Master of Philosophy
(Town Planning) Degree

CRIME AND DESIGN

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May 1993
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The study examined the matter of multi-disciplinary issues which span inter-departmental boundaries, but with which planning has a particular interest. The problem of crime was considered in this context, and as a phenomenon which affects everyone, directly or otherwise.

The body of largely conflicting theory was critically reviewed in terms of the various approaches to crime prevention, but in particular, the environmental design approach.

The state of crime was examined and the Government's response thereto, focusing on the initiatives set up by the Home Office and Police service, as well as official guidance and statutory instruments. The response of the development world was considered with regard to the efforts of local planning authorities in particular, and other agencies involved in the production of the built environment.
Two case studies take an in-depth look at the problem of crime and the factors which come together to 'create' it.

The study found that the issue of crime was the product of many factors. The implication for crime prevention is that an effective and well co-ordinated inter-disciplinary approach is the answer.

The current situation was found to fall well short of this aim in the following ways:

* There is a lack of importance attached to the issue of crime prevention at the most crucial, formative stages of development.

* There is a lack of any co-ordinated approach to designing against crime at the local level.

* Agencies involved in the development process adhere to a narrow school of thought, ie. Alice Coleman and Oscar Newman.
CONTENTS

List of Figures 5

Acknowledgements 8

Chapter 1: Introduction 10

Chapter 2: The Theory So Far ... 24

Chapter 3: The State Of Crime and
The State's Response 82

Chapter 4: The Response Of The Development
World 128

Chapter 5: Case Studies 174

Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusions 262

Bibliography 282

Appendicies 291
LIST OF FIGURES

2.1 Rational Decision Making Theory

3.1 Notifiable Offences Recorded By The Police, England and Wales (July 1991 - June 1992)

3.2 Attrition Within The Criminal Justice System

3.3 Levels Of Recorded And Unrecorded Crime 1988 BCS Estimates

3.4 Number Of Notifiable Offences By Police Force Area

3.5 Crime Rates By Police Force Area (July 1991 - June 1992)

3.6 Population Versus Number Of Offences (July 1991 - June 1992)

3.7 Crime Rates By PFA Of Main Crime Types (July 1991 - June 1992)

3.8 Notifiable Offences Recorded By The Police (% Change From Previous Year)

4.1 Response Rates By Authority Type

4.2 General Responses From LPA's

4.3 Liaison Procedures With ALO/Police Authority

4.4 Liaison Procedures By Category

4.5 LPA's With Design Against Crime Policies

4.6 The Range Of Instruments Employed By LPA's In Design Against Crime

4.7 Staff Resources Allocated For Design Against Crime Initiatives

4.8 Analysis Of Design Against Crime Policies
Produced By LPA's

4.9 Average LPA Response By PFA
4.10 Crime Rates By PFA (July 1991 - July 1992)
4.11 LPA Response To Local Crime Rates (By PFA)

5.1 Location Of Padbury and Claremont In The Fremantle Urban Area
5.2 The Spatial Scale of Padbury
5.3 The Spatial Scale of Claremont
5.4 The Internal Structure of Padbury
5.5 The Internal Structure of Claremont
5.6 Pedestrian Access Via Alleyways To Front Doors
5.7 Segregation Of Pedestrian And Vehicular Traffic
5.8 Recessed Front Doors and Projecting Garages
5.9 Law Surveillance Over Public Open Spaces
5.10 Line Of Sight To The Town Centre
5.11 Effective Surveillance Over Rear Access Paths
5.12 Council House Sales in Claremont
5.13 Council House Sales in Padbury
5.14 Take-Up Rates By House Type For Claremont
5.15 Take-Up Rates By House Type For Padbury
5.16 Demographic Structure Comparisons, 1991
5.17 Demographic Structure Comparisons, 1981
5.18 Demographic Structure Comparisons, Fremantle 1981-1991
5.19 Demographic Structure Comparisons, Claremont
1981-1991
5.20 Demographic Structure Comparisons, Padbury 1981-1991
5.21 Ethnic Structure Of Fremantle, 1991
5.22 Ethnic Structure Of Claremont, 1991
5.23 Ethnic Structure Of Padbury, 1991
5.24 Recorded Incidents Of Burglary 1992-93
5.25 Burglary Rates By House Type For Claremont (1992-93)
5.26 Recorded Incidents Of Burglary 1992-93
5.27 Burglary Rates By House Type For Padbury (1992-3)
5.28 Recorded Incidents Of Vehicle Crimes In Claremont, 1992-93
5.29 Recorded Incidents Of Vehicle Crime In Padbury, 1992-3
5.30 Flats and Communal Parking Areas In Claremont (Front and Rear)
5.31 Proximity To Parking Of Zig Zag And Traditional Terraced Properties
I am indebted to my supervisor, Alan Penn, for his support and invaluable advice and enthusiasm throughout the preparation of this study.

My sincere thanks also go to my employer, Wycombe District Council, who have provided me with the professional and financial support necessary to undertake both the Mphil course, and the research associated with the preparation of this study. I am particularly grateful to the following individuals within the organisation who have afforded me additional assistance:

Tony Parker for kindly offering his cartographic skills; David Frost's great help with Census information; Keith Dobson and Jez Morris for their time and assistance in housing management issues; Joanne in the secretarial bureau; not forgetting the patience and understanding of team managers John Byrne and David Riddington and, of course, my long-suffering development control colleagues!

Particular gratitude is also due to the officers of the Thames Valley Police Force, but especially PC David Binns and PC Mark Wilkinson, together with C.O.P.S. operator Julie, without all of whom's help and encouragement, this research would not have been possible.

I should also like to thank all the local planning authorities and professional bodies who took the time and effort to complete the questionnaire, and the staff at HM Inspectorate of Constabulary in the Home Office for their assistance in the provision of vital statistical information for the research.

With special thanks to 'Michael X' for his unorthodox consultancy advice, and also to my fellow day-release students for providing an unsurpassed motivation and support system.

To my friends who have all been brave enough not to fail to ask how "it" was progressing, and being
patient enough to listen to the painfully repetitive response. I am touched.

However, my greatest and deepest thanks and recognition must go to my family for always providing unlimited quantities of encouragement, re-assurance and faith in me, and for not expecting more of me than I was capable.

Charlotte
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

As a public service body, planning must surely rate as the most diverse in terms of the range of issues it addresses and the various levels at which they are addressed. Social considerations, conservation matters, landfill site implications, technical and highway safety requirements, to name but a few, all judged within the parameters of aesthetic acceptability.

As a kind of jack of all trades the planner calls upon, and works closely with, other public service departments and agencies to resolve complex issues arising in the execution of their daily duties. Arguably, it would be unrealistic to place expectations upon planners which requires them to be masters of all trades, given the vast range of subjects over which he/she has some influence and the complex, often specialist, nature of each. However, this is not to deny the skill required to reach a
balanced judgement on the basis of careful consideration of all the relevant issues. Rather, it is a factor of the multi-disciplinary nature of planning which draws together the theory and practice of many fields into a single service. Despite this dilemma, the profession must continue to respond expeditiously to political directives through policy making and decision taking.

Crime is a relatively recent addition to the long list of issues with which town planners' must be concerned, but one which has a particularly special quality. This 'quality' is the characteristic which gives it universal applicability: crime affects everyone, from the victim of a pickpocket on the London Underground, to increased car insurance premiums payable as a result of high risks of theft. Fear of crime has equally debilitating effects upon large numbers of the population who restrict their own activities and lifestyle through avoidance behaviour. Such behaviour, as well as the phenomena of crime and the fear crime generates (often unjustified) has been the subject of many studies (see KIRK, 1988; SIME, 1988; SMITH, 1987 + 1989; VAN DER VOORDT, 1988; VAN DER
WURFF & STRINGER, 1988 for examples).

To this end, crime holds a highly sensitive political position and as such, is often employed as one of the safest issues to fight an election campaign on. Afterall, is it not everybody's desire to see a reduction in crime? The flipside of the same coin has a darker connotation. Who provides the scapegoat when crime continues to increase? The answer most often lies with the government, and it is this institution to whom the public direct their outcry when it arises.

The Home Office Statistical Bulletin published quarterly by the Home Office (1992b) provides just such an opportunity. It's sensationalism value is not wasted by the media, particularly as crime rates in Britain continue to soar. It is an unfortunate fact that people require little such proof as many more become the victims of crime and fear of crime, whether directly or otherwise. Some crimes have actually been devalued as a result of the increased frequency with which they occur, making them neither newsworthy nor noteworthy. As such, burglary and vandalism are becoming an unacceptable fact of life in Britain in
the nineties.

As crime increasingly comes to the top of the political agenda, all branches of government at national and local levels are formulating policies and embarking on implementation schemes aimed at reversing its increase. For local government and the planning system in particular, the intention is encapsulated in the advice contained in Circular 1/84 (DoE, 1984), Circular 44/90 (HOME OFFICE, 1990) and PPG1 (DoE, 1992).

However, for all the statements of intent, there is still a real lack of understanding of the causes and dynamics of crime, and of the practical measures that can be taken to reduce or deter it. The lack of understanding is surrounded by debate. Different schools of thought blame crime on different factors: the economy and unemployment, education and the breakdown of 'family life', the environment and the breakdown of community structure, to name but a few. Within the sectorial nature of government departments these 'causes' each carry remedies that are the responsibility of one branch or the next, but there is
still a lack of consensus on the most effective measures to be taken.

The problem is to a large degree that the diagnosis of crime depends on the structure of the organisation and instruments we have available to combat it. So for planning authorities the problem becomes one of design, while for education or the police it becomes one of schooling or policing, and for housing it is seen as a problem of management. This seems at first to be a reasonable approach, until we look at the criminological evidence suggesting that crime is likely to be multi-faceted in its causes, and that the most effective remedies are therefore not single-handed attempts, but those requiring policies that span between the responsibilities of various executives. However, even within criminology the evidence is sparse and confused with a number of conflicting theoretical positions. The result is therefore that policy implementations appear to be moving in advance of theory: practical actions are being taken to meet the political objectives, but seldom with the requisite funds to review their effectiveness, particularly on a long-term basis.
The thesis takes this complex set of problems as its starting point in a review of the role of planning in crime prevention at a number of levels. It firstly considers in depth the various 'cause and solution' approaches expounded by academics to date, including the criminological perspective, the educational psychologist's view, the socio-economic school, arguments from the management faction, and the environmental design approach.

Within each approach lies an assumption which presumes that there is some causal relationship between crime and the solution proposed, which exerts some influence upon the incidence of crime to some greater or lesser extent. Thus, for example, it is assumed that levels of education are a determinant in an individual's likelihood to commit crime; that a person's socio-economic status influences the probability of them turning to crime; and that there is a positive relationship between space and its vulnerability to host criminal behaviour.

As guardians of the built environment, the approach which has the greatest implementation possibilities
for planners is that of the environmental design school. Although due to its traditional multidisciplinary mode, the social and management techniques are also influential.

The specific effect of the built environment upon crime rates has long been the cause of debate among academics, and we are realistically no closer to understanding the dynamics of crime and design today. The underlying assumption of the environmental design approach raises more general questions about the relationship between humans and the environment which they create about themselves. This includes questions of how people use urban space, the use made of an urban area by people, and the likelihood of particular forms of spatial structures facilitating certain types of behaviour. Such questions apply equally to all consumers of the built environment; criminals and potential victims alike. For this reason, the study will deal with those elements of space with which people most closely relate: residential areas. These represent the parts of the built environment where people live, and where they may rightly expect to enjoy safety and security, and the associated
psychological well-being.

Many academics and practitioners have clung to the now dated architectural determinist view that poor environments create crime. The theory of the criminal as a rational decision-maker opposes this, by suggesting that few offences are committed in a pure opportunist fashion. Rather, the potential offender makes the initial decision to offend, and reserves his final decision to the point at which his/her target has been selected. It is this theory which underpins the situational approach to crime prevention.

The environmental school of thought suggests that design influences the location of crime, and that spatial patterns will emerge as a result of the non-random behaviour of the criminal. The final decision to offend will be based on the most vulnerable (ie. the least risk) targets.

The school proposes two elements of environmental design which control the vulnerability of an environment:
In Chapter 2, a detailed examination of the most influential works in the design against crime genre will be presented, whilst also setting them within the context of other major academic contributors to the wider body of crime prevention literature.

There are essentially two conflicting theoretical camps within this approach, which will be critically examined in the study. The dominant and much publicised figures of Oscar Newman and Alice Coleman have both advanced theories of a causal relationship between design and crime, based on research in New York and London (respectively). The general theme of their work has contended that particular design variables (especially those related to high rise flat developments), increase crime by creating communal areas over which people have no sense of ownership or
responsibility. From their findings, both authors have recommended that to overcome these problems, concepts of 'defensible space' and 'natural surveillance' be incorporated into developments and refurbishment schemes.

Bill Hillier was not alone in his criticism of this approach, although he was perhaps the only academic in the environmental school of thought to provide an alternative. Hillier studied the processes which came together to create the 'organic city' (i.e. the city which has developed and evolved through time, without direct planning intervention). His research led to the development of a new theory of the way people use space, which became known as 'space syntax'. Hillier's main contention rests in the belief that crime prevention can be achieved through the provision of an integrated and permeable layout, which fosters natural through movement and self-policing of space.

The remaining body of the design against crime literature would expected to fall roughly into one or the other school of thought.
In the light of the current state of theory surrounding this complex subject, the reality on the ground will be considered and evaluated. The study poses the question of what influence the academic debate has had upon the practical activities of planners and other agencies involved in the creation and maintenance of the built environment.

In an attempt to present a comprehensive understanding of the problems faced by the bodies concerned with crime, Chapter 3 provides a critical examination of the current state of crime and its measurement. The Home Office published statistics (HOME OFFICE, 1992b) are discussed in relation to the findings of so-called 'victimization' surveys (which have tended to provide more accurate reflections of the incidence of crime in Britain today), and also in terms of any emerging regional disparities.

The response of the government, both directly and indirectly through its various departments, is scrutinized in respect of the published guidance (i.e. DoE Circulars and Planning Policy Guidance Notes), as well as various initiatives set up by the Police Force.
(for example, the Architectural Liaison Officer system, Secured By Design, etc.).

The primary focus upon the role of planning through the statutory powers of the local planning authority, with particular regard to it's potential as a design against crime co-ordinating body, is critically analysed in Chapter 4. Existing liaison procedures and policies (where in existence) are evaluated for local planning authorities in England, together with an explanation of the respective perceived roles and responsibilities to crime of the other agencies involved in the producing and managing the built environment. The most expedient method to obtain such information from other development industry professions, was considered to be via their respective professional bodies. The representative organisation was expected, through its function as a regulator of professional standards and a central policy formulation and information point, to be able to indicate the position taken by that agency with regard to the issue of design against crime.

The results of the study of local planning authority
responses to government advice on measures to adopt to aid crime prevention is also examined in a spatial context. The research set out to question whether the regional variations in crime rates were reflected in the provision of policies and the implementation of initiatives and liaison procedures aimed at tackling this issue.

Chapter 5 presents a detailed case study of two public housing estates in Buckinghamshire. This element of the research investigates the rate and location of crime on the two estates, with particular regard to the spatial attributes and characteristics of the residents, of each. The level of council property sales and the allocation policies of the local authority are also examined in relation to the incidence of crime in the case study areas.

Potential problems are highlighted from the findings, and suggested crime prevention solutions are made on the basis of the findings, which recommend improvements that could be made to the physical design and layout of the estates to reduce crime.
There are many forms of crime, a good deal of which would still occur irrespective of how well designed an urban residential environment was. What this thesis sets out to consider is the complexity of such a boundless subject and the problems of dealing with such inter-disciplinary issues, which by their very nature, take little regard of administrative divisions of responsibility.
The causal factors to which crime is attributed are broad in origin and complex in nature. Such factors as poverty, unemployment, lack of education, poor management and design are all held to contribute to the undesirable end product. It is perhaps due to the very multi-faceted composition of crime, together with its very emotive properties, which has drawn the interest of researchers from such a diverse range of disciplines. Criminologists, psychologists, sociologists, architects, urban geographers and planners have all tried their hands at pinpointing the 'root cause' of crime and offering their particular brand solution. The academic literature in this field may therefore first appear somewhat large and cumbersome, however it may be more easily digested when categorised according to the 'cause and solution' school from which the work has emerged. Within this chapter there will be a particular emphasis upon the approaches to crime prevention and reduction over
which planning has control, principally environmental
design. However, due attention will also be given to
education, socio-economic and management theories,
which set the situational crime prevention literature
within its proper context.

CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL

It is worthwhile pausing briefly to consider the
thought processes of the criminal. What provokes him
or her to commit a crime? Traditional criminological
approaches drew heavily upon early medico-
psychological models, which took the view that the
impetus to commit crime was inherent in the criminal
and that he/she was spurred on by some internal drive.
The origin was believed to have been the product of
biological inheritance, early learning experiences or
exposure to unfavourable social environments. However, this 'born and bred' theory presented a
rather defeatist and pessimistic view of crime and
also the ability of crime prevention methods to deter;
indicating that the criminal's internal drives would
simply lead to the displacement of crime to a 'softer'
target (CORNISH & CLARKE, 1986: 2-6).

25
Fortunately, the current approaches offer a more positive outlook and a model which enables us to take account of different crime types, ranging from armed robberies to graffiti, whilst also applying equally to those committed for expressive or acquisitive justifications. In this context, acquisitive crimes are those which seek to obtain money, goods, etc, whilst expressive crimes may fulfil a more personal need or desire, for example murder and rape. The model described by Cornish and Clarke (1986) takes the view that the criminal is a rational decision maker who moves through a series of cognitive steps before actually committing the crime. This may be illustrated as shown in Figure 2.1 below.

**Figure 2.1 Rational Decision Making Theory**

```
        COSTS
          (RISKS & EFFORT)
             |
             |
             |
             |
            BENEFITS
             |
             |
             |
             |
             |
        DECISION TO COMMIT CRIME
            \
            \
            \
            \
            OPPORTUNITY ARISES
            \
            \
            \
            \
            TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITY
            \
            \
            \
            \
            COMMIT CRIME
```
The fact that the criminal is a rational decision maker is straightforward enough, but what is more difficult to ascertain is his/her strength of motivation to commit the crime. Where motivation to commit an offence is very strong, ie. when the criminal is determined to perform a particular crime and fulfil a need (whether acquisitive or expressive), the location of the crime itself could be continually displaced (in theory) until a softer target is found. A simple example would be the motivation of a drug addict to find money for their next fix, who may be unshaken by the existence of an alarm system on the first dwelling selected, and would simply continue looking for a house without one. The motivational aspect is undoubtedly a grey area, however it has serious implications for crime prevention theory. Perhaps it is this factor which is preventing us from pinpointing the 'root' causes, and hence identifying appropriate solutions.
THE EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY APPROACH

The main contention of this approach is the belief that crime can be curbed if children are educated adequately in the home and at school, such that they are able to differentiate between right and wrong, and act accordingly. As such, it is supportive of the use of schools and homes in detecting and treating signs of behavioural problems at an early age. The underlying assumption presumes that a predisposition to crime is learnt, and that it is not inherent as advocated by the early traditional criminological theorists.

Writers such as Rutter and Giller (1984, cited in HEAL, 1991) have commented upon the importance of improved school ethos and peer influences in their discussion of the prevention of juvenile crime. They also considered that teachers and parents had a particular role in ensuring that they declared unequivocal disapproval of delinquency.
Anne Court, an educational psychologist, presented a refreshing paper on the role of this bi-disciplinary approach to juvenile crime prevention at a recent crime symposium (1992). She argued for education in homes as well as schools, and discussed the rapidly changing nature of our society and with it our traditional family norms.

Court's argument focused firstly on the need for parents to realise that the autocratic parental methods of the past are not appropriate in our present day 'new democratic' society. Children now have status comparable to adults and as a result, the 'rewards and punishments' system of yesteryear is ineffective and often regarded as unsuitable by society nowadays (for example, through use of violence). Parents and children no longer know precisely what role they are expected to play, and this has led to what Court refers to as "confused parents, who have lost power over their children" (COURT, 1992: 12). The corollary of this retreat from traditional mores has been the product of the sixties 'permissive society', which indulged children in love and replaced teaching with learning through discovery,
according to Court. She suggests that this latter approach has given children much freedom without the requisite sense of responsibility.

The answer, she argued, was in parental education to demonstrate ways of teaching parents how to bring up children in this new emerging democracy in the home. More to the point, she stressed the ineffectiveness of customary corrective measures in both homes and schools, and indicated that such techniques may actually increase problematic behaviour.

The second strand of Court's theory dealt with what she termed the crucial role of the school. Teachers, as with parents, need to understand the reason for misbehaviour, and to this end she advocated the establishment of a new type of pupil/teacher relationship.

In terms of their impact upon crime prevention, Court foresaw the role of schools for:

[1] Tackling behavioural problems in schools
[2] Supporting young people with problems
Involving young people with the police through crime prevention initiatives

However, it was stressed that the involvement of the pupils was an essential ingredient for success of school and community efforts in this sphere. The alternative, direct punishment means (including young offender institutions) were considered by Court, through her experience with young people who had been referred to her from the criminal justice system, to be ineffectual as a method of deterring and preventing crime by juveniles. Much more positive was to concentrate efforts on prevention via provision of effective treatment (i.e. individual or group counselling, in the juvenile's 'natural habitat'), for young people displaying tendencies for delinquency and crime.

Court's argument is persuasive and logical, although supported by no scientific research. It is nevertheless likely to be popular in both mainstream society and among politicians, given the current public concerns regarding juvenile crime. The socio-economic fraternity would also be expected to be
receptive towards such a view, for its sociological perspectives. However, they are perhaps likely to be less enthusiastic about her belief that social and economic factors do not forming adequate 'explanations' of crime.

In a recent French study, carried out by psychiatrists Zeiller and Laine (cited in THE GUARDIAN, 1993), the researchers considered the backgrounds of six hundred children who had committed violent crimes. They found that the majority of cases of violent adolescent crime were the result of the failure of the parents to provide role models. Fathers who had not protected their children from criminal impulses (as they themselves were delinquent or alcoholic), and mothers who had failed to provide an environment in which the child's personality could develop, were blamed for the resultant insecurity and fear of abandonment that juvenile criminals experienced. Failure at school was an inevitable element in the scenario; adding support for Court's argument which promotes early detection of such behavioural disorders.
THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC APPROACH

This approach sees the basis for crime as originating from factors essentially outside of the direct control of the criminal as he/she strives to fulfil basic needs, and resting instead with the structure of the society. Poverty, unemployment, lack of education, class differences, ethnic minorities, etc, all form part of the basis of the socio-economic argument for the 'causes' of crime. The 'solutions' therefore tend to be heavily political in their nature, often advocating fundamental changes to societal structure as the primary means by which crime can be reduced and/or eliminated.

Marxian criminology, usually referred to as 'left idealism', reinterprets power struggles as class struggles and takes the view that the law reinforces class domination, therefore disproportionately affecting the working classes. In this theory, crime is considered to be a phenomenon of capitalism, and hence is only likely to cease to exist when the need
for the state and law has dwindled (see YOUNG, 1979 and LOWMAN, 1989 for a review). However, Young (1979) criticised the 'left realism' approach for tending to romanticise the criminal, ignoring victims of intra-working-class crime by concentrating on crimes inflicted upon the powerful, viewing all crime as the product of class conflict, and the rather inconceivable notion that a socialist political order would obviate the need for a criminal justice system at all.

The work of the Chicago school in the early part of this century by the likes of Park and Burgess (1925, cited from 1967 edition), and Shaw and Mckay in 1942 (cited in VAN DER VOORDT, 1988), discovered a strong correlation between high offence rates and social variables such as poor housing, unemployment, high mobility of tenants (particularly new immigrants), etc. The theory was to become known as 'social disorganisation', and was believed to be self-perpetuating as the influx of new immigrants into Chicago continued. However, Bottoms and Wiles outline a number of studies which have found fault with the concept, and have argued that illegal behaviour may
not be a product of 'disorganisation', but instead the result of an organised, alternative set of normative values (BOTTOMS & WILES, 1991).

Social geographer Susan Smith has written much work on the socio-economic aspects of the occurrence of crime. Smith has paid considerable attention to fear of crime, and has found that differential distributions of rates of fear among the population, may be explained in terms of the effects of age, gender, physical and economic powerlessness, and the influence of children. Furthermore, council housing tenants were found to suffer a disproportionately high impact of crime (in terms of fear as well as actual occurrence of crime). She suggested that is could be argued to be a consequence of high offender-rate populations in the public housing sector: the poor, the unemployed, children from 'problem' families, and so on (SMITH, 1989).

Mawby's paper 'Policing And The Criminal Area' (1989) considered the proposition that police practices influenced area crime rates, in that areas of higher police presence were likely to invoke higher offence
rates. He found, however, that victimisation surveys (such as the British Crime Survey) did not support this thesis. Quoting Hough and Mayhew's report on the second BCS sweep (1985), Mawby suggests that their findings demonstrate that 'multi-racial areas' and the 'poorest council estates' suffered from the highest rates of crime and high levels of fear of crime (using the ACORN Classification of neighbourhood type, see Appendix A for classification types).

Writers from other academic fields have also acknowledged the importance of social and economic factors in the incidence of crime, including environmental criminologists Brantingham and Brantingham (1975), and management approach advocator, Wilson (1978 & 1980). However, this approach confines its approach to the rate of crime, and does not succeed in being able to conclusively predict the location of crime.
THE ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN APPROACH

It is fortunate that the advancement of knowledge in the concept of architectural determinism has superseded its simplistic and mythical origins. The belief that design of urban space has the capability to incite its inhabitants to commit crime, has been replaced if not by an equally blameful scapegoat, by the acknowledgement that whilst a relationship may exist, we have not been able to ascertain its precise nature. There are, however, two principal areas which researchers have discussed with respect to design and crime: the more obvious arguments that particular elements of poor design provide 'opportunities' for crime; and the contentions concerning the less apparent implications of poor design and its impact upon community structure. That is, the effect that modern housing design has had upon community networks and other forms of social infrastructure which are presumed to inhibit crime.
OPPORTUNITY PROVISION:

In the Rational Decision Making theory of the criminal, as exposed by Cornish and Clarke (1986), and supported by Carter (1989), it is contended that the decision to commit an offence is made in advance of its precise location being determined. Thus, in these terms, 'opportunity' may be considered to be the availability of a target which presents the least risk of the offender being detected. It is therefore important not to use the term in the most obvious literal sense, as rarely does the presentation of an opportunity in isolation (ie. without the prerequisite decision to offend being made) provoke the crime to be committed (BENNETT, 1986: 41).

As a proportion of the total crimes committed, so-called 'opportunity crimes' rank highly. For crime prevention it is therefore logical to attempt to manipulate the physical opportunities in order to influence the final decision to offend. This body of literature concerns itself with the identification of the elements in the physical environment which are most conducive to the pre-formed intentions of the criminal.
The academic works divide themselves roughly into two groups, dependant largely upon the author's position concerning the presence of people in urban space. These groupings broadly reflect the belief that either residential areas should be designed so as to limit through routes in order that strangers to an area are conspicuous and may be readily identified, or that their very presence will perform a self-policing function. In other words; keeping people out versus allowing them through.

Oscar Newman's seminal work 'Defensible Space' (1972) heralded the arrival of what may be termed the 'exclusionary theories'. His proposals were noteworthy for his bold contention that physical design could influence crime and anti-social behaviour. The American architect planner promoted the idea that to design a built environment which encouraged the establishment of territoriality (ie. the creation of spheres of influence) and corresponding surveillance over such territory, was crucial in the fight against crime. Furthermore, Newman believed that from this a sense of community responsibility of the residents of an area would
emerge, thus aiding the defence of that area against intruders.

In order to help to illustrate his theory, 'space' was broken down into four elements, thus:

[1] **Private Spaces** are the most personal areas which are least overlooked and which have restricted access. For example, the interior of a dwelling.

[2] **Semi-Private Spaces** may be enclosed or open, but which have real or symbolic thresholds to enable it to be clearly identified as belonging to somebody. Such areas are still personal, although may incur overlooking, such as front or rear garden areas.

[3] **Semi-Public Spaces** are open or semi-enclosed spaces which have direct access to public spaces. Open plan front garden areas and communal lobby areas to flats are two examples of such spaces, which are shared by too many households for anyone to accept responsibility for it.

[4] **Public Spaces** represent the most open areas which
have unrestricted access from all adjacent spaces. These areas tend to be used by the general public as well as being extensively overlooked, and include streets and open areas.

In 'defensible space' terms, private and semi-private spaces should be maximised, whilst semi-public areas should be avoided where possible (McKENZIE & McKENZIE, 1978).

'Defensible Space' emanated from Newman's study of public housing estates in New York in which he studied levels of crime and vandalism for every block in the study group. The aim of the research was to establish, using quantitative means, what design features attracted crime and vandalism. The most detailed work presented in the book relates to a comparison and contrast of two of the estates from the project, and focused upon the design characteristics and crime levels within them: Brownsville, constructed in 1947; and Van Dyke, built in 1955.

From his findings Newman was able to advance eight design variables which were significantly correlated
with crime levels. Of these, three characteristics may be highlighted which he believed to be particularly responsible for providing opportunities to commit crime. These were anonymity, lack of surveillance and the presence of alternative escape routes. Anonymity represents the impersonal nature of some residential areas, where residents do not tend to know their neighbours and therefore where strangers can not be distinguished from legitimate residents. The principle of surveillance, to which Newman gives so much weight, concerns the 'visibility' of a space. Lack of surveillance in a location provided ideal opportunity for the criminal to operate unobserved. The third characteristic, alternative escape routes, relates to the availability of offenders to benefit from means of escape networks, even if detected.

But perhaps more significant is Newman's claim to have demonstrated that the link between his identified design characteristics and crime was causal. His justification for this statement came directly from his 'evidence' that crime rates were reduced when certain design elements were improved.
However Newman's work has not gone uncriticised, far from it. Hillier's article entitled 'In Defence Of Space' (1973), began by launching an attack on the very basis of Newman's thesis - the concept of 'territoriality' - before moving on to devour the statistical evidence presented in it.

Drawing on anthropological and archaeological research, Hillier criticised the use of 'territoriality' as the universal explanation of spatial behaviour. Tracing the origins of the concept, Hillier considers territorial behaviour as it originated in the need to define and defend space, as animals do. In human societies, however, this is largely a symbolic exercise in which people mark out their territory with symbols to warn others away. In Hillier's view, 'territoriality' is a scientifically weak notion when applied to man.

The criticism of 'Defensible Space' continues when Hillier describes as "nonsense" Newman's argument that the statistical evidence presented proves that design causes crime. According to Hillier, nothing within the book substantiates the claim that there is a direct relationship between the two, although he does
admit his personal belief that the built form can encourage crime and fear of crime. An alternative hypothesis is forwarded which Hillier describes as being both more obvious and more likely. This contends that there are underprivileged groups in society from where criminals emerge, and such groups are (whether through unwitting or deliberate policy selection) concentrated in the high rise blocks on large estates in the study. If this were the case, then clearly it would point to the same results as those found by Newman.

Newman is further criticised for not carrying out a test of statistical significance on his results and also for the lack of a full presentation of his statistical findings. In particular, the complex statistical terminology would, Hillier points out, be unfamiliar to many architects who may therefore unquestioningly accept the argument presented, as they are unable to counter it. Through his own analysis of the appendices in 'Defensible Space' which provide data on the 'move-ins' to the two case study estates, Hillier finds that rather than linking design and crime directly, the results are supportive of the
notion that a systematic selective allocation process is in operation. That is, the better-off people were being moved into the better estate, and therefore crime rates would be expected to be lower there.

However, the resounding flaw in 'Defensible Space' in Hillier's view, is the "gross oversight" which has presented a statistical case being made in favour (and therefore connected to) Newman's argument. To quote: "Defensible Space is a bad book about a very important subject" (HILLIER, 1973: 543).

Mawby, in his paper 'Defensible Space: A Theoretical and Empirical Appraisal' (1977) begins by trying to set the popularity of Newman's work within an explanatory context. He then contends that two factors are responsible:

"First, although Newman's theory may generally be applied to any design, it is most explicitly levelled at high rise developments, and thereby has gained support from the increasing number of critics of such developments. Second ... Newman claims
that his theory has been substantiated by a meticulous research project."(MAWBY, 1977: 169)

It is the latter of these two factors which provides the basis for Mawby's criticisms. Although it is acknowledged that Newman's research findings are obscured within the text and thus rather difficult to critically appraise, he identifies three major shortcomings.

[1] The bulk of Newman's 'proof' to support his theory is derived from a comparison of only two estates. No comparability is offered between these two projects and the remaining 167 in his research, which could lead one to believe that these two specific estates have been selected as they best demonstrate his theory.

[2] Whilst a substantial amount of data is presented for the two in depth studies, it is possible that some vital data has been omitted, and more is simply not discussed. For example, socio-economic data is rather limited and relates to
'move-ins' only.

[3] Newman fails to discuss the offender rates (ie. the number of offenses committed during a given time) for the two case studies, nor the extent to which crime is committed by locals or non-residents (MAWBY, 1977: 171)

Other criticisms have also been levelled against the 'scientific' nature of Newman's work, including Poyner (1983) and Bottoms (1974: 206), who in his review of Defensible Space quite correctly concluded

"Newman has, in short, drawn our attention to an important theme, but by the crudity of his treatment of it has run a serious risk of debasing the importance of the theme".

It is clear that Defensible Space has attracted its fair share of criticisms, however the contribution it has made to the publicity of design against crime has been substantial.

Alice Coleman's 'Utopia on Trial' (1985) offered fresh
support for Newman's work. Using official statistics, verbal testimony and 'social malaise' indicators, Coleman and her team examined a sample of over 4,000 blocks of flats and 4,000 houses. She used a 'trial' format for her report, in which the accused were not so much the people involved in Post-War housing, but the 'utopian vision' which was believed to have inspired them. The estates were mainly public housing estates in London, for which measures of the identified malaise indicators of litter, graffiti, number of children in care, vandal damage and excrement were related to the presence of various identified design features. Fifteen design features were identified which included height of blocks, number of dwellings per entrance, interconnected exits and whether entrances have street frontages or not, etc.

The results of Coleman's findings were graphed and it was concluded that social malaise characteristics increased directly with the size of the block of flats. Furthermore, it became clear from graphing each design variable that social malaise characteristics increased as the design variable
increased its value. There were found to be five design features in particular which, when linked to the indices, were most powerful in influencing their occurrence. These were dwellings per entrance, dwellings per block, number of storeys, overhead walkways and spatial organisation.

Perhaps the most crucial aspect of Coleman's work is her unwavering contention that design is the most important factor which influences peoples behaviour. Critics have picked up on her particular brand of architectural determinism, and her scientific method has also been hotly debated in the major architectural and planning journals.

Campbell, when reviewing 'Utopia on Trial' in AJ (1985) noted the imbalance between the 'prosecution' and the 'defence' case relating to matters such as the effects of poverty, unemployment, etc. These factors, it was suggested, were rapidly dismissed with brief and final answers which were therefore incapable of further questioning. Campbell concludes by stating of the work: "There is valuable material in it, but it is distorted and swamped by political and class
prejudice, by carelessness and by almost total historical ignorance".

But perhaps the most damning of Coleman's critics is Bill Hillier. In his paper 'City of Alice's Dreams' (1986), Hillier mounts a public exposure of what he terms 'shoddy research' and so-called 'scientific' claims, to the criticism he felt they deserved.

Beginning with her fundamental argument that there is a positive relationship between design and social malaise, Hillier takes exception to her lack of acknowledgement of any outside, third party factors in the equation. Social factors such as the concentration of children and problem families, which may in turn be influenced by the range of dwelling types and therefore the allocation policies of the local authority, are all equally important variables which would be likely to have an influence upon social malaise. Hillier therefore finds Coleman's work to be scientifically unsound in its whole theoretical basis.

The rather scathing exposure continues with a detailed criticism of the method of quantification used, and in
particular, the 'on-off switch' approach. Hillier acknowledges the difficulties in measuring the indicators of malaise used, but suggests that by using an 'on-off switch' method, you are virtually guaranteed to detect the presence of litter, for example, in a larger block which houses more people than a smaller one. Coleman seems to avoid asking the important question: are these design features more likely to be present in larger blocks? If this is in fact the case (and Hillier finds that most design features seem to vary with size), then her 'trend lines' are simply the same underlying flaw in the measurement technique repeatedly showing itself.

Hillier does not allow the criticism to rest there, and turns his attentions to the design 'solutions' forwarded by Coleman which have since become so fashionable to adopt. Essentially, he criticises Coleman's Design Improvement solutions for providing spaces which would, according to Hillier, be devoid of human presence and serve to isolate people from the public realm. His paper concludes with the ultimate cutting remark: "'Colemanism' is ... nothing less than the disease for which it claims to be the cure"
Brian Anson's article 'Don't Shoot The Graffiti Man' (1989) lashed out at the environmental determinists as a whole for choosing the "inanimate built environment as their scapegoat". In particular, he (quite rightly) stated that for each design disadvantagement theory propounded by Coleman and Newman, there would be examples which refuted them. Anson's criticisms of Coleman's work mainly concerned her attempted recreation of the concept of a 'virtuous poor' as in Victorian times, and the lack of adequate consideration of other reasons, aside from design, which produce crime.

The correspondence section in many academic journals were brimming with both critical and supportive letters following the publishing of Utopia on Trial. Kavanagh's piece in a March 1986 edition of AJ (1986) is perhaps typical of much of the scepticism with which Coleman's 'scientific' method was greeted. Kavanagh begins by questioning the justification for the selection of the 'social malaise' indicators used in the study, and save for the obvious ease of
quantification, there does not appear to be any indication as to exactly why particular attributes were selected. It is suggested that this should be treated with some suspicion. A large range of important socio-economic variables were also omitted, and the only poverty data was extracted from the reputedly unreliable 1981 population census, not to mention the incompatibility of the survey blocks with enumeration districts. All in all, Coleman's claims to have undertaken a scientific piece of research, despite the numbers of dwellings involved, are attacked and her design associations with them.

Given the criticisms levied against her work, and the offerings above are but a few, it would be all too easy to become subsumed amongst the detail. In a more general sense, is it not true that Coleman's work gave too great an emphasis to how an environment looked and used this, without adequate explanation, to extrapolate how a place was used. It does seem logical to assume that the visual impression of an environment may be indicative of the use made of it. However Coleman's use of this method is naive and superficial, and therefore fails to present a true and
The work of the architect Barry Poyner, although lesser known than Oscar Newman and Alice Coleman, has also provided some useful insights into the concept of crime prevention through design. Far from being a devotee of Newman's dogma, Poyner in his work 'Design Against Crime Beyond Defensible Space' (1983) was critical of the methods and what he considered to be the unsubstantiated arguments about the impact of design upon crime in 'Defensible Space'. Alternatively, Poyner acknowledged the lack of knowledge in his area, and highlighted the still underdeveloped status of the subject, even a decade after Newman's work.

But his attitude was not wholly critical, as he considered the various attempts which had been made to understand crime and the criminal (outside of the 'design' school), in order to eliminate or at least reduce crime levels. Having discussed the less than successful efforts to date, Poyner turns to the circumstances of crime itself and more particularly to the reduction of high incidence opportunity crime.
A unique feature of Poyner's work relates to his consideration of what is termed 'access control' and the importance that is subsequently place upon it. Poyner was a critic of Newman's invalidated concept of territoriality and shared Hillier's views in this respect. The term was replaced in Design Against Crime with the concept of 'accessibility' however it is here that the similarly with Hillier ends.

Through use of his own and others' research, Poyner sought to identify patterns of those crimes which most dominated the crime statistics. That is, burglary, vandalism, street violence, petty robbery and theft, in an era which preceded the arrival of large scale vehicle crime. On the basis of the regularities he found, Poyner tried to produce a kind of manual which could be used by practising designers and planners to, as the title suggests, design against crime.

From this rather unique approach (particularly in its day), a series of recommendations were put forward to reduce crime at a neighbourhood level, and more specifically for housing design. Some of the more salient points arising from the patterns which Poyner
identified included his arguments in favour of restricting access, ie. keeping people out. For example, street closure and privatisation were advocated to avoid through movement by restricting access for both vehicles and pedestrians; narrowing entrances to roads and privatising the road itself into the ownership of residents. This was seen to go hand in hand with the limiting of access to neighbourhoods up to a household level of dwelling numbers (4,000 dwellings) (POYNER, 1983). With regard to residential layout, Poyner also recommended that houses be designed so as not to have access, or be easily visible from, main through routes. Instead dwellings should only face onto and be accessed from side roads. By advocating such precise guidelines (although he is careful to refer to them as 'patterns'), Poyner is in fact reiterating the basic premise behind Newman's theory. That is, to avoid crime people should be discouraged from moving freely through an area (ie access control).

A recent work boldly entitled 'Crime Free Housing' (1991) was co-written by Poyner and psychologist Barry Webb which updated and expanded on Design Against
Crime. Crime Free Housing presents an analysis of all residential crimes, rather than solely burglaries which have been a popular choice to date. Each type of crime was analysed in terms of design and planning variable, which were considered to have a bearing on its distribution. The study was innovative in that it did not simply look at differences between individual houses, but compared a variety of forms of residential layout in a given area. From their research, Poyner and Webb found that crime was more a function of general layout than poor design of individual houses, and were able to set out twelve requirements which they contended needed to be incorporated in residential layout to provide crime free housing.

The requirements consisted of the following:-

[1] Moderate locking security

[2] Facing windows (mutual surveillance)

[3] High fences at sides and rear

[4] Front access to a secure yard (gated access to
rear gardens)

[5] Access for servicing and deliveries (provide access to dustbins, gas and electricity meters at front of dwelling to obviate need to enter the secure yard or dwelling)

[6] Space at the front (provide minimum 3 metre buffer between the dwelling and public access areas)

[7] On-curtilage hardstanding for cars (to control autocrime, provide parking within curtilage of dwelling, but preferably at the front for surveillance)

[8] A garage at the side of the house (garage's are preferable for the obvious security they provide for vehicles as well as garden furniture and equipment. Provide at side of house, as close as possible to front door)

[9] Limit road access (avoid creating through traffic routes by reducing the number of road access
points)

[10] Avoid through pedestrian routes (where separate from road ways, prevent the creation of networks through to other housing areas or open spaces)

[11] Surveillance of access road (orientate housing to face access routes and particular points of entry into an area)

[12] Green spaces outside housing areas (provide near the entrances to housing areas rather than within them). (POYNER & WEBB, 1991 : 97-101)

The twelve requirements were then considered in relation to existing guidelines and advice, they concluded that their suggestions could be easily accommodated within the framework of current practise. In fact, some of the developments underway at the time Poyner and Webb wrote the book, were found to meet most of the requirements in any case.

An important shift appears to have taken place in Poyner's thinking between the two works. From an
adamant belief in keeping housing 'tucked away' and not facing onto main through routes of housing areas, a more mellow undercurrent is evident in his latest work which advocates orientating dwellings at least towards access routes (Requirement 11). He also appears to have abandoned the Newmanesque street closure and privatisation recommendations forwarded in Design Against Crime (1983).

Overall, Poyner does not appear to have suffered at the hands of the critics to the extent that Newman and Coleman did. This may be due to the fact that his work was more scientifically sound, or simply that his particular slant of the 'keeping people out' school related more to common sense specifics than abstract theorising.

However, one can not help but wonder if the research drawn upon in Design Against Crime (1983) does not fit a little too neatly into Poyner's theory. For Crime Free Housing (1991) the criticism is not so much levied at the research, but rather at the basic thesis underlying the work, which is dismissive of any additional variables affecting crime except design and
management. The authors contend that you can methodologically remove opportunities for crime (presumably by adhering to the twelve points they have recommended), and therefore "no matter how many potential offenders there are, crime will not occur" (POYNER & WEBB, 1991: 30). The logical conclusion is that you can achieve crime free environments, hence the title of the book.

Notwithstanding the naivety of such a contention in which socio-economic factors are presented as weak elements in the crime equation, surely such a view ignores the whole concept of displacement. By adhering to the twelve commandments in an area, one would expect those who are predisposed to commit crime to simply offend in a neighbouring area which does not fulfil the dozen requirements.

Aside from placing a great deal of emphasis upon design and layout, some of Poyner's earlier recommendations are disturbingly 'classist' by nature. Indeed the location of wealthy or middle class housing "as far as possible from poorer housing" (Poyner 1983: 106) is reminiscent of the social engineering of the
developing world, in which the secure enclosures of the rich become urban fortresses designed to exclude the remainder of the (poor) population.

The 'inclusionary theories' represent the work of those who advocate keeping people in space in order to foster the provision of actual, as well as a sense of, security. Bill Hillier has been prominent in this role as a major critic of the works of both Newman and Coleman, and also his position as a leading theorist in the opposing camp.

Hillier advanced a fundamentally different view of how people use space. The rejection of Newman's 'territoriality' theory arose from his own study of the manner in which unplanned urban space is created by humans, that is, the formation of what he termed the 'organic city'. This was contrasted with the planned ideal city which was advocated in the 1960's and 1970's to replace the 'disorganised chaos' of the city which had evolved naturally and without conspicuous interruption until that time.

'Against Enclosure' (HILLIER, 1988) and 'Is Dense
Civilisation Possible' (HILLIER & PENN, 1991) both use examples of patterns of buildings and spaces (ie. 'grid' patterns) from around the world to illustrate Hillier's central argument that the structure of the grid generates natural movement through it in a predictable manner. The theory suggests that 'convex spaces', ie. those spaces united by a line of sight, can be used to understand the pattern of people's movement through the grid.

Using space syntax software, Hillier and his colleagues were able to map convex spaces onto urban areas and provide a quantifiable measure of the 'integration' of each space to the whole (ie how 'deep' it was in the system).

In 'Against Enclosure' (HILLIER, 1988), Hillier described the need to 'open up' rather than 'enclose' new estate developments, in a move which witnessed a departure from the notions of mainstream thinking of architects, planners and social geographers. Hillier argued that enclosure was contrary to the whole basis of the organic city as it decreased the scale of development significantly below that of the
surrounding areas, and restricted patterns of natural movement in doing so. In his article 'City of Alice's Dreams' (1986: 41) Hillier explained this as follows:

"The actual effect of this design principle is to create zones in our urban environment where no one ever goes unless they have to, As a result, most space is empty for most of the time, since the passage of people to and from their homes is never enough to create a sense of space being used. In these circumstances, the sudden presence of a stranger, which in a street seems to enhance security, seems threatening. The 'territorial' behaviour which may prompt us to ask what the stranger is doing there is not the solution to the problem. It is part of the problem. In streets, this does not happen because anonymity, like interaction, is a useful aspect of everyday decency. Which behaviour we adopt depends on where we are: it is determined by the architecture".
'Against Enclosure' took these beliefs and tested them on the streets of London, comparing rates of encounter with passers by in estates and in traditional street layouts. Hillier found that whereas in streets you have contact with other people most of the time, on estates people tend to be in their own space for the majority of the time (HILLIER, 1988).

This finding was then used to research into vulnerability to crime, and particularly burglary. Hillier discovered that burglary rates rise with segregation, such that the 'deeper' and less integrated a space is, the greater the likelihood of a property being burgled (all other factors being equal) (HILLIER, 1988).

Hillier showed that Newman's concept of territoriality was not the underlying principle of human spatial behaviour, and that the argument advanced by Jane Jacobs several decades earlier that the movement of people through space has a self-policing function, was closer to the truth (JACOBS, 1961).

Although Hillier's criticisms of 'Defensible Space'
and 'Utopia On Trial' were violently rebuffed by Coleman, she had rather less to say in response to his alternative theory. In fact, there appears to have been very little criticism from any source of his work to date. It may be that the complex space syntax software and statistical evidence forwarded by Hillier in support of his argument, proved too a daunting a task for dissection, or alternatively, that many simply accepted his argument for a logical interpretation of human spatial behaviour. Either way, whilst the mud-slinging continues in the 'defensible space' argument, Hillier's research remains in the main unrefuted to date, which must certainly strengthen its position as an important theory.

There have been other works which have promoted the idea of permeability and the desire to encourage natural movement through spaces including Bentley et al's designers manual, (1985) and Anson et al's work on Belfast's Divis Estate, (1986). However, little work has been published of comparative depth to that undertaken by Hillier. It seems to represent the less fashionable of the two distinct schools of thought,
although that may simply be a reflection of the success of the marketing techniques accompanying the 'exclusionary theories', which may appeal to an increasingly more 'private' society.

FAILURE TO CREATE 'COMMUNITY':

The second of the two pronged attack upon environmental design, relates to the effect that the built environment is believed to have on the formation of a community structure. It is argued that some forms of urban design fail to encourage the creation of a sense of community spirit, which in turn, is believed to be influential in reducing crime in an area. For example, when people know their neighbours well, they are more likely to question the presence of a stranger in a neighbours property and so inhibit the occurrence of crime.

Ebenezer Howard and Patrick Geddes, the founding fathers of the Garden City ideal were widely held to have formulated a prototype for the ultimate 'community', through urban design. Their hierarchical layout and neighbourhood 'niches' were believed to be
the base unit for the fostering of community spirit. However, Peter Ambrose in 'Whatever Happened To Planning?' (1986) is cynical of the ultimate aims of Howard and Geddes, and questions their social engineering motives. He suggests that, in a like fashion to the supposedly 'philanthropic' aims of great industrialists Salt, Cadbury and Lever, they may well have been motivated by the desire to maximise national economic performance and industrial efficiency, rather than purely the creation of a functional environment with community solidarity.

Architect planner Le Corbusier proposed a radical shift from traditional housing through the creation of modern tower blocks set in green parks, in the early part of this century. He had a vision of ideal community living and believed that by encapsulating people into a single building, in which each had unfettered access to clean air and sunlight, this could be achieved.

Then in 1957, Young and Willmott published their ethnographic study of 'Family and Kinship in East London', which considered the impact upon community
structure of rehousing from the terraced housing of Bethnal Green to an estate development in Essex. They found that the wholesale removal of an often unwilling population, produced a group of residents in the new estate who had not brought the strong community ethos of their former East End homes with them. Willmott and Young put this down to the absence of community cohesion by family and kinship ties, which they had found to be pre-dominant in the structure of the Bethnal Green community. Instead, people's new lives became house and possession centred, and competition emerged amongst neighbours for status through material acquisition, rather than neighbourliness (WILLMOTT & YOUNG, 1962).

However, the study has aged considerably now, as mobility in modern day society means that people are less likely to live in the same town as their relatives, let alone the same neighbourhood.

Jane Jacob's seminal work entitled 'The Death and Life of Great American Cities' (1961) had identified this phenomenon in the United States. Jacob's considered that the traditional community was being eroded by the
replacement of traditional streets with estate developments (mainly multi-storey, such as those studied by Newman a decade later). Street life and the associated through movement of people was disappearing according to Jacobs, and this was believed to contribute to community breakdown, and rising crime rates.

Martin Pawley's work 'The Private Future' in 1973 argued that public life was in the process of declining as people withdrew into their private worlds:

"Beyond the voluntary abandonment of social obligation and community life, and beyond the corresponding inhabitability of what is left of a public realm dominated by bureaucracy and crime, there is a pattern of private withdrawal which is as obscure in its psychology as it is apparently transparent in its external shape". (PAWLEY, 1973: 13).

He explained this partly in terms of the narrowing of
the definition of community in practise, from its historic and tradition meaning which encapsulated a body of people organised into a political, municipal or social unity. With urbanisation and urban renewal, he argued that people are now grouped into 'communities' purely on the basis of their ability to pay the land rent and obtain employment. There is clearly some basis for Pawley's argument, although if we were to accept this rather cynical view on the future of our society, there would seem to be little purpose in attempting to design for a community at all.

Thankfully, Reyner Banham's paper on the Park Hill flat scheme in Sheffield (1974) provides an example of success. The estate was designed to provide a high density development on a difficult site, sitting proudly on the Sheaf valley side. The project proposed the now famous 'streets in the air' in order to engender neighbourly, street-type friendliness and therefore to promote healthy community relationships. The irony was that the driving motive behind the scheme, according to Banham, was to destroy the existing local community and it was justified as
There was a well-known and well-studied body of person living on the lower Park Hill slopes whose outstanding characteristic was the highest rate of criminality in Britain, and the City simply decided to extirpate them, and destroy their lairs.

Disturbed they were, however; obliterated without trace. Any sense of community that invests the present inhabitants of those slopes is a recent growth without ancient roots on the ground". (BANHAM, 1974: 188)

He describes the manner in which tenants were carefully briefed about the project prior to moving in; how high-rise housing was not uncommon in Sheffield and therefore something which the new residents of Park Hill were accustomed to. More pointedly, Banham highlights the fact that Park Hill breaks all the 'rules' advocated by Newman, but in his view, works anyway. To support his argument, Banham describes the loyalty of Park Hill residents as
illustrative of this 'new' community which has been formed. He also marvels at the striking absence of vandalism on the estate, as a proven indicator of the success of the community reformation.

Banham's argument is now some twenty years old, and perhaps a different picture might emerge if one were to revisit Park Hill today. Hillier, writing at about the same time, questioned the use of "space as a means of stabilising social order", (HILLIER, 1973: 543), and related the use of block system architecture as a mass housing solution, to the treatment of lunatics and other deviants in the eighteenth century. In his later work (1986), he criticised the division of modern access decks and culs-de-sac, which by their very nature, segregated people from one another. Hillier argued:

"The idea that people interact and form sociable groups in these territories is the most infamous of all architectural fallacies and one which architects, it seems are managing to unlearn more quickly than social geographers". (HILLIER, 1986: 41)
The inference to the work of Alice Coleman relates to her attempt to explain the mechanisms of community structure as influenced by design. 'Utopia On Trial' (1985) set out to critically examine the products of the 1960's and 1970's which were so heavily influenced by Le Corbusier's ideas. Her work was based on the belief that Le Corbusier's Utopian vision had failed in reality, and she set about arguing her case against it and for the tried and tested inter-war semi's housing layout. The latter, Coleman argued, fostered community development by, for example, providing front gardens over which residents had a sense of propriety and would be likely to become acquainted with neighbours whilst tending to their respective lawns and flower borders. Her argument against flats echoed much of the work of her predecessor, Oscar Newman, in that flatted developments did not support community formation. This was put down to the absence of areas of defensible space and the abundance of undefined, public space over which residents were argued to have little common interest, and therefore little inclination towards community development (NEWMAN, 1972; COLEMAN, 1985).
Oscar Newman's later work 'Community of Interest' (1980) placed greater emphasis upon the formation of communities and the important role that this played in the control of crime and fear of crime. His views were reminiscent of those of Pawley, (1973) in that he foresaw the withdrawal of people from the public realm. However Newman believed this to be in response to our inability to cope with anti-social and criminal behaviour in such areas (NEWMAN, 1981: 5).

There is clearly a good deal of discussion regarding the manner in which community development can be fostered, or otherwise, by environmental design. However, it is at least accepted by most that community solidarity is a desirable objective, particularly in terms of the benefits it seems to have upon the incidence of crime in a locality.
THE MANAGEMENT APPROACH

The main contention of the management approach relates to allocation policies and what may be termed 'after sales service' offered by the local housing authority or housing association in public housing. A distinction is made at this point between public and private housing tenure which does not reflect the prejudices of researchers in this or previous studies; rather the natural prejudice of crime itself, which is thought to gravitate in and around public housing estates (see SMITH, 1989).

This approach sees the 'hands off' attitude of many local authorities as blameworthy for the continuing decline of quality of life in problem council estates. The alleged allocation biases of housing managers who allocate problem families to problem estates does little to foster amiable landlord/tenant relations across the board. Advocates of the 'management solution' argue for a more positive, interactionary role of the local housing authority or housing association in the management of public housing.
Wilson (1978: 674) argues that improved management and adequate tenant consultation have too frequently been omitted from modification schemes. Local authorities seem too concerned with modifying existing schemes the 'Newman way' to consider solutions beyond the concept of defensible space. Wilson continues with "... on existing schemes physical modifications along defensible space lines rarely resolve the social and management problems which tend to co-exist with those of poor design". Wilson's study of vandalism on London housing estates (1980) provided support for her statement, and she added that for every example of poor design, an equally strong counter argument could be put forward illustrating a low crime rate estate with the same or similar design features. However, the point seems to be stretched a little too far in the statement "New allocation policies rather than physical improvements can bring housing into use which authorities may feel needs total refurbishment or even demolition.". It seems inconceivable that such a simple mechanism could defy all other 'ills'.

In a study of an inner city council housing estate in Liverpool, Hunter (1978) analyzed the effect of a
scheme with design modifications 'a la Newman'. He concluded that the local authority housing department needed to take a much more positive role in order to make the refurbishment as a whole a success. To demonstrate this he cited the entry-phone system which had been installed and was not welcomed by the tenants. The system was subsequently vandalised in protest. Fencing and planters which had been used to help demarcate semi-private external ground areas were vandalised and destroyed. Although the formation of private garden areas to ground floor flats was considered a success - an element which has proved worthwhile in many flat modification schemes around the country.

Hunter acknowledges the difficulties of allocation mechanisms, but remains adamant in his view that "Housing managers, understandably perhaps, tend to place difficult families in the worst stock and the ghetto syndrome ensues". He continues in his emphasis on the management perspective by proposing that "neighbourhood organisations are best placed to perceive the total problems of their locality", and promotes the use of such bodies in order to achieve
solutions which take full account of the total problems of an area.

A more recent article by Stollard (1990) concurs with Hunter's views on the necessity for utilizing and involving the rich local resource of a community group to obtain the full picture. Stollard's article 'Building Safer Neighbourhoods' continues by outlining ideas for setting up steering groups and identifying priorities.

The message is clear: co-ordination and co-operation at all levels, not simply the imposition of improvements aimed at reducing crime on an unwilling population.

The academic journals and literature are brimming over with arguments for and against one approach to crime prevention or another. To summarise the main points arising from this chapter:

* The criminal is believed to be a rational decision-maker, and his/her
behaviour is therefore not random

* Educational Psychology Approach - stresses the importance of education at home and in schools as a form of crime prevention, detection and treatment of children with behavioural problems at an early stage, the impact of changes in family norms with respect to children's educational and psychological development, including the effect of negative parental role models.

* Socio-Economic Approach - advocates a diverse argument which contends that social and economic factors such as public housing, unemployment, ethnic minorities, single parent families etc all influence crime.

* Environmental Design Approach - comprises of two main themes. Within the 'opportunity provision' stream, two
opposing theoretical camps: Keep people out (Newman and Coleman) versus Keep people in (Hillier and Anson). The 'community formation' theme has been the subject of debate over a long period of time which is not the subject of a consensus in approach, either.

* Management Approach - stresses the importance of an integrated and co-operative approach between management bodies, tenants, as well as developers and designers of refurbishment schemes.

The following chapter links the theory to the Government's response, arising from a consideration of the actual pattern of crime in England.
CHAPTER 3

THE STATE OF CRIME AND
THE STATE'S RESPONSE

For an issue which attracts such wide reporting and sensationalised headlines, crime remains notoriously difficult to measure. So much so, that recording and non-recording of offence rates has become an issue in itself. The government has invested resources in the collection, processing and publication of criminal statistics for England and Wales, within the Home Office. Armed with these vital statistics, we may well question what efforts have been made to reverse and reduce the clearly escalating crime rates, and also consider if there's a spatial dimension to the problem. Furthermore, what response has the government and other state agencies (most obviously, the police force) made to the problem of crime in England and Wales?

The official Statistical Bulletin produced quarterly
by the Home Office records notifiable offences in England and Wales across a twelve month period. The document provides information on only those offences which are notified to, and subsequently recorded by, Home Office police forces. The Home Office do however acknowledge that there are many offences which go unreported to the police, or which are not recorded by them. As a result, changes in the number of offences recorded do not necessarily accurately reflect the change in the amount of crime committed (HOME OFFICE, 1992b).

In numerical terms, 5.5 million offences were recorded by the police in England and Wales between July 1991 and June 1992. This represented an 11% increase (or, an additional 531,000 offences) on the previous twelve month period. Broken down, 94% of the total crime figure represented crimes against property, whilst 5% accounted for violent crimes against the person (violence against the person, sexual offences and robbery). The remaining 1% accounted for other types of crimes. Figure 3.1 graphically illustrates a further breakdown of crime types. What is particularly relevant from a planning point of view,
is the high proportion of burglary and vehicle crimes (24% and 28% of the total, respectively). The 16% rise in incidences of burglary (July 1991 to June 1992) is fairly evenly split between residential and non-residential targets, whilst vehicle crimes rose 9% for theft from and 4% for theft of a motor vehicle (HOME OFFICE, 1992b).

Figure 3.1 Notifiable Offences Recorded By The Police, England & Wales (July 1991 - June 1992)

Other theft 24%

Vehicle crime 28%

Burglary 24%

Other offences

Violent crime 5%

5.5 million offences

SOURCE: HOME OFFICE, 1992b: 2
For non-Home Office police forces (mainly consisting of British Transport Police, Ministry of Defence and UK Atomic Energy Authority), British Transport Police record the largest proportion of offences - 72,500 out of the 80,000 total notifiable offences for the twelve month period to June 1992.

The Home Office Statistical Bulletin detailing notifiable offences in England and Wales is heavily caveated with references to the fact that the total number of crimes committed, for one reason or another, do no all appear in its 'official statistics'. The British Crime Survey (BCS) was first carried out by a unit within the Home Office in 1982, then again in 1984, and most recently published information from the 1988 survey. The survey sought to gather information on people's experience of crime from a sample of over 10,000 households in England and Wales, and to extrapolate the findings to provide an estimate of the proportion of unrecorded crimes. Figure 3.2 provides an indication of the degree of unreported and unrecorded crimes, in relation to the proportion of offences which finally become the 'official statistics'.

85
Figure 3.2  Attrition Within The Criminal Justice System

Percentage of offences (1) committed

100% Offences Committed

41% Offences reported

26% Offences recorded

7% Offences cleared up

4% (2) Offences resulting in a caution or conviction

3% (2) Offences resulting in a conviction

(1) Criminal damage; theft of a motor vehicle; theft from a motor vehicle; theft in a dwelling; bicycle theft; burglary; wounding; robbery; sexual offences and theft from the person

(2) Estimates include additional findings of guilt at any court appearance and offences taken into consideration

From this, it is clear that only approximately 26% of offences committed are reported and subsequently recorded by the police. However, the BCS found that each type of crime had its own likelihood of being reported. Estimates from the BCS of each crime category are reproduced in Figure 3.3, below.

Figure 3.3 Levels Of Recorded And Unrecorded Crime

1988 BCS Estimates

SOURCE: MAYHEW et al, 1989: 10
Clearly, for some types of crime, reporting of an offence is a pre-requisite before making an insurance claim. For other offences, police practice may dictate that all offences notified to them are recorded, allowing no discretion. Alternatively, some reported offences may not have been recorded if the police are not satisfied that there is sufficient evidence of a crime having been committed, or that the victims account of the incident is mistaken or disingenuous. The BCS (1989) also considered reasons for not reporting crimes to the police and found that in most instances the victim considered the incident too trivial to report (either involving no loss or damage, or otherwise too inconsequential). In other cases, victims felt that the police would not have been able to do anything, or that the matter would be better dealt with by themselves than by the police. Less frequently cited as justification for non-reporting was the inconvenience of reporting, dislike of the police and fear of reprisals.

The BCS (1989) also found that the decision to report a crime was heavily reliant on the victim's assessment of the seriousness of the offence. Overlying this
element were two additional factors - the personal advantages of doing so (eg. recovering property, reducing fear of further victimisation, getting police assistance or fulfilling insurance requirements), and the moral obligation to notify the police.

What is not clear is why reporting levels have increased over the preceding decade or so, rising from an estimated 36% in 1981 to 41% of offences being reported in 1987 (BCS, 1989). The BCS research has suggested that public sensitivity to crime has increased through crime prevention activities (eg. Neighbourhood Watch Schemes) and/or that people are less tolerant of anti-social behaviour. Alternatively, more practical reasons are forwarded such as greater access to (working) telephones (public and private) and increased home ownership and hence likelihood of taking out insurance.

The value of the BCS findings are invaluable when considering the state of crime nationally, however it remains 'best guesswork' and does only measure selective notifiable offences recorded by the police. As such, the official recorded figures must continue
to form the basis for an indicator of crime and hence police workload, but always having regard to the work of the BCS.

The distribution of crime across the country raises an interesting spatial question. Where do the majority of crimes occur, and where are you most likely to become the victim of crime? As will be demonstrated, the two questions are not necessarily inter-dependent. Figure 3.4 indicates the number of notifiable offences recorded by each police force in England between July 1991 and June 1992.

The Metropolitan Police Force stands significantly ahead of the remainder of the country, perhaps reinforcing the popular view of the capital as a high crime rate city. The forces of West Yorkshire (including Leeds and Bradford), West Midlands (Birmingham and its conurbation), Thames Valley (incorporating Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire), Northumbria (consisting of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Sunderland, etc) and Greater Manchester all reported numbers of offences at levels greatly above the remainder of the country. Even so, these only
Figure 3.4  Number Of Notifiable Offences By Police Force Area

SOURCE: HOME OFFICE, 1992b
accounted for one third to one half of that of the Metropolitan Police Force. Lowest ranked the City of London force, although Wiltshire, Warwickshire and Suffolk fared well (in relative terms), too.

Clearly, to simply take the number of offences as the base point can appear misleading, as no account is taken of the number of people living within each police force area. Figure 3.5 controls for population to provide a crime rate per capita for each police force area (PFA). The City of London appears throughout as something of an anomaly, as whilst the night-time population is very small (somewhere in the region of 5,000 people), the daytime influx may reach as high as 330,000. It is this latter figure which is the basis for Home Office resource allocation and the like, and has therefore been used for the purposes of obtaining a crime rate per capita figure.

Setting aside the City of London, the most outstanding feature of the graph is the 'Top 5' PFA's whose actual per capita crime rate soars ahead of the rest: West Yorkshire, Nottinghamshire, Northumbria, Humberside and Cleveland. The Metropolitan Police Force,
Figure 3.5 Offence Rates By Police Force Area (July 1991 to June 1992)

POLICE FORCE AREAS

SOURCE: FROM STATISTICS IN HOME OFFICE, 1992b & HOME OFFICE, 1993
contrary to the indication given in Fig. 3.4, indicates a fairly average crime rate on a per capita basis. The graph demonstrates the importance of ensuring that the number of offences is adjusted to take account of the population of an area. With the exception of the West Yorkshire and Northumbria forces, the number of notifiable offences alone presents a wholly different picture, and is therefore misleading when considering crime in a spatial context.

An interesting relationship is revealed when the population of each PFA is plotted against the number of offences recorded between July 1991 and June 1992. Figure 3.6 indicates a trend which suggests that as the size of the population increases, so too does the rate of offences. This finding has serious implications for underlying 'causes' of crime (in terms of rates of crime), and it would therefore be logical to assume that more densely populated areas (i.e. cities) are more prone to high crime rates. Such an argument is supported by Katzman (1980), who contended that urbanisation positively influenced crime. However, the sheer numbers of people in a
Figure 3.6 Population Versus Number Of Offences (July 1991 to June 1992)

NOTIFIABLE OFFENCES (BY PFA)

(Thousands)

SOURCE: HOME OFFICE, 1992b, and HOME OFFICE, 1993
given area is insufficient in itself to explain the distribution of crime across the country, or it's rate of increase. The graph illustrates a deviation from the general trend, which record the position for the 'Top 5' PFA's. This would tend to support the idea that there is some other external factor at work in the crime equation.

In a breakdown of the main crime classifications, it was interesting to consider the position of these same five PFA's. The main offence categories analysed include burglary, vehicle crime, violence against the person (VAP), sexual offences and robbery. It should be noted that these are not exhaustive categories, however they are felt to represent the most relevant areas of crime to this study. Vandalism (which is notoriously difficult to measure) has not been included as often such offences of intentional and malicious damage to property tend, when it is recorded, to be classified as criminal damage. Criminal damage does not appear due to the very wide scope of offences contained within this category. The following offers definitions as used by the BCS (1989: 121-124) in its work for each:
BURGLARY - Entering a dwelling as a trespasser with the intention of committing theft, rape, grievous bodily harm or unlawful damage, whether the intention is carried through or not. Note: although BCS figures refer to domestic burglaries, police statistics also include burglaries of commercial premises.

VEHICLE CRIMES - This covers two categories: theft of refers to theft or unauthorised taking of a vehicle (where the vehicle is driven away illegally, whether or not it is recovered); and theft from motor vehicles describes theft of parts, accessories and contents. If parts or contents are stolen as well as the vehicle being moved, the incident is classified as theft of a motor vehicle.

VIOLENCE AGAINST THE PERSON - This refers to serious assaults including wounding, involving severe injuries intentionally inflicted; other wounding, which involves less serious injury or severe injuries unintentionally inflicted; and common assaults, which are assaults or attempted assaults resulting in no or negligible injury. The terms excludes sexually motivated attacks. Note: common assaults tend not to
be treated by the police as notifiable offences.

**SEXUAL OFFENCES** - Offences which included rape (and attempts), woundings with a sexual motive, and indecent assault.

**ROBBERY** - Completed or attempted theft of personal property or cash directly from the person, accompanied by force or the threat of force. Robbery is distinguished from other thefts from the person which involve speed or stealth rather than force or threat.

The graphs illustrating the rates for each offence category, by police force area, are set out below in Figure 3.7. It is apparent that the 'Top 5' are continually identified as 'high' achievers in terms of high numbers of offences per capita, joined by some of the larger metropolitan PFA's (particularly with regard to robberies). The number of recorded offences by PFA's, for each crime type is attached at Appendix B.
Figure 3.7
Crime Rates By PFA Of Main Crime Categories

BURGALRIES PER CAPITA
VEHICLE CRIMES PER CAPITA

POLICE FORCE AREA

POLICE FORCE AREA

OFFENCES PER CAPITA
VIOLENT ASSAULTS PER CAPITA

POLICE FORCE AREA

Metropolitan Police
Wiltshire
West Yorkshire
West Midlands
Warwickshire
Thames Valley
Sussex
Surrey
Suffolk
Staffordshire
South Yorkshire
Nottinghamshire
North Yorkshire
Northumbria
Northamptonshire
Norfolk
Merseyside
Lincolnshire
Leicestershire
Lancashire
Kent
Humberside
Hertfordshire
Hampshire
Greater Manchester
Gloucestershire
Essex
Durham
Doncaster
Derbyshire
Devon and Cornwall
Cumbria
Cleveland
City of London
Cheshire
Cambridgeshire
Bedfordshire
Avon and Somerset

OFFENCES PER CAPITA

0 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.008
SEXUAL OFFENCES PER CAPITA

OFFENCES PER CAPITA

POLICE FORCE AREA

West Yorkshire
West Midlands
West Mercia
Warwickshire
Thames Valley
Sussex
Suffolk
Staffordshire
South Yorkshire
Nottinghamshire
North Yorkshire
Northumbria
Northamptonshire
Nottingham
Merseyside
Lincolnshire
Leicestershire
Lancashire
Kent
Humberside
Hertfordshire
Hampshire
Greater Manchester
Gloucestershire
Essex
Durham
Dorset
Derbyshire
Devon and Cornwall
Cumbria
Cleveland
City of London
Cheshire
Cambridgeshire
Bedfordsire
Avon and Somerset
ROBBERY OFFENCES PER CAPITA

POLICE FORCE AREA

Metropolitan Police
West Yorkshire
West Midlands
West Mercia
Warwickshire
Thames Valley
Sussex
Surrey
Suffolk
Staffordshire
South Yorkshire
Nottinghamshire
North Yorkshire
Northumberland
Northamptonshire
Norfolk
Northamptorshire
Somerset
Leicshsire
Humberside
Kent
Hampshire
Greater Manchester
Gloucestershire
Essex
Durham
Dorset
Derbyshire
Devon and Cornwall
Cumbria
Cleveland
City of London
Cheshire
Cambridgeshire
Bedfordshire
Avon and Somerset

OFFENCES PER CAPITA

0 0.0005 0.001 0.0015 0.002 0.0025 0.003

SOURCE: HOME OFFICE, 1992b and HOME OFFICE, 1993
Crime rate trends (i.e. the rate of change in notifiable offences over time) are often as sensationalised as the very incidence of crime itself. So-called 'crime waves' describe the continuing and increasing rate of crime, and are arguably more distressing as they often depict a worsening of an existing situation.

At a national level, the rate of change is perhaps best illustrated in a graphical format. Figure 3.8 provides a measure of change for the past decade, from which one can obtain a truer picture of crime rate trends for England and Wales.

**Figure 3.6 Notifiable Offences Recorded By The Police (% Change From Previous Year)**

SOURCE: HOME OFFICE, 1992b: 1
It can be seen that from a trough in 1989 (with crime rates decreasing by 4%), notifiable offences rose rapidly to a peak of 18% in 1991. The latest figure indicates a return to less dramatic increases.

This pattern of events mirrors very closely the economic climate of Britain over the decade. The decrease in crime rates during the 'boom' years of the late eighties is contrasted with the rapid increases in crime during the recessionary times of the past three years. Such a finding gives considerable support to the socio-economic argument presented in the previous chapter, as during periods of economic prosperity, people are less likely to resort to crime to fulfil basis needs than in high unemployment periods of recession. This factor may go some way towards explaining the particularly high rates of crime in the 'Top 5' group of PFA's.

The 11% rise in recorded crimes for the 12 months preceding June 1992 as compared with the same for 1991, provides a crude yardstick by which to identify those PFA's who are experiencing crime rates significantly above or below the national average.
For the purposes of comparison, 'significant' deviations from the national mean are defined as more than 5% above the average (ie. >16%) or less than 7%. By and large, crime rates are more accurately portrayed over a ten year period, however in the absence of such information at the PFA level, this rather basic indicator can provide useful guiding insights into crime trends at a regional scale.

Police Force Areas which exhibited such departures from the national increase may be grouped as follows:

**CRIME RATE INCREASES ABOVE THE NATIONAL AVERAGE**

Cambridgeshire  Gloucestershire  Warwickshire
Cheshire  Kent  West Mercia
Derbyshire  Thames Valley

**CRIME RATE INCREASES BELOW THE NATIONAL AVERAGE**

Avon & Somerset  City of London*  Merseyside
Bedfordshire*  Greater Manchester  Northumbria

* denotes decrease in crime rates over the period

What is interesting is the fact that none of the 'Top
5' PFA's previously identified appear in the above average group of PFA's, which reflect high rising crime rate areas. Moreover, Northumbria experienced only a 5% increase over the reference period, however this clearly represents 5% of a much greater number of offences than the majority of other forces in England, and represents some 10,000 offences in numerical terms. Greater Manchester and Merseyside also both demonstrated increases of only 6% from the previous year, however, in a similar fashion to the Northumbria force area, this increase represented a substantial number of offences.

With regard to rates of change relating to specific crime categories, the 'Top 5' PFA's demonstrated differing levels of offence increases/decreases relative to the national average for each particular offence. In Cleveland, sexual offences and burglaries increased by 20% each, whilst robbery suffered a 60% increase on the previous year. However, it was encouraging that VAP offences were down by 3%, and car crime increased at only 2% (ie. significantly below the national average). Humberside, on the other hand, experienced a 5% drop in sexual offences and a 2%
increase in VAP, however robbery was up by 35% on the previous year. The Northumbria Police Force, which had demonstrated crime rates increasing at a level below the national average, followed suit with car crime rates decreased by 8%. Sexual offences and robbery (which had escalated by a staggering 52%) had both increased above the national average. Most noteworthy in the Nottinghamshire area was the 19% increase in recorded burglary offences, whilst car crime had only increased by 1%. Finally, West Yorkshire experienced a 9% drop in sexual offences, but increases above the national averages for robbery and burglary offences (66% and 25%, respectively).

The above has demonstrated that regional disparities occur not only in terms of the actual number of notifiable offences recorded by each PFA, but also in terms of the rate of change as a whole and for particular offence categories. To what can we attribute such spatial variations, and how reliable is our data upon which this is based?

In general terms, recording procedures adopted by particular force areas may provide one insight into
the reasoning for disparities. The diligence (or otherwise) of a Force in recording offences of which they may have been notified may account for a degree of the variation across the country. The underlying aim of a particularly diligent PFA may be to support their case for greater resource allocation, whilst a balance has to be struck so as not to present offence rates which dwarf clear-ups and therefore imply inefficiency.

A study undertaken on behalf of the Nottingham Safer Cities Project sought to consider this factor in relation to Nottingham's reputation as a high crime area. Entitled 'Counting Out Crime. The Nottingham Crime Audit' (SNU/KPMG, 1990), the report claimed that the reputation was largely undeserved and that Nottingham's position in the 'Top 5' was largely related to "more diligent" police recording practices and to its function as a major regional retailing area. However, the argument was not supported by sound evidence which confirmed this was the case, and seemed to rest instead in the perceptions of some locals that crime was not that bad in their city/county. One wonders whether the report was
somewhat biased in terms of the fact that it seemed to present precisely the findings which a city such as Nottingham, trying to attract economic investment unhindered by bad press, would wish for.

Variations within forces, whereby divisions adopt their own recording methods is also problematic in terms of ensuring consistency of approach by PFA, let alone on a national scale. A fairly common-place example may be recording of attempted burglaries (in which the burglar has been unsuccessful) as 'criminal damage' rather than as an incidence of burglary. Furthermore, some forces may consider that if no loss has occurred and if damage is minor, no offence ought to be recorded at all, even if the victim thought the incident was worthwhile reporting to the police. This again points to the findings of the 1988 BCS, in which only approximately one in four offences committed appear in the official statistics.
THE STATE'S RESPONSE:

Faced with such daunting statistics which are so publicly aired, the population look to their elected government for explanations and appropriate action.

The issue of crime prevention, surprisingly enough, has only reached the political agenda in the last decade, prior to which the police, courts and prison system were considered to be the ultimate deterrent for potential offenders. A valiant attempt had been made in the early sixties, by a committee under the leadership of a senior Home Office official W. H. Cornish, which introduced the concept of police crime prevention officers and central crime prevention training. However, the efforts were somewhat subsumed by other advances in policing, most important of which was the massive expansion in vehicular patrolling which, whilst providing quicker response times to call outs, had the disadvantage of reducing police/public contact (LAYCOCK & HEAL, 1989).

The beginning of Lord Whitelaw's period in office as
Home Secretary was significant in witnessing the return to crime prevention (HEAL, 1990), as the experience of prison overcrowding late seventies proved that reactive policing, and the criminal justice system alone were insufficient to curb the rising trends in crime. Added to this was the acknowledgement (via research such as the BCS), that recorded crime figures were only the tip of the iceberg. It was therefore logical to return to prevention as a means for tackling opportunity crime, as by definition, reactive tactics could not be expected to have any impact on unreported crimes (LAYCOCK & HEAL, 1989).

In 1983, the Home Office set up the Crime Prevention Unit, with the specific remit to operate beyond the normal capacity of the Office to promote crime prevention.

The Research and Planning Unit in the Home Office has also been responsible for producing the British Crime Surveys discussed earlier in this chapter. Not only are these studies most valuable for their insights into patterns of unreported and unrecorded crimes over
time (three such surveys have been published to date), but for the impetus they have provided for more localised victimisation surveys. For example, the Islington Crime Survey (JONES, et al, 1986) was commissioned by the London Borough of Islington, and involved surveys of over 2,000 households in the borough. Such surveys have the advantage of being able to target attention and resources towards particularly local problems.

Lord Whitelaw was also successful in persuading other government departments that they had a critical role to play in crime prevention. Most notably, the Department of the Environment (DoE) is now accepted to be the most influential department (aside from the Home Office through its policing function) in aiding the prevention of crime through environmental change (LAYCOCK & HEAL, 1989). Control exercised over design, layout and management of housing estates is recognised as having the potential to significantly alter the occurrence of crime and anti-social behaviour, however the Department also acknowledges the lack of agreement between researchers about the precise nature of the environmental design and crime
relationship (as outlined in Chapter 2).

Through its regulating control over the planning system, the DoE has brought the issue of crime prevention to the attention of planners and developers. However, the weight attached to the advice contained within Government Circulars, Planning Policy Guidance Notes, Design Bulletins and the like, has stopped short of providing Local Planning Authorities with the requisite powers needed to enable them to have a strong enough lever (ie the threat of refusal of planning permission) to negotiate for crime prevention measures with developers.

Circular 1/84 (DoE, 1984) was jointly issued with a number of other government departments and essentially drew attention to the issue of crime prevention and the role that local planning authorities could play in it. It does, however, note that crime control would be unlikely to constitute a reason for withholding planning permission. Subsequent published guidance such as Circular 22/88 (DoE, 1988), Design Bulletin 32 (DoE/DoT, 1992), PPG1 (DoE, 1992) as well as British Standard 8220: Part 1 Dwellings (BRITISH STANDARD
INSTITUTION, 1986) have all drawn attention to security considerations, most particularly at the level of individual buildings. Where layout advice is given, this closely mirrors the 'keeping people out' school of thought, and lean heavily towards estate designs which promote culs-de-sac and limit through movement of both vehicles and pedestrians.

The Government has also set up a range of initiatives and quango-type organisations, such as the Safe Neighbourhoods Unit, Crime Concern, The Safer Cities Project etc, which have between them produced a vast plethora of research papers, guidance manuals, leaflets etc. The sheer quantity of material is daunting in itself, and there would certainly seem to be duplication of work in many areas of situational crime prevention. Furthermore, the obscurity of some of the organisations and their publications would tend to suggest that a single consolidated body would be the key. Such an organisation would have sufficient weight to be heard, and which could produce more readily accessible documents, whilst also being more able to liaise with various voluntary organisations (for example, the well-regarded National Association
& Care and Rehabilitation of Offenders (NACRO)), in their common field of interest.

The Morgan Report, issued August 1991, was set up with the task of "monitoring the progress made in the local delivery of crime prevention through the multi-agency or partnership approach in the light of the guidance contained in the booklet accompanying 44/90" (MORGAN, 1991: 10). The Working Group involved in the study asked Chief Constables and the Chief Executives of local authorities to report on the nature of current and projected activities, and the commitment of resources to crime prevention. One hundred and two reports were received from which a series of findings and recommendations were formulated. The main findings and recommendations are attached as Appendix C. Of particular interest is the discovery and acknowledgement that crime prevention activities for both police forces and local authorities, represent a peripheral activity only. This supports the perception of one of the primary problems outlined at the beginning of this study, in that whilst all agencies agree that the issue is important and one worth pursuing, the practical realities of everyday
pressures on scarce resources demote its importance.

Heal (1992) echoes this finding, and notes the fragmented and patchy nature of crime prevention activity, duplicated efforts and the limited scale of co-ordination which are also reflected in a lack of agreement as to which professions are responsible for co-ordinating which activities.

James Morgan (MORGAN, 1991), in his preface, to the report, remarks on the 'good value' of crime prevention, particularly as compared to the massive costs associated with maintaining the criminal justice system. Expenditure on the system for the 1990/91 period totalled £7,335 million (HOME OFFICE, 1992a), and whilst it is difficult to put a precise figure on the cost of crime prevention, the fact remains that it is substantially less and yet far more cost-effective in the long term.

The examination of the governments response to the state of crime in England has thus far examined long term strategies, which are the result of substantial effort and research into the best way forward.
However, to the public at large, such measures mean little when faced with a 'crime explosion' as reported at all levels of the media. Joe Public is likely to be disinterested in the long-term partnership strategy advanced by the Morgan Report, wanting instead immediate action on an urgent problem. Faced with rising public concern and calls from many corners of the political forum, ministers are forced to respond with an 'instant' solution and a promise of action. A prime example of the 'knee-jerk' reaction was the recent outcry concerning juvenile crime in Britain, prompted by the particularly emotive case involving the murder of James Bulger in Liverpool, and reinforced by the spate of young males and females involved in 'joy-riding'. The Home Secretary's response was to announce a new network of juvenile 'secure training centres' despite having acknowledged in a white paper three years ago the research evidence which had detailed the failure of such approved schools, junior detention centres, junior borstals, etc. A special edition of The Guardian, attached as Appendix D, gives an example of media coverage of, and responses to, the announcement.
It seems that political hot potatoes can provoke ministerial responses completely conflicting with the rational research based approach previously agreed.
POLICE EFFORTS:

The police force have traditionally represented the 'street level' arm of the Home Office. With the recent increased emphasis upon crime prevention nationally, the police service has adapted to accept its enhanced role. No longer quite the poor relation', the crime prevention function has been extended to encompass all police officers (uniform and CID), rather than just the specialised department which had to a large extent been previously isolated from mainstream policing.

In addition, the Home Office Crime Prevention Training Centre at Stafford had benefitted from increased staff and resources, and the curriculum revised to reflect a shift from the 'locks and bars' emphasis, towards community involvement, crime pattern analysis, inter-agency work, etc (LAYCOCK & HEAL, 1989).

Part of this upgrading has been the introduction of the Police Architectural Liaison Officer system. Architectural Liaison Officer (ALO's) are specialised
officers whose role it is to liaise with agencies involved in the design and management of the built environment, ie Local Authorities, Planners and Housing Officers, Developers, Architects and Builders, and more latterly, Housing Associations. The ALO is expected to advise agencies on features to be avoided and appropriate crime prevention measures to be 'built in' to a development. A promotional leaflet published by the Home Office is attached as Appendix E.

Most ALO's tend to originate from a background as a Crime Prevention Officer (CPO), and thus bring with them knowledge about criminals and criminal activity. Specialised training for ALO's is carried out at the Home Office Crime Prevention Training Centre, although this is fairly limited as the training and experience acquired by a CPO is assumed to form the basic ALO skills requirements. However according to at least one ALO it is on-the-job experience which provides the most invaluable training (BINNS, 1993).

At present ALO's are fairly thinly represented across the country, at a rate of one per county (although some counties have none at all). This inevitably
places a strain upon their resources, as they may be serving the needs of up to fourteen district councils (as in Essex).

Government Circular Advice contained within Circular 22/88 (DoE, 1988) suggests that LPA's may wish to consider consulting ALO's on planning applications which involve large numbers of people or property. Notwithstanding the current recession in the development industry which make such large scale developments a rather more rare occurrence than, for example 5 years ago, ALO's are expected to provide a service which spans a large geographical area. Furthermore, their task is not always aided by the support of local authorities, which will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter 4.

Two further well publicised initiatives arising from the police efforts to advance and promote crime prevention, are Secured By Design and Neighbourhood Watch Schemes.

'Secured By Design' was initially launched on a regional basis by the police forces concerned, and has
now been extended to almost complete national coverage. The concept was to set a series of standards for residential development (although various commercial initiatives have recently been launched, as well), which when met, would be able to utilise the Police approved 'Secured By Design' logo. The underlying aim was to encourage housebuilders to design layouts and houses to established crime prevention standards and in return offer a marketing incentive. The Secured By Design literature, setting out the standards to be attained, is attached as Appendix F. In the document, which drew heavily from the National House-Building Council standards, a penchant for restricting through movement is evident as culs-de-sac are advocated for layouts of schemes, together with specific security features for dwellings.

Neighbourhood Watch was set up primarily at the CPO level, to encourage mutual surveillance over neighbours properties, property marking and general security awareness among households. The schemes were hoped to discourage criminals by the display of street signs and other identification on dwellings (eg.
stickers in windows), advising that the area was part of a registered Neighbourhood Watch (NW) scheme. A copy of a promotional leaflet is also included within Appendix F.

A study by the BCS (MAYHEW, et al., 1989) specifically examined the effectiveness of the schemes, and the degree to which they were successful in meeting the goals they set out to achieve. They estimated that 14% of households in Britain were members of schemes at the beginning of 1988, and of the remainder, two-thirds of households were willing to join a scheme. Across the country, membership rates were found to be highest in the North-West and South-East, and lowest in East Anglia and Wales. Positive results were found in that members of Neighbourhood Watch schemes were more likely to report suspicious incidents to the police, and also have greater security awareness than non-members. Moreover, the schemes seemed to be able to sustain the lapse after the initial interest, in that few Neighbourhood Watch schemes were found to have collapsed.

As with the government itself, the police force are
also subject to (often unfair) public pressure to curb the rising crime trends. The most common 'solution' (often bandied about at election time) is to put more bobbies back on the beat. Those advocating this route are often convinced that the very presence of more policemen and women walking the beat, is sufficient to deter criminals from committing offences. It is certainly true that people generally feel safer when they know that uniformed officers are within close proximity, but we cannot realistically expect twenty-four hour guardianship of the entire population. A recent one day experiment carried out by the Cheshire Police Force, in which all officers were put 'on the beat', heralded even greater reported incidences of crime according to some reports. This may be attributable to the greater awareness of the public to matters of crime on that day (and hence they may have been more likely to report incidents), or simply an indication of the need to look at prevention rather than cure.

To summarise thus far:
* Official statistics have many pitfalls, including differential reporting and recording levels.

* The BCS offers a partial solution to the problem of measuring crime, but that is not conducted on an annual basis, and is only representative of a sample of the population.

* Crime rates increase as the population increases, but the 'Top 5' PFA's tend to increase at a rate above the national average, indicating that some other variable is involved.

* Crime rates tend to reflect the economic climate, i.e. low in boom times and high in the recession.

* Government documents and advice (including the quango operations) tend to support the Newman/Coleman theories.
* There is a need for a single quango or authority with greater statutory weight.

* The Morgan Report highlighted the lack of co-ordination between local authorities and the relevant PFA in crime prevention matters.
CHAPTER 4

THE RESPONSE OF THE DEVELOPMENT WORLD

The state of crime in England as outlined in the preceding chapter poses a problem not just for government. If we are to accept that there is substance to each of the arguments presented in Chapter 2, then there are a wide variety of professions who can actively take part in crime prevention activities through their specialised roles. These are the 'street level practitioners' who have the capacity to collectively help curb the rising 'crime wave' we are so frequently reminded of. Teachers, social workers, housing management officers, housing association employees, architects and designers, developers, and local authority planning officers are all examples of street level practitioners.

The development world plays a crucial role in the
provision and management of the built environment, and hence is of greatest interest to this study. In the light of government advice contained within Circulars, PPG's and the like, we may well question what steps have been made to positively act upon the obligation to produce environments which limit vulnerability to crime.

**IN THE DEVELOPER'S CORNER:**

Each of the organisations representing the primary actors in the development world, were asked to give responses on behalf of its members to the following questions, with a particular emphasis upon their co-ordination with other professional bodies.

[1] Does your organisation consider that its members have a professional role to play in crime prevention through the design of developments?

[2] If not your (collective) responsibility, who's do you believe it to be?
[3] From what source do you obtain information related to this subject in order to formulate policy and advise your members? Are particular academic works very influential to your views?

[4] How do you disseminate such advice to your members?

The responses were, as one would anticipate, varied and wide-ranging. In the developer's corner, the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) gave the very positive response that they felt their members had an active role to play in design against crime. In particular, it was noted that the Building Surveyors Division were likely to play the most prominent role. Similarly committed tones were echoed by the House Builders Federation (HBF) and the National House Building Council (NHBC).

All well and good in theory, yet how does the ideology translate into practical advice to members? The RICS honestly admitted that little in the way of specific guidance had been produced, although it did consider
that the bulk of information on design against crime issues would be disseminated through professional journals and the like. It would appear that such an approach leaves each member to decide for his/herself whether or not the material they have read ought to be applied (if possible) into their work.

Considerably more time and effort have been invested by both the HBF and NHBC on the subject of security through design of developments. A guidance note was prepared in 1986 as part of a series of NHBC standards documents, entitled 'Improving Security'. The guidance was issued to all builders at the time of its publication, however the advice contained within it was not mandatory. NHBC's reasoning for this was that the layout of a site was considered to fall beyond the remit of itself and its members, and rather was the subject of control by town planners and highway engineers. It would therefore seem that, contrary to their stated support for design against crime, the fundamental issue of the layout of an estate is regarded as an element to be determined by other actors in the development game.
The document was produced using the assistance of an array of professional institutions, the Home Office and DoE, the Surrey Constabulary, the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations (headed by Barry Poyner), as well as representatives of the house-building and insurance industries. In essence, the document intimates that developments which 'keep people out' are desirable in reducing the attractiveness of an area to burglars, however the majority of its content relates to the physical security measures which can be applied to individual buildings (eg. locks and other security furniture).

On the design side, the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA) could offer no specific answers to the questions asked of them. However, the chairman of the Northwestern branch of RIBA, Sir Desmond Williams, had a keen personal interest in the subject, and was able to offer, albeit on a less formal basis, the position that the architectural profession felt they held with respect to crime prevention through their design. Sir Desmond was keen to point out that more were persuaded of the need to actively play a role in the security aspects of developments. However, the
"collective responsibility" of all agencies was also noted. In terms of published guidance, as with the RICS, RIBA appear to rely on articles published in professional journals as well as seminars which are periodically held on the subject.

The National Federation of Housing Associations (NFHA) were at least honest in their response to the questions asked of them. They admitted that crime prevention was not a subject which they had discussed with their members, however, went on to suggest that through the experience in housing management of most of their members, "close attention to anti-crime measures in associations' design briefs for new schemes" would be likely. It would seem that, along with Safe Neighbourhood Unit advice, ground level knowledge rather than specific schools of thought, lay the basis for any crime prevention input at the design stage of a scheme. With their emerging role as the new primary provider of social housing, would appear that there is a lack of both emphasis and attention given to this issue by the Housing Association's representative body, and almost by definition, by it's members.
The Institute of Housing offered a more positive response to the question of responsibility. It was categorically stated that their members did have a role to play in designing against crime, and also recognised that its members were in a position to have a direct input into design and management. However, this is clearly limited to the politely termed 'social' housing. The Institute also remarked that whilst they accepted that planning and design could have a significant impact upon deterring some sorts of crimes, it was acknowledged that design in isolation was not the only cause/solution. Rather, factors including community development, policing, employment and training opportunities, education and leisure facilities all have equal importance. The Institute continued by stressing the importance of community development and particularly the close involvement of the local community in the design of schemes. It was in these grass roots areas that its members were seen to have the greatest role to play.

The Institute itself has produced a number of optional guidance notes, some of which were produced jointly with RIBA, concerning security and the design of
housing. The organisation was also able to boast regular liaisons with other professional bodies, including NFHA, RICS and Association of District Councils. Whilst no single academic work was considered to influence their views, the Institute of Housing did consider Alice Coleman's 'Utopia On Trial', work by the Safe Neighbourhood Unit and studies undertaken by NACRO's Safe Neighbourhood Advisory Service to have been of value.

For the planners' part, the Royal Town Planning Institute (RTPI) advise that they welcome the role of planning in crime prevention, as documented in PPG1. However the RTPI are also conscious that more traditional planning objectives such as amenity and aesthetics, may conflict with security aims. To further endorse their commitment, the Institute made the point that crime prevention and crime reduction ought to become a material planning consideration. Such a move would significantly increase the role of the LPA in design against crime issues and enable at least one body of professionals to use their statutory powers to give much needed weight to the issue. However, such a decision lies outside of the capacity
of the RTPI as a representative body, and rests instead with central government.

What is apparent from the responses received, is the lack of any co-ordinated approach or regular liaison procedures. The Institute of Housing made mention of their direct contact with other representative bodies, and whilst it is evident that the NHBC consulted widely on the production of its guidance document, there appears to be otherwise little dialogue on the issue of designing against crime and the responsibility of each profession to strive to attain it.

Furthermore, whilst almost every organisation approached offered its unqualified support as a key role-player in crime prevention through development, few were able to demonstrate exactly how they pursued their 'active' role on behalf of their respective members. Formulation of institute/federation policies remains unclear, and distribution of guidance to members was patchy with the exception of the NHBC (which was in 1986 in any case). One wonders whether, even if concerted efforts were made to consider the
practical roles that each agency's members could play in crime prevention, this would be effectively disseminated so as to make each member aware of his/her responsibility as a member of that profession involved in the production and maintenance of the built environment. Even then, one would question how influential this might be in the daily activities of a practitioner.

It was apparent that, even with the declared support of the parent organisation, design against crime issues were not give sufficient weight to merit closer attention at a local level.

IN THE PLANNER'S CORNER:

SURVEY OBJECTIVES AND METHOD:
A survey was conducted of all the Local Planning Authorities (LPA's) in England (a total of 365 authorities), in an attempt to gather information on the efforts which had been made to address crime
prevention through the planning process. The primary aim was to broadly assess whether LPA's had employed any design against crime procedures, and if so, what they were. The essentially autonomous nature of LPA's when dealing with the issue of designing against crime (a la PPG 1), was felt to warrant close attention and also enable examination at a local level. Moreover, the finite and readily identifiable nature of LPA's (particularly in spatial terms) was a unique characteristic not enjoyed by the other agencies, nor the essential centrally ordained control over development.

A short questionnaire was posted to every LPA in England between May and August 1992, together with an explanatory letter, setting out the purpose of the survey. The questionnaire was kept deliberately short in an attempt to encourage the addressee to respond, and within as short a timescale as possible. The questions required respondents to give details of any established liaison mechanisms they had between themselves and the local police authority, to deal with design against crime matters. In addition, LPA's were asked to indicate if they had any crime
prevention policies and to include extracts in cases where they did. The third question asked for details of any informal policies or guidance offered to developers and designers to suggest crime prevention measures which to adopt in schemes. Finally, the degree of staff resourcing allocated for the implementation of such initiatives and/or policies that the LPA had instigated, was questioned. A sample questionnaire is attached as Appendix G.

RESPONSE RATE:
The 74.5% response rate may be considered reasonable by postal survey standards. The question does however arise as to whether those LPA's who failed to respond represent a random collection, or whether they all share some common characteristic, be it geographical location, level of relative wealth, staff resourcing shortages or low/high crime rates.

The respondents were broken down into authority type and the response rates of each were examined. Figure 4.1, below, graphically represents the response rates in terms of London boroughs, metropolitan boroughs and district/borough councils.
Figure 4.1 Response Rates By Authority Type

n = 372 [Note: 2 respondents did not identify themselves, and hence are not included]
It is interesting to note that London boroughs 'performed' worst, whilst the metropolitan boroughs responded at a rate above the overall average.

QUESTION RESPONSES:
Whilst the majority of responses to the questions were specifically related to planning, a number included information relating to efforts made by authorities to addressing crime prevention at a broader, corporate level. Such replies were welcomed as being interesting and helpful in putting the remainder of the questionnaire response into context. However, only those elements on which all respondents had reported could be analysed statistically.

The responses were broadly broken down into three sections - No Policies, Policies and Policies plus Advice Notes and Other Informal Guidance. Figure 4.2 diagrammatically illustrates the broad responses received.
Figure 4.2  General Responses From LPA's

POLICIES AND OTHER GUIDANCE (17.9%)

POLICIES ONLY (20.1%)

NO POLICIES (62.0%)

n = 274
It is immediately evident that the majority of LPA's do not make any formal provisions for design against crime in their development plans. Of the approximately 40% who do, a further half provide information to developers in the form of advice notes, informal policies, etc.

**QUESTION 1 - LIAISON MECHANISMS**

This question sought to attempt to broadly ascertain whether the LPA had addressed the issue of Design Against Crime at a practical level, and in particular, whether any procedures for liaison with the Police Authority/Architectural Liaison Officer had been formalised in line with the suggestions in Circular 22/88 and PPG 1 (DoE, 1988 and 1992).

The responses to this question were, as one might expect, varied and wide-ranging. The vast majority of LPA initiatives relating to Design Against Crime were found to involve liaison (of some form) with the Police force. The replies were categorised into three groups relating to their strength of liaison with the local Police authority/ ALO.
'Close', 'Some Form' and 'None' were the descriptive categories used to group the responses, where 'Close' comprised those local authorities who made conscious, positive efforts to work with the Police when considering development schemes and/or policy formulation. For example, consulting the ALO (or equivalent) direct on agreed types of planning applications, regular liaison meetings to discuss development proposals, involving the Police during policy, guidance note or development brief preparation, etc.

'Some Form' included those respondents who did have contact with the Police, but who appeared to take few proactive measures to establish a close liaison procedure. Examples include the LPA posting the ALO (or equivalent) a copy of the weekly list of planning applications (a fairly common practise), the holding of periodic in-house seminars to educate staff on Design Against Crime issues, or simply directing developers towards the ALO and allowing them to negotiate for crime prevention improvements without LPA input. This was felt to be a curious practise, given that crime prevention and aesthetics do not
always harmonise.

The 'None' category clearly represented those LPA's who had not instigated liaison procedures with their local police authority or ALO. In some instances this may have been the result of there being no designated ALO for a given district.

Figure 4.3 graphically illustrates the breakdown of the responses received in respect of this question.

A form of normal distribution is evident, with approximately one quarter of LPA's who responded having close and proactive liaison mechanisms, one half having some form of established liaison, and one quarter having no formalised procedures for liaising with the Police authority or ALO on development schemes.

Figure 4.4 breaks the distribution down into each of the broad category responses.
Figure 4.3  Liaison Procedures With ALO/Police Authority

None Established (23.3%)

Close (27.0%)

Some Form (49.7%)

n = 274
Figure 4.4 Liaison Procedures By Category Type

POLICY PROVISION

PROPORTION OF LPA'S (%)  
10 20 30 40 50 60 70

POLICIES + GUIDANCE
POLICIES ONLY
NO POLICIES

n = 274
The proportion of LPA's who do not have established liaison procedures reduces as the quantity and type of Design Against Crime initiatives increases. Conversely, the proportion of authorities who have close liaisons with ALO's (or equivalent) increases as the LPA takes more positive action towards crime prevention. This finding highlights the importance of establishing a constructive relationship with the police authority. It also tends to indicate that where there is a lack of serious action in one area, this appears to be representative of that local authority's approach across the board.

QUESTION 2 - ADOPTED POLICIES
The question sought to obtain information on the proportion of LPA's who had included policies specifically relating to the need to include crime prevention measures in a development scheme, within their development plan. On the basis of the responses received, an additional category was added which permitted recognition for those LPA's who were considering the inclusion of policies in the reviews of their local plans, or who had included a Design Against Crime policy in their draft local plan or UDP.
Figure 4.5 portrays the results of this element of the survey.

Figure 4.5  LPA'S With Design Against Crime Policies

n = 274
What is immediately evident is the vast majority of LPA's who have no adopted policies to which they may refer when considering the merits of a development proposal. Only 8.4% of respondents could claim to have an adopted policy specifically aimed at ensuring crime prevention is included as a relevant consideration of proposals. More encouraging is the significant proportion (approximately 30%) who are considering the inclusion of such policies within their forthcoming local plan or UDP, or who are awaiting the adoption of such policies.

**QUESTION 3 - INFORMAL POLICIES, GUIDELINES OR ADVICE**

**NOTES**

The purpose of this question was to attempt to gauge what other devices LPA's may have employed to aid developers and case officers when considering crime issues in the layout and detail of a development. Alternatively, this question enabled those LPA's without any formal policies to indicate what other efforts they may have made.

It became apparent when analysing the responses that there were a wide range of practices which fell within
this category. The selection consisted of instruments such as design briefs including reference to design against crime considerations, in-house practise notes for officers (or reference to Police Secured By Design or Home Office Manual advice), production of advice notes for developers, informal policies, or alternatively, simply distributing crime prevention material produced by the Police or another interested body.

Figure 4.6 illustrates the range of these less formal activities undertaken by LPA's.

Here again, the most outstanding feature is the lack of action by the vast majority of LPA's (63.4%). Of the remaining 37.6%, the production of informal policies was favoured by almost one half, with the publishing of advice notes (or intention to do so) forming the second most prominent group.

Interestingly, 7.3% of LPA's who responded indicated that they distributed Police crime prevention material, indicating a willingness to accept the Home Office and police authority guidance. This could arise
Figure 4.6  The Range Of Instruments Employed By LPA'S In Design Against Crime

n = 273
from a questioning of the underlying theory and principals of the document, and subsequent acceptance of it, or alternatively, accepting it without challenge.

When broken down into the three main response types, the LPA's in the 'No Guidance' category tended to favour the production of informal policies and distribution of Police Authority material, whilst policy producing LPA's tended to opt towards publishing advice notes and using informal policies. This is perhaps the most succinct illustration of the contrast between the LPA's who set out to make positive attempts to reduce crime through their statutory functions, and those who are less enthusiastic, who perhaps do not see crime as problematic within their districts, or who do not see Design Against Crime as a role for planning.

**QUESTION 4 - STAFF RESOURCES**

Having outlined the various initiatives undertaken in respect to Design Against Crime, each LPA was asked to indicated the staff resources which were allocated to implement these measures. However, it became apparent
that, were it not for the desire to keep the questionnaire short and simple, this question would perhaps have been better left open-ended. It was therefore somewhat difficult to analyse the responses in terms of the multiple options given in the questionnaire.

The aim of the question was to ascertain whether the authority had invested money in a specific Design Against Crime Officer; whether there was a lead officer in the field (knowledgeable on the subject); whether case officers implemented any initiatives in the course of their normal duties; or whether no staff resources were made available for the issue. The results of the survey are illustrated in Figure 4.7, below.

One point that needs to be highlighted is the fact that if LPA's had indicated that they did not operate any Design Against Crime policies or other initiatives in the previous three questions, it would be unlikely that they would have made provision (through their staff resourcing) for officers to deal with the subject. It was however noted that only 31% of the
Figure 4.7  Staff Resources Allocated For Design Against Crime Initiatives

n = 271
'No Guidance' category of respondents admitted this. The remaining 69% claimed that, in the main, officers would undertake crime prevention initiatives (if any were available) in the course of their statutory duties. Likewise, if authorities made efforts towards crime prevention, there would be expected to be few who would not allocate any staff to deal with such initiatives (even if this only meant an additional duty for officers). This theory is echoed by the fact that, of the 'Policies Only' LPA's, 90.7% had some form of staff resourcing available to deal with the issue. The remaining 9.3% could either be a result of a misinterpretation of the question, or a lack of availability of planning staff to implement the policy through their development control powers. It could alternatively be that any crime prevention policy was still in its early embryonic stages in a draft local plan or UDP, and hence not yet used for development control purposes. Of the more proactive authorities who had informal advice as well as policies, all allocated some degree of staff resources to their efforts, whilst almost 12% appointed a specific crime prevention officer or had the post available.
A QUALITY APPROACH?

The preceding section has indicated the level of design against crime initiatives instigated by LPA's throughout England, in terms of liaison procedures, policy coverage and other forms of guidance. However, given the wide-ranging nature of such policies, it is important to consider also the degree of clarity of a particular policy, particularly in terms of its usefulness from the point of view of a developer.

It was felt that there was a need to analyse the policies and guidance notes received, in an attempt to assess the overall quality of those policies adopted or awaiting adoption by LPA's. The strength of a policy is, after all, crucial to the success of a local authority in negotiation with developers for a more security conscious development, and by default, with the DoE Inspectorate at appeal.

When considering the responses to the questionnaire, 104 LPA's indicated that they had a specific design against crime policy, either adopted, awaiting adoption, or proposed for inclusion within a
forthcoming local plan or review. Of these, 69 (66%) supplied copies of the relevant documents for analysis.

The vast majority of policies were found to refer to the design of residential developments, although several related to commercial premises (especially roller-shutter policies emerging to resolve threats from ram-raiding and aesthetic issues in shopping areas). To reflect the broad basis of the study, the policies pertaining to residential areas only were analysed. Each policy was categorised under one of five headings, describing the content of the document, as follows:

[1] Vague, non-specific policy - reflecting those policies which simply advised of the need to address 'design against crime', without any specific or more detailed advice as to how to go about it. For example:

"The City Council will have regard to the need to reduce the potential for crime and vandalism
when determining planning applications" (PETERBOROUGH CITY COUNCIL, 1992)

[2] Vague, with specific features to avoid - refers to those policies which went a little further by giving one or two examples of fairly obvious features to avoid. A typical example might read:

"The Borough Council, in considering planning applications for development, will, where appropriate have regard to the need for the design and layout to incorporate features and/or measures to reduce crime and fear of crime including:-

(i) the siting of car parks and open space where visible from the surrounding area
(ii) the location of walls, fences, footpaths and landscaping to eradicate blind spots" (HARTLEPOOL
[3] More detailed, but still not clear guidance — indicates those policies which offer detailed crime prevention measures within the policy, but which 'sit on the fence' rather than openly advocating a particular approach. For example:

"Each residential development should be viewed individually with solutions to problems of security being site specific. However, there are several general guidelines which should be followed:

(i) the maximum natural surveillance of both dwellings and communal open space should be achieved.

(ii) Where appropriate car parking should be located within the curtilage of the dwelling ... and visible.

(iii) Estate layouts should avoid
potential hiding places.

(iv) The limits of private ownership should be defined in physical terms with a clear demarcation between private and public space" (STOKE-ON-TRENT CITY COUNCIL, 1991).

[4] Detailed, advise keeping people 'out' - this category was used to group those policies which quite clearly advised developers/designers to design developments in such a way as to limit access to development and exclude strangers and through traffic (both vehicular and pedestrian). Such policies tended to follow the Newman/Coleman school of thought. A typical example...

"Main traffic routes should be separated from residential areas and hierarchical forms of road systems developed leading through minor access roads to small groups of housing in culs-de-sac. Housing should not front on to
main through routes and entrances should preferably not be easily visible from such routes. Access on foot and by car to residential streets or groups of streets should be limited to avoid through movement" (BIRMINGHAM CITY COUNCIL, undated).

[5] Detailed advise keeping people 'in' - categorised those LPA's with detailed policies advocating an integrated approach, through which increased pedestrian traffic flows were believed to aid the self-policing of an urban environment. This type of policy followed the Hillier/Anson school of thought, and is exemplified...

"The Council will require all development to be designed and improve personal safety in the built environment. [by:]

a) ensuring overlooking over paths, play areas and open
spaces.
b) avoiding creation of spaces with ill-defined ownership
c) ensuring that development is well integrated into the existing pattern of pedestrian and vehicular movement" (LONDON BOROUGH OF GREENWICH, undated).

Not every policy analysed fell neatly into a single category and it was therefore a question of the broad thrust of the policy which determined on what basis it was assessed. Figure 4.8 illustrates the proportion of policies received which fell into each category.

As one might expect, a simple reference to crime prevention through design of development represented the largest single group of policy types at just below 40%. Of the remaining policies analysed, the two 'mid-ranging' categories were fairly even, whilst the Newman/Colemanesque policies represented almost double (15.9%) that of the detailed policies advocating a 'keeping people in' approach (8.7%). Numerically, the integrated policies were only representative of six
Figure 4.8 Analysis Of Design Against Crime Policies
Produced By LPA's

- Detailed, advise keeping people in (8.7%)
- Detailed, advise keeping people out (15.8%)
- More detailed, but still not clear (21.7%)
- Vague, specify features to avoid (15.9%)
- Vague, non-specific policy (37.7%)

n = 69

164
LPA's from the 69 analysed.

The evidence presented on the basis of the responses from the professional bodies would appear to indicate that whilst much lip service is paid to the concept of crime prevention, little in reality is done to achieve this. It is likely that the barrage of other more heavily weighted 'traditional' planning issues achieve higher priorities in the scheme of things.

Local planning authorities represent the most active promoters of crime prevention through their function as controllers of development, however, the response to this comparatively new obligation upon LPA's has not been on the whole very enthusiastic. Coverage varies widely across the country, from authorities who do little or nothing (which represent the majority of LPA's), to those who have made considerable efforts to meet the terms of government advice contained in DoE Circular 22/88 (consultation and liaison with ALO's and CPO's) and PPG1 (provision of crime prevention policies within the development plan).

In a geographical context, the range of LPA responses
has not been uniform either. Appendix H provides maps of every county and metropolitan area in England, shaded to represent the score attained by each LPA who responded to the questionnaire. The score was calculated from an average score for the LPA's making up each PFA and plotted. The results are illustrated in Figure 4.9.

A similar exercise was then carried out using the crime rates per capita figures, presented earlier in Chapter 3. The spatial distribution of crime rates is indicated in Figure 4.10, from which the 'Top 5' PFA's discussed earlier can be readily identified.

From a cursory examination of the two maps, there would not appear to be any emerging relationship. However, when plotted in a scattergram format, as in Figure 4.11 below, a pattern does begin to materialise. Firstly, the 'Top 5' are readily distinguishable for their isolation from the main body of the graph. The general trend is for the LPA average response rate to increase as crime rates increase, demonstrating a positive, yet somewhat weak, relationship. However, the group of north-eastern
Figure 4.9  Average LPA Response By PFA

LEGEND:

- 0.0 - 0.49
- 0.5 - 0.99
- 1.0 - 1.49
- 1.5 - 1.99
- 2.0 - 2.49

SOURCE: Questionnaire Responses
Figure 4.10  Crime Rates By PFA (July 1991 - June 1992)

LEGEND:

- < 0.06
- 0.06 - 0.08
- 0.08 - 0.10
- 0.10 - 0.12
- 0.12 - 0.14
- 0.14 - 0.16

offences per capita

SOURCE: Statistics contained in HOME OFFICE, 1992b
PFA's stand out as having high crime rates, yet comparatively low response rates from their respective local planning authorities in terms of policy and guidance provision.

There are also very positive suggestions that some of the lower crime rate areas are not complacent in their approach, with high scoring LPA's within them (eg. the Metropolitan Police Force Area, Hertfordshire and Suffolk). Conversely, some mid-level crime areas offer little encouragement or guidance to the development industry, such as Bedfordshire (which fairs particularly poorly), Avon and Somerset and Norfolk.

However, we must be cautious not to read too much into the results of such an exercise, which is afterall, based on the average response of a group of LPA's. Whilst every attempt has been made to use a scoring system which was as accurate as possible, inevitably particularly high achieving and low scoring individual LPA efforts may be somewhat concealed. Also, the quarter of LPA's who did not respond to the questionnaire are not included, which may sway the
Figure 4.11 LPA Response To Local Crime Rates (By PFA)

LPA RESPONSE (AVERAGE)

CRIME RATES PER CAPITA

City of London
Northumbria
Cleveland
Humberside
West Yorkshire
Nottinghamshire
results from the situation which exists in reality.

Lastly, whilst a relationship has been found, it is not clear which is in fact the dependant variable. The graph in Figure 4.11 suggests that the LPA will respond to the rate of crime in their respective PFA, however the alternative thesis could well be that the efforts of the LPA in instigating crime prevention through their statutory functions, may influence crime rates. It seems probable, however, that given that environmental design is only part of the cause of crime, and in the light of the relatively recently imposed duty (albeit without any statutory weight) to consider opportunist crime reduction in the design of developments, the former is the more likely scenario.

This chapter has highlighted the following main points:

* There are a large number of professions who can aid crime prevention, although planning is perhaps best placed to do so, given its statutory authority.
Efforts have been made by other professional bodies (via their representative institutions), however these have been limited and lack an overall co-ordinated approach.

The questionnaire responses pointed to a general lack of attention to the subject by LPA's, the majority do not have design against crime policies, those who do tend to have weak and vague content, offering little guidance to developers and designers. Furthermore, few had advice notes.

The questionnaire also highlighted that whilst most authorities had some form of liaison with the police, this was largely infrequent and not formalised liaisons relating to specifically applications.

In a spatial context, a weak but positive relationship between local
crime rates and the LPA response via production of policies and guidance was found. The 'Top 5' stand out again as being poorly provided for (on average) by the LPA's located within them.
CHAPTER 5

CASE STUDIES

The discussion thus far has been limited to the occurrence of crime within administrative boundaries, which has been represented at the scale of Police Force Areas. It is evident that such a large reference unit (sometimes spanning two or three counties) is far from ideal in terms of considering how best to tackle grass root causes and hence appropriate solutions to crime. Only by considering the urban environment at the very detailed level can one expect to be able to confidently discuss the merits (or otherwise) of environmental design and levels of crime.

In order to assist in this task, two case studies have been selected to be examined in terms of the man-made environments which have been created and the characteristics of the people who live within them, before considering the incidence of crime within the estates. At that point, it is anticipated that it may
be possible to consider the influence of the physical, design and layout characteristics of the estate to crime.

The two estates are located within Buckinghamshire, and for reasons of confidentiality, both the names of the estates and the town in which they are situated will remain anonymous. The town will be referred to throughout as Fremantle, whilst the estates shall be called Claremont and Padbury for the purposes of this study.

Fremantle is located in the southern extremities of Buckinghamshire, located thirty miles west of London. As a result, the area is subject to considerable development pressures which is aided in no small way by its proximity to Heathrow Airport, convenient position on the national motorway network, and due to the attractiveness of the environment (much of the surrounding countryside is designated within the Metropolitan Green Belt and/or the Chiltern's Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty).

Physically, the town is broadly characterised by a
valley floor which follows the course of a river, and steep valley sides. The historic location of the town's traditional industries is still evident along the valley floor, whilst the surrounding slopes have been developed primarily for housing.

Fremantle town has a population of 62,000 (OPCS, 1993) and forms the major urban centre of the area. Aside from providing the economic base, it also acts as the major commercial centre for a much larger area, providing shopping, recreation, medical and cultural facilities for the surrounding smaller towns and villages.

Padbury and Claremont are two public housing estates located within the urban area of Fremantle, identified in Figure 5.1. Both have been selected for their residential homogeneity, comparable sizes, and rather unusual low-rise single family dwelling design (in the main, although Claremont has flats as well). Planning permission was granted in 1970 for the rather tight knit development of Padbury. Claremont, unlike the relatively level Padbury estate, is situated on one of the steeply sloping valley sides. It was undoubtedly
Figure 5.1 Location of Padbury and Claremont in the Fremantle Urban Area
a factor of its topographical limitations that a site within such close proximity to the town centre (approx one mile) was not developed until circa 1976. This element may also be responsible for the apparent lower density of the Claremont development. Although there is a range of accommodation within the estate, flatted developments tend to be located around the periphery; the dominant form of housing being terraced single family dwellings.

THE URBAN FORM:

To permit a more digestible account, the estates will be examined in terms of the spatial scale, internal spatial structure and encounter and surveillance of each. Spatial scale considers the scale of each estate as compared to the surrounding urban area; internal spatial structure examines the idiosyncrasies of the layouts of Padbury and Claremont; and the ability of each estate to provide opportunities for surveillance and encounter (ie. regular through movement of people).
THE SPATIAL SCALE

This section seeks principally to identify how each estate 'fits in' with neighbouring urban spaces.

The term "estate" implies a separate parcel of land; an area with an internal uniformity which is not characteristic of the surrounding area. It is therefore not surprising to discover that the spatial scale of the estate differs quite substantially from that of the area in which it has been situated (HILLIER & PENN, 1991).

To take firstly the Padbury estate, an initial inspection of Figure 5.2 tends to suggest that the estate possesses a much smaller spatial scale that the surrounding urban area. This characteristic, combined with the fact that Padbury is bordered on one side only by residential development (the remainder being composed of schools, hospitals, a large office development, and an out-of-town retail centre), effectively isolates the estate from the surrounding area. The implications of this isolation factor upon crime and community formation are serious if we accept Hillier's theory, although his counterparts (including
Figure 5.2  The Spatial Scale of Padbury
the police) in the opposing theoretical camp would be likely to consider such a layout to be very favourable to crime prevention and community development.

Based purely on the road network, as opposed to lines of sight, the dramatic reduction in the scale of this urban space serves to segregate it from the established street system, and consequently the surrounding urban area as a whole.

It has already been noted that the estate is bounded by a number of other non-residential land uses, however, what is also worthy of note is the extent to which the estate as a whole is almost entirely enclosed. Aside from the road which horizontally bisects the Padbury estate, there are no other physical routes through it bar one pedestrian path. Hence, its use is likely to be restricted to the occupants of the dwellings only, as few other people would have cause to utilise this space.

Padbury's internal design produces what may be termed a 'neo-Radburn' formation, such as that described by Hinkle and Loring (1977). The morphology of the
estate comprises of a multitude of square blocks sited within a street pattern reminiscent of a grid, with roads running in a tidy horizontal fashion, yet linked vertically only by pedestrian access paths. Further, the streets fail to span the width of the estate, being severed at the midway mark. It is also unusual in its format, given that only half of the dwellings front onto the street, the remainder being served by footpaths which criss-cross the estate. Furthermore, the 'boxed terraces' provide a completely alien feature from the large detached and semi-detached properties in the neighbouring streets, exacerbating the estates' inability to assimilate in its urban context.

A more hopeful picture is portrayed in the Claremont estate where, as illustrated in Figure 5.3, the spatial scale is not significantly different from that in the surrounding areas.

Unlike Padbury, the Claremont estate is bordered on all sides by residential development, including the vacant land to the east of the arterial road, which has recently been developed for housing. It does,
Figure 5.3  The Spatial Scale of Claremont
however, have the railway running along its southern extremities and the topographical constraints of this site render it almost impossible to feasibly integrate the estate with the land beyond the railway. It is also clear from the figure that the road network links well to the surrounding urban area, whilst also providing an alternative route for through traffic unable to ascend the mountainous main arterial road, thereby encouraging through movement.

Claremont's morphology comprises principally of terraced family dwellings, located on a road system which resembles a slanted grid to reflect the landscape. More importantly, all the roads (with the exception of two culs-de-sac) lead somewhere - normally into the existing network, in contrast the blunt-ended Padbury estate.

**INTERNAL SPATIAL STRUCTURE -**

Having examined how the estates 'fit in' to their surrounding neighbourhood, the next step is to examine the internal spatial structure. In other words; what is it like inside?
The notion of legibility is of prime importance here. Can the estates be understood by those wishing to use them; strangers as well as inhabitants? Bentley et al (1985) note that the legibility of an urban space is that quality which makes it 'graspable'. They also acknowledge that there are two levels within the concept which should ideally compliment each other: physical form and activity patterns. It is indeed important to view the two concurrently, as often what may appear from a plan as a perfectly logical structure, may in actual fact be very confusing for a person moving through the parts on the ground. Hillier and Penn (1991) suggest that the very properties of plans which make them clear to an 'airborne audience', such as geometric form, repetition, etc, make them unintelligible for the users of such spaces.

The Padbury estate exhibits just these elements (see Figure 5.4). The 'boxed terraces', complete with rear gardens and garages, form a neat geometrical square unit which is repeated in an almost stamp-like fashion across the remainder of the estate. Variations in house types are insufficient to distort the blocks,
and combined with the lack of any element of hierarchy to provide some visual relief or reference point, the end result is an urban space which is highly unintelligible for the user and in particular the pedestrian.

The Claremont estate is certainly not beyond reproach with respect to this either. From the turning off the main arterial road into the estate, each turn to the left looks identical to the last, with identical housing styles and identical street layouts (see Figure 5.5). Although here again the topography works to its advantage by informing the user that 'downhill' leads towards the town centre (which is clearly visible), and 'uphill' takes you into the housing beyond. There are also indicators in the form of differing dwelling types, such as blocks of flats, which act as landmarks to denote the transition out of the estate.

**ENCOUNTER AND SURVEILLANCE -**

The use people make of space is inherently related to the legibility of that space, and for this reason the arguments which follow may appear to overlap or at
Figure 5.5 The Internal Structure of Claremont
least expand upon the contents of the preceding section.

Movement within the Padbury estate is guided by a rabbit warren of footpaths which connect the roadways to the front doors of the 'inner' dwellings on the estate. Each pathway which runs perpendicular to the road is bounded (each side) by two metre close boarded fencing to the rear gardens of the dwellings (see Figure 5.6). Aside from providing virtually nil surveillance, 'muggers alleys' such as these do little to reduce fear of crime and also give the pedestrian little to remember or orientate themselves from.

Figure 5.4 provides an indication of the degree of separation between pedestrian and vehicular traffic throughout the estate. Pedestrian movement flows are also separated from the primary arterial route, by way of a subway and footpaths (see Figure 5.7). All these factors make the urban space more difficult to comprehend for users on foot.
Figure 5.6 Pedestrian Access via Alleyways to Front Doors

(a)

(b)
Figure 5.7 Segregation of Pedestrian and Vehicular Traffic
Levels of surveillance on this estate, are worsened by the architectural devices used to set front doors in recessed alcoves, with garages projecting forwards to further restrict lines of sight (see Figure 5.8).

Public open space on the estate suffers a similar fate, being faced by predominantly blank walls and two metre fencing (see Figure 5.9), rendering the areas underused and misused at once. However, the local authority is currently investing substantial resources to revamp the area with new hard and soft landscaping, and improved lighting.

Turning to the Claremont estate, it is immediately evident from Figure 5.5 that the number of footpaths which are segregated from the road system is minimal compared to the Padbury estate. The predominant form of movement is via common routes which are shared by pedestrian and vehicle alike. For the user on foot, in a car, or on a bus (public transport serves the interior of this estate), the area is legible. A stranger would quickly be able to orientate his/herself by utilising the vast lines of sight towards the town centre and across the valley which is
Figure 5.8  Recessed Front Doors and Projecting Garages
Figure 5.9  Low Surveillance over Public Open Spaces
possible from each of the roads. Figure 5.10 illustrates this point, with a view taken from the top of one of the estate roads.

The footpaths which do exist, running principally in a parallel fashion to the roads, serve the rear gardens of the dwellings on the estate. Surprisingly, they give the stranger a sense of intrusion as if you are trespassing in someone's back garden. This sensation is probably attributable to the low open fences which demarcate the small rear gardens (affording little privacy for the occupants) and the close proximity of a large number of windows which provide an impressive form of surveillance as illustrated in Figure 5.11. On the front elevations, and despite the orientation of the dwelling towards the town centre (ie. 'downhill'), natural surveillance is maintained in both directions by virtue of the front doors facing 'uphill'.

It is interesting to note how the deliberate attempts to demarcate private from public space in the Padbury estate have resulted in a network of unsuccessful and undesirable back alleys, whereas the 'open' policy in
Figure 5.10 Line of Sight to the Town Centre

Figure 5.11 Effective Surveillance over Rear Access Paths
the Claremont estate appears to more have been successful in achieving surveillance, but at the expense of occupants privacy.

The examination of these two estates has illustrated the manner in which residential estate development can generate quite different consequences, dependent upon the physical structure with which it is endowed. The urban spaces which have been produced in both instances are strikingly different, and thus the use which is made of them is also contrasting.

To summarise thus far, the Padbury estate fails to integrate successfully into the surrounding area, thus effectively cutting it off from the 'outside world' and creating an island. This larger island is essentially composed of many identical atolls, effectively producing a confusing and repetitive space. Padbury is also characterised by almost complete segregation of pedestrian and vehicular flows, with limited natural surveillance over the pedestrian routes and public open spaces.

In contrast, Claremont appears to be more integrated
within the surrounding urban forms, enabling it to more readily host the passage of through traffic. The intelligibility of the area is (aside from the repetitive road format at the base of the estate), simple to comprehend, aided in no small way by the topographical benefits of the site, which has successfully utilised a major disbenefit to its advantage. Furthermore, the patterns of movement through the estate are co-ordinated such that cars, buses and people on foot can (and do) co-exist in a largely harmonious manner, with optimum surveillance being achieved for its users.

**TAKE-UP RATES ON THE ESTATES:**

With the advent of the Right To Buy initiative, Council estates have become progressively more privatised. This inevitably means that the strength of the local authority (LA), through its housing function, is weakened as it has control over a much smaller proportion of the estate. With respect to the role of management in reducing crime levels, the LA has not only a smaller housing stock, but that stock which (for one reason or another) the tenants have
chosen not to purchase. It seems logical that the more attractive Council houses and flats would be purchased first, leaving behind the least desirable.

For the two estates the subject of this study, the take-up rates (ie. the proportion of tenants who take up their Right To Buy) differ significantly. Of the 353 dwellings on the Claremont estate, only 29.2% had at 1 April 1994 purchased their homes from the LA. Alternatively, 56.8% of the 336 properties in Padbury have taken up the offer. Figures 5.12 and 5.13 illustrate the locations of those properties which have been purchased from the local authority in Claremont and Padbury (respectively). This disparity may be put down to two principal factors.

Firstly, a substantial proportion of the dwellings on the Claremont estate are flats - some 42% - whilst there are none located within the Padbury study area. It may be that the terms of the sale of flats are less attractive to prospective purchasers, in that they are only sold on a leasehold basis; that they have more common walls with other households than the single family dwellings; or that the properties are simply
Figure 5.12 Council House Sales in Claremont
Figure 5.13 Council House Sales in Padbury
located in a less attractive environment, which accounts for only 12.6% have been sold whilst 48% of houses have been sold. Alternatively, the reason may lie in the nature of the residents who occupy them, which may produce housing for less stable persons, such as the homeless, alcoholics, or the mentally ill.

The second reason may relate to the prices set by the LA for the properties. A condition of the Right To Buy scheme stipulates that a property can not be sold for less that the amount it would cost to be constructed today. The topography of the Claremont estate gives rise to a high cost floor, as a result of the high costs associated with constructing dwellings on a steep valley side. The lower take up rate (for all dwellings, as well as single family dwellings) may therefore simply be attributable to more expensive asking prices for the properties, although it is also conceivable that the factors set out in the previous paragraph also have a bearing.

Within each estate, there are a number of different house types, and it is worth considering the take-up rates of each, in an attempt to gain an appreciation
of which house types are more desirable (in terms of purchasing) to their occupants. The term 'house' is used here to apply to all properties, including flats, for ease of reference. There are principally four house types in Claremont:

[1] **ZIG ZAG TERRACES** - tend to be located on the northern (upper) sides of the roads with front gardens at right angles to the front of the house, and rear garden similarly orientated. This type has reduced common walls with adjacent properties, and access to the front door is directly in front of a neighbour's kitchen window. Thus:

[2] **STAGGERED TRADITIONAL TERRACES** - similar form to the zig zag terraces except that the front and rear gardens are situated in a more traditional relationship with the dwelling they serve. The terraces are staggered less prominently than the Zig Zags, with greater expanses of common walls between dwellings. This house type also has less
generous front gardens and lacks the ability to clearly observe callers to neighbouring properties. Thus:

[3] **ADJACENT TO ALLEY / END OF ROW** - a separate category was devised to differentiate those properties which were positioned adjacent to footpaths or at the end of the terrace.

[4] **FLATS** - The flats in Claremont were distinguished from the single family dwellings in order to enable comparison of like with like, with Padbury.

Figure 5.14 illustrates the take-up rates for the Claremont estate by house type, considering the proportion of each house type which have been purchased by tenants. Perhaps unsurprisingly, take-up of flats are particularly low which may be a result of
TAKE-UP RATES BY HOUSE TYPE
CLAREMONT 1992-3

Flats

Adj. Alley, End Row

Staggered Traditional

Zig Zag Terraces

PERCENT TAKE-UP
any combination of the factors set out earlier. Alternatively, the end of row properties and/or those situated adjacent to alleyways, score particularly highly among residents (approximately 46%). One simple explanation could be that, as an end of terrace, the property has the status of a semi-detached house together with a larger garden area (often associated with these dwellings), and the increased potential for further extension without being constrained by the existence of neighbouring properties at close range. A psychological factor which may also contribute to the tenants desire to purchase their Council property located in such 'end' positions (particularly those at the beginning of roads) may be that they are perceived to be on the 'edge' of the Council estates, rather that enveloped within it.

The Zig Zag terraces also appear popular among tenants, 46% on the Claremont estate having been purchased from the local authority compared to 25% of the Traditional Staggered terraces. This may be the result of the fact that the former tend to have larger garden areas than their Traditional Staggered.
counterparts, particularly on the frontage, giving a more spacious appearance. Moreover, the Zig Zag terraces are set above the road, with sweeping views across the town of Fremantle, whilst those on the southern side of the road are set down and screened to a large extent from the road by landscaping. The Zig Zags also appear slightly larger, with a smaller proportion of common walls to adjacent properties than the Traditional Staggered terraces.

The Padbury estate, on the other hand, has a radically different arrangement of dwellings, although it has no flats within it. The house types in the estate were categorised in a broadly similar terms with respect to the 'end row' dwellings, however the remainder were given classifications which described their position as well as house type. Thus:

[1] BUNGALOWS - refers to the single storey accommodation in Padbury, which tends to be located in blocks of four.

a) 'inside' represents those properties located on the inner part of the formation, normally
fronting onto a pedestrian path.

b) 'outside' indicates the bungalows which front on to the roads in the estate.

c) 'edge row' describes those bungalows which are positioned at the end of a street, with no other properties immediately adjacent. Due to the footpath network which proliferates the Padbury estate and the fact that each dwelling abuts an alleyway, the 'edge row' classification has only been used for those dwellings situated on the end of a row.

2. TRADITIONAL TERRACE - describes those dwellings which represent a traditional form of terraced property. In the study area, the western terrace in Road 11, the two dwellings on the north west end of Road 1, and the two dwellings on the north west end of Road 3 are all categorised under this heading. The latter four dwellings have been
included for the fact that they are distinct from the remaining house types on the estate, by virtue of them having a traditional front and rear aspect, linked by a side wall to their neighbour.

3. **CUBED TERRACE** - is the term used to describe the rather unusual 'square' terraces which are characteristic of Padbury. In a sense, they are two sets of semi-detached houses, pushed back to back.

   a) 'inside' as with the bungalows, indicates those properties which are situated on the inner portion of the cube, fronting onto a footpath.

   b) 'outside' describes the outer portion of the cube, which fronts onto the road

   c) 'Edge Row' indicates the properties which are located on the ends of each street.
The graph illustrated in Figure 5.15 provides a measure of the percentage take up of each house type. Most obvious is the significantly lower proportion of bungalows which have been purchased by tenants (approximately 24%) which may be put down to the fact that in terms of the Right To Buy legislation, they are suitable for elderly persons and therefore, not subject to as liberal sales policies (MORRIS, 1993). However, within each type of bungalow classification there are further disparities. The take up of the end properties is significantly higher (approximately 32%), the 'inside' dwellings being favoured second, and least desirable would appear to be those bungalows located on the road frontage. In terms of the end properties it may be that similar reasons to that advanced in favour of the end properties in Claremont are applicable. The differences highlighted for the rest may be attributed to the fact that, given very limited front garden depths of the outside dwellings, elderly tenants prefer to be situated away from the noise and disturbance generated by cars driving and parked along the roads themselves. Alternatively, it may simply be that the more spacious and 'safer' landscaped
TAKE-UP RATES BY HOUSE TYPE IN PADBURY (TO 1 APRIL 1993)

- Cubed Terrace - Edge Row
- Cubed Terrace - ‘outside’
- Cubed Terrace - ‘inside’
- Traditional Terrace
- Bungalow - Edge Row
- Bungalow - ‘outside’
- Bungalow - ‘inside’

PERCENT TAKE-UP

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
environment of the 'inner sanctum' appeals.

The traditional terraces exhibit a lower than average take up rate at 40% (compared to the mean figure of 57%). Of the row in Road 11, two of the four purchased properties are at the ends, and as such benefit from significantly larger gardens and semi-detached status. Of the other types of traditional terrace (both of which may be described as 'semi-detached' in strict terminology), one pair have been 'taken-up' from the Council (Road 1), whilst those on Road 3 have not. Reasoning for this is unclear as both pairs are very similar in terms of position and plot sizes and it may be a factor related to the circumstances of the tenants themselves rather than the particular merits or otherwise of the property.

The cubed terrace, as well as representing the dominant house-type on the estate, also appears to be the most desirable in terms of take up rates at an above average rate of 66%. Echoing the experiences of the bungalows, the 'outside' dwellings appear less attractive than both the 'edge row' and 'inside' category house-types. However, the disparity in this
instance is not particularly great (approx 8%) although the proportion of privatised dwellings along the northern side of the main arterial road is particularly noteworthy. It seems logical that similar reasoning for the degree of attractiveness of a particular house-type applies here also. However it is curious that, given the less convenient location of garages and parking that the preference is still for 'inside' properties rather than those on the outside road frontage.
THE HUMAN FORM:

In order to be able to fully comprehend the nature of crime within the two selected estates, it is necessary to have an appreciation of the characteristics of the inhabitants of each. To consider the level of vulnerability of particular targets of crime (whether they be humans or inanimate objects), one must first be able to identify any particular characteristics or special needs of that population.

A fairly obvious starting point is to consider the demographic composition of the estates; in their own right, as compared with a base of the town as a whole, and comparisons with each other.

Figure 5.16 illustrates the percentage that each age group (in 5 year bandings) makes up of the total population for that area, and sets the town average against Claremont and Padbury for 1991.
Claremont stands out for its well above average proportion of under ten year olds, whilst Padbury is below average for the same group, but steeply rises to significantly above the Fremantle average for teenage groups. Both estates indicate below average proportions of 20-35 year olds, although the trend in both cases is to exceed the town mean for the 35-45 age group. A further feature common to both study areas is the proportion of the population at or below the town average for people 45+. This is with the exception of Padbury, which is high for the over 75's although this may be largely accounted for by the existence of elderly persons accommodation adjacent to the estate and within the census enumeration districts.

At the previous 1981 census, both estates were still very much in their infancy, and as indicated in Figure 5.17, the situation was somewhat different.

Both Claremont and Padbury rated above average for the under 10's. However Claremont is particularly noteworthy for the 21% of its population which were under four years old. Claremont in 1981 had a
DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE COMPARISONS (1981 CENSUS)

FREMANTLE
CLAREMONT
PADBURY

AGE CATEGORIES

% OF TOTAL POPULATION

Figure 5.17
significantly higher proportion of 20 to 35 year olds, unlike Padbury which exhibited levels very much akin to that of Fremantle as a whole. For the older age categories, Claremont exhibited very low levels of elderly persons, with none over 70 years. Padbury, on the other hand, demonstrated above average proportions of the 65 to 75 age group, and the over 85's. From these two figures we can extract information on the significant changes in terms of the demographic structure of Fremantle town as a whole and the study areas located within in.

In general terms as illustrated in Figure 5.18 the composition of the town's population has remained relatively stable, with one further exception. Fremantle has witnessed a significant reduction in the 10-19 age categories, followed by identifiable increases in the proportion of 20-29 year olds. Such statistics, notwithstanding migration factors, would appear to indicate a element of the population (which represent a substantial proportion of that population) upsetting the normal distribution of the towns demographic structure. Moving from teenagers in 1981, to adults in their 20's in 1991, one would expect if
circumstances remained the same, that by the 2001 census there would be a glut of 30-40 year olds in Fremantle.

Turning to each estate, Figure 5.19 illustrates a much more erratic pattern for Claremont over the 10 year time period. Under 4's have dropped to half the level they were in 1981, as have the 20-29 age groups. This shows a clear departure from the trend for the town as a whole, where the proportion of very small children had remained fairly constant, and the 20 to 29 year olds have increased. Meanwhile the levels of school age children have increased in addition to 30-50 year olds. Also noteworthy is the substantial increases in the proportion of elderly persons, from a previously zero representation.

A different story emerges in Padbury (see Figure 5.20), where the major changes over the reference period include reduced levels of under 10's and the elderly (65-75 year olds), corresponding with sharp increases in older teens to early 20's age groups, as well as 40 to 55 year olds. The 80-84 age group has also taken a dramatic rise.
DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE COMPARISONS
CLAREMONT ESTATE (1981 - 1991)
DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE COMPARISONS
PADBURY ESTATE (1981 - 1991)

AGE CATEGORIES

% OF TOTAL POPULATION

0-4
5-9
10-15
16-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
75-79
80-84
85+

1991
1981

Figure 5.20

% OF TOTAL POPULATION
It is apparent from the above that the demographic structure of both estates have altered in the last decade at rates which are at variance with the base of Fremantle as a whole. This may result directly from the allocation policies of the local authority, changing social conditions, changes in housing market conditions and levels of economic prosperity.

In its broadest sense, public housing fulfils a basic need for shelter (in theory at least) for those elements of the population who are unable to afford to purchase or rent in the private sector housing market. It is therefore logical to expect to find concentrations of particular groups of less economically competitive people in Council estates, of which the case study areas are fairly typical examples.

Allocation policies of the Local Authority are a direct attempt to prioritise people who exhibit such characteristics which make them (in the eyes of the Local Authority) more 'needy' of accommodation.

Given the relatively recent privatisation of a large
proportion of the existing housing stock and local authorities' inability to build more to replace lost stock, the choices are that much harder to make as fewer dwellings are available to rent. Compared with the policies of a decade or so ago, when both estates were in their infancy and when houses were allocated to all families with children, today's allocations are predominantly to Homeless Persons (ie. approximately 80% according to the local Housing Management Officer (MORRIS, 1993)), as a result of Homeless Persons legislation. In practise, this results in allocations mainly to those persons with medical or mental problems, or pregnant single women, with few people moving off the waiting lists. The product of this is that there is a greater demand for single person accommodation which is as well given that (according to MORRIS, 1993) tenants with three bed roomed properties are reluctant to transfer 'down' to smaller accommodation, even after children leave home.

Allocation policies for particular kinds of accommodation, eg. homes for the elderly, can also have a direct bearing upon the demographic structure of an area. For example, approximately 20% of the
dwellings in Padbury are bungalows which are suitable for elderly persons, which therefore results in above average proportions of these older age categories (as demonstrated in Figure 5.16). Claremont, alternatively, has no such provision, and correspondingly has very low levels of this group in its population.

Social changes in British Society have resulted in a more ethnically diverse population, and one which no longer recognises 'nuclear' as the only family form. More common are the second and third generation Britons of ethnic origin, and the single parent families of nineties Britain. The latter, and arguably the former groups, are less economically competitive in the housing market, and it is therefore unsurprising to see higher levels (in relative terms) of each located within the study areas. Figure 5.21 provides a diagrammatic breakdown of the ethnic structure of Fremantle town in 1991. Whilst whites are clearly the largest group (80.3%), the remaining 20% or so of the population are of ethnic origin. Of this, Pakistani's make up the next largest single group (9%), followed by Black-Caribbeans (4.4%).
Figure 5.21
ETHNIC STRUCTURE OF FREMANTLE 1991

Source: [Insert Source]

- White
- Black-Caribbean
- Black African
- Black Other
- Indian
- Pakistani
- Bangladeshi
- Chinese
- Irish
- Other Asian
- Other
Other ethnic groups are represented in much smaller proportions.

For the estates themselves, a different picture emerges (see Figures 5.22 and 5.23). Claremont (Figure 5.22) displays a significantly greater proportion of ethnic people (33%), and of these the main groups represented are Caribbean Blacks and Pakistanis (both approximately 11%). African and Non-African blacks account for a further 2% of the estates population, whilst 'other' (ie. those ethnic groups falling outside of the specified categories) make up 6.6% of the population. People of Irish origin are represented in average proportions to that of the town's. Padbury (Figure 5.23) provides a very different picture, in which, whilst levels of ethnic groups are still above the town average, the dominant groups are Caribbeans and Non-African Blacks (approximately 14%). Pakistani's represent a much lower proportion of the population (4.6%) than Fremantle as a whole, whilst Irish persons account for 2.6% of the total population (ie. above the average of 1.7%).
ETHNIC STRUCTURE OF CLAREMONT 1991

Figure 5.22

SOURCE: ORCS 1993
ETHNIC STRUCTURE OF PADBURY 1991

Figure 5.23

Source: ORCS, 1993
In terms of the proportion of single parent families within the town as a whole, the 1991 census (OPCS, 1993) reports that they account for 11.5% of the total households in the town. Whilst Padbury does not differ from this significantly (13.9%), Claremont exhibits a level almost treble that of the town, at 29%. However, these represent decreases on the levels indicated for the 1981 census (OPCS, 1983), at which time 13% was the town average, and Claremont and Padbury each had 32% and 22% (respectively) of non-nuclear families with children.

The post-boom recession has had a significant impact upon the town as a whole, but more particularly on the public housing estates of Claremont and Padbury. The levels of unemployment in Padbury at the time of the 1991 census (OPCS, 1993) was 11.6%, whilst Claremont had reached a high of 14.7%, in comparison to the 8.4% rate for Fremantle town. Such significant differences were also apparent in the 1981 census (OPCS, 1983), at which time unemployment was recorded to be at lower levels (5.8% for the town), although both study areas demonstrated much greater proportions of their population who were unemployed. That is, 9.6% in both
Claremont and Padbury. The step backwards in employment levels both at the broader scale, and in terms of the case studies in particular, together with the slump in the private housing market may also result in children staying in the parental homes longer.

A further indicator of the manner in which the economic recession has had more profound effects upon the recipients of state housing, is levels of car ownership. Car ownership is generally accepted to be an indicator of wealth. Within each estate, the proportion of car ownership falls well below average for Fremantle town which stood at 56% for people aged 17+ in 1991 (1991 census). Padbury recorded a 44% ownership rate, however only 41% of Claremont's population over 17 could claim car ownership.

It also seems clear that the estates of Padbury and Claremont, despite each having fairly high levels of (now) private housing, still provide accommodation for the poorer and less economically competitive elements of the population. The estates are characterised by high levels of children (up to mid teens), greater
concentrations of ethnic minorities, higher levels of single parent families, and higher unemployment rates than the average for the town in which they are situated.

Such factors would, in the eyes of the social-economic school, provide ripe conditions for high crime rates. Alternatively, the educational psychology school may suggest that such high levels of non-nuclear families may result in a lack of adequate socialisation, and subsequent behavioural problems.

THE FORM OF CRIME:

It has been suggested that Council estates suffer higher levels of crime (SMITH, 1989) and even if this is not in fact the case, there is certainly a general perception that such estates are unsafe and/or 'hotbeds' of crime. It is, however, important to understand if particular areas, at the small scale are more prone to crime and if so, what causes may be attributed to this such that resources may be directed
towards remedial solutions.

To explore this, the two case study estates will be examined both in terms of their crime rates compared to each other; the rate for the town; plus the relevant police force area average. Also, internal variations will be examined which may reveal explanations in terms of the particular physical, management or socio-economic characteristics of the estates in question.

Burglary and vehicle offences have been selected for the purposes of this exercise, primarily for the manner in which they relate to the rather more immobile stationary property offences. That is, unlike humans, houses and parked cars are located in one given point in space which can be readily identified on a map. From this, one may analyse any emerging patterns in offence rates to ascertain whether a relationship is occurring between the design of the environment and the incidences of crime within it.

Offences of burglary and vehicle crime for both
Padbury and Claremont in the twelve month period between March 1992 and March 1993 do not appear at first glance to be especially high. In the given period, Claremont experienced four reported burglaries, and Padbury eleven. Car crime rated somewhat higher in numerical terms with a total of eight 'theft of' vehicles and two 'theft from' offences in Claremont. Padbury, alternatively, was the scene of five vehicle thefts, and twenty-eight incidents of theft from them. However it is not appropriate to use base figures as the point of comparison - as discussed in Chapter 3 - the number of dwellings has to be controlled for in each case, as the number of motor vehicles has to with regard to car and motorbike offences.

BURGLARY

The burglary rate for Claremont in the given reference period is 2.5% as compared with the slightly higher rate of 3.3% in Padbury. However, a more significant difference is evident when the rate for Claremont is examined on the basis of burglaries to houses as distinct from flats. Flats report a 3.3% burglary
rate, whereas single family dwellings on the same estate have a relatively low 1.9%. This would tend to indicate that there is a lower burglary rate for dwellinghouses in Claremont, although clearly the figures used are too small to be confident that this is a statistically significant finding.

When considered against the averages of Fremantle as a whole, the rate of burglaries is substantially higher at 6.7% for the same period (THAMES VALLEY POLICE, 1993). However, it should be noted that instead of the number of dwellings (which the total number of burglaries is divided by to produce a 'rate' for the town), the number of private households has been used (OPCS, 1993). It is likely that the two figures offer little difference in reality, however it may be that there are more households than dwellings, thus tending to inflate the Fremantle town rate.

To partially resolve this, a per capita burglary rate may be used which produces a universal measure of the relative occurrence of burglaries in the two case study estates, which can be set against levels for the town as a whole, as well as the police force area in
which Fremantle is located. By this means, Claremont and Padbury have fairly comparable rates (0.8% and 0.9%, respectively), which are again significantly less than the overall rate for the town, at 2.5%. The rate for the Thames Valley PFA as a whole is 0.018 offences per capita, which ranks as average on a national scale. It would therefore appear that the burglary rates for the two estates in the given twelve month period, despite being well below the Fremantle average, still represent high crime rates when judged in the context of the sub-region.

The obvious drawback with using 'per capita' figures is that little account is taken of the demographic structure of the occupants of dwellings to which the figure is related. Hence, the rates of incidence of this crime may be particularly misleading in areas where, for example, there is a high proportion of dependent children, and therefore a smaller number of households occupying a lesser number of dwellings. In such instances, an apparent 'low' burglary rate per capita may conceal a high offence rate per dwelling, and vice versa.
If the incidence of crime on the estates is to be attributed to their design and layout, then one would expect a pattern to emerge in the special incidence of crime. In much the same way as particular house types and house positions were found to be more attractive to tenants purchasing Council properties, the analysis seeks to question which houses a burglar would be likely to find more 'attractive'.

To assist in this exercise, and to supplement the relatively small numbers of offences reported during the reference period, the expertise of a now-retired burglar was sought. For obvious reasons of confidentiality, his real identity cannot be disclosed and he shall instead be referred to as Michael X. In order to elicit information on the preferences of a burglar, Michael X was interviewed as both he and the researcher travelled around the estate (on foot as well as in a car). He was asked to identify those properties which would, in his view, represent attractive targets. In virtually all instances, this meant those properties which could be burgled with the least risk of observation or detection, as calculated by the criminal. Michael X was at no time prior to,
during or after the interview, given any indication of the locations of actual burglaries in the estates.

The suggestions and advice given by Michael X are clearly based on one person's opinion and personal experience and as such is not intended to represent the views of all burglars. However, it is felt that the valuable insights offered by such an (ex)criminal are a vital clue in the quest for better understanding of the vulnerability of particular forms of the urban environment over others.

Figure 5.24 plots the incidents of reported (and subsequently recorded) burglaries for the Claremont estate March 1992-1993. Due to the low numbers, little, if any pattern appears to emerge. Using the same classification as for the take-up rates of Council properties, the Graph in Figure 5.25 would seem to point to some variation between house types. In this case, although each category incurred one burglary, as a proportion of the number of that type of dwelling on the estate, those properties adjacent to alleys and at the end of terraces appeared to be more vulnerable. Second came the zig zag terraces,
Figure 5.24 Recorded Incidents Of Burglary (1992-93)
BURGLARY RATES BY HOUSE TYPE
CLAREMONT 1992-3

HOUSE TYPE

- Flats
- Adj. Alley, End Row
- Staggered Traditional
- Zig Zag Terraces

% BURGLED 1992-3
followed by the staggered traditional terraces and finally the flats. This preference order was confirmed by Michael X, who suggested that a particularly advantageous factor from a burglar's point of view, was the recessed porches in the zig zag house types and some 'end row', as well as the more open end properties with fewer neighbours.

The greater numbers of committed burglary offences in Padbury enables slightly more reliable conclusions to be drawn. Figure 5.26 plots the occurrences across the estate, whilst Figure 5.27 breaks the results down by house type. The rates for each house type are higher in Padbury, although the disparities between various designs and positions of dwellings are also more substantial. The most outstanding feature of the graph is the higher rates of burglary of the cubed terraces. Within this the 'edge row' and 'outside' (i.e. those dwellings positioned on or adjacent to a road) stand out as fairing worse than the properties located on the 'insides' of the cube. Michael X reiterated this preference, adding that a burglar may feel more conspicuous in the pedestrian only footpath areas. Only one burglary was recorded in the
THE PADBURY ESTATE

NOT TO SCALE

Note: One property in Road 1 burgled twice.
BURGLARY RATES BY HOUSE TYPE
PADBURY 1992-3

- Cubed Terrace - Edge Row
- Cubed Terrace - 'outside'
- Cubed Terrace - 'inside'
- Traditional Terrace
- Bungalow - Edge Row
- Bungalow - 'outside'
- Bungalow - 'inside'

% BURGLED 1992-3

Figure 5.27
bungalows in Padbury which occurred on the 'inside' of the quadrangle, however, this may also be judged to be on the edge of the estate, being situated adjacent to a network of footpaths to the school.

It would appear from the analysis of crime trends in the two estates, that properties situated on the end of a row or adjacent to an alley are more vulnerable to the opportunistic criminal. This seems logical, given that such properties would tend to have more open boundaries than mid-terraced dwellings.

This phenomena seems to be compounded in the Padbury estate. By virtue of its unique layout, every dwelling in Padbury (with the exception of the traditional terrace in Road 11) adjoins an alleyway, and therefore opens up the boundaries to each house.

Potential offenders of the cubed terraces may therefore slip down one of the many connecting alleyways, and scale the garden fence before entering the property with very little fear of being observed. This method is aided by the almost complete lack of opportunity for surveillance once the criminal has
entered the safe confines of the alleyway.

Interestingly, the burglary rates of the 'outside' properties rate much higher than the 'inside' cubed terraces. Reasoning for this may be related to the fact that burglars can more easily observe people leaving their homes without appearing conspicuous, from one of the many recessed positions along the roads in Padbury. They then park their car within feet of the front door of the target property, in order to load the stolen goods whilst arising least suspicion. Michael X, confirmed that intruders would feel more conspicuous on the 'inside' areas of the estates.

The relationship between purchases of Council properties and burglaries on the estate was also analysed in order to ascertain whether or not private dwellings were more vulnerable than those still in Council ownership. For the Claremont Estate only one ex-Council property was burgled out of four total (25%) whereas the picture is radically different on the Padbury Estate. Of the eleven burglaries between March 1992 and March 1993, eight were private
properties (73%). As the rate of take-ups is higher in Padbury anyway this may explain the disparity, however an alternative explanation may be that burglars presume that householders who have purchased their properties possess more valuable consumer goods (a point reiterated by Michael X), and are therefore more 'worthwhile' targets. There are also often visual signs apparent on private dwellings when owners have 'done up' their homes (presumably to distinguish them from the remaining Council dwellings), and there may therefore appear more affluent.

An inspection of Figures 5.14 and 5.25 (Claremont), and Figures 5.15 and 5.27 (Padbury), reveals that the types of dwellings which seem to be more popular for tenants to purchase, ie. the cubed terraces in Padbury together with the end properties and zig zag terraces in Claremont, also seem to be more favoured by the criminals. The correlation coefficient for each estate seems to confirm this belief, and indicates a relatively strong and positive relationship (r squared = 0.66 for Claremont and 0.40 for Padbury). However, clearly the numbers of incidents of recorded burglary involved is very low, particularly in Claremont, which
would perhaps throw up an artificially high correlation score. Despite these reservations, it is felt that a positive relationship does exist between Council house sales and the probability of being burgled, which investigation of crime rates over greater time periods may be able to confirm.

VEHICLE CRIME

Vehicle crime rates on the two estates vary to a greater extent than burglaries. During the March 1992 to 1993 period, Claremont hosted a vehicle offence rate of 3.2% of total vehicles, whilst Padbury substantiated a level almost treble this at 8.8%. The Fremantle town rate (THAMES VALLEY POLICE, 1993) of 10.9% tends to indicate that both study areas fare comparatively well at a local level.

Translated to a per capita basis, the disparities between Claremont and Padbury remain in evidence (0.9% and 2.8%, respectively), as does the higher rate of 4.6% for Fremantle. Although, as with the incidence of burglary, this level is substantially higher than the average for the Thames Valley PFA as a whole. In
a national context, the rates for Thames Valley rank seventh highest.

Here again, the disadvantage of using per capita figures for comparison is that little or no account is taken of the number of vehicles available to be stolen or broken into. A typical example may be where an area has low car ownership, and whilst victimisation of vehicles may be high, the proportion of offences when set against the total population would not reflect this fact.

Vehicle crime exhibits rather different, and perhaps less easily identifiable spatial characteristics. There are inherent difficulties in an analysis of crimes related specifically to cars, which include

* the lack of recorded information on the precise location of the vehicle at the time of the offence. This contrasts with burglaries, for which the target remains in a readily identifiable position.

* the relative 'attractiveness' of the vehicle,
which translates to refer to those cars which attract car thieves either for their ease of stealing or alternatively are unattractive because of alarms or other security equipment. High performance cars which can outrun police vehicles are more likely, for example, to be the target of car thieves.

* the 'attractiveness' of the vehicles contents. For example, high quality state of the art stereo systems, cameras, portable phones, lap top computers etc, which all offer high returns to the thief for a couple of seconds, if not minutes work.

Each of these factors, and this list is not exhaustive, may contribute to the criminal's final decision to commit an offence on a particular target. The following attempts to consider if there is a design element which also affects the likelihood of vehicles becoming the targets of crime. Utilising essentially the same method as was used for the study of burglaries in the two case study estates, the incidence of vehicle crimes between March 1992 and
1993 in Padbury and Claremont was analysed.

Figures 5.28 and 5.29 map the recorded offences for 'theft of' and 'theft from' vehicles (both cars and motorcycles), for Claremont and Padbury. The dwelling to which the offence relates, ie. the address of the owner of the vehicle, has been plotted, as precise details of the position the vehicle was parked in at the time of the offence are not available. Crimes which were recorded but no property address given (ie. street name only) have been excluded from the analysis exercise.

In numerical terms, as well as the vehicle crime rates, Padbury scores highest on both counts. In the Padbury estate approximately 9% of all vehicles witnessed thefts of or thefts from them during the reference period, as compared to almost one third of that rate in Claremont (3.3%). This is somewhat surprising, given that virtually all dwellings in Padbury have garages, whilst in Claremont all vehicles are parked in the open. The suggestion is therefore that there is an additional factor at work in Claremont which is missing in Padbury.
Figure 5.28 Recorded Incidents Of Vehicle Crimes In Claremont (1992-93)
Note: One dwelling in Road 3 was subject to a 'theft' of as well as a 'theft from' during the reference period. In addition, a dwelling in Road 2 recorded four incidents of 'theft from a vehicle.'
However, the likelihood of vehicles being stolen (ie 'theft of') in Claremont rather than broken into ('theft from') is greater. Eighty percent of recorded vehicle offences involved theft of the entire car or motorcycle, whilst this offence accounted for only 15% of all vehicle crimes in Padbury.

There are also further disparities evident by house type which are set out in the tables attached as Appendix I. In Padbury, 18% of the total number of car crimes related to vehicles belonging to bungalows on the estate, and all were properties located on the 'inside'. To some extent, this may be explained in terms of the fact that the arrangement for garage facilities for the bungalows is in the form of a garage court. Such systems tend to be inconveniently located to the dwellings they serve, and as such less utilised by the residents. This may well be the case in Padbury, where people park their car in the most convenient positions (ie on the road), and where they can be overlooked from their property. Occupants of the 'inside' properties do not have such surveillance opportunities, and it is for this reason that they may suffer more heavily from vehicle crime.
It should also be noted that four of the six offences committed in respect of cars belonging to occupants of bungalows, related to one single property. This may of course indicate that the vehicle is either easy to break into, or has valuable accessories which are attractive to criminals, and therefore have little bearing upon environmental factors. It is certainly true that such occurrences may skew data, although that is not to say that there is not an underlying design trend at work, such as that described above.

For the traditional terraced dwellings, each with garages located within their curtilages, no vehicle crimes were recorded during the reference period. Such a finding tends to add weight to her argument forwarded in the previous paragraph.

An entirely different picture emerges with the rate of crimes related to the cubed terraces. This form of terrace accounted for some 82% of the total vehicle offences. There was also found to be a fairly average distribution in terms of the 'theft of' offences (in numerical terms), but as a proportion of the total number of that house type 'edge rows' faired slightly
better. It was also evident that more 'thefts from' vehicles occurred on the 'inside' cubed terraces compared to even numbers of other house types. However, as a proportion of the total number of each house type, the 'inside' properties had a 10.2% rate, outside a 6.1% rate, and edge properties 10.3%. This echoes the results found with the bungalows whereby cars which could not park directly outside their homes had a greater probability of being subject to theft.

For the Claremont estate, patterns also appeared to emerge from the relationship between house types and crime rates. 70% of offences occurred from vehicles belonging to zig zag terraces (a rate of 5.3%), all of which were 'theft of' offences. The staggered traditional terraces incurred 20% of the total number of vehicle crimes, one offence of which was 'theft of' and one 'theft from' (2.3% rate). The single offence relating to flats in the estate, was theft from a vehicle, and as a proportion of the total number of flatted dwellings, represents a rate of 1.9%. Figure 5.30 highlights the close proximity of the flats to the communal parking areas, and therefore good opportunities for surveillance.
Figure 5.30 Flats and Communal Parking Areas in Claremont (front and rear)

(a) Front

(b) Rear
Figure 5.31 Proximity to Parking of Zig Zag and Staggered Traditional Terraces

(a) Staggered Traditional

(b) Zig Zag Terraces
The numbers of offences committed in respect of cars and motorcycles on the Claremont estate are too small to make meaningful comparisons, and further research over a longer period of time is required to provide more reliable results. However, it is significant that staggered terraces scored worst, and they are precisely those properties which have more overlooked parking areas. It may therefore be that to the car thief, the distance from the cars to the dwellings is sufficient so as to make the offence easier to commit with least fear of disturbing the occupants of the dwellings. Figure 5.31 illustrates the close proximity of windows to parking areas in the staggered terraces (a), as compared with the arrangement for the zig zag properties (b). The more screened parking for the staggered traditional properties seems to make little impact and it may instead be the close proximity and set down of the dwellings from parked cars which makes vehicles on this side of the road less attractive.
The findings of the case studies may be summarised as follows:

* Claremont was demonstrated to be better integrated into the surrounding urban area than Padbury, which is an island of residential development.

* Padbury was also found to be more difficult to 'grasp' for its users, and although Claremont was more legible, it too suffered from a repetitive layout.

* Pedestrian routes were segregated from vehicular movement in Padbury, and to a far lesser degree in Claremont.

* Surveillance opportunities in Claremont tend to be at the expense of the privacy of the residents, and the converse is true in Padbury.

* Padbury had a much higher take-up rate
than Claremont, although this may be explained in terms of the high cost floor in Claremont and its high numbers of flats.

* End properties were found to be more desirable in both estates.

* Padbury has a higher proportion of teenagers, whilst Claremont has a very high level of under tens.

* There are a higher proportion of single-parent families and unemployed persons in the two estates, significantly above the town average.

* Padbury experienced higher burglary rates in respect of single family dwellings, although a comparable rate was experienced by the flats in Claremont.

* End row properties in both estates were
found to be more vulnerable to burglary, which related to the take-up of council properties on the estates.

* The proximity to parking appears to influence vehicle crime, and more especially, the closer to the dwelling, the better. On plot garages proved beneficial, but clearly their use cannot be insisted upon, and they tended to block surveillance opportunities in Padbury in any case.
DISCUSSION:

The underlying causes of crime are multiple, and as has been illuminated through this study, no single approach can justifiably claim to be able to provide a singular 'solution'. The consensus seems to be supported by the findings of this study, that there are a number of answers to the crime problem, just as there are a number of factors which contribute to conceive it in the first place.

The rate of change of notifiable offences over the past decade have given weight to the socio-economic approach, as the rate dropped significantly in the economically prosperous 'boom' years of the late eighties, before rising again in the recession.
However, providing an explanation of the rate of crime is insufficient in itself, and needs to be combined with possible explanations of the locations of crime.

Enter the environmental design school, complete with an exciting and diverse range of theories on how best to design out crime. Slick marketing and presentation have resulted in a schism emerging between two major, conflicting academic camps, and the success they have had in convincing the relevant decision makers.

The popularity of Oscar Newman and Alice Coleman among politicians and the agencies involved in the development industry has continued since the publishing of their respective works in 1972 and 1985. This has been despite wide-ranging criticisms from academics regarding the questionable 'scientific' nature of their research, and the means by which they arrived at the conclusions they did. A probable explanation may rest in the quantified nature of their works, and the ability of their 'solutions' to be presented in an easily digestible format to politicians, councillors and the public. For example:
Alice Coleman might propose that if a local authority undertakes to perform design improvement X, they can expect to reduce the disadvantagement score by Y. Common sense predictions of 'before and after' scenarios are likely to receive a warm response when put to busy decision makers in such a form, irrespective of the 'scientific' basis from which they emerged.

The conflicting views of Bill Hillier and colleagues have been less popular in the mainstream, which may well be a reflection of the more complex nature of his theoretical approach and findings. It may alternatively be the case that the relationship between design and crime is complex, and putting it into simplistic layman's terminology conceals the true association. Moreover, unlike Coleman and Newman, Hillier et al. have produced recommendations which stress the importance of providing an integrated layout, which may be less implementable for improvement schemes than removing a few walkways.

The case studies have presented evidence which support the contention that the poorer and most economically
disadvantaged elements of the population live on the public housing estates. However, the actual rate of crimes in the study areas compared favourably to the remainder of the town. This may suggest that crime rates are not necessarily highest in the poorest areas, or alternatively, that the offender population may still be resident on the estates (in accordance with Smiths argument, 1989), but choose to target higher return areas outside. If the latter is the case, then a displacement of crime may be occurring. If the former is correct, then this would contradict the findings of authors such as Poyner and Webb (1991) who have implied that the highest crime rates occur in public housing estates. However, given that the more privatised of the two estates (ie. Padbury) has higher crime levels, it seems that this view is incorrectly founded or there is some other factor at work in the case study estate.

The management approach (overlapping with the socio-economic approach) could be considered to be supported in this instance, as the allocation policies of the local authority actively promote greater numbers of families with children to Padbury. This seems
logical, as Padbury has a greater number of family dwellings in any case, and as a result of the allocation policy, has a greater concentration of children as well as crime rates. However, Claremont offers a significant number of single person units of accommodation, and as a result of government legislation, tends to allocate these properties to 'problematic' persons, ie. homeless people who may include alcoholics, the mentally ill, and persons recently released from prison. Perhaps if other categories of crime had been considered, Claremont would have exhibited higher levels of other types of crime (for example, violent assaults, etc.) than its counterpart. Such an exercise may well justify the concerns expressed by the local housing management officer regarding crime in Claremont (DOBSON, 1993). Although, this is arguably not a matter over which design alone can help, with the exception of the actual provision of that type of accommodation in the first place.

No evidence has been collected which either supports or refutes the educational psychology approach.
With regard to design, and in particular opportunity provision, the case studies would appear to support Hillier's theory that the way to achieve crime prevention is through provision of integrated layouts. In the cases to hand, the segregated layout of Padbury exhibited higher levels of both burglary and vehicle crime rates than the integrated layout of Claremont. In Hillier's terms, the estate which promotes natural through movement and therefore self-policing of it's space (with a layout more akin to a traditional grid), achieves a lower crime rate. Conversely, the 'stopped up' cul-de-sac arrangement of the Padbury grid, with its formalised boundaries to the estate (reinforcing it's status as an enclave), attracts a higher rate of crime.

Clearly, only two types of crime have been analysed in the case studies, and one must be wary of making generalisations about all crime types on this basis alone. It is quite probable that, as indicated earlier, different categories of crime may well exhibit very different spatial distributions. The use of burglary and vehicle crime rates are important in as much as they are more likely to be influenced by
design factors, and also in that they are two of the most frequently reported crimes.

A further caveat must be applied, which concerns the timescale over which the study has concentrated. The figures for the two crime categories were low in numerical terms over the twelve month reference period. Whilst this made the statistical analysis more manageable for the researcher, small numbers tend to invoke problems of radically swaying the results to give an often unrealistic impression. Further research over a longer timespan, say five years, would be necessary to provide conclusive evidence that the apparent relationship between design and crime suggested, is in fact correct.

The analysis also showed evidence of spatial patterns of crime emerging within estates. Houses adjacent to alleyways and situated on the extremities of streets tended to be more prone to burglaries. In addition, flats in Claremont sustained higher rates than houses there.

An additional variable may also have influenced the
spatial pattern of crime which appears to have emerged from the case studies. A relationship is apparent between the rate of burglaries and the rate of privatisation of council properties. That is, the properties which are favoured by the criminal, such as end terraces and those adjacent to alleyways, tend to be those which have been 'taken-up'. This is particularly evident in Padbury, where of those dwellings burgled in a twelve month period, almost three-quarters were non-council properties. It may of course be a simple factor of preference, in which the criminal may believe that the occupants of a private house are better off, and therefore likely to have more valuable consumer goods to steal. They would therefore judge to earn a higher return for the risk he/she invests. This explanation assumes that private dwellings are readily identifiable as such, and therefore distinct from properties still in the Council stock. Alternatively, the fact that Padbury has a higher rate of property take-ups from the local authority may mean that there is a greater probability that a private dwelling will be victimised. Finally, it could be a straightforward coincidence that the council properties which are more attractive to
purchase from the occupier's point of view, just happen to also exhibit those characteristics which make them more vulnerable to a burglar.

The second stream of the environmental design approach considers the manner in which the physical form of an area promotes community formation. There is not evidence from the case studies to indicate one way or another in this. Although, it is relevant to note that neither estate had formed residents associations or established Neighbourhood Watch Schemes.

If we are to accept Hillier's theory of the benefits of promoting natural movement through areas via integrated street layouts, then the permeable grid pattern of Claremont would be expected to be capable of fostering community development and therefore inhibiting crime. Given the differential crime rates between the two estates, it would seem to suggest that there is at least some basis to this argument.

In terms of the case studies, refurbishment schemes which undertook to carry out the following alterations are believed to reduce the vulnerability of the
estates to crime:

PADBURY –

[1] Remove rear alleyways by providing interlocking rear gardens, and securing access with gates. This does, however, present problems of providing convenient access to parking areas.

[2] Remove recessed front doors which conceal burglars. These may be replaced with equally functional porch canopies.

[3] Orientate dwellings at the end of rows to face onto the central open space and the entrances to roads, to provide increased surveillance opportunities.

[4] Create 'through roads', particularly in the main body of the estate north of the main arterial road. By 'opening up' the culs-de-sac to through traffic (albeit only estate traffic), more natural movement may be generated. In addition, this would aid police officers pursuing offenders
by car. The disadvantage with such an alteration would be that the recently upgraded play space in the centre of the main open space area would be bisected, and raise highway safety implications for children playing.

[5] Actively promote the establishment of Neighbourhood Watch Schemes and/or residents associations in the estate to encourage community development. This may be more successful if occupiers of privatised dwellings are approached first, as these less 'mobile' residents may then act as a catalyst for the remainder.

CLAREMONT —

[1] Stop up the rear alleyway 'rat runs', using gated access to serve a smaller number of dwellings. Retail one or two main through routes to connect roads and maintain permeability, but target harden properties adjacent.

[2] Remove recessed front doors from the Zig Zag terraces, and replace with porch canopies.

Unfortunately, it is quite likely that few of the above recommendations will be implemented by the local authority concerned, given that a high proportion of properties are now in private ownership. This is particularly relevant to Padbury, which has the higher crime rate of the two, yet the lower proportion of dwellings still in local authority control. Aside from the costs involved (which would be substantial in the case of road alterations) and the legal implications (in terms of the land ownership rights of privatised properties), the question must also be raised of the value of the results on the basis of the expenditure incurred. Moreover, the views of the residents of the estates would also need to be canvassed, not only to provide a more comprehensive understanding of rates and locations of crimes, but to gain their support and co-operation for such a scheme.

The study of crime in England demonstrates the uneven
spatial distribution of crime. Whilst the relationship between population and the number of offences committed (and recorded) appears to suggest a strong and positive correlation, it is insufficient to provide an explanation of national variations. Some high crime areas may have higher unemployment rates than others, and therefore the socio-economic approach is supported. Alternative explanations may include arguments in favour of the management or educational psychology approach, although these have not been considered in detail in the context of this study.

The emphasis on the influence of the built environment upon crime was reflected in the consideration of design against crime issues as perceived by the development world who control it.

The research pointed to little practical effort being made by the majority of the agencies concerned with the production and maintenance of the built environment, despite generous quantities of lip service. The NHBC stood out as an exception to this general principle, however their guidance tended to
promote more in the way of advice on the security of buildings, than general layout. The Institute of Housing also deserve recognition for their efforts in providing guidance, however the influence of their members is likely to be rather more peripheral at the 'production' (ie. design inception) stage of development.

There is clearly an important role for local planning authorities who command a rather different position in the development industry. The LPA is the only body with the statutory authority to carry any degree of power, and therefore have any meaningful impact upon the design of an environment. However, due to the non-statutory nature of consultations with Police Architectural Liaison Officers (or by default, Crime Prevention Officers), and the fact that little weight may be attached to crime prevention as a material planning consideration (although the introduction of specific local plan policies may alter this), the LPA has considerable scope in which to operate.

The research findings highlight the wide variety of responses to the suggestions of Circular 22/88 (ALO
liaisons and consultations) and PPG1 (provision of appropriate policies in the development plan), as was supported by the more general findings of the Morgan Report on Safer communities (MORGAN, 1991). The findings tend to suggest that the majority of LPA's do not have formalised design against crime policies, and those who do are confined to a narrow and unproven approach to crime prevention through design (ie. the 'exclusionary school' headed by Newman and Coleman). Furthermore, the liaison procedures with police ALO's and CPO's are for the most part patchy, and therefore likely to be of little effectiveness. Moreover, much of the police produced guidance material, aside from running contrary to many traditional planning objectives such as aesthetics, is embedded in the same access control approach successfully popularised by Newman and more recently Coleman.

In a spatial context, the general responses to recent government advice by LPA's has been varied, with the more urbanised parts of England (on the whole) tending to perform better than their rural counterparts. In terms of the degree to which this reflects a reaction to local levels of crime, a positive although fairly
weak relationship was indicated by the findings. The results also highlighted the 'Top 5' high crime rate areas and the apparent poor response of the LPA's therein to tackle the local problem. However it is worth remembering that the principal role for the LPA is confined to ensuring that situational crimes are prevented through the design of new and refurbished developments.

On a broader front, there is a requirement for better education and greater awareness among street level practitioners of the different approaches to crime prevention and particularly relevant to this study, of the two environmental design approaches. Planning officers play a pivotal role in the development industry, and whilst it is acknowledged that they have many material considerations to take into account, there is a responsibility to include designing against crime as one of them. LPA officers ought to be aware of the two very different methods available to aim for crime reduction, in order to come to an informed decision as to which to accept. Similarly, whilst the expertise of the police concerning the nature of crime
itself is not doubted, greater awareness and more comprehensive coverage of academic theory and research to date will assist in ensuring that informed and correct guidance can be provided for development schemes. The same applies to the other actors in the development industry, however, given the statutory authority of both the police and LPA's, it is considered most important to educate these role players first and foremost.

Coupled with this is the need for increased liaison mechanisms to be established between LPA's and their respective ALO or CPO, together with the developer. However, there are problems associated with the resources available to ALO's and to be effective greater numbers will be required to serve each county or metropolitan area.

In addition, the question of the status of ALO's needs to be addressed. Consultations with the relevant ALO should become a statutory consultation procedure on all planning applications over a given threshold (for example, residential developments over ten dwellings). This would then open the way for crime prevention
issues to become a material consideration and make developers and their designers aware of the requirement to give consideration to and build in such measures. To refuse planning permission for a development whose design would be likely to make the people and property within it more vulnerable to criminals and anti-social behaviours, would give crime prevention the status it deserves at the most crucial point in the development process.

CONCLUDING REMARKS:

The findings from the research support the contention that crime cannot be attributable to a solitary factor, and as such, there must be a co-ordinated approach to tackling it. However, the study found that the bodies concerned with the prevention of crime through the environmental design approach did not operate in a co-ordinated manner, nor was sufficient attention paid to the issue. Furthermore, in pursuit of adherence to political objectives, the most influential agencies (ie. the police and local planning authority) were found to adopt a narrow-
minded strategy which, in this instance, was observant of a theoretical approach which has been systematically criticised for its unsound basis. The findings of the case studies also provided support for the non-mainstream situational approach to crime prevention.

A positive relationship (albeit weak) was apparent between local crime rates and the response of the relevant planning authorities in addressing particular local requirements. Notwithstanding this general trend, the areas with the highest rates of crime in England did not appear to be widely support crime prevention initiatives at the local planning authority level.

The study set out to address the dilemma of those complex, multi-causal problems with which planning has to concern itself. As a matter of heightening concern to everyone, crime represents a model subject which epitomizes the conflicts and co-ordination difficulties arising from multi-disciplinary issues. However, planning is ideally positioned to play a pivotal role in this particular area, given the unique
spatial and social skills it possesses, together with its experience in balancing issues to reach decisions on appropriate courses of action.

The conclusions arising from this particular study have important ramifications for other areas over which planning has control, yet not the sole responsibility for resolving.

'Co-ordination' is a term which has a tendency to imply bureaucratic attempts to meddle in the concerns of other professions. Yet more positively, such approaches can actively encourage liaison and increase knowledge and skills, whilst simultaneously helping to foster good interdisciplinary relations and dispel mutual distrust.
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APPENDICIES

APPENDIX A: ACORN Classification of Neighbourhood Type

APPENDIX B: Number of Offences Per Capita of Main Crime Types (By PFA)

APPENDIX C: Main Findings of The Morgan Report 1991

APPENDIX D: Extracts from The Guardian

APPENDIX E: Architectural Liaison Officer Promotional Leaflet

APPENDIX F: Secured By Design and Neighbourhood Watch Scheme Promotional Material

APPENDIX G: Sample Questionnaire to LPA's

APPENDIX H: Maps Indicating Individual Scores of LPA's

APPENDIX I: Breakdown of Vehicle Crimes By Estate
Appendix A

ACORN Classification of Neighbourhood Type

ACORN Neighbourhood Groups

AGRICULTURAL AREAS
1 Agricultural villages
2 Areas of farms and smallholdings

3.4% of England and Wales households

MODERN FAMILY HOUSING, HIGHER INCOMES
3 Post-war functional private housing
4 Modern private housing, young families
5 Established private family housing
6 New detached houses, young families
7 Military bases

16.2% of England and Wales households

COUNCIL ESTATES - CATEGORY I
13 Council estates, well-off older workers
14 Recent council estates
15 Better council estates, younger workers
16 Small council houses, often Scottish

11.2% of England and Wales households

COUNCIL ESTATES - CATEGORY II
18 Low rise estates in industrial towns
19 Inter-war council estates, older people
20 Council housing, elderly people

9.7% of England and Wales households

COUNCIL ESTATES - CATEGORY III
22 New council estates in inner cities
23 Overspill estates, higher unemployment
24 Council estates with some overcrowding
25 Council estates with greatest hardship

5.1% of England and Wales households

OLDER HOUSING OF INTERMEDIATE STATUS
6 Mixed owner-occupied and council estates
7 Small town centres and flats above shops
8 Villages with non-farm employment
9 Older private housing, skilled workers

19.7% of England and Wales households

OLDER TERRACED HOUSING
10 Terraced houses, older people
11 Tenement flats lacking amenities

4.6% of England and Wales households

HIGH-STATUS NON-FAMILY AREAS
30 High status non-family areas
31 Multi-let big old houses and flats
32 Furnished flats, mostly single people

5.1% of England and Wales households

AFFLUENT SUBURBAN HOUSING
33 Inter-war semi-detached houses, white collar workers
34 Spaces intermediate semi-detached houses, large gardens
35 Villages with wealthy older commuters
36 Detached houses, Bolshevik suburbs

16.6% of England and Wales households

OLDER TERRACED HOUSING
12 Unmodernised terraces, older people
13 Older terraces, low income families

4.6% of England and Wales households

COUNCIL ESTATES - CATEGORY II
17 Low rise estates in industrial towns
18 Inter-war council estates, older people
19 Council housing, elderly people

9.7% of England and Wales households

COUNCIL ESTATES - CATEGORY III
20 New council estates in inner cities
21 Overspill estates, higher unemployment
22 Council estates with some overcrowding
23 Council estates with greatest hardship

5.1% of England and Wales households

OLDER TERRACED HOUSING
24 Council estates with some overcrowding
25 Council estates with greatest hardship

3.8% of England and Wales households

BETTER-OFF RETIREMENT AREAS
37 Private houses, well-off older residents
38 Private flats, older single people

4.6% of England and Wales households
Appendix B

Number of Offences Per Capita of Main Crime Types (By PFA)

SOURCE: HOME OFFICE, 1992b and HOME OFFICE, 1993
BURGLARY RATES BY POLICE FORCE AREA
JULY 1991 TO JUNE 1992

REPORTED OFFENCES (000s)
VIOLENT ASSAULTS BY POLICE FORCE AREA
JULY 1991 TO JUNE 1992

REPORTED OFFENCES (000s)
SEXUAL OFFENCES BY POLICE FORCE AREA
JULY 1991 TO JUNE 1992

REPORTED OFFENCES

POLICE FORCE AREA

Metropolitan Police
Wiltshire
West Yorkshire
West Midlands
West Mercia
Warwickshire
Thames Valley
Sussex
Surrey
Suffolk
Staffordshire
South Yorkshire
Nottinghamshire
North Yorkshire
Northumbria
Northamptonshire
Norfolk
Merseyside
Lincolnshire
Leicestershire
Lancashire
Kent
Humberside
Herefordshire
Hampshire
Greater Manchester
Gloucestershire
Essex
Durham
Dorset
Derbyshire
Devon and Cornwall
Cumbria
Cheshire
Cambridgeshire
Bedfordshire
Avon and Somerset

0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000
REPORTED OFFENCES
ROBBERS BY POLICE FORCE AREA
JULY 1991 TO JUNE 1992

REPORTED OFFENCES (000s)
Appendix C

Main Findings of The Morgan Report 1991

SOURCE: MORGAN, 1991: 3-5
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. MAIN FINDINGS

Crime Prevention and Community Safety

1. Crime prevention closely inter-relates with many aspects of local government and the diverse elements of the criminal justice system (para 2.9).

2. The term “crime prevention” is often narrowly interpreted and this reinforces the view that it is solely the responsibility of the police. On the other hand, the term “community safety” is open to wider interpretation and could encourage greater participation from all sections of the community in the fight against crime (para 3.6).

3. Community safety should be seen as the legitimate concern of all in the local community (para 3.7).

4. The case for the partnership approach stands virtually unchallenged but hardly tested (para 3.14).

5. The social aspects of crime prevention, including measures to reduce the fear of crime, need to receive attention at least equal to that given to the situational aspects of crime prevention (para 3.4).

6. A successful multi-agency approach to community safety requires the formulation of an overall crime reduction strategy and structure within which agencies can co-operate as well as deliver their own particular contribution (para 3.10).

7. At present crime prevention is a peripheral concern for all the agencies involved and a truly core activity for none of them (para 3.15).

The Local Partners

8. The police play a central role in crime prevention, and providing an effective policing service is one of the most fundamental contributions to reducing crime (para 4.3 - 4.4).

9. Many successful examples of the multi-agency approach to crime prevention occur where the police Operational Commander with responsibility for a local area is clearly identified as playing a major part and is prepared to commit police operational resources (para 4.36).

10. In cases where the police service was effectively the only agency involved at a local level, crime prevention tended to be confined to “opportunity reduction” and attention to social issues was rare (para 4.38).

11. The Probation Service has an important role to play in the wider concept of community safety (para 4.11).

12. The effort and goodwill which voluntary bodies provide can be a significant contributor to success (para 4.16).

13. The business sector has three main contributions to make to the development of safer communities: crime prevention in relation to their own business and its stakeholders; participation in local partnerships; and, where appropriate, financial sponsorship (para 4.20 - 23).

15. *As the provider of a range of services which directly impact on the causes of crime (such as education, housing and recreation), the local authority is a natural focus for co-ordinating, in collaboration with the police, the broad range of activities directed at improving community safety. The reports have demonstrated that some local authorities have already taken on this role. Others have not been so active* (para 4.25).

**Structures**

16. *Good progress has been made on crime prevention in a number of police force and local authority areas, taking into account other pressures on limited resources and an absence of specific statutory responsibility for local government to engage in crime prevention* (para 4.26).

17. *There has been confusion among the various levels of local government, particularly in Shire County areas, about responsibility for crime prevention. The lack of a clear statutory responsibility for local government to play its part fully in crime prevention has inhibited progress* (para 4.31).

18. *There is confusion at local level about the various centrally funded schemes with a crime prevention element and concern about potential overlap and duplication of effort. Some national projects have tended to establish structures which parallel local arrangements rather than merge with them* (paras 4.30 & 5.4).

19. *Progress is inhibited by the lack of coterminous boundaries both at a strategic level, between police authorities, local authorities and the probation service, and at a more practical level between district council and ward boundaries on the one hand and police, probation and social services on the other* (para 4.32).

20. *Any meaningful local structure for crime prevention must relate to the local democratic structure* (para 4.33).

21. *At a local level those multi-agency partnerships which worked best had full-time organisers. The appointment of a dedicated co-ordinator appears to have been a vital element in the success of many structures* (para 4.61).

**Leadership**

22. *Ownership of community safety is as important as leadership. Individual and collective ownership is vital as the effectiveness of local initiatives must depend on the co-operation and participation of each agency* (paras 4.39 – 40).

**Resources and Planning**

23. *Crime prevention projects are often undertaken without analysis of local problems. Moreover problem identification is too often opportunistic and haphazard* (paras 4.41 – 42).

24. *Monitoring and evaluation is the weakest element of most crime prevention programmes* (para 4.50).

25. *The lack of long-term resources was identified in responses to Circular 44/90 as the single biggest threat to the survival of partnership schemes* (para 4.59).

26. *Only the police are able normally to estimate the resources which they devote to crime prevention and then only in terms of specialist crime prevention officers* (para 4.60).
27. There was a lack of reference in reports we received to specific strategies for preventing crime by and against young people (para 4.63).

Training

28. Training in community safety skills is fragmented and, outside the police service, most of it simply occurs on the job (para 4.68 – 70).
Appendix D

Extracts From The Guardian,
3 March 1993
Clarke acts on young criminals

Funding of centres still to be agreed

Alan Travis and Steve Bates

NEW powers for courts to detain persistent 12 to 15-year-old offenders in a national network of “secure training centres” were unveiled by Kenneth Clarke, the Home Secretary, yesterday as the centrepiece of the Prime Minister’s “crusade against crime.”

The package, unveiled to the Commons the day after the Merseyside funeral of James Bulger, the murdered two-year-old, is to include new guidance on “control regimes” within local authority children’s homes and an extra £1 million to be spent on schools’ programmes to reduce truancy.

But Mr Clarke, who said he hoped eventually to establish a network of five secure training centres providing 200 places, confirmed yesterday that he has not obtained any Treasury agreement to their funding and could not yet say when the first would open.

They could cost £75 million to set up and up to £500,000 a week to run. Their funding is subject to the current “fundamental review of public spending” by the Treasury.

The courts will be given a new power to impose a secure training order on 12 to 15-year-old boys who have been convicted of three imprisonable offences and who have proved unwilling or unable to comply with supervision orders. It may last up to two years. Girls are being considered separately.

Legislation will be introduced this autumn to enact the changes to the Children’s Act and the Criminal Justice Act to enable the new network of secure units to be set up.

The Home Secretary said the package would deal with juveniles on the fringes of criminality as well as the hard core who had shown they could not respond constructively to supervision in the community.

Fresh guidance on how local authority children’s homes were run was needed, said Virginia Bottomley, the Health Secretary, because there was concern “among the wider public that we may have gone too far in stressing the rights of children at the expense of upholding the responsibilities of parents and professionals in supervising them”.

Mr Clarke stressed in his Commons statement that the new “primary schools in citizenship” had been planned before the current debate on the causes of crime. He rejected accusations that they would amount to a new generation of borstals by stressing that they would provide a high standard regime, which would combine education with training and discipline with affectionate care.

The Home Secretary confirmed that he hoped they might be run by voluntary organisations, but conceded that no body had declared an interest. Both Barnado’s and the National Children’s Home have rejected participation.

Mr Clarke left the door open to local authorities being asked to provide the new centres.

The announcement was attacked by Tony Blair, Labour’s home affairs spokesman. He told Mr Clarke: “It is far preferable to isolate young offenders from their own peer group and not put them in the company of 40 or 50 other persistent young offenders. What we need is schools of responsibility not colleges of crime.”

Labour was highly critical of the Government’s failure to provide the 65 places in local authority secure accommodation for juvenile offenders promised two years ago, and demanded to know why the Home Secretary did not build on what was already available.

Some Conservative backbenchers feared Mr Clarke’s plans for secure units for 12 to 15-year-olds were too little and too late and would not solve the problem of juvenile crime. They were critical that the legislation would effectively not come into force until 1995.

The Prison Reform Trust said removing children from home was no answer. “The graduates of Mr Clarke’s mini-prisons will be filling the adult jails for years to come,” said its director, Stephen Shaw.

The Police Federation was disappointed about the delay, saying it would dismay the public.
Kenneth Clarke, the Home Secretary, yesterday scorned suggestions that his plan for a network of secure training centres would create "universities of crime".

He insisted that the centres would not repeat the mistakes of borstals or approved schools which were abolished 20 years ago but would provide education and training to break the cycle of offending behaviour.

"It is totally defeatist to say if you put 20 or 30 offenders together in the same place, whatever you do they are bound to get worse," Mr Clarke said.

The Home Secretary's decision to set up privately-run secure units is based on the belief that a comparatively small number of school-age children are responsible for a high proportion of crime, particularly burglary and car crime.

Yet, as he acknowledged yesterday, the evidence rests on anecdotes from chief constables about individual offenders with multiple convictions. No overall picture of the extent of the problem exists. "We shall see how many of these young criminals there are across the country when the courts start using the new powers I have announced today."

The courts already have powers to sentence juvenile offenders to custody, including the use of local authority secure accommodation and supervision in the community, some of which involve extensive loss of their liberty.

The secure training order announced yesterday differs from its predecessors in allowing the previous convictions of a 12 to 15-year-old to be taken into account when deciding whether to give a custodial sentence for a series of offences — none of which would have justified a custodial sentence by themselves.

The Home Secretary made clear yesterday that this new power would only apply to 12 to 15-year-olds and it was far too early to make a judgment about whether the Criminal Justice Act was causing a problem in sentencing other offenders.

The courts will only be able to impose a secure training order if there is sufficient evidence that it is necessary to protect the public from further offences being committed and if a place in a suitable facility is available.

While the Home Office is still considering exactly how long the sentences should be — two years was mentioned yesterday as a possible maximum — the court order will ensure that the offender remains under supervision once he has left the secure unit "until his behaviour has altered and those responsible can be confident that he is no longer a threat to society". Breaches could lead to the offender being sent back to the secure unit.

The new centres will not necessarily be run by public bodies and Mr Clarke said yesterday they might be provided by voluntary or private sector organisations provided they can demonstrate an ability to meet the standards set and give value for money.

An amendment to the 1989 Children Act will be needed and the secure training units will be inspected by both the schools and social services inspectorates.

Mr Clarke said yesterday that as a former Education Secretary he saw the new institutions first and foremost as schools. "These are children of an age where they should be at school going through the national curriculum and also acquiring judgments about right and wrong and about how to behave."

"They will be spending all their time there as they are locked up and there will be people with other skills addressing exactly why they behave as they do... In some cases they will receive more care, more personal attention and more affection than in their own home," said the Home Secretary.
Making a bad scene worse

Do NOT adjust your television sets, there is a fault with reality. Yes, that was the Home Secretary on the news last night, announcing a new network of juvenile borstals. Yes, this is the same Government which in a white paper only three years ago — and implemented only five months ago — declared that imprisonment can be "an expensive way of making bad people worse". And yes, this is the same Home Secretary who only last week wrote in the Daily Telegraph that there was no epidemic of crime and that "what is needed is not a series of knee-jerk, panic measures, but sustained and committed action which will yield long-term benefits." Precisely.

Clearly the Home Secretary is dutifully responding to the Prime Minister's inane call of last week for more condemnation and, less understanding, of juvenile crime. Ignoring a mountain of research evidence detailing the failure of previous special juvenile units (approved schools, junior detention centres and junior borstals, all now abandoned), he is plunging ahead with a plan for a network of new secure training centres for 12 to 15-year-olds. But changing the name will not change the chances of success. All three previous models began with the same high hopes and aspirations that Mr Clarke is bestowing on his latest project. The emphasis will be on constructive regimes aimed to produce primary classes in citizenship. Bully for him. But the history of custodial institutions is that they quickly generate their own negative culture. Putting "really persistent nasty little juveniles" into junior prisons has one predictable outcome: it turns them, as night follows day, into even nastier adult villains.

No one is denying that there is a small group of persistent young offenders for whom intense supervision is not working. A survey of 33 police forces put the number at 100, but this did not include the two biggest police regions, the West Midlands and the Met. The real number is between 300 and 400. Yet we already have a network of 28 secure units run by social service departments, providing 250 places. The latest research from the Home Office shows that these units produce a better level of education and a lower rate of reoffending than the existing young offender institutions run by the Home Office. So why, apart from empire building, is Mr Clarke embarking on this judicial exercise to build up a parallel and competing "system of secure accommodation"

If he sticks to his original intention of five institutions with 200 total places, the running costs will amount to £500,000 a week. The capital cost will be £40 million. Consider what could be done for preventive measures with that sort of money. Mr Clarke should have concentrated on expanding the present system of secure units, which are still too unevenly spread across the country. Compared to his new centres, these secure units are much nearer to offenders' homes, reducing the risk of cutting the juveniles off from their families, local support services and training schemes. Kenneth Clarke's good intentions are not enough. Even benevolent approaches produce their own nightmares. He should go home and read "One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest" — or maybe the "Clockwork Orange".
The nation has crime on its mind. But what can we learn from the latest figures?

Crime counts

Richard Alcock

This month's publication of the annual crime figures will be given increased impact by the explosion of headlines about crime and the “moral vacuum”. But how do you put the figures in context when even the Home Secretary concedes they are next to useless?

In 1988 the Home Office released the British Crime Survey, based on more than 16,000 face-to-face interviews. The survey suggested that the number of crimes experienced by the public was three times that shown in police figures. But it also showed that crime in some categories had not risen nearly as fast as the police data suggested, and that according to the interviews overall crime rose by only 30 per cent between 1981 and 1987, compared with 41 per cent according to the police.

Some commentators suggested that the police statistics were not worth the computer paper they were printed on; that the rise in crime was due, for example, to a rise in telephone ownership (making it easier for victims to contact the police from the comfort of their own turned-over homes) and car ownership (the more cars there are, the more will be stolen), or the need to make a report to police for insurance purposes. Fear of crime was out of proportion to the actuality and figures should be published less often, it was argued.

Andrew Willis, senior lecturer in criminology at Leicester University, agrees that police crime figures have risen faster than actual crime for such reasons. But he points out that some categories of crime are heavily under-reported, yet must influence fear of crime for those who experience it at first or second-hand — for instance, rowdy weekend behaviour in city centres or crime by young people against young people. “Kids may fatalistically accept attacks as part of life,” he said. Minor thefts and damage also go unreported.

In a crime survey by his department in the west of Leicester (a down-at-heel area but not the poorest nor the most crime-ridden in the city), 35 per cent said their area was unsafe, 66 per cent thought they would be burgled and 33 per cent feared assault. At the time the figures were released last September some took them as evidence of an unreasonable fear of crime.

But Mr Willis points out that 22 per cent of respondents lived in a house that had been burgled, 12 per cent had had a car broken into and 29 per cent had been subject to rowdy behaviour. Fear of mugging may be out of proportion to the actuality, “but for burglary, car crime and threatening behaviour the anxiety is more than well-founded”.

Another victim survey which the Home Office press section says “puts UK crime in context” is an international comparison, Criminal Victimisation In The Industrialised World, compiled by Pat Mayhew at the Home Office and Jan van Dijk of the Dutch justice ministry.

Researchers asked 2,000 people in 16 countries if they had suffered any of 11 crimes in 1991. Surprisingly New Zealand came top with 29 per cent saying yes, Holland second. England and Wales came seventh with 24 per cent and Scotland 13th with 18.

After the survey’s 1988 study, which was even more favourable to England and Wales, John Patten, then Home Office minister, said the figures showed fear of crime was disproportionately high in the UK.

Roy Carr-Hill, a social statistician in York, was involved in a similar victimisation survey for the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development in the 1970s with Mr Van Dijk. The exercise was not repeated. “It was my view that you couldn’t rely on it,” he said. Cultural differences could make comparisons unreliable. For instance, Mr Mayhew suggests the New Zealand figures may be driven up by property crime, thanks to “criminogenic” houses — detached properties often concealed from neighbours.

The report says rising crime “seems to be the price for living in an affluent urbanised democratic society, regardless of government policy on crime, or the way in which communities try to organise themselves.”

As presented, this is a useful conclusion for governments. The correlation of affluence and urbanisation fails to address the social and economic disparities in cities. Crime becomes a problem of success, just one of those things we have to put up with.

But, if sceptics like Mr Carr-Hill are right, there are all sorts of cultural and social distinctions that make crime different in one country from another, and also in one region from another. All that affects how people perceive, report and fear crime.

These differences could include police response or success (Scotland scores highly here), social cohesion (as in Japan perhaps) or social break-down, and economic factors. Some of those differences may indeed be linked with “government policy” and “the way in which communities organise themselves”.

A house in New Zealand may be criminogenic because it is plush, detached and private, one in Manchester’s Moss Side because the council has not fixed the lock since the last burglary.
Backbenchers fear loss of initiative

Stephen Bates
Political Correspondent

The performance of Kenneth Clarke, the Home Secretary, in the Commons yesterday did little to reassure Conservative MPs that the Government is making headway on tackling crime.

They recognise that after 14 years in government public disquiet about violence in society, spurred by the murder of Jamie Bulger, has reached a peak. Even more alarming to them is the success of Labour's home affairs spokesman Tony Blair in taking up the issue.

Hence the Prime Minister's reaction to a question from a trusty backbencher about Mr Blair's views — "his voting record on crime is worse than an old lag" — and Mr Clarke's dismissal of his interest as being based on expediency.

Outside the chamber, backbenchers conceded that Mr Blair's performance had been impressive and expressed dissatisfaction with the Government's response to the public concern.

"It's like a blunderbuss," said one rightwinger. "It is scattering off at a range of targets without giving a clear message or homing in on one or two things the public can easily understand."

"They want retribution and people punished."

Others said the Government's response was too little, too late and would not effectively tackle the problems by waiting until children were 12 and had committed three imprisonable offences before consigning them to custody. That reform will not come into effect until 1995 at the earliest.

Three ways forward are being canvassed, with cross-party consensus. A private member's bill by Michael Stephen, MP for Shoreham, which the Government is backing, would crack down on those who commit offences while on bail for other crimes.

It would give the prosecution the right of appeal when magistrates' grant bail against police advice and would reverse the burden of proof when bail is sought in cases where the accused has committed offences while on bail at any time in the previous 10 years.

There are also moves to standardise sentencing in magistrates' courts and lessen the consideration of offenders' ability to pay. Angela Knight, MP for Erewash, has raised the issue with Mr Clarke after a 17-year-old was fined £22 for a series of driving offences while another was fined £600 for driving without insurance.

Conservative MPs are also taking up calls for an amendment to the Criminal Justice Act, in operation since last October, for an accused's previous convictions to be disclosed.

Their discomfort was increased by the fact that the issue was raised by Stephen Byers, Labour MP for Wallasey, in questioning the Home Secretary yesterday. Mr Clarke promised to consider a change when the act had been in operation for a little longer.
Villains and victims: Nearly half of truants turn to crime while others risk being on the wrong end of an 'explosion' of offences by young people

James Melkie
Education Editor

John Patten, the Education Secretary, first linked truancy to juvenile crime in his previous post as a Home Office minister.

Research at Sheffield University had suggested that 48 per cent of secondary school truants became offenders, compared with 16 per cent of non-truants.

Mr Patten also warned for years that truants faced increased risk of being victims of crime as well as committing it for inclusion in comparative legis of further education are now required to detail truancy rates, including justified absence, which can range from less than 2 per cent to about 35 per cent in primaries and up to 23 per cent in secondaries.

Social workers in education recently suggested that up to 500,000 young people out of the 8.5 million children aged between five and 16 were skipping school.

They were launching a campaign for improvements in pay, conditions and support for the 2,800 staff involved in keeping children in school.

They warned of a "massive explosion" in shoplifting, drugs, car thefts and vandalism amounting to a doubling of crime committed by young people in five years.

A study by the National Foundation for Educational Research on the attitudes of 2,000 pupils found one in four 13-year-olds claimed to play truant occasionally.

Ministers have encouraged a range of measures to combat the problem, ranging from pupils using swipe cards to register their attendance to schemes where parents with a record of school truancy are advised on how to ensure their children do not follow in their footsteps.

Court cases against parents who fail to ensure their children attend school are still relatively rare.

The Amdale Centre is big and warm and attracts its fair share of truants. But if they were present yesterday, they were not admitting it. "We're passing through because we've been to a lecture at Manchester University," said the spokeman for a pair of lads.

A patrolling security man said it had been quiet today. "They've only just gone back after a week off school," he said. "We know the regulars. They tend to arrive mid-morning."

At the video games shop, the man in blue uniform was firmly in control. "They used to come in and play on the Nintendo. But now it's been stolen, they don't come in any more," he said.

"The lies they tell you — 'My dad has given me the day off because I had to go to the dentist' and that sort of thing."

If in doubt, ask a policeman. Or woman. Excuse me officer, have you seen any truants? "I just had two of them," she said briskly. "Contacted their parents and social services."

The Amdale has its own police unit, staffed by 11 officers from Greater Manchester Police headed by Sergeant Iain Cross.

"The main time for truants is in the morning and if they are here before 10 am, they really stand out," he said. "Once we detect them, we ask them which school they go to and then contact the head teacher. If they are in no obvious moral danger, we put them on a bus back to school."

Officers on the Amdale beat also pass on details to local education officials and can deal with up to a dozen truants a day.

As a souvenir of their visit, they are usually given a lecture on how bunking off can be at the top of a slippery slope leading to big trouble. "They're pretty naive," said Sgt Cross.

One truant's tale: 'Teachers were the worst. I learned on the street but now I wish I could go back. If I were a social worker I could sort everyone's head out'
Illiteracy and poor education 'fuel juvenile crime and child abuse'

David Hencke
Westminster Correspondent

The former chairman of a government inquiry into reading standards yesterday warned that illiteracy and poor education were fuelling juvenile crime and child abuse.

Lord Bullock's warning was made at the relaunch of the Hands Off Reading Campaign at Westminster, in response to growing speculation that this month's Budget will introduce VAT on books and newspapers.

The Treasury is known to be discussing a wide range of options, from introducing a 5 per cent VAT on books, newspapers, food and fuel to extending 17.5 per cent VAT to all newspapers and magazines selling more than 100,000 copies. Lord Bullock said afterwards: "I believe there is a link between levels of literacy and growing numbers of child abuse cases and juvenile offences.

"Obviously not every criminal is illiterate but the current wave of crime would not be helped by introducing a tax on learning ... A tax on knowledge would disadvantage the poor in our society who always lose out when governments — of any political colour — seek to increase revenues by new purchase taxes."

The campaign coalition includes the Newspaper Publishers Association, the Newspaper Society, the Periodical Publishers Association and the Publishers Association.
Appendix E

Architectural Liaison Officer
Promotional Leaflet
ARCHITECTURAL LIAISON SERVICE

The Police Architectural Liaison Service is available in most police areas. Contact your police headquarters for further information and advice.

NB
In the London Metropolitan police district, Architectural Liaison Officers are known as Crime Prevention Design Advisers.

MANUAL OF GUIDANCE
The Police Architectural Liaison Manual of Guidance is also available. It gives practical guidance and advice on designing against crime, risk analysis, check lists and case studies. Price £15, it is obtainable from the Home Office Crime Prevention Centre, Stafford. Crossed cheques should be made payable to Staffordshire County Council and can be sent to the Home Office Crime Prevention Centre, Police Headquarters, Cannock Road, Stafford ST17 0QG.
Tel: 0785 58217.

For further details please contact:
PC Bob Brill
Architectural Liaison Officer
Thames Valley Police
Text Milton Keynes (0908) 686092
DESIGNING OUT CRIME
THE POLICE ARCHITECTURAL LIAISON SERVICE

Designing out crime at the planning stage is a comparatively recent development in crime prevention, but growing evidence shows that security can be incorporated into the design and layout of a project in a cost-effective way, offering many additional benefits to developers and owners. Police crime prevention officers have extensive knowledge of criminal behaviour and can use this knowledge to provide advice to architects, planners and developers involved in new developments and in refurbishment projects to existing buildings. Architectural Liaison Officers are specialist police crime prevention officers, who have received additional training on the way in which the built environment can help to deny criminals opportunities and assist the normal users of space and buildings to exercise control. At the design stage of a project, as well as advising on layout and design, these officers can provide vital information on the crime profile of an area so that measures can be taken to design out crime at an early stage.

PROJECT AREAS
Advice can be offered on many types of development including:
• Shopping precincts
• Industrial estates
• Housing developments
• Commercial parks
• Sports centres
• Airports
• Football stadia
• Schools

Check lists have been prepared on a number of different types of premises and are available on request. The check lists enumerate briefly the important security considerations. Examples of some of the projects covered are:
• Shopping centres
• Schools
• Hospitals
• Car parks
• Leisure parks

SYSTEMATIC APPROACH
The officers are trained to adopt a systematic approach to each project and to provide detailed advice at each stage of a development. Recommendations can cover the external environment, the building itself and the internal area. Under these broad headings the recommendations will cover:

EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
• Natural surveillance
• Boundaries
• Landscaping
• Lighting
• Access
• Car parks
• Outbuildings

BUILDING
• Building lines
• Recesses
• Doors and windows
• Walls, roofs etc
• Public utilities

INTERNAL AREA
• Target areas
• Cash handling
• Access control
• Staff rooms
• Intruder alarm systems

In making recommendations reference will be made to relevant British Standards and security guidelines.
Appendix F

Secured By Design and Neighbourhood Watch Scheme Promotional Material
"SECURED BY DESIGN"

THE CONCEPT
HOME OFFICE RECOMMENDATION

Home Office Circular 8/1984 states that, "... since some of the factors affecting crime lie outside the control or direct influence of the police, crime prevention cannot be left to them alone. Every individual citizen and all those agencies whose policies and practices can influence the extent of crime should make their contribution."

The 'SECURED BY DESIGN' campaign fully exemplifies this Home Office viewpoint by drawing together in one co-ordinated project: the ten police forces, suppliers (as represented by members of the Panel of Sponsors), the construction industry, architects, insurance companies, local authorities (through planning officers), and members of the public (new home buyers).

The scale of this co-operation should undoubtedly make a major impact on both the fear of crime amongst new home occupiers and the levels of crime affecting new residential areas, thus influencing the quality of life for many years to come of those the campaign is designed to benefit.

GUIDELINES TO BUILDERS

The objective of the 'SECURED BY DESIGN' campaign is to encourage the housebuilding industry to comply with recommended crime prevention guidelines and thus qualify for the free use of the new logo.

The conditions and procedures for approval are as follows:

1. Two copies of each house-type plan are submitted to a designated police officer together with an application form (sample enclosed).
2. The designated officer then prepares a list of recommendations – which invariably reflect NHBC guidelines, current British Standards, and The Architectural Liaison Manual advice. The officer may well liaise with the appropriate manager in the company applying.
3. Once approved, the design will be allocated an Approved Design reference number and details will be held on a central data base. This means that only one application is made for any one design unless, of course, there are subsequent design alterations affecting security.
4. One copy of the plans of an Approved Design, following any necessary amendments, will be returned to the developer. The allocated number should be used together with the design title in further correspondence with any of the participating police forces.
5. Where a development consists of three or less houses of an Approved Design the developer is free to use the 'SECURED BY DESIGN' logo in advertising to denote police approval of the degree of security incorporated in the premises.
6. Should a development comprise four or more houses and the developer wishes to indicate police approval of his project by use of the logo, then the designated police officer for the area in which the development is to be located must be consulted in advance. This is a mandatory requirement even if all the proposed buildings have previously received the Approved Design award. No further recommendations will be made on the specification of existing Approved Designs in such developments. However, the designated police officer will advise the appropriate person in the developer's organisation on the equally essential matter of crime prevention in estate design.
7. Recommendations on estate design will NOT involve the reduction in the number of units. They are concerned with such environmental characteristics as defensible space including landscaping and natural surveillance.

The police recommendations will take note of local authority planning strategies to avoid any conflict of views while incorporating the best practices in environmental design. Once the recommendations are accepted, advertising of the entire development can be supported by use of the 'SECURED BY DESIGN' logo (see Publicity Opportunities and Restrictions).
8. All recommendations provided by a designated police officer will be in accordance with statutory provisions, for example both fire and planning regulations. Should any conflict arise in this area, then the statutory provisions will prevail and the officer will amend his recommendations accordingly.
9. The police retain the right of access for inspection of Approved Designs from commencement of building work to completion of sale.

NB A designated police officer is one as designated by the Chief Officer of a participating police force viz: Bedfordshire, City of London, Essex, Hampshire, Hertfordshire, Kent, Metropolitan, Surrey, Sussex, Thames Valley.
QUALIFYING DESIGNS:  
PUBLICITY OPPORTUNITIES &  
RESTRICTIONS  

A company that receives approval for a qualifying residential building design from a designated police officer is presented with a major publicity opportunity through the free use of the official ‘SECURED BY DESIGN’ logo in its promotional material.

Because of the need for approval of estate design by a designated officer for developments of four or more houses it will not be possible to use the logo for larger projects outside the South East region at present.

The following rules apply to the use of the logo:

1. Companies may only reproduce and use the ‘SECURED BY DESIGN’ logo within printed material to show that a specific, identified building design or housing development has gained acceptance as an Approved Design.

   If the logo is used where it is isolated from the description of the building design – for example on letterheads – it should always be qualified with the name of the Approved Design, which should appear immediately below the logo: such as to ensure that it is clearly associated with a specific building design or housing development of an Approved Design.

2. The logo may not be amended or altered in any way. The logo is dedicated to the year of the award. It encompasses the date and must never be separated: i.e. ‘SECURED BY DESIGN (YEAR)’

   The preferred versions for the reproduction of the logotype are:
   - Silver on black
   - Black on silver
   - White on black
   - Black on white
   - Full colour

   The colour specification for printing of silver is pms 8770 – or foil blocking can be used for even better results. The logo may be screen printed, heat transferred or rubbed down on to the surface of a product as required.

   ‘Contact your local designated officer for details. In the event of any difficulties or enquiries contact Rea Publicity Ltd, Broadmead House, Keymer Road, Hassocks, West Sussex BN6 8AN. Tel: (079 18) 5641. Fax: (079 18) 3639.

   All rights to the term ‘SECURED BY DESIGN’ and its advertising logo are the property of the South East Region Senior Crime Prevention Officers Conference (SERSCPOC). The logo signifies police approval of building security and unauthorised use constitutes an offence under section 14(iv) Trade Descriptions Act 1968.

© South East Region Senior Crime Prevention Officers Conference.
'SECURED BY DESIGN'

Estate
SECURITY MUST HAVE A PRIORITY WHEN ESTATES ARE DESIGNED . . .

This document provides helpful guidelines on estate design. It is based on the Guidance Note produced by the National House-Building Council, BS.8220 and the Police Architectural Liaison Manual of Guidance produced by the Home Office Crime Prevention Centre.

Secure boundaries where land could be used to gain access.

Examination of building complexes that have been affected by crime tend to indicate that the more compact they are, the lower the crime risk. Sprawling complexes provide numerous hiding places, means of entry and potential targets, thus making them attractive to the criminal.

With this in mind, careful thought at the design stage of new estates can directly reduce crimes such as theft, robbery, assaults and crimes against property such as burglary and vandalism — as well as the fear of crime.

The objective of estate design should be to create a community where people recognise the area in which they live collectively as their 'neighbourhood'. They know each other, respect each other's person and property and exercise a measure of responsibility for their own and their neighbours' children. Because they can readily identify those who belong to the estate and their community they have little difficulty in recognising the presence of strangers.

Collectively they are alert to the intrusion of criminal or anti-social behaviour, which they are ever ready to challenge as members of a community.

By encouraging a mixture of housing — bungalows, two and three bedrooemed houses — full benefit is gained by natural surveillance as there is potential occupation throughout the day.

Car parking should be off the road. Locate garages where they are in full view.

Essentially, effective estate design means giving some priority to the application of security measures when planning the layout — as well as to considerations such as appearance and the provision of amenities.

In this context, security covers three interrelated subjects: defensible space, landscaping and natural surveillance.

CREATING 'BOUNDARIES' — DEFENSIBLE SPACE

Estate design should encourage a feeling of territoriality among the residents by providing an environment where they feel they have an influence on the area outside their home.

By using real or symbolic barriers such as a change of road surface in either texture or colour — brick pillars
pedestrian access or exit, such as an alleyway or passage, make a very discouraging target area for the typical housebreaker. So do communal areas which are open to observation from surrounding premises. Non-essential footpaths which can provide unobserved access or escape routes for intruders should be excluded.

It is also important to enhance natural surveillance by means of judicious landscaping and carefully co-ordinated lighting. These deny the intending burglar the benefit of concealment behind bush or shrub and spotlight any attempt to gain illegal access.

NO HIDING PLACE - LANDSCAPING

The landscape design must avoid the creation of potential hiding places for intruders - especially adjacent to footpaths or in close proximity to a dwelling.

Frontages should be in open view and walls and hedges kept to about waist height to avoid obscuring front entrance doors and windows.

High boundary fences, walls and hedges are best avoided but it is of course necessary to establish a balance between facilitating surveillance and people's requirement for privacy.

Unsecured rear gardens that back on to footpaths or common land are a bad idea. A much more security-effective design is to position the rear garden areas so they back on to each other - thus providing a form of mutual protection.

A dwelling layout and its boundaries should form a secure private area between the building line and the side and rear boundaries, which is difficult to penetrate unobserved.

Either the dwelling's walls can be used to form secure boundaries or strong fences and walls should be
provided. Trellis fixed on the top of walls or fences makes a very effective additional deterrent. The strongest items are not always the best security. A shaky panel fence can be more of a deterrent to climbing than a brick wall. There is no reason why effective security should detract from attractive landscaping. It is a matter only of ensuring that cover is not included which might encourage a thief.

**WELL LIT PRIVATE AREAS**
The benefit of defensible space and landscaping should not be lost after dark and adequate levels of lighting should be maintained throughout the public footpaths and secluded roadways.

**A GATE DETERS INTRUDERS**
If there are access paths from front to rear, a strong lockable gate should be introduced close to the building line. It should not be easy to climb and ought to be in full view of neighbours. Beware of design features which might unwittingly make access easy to potential entry points above ground level. In particular, care should be taken with regard to the location of bin and fuel bunkers, boundary walls, flat roofs and balconies. The need for entry to the dwelling and its private areas by strangers such as delivery people and meter readers should be avoided.

Service credit meters (gas, electricity and water) can be located where they can be read without the official going into the secure part of the dwelling and its area. There are meters available which may be viewed through a small panel set into the wall masonry.

**CAR PARKING SECURITY**
Arrangements for car parking should be in locations where the vehicles can be kept under general surveillance as within the curtilage of dwellings. Drives, paths, hard standings, car ports and garage entrance doors ought to be within general view and overlooked by the owner from his/her home. Ideally, garages should be located towards the front of dwellings – but not at the risk of obscuring natural surveillance. Communal car parking should be kept off the street in private secure areas which are well lit, open to natural surveillance and grouped so that occupiers can become familiar with the cars and their owners, and notice intruders. The community spirit encouraged by developments of this nature will aid crime reduction, especially in conjunction with the Neighbourhood Watch Schemes which are continuing to spread throughout the country.

*Original diagrams courtesy of the NHBC and Portsmouth City Council.*

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CRIME PREVENTION

NHW CRIME INFORMATION LINE
HIGH WYCOMBE AREAS (0296) 396555
MARLOW AREAS (0296) 396556

PRODUCED IN CONJUNCTION AND CO-OPERATION WITH
THAMES VALLEY POLICE
COMMUNITY LIAISON DEPARTMENT
AND
WYCOMBE DISTRICT COUNCIL

P.C. Jonathan Riley, Community Liaison Department
High Wycombe Police Station
Queen Victoria Road
High Wycombe
Bucks HP11 1BA

Printed and designed by Wycombe District Council's Design and Print Unit

THAMES VALLEY POLICE

WYCOMBE DISTRICT COUNCIL
Neighbourhood Watch is a collective agreement to keep your eyes and ears open, to take positive action when you see something suspicious, to improve your Home Security and to engender a caring community spirit. There are now more than 300 Neighbourhood Watch Schemes (NHW) in the Wycombe District. Some are just groups of six to eight houses and others cover up to 400 homes.

We have no real way to quantify the success of the scheme but it appears to work in different ways for each scheme depending on their needs and the effort they put into particular aspects of the scheme.

Insurance companies believe that it works as many of them give a ten per cent discount on house contents insurance when you join a scheme.

Our Criminal Investigation Department indicate that most burglars seem to be avoiding NHW areas.

If you would like an information pack simply complete the form below and return.

If you have any queries, please contact P.C. Riley on (0296) 396563.

Name .......................................................
Address ..................................................
Post code.............................................

Please allow 10 days for delivery

1. **DETERRENT** Signs on the street and in house windows tell the burglar that people in this area are security conscious and have jointly agreed to keep their eyes open and report anything suspicious.

2. **INCREASE CONFIDENCE** By knowing that your neighbours are collectively concerned about everybody's security and have agreed to work as a team.

3. **ENGENDER COMMUNITY SPIRIT** Getting to know your neighbours is what it's all about.

   We hope that you will organise as many community events as possible to keep people interested.

4. **ASSIST POLICE** In addition to the police having a means of passing information and advice to you, information from members is collected by the co-ordinators and, depending on its nature, either filed for future reference or passed direct to the police.

   **There is very little effort involved.** Co-ordinators are simply organisers who have occasional meetings to arrange functions such as cheese and wine parties, coffee mornings, barbeques, video evenings (we have a few of interest you may borrow), etc. Co-ordinators do not have to be on call.

Act now! Simply return the form on the reverse side of this leaflet and I shall then send you an information pack and instructions. When you are ready I shall come and give a short talk about NHW, set up your scheme if you wish to go ahead and then we will have a short discussion on improving your home security.
Appendix G

Sample Questionnaire To LPA's
DESIGN AGAINST CRIME
QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Does your authority operate any mechanisms for dealing with Design Against Crime at the planning stage? (including any liaison procedures with the Police Authority and/or the Architectural Liaison Officer)

[ ] NO
[ ] YES If yes, please give brief details _______________________

(continue on a separate sheet if necessary)

2. Does your authority have any adopted policies relating to Design Against Crime? (particularly those included within the development plan)

[ ] NO
[ ] YES If yes, please include copies

3. Does your authority have any other informal policies or guidelines relating to Design Against Crime?

[ ] NO
[ ] YES If yes, please give details

4. On what basis does your authority make staff resources available to deal with Design Against Crime procedures?

[ ] An officer(s) whose sole responsibility it is to co-ordinate and implement the Authority's Design Against Crime initiatives.

[ ] An officer(s) who carries out the Authority's Design Against Crime initiatives in addition to their other local authority statutory duties.

[ ] On an ad hoc basis, with no specific officer(s) allocated to deal with Design Against Crime procedures.

[ ] No officer(s) made available

[ ] Other ________________________________

5. Please provide a contact name and address:

NAME ________________________________

TEL NO. ______________________________
6. Please add any additional comments:

Charlotte Cook
March 1992
Appendix H
Maps Indicating Individual Scores of LPA's

LEGEND AND SCORING SYSTEM:

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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
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<td>No policy for design against crime</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>No policy but guidance provided</td>
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<td>Policy only</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Policy and guidance provided</td>
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</table>

n= 272 [2 LPA's did not identify themselves and are therefore not included in the mapping exercise]

SOURCE: Rusbridge, 1992 (LPA boundaries)
Bucks
Berks
Surrey

Herts
Essex
Kent

1 City
2 Westminster
3 Lambeth
4 Southwark
5 Tower Hamlets
6 Hackney
7 Islington
8 Camden
9 Kensington & Chelsea
10 Hammersmith & Fulham
11 Wandsworth
12 Merton
13 Sutton
14 Croydon
15 Lewisham
16 Bromley
17 Greenwich
18 Bexley
19 Newham
20 Barking & Dagenham
21 Havering
22 Redbridge
23 Waltham Forest
24 Haringey
25 Enfield
26 Barnet
27 Brent
28 Harrow
29 Ealing
30 Hillingdon
31 Hounslow
32 Richmond upon Thames
33 Kingston upon Thames

LONDON

<table>
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<th>Area no.</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>Tyne and Wear (M)</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Durham</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Lancashire</td>
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<td>North Yorkshire</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Cleveland</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Clwyd</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Isle of Wight</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**England—**

**Metropolitan Areas (6)**

- Greater Manchester 9
- Merseyside 8
- South Yorkshire 16
- Tyne and Wear 3
- West Midlands 29
- West Yorkshire 10

**Greater London (1)**

- Greater London 47

**Non-metropolitan (39)**

- Avon 44
- Bedfordshire 38
- Berkshire 46
- Buckinghamshire 37
- Cambridgeshire 32
- Cheshire 14
- Cleveland 7
- Cornwall 41
- Cumbria 2
- Derbyshire 15
- Devon 42
- Dorset 48
- Durham 4
- East Sussex 53
- Essex 40
- Gloucestershire 35
- Hampshire 49
- Hereford & Worcester 28
- Hertfordshire 39
- Humberside 11
- Isle of Wight 54
- Kent 51
- Lancashire 5
- Leicestershire 23
- Lincolnshire 18
- Norfolk 33
- Northamptonshire 31
- Northumberland 1
- North Yorkshire 6
- Nottinghamshire 17
- Oxfordshire 36
- Shropshire 21
- Somerset 43
- Staffordshire 22
- Suffolk 34
- Surrey 50
- Warwickshire 30
- West Sussex 52
- Wiltshire 45

**Wales—**

**Counties**

- Clwyd 13
- Dyfed 19
- Gwent 27
- Gwynedd 12
- Mid Glamorgan 25
- Powys 20
- South Glamorgan 26
- West Glamorgan 24