The Face of Peace

Pedagogy and Politics Among Government Officials in the Colombian Peace Process with the FARC-EP

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2020

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Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
I, Gwen Burnyeat, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

Signed:  
Date: 18 May 2020
Abstract:

This thesis studies officials in the government of Colombian president Juan Manuel Santos (2012-2018), a liberal politician whose central policy was a peace process with the FARC-EP guerrilla (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army), which sought to end fifty years of war. Based on 13 months of ethnographic fieldwork inside the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, the government department responsible for peace negotiations and for explaining the peace process to society, called ‘peace pedagogy’, plus interviews with government officials, international advisors, activists and FARC ex-combatants, it asks how the Santos government communicated the peace process to Colombian society, and how the culture of government officials shapes their work. Building on anthropology of the state, it calls for studying governments ethnographically, as dynamic ecosystems within the wider state, and draws on peace pedagogy officials’ perspectives about their struggles ‘giving face’ (dar la cara), in representing the government to sceptical audiences, to conceptualise how governments ‘face’ society. It also advances the anthropology of liberalism, by showing how liberal world-views are reproduced through ‘cultural liberalism’, the intertwinement of cultural values with political ideology. After a polarising referendum which narrowly rejected the peace accord signed with the FARC, government officials blamed themselves for being ‘too rational’ and ‘not emotional enough’, in contrast to opponents of the accord whom they perceived as right-wing populists. I pinpoint their belief in an imagined binary between rationality and emotions and explore how it shaped their work, showing that while the Santos government spent great efforts negotiating with the FARC, they failed to dedicate the same efforts to communicating with Colombian society, ultimately undermining the peace process. By analysing how this culturally liberal binary shaped the Santos government’s ‘face of peace’, this thesis offers new light from Colombia onto the crisis of liberalism in the global North.
Impact Statement:

This thesis provides a new understanding of the role of government ‘peace pedagogy’ and government-society relations in Colombia’s peace process with the FARC-EP. This offers lessons to scholars analysing Colombia’s recent history, peacebuilding practitioners in Colombia, and the global peace community which sees Colombia as the latest model in peace and transitional justice, by highlighting the importance of government-society relations in peace processes, and revealing how international funding shaped peace in Colombia.

It furthers research agendas in anthropology of the state, in exemplifying how governments can be studied ethnographically, by understanding them as dynamic ecosystems that exist dialectically with and through society. Likewise, it contributes to the anthropology of liberalism, by showing how political ideology is intertwined with culture, and revealing how the imagined binary between rationality and emotions shapes the liberal imagination.

The case study of ‘peace pedagogy’ offers a model for informing citizens about policies, timely because trust in governments and expertise has diminished globally. Two lessons for ‘policy pedagogy’ ensue: firstly, any message from the government is inescapably political, and its reception is influenced by citizens’ culturally-situated perceptions of the government, especially in contexts of political tension like referenda. Secondly, whether ‘policy pedagogy’ comes from government or civil society, disinformation cannot be countered with rational explanations, without engaging people’s emotions: rationality and emotions are mutually imbricated.

I have disseminated this research through publications in *Terrain, Bulletin of Latin American Research, A Contracorriente, and Revista de Estudios Sociales*; in conference papers at the Latin American Studies Association, the American Anthropological Association, the UCL Americas Research Network, the Society for Latin American Studies, and Peace and Conflict Studies in Anthropology; and in seminars at the London Transitional Justice Network, the Institute for Latin American Studies, the Pearson Institute (University of Chicago), Columbia University, the Universidad Nacional de Colombia, the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy (University of Erfurt), the University of Bristol, the Latin American Centre, Violence Studies, Oxford Transitional Justice Network, and OxPeace (all University of Oxford).

Beyond academia, I have drawn on this research to publish articles in Spanish and English, in *Semana Educación*, the *London Review of Books*, *Los Angeles Review of Books*, *The Globe Post*, *The Conversation*, *Latin America Bureau*, the *LSE Latin America and Caribbean Centre Blog*, and elsewhere; to give talks at Canning House, St Ethelburga’s Centre for Peace and Reconciliation, and the Darwin Festival of Ideas; and to brief policy-makers in the Colombian and UK governments about the peace process. Additionally, I co-convene Embrace Dialogue Academia, an initiative bringing together academics researching different aspects of the Colombian peace process to share knowledge and enable practical impact, and our statements have been published in Spanish by Colombian media outlets.
Through my embedded fieldwork methodology within the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, I contributed directly to the Santos government’s peace pedagogy strategy. Finally, through my research and my ongoing development as a public anthropologist, I continue contributing to the work of transnational peacebuilding network, Rodeemos el Diálogo, in Colombia and the UK.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I first acknowledge a huge debt of gratitude to the men and women of the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace who generously welcomed me into their world, allowed me to experience first-hand the challenges they faced in their work, and discussed their views with me. Their commitment and hard work are an example to all governments, not just in Colombia. While ethics protocols require me to keep most of them anonymous, I must thank Diego Bautista and María Paula Prada in particular, for opening the doors of the institution to me and helping me obtain many valuable interviews. I am likewise grateful to all the government officials, international advisors, civil society leaders and FARC ex-combatants who shared their thoughts with me, and I thank María Isabel Cristina González who allowed me to conduct joint interviews with her, and with whom I developed many preliminary analyses.

In Llano Grande, I was warmly received by the government, the FARC, the army, the police, the UN Mission, and above all the community, whose hospitality moved me beyond words. The coexistence among all the parties in Llano Grande shows that building peace is possible. I am grateful to Angie Carolina Tunjano for facilitating my initial access to Llano Grande.

Special thanks to Sergio Jaramillo, for receiving me in Brussels, facilitating further interviews, and providing ongoing support to my research and career. The serendipitous discovery that he had studied in Cambridge under my father, Myles Burnyeat, who died during my PhD, reinforced my belief that I had not chosen my research topic—it had chosen me.

Thanks also to all the members of Rodeemos el Diálogo (ReD), in Colombia and the UK. Not only did our many ‘Peace Breakfasts’, panels, and other events enrich my thoughts throughout my research, but ReD also provided me the space, while studying the government, to remain connected to my overarching commitment to building peace from civil society, through nurturing a culture of dialogue.

Next, I thank my supervisors, Lucia Michelutti and Michael Stewart, for their guidance and comments on my work, my doctoral cohort for their solidarity and companionship, and the UCL Anthropology Department in general. I am especially grateful to Miranda Shield Johansson, for inviting me to co-convene the Research and Reading Group on Anthropological Approaches to State-Citizen Relations, which greatly benefitted my research, and resulted in a fruitful one-day workshop on the Social Contract. My PhD was possible thanks to a Wolfson Foundation Postgraduate Scholarship in the Humanities, and I thank Alex Page from the Office of the ViceProvost for handling my scholarship with warmth and genuine interest in my research.

My thesis got written thanks to collaborative knowledge production with and through the Laboratory for Anthropology of the State in Colombia (LASC). Ana María Forero, Roxani Krystalli, Valentina Pellegrino, Erin McFee, Charles Beach and Emma Shaw Crane all read drafts of my work and provided detailed and thoughtful comments, as well as endless moral support and friendship. My thesis is one of LASC’s many intersubjective outputs; may there be
lots more to come. I thank Erin in particular for her constant loving companionship, and our ongoing transnational dialogue via voice note, about anthropology, Colombia, and everyday life.

I am deeply grateful to Mick Taussig for receiving me in Columbia University as a visiting PhD scholar for a semester, and for reading and commenting on drafts of my work. I audited his last postgraduate class before his retirement, ‘The Art of Fieldwork’, and his thoughts on ethnographic writing will remain with me for life. He also facilitated contact with Paige West, who generously allowed me to participate in her postgraduate writing group, and I thank her and the group, especially Fern Margot Thompsett and Bruno Seraphin, for constructive comments on one of my chapters. I also thank Marilyn Astwood for assisting me with the administration of my affiliation at Columbia, Jonathan and Renee Slon for their wonderful hospitality in Riverside Drive, and Krystina Schaub for her supportive friendship and many philosophical conversations in New York and thereafter about the methods and emotions involved in writing a thesis.

I thank Myriam Jimeno, and the Grupo de Investigación Conflicto Social y Violencia at the Centro de Estudios Sociales, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, for helpful comments to preliminary findings of my research. Likewise, thanks to my fellow panellists at five conferences which greatly enriched my analyses – the Latin American Studies Association, the American Anthropological Association, the UCL Americas Research Network, the Society for Latin American Studies, and Peace and Conflict Studies in Anthropology – and Kimberly Theidon and Winifred Tate who provided useful feedback as discussants. I also acknowledge the organisers and participants of numerous seminars where I received constructive critique, including the Oxford Transitional Justice Research Network, the Oxford Network of Peace Studies, Violence Studies Oxford, the Latin American Centre at Oxford, and the London Transitional Justice Network. Special thanks to Solveig Richter at the University of Erfurt for inviting me to the International Workshop on the Colombian Peace Process, to Erin McFee, James Robinson and María Angélica Bautista at the University of Chicago for inviting me to speak on a panel at the Pearson Institute for the Study and Resolution of Global Conflicts, and to Laura Hankin, Matthew Brown and Julia Paulson for bringing me to speak at the University of Bristol.

Many others also gave generously of their time and knowledge in conversations which greatly benefitted my thinking. These include Stephen Hugh-Jones, Maxine Molyneux, Par Engstrom, Jenny Pearce, Malcolm Deas, Leigh Payne, William Mazzarella, Beth Povinelli, Laura Rival, Akanksha Awal, Marthe Achtich, Maan Barua, Sushrut Jadhav, Paul Angelo, Johanna Pérez Gómez, Johanna Amaya, Juan Gabriel Vásquez, Jonathan Newman, Ralph Grillo, Mary Roldán, Ben Bowles, Roy Foster, Patrick Piatroni, Juan Pablo Vera, Juana Dávila, Francy Carranza, Steven Bunce, Sebastián Ramírez, Elena Butti, Hassan Akram, David Lehmann, Jaskiran Chohan, Kate Saunders-Hastings, Veronica Ramírez, Peter Cousins, Diana Ramírez, Daniel Silva, Dáire McGill, Diana Dajer, Adriana Rudling, Sanne Weber, Tatiana Sánchez, Justina Pinkeviciute and Juan Gabriel Gómez. I thank all of them for the care and thoughtfulness they put into helping me develop my arguments.

Finally, I thank my family for putting up with me through all of this. Samuel Gómez, Carolina Gómez and Juan Carlos Álvarez looked after me in Colombia, and their love, encouragement
and commitment to peacebuilding continue to inspire me. Back in the UK, I am grateful to all those who supported me during my Dad’s final years, especially Abi Burnyeat, Jake Burnyeat, Meg Bent, and Oliver Padel. My mother, Ruth Padel, has been my rock throughout, from my arrival back ‘home’ to London to start my PhD, to finishing my thesis under the coronavirus lockdown together. Her extraordinary generosity and love have kept me going, and her belief in me has helped me become who I am.

My thesis took the shape it did thanks to my husband, Andrei Gómez-Suárez. My research topic emerged through our intersubjective experience working shoulder to shoulder for peace in Colombia, he helped me access many important contacts in the field, he read a final draft of my thesis with his consistently sharp and critical eye, and his love sustained me through the ups and downs of the PhD. I owe my development as a scholar and practitioner to our ongoing affective dialogue, and his passionate conviction that a different world is possible.

Any errors remain my own.
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NOTE ON TRANSLATION

Citations and terms from the ‘Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build A Stable and Lasting Peace’ (henceforth ‘Final Peace Agreement’), signed between the Government of Colombia and the FARC-EP on 24 November 2016, are from the official English translation, unless otherwise stated. All other translations are my own.

ABBREVIATIONS

There is a notorious penchant for acronyms among Colombian institutions. Many of my informants believed the numerous acronyms in the Peace Agreement were yet another obstacle to communicating clearly about the peace process. In this thesis I use emic abbreviations, but have avoided creating unnecessary extra ones.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACR</th>
<th>Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegración, Colombian Agency for Reintegration (subsequently ARN)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADR</td>
<td>Agencia de Desarrollo Rural, Agency for Rural Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARN</td>
<td>Agencia para la Reincorporación y la Normalización, Agency for Reincorporation and Normalisation (formerly ACR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ART</td>
<td>Agencia para la Renovación del Territorio, Agency for Territorial Rennovation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUC</td>
<td>Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CELAC</td>
<td>Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños, Community of Latin American and Caribbean States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHCV</td>
<td>Comisión Histórica del Conflicto y sus Víctimas, Historical Commission on the Conflict and its Victims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNMH</td>
<td>Centro Nacional para la Memoria Histórica, National Centre for Historical Memory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSIVI</td>
<td>Comisión de Seguimiento, Impulso y Verificación a la Implementación del Acuerdo de Paz, Commission for Monitoring, Promoting and Verifying the Implementation of the Final Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTP</td>
<td>Consejo Territorial de Paz, Territorial Peace Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAPRE</td>
<td>Departamento Administrativo de la Presidencia de la República, Administrative Department of the Presidency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ELN</td>
<td>Ejército de Liberación Nacional, National Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPL</td>
<td>Ejército Popular de Liberación, People’s Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERP</td>
<td>Encuentros Regionales de Paz, Regional Peace Encounters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESAP</td>
<td>Escuela Superior de Administración Pública, Superior School of Public Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETCR</td>
<td>Territorial Spaces for Training and Reincorporation (Espacios Territoriales de Capacitación y Reincorporación)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC(-EP)</td>
<td>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia(-Ejército del Pueblo), Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia(-People’s Army). Now a political party FARC: Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común, Revolutionary Alternative Force of the Commons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIP</td>
<td>Fundación Ideas para la Paz, Ideas for Peace Foudnation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH (German Development Agency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFIT</td>
<td>The Institute for Integrated Transitions</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEP</td>
<td>Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz, Special Jurisdiction for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-19</td>
<td>Movimiento 19 de Abril, 19 April Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOE</td>
<td>Misión de Observación Electoral</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSI</td>
<td>Management Systems International</td>
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<tr>
<td>MVM</td>
<td>Monitoring and Verification Mechanism</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OACP</td>
<td>Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, Office of the High Commissioner for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>OED</td>
<td>Oxford English Dictionary</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDET</td>
<td>Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial, Programmes with a Territorial-Based Focus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNIS</td>
<td>Programa Nacional Integral de Sustitución de Cultivos de Uso Ilícito, National Comprehensive Programme for the Substitution of Crops Used for Illicit Purposes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores de Colombia, Workers Revolutionary Party of Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ReD</td>
<td>Rodeemos el Diálogo, Embrace Dialogue</td>
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<tr>
<td>TLPN</td>
<td>Transitional Local Points for Normalization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>TLZN</td>
<td>Transitional Local Zones for Normalization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAL</td>
<td>Universidad Nacional de Colombia</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td><em>Unión Patriótica</em>, Patriotic Union Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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INTRODUCTION

Dar la Cara, Giving Face

What does it mean for a government to ‘face’ society, in the sense of coming face-to-face with people in personal encounters, and in that of assuming one’s responsibility, as in ‘facing the music’? What is the social experience of government officials at the ‘inter-face’, those who must represent and ‘be the face’ of this nebulous, sometimes menacing, fetishised thing, The Government, the proverbial powers that be?

In October 2017, army and police forces opened fire on civilian protestors in Tumaco, on the Colombian Pacific coast, killing eight people and wounding others (Semana 2017d). Local coca-growing communities had signed agreements with the government to participate in a voluntary crop substitution program created by the 2016 Peace Agreement between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP, commonly ‘FARC’), and they felt betrayed, as the police had sprayed their crops with glyphosate. The army claimed the peasants were mixed up with dissident FARC factions; the peasants claimed this was untrue, and said the gunfire had been unprovoked. In a WhatsApp group that connected local activists with government officials from the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace (OACP), the branch of the Colombian presidency in charge of peace negotiations, one activist wrote:

The government must dar la cara [literally ‘give face’) to people here, recognise its mistakes, and explain what they are doing to implement the Peace Agreement in the Pacific, a region that voted for peace [in the 2016 Referendum]. High-level officials need to come and dar la cara – the President, or the High Commissioner for Peace. I feel deep distrust in my heart, I perceive a lack of will in this government to fulfil the promises it made in the Peace Agreement.

On a different occasion, OACP officials realised that, due to administrative obstacles, they would have to let down the people they had been working with to organise an event, for a project that aimed to build new government-society alliances for peace. The official in charge of informing the people of this disappointment wept, lamenting:

I didn’t design this project, but I’m the one having to dar la cara. We’re going to look like idiots. If we ever organise anything again, they won’t believe us. And I’ll never be able to show my face in the region again, because it’s not about the institution; it’s the individual who builds trust with people.
During my fieldwork inside the OACP, government officials repeatedly expressed anguish at having to *dar la cara*, give face, a common phrase meaning both to be present and to assume responsibility. In this thesis, I draw on this emic category to propose the notion of the ‘face of the government’ to illuminate the dynamics of government-society relations in the Colombian peace process and beyond. I focus on the experience and work of the OACP officials charged with doing ‘peace pedagogy’, a strategy created by the government of President Juan Manuel Santos to disseminate the contents of the Peace Agreement signed with the FARC-EP to Colombians citizens, before and after the 2016 Referendum which narrowly rejected the accord.

However, this thesis is not simply a localised ethnography of Colombian government officials. My ethnos is ‘the government’ itself, a construction made by people (government officials) through their imagined relationships with other people (those in the wider state structure, across the political establishment, and in Colombian society, to which they also belong). Through an ethnography of the Santos government’s peace pedagogy in action, I analyse what it means to ‘give face’ to society as the government, and the political effects of the ‘face of the government’ in the Colombian peace process. In doing this, I show that we cannot conceive of ‘the government’ as an entity without considering how it ‘faces’ society. Governments exist through the political relationship between ruler and ruled, a relationship forged through public opinion and perception. Those officials, like the OACP peace pedagogues, whose job involves representing the government in public, at the ‘interface’ between government and society, *instantiate* the government.

**The Face of the Government**

As Navaro-Yashin (2002), Obeid (2010), and others have noted, the state has many faces. This idea indexes the state’s multiplicity; one institution can be benevolent while another is repressive, for example. The reification of this multiplicity into a unitary thing, *the state*, is what Abrams (1988) called the ‘state-idea’, distinguished from the ‘state-system’, the system of institutional practice. This thesis focuses specifically on one ‘face’ of the Colombian state – that of the government of Juan Manuel Santos, President of Colombia for two periods (2010-2018), whose central policy was the peace process with the FARC-EP guerrilla that sought to end fifty years of war. Negotiating and then implementing the Peace Agreement altered Colombian reality irrevocably. The ‘face’ that President Santos sought to ‘give’ from his government was a *face of peace*. 
Governments change periodically (based, in Colombia’s democracy, on elections every four years), and the face of one administration can be radically different from another. Each, in turn, has the opportunity to change the state’s other faces, by appointing ministers and other personnel, promoting laws and policies, and engendering institutional cultures. Governments comprise not only heads of state, but dynamic ecosystems of people, whose culture and practices are shaped by systematically-reproduced conventions of interaction with each other and with Colombian society. President Santos, an internationally-educated, upper-class man, from a family of traditional political elites in Colombia’s capital, Bogotá, was politically and culturally liberal. This was largely reflected in his government’s hiring and policy-making practices, making the face of the Santos administration a liberal face.

‘Liberalism’ as a practice of politics emerged in the Euro-Atlantic historical context of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries, a time of unprecedented social, economic and political upheaval. It has waxed and waned over time, developing different emphases in different societies, consolidating in the postwar era, when liberal democracy was construed in contrast to two defining antiliberal Others, fascism and communism, defeating the former in 1945 and proclaiming triumph over the latter in 1989 (Fawcett 2014, xiii, 13). Despite wide variability across different societies (Gould 1999, 3-4, McLean and McMillan 2003, 1261-2), or ‘liberalisms’ (Mouffe 2005, 10), this practice of politics, according to philosopher John Gray, retains a common outlook with distinctive features:

[I]t is individualist, in that it asserts the moral primacy of the persona against any collectivity; egalitarian, in that it confers on all human beings the same basic moral status; universalist, affirming the moral unity of the species; and meliorist, in that it asserts the open-ended improvability, by the use of critical reason, of human life. (2003, 86)

Nevertheless, no stable understanding exists of ‘liberal’ or ‘liberalism’ – many liberal parties never used the capital-L ‘Liberal’, many parties called ‘Liberal’ are not liberal, and many liberal politicians and thinkers do not identify as such (Fawcett 2014, 6-7). While institutionalised liberalism is associated with tenets such as governance by rule of law, rights based on individual freedoms, the market economy, and separation of church and state, anthropologists have shown that liberalism is also a set of everyday lived experiences, or projects that conjure

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2 The term ‘liberal’ was first used of a political movement in 1812, by the Spanish party Liberales (Gray 2003, xi).
social worlds (Povinelli 2006, 2011, 2016, Schiller 2015, Ansell 2019), which travel and mutate across time and space in 'liberal diasporas' (Povinelli 2002, 6). Central to these social worlds is the assumption of individual rationality, anchored in the Enlightenment idea that empirical, scientific research led to objective knowledge that could be harnessed by neutral states to improve society.

While anthropologists have analysed the cultural repertoires of populist, bombastic, or otherwise quasi-mythical politicians (Michelutti 2016, Hodges 2019), what about liberal politicians? While Santos subscribed to the Colombian variant of political (capital-L) Liberalism, many of his officials did not. However, in documenting how they are culturally situated in Colombian society, I foreground what I call their cultural liberalism – a broader, less visible social phenomenon, in which the outlook described above by Gray intertwines with race, class, region of origin, secularity and education, to value rationality, and repudiate populist politicking.

By focussing on the Santos government’s liberal ‘face of peace’, this thesis delimits government administrations ethnographically from the wider state structure, and shows how the culture of government officials affects their work. As governments have power to influence, though not unilaterally control, the state apparatus, their actions matter for the destiny of their societies. I thereby follow Appel’s (2019, 4) invitation to “know more about that over which we need more power”: how we think about governments affects how we might seek to change them.

Separating ‘the government’ from ‘the state’ is not straightforward; the borders are fuzzy, even porous. In Colombia, people commonly distinguish between the two – though confusingly also sometimes use Gobierno and Estado synonymously. Popular distinctions in Colombia reference the government as one of the three branches of power – the executive branch – and the state as everything else.³ Hansen (2019) distinguishes between ‘the state’ and ‘government’ in India, drawing on the Hindi differentiation between raj/raja and sarkar, meaning, respectively, a sovereign realm, and its everyday bureaucratic administration through institutions. My distinction, rather than focussing on government as an administrative practice, highlights the

³ Popular distinctions stem from though are not necessarily always consistent with the 1991 Colombian Constitution, which separates the state into three branches of power (executive, legislative and judicial), and names other independent entities, including the Public Ministry, the National Commission for Civil Service, the National Television Authority, the Bank of the Republic, the National Electoral Council, the General Auditor’s Office (Contraloría General), the National Registry Office, the Human Rights Ombudsman (Defensoría del Pueblo), public universities, the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Procuraduría General), among others. Colombia’s Constitution of 1991, Art.113-121.
existence of *the government administration* as a separate set of institutions within the bureaucratic realm, including the head of state, the cabinet, the ruling party (ruling either on its own or in a coalition), and the institutions of central government – the presidency, ministries, and so forth. The government/state distinction responds to Hansen's (2019, 13) criticism of the subfield of anthropology of the state for failing to connect attention to the everyday workings of state bureaucracies with the dynamics of electoral politics and public opinion, echoing comparable critiques by Spencer (2007, 119) and Stepputat and Nuijten (2018, 140).

While anthropology has generally not dealt with the government/state distinction, it has attended to government as practice, indebted to Foucault's theory of 'governmentality': practices and rationalities which aim to shape the conduct of populations by calculated means, seeking “the welfare of the population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health, etc.” (Foucault 1991, 100). Foucauldian-inspired work sees governmentality everywhere, tracking its flows through state institutions, international entities, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), bureaucratic plans, and social engineering interventions. Scott's *Seeing like a State* (1998) is an example, as is much anthropological research on development (Ferguson 1994, Li 2007). This literature frequently reveals the inefficiencies of governmentality, failures to achieve ambitious objectives, and the production of unexpected outcomes, especially due to depoliticised conceptions of intervention domains. Hansen and Stepputat (2001, 4) argue that the emphasis on technologies of power, discipline, and resistance, neglects the state's role. Similarly, this literature obscures the difference between the practice of government and the entity we call 'the government'.

To delimit ‘the government’ ethnographically means approaching it as a social world, as strange as – but only as strange as – any other community under ethnographic scrutiny. Government administrations are people. Taussig (1999, 239) depicts a meeting between Mexican state officials and Zapatista rebels, in which the Zapatistas wore masks to equate themselves with the state officials, whom they saw as faceless, saying, “the state is always masked!” The officials are without personal identity, pure representation. While this is revealing of the Zapatista's perception of the state – Abrams' 'state-idea' – it negates the experience of the officials in this encounter. This thesis pulls back the curtain on the people inside the government, giving 'faces' to the government through ethnography. This move follows Joyce (2013, 18), who argues that the theoretical focus on understanding the state as culturally constituted (Sharma and Gupta
2006, Mitchell 2006), while productive, risks “drawing attention away from the institutions and personnel of the state itself”.4

This approach – giving ‘faces’ to the state – could be seen as running counter to the move to cast the state’s mode of existence as ‘magic’ (Taussig 1992, Taussig 1997, Coronil 1997, Navaro-Yashin 2012).5 Yet what could be more magical than the human face? For Levinas (1979, 199), the encounter with the face of the other is an “epiphany”; it reveals to the self the humanity of the other, and the other’s absolute unknowability. Simultaneously, it awakens a fundamental ethical responsibility towards that other. “The face speaks”, says Levinas (1985, 89), and its “first words” are the command, “Thou shalt not kill”. This ‘speaking’ is pretextual, outside language, culture, and semiotics (Rapport 2015). It speaks of human vulnerability: it is “upright exposure, without defense”; the “skin of the face” is the “most naked” (Levinas 1985, 86). The face represents the physical aliveness of the other, and the pre-cognitive encounter with that aliveness, being touched by the other’s “living presence” (Levinas 1979, 66). The two meanings of dar la cara – physical presence and assuming responsibility – are paralleled in Levinas’ conception of the face. Building on Levinas, Taussig (1999, 3) conceptualises the face as “the magical crossroads of mask and window to the soul”. The former reminds us that faces are masklike: “sets of meaningful features, like pictures or texts, trading in apparent permanence or realness for a mobile facade” (1999, 92). The latter articulates the face as a surface that can be read, accessing the soul of the other (1999, 84). The face is also a border, says Taussig (1999, 223), for the face “never exists alone … only when faced by another face”.

In focussing on what it means to ‘give face’ as the government, I analyse what it means to represent the government to the ‘other’ of the state: society. Bourdieu (2014, 60-83) reminds us that when a state official speaks, they do so in “the name of an ensemble that is made to exist

4 Sharma and Gupta characterise ‘the state’ as a “multi-layered, contradictory, translocal ensemble of institutions, practices, and people in a globalized context” (2006, 6); “culturally embedded and discursively constructed”, and “produced through everyday practices and encounters and through public cultural representations and performances” (2006, 27). Spencer (2007, 105) argues that this line of questioning “drives an intellectual wedge between the ethnographer and any informant who dares to subscribe to the delusion” of the state as a homogenised thing.

5 Taussig (1992, 1997) sees the state as a fetish, surrounded by an “aura” of “state fetishism” (1992, 111). Coronil sees the state as a sorcerer, manufacturing dazzling projects that “engender collective fantasies of progress” (1997, 5), casting spells that induce receptivity to its illusions. Navaro-Yashin (2012) connects the imagined and material dimensions of the state, with her category of the ‘make-believe’, referring both to the work of the imagination and to the materiality of crafting. These approaches underline the state as fiction, in the sense not of a falsehood, but of something made or fashioned (Geertz 1973, 15).
by the fact of speaking in its name”. This is called prosopopoeia, the process by which “an inanimate or abstract thing is represented as a person”,⁶ which Bourdieu glosses as “speaking in the place of an absent person or an object, and in the name of something that can be a person, ancestors, the lineage, the people, public opinion”. It comes from the Greek prósopon, meaning face or person, and poléin, to make or to do – thus, to make a face, or to personify. When government officials speak, they are engaging in prosopopoeia; making, doing, calling into being, the face of the government: face-making, giving face. The concept of giving face emphasises the person behind the face, but also their experience of contact with an other (not-state) in the act of representing the government.

As ethnography itself involves representation (Taussig 1993), this thesis is a representation of representation. I am representing the Colombian government officials representing the government. Yet the act of representing the government is unlike ethnography, art, photography, theatre, and other representations that seek to depict, be a likeness, a resemblance of something, where there is an ‘original’ to copy. Even in representations of unreal, magical, or fictional things – jaguar-men, deities, characters in a play, a magic carpet – the referent is a being or an object. A government is neither. Conversely, anthropological engagements with political representation usually focus on the ways politicians are believed to represent the people (Spencer 1997, Michelutti 2016). But representing ‘the government’ is not mimesis, nor the embodiment of the will of an imagined population. ‘Giving face’ as a government official involves representing both an abstract ‘government-idea’ and a specific political leader. Our perception of governments involves faces: those of the public personae of political figures, portrayed through media, interpreted and imagined by us. A politician, a minister, an army general. Such faces connect with each other in complex ways, a cast of characters, both themselves and not themselves, cascading through time and space, kaleidoscoping onto the face of anonymous government officials lower down the ranks, tasked with speaking for and representing the government.

In Colombia, the ‘state-idea’ is commonly perceived by multiple social groups with great distrust, as several ethnographies have shown (Ramírez 2011, Ramírez 2015, Serje 2011, Ocampo 2014, Tate 2015a, Burnyeat 2017), due to historic narratives about the state ‘abandoning’ parts of the country, and to the actions of state and para-state actors in the conflict. In addition to

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generic distrust in ‘the state’, different sectors of Colombian society had varied perceptions specifically of the Santos government, and the peace process which was its central policy. This ethnography reveals the experience of OACP officials in government-society encounters, in which all the perceptions and emotions people felt towards the state as trans-historical abstract entity, and towards the Santos government as a kaleidoscope of imagined political personae, were projected onto them. In such encounters, these officials represented the government, ‘giving’ the government’s face. Through the audiences’ responses to their peace pedagogy presentations – questions, comments, diatribes, accusations, wails, gratitude, support, requests, silences, proposals, attention or lack of attention – they experienced being the face of the government. Yet they were not ‘faceless’ bureaucrats, as Taussig’s Zapatistas would have us believe: they were individuals, themselves situated culturally in Colombian society, and this situatedness was manifest in their faces, just as Deleuze and Guattari use the concept of ‘faciality’ (1987, 170-75) to denote how faces are socially coded, engendering and revealing social power, privilege and inequalities. Audience perceptions of OACP peace pedagogues were shaped by the faciality both of the individual standing before them, and of the persona of President Santos.

Taking the emic category ‘dar la cara’, as employed in the opening vignette by OACP officials and their interlocutors, I use the verb ‘giving face’ to denote the act of officials ‘facing’ society via diverse scenarios, meaning physically being there in a face-to-face encounter, and assuming responsibility to society as the government. Giving face in this sense means crafting a message and sending it via envoys to different audiences. I extrapolate from this verb the related concept, the ‘face of the government’. The face of the government is closely connected to the national-level politics played out via the mises-en-scène through which public opinion develops – the media, symbolic representations such as logos and flags, presidential speeches, public events, and so on. We cannot conceive of the face of government without considering how people interpret politics. By the ‘face of the government’, I therefore mean a real and metaphysical site onto which converge the political personae of the president and other public figures, propaganda, slogans, narratives, policies, manifesto, public opinion, and, in Colombia, peace pedagogy.

**Pedagogy and Politics: Origins of the Research Questions**
On 2 October 2016, Colombia voted ‘No’ to peace. After five years of negotiations in Havana between the Santos government and the FARC, the oldest guerrilla in Latin America, a historic peace deal was signed that sought to end fifty years of armed conflict. The Peace Agreement was put to a referendum. The results—50.2% for ‘No’, 49.8% for ‘Yes’, and 63% abstention—were unexpected, even for ‘No’ campaigners, as polls had forecast the ‘Yes’ would win. Around the world, journalists and commentators wondered why a country would reject the opportunity to stop decades of violence. Some drew parallels with the Brexit vote in the UK just months earlier, and the global trend of what was loosely named ‘post-truth’ politics (Semana 2016d).

The ‘No’ campaign was spearheaded by Álvaro Uribe Vélez, president of Colombia between 2002-2010, and his right-wing party, the Democratic Centre. Their campaign demanded changes to the deal, and spread disinformation about it: if the ‘Yes’ won, Colombia would become communist, “the next Venezuela”; private property would be abolished; and “gender ideology” would be imposed on schoolchildren, turning them gay and destroying the traditional Colombian family. Such messages were spread on billboards, in radio and TV debates, in pamphlets handed out at traffic lights, and on social media. The ‘No’ campaign manager admitted afterwards they had purposefully sought to make people “go to vote angry”, designing different campaign messages for different sectors to provoke “indignation” (Semana 2016e). Colombia’s highest administrative tribunal later ruled that the ‘No’ campaign had employed “generalised deceit” (Semana 2016f).

After the Referendum, the government spent five weeks meeting with ‘No’ campaigners to hear their objections and proposals to modify the deal, and renegotiating with the FARC. A new deal was signed on 24 November 2016 which incorporated almost all the ‘No’ campaign’s demands. Instead of risking a second referendum, President Santos put the new Peace Agreement to Congress, which ratified the deal, and implementation began on 1 December 2016. However, the loss of the Referendum led to a “legitimacy deficit” (IFIT 2018, 24) which haunted implementation. The Democratic Centre refused to back the new deal, deciding instead to build on their success in the Referendum and continue opposing Santos’ peace process to garner support for the 2018 elections. Uribe’s candidate, Iván Duque, promised in his presidential campaign to make substantial changes to the Peace Agreement. He was elected President of Colombia on 17 June 2018, and took office on 7 August 2018. At the time of writing, he has been in power for twenty months. Although implementation of the Peace Agreement continues, multiple Colombian and international organisations and observers have criticised Duque for
undermining the peace process, and allowing a new cycle of violence to emerge, as hundreds of FARC ex-combatants who disarmed have been assassinated, as well as hundreds of social leaders who had campaigned for peace (UNSC 2019c).

Other scholars have analysed how Uribe, frequently construed as a populist leader, won the Referendum and then built on this success to rocket Duque to power (Gómez-Suárez 2016, López de la Roche 2018). This thesis turns the gaze instead onto how the Santos government lost, and thus reframes debates about how populism operates socially toward the way liberalism reacts to its perceived antithesis of populism. To this end, and to answer the wider theoretical question as to how governments ‘face’ society, three interrelated empirical questions guided my research: how did the Santos government communicate the peace process to Colombian society via peace pedagogy? What kinds of government-society relations did this communication reveal? And what role did these relations play in fate of the peace process?

These questions emerged from six years living and working in and on Colombia as both practitioner and academic prior to my PhD. I first arrived in 2010, just before Santos was elected, to work at the International Centre for Transitional Justice, a think-tank in Bogotá, then spent two years working in Peace Brigades International, an NGO that provides protective accompaniment to threatened human rights defenders, in a field team in the North-West conflict region of Urabá. In 2012, while I was working with conflict-affected communities in Urabá, President Santos announced the beginning of formal peace talks in Havana with the FARC. I subsequently did a Master’s in anthropology at the National University of Colombia and taught political anthropology there, living in Bogotá and conducting ethnographic research in Urabá, which led to publication of my book, *Chocolate, Politics and Peace-Building: An Ethnography of the Peace Community of San José de Apartadó, Colombia* (Burnyeat 2018), and a film, *Chocolate of Peace* (2016).7

While in Bogotá, I participated in Rodeemos el Diálogo (ReD), literally ‘Let’s Embrace Dialogue’, a non-partisan civil society organisation founded in 2012 to support the Havana peace negotiations. We held hundreds of ‘peace breakfasts’ and other events to inform ordinary people about what was going on in the negotiations, bringing experts from all sectors (government, guerrilla and paramilitary ex-combatants, victims, academics, artists, activists, ...

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journalists, and others) to share their knowledge and create a culture of dialogue across difference, as a way of peacebuilding from civil society. In everything I did, I was firmly on the side of civil society and of peace, though I was sceptical of President Santos, as were my previous ethnographic informants in the Peace Community of San José de Apartadó, who were victims of state violence. Although a foreigner in Colombia, my privilege inscribed on my own face as a blonde, Caucasian woman, in many ways, Colombia was more home to me than the UK, as I developed my career there, married a Colombian, and my sceptical positionality was shaped by this complex embeddedness at home-yet-not-home, in a milieu of Colombian human rights defenders, civil society leaders and academics who could broadly be said to be on the political left.

Under Santos, various sectors of Colombian society occupying this position of being critical of the state and denouncing state abuses began cautiously to support the government’s peace policy. This was sometimes uncomfortable for them – Santos represented the traditional political elites and had been Uribe’s successor; many did not identify as santistas nor support his economic, social and political vision for the country. Nevertheless, they saw the peace process as a strategic opportunity to end the conflict. This meant making tactical alliances with the government for the shared objective of peace, being critical friends, meeting with government representatives, participating in government-led spaces, offering recommendations, even defending the government against Uribe’s opposition.

As the peace process in Havana progressed, and more information and disinformation became publicly available, ReD and other civil society groups began to do ‘peace pedagogy’, a term that emerged organically to describe the act of giving talks to different audiences to explain what was being negotiated. And, when President Santos began to talk about holding a referendum on the Peace Agreement, ‘peace pedagogy’ gained the emphasis of encouraging people to make

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8 On the term ‘civil society’: Hansen and Stepputat (2001) and Sharma and Gupta (2006), use ‘civil society’ as antonym of state, almost-synonym with simply ‘society’ or ‘people’, even though anthropologists of the state problematise this dualism. I acknowledge critiques of the term ‘civil society’ as grounded in colonial worldviews of an exclusionary public sphere (Chatterjee 2004, Fisher 1997, Harn and Dunn 1996). However, the term is frequently used in Colombia, as in Spanish, ‘civil’ means both ‘civil’ and ‘civilian’, thus sociedad civil distinguishes people from the state and armed groups. I therefore use ‘civil society’ throughout the thesis, as an emic category which was employed to demand citizen participation in the peace process. It generally refers to what could be called ‘organised civil society’: social movements, human rights defenders, victims’ organisations, women’s organisations, community organisations, youth groups, environmental defenders, academics, universities, think tanks, NGOs, journalists, trade unions, faith organisations and business sector platforms, often excluding ‘disorganised civil society’ – those who do not belong to such groups.
an informed decision with their vote. The term filtered into government discourse, and a designated ‘peace pedagogy’ team was created in the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace (OACP), the office that provided technical support to the government negotiating team in Havana, led by Santos’ High Commissioner for Peace, Sergio Jaramillo Caro, and chief negotiator Humberto de la Calle.

The Peace Agreement itself was a complex, 297-page document comprising six points: one, rural reform to address inequalities in the countryside, a key structural driver for the FARC’s armed struggle; two, political participation of the FARC and broadening democracy more generally; three, ending the conflict, disarmament of the FARC and their reincorporation into society; four, tackling the drug-trafficking which had fuelled and degraded the conflict since the 1980s; five, redressing the rights of over eight million victims of the conflict (including six million internally displaced people) to truth, justice, reparations and guarantees of non-recurrence; and six, implementation and verification, including the fateful decision to hold a referendum to seek citizen endorsement. The OACP, civil society organisations, universities, journalists, international organisations and grassroots NGOs worked tirelessly to disseminate this information in the run-up to the Referendum, via face-to-face talks, informative pamphlets, videos, social media, radio programs, public assemblies, and myriad creative strategies from rap lyrics to graffiti.

Other world peace agreements have been put to referenda, but there is no precedent for peace pedagogy, in Colombia or globally. ‘Peace education’, a sub-field of Peace Studies, refers to educational processes through which people acquire skills for peaceful coexistence, non-violent conflict resolution, and analysing and transforming structural inequalities. ‘Peace pedagogy’, however, predominantly referred to dissemination of the Peace Agreement. It was defined by an emphasis on explaining—on rationality. The concept embedded an implicit assumption that the contents of the Peace Agreement, and accompanying conception of ‘peace’, were knowledge that could and should be taught to society in a rational manner.

While perhaps already problematic in the context of our smaller-scale civil society efforts, doing peace pedagogy from the government acquired deeply political overtones. The usual pedagogical faces of the state span school curricula to healthcare outreach campaigns; none

\[9\] See Appendix.
\[10\] See Harris (2007), Bajaj and Hantzopoulos (2016), and Ramírez-Barat and Duthie (2017).
politically neutral. These faces suggest the formation of desirable citizens – the criteria for which vary according to a given regime’s politics. Anything done by the state is a particularly de facto kind of political. Yet ‘peace pedagogy’ aspired to be technical, not political; the government peace pedagogues did not tell people ‘vote Yes’, they told them, ‘vote based on knowledge, on information, which we bring you’. Government peace pedagogy thus contained a central tension which runs through this thesis, between pedagogical and political modes of communication from government to society. As we will see, this tension is particularly liberal; historically, liberals have often been teachers and leaders, accustomed to telling people how to behave, assuming a paternal authority not derived from tradition or religion, but by virtue of being “reasonable, educated men of means who understood the common interest and knew what was best” (Fawcett 2014, 16). Peace pedagogy crystallised an inescapably liberal paternalism, anchored in the ‘meliorism’ which Gray identified as a defining feature of the liberal outlook.

The concept of government ‘peace pedagogy’ made the Colombian Peace Referendum unique amid other cases of ‘post-truth politics’ in global debates. From early in the peace negotiations, varied voices from Colombian society—from academics and the business sector to grassroots communities—lobbied the government to inform citizens about negotiations. This lobby increased as Uribe’s opposition and disinformation grew stronger, consolidating in the run-up to the Referendum. After the Referendum, as I returned to the UK to start my PhD, I noticed a criticism circulating among commentators and activists: “the government didn’t do enough peace pedagogy”.

This criticism blamed the Santos government for losing its own Referendum. Those who espoused this view believed the government’s job was to counter Uribe’s “myths”, as many called them, with “realities”; and that those who voted ‘No’ did so because they were duped, and because they had not read the Peace Agreement, or any of the pamphlet, video, infographic or radio summaries produced by the government and by civil society organisations. The Peace Agreement was complex, therefore it was the government’s duty to explain it accessibly. This was a narrative – one I shared to an extent, but a narrative nonetheless, and therefore socially constructed. The Colombian Constitutional Court, which set the rules for the Referendum, had taken this view: it had stipulated that the government had a duty to inform, but was not allowed to campaign. It had to do pedagogy, but not politics. But how do we tell the difference?
Given this widespread criticism, I wanted to investigate what government peace pedagogy had been done during the negotiations (2012-2016), and what form peace pedagogy would take post-Referendum, in the run-up to the 2018 presidential elections. While I built on my previous experience in Colombia, my formal fieldwork took place between the Referendum and the elections, when informing citizens about the Peace Agreement acquired new significance: both the pro-peace civil society organisations that I knew, and many people inside the government, saw peace pedagogy as a tool to defend the Peace Agreement in these elections. Of five main presidential candidates, three were construed as pro-peace, and two—including Iván Duque—as anti-peace. In this context, the OACP’s peace pedagogy continued disseminating the Agreement’s contents, but also presented advances in implementation – the disarmament of 13,000 FARC members in 26 camps around the country, the creation of new transitional justice institutions, and of agencies to implement land reform. But the peace process was tarnished by the post-Referendum political polarisation. The OACP Pedagogy officials found it increasingly difficult to ‘give face’ on behalf of the Santos administration to distrustful audiences. Their presence and their speeches were inextricably associated with Santos’ political persona, whose popularity plummeted after the Referendum, and also with the FARC – the uncomfortable other of the peace process, unpopular in Colombian public opinion.

Having witnessed the failure of the ‘Yes’ vote to convince Colombian society by rational explanations from outside the government, I then witnessed from inside a repeat of this failure in the 2018 elections. Might things have been different if the Santos government had done peace pedagogy more, earlier, or better? Might the 2016 Referendum have been won? Or might a different president, more committed to implementing the Peace Agreement, have won in 2018? Perhaps, perhaps not. The OACP carried out hundreds of different pedagogy projects between 2012-2018, travelling all over Colombia to inform people and answer their questions. There were many problems with how they did it, which this thesis critiques; not least, a case of too little, too late. Ultimately, ‘policy pedagogy’, which we might call the overall praxis, is just one element in the government’s communication to and relationship with society. In this thesis, I argue that in the end, while the government dedicated great efforts to negotiating with the FARC, winning Juan Manuel Santos the Nobel Peace Prize in 2016, it failed to dedicate the same efforts to negotiating with, or facing, Colombian society; and this, I suggest, was the fatal flaw in the peace process.
Rationality and Emotions in the Liberal Imagination

After the loss of the Referendum, many Colombians, inside and outside the government, criticised the OACP’s peace pedagogy for being “too technical” and “not emotional enough”. Amidst the growing disinformation from Uribe and his followers that appealed explicitly to people’s emotions, the Santos government resorted to rational explanations. This view of peace pedagogy as being too rational connects emotions with the political: it holds that the ‘No’ campaign was successful because it was ‘emotional’. As Valentina, director of the OACP peace pedagogy team, said:

We did not realise the state of society – the hatred, the resentment, the fear, all the emotionality of the process of change. Society needs to feel confidence, tranquillity, trust – but we were transmitting technical things.\(^{11}\)

I first met Valentina, my guide to the social world of the government, over Skype from London, to discuss the possibility of doing embedded fieldwork in the OACP. She became director of the peace pedagogy team after the Referendum, but had worked in the OACP for two years previously. Hardworking, driven by the opportunity she believed the peace process represented for Colombia to end its history of violence and build a better future, Valentina was fairly representative of the OACP officials I got to know during my fieldwork. She was in her late thirties, with the fair skin and dark hair common among the upper-middle class sectors of Bogotá and other Andean regions, and what this thesis calls culture\(\text{ly liberal}.\) Unlike politicians such as Santos, she did not subscribe explicitly to a liberal political agenda, but her culturally-constituted worldview was inflected by liberal values.\(^{12}\) She lived in a simple, stylish flat in Chapinero Alto, an upper-middle class neighbourhood in the foothills of the mountains that flank the city, with her husband, who also worked on peacebuilding issues, sometimes for state agencies, sometimes for NGOs or international organisations, and their dog, “Cat”. She often held team meetings in her flat, ordering pizza for everyone, to escape the OACP’s cramped downtown office. The team would bring their laptops, and discuss pedagogy strategies while looking out from her balcony over the redbrick apartment blocks of Bogotá, the fug of pollution on the horizon.

\(^{11}\) ‘Peace Breakfast’, Rodeemos el Diálogo, 19 August 2017.
\(^{12}\) Chapter 3 discusses intersections of race, class, region of origin and education in Colombian cultural liberalism.
Valentina was different from many senior female government officials, with their manicured nails and hair coiffed by frequent salon blow-dries, who dressed in the aesthetic of the Bogotá elites: expensive yet austere, never outlandish or overtly sexy. Ostentatiousness was associated with regional identities, and being excessively ‘tropical’ or ‘folkloric’, which was seen as parochial.⁵³ Valentina dressed unpretentiously, in jeans and flat boots, wore no makeup or nail varnish, and often sported a multi-coloured beaded necklace made in an Amazonian community, indicating appreciation for indigenous culture. Her appearance, and her warm smile, marked her out as less culturally disconnected from most of Colombian society than many powerful women. Both elites and rural communities found Valentina approachable, generous, easy-going, and passionately committed to peace.

Valentina’s uncle had kidnapped by the guerrilla, and this had influenced her desire to work for peace. She studied Peace Studies at the Sorbonne with John Paul Lederach, a leading figure in the field, and spent ten years working for the German Development Agency (GIZ) in Sri Lanka and Germany. She told me she had been particularly struck by the ‘never again’ message the German education system conveyed about the atrocities of World War II.

Over our initial Skype chat, Valentina said:

> Before the Referendum, we thought doing pedagogy just meant narrating the Peace Agreement. We learnt many lessons along the way. When the Referendum came, it was a shock. We had a period of reflection, some people left, new people came. Now, we understand that our role is to do pedagogy for peacebuilding. We Colombians have to unlearn violence and learn reconciliation, empathy. We need to convey the Agreement and the overall peace process better, connecting with people’s emotions.

This vision, which revealed the emic imagined binary between rationality and emotions at the heart of liberalism, shaped Valentina and the pedagogy team’s work during the final two years of the Santos administration.

Weber saw rationality as a foundational principle in state theory. He conceptualised bureaucracy and politics as two distinct domains. He saw politics as the “vocation” of political leaders (Weber 2004 [1919]), but believed public administration should function via rules,

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⁵³ See Chapter 3 on regional identities in Colombia. On how the anxieties around beauty and how the widespread use of cosmetic surgery in Colombia intersects with the country’s violence, see Taussig (2012).
learned as technical expertise by bureaucrats, allowing the state to provide security and welfare to the population through rationally-planned, technically-administrated bureaucracy (Weber 2006). He cast this as antithetical to older feudal regimes, in which decisions were based on personal relationships, sympathies, favours and alliances.

Many anthropologists have critiqued the Weberian fantasy of rational bureaucracy, showing how it is through the seemingly banal, technical practices, such as mapping and surveying, that state micropolitics operates (Scott 1998, Mitchell 2002, Hoag 2011). However, such critiques are phrased in terms of the same liberal assumption that rationality operates as a binary opposite to the non-rational, variously construed as politics, emotions, magic or violence. For example, Das (2004, 225) argues that the state “oscillates between a rational mode and a magical mode of being”, and that this “rationality effect”, by which the state is construed as rational, is its defining feature (2004, 234). Similarly, Taussig (1992, 115-16) sees the “auratic and quasisacred quality” of the state in the conjunction of violence and reason. The dependence on the rational/irrational binary in anthropological critiques of the state may be a legacy of the ‘state-thinking’ by which the way we conceive of the state is inextricable from the historically-constituted consciousness of Western political thought, which, underpinned by the ideas of the Enlightenment (Vincent 2002), engendered the state itself, leading Bourdieu (2014, 3) to call the state “an unthinkable object”.

Instead of reproducing liberal assumptions about rationality, I pinpoint ethnographically the emic belief in the rationality-emotions binary within the worldview of OACP officials, and explore how it informed their outward-facing work. They believed that explaining the contents of the Peace Agreement was not political, because it was based on rational-technical explanations; however, I argue that this is a key logic in liberalism, a political ideology that promotes itself as common sense, as not emotional, above all, not political.

Mazzarella (2015, 92) defines the ‘liberal imagination’ as it exists today as “a set of assumptions about human nature and its relation to public life”, rooted in liberalism as a historical practice of politics but permeating far beyond, providing “a basic matrix for mainstream political discourse, on both the left and the right”. It embeds the belief that a “rational mediation of public affect” could cultivate “a new kind of secularized vigilance against the seductions of theatrically and rhetorically insincere forms of public persuasion” (Mazzarella 2015, 93). This liberal imagination, says Mazzarella (2015, 104-5), “has generally expressed imperial condescension toward the
purported backwardness and irrationality of other lifeworlds”, and a “pedagogical-imperial impulse” (resonating with peace pedagogy) to remake the world in its image, away from the figure of the irrational, corporeal, savage, affective crowd, toward the Enlightenment ideal of rationality.

Stoler (2004, 4) argues that imperialism rested on the “conceit of reason”, in which the “authority to designate” what counted as rational and reasonable, in apparently Weberian-style bureaucratically-driven states, was colonialism’s most effective technology of rule. However, she argues, alongside colonialism’s celebration of rationality, colonial authorities sought to regulate, distribute and manage what they saw as the correct emotions for society. Reason, in Enlightenment thought, was defined by its relationship to emotion: “To be reasonable was to master one’s passions, command one’s sensibilities, and abide by proper invocation and dispersal of them” (Stoler 2004, 18). Likewise, liberalism has an emotional side. Liberals get passionate about their ideals, engendering commitment, like Valentina’s unwavering commitment to the peace process. Liberalism’s great orators and writers appealed to liberal sentiments, which Fawcett (2014, 98) suggests include “hatred of domination, pride and shame in one’s society, outrage at mistreatment, zest in effort and action, and longing for tranquillity”, and a darker side including “envy and resentment, self-punishing scrupulosity, selective indignation, interfering recklessness coupled with undue fear of risk”. Nevertheless, the liberal imagination, as I saw it expressed among OACP officials, insistently separates rationality from emotions.

The OACP’s self-criticism, ‘we were too rational’, existed dialectically with their perception of Uribe’s populism. Mazzarella (2017) reminds us that we live in a time of politics as marketing and marketing as politics, extending Taussig’s trope of the magic of the state to the magic, or mana, of politics, meaning “the transformative vitality of encounter, whether divine, prosaic, destructive, or erotic” (Mazzarella 2020, 159). While studies on charisma focus on the individual political figure (Michelutti 2013), Mazzarella (2017, 5) interrogates the vital force behind the crafting of political authority, activated by the charismatic leader and the desirable brand. He proposes the concept of ‘constitutive resonance’, which glosses the way people or things resonate with each other, and in so doing, actualise themselves. This concept enables the question, why do some things cause us to resonate and not others? In the Peace Referendum, why did (Santos’) peace resonate for some Colombians but not others?
The liberal view of emotions as opposite from rationality is connected to an equation of emotions with politics, associated in anthropology with the primitive. As Mazzarella (2017, 34) notes, Malinowski (2002 [1935]), depicting a mob frenzied by the spell of a charismatic politician, saw such irrationality as an uncomfortable example of enduring primitivism in the modern world. Current political analyses draw on primitivist metaphors, presenting charisma in public life as “irrational, reactionary, even fascist … the dark side of political theology” (Mazzarella 2017, 141). This is how the Santos government saw Uribe’s ‘No’ campaign. Central to their attachment to rationality was their perception of the potential threat of Uribe’s populism, which today manifests as liberalism’s main ‘other’. As Mazzarella argues (2017, 167), liberalism has been unable to overcome the Enlightenment binary of reason as civilised and emotion as primitive.

Thus, in the liberal imagination, emotions and politics are frequently conflated. Spencer (2007, 15-16) offers two lay conceptions of ‘politics’ and ‘the political’ – first, politics as the practice of government by state institutions; second, calculated behaviours, “actions concerned with the acquisition or exercise of power, status, or authority”, used in a “frequently derogatory” way. He glosses this conception as “politics-as-politicking”; how the OACP peace pedagogues saw Uribe’s actions.

Spencer diverges from both the structural-functionalist agenda of the 1940s-70s, which studied politics “on an abstract plane where social processes are stripped of their cultural idiom and are reduced to functional terms” (Forbes and Evans-Pritchard 1940 cited in Spencer 2007, 3), and the Foucault-inspired resistance literature associated with the Subaltern Studies Group of the 1980s, which Spencer (2007, 44-6) criticises for excluding the state from politics. Instead, he roots his theory of politics in Schmitt (1996 [1932]) and Mouffe (2000), taking politics as agonism, the clashing of factions that divide social groups, the space “in which friend is differentiated from foe” in everyday life (Spencer 2007, 177).14 Even politicians who claim to transcend “the petty squabbles of agonistic politics” use this claim to enter those squabbles (Spencer 2007, 177). I maintain this definition of politics as agonism while also tracking emic conceptions of politics and the political, which frequently resonate with the conception of politics-as-politicking, as deception, dishonesty, emotional manipulation, based on purely

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14 Schmitt defines politics as the fundamental distinction between friend and enemy; Mouffe distinguishes between antagonism, a potentially destructive relation between enemies, and agonism, a positive relationship of productive, democratic confrontation between adversaries. See Spencer (2012).
electoral and/or economic interests, underpinned by bad intentions, contra integrity and rationality. As being, as it were, two-faced. This conception informed the OACP’s desire to distinguish peace pedagogy from politics. However, ‘deception’ implies the possibility of being undeceived (enlightened), as if power were a zero-sum game of capture versus resistance (Mazzarella 2017, 167).

The current wave of populism, associated with figures like Donald Trump, Jair Bolsonaro and Nigel Farage, is not necessarily bringing something substantially new into the world, but Mazzarella (2019, 54) nevertheless calls it “world-historical” as it “marks the moment when aspects of world-making that have always been fundamental demand to be recognized as politically decisive”. The affective force of populism is a “direct provocation to a liberal ethics of self-control and deferred gratification,” he writes, and liberalism depicts this emotionality as symptomatic of “legitimate grievances” which, if resolved, would allay such unseemly excitement. Thus “well-meaning liberals do their best to ‘understand’ radical rage, of the right or the left, while being careful not to condone it” (Mazzarella 2019, 51). However, liberalism “involves its own projects of inciting and containing public affects” (Mazzarella 2019, 50); it is not a zero-point neutrality (Castro-Gómez 2005), but an ideology. Haugbolle (2018) defines ideology anthropologically, as the systemic, cultural formation of political subjectivities. Post-Marxist criticisms of ideology, he writes (2018, 195), interpreted ideology as akin to delusion, and privileged rational pragmatism as the sensible choice for Western politicians and societies. Likewise, in Colombia, officials in Santos’ government commonly saw themselves as not ideological, in opposition to the perceived ideological-ness of the far-left and the far-right.

The term ‘peace pedagogy’ encapsulates this perceived binary between rationality and emotions, integrity and manipulation, civilised and primitive. The peace pedagogues sought to transcend the agonism of politics, but failed because they were speaking from the government. This thesis explores how this binary operated in the social world of the Santos administration, and how it impacted the ‘face’ the government ‘gave’ to society, thereby revealing as precarious the emic rationality-emotions binary at the heart of liberalism. In 2016, Michelle Obama appealed to decency in the face of Trump’s political bullying, saying “when they go low, we go high” (Washington Post 2016). Yet, as we know, this moral superiority preceded the Democrats’

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15 Mazzarella (2019, 47-8) writes that populism is a slippery concept, applied promiscuously to political leaders across the spectrum, but common tropes include a Manichean ‘us’ versus ‘them’, a folkloric or vernacular style, suspicion toward expert discourse, cosmopolitanism and bureaucracies, and appeals to popular sovereignty.
loss of the US elections. By exploring the perceived bifurcation between apparently dry technocracy and the explicit affect of populism among liberal government officials in Colombia, this thesis contributes to the emergent anthropology of liberalism, offering new light from the global South onto the crisis of liberalism in the global North.

**Colombia’s Political Violence and the Search for Peace**

Colombia has had successive waves of political violence since Independence in 1810, each paving the way for the next. More than any other Latin American country, in Colombia, politics and war have shaped each other (Sánchez 2008). In the first years of the Republic of Gran Colombia (comprised of Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador until the countries separated in 1830), violent clashes occurred between federalists and centralists (Klein 2018, 171-2). Centralism finally predominated, with a centralist constitution in 1886, in place until 1991. In the mid-nineteenth century, the Liberal and Conservative parties were founded, and multiple civil wars between them ensued (González 2014, 209). These two elite-led parties monopolised politics for generations, stymying attempts to create new parties until 1991, when the constitution was finally changed to allow broader political participation, and some measures of decentralisation (Schneider 2010, 81), more on which below.

The Liberals favoured free trade, federalism and secularism in public affairs. The Conservatives wanted protectionism and centralism, and were pro-clerical (Klein 2018, 176). While Liberal-Conservative antagonisms were common across post-independence Latin America, nowhere did violent political sectarianism remain so prolonged and entrenched as in Colombia, and involve so much of the population (Deas 2015b, 41). These civil wars left a unique legacy of intense partisan loyalties, across all regions and social sectors, fostering further political violence in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries (Deas 2015a, b). Violence became the norm in Colombian politics.

The protracted nature of the conflict is partly attributable to Colombia’s mountainous and fragmented geography. Colombian Sociologist Orlando Fals Borda wrote, “If there is anything we are taught in school it’s that Colombia is a country of regions” (un pais de regiones) (2000, cited in Serje 2011, 138). Colombia is frequently interpreted as geographically, politically and culturally fragmented (Safford and Palacios 2002, Serje 2011, Appelbaum 2016). Topographically, the country is split by three branches of the Andes mountains, dividing
populations since pre-Columbian times (Safford and Palacios 2002, ix). Under colonialism, these divisions were reinforced, as the colonial state never achieved domination over the whole territory. There are five distinct natural regions: the Andean region (home today to three-quarters of the population), the Caribbean coast, the Pacific coast, the Eastern plains along the Venezuelan border, and the Amazon rainforest (Klein 2018, 170).

The Republican state, relatively poor in comparison to other Latin American countries, struggled to govern this large country with its disperse, mostly rural population (Deas 2015a, 108), and racial hierarchies became mapped onto regional differentiation (Appelbaum 2003). There were fewer Native Americans in Colombia when the Spanish arrived than elsewhere, such as contemporary Guatemala, Bolivia and Peru (Klein 2018, 175), and racial mixing led to an essentially mixed (mestizo) population, today comprising those of Spanish heritage, indigenous people, and descendants of African slaves brought by the Spanish, plus mixtures of these three, though most elites have a predominantly Spanish background (Klein 2018, 170-1). Mestizaje, however, is not a mainstream national imaginary as in places like Cuba, and it was not until the 1991 Constitution that ‘multiculturalism’ was adopted as a state policy narrative, giving expanded rights to indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations.16

Between 1948-1953, a particularly bloody civil war known as La Violencia raged between the Liberals and the Conservatives (Sánchez and Meertens 1992), which ended when a short period of fairly benign military rule, under General Rojas Pinilla (1953-57), fostered a relative peace, followed by a power-sharing experiment called the National Front (1958-74), in which the two parties alternated government every four years (Palacios 2006). This distinguished Colombia from other Latin American countries where military dictatorships spawned authoritarian regimes where national security was the guiding ideology (Mares 2011). The sectarian legacy, however, created fertile ground for other conflicts, particularly over land distribution and class inequalities (Deas 2015b). The Liberal-Conservative clash evolved into a new period of political violence, from the 1960s onwards, generally known as the internal armed conflict, between the Colombian state and various leftist guerrilla insurgencies, in the shadow of the Cuban Revolution, the Cold War, and US anti-communism, into which paramilitarism and drug-trafficking would merge.

16 See also Chapter 3.
In the 1960s, the USA sent more military aid to Colombia than any other Latin American country (Angelo 2019, 85), and in 1964 financed Plan LASO (Latin America Security Operation), a counterinsurgency strategy adopted by Colombia, designed to prevent the expansion of communism after the Cuban Revolution. This included ‘Operation Marquetalia’, in which the Colombian army bombed an enclave of former Liberal guerrillas who had remained after La Violencia and were increasingly radicalised, whom the government construed as a transnational communist threat. The FARC was founded partly in reaction to this attack, and other guerrilla groups followed. Borda (2012, 41) argues that the Colombian government (under then President Guillermo León Valencia, 1962-66) constructed a “shared cosmovision” of counterinsurgency with Washington, to obtain international support to expand and strengthen the military and combat internal threats.

Drug production and trafficking (marijuana and cocaine) boomed in Colombia from the late 1970s onwards, and the 1980s saw drug cartel violence proliferate, while the FARC and other guerrilla groups expanded into this illicit economy. The government of Julio César Turbay (1979-1982) increased war efforts against the guerrillas, supported by Reagan’s administration in Washington, fostering a record number of human rights violations (Borda 2012, 43). Paramilitary groups emerged in the 1980s, when drug cartels joined forces with civilian counterinsurgency groups, initially to support the army in combatting the guerrilla, evolving into regional power blocs connected to diverse public, private and criminal interests. In the late 1990s, paramilitary armies from different regions merged, creating the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC), linked to multiple economic interests, from arms-dealing to land-grabbing, mining and drug-trafficking (Romero 2007).

By the early 1990s, drug cartels had infiltrated much of the Colombian state. At the height of the drug wars, a US-Colombia task force killed Colombia’s most wanted drug-trafficker, Pablo Escobar, but the cartels simply atomised (Angelo 2019, 87-88). President César Gaviria’s administration (1990-94) promoted a discursive linkage between the war on drugs and counterinsurgency, to convince Washington to support both. Subsequent presidents continued

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17 Security-focussed US-Colombia cooperation dates back to the 1930s, and grew during World War II, through collaboration to defend the Panama Canal (Coleman 2008). US-Colombia relations strengthened during the Korean War (1950-53) as Colombia sent troops to support the US, synchronising the Colombian military with American anti-communist convictions (Angelo 2019, 83, Forero 2017a, 94-98). These antecedents paved the way for the partnership to flourish during the Cold War.

18 On the political discontent during the National Front era and the exclusion of communist movements, also a precursor to the formation of guerrillas, see Karl (2017).
this, especially Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002), who in 2000 signed a bilateral agreement with the US called ‘Plan Colombia’, making Colombia the third largest recipient of American military aid after Israel and Egypt (Pizarro 2017, 278). Plan Colombia totalled over a billion dollars, 68% dedicated to the armed forces (Borda 2012, 71), also targeting socio-economic unrest, conceived of as breeding grounds for illicit crop cultivation and communism. The strategic ambiguity of Plan Colombia allowed support from multiple actors (Angelo 2019, 92), enabling linkages between counterinsurgency, peace-making, state-building, humanitarianism and development. The discursive connection between insurgency and drug-trafficking was followed, after 9/11, by another linkage: that the Colombian insurgencies were part of global terrorism (Borda 2012, 59). The guerrilla attacked oil pipelines, a strategic US interest, and the Bush administration used this to paint the guerrilla as a direct terrorist threat to US interests.

Since the beginning of the conflict with the FARC and other guerrilla groups in the 1960s, successive governments engaged in simultaneous war and peace efforts, shaped by Colombia’s international relations, especially with the USA. Each administration built on antecedents left by its predecessor: each government’s ‘face’ is conditioned by the shifting dynamics of politics and public opinion. Before Santos’ presidency, there were three failed attempts to negotiate a peace deal with the FARC, under Presidents Belisario Betancur (1982-86), César Gaviria (1990-94) and Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002). Successful negotiations took place with the M-19 guerrilla (19th April Movement, formed in 1970) in 1990 under President Virgilio Barco (1986-1990), and in 1990-1 under President Gaviria with the EPL (People’s Liberation Army, formed in 1967), the PRT (Revolutionary Workers’ Party, formed in 1982) and the Quintín Lame indigenous guerrilla (formed in 1984). President Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010) negotiated with the AUC, leading to their disarmament between 2005-6, although these negotiations were criticised by Colombian and international human rights organisations for failing to guarantee victims’ rights. These antecedents prefigured and paved the way for the Santos government’s peace policy.

The ‘State-Idea’ in Colombia

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19 On Plan Colombia’s multiple ‘policy narratives’, see Tate (2015b).
20 In 2001, a record 170 bombings on the Caño Limón-Coveñas pipeline forced a shutdown in oil flow for nearly a year (Isacson 2003).
21 Some argue this was not a peace process but a “submission to justice”, though this discussion is complex, due to the heterogeneity of the AUC and their links to state structures (Pizarro 2017, 342-345).
The quality of peace achieved via negotiation depends on the quality and robustness of implementation of accords, and in most cases, it is the state that implements. To implement a peace accord requires both state institutional capacity and political will (Rettberg 2019, 8). The aspirations of the Santos-FARC Peace Agreement arguably exceeded both. The state’s centrality in implementation is magnified in Colombia, as the Peace Agreement promised to expand state presence into areas of the country formerly under FARC control (especially point one on rural reform), and to strengthen the state (by broadening democratic participation, creating new institutions to dismantle drug-traffickers and paramilitaries, and new transitional justice institutions). Lemaitre and Restrepo argue that these promises reproduced a foundational narrative, common across Latin America, that places state-building at the core of a “persistent aspiration for a national identity that is shaped by the opposition between civilization and barbarism” (2019, 4). In Colombia, this opposition, echoing the perceived rationality-emotions binary, assumes that state presence will guarantee peace.

Along these lines, the concept of ‘territorial peace’ (paz territorial) was developed during negotiations on point one, and conceptualised further by High Commissioner for Peace Sergio Jaramillo in a lecture at Harvard in March 2014 (Jaramillo 2014). The government conceived of the peace process not only as a means to demobilise guerrilla fighters, but also an opportunity to make structural changes: transforming the conditions that kept reproducing the conflict, closing the gap between urban and rural worlds, strengthening democratic inclusion and participation, and altogether, finishing the perennially-truncated project of modern state-building. This reflected a common conception that there are ‘two Colombias’, divided geographically between central (civilised) regions of the country, under state control, and marginal (barbaric) areas inhabited by guerrillas, paramilitaries, drug-traffickers, and illicit coca crop growers (Ramírez 2018, S134). This ‘other’ Colombia is frequently referred to as ‘the territory’, el territorio.

This conception dates back to colonisation, as the Spanish, unable to rule this topographically-divided territory, produced a series of connected spaces to enable trade and export (the top commodity was gold, and later coffee, quinine and tobacco; coffee allowed economic growth in the twentieth century, as did the narcotics trade (Bulmer-Thomas 2003)). ‘Civilised’ Colombia

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23 Centeno et al (2017, 6) define state capacity as the state’s ability to achieve its own goals, to achieve an ideal set of goals determined by an outside party, to compel citizens and other states to do things, and civil servant competence.
encompassed the North-South axis of the Andean mountains, which connected to ports on the Caribbean coast between the Sinú and Magdalena rivers. Outside this spatial ordering was the periphery, the other. Margarita Serje (2011) argues that these wild areas were discursively produced as the ‘reverse of the nation’, depicted in layered re-iterations throughout history, from regions to explore under the Spanish, then for adventure and expansion of the agricultural frontier, then ‘red zones’ under the control of non-state armed groups. As the ‘peripheries’ are produced in the national imaginary, so is the centre, as the nation is defined in contrast to its wild lands, drawing on and consolidating an evolutionist paradigm of civilisation and modernity (Serje 2011, 18-20, 34-5). This imaginary undergirds the logic used by successive governments to intervene in these regions, casting the solution in terms of finishing the state-building project, “integrating” the wild regions into the nation, albeit via the economic and political interests of the centre (Serje 2011, 172).

Rettberg (2019, 2) notes that although quantitative indicators of Colombia’s state capacity and performance have improved over past decades, the state is still widely perceived as semi-illegitimate among the population. An entrenched interpretation of the Colombian state, in both academia (national and international) and popular discourse, is as a failed state, a precarious state, a weak state, a captured state, or a state still undergoing formation; categories not usually applied to other Latin American countries. Such perceptions hold that peacemaking requires building a strong state (Rettberg 2019, 8).

Anthropological engagement with the state in Colombia is indicative of this deep, long-term preoccupation (academic and lay) with the state. I tentatively identify two trends in anthropology of the state in Colombia. First, a wave that approached the state from the perspective of its other, society, documenting ethnographically the ‘state-idea’ in marginalised or conflict-affected regions (Ramírez 2011, Ramírez 2015, Ocampo 2014, Tate 2015a, Burnyeat 2017). Second, a

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24 Colombia has improved on the Fragile States Index, going from 92.8 in 2001 to 76.6 in 2018, though is still in the ‘high warning’ range (Rettberg 2019, 9).

25 Surveys reveal the state’s largely negative image among the population, e.g. perceptions of unfairness in state service delivery, low effectiveness, rampant corruption and impunity, distrust of formal democratic politics, political parties, the executive branch of government, the courts, and Congress (Rettberg 2019, 10-11).

26 See González (2014, 39-63 ) for a review of the scholarship engaging these different categories.

27 I do not pretend to describe a single ‘anthropology of the state in Colombia’, nor provide an exhaustive review. I discuss here publications and PhD theses by Colombian and non-Colombian scholars, in English and Spanish, from Colombian and foreign universities. Some Colombian academics from other disciplines also draw on anthropology to analyse the state (e.g. Buchely Ibarra 2015, González 2014).
view of the many faces of the state through ethnographies of state institutions, including those tasked with various dimensions of successive peace policies (Forero 2017b, Dávila 2017, Vera 2017, Pellegrino 2017, McFee 2019).

The ethnographies of the Colombian state from its ‘margins’ foreground the common trope of ‘state absence’ (ausencia del Estado) or ‘abandonment’ (abandono) which underpins the state-idea in Colombia. In her ethnography of the Putumayo department, Ramírez (2015) shows how this trope is reproduced by disparate actors, including academics, politicians, national and local state officials, paramilitaries and guerrillas, referencing zones lacking the kind of state control and service delivery believed to characterise a modern state, legitimising militarisation of those territories (Ramírez 2018, S134). In fact, as Serje argues (2011, 304), violence and disorder in such places connects them to the national economy, as regional and national elites have got rich off their legal and illegal economies. Ramírez shows how in Putumayo, “state effects” were produced by central government, local government, and the FARC, and argues that rather than state absence, Putumayo suffered from “an excess of statehood practices”, with too many actors competing to perform as the state (Ramírez 2011, 172). These state effects were contradictory: on one hand, coca-growing campesinos28 were treated as criminals, with military force silencing their demands; on the other, the state opened spaces for citizen participation (Ramírez 2011, 181).

Ethnographies of the state in Colombia reveal how different groups simultaneously reject and desire the state, long and hope for it to meet their expectations, and feel betrayed when it does not. The imaginary of what the state ought to be is held up as an impossible yardstick against everyday state effects. Tate (2015a, 236) calls this the ‘aspirational state’, an “ideal form” of the state as “caring, responsive, generous, and abundant, rather than distant, repressive, and extortive”. This aspirational state is “impartial”, “independent from politics” (Ramírez 2015, 55); the Weberian fantasy of state bureaucracy as rational, impersonal and modern, casting ‘politics’ as bad, corrupting, and backward. Campesinos in Putumayo desire and demand the state “take care of its citizens the way a responsible father meets the needs of his children”; “a paternalistic state” (Ramírez 2011, 10), capable of magically solving everyone’s problems. While longing for the service-providing state, people simultaneously reject the repressive state.

28 In all my publications, I maintain the Spanish campesino rather than translate it as peasant or rural farmer, as these sound potentially derogatory, and because campesino is a cultural category in Colombia and elsewhere in Latin America not accurately conveyed by these translations (Burnyeat 2013, 437n2).
The relationship of these ‘wild regions’ to the centre is predicated on Colombia’s political decentralisation. Under the 1886 Constitution, the president named governors who in turn named mayors, usually based on patronage, meaning that the party that won the presidential elections controlled positions throughout Colombia, as well as the police and the military (Klein 2018, 171-2). The 1991 Constitution took some decentralising measures, though the executive branch remained dominant. It created departments, districts and municipalities as territorial entities, granting them shares of national revenue, the power to levy taxes and administer resources, and enabled popular election of governors. Today, Colombia has 32 departments and 1,122 municipalities. With decentralisation, the Constitution discursively promoted territorial autonomy, but simultaneously increased central state control, to tackle clientelism and corruption, considered practices of the periphery, requiring modernisation (Ocampo 2014, 218). However, clientelistic practices were simply reconfigured (Ocampo 2014, 312). Ocampo’s ethnography of politics in the department of Córdoba shows how the relationship between local and national government involves “exchanges between regional electoral powers (votes) and central distributive powers (resources)”, into which non-state armed groups integrate (Ocampo 2014, 32).

Non-state armed groups in Colombia play a significant role in the state, in diverse and fluid expressions according to regional conflict dynamics (Gonzalez, Bolívar, and Vásquez 2003). In some areas the guerrilla established de facto sovereignties (Ramírez 2011); in others, right-wing paramilitary groups regulated social life in a state-like way (Madariaga 2006). The AUC became “incrusted” in national and local politics through clientelism (Ocampo 2014, 259-60) and “intertwined” with the state (Civico 2016). Rather than simplistically differentiating between ‘the state’ and ‘criminal organisations’, Bunce (2019, 29) proposes the term ‘covert governance’ to conceptualise the “unseen hybrid systems of governance” in Colombia, whereby state institutions, organised crime, transnational networks and private interests converge, and legal and illegal actors “directly or indirectly synergize to maintain a mutually beneficial outcome”.

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29 Popular election of mayors was established in 1986 by President Betancur, to reduce clientelism. While opening up politics in some places, it simply strengthened existing power monopolies in others (Safford and Palacios 2002, 336).

30 On clientelism between local and national government see Ocampo (2014, 182), and between citizens and the local state see Ocampo (2014, 134).
While the ethnographies in this first wave reveal the multiple, often conflicting ‘faces’ of the state as experienced by communities in the so-called ‘territory’, the second wave of anthropology of the state in Colombia showcases the multiple institutional ‘faces’ of the state, including those tasked with various dimensions of successive peace policies. Vera’s PhD thesis (2017) charts institutional design for peace amidst war since the first failed peace process with the FARC. He shows how development policies were first combined with counterinsurgency strategies in the 1980s, seeking to detract from the legitimacy of the guerrilla among disenfranchised populations (2017, 68), and the idea that development was a solution to the conflict consolidated over successive governments. Given the vast numbers of people forcibly displaced due to the conflict, in 2004 the Constitutional Court declared an ‘unconstitutional state of things’ and ordered the state take measures of redress. This prompted the expansion of the “humanitarian apparatus” in Colombia, spanning state institutions, international organisations, and communities (Aparicio 2012b). With increasing incorporation of international legal and discursive frameworks and guidelines, Vera (2017, 284) argues that the development and humanitarian paradigms converged, making the Colombian state a “humanitarian state”, with a complex web of public, private and non-governmental institutions deploying practices that foregrounded “an emergent set of rights” centred on the victims of the conflict.

Following Uribe’s negotiations with the AUC, this humanitarian bureaucratic machine extended into the transitional justice paradigm; we might even speak of Colombia as a ‘transitional justice state’. In Colombia, tools developed in contexts which had already gone through some kind of transition (from war to peace or dictatorship to democracy) began to be applied in debates on how to end the war (Burnyeat 2010). Within this paradigm, victims of the conflict became

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31 Constitutional Court, Sentence T-025 of 2004.
32 Alongside older frameworks such as human rights law and international humanitarian law, the 2000s saw the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the enactment of various UN guiding principles on the rights of conflict victims and displaced populations, and corporate responsibilities (Vera 2017, 267).
33 The transitional justice field emerged in the 1980s in the context of Southern Cone transitions to democracy (Arthur 2009), and evolved quickly into a discipline with its own journal (the International Journal of Transitional Justice), its own Cambridge Encyclopaedia (Stan and Nedelsky 2013), and associated academic courses, networks and think-tanks. The UN Security Council (2004) defines it as “the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation”. It can include judicial mechanisms such as prosecutions, and non-judicial measures such as truth commissions and institutional reform. It comprises four interdependent conceptual pillars: truth, justice, reparations and guarantees of non-recurrence (De Greiff 2012). On ‘transitional scenarios’ in Colombia as spaces produced via laws aimed at reconciliation, characterised by assemblages of institutional practices, expert knowledges and global discourses which combine in given historical contexts, see Castillejo (2014).
increasingly visible legal and political subjects. This transitional justice state apparatus, in which existing state logics of counterinsurgency, development and humanitarianism converged (Fattal 2018), expanded further under the Santos government, which created new institutions that adopted transitional justice strategies to prepare for peace, such as the Land Restitution Unit and the Victims’ Unit. Each new law, policy and institution built on and incorporated existing bureaucratic structures. It is this apparatus that recent institutional ethnographies foreground (Pellegrino 2017, Dávila 2017, Vera 2017, McFee 2019), which together reveal the social worlds of institutions. I suggest that the recent increase of institutional ethnographies in Colombia reveals a prerogative to understand the state in greater complexity, in the context of the Santos government’s peace policy, given the perceived relationship between fixing the state and ending the war.

Pellegrino’s (2017) concept ‘complying uncompliantly’ (incumplir cumpliendo) engages the Colombian stereotype of state non-compliance with laws or promises. Her ethnography of the Interior Ministry’s implementation of a law that sought to protect conflict-affected indigenous populations shows how state institutions claimed to obey this law, while actually delivering already-existing programs, in a “pantomime of compliance” (2017, 25-6). Simultaneously, however, indigenous organisations gained expertise in institutional forms of knowledge and administration, and formed personal relationships with state representatives, “infiltrating the state” to make their own demands.

Behind the stereotype of non-compliance and failure to implement policy is the reality of an unwieldy multiplicity of institutions: the state’s contradictory ‘faces’. Many ethnographies depict state officials expressing concern about this multiplicity, often through the concept of ‘inter-institutional articulation’; a term introduced in Colombia by international consultants as a response to a “perceived lack of coordination in the public sector” (McFee 2019, 146). The term “glosses as a collaborative undertaking among various institutions … the idea is to pool resources to achieve a common policy goal more efficiently than would happen were each institution and organization to operate independently” (McFee 2019, 169), however, frequent “division and hierarchical jockeying” prevents this (McFee 2019, 146). McFee (2019, 195-6) discovers several behaviours which impact inter-institutional articulation: envy, negative reactions to others’ success, information-hoarding, sabotage, the prioritisation of personal objectives over shared goals, limelight-seeking, and a reliance on personal relationships to get things done. Her analysis of cultural practices among Colombian institutions complicates the
idea of bureaucracy as a machine for the ‘social production of indifference’ (Herzfeld 1993); state institutions are part of society and operate through local cultural idioms. A state trying to make peace operates through cultural idioms acquired in war.

Many recent ethnographies reveal individuals in state institutions aware and critical of perennial state inefficiency, yet deeply personally committed to furthering what they see as just causes (peace, reconciliation, land restitution, reparation to victims, indigenous rights). Pellegrino (2017), Vera (2017) and Dávila (2017) all document young, educated, motivated individuals who sought jobs within the state partly to support these causes, working extra hours, pouring efforts into overcoming cumbersome bureaucracy, often drawing on personal relationships to get things done, making the state function via the personal efforts of individuals, rather than as a Weberian rational machine; what Buchely (2015) calls ‘bureaucratic activism’.

Dávila proposes the concept of ‘the virtuous state’: in the Land Restitution Unit, she found officials who wanted “not only to reverse land dispossession but to incarnate a virtuous state, a state different from the one that allowed and even contributed to the victimization and invisibilization of the dispossessed” (2017, vii). Whereas Tate’s ‘aspirational state’ is an ideal held by marginalised communities against which to measure state failure, Dávila’s ‘virtuous state’ is an ideal held by critical state officials seeking to be different from the rest of the state, while experiencing constant frustration that this is beyond their control (Dávila 2017, 49-51). Her interlocutors subscribed to the narrative of the Colombian state as pre-modern, backward, feudal, anachronistic and underdeveloped – in contrast with more advanced, coherent states, imagined to be in the global North.

These two waves of anthropology of the state in Colombia thus reveal the ‘state-idea’, viewed both from the margins and the centre, as anchored in the foundational narrative of Colombia’s state as unfinished, in the colonial, Eurocentric terms of civilisation and barbarity, rationality and emotions. They also indicate the mutual imbrication of state-making, peace-making and war-making in Colombian history. Successive governments build on existing institutional structures and political power constellations, and exert control over state bureaucracies. These ethnographies show the importance of looking at the social dynamics of state institutions in order to understand how policies are implemented. While President Santos often referred to himself as the captain of a ship, sailing through stormy waters with a firm hand on the rudder,
navigating toward the port of peace, state structures do not necessarily respond straightforwardly to the policy demands of the government. This thesis contributes to this literature by ethnographically demarcating the government from the wider Colombian state.

**Methods and Ethics: Approaching the Government**

During my previous research on the Peace Community of San José de Apartadó, I interviewed Gloria Cuartas, mayor of Apartadó during a period of intense military-paramilitary violence in Urabá. She told me how the Community perceived her as part of the same structure – the state – that was doing the killing. They told her, “you let them kill my father”, “you are the mayor, you are the state”, but also begged her not to leave. She had to choose between ethically rejecting the structure she was part of by quitting, or staying and doing what she could. She stayed, denouncing state abuses, collecting the bodies strewn on roads every morning, and getting food supplies through paramilitary blockades to remote settlements, but felt the “moral dilemma” of representing a “criminal state, a state which was assassinating its population” (Burnyeat 2018, 84-5). Her story made me curious about the experiences of state officials trying to do good from inside a state that was responsible for violence. I had worked with victims of the state; what might it be like to get to know the people on the other side of the state-society divide?

I first came into contact with OACP officials in our ReD peace breakfasts; we invited them to come and tell us about the Havana negotiations. I was impressed by their knowledge, their passion, and their openness to listen to our recommendations. After the Peace Referendum, hearing the criticisms to the government about the supposed failure of peace pedagogy, I approached the OACP about the possibility of doing fieldwork within the institution. I followed the idea of ‘studying up’, turning the anthropological gaze to the study of the powerful (Nader 1972, Gusterson 1997, Aguilar 2012).

This is a challenging positionality – it is easier to identify with the ‘suffering other’ (Robbins 2013). In many ways, a government trying to make peace is more ‘other’ than a victim. Methodologically, I am indebted to Forero (2017a), whose ethnography of the Colombian army

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34 In his Nobel lecture, Santos said, “At a time when our ship felt adrift, the Nobel Prize was the tailwind that helped us to reach our destination: the port of peace” (Santos 2016).
is an object lesson in how to approach this challenge. She foregrounds the dilemma of listening to the other when that other has perpetrated human rights violations, and navigates the politics of ethnographic representation without either becoming accomplice to violence, or making acritical generalisations, by recognising the army as historically produced by and reproducing Colombian culture. Studying the powerful does not imply agreeing with them, but I had to apply the same openness, the same critical but non-judgemental eye, the same empathy in my approximation of the OACP as I had with the Peace Community, while not losing sight of the responsibility of the institution and its members in Colombia’s destiny.

The OACP generously accepted my proposal to spend a year embedded with them, partly because they saw international academic expertise as a source of knowledge and support to the peace process, and partly as they saw my experience with the Peace Community and ReD as relevant and useful. Our agreement, drawn up in a memorandum of understanding, was that I would accompany the peace pedagogy team for thirteen months, as researcher and volunteer, from July 2017 to August 2018.\(^\text{35}\) This allowed me privileged access to the ‘behind the scenes’ of the OACP, spending time at the office, participating in meetings and in social settings such as lunches and drinks, as well as seeing them in action, travelling with them to dozens of peace pedagogy sessions with a range of social sectors around the country. I did not myself conduct peace pedagogy, but I offered thoughts in meetings, helped produce documents, and liaised with participants in pedagogy projects. I also compiled institutional publications and internal policy documents, and was included in the internal WhatsApp groups which functioned as additional spaces for information-sharing, decision-making and general team sociality, and WhatsApp groups created to connect civil society participants with the OACP for specific projects.\(^\text{36}\) I take digital communication via WhatsApp and email as ethnographic spaces, continuous with face-to-face communication among OACP officials and between OACP and civil society participants.\(^\text{37}\) My husband, Andrei Gómez-Suárez, was hired by the OACP as external consultant on a pedagogy project in the middle of my fieldwork, blurring ‘field’ and ‘home’, and

\(^{35}\) Drawing on Mosse’s (2006) experience of his informants’ rejection of his institutional ethnography, this memorandum made explicit that the interpretation of results was mine alone, to protect academic integrity; but that I committed to the ethical guidelines of the Association of Social Anthropologists of the UK, including sharing my thoughts throughout my fieldwork, taking informed consent as a constant, dynamic process, and considering the reputation and security of the OACP and its personnel.

\(^{36}\) WhatsApp groups are extensively used in Colombia for professional communication. A recent scandal involved the revelation that an army Colonel ordered his subordinates to assassinate a FARC ex-combatant in a WhatsApp group (\textit{Semana} 2019a).

\(^{37}\) For an analysis of WhatsApp as part of an ensemble of encounters, both real and virtual, and of ways of being with others, see O’Hara et al. (2014).
we both continued to work with ReD throughout. I was thus complexly embedded in the OACP, with one foot still in civil society peacebuilding.

This embedded engagement was possible because I was ultimately supportive of the OACP’s overall objective to consolidate the gains of the peace process. It is unlikely I would be granted the same access under the Duque administration, especially given my trajectory with pro-peace and left-wing organisations. Likewise, being embedded in the institution under an administration I politically disagreed with would engender more complex ethical challenges to fieldwork. Participant observation inside government administrations is therefore deeply contingent.

Additionally, I conducted several visits of up to two weeks in and around Llano Grande, one of 26 FARC disarmament and reincorporation zones, in the municipality of Dabeiba, department of Antioquia, close to my previous fieldsite of Urabá, between January 2017 and August 2018. The OACP was responsible for orchestrating construction and oversight of these zones, and an OACP liaison officer was assigned to each, and I conducted participant observation with the Dabeiba liaison officer. I also did 83 interviews with members and ex-members of the OACP, officials from other government and state institutions, local government authorities, FARC ex-commanders and ex-combatants, civil society activists, participants in OACP projects, diplomats and international advisors to the government, staff of international agencies that funded the OACP, and CEOs of marketing agencies that worked with the government, among others.

Doing ethnography with OACP officials meant situating them within the government, as their experience ‘facing’ society is inextricable from the unfolding of national politics. That means taking an ethnographic approach to the political personae of public figures, in this case President Santos, High Commissioners for Peace Sergio Jaramillo (2010-17) and Rodrigo Rivera (2017-18), opposition leader Álvaro Uribe, FARC commandants, and prominent civil society leaders. I have anonymised OACP officials and other government personnel, who appear throughout by a first (fake) name only; public personae, however, are identified in full, and where I cite interviews with public figures I have obtained signed permission to do so. Otherwise, I draw on their discourse in the public domain. I interviewed advisors to President Santos, and I travelled to Brussels to meet Sergio Jaramillo, who left the position of Peace Commissioner shortly after my arrival, after completing oversight of FARC’s disarmament, becoming Ambassador of Colombia to Belgium and the European Union.
Thesis Structure

This thesis is structured in two parts. Part I, ‘Anthrohistory of the Santos Government’ (invoking Coronil’s (2019b) concept of ‘Anthrohistory’ which foregrounds the peopled unfolding of political histories of the present and recent past), comprises three chapters which together reveal how the government’s culturally liberal face of peace was instantiated through the social world of the Santos administration, across its two periods (2010-2018). Part II, ‘Ethnography of Peace Pedagogy in Action’, comprises four chapters which focus on OACP peace pedagogy implemented during my fieldwork period (2017-2018), encounters between OACP officials and different audiences, and the role of the emic rationality-emotions binary in the OACP’s outward-facing work.

Chapter 1 presents a chronology of the national politics of the Santos government (2010-2018), drawing on historical and journalistic literature about the peace process and the political agonism between Santos and Uribe, Santos’ and Jaramillo’s own publications, and interviews with government officials and civil society leaders. I argue that ‘giving face’ was a crucial element in the ‘perfect storm’ of conditions which led to the government losing the Peace Referendum. I also show how a ‘government’ is constituted via the discourses, culture, actions and interactions of multiple individuals working through multiple institutions, and propose seeing governments as dynamic ecosystems within the wider state structure.

Chapter 2 locates the OACP as the central institution for the peace process within the Santos government ecosystem. It reconstructs ethnographically the untold history of peace pedagogy, using institutional documents and interviews with the protagonists – the OACP officials themselves, and some of their pedagogy recipients and collaborators – revealing the evolution of a *sui generis* mode of government-society communication based on what I call the ‘rationality drive’: technical-rational explanations that emphasised dissemination of official information to dispel Uribe’s disinformation messages, which the OACP officials called "myths". I reveal the anguished perception among many officials that peace pedagogy was de-prioritised compared to the negotiations, leading to things going “well in Havana, but badly in Colombia”.

Chapter 3 examines the backgrounds and trajectories of President Santos, Peace Commissioners Sergio Jaramillo and Rodrigo Rivera, and the OACP officials, suggesting that all were ‘culturally liberal’. They were mostly from Bogotá, socially white, middle or upper class,
educated in private universities and abroad, and professionally secular (not necessarily meaning they were not personally religious). Drawing on interviews and observation, I analyse how these cultural factors intertwined with government officials’ liberal worldviews, in particular regarding the difference between Santos the rational statesman, and Álvaro Uribe, a regional, landowning elite, whom they construed as the populist, premodern other. I argue that cultural liberalism involves a negative valuation of politics, or ‘anti-politics’, subtly different from Ferguson’s (1994) theory of the anti-politics machine as a denial of political realities.

Chapter 4 depicts a typical peace pedagogy session given by OACP official Pilar in a conflict-affected municipality. It takes Pilar as an ‘authorised spokesperson’ in the Bourdieusian sense (1991), who explains the peace process using a memorised script and a Power-Point presentation. The face of the government emerges at this ‘interface’ via an assemblage of elements, including Pilar’s culturally liberal attributes, and the OACP’s institutional script, which insistently legitimates the peace process, and, by extension, the government itself, recurring to information-overload to defend against the Democratic Centre Party’s delegitimation. I argue that explaining is a culturally liberal mode of government-society communication, revealing the Santos government’s belief that their legitimacy could be produced and, if threatened, restored, by rational explanations.

Chapter 5 describes a year-long pedagogy project that unfolded throughout my fieldwork, which sought to promote citizen support to the peace process before the 2018 presidential elections, and rectify what the OACP saw as their pre-Referendum mistake – being “too technical” and “not emotional enough”. I build on Glaeser’s (1999) analysis of East Berlin police as experiencing emotional tensions between personal, role, and state sincerity, to propose an analogous tension between personal, role, and government responsibility, which underpinned the OACP officials’ distress in ‘giving face’ when forced to renege on commitments for reasons beyond their control. Likewise, project participants’ perceptions of OACP officials shifted between three corresponding layers of trust or distrust: toward the individuals, the institution, and the government. I propose the term state-consciousness, an awareness of being the state, to describe government officials’ experience of these three layers of responsibility, and of the corresponding three layers of trust or distrust projected onto them. I argue that the officials’ tenuous state-consciousness undermined their attempt at a tactical government-society alliance, partly due to the ‘anti-politics’ of their cultural liberalism, described in Chapter 3.
Chapter 6 focuses on the OACP liaison personnel charged with overseeing early stages of implementation of the Peace Agreement, particularly the construction and equipping of the disarmament and reincorporation zones. It follows Rebeca, one liaison officer, in a multi-faceted extended encounter with FARC ex-combatants, the Armed Forces, the UN, and local communities, politicians, and service-providing state institutions. Unlike the liberal state-consciousness of the Bogotá officials, Rebeca – local, from a poor family, who had grown up witnessing the conflict – was hyper-aware of the political repercussions of working as the government. I invert Li’s (2007) concept of ‘rendering technical’ – the process by which development projects exclude political realities and cause unintended outcomes – and propose that Rebeca’s work involved ‘rendering political’. I see this as affective labour, the opposite of Weber’s ideal of impersonal, rational bureaucracy, and suggest that liaising, building relationships over time in a particular place, was a form of peace pedagogy at the opposite end of the rationality-emotions continuum.

Chapter 7 turns to how the relationship between the government and the international community shaped peace pedagogy and the Santos government’s face of peace. Drawing on observation, and interviews with international agency staff, it documents the everyday relationships between the OACP and two international donor agencies that funded peace pedagogy. Although these donors sought to support the internationally-heralded peace process, I show that the restrictions on how their funds were used contributed to ‘elite precarity’ among OACP officials, via unstable short-term personnel contracts, and undermined the OACP’s attempts to build trust with sceptical civil society. I borrow Rothberg’s (2019) theory of ‘implication’, referring to the ways individuals and collectives are involved in historical violence and injustices, to analyse the implication of the international community in the co-production of the peace process, and more broadly, the complex constitution of government administrations through global entanglements of people, institutions and policies.

Finally, the conclusion argues that ‘giving face’ as the government has two dimensions: authentic physical presence, and the assumption of government responsibility by officials who, when facing society as the government, temporarily adopt this responsibility as their own. It offers implications for the anthropology of liberalism resulting from the ethnographic pinpointing of the emic rationality-emotions binary, and ends by suggesting that the future fate of the Colombian peace process will be forever marked by the tensions inherent in the Santos government’s face of peace.
PART I: ANTHROHISTORY OF THE SANTOS GOVERNMENT
CHAPTER 1 – The Politics of the Face: Peace Policy and Public Opinion under Juan Manuel Santos, 2010-2018

“What’s it like, speaking as the government, in the events you organise about the peace process?” I asked. Salomé, a young OACP official, inhaled deeply and laughed out a sigh, suggesting there was a lot to my question. We had snatched a few moments from her busy agenda for an interview, and we were sitting at the long table in the OACP meeting room. From the window we could see the changing of the guard outside the Presidential Palace of Nariño, red soldiers’ jackets against blonde stone. Beyond, the terracotta roofs of Southern Bogotá stretched into the horizon, in the thin light of the high Andean plain. “The thing is”, said Salomé, “People understand what the FARC is. But they don’t understand the government. The government is a load of institutions and people”.

Salomé’s statement highlights the challenges of ‘giving face’ from a single government institution, the OACP. She had encountered a widespread incomprehension about what the government was, she explained, which made it difficult to communicate with people. Her parallel with the FARC emphasised how the FARC, while a multiplicity in their own right, are a single entity; the government, in contrast, comprises multiple institutions: the presidency, the OACP, different ministries, and so on – a complexity obscured to people outside the social world of government institutions.

The OACP, headed by High Commissioner for Peace Sergio Jaramillo Caro, was the central institution for the Santos government’s peace policy, responsible for supporting the government negotiating team in Havana and doing peace pedagogy. Peace processes themselves are shaped by the combination of personalities and paradigms in each negotiating team, and their respective perceptions of and relationships to the other side. But Jaramillo and the OACP were not always in harmony with other elements within the government. This chapter presents an anthrohistorical chronology of the government of Juan Manuel Santos throughout its two periods (2010-2018), their central policy – the peace process with the FARC-EP—and their political confrontation with ex-president and opposition leader Álvaro Uribe Vélez. It depicts government administrations not as monolithic entities within the broader state structure, but as dynamic ecosystems: social worlds comprising multiple institutions and people, each with their own

38 Interview 11 December 2017.
objectives, practices, hierarchies, and relationships, whose actions and interactions produce ‘the government’.

Coronil’s concept of ‘anthrohistory’ – an “ensemble of practices for examining human practices through ever changing prisms”, showing the partiality of any single perspective, because “any representation simultaneously encloses time and space” (Coronil 2019b, 54) – invokes a methodological and theoretical agenda to attend ethnographically to the peopled unfolding of political histories of the present and recent past (Coronil et al. 2019). This chapter draws on historical scholarship, interviews with government officials and people who interacted with the government, public discourses, and documents from the peace process, including the OACP’s eleven-volume official archive. It is ethnohistorical in orientation, as I foreground government officials’ own perceptions about this period, explicating the logics behind these perceptions while recognising them as socially constructed.\(^{39}\) Like Coronil (2019a), I lived through the period I am writing about, while interrogating its relationship to earlier historical trajectories.

This same chronology could be told differently from the perspective of the FARC, the Democratic Centre, a victims’ organisation, a university student, a campesino, or a taxi driver. Coronil (1997, 15-16) recognises that histories centred on the “highest centers of political power” can seem problematically top-down, excluding subordinated sectors from view and reproducing the top’s “self-proclaimed universality and fundamental disregard for the lives and forms of knowledge of subaltern subjects”. However, following Coronil, I try to “offer a perspective of the top from within but also from without”, by foregrounding how the Santos government’s actions engendered certain kinds of government-society relations and impacted the whole of Colombian society. This in turn contributes to the wider theoretical argument of the thesis that we cannot conceive of ‘the government’ as an entity without considering how it ‘faces’ society.

Government administrations exist within specific historical and political coordinates; they are immersed in temporality and relationships – within themselves, with their opposition, and with society.\(^{40}\) When they ‘face’ society, they do so not in a vacuum, but according to the possibilities

\(^{39}\) On ethnohistory as the use of historical and ethnographic methods to investigate a culture in its own terms, and the foregrounding of ethnographic subjects’ conceptions of their own pasts, see Krench (1991), Strong (2015), and Chaves (2008).

\(^{40}\) Strong (2015, 196) asks whether, in fact, there is any anthropology that is not ethnohistorical, given the immersion of the human species in time.
of the specific situation they inherit. In delimiting governments from the wider state structure, I consider how the possibilities for each administration’s ‘face’ are shaped by antecedents in policies and public opinion, and the unfolding of the political present. This anthrohistory of the Santos administration is not just ‘context’ for following chapters, but proposes the politics of the face as the chronology of events during a government’s time in power, which shape the experience of officials representing the government to society.

**Successive Mandates for War and Peace, 1998-2010**

The possibilities for any government administration ‘face’ are historically predetermined by the ‘face’ of previous governments, and public opinion about these. While I do not equate simplistically voting with public opinion, especially given Colombia’s widespread clientelism (Ocampo 2014, Vidart-Delgado 2017), voting reflects the vital force behind the crafting of political ideas, which Mazzarella (2017) calls ‘constitutive resonance’. Public opinion expressed through voting creates ‘mandate’, defined in the OED as the “commission to rule or to pursue stated policies conferred by electors on their elected representatives; support for a policy or measure of an elected party regarded as deriving from the preferences expressed by the votes of the electorate”. Governments get elected by promising things; they do not necessarily fulfil what they promise once elected, but they seek to maintain popularity and power by attempting to gauge, through opinion polls and media analysis, the public’s views about their actions, especially at electoral conjunctures. A ‘mandate’ describes the idea that a ruler has more power to implement a given policy if it is believed that society has supported it through voting. This is one of the ways that government and society co-create each other.

Throughout the fifty years of Colombia’s armed conflict, perceptions regarding war and peace have fluctuated, and these have contributed, among other factors, to the election of successive governments, and the policies for war and peace that each has pursued. This section explains antecedents since 1998 that shaped Santos’ options for a peace policy.

One can go back indefinitely into the past to explain the present. I start with the 1998 election of Conservative President Andrés Pastrana, because of two landmark events which illustrate the connection between public opinion and government policies on peace and war, and which

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influenced the Santos government's peace policy. The first was ‘the citizen mandate for peace, life and freedom’, an additional ballot paper included in elections of mayors and governors in 1997, in which nearly 10 million Colombians voted for the government and the guerrillas to seek a peaceful solution to the armed conflict through dialogue (Tokatlian 2000, 346). The presidential elections the following year, therefore, occurred in a moment of mass public support for peace talks, creating a ‘mandate’ no president could ignore.

While Pastrana built on his predecessors’ efforts to obtain US support for tackling violence and drug-trafficking and negotiated the bilateral agreement, Plan Colombia, he also led the third attempt at peace talks with the FARC, in San Vicente de Caguán, from 1998-2002: the second event which influenced Santos’ peace policy. The Caguán talks began with “collective euphoria” for peace within public opinion (Pizarro 2017, 302). The negotiation agenda included twelve ambitious topics, from the economic model of the country, to major reforms to the democratic system. 42,000 square kilometres, an area the size of Switzerland, was demilitarised and ceded to the FARC as seat of the negotiations, and the FARC used this to strengthen themselves militarily. The negotiations were open to the media, in an attempt to foster transparency, but this put the talks under pressure from public opinion (Pizarro 2017, 273-324). The FARC’s kidnapping and killing of three American citizens in 1999 gravely affected the peace process, as Washington condemned this “brutal terrorist act” (Bora 2012, 64), paving the way for the discursive linkage in 2001 between the war on the FARC with the war on global terror. Pastrana’s attempts to negotiate with the National Liberation Army (ELN) also failed, and in 2002, the Caguán talks broke down, and the Colombian conflict became a new frontier in the global war on terror. Public opinion turned against Pastrana, against the FARC, and against the possibility of a negotiated solution to the armed conflict.

Álvaro Uribe, ex-governor of Antioquia, an independent candidate originally from the Liberal party, was elected on a landslide in 2002 on a post-Caguán anti-FARC sentiment (Pizarro 2017, 326), promising to take a hard military line, with his slogan ‘hard hand, big heart’. Santos (2019, 116) writes in his post-presidency autobiography about Uribe’s election: “the popular mandate had gone to the other extreme of the pendulum. If before, the president was expected to negotiate with the guerrillas, now public opinion demanded combat”. This use of the word ‘mandate’ encapsulates the relationship between socially and historically constructed public opinion, and a government’s perceived policy options.
Uribe inherited an army strengthened by Plan Colombia. He drew on US anti-terrorism discourse, declaring that in Colombia there was no internal conflict but a terrorist threat (Pizarro 2017, 330). His cornerstone policy, ‘Democratic Security’, involved attacking the guerrilla militarily with financial, military and strategic support from the US. He fanned anti-FARC sentiments throughout his presidency, which López de la Roche calls “anti-FARC nationalism”, depicting the FARC as Colombia’s “public enemy number one”. Uribe’s “anti-FARC nationalism”, according to López de la Roche, emphasised atrocities committed by the FARC, and reduced visibility of paramilitary and state violence. Additionally, mainstream media downplayed scandals involving Uribe’s ministers and family members, including their links to paramilitarism (López de la Roche 2018, 210).

Uribe got the Constitution changed to allow him to run for a second term. The Liberal Party opposed his re-election, but his supporters from the Party, including Juan Manuel Santos, founded the Social Party of National Unity (Partido de la U), and Uribe was re-elected in 2006. In 2007 Uribe negotiated a second phase of Plan Colombia, dedicated to consolidating security gains made in the first phase (Pizarro 2017, 106). In this second term, he appointed Juan Manuel Santos as Defence Minister, the most prominent position after the President, because Plan Colombia had increased the size and capacity of the military, and because a strong defence sector was the flagship of Uribe’s popularity (Duzán 2018, 79-80). Uribe charged Santos with consolidating the Democratic Security policy and attacking the FARC secretariat. Santos, with support from the US, the UK and Israel, strengthened the army’s intelligence capacity, and achieved several strategic wins, killing FARC commander Raúl Reyes in 2008, and rescuing 15 hostages the FARC had kidnapped, including ex-presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt, in ‘Operation Checkmate’. Santos wrote a book about his war efforts against the FARC, called ‘Checkmate to Terror: The Horrible Years of the FARC’ (Santos 2009). Anti-FARC public opinion reached its apex on 4 February 2008, when millions marched to protest FARC’s belligerent actions, in a demonstration called “No more FARC”.

Santos had two vice-ministers – Juan Carlos Pinzón, later to become his own Defence Minister – and Sergio Jaramillo, who had worked in the Defence Ministry during Uribe’s first term, under Minister Marta Lucía Ramírez. Santos tasked Jaramillo with producing a human rights policy for the Armed Forces, due to pressure from Colombian and international society about the human rights situation, which had worsened under Uribe. Santos and Jaramillo faced the ‘false positives’ scandal: the revelation that thousands of innocent civilians had been killed by the
army and dressed up as guerrilla fighters, following a 2005 directive from the previous defence minister to reward the military for every insurgent killed in combat. They restructured the Democratic Security policy away from ‘body count’ incentives, focussing instead on encouraging guerrilla desertion (León 2010). The resulting Program for Humanitarian Attention to the Demobilised saw the Defence Ministry hire a global marketing agency to target guerrilla fighters with advertising that invited them to disarm, simultaneously rebranding the military as a humanitarian actor (Fattal 2018). Santos notes retrospectively (2019, 164-5) that his time as Defence Minister “won me popularity among Colombians, because there’s nothing more popular than showing the people the trophies of war, the bleeding head of the enemy”.

Though Santos had held two ministerial positions previously – Foreign Trade Minister under Gaviria, and Finance Minister under Pastrana – he had never been elected to popular office.42 In 2009, Uribe tried to change the Constitution again to run for a third term, but the Constitutional Court disallowed it. His first-choice successor candidate was Conservative Party member Andrés Felipe Arias,43 but the Conservatives chose Noemí Sanín, so Uribe backed Santos, who was elected in 2010 thanks to Uribe’s endorsement. The ‘mandate’ which Santos received was to continue his predecessor’s legacy. In Santos’ own words (2019, 182): “I was elected, basically, because Colombian society recognised my work as Defence Minister … and they saw me as the right person to continue weakening the illegal armed groups militarily”.

The Narrative Wars: ‘Peace’ vs. ‘Betrayal’

Given these antecedents in public opinion and previous government policies on peace and war, it was a surprise to everyone, especially Uribe, that in his possession speech, Santos announced his intention to seek peace, saying he would continue fighting the war, but “the door to dialogue is not locked with a key” (Semana 2014). Journalist Duzán (2018, 56) writes that “many Colombians who hadn’t voted for him, like me, were surprised with his message; others, who had voted for Santos thinking he would extend Uribe’s Democratic Security policy, were annoyed”.

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42 He had been elected by Congress to presidential designate in 1993, the candidate to succeed the president in case of death or removal from office, a position replaced a year later by the Vice-Presidency. This was the only vote Santos faced until his election in 2010 (Santos 2019, 64).

43 Later condemned for corruption (El Espectador 2011).
A narrative began to circulate that Santos had betrayed his predecessor. This alleged ‘betrayal’ became the foundation stone of Uribe’s opposition, and his drumming up of opposition to the negotiations, while Santos was trying to garner public support for peace. Santos’ decision to go against Uribe’s legacy determined the politics of the face for the rest of Santos’ administration, recalling Spencer’s (2007) definition of politics as agonism. At the heart of this clash was a conflict over control of the dominant political narrative, understood as “elite-produced stories” that both reflect and shape a “political common sense” (Polletta and Callahan 2017). The confrontation played out between the narrative of ‘peace’ on one side and ‘betrayal’ on the other; what novelist Juan Gabriel Vásquez later called “the narrative wars” (Burnyeat 2020). Gómez-Suárez (2016) argues that Uribe’s propaganda sought to undermine Santos and influence public opinion against the possibility of a negotiated solution with the FARC, by creating what he calls an “anti-peace mindset”. Santos, in his post-presidential autobiography, aptly titled The Battle for Peace, alleges it was “character assassination” (2019, 186).

Uribe began construing this ‘betrayal’ before the peace talks. In his presidential campaign, Santos named Angelino Garzón as his vice-presidential formula, a centrist politician with ties to trade unions and social movements, which Uribe’s followers saw as offensive to Uribe’s legacy (Tappe 2019, 49); Santos (2019, 181) claims this choice sought to attract voters from a broader political spectrum. Soon after taking office, Santos rebuilt democratic relations with Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Rafael Correa in Ecuador, with whom Uribe had broken, as he knew their support would be crucial for peace negotiations; he had to “convert enemies into friends or allies” (Santos 2019, 197). Additionally, as the Partido de la U did not have a congressional majority, Santos proposed a ‘national unity’ platform to govern, designating his opponents Rafael Pardo (the Liberal Party’s candidate) as Minister of Work, Germán Vargas Lleras (the Cambio Radical Party’s candidate) as Interior and Justice Minister, and Juan Camilo Restrepo (Conservative party member) as Agriculture Minister – the latter two political enemies of Uribe.44

In 2011, Santos formally acknowledged the existence of an internal armed conflict, which Uribe had vehemently denied. This was a major change in the official state narrative, as it made applicable International Humanitarian Law, and recognised the political character of the FARC, which Uribe had opaqued. Santos did this via the Victims’ and Land Restitution Law of 2011,

44 Santos claims (2019, 232-5) he drew this strategy from a biography of Abraham Lincoln, who after election in 1860 gave appointments to opponents, to maximise governability.
which construed the armed conflict as the legal basis for reparations. In an interview, Santos said “there’s been an armed conflict in this country for a long time”, cueing a series of irate tweets from Uribe, who said there was no reason to link reparation of victims with “recognising terrorists” (Notiamerica 2011). At the signing of the Victims’ Law on 10 June 2011, Santos emphasised that “the recognition of the conflict we have suffered for nearly half a century does not signify … a political recognition to illegal armed groups”, but rather “paying a moral debt … to the victims of a violence which must end” (Presidencia 2011). In his autobiography, Santos (2019, 272) explained that to make peace, he had to recognise the FARC’s political origins: “they were a genuine irregular army, with thousands of armed men and women, with ideological foundations, and with a series of social and economic vindications”.

On 4 September 2012, Santos announced on national television that his government had for the past year been carrying out secret exploratory talks with the FARC-EP, which had led to an agenda for formal peace negotiations. This was huge news, provoking a wide range of reactions, positive and negative. I interviewed Vanessa, a senior official from Santos’ Presidential Communications Department, in 2017 in her spotless flat in the posh neighbourhood of La Cabrera. She, like many officials I met, was deeply critical of how Santos had managed communications throughout the peace process, blaming the loss of the Referendum on the failure to communicate peace in the right way from the beginning, and felt bitterly disillusioned. She thought that the problem went back to this announcement in September 2012. “Colombian society had withdrawn permission to a political solution to the conflict after the failure of the Caguán peace process”, she said. By announcing peace talks, Santos had broken a kind of “taboo”, akin to “dating the girl that everyone in the family had forbidden”:

The grandmother with the golden ring forbade the little prince to date her. But Santos became her boyfriend, and announced his engagement to her. Society felt it was like an infidelity; Santos was going against something that had been agreed.

45 A previous attempt to legislate for reparations to victims was blocked in 2009 by Uribe’s bench in Congress, as they refused to equate the status of victims of the state with that of victims of the FARC, largely because of the narrative that the FARC were a terrorist threat (Burneyat 2010).
46 Although the parties had agreed to announce this on 4 September, the news was leaked on 26 August, allegedly by the President’s right-wing cousin, Francisco Santos (interview with advisor to Santos, 6 July 2018). This created controversy. In response, Santos announced on 27 August he had indeed been talking to the FARC, but waited until 4 September to reveal details, refusing to submit to media pressure. See Santos (2019, 336-7).
47 Interview 5 October 2017.
She added that people “took refuge” in the “easier discourse” made available to them by Uribe, of “betrayal”.

For Goffman (1967, 5-7), ‘face’ is “an image of self delineated in terms of approved social attributes”, and keeping or maintaining face is when people, through their self-presentation, maintain consistent images of themselves. Thus, the phrase to “save face” refers to “the process by which the person sustains an impression for others that he has not lost face” (Goffman 1967, 9). Face is about consistency, and “face-work” means “actions taken by a person to make whatever he is doing consistent with face” (Goffman 1967, 12). Vanessa interpreted Santos’ unexpected shift towards a peace policy as a change in ‘face’, inconsistent with the mandate he had inherited and with people’s expectations of him based on his work as Defence Minister. In fact, as Tappe (2019) argues, and as his autobiography relates, Santos had been involved in many previous peace efforts; seeking peace was not inconsistent with his trajectory. Vanessa’s view was that Santos’ change in ‘face’ gave Uribe’s opposition more power. However, there was also wide public support for the peace process at the time. While her interpretation may reflect how some people received Santos’ announcement, it also indicates her retrospective criticism and self-criticism of the government’s communications strategy.

A senior foreign diplomat I interviewed said Uribe had told him in 2012 that he saw no problem with Santos talking to the FARC, which he had also tried to do, but complained, “do they have to say there’s a conflict?” This diplomat attributed Uribe’s anger to Santos’ change of narrative, which undermined his legacy. Uribe frequently talked about the “three eggs” Santos inherited from him – the three pillars of his government (democratic security, investor confidence, and social cohesion) – and claimed Santos failed to protect this inheritance. Additionally, during Santos’ presidency, several of Uribe’s close allies were arrested, which, this diplomat said, Uribe took as a personal attack.

48 According to Frank Pearl, Uribe’s High Commissioner for Peace, Uribe wanted to negotiate peace with the FARC but his personal disputes with Hugo Chávez and Rafael Correa, presidents of Venezuela and Ecuador, created obstacles, among other things (Tappe 2019, 24, 51).
49 Interview 19 April 2019.
Many attempts were made to broker understanding with Uribe to save the peace process, including by Kofi Annan, Felipe González, Tony Blair, the United Nations, and the US. Pope Francis II received Santos in the Vatican on 16 December 2016 to award him the Peace Lamp, and tried to mediate between Santos and Uribe. According to Santos (2019, 386-7), Uribe simply relayed to the Pope his criticisms to the Peace Agreement, and the meeting led nowhere. On their way out, Uribe said to Santos, “President, cede, cede a little bit”. Santos claims he did not know to what Uribe was referring, because the new Peace Agreement had already been ratified by Congress, and implementation was beginning. His implication is that Uribe wanted him to make a gesture of recognition – a change of narrative that would allow the Democratic Centre to retain dignity in the face of their followers, though what that could have involved is unclear. Whatever the truth, Uribe’s opposition, once begun, did not waver. These ‘narrative wars’ affected every aspect of the Santos government’s face of peace, revealing the extent to which a government’s face incorporates their relationship and responses to their opposition.

**Negotiating a Liberal Peace: The 2012 Framework Agreement**

Santos began efforts for peace soon after taking office, at first by secret back channels. Businessman Henry Acosta, previously designated by Uribe to explore the possibility of peace talks, carried messages between the President and the FARC.51 Simultaneously, Santos continued war efforts, killing the FARC’s second in command, Víctor Julio Suárez, alias Jorge Briceño or Mono Jojoy, on 22 September 2010, and top commander Guillermo León Sáenz Vargas, alias Alfonso Cano, on 4 November 2011. The first secret meeting took place in March 2011, in which the parties decided to hold exploratory talks in Cuba.52 On 24 February 2012, FARC and government delegations met in Havana, accompanied by representatives from the Norwegian and Cuban governments, to discuss an agenda for formal negotiations.

The FARC wanted to retake the twelve-point agenda from Caguán. The government wanted a more limited agenda, and Santos (2019, 320) insisted on various “red lines”: the political and economic structure of the country were not up for negotiation, meaning the rule of law, democracy, and market economy. Neither were the future of the Armed Forces or Colombia’s

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51 See Acosta’s (2017) own account of his experience.
52 This first meeting was held in a FARC camp on the border between Colombia and Venezuela in Tibú, Norte de Santander. Two further preparatory meetings to agree security conditions for the FARC’s travel to Cuba occurred in July 2011 on the Venezuelan island of Orchila (Santos 2019, 281-5).
international relations. Over six months, the two parties held ten rounds of negotiations, which led to a Framework Agreement, called the ‘General Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace’, signed on 26 August 2012. This agenda had five substantive points and one procedural, each with numerous sub-points:

1. Comprehensive Agrarian Development Policy
2. Political participation
3. Ending the conflict
4. Solving the problem of illicit drugs
5. Victims’ rights
6. Implementation, verification and public endorsement

Sergio Jaramillo (2018b) retrospectively explained that this agenda allowed each side to maintain their own justification for each point. The FARC saw points one and two, land reform and reform of the political system, as fundamental reasons for their armed struggle; the government saw them as overdue reforms to conditions that kept the conflict alive. Jaramillo believed, “in practice these conceptual differences did not matter. We could each live with our own interpretation, so long as we were talking about the same concrete things”.

The government’s “interpretation” of the agenda, to use Jaramillo’s term, arguably belonged to a ‘liberal peace’ paradigm. In Santos’ view (2019, 321), the FARC’s proposals for peace “were not that different from the agenda of reforms the country had been putting off for decades, and which would bring greater equality and productivity to the countryside”. He therefore saw the negotiations as an opportunity to accelerate the reforms he believed necessary to modernise the country.

The government also believed that including structural issues such as land and political reform gave the FARC an opportunity to save face. Santos wrote that after half a century of combat, the guerrilla could not disarm “without an achievement … for themselves and their troops. All

53 The term ‘liberal peace’ was not used by the Santos government; it is frequently used by critical peace studies scholars to signal a set of underlying assumptions in peacebuilding frameworks which stem from the liberal mindset. According to Richmond (2006, 292) the ‘liberal peace’ paradigm is associated with democratisation, rule of law, human rights, free and globalised markets, and neoliberal development. Mac Ginty (2008, 143-4) defines ‘liberal peace’ as “the concept, condition and practice whereby leading states, international organizations and international financial institutions promote their version of peace through peace-support interventions, control of international financial architecture, support for state sovereignty and the international status quo”, and the belief that the market will drive peace and reconstruction. See Chapter 3 on liberalism in Colombia, and Chapter 7 on the influence of global liberal elites on the Colombian peace process.
human beings need a justification for our lives. The agreement on the agrarian issue could enable them … to save face (salvar la cara). They told us so themselves” (Santos 2019, 321). Similarly, Jaramillo (2018b) noted the importance of allowing the FARC “dignity” in the negotiations, by granting them the status of political adversary via recognising the existence of an internal conflict.

Government policies “reflect the rationality and assumptions prevalent at the time of their creation” although they are not “essentialised or bounded entities”, but “windows onto political processes in which actors, agents, concepts and technologies interact in different sites, creating or consolidating new rationalities of governance and regimes of knowledge and power” (Shore and Wright 2011, 2-3). Peace accords, however, are unlike most government policies: they are produced through a process of contestation between enemies. The Santos government’s view of their objectives in the peace process, which I locate within a liberal peace paradigm, was only one side of this contestation.54

The Framework Agreement (OACP 2018a, 275-281) laid out the rules of the negotiations. Talks would happen in Havana, without mediation, but with accompaniment from Cuba, Venezuela, Chile and Norway, and would be governed by three principles: first, negotiations would take place in the midst of conflict, without a ceasefire, to prevent the FARC using the peace process to strengthen themselves militarily as they had done in Caguán, and to prevent events in Colombia affecting developments in Havana. The catchphrase was, “We’ll negotiate as if we were not in conflict, but combat as if we were not negotiating”. Second, “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”: neither side was committed to anything until agreements had been reached on all six points; the final agreement would be an interdependent whole. Third, negotiations would be confidential, to avoid the publicly-televisioned chaos of Caguán, although there would be periodic joint statements on progress. While the Framework Agreement made no mention of ‘peace pedagogy’, it did propose channels for citizen participation in the negotiations; Chapter 2 shows how peace pedagogy evolved partly out of these. The negotiating parties conceived of the peace process in three phases: the exploratory phase conducted secretly between the government and the FARC; the public phase of negotiations in Havana; and a third phase of implementation of the Final Peace Agreement.

54 On the polysemic interpretations of ‘territorial peace’ among the government, the FARC and the Armed Forces, see Cairo et al. (2018).
The Government Negotiators and the OACP

The public phase of negotiations began in Oslo on 18 October 2012, then continued in Havana. As noted, peace processes are shaped by the combination of personalities and paradigms within each negotiating team. The government delegation was led by Liberal politician and lawyer Humberto de la Calle, whom Santos designated chief negotiator, and Sergio Jaramillo.\(^\text{55}\)

In addition to Jaramillo and de la Calle, the government delegation included former Peace Commissioner Frank Pearl, two retired members of the Armed Forces, Police General Óscar Naranjo and Army General Jorge Enrique Mora, businessmen Luis Carlos Villegas and Gonzalo Restrepo, and later, after women’s organisations lobbied for inclusion of women at the table, lawyer María Paulina Riveros and Afro-Colombian state official Nigeria Rentería. Other plenipotentiaries were sent toward the end of negotiations to close the deal, including Congressmen Roy Barreras and Juan Fernando Cristo, and Foreign Secretary María Ángela Holguín. The FARC’s negotiating team comprised most of their secretariat and their top commander, Rodrigo Londoño, alias Timoleón Jimenez or Timochenko. Recalling Salomé’s quote at the start of this chapter, an insurgency and a government participate in peace talks in different conditions – most of the FARC’s leaders were present in Havana at some point, whereas the government delegation in Havana represented just one fragment of the complex dynamic ecosystem, while the President, the face of all faces, remained in Colombia.

The position of Presidential Counsellor for Peace was first created in 1994, to undertake peace negotiations with illegal armed groups and advise the President on peace policy. The rules governing this position allowed the designated official to talk to illegal armed groups without breaching the law.\(^\text{56}\) The position grew in national relevance during the Caguán talks, then under Santos, its support staff multiplied, to provide technical and strategic support to negotiations.\(^\text{57}\) In 2012, this office was rebranded as the Office of the High Commissioner for

\(^\text{55}\) On taking office, Santos appointed Jaramillo Presidential Advisor on Security, and gave him the functions of High Commissioner for Peace without officially naming him as such, to avoid publicising the exploratory negotiations. In the public phase, Santos officially designated Jaramillo High Commissioner for Peace. See Chapter 3 on Jaramillo’s trajectory, and de la Calle’s (2019) own account of his experience.


\(^\text{57}\) In 2010, President Santos created the High Advisory Council within the DAPRE via Presidential Decree 3445 of 2010; the Presidential Counsellor for Peace became the High Advisory Counsellor of Peace to the Presidency.
Peace (OACP). Thus, a relatively invisible advisory position inside the Presidential Palace rapidly expanded, got its own logo (Fig.1), and grew in status and visibility within the government ecosystem. It got its own office, a sprawl of rooms spread over the third floor of the Administrative Department of the Presidency of the Republic (DAPRE), an ugly concrete building on the edge of La Candelaria neighbourhood, behind the colonial elegance of the Presidential Palace. The OACP came into being as an institution through the peace process, and its people helped shape the outcome of the negotiations.

![OACP logo](image)

**Fig.1 Becoming an institution - the OACP logo**

**Source:** Author screenshot. Personal archive.

### The 2014 Presidential Elections

While the Havana negotiations progressed, with multiple ups and downs, Uribe’s opposition also evolved, from the narrative of ‘betrayal’ to a full-blown political platform based on opposing the peace process. In June 2012, the government filed in Congress the draft law for the legal framework for peace (Legislative Act 01 of 2012); in response, Uribe and his followers launched a political movement, Front Against Terrorism, and Uribe claimed Santos had “shown greater interest in dialogues with terrorism than in security” (*Caracol Radio* 2012). This movement formed the basis for Uribe’s new political party, the Democratic Centre, founded in January 2013, which explicitly rejected the peace process (Centro Democrático 2013).

The Democratic Centre promoted public rejection of the peace process using narratives that attacked and distorted the negotiations, appealing to the anti-FARC emotions which Uribe had fanned during his presidency. Santos government officials frequently referred to these narratives as “myths”, which had to be repudiated with “realities”. Their realities/myths

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58 Presidential Decree 394 of 2012.
60 E.g. an article by Humberto de la Calle titled ‘Myths and Realities about the Negotiations’, in OACP (2014b, 12-13).
dichotomy reflects the perceived rationality/emotions binary of the liberal imagination; the government construed the Democratic Centre as targeting emotions with dishonest politicking, and their own views as rational, objective truths. The notion of responding to politics with “realities” suggests an avoidance of the political nature of their own, pro-peace narratives: political in the *de facto* sense by virtue of speaking in the name of the government, and in the sense that the liberal ideology underpinning their own logic about the peace process was political, although its discourses claimed neutrality. Uribe’s “myths”, however, were often bare-faced lies that deliberately sought to misinform, as we shall see. Critiquing liberal claims of objective ‘truth’ should not create false equivalences between ‘spin’ or ‘propaganda’ and ‘post-truth’.

The Santos-Uribe agonism crystallised in the presidential elections of 2014, in which peace was the central issue. In the first round on 25 May, Santos lost to the Democratic Centre candidate, Óscar Iván Zuluaga.⁶¹ That night, Santos’ campaign team decided to hire a new advertising company and change the campaign strategy for the second round.⁶² Raúl, the CEO of this company, decided to fight the second round based on the narrative of peace versus war. Just as Lempert and Silverstein (2012) show how ‘Message’ in US politics is crafted by configuring a candidate as a persona associated with some issues and simultaneously depicting their opponent as associated with opposing issues, so Raúl’s campaign depicted Santos as the candidate who represented peace, and Zuluaga as the candidate of war. Raúl explained, “what you have to do in a campaign is say things in black and white – you’re for war and I’m for peace”.⁶³

This polemical opposition was exemplified in Raúl’s company’s first TV commercial. It showed Santos meeting an audience of well-to-do middle-class men and women, and asking them if they would lend him their children to fight the war. When they responded no, Santos asked who, then, would fight the war? “Other mothers can give their children to be killed. That’s the

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⁶¹ In Colombia, presidential elections have to be won by a majority (over 50%). As this rarely occurs, voting usually happens in two rounds, with the second held between the top two from the first round. The results of the first round were: Óscar Iván Zuluaga 3,769,005 votes (29.28%); Juan Manuel Santos 3,310,794 votes (25.72%), followed by Marta Lucía Ramírez for the Conservative Party, Clara López for the Polo Democrático Alternativo, and Enrique Peñalosa for the Green Alliance. Registraduría Nacional. 2014. “Elección de Presidente y Vicepresidente – Primera Vuelta”. 25 May 2014. [https://elecciones.registraduria.gov.co:81/elecciones2014/presidente/1v/99PR1/DPR9999999_L1.htm](https://elecciones.registraduria.gov.co:81/elecciones2014/presidente/1v/99PR1/DPR9999999_L1.htm)

⁶² See Fattal (2018) on marketing as weaponization in Colombia, and Vidart-Delgado (2017) on the convergence of political marketing and clientelism in Colombia.

message we’re sending to the poorest campesina mothers when we vote for war”, he said. “It’s easy fighting a war with the sons of others. No more war. We want peace”\(^\text{64}\). This caused controversy, but Santos’ popularity in the polls increased. On 15 June 2014, in the second round, Santos beat Zuluaga by 50.98\%.\(^\text{65}\) Peace won – but only just.

Santos (2019, 192) wrote that “in 2010, I was elected by a political base from the centre-right, and in 2014, I was re-elected by a centre-left electorate”; an electorate which wanted peace. As public opinion expressed through voting creates mandate, Santos’ re-election on a peace ticket strengthened his mandate for continuing the negotiations with the FARC. Mandate, in this sense, is a type of leverage which the government uses to influence the wider state structure and mobilise particular actions. While politicians do not necessarily deliver what they promise, a vote from the public gives the government more power to act on certain policies. After Santos’ re-election, congressmen were more likely to back legislation that paved the way for the future peace agreement, and politicians increased public support to the peace process, as it was proven to win votes. In this sense, the way governments ‘face’ society is influenced by the need to build mandate, necessary to get the rest of the state to do things.

With this increased mandate, after another eighteen months of negotiations, during which intersubjective logics formed between the two parties, each themselves representatives of multiplicities, on 24 August 2016 the parties reached the ‘Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace’\(^\text{66}\).

**The 2016 Peace Referendum**

When the Agreement was signed, Santos announced there would be a referendum on 2 October 2016, five weeks later\(^\text{67}\). He emphasised that the 297 pages would be disseminated

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\(^\text{64}\) *YouTube*. 2014. “Y usted, ¿Prestaría a sus hijos para la guerra?” (commercial). [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gjTUF7AvVU0](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gjTUF7AvVU0)


\(^\text{66}\) See Appendix.

\(^\text{67}\) The FARC wanted a constitutional assembly to incorporate the Peace Agreement into national law. The government wanted a referendum, which in Colombia is a citizen vote that approves or rejects a legal norm. In the end, because of time limitations, they held a plebiscite (which I translate as referendum for
widely, “for all Colombians to know it … so that you, the citizens, when you vote in the Referendum, have all the information … Nobody, in Colombia or abroad, will be able to say that they did not have the chance to know the Agreement” (Notiamerica 2016). This cast the referendum – a political-electoral exercise – in terms of knowledge or rationality, the fundamental paradox encapsulated by peace pedagogy. It also neglected to consider the literacy and comprehension capacity of Colombian society, and the fact that most people were unlikely to have the time or ability to read it.68

It is not unusual for peace processes to involve referenda; antecedents exist in Indonesia, South Africa and the Philippines. However, the most influential antecedent was Northern Ireland. Jonathan Powell, a British politician who worked with Tony Blair on the Northern Ireland peace process and one of five international advisors to the Colombian government for the peace process (see Chapter 7), told Santos he believed a referendum was necessary to ensure democratic legitimacy. In Northern Ireland they had had a similar time-frame to campaign; however, the Good Friday agreement was only 35 pages long, the country is much smaller, and has greater literacy. Powell explained:

The problem in a peace process is that … you can’t progress unless negotiations happen behind closed doors. So you have to reassure people they’re going to have a say at some stage. … So I argued it was necessary to have a referendum at the end, to give legitimacy to the peace process. It seemed to me it would be fairly hard to lose, because who doesn’t want peace?69

It was not legally necessary to hold a referendum on the Peace Agreement; it could have been ratified in other ways, but according to de la Calle (2019, 247) the government considered it an important pillar of democratic legitimacy and legal security. Santos repeatedly defended himself from attacks on the peace process by pledging that “Colombians will have the last word”, especially in his 2014 re-election campaign. It would have been politically impossible to renege. Santos also believed he could defeat Uribe, and thus silence his opposition.

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68 Colombia has a 93% literacy rate (Burton 2018), but 2015 tests by the OECD’s Program for International Student Assessment show that 43% of Colombian students are low achievers in reading, well below the OECD average (OECD 2016).

69 Interview 22 March 2019.
On 24 August 2016, the day the final agreement was reached, the Constitutional Court passed Statutory Law 1806 of 2016, regulating the rules for the Peace Referendum. This Law determined that the government had to disseminate the Peace Agreement at least 30 days before the vote, so citizens could make an informed decision, and publicise summaries of the Agreement via government websites and social media channels, national newspapers, public radio and television, and Colombian consulates abroad. However, although the government had this duty to inform, it was not allowed to campaign. Government officials could declare themselves personally for the ‘Yes’ vote, but state resources could not be used to ‘campaign’, because the ‘No’ and the ‘Yes’ campaigns had to participate in equal conditions. A Constitutional Court magistrate explained this to me:

The government’s position was already contained in the Agreement: I want the Agreement. The President decided to consult the people. … but because he is a figure of public reference he cannot drive the electorate toward the result. … There were commercials on TV which said ‘vote YES because Colombia deserves peace’. But the figure of the President or his Party’s logo could not be there. … Because that implies campaigning for a name, a party, not the general idea of peace.

This paradox, of a government unable to campaign in its own referendum, limited how the government could communicate about the Peace Agreement, and exacerbated their tendency to resort to rational explanations (see Chapter 2).

World experts in referenda advised the Colombian government on campaign strategies. Alistair Campbell told them about how the Irish referendum had been won; political scientist Arthur Lupia warned Santos that referenda were risky as they frequently became popularity contests for governments. The Brexit vote in the UK had just happened; Powell and other international advisors kept reminding the government that the polls, which predicted a win for the ‘Yes’, could be wrong. Jaramillo told me, “we weren’t entirely naïve, we were aware the referendum could go wrong … but in the end, the truth is really there was an expectation that we would not lose it”.

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70 The government filed the draft statutory law in September 2015 in Congress; it was approved in December 2015 and sent to the Constitutional Court for revision. On 18 July 2016, the Court ruled the law was constitutional, and made some amendments to the rules. See OACP (2018e, 31-2).
71 Statutory Law 1806 of 2016.
72 Interview 29 January 2018.
73 Interview with Jonathan Powell, 22 March 2019.
74 Interview with official from the Presidential Department on Communications, 23 January 2017.
75 Interview 23 May 2017.
Meanwhile, Uribe and the Democratic Centre party were campaigning hard. They spread their “myths” via billboards, radio and TV talk shows, pamphlets handed out at traffic lights, WhatsApp groups and Facebook. Common “myths” included: ‘the FARC will receive 1,800,000 pesos per month to do nothing; whereas ordinary Colombians work hard for little money’. The monetary support was actually 90% of minimum wage for two years, 620,000 pesos. ‘There will be complete impunity for crimes against humanity’ was another. In fact, the International Criminal Court praised the agreements for not amnestying international crimes, but there was controversy around the fact that point five enabled alternative, non-jail sentences for both FARC and the armed forces, if they contributed to truth-telling. ‘Santos is castro-chavista, Timochenko will become president and Colombia will become communist, there will be no more private property, the economy will be destroyed and we will become the next Venezuela’. This Cold War-eseque discourse played on decades of anti-FARC and anti-communist imaginaries.76 The persuasiveness of these anti-FARC narratives showed how the face of the government, in a peace process, incorporates the adversary in negotiations. The Referendum was a popularity contest for both the government and the FARC, who were unpopular in public opinion, and it conflated the two electorally.

Another pervasive “myth” was added in August 2016, when the ‘gender ideology’ scandal broke. A leaflet for schools was published by the Education Ministry promoting tolerance toward different sexual orientations. Someone circulated a false version of this leaflet which showed two men having sex, saying that ‘gender ideology’ was being imposed in schools by the government. The Minister, Gina Parody, was gay, which fuelled this further. Conservative Catholic sectors organised a nation-wide march, and the Democratic Centre party joined, claiming that ‘gender ideology’ was being negotiated in Havana, merging outrage at the leaflet with opposition to the peace process. The “myth” that consolidated was that the Peace Agreement would destroy the traditional Colombian family and its values, because the Agreement promoted homosexuality in schools (Burnyeat and Gómez-Suárez 2017). There were even signs in some places associating the Peace Agreement with abortion (Fig.2).

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76 See Gómez-Suárez (2016) for an overview how these “myths” developed and an analysis of the emotions they targeted.
Fig. 2: “NO to abortion, to those who attack the family, to the gender focus. That’s why I say NO to the Havana Agreement”

Meanwhile, the government had no single communication strategy: it had many. Different elements within the dynamic ecosystem of the government tried to coordinate towards the shared objective of winning the referendum, but failed. The main government entities involved were the Presidential Communications Department, the Press Office of the Presidential Palace, the OACP, and ‘The Biggest Conversation in the World’, an outreach campaign which began in late 2015 to promote dialogue about peace, run from the Presidential Communications Department but operated independently by Vanessa. Mateo, an official from the Communications Department, lamented, “We tried to coordinate, but each entity had their own idea about what to do. There was a fracture between the institutions. We tried to meet at 7am in the Presidential Palace with spokespersons from each entity, but sometimes it was only us present”.77

This disconnect reconfirms Pellegrino’s (2017) and McFee’s (2019) findings on the difficulties in Colombia of inter-institutional collaboration. Coordination between the OACP and other government entities about how to communicate the peace process were strained from the beginning of negotiations. There was particular controversy around the figure of Sergio Jaramillo. Government institutions comprise people with different characters and interests. Peace is not only political, it is personal; the personalities of each institution’s director and their relationships influence the degree to which their institutions can work together. The OACP were the authorities on the contents of the Agreement. Officials in other government institutions felt

77 Interview 10 January 2017.
the OACP was too protective of this official information. Everyone who worked under Jaramillo in the OACP deeply respected and appreciated him and his work. Many of those who had to work with him from other institutions found him difficult.\textsuperscript{78} Alfredo, from the Presidential Communications Department, felt the OACP “guarded the information coming out of Havana jealously, giving an impression of secrecy”.\textsuperscript{79} Vanessa complained the OACP were “an island”.\textsuperscript{80} This disconnect, rooted in the confidentiality principle (see Chapter 2), grew over time and intensified in the Referendum.

The lack of coordination across this dynamic ecosystem prevented the government from crafting a unified message. Santos delegated Gina Parody with coordinating the ministries to target key audiences, but the ministries were limited by the Statutory Law.\textsuperscript{81} Ministers could say “I invite people to vote ‘Yes’ in the Referendum”, but this could not be a position of the ministry as an institution. Conrado, director of the Presidential Communications Department, told me he found this Law so constricting that it was like “being castrated”.\textsuperscript{82} It required his team “to explain the Peace Agreement, point by point, make it comprehensible, but not explain the consequences of voting ‘Yes’ or ‘No’”, they could not say, “peace means fewer deaths”. It was “surreal”, he said, not to be able to “sell or promote” the Agreement, or say “vote for it because it’s great”. The only thing they could do was get the complete Agreement published in national newspapers, and produce video summaries about each point. Every commercial and every message in social media had to be justified in a sub-point of the Peace Agreement’s text, otherwise they risked sanction from the National Electoral Council or the Constitutional Court. As the OACP was the authority on the text, Conrado consulted them. He said, “I wanted to simplify words and concepts, but they often said no because they felt it betrayed the spirit of the text,” which became “gospel”. Meanwhile, the opposition had no such restriction. They could say whatever they liked, said Conrado, and “I couldn’t say ‘that’s not in the agreement’, I couldn’t dispute it, all I could do was say ‘the agreement says X’”. He was exasperated, he said, it was “like a tiger fighting a tied-up donkey”.

\textsuperscript{78} This information is relatively public, so I do not consider it unethical to mention. De la Calle writes about the internal lobby against Jaramillo during the negotiations, including back-channel efforts to side-line Jaramillo out of the negotiations. He writes (2019, 263-4) that Jaramillo had “a difficult personality”, but “despite differences in temperament and style, [I] never had strategic differences with Sergio”; on the contrary, “it’s difficult to find someone with a greater, more authentic commitment to Colombia”.
\textsuperscript{79} Interview 28 February 2018.
\textsuperscript{80} Interview 5 October 2017.
\textsuperscript{81} Parody then lost leverage with the gender ideology scandal.
\textsuperscript{82} Interview 24 July 2018.
Within the limits of the Statutory Law, the government could not campaign, but it could provide material for ‘Yes’ campaign groups. Santos delegated campaigning to three sectors: the political parties, the business sector, and civil society, and designated leaders for each: for the political parties, César Gaviria (ex-President, then President of the Liberal Party); for the business sector, Fabio Villegas (ex-President of Avianca) and Miguel Silva (businessman in communications firms); and for civil society, Luis Eduardo (‘Lucho’) Garzón (centre-left political activist, former union leader, ex-Mayor of Bogotá and former Work Minister). The Presidential Communications Department coordinated with each, giving them material, which had to be in kind, such as informative booklets about the Peace Agreement, or T-shirts with logos on (Fig.3), but not financial. The Communications Department produced a white paper of key messages, based on two years of communications research, and an accompanying digital archive of memes, images, gifs, videoclips, guidelines and tips for peace pedagogy events, which they distributed among ‘Yes’ promotor groups. “The government never tried to control civil society”, Felix from the Communications Department told me. “The message was, organise yourselves as you wish, construct your own messages and proposals, and use our resources how and when you want”.83

Fig.3 The Presidency’s ‘Yes to Peace’ campaign logo
Source: Government white paper, personal archive

This triple campaign meant coordination between government and other sectors. Government-society collaboration proved even harder than inter-government coordination. Mauricio Rodríguez, brother-in-law and close advisor to Santos, deeply frustrated by the campaign, told me:

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83 Interview 23 January 2017.
The campaign belonged to everyone but no one. A bit of this, a bit of that, each one doing their own thing. There was not a structure, a strategy, leadership. That was Santos’ leadership style. Instead of a single clear line of command, he multitasks, thinking it will all add up. He thought each group would win votes from different sectors, but the effort wasn’t coordinated. 84

The private sector opted for the slogan ‘Everyone for Peace’ (Todos por la Paz), creating a foundation with that name to raise money for the campaign. Villegas, in interview with Semana, explained that their strategy was not to react to the ‘No’ campaign, but to “be positive” and “send the message that despite our different views on the future of the country, we need a short-term agreement on one objective: Yes to peace. A country without war is more productive” (Semana 2016b). However, despite public support to the peace process from some influential businessmen (and rejection by others), much of the private sector avoided taking a public stance on a political issue, and ‘Everyone for Peace’ failed to raise as much money as hoped. It did, however, contract an advertising agency which produced emotive commercials, such as ‘Juliana’, the imaginary story of the first Colombian baby born the day after the Referendum in a country at peace, and celebrations in the streets by Colombians and people around the world, marking the end of 50 years of war. 85

The political parties’ campaign was undermined by partisan politics. The Santos government’s power depended on the ‘national unity’ coalition in Congress, which comprised different parties. Designating Gaviria, who only represented one of these, to coordinate all the parties in a united campaign, provoked public discontent among politicians from other parties, who did not want to work with Gaviria (El Espectador 2016a). Additionally, in referenda, political parties have to use their own funds, whereas in normal political campaigns, they can claim funds back from the state. This was an added disincentive for the parties to mobilise their networks out of electoral season, especially given that polls predicted the ‘Yes’ would win, although many parties declared themselves publicly pro-‘Yes’, and some politicians from different parties campaigned actively. The ‘No’ campaign, however, had full backing from a single party, the Democratic Centre, together with some Conservative politicians. They had nothing to lose, and everything to gain, so mobilised all their resources.

The civil society campaign was called ‘Citizens for Peace’. It comprised national and international organisations which been preparing for the referendum from early 2016, each

84 Interview 5 June 2018.
doing peace pedagogy in their own way with their own audiences, using their own interpretations of the peace process.86 Lucho Garzón came in as coordinator when he was named by Santos. According to my husband Andrei, who participated in this campaign for ReD, Lucho had the ability to build bridges across different political tendencies; he had affinities with the left but was not off-putting to the right.87 Although the civil society organisations received the white book and materials from the Presidential Communications Department, they were unsure about using government slogans and images, due to Santos’ increasing unpopularity. Because of this, and because each organisation had its own tendencies and discourses, there was no single, unified campaign slogan. Instead, said Andrei, “we thought polyphony was a good idea”. Different organisations used different slogans – some chose the government slogan “Sí a la Paz”; Viva la Ciudadanía used “Súmate” (‘Add Yourself’); ReD, “Yo Firmo la Paz” (‘I sign peace’).

The Presidential Communications Department also distributed their materials to the National Peace Council, a multi-sectoral entity created in 1998 to advise the government on peace policy.88 The Council had been inactive for several years under Uribe, but civil society groups lobbied Santos for its revival, and just after the first round of presidential elections in 2014, when he was turning to pro-peace sectors for his re-election, Santos relaunched it, saying “the time has come for society to get more involved in the peace process” (RCN Radio 2014a). The new Council was inaugurated in October 2014, and Santos specifically asked its members to help counter the disinformation (RCN Radio 2014b). Throughout 2016, the OACP and the Presidential Communications Department met with the Council and gave them pedagogical and campaign materials. However, there was no money for the Council to campaign, and prominent Council members complained that the government did not really want to work with civil society. For example, human rights lawyer Luis Guillermo Pérez told me he felt the government “trusted too much in the political class, and thought they didn’t need us”, and believed there was an

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86 According to Andrei Gómez-Suárez (interview 25 July 2019), these organisations included Viva la Ciudadanía, la Ruta Pacífica de las Mujeres, Casa de la Mujer, Redepaz, Rodeemos el Diálogo, the International Centre for Transitional Justice, among others. These organisations then joined forces with pro-peace politicians Ernesto Samper, Iván Cepeda and Ángela María Robledo.

87 Interview 25 July 2019.

88 The National Peace Council was created by Law 434 of 1998. It comprised delegates from several state institutions and various sectors of civil society, including churches, the business sector, unions, universities, indigenous, Afro-Colombian and campesino communities, women’s organisations, human rights organisations, peacebuilding organisations, demobilised guerrillas’ organisations, and victims’ organisations. The Peace Agreement changed its composition and mandate, becoming the National Council for Peace, Reconciliation and Coexistence, but in 2016 it was functioning still under its previous structure.
“anti-NGO culture in the state”; it was a “wasted opportunity” not to use the National Peace Council, he thought, where so many social sectors converged.89

Vanessa also perceived a lack of interest in coordinating with organised civil society, despite the fact that this sector really cared about peace. She tried to bring civil society into her efforts at the Biggest Conversation in the World, she said, but other people in the government said to her, “you like the chusma [riffraff], don’t you?”, and another source told me that people in government called Vanessa “the chusma ambassador”.90 Chusma was a term used to refer to the liberal guerrillas of the 1950s; elites use it to denigrate popular sectors and the left. I never witnessed this attitude among the OACP, but these and other interviews support the idea that there was reluctance among some elements in the government to work with civil society organisations. Whatever the extent of this cultural scorning of civil society, the fact that many civil society leaders I spoke to felt they were side-lined is itself significant. The mutual mistrust between the state and society impeded collaboration.

A week before the Referendum, on 26th September 2016, President Santos and Timochenko signed the Peace Agreement in a formal ceremony in Cartagena, all dressed in white, accompanied by various world leaders, and criticised by many as elitist. It was hubristically anticipated. On 2nd October, Colombians voted against the Peace Agreement, by a fraction. The results were 49.78% for the ‘Yes’ (6,377,482 votes) and 50.21% for the ‘No’ (6,431,376 votes) – a difference of some 50,000 votes.91 37.43% of the electorate participated; or 13,066,047 out of 34,899,945 people registered to vote. 63% abstention seems high, but the minimum threshold established by the Statutory Law was 13%, or 4,536,992 votes, so the vote was valid. In Bogotá, and in many peripheral departments, those characterised by Serje (2011) as ‘the reverse of the nation’ and hardest hit by the conflict, the ‘Yes’ won. The wealthier, more populated central Andean departments, with urban centres that had not experienced the conflict so directly, had more electoral muscle, and voted ‘No’. The day of the vote, Hurricane Matthew blew through the Caribbean coast region, typically pro-Santos in its voting behaviour, preventing many people getting to voting stations, perhaps changing the course of Colombian history. The outcome was therefore influenced by multiple factors that created a ‘perfect storm’: the government’s complacency, Uribe’s success, inter-institutional frictions, and a real storm.

89 Interview 16 August 2018.
90 Senior mediation advisor, interview 26 August 2018.
Evident here are multiple responsibilities – complexly distributed across the government ecosystem – and bad luck.

That night, President Santos gave a nationally-televised speech, recognising the victory of the ‘No’. The ‘No’ had not said they wanted war – just changes to the Agreement. Santos said he would maintain the bilateral ceasefire, in place since 29 August, announced he would call a National Dialogue next day, convening all political forces, especially the ‘No’, to discuss a way forward, and said, “I will not give up. I will continue seeking peace until the final minute of my mandate, because that’s the way to leave a better country for our children” (OACP 2018e, 93-4).

**The Renegotiation**

The night of the Referendum, Colombians shocked by the outcome met in public plazas around the country. A spontaneous movement formed led by young people, called ‘Peace on the Street’ (*Paz a la Calle*), which convened a multitudinous march in Bogotá on 4 October in silence, everyone in white, ending in the central Bolívar Plaza by the presidential palace, recalling the historic 1948 ‘March of Silence’ organised by Liberal presidential candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán.92 Many ‘No’ voters also marched, all demanding the government and the FARC reach a new agreement, quickly, and maintain the ceasefire. A group of young people pitched tents in Bolívar Plaza, pledging to stay until a new agreement was signed, called the ‘peace camp’. The ‘March of the Flowers’ followed on 12 October, with victims from around Colombia travelling to Bogotá, marching through flanks of Bogotá inhabitants who handed them flowers to express solidarity and support. Demonstrations took place in cities around the world, with Colombians and foreigners joining forces in international ‘Peace on the Street’ vigils (Burnyeat 2016c). This citizen mobilisation, together with the announcement on 7 October that Santos had won the Nobel Peace Prize, sustained pressure for renegotiation.

On 3 October, Santos sent the government negotiation team to Havana. The FARC agreed to maintain the ceasefire, and renegotiate after hearing proposals for amendments. The government spent a month meeting with ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ campaigner groups: social and ethnic organisations, victims’ groups, women’s organisations, youth organisations, trade unions, all the

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92 The ‘March of Silence’ was a non-violent protest against the partisan violence raging in the country. Gaitán was later assassinated, sparking the civil war known as *La Violencia* (Sánchez 2013).
political parties, local authorities, retired military, the business sector, various churches, and others (OACP 2018e, 33; 152-7). On 5 October, Santos met with the leaders of the ‘No’: Álvaro Uribe, Marta Lucía Ramírez, Alejandro Ordóñez, and, separately, Andrés Pastrana, and established a dialogue commission to hold meetings with the ‘No’ promoters (OACP 2018e, 38-9). The commission collated 59 discrete demands for modifications made by the ‘No’ (OACP 2018e, 211-302). The government negotiating team then returned to Havana with this table, and renegotiated with the FARC from 4-14 November.

The new Agreement incorporated almost all the ‘No’ campaign’s requests. According to a Jaramillo, most of the changes were “clarifications” of the myths spread by the ‘No’ campaign; they “responded to incorrect or badly-intentioned interpretations of the Agreement, which had served as battle horses during the referendum: [e.g.] that the government had agreed new strategies to expropriate lands, that private property was under threat” (Jaramillo 2018a). Other changes reduced concessions to the FARC, such as decreasing funding for their political party. More substantial changes included clarifying the ‘gender focus’ by emphasising special provisions for women, removing mention of LGTBI communities from the Agreement; and making the Special Jurisdiction for Peace magistrates all Colombian, instead of allowing some international judges. The FARC refused two of these changes: the imposition of jail time, and the demand that their high-ranking commanders would not be able to participate in politics until their case was processed by the Special Jurisdiction for Peace. Jaramillo added, “no guerrilla enters into a peace negotiation to jump off a precipice and disappear, but to become a legal political force. That has happened in all negotiations with guerrillas; in El Salvador, Mozambique, Guatemala, East Timor, Nepal, and of course also in Colombia”.

Santos visited Uribe on 12 November 2016 to share these modifications with him. According to Santos (2019, 551-3), Uribe said, “You’re notifying me, not consulting me”, and requested time to review the changes. Santos refused, because the ceasefire was fragile, and he felt it would be ceding too much. The new Peace Agreement was signed in Bogotá on 24 November in the national Columbus Theatre (Teatro Colón). An imperfect yet democratic solution to the impasse of the Referendum had been reached within two months. Santos decided not to risk a second referendum, and instead gave the Agreement to Congress to ratify, which it did, unanimously, on 30 November, though the Democratic Centre Congressmen abstained, deciding to oppose

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93 See OACP (2018e, 34-7) for a summary of these changes; and OACP (2018e, 211-302) for the annotated table of the ‘No’ campaign’s proposals noting the changes made on each one.
the renegotiated deal. Thus, the Santos-Uribe agonism which characterised the politics of the government’s face throughout the peace process failed to be resolved at this final stage, and was carried into the implementation phase.

Implementation amid Political Campaigning: 2016-2018

While implementation of the Final Peace Agreement began officially on 1 December 2016, preparations had begun earlier, but were affected by the relationship between the OACP and other institutions in the government ecosystem. After Santos’ re-election in 2014, he created a new post: the Presidential High Counsellor for Post-conflict, to which he initially appointed General Naranjo, and then Rafael Pardo. The OACP was supposed to work with the Post-conflict High Council to prepare implementation, and the UN supported efforts to plan the first eighteen months. However, a rift opened between the OACP and the Post-conflict High Council, which began at the top, between Jaramillo and Naranjo, and widened under Pardo. Many of my interlocutors from different sectors signalled the lack of preparation, arising partly from this clash, as a contributing factor to later difficulties in implementation. An assistant to Naranjo during his time as Post-conflict Counsellor told me that the friction between the two had been palpable; Naranjo felt he did not have space to work, partly because Santos had not made clear the division of responsibilities between the two institutions.

Alberto, an OACP official, participated in meetings between the OACP and other government institutions to plan implementation, and told me how frustrated he felt from trying to coordinate institutions. He said, “it sometimes felt like in the OACP we were the only ones driving all this. We had the president’s support, and we tried to make it a task that belonged to the whole government, not just the OACP. We managed with some institutions, but not others”. He criticised officials in the Presidential Palace: “They never understood what was at risk. The Bogotá technocratic elite don’t understand the real, popular, rural world”, they only managed to get their head around the peace process when implementation began and they had to actually meet and work with the FARC, he said. It was “schizophrenic”, he felt, “the importance of preparation, and not being able to do it ... The traditional political sector did not lift a finger.”

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94 In 2019, Duque rebranded this as the Presidential Advisory Department for Stabilisation and Consolidation. Presidential Decree 179 of 2019.
95 Interview 12 July 2018.
96 Interview 5 March 2018.
Alberto attributed this partly to Jaramillo’s being “de-contextualised from the world of government institutions, because he was thinking about Havana”, recalling the fact that only a fragment of the government ecosystem was involved in the negotiations. He said:

The president tries to pressure from above, without having all the information, because no one tells the president the truth. It’s very Colombian, not saying things. That’s why no one liked Sergio. Because Sergio said things. If the president says, “Mr Pardo, how are the preparations going on X?”, Pardo says, “Very well Mr President”. When it’s not the case. Everyone got fed up with Sergio. But the president knew he was key. Because Sergio says “Mr President, I don’t agree”, and criticises things. There was a big anti-Sergio dynamic within the presidency. Because he tries to do things well, without political interests.

Alberto conceived of Jaramillo as altruistic and not ‘political’, in the sense of dishonest politicking, a conception shared by others (Chapter 3). Also, Alberto said, “we stuck our nose in areas that were not our competency. Like land issues. We got into big fights on that, because it was in the Agreement, with the excuse that we were the authorities on the Agreement.” Jaramillo saw the peace process as a window of opportunity to leverage the political system to make structural changes in Colombia. However, with the loss of the Referendum, Santos lost his mandate for peace, and the OACP therefore lost power in the government ecosystem.97

Peace became unpopular. Where the negotiations had been somewhat protected from partisan politics by their isolation in Havana, implementation returned peace to the political realm. During the final two years of Santos’ administration, implementation of the Peace Agreement occurred within this context of reduced mandate, or what Powell called “political capital”,98 and every action came under fire from the Democratic Centre. The first steps of implementation included disarmament of the FARC, the creation of new state institutions tasked with implementation of

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97 García (2018) argues, in the case of point one, that the Peace Agreement opened policy space for a redistributive rural agenda, but the robust provisions of the Agreement were undermined in implementation by policy capture from agribusiness elites, a lack of coordination within the government, political pressures from the government coalition in Congress, and external pressure from the opposition which delegitimated both the government and the peace process.

98 Interview 22 March 2019. Powell said that a difference with the Northern Irish peace process was the fact that the Good Friday agreement was signed in 1998, early in Tony Blair’s administration after his 1997 landslide election. Blair thus had ‘political capital’ with which to implement the deal; Santos, six years into his presidency, had ‘spent’ his capital on getting the peace process done, and had none left with which to implement.
specific aspects of the deal,\textsuperscript{99} and the passage of laws in Congress to translate the Peace Agreement into national legislation, turning the Agreement into a political shuttlecock.\textsuperscript{100} The OACP was responsible for overseeing the disarmament zones (Chapter 6), preparing draft laws for Congress, and for representing the government in various commissions to monitor and guide implementation. All other aspects of implementation were out of their hands. In early 2017, the government also began formal negotiations with the ELN, the remaining guerrilla group, but this failed to progress, partly due to the polarisation around the Agreement with the FARC.\textsuperscript{101}

In this context, the peace process became a central issue in the run-up to the 2018 congressional and presidential elections, and the Democratic Centre fanned citizen indignation about Santos allegedly “ignoring” the Referendum result by continuing with the peace process. Uribe chose Iván Duque as his candidate. Duque pledged to modify the Peace Agreement if he won; other Democratic Centre members promised to “shred” the paper it was written on (Telesur 2017). Many people saw the elections as a re-run of the Referendum: of the five main candidates, three were widely construed as ‘pro-peace’ – leftist Gustavo Petro of the ‘Colombia Humana’ platform, Humberto de la Calle for the Liberal Party, and Sergio Fajardo of the Alianza Verde – and two as ‘anti-peace’ – Germán Vargas Lleras for Cambio Radical, and Iván Duque. Santos could not run again as he had had the allotted two terms, and he abstained from endorsing any candidate. While chief government negotiator de la Calle would have been an obvious choice, given Santos’ hope for the peace process to continue under the next administration, and Santos’ connection to the Liberal Party, Santos was so unpopular due to his exhausted mandate and the political polarisation around the peace process that any endorsement from him would have been a political kiss of death.

Based on their anti-peace and anti-Santos platform, on 11 March 2018, the Democratic Centre won an increased number of seats in congressional elections. On 27 May, in the first round of presidential elections, Iván Duque came first, followed by Gustavo Petro, making the second

\textsuperscript{99} These included the Agency for Territorial Renovation (ART), the National Land Agency (ANT) and the Agency for Rural Development (ADR), tasked with different aspects of point one; the Truth Commission, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace and the Search Commission for Persons Presumed Missing, tasked with point five.

\textsuperscript{100} On the political and legal battles of translating the Peace Agreement into laws, see Cristo and Rivera (2019).

\textsuperscript{101} The negotiations between the Santos government and the ELN are outside the scope of this thesis; see de Currea-Lugo (2016) and Celis (2019).
round a contest between right and left. On 17 June, Duque beat Petro by a substantial majority. The voting pattern echoed the results of the Referendum – Petro won in many peripheral, conflict-affected departments, and in Bogotá.

Conclusions

“It’s about people making it”, reads Coronil’s (2019b, 57) eleventh and final thesis on anthrohistory. I interpret the poetic ambiguity of the two “its” as ‘anthrohistory is about people making history’. This pithy statement encapsulates the thrust of Coronil’s endeavour: to produce political histories of the present or recent past by focussing on how the actions and interactions of powerful people foster reality. This chapter has followed Coronil’s invitation by rendering human the Santos government administration throughout its two periods, 2010-2018, revealing the complexity of interactions within its dynamic ecosystem, between the government and the wider state structure, and with Colombian society.

The concept of ‘giving face’ as the government, as delineated in the Introduction, invokes both physical presence and the assumption of responsibility. By depicting government administrations as dynamic ecosystems, this chapter shows that government responsibility is complexly distributed across this ecosystem, illustrated by the Santos administration’s failure to win its own referendum. This is not to exonerate powerful individuals from responsibility, nor to suggest that the unfolding of national politics is accidental. Indeed, though the ecosystem is unwieldy and difficult to coordinate, it can be manipulated; recalling Bunce’s (2019) concept of ‘covert governance’ we could say that such ecosystems have porous borders, inter-penetrable by the wider state, political parties, the private sector, and criminality. However, the converse idea that government administrations operate homogenously with a single hidden political agenda is overly simplistic. The ecosystem can fail to coordinate toward an objective, as in the Referendum. In his novel The Shape of the Ruins, Juan Gabriel Vásquez (2018, 496) contrasts

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what he calls “accidental vision”, a belief that events unfold according to complete chance, with “conspiratorial vision”, the converse idea, common in Colombia according to Vásquez, that everything is planned by a secret, higher power. The reality, arguably, is somewhere in between.

The future fate of the peace process in Colombia under Duque’s administration will be forever inflected by the ‘narrative wars’ between Santos and Uribe that marked its inception. In retrospect, Santos thought the Referendum was a mistake, because Uribe’s disinformation “won territory which we failed to recover with pedagogy” (Santos 2019, 531-2). In attempting to refute “myths” with “realities” and combat politics with pedagogy, the Santos government portrayed the peace process as a public good, politically neutral, above politics. This is the ideology of liberalism which sees itself as non-political, objective, rational. Yet the peace process was exposed to what Spencer (2007, 17) calls “the agonistic energies unleashed in electoral politics” in three moments: the presidential elections of 2014, the Peace Referendum of 2016, and the presidential elections of 2018. In all these, a ‘face-off’, as it were, took place between Santos and Uribe, construed respectively as the candidates of peace and war. This chapter has called this clash ‘the politics of the face’, as it dominated the face of the Santos government.

In the perfect storm of factors which led to the loss of the Referendum and the subsequent election of Iván Duque on an anti-peace platform, government-society relations or ‘giving face’ to society about the peace process played a critical role. The next chapter turns to the OACP’s peace pedagogy development over this same chronology, analysing how the logic of countering “myths” with rational-technical information evolved amidst the Uribe-Santos agonism, and how the ‘face’ of the Santos government was inextricably inlaid, as it were, on the ‘faces’ of individual peace pedagogues.

Over a coffee in downtown Bogotá, OACP official Simón told me he thought that peace pedagogy had revealed not just the challenges of communicating about the Peace Agreement, but of "communication in general from a state to a citizenry"; it "exposed with greater force what was already there … that communicating from a state to society involves trust, presence, being there, and bringing language down from the technical to the accessible".104 I recalled Geertz’ essay, ‘Being There’, which argues that the ability of anthropologists to be taken seriously rests on their capacity to convince their reader they had truly been present and “actually penetrated” or “been penetrated by” another form of life (Geertz 1988, 4-5). While I do not wish to compare peace pedagogy with ethnography, Simón’s quote illuminates the impact on OACP officials of experiencing how their presence as the government was received. For Simón, delivering peace pedagogy entailed learning about how people perceived the state through his own experience of representing the government. This is what Aretxaga (2003, 399) called the “mirroring dynamic” by which state officials become the state through encountering society, which makes peace pedagogy different from presidential speeches transmitted over national media. Simón’s statement also suggested a thoughtful reflection on the quality of presence offered via peace pedagogy; the need to “bring down” the language of the Peace Agreement to the people, a complex-to-simple directionality which suggests condescension, but also a recognition of the problem of trust in the state-society relationship. This self-reflection about what it meant to give face as the government was common among OACP peace pedagogues. In everyday conversations and in my interviews, many were critical of how peace pedagogy had been done, in the light of the lost Referendum.

This chapter extends the anthrohistory of the Santos government, complementing the wider focus of the Chapter 1 by zooming in on the OACP, one institution within the complex dynamic ecosystem of the Santos government administration, itself a multiplicity of different teams and people, over the same chronology. Chapter 1 argued that ‘giving face’ to society in various ways played a critical role in the peace process, and critiqued the logic of refuting “myths” with “realities” by responding to politics with pedagogy as a flaw in the Santos government’s face, product of the liberal imagination which sees itself as non-political. This chapter draws on

104 Interview, 15 February 2018.
retrospective perceptions of OACP officials and people who interacted with them to reconstruct the development of peace pedagogy, and their logic of resorting to technical-rational explanations in reaction to the Democratic Centre’s disinformation campaign, which I call ‘the rationality drive’. In charting the development of the rationality drive in historical context, the chapter explicates its culturally-constituted logics: the rationale of rationality.

This move attends to the internal workings of liberalism while keeping its effects in view. Povinelli (2002, 16) calls for analyses of liberal subjects’ worldviews, while recognising that these worldviews, while frequently predicated on good intentions, can have harmful effects. She argues that “critiques of liberal forms of domination should not dismiss or take lightly the truth of state, national, and legal caretaking. Persons who work within juridical and state jobs do care deeply about subaltern bodies, desires, and language” (Povinelli 2002, 268). Dwelling only on critiques of how liberalism unintentionally reproduces capitalist inequalities obscures the real emotional care that people like the OACP officials invest in their work.

Thinking with Li (2007), I take seriously the OACP’s will to make peace, and their belief that explaining the Peace Agreement was necessary to that end. They made sincere efforts in a high-stakes context, but the actions of government administrations, as Chapter 1 showed, are product of multiple forces within and acting on the wider government ecosystem. Ultimately, peace pedagogy was insufficient to win the 2016 Referendum or get a pro-peace president elected in 2018. The criticism “the government didn’t do enough peace pedagogy”, which inspired my research questions, blames these outcomes largely on the OACP. Their failure is public, but this chapter seeks to recognise their sincerity, without necessarily agreeing with their logics or exonerating their responsibility. After all, if we do not give government officials the possibility of our interpretative dignity, how can we expect them to serve our societies in a dignified way?

Focussing only on the effects of liberal governments’ actions obscures the contingent development of the rationales behind their strategies. As Chapter 1 argued, governments exist temporally, responding to shifting political winds. The rationality drive has to be understood in its own terms. This means understanding how it formed over time, influenced by external political factors, and by the internal cultural logics of the OACP, as institutions produce shared ‘common sense’, as many anthropologists have observed (Douglas 1986, Schwartzman 1993, Wright 1994, Corsín 2007, Caulkins and Jordan 2013), through their formal work – which, in the
OACP’s case, involved both internal interaction and interaction with diverse publics through peace pedagogy – and their informal social interaction. In other words, while we may still critique the liberalism of the rationality drive from the outside, this chapter seeks to understand it from the inside.

Phase 1: The Confidentiality-Communication Tension 2012-2014

The Framework Agreement which set the agenda for the Havana negotiations had no mention of ‘peace pedagogy’. It did, however, stipulate three mechanisms for citizen participation in the peace process: consultation of invited experts, a form for citizens to send proposals to the negotiating table, and a series of public forums. The government, guided by literature reviews on the topic and their international advisors, saw citizen participation as helpful for public appropriation and legitimacy of the peace process, which could increase its sustainability (e.g. Nilsson 2012), but believed that too much open-ended participation would make it harder to reach an agreement, and that therefore limits should be established (e.g. Paffenholz 2014).

The government also wished to avoid direct contact between the FARC and society, which had happened in Caguán. In the words of Gabriel, a senior OACP official:

It was impossible not to give an outlet to people who wanted to participate. We talked honestly with the FARC, saying, Caguán is a referent. The media image of citizens participating, and the FARC with guns on their shoulders, we cannot permit that. But neither do we want the other extreme.

The government’s idea was that while there would be limited channels of participation in the peace negotiations, there would be greater opportunities for participation during implementation of the Final Peace Agreement. According to Sergio Jaramillo, a key message the government wanted to communicate was that the implementation phase was when all Colombians could take part. The concept of territorial peace (Jaramillo 2014, Cairo et al. 2018) promised that local communities would build peace in the regions, via bottom-up, participatory processes, strengthening local state institutions, increasing decentralisation, and promoting territorial

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105 Over 100 Colombian and international experts on different points of the agenda travelled to Havana to advise the negotiating table. See OACP (2018d, 45-46; 242-248).
106 Participation mechanisms in peace processes include direct participation of citizens at a negotiating table, citizen observers at negotiating tables, official consultation forums, parallel informal channels of consultation, referenda, and mass public movements such as demonstrations (Paffenholz 2014).
107 Interview 5 March 2018.
108 Interview 23 May 2018.
integration; and the Final Peace Agreement included over 70 mechanisms of citizen participation in implementation (FIP 2017).

While the OACP’s main role was to support the government negotiating team, and most of its 60-something officials were dedicated to this task, it was also responsible for orchestrating citizen participation. A three-person ‘Participation Group’ was formed. They quickly discovered that to invite participation, they had to give basic information about what people were participating in. However, there was a tension between participation and the confidentiality principle governing the negotiations. How to invite people to participate in something about which there was limited public information? Government peace pedagogy was not planned, but emerged from this conundrum during the first two years of the public phase of negotiations, 2012-2014, and evolved in response to shifting political dynamics thereafter.

The Participation Mechanisms

Official public forums were held on the first three points negotiated (agrarian reform, political participation, and drug-trafficking), during discussions on each, then three regional forums were held on point five (victims), and a final forum combined point three (ending the conflict) with point six (implementation) (see OACP 2018d, 58-213). These were organised by third parties, to prevent bias: the UN Development Programme and the National University’s Centre for Analysis and Monitoring the Peace Talks, who compiled proposals from each forum for the negotiating table. This was an ambitious and expensive effort, with participants from across the country in each forum. In total, 7811 people participated, contributing 40,000 proposals to the negotiating table (OACP 2018d, 46-48).

Any citizen could submit the proposal form to the negotiating table, either electronically, via the negotiating table’s website www.mesadeconversaciones.com.co (now defunct), or physically. Paper forms were distributed throughout Colombia which people could fill out and send via a free postal service. Physical and electronic versions went directly to the José Martí publishing company in Havana, which compiled forms for the negotiating teams. All proposals received via the forms and the forums were systematised in a database by the NGO Ideas for Peace.
Foundation (FIP) for the negotiating parties to access. Between 2012-2016, 5741 physical or electronic forms were sent in; the FIP identified 68,181 discrete proposals.\(^{109}\)

Some third-party efforts to promote dialogue and collate citizen proposals for the negotiating table were also included in the FIP systematisation. The Peace Commission of Congress, supported by the UN, organised eight meetings in different regions in 2012-13, called the Regional Working Boards to Contribute to Ending the Conflict, collating over 6000 proposals. Additionally, eight women’s organisations held two Summits on Peace and Women, one in October 2013, which pledged support to the negotiations and lobbied for including women in the negotiations; the second in September 2016. 1300 women participated in these summits (OACP 2018d, 48-49).

**The Participation Group**

This early OACP Participation Group was directed by Marcela. When I interviewed her in early 2018, she had left the OACP, bitterly disappointed, like many other OACP officials, by the loss of the Referendum. We talked over coffee in her new workplace, a think-tank, about her experience working for the OACP. She was in her mid-thirties, *bogotana*, had studied anthropology and political science at the private Los Andes university, had a Master’s from the University of Oxford, and had previously worked on human rights issues in leading NGOs. She was forthcoming about her frustrations, even apologising for using our interview “to be critical” of “the government”, saying “it’s also a self-criticism. For me the Referendum was like a knife, because peace pedagogy was my job”. Her separation of “self” and “government” indicated that she accepted responsibility personally for the outcome, but also blamed the wider government, reminding us that government responsibility is complexly distributed across a dynamic ecosystem, as Chapter 1 argues.

Marcela told me that the first task of the Participation Group was to promote participation via the online and physical forms. Three people were obviously too few cover the entire population, so in November 2012, the negotiating table agreed to ask governor’s offices and mayoralties to promote participation, and President Santos issued a Presidential Decree on 11 January 2013 (Decree 001 of 2013) to this effect. Marcela’s team travelled to talk to mayors, governors and

\(^{109}\) For an overview of this systematisation, see OACP (2018d, 215-241).
their staff, to the Colombian Federation of Municipalities and the National Federation of Departments, telling them about this Decree, and sent boxes of forms to all municipalities, distributing 600,000 copies of the physical form to mayors and governors. Sergio Jaramillo went with her as often as possible, and they organised workshops, explaining progress in Havana and answering questions.

This was the first time that the OACP built relationships beyond the capital. They prioritised mayors and governors in conflict-affected regions, to encourage participation from conflict-affected populations. They created a platform called the Network of Mayors and Governors for Peace to maintain communication with governors’ and mayors’ offices, sending them copies of the Framework Agreement, participation forms, a guide about citizen participation, and regular updates from Havana. Whether a given mayor or governor appropriated the idea or not was inevitably related to their party’s stance on the peace process; according to Tarcisio, a member of the Participation Group, some mayors and governors requested more forms and designated staff to promote participation, whereas others never opened the boxes.110

Many mayors and governors requested the OACP explain the peace process to local communities. However, because of the confidentiality principle, only chief negotiators Sergio Jaramillo and Humberto de la Calle were licensed to speak publicly about the negotiations, and their time was mostly spent in Havana. Marcela’s team was authorised only to distribute and explain the Framework Agreement, to instruct people to read the joint communiqués released after each negotiation round, and disseminate the participation form. This limited information was nevertheless meaningful. The significance of official ‘envoys’ such as Marcela, sent from the government institution in charge of the peace negotiations, suggested recognition of local communities and their participation in peace. This was the beginning of the mode of ‘giving face’ that paved the way for peace pedagogy.

The Participation Group’s authority to speak publicly about the peace negotiations was further limited by two other factors: their lack of seniority in government, and their lack of direct involvement in negotiations. Marcela and her team were young and unknown to the public eye. She said, “When Sergio went to a [participation] event, all the mayors and governors would come. But he couldn’t be everywhere. Mostly it just was me and my team.”111 People felt the

110 Interview 1 February 2018.
111 Interview 16 February 2018.
government was sending “the least important representative, the little brother. And it was true. Participation was relegated as a secondary issue”. Their lack of seniority, she felt, was product of the value hierarchy within the OACP: the negotiations took priority over participation.

This was mirrored by an internal hierarchy of knowledge inside the OACP; those who had been in Havana acquired a higher status. “I was in Havana” or “she was in Havana” were common phrases that conveyed authority, comparable to the Geertzian being there, in which the ethnographer’s authority is construed through his capacity to convince them of having authentically been in a place. In contrast, those who had not been in Havana, or in the technical discussions in the OACP Thematic Department which compiled policy literature reviews and analysed options for the government’s position on different points of the Havana agenda, feared making technical mistakes in public. Martín, an official from the Thematic Department, had been in Havana. He said:

It was good to have people communicating who had been in the negotiations. It gave you authority to speak. Sometimes a journalist would ask me a question, and between the lines it sounded like ‘with what authority are you speaking to me about X’. When I replied, ‘I was in Havana’, they believed me more, and asked more questions. 

Marcela tried to get Thematic officials like Martín to go to regional meetings and events, as she felt they were better qualified to speak, but they were frequently busy attending to the negotiations. No one in the Thematic Department seemed to care enough, she said. “No one wanted to travel with me to [the conflict-affected municipality of] Florencia, for example, to meet the mayor. They all felt it was more important to go to Havana”.

Additionally, Marcela struggled to access funds to finance the Participation Group’s activities. The OACP’s budget was managed by the Peace Fund (Fondo Paz), designated legally for implementing the Framework Agreement, which included the participation mechanisms. She could use this budget for printing and mailing the forms, but she struggled to get Fondo Paz to finance her travel to different regions to explain the participation mechanisms, as its administrators did not consider this a priority for the negotiations. When Marcela discovered that

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112 Interview 29 January 2018.
the international community were interested in financing citizen participation, she realised she could hire more staff and do projects, leading to a reliance on international funding for peace pedagogy (Chapter 7).

The government-society relationship created through these participation mechanisms was unidirectional. According to Sara, another official from the Participation Group, proposals arrived from all over Colombia, some deeply poignant, such as artists’ sketches for peace monuments in war-ravaged villages, books compiled by schoolteachers of pupils’ drawings imagining Colombia at peace, PhD theses, photos, and more. However, several officials told me they regretted the lack of feedback to these proposals. The joint communiqués after each negotiation round included a short, standardised sentence thanking people for submitting proposals, but Sara felt they ought to have acknowledged receipt of each proposal, and promise the sender that it would be read in Havana. Negotiators from both the government and the FARC told me a lot of these proposals were included in the Peace Agreement, but identity protection for those who participated meant proposals could not be published, and the FIP’s systematisation is still classified to date.

**Communicating is also Negotiating**

The Participation Group worked closely with the OACP Communications Team, which was in charge of media relations for the negotiations. It quickly became clear that communicating and inviting citizen participation were related tasks; the one affected the other, and both affected negotiations. After each negotiation round, a press conference was held and the joint communiqué was read aloud, then published on the negotiating table’s website. Communication beyond this was restricted by the confidentiality principle.

Between rounds, the government negotiators returned to Colombia, where Jaramillo and de la Calle held closed-door briefings with the editors of mainstream media and the business sector. Jaramillo went to the Regional Working Boards organised by the Congress Peace Commission to explain progress in Havana, and Semana magazine organised a series of regional events, where Jaramillo spoke, guided by the confidentiality principle, focusing on explaining the Framework Agreement and the overarching logic of the peace process. In these first two years,

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114 Interview 19 January 2018.
the government’s public statements about the peace process were cautious: the talks were fragile, and they did not want to transmit false expectations to society about a peace process that could fail, for a fourth time in as many decades. The other principles - ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’, and negotiating during ongoing conflict, had major implications. They aimed to prevent events in Colombia affecting negotiations in Havana, and this worked well, although some political crises did impact negotiations and could have led to failure, such as the FARC’s kidnapping of a General in November 2014. Communicating anything as the government also affected national politics. It was not until Santos’ re-election in 2014 on a peace ticket that his administration had a clear mandate to communicate more vigorously about the peace process (Chapter 1).

While the government was communicating cautiously in this way, the FARC talked to press in Havana, and published their proposals for each agenda point. Some people believed these proposals amounted to agreements. OACP official Martín told me that although the FARC were not technically breaking confidentiality, this speculation created pressure in public opinion:

They were speaking to their people, their future electorate. That distorted things in the media because people thought it was what was being negotiated but it wasn’t; they were proposals they wanted to share as a political group, but it created confusion, so it was necessary to do pedagogy and clarify.

This quote illustrates Martín’s logic of “clarifying” the FARC’s “politics” with “pedagogy”.

It became clear that communicating was also negotiating. When government representatives spoke publicly about the peace process, this affected the peace talks. This was especially true in regions with strong FARC presence, because pro-FARC communities would report back to the guerrilla. Saying anything publicly in Colombia as the government could impact negotiations in Havana. The rationale behind the government’s tight control over official discourse about the peace process at this stage was thus geared towards protecting the negotiations; in communicating publicly, they were not only facing Colombian society, but also the FARC.

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115 See Santos’ speech suspending negotiations until the release of General Alzate (OACP 2018b, 370).
116 For example, the Communist Party’s newspaper distributed a pamphlet with their issue of 29 May 2013 called ‘100 Proposals in Havana’, containing the FARC’s proposals for point one (Seminario Voz 2013).
117 Interview 29 January 2018.
Mavis, the OACP Communications Director, told me that in retrospect, she believed it was a mistake to take the principle of confidentiality so literally. They could have maintained confidentiality but found ways to keep the Colombian public in the loop, instead of generating a feeling of secrecy and allowing the FARC’s proposals to create speculations. She explained:

We wanted to foster trust in the process. When we wrote de la Calle’s speeches, we weighed up the implications of each word. For the first two years, we never gave interviews. That worked well in Havana, but badly in Colombia. We weren’t able to correct that in time, or combine the two strategies, the one in Colombia with the one in Havana.\(^{118}\)

Her belief, that the OACP did things “well in Havana, but badly in Colombia”, was shared by many inside and outside government. While the OACP’s priority was to progress in the negotiations, the Participation Group were travelling to different regions and giving face. Marcela felt her role was undervalued, compared with the task of negotiating. “I was the only thermometer measuring what was happening in Colombia”, she said. She was witnessing the growing narrative, promoted by Uribe’s opposition, that the government was negotiating “with its back to the country”. We travelled all over the country, she told me, “and we were on the receiving end of everybody’s criticisms”. People’s perceptions of the national ‘politics of the face’ (Chapter 1) were projected onto the OACP representatives. This was the experience highlighted by Simón’s self-reflexive quote at the start of this chapter – these were relatively young, committed government officials, mostly from Bogotá, who would not usually travel so widely and speak to such varied audiences as the government. If they were the “thermometer”, they were measuring a high degree of scepticism about both Santos and his peace process, projected onto their own individual faces.

**The Emergence of Peace Pedagogy**

As public interest in the peace process grew, the OACP received requests to attend events in different regions, from organisations, universities, and the Peace Commission of Congress, to share official information about the peace process. People wanted to hear from the horse’s mouth – from those who had been in Havana. These requests were increasingly formulated as demands for “peace pedagogy”, *pedagogía de paz*, and the term filtered into government

\(^{118}\) Interview 28 February 2018.
discourse. In early 2014, the Participation Group became the Participation and Pedagogy Group. However, they were not ‘pedagogues’ but technocrats (Chapter 3), and the focus was on explaining, rather than ‘teaching’ (Chapter 4).

The growing demand for peace pedagogy, especially from pro-peace, left or centre-left sectors of society, existed dialectically to the anti-peace narratives which were also growing, partly in reaction to Uribe’s opposition. Marcela described how frustrating representing the government was in this political climate:

The idea that the peace process was happening behind the country’s back took root in people’s minds and was impossible to break. I spent two years meeting mayors and governors without rest, sharing everything I could. I’d see each of the 32 governors four or five times a year. And I would later see them in events where they would repeat, “the problem is that no one knows about this peace process because the government’s doing it behind the country’s back”.

Years after leaving the OACP, Marcela continued seeing the same governors and mayors saying, “the government had no dissemination strategy, there was no information, that’s why they lost the referendum”. She said, “I couldn’t believe it, I heard it from people I personally had explained things to many times.” It got to a point, she thought, that “the collective imaginary was impossible to mitigate with pedagogy. I don’t know if we could have prevented that if we had started earlier”. The idea of “mitigating” Uribe’s narratives with “pedagogy” conjures the notion of pedagogy as antidote to politics.

In early 2014, the OACP produced its first informative booklet, titled ‘Everything You Need to Know About the Peace Process’ (OACP 2014b) (Fig.4). 24,000 copies were distributed, through the Network of Mayors and Governors for Peace, in the participation forums, and in all the events the OACP attended. It contained an introduction by Jaramillo explaining the Framework Agreement, summaries of each agenda item and the agreements reached by then (points one and two), written by the technical experts on each point, a timeline of events thus far, and information about how to participate. It also contained an article by Humberto de la Calle titled ‘Myths and Realities about the Negotiations’, which compiled and responded to five common ‘myths’ circulated by the Democratic Centre: that the country would be handed over to the FARC, the Armed Forces reduced, the agrarian reform would affect private property, the negotiations were taking place behind the country’s back, and that crimes against humanity would remain in impunity.
Todo lo que debería saber sobre el proceso de paz

Visión, realidades y avances en las conversaciones que adelanta el Gobierno Nacional en La Habana

Fig.4: Cover of ‘Everything You Need to Know About the Peace Process’. Source: Screenshot (OACP 2014b)

The informative booklet established an institutional script, which Marcela’s team could draw on in their pedagogy sessions, bolstering their confidence about speaking publicly.119

Phase 2: Peace Pedagogy to Prepare for Implementation, 2014-2015

Relaxing Confidentiality and Increasing Information

The day after his re-election, 16 June 2014, Santos declared, “one of the objectives of my government from now on is to do much more pedagogy about peace and its benefits”, and said

119 Chapter 4 describes the production of the pedagogy script.
he ought to have been doing so from the beginning of the peace process (Restrepo, 2014). Given Santos’ re-election on a peace ticket, peace became the key political issue on the public agenda. Forums and conferences on peace organised by diverse social groups proliferated. As the OACP was the authority on the peace process, the institution gained visibility, and requests for peace pedagogy increased. They published 300,000 copies of an updated booklet, ‘Get Informed about the Peace Process’, which included a summary of the third agreement on drugs, reached during the election (OACP 2014a).

Given the persistent disinformation, on 24 September 2014 the negotiating parties released the draft or “partial” agreements reached to date – point one (agrarian reform), point two (political participation), and point four (drug-trafficking) – with the idea of increasing transparency. The joint communiqués after each negotiation round informed on advances in negotiations, and two joint reports were published in 2013 which summarised the agreements reached that year (points one and two), but this had not diffused the narrative about secrecy. The communiqué accompanying the published partial agreements stated: “All kinds of speculations persist about what’s being agreed. These speculations are sometimes product of lack of knowledge of the communiqués and reports, and other times, of a clear intent to misinform public opinion” (OACP 2018b, 270-1)

The Participation and Pedagogy Group realised they had to explore new strategies to meet the growing demand. Marcela said:

We couldn’t possibly respond to the huge demand for information from organised civil society – this or that victims’ association in such and such a place, inviting the OACP to an event on Afro-Colombians and peace or whatever.

She hired two more people, but it was still a tiny team. They decided to create a free online course, also named ‘Get Informed about the Peace Process’. Its first version was fairly rudimentary; sign-up was managed through a Google database, and classes were a series of YouTube ‘webinar’ videos, explaining the agenda, the partial agreements, and how to participate. Interest in the course came initially from state institutions, who encouraged or even required their staff to take the course; but as negotiations progressed, varied people signed up – university lecturers, teachers, young people, members of the Armed Forces, indigenous communities, social movements. Given this interest, the OACP updated the course, producing more polished webinars, filmed in a studio, of eight ‘modules’ (each with up to three videos,
varying between 7-20 minutes each), with a quiz to measure comprehension. Quiz answers were submitted via a Google Drive form, and Marcela’s team checked responses and sent back corrections. Those who completed the course received a certificate signed by Sergio Jaramillo. In an introductory video, Jaramillo stated that this course sought to make accessible the basic elements of the peace process to all Colombians, saying “this peace process is open to all of your opinions, but hopefully on the basis of information”. The logic was consolidating within the government ecosystem that the peace process involved a body of knowledge, based on objective facts, on which the OACP was the authority.

The online course would be updated again in 2016, with eight modules, called ‘Peace in Action’: historical context, the structure of the peace process, agrarian reform, political participation, drugs, victims, territorial peace, and the benefits and opportunities of peace. These videos were more succinct, one per module, between 9 and 17 minutes long, except the one on victims, which was 28 minutes. By August 2018, approximately 35,000 people had taken the online course, and the Superior School for Public Administration (ESAP) adopted it as a diploma course. The ‘modules’ are still available on YouTube.

The Logic of Dissemination

Peace pedagogy was based on explaining the technicalities of the partial agreements. This was partly due to the confidentiality principle (they were not allowed to reveal anything not contained in the published documents) and partly as the agreements were still only drafts—they could (and did) change with the Final Agreement. However, this attachment to technicalities was also because speaking as the government has implications. Hugo, an official who had worked in the Participation and Pedagogy Group said:

In early pedagogy sessions I never knew what I could or couldn’t say … We were traumatised by the idea that everything was confidential. The OACP’s position was

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120 OACP. 2016. “Entérese del proceso de Paz” (playlist). https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLN-hTO3pfQVRw7yagOSUZsLwylVefPp0K
121 Jaramillo, Sergio. 2015. “Saludo”. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GLUbAJFSq4U&list=PLN-hTO3pfQVRw7yagOSUZsLwylVefPp0K&index=2&t=0s
123 OACP. 2016. “Paz a la Acción” (playlist). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wDLkB3scrAg&list=PLMvhKl2maAvPKdPCDOH1Hsr4szhZzi454p
always to inform, rather than promote the peace process. … Our narrative was about deconstructing myths with truthful information.  

This foundational logic of peace pedagogy was characterised by the tension between confidentiality as a requirement for the success of the negotiations, and the obstacle it created to communicating, which Hugo felt was “traumatising”. Andrea, another member of the Group, said:

We believed we had to be faithful to the technical details. Those of us who hadn’t been in Havana were scared to get things wrong. The content of the informative booklets was always written by the Thematic Department, and Sergio Jaramillo had to review everything, which was difficult because he always was busy. The whole office was mostly focused on the negotiations; pedagogy wasn’t a priority.  

Evidently, the tensions of phase one continued into phase two: the perception that the technical experts had more authority to speak, and the feeling among members of the Participation and Pedagogy Group that their work was undervalued compared to the negotiations themselves.

Building Trust

The increase of peace pedagogy, while retaining the unidirectional government-society relationship of the first phase, created new encounters between the OACP and multiple social sectors. The OACP officials who went out to speak to people became an interface with society, and began to learn how society perceived them, the government, and the peace process, as in Simón’s opening quote. They realised the great distrust toward the Santos government and the state generally; yet they also discovered widespread hope about the peace process. Hugo said:

The relationship [between state and society] was broken. The state had been a victimiser in some regions. … I encountered great distrust. But the peace process was a powerful issue which helped people overcome that and build alliances with the state, to move peace forward together. People complained about the state, but they knew we were trying to make peace, and that facilitated trust.

Many sceptical communities and groups were increasingly supportive of the peace process, while not necessarily being pro-government. I had seen this among the Peace Community, who initially believed the peace process was just a media stunt by Santos. When discussions began

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124 Interview 27 November 2017.
125 Interview 18 January 2018.
126 Interview 27 November 2017.
in August 2014 on point five, five delegations of twelve victims, selected by the UN, the National University of Colombia and the Catholic Church, travelled to Havana to give their testimony and make proposals to the negotiating table. This led some members of the Peace Community to take the peace process more seriously, even sending their leader, Germán Graciano, in the fourth delegation (Burnyeat 2018, 162-170).

As the OACP was the institution in charge of negotiations, people who distrusted the state but supported the peace process were more open to listening to OACP officials than representatives from other government institutions. The peace pedagogues encountered the existing distrust, and the stereotype of state non-compliance (Pellegrino 2017). Tarcisio told me that when he gave pedagogy sessions to victims, they complained about lack of fulfilment of the 2011 Victims’ Law, saying, “before coming here and talking about more things, first fulfil what you’ve committed to in the Victims’ Law”. However, talking about the peace process opened the possibility of building trust, at least with one institution.

**Territorial Peace and the Pro-Peace Echo Chamber**

In 2013, the concept of ‘territorial peace’ (see Introduction) emerged from discussions on point one and was incorporated into official government discourse about the peace process. The concept gained recognition from social movements and civil society organisations in conflict-affected regions. In 2014, a Territorial Peace Group was created in the OACP, which varied between four and six officials between 2014-2018, and frequently worked with the Participation and Pedagogy Group on joint projects, as both involved ‘facing’ society and thinking about what was happening in Colombia, rather than Havana.

Many requests for peace pedagogy came from conflict-affected regions, as the OACP had established contacts in these regions during their earliest work with mayors and governors, and were invited back to talk to new audiences by civil society organisations, universities and local media. Peace pedagogy was largely reactive, based on responding to requests, which naturally came from sectors who were already interested in the peace process. The OACP sought in this phase to prioritise conflict-affected regions, as these would be most affected by implementation, so they reasoned that conflict-affected communities needed to be more aware, more informed, and have greater opportunities to participate. At this stage, peace pedagogy was not conceived of in terms of building legitimacy for the peace process, but sought to prepare for
implementation. It was not until 2016 that the OACP realised the risk of losing the referendum due to the greater electoral muscle of the urban areas, which had not experienced the conflict so directly, and changed this logic. Thus, a pro-peace echo chamber began to form between organised civil society, especially in conflict-affected regions, and the OACP.

One joint project run by the Territorial Peace Group and the Participation and Pedagogy Group were the Regional Peace Encounters (ERPs), widely-cited in my conversations with civil society leaders as one of the OACP’s best efforts. These were 17 two-day meetings throughout 2014-15 with local communities in conflict-affected regions; some 6500 people participated, 200-250 in each meeting. These aimed to explain advances in the negotiations, listen to people’s thoughts on the six points, and compile feedback for the negotiating table. This changed the early logic of peace pedagogy as a unilateral dissemination of information from government to society, creating a sense of dialogic exchange.

The proposal for this project came from four NGOs – Redprodepaz, Ruta Pacífica de las Mujeres, Red de Iniciativas y Comunidades de Paz desde la Base, and Corporación Pensamiento y Acción Social – all experienced in working with communities in conflict-affected regions. They hoped to unleash a national public dialogue to support the negotiations, inform citizens, and counter disinformation. The ERPs were co-convened by the OACP and the NGOs, creating a new government-civil society alliance. Most participants were from sectors naturally interested in the peace process; grassroots, broadly left-wing communities, rather than people who tend not to participate in civic or political organising.

Cesar, a consultant for one of the NGOs, told me that the ERPs created unique spaces that built trust between government and society by opening a new opportunity for dialogue. People had the chance to say what they felt to the government, he said, instead of expressing it confrontationally, for example via civic strikes.127 The organisers prepared the methodology carefully, visiting the regions beforehand, agreeing the agenda with local leaders. “It was a real pedagogical exercise”, Cesar said, “because it was informing, listening, bringing people together, building trust, resolving doubts, discussing, seeing points of convergence, and understanding what was going on in the territories”.

127 Interview 22 January 2018.
Manuela, from another of the NGOs, underlined the novelty of the government institution in charge of the peace process coming to face people in the regions directly:

The distrust in the state was evident, but people were open to the OACP. When Sergio [Jaramillo] went ... queues of people came to ask questions; it was historic that the government negotiators had arrived to speak with them. We mediated a lot, it helped that we chaired – the alliance with us made it less confrontational.128

In many such regions, the conflict was still ongoing – there was no bilateral ceasefire with the FARC yet, and there were other armed actors, including criminal and paramilitary groups, and the ELN. Many people feared to speak in plenary sessions, afraid of being publicly identified, but took advantage of group exercises and coffee breaks to ask OACP officials questions. The principle of ‘negotiating in the midst of the conflict’ affected the possibilities of peace pedagogy. Giving face as the government was affected by the dynamic nature of ongoing conflict and shifts in public opinion about the peace process – each new event, in Colombia or Havana, affected how communities perceived the OACP officials visiting them.

In 2015 the OACP rebranded the Network of Mayors and Governors for Peace as the Network of Territories for Peace, indicating their prioritisation of relationship-building with civil society. The logic was consolidating within the OACP that peacebuilding had to be anchored in existing efforts of local people across Colombia. Drawing on feedback from peace pedagogy sessions, they decided that rather than swooping in somewhere for a day and giving a talk, the usual way that government officials gave face to society, they needed to engage people in longer-term processes. They ran pilot projects in the conflict-affected regions of Bajo Cauca and Montes de María, partnering with lecturers from local universities to create locally-specific methodologies – the University of Antioquia and the Technological University of Bolívar, respectively. These pilot projects sought to inform people about the negotiations, strengthen local leadership for peace, and design toolkits for participants to do their own peace pedagogy with local communities. As in the ERPs, working with local universities helped convene communities distrustful of government projects.

A (now defunct) website was set up, www.territoriosporlapaz.com.co, alongside social media channels on YouTube, Facebook and Twitter, which aimed to share good peacebuilding

128 Interview 15 February 2018.
practices from different regions. These became repositories for multiple forms of engagement between the OACP and regional civil society, showcasing news that people sent in about their own peacebuilding campaigns and events (Fig.5). The OACP sought to boost existing capacities, finding international funding for local initiatives – concerts, forums, debates, workshops, mural paintings, film screenings, culture fairs, radio shows, community tree-planting, school outreach, and exhibitions about peace. They publicised these initiatives on the website, aiming to “turn up the volume” on local voices, allowing them to resonate more widely. They ran a campaign called “I’m a peacebuilder”, producing videoclips of inspiring local testimonies about peacebuilding.129

![Image of the Network of Territories for Peace website homepage](https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCKc4j9WWGdrcc1ubd2upg/videos)

**Fig.5:** Image of the Network of Territories for Peace website homepage  

**The Impacts of the Interface**

This interfacing work with conflict-affected communities led to a change in the OACP’s discourse on peacebuilding. According to Cesar, participants in the ERPs were annoyed when Jaramillo said peacebuilding would occur in the implementation phase. “Dammit, we’ve been building peace here for 20 years!”, they said to Cesar. Jaramillo’s discourse changed, incorporating recognition of grassroots peacebuilding knowledge. An internal OACP report

129 Some of these are still available. Red territorios por la paz. n.d. YouTube Channel. Accessed 3 February 2020. [https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCKc4j9WWGdrcc1ubd2upg/videos](https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCKc4j9WWGdrcc1ubd2upg/videos)
about the ERPs emphasised the importance of “building on what’s already there” (*construir sobre lo construido*), illustrated with a quote by an indigenous leader from Putumayo: “Aquí ya sabemos vivir en paz”, “here we already know how to live in peace”. The use of local people’s quotes in institutional reports itself reveals the deferential recognition underpinning the logic of territorial peace. This report states:

All the territories have peacebuilding capacities and experiences … These have emerged from adversity, they have resisted, protected things the state has been unable to protect; that makes them valuable and legitimate. Implementation and peacebuilding must begin by identifying and recognising the labour of [local] organisations.\(^{130}\)

The logic of territorial peace promoted a form of recognition of ‘the territories’ that roughly corresponds to what Povinelli (2002) calls ‘late liberalism’.\(^{131}\) Povinelli’s analysis of the politics of recognition in multiculturalism as state policy in Australia has similarities with the OACP’s orientation toward ‘the territories’ in Colombia, loosely comprising victims, ethnic minorities, grassroots communities, and various conceptions of the ‘local’. Many of my interlocutors, from both the OACP and NGOs, described transformations among OACP staff, from stiff, Bogotá-centric and overly-technical, awkward in speaking with communities, to individuals who built rapport, talking naturally and empathetically with people. Manuela told me, “At first the OACP officials were very technical, they didn’t know how to talk to a peasant without sounding pitying”.\(^{132}\) A journalist who covered the ERPs told me that one OACP official “went from being a distant bureaucrat, to sitting next to ordinary people and saying ‘what’s up mate!’”. In one ERP, a woman related publicly how her husband was assassinated and started crying, and an OACP official stood up and hugged her. “When people saw that, it had a huge impact”, he said.\(^{133}\)

These regional projects, however, remained an extra dimension of the OACP’s work; the main focus was still on Havana. Rafael, a university lecturer who worked on the Bajo Cauca project, thought the Participation and Pedagogy Group and the Territorial Peace Group were “very close to the communities, they cared about civil society”, but they were few, and “I felt the project wasn’t a priority for the rest of the OACP, which is why it was quite small-scale”.\(^{134}\) Hugo said,

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\(^{131}\) Povinelli’s term ‘late liberalism’ indexes a “new stage of reflexivity” towards cultural difference in liberal regimes (Povinelli 2011, 25).

\(^{132}\) Interview 15 February 2018.

\(^{133}\) Interview 3 May 2018.

\(^{134}\) Interview 15 February 2018.
“we were the ‘hippies’ of the office. The thematic experts, they were all technical, and just tried to ‘explain the agreement’ – but we tried to do things differently.” Nevertheless, by interfacing with society in the regions, new ways of thinking gradually filtered into the OACP.

Phase 3: Peace Pedagogy to Vote, 2016

Given Marcela’s concern that people felt the government was sending “the little brother” because of her age, she frequently lobbied Sergio Jaramillo to hire someone more senior to direct peace pedagogy. In December 2015, Jaramillo hired Melissa, who was older, and had an impressive international CV spanning the UN, the International Criminal Court, and other international entities. She rebranded the Participation and Pedagogy Group as simply the ‘Pedagogy Group’. Negotiations were entering their final stretch, and it was increasingly clear there would be a referendum on the Peace Agreement. Suddenly, pedagogy became a priority – no longer to prepare for implementation, but to get people to make an informed vote.

Like Marcela, Melissa left the OACP after the Referendum, and I interviewed her in her twentieth-floor office at another state institution. Outside her expansive window, the redbrick rooves of Bogotá spread into the horizon. Melissa was far closer in aspect to the stereotypical powerful women of Bogotá than Marcela, with coiffed, bouncy hair and understated gold jewellery. She was in her late forties, and I guessed from a fairly upper-class family, given her international trajectory, the expensive cloth of her trousers, and the fact that she occasionally dropped a phrase in impeccable English into our conversation. Like Marcela, Melissa felt some responsibility for the lost Referendum, but also expressed passionate regret that her role had not been taken seriously enough by the wider government, and said that peace pedagogy had not been given sufficient resources and importance. She described to me the sense that she had been given a huge responsibility, to inform the country and “deconstruct” the opposition’s “myths” with pedagogy, but she was not assigned a government budget: she had to raise more money for peace pedagogy from the international community. Within the wider government ecosystem, peace pedagogy became more important in the run-up to the Referendum, but was still not given much funding, and Melissa’s team fluctuated between eight or nine members throughout 2016. When the Agreement was reached on 24 August, the full text was published,

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135 Interview 27 November 2017.
136 Interview 14 November 2017
and during the campaign month, nearly the entire OACP was dedicated to peace pedagogy.

As peace pedagogy had always focused on informing, the OACP were not affected by the Statutory Law ruling that the government had to inform but could not campaign (Chapter 1). In the referendum campaign month, the OACP promoted their message that all citizens should “read the Agreement” to make an informed vote. However, once the ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ campaigns began, it was difficult for people to distinguish between peace pedagogy and the ‘Yes’ campaign. Sceptical audiences complained that peace pedagogy was one-sided, and called for debate-style panels with equal representation from the ‘Yes’ and the ‘No’ campaigns. The OACP insisted that they were not promoting the ‘Yes’ but simply disseminating information. The rationality drive, in this context of heightened political tensions, became a defence mechanism.

Melissa realised that pedagogy thus far had tended to preach to the converted, focussing on pro-peace sectors in conflict-affected regions, and she sought to target uninformed or apolitical urban voters, with more electoral muscle. She proposed to create different strategies and messages for different “audiences”. Her objective was to inform, and by informing, build legitimacy. The “audiences” included young people, women’s organisations, the Armed Forces, state officials, the business sector, and religious and faith communities. The selection of some of these sought new audiences who perceived the peace process less favourably; others built on existing relations and strategies. However, while this proliferation of ‘audiences’ generated creativity, it also led to a series of tenuously-connected projects, some of which are recounted next.

**Youth**

The Pedagogy Group launched a competition called ‘This is Your Challenge’, inviting young people to propose their own peace pedagogy, taking the OACP’s material and translating it creatively into a more accessible language and format. Winning proposals were implemented with a budget and support from the OACP. Over 136,000 young people participated in the competition, across two rounds in 2016 (OACP 2018d, 556).

One of the winning proposals came from *Los Desatinados*, ‘the crazy ones’, a YouTuber group of communication studies students from Bogotá. They produced a video series in which they asked passers-by on the street what they thought was in the Peace Agreement, then dispelled
any “myths” with realities. Two of the Desatinados, Javier and Salomón, told me they enjoyed the experience, working with the Pedagogy Group to produce the video scripts, but found the OACP’s insistence on technical correctness challenging. “When we talked about coca, they changed it to ‘illicit crops’,” said Javier. But, they said, they found creative ways around this; for example, in the video explaining point one, the OACP insisted on the term ‘agrarian jurisdiction’. They used it, but then added, “let’s say that differently”, and used their own terms. “We wanted to translate things into a language for ordinary people”, they said.

They had thought that they would get massive exposure by doing a project with national government. They were disappointed when after recording the videos there was little budget left for dissemination, and their videos were only shared on the social media channels of the Network of Territories for Peace and a ‘This is Your Challenge’ Facebook group, reaching a few thousand views. Nevertheless, they received positive feedback, which they thought was because it was easier for people to receive information from citizens than from the government, because of people’s distrust. Salomón said, “it was clear we were not defending the government, but explaining things so people could form an opinion”.

Women’s Organisations

Many influential women’s organisations supported the peace negotiations from the beginning, and developed collaborative relationships with the OACP. In 2016, monthly coordination breakfasts were held in Bogotá between the OACP and these organisations, many of which were doing their own peace pedagogy. A specialised informative booklet for women was produced (unfortunately, to me, pink), titled ‘Peace Involves Me: Women as Protagonists of Peacebuilding’, explaining the gender sub-commission, the gender dimensions of the agreements, and summarising the role of women in implementation and peacebuilding in Colombia and globally (OACP 2016d). Pedagogy official Adriana was tasked with liaising with the women’s organisations, which she told me she thought was easier than working with more

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138 Interview 20 February 2018.
139 These organisations included Casa de la Mujer, la Ruta Pacífica de las Mujeres, Colombia Diversa and Sisma Mujer.
“difficult” audiences, as these organisations saw the OACP positively. “I always felt their approval”, she said, “they saw us as a separate organisation” from the rest of government.\textsuperscript{140}

As with other pro-peace groups, many women’s organisations were critical of the state, but the shared objective of peace facilitated an alliance. Oriana, director of one of these organisations, told me she thought that the “traditional tension in the relationship between state and civil society in the territories” meant that peace pedagogy was more effective when they did it together, as it helped when the message did not come exclusively from the government.\textsuperscript{141} These organisations mostly worked with grassroots women in conflict-affected areas: doing pedagogy with these sectors perpetuated the pro-peace echo chamber. The OACP realised this and in 2016 organised two events in Bogotá and Medellín, targeting uninformed middle and upper-class women, but too little, too late. According to official figures, women-specific peace pedagogy by the OACP (rather than by the NGOs) reached 1500 women (OACP 2018d, 556).

**Armed Forces**

Pedagogy with the armed forces began in 2013, paralleling major efforts to ensure the military’s support to the peace process.\textsuperscript{142} OACP officials gave talks and distributed informative booklets in brigades, battalions and organisations of retired military personnel. Lieutenant Medina, who worked in a military liaison unit within the OACP, said that pervasive “myths” among the armed forces were that the military was going to be reduced in size, their salaries reduced, and that the transitional justice system would “equate” the military with the guerrilla.\textsuperscript{143} In pedagogy sessions, these “myths” constantly had to be corrected. She said, “about half the Armed Forces started to believe, bit by bit, and began to support peace, but there were difficulties in their hearts”.

In 2016, Andrea from the Pedagogy Group was designated to conduct peace pedagogy sessions jointly with Colonel Marín, another military liaison official. Andrea was a young woman, in her early twenties, with a Bogotá accent. It was not easy for her, acknowledged Marín, to present to a room of war-weary soldiers. “Some people were mature about it”, he said, “but

\textsuperscript{140} Interview 24 January 2018.
\textsuperscript{141} Interview 21 February 2018.
\textsuperscript{142} Santos knew that support from the military was fundamental; hence the inclusion of active military at the negotiating table (Santos 2019, 347-9). The Strategic Command for the Transition (COET) was created in 2014 to determine the strategic direction of the military in the post-conflict (Forero 2018).
\textsuperscript{143} Field diary, 17 August 2018.
others were confrontative.” He accompanied her, “to soften them up, explain to them, look, it’s not that I’m pro-FARC, the government is seeking a negotiated solution to reduce the conflict”. It helped that they “presented a united front, government and Armed Forces. My grade [of colonel] was like an umbrella. My credibility created trust”.\(^{144}\) As with the ERPs and the joint peace pedagogy with women’s organisations, alliances made peace pedagogy more effective: a “united front” meant a united face.

Andrea was less enthusiastic. “In my first pedagogy with the military, they massacred me”, she told me (an unfortunate choice of words).\(^{145}\) She explained:

> It was the worst pedagogy I ever did. Because I was young and female. They asked me, ‘is this your first job?’ They interrupted me constantly. They said some terrible things; all campesinos are guerrilleros, the government doesn’t know what it’s doing… They didn’t believe anything I told them.

Andrea’s experience reveals the difficulties of giving face to a sceptical audience, and that such scepticism is partly institutional – anchored in the military’s perception of the government – and partly personal, relating to her cultural positioning in society – her age, class and gender.

**State Officials**

The OACP saw state officials as an important target for pedagogy, as they would have roles in implementation. In 2015, Función Pública (‘Public Function’), the government institution responsible for managing the quality of the public sector’s human resources, proposed a project to the OACP called ‘Public Servants as Peacebuilders’, involving an itinerant exhibition of informative panels, rotating through different ministries and institutions for state officials to receive information in their own workplace. Three sets of panels rotated through institutions in Bogotá in 2015 and 2016,\(^{146}\) and OACP officials gave pedagogy presentations alongside them. Picture frame-shaped stickers went up in bathrooms with the message, “You’re looking at the most important person for achieving peace”. In July 2018, I happened across one of these in an out-of-the-way ladies in a back corridor of the Interior Ministry, and wondered ironically if its continued presence was a sign of the remoteness of the bathroom, or of the commitment to peace of the staff on that floor (Fig. 6).

\(^{144}\) Interview 6 July 2018.

\(^{145}\) Interview 18 January 2018.

\(^{146}\) It was expensive to transport the panels beyond Bogotá, though they went to Ibagué in August 2016.
A Función Pública official told me this exhibition was well received, and began to operate by demand, with ministry staff asking, “When are you going to come to our institution?”

Altogether, strategies to target state officials reached some 90,000 people around Colombia (OACP 2018d, 551).

The Business Sector

OACP official Julián Arevalo, an economist in his late thirties with a PhD in Political Science from the University of Boston, was tasked with doing peace pedagogy with the private sector. Arévalo’s status—a PhD from a foreign university, which he accentuated with his smart suits—

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147 Interview 15 February 2018.
148 I use his real name because he is public enough to be identified and has published his views on the role of the business sector in the peace process, e.g. Arévalo (2016). I interviewed him on 2 March 2018.
helped him ‘face’ senior business people. His strategy was called *Efecto Paz*, ‘Peace Effect’, based on a message emphasising the “benefits and opportunities” of peace. He gave talks at companies, regional chambers of commerce, the National Business Association of Colombia, and events around the country. He produced a specialised informative booklet (Fig.7) showing the “costs” of war to the economy, and encapsulating the “benefits and opportunities” of peace, for example, projecting potential GDP growth under peace; showing Angola’s 17.8% average growth per year after three years of peace; and estimating potential benefits to infrastructure, tourism and agriculture (OACP 2016b).

Fig 7: Pages from *Efecto Paz* informative booklet
Source: Screenshot (OACP 2016b)

‘Peace Effect’ had a website, [http://efectopaz.com](http://efectopaz.com), a Twitter account (both defunct), and a monthly newsletter about the economic dividends of peace, with pronouncements by influential
pro-peace business figures. According to an internal report, in-person peace pedagogy sessions with the business sector reached 5000 people; and the digital platform an additional 3000.

Religious and Faith Communities

Colombia is a religious country, mostly Catholic (70% of society), though with an increasingly influential array of new evangelical churches (10%) and historical protestant churches (including Presbyterians, Lutherans, Anglicans, Baptists, Mennonites, among others, together representing 5%) (Burnyeat and Gómez-Suárez 2017). While the Catholic Church supported some aspects of the peace process, helping select the victim delegations, and the Pope publicly supported the peace process, the Church never formally expressed support to the ‘Yes’, as being pro-peace suggested affiliation with the government.

In 2016 the OACP hired Joaquín, an academic theologian and Jesuit, to do peace pedagogy with religious sectors. Joaquín toured Colombia with the Interior Ministry’s Coordinator of Religious Affairs, explaining the Peace Agreement, citing Christian values such as forgiveness and reconciliation, and using theological arguments in favour of negotiating peace. Joaquín had never worked for the state before, and did not expect the staunch opposition to the peace process from conservative, anti-communist sectors of the Catholic church, who rejected Pope Francis II as a “communist Pope”. In reaction to his audiences’ scepticism, he distanced his own face from that of the government as much as possible. He told me, “I tried to disarm their distrust by presenting myself as a theologian, not a bureaucrat”, and told people, “I support the peace process not because I’m working for the government. Rather, I’m working with the government because I support the peace process, due to my Christian principles”.

There was resistance in this sector to associate too closely with the government. The Catholic Church had a Commission on Reconciliation and Peace, which Joaquín worked with, but the

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149 E.g. a video by Colombian businessman Marío Hernández, saying that the peace process was important irrespective of politics, but which only got some 1900 views. YouTube. 2016. “Mario Hernandez - Empresario y columnista”. 22 July 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=10&v=rByj38ZKgoY
151 See also Chapter 3. On the role of churches in the Referendum and the 2018 elections, see Cosoy (2018).
152 Interview 28 August 2018.
Episcopal Conference refused to do joint pedagogy with the OACP, “because they were afraid of being accused of corruption”, said Joaquín. “Although we shared objectives, we couldn’t coordinate, because they wanted to maintain distance from the government”. Sometimes the Catholic church invited him to speak at their events, but joint events – a “united front” – were impossible. A specialised informative booklet was produced, titled ‘Peace Involves Me: The Religious Sector in the Implementation of the Peace Agreement’ (OACP 2016c), but it never circulated, said Joaquín, because influential priests complained it had been produced unilaterally by the government, so they opposed its distribution.

When the ‘gender ideology’ scandal broke in August 2016, all Joaquín’s subsequent efforts went toward trying to “clarify the misunderstanding”. But the ‘gender ideology’ narrative stuck, and people started to say that peace pedagogy was “a strategy to manipulate the churches to vote ‘Yes’ in the Referendum”.

Other Audiences

To target the six million Colombians outside the country, government delegates and activists who worked with exiled victims travelled to Santiago de Chile, Miami, Quito, Brussels, Valencia and Barcelona in Spain, San Cristobal and Maracaibo in Venezuela, Geneva, Berlin, and Montreal and Toronto in Canada, giving talks to Colombians abroad, with convening support from consulates. Between July and September this strategy reached 50,000 Colombians.  

To do pedagogy with victims, the OACP and the Victims’ Unit proposed projects with the National Federation of Ombudsmen (Fenalper). Resulting initiatives included an Afro-Colombian rap group, Los Herederos de Suárez, from a conflict-affected municipality in Cauca, recording eight hip-hop songs explaining the Peace Agreement. The Pedagogy Group reviewed the lyrics and found funding for such initiatives. A specialised informative booklet for victims was produced, with a summary of point five, and ways victims had participated in negotiations (OACP 2016f).

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To target rural communities, the OACP ran a project with the Ministry of Information Technologies and Communications called ‘Peace Kiosks’, using digital internet kiosks the Ministry had installed in rural areas, to deliver webinars, reaching approximately 6600 people via 359 kiosks (OACP 2018d, 561). 155 In 2016, the OACP and the Gabriel García Márquez Foundation for New Iberoamerican Journalism ran a project called ‘Community Radios for Peace and Coexistence’, giving training to 450 community radio stations in conflict-affected areas, and funding fifty scholarships for community radio personnel to study diplomas in peace studies. 400 radio stations received funding to produce weekly shows about the peace agreement (OACP 2018d, 573).

For ethnic communities, the OACP worked with the Ministry of Culture to produce summaries of the Peace Agreement in 56 indigenous languages; 47 written, and nine, which only exist orally, were recorded. 156 3.36% of the Colombian population is indigenous, 10.4% Afro-Colombian, and 0.01% Roma. 157 At least 60 different indigenous languages are spoken; Afro-Colombian creoles also exist. The OACP and Ministry of Culture produced a specialised informative booklet for ethnic communities, called ‘Peace Involves Me: Ethnic Communities as Protagonists of Peacebuilding’, explaining the Ethnic Chapter of the Agreement (OACP 2016e). These strategies, plus in-person peace pedagogy sessions with ethnic communities, reached 10,000 people (OACP 2018d, 557). The OACP also produced six videos with the National Institute for the Deaf translating the Agreement into sign language. 158

The OACP also did various other initiatives as the Referendum loomed, including visits to 24 prisons to deliver pedagogy to FARC prisoners; an exhibition in a geodesic dome in an upper-middle class neighbourhood in Bogotá; a stand at the Bogotá Book Festival; a conference in the Cartagena Hay Festival; and multiple talks by Sergio Jaramillo, Humberto de la Calle, and leading national and international academics. In September 2016, seven government

155 In June 2016 there were 2000 of these digital kiosks around Colombia (MinTIC 2015).
negotiators did a ‘Pedagogy Marathon’, touring the country, doing 16 pedagogy events in seven cities, reaching 7400 people.\textsuperscript{159}

**Phase 4: Self-Criticism amid Implementation, 2017-2018**

The Referendum result devastated the OACP, as evident in Marcela’s and Melissa’s disillusionment. Melissa said to me:

> For God’s sake, the government spent five years on the peace process, we had to inform people, there was so much disinformation, so many lies, it needed a structure to do it well, but ... I did not see a clear, strategic vision to make pedagogy central. Sergio [Jaramillo] wanted to, but he was in Havana and couldn’t do everything. And the OACP is tiny, the rest of the state ought to have accompanied it.

Her interpretation blamed Santos, and the wider government ecosystem, for not “accompanying” the OACP’s peace pedagogy with human, political and financial resources. The fact she had to secure finances from the international community, she said, was “as if we were an NGO and not a state institution”.

After Melissa left, she was succeeded by Valentina, who had previously worked in the Territorial Peace Group. Valentina directed the Pedagogy Group for the rest of the Santos administration, the period of my fieldwork. A common post-referendum analysis among OACP officials was that the Referendum had been lost because peace pedagogy had been too “technical” and not “emotional” enough. Valentina said:

> We stuck to technical rigour, and being faithful to what had been agreed. That prevented us from communicating more simply. ... Thematic experts didn’t necessarily know how to communicate clearly.\textsuperscript{160}

This resonated with the views of those who had struggled with the OACP’s insistence on technical correctness, from the *Desatina*ados to the Presidential Communications Department. Valentina wanted to propose alternative peace pedagogy projects that engaged the emotions of society. However, in the first half of 2017, Jaramillo instructed the Pedagogy Group to prioritise delivering peace pedagogy to local populations and state institutions in all municipalities with disarmament and reincorporation zones, because these places were where the first steps of

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\textsuperscript{159} OACP internal document. 2016. Personal archive.
\textsuperscript{160} ‘Peace Breakfast’, Rodeemos el Diálogo, 19 August 2017.
implementation were taking place, and it was urgent that these populations should ‘know the Agreement’.

The perceived urgency of pedagogy in the Referendum had elevated its importance within the wider ecosystem of the Santos government, and this led to a structural change in the OACP. Whereas previously the Pedagogy Group was an ad hoc team, legally dependent on the OACP’s Thematic Department, in mid-2017 it became formalised as the Pedagogy Department, meaning it was assigned its own budget.\(^{161}\) This coincided with the end of the disarmament phase in August, when Jaramillo left his post to become Ambassador of Colombia in Belgium, and Santos appointed the extant ambassador, Rodrigo Rivera, as High Commissioner for Peace in his place, for the government’s final year. Many observers perceived this switch as a significant change in face: Rivera was a Liberal politician, from a regional elite, and overtly religious (see Chapter 3).

Rivera maintained most of Jaramillo’s staff, and Santos asked him to consolidate Jaramillo’s efforts. Under Rivera, the OACP’s priorities included participating in the bilateral (government-FARC) bodies charged with promoting implementation of the Peace Agreement: the Commission for Monitoring, Promoting and Verifying the Implementation of the Final Agreement (CSIVI), the National Commission on Security Guarantees, and the National Council on Reincorporation. Rivera tasked the new Pedagogy Department, directed by Cristian, not Valentina, with creating Territorial Peace Councils (CTPs), municipal and departmental councils comprising state institutions and civil society tasked with overseeing and promoting implementation of the Peace Agreement locally.\(^ {162}\) This was a loose conception of ‘pedagogy’, more to do with relationship-building than information dissemination (see Chapter 6). However, Valentina maintained her own separate Pedagogy Group within the wider Pedagogy Department, and Rivera gave her relative autonomy to lead the new projects she had proposed, particularly one that sought to create “new narratives” about the peace process in Colombian society. Nevertheless, this project remained marginal to the OACP’s central efforts, and faced numerous challenges, as Chapter 5 recounts.

\(^{161}\) Via Presidential Decree 1270 of 2017.

\(^{162}\) Point 2.2.4 of the Peace Agreement established that Territorial Councils for Reconciliation and Coexistence would be created, to advise and accompany local authorities on implementation of the Agreement. Law 885 of 2017, which updated the National Peace Council’s regulations, authorised Departments and Municipalities to create Territorial Peace Councils with citizen participation.
Meanwhile, with implementation of the renegotiated deal underway, multiple groups around Colombia, from local state institutions and businesses to universities and victims’ organisations, continued to request traditional peace pedagogy from the OACP, believing it was necessary to “know the Agreement”. Valentina’s team responded to these demands, focussing increasingly on implementation of the Agreement, believing that informing people about it was necessary to protect the early victories of the Peace Agreement, and make peace sustainable. However, while it was a straightforward if laborious task to summarise the Agreement, it became increasingly difficult to keep track of and centralise information related to implementation, which was not a centralised process. In these pedagogy sessions, OACP officials explained the Agreement, and invited representatives of implementing institutions to complement their overview by explaining their work. As implementation progressed, and different implementing institutions established teams in the regions, there were increasing institutions to include in inter-institutional pedagogy sessions, pedagogy sessions got longer and longer, and the amount of information proliferated wildly. Chapter 4 shows how going from presenting a text which made promises to explaining realities on the ground, which could be evaluated in different ways, made it difficult to keep pedagogy neutral and technical, which had always been the OACP’s safe position – the foundational logic of explaining.

**Conclusions**

Whatever criticisms the OACP had of their own peace pedagogy, and whatever criticisms we might have to their efforts, the government clearly did do peace pedagogy. Looking back, it could have started earlier, they could have prioritised it more, hired more staff, people with teaching experience rather than technocrats: they could have done more pedagogy, earlier, and better. They could have focussed on uninformed urban audiences from the beginning, instead of preaching to the converted, rural conflict-affected audiences who were always going to vote ‘Yes’, and creating pro-peace echo chambers underpinned by liberal politics of deferential recognition to ‘the territories’. These are valid lessons we can signal retrospectively, but this chapter has shown the logics according to which peace pedagogy developed, especially the need to progress in the negotiations themselves, the difficulties of speaking as government, and the need to control tightly the official, technical line, as communicating was also negotiating. The rationality drive was shaped by the possibilities of speaking as the government in this context, and as Uribe’s “myths” increased, they retreated further into this rationality.
The rationality drive, resonant of the ‘meliorism’ which Gray signals as central to liberalism, thus encapsulates the fundamental paradox of peace pedagogy. It sought to be technical, to avoid being seen as ‘political’; yet anything done by the government is *de facto* perceived as political, as perceptions of national-level politics are projected onto individual government representatives. Collaborators from pro-peace society who shared the objective of explaining the Peace Agreement did not want to seem too associated to the government, and thought pedagogy was more effective when done jointly with people outside the government, because people were less likely to interpret it as government propaganda. On its own, the government struggled to dispel “myths” with rational explanations, because speaking from the government meant an *a priori* agonistic position vis-à-vis the opposition. Government peace pedagogy was inescapably political. The Santos government’s reluctance to accept this is perhaps resonant of the crisis of global liberalism, in its inability to combat ‘post-truth’ using rational arguments.

Levinas (1979, 198) says “the face speaks to me and thereby invites me to a relation”. Peace pedagogy created a new kind of government-society interface which involved presence, *being there*, as Simón put it in the opening quote. As peace pedagogy evolved, incorporating feedback from this interface, many OACP officials developed increased sensitivity about the need to spend time with people, listening to them and offering recognition as the government, to overcome distrust. The liberal peace paradigm has been criticised for excluding local knowledge (Mac Ginty 2008); yet peace pedagogy sought to include people and build genuine government-society relationships, even if it was a case of too little, too late, and not prioritised by the wider government. Despite these good intentions, the foundational paradox of peace pedagogy, in its aspiration to be non-political, located the Santos government’s appeals to reason in a different world from the Democratic Centre’s disinformation campaign, making it impossible for Santos to win the ‘narrative wars’. Chapter 3 turns to the cultural underpinning of this aversion to emotional politics among the OACP *bogotano* liberal elites, in reaction to the perceived threat of liberalism’s internal other, populism.
CHAPTER 3 –The Anti-Politics of Cultural Liberalism

Mauricio Rodríguez, brother-in-law and close advisor to President Juan Manuel Santos, told me he thought the way that Santos had communicated peace was “too rational and technical”; he should have tried to “sell it emotionally”. But, he said, that was not Santos’ style. “I sometimes write bullet points for his speeches, and he always takes out any emotional phrases”, said Mauricio. He contrasted this with Uribe’s success in the Referendum, which he attributed to the capacity to incite the “negative emotions” of “hatred and fear”, because Uribe was a “communicative genius”, and had “charisma”, whereas Santos, he believed, was uncharismatic.

This opposition of Santos and Uribe’s leadership styles as rational versus emotional was common among Bogotá elites, and underpinned by a cultural and ideological framework based on Enlightenment conceptions of modernity and backwardness. Mauricio said that Santos’ speeches were always well-received internationally, because of his analytical, rational, logical character; but “they applaud him in Oxford, not in a Colombian town”, because Colombia is “not a rational country”, it is “emotional, visceral, impulsive”. Santos was “a statesman”, a “man of institutions”, he said, who tried to “bring Colombia into modernity” by working for peace, when the country was “still living in the eighteenth century”. He “lacks Uribe’s common touch”; whereas Uribe was “a populist, a caudillo, a Messiah”, who “uses the popular diminutive all the time, la casita, mijita, los sombreritos, and he asks after everyone’s families”, he “knows how to talk to ordinary people”. In other words, said Mauricio, Uribe was “the traditional paternal figure that resonates in all weak societies. Someone who protects, orders, organises, controls.” Santos represented “the Bogotá elite, a bit academic”, who in New York or London is “like a fish in water”, whereas Uribe was “a Colombian, a patrón de finca [ranch boss], and doesn’t feel comfortable in Europe”.

This chapter turns to the cultural underpinning of the Santos government’s face. I use Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of ‘faciality’ (1987, 170-75), which denotes how faces are socially coded, engendering and revealing social power, privilege and inequalities, to reference how government officials—from President Santos, to High Commissioners for Peace Sergio Jaramillo and Rodrigo Rivera, down to the OACP peace pedagogues—are situated culturally in Colombian society, via markers such as race, class, gender, age, education, region of origin

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163 Interview, 5 June 2018.
and career path. I highlight the opposition in the liberal imagination between modernity – represented by Santos’ rationality – and backwardness – represented by Uribe’s populism – to understand how this faciality shapes the OACP officials’ outward-facing work.

The way we perceive governments involves a kaleidoscope of public personae, including the President and other public figures, whose faces are inlaid over those of lower-ranking government officials tasked with speaking for the government. The OACP officials, indirectly, personified President Santos; or better, they *personated* him, a now-obsolete verb signifying to play the part of someone.\(^{164}\) When people attended peace pedagogy sessions, their perceptions of OACP officials were shaped by a convergence of their perceptions of the state as trans-historical idea, their perceptions of government public personae, and of the individual official standing before them.

By documenting the faciality of Juan Manuel Santos, Sergio Jaramillo, Rodrigo Rivera, and OACP officials, all mostly from elite sectors of Bogotá, I argue that the Santos government’s face is characterised by what I call ‘cultural liberalism’. With this concept I seek to articulate the way that liberalism is frequently expressed as a cultural trait; the embedding and reproduction of the ‘liberal imagination’ (Mazzarella 2015) within cultural contexts, and the intertwining of liberal ideology with cultural values, in such a way as to make many people unaware of the ideological underpinnings to their views, believing their liberal ‘common sense’ is ‘not political’. This cultural liberalism incorporates the Santos government’s perception of Uribe as a populist threat. I thus follow Mazzarella’s (2015, 2019) attention to the role populism plays in liberalism, as an internal ‘other’ seen to represent “the purported backwardness and irrationality of other lifeworlds” (Mazzarella 2015, 104-5), a threat to the linear march of civilisation toward the Enlightenment ideal of rationality.

Chapter 2 showed how peace pedagogy was founded on a paradox, insofar as it sought to be technical and avoid being seen as ‘political’ – the ‘rationality drive’ – yet was *a priori* political by virtue of the fact it was done by the government, and shaped by the government’s liberal way of thinking about the peace process. This chapter shows that the rationality drive, valued both as a virtue in itself, and in opposition to what the Santos government officials saw as the premodern, populist emotionality of Uribe, is a culturally liberal trait. Whereas Santos as a politician explicitly

subscribed to liberal political ideology (specifically the ‘Third Way’ variant), OACP officials commonly saw themselves as ‘not political’. However, they shared the imperceptible ideological underpinning of cultural liberalism, and its rejection of politics, or ‘anti-politics’. This concept of the anti-political is subtly different from Ferguson’s (1994) theory of the anti-politics machine, which foregrounds how the technocratic discourse of development “depoliticises” both poverty and the state that is supposed to implement development policy. Spencer and Curtis (2012, 3) write that Ferguson’s book is “not about what people in Lesotho do or say in the name of politics or the political: ‘politics’ and ‘the political’ describe what ought to be happening … were it not for the obfuscatory fog of the development apparatus”. By taking Spencer’s approach, asking how people “attempt to bound the workings of the political” (2012, 726), this chapter unveils an emic conception of things that are not politics, revealing the anti-political as a core value in cultural liberalism. Whereas Ferguson’s ‘anti-politics’ denies politics, the ‘anti-politics’ of cultural liberalism values politics negatively.

Juan Manuel Santos and the Bogotá Elites

The idea people have of a president’s public persona comprises what Lempert and Silverstein (2012, 1-2), drawing from US political campaign jargon, call ‘Message’ with a capital ‘M’, meaning a “politician’s publicly imaginable ‘character’ presented to an electorate, with a biography and a moral profile crafted out of issues rendered of interest in the public sphere”, and what a politician seems to communicate “about his or her identity and personal values through selectively taking up some Issues and avoiding others”. Drawing on Goffman (1959), Lempert and Silverstein (2012, 6-11) say that ‘Message’ incorporates the cultural ‘signs’ of a political figure emanates, mediated by media (Martín-Barbero 1993) which imply things about social sector and lifestyle. This section locates Juan Manuel Santos culturally within Colombian society, based on his family background and professional trajectory, revealing his ‘faciality’.

Juan Manuel Santos was born in 1951 into an influential Bogotá family with a prominent role in politics. Eduardo Santos Montejo, Juan Manuel’s grandfather, bought the small newspaper El Tiempo in 1911 and developed it into one of the country’s major newspapers, the leading source for dissemination of the Colombian Liberal Party’s ideology. Eduardo Santos held various ministerial positions, was elected to Congress, and was president in 1938-42 of the
Liberal party. But *El Tiempo* was his great legacy, and he came to politics through journalism. Presidents would call him before announcing big decisions and ask his opinion; the *El Tiempo* editorial line was so important that it could “knock down state officials and elect presidents” (Duzán 2018, 46).

The practice of combining journalism and politics echoes the long-standing tradition of the Latin American public intellectual, the *hombres letrados*, ‘lettered men’. As in wider Latin America, race and language in Colombia were connected elements that policed social hierarchies under colonialism. Colonial elites were concerned with maintaining the purity of the Spanish language, and saw whiteness as cultural capital, representing access to scientific and literary knowledge, and guaranteeing social distance from the colonised (Castro-Gómez 2005, 15). After independence, the Colombian elite, relatively small and poor compared to other Latin American elites, were literate in a country of 90% illiteracy, Creole (descended from Spaniards) among a majority of mestizos (mixed), Indians and Afro-Colombians, and saw themselves as “the architects of civilization” in a country of barbarity (Rojas 1995, 153). Throughout the nineteenth century, the connection between politics and being letrado consolidated around the value given by both Liberal and Conservative party elites to philology and grammar (Deas 1992).

Eduardo Santos had no children, but two nephews, Hernando and Enrique Santos. Hernando, a left-leaning Liberal, became director of *El Tiempo*; Enrique was right-wing, sympathetic to Spanish dictator Franco and staunchly anti-communist, and became general editor. Juan Manuel Santos was the son of Enrique and his wife Clemencia Calderón, also from a family of elite Liberals. Politics was a daily topic of discussion in the family, and politicians visited the home and the newspaper offices frequently. This upbringing instilled in Juan Manuel Santos a feel for politics and journalism, and a loyalty to the ideals of Colombian Liberalism, while also being exposed to the more right-wing perspectives of his father (Duzán 2018, 46-52, Tappe 2019, 27-29).

Juan Manuel Santos studied in a Catholic school, was a cadet in the Naval School of Cartagena, and read Economics and Business Management in the University of Kansas. He went to London in 1973, where he took an MSc in Economics at the London School of Economics, while working in his first job as chief executive of the National Federation of Coffee

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Growers of Colombia and delegate to the International Coffee Organisation. He remained in London for nine years, learning diplomacy and strengthening connections with Colombian diplomats and politicians (Tappe 2019, 30). He later did a Master's in Public Administration at the Harvard Kennedy School, graduating in 1981, where he studied with Roger Fisher, who supported negotiations in the Camp David Israel-Egypt peace talks in 1978.

Santos became deputy director of El Tiempo when he returned to Colombia in 1981, and its director two years later. He wrote opinion pieces in the newspaper, often about the possibilities for peace in Colombia, drawing comparatively on peace processes in South Africa, Sri Lanka and Northern Ireland (Tappe 2019, 37-41). In 1991, President Gaviria appointed him Minister of Foreign Trade. In 1994 Santos founded a think-tank, Fundación Buen Gobierno (‘Good Governance’), through which he led a peace initiative called Destino Colombia (‘Destiny Colombia’), which aimed to bring together the different factions of Colombia’s conflict for negotiations, including the guerillas, paramilitaries, the business sector and the Catholic church. It failed because he left then President Samper out of the loop and was accused of plotting to overthrow the government (Tappe 2019, 33-34).

During Pastrana’s administration, Santos was initially part of the commission that created and verified the Caguán demilitarised zone, but he quit early, publicly criticising the disorganisation of the Caguán peace process in El Tiempo op-eds. In 2000, Pastrana appointed him Minister of Finance and Public Credit. Santos originally opposed Uribe’s candidacy within the Liberal Party for the elections of 2002, though his right-wing cousin, Francisco Santos, was Uribe’s vice-presidential formula. A year into Uribe’s first term, Santos wrote a critical op-ed in El Tiempo, opposing Uribe’s plans for re-election. In 2003, Santos tried to run for mayor of Bogotá but the Liberal party did not back him. In 2004, Uribe appointed Santos as leader of the government party in Congress. Given this support, and his failure to launch his own political career, Santos began to engage more with Uribe’s political agenda. By 2005, he publicly supported Uribe’s policies, and co-founded, with Óscar Iván Zuluaga, the Partido de la U which allowed Uribe to run for his second term (Tappe 2019, 36-37). After his re-election, Uribe made Santos Defence Minister, which, as Chapter 1 recounts, was Santos’ stepping stone to the presidency. Tappe (2019) argues that Santos’ trajectory indicates a clear preference for negotiated peace, and that his support to Uribe was partly strategic, and partly because he genuinely saw a military

166 See Santos (1994) about his work in this role, and his views on Colombia’s development.
approach as appropriate in that moment. The Santos family sold their shares in *El Tiempo* to Spanish company Planeta in 2007, but the family remains prominent in political journalism; Juan Manuel Santos’ nephew, Alejandro Santos Rubino, is director of *Revista Semana*, the influential political analysis weekly magazine.

President Santos, like almost all presidents of Colombia, was upper-class, white, *bogotano*, and Catholic but with a secular outlook – four intersecting ‘faciality’ markers. ‘Whiteness’ in Colombia was fluidly construed after independence to encompass selectively the *mestizo* population, and the process of *mestizaje* (mixing) as a civilizing process of ‘whitening’ the Indian population, meaning to make them more culturally Spanish, especially regarding Spanish liberal notions of morality and progress (López Rodríguez 2019, 33-34). Unlike Peru and Bolivia, where the Andes were associated with indigenous populations, the Colombian elites considered the Andean region, where Bogotá is located, as the best place for consolidating a ‘white’ nation on the basis of this *mestizaje* (López Rodríguez 2019, 14), in contrast to the parallel construction of racialised, exotic tropics, construed as barbaric and uncivilised, where Indians and Afro-Colombians lived (Appelbaum 2016). Whiteness today is associated with upward mobility, and race and class intersect as determinants of status (Wade 1993, 337-8). The boundaries of ‘whiteness’ are more ambiguous than in the US or Europe, and intersect with class, just as de la Cadena (2000, 17) shows how in Peru, people with varied *mestizo* skin tones can be socially construed as white via intersections of race with geography (those from the capital are higher-status) and education, as “prevalent liberalism swayed the country’s elites to envision education as the ‘racial homogenizer’ and therefore a key nation-building element”.

While ‘class’ generally refers to groups of people in the same society with differential access to resources, whose stratification shapes people’s consciousness (Durrenberger 2012, 10, 16), Eurocentric categories of stratification cannot be unproblematically mapped onto other cultures (Smith 1984), even though the production of social hierarchies in the global South is implicated in global coloniality (Quijano 2007). As Maqsood (2017, 3), in her ethnography of Pakistani middle classes, writes, “It is obvious, but often ignored, that groups comprising the middle class in western Europe—where the term was first used—are different from those that are typically considered as the middle class in the postcolonial world”. Upper-class, upper-middle class and middle-class mean different things in Colombia and the UK. Those with lifestyles commonly conceived of as middle-class – access to education, disposable income, choice of career path – are also construed as middle-class in Colombia, but actually represent the top segments of
Colombian society.\textsuperscript{167} Socio-economically speaking, the top 1% of Colombia’s population receives 20.5% of total income, the highest percentage in Latin America (Klein 2018, 171). While the middle class grew throughout the 2000s, Colombia remains one of the most unequal countries in the world.\textsuperscript{168} In this context, upper-class, upper-middle class and middle class, while differing greatly between themselves, are all, comparatively within Colombia, elites.\textsuperscript{169}

Regional identities are important in Colombia, and intersect with race and class in the social hierarchy (Appelbaum 2016). Divergent patterns of colonisation and state-building over time (Safford and Palacios 2002) led to regional elites developing in parallel to Bogotá elites, governing their own regions and receiving money from central government in return for political allegiance (Ocampo 2014, González 2014, Robinson et al. 2017). The Bogotá elites consider themselves exemplary of order and modernity, and other areas of the country as wild and backward (Serje 2011). Uribe, from a land-owning family in the department of Antioquia, is elite, but culturally very different to Santos.

Santos was a practicing Catholic, was sometimes seen going to Mass, occasionally cited the Bible in his speeches, but mostly maintained a secular discourse, consistent with the separation of church and state instilled since the 1991 Constitution. The relationship between piousness, faith institutions, and political power in Colombia has evolved over time, dating back to colonialism, when the Catholic church played a major role in state-building, and in evangelising indigenous communities. The church’s role in public affairs was a key issue perpetuating the sectarianism between Liberals and Conservatives: the Liberal ideal that human progress and transformation was in the hands of men and science threatened the Conservative notion that the Catholic church should give structure, tradition and stability to society (Cosoy 2018, 29), and the involvement of the church in the Liberal-Conservative clash was more pronounced in Colombia than elsewhere in Latin America (Deas 2015b, 42-3). From the mid-nineteenth century, Protestant churches also established increasing presence in Colombia, largely from the USA (Cosoy 2018, 33-4). Today, 97% of Colombians believe in some kind of God (Cosoy 2018, 13), the Catholic church consistently figures in surveys among the institutions most trusted by Colombians (Cosoy 2018, 80), and there are around 4000 registered religious institutions,

\textsuperscript{167} On the history of middle-class formation in Colombia see López-Pedreros (2019).
\textsuperscript{168} Colombia had a GINI coefficient of 50.8 in 2016 (World Bank 2016).
\textsuperscript{169} On the anthropology of elites as a category that varies greatly across different societies, see Shore and Nugent (2002). Within their volume, Watson (2002) argues that the term ‘elite’ is useful only when employed together with other concepts (e.g. military, political, business) and within historical contexts.
mostly evangelical, with between six and twelve million followers (Cosoy 2018, 97). Churches remain important spaces of political indoctrination, and evangelical churches especially have allied with right-wing parties, like in the USA, winning votes from poorer classes (Cosoy 2018, 102-8). While religion thus plays a major part in cultural and political life in Colombia, for Santos and other cultural liberals, it was a personal, not a public matter.

According to Bunce (2019, 178-80), with the increase of drug-trafficking and criminal wealth in the 1980s, and the increased secularisation of public life, Colombian elite identities, already split by region, became further bifurcated along two lines: “the more cultivated, established affluent class, and the ostentatious nuevos ricos [new rich]”. The Bogotá upper classes, such as the Santos family, employ symbolic boundaries to differentiate themselves from “the chauvinistic or religious conservatives, regional political classes, and families who have suspicious sources of wealth”. They reject those they see as parochial, overly religious, populist, and lacking in both international outlooks and refinement in general. Their liberal ideology exists in opposition to the ultra-conservative nationalism spearheaded by the Colombian far-right. They are transnationally-mobile, speak several languages, and have a liberal, secular, humanist outlook: they are the “type of Colombian that the foreign investor can feel comfortable dealing with” (Bunce 2019, 188). These cultural boundaries transcend partisan lines; members of the Colombian Conservative party can be culturally liberal, while members of the Liberal party can be culturally conservative. Thus, just as Maqsood (2017) shows how different Pakistani class identities are intertwined differentially with practices of piety and ideals about modernity, in Colombia, class, religion, race and region of origin all intersect with notions of modernity, and among liberal Bogotá elites, modernity was associated with secularity.

**Liberalism’s Internal ‘Other’: Álvaro Uribe Vélez**

Uribe’s approval ratings during his government remained between 70-80% (Viveros 2013, 77), despite the multiple scandals he was implicated in, including the ‘false positives’ scandal, the revelation that the security services were chuzadando or wire-tapping human rights defenders and political opponents, the investigations into multiple members of his bench in Congress and his family for connection to paramilitaries and drug-trafficking (the parapolítica scandal), and hundreds of accusations of human rights crimes. Nothing seemed to affect his popularity, earning him the title of “Teflon president”, because “nothing stuck to him” (Viveros 2013, 92).
Uribe’s popularity was connected to a strongman style of governance Michelutti (2013) has called ‘muscular politics’, whereby popular leaders construct their charismatic appeal using cultural resources. The cultural resources underpinning Uribe’s popularity, as Viveros (2013, 81-2) analyses, include the Colombian ideals of white masculinity and the paisa regional identity. People from Antioquia, antioqueños, known as paisas, have “strong, unusual identity referents”, identified with the values of capitalist modernity, such as “hard worker”, “responsible father”, “economic provider”, strength, entrepreneurship, taste for adventure, business sense and religiosity. These values are underpinned by historical referents: Antioquia has a trajectory of small-scale settlers and peasants venturing out to remoter parts of the department such as Urabá, facing inhospitable landscapes, using their strength, courage and wiliness to prevail in these ‘wild’ regions (Serje 2011), domesticating these lands and putting them to productive use via agriculture (Roldán 2003, Burnyeat 2018, 41-45). Uribe combined many elements of paisa masculine identity: “a hard work ethic, the brusque discipline of the campesino, austerity and the sense of saving money, love for the countryside, a family spirit” (Viveros 2013, 89).

Uribe’s detractors jeered at his “provincial” celebration of regional identity: he wore clothing characteristic of the campesino antioqueño, like the poncho and volteado hat, he used rural metaphors, and, as Mauricio noted, popular diminutives (Viveros 2013, 86). Semana magazine compared Uribe to George Bush on the front cover of its August 2005 edition, depicting them both as strongmen riding horses. The Bogotá elites’ dislike of the regional elite is exemplified by upper-class bogotano writer Antonio Caballero in a scathing column titled ‘Uribe: the Horseman’, which equates Uribe with “crude populism”, calls him “demagogic and messianic, a jingoistic patriot and troublemaker,” the stereotype Latin American president “who is at once father and godfather, feared and patriarchal, cheerful and authoritarian, loyal friend of his friends, mortal enemy to his enemies” (Caballero 2008).

Despite his family’s wealth, Uribe was portrayed as a “leader close to his people, just another Colombian” (Viveros 2013, 91), similar to how Michelutti (2016, 15) describes popular leaders’ use of “fictive kinship” to promote the idea of a “charismatic relational bond” with citizens. These bonds are often produced in ritual spaces (Forbess and Michelutti 2013, 13); in Uribe’s case, these were his famous consejos comunitarios, ‘community councils’, weekly visits to different municipalities to engage directly with local communities live on public television; the cornerstone of his “personalist style of government” (Viveros 2013, 85). Caballero, caricaturing these councils, said:
[Uribe] imparts justice, appoints or arrests state officials, gives sexual advice to adolescents, distributes subsidies, kisses beauty queens, blesses babies, prays three *Ave Marias* on his knees and issues threats against terrorists or magistrates of the Supreme Court. Sometimes he tops it all off with a show of horsemanship, taming a wild colt. (Caballero 2008)

In other words, Uribe, in Caballero’s view, governed without respect for laws, based on his muscular authority. This depiction of Uribe as the war-lord of the embarrassing barbaric past of Latin America says more about Caballero and the Bogotá elites than about Uribe. It reveals the imperialist condescension analysed by Sánchez (2016), who critiques the liberal global stereotyping of Latin American political leaders, from Simón Bolívar to Hugo Chávez, as backwards populists. Sánchez (2016, 8) cites Peruvian novelist Vargas Llosa: “The good Latin American political orator bears a much closer resemblance to a bullfighter or a rock singer than to a lecturer or a professor: his communication with the audience is achieved by way of instinct, emotion, sentiment, rather than by way of intelligence”. The subtext is that “a thin veneer covers up a much older, luxuriant undergrowth of premodern values, practices, and institutions” (Sánchez 2016, 9). This is what Mazzarella (2015, 104-5) calls “the imperial condescension” of the liberal imagination, by which populism is construed as a threat to “the clear-cut moulds of a rational community” (Laclau 2005, x). Populism is the internal *other* of liberalism.

The face of the government differed under Uribe and Santos. A foreign diplomat who served his own government in Colombia during both administrations summarised this difference to me by describing a trip he made to one of Uribe’s community councils and contrasting it with his experience accompanying a regional visit by Santos. He said that Uribe’s assistants were “really serious”, sent a research team to the municipality two weeks beforehand, and had huge briefing folders on every single aspect of life there which they discussed with Uribe on the presidential plane, and they transmitted statistics from this research onto a hidden screen in Uribe’s lectern during his speech, creating the sense that the president really knew and cared about the municipality’s problems. Uribe stayed until late at night, meeting different interest groups. By contrast, when this diplomat travelled with Santos to a regional event, there were no briefing folders on the plane, and they left before lunch. “It didn’t feel serious”, he told me. When they arrived, he said, Santos even removed his watch, and gave it to his bodyguard before going to shake hands with people.\(^\text{170}\) Uribe’s populist aesthetic – folkloric, distinctively Colombian,

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\(^{170}\) Interview 9 April 2019.
governing through spectacular rituals – contrasted with the liberal aesthetic of Santos – a white man in a bland, neutral suit, completely non-spectacular.

**Colombian Liberalism, Neoliberalism and Santos’ Third Way**

The Colombian manifestation of global liberalism has its own historico-cultural specificities. The Colombian Liberal party consolidated as a permanent political force in the 1840s, although many of its themes emerged earlier, under the influence of Vice President Francisco de Paula Santander, generally considered the father of Colombian Liberalism, though also an influence on the Conservative Party (Delpar 1981, 2). Early Colombian Liberalism was influenced particularly by the French Revolution of 1848, although there were many differences with the European philosophical roots. The Party was characterised by factionalism, partly due to regional divergences, never coalescing around a single coherent ideology; however, its members advocated reform aimed at eradicating colonial practices and institutions they felt had survived post-independence (Delpar 1981, 5).\(^{171}\) Colombian Liberals tended to eschew Hispanic influences, rejecting their colonial forebears, and turned to French and British thinkers, such as Jeremy Bentham, Antoine Louis Claude Destutt de Tracy, Jean Baptiste Say, and, later, John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer.\(^{172}\)

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, most Latin American countries adopted a package of programs prescribed by the International Monetary Fund, influenced by the thought of Milton Friedman from Chicago, and Friedrich Hayek and Ludwig Von Mises from Austria (Ahumada 2000, 114-5), which opened up economies to international capital, cut public spending and eliminated social subsidies, privatised state companies, and promoted international investment (Ahumada 2000, 13). In Colombia, neoliberal economic policies were first adopted by Virgilio Barco’s government (1986-1990), were increased by César Gaviria (1990-1994), and strengthened by Ernesto Samper (1994-1998), accompanied by state authoritarianism and repression (Ahumada 2000, 14-15). While neoliberalism, like liberalism, is not a concrete ‘thing’, but, as Povinelli (2011, 17) suggests, a “set of uneven social struggles within the liberal diaspora”, I understand ‘neoliberal’ as an offshoot of liberalism entailing a belief in the power of the market and its role in socio-economic development, and the prevalence of the private over

\(^{171}\) On the origins of the Liberal Party see Delpar (1981, 1-13).

\(^{172}\) On the evolution of Colombian Liberalism throughout the nineteenth century see Delpar (1981, 60-83).
the public sector. Multiple critiques of neoliberalism in Colombia show how prosperity and security for some came at the expense of increased inequalities and violence for others (Ahumada 2000, Rojas 2009), a format Gill (2016, 19) calls “armed neoliberalism”, following Harvey’s (2003) theory that neoliberal capitalism involves ‘accumulation by dispossession’.

Santos grew up influenced by his grandfather’s liberal values, liberalism remained his explicit philosophical referent, and his allegiance to the Colombian Liberal party lasted until he co-founded the Partido de la U in 2005. Throughout his professional trajectory, Santos developed beliefs about how to solve Colombia’s problems, and landed on the Third Way, a doctrine attributed to sociologist Anthony Giddens, who advised Tony Blair during his time as British Prime Minister (1997-2007). Santos became familiarised with this philosophy while living in London, and later published a book with Blair called ‘The Third Way’, comprising a translation of Blair’s theses on the Third Way (‘New Politics for the New Century’) and Santos’ proposals on how to adapt them for the Colombian context (‘An Alternative for Colombia’) (Blair and Santos Calderón 1999).

In his half of the book, Santos (1999, 13-16, 23-26) proposes the Colombian Liberal party adopt the ‘Third Way’ to balance neoliberalism with social democracy. He says the ‘Third Way’ was born in the UK in reaction to the failure of neoliberalism under Margaret Thatcher, and that Tony Blair adopted Giddens’ proposals for what he called ‘New Labour’; seemingly a renovation of the left, as neoliberalism had been a renovation of the right. He notes that neoliberal policies in Latin America have failed to resolve economic inequalities, and acknowledges a growing general clamour for change. He proposes adaptations to Blair’s model for the Colombian context, incorporating the need for “good governance”, because, he argues (1999, 58-9), there are many intelligent diagnoses of Colombia’s problem, plus imaginative solutions and sophisticated laws, but state institutions lack capacity to implement these. The Third Way, he proposes, promotes alliances between the public and the private sector, to improve state efficiency. In terms of the state-society relationship, he argues against paternalism, but calls for citizen empowerment and participation in public affairs: “a middle point between the old left and the new right, [between] a state that seeks to monopolise representation of civil society, and a

173 Whether ‘neoliberalism’ is truly a variant of liberalism, or whether it takes its name in vain, is disputed (Freeden 2015, 142). On how ‘neoliberalism’ became a new form of governmentality see Povinelli (2011, 17-25).
state replaced by it’ (Santos 1999, 63).

Santos reasserted his subscription to the Third Way throughout his presidency, and in his post-presidential autobiography, where he summarised it as “the market as far as possible; the state as far as necessary” (Santos 2019, 66-7). This ideology informed his efforts as President, including the ‘liberal peace’ paradigm (Chapter 1). While grounded in explicit political philosophy, this ideology is also cultural: Santos’ attraction to the Third Way was influenced by his time in the UK, his secular, international outlook, and the way the Bogotá upper classes eschew the backward, ultra-conservative, overly-religious and ‘folkloric’ tendencies of people like Uribe. This is not to deny agency in the development of personal ideologies; on the contrary, from the same cultural context, Santos’ brother, Enrique, became more left-wing; his cousin, Francisco, more right-wing. Nevertheless, the formation of political ideologies is intertwined with culture (Haugbolle 2018).

Blair’s ‘Third Way’, of course, had multiple critics. Mouffe’s (2005) critique is salient for the discussion regarding liberalism’s attachment to rationality. She argues that Giddens’ proposals for a ‘Third Way’ constitute a “consensual, post-political perspective … characterized by a side-stepping of fundamental conflicts” (Mouffe 2005, 60). She draws on Hall’s (2005) searing indictment of Blair’s administration to argue that New Labour, instead of challenging Thatcherite neoliberal hegemony, simply picked up where Thatcher left off, abandoning the struggle for equality, and absorbing social democracy into neoliberalism.174 She argues that the attachment to rationality and individualism prevents liberals from grasping “the pluralistic nature of the social world, with the conflicts that pluralism entails; conflicts for which no solution could ever exist” (Mouffe 2005, 10). By proposing to value pluralism and harmonise different perspectives and values into a non-conflictual ensemble, liberalism invalidates the agonism of politics. Mouffe (2005, 11-12) argues that “the political” is liberalism’s “blind spot”, because of the “rationalist belief in the availability of a universal consensus based on reason”. The end result, she argues (2005, 63), of the idea of ‘centrist’ consensus, are political parties with no fundamental differences between them, reducing politics to “clever marketing with the help of advertising agencies”, leading in turn to a growing disaffection with politics and a fall in electoral

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174 Hall (2005) argues that New Labour had a choice, either to offer a radical alternative to Thatcherism that was attuned to the sea changes of globalisation, post-industrialisation, new technologies and the new neoliberal hegemony which made impossible a return to a Keynesian welfare state social democracy; or to adapt to neoliberal terrain. They chose the latter, which, he says, led to the wholesale deconstruction of the welfare state and the triumph of corporate greed.
participation. In other words, the problem with the liberal attachment to rationality is that it obscures, or at least sanitises, the confrontationality of politics.

**Sergio Jaramillo, Rodrigo Rivera and the Technocracy-Politics Binary**

Santos’ High Commissioner for Peace, Sergio Jaramillo Caro, hailed from the same social world of the Bogotá upper-classes, as did many senior public officials appointed by Santos (Roth and Robayo Corredor 2015, 24). Jaramillo was the great-great-grandson of Miguel Antonio Caro, a famous philologist and Conservative politician, one of the Republic’s ‘lettered men’, whose father José Eusebio Caro co-founded the Conservative party, and who was one of the architects of the 1886 Constitution, together with President Rafael Núñez (Deas 1992). Jaramillo was also descendent of Luis Eduardo Nieto Caballero, a twentieth-century Liberal, and via the Nieto family, Jaramillo was distantly related to Santos, though they did not meet until their work brought them together.175

Jaramillo studied philosophy at the University of Toronto, philology at the University of Oxford, did a Master’s in philosophy at the University of Cambridge and undertook doctoral studies in Greek at Heidelberg University in Germany, though did not finish. He lived abroad for some fifteen years, and speaks several languages, including English, French, Greek and German. He worked in the Defence Ministry under Minister Marta Lucia Ramírez in 2002-2004, then directed the think-tank FIP from 2004-2006. He did not belong to any political party, had never held elected office, and had generally kept his distance from partisan politics.

When Jaramillo left office in 2017, switching places with Rodrigo Rivera as Colombian Ambassador to Belgium, a surprising outpouring of columns and social media lamented his leaving and expressed gratitude for his work in the peace process; surprising because civil servants do not usually receive public admiration. Many of these expressions of gratitude were articulated in terms of a binary between technocracy and politics. Ana María Ramírez, from think-tank DeJusticia, praised Jaramillo’s “total honesty and integrity”, and called for Santos to choose a replacement who would continue this “depoliticised leadership” (Ramírez 2017). Even

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175 Jaramillo’s mother was second cousin to Juan Manuel Santos. His great-grandmother, María Calderón, wife of Luis Eduardo Nieto Caballero, was one of the ‘Policarpas’, a group of women who opposed General Rojas Pinilla’s dictatorship. She was a great-aunt of Enrique Santos, father of Juan Manuel Santos (Duzán 2018, 78).
the FARC thanked Jaramillo’s “commitment” (Las2Orillas 2017). Francisco de Roux, Jesuit priest, human rights activist and today President of the Truth Commission, praised Jaramillo’s “ethical perspective” and “moral conviction” for peace, proclaiming “Thank you, Sergio!” (De Roux 2017). Feminist activist Florence Thomas thanked him for the impact of the peace process on Colombian women (Thomas 2017), and novelist Ricardo Silva portrayed him as one of the few men who “are not being cynical when they speak of serving the country”, and do not see politics as “the election industry or the network of power parasites or the mirror of the ego, but as a design for coexistence” (Silva 2017).

Rodrigo Rivera Salazar, in contrast, was from the regional elite of Pereira, a city in the coffee region. He studied Law and Political Science in the Pereira campus of the private Universidad Libre de Colombia (co-founded by his father, magistrate Rodrigo Rivera Correa), and completed postgraduate studies in Economics at the American University in Washington D.C.. A journalist and Liberal politician, Rivera had been local councillor in Pereira, was elected to the House of Representatives, then president of the House of Representatives, was twice elected to the Senate, and had been president of the Liberal party and a presidential pre-candidate. He co-managed Santos’ first election campaign, and had briefly been Defence Minister under Santos, leading the operation which killed FARC leader Mono Jojoy in September 2010, for which he received the Cruz de Boyacá medal, the highest decoration in Colombia. In December 2011, Santos made him Ambassador to Belgium, and he remained there until the switch with Jaramillo in 2017 (La Silla Vacía 2017). He belonged to the Avivamiento evangelical mega-church, a branch of the global Revival movement and one of Colombia’s largest Christian churches, and he thanked Santos for the appointment as Peace Commissioner in a Tweet citing the Bible: “Blessed are the peacemakers, for they will be called children of God” (León 2017b).

Rivera’s appointment caused alarm among pro-peace civil society. One journalist wrote that Rivera’s arrival “implied a 180 degree turn; a technocrat leaves and a politician enters”, referencing Rivera’s “fervent Christianity” as a source of concern (Arboleda 2017). In fact, Rivera’s public piousness was interpreted by many government officials as a strategic move by Santos to regain the support lost among the religious community to the peace process by the ‘gender ideology’ scandal; nevertheless, the ‘political’, in these expressions of concern, echoes the appreciation of Jaramillo as ‘not political’, and recalls the opposition described by Bunce (2019) between the liberal, internationally-facing, secular ideal of the Bogotá elites versus the traditional, local, religious elite. ‘The political’ here is perceived as politicking, manipulation, and
potential dishonesty (being ‘two-faced’); ‘technocracy’ is seen as involving honesty, objectivity, integrity and rationality.

This perceived technocracy-politics divide is not unusual. The rise of technocracy in the public sector in Latin America was accompanied by a view that rationality and scientific expertise could lead society to modernity, unimpinged by political bickering (Baud 1998, 15-16). The increase of technocrats is associated with “the increasing depoliticization of society as a result of the alleged diminishing influence of political ideologies” (Silva 1994, 281). A common popular perception is that technocrats are aloof from politics, whereas politicians get into power because they are “someone’s nephew or uncle”, or because they are “successful manipulators of power and interpersonal relationships” (Grindle 1977, 425). This is a simplistic dichotomy, problematised by much of the literature on technocracy (Camp 1983, Silva 1994). The technical is consistently associated with the rational, the bureaucratic, the politically neutral, and Western ideals of modernity; this view is at the core of the legitimacy of technocracy (Domínguez 1997, 6). Political leaders who propose technocratic solutions often cast these in terms of a rejection of politics (Centeno and Silva 1998, 4), which echoes anthropological engagements with technocracy as negating politics (Ferguson 1994, Li 2007).

Neoliberal elites in Latin America have frequently capitalised on society’s discontent with traditional politicians, emphasising the supposed ‘neutrality’ of technocracy (Ahumada 2000, 158). However, the neoliberal elite’s independence from traditional politicians is only discursive; in Colombia, neoliberalism led to new forms of clientelism, involving contracts with the private sector and multinational companies (Ahumada 2000, 169-72), and overlaps exist between the political, bureaucratic and business elites in Colombia, including through kinship cliques (Barrera 1991, 16) and through similar social backgrounds which facilitate affinities (Barrera 1991, 31-2).

Jaramillo, in fact, was not a technocrat in the classic sense; his training was not in economics, law, or public administration, but in the humanities. People perceived him as ‘technocratic’ partly due to his insistence on attention to detail and his sourcing of international expertise in the peace process, but partly this label was construed in terms of its opposite: he was seen as not

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176 Technocracy is not only neoliberal – there are examples of technocracy in leftist revolutions (Centeno and Silva 1998, 4) – but in Colombia, high-level technical expertise has been channelled exclusively toward neoliberal agendas (Ahumada 2000, 155).
'political'. Jaramillo’s ‘not political’ character was associated with the frictions noted in Chapter 1 between the OACP and the High Council on Post-conflict, and his refusal to ingratiate, engage in political bargaining, or compromise the Peace Agreement, which some saw as arrogance, others as integrity. Supporters and critics alike, however, recognised Jaramillo’s leadership in the peace process, his hard work ethic, and his commitment to ending Colombia’s conflict. Conversely, Rivera was seen as friendly, personable, and non-conflictive, his colloquial pereirano persona contrasted with Jaramillo’s austere bogotano ‘face’, and commentators speculated that his appointment would reduce inter-institutional frictions (León 2017b). Indeed, in one event I observed in Antioquia, where local politicians expressed their disagreement with Santos’ handling of the peace process in impassioned tones, and Rivera kept his cool, responding diplomatically and politely, an OACP official whispered to me, “Sergio would never have put up with this”. Rivera’s ability to manoeuvre through political relationships was useful: the state is political, the government cannot make the rest of the state work without human diplomacy. This change of the OACP’s ‘face’ from Jaramillo to Rivera, therefore, involved the ‘faciality’ markers of region of origin and religiosity, and these blended with the idea that he was ‘political’ rather than ‘technocratic’.

The OACP Officials: Peace as a Public Good

Any institution is a complex social world, whose individuals have different profiles and viewpoints, and may agree and disagree with each other on various issues. The OACP under Santos was not homogenous, but there were cultural and ideological tendencies, beginning with Santos’ decision to appoint Sergio Jaramillo and Jaramillo’s subsequent selection of his staff, most of whom were maintained by Rivera. A priori tendencies reflected in hiring practices sedimented further over time, as institutions shape culture, identity and the production of shared ‘common sense’.

At the heart of the OACP ‘common sense’ was what journalist Juanita León referred to as Jaramillo’s “altruistic view of the Peace Agreement”, an “idealism” he transmitted to his team in the OACP (León 2017a). Most of the sixty-odd officials in the OACP were deeply personally committed to the peace process; they were motivated by an opportunity to contribute to what they saw as a historic opportunity to end Colombia’s fifty-year armed conflict. Jaramillo was a

177 Field diary, 30 May 2018.
notoriously demanding boss, and his team worked long hours and weekends without extra pay. For some, it was their first time working for the state, and their motivation for doing so was their belief in the peace process. This commitment was praised by commentators in similar terms to the praise directed at Jaramillo; Ricardo Silva, for example, celebrated their “indifference to electoral calculations” (Silva 2017). Many sceptical civil society leaders I interviewed, while sometimes criticising the OACP, recognised this commitment, and saw it as new within the government.

Each OACP team had a director selected by Jaramillo, and staff were selected by team directors with Jaramillo’s approval. Although some more senior staff were from the Bogotá upper classes, most OACP officials were from what is construed in Colombia as middle or upper-middle class. They were almost all from Bogotá, and mostly ‘white’ in the sense described above. Those who were less white or not bogotano tended to be from wealthy, upwardly-mobile regional elites. Officials’ profiles differed across the teams, but there were commonalities in their professional trajectories. Many had studied ‘Finances, Government and International Relations’, an undergraduate degree only offered by the private Externado University in Bogotá. Others had studied Law, Economics, Public Administration, Accounting and Political Science, mostly at the top private universities in Bogotá – Los Andes, Javeriana, Externado and Rosario – consistent with the education background of top government officials under Santos (Roth and Robayo Corredor 2015). Many had Master’s degrees in things like Public Policy, Political Science, Latin American Studies, and Peace and Conflict Studies, a few from universities in Europe and the US; others aspired to undertake future postgraduate studies abroad. Their past work experience included other state institutions, such as the Justice Ministry, the National Planning Department and the Bogotá mayoralty; the private sector; development and international agencies such as USAID, the UNDP, German Development Agency (GIZ) and the Ford Foundation; NGOs such as Insight Crime and Redprodepaz; and media outlets such as La Silla Vacia. Many of Jaramillo’s closest aides had worked with him previously, either at the FIP or the Defence Ministry.

The composition of the Pedagogy Group varied over time, but as Chapter 2 shows, the negotiations in Havana were consistently prioritised over peace pedagogy, and this was reflected in the quantity and seniority of Pedagogy officials. They fit the general profile outlined above, but tended to be younger, mostly female, in their early twenties to early thirties, some so recently graduated they had almost no professional experience. They took public transport to
work, and mostly lived in small, tidy flats in the further reaches of Northern Bogotá, strata 4 or 5 neighbourhoods, while team directors tended to live in strata 6 neighbourhoods, with cars and sometimes chauffeurs to drive them to the office.\textsuperscript{178} They dressed more casually than the suit-wearing Thematic and Legal teams, in line with their role as the “hippies” of the office, close to communities and pro-peace civil society (Chapter 2), echoing Dávila’s (2017, 381-2) finding that “technical” cadastral engineers and lawyers in the Land Restitution Unit claimed “epistemological superiority”, whereas public-facing officials were seen as dealing with something “more mundane”: “people”. Some officials referred condescendingly to the Pedagogy Group as “the pedagogy girls”, layering a gendered gaze onto their age and relative importance vis-à-vis the rest of the OACP’s work. This internal hierarchy was reconfirmed by the physical layout of the OACP office. While the Thematic, Legal and Communications teams had designated areas of open plan offices and cubicles, the Pedagogy Group occupied a stuffy, windowless office at the end of a corridor, little more than a glorified cupboard, often used as storage, with long tables across three walls, the fourth lined with stacked cardboard boxes containing bound copies of the Final Peace Agreement and the multiple informative booklets (Chapter 2). Someone had written “PEDAGOGY” with a pencil on an A4 sheet of paper and blue-tacked it to the door. This is not to suggest we should feel sorry for them, nor exonerate them from responsibility in the peace process; however, it signals their modest leverage within the OACP.

In the perception of OACP officials, as for many pro-peace civil society groups, peace was not and should not be ‘political’ – it was a public good, connected to the construction of a state that purports to further utopian goals in a rational, non-political manner (Bear and Mathur 2015). This resonates with ethnographies of state institutions within the Santos administration’s peace policy doing similarly ‘moral’ work, which officials saw as for the good of the people, such as the Victims’ Unit (Vera 2017, 102) and the Land Restitution Unit (Dávila 2017, 384-5). The conception of peace as a public good, matched by the ideal of a rationally-functioning, Weberian-type state, shaped the ‘face’ of peace pedagogy as an activity which sought to convince the public of the non-political nature and public good of the peace process.

Valentina, described in the Introduction, exemplified this ‘face’. In describing her motivation to work at the OACP, she told me that during her previous experience at the German Development

\textsuperscript{178} On Bogotá’s 1-6 neighbourhood stratification system, a unique geographically-targeted rather than means-tested classification system, see Bunce (2019, 84-90).
Agency (GIZ) she had witnessed the distrust between communities and the state, and decided the only way the state would improve was if good people went to work for it, which she felt many people were unwilling to do, because negative perceptions of the state were so entrenched. “That’s why I put on the shoes of the state”, she said, suggesting a sense of personal responsibility towards the common good. Her notion of “the shoes of the state” is similar to the concept of the face of the state, reminding us that the state is always a personification, yet it is also temporary, not quite an embodiment, because it is something you wear, and can remove at the end of the day. Some communities Valentina had worked with from GIZ treated her as a “traitor” when she moved to the OACP, she said; nevertheless, she believed it was necessary to increase the number of ‘good’ individuals in the state. This echoes Dávila’s (2017) concept of the ‘virtuous state’ which state officials in the Land Restitution Unit sought to incarnate. In both cases, the aspiration was to remedy the perceived flaws of the state from the inside.

Valentina spoke about working for the state in terms of working in ‘lo público’, a concept which indexes the cognate ideas of the public sector and the public good. “My heart has always been in serving others, and we have to do that from lo público, the public sector,” she said. She frequently expressed awareness of the problems with the state, and felt that in order to change it, one had to take on the challenge of working as the state, put one’s own body into it, put on its shoes. She explicitly contrasted ‘lo público’, the idea of serving others for the good of the country, with ‘lo político’, the political, which she saw as electoral, as masking hidden interests.

Valentina soon discovered the difficulties of ‘giving face’ as the government, which she contrasted with her previous experience in GIZ. “Working in international cooperation is comfortable”, she said. “Everyone likes you, because you’ve got the money”. Speaking as the OACP was the opposite:

I never imagined it would be so difficult to be the government. Standing in front of communities and saying ‘I come from the OACP’ means starting with an 80-90% disadvantage, because of the negative perceptions about the government. Not 100%, because the OACP has certain recognition. … When I worked in GIZ it was so easy to go to communities and say ‘let’s do X’. If I say that now, it’s fatal. I have come out of some meetings completely crushed.179

Valentina had to learn strategies for working with this new ‘face’ in speaking as the government, and this involved being aware of the prevalent distrust of the state, and the added cultural

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distance between her and many of her audiences. “You go to a community as the state, but also, in my case, white, female, rola [from Bogotá, with a middle or upper-class Bogotá accent], and young. All those things count against you. You have to be conscious of them and manage them. Not deny them, but recognise them.”

Valentina was thus conscious of the social codification of ‘faciality’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987); how various cultural markers revealed her as privileged, affecting how she was perceived. Chapter 2 showed how peace pedagogy was easier when the messenger was closer in faciality to the audience – a senior economist was taken more seriously by the business sector than a young civilian woman among hardened military audiences. Despite the Pedagogy Group being the “hippies” of the OACP, there was still a gaping cultural chasm between them and many Colombians, especially those from working classes or in rural, conflict-affected communities. This was compounded by the fact that speaking as the government was always a disadvantage. Even those Pedagogy officials who could reduce the faciality gap by being conscious of it, as Valentina did, had to contend with ingrained negative perceptions, as Chapters 4, 5 and 6 reveal.

Conclusions

This chapter has shown how members of the Santos government administration at different levels articulated various things as not political. Mauricio saw President Santos’ speeches as rational, logical and academic, in opposition to how he saw the emotional charismatic populism of Uribe. Santos proposed the ‘Third Way’ as an option to balance the old left of social democracy and the new right of neoliberalism, which Mouffe’s critique helpfully signals as negating the agonism at the heart of politics. The ‘change of face’ from Sergio Jaramillo to Rodrigo Rivera as High Commissioner for Peace was widely seen as a surprising switch between a technocrat and a politician, and Jaramillo’s technocracy was seen as non-political, honest, rational, even idealistic, and these values were intermingled with cultural markers such as religiosity and region of origin. The OACP staff saw peace as a ‘public good’, and working for the government on the peace process as contributing to this public good while simultaneously incarnating a ‘virtuous state’ based on technocratic rationality, despite the difficulties of representing the government to sceptical communities.

180 Interview, 30 January 2018.
Many OACP officials did not see themselves as political; they often said they were “not santista” but were motivated by the peace process. None would have identified as ‘liberals’ in the same way as Santos, as most, like Jaramillo, had steered clear of party politics. However, I argue that their rejection of politics was shaped both by their cultural repudiation of Uribe’s populism – the internal other of liberalism – and by an imperceptible liberal ‘common sense’, just as Vincent (2002, 1) identifies in political anthropology the “subterranean presence” of Enlightenment ideals and values, including rationality. This is a culturally-constituted liberalism which promotes itself as not political, and in doing so, obscures the fact that it, too, is ideological. The ‘rationality drive’ depicted in Chapter 2 is associated with the Bogotá educated classes’ aversion to the regional, folkloric, backward stereotype of the Latin American populist leader, and their view of politics-as-politicking.

Spencer (2007), following Mouffe’s (2000) understanding of politics as agonism, argues that when people conceive of things as ‘anti-politics’ or strive to be ‘outside politics’ and create an antithesis to the political, this is really just a product of politics. Politicians who “claim to transcend the petty squabbles of agonistic politics even as they enter into the same squabbles” reveal that there is no space “outside” politics from which to “mount a critique which is not itself a part of that which is being criticized” (Spencer 2007, 177). The very idea of anti-politics, he writes, “is rooted in a paradox – the exploitation, for political purposes, of popular unease with the moral implications of actually existing politics”. The various articulations of the anti-political among officials in the Santos government are product of a political stance which sees itself as not political: what I call here ‘cultural liberalism’, connected to liberalism’s attachment to the Enlightenment binary of reason as civilised and emotion as primitive (Mazzarella 2017, 167).

The Santos government’s face is thus construed through the various ‘faciality’ ingredients of the public personae of the Santos himself, Jaramillo, and the OACP officials, all underpinned by the anti-politics of cultural liberalism. We now turn from the anthrohistory of the Santos administration, to the ethnography of the interface, the way the face comes into contact with society, and the next chapter focuses on the peace pedagogy encounter.
PART II: ETHNOGRAPHY OF PEACE PEDAGOGY IN ACTION
CHAPTER 4 – Interface: The Enactment of Legitimacy by Explanation

We are in the coliseo of Dabeiba, the ubiquitous covered open-air sports stadium where large events are held in small towns across Colombia. Some three hundred people are sitting along one side of the coliseo on the steps. In front of them is a white plastic table, a wonky projector screen with a power-point presentation projecting palely onto it, and two giant speakers connected to a roving microphone, held by Pilar from the OACP Pedagogy Group, who has come from Bogotá to deliver a peace pedagogy session.

Dabeiba is a municipality in Antioquia, in the foothills of the northern-most tip of the western Andes. It has been devastated by the conflict. Both the FARC and the paramilitaries have carried out violent occupations of the town, though things have been safer since the ceasefire in 2016. The time is April 2017, four months into implementation of the Peace Agreement. The FARC are currently in the 26 disarmament zones (TLZNs) around the country; Dabeiba is host to one of these, in a rural settlement (vereda) called Llano Grande, some 40 minutes from the town.

I am sitting on the steps with the community. I am spending a few weeks in Llano Grande on a pilot fieldtrip, prior to joining the OACP to do research inside. Though I have seen senior OACP officials speaking on panels in Bogotá, it is the first time I am seeing a talk by a member of the Pedagogy Group. Pilar is in her mid-twenties, wearing a bright white pair of designer trainers, a slim-fit pair of black trousers, and a crisp pale blue shirt. With her fashionable but understated outfit, her pale skin and slender figure, she looks completely different from the Dabeiba campesinos sitting around me, who travelled to the town in chivas181 hired by the OACP. They are darker skinned, many of the women are overweight, with skin-tight neon T-shirts with nonsensical English phrases, and the men are wearing the distressed jeans made fashionable by reggaetón singers, copied by cheap clothes shops around the country, and broad volteado hats. Most are wearing the standard-issue rubber boots of the Colombian countryside, which they would have cleaned of mud before entering the town. The audience also includes local state officials from the mayoralty, a schoolteacher and his students, representatives of local victims’ organisations, and some policemen.

181 A multi-coloured open-air bus, traditional in rural Colombia.
Pilar greets the audience, walking up and down in front of the tables as she talks. “Welcome everyone, thank you so much for coming”. Her accent is upper-middle class bogotano, contrasting sharply with the sing-song paisa accent of the rural people of Dabeiba I’ve been staying with. My first impression, hearing her, is shock. I cannot understand why the government would send someone so young, whose presence transmits so forcefully the cultural distance between herself and the audience, to a priority location for implementation of the Peace Agreement. I write in my field diary:

It feels absurd for someone from Bogotá of her age to come and tell people in Dabeiba why it’s important to end the conflict. How are people here supposed to respect the government if this is the face it gives? She’s fine, I don’t want to be rude about her, but central government has sent one of their most junior pedagogy officials to a place which is key for sustainability of the peace process; it seems quite insulting to Dabeiba.¹⁸²

Chapter 2 showed how peace pedagogy was deprioritised within the OACP’s work, and argued that this was reflected in the hiring of junior personnel; Chapter 3 revealed commonalities in staff profiles, including class, regional identity, gender, education and age, which shaped their ‘faciality’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987). Later, doing fieldwork inside the OACP, I realised the decision to send Pilar to Dabeiba was not intended as disrespectful: Pilar was representative of the human resources available. I learned to unlearn my sense of shock. However, in this chapter I revisit it, to ask what happened when the OACP’s bogotano, young, upper-middle class, socially white, culturally liberal ‘face’ became an interface?¹⁸³

Building on Chapter 3’s description of the cultural constitution of the Santos government’s face, this chapter analyses the effect of this face in the encounter with society. It extends a common theme in anthropology of the state: the analysis of state-society encounters to interrogate the social production of boundaries between the state and its other, society (Sharma and Gupta 2006, 11). Many ‘ethnographies of the state’ (Gupta 1995) analyse state-society encounters in varied contexts (Mitchell 2006, Gupta 2012, Mathur 2016). Such ethnographies often focus on how ‘society’ experiences these encounters, as in my previous research with the Peace Community (Burnyeat 2017), though increasingly anthropologists also explore the experience of

¹⁸² Field diary 21 April 2017.
¹⁸³ Unlike other OACP personnel whose names I have simply anonymised, Pilar is a composite character comprising traits and discourses from various members of the Pedagogy Group, partly to anonymise further the person who really was in Dabeiba that day and avoid seeming to pick on her personally; partly to use this single peace pedagogy session as a literary mechanism with commonalities with the dozens of similar peace pedagogy sessions I attended across Colombia.
state officials, via the “mirroring dynamic” between those embodying the state and those encountering it (Aretxaga 2003, 399). Methodologically it is hard to attend equally to both sides, though Middleton’s (2015) ethnography of communities in Darjeeling and their encounter with government anthropologists charged with granting tribal status is an exception, as he spent time with both, aptly terming the encounter an “interface”; whence this chapter’s title.

We know the state-society encounter produces a “state effect” – the calling into being of the state (Mitchell 2006). But what else does it do? I take Pilar’s speech, following Bourdieu (1991), as the “authorised language” of a “delegated representative”, representing the (de-)limited authority conferred upon her. As Bourdieu (1991, 111) says, the authorised spokesperson’s speech “concentrates within it the accumulated symbolic capital of the group which has delegated him and of which he is the authorized representative”. Pilar has a guión, literally ‘script’, an extensive Microsoft Word document which the Pedagogy Group had to learn. This did not mean memorising exact phrases, but key bullet points. Not everything in the script would be covered in the session; they could tailor the presentation to their strengths, to the audience, and also provided answers to potential questions. It was constantly updated, but a draft I saw in January 2018 had 28 pages, single-spaced.

Just as important as what Pilar says is the framing in which she says it. In Bourdieu’s words (1991, 111), the efficacy of enactments of delegated authority, or “authorized acts”, depends on “the combination of a systematic set of interdependent conditions which constitute social rituals”. This chapter therefore examines ethnographically both setting and content of the peace pedagogy session, analysing the encounter as a theatrical mise en scène, depicting its elements in terms of staging and script.¹⁸⁴ I argue that both staging and script aim to produce legitimacy – for the peace process, and, by extension, for the government itself. Weber’s (1978) classic theory that power needs legitimacy to rule offers three ‘types’ of authority as the basis of legitimacy: legal, traditional and charismatic. Rather than inquiring into the cultural construction of the legitimacy (or illegitimacy) of the Santos administration in the eyes of the Dabeiba audience,¹⁸⁵ I argue that the OACP officials enact legitimacy, based on their belief that their legitimacy could be produced, and, if threatened, restored, by rational explanations. This belief is both a priori (embedded in the anti-politics of cultural liberalism) and defensive (in response to

¹⁸⁴ I am indebted to Forero (2017a) on the use of theatrical metaphor in ethnographic representation of powerful institutions in Colombia.
¹⁸⁵ For anthropological analyses of how ordinary people construe the legitimacy of their rulers see Pardo and Prato (2019).
the perceived threat of the Democratic Centre’s delegitimation campaign). The chapter title, ‘the enactment of legitimacy by explanation’, thus signals explaining as a culturally liberal mode of government communication to society.

**Staging Peace Pedagogy**

The state-society encounter in the Dabeiba coliseo was mediated by the staging of the space. This could potentially be analysed to an infinitesimal degree; everything contributes, from the crackle of the ancient microphone reverberating off the concrete walls and the sounds of children playing in the square outside, to the dull ache of keeping one’s back straight with other people’s knees on the step behind. I highlight two prominent factors in the staging of the peace pedagogy encounter: the regulation of time, and the material culture of the state.

**Time Regulation**

Pilar has flown to Medellín from Bogotá that morning, waking up at 4am to get to the airport, and she has to cover the four municipalities with TLZNs in Antioquia in three days. Getting around Antioquia means many hours in a hired car on potholed roads, winding through the sharp curves of the Andes, and sleeping in raggedy hotels. She is exhausted, and operating on a short-term logic; she has to return to Bogotá to other duties. The OACP is paying for her to travel there, and for local communities to travel to the town to hear her talk, so she believes local people ought to adapt, and take advantage of her visit. She later complains the chivas were not full, and that some people had travelled in them to Dabeiba but not attended the event, using the opportunity to visit family or buy supplies, saying “people always say the government is not doing enough peace pedagogy, but when we do it they don’t come”.

The peace pedagogy session lasts three hours, and has a pre-determined format. Pilar gives her presentation, which lasts an hour and a half as there is much information to cover. Then there is a Q&A, and Pilar responds to each question individually, each response taking several minutes, so there is only time for ten or twelve questions. Then lunch is provided (polystyrene boxes of chicken stew with rice), people mill around, and I hear several audience participants complain there was insufficient time for questions.
Not all the comments in the Q&A are about the Peace Agreement. Pilar asks her audience to make their questions relevant, as “this is the chance you have to clarify doubts”; but this request presumes that everybody in the audience shares the same objective: to receive official information about the peace process. Some people make extended comments on personal experiences of the conflict. One stooped campesino with a low voice, mumbling into the microphone, takes several minutes, with much repetition, to say something along the lines of:

I don’t want for there to be any more war, ever again. I lost two sons in the war. I pray to God it doesn’t happen again. I was heavier before, look how skinny I am now. It’s good there can be peace.

Pilar reminds her audience that this is their opportunity to “clarify doubts” about the peace process; presuming the shared objective of unilateral transference of information. She asks them to “be concise”, to allow as many people to ask questions as possible; but this request belongs to an urban social world of agendas, appointments and protocols, and does not contemplate the need for people to express their experiences of war, rather than learn about peace.

Auyero (2012) shows how time management is a governance technique in which those with power, the state, whose time is valuable, make the poor wait, as their time is not; this in turn reinforces relationships of domination. This dynamic is certainly at work here; Pilar’s time is deemed to be precious, unlike that of the campesinos who have taken a day off from their agricultural labour to attend. Her time is paid for; theirs is not, although they get a free trip to town, and lunch. But the disconnect in time also points to a lack of coevalness (Fabian 1983, Mathur 2014). Campesino time is different; in my previous research with the Peace Community, I saw meetings going on into the night, often continuing the next day. Their process of deliberation meant taking time, allowing everyone to express themselves. The complaint ‘there was not enough time for questions’ suggests that people’s expectation was not necessarily to hear and retain every bullet point, but engage in discussion.

The Material Culture of the State

Several anthropologists have noted how the state leaves material traces in Colombia; through logo-ed humanitarian kits (Aparicio 2012a) and conference swag bags (Krystalli 2019), for example. Pilar’s speech is accompanied by her Power-Point presentation, and a few hundred
copies of the latest blue and white OACP informative booklet, ‘The Final Peace Agreement: The Opportunity to Build Peace’, packed in cardboard boxes. At the end of her speech, she tells people that these booklets contain summaries of the information she has shared with them, and encourages them to take copies home to their communities and “become multipliers”; as if information were contagious. “You have all received official information, and you should spread it within your communities”, she says. “You know there is a lot of disinformation, we can all contribute by replicating the message”. The booklet thus becomes a metonym for the OACP. It expresses the idea that by taking home the booklet and sharing it, the scope of this peace pedagogy session will be increased, the official message will be received by all who see it, amplifying the number of people to whom peace pedagogy has been ‘done’. Explanation by contact, as it were.

The Power-Point presentation guides the structure of Pilar’s speech. Each slide provides her with key bullet points to aide her memory and reinforce these points visually. The Power-Point plays a supporting role in the legitimating function of the script, discussed below, by making the contents of Pilar’s speech seem logically ordered and technically sophisticated. It creates an aura of officialness, with its institutional logos and its lists of numbered decrees. Yet the use of the Power-Point as a pedagogical mechanism, just as much as its content, plays a role in this performance of state rationality. In this staging, the government is represented not just by Pilar, but by Pilar plus Power-Point, and the communication of official information is distributed between the two. Different members of the Pedagogy Group related differently on stage to the Power-Point, emphasising some slides and skipping over others, but it was always the central referent of their talk.

The Power-Point was made by the Pedagogy Group using information compiled from the Thematic Department. As noted in Chapter 2, peace pedagogy evolved over time, as the information available changed. The message shifted after the Referendum, from doing pedagogy about the Peace Agreement to doing pedagogy about the Agreement and about implementation. During implementation, the Power-Point expanded, with each new decree passed and each action by the new implementing institutions. Different versions existed over the years, and expanded or contracted for different purposes; one version, from September 2017, contained 68 slides (Figs.8 and 9).
I see the booklet and the Power-Point as actants in the staging of peace pedagogy. As Latour says, “objects too have agency” (2005, 63); the material culture of the state is “participant in the
course of action” (2005, 71). This is not to say that the material culture of the state is equal to Pilar. The peace pedagogues had to be able to perform their script without a Power-Point, for example, if the technology in a rural municipality failed. Similarly, the legitimating function of the booklet was increased by the fact that Pilar had brought it herself. Sending booklets in boxes through mayoralities, which the OACP also did (Chapter 2), did not have the same effect as sending an official messenger to explain the contents.

The Pedagogy Script

Production

Once embedded in the OACP, I learned that the ‘script’ was produced and updated jointly by the Pedagogy Group and the Thematic Department, with the aim of “making the technical information pedagogical”, as one OACP official put it. However, the script relied on technical accuracy. The objective of the script evolved over time, but was always to explain: what Chapter 2 called the rationality drive. Before the Referendum, the purpose of explaining was to get people to vote based on information rather than “myths”; after the Referendum it was to generate citizen support for implementation. An OACP internal strategy document from early 2018 states that peace pedagogy sought “to inform Colombian society, get them to talk about the transition to building a stable and lasting peace, and appropriate the Peace Agreement and support its implementation”. The document outlined three “guiding verbs” for this objective: “to communicate” about the Peace Agreement and peacebuilding, “to prepare” the regions for implementation and participation in peacebuilding; and “to mobilise” Colombian society around the peace process.  

There was also an unstated objective: to legitimate. In one internal meeting to deliberate on the key messages for peace pedagogy during implementation, Pedagogy official Margarita said, “the message should be that implementation is progressing, because people always say nothing is happening, and we need to show that a lot is being done”. Whereas prior to the Referendum, explaining was expected to play the role of campaigning, during implementation,

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187 Field diary 26 September 2017.
explaining was expected to legitimate the government’s efforts. In both phases, it sought to counter the “myths” circulated by the Democratic Centre.

This had increasingly electoral dimensions: the legitimacy of the Peace Agreement was a central issue in the 2018 elections. Thus, the legitimating subtext of peace pedagogy had unescapably political undertones, but the OACP officials tried to avoid politics in their presentations, especially when local politicians were present. “We have to be completely technical, to avoid political issues”, Valentina told her team. However, the OACP was conscious that if the Democratic Centre won the 2018 elections, they could destroy the gains made in the peace process. Pedagogy official Adriana said, “it’s important to show what has already been achieved, such as the demobilisation of the FARC and the decrease in homicides”. The unstated objective was to defend the peace process electorally by showing its early gains, which needed to be protected, and encourage people to vote for one of the presidential candidates perceived as pro-peace.

The continuous institutional production of scripts, Power-Point presentations, informative booklets and other forms of communication about the Peace Agreement meant putting into writing the internal ‘common sense’ produced within the OACP about the peace process, and the concatenation of a series of dominant topoi, all underpinned by the anti-politics of cultural liberalism, into a linear narrative. This exercise presumed that the same script, with minor adaptations, was valid for all sectors and all regions of Colombia.

**Topoi**

This section identifies the topoi, or recurring themes, in Pilar’s authorised speech, following Forero’s (2018) approach to analysing the identity narratives of an institution. Forero (2018, 3) argues that the production of narratives reveals what subjects perceive as “the *inevitability* of their opinions and actions, product of their cultural, political and social conditions”. Thus the peace pedagogy ‘script’ (the bullet points they memorise, contained in the constantly-updated

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188 Field diary 1 December 2017.
189 Interview 24 January 2018.
190 Forero follows Jimeno’s (2016, 7, 10) understanding of ‘narratives’ as stories or accounts enmeshed in the discursive forms and conventions of their time and place, “social facts” which offer a privileged site for analysing the perspectives of different subjects via their own accounts. See also Visacovsky (2016) for an overview of the focus in anthropology on narratives.
Microsoft Word document) reveals, through a series of topoi (narrative elements or recurring themes), the narratives of the OACP and the Santos government administration (their own sense-making) about the peace process, the FARC, and Colombian society. Pilar’s speech followed the order outlined below, but after each topos I pause to identify the narrative elements, revealing their culturally-constituted rationale.

**Peace Needs You**

Pilar begins her talk, saying:

> It is with you, the territories, that real peace is built. The purpose of this workshop is to reflect on how peace is built from society. The implementation phase involves everyone, not just the FARC and the government.

This topos invokes, legitimates and mobilises. Her address to “the territories”, invokes the inhabitants of Dabeiba as the people and the subjects of peace. It calls into being the state-society boundary, by naming them as different from her, the state. It suggests the deferential recognition from the government to the people described in Chapter 2 as underpinning the logic of ‘territorial peace’, by saying that they will build “real peace”. This deference, however, has defensive and legitimating undertones: it exists in reaction to the criticism that the government was negotiating “with its back to the country”, and another common criticism: ‘you cannot build peace in Havana, you have to build peace in the territories’. The invocation of society’s role pre-empts criticism, reassuring people they have a role.

The emphasis that the peace process is not just between the FARC and the government is similarly legitimating. According to OACP official Simón, Sergio Jaramillo sought to convey to Colombian society that the peace process was “an opportunity to do a load of things we haven’t been able to do because of the conflict and the weakness of the state … the peace process is to get the FARC to demobilise, but is also leverage for other things”. Simón said that peace pedagogy needed “to de-FARC-ise [des-farc-izar] the peace process”, he said, meaning to communicate the message that the peace process transcended the FARC; “Giving the FARC seats in Congress is the least important thing”. This “de-FARC-isation” was necessary, he said, to defend the peace process from the opposition, who “managed to completely FARC-ise [farc-izar] the peace process”, referencing the Democratic Centre’s appeal to anti-FARC sentiments.

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191 Interview 15 February 2018.
Pilar’s words stem from this logic, inserting the population of Dabeiba into a position of prominence, which is legitimating – peace also involves you – while simultaneously indexing their responsibility in peace, thus performing a mobilising function. “The implementation phase involves everyone” is similarly both a recognition and a call to action: you will have to do things in order to get peace, it is not just the government’s responsibility.

Pilar presents a Power-Point slide showing the timeline of the three phases (the exploratory phase, public phase and implementation phase). She explains, “we are now four months into implementation,” which, she says, requires participation of all society:

This phase does not belong to the government, or the FARC, it belongs to all of us. The negotiations in Havana sought to end the conflict between the government and the FARC. In Havana, they didn’t sign peace. Peace is built in the territories, from below, with the people; in the Agreement this is called territorial peace. The Agreement establishes a ‘what’ – some plans, some reforms – but the ‘how’ is defined in the communities, depending on the local requirements.

This ‘peace needs you’ topos, underpinned by the deferential logic of territorial peace, recognises and incorporates a pre-emptive response to the criticism that “peace is not signed, it is built”, and reaffirms the OACP’s temporal logic that the negotiations in Havana sought to end the conflict, before allowing society to build peace. Pilar continues:

To build peace, the state and the citizenry must work together. We cannot sit and wait, thinking the state that has to provide everything. We, as citizens, have to participate in the process, and work with the state.

This echoes the frustration of OACP officials that people criticise the state but then do not participate. Her use of ‘we’ does not refer to herself, Pilar. It is a condescending ‘we’, meaning ‘you all’; ‘we have to participate’ means ‘you have to participate’. Once I get to know Pilar I realise that she genuinely means to be encouraging, inclusive, communicate the idea that she is with them, they are all Colombians, all part of the same society which needs to turn a page in its history. But her condescending ‘we’ unwittingly suggests she is in the same boat as the people of Dabeiba, when she is not. She is socially whiter, they are socially darker; she has expensive clothes, a university education, and holidays with her family in Miami; most of the audience are lucky if they have finished primary school, and are likely to have never travelled beyond Medellín; she owns a laptop and smartphone, they work with their hands on the land and may not have power sockets in their house. Above all, she has never experienced the conflict first-
hand, whereas they live with the potentiality of violence ingrained in everyday life. It is also an uncannily un-state ‘we’ – as if she were not the state herself. The contrast between Pilar’s reality and theirs is further encapsulated in her blithe call to ‘participate’; in places like Dabeiba, participating in state-led mechanisms for implementation, engaging locally in peace activism, or even speaking publicly in the Q&A session of a forum like this, can expose people to death threats.

**International Experts**

Pilar continues:

> One of the world experts on peace, Johan Galtung, says that violence is a triangle – at the top is the bit you can see, the direct violence. Underneath that is structural and cultural violence. The costs of war in Colombia have been on all three, and ending the war and building peace has to address all three.

The invocation of international peace studies experts, most commonly Johan Galtung and John Paul Lederach, but also sometimes just the phrase “international experts”, plays a legitimating role. It appeals to a perceived superiority of the international over the local, confers “expertise” on the peace process, and suggests objectivity, non-partisanship. Again, this legitimating has a defensive dimension: if it were not for the opposition’s delegitimizing attacks on the peace process, it would not have been so necessary to defend the peace process. Throughout the script, various claims are supported with reference to ‘international experts’, drawing on their aura of authority – not unlike the way academics use citations. This topos reveals the reliance of the Santos administration generally on international peace expertise in their conception of the peace process (Chapter 7).

**Peacebuilding Requires Cultural Transformations**

Elaborating further on Galtung’s triangle, Pilar says, “Ending the conflict is necessary for peacebuilding, but it is not enough. Peacebuilding means transforming the way we relate to the other, transforming our culture”. This definition of peacebuilding as a separate but parallel process to implementation of the Peace Agreement, involving all society, requiring a cultural transformation, is influenced by seminal concepts in peace studies (Galtung 1969, Lederach 1997). It draws particularly on the theory that peace is grounded in culture, and that peacebuilding means building a culture of peace. Chapter 5 analyses the OACP’s increasing
use of this theory after the loss of the Referendum; the role of this topos in the script to reinforce the topos of ‘peace needs you’ and its simultaneous invocation, legitimisation and mobilisation.

Costs of War, Benefits of Peace

To an outsider, a government representative explaining to the population of a war-torn town why peace was better than war might seem ludicrous. Nevertheless, another common topos was to present the peace process in terms of costs of war and the benefits of peace; this stemmed from having to defend the peace process against the Democratic Centre’s opposition. Pilar says:

Agriculture is one of the sectors most affected by the conflict, and will benefit greatly from peace. According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation, Colombia has the seventh greatest potential for food production in the world, and that potential has not been exploited due to the conflict. With peace, Colombia could produce 700 thousand more tonnes of food than it does now. There have already been benefits; the Ministry of Agriculture says that in 2016, food production increased 12 times.

Again, this quote legitimates by referencing the supposedly neutral expertise of international organisations. The legitimisation of the peace process in terms of economic dividends reveals the liberal peace paradigm. I learn later that Pilar emphasised the agricultural costs and benefits because she knew that Dabeiba was a largely agricultural population, and she was trying to tailor her script to them. However, the talk of the ‘costs’ of war in the mouth of someone whose faciality indexes the social positioning of someone who has demonstrably not paid these costs, to a population which has paid all kinds of costs, seems condescending and naïvely disrespectful.

Swallowing Toads

The ‘costs and benefits’ topos attempts to move beyond the defensive position of responding to “myths”, to which the government was consistently reduced, and tries to establish a positive narrative. By highlighting the positives, the script seeks to detract attention from what the OACP saw as the negatives: the concessions to the FARC. In 2014, after his re-election, Santos mentioned in an interview that Colombians would have to tragar sapos, “swallow toads”, in order
to get the benefits of peace, a Colombian phrase meaning to accept unpleasant things, to make a trade-off for something good. Santos said:

If we want peace we have to sit down with them (the FARC) and decide how we are going to agree this peace. The alternative is 20 or 30 years more war, with victims, suffering and death. Yes, these are very large toads that we have to swallow. (El Espectador 2014)

This became a common phrase in discussions about the Peace Agreement to refer to the concessions made to the FARC, such as seats in Congress, economic support in their reincorporation process, and the option of non-jail-based sentences. The opposition, among them current president Iván Duque, insisted during the ‘No’ campaign, “there are toads we cannot swallow” (Semana 2016a).

Pilar’s script does not use this phrase, but all her references to the positives of the Peace Agreement implicitly create the idea of the trade-off: if we are going to get these positive things like agrarian development, we need to accept the concessions to the FARC. The emphasis on the benefits likewise contributes to the de-FARC-isation of the Peace Agreement.

**Peace Will Not Happen Overnight**

Pilar continues:

We cannot sign an agreement and think we will see those benefits overnight, obviously it doesn’t work like that. Implementation will take 15 years; currently we are just four months in. What happens in the first two years, according to international experience, is fundamental. We therefore all need to play an active role.

The 15 years refers to the timeline the OACP produced, based on the time frames agreed in Havana for different short, medium and long-term aspects of the Peace Agreement; for example, the FARC’s disarmament was stipulated to take place over six months, the Truth Commission was mandated for three years, and the land titling was to take place over ten years. Again, the ‘international experts’ topos is employed both to legitimate and to mobilise, in Pilar’s urging people to participate now – the ‘peace needs you’ topos. She says, “International experts say peacebuilding can last even longer than the conflict. So it could take us more than 50 years, and we’re going to need several generations.” This reminds the audience that
implementation, the state’s responsibility, is separate from peacebuilding, society’s responsibility. She adds:

Sometimes people get desperate when they do not see things from the Agreement arriving in the territories straightaway. But first it’s necessary to make different commissions, different entities, create new laws to implement the points.

The translation by Congress of the Peace Agreement into laws, and the creation of new institutions, were important steps in early implementation that were not necessarily visible to the public, as they took place at an institutional level. However, Pilar’s explanation has defensive undertones, pre-empting criticisms about state in compliance: ‘people in the territories want to see changes now, but they have to wait’. It also contradicts her call to mobilise, to participate, to act.

**The Six Points of the Agreement**

Pilar next goes on to present the six points of the Peace Agreement. The FARC and the government had different justifications and interpretations of each point (Chapter 1). The pedagogy script, however, cast the government’s interpretation of the Agreement as if it were neutral, objective, technical information. While Jaramillo’s view that the agenda allowed each side to maintain their own interpretation was useful in the negotiations, it became more complex when it came to conveying a single version to the Colombian public, from only one of the parties.

Pilar presents each point in order, explains its objective(s), two or three key measures agreed within that point, and advances in implementation. The anchoring of the script in the six points is in itself a topos, as it indicates the continued insistence on the original text of the Peace Agreement as an invocation of truth – ‘that which is really contained in the Agreement’ – and the OACP as the authority on that truth.

Pilar clarifies that the OACP is not responsible for implementation: “In peace processes, some people do the negotiations and other people implement. The OACP did the negotiations, but implementation is done by different institutions.” This references the problem the OACP had in

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doing pedagogy on implementation: they were explaining things that were outside their remit. They therefore increasingly invited local representatives of implementing institutions to accompany peace pedagogy sessions and give their own presentations after the OACP. This topos distances the OACP from responsibility in the outcome.

**Point One, Comprehensive Rural Reform: Closing the Gap**

Pilar’s presentation of point one, the comprehensive rural reform, privileges the government’s view of rural reform as part of a liberal state-building project. She says, “the objectives of this point are to make structural transformations in the territories, generate dignified living conditions for people in the countryside, reduce poverty levels, promote equal development, and close the gap between the rural and urban areas”. To fulfil those objectives, she lists three measures agreed in point one: the creation of a land bank to distribute land to *campesinos*; plans to improve productivity and quality of life in rural areas; and Development Programmes with a Territorial-Based Focus (PDETs). The notion of “closing the gap between the rural and the urban” conveys the common view of the Colombian countryside as wild and primitive, and the city as modern and civilised (Serje 2011).

In terms of implementation, at this point in time the main advance was the creation of new institutions; the Power-Point slide lists the institutions in charge of the three measures (Fig.10).
**Fig.10 Power-point slide on point one, Comprehensive Rural Reform**

*Source: Screenshot. OACP internal document. Personal archive.*

The clean aesthetic of the Power-Point with institutional logos reinforces the message: point one was a technical exercise, to be done by state bureaucracies with participation of local people. This obscures the fact that land reform is a contentious political issue involving redistribution of economic wealth and power, attempted several times throughout Colombian history, and consistently undermined by political and business elites.¹⁹³

In the Q&A, a *campesina* woman asks, “When will this rural reform begin? Can we go and ask for land now? Where is this land?” Her question reveals how, instead of the objective to ‘know the Agreement’ which Pilar presumes she shares with her audience, many local people are more concerned about whether this new government spiel will lead to their immediate needs being solved. But Pilar replies, “The land bank will last 12 years and contains 3 million hectares. This is the responsibility of the National Land Agency; they will come to Dabeiba when they are ready”. This defers responsibility to the National Land Agency, one of the implementing institutions; thus, government responsibility dissolves into the complex ecosystem of the wider state.

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¹⁹³ On the cultural politics of land (re-)distribution in Colombia see Dávila (2017); for an analysis of how political and business interests ultimately undermined the redistributive aspirations of point one of the Peace Agreement see García (2018).
**Point Two, Political Participation: Democratic Opening**

Pilar explains that point two, on political participation, seeks “to enable a greater diversity of voices within public affairs, and for weapons and politics never to be mixed again”. She mentions the new statute of opposition; the expert commission that will make recommendations on electoral reform; the security mechanisms to protect those who participate in politics; and the 16 special peace constituencies. In terms of implementation, Pilar says the National Commission on Security Guarantees has been created, and that they have “started discussing” the assassination of leaders. Behind each of these measures, as in those of point one, are decades-old political struggles. The struggle to reform the political system to increase inclusivity and break the hegemony of the traditional political elites dates back to the origins of the FARC’s armed struggle. The mention of protection measures for those who participate in politics might well remind an audience like Dabeiba of assassinations of local politicians and candidates over the years. The compression of this complexity into equally-weighted bullet points is understandable, given the quantity of information to be communicated, but presenting political and electoral reform as technical and non-political is the height of what Li (2007) calls ‘rendering technical’. This title of point two, ‘democratic opening’, encapsulates this topos; it states the positive intentions without mention of any challenges.

In the Q&A, a woman asks:

What’s going to happen with security in the areas the FARC left? The Agreement says these areas will be occupied by the state, but so far we haven’t seen any state presence. How long do we have to wait?

Pilar replies: “As I said, implementation is not going to happen overnight. I do not have a date for you. But that’s one of the government’s main concerns at the moment”. Again, the ‘peace will not happen overnight’ topos is used to call for patience. Yet Pilar cannot say anything else – she is powerless to address the woman’s security concerns.

**Point Three, Ending the Conflict: A Necessary Condition**

“The objective of point three”, says Pilar, “is for the FARC to disarm and reincorporate into civilian life. We have 26 Transitory Local Zones for Normalisation, one of which is in Dabeiba”.

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She explains these Zones will last six months, while the FARC disarm under UN supervision, and prepare for reincorporation into social, political and economic life. “The effective reincorporation of the FARC is a necessary condition for building peace”, she says. She explains the economic support to the FARC in their reincorporation, and the fact that the FARC will, after disarming, transition to a political party with 10 seats in Congress. Her emphasis on the FARC’s reincorporation as a “necessary condition” pre-empts the possibility of people finding it unpleasant: the ‘swallowing toads’ topos. She also emphasises the UN supervision, which conveys the ideas of technical expertise and neutrality contained in the ‘international experts’ topos. Her Power-Point shows a picture of the UN containers for storage of weapons, with a UN logo sign in the foreground (Fig.11).

In terms of implementation, she explains the role of the UN Monitoring and Verification Mission (MVM), and says that the OACP is currently certifying each FARC member’s disarmament (Chapter 6). Later, when the disarmament phase is completed, the pedagogy script will incorporate statistics to show implementation of point three: the number of FARC members disarmed, weapons decertified, explosive stores extracted. As Merry (2016, 1) argues,
quantification, the use of numbers to describe social phenomena, is seductive; numbers “convey an aura of objective truth and scientific authority despite the extensive interpretive work that goes into their construction”. These numbers will be accompanied with photos, providing ‘proof’ that the Peace Agreement is being fulfilled (Fig.12). The use of numbers and photos, in the context of opposition to the peace process, contributes to the legitimation effect of the script.

Fig.12: Power-Point slide showing numbers and photos to substantiate fulfilment of point three
Source: Screenshot. OACP internal document. Personal archive.

**Point Four, Solving the Illicit Drugs Problem: A Chapter Within Point One**

Point four, says Pilar, “includes voluntary crop substitution, treatment of consumers, and combatting the drug-trafficking chains”. She reminds them, “many campesinos produce coca because they have no dignified economic alternatives”, but “crop substitution will remedy that problem”, recurring to point one’s ‘closing the gap’ topos. “We can see point four as a chapter within point one”, she says, “that’s why it’s important that the agreement is comprehensive and interdependent”. The appeal to the interdependency of the Agreement indexed by the topos of point four as a ‘chapter within point one’ reminds the audience that they cannot cherry-pick: it only works if it all happens together.
On implementation, Pilar explains that the National Comprehensive Programme for the Substitution of Crops Used for Illicit Purposes (PNIS) has been created. “This voluntary substitution involves pacts between communities and the state”, she says, “and if the communities don’t fulfil their side of the pacts, we will return to forced eradication”. This emphasis stems from the renegotiation: one of the demands of the ‘No’ campaign was for the government to maintain the option of eradicating coca forcibly. The tensions between the state and coca-growing communities vis-à-vis manual eradication versus aerial spraying and forced eradication versus voluntary substitution are as old as the coca trade itself (Ramírez 2011); as with points one and two, the presentation of point four in terms of equally-weighted bullet points, with technical terms and acronyms, flattens the political complexity of this history. Pilar’s reference to this is part of the legitimating function of the script: it pre-empts criticisms that ‘voluntary substitution will not work’, and provides an answer. The prevalence of pre-emptive emphases in the script reveals the extent to which the face of the government is affected by and incorporates the relationship to its opposition.

**Point Five, Victims’ Rights: The Victims are at the Centre**

Point five, on victims’ rights, says Pilar, is “the central axis of this Agreement, and the main reason why the government and the FARC sat down to negotiate: for the victims, and to prevent future victims”. This topos, the ‘victims are at the centre’, was repeated by both Santos and the FARC throughout the peace process. “The objective of this point”, she says, “is to reveal the truth about what happened in the conflict, provide justice for crimes committed, make reparations to the victims, and ensure guarantees of non-repetition”. This topos draws on the transitional justice paradigm (see Introduction). It contributes to the ‘de-FARC-isation’ of the Peace Agreement: as with ‘peace needs you’, it shifts the focus away from concessions to the FARC toward the role of the audience, many of whom, Pilar knows, are likely to be victims, suggesting peace is for them.

Point five, explains Pilar, includes the Truth Commission, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), the Special Unit for the Search for Disappeared Persons, and the strengthening of existing reparation mechanisms, which together comprise the Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice, Reparations and Guarantees of Non-recurrence. The JEP was one of the most controversial issues in the peace process; Pilar explains the three pathways for those
investigated, and clarifies that the option of non-jail sentences for those who comply fully with truth-telling does not mean there is no sanction, but “they will be in a specific territory, and will have to make reparations to the victims”; this “is a form of restorative justice”. Her anticipatory clarification seeks to correct the “myth” that the Agreement created impunity for the FARC.

In terms of implementation, Pilar says the selection committee has been formed to appoint the magistrates of the JEP, the truth commissioners, and the director of the Unit for Searching for Disappeared Persons, and that there have been some “early acts of recognition of responsibility” (Fig.13) and remains returned to family members of the disappeared. Pilar says, “These are solemn public events, carried out with the victims”, in places of emblematic acts of violence carried out by the FARC against civilians.194 “Of course the state also has to recognise responsibility when it has caused harm,” she says, “and President Santos has done so with the UP”.195 Pilar’s throwaway “of course” seems to foreground the FARC’s responsibility for atrocities, embedding an assumption that most people will see the FARC as the greater evil. This was a dominant view among some sectors of society (see Chapter 1); but other sectors held the opposite view, and some were likely to be present in the audience, due to the patterns of state violence in Dabeiba. When Pilar says ‘the state has to recognise responsibility’, she does not use ‘we’; she does not connect herself to that state, nor that responsibility.

194 The FARC recognised responsibility and apologised to the victims of Bojayá on 6 December 2015 (El País 2016), and to the victims of La Chinita on 30 September 2016 (Semana 2016c), among other cases. 195 President Santos recognised the responsibility of the Colombian state in the destruction of the Patriotic Union party (UP) on 15 September 2016 (BBC Mundo 2016).
**Point Six, Implementation and Verification Mechanisms: The World is Watching**

Finally, says Pilar, point six, on implementation, “seeks to ensure all this gets implemented, and verify that implementation is consistent with what was agreed in Havana, with international accompaniment”. She explains that the CSIVI has been created, comprising members of the government and the FARC, that the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies will monitor implementation, and that the Peace Agreement is being incorporated into a United Nations Security Council resolution. The emphasis on international accompaniment builds on the ‘international experts’ topos, legitimating the Agreement, and pre-empting scepticism about whether these promises will be fulfilled, which inevitably arises in every peace pedagogy Q&A. This topos encapsulates the idea that fulfilment will occur, because ‘the world is watching’.

In the Q&A, a man says, “This all sounds very nice. But who is going to make sure it is all fulfilled?” Pilar replies:

> Like I told you, we have the MVM, the international notables, and the CSIVI. But I think we should not be asking what will happen if it’s not fulfilled. It’s not an option for it not to
happen, we have to make it happen. Yes, historically there have been deficiencies in the state, but we have to participate actively, we cannot continue the mantra that the state never fulfils. We have to demand compliance. I invite you all to study the Agreement, so we can do our own monitoring in the territories, not just think, oh, the internationals are going monitor it. We, the citizens, people in the territories, we are the ones being affected, we must monitor each of the points.

This invocation of the ‘peace needs you’ topos seeks to mobilise and encourage people to start organising themselves around the Agreement. But the notion that the people of Dabeiba can ‘make it happen’ by ‘doing their own monitoring’ and ‘demanding compliance’ is absurd. The man’s question indexes the stereotype that the state never fulfils (Pellegrino 2017). Pilar acknowledges this complaint, ‘historically there have been deficiencies in the state’, but puts the responsibility for making the state do things on citizen oversight.

Thus, each individual topos in the pedagogy script reveals identity narratives and the culturally-constituted ‘common sense’ among officials in the Santos government.

Absences

What the OACP peace pedagogy script does not contain is as important as what it does. Bourdieu reminds us that authorised speech is subject to “the norms of official propriety”; meaning “censorship”, which does not necessarily take the form of explicit prohibitions; these are unnecessary when spokespeople are selected who are inclined to engage in discourse compatible with the institution’s objectives (Bourdieu 1991, 138). I am unconvinced about calling this censorship, which suggests intentional repression of speech, but Bourdieu’s point stands: the OACP Pedagogy Group was selected, as Chapter 3 argues, with culturally liberal tendencies, and their shared ‘common sense’ was produced over time in the institution, which makes them inclined to share the stated and unstated objectives of the script.

One absence in the script is the FARC’s perspective. If this were any other government policy, a government representative’s single-view authorised speech would make sense. However, as Chapter 1 notes, a peace accord is, by definition, a document crafted between antagonistic parties. Throughout the negotiations, the government never did peace pedagogy jointly with the FARC. The FARC felt the government’s peace pedagogy was one-sided, but considering the

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196 Interview with FARC commander Pastor Alape, 5 August 2018.
challenges in communicating under the principle of confidentiality (Chapter 2), getting to an agreement about doing joint peace pedagogy would have been difficult. Some world peace processes have seen public gestures of cooperation between leaders of opposing sides: Ian Paisley and Gerry Adams in Northern Ireland, or Nelson Mandela and Frederik Willem de Klerk in South Africa. This did not happen in Colombia until after the signing of the Agreement, partly because the FARC were so unpopular that Santos’ advisors believed it was inviable, though during implementation, I observed one pedagogy session in which FARC representatives spoke after the OACP, which was symbolically powerful and conveyed a message of reconciliation (Chapter 6).

The impact of this absence on the pedagogy script was twofold: firstly, it obscured the FARC’s interpretation of the Peace Agreement, making it seem as though the ‘benefits of peace’, such as the rural reform, were the unilateral policies of a benevolent state. The FARC’s presentation of the Peace Agreement was radically different; they cast points one and two as part of their emancipatory project to redress the structural inequalities that were the raison d’être of their armed struggle. The OACP’s presentation of land reform as technical was political, because it was the government’s (liberal) interpretation of point one. The notion that the pedagogy script could be technical, not political, was built on this paradox. Secondly, it put the government in the uncomfortable position of having to defend making concessions to their antagonists. As Chapter 1 suggests, the government’s face in a peace process incorporates the refraction of the government’s relationship to their adversary. No wonder, then, the OACP wanted to ‘de-FARC-ise’ the Peace Agreement – in speaking about the FARC, the government came across as apologetic.

This is related to another absence: there was no discussion about the history of the conflict. Chapter 1 showed how the Santos government’s peace policy rested on an interpretation of history which depicted Colombia’s violence as an internal armed conflict, with harms caused by all parties, countering Uribe’s interpretation of history which depicted the violence as internal terrorism. Different sectors ascribe to variants of one or other version, depending on political viewpoint, on where they live, and on how they have experienced the conflict. Conflict dynamics have varied regionally (Gonzalez, Bolívar, and Vásquez 2003), and the experiences of a guerrilla-controlled town are different from those of a paramilitary-controlled town, or a town over which guerrillas and paramilitaries competed for territorial control. Experiences vary across the rural and the urban worlds, and between social sectors; as Dávila (2017, 119) argues, the
problem of how to “name this past” has been at the heart of many recent political disputes. The peace pedagogy script does not engage with this discussion.

I asked members of the Pedagogy Group why they never gave historical context in their presentations, especially when speaking to urban audiences who, unlike Dabeiba’s population, had mostly not experienced the conflict directly. Tarcisio delivered several pedagogy presentations in 2016 to Bogotá state officials, and told me that he mostly received questions about history, rather than the Peace Agreement. “Often, people had no idea about the history of the conflict, so we ended up talking about why there was a war”, he said. “But the OACP didn’t have an approved script for that. So it was out of our hands. There was a vacuum.”197 Those Pedagogy Group members with more academic expertise could engage in limited discussions about this; but it was generally difficult for the government to take sides in interpretations of history. This created a challenge: without the history, it was difficult to explain the ‘why’ of each point. The fact that there was a point on rural reform presumed a shared interpretation of the past between script and audience, that land distribution had been one of the contributing factors in the conflict; likewise for the other points.

The interpretation of history is a political battlefield. During the negotiations, a Historical Commission on the Conflict and its Victims was formed, with twelve experts (six chosen by each negotiating party) and two rapporteurs (one chosen by each side), tasked with producing a report on the origins and multiple causes of the conflict, the factors which have contributed to its persistence over time, and the effects on the population. However, the commission failed to agree on a single historical narrative. Instead, it published twelve different reports, and two rapporteur’s summaries, evidencing the multiplicity of interpretations about the past (CHCV 2016). Establishing a unified historical narrative is a struggle which continues long after the signing of any peace agreement, and the Truth Commission continues that challenge today. In the peace pedagogy script, the absence of history, which we might see as the de-historicisation of the Peace Agreement, undermined the OACP’s attempt to persuade audiences of the Agreement’s legitimacy, especially its concessions to the FARC. Some sectors perceived the FARC as terrorist groups whose only activity was drug-trafficking; they therefore struggled to understand why the FARC should be treated differently from common criminals. Although the National Centre for Historical Memory (CNMH) during the Santos administration had among its

197 Interview 1 February 2018.
duties the task of doing pedagogy about the history of the conflict, there was never a concerted collaboration between the CNMH and the OACP; another instance of non-coordination across the multiple institutions of the state.

The script also avoids the political polarisation around the peace process; perhaps the most radical absence. Pilar mentions briefly that there was a Referendum, a renegotiation, and that the renegotiated deal was ratified by Congress and began to be implemented on 1 December 2016, but this is all she says. For most Colombians, unless they followed developments of national politics and the peace process closely in the news, the Referendum was the central, in some cases the only, thing they knew about the peace process.

The Pedagogy Group were wary of talking politics, yet the politics emerged in the Q&A. One man in Dabeiba asked, “what if the next president doesn’t want to continue with the process?” This question arose increasingly throughout 2017 and 2018, as the elections neared. The OACP, as government spokespersons, could not express political affiliations; their role was to remain technical, but they wanted to motivate people to engage in peacebuilding. In one pedagogy session, shortly after Duque was elected but before his investiture, a woman asked, “What can we do to stop things from going backwards? Whenever the government changes, the processes change”. Myriam, the Pedagogy official giving the session, said:

The Agreement is legally binding, but peace is made with political will, not by decree. Just because something is passed in law, doesn’t mean it will be implemented. The 1991 Constitution has lots of beautiful things but they do not necessarily happen. It does not only depend on the government, but also on you, civil society. That’s why you need to know about the Peace Agreement, so you can lobby for compliance. I can’t take sides here; my objective is to offer you information so you can safeguard the Agreement.

This reveals another unstated objective of peace pedagogy: to inform society so they could protect the peace process, independently of what future governments might do. They saw arming society with technical information as giving them “tools” with which to do their own monitoring and lobbying.

The final absence was a lack of evaluative statements. Explaining the text of the Peace Agreement, the original objective of peace pedagogy pre-Referendum, was relatively straightforward: there was a text, and it could be summarised. Summaries were interpretatively biased, and authorised speech from the FARC was different from authorised speech from the
government, but there was a single referent. Implementation of the Peace Agreement was another matter. Reporting on what had and had not been done, and how, by a plethora of institutions, had multiple referents. Chapter 6 shows the contrasting interpretations of whether the OACP’s implementation of the TLZNs was a success or a failure. Pilar’s explanation of implementation only says what has been done; it cannot evaluate its quality, as the script was restricted to presenting technical information. Yet beneath this technical veneer was a complex political reality.

These absences are all explainable; I am not suggesting that the OACP should have collaborated with the FARC on peace pedagogy, included a government-approved historical narrative, discussed the polarisation caused by the Referendum, or evaluated implementation. The absences are built in structurally to giving face as the government. When Pilar speaks as the government, she cannot deviate from the script because this would risk undermining the government’s face: being the authorised spokesperson of a government involves the responsibility of what Goffman (1967, 12) called face-work, maintaining the consistency of an image of self, for the whole imagined entity, ‘the government’. It is thus understandable why a junior representative would have limited authorised speech, as “losing face” as the government could have considerable consequences on legitimacy.

Conclusions

In this encounter, the government gives face to society. The face becomes the interface. In the Dabeiba coliseo, the state has many faces: Pilar is one face, the police officers listening to the talk are another; even the schoolteacher, whose salary is paid by the Education Ministry, is a face of the state. Pilar represents the face of the government. Yet the face of the government emerges, at the interface, via an assemblage of elements: the staging in the coliseo, the time regulation, the Power-Point, the informative booklets, Pilar herself, and the script. By this enactment, this mise-en-scène, the face comes into being, more than the sum of its parts.

One of these parts is Pilar’s faciality, indexing her as belonging to a particular social group. The OACP peace pedagogues mostly had no didactic experience, they were not given training in public speaking; they were just given the script, putting the emphasis on the information, rather than on its communication. But it matters who is speaking. Pilar’s faciality, accent, clothing, everything about how she inserts herself in the space, shows her cultural distance from the
reality of the people of Dabeiba. My initial disapproval at this, as noted in my field diary, however, was not necessarily shared by the audience. When I asked the campesinos I was staying with what they thought of Pilar, they were approving. “She was good”, they said, nonchalantly. Her faciality was an actualisation of established, even accepted, social hierarchies; it was neither offensive to them, nor particularly impressive – it was what they expected. What they underlined was the importance of her visit, and the overall symbolic message of ‘we are making peace’.

In this instance of giving face, beyond the production of the state-society boundary, Pilar appears to build a wall of information, slide by slide, bullet point by bullet point, topos by topos. The script emphasises the overwhelming quantity of information about the Peace Agreement, predicated on an appeal to the technical, and an avoidance of the political. The overall effect is an insistent legitimation of the peace process, and, by extension, of the government itself. The phrase that comes to mind, with so much pre-empting of potential criticism, is “The lady doth protest too much, methinks”; spoken by Queen Gertrude in Hamlet, in reference to an actor in a play whose insistent affirmations are overdone, and, therefore, suspect. I do not mean the OACP officials were insincere; they were not, as Chapter 3 shows. Rather, I am highlighting the effect of information-overload as defensive strategy, to protect the peace process from the Democratic Centre’s delegitimation campaign, and signalling explaining as a culturally liberal mode of government communication to a society.

The Santos administration’s enactment of legitimacy is founded on the idea of rational dissemination of information, via a script learned by junior spokespeople and deployed across Colombia. Yet this is not a purely rational exercise. Just as Weber reminds us (1978, 216) that his ‘ideal types’ of legitimacy are not necessarily found in pure form, the insistence on explanation, which might correspond in Weber’s model to the rational basis for legal-institutional authority, does engender emotional effects, normally associated with Weber’s notion of charismatic authority.\(^{198}\) Whether the effect is convincing or not depends on individual audience members. Despite my criticisms to the script, several participants in the Dabeiba Q&A call for more pedagogy. A woman says:

\(^{198}\) Weber (1947, 358) defines charisma as “a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities”.
I think this event is really important, thank you. I had presumed that what you signed in Havana was for the FARC’s benefit. So it’s good to hear all this. But I think the attendance here today is nowhere near sufficient.

A man agrees, saying, “We, the dabeibanos, should be the people most aware of what’s going on in this peace process, but many of us had no idea; maybe one or two of us has read a couple of pages of the Agreement, but no more”. He adds, “this presentation should go round all the settlements”, because there is “so much disinformation”. These comments validate the idea that society should be informed about the Peace Agreement. The notion that society should ‘study the Agreement’, as Pilar had said, to protect the peace process, might sound absurd to an outsider, but it was a narrative shared by much of Colombian society. Indeed, after Duque’s election in 2018 and the increasing violence in the context of lacklustre implementation, many groups have used their knowledge of the Agreement to demand compliance and protect the gains of peace, often at considerable risk to their lives. What makes it sound absurd is the fact of it being said by the government.

Other individuals, however, rejected the OACP’s explanations. In one 2015 pedagogy session with students and lecturers in the University of Cauca, a man exclaimed, “What you’re bringing us here is pure grammar, rhetoric! The grammar on these papers you’re handing out, it’s dead letters. The rhetoric that everything in Havana is going well. Lies” (Escobar, 2015). No government administration can ever appeal to the entire population; the persuasiveness of the face of government depends on the complex interplay of projection and perception, giving face and receiving face, which is evident at the interface.

The call for ‘more pedagogy’ to combat disinformation was a common response in pedagogy sessions across the country. I saw variations on this script throughout 2017 and 2018 with multiple audiences: women activists in Barranquilla, local state officials in Ibagué, religious organisations in Bogotá. The OACP’s self-criticism that their peace pedagogy was ‘too technical’ and ‘not emotional enough’ led them to design a pedagogy project which sought to engage people’s emotions, discussed next in Chapter 5. However, multiple audiences continued to request the original style of peace pedagogy, calling for ‘more information’ about the Peace Agreement. Perhaps what was missing in the OACP’s internal self-criticism was the recognition that ‘explaining’ also engenders emotions.
CHAPTER 5 – State-Consciousness: Three Layers of Responsibility and Trust

On 20 July 2018, at the official Independence Day concert in Cali, President Santos announced the launch of a new song, *La Confianza*, ‘Trust’. In his televised speech, Santos celebrated “the diversity of our regions”, and called for this diversity to “unite us, not divide us”, for peace to prosper. The song was composed by Andrés Mendiola, a singer from the Caribbean coast, and Jorge Botello, alias ‘Ahiman’, a rapper from Cúcuta. It featured two renowned Colombian musicians, rock singer Andrea Echeverri, lead vocalist for the band *Aterciopelados*, and Orlando “El Cholo” Valderrama, a singer of *joropo*, traditional music of the *Llanos*, the Colombian Eastern Plains. *La Confianza* was the result of an OACP project that sought to “co-create new narratives” between the government and regional civil society. Its combination of Caribbean ballad and urban rap was complemented by Cholo’s *joropo*, Echeverri’s modern rock, a verse backed by *chirimía* –the traditional music of the Pacific region—another verse backed by electronic music, and an accordion *vallenato* solo, the music of Antioquia and the Caribbean. City, countryside, and different regional styles united, in a celebration of Colombia’s cultural diversity.

The lyrics, written by Mendiola and Ahiman, were inspired by a year of meetings, conversations, phone calls and WhatsApp chats between OACP officials and approximately 100 pro-peace artists, musicians, journalists and teachers from the 32 departments of Colombia. Mendiola sings:

> Trusting you  
> I want to spend my life trusting you  
> And that has such a special sound  
> It’s the closest thing to happiness  
> The evil voice of experience tells me  
> Don’t believe that story, it won’t work  
> They are taking advantage of your innocence  
> One cloudy day the sun shone  
> The sea-spray wet my feet  
> They explained, they told me, that trusting was better  
> I’d prefer to walk with the strength of your embrace  
> There’s a rest on the way, and your colour at night  
> A necessary silence for the grieving soul  
> I love the hope you feel.
Ahiman raps:

Oh my darling, give me your hand, trust,  
There’s no fixed destiny, we build it day by day  
I understand your distrust, let’s walk together  
Continuing as we are is the worst that can happen to us  
With so much distrust, you must understand, love, that it’s in the darkest moment when the sun comes out,  
Let’s do it! Let’s attempt the impossible  
And let’s make this dream truly unfading.  

The music is joyful, catchy, rhythmic. The lyrics play ambiguously between the notion of trust between a romantic couple and trust within society; they invite Colombians to embrace trust as the emotion able to transform the country for a better future. They suggest a national tendency to distrust – “the evil voice of experience tells me / Don’t believe”; “I understand your distrust” – and invite Colombians to “walk together” to build a better future in which trust predominates, because “trusting [is] better”. The song release was accompanied by dozens of smaller cultural activities in different regions on the theme of trust – mural paintings, radio jingles, community magazine issues, a high school short story competition, conference speeches, and videoclips. The slogan of this cultural campaign was En Vos Confío – ‘In Thee I Trust’.

The idea was to target people’s emotions, especially those unconvinced by the peace process – the 63% who had not voted in the 2016 Peace Referendum—to persuade them that a better future was possible, and encourage them to participate in peacebuilding. It aimed to promote citizen support to the peace process before the 2018 presidential elections, to foster a pro-peace climate and get people to vote for peace, whoever they voted for, which implicitly meant not voting for those candidates perceived as anti-peace, including Iván Duque. But the song was launched too late to achieve this. The project to “co-create new narratives” between government and society (henceforth the ‘narratives project’) began in August 2017, but took a year to finish. By the song launch, President Santos had two weeks left in office; Iván Duque had already been elected. This lateness was due to multiple delays, many resulting from the challenges involved in working across the government-society relationship, and –ironically—a mutual lack of trust.

Whereas Chapter 4 examined the government-society encounter of the standard peace pedagogy session, a single, three-hour event, this chapter turns to a sustained year-long encounter between the OACP and pro-peace civil society, which was ongoing throughout my fieldwork. It shows how, despite shared objectives of encouraging citizen appropriation of peace and protecting the peace process in the 2018 elections, government and society struggled to “co-create” together. In this encounter, OACP officials sought to rectify what they perceived as their previous mistake – being ‘too technical’ and ‘not emotional enough’ – and the historical mistakes of the state – the stereotype of ‘non-compliance’ (Pellegrino 2017). They said they wanted to “do things differently as the state”, incarnating a ‘virtuous state’ (Dávila 2017).

However, they consistently found themselves having to renge on commitments for reasons outside their control: moving the date agreed for an event because of sensitive political context, or requesting additional paperwork from participants they had not previously believed necessary. When these things happened, the OACP officials had to dar la cara, ‘give face’, in the original sense of the phrase: to assume responsibility for something negative. The officials frequently expressed distress about this, saying things like, “It’s not my fault this is happening, but I’m the one who has to phone people and give face”. They had to assume responsibility as individuals for the fault of the institution, personally disappointing participants in the name of the government, and reconfirming people’s historical distrust of the state. They experienced this as contradictory.

Glaeser (1999, 233-4), analysing the experiences of police in East Berlin during the Cold War, discovers a “particular kind of psychic stress which is the consequence of insincerity”. When police officers had to act in ways incongruent with their moral self-image, they cast themselves as the victims of a state that had “forced them into duplicity”, as a way of resolving the tensions between personal sincerity and role sincerity. Glaeser (1999, 243-4) notes that “Blaming the system for inducing insincerity can be an effective tool of moral exoneration”, as police reject responsibility for their behaviour by identifying themselves as powerless within the institution. I suggest that the OACP officials’ experiences of distress are due to a tension analogous to that depicted by Glaeser, between personal responsibility, role (or institutional) responsibility, and government responsibility. Similarly, the way that the civil society participants in the project perceived the OACP officials shifted, often uncomfortably, between trust or distrust in the OACP individuals, trust or distrust in the institution (the OACP), and trust or distrust in the wider government, which was both trans-historical (the abstract ‘state-idea’) and specific (the Santos administration).
I propose the term state-consciousness, an awareness of being the state, to describe how government officials experience these three layers of responsibility, and how they experience the three layers of trust or distrust projected onto them by society. I argue that the type of state-consciousness the OACP officials developed was culturally liberal, involving the politics of recognition of cultural difference which Povinelli (2002, 4) argues engenders “moral sensibility” and corresponding feeling of obligation toward the culturally other.

Glaeser (1999, 254) argues that “Trust is built on the belief that the other is sincere” and “the belief in the sincerity of the other can only be established slowly through countless personal interactions”. The OACP sought to build trust with sceptical civil society as the government, but found themselves in what Glaeser (1999, 255) calls a “double bind situation”, an emotional distress caused by inescapable incompatibility between the ‘virtuous state’ they wished to incarnate, and non-compliance as the state, which they believed was morally reprehensible but had to enact as part of their role.

My fieldwork within the OACP started at the beginning of the narratives project, and ended shortly after the song’s launch. I worked on the project as an OACP volunteer, and sometimes was forced myself into the position of having to act in precisely the way I have argued in academic writing (Burnyeat 2017) the Colombian government should avoid: making promises and failing to keep them, thus experiencing personally this “double bind”. Additionally, my husband, Andrei, was contracted as external consultant to the OACP for the project, bringing the field into my own home, and I witnessed his struggle in working with sceptical civil society as the government, having previously been on the other side. Our combined experience points to the ease with which scholars may prescribe what governments should do, but the difficulty of doing such things when one is acting as government, with all the entailing responsibilities.

Objectives: The Logics of Intentions

Just as the peace pedagogy script (Chapter 4) had stated and unstated objectives, so did the narratives project. Anthropological literature on development frequently foregrounds the unintended outcomes of development projects, highlighting the gap between stated objectives and implementation (Ferguson 1994, Mosse 2005, Li 2007). In Colombia, McFee (2019) finds that interventions by international, state and non-governmental institutions to promote
reconciliation frequently end up reproducing conflict divisions. Certainly, there was a chasm between the objectives of the OACP narratives project and its outcome, which the next section discusses; but I first analyse the objectives, as they reveal much about the OACP officials and their perception of Colombian society.

An internal planning document stated the project’s objective thus:

**What do we want?** To change people’s chips!
**Why?** Because we are in a phase of transition from war to peace
**How are we going to do it?** Creating narratives from the territories for the country which mobilise society to support this transition
**What are we going to do it with?** Collective actions which transmit these narratives to different audiences.\(^\text{200}\)

The unfortunate phrase “change people’s chips” in the mouth of a government institution jars; it sounds like an attempt at the sort of government social engineering Scott (1998) critiques. However, the origins of its underpinning logic were quite the opposite.

The central self-criticism among OACP officials that peace pedagogy had been ‘too technical’ and ‘not emotional enough’, hinged on their perception that the ‘No’ campaign was successful because it targeted people’s emotions. By ‘narratives’, they meant the catchphrases and recurring topos of the ‘No’ campaign: ‘peace without impunity’, ‘castro-chavism’, ‘gender ideology’, and so on, employed by the ‘No’ campaign to make people “vote angry” (Chapter 1): the logic of what novelist Juan Gabriel Vásquez called the ‘narrative wars’ (Burnyeat 2020). They proposed to create new pro-peace ‘narratives’ to counter these anti-peace narratives, which the Democratic Centre Party continued to circulate in the run-up to the 2018 election.

OACP official Danilo told me the idea initially was to “widen the conversation” beyond the Peace Agreement and the FARC, and get people “to understand the concept of transition, and the long-term transformations contemplated in the Agreement”.\(^\text{201}\) The narratives project was run jointly by the OACP’s Pedagogy and Territorial Peace groups, and led by Valentina. Both teams believed these ‘narratives’ had to come “from the territories”. The logic of countering the anti-peace narratives converged with the logic of deferential recognition underlying the concept of territorial peace, which Chapter 2 shows influenced the evolution of peace pedagogy, creating

\(^{201}\) Personal communication August 2018.
an echo chamber between the OACP and pro-peace regional civil society. An internal report about the 2014-15 ERPs (Chapter 2) states:

Working hand in hand with local organisations is a gesture of respect toward communities ... a ‘reparative’ act in itself, building trust and dialogue between central government and the territories.\(^{202}\)

This shows the OACP’s gradual incorporation of the dual logic of recognition: first, learning from those who have been doing peacebuilding work for decades; second, offering redress for historical marginalisation. For the narratives project, the OACP therefore decided to convene artists, teachers and journalists from Colombia’s 32 departments, because they believed people with these profiles were already communicating about peace locally. The idea was to “turn up the volume”, as Valentina said, on local voices, usually unheard nationally, bridging the perceived gap between the urban and the rural, and between victims and those who had not experienced the conflict. This logic is underpinned by a well-intentioned reversal of the imaginary of the ‘wild regions’ (Serje 2011), which casts the urban centres as ignorant of the realities of the conflict and the reasons to support the peace process, and “the territories” as repositories of experiential knowledge – of victimisation and peacebuilding – needed to “integrate” the country in a common project of transitioning to peace.

Valentina proposed that these ‘new narratives’ should be created via a participatory “co-creation” methodology, rather than trying to counter anti-peace narratives with the same strategies as those employed by the Democratic Centre, such as mass marketing. This combined the OACP’s ‘narrative wars’ logic with their ‘territorial peace’ logic, and was underpinned by the anti-politics of cultural liberalism (Chapter 3). OACP officials perceived the Democratic Centre’s strategies as ‘politicking’ or ‘populist’, which they valued negatively. Instead of demagoguery and cheap appeals to emotions through advertising, they believed the solution lay in the authenticity of “the territories”. A new binary emerged: instead of technical rationality versus populist emotionality, they saw “culture” as the positive alternative to rationality, the new ‘good’ that could triumph over evil.

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The OACP’s conceptions of “culture” were multifarious, stemming from previous phases of peace pedagogy. The aforementioned internal report emphasised “the cultural dimension of peace” and the need to do “peacebuilding through culture”. It defined culture in three ways: first, the “practices, customs, attitudes, relations and behaviours rooted in territories”. Our “capacities for war and survival are deeply rooted”, it said; “we must now unlearn these practices”. Second, it suggested the “cultural and ancestral practices” present in territories with “considerable ethnic presence” should be “the vehicles with which to promote structural transformations.” Third, it identified art and culture as “natural mechanisms of social cohesion which can help reconstruct social imaginaries of peace”.

The first of these conceptions, which I shorthand as ‘behavioural culture’, was influenced by the concept of ‘culture of peace’ from Peace Studies, especially the work of Galtung (1969) and Lederach (1997). The UN defines ‘culture of peace’ as “a set of values, attitudes, traditions and modes of behaviour and ways of life”, based, among other things, on “respect for life, ending of violence and promotion and practice of non-violence through education, dialogue and cooperation” (UN General Assembly 1999). This echoes the Santos government’s conception that ending the conflict was one step, and peacebuilding a longer project requiring participation by all society – the ‘peace needs you’ topos analysed in Chapter 4. Valentina, who led the narratives project, had studied under Lederach, and her work in the OACP emphasised Lederach’s conceptions of peacebuilding as involving the transformation of social relationships.

The second conception I will call ‘cultural diversity’; this was influenced by the feedback loops created in the pro-peace echo chamber, whereby the discourses of those sectors of society who attended regional OACP pedagogy events were incorporated into the OACP’s internal ‘common sense’. One participant in the narratives project expressed her appreciation of the project’s idea in the launch event:

It’s lovely that you’ve invited people who aren’t normally listened to. This [gesturing around her] is Colombia, in all its diversity. Black, indigenous, mestizo. This [pointing] woman was raped, saw her mother die, and was forcibly displaced. And me, they gave me my son dead in a box. But here we are, standing tall. It’s important the whole country see that this is Colombia, our pain but also our culture, our faces, our voices.

The notion of ‘ethnic diversity’ (black, indigenous, mestizo), merges with ‘victims of the conflict’, in the master subject of “the territories”.

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The third conception was ‘artistic culture’: arts, education, journalism. This built on a previous project run from 2015-17 by the OACP following the ERPs, called ‘Dialogues and Capacities for Peace’, which promoted peacebuilding through local cultural practices such as festivals, commemorations and celebrations (OACP 2017b). Through previous projects, the OACP came to believe that ‘artistic culture’ could be employed via what they called “collective actions” (songs, festivals, etc.) to target people’s emotions, create new narratives, and thereby influence ‘behavioural culture’.

Thus, the OACP decided to work with artists, educators and journalists from “the territories”, to foster the cultural change they believed was necessary to mobilise citizens in support of peace. The idea of doing this via “co-creation” indicated their response to another common criticism: that the government had done peace pedagogy unilaterally, in a top-down, condescending dynamic. “Co-creation” sought to remedy this by collaborating horizontally, anchored in the recognition embedded in the logic of territorial peace.

The objective, therefore, imagines the opposite of the kind of top-down, hubristic government intervention Scott (1998) critiques, as it hinges on a desire to build collectively between government and society, and incorporate society’s requests for a different kind of government action. The objective itself is solid; cultural artefacts have historically influenced cultural change, and the use of songs to mobilise people, like Michael Jackson’s We Are the World promoting transnational solidarity with Africa, or Pink Floyd’s The Wall supporting counter-culture in Seventies’ Britain, inspired the OACP and project participants to make a song the centre-piece of their cultural campaign. If it seems absurd to propose to use culture to “change the chip” of Colombian society, it is because the intention is coming from the mouth of the government. This chapter questions whether it is in fact possible for a government and society to work together across this divide.

The temporality of the project was cast as long-term: changing ‘behavioural culture’ in order to build a ‘culture of peace’. As in the ‘peace needs you’ topos (Chapter 4), the OACP saw this as something that would take generations. However, the project was short-term in nature: the OACP could only plan until the end of the Santos administration in 2018, because when governments change, staff, policies and projects change. More importantly, the OACP hoped these ‘narratives’ would generate a pro-peace citizen effervescence that would affect people’s
emotions and ensure election of a pro-peace president in 2018. In one meeting, Andrei explained to project participants:

Seventy percent of votes come from the big cities. Every four years, half of them vote, and decide who becomes president. The other half sit at home scratching their ears. In the short time we’ve got, we want those Colombians to imagine another Colombia is possible, to prevent a new cycle of violence. In the 2016 Referendum, 63% of people did not vote. We were incapable of mobilising indifferent people, partly because there was no synergy between those who believe in peace within the state, and those who believe in peace in civil society. That was the great error of the Referendum; we cannot make it again.

He and Valentina believed that cultural change was necessary and recognised that it would take time, but that new, pro-peace ‘narratives’ could prevent the election of an anti-peace president, under whom the window of opportunity for the longer-term cultural change of peacebuilding would close. The temporality therefore had a double logic: defend the peace process, and keep open the window of opportunity for peacebuilding. The complexity of the logic behind these objectives, however, was the project’s downfall: it sought to do too many things at once.

A Year of Making and Breaking Trust

Chronology of the Project

The narratives project began with a 3-day meeting in Bogotá in August 2017 with some 95 participants, three from each of Colombia’s 32 departments; then branched out into six amplified three-day regional meetings (the Pacific, Caribbean, Orinoquía, Amazonía, Eastern Andes, Western Andes) with nine people from each department, throughout October-November 2017. The plan was that in the first meeting, participants would discuss and validate the objective, and propose initial ideas for emotions they wanted to awaken in “indifferent” society, narratives that would target those emotions, and collective cultural actions to deploy these narratives. The follow-up meetings sought to build on these foundations and agree cultural actions for each region. After these regional meetings, communication continued between the OACP and participants via WhatsApp groups, one created for each region, via phone calls and emails, and regional visits by OACP members to meet participants and follow-up on tasks.

Initially, Valentina planned to implement some of these collective actions before the end of 2017. However, due to numerous difficulties, discussed below, this did not happen. In March
2018, another two-day meeting was held in Bogotá with a reduced number of participants (one from each department), in which the OACP gave explanations for this failure and said they wanted to try again. In the March meeting, consensus was reached on doing a song and accompanying its launch with local cultural activities. Valentina planned to launch the song before the first round of presidential elections in May 2018. Follow-up continued again via WhatsApp, phone calls, emails, and targeted visits. Again, due to various obstacles, the launch date was postponed until just before the second round of elections in June 2018. Again this was postponed, but the OACP persisted, and despite multiple challenges, the launch occurred on 20 July 2018. The following sections describe the ups and downs of the project, and the government-society relationship it revealed and produced.

**Convening ‘The Territories’**

The first meeting in Bogotá was convened by the OACP through the networks which the Pedagogy and Territorial Peace teams had built over previous years. They invited one person from each department with the profile of journalist (radio, online or print), educator (school or university) and artist (musician, graffiti, film-maker, actor, writer, photographer), by asking local contacts for recommendations. At this meeting were lecturers from regional universities, graffiti artists, members of art collectives who did social work with vulnerable youth, school-teachers, journalists from alternative media outlets, and community radio hosts. Some were threatened social leaders who came in bullet-proof cars with bodyguards, protection measures granted by the National Protection Unit to at-risk leaders, unionists and human rights defenders. Many were victims of the conflict or worked with victims’ organisations; most were engaged in various kinds of activism for peace. They were mostly not the well-known human rights defenders and social movement leaders who typically get invited to national events, but they were broadly within the pro-peace echo chamber described in Chapter 2. Each participant was asked to propose three more people from their department to attend the regional meeting; this ended up widening the invitations to activists and social leaders, beyond the three profiles.

Translating ‘territorial peace’ into reality was logistically complex. Organising travel of participants to Bogotá was expensive; Colombia has poor overland transport; there are no trains, it is a large country, divided by mountain ranges, and many roads are full of holes, unpaved, or non-existent. Bringing participants from a large city like Medellín or Barranquilla was easy – relatively inexpensive domestic flights go several times a day. Bringing people from
remote places, however, meant long river-boat trips to a town with scheduled flights only twice weekly to an intermediate city, for example, and hotel accommodation until they could fly to Bogotá. This is why much of the time, government officials fly to the regions, rather than bringing the regions to Bogotá. The effort to do the opposite was part of the novelty of the project, and the OACP team spent hours on the phone coordinating travel with each participant.

I felt there was a slightly exoticising tendency in the way the mostly-bogotano OACP staff viewed and portrayed ‘the territories’ as repositories of local knowledge. The conference pack given to participants on their arrival contained specially-designed notebooks and pens, featuring a map of Colombia inlaid with photos of ethnic communities and landscapes, conjuring the idea of Colombia as a country of regional diversity (Fig.14). Although there were several Afro-Colombian and indigenous participants in the project, the majority were mestizo. This view of ‘the territories’ was culturally inclusive, but not specifically ethnic.\textsuperscript{203}

\textsuperscript{203} On the politics of multiculturalism as state policy in Colombia, see Pineda (1997), Jimeno (2011) and Pellegrino (2017).
Despite my anthropologist’s view that this was exoticising, many participants said in the meeting that they were grateful the government was recognising their ‘regional’ identities, because they felt the government usually did not do this. The feedback loops created by the pro-peace echo chamber, and the desire of the OACP Pedagogy and Territorial Peace Groups to enact a ‘virtuous state’, combined to create a relationship based on deference to ‘the territories’. However, this created a methodological challenge. The idea was to co-create, but from this position of deferential recognition, the OACP officials had to be cautious about interrupting
people who were talking, asking them to cut their comments short, or challenging their ideas. Valentina said to me, “As the state, you cannot question communities”. This was one thing in classic pedagogy sessions aimed at unilateral information transference. It was another when OACP officials were facilitating a pre-designed workshop methodology with specified objectives and time-frames for different exercises. None of the meetings I attended (four of the six regional meetings, and both national ones) completed the planned agenda, as everything went overtime. This is not specific to state-society meetings; it happens in NGO workshops too. However, the fact that the state can be silenced by legacies of its own oppression, and by the imagined expectations of the people it hopes to engage, reveals a structural difference in the relationship, an obstacle to the horizontal participation the OACP hoped to create.

Debating the Government-Society Alliance

The most significant discussion the OACP were unable to interrupt was the very question of whether it was possible to work with the state on a common objective, given participants’ distrust. This discussion took place in different forms in all meetings. In the first meeting in Bogotá, participants validated the objective; they said the ‘Yes’ narratives had been “too rational”, “defensive”, “not emotional enough”, and the ‘No’ narratives, “catchy”, “emotive” and “hard to debunk”. They shared the OACP’s belief that their regional voices needed to “speak back” to the centre. One man said, “We need the methodology by which our narratives, our slogans, can have the same space in national media as Uribe’s narratives”; another said, “we have seen the armed conflict in our territories, and we can see a tangible, drastic difference since the peace process; we must find a way to make the rest of the country empathise with that.”

However, they were suspicious of the ‘political’ dimension of the narratives project. OACP officials were forbidden from expressing support to one or other presidential candidate or party, and their intention was citizen mobilisation, not propaganda. In any case, they were technocrats, not politicians. Nevertheless, the unstated objective of impacting the 2018 elections to protect the peace process was evident to all participants, and largely shared by them. One participant told me that this was what made him stay in the project. “I really agreed with that. Obviously the OACP couldn’t say explicitly. But I think the majority of participants wanted it,” he said.

204 Interview 30 January 2018.
While this shared objective created a sense of complicity between OACP officials and participants, some participants voiced concerns about a possible secret political agenda, because the invitation had come from the government. Perhaps, they speculated, they had been invited to give ideas for propaganda, or that the government was “using the regions as a box of ideas”, as one person put it. One participant said, “You want us to do the government a favour, you want us to get a load of people in Plaza Bolívar [Bogotá’s central square] holding big white doves and saying ‘peace’.” Danilo, one of the OACP facilitators, responded:

This is not an institutional exercise. We, the government, are convening – yes. But we are passing the ball to civil society. Because it’s not in good hands if it’s with the government. That’s not to say it’s in bad hands, but this government will soon be over. And we need you guys to steer us out of this period of the storm of the polarisation and the election. So if you are seeing behind me a government or institutional flag, take it away.

His statement recalls the ‘peace needs you’ topos (Chapter 4) but adds a profoundly electoral dimension: it is not only your responsibility to build peace, but also to ensure the election of a president who will implement the Peace Agreement. This statement reflects the OACP’s conception of the peace process as a public good (Chapter 3), not a political bandwagon, but it is contradictory: it suggests, ‘I am the government, but not for this project’.

In a team debriefing on the evening after this conversation, the OACP discussed participants’ distrust of the project’s intentions. Valentina said, “this is not about the government”; David said, “this is political but not political-electoral”; Cesar said, “this is politics but not politiquería [politicicking]”. They viewed the project, and peace itself, as ‘political’ in a wider sense, but not the ‘bad’ electoral ‘politicicking’ they eschewed. This viewpoint was shared by many participants, but the ‘peace needs you’ topos in the mouth of government officials suggested a deflection of government responsibility onto citizens. This tension dominated the narratives project throughout: participants mostly identified with the OACP officials as individuals, shared their views of the peace process, and agreed with the project’s objectives. However, they struggled to overcome their distrust in the institution these individuals represented: the government.

Participants also debated the possibility of making a tactical alliance with the government. In the first meeting, one woman said, “This space is important, civil society with government, we have been waiting for it a long time, we thought you would ask us sooner,” echoing the criticisms to
the government for not working with society to win the Referendum (Chapter 1). However, they referred frequently to their distrust. Another woman said, “Building trust between state and society doesn’t happen in three days, it takes time”. It was difficult for participants to disaggregate the OACP officials from the wider ‘state-idea’.

This difficulty was heightened by the fact that many had experienced past direct or indirect violence at the hands of the state. With such comments, they called into question the relative value of working with the OACP on one project, while in their regions, the state was either instigator of violence or continued failing to guarantee basic life conditions. In that first meeting, a woman, crying, said:

I demand from you, the state, a concrete commitment. Who in the OACP can I call to talk about how to help [the department of] Caquetá? I respect you, the OACP, you are strong, valuable people. But our voices have to resonate. I was raped, and my mother was raped. That has to resonate. The state has to do something.

This statement enacts her demand to be heard by representatives of ‘the state’, disaggregates and re-aggregates the OACP individuals from ‘the state’, demands ‘the state’ make her testimony resonate more widely, and calls on ‘the state’ to make concrete commitments in Caquetá. Many participants in these meetings felt their need to be listened to by ‘the state’ was realised. Testimonies of victimisation were received by sympathetic OACP officials, who not only offered personal expressions of support, such as hugs and even tears at hearing their stories, but also institutional expressions of self-criticism. Danilo told participants, “This is new for us. We, the state, have not known how to arrive in the territories. But we are learning. There have been many mistakes in peace pedagogy. We want to build an alliance with you.” This reflexive self-criticism helped build trust. One participant told me after the first meeting that he had been wary about coming to a government event, but the OACP team “took my prejudices away”.

In an internal debrief after this first meeting, the OACP recognised their failure to anticipate how much this distrust would dominate discussions. “We forgot we are the state which civil society hates and distrusts,” said Myriam; “We believed we were their friends”, agreed Pilar. To an outsider this might sound naïve. I attribute it, however, to three factors: first, the sincerity of the OACP’s conception of peace as a public good, beyond politics or politicking. Second, the fact

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205 Krupa and Nugent (2015, 16-18) propose ‘aggregation’ as the process by which people conceptually elide discrete entities and events into a totalised whole, the ‘state-idea’. My use of ‘disaggregation’ indexes the reverse process of analytically separating discrete things.
that this proposal to work together, between government and society, was new: they were learning as they went along. Third, the fact that for many OACP staff it was the first time working for the state, and they were discovering what this meant through the encounter with society, in what Aretxaga (2003, 399) calls a “mirroring dynamic”. Rather than naïveté, I suggest the OACP team were lacking in ‘state-consciousness’, the awareness of how they would be seen by society as the state.

The Value of ‘Narratives’ in a Context of Violence

Another debate common in various meetings was about the relative value of creating ‘narratives’ in a context of violence and marginalisation. In the Orinoquía regional meeting, a woman said:

The conflict has political, social and economic roots. Violence, poverty and exclusion have been normalised. Power structures have caused this abandonment. In Orinoquía, there are completely abandoned territories, municipalities with no healthcare. I’ll participate if this project will produce a real effect. These spaces, convened by those who are supposed to ensure fulfilment of the Peace Agreement, will they generate deep changes? Many things are not being fulfilled. It doesn’t seem like there is real political will.

Her statement suggests the OACP’s priority should not be ‘narratives’. The fact that the project came from the government created a barrier, because the government, as abstract trans-historic entity, belonged to these “power structures” at the root of the conflict, and the Santos administration, as a specific set of institutions in a specific temporality, was responsible for implementing the Peace Agreement, which she saw as going poorly. These two responsibilities—one trans-historic, one specific—should, in her perspective, take priority. The idea that a government should not be doing something because it is not the perceived priority sees governments as having limited scope for action. This corresponds, of course, to a government’s limited budget. One could build a hospital in a village for the cost of the narratives project. The first event in Bogotá alone, with transport and logistics, cost over 110 million pesos (approximately £26,610). The OACP’s logic in the project, however, was that a new hospital would not enable the long-term opportunity of peacebuilding, which in theory would lead to many more hospitals, schools, roads, and equal opportunities to access these things.

This woman’s comment, however, was answered by another participant, who argued:
Of course we have to resolve the structural issues in the territories. But this project is useful to de-polarise. We have to promote a transformation. I think as citizens we have co-responsibility, we elect the wrong people. Colombian society is lazy; we sell our votes too cheaply. We need to elect different kinds of politicians.

His perspective, unlike hers, construed those abstract “power structures” as not divorced from society, and he believed that cultural change was necessary in order for structural change to happen, specifically to elect better politicians. David, the OACP official facilitating this meeting, replied, “The narratives project is not going to change poverty. But the normalisation of poverty and violence can be challenged by making cultural changes”. For participants, hearing a government representative recognise their concerns about the relative validity of the narratives project in a context of ongoing structural and direct violence was important. Over dozens of such conversations, many people began to feel that the OACP officials shared their worldview, despite being the government. Many began to believe the project was worthwhile, and commit to it. Others did not, and discontinued involvement after the first meetings. As Chapter 4 argues, how individual people perceive government representatives varies according to multiple factors.

In general, although most people shared the objectives, only some felt able to work on them with the government.

The OACP also worried about the relative value of co-creating narratives with people whose everyday realities included direct and indirect violence. Myriam, in the debriefing after the first meeting, said anxiously:

*When that girl said ‘who can I communicate with in the OACP about concrete issues in Caquetá’, I felt a kick in the liver, because it’s true, what relationship are we really building with them? I can’t get that out of my mind.*

Although the team saw the project as a tactical way to defend the Peace Agreement, which they believed would deliver the longer-term structural change in future, the fact of representing the government in this relationship gave them a responsibility which weighed on their shoulders. As the Pedagogy and Territorial Peace Groups, they did not have institutional responsibility in implementing the Agreement, nor any power to make structural changes in Caquetá or elsewhere. Glaeser’s (1999) discussion on sincerity differentiates between personal sincerity, role sincerity, and sincerity as the state. Building from this differentiation, I see the OACP officials as experiencing three layers of responsibility: personal, role, and government. Role responsibility is the experience of responsibility within a particular team in the OACP, a single government institution within the wider dynamic ecosystem. Government responsibility is the
feeling of abstract responsibility, stemming simply from working for a government institution: the specific responsibility for implementing the Peace Accord, and the trans-historical responsibility for solving structural inequalities of centuries. Myriam’s statement reveals her feeling of impotence regarding government responsibility, enhanced by the fact that her team was low in the OACP’s internal hierarchy.

The Idea of Trust

As the OACP had never done anything like this before, their ‘co-creation’ methodology was experimental. They wanted to allow discussions to unfold organically, rather than imposing formulae on participants, which was what they felt the state usually did and they wanted to correct. The participatory methodology in the meetings revolved around group work, with paper, coloured markers, post-its and glue, followed by plenary presentations and discussions to build consensus. The meetings went well, as discussed above, and built trust. But when it came to implementing plans, and follow-up communication via WhatsApp, phone and email, distrust prevailed.

The choice of trust as the emotion to target originated in two of the six regional meetings (others proposed hope, spirituality and wonder), and consolidated in the second national meeting in Bogotá. Participants conceptualised trust as the emotion necessary to overcome rifts left by the war, and create bonds of solidarity across Colombia’s diversity. The diagnosis of distrust as a central difficulty in Colombia in overcoming vicious cycles of violence and exclusion is shared by academics and policy-makers (García Villegas 2018, McFee 2019), and the need to rebuild interpersonal trust after war echoes research conducted in other post-conflict contexts (e.g. Bloomfield, Barnes, and Huyse 2003, Widner 2004). In the narratives project, the diagnosis centred on a discussion about the perversity of “papaya law” – la ley de la papaya, a Colombian aphorism which holds that if you make yourself vulnerable, someone will take advantage of you. If this happens, it is your fault: you should not “give papaya”, dar papaya. As McFee (2019, 85) found, the social rules around self-protection are “do not make yourself vulnerable. You are on your own. To trust is to be a fool”.

Andrei summarised in an institutional document the conception of trust that participants and OACP officials arrived at over these meetings:
Trust is a virtuous cycle … an emotion which motivates us to act, giving life to human processes of cooperation which are imperfect, but which, if sustained through time, create habits that allow us to transform the uncertainty of the transition from war to peace. ... This means a community based on respect, solidarity, generosity, and a recuperated sense of *lo público* [the public good].

This conception relates trust to the public good, citizen cooperation and co-responsibility. Promoting trust through the invocation, ‘In thee I trust’, with its religious overtones (which participants hoped would appeal to those who had been duped by the ‘gender ideology’ scandal) invited people to make a leap of faith, to take the first step in creating “virtuous cycles”. This is consistent with theories that define trust as a disposition, based on rationality and emotions (Simmel 1950, Mollering 2001), involving the *expectation* that someone will act in a certain predictable way, the *interpretation* of trustworthiness based on lived experience, and something extra, more mysterious, beyond knowledge. Simmel calls this something extra a “leap”, and Mollering, “suspension”, because all interpretation regarding another’s trustworthiness provides insufficient rational arguments in favour of trust, and there can always be arguments against trust which one has to suspend (Mollering 2001, 415). Mollering (2005, 33) thus defines trust “as a process of building on available good reasons and suspending irreducible social vulnerability and uncertainty *as if* they were favourably resolved”. ‘In thee I trust’ resonates with this, suggesting a quasi-religious leap of faith.

**The Reality of Trust**

Ironically, while participants and OACP officials reached a shared conceptualisation of trust as the solution for sowing the seeds of new social bonds in Colombia, first to promote a vote for a president who would continue implementing the Peace Agreement, then to transform society more broadly, they failed to trust each other. One factor undermining the trust built in meetings was the reality check of state bureaucracy when it came to implementing the project. As all the regional meetings ran out of time without reaching concrete plans for collective actions, these meetings ended with the OACP promising they would follow up with participants remotely, via WhatsApp, phone and email.

The OACP had encouraged participants to dream big and think outside the box in proposing collective actions. They did not have a clear budget for implementation: the meetings were

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funded by international agencies, and the plan was to negotiate budgets for the actions once participants had made their proposals. Given the enthusiasm in the meetings, the proposals were wildly ambitious. For example, the Pacific region envisaged a cultural exchange in Tumaco, in solidarity with the municipality’s high murder rate, with thousands of people bringing music, theatre, dance, art and indigenous rituals from all over the Pacific. The Eastern Andes region proposed to drive a ‘bus of trust’ through four departments, stopping at eight towns and creating community exhibitions depicting local trustworthy figures. The Caribbean region wanted to land a hot air balloon in the Barranquilla Olympic stadium during a football match; the Western Andes wanted to build travelling digital kiosks that would connect people who stepped into them virtually with someone in another town.

Valentina expressed concerns about these proposals, saying to the team: “My biggest fear is that people do the same activist actions they could do without us, instead of doing something different that will reach indifferent people”. As follow-up communication began, she instructed her staff to “remind participants that the objective is not to preach to the converted”. But questioning participants as the government over remote communication was difficult. Different OACP officials were assigned to liaise with different regions, and Valentina instructed them to construct a ‘requirement’ to bid for a pot of money at Fondo Paz. This meant gathering lists of all materials necessary for the proposed actions: types of paints and paintbrushes, a camera, a set number of meals. This had to be compiled by a specific date, in a specific way, to access the money. The follow-up communication, therefore, both sought to refine vague proposals into activities more likely to impact so-called “indifferent” sectors of society, and fit them into Fondo Paz’s administrative logic. Both these tasks were challenging, and evidenced a cultural clash, as in Chapter 4. Valentina complained to me that her team seemed unable to question and co-construct with participants – they were just helping them build “shopping lists” of stuff. “Working with participants is pedagogical”, she said, “But the team doesn’t see it as pedagogy”.

However, it was hard being at this extended government-society interface. Camilo, the official in charge of liaising with the Eastern Andes, received frustrated communication from participants who continued to express mixed feelings about participating in a government project. One wrote to him saying she wanted the project to work because she wanted to believe it was possible to co-create between state and society, and transform this “relationship of intense distrust based on indignant historical conditions”. She said, “we detect among members of the OACP the intentions to make changes, that’s why we are willing to participate”. Another participant,
however, emailed Camilo saying “I am concerned the government is trying to channel a process, and a process can’t be pushed, it has to emerge”. Many such messages were not sent individually to OACP members, but CC-ing other participants in an email, or written publicly in the region’s WhatsApp group. This affected group dynamics, as when one participant expressed distrust, others responded, either agreeing or disagreeing, usually blaming the government. As participants were not working on this project in working hours as part of a job, but because they believed in the shared objective, they wrote at all times of day and night, and on weekends, and the OACP officials felt pressured to respond, becoming increasingly anxious.

Camilo turned to the other side of the interface – the OACP. He composed a lengthy email to the team, warning Valentina against “sacrificing the process for the possibility of financing it”, saying the project had “created a sincere environment in which people can express opinions and believe in the possibility of a ‘different’ state”, but that “co-construction” was becoming merely discursive. People often criticise the state for having to spend resources within specific time periods, he wrote; “that’s why often it’s easier to make policies at desks in Bogotá than spend time listening and constructing with civil society”. He felt that the lack of genuine participation was affecting the trust built in the meetings, and said, “how are we going to project trust if there is no trust consolidated between ourselves and participants?”

Despite Camilo’s protests, the possibility of implementing the collective actions depended on accessing the Fondo Paz money. One of Camilo’s participants decided to quit, saying:

I thought we were going to work collectively. I’m afraid you are going to ask us simply to approve something you design. That would have repercussions on our credibility. … As you manage the resources and the agenda, our participation ends up being that of a focus group. Is that all we are? Does this government actually care about participation? It’s like we’re employees of the OACP, but unpaid.

Camilo wanted to prioritise the participatory process and relationship, but Valentina sought to optimise impact, and time was limited, given the looming elections which represented the end of their time in government. The suggestion that this participation was “that of a focus group” was a condemnation of the ‘co-creation’ methodology, which appeared incompatible with the bureaucratic restrictions of doing things as the government, and pressing political time-frames.

At the end of November 2017, the Fondo Paz application fell through, due to lack of time and clarity. This meant giving face, and accepting responsibility. Myriam wept in the office, after
phoning participants in the Pacific region to tell them the cultural exchange in Tumaco was cancelled. “I didn’t invent this project or design its methodology”, she said, “but I’m the one having to dar la cara. We’re going to look like idiots. If we ever organise anything again, they won’t believe us. I’ll never be able to show my face in the region again, because it’s not about the institution; it’s the individual who builds trust with people”. This expression encapsulates the tension between personal, role and government responsibility. Myriam did not feel personally responsible for the outcome of the project – “I didn’t design its methodology” – and she felt anguish at having to inform participants of the OACP’s failure, thus reconfirming the stereotype of the non-compliant state. This was Glaeser’s “double bind”: instead of ‘doing things differently as the state’ as they wished, they had to enact the unfulfilling state they criticised. This is the emotional strain of giving face as both individual and government.

Some participants were understanding; they recognised the OACP had done everything they could. Others were not. One participant quit her WhatsApp group, calling the OACP “friends” and apologising for leaving, but saying “I don’t want to continue supporting a government that creates so many obstacles”. This statement shows her disaggregation of the ‘good’ individuals of the OACP, while simultaneously blaming the outcome on the aggregated totality of the ‘bad’ government.

When the OACP proposed to reactivate the project, and brought the reduced group to Bogotá in March 2018, participants who accepted the invitation demanded explanations for the failure the previous year. One said:

> We risk our lives for peace every day, without any real commitment from the government. Why hasn’t the OACP had the balls to tell us what happened last year? Many people are exasperated with this project. I demand a real explanation.

This was a call to give face. Valentina replied:

> OK, about what happened – the proposal was that collective actions would allow us to position new narratives and awaken emotions. Collective actions were designed participatorily in the regional workshops, sadly, without a reality check on our behalf about what was possible. For example, one action was estimated at 1200 million pesos [approx. £295,174]. Technically, it was impossible to land a hot air balloon in a stadium [the Caribbean’s proposal]. These errors were due to our enthusiasm. Also, we were told there were some resources available, and we did everything we could to apply for them, but we didn’t get them.
People nodded, and made appreciative comments about Valentina’s honesty and self-criticism. This was an instance of satisfactorily giving face, because Valentina recognised “error”, and personalised government responsibility. This time round, Valentina promised, the finances were guaranteed – the International Organisation for Migration had pledged 370 million pesos to implementing the project (approximately £91,000). Valentina’s acknowledgement of error in a face-to-face meeting, which many participants perceived as sincere, allowed the possibility of trust to re-emerge. The meeting led successfully to a consensus: the idea of producing a song, and accompanying its launch with local cultural activities.

After this re-activation meeting, remote communication resumed. Valentina asked her team to coordinate with participants to compile proposals for the local activities, while she and Andrei worked with the singers to produce the song. Money became a major obstacle in the possibilities of creating a government-society alliance. Many called for reimbursement for their time. One wrote:

> You all have guarantees as professionals for carrying out activities and for the days you spend working; we run a non-profit organisation but we also have to eat. We will send you our proposal if there are economic guarantees.

This called out the difference between the OACP officials and participants: they were participating in unequal conditions. However, paying people as the government requires rigorous paperwork. Although the project was financed by international agencies, not a government fund, it required official justification. Valentina negotiated with the donors, and returned with a solution: people could be paid for their time through service provision contracts if they were going to make products that required long-term work (a videoclip, the song). Other actions would be funded by contracting a logistical operator to provide materials requested on a given day (paints for a mural, printing flyers to advertise an event), but participants would not receive payment. This meant the team spending hours on the phone with participants, compiling ‘requirements’ for each activity, and translating proposals into a series of billable ‘products’. Money was another element undermining the government-society alliance. It made it seem the OACP was ‘hiring’ participants, instead of co-creating between equals.207

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207 Chapter 7 analyses how international funding affected the OACP’s attempts to build trust with society.
Participants’ reactions to these bureaucratic demands varied, largely according to how experienced they were with projects funded by international or state agencies. Some, who had previously worked with NGOs, had the necessary papers and knew how to fill out the forms. Other participants struggled to navigate these requirements. One, a transsexual sign language interpreter proposing to make a video signing ‘In thee I trust’ for the deaf community, wanted a contract of 4 million pesos, less than one thousand pounds, to split between four people. But she found the paperwork demands so excessive that, after much back and forth, she eventually withdrew from the project, accusing the OACP of discrimination against minorities, writing in an email, “I don’t know what ‘In Thee I Trust’ means to you, but by giving us so much paperwork it doesn’t seem you trusted us”.

Politics also undermined the possibilities of the government-society alliance, as the election campaign was now in full swing. One day, Valentina suddenly instructed the team to suspend all contact with participants due to an internal OACP review on the narratives project, citing “political sensitivities”. One of the presidential candidates, Sergio Fajardo, had mentioned trust in a televised debate, and Rodrigo Rivera’s senior advisors were concerned that the ‘In thee I trust’ campaign could be perceived as the Santos government campaigning for Fajardo. The project remained on hold for a week, generating uncertainty among participants. When the project was allowed to continue, the team frantically tried to recover lost time. Then a rumour reached the OACP that Semana magazine was going to publish a front cover of Fajardo with senator Antanus Mockus, publicising his endorsement of Fajardo’s campaign, with the slogan “Fajardo, in thee I trust”. Contact with participants paused again, until this rumour was dispelled. Then, in a third bizarre, unlucky twist, Gustavo Petro’s campaign distributed a newspaper-style flyer throughout Medellín, captioned ‘President Petro: In Thee I Trust’ (Fig.15).
Valentina began to micro-manage. In one internal meeting, Pilar explained that the woman running a high-school short story competition was requesting money to transport three students to schools throughout Quindío to promote the competition and invite submissions. Valentina exploded – what were these students going to say, and how? “We have to be careful about how people talk publicly about the narratives project, to avoid any more political problems”, she said. The word that came to my mind was ventriloquism. Valentina, leader of the project and therefore responsible for its outcomes to the rest of the OACP, had found herself in a position where the unintended side effect of the project was a government effort to control participants’ discourse. This was understandable: she needed to protect the project, both from her seniors in the OACP, whom she worried might cancel it, and from the Democratic Centre’s ongoing opposition to the Santos government. If an opportunity arose for them to claim the OACP was campaigning for leftist Gustavo Petro, they would undoubtedly use it to attack the government and say it was ‘proof’ that the peace process was a ‘castro-chavista’ conspiracy. Nevertheless, it undermined the original intention to co-create horizontally.

Overall, while in face-to-face meetings the OACP officials and project participants built trust through dialogue, in remote communication and implementation, multiple factors undermined
this trust, causing delays that prevented the song and the local cultural activities being ready before the elections. However, although some participants quit the project, expressing loss of faith at so many obstacles, some forty people in different regions stuck with it: the song was produced, and local actions took place.

**On the Possibility of Government-Society Alliances**

Different individuals had different perceptions of the government, the OACP, and the individual OACP officials with whom they interacted. When Valentina emailed all participants announcing the forthcoming launch of the song on 20 July, many responded congratulating the OACP and expressing appreciation for the project, despite its failure to prevent the election of Iván Duque. But one participant wrote:

> I recommend that in future projects, consolidating trust should take priority over activities. It's important to do no harm. And not to use administrative, technical or financial difficulties as an excuse. The relationship between government and civil society in this process continues as before. #NoTrust.

Other participants were understanding about the administrative difficulties faced by the OACP, especially when they felt they were given adequate explanations. This signals a fundamental connection between trust-building and giving face. Trust does not preclude the possibility of failure, but presumes that failure to have happened despite somebody’s best efforts. Participants who remained in the project did so because they felt the individuals in the OACP were personally trustworthy, they understood that doing things as the state involved laborious bureaucracy, and they believed the OACP team had tried their best. Their perceptions of the OACP therefore differentiated between personal, institutional and government responsibility.

One participant told me:

> We found really nice people in the OACP, who were not just there for a contract. That was so valuable. I talked to my friends who were resistant to working with the state. They said, ‘they’re all the same’, and I said ‘no mate, they’re people like you and me, lots of them come from civil society organisations or international cooperation’.  

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208 Interview 28 June 2018.
He felt, however, that other participants proposed ambitious actions, “because they said ‘it’s the state and they’ve got money to spend’.” Instead of seeing an opportunity to build a genuine government-society alliance, he said, they reproduced the “the civil society cliché of throwing stones at the government, without seeing a human being there who wants to do things differently”, and therefore missed the “window of opportunity” to affect the elections. He felt they had been short-sighted, because the longer-term cultural transformation of peacebuilding could only occur under a government that would continue to invite citizen participation; an opportunity lost, in his view, with the election of Duque.

Some participants compared the experience of the government-society relationship under Santos with previous governments. One participant told me, “Under Uribe I lived in fear, and that fear was normalised.” The opportunity to co-construct with the government, he said, represented an opportunity of change. Under Santos, pro-peace civil society demanded recognition from the government as a third actor in the peace process, yet complained that this recognition, when it came, was timid and ineffective; the narratives project sought to rectify that. Even a particularly sceptical participant said, “We have to admit that the OACP has made progress in recognising civil society. We didn’t have this kind of project at the beginning of the negotiations.”

These perceptions reflect the fact that under Santos, sectors of critical, organised civil society who had denounced state violations under Uribe began to meet with government officials and make proposals for the peace process, while not necessarily being pro-government. This was uncomfortable for many, as criticising is always easier than constructing. Some participants valued the OACP’s invitation to work together, government and society, toward the shared objective of defending the peace process. However, as this chapter has shown, the possibilities of this alliance are fraught with obstacles and inequalities. These obstacles included interpersonal distrust, and distrust of the state-idea. Some participants overcame their distrust of the government in the abstract by building trust with individual OACP officials who they perceived positively, yet this was fragile, and many participants lost trust in the OACP during the bumps in the road.

Additionally, the narratives project did not happen in a vacuum, but in a context of ongoing violence. People’s perceptions of implementation of the Peace Agreement varied according to region and social sector, but everybody was concerned by the ongoing killings of social leaders.
Andrei and I lamented to each other privately, “How can we ask people to trust when people are being killed every day?” Some of this violence was directly attributable to other ‘faces’ of the state, as in the police killing of campesino protestors in Tumaco in October 2017 depicted in the Introduction. When this happened, one participant, from Tumaco, wrote in her WhatsApp group:

I’d like to ask our friends in the OACP, how are we going to build trust and create this new narrative, when a state generates such a rupture in dialogue? Peace cannot cost us our lives!

OACP members responded with messages of solidarity. The police violence was not their personal or role responsibility, though it was the wider government’s responsibility. Myriam wrote:

Today we are here, we are the state but we are also human beings who wish to accompany you in this terrible moment. These events are difficult and painful. Words are insufficient in a moment like this but we want you to know that we are a team that believes the state needs to start thinking, feeling and doing differently. We believe we can transform these relationships. We send you lots of love, and solidarity with Tumaco.

The very inclusion of the word “feeling” in this statement points to the “difference” Myriam and her colleagues wanted to enact. They did not just want to engender emotions among Colombian society; they wanted the state to “feel”, and recognised themselves as feeling beings, trapped in the conundrum of wondering how to “feel” as the state, when the state was responsible for violence.

Conclusions

The narratives project, the OACP’s attempt to rectify what they believed was their past failure of communicating peace too rationally, sought to engage the emotions of Colombian society. This chapter has attended to the emotions of the OACP officials themselves, in the double bind they experienced between the government they wished to enact, and the government they were forced to perform. It has argued that this double bind is due to tensions between three layers of responsibility experienced by OACP officials: personal, role/institutional, and government, and three corresponding layers of trust, felt by project participants. Trust or distrust in governments differs from interpersonal trust or distrust as it involves these three layers, and is therefore more volatile, with more moving pieces. When police killed protestors in Tumaco, the OACP officials
grieved alongside the participants. The participants recognised this as not the OACP’s personal or institutional responsibility, but it undermined their trust in wider government.

In Chapter 2 I argued that the deferential recognition underpinning the logic of territorial peace corresponded roughly to what Povinelli (2002) calls ‘late liberalism’. Povinelli (2002, 6-8) and other anthropologists (e.g. Middleton 2015) note how liberal politics of recognition frequently require indigenous peoples to perform “authentic difference” in a way that fits national, legal imaginaries of multiculturalism. However, Povinelli also invites us to consider the emotional regime of liberalism itself. She notes the force with which the feeling of moral obligation imposes itself on liberal subjects, developed independently from how they “arrive at critical rational conclusions” (Povinelli 2002, 8). Moral sensibility, which the OACP officials felt toward ‘the territories’, is experienced as an “a priori type of ‘knowledge’”, different, in the liberal imagination, to critical rationality. However, both moral sensibility and critical rationality are, says Povinelli (2002, 10), based on inferences of “perceptual judgement”, equally susceptible to reconfiguration in different historical conjunctures in a society. Whether such “perceptual judgements” are rational or emotional is questionable, because these categories themselves are culturally and historically constituted. The binary, rationality-emotions, is itself proper to cultural liberalism.

The OACP officials’ feelings of moral obligation to ‘the territories’ was rooted in their cultural liberalism as educated, upper and middle-class bogotanos. In the narratives project, the OACP officials felt the desire to respect and honour participants’ cultural differences. They felt distressed at having to let people down when plans changed, because trustworthiness and integrity are culturally liberal values. As individuals, they did not want to perform untrustworthiness, construed as a characteristic of the illiberal ‘other’ of populism, associated with dishonest politicking, manipulation and deceit.

Additionally, in the “mirroring dynamic” (Aretxaga 2003, 399) created by the year-long encounter of the narratives project, the OACP officials felt obliged as the government to the not-state other, society. This goes beyond the feeling of obligation these individuals might also feel toward culturally-other project participants if they were working with them from an NGO or international agency, rather than from the government. Their distress at having to enact untrustworthiness was not just due to their being culturally liberal individuals, but by virtue of relating to society participants from a culturally liberal government administration, which posited
recognition of ‘the territories’, ‘the victims’, ‘the indigenous’, and other such ‘others’ as a core tenet.

Giving face in representation of this government meant recognising its failure to live up to its word. Through giving face and assuming responsibility on behalf of the government, over the year, the OACP officials developed state-consciousness, an awareness of being the state. This was emotionally difficult, because it meant assuming responsibility for things they personally did not agree with and believed the government should not do, but were unable to prevent, because government responsibility is, as Chapter 1 showed, complexly distributed across a dynamic ecosystem. Giving face meant accepting that, by virtue of their role, they shared this complexly distributed responsibility. The emotions behind their experience of this responsibility were particular to their cultural liberalism; theirs was a liberal state-consciousness.

While many scholars rightly critique the politics of liberal multiculturalism for proscribing forms of ‘indigeneity’ which do not fit imaginaries of ‘acceptable’ cultural difference, Povinelli emphasises the importance of analysing “the good intentions” of liberal subjects. She says that many Australians “truly desire that indigenous subjects be treated considerately, justly, and with respect”, they “do not feel good when they feel responsible for social conflict, pain, or trauma” (Povinelli 2002, 16). Povinelli's book title, ‘The Cunning of Recognition’, encapsulates her argument that late liberalism seeks to recognise ‘others' without allowing conflict and contestation. The fantasy of “liberal capitalist society” is “social difference without social consequences” (Povinelli 2002, 16). This is the flip side of what Chapter 3 called the ‘anti-politics’ of cultural liberalism: ‘anti-politics’ is the negative valuation of agonism, the ‘cunning of recognition’, its evasion.

One participant, after Duque’s election, said to me, “Now there will be an OACP that is less of a friend to us, and I think we will miss these kinds of spaces and possibilities”.209 This statement suggests a relativity: ‘this government is better than others and we want to avoid a return to a repressive government, therefore we should work with them toward this shared objective; maybe we can get a better government in the future’. Other participants did not see things in such relative or pragmatic terms, and rejected the OACP. Their rejection is comparable to the easy rejection of liberalism by critical scholars, often, ourselves, culturally liberal, but without the

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aggravating factor of being victims of state violence, which some participants were. Yes, liberalism is full of hypocritical contradictions, including the attachment to the historically- and culturally-produced rationality-emotions binary. Yes, good intentions are insufficient, sometimes naïve, condescending, exoticising, and even harmful. But if we cannot, as scholars and as citizens, find ways to work with culturally liberal governments, throwing out good intentions with the proverbial bathwater, we risk the return of repressive, illiberal governments. This is not to make the trite suggestion we have to choose between liberalism and fascism. It is not an either/or situation. But it does matter which government, which face.

The narratives project sought to build an alliance between pro-peace government and pro-peace society. I was left wondering whether such an alliance is ever really possible. The OACP sincerely intended to create an alliance between equals, but their position as government undermined this, whether due to internal factors, like laborious state administrative processes, or external factors, such as shifting national politics. The OACP had no responsibility over Fajardo mentioning trust in a debate, but this affected the project because the OACP were the government. Ultimately, the OACP team was unprepared for these challenges; they were insufficiently state-consciousness, unable to navigate the three layers of dis/trust and responsibility.

Beyond the difficulties of this positionality, the narratives project was also overly ambitious in trying to work with so many people from different regions, with such a small team at the centre. Bringing ‘the territories’ to Bogotá, then conducting follow-up communication remotely and trying for months to get participants to work according to the logics of the Bogotá and the state, revealed the extent of the cultural chasm which Chapter 4, the single encounter, hinted at. Not only was there a lack of coevalness (Fabian 1983); the OACP and project participants inhabited different worlds, with different political logics and emotional regimes. The next chapter shows what happened when instead of trying to incorporate the regions into Bogotá, the OACP tried to intervene directly in ‘the territories’.
CHAPTER 6 - Rendering Political: The Affective Labour of Liaising with the FARC et al.

Rebeca and I sat at the white plastic table on the school veranda in the rural village of Llano Grande, sipping from plastic cups of coffee, prepared by the women who ran a community restaurant out of a back room. Through the carefully tended fronds of the school flower-garden, the vivid green of the Abibe Mountains spread out in front of us, some flanks furred with dark green forest, others stripped to grass for cattle grazing. Across from us on the other side of the valley we could just make out some white tips: the tents of the FARC camp. This was one of the 26 disarmament and reincorporation zones, where the FARC lived between January and August 2017. Rebeca was the OACP liaison officer for Llano Grande.

“I had a bit of a disagreement with Comandante Martín yesterday”, Rebeca told me, referring to the top FARC commander in the camp. “I decided to leave it a while and let things sink, then a couple of hours later I went back. I found him sitting on his own on the ridge looking over the camp, watching the ex-combatants playing football after their day’s work. I sat next to him, we started talking, and we resolved our dispute. Then he said to me, ‘I look at them all, playing football down there. And I know a lot of them will be killed after this. Maybe they’ll kill me too. But that’s the cost of peace’.” She paused, inhaling deeply, and her eyes welled. “I can’t imagine what it must be like for him – feeling responsible for all those men and women, after all these years as their commander, watching them and thinking that”.

Several months later, in January 2018, the commander’s prophecy was fulfilled: two FARC ex-combatants who demobilised in Llano Grande were killed, Wilman Asprilla and Ángel de Jesús Montoya Ibarra, the first assassination of the 2018 electoral period (El Universal 2018). I visited Rebeca shortly afterwards, and when we discussed these killings, she recounted the same story of that conversation with Comandante Martín. This repetition revealed the profound emotional imprint the experience had left on her, consistent with what I knew of Rebeca more broadly: she was deeply emotionally invested in her liaison role, working to support the disarmament of the FARC and their transition to civilian life, and facilitating local implementation of the Peace Agreement.
This chapter shifts the focus from the OACP in Bogotá to local OACP personnel like Rebeca, charged with overseeing the first stages of implementation of the Peace Agreement, in particular, the FARC’s disarmament and reincorporation. Point 3 of the Agreement established that FARC members would concentrate in 20 ‘Transitional Local Zones for Normalization’ (TLZN) and seven smaller ‘Transitional Local Points for Normalization’ (TLPN), for 180 days (henceforth ‘Zones’), roughly the size of rural villages (vereda). The OACP was charged with constructing and equipping the Zones, with operational support from the Armed Forces. The disarmament process was monitored by a tripartite Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM), comprising unarmed officials from the Colombian Armed Forces, unarmed FARC members, and members of the UN Political Mission to the Colombian peace process.\(^{210}\) The Zones were spread across Colombia in rural areas, in those spaces conceptualised historically *el territorio*, the *Other Colombia*, which Serje (2011) argues are fundamental in the centre’s self-imagination; areas where the state was seen as untrustworthy, absent, or present in the wrong way (Ramírez 2011). The regions which, largely, had suffered the conflict, and voted ‘Yes’ in the Peace Referendum.

Rebeca, like Pilar in Chapter 4, was a “delegated representative” of the OACP and the Santos administration in the Bourdieusian (1991) sense. Yet there were contrasts in their two modalities of *giving face*. While Pilar was charged with delivering a script and explaining, Rebeca’s role was largely administrative and operational, but in a context where administrating entailed relating and negotiating: with the FARC, and with many other actors present in Llano Grande.

Previously, the OACP’s job had consisted mainly of talking roles – negotiating in Havana, doing peace pedagogy in Colombia. With implementation, they had to combine talking with action. This was the moment when the Peace Agreement went from hypothetical to real, when the government and the FARC had to fulfil promises made on paper, and go from being negotiation antagonists to collaborators in implementation.

The administrative labour of the OACP liaison personnel had major political consequences. Rebeca was hyper-aware of the fact that everything that happened in Llano Grande was under the eyes of the nation. “Any tiny thing could become a national political mess and jeopardise

\(^{210}\) The First UN Special Mission comprised unarmed UN observers, mostly military with some civilians, principally from member states of CELAC, but also elsewhere. See Chapter 7.
peace”, she often said. Early on in implementation, a scandal occurred when UN Mission staff in one Zone were filmed dancing with FARC members in a New Year’s party, undermining the perceived seriousness of the disarmament and neutrality of the UN (Semana 2017a). An apparently innocuous action, born from human beings sharing space together, was an opportunity for the Democratic Centre to delegitimate the peace process. “This is how the administrative becomes political”, said Rebeca.

Li, building on Ferguson’s (1994) concept of the ‘anti-politics machine’, argues that development projects frequently fail to produce their intended outcomes because they are conceived by processes of “rendering technical”; practices which delimit and characterise a domain to be intervened, simultaneously rendering it as non-political, “excluding political-economic relations from their diagnoses and prescriptions” (Li 2007, 7). In this chapter, I invert Li’s concept and foreground Rebeca’s mode of attention to the political repercussions of her administrative work as ‘rendering political’. Rebeca’s meaning of ‘the political’ in the above quote differs from Li’s definition of the political as comprising political-economic relations – it refers to the potential repercussions on public opinion of doing anything as the state, especially in context of the heightened political stakes of implementing the Peace Agreement. Documenting Rebeca’s attention to ‘rendering political’ the implications of her work fills the need identified in the Introduction for anthropology of the state to connect ethnographic attention to the everyday workings of state bureaucracy with the dynamics of electoral politics and public opinion.

To Rebeca’s meaning of the ‘political’, I add two further ways I see her administrative labour as ‘political’: it was relational, and it was emotional. The role of liaison officer – ‘enlace’ in Spanish, literally link or connector – was a role of relationship-building. Rebeca was at the interface between the OACP in Bogotá and the multiplicity of actors involved in implementation in Llano Grande: the FARC, the local civilian population, the UN, the army, the police, the builders, truck-drivers and engineers constructing the camp, the on-site healthcare personnel, representatives of service-providing state institutions, and local authorities. She had to translate between these worlds and make them legible to each other. She received instructions from the OACP in Bogotá and carried them out locally, engaging with multiple groups, each with their own cultural logics.

I take Rebeca’s liaising work as affective labour, a concept forged through various research agendas, especially feminist scholarship, seeking to expand the category of labour to include
frequently invisibilised gendered forms of work (Weeks 2007).²¹¹ Hardt, drawing together such agendas, situates affective labour as one form of immaterial labour, incorporated into capitalist postmodernisation, the analysis of which has often served as ground for anti-capitalist projects. He defines affective labour as the “processes whereby our laboring practices produce collective subjectivities, produce sociality, and ultimately produce society itself” (Hardt 1999, 89). Affective labour, ranging from care-giving to ‘in-person’ service provision via human exchange, is “immersed in the corporeal, the somatic, but the affects it produces are nonetheless immaterial”, producing “social networks, forms of community, biopower” (Hardt 1999, 96). Rebeca’s relationship-building over time with different actors was the opposite of Weber’s ideal of bureaucracy as an impersonal, rational machine.

The Zones were uniquely multi-faceted extended encounters, unlike the bilateral OACP-society encounters of Chapters 4 and 5. One of these ‘facets’ was the relationship with the FARC, the government’s ‘other’ in the peace process. While the OACP tended to “de-FARC-ise” the Peace Agreement discursively in the pedagogy script (Chapter 4), implementation required working with the FARC on the ground: facing the FARC. It also required recognising that what the FARC did and said reflected back onto the government, because the government’s ‘face’ in a peace process incorporates its counterpart. Rebeca therefore had to liaise in curating the FARC’s face.

The work of liaising is thus political because it is relational. The relationships Rebeca built in Llano Grande went beyond professional exchange; they were also personal, because she invested herself emotionally – as the opening vignette suggests – in her relationships with the FARC, with the other entities present in Llano Grande, and in her imagination of the wider peace process. Public opinion, relationships, and emotions: three domains of ‘the political’ usually held as antithesis of rationality, in the liberal imagination of the Santos government, and in the Weberian state-thinking which shaped it.

This chapter follows Rebeca’s work during two moments. First, her overseeing of the Llano Grande Zone from January-August 2017, representing the government to the FARC and to

²¹¹ I use ‘affective labour’ not ‘emotional labour’, following Krystalli’s (2019, 244n526) note that popular contemporary uses of ‘emotional labour’, referring to invisible, unpaid or care work requiring emotional effort, do not reflect the original coinage of the term by feminist sociologist Hochschild (2012 [1983]), which referred to the work of suppressing or inducing emotions as part of a job, for example, air hostesses maintaining a calm, friendly countenance. Hochschild has argued that the current extension of the concept is unhelpful (Beck 2018).
other entities. Second, when the FARC finished disarming and began reincorporation, her new role building relationships and doing peace pedagogy across the region of Urabá in the subsequent stage of implementation, from August 2017-August 2018. I capture Rebeca’s own ‘rendering political’ of her work – her hyper-awareness of the political-electoral implications of acting as the government in her everyday activities. In turn, I ‘render political’ her work as OACP liaison officer, by analysing her liaising work as affective labour.

Making Zones in the Wild Regions

The disarmament of the FARC, occurring in the ‘negative spaces’ (Serje 2011) of the nation, attracted national and international interest. When implementation began in December 2016, the FARC came out of the jungle into the media. Images of their movements to the Zones proliferated (Fig.16): they travelled on buses and in canoes, escorted by the Colombian army, often welcomed by local populations.

Fig.16 The FARC arriving
Source: Semana (2017b)

Point 3 was drafted in Havana by a bilateral Technical Sub-commission for Ending the Conflict; the first time in the world of peace negotiations that a government’s counterpart (the FARC)
was included in designing their own programs of what is standardly referred to in the peacekeeping world as DDR – disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (McFee and Rettberg 2019, 1). The FARC proposed the locations for the Zones, close to their areas of influence, where they felt comfortable and not too exposed. FARC and government delegates from the Technical Sub-commission visited each site toward the end of the negotiations in August 2016 (Fig.17). In Sergio Jaramillo’s words, this was when “the peace process arrived in Colombia” (El Espectador 2016b). Point 3 established that the Colombian army would provide security, and that the laying down of weapons into special containers and destruction of unstable explosives was to occur in three stages, managed between the FARC and the UN component of the MVM. Fifty-six pages in the Peace Agreement governed security, communication and monitoring protocols for the Zones.

Fig.17: Location of the TLZNs and TLPNs. Dabeiba, the municipality host to the Llano Grande TLZN, shown top left. Source: Screenshot (OACP 2017a).
During negotiations, the FARC insisted they wanted to undergo a collective, rather than individual, process of reincorporation into society. They were critical of previous DDR processes in Colombia, of which there have been over a dozen throughout the twentieth century (Carranza-Franco 2019, 8), and they wanted to differentiate their process from that undergone by paramilitaries and guerrilla deserters under the Uribe administration. They rejected the Uribe government’s DDR model, implemented by the Colombian Agency for Reintegration (ACR), based on three arguments (Carranza-Franco 2019, 12): First, that DDR had been used as a counterinsurgency strategy to weaken the guerrillas and favour the paramilitaries; second, that their laying down of weapons did not constitute a surrender, but a transition from an armed to a political organisation; and third, that they would reincorporate into society collectively, rather than via the individual incentives and programmes offered by the ACR, which they criticised as neoliberal and de-politicising due to a focus on individual micro-entrepreneurship. They pushed for a change from the concept of reincorporation, the standard term in international DDR literature, to reincorporation. The ACR was thereby rebranded as the Agency for Reincorporation and Normalisation (ARN). While this institution maintained the individual pathway, still called ‘reintegration’, for ELN deserters and FARC members who preferred to abandon the collective, they were also tasked with implementing the collective reincorporation process agreed in Havana.

Prior to the Peace Referendum, the FARC combatants stationed in ‘pre-cantonment’ areas near each Zone. With the unexpected Referendum loss, they found themselves in limbo until the renegotiated deal was signed, and they could move their troops into the camps. But nothing was ready for them. The OACP found itself suddenly with the task of constructing 26 camps for the FARC and providing basic amenities: temporary accommodation in prefabricated houses, sanitation, food and water, for 11,049 FARC combatants, urban militia and political prisoners, and overseeing the disarmament phase before handing over responsibility for reincorporation to the ARN.

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212 The word ‘normalisation’ comes from the 1991 peace accord signed with the M-19 guerrilla group, which created the National Council for Normalisation as part of the institutional DDR infrastructure (Carranza-Franco 2019, 46); the FARC preferred it to ‘reintegration’ which they saw as synonymous with the Uribe administration’s DDR model.

213 For a comparison of DDR under Uribe and Santos, see Carranza-Franco (2019).

214 For Socioeconomic data on those who disarmed, see UNAL (2017).
How the sequencing of this enormous task came to be so overlooked is impossible to determine completely. The Referendum caused delay, but if the ‘Yes’ had won, the government would still have had to build and equip the camps quickly. Chapter 1 discussed the complexly distributed responsibility of the government’s poor preparation for implementation, and despite meticulous attention to the Peace Agreement’s wording, implementation became more improvised when it came to confronting local realities, especially in building the Zones. This improvisation was heightened by the adverse political context in the wake of the ‘No’ vote. A government official who helped design the methodology for the PDETs said implementation was like having to “fly the plane and build it at the same time”.\(^{215}\)

Whatever the combination of causes, in December 2016, the OACP had to orchestrate the construction of these Zones and oversee the FARC’s arrival. Although the Peace Agreement stipulated these Zones were to have road or river access, it transpired that existing roads were unpaved and potholed, unsuitable for construction machinery; and river ‘access’ invariably meant via small speedboat or motorised canoe, hours from viable ports. Many neighbouring villages had no drinking water, electricity, or mobile phone connectivity, and most had complex security situations owing to presence of other illegal armed groups and economies (MOE 2016).

The OACP existed to negotiate with armed groups. It had no experience intervening administratively in Colombia’s regions, and its presence outside the capital had hitherto been restricted to short regional visits from Bogotá personnel, like the peace pedagogy sessions. Usually, state administration on the ground is done either by local government authorities (mayoralties and governors) or by service-providing institutions with ‘street-level’ bureaucrats (Lipsky 1969). However, disarming the FARC had to be centralised and tightly-controlled, so it fell to the OACP. For this purpose, the OACP created a new ‘Regionals’ team, comprising a director, six or seven people in Bogotá coordinating several Zones each, and a liaison officer in each Zone; the first time the OACP had permanent local faces.

The first job of the liaison officers was to oversee construction of the Zones. These faced notorious difficulties. They had to oversee the delimiting of the FARC and MVM camps, negotiate rental contracts with the land owners, establish the position of the army camp to

\(^{215}\) Interview 28 August 2018.
secure the area, prepare access routes, and build the camps. By May 2017, according to the UN Mission, 20 of the 26 were “nearly complete in terms of basic infrastructure”, four over halfway completed and four less than halfway completed (one Zone had two camps); delays were due, among other factors, to “adverse weather conditions, delays in payments to contractors … which prevented delivery of construction materials” (UNSC 2017). The OACP filmed a documentary about making the Zones, which reveals their overwhelming shock at how remote these places were, reproducing the dominant perception of Colombia as a country with a civilised centre and ‘wild regions’ (Serje 2011). One OACP official in the documentary describes a conversation with a woman from the local community regarding the provision of an ambulance for the Zone. He says:

I told her we needed to get an ambulance into the area. She asked me what an ambulance was. I explained it was a car with a medical team. She said no, that’s impossible, to get here you need to ride on a mule. The nearest doctor is in the town which is four hours away – three on the mule, one in a jeep. I kept thinking, we have to fulfil the Peace Agreement. We have to get an ambulance here. In my naïveté, I asked her, how do you usually get sick people out from here? She said, usually, dead.\footnote{OACP. 2018. “Una Nueva Vida: el camino a la ciudadanía de las Farc” (documentary film). \url{https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=thmPGvnKcZg&i=1826s}}

His surprise at this, and his choice to narrate this anecdote in the documentary, is revealing of how government officials in Bogotá perceived the rest of Colombia as remote from the capital.

**The Multi-Faceted Encounter**

Llano Grande was a rural mountain village, populated by some 140 campesinos who grew coffee and passion fruit as cash crops, and beans and corn as subsistence crops. Once the army levelled the road, enabling access for machinery and trucks, it took under an hour to drive there from Dabeiba; previously it had taken hours. Most villagers had lost family members in the conflict, and Dabeiba had undergone several violent takeovers by both guerrilla and paramilitaries. Local campesinos told me no one had ever visited Llano Grande from Bogotá before. With the Peace Agreement, it suddenly became an area of great density of state presence. Unlike some other Zones, everything was relatively close together, thanks to the topography of the valley. The village, the FARC camp, the MVM camp, and the army camp, were mutually visible and within walking distance, which facilitated communication and coexistence.
The process of constructing and equipping the Zones, with the FARC already living in makeshift tents in the camp, created an extraordinary multi-faceted encounter. McFee, Johnson and Adarve (2019, 190), in a study of seven Zones, note that despite different socio-historic conditions, all created an “extraordinary set of circumstances in which mortal enemies had to collaborate and cohabit alongside civilians, in areas of the country deeply scarred by conflict-related violence”, an experience without precedent in global DDR. During the seven months the FARC remained in these Zones, the different actors had to adjust to each other. For the FARC, this period involved “incremental reincorporation … into civilian life”, learning how to use cellphones, re-learning gender roles, and adjusting psychologically to their new situation (McFee, Johnson, and Adarve 2019, 190-1) while being issued ID cards, health insurance and bank accounts, participating in trainings, basic education, and productive activities. They had to hand over their weapons and make a signed commitment never to take up arms against the state again, receiving in return an OACP certificate signed by Sergio Jaramillo which accredited them as complying with their obligations in the Peace Agreement, a document they needed to access reincorporation benefits. The OACP liaison personnel had to process paperwork for these documents.

For their part, the army and police had to adjust to protecting instead of combating the FARC, leading to a “reorienting of soldiers’ and officers’ subjective orientations towards the former guerrilla organization” (McFee, Johnson, and Adarve 2019, 201-2). During the disarmament phase civilians were not allowed to enter the FARC camps, so initial interactions with local communities were highly controlled, allowing a gradual adjustment. Throughout this period, the different actors involved in this multi-faceted encounter engaged in anticipated and unanticipated collaborative activities related to implementation of the Peace Agreement and daily life in the Zones. For example, in the tripartite MVM, members of the FARC and the Armed Forces had to work as a team; this was an anticipated challenge which many MVM members reported finding unexpectedly rewarding. Unanticipated collaboration included resolving logistical challenges, such as installing a wifi service up a mountain, which created opportunities for “reciprocal cooperation” (McFee, Johnson, and Adarve 2019, 207) between groups divided by conflict identity. As time went on, football tournaments and other recreational activities occurred, furthering inter-group relations. The OACP liaison personnel had to maintain relationships on behalf of central government with all these different actors, in a multi-faceted interface.
Being the Face, Wearing the Vest

Rebeca had a completely different profile from the Bogotá peace pedagogy team. In her late thirties, born in a poor household in a small village in Urabá, Rebeca had grown up in the shadow of war. She recalled seeing dead bodies on the streets as a child, and worse, seeing the bodies of dying people whom one was forbidden from helping: if you helped them, you might be next. She told me she was once nearly recruited by the FARC when she was a teenager; two men would frequent her mother’s house for meals, and one day they suggested she come and work for them. Her mother discovered, and stopped receiving them in the house. Her mother rented a kiosk outside the Urabá Police Station, where she sold empanadas and fizzy drinks to police officers. At sixteen, Rebeca married a policeman she met at the kiosk, who was stationed in a town in Urabá where all police families had to live in a single house for protection, due to frequent attacks by the FARC. Rebeca and her husband later separated, and she studied an undergraduate degree in psychology and a master’s in organisational management in a Medellín polytechnic. Before working for the OACP she had worked in the Medellín office of the Victim’s Unit, so she had experience as a ‘street-level’ bureaucrat, dealing with victims and processing paperwork while representing the state.

Rebeca applied for the OACP job because she saw it as a “historic” opportunity to contribute to the peace process, which she believed would mean a better future for Colombia, despite it requiring her to live away from her children in Medellín for extended periods. Chapter 3 revealed the affective commitment to the peace process of most OACP personnel. Rebeca shared this, but in contrast to the Bogotá officials, her commitment was shaped by her childhood in wartime Urabá. She frequently expressed love for her region and its people, and compassion for what they had suffered; this was anchored in her lived experience, which arguably made it easier for her to connect with others who had suffered similar things.

Whereas Chapter 5 depicted the tenuous ‘state-consciousness’ of the Bogotá OACP personnel, Rebeca was hyper-aware that representing the government meant that people would perceive her according to their historically and culturally-formed ‘state-idea’ (Abrams 1988). In a place like Llano Grande, this implied distrust, due to the state’s actions in the conflict, and its perceived absence. She told me, “My role is to be the face of the state in a place where the state has never been present”. I noted her use of the term ‘be the face’, ser la cara, contrasting
with *dar la cara*, ‘give face’. ‘Being the face’ connotes presence over a long-term period, in contrast to the peace pedagogues’ fly-in-fly-out visits.

In contrast to the Bogotá elites who had to learn how to interact with *campesinos*, Rebeca was exceptional at building human relationships with the different actors in the Zone, and in navigating projections of the state-idea onto her. She told me, “the state often crushes communities’ expectations, when officials promise things and don’t fulfil. So when I say we’re going to do A, I make sure we do it, but I don’t say we’re going to do B as well if I don’t know whether we can”. I asked her what it felt like to be the recipient of people’s distrust of the state. “You learn to develop a thick skin”, she said. “The important thing is to *dar la cara*, listen to people, and recognise their hurt and suffering.” Here, giving face explicitly involved acknowledging responsibility as the state.

Rebeca’s liaising work was *sui generis*, unlike most service-providing bureaucratic jobs. She had no office, just her personal laptop and gmail account: the OACP’s regional presence had been improvised fast. Rebeca had no institutional car, as service-providing state institutions or the mayoralty and governor’s staff did. She drove her own car between Llano Grande and Dabeiba, for meetings with the mayor or to receive OACP personnel from Bogotá. She received magnetic OACP logos to stick on the sides of the car, branding it temporarily, and one million pesos per month for travel expenses, which she used for petrol, but which fell significantly short of the cost of these journeys, especially in her second role, which involved driving around Urabá. She had no ID card on a ribbon around her neck like most service-providing state institutions in the regions. The absence of such a final, definitive thing as an ID card speaks to the transitory, improvised, flexible presence of the OACP in the Zones, juxtaposing sharply with the political gravity of their work.

What Rebeca did have, however, was an institutional vest, a *chaleco*, a white waistcoat with red logos on the back and chest pocket (Fig.18). Vests are a symbol of the state in contexts when state officials are facing the public, such as in service-providing fairs and institutional field visits. They are not only used by state institutions; NGOs also clothe their representatives in vests, branding and identifying them, distinguishing one institution from another. “The dance of the vests”, *el baile de los chalecos*, is a common phrase in Colombia to describe the arrival of multiple intervening entities into the latest trouble spot, each with different coloured vests.
The logo-blazoned vest is one way the state “makes a presence” (*hacer presencia*), an emic concept embedding the claim which state institutions make of being present in contexts of longstanding discourses of state absence (McFee 2019, 108-144). With this branding, individuals are identified with their institution, becoming metonyms for it. As McFee (2019, 164-5) describes, in inter-institutional meetings, individuals are frequently referred to, addressed, and interpellated as their institution, rather than by name. The presence of vest-wearing representatives indicates the presence of the institution; state-consciousness involves becoming this metonym, by putting on the vest.

The experience of wearing the vest of the state is different from the metaphor of giving face. It is another way of the state inhabiting the body, but whereas the face is permanent and personalised, the vest is temporary and depersonalised. It is transferable – an individual may own it while working at one state agency, then pass it to another official when they leave, and acquire a new vest in their next job. One day, as I was walking with Rebeca in Apartadó to a multi-institution meeting, she bumped into an acquaintance, who was wearing a red vest with the ARN logo. She greeted him by saying “Hi! You changed your vest!” They had worked together at the Victims’ Unit; her greeting referred to the fact he had changed jobs.
An ART official I met told me it was her first time working for the state, and it had been a strange experience, because putting on the vest made people see her differently. “It makes people suspicious”, she said, “they are afraid of us”. The vest-wearer is confronted with the fact that wearing the vest changes how people see and interact with them; meeting people while wearing the vest creates a state-society encounter, that “mirroring dynamic” (Aretxaga 2003, 399) through which state-consciousness develops. All the perceptions and emotions people have toward the state-idea are projected onto the individual wearing the vest. Vera (2017, 226-7) describes his discomfort at having to wear a Victims’ Unit vest during a fieldwork event, becoming thus a metonym for the institution he was researching. He blamed the Unit for failing to solve people’s problems, and by putting on the vest and representing this institution publicly, he felt that responsibility in himself.

At the end of the day, state representatives can remove the vest, and thereby remove state responsibility, becoming non-state again, although in small communities, state officials are known to people, and frequently referred to by their institution even when they not wearing the vest. Wearing the vest thus leave residues of state-ness, of state-being, on its wearer. In the context of Llano Grande, Rebeca was permanently the OACP, whether or not she was wearing the vest, by virtue of her presence. Everything she did represented the government. She could go home to Medellín and spend a weekend with her family, however, and be herself again, and stop ‘rendering political’ her actions’ potential repercussions. The FARC, by contrast, could not stop being the FARC – their certification documents would follow them throughout their civilian lives, a permanent legal status.

**Getting Things Done as the State**

The OACP as an institution, inexperienced in administrating in the regions, soon discovered how difficult it was to get things done in these places as the state. The contracts, the paperwork, the receipts, the bureaucracy; everything had to be meticulously justified, because all public spending was scrutinised by institutional accountability systems. “I became an ironmonger”, one OACP official told me, because he had to learn about different kinds of construction materials, tubing and bricks and tents, to process the administration. Rebeca coordinated the arrival of architects, engineers and builders, and negotiated with them and the FARC about the ongoing camp construction. The Peace Agreement contained little detail on the Zones’ logistics, and
multiple discussions and disagreements materialised.

Getting things done as the state was different from getting them done as the FARC. In September 2016, before the Referendum, I attended the FARC’s Tenth Conference, held for the guerrilla to approve the Peace Agreement. It was the first time a FARC conference had been open to national and international media. In the middle of the Eastern Yari Plains, the FARC built a conference complex larger than most local villages. They hired a giant concert stage, with loud-speakers and three outsized screens, where speeches were made and concerts held every evening; a bamboo barn for the FARC’s meeting; sleeping quarters for journalists; a pristine white press tent with a restaurant, a space for press conferences, and a room with hundreds of plastic tables and electric sockets for journalists to work and charge equipment; a petrol pump; and two medical posts. Everything was organised with precision planning and discipline; it was ready in three weeks and taken down again in two, after the conference (Burnyeat 2016a).

The FARC’s Tenth Conference was perhaps seven times bigger than the Zones the OACP had to build, yet the construction of the Zones took months. This was partly because the state’s bureaucracy makes it slow and awkward, and partly as the OACP officials had never been to these regions, whereas the Yari was FARC territory, and they knew how to get things done there – they knew local builders, drivers, suppliers and cooks they could hire, and they were known by the locals. The awkwardness of making the Zones evidenced the difficulty of central government intervening directly in the regions. The FARC itched to do the work themselves, but once they signed the Agreement, they committed to handing over their assets to the government. “Just give us the materials and we’ll finish the construction”, they begged. But everything had to be contracted officially, to show the right paper trail, and avoid corruption.

Rebeca had to negotiate with the different actors to find administrative solutions to everyday problems. The leaders of each entity held regular meetings in the village school to address arising issues. These varied from the increase of pupils in the school once the FARC brought their children to live with them in the camp, requiring additional teaching staff, to organising a party for National Children’s Day, for which each entity agreed to contribute a different element: the Police brought the sound system, the Army provided gifts for the kids, the OACP purchased footballs. At one meeting, Rebeca announced an upcoming visit to Llano Grande from a Family

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217 On ‘rebel governance’, how rebels govern civilians during civil war, see Arjona et al (2015); for an analysis of rebel governance in the Colombian case, see Arjona (2016).
Welfare Fund representative. She said, “I will see if she can help us with the extra classroom needed in the school, but yesterday I met with someone from the Victims’ Unit in Dabeiba who told me they’ve got a fund for construction materials, administered through the mayordomía, so long as the community provides the labour. Let’s see which way we can get the classroom”. This logic of finding “which way we can get things done” is an example of administrating as the state locally. In contrast to popular perceptions of the state as a monolithic entity which has to provide services because these are citizens’ “rights”, Rebeca sought ways of accessing different funds for different things, each with different restrictions. She had experience in getting things done as the state: providing services was a question of operating the state’s labyrinthine bureaucratic machinery, and learning to improvise.

This was a shock for the FARC. FARC Secretariat member Carlos Antonio Lozada told me he was “surprised” at how “pachydermic” (meaning slow) the state was, with all its “norms, institutions, positions, tramitología (processes)”218 There was a major difference between fighting the state and calling for a revolution to overthrow it, and playing counterpart in implementation, understanding the need to get paperwork right and do things legally. The problem, said Lozada, was that the Peace Agreement was conceived of as inter-dependent, “but the Colombian state is not conceived to operate like that. There’s a total disconnect among the institutions, and we had to learn to manage ourselves in all these relationships”. The FARC were learning the hard way about the many faces of the state, and the challenges of ‘inter-institutional collaboration’.

Facing the FARC

In liaising with all the sectors in this multi-faceted encounter, Rebeca had to navigate the tensions between the three layers of responsibility and trust depicted in Chapter 5: personal, role/institutional and government. Liaising with – or facing – the FARC was uniquely complex. At the personal layer, Rebeca had grown up in a context of FARC violence: they had tried to recruit her, and attacked her policeman ex-husband. At the government layer, the FARC perceived her as antagonist, and projected their frustrations about the government’s implementation of the Peace Agreement onto her. However, over seven months coexisting with her, they built trust with her personally, with many ex-combatants expressing open appreciation of her work and

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218 Interview, 24 August 2018.
dedication, while they continued distrusting the government. Rebeca told me that when she arrived in Llano Grande, she felt wary around the FARC, “like walking on eggshells”, but soon she developed positive working relationships with them. “We’re just human beings working together and trying to sort things out between different entities”, she said.

The FARC and the OACP had opposite interpretations about whether the construction of the Zones was a success or a failure. This reinforces the argument of Carroll et al. (2017) that culturally-constructed interpretations of failure are reflective of the socialities that produce them, and extends it by showing how public discourses from parties in a peace process about success or failure are embedded in wider political contestation. The OACP’s institutional documentary depicts the Zones as successful, because despite numerous difficulties along the way, which they attributed to the remoteness of the locations, they completed most of the infrastructure, and disarmament finished in August 2017, only a month longer than stipulated. The FARC saw things differently. They had agreed to arrive at already-constructed Zones, but instead had to help finish construction, which in many Zones took months. In Llano Grande, things advanced more quickly than elsewhere, but on a visit in April 2017, four months after the FARC’s arrival, while I noted significant advances (the plot of land for constructing temporary housing had been levelled), there was still a long way to go; lorries and backhoes continued transporting cement between Llano Grande and Dabeiba, and most FARC members were sleeping in makeshift tents (Fig.19).
By this point, four months into implementation, the ex-combatants in Llano Grande were repeating a phrase that became common across Colombia: ‘we, the FARC, are complying with the Agreement, despite the government’s lack of compliance’. The construction of the Zones was the first opportunity to criticise the government for not fulfilling the Agreement, a narrative made more persuasive given the existing stereotype of the Colombian state as non-compliant (Pellegrino 2017) and untrustworthy (Chapter 5). Anything they could perceive as failure by the state to fulfil the Agreement, they interpreted as further evidence that the state never fulfils. The FARC’s interpretation had two added dimensions to this generic distrust of the state: first, their collective identity had been forged over decades of opposition to the state; second, their public discourse about the state’s failure to comply with implementation had a political-electoral dimension, as they were preparing to launch their political party in time for the 2018 congressional and presidential elections. Criticising the state was electoral; it might win them votes from sceptical communities.

FARC commanders such as Lozada, participating in meetings with state officials, began to comprehend the administrative complexities of getting things done as the state. Meanwhile, rank-and-file FARC members were experiencing everyday difficulties in the Zones. One sub-
commander in Llano Grande told me how frustrating it was that when bits of machinery broke down, or construction tool was needed, it was always difficult to get the state to release the corresponding funds. “Every little thing is a fight”, he said. The Peace Agreement stipulated that the state would supply the FARC camps with food during the TLZN phase. The FARC wanted to purchase food supplies from local farmers, but the government was required by law to contract food provisions with a company registered with the chamber of commerce, so hired a company in Medellín. There were constant problems with food delivery; meat arrived rotten, and some FARC members interpreted this as intentional. Everyday administrative problems in the Zones quickly became interpreted thus: “the government’s non-compliance is a strategy to tire the FARC out so that when we get to the 2018 elections we are exhausted and do badly”, as one ex-combatant told me.

Rebeca disagreed with the FARC’s interpretation. She told me, “it’s true the camp construction isn’t finished, and they were expecting to come to a ready-made camp. But it’s really difficult, everyone is making a huge effort, and things don’t always work out because of administrative difficulties”. She told me about a receipt she sent to Bogotá which was returned because the comma in the numbers was in the wrong place, and she had to get it reissued to receive the money. Her seniors in Bogotá, she believed, “really want to fulfil, but they are trapped in an administrative logic”.

The frustration of local state officials at Bogotá officials’ incomprehension of local realities is a common finding in ethnographies of the state in Colombia. Rebeca was used to patiently working through such challenges; the FARC were not. Non-compliance, or compliance that was either late or different from what they believed had been agreed in Havana, easily became interpreted as intentional. Rebeca felt the FARC’s criticisms of the government were unfair, and thought it was not strategic for them politically. “It will become a problem for them later”, she said, “because if they continue to complain publicly about the government’s lack of compliance, it will contribute to the idea that the peace process is a failure and undermine people’s belief in it”. This, she believed, would strengthen the already-existing scepticism about the peace process left after the Referendum, and increase the Democratic Centre’s chance of winning the 2018 elections. She told me, “in private, to my face, they recognise the government is making an effort, and things are progressing”. Many ex-combatants I spoke to in Llano Grande respected Rebeca, collaborated with her, and believed in her good faith, but disaggregated her from the rest of the government, which they continued to distrust.
Curating the FARC’s Face

The Peace Agreement stipulated that during the disarmament phase, the FARC could designate 60 members nationally to move freely around Colombia performing tasks relating to implementation. Additionally, each Zone could designate 10 individuals to do the same locally, so long as they handed in their weapons and only left the camp in civilian dress.\textsuperscript{219} From these 10 people, the FARC could appoint three spokespersons to “carry out peace pedagogy work in local municipal councils”\textsuperscript{220} In Llano Grande, the FARC interpreted this more broadly, creating a 10-person ‘peace pedagogy’ team to talk to local communities about the Peace Agreement. They were not allowed to “do politics” until they had finished the disarmament phase, but the line between ‘peace pedagogy’ and ‘politics’ was blurry.

The FARC had used the concept of ‘peace pedagogy’ during the negotiations, referring to visits from FARC negotiators to their Fronts in Colombia to explain what was being discussed in Havana. It was crucial to keep the guerrilla informed, to maximise their compliance with disarmament once the Agreement was signed. The Tenth Conference, which unanimously approved the Peace Agreement (minus a sector of the First Front who declared themselves dissidents before the signing of the Agreement and did not attend the Conference), showed the FARC’s ‘pedagogy’ had successfully convinced their members to approve the Agreement. It stood in stark contrast to the Referendum result some weeks later, and the government’s efforts to do ‘peace pedagogy’ with Colombian society. During the disarmament phase, the FARC used ‘peace pedagogy’ to refer to explaining the Peace Agreement to local communities. Once disarmament finished, many pedagogy delegates became spokespersons for the new FARC political party, travelling the region to disseminate their manifesto and foster electoral support, highlighting the close connection between ‘pedagogy’ and ‘politics’. This included the two assassinated Llano Grande FARC members of this chapter’s opening vignette, one of whom was described in a tweet by FARC commander Pablo Catatumbo after his death as “a lover of

\textsuperscript{219} Final Peace Agreement, Point 3.1.4.1.
\textsuperscript{220} Final Peace Agreement, Point 3.2.2.7. The official English translation calls it “peace education”, but the original Spanish is “pedagogía de paz”, which was how it was referred to on the ground by FARC members. Given the differences signalled in the Introduction between peace pedagogy in this context and peace education as a sub-field of peace studies, I translate it as peace pedagogy here.
pedagogy”. 221

In a few peace pedagogy sessions in TLZN municipalities, during the disarmament phase, the OACP gave FARC peace pedagogy delegates the opportunity to speak. This was the exception rather than the rule. It did occur in Dabeiba, when two local FARC representatives, Darwin and Ganso, were invited to speak after the OACP presentation. Darwin, a Front sub-commander, arrived wearing a cap with a picture of Hugo Chávez, captioned “CHAVEZ” in capital letters. Ganso, a middle-ranking ex-combatant, wore a T-shirt with the photo of a FARC ‘martyr’. Like the state, the FARC communicated their public ‘face’ via clothing. Darwin read out a written speech, telling the audience they were in a transitional phase, and were committed to “using words as our only weapons”, a phrase used by FARC commander Rodrigo Londoño during the signing of the Peace Agreement in Cartagena. Darwin said, “We do not want to disqualify the efforts of the President. It’s possible that some of his staff are blocking implementation, because there are still people who want to continue the war”, conveying his discontent with the lack of finished construction in the camp, but refraining from attributing specific blame. He even said, “We all have to help the state institutions in implementation,” indicating his awareness of the difficulties in construction. He told me afterwards he had measured each word carefully. He had wanted to say more, and tell people about the political proposals of the FARC. He said:

We want to share our political ideas, we think they are good, we want this to be a socialist country, and we want to get people’s votes, we know people are sick of existing politicians. But we can’t do that yet. We have to be really careful, or the government will shut down this little space that we have.

Ganso was less diplomatic. He expressed concern about the continued presence of paramilitaries in the region, saying “the paramilitaries are just the police and army in disguise.” Rebeca was furious; she talked to Darwin about it afterwards, who apologised, and Ganso was admonished and removed from the peace pedagogy team as he could not be trusted not to say such things again in the future. Rebeca, as the OACP, had to curate the FARC’s public face, negotiating with them the line between pedagogy and politics. The OACP in Bogotá was aware that FARC pedagogy was ambiguous – one official told me the FARC’s pedagogy was “a

pedagogy doing politics (*una pedagogía haciendo política*), in a stance of confrontation with the state”, consistent with what he imagined they planned to do once they became a political party.

The overall effect of this ‘joint’ peace pedagogy on the local population of Dabeiba was impressive. Regardless of how much technical detail the local population retained, the FARC and the government were singing from the same hymn sheet, as it were. Some people in the audience might have been FARC sympathisers, others might have had family members killed by the FARC and be strongly anti-FARC; multiple affects and perceptions exist toward the FARC, just as they do toward the state. Seeing them speak on the same panel conveyed a symbolic message of reconciliation.

Tarcisio, an OACP official from Bogotá, told me he had done some joint peace pedagogy sessions with the FARC. “Some of them were timid about public speaking”, he said, and other times they were “too political”, but “only ever in the euphoria of the moment. If I reminded them they were not allowed to use the space for politics, they calmed down”.

He recognised the cultural difference between the FARC and the OACP, saying “The FARC often have a discourse that is closer and more relatable to people than ours”. However, he attributed part of this “closeness” to the FARC’s criticisms of the state: “If they said things like, ‘we have to change all the corrupt politicians’, people obviously say ‘yes, we agree’. Their anti-state discourse was persuasive”.

Another example of the government ‘curating’ the FARC’s face during the disarmament period were the billboards which the FARC put up around each Zone. In Llano Grande, these included billboards referencing historic FARC commanders (Figs. 20 and 21). The UN Mission mediated between the government and the FARC: “The government said it was political propaganda”, the UN Coronel told me. “The FARC said it wasn’t. The Peace Agreement doesn’t specify.” The disagreement was registered by the MVM, but the signs remained.

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222 Interview 1 February 2018.
Fig.20 “TLZN Jacobo Arango, Llano Grande” (each Zone was named after a historic FARC commander)
Source: Gwen Burnyeat, 2017

Fig.21 “TLZN of Llano Grande, Territory of Peace” with the famous profile of FARC founder Manuel Marulanda
Source: Gwen Burnyeat, 2017
Doing Peace Pedagogy Automatically

When the UN certified the end of the decommissioning of weapons on 15 August 2017, the legal status of the Zones changed. The fate of these sites had not been anticipated in the Peace Agreement, so the CSIVI agreed to allow the FARC to remain and engage in activities relating to their reincorporation into civilian life, such as undertaking training and preparing proposals for economic projects. The Zones were thus rebranded as Territorial Spaces for Training and Reincorporation (ETCR). At this point, the FARC were allowed to come and go as they pleased, and form their political party. A significant percentage of demobilised FARC members remained in these ETCRs initially. Over time, some left, others formed new collective settlements, plots of land bought with their reincorporation money, in places they considered more advantageous for their futures.

The OACP’s oversight responsibility ended with disarmament, as reincorporation was the ARN’s purview. However, the liaison personnel had proven invaluable to central government in maintaining relations between Bogotá and local implementation of the Agreement. They had been living in the Zones, sleeping in the UN camps, but with the transition to ETCRs they moved into nearby towns and were assigned new roles, which meant liaising with a new set of actors across much larger territories: coordinating the creation of CTPs and doing peace pedagogy.

Rebeca’s role changed dramatically. She had to interface with many actors across Urabá. In March 2018, six months into her new role, I asked her how she found doing peace pedagogy. “I think I have been doing peace pedagogy automatically”, she said. Building on this statement, I suggest that Rebeca’s liaising, building relationships over a period of time in a particular region, is a kind of peace pedagogy.

To create the CTPs, Rebeca had to coordinate with municipal and departmental government. Bogotá technocrats tend to see local government representatives as parochial; local government representatives see Bogotá technocrats as not understanding how to do things.

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223My translation, given that this concept did not exist in the Peace Agreement (CSIVI 2017 followed by Presidential Decrees 1274 of 2017 and 2026 of 2017).
locally (Ocampo 2014, 211). I interviewed mayors and mayoralty staff from three municipalities Rebeca worked with, and two senior staffers from the governor of Antioquia’s office. They were all sceptical about central government, felt the peace process was too centralised, and believed implementation of the Peace Agreement was being imposed by Bogotá, instead of being negotiated with local authorities. They all complained the government had not done enough peace pedagogy, and that the pedagogy that was done was overly technical and not relatable for local people. However, they respected Rebeca, who knew how to relate culturally to local politicians. One mayor told me, “The three levels of government are supposed to collaborate harmoniously, but that doesn’t always happen. Rebeca has been supportive though, she helped us get some money from central government”.

A staffer in the Antioquia governor’s office was sceptical of the OACP as an institution, saying, “The OACP just wants to formalise all the CTPs to say they fulfilled”, but he considered Rebeca a friend.

One of Rebeca’s liaison colleagues, discussing the delicacies of dealing with the “egos” of local government representatives, referred to “the art of hairdressing ponytails” (el arte de peinar moños), which I interpreted as the art of hairdressing hair that is already styled, managing people’s sensibilities, paying the right kind of respects to people, being deferential in order to smooth things along. This expression reveals the fundamental connection between the relational and electoral dimensions of ‘the political’ in getting things done as the state.

Rebeca went to dozens of multi-institutional meetings in Urabá, from multi-institutional committees and service-provision fairs to NGO events. In each event she introduced herself and said something about her personal experience living and working in Llano Grande, emphasising the historic nature of the FARC’s disarmament, and explaining the OACP’s new role in the region. She spent time afterwards swapping numbers with people and scheduling one-on-one meetings, going for informal coffees, often talking about her own experiences growing up in wartime Urabá, and seeking opportunities for collaboration in local projects to support peacebuilding and implementation. I went with her to meetings with the Commander of the Seventeenth Brigade of the Army, the Bishop of Apartadó, the president of the Urabá banana and agricultural workers union, municipal staff and mayors, the UN Mission staff, local UNHCR teams, the nuns who ran the Dabeiba school, academics at the Apartadó campus of the University of Antioquia, and others.

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224 Interview 10 August 2018.
225 Interview 29 May 2018.
In one public event, she said:

This peace process is not going to deliver immediate results. In Havana, it took five years to reach a deal. Implementation will take 15 years. In this first year, progress has been made – the FARC have disarmed, and begun reincorporation. People are distrustful of the peace process, because the idea has spread that peace is synonymous with Santos. But Santos is on his way out, peace doesn’t have a surname, it belongs to everyone. The FARC caused a lot of damage in Urabá, but either we continue to kill each other or we start disarming our hearts and building a new country. Peace cannot be a political flag. We have to stop thinking like that. We have to defend the agreement; it’s for all Colombians.

Despite common topoi with the peace pedagogy script– ‘peace will not happen overnight’; ‘peace needs you’ – there is a contrast between Pilar’s technical presentation with its 68-slide power-point analysed in Chapter 4, and Rebeca’s short, personal, emotive speech. For Rebeca, this was “doing peace pedagogy automatically” – going to these different spaces, building relationships with people, and talking to them about peace. ‘Doing peace pedagogy automatically’ went beyond the administrative side of liaising; it meant communicating the spirit of the Peace Agreement, in the sense of the phrase, ‘the spirit of the law’, versus ‘the letter of the law’.

Rebeca also offered formal peace pedagogy sessions. I went to one session she gave to local state officials. She began by saying:

Look, I have a power-point presentation from Bogotá you can all look at, with statistics and things, but I can leave that for you to study, I’d rather start with your questions. Why don’t you tell me all your doubts, and all the questions the communities you work with have asked you?

In contrast to the peace pedagogy team’s reliance on the power-point presentation as instantiation of official, technical-rational truth, which Chapter 4 called the enactment of legitimacy by explanation, Rebeca used informal, human relations to do peace pedagogy. She answered questions, then shared a slideshow of her personal photos from Llano Grande, and related her experience living there for seven months. She explained:

We had to build basic services for the FARC – a roof over their heads, water, electricity and gas. They receive a basic stipend over the first 24 months, and a one-off payment at

\footnote{Field diary, 18 March 2018.}
the beginning of two million pesos each. Before, they only had combat trousers with loads of pockets, and T-shirts with photos of their martyrs. They had to buy clothes. Today, they can move around freely, around 50% decided to stay in Llano Grande but they come and go now, visiting their families and returning, for example. The FARC have families, dreams, everything that we also have.

She showed them photos of reconciliation evenings in Llano Grande, where the FARC, the police, the army, and the local civilians had written the names of their dead on pieces of paper and arranged them in the shape of a mandala with candles, and football tournaments in which the FARC, community and police played against each other. This was an emotive ‘peace pedagogy’; it drew from Rebeca’s personal experience in Llano Grande, and her long-term engagement with the region and its inhabitants. This communication from an experiential archive involved conveying, through stories and photos, a testimony which gave her a more persuasive authority than the presentation of the Agreement as something that would happen, as per the pedagogy script.

Rebeca’s “automatic” pedagogy contributed to a generalised momentum in Urabá around peace, where many events were organised to promote reconciliation, truth and forgiveness. This was not due only to Rebeca; many local people believed in the peace process as a window of opportunity. However, she played an enabling role in this momentum, connecting local initiatives with Bogotá, seeking logistical and financial support, and conveying gravitas on small projects by adding the OACP’s name. She helped organise the first regional event on peace and reconciliation in Urabá, held in Chigorodó at the end of the Santos administration, bringing together the FARC, central government, local mayors and staff from the Antioquia governor’s office, local business owners, and communities. The most important thing, she said, was to get the different entities talking, and “put the issues of peace and reconciliation on the table”. This kind of peace pedagogy transcended unilateral transfers of information about the Peace Agreement: it created space for cross-sectoral dialogue.

Conclusions

Rebeca told me that her experience in Llano Grande had been “a factory of emotions”, and that she had laughed and cried many times throughout her time there. She harnessed this experiential passion in her amplified liaising work in Urabá after the FARC’s disarmament. I suggest that Rebeca’s liaising work, a form of giving face that is fundamentally relational, is a
type of affective labour underpinned by her attention to the political nature of everything she does, a mode of attention I have called *rendering political*. The ‘political’ here combines three dimensions: political-electoral (avoiding administrative blunders which the Democratic Centre could use to garner anti-peace electoral support); political-relational (establishing collaborative rapport with the multiple actors in the Zone); and political-emotional, which I take to mean genuine presence, submitting herself to this “factory of emotions”, to the extent that the experience left on her a lasting emotional imprint, as the opening vignette suggested. Rebeca’s testimonies served as experiential archives, along with her photographs, for doing emotionally-convincing peace pedagogy herself. This tripartite conceptualisation of ‘politics’ resembles Baines’ (2017, 13-14) understanding of ‘the political’ as the negotiation of relationships, the question of “what it means to be a human being within the realm of social action”, located not only in “grand gestures to claim the rights of a person … but in the myriad exchanges between persons (which constitute the meaning of sociality)”.

The OACP liaison officers’ jobs were formally recognised and remunerated as ‘work’, unlike many of the activities which the concept ‘affective labour’ seeks to vindicate.227 The affective dimensions of liaising, however, were not explicitly recognised as part of their job. Rebeca’s responsibilities were practical, but this chapter has shown the role of personal relationships in her administrative labour. While an emotional commitment to peace was a central motivation for the Bogotá OACP officials, their outward ‘faces’ were underpinned by what Chapter 3 called the anti-politics of cultural liberalism. Rebeca’s explicit recognition of the political nature of her administrative work, her ‘rendering political’, was the opposite.228 She did not evade agonism; she recognised it and negotiated between parties. Whereas the negotiations in Havana occurred between two parties, Rebeca’s *liaising* involved negotiating with multiple groups. The way she built relationships between and across groups echoes the ‘bridge-building’ which anthropologist and negotiation expert William Ury conceptualises as a conflict-prevention

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227 E.g. on the affective labour of victimhood in Colombia, see Krystalli (2019).
228 I avoid connecting Rebeca’s affective labour explicitly with her gender; first as there were male OACP liaison personnel, second because I eschew binary definitions of gender and gendered work. I note, however, that ‘political’ work is commonly associated with masculine notions of power contests, and ‘relational’ and ‘affective’ work frequently associated with feminine notions of caring; this ‘rendering political’ contributes to deconstructing simplistic binaries between the masculine and the feminine, power and care.
technique: creating “cross-cutting ties” across relationships of potential or actual conflict to “build trust and establish natural avenues for communication” (Ury 2000, 132).229

Rebeca’s recognition of the potential for conflict between different groups in the Zone maps onto her recognition of the potential for conflict within her personal experience, and the political-emotional labour of presence in the “factory of emotions”. While the peace pedagogy team struggled to navigate the tensions between the personal, institutional and government layers of the face, experiencing these as contradictory and emotionally distressing, Rebeca genuinely submitted herself to the affective experience of these relationships. To be human is to experience internal conflicts and contrasting emotions; being the face of the government entails additional internal conflict, due to the tensions between the three layers of responsibility and trust. In being the face over this long-term, multi-faceted encounter, and getting things done as the state in a context of unpredictable logistical challenges, Rebeca navigated these three layers by building collaborative relationships that allowed for personal, institutional and government exchanges.

The implication of ‘rendering political’ Rebeca’s affective labour is that it reveals ‘giving face’ as profoundly political, in this expanded, tripartite sense. Rebeca’s personal, institutional and government presence constituted and enabled a form of ‘peace pedagogy’ which communicated the peace process to her interlocutors in a starkly different way from the Bogotá peace pedagogy strategy. Liaising facilitated a lesser cultural divide than explaining (Chapter 4), and was thereby more convincing and effective.

Rebeca’s effectiveness contributed to Llano Grande becoming a success story within other Zones, even in the FARC’s view. It had a low desertion rate; the Army sent a delegation to visit Llano Grande to analyse the good practices; the positive cohabitation led to recognition in the media as an example of reconciliation; and several peacebuilding and development initiatives have since taken place there (e.g. UN 2019; Universidad EAFIT 2019). Not all Zones were so harmonious. This depended on multiple factors (McFee, Johnson, and Adarve 2019), including the personalities of the different groups involved, all of which engaged in some form of affective labour in their coexistence. Rebeca was one element within this milieu. While liaising as a role

229 Ury (2000, 131-9) notes that bridge-building strategies often include developing joint projects between potentially conflictive parties, and creating spaces for dialogue that promote mutual understanding; both of which Rebeca and others encouraged in Llano Grande.
gave a particular kind of government ‘face’, different liaison personnel had different faces and facialities (Deleuze and Guattari 1987). Rebeca was particularly skilled at this affective labour, due to her personal and professional background. Many OACP liaison officers were similarly adept, but not all. After all, government representatives are people, with different personalities, and varying interpersonal skills, who may connect better with some people than others.

The OACP liaison officers’ role evolved organically. Like ‘classic’ peace pedagogy, the job had not been anticipated in the Peace Agreement, but developed in response to the unexpected challenge of building the Zones. The fact they were maintained after disarmament indicated how useful it was to have local ‘faces’. In retrospect, it might have been useful to have had one overseeing each Zone, and one building cross-sectoral regional relationships and promoting implementation of other aspects of the Agreement, as Rebeca did in her second phase. But this had to be learned along the way; such is the nature of a peace process. Although policy interventions usually have unexpected outcomes, as Ferguson (1994) and Li (2007) have shown, the need for dynamic time-sensitive flexibility in implementation of a peace accord is different from implementation of normal government policies, which often have to be legislated, planned and budgeted for years in advance. The next chapter turns to the international community’s role in funding and enabling the OACP’s flexibility, while also creating new constraints, and implicating itself in the complex distribution of government responsibility.
CHAPTER 7 – The Entangled Face: International Implication in Government Responsibility

In a windowless dining hall in a smart Bogotá hotel, High Commissioner for Peace Rodrigo Rivera and his team received the heads of the international community in Colombia for a working breakfast. Seven round tables, laid with starched white tablecloths and napkins, silver cutlery, ramekins of jam and butter, salt shakers and jugs of orange juice, fanned out before Rivera, who stood at the front of the room. Behind him, an institutional power-point presentation glowed on a screen, titled ‘Overview of projects carried out by the OACP with international cooperation, and challenges for implementation of the Final Peace Agreement with the FARC-EP’. Sitting at the tables, in stiff grey and black suits, were ambassadors and their attachés from various diplomatic missions, senior UN delegates, and country directors of foreign donor agencies. Waiters served them warm croissant from baskets with silver tongs, and brought out carafes of coffee and white china plates with melon slices, scrambled eggs and cheese.

The time was late July 2018. Santos was completing his final weeks in office before the handover to president-elect Iván Duque. The purpose of this breakfast was for the OACP to give an account of their work over the two periods of the Santos administration, and thank the international community for their support to peace. The mood was sombre: there was growing concern among all those who supported the peace process about increasing killings of social leaders across the country, and about the future of the Peace Agreement under the incoming government.

Rivera welcomed his distinguished guests:

It’s an honour for my team and I to have this meeting with you, to show you what we have done in the last few years with your strategic support. These recent years will go down in history for achieving an agreement with the FARC and progressing in negotiations with the ELN … Among us today are friends from different embassies and institutions, and I want to recognise and thank you for all your support over the years to the peace process.

He proceeded to present the work conducted by the OACP under Santos with support from different international agencies, with "achievements" listed in bullet-points, and names of the
donor agencies or countries which had supported different strategies. “These are not minor achievements”, he said, “and they are not just Colombia’s, but also your achievements”.

This throwaway phrase of diplomatic gratitude, “also your achievements”, encapsulates a fundamental entanglement between the Colombian government and the amorphous entity generally referred to as the ‘international community’, a mutual imbrication which implicates the international community in the peace process, and in the very constitution of the Colombian government itself. This chapter explores how this entanglement shapes the Santos government’s face of peace, including its peace pedagogy.

Trouillot (2001) signals the continuing importance of states in the late twentieth century, despite the challenge to state borders and economies by neoliberal transnational corporations and supra-national organisations. Yet globalisation has changed states: “state effects never obtain solely through national institutions or in governmental sites”, he writes, and this has been “exacerbated by globalization” (Trouillot 2001, 126). Sharma and Gupta (2006, 6) likewise see the state as a “translocal ensemble of institutions, practices, and people in a globalized context”.

Building on the analyses of Chapters 4, 5 and 6 about government-society encounters and relationships with different sectors of Colombian society, this chapter turns to the relationship between the government and the international community, and how this in turn shapes government-society relationships. I follow Lombard’s (2016, 46) conceptualisation of the term ‘international community’ as encompassing an assortment of people present in the same place, with diverging interests but a tendency to “conventionalisation”: the development of shared languages, objectives, and tools for collaboration. I problematise the notion of a clear boundary between the government and the ‘international’, and thereby contribute, to the understanding of states as translocally-constituted, a theory of translocal government responsibility, returning to Chapter 1’s theme of government responsibility as complexly distributed, and widening the gaze.

Lombard’s ethnography of international interventions in the Central African Republic reveals how personal and structural factors shape the relationship between the CAR and donor states and entities, and critiques the tendency to “divide politics into ‘internal’ state spheres and ‘external’ intervener spheres” as “an analytical fiction … They exist only through their relationships with each other; they create each other” (Lombard 2016, 3). I build on Lombard’s
analysis of the co-constitution of the intervening and the intervened by blurring the boundary between the OACP and the international community which supports their work. Drawing inspiration from Tsing (2005, 2015), I see this relationship as an ‘entanglement’ of global connections across people, places, flows and things, an analytical move which “bursts categories and upends identities” (2015, 219) to highlight the flux of “shifting assemblages, which remake us as well as our others” (2015, 47).

This chapter first describes the multiple ways the international community is entangled with the Colombian government’s peace process. It then documents ethnographically three ways this entanglement implicates the international community in government responsibility, weakening instead of strengthening the government’s peace policy. First, the OACP peace pedagogues were all employed on short-term contracts funded by international donors, perpetuating an existing reliance on temporary contractors. This promoted what I call ‘elite precarity’: the experience of precarious working conditions among elites, the flip side of the coin of the increasingly precarious labour conditions under neoliberalism, which creates instability within the government by disincentivising continuity of personnel. Pedagogy officials represented the government in public, but were paid by international donors. This grey area between inside and outside the government led to overlapping agendas, as they had to answer both to their OACP boss, and their funders. Second, the accountability paperwork which international donors imposed on the use of their funds in the ‘narratives project’ (Chapter 5) ended up undermining the incipient trust the OACP was building with sceptical civil society. Third, donors conditioned who could participate in the spaces they funded, and US funding precluded participation of FARC ex-combatants, as FARC were still on the US terrorist list. All three affected the government’s credibility, yet the international community rarely had to ‘give face’ and accept responsibility for their role in the government’s actions.

In revealing the entanglement between the Colombian government and the international community, I propose understanding government responsibility as comprising complex layers of implication. I borrow Rothberg’s (2019) categories of ‘implicated subject’ and ‘implication’, which describe the “manifold indirect, structural, and collective forms of agency that enable injury, exploitation, and domination but that frequently remain in the shadows” (Rothberg 2019, 1). From the Latin implicāre, meaning “to entangle, involve, or connect closely”, ‘implication’ foregrounds the way we are “folded into (im-pli-cated in) … events that at first seem beyond our agency as individual subjects” (2019, 1). Implication, in contradistinction to the subject positions
of victim, perpetrator, bystander and beneficiary, offers a more nuanced understanding of individual and collective responsibility for violence and injustice. Contradictory and multiple relations to past and present injuries can coexist in individuals and collectives; Rothberg calls this “complex implication”, and suggests that “different modes of implication frequently converge and overlap” (2019, 13). His discussion centres on how societies, social groups and individuals are complexly implicated in large-scale historical violence (e.g. slavery, Nazism, colonialism). I extend this concept by applying it to think through the international community’s implication in the responsibility of government administrations, both for direct violence, and in seemingly mundane things, like personnel contracts and everyday bureaucracy.

By analysing government responsibility in this way, I do not limit the discussion to holding the international community to account for implication in war and marginalisation in Colombia, though this is encompassed in my theoretical move. The concept of implication goes further: it renders visible the co-production of the peace process, and of the Colombian government itself. In other words, looking at international implication in government responsibility permits a view of international implication in governments as entities.

This is proximate to recent anthropological debates which trouble normative assumptions of nation-state sovereignties as regimes of power over specific territories, “grounded in formal ideologies of rule and legality”, insteading view de facto sovereignty as “a tentative and always emergent form of authority grounded in violence that is performed and designed to generate loyalty, fear, and legitimacy from the neighborhood to the summit of the state” (Hansen and Stepputat 2006, 16.2-16.3). In this vein, Gill’s ethnography of trade unionism in Barrancabermeja reveals how “the formal fiction of nation-state sovereignty and national control” in Colombia masks “the imperial power of the United States by maintaining its invisibility, even as its corporations, security forces, diplomats, and aid programs intrude into the ability of client states to control economic activity, regulate social life, and command territory” (Gill 2016, 20). However, rather than analysing how power from different sources operates over Colombian affairs, my focus on responsibility reveals how different people and institutions in different places combine to produce the actions of the entity we call the Colombian government.

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230 Rothberg contrasts ‘implication’ with ‘complicity’, which shares the sense of “folded-togetherness”, but is more closely tied to “legalistic models of responsibility in which causality functions in relatively direct ways”, and fails to capture our complex relationships to historical injustices. He argues, “We are implicated in the past … but we cannot be complicit in crimes that took place before our birth” (2019, 14).
The International Interface

Policies for war and peace of successive governments in Colombia have occurred within shifting geopolitical coordinates and with participation of different kinds by international players, especially the US government. Borda calls these involvements ‘internationalisation’, the process by which states make conscious decisions to involve international actors in an internal conflict (Borda 2012, 11-13). She argues that ‘internationalisation’ increased over the twentieth century, due to the construction by successive Colombian administrations of a “shared cosmovision” with the US: first by depicting the internal violence in Colombia as a local expression of the war on communism, then in terms of the war on drugs, and after 9/11, the war on terror. This “shared cosmovision” was not limited to financial and military support, but also, as Tate argues (2015b), consolidated shared “policy narratives” between Washington and Bogotá.

The Santos administration likewise involved international entities in the peace process with the FARC. Santos, as Chapter 3 delineated, hailed from a sector of the Bogotá upper-classes with an international outlook – the “type of Colombian that the foreign investor can feel comfortable dealing with” (Bunce 2019, 188) – and had lived abroad extensively, especially in the UK. I suggest that Santos drew on these cultural resources to construct a more expansive “shared cosmovision”, to use Borda’s term, with the global liberal elite, to involve them in his peace policy in Colombia, at a time in which the geopolitical winds were resolutely liberal: the so-called ‘pink tide’ in Latin America had waned, reducing support for the FARC in the region, relations with the EU and the UN, which had deteriorated under Uribe, improved with the arrival of a president who expressed desire for peace, and Obama was in the White House and looked favourably on the peace process (Pizarro 2017, 370-3).

International involvement in the peace process had several dimensions. The very paradigms of the peace process, far from being autochthonous, drew on a global field of knowledge about peace negotiations and peacebuilding, which Chapter 1 argued could be characterised as liberal peace. The government negotiation team conducted literature reviews from policy and scholarly fields on relevant topics at different points during the negotiations to inform their strategies. Many government negotiators and OACP officials had undertaken studies abroad, and were from similar upper, upper-middle or middle-class internationally-facing elites (Chapter 3): we therefore cannot conceive of the government negotiating team as product of a bounded ‘Colombian-ness’.
Santos invited a team of international experts to advise negotiations: Jonathan Powell (a British politician who had worked with Tony Blair on the Northern Ireland peace process, founder of the charity Inter Mediate), William Ury (negotiation expert, co-founder of the Harvard Program on Negotiation), Dudley Ankerson (academic, consultant for Latin Insight Consulting, ex-British foreign service), Joaquín Villalobos (former Salvadoran guerrilla and politician, international expert on conflict resolution) and Shlomo Ben-Amí (former Israeli politician and diplomat who had participated in peace talks with Palestine, vice-president of the Toledo International Centre for Peace). From 2011 to 2018, this group travelled to Colombia four or five times per year, to advise the government.231

Though the talks were not internationally-mediated, several international actors were involved at the negotiation table. Four guarantor countries, Cuba, Venezuela, Chile, and Norway, accompanied the talks. While Chile and Norway aligned closer to the government, the ideological affinities of Cuba and Venezuela with the FARC offered reassurance to the guerrilla. Fidel Castro had long encouraged the FARC to find a negotiated solution to the conflict;232 and Hugo Chávez provided transport for the FARC out of the jungle, and encouraged them to keep going during difficult moments in the negotiations.233

Other governments and multilateral organisations appointed delegates to the negotiating table: Jean Arnault for the United Nations Secretary-General, Tom Koenings for Germany, Eamon Gilmore for the European Union, and Bernard Aronson for the USA. These delegates offered advice to the parties, and engaged in back-door conversations to facilitate dialogue. Both negotiating teams also received visits from abroad. Within the gender sub-commission, for example, 16 female ex-combatants from other countries visited Havana to share their experiences of DDR (OACP 2018d, 382-6; La Haine 2016). The Colombia mission of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) supported the negotiations by co-organising the citizen participation forums (Chapter 2) with the National University of Colombia, and orchestrating, together with the National University and the Catholic Church, the delegations of victims who travelled to Havana. This international involvement at the negotiating table reveals the entanglement of people and institutions which influenced the development of the peace talks.

231 Interviews with two of this experts, 2 November 2018 and 22 March 2019.
233 Personal communication with FARC commanders, September 2016.
This is not to suggest a simplistic transference of logics from international actors onto the government or FARC negotiating teams, but rather unfolding intersubjective processes of mutual influence.

International involvement was also planned for implementing the Peace Agreement. The United Kingdom looked favourably on Colombia’s peace policy, and played the role of penholder for Colombia in the UN Security Council. On 25 January 2016, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2261, proposed by the UK, to establish a political mission of unarmed international observers to verify the decommissioning of weapons as part of the tripartite Monitoring and Verification Mission (Chapter 6). A headquarters for the UN Mission was established in Bogotá, led by Jean Arnault, and regional offices and teams created, comprising principally military personnel from member states of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). This UN Mission completed its Security Council mandate on 26 September 2017 when disarmament finished. The Peace Agreement contemplated a follow-on UN political mission, to verify implementation (Point 6.3.3), and on 10 July 2017, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2366, establishing the second UN Verification Mission in Colombia.

An international component was agreed within the CSIVI, comprising two “notable persons” with an “international status”, one selected by the government and one by the FARC, to verify implementation and present reports, with technical assistance from the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies of the University of Notre Dame (Point 6.3.2). These “notables” were selected in March 2017: Spanish ex-President Felipe González (the government’s choice) and Uruguayan ex-President José Mujica (the FARC’s choice). Point 6.4.2 of the Agreement details a host of other international entities to accompany different aspects of implementation (Fig.22).
Fig. 22: Table in point 6.4.2 on international accompaniment
Source: Screenshot (Final Peace Agreement)

Allocation of these roles was not neutral. Different agencies made themselves known to the negotiating parties through human relationships, enmeshed in the assortment of players in the international community in Colombia. International presence in Colombia includes diplomatic
missions, the aid programmes of specific countries (e.g. USAID, GIZ), supra-national organisations including multiple UN agencies, and international NGOs such as the International Committee of the Red Cross or Oxfam. These entities have developed an economy around international cooperation throughout the conflict, and vast sums of money are sent to Colombia for humanitarian relief and development (Aparicio 2012b, Vera 2017). In the context of the peace process, this war/aid economy looked set to shift to a peace/aid economy, and all the international institutions wanted to get involved. This is not to question a genuine ‘will’ to support peace, drawing on Li’s (2007) concept of the ‘will to improve’; however, economic factors do drive how international cooperation is distributed.

The individuals working in international organisations in Colombia are a mix of Colombian and foreign staff, and the foreign staff become entangled in local institutional cultures, so they cannot be considered “bounded” foreign nationals. Those international entities formally included in the Peace Agreement had gained a sufficient degree of perceived legitimacy, in the eyes of both the government and the FARC. In the words of a Colombian-national mid-level UN official, “the internationals who have been in Colombia for a long time are part of the traditional rosca”. The word rosca, (literally ‘doughnut’), is a Colombian idiom referring to being ‘in the loop’ or ‘on the inner track’, having privileged access to closed circles or cliques, sometimes involving corruption, though not necessarily. “The international entities got into the Peace Agreement due to rosca”, she said. As the peace process progressed and grew in international renown among global liberal circles, it became an attractive thing for diplomatic missions and NGOs to be involved in, and it conveyed status on an organisation or individual to say they had “advised on the Colombian peace process” or were “providing support to implementation”. Global liberal support to the peace process crystallised in the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to President Santos in 2016, and the 2016 official State Visit of Juan Manuel Santos to the United Kingdom, the first ever by a Colombian president.

Chapter 4 revealed two common topoi in the peace pedagogy script which invoked the international community as a legitimation mechanism: the ‘international experts’ topos and ‘the

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234 Legitimacy in the eyes of one of the negotiating parties and illegitimacy in the perception of the other would be unlikely to lead to inclusion of an international entity in the Peace Agreement, because everything had to be agreed. Nevertheless, there are clear preferences among the entities listed; e.g. the International Peasant Movement was likely to have been proposed by the FARC; the Carter Center by the government.

235 Interview 8 July 2017.
world is watching’ topos. Santos’ efforts to ‘internationalise’ the peace process were also legitimization strategies, implicitly to prevent possible attempts by future governments to renege on the word of the state, and ensure continued commitment to implementation. To this effect, he formally deposited the Peace Accord in the custody of the Swiss Federal Council, in the Federal Palace at Bern where the Geneva Conventions are held, and the Peace Accord was deemed a Special Agreement in the terms of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions (OACP 2018c, 293-303).

International involvement was also financial. Pledged and programmed aid to Colombia amounted to approximately 1.1 billion dollars between 2013 and 2019 (Kaplan and Young 2019, 203). The final stretch of the peace process in 2016 saw an increase and consolidation of international interest, and various countries and multilateral entities pledged aid to support implementation. The Obama administration announced in 2016 a new framework for bilateral cooperation, rebranding ‘Plan Colombia’ as ‘Peace Colombia’, pledging 450 million dollars to help Colombia secure peace (White House 2016). The same year, the European Union established the European Fund for Peace in Colombia, initially 120 million euros, with contributions from 19 member states, and EU aid to Colombian peace efforts totalled almost 600 million euros over 15 years, from the beginning of peace talks in 2012 (European Commission 2016). Canada pledged 78.4 million dollars to supporting Colombia’s efforts for peace (Reliefweb 2016), and the UK increased funding to Colombia in 2016 by 25 million pounds (Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2016). The UN Post-Conflict Multi-Partner Trust Fund was established in 2016, with funds from the UK, Ireland, Sweden, Canada, Norway, Switzerland, Germany and the UN, co-chaired between the Colombian government and the UN, to channel international aid towards peacebuilding and post-conflict. These funds were dedicated to bilateral cooperation between states. Other international funds were dedicated to civil society peacebuilding initiatives, and even academic research to contribute to furthering peace. International aid flows between countries shift with geopolitical winds; some of these

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237 A £2.8 million bilateral research fund was created for Colombian-British academic collaborations, launched by UK Research and Innovation and Colombia’s Administrative Department of Science, Technology and Innovation (Colciencias). 10 projects are currently underway (UKRI 2018).
countries have since pledged increased aid, and others have jumped on the peace bandwagon.²³⁸

The Santos government thus successfully marketed the Colombian peace process among transnational policy networks. Convincing global policy elites to incorporate an issue into their agenda requires understanding how to manoeuvre among their networks strategically, as Carpenter (2014) shows. Santos managed to forge a shared cosmovision of liberal peace along an international interface, across which international actors and entities became entangled with the Colombian government, shaping the Havana negotiations and early implementation of the Peace Agreement. These entanglements, as this section has documented, included knowledge practices, legitimation strategies, strategic support, and financial contributions. The peace efforts of the Colombian government relied on and were shaped by its international relationships. These, in turn, shaped the way the government could ‘face’ different sectors of society: none of these forms of involvement were neutral, but came with strings attached.

**The Elite Precarity of Government Contractors**

The OACP’s budget was run through Fondo Paz (Chapter 2), a budget which initially prioritised the negotiations, then implementation. It was also used to hire contractors: most OACP officials were on short-term contracts which had to be renewed regularly, allowing the government flexibility to respond to the dynamic political contexts that characterise peace processes. As Chapter 2 showed, the Fondo Paz budget was supplemented by international funding, including via personnel contracts. This section describes the experience of OACP officials hired through the contracting system, and argues that the system creates ‘elite precarity’.

Anthropological discussions of ‘precarity’ (Allison 2013, Millar 2014, Han 2018, Lazar and Sanchez 2019) generally refer to employment insecurity and the proliferation of intermittent and unstable labour, associated with the rollback of the welfare state under neoliberalism and globalisation, and the ways that labour insecurity fosters ontological precarity. Allison (2013, 9) writes, “Precarity soon slips into other dimensions of life”, such as paying bills, keeping food on the table, maintaining one’s honour, leading to “a state where one’s human condition has

become precarious as well”. However, as Lazar and Sanchez write (2019, 4-5), the sense of loss accompanying the notion of precarity, and its related concept the ‘precariat’ (Standing 2011), is premised on a Euro-centric ideal of secure employment, benefits and the welfare state, which has historically been “the exception rather than the norm even in Europe”. In large parts of the global South, neither the welfare state nor secure waged labour have ever been widespread, signal Lazar and Sanchez, differentiating communities who define their insecurity in terms of experiences of post-Fordist decline, from the “vast swathes of global labour [who] do not regard precarity as new or as grounded in any type of collective labour history” (Lazar and Sanchez 2019, 10).

While OACP officials were elites within Colombian society (Chapter 3), their working conditions were precarious – short-term contracts, no labour rights, and frequent late payments and unpaid overtime. While ‘precarity’ usually indexes experiences of poverty and marginalisation, I was surprised to find that government officials working on the central policy of a two-term government administration experienced unstable employment conditions, suggesting that similar global forces, including the bilateral aid strategies of the international community, also affect privileged sectors of society.

I do not want to equate the ontological experience of the OACP officials with the dramatic everyday vulnerability of those in the informal sector in Colombia, or of post-Fordist workers in the global North. The OACP officials were not experiencing poverty, though their precarious employment did connote some ontological instability, as this section recounts, which I argue is a disincentive for people who could theoretically have the luxury of choosing a career path to remain in the public sector. The implication of showing this elite precarity is to reveal how the contractor system promotes instability within the Colombian government, and the international community’s implication.

Many state institutions in Colombia combine civil servants (funcionarios) with contractors (contratistas). The former has a long-term contract; the latter is hired for a specific purpose. The post of High Commissioner (Jaramillo then Rivera) was politically appointed by the President.239 The OACP staff were mostly contractors, some with Fondo Paz, others with international

239 The 1991 Constitution regulates four government position types: popular election (elección popular), career civil servant (funcionarios de carrera), official workers (trabajadores oficiales) and political appointment (free appointment and dismissal, de libre nombramiento y remoción), like the post of Peace Commissioner. Colombia’s Constitution of 1991, Art.125.
institutions. Many state entities rely on international cooperation to fund part of their human resources, and contractor hires were straightforward ways to implement pledged financial support to the peace process. However, it was commonly noted that the OACP was especially given to using international cooperation to make hires.

Two main international cooperation programs funded the OACP’s pedagogy work: the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), a multi-lateral UN entity which channelled funding from different donor countries. The USAID program which supported the OACP was run by the American consultancy Management Systems International (MSI), a firm specialising in international development, frequently contracted to implement USAID projects. MSI had two USAID funded programs in Colombia associated with the peace process: ‘Colombia Transforma’ sought to “improve the Colombian government’s ability to create fast change in rural communities, promote collaboration, and mitigate destabilizing tensions”,240 and ‘Regional Governance Activity’ aimed “to strengthen the ability of sub-national governments to effectively deliver key services in 40 conflict-affected municipalities across nine Colombian departments” and re-establish “the legitimacy of government institutions in areas where the effective state presence was limited during Colombia’s extended civil conflict”.241 The IOM program supporting the OACP was called ‘Institutional Strengthening for Peace’, and aimed to “support government and civil society institutions in developing peacebuilding and reconciliation strategies”.242

As Chapter 6 showed, implementation of a peace accord requires greater flexibility and capacity to improvise than normal government policies, which frequently have to be legislated, planned and budgeted far in advance, and are constrained by numerous legal oversight mechanisms. According to Allison (2013, 10), ‘flexicity’, the search to balance flexibility for employers with security for employees is a common goal among states. Hiring OACP officials on short-term contracts allowed for flexibility, yet provided little in the way of security. According to Ahumada


(2000, 153-4), the rise of contractors in government in Colombia, as elsewhere in Latin America, is associated with neoliberal policies; the Gaviria and Samper administrations assigned fat consulting contracts to companies, and simultaneously cut thousands of public sector workers, allegedly to modernise the state, increase efficiency and decrease public spending. In parallel, international entities began to finance government contractors. While civil servants are difficult to get rid of due to labour rights and unions, service-provision contracts (prestación de servicios) allow the state to grow quickly, and shrink again when needed. This is useful in a peace process, which requires staff conducting specialised, short-term tasks, like the local liaison officers in the disarmament zones (Chapter 6).

There were advantages in not being a funcionario. In particular, it reduced your accountability. A civil servant’s signature was liable to legal oversight mechanisms, and legal action could be taken against them if they failed to comply to the letter with their stipulated terms of reference, or with court orders to particular state entities for specific actions. A contractor, on the other hand, had “no public fingerprint”, as Nancy, a Colombian IOM employee, told me. She explained, “A contractor can do anything that is legal. But civil servants have to fulfil things stipulated by the law in their terms of reference. If you don’t fulfil, the accountability mechanisms come after you”. Contractors get no holidays, no maternity leave, no insurance, no job security, and are responsible for making their own pension and social security payments. Yet they are not responsible as the state if something goes wrong, as they are not overseen by the accountability mechanisms. To take action as a funcionario requires certainty of the law.

I told Nancy I was surprised at how widespread this practice was. She replied, “This is the tropicality of the tropics my dear. Informality is our daily bread, it exists at every level. Of course contractors are a kind of informal staff. But it’s a national practice.” Nancy’s application of the concept of ‘informal’ labour, which usually refers to people who work outside unionised sectors (domestic workers, street vendors, etc.) and generally live in conditions of poverty and the ontological insecurity documented by anthropological discussions of precarity, jars interestingly in the context of elite government officials.

Gill’s (2016) ethnography of the rise and decline of trade unionism in Barrancabermeja reveals how neoliberal policies have transformed labour in Colombia: outsourcing oil workers,

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“dispers[ing] working-class power away from former union strongholds”, creating new geographies of marginalisation and wealth, leading to “temporary or part-time, nonunionized workers … replacing a relatively small group of people who once had stable union jobs; and unwaged, wage-insecure, and criminalized labor … intensifying” (Gill 2016, 8-11). The OACP contractors were culturally, socially and geographically distant from trade unionists in the violent city of Barrancabermeja, enjoying many privileges the unionists lacked, not least the option of choice (they could leave the OACP and find work elsewhere), and the absence of everyday violence. However, the elite precarity of their contracting system was the flip side of the decline of the Barrancabermeja unions: the vulnerability of outsourced work was an effect of neoliberalism.

OACP contractors were hired by team directors, who negotiated a contract for their workers with Fondo Paz or an international agency, and their salary was dependent on their academic degrees and their years of work experience. Members of the Pedagogy Group therefore earned different salaries doing the same job, which created resentment. The salaries varied from four to nine million Colombian pesos per month, roughly 5.4 times to 12 times minimum wage.\textsuperscript{244} This was a comfortable middle-class salary, but not a high one; for comparison, the salary for congressmen was nearly 30 million pesos, 40 times minimum wage (El Colombiano 2017).

The OACP Pedagogy Group was completely dependent on international contracts, which lasted three or four months each, and had to be renegotiated and renewed often, sometimes with a different donor. Many Pedagogy officials had both IOM and MSI contracts during their time at the OACP. Contractors were hired nominally for specific projects, not for time – and therefore had no labour rights. One contractor, who had worked in the OACP for years, had a baby during my fieldwork, and was not entitled to maternity leave. Her boss, keen to support her and find ways of covering this basic right within the limitations of the system, negotiated with the donor on her behalf. She was given the choice of writing some reports during her “time off”, or continuing to meet regularly with her team and offer input on their work, and she chose the second, but struggled, as she felt unable to be fully present either in the office or at home in the early months of motherhood.

\textsuperscript{244} Minimum wage in Colombia in 2017 was $737,717 Colombian pesos monthly (Portafolio 2017).
One member of the Thematic team arrived in the OACP just with the promise of a contract, leaving behind a job in a ministry. She worked a month without a contract, which her boss was able to “cover” afterwards with an invented one-month consultancy at IOM, while her Fondo Paz contract was processed. Several contractors in the Pedagogy Group worked 26 days for free, without contracts, on their bosses’ promise that the new contracts were coming, and that they would be reimbursed for those days, but that they had to keep working in the meantime, because everything was urgent, as is genuinely the case in a peace process. The liaison officers (Chapter 6) were in a similarly unstable situation. They were originally contracted through IOM, but when the TLZNs ended and the changeover was made to the ETCRs, they were asked to remain in their posts while new contracts were negotiated, and they went two months without pay.

Additionally, contractors’ monthly salaries were frequently paid late, which was a source of constant concern. Pedagogy official Juliana was a single mother and lived with her parents; her outgoings, including school fees, were over five million pesos per month, but her MSI contract was for four million. She had previously worked in the Bogotá waterworks, and had studied a Master’s in conflict resolution with the aspiration of working in jobs related to the peace process, because she believed it was important for Colombia’s future, but she was worse off economically than before. She supplemented her income with piecemeal work such as proofreading, but when her monthly OACP salary was late, she struggled to afford the petrol to drive to work, and public transport from the suburb where she lived was unreliable. Payments were often made only when team directors pushed the donors. Pedagogy officials would complain to Valentina, “we still haven’t been paid”, and Valentina would follow up personally with the coordinator of the relevant program at IOM or MSI. Only through personal communication could this pressure be applied.

The Pedagogy and liaison officials’ work required extensive travel, and expense reimbursement was similarly erratic. Contractors had to request domestic flights five working days in advance, which donors purchased directly. MSI required their consultants to stay in hotels on their “list” – luxury hotel chains with which they had accounts – and would make and pay for bookings directly. MSI contractors received per diems to spend on food and inter-city transport. IOM contractors’ per diems had to include their accommodation, and the amounts varied per city. One OACP official contracted by IOM told me that in some cities the per diem was sufficient to cover his activities, but in others he was frequently left out of pocket. Another, also with IOM,
told me that at one point, waiting for a delayed payment, she only organised pedagogy sessions in the city where her parents lived, so she did not have to pay for accommodation up front and wait for reimbursement.

I asked Erica, an American IOM employee, why these payment delays were so common. She explained they usually stemmed from a problem with the contractor’s paperwork. For example, she said, “An invoice might say January 1st-30th, instead of 1st-31st. So it doesn’t pass the internal revision process.” However, it was common with both MSI and IOM for contractors to be told months later that they were missing a document or had done a piece of paperwork wrong, and that things would need to be redone in order for payment to be authorised. Erica said the problem was that “the person who receives it often doesn’t say anything, the paperwork just sits there, nobody’s informed there’s a problem with this invoice”. Why was this the case? I asked. “On one hand”, she said, contractors are given a list of required paperwork. “There’s nothing they need that is not on the list. If there is a document missing, that’s their fault”. However, the IOM was notoriously bad in processing this paperwork: “It takes them, like, 95 years to recognise the missing paperwork, and the contractor has to stay on top of them and hassle them in order to figure out where the problem is”. This “staying on top” of officials in charge of payments echoed the need for bosses to follow up payments via personal communication. Erica said, “My boss would tell me, so and so is waiting for a payment, you have to stay in top of it. Why it requires continued pressure in order for payments to be released, I don’t understand. It’s not like I’m an important boss figure, it’s just the fact of maintaining pressure that gets things done”.

As Chapter 3 showed, most OACP officials were motivated by a deep personal commitment to the peace process. For many, it was their first time working for the state, and they believed that solving the many problems of the Colombian state required good people taking responsibility for working in the public sector. Many OACP officials worked long hours, over weekends, and frequently responded to work-based WhatsApps and emails between 7am-10pm. These labour conditions might well disincentivise continuity among capable, highly-educated and committed individuals with other career options, ultimately risking the quality of the government, thereby impacting wider society. However, they also contribute to fragmentation of the government itself,

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245 Interview, 10 July 2018.
ironic given the stated aims of the IOM and USAID programs to strengthen government institutions for peace, as the next section discusses.

**The Periphery of the Government**

While officials in the OACP Thematic department tended to be on Fondo Paz contracts, the Pedagogy Group were *all* on international contracts. The international contractors had a slightly lower status internally from the Fondo Paz contractors, even though in some cases their salary was higher, because they were seen as less of the OACP and more *adjunct* to it. The Fondo Paz contractors had [@presidencia.gov.co](mailto:presidencia.gov.co) email addresses; the international contractors used their own personal email addresses, and their own laptops and mobile phones for doing government work. The use of international contracts was another way the Pedagogy Group was relegated to the bottom of the OACP’s internal hierarchy (Chapters 2 and 3), and created a strange liminality: the Pedagogy Group seemed more ‘outside’ the government than other OACP teams. One IOM employee told me she saw them as “an extension arm of the OACP, not so much part of the structure”.

This liminality, however, also gave Pedagogy officials slightly greater room for manoeuvre within the laborious bureaucracy of ‘pure’ government work. Danilo, a senior OACP official, said, “There’s a limited payroll in the OACP. Contracting through that payroll is a *rollazo* [a huge bore]. And the international cooperation sector trusts me, so I generally do things with them.” This reinforces the notion that international cooperation relies on personal relationships – the *rosca*. Danilo had existing personal relationships within the international community because he had previously worked in USAID. Which state agencies are financed by which international agencies is contingent upon pre-existing entanglements, and consolidates institutional linkage tendencies.

Though the Pedagogy Group were all international consultants, they were treated as staff. They worked from the office, participated in OACP meetings, and presented themselves in public as working for the OACP. For these reasons, one Pedagogy official told me, “I don’t feel like I’m IOM, I feel like I’m OACP”. In addition to contractors inside the teams, the OACP also employed external contractors, who had almost identical contracts, but were hired as ‘advisors’ rather than

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246 Interview, 18 April 2018.
247 Interview, 27 October 2017.
team members. Advisors neither went to the office everyday nor participated in internal meetings – they worked on specific projects, usually from home, coming in only for meetings about that project, and were not contracted on a rolling basis, but for specific periods of time with specific outputs. They often had other jobs elsewhere; some taught in universities, others worked with NGOs.

The Pedagogy Group thus operated in a grey area, where the international community and the Colombian government overlapped. This had a significant effect on their public-facing work as authorised government spokespersons (Chapter 4). They had to navigate the tensions between personal, institutional and government responsibility (Chapter 5), yet in fact were employed not by the government but by IOM or MSI. Mario, an external advisor hired to support Territorial Peace projects, summarised this situation:

With the OACP’s public-facing work, a critical red frontier between state and civil society widened. Some beautiful things happen there – but it’s also very delicate. It allows trust-building, but it also increases the chains of communication. It’s not a government official going to the territories, but someone contracted by an international organisation. It’s really weird. People see me as the government. But I’m not.248

This conceptualisation of the “critical red frontier” reveals a government-society interface in which the government is represented by personnel who are in fact peripheral to the government. The concept of state ‘peripheries’ (or ‘margins’) usually refers to areas impenetrable to Weberian rational state rule across territories, commonly conceptualised in terms of centre/periphery morphologies (Das and Poole 2004, Krupa and Nugent 2015). I propose inverting the term onto the government itself, the epitome of the ‘centre’, to highlight the international contractor “frontier” as a kind of government periphery.

Just as ethnographies of geographical ‘frontier’ regions frequently note the overlapping of de facto sovereignties (e.g. Ramírez 2011), employees on the periphery of the government had to navigate competing claims on their loyalties, answering both to their OACP boss and to their contract handler. To get paid, the contractor had to submit a “product” (producto) to their donor. These were usually descriptive reports of activities, quantified with number of beneficiaries (e.g. attendees at a peace pedagogy session), photos of events, and sometimes evaluative discussions, including lessons learned, or recommendations for future projects. They took

248 Interview, 22 January 2018.
considerable time to write, and were signed off by the OACP team director and sent to donors. Officials’ reports had to match the terms of reference specified in their contract, which created tension because the contracts described the activities of consultancies supporting specific projects, when contractors were actually used as staff, and their bosses frequently tasked them with things that arose after negotiation of the contract. The contract handlers at IOM or MSI knew this, but did not like it, because they had to combine dozens of such documents to prepare their own reports for the original donors – in this case Britain, Canada, Sweden and USAID – about the results of X or Y aid program.

Pellegrino (2017, 184), describing the compilation in the Interior Ministry of a report to the Constitutional Court about the actions of multiple state institutions, discovers how “each institution produced their documents as the product of a task differentiated from the tasks of the others … then all the documents were combined,” producing an assemblage that created the illusion that a series of disconnected actions had taken place as a coordinated response, in what one of her informants called a “Fordist model of report production”. The report-writing by different consultants in the OACP was the inverse; each report suggested an individual effort, and was assembled with other documents to produce a donor report suggesting a coherent intervention. In fact, peace pedagogy was the strategy of a team, part-financed by IOM and part-financed by MSI.

This dynamic created tension in the government-donor relationship around the question of who was in charge, and whether the relationship was purely financial, or financial and technical. Erica from IOM told me the IOM wanted to avoid being seen as an operator, literally ‘operator’ – an entity which simply receives money from international donors and implements it for the government. “They want to be technical accompaniment”, she said, meaning they wanted input into how the OACP spent their money; they believed their expertise could contribute to the government’s strategies. However, the OACP tended to see international donors mainly as funding sources.

In the Pedagogy Group, this played out as a power struggle. The contractors would go to meetings with IOM or MSI when they handed in their products, receive verbal feedback from their contract handler, then return to the office and report back to Valentina, saying “The IOM says we cannot do X or Y”. They often expressed concern about whether they would be able to justify a task they were being assigned within the context of their terms of reference. MSI and
IOM sent representatives to accompany events they funded, and OACP officials often complained they felt under observation, as these representatives would sit in the back of the room and take notes. During the ‘narratives project’ (Chapter 5), the team worried their contracts might not get renewed, because their terms of reference were for delivering traditional peace pedagogy sessions (Chapter 4). Valentina reassured them, saying she would handle the donors. “We need to respond to our priorities as the government”, she said. “We can’t change our project parameters without speaking to the donors, but that doesn’t mean we can’t change them.” Sometimes, officials returned from meeting their contract handlers with the sensation of having been told off for not fulfilling their terms of reference. When this happened, Valentina became indignant, and said, “We can’t take orders from IOM/MSI, they can’t tell us, the government, what we can and can’t do,” and she would schedule a meeting with more senior representatives of the donor agency to straighten things out.

The donors insisted they were not simply giving money for the OACP to do what they liked with it, but that it was a partnership. Alicia, a Colombian advisor to IOM, told me this tension was an open secret. “Rarely is there a horizontal dialogue of mutual recognition, where the donor is seen as able to make a technical contribution”, she said. Instead, “The government says, listen, if you’re going to give me this money, please contract that person, do this thing, and so on … via demand”. She recognised that the OACP felt defensive when MSI and IOM sent their representatives to watch and evaluate their events: “they feel like scolded children”, she said. The problem, she thought, was that “they have not understood the donor as someone who can offer alternatives.” She took the image of ‘scolded children’ further:

[The donor] is like a parent who gives everything to the child, but never says to the child, no, you can’t have everything, because you’re messing things up, wait a moment. I’ve given you five cars and you’re asking me for twenty more, but what are you doing with the five you’ve already got? And the child asks for things ‘just because’, but doesn’t understand why it’s asking for those things. Obviously I’m being patronising, of course there are people in the government with incredible capacities.

While recognising her metaphor was ‘patronising’, Alicia’s idea of the international community-government relationship as comparable to a parent-child relationship suggests a mentality which construes the international community as superior. She was also critical of the donors, however, saying they gave money to the OACP, then washed their hands of responsibility. This was a crucial insight: despite entanglement, in the public eye, the donor’s involvement was rarely visible. Actions by the government were perceived only as the government’s
responsibility; the government had to ‘give face’ for any mistakes, yet the international donors were complexly implicated in the OACP’s actions. The next section shows how this implication affected the OACP’s ability to ‘face’ society.

Implication by Paperwork

The OACP’s ‘narratives project’ (Chapter 5) sought to build trust and co-create with pro-peace civil society, but this section reveals how the IOM’s paperwork undermined these objectives. The IOM agreed to fund the project, and offered two mechanisms by which they could deliver this funding: first, purchasing orders to finance materials for specific activities. The OACP officials had to liaise between project participants and the IOM, ‘giving face’ in both directions, and translate participants’ proposals for local cultural activities into the IOM’s administrative logic. Purchasing orders had to be detailed, down to paintbrush sizes and spray-paint brands, and the IOM repeatedly returned them to the OACP with queries and corrections. The OACP officials felt inadequately equipped to deal with this bureaucracy; they were not trained in administration, and had to learn on the job. This created long delays in a time-sensitive project, undermining the already fraught relationship.

The second mechanism were service-provision contracts to pay participants for their time and labour. For each person contracted, IOM required a paperwork package, including a project proposal and cost break-down. Each participant had to propose at least two ‘products’: a detailed work plan, and the final video, song, or artwork. Valentina sent an email to the team detailing the procedures:

Firstly, IOM must receive all the following documents from each contractor:
1. IOM-format CV – work experience listed must coincide with accompanying certificates
2. ID card copy
3. Police background check – no older than three months
4. Background check from the Public Prosecutor’s Office – no older than three months
5. Copy of Unique Tax Registration number (RUT) – no older than 2013
6. Payment as a self-employed user to social security system and/or letter committing to make the payment as soon as the contract is signed. (Example letter attached.)
7. Medical certificate with osteomuscular emphasis by specialist in occupational health/general health certifying good state of health
8. Work experience certificates
9. Academic certificates
10. Letter from bank indicating account number and type

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11. Complete the attached forms (print, sign and scan them) – these are obligatory and must come signed:
   a. Consultants
   b. Declaration of dependents
   c. Professional References Form
   d. Commitment to work insurance and social security

NB: if they do not have any ongoing contract with another public or private entity, supported by a work insurance company, at the time of starting this contract, they will automatically be affiliated with work insurance company SURA. These documents must be sent as a complete package.

Secondly, IOM want us to help them with the terms of reference of each contract, using the attached format.

Thirdly, we must sign a letter requesting each contract, stating the value of the contract, explaining the work that will be done and justifying the reason for contracting directly (example letter attached).

Once IOM receive the TOTALITY of the documents, their contracts unit takes 7 WORKING DAYS to emit the contract. Then, we can send billing statements for the first products as defined by the terms of reference. The billing statement must be original and be accompanied by the following documents (FORMS ATTACHED):

1. Billing statement or receipt – must be original. Must be dated the last day of the month being charged for, or any date of the following month
2. Activity report – this must be signed by us, as contract supervisors
3. Up-to-date RUT
4. Social security form
5. Payment authorisation form

Note: the first billing statement must also come with signed copy of contract attached.

Once all these are received, the payment will take approximately 10 working days. It's important we transmit this information to each of the possible contractors, so they have clarity about processes and internal time-frames.²⁴⁹

This email seemed overwhelming to me. It was, however, the standard paperwork ‘package’ which freelance contractors, for state institutions or other entities, are familiar with in Colombia. But, as Chapter 5 showed, while some participants in this project were accustomed to such procedures, others were not.

The IOM’s anxiety about maintaining an impeccable paper trail was compounded by scandals unfolding simultaneously over questionable use by other government institutions of international monies dedicated to implementation of the Peace Agreement (El Espectador 2018). The IOM

²⁴⁹ Field diary, April 2018.
insisted that before contracting any participants, a formal selection process had to be followed, requiring a public call for proposals, reception of three CVs and interviews, unless the donor embassy made an exception. While the logic behind this was to prevent corruption, it was absurd given that the proposals had been made by the civil society participants for their own activities within the project. It created the sense that the government was hiring people to carry out a government job, rather than the horizontal co-creation which the project envisaged. Valentina negotiated with the embassy in question, and the contracting process was fast-tracked, but these negotiations meant constant delays, which, as Chapter 5 showed, undermined the incipient trust between project participants and the OACP. This was compounded by the fact that the OACP had to sign off on the ‘products’ created by the participants – the song, a radio jingle – in a similar way that OACP bosses had to sign off on the reports of their staff to authorise their monthly salary.

Once the song and the local cultural activities were complete, the IOM failed to fulfil their promised time-frames for payment with the civil society contracts. Many participants had begun the work for free, without contracts, even lending seed funding, like renting a recording studio for the song production. Some contractors on the project were not paid until four months afterwards. This was different from the elite precarity of OACP officials: many participants were from vulnerable grassroots social movements in conflict-affected areas. Some had prior experience with international paperwork; Santiago, a singer, told me he had experienced previous difficulties with IOM bureaucracy and was therefore understanding. He was grateful to OACP official Andrea for mediating: “She explained to me, look, send this email, send that receipt, and so on. … I valued her patience putting up with the IOM’s requirements”. Other participants, however, blamed the government for these paperwork demands. With the constant delays, the OACP officials had to call participants and dar la cara. The responsibility for these delays lay within the entanglement between the IOM and the OACP, yet the onus was on the OACP to inform participants of each new disappointment. The IOM was thus inextricably implicated in the Colombian government’s reiterated letting down of civil society.

**Conditioning Participation: Excluding the FARC**

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250 Interview, 28 June 2018.
Normally, international implication in government actions was barely visible; a government official might acknowledge gratitude at the beginning of an internationally-funded event, and donor agency logos figured frequently on government ‘swag’ (Fig.14 p.185), but no more. However, the peace process created an exception: USAID did not fund anything where FARC ex-combatants would be present, because the FARC were still on the US terrorist list, and this evoked the spectre of ‘US imperialism’.

In late 2017, I was in a car on the way to Villavicencio with OACP officials Gerardo and David, who were going to run a regional workshop for the narratives project, when Valentina telephoned urgently from Bogotá. There was a problem with the list of invited participants: one, Roberto, was a FARC ex-combatant. By this point, the disarmament phase had ended. The EU had taken the FARC off its terrorist list; the US had been expected to follow suit. However, Donald Trump was now in office, and the global liberal interface which had been strong at the beginning of Santos’ presidency was changing rapidly. One of Trump’s foreign policy priorities was drug-trafficking. The US Ambassador to Colombia announced in a media interview that the reason for keeping the FARC on the list was that the FARC “had not fulfilled” their commitments in the Peace Accord, nor stopped drug-trafficking (El Tiempo 2017). This presented a major restriction to the ways USAID could implement money from ‘Peace Colombia’.

Gerardo and David were distraught. Roberto had demobilised eighteen years earlier, long before the Havana peace process, and did social work with youth ex-combatants in a poor neighbourhood in Villavicencio, which is why he had been proposed by another participant as a valuable addition to the project. But MSI’s policy was strict. Gerardo had to phone Roberto, un-inviting him, apologising profusely but explaining that while the government was fully committed to supporting reincorporation of the FARC, “some donors” (not specifying which) had restrictive policies while their governments processed the removal of the FARC from their lists of criminal organisations. After hanging up, Gerardo put his head in his hands and sighed, distressed. “I was in the Zones during disarmament”, he lamented. “I handed the FARC members their certificates, shook their hands, and said, ‘welcome to civil society’. And now, having to uninvite this guy, I feel so bad! It feels like hypocrisy.”

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251 See Krystalli (2019) on “peace swag” from state-sponsored events in Colombia.
252 See Chapter 6 on different DDR pathways.
But that was not the end of the story. At the beginning of the workshop, Diógenes, the participant who had invited Roberto, stood up and told the whole room that his friend had been un-invited. He said:

I won’t question the OACP, I know it’s out of their hands, it’s because USAID, the US government, has a policy to exclude demobilised subjects, and although they’re giving millions to the peace process, they put conditions on it. But an ex-combatant is a citizen, and this goes against the spirit of the Peace Agreement.

This undermined what was already a delicate encounter between the OACP team and sceptical civil society. David responded, saying “various donor agencies are in transition, and in all transitions, dilemmas occur, but I think we should take advantage of the limited time we have together and start working, is that OK?” But a woman raised her hand and said that after hearing Diógenes, she felt the OACP owed them an explanation, because peacebuilding could not happen if people were excluded. An MSI representative was sitting at the back of the room, observing, which meant David had to perform to her also, and avoid seeming to blame USAID. He explained there were donors who at that moment had practical restrictions, because removing FARC from terrorist lists was a political process that would take time, but he hoped that Roberto could be included in other events in the future. However, the afore-mentioned interview with the US ambassador had circulated widely in social media just weeks earlier, and Diógenes replied, “let’s call a spade a spade. It’s not ‘donors’, it’s US imperialism, the Americans don’t want to take the FARC off the terrorist list.” Eventually, David said, “Look, you guys have to understand that I’m David, I don’t have macropolitical influence! I’m with you guys, I empathise with what you’re saying, and I wish Roberto could have been here, but practically that was impossible”.

Among left-wing sectors, it was easy to drum up anti-American sentiments, using the narrative of ‘US imperialism’, given the history of US involvement in Colombia.253 ‘US imperialism’ consolidated as a common enemy among the participants, an external force undermining the spirit of peace. This made things somewhat easier for David and Gerardo to ‘give face’ to participants for this blunder, as the blame was displaced away from the government, but it did not go down well with the MSI representative, who reported this back to her office. This was

253 Gill (2016) describes consolidation of ‘anti-US imperialism’ narratives among left-wing and popular workers’ movements in the first half of the twentieth century, especially resonant in foreign-controlled export enclaves like Barrancabermeja.
later discussed in Bogotá between the respective bosses, though it was agreed that David had handled it as best he could.

Paradoxically, David and Gerardo, the government representatives having to ‘give face’ to Roberto on the phone and to workshop participants, were themselves contracted by MSI. They were at the periphery of the government, having to ‘interface’ and accept responsibility for these events, as the OACP, not as MSI. At the same time, the OACP’s institutional relationship with MSI meant they had to try to ‘save face’ for the US government, though they ultimately failed.

This situation was not uncommon during this period, as FARC members who disarmed and created their political party were increasingly included in the various events and projects occurring in the context of the peace process. A senior Colombian-national MSI official explained to me that under American law, no organisation categorised as terrorist could receive material or reputational benefits from American resources:

We’ve got a protocol that we discuss with the entities we work with. When we fund an activity, we evaluate the risk of FARC members being present. If it’s inevitable, we can’t fund it. If it’s avoidable, we take measures to avoid it. If it happens by accident, our lawyers can show that measures were taken, but that they got into the event anyway. There’s so much that needs doing in implementation that has nothing to do with the FARC anyway, and other institutions fund things with the FARC. And we are keen on promoting the idea that the Peace Agreement is for the people, not the FARC; we prefer to see it as an opportunity to emphasise that, not an obstacle.²⁵⁴

Nevertheless, this policy conditioned participation at US-funded activities, which affected the legitimacy of the Colombian government in ‘giving face’. A young Colombian-national USAID employee told me of a more dramatic example.²⁵⁵ A ministry organised a conference in Bogotá about point two of the Agreement, political participation, and she had to run the names of invited participants through various US databases doing background checks. First, it transpired that the FARC members of the CSIVI could not be invited, which was absurd, as the CSIVI was the mechanism for ongoing dialogue between the government and the FARC, and reviewed the draft laws for implementation prior to congressional debates. Second, one invited speaker was a prominent activist for left-wing party Marcha Patriótica, who had been part of Voces de Paz, a temporary mechanism created by the Peace Agreement to monitor congressional debates

²⁵⁴ Interview, 5 March 2018.
²⁵⁵ Personal communication, June 2019.
about the laws for implementation while the FARC were undergoing disarmament, giving the FARC a voice (but no vote) in Congress until their party was established. He worked extensively with the FARC Party but had never been a member of the guerrilla nor the Party. USAID determined he should be un-invited, due to his affiliations with the FARC. After un-inviting him, the background checks revealed he had no criminal antecedents, and the organisers repented, and tried to re-invite him, but he was, understandably, offended by what had happened and refused. The event took place without him, and without any member of the FARC present.

In this way, US foreign policy conditioned participation at government events. Excluding the FARC did not only undermine trust with ex-combatants and their direct allies, but also reinforced perceptions among civil society that the US was ‘interfering’ in Colombian affairs, undermining the government’s face of peace.

Conclusions

These international cooperation programs channelled the financial pledges made by global players along the international interface to support implementation of the Peace Agreement. Despite the stated objectives to ‘strengthen’ state institutions for peace, the way these finances flowed through Colombian state institutions, and the restrictions on how these funds were used, contributed to elite precarity inside the government, and undermined attempts to build trust with sceptical civil society, especially notable in the OACP’s public-facing peace pedagogy work. This is not to diminish the OACP’s own responsibility, nor suggest they are innocent victims of ‘bad’ donor agencies. Nevertheless, this chapter has revealed how the government’s face is constituted through an entanglement of people, institutions and policies.

Analysing this entanglement reveals a government periphery where clear-cut lines between government and donor, Colombian and foreign, dissolve. Staff on both sides of this periphery are enmeshed in Colombian culture. Most senior embassy staff are foreign nationals but employ Colombians for administrative work; USAID and IOM largely comprise Colombian employees. Ferguson and Gupta (1992), deconstructing the notion of bounded cultures, argue that the identities of places emerge through interactions in a system of hierarchically-organised spaces. Coronil posits the concept of ‘occidentalist’ as the “dark side” of Said’s ‘orientalism’ (Said 1978), referring to the representational practices which separate the world into bounded, disaggregated units, turn difference into hierarchy, and reproduce existing asymmetrical power.
relations (Coronil 1996, 57). The OACP and their international donors shape each other, constituting and reinforcing hierarchical relationships between Colombia and funding countries in the global North, troubling normative assumptions about sovereignty (Hansen and Stepputat 2006), yet also destabilising the idea of a discrete ‘international community’, most of whose personnel are local.

This chapter completes Part II’s ethnography of peace pedagogy, and invites us to re-examine any assumptions we may have left about the bounded agency of the Santos government administration after reading the previous six chapters. Aspects of blame or failure which affected the troubled peace process include Santos’ decision to hold a referendum (Chapter 1), the OACP’s rationality drive (Chapter 2), the anti-politics of cultural liberalism (Chapter 3), the OACP’s defensive attachment to legitimation by explanation (Chapter 4), their lack of state-consciousness (Chapter 5), and the failure to prepare the disarmament zones for the FARC’s arrival (Chapter 6). However, the international community is implicated in the Colombian government’s complexly-distributed responsibility for these things; and I argue that the Colombian government itself is internationally co-produced. In particular, the Santos government’s culturally liberal belief in the rationality-emotions binary is internationally co-produced; it is part of the global liberal framework. Thus, the OACP’s efforts to engage with people’s emotions get stuck in the international machine of administrative processes, in which emotions have no place.

Behind these international donors are other governments in other countries, each a dynamic ecosystem in its own right, whose actions are also complexly entangled across time and space. Rothberg (2019, 19) recalls that those of us who pay taxes are all “implicated in the actions of our government, whatever our ideological opposition to or affective disengagement from particular policies”. All Colombian taxpayers are implicated in the actions of their government; all British taxpayers are implicated in the actions of their government, which has given funding to the Colombian government for peace. I do not suggest these implications are equal, but we are complexly situated in relation to the actions of foreign governments. Additionally, our implication transcends bilateral relationships between states; we, foreign citizens, are implicated in Colombia. Oil, Coca-Cola, bananas, coffee, cocaine, liberalism, neoliberalism, military aid, anti-communism, human rights, solidarity, academics researching the peace process: these are all relationships; this is a trans-local story.
While this chapter has critiqued international entanglement with the Colombian government, the Santos government’s strategy to ‘internationalise’ the peace process did result in commitment from various global actors to support implementation of the Peace Agreement, including through financial aid to state institutions. The UN, foreign governments, and various transnational NGOs have since employed diverse strategies, within their own limitations, to apply pressure on the Duque administration to keep implementing the Peace Agreement. The implication of the international community in the Duque government’s face, however, would be the subject of another thesis.
CONCLUSION

At a meeting in Bogotá between the OACP and sceptical pro-peace civil society participants in the ‘new narratives’ project (Chapter 5), one participant, during a discussion about whether to make a strategic government-society alliance for peace, said, “We are all the state; I am also the state”. His statement aimed to convince other participants to take advantage of the opportunity to work together, government and society, despite generic distrust toward the state. It conjured an idea of ‘the state’ as the public sphere or public good, co-created by all citizens – the classic liberal ideal of the ‘social contract’ – and invited others to be co-responsible for it. Yet we are not ‘all the state’. In this encounter, ‘the state’ existed as the ultimate ‘other’ against which participants defined themselves as not state, not co-responsible for its actions; hence their reluctance to accept the invitation to work with the OACP on a shared tactical objective, despite reiterated calls from similar social sectors for the government to work with civil society to protect the peace process from the Democratic Centre Party’s attacks.

His statement, however, recalls a central argument of this thesis: the government, and the state as a whole, cannot be conceived of without considering how it ‘faces’ society through state officials at the ‘interface’. This echoes existing anthropological debates on how the state-society boundary is culturally produced through state-society encounters. However, this thesis also extends such debates in two ways: first, by revealing how the OACP officials are culturally situated. Rather than ‘we are all the state’, we are, in fact, ‘all society’. By dwelling on OACP officials’ ‘faciality’, I have troubled the assumption of Taussig’s Zapatistas (1999, 239), the Peace Community of San José de Apartadó (Burnyeat 2017), and even many anthropologists, of state officials as ‘faceless’, decontextualised from the society which has produced them. When authorised spokespersons such as OACP officials ‘give face’ to society, it matters who is speaking. The messenger matters as much as the message. However, although I have critiqued the elite positioning of the Santos government’s messengers, I avoid the trite argument that elite messengers are bad, and out of touch with ordinary people, because reception of messengers is politically and culturally situated.

The ‘face of the government’ comes into being via an assemblage of elements, which include the ‘faciality’ of the individual official charged with representing the government in a given context. How people interpret this representation depends on their perception of four
overlapping elements: their trans-historical state-idea, their perception of a specific government administration, their perception of the institution for which the official is speaking, and their perception of the individual in front of them. As Butler argues (2004, 142-3), the face can humanise or dehumanise the other, depending on contextual framing. An audience’s physical encounter with the face of the government can render the government face-less, as for Taussig’s Zapatistas; or they can identify the official as human, as when people disaggregated individual OACP officials working for peace who they perceived as ‘good’ from the rest of the state which they perceived as ‘bad’.

Second, I have shown how the state-society relationship is fundamentally political, contra the classic liberal ideal of equally-weighted co-responsibility conveyed by the notion of the ‘public good’ contained in the statement, ‘we are all the state’ (c.f. Bear and Mathur 2015). By focussing specifically on government administrations as entities within the wider bureaucratic realm of the state, themselves dynamic ecosystems comprising multiple people and institutions, which change hands and ‘faces’ every electoral cycle, I have foregrounded this political relationship. The government exists through the relationship between ruler and ruled, which depends on public opinion and perception. The OACP officials, as representatives of the Santos administration, exist dialectically with Colombian society, while also being part of that society as individuals. Rather than ‘we are all the state’, it would be more correct to say from the society perspective, ‘we are co-responsible for the state that we have, insofar as we elect our government officials and thereby shape their mandate, and they exercise power over the wider state structure’; and, from the perspective of government officials, ‘we need society to support our actions, electorally or otherwise, to maintain legitimacy in the face of our opponents’. State and society depend on each other, but they can never have equal responsibility toward a public good such as peace, because their relationship is never not political, both because the agonistic struggles of national politics are ever-present in the government’s face, and because the state-society relationship is itself one of agonistic (sometimes violent) actual and potential contestation.

This thesis set out asking the question, what does it mean for governments to ‘face’ society? Three interrelated empirical questions guided my research: how did the Santos government communicate the peace process to Colombian society via peace pedagogy? What kinds of government-society relations did this communication reveal? And what role did these relations play in fate of the peace process? To answer these questions, it focussed on the experience of
OACP officials at the ‘interface’ with society, analysing the culturally-constituted logics behind their peace pedagogy, exploring the impact of these logics on pedagogy audiences, and extrapolating the wider political effect of the Santos government’s face, as exemplified through peace pedagogy, on the peace process.

To recap my argument, Chapter 1 situated peace pedagogy within the wider macro-politics of the eight years of the Santos administration, for which peace was its central policy. It suggested that peace pedagogy offered insight into how insufficient attention to government-society relations led to the loss of the 2016 Peace Referendum and the subsequent 2018 election of Iván Duque on a platform of opposing the Peace Agreement. It argued that governments ‘face’ society according to the historical context in which they exist, and that their relationships to their political opposition (the Democratic Centre), and, in a peace process, their negotiation counterpart (the FARC) are necessarily refracted through this ‘face’. Chapter 2 documented how peace pedagogy emerged and evolved, in response both to the Democratic Centre’s disinformation campaign, and to demands from Colombian society for information about what was being negotiated, but that it was deprioritised vis-à-vis the negotiations themselves. It argued that peace pedagogy was a mode of ‘giving face’ characterised by a ‘rationality drive’ wherein government communication about the peace process sought to be technical, not political, and counter the Democratic Centre’s ‘myths’ about the peace process with ‘realities’.

Chapter 3 situated the Santos government administration officials as educated, internationally-minded, bogotano elites within Colombian society, making the Santos government’s ‘face’ culturally liberal, characterised by an aversion to politics – an anti-politics – in contradistinction to the perceived internal ‘other’ of populist politics, Álvaro Uribe, whom officials saw as backward, provincial, and authoritarian. Chapter 4 depicted a typical peace pedagogy session, showing how the government’s ‘face’ emerged through the OACP’s pedagogy script and the staging of the pedagogy encounter, which sought to legitimate both the peace process and the government itself through rational explanations. The session aimed to inform people, partly to defend the government against the Democratic Centre’s delegitimation campaign, partly to convince the audience that they, civil society, had to learn about the Peace Agreement in order to force the next government to fulfil it, whichever candidate won the 2018 elections.

Chapter 5 documented the year-long ‘narratives project’, which sought to make a strategic alliance between government and pro-peace civil society to co-create new pro-peace narratives,
and correct what the OACP officials believed was the fundamental error of peace pedagogy: being ‘too technical’ and ‘not emotional enough’. The project implicitly sought to prevent election in 2018 of an ‘anti-peace’ president, but failed to complete in time because of multiple obstacles. These were beyond the OACP’s team’s control, but officials had to ‘give face’ and assume responsibility, which they found distressing because it was inconsistent with the ‘virtuous state’ (Dávila 2017) they desired to enact. It argued that the officials’ cultural liberalism made them insufficiently ‘state-conscious’, aware of how they would be perceived as the state in the state-society encounter, because they saw peace as a ‘public good’ and ‘not political’.

Chapter 6 moved from Bogotá Pedagogy officials to the local OACP liaison officers charged with overseeing the FARC’s disarmament Zones, and proposed the concept of ‘rendering political’ as a situated form of awareness about the political consequences of every action by the state, in contrast to the insufficient state-consciousness of the Bogotá liberal elites. It suggested that the liaison officers communicated the peace process in a more emotional way because of their relationship-building with the FARC and other actors in and around the Zones, and argued that liaising, a mode of ‘giving face’ that was fundamentally relational, was a form of affective labour. Finally, Chapter 7 turned to the entanglement between the Colombian government and the international community, and documented ethnographically how this entanglement shaped the Santos government’s face of peace. It argued that international funding fragmented the government by perpetuating the neoliberal reliance on contractors, creating a ‘periphery’ wherein OACP peace pedagogues ‘gave face’ as the government but were actually employed by international agencies, and had to answer both to their OACP boss and their contract handler. It also showed that despite intended objectives of supporting the government’s peace policy, international donors ended up undermining the government’s credibility through contradictory paperwork and by conditioning participation in spaces they funded. OACP officials had to ‘give face’ and take responsibility for perceived failures as the government, but government responsibility was, in fact, complexly distributed and internationally co-produced.

Overall, this thesis has argued that ‘giving face’ as the government has two key dimensions: authentic physical presence, and the assumption of government responsibility before society. These are the same two dimensions envisioned by Levinas’ (1979, 1985, 1999) conception of the face. Levinas sees the encounter with the face as revealing the absolute human vulnerability and mysterious unknowability of the other, as awakening in the viewer an ethical responsibility
to that other *qua* other. In extrapolating, from the emic category of *dar la cara*, the related concept of the ‘face of government’ I do not wish to suggest that when the OACP Pedagogy officials appeared before audiences, these audiences were interpellated in the Levinasean sense as ethically responsible for the government official. Rather, that facing society *as* the government in face-to-face encounters required OACP officials to assume momentarily as their own that trans-historical, complexly-situated government responsibility, and led them to believe that the government needed to ‘give’ genuine presence to society, to go some way toward making up for its historical failings and countering the widespread distrust.

In documenting government officials’ faciality (Deleuze and Guattari 1987), culturally-constituted political logics, and experiences of interacting with society, this thesis has itself sought to ‘give face’ to the abstract entity we think of as ‘the government’. We – ordinary people and anthropologists – often see governments as opaque, inhuman, even bad. In contexts like Colombia, where successive administrations have contributed to protracted direct and structural violence, we frequently see them as evil. Butler (2004, 144-5), building on Levinas, signals the potential for representations of the face to humanise, in the sense of rendering a person human, while simultaneously conveying the impossibility of representing the human, because of Levinas’ insistence on the mysterious unknowability of the other. By giving them ‘faces’ through ethnographic representation, I am showing the OACP officials – and, by extension, the whole of the Santos administration – as human, and therefore vulnerable, imperfect, and product of their own culture.

**Implications for the Study of Liberalism**

The global hegemony of what Mazzarella (2019) calls the ‘liberal settlement’ is declining, although it has not ended, and has always had historical mood swings (Fawcett 2014). Many scholars question whether it was ever truly hegemonic in the first place, or whether its world dominance was simply a product of the fact that it was used by those in power – especially governments – to rule their countries and order the world. Political scientist Patrick Deneen (2018, 3) argues that liberalism has failed, “not because it fell short, but because it was true to itself. It has failed because it has succeeded”. As liberalism consolidated, he says, its inner contradictions became more evident, and instead of fostering equity, protecting human dignity, defending cultural plurality, and expanding liberty, it has generated inequality, enforced homogeneity, fostered material and spiritual degradation, and undermined freedom. Today, in
global North countries once believed the pinnacle of liberalism, such as Britain and the US, there is declining trust in government, deep cynicism towards politics, elections are perceived as rigged, and there is a growing gap between the 1% and the 99%. “Nearly every one of the promises that were made by the architects and creators of liberalism has been shattered”, writes Deneen (2018, 2).

Liberalism was the first of the modern world’s three competitor political ideologies, and with the end of the Soviet Union in 1989, was famously declared by Fukuyama (1989) to have triumphed over socialism and fascism, signifying the “end of history”. The advent of liberalism in the Enlightenment marked the supposed “liberation of humanity from darkness” (Deneen 2018, 27): the overcoming of arbitrary inequalities, the end of aristocracy, and the dawn of a new age of progress and modernity. Liberalism’s foundational thinkers aimed to disassemble what they saw as irrational religious and social norms, and foster an “individualistic rationality that could replace long-standing social norms and customs as guides for action”, with “potential deviations from rationality … corrected by the legal prohibitions and sanctions of a centralized political state” (Deneen 2018, 26). This fantasy of rationality has masked liberalism’s ideological nature. It has become imperceptible as a political ideology because it “pretends to neutrality … denying any intention of shaping the souls under its rule”, but today, it is becoming increasingly visible, “precisely because its deformations are becoming too obvious to ignore” (Deneen 2018, 4-5).

When people vote for politicians from whose policies they stand to lose most, liberals construe this as civic ignorance, and call either to restrict democracy or, more commonly, for increased civic education. The idea that people need to be educated to vote better and be better citizens – the ‘meliorism’ Gray (2003) identifies as a liberal tenet - is central to the idea of government peace pedagogy. However, Deneen (2018, 161-2) rejects the idea of fixing liberalism with more liberalism, because, “The persistent absence of civic literacy, voting, and public spiritedness is not an accidental ill that liberalism can cure; it is the outcome of liberalism’s unparalleled success” (161-2). In fact, Deneen (2018, 149-53) argues that it is through education that a new aristocracy is emerging, which he calls the “liberalocracy”, amongst whom a concern for social justice is encouraged from a young age, often in the very educational institutions responsible for their elevation into the elite, thereby educating them in a

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256 Finland is taking this to new levels, by teaching primary school children about the dangers of ‘fake news’, and giving them lessons in distinguishing between ‘fact’ and ‘fiction’ by fact-checking and critical thinking (Henley 2020).
“deep self-deception” that they are not a new aristocratic order. “Liberalocrats” deeply lament the social stratification of society, even as they contribute to its perpetuation (Deneen 2018, 134). There are obvious echoes here with the OACP government officials – and with Western academe.

The anthropology of liberalism is still a relatively emergent field: according to Ansell (2019), liberalism became an object of anthropological study in the wake of Foucault’s theories of governmentality and the expansion of neoliberal economic policies, which made more evident the contradiction between the inequalities of an increasingly globalised world and the continued hegemony of liberalism’s premises of rationality and progress. Anthropological critiques of neoliberal governmentality (Rose 1993, Ferguson 1994, Li 2007) paved the way for anthropological attention to liberalism itself. While Latin America is frequently studied through the lens of neoliberalism as a tool of governance, especially economic (e.g. Abelin 2012, Gill 2016), this ethnography shows the relevance of looking at the continent through the lens of liberalism, because, as demonstrated in the Colombian case, liberalism shapes the rationales and actions of many political elites in government and therefore continues to impact society. The ideological nature of their liberalism is frequently not construed as political, but disguised as neutral ‘common sense’, and is embedded in and reproduced through culture – what I have called ‘cultural liberalism’. It is this cultural liberalism, I argue, in particular its repudiation of agonistic politics and its conflation of emotions with political demagoguery, that prevented the Santos government officials from engaging with people’s emotions, even when they tried to do so, leading ultimately to the enduring legitimacy deficit of the peace process.

Ethnographic documentation of how liberal concepts manifest in multiple everyday spheres reveal “a belief in a transcendental rational subject whose freedom is linked to an individual will to act autonomously” (Schiller 2015, 12), with key emphases in anthropological literature on liberalism including discourses of individual autonomy (Mahmood 2005) and multiculturalism (Povinelli 2002). As Mahmood (2007, 149-50) writes, liberalism was introduced into non-Western societies through coloniality and globalisation, becoming an intrinsic part of these societies, with many of liberalism’s precepts “now constitutive of the modern postcolonial imaginary”. If cultural liberalism involves the intertwinement of cultural values and political ideology, how does it differ in other contexts? In Colombia, where violent political sectarianism has such extensive history, the role of ‘anti-politics’ is especially prominent, but what about elsewhere in Latin America? And how different is cultural liberalism in post-colonial societies,
compared to the global North? Such questions invite future research toward an anthropology of cultural liberalism.

While many anthropological studies touch on the liberal belief in universal rationality, this thesis has pinpointed more forcefully the attachment to the imagined binary rationality-emotions among liberal government officials in Colombia, and analysed how it impacts their actions as powerful elites acting on wider society. How we make conceptual divisions matters. The rationality-emotions binary is reproduced in the many other binaries signalled in this ethnography from the Colombian context and which echo further afield: technocracy-populism, urban-rural, white-brown, modern-primitive, and so forth, yet these binaries are increasingly showing themselves as precarious.

The precarity of the liberal fantasy of rationality is increasingly evident in liberal anxieties in reaction to what has been called ‘post-truth politics’, particularly prevalent in Britain after the Brexit Referendum and in the US after the election of Donald Trump – both in 2016, the year of the Colombian Peace Referendum. This ethnography of government officials from the global South holds up a mirror to the crisis of liberalism in the global North. ‘How can we explain the Peace Agreement to Colombian society in such a way as to make them realise that it’s good for them?’ Or, ‘How can we explain to Colombian society that voting against the Peace Agreement, and voting for a president who promises to do away with it, is against their best interests?’ Are not these questions, posed by government officials in the Santos administration, the same questions, albeit in radically different contexts, that we are asking ourselves in the UK, vis-à-vis Brexit, climate denial, and fake news? And, as anyone who has tried to explain the supposed common sense of remaining in the EU to a ‘leaver’ will know, we cannot explain these things to people, because human beings are not rational animals. Some critics blame the ‘post-truth’ era on post-modernism, for robbing us of the language with which to assert ‘truth’ over ‘lies’, by deconstructing any notion of universality and taking all perspectives as relative and socially constructed (Cadwalladr 2017). Others disagree (Chen 2017), and in any case there are plenty of liberals who eschew vehemently the post-modern paradigm, and believe there is such a thing as ‘truth’. Rather than the issue of whether or not truth can be said to exist, I believe the issue is the way liberalism construes rationality. The very endeavour of explaining in such contexts, as if our viewpoints were predicated on neutral truths, is to fail to recognise that our political ideology is embedded in our cultural ways of interpreting the world.
Human beings do not form opinions and take decisions based on rationality, but for a plethora of reasons shaped by passions, thoughts, feelings and culture, all multiple and frequently contradictory. Western scientific discourses have for millennia construed emotions as a kind of brute reflex, which we have to overcome and learn to dominate using rational deliberation, and that this is what distinguishes us from other animals. However, this view is increasingly rejected by scientific studies, wherein neuroscience, psychology and related disciplines are converging with anthropology (e.g. Ahmed 2004) by positing theories of culturally and socially constructed emotions (Feldman Barrett 2017). At the level of brain activity, humans are not rational actors, we cannot overcome emotion through cognitive processes; no decision or action is free of affective force (Feldman Barrett 2017, 81-2). Culture literally wires our brains, altering our neural pathways (Feldman Barrett 2017, 153), and today, the internet is reprogramming our minds in unprecedented ways, making us desire information in “short, disjointed, often overlapping bursts—the faster, the better” (Carr 2011, 10). The hubris of liberalism has been to conflate cognition – a biological process which always operates simultaneously and interactively with emotion in human sense-making and decision-taking (Feldman Barrett 2017, 222-23) – with rationality, a culturally-constituted rationale whereby human thought and action is determined to be right or wrong, good or bad, ‘emotional’ or ‘reasonable’, according to internal logics sedimented over time and space.

So, in Tolstoy’s (1991 [1886]) words, what then must we do? As Mazzarella says, “any relationship—personal and/or political—has to be affective in order to be effective” (2017, 141). Mouffe’s (2018) call for a “left populism” recognises that recent right-wing populists have been more skilled at this, but neglects the role of culture in long-term habits and transformations. Trying to adopt the tools of those we conceive of as the enemy while maintaining our liberal superiority complex is insufficient. We need to recognise the embeddedness of liberalism in our cultural ways of thinking. As Schiller says (2015, 12), while furthering the anthropology of liberalism we must also consider the liberalism of anthropology, which, like all social sciences disciplines, “is both a creation and critic of liberalism in its different historical iterations”. Many of us are culturally liberal too, and frequently blind to how much this political ideology, in particular its attachment to the rationality-emotions binary, shapes our thinking, even as we criticise liberalism’s failures.

Contemporary liberals such as Nussbaum (2015) propose to correct the inattention to emotions in liberalism, which has (as the Colombian case confirms) associated the work of emotion-
shaping to illiberal forces, “making people think of liberal values as tepid and boring” (Nussbaum 2015, 2). She proposes the state should cultivate “appropriate” political emotions such as love and compassion among citizens, emotions which support the nation’s progress toward its goals of equality and fundamental justice, and discourage “inappropriate” emotions such as hatred, discrimination and disgust toward others, using education and performances of political culture. While I agree with Nussbaum’s argument (2015, 15) that if liberalism remains focussed on cultivating calm principles, instead of passionate emotions, then no genuine political change can occur, this proposal fails to account for the emotional regime produced by liberalism itself. While the idea of the state prescribing any emotional cultivation grates on the liberal ideals of freedom and autonomy (Nussbaum 2015, 4-6), liberalism does engender emotions, as Fawcett (2014) recognises, one of which is clearly the anxiety around the attachment to the idea of rationality. As novelist Ian McEwan wrote in an impassioned lament in The Guardian on 1 February 2020, the day after Britain left the European Union, “We have witnessed reasoned argument’s fall from grace” (McEwan 2020). Uncovering the full spectrum of liberal emotions would be another worthwhile future research agenda in an anthropology of cultural liberalism, as would interrogating further the role of the state in the production of the liberal emotional regime.

However, I am more inclined to follow Deneen (2018, 18-20), who rejects the idea that the ailments of contemporary liberalism can be fixed simply by doing liberalism better, and calls for us to abandon liberalism altogether. Yet, rather than just criticising liberalism (often, I would add, from the comfortable position of Western academia), Deneen argues that we should keep in view some of its main commitments and aspirations, particularly for justice, human dignity and political liberty, longer-standing Western ideals that paved the way for liberal thought. “Building on liberalism’s successes means recognizing both the legitimacy of its initial appeal and the deeper reasons for its failure”, he writes (2018, 187). Deneen does not believe this could be achieved through a revolution that replaced liberalism with a new (or old) ideology, but rather through local practices of resistance that foster new forms of culture and polis. Rather than fighting back through the agonism encapsulated by Mouffe’s call for a left populism, this idea is closer to Spencer’s (2007, 177) concept of “counter-politics”; those activities which consciously seek to “defuse the effects of the political”, in contrast to the “anti-politics” that I have argued is central to cultural liberalism, which fails to recognise the politics of its own ideology. Could counter-political strategies, like the ‘culture of dialogue’ nurtured by Rodeemos el Diálogo, be used to engage emotions in the age of the internet, create new habits and transform cultures, and move us towards a post-liberal era? We, cultural liberals who may criticise or reject
liberalism, have not yet found ways of communicating ‘peace’, and cognate proposals for socio-cultural change that seek eradication of direct and structural violence, in meaningful ways that do not implicate us in the perpetuation of liberalism’s failures. The dawn of ‘post-truth politics’ has made this lack more evident, but it was always-already there.

As Appel (2019, 281-2) argues, one thing is on the page, where we can imagine and advocate for the end of liberalism, and the multiple violences and historical injustices in which it is implicated. Off the page, such imaginings meet limits. In Equatorial Guinea, Appel acknowledges it would be absurd not to recognise that a liberal government, an end to dictatorship and impunity, and respect for human rights, would be better than the current regime; yet she holds it is possible to commit ourselves warily to pragmatic liberal reforms while also remaining committed to radical projects that are antiracist, antipatriarchal, anticapitalist and antiliberal. Liberalism is not over. A peace process is a good example of the kind of objective that needs us to engage pragmatically with liberalism – even while imagining more radical ends. After all, it is difficult for political alternatives to emerge, if those who champion them keep being murdered.

The Future of Peace in Colombia

At times while writing this thesis, I have felt like I was writing a chronicle of many deaths foretold, to modify the title of Gabriel García Márquez’ 1983 novel (García Márquez 1996). While my fieldwork ended with the handover of the government to Iván Duque, news from Colombia followed me to London. I received constant updates from my social media feeds, and I woke up each morning to new messages in pro-peace WhatsApp groups about the latest killings of social leaders and demobilised FARC ex-combatants. In the UK chapter of Rodeemos el Diálogo, we discussed the unfolding situation in seminars and public dialogues with the urgency of the present. I began to realise that I was writing one piece of the anthrohistorical puzzle (Coronil 2019b) that could help us understand how we got here.

The Duque administration won the 2018 presidential elections on a platform that promised to do away with the Santos-FARC Peace Agreement, or at least modify it substantially. This gave him a mandate to undermine the peace process, recalling ‘mandate’ as defined in Chapter 1 as a kind of leverage conferred by elections which the government uses to mobilise wider state structures. It also increased the “legitimacy deficit” (IFIT 2018, 24) of the Peace Agreement.
Those who had created the polarisation around the peace process were now in government. As hate crime spiked in the UK after the Brexit Referendum, so Duque’s victory strengthened the climate created by the Peace Referendum, legitimating people’s hatred against various ‘others’, justifying the killings of social leaders and ex-combatants, which the government failed to condemn publicly. The UN Verification Mission’s December 2019 report to the Security Council documented 173 total killings of FARC ex-combatants since the Peace Agreement, including by members of the army, and 303 killings of social leaders and human rights defenders (UNSC 2019c). However, while Duque tried to undermine the Peace Agreement from the executive branch, his efforts have thus far been partially held in check by the legislative and judicial branches, pro-peace sectors of Colombian society, and the liberal international community, though as Chapter 7 noted, the geopolitical winds have shifted. Implementation of the Peace Agreement continues, though with many challenges, as this final section sketches.

Duque took power on 7 August 2018. Most of the officials I worked with left the OACP shortly after. Many have gone on to defend the spirit and the letter of the Peace Agreement, and the long-term cultural change they believe it will deliver, from other state and non-state institutions. Several members of the Pedagogy Group are now working in the Truth Commission, alongside its President, Father Francisco de Roux, a long-term human rights and peace activist. The concept of ‘territorial peace’ central to the Peace Agreement has been preserved in the Truth Commission, via a regionally-deployed methodology with 27 ‘Truth Houses’ across Colombia, and several hubs worldwide working with exiled Colombians. Juan Manuel Santos retired from politics, and Sergio Jaramillo resigned his ambassadorship and remained in Brussels, though both continue to speak out publicly in support of the peace process. Many of Jaramillo’s advisors continue to fight for the Peace Agreement. Despite never having participated in politics before, Juanita Goebertus, technical advisor to Jaramillo on transitional justice, was elected as congresswoman for Bogotá to the House of Representatives in March 2018 for the Green Alliance, and participates in a multi-party platform to defend implementation against legal initiatives by the Duque government that undermine the Peace Agreement.

Duque’s ‘face’ vis-à-vis the peace process has been ambiguous; some might say, two-faced. On taking office, he appointed his key officials responsible for overseeing implementation: Miguel Ceballos as High Commissioner for Peace, and Emilio José Archila as High Counsellor for Post-Conflict, rebranded as the Presidential Counsellor for Stabilisation and Consolidation. They, together with Interior Minister Nancy Gutiérrez, were designated to represent the
government in the bilateral bodies charged with promoting implementation of the Peace Agreement: the CSIVI, the National Commission on Security Guarantees, and the National Council on Reincorporation. Duque supported the extension of the UN Verification Mission in Colombia (UNSC 2018), and on diplomatic visits, repeatedly promised the international community he would fully implement the Peace Agreement. On 17 December 2018, Duque launched his plan ‘Peace with Legality’, led by Archila, which seeks to coordinate implementation efforts across different institutions.

In March 2019, however, Duque announced objections to the statutory law governing the JEP, which had been approved by Congress and the Constitutional Court, and proposed to modify the law, an unprecedented act for a president. This caused outrage. Jaramillo gave his first interview from Brussels since Duque took office, saying Duque had “removed his mask” with this act, and showed his true intention to bury the peace process (Molano Jimeno 2019). The UN, several foreign governments, the Kroc Institute, and multiple civil society groups inside and outside Colombia urged for this to be resolved so that the JEP, which had already started work, could function with legal guarantees (UNSC 2019a). The matter was eventually resolved by Congress and the Constitutional Court in May, overruling Duque’s objections, and the law was enacted on 6 June.

Implementation of the Peace Agreement by Duque’s government has continued with this doubled-faced ambiguity: making promises to the international community on one hand, while making slow and lacklustre progress in Colombia. Nevertheless, it has continued. In its April 2019 report, the Kroc Institute, which tracks implementation of 578 stipulations contained in the Peace Agreement, documented only 23% of the Agreement completely implemented, and 30% completely uninitiated (Kroc 2019). On point one, rural reform, the PDETs are being implemented in 16 conflict-affected areas, and over 220,000 local people participated in their design, although the redistributive aspirations of the Peace Agreement have largely been abandoned (García 2018). Drug-trafficking continues to fuel violence. The PNIS, established by point four, has led to some voluntary eradication of illicit crops, with 95% of the 99,097 families registered in the programme complying, but not all have received their full subsidies, and without serious implementation of point one, they will struggle to remain within legal economies (Kroc 2019).

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257 E.g. at the 2018 Paris Peace Forum (Notiamerica 2018).
In point five, transitional justice, the operation of the Truth Commission, the JEP, and the Unit for the Search for Persons deemed missing continues. Despite drastic budget cuts by the government to these mechanisms (*Caracol Radio* 2018), the Truth Commission has been hearing testimonies, receiving documents, and organising local encounters for truth and reconciliation; the Unit has received information on 1000 cases so far to search for bodily remains; and the JEP has prioritised seven macro-cases which have begun hearings, including the case against the FARC for kidnapping, and the case against the army for extrajudicial executions (UNSC 2019b).

Point three on reincorporation of FARC ex-combatants remains a challenge. 70% now live outside the ETCRs (Chapter 6) and face challenges in terms of access to basic services and security. As of December, only 1530 ex-combatants had received funding for collective productive projects (including agriculture, ecotourism, artisanal coffee and beer production), most of which are being carried out on rented land, which the UN signals as a factor of potential unsustainability, urging the government to purchase the land (UNSC 2019c). A reconfiguration of non-state armed groups compete over the power vacuums left by the FARC and the drug trade (INDEPAZ 2018), including the ELN, the remaining guerrilla group, with which Duque, in January 2019, terminated the negotiations started by Santos (Burnyeat and Gómez-Suárez 2020). While the FARC Party occupied their seats in Congress and ran in the local elections of October 2019, with 12 candidates—including three mayors—elected to office, stigmatisation and violence against them prevail (UNSC 2019c). One of FARC’s Congressmen, former negotiator Seuxis Hernández Solarte, alias ‘Jesús Santrich’, was arrested in April 2018 for alleged drug-trafficking after the Peace Agreement, following an extradition order from Interpol. After a year’s imprisonment he was released as no evidence about the date of this drug-trafficking was supplied, but in the face of insufficient legal and security guarantees, Santrich and some 20 other ex-combatants, including chief FARC negotiator Iván Márquez, announced their return to arms in August 2019, accusing the Duque administration of betraying the Peace Agreement (UNSC 2019b). The FARC Party faces many challenges, including divisions within the party, and between the leadership in Bogotá and the ex-combatants struggling to make ends meet around Colombia (*Semana* 2020).

The unstable situation in Venezuela compounds this delicate security situation: Duque supports the leadership of Juan Guaidó, as one of the Democratic Centre’s strongest narratives from its
inception as a party was that left-wing politicians, such as the FARC Party or Gustavo Petro and his platform Colombia Humana, would turn Colombia into “the next Venezuela” (Gómez-Suárez 2016). Millions have fled Venezuela, creating a major humanitarian crisis, but Maduro’s regime persists, and the ELN and the FARC dissidents led by Iván Márquez operate across this porous border with Maduro’s acquiescence (FIP 2020).

Duque’s mandate to undermine the Peace Agreement has been weakened by Colombian society since taking office. The Democratic Centre lost seats in the October 2019 elections, including in the country’s two biggest majoralties – Bogotá, which elected Claudia López, the country’s first ever lesbian mayor, and Medellín, Álvaro Uribe’s stronghold (Semana 2019b). In November 2019 a national strike began, following similar large-scale mobilisations in Chile, Bolivia and Ecuador, with a range of demands that included the withdrawal of proposed tax reforms, opposition to modifications of pensions, the protection of social leaders and FARC ex-combatants, and implementation of the Peace Agreement, which were largely peaceful (UNSC 2019c). What the future of peace under Duque will hold, and what role ‘giving face’ and government-society relations will play, remain questions for future research.

In some regards, the OACP’s peace pedagogy under Santos seemed to have failed, as it did not manage to prevent the loss of the 2016 Referendum and the 2018 election of Iván Duque. However, this failure is not so clear-cut. The central pedagogy narrative post-Referendum was that society should ‘learn the Peace Agreement’, in order to defend it against potential attacks by future governments. This idea was not only shared at the time by multiple pro-peace sectors; it is now a reality. Many civil society groups today, including Rodeemos el Diálogo, are using the Peace Agreement, often at considerable risk to their lives, to fight for the changes they believe are possible and necessary for Colombia to achieve peace, by demanding compliance with what was agreed in Havana and ratified by Congress in 2016. Seen in this light, peace pedagogy was, in fact, a success.

Just as violence is reproduced culturally, ending violence and building peace in Colombia is a task that requires unlearning old habits and acquiring new ones, as the narratives project of Chapter 5 aspired (highly imperfectly) to do. The 2018 election was but one challenge along the way. It matters greatly who is in charge of a government, as this thesis has demonstrated – but it is only one factor, and Duque will not be president forever. Watching the thorny unfolding of the peace process from London has been deeply sad, as my own emotions are invested in the
country’s future. Ghassan Hage (2010) proposes to analyse the “political emotions” that anthropologists often share with their informants, especially in his (and my own) case of complex belonging-yet-not-belonging to the country one is studying, whilst also recognising the limits to the similarity between the emotions of the anthropologist and those of their informants. While I continue to feel worried about the fate of the peace process, I find hope in the millions of Colombians who are using the Peace Agreement as a springboard to promote larger cultural transformations. Among them are my informants from the OACP; fallible, imperfect human beings, who have nonetheless incorporated the spirit and promises of the Peace Agreement into their raison d’être, and are striving to make Colombia a better, more peaceful and equal country. In the tension “between the political and the analytical” identified by Hage (2010, 150), I rest in the gap, animated by the hope that my research can offer something, however small, to our utopian dream of peace.
APPENDIX
Summary of the Peace Agreement

I considered writing my own summary of the *Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build A Stable and Lasting Peace* signed by the government of Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC-EP on 24 November 2016, for readers to consult. However, I concluded that this would go against the very argument I make in my thesis – namely, that any explanation of the Peace Agreement is subjective, and socially and politically constructed. I have written various summaries of the Peace Agreement, all shaped by the needs of the moment, the angle of the piece, the publication, and the imagined audience, which can be found in the *London Review of Books* (Burnyeat 2016b), the *LRB Blog* (Burnyeat 2016d), *The Globe Post* (Burnyeat 2019), and elsewhere. But ultimately, these are my own ‘pedagogy narratives’, and reflect my personal and political positioning, as a pro-peace scholar and practitioner. Instead, therefore, I reproduce here in full the final informative booklet on the Agreement published by the OACP during the Santos administration, in its English translation, ‘The Colombian Peace Agreement: The Opportunity to Build Peace’ (OACP 2016a), via screenshots. This booklet serves both as an example of the OACP’s pedagogy narratives ‘in the raw’, and as a helpful reference guide to the Peace Agreement.
The Colombian Peace Agreement

The opportunity to build peace

A publication of
The Office of the High Commissioner for Peace
Structure of the peace process

**PURPOSE:** End conflict in order to build peace

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**FIRST PHASE**
(Exploratory talks)
February - August 2012

During this confidential phase, the Colombian government and FARC exchanged views on ending conflict and laid down conditions for the establishment of peace talks.

A "General Agreement to End the Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace" was signed, laying down the framework for the peace talks.

This document also established a detailed agenda for discussion comprising 5 specific topics and an additional chapter on implementation and verification.

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**SECOND PHASE**
(Ending conflict)
October 2012 - November 2016

Direct talks between the Colombian government and FARC were launched in Oslo (Norway) on October 18, 2012 and continued in Havana (Cuba) for four years.

Direct talks between both parties were aided by Norway and Cuba as guarantor countries and Chile and Venezuela as accompanying countries.

Civil society participated during the entire peace talks, sending their proposals and suggestions to both parties.

Conversations were held under the following rules: there were no demilitarized areas in Colombia nor were military operations suspended; work sessions in Havana were confidential and direct to guarantee discretion and diligence; and dialogues were held in accordance to the principle that "nothing is agreed upon until everything has been agreed upon".

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**THIRD PHASE**
(Building peace)
10 years

After the end of armed conflict, peacebuilding throughout the country begins. It will take all of us to achieve it.

Peacebuilding requires a territorial approach that motivates participation of citizens and communities across Colombia, creating a positive impact in the rights of victims of conflict and guaranteeing everyone’s wellbeing.

NOW IT’S OUR TURN TO BUILD PEACE IN THE ENTIRE COUNTRY

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**NOTE:** THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY DOES NOT REPLACE THE PEACE AGREEMENT. FOR MORE INFORMATION, READ THE FULL TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT AT [WWW.MESADECONVERSAciones3.COM.CO](http://WWW.MESADECONVERSAciones3.COM.CO)
Colombians participated in the entire process

66,098 contributions had been received by both parties in June 2016

Rural Development
27,142 contributions

Political Participation
11,933 contributions

Drugs
4,502 contributions

Victims
28,336 contributions

End of Conflict and Implementation and Verification
14,666 contributions

Who Participated?

60 victims of the Colombian conflict

visited Havana to share their stories, their ideas and their expectations on the peace talks and implementation of an Agreement with both parties. These victims – who represented the diversity of Colombians in terms of gender, age, ethnicity, regional origin, type of victimization, and actor responsible of victimization – all coincided in the importance of putting an end to conflict in Colombia.

Contributions is the category used by the Colombian government delegation to classify and analyze the different ideas and suggestions put forward by citizens. Each proposal presented by citizens and organizations may contain several contributions.
Comprehensive Rural Development
Toward a new Colombian countryside

This chapter seeks to lay down the foundation for the transformations of rural Colombia, in order to reverse the adverse effects of conflict and the conditions that permitted the persistence of violence in the country, and ensure the health and wellbeing of the rural population.

It seeks to eradicate extreme rural poverty and reduce rural poverty by 50 percent within 10 years, to promote equality, the closing of gaps between urban and rural areas, the economic recovery of the Colombian countryside, and to develop small-scale, family and community agriculture.

Political Participation
A democratic opportunity to build peace

Building peace requires taking advantage of a democratic opportunity to strengthen pluralism and, as such, the participation of the different visions and interests of society, in order to promote and strengthen citizen participation in matters of public interest, and to outlaw violence as a method of political action.

This will enable Colombians to deal with conflicts peacefully and to promote a culture of reconciliation, coexistence, tolerance and non-discrimination.

End of the Conflict

This chapter establishes the terms for the end of military confrontations with FARC and the end of FARC hostilities toward civil society, by way of a bilateral and definitive ceasefire and cessation of hostilities, a detailed 180-day timetable for the laying down of arms, and the beginning of their transition into civilian life.

The United Nations will receive the entirety of FARC’s weapons following a technical, transparent and verifiable procedure, that will guarantee the Colombian population this is a complete and irreversible process.

This chapter seeks to

1. Gain access to land
2. Access the means to make this land productive
3. Participate in the planning of their regions

This chapter aims to

1. Foster more diverse voices in politics
2. Increase citizens’ participation in public affairs
3. Guarantee that politics and weapons are no longer used together

Guarantee security conditions for everyone

Aid FARC members’ transition into civilian life

See Page 8
See Page 12
See Page 16
Solution to the problem of illicit drugs

Finding a definitive solution to the problem of illicit drugs is necessary to build a stable and lasting peace. Therefore, this chapter proposes a new strategy that addresses the causes and consequences of this phenomenon.

It gives a differentiated treatment to the weakest links in the chain of production and commercialization of illicit drugs, by promoting voluntary substitution of illicit crops and the transformation of territories affected by them, and by addressing drug consumption as a public health issue. At the same time, it intensifies the fight against criminal organizations controlling this business.

Victims

Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repetition

This chapter seeks to satisfy the rights of victims of the conflict, to ensure the accountability and clarification of what happened, to guarantee the legal certainty of persons participating in the System, and to promote cohabitation, reconciliation and non-repetition as essential cornerstones of a transition toward peace.

Implementation and Verification

In order to guarantee compliance with the Agreement, this chapter establishes mechanisms to ensure its proper implementation, and to monitor and verify compliance with the commitments it lays down.

This chapter seeks that

1. The Peace Agreement is implemented internationally.
2. Implementation is verified by citizens.
3. Reparation of victims.

This chapter seeks

1. Truth regarding what happened during the conflict.
2. Justice regarding crimes committed during the conflict.
3. Fight against the entire chain of drug trafficking.
10 ideas to understand the Colombian peace process

1. We must end conflict to build peace

The Peace Agreement’s main objective is to end the conflict in order to begin a phase of peacebuilding that involves the entire Colombian society.

2. Victims are in the center of the process

One of the Agreement’s goals is to promote, protect and guarantee the rights of all Colombians, in particular those who have suffered the conflict directly. The victims have participated in the construction of the agreement, and will participate in its implementation.

3. The Agreement addresses specific issues, but cannot solve all the country’s problems

An agenda of five subject matters and one procedural chapter was agreed upon with the objective of ending the conflict. If substantial transformations are achieved as a result, Colombia may overcome the conditions that permitted the persistence of the conflict and focus on other important problems.

4. An end to conflict to ensure there are no more victims

The satisfaction of the rights of victims, accompanied by the proper implementation of the entire Peace Agreement and the strengthening of the rule of law in the entire country, are the best guarantee that these violations will not recur.

5. The Peace Agreement belongs to everyone

Both parties informed Colombians permanently about progress of the peace talks in Havana and made the contents of each chapter public as soon as they were signed. Additionally, the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace has prepared an array of publications and educational tools aiming at enabling citizens’ understanding of the Peace Agreement.

6. Citizens participated throughout the process

During the four years of the peace talks, Colombians sent more than 68,000 suggestions and ideas to both parties in Havana. Their active participation during the implementation of the Peace Agreement will also be a guarantee of its transparency, legitimacy and accountability.
7. Justice is a cornerstone of this Agreement

The Colombian government and the FARC agreed in the '10 Principles regarding the victims' that they were not going to exchange impunity. Therefore, they created a Comprehensive System that prohibits amnesties for international crimes and serious violations of human rights, and created a special Tribunal for Peace to investigate, prosecute and punish, and ensure accountability for the most serious and representative crimes. In order for someone to gain access and participate in special criminal proceedings, they must contribute to truth, reparations and non-repetition measures.

8. FARC will lay down their arms and reincorporate to civilian life

Ending the conflict necessarily implies that FARC lay down their arms and undergo a process of reinstatement into civilian life, on a political and a social level. Building peace also involves eliminating the conditions that permitted the conflict to persist throughout Colombia and to reverse its effects.

9. Peace needs the participation of all Colombians

Once we put an end to the conflict, peacebuilding requires an active participation of citizens and spaces of discussion on how the Peace Agreement shall be implemented. This process involves making use of the different skills found in each territory and reflecting locally on what transformations are needed to close the gaps between cities and the countryside.

10. This is a unique opportunity for a peaceful coexistence and reconciliation

The implementation of the Peace Agreement will require new spaces of citizen participation, in order to enable the different groups—including victims, local authorities, social organizations and also those who participated in the conflict—to meet, discuss and build a joint vision of how to build peace in their territories. These spaces of deliberation also foster reconciliation.
Comprehensive Rural Development
Toward a new Colombian countryside

LAND ACCESS AND USE

This chapter seeks to lay down the foundation for the transformations of rural Colombia, in order to reverse the adverse effects of conflict and the conditions that permitted the persistence of violence in the country, and ensure the health and wellbeing of the rural population.

It seeks to eradicate extreme rural poverty and reduce rural poverty by 50 percent within 10 years, to promote equality, the closing of gaps between urban and rural areas, the economic recovery of the Colombian countryside, and to develop small scale, family-run and community-based agriculture.

3. LAND FUND

Creation of a land access programme for the free distribution of land to rural people without land, or with insufficient land, with priority given to rural women, female heads of household and victims of the conflict. There will be other access to land mechanisms, such as asset transfers, subsidies and improved access to credit.

4. COMPREHENSIVE ACCESS

The goal is to guarantee a 'comprehensive access to land' that enhances the effective use of land. That is, to ensure that access to land is accompanied by technical assistance, seed capital and loans, roads and infrastructure, and the conditions that foster productivity and overall well-being.

5. LAND REGISTRATION

A large-scale plan for land registration will be undertaken, in order to formalize the ownership of those in possession of land but without the deeds that allow them to seek loans or access government programmes.

6. RURAL LAND LEGAL SYSTEM

A new special rural land legal system will be put in place, to nimbly solve conflicts over land access and use, and ensure the protection of the property rights of peasants and rural inhabitants. This will prevent forced displacement, ease conflict resolution, and help sow peace.

7. LAND USE

In order to close gaps between the use of land and its vocation, the Government will define the general guidelines for land use, taking into account the development visions for the different territories, promoting citizen participation in the creation of these territorial regulations and designing reconversion programmes.

8. DELIMITING THE AGRICULTURAL FRONTIER AND PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT

A multi-purpose land registry (cadastre) will be created in order to regularize the transparent ownership of land, increase the collection of property taxes in rural areas, and encourage the productive and sustainable use of land.

9. FARMER ENTERPRISE ZONES

The Government will support the development plans of Farmer enterprise zones (zonas de reserva campesina) that exist or are created at the behest of local communities, seeking a more active presence of the State in these territories.
National plans aim to provide the Colombian countryside with public services and infrastructure, with the goals of helping its inhabitants overcome poverty and inequality, improve their opportunities and close the gaps between urban and rural areas. They specially seek to strengthen rural, family-run and community-based primary production economies and integrating them with markets across the country.

**INFRASTRUCTURE**

1. **RURAL ROAD NETWORK**
   - This plan seeks to connect regions and enable rural inhabitants access to markets and public services.

2. **IRRIGATION AND DRAINING INFRASTRUCTURE**
   - This plan seeks to foster rural productivity by guaranteeing democratic access to water in a sustainable way.

3. **ELECTRICITY AND INTERNET SERVICES**
   - This plan seeks to expand the coverage and quality of power and internet services.

**SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT**

4. **HEALTHCARE**
   - This plan seeks to improve coverage and quality of public healthcare in rural areas.

5. **EDUCATION**
   - This plan seeks to improve coverage, quality and relevance of education, from early childhood to higher education, and to eradicate illiteracy in rural areas.

6. **HOUSING AND DRINKING WATER SERVICES**
   - This plan seeks to guarantee access to community-run aqueducts and waste management systems, as well as improve housing conditions in rural areas.
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES WITH A TERRITORIAL-BASED APPROACH (PDET)

In the zones most affected by poverty, the conflict, institutional weakness and illegal economies, Development Programmes with a Territorial-Based Approach will be implemented in order to speed up the execution and funding of the national plans.

These will begin with an action plan for regional transformation, which will strive to include ample participation from the relevant sectors of the community, in the plan’s formulation, execution and follow-up.
Political Participation
A democratic opportunity to build peace

1. ACCESS TO THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

The goal is to enable the appearance of new political parties and the transition to the political scenario of social organizations seeking to do so, without putting at risk the progress made in strengthening the party system.

As a result, the minimum threshold requirements to obtain legal status for political parties and movements will be modified and a system for the gradual acquisition of rights for parties will be designed.

2. RIGHTS AND GUARANTEES FOR EXERCISING POLITICAL OPPOSITION

Political parties and movements will be invited to a commission tasked with the purpose of defining the guidelines of a new statute of guarantees for political parties or movements that declare themselves in opposition, a promise of the 1991 Constitution that has yet to be adopted.

3. PROMOTION OF ELECTORAL TRANSPARENCY

Measures will be undertaken to promote greater electoral transparency, including tools for citizens to report electoral anomalies, a technical audit of the electoral census, the formation of an electoral guarantees tribunal, and the financing of the digitalisation of electoral processes.

4. REFORM OF THE ELECTORAL REGIME

A special electoral mission will be created, made up of high-level experts, to submit recommendations to the government on ensuring the greater autonomy of the country's electoral organisation, and to modernise and make more transparent the electoral system.

5. PROMOTION OF ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION

Measures will be undertaken to promote greater electoral participation, including a large-scale ID-issuance campaign that will give priority to marginalised areas and mechanisms to enable access of isolated communities to election booths.

6. SPECIAL TRANSITORY ELECTORAL DISTRICTS FOR PEACE

16 new, temporary electoral districts will be created, for the House of Representatives elections, for two electoral periods, in order to ensure a better representation of the zones particularly affected by the conflict, by neglect and by a weak institutional presence. None of the political parties with Congressional representation will be allowed to compete in these special electoral districts.

7. PROMOTION OF WOMEN IN POLITICS

Affirmative action measures will be undertaken to strengthen the participation and leadership of women in public affairs.
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

Building peace requires promoting and strengthening citizen participation in matters of public interest, as well as a democratic culture of tolerance in the arena of public debate.

1. COUNCILS FOR RECONCILIATION AND COEXISTENCE

A National Council for Reconciliation and Coexistence and similar territorial councils will be created, whose role will be to foster a culture of peace and tolerance throughout the country.

2. STRENGTHENING OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS

Measures will be undertaken to strengthen social organizations, as a means to enable them to have a more audible voice in public affairs. Therefore, the Colombian government will draft a bill on guarantees and promotion of citizen participation.

3. GUARANTEES FOR SOCIAL PROTESTS AND DEMONSTRATION

Measures will be undertaken to guarantee the right to social protest and demonstration, protecting the rights of those persons protesting as well as the rest of citizens. The Government will promote spaces of dialogue to treat protests and demonstrations democratically and the design of mechanisms to follow up on agreements made.

4. CITIZEN CONTROL AND OVERSIGHT

Citizen participation and control are essential for the transparency of public administration and the correct use of public resources. For this, citizen oversight boards will be created and public transparency watchdog organisations will be promoted, as well as tools designed to foster accountability of the implementation of the Peace Agreement.

5. PARTICIPATORY PLANNING

Democratic and participatory planning will be strengthened, to ensure citizens take an active part in the decisions involving their communities. This includes participating in formulating development plans, following up on their execution and monitoring the budgets that sustain them.
6. COMMUNITY MEDIA
Community media will be strengthened, in order to promote citizen participation in public affairs.

7. SECURITY GUARANTEES FOR SOCIAL LEADERS
Security measures will be undertaken to protect leaders of social organizations and human rights advocates, in order to prevent crimes against them.

8. SECURITY GUARANTEES FOR THE EXERCISE OF POLITICS
Security measures will be undertaken to protect persons within the political arena, in order to ensure differences are solved through democratic means. This includes those who lay down their arms to transition into politics, who require guarantees that they will not be victims of violence.

To ensure this, a Comprehensive Security System for the Exercise of Politics will be put in place, including efforts to strengthen the Government's capacity to prevent violence against those in politics and the creation of an early alert system and permanent mechanisms of dialogue with political parties.

OUTLAWING VIOLENCE AS A METHOD OF POLITICAL ACTION
The signature of a Peace Agreement and its proper implementation will contribute to the strengthening of democracy, in as much as it entails that no one will use violence or arms to promote a political cause ever again.
End of the Conflict

SECURITY GUARANTEES AND THE FIGHT AGAINST CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS

The final termination of hostilities, a bilateral and definitive ceasefire, and the laying down of arms will be certified by a Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, led by the United Nations and also comprised by the Colombian government and FARC.

This set of measures aims to create conditions of security and protection for all Colombians, including all the political parties and movements and the political movement that emerges from the transition of the FARC into legal political activity.

HOW THE CEASEFIRE AND LAYING DOWN OF ARMS WILL TAKE PLACE

- **D**
  - December 1, 2016
  - Endorsement of the Final Peace Agreement and beginning of the process by which FARC lay down their arms

- **D+1**
  - Reorganization of the Public Law Enforcement authorities' units

- **D+5**
  - The relocation of the FARC with their weapons to the Transitional Local Zones for Normalization begins

- **D+7**
  - Transport of heavy weaponry, militia’s weaponry, grenades and ammo

- **D+10**

- **D+30**

DESTRUCTION OF UNSTABLE WEAPONRY
GUIDING PRINCIPLES

1. Respect, protection and promotion of human rights
2. Ensuring the State's monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force and arms in the entire country
3. Strengthening the justice system
4. Ensuring the State's monopoly of taxation
5. A territorial-based and differential approach
6. A gender approach
7. Coordination and joint responsibility of State institutions
8. Citizen participation
9. Accountability
10. Guarantees of non-repetition of violence

BUILDING OF THREE MONUMENTS

D+60
Storage of heavy weaponry, militia's weaponry, grenades and ammunition in designated containers under the exclusive control of the United Nations

D+90
Collection and storage in the designated container of 30% of the total weaponry

D+120
Collection and storage in the designated container of a further 30% of the total weaponry

D+150
Collection and storage in the designated container of the remaining 40% of the total weaponry. At this point, a full 100% of weaponry will have been collected

D+180
Completion of the operation of the Transitional Local Zones for Normalization, the disarmament process and the Bilateral and Definitive Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities
TRANSITIONAL LOCAL ZONES FOR NORMALIZATION

Their goal is to guarantee the Ceasefire and Laying down of arms, and to lay the groundwork for the reincorporation of the FARC into civilian life and their transition to legal activities.

LOCAL ZONES | EACH WILL CONTAIN SEVERAL ENCAMPMENTS

LOCAL POINTS | THESE WILL BE SMALLER IN SIZE AND WILL CONTAIN ONLY ONE ENCAMPMENT

In total, there will be 20 Local Zones and 6 Local Points. This is less than 0.1% of the more than 30,000 hamlets (rural districts) throughout Colombia.

- The Local Zones will be of a temporary nature, with clearly defined territorial limits. Their location was chosen jointly by the Colombian government and FARC.
- They will be of reasonable size such as to ensure their proper monitoring and verification and unfettered access by the Monitoring and Verification Mechanism.
- All of the rules and protocols established guiding the Ceasefire and Laying down of arms must be complied with.
- The rule of law will remain always in all Local Zones.
- Local Zones cannot be used for political demonstrations.
- The non-military civilian authorities that operate in these Local Zones will continue to do so, as normal.
- Carrying and possession of weapons within these Local Zones will be suspended.
- The Government will implement measures to ensure public welfare and healthcare, the issuing of national ID cards, and other programmes aimed at preparing FARC members' reincorporation during these 180 days.
- Local Zones will enable training of FARC members in productive labor and education.

ENCAMPMENTS

- The number of encampments within each Local Zone will depend on the topography of the surrounding land and the amount of combatants disarming.
- There will be no civilians present within the encampments at any time.
- The FARC combatants will only be permitted to exit these encampments without weapons, and as regular civilians.
- There will always be representatives of the international component of the M&V present.
- In each of the encampments, there will be a storage point for weaponry in designated containers, which will be controlled exclusively by the IC M&V.

The National Police, and other State armed forces, may enter the Local Zones in response to any circumstances requiring their presence. This will be only done by informing, and with the coordination of the M&V.

LOCAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE MONITORING AND VERIFICATION MECHANISM

SAFETY ZONE

- A 1 km safety zone will surround each Local Zone.
- The Monitoring and Verification Mechanism will operate within this zone, its members always being unarmed and with proper identification symbols.

VACCINES
POLITICAL REINCORPORATION

One of the goals of the Peace Agreement is creating the conditions for the FARC to transition from an armed organization into legal political life, following the laying down of all their arms.

Upon conclusion of the laying down of arms process, the political party or movement that emerges from the transition of the FARC-EP into legal political life, will have its legal status recognised, following its compliance with all necessary legal requirements except for the requisite minimum voting threshold. This legal status will hold until July 19, 2026.

This political party will not receive seats in Congress automatically. The Agreement guarantees it will have a minimum representation of 5 Senators and 5 Representatives for two electoral periods, provided they compete in the elections. In the case that the party fails to obtain 5 seats in any one of the chambers of Congress, those missing seats will be assigned. If they gain 5 or more seats, no additional ones will be assigned.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REINCORPORATION

This programme seeks to create short and long term conditions for former FARC combatants to build life projects within civilian life.

The process of economic and social reincorporation includes access to education, healthcare, and psycho-social care; one-off financial support packages to start individual or collective socially-productive projects; and the identification of prospective socially-productive projects.

To guide this process, a National Reincorporation Council will be created, with representation of both the Colombian government and the FARC, in order to define reincorporation activities and monitor the process.

Once the members of the FARC have laid down their arms, they will receive their respective accreditation from the Colombian government based on the list submitted by the FARC. This will help certify they belonged to the organization, they laid down their arms and they will be admitted into the reincorporation programme.
Solution to the problem of illicit drugs

SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF ILICIT CORPS WITH RURAL DEVELOPMENT

In order to solve the problem of crops used for illicit purposes, the Agreement promotes voluntary substitution programmes accompanied by measures seeking to transform the territorial conditions of affected areas and improve the well-being of local communities.

NATIONAL COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME FOR THE SUBSTITUTION OF CROPS USED FOR ILICIT PURPOSES

This programme (named PNIS) seeks to work jointly with communities to transform the conditions of territories affected by illicit crops and solve the problem they create with regional integration and social inclusion. This programme will be led by the Presidency of Colombia.

SUBSTITUTION AND NON-REPLANTING AGREEMENTS

In these agreements, rural people commit to crop substitution, non-replanting and to not engaging in any activity related to drug trafficking. The new programme also includes measures to eradicate illicit crops within Colombia’s national parks and in areas of difficult access and low population density, as well as plans for their environmental recovery.

IMMEDIATE RESPONSE PLAN

In return, the government will commit to creating an Immediate Response Plan that will guarantee food assistance for persons who sign substitution and non-replanting agreements. This plan will benefit growers, collectors, and sharecroppers, as well as the local community in general.
RURAL DEVELOPMENT APPROACH

The substitution programme is considered a part of the Comprehensive Rural Reform chapter of the Peace Agreement. Thus, it seeks to transform the conditions of rural areas affected by illicit crops, enabling communities to find alternative legal activities, access to public services, development opportunities, and improved living conditions.

STATE PRESENCE

The programme seeks to strengthen the presence of the State in territories affected by illicit crops, by guaranteeing citizens' rights, and providing infrastructure and access to public services.

In areas where a substitution agreement with communities is not possible or whenever growers fail to comply with their obligations, the Government will forcibly eradicate the illicit crops.

PARTICIPATORY PLANNING

The cornerstone of this new approach to the problem is the creation of participatory planning processes, allowing communities to make the decision of abandoning illicit crops and transitioning to legal activities. The idea is to forge a new partnership between communities affected by illicit crops, national and local authorities that is able to solve their problems.

To achieve this, an ample participation of communities is necessary, including those directly involved in growing these crops. By means of a bottom-up planning, communities will be able to identify their needs, build their Comprehensive Substitution and Alternative Development Plans (Pisda) and become actively involved in their implementation.
ILlicit Drug USE

The Peace Agreement acknowledges that the use of illicit drugs is a pressing matter of public health, that requires joint work between authorities and communities.

INTERNATIONAL APPROACH

All the measures in the Peace Agreement are consistent with the recommendations made by scientists and international experts, such as the Global Commission on Drug Policy, on how to reorient illicit drug use policy. The Agreement also commits Colombia to continue promoting an international debate on drug policy.

PREVENTION OF ILlicit Drug USE

A new National Programme for Comprehensive Intervention into Drug Use will be created, articulating prevention initiatives and evaluating existing policy.

All of its measures will be based upon a human rights approach, including the non-discrimination of consumers and non-prosecution of illicit drug users, and will be guided by an evidence-based approach. Special attention will be given to prevention for children and teenagers, with special prevention initiatives and the strengthening of leisure activities that help prevent drug use. Drug prevention policy will be drafting guided by participatory processes with all the relevant actors of society.

ATTENTION FOR ILlicit Drug USERS

A National Attention System for Illicit Drug Users will also be put in place, including addiction rehabilitation programmes and measures for their social inclusion.

This system aims to widen and improve access to qualified medical attention for illicit drug users, including treatment and rehabilitation. It will also include harm reduction measures based on scientific evidence to minimize the negative effects of drug use, focusing on vulnerable populations such as homeless people, women and prisoners.
SOLUTION TO THE PHENOMENON OF THE PRODUCTION AND COMMERCIALIZATION OF NARCOTICS

CORRUPTION
A strategy for strengthening the fight against corruption associated with drug trafficking will be put in place.

ASSET LAUNDERING
The Government will strengthen its ability to detect, control and report illicit financial operations and will draft a new bill against asset laundering in order to more effectively prosecute people involved in drug trafficking. A new strategy to repossess properties and assets involved in drug trafficking will also be put in place.

INPUTS AND CHEMICAL PRECURSORS
Stronger state controls will be put in place on the production, importation and commercialization of the inputs and chemical precursors used for drug production.

COMMITMENTS BY BOTH PARTIES
- The Colombian Government states its commitment to start the aforementioned policies and programmes, and to intensify the fight against corruption associated with drug trafficking.
- The FARC state their commitment to contribute towards a definitive solution to the illicit drug problem and to put an end to any malion whatsoever that they may have had with drug production or commercialization.
Agreement regarding the victims of the conflict

COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM FOR TRUTH, JUSTICE, REPARATION AND NON-REPETITION

The Comprehensive System will consist of different judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, that will be implemented in a coordinated manner, in order to achieve the greatest possible realization of victims’ rights and accountability for what happened, ensure legal certainty for those involved, help achieve coexistence, reconciliation and non-repetition, and assist with the transition from armed conflict to peace. It is the first time a system of this nature has been agreed upon directly out of a peace negotiation process.

1. TRUTH, COEXISTENCE AND NON-REPETITION COMMISSION

An impartial and independent mechanism, of transitory and extra-judicial character, with a territory-based approach, which will seek to contribute to the realization of the right to the truth for victims and society as a whole.

2. SPECIAL SEARCH UNIT FOR PERSONS REPORTED AS MISSING

A special unit of humanitarian and extra-judicial nature, which will work with independence and autonomy in seeking to establish what happened to persons deemed as missing in the context of and due to the armed conflict.

3. COMPREHENSIVE REPARATION PROGRAMS FOR PEACEBUILDING PURPOSES

The end of the conflict represents a unique opportunity to strengthen the programs of comprehensive victim reparation that are being implemented by the Colombian government, as well as to adopt new measures and promote the commitment of everyone to repair the damage that has been done.
4. SPECIAL JURISDICTION FOR PEACE

The various organs of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace will undertake criminal justice proceedings and comply with the state’s duty to investigate, prosecute and punish crimes committed in the context of and due to the armed conflict, particularly those that are most serious and representative.

5. GUARANTEES OF NON-REPERITION

The guarantees of nonrepetition will result from the coordinated implementation of the various mechanisms of the Comprehensive System, and the measures agreed under item 3 of the Negotiation Agenda (“End of the Conflict”) which includes the surrender of weapons, the reintegration of guerrillas into civilian life and other security guarantees.

Any special justice treatment is conditional to contributing to the clarification of the truth, reparation of victims and guaranteeing non-repetition.

The different mechanisms and measures are coordinated.

WHO WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM?

VICTIMS

The victims will participate in all of the mechanisms and entities in the Comprehensive System, as an essential guarantee for the realization of their rights to the truth, justice, reparations and non-repetition.

GUERRILLAS

The Comprehensive System shall apply to members of those guerrilla groups that sign a final peace agreement with the government and whose participation is conditional upon the surrender of their weapons.

STATE AGENTS

The Comprehensive System will apply to state agents who have committed crimes in the context of and due to the armed conflict, whilst recognizing that their role in the conflict was to be guarantors of security, and that there was a presumption that they legitimately had a monopoly on the holding of weapons.

DEMOBILIZED PARAMILITARIES

The Comprehensive System will help to establish the facts on the phenomenon of paramilitarism, and will assist with the full reparation of its victims.

THIRD PARTIES

The Comprehensive System will apply to third party civilians that have participated indirectly in the armed conflict and who were not part of illegal armed groups, but nonetheless had an uncoerced relationship of funding or collaborating with these groups, and in doing so are connected to crimes committed in the context of and due to the armed conflict.
HOW THE COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM WILL WORK

1. TRUTH COMMISSION

The Commission seeks to contribute to the clarification of what happened and the recognition of the victims of the conflict. It will also promote the recognition of the responsibility of those that participated directly and indirectly in the armed conflict and foster coexistence across the country’s territories, through promoting a climate of open dialogue.

To achieve this, it will undertake processes fostering broad and pluralistic participation in order to hear different voices and views, creating spaces at national, regional and territorial levels in order to listen to different voices and promote the participation of different sectors of society, including victims.

2. SEARCH UNIT FOR MISSING PERSONS

This special unit will be mandated to search for, and identify, missing persons who are alive, and in the case of deceased persons, establish the location and undertake the dignified return of their remains to their families.

To achieve this, it will gather and compare the information from governmental and non-governmental databases, establish the universe of persons deemed as missing, implement search plans and exhumations, and undertake processes for their identification. At the end, it will provide family members with a report about what happened to the missing person, and, where relevant and possible, it will undertake the dignified return of their remains.

3. COMPREHENSIVE REPARATION PROGRAMS

The end of the armed conflict represents a unique opportunity to strengthen the programs of comprehensive victim reparation being implemented by the Colombian government. The Peace Agreement strengthens reparations through several means.

The recognition of responsibility, by way of public and solemn acts concerted with victims and communities, enables persons who caused damage to acknowledge it, request for forgiveness, and commit to repairing them. Whoever caused damages must contribute to repairing them by way of concrete actions that benefit affected communities, such as undertaking community development projects like demining or building infrastructure, or by direct monetary compensations.
4 SPECIAL JURISDICTION FOR PEACE

This is the judicial component of the Comprehensive System. It will seek, above all, to realize the victims’ rights to justice, to fight against impunity, to comply with the state’s duty to investigate, prosecute and punish criminal acts, and to make decisions that give complete legal certainty to those involved in the mechanisms of the Comprehensive System.

FOR THOSE who have committed crimes capable of being amnestied or pardoned, or other crimes subject to special judicial proceedings:

FOR THOSE who have committed crimes NOT capable of being amnestied or pardoned, or other crimes subject to special judicial proceedings, and who have had significant involvement in the most serious and representative crimes:

Those who acknowledge responsibility before the Judicial Panel of Acknowledgment of Responsibility

Those who acknowledge their responsibility after proceedings begin

Those who do not acknowledge responsibility and are convicted

SPECIAL SANCTIONS

These will have a restitutive and a restorative function, involving concrete actions of reparation for the damages caused.

ALTERNATIVE SANCTIONS

Under ordinary prison conditions

ORDINARY SANCTIONS

Under ordinary prison conditions

Penal deprivation of liberty

5 TO 8 YEARS

Penal deprivation of liberty

35 TO 20 YEARS

Effective restriction of liberty

5 TO 8 YEARS

TRIBUNAL FOR PEACE
Implementation and Verification mechanisms

FOLLOW-UP AND VERIFICATION COMMISSION FOR THE PEACE AGREEMENT

This commission (named CSIVI) will be created after the Peace Agreement is signed and endorsed, to follow-up on its implementation and prepare a 10-year Framework Plan for the Implementation of the Agreement based on a draft prepared by the Colombian government. It will promote the active participation of the private sector, local communities and social organizations in the implementation of the Peace Agreement, and adopt different measures to guarantee the transparency and accountability in the implementation, as well as prevent any form of corruption.

MECHANISM FOR THE VERIFICATION OF IMPLEMENTATION

This mechanism, comprised by several institutions and international representatives, will verify the state of implementation of the Peace Agreement, identify delays and setbacks, and strengthen implementation. The Colombian government will also request United Nations a Political Mission to verify the process of reincorporation of FARC members into civilian life.

INTERNATIONAL ACCOMPANIMENT

The Colombian government and FARC agreed to request several countries, international organizations and United Nations agencies to accompany implementation of specific topics included in the Peace Agreement.
International support of the Peace Agreement

The world sees Colombia’s Peace Agreement and the end of conflict with great optimism and hope. More than 40 Heads of State and Government, 25 Nobel Peace Prize laureates and the entire United Nations System endorsed the peace talks and now support implementation of the Peace Agreement.

Ban Ki-moon  
Former Secretary General of United Nations  
March 12, 2016

“When I visited Colombia in 2011, peace seemed like a very remote possibility. However, today, and over the past three years, Colombia has shown the world its commitment to peace. Two parties that have been in conflict for more than five decades have decided to sit down and resolve their differences through dialogue. The country has become an example for ending conflicts throughout the world (...) In my last year as Secretary-General, it is a privilege to participate in this historic event, which is the building of a stable and lasting peace in Colombia.”

Barack Obama  
Former President of the United States  
February 4, 2016

“Just as the United States has been Colombia’s partner in a time of war, I indicated to President Santos we will be your partner in waging peace. So I’m proud to announce a new framework for the next chapter of our partnership. And we’re going to call it Peace Colombia - Paz Colombia.”

Pope Francis  
September 20, 2015

“I pray that this long night of pain and violence, with the will of every Colombian, can be transformed into a day without sunset, one of harmony, justice, fraternity and love, into love for institutionality, for national and international law, so peace can be lasting. Please, we do not have the right to allow ourselves another failure on this road toward peace and reconciliation.”

Archbishop Desmond Tutu  
Leader of South Africa’s democratic transition and Nobel Peace Prize laureate  
September 23, 2012

“Violence breeds violence and this, in return, breeds more violence. Both Colombians and South Africans have paid a terrible price, but only physically, but also with their wounded souls and hearts (...). Congratulations Colombia. May God bless you on the road ahead.”
Now it is up to us

Peace is possible

“He who loses hope loses everything”
PROVERB

Peacebuilding begins by convincing ourselves that peace is possible. This is a decisive moment in the history of our country. Nothing will change if we continue to think that this is the way things are.

Peace emerges from the territories

“Here we already know how to build peace”
TAITA ANDRÉS RAMENTEA
INDIGENOUS LEADER FROM PUTUMAYO

Thousands of persons have been building peace throughout Colombia: they are the protagonists of the transition and the transformation of living conditions in the entire country. Once they lose the gap war placed on them, they will be able to express themselves with liberty and without the threat of arms...

The Peace Agreement is an enormous opportunity

“We do not have the right to allow ourselves another failure on this road toward peace and reconciliation”
POPE FRANCIS

The key question many Colombians ask themselves is how will the Peace Agreement change my life? It will not solve every problem in our territory, but it represents an opportunity to negotiate conflicts peacefully and to build solutions for them as communities.

Ending the conflict will bring concrete benefits

“There’s no evil that lasts a hundred years, nor body that can endure it”
PROVERB

The greatest benefit will be seeing no new victims as a result of conflict. Just during the peace talks—between October 2012 and May 2016—around 1,500 deaths were prevented, according to the Conflict Analysis Resource Center (CERAC) think tank. Add the enormous economic, educational and professional opportunities that appear in a peaceful country.
It can only be done with all of us

“If you want to go quickly, go alone. If you want to arrive far, go with someone”

PROVERB

Peacebuilding in our territories requires teamwork among everyone: between local authorities, social organizations, businessmen, academia, faith-based organizations, and citizens in general. Only these alliances, accompanied by spaces for dialogue and agreement, can help us build a new social imaginary.

Trust is the way toward coexistence and reconciliation

“The heart’s memory eliminates the bad and magnifies the good, and thanks to this artifice we manage to endure the burden of the past.”

GABRIEL GARCÍA MÁRQUEZ

Building peace in our territories means that we need a new pact for coexistence that helps us share and live together, mend relations between neighbors, reconcile with those who think differently from us, and defend life as a supreme value.

Our greatest challenge is to create a culture of peace

“Something has to change in our way of thinking, speaking and doing things”

Living in peace implies committing to a cultural change. If behaviors expressed in mottos like ‘the clever one lives off the dumb one’, ‘what’s my stake’ or ‘let them steal but do a bit’ reflect us as a society prone to violence, we must find other sentences that defend the value of life, of the public good and of togetherness.

We have the incredible opportunity of ending a 50-year-old conflict and changing our history!
“We must break the historic cycles of violence. This is why the idea of guaranteeing non-repetition of violence is so central to the entire peace process and has been the rationale behind each chapter and each topic discussed in Havana.”

Sergio Jaramillo
High Commissioner for Peace

WE INVITE YOU TO READ THE COLOMBIA’S AGREEMENT FOR ENDING CONFLICT AND BUILDING A STABLE AND LONG-LASTING PEACE.

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Anthropology, Rutgers.


