distribution. Nothing can be pinned down. Rather, their memories are indeterminate. The mismeeting occurs because of the divergence and multiplicity of the bodily memories that are implicitly presupposed and that become expressed in the bodily sense between the two sides. The white lads’ puzzlement
expresses their sense that they did not do anything that merited being stared at. What is presupposed is a bodily memory unprepared for an entrainment into a relation such as this. Their bodies remember staring as an expression of a specific form of desire, but they cannot pin this desire down: it is violent, antagonistic, sexual, or outraged? The white lads’ reaction suggests that they find the implication of either their racism or their openness to a homosexual advance beyond their thought.

Yet, even this attempt at understanding events becomes opened up again to yet other potentials. A bodily memory infolding a cultural history of the skinhead potentially subsists between the Asian lad and the white lads. It belongs to neither side. Does the Asian lad encounter these skinheads and wonder what their haircuts portend? Do the white lads think that the Asian man is making a judgement about them on the basis of their haircuts? Or neither of these? Moreover, what does such a stare express from the point of view of the Asian man’s body? Perhaps he was not a British Asian, or, if he was, had incorporated a South Asian bodily memory. Such a bodily memory might arrange bodies differently in relation to a stare. The stare might not be aggressive, and there might not be anything out of the ordinary about the timing. Perhaps the man was only curious. A mismeeting, then, one haunted by many memories of differently ethnicised and sexualised masculinities.

*Time to write myself back in...*

The woman at Hexagonal who kept hitting me as she danced (see chapter six) decided to go outside, along with her two friends. They are about to pass my friend Becky when the woman stops to ask Becky for a cigarette. Once Becky has given her a cigarette, the woman moves on a pace, but stops momentarily in front of me. She looks me straight in the eye. It is not a glance – it lasts too long, maybe two seconds – but then she looks away and heads off to the front with her friends. I cannot decide what that look was expressing. I do not think
that it was a come on; her face was absolutely impassive, almost harsh in its steady lack of expression. Perhaps she was waiting for me to respond with a smile, something I did not do: a failure to increase the potential between two bodies. In that case, it might have been a come on, or an attempt just to make contact with somebody. Perhaps she was annoyed at me for taking up her dancing space earlier, expressing an accumulated virtual memory of an event. Perhaps she thought that when I was watching her and her friends earlier – briefly I might add – that I was being too intrusive, and this was her response, a return of a stare. Yet, her stare does not need to be returned to reason. It does not need to be recuperated into a typology or a bodily memory: perhaps she was just looking.

Back at the Nature bar, and it was almost time to go. A crowded dancefloor, and I walk through the dancing crowd towards the bar. In the opposite direction three people are also snaking their way through the crowd. One man is in front, then a woman, and another man brings up the rear. We squeeze past each other. The first man turns side on to pass me, and as he does so, the woman and I come into each other’s view. We make eye contact. Instead of immediately looking away, we both maintain that eye contact for just a moment longer. Is this still a glance? Even though it’s a matter of fractions of a second, it’s been longer than merely just a glance. Our momentums, being swept along by our trajectories, take us past each other, but not before we both start smiling. Our heads turn slightly and we can prolong the eye contact for a few more fractions of a second. A multiplicity of questions or potentials run through me, holding me in a state of puzzlement. Then she is gone.

What happened? Or, more to the point, what could have happened? I thought about the men she was with. They, as well as her, were facing forwards, towards me, so they wouldn’t have seen anything. What did she see? What potential connectivity did she encounter? Was I a skin, or the faint beginnings of a smile? A flutter around the heart region, adrenaline rushing? The indeterminacy was expressed in that surge of
adrenaline. But more than that, the indeterminacy was timed. It was between us, that moment of potential reaching out, of feeling around for a way to connect. Desire is the eventfulness of bodies becoming-connected to one another, feeling out both with a memory and without.
Chapter 8

Conclusions

1. Transformations

We have frequented many pubs and bars, and a few nightclubs too. The pubs imply it in their very name: these are supposed to be public spaces. A capitalised industry of leisure provision proliferates differences, yet everywhere seems the Same. Our cities become monotonous. Informal socialities regulate bodies, and then these bodies binge drink and get into fights, every Friday night. White masculinity revels in its laddishness. It is virile and hard. White femininity goes in many different directions, most of them normal: some become raucous and loud – the Friday night punch up is no longer the preserve of the lads. Some become glamorous and cool. They mark their class by their skills at socialising and circulating. Yet, coursing throughout all of this repetition is the forever enacted difference of the new. We cannot contain ourselves. We will not be contained. Our desires are everywhere improper, forming relations with those we should not, in ways that we should not. Dancing, dressing, creating music: typologies of propriety and organisations of Capital all have to keep up with these, not the other way round.

There is always the promiscuity of bodies coming together. This is one of the reasons for going to the pub or to a club, after all: to be with others, to interact. Yet, there are various levels of organisation to this interaction. The sociality of friends relies on a desiring ethic, but, to varying degrees, such socialities also infold lines of force and organisations of relations that subsist elsewhere. If local social relations (amongst friends, or specific to a particular venue) are considered as they emerge in situated localities, it becomes clear that while thinking about friendship relations, we also have to think beyond
friendship. A community, or a nation even, is not created on a friendship ethos. A plurality of socialities come together to run through our towns and cities where entertainment strips eat up ever more space with a voracious appetite. Who can belong here? Who can become a citizen of such public spaces?

Such questions of belonging are negotiated in practice. It is the very nature of our practices of socialising with others to be a negotiation of how we enter into relations with them. Actions are performative, and one of the effects performed in any action is the enactment of a specific form of relation. Action selects from amongst a field of potential - all the various permutations of what can be done. This crowd of different arrangements, all jostling and pressing to make themselves available, offers potentials of new connections, conjunctions and disjunctions. Yet, it also offers potentials for action that reverberate with a memory of how things are to be done properly. We have a practical involvement in the world, and as such we often rely on what our bodies have learnt or have made habitual. Within the complexity of our social lives, we sometimes need things to be organised and regularised in order for them to work. We need to know what to expect. At its simplest, an interaction involves a practical grasp or prehension of how to get along in the world. It is being a part of the world, connecting with other bodies and forces in order to do things. This prehension affords a bodily memory, measuring out our expectations and our times. What various potentials might offer themselves for different individuals, different groups or in different situations, upon meeting, say, a white skin? What can be done? What will happen? How can this skin be related to?

These memories are both within our bodies, in the very flesh of our reactions – literally prehensions – and without us, too. They are social, not only in the sense that they become encountered in practical situations, but also in the sense that they can enact an organisation. Socialities are the ways in which we unthinkingly organise our social activities with others. Actions and interactions become patterned and
ordered. An action is the point at which a collection of elements becomes an assemblage. All too easily, lines of striation can become infolded into the heart of the action, into the heart of a group’s sociality, or the sociality of a pub or a club. The sociality subsisting between a group of friends instantiates a broader sociality of how to act in a particular kind of pub, for example. Other lines of striation can run through such interaction. An organisation of bodies, and what they can do, can become sexualised racialised, gendered or ethnicised. Power is immanent to action, just as much as desire is. Bodies are placed into relations of power, into relations that specify their affects. The potential to do different things seems to become limited.

These relations of power become enacted in practice. Collectively, we regulate what we all can do. We make implicit judgements in our talk and in our embodied actions that act as injunctions to force ourselves and others to act properly. We regulate our sexualities, making our bodies desire in certain ways. Other bodies become objectified through these practices of regulation. The three lads on the night bus, for example, enacted an economy of the proper place, dividing up ‘Asian’ women, black women and American women. These women are ordered to conform to what their bodies should do. Their affects become ordered. The lads seem to bring into play the presupposition, for example, that Asian women “don’t want to shag” because they suffer the over-regulation of their sexual desires by their communities and families. Elsewhere, we met Jasbir, and she told us about the practical ways in which such a regulation might take place. But, yet, she merely circumvents such regulation. Her desires cannot be reduced to being the effect of a system of regulation.

Darren told us, not only about how it matters what his parents think of potential partners for his sister, but how his parents’ ‘views’ acted to regulate his choice of partner too. Into these relationships - into these interactions between bodies becoming related – a series of other bodies intervene. Yet, it is not just for Asian bodies that these other bodies also get added to the relationship. Neil also talked about the
importance of his parents’ injunctions regarding the ethnicity of any prospective partner. In all of these cases, bodies start to become ordered through the efficiency of implicit and explicit commands.

There are many techniques for performing the ordering of bodies. These are the techniques by which modes of sociality become enacted. They enter bodies into machinic relations, making them work in as part of a functional assemblage of interconnected and regularised elements. The men on the night bus attempted to insert the woman sitting in front of them into a machinic set of relations enacting their own attractiveness as nightclub bouncers. Chloe’s colleagues at the O’Neill’s pub kept circulating, performing a set of commands to find them attractive and popular. They expressed a sense of their embodiment, of what they could do, of what styles they could carry off. They enacted a machine, a sociality of how to be sociable with distinction, and in the process ordered the relations amongst the group. The women in the group become distributed among various modes of white middle class femininity, lines of striation that become drawn through the group. Yet, this drawing of lines is acted out precisely through the modes of sociality in which all the group members participate.

Other techniques transform bodies directly. These corporeal transformations have a direct impact on other bodies. They transform their affects – their capabilities to affect and be affected by others – and hence their capacity for action. The drunk South Asian woman in the Nature bar faced a corporeal challenge. Here she met a memory of how she was supposed to live her ethnicity through a sexualised propriety. She had to act, and she did, but not in the way the man who had confronted her had wanted her to. She recognised the memory and moved on, moving to her own rhythm, following her own line of affect.
2. Distributed orders and territorialisation

We seem to find everywhere that acts of distribution organise the relations between bodies, recuperating racialised, sexualised, gendered and ethnicised differences. There is no regime of ‘sex-desire’ (Butler, 1999) except in the multitude of practices that enact it. Both men and women of colour are *made to* bear the costs of becoming a subject of sexuality, or are even sometimes denied this form of subjectivity. The costs applied are different according to where one is placed in the distribution. Black men, for example, might be taken as sexually attractive, a sexual subject even, but there are other costs involved in this sexuality: a practical order to become excessive or debased. Muslim men might become exotically mysterious, taken to exude an allure because of their inaccessibility. Yet, the workload entailed in achieving this allure is immense, and the promise of being able to consummate a relationship to heterosexuality still one that is not quite kept. Asian women are expected not to be able to express a sexual desire, but it is the actions of others that enforce this difficulty of expression. Real desire eludes attempts to repress it, because it is prior to repression. When Ranjana expresses the potential of attraction in men’s faces, her peers make it very clear what proper forms of desire they expect from her. Yet, Ranjana’s desire does not become confined. Instead it makes its own movement, travelling to meet up with the desires and practices of other women, like Chloe and Kate, or even Alison when she’s on a ‘girls’ night out’. These women follow a path that becomes louder and more boisterous, one that allows them to express their sexual desires in ways that used to be the preserve of men. Yet, while Ranjana and Alison may need to assert their desires in the face of the playful jests of their friends, for other women, such as Chloe and Kate, becoming raucous is no longer a relative deterritorialisation.

Many of the heterosexual white men we met, on the other hand, often think that their practices are transgressive. Yet, their transgression only plays itself out within a proper order of things and actions (c.f.
Kazarian, 1998, on Foucault’s notion of transgression). Nonetheless, this is not to say that their bodies cannot be creative and expressive too. Bodies can make a proposition. They can express a sense of the unfolding arrangements they are entering into. This is a sense of affect, of the dynamic entanglements of bodies and their relations. Yet, this sense is multiplicitous and cannot be accounted for by one action or one proposition. The arrangement of bodies is beyond even a multiplicity of bodily memories because it is always differentiating itself. Events are no respecters of individuals, and as we engage in an event, its potential nature confronts us with an indeterminacy to our actions. Will we connect with the other? What does that glance do, and how should we respond? We are always having to act into this gap of the unknown.

It is no wonder, then, that we sing to ourselves or dance with others. It is no wonder that we talk and interact with a rhythm, making our practices orderly. In the face of chaos, we start inflecting space with our own markers, familiar or at least something we know we have created. The territories we mark incorporate both milieu effects (a molecular ordering) and the expressions of a synthetic memory (a molar organisation). An increase in organisation reverberates with the rhythms and organisations of other milieus and other territories. Territorialisation is always an action. The couples in Miss Lulu’s subtly organised the space as a heterosexual one. The breakdancers at first only ordered the space around themselves, placing their markers, making their mark. A sense accumulated, an arrangement of bodies and an inflection of their space-times. The two blonde women became ensnared in this territorialisation, lines of striation cutting through them. Yet, their own dancing ordered another milieu. Two different sets of desires mismet, and eventually it is the women who are forced to deterritorialise.

Yet, such a reverberation is not a reflection. It occurs across a gap into which all sorts of monsters can leap. Territories are already multiplicitous because their reverberations are the immanence of a
multiplicity of other forces, other formations, other times and places. Many territories can intersect, and there are also always lines of deterritorialisation. All this problematises the notion of a unified social field of action. We can misread what is expected of us because we mistake the orders of this territory for those of another one. Our socialities fold reverberating rhythms and modes of organisation into our actions, yet we encounter our memories on the outside, as the potential offered by events. The question is: how are these memories to be used? How are these potentials to be actualised?

So, our practices recuperate memories of how we are to relate to others. We organise our relations, our desires and our affects. We enter the strata. Yet, everywhere we find messiness and things seeping out over the edges. The young woman on the night bus resisted being enrolled into a gendered-sexualised set of machinic relations. Minesh mistook a Tom for an Ed, disrupting his performance of popularity, yet he was too drunk to care. The drunk South Asian woman in the Nature bar danced with whom she liked, and stood up to the South Asian man trying to stop her. All the various mismeetings of looks, stares and glances, nothing followed up, beyond any specific transformation. What are we to do with all this messiness?

3. Performativity, potential and ethics

In chapter two, I posed another question, one to do with performativity. If the performative ushers in the new, then the crucial question becomes how does ‘structure’ and inequality perpetuate itself? This question can now be posed somewhat differently. We now understand that the performative can simultaneously introduce difference and enact a repetitive organisation of bodies. The performative opens up onto a space of potential becomings – indeed a pure process - yet such a field of potential not only affords an opening onto the pure difference of new connectivities but it also proliferates virtual structures and bodily memories (themselves also only a potential). The question, then, can be reposed to ask what we do to
intensify difference. What do we do to introduce pure process into our practices? What do we do to increase our potential? In short, the performativity of actions does not guarantee ethical action and thought. It is the gap where ethical acting and thinking needs to take place, where such ethical acts and thoughts stutter the repetition of power (c.f. Dewsbury, 2000; Thrift, 2000).

In relation to our thinking about the ethics of friendship, an ethics that was explored in chapter seven, we should be careful not to take the virtual field itself as experimental or perverse. The virtual field is the field of potential, a field of the pure processes of arrangement (e.g. singularities, events, intensities) (Deleuze, 1990), yet it can offer the potential to arrange bodies in an overcoded relation. Good and common sense (Deleuze, 1990), for example, are virtual arrangements that become actualised as an application of power distributing bodies into proper relations. It is not the virtual field that is experimental or perverse. Rather, it is the act of making the process of arrangement the subject or limit of one’s practice that is experimental or perverse.

Such an understanding of our practices – that they are simultaneously and potentially differential (new) and reproductive (repetitive) – asks us to take into account the life of our social and bodily memories. We must break open our memories and track their potentials, becoming ever watchful about how they are actualised. A nomadism maps anew, but remembers where it has been. How do we become friends with others when morality or normativity gets in the way? When trying to develop a friendship sociality, we have to take into account the potential memories brought to this activity by ourselves and others. It is important to remember our territories, our reverberations, to ask ourselves what territory it is that we deterritorialise from. As we saw in chapter seven, what constitutes deterritorialising practice depends on the territories one attempts to take flight from. A sociality dominated by a laddish white masculinity requires a trajectory of flight different from that required to leave a territory dominated by a raucousness of both male and female bodies.
Nevertheless, it is the total potential subsisting between socialising bodies that is most important. We should apply the test of the eternal return to our friendships: do our practices perpetuate our affective relations? Do they allow us to become friendly? More than this, even, a desiring process needs to be reinserted into friendship. Follow Neil, Tariq, and their friends: develop a sociality that allows different desires to become expressed, different relations to be performed. An increase in the complexity of a mode of sociality simultaneously reconnects with the dynamism of pure process. Ethical socialities forever multiply their potential for arrangement. Whenever we socialise we should be experimental: meet the indeterminate head on. Step into the gap where both monsters and ghosts proliferate and explore the tension between them.
Appendix A: Participant profiles and group composition

Group 1

Ranjana was in her mid-twenties, and lived in South-East London, where she spent most of her childhood. She was the main contact for this group and the only member of the group who I knew previous to the research commencing. I met her at UCL where she was a student (I had not met any of the rest of the group prior to the research). Both of her parents are first generation immigrants from Bengal. She described herself as heterosexual and, at the time of the research she was single.

Jack was in his mid-twenties and lived in South London. At the time of the research being conducted he was single. He describes himself as being heterosexual and of “White” or “British” ancestry, although he also says that parts of his family’s ancestry is “Jewish”. He was working in IT. He knows Ranjana through their both being undergraduates together at the same university.

Tariq was in his mid-twenties and lived in South London. He is of Muslim Indian and Puerto Rican parents and spent most of his childhood in Kenya. He initially came to Britain to study for his degree, and has stayed here since graduating. He was working as a pharmacist in a neurological institute at the time of the research. He met Ranjana, Jack, and Neil at university, and it was while he was studying there that he came out as gay, and it was to these friends that he first did so. Tariq was in a long-term relationship during the research.

Neil was in his mid-twenties and was living in South-East London with Meera, whom he is married to. Neil met Meera through Ranjana while he and Ranjana were undergraduates at university together. Neil spent most of his childhood in Norfolk and describes his parents as being of “White” British ancestry. At the time of the research, Neil worked as an
accountant. Others in the group spoke of Neil, and Neil spoke of himself, as a lapsed Christian.

**Meera** was in her mid-twenties and lived in South-East London with her husband Neil. She had spent quite a lot of her childhood living in the area she was still living in. She met Neil through Ranjana who she went to school with. Meera is a graduate of a university in London and is a solicitor. She is of “Indian” first generation immigrant parents.

Other participants named in the thesis: Sophie; Jasbir.

**Group 2**

**Darren** was in his mid-twenties. He was living in South London quite close to where he had lived for most of his childhood. He is of “Indian” and “Anglo-Indian” parentage. At the time of the research, he was in a long-term relationship with Kirsty, a “White British” woman, who he had met while at university. Darren was the main contact for this group. During the research, Darren was working for a large accountancy firm and was still training for his ACA qualification. Darren studied at an all-boys public school in London between the ages of 11 and 18. This is where he met several of the other participants in this group (Anthony, Henry, Stuart, Hassan, and Peter). Darren is a practising Christian (Church of England).

**Anthony** was in his mid-twenties and of “White British” parents. He was living in South-West London with Alison whom he was engaged to. Anthony’s parents lived in this area while he was growing up, while Anthony went to the same school as Darren and several of the other participants (see Darren’s profile). Anthony had recently qualified as a solicitor, and had taken up a post with a large law firm. He had met Alison while they were both undergraduates at university, the same university that Darren, Peter and Henry had also attended.
Alison was in her mid-twenties and lived in South-West London with Anthony to whom she was engaged. She grew up in Lancashire and is of “White British” parents. She met Anthony at university, where she also met Darren, with whom she shared a flat while they were both undergraduates. She also met Henry and Peter while at university, through Darren and Anthony. She has also become friends with Stuart and Hassan after being introduced to them by Anthony and Darren. At the time of the research she was a civil servant, although she was considering a career move.

Henry was in his mid-twenties and lived in South London. He is of ethnically “Chinese” parents. He was born in Paris where he lived until coming to London when he was 12. In London he went to the same public school as Darren, Anthony, Stuart, Hassan and Peter. At the time of the research he was working in IT for an investment bank. Henry went to the same university as Darren, Anthony and some of the others. Henry was single at the time of the research and described himself as “heterosexual”. I had met Henry once prior to the fieldwork.

Stuart was in his mid-twenties and lived in Slough. He was in a long-term relationship with a “White” woman whom he had met at work – they both work in IT. Stuart is also of “White British” parents. He went to school with Darren, Anthony, Henry, Hassan and Peter. I had not met Stuart previous to commencing the research.

Hassan was in his mid-twenties and lived in West London. He spent most of his childhood in London, attending the same school as Darren and several of the other participants in this group. At the time of the research he was working as a consultant surgeon at an NHS hospital in a London suburb. He is of “Egyptian” first generation immigrant parents. Hassan is a practising Muslim. He was celibate. I had not met Hassan previous to commencing the research.

Peter was in his mid-twenties and living in South-West London. He is of “White British” parents. He attended the same school as Darren,
Anthony and several of the other participants in this group, and also went to the same university as Darren, Anthony, Alison and Henry. I had met him twice before the fieldwork. At the time of the research, Peter was attempting to put together a CD of music he had composed and market this music over the internet. Peter was single at the time of the research and described himself as heterosexual.

Other participants named in the thesis: Kirsty, Adam.

**Group 3**

*Paul* was in his mid-twenties during this research. He works as a primary school teacher in West London near to where he lives. He spent most of his childhood in North-West London. Paul is of “White British” parents. He, Ben, Chloe and I have known each other for many years. Paul came out to the rest of this participant group in spring 2000. Paul likes going to pubs and bars, but only likes going to nightclubs if the venue is holding a gay night or an indie night. Paul was single during the research.

*Ben* was in his mid-twenties during this research. He was working as a primary school teacher in North-West London, close to where he lives. Ben has lived in this area of North-West London for most of his life. His parents are of “White British” ancestry and from Wales, and a lot of his family live in South Wales where Ben often visits them. Ben likes going to pubs and bars, but does not like going to nightclubs. He describes himself as heterosexual and was single at the time of the research.

*Chloe* was in her mid-twenties and worked as a journalist for a local newspaper. She lives in North-West London near where she has lived for most of her life. She is of “White British” parents. She describes herself as heterosexual and was single at the time of the research.
Penny was in her early-twenties during this research and was working for a radio programme production company. She is of “White British” parents and grew up in Liverpool where she went to an all-girls Catholic public school. She met Chloe while they were both studying at university together, and became friends with the rest of the participant group and through Chloe. She was living with Chloe in North-West London during this research. Penny describes herself as heterosexual, and was in a relationship when the research commenced.

Other participants named in the thesis: Kate, Matt, Alice, Nicole, Ken, Michelle, James.
Appendix B: Breakdown of research activities with each of the participant groups

Group 1

‘Nights out’

   (Ranjana, Jack, Meera, Jasbir present, along with others)
   (Ranjana, Jack, Tariq, Neil, Meera, Sophie, and others)

Group interviews

Group interview 1.1: Sat 24 June 2001, Ranjana’s house (Ranjana, Jack, Tariq, Neil, Meera)
Group interview 2.1: Sun 12 August 2001, Tariq’s flat (Ranjana, Jack, Tariq, Neil, Meera)

Group 2

‘Nights out’

1. Fri 29 June 2001, Wetherspoons 1, South London  
   (Darren, Anthony, Alison, Henry, Stuart)
2. Fri 06 July 2001, Bar on the banks of the Thames  
   (Darren, Anthony, Henry, Stuart, and others [to follow])

Group interviews

Group interview 2.1: Sat 30 June 2001, Anthony and Alison’s house  
(Darren, Anthony, Alison, Henry, Stuart)
Group interview 2.2: Mon 20 August 2001, Anthony and Alison’s house
(Darren, Anthony, Alison, Henry, Stuart, Hassan, Peter)

Group 3

‘Nights out’

   (Paul, Ben, Chloe, Penny, Matt, Alice, Pam, Pauline and others)
2. Fri 27 - Sat 28 April 2001, O’Neill’s 1
   (Ben, Kate, Matt, Alice and others)
   (Paul, Matt, Alice)
4. Fri 18 May 2001, O’Neill’s 1
   (Paul, Ben, Matt, Alice)
5. Sat 26 May 2001, Bar; club; bar [not cited in thesis]
   (Paul, Matt, Alice)
6. Fri 1 June 2001, Wetherspoons 3
   (Ben, Alice)
7. Sat 9 June 2001, O’Neill’s 1
   (Paul, Ben, Chloe, Penny, Matt, Alice, Kate, others)
   (Paul)
   (Paul, Chloe, Penny, James and others)
10. Sat 28 July 2001, O’Neill’s 1
    (Paul, Ben, Kate, Michelle and others)
    (Paul, Ben, Chloe, Penny and others)

Group interviews

Group interview 3.1: Sun 19 August 2001, Ben’s house (Paul, Ben, Chloe, Penny)
Appendix C: Participant observation research guide

Initial research guide

- Note the operation of order-words that circulate between the participants and how these effect the transformation of bodies
- Observe the embodied, non-discursive practices between participants.
- How do these embodied practices transform bodies?
- How do these order-words and non-discursive practices work together?
- Observe the emergence of affects and desires among or between participants; note those that seem not able to be established or felt (for instance that have been on other similar occasions with other participants)
- Be aware of the importance of timing in embodied practices and speech-acts for placing and distributing bodies
- Be aware of the differences in things that bodies are can do and are allowed to do. These may include:
  - kinds of dancing
  - other kinds of bodily activity and expression
  - spaces allowed and able to be constituted by bodies (e.g. private or personal bodily spaces)
  - things that can be said/ can’t be said
  - who dominates conversation, group sociability - how is such a bodily performance enacted?
  - how these differences in bodily capabilities are enforced or managed
  - how images, texts and discursive elements about Others become enfolded into performances
- For each of the above, note the practices and processes that enact and organise these performances and actions

With respect to how race, ethnicity, gender and sexuality are enacted through each other, look out for:

- Differences in abilities of bodies to act or create connections
- Who is found attractive - is this enacted along racial lines?
- What styles of sexualised performance are associated with which ethnicised bodies or spaces?
- What counts as sexualised behaviour and to whom?
- Illegitimate sexualised/ethnicised encounters and relationships (e.g. family, friends or acquaintances disapproving)
- Different versions of femininity and masculinity to be enacted for differently ethnicised bodies. (indications from literature):
  - distributions of bodies into types e.g. black men and women as excessively sexual
  - Asian men becoming made to be desexualised
  - Asian women becoming ambiguously sexualised or becoming virtuous and reserved
  - white men as expansive in sexual use of space, body and language
  - differently classed dynamics for the sexualising or desexualising of white women
Appendix D: Focus group facilitation guide

This facilitation guide was not rigidly adhered to during the focus groups. Questions were asked in response to the flow of the discussion, and hence many questions that were actually asked in the focus group are not to be found on this guide. Furthermore, the questions asked in the focus groups were usually not in the form set out in this guide. The wording of the questions was formulated ‘on the hoof’ in an attempt to ask questions in a more appropriate manner. This did not always go as smoothly as it could have done, mainly because of the difficulty in formulating simple questions to probe difficult and complex issues, and in making sure the questions asked were ‘open’ questions as far as possible.

The notes in square brackets are notes and warnings to myself about some of the dangers of asking these particular questions.

Possible questions for group discussion 1

1. Preparation

For our evening out the other night, how did you prepare to go out? [presupposes difference of going out from other leisure time – the social need to prepare]
Do you always prepare to go out in this way? [presupposes categories of different venues, types and styles of experience]
Why is it important to look nice?

2. Place and space

Do you like the place we went to the other night? What do you like about it? [engagement with material and social place might be reduced to objectification]
What did you enjoy about the night? [practical and lived engagement, but still asking for differentiation to be made]

3. Practices of sexualised sociality

How do you meet somebody new in a pub?
How do you meet somebody new in a club?
What do you do when you meet somebody new?
Suppose you were in that place we went to the other night, what are the chances of meeting somebody new there?
Why is it so difficult to meet new people in a pub/club?

Recall another group of people observed on the group night out. Ask participants whether they could tell who was single, who were partners, and how could they tell?
Or, do you think other people would they be able to tell which of you were partners, which were single, which were attached, but partners not present?
How can you tell whether somebody is ‘on the pull’?
How can you tell whether somebody would be receptive to being approached?

Ask them about other places they have been out with each other. Do they think that they had behaved the same way with each other in those other places?

Recount an event from the participant observation night out with the group that may involve cultural differences in understanding gendered and sexualised practices. This is designed to get participants talking about the issues involved, and hopefully to see if different perspectives on the event arise. e.g. What do respondents think about the etiquette of pulling?
[could go either way. If ask without specifying ethnicity, participants might deny that ethnicity makes a difference – don’t want to see themselves as racist. If talk about ethnicity first, danger of implying
ethnicised explanations for this behaviour - this may pre-empt any sense in which their behaviour would be ordered on other (e.g. gendered) terms]

What cultural understandings are important in knowing how to appropriately chat someone up, or flirt with them?
[already shifts the ground from ethnicity as an understanding of cultural difference based on race, to cultural difference based on practical senses]

More generally, how does one find a partner?
[culturally loaded question? - wording implies that finding a partner is an individualistic pursuit]
Is there a difference between ‘pulling’ and trying to find a partner?
[attempting to explore gendered and cultural differences; but assumes a historically given set of gender and cultural relations (access) to sexual subjectivity and agency]
What is ‘pulling’? How do you go about doing it? [gendered differences?]
Who can ‘pull’?
How does one ‘pull’? What does one do when one is on the ‘pull’?
[again, gendered and cultural differences might be apparent]
Where do you go to ‘pull’? Why there?
[categorical geography might map onto a minor politics of style and the practical constitution of space]
What do you wear to ‘pull’? How do you prepare yourself?
[asks about production of the body to meet moral dimension of appearance and performance]

What constitutes flirting? What sorts of things do people do when they flirt?
[again, gendered and cultural differences in relation to flirting practices; ‘sorts’ will hopefully not be taken as indicating that categorical differences are being asked for, but rather that question is asking for a general discussion to produce a sense about flirting]
What is the purpose of flirting? [very asking of this question might indicate that I am not expecting obvious answer]
Who do you flirt with?
Is flirting different from chatting somebody up?
[definitional question; but hopefully will prompt discussion about distinctions made in and through practice]
Do you flirt with people who you don’t want to pull? [already implies disjuncture between flirting and pulling]
When other people have flirted with you / Imagine somebody flirting with you:
What is nice flirting? What is a right turn off?
What would be the ideal way to flirt with you?
[practical economy of flirting]

What really puts you off a person (a potential partner) when you first meet them?
What qualities are desirable in a potential partner?

Possible questions for group discussion 2
(second group discussion: use of images from magazine will kick off discussion)

1. Images exercise

Introduce set A images
A: Famous bodies.
Who do you think is sexy from amongst these?

Introduce other images (grouped)
Genres:
Write some captions or say what the photos are illustrating?
Can you tell what type of magazine the images come from?
What type of article or feature might the image come from (what would the article/feature be about)?
What would you say about the people in the photos? What do these photos say to you about (this person/the sort of person this is)?

2. Continuing from images

Who belongs in what genres?
How many Black and Asian people do you see in fashion or other magazines positioned as ‘beautiful’ or stylish? Is there a difference between men and women in this respect?
What do you think people see, then, when they see black or Asian models in such roles? What do you see?
Where do you see images of Black people, images of Asian people?
[could mention fashionability of Asian fashions and models a couple of years ago]
[What legitimate positions do e.g. Asian men have in fashion/beauty magazines? Access to/role in fashion magazines (like how women with lots of make up in newsprint are usually seen as prostitutes or mistresses)? ]

How does this compare to when you meet somebody who looks like this/dresses like this in real life?
[depends on context of meeting – take those used in photos/ascribed to photos]

3. Attractiveness

Who is attractive? Who are the attractive people in the world?
What is attractive? What do you find attractive?
What styles of (clothing, music, culture, etc.) do you find attractive in others? And for yourself?

What is “glamorous”?
Is “glamorous” attractive?
What is “cool”? Is “cool” attractive?
Do you think of yourself as attractive?
[are you really going to ask this question?]

The ideas of attractiveness that we’ve been talking about, do these apply when you’re out, say, at a pub or club, if you’re meeting somebody for the first time, or if you’re on the pull, in real life?

4. Relationships

Have you been out with people of different ethnicities? Which ethnicities?

Are there types of ethnicity where you couldn’t see yourself going out with a person of that ethnicity, or that you haven’t found people of that ethnicity attractive – which ones?

What did your friends think when you started going out with X? What about your family?
Have you ever encountered anyone from amongst your friends, family or extended family who said that you should go out with people of a certain ethnicity?
Have you encountered any objections or been treated differently because of a relationship with a person of a certain ethnicity?

Do you think that your experience is typical?
Appendix E: My presence in and absence from the thesis

For a long time now, and for good reasons, social science researchers have been exhorted to exercise reflexivity to make accountable their influence on the research they carry out. In particular, researchers are often urged to make themselves present within the texts that they write. Feminist researchers especially have critiqued the supposed neutrality of positivist social science approaches, and have pointed to the situatedness of knowledge and knowledge production. There are unconscious biases in the assumptions held by researchers that become applied to their research (McDowell, 1992; Mohammad, 2001). By trying to make explicit the researcher’s impact on the research process - from the researcher’s relation with the researched in the field (Mohammad, 2001; Punch, 2001), through data analysis (Mauthner and Doucet, 2003), to the writing process (Butler, 2001) - a certain account can be made of such biases.

Such concerns are political ones. Ostensibly, they are about the power of researchers to represent – to speak for and write for – the Other (Clifford, 1986). The uneven power relations between researchers and the researched mean that the Other can become inserted into particular discursive formations, often for institutional and political reasons that benefit the researcher (Rabinow, 1986; Keith, 1992). To confront this politically uneven relationship, Clifford (1986) and many others following his lead, have advocated the disruption of the authority of the authorial voice within the research text. Unfortunately, a questioning of authorial authority often slides into a questioning of the authority of the author to authentically represent the Other (c.f. Mohammed, 2001). Here, the question becomes: does the researcher have the right or the authentic credentials to represent this Other? This move turns the problem of potential misrepresentation into one of accuracy or authenticity.
The concern with the Other, moreover, not only accompanies a return to a representational paradigm, but also brings with it the danger of a totalising account. This thesis, however, has not been about representing a totalised Other. There is no exhaustible content to the researched to be represented. I have not been concerned to find any putatively authentic ‘truth’ about them, nor do I think such a truth exists. The question of the power relation between myself as the researcher, and the research participants does not come down to a problem of voices. Not only do the participants not speak with a singular voice, either individually or collectively, but neither do they especially suffer from a collective voicelessness in relation to myself or to a broader British constituency. Rather, the question in the thesis has always been related to the differentials amongst the participants to make themselves heard, and to affect and be affected by others. The participants were not just conversing or interacting with me, but were interacting and responding to each other. It is their relative powers within these processes which are the issue. It is more important to place the responses and actions of the participants into the context of their interaction with other participants than into the context of their interaction with me. This is because it is the power relations that are immanent to the participants’ joint interactions that are at stake.

Within the parameters of this research, there was not a unified disadvantaged Other, but rather an uneven field of power relations. I have not been concerned to represent the content of some Other, nor the truth of their voices. Rather, if anything, I have been concerned to represent their interactions, what goes on between them. These are virtual events. I have sought to work in the spaces between bodies where there is not just a singular truth, but a proliferation of impacts. An encounter, a set of interactions, has an impact upon the researcher as well as the researched. Each of these impacts are partial and specific, but they are real, nonetheless. It is these real impacts from the ethnographic work I have conducted that I have taken to write about. My presence within both the field and the analysis as it is presented is everywhere within the text. I can say this because
immanent to the decisions I took as to what to write is the virtuality of
these real impacts upon me, the marks they have left upon my body
and my affects.

Of course, by writing I am doing something: I am intervening
politically. This is something I hope I have made explicit throughout.
Yet, the acts committed by my writing this thesis, and my carrying out
of the research, are only one set of political interventions amongst
many. Moreover, I have, of course, also made a series of judgements
and decisions in the course of the research and the writing of this
thesis. I claim these judgements as mine, or, rather, as my
instantiation of a machine of which I am part. That is, I take
responsibility for these judgements while being modest about whether
such judgements exhaust all that can be said or written on the matter.
Certainly, not all of the participants are entirely comfortable with what
I have written about their actions. On some occasions, they have a
problem recognising what I have written. Yet, it is not only the
academic who must take responsibility for her or his actions. The
researched must too, and, as I stated in the Introduction, I am not just
going to let them be. If the participants want to come back at me, then
they can.

Am I absent from the thesis? It might seem so, but I think this is
because I do not specifically draw attention to myself. I am there:
throughout, there are things that I do. I appear in many of the
accounts of participant observation events, not only observing, but
speaking and interacting. My presence in such instances is important
because I, as well as other participants, might have an impact on the
research process and its outcomes – in this case, what happens during
participant observation events. I do not overplay my role in these
events, however, because, in most cases, what I do is not particularly
important. What is most relevant – what is the focus of the research –
are the actions of the participants. I have not wanted to detract from
what is important (c.f. Bennett and Shurmer-Smith, 2001).
In chapter three, I have also written about my differing relationships with the different groups of participants, and about how I built up relationships of trust with each of these groups. I might have provided a little more detail about these processes, for instance, whether there were symbolic shifts in the relationships between any of the participants and me that might have influenced my ability to participate within the groups. Other than this, I think there are only a few other occasions when I have failed to write through my presence in the research process when to have done so would have afforded some insight into my influence on that process. Most significantly, Minesh’s views, statements and performances (Chapter four, pp. 141-144) were highly dependent on what I said and did during our conversation.

I am present throughout the thesis in the theoretical and interpretative assertions that I make. I often write in the first person, and, by doing so, hope to draw attention to the responsibility for these assertions and interpretations that I am taking. I hope to have made quite explicit my political motivations, and to have also been quite explicit about what some might think of as the ‘ontological’ assumptions undergirding the thesis, significantly those regarding the nature of subjectivity and objectivity (Mauthner and Doucet, 2003).

I have not attempted to establish my positionality relative to the research participants in terms of writing a biography of my identity positions. Not only would this be contrary to the whole thrust of this research, but it would not account for how I affected the research. More broadly, I am not sure how fully one can either know oneself, or account for one’s effects on the research process (Rose, 1997). I am quite certain that it is not necessarily the case that I would occupy a more powerful position than the research participants, even within the parameters of the research project, let alone outside of it. To that extent, I felt and continue to feel the need to protect myself. Perhaps I have lingered in the background a little too much, just there, observing, of seemingly little significance. More properly, I have been
there, in a supporting role, and have perhaps let others in a supporting role, such as Darren and Henry in group two, stand in for me. If this has been the case, then I have been a little unfair on them, and on myself. The research has been very personal to me, despite my putative absence, but it has been personal to the extent that it has helped me to realise what it might mean to be a person. It is difficult to say how I might have dealt with or reacted to, for instance, the racism, sexism or homophobia that I encountered during the research process, but this is because realising myself in these contexts has been difficult. Of course, this difficulty in realisation would have textured the fieldwork, in particular the participant observation, but, nonetheless, I am there. Just look for me in the gaps.


**Bibliography**


Seabrook, J. (1999), Love in a Different Climate: Men who have sex with men in India, Verso: London and New York.


