JOHN BULL'S OTHER HOMES: 
STATE HOUSING AND BRITISH POLICY IN IRELAND, 
1883-1922

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This thesis proposes that state housing became an integral aspect of the relationship between Ireland and Great Britain from the 1880s until the early-1920s. Based on research into both Irish and Westminster sources, it shows that there was recurrent pressure for the state to intervene in housing in Ireland during a period when the 'Irish Question' was the major domestic political issue. The outcome was that the basis of subsequent state housing policy in Great Britain, namely direct central subsidy and recommended plan types, was introduced first in Ireland.

The pioneering subsidy programme, the result of nationalist agitation by the Irish Parliamentary Party after the 'Land War' of the early-1880s, had by 1914 built nearly 50,000 rural cottages for agricultural labourers. Urban housing proved to be more intractable, since successive British Governments resisted a comparable state subsidy for Irish municipalities. This led to conflict with Westminster in the pre-war period, notably during the bitter industrial confrontation in 1913-14 between Dublin employers and the unskilled labourers' union organised by James Larkin and James Connolly.

In parallel with policy developments, there was a continued attempt to introduce British garden suburb principles through initiatives like the 1914 Dublin Town Plan Competition. When after the 1916 Easter Rising the British Government decided expeditiously to increase housing funds, it was to this design model that Dublin Corporation turned. Post-war Irish housing legislation (the equivalent of the 1919 Addison Act on the mainland) finally codified garden suburb orthodoxy, but opposition from Sinn Fein and a disadvantageous subsidy system meant that little state housing was actually provided. An exception was the anomalous policy of the British Government to build cottages directly for Irish ex-servicemen, a programme that continued even after independence for the Irish Free State and partition for Northern Ireland were granted in 1922.

Irish state housing thus formed a significant plank for colonial relations, and became a volatile issue in the ongoing three-way interplay between Westminster, the Castle Administration in Dublin, and Irish Nationalists. The pattern of cross-influence was that, in general, policy innovations were developed first in Ireland whereas design ideas came from Britain.
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INTRODUCTION

State housing played an integral role in the relationship between Ireland and Great Britain from the 1880s until the early-1920s, during the period when the 'Irish Question' was the major issue in the domestic politics of the United Kingdom. The form of state housing policy as it was to develop subsequently in Great Britain, namely direct central subsidy and recommended plan types, originated in Ireland. Yet the significance of early state housing in Ireland has not been fully appreciated by Irish historians, and in Britain the subject remains virtually unknown. This study will therefore set out to explain the complex interplay of ideas about Irish housing policy and design, and in doing so will place most emphasis on the moments when either Ireland or Great Britain came to decisively influence the other party.

Three types of historiographical questions present themselves immediately. Did the relationship with Britain determine or simply reflect social change in Ireland? In what ways did cultural interaction influence the framework of architectural practice in Ireland? How does the subject of Irish state housing fit into the established account of housing developments in Britain? This introduction will deal with each area in turn.

In terms of analysing the influence of Britain on Ireland, the concepts that are of most importance to this study are those of 'modernisation' and 'nationalism'. Modernisation is understood here as the transformation from an agricultural society governed by a small land-owning elite, to a functionally specialised and (usually) capitalist industrial society, committed (at least in theory) to democratic participation and an open meritocracy. Ireland does not conform to this pattern in that it remained - with the exception of an industrial enclave in North-East Ulster - an essentially agricultural economy. Problems of interpretation therefore stem from the fact that historians have differing views as to what extent, if at all, Ireland went through a process of modernisation. Nevertheless a number of general points need to be outlined. Firstly, modernisation in the Irish context means in essence the response to the modernisation of England, since it was the latter nation that produced not only the first capitalist industrial system, but also developed an effective colonising strategy that culminated in worldwide empire-building. Wales was the first territory to be economically and politically assimilated, followed by union with Scotland in 1707. The slow conquest of Gaelic Ireland had begun with the Norman feudal expansionism of the twelfth century (establishing the colonial region around Dublin known as the 'Pale'), but it was not until the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that colonisation was pursued with sustained purpose [Fig.1]. From this period the consolidation of an
Anglican Anglo-Irish 'Ascendancy' as a ruling landowning class throughout the land, along with the intensive 'plantations' of both Anglicans and Presbyterians in Ulster, served to cement the dominance of British interests over those of the native Roman Catholic majority (nineteenth-century statistics consistently showed that Catholics accounted for around 75% of the total population of Ireland; while in Ulster, Protestants of all denominations comprised some 56% of the population, rising to 66% in the six North-Eastern counties). Catholics were now mostly reduced to the status of tenant-farmers and labourers. An Irish Parliament governed the kingdom under the authority of the English Crown, and after the Battle of the Boyne in 1690 passed a sequence of legal and civil restrictions over Catholics known as the "Penal Laws" which were to remain in force for most of the eighteenth century. There were two reasons why Britain felt it necessary to maintain its rule over a disaffected and often hostile population. The first was the desire to create a enlarged economic market based on the supply of Irish agricultural produce and the reciprocal consumption of British manufactures; the second was a continual concern to protect the expanding British state from the strategic threat that a potentially disloyal Ireland posed as an invasion route. These goals were jeopardised in the late-eighteenth century by the growing demands for colonial autonomy from the Irish Parliament, and then by the 1798 Rebellion of the United Irishmen. The government of William Pitt the Younger could no longer rely with confidence on the Ascendancy class to preserve Ireland as a bulwark against foreign invasion, and hence it introduced the Act of Union in 1800-01 to create the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. This was a watershed in modern political relations between the countries, since it appeared to give Ireland the status of a province, rather than an imperial colony of Britain. However, unlike the incorporation of Wales and Scotland into the Kingdom, the lack in Ireland of popular support for unification, outside a few counties in North-East Ulster, meant that it remained an unhappy and resented marriage of convenience. The outcome was a conflict, found at all levels, between pressures that tended toward integration and those that tended toward separation.

Tensions over economic matters were evident in the eighteenth century, but took on increasing importance from the early nineteenth century. Already by 1800 Ireland had become an integral part of the imperial economic system: some 80% of Irish imports came from Britain, and 85% of its exports flowed in the other direction. The Act of Union intensified this trend through the abolition of the Irish Exchequer in 1816, the removal of customs duties in 1820, and monetary unification in 1826. However closer dependency never brought about real equality for Ireland. "A condition of genuine market unification existed", one historian has written, ".....but Britain was clearly the richer, more powerful and more populated of the two." Ireland in general became ever more specialised as the supplier of agricultural goods (particularly cattle products) to the burgeoning British urban
population. It remained essentially a colonial economy, and hence the least developed and poorest part of the United Kingdom. It was the entrenchment of 'pre-industrial' agricultural society in the majority of Ireland, and its growing identification with Nationalist and Catholic values, that prevented the modernisation of Ireland in parallel with Britain. Indeed, by the nineteenth century Britain had all but abandoned direct attempts to alter the dominant social system in Ireland. Catholicism was too far entrenched in areas outside Ulster for proselytisation or repression to have a chance, and the incidence of Irish-speaking was declining of its own accord. What there was instead was a steady wave of racial propaganda from Britain which denigrated 'backward' Irish culture, as if somehow assertions of British superiority would indirectly make people in Ireland wish to become more like their rulers. No such message was needed in North-East Ulster, where a much closer economic integration with Britain was found in the industrial region centred on the Lagan valley. This underpinned the political and cultural loyalty of the Protestant and Presbyterian majority in the region: it was no coincidence that the Union was defended most virulently by capitalist businessmen who realised that their economic well-being depended on the British connection.

It was at the political level, however, that the conflict in Ireland between integration and separation was revealed with most clarity. The Union had in principle made uniform the political structure of the United Kingdom, since Irish Members now sat in the Westminster Parliament as provincial representatives. Yet the myth of a unified Parliament was always to prove a chimera, since, as MacDonagh has observed, "in the case of Ireland its fundamental objective was the maintenance of imperial control." Thus the policies of Parliament could in Ireland only be implemented by a unique quasi-colonial administration in Dublin Castle. The Castle Administration sat nominally under the rule of a politically appointed Lord Lieutenant, but in reality it was increasingly controlled by the Chief Secretary of Ireland - a figure who usually, though not always, was also a member of the British Cabinet.

In its attempt to achieve the political integration of two countries with very different levels of development, the British Government was forced to rely in Ireland on an unparalleled degree of centralised state intervention. The aim was to ameliorate the worst social and economic consequences of uneven modernisation, and in most instances hinged on policies designed to improve agricultural performance. The instinctive starting point for British policy in Ireland was the same as that for the mainland, where the laissez-faire doctrine of 'political economy' (as first put forward by the Classical economists) remained essentially intact, if somewhat dented, in the period up to the First World War. However the few policies that were actually transferred to Ireland unaltered, such as the Poor Law system in
1838, proved so disastrous in operation that it soon became the accepted principle that special treatment was inevitable. It was this realisation that caused some radical British intellectuals, such as John Stuart Mill, to modify their economic theories. "Finding Irish solutions to Irish problems," O'Tuathaigh has written, "became part of the strategy of government pursued by various British cabinets during the second half of the nineteenth century." The result was a number of 'exceptional' social policies which apparently anticipated the later introduction of similar policies in Britain: examples included a national police force (1836; Dublin retained its own force), a national elementary education system (1831), and, as will be seen, a greater involvement in state housing. The reason for this degree of 'collectivist' state intervention in Ireland has been the subject of historical debate. One theory has argued that Ireland formed a 'social laboratory' in which experiments to solve particular social or economic problems could be tested, and if successful, could then be transferred to Britain. However there are undoubted difficulties with this viewpoint. There is no evidence that any strategy was tried out with the conscious intention of it being intended for Britain, nor indeed did any policy of collectivism exist to form the hypothesis for an experiment. Most historians tend to the view that British intervention was instead a series of reactive, ad-hoc expedients, hastily conceived and with uncertain long-term consequences. The notion of Ireland as a 'social laboratory' can only be, at best, an explanation that is applied in retrospect and not one that was perceived at the time. State intervention in Ireland, as will be seen, remained in British eyes essentially a necessary evil.

Yet nothing more starkly prevented political integration of Britain and Ireland than the complex and growing Nationalist movement. At heart, Irish Nationalism was motivated by a desire for greater autonomy from Britain and the emasculation of an Ascendancy landed class, whose *raison d'etre* as a colonial governing elite had been made theoretically irrelevant by the Act of Union. Nationalist demands varied throughout the nineteenth century, and the movement changed from one with a cross-denominational base, to a narrower ethnic position in which the tendency was, as Townshend has noted, "for Irish Nationalism to be seen as a Roman Catholic movement posing both economic and moral threats to Protestants." After the campaign for religious equality led by Daniel O'Connell had resulted in the 1829 Catholic Emancipation Act (and the disestablishment of the Anglican Church of Ireland 40 years later), in the 1840s the more militant Romantic nationalism of 'Young Ireland' began to develop a keen interest in cultural separateness. The greatest possible emotional charge was given to Nationalist sentiment by the cataclysmic Irish Famine of 1845-49. Probably around a million people died and the same number or more were forced to emigrate: blame was placed squarely on the British Government, and large-scale exodus became a persistent trauma thereafter. In the late-
1860s the Fenians preached out-and-out physical force; yet just over a decade later a 'New Departure' in the Nationalist movement, led by Charles Stewart Parnell and the Irish Parliamentary Party, had allied a constitutional demand for self-government with the campaign by Irish tenant farmers for land reform following the severe agricultural slump and 'Land War' of 1879-1882. Land redistribution was now to be the economic 'engine' that was to drag in its train the political demand for 'Home Rule' (or, more precisely, a greater autonomy for Ireland over non-strategic matters within the United Kingdom). The implication of this parliamentary strategy, once William Gladstone had committed the Liberal Party to Home Rule, and total opposition had been registered by the Unionist heartland of North-East Ulster and the Conservative Party in Britain, was that the 'Irish Question' came to dominate domestic politics for the next thirty-five years. The failure of Gladstone's famous Home Rule Bills in 1886 and 1893 made disenchanted intellectuals in Ireland opt increasingly for, on one hand, an anglophobic 'cultural nationalism' as the basis for political mobilization (initiatives included the formation of the Gaelic Athletic Association in 1884 to promote native Irish sports, and the Gaelic League in 1893 to revive the use of the Irish language and the study of medieval Irish literature); and, on the other hand, more radical political groupings. Amongst the latter was the creation in 1900 of the minority separatist party that was to become Sinn Fein, with its advocacy of abstention from the Imperial Parliament and of the establishment of Ireland as a distinct nation under the British Crown, on the Austro-Hungarian precedent of 'dual monarchy'. These new initiatives produced a veritable 'alternative history' to the mainstream path of constitutional Nationalism. Yet for all its intended radicalism and the heroic status it was later awarded in the republican pantheon, separatist Nationalism was at root only another facet of the same rejection of British rule in Ireland.

It is the explanation for the growth of Nationalism, and particularly its relation to the modernisation process in Ireland, that has caused perhaps greatest disagreement amongst Irish historians. To provide a framework for the debate, it is worthwhile looking briefly at the abstract level. The process by which nation-states are formed has been of continuing interest to sociologists since the writings of Max Weber at the turn of the century. Sociological theory generally holds that there are two stages to state-formation, irrespective of whether this involves the annexation of an adjacent region or an overseas territory. The first stage is the acquisition of a new territory by a powerful 'state-building core'; the second, the efforts to maintain the 'peripheral' territory within the enlarged state by establishing legitimacy and loyalty to the 'core'. If the new territory becomes assimilated within several generations, even if force and coercion was necessary in the initial stage, then a legitimate process of 'national expansion' can be said to have taken place. This pattern accords closely with what has been described as the traditional, 'diffusion' model of
national development. In this model, economic interaction will result in a growing equalisation of wealth from the 'core' to the 'peripheral' region (particularly beneficial if the former is a modern industrialised nation), which in turn will lead to cultural convergence and a political homogenisation based on common class interests rather than regional status groups. However, it has been pointed out that the 'diffusion' model does not explain those cases where there is continual and violent resistance by the 'periphery' to what it regards as illegitimate 'imperialism'. This has prompted Michael Hechter to put forward a counter-model which he has called 'internal colonialism'. Here an initial, uneven pattern of industrialisation enables a wealthy 'core' nation to establish economic and cultural superiority over a less advanced 'periphery'. Dominance is then not diminished by greater interaction, but is in fact aggravated by the restrictions placed on the 'peripheral' economy to serve the 'core'. Real equalisation of wealth is prevented, and disparity becomes socially institutionalised through a 'cultural division of labour' between the two nations. Under the 'internal colonial' model, when this situation is compounded by the persistence of a distinct cultural identity in the 'periphery', then political integration will never occur and a sectional nationalism will develop in response to perceived economic and cultural inequality.

The model of 'internal colonialism' would therefore appear to be a useful one to apply to Ireland, since it describes a condition which is neither one of a subject colony (such as say India after the 1858 Mutiny) nor one of a successfully integrated part of the 'core' nation. It offers a plausible explanation for the hatred felt in Ireland about the unfavourable consequences of economic and political dependence on Britain. Hechter has therefore argued that Nationalist movements in the Celtic fringes like Ireland were "a political response to the persistence of regional inequality": in other words, a reaction in the later nineteenth century, through campaigns such as the Irish 'Land War', to the evident disparity between peripheral agricultural regions and the industrialised areas of the United Kingdom. Yet the problem however remains as to how far this 'anglicised' model of modernisation, defined as a process resulting from industrialisation, can ever adequately cover the social complexities of Ireland. Indeed several historians have poured doubt on a correlation between economic modernisation and the growth of Irish Nationalism, by pointing out that what the 'Land War' did was to usher in a new phase of a movement whose ideas and historical pattern had been developing ever since O'Connell's campaign for religious equality in the 1820s. This reminder of the complex interaction between British influence and Nationalist counter-struggle is useful: not least in the fact that, as has been pointed out, the strategies of constitutional Nationalists or even the most separatist of 'Irish-Irelanders' were so deeply infused with British values of liberal democracy and modernisation, that they themselves contributed to the 'anglicisation' of the country.
Nevertheless it is still useful to hold to the model of 'internal colonialism' in order to analyse another aspect: the extent to which Ireland could affect developments in the dominant 'core' nation of Britain. Hechter has pointed out that a by-product of political centralisation was that, in conditions when the British Government needed to ensure stability, then 'peripheral' political groups could exceed their apparent powers and win innovative social concessions.23 The best-known example from nineteenth century Ireland was O'Connell's campaign that in 1829 secured Catholic emancipation for the whole of the United Kingdom. This intriguing issue of the influence of the Celtic fringes on the 'core' has prompted some recent cultural writers to look to Antonio Gramsci's idea of a 'hegemonic' ideological struggle between social classes. In the marxist theory of Gramsci, the ruling bourgeois class only sustains its hegemony by a fluctuating and unstable equilibrium of compromise through the medium of the 'integral state' (i.e. a widened concept of the state which operates in both the political and civil spheres of society). Compromise is achieved both between different sections within the ruling class, and also, significantly, by the absorption and neutralisation ('transformism') of antagonistic working-class ideas and culture. Hence the response to any social crisis is a reconstruction by the bourgeoisie of the hegemonic apparatus: this is the so-called 'passive revolution', or 'revolution without revolution'. Gramsci's theory has been adapted to argue for a more refined version of the 'core-periphery' model, in which the dependent country must also force the dominant 'core' nation to modify its way of thinking.24 It is illuminating, for example, that nineteenth century English observers frequently defined themselves in terms of the rational, civilised 'opposite' of the under-developed Celtic periphery. The perceived 'backwardness' of Ireland was therefore essential for Britain, both in the economic and the ideological realms, as part of the latter's need to justify claims of cultural superiority and imperial 'advancement'. This important cross-influence between ruler and ruled was never likely to result in genuine cultural integration, but it does reveal that there was more than a simple one-way domination of the 'core' over the 'periphery'. In this study it is necessary therefore to look at not only the direct impact of British policies on Ireland, but also the extent to which the mainland country came to itself be modified by Irish developments.

The interplay of British modernisation and Irish Nationalism thus forms the background to the developments discussed in this study. What then of the second area of historiographical investigation: that is, to what extent did Britain exercise a cultural hegemony over Irish architecture? In nineteenth century Ireland, architectural practice continued to be centred in Dublin; although provincial towns such as Cork, Waterford, Limerick, and above all Belfast, began to develop their own local networks of architects.25 Indeed the leading Irish practice of the mid-nineteenth century, that of Sir Thomas Deane...
and Benjamin Woodward, came from Cork. Regional diffusion did little to alter the fact that, compared to Britain, architecture remained an insignificant occupation. The first moves towards professional organisation in Ireland generally followed in the wake of those on the mainland. The Royal Institute of Architects of Ireland (hereafter RIAI) was formed in 1839, partly through the efforts an English architect, George Papworth, who had links with those whom had five years earlier set up the Institute of British Architects (soon the Royal Institute of British Architects; hereafter RIBA). In 1859 the fortnightly Dublin Builder was first published in emulation of its namesake in Britain: by 1867 it was renamed the Irish Builder, and it was to prove the principal source of architectural information and analysis over the next century. The Architectural Association of Ireland was briefly set up in Dublin in the 1860s as a pale imitation of its famous London precedent. The association lay moribund until it was revived in 1896 largely at the initiative of a recent British arrival, Harry Allberry, for the similar purpose of providing informal education for young architects. Yet the weakness and disorganisation of the Irish profession was continually demonstrated by the ineffectuality of the RIAI. "The Irish Institute has been for a long time little more than a name", wrote the Irish Builder in the late-1870s, and there was no dramatic change thereafter. Membership stood at about 65 architects in the 1880s, and this barely rose to around 100 members just before the First World War. The business of the RIAI was riven from the turn of century by a growing division with a splinter association in Belfast, the Ulster Society of Architects, and by a fruitless obsession with the idea of securing compulsory legal registration for the use of the title of 'architect'. One path for the RIAI to augment itself was to attach itself to the much stronger English institute, and thereby to become a regional branch of a 'trade union' across the whole United Kingdom. However a complete merger had been ruled out in 1889 in favour of a formal alliance with the RIBA. This link was praised by the incumbent RIAI President in 1898 because it "strengthens uniformity of practice between ourselves and our brethren across the water, and strengthens our hands." Nowhere was the attempt at parallelism more clearly shown than in the matter of architectural education. In 1889 the RIAI introduced the RIBA professional examination, and then, after overcoming the objections of the English institute, began in 1905 to set its own equivalent entrance exam. By this point many Irish architects believed that professional salvation lay in the foundation of a university school of architecture on the academic Beaux-Arts model, as first formulated in the USA and subsequently introduced to Britain at Liverpool University. A Chair of Architecture was duly established in 1909 at the new 'Catholic' institution of University College Dublin. However, this remained in reality only a professorship during the period of the first two incumbents, Sir Thomas Drew and William Scott. It was not until the mid-1920s that a proper architectural course could have been said to have started.
The desire of Irish architects to found a university course was not just based on a concern to bolster the profession, but also reflected a deep insecurity about their relationship with Britain. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries it was obvious that British architecture set the lead. The *Irish Builder* repeatedly described Irish architecture as a "colourless imitation" of that on the mainland, and in 1909 wrote of Ireland's future prospects that "the probability is that she will continue to follow England, as heretofore, at a respectful distance - the habit of imitativeness is too ingrained to be readily cast off." Just over a decade later the same journal observed that "It must be confessed that the illustrated English building journals have wholly set our fashion for sixty or seventy years." Dependence on Britain brought undoubted benefits. Many of Ireland's leading architects at the turn of the century were Britons who had settled there, and several native practitioners had trained in offices on the mainland. There was also a healthy cross-flow of commissions between the two countries, even if it was British architects who tended to benefit most. The two outstanding examples of reciprocation date from the High Victorian Gothic Revival, and were - respectively - William Burges' St Fin Barr's Cathedral in Cork (1862-78), and Deane and Woodward's Oxford Museum (1855-60). Although there are no statistics available on the religious affiliation of Irish architects, it is probable that the high proportion of Protestants found in professions in Ireland at the time would have tended to make architects as a group more sympathetic to British values and the Imperial connection. It was not uncommon for Irish architects, such as the RIAI President in 1900, Sir Thomas Drew, to welcome the "friendly invasion" of English architects if in return was the chance to obtain work in Britain and the Empire.

Cultural dependence, however, also bred resentment and feelings of inferiority. The esteemed poet William Butler Yeats could therefore deride the profession in 1915 by observing that "we have no Irish architect whom anybody suspects of remarkable talent." Nor would architectural practitioners have necessarily disagreed. "I do not think that we have had in Ireland.....any architect who can be called first-class or of international repute", bemoaned one architect in 1924. Irish resentment usually came to the surface when a plum public commission went to a British architect, notably in the controversies over the appointment of Sir Aston Webb for the College of Science in Dublin (1904-13; the Irish architect Thomas Manly Deane was brought in as collaborator), and Hugh Lane's nomination of Edwin Lutyens to design the new Dublin Municipal Art Gallery (1912-13; unexecuted). Yet an even greater problem brought on by British domination was the confusion produced in Irish architects when they tried to wrestle with the concept of 'national style' - the holy grail that permeated nineteenth century architecture in Europe generally, and which was so often linked with medieval revivalism. "What chance is there
of a distinctly national style being produced amongst us?”, asked the then President of the RIAI in 1874. But within Ireland’s specific historical context this of course meant that architects had to decide whether or not to directly embrace a Nationalist position. An alignment with Nationalism had been made with notable success in the field of literature, from the ‘Young Ireland’ Romantic movement of the 1840s through to the avant-garde Celtic Literary Revival (the so-called ‘Irish Renaissance’) led by Yeats at the turn of the century. In the case of Irish architecture the decision was to prove more difficult for two reasons. Firstly, unless architects chose to confine themselves to visionary projects (such as those of Ancien Regime architects after the French Revolution), then they had to compromise with clients who controlled the means of building production in Ireland and who were likely to support the status quo. Put another way, it was far easier and cheaper to write a book or join a society than to build a monument to Nationalism. Secondly, the oral tradition of Irish language and literature was diminished but definitely still alive in the nineteenth century, particularly in the remote Western areas. It could therefore be more easily revived than the tradition of Irish building which, with the possible exception of the continual and repetitive production of vernacular housing, was generally seen to have died out. “There is no real Irish national style of architecture…..practically no good architecture was produced in Ireland after the coming of the English”, was the view of one extremist.

How then did Irish architects respond to the dilemma created by the idea of a ‘national style’? Here it is fruitful to use the framework described by Lyons in his analysis of Irish literature in the period. At one extreme lay those architects who from the 1840s believed in the possibility of a distinctively ‘Irish’ national architecture. Usually, though not necessarily, committed Nationalists, the first of note within this group was J.J. McCarthy. McCarthy was the leading Gothic Revivalist in the mid-nineteenth century and a supporter of the ‘Young Ireland’ movement, but his call for a national style based on Irish Gothic was seen by others as problematic because the original buildings dated from after the first colonization and were thus tainted by British influence. Hence by the late-1860s the preferred Nationalist style was nearly always the pre-colonial Hiberno-Romanesque. While the Irish Romanesque Revival did produce a few important church designs, more commonly it meant the superficial application of romanticised Celtic symbols such as round-towers, shamrocks, harps, wolfhounds, and celtic crosses. This sham tendency was even more pronounced in the Nationalist applied arts of the period, and not surprisingly was frequently criticised. A more imaginative approach seemed to be introduced into the Hiberno-Romanesque style at the turn of the century by the talented young architect, William Scott. He designed a series of bold, and often polemically Nationalist buildings such as St Enda’s Church in Spiddal, Co. Galway (1904-07) [Fig.2]. At one level. Scott could be said to have been the nearest to an architectural
equivalent of the Celtic Literary Revival: for instance, it was he who refurbished Yeats' famous Ballylee Tower in Co. Galway (1917-18). However, Scott was never a zealous Romanesque Revivalist. Rather, as will be seen below, it was his commitment to the English Arts and Crafts that allowed him to use free-style Romanesque when he felt it appropriate. All in all, the structure of British cultural domination appears to have been too strong for would-be Nationalist architects to overcome. In the early-1920s the Irish Builder wrote in retrospect:

"It is thirty years now since the beginning of the modern Irish renaissance in Literature and Art, and much has been achieved in that period, notably in dramatic art, but architecture has been left out in the cold."44

It is a view echoed by recent commentators. "The hopes of those who had wished for a distinctly Irish style of architecture to emerge from the Celtic Revival were not realized", Sheehy has observed.45 For example, there was certainly nothing like the innovative and romantic variant of Neo-Classical architecture found in turn of the century Finland in the designs of Lars Sonck and Eliel Saarinen, as the result of cultural Nationalism in another peripheral European nation in response to domination by a powerful political neighbour. As a postscript from Ireland in the 1920s, whenever triumphant Nationalists (including a few Government ministers) called on architects to create a national style for the new Irish Free State, their calls went unheeded. "No country has a style of architecture which can be classed entirely as its own:" wrote one architect dismissively in 1923, "all it can do is to dress a tradition in a national garb."46

If this was the dominant view amongst Irish architects, there remained the question of which tradition to follow. Lyons has described a position within Irish literary circles which sought to bypass the reality of British domination by looking for 'cosmopolitan' inspiration from countries beyond. "Should Ireland try to establish a purely native school of building or should she open her doors to the art of the world", inquired the Unionist Irish Times in 1922, ".....The best way to encourage the development of Irish genius is to feed it on universal beauty."47 However it is difficult to find any substantial evidence of cosmopolitanism in Irish architecture. One possible source of inspiration was of course the USA, and its large population of Irish immigrants, but no direct architectural links can be traced: indeed it was English architects who promoted the virtues of US Beaux-Arts architecture and town planning.48 The example of Continental Europe was nearer to hand, but not till after the formation of the independent Irish Free State in 1922 were even the first hesitant connections made. William Butler Yeats, now a distinguished Senator, went to Stockholm in 1924 to collect the Nobel Literature Prize. On his return he recommended to Irish architects that they strive for an approach similar to that found in Romantic
Nationalist buildings in Sweden. Yeats however could offer no real direction beyond a vague assertion that what was needed was a balance between tradition and innovation. Quite simply, there was in Ireland no framework for the type of cosmopolitanism that enabled, for example, Josef Chochol and a few colleagues in Prague before the First World War to turn to Parisian Cubism, as a nationalist style that could finally erase Viennese domination. In Ireland it was the late-1920s before interest first grew in European Modernism, and even then it took a further decade and the continuing influence of British ideas until the new approach amounted to anything near a significant movement.

Instead, most Irish architects in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries supported a position that has been described by Lyons as an 'Anglo-Irish' cultural identity. This bi-partisan approach sought consciously to create an Irish dimension that was based on acknowledged English precedent. It demonstrated above all a pragmatic acceptance of British influence in Ireland, and thereby could appeal to Unionists as well as non-militant Nationalists. The fundamental tenet was that the search for a 'national Irish' or even a 'cosmopolitan' approach was inherently misguided, since any genuine architectural style could not be suddenly adopted but had to be evolved over a long period of time. This of course immediately closed down many options. It meant, in effect, that the field was open to re-enact the battle within British architecture between the Neo-Vernacular Arts and Crafts movement, which was in notable decline after 1900, and those who supported the Neo-Classical Revival that was in the ascendant from around 1906. Irish architects in the Arts and Crafts camp argued not for a simple copying of Richard Norman Shaw or his followers, but rather a development of the Vernacular Revival approach that was "based upon our own climate, our own materials, our own way of life, and our own landscape." Here the best exponent was again William Scott, who, after a spell within the prestigious Architects Department of the London County Council - designing Arts and Crafts fire-stations such as West Hampstead (1901) - returned to Ireland in 1902 to work mainly in a Neo-Vernacular manner that relied heavily on Charles Voysey. Examples of Scott's designs include the eclectic, thatched dwellings for a model industrial 'garden village' at Sheestown, Co. Kilkenny (1907) and, as will be seen in Chapter 1, his contribution to the labourers cottages built in South Co. Dublin.

As in Britain, supporters of the Arts and Crafts in Ireland increasingly came under attack from Neo-Classical partisans both before and after the First World War. Joining in the assault were such distinguished British classicists as Professor Charles Reilly, head of the Liverpool University School of Architecture, and Albert Richardson, who gave high praise to the impressive public buildings of Georgian Dublin in his major tome, Monumental Classic Architecture in Great Britain and Ireland in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries.
Richardson took up a professorial role in 1919 as head of the Bartlett School of Architecture at University College London, and on a subsequent visit to Dublin he asked his audience:

"Why is necessary for Irish architects to follow the prevalent fashion of England [Arts and Crafts], and import ideas of hooded gables and half-baked systems of tile-hanging .....when such excellent material exists as that offered by the Irish section of the national tradition."

The last phrase was a calculated attempt to capitalise on the pride felt by the Irish cultured elite in the Ascendancy contribution to eighteenth century Neo-Classicism. The Irish Georgian Society had been formed in 1908, and fed on the popular and nostalgic myth that the buildings from the time of 'Grattan's Parliament' were the symbols of a halcyon period of national independence prior to the Act of Union. A more contemporary Neo-Classical argument was put forward by Charles Reilly when he declared that Beaux-Arts design, learned along the lines of the American university system, was the only way out of the morass of Arts and Crafts amateurism and individualism. It was a message that appealed to the leading Neo-Classical propagandist in Ireland, R.M. Butler. Editor of the *Irish Builder* between 1899-1935, and also Albert Richardson's guide around Dublin, Butler realised his ambition when in 1924 he was appointed as Professor of Architecture at UCD. It was he who set up a course in emulation of his mentors, Richardson and Reilly, and who wrote:

"This means that the ideal set before the future students of architecture in Ireland is an academic one, conforming in time to the model of Liverpool University, the Ecole des Beaux-Arts, and the American University schools. That ultimately this will lead to the establishment in Ireland of a strong, efficient "School" of architecture."

Hence in Ireland, as in Britain, the battle was all but won by the Neo-Classicists after the First World War. A more general area of agreement amongst Irish practitioners lay in the belief that the best architecture in Ireland was, as a result of economic and climatic factors, distinguished by an austere severity. "In their massive buildings, their simple roofs, and their quiet but effective grouping of blocks of buildings, there is much to be admired and followed as a lead at the present time.....Their decoration was simple, but not the less effective", declared William Scott of the ancient builders of Ireland. From a different perspective, R.M. Butler expressed the view that the new Neo-Classical school in Ireland should "in view of our native building materials, our resources, and our traditions. be of a very simple style, bold and vigorous, but very refined - indeed almost severe." These attempts to posit an ideology of essential simplicity in Irish architecture were not to be without significance in the design of early state housing. Yet it was, however, to prove to be only a minor graft onto a condition in which British ideas were clearly dominant.
Turning now to the third historiographical problem, there is a clear discrepancy between the abundance of published research into housing history in Britain, and the paucity of work on the same subject in Ireland. In general this is because of a long-standing interest in Britain in the historical development of the urban working class: this in turn prompted analysis of the process by which (however reluctantly) the British Government in 1919 took over the primary responsibility for housing this class and introduced subsidised rents. The first histories of British state housing were written from the perspective of the post-war Keynesian Welfare State: as such, they adopted a teleological construct in which an apparently inevitable and linear process of state intervention was set in motion in the mid-nineteenth century, by a growing perception that private enterprise could no longer provide for those at the bottom of the rent spectrum.\textsuperscript{58} The outlines of this story are familiar enough now. State regulation over public health standards gave way in the large cities to Victorian semi-philanthropic housing companies, which used either multi-storey tenement blocks or, in suburban schemes, the more traditional English model of two-storey terraces. In turn these companies were superseded by local authority house-building, which was subsidised after the First World War to build low-density suburban cottage estates. This policy gave way to slum clearance and inner-city flats in the 1930s, and the pattern was set for the realisation of the mass housing of the Welfare State. As explanations of Welfarism, these studies tended to combine what Derek Fraser has termed a 'whig' (ie. liberal-progressivist) interpretation of evolutionary growth, and a 'pragmatic' or 'bureaucratic' justification of the process by which the state came to incrementally acquire new housing responsibilities.\textsuperscript{59} The liberal-progressivist analysis was, however, shown to be increasingly inadequate by the new British socio-economic history that was initiated by the urban history of Jim Dyos in the early-1960s, and later included Gareth Stedman Jones' classic study of working class housing in terms of late-Victorian class relations in the East End of London.\textsuperscript{60} The economic insights provided by such analyses had by the early 1980s fed through to a new phase of housing history which - appropriately for the time at which the Welfare State was being dismantled - specifically rejected the notion of evolutionary development. "There was no inevitability in the acceptance of subsidised public housing as the end result of policy, as the experience of other countries makes perfectly clear," Daunton has written, "The historian should ask why one particular solution to the housing problem was selected from the wide range of possibilities."\textsuperscript{61} Thus attention was now concentrated on explaining the decisive moment, sometime around the First World War, when the British government committed itself to a policy of subsidised state housing. Before looking at current historical explanations of this event, it is worth restating just why this moment is so important.
It has been pointed out that there was some degree of financial assistance implicit in all housing legislation ever since the first Shaftesbury Housing Acts of 1851. However, help to housing agencies in Britain prior to 1914 was minimal, and took on two specific forms. On one hand, the provision of public loans from the Exchequer at interest rates slightly below the general 'market-rate' was contained in, say, the 1875 Cross Act and the 1890 Housing Act. But at no point did the pre-war Treasury ever incur a loss by permitting housing loans at rates lower than it could borrow itself. Indeed when this possibility of subsidy was mooted during the lengthy preparations for the 1909 Housing and Town Planning Act, it was rejected outright by the incumbent Liberal Government. The second form of assistance did involve an actual capital loss, but, importantly, this was only to the rate income of local authorities and most decidedly not to the Exchequer. For example, the 1875 Cross Act allowed local authorities to sell land to semi-philanthropic housing companies at a sums below that necessary to meet the expense of site acquisition. This 'writing-down' of site costs was intended to help ensure that the joint-stock companies could pay their stipulated 5% dividend to investors, and hence, for ideological purposes, to sustain the belief that working-class housebuilding was an economic proposition. The aim was never to provide cheaper rents for tenants, and for this reason it has been described by Merrett as at best a fallacious "indirect subsidy". Another case was the decision by Liverpool Corporation in the early 1880s to deliberately not set rent levels that would be sufficient to cover the capital expenditure on housing schemes, a policy that Pooley has called "local subsidy". But, significantly, it must be remembered that both these instances needed to be met by a compensating increase in local rates, and that this, as historians have pointed out, was a notoriously regressive tax system. Hence the net effect would have been simply to worsen the financial burden on the working classes in the city, possibly even on the few that were rehoused. This explains why such ventures were rare, and why they cannot be regarded as being a genuine subsidy. They were certainly not regarded as subsidy at the time, as will be seen in Chapter 3 when examining British reactions to precedents in Irish housing policy. Rather, ever since the writings of that early evangelist of 'municipal socialism', Sydney Webb, an important distinction has been given to those state policies that are not merely collectivist, but are geared explicitly to effect a redistribution of wealth to the working class. Thus the term 'subsidy' will be confined here to describe the point when national wealth that has been collected centrally via a system of progressive taxation (however imperfect), is then redistributed centrally as a net gain to the working class via subsidised rents on new dwellings.

Three revisionist theories were put forward in the early-1980s to explain why the British Government decided to introduce central subsidy for working-class housing in the 1919 Addison Housing Act. The first, by Avner Offer, argues that state intervention was the
result of an inherent contradiction in the capitalist housing market, first touched on by Frederick Engels in the 1870s, and which by the property slump of 1905-12 had created an endemic crisis.56 Housing capitalists, whether speculative builders or private landlords, now found that the profit return on working-class dwellings had been eroded by a range of factors. On the supply side, the higher construction standards imposed by late-Victorian public health legislation, and the rising interest rates on loans, pushed up the cost of housebuilding and maintenance. On the demand side, the pressure within the capitalist economy to keep wages low (to allow the extraction of surplus value of labour), and the punitive effect of increased local taxation from municipalities starved of central funds, meant that there was little capacity for the working class to pay higher rents. The profit now available from housing the poorer sections of the working class were minimal compared to that from the better-off classes. One solution might have been for the Conservative Party, the traditional bastion of property interests, to have come to the aid of housebuilders and landlords. However the deliberate politicisation of the whole issue of land and property ownership by the pre-war Liberal Party ensured that no political group was willing to defend this marginalised and unpopular sector of housing capitalists. The result, Offer argues, was that even before the First World War the Liberal Government was in the position of being forced to intervene itself.67 The introduction of rent controls on working class dwellings under the 1915 Rent Act simply intensified the structural crisis, and meant that in the post-war period the desperate need to ensure the 'reproduction of labour power' forced the state to intervene decisively. This interpretation is of course essentially economic, and is echoed by the writings of marxist economists on more contemporary housing issues.68 It is an example of a 'capitalistic' theory that sees the development of Welfarism in Britain as a product of the state being forced to mediate in class relations in order to sustain the capitalist system.69

A second, slightly different explanation is given by David Englander.70 This theory builds on the same basic economic analysis, but places far more emphasis on the social tensions that had been created by 1914 as the result of the growing political power of working-class tenants. Englander argues that tenants' organisations in several British cities were instrumental in swinging the pendulum of political influence away from what were seen as exploitative landlords: hence it was mass action that effectively undermined the economic basis of the private housing market. The most decisive front was fought in Glasgow, notably in the militancy that provoked the 1915 Rent Act. It was the British Government's inability to repeal this legislation in the volatile post-war political climate (indeed rent control was extended to cover the lower middle-classes), that made it decided reluctantly that it would have to temporarily subsidise new working class housing. This account of early Welfarism blends the 'capitalistic' theory with a more 'democratic' perspective that
gives a decisive role to mass consumer demand. The third current interpretation is by Mark Swenarton, and sees the state housing campaign after the First World War as being motivated principally by political ideology. Swenarton argues that the over-riding concern of the British Government was to maintain social stability. Returning servicemen had to be convinced that their best interests lay in a continuation of the current political system, rather than an overthrowal of it as in Russia. Subsidised state housing was thus an ad-hoc "insurance against revolution", designed and implemented from above as an instrument of political control over the working class. The dramatic termination of the initial post-war campaign in July 1921 was prompted by the Government's realisation that social revolution was now unlikely, given that the threat from labour power had collapsed along with the post-war economic boom. Swenarton also accounts for another important aspect of post-war housing, that is not dealt with in other theories. Central to Swenarton's case is that the qualitative improvement in design standards of post-war housing was conceived as a tangible demonstration of the irrelevance of revolutionary action. It is the only explanation that links policy developments with architectural ideas, and in so doing demonstrates that early state housing was the product not only of economic and political factors, but also of the ideological nature of design. In general, Swenarton's thesis augments the 'capitalistic' theory of Welfarism by introducing what Fraser has termed a 'conspiratorial' use of state ideology to delude the working class into supporting the existing social order.

Martin Daunton has for the last decade been the principal interpreter of British housing history. He has suggested that the three explanations outlined above might not be necessarily mutually exclusive, and has raised serious questions about each. Daunton has pointed out, in terms of Offer's analysis, that it is far from certain that profit erosion in the working-class sector of the housing market was seen at the time as (or indeed really was) a terminal structural crisis, rather than a temporary cyclical slump. The emphasis on undoubted tenant militancy in Englander's explanation seems to over-estimate its influence on both pre-war attitudes to housing capitalists, and on the reasons why rent control was so staunchly maintained after the war. Daunton has countered the Swenarton theory by arguing that the use of state housing as a primary instrument of social legitimation was unlikely given that it was slow, expensive and cumbersome to implement. He has also suggested that the working class was by this point too organised for such a blatant ideological manoeuvre to be effective: social legitimation might have been a secondary benefit of the housing campaign, but not its primary cause. Instead, Daunton has argued that the history of early state housing must be dealt with on a much broader canvas. On one hand, this involves concentrating much less on the atypical or 'pathological' elements of the housing market (local authorities and semi-philanthropic housing companies had
built less than 1% of Britain's housing stock by 1914), and placing much more emphasis on the dominant private speculative sector. Comparative studies with other countries can also be used to throw light onto developments in the housing of the working classes in Britain. And in terms of state housing policy, it involves a broader analysis of economic policy and the relations between political parties. Daunton has thus tended to stress that the post-war Government intended subsidised housing to be a short-term response while wartime rents controls continued, and therefore subordinate to its real economic aim of deflation and a return to the 'Gold Standard'. It began the policy shift by cutting the post-war campaign in mid-1921, but the impossibility of lifting rent control legislation meant that the Conservative Party had reluctantly to retain subsidised local authority housing as a residual activity. The Labour Party was by then the principal opposition, and had clearly accepted its role as the promoter of ameliorative social democratic ideals within a British state which gave an image of class neutrality. In reality, the growth trend in inter-war subsidy was the Conservative Party's stimulation of middle-class house-ownership through mortgage relief. Yet, while Daunton's work brings an important breadth to the subject of housing history, the corollary is that the central questions of why precisely the British Government intervened in working class housing in 1919, and did so using such distinctive house designs, are lost sight of.

Academic interest in early state housing in Ireland has been far more limited. The sole pioneer in the field has been Frederick Aalen, a social geographer at Trinity College Dublin. His work has covered almost the entire span of early housing history in Ireland, in particular looking at the semi-philanthropic housing companies of nineteenth-century Dublin, and at local authority housing in both town and country prior to the First World War. Aalen's methodology however is essentially descriptive and fragmentary, and has not advanced an adequate historical explanation of why Irish state housing developed as it did. His writings have not examined the involvement of the British Government in the process, nor have they pursued the cross-influence with housing policy in Britain. There have of course been a number of books dealing with wider aspects of housing in Ireland, and these have sometimes contained material on early state housing. Rural authority housing crops up briefly in general studies of Irish vernacular dwellings, and information on early urban schemes has been included as background for analyses of modern problems such as housing policy in sectarian Belfast. In addition there has been fragmentary coverage of Irish state housing in associated historical disciplines. Studies of social policy have given an overview of the pattern of housing history in Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State after independence and partition in 1922. Probably the most interesting work has come from socio-economic historians, notably Joseph O'Brien and Mary Daly, and their concern with working class housing as a key part of wider problems in Dublin prior to
Attention to early state housing has also resulted from the attempt by Michael Bannon and associates to inaugurate the subject of planning history in Ireland: the problem with this approach, as will be seen, is that it tends to distort the explanation of housing issues. In the field of architectural history, the two Irish writers who have concentrated on the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, Jeanne Sheehy and Sean Rothery, have both all but ignored the subject of state housing.

Thus this study represents the first synthesised historical account of early state housing in Ireland, and it is certainly the only one to draw on source material in both Ireland and Westminster. The methodology used here is based on the innovative approach to architectural history developed over the last fifteen years by Adrian Forty and Mark Swenarton at the Bartlett School of Architecture. In emulation of the methodological advances made in other historical disciplines, the intention is to explain changes in architectural design as part of the broader social, economic and political transformation in society as a whole. The specific model for the present study is the aforementioned analysis by Swenarton of early state housing in Britain, and therefore the reader will find that discussions of housing policy and design are consciously inter-woven throughout. Furthermore, the aim here is also to represent the widest possible range of views of political and economic interest groups in Ireland. Only in this way can the multifarious influences on Irish state housing be examined within a complex structure of modernisation and Nationalism, and of cultural reliance on British ideas. Unlike mainland Britain, rural housing was as much a subject of state policy as urban housing, and indeed in the 1880s received far more attention than the problem in Irish towns. The result was that housing policy in late-nineteenth century Ireland split into distinct rural and urban initiatives, with the former initially dominant. Chapter 1 therefore looks at pre-war rural housing, and the introduction of the first state subsidies under the Irish Labourers Act. Chapter 2 studies the urban housing question, and the reasons why this issue had become of paramount importance by the First World War, particularly during the Dublin labour crisis of 1913-14. Two short chapters then round off the period before 1914. Chapter 3 traces the influence of Irish state housing precedent on British policy, while the next chapter returns to Dublin to examine the pre-war crusade by enthusiasts of British garden suburb ideals. Chapter 5 then deals with developments in policy and design during the First World War, in light of critical events such as the 1916 Easter Rising and the 1917-18 Irish Convention. The next chapter traces the course of the much disrupted post-war housing campaign in Ireland, while Chapter 7 details the unique programme from 1919 to build cottages directly for ex-servicemen. Then, as a deliberate counterpoint to the preceding analysis, Chapter 8 provides a brief account of housing in Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State after 1922. A final conclusion will draw together the underlying themes raised by the study.
1. RURAL HOUSING AND THE STATE IN IRELAND BEFORE THE FIRST WORLD WAR

Any account of Irish state housing must begin with the rural issue. By 1914 a total of nearly 50,000 cottages had been built for agricultural labourers, mostly with subsidy from the Imperial Exchequer. The programme was the result of nationalist agitation by the Irish Parliamentary Party from the early 1880s, and was linked to the demand for redistribution of landownership to tenant farmers. This chapter will examine the rural housing campaign in light of the complex structural changes in agricultural Ireland. Particular emphasis will be given to the major turning point in 1906, when a substantial increase in rural subsidy was accompanied by the publication of the first official manual of recommended type-plans for state housing.

The nineteenth century saw the confirmation of Ireland as an essentially agricultural nation, with the exception of North-East Ulster. Population growth had been checked (and had probably already begun to reverse), when successive failures of the potato crop during the Great Famine (1845-49) precipitated a dramatic fall from over 8,200,000 people in 1841 to only around 5,200,000 forty years later. Net migration to towns remained slow: in 1881 nearly 75% of Irish people still lived in rural areas.\(^1\) The Famine also appears to have accelerated a major transformation already underway in Irish agriculture.\(^2\) At the start of the nineteenth century, the predominant landownership structure had been that of the Anglo-Irish Protestant Ascendancy letting out parcels of their estates to so-called 'middlemen', who would then sub-let to a farming class of Catholic tenant small-holders (1-15 acres) or marginal cottiers (less than 1 acre). The farming pattern was labour-intensive tillage of high-yield crops, such as the potato, which could feed a large workforce. This system was showing signs of strain by the 1820s, but it was undoubtedly the chronic manpower shortage after the Famine that speeded up a switch towards larger holdings (15-30 acres, or over) and labour-extensive livestock farming. This created a new structure of small to medium tenant farmers leasing directly from Ascendancy landowners. Not only were the 'middlemen' finally eliminated, but there was also a dramatic decline in the number of rural labourers available for hire. The degree of agricultural restructuring varied across Ireland. It was most noticeable in the southern and eastern provinces of Munster and Leinster, and could also be detected in rural Ulster.\(^3\) The only real exception was in the poorest western seaboard counties of Connaught, where there persisted a pattern of subsistence cottier farming coupled with seasonal migration to work in Ulster or Britain.
What did not change was the negligible extent of owner-occupation. In 1870 still only 3% of Irish farmers owned their land, and amongst the Ascendancy landlords, fewer than 800 owned half the country. The post-Famine transformation in rural Ireland therefore provided a new focus for the political challenge to the Anglo-Irish Ascendancy. Large landowners were consistently portrayed in Nationalist lore as being mainly absentee, unwilling to invest in land improvements, and rapacious in their pursuit of extortionate rents. Revisionist scholarship has shown much of this to have been over-stated: the Ascendancy landownership system does not appear to have held back economic development to the extent claimed, and rent increases and evictions of tenant farmers were if anything rather on the low side. Yet the reality was less relevant than the ideological battle. Thus while many nineteenth century Irish landowners like the Duke of Leinster or the Duke of Devonshire did in fact build model cottages for estate workers (and were even encouraged to do so by an annual design prize offered by the Royal Agricultural Society of Ireland), these efforts won few friends. "Irish landlords as a class have done comparatively little for the comfort of their tenants, whether small cottier farmers or labourers," adjudged the *Irish Builder* in 1871.

Rural class tensions in Ireland could not be ignored by the British Government. "The role of Irish agriculture", Bew has written, "was to supply the British market, regardless of broader social and national considerations". Nearly two-thirds of Irish exports to Britain consisted of agricultural produce, principally the livestock and dairy goods that helped to feed the mainland urban population. The initial concern of successive British Governments after the Famine was to instil free-trade principles into Irish agriculture. It was believed that this would increase productivity and wages, and thereby stifle endemic rural unrest. The Imperial Parliament thus passed the Encumbered Estates Acts to encourage the sale or lease of large holdings to more entrepreneurial farmers. And in addition, the Land Improvement Acts (which began in 1847 as an emergency relief measure) offered low-interest loans from the Irish Board of Works to landowners or farmers, for investment in drainage, land reclamation, and the like. One activity not eligible under the early Land Improvement Acts was housing, and it is necessary to explain why.

Before the Famine, rural housing conditions in Ireland had been truly appalling, and easily amongst the worst in Europe. The 1841 Census showed that 470,000 dwellings, around 40% of the rural housing stock, had only one room. These hovels were commonly known as 'cabins', and were poorly constructed with walls usually of wattle and mud, and roofs of turf or thatch. Most had straw floors since livestock were kept indoors, and chimneys and windows were rare. The next category of dwelling identified by the 1841
Census included modest cottages of 2-4 rooms, and these accounted for another 490,000 units (42% of the stock). However, even these apparently better dwellings were prone to overcrowding, and thus the Census also recorded separately the pattern of occupation. Using this indicator, then a total nearer 540,000 dwellings (44% of the stock) in rural Ireland fell into the lowest category of '4th Class' accommodation. The highest proportion of substandard dwellings was to be found in Connaught, but much of Munster was also wretched. In Co. Cork alone in 1841 there were some 16,000 one-room 'cabins', and in the very poorest districts this type of dwelling formed 80% of all dwellings. It was a desperate situation much commented upon at the time. As early as the mid-1830s a Royal Commission examining the conditions of the rural poor recommended that the mud 'cabin' which littered the Irish countryside be replaced by healthy cottages. A similar view was found in an official inquiry into Irish agriculture in 1843-44, and at the same time Frederick Engels observed that in Ireland most rural workers "live in single-roomed cabins built of mud.....which are hardly fit for animals". However, the decimation of the population by the Famine had a striking effect. Reduced housing demand meant that the worst hovels were abandoned, and a period of rising Irish rural prosperity in the 1850s also saw a modest revival in investment in estate improvement and rural housing. By 1861 the number of one-room 'cabins' had plunged to 85,000 (10% of the stock), and the proportion of '4th Class' accommodation was now only 15% of rural dwellings.

Yet although the Famine took away much of the urgency of the rural housing problem, there was a by-product of the British Government's free-trade strategy in the 1850s that needed to be addressed. If larger farm units were to be created, then in some cases this would require new dwellings to be built if none were available. Hence the Land Improvement Acts were extended in 1860 to allow public loans (at 6.5% interest over 22 years) to landowners or lessees, in order to build homes for themselves and their labourers. To accompany the new borrowing powers, in 1869 the Irish Board of Works published a full set of suggested plans, plus details and specifications, for dwellings ranging from humble cottages to substantial farmhouses. This manual was an official version of the books on model rural housing written by English architects from the late eighteenth century, and it is significant that the designs it contained ignored the Irish vernacular (the latter was typically an unadorned single-storey cottage, one-room deep, and built of rendered mass stone walling with a sod grass or thatched timber roof). Instead, the four recommended plans for labourers cottages given by the Irish Board of Works all had a layout closer to the English model [Fig.4]. One half of the dwelling comprised a double-height living room/kitchen, and contained the entrance (in all but one case this had a lobby) and a central chimney. The other half was two-rooms deep, and
had a first floor reached by a ladder-stair in the living room. This allowed the possibility of either 3-4 bedrooms, and in general space standards were much more generous than in the usual Irish cottage. The living room/kitchen ranged between 156-288 sq.ft in area, and bedrooms from 72-120 sq.ft. Construction was likewise atypical, being of unrendered masonry or brickwork with a slate roof. Indeed, the watered-down blend of Gothic Revival and neo-vernacular styles in the elevations showed clearly showed the reliance on conceptions of the English Picturesque. Features such as ornamental bargeboards and front porches were obvious anglicisations, and in using them the Irish Board of Works emulated the trend towards a non-Irish character displayed in the 'improved' estate cottages built by Anglo-Irish landowners at Enniskerry, Co. Wicklow, and elsewhere. In the 1870s some designs by Edward Townshend for estate labourers' dwellings in Co Galway and Co Mayo shared strong similarities with one of the recommended alternatives of the Irish Board of Works. But it is hardly surprising that the attempted anglicisation of rural housing found little support in Nationalist Ireland. In the event, the policy of housing loans under the Land Improvement Acts (like the whole strategy of the British Government to attract entrepreneurial farmers) was an almost complete failure. A later official estimate was that the 1860 Act produced only 600-800 cottages in all of Ireland; activity in Ulster appears to have been particularly sparse. The measure soon lay all but forgotten.

1.1 The Irish Land Acts and the background to the Labourers Act

In 1870 the Liberal Government led by William Gladstone reacted to rural grievances in the wake of Fenianism, by passing the first of a wave of Irish Land Acts. The measure gave greater protection of tenure and rent to tenant farmers, and implied a possible 'dual ownership' whereby property might be shared with landowners. The 1870 Act itself had little effect, but an ensuing period of moderate prosperity in rural Ireland led to a brief respite in agitation. This situation was soon drastically reversed by the 'great depression' that hit Europe in the late 1870s and lasted for a decade. In agriculture, the causes lay in a series of poor harvests in countries such as Ireland, and a collapse in prices due to the influx of cheap wheat and beef from the USA. Conditions were especially severe for farmers in the poorest western regions in Connaught and Munster, and it was these areas that fuelled the famous 'Land War' waged by Michael Davitt and the Land League from 1879-1882. Out of this bitter struggle against the British Government and the Ascendancy elite, came the so-called 'New Departure' of Irish Nationalism in the early 1880's. The most influential strand was now the constitutional approach of the Irish Parliamentary Party (hereafter the Irish Party, or IPP). The party's organisational
machine, the National League, soon dominated Irish politics outside Ulster, and skilfully blended a heterogeneous mix of tenant farmers, shopkeepers, urban professionals, and support from the Catholic clergy. In the Westminster Parliament, the Irish Party under the leadership of Charles Stewart Parnell used obstructionary tactics to advance the key demands of Home Rule plus land reform.

In 1881 the new Gladstone Government, under pressure from the IPP, passed a far more ambitious Land Act. This measure successfully undermined the Land League by granting fair-rent control, fixity of tenure on leases, and freedom of sale; all to be overseen by a new Irish Land Commission. 'Dual ownership' of land had replaced free trade as the guiding principle, and in holding down rents during a period of low agricultural prices, the result was a squeeze on landowners' profits. Soon there would be little other alternative for landowners than to sell off land. Thus the 1881 Act also tentatively conceded the need for state participation in the redistribution of Irish landownership. There was no subsidy, but public loans for up to 75% of the purchase price were made available to tenant farmers (at 5% interest over 35 years), if the owner was willing to sell. A further consequence of eroded landowners' profits was the depletion of new housing for agricultural labourers. As a leading Conservative peer put it, the 1881 Land Act had "destroyed, to a great extent, in Ireland the only person who was in the habit of building cottages - namely, the landlord". But although some minor clauses in the 1881 Act (and in a further measure the next year) allowed public loans for labourers cottages, the terms were too limited and found little than minimal application.

The half-heartedness shown towards labourers housing by the 1881 Land Act was symptomatic of the fact that Irish rural labourers had been little involved in the 'Land War'. Indeed, the post-Famine changes in Irish agriculture were causing a steady 'disappearance' of this class. From 1841 to 1881 the number of agricultural labourers plunged from just under 900,000 (56% of the rural workforce) to around 360,000 (38% of the workforce). Importantly, it would also appear that the greatest decline was amongst labourers who leased some land; being slightly better off, they were more able to become farmers, or emigrate to the USA. Clark has estimated that 'landless' labourers remained a constant 25% of the rural workforce in late-nineteenth century Ireland, rising steadily to account for nearly 70% of all agricultural labourers by 1881. The outcome in areas where poor landless labourers were most concentrated, such as Co. Limerick and Co. Cork, was a heightened class differentiation between farmer and labourer. This forced the Land League to address labourers' grievances, and in particular the Irish Party began to realise that sectional rural conflict posed a threat to its aim of building broad-based support for parliamentary Nationalism around the issue of land redistribution.
the National Convention in September 1881, Parnell called on Irish labourers to stand alongside the tenant farmers, and he is reputed to have become further converted to the labourers' cause during his imprisonment in Kilmainham Jail the following year. In the famous pact he signed with Gladstone, the renunciation of extra-parliamentary agitation was to be repaid by further land reforms in Ireland. On release, Parnell declared at the foundation of the Irish Labour and Industry Union in August 1882 that "the national credit is pledged to securing for the Irish labourers some such amelioration in their own condition as they have so loyally striven to bring about in the condition of the tenant-farmers". The twin demands of labourers at the time were for a decent home, and a small piece of land at a fair rent. The latter was potentially divisive, since tenant-farmers with their eyes on purchase clearly did not want to give any land away. Parnell tried to get round this by promising plots of unwanted semi-waste land to landless labourers, but it was hardly an appealing offer. Better housing was a far less controversial concession.

It was also the case that the post-Famine structural changes in rural Ireland had by the 1880s highlighted the relative housing hardship of landless workers. The 1881 Census showed that there remained only about 40,000 one-room 'cabins' (5% of the rural housing stock). Over-crowded '4th Class' accommodation now formed just 7% of all dwellings; only in Co. Kerry and Co. Limerick in west Munster did the figure exceed 10%. Yet it was precisely this type of cottage in which an estimated 60,000 agricultural labourers and their families were still forced to live. The squalor of the worst dwellings prompted the Irish Builder to call for the application of modern sanitary science to rural housing design. And one American observer wrote in 1882 that:

"In some parts of the South and West one often finds the people living in small mud huts one storey high, often with no floor, window or chimney, and the poorest conceivable sort of furniture. In these wretched huts the man and his wife and children live with the pigs and chickens, the cow and the donkey, if the family are rich enough to own these animals. The manure heap and green pool are sometimes so near the door that one has difficulty in entering. The inside is often much more like a very poor stable than a human habitation." Concern about the special plight of the Irish rural labourer even reached the House of Lords, with one peer noting that this class "had always been very poorly paid, fed, clothed and housed". Yet the extent of bad rural housing in Ireland in the 1880s must not be overstated: equally appalling conditions could have been found in the poorest English counties of the West Country and East Anglia. What was different about rural Ireland was the determination of the Irish Party to win the landless labourers over to constitutional Nationalism through the offer of better housing. The Liberal Government
was also willing to concede this social improvement so as to mediate the conflict between farmers and labourers. Thus, ultimately, action to improve the dwellings of Irish rural workers in the early 1880s was due to political factors rather than a perceived shortage or housing need per se.

1.2 The first phase of the Irish Labourers Acts from 1883-1906

Rural housing from the 1880s was dealt with under a distinct legislative code known as the Irish Labourers Acts. There were in fact two distinct phases of the Labourers Acts prior to the First World War, as was pointed out in a war-time report by a British official. The first phase lasted from 1883-1905; the second, and more comprehensive, from 1906-1914.

In 1883 the Irish Party brought in a private members Bill which, with the support of the Opposition Tories and the Gladstone Government, became the first Irish Labourers Act. Intended by the IPP as proof of the validity of the parliamentary approach, what the measure did was to extract the relevant clauses out of the Land Acts and create a corollary rural housing code. Twelve or more local ratepayers could now apply to the local Board of Guardians (then responsible for rural sanitation) to ask them to carry out a housing scheme for labourers in the vicinity. If a proposal was approved by the Irish Local Government Board (hereafter ILGB), and then sanctioned by Parliament, the Guardians could apply to the Irish Board of Works for a public loan over a maximum period of 60 years. The model used by the Irish Party was that of contemporary British urban housing legislation, i.e. the 1866 Torrens Act and the 1875 Cross Act; indeed their intention was simply to extend these measures, which hitherto applied only to the five largest Irish cities, to rural districts. This led to a curious situation whereby powers devised to facilitate slum clearance in London were applied on behalf of Irish rural labourers. Certainly the incumbent Chief Secretary for Ireland was worried about setting a precedent which might then be demanded for rural Britain, and he consulted the Treasury about the likely cost. Alarm about the implication of the 1883 Labourers Act was greatest in the House of Lords, where one peer complained that if "the State built houses for the working classes, he did not see why they should not undertake to clothe them also". Another warned that, by killing off private enterprise in Irish rural housing, soon "they would be obliged to proceed more upon what were called socialistic principles, and to insist on local authorities building cottages". To allay such fears, tight controls were imposed. The maximum rate that could be levied for housing was set at 1s in the £1; the 1883 Act had a 5-year limit; and only bona-fide agricultural labourers could be housed.
Importantly each cottage was given a half-acre of land to supplement the tenant's income, meaning that the British Government was helping to create a quasi-cottier class.

Given that the first Labourers Act was based on slum legislation, it soon proved to be cumbersome in practice. In 1884 a parliamentary committee, including Parnell and other IPP members, decided that easier legal procedure and more favourable loan terms were needed. In 1885 the new Tory Government (at that point exploring the possibility of an alliance with the Irish Party) demonstrated their support for Irish rural amelioration by pushing through an amending Labourers Act. The 1885 Act made the Irish Privy Council rather than the Imperial Parliament the final appeal body, and allowed Boards of Guardians to repair existing cottages as well. The loan terms from the Treasury were also improved. The popularity of the policy in Ireland was undoubted. Rural labourers helped the Irish Party to sweep to a convincing victory throughout most of Ireland in the 1885 General Election. This prompted the IPP to push for further concessions. The Labourers Act of 1886 extended housing eligibility to anyone who worked even part-time as an agricultural labourer, but might have another trade. Together these stimuli resulted in the first peak in output in the late 1880s, with a total of 2,188 cottages being built in 1888-89 [Diagram B; Table U]. By the early 1890s, after a decade of operation, 94 out of 161 rural Poor Law Unions had either completed or at least begun schemes. A striking feature of the first phase of the Labourers Acts was the consistent regional disparity in activity [Table W]. Around 3 out of every 5 cottages built were in the south-western province of Munster, with its high proportion of low-paid labourers. Virtually all the other two-fifths were in Leinster, where agricultural wages were slightly higher. Within these two southern provinces, it would appear that schemes were most likely in districts where local labourers' associations, at the urging of the Irish Party, were best organised. The converse was that only negligible numbers of cottages were built in Connaught or Ulster. Connaught was the poorest province. Rural authorities were handicapped by extremely low rate incomes, and the prevalence of cottiers meant in any case that there were relatively few eligible agricultural labourers. Wages were higher in Ulster, but here the Unionist rural authorities were notoriously reluctant to burden the rates, and were opposed to legislation so clearly associated with the Nationalist cause. By 1892 only two Ulster RDCs in Ballycastle and Ballymena had acted, and they had built just 26 cottages between them.
1.3 Political influences on the first phase of the Labourers Acts

In the late-1880s the Labourers Acts became, like all other matters, overshadowed by the political polarisation in both Ireland and Britain over the issue of Irish self-government. The key question asked in Ireland about any initiative was whether it would help or hinder British rule. In 1886 the IPP for the first time held the balance of power in the House of Commons. Gladstone, previously intransigent, now underwent a complete conversion and introduced the first Home Rule Bill. This measure envisaged that Ireland remain firmly within the United Kingdom, yet with greater autonomy over domestic policy (though not over key areas such as defence, or customs and excise). In the event Gladstone's Bill and its successor in 1893 were humiliatingly defeated by the combined opposition of Ulster Unionists, Conservatives, and Liberal Unionists (several top Liberals, notably Joseph Chamberlain, crossed the floor of the Commons over the issue). The failure of Home Rule fuelled the resumption of land agitation in the 'Plan of Campaign' of 1886-1891, and aggravated the split within the Irish Party that followed Parnell's fall in 1891. The rift was not healed until the rapid growth of a rival United Irish League amongst western smallholders prompted the IPP's new leader, John Redmond, to reunite most of the Nationalists factions in 1900.

Meanwhile the Conservative Party, now calling themselves Unionists, enjoyed an unbroken spell of rule from 1893 to 1905. In response to the policy of Home Rule, the Conservatives developed a balanced strategy known as 'constructive Unionism'. State intervention in Irish economic and social reform was used to prove that Ireland's future progress lay with Britain. Opponents derided the aim as trying to "kill Home Rule by kindness"; yet more likely the Tory Cabinet wanted to give British rule the best possible image, and thereby to reassure waverers amongst the Tory Party and Liberal Unionists of the need to reject any manifestation of Home Rule. The detailed policy of 'constructive Unionism' was worked out in Dublin Castle during the stints as Chief Secretary by the future Prime Minister, Arthur Balfour (1887-1891), his brother Gerald Balfour (1895-1900), and then George Wyndham (1900-1905). The most conspicuous legacy was the reform of Irish local government in 1898 along the lines of the new British model. Also important were unique new official bodies such as the Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction, and, in 1891, the Congested Districts Board.

The Congested Districts Board was a quasi-autonomous development agency set up to provide relief and stimulate economic growth in western Ireland. The area of operation was restricted to the poorest rural areas with an average rateable value of less than 30s per head, which in actuality meant the unproductive smallholdings of Connaught. The
Board's dominion at first covered 3,500,000 acres and 500,000 people; later, in 1909, it was doubled to incorporate nearly a third of Ireland, including parts of Munster (and was given control over land purchase to consolidate farm holdings). Yet for all the money and effort that went into projects such as drainage schemes, road building, and fisheries, the success of the Congested District Board in stimulating economic growth was far more limited than its supporters claimed. This was clearly the case in terms of the powers given to the Board to build or renovate cottages, wherever land reorganisation required it. Housing remained a minor part of the Congested District Board's activities, and those dwellings that were provided - mostly in the very poorest coastal areas - were generally for small farmers and cottiers rather than labourers. By 1919, after nearly three decades, it had built barely over 3000 new cottages itself, and had given grants to occupants for the rebuilding of a similar number. Such was the inertia that a Royal Commission in 1906 even considered the possibility that the Board be given a share of Labourers Acts funds, in order to be forced to take on the major housing responsibility in its area.

The relative disinterest of the Congested District Board in rural housing was reflected in the oft-remarked utilitarianism of its cottages. In 1903 the Board's Estates Department followed the example of the Irish Board of Works in the late-1860s, and produced a series of recommended plans; these were subsequently amended slightly, and reissued in 1914. Since the cottages were intended for small farmers or cottiers, space standards were higher than for those under the Labourers Acts. Living rooms varied from 169-249 sq.ft, and bedrooms between 79-229 sq.ft. Yet the eight layouts given by the Board were of an extremely basic design. There were two principal types. The cheaper was a single-storey detached bungalow, with two bedrooms and a large living room/kitchen containing a further bed recess. The other type was a double-storey detached cottage with three bedrooms (or two bedrooms plus a parlour). The latter type were generally built in the slightly more prosperous inland districts and, after 1909, in south-west Munster. Hearthw were central, and in most cases a dairy was attached. Elevations were of plain, rendered masonry walls and simple slate roofs to ward off the harsh western climate. A decorated barge board might be provided on flank walls, but the overall severity can be seen in a contemporary photograph of a cottage in Co. Roscommon. The Irish Builder described the Congested Districts Board cottages as "hideously ugly, in many cases badly built, and always a blot on the landscape".

Returning to the mainstream Labourers Acts, the policy of 'constructive Unionism' also indirectly influenced this programme as a consequence of further Irish Land Acts. The Conservative Government in the 1890s now offered state compensation to induce
Ascendancy landowners to sell land to tenants. Following a special cross-party Land Conference in late 1902, the revolutionary 1903 Wyndham Act provided even more generous subsidy terms. Bonuses were paid to landlord on sale, and tenants were wooed by interest repayments that worked out at 20% less than their hitherto rent. The result was the formation of a new peasant proprietorship and the steady extinction of the Anglo-Irish landed class. Whereas in 1870 only 3% of Irish farmers had owned their land, by 1908 this had leapt to almost 50% (by the early 1920s the figure was nearly 70%, and independence saw the process completed). The Tory Party showed far less concern for the issue of Irish rural housing, but it was realised that the process of land transfer had secondary economic consequences. "Owner-occupation cannot be created throughout rural districts without regard to the proper accommodation of necessary labour," noted one champion of 'constructive Unionism'.

The problem for the Salisbury Government in the early 1890s was a noticeable slump in activity under the Labourers Acts; just one of the repercussions of a 20% fall in Irish agricultural output and prices. Their response was an improvement in the financial terms for rural housing. In 1890 the Chief Secretary, Arthur Balfour, proposed as part of an innovative Irish Land Bill that the proceeds of an unused land purchase reserve could be used as a small "experimental" housing subsidy to help rural authorities. Balfour's intention was to drive a wedge into the coalition of agricultural labourers and the Irish Party. He declared provocatively that he wanted "to do something - and something substantial - for the labouring classes, who have been excluded absolutely from the benefits of every other Bill ever proposed". Stung by this direct attack on the Labourers Acts code, an Irish Party spokesman rejected Balfour's subsidy proposal "because we believe that it is not likely to succeed, and we object to the employment of Irish funds for any experiment of the kind". However, it could not sustain this line given the party's over-riding commitment to secure any financial redress for Ireland that could be obtained from the Imperial Parliament. The IPP brought in a private members Labourers Bill which proposed an alternative source of funding (from the residue of the Church Surplus Fund), but this was never likely to prevail. Instead the Irish Party satisfied itself by persuading Chief Secretary Balfour to turn the subsidy contained in the 1891 Land Act into a more permanent feature (previously Balfour had envisaged a discretionary and occasional allowance). Following discussions between the ILGB and the Treasury, an initial grant of £40,000 was divided between all the counties in Ireland, and was then given to local authorities, pro-rata to the number of cottages built, for the repayment of capital on housing loans. In counties where the grant was not fully expended (notably in Ulster), the surplus was put into a special account, totalling just under £15,000, and then re-allocated. It was a purely ad-hoc solution to a specific problem.
problem, but qualifies as the first direct housing subsidy from central government. In addition, it had also been agreed in 1891 that for the following five years the same £40,000 annual surplus from the Land Acts should be invested in a special account. Correspondingly a reserve fund of £200,000 (plus accrued interest) was created by 1896, and after this date the annual proceeds from this fund, amounting to just under £37,000 per year, was ear-marked as an ongoing Labourers Acts subsidy.  

During the 1890s, the Conservative Government also provided better public loan terms for Irish rural housing.Procedure was also amended. A new Labourers Act in 1891 permitted agricultural labourers themselves to be counted amongst the 12 representatives needed to initiate a scheme, and gave the ILGB powers to act in default if a rural authority failed in its duty. The following year there was an increase in the the maximum area of land that could be given, up from a half-acre to one acre. A further Act in 1896 allowed rural authorities to sell off cottages if no longer required for labourers. However, it is doubtful whether the advent of partial state subsidy and increased powers did much to stimulate activity. There was a slight, temporary upturn under the Labourers Acts from the mid-1890s, but even then the completion rate still fell below 1,000 dwellings a year [Diagram A; Table U].

Far more significant in the first phase of the Labourers Acts was the introduction of a universal franchise under the 1898 Irish Local Government Act. A modern administrative hierarchy was created (ie. County Councils, Urban District Councils, and Rural District Councils), and one result was the completion of the transfer of local power in rural Ireland (outside Ulster) to Nationalist tenant farmers and shopkeepers. Another consequence of the 1898 Act, as the ILGB observed, was that by giving labourers the vote it forced rural authorities to pay greater attention to the demand for Labourers Act dwellings. Certainly, there was a significant surge in loans sanctioned in 1901-02, which would have been an appropriate time-lag for newly elected councils to get schemes ready. There followed a rise in cottage building, peaking in 1904-05 with the completion of 1,750 new dwellings [Diagram B; Table U]. By this point, twenty years after the first Labourers Act, a total of slightly over 19,000 cottages had been achieved. Another revealing statistic was that in 1900 over 80% of the total debt incurred by rural authorities was for Labourers Acts loans; this proportion rose to an average of 90% in the provinces of Munster and Leinster. Progress was steady but not yet spectacular.

The inherent limitation on the first phase of the Labourers Act was that, ultimately, the Conservative Party's allegiance lay with Irish landowners rather than rural labourers. It was a dilemma epitomised by George Wyndham, the last Tory Chief Secretary to practice
"constructive Unionism". The report of the 1902 Land Conference called for greater action on connected issues such as labourers' housing on the grounds that, as Wyndham noted, the "transfer of property under the Land Act makes it necessary to deal now with these questions". Wyndham had only secured the Irish Party's support for the 1903 Land Act by promising an equally bold new Labourers Bill. Rural housing reform also fitted in with his moral support for the 'National Efficiency' movement that swept Britain in face of the Boer War defeat and the growing threat from Germany, and which regarded the decline of the rural labourer (hitherto assumed to be the stout backbone of the country) as the most serious problem. "If the Irish Nation is to be healthy, energetic, hopeful and independent", wrote Wyndham, then up to a third of the population would need to be rehoused. Wyndham, however, was faced with the reality that Anglo-Irish landowners objected to a further augmentation of housing powers being given to rural authorities which they detested as not only virulently Nationalist, but also corrupt and profligate. As Wyndham complained to the Prime Minister, Arthur Balfour, in March 1904:

"It is very difficult to run my policy in Ireland - which is your policy and that of the Cabinet and party - if we are to revert to the view that the Irish County Councils are unfit for the duties which devolve upon them.....[Unionist intransigence] will go far to destroy such influence as I have over the Irish Party and to supply an excuse for declaring that I have closed the experiment of conciliation over agrarian problems."

Despite his pleas, all that Wyndham was able to put forward as a new Labourers Bill in 1904 was a slight improvement of legal clauses, and a requirement that the ILGB carry out a survey of rural housing needs. Not surprisingly, the Irish Party regarded this proposal as a betrayal of his earlier promise, and sabotaged the initiative. In 1905, both Wyndham's career and 'constructive Unionism' lay in ruins when a plan to grant a very limited degree of Irish self-administration ended in fiasco: the incoming Tory Chief Secretary, Sir Walter Long, returned to the policy of imposing law and order. It was a political impasse that heralded the end of the first phase of the Labourers Acts.

What had been the economic consequences of partial subsidy for Irish rural housing from the early 1890s? The Land League veteran, Michael Davitt, went so far to declare in 1904 that the Labourers Acts constituted "a rational principle of state socialism". The reality was far less heroic, but nevertheless provided a useful case study for British and Irish observers to examine the results of a deviation from classical laissez-faire economics. Many contemporaries were interested in whether state intervention had killed off private housebuilding in rural Ireland; but the general consensus was that this question could not be proved one way or the other, given that the Irish Land Acts had probably already ended the provision of labourers cottages by landowners. The other important question was whether the granting of a subsidised cottage had, as the theory of Liberal political
economy held, served merely to hold down labourers' wages. Here the Irish statistics, though problematic in detail, were seen by most contemporary writers as disproving the old canard. A scarcity of labour and rising agricultural prosperity after the Famine had seen the average agricultural wage in Ireland rise gradually to a level in the early 1880s of around 8-9s per week. Subsidy under the Labourers Acts did nothing to halt this trend, and in 1906 the estimate of the Castle Administration was that the typical wage for a rural labourer was now 10s11d a week. It was not a uniformly rosy picture: there was considerable regional variation (the highest wages were in Ulster, Munster, and around Dublin; the lowest in Connaught and south-east Leinster), and the Irish level remained stubbornly 33% lower than the average farm workers pay in England. Nevertheless, there seems to have been a genuine improvement in real income and living conditions for rural workers in late nineteenth century Ireland. And undoubtedly cheaper housing under the Labourers Acts played its part. The typical rent for a cottage in 1906 was the same as at the outset of the programme, ie. 11d-12d per week (around 1s1d including rates) for a dwelling with half-an-acre of land, and 1s3d per week (1s5d with rates) for a one-acre plot. The range of rents varied from 4d a week in remote districts, to a maximum of 2s6d in the districts around Dublin, such as Rathdown, which had the highest wage-levels. At the turn of the century, therefore, the Labourers Acts were providing decent new dwellings for only 10-14% of farm labourers' income: in meeting the needs of the class for which they were intended, they were notably more successful than early local authority housing in Britain. The problem for Irish rural authorities, however, was that rents of around 1s per week were insufficient to meet loan charges given an average "all-in" cost, including land, of £100 per cottage. Since there was only a limited degree of subsidy available before 1906, the prospect was another burden on already high local rates. Where land was cheap and plentiful this was less of a problem. But in agricultural districts close to cities such as Dublin, Cork, and Limerick, even with higher rent levels there was a 'housing-rate' under the Labourers Acts of anything up to 8d in the £1. There remained a powerful disincentive to the building of rural dwellings.

1.4 The design of early Labourers Acts cottages

The Castle Administration brushed aside all calls for the issue of standard plans for the 1883 Labourers Act (hence taking a very different line to that of the Irish Board of Works in the late 1860s). An ILGB Circular in November 1883 declared that "the Board desire to interfere as little as possible with the discretion of Sanitary Authorities in regard to the plans and designs of such houses". Instead the ILGB simply stipulated a few basic requirements. There was to be a minimum ceiling height of 8 feet (reduced to 7 feet for
attic bedrooms); a window area in every habitable room of at least one-twelfth of the floor area; an external WC located at least 10 feet away from the dwelling; and no cottage could be less than 15 feet from a main road. Each dwelling was to have a single room for living and cooking, and at least two bedrooms. The ILGB did not rule out the possibility of a third bedroom, but pointedly warned that this would add a further £10-15 onto the anticipated building cost of £65-70 per cottage. Beyond this, all the ILGB could suggest was that plans submitted to them for approval "may be prepared by the architect or builder employed by the Sanitary Authorities".

Given this laissez-faire attitude during the first phase of the Labourers Acts, perhaps not surprisingly the quality of design was seen as leaving much to be desired. The vast majority of cottages plus plots were built along the roadside, either as isolated units or in small linear groups, in order to be close to the farms where the tenant worked. And in contrast to the Irish Board of Works in 1869, the typical detached cottage was a reworking of the indigenous single-storey vernacular preferred by rural labourers. On one side of the dwelling a single large living room/kitchen, containing a central hearth, gave access to two bedrooms (or, occasionally, three bedrooms). Wherever dwellings were built as a semi-detached pair, the same plan would be handed. Internal space provision was in the order of 400-480 sq.ft in total, which, although hardly generous, was a clear improvement on the traditional rural "cabin". A typical early Labourers Act plan could be seen in the rendered stone cottages built by Midleton RDC in Co. Cork [Fig.8]. Sometimes, however, two-storey cottages were built on the Irish Board of Works' model. Examples can be found in Co. Wexford or in Tallaght near Dublin, but even here the upper storey generally consisted of attic bedrooms with windows in the end walls, so that an appearance of a single-storey dwelling could be maintained. The reality was, as the Irish Builder noted, that "two-storey cottages are very unpopular with the labouring classes in rural districts in Ireland. Considerable objection is expressed to stairs". As will be seen later, it was not until after 1906 that the building of two-storey dwellings became a more regular feature.

Aesthetically the early Labourers Acts cottages were also closer to the vernacular tradition with their roughcast-rendered masonry walls and plain roofs (albeit in slate) [Figs.9-10]. Some designs introduced minimal brick details such as window dressings and quoins, to a pleasant effect. But most were undecorated and architecturally modest: as one participant commented, the dwellings were "not intended to ornament a gentleman's property, so that there is no reason why they should build any fancy cottages". There was, however, a counter lobby from the Royal Institute of Architects of Ireland (hereafter RIAI) and the Irish Builder, that called for the mandatory employment of architects in
order to improve cottage design. The RIAI sent a deputation to Dublin Castle in June 1901 to demand a stricter control over those carrying out Labourers Acts schemes, but given its political ineffectiveness, the suggestion went unheeded.\textsuperscript{93} By leaving the design of labourers dwellings entirely in the hands of rural authorities up until 1906, successive British Governments were taking a laissez-faire approach that was less likely to antagonise Nationalist councils. The result were cottages that were simply rationalised versions of vernacular types, regressive rather than innovative.

1.5 The second phase of the Labourers Acts from 1906-1914

The turning point for the Labourers Acts programme came in December 1905, when the Liberal Party won a landslide election and held power for the next decade. The motives in the second phase were very different to those of 'constructive Unionism', and arose from the need to appease the Irish Party in lieu of dealing with the thornier question of self-government. The Liberal Government (first under Henry Campbell-Bannerman, and from 1908, Henry Asquith) decided not to attempt to pass Home Rule, realising that it would simply be vetoed by the House of Lords. Instead the Cabinet concentrated on the populist social reform legislation of 'New Liberalism' advocated by young radicals like David Lloyd George, who preferred to keep Ireland down the political agenda.\textsuperscript{94} Various Irish measures were also granted to keep the IPP more or less loyal until such a time as Home Rule might be introduced. Thus a further Land Act in 1909 provided more funds and made sale compulsory if the tenant wished to purchase, and innovative mainland policies, such as the Old Age Pensions scheme copied from Bismarckian Germany, were extended to Ireland.

Likewise, the Irish Party was forced to turn attention to social legislation in face of its inability to deliver Home Rule.\textsuperscript{95} Winning improvements in Irish social conditions at least enabled it both to defend the legitimacy of constitutional Nationalism (against, say, the abstentionist approach of Sinn Fein), and to deter the development of an independent working-class political party in Ireland. The IPP was determined to make housing reform a key plank of the social concessions it extracted from the Liberal Government, and indeed used the demand for increased rural subsidy as a central issue in the 1905 election campaign. By February 1906, the IPP's deputy leader was confiding to his superior, John Redmond, that in the secret negotiations with the Liberal Government, "we have so far got nothing beyond the hope of a satisfactory Labourers' Bill, and even as regards that there is no definite promise".\textsuperscript{96} The pressure was kept up, and a few months later Redmond could publicly declare that he had told the new Chief Secretary, James Bryce:
"that the first business of the Government would be the introduction of a satisfactory Labourers Bill, and....I have myself, on behalf of the Irish Party, been PRACTICALLY IN DAILY COMMUNICATION WITH MR BRYCE and the other men responsible for the Government of Ireland, pressing upon him and them the full claims of the Irish labourers".97

Privately in April 1906, Bryce warned the Prime Minister that given the absence of Home Rule proposals, the IPP was likely to stir up unrest in Westminster and Ireland over the coming year unless alternative victories were provided. The Chief Secretary added that "they are very eager and pressing about the Labourers' Bill, wanting a Treasury Grant to work it: and I fear this is necessary, if quiet is to be preserved".98 Bryce duly got Cabinet approval, and at once set about pushing through a new Labourers Act.99 The second phase had begun, and yet again the impetus was political. The genuine demand in 1906 for improved rural housing in Ireland was even lower than before. The number of farm labourers had continued to decline due to rural depopulation and emigration, and the 1901 Census showed that there were just over 9,000 one-room 'cabins' (a mere 1% of the rural housing stock). Only 2% of dwellings were classified as '4th Class' accommodation: and in fact, by now nearly two-thirds of rural dwellings were substantial cottages with up to four rooms.100

The 1906 Labourers Act was remarkable for its financial features. It not only extended to rural housing the generous public loan terms of the 1903 Irish Land Act (interest at 3.25 % including sinking fund over 68.5 years), but it also created a dedicated loan fund of £4,250,000. The fund was to be administered by the Irish Land Commissioners and not, as previously, by the Irish Board of Works. But, most importantly, the 1906 Act provided a massive direct subsidy whereby the state met 36% of loan repayments: ie. out of a repayment cost of £3:5s in £100, the Treasury paid £1:4s and the rural authority £2: ls.101 A maximum expenditure of £170 per cottage was also stipulated, based on an estimated £130 for building and £40 for land, and hence it was expected that the loan fund would produce that 25,000-30,000 dwellings. There were also procedural improvements, with for instance the ILGB now able to issue provisional orders without Privy Council approval.

The 1906 Act was an exceptional innovation, which the Cabinet presented as an inevitable extension of the generous Wyndham Land Act. Chief Secretary Bryce pointed out that "there were circumstances in this case which justified very exceptional measures".102 Even the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Henry Asquith, known to be a staunch opponent of housing subsidy, was forced to admit that the terms "were both financially sound and morally equitable, and he did not in the least degree recede from them".103 The Irish Party proclaimed the new Labourers Act as a "radical and sweeping measure", and it is
notable that it enjoyed full cross-party support from the Ulster Unionists and from Irish landowners. Against the argument that it might be "too socialistic", one Irish MP pointed out that private enterprise had failed in Irish rural housing and that because of the Land Acts there would soon be no landlords to build cottages either. There were some minor parliamentary disagreements. The IPP failed to get the definition of "rural labourer" extended to include artisans and fishermen. Ulster Unionists tried unsuccessfully to get the subsidy allocated to counties on a fixed basis, so that less active Ulster authorities would not lose out. The House of Lords sought to emasculate the clauses giving increased powers of compulsory acquisition. But against the broad sweep, these disputes were insignificant.

When applied in Ireland, the financial benefits of the 1906 Labourers Act were immediately apparent. Rural authorities found that, although the average 'all-in' cost of £185 per cottage exceeded the stipulated limit, they could now build larger 3-bedroom cottages and still let them at an average rent of just 1s1d per week. From 1906 the majority of rents lay in a band from 1s-1s6d per week, and the range was from only 4d in the most rural areas to 2s9d per week near to Dublin. At a time when rural wages continued to rise, reaching an average of 11-12s a week in 1915, this meant that even higher standard housing was being supplied for only 9-10% of labourers' income. Furthermore, rural authorities could now build at no loss at all to the rates. Roscrea RDC, which from 1908 built 99 cottages for £160-170 each and let them at 1s4d-1s9d per week, even boasted of making a small profit. The terms were simply too good to refuse. As the Irish Party proudly pointed out, there was never any need after 1906 to put compulsion on rural authorities to build dwellings. By the outbreak of the First World War virtually every single one of the 213 RDCs in Ireland had acted, and perhaps most significantly, even the previously parsimonious authorities in rural Ulster could not restrain themselves. Hence from having a negligible proportion of Labourers Acts cottages prior to 1906, by 1914 nearly 20% of dwellings were to be found in Ulster. Indeed, in January 1913 the Irish Builder observed that the "bulk of activity is now in the north, where formerly the vast benefits of these Acts were almost wholly ignored". There was also a new-found zeal amongst Ulster Unionists to press the Chief Secretary for further funds and to convince Northern authorities to undertake schemes. Altogether in Ireland there was a dramatic escalation following the 1906 Act. By March 1914 a total of 43,702 cottages had been built under the Labourers Acts, of which just over 23,000 were from the last eight years. In the peak year of 1910-11, an unprecedented 6,223 dwellings were completed. Such was the demand that by this point the original loan fund of £4.250.000 was virtually exhausted: the IPP soon obtained a new Labourers Act in 1911 with a further £1.000,000
to build 6,000 cottages. This produced another noticeable surge in building activity just before the First World War [Diagram A; Table U]. Between 1906-14 the one-room "cabin" and indeed the housing demand from rural labourers were all but eradicated in Ireland. However, the Labourers Acts programme had by now taken on a wider significance. From 1906 it was clear that rural authorities were building increasingly for those with marginal connection with agriculture, and thus were providing suburban working-class housing close to towns. For instance, in 1913 the Limerick Echo reported a discussion of Limerick No.1 RDC in which it was stated that if they evicted one tenant because he worked in the city and not on a farm, then "a good deal" of their other tenants would have to go as well. The scope of the second phase of the Labourers Acts created a situation in Ireland of virtually unanimous support for state-subsidised housing. It was an attitude much remarked on by contemporary observers. Only a few lonely voices, such as Nicholas Synnott, dared to criticise the Labourers Acts on the grounds that they had pauperised rural labourers and ended private housebuilding. The vast majority disagreed. The Irish Builder claimed that on "the principle of State aid in the shape of Exchequer contributions and loans perfectly secured on the rates, there is no room for difference of opinion"; it later added that the result was "a bloodless social revolution in the condition of the Irish rural labourer.....The operation of these Acts has literally changed the face of rural Ireland". Even members of the Catholic Church, a body generally opposed to state intervention, supported the Labourers Acts code. Occasionally there was friction between farmers and labourers, in cases where the former objected to having land compulsorily purchased, or where the latter felt that schemes were being deliberately obstructed. But by the turn of the century, both classes were united behind the Labourers Acts due to the efforts of the Irish Party and its new national organisation, the United Irish League. Nationalist justifications for the Labourers Acts were often fallacious, the chief myth being that the code had been instrumental in stopping rural depopulation and emigration. "For every house you build you are keeping a family in the country and rooting them to the soil," opined an Independent Nationalist MP, .....You are not only building cottages, but you are building up the national character of the people". One architect stated a commonplace when he said that the code had "done more than anything to combat the awful drain of emigration": an emotive message that went down well with Nationalist organisations in the USA. In reality, the Labourers Acts seem to have done little to prevent a decline in the rural population to two-thirds of the Irish total at the outbreak of the First World War. Emigration was then still running at an average of almost 40,000 a year, and while this was less than in the 1880s, the drop was due mainly to economic recession and stricter immigration controls in the USA.
anything, rural labourers appear to have made up a higher proportion of Irish emigrants from the turn of the century, since, paradoxically, rising incomes meant that many could for the first time afford the cost of passage.\textsuperscript{119}

Support in Ireland for the Labourers Acts was grounded more on political allegiance. The Irish Party never missed a chance to cite rural housing reform in the litany of its achievements. "The Irish Labourers in these cottages are now the best housed in the world," boasted the United Irish League.\textsuperscript{120} The IPP leader, John Redmond, told the Imperial Parliament that "there was "no work to which this House has ever set its hand which I think has been more beneficial to the people of Ireland than the erection of these cottages"; similar sentiments were frequently expressed by his colleagues.\textsuperscript{121} The IPP used the Labourers Acts for three specific political purposes. Firstly the code was a rallying point to fight what Nationalists saw as the continuing economic exploitation and over-taxation of Ireland. One leading MP said that the Labourers Acts were one of the few things "that console one for the many unpleasant and mortifying incidents in the social and political history of Ireland", and another added that the payment of rural housing subsidy "would only be paying back a very small instalment of the millions and millions that they [British Government] have robbed from our country".\textsuperscript{122} Secondly, the Irish Party was always mindful of appearing to be only acting in farmers' interests. Thus the housing programme also served as proof that rural labourers - linked to the IPP by the Irish Land and Labour Association, and its President, William Field - were an essential part of the movement. "Believe me THE SAFETY OF THE LABOURERS' CAUSE depends to-day, as it always did, on the power and unity of the Irish Party", declared John Redmond. Another MP reassured them that there "was no better Labour Party in the House of Commons than the Irish Party.....there was no member of the Party who had not the interests of the labourer as much at heart as those of the farmer or any other class".\textsuperscript{123} Thirdly, the IPP continually used the Labourers Acts to highlight the relative impotence of other parties, whether they be Independent Nationalists, Sinn Fein, or Ulster Unionists.\textsuperscript{124} In the manipulation of rural housing for political ends, the Irish Party received the steadfast support of their allies in the Liberal Government. In 1910 the Chief Secretary, Augustine Birrell, told the House of Commons that "no money.....was ever better spent, out of Imperial resources or Irish money, than for this rebuilding of the cottages of the labourers in Ireland".\textsuperscript{125} Of course, the other political parties in Ireland were forced to respond. Unionists taunted the IPP that Home Rule would deprive Ireland of the very source of funds that made the Labourers Acts possible.\textsuperscript{126} The most complex position was that of the Independent Nationalists. Their leader, William O'Brien, promoted a conciliatory Nationalism which could compromise with Ascendancy landowners and Ulster Unionists, and he saw labourers housing as an issue on which
differing parties could unite. O'Brien had been in the Irish Party at the time of the 1902 Land Conference, and he repeatedly claimed that it was his idea to extend land purchase finances to rural dwellings. He even said that he had come to a secret agreement on the issue with the Castle Administration prior to the 1906 Labourers Act. Such claims were unlikely, but nevertheless Independent Nationalists tended to praise the rural housing programme as if it belonged to them and not the IPP. O'Brien wrote that the Labourers Acts were "scarcely less wonder-working than the abolition of landlordism itself". He told Parliament that (after land redistribution) the code was "the most vital requirement to the peace of Ireland", and "the only matter in which Ireland ever got the best of a bargain with the Imperial Exchequer".

1.6 Housing design in the second phase of the Labourers Acts

The second phase of the Labourers Acts programme from 1906 saw the provision of massive state subsidy accompanied by a significant change in official attitude towards the quality of cottages. Housing standards were raised, most tangibly by the recommended inclusion of a third bedroom and a separate scullery. It was also made clear that rural authorities would now have to build in accordance with types issued by the ILGB, unless they obtained special approval for their own designs. This is significant, for it represented the imposition of the first centralised controls on the architectural form of working-class housing (by contrast, the plans issued by the Irish Board of Works in 1869 had been illustrative, while those by the Congested District Board in 1903 were intended only for a minor aspect of that agency's work). The greater degree of design control was welcomed by Irish MPs from all parties, with one Unionist hoping that "the cottages to be built under the Bill would be better and more substantial than many of those which he had examined". The Castle Administration had three aims in introducing standardised plans: firstly, to speed up the approval process; secondly, to ensure that no substandard schemes got through; and thirdly, to reduce design costs. Thus in 1906 Chief Secretary Bryce stated that the ILGB would "issue model plans of cottages, under which architects' charges might be greatly reduced". The typical architectural fee at the time was 5% of the contract sum, yet under the 1906 Labourers Act the ILGB imposed a 2% maximum on the grounds that the use of standard plans meant only contract supervision was required. Rural authorities were even encouraged to seek competitive fee bids to reduce the figure even more. Indeed some Irish Party MPs, including John Redmond, argued that it was unnecessary to use a qualified architect at all. The Nationalist Freemans Journal declared that "the building of a plain four or five-roomed slate cottage is surely simple enough to
allow the businessmen of Ireland who constitute the District Councils to arrange it for themselves".  

The undermining of fee income and potential workload for its members caused the RIAI to bitterly complain "that the distribution of complete working drawings broadcast throughout the country will inflict a serious injury on the qualified Country Architect who would otherwise, probably, be employed to design and superintend schemes undertaken in his district". As a result of pressure from the RIAI and Irish MPs who argued that the use of architects would be cost-effective, the ILGB finally agreed to stipulate that rural authorities had to appoint either a qualified architect, engineer, or surveyor with sufficient experience in cottage-building. Curiously, the Irish Builder welcomed this as the first official recognition of the need for compulsory registration of architects, on the grounds that "for the first time in the history of dealings between their profession and the State, regard is had to the professional attainments and qualifications of the persons entrusted with.....the design of structures built with public funds". In fact the ILGB's clause posed a bigger dilemma for the RIAI in its campaign for professional protection, since rural authorities could clearly continue to use non-architects to carry out the work and the latter would now be able to claim the reflected status of being the 'architect' for the project. Hence the RIAI tried fervently once more to persuade the new Chief Secretary, Augustine Birrell, to restrict employment to registered architects only. However, they were crushingy rebuffed by Birrell in May 1907 when he declared that designing labourers' cottages "does not require specialist knowledge.....excellent work in connection with such schemes has been done at a moderate cost by men who did not claim in any way to be professional Architects". After this, the RIAI could only look on in impotence. From 1907-12 there was a prolonged period of depression in the Irish building industry, during which time the Irish Builder repeatedly noted that the greatest area of activity was rural labourers cottages, and yet Irish architects were being denied their fair share of this work. Numerous disputes arose in Labourers Acts schemes because of negligent site supervision. An official report noted that "the root cause of the bad quality of the work done is to be found in bad supervision.....appointments have frequently been made of men who were wretchedly qualified, unreliable, and often morally unsound and not above accepting a five pound note from the contractor".

But having decided to adopt standardised plans, the ILGB had to face the problem that there were simply no adequate models available (the CDB types were widely seen as deficient, and the Local Government Board for England and Wales did not issue recommended plans until 1913). So in November 1906 the ILGB organised the first official competition for the design of labourers' dwellings. The spur appears to have been
dissatisfaction with the failure of the 1905 Cheap Cottages competition, held in Letchworth Garden City, to come up with a solution that realistically cost less than £150.139 The competition brief set by the ILGB was to design an Irish cottage which could be built for £130 or less, and which needed the minimum of skilled labour.140 Some 386 architects entered from all over the United Kingdom. The results were announced in January 1907, the winner being a Lancashire architect, Sydney Moss. Runner-up was a Scot resident in Dublin, J. Roseman Burns, and in third place was the distinguished Irish architect, Thomas Manly Deane: the latter subsequently added a variant of his design, making four winning type-teams in all. All four successful designs were for detached single-storey cottages containing three bedrooms, and, as Gailey has suggested, were essentially attempts to recast vernacular idioms to suit modern planning needs.141 The question, then, was how well had the architects understood Irish building traditions. There was widespread criticism of the competition from Irish architects, partly on the grounds that the £130 limit was too low, but also because the winning entries were seen as too picturesque and impractical for the Irish climate and building industry. The most outspoken opponent was the Belfast antiquarian and Nationalist, Joseph Biggar, who accused the designs of being too anglicised. Biggar, and another critic, Robert Brown, both asked a Belfast architect, W.J. Fennell, to design alternatives in a romanticised 'Irish' vernacular [Fig. 11].142 This represented a rare piece of Nationalist objection to the Labourers Acts, and certainly Biggar's vision was fired by mythical notions of the 'native' Celtic home common in the Gaelic Revival movement (and later memorably satirised in Flann O'Brien's *The Poor Mouth*).

The ILGB simply ignored these criticisms. Indeed, when it issued the set of recommended plans in June 1907, included were not just the four competition winners, but also a further four types designed by its own architects and which bore even less resemblance to vernacular precedent [Figs. 12-15].143 Three of the ILGB suggestions were for two-storey cottages on the English model; two were for semi-detached arrangements (Types F and H), and one was even suitable for a terraced layout (Type G). Clearly these designs were intended for more suburban sites. To provide a range of sizes, two of the ILGB types had only 2-bedrooms (Types G and H). The sizes of rooms varied across the different plans, but nevertheless the ILGB issued recommended space standards for an average 5-person cottage: a single living room/kitchen of between 1200-1400 cu.ft (ie. 150-175 sq.ft in area); a main bedroom of at least 900 cu.ft. (ie. 110 sq.ft); and smaller bedrooms of between 600-800 cu.ft (ie. 75-100 sq.ft). No parlour was envisaged. Ceiling heights were to be a minimum of 8 ft, except on the first floor where an average of 7 ft was allowed. An open shed was to be provided at the rear of the house. Elevations were generally plain, though in some of the designs monotony was relieved by
using hipped roofs, dormer windows, brick window-dressings, quoin etc. Servicing was extremely basic. All rooms had hearths located on internal walls. Mains water supply was not insisted upon, and an outside dry-earth closet at least 10 ft. away from the house was preferred to a WC. Construction was also regulated by the issue of standard details and specifications. Roofs were to be slated, and wall construction was to depend on what was the cheapest local material: permitted variants were for 18-inch solid masonry; 14-inch solid brickwork; 9-inch rendered brickwork; 11-inch cavity brickwork; 10-inch in-situ poured concrete walls; and 10-inch concrete blockwork. Thus while construction was to be mostly traditional, the last two options allowed experimentation if brick or stone were scarce. There was support for this within the ILGB, notably from one inspector who recommended the pre-cast concrete system pioneered by the Liverpool City Engineer, J.A. Brodie, on the basis that "all the advantages of modern factory methods and repetition work are available for cheapening the finished article". The ILGB also encouraged an English and an Irish contractor to build the two top competition entries at the 1907 Irish International Exhibition in Dublin, to demonstrate the possibilities of concrete block construction.

It would appear that from 1906 the majority of Irish rural authorities simply followed one or more of the ILGB's eight recommended plans. This can be seen for example in schemes by Mallow RDC, or Larne RDC in Ulster. Also significant was that, as mentioned earlier, the search for new demand meant that the Labourers Acts now incorporated the role of a suburban housing programme. One leading British reformer noted that while "at first the cottages were built near to farms on which the men were employed, the cottages in recent years have been built in village groups". Land, however, was more expensive on the outskirts of urban centres: prices in Co. Dublin could be anything up to £100 per acre, compared to only £25-60 an acre in more rural districts. The consequence of dearer site costs was that housing density needed to be increased. In turn this meant the provision of smaller plots of accompanying land under the 1906 Act (as low as a quarter-acre in some case), and the far greater use, as a visiting deputation observed in 1912, of "two-storey semi-detached cottages of the English type, with bedrooms upstairs". The result in towns such as Roscrea was the replacement of existing single-storey thatched cottages by new terraces of double-storey, slated houses more reminiscent of an industrial town in Northern England [Fig.16]. Yet, irrespective of whether single or double-storey types were used for schemes under the 1906 Act, the over-riding aim of the ILGB was to keep building costs to an absolute minimum. Therefore it was common for observers to praise the general rise in housing standards from 1906, but to continue to disparage the aesthetic appearance of Labourers Act dwellings. The Irish Buildercommented that in general the cottages 'cannot be said to
boast any great architectural qualities". In 1909 an Irish Party MP called on Chief Secretary Birrell and the ILGB to "introduce a little variety into these cottages by placing more artistic, but not more expensive, designs before the local authorities". Birrell at first prevaricated, but was later forced to concede that:

"They are not all of them architecturally beautiful. Some of them, I am sorry to admit, are hideous, but the greater part of them may be described as in themselves an addition to the landscape."

The IPP leader, John Redmond, concurred that most of the cottage designs were plain, but added that once covered with creepers and climbing roses then they made a beautiful scenic contribution. It was a romantic view echoed by the Independent Nationalist, William O'Brien, when he wrote fulsomely of "the labourers' cottages which dot the landscape - prettier than the farmers' own homes - honeysuckles or jasmines generally training around the portico.....a bunch of roses in the cheeks of the children clustering about the doorsteps".

Yet it was not the case that all Labourers Act cottages after 1906 were architecturally undistinguished, or simply followed ILGB types. From the turn of the century, a number of eminent Irish architects derived a substantial part of their workload from rural cottage design. The entries for the 1906 ILGB competition by Thomas Manly Deane were mentioned earlier. There were also a number of exceptional figures who worked for rural authorities in the areas around Dublin, where the highest rents could be charged. Many had been wrestling with the problem of improving design quality even before the 1906 Labourers Act: after it, the generous subsidy and the switch towards larger, suburban schemes enabled them to be more ambitious. One such architect was R.M. Butler, who (as noted in the Introduction) was both the influential editor of the Irish Builder and a leading advocate of a sober Neo-Classical style. Butler's own work included cottage schemes for Rathdown No.1 RDC, and in 1906 he gave a lucid analysis of the problem in hand. To be economical, Butler said, what were required were two-storey, semi-detached cottages, with 3 bedrooms and designed without ostentation: "plans should be as simple and as nearly square as possible - all excrescences in the walls are costly and to be avoided, as are gabled structures in the roof." He added:

"The external appearance should be extremely plain, and one must trust to a good outline for effect.....Projecting porches, unnecessary gables, and ornament add to the cost.....All the space within the walls should be devoted to kitchen and bedrooms. What the labouring man wants is living accommodation, pure and simple."
This equation of architectural simplicity with good housing design (ie. the rejection of unnecessary ornament, and the use of harmonious proportions), was thus being advocated in Ireland at exactly the same time as the more famous exponents in England such as Raymond Unwin, Alexander Harvey, and Charles Ashbee.156

Another important Irish architect within this category was Anthony Scott, who sat at the head of a dynasty responsible for numerous labourers' cottages in the Dublin region. Anthony Scott worked for, among others, Navan RDC, Balrothery RDC, and South Dublin RDC. In his obituary the Irish Builder adjudged that "he probably designed and superintended the building of far more houses for the working classes than any other architect in Ireland".157 In 1901 Scott handed over his position in South Dublin to Thomas Joseph Byrne, his ex-pupil and very soon to be his son-in-law. Byrne had worked from 1899-1901 with the prestigious LCC Architects Department; first in the section responsible for new fire-stations, and then on the design of workingmen's hostels. He was extremely influenced by the innovative municipal housing being built in London, and for a while lived in a flat on the LCC's Millbank Estate.158 On his return to Ireland, he served for 18 years as the full-time clerk and architect to South Dublin RDC, during which time he designed hundreds of Labourers Acts cottages in districts such as Rathfarnham, Tallaght and Chapelizod. Byrne's experience in England was important in two respects. Firstly, he gained knowledge of the latest town planning principles and subsequently began to extol these ideas in Ireland. For instance, Byrne criticised the policy of providing scattered labourers cottages, and instead urged the creation of 'garden villages' or 'garden hamlets' on the outskirts of towns and villages. Secondly, Byrne became an adherent of the Arts and Crafts approach associated with the LCC Architects Department, and was thus the first to apply this British model to the design of mass housing in Ireland. Here it is significant that for the design of the two major housing programmes carried out in South Dublin under the 1906 Labourers Act, Byrne brought in his talented and highly respected brother-in-law, William Scott, as assistant. Scott too had worked on fire-station and housing design for the LCC between 1899-1902, and (as noted in the Introduction) in his subsequent domestic projects in Ireland had shown clearly the Neo-Vernacular influence of Charles Voysey and William Lethaby.

The first programme designed by Byrne, with help from Scott, was for a total of 223 cottages distributed over a large number of sites. Built between 1908-12 at an average "all-in" cost of £236 per dwelling (including a building cost of £145), these schemes reflected a conscious attempt to increase standards in light of the 1906 Act. Whereas previous housing by South Dublin RDC had generally consisted of 2-bedroom cottages, now virtually every dwelling included a third bedroom. Byrne employed a repertoire of
single-storey, wide-fronted types on rural sites, arranged as individual detached dwellings, symmetrical pairs, or in short terraces. Double-storey cottages with narrower frontages were used on more suburban schemes, and in some instances the front room on the ground floor became the parlour. Elevations were definitely intended to be better than the typical Labourers Act house. Many of the single-storey cottages, especially in the Tallaght area, contained simplified classical or vernacular details such as string courses, brick quoins, projecting gables, and front porches with semi-circular fanlights [Fig.17]. In one scheme for 20 cottages in the village of Templeogue, a striking semi-circular layout was introduced. The influence of the English Arts and Crafts was even more pronounced in a second housing programme of 220 dwellings, built by South Dublin RDC from 1912-16. Now Byrne and Scott were required to design some suburban terraced schemes to even higher densities, and this forced them to pay more attention to the issues of site aspect and the maximisation of sunlight within each dwelling (in keeping with advanced housing theory in Britain). "The essential factor determining the sanitary value of a building is...its orientation", declared Byrne. The pinnacles of pre-war housing in South Dublin RDC were represented by two quite different schemes. The first was a design that Byrne singled out for special mention, and which consisted of two terraces of 8 dwellings at Woodview Cottages, off Church Lane in Rathfarnham. Here there was a careful blend of 4-roomed parlour cottages (619 sq.ft in total area), with large bedrooms of between 104-162 sq.ft; and smaller 3-room cottages (520 sq.ft) with a substantial living room/kitchen of 175 sq.ft [Figs.18-19]. Elevationally the scheme demonstrated a sophisticated manipulation of materials. The houses had a rusticated stonework base made from hammer-dressed granite and an upper storey built of local Dolphins Barn brick. There were also projecting stone lintels over the front doors, and half-timber infilling to the gable ends. The overall feel is very much that of a small version of the pre-war LCC suburban estates such as White Hart Lane in Tottenham, or Norbury in Croydon. The second notable scheme by South Dublin RDC was a model village for agricultural labourers at Shankhill, near Bray. Here just over 30 single-storey cottages were built to a much lower density, mostly in semi-detached pairs. What was innovative was the symmetrical arrangement of the dwellings around a central green; the latter being a formal device based on an idealised image of the English village and recommended in Raymond Unwin's Town Planning in Practice (1909) [Fig.20]. Byrne's work was repeatedly eulogised in the Press and in official reports. The Irish Builder observed that his simple but artistic designs "are models of all that Irish labourers' cottages should be", and added that Byrne "has transformed the entire face of entire districts of County Dublin, with his most admirable cottages". The quality of design in South Dublin RDC outshone all other pre-war Labourers Acts cottages, although it should be noted that there were also two attempts to create superior 'garden villages' at
Tower, near Blarney in Co. Cork, and at Gorey in Co. Wexford. In general, therefore, the standard of cottages in the second phase from 1906 was raised by a combination of recommended plans and closer monitoring by the ILGB. In the best suburban schemes by Thomas Byrne and William Scott there was a careful attention to efficient site layout, orientation, rationalised design, and picturesque elevations in the Arts and Crafts manner. The results resembled the low-density and 'close-to-nature' model reached in England by an entirely different route: ie. the anti-urban social idealism of Ebeneezer Howard and Raymond Unwin.

1.7 The decline of the Labourers Acts programme

The Labourers Acts stemmed from Irish agitation but ultimately depended on support from the British Government. Hence it was political events in Westminster that signalled the end of the programme. The catalyst was the constitutional crisis of 1910-11, provoked when the House of Lords rejected Lloyd George's so-called 'People's Budget'. The re-elected Liberal Party, with the IPP and Labour Party now holding the balance of power, immediately passed legislation to reduce the Lords' veto to a delaying power only. The course was now open for the introduction of the third Home Rule Bill in 1912, a reworking of Gladstone's first two measures and thus devolutionary rather than separatist. There appears to have been little consideration of the form of the future Irish administration. The Irish Party simply assumed that eight new Irish Departments would replicate the existing structure of Dublin Castle, with a Ministry of Home Affairs taking over from the ILGB (thereby demonstrating the continued inability of Nationalists to break away from British models). However, the major problem with the new Home Rule Bill was that it made no allowance for Ulster Unionism, despite the private warnings of some Cabinet ministers. Egged on by the Conservative Party, ferocious Unionist opposition led by Sir Edward Carson plunged the Government into an escalating 'Ulster Crisis' that was only resolved by the outbreak of war with Germany in August 1914. The Conservatives now agreed to a compromise whereby the Home Rule Bill was passed on condition that it be suspended for the duration of the war, and that it would never be implemented until Parliament had agreed an exclusion clause for Ulster. The failure of the Asquith Cabinet to deal effectively with the Ulster problem undoubtedly undermined its authority, and also paralysed the social policies of 'New Liberalism'. Jalland has observed that, after the premature high-point of the 1911 National Insurance Act, "the Liberal Government was unable to give the necessary attention to the demands of the radical elements within the party for increased state intervention in the interests of the working classes". Many of the party's supporters were alarmed at the time. The
Yorkshire Liberal Association warned the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lloyd George, that unless the 'Irish Question' was settled quickly, then "we are wasting our time on land and housing". Lloyd George was only too aware of the problem, stating that the preoccupation with Home Rule "has stayed in the way of settling great urgent problems which affect the lives and conditions of millions of people". The consequences seemed to be borne out by a string of disastrous by-election defeats for the Liberal Party in mid-1912, during which Conservatives ridiculed the Government's impotence over both Ireland and social legislation. Lloyd George responded by launching his diversionary 'Land Campaign', an ill-fated attempt to draw attention away from Ireland and to win support (particularly in rural areas) in case of a general election.

The paralysis on social issues caused by the Home Rule controversy also affected the Irish Party from 1911. By March 1913 the loan funds under the Labourers Acts were again running out, but now the IPP was hamstrung by its need to maintain solidarity with the Liberal Government whilst the Home Rule Bill was steered through. This allowed William O'Brien and the Independent Nationalists to seize the initiative away from an embarrassed Irish Party. Chief Secretary Birrell relieved the pressure on the IPP when he finally obtained Treasury agreement for a further £1,000,000 loan, but due to the urgency of other events, the 1914 Labourers Act was not passed until war had broken out. By this point, some £4,415,000 of rural housing loans had actually been advanced. Since the total fund under the Labourers Acts now stood at £6,250,000, there appeared to be plenty of scope for action. However, as will be seen in Chapter Five, the imposition of war-time retrenchment by Treasury representatives prevented any revival. As early as 1912 the Treasury Remembrancer in Dublin Castle, Maurice Headlam, had been trying to wind down the rural housing programme and prune back the ILGB staff involved. By the outbreak of war, the Treasury could justifiably declare that the Labourers Acts had done their job, and that sub-standard rural dwellings had been erased. The question of rural housing reform in Ireland had now become a residual issue.

Thus the Irish Labourers Acts prior to 1914 had initiated the connected policies of direct state subsidy and official type-plans for local authority dwellings. The subsidy was sufficient to create a rare example of an initiative that actually housed the class for which it was intended. Indeed the success in rehousing agricultural labourers was shown by the increasing tendency from 1906 to also include low-paid workers who lived in suburban districts. The scale of the Labourers Acts programme produced a complete 'municipalisation' of new working-class dwellings in rural Ireland: an achievement that can still be seen today in the plethora of detached, usually single-storey, pre-war cottages dotted around Munster and Leinster. There would appear to be a paradox in that the
most advanced - or certainly the most 'socialised' - housing model came about in what was the least economically developed part of the United Kingdom. This, however, can be explained by seeing the Labourers Acts as a response to the economic and political problems engendered by an uneven process of modernisation. The initiative was therefore a product of the major socio-economic transformation in rural Ireland that, through legislation for land redistribution, was forming a peasant proprietorship. The specific impetus for the state to become the principal provider of rural cottages came from the desire of the Irish Party to absorb farm labourers into the parliamentary Nationalist movement. The political basis of the Labourers Acts was shown by the fact that this class was in severe decline, and that therefore nearly 50,000 new houses were supplied in a condition of diminishing demand. By 1914, a profusion of cheap dwellings had been provided and still the wages of agricultural labourers had continued to rise. Interest was stirred amongst British housing reformers, particularly in the best designed cottages such as in South Co. Dublin. Yet the example of the Irish Labourers Acts only hardened the resistance of the pre-war Liberal Government and Imperial Treasury to the extension of central state subsidy to other sectors of the housing market. The strength of this resistance in Westminster, and the political battle it provoked in Ireland, forms the context for the next chapter on Irish urban housing.
The last chapter showed that from the 1880s successive British Governments were compelled to intervene in Irish rural housing, as a result of the Irish Party's determination to use land reform as the engine for Home Rule. State intervention was deemed necessary because Ireland was an important agricultural supplier to the British market. But given the relative insignificance of Irish industry, what was the attitude of Westminster and Dublin Castle to the housing problem in Irish towns and cities? This chapter will show that, despite a relative absence of state support for Irish urban housing compared to the Labourers Acts programme, similar political pressure from constitutional Nationalists produced a turn-around in policy through the 1908 Irish Housing Act. From this point until the outbreak of the First World War, it was the urban housing question that became the most volatile social issue in Ireland.

There had been signs of early industrialisation in Ireland in the period prior to 1815, but after this date the spectacular growth of industrial capitalism in Britain had left most of the country relatively untouched. The causes of Irish industrial retardation are the subject of debate, but contributory factors included an absence of natural energy resources, a lack of risk investment in domestic industries, and an unfavourable geographical location on the periphery of European markets. The domination by British capitalism also consumed a large proportion of potential Irish labour, particularly in the spheres of heavy industry and transport infrastructure. Large Irish immigrant communities formed in many of the great western ports and industrial centres of Britain; notably Liverpool, Manchester, Glasgow, and also in the metropolis of London. In 1861 nearly 9% of the British workforce were Irish-born. The vast majority of this group worked as unskilled labourers, constituting a genuine lumpen-proletariat that was notoriously the lowest paid and worst housed sector of the working classes. As a result the Irish gained a stereotyped, not to say prejudiced, reputation for violence and drunkenness. By the late-nineteenth century, Ireland and mainland Britain were virtual mirror-images in terms of their demographic structure. In 1881 only 25% of the Irish population lived in towns, compared to about 70% in Britain; even after the First World War, the figures were around 30% and 80% respectively. Ireland before 1914 had in the region of 1,300,000 urban inhabitants. There were only two cities of any real size: Belfast, which by 1901 was the largest with a population of 350,000; followed by Dublin, with 305,000 citizens. The next in importance was Cork (76,000 population in 1901), followed by Londonderry and Limerick (both with just under 40,000), and then Waterford (under 25,000). These six cities accounted for nearly two-thirds of the entire urban population. A further 150,000 or
so people lived in the disparate suburbs surrounding Dublin; the remainder in secondary ports or market towns such as Galway or Kilkenny.

Only Belfast was truly enmeshed with British industrial capitalism, importing vast quantities of coal and then exporting the products of its staple industries, linen and shipbuilding. Yet even in Belfast the unique political and religious circumstances produced a distinctive character. Three-quarters of the city's population were Protestant (either Anglican or Presbyterian), and thus most of its capital was in the hands of Unionist businessmen determined to preserve the market connection with Britain against the threat of Home Rule. Belfast Corporation was a staunch defender of Unionist interests, modelling itself on the confident new British municipalities and in particular on the Conservative-controlled administration in Liverpool. The Corporation successfully implemented the twin policies used in the nineteenth century by its British counterparts to increase municipal power. A steady process of boundary extension helped the population swell from 20,000 in 1801 to around 90,000 in 1851, and then four times the latter figure by the turn of the century. Property revaluation in the first decade of this century also raised Belfast's rateable valuation to nearly £1,500,000, enabling the Corporation to cut the local rates to only 6s1d in the £1.

Belfast Corporation from the mid-1840s also introduced a series of local by-laws and improvement measures to ensure that the booming city had a sanitary housing stock. And because Belfast's industrial and suburban expansion began later than in comparable British cities, more of its dwellings conformed to the higher standards imposed by these building regulations. The Corporation acted a locus of power for wealthy Unionist house-builders, notably Sir Daniel Dixon and later Sir Robert McConnell. As in the industrial cities of Northern England during the later nineteenth century, the supply of new speculative housing in Belfast generally kept pace with, and often exceeded, demand. The number of houses in Belfast rose from 12,342 units in 1851 to 67,108 in 1901, resulting in a fall in average occupancy to only 5 persons per dwelling. House-building ran at a rate of around 1,000 units a year in the 1880s, then boomed in the next decade at an annual average of nearly 2,000 dwellings. Production reached a peak of 4,500 new dwellings in 1898, before tailing off sharply. It was later estimated that in 1904 there were 9,000 vacant dwellings in Belfast. Most new houses were built for the working classes, and conformed to the repetitive 'by-law housing' found in English towns. Rigidly laid out in monotonous terraces at a density of around 40 dwellings per acre, the typical Belfast home was a 'two-up-two-down' built of good quality red brick with a slate roof. A single-storey rear projection contained the scullery, and in the back-yard was a coal store and dry privy (water closets were not common until 1911). Houses were carefully graded in size at rents
between 2s6d-5s per week, thus catering for all sectors of the working classes. The smaller dwellings were colloquially known as 'kitchen houses', and had a single room for living and cooking plus three bedrooms; more expensive were 'parlour houses', which had the front room given over to this symbol of social respectability. Belfast's housing stock was of course not perfect: the persistence of a few slum spots around the docks and the Smithfield Market area continued to cause concern. Nevertheless the Royal Commission on Working Class Housing in the mid-1880s found the housing situation in Belfast to be good, a view often reiterated. "No city in the Kingdom has a better supply of smaller modern suburban houses at very moderate rents," wrote the Irish Builder in 1913. Ulster Unionists and their supporters on the mainland capitalised on the belief that Belfast was the best housed city in the United Kingdom, portraying it as a vindication of Unionist values. Political opponents could not respond. "In Belfast, the housing problem is not so urgent or so difficult as it is in other Irish centres," conceded the city's solitary Irish Party MP.

The inconsistency in the Unionist argument, however, was that other towns in Ulster did not match Belfast. For instance, Londonderry had a healthy rate of speculative building but was still riddled by decaying older dwellings; one-room tenements formed around 7% of the town's housing stock in 1913, and housed the female workers for its low-wage textile industries. Smaller towns appear to have had the worst housing conditions in the province.

Yet the problems in Ulster were nothing compared to Southern Ireland, where towns and cities acted principally as centres for the exchange and consumption of agricultural wealth. The largest urban concentrations were ports that served the hinterland (aided by the railway boom from the late-1840s to the mid-1860s), and also contained associated export industries such as brewing or distilling. The coastal economy sustained a small mercantile middle class, both Protestant and Catholic. But given that trade was relatively constant, towns in the South remained economically stagnant. The example par excellence was Dublin, where a particularly unfortunate combination of economic, political and social factors created a housing situation that was in greatest contrast to Belfast. In the eighteenth century Dublin had been the second city of the British Empire, but after the Act of Union the population barely grew despite a continual role as the administrative, legal, banking, medical, and intellectual capital of Ireland. The 1911 Census revealed that 194,250 people, 63% of the population, were classified as 'working class'. What was most alarming was that the city had a very small industrial base. "Dublin is, in point of economic structure, the weakest city in the three kingdoms," declared a contemporary economics professor. Some industries did well by exporting quality foodstuffs to Britain, notably the Guinness brewery and Jacobs biscuit factory. But despite a scattering of engineering works, only a fifth of male workers were in manufacturing. Instead there
was a preponderance of low-paid casual labouring and carrying work centred on the docks: in 1911 some 20% of Dublin's workers were classed as general labourers, and a further 15% worked in the transport sector. The total of unskilled occupations came to around half of the workforce.\textsuperscript{15} Structural unemployment was probably around 15% (it was estimated at around 7,000 in 1909), and under-employment undoubtedly affected many more.\textsuperscript{16} Over 12,000 people received outdoor relief every year in the pre-war period, on top of the 32,000 or so who at any time resided in Dublin's workhouses. Wages crept up but slowly, with the average combined earnings for a Dublin family just before the First World War reaching only 22s6d per week. Casual labourers earned just 18-20s, only 66-75% of the average unskilled wage in Britain (skilled workers in pre-war Dublin fared slightly better, with a weekly take-home of around 36-40s).\textsuperscript{17}

The most telling sign of extensive poverty in Dublin were the putrid slums, a widespread problem noted ever since the 1836 Poor Law Commission. In the mid-1840s Frederick Engels described the city's poorer districts as "among the ugliest and most revolting in the world".\textsuperscript{18} By the early-twentieth century Dublin had a veritable 'cordon insanitaire' of slum-lands that encircled the city centre, with the exception of the wealthier south-east sector. "The whole city", wrote the \textit{Irish Builder} in 1913, "outside a few leading streets is in a process of decay."\textsuperscript{19} Surviving photographs show a rash of ruined or demolished properties more akin to a modern war-torn city [Fig.21]. Contemporaries searched for comparisons to the worst spots of Europe, such as Budapest, or to Imperial horrors like Calcutta. "The slums of Dublin are the worst in the kingdom", opined the \textit{Times}, adding later that such conditions "would not be tolerated even in a modern Oriental city without desperate attempts to remedy so deplorable a state of things.....Yet people die like flies in its squalid slums."\textsuperscript{20} By the turn of the century, Dublin's slums had replaced Irish rural dwellings as the most frequently cited social problem. As one Irish Party MP put it, "the housing problem really touched Dublin in a more extraordinary way than any other city in the Empire."\textsuperscript{21} British politicians of all parties echoed the despair. The pre-war Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lloyd George, described the city as having "the worst housing conditions in Europe."\textsuperscript{22} A leading Conservative MP stated that "the point about Dublin is that it is infinitely the worst of all the great cities in the United Kingdom. It is not that it has got a few slums, but it seems to have got very little else."\textsuperscript{23} Much of the social concern about Dublin's slums focussed on moralistic side-issues such as drunkenness, inefficiency, immorality and crime. One lurid description called the slum-lands "a thing apart in the inferno of social degradation", and another declared the problem as "sui-generis both in its extent. and the intensity of the evils which it involves."\textsuperscript{24} Yet in late-nineteenth century Dublin, following developments such as Charles Booth's sociological survey in London, there was also a clearer understanding of the direct link between bad
housing and the prevalence of low-paid casual labour. The influence of poverty on Dublin's slums was tentatively mentioned by the 1884-85 Royal Housing Commission, and became explicit in subsequent inquiries such as the 1900 report into public health in the city.\textsuperscript{25} By 1913 the \textit{Freemans Journal} could write unequivocally that "the question of the slums is not simply a question by itself, but is related to a much bigger problem - the problem of unemployment and of the uncertainty of work."\textsuperscript{26} A political edge to Dublin's social problems was provided by the exodus from the mid-nineteenth century of the professional and middle classes, including a large proportion of Protestants, to live in the southern suburbs.\textsuperscript{27} Catholics by 1911 now accounted for 83\% of the city's population, and the administration of Dublin Corporation was left increasingly to Nationalists from the Catholic lower-middle class (predominantly merchants, shopkeepers and publicans). Unionist opposition from suburbs such as Rathmines and Pembroke emasculated boundary extension, and a property revaluation in the mid-1900s lifted the rateable valuation to only £1,180,000. Despite constantly high rates, set in 1911 at 10s10d in the £1 for the north side of the city and 10s6d for the south side, municipal debt soared to nearly £2,700,000 by 1914. The \textit{Irish Builder} wrote that Dublin's financial difficulties, "and the apparent insolubility of its housing problem, is undoubtedly to be found in the ever increasing tendency of the better-to-do classes to migrate to the suburbs."\textsuperscript{28}

The net result for Dublin was a housing stock shown by official reports to have improved only marginally from the 1880s up to the First World War; here the most complete data, that from the 1911 Census, will be used.\textsuperscript{29} The root problem was that speculative house-building in Dublin had virtually ceased for several decades. From 1891 to 1911 the population of the city grew by 20,600 and yet only another 2,600 new dwellings were added: an average pre-war building rate of 130 dwellings per year.\textsuperscript{30} Even in the suburbs comparatively little was built for the working classes, precluding suburbanisation, and forcing Dublin's labourers to make do with the existing stock. Thus of the 194,000 working-class citizens in 1911, only 32,000 lived in purpose-built new houses (most of these provided by semi-philanthropic or municipal agencies). A further 34,000 people were recorded as inhabiting older dwellings deemed to to be satisfactory ('1st Class'). This left 128,000 people - 66\% of the working classes, and around 40\% of the total population - in sub-standard housing. Around 10,000 of this category lived in self-contained '2nd Class' or '3rd Class' houses, which were either dilapidated single-storey cottages or jerry-built dwellings erected in the back-lots of the grand terraces of Georgian Dublin. The vast majority of Dublin's poor, some 118,000 people, were squeezed into just over 5,000 so-called 'tenement houses'. These were not purpose-built tenements, as in say Glasgow, but instead Georgian houses that had been crudely converted into multi-occupancy flats with inadequate, or even no, sanitation. As early as the 1870s the \textit{Irish
Builder remarked that "the great majority of our working classes are housed in antiquated and ill-drained and ill-ventilated tenement houses", and that "whole streets of houses once occupied by single families are now inhabited by several families, from basement to attic.....It is a system of "flats" improvised, but not the Scotch system of "flats", built to order."\(^{31}\) In 1884 the Medical Officer of Health, Sir Charles Cameron, noted that the city:

"does not in the least resemble Belfast, Liverpool, Manchester, Glasgow, and most other British cities. The latter consist in the chief part of new buildings, but they differ from Dublin in the important point that their working population live in houses built specially for them, and adapted to their wants, whilst the Dublin artisans and labourers live chiefly in the decayed houses of former generations of people of superior rank."\(^{32}\)

The pressure of living in even once-grand houses took its toll. By 1911 around 1,500 of the worst tenement houses, containing 22,700 people, were technically defined as unfit for habitation. Surplus demand also resulted in nearly 80% of all tenement flats having only one room. This was equal to a third of Dublin's housing stock, giving it easily the highest incidence of single-room units in the United Kingdom (next came Finsbury in London, with just under 28%, and Glasgow with 20%).\(^{33}\) It meant that 22,108 families, nearly a quarter of the city's population, lived in one-room tenements (compared to around 14% in Finsbury and 13% in Glasgow). Overcrowding was chronic. The average occupancy of a one-room flat in Dublin was 5 people, but many contained more. The proportion of families with over 5 members living in a single room was twice as high as that in Glasgow, the next worst case.\(^{34}\) As a graphic example, the Times reported a harrowing Dublin court case in which the defendant lived in a one-room tenement with "his brother and himself, his wife, his six children, and his brother's child, who was dying of consumption - ten persons in all."\(^{35}\) With virtually all of the other 20% of tenement flats having only two rooms, by 1911 the average occupancy of what had been a single-family Georgian residence was now 22 persons. Official inquiries revealed houses with up to 98 people living in them!

Housing shortage also meant that rent levels in Dublin were higher than in other Irish towns. In 1912 the typical rent for a one-room tenement was 3s per week, a sum which in Belfast would pay for a 3-room house. To move up to a two-room flat in Dublin, a tenant would pay between 3s-4s6d per week, and for a further room the rent would rise to 4s-6s.\(^{36}\) As a proportion of income spent on rent, the figures in Dublin do not appear to have been significantly different than the estimated 16% paid on average by workers in large British cities.\(^{37}\) More the problem was that Dublin tenants got far less for their money and slum landlords were able to make more profit. By splitting a single Georgian house up into six flats, an owner could increase the rent return to nearly £1 per week, equivalent to a labourers' entire wages (the practice prevalent was known in London as 'house-
knackering'). Much of Dublin's pre-war housing, as in Britain, was owned in small parcels by a wide spectrum of petty-bourgeois and middle-class landlords. Yet there was also a wealthy strata that owned extensive tenement property, and who relied on middlemen to maximise profit through a complex pattern of sub-letting. The large property-owners enjoyed strong influence at municipal level, causing political opponents such as the Times to allege that "the Dublin Corporation is in the grip of the slum landlord." While there was a grain of truth in this charge, it was an over-statement given that Corporation members owned less than 2% of pre-war tenement houses.

Perhaps the most chilling result of Dublin's pre-war housing problem was its contribution, along with poverty, to a persistently high annual death rate of 22 per 1000 people, and an appalling infant mortality rate of one in seven babies. Both figures were at least 25% higher than in British cities, and indeed were surpassed only by the world's unhealthiest cities such as Moscow or Rio de Janeiro. From 1880, official reports on public health in Dublin increasingly pinned the primary blame on the overcrowded and insanitary tenement system. By the turn of the century it was realised that the mortality rate for a Dublin labourer living in a congested tenement was twice as high as for a suburban professional. The worst fear was tuberculosis, with pre-war Dublin having easily the highest incidence in the United Kingdom.

The economic and social problems of Dublin were repeated on a lesser scale in the other towns of Southern Ireland. The 1884-85 Royal Commission heard of woeful housing and poverty in Limerick, Cork, Waterford, Galway, New Ross, and in towns near to Dublin such as Kingstown (now Dun Laoghaire). Later investigations added numerous other centres, including Sligo, Drogheda, Tipperary, Wexford, and Howth, to a growing roll of dishonour. Decayed Georgian dwellings were often shoddily converted into overcrowded tenements, and in smaller towns especially there were extensive single-storey cottages, poorly built in render and thatch, and not dissimilar to the worst rural housing. Limerick was the provincial town frequently described as having the worst housing conditions after Dublin. In 1913 there were 1,050 tenement houses in Limerick, around 20% of the housing stock, and the proportion of one-room flats was around 15%. Employment was mostly confined to casual labouring related to the docks and railways, and Limerick's rates in 1908 stood at 1 1s6d in the £1. The Irish Board of Works noted that it was "a backward town, and the housing accommodation for the poorer classes is of a squalid description": the Irish Builder could think of nowhere "with worse slum dwellings than Limerick or where proper houses for the poor are more necessary." It was part of a wider housing problem whose causes lay, as an Irish Party spokesman pointed out, "in the poverty of the towns, in the high rates of the towns, and in the
unwillingness of Parliament to give any assistance in the matter.\(^43\) It was the legacy that any housing reform movement in Ireland had to deal with.

### 2.1 Urban housing reform in Ireland

The crucial difference between urban housing reform in Britain and Ireland lies in timing. Economic depression and cholera outbreaks in England in the early-1830s prompted the first official health inquiries, and out of these came the partnership of public regulation and private charitable activity best symbolised by the semi-philanthropic housing companies set up from the 1840s by Lord Shaftesbury and others. Reform was more tardy in Scotland, not commencing until the 1860s, by which point urban municipalities had begun to take a more active role through innovative Improvement Acts.\(^44\) Ireland, being a mainly agricultural country, followed such developments at one remove. The London-based Builder noted in the late-1870s that "the Artisans' and Labourers' Dwellings movement in Dublin is very small in its dimensions."\(^45\) In a recent account, Daly has observed that in nineteenth-century Dublin there was a lack of public interest and charitable action on the issues of public health and housing.\(^46\) Quite simply, the strata of upper-class and middle-class society which provided the charitable reformers in Britain was narrower in Ireland, and was beset by social and religious differences. Unionist reformers were often treated as would-be proselytisers, and found it hard to bridge the gulf between themselves and the poor Catholic labourers who were the source of concern. For their part, Catholic organisations preferred to deal with moral or temperance issues rather than concrete social problems. A rare example of ecumenical reformism was provided by Sir Charles Cameron, an Unionist who served as Dublin Corporation's Medical Officer of Health from the 1870s to the First World War. Cameron's aims were openly paternalistic, arguing that "the wealthy classes must stand in loco parentis to the poorer and more dependent classes."\(^47\) Yet his attempts to bring together different Irish social groups on the issue of public health remained only partially successful.

It was cholera epidemics in Ireland in 1848/49 that prompted the pioneering investigations by medical practitioners serving in the front line, namely Dr Malcolm in Belfast and Dr Willis in Dublin.\(^48\) Medical alarm was simple and direct. "A man going about with insufficient clothing would probably only injure himself, whereas if his house is in a filthy condition it may injure me, and as a means of protection I get his house put into a proper sanitary state," as Sir Charles Cameron was later to note.\(^49\) Concern over a further cholera attack in Dublin in 1853/54 led to the building of a pair of single-men's lodging houses; one by a businessman, Thomas Vance, who also provided a small block off
Lower Bridge Street for 30 families at rents of 1s-3s6d per week. Of more significance for Dublin's housing in the 1850s were the first schemes built by employers for their workforce. Over the next half century, housing was built for skilled workers in suburban areas, mostly by transport firms such as the Great Southern and Western Railway Company (142 cottages), the Midland Great Western Railway Company (83 cottages), and the Dublin United Tramway Company (104 cottages). From 1872, the Guinness Company also built a total of 180 dwellings in a mixture of tenement flats and higher-rent cottages. The economic rationale was the same as for British welfare industrialists: Sir Arthur Edward Guinness said that by providing these dwellings, the company's employees "live in fresher air and are more healthy; there are fewer days in the year when they are unable to do their work, it saves in that way." But in a non-industrial city like Dublin, such efforts had limited effect.

The first sustained initiative for public health reform in Dublin occurred in the mid-1860s, at a time of sharp economic downturn and a further influx of disease epidemics from Britain. In 1862 Nugent Robinson called for the establishment of semi-philanthropic housing companies, a sentiment echoed by Dr Edward Mapother following his appointment two years later as Dublin Corporation's first health officer. By 1866 the Corporation had set up a Public Health Committee, with Robinson as its secretary; an initiative marred, however, by persistent laxity over cases where councillors used their influence to protect vested interests. In the same year came Ireland's first housing legislation, the 1866 Labouring Classes (Lodging Houses and Dwellings) Act. It was a belated transference of British powers, combining Shaftesbury's two measures of fifteen years previous, with a new measure to facilitate the building of individual dwellings for the working classes. The Irish Board of Works could now make public loans at 4% interest over 40 years to private companies, and even municipalities, for up to half the cost of a housing scheme. The outcome in 1866 was the Dublin Industrial Tenements Company, the first joint-stock housing body in Ireland on the British model whereby a reduced 5% dividend was paid to investors. Most of the founders were Dublin businessmen, along with reformers such as Dr Mapother. In the event the company built only one scheme in Meath Street in 1867, consisting of plain 4-storey brick tenement blocks with 50 small flats at rents of 1s-4s per week. It soon became a well-known slum. Further activity under the 1866 Act was slow. By the time it was superseded twenty years later, a total of only £190,000 had been advanced and 3,416 dwellings completed. Even less use was made in Ireland of the 1868 Artisans and Labourers Dwellings Act (the Torrens Act), which gave local authorities powers to repair or demolish individual insanitary dwellings if owners failed to maintain them.
Economic revival in Dublin in the late 1860s reduced concern about public health, yet by now housing reform was established as an issue. In 1871, at a Corporation banquet, the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland called for an end to political agitation by wondering "that more has not been done in this country to improve the habitations of the poorer classes... we require a time of peace and quiet in order to carry out these reforms." Other influential voices, notably the *Irish Builder* and reformers such as Charles Dawson, constantly promoted the need for semi-philanthropic housing companies. The next impetus came from a devastating smallpox epidemic in Dublin in 1871-72 which killed an unprecedented total of 1,650 people. A report by Dr Thomas Grimshaw (later to become Registrar-General for Ireland) drew links between fever outbreaks and the slums, and resulted in the formation in 1872 of the Dublin Sanitary Association. This soon became the most effective public health pressure group in Ireland, combining members of the medical profession, barristers, Protestant clergy, some wealthy Unionist businessmen, and a few Corporation councillors. The Dublin Sanitary Association had two major results. Firstly, it ensured that Dublin Corporation was the first municipality to issue by-laws under the 1878 Irish Public Health Act, covering factors such as street widths, constructional standards, waste removal, and the usage of lodging-houses and tenements (other urban authorities in Ireland by comparison were to use these powers, not least because the ILGB failed to issue model bye-laws until 1903). Secondly, it was lobbying by the Dublin Sanitary Association that secured the extension to Ireland of the 1875 Artisans and Labourers Dwellings Improvement Act of 1875 (the Cross Act). This measure, inspired by Scottish Improvement Acts, was primarily intended to facilitate the clearance and redevelopment of London's slums. Urban authorities were offered public loans at 3.5% over 50 years to clear insanitary sites, with the intention that the land would then be sold or leased to private companies to build new dwellings (municipalities were permitted to rehouse as a last resort, if no private body came forward). A key requirement was that the same number of people as displaced, though not necessarily the same people, had to be rehoused. Eligibility under the Cross Act was confined to towns with a population over 25,000: a threshold that made sense in Britain but, as Irish MPs pointed out, was nonsensical in Ireland since only five cities would be included. Calls to lower the population limit in Ireland were spuriously dismissed by the Conservative Home Secretary, Assheton Cross, on the grounds that "he thought the Irish members wished England and Ireland to be treated alike." Subsequent amending legislation in 1879 and 1882 reduced the limit to 12,000 inhabitants, bringing more Irish towns into the frame, and removed the need to rehouse the number of displaced people on the cleared site.

As well as providing the Irish Party with an inappropriate model for the first Labourers Act, the 1875 Cross Act also boosted urban housing reform. Out of a housing conference
organised by the Sanitary Association in early 1876 came the Dublin Artizans Dwellings Company (hereafter DADC). The DADC was to prove the only sizeable semi-philanthropic housing body in Ireland: not surprising given that it contained the city's Unionist business elite, including Sir Arthur Edward Cecil Guinness (its chairman, and later Lord Iveagh), Arthur Edward Guinness (later Lord Ardilaun), William La Touche, and John Jameson, as well as wealthy Anglo-Irish landowners such as the Earl of Pembroke and the Countess of Meath. From the outset the DADC was run as an efficient business and paid a 4-5% dividend to shareholders. "The commercial principle must be upheld", declared Sir Arthur Guinness, "and to succeed it must be made to pay" (significantly, many Guinness workers lived in DADC dwellings in south-west Dublin). Yet the declaration of free-market principles cannot conceal the fact that the company received two forms of state assistance from national and local levels. Over its period of activity, the DADC obtained nearly half its capital expenditure, around £290,000, from public loans at interest rates that were slightly better than the general market rate. Furthermore, on two early clearance schemes under the Cross Act, the DADC also benefitted at the ratepayers' expense when Dublin Corporation leased them sites for sums that did not cover the expensive acquisition costs. Both sites were in south-west Dublin; the first, the Coombe, cost the Corporation in 1878 some £24,000 to buy and develop, and was then let to the DADC at an annual rent of nearly £200 per acre; the second, at Plunket Street, cost £37,000 in the early 1880s and was let at £133 per acre. However the financial strain put on Dublin Corporation (by 1913 the Coombe scheme had lost over £26,000, and Plunket Street over £31,000) made the Corporation decide not to repeat the mistake, and so the partnership soon ended. The loss sustained by the Corporation was by no means a subsidy for Dublin's poor, but simply sustained a pretence that 5% semi-philanthropic housing was financially viable.

The DADC built in total nearly 3,600 dwellings, plus a few shops. Given that private house-building had virtually ended in Dublin, the DADC thus assumed the mantle of the major provider of new working class dwellings. Its economic rationale determined both the type of housing built and the class of tenant catered for. The company's prestige provoked an interest in housing design hitherto lacking in Irish architects, with for instance Sir Thomas Drew acting as its first adviser. In terms of design, the DADC concentrated on two strategies taken directly from London precedents. The first was to provide small 1-3 room flats in multi-storey blocks, on the lines of those by Sir Sydney Waterlow's Improved Industrial Dwelling Company. This strategy was used for early schemes where the DADC had to buy central sites at full market prices, such as the 4-storey block in Echlin Street, and by fixing rents at only 2s-4s3d per week was aimed at the poorer members of Dublin's working class. The DADC built in all some 454 model tenement
flats, but then abandoned the policy because it was deemed unsuccessful both financially and morally (small flats did not allow for gender segregation in children's sleeping arrangements). Furthermore the use of tenement blocks was strongly criticised by the Irish Builder and others. Instead, as Sir Thomas Drew admitted at the outset, the DADC's real view was "that cottages would be much better suited for Dublin than the barrack-system which was in vogue in England." Thus the vast majority of DADC dwellings, some 3,130 units, were built as cottages to lower density layouts. The first major cottage estate was at the Coombe in 1880-82, with 210 mainly two-storey houses built around four squares in a spacious arrangement made possible because Dublin Corporation was shouldering the loss. The second Cross Act scheme at Plunket Street had 126 cottages and dated from the late-1880s. But from this date the DADC favoured the building of larger estates on cheaper suburban land. Here the model was another London precedent, the General Industrial and Artisans Housing Company: the result was estates laid out in long, monotonous rows such as in Oxmanstown in north-west Dublin (900 dwellings built 1903-08), and outside the city in Rathmines (318 cottages), Bray, and Kingstown. The DADC's own architect, Charles Ashworth, developed a standard range of house types based on the typical speculative terrace, with frontages between 14-18 ft. The basic division was between single-storey and two-storey dwellings, but within each category there was a range of 2-3 rooms in the former, and 3-5 rooms in the latter. The relatively high cost and low density of cottage estates meant that, as the DADC always openly admitted, it was only able to rehouse better-paid skilled workers if it was to pay the required dividend. Standard rents for single-storey DADC cottages were thus from 3s6d-5s per week, and for two-storey dwellings from 6s-8s. The DADC dwellings were renowned for housing the elite of the working classes, and indeed were made desirable by this fact. The DADC relied on the justification used by semi-philanthropic housing bodies in Britain, namely that by rehousing this sector there would be a 'filtering up' of the poor into vacated dwellings. Yet even the single-minded business strategy of the DADC could not help when the pre-war slump in Dublin brought their building work to an abrupt end in 1907. The slump also put paid to the few other joint stock housing companies that had laboured in the shadow of the DADC.

Before looking at municipal housing reform, it is worth noting two further philanthropic models brought over from Britain during the 1890s and aimed at providing cheaper flats for the poorest citizens. The first was the Guinness Trust (later the Iveagh Trust), set up in April 1890 in emulation of the famous Peabody Trust, with a donation of £50,000 from Sir Arthur Edward Cecil Guinness. The Guinness Trust provided 586 dwellings in all, the most important scheme for 250 flats, with 1-3 rooms, in three five-storey blocks in the Bull Alley area next to St Patrick's Cathedral [Fig.22]. The design showed considerable
architectural care by the London practice of Josephs and Smithem, with 'Queen-Anne' style gables, dormers and chimneys used to enliven the elevations. The Bull Alley project later included a lodging-house, public baths, and recreation building, making it an enclave of Unionist social reform in a decaying Nationalist city. The second model imported to Dublin was that of the strictly managed lodging-houses pioneered by Octavia Hill. An isolated experiment had been tried in the 1870s; then in 1898-1900 three companies were set up of which the most significant was the Association for Housing the Very Poor (formed after a special conference organised by Sir Charles Cameron on behalf of Dublin Corporation's Public Health Committee). For its second scheme in 1905, the Association moved closer to the principles of Samuel Barnett's East End Dwellings Company and built a three-storey block of 118 very basic single-room flats. Yet even with public loans of £9,000 from the sympathetic Irish Board of Works, and by increasing rents to 2s6d-4s6d per week, the scheme was a financial disaster. It was another demonstration of the failure of semi-philanthropic housing to continue in face of the pre-war building slump. Nevertheless by the First World War this form of initiative had contributed some 4,500 dwellings in Dublin, equivalent to around 15% of the city's housing stock. It was a substantial total, proportionately more than in London, though helped by the fact that there was no competition from private speculators. Over 75% of semi-philanthropic dwellings were built by a single company, the DADC, yet as an essentially Unionist organisation it remained somewhat anachronistic in a Nationalist city. Victorian reform bodies such as the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society or the Philanthropic Reform Association persisted into this century, but became increasingly marginalised. Perhaps the most telling epitaph for the voluntary reform movement came in 1913, when the Times thundered: "The reproach for the condition of Dublin must lie chiefly at the doors of the better classes of the city, whose apathy and lack of public spirit has so long permitted nearly a third of the population to live in an environment which should long ago have been dealt with." 

2.2 Early municipal housing in urban Ireland

The remainder of this chapter is concerned with Irish municipal housing, which grew steadily to take over the primary housing role from 1907 when semi-philanthropic activity collapsed. Municipal action began in the wake of the 1875 Cross Act, but, paradoxically, it was the failure of the measure that proved to be the spur. As in Britain, the Cross Act itself was little used: a total of only £81,000 was borrowed under its terms, and no schemes were started after 1885. Instead, the first local authority in Ireland to build its own dwellings, Waterford Corporation, did so out of grievance; it, alone out of the six
county boroughs in Ireland, was ineligible under the 1875 Act since its population was below 25,000. The Corporation owned an uniquely high proportion of land in Waterford, and this enabled it to follow the precedent set in 1869 by Liverpool Corporation in the pioneering municipal scheme at St Martin's Cottages. In 1878-79 the Waterford Corporation, using a loan of £1,700 under the 1866 Irish Housing Act, built 17 two-storey terraced houses, each with four rooms, at Green Street (then Green's Lane) in Ballybricken, to the west of the city centre [Fig.23]. Waterford was thus one of first authorities to act anywhere in the United Kingdom, but it proved a chastening experience. Originally the Corporation had hoped to make a profit, but due to contractual problems and unforeseen building costs, rents had to be set at 4s6d per week just to cover expenses. Although the figure was later dropped to 3s6d, the cottages still lay beyond the reach of unskilled labourers in the town.

The scheme by Waterford Corporation was the start of a wave of municipal activity during the widespread economic depression that hit cities such as Dublin in the late 1870s, and persisted for over a decade. In Britain the depression heightened concern that semi-philanthropic companies were not catering for those most in need, the labouring poor, and the 1880s saw a near panic over the prospect of social breakdown in areas such as the East End of London. Echoes of these fears were voiced by contemporary housing reformers in Ireland. In 1883 the *Irish Builder* claimed that Dublin's slums were "a serious social problem, which must be solved before long, or dangers will arise which the Government may not be able to cope with.....the sooner our statesmen recognise the fact and legislate with the view of minimising the evil, the better it will be for the common good and well-being of all classes in the State." The Registrar-General of Ireland, Dr Thomas Grimshaw, called for the eradication of slums because "ill health produces poverty, that poverty produces crime, and that so long as this vicious circle exists we need not expect anything but social chaos." Irish MPs successfully lobbied for the 1884-85 Royal Commission on the Housing of the Working Classes to turn its attention to their country in its third volume of investigation. It proved, like in Britain, to be a desultory affair that revealed the extent of the slum problem but offered no real answer. The minor legal adjustments incorporated into the 1885 Housing Act were paltry, particularly when compared to bold calls in Ireland for the municipalisation of all working-class housing. The Irish Party's representative on the Royal Commission, Edward Dwyer Gray, was an ex-Lord Mayor of Dublin Corporation, and in his 'minority report' he called for the wholesale purchase of urban land by local authorities. Michael Davitt, the hero of the 'Land War' and now a sworn enemy of urban landlordism, declared in 1886: "I favour Corporate bodies building dwellings for the poor when decent ones will not or cannot be erected by private enterprise without over-renting the occupants." In January 1887 the

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Irish Party even introduced its first private members Bill to deal with urban housing: this however was dropped when its main proposer died suddenly.  

It was against this background that Sir Charles Cameron in late 1879 recommended that Dublin Corporation should themselves rehouse the poor, rather than pursue any further disastrous schemes with the DADC. Cameron estimated that the Corporation could make a 4% profit and yet still provide dwellings for 10,000 citizen at rents of up to 2s6d per week. There was much support for his view, particularly from a deputation of local labourers protesting about chronic unemployment in August 1882. The Artisans' and Labourers' Dwellings Committee of Dublin Corporation, which had hitherto dealt with Cross Act clearance work, sent an official to study early municipal schemes in Liverpool and Glasgow. In February 1884, formal approval was given for the Corporation's first housing scheme at Benburb Street (then Barrack Street), to be carried out under the 1866 Act. The DADC protested on the grounds that rate revenue was being misused to compete unfairly with semi-philanthropic housing, but Dublin Corporation officials argued that their explicit intention was to build for "those for whom no company would attempt to provide dwellings." This result was that Benburb Street was designed by the City Architect, D.J. Freeman, as consciously austere four-storey blocks in the manner of the tenements by the Glasgow Improvement Trust. Built in 1886-87 at a total cost of £27,920, the scheme contained 144 small flats with 1-3 rooms at rents from 1s6d-5s per week (there was also a separate 72-bed lodging house) [Fig.24]. The Benburb Street blocks were built to such a low sanitary and constructional standard that they needed constant remedial work. A proposal to build cottages at Dublin Corporation's second site, Bow Lane, was rejected because rents would have been too high. The scheme built from 1888-89 comprised 86 flats with 2-3 rooms, let at 2s-4s6d per week, in two-storey cottages (a model used by speculative builders in Newcastle, and later tried out by the LCC). The Bow Lane cottages were designed by Arthur Dudgeon to utilise the supposed economy of reinforced concrete floors, staircases, and flat roofs. They too ended up as a catalogue of building failures. Thus although Dublin Corporation built 230 dwellings in the 1880s aimed at housing the poorest labourers, cost-cutting had been at the expense of design standards. 

In addition to Waterford and Dublin, evidence suggests that eleven other Irish municipalities built housing during the 1880s. The largest number of dwellings outside Dublin was in Cork, where 90 houses were provided on disused land in two schemes at Madden's Buildings (1886) and Ryan's Buildings (1888). The plans for these 4-room, two-storey dwellings were essentially those of the speculative terrace, but were even more basic in that there was no scullery and the upper floor consisted of attic bedrooms lit by rooflights. From outside it gave the cottages the appearance of being single-storey
The 1885 Housing Act, by offering public loans at only 3.5% over 50 years to urban authorities, also enabled smaller bodies such as Sligo UDC and the New Ross Town Commissioners to each build just over 25 dwellings at rents around 3s3d per week. In total the 13 active Irish municipalities provided around 570 dwellings in the 1880s; proportionately more than the estimated 2,400 dwellings built by five authorities in Britain prior to the 1890 Housing Act. Ireland, with an urban population only 5% of that in Britain, had produced nearly 25% of Britain's stock of municipal dwellings. Even before 1890, Irish urban housing was comparatively more municipalised.

2.3 Nationalism and municipal housing in Ireland from 1890

In Britain the reform impetus during the 1880s led to the famous 1890 Housing Act, and this was extended to Ireland despite protests from Irish MPs that they had not been consulted about its provisions. The Act was mostly unadventurous: existing measures to clear insanitary areas were consolidated under the 'Part 1' clauses, those dealing with individual unhealthy dwellings under 'Part 2'. Yet a considerable widening of powers came in the 'Part 3' section, since it allowed local authorities for the first time to build new dwellings on virgin sites and thus remedy housing shortage as well as slum replacement. The 1890 Act also improved public loan terms by fixing a 3.125% rate of interest and extending repayment periods to up to 60 years. In Ireland it ushered in a distinct new phase in municipal housing. A realistic estimate is that by March 1901, a decade after the 1890 Act, a further 1,500 dwellings had been added to make a cumulative total of nearly 2,100 units. By the date of the next major legislation, the 1908 Housing Act, Irish urban authorities had probably built some 5,000 dwellings.

Also significant was that the middle-sized urban authorities had become more active. Prior to 1890, this category had built only 30% of urban municipal dwellings; by the mid-1900s it was nearer a half. By 1906 some 70 of the 125 Irish urban municipalities had begun housing work. Particularly prolific were a cluster of wealthier suburbs to the south of Dublin, now determined to eradicate slum pockets. Rathmines UDC, which remained staunchly Unionist, built 355 dwellings by 1908; Pembroke UDC, where Unionist domination dissipated after the 1898 Local Government Act, built 269 houses by the same date; and Kingstown UDC, a more distant railway suburb and passenger port, embarked in 1903 on over 300 dwellings. These three suburbs, with a combined population of around 85,000, produced nearly 1,000 units (a fifth of all municipal housing in Ireland) before the 1908 Housing Act. Nearly half of the 5,000 municipal stock were now in the capital or its environs, with Dublin Corporation remaining the single largest
producer with around 1,200 dwellings by 1908. Elsewhere the largest concentrations were to be found in Cork (515 cottages) and Waterford (260 cottages). Less clear are the reasons behind fluctuations in activity by Irish municipalities under the 1890 Act. In Britain it has been argued that the rate of pre-war municipal house-building under 'Part 3' clauses was inversely related to the amount of empty housing stock (itself a product of economic cycles in speculative building), and was mediated by demands from local organisations of skilled labourers. In Ireland the 1890s were a period of relative prosperity in Dublin and other towns, but this was followed by a prolonged economic depression and a fall in real wages from 1904-12. During this downturn, the slump in the British housebuilding industry spread to Ireland. Although British economic cycles tended to have a lesser effect in agricultural Ireland, the effect of the pre-war building slump could be seen in two ways. As noted earlier, it was now financially unrewarding for semi-philanthropic companies like the DADC to build new schemes. And in Belfast, the only Irish city with an extensive private housebuilding sector, the boom of the late-1890s had plunged to only 622 new dwellings in 1906. Gradually the surplus of empty stock in the city was eaten away. But despite this definite slump, the building rate of Irish municipalities remained consistent, with only a slight trough in 1893-94 and a peak between 1898-1903. There was no apparent pressure on Ulster municipalities to intervene. Londonderry Corporation built nothing; Belfast only a 222-bed single-men's lodging hostel (1899-1903), as a reluctant contribution after it had been pushed by the ILGB into a small clearance scheme. From 1901-03 advances to Irish authorities soared to nearly 100% of public loans for urban housing, yet with the onset of slump in 1904, municipal building dipped substantially while private housing companies made a brief revival [Diagram D; Table Y].

Political factors appear to have been of more importance to Irish municipalities than economic pressures. By 1890 the growing interest of constitutional Nationalists in urban housing turned the issue from one of public health into a political demand that paralleled rural housing reform. This stemmed from the Irish Party's attempt to sustain a municipal hegemony (outside Ulster and a few southern Dublin suburbs) that depended on uniting a heterogeneous mix of lower-middle class merchants, shopkeepers, publicans, professionals, and Catholic clergy. As in rural areas, a continual concern of the IPP was to stress the nationalist demand over labour issues and thereby to prevent the formation of an independent working-class political party as in Britain. They were aided by the fact that the lack of industrialisation meant that the Irish labour movement was late to develop, and structurally weak even when it did. Skilled trade unions were set up in the mid-nineteenth century, often as branches of British organisations, and from the 1880s started to form Trades Councils in larger cities. These councils however were
highly conservative, aiming to improve pay and working conditions for their skilled members rather than pursue militant political demands (a tendency confirmed with the formation of the Irish Trades Unions Council in 1894). Even in Belfast, which had formed the first Trades Council in 1881 and a local labour party in the next decade, an over-riding concern with maintaining pay differentials plus sectarian rivalry led by Protestant skilled workers - Ireland's 'aristocracy of labour' - caused fragmentation and stagnation. The opposition of skilled trade unions also helped to defeat efforts in 1889-91 to organise the many unskilled labourers in Dublin and Cork on the lines of the so-called 'new unionism' in Britain.

However, the flurry of excitement about 'new unionism' did inflame the divisions within the Irish Party following the fall of Parnell in late 1890. Both factions began to jockey for the favour of the urban working classes. The anti-Parnellites were led by the champion of land and housing municipalisation, Michael Davitt, and his short-lived journal *Labour World*. The Parnellite rump believed, probably erroneously, that their strongest support lay in Irish towns. Hence Parnell, previously indifferent to urban labour issues, in the period up to his early death in October 1891 openly courted the labouring classes by advocating measures such as land acquisition to build municipal dwellings. During the parliamentary debate in 1891 on rural housing subsidy, discussed in the last chapter, the Parnellite faction suddenly put forward an amendment to extended the benefit to Irish towns (though not the largest county boroughs). It was the first attempt to secure urban subsidy, but as Parnell told the Commons, "there are no people in the world, certainly there are none in Ireland, whose dwellings stand more in need of improvement than those of the artisans and labourers in Irish towns." Chief Secretary Balfour was alarmed by a proposal which might wreck his Land Bill, and asked "whether it is quite fair to the Government to ask them to graft on to a Bill for land purchase in Ireland so novel and so wide-reaching a proposal, and one that would involve the employment of funds contributed by the British taxpayer for the erection of artisans' dwellings in the Irish towns?". Yet when Parnellite MPs pointed out the inconsistency of this argument, in that the first-ever rural housing subsidy was already clumsily tacked onto the Land Bill, Balfour fell back onto a line that became a standard for British Governments over the next quarter century:

"The Act for providing agricultural labourers with cottages is a very exceptional one; but, then, it is admitted that the condition of the agricultural labourers in many parts of Ireland is exceptional, and there is no analogy between their condition and that of the agricultural labourers in England and Scotland. But when we come to the towns, can we make out a distinction whatever between the urban population of Ireland and the urban population of England or Scotland?"
Balfour's refusal of urban housing subsidy was not seriously challenged by either faction of the IPP, and the interest of constitutional Nationalists in urban issues faded when the organisation of unskilled unions failed to materialise. This possibly explains the slight downturn in municipal housebuilding in the early 1890s. The next potential challenge to the Irish Party's dominance over labour interests came when the 1898 Irish Local Government Act extended the municipal franchise. The Dublin electorate increased five-fold, and Cork's four-fold; the outcome was the election of a few independent labour councillors in these cities. The new councillors, however, were members of skilled trade unions and showed no sign of social radicalism. Most were absorbed into the constitutional Nationalist movement, but the Irish Party only achieved this assimilation by including the demands of urban labour within its social programme. Thus the 1898 Local Government Act appears to have stimulated municipal housing at the turn of the century, and forced the IPP to balance petty-bourgeois property interests along with those of the working classes.

Nowhere was the incorporation of urban housing reform into constitutional Nationalism after 1898 more clearly demonstrated than in Dublin. An alliance was formed between the Corporation and the Dublin Trades Council, and was led by councillors who became local Irish Party MPs on an avowedly 'Labour-Nationalist' ticket (the most vocal was William Field, a wealthy cattle trader, and the other figure of note was Joseph Nannetti, a skilled trade unionist and ex-president of the Trades Council). Dublin Corporation was by now demanding the two powers most desired by British municipalities: increased borrowing limits for housing, and the right to build on suburban land outside the city area. In August 1899 the Corporation decided to call a housing conference, but was pre-empted by an ILGB inquiry into the city's health the following year. At the inquiry, Dublin Corporation said it wanted to borrow £500,000 to rehouse 10,000 of the poorest citizens at rents less than 3s per week, even if it meant a housing rate charge of 6d in the £1. The Corporation also wanted powers to encourage speculative builders to provide suburban estates, or, if necessary, to build these itself. Yet the Irish Party and Dublin Corporation were incensed when the Conservative Government refused to include Ireland in either the 1900 Housing Act (which gave suburban housing powers to local authorities) or the 1903 Housing Act (which removed the borrowing limit for municipal housing, and increased loan periods to up to 80 years). For the first time in 34 years, Ireland had been deliberately omitted from British urban housing legislation, and the divergence was soon to widen further.

The Irish Party, particularly William Field and Joseph Nannetti, demanded bitterly in the Imperial Parliament that Ireland be given comparable treatment at once. To increase the
pressure, the Corporation organised a special Housing Conference in September 1903 following a request by the Dublin Trades Council. The conference was a one-sided Nationalist cabal, with no representatives from the Unionist suburbs, and not surprisingly the report simply reiterated the calls for the extension of the housing powers recently granted to British authorities. Of interest was the faith placed by the conference in the suburbanisation of the working class as the means to relieve over-crowding, and to provide lower rents by capitalising on cheaper land prices. Suburbanisation was envisaged as a combination of municipal activity and the encouragement of private speculation through the offer of a 10-year rate remission on working class dwellings (a similar incentive had been used by Belfast Corporation, and was recommended by British supporters of town extension planning such as Thomas Horsfall and John Nettlefold, the Chairman of Birmingham Corporation's Housing Committee). Support for a policy of suburban housing was common within the Irish Party and included its leader, John Redmond. But the most tireless advocate was a figure at the heart of Dublin Corporation's housing drive, Councillor Coughlan Briscoe. It was Briscoe who was the main mover in forming the national Town Tenants League in the early-1900s. The League campaigned for the same legal and rent protection against urban landlords as enjoyed by rural labourers, but more significantly, it also ensured that the issue of urban housing moved to the forefront of Irish Party policy. William Field was the President of the Town Tenants League, and in 1903 he warned Parliament, in typically inflammatory language, that improved working-class housing:

"was a burning question in Dublin, and also in Cork, Limerick, Waterford, and other places.....it is possible that our civilisation might be overturned; if it were, it would be by our slums - by the rebellion against the land system, the capitalist system, which condemned the workers to live in a state of barbarism."

From 1904 the Town Tenants League provided the bridge for municipal housing agitation between constitutional Nationalists at local and national levels. There were parallels in Britain with the role of local Trades Councils and the Workingmen's National Housing Association, a combination which proved decisive on housing policy in towns like Sheffield or Coventry. The key differences were that the British organisations represented only skilled workers desiring better quality housing, and they did not have a national political party solidly behind them. By contrast the Town Tenants League was yet another outlet for the Irish Party. Thus in 1904 John Redmond threw his weight behind demands that the Conservative Government bring in new urban housing legislation for Ireland. At first, Chief Secretary Wyndham seemed willing to accede to this request. But, as was seen in the last chapter in his dismal proposal for rural housing, the policy of 'constructive Unionism' was at this point being obstructed by those who were determined
not to give increased spending powers to Nationalist municipalities. Wyndham incurred
the wrath of the IPP by declaring that, due to a heavy legislative programme, action on
Irish urban housing would have "to await a more favourable time." As long as the
Conservatives held power, there was little that the Irish Party could achieve.

Meanwhile, urban authorities in Ireland were experiencing severe difficulty in their
determination to build dwellings for the poorest labourers at rents of no more than 3s per
week. Evidence is sketchy, but figures given by a leading ILGB official in 1907 stated
that the average municipal rent was 2s4d, and that most Irish schemes incurred a loss to the
rates. The burden was less critical in smaller towns, since fewer houses were built and
the availability of cheap land allowed the favoured option of 'Part 3' cottage schemes.
Where site costs were higher, municipalities had to rely on a range of unsuccessful
strategies. Dublin Corporation, for example, faced the most expensive sites in Ireland, and
its financial problems were compounded by a rise in building costs in the early 1890s.
Thus the Corporation pursued a complex and often vacillatory policy under the 1890
Housing Act, combining slum replacement schemes on central sites with suburban cottage
estates at much lower densities. Corporation slum-clearance during the 1890s ended in
disaster in two tenement schemes early this century. At Brides Alley (1900-11) a total of
176 flats with 2-3 rooms were built in three- and four-storey blocks, with Dutch gables
that echoed the adjacent Iveagh Trust housing [Fig.22]. But due to exorbitant site costs
(over £11,500 an acre) and expensive foundation works, rents were set at 3s6d-6s6d per
week and Dublin Corporation decided to curtail the scheme. An even larger estate of
austere five-storey tenements in the 'red-light' district of Foley Street was built in 1904-05
as a blatant attempt to house the very poor: 80% of the 460 flats had only a single room
plus scullery and WC. This scheme also back-fired on Dublin Corporation when the estate
earned such an unrivalled reputation for vice and squalor that loss-making rents, some as
low as 1s per week, had to be set. By 1913 these two schemes had between them lost
over £70,000, amounting to half of the Corporation's housing deficit in the pre-war
period. Dublin Corporation tried the popular alternative of self-contained cottages for
the first time in 1894-95, at St Joseph's Place (then White's Lane). Here 80 single-storey
and 3-room houses were laid out in terraces in the backlot of a Georgian street block. But
the lower density of 160 persons per acre (far below the 400 plus in tenement blocks)
meant rents of 4s6d per week that were beyond the reach of labourers. The cottage model
became more widely used when a partial boundary extension in 1900 gave Dublin
Corporation access to suburban land. Small schemes were built in Drumcondra (1903-04)
and Clontarf (1904-05), but easily the largest was for 220 cottages at Inchicore from 1905-
10. The 13-acre site here cost only £320 per acre, around 5% of the typical rate for central
sites. Yet again a density of 138 persons (approximately 30 dwellings) to the acre, and
the use of larger 3-4 room cottages, some with bathrooms, produced rents of 4s-7s6d per week aimed explicitly at skilled artisans. Many Dublin councillors openly questioned the wisdom of suburban housing if housing was not being provided more cheaply, especially if tenants were going to have to pay transport costs on top. The *Freemans Journal* argued that "the great cost of travel in Dublin makes it out of the question to house the worker at any distance from his work."124

Cork Corporation tried a similar mixed policy of inner-city tenement blocks and cottage estates on green-field sites, but it too was unable under the 1890 Housing Act to set rents affordable by unskilled workers.125 The authorities in Dublin's southern suburbs were faced by powerful ratepayers associations opposed to any housing loss, and so tended to build only high-rent cottages. However, two competitions were held to design cheap tenement schemes, the first by Rathmines UDC in 1900 and the other by Kingstown UDC in 1907. The latter was won by a London architect with a design for 134 flats with 2-rooms at only 2s per week, but was so substandard that the ILGB insisted it be drastically altered.126 No Irish municipality could find a satisfactory solution: tenement blocks for the very poor were unpopular and incurred heavy losses, whereas suburban cottage schemes resulted in expensive rents. In Britain, only Liverpool Corporation seriously tried to rehouse the very poor, and even with a loss on the rates, no more than half of its tenants were labourers. Every other pre-war municipality followed the lead of LCC (with its famous resolution in 1893 that rent income had to provide a minimum 3% return on capital expenditure), and catered for the skilled artisan.127 But whilst the rationale of high-rent cottages had some attraction in a British city with a large artisanal class, on the grounds that 'filtering-up' would help the poor, it had no validity in Irish towns where the overwhelming need was to rehouse casual labourers near to their workplace. By the mid-1900s it was obvious to most observers in Ireland - and particularly constitutional Nationalists - that urban subsidy was required. The prerequisite for this was sustained political agitation.

2.4 The Irish Party and urban housing after 1906

The last chapter showed that the 1906 Labourers Act resulted from the need of the Irish Party, in collusion with the new Liberal Government, to offer social reform as a substitute for Home Rule. There were also great expectations for urban housing legislation amongst the party's supporters in Dublin Corporation. In January 1906 the incoming Lord Mayor, Joseph Nannetti, promised that it would be one of the first issues to be taken up; a message welcomed by the Irish TUC and the Dublin Trades Council.128
League mounted a sustained campaign calling for urban state subsidy. The League even included housing provisions in its draft Town Tenants Bill, but was persuaded to confine this measure to improving tenant rights. Instead, the IPP leader, John Redmond, made it clear in September 1906 that urban subsidy would be the next goal, adding that "no settlement of the labour question in Ireland can be complete or satisfactory which does not provide decent and cheap homes for the workers in the towns as well as in the country." A few months later his deputy, John Dillon, proclaimed that:

"the Irish Party have not the least idea of deserting THE CAUSE OF THE TOWN LABOURERS.....We will take up their case now and press it with all our energy. Let me say this to the town labourers of Ireland.....that if they want to get their cause brought on to a speedy success they ought to organise, and they ought to carry on this agitation in alliance with the Irish Party."

There was however a difficulty for the Irish Party, which was that preparations for a new Housing Bill had already been set in motion by the President of the English Local Government Board, John Burns. The IPP were at first determined that Ireland would not be excluded again. They were heartened when a Parliamentary Select Committee looked at the financial provisions of the Irish Labourers Acts, but then dismayed when the Chancellor of the Exchequer, H.H. Asquith, rejected outright any possibility of housing subsidy. Burns turned increasingly to the idea of town extension planning as an alternative policy, during the lengthy and complicated manoeuvres that eventually resulted in the 1909 Housing and Town Planning Act in Britain. To the IPP, determined to extract subsidy from the Treasury as redress for what it saw as the economic exploitation of Ireland, this was a foolish diversion. One Irish Party MP summed up their approach when he declared that "finance and finance alone was the means to remedy the grievance." By late-1906 the IPP had lost patience with Burns and were instead demanding separate legislation for Ireland. The problem, however, was that the Irish Chief Secretary - first James Bryce, and then, from January 1907, Augustine Birrell - were both ideologically opposed to state subsidy, and did not want to prejudice any potential Government housing measure now that Burns had finally got round to addressing the issue directly. The danger of stalling, however, was that the 1907 parliamentary session was proving uneasy for the pact between the Liberal Cabinet and the Irish Party. The Castle Administration’s attempt to push through a half-baked scheme of limited devolution had been sunk when the IPP withdrew support. By late 1907 the IPP's strategy of cooperation was being widely criticised in Ireland, and Redmond was not in a conciliatory mood. In particular, there were two political threats facing the Irish Party. The first was a need to reassert its dominance over the Irish labour movement, following a new and sustained attempt from 1907 to organise unskilled labour in Dublin. This latest variant of 'new unionism' was led by Ireland's leading Marxist theorist, James Connolly, and the union boss par excellence.
James Larkin. The medium was the renowned Irish Transport and General Workers Union (hereafter ITGWU), which in its goal to become 'one big Union' progressively absorbed virtually all labourers and transport workers, reaching a membership of 10,000 in 1913. Larkin gradually won control of the Dublin Trades Council and Irish TUC, and pursued an effective combination of syndicalist strike action, socialist propaganda in the Irish Worker, and (from 1912) political action through the Irish Labour Party. The second threat to the IPP came from the minority separatist party, Sinn Fein. The two councillors from this party that now sat on Dublin Corporation, Thomas Kelly and William Cosgrave, argued for parsimony in municipal housing and rejected any policy dependent on legislation or subsidy from the Imperial Parliament. In late 1907 Sinn Fein also seriously worried the Irish Party by putting on an unexpectedly good show in a parliamentary by-election.

Chief Secretary Birrell was aware that if constitutional Nationalism became perceived as a bankrupt policy, then the Liberal Government's strategy in Ireland would be in ruins. In October 1907 he warned Prime Minister Campbell-Bannerman that the Irish Party would have to be seen to win substantial concessions if they were to remain loyal. "What are we going to offer Ireland this next Session?", the Chief Secretary asked. Birrell's proposals were for the long-desired 'Catholic' University, which Redmond accepted, and a further land purchase measure, which was rejected. Instead Redmond substituted the alternative of state subsidy for urban housing, which he knew would go down well with Nationalist municipalities and with the Town Tenants League. In late October 1907 Redmond chose a large rally in Sligo, a western port with many unskilled labourers and chronic slums, to announce the new policy. He pledged that on "the housing of the working classes the Irish Party intend to make a proposal to the Government of a perfectly practical character, and to press it with all the power at their command." Urban housing reform was now the IPP's immediate top priority. The Freemans Journal loyally declared that the issue "was second only to Home Rule....If an Irish Parliament was established tomorrow this is the very first problem with which it would be called upon to deal." Redmond handed the task of drafting the legislation to J.J. Clancy, an ex-councillor on Dublin Corporation and an IPP representative at the 1903 Housing Conference. Ten days after the Sligo speech, Clancy outlined a proposal based on urban subsidy and cheaper public loans. "If we cannot carry it or some other equally large scheme, then one more irresistible argument will be furnished against foreign rule in this island," he warned the Cabinet. Redmond declared that "in the next Session of Parliament, the Irish Party and the Irish organisation will be directed with its full force to the consideration of this question." By late November the Chief Secretary had accepted the proposals, and publicly announced that an urban counterpart to the Labourers
Acts would be rushed through Parliament. A temporary setback for the Irish Party arose when Dublin Corporation that same month rashly added some housing clauses into an Omnibus Bill, as part of a long-standing but now outdated pledge to implement the recommendations of the 1903 conference: fortunately for the IPP, the Corporation's whole measure was sunk by ferocious opposition from Sinn Fein councillors, the Dublin Chamber of Commerce, and ratepayers associations.

The path was finally clear in February 1908 for the Irish Party to introduce their first measure of the new session, a private members Housing Bill. It proposed, firstly, that a subsidised public loan fund be created by diverting £5,000,000 from the Irish Post Office Savings Bank and offering this to urban authorities at the staggering low rate of 2.5% interest (this was the same rate as paid to the bank's investors, and the Treasury was to underwrite the fund in case of a sudden rush of withdrawals). Repayment of interest was also to be deferred for the first two years of any loan. The IPP estimated that the fund would provide 25,000 houses based on an estimated cost of £200 each. The loan subsidy was insufficient to avoid a loss on the rates if rents were to be set at the desired level of 2s6d per week, and so the Bill also proposed that a special Irish Housing Fund be set up to yield a direct annual subsidy of just under £40,000. Altogether it was a bold strategy, made even cleverer by the fact that the Irish Party could claim that it did not entail one single penny of money from British sources. There was wide support for the Nationalists' Bill, even from Ulster Unionists who had been hitherto silent on the subject of urban housing subsidy: prompting one IPP member to say that he "knew absolutely no question on which there was such unanimity of feeling in Ireland." Many Labour MPs and Liberal backbenchers were also behind the measure, as indeed were several Tories.

The critical test, however, was how the Liberal Government would respond. Chief Secretary Birrell struggled to find justifications for urban subsidy. He told Parliament that the alternative emphasis on town planning powers in Burns' forthcoming measure, "while no doubt suitable to English industrial centres of population, would not meet the difficulties which present themselves in dealing with the housing problem in Ireland." Birrell tied himself in knots when arguing why a traditional Liberal like himself, who shared the Cabinet's disapproval of subsidy, might now wish to reverse the Balfourian argument (that Irish urban conditions were no different to Britain) by treating Irish towns as a special case. "In Ireland wages are so low", he wrote, "compared with England, that rents which would enable the houses to be built without heavy loss cannot be paid; and the high rates and indebtedness of most urban areas in Ireland preclude the local authorities from embarking on unremunerative schemes." Such subtleties were not to the taste of the Treasury, who had two objections to the subsidy proposals. The first was that the
terms were so generous that there would be no charge to Irish authorities, and hence no check on municipal extravagance. The more important objection stemmed from a crucial structural difference between Ireland and Britain. The principle of subsidy had already been conceded for Irish rural dwellings, which in 1908 constituted nearly 80% of state housing there; by contrast, it has been estimated that 98% of pre-war local authority housing in Britain was in urban areas. Thus any concession on urban subsidy in Ireland, which in itself might not prove too onerous to the Exchequer, had a potentially devastating effect if the Treasury were forced to concede equal terms to British municipalities. But even the Treasury realised that the Liberal Government could not sink a measure on which the Irish Party had set its stock, and which had the backing of Ulster Unionists. Instead the Treasury contented itself by emasculating the financial clauses. Chief Secretary Birrell had the embarrassing task of telling Parliament that the subsidy proposals, and indeed the whole principle of no charge to the local rates, had been vetoed. Birrell then offered the Irish Party an olive branch. The Government were willing to take over the measure and pass it under their own steam, if only a compromise on state subsidy could be agreed whereby the "deficit will have to be met in some way between the liability of the ratepayer and the willingness of the Exchequer to come to Ireland's assistance in this matter."

It was of course a fatal flaw in the policy of constitutional Nationalism that if the Liberal Government ultimately refused to endorse a proposal, then there was nothing that the Irish Party could do without abandoning their whole raison d'etre. Clancy was thus forced to work with Birrell and the Irish Lord Chancellor to find a reduced form of state subsidy. The resulting Irish Housing Act, known as the Clancy Act, was passed in December 1908 as a pale imitation of the original. Many of the less important clauses were residues from the 1903 Housing Conference, such as that allowing municipalities to offer rate rebates to private builders (Irish Party MPs did not hide the fact that they expected this to have little effect). And, to match British powers, the limit on municipal borrowing was finally lifted and loan periods were extended to a maximum of 80 years. Loan terms were slightly improved, but only to the lowest current rate available from the Local Loans Fund. There was to be a two-year moratorium before repayment began, and municipalities were able to borrow on the new terms to reschedule their housing debts. When it came to the central issue of subsidy, the Clancy Act demonstrated the limitations of the Irish Party. True the first direct subsidy for urban housing was created through a Irish Housing Fund, but the amount had been cut to just around £6,000 per year. This sum was derived from the annual proceeds of investing £80,000 from of the Suitors Fund in the Irish Supreme Courts and £100,000 of consols from the Dormant Suitors Fund; enabling the Treasury to argue that it had not compromised its opposition to the principle of urban subsidy. "There
was no charge on the Exchequer", boasted the Chancellor, David Lloyd George, to the House of Commons.\textsuperscript{154} Furthermore, the Treasury also extracted its pound of flesh by secretly blocking all attempts by Irish urban authorities to reschedule their debts, and by agreeing with the ILGB that 80-year loans would only be given to buy land, and never to build dwellings.\textsuperscript{155} The result was continual animosity between the Irish Party and the Treasury, with the latter clearly resenting having to give improved financial terms to Nationalist authorities in Ireland.\textsuperscript{156} The Liberal Government proved more resistant to attempts by the Conservative-dominated House of Lords to mutilate the measure. Anglo-Irish landowners, who had consistently opposed Dublin Corporation's boundary extension, were alarmed by the possibility of slum dwellers being rehoused \textit{en masse} in Rathmines or Pembroke. "I do not wish to say anything that may be in the back of the minds of the Nationalist Members of Parliament," declared the Earl of Mayo, "but the real truth of the matter is that if that were allowed to take place it would alter the Parliamentary representation of the South Dublin constituency."\textsuperscript{157} In the end the Clancy Act went through the Lords unloved but unchanged.

The Irish Party were dismayed by the dilution of the 1908 Housing Act. The Treasury were cast as villains, and the measure was portrayed instead as a crucial \textit{first step} towards the solution of the urban problem. John Redmond declared triumphantly that urban subsidy was "an entire innovation; there is nothing of the kind known in the legislation of England or of Scotland", and he later boasted that the IPP had "set an example to Great Britain."\textsuperscript{158} This line was echoed by Clancy when he said that "for the first time in the history of such legislation, cheap money and a free grant in aid would be afforded for the erection of houses for the workers in towns."\textsuperscript{159} In this manner, the 1908 Clancy Act joined the Labourers Acts in the party's litany of legislative achievements. The United Irish League called it "one of the most beneficent measures ever secured by the Irish Party", and the \textit{Freemans Journal} even described it as "the greatest aid won for reform during the last twenty years."\textsuperscript{160} Praise was forthcoming from Catholic clergy, such as the Bishop of Galway, and the Irish Party carefully used the 1908 Act to legitimise its approach. John Redmond told one meeting "that what they have done for the farmers, and what they have done for the agricultural labourers, they have also done for the artisans of the towns"; he later added with satisfaction that "with the great question of the Housing of the Working Classes practically settled, the decks are clear for Home Rule."\textsuperscript{161} Indeed, the principal aim of the IPP was to use the Clancy Act as tangible propaganda against the independent labour movement. Redmond noted:

"We have obtained for Ireland a measure which, in principle, is far ahead of anything proposed by John Burns in his Bill. That is a great achievement, and it is an indication that we are trustworthy representatives of the masses of people in the towns.....we will in future, as in the past, endeavour to fulfil for Ireland in the fullest sense THE FUNCTIONS
OF A LABOUR PARTY, believing that we are the Labour Party, as far as Ireland is concerned.\textsuperscript{162}

The Irish TUC loyally agreed in 1911 that the IPP "has been a Labour Party not only for Ireland, but for Great Britain, and the most effective that the masses could desire.....The workers of England, Scotland, or Wales would be glad to have so potent a force at their command."\textsuperscript{163}

2.5 The results of the 1908 Irish Housing Act

Although the Treasury had cut urban subsidy, the 1908 Clancy Act still had a great effect. It provided a further boost to a pre-war climate of opinion in Ireland that overwhelmingly favoured the municipalisation of working-class housing. Once again, only a few dared to express dissent.\textsuperscript{164} By contrast, municipal representatives were totally enthusiastic. "For twenty years", said one Wexford alderman, "they had been trying to deal with the housing question, but until the Clancy Act came along they had been able to do little."\textsuperscript{165} Clancy boasted that municipalities were now only too keen to act due to the carrot of subsidy, rather than the stick of legal compulsion:

"In England they had to be coerced in this matter. The Irish public bodies did not require to be coerced. They would gladly enter into schemes if they had any reasonable hope that they would not have to burden the ratepayers to any considerable extent."\textsuperscript{166}

The greater degree of municipalisation in Ireland was noted at the time by official departments such as the ILGB, and also by English housing experts interested in Irish rural and urban initiatives.\textsuperscript{167} There were many Dublin Castle officials, notably the ILGB's Chief Engineering Inspector, Dr Peter Cowan, who personally favoured public utility companies and co-partnership housing societies, on the grounds that these promoted values of self-reliance and individualism.\textsuperscript{168} But the reality in Ireland of a moribund private house-building industry, and then the collapse of semi-philanthropic activity, meant that there was little choice for the Castle administration but to support municipalisation. In early 1909, the Irish Board of Works and the ILGB both predicted a surge of municipal house-building under the Clancy Act.\textsuperscript{169} They were not to be disappointed. Two years after the measure was passed, a total of £150,000 had been advanced to 24 urban authorities and the ILGB were inspecting over 40 further proposals.\textsuperscript{170} Allowing for a time-lag for schemes to be designed and approved, the surge induced by the 1908 Act was shown in 1911-13 by the first real peak in public loans for Irish urban housing [Diagram D; Table Y]. Average annual housing loans to urban authorities in the five-year period prior to 1908 had been £11,685: in the five years after the Clancy Act the figure soared to

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£80,550 per year. The zenith reached £230,000 in 1912-13, meaning that municipal housing received nearly half of all the public loans in Ireland that year. By 1914 around 80 out of 125 urban authorities had taken out public advances for housing, to a combined total of around £950,000. House completions boomed accordingly. The number of dwellings built by Irish urban authorities, which had been less than 80 per year immediately prior to the Clancy Act, rose steadily from 329 cottages in 1909-10, to 709 cottages in 1910-11, before dipping slightly to 665 the following year. Official statistics vary slightly, but a reasonable assumption is that a cumulative total of 7,600 dwellings had been built by Irish urban authorities by 1914. This meant that Ireland, with a pre-war urban population only 5% of that in Britain, had a municipal housing stock equal to nearly a third of the estimated 24,000 units in British urban areas. In other words, Irish municipalities had built proportionately almost seven times as much per head of urban population.

The partial subsidy under the 1908 Clancy Act was clearly the decisive factor. Municipalities found that the amount they received from the Irish Housing Fund was sufficient to cover the interest charge on public loans, and Clancy boasted that "since 1908 not only has no expense whatsoever fallen on rates, but the various town authorities have had the rents of the houses built as pure profit." This was later echoed by Chief Secretary Birrell when he told the Treasury that "the Clancy Act.....enabled schemes to be started without loss, and led to a healthy rivalry among the different urban authorities." This rivalry was probably greatest amongst the middle-sized UDCs. This category had by 1914 increased its share of Irish municipal housing to nearly 60%. Urban councils in provincial centres took advantage of the Clancy Act to augment their stock prior to the First World War, including Galway (194 dwellings), Kilkenny (140 dwellings), Wexford (117 dwellings), and Drogheda (116 dwellings). Yet easily the most active were still in the southern suburbs of Dublin. Top came Kingstown UDC, with a total in 1914 of nearly 450 dwellings, followed by Pembroke UDC and Rathmines UDC with 354 dwellings apiece, and then Blackrock UDC with 205 units. These four Dublin suburbs had built 1,360 dwellings, nearly 20% of the total in Ireland. Given that their combined population was only around 95,000, they therefore they had rehoused around 6.5% of their inhabitants in municipal dwellings (over three times the Irish national average). The causes lay in the political composition of the southern Dublin suburbs, and particularly in the way in which supporters of the Irish Party used municipal housing to win working-class votes in their bid to overturn Unionist control. For instance, in 1911 a councillor in the smaller suburb of Dalkey reminded the voters that "when the Nationalists assumed control of the administration of Dalkey they saw that magnificent, comfortable and sanitary dwellings were erected for the working classes.....under the Clancy Act." Housing was also a
key issue in adjacent Blackrock, not least because William Field was a councillor in one of the Nationalist wards. But perhaps the most political use of housing was in Pembroke, where Nationalists finally won control in January 1911 after campaigning on a ticket that derided the record of the previous Unionist council on the issue. A massive housing programme was duly inaugurated by the energetic new Chairman, Councillor Charles O'Neill, and became a key symbol for the success of the constitutional Nationalist approach at municipal level. Of the south Dublin suburbs, only Rathmines UDC remained unique in continuing to be run by Unionists; yet it too realised the need to build, or else risk unflattering comparisons with its neighbours.

The converse of increased activity by the middle-sized UDCs, was that the six large county boroughs saw their proportion of Irish municipal housing slide to only 38% by 1914. These largest centres had by this point rehoused an average of just 1.3% of their inhabitants. Dublin Corporation continued to be the largest single builder of dwellings, even if the losses on its tenement schemes and the ferocious opposition to its 1907 Omnibus Bill now made it painfully tentative in its housing aims. An awkward working relationship grew between constitutional Nationalist councillors such as Coughlan Briscoe and Lorcan Sherlock (Lord Mayor from 1912-14), and the Sinn Fein team of Thomas Kelly and William Cosgrave. Both groups believed that housing should be the top priority for Corporation expenditure, but beyond this there was much disagreement and obstructionism. The agreement reached in late 1911 to set up a Housing Committee was not implemented until February 1913. Much internal debate arose from the fact that all but two of Dublin Corporation's pre-war schemes incurred substantial losses, with the result that its rent income of nearly £12,000 per year met only half the housing deficit and thus necessitated a charge to the rates of 2.5d in the £1. Yet the advent of subsidy was an undoubted help: a later estimate was that after the 1908 Clancy Act, Dublin Corporation received aid from the Exchequer equal to around 10% of its expenditure. Thus by the outbreak of the First World War the total of Corporation dwellings built stood at around 1,450 units in a dozen or so schemes. This represented nearly 5% of Dublin's housing stock, compared to an average provision by pre-war British municipalities of not more than 1% of the stock. Dublin Corporation chose another comparative statistic to show that it had built more proportionately more housing than any other city in the United Kingdom. The Corporation claimed repeatedly that by 1914 it had rehoused 2.5% of its population in municipal dwellings, and thereby exceeded the more famous programmes of Liverpool Corporation (2,895 dwellings, but for only 1.7% of the population) and the LCC (10,000 dwellings for only 1.2% of the population; rising to 1.5% if the 2,500 units by lower tier London authorities are included). It was an accurate claim, but what Dublin Corporation failed to mention was that, while in Britain the large cities led the way, in
Ireland the southern Dublin suburbs such as Kingstown or Pembroke had provided many more dwellings per head of population than it had. Of the three other county boroughs in Southern Ireland, the most curious fact is that Cork Corporation carried out no schemes under the 1908 Irish Housing Act (in striking contrast to the 546 dwellings it has built up to 1906, and which still meant that Cork was the second largest owner of municipal dwellings). A possible reason for the hiatus after 1908 lay in the political structure of Cork, in which Independent Nationalists under William O'Brien held much influence. The result was that there was not the decisive combination of active Irish Party MPs plus the Town Tenants League, that was to prove so effective in promoting the Clancy Act in other centres of nationalism (indeed in Sligo, the local IPP member even suggested that a branch of the League be formed just to coordinate the housing campaign). By the First World War, both Waterford and Limerick Corporations had each built over 250 dwellings; the latter providing most of its contribution in four pre-war estates under the impetus of the local Irish Party MP and councillor, Alderman Joyce, and a particularly energetic branch of the Town Tenants League that pressed vociferously for low-rent municipal cottages.

The fact that Londonderry Corporation had still not built a single house by the First World War was more to be expected. Urban authorities of whatever size in Ulster were reluctant to engage on local expenditure, and defended their inaction with the Unionist argument that housing conditions were not nearly as bad as in Southern Ireland. It has been estimated that in Northern Ireland a total of only 634 houses were built by municipalities up to 1919. And yet it was Ulster that provided the clearest example of opportunism under the Clancy Act. Belfast Corporation decided in late-1909 to undertake a massive slum clearance scheme to replace 700 dwellings in and around Hamill Street, in the western industrial area that lay between the Falls Road and the Shankhill Road. There were a number of reasons for this. The downturn in speculative house-building provoked calls for Unionist municipalisation in emulation of Liverpool Corporation, though always expressed in loyalist terms. "It was from the urban classes that the Government got soldiers for its army and sailors for its fleet", Alderman Dr King Kerr proclaimed, "and if the population declined in physique and numbers owing to bad housing conditions, it was obvious that that was a very serious consideration for the Government." But what finally spurred Belfast Corporation to act was the advent of subsidy, since it realised that it could silence its critics and yet ensure there would be no cost to the precious guarded rates. The Imperial Treasury, alarmed by a request for a huge public loan of £108,000, wanted initially to tell Belfast Corporation to raise the sum by issuing municipal stock. However the Treasury realised that it would be unable to refuse without an Unionist outcry of unequal treatment compared to Nationalist authorities. Belfast Corporation duly got its loan and began an extensive clearance in 1912, only then to procrastinate (rebuilding
was not finally started until 1917). The delay provoked a stinging attack in early 1914 by the ILGB's Chief Engineering Inspector, Dr Peter Cowan, on the grounds that the subsidy to the Corporation to clear the site had drained the Irish Housing Fund, and yet there were no houses to show from it. Even more serious were allegations by the Irish Party MP for West Belfast, Joseph Devlin, that the delay proved the Unionist Corporation had only cleared the area for the sectarian purpose of breaking up the Catholic vote in the local elections. This bitter controversy certainly did not help the rehousing work to start. But the real reason for delay, as will be seen below, was the Corporation's inability to secure tenders low enough to convince the house-builders' and ratepayers' lobbies that there were be no loss to the rates. The Nationalist accusations of housing sectarianism sprang from Belfast's social structure and the pre-war 'Ulster Crisis'. Since the most deprived slums were likely to be inhabited by poor Catholic labourers, as Hamill Street certainly was, then it was this group that was bound to be dispersed. In pre-war Liverpool, similar religious and political divides led to an identical accusation, but here too it was the product of wider ideological divisions rather than a conscious housing policy. In Belfast it was particularly odd of Nationalists to accuse the Corporation of gerry-mandering through slum clearance when, unlike say Liverpool Corporation, it did not even propose a major scheme until 1909!

2.6 Housing design in pre-war municipal schemes

The subsidy under the 1908 Irish Housing Act increased the pressure on municipalities to keep rents low. Clancy declared that "a grant in aid out of public funds is necessary, if, in the effort to house the POORER SECTIONS OF THE WORKERS in towns at rents which they can pay." The pre-war Mayor of Dublin concurred:

"We do not ask the assistance of the state to enable local authorities in Ireland to build houses for artisans......who, by virtue of their positions in life, are able to pay economic rents. I appeal for that mass of humanity existing in all cities on small wages and casual employment - the very poor who are unable to protect themselves."

The target now commonly cited by Irish municipalities was a rent at only 10% of the average labourers' wage, ie. around 2s per week. The Clancy Act appears to have nearly achieved this ideal. An ILGB breakdown of municipal rents in late 1913 showed that well over half of dwellings were let at between 2-3s per week, and only the upper quarter had rents over 3s9d per week. And due to the subvention from the Irish Housing Fund, urban authorities also found they could avoid a loss to the rates. All this was in marked contrast to Britain, where the effect of the 1909 Housing and Town Planning Act was to
further concentrate activity on higher-standard garden suburbs for skilled workers.\textsuperscript{196} The policy in Ireland had a marked effect on design, for it meant a relatively greater cost-paring and utilitarianism in pre-war housing. One Irish municipality declared in 1913 that "it is evident that the most we can expect to provide is a sanitary dwelling, without any of that ornamentation, and even luxury, which marks the houses at present being built in the garden cities of England and elsewhere." The ILGB's chief housing expert agreed that there "has been no extravagant expenditure on houses larger than are required by families of moderate size; on the contrary, the authorities have striven to build houses which could be let at economic rents within the means of the poorer classes."\textsuperscript{197}

The ILGB laid down no standard type plans under the Clancy Act, as it had with full subsidy in the 1906 Labourers Act. Instead it merely set the first space requirements for urban dwellings: living rooms were to be a minimum of 1200 cu.ft (150 sq.ft); the main bedroom to be 960 cu.ft (120 sq.ft); and other bedrooms at least 640 cu.ft (80 sq.ft). These standards appear to have been rigourously enforced. The ILGB also made it clear that it regarded the self-contained two-storey cottage as the paradigm, and that what it wanted to see larger schemes and lower densities than hitherto.\textsuperscript{198} This championing of cottage estates was however rather superfluous in Ireland after the 1908 Act, since, given the disastrous precedent of Dublin Corporation's tenement schemes, it was the preferred model anyway. The United Irish League, for instance, called on municipalities in 1911 "to provide cottage homes, with a patch of garden and as much space as possible for play and recreation grounds."\textsuperscript{199} There was, however, little interest in design innovation. The typical Clancy Act design still conformed to the rigid layout and narrow-frontage terraced plan that had been used by bodies such as Cork Corporation from the 1880s. Pre-war examples of plain brick municipal terraces, with 2-3 bedrooms and frontages varying between 12'6"-16'6", were found in Waterford, Dundalk, and elsewhere: it was a conservative design approach that echoed the low-cost type officially recommended in 1913 by the English LGB.\textsuperscript{200} The connection between minimal rents and unambitious design was particularly intense where land costs were high, again notably in Dublin. Steering a course between criticisms of tenement blocks and expensive suburban schemes, Dublin Corporation from 1908 tended to build self-contained cottages on cleared inner-city sites.\textsuperscript{201} The dominant concern was that of Nationalist councillors, such as the pre-war Lord Mayor, Lorcan Sherlock, to see that the subsidy achieved by the Irish Party was made manifest by low rents. Sinn Fein members were also determined to restrict council expenditure, and the first woman councillor, Sarah Harrison, proved from 1913 to be a redoubtable champion of labourers' interests. In 1912 the Corporation agreed a resolution to let all new municipal dwellings at only 1s per room (this was a target that had been set by Liverpool Corporation in the 1880s but never achieved).\textsuperscript{202} Yet at the same time the
Corporation responded to ILGB criticisms of its piecemeal strategy, by also deciding on a costly policy to build cottages to a higher space standard than officially required. All bedrooms were to be a minimum of 1000 cu.ft (125 sq.ft), and furthermore a small playground was included in every scheme. The outcome was that only two small Clancy Act schemes were actually completed by Dublin Corporation before the First World War, at Cook Street (1912-14) and Linenhall (1913-14). Together they contributed only 93 two-storey 3-room cottages, at a density of around 40 dwellings per acre. In addition there were in 1914 a number of similar slum-clearance schemes in the pipeline, such as Beresford Street/Church Street, Spitalfields, and Ormond Market (as well as two atypical proposals to build small flats for dock labourers in response to union demands for cheap housing). It would appear that the pre-war Dublin Corporation had only limited success in rehousing the poor: nearly 70% of its dwellings in late 1913 were 1-3 room tenement flats at rents between 1s-3s6d per week, and just over 30% were 2-4 rooms cottages at 2s6d-7s6d per week. Whilst its cottage rents averaged only two-thirds of that paid by DADC tenants for a similar dwelling, the typical pre-war Dublin Corporation estate still contained probably around 25% artisans. Daly has suggested that the Corporation catered for a sector that lay between the very poor in the tenements, and the working class elite housed by the DADC.203

Limerick Corporation developed a slightly different house design, based on an Irish urban vernacular type used previously by municipalities in Waterford and elsewhere. The type used in Limerick was also terraced, yet had a very wide frontage of between 21-23 ft to allowed a window to be placed on either side of the front door. Being double-fronted, it was hence nearly square on plan.204 There were three variants: a single-storey 3-room cottage; a two-storey 4-room cottage with attic bedrooms and dormer windows upstairs; and a larger 5-room type to provide either 3 bedrooms or 2 bedrooms plus parlour. The rear addition was eliminated entirely in the two smaller types by bringing the scullery, WC, and coal store into the main body of the house. One of the wide-frontage schemes by pre-war Limerick Corporation was built in the decayed central district of Pennywell, and included Mitchell Street and Grattan Street [Figs.27-28]. Such radical planning however created problems. For instance, in the 4-room house the WC was located directly off the scullery, and the coal store opened into the living room.

A few Irish municipalities sought to follow the previous lead of Rathmines and Kingstown, and hold design competitions. Nationalist examples include Waterford Corporation (1909), Athy UDC (1909), and Queenstown UDC (1910).205 Yet the most important pre-war competition was that held by Belfast Corporation in 1912-13, in an attempt to reconcile conflicting pressures from the ILGB for a high standard of rehousing,
and those from Unionist councillors determined to cut costs. The Belfast competition nearly resulted in a break from the normal terraced plan, since the winning practice from Cork, Chillingworth and Levie, proposed an ingenious solution for pairs of semi-detached, wide-fronted dwellings arranged either as single-storey bungalows or else as two-storey flats with a side entrance [Fig.29]. Each type was compactly planned, with no rear projections, and had a WC, scullery, and 1 or 2 bedrooms opening off a main living room/kitchen. Elevations were in a simplified neo-Georgian style, with well-proportioned sash windows and hipped roofs. The front facade of the semi-detached flats gave the impression of a substantial villa due to the absence of a front door or obvious internal subdivision. However, as soon as it was found that this design came over budget, Belfast Corporation reverted to a dull terraced plan (prepared by the Assistant City Surveyor) with only a 13’6” frontage and an external WC in the rear yard. This retrogressive decision prompted an already irate ILGB to accuse Belfast Corporation of having no real commitment to housing quality.206 The result was a full-blooded row in early-1914 that disrupted any hope of progress in the rehousing work.

If competitions were unable to achieve better design within cost limits, then the only alternative option for municipalities was to pursue the English strategy of building large cottages at higher rents. But this was only feasible in the wealthier southern Dublin suburbs such as Pembroke and Dalkey, which contained a significant number of skilled artisans and lower-middle class tenants. As the pre-war slump gradually eroded housing supply for this better-paid sector, so a few municipalities found themselves compelled to deviate from the general policy of rent-minimisation. The Freemans Journal defended the much-praised Nationalist Pembroke UDC on the grounds that the authority had to deal with an unfavourable combination of high land and building costs, plus a very low rate income.207 However, the distinct policy in Dublin's southern suburbs did enable distinguished architects, such as Thomas Manly Deane for Dalkey UDC, and younger specialists such as Edwin Bradbury for Pembroke UDC and J.L. Donnelly for Blackrock UDC, to design to a higher standard than found elsewhere under the Clancy Act.208 The Irish Builder lauded the Pembroke scheme by Bradbury at Home Villas and St Brocs Villas in Auburn Avenue, Donnybrook (1911-12).209 Here some 88 cottages were provided for a cost of £24,000, the majority in two-storey terraces with a 15’6” frontage and containing a living room (135 sq.ft) and 3 bedrooms (120 sq.ft/90 sq.ft). There were also 11 smaller single-storey cottages with a 20’3” frontage, comprising living room (149 sq.ft) and 2 bedrooms (106 sq.ft/69 sq.ft). The long brick elevations were punctuated by sash windows and a striking rhythm of partially-rendered gables [Fig.30]. All dwellings had the luxury of a plumbed bath and sink in the scullery. The corollary was rents of 4s9d per week for the single-storey units, and 7s for the larger 4-room cottages. Another of the
ambitious architects used by pre-war Pembroke UDC, George O'Connor, became (as will be seen in Chapter 4) one of the leading polemicists for innovative housing design. O'Connor declared in 1912, as incoming president of the Architectural Association of Ireland, that "a hygienic and comfortable home, not unbeautiful in its external appearance, suitably planned to house the worker, was of really more importance to a nation than magnificent public buildings, and should not be beneath anyone's interest." 210

2.7 Responses to the inadequacy of the Irish Housing Fund

The Irish Housing Fund was a fixed, ad-hoc subsidy unrelated to demand, and the sum of £6,000 per year was soon exhausted by a rush of applications by Belfast Corporation and other bodies. Thus, while in 1911-12 the fund paid subventions to 34 urban authorities sufficient to cover all their interest payments, by 1912-13 it could only meet 80% of loan charges. The following year municipalities received 36% of what they had to repay, and the momentum was such that, as an ILGB official noted, "this percentage will gradually diminish as fresh borrowings are effected." 211 From the outset, Clancy had pledged that "it must be the business of the Irish Party to see to it that additions are made to this fund as opportunity offers." 212 The IPP were provided with an immediate chance in June 1909, during the uproar over the attempt by the Conservative Opposition and the House of Lords to defeat Lloyd George's 'People's Budget'. The increases that the 1909 Budget imposed on whiskey were extremely unpopular in Ireland, and the IPP were not convinced by the controversial new taxes on the 'unearned' site-value of land. In Britain, Lloyd George had already promised disgruntled urban authorities half the proceeds of new land-tax revenue, to be used as supplemental rate relief from the Exchequer for education services 213. Now the Irish Party began to demand, in return for supporting the Budget, that half of Ireland's share of the controversial land revenue be given to municipalities, not for education, but to subsidise urban housing. "THE RESULT OF THIS LAND TAX", Redmond told his supporters, "will be, most undoubtedly, that a considerable sum of money, and an increasing sum of money, will be available year by year to swell this Housing Fund in our Housing Bill." 214 Amidst the escalating political crisis in June 1910, the IPP leader was still reminding Parliament "that so far as Ireland is concerned we desired to have the half of the Land Taxes which were to go to local authorities, and that they should be reserved for the purpose of assisting our schemes for the housing of the working classes in the towns." 215 But the demand for increased urban subsidy was halted, as in the last chapter, by the need of the Irish Party's to show unity with the Liberal Government during the constitutional storm of 1911 and the subsequent introduction of the 3rd Home Rule Bill. Instead the IPP could now only ask Nationalist municipalities to wait for Home Rule when
a more sympathetic Irish Parliament could augment state subvention; and Chief Secretary Birrell brushed off attacks by arguing, against all the evidence, that the existing Irish Housing Fund was adequate. A brief flurry of interest came in February 1912 when the Treasury quietly tried to top up the capital in the Irish Housing Fund, after the Irish Dormant Suitors Fund had become slightly over-stretched. Opposition MPs seized on the incident to embarrass the Liberal Government over the boast made in 1908 that no British tax revenue was going towards Irish urban housing. But the sum involved was so minor, and clearly did no more than maintain the existing subsidy.

Against the background of a hamstrung Irish Party, the Association of Municipal Authorities of Ireland (hereafter AMAI) was formed in September 1912 after a conference organised by a town-planning pressure group (see Chapter 4). The role of the AMAI was to coordinate the campaign for increased urban housing subsidy. Soon it was demanding that municipalities receive public loans on Labourers Acts terms, and that the Irish Housing Fund be tripled to provide a subsidy of £20,000 per year. The AMAI was therefore quite different from its counterpart in Britain (the Association for Municipal Corporations had been formed in 1872 and by 1890s had become an effective mouthpiece of "municipal socialism"), in that it was the specific product of the pre-war municipalisation of urban housing in Ireland. It was also avowedly non-partisan in its aims. The Irish Times observed that it had chosen the only pre-war issue which had "the rare merit of being supported, in principle, by all Irish members of Parliament, without distinction of party"; and the AMAI's secretary noted "that the exclusion of politics from the business of the association is one of its fundamental principles." Soon 62 Irish municipalities had joined, and within the climate of the "Ulster Crisis" it had received a letter of support from the Ulster Unionist leader, Sir Edward Carson. An active participant in the AMAI was Belfast Corporation's housing enthusiast, Dr King Kerr, who urged "a great patriotic movement in which we can all take part, whether we come from the north or the south, whatever may be the particular shade of our party politics." Yet it was obvious that the majority of members were Nationalists, the most influential being Lorcan Sherlock (Lord Mayor of Dublin), Charles O'Neill (Chairman of Pembroke UDC), Thomas McGahon (Chairman of Dundalk UDC), and George Hadden (Alderman of Wexford UDC). Irish Party housing spokesmen such as Clancy and Field were soon closely involved, and the alliance was cemented in June 1913 when John Redmond received an AMAI deputation in London. The IPP then used the AMAI to distract attention from a campaign by Independent Nationalists which demanded that new funds earmarked for National Insurance in Ireland be given to urban housing subsidy instead. Yet the dilemma remained that the Irish Party, which from the turn of the century had seized on urban housing as an element in the policy of constitutional Nationalism, had by 1913 no real
strategy to win increased state subsidy. The absorption of the AMAI only reduced the effectiveness of the latter body in its campaign to convince the British Government.

2.8 The 1913-14 Dublin Lock-out and the housing issue

In mid-1913 the Liberal Government and the Irish Administration were confronted by a more urgent crisis in Dublin, namely the bitter industrial conflict provoked by the Irish Transport and General Workers Union as part of Larkin's campaign to bring socialism to Ireland. Larkin was by this point the virtual master of the Port of Dublin, but the ITGWU policy to incorporate all local unskilled labour ran into trouble when it targetted the employees of the Dublin United Tramway Company. This company was owned by one of Ireland's wealthiest railway capitalists, William Martin Murphy, who was also proprietor of the O'BrieniteIrish Independent and a trenchant opponent of trade unions. Simmering industrial unrest escalated into a full blooded confrontation when the ITGWU called a tram strike during the popular Dublin Horse Show in late August 1913. After a series of further provocations, Murphy galvanised the Dublin Employers' Federation into 'locking-out' all members of the ITGWU and sympathetic unions. Soon some 25,000 men were out of work in what had become an enforced general strike, and a total of around 100,000 members of Dublin's long-suffering working classes were without income. The United Kingdom's most titanic struggle to date in the struggle between capital and labour resulted in Dublin being plunged into a state of disorder. James Larkin called it "this grand class war", and his associate James Connolly wrote that "Our enemy is the governing class; the political force of that enemy is the Liberal Government." Aided by the repressive elements of state, such as the Law Courts and the Dublin Metropolitan Police, and by conservative bodies such as the Roman Catholic Church, the employers inexorably wore down the ITGWU. But in doing so they lost much public support. Both Larkin and Connolly were temporarily jailed, causing widespread outcry. Police behaviour during the mass demonstration on "Bloody Sunday" on 31 August 1913 was undoubtedly brutal, killing two demonstrators and injuring hundreds of others. Alarmed by the conditions in Dublin, Chief Secretary Birrell told the Cabinet that the city "had been living in a state of terror under Larkin." The Castle Administration set up an inquiry into the dispute in September 1913, but the Dublin employers ignored its conciliatory report as well as appeals from a wide range of socialists and moderates including George Bernard Shaw and George ("A.E.") Russell. In November 1913 James Connolly defied the employers' hard-line stance by founding the Citizens Army to protect the ITGWU against attack. But in reality the ITGWU was by now depleted by a shortage of funds, and the failure to convince moderate British trade unions to support it. There was a gradual drift back to
work and the dispute finally collapsed in February 1914. The glorious attempt to forge a socialist Ireland had ended in a defeat that retarded the growth of trade unions and the nascent Irish Labour Party for several decades.225

An important by-product of economic turmoil was the establishment by the Castle Administration of the 1913-14 Dublin Housing Inquiry. The immediate impetus for the inquiry was the collapse on 2nd September 1913 of two dilapidated tenement houses in Church Street, a particularly bad slum area which the Corporation intended to clear. Seven people were killed. But, as was pointed out at the time, a fatal house collapse in itself was not enough to produce a major investigation: similar disasters had occurred previously in Dublin and other British cities, with no official response.226 Far more important was the realisation by the Castle Administration and Dublin's middle classes that, at a time of bitter industrial upheaval (the city was still reeling from the "Bloody Sunday" riot and the uproar over Larkin's imprisonment), the horrors of the slums constituted a damning social indictment. The ITGWU turned the 'housing issue' into an active element in class relations, and for explicitly political purposes. "Labour advocates were not slow to see in this Church Street calamity a splendid object-lesson of the evils of Dublin capitalism," wrote a contemporary observer.227 Housing conditions and tenement owners became the scapegoat for the failure of the economic system in Dublin.

James Larkin and the ITGWU had for several years been trying to seize the urban housing initiative away from moderate trade unions and the Irish Party. This was quite different from pre-war Britain, where skilled unions were most active in demanding municipal housing for their members, and where even in militant cities like Glasgow, unskilled labourers took no part in major rent strikes.228 What was unique about Dublin in 1913 was that it was the under-class of casual labourers that was at the forefront of housing demands. James Connolly used the slums as a tangible and emotive illustration of his central Marxist argument that capitalism was an alien system introduced by British colonizers to exploit Irish labour and resources, and had brutally overthrown a pre-industrial Gaelic society that had more in common with socialism. The ITGWU tried to improve the life of its members by setting up a 'model' social and recreation centre (first at Liberty Hall and later at Croydon Park), and it used the Irish Worker to ally housing reform with socialism. Connolly wrote that by building up their union, "the people will be given a better chance of living - they will be given better wages and better housing accommodation, instead of living in the slums."229 The ITGWU launched vitriolic attacks on its enemies in the Irish Party and Catholic Church, arguing that housing progress could only be achieved by electing genuine working-class municipal representatives to root out the interests of slum landlords. The Dublin Labour Party began
its manifesto for Corporation elections in January 1914 with the slogan: "VOTE FOR LABOUR and SWEEP AWAY THE SLUMS." It was not surprising, therefore, that during the 1913 Dublin Lock-out the ITGWU characterised the slums as the most visible product of the war that British and Irish capitalism waged on Irish labour. Larkin told the inquiry into labour unrest that:

"What was the position of affairs in connection with industrial life in Ireland? there are 21,000 families - four and a half persons to a family - living in single rooms. Who are responsible? The gentlemen opposite to him [Dublin employers] would have to accept the responsibility. They said they control the means of life; then the responsibility rests upon them. Twenty-one thousand people multiplied by five, over 100,000 people huddled together in the putrid slums of Dublin."

A follower of Larkin told the same inquiry:

"The long period of stagnation in the labour ranks of Dublin was responsible for the growth in your midst of labour and housing conditions scarcely to be equalled outside Bombay or Constantinople. Now that the Irish Transport Union and its officials have set out to arouse the people; now that the fierce fighting has inspired the suffering masses with a belief in their own ability to achieve some sort of emancipation; now, in short, that the luxury, comfort, and even the security of the propertied classes are menaced, we see the quickening of a faint sense of social conscience in Dublin."

Then when it became clear that the strike was being lost, the IGTWU used the housing issue to instead draw attention away from its industrial defeat. Larkin proclaimed in January 1914:

"They, the workers, who produced all the wealth and built the houses of the rich, instead of living in the slums should be living in the fine mansions in Merrion Square and Mountjoy Square. the houses in which the workers lived were so bad that they should pay no rent for them. If the workers had the moral courage they would not pay a d**n cent of rent for the next twelve months. If that were done they would focus public attention on the question, and then the housing question in Dublin would solve itself."

After defeat came, Connolly declared that increased concern about the slums "was one of the fruits the strikers of Dublin had won through suffering, imprisonment, death and calumny that is crueler than death, in their historic conflict. Thus labour wins, even when it seems to have lost its all." A resolution passed at the Irish TUC in June 1914 declared defiantly that "labour unrest can only be ended by the abolition of the capitalist system of wealth-production, with its inherent injustice and poverty, and among the first steps to that end demands legislation to secure.....the building of healthy homes for all." It was an uncompromising message, repeated in the Worker (Connolly's short-lived successor to the Irish Worker) when it wrote:
"The houses of the poor of Dublin are altars, aye, altars to the worship of a Devil whose attendant ministers are the political and civic upholders of the capitalist system... Dublin slums, Dublin politics, Dublin misery are all but manifestations of the denial of that right for which we ask Dublin toilers to battle." 236

But what was most remarkable about pre-war Dublin was that middle-class reformers responded so directly to attempts by the radical labour movement to turn the housing issue into a weapon of class warfare. Daly has recently suggested, following Stedman Jones' analysis of class relations in London during the 1880s, that it was the threat of socialism represented by the ITGWU lock-out that provoked widespread alarm about the slums. 237 Crucial here was a growing belief in Ireland in the sociological theory of environmental determinism, which held that criminality and social unrest amongst the poor were not hereditary but the product of bad living conditions. As one English observer wrote of the 1913 Strike:

"It is beyond doubt that the evil social conditions of Dublin were a cause, possibly the primary cause, of the Larkinite movement obtaining the hold it did. In the depressed and degraded population of the slums Mr Larkin found a double source of strength... minds have been set actively at work to find a solution of the housing and other problems inherent in the present conditions of the city's life. If eventually out of the evil of labour strife good should come in the form of a reconstructed Dublin, the memory of Larkinism will be a less painful one; but nothing that may happen will deprive it of the reputation it has won as being the crudest and cruellest emanation of Labour belligerency that modern history takes count of." 238

Similar views were voiced by Irish commentators. A leading Catholic social reformer, Dr John O'Connell, stated that "at the bottom of all the trouble in Dublin for the past six months was the question of housing accommodation, and the lawlessness and discontent which occurred could never have manifested itself if the houses in which the working classes lived were satisfactory." 239 Another housing reformer, E.A. Aston, wrote:

"The growth of Syndicalism, in the form of Larkin... cannot be accounted for by any natural tendency of the workman of Dublin. The heather of revolt against intolerable conditions of life has been dried in the one hundred thousand inhabitants of the twenty thousand single tenement rooms of Dublin. Syndicalism set the heather on fire, the conflagration extends, and even the conservative and restraining influence of the Catholic Church have failed to stay its progress." 240

Alarmist warnings also came from academic observers, as part of a tendency of the nationalist intelligentsia to temporarily blur labour issues into the general attack on British rule. The Professor of Architecture at UCD, William Scott, opined that "many of the evils of the unrest are generated in the unsuitable, insanitary, ungenial and unsympathetic dwellings and environment of the worker." 241 Professor Kettle of the UCD Economics Department wrote of the syndicalist threat to Dublin:
"We must put before them [working classes] a planned, systematic scheme for the extinction of the slums....and we have got to carry that scheme steadily through.....We have got to go down to the workers, and we must not go with empty hands. And mark that a housing scheme of this character will probably involve the acceptance of a sacrifice in the shape of a new rate by the better streets of the city.....It may be thought by men of little faith that it is impossible to find any mediating ground between the frenzy of Socialism and the obtuseness of Capitalism. If so, not only Dublin, but civilisation as we know it, approaches dissolution.«242

Kettle formed a short-lived 'Peace Committee' of leading Dublin citizens to mediate in the labour dispute and to draw up a programme for social reconstruction. At its first meeting in October 1913, E.A. Aston called on both Larkin and Murphy to unite "to carry out a high and holy war against the common enemy - the slum owner and the slum tenement in the City of Dublin. The combination of the force of the capitalist leader and the labour leader would produce the result they all longed for."243 Another avenue of concern over the link between the slums and the spread of labour militancy came from the Roman Catholic Church. In February 1914 the Irish Hierarchy issued a pastoral calling for sweeping housing reform in Dublin, and elsewhere one Irish Cardinal declared that "social reform is what we want. We want something done for the workmen, something done for the poor in the way of housing.....If that is done wonderful work will be done for social science, and social reform will kill socialism."244

Yet it was the Press throughout the United Kingdom that stirred up the greatest fears over housing conditions in Dublin. Both the Unionist Times and the Liberal Manchester Guardian connected the slums to Larkinism.245 In Ireland the most outspoken newspaper on the issue, the Irish Times, proclaimed that:

"the condition of the Dublin slums is responsible not only for disease and crime, but for much of our industrial unrest.....The members of the ITGWU live for the most part in slums like Church Street. Their domestic conditions make them an easy prey to plausible agitators. We believe that, if every unskilled labourer in Dublin were the tenant of a decent cottage of three, or even two, rooms, the city would not be divided to-day into two hostile camps."246

The same point was echoed by the Irish Builder when it wrote:

"The terrible labour unrest.....has been largely developed by reason of the bad condition of housing. It is safe to say that, had the labouring masses been better housed than they are.....the agitators who now dominate the labour mind in the city would never have obtained such influence. Decently housed men would never have fallen such a complete prey to mob-oratory.....the main factor that the citizens as a body are directly responsible for, and must grapple with and solve, is the housing problem."247

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Politicians from all parties in Ireland and Britain reinforced the consensual view that Dublin's slums predicated labour unrest, and hence property owners became isolated as the scapegoat. The Irish Party pursued an ambivalent strategy of sympathising with the anger of the urban working class, but also trying not to upset nationalist petty-bourgeois interests by avoiding direct denunciations of slum landlordism. Yet many of the party's supporters did speak out. "Bad housing and the evils that follow in its train," wrote the Chairman of Pembroke UDC, "is.....largely responsible for the discontent among the working classes." Sinn Fein members, notably Arthur Griffith and Patrick Pearse, used forthright condemnation of the slums during the 1913-14 Lock-out as part of its continuing campaign to win working class support away from constitutional Nationalism, and over to their militant brand of anti-British sentiment. In Westminster concern was expressed by several Conservative members, and the rising Liberal MP, Christopher Addison, protested to the Chancellor of the Exchequer over Larkin's imprisonment by noting that "the housing and wage conditions in Dublin are a disgrace to the community and I think he has done a good service in showing them up". Lloyd George concurred, and much to the displeasure of Chief Secretary Birrell, helped to secure Larkin's release. The sheer weight of the climate of opinion against property owners was such that only the belligerent leader of Dublin's employers, William Martin Murphy, tried to argue that the slums had little to do with industrial unrest and that the issue was simply being exploited by the ITGWU in their struggle to overthrow the social order. Yet his claim fell on deaf ears, and instead pressure mounted on the Castle Administration to mediate in the matter of Dublin's working-class housing.

2.9 The 1913-14 Dublin Housing Inquiry

In the wake of the Church Street collapse the Irish Times called for an official inquiry into housing in Dublin. Then in October 1913 Chief Secretary Birrell received three heavyweight deputations in quick succession. The first was from the Association of Municipal Authorities of Ireland, and was led by the Irish Party's housing spokesman, J.J. Clancy. The AMAI repeated its call for loans on Labourers Acts terms and an augmentation of the Irish Housing Fund to £20,000 per year. Clancy declared that "in view of recent events, and what was going on at present, the State, in the interests of society at large, was bound to intervene." Birrell as usual prevaricated, stating that the Liberal Government was currently considering its housing policy and that Ireland would have to wait and see what was offered to the United Kingdom as a whole. A similarly vague reply was given by Birrell to demands for increased urban subsidy made by a deputation from the Women's National Health Association of Ireland. What
particularly incensed the Chief Secretary was that this deputation was led by Lady Aberdeen, and received by her husband in his role as Lord Lieutenant! Birrell at this time was privately telling Prime Minister Asquith that he regretted that he could nothing to stop the Aberdeens from using their official influence in such matters.\textsuperscript{255} The tension within the Castle Administration reached a head with a third deputation in late October 1913, again led by Lady Aberdeen, but this time from the Housing and Town Planning Association of Ireland (hereafter HTPAI). This garden suburb propaganda body, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4, side-stepped the issue of state subsidy and instead demanded that a Vice-Regal Commission be set up: a call supported by numerous memorials to Dublin Castle at the time.\textsuperscript{256} In fact the Chief Secretary had as early as mid-September also arrived at the conclusion that an official inquiry was needed, but because of pressing matters had not publicised his decision. In a letter to Asquith he declared regret at having to hold inquiries into police conduct and the causes of industrial unrest before investigating the Dublin slums, noting that it was "rather dreadful to be wrangling about machinery in the midst of such squalor."\textsuperscript{257} Birrell knew that Irish public opinion would only be appeased by increased subsidy, and so therefore what was needed was accurate information to present to the Treasury about Dublin's housing problem and the financial implications of a proposed solutions. However, he rejected outright the calls for an exhaustive Vice-Regal Commission, and argued instead that a departmental inquiry by the ILGB would be quicker, cheaper, and easier to organise. Many of those who had previously called for a Vice-Regal inquiry, such as Dublin Corporation, accepted his alternative offer. Not so the HTPAI and Lord Lieutenant Aberdeen, who believed that Birrell was trying to downgrade the importance of the inquiry so that the British Government could evade its financial responsibility. The HTPAI even went to the expense of sending three representatives to London in order to pressurize Birrell. This lobby was also intended to give backing to Lord Lieutenant Aberdeen, who was over in London at the same time for a meeting with Prime Minister Asquith. The \textit{Times} alleged that Lord Aberdeen's aim was to overturn Birrell's decision to appoint a departmental inquiry.\textsuperscript{258} If so, the plan failed and, in any case, distrust about Birrell's intentions was misplaced. The Chief Secretary appears to have been genuinely concerned about the danger of a lengthy enquiry (the Royal Commission into Working Class Housing in Scotland, for instance, was set up in 1913 and did not report until 1917). As he told the HTPAI deputation, "quite frankly what I want is to have something in my hands by the time Parliament meets."\textsuperscript{259} Birrell readily agreed to hold the proceedings of the inquiry in public, and in his contemporary speeches he seized on the Castle Administration's role as mediator in housing reform to appeal for conciliation from the working classes, and to dispel criticism for having jailed Larkin.\textsuperscript{260} Yet what is less clear is why the four ILGB officials appointed to the inquiry committee - that is, Charles O'Conor, J.F. MacCabe, A.P.
Delany, and S. Watt - did not include the department's housing expert, Dr Peter Cowan. This led to some criticism of the lack of experience within the investigatory committee, but the choice was probably intended to be even-handed given that Cowan was known as a proponent of garden suburb design and a critic of Dublin Corporation's inner city schemes. Some sceptics doubted the commitment of the British Government given the imminence of Home Rule. But, in general, Nationalists and the AMAI believed that Birrell was acting in good faith, and that further urban housing subsidy would be forthcoming.

The Dublin Housing Inquiry sat for 17 days in November and December 1913, and heard evidence from 76 witnesses of widely different social backgrounds. It provided an unique analysis of contemporary attitudes to the issue of working class housing. Around a quarter of witnesses were members of Dublin Corporation; another quarter were Corporation officials; a further quarter could be classed as social reformers or housing experts; while the remainder represented either private interests, various church bodies, or labour organisations. Not surprisingly - and as noted at the time by figures such as J.J. Clancy - the inquiry yielded little new information on the sub-standard nature of housing accommodation in the city, nor on the financial difficulties faced by semi-philanthropic bodies and then Dublin Corporation in taking over responsibility from private house-builders. The horrors of the slums were luridly reported in newspapers such as the Glasgow Herald or as far afield as the New York Times. Much of the inquiry's time was taken up by serious allegations of laxity in Dublin Corporation's public health enforcement; a deficiency that Daly has put down to the self-interest of some Nationalist councillors plus the lack of an effective political opposition within the Corporation. The first criticism was that the Corporation's Sanitary Department was not closing down tenements when there was an obvious breach of bye-law requirements (such as the failure to provide a water supply point on each floor, or a water closet for every twelve occupants). This was justified by the Chief Sanitary Officer, Sir Charles Cameron, on the grounds that an over-zealous closure policy would only increase overcrowding elsewhere: a commonly-held and pragmatic view, yet one that reduced the incentive to build better dwellings since equivalent profits could be made from slums with no capital investment. An even more serious allegation was that, in a few cases, members of Dublin Corporation who owned tenement property had received a rate rebate intended for landlords who carried out improvement, even though their properties did not meet the required standards. This was less a case of corruption by the Sanitary Department, as of the unfair pressure that could be exercised by a few municipal slum landlords. The reality of Dublin Corporation's public health enforcement was not that it was corrupt but that it was largely irrelevant. The epitome was one by-law which stated that every occupant of a tenement
needed to have a minimum of 300 cu.ft of space: yet because many tenement rooms were in Georgian houses with high ceilings, it meant that even patently overcrowded flats complied with the letter, but certainly not the spirit, of the regulation. The disclosures of the Dublin Inquiry were seized on by Unionists and the Larkinite labour movement, but were defended by the Corporation on the basis that the inquiry was one-sided because it did not look at the responsibility of the ILGB, nor did it subject other municipalities to similar scrutiny for comparison. The actual report of the ILGB Housing Inquiry played down the controversial revelations by praising the Corporation's housing record; one committee member, J.F. MacCabe, appended a minority report rejecting all criticism of Dublin Corporation.

Indeed, the ILGB Housing Inquiry was undoubtedly more interested in determining proposals for a major housing scheme in Dublin. The tone had been set by the Chairman in an opening statement that observed:

"The financial difficulty had two sides. It had the difficulty of the Imperial Exchequer on the one hand, and on the other the burden cast on the citizens of Dublin for the proper housing of the poor. Both these questions were questions they would have to consider carefully....The more detailed information they could get the more accurately they could vouch on their account, as it were, to the Treasury, and the more likely they were to gain, what they desired to gain, the proper housing of the citizens of Dublin."²⁶⁶

Calls for generous Exchequer subsidy duly came from Nationalist members of Dublin Corporation, and from municipal officials. Much debate then revolved around whether inner-city schemes were best, as favoured by Sir Charles Cameron and the Town Clerk, Henry Campbell; or whether a mixed policy should be followed that included suburban estates for better-paid artisans, as argued by the City Architect, Charles MacCarthy, and the City Engineer's assistant, William Cranwill Wilson (the latter had been sent to England in 1911 to study Port Sunlight, Letchworth, and Hampstead Garden Suburb). Support for Unwinian garden suburbs also came from town planning enthusiasts who gave evidence to the inquiry, notably E.A. Aston and Patrick Geddes, the Scottish polymath biologist, sociologist, and geographer. Geddes was brought over by Lady Aberdeen and the Women's National Health Association (see Chapter 4), and expressed his belief that municipal activity and state aid should concentrate on rehousing the 'submerged' 10% classed as very poor. A far broader view of state responsibility was put forward by Dublin labour representatives that attended. "Every class of the community is assisted," noted Larkin's lieutenant and Vice-President of the Dublin Trades Council, William O'Brien; before going on to put the ITGWU case that subsidy be provided to enable suburban cottages to be built at a maximum of 10% of labourers' wages, and, if necessary, free for those in desperate need.²⁶⁷ The report of the Dublin Housing Inquiry did not go as far as
this, but was still notable for being the first official recommendation of state subsidy for a major programme of urban housing. Part 5 of the report began by asserting that the tenement system in Dublin must be broken up. This was to be achieved partly by the State providing 100% loans to build 14,000 suburban cottages: at an estimated average cost of £250 per dwelling, a total capital expenditure of £3,500,000. The report proposed that private enterprise should be encouraged through various incentives (such as tax relief and low-interest loans), but noted sharply "that the provision of houses for the working classes through the medium of private enterprise under existing conditions can no longer be relied upon."268 Dublin Corporation, despite its shortcomings, was envisaged as the major housing agency. Next the ILGB Report pointed out that the principle of substantial state aid had already been conceded for Irish rural housing in the Labourers Acts, and calculated the likely burden to the Exchequer of pursuing a similar policy for housing in Dublin. The estimate was that if £3,500,000 were borrowed at the current rate from the Local Loans Fund, then the 'economic rent' to cover the cost of new dwellings would be just under 5s6d per week. This the report argued was beyond the means of those in need, and a more reasonable rent was 3s7d per week. This however would mean a shortfall of around 1s1ld per week on every cottage built, too heavy a burden on Dublin's already high rates. The ILGB Housing Report then looked at ways of reducing the loss, such as making repayments on the "annuity" system, and giving loans on Labourers Acts terms of 3.25% interest over 68 years. Still the potential weekly loss stood at just under 1s per week, and so the report proposed that state subsidy should contribute 16% of the annual loan repayments. Realising that this proposal would alarm the Treasury, it suggested that, if wages rose:

"The State might therefore hold that it should not be saddled with a fixed burden of 16% during the full period. We recommend, if our proposals are entertained, that the State should reserve to itself the right of revising its financial liability at the end of, say, each ten years."269

Importantly the ILGB Housing Report also recommended that low-interest loans plus 16% subsidy be offered to all Irish municipalities (an appendix gave summaries of the chronic housing conditions found in other urban centres). It even suggested that the existing Irish Housing Fund be reserved as a special additional aid to provincial towns with worse financial problems than even Dublin. The report contended that such extensive state investment would be recouped by improving the "moral tone" of the Irish people, and through financial savings due to reduced crime and ill-health (notably by having to build fewer tuberculosis sanatoria). "Both these considerations furnish, in our opinion, strong grounds for generous financial treatment," it concluded.270 The Dublin Housing Report also made a host of other proposals. The 14,000 new units were to be self-contained 3-
bedroom suburban cottages; in addition some 3,803 of the best tenements could be remodelled to provide 13,000 modernised inner-city flats. The ILGB Report recommended that Dublin Corporation should analyse housing need and within two years put forward a complete scheme for the city, a point emphasised even more in MacCabe's minority report with its call for a civic survey and town plan in "conformity with modern ideas."  

The 1913-14 ILGB Dublin Housing Report was thus a significant document, and it was generally well received in Ireland. There was a minority of opposition to the subsidy proposals, mainly from the Sinn Fein Party with its implacable hostility to all British intervention in Ireland, and also from the residue of the voluntarist reform movement, such as the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland. The vast majority felt differently. For instance, the Irish Times described the ILGB Report as "a document of almost historic importance", and added that it "has become obvious, as the report points out, that the ordinary laws of economics are not adequate to deal with the situation. We must have State action, whether we like it or not." The Manchester Guardian wrote that the report adopted "the view that adherence to strict economic principles cannot be insisted upon in dealing with a grave social evil of this kind"; and the ILGB reported to Parliament that because of the massive cost of the proposed scheme, "the Government might, therefore, consent to lend the money on Labourers Acts terms with a grant-in-aid." Interest groups as disparate as the Larkinite Dublin Trades Council and the Dublin Chamber of Commerce urged that the Inquiry's recommendations be implemented at once. Dublin Corporation concentrated much of its effort in responding to Unionist attacks on its public health record, but not surprisingly welcomed the prospect of more housing subsidy from the Imperial Exchequer. Therefore it is necessary to reject the interpretation that the ILGB Inquiry was a limited and conservative response to the city's housing problem, and instead favour O'Brien's view that the report "had no hesitation.....in placing a share of the responsibility for the solution of the housing problem at the door of the Treasury."  

The ILGB Inquiry was thus a substantive contribution to the pre-war housing crisis in Dublin, and played its part in creating a near pathological fixation with the slum-lands that was vividly expressed by contemporary literary figures. Sean O'Casey was a labourer from the slums who became an admirer of Larkin and a short-term member of the Citizens Army, and he later used the atrocious housing system as a memorable locus for plays such as "The Shadow of a Gunman" (1923); "Juno and the Paycock" (1924); and "The Plough and the Stars" (1926), in which one character says of Nora Clitheroe:
"She's always grumblin' about havin' to live in a tenement house....."I wouldn't like to spend me last hour in one, let alone live me life in a tenement," says she. "Vaults," says she, "that are hidin' th' dead, instead of homes that are shelterin' th' livin'." "

In his private correspondence, O'Casey called Dublin's slums "the hidden Ireland", and in 1914 wrote that "twenty thousand families are wriggling together like worms in a putrid mass in horror-filled one-room tenements."278 From a middle-class reformist perspective, Dr Oliver Gogarty in 1917 co-wrote a play called "Blight" which bitterly attacked slum landlords. Irish literary interest was echoed in Britain by the ex-patriot George Bernard Shaw, who joked blackly to a pro-Larkin meeting in the Albert Hall in November 1913, that he "was extremely glad to hear it stated that 20,000 families in Dublin had one room apiece to live in. In his time.....there was no such luxury; there were often two families in a room, and both families took in lodgers."279 The ILGB Report also evinced sympathy from many involved in social reform in Britain, including Patrick Geddes and the *Town Planning Review*.280

Within the Dublin Castle Administration, support was also readily forthcoming from the Lord Lieutenant, Lord Aberdeen, and his wife, Lady Ishbel Aberdeen. But they were peripheral figures. More significantly, the Vice-President of the ILGB, Sir Henry Robinson, stood firmly behind the findings of his departmental committee, and appears to have been joined by the President of the Irish Board of Works, Sir George Stephenson.281 A more unexpected source of support came from the Imperial Treasury's representative in Dublin Castle: the Treasury Remembrancer and staunch Unionist, Maurice Headlam. In an attempt, albeit unsuccessful, to secure extra payment for the ILGB committee members for working over Christmas, Headlam praised "the unique character of the Enquiry, the excellent way in which it was conducted, and the great stress in getting it done quickly."282 However, the key link between the Castle Administration and the centre of power in Westminster was the Chief Secretary, Augustine Birrell. He continued to sit on the fence in an effort to on one hand not compromise his personal dislike of state subsidy, and on the other, to appear to go along with Irish demands to implement the proposals of the ILGB Housing Inquiry.283

Even more important for the fate of the ILGB Dublin Housing Report in early 1914 was the attitude of the Liberal Cabinet. Political backing for increased state subsidy was guaranteed from the Irish Party, as part of its policy to build a broad urban base and to use social reform to prevent the growth of an independent labour party. As a result of the IPP's desire to negate any movement towards social radicalism, both urban housing policy and the municipalisation of working class dwellings was far more developed in pre-war Ireland than in Britain (even if they lagged behind rural Ireland). This would support
Lyons' view that the 1908 Clancy Act was one of a series of important measures that were "very directly the outcome of the party's activity and could not be regarded merely as concessions devised by an English ministry for the purpose of conciliating the Irish members." \(^{284}\) It would conversely tend to dispel the view of other historians that the Irish Party, and supporting bodies like Dublin Corporation, remained indifferent to the urban housing problem because of a combination of vested landlord interests and political apathy. \(^{285}\) The role of slum-owners within Nationalist groups has been over-emphasised, especially given the links between the Irish Party and the Town Tenants League. The weakness of the constitutional Nationalist approach, however, was that it depended on support from Westminster, and here the Treasury emasculation of the first-ever urban subsidy in the 1908 Irish Act was to prove serious. The use by the Liberal Government of the Balfourian argument that urban conditions in Ireland were no different to those on the mainland, did avoid setting too dramatic a precedent for urban subsidy at home. But in Ireland it meant that there was no campaign to build the 25,000 town dwellings suggested by the Irish Party in 1908 as a solution to the problem (a provision, incidentally, that would have been proportionately greater than that under the Labourers Acts in rural areas). British intransigence to urban subsidy became further entrenched once the Home Rule Bill was introduced, and so the structural housing crisis in Irish towns and cities worsened. Chronic poverty and the inertia of speculative house-building remained, with the latter even touching hitherto complacent Belfast during the pre-war slump. Alarm about the threat to social stability posed by over-crowded slums became endemic in Dublin in the wake of the 1913-14 ITGWU Lock-out, and found clearest expression in the ILGB Housing Inquiry. It is now time to switch attention to see how the ILGB Report was received in Westminster. To understand this fully, it is also necessary to look at the influence of the Labourers Acts programme on housing ideas in pre-war Britain.
3. THE INFLUENCE OF EARLY IRISH STATE HOUSING ON BRITISH POLICY

This study is concerned with early state housing in Ireland not as a purely Irish affair, but as an element within colonial relations. Therefore, it is important to now deal with the other side of the colonial condition, and look at the reciprocal effect that Irish experience had on Britain. This chapter will focus on British reactions to the rural Labourers Acts programme, so as to understand the extent of resistance in Westminster in early 1914 to an equally generous subsidy being granted for urban housing in Ireland.

An important general point to make is that British policy towards rural Ireland came to significantly influence thinking on the mainland. The need for concerted state intervention following the Famine ran against laissez-faire principles, and, coupled with the case put forward by Nationalists for the creation of a peasant proprietorship in Ireland, prompted writers such as John Stuart Mill in the late-1860s to begin to advocate policies of 'economic relativism'. This modified theory held that the role of the state should be tailored to suit a country's specific circumstances rather than the abstracts of classical political economy. The 'Land War' and the subsequent policy of subsidised land redistribution in Ireland also helped to shape the varied - if ultimately futile - theories of land reform in late-nineteenth century England, including Henry George's single-tax proposal and the "Back-to-the-Land" movement. Interest was particularly keen due to the rapid economic decline of British agriculture following the 'great depression' of the 1880s, which had led to an almost total stagnation in private house-building by rural landowners in the period up to the First World War. The rural shortage came to be seen as the most intractable housing problem, and yet British housing legislation proved entirely ineffective in agricultural districts. Only eight English rural authorities made use of the 1890 Housing Act. Its successor, the 1909 Housing and Town Planning Act, forced the closure of 13,000 cottages, but by 1914 had only provided loans to build a total of 470 dwellings throughout the country (and those that were built were let at punitively high rents of around 4s per week). Despite the protests of the English Local Government Board to the contrary, it was a pathetic total.

Irish Nationalists had no doubts that the solution to the rural housing impasse in Britain was to follow the precedent of the Labourers Acts. The Irish Party was especially keen to boast to British audiences about the unique successes it had won. The party's deputy leader told a meeting in Halifax in March 1911 that Irish rural labourers "were better housed and more independent than the labourers of Great Britain. Nearly forty thousand
of them had got a nice, clean cottage and acre of land, for a shilling per week, and the employer could not turn them out. He wished that in the English counties the labourers had got the same terms. The Irish Builder noted of the repeated concern expressed over pre-war British rural housing:

"This is surely one of those things about which we are better off in Ireland, for we can boast of an enormous improvement in the housing of the rural labourer. The remedy for the unfortunate state of things in England is the application of the Irish Labourers Acts to England."^4

Irish architects involved with the Labourers Acts felt that they had shown the way to a simplified design approach that was cheap but still attractive. They looked on with disdain at mainland attempts to design low-cost rural cottages, particularly when the competition held in Letchworth Garden City in 1905 failed to meet a target of £150 for building costs (a figure repeatedly achieved in Irish schemes).^6 Instead the Irish Builder declared that the policy in Ireland of state subsidy and rationalised design "may well, and probably will, serve as a model for other countries to follow, profiting by our experience and......mistakes."^7 Thus when reviewing a pre-war English rural scheme that consciously omitted unnecessary accommodation and fripperies, the same journal wrote that the design was "very much on the lines of one of the standard plans of the Irish Local Government Board for labourers' cottages. It displays no point of novelty or ingenuity in planning."^8

3.1 Pre-war British reactions to the Irish Labourers Acts

From as early as 1902 several British observers, notably those involved in the 'National Efficiency' movement, drew attention to the achievements of the Irish Labourers Acts and argued for the introduction of rural subsidy at home.^9 Amongst the Press the most influential advocate was Laurence Weaver, the conservative editor of Country Life and a rural housing campaigner. Weaver argued that if Irish precedent was transferred "it should mean keeping on the land thousands of souls who are being driven by lack of good cottages into the towns or the Colonies."^10 Even more important were British housing pressure groups and local authority associations, most of which enjoyed strong broad political support, and which also urged an emulation of the Irish Labourers Acts. These bodies included the Workingmen's National Housing Council, the Rural Co-partnership Housing Association, the National Land and Housing League, the County Councils Association, the Rural District Councils Association, and above all the National Housing Reform Council (subsequently the National Housing and Town Planning Reform
The last-cited was led by the indefatigable Alderman William Thompson of Richmond District Council, who, as Sutcliffe has noted, "was widely acknowledged as the leading housing reformer of his day." Thompson was a Progressive who advocated the municipalisation of suburban land, so as to prevent private owners from appropriating the profit (the 'unearned increment') that was created when sprawling urbanisation boosted land prices. Municipal town planning was to be used to improve working-class living standards, and significantly Thompson also became the pre-eminent champion of what was then widely known as the 'Irish system' of state housing subsidy. Thus the National Housing and Town Planning Council in 1912 demanded that the Liberal Government introduce rural subsidy, on the grounds "that it is not consistent to deny such help to English labourers when an exactly similar class on the other side of the Irish Channel are benefitting enormously from this action." In September 1912 Thompson took a top-level delegation of his organisation across the Irish Sea to see the results at first-hand. They were received by the ILGB and were shown the premier Labourers Acts' schemes in Southern Ireland, including those in the Dublin region by Thomas Joseph Byrne and R.M. Butler. The report published by the Council stressed that subsidised rents had not held down rural wages in Ireland, and argued that only slight modifications were needed before applying the Labourers Acts in Britain. "Our inquiries in Ireland", wrote the deputation, "have deepened our conviction as to the wisdom and judgement of the granting of some similar measure of State aid." The representatives were also impressed by the design of the post-1906 Act cottages, and the Council's secretary, Henry Aldridge, when later recommending garden suburb planning noted that "here, as in Ireland, the need for care in grouping will be recognised."

Conversely, there were those in pre-war Britain who were appalled by the 'Irish system' of state subsidy. Opponents included the Rural Housing and Sanitary Association, the Municipal Journal (mouthpiece of the British metropolitan authorities), and powerful individuals like John Nettlefold, Chairman of Birmingham Corporation's Housing Committee. Nettlefold was the most single-minded exponent of the policy of town-extension planning, and specifically recommended that municipal involvement be limited to the acquisition and lay-out of new suburbs. As in Germany, where the model was derived from, private developers or housing companies were to provide the actual dwellings. Thus in his influential book, Practical Town Planning (1914), Nettlefold denounced Irish rural subsidy as providing nothing other than debilitating 'charity-rents'. In addition, there were a number of British architects who openly criticised the design of Labourers Acts' cottages. The Builder wrote that the new dwellings, "though a distinct advance in the interests of health and sanitation, are unfortunate from an aesthetic standpoint."

Irish precedent therefore helped to polarise British attitudes to state housing.
housing subsidy in the period before the First World War, and nowhere was this disagreement more marked than between the two main political parties.

3.2 The attitude of the Conservative Party to the Labourers Acts

The Conservative Party had shown since Disraeli that it would accept the idea of central government subsidy in specific cases where its supporters benefitted (for instance, the generous pay-off to Ascendancy landowners in the 1903 Irish Land Act). From the turn of this century, a strong force within the Tory Party was the creed of 'social imperialism': a balance between the defence of the British Empire abroad, and domestic social reform to improve 'national efficiency' and prevent the growth of socialism at home. Conservatives with backgrounds in Ireland, such as Lord Lansdowne and the ex-Chief Secretary, Sir Walter Long, came to the conclusion that the Irish policy of subsidised land redistribution to create a peasant proprietorship, could now build a bulwark of small property owners in Britain that would protect landed wealth from working-class political demands. It was a view that received much backing from the party leader, Arthur Bonar Law, and other senior figures such as Austen Chamberlain. It also greatly interested the 'Back to the Land' group within the Conservatives, and the leading small-holdings campaigner, Jesse Collings, visited Ireland on behalf of the Rural League to examine the effects of state subsidy. Importantly, many Tory advocates of land redistribution also saw the need to subsidise rural housing. Walter Long declared:

"that of all the money which has been so well spent in the development of Ireland...probably none of it has been spent with so much advantage to the community, as has been spent in the erection of labourers' cottages. If these results have followed from the application of those principles in Ireland, why should it be stated that similar results may not follow in this country?"

There were two main avenues of support within the pre-war Conservative Party for the calls for state housing subsidy by Long and Lansdowne. The first were the reactionary editors of the Tory Press who were directly involved in designing improved rural housing, notably Laurence Weaver at *Country Life* and John St Loe Strachey of the *Spectator*. The second lobby was inside Westminster and centred on the Unionist Social Reform Group. The leaders here were municipal Tories like Sir Arthur Griffith Boscawen, Chairman of the LCC's Housing Committee, and Colonel Kiffin-Taylor, his counterpart in Liverpool Corporation. This municipal lobby was convinced that it could exploit the inactivity of the Liberal Government over housing reform, and thereby appropriate the issue as its own. From 1912-14 the circle masterminded the introduction of no less than seven private Conservative Housing Bills based on the 'Irish system' of...
state subsidy.\textsuperscript{22} None were successful, and indeed were defeated due to the parliamentary influence of the President of the English Local Government Board, John Burns, and his successor, Herbert Samuel. In many ways defeat suited the Conservatives, for it is clear that the party as a whole had not agreed on a housing policy. Many within the Tory Party were uncertain about state subsidy, and so Walter Long was careful to reassure Bonar Law when the first measure was introduced that "of course it is a private members Bill and does not commit the party officially."\textsuperscript{23} Instead the political purpose of the pre-war Conservative Housing Bills was to expose the achilles heel of a Liberal Government that had subsidised Irish rural housing but now refused demands to extend the policy to Britain. As one Tory supporter reminded Bonar Law, "references to equality of treatment of the Irish Peasant and the English Labourer are well received."\textsuperscript{24} In bracing themselves for the Tory onslaught, an official in the English Local Government Board noted of state subsidy that "It will be upon this point that the debate will centre and attention will again be drawn to what has been effected in Ireland by Imperial financial assistance."\textsuperscript{25}

Thus the private Rural Housing Bill introduced in 1912, and again in 1913, was explicitly modelled on the 1906 Irish Labourers Act. There were only a few minor alterations. The Tory MP who proposed the 1913 Bill said:

"The principle of the Bill is the same as in Ireland.....I would urge upon the right honourable Gentleman [Burns].....to consider whether it is just or fair to English labourers to deny them the same facilities which we have given so generously and cheerfully to the labourers of Ireland."\textsuperscript{26}

Some of the Opposition Housing Bills went even further, and proposed that Exchequer subsidy be granted to urban areas as well. This series of general Bills was drafted by Sir Arthur Griffith-Boscawen, and was also justified by Irish precedent. The proposer of the 1913 measure pointed out that "this country has admitted in the case of Ireland the principle of assisting by State aid the building of cottages. If it is uneconomical to do it in Ireland it is equally uneconomical to do it in this country. If it is uneconomical in Ireland why did the house agree to it ?"\textsuperscript{27} Tory attacks on the hypocrisy of the Liberal Cabinet's double-standards towards Irish housing continued right up to the outbreak of war.

The Conservative Party tried to broaden the attack on the Asquith Government by calling on other political parties to support housing subsidy for Britain. The Irish Party were put in an embarrassing position, since they had already publicly advocated the transference of their beloved Labourers Acts. But in the end political reality made it impossible for them to side with an Opposition that was at the time voting against Home Rule.\textsuperscript{28} The pre-war
Labour Party was also compromised. The party was undecided on the issue of housing subsidy, but several radical MPs were fervent advocates. Fred Jowett had in 1909 demanded the importation of the Labourers Acts, and now gleefully joined in the Tory assault (though singling out John Burns, the famous ex-union leader seen by many in the labour movement as a 'class traitor'):

"I believe that there is no possible solution of the housing question, either in rural districts or in urban areas, without the assistance of the State, and I cannot for the life of me understand the position of honourable Gentlemen who will with the utmost freedom vote for millions being loaned for Irish housing, for cheap loans and subsidies, and who will not, on principle, vote for a similar system for English housing.....I am not sure that the President of the Local Government Board [Burns] approves of the Irish policy. But where is his consistency? If this policy of State subvention is wrong for England, it is wrong for Ireland, and the right honourable Gentleman ought to have opposed it."29

3.3 The attitude of the Liberal Party to the Labourers Acts

At one level, the debate over Irish housing precedent was a game of political football between the main parties. However it also went deeper than that. To Conservatives, Ireland was an integral part of the United Kingdom and not a separate nation; they believed, at least in theory, in the 'equalisation' of the legal and administrative systems.30 Thus the Tory Party had no fundamental ideological difficulty in borrowing from Irish precedent, provided that the purpose ultimately reinforced the interests of wealthy landowners. The position of the Liberal Party was fundamentally different. Liberals saw Ireland as a distinct entity where conditions were not at all analogous, and therefore unusable as a model. It was a relativist or sui generis view that different systems were required in different countries. The Irish Party might have coerced housing subsidy out of the Liberal Government, but the latter was determined that the same policy would not be applied to Britain. The pre-war Cabinet appears to have had two basic objections to state subsidy. The first was that it interfered with the theory of political economy, by discouraging speculative house-building and holding down wages. Lloyd George told a deputation in May 1914 of his hatred for subsidy:

"Once that was done, no builder would enter the field. He was against that. He was in favour of giving the working-class a living wage. But he was against giving them charity rents....To give those necessaries at less than cost price would be the most degrading policy which they could embark upon, and no self-respecting workman would demand that commodities be given him under cost price. He hoped that men of all Parties would set their faces against it."31

The second reason was that subsidy destroyed the Gladstonian precept of State parsimony at national and local levels, by breaking the connection between rates and local...
expenditure. In addressing the Oxford Union in late-1913, Lloyd George warned of the potential cost:

"If you are going to make grants for the purpose of building houses, how are you going to stop in the rural districts? Are you going to tax the artisans in the towns for the purpose of paying the rent of the workmen in the villages? This is one of the most disastrous policies ever propounded in this country."32

The Cabinet figure who prided himself on being the most belligerent obstacle to state housing subsidy was John Burns at the English Local Government Board. The parliamentary committee set up in 1906 to consider the proposed Housing Bill had looked at whether the 'Irish system' should be applied to Britain. Subsidy was ruled out by the Liberal Government, and Burns had ensured that the 1909 Housing Act in Britain adopted instead the policy of town-extension planning.33 He later took great pains to ensure that neither Lloyd George's 'Land Campaign', nor his successor from early 1914 at the Local Government Board, Herbert Samuel, gave any ground on the subsidy issue.34 Burns argued trenchantly that Irish rural experience must not be taken as a precedent, since subsidy had only been condoned there because of the unique conditions of low wages and agricultural stagnation:

"You had in Ireland, as a result of political injustice, an economic depression, bad housing, and a condition of things that has not for centuries been equalled in any other part of Europe.....the result was this exceptional and drastic remedy. You must take the Irish system with its advantages and its disadvantages, and......since subsidised cottages have been built in Ireland, no other cottages have been erected. I can conceive no greater condemnation of this system being adopted in this country."35

Thus John Burns apparently interrupted one Cabinet discussion on the 'Land Campaign' in October 1913, and, in Charles Hobhouse's words, "gave us half an hour's lecture, from notes, against the Irish system of doles."36 It was a widespread view within the Liberal Party, and was lucidly expressed by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Local Government Board:

"There are a good many violations of normal political economy in Ireland which have not yet crossed St George's Channel.....we are giving a subsidy not merely to labourers, but generally to the rural areas of Ireland. I do not in the least degree object to such a thing, only.....do not let us declare in light-hearted fashion that it is necessary for this House.....to solve the problem by giving a subsidy to the farmers and landlords of the rural districts of England."37

The Irish Chief Secretary, Augustine Birrell, declared that the Labourers Acts were simply "a necessary appendage of the great scheme of land purchase in Ireland"; and another
Liberal MP said that he did not think "that because we have done something foolish in Ireland it is at all necessary that we should do foolish things in England."³⁸

A more constructive opposition to state subsidy within the pre-war Asquith Cabinet came from Lloyd George and his famous Land Enquiry Committee. This initiative aimed at a radical land and housing policy, and was driven by the romantic nineteenth-century Liberal belief that there was an irreconcilable opposition between landed wealth and industrial capital, that could only be resolved by destroying the vested interests of landlordism.³⁹ The Land Enquiry Committee drew up two reports in 1913-1914, both of which explicitly rejected the 'Irish system' of subsidies for land purchase and housing. Lloyd George denounced Tories such as Lord Landsdowne, who called for the creation of a peasant proprietorship, on the grounds that this policy had cost the Treasury a fortune in Ireland and was entirely inappropriate in an industrialised country like Britain.⁴⁰ Instead the Land Enquiry Committee recommended that in rural areas a minimum wage be established so that labourers could afford unsubsidised speculative housing, with the burden of higher wages falling on rural landowners; and in urban areas, that municipalities be given an increased Exchequer grant and that the existing local taxation system financed by rates be augmented by a supplementary tax on site-values to be paid by ground landlords. By these means, both rural and urban Britain were to be rid of landlordism but this time by taxing land values so that the profit margin on property was eroded.⁴¹ In the event the subsequent 'Land Campaign' came to little, hampered mainly by utter confusion over the urban housing proposals. However it did prove influential within the Liberal Government. For instance, the Board of Agriculture in Autumn 1913 decided on a programme to build farm labourers' cottages at strictly 'economic' rents: state subsidy was again rejected in favour of the recommendation by the town planning expert, Raymond Unwin, that a better policy was to provide higher standard cottages designed on the garden suburb model.⁴²

Indeed the only member of the pre-war Asquith Government who dared to break ranks was the Paymaster-General, Lord Strachie (Sir Edward Strachey), and a look at what happened to him shows the Cabinet's tough line. Strachie was a large Somerset landowner and had links with Tory rural housing reformers through his brother, John St Loe Strachey. From 1911 Lord Strachie was President of the Rural District Council Association, and he used this position to advocate the introduction of the Labourers Acts system in Britain. He even organised a deputation to Chancellor Lloyd George in January 1913 to ask for a £5,000,000 loan on the Irish terms.⁴³ Conservatives tried to exploit this dissident view, but Prime Minister Asquith told Parliament bluntly that Strachie did
not represent the Cabinet, and that he had been written to on the matter (no doubt insisting that Strachie stop bucking Government policy).44

3.4 The reaction in Westminster to the Dublin Housing Inquiry

It is important to bear in mind the depth of opposition of the Liberal Cabinet to the 'Irish system' of housing subsidy when looking at the British response to the ILGB Dublin Housing Report. A copy of the document was laid before the Imperial Parliament in February 1914, and the appendix giving minutes of evidence was presented a month later. Immediately politicians from a wide range of parties drew attention to the links with the recent industrial unrest, while Unionists and the Irish Party clashed over the public health record of Dublin Corporation.45 The Asquith Government were clearly unwilling to allocate time to discuss the ILGB Housing Report, no doubt realising that Conservative demands for a debate would reopen the battle over the issue of state subsidy. Eventually a debate was only forced on 16 April 1914, when the Irish Party and Opposition MPs hijacked the deliberations on the ILGB's financial vote for the next financial year. One of the IPP members for Dublin told the House of Commons bluntly that they wanted increased urban subsidy:

"In my view, and I am fortified in that view by the [ILGB] Report which we have been considering, the problem can only be dealt with adequately on Imperial lines. Surely what has been done, and so successfully, for the Irish labourers ought to be done with equal success for the dwellers in our cities! It would be impossible to place the entire burden on the shoulders of the rate-paying community in Dublin, and it would be a good investment for the State, because it is only in the health and material well-being of the citizens, from the lowest to the highest, that true national prosperity can be secured."46

Tory Party support came from Sir Arthur Griffith-Boscawen when he observed that "Just as we on this side have asked for State aid in this country for the purpose of rehousing people when turned out of the slums at a rent that they can afford to pay, so the [ILGB] Report asks for a similar condition of things to prevail in Ireland."47

There is no record of a Cabinet decision on the matter, but Chief Secretary Birrell certainly toed the party-line in abandoning his previously equivocal stance. Birrell now told Parliament that the ILGB Housing Report was rather over-dramatic in its claims and too sweeping in its conclusions. In typically elliptical style, he rehashed the Liberal view of state subsidy as being the antithesis of free enterprise and self-reliance:

"Socialism may be a good thing or it may be a bad thing, but there is nothing worse than to try to combine Manchester principles with little patches of philanthropic socialism. A
large class of people living in an uneconomical way on 15s. or 16s. a week! And you will thereupon say that the public must supply the money to build nice, clean, charming residences, where they and their wives and their children can lead useful lives, and the rent may be provided for out of the pockets of other people. That is a rotten state of things.\textsuperscript{48}

Furthermore Birrell rejected the recommendations of the ILGB Inquiry on the grounds that it would involve enormous expense to the Imperial Exchequer, justifying this by a resurrection of the Balfourian argument (which he had temporarily abandoned at the time of the 1908 Housing Act) that no essential difference could be drawn between urban conditions in Ireland and Britain. He was now "sure that no Chancellor of the Exchequer, to whatever side of politics he belongs, will be satisfied, or will be willing to make a grant to Ireland and refuse it to other places."\textsuperscript{49} Instead the Chief Secretary offered some half-hearted alternatives to an increase in state subsidy, such as slightly improved terms for public loans and even a civic survey for Dublin.

The Irish Party were placed in a very awkward position, particularly since the imminent Home Rule Act made no explicit mention of financial provision for future housing reform. The IPP tried to reassure municipal representatives that any Exchequer subsidies that were introduced in Britain would still be paid to Ireland even under self-government. This they argued would not undermine their autonomy, but would simply be Ireland receiving redress from Imperial funds for social problems created by British rule. However, Unionists pointed out the obvious loophole that there would be no legal compunction on the British Government, since housing had not been made a 'reserved service'. "Irish housing", warned the Irish Times, ".....will be brought to a standstill from the very moment when the Home Rule Bill reaches the Statute Book."\textsuperscript{50} From another direction, the O'Brienite Nationalists criticised the Irish Party for having failed to win more generous urban housing subsidy prior to Home Rule. As one Independent Nationalist MP put it, "they cried "Freedom before Finance", as if finance is not the breath of freedom."\textsuperscript{51} Thus on the very eve of Home Rule, opponents turned the urban housing issue into a critical test of the validity of constitutional Nationalism. The IPP housing spokesman, J.J. Clancy, found himself unable to counter these attacks, and instead the Irish Party sought to escape the predicament by pinning its hopes on securing a share of the housing and land reform initiatives widely expected in Lloyd George's forthcoming Budget.

3.5 The 1914 Budget and Irish urban housing subsidy

It was the Asquith Government that had rejected the generous subsidy recommendations of the ILGB Housing Report, and so the Irish Party had no qualms in threatening a public
row if Irish municipalities were left out of any improved housing terms for Britain. Hence in early-April 1914 John Redmond wrote to Lloyd George, enclosing a hostile leader from the Irish Times:

"You will see from this article how vitally important this matter is to us, and how impossible our position would be with our own people if we did not get our proper equivalent grant......In your Budget Speech you must make some allusion to this matter. Otherwise, it will be raised by O'Brien or Healy [Independent Nationalists]......I would not bother you about this matter under present circumstances, were it not so very, very urgent."52

Chief Secretary Birrell confirmed to the Chancellor of the Exchequer that the issue could wreck the IPPs delicate position over the Home Rule Bill:

"They are undoubtedly in a great fix over your Budget. Never were they in a bigger.....If it becomes plain that but for "my Bill".....Ireland would get £400,000 a year but now is to get nothing - it is all up with Ireland as a Nation !.....The Irish press and the O'Brienites are on the watch and I am speaking the sober truth when I say a refusal to let Ireland in, will ship enough water to sink the ship.....On the other hand, if that Windfall tumbles in, just at the right moment to relieve the crazy finances of the Bill (pace Samuel) it will carry us through..... Anyhow, take it from me - that it is a Crisis, big with fate."53

The pleas were heeded, and Ireland was duly incorporated in the Budget that was presented in early May 1914. Lloyd George once again used the Budget as an instrument of social reform; this time announcing the introduction of the Land Enquiry Committee proposals for a new local tax based on site values, plus increased rate-relief grants to local authorities to cover general public health matters. The additional Exchequer expenditure was to be met by raising the rate of income tax.54 The Chancellor took care to stress that the £4,000,000 per annum of extra rate support would cover all of the United Kingdom, including Ireland. This was enthusiastically received by the Irish Party and its supporters, and after the Budget debate John Redmond told Lloyd George that it was the "best speech you ever made !"55 Yet the boldness of the 1914 Budget belied the fact that the Cabinet had not been properly consulted about the cavalier new policy, and that the Treasury had grave reservations. The Budget speech by Lloyd George was full of the rhetorical bluff of the 'Land Campaign': it reads more as ideology in the absence of a considered land or housing strategy, and in preparation for the next general election. Many who heard it were confused afterwards about what had actually been promised, and the feeling of unreality was confirmed by inter-party banter that followed. In the face of concerted attack from the Conservative Party, Lloyd George was unable to give firm details of how the scheme would work. One of the main areas of uncertainty, not surprisingly, was the relationship of the Budget to the Home Rule Bill. The Chancellor promised that Ireland's share of the new public health grants would be paid over to the Dublin Parliament to do as
it wished, and an amendment to this effect was hurriedly inserted into the proposals for Home Rule finance.\textsuperscript{56} This degree of autonomy, however, was contrary to the rest of the financial system on offer to Ireland, and this issue was fiercely debated by Tory MPs while the Budget controversy rolled on into June 1914. In the end the Budget turned out to be a fiasco: first, Lloyd George fell foul of constitutional procedure when he tried to slip the rate reform clauses into the Finance Bill; and then the Cabinet jettisoned the local government proposals following a revolt by influential right-wing Liberals, who erroneously suspected the Budget of introducing a veiled state subsidy for matters such as housing. Thus in the eventual 1914 Finance Act, tax reform was dropped and the additional Exchequer rate-relief grants were 'postponed'. Lloyd George continued to talk of the need for improved dwellings in both Britain and Ireland "to increase the efficiency of the people, and to make a stronger and more enduring State."\textsuperscript{57} But in truth all prospect of housing reform under the 1914 Budget had now evaporated.

The 'Land Campaign' lay irrevocably broken. As Swenarton has noted, it meant that there was no clear housing policy agreed by the Asquith Cabinet - let alone prepared for legislation - by the time that war broke out in August 1914.\textsuperscript{58} The limitations of the Government's vision was shown by the feeble Housing Bill that was introduced in mid-1914. It was brought in as an interim measure, and pragmatically combined the need to build dwellings for employees at the Rosyth naval base and other military establishments (necessary due to the rapid European arms build-up), with a limited scheme to implement the Board of Agriculture's proposals for rural housing.\textsuperscript{59} The 1914 Housing Bill stipulated that unsubsidised, 'economic' rents must be charged, and it saw public utility societies rather than local authorities as the main building agency. A fall-back clause permitted the Board of Agriculture to act in default if no housing society was set up in a particular rural district, but this provoked parliamentary outrage at the prospect of the State taking over the role of rehousing rural labourers. The Asquith Cabinet responded to this outcry by dropping the rural housing provisions entirely, making the 1914 Housing Act even narrower than originally intended. The measure was significant because it signalled official acceptance of the principles of garden suburb design, but in terms of finance or policy it was retrogressive. Indeed when Opposition MPs such as Griffith-Boscawen called for the inclusion of state subsidy on the Irish model, they were unceremoniously dismissed.\textsuperscript{60} It showed that right up to the First World War, the Liberal Government not only opposed state subsidy but also preferred private initiative to public intervention. Given the disparity with Irish demands, it was not surprising that 1914 proved to be a frustrating year for those involved in the housing movement in Ireland.

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3.6 Aftermath of the rejection of the Dublin Housing Inquiry

To conclude, it is worth looking at the results in Dublin in 1914 of the Liberal Government's failure to grant increased urban housing subsidy, or indeed to come up with any positive proposals for Ireland. Chief Secretary Birrell simply reiterated the Cabinet line that new housing legislation for all of the United Kingdom would be forthcoming, but not before the 1915 parliamentary session. It was a vague promise that did not prevent a wave of Irish appeals for more urgent action.61 Meanwhile, Irish municipalities greatly stepped up their efforts. After a trough in 1913-14, when municipal housing loans fell by a third, there was a resurgence just before the First World War in loan applications by Nationalist authorities such as Dublin Corporation and Pembroke UDC [Diagram D; Table Y].62 But the reality was that the Irish Party and the Castle Administration were preoccupied with the 'Ulster Crisis' that was threatening Home Rule at the final moment of implementation. The IPP could no longer provide a lead on the urban housing issue, and the outcome was a stalemate leading to the fragmentation of the hitherto united Irish demand for greater state subsidy. The dissipation of efforts was seen by two new initiatives in which the Larkinite labour movement played a key role: the Citizens Housing League, and the Irish Builders' Cooperative Society.

The Citizens Housing League (hereafter CHL) was formed in April 1914 after joint meetings between two social reform groups, the Civic League and the Irishwomen's Reform League, and the Larkinite Dublin Trades Council.63 The main organiser and honorary secretary of the CHL was E.A. Aston, a retired Unionist businessman and town planning advocate, who had since the 1913 Lock-out been trying to unite the opposing forces of capital and labour in Dublin around a campaign to remove the terrible slum tenements. In the CHL's own words, it was "called into existence primarily to obtain immediate State assistance, and represents citizens of every class and political opinion in Dublin."64 In practice it incorporated the radical labour movement into the middle-class housing reform movement in Dublin: hence the CHL included leading Unionist businessmen from the Dublin Chamber of Commerce, such as its Chairman James Shanks (an ex-Lord Mayor), as well as prominent socialists such as its Vice-Chairman, William O'Brien. This unlikely marriage of convenience was an extension of an 'Orange-Syndicalist' alliance first attempted during the Dublin Corporation elections in January 1914, when the Municipal Reform Party tried unsuccessfully to win municipal power on a programme that made extensive slum clearance its main priority.65 The CHL sought to cement this temporary anti-Nationalist alliance around two specific aims. The first was to secure better financial terms to enable the 14,000 new cottages recommended by the ILGB Housing Inquiry to be built. It demanded that the Government provide a £3,500,000
loan at 3.5% interest over 60 years, plus an Imperial Exchequer subsidy of £60,000 a year. Secondly the CHL wanted to ensure that all future Dublin Corporation schemes conformed to the 'modern' town planning ideal of low-density suburban estates on Unwinian lines. The initial prospects seemed good. The CHL's inaugural meeting was a massive demonstration on 12 May 1914 chaired by the Lord Mayor of Dublin, Lorcan Sherlock, and was addressed by numerous reformers and labour leaders. An overflow meeting was also held to hear the more radical speakers such as Larkin, Connolly, Countess Markiewicz, William O'Brien and Thomas Lawlor. Further impetus was added by the debacle over Lloyd George's much anticipated Budget, and the realisation that nothing would be forthcoming to help housing in Dublin.

However, the CHL ran into problems when it openly criticised the inner-city schemes proposed by Dublin Corporation. The result was bitter clashes at ILGB inquiries into Corporation schemes in mid-1914, which, as will be seen in the next chapter, the CHL sought to overcome by providing the services of Patrick Geddes and Raymond Unwin as advisers. But in doing so it made powerful enemies within the Irish Party, notably J.J. Clancy, and also with the Sinn Fein members who dominated the Corporation's Housing Committee, Alderman Thomas Kelly and Councillor William Cosgrave. Its opponents portrayed the CHL as an unelected pressure group trying to dictate municipal policy. Another problem was that there was little love lost between the socialists and the middle class reformers in the CHL, and significantly James Larkin (who was never a member) played a key part in undermining Aston's efforts to build a bridge to the ITGWU. The CHL's facade finally disintegrated when it hatched a plan to send an umbrella housing deputation, led by Lord Mayor Sherlock, to Chancellor Lloyd George to demand that he provide a £60,000 annual subsidy to build cottages in Dublin. It was intended that the delegation go over to London in June 1914. But Larkin launched a blistering attack on the CHL's policy, and steadfastly refused to go on the deputation or give it his support. And many Nationalist and Sinn Fein members of Dublin Corporation, with again Alderman Thomas Kelly setting the lead, refused to join any coalition that included radical socialists. Instead the Corporation voted decisively to send a separate deputation to the British Government. The result was a bitter row between Aston and Kelly in June 1914, further fuelled when Larkin challenged the two disputants to an open debate on the housing question. Even if the CHL had been able to organise a coordinated deputation it was unlikely to have achieved anything, since the embattled Lloyd George had decided that any Irish housing lobby should be referred to Chief Secretary Birrell instead. The outbreak of war saw the CHL decline further, with Aston leaving to work first with the emergency Dublin Distress Committee and then the Irish recruiting campaign.
The other factional housing initiative in Dublin in mid-1914 was the Irish Builders' Cooperative Society (hereafter IBCS), which arose from James Larkin's brief embrace of the linked ideals of cooperativism and guild socialism. The theory came from a group of British followers of John Ruskin and William Morris (notably A.R. Orage and S.G. Hobson in the New Age, and the Arts and Crafts architect, A.J. Penty), who argued that the conflict between capital and labour could only be overcome by organising industrial production into 'national guilds' run by the workers themselves.74 For the beleaguered ITGWU at the end of the 1913-14 Dublin Lock-out, guild socialism offered a means to by-pass and subvert Irish capitalism. Larkin thus began to work on a 'New Campaign' for a producers' cooperative to incorporate all Irish labour in an organisation even more advanced than the model ITGWU.75 A key element in the strategy was the IBCS, formed in February 1914 in conjunction with the agricultural cooperativist, George ("A.E.") Russell, and three leading socialists: Captain J.R. White (a retired British Army officer, and an organiser of Connolly's revitalised Citizens Army), Countess Constance Markiewicz (the renowned Anglo-Irish rebel, feminist, long-time worker with Dublin's poor, and member of the Citizens Army), and Councillor Richard O'Carroll (a Labour member of Dublin Corporation, and leader of the Dublin Labour Party). The Irish Worker declared that:

"one section of workers in Dublin have completed arrangements by which all the building operations in the new Dublin, about to be undertaken, may not only be affected but may be carried on by the workers themselves.....The Irish Transport Union will appear in the future as a competitor with the bosses, and owing to the less need for private profit that exists in the case of the Union, the building boss bids fair to become a rapidly disappearing body."76

By killing off the private contractor, it was hoped that the IBCS would thus not only get rid of the Dublin slums but also improve the working conditions of building labourers. As early as January 1914 Larkin claimed to be preparing "a scheme of model housing, which could be built by them, and they intended to show what could be done by organised and skilled labour in Dublin, independent of the politicians"; another supporter argued that when sufficient profits were accumulated from cooperativism, the ITGWU member "might eventually decide to lay out a garden suburb for Dublin, and provide himself with a decent little house, large enough for privacy and comfort, and small enough to be homely."77 There is no evidence that a IBCS housing scheme was ever designed, but in mid-1914 James Larkin appears to have discussed the idea of a garden village for Dublin's dock labourers with Patrick Geddes (who, as will be seen in the next chapter, was over in connection with the 1914 Civic Exhibition and Summer School of Civics). The two had met in Edinburgh towards the end of the 1913-14 Lock-out, and Geddes was known as a
supporter of cooperativist ideas. Larkin would also have heard about Geddes from his associate William O'Brien, through the latter's role in the CHL.

Meanwhile the IBCS appointed a secretary, and in early May 1914 an appeal was launched calling on Irish trade unionists to buy shares to provide a working capital of £1,000. A further boost was given when the first ever Irish meeting of the United Kingdom Cooperative Union was held in Dublin in early June 1914. This was attended by William O'Brien, and he heard delegates extolling cooperativism as the only means to achieve labour and housing reforms in Ireland. By this point Larkin had forcefully crushed all links with the CHL, and hence the IBCS had become the sole focus for the housing aims of the radical labour movement. A public meeting in early July 1914 was chaired by Countess Markiewicz, at which leading labour representatives pledged their support. But despite subsequent appeals for more shares to be taken up, nothing was actually achieved. Within a month war had broken out, and Larkin's cooperativist plans ended when he went to raise funds in the USA. The ICBS, however, did prefigure the post-war building guilds in Dublin; and certainly the radical ideas advocated by the ITGWU went far beyond those of the Glasgow Labour Party, which Englander has claimed were the most innovative of the pre-war period. The ultimately futile efforts of the CHL and IBCS were symptomatic of a stalemate in the urban housing movement in pre-war Ireland, brought on by the paralysis of the Irish Party and the Asquith Cabinet's refusal to augment state subsidy. Another aspect of this unstable situation in 1914 was that the British town planning movement was able to step in and acquire an importance previously denied to it in Dublin. This will form the subject of the next chapter.
4. HOME RULE AND GARDEN SUBURB IDEALS IN IRELAND BEFORE 1914

From 1911 to 1914 there was a determined attempt, involving many of the leading British exponents of town planning, to introduce garden suburb ideals to Ireland. The paradigm being promoted was a combination of the social theory of Patrick Geddes and the low-density, picturesque model of suburban design pioneered by Raymond Unwin. The planning crusade in pre-war Ireland capitalised on the vacuum in urban housing reform that was caused by the preoccupation of the Irish Party with the Home Rule Bill and the 'Ulster Crisis'. Out of this crusade came a series of remarkable initiatives that included the 1914 Dublin Town Plan Competition, won by Patrick Abercrombie, and the housing report produced by Geddes and Unwin for Dublin Corporation at the outbreak of the First World War. And yet it is notable that, for all their efforts, Irish planning enthusiasts and their British mentors remained on the periphery of the housing issue. Recent accounts of this episode have not explained clearly why town planning failed to establish itself in pre-war Ireland. 1 This chapter will argue that marginalisation can only be explained by two factors: firstly, because town planning protagonists did not appreciate the ideological gap between their ideas and the preoccupation in Ireland with Home Rule; and secondly, because they did not take into account the relation of the Irish housing debate to that in Britain. In this sense, early garden suburb theory proved extremely limited when applied to a country like Ireland.

4.1 The beginnings of the town planning movement in Ireland

Up till 1911 there had been no real Irish town planning movement, only a few isolated supporters. 2 This is not surprising, given that Ireland was not fertile ground for those advocating garden cities or garden suburbs. Ireland's slow industrial growth compared to Britain, and its predominantly agricultural economy, meant that it had neither the proliferation of ugly manufacturing towns nor the tradition of intellectual critiques of industrial urbanisation which had prompted the communitarian ideals of Ebenezer Howard and Raymond Unwin. The few genuinely industrial towns that existed in Ulster prided themselves on being well housed, a complacent attitude best summed up in a lecture by a Belfast Corporation official in 1911 entitled "How a Town Succeeded without the Town-Planning Act". 3 Instead the majority of Irish towns were seen as suffering from economic decay rather than the problems created by unregulated urban expansion: the slums of Dublin being the quintessential product. Hence the Irish Party's spokesman dismissed
John Burns' 1909 Housing and Town Planning Act on the grounds that it was "largely concerned with the planning of new towns, whereas our concern, unfortunately, is rather to do what we can to prevent old towns from becoming absolute ruins". Yet the certainty that British town planning had no relevance to Ireland became less convincing in the conditions of political uncertainty over Home Rule from 1911. Now that the planning movements in Britain and abroad were receiving greater official recognition through events such as the 1910 RIBA Town Planning Conference, they could no longer be so easily ignored. Even more important in Irish terms were the growing calls for the civic aggrandisement of Dublin, in anticipation that it would soon become a real capital city once more.

But if the focus for town planning in pre-war Ireland fell on Dublin, there is no doubt that the impetus derived from Britain (or more accurately, Scotland). The main protagonists were the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Lord Aberdeen, and his indefatigable wife, Lady Ishbel Aberdeen. Lord Aberdeen was a wealthy Northern Scottish landowner and a stalwart of the Liberal Party: he had served briefly as Irish Lord Lieutenant during the fiasco of the first Home Rule Bill in 1886, and was reappointed after the landslide election victory twenty years later. Both the Aberdeens were well known as Gladstonian Liberals and devout Christian social reformers, and Lady Aberdeen had won international recognition for her crusading work against tuberculosis in Ireland. They were concerned to find a way to heal the growing divisions in Irish society, which were now appearing between capital and labour as well as between Nationalists and Unionists. In 1911 Lord and Lady Aberdeen visited Patrick Geddes' Cities and Town Planning Exhibition while it was in Edinburgh, and felt they had found the answer. Geddes after all claimed that his new discipline of 'Civics', and its physical application through town planning, represented the best means of ensuring the beneficial social evolution of mankind. He believed that by recapturing the lost values of citizenship, which he felt had existed in the pre-industrial city, there would be a regeneration of urban life that would sweep away the unhealthy industrial cities and the blind values of political nationalism. Meller has noted that Geddes' message of creating 'social peace' through civic reconstruction had strong appeal for liberal administrators in troubled colonial provinces, such as Lord Aberdeen and his wife. In return, Geddes saw Ireland as an excellent testing ground for his theories precisely because of its extremely complex social problems. He felt that political and economic factors had held back the evolutionary growth of cities such as Dublin, and that it would be his role to reveal this and to point the way towards harmony through civic endeavour. In this Geddes saw himself following the work of Sir Horace Plunkett, who had long championed agricultural cooperativism in Ireland as a means of turning attention away from the Home Rule issue and towards social and economic progress.
Town planning in Ireland received its first major impetus when in 1911 Lord and Lady Aberdeen twice in the same year invited Geddes to bring his Cities and Town Planning Exhibition to Dublin. The first opportunity was at the "Ui Breasail" exhibition in late May and early June. Lord and Lady Aberdeen failed in their attempt to get John Burns to open the exhibition, but nevertheless a distinguished field of lecturers including Lord Leverhulme, Stanley Adshead and Henry Vivian came over to supplement talks given by Geddes and his assistant Frank Mears. The exhibition went on briefly to Belfast, where it failed to make much impression. In August 1911 it returned to Dublin for the Royal Institute of Public Health Congress, where again British experts lectured in connection. By now Geddes had become the dominant influence over the nascent Irish planning movement.

The main outcome of these two exhibitions was the formation in September 1911 of the Housing and Town Planning Association of Ireland (hereafter HTPAI). The president of this body was Lady Aberdeen, and most of its membership was comprised of social reformers from the professional and business classes, such as E.A. Aston and D.A. Chart. Architects and engineers dealing with housing work were also well represented, including the Dublin City Architect, Charles MacCarthy, and the Chief Engineering Inspector of the Irish Local Government Board, Dr Peter Cowan. The message of the HTPAI was that both aspects of its title could not be separated, and that the way forward was through a combination of Geddesian ideas about civic duty and the building - not of garden cities - but of Unwinian garden suburbs to replace the chronic slums in Irish cities. The association campaigned for the extension of British town planning legislation to Ireland, and for a civic survey to be carried out in Dublin. Much of its time was spent in organising a series of exhibitions and conferences. The most important of these conferences was that on "Housing and Town Development", held as part of the HTPAI's first annual meeting in October 1912. This was attended by many Irish municipal representatives, and resulted in a deputation being sent to Lord Lieutenant Aberdeen to demand that the subsidy terms under the Labourers Acts be given also to urban working class housing. From this, as noted in Chapter 2, the Association of Municipal Authorities of Ireland was formed in December 1912 specifically to take over the agitation for urban housing subsidy, now that the Irish Party was no longer taking the lead. From this point the HTPAI virtually ignored the question of housing finance in order to concentrate fully on town planning propaganda. A look now at the reaction of Irish groups to garden suburb ideals will show that this division of responsibilities was to prove disastrous.
4.2 Reactions to town planning ideals in pre-war Ireland

In Britain the claim of the garden city movement to be able to solve the problems of urban growth and housing conditions while leaving the existing social system intact, meant that it managed to appeal to all political parties and to a wide spectrum of opinion from wealthy industrialists such as Lever to socialists such as Unwin. Clearly figures such as Geddes felt that a similar message could potentially bring together otherwise antagonistic parties in Ireland.

However the attitude of Irish groups towards garden suburb ideals was more complicated. Unionists outside Ulster were open to ideas of social reform and formed an important part of bodies such as the HTPAI. But much of their effectiveness depended on alliance with Ulster Unionists, and it has already been noted that the latter had no real interest in housing matters, nor could they be convinced of the importance of town planning while the Home Rule controversy raged. While it is clear that the radical labour movement in pre-war Dublin favoured garden suburb housing, as was seen in Chapters 2 and 3, its leaders vilified the middle class social reformers whom they claimed had appropriated these ideals. Larkin and Connolly instead placed their hopes on securing the election of labour municipal representatives, but this strategy was to have little success in breaking the IPP's hegemony over local politics.

Indeed it was the Irish Parliamentary Party that held the key to the fate of garden suburb ideals. As mentioned previously, the IPP tried to broaden its support amongst the urban working class by supporting bodies like the Town Tenants League which took a leading role in the housing issue. The main force within the League, Councillor Coughlan Briscoe of Dublin Corporation, became personally interested in town planning and visited many examples in Britain and the Continent. After representing Dublin Corporation at the 1910 RIBA Town Planning Conference, on his return he recommended that the municipality should build a garden suburb at Marino. A similar interest in town planning ideals was also found amongst other individual representatives of nationalist municipalities, several of whom were members of the HTPAI. Leading examples were Councillor Lorcan Sherlock, the pre-war Lord Mayor of Dublin Corporation, and Councillor Charles O'Neill of Pembroke Council. However, despite this element of municipal support, the Irish town planning movement was unable to win over the Irish Party because it failed to deal directly with the key question of urban housing subsidy. Thus, while the IPP was ready to back the demands of the Association of Municipal Authorities for increased aid from the Imperial Treasury, it pointedly did not give any help to the HTPAI. "Picturesque sites, artistic plans. and aesthetic disposition of the houses are desirable", wrote the nationalist Freemans...
"but the main point is to secure that the houses will be let at rents within the means of the working classes". This line was taken even further by the IPP's housing spokesman, J.J. Clancy. In 1913 he bluntly told Chief Secretary Birrell that what was wanted was "not town-planning, or such ornamental development, but something that will house the people afresh in those localities in which now the conditions of life are abominable and intolerable". The accusation that town planning had nothing to offer in terms of the financial problem of housing, meant that it was unable to overcome the indifference towards urban issues shown by large sections of the Irish Party's supporters, including the Catholic Church.

It was also an argument that played straight into the hands of the Sinn Fein representatives on Dublin Corporation's Housing Committee, Alderman Thomas Kelly and Councillor William Cosgrave. Kelly in particular became the most trenchant opponent of town planning within the Corporation, arguing persuasively that because unskilled casual labour predominated in Dublin, then the municipality must concentrate on providing cheap dwellings as close as possible to sources of work in the city centre. Due to the efforts of Kelly above all, the plans for a garden suburb at Marino were frustrated, and town planning sympathisers remained a minority in the pre-war Dublin Corporation.

4.3 The intensification of the town planning campaign in 1913-14

Thus the HTPAI had made little impact in Ireland during its first two years. It saw however a major opportunity for advancement in the wave of housing concern during the 1913-14 Dublin Lock-out. As noted in Chapter 2, it was Lord and Lady Aberdeen, along with others in the HTPAI, that tried strenuously to have the official inquiry into the city's housing conditions turned into a Vice-Regal Commission. Their aim in doing so was to secure the appointment onto the inquiry team of a town planning expert. When their strategy failed, Lady Aberdeen - through the Women's National Health Association - brought over Patrick Geddes to give evidence to the ILGB Housing Inquiry. Geddes and his Irish follower, E.A. Aston, outlined to the inquiry the need for proper town planning, and both specifically urged the adoption of Unwinian garden suburbs. However, the final ILGB Housing Report concentrated on the issue of state subsidy and played down town planning claims, save in a minority report by one of the inquiry team, J.F. MacCabe.

Thus for the HTPAI, the 1913-14 Dublin Housing Inquiry was a lost chance. In order to keep up the momentum, in January 1914 Lord and Lady Aberdeen launched two initiatives both apparently suggested by Geddes. One was to hold the first Civic Exhibition in the
United Kingdom, similar to that held in Ghent in 1913 and that planned for Lyons that year. The other initiative was the well-known 1914 Dublin Town Plan Competition.

There were two aims behind the Civic Exhibition. One was the Geddesian notion of focussing on 'Civics' and town planning as a means of overcoming the social divisions revealed by the Dublin strike. A brochure for the exhibition stated that it would "not be by the exertions of the few but by the hearty cooperation of all classes that real progress will be made"; and Geddes called on Ireland to now "take a definite and historic place in this movement for citizenship which was now manifestly becoming a central movement throughout the world". A Civics Institute was formed to make the exhibition into a permanent campaign, with Lord and Lady Aberdeen as its joint Presidents. Geddes ran a Summer School which spelt out the need for a civic survey. The second aim of the 1914 Civic Exhibition was to address the thorny issue of Irish economic under-development, by promoting the American theory that only town planning could ensure that cities would work as effective instruments of production and consumption. Several of those associated with what became called the 'City Functional' movement, and especially the 'Boston-1915' campaign, were brought over to put this view. The leading US planner John Nolen, described as being Irish-American, was engaged as manager of the Civic Exhibition and immediately began to stress economic factors. "Unless there is some hard town-planning done", warned Nolen, ".....Dublin will slip back." A later brochure for the exhibition claimed that it would "show how Dublin can be made a better and more profitable place to do business in".

The Civic Exhibition opened on 15 July 1914 with much pomp. It had a wide range of exhibits, but pride of place was given to the housing and town planning section. This showed many planning exemplars from the USA, Germany and elsewhere, but above all praised the British garden city tradition. Visitors were left in no doubt that, as the Irish Architect noted of the housing schemes on show, "the Irish designs are not as a rule up to the standard of the English". The Civic Exhibition was held in the refurbished Linenhall Barracks, which Lord Aberdeen tried secretly to have given over permanently as a museum for the new Civics Institute. But despite his appeals to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lloyd George, the Treasury rejected this suggestion on the grounds that "to give this away to even a much deserving enterprise would be tantamount to assisting it from public funds". Due to the outbreak of war in early August, the Civic Exhibition did not receive as many visitors as anticipated. However its main failing was that it patently did not help to reconcile Irish factions as intended. Several Unionist municipalities, including Belfast Corporation, declined to attend in light of the escalating 'Ulster Crisis'. The exhibition also failed to attract Dublin's casual poor, partly because of entrance charges and partly because
Larkin called on his supporters to treat the exhibition with contempt. Only on the last day was entrance made free, and the working classes responded by making off with much of the furniture and exhibits! Geddes typically tried to gloss over this episode, fantasising that "each thief would now have a model of a little cottage on his mantelpiece, and that would show him the sort of place he should be living in, instead of the slums".

The other initiative launched in January 1914 was the Dublin Town Plan Competition. Lord Aberdeen offered a £500 prize, and Geddes and Nolen were appointed as judges along with the Dublin City Architect. Since all agreed that a full civic survey would have to be held before any plan was decided on, the competition was always intended more to produce ideas and publicity. The key stipulation of the brief was to provide for the 14,000 new dwellings recommended by the Dublin Housing Inquiry, but this was to be blended with the reorganisation of the transport system and land use generally in Dublin and its environs. Judgement of the eight entries was delayed because of the First World War, until heated debate over the rebuilding of areas destroyed in the 1916 Easter Rising prompted Lord Aberdeen and the Civics Institute into action. Patrick Abercrombie was declared the winner. His approach was typical of the 'Liverpool School', in that it combined a Geddesian approach with US 'Beaux Arts' monumental planning in central areas and neo-Georgian suburban housing estates [Figs.31-33]. Abercrombie's grand public buildings were designed in eclectic neo-historical styles, and included a new 'traffic centre', just to the west of the existing heart of Dublin, to act as a fulcrum for transport networks. A series of boulevards or 'parkways' then linked the city core with a ring of garden suburbs, each having its own axial and geometric layout, and forming a distinct 'neighbourhood centre'. The housing types were in a rationalised neo-Georgian manner, and consisted of short rows of two-storey cottages with wide frontages and a through-lit living room. Abercrombie repeatedly stressed that his essential message was that housing and transport links had to be reformed together in order to rescue Dublin from economic stagnation. But while his design was audaciously executed, Geddes made it clear that its main use should be educative rather than prescriptive. The entry with the written report that Geddes praised most was that of Charles Ashbee, the leading Arts and Crafts architect. Ashbee was a great admirer of Geddes, as can be seen in his subsequent book on town planning entitled Where the Great City Stands: A Study in the New Civics (1917). The problem for Ashbee, however, was that his design proposals were extremely weak, and consisted primarily of two idealised birds-eye perspectives what the 'new Dublin' might look like.

Abercrombie's town plan for Dublin had little effect in Ireland until it resurfaced during the 1920's, when it was published by the Civics Institute as part of the demand for town
planning legislation in the new Irish Free State. In the short term, Abercrombie's design was more influential in Britain than in Ireland. It was described by H.V. Lanchester as "the highest development that had yet been reached in the matter of town planning in the United Kingdom", and Unwin recommended that it be studied "by town planners all over the world, because it showed the state to which town planning was brought". Thomas Mawsom wrote in September 1916 that it was essential that the plan be implemented in the wake of the Easter Rising, because:

"the present occasion marks a crisis in the history of the town planning movement. On its results depends the place the art is to take in the future in this country for never before have such favourable conditions prevailed nor can we hope for another such opportunity."

But (as will be seen in the next chapter) given the extreme sensitivity of administrative policy in war-time Ireland, plus the controversy over the rebuilding of central Dublin, this statement reveals not an understanding of actual Irish conditions but rather an over-riding concern for the furtherance of town planning theory and practice in Britain.

A similar blinkered attitude from British town planners can also be seen in the pre-war experience of the previously-mentioned Citizens Housing League. After clashing repeatedly with Dublin Corporation over the latter's continued preference for inner-city schemes, the League offered to put the services of Geddes and Unwin as advisers to the Corporation's Housing Committee. Many councillors, especially Sinn Fein, were totally against the idea, but overall Dublin Corporation voted to accept. The actual report produced in September 1914 appears to have been written mainly by Unwin, and contained several suggested housing designs including a striking and picturesque garden suburb on the Marino site (designed with help from Geddes' assistant, Frank Mears) [Fig.34]. However any benefits from these suggestions were lost because the Geddes/Unwin Report simply disregarded the central issue of state subsidy. The report stated that the housing question should not be mixed up with the problem of poverty, which required other policies. Instead it urged Dublin Corporation to build high-standard garden suburbs for those artisans who could pay higher rents, which would then allow the very poor to 'filter up' into the dwellings which were vacated. This was the rationale in Britain behind the acceptance of Unwinian design by the Land Enquiry Committee and the English Board of Agriculture in the pre-war period, but it clearly went against the collectivist view in Ireland that state subsidy for the very poor was paramount. It meant that the Geddes/Unwin Report was simply denounced by Dublin Corporation as being based more on conditions found in an English manufacturing town, and of having "approached and reported on the subject from an exclusively Town Planning point of view".

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4.4 The outcome of the planning crusade in pre-war Ireland

What then had been achieved by the town planning movement in Ireland on the eve of the First World War? There were no significant private initiatives to speak of, and no co-partnership societies had been set up. As noted in the last chapter, in mid-1914 James Larkin hatched a scheme for a garden suburb for ITGWU members, using the profits of the new workers' building guild; but, despite consultations with Geddes, nothing came of the plan. A minuscule suburban estate on British Arts and Crafts lines was built in Pembroke in 1913-14 as a memorial to the Earl of Pembroke, with advice from the HTPAI. It made no impact. In the case of private enterprise housing, one pre-war Belfast speculator advertised the building of a so-called 'garden suburb', but this referred only to the provision of attractive housing for sale to the city's middle-classes. Municipalities were the main source of new working-class dwellings in pre-war Ireland, and here, whether Nationalist or Unionist, the over-riding preference was to provide low-cost inner-city schemes comprising two-storeyed terraced houses in high density layouts. As seen in Chapter 2, only a few authorities in the wealthier southern suburbs of Dublin - where there was an unusually high proportion of skilled artisans who could pay higher rents - was the British policy of high-standard garden suburb design seriously considered. It is significant that all of these atypical municipalities had active members of the HTPAI or the Association of Municipal Authorities in key positions. But even amongst the bodies that were sympathetic to town planning ideas, only Pembroke UDC actually brought in the HTPAI to advise on the design of what it termed a 'garden suburb' in the Ringsend district. This scheme, actually spread over several sites and built from 1913-16, was praised highly by the Irish Local Government Board Inspector as a model for other municipalities. The architect was George O'Connor, an ambitious young member of the Irish planning movement who had designed the alterations for the 1914 Civic Exhibition. The largest site developed by Pembroke UDC was an estate of single- and two-storeyed terraces on a grid layout at Stella Gardens, off the Irishtown Road. It was however not a complete Unwinian garden suburb as such, but rather an improved suburban terraced scheme in the same sense as the pre-war estates built by the LCC. Higher standards were provided, and the largest dwellings even had 3 bedrooms and a separate bathroom. The most attractive of the Pembroke schemes was a pair of terraces in Harmony Avenue and Brookvale Avenue, in a quiet riverside site off Eglington Road. Here a subtle use of brick features such as a string course and arched door openings, along with delicate gables above the main bedroom windows, blended in harmoniously with the leafy surroundings. But in the absence of increased state subsidy the result was that Pembroke UDC had to charge substantial rents, and it was for this very reason that other Irish authorities did not follow
suit. "So far the garden city epidemic has not visited Dublin", declared the *Irish Builder* in 1915, and this observation applied even more forcefully to the rest of Ireland.

Given this almost complete failure, it would appear that ultimately the pre-war town planning movement in Ireland had more to do with British rather than Irish conditions. For British participants the very attraction was the complexity of the political situation, and the hope that town planning and citizenship might resolve the confrontation between Nationalism and Unionism and between capital and labour. Geddes felt that Ireland had a lesson for everywhere:

"Through such large civic endeavours as that of the town planning of Dublin, this correlation of Survey and Eutopia [sic] may be made plainer to other cities; and this is appealing to all parties, classes, occupations, and individuals. In such ways city surveys and exhibitions and plans are actually generating a new movement of education, that towards a School of Civics, as in Dublin, and soon in every city."

Of course nothing remotely like this happened in pre-war Dublin. Town planning failed to establish itself simply because it offered nothing to any of the groups holding power. It clearly provided no solution to the opposition of Nationalists and Unionists over the question of Home Rule. Likewise there was no integration of the radical labour groups into the town planning movement in Dublin, despite the efforts of bodies like the Citizens Housing League. Garden suburb ideals remained generally in hands of a rather narrow clique of middle class reformers. This explains why the Irish Administration and the British Government remained so indifferent to demands for town planning in Ireland, since it offered them no help in their delicate policy of balancing rival Irish groups. Garden suburb supporters such as Lord and Lady Aberdeen remained on the periphery of official British policy, and their involvement stemmed from personal belief in the need to reform society. Thus there was no sense in which town planning formed part of British policy in Ireland, as has been tentatively suggested.

Instead the propagation of garden suburb ideals should be seen as part of the wider attempt by many groups in Britain to deal with the problems engendered by proposed self-government for Ireland. However the failure of town planning advocates to adapt their precepts to suit pre-war Irish conditions meant that the movement tended to appear irrelevant in two ways. Firstly, Geddes' attempt to remove the political dimension underestimated the need in Ireland, at such an uncertain juncture, to reinforce support either for or against Home Rule. For adherents of the Irish Party and other nationalist groups, any attempt to turn away from the question of independence was seen ultimately as playing only into the hands of Unionists and the British Government. As has been observed of Sir Horace Plunkett, whom Geddes so much admired, the aim to bypass nationalism was
perceived as simply another form of 'constructive Unionism' - that is, of promoting Irish social and economic reform to help divert from the demands for self-government. Indeed the ridiculous later contention by Geddes that the 1916 Easter Rising could have been averted if only money had been spent on housing and planning reform, reads exactly like this. The other way in which British town planners appeared to be irrelevant was that they simply did not appreciate the emphasis placed in Ireland on extracting more state subsidy for urban housing. Given the historical resentments that had built up against British rule, any solution that did not propose financial redistribution was seen again as only doing the Treasury's work for them. Both these omissions were to give the pre-war Irish town planning movement a definite air of unreality. Another aspect which many in Ireland found difficult to accept was the cultural imperialist assumption that English planning and housing design was inherently superior and should be exported to dependent nations such as Ireland. This was clearly the view of Charles Ashbee, a strong admirer of Geddes and a commended entrant in the Dublin Town Plan Competition, and would appear to have been echoed by Geddes. Although Geddes was to take a different approach later in India, in his dealings with pre-war Ireland he saw the latter as a kind of laboratory in which to try out what Meller has described as a "Geddesian social experiment".

If the crusade to import British town planning values (i.e. Geddesian sociology and Unwinian garden suburb design) turned out to be a side issue in the pre-war urban housing debate in Ireland, it nevertheless offers an interesting case study in how ideas are transformed within the colonial condition. In Britain, town planning was a highly contentious subject given that it was viewed by many as a stalking-horse for land municipalisation: the latter representing a means to reduce the profit that private landowners could earn from the expansion of industrial cities. Thus however much it might be watered down in say the 1909 Act, garden suburb planning remained for figures such as Lloyd George and the Land Enquiry Committee a political instrument to be used in the long-running conflict between commercial and landed capital. Yet when British adherents came to campaign in Ireland, town planning was portrayed instead as a consciously apolitical and technical issue. The emphasis on technocracy appears to have become even more marked in the later work of Patrick Geddes in further-flung colonies of the British Empire like India and Palestine. Another undisputable intention of British participants in Ireland was to use the country's problems as an opportunity to publicise their views and make their names. "The Irish experience was crucial in establishing Geddes' position in the British town planning movement. Until Dublin he had been merely a propagandist," as Meller has written. Frank Mears was the protege of Geddes in the pre-war Dublin campaign, and in early 1915 he was still in Dublin hoping to pick up the design work from the Corporation for the Marino Estate and another nearby scheme. And perhaps no-one
benefitted as much from the flurry of planning interest in Dublin than Patrick Abercrombie. Dix has observed that the 1914 Town Plan Competition "drew national and international attention to Abercrombie and to his application of a Geddesian approach": he was thereby launched on a glittering career as the doyen of British planning from the time of his Doncaster Report (1922), through to the renowned County of London Plan (1943) and Greater London Plan (1944), and beyond.50

Finally, it can be argued that existing accounts of the pre-war movement in Ireland have followed the dominant mode of British planning historiography, wherein the "development of planning has been to a large extent treated as a simple victory of professional aspiration in which the planner triumphs against the blind and wasteful operation of economic forces."51 The emphasis has been primarily on a narrative of events and an uncritical description of participants. The result has been the writing of history very much from the point of view of the early planning enthusiasts in Ireland. This has tended to distort the views of important groups in Irish society, and play down the extent of the forces which militated against the acceptance of garden suburb ideals. Another tendency has been to separate the planning debate from that of housing policy generally, thereby giving the early Irish town planning movement greater coherence than it actually had. Instead garden suburb ideals should be seen as but one aspect of the larger urban housing issue, that was a far more important factor in Irish society and in British policy towards Ireland. Indeed it was to be as the result of Irish housing policy during and after the First World War that garden suburb planning was finally introduced. The next chapter will now trace these wartime developments in Ireland.
5. WAR-TIME HOUSING AND RECONSTRUCTION AFTER THE 1916 EASTER RISING

This chapter, central in all senses, traces the way in which the pre-war stalemate between Ireland and Westminster over urban housing policy was transformed during the course of the First World War. At the outbreak of hostilities with Germany in August 1914, the prime concerns of the British Government and the Castle Administration became the repression of anti-war propaganda and the promotion of the recruitment campaign. The Home Rule Act was passed but put on ice for the duration of the war, and the Irish Party showed its loyalty by recommending enlistment and support for the war effort. A policy of state retrenchment was introduced that severely restricted Irish rural and municipal house-building, and was to make new measures like the 1914 Housing (No.2) Act irrelevant. However, the 1916 Easter Rising was to prove a decisive turning point. From this moment on, first the Castle Administration and then Westminster took control of Irish state housing, and began to use the issue as a political tool in initiatives such as the 1917-18 Irish Convention. Ireland was thus the crucible where Lloyd George's post-war policy of using housing for political ends was first expounded. Whilst few dwellings were actually built in war-time Ireland, the involvement of British officials reinforced a move towards garden suburb design in schemes by Dublin Corporation. By the end of the First World War, the British Government regarded housing as a key strategy in its search for a solution to the thorny question of Irish Home Rule.

5.1 War-time retrenchment in Irish urban housing policy

The prospects for Irish urban housing at the start of the First World War were not promising. Two new initiatives emanating from Britain, the 1914 Housing (No.2) Act and then the housing programme of the Ministry of Munitions, made no impact on Ireland. The Housing (No.2) Act was introduced in late-1914 by the British Government to meet Parliamentary demands for a safeguard against potential unemployment in the building industry. A sum of £4,000,000 was allocated to the English Local Government Board and the Board of Agriculture, to lend to local authorities or public utility societies for housing purposes up till 31 August 1915. The Chancellor of Exchequer, Lloyd George, pledged that loans would receive a grant-in-aid from the Exchequer but only to meet wartime inflation in the cost of building materials; duly he announced a 10% free grant plus 90% loan at 4.25% interest over 60 years to local authorities, and a 10% free grant plus 80% loan at 5% interest over 60 years to other agencies. The Treasury, however, strongly
opposed the Housing (No.2) Act, and in particular the prospect of subsidy. Hence it
issued a minute in December 1914 stating that grants would be for exceptional cases only,
and were intended to relieve chronic unemployment rather than housing need. This was
simply a Treasury pretext to use the strict terms of eligibility, in having to prove
"exceptional and insistent distress" in an area due to lack of building employment, as the
means to refuse all loan applications. Since the anticipated war-time unemployment did
not arise, the 1914 Housing (No.2) Act remained a dead letter.

A potential threat to the Treasury's intentions came from the determination of the Irish
Party, backed by Dublin Corporation and the Association of Metropolitan Authorities of
Ireland, to exploit the Housing (No.2) Act as the long-desired augmentation in urban
subsidy under the Irish Housing Fund. The IPP's spokesman, J.J. Clancy, told
Parliament that in Ireland "the problem of increased unemployment is greater and the
housing conditions worse than in Great Britain." Chief Secretary Birrell was pressured to
secure an extending Act, known as the 1914 Housing No.2 (Amendment) Act, to cover
Ireland. There followed a dramatic rush in loan applications from Irish municipalities.
But when the Castle Administration applied in September 1914 for Ireland's share of the
allocated loan fund (estimated at around £350,000), the Treasury sharply reminded them
that the measure "is not intended as the foundation of a general housing scheme for which
the present time is obviously most inopportune." Dismayed, Clancy wrote bluntly to the
Treasury on 7 October 1914:

"I am writing now, at the instance and with the sanction of Mr John Redmond, and I say
that there really ought to be no haggling and haggling in this matter. The state of things
here is too serious to be considered from the mere usual point of view, and the reasons for
giving the grant to Ireland which is asked for are so plain that I need not refer to them. I
believe that my views on that subject will be fully confirmed by the Local Government
Board for Ireland.....the seriousness of this matter from every point is so great that I hope
that, in the public interest, no delay will be made in announcing a satisfactory answer from
the Treasury."

The Treasury reiterated that the Housing (No.2) Act was purely a temporary relief measure,
and that "Ireland will be treated in no way differently from England, Scotland, or Wales." Several Irish municipalities then drew up detailed applications; the most authoritative
coming from Dublin Corporation in March 1915 with testimonies from the Building Trades
Employers' Association and the RIAI as to the likely unemployment in the local building
trades during the forthcoming year. Not surprisingly, the Treasury refused the claim,
causing the Sinn Fein Chairman of Dublin Corporation's Housing Committee, Alderman
Thomas Kelly, to declare in exasperation "that the Housing (No.2) Act, 1914, about which
there was such a great flourish of trumpets, was merely a make-believe and a sham."
Much of the acrimony was directed at the ILGB, but the real source of intransigence lay in the Treasury and therefore the British Government.

Ireland fared little better out of the major programme of state housing by the Ministry of Munitions after its inception in June 1915. It was the cottages built by this department that received the first state subsidy in Britain, and which consolidated garden suburb design as the new orthodoxy. In Ireland there was a shortage of facilities and resources suitable for munitions production, and political opposition to the war made it risky to produce armaments there. At the height of the war there were only around 14,500 munitions workers in Ireland (although many went to work in British factories), and thus the Irish sub-department of the Ministry of Munitions had little to do. The two large centres of production were in Belfast shipyards and the Kynochs Cordite Works at Arklow, Co. Wexford. The former was renowned as a well-housed city, and so the only actual munitions scheme in Ireland appears to have been 112 cottages for explosives' workers in Arklow. These dwellings pre-dated the programme of the Ministry of Munitions, and were built by Arklow UDC using a £13,500 public in November 1914 once the Treasury had abandoned its insistence on temporary dwellings. New municipal cottages were permitted "on the understanding that the buildings to be erected will not be in excess of the normal requirements of the District." Subsequently, however, the Treasury fought off an attempt to revive a scheme for a 'garden village' at nearby Gorey for workers commuting to Arklow. And when further local housing need was identified in October 1915, the Castle Administration recommended to the Irish branch of the Ministry of Munitions that they simply lend £3,000 to the factory owners for a 300-bed temporary hostel. It is not clear whether this hostel was ever built, but certainly nothing came of a later application by Arklow UDC to the Ministry of Munitions in February 1917, asking for a £20,000 grant for up to 200 permanent cottages. By this point, the building of munitions housing through the agency of local authorities had anyway been abandoned in Britain.

In lieu of positive housing initiatives from Westminster, state housing in Ireland dwindled with the onset of war. Despite a further grant of £1,000,000 under the 1914 Labourers Act, the rural programme was greatly reduced. Only around 1,100 rural cottages were built each year from 1914-18, compared to an annual average of 3,500 in the four preceding years [Diagram A; Table U]. Chief Secretary Birrell and the Castle Administration went along with a Treasury stipulation that only those rural schemes that had already been sanctioned should now be completed. The Treasury also announced in October 1914 that the limit for Irish public loans in the next financial year was to be cut to only £600,000, rather than the £700,000 previously envisaged. The President of the Irish Board of Works warned that "it would be extremely awkward if the smaller sum proved insufficient, and
particularly if loans for Housing of the Working Classes (a burning question here) had to be refused or delayed.\textsuperscript{17} The Treasury thus reluctantly permitted loans for urban housing to receive favoured status. Dublin Corporation were granted a sum of £43,500 in December 1914 to commence its three most developed schemes, and the Irish Party leader, John Redmond, also secured a loan of £23,000 for Waterford Corporation to proceed with an estate of 38 single-storey cottages in Trinity Square, Ballybricken (1915-17). The latter loan, however, was only agreed by the Treasury on condition that Redmond used his influence over Nationalist municipalities to curb future urban housing applications.\textsuperscript{18} Such voluntary restraint was not forthcoming: so when Dublin Corporation asked in April 1915 for a further £31,980 to build the scheme in Beresford Street/Church Street, the Treasury finally decided to extend to Ireland the moratorium on local authority expenditure already in operation in Britain. They called for Cabinet support on the matter:

"Our position in regard to Irish finance is stronger in so far as practically all the Irish authorities have recourse to the Local Loans Fund and do not (or cannot) borrow in the open market; it is weaker in so far as the Departments there are in alliance with the borrowers and hostile to economy. Our appeal to them to suspend current works (which cover a large proportion of the expenditure) would therefore be ineffective unless the decision was put to them as the decision of His Majesty's Government."\textsuperscript{19}

The Treasury were duly empowered to send a directive to the Castle Administration on 21 April 1915 imposing a moratorium on all public loans, and this decision was notified to Irish local authorities through an ILGB Circular in early May.\textsuperscript{20} Contrary to Treasury suspicions about the loyalty of Irish Departments, the latter fully supported retrenchment now that it was official Government policy. The ILGB assiduously turned down all new applications for rural cottages under the Labourers Acts, and even sought to cancel existing contracts wherever possible. The Under Secretary for Ireland, Sir Matthew Nathan, pointed out the political sensitivity of pursuing a hard-line policy at a time of widespread anti-British feeling, but on balance the Treasury doubted "that a temporary suspension of new schemes would provoke a revolution."\textsuperscript{21} In terms of urban housing, the Vice-President of the ILGB, Sir Henry Robinson, observed that:

"As regards Public Health and Town Housing loans we have, to all intents and purposes, shut down inexorably on them, and are very glad to do so, as Ireland hardly realizes the seriousness of the situation and the only way to put a stop to their anti-recruiting blackguardism.....is to make the people over here feel the inconvenience and trial of the war."\textsuperscript{22}

The ILGB's housing expert thus reminded Dublin Corporation at an inquiry in July 1915 that, because of the war, "the claims on public resources for even so urgent a matter as the...housing of the working classes in Dublin should be subordinated to other claims of an unprecedented and dominating character on the energies and financial abilities of every
part of the Empire."23 The net outcome was a further decline in Labourers Acts schemes, and a dramatic fall in Irish municipal house-building from mid-1915 [Diagram D; Table Y].24 The complacency of the Castle Administration on the urban housing issue was shown by their lack of interest in the 1915 Rent Act (which prohibited war-time rent increases on dwellings with rateable values of up to £26, or £35 in London). The Under Secretary merely observed that rent control was not a burning issue in Ireland, because the departure of soldiers to the front and munitions workers to Britain meant that housing demand and thus pressure on rents was, if anything, on the wane.25 And when an unnamed wealthy citizen offered to lend money to Dublin Corporation for housing purposes, Sir Matthew Nathan argued that such funds would be better diverted to the war effort.26

Yet the desire of the Castle Administration to impose thrift in Irish housing was threatened by British Government's need to retain the support of the Irish Party in the recruitment drive. This conflict came to a head when the ILGB, after carefully preparing the ground, informed John Redmond in August 1915 that the payment of the remaining £17,000 loan to Waterford Corporation was now to be postponed until after the war. The ILGB requested the Treasury "that if John Redmond tackles your parliamentary chiefs you won't give way again", and the Treasury Remembrancer in Ireland declared that if the ILGB were overruled then "we shall be unable, I am afraid, to put the almost complete stopper on local loans which I had hoped for: because all the arguments in favour of Waterford apply - and in some cases with much greater force - to other places."27 However, John Redmond privately threatened the Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury, E.S. Montagu, that if "the promise publicly given is broken, there will be very serious trouble in the City of Waterford, and I, personally, will be put into a position of extreme embarrassment."28 Montagu therefore agreed a special loan of £5,000 for Waterford Corporation to continue its housing work, and Redmond tactfully asked local Nationalist councillors "that no public splash be made about this at all."29 It was a political concession that greatly angered the Castle Administration, for it meant that the strategy of imposing a moratorium on urban housing loans had been effectively sunk. Faced by a renewed wave of applications, the ILGB introduced another tactic in late-1915. It now told Dublin Corporation to borrow on the open market to carry out schemes at Spitalfields and the McCaffrey Estate, hoping that high war-time interest rates would deter municipal building. The new policy was justified by the ILGB's Vice-President, Sir Henry Robinson, on the grounds that:

"many of these Boroughs are packed with Sinn Feiners who are openly anti-British and who declare that the war is no concern of theirs and that no Irishman has any interest or reason in fighting England's battles and should not be asked to enlist.....It is a very good object lesson to these people to let them see how they are affected by the war."30
The attempt by the Castle Administration to turn off the tap of public funds provoked a swift response. An Irish Party deputation led by Redmond and Clancy met the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Reginald McKenna, on 16 November 1915 to demand an urgent housing loan of £35,500 for Dublin Corporation. A plethora of documents were submitted in support of the application, including a pamphlet written by the Corporation that declared:

"Countless millions are being spent on the prosecution of a war to which Dublin alone has sent some 14,000 men to fight the Empire's battle... Are they to find the Empire's gratitude on their return represented in the refusal of the Government to allow the Corporation to lift their wives and children from the horrors of life in dilapidated tenement houses or cellar dwellings into the atmosphere of light and life in a sanitary, self-contained comfortable home?"  

Unaware of the ILGB's ruling that housing loans had to be raised on the open market, the Chancellor of the Exchequer approved a loan of £25,000 to buy sites at Ormond Market, Spitalfields and the McCaffrey Estate. The ILGB again complained bitterly that "it is very hard for us to force the Treasury policy of retrenchment upon the local authorities when ministers make promises in individual cases without first hearing what we have to say in the matter." The Treasury, realizing that the IPP deputation had been a 'try-on' that successfully exploited the lack of communication between Dublin Castle and Westminster, resolved in future to back the ILGB. They were compelled to grant one further loan of £15,750 to Dublin Corporation to buy a site at Fairbrothers Fields, since the expenditure had already been sanctioned. But the Treasury made it clear that this was intended as the last housing loan that would be made to Irish municipalities during the war. Thus by March 1916, despite dire warnings of social unrest from the Irish Party, Dublin Trades Council, and journals such as the Irish Builder, the Castle Administration and the British Government had imposed strict retrenchment on urban housing. It took the dramatic events of Easter 1916 to alter the course of British housing policy in Ireland.

5.2 The aftermath of the 1916 Easter Rising

The outbreak of rebellion in Dublin on Easter Monday 1916 came as a surprise to the Castle Administration, and highlighted their ineffectiveness in either controlling the supply of arms or in foreseeing the extent of anti-British opposition in Ireland. The abortive uprising was led by a conjunction of hard-line nationalists from the Irish Volunteers and the outlawed Irish Republican Brotherhood, along with socialists from James Connolly's Citizens Army. Although the insurgents made swift gains, the rebellion was firmly crushed by the British Army within a week. The bombardment of the GPO building in
Lower Sackville Street led to the surrender of the rebels' headquarters, and Ireland was immediately subjected to martial law under the firm hand of General Maxwell. The Easter Rising was in effect a futile 'blood sacrifice' with little support at the time. Yet it proved significant for two reasons: firstly, because outrage against the Government's swift execution of the rebel leaders appears to have driven many towards sympathy with Sinn Fein; and secondly, because the Rising foreshadowed the coalition of extreme nationalists and labour elements in the post-war nationalist movement. The participation of radical socialists was precipitated by a revulsion against imperial militarism, lucidly shown in their response to a British Army recruiting poster which proclaimed that "The trenches are safer than the Dublin slums." Connolly's retort was bitter: "It is the idea of English wit.....We may yet see the day that the trenches will be safer for those gentry than any part of Dublin."35

The inevitable inquiry into the causes of the Easter Rising squarely blamed the Castle Administration for having been too soft on political opposition. A number of contributory factors were cited, and importantly the pre-war concern over the link between social unrest and the extensive slums was now given official voice:

"Throughout the whole of this year Ireland was in a state of great prosperity so that Irish discontent could hardly be attributed to economic conditions, except that the housing conditions of the working classes in the City of Dublin might have accounted for an underlying sense of dissatisfaction with existing authority."36

General Maxwell told the Asquith Cabinet that urban housing conditions were one of the prime causes of the discontent behind the rebellion, and a member of the Irish Army Command also said that they "must deal with the Slums in Cities like Dublin,Limerick, Cork, etc. which are very bad."37 The Irish Builder echoed the sentiments, yet the strongest attack on the Government came in the Architect when it proclaimed that "The Minister of Munitions has realised that he cannot keep his department going without building houses for workers, but the rest of the incompetents have not yet grasped the fact that squalid living is the finest of hotbeds for revolution and rebellion."38 The issue was given an typically ironic twist by George Bernard Shaw:

"And why, oh why didn't the artillery knock down half Dublin while it had the chance ? Think of the insanitary areas, the slums, the glorious chance of making a clean sweep of them ! Only 179 houses [destroyed] and probably at least nine of them quite decent ones. I'd have laid at least 17,900 of them flat and made a decent town of it !"39

In the aftermath of martial law, the administration of Ireland was temporarily handed over to the Home Secretary, Herbert Samuel. Then in August 1916 an active new Chief Secretary, H.E. Duke, was appointed to not just to stifle dissent but also to directly address
economic and social problems. He was a well-intentioned Unionist barrister who believed that a conciliatory policy was essential to keep Ireland a contented member of the British Empire. Urban housing soon became one of Duke's main political concerns, but more immediately the Government and the Castle Administration had to deal with the rebuilding of the destroyed commercial areas in central Dublin. The general town-planning debate was reopened when, after prompting by the Civics Institute and the Town Planning Institute in London, the long-awaited judgement of the Dublin Town Plan Competition was brought forward (as seen in the last chapter). More prosaically, the proposals for rebuilding soon polarised into a struggle over the cost and manner of reconstruction. On one hand Dublin Corporation, backed by some Irish Party MPs and bodies such as the RIAI, wanted legislative powers (such as compulsory purchase and aesthetic control) and generous state finance to impose a scheme for central Sackville Street in a grand 'commercial-classical' style. On the other side private property owners, as represented by the Fire and Property Losses Association, saw these proposals as needlessly expensive and an infringement of their right to rebuild as they chose. It was at this point that the British Government, initially through Prime Minister Asquith and Home Secretary Samuel, intervened to mediate. Legislation was drafted by Dublin Corporation in conjunction with the ILGB, and was promoted in Parliament by Chief Secretary Duke. When this proposal ran into difficulty, the Government agreed to a Corporation suggestion (initiated by the Civics Institute) that Raymond Unwin be seconded from the Ministry of Munitions to act as negotiator. There was some initial resentment over Unwin's involvement, but in general his contribution was positively received. Compromise was reached in due course, and the Dublin Reconstruction Act passed into law on 20 December 1916. A low-interest public loan was to be provided after the war for Dublin Corporation to carry out street-widening, and to compensate private owners for any 'reasonable' aesthetic improvement to their design suggested by the City Architect (a clause allowed for arbitration wherever an owner felt that the required alteration was excessively costly). The 1916 Dublin Reconstruction Act constituted the first, tentative Irish planning legislation, yet was never used: when Lower Sackville Street was reformed as O'Connell Street under a new regime in the 1920s, there was little cohesive urban vision.

Even more significant in the turmoil over reconstruction proposals in mid-1916, was that the British Government used the issue of working-class housing to pressure Dublin Corporation into scaling down their demands. When a deputation of Corporation councillors and Irish Party MPs met the Home Secretary in early June, Herbert Samuel declared:

"the greatness of Dublin depends not only on noble thoroughfares and palatial public buildings but also in no less degree on the provision of comfortable sanitary homes for the
population, and so far as money is available I know that you have large schemes in prospect. You would not I am sure wish to spend great sums on too magnificent schemes of town planning while leaving this question of rebuilding slums in the background. It is of the first importance to provide for the health and comfort of the people; it is only a secondary object to make a noble and architecturally fine city."\(^{44}\)

This was a naive tactical mistake, for the IPP members immediately demanded that the Home Secretary should therefore support their appeals for an augmentation of the Irish Housing Fund. Samuel was forced to backtrack, and resort to the pre-war argument against both the principle of housing subsidy:

"As to a grant, a gift of money for housing in Dublin, if that was given, what would all the towns in England say, many of which have got very bad housing conditions. In the House of Commons I have had to resist again and again very strong demands for gifts of money for housing purposes in England and Wales. I have always refused them. You in Ireland have been more fortunate because of the Labourers Acts, but so far as urban housing is concerned only loans may be given when money is available, but no subsidies."\(^{45}\)

The over-riding urgency of housing need in Dublin was again raised by the Treasury when arguing against the state-financed town planning contained in the Corporation's grand rebuilding scheme. Unprompted, the Treasury in June 1916 estimated the likely cost of post-war housing provision:

"the Dublin Corporation ought not to be encouraged to embark upon grandiose schemes of beautification, which are of the nature of luxuries, at a time when they will have hard work to meet the requirements of public health [housing]; and further that, as the Government will presumably have to lend something approaching £500,000 for the latter purposes, the British taxpayer ought not to be asked to raise more money for Dublin by loan after the War."\(^{46}\)

Such statements demonstrated a definite change in the attitude of Westminster to the issue of urban housing in Ireland, and indeed from this point the Castle Administration consciously employed housing as a political tool. Even before the new Chief Secretary had taken office, the Vice-President of the ILGB reported back to H.E. Duke that the seeds of the new policy had been sown amongst the Nationalist Dublin Corporation:

"I told the Lord Mayor that you wanted his confidential help and advice as to what you could do about Housing, whereat his "heart warmed to you", as he expressed it."\(^{47}\)

At his first public engagement in September 1916, to open the new Pembroke UDC estate at Stella Gardens, Duke described Dublin's slums as "a problem of as tremendous magnitude, probably as any problem, which in modern times can engage the attention of statesmen in connection with the well-being of the community of this Island and the Empire."\(^{48}\) Later the same month the Lord Lieutenant, Lord Wimborne, told the annual
meeting of the Association of Municipal Authorities of Ireland that "there is no more important question before the Conference than the question of the better housing of the industrial and artisan classes." The central importance of housing to the Castle Administration's new strategy was also demonstrated by the active promotion of the matter in Westminster. A contemporary memorandum by the Attorney General for Ireland proposed that Home Rule should be granted at once, along with a generous financial settlement from Britain which included a housing grant of up to £4,000,000. The Lord Lieutenant submitted his own personal plan for a conference to discuss Home Rule and conscription, and he added that it might also consider "whether a substantial Treasury loan for the purpose of exterminating the urban slum evil would not go far to reconcile the labour dissatisfaction which was, and is, to a great extent, responsible for the Sinn Fein animus." And in September 1916 Chief Secretary Duke informed the Cabinet of the adverse results of war-time retrenchment in Ireland:

"Just as in Dublin, in the various provincial towns which I have visited, appalling conditions of housing exist, on a scale which affects an extraordinarily large proportion of the population. The suspension of works of social amelioration which are dependent upon governmental initiative or help, operating with the prevailing political discontents, adds to the difficulties of administration. If local authorities could even be encouraged to provide for works to be done at the end of the war I think good would result."

The new approach of the Castle Administration was warmly welcomed in Ireland. As a result of Duke's speech at Pembroke, the Dublin Chamber of Commerce set up a Housing Reform Committee. When the Under-Secretary deputised for Duke at a meeting of the Civics Institute in January 1917, one Irish Party MP remarked "that the presence of a high Government official in the chair was an indication that the Government was at last beginning to recognise its duty in connection with the housing of Dublin." The Chief Secretary subsequently attended the 'Civic Week' exhibition, which contained the entries for the 1914 Dublin Town Plan Competition. After this, Duke restated the message "that town planning might be left over for happier times but [he] recognised that the housing of the poor was a matter of great urgency which would demand the united efforts and thought of all classes of citizens." The immediate problem for Chief Secretary Duke, however, was that Irish demands were focussed on an immediate resumption in public loans for urban housing. In November 1916 John Redmond was again able to use his personal influence to secure a further £5,000 for Waterford Corporation, but the Treasury insisted that this was simply the fulfilment of an earlier promise. All other Irish municipalities were refused funds, and so Dublin Corporation began to look at the possibility of raising housing finance in the USA. Soon interest centred on a proposed $2,000,000 (£419,000) loan from Messrs. Lee, Higginson & Co of Boston, but negotiations broke down when the Treasury refused to underwrite the deal and US interest rates rose.
The collapse of Dublin Corporation’s loan negotiations in early 1917 came at a difficult
time for the Castle Administration. Around 1,500 workers in Dublin had lost their jobs
over the winter, and the unemployment total in the city probably stood in the region of
7,000 men. The issue of unemployment was especially contentious in Dublin because the
British Government’s recent anti-alcohol legislation threatened the important brewing
industry which included the large Guinness company. The Irish Party led a fierce
opposition to the temperance measures, and did not shrink from emphasizing the threat of
political unrest. "The Russian revolution has arisen in Petrograd from causes, in certain
respects resembling past and prevailing conditions in Ireland's capital," warned one IPP
member. Thus the Chief Secretary, as part of a general strategy in early-1917 of public
expenditure to encourage social peace, now urgently requested a £200,000 loan to restart
housing work in Dublin. Duke asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Arthur Bonar Law,
for an assurance that "in the event of his being persuaded that employees of Guinness' who
lose their employment owing to the recent restrictions in the output of beer have a good
prospect of being employed in the work of rehousing Dublin, the money will be
forthcoming." At this point, as will be seen later, the Cabinet were embarking on a more
consensual policy towards Ireland, and so were open to suggestions that would ameliorate
social grievances. Thus in early-April 1917 the Chancellor, after consulting with the Prime
Minister’s secretariat, informed Duke that housing loans for Dublin housing were now
available "in respect of such schemes as ought in your opinion to be proceeded with." Armed
with this pledge the Lord Lieutenant and Chief Secretary returned to Dublin, and on
5 April 1917 told a Dublin Corporation deputation that housing schemes would now be
resumed to relieve the problem of unemployment. The ILGB now dropped its
commitment to retrenchment, and helped the Chief Secretary to draft a plan for a war-time
loan to Dublin Corporation of £100,000 a year. The aim was explicitly to reduce dissent
and anti-war sentiment. The Vice-President of the ILGB, Sir Henry Robinson, noted that
"from our own point of view - that of relieving distress - the immediate commencement of
the work at Spitalfields would remove a great deal of unrest in the city." But before
looking at the resumption of housing work in Dublin in mid-1917, it is first necessary to
look at the changes in housing design that took place in Ireland during the First World War.

5.3 War-time housing design in Dublin Corporation schemes

The last chapter showed that the principles of garden suburb design and higher-standard
cottages had limited influence on state housing in Ireland prior to the First World War.
This was in contrast to Britain, where Unwinian orthodoxy was officially accepted by the
Board of Agriculture in 1913, and subsequently formed the basis for munitions housing. The adoption of the garden suburb model in war-time Ireland was far more gradual, and took place in two flagship schemes of Dublin Corporation: first in the McCaffrey Estate, and then in the redesigned Fairbrothers Fields estate. Both of these projects were designed specifically to anticipate substantial subsidy from the British Government, and hence were notably different from the general slum clearance policy that continued to be favoured by the Corporation's Housing Committee.

Dublin Corporation signalled the first significant improvement in housing standards in early-1915 with the redesign of the McCaffrey Estate (later Ceannt Brown). Partly this was in response to the repeated criticisms of high density inner-city schemes by the Geddes/Unwin Housing Report, and by bodies such as the Civics Institute and the Citizens Housing League. But the primary motive for the Corporation was that it hoped to secure subsidised funds under the 1914 Housing No. 2 (Amendment) Act, and so it needed a centrepiece project to overcome any potential objections from the ILGB. The problem was that the City Architect, Charles MacCarthy, had no experience of designing garden suburbs, and so the Corporation brought in Thomas Joseph Byrne, architect for the highly-praised labourers cottages in South Dublin RDC. Thus the design of the McCaffrey Estate represented the translation of the premier 'suburban' Labourers Acts' schemes into municipal housing. Byrne's Arts and Crafts approach can be seen in the picturesque, quasi-vernacular terraces built in yellow stock bricks, and adorned with complex, stepped rooflines punctuated by hips and gables. The elevational treatment was evocative of the 'street picture' diagrams in Unwin's _Town Planning in Practice_ (1909), and hence followed both pre-war LCC estates and the picturesque strain of munitions housing epitomized by the Well Hall Estate in Woolwich (1915). Equally important in the McCaffrey Estate was the overall site planning. The scheme as redesigned by Byrne cut the number of dwellings on the 7-acre site to 205 cottages, a density of 29 dwellings to the acre [Fig.37]. This was substantially higher than the Unwinian stricture of 12 dwellings to the acre, but was well below the norm for Dublin Corporation schemes. The symmetrical, terraced layout now provided green spaces for two childrens' playgrounds. The other major innovation was to abandon plans for mostly 3-roomed houses, and instead provide only 4-roomed cottages with a parlour, living room, and two bedrooms, let at a higher rent of 7s per week [Figs.38-39]. Two house-types were used: the majority (80% of dwellings) had a 15 ft. frontage and a typical terraced layout; yet there was also a new type (20% of dwellings) with a wider 24 ft. frontage, and a through living room (160 sq.ft) and a parlour on either side of a central staircase. Neither house type had a separate bathroom, so, as in contemporary Ministry of Munitions designs, the bath was placed in the scullery. Dublin Corporation had not built to such a high standard before, and while
the high rents were attacked by councillors who favoured housing for the very poor, the ILGB praised the redesign of the McCaffrey Estate as "admirable" and asked for only minor alterations.63

The McCaffrey Estate was however an exception within Dublin Corporation's housing strategy, and was intended to balance the primary emphasis on providing cheap dwellings for unskilled labourers in central districts. The most cogent advocate for the latter policy was once more Alderman Thomas Kelly, the Sinn Fein Chairman of the Corporation's Housing Committee. Kelly declared in October 1916 that until all the slums were cleared, "there was no use talking of garden suburbs."64 Thus in other war-time housing schemes, the Corporation simply refined the existing inner-city model. The design for the Ormond Market site contained 3-roomed cottages and 2-roomed flats in a high-density terraced layout around a central square. The other substantial contemporary slum-clearance schemes were in Church Street/Beresford Street and in Spitalfields, and these merely added a greater variety of brickwork detailing to the elevations [Fig.40]. These designs provoked bitter opposition from the Citizens Housing League and the newly-formed Dublin Tenants League, a working-class body set up by William Larkin (brother of James) to demand that nothing but suburban housing be built for the working classes. The Dublin Tenants League formed an unholy alliance with the Housing Reform Committee of the Dublin Chamber of Commerce, to demand that the British Government reject the Spitalfields scheme.65 Events such as the 'Civic Week' held in Dublin in January 1917 became polemical exercises for the promotion of garden suburb design, and when one of the Irish Party MPs for Dublin, Patrick Brady, suggested a broad-based conference to discuss post-war housing reconstruction, his altruistic proposal soon degenerated into a sectional attack by the Civics Institute and Dr Oliver Gogarty on Dublin Corporation's inner-city estates.66 More constructive pressure during war-time came from the ILGB, whose Vice-President noted that his department "have done our best to induce the Corporation to build houses on virgin soil on the outskirts of the City."67 And in late-1917 the Association of Municipal Authorities of Ireland wrote:

"It is to be hoped that in the new schemes the system of building long rows of dreary-looking dwellings will not be tolerated, and that....an attempt will be made to provide gardens, open spaces, wide tree-shaded thoroughfares, and other modern town planning ideas."68

Yet when Dublin Corporation came again to set an even higher standard for Irish housing design, this time through the Fairbrothers Fields estate, it was specifically to ensure that the scheme would receive subsidy from the British Government. The first redesign was commissioned in late-1916, when the Corporation were hoping to persuade the Treasury to
contribute to the interest repayments on the prospective US loan. Now the City Architect, Charles MacCarthy, was expected "to adopt a layout more nearly approaching the treatment recommended by the advocates of the Garden Suburb": though it is almost certain that his assistant, Horace O'Rourke (later City Architect from 1922-45), was primarily responsible for recasting the Fairbrothers Fields design along the lines suggested in the 1914 Geddes/Unwin Housing Report. The density on the 22-acre site was lowered from 800 dwellings (36 per acre) to only 586 dwellings (26 per acre), and the street layout was realigned to create a bi-axial plan with the first use in Ireland of Unwinian set-backs and cul-de-sacs to break up the large site blocks. Even more striking was the decision to build larger 3-room (44%), 4-room (38%), and even 5-room (18%) cottages. The respective rents were to be 6s, 8s, and 10s per week, easily the highest for any Corporation dwellings. The 5-room cottages were also the first Dublin Corporation house-types to include separate bathrooms on the first floor, with hot and cold water supply. When the US loan fell through, and the Castle Administration announced the new public loan from the Treasury in April 1917, the Corporation were even more determined to ensure that Fairbrothers Fields would qualify retrospectively for whatever post-war subsidy might be on offer.

The corollary of an increased reliance on British Government subsidy was that the ILGB's Chief Engineering Inspector, Dr Peter Cowan, expected a further increase in housing standards at the inquiry held into the scheme in September 1917. Cowan wanted to reduce the site to only 16 acres, so that the remainder could be devoted to parks and allotments, and then to build larger cottages to a lower density. The City Architect and the Corporation's Legal Officer were incensed by the ILGB's interference, but the Housing Committee decided to comply with the alterations rather than risk losing retrospective state subsidy. There followed numerous consultations with the ILGB in November and December 1917, with the City Architect noting ruefully that "I do not think that Mr Cowan will approve of any plans that do not fully comply with his suggestions." Cowan at this time was preparing a report on post-war housing in Dublin for the Chief Secretary - as will be discussed later - and his intention was plainly to introduce British standards to Irish state housing. Hence in the final version of the Fairbrothers Fields scheme, drawn up in March 1918, there were only 370 cottages on the 16-acre site (23 dwellings to the acre). When the area given over to parks and allotments was included, the overall density fell to just 17 dwellings to the acre. The distribution of house-types was now 157 3-room (42%), 128 4-room (35%) and 85 5-room cottages (23%), revealing a relative increase in the proportion of larger dwellings [Figs.41-42]. The 3-room cottages had a 15 ft frontage, and were of two types: one where the porch opened directly into the living room and had an external WC; the other with a separate staircase lobby and internal lavatory. The 4-room cottages

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now had a wider 16 ft frontage and three type-plans: the first was a non-parlour type with 3 first floor bedrooms; the second had a parlour and 2 larger bedrooms; and the third was a semi-detached version of the parlour-type with a side entrance and WC on the first floor. The 5-room cottages had a 20 ft. frontage and were distinguished by a first-floor bathroom. Bedroom sizes were also upgraded, particularly in the 4-room cottages. Cottages were designed in blocks varying from semi-detached pairs to terraces of 12 dwellings, and had only very shallow gable-projections to relieve the monotony in the rooflines. The regularised rhythm of door and window openings, and the simplicity of the roof profile, was the product of two influences found within the contemporary schemes of the Ministry of Munitions in Britain. The first was the tendency of Raymond Unwin's team to move away from vernacular intricacies, to a more rationalised design; the other came from the neo-Georgian preferences of the 'Liverpool School', as demonstrated in Ireland by Abercrombie's entry for the Dublin Town Plan Competition. The elevations for Fairbrothers Fields contained abstracted neo-classical details: a string-course was used to distinguish the brick ground floor 'plinth' from a rendered upper floor, and the gables (particularly in the semi-detached 5-room dwellings) were emphasised to suggest pediments. Roundels, along with semi-circular arched panels with keystones in the gables, added more neo-classical features. All in all, the Fairbrothers Fields estate had become Dublin Corporation's most prestigious design: as the Chairman of the Housing Committee later stated, "the Corporation always regarded the Fairbrothers Fields scheme as their magnus opus." The revised scheme was published in the London-based Architect - the first Irish housing project to receive such an accolade - and the journal noted approvingly that the scheme was now "laid out in a more pleasing manner, and it is proposed to plant all the main roads with trees, while the houses themselves will be spread out with a view to securing greater variety of effect." It is therefore right to describe the Fairbrothers Fields estate as the first genuine application of garden suburb design in Ireland. It was produced by Dublin Corporation in accordance with British housing expertise, with the aim of anticipating the post-war standards that would be set by Westminster.

In the negotiations with Chief Secretary Duke and the ILGB in April 1917 that led to agreement on an annual housing loan of £100,000 from the Treasury, Dublin Corporation made clear its intention to combine inner-city schemes such as Spitalfields as well as suburban projects at the McCaffrey Estate and Fairbrothers Fields. An advance of £10,000 was granted to start building work at Spitalfields at once. But by June 1917 the Corporation realised that it had under-estimated the financial consequences of war-time inflation, and of having to pay an interest rate of 5.5% on the public loan. It therefore demanded from the ILGB a guarantee that whatever post-war housing subsidy might be decided would be given retrospectively to schemes built in the interim. The ILGB
recommended to the Treasury that this assurance be given, on the basis that the threat of social unrest in Dublin was so critical that housing employment was urgently required. The Treasury bluntly refused. The outcome was that, with the exception of the Spitalfields scheme, Dublin Corporation resolved simply to clear the other sites, and not build any dwellings until it could be sure of receiving state subsidy. In May 1918 only £44,000 of the first annual loan of £100,000 had been taken up, and so the Corporation reluctantly decided to commence some construction work on the McCaffrey Estate and the small site at St James' Walk. Thus whereas housing had all but ceased in British cities, it did continue on a reduced scale in Ireland: in early 1918 the Architect estimated that Irish house-building stood at around a quarter of the level in 1909. The reality for Dublin Corporation, however, was that the Treasury continued to undermine its war-time housing programme. When the Corporation applied in Spring 1918 to clear a slum site at Boyne Street, the Treasury observed acidly:

"We should be especially careful as there appears to be a great deal of feeling in Dublin that the Corporation are wasting money in purchasing "worthless rookeries" instead of building on the virgin soil of Fairbrothers Fields which scheme it is significant has not been started." This was somewhat rich, given that it was the Treasury's refusal to give an assurances on housing subsidy that had virtually turned the special war-time housing loan to Dublin Corporation into a virtual dead-letter. After two years, in May 1919, a total of only £85,000 had been advanced (this included a recent loan of £24,930 to finally clear the Fairbrothers Fields site). The Treasury were noting with satisfaction that "probably the Corporation will not proceed very actively with any building until they know what the Government intend to do for housing generally in Ireland." In any case, the emergency loan sought by Chief Secretary Duke in April 1917, though important for revealing a novel use of housing as a political tool, was now over-shadowed in Ireland by the larger issue of the British Government's plans for post-war reconstruction.

5.4 Plans for Irish reconstruction and housing

A special committee had been set up by the Asquith Cabinet in March 1916 to start the preparations for reconstruction. This body acknowledged that a subsidised state housing programme would be needed after the war, as a temporary and transitional measure while the private house-building industry was reformed. Now the pre-war experience of the 'Irish system' was to prove invaluable. "Outside Ireland," the Treasury informed the Reconstruction Committee in late 1916, "the only case in which free grants have been given
for housing is that of housing urgently needed for war workers.\textsuperscript{82} No agreement was reached as yet on the nature of a post-war housing policy, nor were specific reconstruction plans for Ireland considered (indeed the issue of an Irish settlement was shelved after the collapse of Lloyd-George's attempt to orchestrate an agreement in Summer 1916). When a new Coalition Government under Lloyd George took power in December 1916, a far more ambitious 'Second' Reconstruction Committee was formed. The radicals within its Housing Panel, notably Seebohm Rowntree, called for a comprehensive post-war state housing campaign on the model of munitions schemes. The reconstruction issue was brought to a head by a wave of strikes in May 1917 that imperiled the war effort. An Industrial Unrest Committee was appointed, and the resulting report - echoing the official view on the 1916 Easter Rising - declared that bad housing was a contributory factor in labour unrest. The report thus recommended that the Government, although unable to embark on an immediate building programme, should make a bold announcement on its post-war housing proposals.\textsuperscript{83} Hence in late-July 1917 the Lloyd-George Cabinet authorized the English LGB to issue a circular to local authorities, promising unspecified state assistance for housing after the war and asking them to record the housing need in their area. There was, however, substantial disagreement within the Government as to the scope and finances of the housing programme. On one side, the newly-formed Ministry of Reconstruction under the radical Liberal MP, Dr Christopher Addison, wanted a bold and wide-ranging strategy: while a more conservative and economical plan was promoted by the English LGB and its successive Presidents, Lord Rhondda and W. Hayes Fisher. The result was much inter-departmental friction, which enabled the Treasury to block attempts to clarify the vague subsidy promised in the English LGB circular of July 1917. Before looking at the outcome of this struggle, it is worth looking at Irish reactions to the British Government's efforts to defuse domestic labour problems by making announcements on housing policy.

In Ireland there were immediate calls for a similar circular on housing be issued by the ILGB, and for the Government to explain the subsidy proposals.\textsuperscript{84} Particularly ominous for the Castle Administration was the spread of industrial unrest. One militant labour leader, invoking the Easter Rising and the current political turmoil in Russia, told the Irish TUC in August 1917 that:

"if the state of things existing in Dublin with regard to housing were to continue much longer the delegates need not be astonished to hear of another rebellion. The workers would have to march out and seize the land available for buildings. Then they would seize the building yards. and.....build there happy homes for the workers."\textsuperscript{85}
The Irish TUC passed a militant resolution demanding generous state aid for housing, and the labour threat was played up by both Irish Party MPs and the Association of Municipal Authorities of Ireland.\textsuperscript{86} However, given the differences raging within the Cabinet, Chief Secretary Duke could do little but stall. "The housing of the working classes in the cities and towns of Ireland is a matter of urgent importance," he told Parliament, "and will, I hope, be taken in hand as soon as possible after the War together with the housing proposals for Great Britain."\textsuperscript{87} Privately, Duke was worried as to whether Irish housing needs were being properly considered by the Cabinet. In mid-August 1917 he wrote to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Arthur Bonar Law, to reiterate the connection between urban slums and social discontent in Ireland, and to point out that the recent housing announcement in Britain had put intolerable political pressure onto the whole policy of the Castle Administration:

"I shall be obliged if you will let me know to what extent I may hold myself free to assure the representatives of public authorities in Ireland and other interested persons that equal generosity will be shown by the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the promoters of necessary works for the better housing of the poor whether this sphere of operations is in Ireland or in Great Britain. If you can give me this information before the adjournment of the Parliamentary Session it will put me in a position to avoid serious difficulties with which I must otherwise be confronted while I am in Ireland, as I expect to be, during the Parliamentary Recess."\textsuperscript{88}

The Treasury replied that it could offer no firm guarantee until a general housing policy had been decided for Britain, nor until there was agreement on the larger question of how Irish Home Rule might be financed.\textsuperscript{89} Duke tried to force the issue by inviting the Minister of Reconstruction to visit Dublin in November 1917 for a special housing conference. Realising that this would only raise Irish expectations, Addison tactfully declined.\textsuperscript{90} Frustrated by what it saw as the ineffectuality of the Castle Administration, the Irish Party took their appeal directly to the President of the English Local Government Board. Yet although the IPP and the Association of Municipal Authorities of Ireland set up their own respective Housing Committees in late-1917, neither was able to extract any definite promises on the likely form of housing subsidy.\textsuperscript{91} The simple truth was that the British Government was not in a position to make details available.

Yet if the Castle Administration could not satisfy Irish demands on financial aspects, it was able, as an alternative, to deal with the issue of housing standards required for the post-war campaign. In mid-1917 an Irish Party member for Dublin, Patrick Brady, suggested to the Chief Secretary that a commission be asked to prepare a scheme for Dublin housing; adding that "the setting up of such a Commission at this moment would do something to allay that spirit of unrest which unfortunately exists in Dublin as elsewhere."\textsuperscript{92} Duke realised that it would be improper to appoint a broad inquiry while the Cabinet was still formulating its
policy, and so the Vice-President of the ILGB suggested that instead the department's housing expert, Dr Peter Cowan, be asked to report on the matter. The proposal was favourably received, and so in late-July 1917 the Chief Secretary directed Cowan to prepare a confidential memorandum on how Dublin's housing needs could best be met. The finished report was presented to Duke in January 1918, but was not shown to Dublin Corporation until August despite demands for it to be published earlier. Cowan consulted with the Corporation and numerous housing experts, and his pragmatic report was intended as a consolidation of information already gathered by bodies such as the 1913-14 Dublin Housing Inquiry. Cowan's document was hence far more limited in scope than its British counterpart, the Tudor Walters Report. The latter was drawn up by an influential committee appointed by the English LGB on 26 July 1917, and its remit was subsequently extended to include Scotland. But when Irish Party MPs tried to have the Tudor Walters Report increased to cover Ireland as well, Chief Secretary Duke replied that this was unnecessary, since any of its recommendations on house-types or construction methods would be incorporated as a matter of course into the post-war Irish programme. There was a common link between the two reports in that the dominant architectural figure on the Tudor Walters Committee was Raymond Unwin, of whom Cowan had long been a dedicated supporter. It was the rather idiosyncratic approach of the Cowan Report, particularly in its view of the role of local authorities, that was to prove the most noticeable difference.

Cowan's central recommendation was that 16,500 cottages were now required in Dublin, and that these should be predominantly built on suburban sites in Clontarf, Drumcondra, Cabra and Crumlin (that is, in those areas identified by the 1914 Town Plan Competition). In addition, 3,800 existing tenement houses could be renovated to provide a further 13,000 modern dwellings. The scale of the programme, estimated to cost £8,640,000, presented problems:

"The task in Dublin is colossal, immensely greater proportionately than that of erecting 300,000 houses in England and Wales as soon as possible after the war, as the Government is now considering.....It is evident, therefore, that measures which might suit England, where the work will be divided amongst a very great number of local authorities, are not likely to suffice in the case of Dublin."

Cowan argued that Dublin Corporation was not fit to carry out this building programme, not because it was especially inept or corrupt, but because he felt that it was a natural tendency for self-interested councillors to seek working-class votes rather than pay proper attention to economy and efficiency. Instead Cowan proposed that a Dublin Housing Board be set up from representatives of government departments and local municipalities,
and that it be given drastic powers to sweep away the social threat posed by the city's slums. State subsidy would be necessary but only as an unwelcome temporary feature:

"There is a great emergency now, and it must be met by emergency measures, but these should be so designed and limited so as to leave some prospect of arriving after a reasonable transitory period at a stage where healthy houses and healthy economic conditions may be found together.....It may therefore be hoped that any period during which large numbers of the working classes in Dublin can be said to be in receipt of relief from the public purse in the matter of house accommodation will be short."97

In terms of housing standards, Cowan remarked that the designs for the McCaffrey Estate and Fairbrothers Fields were "a great advance on earlier schemes in the City of Dublin". Yet these too would now have to be exceeded:

"It is, however, quite clear that houses of ampler accommodation than have hitherto commonly been built for the working classes should be provided in any new housing schemes, even if our accustomed methods of construction have to be abandoned for a long period."98

The layout of housing estates was to be based on British garden suburb orthodoxy, with a maximum of 12 houses to the acre, and large estates of around 400 dwellings being built at a time. When it came to the question of individual house design, Cowan's recommendations were much closer to the conservative ideals of the English LGB than the generous standards proposed by the Ministry of Reconstruction. The Cowan Report relied heavily on the findings of the long-running Royal Commission on Scottish Housing, finally published in October 1917. Cowan thus recommended a minimum dwelling size of 2-bedrooms, living room and scullery, along with a larder, coal cellar and WC. There was to be the possibility of fitting a bath with hot water, but no need for a separate bathroom. As an overall proportion, there should be 60% of the 2-bedroom cottages; 35% 3-bedroom cottages; and only 5% 4-bedroom cottages. Some 40% of the larger 3-bedroom and 4-bedroom houses (16% of all dwellings) were to be provided with a parlour, allowing the living room to be made smaller. In terms of the sizes of individual rooms, Cowan took the standards set out in the 1917 RIBA Housing Competition: a minimum area of 160 sq.ft for the living room; a minimum 160 sq.ft for the main bedroom; and 70 sq.ft for other bedrooms. Cowan's Report on Dublin Housing was the only official document on Irish housing produced during the war, and enjoyed a mostly favourable reception. Nationalists objected to the indirect attack on Irish municipalities, but the ex-Chief Secretary, H.E. Duke, called it "a valuable contribution to a most serious subject."99 The Architect even went as far to say that it was "a masterpiece of clear and impartial reasoning and succinct expression.....We doubt if a better report on any great subject has ever been written."100 Yet while the standards that Cowan took from Britain were higher than those obtaining in
Ireland, they represented, as indeed did the memorandums of the English LGB in 1917, merely the best of pre-war thinking. Thus the Cowan Report was to have little influence on the final standards introduced in post-war Ireland: the Tudor Walter Report, with its bolder vision and suggested plan arrangements, was to have a greater impact.

By early-1918 Irish MPs were becoming noticeably more impatient with Chief Secretary Duke's bland reassurances that preparations for post-war housing in Ireland were being developed hand-in-hand with that for Britain. For in fact the question of Irish housing was being virtually ignored in the Cabinet's deliberations. Partly this was due to the concern, as will be seen below, of the British Government to try once more to find a political settlement for Ireland. But it was even more to do with the fact that the battle over housing proposals for post-war Britain had escalated in the wake of Lloyd George's 'war aims' speech of 5 January 1918. Now the Government was again using housing promises to try to placate labour opposition to the proposal to divert manpower from munitions work to military service. This latest concession plan was in breach of earlier promises, and threatened serious strike action. Hence in February 1918 the Cabinet saw a full-blooded confrontation between the Ministry of Reconstruction and the English LGB over what specific pledge on housing subsidy should now be made. Christopher Addison proposed a large-scale mandatory programme as part of a state-led transition from demobilisation to peace-time, with municipalities being subsidised for the whole of the excess cost of building after the war. Addison envisaged "a housing shortage of between 300,000 and 400,000 for England and Wales and 100,000 for Scotland and a substantial number for the urban districts of Ireland." In opposition, the President of the English LGB, Hayes Fisher, suggested a tentative Treasury proposal to offer municipalities 75% of the estimated annual loss for seven years, or a higher percentage if the total loss was likely to be greater than the produce of a local 1d-rate (after seven years the state contribution was to be reassessed at 75% of the local authority's loss over the recalculated value of the scheme). Despite virulent objections from Addison, the less costly subsidy proposal from Hayes Fisher was incorporated into a further circular by the English LGB. During the Cabinet debate in February 1918, Chief Secretary Duke drew up a paper that stressed the appalling urban housing conditions in Ireland, and called for subsidised municipal housing for the desperately poor. He continued:

"The adoption of National Housing Proposals for England and Scotland will I think involve a similar proceeding with regard to Ireland. The uncertainty which exists as to the future of Irish Government will not relieve Parliament, as matters now stand, from the necessity of dealing with the housing problem. What is really to be decided seems to me to be the question of what is most prudent under the circumstances.....After discussing the relative merits of the schemes proposed by the Minister of Reconstruction and the President of the Local Government Board, I have come to the conclusion that the latter is best adapted under existing circumstances to meet the cause of Ireland."
Duke's support for the Hayes Fisher proposal demonstrated the limited approach towards state housing that still existed within Dublin Castle. It also reflected the dominant view in Westminster, where the urgency of the housing issue and the 'manpower crisis' vanished in face of the German Army's massive offensive in Spring 1918. Not until the post-war election campaign at the end of the year did Lloyd George and other British politicians return to making bold promises of "homes fit for heroes". In Ireland, by contrast, the pressing question of self-government had once again become a key concern since the formation of the Irish Convention in mid-1917. And from February to April 1918 the Convention temporarily took over the issue of post-war Irish housing.

5.5 The 1917-18 Irish Convention and state housing proposals

There were two reasons why the Lloyd George Coalition Government was compelled to reopen the constitutional question of Irish self-government in April 1917. The first was that the Irish Party, fearing the growth of Sinn Fein if Home Rule was not achieved, had begun to use obstructive tactics in Parliament that posed a threat to the war administration. Secondly, the Government were facing a growing shortage of military manpower and Ireland was the obvious source given that, as Conservatives and Unionists never failed to point out, it was the only part of the UK where conscription was not in force. But the Cabinet realised that the extension of compulsory service to Ireland was politically impossible unless accompanied by Home Rule Act. Irish strategy was at this point largely being drafted by Professor W.S.G. Adams, head of Lloyd George's own policy unit. Adams had worked in the Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction for Ireland prior to becoming an Oxford don, and had served as a labour adviser in the Ministry of Munitions before moving to the Prime Minister's secretariat in 1916. Now Adams had come to the conclusion that a consensual agreement on Home Rule could be achieved if the British Government was also to make a generous financial settlement.

Hence on 16 May 1917 the Prime Minister wrote to John Redmond offering the immediate introduction of Home Rule. This was to be modified by the temporary exclusion of the six north-eastern Ulster counties, and the establishment of a council to legislate for all of Ireland on certain non-controversial matters. And significantly the Government now proposed an improvement in the financial deal for Ireland, with Lloyd George declaring in general terms that:

"the Government consider that the financial proposals of the Home Rule Act are unsatisfactory and ought to be reconsidered. There are a number of important objects, such
as the improvement of housing in the towns...which cannot, owing to changed conditions which have arisen since the war, be adequately dealt with under the powers of that Act, without imposing an undue burden on the Irish taxpayer.*108

It was the first acknowledgment by Westminster that the post-war housing programme in Ireland would involve the Imperial Exchequer in shouldering the burden, and it also pre-dated the aforementioned public pledge given by the Government for Britain. However the Prime Minister and Adams realised that the Nationalist Party would probably not accept an offer which involved the exclusion of Ulster. Thus Lloyd George also suggested the alternative of holding a convention to devise a solution for self-government (on the sole condition that Ireland was to remain within the Empire). This latter option was duly chosen, and so the Government began to look for suitable representatives from the main Irish interest groups. The Irish Convention represented a final, ill-fated attempt by Westminster to reach an Irish settlement by consensus.109 Participants were not overly optimistic of success, but met intermittently under the chairmanship of Sir Horace Plunkett from July 1917 until April 1918. The entrenched opposition of Nationalist and Unionist views ensured that discussions became deadlocked on two main issues: whether Ulster should be excluded; and how much fiscal autonomy, particularly over customs and excise duties, should be conceded to the new Irish Government. But the principal failure of the Irish Convention was the inability to get Sinn Fein or the radical labour movement to participate.110

The Convention proceedings had run into serious difficulties by the end of 1917, and the absence of agreement was a serious blow to the British Government if it intended to introduce conscription in Ireland. Chief Secretary Duke was also concerned that a 'revolutionary' party would sweep the country unless a settlement was reached and a sympathetic Irish Government installed.111 So from December 1917 to February 1918 both Professor Adams and Sir Horace Plunkett "orchestrated the government's policy towards the Convention in an attempt to prevent a collapse."112 Areas of common consent were sought to cement the fragile unity of the Irish Convention. A sub-committee on land purchase was set up in January 1918, and rapidly produced a report that recommended measures for the completion of the process of land transfer to tenants. Adams also privately suggested to Plunkett that it should be publicised that the Government were also prepared "to treat as part of the plan of settlement substantial provision in connection with the vital problems of housing in Ireland."113 The Cabinet invited various deputations over from Ireland, following which Lloyd George sent another letter to the Irish Convention on 25 February 1918 that declared:

"The Government have also had submitted to them by the Labour Representatives in the Convention the need of provision for dealing with the urgent question of housing in
Ireland, and on receiving recommendations from the Convention on the subject they would be prepared to consider the inclusion in the scheme of settlement of a substantial provision for immediately dealing with this vital problem. 114

However, it would appear from accounts of the meetings in London that matters such as working class housing were in fact of more concern to the Government than to the 'labour' members of the Convention. 115 It was of course at this very point in February 1918 that Lloyd George was eager to make further housing promises to defuse labour unrest in Britain during the 'manpower crisis'. In Plunkett's report on the Irish Convention, he noted pointedly that on the issues of land purchase and urban housing, "the Prime Minister had, it might almost be said, gone out of his way to be generous." 116 Thus when the Convention resumed in late February a special Housing Committee was immediately set up. The committee had 15 members, and was presided over by the Lord Mayor of Dublin, Lawrence O'Neill. Plunkett reported back to Adams:

"To-morrow we shall meet only in the morning and we are going to appoint a Housing Committee. That matter seems to interest the Convention immensely. Sundry County Councillors will try to get villages into the Town Housing problem, and very likely that harmless and futile effort will keep us off more dangerous topics." 117

Plunkett noted with satisfaction that the Lord Mayor of Dublin was proving "wholly friendly", and he continued to press home that generous subsidy from the Imperial Exchequer was now there for the asking. 118 Thus although the Prime Minister's secretariat wanted it to appear that housing had been brought in as an Irish demand, in reality the intent was to control the Housing Committee as part of Lloyd George's strategy to use housing as a political tool. This was clearly demonstrated by the fact that the Assistant Secretary to the Convention, Roland Vernon, was entrusted with overseeing this important matter. Vernon was on secondment from a senior position in the Ministry of Munitions, where he was the civil servant in charge of the housing section. 119 Thus when pressed for a rapid report in late-March 1918, Vernon was able to tell Adams that he would introduce his professional expertise:

"I am going to dictate tomorrow a memorandum which will, I hope, suffice as an outline of a report of the Housing Committee. It will of course be very sketchy. I will send you a copy of it. The Housing Committee is to meet on April 3rd to consider it. The Convention will meet on April 4th & 5th, and if all goes well we should be able to get through both the main Report and the Housing Report." 120

Then in sending the draft report to Adams for approval, Vernon added:

"It has had to be prepared in great haste and with very little material. You will see that gaps are left for the figures which will of course be the pith of the Report. I originally put in 45 per cent as the degree of Government assistance which would be necessary but then
decided that it would be better for me not to give the Committee a lead in the matter. I am inclined to think, however, that they will probably ask for something like this.\textsuperscript{121}

Adams was concerned that the proposal appeared to require new housing legislation, and that this might delay the path of an urgent Home Rule Bill. However, Vernon gave the reassurance that all that was needed was "only a grant of money!"\textsuperscript{122} Using the draft, the Housing Committee of the Irish Convention met urgently on 3 April 1918 and held a full discussion on subsidy and housing standards, prior to finalising the recommendations.\textsuperscript{123} The report was accepted by the whole Convention at its final session two days later. The principal demand was for a large post-war programme of 67,500 houses in Ireland and a fixed subsidy to municipalities of 50\% of capital expenditure. At an estimated figure of £400 per dwelling, it was anticipated that the scheme would cost around £27,000,000. The Convention's Housing Committee took its cue on design standards from the Cowan Report and above all from Britain, drawing on advice from English LGB circulars and from Seebohm Rowntree's memorandum for the Ministry of Reconstruction's Housing Panel (which the committee was allowed to consult in strict confidence).\textsuperscript{124} Thus the report called for a maximum density of 12 houses to the acre, and the provision of mostly 2-3 bedroom cottages yet with a proportion of larger houses with a parlour or fourth bedroom.

The Chairman of the Convention, Sir Horace Plunkett, used the report to praise the contribution of labour and municipal delegates to the search for an Irish settlement.\textsuperscript{125} Chief Secretary Duke reported to the Cabinet that the housing recommendations "will form part of the general plan of settlement"; and he noted in the House of Commons in mid-April 1918 that:

"It will appear from the Report of the Irish Convention that His Majesty's Government is ready to recommend to Parliament the making of special provisions for the needs of urban localities in Ireland in connection with the measure for granting self-government to Ireland."\textsuperscript{126}

In fact there was strong opposition in Westminster to a subsidy proposal that was notably more generous that that which had hitherto been offered by the English LGB. Vernon tried to reassure the Government that the Convention's Housing Report was not "really quite as alarming as it looks on the face of it": he pointed out that it would take several years to climb to a maximum expenditure of £1,620,000 a year, and that the British contribution would only be half of this amount.\textsuperscript{127} This did nothing to ease the alarm of the Treasury, which had just scored a success when the Cabinet accepted the subsidy terms of the English LGB rather than of Christopher Addison. The Treasury's main worry was that the more generous terms suggested by the Irish Convention's proposal might then be
demanded by British municipalities. As one official noted, "this may very easily upset our English scheme. Can it be camouflaged as part of a general Home Rule Settlement?"128

The Treasury pointed out their fear to the Prime Minister:

"A free capital grant of 50% far exceeds the modest proposals of 75% of annual deficit on loan charges made for Great Britain. Even allowing for special circumstances in Ireland, a grant on so generous a basis will make it impossible to avoid something far more generous than present proposals for Great Britain, at enormous cost to his Majesty's Government."129

But realising that Lloyd George was politically committed to giving substantial Exchequer aid for Irish housing, the Treasury put forward an alternative proposal that accepted the principle of a 50% capital subsidy, but suggested that the British contribution should be limited to a sum of £5,000,000 over a ten year period. This fund was to be created by allowing the new Irish Government to make a deduction from the annual revenue contribution that it would have to pay towards Imperial expenditure. This the Treasury argued would free Irish housing policy from interference from Westminster, and conversely "being the scheme of the Irish Government would not react on Housing Policy in Great Britain in the same way as would a scheme devised for Ireland by the Imperial Government itself". This point was emphasised by a senior Treasury official when he told Lloyd George:

"The last consideration is to my mind of very great importance, since the Scheme proposed by the Convention Committee (whether possible or not in Ireland) could not be copied in Great Britain without scrapping a scheme recently launched and completely "socialising" not only all new building but the State System of working-class housing."130

In any event, the fundamental failure of the Irish Convention to reach a solution on self-government resulted in the proposals of the Housing Committee being lost. The British Government desperately tried to salvage what it could. A Cabinet Committee was set up in April 1918 under the staunch Unionist, Sir Walter Long, to draft a new Home Rule Bill. There was now to be in essence an imposed settlement, to accompany the introduction of conscription. Professor Adams was appointed as secretary to the Committee, although his personal influence had waned because of the failure of the Irish Convention.131 The Cabinet Committee on Ireland drew up two alternative schemes in June 1918: one based on the Convention's recommendation of dominion-style rule ('Scheme A'); and the other for a federal system which retained greater control for the Imperial Parliament ('Scheme B'), and which was favoured by Long. Both alternatives contained a large-scale housing programme as an essential part of the settlement. Adams now accepted the Treasury's suggestion that the British contribution be offset from Ireland's payments towards Imperial expenditure, but he rejected any diminution of the Irish housing programme. Instead
Adams argued that the estimated Exchequer subsidy of £13,500,000 that was required to build the 67,500 cottages proposed by the Irish Convention, should be deducted over a period of 7 years. This worked out at around £1,930,000 per annum, which in subsequent calculation in mid-1918 was rounded up to £2,000,000. Hence as the war drew to a close, the British Government was committed to financing a substantial housing campaign in Ireland as part of a Home Rule settlement. Irish housing policy was now being decided entirely in Westminster. Significantly, Ireland was deliberately excluded from the unadventurous Housing Bill that was introduced by the President of the English LGB in October 1918 to demonstrate the Cabinet's commitment on housing, but then dropped when the General Election was called for that December.

5.6 Preparations for the post-war Irish housing campaign

Westminster's growing control over housing policy in Ireland was clearly shown by the weakened position of the Castle Administration and Irish political parties towards the end of the First World War. In May 1918 a new Executive was installed, comprising Lord French of Ypres as a powerful pro-consular Lord Lieutenant, and Edward Shortt as Chief Secretary. The main aims were now to escalate the recruiting programme, and to pursue a tougher policy of repression against Sinn Fein. Despite the new broom, conditions in Ireland deteriorated when mass opposition was orchestrated in response to fears that conscription was finally about to be introduced there. As a result of this heated 'conscription crisis', by late-June 1918 the Government was forced to abandon its strategy of implementing compulsory military service accompanied by Home Rule. Dublin Castle instead sought to deflect criticism by stressing important social issues such as urban housing, but on the issue the Castle Administration was still unable to offer any firm promises. When pressed in August 1918, Chief Secretary Shortt replied weakly that "I am going to consider the whole question during the Recess."

Irish political parties were far removed from the Cabinet debates on post-war reconstruction and housing, and their relative impotence was reflected in the rhetoric of the post-war election campaign. Prior to the First World War the Irish Party had dominated politics outside of Ulster, and had been closely involved in the development of housing policy. Yet by 1918 the IPP was in terminal decline (as shown by a series of disastrous by-election defeats) due to the inroads that Sinn Fein and its leader, Eamonn de Valera, had made by fanning anti-British sentiment after the Easter Rising and then during the 'conscription crisis'. An important element in Sinn Fein's success was the broad-fronted alliance forged with the radical labour movement: together they espoused abstentionism and republicanism,
and bitterly attacked the policy of constitutional nationalism.\textsuperscript{137} The problem for the labour movement was that, while Sinn Fein was eager to subsume the urban working classes into the separatist struggle, in reality the majority of extreme nationalists had no interest in social issues such as housing reform. The line taken by de Valera and Sinn Fein was expressed succinctly by one of their candidates:

"There were no doubt many social and economic questions to be dealt with such as better housing for the people....but before these could be gone into they must first get at the foundation for all these, and by getting rid of the English connection with Ireland they secured this end."\textsuperscript{138}

Nevertheless, for tactical reasons the Irish Labour Party gave its full support to the republican movement, and agreed not to contest the 1918 General Election. The way was now clear for Sinn Fein to sweep to power in Southern Ireland, and wipe out the old Irish Party. In a vain attempt to fight back, the IPP turned housing into a central issue in the attack on Sinn Fein's abstentionist strategy of refusing to take up seats in the Imperial Parliament. The Irish Party pointed out that this would mean that Ireland would miss out on post-war housing subsidy, whilst still continuing to contribute revenue towards the campaign in Britain. The IPP member for West Belfast, Joseph Devlin, exclaimed:

"Nearly a hundred million is going to be spent on housing in England. Am I to allow them to force us to pay our share for the housing of John Bull, while Paddy Murphy has to live in a slum ? We are out for one thing, to improve and elevate the people, and are we going to allow the people to continue to live in slums, or are we going to Parliament to get our fair share of these funds for housing improvement ?"\textsuperscript{139}

And one of the Irish Party members for Dublin launched a bitter attack on:

"the cruel and thoughtless absurdity of Sinn Fein. When the question of housing came to be dealt with the Irish Party would endeavour to force the Government to interpret the Cowan Report with regard to housing in Dublin in £.s.d., but if the Sinn Feiners were returned he would like to know who would be in Parliament to see that Ireland was not forgotten and would get her proper share of the millions that were to be spent on housing after the war ?"\textsuperscript{140}

Another tactic used by the IPP to shock voters in Southern Ireland into rejecting Sinn Fein, was to exploit fears of giving ground to the Ulster Unionists:

"Abstention from Parliament would certainly be the worst means for securing this. Portions of large grants that would be given in the future must be secured for Ireland. Must Carson secure all this for Ulster, if Carson alone would have representation in the House of Commons ?"\textsuperscript{141}
Joseph Devlin tried to revive the spirit of the IPP's pre-war achievements, by pledging "to use this great and efficient instrument which has been so splendidly successful to give our town dwellers the same decent housing accommodation and better than that which was given to labourers in agricultural Ireland." Yet this was pure nostalgia, and only highlighted the fact that the illustrious days of the Irish Party were over.

In Ulster a remarkable transformation had taken place by the end of the First World War. Now the previously reactionary Sir Edward Carson and his Ulster Unionist Party were fully committed to housing reform because a growing fear of 'bolshevism'. In July 1918 the Ulster Unionist Labour Association was created, with Carson as its President, in an attempt to divert working class support away from socialism and the Belfast Labour Party. From this point, Ulster Unionists repeatedly warned of the need for state housing, particularly in Belfast, if the province was to avoid the social revolution that had occurred in Russia. Concern was heightened by a wave of serious industrial unrest that shook the Ulster capital in the winter of 1918-19. Carson declared impatiently during the post-war Election campaign:

"We are promised.....by the Prime Minister, a great housing reform in England. We are not going to wait until he comes to terms with the Nationalists to have that reform for Ulster."  

There was undoubtedly a chronic housing need in Belfast, since the cessation of house-building during the war had created a increasing shortage of accommodation. The Belfast Branch of the Auctioneer's and Estate Agents' Institute produced a widely circulated report in March 1918 that estimated that 5,000 high standard cottages were needed, and called for state subsidy to private housebuilders to remedy the deficiency. Soon after the Armistice the Irish Times declared that there was not a single vacant house left in Belfast, and a general view was that at least 2,000 new dwellings were urgently required. In November 1918 both the Law Committee and the Improvements Committee of Belfast Corporation called for the stimulation of a large housing programme. The following month saw the creation of the city's first municipal committee to deal specifically with the housing issue. There was a strong division within the Housing Committee as to whether Belfast Corporation should become a major house-builder itself, as Unionist MPs now proposed, or whether to rely on giving aid to private builders and public utility societies. The final decision reached in March 1919 was to stimulate private enterprise, but this only led the Corporation into renewed conflict with the Castle Administration in Dublin since it plainly contradicted the policy now emanating from Westminster.
Demands on the British Government for action on post-war housing came not just from politicians in the Irish Party or Ulster Unionists, but also from a wide range of bodies such as Dublin Corporation, the Association of Municipal Authorities of Ireland, the Dublin Chamber of Commerce, Catholic reform societies, the RIAI, the Irish Press, and professional journals such as the *Irish Builder*. The pressure on the Castle Administration became intense when in November 1918 the English LGB wrote again to local authorities to ask that they start to prepare housing schemes. Chief Secretary Shortt denied allegations made by Christopher Addison that Ireland was lagging behind in its housing plans, and instead assured Lloyd George:

"Moreover, the Committee of the Irish Convention have prepared an estimate of the total number of houses required for the whole of Ireland, and standard plans and specifications have been prepared by the Local Government Board so that there is really nothing lacking in the way of knowledge of Irish requirements which would delay the resumption of building schemes as soon as the financial aspect of the question is considered by the Government."149

The Chief Secretary's attitude was undoubtedly over-complacent, but it stemmed from a genuine structural problem in that the Irish housing programme was now entirely dependent on the decisions of the British Government. Professor Adams warned Lloyd George in late-December 1918 that a decision on subsidy was urgent:

"I need hardly emphasise the fact that a satisfactory announcement on these points would help to improve the situation in Ireland. The feeling in Ireland that Ireland is not in the great reconstruction proposals which are being discussed in Great Britain is undoubtedly increasing unrest and sense of grievance. The soonest, therefore, that definite proposals affecting reconstruction in Ireland can be announced the better."150

It was a point echoed by the Chief Secretary when he reported that a housing pledge might help to avert a dangerous political situation developing in Ireland:

"I can not get on because I can not get a definite statement as to the percentage of cost which will be borne by the Treasury. It is essential that we should get a definite statement at once. Do help me."151

Yet despite Shortt's pleading, all that the ILGB were able to send out to Irish local authorities in December 1918 was a general circular requesting that they follow their mainland counterparts, and make a start on housing proposals. Thus after the Easter Rising, official concern about the effects of slums on social unrest had led the Castle Administration to expound a policy of using housing for political ends. The results of this policy in war-time Dublin were minimal (save for encouraging the adoption of garden suburb design). Yet it did influence British Government strategy, as could be seen in the public announcements about the post-war housing campaign, and in the offer of Exchequer
subsidy to the 1917-18 Irish Convention as an incentive to agree a Home Rule settlement. By the end of the First World War, Westminster had assumed full control of the Irish housing programme, and the manner in which proposals were subsequently formulated showed that British interests were paramount. No definite commitments on housing policy or finance had yet been authorised by the Lloyd George Cabinet, and the Treasury were especially determined to keep a tight control over any proposals for Ireland. The development of the post-war Irish housing campaign forms the subject of the next chapter.
In early-1919 all aspects of Irish policy were being determined by the ideological divisions within the newly-elected Lloyd George Coalition Government. Home Rule was supported by Liberal ministers but was effectively stalled by influential Unionists inside the Cabinet, headed by the elder statesman of the Conservative Party, Sir Walter Long. The problems of the British Government were compounded by the fact that Sinn Fein won the vast majority of Irish seats in the General Election of December 1918, and duly proclaimed its own separatist republican parliament, the Dail Eireann. Meanwhile the policy for state housing in Ireland was still awaiting the outcome of the struggle between the English LGB and the Ministry of Reconstruction, over both the quality and quantity of the post-war campaign. It was the divisions in Westminster that were to ensure that the housing initiative devised for Ireland in 1919 was unique compared to that for the rest of the United Kingdom. Two characteristics of the Irish campaign stand out. Firstly, the British Government's use of housing policy for political purposes explains its determination to see the programme through, even when opposition in Ireland was clearly making progress impossible. Secondly, once the Treasury and the Cabinet had decided that a distinct subsidy system was necessary in Ireland, the greatest obstacle to success became an obsessive attempt to ensure comparability between Britain and Ireland, so that neither was seen to be treated advantageously compared to the other. This chapter will look at the way in which post-war Irish housing policy was drawn up in Westminster, and at the reactions in Ireland to the new 1919 Irish Housing Act. It will then examine the design standards that were introduced in the post-war period, before discussing the reasons why the actual housing campaign in Ireland proved to be so ill-fated. A distinct British initiative, specifically to rehouse Irish ex-servicemen returning from the front, will form the subject of the next chapter.

6.1 Initial British proposals for the Irish housing campaign

At the time of the Armistice the British Government's policy in Ireland was in disarray. The offer of self-government that Lloyd George had made earlier in 1918, which included a sweetener for Ireland of £2,000,000 a year towards state housing, was a dead letter. The Irish Convention had failed to achieve a settlement by consensus. Progress within the Cabinet Committee appointed to draft a new Home Rule Bill was being held up by opponents such as Sir Walter Long. The resultant stalemate had important political consequences for the British Government. It caused resentment in Irish communities...
abroad, especially in the USA, and it actively contributed to the wave of industrial unrest that was sweeping post-war Great Britain and was threatening to shake the very foundations of the state. "A satisfactory solution of the Irish question was most important from the point of view, not only as regards the industrial world, but also of our relations with the Dominions and the United States," the Prime Minister told the Cabinet. The British Government thus realised that it had to portray itself as paying close attention to finding an Irish settlement, even if all it was actually doing in the meantime was to continue to administer as before. Hence in early-1919 the Cabinet proposed, as an alternative strategy, a reconstruction policy for Ireland that would enable it to govern in the interim while political differences in Britain could hopefully be overcome.

An important consequence was that, as the Castle Administration had long urged, the post-war housing campaign in Ireland was now to be considered by the Cabinet alongside that for Britain. In December 1918 the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Austen Chamberlain, wrote to the Chief Secretary for Ireland, Edward Shortt, stating that he now "thought it clear that housing terms given to the United Kingdom would have to be extended to Ireland." This decision coincided with a decisive change in the Government's attitude towards the housing campaign that has been comprehensively documented by Swenarton, and need only be summarised here. Towards the end of the First World War the question of housing had been reopened in Cabinet discussions, and during the post-war Election Lloyd George had made much of a crusade to build "homes fit for heroes". Cabinet concern was fuelled by the serious wave of industrial unrest and by the concomitant fear that 'bolshevism' might sweep the country and overthrow the state, just as it had done in Russia (and to a lesser extent, in post-war Germany). The fear, although it might seem unfounded now, was made very tangible at the time by the demobilisation of five million militarily-trained servicemen, and the release from duty of a similar number of munitions workers. The British Government now promoted better housing as the main means of appeasing labour demands and convincing the working class that there was no reason to overthrow the existing social order. A belief that housing could avert unrest and provide legitimation for the state was not confined to radicals in the Government, but was also shared by Conservatives such as the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Austen Chamberlain. Consensus on issues like housing was essential to the post-war political coalition if it was to achieve a bourgeois realignment - a 'passive revolution' in Gramscian terms - based on a greater acceptance of state intervention, and thereby replacing a laissez-faire 'liberal hegemony' that had collapsed due to the inroads made by working-class political organisation and the slow disintegration of the Imperial system.
Thus by early-1919 housing had come to constitute, at least in the minds of the Cabinet, an "insurance against revolution". It was an alarmist view, but one that found ready support amongst all the political parties in Britain. However, what Swenarton has omitted from this account is the role of Ireland in shaping the Government's housing policy. The last chapter showed that during the war the Cabinet had authorised housing funds for Dublin to overcome political problems, and that Lloyd George had been prepared to offer generous state housing subsidy as part of a Home Rule settlement. Now after the Armistice, it was the example of land redistribution and subsidised labourers cottages in Ireland that the Prime Minister used to justify his belief that social reform would be a successful antidote to insurrection. In his famous speech to the Cabinet on 3 March 1919, demanding a substantial programme of land settlement and housing to avert 'bolshevism', Lloyd George began by declaring that:

"The policy here advocated was the same as that put into effect by Mr Balfour [Chief Secretary from 1887-1891] in Ireland, although it was on a larger scale. In Ireland, Mr Balfour had found a condition of social disorder, chronic trouble, poverty, and misery, which he desired to ameliorate, and he had developed a large scheme for settling labourers on the land. It was not an economic scheme. It involved considerable grants from the State, certainly up to the beginning of the war, if not since. There was no doubt that Ireland had benefitted thereby. It was true she was not contented, but what would have happened in Ireland during the last five years if the same conditions had prevailed as before the Balfour schemes were put into operation? The same applied with regard to houses. About 50,000 had been built in Ireland, largely at the expense of the State. He had been told that they had transformed the whole country."

Lloyd George's characterisation of subsidised Labourers Acts cottages as the product of Balfourist 'constructive Unionism' was not entirely historically accurate, but it served the purpose of reminding Tories within the post-war Cabinet of their party's role in the policies of Irish land and housing reform.

The results of the major shift in Cabinet thinking towards housing was signalled by a memorandum drawn up in December 1918 by the new President of the English LGB, Sir Auckland Geddes. This paper rejected the line previously taken by this department, and instead supported the call by the Minister of Reconstruction, Christopher Addison, for a more radical post-war housing programme. It was now generally realised that the state would have to meet a more substantial portion of high post-war building costs, because it would be politically necessary, to avoid inciting labour agitation, that legal controls on working-class rents be continued for some time after the war (the 1919 and 1920 Rent Control Acts permitted maximum increases over pre-war levels of 10% and 40% respectively). Geddes' central recommendation was for the financial proposition that Addison had put forward in March 1918, namely that the state should for a period of seven years meet the excess cost of housing schemes above the produce of a penny-rate levied by
the local authority. It constituted a great increase over the previous pledge by the English LGB to pay 75% of the annual loan charges, and it was also designed to ensure that the smaller or more reluctant municipalities would act, now that they had been given a fixed liability above which the Exchequer would meet all expenditure.

Various members of the Cabinet were again asked to comment on the latest proposal, and on 27 December 1918 Chief Secretary Shortt duly drew up a memorandum on Irish housing. The Chief Secretary was alarmed at the consequence of offering a subsidy with no upper limit on state contribution to Irish authorities that would undoubtedly be more than eager to build:

"I fear that none of the safeguards upon which Sir Auckland Geddes relies to secure the Exchequer against extravagance on the part of the local authorities would, in Ireland, offer adequate protection.....To fix a border-line of one penny in the pound above which the ratepayers are not to be affected by any increase in the cost of their housing schemes would open up infinite possibilities of extravagance in Ireland, in the way of purchase of sites and the making of contracts.....The views entertained by the rural district councils as to what should be regarded as "economic rents" for labourers cottages, according to our experience convinces me that if the Treasury, alone, had to bear the losses involved by reductions of the rent, when the limit of one penny was exceeded, there might be very soon a strike against all rents, save those which were merely nominal and it would be very hard to induce the urban councils to dispossess the occupiers declining to pay."

"The only safe policy for this country, I am convinced, is to give a government grant in the shape of a fixed percentage of the annual charge for principal and interest. The percentage should be sufficient to enable the councils, if due economy and forethought are exercised, to build houses without appreciable loss, so that, on the one hand, if councils mismanage their funds, reduce their rents and build unproductive and extravagant houses, the ratepayers will share the burden with the Exchequer; while on the other hand, if they decline to continue building houses, owing to the losses involved in their schemes, the terms will be sufficiently liberal to enable the Local Government Board to appoint an officer to exercise all their powers under the Housing Acts without undue loss."

The Chief Secretary was thus arguing for the retention of the subsidy system already devised by the English LGB, but mindful of the demand for greater state subsidy, he ventured that the fixed Exchequer contribution might be increased to 90% of the annual loan charges. In conclusion, Shortt declared that if the Cabinet were to insist that an identical penny-rate subsidy system be given to Ireland, then the responsibility for building must be taken away from local authorities and given to a special Housing Commission.

The Cabinet did not have to respond to the conservative views expressed by Shorttt, for in January 1919 a new Chief Secretary was appointed. The new incumbent, Ian Macpherson, was a Liberal Home Ruler who believed that self-government could only be granted once law and order had been enforced, and Sinn Fein eradicated. In the interim he was committed to a conciliatory policy to quell unrest and redress Irish grievances.9
Macpherson was a politically significant appointment, for he had been a member of Lloyd George's pre-war Land Enquiry Committee and was versed in the issues of land and housing reform. It was no surprise, therefore, that the new Chief Secretary saw a bold housing initiative as the central and most urgent part of the reconstruction programme.

Hitherto the Cabinet had been wary about making decisions while the larger political issue of Home Rule lay unresolved, but in January 1919 the responsibility for Irish housing policy was handed over squarely to Macpherson. The Acting Cabinet Secretary ruled that it would "not be necessary to raise the subject at the War Cabinet except in the case of disagreement" (even so, Lloyd George continued to monitor the discussions between the Chief Secretary and the Treasury). On taking office, Macpherson told the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Austen Chamberlain:

"The situation in Ireland at the present time can hardly be exaggerated. Discontent is seething. Anything may happen at any moment, and both His Excellency [Lord Lieutenant French] and myself are strongly convinced that, while we must maintain law and order at all costs, we must at the same time meet the just demands of large public bodies like the Association of Municipal Authorities in Ireland who are clamouring for the fulfilment - long overdue - of a promise that a Scheme of Housing should be introduced and carried through.....neither His Excellency or myself would seek to overstrain you at the present moment had it not been that our difficulties in Ireland are so stupendous."^

The Chief Secretary intended to make housing the centrepiece of his speech on his first visit to Ireland in February 1919, and so before setting off he pleaded with the Treasury Secretary, Stanley Baldwin:

"I need hardly tell you that in Ireland there is grave discontent because no announcement has been made with regard to this important problem, though in this country such an announcement has been made and a Bill even introduced. My predecessor drafted a Memorandum which was submitted in December to the War Cabinet, and about which I have been in communication with the Chancellor. In that Memorandum it is made quite clear that in the interests of the Imperial Exchequer it would not be advisable to have the penny rate.....I have to go to Ireland towards the end of next week to meet Deputations from Municipal Authorities upon this question, and I would beg of you to place me in the position of being able to make a definite announcement. I do not like having to press in this way, but my position is almost intolerable unless I can make it clear that the interests of the country, which, through no wish of mine, I had been asked to look after, are not lost sight of."^

As soon as Macpherson landed in Dublin, he was told by one Castle official:

"I see by to-days Times that you have arrived and will be speaking on Monday about the housing problem. I want you to think over what I said to you about touring the country and devoting a little imagination and enterprise to propaganda. It is easy enough to organise opportunities for you to deliver speeches if you have in your mind a clear idea of a line of policy to counteract the Bolsheviks.....Set this country talking about you and your schemes for a change."^
This was clearly the Chief Secretary's intention, for he immediately told a deputation from the Association of Municipal Authorities of Ireland that the issue "which had caused more uneasiness in the minds of the public generally had been undoubtedly the housing problem.....The cry now was for a land for heroes to dwell in. There could not be a better cry, nor could any State carry out a wiser or a better policy." The cry now was for a land for heroes to dwell in. There could not be a better cry, nor could any State carry out a wiser or a better policy."14 Over the next few months both Lord Lieutenant French and the Chief Secretary continued to use state housing as a propaganda tool, with for instance Macpherson stating at an official dinner in Belfast that it "was childish to talk of reform, of a betterment of the working classes if they did not, as a first measure in reform or reconstruction, provide the working classes of the people with better houses to live in. The home was the centre of all things." The new strand of Irish policy was also publicised in Britain. In April 1919 the Chief Secretary told Parliament of the paramount importance of the housing issue in Ireland:

"Indeed, it was the very first problem which occupied my thoughts when I took office in Ireland, and I set myself to see what could be done, and done quickly.....On the urban side, the problem is urgent, and more urgent in certain parts of Ireland than in any other part of the United Kingdom. Report after report has disclosed the appalling conditions which, in my judgement, are a disgrace to civilisation .....They are the allies of death and disease, of immorality and vice all over the world. But in Ireland they are that and something more. They are the allies of Bolshevism and Sinn Fein.....The problem of housing is largely a problem of health in the family and in the State. A good house, with all the associations of a home, is the most effective weapon, in my judgement, to secure the sanest outlook on life, and is the best guarantee for the moral and physical well-being as well as for self-government."16

Yet the intention of the Castle Executive to use housing policy to fight against discontent and rebellion in Ireland - a threat far more real than any faced by the British Government at home - was compromised by the continuing determination of the Treasury to restrict Irish expenditure, and to ensure that British financial interests were paramount. In his initial pledges to Irish municipalities, Chief Secretary Macpherson had stressed that the housing campaign "should be administered in Ireland and nowhere else, and by Irishmen and no one else." The Irish Times warned prophetically:

"If, however, the Irish Government is to retain its authority for firm administration and is to be able to use to the full its present opportunities for social reform, it must have an absolutely free hand. Recent events suggest that its hands are now tied by influences in London.....We cannot be sure that the promised blessings will ever reach us until we have definite knowledge that the Irish Government is to be its own master from the Alpha to the Omega of this great programme of reconstruction."17

In the event, Irish scepticism proved to be well founded. The Treasury was opposed to the penny-rate subsidy system in Britain, and so eagerly seized on the continuing doubts within the Castle Administration, repeated by Chief Secretary Macpherson, as to whether it was suitable for Ireland. The poverty of Irish towns was, as the Attorney General for
Ireland explained to Parliament, such that "in a large number of cases where the conditions are worst and where it is most necessary to build, you would not get any substantial contribution from the community by a penny rate, and practically the whole of the cost would fall upon the State." Furthermore there would be no safeguard to compel what were seen as traditionally extravagant Irish municipalities from charging anything but nominal rents, particularly (as was likely) if these bodies came to be controlled by Sinn Fein. The Chancellor of the Exchequer therefore accepted a Treasury note from Sir John Bradbury, in which the latter agreed "with the Irish Government that the English Scheme (which I have all along regarded as a most dangerous one for Great Britain itself) will, if an attempt is made to apply it to Ireland, lead to wholesale scandal." However, once the penny-rate system was rejected, there remained for the Treasury and the Castle Administration the dilemma of what alternative might be used. In post-war Ireland there would clearly be the same structural problem as in Britain, whereby the continuation of rent control legislation meant that 'economic' rents could not be charged to cover the inflated costs of building new working class dwellings. The problem then for the British Government was to find a different yet comparable subsidy system, whilst all the time being under the close scrutiny of interested parties in both Britain and Ireland.

Two other Irish subsidy proposals already existed, and these were both unceremoniously dismissed by the Treasury. The suggestion made by Chief Secretary Shortt for a grant to meet 90% of the annual loan charges found support from Macpherson, but was rejected by the Treasury on the grounds that it was even more extravagant than the terms they had been forced to concede in Britain. One official warned of "the outcry it would immediately provoke from the Scotch and English Local Authorities who will have to put a 1d rate before they get anything at all from the Exchequer." The second possibility was the Irish Convention's proposal that the Exchequer give a free grant of 50% of the capital expenditure of building 67,500 dwellings. The Treasury noted:

"In contemplation with the Irish Home Rule discussion last year it was contemplated that Ireland should get this £13,000,000, but that was of course as part of a settlement which would have precluded comparison of the treatment of Local Authorities in the United Kingdom and Ireland respectively by the British Government. For present purposes the incident may I think be disregarded."

Instead the Treasury devised a novel subsidy system for Ireland in which the level of state contribution was conditional on the amount of rent that a municipality collected from the houses it built. A fixed ratio of subsidy was to be determined between the typical 'economic' rent necessary to cover building and maintenance costs, and the 'reasonable' rent that an authority could be expected to achieve. The Treasury argued that if an Irish local authority exercised due economy in erecting dwellings and in extracting revenue from
new schemes, then in theory it could build with no loss at all to the rates (whereas every British authority would have to bear a penny-rate charge). But the real purpose of the system was to ensure that if there were rent strikes, or if municipalities set rents too low, then the Exchequer subsidy would correspondingly reduce. Hence the Treasury noted that their system "would give the local authorities the strongest possible incentive to charging the highest rents possible and collecting them." The alternative subsidy proposal was readily accepted by Chief Secretary Macpherson and Castle officials such as the Vice-President of the ILGB, Sir Henry Robinson, who shared the distrust of Irish local authorities. The Treasury Remembrancer was concerned if the ILGB were to be responsible for assessing the ratio between 'reasonable' and 'economic' rents, adding that this was "all right while Robinson is there, but if he died or retired, and was succeeded by a disloyalist, the Treasury would be terribly at his mercy." The Treasury gave full reassurance that they and they alone would fix the ratio of housing subsidy in Ireland.

Once the principle of the subsidy system was accepted, the Treasury (after consulting with the ILGB) decided that for every £1 of rent collected, then an Irish local authority would receive £1 subsidy from the Imperial Exchequer. Robinson prepared a draft circular, telling the Treasury that he had "followed as closely as possible the Circular you approved for the English Local Government Board, and have merely departed from it where it was necessary to do so in order to meet the special arrangements for Ireland." The ILGB circular was issued to Irish municipalities on 31 March 1919. The period of subsidy was fixed at seven years, after which the principle would be reviewed, especially in the case of local authorities whom the ILGB regarded as not being economical or of charging too low rents. Schemes were to be submitted to the ILGB within before 15 April 1920, and, as in Britain, were to be completed within three years of the date of passage of the forthcoming Housing Act. Robinson had argued that this would not give enough time to meet housing need in Ireland, but the Treasury insisted that a strict limit was necessary to ensure that local authorities proceeded with schemes immediately. At the ILGB's instigation it was agreed that the Exchequer should pay the interest on housing loans for the first year, while schemes were being built; thereby covering an obvious flaw in the system, for otherwise authorities would not be able to receive subsidy until dwellings had been completed and let. In addition, the circular also gave the first notification that a design competition would be held by the RIAI and ILGB.

The constant problem for the Treasury was to convince both British and Irish local authorities that the unique terms on offer to Ireland were neither better nor worse than those for in Great Britain. When the decision was made to offer £1 subsidy for every £1 of rent collected, one official was concerned "that this gives better treatment than in England (or
may be represented as so giving). To stave off criticism of unequal treatment, the Treasury Secretary, Stanley Baldwin, coined the phrase of 'equivalence' of subsidy in a parliamentary reply in March 1919. This became the terminology subsequently used by the Castle Administration to defend the financial proposals. It did not stop the question of parity from taking up much of the Treasury's time. "The joke is that the terms of the Irish Bill are exactly the same as the English Bill," exclaimed an official, "...as a matter of fact probably a much more advantageous arrangement to a competent Local Authority than the English arrangement. Anyhow that is what the English Authorities think of it." But in reality it was, as the Treasury privately admitted, practically impossible to compare one subsidy system with another. One official noted that it was "impossible to get...an equation which we could successfully show to the English Authorities was no more favourable to the Irish than the English scheme, and to the Irish that it was no less favourable to them than the English scheme."

Another controversial issue in terms of comparability of treatment with Britain lay in the nature of housing loans to local authorities. Even though there was a widespread demand from Ireland that preferentially low rates of interest be given from the Local Loans Funds (since the rates for public loans had risen steeply due to post-war financial conditions), the Treasury had to refuse "in order to prevent outcry from England and Scotland." There was also outrage in Ireland when Chief Secretary Macpherson stated that all Irish municipalities would have to borrow on the open market. This went against the proposal for Britain, where to alleviate the financial worries of smaller local authorities, it has been agreed that towns with a rateable valuation under £200,000 should continue to qualify for loans from the public purse. The Treasury pointed out that while this restriction excluded a large number of British towns (even those as small as Wrexham or Coatbridge), in Ireland it meant that only Belfast and Dublin would be excluded. But, after being reassured by the Castle Administration that it was the two excluded authorities that were likely to provide the vast majority of post-war houses in Ireland, the Treasury agreed to maintain parity and thus extend public loans to virtually every Irish municipality. Even so, the problems faced by Dublin Corporation continued to make it a special case. Rates in Dublin had soared to 17s in the £ during the war, and political uncertainty about Home Rule meant that investors were extremely unwilling to lend money or buy Dublin Corporation stock. The Vice-President of the ILGB, Sir Henry Robinson, spoke for many Castle officials when he stated:

"The case of Dublin presents the only flaw in a really good scheme. The needs of the workers are so great, the rates are so high that, although the security is undoubted......nevertheless the temporary financial difficulties of the Corporation loom so large in the investor's eye and money in the open market would be so hard to get, that I fear the operations of the scheme will hang fire in the one city of the United Kingdom where the
conditions of the working classes' houses is, admittedly, the most insanitary and deplorable.\textsuperscript{34}

Even the parsimonious Treasury Remembrancer told his superiors:

"You will probably have to give way as to Dublin - it is the only place where housing is really required on a large scale except Belfast. And every Bank would have a profound distrust of the Dublin Corporation administration. Perhaps under a Corporation reformed by Proportional Representation (for which we are to have legislation at once) the Bank views might alter.....But it is really politics: successive Chief Secretaries have talked so much about Dublin that they have to some extent already committed His Majesty's Government.\textsuperscript{35}

Under this pressure, the Treasury eventually conceded that it would in the last resort be prepared to make Dublin a special case, but only after Belfast Corporation had been forced to raise its loans on the private market:

"With regard to Dublin, we may have to let them in eventually, but we must present a stern front until Belfast have burnt their boats (which they are most anxious not to do); and even then I foresee considerable difficulty in establishing against other comers that Dublin is a very special case. Mr Macpherson quite agreed that Dublin may anyhow go through the performance of endeavouring to raise a loan and can only come to us \textit{ex misericordia} when it can say that its efforts to raise money.....are useless.\textsuperscript{36}

The reason for the Treasury's deviousness was that unless Belfast Corporation borrowed privately, then the argument about the uniqueness of Dublin would be lost, and therefore there would be an outcry from large British municipalities demanding comparable treatment on public loans. Although the Castle Administration expected Belfast to have no difficulty in borrowing on attractive terms, the issue continued to beleaguer the post-war housing campaign in Ireland. As redress for considering special treatment for Dublin Corporation, the Treasury were determined to ensure that none of the city's notorious slum landlords profiteered from compulsory acquisition for post-war housing schemes. The Chief Secretary replied that since the ILGB would not sanction the purchase of expensive inner-city sites, then the situation was unlikely to arise.\textsuperscript{37}

Given that post-war housing policy was clearly being decided by the British Government with little or no discussion with Irish bodies, it is not surprising that in Ireland it was felt that the country would not receive its fair share of funds for this crucial issue.\textsuperscript{38} There were observers in Ireland who shared Chief Secretary Macpherson's belief that a constructive housing policy was the means to stifle unrest. The \textit{Irish Times} wrote that:

"the alternative to social chaos must be found in something very like social revolution.....We have a right to know what Parliament will do to put our housing problem on the same plane of national importance and urgency to which the Government has lifted
the problem in Great Britain.....It is very important that the Government should hasten to put a sound and generous programme of Irish legislation in contrast with Sinn Fein's barren policy of abstention.139

In late-January 1919 an extraordinary debate on "Socialism and the War" was held in the Unionist bastion of Trinity College Dublin. A line of heavyweight speakers, including the celebrated nationalist poet William Butler Yeats, took turns to launch an attack on communism and urge instead the reform of the capitalism system through better working and housing conditions. In reply the lone socialist and leader of the Irish Labour Party, Thomas Johnston, declared bluntly:

"That testing-time was coming for the Governments of Europe, and its results would prove whether the revolution would be a violent one or not. These revolutions could easily be avoided: cease the exploitation of labour, and there would be no revolution.....Those who did the work should control the work, and, if that idea took hold of the people in Belfast, it might spread through Ireland."40

Indeed it was the threat of trade union militancy in the Ulster capital, spreading over from the 'Red Clyde', that provoked the greatest alarm. Housing was widely seen as the response. The Northern Whig observed that "the shortage of housing and the delay in the reduction of the cost of living have been very potent factors in creating and accentuating the prevailing labour unrest."41 And at a social reform meeting of the Presbyterian Church in Belfast, a speaker warned that if "they did not produce some scheme tolerably soon the inevitable answer would be the rising up of what was called Bolshevism."42 The newfound interest of Ulster Unionists in the housing issue was noted in the last chapter, and it continued apace after the Armistice. Sir Edward Carson declared in February 1919 that "in Ireland, and especially the Constituency I now have the honour to represent [a working class division of West Belfast], there is no more pressing question at the present moment than housing."43 A fellow Unionist MP told Parliament that:

"Not only is bad housing largely responsible for the drink evil, not only is it largely responsible for other evils of that character, but it is largely at the back of that greater evil, Bolshevism, and the extreme Socialism which is stalking through Europe to-day, and is causing so much difficulty, not only to the Government of this nation, but to the Governments of nearly every civilised nation of the world."44

The Ulster Unionist Labour Association, in conjunction with Belfast Corporation, sent a housing deputation to the ILGB in February 1919.45 The key aims of the Ulster Unionists were to kill socialism at home, and also to have Ireland included in British social legislation, in the belief that administrative integration with the mainland militated against the introduction of Home Rule. But although the Ulster MPs managed to get Ireland added into Christopher Addison's new public health legislation in early 1919, they were notably
less successful in the field of housing. All the Ulster Unionists could extract from the
Castle Administration was a promise that a separate Irish Housing Bill would be passed at
the same time as the corresponding measure for Britain. The view of Ulster was
something that the British Government could not lose sight of. In mid-1919 the Treasury
Remembrancer, Maurice Headlam, warned the Treasury that "a great opposition is being
engineered against your scheme - and Ulster, which is of course strongest in the House of
Commons, is I understand leading it."

The Ulster Unionists led Irish demands on the post-war housing campaign because they
were now the largest Irish political party in Parliament, and because the issue in Southern
Ireland was clouded by the alliance between the radical labour movement and Sinn Fein.
Two new parties formed in the South believed that the housing issue could help to win
hearts and minds away from Sinn Fein, but neither the Unionist Anti-Partition League
under Lord Midleton, nor the Irish Centre Party established by Sir Horace Plunkett
(erstwhile Chairman of the Irish Convention), had any real political weight. The
remnants of the Irish Party, cut to only seven members in the post-war Election, were also
unable to do little to influence British housing policy. The IPP's new leader in the House
of Commons, Joseph Devlin (MP for West Belfast), had now to engage in a humiliating
compromise with the Ulster Unionists in an attempt to secure a better deal for post-war
housing in Ireland. Devlin weakly defended this strategy by declaring:

"Until we realise that we have fought for the right of small nations to fashion their own
destinies - until that time comes - I am not going to allow my Constituents in Belfast to live
under sordid conditions in squalid conditions if I get the opportunity of giving them better
homes."

Political authority outside Ulster now lay with Sinn Fein, and more uneasily with the
military wing of the republican movement, the Irish Republican Army. Sinn Fein won 73
seats in the post-war Election, some three-quarters of the total for Ireland. None of these
newly-elected members took up their seats in the Imperial Parliament, but instead
constituted themselves unofficially as Dail Eireann, the first republican parliament. The
Dail grew in strength, forming its own parallel executive government, administrative
departments, and legal system. Increasing harassment from the Castle Administration
made it virtually impossible for Dail Eireann and its unofficial departments to carry out their
business; eventually Sinn Fein was proscribed as illegal in most of Ireland in September
1919. The refusal of the democratic representatives of the majority of the Irish people to
participate in post-war housing legislation, might have been expected to produce a situation
in which Sinn Fein would refuse to have anything to do with British housing proposals.
But in fact the issue of urban housing was one on which the Dail Eireann found it difficult
to maintain a consistent position of opposition to British rule. Sinn Fein was an essentially conservative and lower-middle-class party, and it was careful to distinguish itself from the social revolutionary uprisings elsewhere in Europe in order to ensure maximum political and financial support, both from the Roman Catholic hierarchy at home and from the United States. However, as noted previously, Sinn Fein was also dependent on the support of the radical labour movement in Southern Ireland, and therefore had to attach importance to demands such as better working-class housing. The contradiction was shown by the 'Democratic Programme' for the new republic drawn up by the inaugural meeting of Dail Eireann. Many of the Sinn Fein political leaders were either imprisoned or abroad on diplomatic missions, and so the leader of the Irish Labour Party, Thomas Johnson, was able to draft a declaration which (although subsequently modified) promised sweeping reforms in social welfare. Yet clearly this document was accepted as a temporary expedient to maintain republican unity, and did not correspond to any real commitment to social change from Sinn Fein or its leader, Eamonn de Valera. The problem of balancing the demands of conservative nationalists and labour representatives was exploited by political opponents. The *Times* argued that logically the Dail should refuse British housing subsidy, but asked "whether Sinn Fein will be foolish enough to hasten its own downfall by an unpopular movement of this kind, for the need for better housing in Ireland is widespread and acute." For the most part, Dail Eireann avoided discussions on divisive social issues. But on 17 June 1919 it was compelled to issue a decree stating that "the provision of suitable houses for the working classes is declared to be a matter of deep concern to the Nation and of urgent importance to the well-being of the people." A special Housing Committee was formed to look into the question, yet the ensuing attitude of Sinn Fein towards the Irish housing campaign was to remain decidedly ambivalent.

6.2 The 1919 Irish Housing Act and reactions in Ireland

By mid-1919 the British Government and the Castle Administration were well advanced with plans for the post-war housing campaign, and legislation was promised as soon as possible. The fundamental divergence from the proposals for mainland Britain was that in Ireland there was a far greater fragmentation of policy. One distinct initiative, as will be seen in the next chapter, was for the state to build cottages directly for returning ex-servicemen under the 1919 Irish Land (Provision for Soldiers and Sailors) Act. A further complication derived from the pre-war split in the rural and the urban housing programmes in Ireland. Rural housing was now universally acknowledged as a residual issue, given the success of the Labourers Acts in providing nearly 48,000 cottages by the end of the First
World War. Thus only a minor Irish Labourers Act was passed in late-1919 to widen eligibility to any waged rural worker, even if employed in a craft or industry. No further grant was allocated, given that there remained around £1,110,000 of unsanctioned pre-war funds. The Treasury, determined to make sure that the rural programme would proceed only slowly, ruled against any increase in post-war subsidy even when it was found that the average cost of the smallest dwelling type had risen to around £450 each.\textsuperscript{55} The outcome was that after the First World War, state housing in rural Ireland came to an almost total end [Diagram B; Table U]. The priorities of the Castle Administration were now entirely different, as Chief Secretary Macpherson told Parliament in May 1919:

"The housing problem in Ireland was, in the past, largely a rural problem....Nothing has been so remarkable as the success of Irish rural housing....We are now faced with a more difficult problem - the housing problem as it affects Ireland in the cities."\textsuperscript{56}

Hence the centrepiece of post-war policy was to build 50,000 urban cottages under the 1919 Housing (Ireland) Act. The Castle Administration stressed that the target figure was proportionately far greater per head of urban population than the pledges for either England and Wales, or Scotland. A separate legislative measure was deemed necessary for Ireland because of its unique subsidy system and the fact that rural areas were to be excluded. Otherwise the Irish Housing Bill was closely modelled on that for England and Wales, and it was introduced in early-April 1919 barely a fortnight after the latter.\textsuperscript{57} Chief Secretary Macpherson hoped to reassure Irish MPs that progress in Ireland was integral to the mainstream "homes for heroes" campaign in Britain, but his efforts proved unsuccessful. Acrimony marked the parliamentary debate on Irish housing legislation in the summer of 1919, in complete contrast to the virtual unanimity over the proposals for Britain. Irish protests were orchestrated by the Ulster Unionists, and focussed on what was perceived as the unfairness of the subsidy system. An obvious stumbling block was the refusal to give low-interest public loan to Belfast and Dublin Corporations. A member of the Chief Secretary's staff pointed out to the Treasury that:

"owing to the difference between the British and Irish subsidy schemes, the consideration of the rate of interest at which it can borrow is not a matter of paramount importance to a British local authority, seeing that the burden of any excessive rate will be borne by the subsidy, whereas it is vital to an Irish local authority seeing that in their case the burden will fall on the local rates."\textsuperscript{58}

The Treasury acknowledged the problem, but were determined not to give way. It placed the Chief Secretary in an invidious position when dealing with Irish protests, and the Treasury Remembrancer reported that Macpherson "told me that he "could not justify" the differential treatment - and as the difference is due to the fact that Irish local authorities are not to be trusted, that is extremely likely."\textsuperscript{59} Demands for a rethinking of the subsidy
system and the provision of public loans to Belfast Corporation were raised by both Ulster Unionist and Irish Party MPs during the second reading on 13 May 1919. But on balance, Irish MPs declared that they were willing to curb their criticisms rather than lose what was described by one Irish Party member as "a great reform", and by a Ulster Unionist MP as "one of the greatest Bills ever brought in for Ireland in our time." \(^{60}\)

Yet the problems for Chief Secretary Macpherson re-escalated when the financial estimates for the Irish Housing Bill were published in an extremely vague 'White Paper', which concluded that it was "not practicable to do much more than guess at the ultimate annual charges, so uncertain are many of the factors." \(^{61}\) The calculations were unsure whether the average post-war cost per dwelling would be £500 or £600, or £700 per dwelling, and so the total capital expenditure to build the target of 50,000 cottages was vaguely set at between £25,000,000-35,000,000. Then, assuming that expenditure would be spread over a three year period, the total was simply divided up so that the expenditure in 1919-1920 was estimated as 20% of the total, that for 1920-1921 was assumed to be 40% of the total, and that for 1921-1922 the remaining 40%. At a subsidy of £1 for every £1 of rents collected, and if rents were set at just under 10s per week, the Exchequer would have to provide £12.10s a year for every house built and therefore a maximum on 50,000 cottages of £625,000 per annum. However if rents were just under 12s per week, then the state contribution would be £15 a year for every house up to a total of £750,000 per annum; if rents were just over 15s per week, then the figure would be £20 a year up to a limit of £1,000,000 per annum. Financial vagueness was also a feature of the comparable calculations produced by the English LGB, but it provoked little criticism. \(^{62}\) In contrast, the financial estimates for the Irish Housing Bill came under intense fire in the Imperial Parliament during the committee stage in late-June and early-July 1919. Conservative MP were alarmed that there was no upper limit placed on state contribution, but Irish members, after reminding Parliament that this was also a feature of the English housing measure, counter-attacked by launching a concerted campaign to extract better subsidy terms from the British Government. \(^{63}\) For the next week there was deadlock over the financial proposals. Then on 2 July 1919, Chief Secretary Macpherson received a deputation from Irish municipal representatives, including Belfast Corporation, and both Ulster Unionist and Irish Party MPs. The deputation left him with a clear ultimatum that if the Irish housing campaign was to proceed at all, then better subsidy terms would have to be offered. \(^{64}\)

The Chief Secretary had staked his political future on the success of the Irish housing campaign, and so he now urgently requested the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Treasury for financial concessions. After dragging their heels, the Treasury agreed to a compromise whereby it would publicly announce that public loans might be given in the
last resort to Belfast and Dublin Corporations, but that it did not have to pledge that any housing advances to Ireland would be at preferentially low rates of interest. More importantly, Chief Secretary Macpherson was able to secure an improvement in the Irish subsidy terms. At first, the Chief Secretary hoped that opposition might be placated by offering municipalities that the ILGB designated as 'exceptional cases', an increased subsidy of 25s for every £1 of rent collected. But when this failed to do the trick, Macpherson went back to the Treasury to ask for a general increase in subsidy to 25s for every £1 collected, rising to 27s6d for special cases. The Treasury at first refused on the grounds that any further concession would only provoke British municipalities. They had to relent when the Chancellor of the Exchequer backed the Castle Administration, and so notified the Irish Office:

"While we feel considerable hesitation in giving further increases to Ireland the Chancellor of the Exchequer is prepared to agree to this proposal on the understanding that it is accepted as a firm bargain in settlement of all claims, and that all other financial amendments will be dropped.....The Chief Secretary will.....realise we cannot have this offer used as a jumping-off place for further demands.....If you let the Irish members know that we have already agreed to it they will immediately think they can get something more by further pressure."66

English MPs were outraged by the secret negotiations. However, the Castle Administration used the Treasury concession to its advantage. On 8 July 1919 the Attorney-General for Ireland triumphantly announced the new subsidy terms to the parliamentary committee, and he subsequently reminded Irish members that Chief Secretary Macpherson had gone "a long way in trying to get all the concessions that he could in reference to the finance of the Bill and other matters."67

The 1919 Housing (Ireland) Act was passed on 15 August 1919. Compulsion was placed for the first time on Irish municipalities to meet the housing need in their area, and if they failed to do so, then the ILGB was given the power to carry out the function on their behalf. The procedure for acquiring housing sites was simplified, and local authorities were given greater power to obtain suburban land to build 'Part 3' schemes. Weak town planning clauses were also included, but these lagged far behind Britain; significantly, the Irish measure was not termed a "Housing, Town Planning, etc., Act", like that for the mainland. The 1919 Irish Housing Act envisaged municipalities as the main vehicle for providing new urban housing, although a lesser subsidy was also offered to public utility societies or housing trusts (the terms were the same as in Britain, and involved a subsidy of 30% on the annual charge for housing loans). To enable more private tenants to buy their homes, the limit on the market value of dwellings eligible for low-interest loans under the 1899 Small Dwellings Acquisition Act was raised from £400 to £800: many Unionist and
Irish Party MPs believed that home-ownership should be spread by selling off even the new dwellings built by local authorities. On 19 August 1919 the ILGB issued an explanatory circular, and gave official notice that Irish municipalities would receive 25s subsidy for every £1 of rent collected in ordinary cases, and 27s6d subsidy in special circumstances.

The manoeuvres of Chief Secretary Macpherson had succeeded in steering the 1919 Irish Housing Act through Parliament. It was no guarantee, however, that the measure would be well received in Ireland. Indeed, only a very few commentators, such as the *Northern Whig*, thought that the Irish subsidy system was more generous than that for Britain. Instead from August 1919 a huge wave of opposition grew in Ireland which embraced the Ulster Unionists, the Unionist Anti-Partition League, the Irish Party, the Association of Municipal Authorities of Ireland, and newspapers such as the *Irish Times*. The Housing Committee of the Dublin Chamber of Commerce even engaged the leading English housing and town planning expert, Henry Aldridge, to produce calculations to show that Irish urban authorities would be much worse off than their British counterparts; these findings were forwarded to the Castle Administration and the Treasury. The Treasury Remembrancer observed that Chief Secretary Macpherson was "evidently rather frightened" about the outcry against his housing scheme. Yet the Treasury remained determined that no further concessions would be given.

A further twist to the problems of the Castle Administration came from the need of Dail Eireann to commit itself to the housing programme, so as to maintain its alliance with the labour movement. The Irish Labour Party and Trade Union Congress passed a resolution in August 1919 calling for the creation of a special council of municipal and building union representatives, to press ahead with rehousing work irrespective of British proposals. Furthermore, Sinn Fein hoped to extend its political control over Southern Ireland by contesting the first post-war municipal elections due to be held in January 1920. The Irish Labour Party also intended to stand in many of the municipal elections, and made it clear that it would be campaigning on radical labour issues such as state housing. Thus in late-July and early-August 1919 the Housing Committee of the Dail Eireann met three times under the chairmanship of William Cosgrave, the unofficial Minister of Local Government, and reported that:

"The Committee proceeded at once to deal with the ways and means of securing adequate housing accommodation for the working classes. The provisions in the Bill before the English Legislature were examined and the committee after due consideration of the facilities afforded by it, and the fact that there was at present no better machinery available; the present cost of buildings and building material which practically precludes private enterprises from undertaking the responsibilities of such a vast and costly scheme as is necessary; and the notoriously inadequate housing accommodation in Urban Districts..."
which seriously reacts on the health and efficiency of the working population in these districts; unanimously decided to recommend that Local Authorities should proceed "full steam ahead" to avail themselves of the facilities offered them in that Bill.\textsuperscript{75}

In addition, the Housing Committee declared that "as a well-informed and sympathetic public opinion was considered absolutely necessary, it was decided that a propaganda campaign be begun at once."\textsuperscript{76} Members of the Dail and all urban Sinn Fein branches were sent a number of papers "outlining the principles of proper housing schemes" and explaining the terms of the 1919 Irish Housing Act. A series of local Housing Conferences were set up in twelve regional centres, each to be attended by a member of the Dail's Housing Committee plus Sinn Fein municipal representatives.\textsuperscript{77}

But if Sinn Fein now recommended that municipalities should accept British housing subsidy, it felt that having to rely on Treasury loans would prove to be an administrative straight-jacket. Already there were extensive fund-raising campaigns being carried out by Irish groups in the USA, and with the personal help of Eamonn de Valera in 1919-20 a total of around $6,000,000 was netted (of this, nearly three quarters was actually spent in Ireland on the political and military campaign against British rule).\textsuperscript{78} But while Dail Eireann would not consider using essential funds for matters such as housing, the pattern was set for the most bizarre episode of the post-war Irish housing campaign. In late-August 1919 a previously unknown body called the National Development Company of Ireland announced that it would be prepared to grant housing loans at 5% interest over 50 years, from a staggering £150,000,000 fund.\textsuperscript{79} The front-man for this shadowy organisation was J.J. Kelly, a Dublin businessman and alderman, and he claimed that the money had been put up by a combination of Irish-American and Scottish trusts. Kelly persuaded the Sinn Fein Chairman of Dublin Corporation's Housing Committee, Alderman Thomas Kelly, that this body should apply for a loan of £1,000,000. Soon a host of other Irish urban authorities were making inquiries, ranging from Cork Corporation to Belfast Corporation. These startling developments were followed with keen interest in Ireland and Britain, though no-one was entirely sure whether the loan offer was genuine.\textsuperscript{80} The Castle Administration saw it as but another part of Dail Eireann's propaganda campaign, with the Treasury Remembrancer reporting back to his superiors in Whitehall:

"The Sinn Feiners are having great success with their loan in America, and they are proposing to lend the proceeds to the Dublin Corporation for Housing purposes. This will be the loan in the open market which you have been urging on Dublin - and Belfast - as opposed to the Government loan which was asked for. The result will be that the British Government will be practically guaranteeing the interest on the Sinn Fein loan."\textsuperscript{81}

In reply the Treasury said that they did "not see much harm in the Sinn Feiners' voting their money to the Dublin housing.\textsuperscript{82} But in the event the National Development Company of
Ireland turned out to be run by a rather dubious Irish-American financier, Patrick Kieran, as part of a long-standing scheme to profit from post-war reconstruction projects. Alderman J.J. Kelly was an innocent whose involvement soon turned to nightmare when the scheme collapsed: he tried to sue to recover the money he put in to the project, and was attacked physically and lost his post as alderman on returning to Ireland. Within a year Kieran had been declared bankrupt, and the whole episode appeared to have been a huge confidence trick that traded on the desperate housing needs of Irish municipalities.

The compromise that the Dail Eireann was forced to make on housing was clearly demonstrated when the unofficial Minister of Local Government, William Cosgrave, attended a special conference held by the Association of Municipal Authorities of Ireland on 22 October 1919. Nominally Cosgrave was attending in the capacity as one of the delegates from Dublin Corporation (along with Alderman Thomas Kelly and Councillor Coughlan Briscoe). Yet his true role would have been known to everyone present. It therefore represented the first time that Sinn Fein had joined its erstwhile political opponents to denounce the post-war housing plans of a Government that it refused to recognize. The conference was addressed by the ILGB's housing expert, Dr Peter Cowan, yet despite his plea that local authorities now get on with their housing schemes, the Association of Municipal Authorities of Ireland resolved to demand a further increase in Exchequer subsidy. Cosgrave in his report back to Dail Eireann rejected the whole principle of a rent-based subsidy. Instead he argued for the revival of the Labourers Acts subsidy system, plus a gradual increase in Dublin's rates to create a special housing rate of 1s in the £1. The proposal was typical of Cosgrave's conservative attitude, and was undoubtedly conceived with the intention of minimising the financial commitment that could be expected from a future Sinn Fein Government. But, importantly, it demonstrated that Sinn Fein like other political groups in Ireland was in principle committed to an extensive programme of state housing.

6.3 Efforts to implement the post-war Irish housing campaign

By late-1919 the ground appeared to have been prepared for the post war housing campaign in Ireland. The survey returns prepared by local authorities under the 1919 Irish Housing Act revealed a total need of 61,648 dwellings, up on the Castle Administration's estimate of 50,000 houses. Soon the vast majority of municipalities had submitted proposed schemes totalling nearly 42,000 urban dwellings. Yet at this time the whole housing campaign ran into a fundamental difficulty that stemmed from Britain. Swenarton has noted the unwillingness of the Lloyd-George Coalition Government to impinge on the
interests of the industrialists, businessmen, and City financiers, on whom it relied for power. The Cabinet refused to bring in controls that would give housing schemes priority over the use of materials and labour, and its decision in December 1919 to prepare for a return to the pre-war 'Gold Standard' (as recommended by the Treasury and the City of London) meant that there was insufficient finance available for local authorities to borrow for housing. As a result, the housing campaign throughout the United Kingdom did not receive the allocation of resources that it required, and the Government were forced to announce two major expedients in November 1919. Firstly, a Treasury Committee was set up to devise a new method for local authorities to raise housing loans on the open market, and thereby to head off growing demands from the larger local authorities for public loans. Since in Ireland this issue only affected Dublin and Belfast Corporations, and the Treasury had already made a secret concession on the former, there was little for the Irish representative on the committee to do but go along with the recommendation that municipalities be allowed to issue special 'Local Housing Bonds'. The Treasury hoped that they might now delay the point at which they would have to concede public loans to Dublin or Belfast Corporations. An official noted that only when "they have tried to raise stock or Local Bonds on reasonable terms and have failed, it will be time to consider whether special terms are required to get them out of their difficulty." In the event, the scheme to issue 'Local Housing Bonds' achieved virtually nothing for the two largest Irish authorities.

The second major initiative of the British Government in late-1919 was to offer subsidy to private builders as one of the miscellaneous provisions under the Housing (Additional Powers) Act. The original draft of the new Housing Bill excluded Ireland and Scotland, and allocated £15,000,000 to subsidise a total of 100,000 new dwellings by private contractors in England and Wales. When the Minister of Health, Christopher Addison, introduced the new measure on 21 November 1919, he was forced to give a spirited defence against accusations that the housing campaign had all but collapsed. Irish MPs used this debate to launch a strong attack on the Castle Administration. One Ulster Unionist declared of the housing initiative that "whether or not it has broken down in respect of England, Scotland, and Wales, it has undoubtedly broken down in respect of Ireland.....We need the help of the Government more urgently in Ireland than in England or Scotland." Irish MPs demanded a change in the system of municipal subsidy, and the extension to Ireland of the £150 grant now on offer to private contractors in Britain.

Chief Secretary Macpherson, who had not been consulted about the proposal to introduce private subsidies, denied that the Irish housing campaign was in trouble. He glossed over the over the fact that so far only two houses had been completed in Ireland. Instead
Macpherson pointed out that over 90 of the 127 Irish municipalities had submitted schemes to the ILGB, and that the latter had so far approved 42 housing sites. He confidently proclaimed:

"With regard to the urban side, I say that the Irish Housing Act is a good one. I know that when I introduced a scheme entirely different, financially and otherwise, from the scheme which was introduced for England and Scotland, I took my own political reputation in my hands, but the longer I live the more content I am to stand by that scheme ....I am a great believer in the Irish scheme."^{92}

The Chief Secretary gave a pledge that he would now consider whether to introduced subsidy to private builders in Ireland. Yet in writing to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Macpherson was decidedly lukewarm:

"So far as I can see at present I am not altogether convinced of the necessity of extending this provision to Ireland, though if it is not granted we are certain to be strongly criticised. There is this much to be said for it, that if the provision of houses is left altogether in the hands of local authorities the contractors will form rings to force up the prices. If, however, we encourage private enterprise, as Addison proposes, the builders will make every effort to keep prices down."^{93}

The Treasury were also less than enthusiastic, but saw a potential benefit if private subsidy were granted to Ireland. As one official noted:

"I am inclined to think that the £150 will be cheaper than the subsidy (in Ireland 25/- for every £ of rent collected) and may save us from giving improved subsidy terms to Ireland (of which premonitory rumblings are going on).....On the merits therefore I should be rather inclined to let Irish builders have the £150.....Moreover it will be difficult to refuse Ireland what is given to England and Scotland.....I think the responsibility for deciding should be left with the Irish Government."^{94}

Given the demands from Ireland in favour of private subsidy, the Castle Administration duly wrote to the Minister of Health asking to be included in the new Housing Bill. On 3 December 1919 the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Austen Chamberlain, told the Housing Committee of the Cabinet "that providing that the sum of £15,000,000 was not exceeded for the United Kingdom he had no objection to the number of houses being varied from the figure of 100,000 originally proposed."^{95} Yet if the ceiling on the Treasury's contribution was maintained, to provide more cottages would have meant dropping the subsidy for each house to below the £150 level seen as necessary. So instead the target figure of 100,000 dwellings was retained but now had to be shared out across the United Kingdom. Provisional agreement was reached that the subsidy under the 1919 Housing (Additional Powers) Act would be allocated in the following proportions: £12,000,000 for England and Wales; £1,650,000 for Scotland; and £1,350,000 for Ireland, sufficient to subsidise 9,000 privately-built dwellings.^{96} The new Housing Act received Royal Assent
in late-December 1919, and was notable for being the only piece of post-war British housing legislation (and indeed the first measure for nearly 30 years) to directly include Ireland in its provisions.

In drafting a circular to set out the terms for private grants, the Treasury insisted that the ILGB inserted a clause which - unlike in Britain - limited the application of the 1919 Housing (Additional Powers) Act to the urban areas covered by the main Irish Housing Act.97 The ILGB Circular was finally issued to all Irish local authorities on 23 April 1920, and followed English precedent in that it now offered a variable subsidy depending on house size. Private builders were entitled to a £160 grant for a 5- or 6-roomed parlour house, provided that the total floor area was a minimum of 920 sq.ft; a £140 grant for a 4-roomed non-parlour house if the total floor area was a minimum of 780 sq.ft; or a grant of £130 for a 3-roomed non-parlour house of at least 700 sq.ft. No house over 1400 sq.ft was eligible for subsidy, thereby ruling out larger middle-class dwellings, and all dwellings had to be started after 23 December 1919 and be completed by 23 December 1920. The continued dominance of British interests in this matter was shown by the fact that only a month after the ILGB Circular was issued, the Minister of Health increased the level of private subsidy by £100 in each of the three cases.98 The effect of the increase in subsidy to between £230-260 was to reduce the number of dwellings that could be subsidised by Ireland’s share of the grant to as low as 5,200 cottages if contractors all decided to build only the largest dwellings eligible.

Ireland by the end of 1919 had a legislative programme analagous to that in Britain, with a central Housing Act and a supplementary measure which, amongst other things, widened the subsidy to private speculators. Swenarton has noted that in England the post-war campaign effectively switched prime responsibility for state housing from local authorities to central government.99 The effect of this in Ireland was even more marked, for the unique conditions of colonial rule meant that there was another intermediary tier in Dublin Castle. The Castle Administration had to implement a policy which had effectively been decided in Westminster, and in many cases its officials felt that they were being kept in the dark. In February 1919 the ILGB wrote to the Under Secretary for Ireland that:

"in view of the statements appearing in the Press as to the intentions of the Government with respect to the financing of housing schemes in England, Scotland and Wales, it would be desirable that the Board [ILGB] should be furnished as soon as possible with information as to what arrangements are contemplated in this respect as regards housing in Ireland in order that they may be in a position to dispel the uncertainty and misconception on this head at present prevailing throughout the country."100
The greatest contribution made by the ILGB was in sorting out problems caused by decisions made in Westminster. It was the ILGB's Vice-President, Sir Henry Robinson, who pointed out to the Treasury that the state would have to pay the interest on loans while dwellings were being built. He also suggested that if a local authority were to deliberately charge high rents in order to make a profit, then the subsidy contribution would be accordingly reduced. In return for such help, the Treasury ruled that the Irish housing campaign should be overseen by the ILGB, and not the independent Housing Commission recommended by many Irish MPs. In England and Wales the responsibility for the housing campaign was transferred to the newly-created Ministry of Health, which sat at the head of a three-tier hierarchy with regional housing commissions acting as mediators between local authorities and central government. In Ireland the role of intermediary was fulfilled by a hand-picked advisory Housing Committee, set up in May 1919 and nominally independent. But in reality, the Housing Committee was simply another arm of the ILGB. The chairman was the ILGB's Chief Engineering Inspector and housing expert, Dr Peter Cowan; other members were Louis Deane, the ILGB's Chief Architect, and Charles O'Connor, who had presided over the 1913-14 ILGB Dublin Housing Inquiry before becoming chairman of the Agricultural Wages Board. The predominance of ILGB officials was widely criticised by municipalities in Ulster and Southern Ireland; so to present a degree of impartiality, the final place on the Housing Committee was given to Hugh Law, an Unionist barrister. But as Sir Henry Robinson later explained to the Treasury:

"I succeeded in persuading Macpherson that it [English system] was unnecessarily extravagant, and he got over it by promising a Housing Committee with outsiders represented thereon. He was asked if the Committee he proposed to set up would be independent of the Local Government Board, and he erroneously replied - "Yes, certainly", but as a matter of fact, the Committee, its finance and policy, is rigidly controlled by the Local Government Board.....However, Macpherson's assurance was accepted, and the only claim which our Housing Committee has to be regarded as a departure from the old system and a fulfilment of the Chief Secretary's promise, is the presence of Law as one of its members." 

The Housing Committee was primarily concerned with generally facilitating the programme, and met regularly to advise on schemes and to discuss a wide range of financial and procedural issues.

The actual Housing Department of the ILGB, like its counterpart in the Ministry of Health, continued to direct overall policy and to approve (or reject) every scheme submitted by Irish municipalities. The permanent Housing Inspector was the recently demobilised Colonel J.F. MacCabe, who had also sat on the 1913-14 Dublin Housing Inquiry. Beneath him were between 3-5 'temporary' housing inspectors, mostly architects. The most respected
and longest serving inspector was Thomas Joseph Byrne, who had of course designed labourers cottages for South Dublin RDC as well as the war-time McCaffrey Estate for Dublin Corporation. The *Irish Builder* wrote of Byrne that "it is no reflection on other Irish architects to say that he is by far the best authority on housing in Ireland", and undoubtedly his appointment to an important position in the ILGB helped to establish Unwinian garden suburb design as official policy. Other inspectors included Thomas Strahan (later to become the Chief Housing Inspector for the new Ministry of Local Government after independence, and a founder member in 1923 of the Dublin Civic Survey Committee), and another architect, Frank Aylward. The staff of both the Housing Committee and the ILGB Housing Department were of the highest rank in Ireland. Yet despite this eminence, as soon as it was realised that progress under the Irish housing campaign was unlikely, the administrative mechanism set up by the ILGB was continually weakened by the threat of retrenchment from the Treasury.

An example of the ILGB’s impotence was its inability to secure a sufficient and cheap supply of building materials, especially bricks, for the post-war Irish housing drive. In England and Wales the Cabinet had authorised the Ministry of Munitions (and then the Ministry of Health) to bulk-buy housing materials, as a less contentious alternative to prioritising the whole supply of materials through building controls. The ILGB's Housing Department estimated that post-war materials costs in Ireland were 300-400% above pre-war levels, and therefore that savings made possible by mass purchasing could be substantial. Yet although the Treasury agreed to the inclusion of Scotland in the central purchasing policy, it quite bluntly refused to do the same for Ireland despite repeated pressure from May 1919 by the Castle Administration. It was yet another example of the determination to protect British interests, at the expense of efforts to stimulate the flagging Irish housing programme.

### 6.4 Design standards for the Irish housing campaign

A central concern of the Irish Administration, particularly the ILGB, was to ensure that post-war state housing in Ireland would be built to a higher standard than hitherto. By early-1919 the basis for design standards was no longer Dr Peter Cowan's *Report on Dublin Housing* of the previous year, but the more generous recommendations of the Tudor Walters Report. It signalled an almost universal acceptance in Ireland that the source of 'modern' housing design was Britain. Swenarton has contended that a belief within the Lloyd George Cabinet that the quality of new dwellings was just as important as the quantitative aspect, played a key part in the intention to use state housing as tangible proof of
the irrelevance of revolution. In Ireland a similar climate of opinion existed about the need for demonstrably better houses for the working class, and could be seen in the viewpoints of politicians, the Press, and professional bodies such as the RIAI. The *Irish Times* stated that "the type of house now demanded is more spacious, and contains many more conveniences than the house which was regarded a few years ago as an ideal "workman's dwelling".* The editor of the *Irish Builder* wrote of the threat posed by bad housing:

"If we are to avoid a spirit of social revolt, leading perhaps to anarchy, the problem must be dealt with in a wide and statesmanlike way, and the houses made comfortable, convenient and attractive, a system in which garden plots must be an essential feature, as well as abundant open spaces."*

It was therefore with conviction that Chief Secretary Macpherson declared that new dwellings must be built as "happier homes", as he put it. The new leader of the Irish Party, Joseph Devlin, echoed the sentiment:

"I think also there ought to be.....greater attention paid to the character of these houses.....This ought to be a Bill not only to rush people into rooms where they can live and sleep, but it should be one for the purpose of making the whole surroundings a thing of beauty, an attraction, a fascination, something which will make those who live in the houses believe that, after all, we are not engaged in camouflage when, in Parliament or outside, we say to the people that we want to make these Islands lands fit for heroes to live in."*

Improvements in housing design were to be achieved in a number of ways. In terms of layout, it was believed that the health and recreational benefits of suburban estates would create a better standard of living. Hence the Ulster Unionist leader, Sir Edward Carson, stated that he would "like to see these houses extend more and more out into the country." In keeping with this, there were calls for a more careful consideration of the "architectural qualities", or in other words the exterior design, of suburban cottages. Another concern was to increase internal space provision through the provision of a parlour where possible, and imposing a minimum of three bedrooms. The justification for the latter was to allow gender separation in children's sleeping arrangements: as one Irish MP observed, this would "make the life of the people sweeter and better, and......more Christian." Domestic arrangements were also to be raised by providing better services such as hot water or electricity. Chief Secretary Macpherson opined that he was "glad to think that every house will provide for a bathroom and a wash-house." The corollary of higher standards was an unprecedented consensus in Ireland that only trained architects were qualified to design post-war housing schemes. "The actual planning, the architectural side of the work, is very difficult." noted one Ulster Unionist MP, "calling for special experience and qualifications in those who are responsible for it, if full advantage is to be
The RIAI tried to capitalise on the new mood in its continuing battle to strengthen the architectural profession in Ireland. The model as always was the Royal Institute of British Architects, which was closely involved in housing preparations on the mainland, and in 1919 had confidently raised the recommended fee-scale for architects from 5% to 6% to cover post-war inflation. In Ireland, the RIAI and its Honorary Secretary, Harry Alberry, made housing its primary interest from early-1919. A Housing Committee was formed to consider issues such as materials shortages, fee-scales for housing work, and the need for a housing design competition. The RIAI's motivation was partly that of self-interest, for it saw an opportunity to expand the workload of its members, and thereby to attract more recruits. It expanded noticeably in the post-war period, with the *Irish Builder* writing in January 1920 that the RIAI "has had a busy year, notably in questions associated with housing, and has this year taken the step of throwing open its membership to a much wider circle than was previously eligible." However, there was also a genuine belief amongst Irish architects that their employment would lead to cost-effectiveness in design. Only this way could the state provide dwellings with the maximum of accommodation at the minimum of cost. As the editor of the *Irish Builder*, R.M. Butler, later put it:

"Good planning - that is to say, the scientific and skilful disposition of the several items of accommodation - is of the first importance, for good planning means economical building, and bad building means waste."

The target set by the RIAI was to have included in the 1919 Irish Housing Bill a clause stipulating the mandatory employment of architects (a raw nerve ever since the Castle Administration had refused in connection with the 1906 Labourers Act). The RIAI claimed "that the result will not only prove of ultimate benefit to the whole Architecture profession in Ireland irrespective of Membership of this Institute, but will also tend to safeguard the industrial classes against the evils arising from badly designed and ill-constructed houses." There was strong sympathy for this demand from the Under Secretary, James McMahon, and ILGB officials such as Peter Cowan. Although Chief Secretary Macpherson finally agreed to make a concession, he still rejected the notion that it be made compulsory to employ architects for post-war housing work. Instead the ILGB and the RIAI were asked to set up a joint committee to draw up an approved list of designers, which could include non-registered architects or engineers with appropriate experience. Nevertheless, the likelihood was that most housing schemes in Ireland would now be
designed by qualified architects; and that, as in Britain, engineers and surveyors would be
displaced from a field that they had previously dominated.\textsuperscript{127}

The RIAI had even more success in their demand that a housing design competition be held
along the lines of those organised by the Royal Institute of British Architects for England
and Wales (1917), and by the Royal Incorporation of Architects of Scotland and the
Scottish LGB (1918). Backing for the RIAI came from the ILGB and Lord Lieutenant
French, but the Treasury at first argued that Ireland could simply make use of the designs
secured by the British competitions.\textsuperscript{128} Then, under pressure from Chief Secretary
Macpherson, the Treasury finally relented in early-April 1919 on condition that it retained
final approval over the terms of the competition.\textsuperscript{129} A sum of £650 was granted to the
RIAI and the ILGB to cover organisational costs. Disregarding demands from the Ulster
Society of Architects that it be allowed to hold a separate event, by mid-1919 a competition
had been arranged in Ireland "for the purpose of securing the best designs for suitable and
economical types of houses."\textsuperscript{130} The central part of the competition asked for cottage
designs for three typical suburban sites, and there was also a subsidiary section dealing
with tenement rehabilitation. A total of £500 in prize money was offered. Three architects
were appointed as judges: William Kaye Parry, President of the RIAI; Henry Seaver, an
eminent Belfast architect; and Thomas Byrne, soon to be appointed as a 'temporary'
housing inspector by the ILGB. In addition, the assessors received help from two
members of the Dublin Trades Council in making the awards.\textsuperscript{131}

The requirements set out by the ILGB and RIAI for the housing competition were
essentially British standards.\textsuperscript{132} Entrants all received a copy of the 1917 Royal
Commission on Scottish Housing; the 1918 Report of the Women's Committee to the
Ministry of Reconstruction; the winning designs from the 1917 RIBA Housing
Competition; and, above all, the influential Tudor Walters Report of November 1918.

Three general conditions of the Irish Housing Competition also ensured that it kept in line
with developments in Britain. The first was that competitors did not necessarily have to
comply with every existing building by-law: a waiver pioneered by Raymond Unwin in
\textit{Town Planning in Practice} (1909) and at Hampstead Garden Suburb, in order to introduce
site-planning features such as cul-de-sacs and access-only routes, and thereby make
savings on road construction. The second stipulation was that entrants adhere to the
simplification and standardisation of house design that had been introduced by Unwin and
also the 'Liverpool School' in the war-time schemes of the Ministry of Munitions. Thus
the conditions of the 1919 Irish Housing Competition noted:
"In all new houses, return buildings are to be avoided, as far as possible. Simplicity in form of roofs and avoidance of unnecessary breaks in walls are most desirable in the interest of economy."  

The third area of British influence was in housing standards. Main bedrooms were to be a minimum of 160 sq.ft and other bedrooms at least 80 sq.ft (although the latter could be reduced if designated as 'sleeping cubicles'). Parlours where provided were to be a minimum of 110 sq.ft; and where omitted, a corresponding increase was to be made in the size of living rooms. Ceiling heights were to be at least 8 feet high. And importantly, every dwelling was to have a separate bathroom with hot-and-cold water supply.

Altogether the competition represented a marked increase in standards from Dr Peter Cowan's *Report on Dublin Housing* (1918). This was clearly seen in terms of house sizes: now 61% of cottages were to have 3 bedrooms and 39% to have 2 bedrooms, compared to figures of 35% and 60% respectively in the Cowan Report. The 1919 Irish Housing Competition also asked for parlours in 26% of all dwellings, compared to only 16% in Cowan's previous recommendation.

Competitors were asked to provide designs for four types of two-storey dwellings. Type 1 was a 3-roomed non-parlour house with two bedrooms; Type 2 was a 4-roomed non-parlour house with three bedrooms; Type 3 was a 5-roomed parlour house with three bedrooms. Within these three house types, alternative plans were requested for end-of-terrace cottages, narrow fronted mid-terrace cottages, and wide fronted mid-terrace cottages with a through living room. The fourth dwelling type was for 2-bedroom flats arranged in a group of four within a two-storey block (with the provision that any two flats on a floor should be convertible to create a large 3-bedroom unit and a smaller 1-bedroom unit). The type was similar to the winning design by Chillingworth and Levie for Belfast Corporation's pre-war competition, but was taken even more directly from a plan for semi-detached 'cottage-flats' by the idiosyncratic English architect, Robert Thompson, that Dr Peter Cowan had included in his *Report on Dublin Housing* [Fig.43]. The basic motivation for Thompson was always to provide alternatives that challenged the dominant orthodoxy of Unwinian house-types, which he criticised. To this effect, Thompson had obtained useful publicity in Britain during the war by being championed by the National Workingmen's Housing Council and its organ, the *Housing Journal*. The results of his success in selling himself to the ILGB will be noted below. In addition to the general requirements of the Irish Housing Competition, entrants also had to design three regional permutations to take account of differing social conditions. The first was for industrial towns in Ulster, where estates were to have 20% 3-roomed houses; 30% 4-roomed houses; 40% 5-roomed parlour houses; and only 10% 2-bedroom flats. The second variant was for large towns in the rest of Ireland, which were to have 35% 3-roomed houses; 35% 4-
roomed houses; only 18% 5-roomed parlour houses; and 12% 2-bedroom flats. The final permutation was for smaller towns, and asked for 40% 3-roomed houses; 40% 4-roomed houses; 20% 5-roomed parlour houses; and no flats. The principle of regional design variations was not novel (having been included in the 1917 RIBA Housing Competition), and indeed the only concession to Irish conditions in the RIAI/ILGB competition was a minor section for the conversion of four tenement houses into modern 3-4 roomed flats, each with a separate bathroom.

In the event the 1919 Irish Housing Competition proved to be of little benefit except to publicise the new standard of housing that would be required for the post-war campaign. Only 22 architects entered the competition, each submitting an average of two schemes each. Of the eleven prizewinners, all but two came from Dublin or its suburbs, and most were leading Irish practices with previous experience in housing design. The competition entries showed the strong influence of British garden suburb principles, with estates being laid out around central greens, and using cul-de-sacs and set-backs in the building line to break up a pattern of large site blocks. The ILGB did not publish the winning designs until late-1919, and when it did, it subjected each entry to detailed scrutiny. Designs were criticised for providing too little public space, and above all for having sub-standard house plans that were poorly planned, failed to show proper consideration of aspect, and did not give adequate access to back gardens. "Generally the Competition has indicated that the ability to lay-out a site suitably does not necessarily accompany the faculty of sound and economical house planning," the ILGB wrote dismissively. Because the ILGB thought that the competition designs were too close to the picturesque model of pre-war garden suburbs in Britain, it attached some 'corrective' plans. One exemplar included was a copyrighted design for an economical two-storey 2-bedroom cottage by Robert Thompson (the ILGB noted that Thompson was willing to grant licenses to Irish local authorities, demonstrating that it was again willing to promote British housing designs even from non-official architects). The other model offered by the ILGB was a set of preferred type plans designed by its in-house architects, and previously sent to Irish municipalities in a circular in September 1919.

It is now worth looking at the two circulars on housing design issued in 1919 by the ILGB. since these formed the main channel by which the Castle Administration instilled Unwinian standards of rationalised cottage plans and garden suburb planning. The first ILGB design circular was issued on 5 May 1919, and covered the requirements for the selection of sites, estate layout, house types, internal planning, space requirements, and services provision. It was taken directly from similar memoranda issued in Britain, principally the English LGB’s Manual on the Preparation of State-aided Housing Schemes.
published the previous month. Thus the ILGB Circular of May 1919 called for the careful selection of large suburban sites, and recommended the employment of skilled architects. Average site density was not to exceed 12 dwellings to the acre, with a maximum of 20 cottages on any single acre. Good sized gardens were to be provided, along with areas for public parks and allotments. Semi-detached houses were deemed as most desirable, although it was recognised that it might be necessary to build blocks of up to 8 dwellings to achieve savings. In terms of elevational design, the ILGB paraphrased the Unwinian precepts of the Tudor Walters Report:

"A good architectural effect can be most satisfactorily secured, not by expensive ornamental treatment or great variations in the design of the houses, but by grouping them skilfully so as to avoid the monotony of long, unbroken lines. Corner sites should be treated with special care so that blank gable walls may not be prominent features."

A similar rationalisation in design was also to be applied to the internal planning and orientation of cottage plans:

"It is desirable that the plan of a house should be nearly square, but rooms of oblong shape are most advantageous....Return buildings should be avoided as far as possible, and for simplicity and economy there should be no unnecessary breaks in roof or walls.....It is most important that the internal plan of each house should be carefully adapted to its site. The living room and principal bedrooms should have the sunniest aspect, and to secure that, in all houses, different plans should be used for the two sides of the road, or a long-fronted type of house with a through living room lighted at both ends."

The ILGB Circular of 5 May 1919 confirmed the new standard for house types and internal space provision set out in the 1919 Irish Housing Competition. Space requirements were generally the same: main bedrooms were to be a minimum of 160 sq.ft, other bedrooms were to be at least 80 sq.ft (except where provided as 'cubicles'), and parlours at least 110 sq.ft. All dwellings were to have separate WC and a hot-and-cold water supply, with space for a bath. There was also to be a fireplace in every room, proper provision for coal storage, a decent larder, and space to store a pram and bicycle. Furthermore, in some ways the ILGB circular set a slightly higher standard than the Irish Housing Competition. Living rooms in parlour houses were now to be a minimum of 160 sq.ft and 180 sq.ft in non-parlour houses; sculleries were to be at least 80 sq.ft if there was no separate bathroom, and 60 sq.ft if a bathroom was provided. In terms of house size, parlour houses were now to constitute 40% of all dwellings, and in larger schemes even some 4-bedroom houses would be allowed.

The second design circular issued by the ILGB on 11 September 1919 contained sample type-plans for dwellings. The suggested plans were clearly influenced by the British trend towards standardisation and simplification, but significantly they did not correspond
exactly to the contemporary house types provided by the Ministry of Health. Instead the ILGB's architects simply produced variations on the design by Robert Thompson, for a semi-detached 2-storey cottage with side entrance, that was appended to the booklet on the Irish Housing Competition. In the ILGB circular in September 1919, Thompson's own copyrighted plan was recommended only as a possible layout for the smallest type of 3-roomed dwelling ("Type A"). What the ILGB did was to take the basic semi-detached layout and adapt it for larger dwellings. It was a plan configuration that overcame the criticisms the ILGB had made of entries for the Irish Housing Competition, for it provided an economical box-like shape with maximum daylight and ventilation in every room, and yet allowed direct access to all rear gardens.

The ILGB circular showed six types of semi-detached cottages of differing sizes, plus an extra variant for one of the house types (in addition, for the smaller house types there was also an alternative layout to show how the plans could be laid out as flats if economies needed to be made) [Figs. 45-48]. "Type A" was a small 3-roomed cottage, with a living room (180 sq.ft), main bedroom (180 sq.ft), and second bedroom (120 sq.ft). "Type B" was a 4-roomed parlour version, with a living room (160 sq.ft), parlour (110 sq.ft), main bedroom (190 sq.ft), and second bedroom (80 sq.ft). "Type C" was a 4-roomed non-parlour cottage, with a living room (193 sq.ft), main bedroom (160 sq.ft), second bedroom (120 sq.ft), and third bedroom (80 sq.ft). The ILGB noted that this was probably the most economical house to erect in large numbers. There was also a variant of this type with an even larger living room (210 sq ft) that could be divided up to create a study. The remaining three types were for larger families. "Type D" was a 5-roomed parlour cottage, with a living room (160 sq ft), parlour (110 sq ft), main bedroom (190 sq ft), second bedroom (130 sq ft), and third bedroom (80 sq ft). "Type E" was a 5-roomed non-parlour version, with a living room (180 sq ft), main bedroom (190 sq ft), second bedroom (130 sq ft), third bedroom (90 sq ft), and fourth bedroom (80 sq ft). "Type F" was a large 6-roomed parlour cottage, with a living room (180 sq ft), parlour (120 sq ft), main bedroom (160 sq ft), second bedroom (121 sq ft), third bedroom (121 sq ft), and fourth bedroom (80 sq ft). This ILGB recommended that the last type should only be used where sufficiently high rents could be charged. The designs contained in the ILGB Circular of September 1919, particularly the "Type E" and "Type F" cottages, represented an unprecedented standard of working-class housing in Ireland. The sizes of individual rooms were well above the minimums laid down in the circular of May 1919, with for instance an average living room area of 176 sq.ft (compared to the 160 sq.ft minimum), and an average main bedroom of 178 sq.ft (compared to the 160 sq ft minimum). All the ILGB's house plans contained a kitchen, large larder, coal store, and an upstairs WC.
Each also had a ground floor bathroom directly off the front entrance lobby, avoiding the need for an expensive circulating system to pump hot water to the upper floor.

The ILGB do not appear to have provided sections or elevations for their suggested plans, although the symmetrical disposition of door and window openings fitted the rationalised neo-Georgian manner adopted for the post-war campaign in Britain. Indeed it was the ILGB's stated intention (following the disclaimer given in the Tudor Walters Report) not to provide fixed or complete designs for state housing. Rather it was left up to Irish municipalities to employ architects to designs within the general standards set out in the circulars.143

An crucial test for the Irish housing campaign was how the introduction by the ILGB of higher design standards from Britain would be received in Ireland. Here it appears that a continuing dependence on British architectural ideas resulted in an almost total absence of ideological opposition. Several of the key figures involved were well known as garden suburb enthusiasts: the role of Thomas Byrne in the ILGB has been noted, and his brother-in-law, Professor William Scott, was consultant architect to Enniskillen UDC until his early death in 1921. The RIAI kept in close contact with the Royal Institute of British Architects over housing issues. But, most importantly, Unwinian orthodoxy was regarded in Ireland as embodying the best of contemporary practice. Therefore to adopt rationalised garden suburb design represented the 'modernisation' and not the 'anglicisation' of Irish state housing. The Irish Builder wrote of the ILGB circular of May 1919 that it "inculcates the elementary principles of modern practice in these matters. It is a very great step forward in this country, and the first of its kind."144 The same journal later added of the municipal schemes produced along the lines promoted by the ILGB:

"In other words, an entirely new standard has been set. Unfortunately these houses exist only on paper. They, however, form the sole development of architectural design that we have witnessed in Ireland for quite forty years."145

The Housing Committee of Dublin Corporation, despite its hostility to British rule, noted in September 1919 that the Tudor Walters Report "is now regarded as a work of reference on housing questions", and it gave a copy of the report to all the consultant architects it employed.146 For there was a general belief in Ireland that British precedents in housing design had to be followed. One reformer in Dublin even asked in desperation at one point, "is there no Irish Mr Raymond Unwin.....?"147

Widespread acceptance in Ireland for the introduction of British housing design also enabled the ILGB to fight off an attempt by some municipalities, notably from Belfast
Corporation, to cut standards. Demands for cost-paring stemmed from the fact that inflated post-war construction costs threatened to make state housing hopelessly uneconomic. The estimate of £400-600 per cottages used by Chief Secretary Macpherson at the outset was proving completely erroneous. For instance, in Belfast a typical pre-war building cost of around £250 had by 1919-20 soared to an average tender price of £900-1000 for non-parlour cottages, and up to £1200-1300 for the largest parlour dwellings. Irish municipalities realised that they still stood to make a loss even if rents were set at an exorbitant 15s per week. One solution was an increase in Exchequer subsidy; the other was to permit local authorities to reduce the level of provision so as to save on building costs, and a general resolution to this effect was passed by the Association of Municipal Authorities of Ireland in September 1919. Belfast Corporation was the prime instigator behind this move, since it was determined that there should be no charge at all to the rates (see Chapter 8). At the inquiries into the housing proposals for Belfast in October 1919 and in May 1920, the Corporation insisted that it be allowed to abandon the semi-detached layout promoted by the ILGB's design circulars, in favour of short blocks of small non-parlour dwellings. "Belfast people did not want big semi-detached houses...They wanted good terraced houses," declared the Chairman of Belfast Corporation's Housing Committee. ".....What they wanted to do was to get the Local Government Board to reduce its standard." It led to an extremely bitter clash with the ILGB inspector, Dr Peter Cowan, with the latter calling the designs "very amateurish" and admonishing Belfast Corporation for being "content now to lag in the rear and to forget that the housing standard of a past generation was not a good modern standard." Considerable pressure was also exerted on the Castle Administration in Parliament by the Ulster Unionists. In November 1919 one Unionist MP drew the "attention of the Government to the danger of putting forward too high a type of house." In Britain the result of similar demands was that the Ministry of Health in May 1920 by introducing a range of modified type plans with more flexible accommodation. Yet in Ireland the ILGB steadfastly refused to reduce standards or promote alternative types of layouts, despite an almost constant atmosphere of hostility from municipalities such as Belfast Corporation. Yet by doing so the ILGB received support from many sources, including Irish Party MPs. The Irish Builder noted that it was "gratifying that the Local Government Board is maintaining a firm stand in the matter of insisting upon modern principles being followed in the planning and laying out of the houses. This has several times brought them into conflict with local authorities."

6.5  The collapse of the post-war Irish housing campaign

In late-September 1919 the ILGB wrote to municipalities setting out the timetable for the implementation of the 1919 Irish Housing Act. The surveys of local housing need were to
be returned by November 1919. Design proposals for housing schemes were to be submitted by April 1920, and all dwellings were to be completed by 15 August 1922 unless an extension of time was authorised. There was a strong commitment to the housing campaign within the British Government and Dublin Castle, as could be seen by the inclusion of Ireland in the 1919 Housing (Additional Powers) Act. A broad political consensus in Ireland was in favour of the initiative. Thus in November 1919 the Times reasoned that "the new housing scheme can easily be made a success, and, if the local authorities approach their task in a business-like, disinterested, and efficient manner, there is no reason why Ireland's formidable problem should not be solved to the satisfaction of everybody." In early-1920 the Irish housing campaign could still be portrayed in a positive light. Chief Secretary Macpherson announced to Parliament in February 1920 that 97 out of 127 Irish municipalities had submitted outline housing schemes, and, of these, 74 had included detailed plans. The ILGB had held inquiries covering a total of 640 houses. Although only 25 houses were actually built, the Castle Administration claimed that another 243 dwellings were at an advanced stage of construction: on the surface at least progress was not proportionately far behind that in England and Wales, where by the same date only around 1250 houses had been built. By the date deadline for the submission for Irish housing proposals in April 1920, a total of 85 municipalities had provided detailed proposals and a further 24 had given outline information.

However, the problems of British rule in Ireland were now manifest. The operations of the Castle Administration outside Ulster had run into chronic difficulty, due to escalating political opposition from Sinn Fein and military action by the Irish Republican Army. The response of the British Government remained undefined, but the knee-jerk reaction advocated by Conservative Unionists in the Cabinet was to repress dissent. Sinn Fein was proscribed as illegal in the majority of Ireland in September 1919. Yet another crisis arose out of the first post-war municipal elections in January 1920. Despite the introduction of proportional representation, Sinn Fein won control of 72 out of 127 Irish municipalities in Ireland, and shared power with the Irish Labour Party in another 26 authorities (the hegemony of Sinn Fein in rural areas was even greater, taking over 28 out of 33 county councils and 182 out of 206 RDCs in mid-1920). The consequence for the housing campaign was that, if it were to proceed, then in most cases loans and subsidies from the Imperial Exchequer would be given to die-hard separatists. There were also administrative repercussions. When the Chairman of Dublin Corporation's Housing Committee, Lord Mayor Thomas Kelly, was deported to England in March 1920 (along with Councillor William Cosgrave), his deputy wrote provocatively to Lloyd George that the action had "undoubtedly held up Corporation work - housing, planning, etc. - in which you have always taken such a lively interest."
Yet, as McColgan has pointed out, the paralysis in British rule inflicted by Sinn Fein prompted the British Government and the Castle Administration to introduce policy changes in an attempt to regain the initiative.\textsuperscript{162} Perseverance could also be seen in the ILGB’s efforts to revive the housing campaign, once it was realised that only Ulster (and thus essentially Belfast Corporation) was now pressing ahead with plans. In February 1920 the ILGB’s Vice-President, Sir Henry Robinson, sought Treasury approval for financial concessions for Irish housing.\textsuperscript{163} Robinson suggested that the Exchequer should now pay loan interest charges for two years to allow more time for building, and that the Treasury should drop its stipulation that subsidy levels would be recalculated after a period of seven years, and give a longer-term commitment to assist Irish municipalities. Further more the ILGB recommended that the subsidy system be slightly altered, so that the Exchequer contribution was linked to an agreed ‘economic rent’ and not the amount of rent collected. This would mean that authorities would not be financially crippled in the event of rent strikes, when otherwise they stood to lose both income and subsidy. The Treasury were totally against any amendment that would remove the incentive for Irish municipalities to maximise their rent collection. As to the argument that the current subsidy system was particularly unfair if tenants refused to pay, one official wrote that “as the temptation to strike for no-rents will probably make more appeal to the Irish mind, it is perhaps appropriate that the punishment should be a double one.”\textsuperscript{164} The other continual concern of the Treasury was that any improvement in Irish terms might provoke resentment in Britain. Hence the Treasury wrote to the Ministry of Health to see whether the latter "would be embarrassed if we met them [ILGB] on one or two points", and was told in response that any substantial concession was likely to lead to costly demands from hard-pressed British municipalities.\textsuperscript{165} Therefore the Treasury told the ILGB that it would only approve one of the minor suggestions, to increase the period over which interest payments on loans would be met. In so doing, the attempt by the Castle Administration in early-1920 to rescue the Irish housing campaign was frustrated.

The only political power that could resolve the problems of Irish state housing lay elsewhere in Westminster. In September 1919 a new Cabinet Committee had been set up under Sir Walter Long to consider the question of Irish self-government, and there followed an undoubted narrowing of the divisions within the Lloyd George Government once Unionist ministers came to realise that a purely coercive Irish policy would not suffice. An instrument of redress was also required.\textsuperscript{166} The Cabinet Committee produced a draft in early-1920, although continuing disagreements meant that the new Government of Ireland Act was not passed until late-December. The essence of the 1920 Government of Ireland Act was that Ulster must not be coerced into a united Ireland - which in effect
formalised partition - and that Ireland as a whole must not be separated from the Empire. Lloyd George reminded the Cabinet that he was "was still a Gladstonian Home Ruler, and he wished to keep Ireland as an integral part of the United Kingdom."167 British supremacy was to be upheld in matters of defence and commerce. In other words, there was to be limited devolution to two new federal-style administrations. Ireland was to make an annual 'Imperial Contribution' of £18,000,000 towards expenditure on reserved matters such as the army, police, land purchase, and taxation. A few minor matters were entrusted to a joint 'Council of Ireland', consisting of representatives from both new Irish administrations, but in general the 1920 Government of Ireland Act partitioned virtually all the transferred services.168

Professor W.S.G Adams was the secretary to the Cabinet Committee, and in the various draft proposals it was still envisaged that the British Government would finance Irish state housing after the transfer of power. The Cabinet was told on 3 December 1919 that to help the new administrations, "from a financial point of view, it was of the greatest importance that the cost of the local services should not be increased by any additions such as.....Housing."169 The amount of Exchequer contribution was initially set at the £2,000,000 per annum proposed by the 1917-18 Irish Convention, this to be paid for the first seven years following devolution.170 The Treasury still believed that the estimate was too high, and it received strong support from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Austen Chamberlain, who by late-1919 was advocating retrenchment in the British housing campaign as well. Hence the Cabinet Committee on Ireland now took a tougher line on Adams' financial proposal:

"There is also the question of a grant of £2,000,000 for housing. No promise of this kind has been made, though the Prime Minister undertook to give a grant for housing as part of the Home Rule scheme offered in 1917, which was rejected by Mr Redmond when he accepted the Irish Convention instead. On the other hand, an Irish Housing Act, involving an expenditure out of taxes of 5/4th of the rents charged and collected has already been passed. This may mean an annual expenditure of £100,000 a year, rising by, say, £100,000 to a million a year."171

The 'White Paper' on expenditure under the Government of Ireland Bill was finally published in May 1920, and while state housing was not itemised as such, it would appear that around £1,000,000 per annum was to be divided between the new Irish administrations.172 Austen Chamberlain argued that it would be simpler to repeal the 1919 Irish Housing Act, and hand a free grant over to the Northern and Southern Governments to frame their own housing policies. The majority of the Cabinet Committee disagreed. Instead the 1920 Government of Ireland Act used the formula suggested by the Treasury to Adams back in mid-1918: an annual payment was to be provided by making the appropriate
deduction from Ireland's contribution to Imperial expenditure. In terms of administrative control, at first the Cabinet Committee decided that state housing should be temporarily reserved for a year, and then handed over as a non-partitioned matter overseen by the 'Council of Ireland'. But manoeuvring by Ulster Unionists, who were seeking to minimise future Irish unity, meant that in the final draft the administrative responsibility for state housing was to be partitioned and handed over immediately.

The 1920 Government of Ireland Act demonstrated that Westminster had still not relinquished its intention to finance Irish housing, although the actual effect of the measure on the post-war campaign was minimal. More significant was the Cabinet's realisation that a thorough reform of Dublin Castle was essential if self-government was to be successfully implemented. It was necessary to remove senior Unionist officials who were known to be hostile to a transfer of power, and the administrative machinery had to be in good working order if there was to be an efficient handover. Thus in April 1920 a new Chief Secretary, Sir Hamar Greenwood, was appointed to help Lord Lieutenant French. The next month the Treasury Secretary, Sir Warren Fisher, conducted an inquiry which concluded that the chaotic Castle Administration "does not administer." The British Army in Ireland was duly strengthened to show resolve against lawlessness, and a new breed of progressive yet politically-neutral officials were appointed to powerful positions within Dublin Castle. Staff councils were set up to improve labour relations with senior officials, in extension of the 'Whitley' scheme of civil service reform in Britain. Control over Irish finances was also streamlined by removing the Treasury Remembrancer, and giving the incoming Joint Under-Secretary, Sir John Anderson, a second role as head of the newly-created Irish Treasury. As McColgan has observed, the arrangement meant that Sir John Anderson now had:

"the same financial powers in Ireland as those of the Secretary to the Treasury in Britain. Combining both the administrative and financial function of the Irish administration under one person - though at times producing the odd spectre of Anderson requesting funds in one capacity and refusing himself in another - was an extraordinary step and underscores how serious British officials regarded the administrative emergency in Ireland." The reformed Castle Administration in May 1920 faced the task of preparing for the implementation of the forthcoming Government of Ireland Act. Following strong pressure from Ulster Unionists, yet another Joint Under-Secretary, Sir Ernest Clark, was appointed in September 1920. Clark began at once to build quietly and assiduously the foundations for a separate Northern Irish Government. By the middle of the next year an effective administrative mechanism had been set up in Ulster in advance of preparations in the South. In Southern Ireland progress was hindered by the open hostility between the Castle Administration and Sinn Fein. Dublin Castle stepped up military repression to

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clampdown on unrest and guerrilla activity; Sinn Fein called for strikes and a complete boycott of government institutions to frustrate British rule. Housing policy was caught up in the battle. In May 1920 Chief Secretary Greenwood stalled a demand from the Association of Municipal Authorities of Ireland for increased housing subsidy. The Cabinet at this point was more concerned to ensure that whenever property damage or personal injury occurred in Ireland, then local people should bear the burden. Approval was given in late-May to a Coercion Bill which stipulated that compensation payments would automatically be deducted from state subsidies to the local authority for that area. It was a provocative gesture that dealt a severe blow to local government activities in general, and the housing campaign in particular. Sinn Fein municipalities - which now formed the vast majority outside Ulster - would be unable to calculate what housing subsidy they might receive, since they obviously could not guarantee that there would be no local military action.

The Dail Eireann was forced to respond to the concerted attack on its hold over Irish local government. From May 1920 the unofficial Ministry of Local Government held a series of meetings to consider what strategy might be recommended to local authorities under their control. Yet, because of the need to avoid a split in the alliance with the radical labour movement, it was decided that Sinn Fein must not take precipitate action that would be seen as terminating popular initiatives such as the housing campaign. Instead the British Government should be forced to make the first move. As the deputy Minister of Local Government, Kevin O'Higgins, told the Dail Eireann:

"If we are not prepared, of our own initiative, to cut adrift from the Local Government Board I see no sufficient reason why we should burden ourselves with a self-denying ordinance against making full use of them in the matter of Housing Loans, drainage, etc. Housing is a matter of absolutely paramount importance and if the word went out that our Councils were absolutely debarred from taking any steps in this matter the political effect would be distinctly bad.....If we refuse to forward minutes to [the] English Local Government Board, to accept their audit and otherwise to conform to existing regulations we cannot consistently apply for inquiries under their auspices to obtain sanction for loans from [the] Board of Works or from the British Treasury.....Therefore Housing, Drainage, and all similar activities of public bodies would be at a standstill. What the effect of this would be in Labour circles it is easy to conceive." 180

A special Dail conference on 29 June 1920 agreed that Irish municipalities should simply be asked to pass resolutions that repudiated the authority of the ILGB, and swore allegiance to Dail Eireann alone. The ILGB at first chose not to respond, deciding to play a waiting game in the expectation that local authorities would change their tune when they wanted state funds for housing and other matters. However, the provocative tactic by Sinn Fein outraged Ulster Unionists and leading Conservatives. The Cabinet decided that no Exchequer loans or subsidies would be given to any local authority that refused to
recognise the Castle Administration. After a warning letter in late-July from the ILGB, on 4 August 1920 an official directive was sent to Irish authorities stating that they would not receive public loans unless they pledged to submit their accounts for annual audit. At the same time the British Government passed the 1920 Coercion Act, finally providing Dail Eireann with the ideal opportunity to issue a decree in mid-August instructing sympathetic local authorities to sever relations with the ILGB and pursue a policy of total non-cooperation. 182 Within a few months an ILGB official noted that Ireland was "in a parlous state, and the work of the Local Government Board is at a standstill in all branches except old age pensions."183

Yet if the Dail Eireann now expected municipalities to refuse to accept housing loans from the British Government, Sinn Fein politicians were careful not to state this as official policy to avoid irritating municipal and labour representatives.184 But no alternatives could be offered to Irish local authorities while British rule lasted. Dail Eireann had decided that the priority for Sinn Fein funds must be the immediate struggle, and not costly policies such as municipal housing (particularly if British subsidy could not be expected). Hence, in refusing an application for a housing loan from one municipality, the Dail stated that the unofficial Ministry of Local Government "are alive to the urgency of the Housing problem and they hope that at a later stage it may be found possible to make provision for affording financial assistance to local bodies in dealing with it."185 Another body was told:

"There are no funds earmarked for Irish housing.....Local authorities must bear in mind the abnormal conditions of affairs prevailing, and endeavour in local matters to shoulder their own burden until the main cause of the abnormal condition of affairs, viz. foreign domination, is finally removed."186

Dail Eireann's refusal of housing loans provoked a protest from some municipalities that, given the urgency of the campaign, they should therefore be allowed to extract the finance for state housing from the British Government. Unity was only maintained at the annual conference in September 1920 of the Association of Municipal Authorities of Ireland (now dominated by Sinn Fein), through a compromise resolution to "go fully into the housing problem, not with a view to obtaining a subsidy from the Government, but with a view to carrying out housing schemes from a national point of view."187 It was a meaningless formula given that there was virtually no alternative capital available in Ireland for state housing. The extent of the problem was revealed by the difficulties faced by Dublin Corporation in trying to complete its war-time schemes. By August 1920 the Corporation owed £160,000 to the contractor for the McCaffrey Estate and St James' Walk schemes, and, now that the ILGB was withholding public loans, it needed urgently to find another source of funds. The matter was complicated by the fact that William Cosgrave was both
the unofficial Minister of Local Government and Chairman of Dublin Corporation's Finance Committee. Cosgrave told the unofficial Minister of Finance about the Corporation's predicament:

"We are in immediate danger of bankruptcy, in the sense that we have undertaken Capital expenditure but so far have not been able to secure a loan....The matter is so serious that if we don't get the money, the only solution would be for me to retire altogether from public life, as it would not be in the interest of the Republic that such a failure in the Corporation could continue as head of the Local Government Department."

Despite Cosgrave's resignation threat (which if carried out would have denied the future Irish Free State its first President), the unofficial Ministry of Finance was reluctant to help out. Dublin Corporation was in the end able to cover its debt by selling stock to the Bank of Ireland, but it was forced to suspend all housing projects.

The inability of Dail Eireann to provide funds for municipalities was an obvious weakness in the strategy of non-cooperation. The Castle Administration realised that if it now offered increased state subsidy to revive the Irish housing campaign, then not only would it be seen to be dealing with a chronic social problem, but it might also help to isolate Sinn Fein. In July 1920 the ILGB Housing Committee recommended that the present subsidy system be scrapped, in favour of a suggestion by the Association of Municipal Authorities of Ireland that the Exchequer pay 5.25% of the annual capital expenditure (rising to 6% for atypical slum-clearance projects). However, the ILGB's Vice-President, Sir Henry Robinson, argued that this would be disastrous given the rebelliousness of Sinn Fein authorities: "It is impossible to ignore the political situation.....The Municipal Authorities are now asking for loans on favourable terms and for largely increased grants from the Government which they decline to recognize and which they pledge themselves to do all in their power to resist.....the difficulty is in applying to Parliament for an amended Act, or for sanction to amended Regulations, by which largely increased grants will be given for distribution to disloyal bodies. One brief example of the irony of the situation can be gathered from today's paper, from which it appears that an Urban Council having ordered the water supply to be cut off from the military and police barracks, then proceeded with the consideration of an application to the Government for a large loan for housing purposes for the benefit of their District!.....The grounds for this [rent-based subsidy] were clearly explained to the Irish Government at the time, and the case is probably stronger now that the new Councils are composed largely of men elected because they possess no means and would not be a mark for costs."

By early-November 1920 the Joint-Under Secretary, Sir John Anderson, stated in an internal memo that it was now "urgent" that permission to introduce new housing proposals be sought from the Chancellor of the Exchequer. It showed a political imperative attached to state housing within Dublin Castle that was in contrast to developments in England and Wales, where by now even the Minister of Health, Christopher Addison, conceded in face of widespread criticism that sights must be lowered. The Castle
Administration sought to restart the Irish housing programme through three initiatives: by increasing the level of subsidy to municipalities; by purchasing building materials; and by extending the subsidy to private builders. The first was easily the most important, and was suggested by Sir Henry Robinson (and accepted by Chief Secretary Greenwood) as an alternative to changing the subsidy system. The pretext given to Parliament was that extra assistance was necessary to cover the inflation in Irish building costs - estimated at around 34% - since the housing campaign started in mid-1919. Yet the escalation in post-war costs was hardly new information. What was different was the revived political commitment to Irish state housing. After discussions with the ILGB and the Housing Committee, the Chief Secretary's Office advocated that the ordinary level of subsidy should be increased to 35s for every £1 of rent collected (a ratio of 7:4 compared with 5:4 previously); and to 40s for every £1 of rent (a ratio of 2:1 compared with 11:8 previously) in special cases where the ILGB decided that local economic circumstances were such that only low rents could be charged. Contrary to the parsimony shown earlier by his counterparts in Westminster, Sir John Anderson stated in reply that the Irish Treasury:

"recognize that there has been an appreciable increase in the cost of building since the rates of subsidy at present embodied in the regulations were fixed, and.....are prepared to admit that some increase of subsidy is now necessary. On the other hand, the steady and appreciable rises of wages which have taken place in most employments since July 1919 justify the expectation of rents higher than those contemplated at that time."  

In return the Irish Treasury stipulated that the higher band of subsidy could only be granted in exceptional areas of economic hardship, and that there now had to be a mandatory review of municipal subsidy after a period of only four years (on 31 March 1925) to check that local authorities were charging appropriately high rents. The latter ruling was criticised by the Chairman of the Housing Committee, Dr Peter Cowan, on the grounds that it:

"appears to strike at the basis of the Irish system of subsidy, by giving an undetermined rate of subsidy for the major period of the loan periods instead of a rate which an honest and efficient Local Authority can regard as certain.....It should not be forgotten that the difficulties in framing and carrying out building schemes are at present so great, on account of the scarcity of skilled labour and the scarcity and high cost of materials, that no very large number of houses could be built in Ireland within four years, even if political conditions were normal.....It would seem to be not only unnecessary but most impolitic to add to the restrictions inherent in the Irish form of subsidy the safeguarding provisions required in Great Britain. The only certain effect of doing so would be to increase the hesitancy of Irish Local Authorities in embarking on housing schemes."  

Despite support for this view from Sir Henry Robinson, the Irish Treasury saw no reason to change their mind about the mandatory four year review. The second method by which the Castle Administration tried to stimulate the housing programme was in the matter
of building materials supply. When the ILGB applied in November 1920 for a reduced sum of £250,000 to buy materials for the year 1921-1922 (of which £187,500 would be recovered by the resale to municipalities), they received a favourable response from the Chief Secretary and the Irish Treasury on condition that materials were not given to local authorities who refused to present their accounts for audit. A third strategy was to increase the scope of private subsidy under the 1919 Housing (Additional Powers) Act. Only 342 dwellings had been completed in Ireland by late-1920, although the total was expected to rise to nearly 1,000 cottages by the deadline on 23 April 1921. At the suggestion of the ILGB and Ulster Unionists, the Irish Treasury now agreed to extend the date of eligibility and to allow semi-rural dwellings to receive the subsidy. Thus the 1921 Housing Act, which extended private subsidy throughout the United Kingdom to houses completed by 23 June 1922 (or by 23 October 1922 with special permission), also contained a specific clause for Ireland confirming the inclusion of houses built within a 1.5 mile radius of urban districts.

Yet it is not surprising that the housing initiatives of the reformed Castle Administration came to little, when considered that in April 1921 some 372 (72%) local authorities out of a total of 516 Irish urban and rural councils either refused to recognise the ILGB, or were at least ambivalent about British rule. Chief Secretary Greenwood told Parliament that "there is a campaign extending.....to the whole administration of the Local Government Board in Ireland, and it is bringing Ireland to chaos and misery." Most municipalities, particularly in Southern Ireland, had for political reasons given up hope of receiving housing subsidy from the Imperial Exchequer. Sir Henry Robinson declared privately that "the local authorities would have been content to go on with their schemes while negotiations [for higher subsidy] were proceeding.....had it not been that they were ordered by Dail Eireann to hold no communication whatsoever with the Local Government Board." Thus in Southern Ireland by April 1921 the ILGB had sanctioned only a paltry £58,000 of public loans out of total figure of £2,180,000 for municipal housing applications. Only two small schemes totalling 30 dwellings were ever built in the South under the 1919 Irish Housing Act: Dalkey UDC borrowed £20,786 to build 22 dwellings (1921-22), and in north Co. Dublin, Balbriggan Town Commissioners provided 8 dwellings. The lack of progress was particularly poignant when borne in mind that nearly 80% of dwellings required in post-war Ireland were needed in Southern towns and cities. The dilemma of the slums in Dublin was frequently used by political opponents to deride Sinn Fein's rejection of British housing funds after August 1920. "What political object can such a sacrifice achieve ?," asked the Irish Times , "Even if Dail Eireann should win its Republic, would it wish to find its capital in the last stages of municipal decay ?"
However, as many participants pointed out at the time, the failure of the Irish housing campaign could not simply be attributed to political abstentionism by Sinn Fein. The example of loyalist Ulster shows that the unique and unfavourable rent-based subsidy system designed by the Treasury was also a major cause. By April 1921, Northern municipalities had applied for £2,250,000 of public loans under the 1919 Irish Housing Act. Of this total, loans for nearly £706,000 had already been sanctioned. Yet in Northern Ireland by mid-1921 only some 90 dwellings were as yet completed by Portadown UDC, Tanderagee UDC, and Belfast Corporation; although the latter had just embarked on a programme, as will be seen in Chapter 8, that was to bring the eventual total in Ulster under the 1919 Irish Housing Act to just over 530 houses. The slow rate of completion by Belfast Corporation was partly due to an obsessive desire to avoid a loss to the rates. Hence the Corporation diverted much of its energy in early-1921 into demands for more state subsidy and a cut in standards. Yet Belfast Corporation also had a legitimate right to be alarmed about a subsidy system that fixed neither a ceiling on the municipal contribution, nor a constant sum from the Exchequer. "Belfast is the only place in Ireland where the Government's housing scheme has had a chance of success," adjudged the Irish Times, "but the result of the Corporation's effort to put it into operation has not been very encouraging."

There was not surprisingly widespread disillusionment about the Irish housing campaign by early-1921. At the same time in Britain, the Cabinet and the Ministry of Health were encouraging various ad-hoc expedients to accelerate housebuilding and yet still avoid antagonising powerful financial and industrial interests. But while these British experiments were yet again studied in Ireland, implementation was limited. The few Irish expedients that were attempted were, significantly, private initiatives to solve the economic and political problems of housing independently of the Castle Administration. For example, there was in Ireland no scientific investigation of new building methods to overcome shortages of materials and skilled labour; there was no comparable body to the Building Materials Research Committee, formed in Britain in 1917 at the suggestion of Raymond Unwin. Knowledge in Ireland of non-traditional construction remained vague, and the nearest thing to an Irish building system was the little-used 'Orion' walling block marketed by the Ryan Manufacturing and Construction Company. Limited efforts to use the 'Orion' system for ex-servicemen's housing at Killester will be discussed in the next chapter. A second expedient used in Britain was to encourage alternative housing agencies and financial sources, but in Ireland this was confined to a handful of public utility societies with specific ideological intentions behind their actions. The most publicised was the St Barnabas Public Utility Society in north-east Dublin, which sought to revive
Unionist voluntarist philanthropy. By the mid-1920s the society had only built in the region of 175 cottages. A third initiative stemming from Britain was the attempt to modify the building process to eliminate the profit paid to private contractors, and thereby to reduce construction costs. As will be seen in Chapter 8, Belfast Corporation failed to reach an agreement with the local builders' federation on tender prices, and reluctantly turned to using its own direct labour force on some schemes. It was a move urged by local building unions and the Belfast Labour Party, and was copied from the pioneering British scheme at Newbury in late-1919 and subsequently adopted in Liverpool, Glasgow, and other cities. Another example was the creation of the Dublin Building Trades' Guild. As will also be seen in Chapter 8, this socialist guild had been given its first contract by Dublin Corporation for some dwellings at Fairbrothers Fields. The model was the post-war guild movement of Northern England that began in Manchester, and the aim, as an Irish labour leader told Sinn Fein, was to show "that the workers were capable of building houses cheaper and better than they could be built by the capitalists of Dublin or any other city." The Dublin Building Trades' Guild was a product of the post-war alliance between the labour movement and republican separatists, and hence it received support from Sinn Fein members of Dublin Corporation such as William Cosgrave. Yet in Ireland the use of direct labour or guilds did not prove to be noticeably cheaper than tenders from private contractors, and such experiments withered under sustained ideological opposition from conservative vested interests.

6.6 Housing policy at the end of British rule in Ireland

The attempts by the Castle Administration and private initiatives to inject life into the post-war housing campaign were by mid-1921 totally overshadowed by political events in Ireland. General elections were held in both Northern and Southern Ireland in May 1921 for the new parliaments under the 1920 Government of Ireland Act. The outcome was entirely predictable. In the North the Ulster Unionists won 40 out of 52 seats. On 7 June 1921 the new government led by Sir James Craig was sworn in, and preparations began for the formal transfer of power to Ulster. In Southern Ireland, despite increased repression by the British Army, Sinn Fein appropriated the election to select members for the Second Dail Eireann. By this point even hardliners in the Cabinet realised that they could not introduce the Government of Ireland Act in the South without an unacceptable degree of military force. After secret and mostly unproductive peace negotiations, the Lloyd George Government used King George VI's inaugural speech to the Northern Parliament in June 1921 to offer an olive branch to Sinn Fein. A 'Truce' was declared in mid-July by Lloyd George and the Sinn Fein leader, Eamonn de Valera. There followed
complex negotiations over a formula for self-government that would also be acceptable to Northern Ireland. A 'Treaty' was finally signed in late-December 1921; yet bitter division within the republican movement over the terms of settlement, as will be seen in Chapter 8, was to lead to a bloody conflict after independence.

As well as general political considerations that derived from the ending of British rule, state housing in Ireland was also conditioned by the imposition of a moratorium on the British housing campaign in mid-1921. This move had been on the cards for some time. Treasury proposals to restrict the housing programme began in late-1920, and intensified when Christopher Addison was replaced by Sir Alfred Mond as Minister of Health the following March. Smaller and narrow-fronted house types were published by the Ministry of Health, and the process culminated when the Cabinet decided on a complete moratorium in housing expenditure. The announcement was made by Sir Alfred Mond in the House of Commons on 14 July 1921. Now only those schemes already contractually committed could proceed, and the result was that 176,000 rather than 500,000 dwellings were eventually built in for England and Wales under the 1919 Housing Act. Subsidy for private housebuilding was likewise curtailed. Retrenchment came ironically at a time when, due to the fact that the post-war inflationary boom was beginning to evaporate, local authorities were at last able to overcome their financial and administrative problems (by mid-1921 tender prices had fallen to an average of around £800, and the rate of house completions had risen sharply). Swenarton has argued that the termination of the housing campaign in Britain, after economic boom had turned to slump in the winter of 1920-21, was just as politically motivated as its conception. The 'insurance against revolution' was no longer needed once wages were falling and the threat from labour power had collapsed. The decline in labour power was graphically shown by the British Government's victory over the miners union, once the general strike threatened by the 'Triple Alliance' (i.e. miners, railwaymen, and transport workers) failed to materialise in April 1921. Daunton has disputed this interpretation, and has instead suggested that the imposition of the moratorium on the Addison programme derived more from a longer-standing aim of the Lloyd George Coalition Government to deflate the economy, in preparation for a return to the 'Gold Standard' system of currency regulation.

In Ireland it was undoubtedly political factors which determined the response of the Castle Administration to the moratorium announcement in Britain. The ILGB and its Housing Committee immediately argued against an extension of the Treasury's moratorium to the Irish campaign. In a memorandum written on 16 July 1921, the Housing Committee pointed out that due to political problems and a disadvantageous subsidy system, to date there were built or nearly completed only 300 of the 50,000 dwellings envisaged under the
1919 Irish Housing Act. Were a stop to be imposed now, then "the municipal housing scheme for Ireland will be paralysed and it would be some time before the new Governments in this Country could frame a new policy and revive the former activities of the local authorities." Instead the Housing Committee suggested two possible limits that might be placed on the Irish campaign: either a new ceiling figure of 25,000 dwellings, or else to confine subsidy to municipalities that started schemes before 15 August 1922 and completed them within two years. Senior officials within Dublin Castle were fully aware about the political danger of imposing a moratorium at a time when the British Government was engaged in sensitive discussions with Ulster Unionists and Sinn Fein on the transfer of power. The Joint-Under Secretary and head of the Irish Treasury, Sir John Anderson, told Chief Secretary Greenwood:

"Owing to the disturbed state of the country and the attitude taken up by local authorities but little progress has been made. Conditions may improve but at best the commitments entered into by the time these matters pass out of the hands of the United Kingdom Government are practically certain to fall far short of the equivalent of the provision already secured in both England and Scotland.....In the circumstances I do not think there is any need to impose special limitations upon the development of the scheme. As a matter of precaution however I would give the Local Government Board an administrative direction - which need not be made public - that they are not to enter into commitments representing more than 15,000 - without further authority. The point is never likely to arise." Anderson suggested that the previously agreed increase in Irish housing subsidy to 35s for every £1 of rent collected in ordinary cases, and 40s for special cases, ought now to be made public. Thus in late-August 1921 the Chief Secretary wrote to this effect to Councillor T.E. McConnell, Vice-Chairman of Belfast Corporation's Housing Committee and a Ulster Unionist MP for the city.

Yet if the Castle Administration wanted to give a public appearance that Ireland was the only part of the United Kingdom in mid-1921 to receive improved financial terms for state housing, behind the scenes there was a rather different strategy. The Irish Treasury were determined to take measures to minimise the burden on the Imperial Exchequer at the point when housing responsibilities would be handed over to the new Irish governments. Thus although a moratorium was never announced, a de facto ceiling on potential housebuilding was imposed by a ruling that the ILGB must restrict building work to schemes that had already been sanctioned and thus committed. The Irish Treasury also effectively terminated the subsidy to private builders, recently extended under the 1921 Housing Act, by declaring that grants would now only be paid for dwellings that had been begun before 1 July 1921 (or for cases where a contract had been agreed before 14 July 1921 and work started on site by 25 August 1921). By September 1921 only about 400 dwellings had been built with private subsidy and another 450 cottages were in the pipeline; a total far
short of the promise for Ireland under the original 1919 Housing (Additional Powers) Act. Another means of retrenchment explored by the Irish Treasury in late-1921 was a renewed attempt to close down the ILGB's Housing Department and the associated Housing Committee. The ILGB successfully fended off the cut-back by arguing that decisions about housing administration were no longer a responsibility for the British Government. By January 1922 some ILGB officials were about to be transferred to Ulster, and it was pointed out:

"The Board [ILGB] are not aware of the policy of the new Government in Southern Ireland and it appears to them that the continuance, abolition, or reduction of the Housing Branch of this Office is a matter to be left for decision to the Provisional Government who will deal with it in accordance with the views they may adopt in regard to this important section of the Board's work."

The position of the Castle Administration on state housing had become impossible by the winter of 1921-22. The underlying aim to minimise housing expenditure was complicated by the need for it to appear that the new Northern and Southern Governments were about to be handed unconditional responsibility for policy. The result was confusion and recrimination, particularly in Ulster where municipal housebuilding was proceeding slowly. As will be noted in Chapter 8, Belfast Corporation was incensed when the Irish Treasury provided no extra funds to pay for the recent subsidy increase, and the nascent Ministry of Home Affairs refused to honour the deal. But before looking at the consequences of independence and partition from 1922, the next chapter will examine the other strand of the British Government's post-war campaign in Ireland, the building of cottages for ex-servicemen.
Previous chapters have described a series of unique housing policies that resulted from the inter-relationship of Ireland and Britain. Yet no episode was more curious than the cottages built for returning servicemen under the 1919 Irish Land (Provision for Sailors and Soldiers) Act. Through this code, the British Government itself undertook to provide housing for a definite political purpose. By the end of the First World War it was clear to Westminster and the Castle Administration that separatists under the Sinn Fein banner were likely to win control of national and local politics outside Ulster, and as a result, the majority of Irish local authorities could not be trusted to rehouse what were seen as the most deserving cases: the sailors and soldiers returning from battle. As one Castle official noted later, a scheme was deemed essential for Irish ex-servicemen "owing to the fact that in this country they were likely to be placed at a disadvantage in the allocation of houses under the Local Authorities' Housing schemes." Furthermore there was in Ireland a strong ideological purpose in building cottages to an unprecedentedly high standard on garden suburb principles. If trained fighting men were to be prevented from being recruited into Sinn Fein and its military wing, the Irish Republican Army, then some tangible gesture was needed to remind them that their best prospects lay with the country for which they had fought in the war. An ideal opportunity presented itself to the Castle Administration with the eclipse of the pre-war Labourers Acts programme: the housing for ex-servicemen could therefore be framed as a rural initiative that would not interfere with the urgent intentions of the main Irish Housing Act. In Britain the plan to resettle 100,000 demobilised soldiers and sailors on the land had the broad support of the populace, and was carried out by local authorities (indeed the post-war Office of Works was only pressed into contributing directly when it was realised that the main Addison Act was failing). This chapter will show that the way in which the policy was framed and implemented in Ireland was radically different. It is therefore incorrect to view the 1919 Irish Land Act as being "in tune" with the post-war programme to resettle veterans in Britain, as Aalen has suggested recently. Instead the closest parallel to the post-war cottages for Irish ex-servicemen were those paid for and constructed in Britain by the Ministry of Munitions. As 'war-time' housing carried on in a state of civil unrest in Ireland, the cottages built under the Irish Land Act were quite unlike any other social housing initiative in post-war Europe.
7.1 Preparations for the 1919 Irish Land Act

The impetus behind the ex-servicemen's housing programme stemmed from a decisive change in British policy towards Ireland in the last months of the First World War. As noted in Chapter 5, the manpower shortage following the massive German offensive in Spring 1918 had forced the Cabinet to intimate that conscription would soon have to be introduced in Ireland. The British Government sought once more a formula for Irish self-government, and a tough new Lord Lieutenant, Field Marshal Lord French, was appointed in May as the proconsular head of what was now in effect a quasi-military administration in Dublin Castle. French was appointed to the Cabinet and the new Chief Secretary, Edward Shortt, was given a subordinate role in charge of administration. Despite a more coercive policy, the British Government found that it had to again postpone conscription in face of ferocious Irish opposition. Instead French decided to escalate the recruiting campaign to attract 50,000 more volunteers. The Lord Lieutenant believed that in Ireland the Government had to go beyond the vague post-war pledges already made to servicemen: it must now definitely promise a plot of land to everyone who enlisted. In late-May 1918 Lord French told the Prime Minister, Lloyd George, that he was "very anxious to get the Congested Districts Board and the Estates Commissioners to entertain the idea of making small grants of land to Irish soldiers returning from the front. This hastily conceived gesture was turned into an abortive 1918 Irish (Soldiers and Sailors) Land Bill, through which the Castle Administration intended to give ex-servicemen special status by allowing the Irish Land Commission to grant them subsidised small-holdings (or even sizeable farms), on the same terms as existing land redistribution legislation. Not surprisingly the offer was bitterly opposed by Nationalists as a bribe, and was heavily ridiculed by all Irish political parties in the House of Commons. It was also divisive to offer land to Irish recruits without giving a similar promise to their British counterparts. Faced with a serious political embarrassment, the Government dropped the measure.

With the war drawing to a close, Lord Lieutenant French turned his attention to the pressing issue of post-war reconstruction then being seriously debated by the Cabinet. In October 1918 French set up a small Advisory Council, consisting mainly of compliant Unionists, as a forum to discuss post-war proposals for Ireland. Soon the council was recommending that £2,000,000 be given to rebuild Irish agriculture and industry, and that this should be entrusted to an Irish equivalent to the Ministry of Reconstruction. The motive for the Castle Administration was quite clearly to stop the growth of separatist Nationalism. As Chief Secretary Shortt told the Cabinet in December 1918:

"In Ireland political conditions are of a much greater importance and are much more far reaching than they are in Great Britain. In the present state of unrest it would be highly
dangerous to have a large number of men standing about idle, however generous are the
unemployment grants; and for that reason it is essential that work of some kind should be
found for them without delay. It is an undoubted fact that returned soldiers and sailors will
not receive the patriotic welcome in Ireland which they will receive in England and Scotland
and Wales, and it is of the highest importance that everything should be done to let it be
known that those who have done their duty are receiving proper assistance.7

The Cabinet were unwilling to concede such sweeping powers, and a bitter clash between
Lord French and his Chief Secretary over who would control Irish industrial reconstruction
finally sunk the plan. Then, against the background of Sinn Fein's sweeping general
election victory in Southern Ireland in December 1918, Lord French decided on a more
pragmatic and even more urgent policy. There were somewhere in the region of 80,000
Irish servicemen about to return to their country.8 Now the Lord Lieutenant demanded a
Treasury grant of £250,000 to convert the Irish Recruiting Council into a post-war
Demobilisation Committee, and enable it to carry out public works to employ specifically
ex-servicemen. It was envisaged that projects would be predominantly rural, such as road-
building or land drainage. This was similar to proposals in Britain, but to the Castle
Administration there was an added imperative. The belief, as the Treasury noted later, was
"that most of these men could be saved from absorption into the ranks of militant Sinn Fein
so long as they were employed and in receipt of regular wages."9 Thus Lord French
warned that "if this money is not forthcoming all our efforts will be frustrated and we may
find the Sinn Fein organisation...strengthened by a powerful and numerous body of
soldiers fresh from service in the field."10 The new Chief Secretary appointed in January
1919, Ian Macpherson, was an advocate of conciliatory policies such as state housing, but
his desire to arrest the deterioration of law and order made him a reliable supporter of Lord
French's policy of trying to strangle Sinn Fein. Macpherson soon told the Treasury:

"The question of ensuring employment for demobilised soldiers and sailors who are
returning to Ireland has been causing the greatest anxiety to the Irish Government.....in
Ireland there is unfortunately clear evidence of hostility or reluctance to engage returned
soldiers and sailors. It has happened that other workers have objected to work with ex-
service men, and this symptom, if allowed to develop, will add to the grave industrial
unrest existing in the country. The Sinn Fein organisation is furthermore openly hostile to
those men who have served, and the Irish Government, accordingly feel it imperative not
only in the interests of the men themselves, but in the interests of the peace of Ireland itself,
that the returning soldiers and sailors must be placed in the way of obtaining
employment."11

Within Dublin Castle there was active support for French's scheme from stalwart Unionists
such as the Vice-President of the ILGB, Sir Henry Robinson. Yet the most alarmist figure
was a defeated Irish Party MP, Captain Stephen Gwynn. Appointed as propaganda agent
for the Demobilisation Committee, Gwynn warned the British Cabinet about returning Irish
servicemen:
"Their resentment against Government may easily ally them even with those who are the occasion of their trouble. Other influences may draw them in the same direction, and Sinn Fein may gain several thousand adherents who are accustomed to throwing Mills bombs....It follows that the problem for Ireland concerns not merely the interests of the discharged men, nor the industrial welfare of the country, but firstly and chiefly public order and safety."\(^\text{12}\)

In Britain the most influential champion of Lord French's campaign was the Unionist Colonial Secretary, Sir Walter Long. It was Long who above all persuaded the Cabinet to keep to a hard-line policy of clamping down on dissent in Ireland. "It was a fair and square fight between the Irish Government and Sinn Fein as to who is going to govern the country," he had told his colleagues in December 1918.\(^\text{13}\) Long was also, as a result of his Irish experience, a trenchant advocate in Cabinet for the policy of providing land and housing for ex-servicemen, as an antidote to social revolution in Britain and Ireland. Long thus told the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Austen Chamberlain, that he fully supported the Castle Administration's view "that if they could only get the money they could get on and keep the soldiers out of Sinn Fein and Bolshevism, but if they are paralysed by lack of funds they can do nothing and will have to sit down and see the best of the Irishmen drawn into the Sinn Fein vortex."\(^\text{14}\) He was an unrepentant alarmist: when it was pointed out to him that Sinn Fein were far from being 'bolshevists', Long retorted that "I don't trouble my head about these niceties: I know they are all rebels, and I don't mean them to succeed."\(^\text{15}\)

The *Irish Times* reinforced the Unionist view when it stated that French and Macpherson's policy "will hasten Sinn Fein's collapse in no way more surely and quickly than by meeting its policy of economic destruction with a policy of economic construction."\(^\text{16}\) The stumbling block for the Castle Administration was, as ever, the Treasury. The Treasury Remembrancer, Maurice Headlam, was opposed to giving funds to an Irish body over which there would be no strict financial control. Headlam pointed out a key weakness in the proposed relief projects, in "that the bulk of the Irish Recruits came from the towns; and would not be willing to go into wild places, and risk attacks - except with adequate housing and high wages."\(^\text{17}\) It was now obvious to the Castle Administration that it would have to build dwellings along with providing land for veterans in rural areas. This meant, however, that French's plan now became totally enmeshed in the Cabinet debate in March 1919 over the legislation that had been drafted to provide land plus housing for ex-servicemen in Britain. The Treasury objected to the inclusion of building powers in the British Land Settlement Bills, both on the ground of expense, and because it would duplicate the work of the Addison Housing Act. But Lloyd George and most Cabinet members saw the legislation as as a political necessity, and so ruled that dwellings could
also be provided. While this was the decision that the Irish Administration desired, it did cause a substantial delay. In May 1919 Lord French had asked Long to put the Castle Administration's case to the Treasury, and in a public speech a few weeks later he gave notice of the plan "to establish small colonies of discharged soldiers living close to one another, each one possessing some personal interest in the soil, and a loyal attachment to it." Yet it was not until late-September that the Cabinet finally got around to authorising the Irish Land (Soldiers and Sailors) Bill, and this was only after French had warned them ominously that the "future pacification of the country largely depends" upon measures such as this.

The Irish Land (Provision for Sailors and Soldiers) Bill, as introduced to Parliament in November, thus permitted the provision of cottages as well as grants of land. But the measure differed from the corresponding British legislation in two main ways. Firstly, in Britain it had (to the horror of the Treasury) been agreed that while veterans would be given priority, land settlement terms were to be open to civilians as well. Yet for Ireland the Government saw it applying only to the loyal citizens who had served during the war. "The one test in this Bill", declared the Chief Secretary, "is the test of service." The other difference was that in Britain the responsibility for allocating land and new housing was given to local authorities, while in Ireland this was seen as politically unacceptable. For the Castle Administration was constantly aware that, however much they might delay local elections after the Armistice, sooner or later the majority of these bodies would be run by separatist Nationalists (as was noted in the last chapter, Sinn Fein duly established a hegemony outside Ulster by mid-1920). Thus Chief Secretary Macpherson stated:

"The second important point is that there is a direct transaction by the ex-Service man, not with the local council, district or otherwise, but with the Government, or a Department of the Government.....I hope the House will agree that this plan is much better, much safer, and much more valuable than one under which the ex-Service men would be at the beck and call of or under the influence of local councils."

Hence the Irish Land Bill passed responsibility to government agencies in Ireland. For ex-servicemen who wanted large holdings of 10-12 acres in order to become full-time farmers, the Bill allowed (as had its predecessor) for the Irish Land Commission or the Congested District Board to grant land on the terms of the Land Purchase Acts. Those who lived in urban or semi-rural areas and wanted to continue some other trade, but who might want a small-holding and a subsidised cottage to supplement their income, the Bill offered plots of up to two acres. This was a deliberate increase on the maximum plot allowed under the Labourers Acts, because, in the Chief Secretary's words, "of the special circumstances of these cases, and of the meritorious service which these men have rendered to their country and to the Empire extension of another acre as the full limit is quite a proper
The Government desire to be very generous in its assistance to these men. "24 In addition Clause 4 permitted the ILGB, for a period of two years after the war, to provide accompanying cottages. As the Treasury noted:

"The object is.....to provide for men who may not be fitted to become small farmers. It is proposed to provide them with a cottage and a plot not exceeding two acres. Rural District Councils have power to do this (up to one acre) for labourers and are subsidised for the purpose under the Labourers Acts. In present Irish conditions such Councils would not do anything for ex-soldiers and it is proposed therefore to give the Local Government Board the powers of a Rural District Council for the purpose, financing them out of Votes."25

The Irish Land Bill clearly envisaged a high degree of social engineering. Cottage provision was not to be based on the existing need in an area, as under the Labourers Acts, but on a desire to form distinct communities of loyal ex-servicemen. As Macpherson declared:

"I look forward myself to seeing large colonies of these soldiers scattered all over Ireland.....Whatever our feelings may be about Ireland, it is true that these men have had since their return in many parts of the country a very difficult time. Their association together in a colony of this kind will not only be of material value to them, but will afford them a great amount of coherent sympathy and protection."26

The deliberate policy of creating loyalist "colonies" appealed especially to Ulster Unionist MPs, and they asked for the time period of the scheme to be extended and for the ILGB to be actually compelled to provide cottages. Sir Edward Carson described the powers to build dwellings for non-agricultural workers as "probably the most important part of the Bill", particularly in Ulster where he predicted a great demand amongst the industrial population.27 Given the anti-democratic political slant of the Bill, it is not surprising that Nationalists were almost unanimously hostile. There was in fact little difference between the statements of Sinn Fein and those of the rump of the old Irish Parliamentary Party. Both emotively characterised the Castle Administration's strategy as a new 'Plantation', and echoed the view of the Irish Bulletin that Irish ex-servicemen should simply ignore what was patently "a bribe to divide them from their fellow country-men."28 Sinn Fein remained uncompromised since they had refused to take their seats in the Imperial Parliament: for the few Irish Party MPs left, it was one more humiliation when all they could do was to boycott the parliamentary debate.

The Irish Land (Provision for Soldiers and Sailors) Act received Royal Assent on 23 December 1919. The ease of its passage through Parliament belied the restrictions which the Treasury had imposed behind the scenes. At first the Irish Administration had estimated that 7,600 cottages would be built at an average cost including land of £600 (not to mention the loss on larger holdings), and an alarmed Treasury wanted to reject the
proposal outright. The Treasury had however been forced to accept similar proposals for Britain, and so the Chancellor of the Exchequer conceded that: "I do not think that in face of what is being done for the English ex-serviceman we can dispute the policy of the Irish Government as to cottages with land attached." Instead the Treasury limited the housing proposals, which it put at a target building figure of around 2,000 dwellings and a total cost of only £1,000,000. The Treasury was notably successful in reducing the time-span for providing cottages from the five year period favoured by the Irish Administration, and in ensuring that the 'spendthrift' ILGB would not be allowed to carry out the actual building work. Instead the Treasury insisted on an unwieldy compromise whereby the ILGB was responsible for overall administration and the acquirement of sites, and the Irish Board of Works were to design and erect the dwellings. The Treasury also tried to restrict the maximum amount of land that could be given with a cottage to only one acre, but on this issue backed down after opposition from Dublin Castle. The Vice-President of the ILGB, Sir Henry Robinson, argued:

"In any district in the north.....where there was a steady demand for labour and the returned soldiers would be under no boycott of any kind, we should not dream of giving two acres with the cottage.....But in the south and west, where there is a set against the soldiers, or where land is scarce, many a soldier would have grave difficulty in making both ends meet by what he would earn and the extra acre for additional crops or for a cow would be of inestimable benefit in such cases. Moreover, it would be a good object-lesson for the disloyal people of these districts to note that the Government had not forgotten the patriotic Irishmen who stood by the Empire in times of stress."31

7.2 The implementation of the 1919 Irish Land Act

Nationalist politicians of all hues unequivocally rejected the scheme to rehouse Irish ex-servicemen and urged would-be recipients to do the same. This clearly carried little weight with those who saw a chance to secure a better dwelling for themselves. Demand for cottages under the Irish Land Act proved to be far greater than the Castle Administration expected. In late-November 1919 the Attorney-General for Ireland had predicted a total of around 3,000 beneficiaries, yet within a few months there had already been some 5,700 applications. The Chief Secretary claimed in March 1920 that four cottage schemes would soon be started in Ulster, and by this time the ILGB had secured 10 sites on which to build a total of 222 cottages. It was also essential to the Castle Administration that the design of the cottages would be of a demonstrably high standard. Thus the ILGB noted that, in consultation with the Irish Board of Works, "we adopted three types of cottages in all of which accommodation of a somewhat superior character to that obtaining in the cases of cottages built by Rural District Councils under the Labourers Acts will be provided."
It meant that the dwellings produced for Irish ex-servicemen would be equal to the new, 'modern' standard adopted by the ILGB for the main Irish Housing Act of 1919.

The optimistic start to the ex-servicemen’s housing campaign was however short-lived. There was at the time a chronic lack of direction in Castle Administration policy, prompted by its failure to control the steadily deteriorating political and military situation in Ireland. One British official who visited in late-1919 found that many Irish departments were barely on speaking terms. As noted in the last chapter, it was precisely this problem that the Castle reorganisation in Spring 1920 under a new Chief Secretary, Sir Hamar Greenwood, was intended to sort out. By May 1920 the incoming Castle officials - notably the highly influential Joint-Under Secretary and head of the newly formed Irish Treasury, Sir John Anderson - were forced to intervene in a bitter dispute between the ILGB and the Irish Board of Works stemming from the complicated division of responsibilities imposed by the Irish Land Act. There were two particular causes of this inter-departmental dispute. The first arose over the issue of eligibility. Originally the Castle Administration and the Government had seen the Irish Land Act as a rural measure to complement the main Housing Act, but under sustained pressure from the British Legion and others, the Castle Administration in August 1920 was reluctantly forced to allow that ex-servicemen living in urban areas could also be rehoused. "This new decision of the Government letting in urban cases throws thousands more of applicants on us" wrote Sir Henry Robinson at the ILGB, "and as land near Towns is so expensive I am much troubled by it." Another dispute over eligibility arose between the ILGB and the Irish Board of Works over whether housing should be built for miners at the privately owned Wolfhill and Castlecomer Collieries, if they employed ex-soldiers and sailors. Sir Henry Robinson was fully in support of these schemes, warning that "any action in the way of blocking or delaying the Schemes and thereby keeping the men out of employment in Districts where high wages are offered, will be regarded as a breach of faith and might tend to drive these loyal men in despair into the ranks of Sinn Fein." However the Irish Board of Works were able to block the ILGB, and in the end the Irish Treasury imposed such strenuous financial restrictions on the colliery owners that only some very basic and temporary huts were ever built.

The other cause for dispute was financial. Post-war inflation, plus the decision to build to an exceptionally high standard, meant that in mid-1920 the Board of Works found itself unable to obtain tenders from contractors for less than £1,200 per cottage. This was of course no different from the problems then being experienced by local authorities in Ireland and Britain under the main Housing Acts, but in the case of Irish ex-servicemen's cottages it provoked a serious row between the Irish Board of Works and the ILGB. The former
felt that costs should be kept down by restricting the number of applicants and building on cheaper rural sites, whereas the ILGB (notably Robinson and Dr Peter Cowan, Chairman of the Housing Committee) wanted to achieve savings by using shorter-life, 'semi-permanent' construction as long as post-war inflation lasted. The Irish Treasury sided entirely with the ILGB, and in justification relied on the argument that by using non-traditional building methods then it was possible to stipulate that a certain proportion of unskilled ex-servicemen must be employed on the building works. Thus it was the need to provide employment and tangible results that was the main impetus, as the Irish Treasury noted:

"Moreover these cottages are intended for an emergency. It is far more important to get a cottage of some sort for the ex-serviceman, than to give him nothing at all, because for our credit we will not build for less than 100 years, and that costs more than we can afford to spend! On political grounds the answer is quite clear."  

By December 1920 the administrative deadlock was finally broken when the Irish Treasury notified the Irish Board of Works that they had now "come to the conclusion that the Government must definitely abandon the standard...of the Labourers Cottages Acts, and must be content with a type of cottage which can be erected more cheaply, and, if possible, more quickly, even though this saving may be obtained by a sacrifice of durability and economy of maintenance."

The Vice-President of the ILGB, Sir Henry Robinson, took advantage of this decision to embark on an ex-servicemen's housing scheme on a 40-acre site at Killester, in the northern suburbs of Dublin. This was the only scheme actually built directly by the ILGB, and was intended to be a paradigm of the post-war policies promoted by Lord French and the Castle Unionists. In the Killester scheme the ideological conjunction of loyalty to Empire, special provision for ex-servicemen, technical standardisation, and garden suburb planning, all reached their apotheosis. The site had been bought in 1916 by Sir Henry McLaughlin, a wealthy Unionist building contractor and head of the Irish Recruiting Council, and was entrusted to a Local Relief Committee (indeed a tentative plan was hatched by Robinson in 1917 to turn it into a model farm to provide work). After the war it was first offered to Dublin Corporation for housing purposes, but when this this fell through, McLaughlin (by now head of Lord French's Demobilisation Committee) made a free gift of the land to the ILGB. Sir Henry Robinson now began to request funds so that the ILGB could employ a team of ex-servicemen to clear the site over the forthcoming winter as a special relief scheme. In late-October 1920 he wrote:

"There is every indication that we may be faced with severe difficulties during the Winter months owing to unemployment and depression in trade, especially in urban areas. On
similar occasions in the past, the centre of disturbance has always been Dublin....It would be a most grievous thing and a triumph for the disloyal if they [ex-servicemen] were driven to make demonstrations of their want in the streets of Dublin."44

Indeed it was an increasingly tense time in Southern Ireland. Only three weeks after this letter a particularly grisly day in Dublin saw the IRA shoot 11 Englishmen accused of being spies, and the notorious 'Black-and-Tans' retaliate by opening fire on a crowd at a Gaelic football match, resulting in the death of 12 people and the injuring of 60 more. In County Cork martial law was declared in December 1920, soon to be followed by most of Munster. The Castle Administration was now particularly worried as a result of the collapse of the post-war boom in late-1920, that economic recession might drive more ex-soldiers into the ranks of Sinn Fein. As Sir John Anderson told a senior Treasury official in Whitehall:

"Ex-soldiers as a class in Ireland can be a great political asset or the reverse. They are just the sort of people the rebels would like to entice into the ranks of the Irish Republican Army. The tendency a few months ago was all in this direction. The rot has been stopped: we don't want it to start again as the result of unemployment."45

Thus approval was given in December 1920 for a grant from the Reconstruction Fund to clear and prepare the Killester site. "The Board of Works do not object," noted Anderson, "......and in the circumstances I have told Sir Henry Robinson that he can count on £10,000. It is very important to keep the Dublin ex-service men in good heart."46 A team of around 180 veterans, under direction of an ILGB official and ex-Royal Engineer, Colonel MacCabe, began building roads. But Robinson's plan was of course for more than just a temporary relief scheme. By late-February 1921 the ILGB team were now laying foundations and drains, and Robinson declared that the Killester project "will be the means, not only of affording much-needed employment at present, but of allaying a good deal of discontent amongst ex-service men on the housing question."47 Robinson and the ILGB also intended to show-case a particular 'semi-permanent' form of construction: the 'Orion' system, marketed by an Irish company, Ryan Ltd. Amongst the directors of this company were two leading lights of the war-time recruiting campaign, Sir Henry McLaughlin and E.A. Aston, the latter of course in addition a notable town planning enthusiast. Ryan Ltd had already built some exhibition dwellings at Victoria Road, Clontarf (close to the Killester site), which had been visited by Robinson and an official of the Irish Treasury in July 1920 [Fig.49].48 In September the ILGB signed a contract with Ryan Ltd for a total of 38 cottages on the Clontarf estate, and took the scheme over for veterans' housing when it was completed in mid-1921.49 The patented 'Orion' dwellings were designed by George O'Connor, the much-praised architect for Pembroke UDC's wartime estates, and set an uncompromisingly high standard for ex-servicemen's dwellings.
There were two types of semi-detached cottages: the first a 4-room bungalow with 2 bedrooms, a bathroom, and a frontage of 30 ft (total area of 765 sq.ft); the other a very substantial 7-room two-storey dwelling (over 1,050 sq.ft), with a parlour, living room, four bedrooms, and a separate bathroom.

The Irish Board of Works, however, continued to raise objections about the use of 'Orion' dwellings. The nature of the system was indeed dubious, consisting of lightweight walling blocks made from gypsum plaster mixed with sawdust, which were then coated with vulcanite and finished externally with cement render on metal lathing (for the two-storey dwellings a structural steel frame had to be provided). When the Irish Treasury consulted the English Ministry of Health about the suitability of this method, even sending some sample blocks over for inspection, the latter appear to have sided with the Irish Board of Works. But what finally killed off the chance of using 'semi-permanent' construction was the fact that tenders could not be obtained for much less than £1,000 per dwelling: the system was thus unlikely to prove significantly, if any, cheaper than traditional construction. Instead in late-1920 the Irish Board of Works consulted again with the ILGB about the design of ex-servicemen's cottages. A compromise was reached whereby concrete blocks were to be used instead of brick, and either asbestos-cement or cheap clay tiles instead of slate roofs. The Irish Board of Works took pains to point out that the "alterations made in the plans have not involved any material decrease in the accommodation provided", and that the constructional method would still have a long life. Soon tenders were being received for £900 per dwelling and it was expected that this would fall further as the recession deepened. Within this climate, the use of the experimental 'Orion' system was dropped for the Killester scheme in favour of rendered concrete blockwork.

The omission of 'semi-permanent' construction was only a minor blow to those promoting the Killester project. Sir Henry Robinson and his allies clearly had larger issues in mind for the design of the 247 dwellings that were to make up the estate. As Sir Henry McLaughlin declared, Killester was to be "the first considerable instalment of housing for ex-Service men.....[and] a model for similar schemes throughout the country." The scheme was intended to epitomise the best of British garden suburb design, and to this end Robinson was presented with a free site layout by a clique of town planning enthusiasts headed by the well-to-do Dublin philanthropist, Frederick Purser Griffith. The latter had succeeded E.A. Aston as the main mover of the Citizens Housing League, and was now involved in the Killester scheme through his close association with Aston and Colonel MacCabe. In keeping with the pre-war town planning campaign in Dublin, it was to Edinburgh and the Geddesian connection that this clique turned for help. Hence in late-
1920 Frank Mears, Geddes' son-in-law and assistant on the 1914 Dublin Housing Report, was invited over to design the layout plan for Killester and a few other putative sites (Mears also designed an unrealised project for a public utility society set up by Aston in Killester, and was the following year involved with Aston and Griffith in drawing up town planning proposals for central Dublin). The outcome was that the design for the Killester Estate was widely praised. Patrick Abercrombie was reportedly "delighted with it", and even the Irish Treasury, whilst regretting the expense of a garden suburb arrangement, admitted that Killester was "quite a successful attempt at lay out which has been generally admired by independent persons."

The Killester design therefore had most of the hallmarks of the layout of a typical post-war suburban scheme in Britain. Many existing site features such as roads and trees were retained, and the new insertions were arranged in a winding yet carefully contrived manner to exploit the changing aspects of 'street pictures' as the observer walks around the scheme. Dwellings are well set back from the road, and are arranged in large blocks of land broken up either by cul-de-sacs, or by communal recreation facilities in the centre of the blocks. Yet the Killester design also varied slightly from British practice in two aspects, both of which stemmed from the desire of Robinson and the Castle Administration to produce a quality of design appropriate for ex-Army officers (be they commissioned or non-commissioned). The first is that Killester had an exceedingly low density of only 4 cottages to the acre. Secondly, in keeping with the quasi-rural ambience and the cultural preference in Ireland for bungalows, all the dwellings were single-storey. There were 3 standard cottage types repeated throughout the estate, the majority being built to a size and standard that was noticeably higher than even the houses designed elsewhere for ex-servicemen by the Irish Board of Works. The best at Killester were 32 very large detached bungalows with 5 rooms (total area of 1,007 sq.ft), comprising a parlour (121 sq.ft) living room (162 sq.ft), 3 bedrooms (80-160 sq.ft), a large kitchen/scullery (89 sq.ft), and bathroom. These detached cottages were concentrated in the southern part known as 'The Demesne', and were aimed at commissioned officers. The other bungalows at Killester were all in semi-detached pairs. The vast majority were simply 4-room non-parlour versions (841 sq.ft) of the above type. There were however also some 38 dwellings aimed at the ordinary soldier and having only 3-rooms (675 sq.ft). The Killester elevations were very plain, being rendered externally with pre-cast concrete surrounds to doors and windows. Since cottages are single storey there was in fact little elevation to be seen, and contemporary photographs show a streetscape dominated by a forest of powerful, vertical chimneys which pierce the diagonal pattern of asbestos-cement tiles used to cover the large, hipped roofs.
Although the dwelling types at the Killester Estate were obviously designed to a very high standard, Robinson still anticipated tenders of £700 for the semi-detached cottages and £900 for the detached dwellings. He even appears to have volunteered to meet any excess costs above these levels from his own funding sources. In the event the high standard of design, and the use of inefficient direct labour by ex-service men in preparing the scheme, meant that the average cost worked out at nearly £1,500 per dwelling. As a consequence rents at Killester were staggeringly high, set at a punitive 12s6d-20s per week depending on the type of dwellings (as will be seen this was to provoke rent strikes that reduced this figure). "The Killester houses are, after all, exceptional", as one official was to later justify. By 1922 the Irish Treasury were being openly critical of Sir Henry Robinson, accusing him of "lamentable extravagance" at Killester and asking that he make good his promise to contribute towards the excess cost. The existing programme with the contractor at Killester was abruptly cut short, and the remainder of the scheme was re-tendered but this time under the control of the Irish Board of Works. The original design for 247 cottages was completed in August 1923, and the estate was extended by another 42 dwellings later in the decade.

If Killester represented the 'creme-de-la-creme', how then did the typical schemes designed by the Irish Board of Works compare? Altogether nearly 1,400 cottages were built to their designs in Southern Ireland, plus another 390 in Ulster. Since the 1919 Irish Land Act was originally a rural measure, not surprisingly many of the ex-servicemen's cottages were designed in isolated clusters of between 2-10 dwellings. But there was also the desire of the Castle Administration to form larger 'colonies' for veterans, and the agreement to take on more urban sites in late-1920 meant that there were also many schemes of between 30-60 dwellings on more suburban sites. Some of these early schemes went on to become very large estates, such as the 146 cottages at Cregagh near Belfast, although none ever matched Killester. The Irish Board of Works designed a wide variety of house types, all of which met the requirement of exceeding the standard found in pre-war Labourers Acts housing. "In no two schemes are the designs alike", wrote the Irish Times in 1922,

"although most of the houses are four-roomed with sculleries and out-houses, and bathrooms in urban districts." All the types were two-storey cottages, some detached but the majority in pairs. In not one version was there a parlour. The most common rural type was a small 4-room semi-detached cottage with a frontage of 22 ft (Type 2 and 2A; total floor area of 720 sq.ft) [Fig.53]. The plan had a side entrance leading through a hall to a large living room (176 sq.ft) and a ground floor bedroom (92 sq.ft). The other two bedrooms were upstairs (92-176 sq.ft). Due to the lack of a water supply and drainage system in rural areas, this version was very basic in terms of services provision: there was no bathroom but only an external earth closet, and the scullery was in a small side
projection opening off the main living room. This overall form was typical of the austere design used by the Irish Board of Works, with its compact plan and volume reminiscent of the plain 'boxes-with-lids-on' found in British post-war housing. Variations of rural dwellings tried to counter monotony by introducing a more picturesque hipped roof, projecting eaves, and a front porch. The other alternative versions for rural areas - all with the same basic 4-room plan arrangement - either offered a through living room (Types 1 and 6), or else were conceived an essentially a single-storey plan with only an attic bedroom over (Type 3) [Fig.54]. For its more urban types, the Irish Board of Works still used a 4-room semi-detached cottage, but increased the standard by making the dwelling larger (750-900 sq. ft) and including a ground floor bathroom and WC. The kitchen/scullery was also more generous, providing in effect a 5-room cottage. Thus in general the urban dwellings for ex-servicemen produced by the Irish Board of Works corresponded to the recommended types for medium sized cottages as designed by the ILGB for the main post-war Housing Act. The construction of the Irish Board of Works' dwellings, as noted earlier, were generally in rendered concrete blockwork. In one slightly later scheme in Kingstown, the design emulated a precedent first set by Liverpool Corporation and used patterns of coloured blocks to decorate the elevations.

7.3 Ex-servicemen's housing and the transfer of power in Ireland

Despite the administrative reform within Dublin Castle in May 1920, there was still very little actual progress under the Irish Land Act. Nearly a year later only 134 ex-servicemen had received farm holdings. In terms of building cottages, the figures were just as bad. The Castle Administration noted that "owing to labour troubles and the general state of unrest in Ireland progress has not been as expeditious as could be desired." Hence by August 1921 only 15 dwellings had been completed, although another 926 cottages were at some stage of construction. Yet this needs to be compared with the fact that the ILGB had now received 14,000 applications for cottages, and had approved schemes totalling 1,670 cottages. Dublin Castle departments declared optimistically that many more dwellings for ex-servicemen would soon be commenced, and that progress would be helped by the likely downward trend in building costs, and by finance from the £1,250,000 fund recently approved by the Irish Treasury and Whitehall.

Yet although the persistence of the Castle Administration meant that ex-servicemen's housing finally started in earnest in mid-1921, the programme was soon constrained by wider political factors. An immediate blow was the imposition by the Cabinet in July 1921 of a moratorium on the mainstream housing campaign. In Britain the announcement had the effect of finally terminating the already moribund scheme to resettle ex-servicemen on
the land. As noted in the last chapter, the Castle Administration and Westminster decided not to publicly declare a moratorium in Ireland, on the grounds that there was unlikely to be much built in the interim before housing responsibility could be handed over to the new governments in Northern and Southern Ireland. However the scheme to build cottages for ex-servicemen was obviously a special case, since it was funded entirely by the Imperial Exchequer and was only intended for a minority who had served Britain during the war. Since it was therefore likely to remain a permanent 'reserved service' even after the transfer of power, the British Government was forced to treat this aspect of Irish housing policy in terms of the recently announced moratorium. In Ireland there was already a growing dispute between the ILGB and the Irish Treasury, with the latter being determined to do something about the high tenders that were still being received for dwellings under the Irish Land Act. The Irish Treasury had abruptly halved the allocation for Irish ex-servicemen's housing for 1921-22 to only £1,500,000, and relations only worsened in June 1921 when the ILGB were instructed to stop buying expensive urban sites. With the advent of full-scale retrenchment in Westminster in early-July 1921, the balance of power shifted entirely in favour of the Irish Treasury. The supporters of the ex-servicemen's housing campaign attempted to fight back by reviving the old alarmist scares. The ILGB said that any cutback "would probably have very serious consequences throughout the country....The almost inevitable result of such action, if persisted in, will be to drive the ex-service men into the ranks of those who are the disturbing element in the country." And the Unionist Irish Times launched a savage attack on the Irish Treasury, declaring that:

"to allow these men to become Bolsheviks (and what else can they become ?) in order that the Treasury......may save a few thousand pounds.....is a crime against civilization, as well as a betrayal of the men who saved the Empire by their courage and tenacity."

Yet by this date, with Lloyd George now making overtures to Sinn Fein, these warnings carried little weight. Instead the Chief Secretary, Sir Hamar Greenwood, and the Joint-Under Secretary, Sir John Anderson, intervened during the autumn of 1921 on behalf of the Irish Treasury. As concessions to Robinson at the ILGB, they agreed that there would be no staff cutbacks in the section dealing with ex-servicemen's housing, and that "to avoid a breach of faith" by the Government then urban schemes that had already approved would completed (thereby saving the later stages of the Killester Estate). However the Castle Administration completely rejected an argument by the ILGB, that the target for the ex-servicemen's campaign should still be in the region of 4,500-6,000 dwellings to ensure that Northern Ireland, where so far little was built, would receive its fair share. Chief Secretary Greenwood and Sir John Anderson replied that any imbalance between Northern and Southern Ireland could instead be remedied by dropping some of the schemes for the
latter region. Thus in early November 1921 the Irish Treasury was able to rule that for ex-
servicemen's housing in Ireland, "no new commitments in either Southern or Northern
Ireland should be entered into, either in Urban or Rural Districts." This constituted a
total moratorium on new schemes, but the question was then to decide how many of
the current commitments should be honoured. After much haggling it was decided that the
final total under the campaign should be set at 3,672 dwellings: this was to be divided in a
ratio of 2,626 cottages in Southern Ireland, and only 1,046 in Ulster. This revised total
was only half of the number that the ILGB had originally hoped for, but now the Castle
Administration had made it clear that this would be the final obligation towards the housing
of ex-soldiers and sailors in Ireland.

The next problem for the Castle Administration in the winter of 1921-22 was how to
proceed with an albeit reduced ex-servicemen's housing campaign at a time of sensitive
political negotiations over the transfer of power. By this point the Northern Ireland
Government was de facto in existence, and in the South a Provisional Government was set
up in January 1922 to gradually take over administration while preparations were
completed for a full handover to the new Irish Free State. The British Government saw the
housing programme for veterans as a means to help both new Irish administrations, with a
Cabinet sub-committee noting in March 1922 that "the settlement of between 3000 and
4000 men with suitable houses and allotments will prove a national asset of the first
value." At first the Irish Treasury proposed that responsibility for the completion of the
3,672 cottages should be handed over at once to both Irish Governments. Under this plan,
the Imperial Exchequer was to contribute the entire cost of building in Ulster in exchange
for the rent income: while in the South, to encourage economy in construction, the
Treasury would pay only 50% of the costs and receive half the rents. The Northern
Ireland Government was of course amenable to the preferential financial treatment being
offered to Ulster, but were determined to fight for a larger proportion of ex-servicemen's
dwellings. It argued that since just over half of Ireland 145,000 recruits came from the
North, then the province should receive at least 1,400 cottages (40% of the total). In
March 1922 only 73 dwellings had as yet been built in Ulster, with another 540 in the
pipeline. However, the Treasury realised the political controversy that any readjustment of
housing allocation under the Irish Land Act would cause in the Irish Free State. It argued
that the Northern Government was simply trying to get out of its own housing
responsibilities; if anything the Treasury was tempted to cut the Ulster allowance to make
savings.

The problems with the Northern Government were eclipsed by those between the Irish
Treasury and the new Provisional Government in Southern Ireland. Sinn Fein had from
the start been bitterly opposed to the campaign to build dwellings for ex-servicemen. Its policy of calling for a boycott of the Irish Land Act sufficed while nothing, or virtually nothing, was being built. But when the programme began to take off from mid-1921, just as peace negotiations were starting between the Government and Sinn Fein, it became a much more sensitive issue. Republicans now accused the Castle Administration of taking advantage of the ceasefire to push through a highly provocative policy. Discussions arose as to what form of resistance, political or military, Sinn Fein should take. A hard-line position was represented by Dail Eireann's unofficial Minister for Agriculture, A.O. Concubair. He believed that, while many ex-servicemen had indeed served Sinn Fein well, "there are others who are so much out of sympathy with the desires and aspirations of the majority of our people that their settlement either individually or in Colonies - the latter being in the nature of a new "Plantation" - in parts of the country would be a menace that under no circumstances should be tolerated." Concubair thus stated in November 1921 that:

"I am of opinion that the attempt to settle Ex-soldiers on our lands is an invasion of our Sovereign Rights which should be resisted by every means at our disposal right up to the use of force. I believe that the parties concerned in the country so regard it as a hostile act that in places it may lead to a breach of the Truce if persisted in."76

A belligerent response such as this would obviously have had serious repercussions on the peace negotiations. So instead Dail Eireann resolved that it would merely declare once again its opposition to the principle of the scheme, and warn the British Government that to continue building works was not conducive to a political agreement. Conflict over the ex-servicemen's housing programme continued even as the new Provisional Government wrestled to take over administrative departments in early 1922. One member of the new Ministry of Local Government told the Dail Cabinet that the ILGB were being deliberately obstructive, and cited:

"Another instance of the undesirable activities of the other Department [ILGB] is the working of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Provision of Land Schemes. It is our policy to temporarily suspend these, as there is a grave danger of serious trouble in rural areas over this matter. A most undesirable class of ex-soldiers are getting those lands, while I.R.A. Soldiers are walking about unemployed.... We believe that those orders are being deliberately issued to prejudice us, as the Act has been practically moribund for two years. There is a large sum of money, we believe, about £600,000 ear-marked for this Scheme, and it may be undesirable to lose it, but, it is most necessary that during the transition period we should suspend the operation of those acts under a Dail Department."78

For the Provisional Government of the Irish Free State the fact that the British Government were prepared to continue the veteran's housing campaign placed them in a tricky position. The Irish economy had entered a serious downturn from 1921-1923 and unemployment
was escalating.\textsuperscript{79} Therefore the severe financial problems in Southern Ireland limited the capacity of the Provisional Government to deal with the housing issue. Yet on the other hand, the fact that Westminster was still asking the Southern Government to contribute towards the cost of ex-servicemen’s housing made it politically impossible for them to accept; particularly at a time when the bitter debate over the terms of the 'Treaty' was plunging Southern Ireland into civil war. Thus an Irish Treasury official reported that the private views of William Cosgrave, Minister of Local Government (and soon to become President of the Free State), were as follows:

"Cosgrave, while admitting frankly our argument that the money spent brought solid material advantages to the Irish people and Government as a whole, said that.....it was simply impossible for the Irish Government to ask the Free State Parliament to vote money expressly for the benefit of men who had fought for the British Government in the European War. The answer would be at once: What are you doing for our ex-service (I.R.A.) men? and as he intended to do nothing, outside the general housing scheme, and the Ministry of Finance had no money to spare......he would certainly be defeated on the motion for the Vote."\textsuperscript{80}

Cosgrave particularly objected to being asked to contribute towards the completion of the notoriously expensive scheme at Killester, associated as it was with the arch-Unionist faction led by Robinson. But even though the Treasury offered to finish Killester at its own expense, and make other financial concessions, the Provisional Government held firm in its refusal to take over responsibility for the ex-servicemen's campaign.\textsuperscript{81}

\section*{7.4 The creation of the Irish Sailors’ and Soldiers’ Land Trust}

The campaign to build cottages for ex-service men in Ireland was an unusual initiative to begin with, and the transfer of power to the new Irish Governments made it even more so. When the proposal to involve the Irish Free State Government was turned down by the latter in late April 1922, William Cosgrave suggested an alternative. This was for a special housing trust to be set up for the the whole of Ireland to complete building work, and then manage the estates.\textsuperscript{82} The Treasury were initially lukewarm about the idea, but saw some advantages: an independent trust could be relied on to be more zealous in collecting rents, and if they agreed it might compel the Free State Government to contribute to the cost (they were again to be disappointed). Thus, as a result of special legislation passed in Westminster and both Irish Parliaments in the winter of 1922-23, a body known as the Irish Soldiers' and Sailors' Land Trust (hereafter ISSLT) was set up in January 1924. Its purpose was to complete the target of 3,672 cottages in the ratio set down by the Treasury (ie. 2,626 in the South and 1,046 in Ulster). By the start of 1924 around 1,500 cottages for ex-service men had been built, almost exclusively in Leinster and Munster. This meant that the ISSLT had to build just over 2,000 dwellings and pay much more attention to the
demands of Ulster. A capital sum of up to £1,500,000 was allowed for under the legislation.\(^{83}\) A board of trustees was set up to oversee the programme, while the actual designing and building work was to be continued by the special sections which had stepped into the breach in 1922. In the case of Northern Ireland this meant a branch of the Ministry of Finance, while in the Irish Free State it was a section within the Colonial Office (although the latter was subsequently transferred over to become part of the ISSLT in April 1925). A trust which covered the whole of Ireland was unusual at a time when the two Irish Governments were effectively refusing to acknowledge each other's existence. One housing expert declared optimistically that the ISSLT offered "one of the very few points of direct contact between the two areas into which the island has unhappily been divided."\(^{84}\)

In reality the ISSLT could not avoid the implications of partition. The four trustees appointed were all ex-army officers, with two taken from Southern Ireland and two from Ulster. Both pairs of trustees tended to champion the cause of their particular part of Ireland. This suited the Imperial Treasury, since the latter were determined to maintain control of the ex-servicemen’s housing campaign. For the Treasury the only real issue was who was going to be Chairman of the ISSLT, and to this post they appointed an Englishman, George Duckworth. Although Duckworth had a long track record as a housing reformer (he was a supporter of Octavia Hill and had worked for ten years as a researcher for Charles Booth's mammoth social survey of London), he had two particular qualities which recommended him to the Treasury. "During the War", wrote one British official, "Mr Duckworth was engaged in the Housing Department of the Ministry of Munitions, and the experience he then acquired is of special value for the Trust work."\(^{85}\) Indeed Duckworth had been the head of administration for the munitions housing programme for 18 months, and he clearly saw the purpose of the ISSLT as continuing this work but now geared towards creating 'practical' as well as symbolic war memorials. Duckworth stated that he regarded:

"the provision of houses and land under the Act out of Imperial Funds as a continuing Imperial service forming a war memorial which should be maintained not merely for the life of the ex-service men, but should be carried on...in favour of his children. In this way our little settlements all over Ireland would become living, visible and more or less abiding monuments of England's gratitude to the Irishmen who fought for her in the Great War."\(^{86}\)

The other attraction for the Treasury was that Duckworth insisted that he would only take the post on condition that he was based in London. Indeed the Treasury Secretary regarded "the London Headquarters, with Duckworth or some other impartial Englishman as Chairman, as a necessary condition of handing over to an otherwise irresponsible body such a large capital sum."\(^{87}\) Duckworth served as Chairman until mid-1927, during which
time he acted essentially as a Treasury puppet to restrict what was seen as would-be extravagance by the Irish trustees. Thus a British official noted:

"During 1924 strong differences of opinion developed between Mr Duckworth, the Chairman of the Trust, whose main concern was that the Trust should operate efficiently and that the rents to be charged for the houses should be set at such a figure as would ensure the proper maintenance of the Trust's property out of their income, and the other four members, some of whom showed a tendency either to seek popularity among ex-service men by fixing rents at such a figure as would necessitate drawing upon capital for maintenance or to consider themselves as the servants of the Irish Governments rather than of the British Government." 88

The primary cause of dispute with the trustees was the Treasury's determination to achieve a reduction in the permitted expenditure figure of £1,500,000. The Treasury secretly consulted the new housing departments in the Irish Free State and Northern Ireland, to see if there were any grounds on which they could cite current Irish standards in support of their desire to cut the ISSLT's building costs. In these consultations the Treasury showed a clear bias towards the Unionist Government in Ulster. "I have no doubt that in Belfast we should be bound to provide baths because the standard of civilisation there presumably requires it", noted a Treasury official, "But I am by no means certain that this is necessary in the South even in the towns." 89 Late in 1924 the Treasury duly notified the ISSLT that it was now imposing a maximum 'all-in' cost of only £500 per dwelling. The trustees saw this as an impossibly low figure, and bitterly accused the Treasury of wanting to build 'dog kennels' rather than houses for ex-servicemen. In fact it was only an opening gambit by the Treasury, who then offered to lift all constraints on building costs and the number of dwellings to be built, if only the ISSLT would now accept a reduced lump sum as a final settlement. After much acrimonious bargaining a compromise total of £1,300,000 was agreed. The deal did not however give the ISSLT any real autonomy, since the Treasury insisted on three key safeguards: the headquarters were to stay in London; the British Government were still to appoint the chairman; and the Treasury were to continue to stipulate minimum rents. Duckworth could not have been surprised to receive a resentful note from his colleagues to the effect that "the Treasury have issued Regulations which render the Irish Trustees largely without power or authority." 90 Nor were the trustees able to apply to any higher authority for help. The truth of the matter was that by the mid-1920s the British Government was only interested in completing the programme at the minimum cost. In 1926 the Chancellor of Exchequer, Winston Churchill, refused any further funds on the grounds that having committed over £3,000,000 already, this "was on a far more generous scale than anything which it was found possible to do in the way of providing houses or land holdings for ex-service men in this country." 91
Cost cutting was clearly expected from the ISSLT, and hence Duckworth asked the Trustees in mid-1924 to in future only approve cottages which were "smaller and rather more suitably planned than those built hitherto." What this directive in fact meant was that the ISSLT was to break away from the exceptionally high standards deemed necessary for ideological reasons under the 1919 Irish Land Act, and instead look to methods of economy employed by British local authorities facing the realities of the mid-1920s. Duckworth for instance consulted Raymond Unwin, Chief Architect at the Ministry of Health, over the possible use of prefabricated construction: nothing came of this. More productive was a series of visits by Duckworth to study municipal schemes in Britain, after which he declared that the new house types used by the ISSLT "will, on an average, be smaller than those built [previously] by the Irish Local Government Board and will be grouped, where it is possible to do so, into pleasant "gard-en-suburbs"." In terms of layout, this meant that ISSLT densities were to be at the proscribed garden suburb standard of 8-12 houses per acre, rather than the semi-rural 4-6 dwellings per acre in the so-called 'garden villages' at Killester and in the early schemes of the Irish Board of Works.

Duckworth's ruling on site density had important design implications. Garden plots would obviously be smaller, and there would be less land for communal amenities. It required the use of small terraces of four cottages alongside the more dispersed semi-detached types hitherto under the Irish Land Act. And it also meant concentrating on a fewer larger schemes on increasingly suburban sites, rather than small rural clusters. For the ISSLT, building smaller dwellings posed some problems. An experimental scheme of eight very small 3-room dwellings was built at Sallynoggin. The design was indeed novel (Type A; total area of only 550 sq.ft), being a terrace of single-storey cottages each with a cruciform plan [Fig.55]. Two small bedrooms opened directly off a central kitchen/living space, and there was not even a scullery let alone a bathroom. However the ISSLT did not find this type to be cheap enough to compensate for the drastic drop of standards involved, and built no further dwellings along this line. Instead it was decided to make savings by building almost exclusively 4-room dwellings (the proportion of 5-room houses could now not exceed 10% in any scheme), and reducing general standards.

The pruning of standards was not applied uniformly, and thus there is a noticeable divide in the houses built by the ISSLT in Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State after 1924. The houses in the former were larger (712-859 sq.ft), and usually had bathrooms. Schemes in Ulster were now mainly on large suburban sites, and involved the mixing of short terraces of four dwellings with semi-detached pairs, all organised within an axial and symmetrical layout. The largest estate was for 146 cottages at Cregagh near Belfast, but probably the best design was at Shantallow, near Londonderry. Here 57 neo-Georgian houses were built to a wide-fronted plan type (Type Z.1: 804 sq.ft), with a 26 ft frontage and a generous
internal arrangement [Figs.56-57]. A large front hall gave onto either a bathroom or on the other side a through living room (187 sq.ft), and there were three bedrooms (64-163 sq.ft) on the first floor. The ISSLT schemes in Southern Ireland were also often in groups of 30-80 dwellings on the outskirts of towns such as Dublin and Cork, yet the quality of the dwellings was significantly lower. The overall space standards were less than in Ulster (600-780 sq.ft), and now, as the Treasury had demanded, nearly 60% of dwellings had no bathroom. Even types which were clearly based on designs for Northern Ireland were to a lesser standard. Type D was a version of the above mentioned type with a through living-room and ground floor bathroom, but it had a slightly narrower (24ft8in) frontage [Fig.58]. This type was built in terraces of four dwellings, with attractive hipped gables over the end-returns, rather than in pairs as in Ulster.

In the event, the ISSLT trustees all came to favour cheaper and smaller dwellings on the basis that it made rents more affordable to ex-servicemen. There were nevertheless plenty of other sources of conflict with the Treasury. One battle which the trustees lost was over a plan to sell off ISSLT cottages to tenants at reduced cost. This was blocked by both Duckworth and the Treasury because they wanted the cottages to be maintained by the ISSLT as permanent war memorials. Where the trustees were successful was in preventing a Treasury move to increase existing rents to create a surplus which could form a contingency fund. This went against the feelings of ISSLT tenants, who, looking enviously at Labourers Acts cottages let at only 1s6d-2s per week, became increasingly belligerent in their demand that rents should be lowered. Tenant militancy began, not surprisingly, in the Killester estate. With soaring unemployment in Dublin in the winter of 1923-24, the Killester tenants went on a rent strike which finally won a 4s per week reduction off all rents on the estate. This only encouraged other ISSLT tenants to try the same tactics, and a wave of rent strikes resulted. Arrears in the Irish Free State soared to around 12% by late 1925, and soon after the Killester tenants managed to secure yet another reduction of 4s per week. Tenant militancy, backed by the Southern trustees and the British Legion, produced a clear downward trend in rent levels. The average rent in 1926 stood now at just over 6s per week (though this varied from 3s in very rural areas, to a maximum now of 12s6d for the largest cottages at Killester). Organised rent strikes only worsened relations with the Treasury, who characterised events as "the old battle between English economy, represented by Duckworth and the headquarters of the Trust in London, and Irish wastefulness."94

Controversy over rents and the determination to reduce building costs undoubtedly resulted in a hiatus in the preparation of housing schemes for ex-servicemen. Thus while £520,000 had been spent and 2,425 dwellings completed by mid-1926 (1,692 in Southern Ireland
and 733 in Ulster), most were in projects inherited by the ISSLT. There were very few new schemes in construction by this date, prompting the British Legion and the *Irish Times* to launch a high profile attack on the ISSLT's inertia. Tenant dissatisfaction in the Irish Free State was so strong that the Government there was forced reluctantly to act. Prior to this point President Cosgrave and other officials had been determined not to interfere. The Irish Governor General, Tim Healy, while he had argued that the ISSLT headquarters should be moved to Ireland, was otherwise reported by Duckworth as having said "that he swelled with pride and satisfaction at the Trust's houses whenever he drove past our Killester Scheme." Yet with the crescendo of protests about the ISSLT, the Free State Government was forced in 1927 to appoint an inquiry (the Lavery Commission) to look into the matter. The Imperial Treasury were incensed, not least when a critical report called for rent reductions and an increase in the number of dwellings to be built.

Duckworth had attempted to resign as Chairman of the ISSLT in April 1927, but it was some months before he was replaced by Sir James Brunyate. Now the ISSLT were determined to meet the criticisms made of them. The Southern trustees argued for cheaper and lower rent 3-room cottages on the grounds, as the director of the Dublin office put it, that "the Trust have catered primarily for the middle or lower middle class, and.....the requirements of the labouring man have not, perhaps, been sufficiently considered." Brunyate was in principle opposed to the idea, but conceded that in new schemes up to 25% of dwellings might be 3-room cottages. In March 1930 the ISSLT even considered building flats, but found that the terms of its charter forbade this. Instead it increased the density on its new estates to 15 houses per acre. As well as cutting building costs, the ISSLT received a financial boost in mid-1927 when, after sustained lobbying by the Northern trustees, it finally became eligible for subsidy from the Northern Ireland Government. It now received £80 for every cottage built in Ulster, and this was extended in 1929 to provide a maximum total of £35,000 subsidy available to the ISSLT. This prompted the Free State Government to belatedly offer a £45 subsidy per cottage under its 1930 Housing Act, increased under new legislation two years later. However in actuality building progress continued to be painfully slow. Only 2,897 dwellings were finished by March 1929 (2,018 in Southern Ireland and 879 in Ulster), leading to renewed protests from British Legion on behalf of tenants. It took the ISSLT until March 1933 to meet its target of completing just under 3,700 dwellings throughout Ireland.

If the housebuilding efforts of the ISSLT were widely criticised, the trustees sought to win favour in other ways. In spite of severe restrictions imposed by the Treasury, a scheme was finally started to sell off dwellings to tenants at 50% of replacement cost in rural areas, and 66% in urban districts. The ISSLT's stock was thus slowly wound down, and a
surplus was produced for investment.\textsuperscript{100} The ISSLT also continued the process of cutting rents. By 1929 the average rent had fallen to only 5s2d per week, and within five years this stood at around 3s9d per week. But neither policy endeared the ISSLT to its tenants, and a catalogue of rent disputes persisted. In the Free State this culminated in 1932 with a Supreme Court decision that the ISSLT had no legal power to charge any rent at all. The result was that all building work promptly stopped in Southern Ireland. Similar legal action in Ulster failed, allowing the programme to limp along until the final total of dwellings for ex-servicemen reached nearly 4,000 in all. The ISSLT suffered from being a complete anachronism, best summed up when an official in the British Ministry of Health declared in late-1931 that "I can only be thankful that there is nothing of this kind in England and Wales."\textsuperscript{101} The ISSLT survived, barely, until British legislation in 1987 finally dissolved it and redistributed the surplus capital. A curious episode was finally over. At its genesis the Irish Land Act had demonstrated lucidly how housing policy in Ireland prior to 1922 was dictated by the political structure of British rule. Furthermore, the residual British influence on Ireland even after independence and partition was seen by the fact that financial support was provided for ex-servicemen's housing (however grudgingly) by Westminster, even after a point when surely any potential political benefits had passed.
8. **STATE HOUSING IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE IRISH FREE STATE**

1922 was a seminal year in the history of Ireland. It marked the transfer of power to the new governments in Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State. Yet independence and partition had another consequence: state housing ceased at a stroke to be an important political issue in Ireland. During the 1920s there was a striking similarity in that state housing effectively dropped out of the story in both parts of the country. The governments in North and South provided an initial and short-term injection of funds for working-class housing, in an attempt to legitimise their new-found position and to deal urgently with chronic unemployment problems. But within a year or so, both administrations had drastically scaled down their intentions. Housing policy in Northern Ireland lay moribund until after the Second World War; while the Irish Free State saw a revival in the early-1930s. This chapter is therefore intended simply as an epilogue and a counterpoint to the preceding analysis. It will briefly outline the implications of the ending of British rule for housing design and policy on both sides of the Irish border, and will also note the schemes that resulted from post-war initiatives in the respective capitals of Belfast and Dublin.

8.1 **Post-devolution housing policy in Northern Ireland**

Looking first at Northern Ireland, it is important to remember that the 1920 Government of Ireland Act had envisaged the temporary partition of the six counties of North-East Ulster. The opportunity had been seized upon by Unionists determined to lose no time in setting up a new government for the province. Preparations effectively began in September 1920, with the appointment of Sir Ernest Clark to Dublin Castle to oversee the transfer. In the event, the formal handover of power was delayed until the creation of the Irish Free State two years later.1 In the meantime the housing situation in Ulster deteriorated badly. By October 1921 the province had seen very little activity under the 1919 Irish Housing Act: only 95 cottages were built and another 219 started, and 80% of these new dwellings were concentrated in Belfast. Hence it was Ulster Unionist members that led Irish demands in the House of Commons for an increase in housing subsidy to 35s for every £1 of rent collected in ordinary cases, and 40s where exceptional need was diagnosed. As noted at the end of Chapter 6, when the Irish Treasury and Westminster agreed to the subsidy increase in November 1921 it was a purely cosmetic gesture, since the new Ministry of Home Affairs in Belfast were also told that there would be no corresponding augmentation of the housing funds about to be transferred over to Northern Ireland.2 This was to be
typical of the parsimony shown by the Imperial Treasury towards Ulster, and it provoked a belligerent but unsuccessful attempt by the Northern Government to improve the deal. What did result in 1922 was rather ill-tempered haggling over the North's share of residual housing funds from sources as diverse as those for the ex-servicemen's programme, as mentioned in the last chapter, to the now insignificant pre-war funds from the Labourers Acts and the 1908 Housing Act.\(^3\)

Westminster's lack of commitment to the province helped to shape the two fundamental structural problems that beset Northern Ireland in the inter-war period.\(^4\) The first was the continual shortfall plus uncertainty that the Northern Government faced in its public revenue. During the 1920s the Imperial Treasury was primarily concerned with enforcing retrenchment in public spending in order to allow the return to the 'Gold Standard'. One product was that by the early-1930s, the crucial 'imperial contribution' from Britain to Northern Ireland was only 5\% of what had been envisaged at the outset of the new state ten years earlier. This was particularly damaging given that a sharp downturn in the traditional industries of North-East Ulster, linen and shipbuilding, had created a deep economic depression. The province's average unemployment rate during the 1920s was 19\%, rising to an even more crippling level of 27\% in the following decade. Wages in Northern Ireland were on average at least 10\% less than on the mainland, and yet there was proportionately even less public finance available for social services such as housing. The second structural problem was a stultification that arose from being in effect an impregnable one-party state, run by Ulster Unionists at both central and local levels. Protestant 'siege mentality' was best symbolised by the imposing solidity and grandeur of the Stormont Parliament House (1927-32), wherein ruled the party led by Sir James Craig (later Lord Craigavon) from the inception of the new state until his death in office in 1940. Any potential challenged from the province's Labour Party was fractured and nullified by bitter sectarian divisions. Yet, despite the obvious absence of an effective opposition, there was little check placed on Unionist hegemony by Westminster.\(^5\) North-East Ulster was the only economically modernised region of Ireland, but still there was no strong working-class organisation able to press for state intervention in housing.

Housing policy in inter-war Northern Ireland therefore rarely progressed beyond the level of rhetoric. The bold initial declaration by Sir James Craig and his ministers was that the population could expect the same standard of social provision as in the rest of Britain.\(^6\) And, initially, the province saw a spate of working-class housing funded by the residue of funds under the 1919 Irish Housing Act, and by the Northern Government's own contribution, the 1922 Housing (Unemployment Relief) Scheme. The latter was essentially an attempt to relieve some of the unrest created by widespread unemployment, and

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committed the state to pay a generous 80% of labour costs on approved schemes. Yet the flurry of activity it produced was short-lived. When retrenchment from Britain began to bite, the Unionist Government resorted to the more favoured policy of non-intervention. Like other fields of social policy, the 1923 Northern Ireland Housing Act and successive annual measures for urban housing, were all based explicitly on precedents set by the British Conservative Party. Thus in Northern Ireland the task of rehousing the working class was now seen once again as primarily the responsibility of private housebuilders; local authorities were to have a secondary, supporting role. Subsidy terms were, however, less favourable than in Britain. There was in Northern Ireland a single lump-sum payment instead of an annual contribution, resulting a lower total of state contribution, and there was far more volatility in the manner of fixing subsidy levels. Under the 1923 Housing Act the state provided £60 per dwelling, and local authorities were then allowed to offer another £40 subsidy plus the possibility of an interest free loan of £100 on each house. Central subsidy from the Northern Government rose slowly to a peak of £100 per dwelling in 1927, but then fell progressively in the 1930s before finally being phased out in 1937. In Northern Ireland there was also a far sharper decline in expectations of the standard of housing that was needed. The 1923 Housing Act allowed subsidy on new dwellings of between 600-950 sq.ft in area. Yet by 1927 the Minister of Home Affairs was openly declaring "that the greater need was now for smaller houses." The undisguised aim of the Northern Government was to cut costs. Hence the largest house size eligible for subsidy was fixed in 1928 at 650 sq.ft, and preference was given to 3-room 'kitchen' cottages without parlours. Rural dwellings were even allowed to be as small as 500 sq.ft. By 1933, as central subsidy plummeted, the latter figure became the maximum for any dwelling.

All in all, it was an unambitious housing policy that was carried out by the Craig Government. This was also shown by the fact that in rural areas there was a revival in 1923 of the pre-war subsidy terms and powers of the Labourers Acts (this code continued despite a temporary suspension between 1931-35). Social conservatism did not just permeate central government. It was also the creed of Unionist local authorities not to burden their rates. Given that most had very low rateable incomes in any case, it meant that they were rendered largely inactive. Thus, despite the Unionist pledge to match 'step-by-step' the level of social provision on the mainland, only a paltry 50,000 new dwellings of any type were built in Northern Ireland from 1919-39. In comparison, Britain as a whole built 80 times more dwellings even though the population was only 30 times larger; and in Scotland alone, with a population four-fold that of Ulster, some 311,500 units were produced in the the inter-war period. The performance specifically of local authorities in Northern Ireland was proportionately even worse. In all a total of nearly 7,500 local
authority dwellings were built in Ulster between 1919-39, approximately half in urban areas and half in rural districts. Yet this was only 15% of the total housing output in the province, well below the proportion of around 25% in Britain (between 1919-34 the level of state provision was 31% in England and Wales, and a staggering 61% in Scotland). It was not until the need to rebuild the areas of Belfast destroyed in the Second World War, when at last an adequate contribution towards social expenditure was provided by Westminster, that the Northern Government seriously made working-class housing a public responsibility. In 1944 a distinct Ministry of Housing and Local Government was formed. The 1945 Northern Ireland Housing Act introduced generous subsidies to help create the 200,000 dwellings required to make up the housing shortage and remove all the slums. By 1963 nearly 112,383 houses had been built: 37% by local authorities, and a further 24% through the special agency of the Northern Ireland Housing Trust.11

8.2 Municipal housing in Belfast from 1919

Belfast Corporation was the dominant influence on Ulster attitudes towards state housing after devolution, and a look at its activities from 1919 crystallises the problems of inter-war Northern Ireland.12 The Corporation remained a solidly Unionist body, particularly once the post-war experiment of proportional representation in local elections was scrapped by the new regime in 1922. In 1928 only 5% of its employees were Catholics.13 As with everything else in Belfast Corporation, housing policy was determined by a small clique of Unionist councillors. Sir Crawford McCullagh presided unchallenged over the Housing Committee that had been set up the end of the First World War, and was loyally supported by his vice-chairman, T.E. McConnell, who was a leading estate agent. From 1919 these councillors constantly reiterated that Belfast Corporation's ideal was that private enterprise should build working-class dwellings, but given the short-term political and economic necessity, then they would act. The Housing Committee were alarmed by the impact of post-war inflation on building costs, and so (as noted in Chapter 6) engaged on a double strategy of campaigning for an increase in Exchequer subsidy under the 1919 Irish Housing Act, while at the same time demanding that the ILGB reduce design standards to pre-war levels. Sir Crawford McCullagh and his colleagues made no secret of their intention to defy the principle of shared financial responsibility that was envisaged by the Lloyd George Cabinet. The only goal was instead to ensure that municipal housebuilding did not result in any charge to the local rates. "Belfast Corporation was the only authority dealing with housing in Great Britain that had not spent a penny on it." boasted one councillor in late-1923.14 It was a stance that could be presented locally as sound Unionist 'business-sense', but it made a mockery of Belfast Corporation's initial appeal for a
£2,000,000 loan under the 1919 Irish Housing Act. The reality in the immediate post-war years was that, despite an estimated need of between 5,000-8,000 dwellings in the city, only a few schemes of demonstration houses were actually built.

With the drive towards devolution in full swing in mid-1921, Belfast Corporation finally secured a substantial £500,000 public loan under the terms of the 1919 Act. The overseeing of the building programme was transferred to the incoming Northern Ireland Government, and the £227,500 subsidy that the Corporation received to erect 459 cottages in the early-1920s made it the only major Irish municipality to use the measure. Most of the dwellings built under the 1919 Irish Housing Act were substantial parlour cottages, the Corporation having been unable to get the ILGB to bend its guidelines. The result was rents of up to 18s per week, or 22s including rates. By far the largest and most prestigious estate was for 224 dwellings on the Wandsworth Road, built from 1922-24. Imposing rendered cottages were grouped in short terraces, and were given carefully modulated elevations broken up by shallow bay windows aligned with the roof gables above [Fig.59]. In parallel, Belfast Corporation also seized on the Northern Ireland Government's interim Unemployment Relief Scheme to provide a further 1,102 dwellings between 1922-25. The prime example was the Woodvale Estate, and here the 355 cottages provided were typical of the reduced standards now prevailing in that more non-parlour 'kitchen' houses were now included at rents of around 11s per week (13s6d with rates). Furthermore, parlour dwellings were reduced in size so that maximum rents could be cut to 13s per week (16s with rates). Elevationally there was also a move towards the use of a simpler roof line and the reliance on rendering the upper storey of cottages to provide visual variety [Fig.60]. The designs for schemes in both these housing initiatives were provided by a local 'Panel of Architects', and consciously followed the low-density layout and house types recommended in the Tudor Walters Report. A Belfast Corporation deputation went over to England in 1922 to examine post-war schemes there. The outcome was that the post-war municipal housing in Belfast was thus to a higher standard than hitherto: all cottages now had 3 bedrooms plus a scullery and bathroom, and around 60% of dwellings also had a separate parlour. Means of constructional economy were also sought in an attempt to reduce costs to nearer £500-800 per dwelling. As an alternative suggested by local labour organisations to the exorbitant tenders being received from private contractors, Belfast Corporation built half of the dwellings in the early-1920s using its own direct labour force. It also experimented with a concrete block system used for municipal housing in Liverpool. Furthermore, in late-1923 Belfast Corporation initiated a policy to sell the cottages built under the 1919 Irish Housing Act to tenants for around £310-550 each. The aim was to ensure that if state subsidy were to be terminated, then the Corporation would still incur no loss to the rates.17

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As noted above, the 1923 Northern Ireland Housing Act marked both a retrenchment and a switch in policy towards private enterprise by the Craig Government. Belfast Corporation now envisaged itself as fulfilling a residual role of housing the very poor, and was accordingly extremely critical of the low level of subsidy now on offer. The solution of the Corporation was, this time with the blessing of the Ministry of Home Affairs and Sir James Craig, to simply cut design standards to pre-war levels. Bathrooms were omitted and only 2-bedroom non-parlour house types were used. Traditional long terraces with narrow frontages of around 15ft made a reappearance. A typical scheme from this phase was the 209 dwellings built in Donegall Avenue for an average cost of only £370 per unit. In keeping with its reduced housing role by the mid-1920s, the intention of Belfast Corporation was now to build only a further 630 dwellings. Yet even this limited programme was plunged into disarray when in 1925-26 a judicial report (the Megaw Commission) revealed that corruption was rife in the city's housing contracts. It was the pretext for a savage pruning and rearrangement of the Corporation's powers, and it dealt a body blow to the municipal housing initiative. By this point Belfast Corporation had built a total of 2,188 post-war houses, and while it limped on to provide another 464 dwellings (mostly on the Seaview Estate from 1927), the situation prior to the Second World War was one of paralysis. The Corporation provided less than 10% of the inter-war housing in the city, a contribution nearly as hesitant as the single slum clearance scheme begun before 1914. Social conditions in the city meanwhile worsened. Brett has observed that in both local authority and private housebuilding, no other inter-war city in Britain had a poorer record than did Belfast.

8.3 Post-independence housing policy in the Irish Free State

The initial pattern in the Irish Free State from 1922 was in many ways similar to Northern Ireland. Under the dominion-type status offered by Lloyd George in the negotiations that led to the 'Treaty' in December 1921, the new Southern administration was promised "uncontrolled authority over.....the health and homes of her people." Yet despite the grand hopes of visionary republicans and labour representatives in the Dail Eireann, it was soon apparent that the newly-elected Cumann na nGaedheal Government under William Cosgrave, which held power for a decade, was not committed to the idea of radical social improvement. "We were probably the most conservative minded revolutionaries that ever pushed through a successful revolution", boasted a leading member of the new Free State Government. The lack of social ambition has been attributed by historians to two factors. The first was an obsessive desire by the Cosgrave Government to be seen to...
govern efficiently in the face of enormous problems. There was open militancy from republicans like Eamonn de Valera who saw the 'Treaty' as a betrayal of the demand for complete independence from the British Crown. Conflict spilled over into bloody civil war in 1922-23. Furthermore, the economy in the South had entered a severe economic slump. Agricultural prices, which had boomed during the First World War, fell by almost 45% between 1920-24. The Free State Government was determined to follow the British deflationary policy of returning to the pre-war 'Gold Standard'. It meant fiscal restriction and state retrenchment: between 1924-27 public spending in Southern Ireland was slashed by over 40% in order to balance the budget. The second factor was that, irrespective of the strength of the economy, in the new Irish Free State there was an entrenched ideology of social and cultural conservatism amongst the groups which now constituted the ruling alliance. This included the petty-bourgeois commercial class, the Catholic Church, and, above all, farming interests (agriculture still accounted for just over half the workforce, and by now virtually every farm was owner-occupied). State action was frowned upon and there was no interest in the redistribution of wealth. Social conservatism was undoubtedly helped by the continuing structural weakness of the organised labour movement in both urban and rural areas. The 1920s in the Free State saw the marginalisation of the Irish Labour Party and the Irish TUC, and hence their calls for a bold housing programme, to be carried out by a special national agency, fell on deaf ears.

It is also remarkable the degree to which social inertia was underpinned by the very structure and administrative apparatus of government. A modernised civil service was inherited from British rule with virtually no interruption to business, creating a climate which favoured a conservative adaptation of British precedents in spheres such as social policy. The reality of entrenched colonial influence stemmed from economic dependence on Britain. In the mid-1920s nearly 98% of exports from Southern Ireland still went to the United Kingdom (including Ulster), and just over 75% of imports came from this source. McDonagh has observed that the Irish Free State "remained effectively a provincial segment of a mature economy in the British Isles...a pocket of under-development in an advanced region." Economic dependence only began to decline in the mid-1930s during an acrimonious trade war with Britain, but even then change was gradual. Thus despite the public rhetoric of the Cosgrave Government from 1922, and the much vaunted campaign to promote Irish-speaking in schools, in general the tendency was to imitate British policies with slight amendments to suit Irish conditions. Self-government therefore brought not cultural independence or a policy of 'de-anglicisation', but rather a continuing British hegemony.
The gap between the rhetoric of the Cosgrave Government and the low priority given to social policy was nowhere more evident than in the field of state housing. From early in 1922 the Provisional Government had been openly challenged to address the urban housing problem which Nationalists had stressed so much under British rule. "None of the many problems which await solution by the Irish Free State is of more vital importance than the question of housing", declared the Irish Times in February 1922. It was also clearly a political issue that could not be ignored for fear of losing support to the Irish Labour Party. "The housing problem was, perhaps, the greatest problem they had to tackle," as President Cosgrave boldly told the Dail Eireann. Thus the Provisional Government in March 1922 announced a brief injection of funds as a transitional unemployment relief measure, popularly known as the 'Million Pound Scheme'. The target was for municipalities to build 2,150 new urban houses, at an average cost of £750, and then let them at rents of 10s6d per week. To this purpose, local authorities were asked to raise £125,000 by levying a local housing-rate of 1s in the £1, and also to take out short-term loans of £375,000 on the open market. When they had done this, then the Free State Government would provide a matching amount of £500,000 from central funds. Altogether a total of 2,000 houses were built under the scheme by 20 local authorities between 1922-24; most of the new dwellings in Dublin or its surrounding townships. Since the 1919 Irish Housing Act had been virtually unused in Southern Ireland, these were effectively the first post-war municipal dwellings. As such they made concrete the long-awaited increase in design standards: all the cottages built under the 'Million Pound Scheme' had 3 bedrooms, and 40% also contained a parlour. The housing scheme was used as a campaign point by Cosgrave in the 1923 General Election, in a successful attempt to win votes away from the Irish Labour Party and to deride the ineffectiveness of the anti-'Treaty' faction. Yet having won the election, the housing commitment of the Cosgrave Government promptly collapsed in favour of financial retrenchment. Instead there ensued a dull imitation of British housing policy, with the latter being no longer regarded as the controlling or determining force, but rather as the accepted source for ideas. "Britain's progress should excite emulation rather than envy," wrote the Irish Times, "and the Irish Free State should go about its [housing] task in the same enterprising way as its neighbour." British values were also supported by the official expert on Free State housing policy, Thomas Joseph Byrne, who had moved from his post-war position as a 'temporary' ILGB inspector to an important new role from 1923 as Principal Architect at the Irish Board of Public Works. Furthermore, during the 1920s there was repeated consultation and exchange of information between Irish civil servants involved in housing matters and their counterparts in London (a connection that has also been noted between officials in the Free State's Ministry of Finance and the Imperial Treasury).
Thus from 1924 the Cosgrave Government rejected any pretence that it was trying to solve the housing problem, and instead offered a limited subsidy to private builders. There was an explicit orientation towards the provision of larger dwellings for better-paid workers and the lower middle-classes; this being justified on the grounds that the Free State simply could not afford to build for the very poor. The 1924 Housing (Building Facilities) Act provided a grant of £250,000 to subsidise the building of 3,000 new dwellings, plus another £50,000 for the rehabilitation of existing houses. Urban subsidy was offered on dwellings with between 3-5 rooms, and was set out on a scale of £20 for each room provided (rural subsidy was slightly less in each case). Houses had to be between 520-1,000 sq.ft in area to be eligible for subsidy, although the maximum size could be increased to 1,500 sq.ft if the house was built for a civil servant! Local authorities were initially confined to offering rate rebates or cheap sites to encourage developers, but an amending Housing Act in December 1924 extended state subsidy to municipalities.

Subsequent legislation along similar lines gave local authorities a marginally higher subsidy than private builders, but in the event did little to stimulate activity. In the decade from 1922-32 under the Cosgrave Government, slightly less than 10,000 subsidised dwellings were built by local authorities and another 16,500 were provided by private builders (the latter mostly in rural areas). It was not an impressive total, and combined barely equalled the number of cottages built by local authorities alone in the ten years prior to 1914. A tendency towards conservatism was also shown by a policy to sell dwellings to tenants to cover expenditure. "The purchase scheme induces thrift and the tenant ownership adds pro tanto to the sense of civic responsibility," noted an official in the Ministry of Local Government and Public Health. It was a strategy that was to be widely applied by Dublin Corporation and other authorities, and which pre-dated the Thatcherite 'right-to-buy' policy in Britain by half a century.

Housing design in the 1920s Irish Free State, whether under the 'Million Pound Scheme' or subsequent legislation, was clearly derived from the low-density garden suburb model urged by the Tudor Walters Report and the 1919 circulars of the ILGB. British influence was acknowledged by the Irish Builder in the mid-1920s when it wrote that "the illustration of many of the most admirable housing schemes in England in the building papers, has also helped to improve taste, and the result is seen in some of the houses about Dublin built under housing grants." The Dublin City Architect, Horace O'Rourke, declared that "England.....has been able to show all civilisation the way to plan ideal houses for all classes of the people." In the Irish Free State, as in Northern Ireland, there was a noticeable reduction in standards from 1924 as part of an attempt to get average costs down to £600 per dwelling, or below. The maximum permitted size for local authority dwellings was reduced to 820 sq.ft (private builders could still go up to 1,250 sq.ft), and parlours
were generally omitted. Dwellings in rural districts could be as small as 500 sq.ft in area. In one recommended type plan for a single-storey 4-room rural house, the bathroom and even the internal WC were omitted. Yet despite the pruning of standards, the Unwinian model of suburban estates came to dot most Southern cities from the mid-1920s: examples include McSwineys and MacCurtains Villas in Cork, the Kileely area of Limerick, and, as will be seen, the outskirts of Dublin.

There were few new avenues of thinking about architectural design in the post-independence Irish Free State. Calls for the creation of an 'Irish' style were discounted by architects, and nothing came of the vague suggestion by William Butler Yeats that a blend of tradition and innovation as found in Swedish Romantic Neo-classicism offered a possible model to follow. A certain sense of déjà-vu was also provided by the revival in 1922 of town planning proposals for Dublin. That tireless campaigner, E.A. Aston, set up the Greater Dublin Reconstruction Movement: the object was to prepare a plan for the rebuilding of areas destroyed in 1916 and in the early-1920s, and for the relocation of the important public buildings needed to aggrandise Dublin now that it was a true capital once more. Frank Mears, who as noted in the last chapter had been brought over to design the ex-servicemen's estate at Killester, was engaged as the main architect and planner. The activities of the Greater Dublin Reconstruction Movement, however, provoked a temporary split in the planning movement. Both Aston and Mears now argued that the 1914 Dublin Town Plan by Patrick Abercrombie was too costly and grandiose, and had to be replaced by a more realistic proposal if they were to win favour with the Cosgrave Government. Mears told his father-in-law, Patrick Geddes, that Abercrombie's plan "cannot be worked, and least of all in a now impoverished country"; more scurrilously, Mears added that "Abercrombie is a very fine chap for the commercial industrial midlands of England but doesn't understand Dublin a little bit." Mears called on Geddes to use his influence to discredit the 1914 Town Plan, and Geddes duly had a private, and highly discouraging, conversation with Abercrombie. Meanwhile the patrons of the Abercrombie plan, Lady Aberdeen and the Civics Institute, responded by claiming that the scheme proposed by Aston and Mears was also premature according to Geddesian principles. The Civics Institute therefore set up the Dublin Civic Survey Committee in 1923-24, and published the findings in 1925. Meanwhile the institute had also published Abercrombie's plan in 1923, and the following year they brought him over to press his services onto those responsible for planning the development of Dublin. Town planning ideals were likewise promoted in a civic survey carried out in 1922 by a local association in Cork, again with Patrick Abercrombie as adviser. Interest in town planning was also shown by the Greater Dublin Commission, which had been asked to investigate the administration and possible future development of the Irish capital and its environs. In the early-1930s the campaign
led by Manning Robertson secured the first genuine planning legislation in the Free State, modelled closely on English precedent. It was to prove highly ineffectual, and of little relevance to the issue of state housing.

A far more significant housing development occurred in 1931 when the Cosgrave Government, in emulation of the policy switch heralded by the 1930 Greenwood Housing Act in Britain, introduced legislation which for the first time offered a special subsidy for slum clearance by municipalities. Thus in urban areas the replacement of insanitary stock was now to be given preference over the provision of additional new dwellings. The 1931 measure had little chance to take effect, for the next year the Cosgrave Government fell from office. The dominant group was now the Fianna Fail Party led by Eamonn de Valera, and whose policy centred on the promise of trade protectionism and economic self-sufficiency for Ireland. For a brief period after the 1932 General Election, the Irish Labour Party held the balance of power. It used this position to ensure that the new de Valera Government kept to a commitment to raise income tax in order to pay for increased action on social issues such as housing. Thus the 1932 Housing (Financial and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act provided yet more generous terms. Now the state contribution for slum clearance was equal to 66% of the annual loan charges (a higher figure than for rural dwellings, and twice the amount for additional houses in towns). It has been estimated that subsidy under the 1932 Act was effectively double that which had been on offer to municipalities in the Free State in the 1920s. The design standard of local authority housing in the 1930s was raised slightly, with some 80% of new houses having 3 bedrooms even if no parlour. This, however, was offset by a fall in building costs: a dwelling of around 700 sq.ft could now be provided for only £350. The overall result was an impressive campaign that in the decade from 1932-42 saw some 47,900 dwellings built by local authorities, of which nearly 60% were in urban areas and 40% in rural districts. Along with another 32,700 houses built by private enterprise, it meant a total approaching 81,000 units in the period. Of the municipal dwellings, by the early-1940s over 10,000 dwellings had been built in Dublin (a quarter of them in blocks of flats). When taken in conjunction with the previous decade, it meant that some 41% of inter-war dwellings in the Irish Free State were built by local authorities: a figure higher than Northern Ireland (15%), or England and Wales (25%), and only surpassed by Scotland. And yet the transformation wrought by the Fianna Fail housing campaign should not be over-estimated. In the 1930s Free State the prevailing ethos remained one of social conservatism in alliance with the Catholic Church. Thus de Valera's housing campaign stemmed from a realisation of the pragmatic benefits of state intervention rather a radical attempt to meet working-class needs: the aim was populism, not socialism. Hence the 1939-43 Dublin Housing Inquiry found that 23,000 dwellings were still wanted in the Irish capital and that over-crowded

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slums and ill-health remained chronic. Abercombie was brought back in late-1930s to produce another plan for Dublin, published in 1941. In 1948 the total post-war housing need in what was now the Irish Republic was estimated at 61,000 working class dwellings, of which nearly 45,000 were in urban areas (the response was the first 'welfare state' housing policy in the South, even if this proved to be relatively short-lived).

8.4 Municipal housing in Dublin from 1919

The case of Dublin Corporation best illustrates the course of housing policy in the Irish Free State. By early-1920 the Corporation had drawn up proposals to address an estimated need of 21,780 dwellings. No real start was possible for republican authorities under British rule, yet neither did the euphoria of independence last long for Dublin Corporation. The Cosgrave Government soon embarked on a 'centralising' policy to improve local administration and stifle political opposition, and this was largely achieved by disbanding the elected councils in most cities in the Free State. From 1924-30 Dublin Corporation was dissolved and its powers handed over to appointed City Commissioners. The suspension of local democracy, however, did not greatly alter the outline of a housing policy that was already geared to the building of suburban cottage estates. Indeed the two prestigious 'model' schemes conceived by Dublin Corporation, at Fairbrothers Fields and the Marino Estate, were subsequently completed by the City Commissioners.

Dublin Corporation had tried during the First World War to begin work at the Fairbrothers Fields scheme, as was seen in Chapter 6. The scheme as redesigned to suit the ILGB in 1917-18 was along the garden suburb lines recommended by Geddes and Unwin, and now comprised 370 dwellings with 4-5 rooms laid out in streets around a diamond-shaped central green. Site clearance was commenced with the housing loan arranged by Chief Secretary Duke in 1917, but progress was then halted when the Treasury refused to confirm that the scheme would be eligible for retrospective post-war subsidy. Fairbrothers Fields was restarted in 1921 using a short-term Corporation loan, but was eventually built under the Free State Government's 'Million Pound Scheme'. The estate was completed by 1927 in three stages, and consisted of 334 5-roomed cottages with parlours (at a cost of around £955 each) plus another 82 4-roomed non-parlour houses (mostly built in the last phase and costing £677 each). It was an unprecedented standard of housing, and was reflected in the quality with which brickwork and rendered details were brought together in the elevations [Fig.61]. As well as being the first thorough-going design in Ireland along British garden suburb principles, Fairbrothers Fields was also notable for being built partly by the Dublin Building Trades Guild. This body, as mentioned in Chapter 6, was formed
along the lines of post-war guilds in Britain, and was a manifestation of the republican coalition between the Irish Labour Party and Sinn Fein. Dublin Corporation awarded a series of contracts to the Dublin Building Trades Guild between 1921-24, for a total of 129 houses in all.\textsuperscript{57} In reality the guild proved to be more expensive than anticipated, and it withered along with the Irish labour movement in general. Once the Dublin City Commissioners took over responsibility in 1924, cost-cutting became the prime target. Fairbrothers Fields was used as a pilot scheme to sell off new cottage estates to tenants through a weekly 'pay-back' system instead of rent. Over the next decade or so, all the council's inter-war suburban cottages were sold to tenants: a total of 4,248 dwellings, equivalent to just over a quarter of the municipal housing stock (during the 1920s only a few small blocks of municipal flats were built to actually supplement the existing rented accommodation).\textsuperscript{58}

The 'jewel in the crown' of Dublin Corporation's suburban estates of the 1920s, and indeed the most important inter-war estate in the whole of Ireland, was located in the northern suburb of Marino.\textsuperscript{59} This was the site that Geddes and Unwin had paid special attention to in 1914, and it was then given to the Assistant City Architect, Horace O'Rourke, to draw up a detailed proposal in 1918-19. O'Rourke's more immediate guide was the Tudor Walters Report, and his new design for Marino showed the post-war tendency towards a more symmetrical and axial neo-Georgian layout for garden suburb [Figs.62-63]. There were now to be 550 dwellings with frontages of between 18ft-31ft, at a density of 11 houses to acre. The size of houses were to be from 3-5 rooms, but the majority were to be 4-roomed houses with separate bathrooms and let at 8s per week rent. However, when Dublin Corporation's Housing Committee finally came to consider the Marino Estate in 1922 as part of its plans for the 'Million Pound Scheme', the scheme was amended to suit a larger site of 126 acres. The design was also now handed over to F.G. Hicks, an Arts and Crafts architect from England who had lived in Dublin since the 1890s, and had designed the Irish section of the 1904 St Louis Fair.\textsuperscript{60} The choice of Hicks as architect served as a perfect symbol of the Anglo-Irish nature of the Marino Estate. The scheme as designed by Hicks, and built in two phases from 1923-27, had a layout that involved a even more rigid geometry. The focus was two circular greens of differing sizes, with roads and T-shaped cul-de-sacs radiating like spokes off a central circus [Fig.64]. In total there were 1,262 municipal dwellings built at a density of 12 houses to the acre. Virtually all were substantial 5-room parlour cottages with separate bathrooms. Eight plan types were used in blocks of 2-8 dwellings. There were two principle forms: one a neo-Georgian two-storey cottage, built either in semi-detached pairs or in short terraces; and the other in longer terrace with a mansard roof to give the ostensible appearance of a single-storey block [Fig.65]. The effort that went into making Marino the prestige estate was
also seen in the variety of materials employed to avoid visual monotony: brick, block, rendering, slate, and clay tiles were skilfully handled. There was also high standard of space provision on the estate through private gardens and playgrounds, although like most suburban schemes of the period there was a noticeable shortage of shops and other services. Another intriguing element of the Marino Estate came out of the determination of the City Commissioners to reduce costs on the second section of the scheme. Officials were sent to look at new building techniques on the Continent, and particularly concrete construction in Rotterdam and Amsterdam. Duly a Bremen firm, Kossel Construction, won a contract to use a proprietary 8" in-situ concrete-wall system for a phase of 230 houses. The *Irish Times* noted that "it will be the first time that a big housing contract in the British Isles has gone to a German concern." In the event this first contract was blocked by Ministry of Local Government and Public Health, on the grounds that the system was untested, but in 1926 a later contract for 104 dwellings was given to the same firm. Yet the Marino Estate was still far from being a Frankfurt-style modernist siedlung! "Little of continental European thought or experience was directly tapped or assimilated by the Irish", as Chubb has observed of post-independence Southern Ireland. Far more of an influence on Marino and its ilk were the municipal garden suburbs of England. In 1923 Dublin Corporation sent officials to visit the premier LCC estate at Roehampton, and they came back very much impressed.

Indeed the Roehampton Estate provides the most useful parallel for the Marino scheme. Both schemes set the standard for their respective countries, and the variety of materials and forms at Marino, including the mansard-roof terraces, appear to derive directly from the LCC's designs. Yet it must also be pointed out that the almost universal provision of 5-room parlour dwellings on the Marino Estate far exceeds the proportion of similar-sized dwellings (just under 50%) in the London precedent. Thus Marino was not merely a second-string application of Unwinian garden suburb design, visually indistinguishable from hundreds of schemes in Britain, but in fact was superior in terms of housing standards. The reason for the higher standard stems from the fact that Dublin Corporation in the early days of the Irish Free State had rejected any pretence of even trying to provide homes for the poorer working class. Thus the Corporation's Housing Committee had decided in 1922 to build only 5-room houses for better-paid workers, on the basis that poor slum dwellers might then occupy the vacated dwellings. It was a well-worn argument of 'filtering-up' that had first been voiced in Britain, but now Dublin Corporation was pursuing the stance far more rigidly than, say, the LCC. The results were plain to see. As the *Irish Times* noted in June 1925, the new Marino tenants "are among the aristocracy of labour in Dublin.....The housing problem is being solved - how slowly! - by a process of "moving up"." It was after all part of an attitude adopted by the City Commissioners
whereby new cottage estates were being built explicitly for sale to tenants. Yet by the mid-1920s, however, the contradictions of the approach were also becoming obvious. For, despite falling building costs in the mid-1920s (the cost of a 5-room cottage at Marino dropped from £805 to £680 by 1927), the use of expensive house types at a time of strict public retrenchment meant of course that fewer dwellings could be built. "Capital Expenditure involved in a very early solution of the Housing Problem on the basis of the present costs of building is entirely beyond the financial resources of the city," observed an official report on unemployment relief in 1927.66 The Ministry of Local Government and Public Health was also advocating that Dublin Corporation now build smaller houses, and so in the mid-1920s the City Commissioners gradually moved over to this policy. Hence in subsequent suburban estates the standard was reduced: first to a mixture of 4-room non-parlour dwellings and 5-room parlour dwellings, such as at Drumcondra (535 houses; completed by 1928) and Emmet Road (702 houses; 1929); and then to a total reliance on 4-room non-parlour cottages at Donnycarney (421 houses; 1930), and Cabra (641 houses; 1931).

The reinstatement of an elected Dublin Corporation in 1931 came at the end of the Cosgrave administration. Progress under the housing legislation of the 1920s had been muted, and as a result the municipality had only built around 5,000 dwellings in the decade after independence. With the advent of the Fianna Fail campaign in the early-1930s there was a stepping up of the Corporation's completion rate. Dwellings were now no longer built for sale. By 1939 a further 7,650 dwellings had been added under the 1932 Housing Act, making a total of nearly 12,650 inter-war dwellings built by the Corporation. The attention given to slum clearance in the 1930s saw a greater provision of blocks of flats of smaller 2-3 room units. Flats formed 22% of the Dublin Corporation dwellings between 1932-39, compared to only 8% in the previous decade (an overall average of 17% in the inter-war period). The use of flats was widely criticised, with, for instance, the 1939-43 Dublin Housing Inquiry accusing this form of housing of being more expensive and socially undesirable than suburban cottages.67 Rothery has suggested that the design of many of the Corporation flat blocks, such as those at Townshend Street (1934-36), were influenced by the 'Amsterdam School' of Michel de Klerk and his followers. Such a link is however not proven, and a more likely source are the contemporary inner-city schemes by the LCC and other British municipalities.68 Dublin Corporation meanwhile continued apace. By 1947 around 14,400 dwellings had been provided under the 1932 Act alone, and the Corporation had built to date nearly 24,000 homes.69 Yet again this far from effected a radical change in the circumstances of the poorer citizens. The 1939-43 Dublin Housing Inquiry showed that things had barely improved since the last investigation just before the First World War. Some 28,679 families (24% of the population) still lived in 6,307
tenement houses. Nearly 70% of families lived in 1-room, and 13,000 people lived in dwellings unfit for human habitation. The estimate was that 21,000 houses were required, plus around another 1,500 units per annum to keep pace with new demand. A similar story of increased municipal activity failing to improve housing conditions was found in Cork, where the need for a further 3,500 dwellings still existed in 1939. All in all it was a unhappy state of affairs, especially given the fact that the urban housing issue had up to 1922 played an important role in the relations between Ireland and Britain. In conclusion, it is now necessary to draw the underlying themes of this study together.
CONCLUSION

If then the issue of Irish state housing lost its urgency in the cold reality of independence and devolution, what does this tell us about developments up to 1922? The fundamental point to make is that state housing had been significant as an aspect of the relationship of Ireland within the United Kingdom. The result was that Ireland prior to 1914 was the first, and apparently the only, country to have a national policy of state housing based on centrally subsidised municipal dwellings and recommended design types. There was by no means a completely uniform policy: for instance, the structure was more fully developed for Irish rural housing, and notably less so for urban areas.

The process by which state housing policy was determined in Ireland before the First World War was ad-hoc and reactive. It involved a crucial three-way mediation between Irish Nationalists, the British Government, and the Castle Administration which oversaw British policy (there was in addition a lesser influence from groups such as opposition parties in Westminster, the Irish labour movement, and town planning advocates). Useful in this context is the Gramscian concept of a continual and unstable 'hegemonic struggle' for the control of housing ideas and policies, particularly during the period prior to 1914 in which the economic and political uncertainties of the Imperial system made the 'Irish Question' a key factor in the crisis of British liberalism. In the sphere of state housing policy, the force of Irish Nationalism was represented almost entirely by the constitutional nationalist approach of the Irish Party. The IPP had proved extremely adept at exploiting the desire of Westminster to maintain constitutional stability at critical moments. "Native political success in claiming some voice in decision-making during the nineteenth century", Lee has written, "was not won by rejecting the rules of the English political game, but largely by mastering them, and playing effectively within English terms of reference." The primary tactic of the Irish Party from the 1880s was to use the issue of land redistribution as the 'engine' that would pull Home Rule in its train. Connected to this within the IPP's umbrella of social reform was the demand for state housing subsidy, yet the latter policy arose for two distinct reasons. Firstly, the campaign for rural and then urban housing reform served to overcome ideological and class tensions created by the emphasis on helping tenant farmers through land purchase, and thereby enabled constitutional Nationalism to build a broad support base that prevented the growth of an independent labour party in town or country. Secondly, the Irish Party desired economic redress for the disadvantages that agricultural Ireland suffered in comparison to a rapidly modernising Britain: thus the achievement of housing subsidy under the 1906 Labourers Act, and partially under the 1908 Clancy Housing Act, was seen as clawing back financial

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benefits from an exploitative Imperial system. By obtaining uniquely favourable housing
terms for Ireland (at a time when the country was receiving merely equal treatment in for
instance Old Age Pensions or National Insurance), enabled the IPP to portray the pre-war
Irish housing legislation as the crowning glory of constitutional Nationalism in the sphere
of working-class interests. "THE IRISH PARTY HAS BEEN THE LABOUR PARTY IN
PARLIAMENT FOR THE PAST THIRTY YEARS," declared John Redmond in 1909.2

The over-riding concern of the British Government and its representatives in Dublin Castle
administration was always to maintain political peace in Ireland, in order to protect the
Imperial economic system from external threat. In practice the distinction between
Conservative and Liberal social policy in Ireland was never that substantial, even if the two
British parties had rather different specific intentions and ideological purposes. These
differences meant that there was never a fixed or consistent policy on state housing. The
Conservative policy of 'constructive Unionism' was predicated on the belief that social
order was the product of economic progress, and that therefore Irish discontent could be
defused by addressing rural poverty.3 The attempt to bypass Nationalist demands was
demonstrated by the introduction of the first element of rural housing subsidy by Chief
Secretary Balfour under the 1891 Land Act, and by George Wyndham's interest in 1903 in
a new Labourers Bill. Yet 'constructive Unionism' was doomed by an inherent limitation,
which was that, in the final analysis, staunch Unionists would not accept so much financial
and political power being given over to Nationalist bodies in Ireland. What was to prove
more productive in terms of Irish state housing was the need of the Liberal Party from 1906
to accept unpalatable policy innovations proposed by the Irish Party in lieu of Home Rule
legislation. Interpreted in Gramscian terms, this represented an attempt to reconstruct the
failing Liberal hegemony by absorbing and thereby 'transforming' the demands of Irish
Nationalism.4

It was the larger political divisions engendered by Home Rule and the pre-war 'Ulster
Crisis' that led to the paralysis of the Irish Party on the issue of state housing.
Responsibility at first devolved to the Castle Administration: initially through the 1913-14
Dublin Housing Inquiry (a conciliatory device to absorb the demands of radical labour and
town planning adherents), and then, following the debacle of the 1916 Easter Rising, to the
first concerted adoption of state housing as a tool of government policy. "The general
problem of the housing of the working classes in Dublin is one of the most pressing
problems that are engaging the attention of the Government in Irish affairs", Chief
Secretary Duke told the Imperial Parliament in 1917.5 The special war-time housing loan
to Dublin Corporation was intended to reduce political opposition in Ireland during a critical
period of the war, and thereby to help pave the way for the introduction of conscription.

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Yet the problem now for the Liberal Government was that with the decline of the Irish Party, there was no longer a clear avenue of support on state housing policy. Instead the issue became subsumed into what has been described as the war-time Government's attempt to establish a middle-ground, 'coalitionist' compromise with the Conservative Party. Thus in 1917-18 Lloyd George and his advisers offered substantial housing subsidy as an enticement to those taking part in the ill-fated Irish Convention. Coalition in British politics was of course achieved by the post-war Lloyd George Government, and was echoed in the sphere of Irish state housing by the fact that for the first time Ulster Unionists became actively involved. Worries in Ulster and in Dublin Castle derived from the absorption of the radical Irish labour movement into the separatist republicanism of Sinn Fein, and from the fear of trained demobilised soldiers swelling the ranks of the Irish Republican Army. The outcome in post-war Ireland was an autocratic housing policy that emanated from Westminster, via the Castle Administration, as a grotesque relative of the Addison campaign on the mainland. Typical was the unfavourable subsidy system under the 1919 Irish Housing Act, based on the amount of rents collected, and above all the unique programme to build directly houses for ex-servicemen. The degree of separation from actual Irish demands was but a portent of the collapse of British rule by 1921, and the handing over of housing policy the following year to both parts of Ireland.

These ad hoc and reactive swings in Irish housing policy, however, always took place within a structural condition in which every initiative was distorted by - or at least contingent upon - what MacDonagh has termed "British states of mind". There was a continuing inability to see Irish problems in anything other than British terms, and the resulting restrictions were four-fold. Firstly, all housing initiatives were ultimately subject to Imperial veto in Westminster, depending on whether it was believed that they would support political and economic stability in Ireland (and thereby strengthen British rule). Secondly, no policy was ever introduced if it was likely to cause too much friction with interest groups in Britain. Substantial rural housing subsidy could be therefore condoned on the grounds that Irish agriculture was a special case, as Chief Secretary Balfour had argued in 1891: yet the Irish Party's pre-war proposals for equivalent urban treatment were emasculated by the Liberal Government for fear of provoking an unstoppable momentum of demand from British municipalities. The generous subsidy proposal of the Irish Convention in early-1918 sent panic through the Treasury: the result was an obsession with the idea of "equivalence" in post-war efforts to devise a separate subsidy system for Ireland that could not be construed as being either less or more favourable than that for the mainland. Thirdly, the Imperial Treasury always insisted on strict controls over what it saw as the profligacy of government departments and local authorities in Ireland, in reciprocation for any concessions it was forced to make. For the Treasury knew full well
that the goal of constitutional Nationalists was always to extract as much money as possible from the Imperial Exchequer. Thus, for instance, the granting of full rural subsidy under the 1906 Labourers Act was offset by the publication of the first-ever recommended type plans for state housing (the aim being both to provide models of economic design, and to save on architects' design fees). The fourth point to make is that there was a continual, virtually unchallenged assumption that British models of housing design were inherently better. On the part of Irish architects and housing campaigners, this was due to what Lee has described as "the dependency syndrome that has wormed its way into the Irish psyche during the long centuries of foreign dominance." The outcome was a tendency by journals such as the *Irish Builder* to repeatedly compare Irish achievements unfavourably with those in its larger, industrial neighbour.

Yet ultimately cultural inferiority was the product of a British imperialist ideology that denigrated the values of rural Ireland, and categorised 'primitive Celtic' alongside the native cultures of remoter outposts of the Empire. The most extreme manifestations of British condescension were the fake Irish villages designed for the international exhibitions of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. It must, however, also be stressed that there was a socially-progressive side to the efforts to draw a distinction between 'advanced' Britain and 'uncivilised' Ireland. For the concern of British imperialists in late-nineteenth century involved not just a mission of territorial acquisition and moral 'improvement' in regions such as Africa, but also a consolidation of the existing parts of the Empire. This ideological mind-set held that under-developed countries such as Ireland, if they were to survive in a rapidly modernising world riven by aggressive colonial expansionism, had to be shown how to integrate into the dominant Imperial value-system. It was in effect a 'social Darwinism' that sprang from the same source as the 'national efficiency' campaign launched after the Boer War debacle; and, in general terms, it created the generalised policy known as 'social imperialism'. Hence the emphasis on social efficiency, and the attendant desire to eliminate Irish Nationalist dissent, that can be seen in the writings of Sir Horace Plunkett and Patrick Geddes. An unquestioning acceptance of the benefits of the anglo-centric colonial 'mission' was not surprising given that the founding father of the tradition of romantic social critique in nineteenth-century art and architecture, John Ruskin, was a supporter of imperialist values. In his inaugural lecture as Slade Professor of Art at Oxford University in 1870, Ruskin had declared of Britain's historical role:

"And this is what she must either do, or perish: she must found colonies as fast and far as she is able, formed of her most energetic and worthiest men; seizing every piece of fruitful waste ground she can set her foot on, and there teaching these colonists that their chief virtue is to be fidelity to their country, and that their first aim is to be to advance the power of England by land and sea....But that they may be able to do this, she must make her own majesty stainless; she must give them thoughts of their home of which they can be proud. The England who is to be mistress of half the earth, cannot remain herself a heap of
cinders, trampled by contending and miserable crowds; she must yet again become the England she was once, and in all beautiful ways."

From this sentiment it was an easy step to the declaration in 1907 by the journal Garden City that what was needed was "not only England but all parts of the Empire to be covered with Garden Cities." The result was that the early town planning enthusiasts such as Geddes, Unwin, Adshead, or Abercrombie, acted as unwitting agents for the imposition of a professional ideology which served to incorporate and control the colonial cities of the British Empire. Certainly one notable admirer of Geddes was the socialist Arts and Crafts architect, Charles Ashbee, an entrant in the 1914 Dublin Town Plan Competition, and (according to his biographer) "a cultural imperialist" in attitude. A similar propensity to ideologically condition Ireland to the realities of British rule was also present in the recommendation of garden suburb housing by Geddes and Unwin in the pre-war era.

Thus the other side of the same anglo-centric coin was that Irish state housing design was undoubtedly modernised by the assimilation of the latest models from Britain. In terms of rural dwellings, this came less from the recommended cottage designs of the Irish Board of Works in 1869, or those later of the Congested Districts Board, than through the larger two-storey types produced by the ILGB for the 1906 Labourers Act to augment the traditional single-storey vernacular. Unwinian suburban housing was promoted by town planning enthusiasts, but before the First World War had made limited impact save for a few small schemes by South Dublin RDC and some designs by Pembroke UDC. Yet by the end of the First World War the new orthodoxy was accepted in the Fairbrothers Fields scheme of Dublin Corporation, and in the reports of the Irish Convention's Housing Committee and of the ILGB's Dr Peter Cowan. The institutionalised framework for garden suburb design was created by the circulars of the ILGB in May and September 1919. An adherence to British housing design was to continue after 1922 in both Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State, the declared intention of 'de-anglicisation' in the latter notwithstanding. It was one part of a bland, consensual continuum almost untouched by independence. "No architectural splendours can be pointed to as expressions of a confident, assertive......society," is the judgement that Brown has made of an Irish Free State that remained obsessed by the mythology of the remote Western rural districts.

The structural restrictions of British rule aside, the paradox remains that, due to political pressures, what appears to have been the most advanced housing policy in the United Kingdom before 1914 came about in the least developed nation. Both the main political parties in Britain accepted a greater socialisation of state housing in Ireland than was permitted elsewhere. It was a situation that prompted the Conservatives and Liberals to once more define their ideological basis. "Ireland forces upon us these great social and
great religious questions - God grant that we may have courage to look them in the face, and to work through them," as Gladstone had written way back in 1845. Thus to reconcile Irish political demands with the desire to safeguard British rule, the pre-war Liberal Cabinet found itself having to reluctantly absorb what ministers such as John Burns derided as the 'Irish system' of subsidised municipal housing. Yet the Liberal Government, with the sole exception of Lord Strachie, were still determined that there would be no transference of the policy to mainland Britain. Ireland remained, in Liberal eyes, *sui generis.* By contrast, many influential figures within the Conservative Party - particularly those such as Sir Walter Long, who argued that Balfourian 'constructive Unionism' had killed off socialism in Ireland - now called for the introduction of state housing subsidy on the Irish model. Their belief was that similar socio-economic intervention would head off working-class disaffection in Britain, and would also demonstrate the integrity of the United Kingdom. Several Labour MPs capitalised on Irish experience to attack the precept that state subsidy held down wages, and as a result they found themselves rallying around the Opposition Conservative Housing Bills that were introduced between 1912-14. The ideological division over Irish housing precedent was not confined to politicians, but also affected well-known housing reformers. William Thompson, for example, became a champion of the 'Irish system'; whereas John Nettlefold of Birmingham Corporation remained implacably opposed. Yet by the end of the First World War, the new coalitionist alliance formed by Lloyd George with the Conservative Party and Ulster Unionists entirely accepted Irish precedent in principle, if not in actual detail. "The policy here advocated was the same as that put into effect by Mr Balfour in Ireland", Lloyd George told the Coalition Cabinet in March 1919, "...About 50,000 [houses] had been built in Ireland, largely at the expense of the State. He had been told that they had transformed the whole country." While the description of subsidised housing as a 'Balfourist' strategy was not entirely accurate, it served to bind Conservatives to a policy aimed at neutralising social democratic demands (and thus effecting a "passive revolution" in the reconstructed bourgeois hegemony). The pre-war experience of Ireland thus helped to shape, even if it did not determine, the framework for state housing in post-war Britain.

It is clear that the analysis of early Irish state housing substantially modifies the current interpretations of the origins of state housing policy in Britain that were mentioned at the outset. The first stage of state intervention in Ireland was to provide dwellings for farm labourers, yet this policy began at a time when the rural proletariat was already declining sharply as a consequence of land redistribution, and their standard of housing was, if anything, improving. Therefore any theory that takes as its basis the notion of a perceived housing need cannot apply to Ireland. In terms of Offer's explanation, certainly the pre-
war slump of 1906-12 eroded the speculative building of working class dwellings in Belfast. There was still, however, relatively little pressure in Ulster for state action. By comparison, in cities such as Dublin the link between chronic poverty and appalling housing had been noted by Engels as early as the mid-1840s, and by this century had become a commonplace remark. One pre-war Sinn Fein councillor stated that "the main cause of the social evils of Dublin is the dire poverty of the major portion of the working classes, which is the greatest barrier to social progress. If work and wages were plentiful and ample, the solution of the housing problem would be simple."18 The inherent contradiction in profit-based housebuilding had long been apparent, and there was in the extensive slums of Dublin (if the phrase is to mean anything) a genuine crisis for the 'reproduction of labour power'. Yet in this most desperate case of housing need and class conflict, the Liberal Government resisted the demands for increased urban subsidy voiced by the 1914 Dublin Housing Inquiry. Nor is there any real evidence in Ireland for the emphasis placed by Englander on tenant militancy as the force that broke the dominance of housing capitalists. The Irish Party took up the running - first on rural housing, and then on the urban issue through the Town Tenants League - precisely to stop the growth of working-class political agitation. It was an avowedly non-radical strategy that aimed to counter-balance the influence of petty-bourgeois urban landlords. And even the radical labour movement during the Dublin industrial upheaval of 1913-14 was less concerned with the housing problem per se, than in using it emotively as a marxist argument for fundamental social revolution against British capitalism. When comprehensive state subsidy for urban housing came to be introduced by the British Government in 1919, it was at a time when the Irish labour movement was becoming increasingly marginalised in both North and South.

Instead, the analysis of early state housing in Ireland shows that the issue was less and less to do with the reality of working class demands, and more and more to do with its function as an instrument of political ideology. This accords most closely with the theory of an 'insurance against revolution' advanced by Swenarton. Yet the Swenarton thesis needs to be modified in two key aspects in light of Irish experience. Firstly, the advent of rural subsidy and partial urban subsidy in pre-war Ireland did not result from a condition in which the British Government could determine housing policy centrally or in isolation. Rather the pattern of imposing policy 'from above' only began once Westminster and the Castle Administration took the upper hand following the 1916 Easter Rising. The trend was consolidated as a response to alarmist post-war fears about the threat to Imperial stability posed by an alliance of 'bolshievism' and republicanism. Secondly, the state subsidy introduced by the 1919 Addison Housing Act in Britain was not a novel or untried solution: it was instead the transfer of the hitherto rejected 'Irish system', now seen by the
Lloyd George Government as the means to maintain political peace. This modification, however, also serves to reinforce the Swenarton thesis, since it counters the criticism made by Daunton and others that state housing was too cumbersome and uncertain to be used as a primary tool of social legitimation. The view expressed within the Cabinet in 1919, however erroneous it might have been, was that subsidised state housing had been directly effective in mitigating unrest in rural Ireland.

This study of one particular social aspect of British rule in Ireland obviously cannot be used to construct a comprehensive theory, but it can shed some light on the general workings of colonialism. A tendency in recent writings on imperialism has been to discount unitary or generalised theories about the process of colonisation. Imperialism is instead usually described as a complex phenomenon with inter-related political, psychological, economic and social dimensions. Circumstances vary considerably depending on which country is being analysed. The case of Ireland presents particular difficulties: firstly, because British domination pre-dated the phase of 'classical imperialism' pursued by European countries from the 1880s up to 1914; and secondly, because there was a far greater degree of economic and social integration between Ireland and Britain than was found in more distant colonies. It is, however, this level of inter-connection that makes Ireland such an important subject for the study of political and cultural influences. Ireland by no means formed a 'social laboratory' for the British Government. Nor could it ever do, as long as a situation existed wherein no single group could devise, control, or monitor any would-be policy experiments. And yet it was the case that Irish experience constituted one of the crucial pressures that was to push Britain after the First World War to move away from laissez-faire liberalism and towards a more collectivist society.

The best model that is available to explain the paradox is that of 'internal colonialism'. State housing subsidy in Ireland represented a mediation of Nationalist demands for redress for an entrenched unequal industrialisation (and hence uneven economic modernisation) of the United Kingdom. Irish state housing was therefore the product of a sectional and 'peripheral' political influence, and not that of a modernised class-based labour movement. It represented at most an indirect consequence of the economic modernisation of Britain, and yet nevertheless the outcome was that one aspect of social provision in Ireland was to a large extent modernised along the lines of the most advanced policy conceived at the time. Irish demands on the issue of state housing were essentially economic, and the strategy for achieving financial redistribution was played out in the political sphere. The corollary was that there was little cultural interest shown by the Irish Party or other groups in finding sources of housing design that might provide alternatives to British models. Nationalists offered far less resistance to the belief that what was widely perceived as the most advanced
model, that of Unwinian garden suburb design, should be adopted as the physical form of modernisation. An important counter-effect of the process of 'internal colonialism' was that housing developments in Ireland were fed into the 'hegemonic struggle' over ideas about state housing in Britain. Thus there was a definite influence on British ways of thinking - what can be termed an 'inverse-diffusion' of cultural values from 'periphery' to 'core' - but an influence that was heavily filtered and transformed by the structural realities of Imperial domination. Yet in turn it meant that a modernised social policy on the provision of working-class housing as developed in Britain after the First World War, was the result not just of the political and economic pressures resulting from widespread industrialisation on the mainland, but had also been conditioned by the realities created by the unequal modernisation of the United Kingdom as a whole.

In the final analysis it is the extent of the inter-relationship between state housing policy in Ireland and Britain before 1922 that is the underlying thread of the study. Developments in the different parts of the United Kingdom were by no means stereotyped, but neither can they be studied independently. This observation is part of a phenomenon that has been observed by Irish historians, and of which Oliver MacDonagh has written:

"British values and criteria would sooner or later be imposed on Ireland, and sooner or later would be themselves profoundly influenced by Irish experience.....Ireland showed in macrocosm some of the forces making for collectivism everywhere.....Ireland's needs differed in intensity and form of manifestation rather than in type from those of the other island. No departure in Ireland was ultimately irrelevant to Britain." 23

Specific studies of the effect of colonial inter-relationships on the production of the built environment have, however, remained relatively few. One notable exception has been the work of Anthony King, in which it is convincingly argued that the bungalow house-type, to take a specific Anglo-Indian example, and indeed the overall form of the modern city, have been (in King's phrase) "globally produced". 24

On an even wider level, this present study offers a testimony to the incisive analysis put forward by the distinguished cultural and literary critic, Edward Said. 25 At the heart of Said's writings lies the belief that Western imperialism, and the nationalist resistance that it spawned, has been the most important conditioning factor on cultural development over the last two centuries. For Said, the response of the contemporary intellectual should not be to apportion blame or vainly to attempt to redress the consequences of colonialism in a given country. It is far more essential to systematically reveal that all cultures, and particularly those of oppressor and oppressed, are by their very nature inter-dependent. The primary role of investigation therefore becomes that of demolishing the 'ideology of separation' that was promoted by imperial nations in order to 'divide-and-rule'. The aim, in other words,
is a post-colonialist dismantling of those orthodox intellectual structures - of culture, history, and geography - which were used to maintained an imperialist hegemony based on illusions of national separateness and racial purity. As Said has noted:

"One of imperialism's achievements was to bring the world closer together and, although in the process the separation between Europeans and natives was an insidious and fundamentally unjust one, most of us should now regard the historical experience of empire as a common one."26

Under this analysis all cultures must by necessity be seen as hybrids that fundamentally affect each other, while at the same time clearly acknowledging the real structures of political and economic power which determine the framework of colonial inter-relationship. Again, as Said has observed:

"Partly because of empire, all cultures are involved in one another; none is single and pure, all are hybrid, heterogeneous, extraordinarily differentiated, and unmonolithic."27

In the field of Irish literature, William Butler Yeats is the figure who created the shining model of 'colonial' expression from out of a search for a national signature that was opposed to British colonial rule, and yet at the same time also indebted to the sense of 'Englishness' that pervaded Irish culture. On a more prosaic and unashamedly tangible level, the preceding analysis of Irish state housing suggests an area where a close connection developed between otherwise politically and culturally divided nations. The pattern in general seems to have been that policy innovations originated in Ireland, whereas Britain remained the primary source of architectural design ideas. Early state housing in Ireland was a profoundly Anglo-Irish creation.
REFERENCES

Standard Abbreviations

AMAI     Association of Municipal Authorities of Ireland
BL ADD MSS  British Library Additional Manuscripts
HC DEB   House of Commons Debates
HLL     House of Lords Library
HTPAI    Housing and Town Planning Association of Ireland
ILGB    Irish Local Government Board
IWM     Imperial War Museum
JSSISI   Journal of the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland
NLI MSS  National Library of Ireland Manuscripts
NLS MSS  National Library of Scotland Manuscripts
PP     Parliamentary Papers
PRO     Public Records Office (Kew)
RIAI    Royal Institute of Architects of Ireland
RPDCD   Reports and Printed Documents of the Corporation of Dublin
SPO     State Paper Office (Dublin)
TCD     Trinity College Dublin
UCD     University College Dublin
WRO     Wiltshire Record Office
References for Introduction (pp. 9-27)

INTRODUCTION (pp. 9-27)

1. the classic study is still: E.J. Hobsbawm, *Industry and Empire*, 1968
6. M. Hechter, op cit, pp.76-77,184-185,267-270
14. C. Townshend, op cit, pp.233-243: the first real analysis of the subject was in: J. Lee, op cit
17. M. Hechter, op cit, pp.6-8.22-30,166,210-212,343-344
18. ibid. pp.8-10,30-43,132-133,166,212-213,233,344-351
22. C. Townshend, op cit, p.241
23. M. Hechter, op cit, p.114


27. *Irish Builder*, 1 September 1878, p.247: also 15 June 1879, p.184; 15 November 1880, p.313; 1 December 1881, p.344.


33. For background data on white-collar professions, see for instance: M. Daly, *Dublin, the deposed capital. A Social and Economic History, 1860-1914*, 1984, pp.124-133,145-151: Daly's statistics, though not specifically mentioning architects, show that Protestants/Presbyterians formed only 18% of Dublin's population and yet nearly 48% of the professional class in 1871; that this fell only slightly to 14% of the population and nearly 38% of professionals by 1911; and surrounding townships contained many Protestant professionals who commuted.


41. This tendency has been admirably covered in: J. Sheehy, op cit.


47. *Irish Times*, 9 February 1922, p.4.
48. hence there is no real basis for the American influence argued in: S. Rothery, op cit, pp.5-20,68-74,155-167: while Rothery contends that there were some general links with US architecture in Irish buildings, the case remains unproven and he can only produce two instances of actual American design: the work of the Irish-American sculptor Augustus Saint-Gaudens for the Parnell Monument in Dublin (1909-11), and then Barry Byrne's Church of Christ the King in Cork (1927-31).

49. following Yeats' fulsome praise of Ragnar Ostberg's Stockholm Town Hall (1909-23), the Swedish architect was brought over to Dublin in 1926 after collecting the RIBA Gold Medal in London: S. Rothery, op cit, pp.98,140-141.

50. a different view, which minimises the British connection, is given in: S. Rothery, op cit, pp.196-229: for a detailed critique of this book, see review by M. Fraser in AA Files, no.24, Autumn 1992, pp.96-98.


59. D. Fraser, op cit, pp.xxi-xxxii.


References for Introduction (pp.9-27)


67. however, claims that the Liberal Government in Britain had come round to an acceptance of subsidy by 1914 are based on some scanty and doubtful evidence in P. Wilding "Towards Exchequer Subsidies for Housing 1906-14", *Social and Economic Administration*, vol.6 no.1, January 1972, pp.15-18: for the counter view, see: M. Swenarton, *Homes Fit For Heroes: The Politics and Architecture of Early State Housing in Britain*, 1981, pp.44-46: also Chapters 3 and 5 below


69. D. Fraser, op cit, pp.xxi-xxxi

70. D. Englander, op cit

71. D. Fraser, op cit, pp.xxi-xxxi

72. M. Swenarton, op cit

73. D. Fraser, op cit, pp.xxi-xxxi


75. M.J. Daunton, op cit (1983), p.194

76. M.J. Daunton (ed), op cit (1990) [b]


References for Chapter 1 (pp.28-57)

1. **RURAL HOUSING AND THE STATE IN IRELAND BEFORE THE FIRST WORLD WAR (pp.28-57)**


8. R. E. Matheson, "The Housing of the People of Ireland During the Period 1841-1901", *JSSISI*, 56th Session, vol.11 no.4, November 1903, pp.196-212: see also K. Danaher, *Ireland's Vernacular Architecture*, 1975/78, p.30: the squalor of the pre-Famine dwellings later became the emotive stuff of historical novels, such as L. O'Flaherty, *Famine*, 1937, pp.9-10,16-17,121-122


13. Board of Public Works, *Ireland, Land Improvement: Instructions with the rules and conditions under which loans are made; and Addenda, containing specimen plans, specifications, etc*, 1869

14. for an account of vernacular rural housing in Ireland, see F.H.A. Aalen, "Evolution of the Traditional House in Western Ireland", *RSAI Journal*, 1966: K. Danaher, op cit, pp.5-14: A. Gailey, *Rural Houses of the North of Ireland*, 1984: A. Gailey, op cit (1987), pp.86-103: P.& M. Shaffrey, *Irish Countryside Buildings*, 1985, pp.54-60: in general, the typical medieval cottage in Ireland had been single-storey, usually detached, and built in timber frame and thatch. In plan it was almost always only one-room deep, no matter how many rooms were added along the length, and access was of the 'direct-entry' type so that livestock could be brought into the main living room. From the seventeenth century two main innovations occurred, which Gailey has convincingly argued were English features brought over during the Ulster Plantation. These were the introduction of the 'hearth-lobby' plan, whereby an internal lobby prevented cattle from entering, and the use of stone or brick chimneys to remove smoke and thus enable the
addition of a second storey. The former soon became an accepted variation within the rural Irish vernacular, but the reaction to the latter was mixed. Chimneys did indeed become more common, with the usual location of the hearth remaining in the centre of the dwelling (only in North-West Ulster, and the western seaboard, were they generally placed on the gable-end wall). But historical custom militated against a departure from the single-storey dwelling. In terms of vernacular building materials, the spate of new cottages built in late-eighteenth century Ireland to meet the rural population growth coincided with one significant development: namely the more frequent use of mass random-stone walling, usually mud-rendered and whitewashed, to replace timber construction. Otherwise the rate of technology change was exceedingly slow. Roofs continued to be built of basic cruck frames with sod grass or thatched coverings. The introduction of brick walls and slate roofs in rural areas did not really begin until the mid-nineteenth century, and even after then, both materials remained relatively rare outside Ulster.

15. examples of neo-Gothic and neo-vernacular model estate cottages in England can be found in: S. Martin Gaskell, Model Housing: from the Great Exhibition to the Festival of Britain, 1987, pp.24-29,39-46: this mode was typical of the architectural output of the Irish Board of Works, as can be seen in: C. O'Connor & J. O'Regan (Architectural Association of Ireland), Public Works: The Architecture of the Office of Public Works 1831-1987, 1987, pp.10-26


17. Irish Builder, 15 September 1875, p.253


23. 283 HC DEB, 17 August 1883, col.1486 (Salisbury)

24. nearly 20 years later, only some £14,000 had been advanced for rural housing under the Irish Land Act clauses: PP 1898 Cd.9029 xx, "66th Annual Report of the Commissioners of Public Works in Ireland for the year ending 31 March 1898", ff.505-589: G. Slater, "Rural Housing - A Lesson from Ireland", Contemporary Review, vol.82, September 1902, p.405

26. S. Clark, op cit, pp.113-114: a contrary view is given in D. Fitzpatrick, op cit, pp.76-80
27. J. Lee, op cit, pp.92-93: P. Bew, op cit, pp.142-143,174-175,185-190
28. quoted in D.B. King, op cit, p.275: see also F.S.L. Lyons, Charles Stewart Parnell, 1977, pp.263,280: it was the case that Parnell, a middle-ranking Protestant landowner in Co. Wexford, had engaged on benevolent improvements on his estate, including some cottages for agricultural labourers: R.F. Foster, Charles Stewart Parnell: The Man and his Family, 1976, pp.168,370
30. P. Bew, op cit, p.185
31. D. Roche, op cit, p.221
32. Irish Builder, 15 December 1871, p.328; 1 July 1872, p.179; 15 April 1874, p.107; 15 May 1874, p.135; 1 September 1874, p.235; 1 August 1875, p.203; 15 November 1878, pp.323-324; 1 October 1883, pp.301-302; 1 June 1884, pp.155-156; 1 November 1900, p.523
33. D.B. King, op cit, p.20
34. 278 HC DEB, 13 April 1883, col.169 (Dunraven): also cols.180 (Carlingford), 182 (Fortesque): 279 HC DEB, 30 May 1883, cols.1240 (O'Connor), 1243 (King-Harman)
36. PRO/RECO.1/485 (report by Gollancz on the Labourers (Ireland) Acts)
37. D.D. Sheehan, Ireland Since Parnell, 1921, p.177
40. 279 HC DEB, 30 May 1883, col.1252 (Trevelyan)
41. 283 HC DEB, 17 August 1883, col.928 (Wemyss)
42. ibid, col.929 (Argyll)
43. PP 1884 Cd.317 viii, "Report from the Select Committee on Agricultural Labourers (Ireland): together with the Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, and Appendix", ff.245-401: PP 1884-85 Cd.32 vii, "Report from the Select Committee on Agricultural Labourers (Ireland): together with the Proceedings of the Committee, and Minutes of Evidence", ff.559-677
44. L.P. Curtis Jr, Coercion and Conciliation in Ireland 1880-1892, 1963, p.46
45. previously public loans for Irish rural housing had been given at 4% interest (5.35% including principal) over a 35 year period: from 1885 there was a choice of loans at 3.25% (4.5% including principal) over 35 years; 3.5% for a 40 year loan and 3.75% for 50 years
48. PP 1894 Cd.7450 xxvii, "62nd Annual Report of the Commissioners of Public Works in Ireland for the year ended 31 March 1894", ff.373-452
49. J.W. Boyle, op cit, p.333: for an anecdotal example that supports this view, see Sir H. Robinson, Further Memories of Irish Life, 1924, pp.205-210
References for Chapter 1 (pp.28-57)

Housing in Town and Country", Section 3, Manchester Guardian Commercial, 26 July 1923, p.39


55. J. Lee, op cit, pp.123-125


59. L. Weaver, *The "Country Life" Book of Cottages*, 1913, p.6

60. *Irish Builder*, 22 April 1916, p.177: also 4 January 1913, p.19


63. BL ADD MSS, Balfour Papers, Ms. 49804 (note on "A General Sketch of Irish Policy", unsigned but probably Wyndham, 28 September 1903)


65. 343 HC DEB, 1 May 1890, cols.1862-1863 (Balfour): also 342 HC DEB, 24 March 1890, cols.1708-1714 (Balfour)

66. 344 HC DEB, 14 May 1890, col.878 (Fox): also col.880-881 (O’Connor)


68. PP 1896 Cd.8239 xxiv, "64th Annual Report of the Commissioners of Public Works in Ireland for the year ended 31 March 1896", f.508: PP 1898 Cd.9029 xx, "66th Annual Report of the Commissioners of Public Works in Ireland for the year ended 31 March 1898", ff.505-589: PP 1905 Cd.2657 xxii, "73rd Annual Report of the Commissioners of Public Works in Ireland for the year ended 31 March 1905", ff.359-477: legislation in 1891 allowed loans for up to 50 years, and in September 1895 the Treasury reduced the rate of interest on a 30 year loan to 3.25%: on a 40 year loan to 3.375% and a 50 year loan to 3%: two years later interest was reduced further to 2.75%; 3%; and 3.25% respectively: in 1904, however, the rate was raised again to 3.75% for a 30 year loan, and 4.25% for a 50 year loan

69. PP 1896 Cd.7818 liii, "23rd Annual Report of the ILGB for the year ending 31 March 1895", ff.44.141-147: in the few cases where this power was used, such as in Strabane, there was little reward
References for Chapter 1 (pp.28-57)

71. PP 1905 Cd.2655 xxxiii, "33rd Annual Report of the ILGB for the year ended 31 March 1905", ff.xlii-xliv
72. G. Slater, op cit, p.405
74. BL ADD MSS, Balfour Papers, Ms. 49804 (note on "A General Sketch of Irish Policy"): the "National Efficiency" argument was common at the time, and was used by several ILGB officials involved in the Labourers Acts campaign, such as Richard Smith O'Brien and Peter Cowan: Irish Builder, 14 July 1906, p.564; 13 July 1907, p.496; 30 January 1915, p.48: for British views, see G. Slater, op cit, pp.409-410
75. BL ADD MSS, Balfour Papers, Ms. 49804 (Wyndham to Balfour, 5 March 1904)
76. 162 HC DEB, 27 July 1906, col.35 (Denham): NLI MSS, Ms. 15176 (draft letter from Clancy, 1 August 1904: D. Gwynn, The Life of John Redmond, 1932, p.133
77. M. Davitt, The Fall of Feudalism in Ireland: or The Story of the Land League Revolution, 1904, p.xi
78. Municipal Journal, vol.21 no.1031, 1 November 1912, p.i (supplement on the visit of the National Housing and Town Planning Council delegation): PRO/RECO.1/485 (report by Gollancz on the Labourers (Ireland) Acts)
79. PP 1884 Cd.317 viii, "Report from the Select Committee on Agricultural Labourers (Ireland)", f.256: J. Lee, op cit, p.8
82. Irish Builder, 2 June 1906, p.446: under the Labourers Acts, rural authorities could levy a housing rate of up to 1s in the £1, and in special cases the ILGB had powers to increase this to 1s3d
84. PP 1884 Cd.317 viii, "Report from the Select Committee on Agricultural Labourers (Ireland)", ff.253,262,268-269
85. PP 1884 Cd.4051 xxxviii, "12th Annual Report of the ILGB for the year ended 31 March 1884", f.82
86. see for instance: PRO/RECO.1/485 (report by Gollancz on the Labourers (Ireland) Acts)
90. Irish Builder, 20 April 1907, p.273: also 22 November 1913, p.729

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References for Chapter 1 (pp.28-57)

91. *Irish Builder*, 1 May 1884, p.136
92. PP 1884-85 Cd.32 vii, "Report from the Select Committee on Agricultural Labourers (Ireland)", f.640: also J.W. Boyle, op cit, p.333
96. letter from Dillon to Redmond, 7 February 1906, as quoted in D. Gwynn, *The Life of John Redmond*, 1932, p.121
97. *Freemans Journal*, 23 April 1906, p.8: also 8 January 1906, p.8; 17 January 1906, p.9; 1 January 1906, pp.5-6; 6 March 1906, p.9
98. BL ADD MSS, Campbell-Bannerman Mss, MS. 41211 (letter from Bryce to Campbell-Bannerman, 26 April 1906)
99. BL ADD MSS, Campbell-Bannerman Mss, MS. 43542 (letter from Bryce to Lord Ripon, 22 July 1906: D. Gwynn, op cit, p.133
100. R.E. Matheson, op cit, pp.201,204
101. PP 1907 Cd.3682 xxviii, "35th Annual Report of the ILGB for the year ended 31 March 1907", ff.xxxvii-xxxix, 337-384: of the 36% state subsidy, 20% came from Imperial Exchequer grant (c.£28,000 a year) and 16% from Irish sources (c.£22,000 a year)
102. 158 HC DEB, 28 May 1906, col.111 (Bryce)
103. 161 HC DEB, 23 July 1906, col.873 (Asquith)
104. 158 HC DEB, 13 June 1906, cols.998 (Dillon),974 (Redmond),1016- 1019 (Craig): also 18 HC DEB, 7 July 1910, cols.1798-1799 (Clancy),1811-1812 (Redmond): *Times*, 15 June 1906, p.9,c-d; 28 August 1906, p.4,c: F.S.L. Lyons, op cit (1951), p.244
105. 158 HC DEB, 13 June 1906, col.1021 (Corbett)
108. *Irish Builder*, 4 January 1913, p.19
110. 18 HC DEB, 4 July 1910, cols.1471-1472 (Birrell); 7 July 1910, cols.1797-1801 (Clancy), 1811-1812 (Redmond)
111. *Limerick Echo*, 7 January 1913, p.3
112. see for example: PRO/RECO.1/485 (report by Gollancz on the Labourers (Ireland) Acts)
114. *Irish Builder*, 27 January 1906, p.61; 20 August 1910, p.524
117. 29 HC DEB, 11 August 1911, col.1504 (Sheehan): also 38 HC DEB, 6 May 1912, col.107 (Devlin)
References for Chapter 1 (pp.28-57)

118. *Irish Builder*, 27 January 1906, p.61: also 29 August 1914, p.509; *Freemans Journal*, 6 September 1909, p.9; 18 September 1909, p.10; 31 December 1914, p.6


120. *Freemans Journal*, 8 February 1912, p.8

121. 55 HC DEB, 21 July 1913, col.1739 (Redmond); also 18 HC DEB, 7 July 1910, col.1811 (Redmond); 26 HC DEB, 31 May 1911, col.1174 (Dillon): *Freemans Journal*, 29 May 1906, p.4; 16 August 1906, p.8; 24 September 1906, p.8; 14 October 1906, p.5; 30 July 1907, p.7; 19 October 1908, p.8; 5 January 1910, p.6; 30 November 1910, p.9; 4 June 1912, p.8; 27 July 1915, p.8; 4 August 1915, pp.6-7: J. Clancy, *The Housing Problem: How to Solve It*, 1908, p.6

122. 18 HC DEB, 7 July 1910, cols.1801 (Clancy), 1803 (Joyce)

123. *Freemans Journal*, 23 April 1906, p.8; 24 April 1906, p.9: also 29 April 1909, p.8; 23 October 1911, p.8

124. *Freemans Journal*, 26 July 1907, p.5; 9 December 1907, p.8; 23 May 1910, p.9; 28 March 1913, p.6

125. 18 HC DEB, 7 July 1910, col.1814 (Birrell): also *Freemans Journal*, 23 November 1907, p.8; BODLEIAN MSS, Birrell Mss, Dep.C.302 (memo by Birrell on "Irish Land Purchase", 14 July 1913)

126. *Irish Times*, 28 March 1913, p.6; 14 January 1914, p.4; *Glasgow Herald*, 17 October 1912, p.8.4


135. letter from Birrell to RIAI, 27 May 1907, quoted in *Irish Architect and Craftsman*, 1 June 1912, p.888


138. Local Government Board for England and Wales, *The Housing of the Working Classes Acts, 1890-1909: Memorandum with respect to the Provision and Arrangement of Houses for the Working Classes*, 1913: this document has been wrongly acclaimed as the first official housing design guide in S. Martin Gaskell, op cit, p.148

the ILGB sent one of its inspectors, J.F. MacCabe, over to Letchworth, and his unflattering report echoed the general view of the British Press that the cottages...


144. PP 1906 Cd.3012 xxxvi, "34th Annual Report of the ILGB for the year ended 31 March 1906", f.820


148. Municipal Journal, vol.21 no.1031, 1 November 1912, p.i

149. HTPAI, op cit, p.48 & photographs


151. 9 HC DEB, 26 August 1909, col.2447 (Devlin): also 26 HC DEB, 31 May 1911, cols.1176-1177 (O'Neill)

152. 18 HC DEB, 7 July 1910, col.1813 (Birrell): also 26 HC DEB, 31 May 1911, col.1168 (Birrell): 55 HC DEB, 21 July 1913, col.1724 (Birrell)

153. 26 HC DEB, 31 May 1911, col.1182 (Redmond)

154. W. O'Brien, op cit, p.393


160. *Irish Builder*, 15 January 1916, p.28
References for Chapter 1 (pp.28-57)


162. Municipal Journal, vol.21 no. 1031, 1 November 1912, p.i: Irish Builder, 10 June 1911, p.377; 27 September 1913, p.609; 16 January 1915, p.40; 31 July 1915, p.338: Irish Architect and Craftsman, 22 June 1912, p.919; 5 July 1913, p.29: the scheme for Gorey Garden Village began as a private initiative in 1908, but was taken up by the local Irish Party MP, Sir Thomas Esmonde, to emulate the improved estate villages that he had seen in Newfoundland - in 1914 approval was obtained to build 72 cottages with 1 acre attached, but only 12 cottages were started before war intervened. Esmonde was unsuccessful in his efforts in 1915 to link the scheme to housing need for the nearby Arklow munitions factory: PRO/T.1/11683/23569 no.23569 (Esmonde to Birrell, 2 July 1915; Harmsworth, Treasury to Montagu, 15 July 1915; Esmonde to McKenna, 22 July 1915); Freemans Journal, 3 July 1915, p.4; 30 August 1915, p.4: Irish Builder, 11 September 1915, p.406


164. NLI MSS, Miscellaneous Papers, Ms. 26,173 (draft public notification of functions assigned to various Irish Departments, undated but probably late 1914): E. O’Halpin, op cit, pp.97-98


166. HLL, Lloyd George Papers, C/2/4/20 (Carter to Lloyd George, 28 May 1914): also C/2/4/27 (Storey to Lloyd George, 29 May 1914): R. Douglas, "God gave the Land to the People", in A.J.A. Morris (ed), Edwardian Radicalism, 1974, p.159

167. HLL, Lloyd George Papers, C/36/2/12 (speech by Lloyd George at Huddersfield on 21 March 1914, reported in Huddersfield Daily Examiner, 23 March 1914)


171. PRO/T.143/1 (Headlam to Treasury, 7 December 1911, ff.188-189; Headlam to Treasury, 6 December 1912, ff.427-429): PRO/T.143/2 (Headlam to Treasury, 23 June 1913, f.144; Headlam to Treasury, 27 November 1913, ff.307-308)

172. PRO/T.1/11808/17813 (internal Treasury note, unsigned and undated but probably late 1914)

173. in the early 1960s two-thirds of the rural housing stock dated from before the First World War, though this has now dropped to around 40%: T.J. Baker & L.M. O’Brien, The Irish Housing System: A Critical Overview, 1979, p.2 (Table1.1): J.M. Blackwell & E. Brangan, Survey of the Housing Stock - 1980: A Summary Report, 1984, pp.9-31 (Table 1)
2. **URBAN STATE HOUSING IN IRELAND BEFORE 1914**

(pp.58-107)


6. PRO/T.1/11271/4624 (internal Treasury note by "O.G.N.", 24 October 1910): the Treasury estimated that on the old valuation, the rates in Belfast would have been around 10s in the £


References for Chapter 2 (pp.58-107)


15. F.S.L. Lyons, op cit, p.278: J.V. O'Brien, op cit, p.200: M. Daly, op cit, pp.5-6,15-17,64-67,124-125,138-140


17. F.S.L. Lyons, op cit, pp.68: M. Daly, op cit, pp.67-76,110-112


19. *Irish Builder*, 25 October 1913, p.678: three areas stood out as being the lowest of the low, ie. the area around the Coombe and Francis Street in the industrial southwest, between St Patricks Cathedral and the Guinness brewery; from Capel Street to Smithfield on the north bank of the Liffey, to the west of the city centre and behind the magnificent Four Courts building; and to the east of the centre, from Marlborough Street to Amiens (now Connolly) Station, bounded to the north by Mountjoy Square and containing the notorious brothel district around Foley Street: see for example: *Freemans Journal*, 12 April 1913, p.8: RPDCD, 1916 (Vol.1), no.35, p.340


21. 118 HC DEB, 18 February 1903, col.191 (Field): also 186 HC DEB, 20 March 1908,cols.930 (Clancy),946-966 (Nannetti)

22. *Times*, 1 December 1913, p.64,a: also 186 HC DEB, 20 March 1908, col.976 (Birrell): for Labour Party views, see 186 HC DEB, 20 March 1908, col.988 (Duncan): 46 HC DEB, 15 January 1913, col.2143 (Outhwaite): 58 HC DEB, 18 February 1914, cols.976 (Barnes),1015-1017 (Roberts)

23. 61 HC DEB, 16 April 1914, col.371 (Cecil): also 76 HC DEB, 9 December 1915, cols.1700-1701 (Long)

24. A. Wright, *Disturbed Dublin*, 1914, p.29: *Freemans Journal*, 23 May 1914, p.4: also 30 May 1911, p.6; 13 August 1912, p.6; 4 January 1913, p.6; 12 April 1913, p.8


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27. M. Daly, op cit, pp.117-239
28. *Irish Builder*, 20 June 1914, p.384: also 27 October 1913, p.678; 28 March 1914, pp.181-182: RPDCD, 1914 (Vol.2), no.120, p.158: H.T. O'Rourke & The Dublin Civic Survey Committee, *The Dublin Civic Survey Report*, 1925, p.13: L.M. Cullen, op cit, p.166: boundary extension had been recommended in a number of official reports from 1879, but even when achieved in 1900, the House of Lords emasculated the measure so that it included only the less wealthy northern/western suburbs such as Clontarf, Drumcondra, and Kilmainham: this was offset only partly by the 1901 Rate Equalisation Act, under which for the first time Rathmines and Pembroke contributed towards the city resources
30. RPDCD, 1914 (Vol.2), no.120, p.167: 1920 (Vol.2), no.110, p.424: 61 HC DEB, 16 April 1914, col.348 (Clancy)
31. *Irish Builder*, 1 July 1872, p.179; 15 May 1874, p.135: also 1 November 1880, pp.297-298
32. PP 1884-85 Cd.4547-1 xxxi, "Minutes of evidence, etc....of the 3rd Report of Her Majesty's Commissioners for inquiring into the Housing of the Working Classes (Ireland)", f.304: the same situation was described thirty years later in: PRO/T.1/11782/5824 (Williams, Office of Public Works, Ireland to Treasury, 13 April 1914): also RPDCD, 1914 (Vol.2), no.120, pp.158,179-180: H.T. O'Rourke et al, op cit, pp.60-61
33. PP 1913 Cd.6955 lxvi, "Report of an Enquiry by the Board of Trade into Working Class Rents and Retail Prices together with the rates of Wages in Certain Occupations in Industrial Towns of the UK in 1912", f.752: G.F.A Best, op cit, pp.401-404
34. A. Roche, "The housing of the working classes", *Tracts on Social and Industrial Questions, 1896-1905*, no.7, 1905, pp.3-5: 61 HC DEB, 16 April 1914, cols.344-345 (Clancy)
35. *Times*, 20 September 1913, p.3,f
36. PP 1913 Cd.6955 lxvi, "Report of an Enquiry by the Board of Trade into Working Class Rents and Retail Prices together with the Rates of Wages in Certain Occupations in Industrial Towns of the United Kingdom in 1912", f.752: *Freemans Journal*, 11 October 1913, p.6
39. PP 1880 xxx Cd.2605, "Report of the Royal Commissioners appointed to inquire into the Sewerage and Drainage of the City of Dublin, and other matters connected therewith, together with Minutes of Evidence, Appendix, Index, etc.", ff.20-23,28-29: *Irish Builder*, 1 October 1879, p.311; 15 October 1879, pp.324-326; 15
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41. R.E. Matheson, "The Housing of the People of Ireland During the Period 1841-1901", JSSISL. 56th Session, vol.11 no.4, November 1903, pp.208-210: Freemans Journal, 11 October 1913, p.6: Limerick Echo, 6 September 1913, p.3: the process of economic and housing decay is described in J. Hill, The Building of Limerick, 1991, pp.149-150

42. PRO/T.1/11271/4624 no.18711 (Sharrah, Irish Board of Works to Treasury, 15 October 1910); Irish Builder, 18 March 1911, p.173: also 24 October 1914, p.589; 8 November 1911, p.711: Freemans Journal, 17 September 1906, p.5: 5 August 1909, p.9: Irish Architect and Craftsman, 4 March 1911, p.73: Irish Worker, 9 March 1912, p.1: PRO/T.1/11282/6065 no.4958 (Irish Board of Works to Treasury, 13 March 1911)

43. 61 HC DEB, 16 April 1914, col.351 (Clancy)


45. Builder, 18 May 1878, p.506

46. M. Daly, op cit, pp.114-116,272-276

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47. PP 1880 xxx Cd.2605, "Report of the Royal Commissioners appointed to inquire into the Sewerage and Drainage of the City of Dublin, and other matters connected therewith, together with Minutes of Evidence, Appendix, Index, etc.", f.91


49. PP 1884-85 xxxi Cd.4547-1, "Minutes of evidence, etc.....of the 3rd Report of Her Majesty's Commissioners for inquiring into the Housing of the Working Classes (Ireland)", f.223

50. C. Brady, *The Practicability of Improving the Dwellings of the Labouring Classes, 1854*: R.D. Urlin, "On the Dwellings of Working Men in Cities, and the efforts that have been made to improve them", *JSSISI*, 18th Session Pt.29, January 1865, pp.158-164

51. PP 1884-85 xxxi Cd.4547-1, "Minutes of evidence, etc.....of the 3rd Report of Her Majesty's Commissioners for inquiring into the Housing of the Working Classes (Ireland)", f.247


54. M. Daly, op cit, pp.257-264,271-272


57. *Irish Builder*, 15 February 1871, p.52


60. 223 HC DEB, 18 March 1875, col.45 (Gibson): *Irish Builder*, 1 April 1875, p.91; 1 September 1875, p.243: Dublin Sanitary Association, op cit, pp.27-29: G. Stedman Jones, *Outcast London*, 1971, pp.197-199: this measure was in itself the product of pressure from the Charity Organisation Society in England

61. 223 HC DEB, 18 March 1875, col.59 (Cross), cols.60-62 (Mundella, Nolan, O'Gorman, O'Conor Don): *Irish Builder*, 1 April 1875, p.91

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References for Chapter 2 (pp.58-107)


63. Irish Builder, 15 January 1878, p.19; 1 June 1886, p.138
64. S. Harty, "Some considerations on the working of the Artisans' Dwellings Acts, as illustrated in the case of the Coombe Area, Dublin", JSSISI, 37th Session Pt.62, July 1884, pp.508-522: Irish Builder, 15 April 1877, p.117; 1 November 1877, p.325: this was also the case for similar semi-philanthropic companies in Britain: A.S. Wohl, op cit, pp.141-147: S. Merrett, State Housing in Britain, 1979, p.21
66. Irish Builder, 1 August 1876, pp.219-220; 15 August 1876, p.246; 15 December 1876, pp.359-363,367; 1 March 1877, p.70; 15 April 1877, p.117; 1 December 1886, p.315
67. Irish Builder, 1 June 1879, p.159; 15 September 1880, pp.254-255; 15 August 1881, p.247
68. Irish Builder, 15 April 1877, p.117: also 23 March 1907, p.202
70. the other semi-philanthropic company of note in the capital was the Dublin and Suburban Workmen's Dwelling Company, which built a mere 288 dwellings: otherwise there were only the Cork Improved Dwellings Company (420 dwellings), and the Thomond Artisans Dwelling Company in Limerick
73. PRO/T.1/10994/5264 (Irish Board of Works to Treasury, 8 March 1909)
References for Chapter 2 (pp.58-107)

74. PP 1914 xix Cd.7273, "Report of the Departmental Committee appointed by the ILGB to inquire into the Housing Conditions of the Working Classes in the City of Dublin", ff.17-19: M. Daly, op cit, p.318

75. Times, 22 October 1913, p.9,e


77. Waterford News and General Advertiser, 5 July 1878, p.3; 9 August 1878, p.3; 4 October 1878, p.3; 7 February 1879, p.3; 21 February 1879, p.3; 6 February 1880, p.3; 4 June 1880, p.3: PP 1884-85 xxxi Cd.4547-1, "Minutes of evidence, etc.....of the 3rd Report of Her Majesty's Commissioners for inquiring into the Housing of the Working Classes (Ireland)", ff.279-280,290: PP 1914 Cd.7317 xix, "Appendix to the Report of the Departmental Committee appointed by the ILGB to inquire into the Housing Conditions of the Working Classes in the City of Dublin: Minutes of Evidence, with appendices", ff.492-493 (Appendix xxxvii): this means that an erroneous date of 1889 is given for the first Waterford Corporation dwellings, actually the second scheme in Green Street in: E. Gribbin & P. Braniff, Urban Housing Waterford: A Case Study of Two Areas, 1979, pp.25,38-39

78. the Irish economic depression is discussed in: L.M. Cullen, op cit, pp.146-148: M. Daly, op cit, pp.57-62: the classic study of housing concern in 1880s Britain is still: G. Stedman Jones, op cit: see also: D. Fraser, op cit, pp.122-123

79. Irish Builder, 1 November 1883, p.336: also 1 May 1883, p.131; 1 December 1883, pp.367-368

80. Dublin Sanitary Association, op cit, p.37: also T.W. Grimshaw, op cit


82. NLI MSS, Ms.22,978 (Davitt to Smith, 15 March 1886)


84. PP 1880 xxx Cd.2605, "Report of the Royal Commissioners appointed to inquire into the Sewerage and Drainage of the City of Dublin, and other matters connected therewith, together with Minutes of Evidence, Appendix, Index, etc.", f.90: Irish Builder, 1 August 1881, p.231; 15 October 1881, p.275; 15 October 1881, pp.308-309; 15 November 1881, p.340; 15 May 1882, pp.140-142

85. Irish Builder, 1 August 1882, pp.216-217; 1 June 1883, p.164; 1 December 1883, p.369; 15 February 1884, p.49; 1 September 1884, p.254


87. PP 1914 Cd. 7317 xix, "Appendix to the Report of the Departmental Committee appointed by the ILGB to inquire into the Housing Conditions of the Working Classes in the City of Dublin: Minutes of Evidence, with appendices", ff.118-135

88. they were: Dublin Corporation, 230; Cork Corporation, 90; Waterford Corporation, 42; Kilkenny UDC, 37; Sligo UDC, 28; Wexford UDC, 26; New Ross TC, 26; Limerick Corporation, 24; Cavan UDC, 20; Waterford Corporation, 17; Mullingar UDC, 16; Kinsale TC, 13; Enniskillen UDC, 12; Trim TC, 3: for

92. 345 HC DEB, 24 June 1890, cols.1850-52 (Chance), 1859 (Kenny)
95. M. Daly, op cit, pp.152-165,175-202
96. M. Swenarton, op cit, p.30
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1900 Cd.338 xxxv, "28th Annual Report of ILGB for year ending 31 March 1900". f.lxv-lxvi: Irish Builder, 1 April 1900, p.327: W. Thompson, Housing Up-to-date, 1907, pp.96-97

100. PP 1901 Cd.724 xvii, "69th Annual Report of the Commissioners of Public Works in Ireland for year ending 31 March 1901, f.547


107. 352 HC DEB, 28 April 1891, col.1621 (Parnell)


109. a second private members' Irish Housing Bill in February 1892 sank without trace: 1.1 HC DEB, 10 February 1892, col.162


111. 84 HC DEB, 25 June 1900, col.978 (Chaplin): 101 HC DEB, 17 January 1902, cols.218-221 (Field), 233-236 (Nannetti)

112. RPDCD, 1903 (Vol.3), no.176, pp.381-396: A. Roche, op cit, pp.7-8


114. Freemans Journal, 8 May 1906, p.11; 29 October 1907, p.8

115. Freemans Journal, 22 February 1907, p.9; 20 December 1907, p.10: 17 February 1908, p.8; 17 October 1910, p.8; 20 October 1910, p.9; 3 November 1910, p.5: Irish Builder, 26 November 1910, p.732; 18 February 1911, p.100

116. 118 HC DEB, 18 February 1903, cols.191-193 (Field)


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119. Irish Builder, 13 July 1907, p.497
121. Irish Worker, 27 December 1913, p.1: J.V. O'Brien, op cit, p.143
122. PP 1914 Cd.7317 xix, "Appendix to the Report of the Departmental Committee appointed by the ILGB to inquire into the Housing Conditions of the Working Classes in the City of Dublin: Minutes of Evidence, with appendices", ff.139-146, 444-450 (Appendix X): Irish Builder, 4 December 1902, p.1504; 3 December 1904, pp.804-806; 22 September 1906, p.767
123. P.C. Cowan, op cit, pp.9-12
124. Freemans Journal, 11 October 1913, p.6: also 5 October 1906, p.7: Irish Builder, 16 July 1903, p.1880; 10 April 1915, p.175: RPDCD, 1915 (Vol.1), no.78, p.753: M. Daly, op cit, pp.173-174: there was not the same structure of cheap workmen’s fares on Dublin’s public transport as in British cities, and the tram company was owned by William Martin Murphy, a supporter of the Independent Nationalists and hostile towards Dublin Corporation
125. M. Gough, op cit, pp.311-314
126. Freemans Journal, 5 April 1907, p.10; 7 February 1908, p.6; 18 February 1908, p.2: Irish Builder, 15 July 1890, p.167; 15 June 1900, p.387; 18 November 1905, p.830; 6 April 1907, pp.234-241; 14 December 1907, p.845; 3 October 1908, p.608; 20 February 1909, p.113
128. Freemans Journal, 8 January 1906, p.8: also 24 February 1906, p.5; 12 November 1906, p.9
129. Freemans Journal, 8 October 1907, p.5: also 29 January 1906, p.5; 6 March 1906, pp.6-7,9; 13 March 1906, p.7; 6 April 1906, p.7; 5 June 1906, p.3; 31 August 1906, pp.4-5; 13 October 1906, p.4; 1 November 1906, p.10; 26 March 1907, p.8; 9 April 1907, p.8; 19 April 1907, p.10; 20 May 1907, p.10; 21 May 1907, p.6; 13 July 1907, p.10; 3 August 1907, p.9; 30 October 1907, p.2; 12 December 1907, p.4; 20 December 1907, p.10; 27 January 1908, p.8
130. Freemans Journal, 24 September 1906, p.8
131. Freemans Journal, 21 January 1907, p.8: also 14 October 1906, p.5; 5 November 1906, p.8; 22 October 1907, p.8
134. 186 HC DEB, 20 March 1908, col.966 (Nannetti)
135. 158 HC DEB, 28 May 1906, col.1009-1010 (Bryce),1013 (Redmond): 159 HC DEB, 19 June 1906, cols.46-47 (Redmond, Bryce); 26 June 1906, cols.782-783 (Redmond, Cherry): 169 HC DEB, 26 February 1907, col.1447 (Joyce, Birrell): 177 HC DEB, 1 July 1907, col.341 (Ginnell, Birrell); 3 July 1907, cols.700-701 (O'Shaugnessy, Birrell): 10 July 1907, cols.1616-1617 (O'Shaugnessy, Cherry): 181 HC DEB, 22 August 1907, col.1100 (McHugh, Birrell)
References for Chapter 2 (pp.58-107)


140. *Freemans Journal*, 29 October 1907, p.8

141. *Freemans Journal*, 7 November 1907, p.7


143. *Freemans Journal*, 18 November 1907, p.8: also 23 November 1907, pp.6-8: 25 November 1907, pp.7-9: 28 November 1907, pp.7-8


145. PP 1908 Bills 6/268/389, "Housing of the Working Classes (Ireland) Bill, 1908, and various amendments": *Freemans Journal*, 3 March 1908, pp.7-9: 4 March 1908, p.6

146. 183 HC DEB, 3 February 1908, col.541 (Hogan, etc.): 186 HC DEB, 20 March 1908, cols.928-937 (Hogan, Clancy): the Irish Housing Fund was to be achieved by investing £370,000 from the dormant portion of the Irish Suitors Fund and then using the proceeds, and by appropriating £25,000 each year from the Irish Crown and Quit Rents income

147. 186 HC DEB, 20 March 1908, col.968 (Redmond): also col.949-953 (Lonsdale), 956-960 (Barrie), 969-970 (Sloan)

148. 185 HC DEB, 9 March 1908, col.1086 (Birrell); 11 March 1908, col.1494 (Sheehan, Burns)

149. PRO/T.1/11668/18955 (Birrell to Montagu, 22 September 1914)

150. S. Merrett, op cit, pp.26-27

151. 186 HC DEB, 20 March 1908, col.982 (Birrell)

152. SPO/CSO.RP (1913)/21697, (speeches by Clancy and Birrell at AMAI deputation to Chief Secretary Birrell on 17 October 1913)

153. 186 HC DEB, 20 March 1908, col.933 (Clancy): 192 HC DEB, 10 July 1908, col.304 (Clancy, Nannetti)

154. 189 HC DEB, 27 May 1908, col.1040 (Lloyd George)


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158. *Freemans Journal*, 2 September 1908, p.8; 5 January 1910, p.7: also 19 June 1908, p.6; 6 July 1908, p.10; 23 October 1908, p.8; 24 May 1910, p.8; 192 HC DEB, 10 July 1908, col.277 (Redmond)

159. *Freemans Journal*, 8 March 1909, p.8: also 3 June 1908, p.6; 15 June 1908, p.6; 11 July 1908, p.7; 20 August 1908, p.8; 8 January 1909, p.8; 29 September 1911, p.4; *Irish Builder*, 6 February 1909, p.69: 61 HC DEB, 16 April 1914, cols. 352-353 (Clancy)


162. *Freemans Journal*, 15 February 1909, p.8

163. *Freemans Journal*, 8 June 1911, p.6


165. SPO/CSO.RP (1913)/21697, (speech by Hadden at AMAI deputation to Chief Secretary Birrell, 17 October 1913)

166. SPO/CSO.RP (1913)/21697, (speech by Clancy at AMAI deputation to Chief Secretary Birrell, 17 October 1913)


170. PRO/T.1/11009/8105 (Irish Board of Works to Treasury, 13 April 1909): SPO/CSO.RP (1913)/22106 (1910: 24849), (memo on 1908 Housing Act, undated but probably June 1910): 20 HC DEB, 22 November 1910, cols.283-284 (Ginnell, Birrell): PP 1911 Cd.5847 xxxiii, "39th Annual Report of ILGB for year ending 31 March 1911", ff.56-57: the first Clancy Act schemes were completed in the financial year 1910-11, with municipalities such as Kingstown UDC being the first to receive subsidy payments from the Irish Housing Fund

171. SPO/CSO.RP (1914)/13552, ("Loans for Housing Purposes (Ireland)", HMSO, 1914)

172. 52 HC DEB, 21 April 1913, cols.50-51: a slightly different spread, but the same total, is given in: Irish Government White Paper, op cit, p.35 (Appendix 1.1)

173. an ILGB housing official stated in mid-1911 that around 6,000 working class dwellings had been built in urban areas by that date, and a memo by the same department in late-1913 puts the number of completions at nearly 7,400 units: both these would support a much later official figure of 7,600 urban dwellings built by pre-war Irish municipalities: *Irish Architect and Craftsman*, 19 August 1911, pp.414-416: SPO/CSO.RP (1913)/21697, (memo by Bourke, 8 October 1913): Irish Government White Paper, op cit, p.35 (Appendix 1.1): see also: PP 1914 Cd.7317 xix, "Appendix to the Report of the Departmental Committee appointed by the ILGB to inquire into the Housing of the Working Classes in the City of Dublin: Minutes of Evidence, with appendices", ff.478-503 (Appendices xxxvi-xxxvii): an estimate of 8,700 dwellings in 1919, ie. including war-time building,

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is given in A. McCashin & M. Morrissey, "Housing Policy: North and South", *Administration*, vol.33 no.3, 1985, p.298

174. British local authority expenditure on housing by 1914 has been put at only £1,000,000 per year, and municipal dwellings formed less than 5% of new houses in Britain between 1890-1914: S. Merrett, op cit, pp.26-27: E. Hobsbawm, op cit, p.166: J. Burnett, op cit, p.181: M.J. Daunton, op cit (1983), p.194

175. *Freemans Journal*, 5 March 1913, p.8: also SPO/CSO.RP (1913)/21697, (speech by Clancy at AMAI deputation to Chief Secretary Birrell on 17 October 1913)

176. PRO/T.1/11668/18955 (Birrell to Montagu, 22 September 1914)

177. statistics here taken from: PP 1914 Cd.7317 xix, "Appendix to the Report of the Departmental Committee appointed by the ILGB to inquire into the Housing of the Working Classes in the City of Dublin: Minutes of Evidence, with appendices", ff.478-503 (Appendices xxxvi-xxxvii)

178. *Freemans Journal*, 12 January 1911, p.10

179. *Freemans Journal*, 9 January 1911, p.8; 24 January 1911, p.5; 20 February 1911, p.10; 30 March 1911, p.9; 14 October 1911, p.6; 26 October 1911, p.5; 14 November 1911, p.8; 12 August 1912, p.4; 24 September 1912, pp.4,6; 12 November 1912, p.9; 29 November 1912, p.10; 17 December 1912, pp.4,6; 10 April 1913, p.6; 13 September 1913, p.5; 7 January 1914, p.6: *Irish Builder*, 4 February 1911, p.83; 1 April 1911, p.209; 10 June 1911, p.377; 28 October 1911, p.709


181. *Freemans Journal*, 25 February 1913, p.8; 4 April 1913, p.9; 11 November 1913, p.8; 24 January 1914, p.7

182. Department of Local Government and Public Health, op cit, pp.205-210


185. M. Gough, op cit, p.314


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189. SPO/CSO.RP (1913)/21697, (speech by Kerr, from memo on AMAI deputation to Chief Secretary Birrell on 17 October 1913): also Irish Architect and Craftsman, 9 November 1912, p.1164


192. P.J. Waller, op cit, pp.151,259

193. Freemans Journal, 20 August 1908, pp.7-8: also 8 January 1909, p.7

194. SPO/CSO.RP (1913)/21697, (speech by Sherlock at AMAI deputation to Chief Secretary Birrell, 17 October 1913)

195. AMAI, Report of Conference held in City Hall Dublin on 11th & 12th December 1912, 1913, p.71: SPO/CSO.RP (1913)/21697, (memo by Bourke, 8 October 1913)


197. PP 1914 Cd.7317 xix, "Appendix to the Report of the Departmental Committee appointed by the ILGB to inquire into the Housing Conditions of the Working Classes in the City of Dublin: Minutes of Evidence, with appendices", f.496 (Appendix xxxvii): P.C. Cowan, op cit, pp.41-42


199. Freemans Journal, 19 January 1911, p.9


203. M. Daly, op cit, p.308

204. P.C. Cowan, op cit, plans 17-19: Irish Builder, 24 October 1914, p.589

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July 1909, p.469; 6 August 1910, p.504; 14 August 1915, p.357; 28 August 1915, pp.377,386: it should be noted that Irish architects deplored the accompanying practice of fee-tendering to cut design costs.


211. SPO/CSO.RP (1913)/21697 (Bourke, ILGB to Le Fanu, CSO, 8 October 1913); (1913)/22106 (1912: 23533), (memo on parliamentary question by Clancy, 18 June 1912): 61 HC DEB, 16 April 1914, col.352 (Clancy): 62 HC DEB, 21 May 1914, col.2114-2115 (Birrell).


216. *Freemans Journal*, 9 December 1910, p.6; 29 September 1911, p.4; 7 January 1913, p.6; SPO/CSO.RP (1913)/(1911): 24381), (memo on parliamentary question by Ffrench, 23 March 1911): 21 HC DEB, 21 February 1911, cols.1870-1871 (Doris, Birrell); 23 HC DEB, 23 March 1911, col.593 (Ffrench, Birrell); 30 March 1911, cols.1512-1513 (Sheehan, Birrell).

217. 34 HC DEB, 27 February 1912, cols.1205-1231 (Birrell, Banbury, Clancy, Mitchell-Thompson, Castlereaigh, Craig, Birrell).

218. AMAI, op cit: *Times*, 16 October 1913, p.15.f; 16 October 1913, p.10.d: 17 October 1913, p.5.e: *Freemans Journal*, 25 October 1912, p.4: 25 February 1913, pp.8,10; 17 April 1913, pp.6,8; 23 April 1913, p.4; 12 June 1913, p.6; 21 August 1913, p.9: 16 October 1913, p.10; 18 October 1913, pp.5,7; 12 November 1913, p.5: 12 May 1914, p.8; 15 July 1914, p.5: *Irish Times*, 3 February 1913, p.6; 10 March 1913, p.516 October 1913, pp.4,7: *Dundalk Democrat*, 14 June 1913, p.4: *Irish Architect and Building Trades Journal*, 14 December 1912, p.1219, 21 December 1912, pp.1237-1239; 8 March 1913, pp.77-78,80-81; 22 November 1913, p.527: SPO/CSO.RP (1913)/21697 (Heron, AMAI to Le Fanu, CSO, 16 October 1913: much of the AMAI's effectiveness was due to its diligent secretary, R. Finlay Heron, Clerk to Blackrock UDC.


References for Chapter 2 (pp.58-107)

223. Irish Worker, 1 November 1913, pp.1-2
225. E. Larkin, ”Socialism and Catholicism in Ireland”, Church History, vol.30, 1964, pp.462-482: E. Rumpf & D. Hepburn, Nationalism and Socialism in Twentieth Century Ireland, 1977, pp.15-16: James Larkin turned briefly to guild cooperativism before going to the USA in late 1914, and was jailed during the infamous 1919 ”Red Scare” before returning to Ireland in April 1923 to deepen the split within the Irish labour movement through a bitter struggle for control of the ITGWU against the more moderate William O’Brien: James Connolly stayed in Dublin to inherit the leadership of the battered ITGWU, before embarking on his tragic plan for a military insurrection by the Citizens Army which was to result in martyrdom in the 1916 Easter Rising
226. Freemans Journal, 3 September 1913, p.6
227. A. Wright, op cit, p.151
229. Irish Worker, 17 July 1911, p.2: also 5 August 1911, p.4; 10 June 1911, p.1; 29 July 1911, p.1; 21 October 1911, p.1; 18 November 1911, p.1; 20 January 1912, p.2; 9 March 1912, p.1; 1 June 1912, p.4; 31 August 1912, p.3; 7 September 1912, p.4; 20 September 1913, p.11; 27 September 1913, p.1; 8 October 1913, p.4; 8 November 1913, p.1; 15 November 1913, p.1; 6 December 1913, p.2; 27 December 1913, p.1; 8 February 1914, p.2; 14 February 1914, p.2; 26 September 1914, p.3: D.J. O’Neill, ”Explaining Irish Underdevelopment: Plunkett and Connolly prior to 1916”, Eire-Ireland, vol.22 no.4. Winter 1987, p.61
230. Irish Worker, 3 January 1914, p.1: also 14 February 1914, p.2
231. Freemans Journal, 6 October 1913, p.7: also 7 October 1913, p.7; 6 November 1913, p.10; 17 November 1913, p.9; 24 November 1913, p.7; 26 November 1913, p.7: E. Larkin, op cit (1965), pp.126,134,141
232. Freemans Journal, 6 October 1913, p.9
233. Freemans Journal, 13 January 1914, p.10
234. Irish Worker, 16 May 1914, p.2
235. Freemans Journal, 20 May 1914, p.4
236. Worker, 26 December 1914, p.2
237. M. Daly, op cit, p.319
238. A. Wright, op cit, pp.256,265
240. Freemans Journal, 4 September 1913, p.9: also 3 September 1913, p.8: Irish Times, 5 September 1913, p.8
241. Irish Builder, 8 November 1913, pp.700-701: for the reaction of the intelligentsia, see: R. Foster, op cit, pp.444-445
242. Freemans Journal, 30 September 1913, p.5
243. Freemans Journal, 8 October 1913, p.8: also 28 October 1913, p.8; 10 November 1913, p.8
244. Freemans Journal, 1 June 1914, p.3: also 1 January 1914, p.8; 20 February 1914, p.5; 23 February 1914, pp.7-8: Irish Worker, 18 April 1914, p.4; 23 May 1914, p.1
245. Times, 20 September 1913, p.3, f; 1 December 1913, p.69, c/d: Manchester Guardian, reprinted in Irish Worker, 22 November 1913, p.2
246. Irish Times, 4 September 1913, p.6: also 1 November 1913, p.6: 13 January 1914, p.4; 3 February 1914, p.4; 23 February 1914, p.4
248. Freemans Journal, 13 September 1913, p.5: the same view was later expressed by the IPP MP, William Field, and the Dublin Trades Council: Irish Builder, 3
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February 1917, p.52; PRO/T.1/ 11914/7107 no.10641 (memorandum from Dublin Trades Council, attached to letter from Henry, Dublin Corporation to Montagu, Treasury, 13 November 1915)


250. HLL, Lloyd George Papers, C/10/2/24a (Addison to Lloyd George, 10 November 1913); C/10/2/24b (Lloyd George to Addison, 11 November 1913)

251. *Freemans Journal*, 17 November 1913, p.8

252. *Irish Times*, 17 September 1913, p.4

253. SPO/CSO.RP (1913)/21697 (note on AMAI deputation to Birrell, 17 October 1913)

254. SPO/CSO.RP (1913)/21697, (note on WNHAII deputation to Birrell, 29 October 1913): *Irish Times*, 18 October 1913, p.6; 21 October 1913, p.6; 30 October 1913, p.6

255. BODLEIAN MSS, Ms.Asquith.38, f.236 (Birrell to Asquith, 16 October 1913, f.236): L. O'Broin, op cit, pp.126-127

256. SPO/CSO.RP (1913)/21697, (note on NHTPAI deputation to Birrell, 31 October 1913)

257. BODLEIAN MSS, Ms.Asquith.38, f.197 (Birrell to Asquith, 20 September 1913): L. O'Broin, op cit, pp.74,78

258. *Times*, 7 November 1913, p.6.b; 8 November p.8.c: for HTPAI manoeuvres, see: SPO/CSO.RP (1913)/21697, (Irish Office to Griffiths, NHTPAI, 7 November 1913; Griffiths, NHTPAI, to Birrell, 12 November 1913; note by Robinson, ILGB, 17 November 1913)

259. SPO/CSO.RP (1913)/21697, (note on arguments against a Vice-Regal Commission, unsigned and undated, but probably by CSO in October 1913: *Freemans Journal*, 1 November 1913, pp.7-8)

260. *Times*, 26 November 1913, p.8.a/b: *Freemans Journal*, 24 November 1913, p.7; 26 November 1913, p.7: thus there seems no basis for the recent claim that the Castle Administration was reluctant to undertake an inquiry, in J.V. O'Brien, op cit, p.150

261. *Freemans Journal*, 11 November 1913, p.8,10; 26 November 1913, p.6; 8 January 1914, p.6; 10 January 1914, p.6; 13 January 1914, pp.6-7; 9 March 1914, p.6; 15 January 1914, p.9

262. PP 1914 Cd. 7273 xix, "Report of the Departmental Committee appointed by the Local Government Board for Ireland to inquire into the Housing Conditions of the Working Classes in the City of Dublin": PP 1914 Cd. 7317 xix, "Appendix to the Report of the Departmental Committee appointed by the Local Government Board for Ireland to inquire into the Housing Conditions of the Working Classes in the City of Dublin: Minutes of Evidence, with appendices"


266. *Freemans Journal*, 19 November 1913, p.11

267. PP 1914 Cd. 7317 xix, "Appendix to the Report of the Departmental Committee appointed by the Local Government Board for Ireland to inquire into the Housing Conditions of the Working Classes in the City of Dublin: Minutes of Evidence, with appendices", f.195: see also: *Irish Worker*, 8 November 1913, p.2

References for Chapter 2 (pp.58-107)

269. PP 1914 Cd. 7273 xix, "Report of the Departmental Committee appointed by the Local Government Board for Ireland to inquire into the Housing Conditions of the Working Classes in the City of Dublin", f.88

270. ibid, f.89

271. ibid, f.94


275. *Irish Worker*, 28 March 1914, p.4: *Freemans Journal*, 5 March 1914, p.5

276. RPDCD vol.2 no.120 (1914), pp.155-187; vol.1 no.35 (1916), pp.337-357


279. *Times*, 3 November 1913, p.5,d


281. SPO/CSO.RP (1913)/24059, (Barlas to Under Secretary, 26 November 1913): SPO/CSO.RP (1914)/5006, (Robinson to Treasury, 24 February 1914): PRO/T.1/11782/5824 no.7882, (Williams to Treasury, 13 April 1914): PRO/T.1/11914/7107 no.10069 (Williams to Treasury, 13 May 1914)

282. PRO/T.143/1, f.162 (Headlam to Treasury, 7 March 1914): also PRO/T.143/1, ff.329-330, (Headlam to Treasury, 3 December 1913): SPO/CSO.RP (1913)/24059, (Heath to Under Secretary, 10 December 1913): CSO/RP (1914)/5006, (Robinson to Treasury, 24 February 1914; Heath to Under Secretary, 21 March 1914)

283. *Freemans Journal*, 24 November 1913, p.7; 26 November 1913, pp.6-7; 10 January 1914, p.6; 24 February 1914, p.5: 50 HC DEB, 12 March 1913, col. 243 (Birrell)


3. THE INFLUENCE OF EARLY IRISH STATE HOUSING ON BRITISH POLICY (pp.108-123)


4. *Freemans Journal*, 20 March 1911, p.8


7. *Irish Builder*, 4 January 1913, p.19

8. *Irish Builder*, 1 August 1914, p.471; also 6 December 1913, p.757


10. L. Weaver, op cit, p.15: also pp.12-17


14. *Municipal Journal*, vol.21 no.1031, 1 November 1912, p.iii: also pp.i-iv (supplement on the visit of the National Housing and Town Planning Council
References for Chapter 3 (pp.108-123)

depuration): Garden Cities and Town Planning, vol.11 no.11, November 1912, pp.250-251: Times, 1 November 1912, p.4, d


17. Builder, 5 January 1917, p.4: see also: J.G. Allen, The Cheap Cottage and Small Home, 1912,preface


19. Times, 13 September 1909, p.2,f; 19 September 1911, p.5,f; 22 February 1912, p.6,a; 29 July 1912, p.7,f, 8,a: Walter Long Papers, 62403 (Long to Lansdowne, 27 June 1914): HLL, Bonar Law Papers, 26/3/28 (Collings to Law, 17 May 1912); 29/4/5 (Strachey to Law, 5 May 1913); 29/4/8 (Strachey to Law, 13 May 1913); 29/5/8 (Strachey to Law, 3 June 1914): Times, 28 July 1913, p.11,f: C. Williams-Ellis, Cottage Building in Cob, Pise, Chalk and Clay: A Renaissance, 1919, p.13: L. Weaver, op cit: Strachey had organised the 1905 Letchworth Cheap Cottages Competition, and had built on his estate near Guildford several cheap model cottages based on the use of innovative techniques such as timber framing and pise-de-terre, to designs by Clough Williams-Ellis and himself

20. 51 HC DEB, 18 April 1913, col.2299 (Long)

21. BL ADD MSS, Walter Long Papers, Ms.62403 (Long to Lansdowne, 27 June 1914): HLL, Bonar Law Papers, 26/3/28 (Collings to Law, 17 May 1912); 29/4/5 (Strachey to Law, 5 May 1913); 29/4/8 (Strachey to Law, 13 May 1913); 29/5/8 (Strachey to Law, 3 June 1914): WRO, Walter Long Papers, 947/441 (Fisher to Long, 9 January 1914): HLL, Bonar Law Papers, Ms.46335 (diary entry for 4 April 1913, f.77); Walter Long Papers, Ms.62403 (Long to Lansdowne, 27 June 1914); 62404 (Long to Bonar Law, 27 June 1913 ?): HLL, Bonar Law Papers, 26/3/28 (Collings to Law, 17 May 1912); 29/4/5 (Strachey to Law, 5 May 1913); 29/4/8 (Strachey to Law, 13 May 1913); 29/5/8 (Strachey to Law, 3 June 1914): Times, 28 July 1913, p.11,f: C. Williams-Ellis, Cottage Building in Cob, Pise, Chalk and Clay: A Renaissance, 1919, p.13: L. Weaver, op cit: Strachey had organised the 1905 Letchworth Cheap Cottages Competition, and had built on his estate near Guildford several cheap model cottages based on the use of innovative techniques such as timber framing and pise-de-terre, to designs by Clough Williams-Ellis and himself


23. HLL, Bonar Law Papers, 24/2/164 (Long to Law, 29 December 1911)

24. HLL, Bonar Law Papers, 32/2/5 (Flannery to Bonar Law, 2 April 1914)

25. PRO/HLG.29/106 (memo by Kershaw on "The Housing of the Working Classes Bill 1912", 12 March 1912)

26. 51 HC DEB, 4 April 1913, cols.714 (Fletcher),736-744 (Stanier),745-750 (Atherley-Jones): also Times, 21 January 1913, p.10,f; 28 July 1913, p.11,a-c

27. 51 HC DEB, 18 April 1913, cols.2240-2241 (Baker),2281 (Cavendish-Bentinck),2298-2299 (Long): 35 HC DEB, 15 March 1912, cols.1424 (Boscawen),1433-1434 (Bathurst),1461 (Guinness),1465-1466 (Sutton): 65 HC DEB, 24 July

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1914, col.854 (Boscawen): National Unionist Association of Conservative and Liberal Unionist Associations, op cit (1914), p.563

28. 18 HC DEB, 7 July 1910, cols.1822-1823 (Jardine),1823-1824; 51 HC DEB, 4 April 1913, col.717 (Fletcher): 61 HC DEB, 16 April 1914, cols.361-362 (Boscawen),362 (Brady)


31. HLL, Lloyd George Papers, C/36/2/19 (deputation of Welsh slate producers to Lloyd George on 30 May 1914, from Manchester Guardian, 1 June 1914): M.J. Daunton, op cit, pp.53-54

32. HLL, Lloyd George Papers, C/36/1/24 (speech by Lloyd George at Oxford Union debate on 21 November 1913, reported in Oxford Chronicle, 28 November 1913): also C/12/2/17 (memorandum by Lloyd George for Cabinet, 19 October 1913); C/15/2/3 (memorandum by Lloyd George for Cabinet, June 1914: E. David (ed), Inside Asquith's Cabinet: From the Diaries of Charles Hothouse, 1977, p.147: C. Bellamy, Administering central-local relations, 1871-1919: the Local Government Board and its fiscal and cultural context, 1988, p.24


34. BL ADD MSS, Burns Mss, Ms.46335 (diary entries for 3 April 1913, f.77; 4 April 1913, f.77; 18 April 1913, f.83; 19 April 1913, f.84; 10 October 1913, f.170; 17 October 1913, f.173; 24 October 1913, f.177; 6 November 1913, f.183, 7 November 1913, f.184, 2 December 1913, f.196, 4 December 1913, f.197); Ms.46336 (diary entry for 29 January 1914, f.39): HLL, Lloyd George Papers, C/3/9/1 (Burns to Lloyd George, 9 October 1913): K.B. Brown, John Burns, 1977, p.172: E. David (ed), op cit, pp.147-8: P. Wilding, op cit, pp.4-12: C. Bellamy, op cit, pp.96-97

35. 51 HC DEB, 4 April 1913, col.774 (Burns)

36. E. David (ed), op cit, p.148

37. 188 HC DEB, 12 May 1908, col.1047 (Masterman)

38. 61 HC DEB, 16 April 1914, col.393 (Birrell): 51 HC DEB, 4 April 1913, col.756 (Banbury): also 18 April 1913, col. 2284 (Verney),2312-2313 (Burns): 35 HC DEB, 15 March 1912, cols.1483-1491 (Burns): Times, 4 July 1912, p.10.b

39. A. Offer, op cit, pp.363-384


42. M. Swenarton, op cit, pp.41- 44

43. Times, 3 July 1912, p.6.d; 11 January 1913, p.10.f; 22 January 1913, p.7.e; 28 July 1913, p.11.f: L. Weaver, op cit, pp.12-15

44. 41 HC DEB, 30 July 1912, col.1833 (Bathurst, Asquith): 42 HC DEB, 10 October 1912, cols.519-520 (Boscawen, Asquith): 22 October 1912, col.1909 (Boscawen, Asquith)
References for Chapter 3 (pp.108-123)

45. 58 HC DEB, 16 February 1914, col. 547; 18 February 1914, cols.976 (Barnes),994 (Brady),1015-1017 (Roberts): 59 HC DEB, 5 March 1914, cols.584 (Boscawen),629 (Cooper): 12 March 1914, cols.1530-1532 (Boscawen),1536 (Birrell): 60 HC DEB, 24 March 1914, col.201 (Brady, Birrell): 30 March 1914, col.797: *Freemans Journal*, 27 October 1913, p.7; et seq

46. 61 HC DEB, 16 April 1914, col.371 (Brady)

47. ibid, col.361 (Boscawen)

48. ibid, cols.392-393 (Birrell)

49. ibid, col .394 (Birrell)

50. *Irish Times*, 17 April 1914, p.6: also 14 January 1914, p.4: *Freemans Journal*, 13 January 1914, pp.6-9: *Glasgow Herald*, 17 April 1914, p.8

51. 62 HC DEB, 20 May 1914, col. 2008 (Healy)

52. HLL, Lloyd George Papers, C/7/3/8 (Redmond to Lloyd George, 7 April 1914)

53. HLL, Lloyd George Papers, C/3/8/3 (Birrell to Lloyd George, Easter Monday [13 April 1914])


55. HLL, Lloyd George Papers, C/13/1/18 (note from Redmond to Lloyd George, 11 May 1914): 62 HC DEB, 4 May 1914, cols.76-78 (Lloyd George); *Freemans Journal*, 7 May 1914, p. 9; 12 May 1914, p.8: *Irish Builder*, 23 May 1914, p.314

56. 62 HC DEB, 14 May 1914, col.1283 (Lloyd George); 18 May 1914, cols.1598 (Lloyd George),1739 (Samuel); 19 May 1914, col.1758 (Lloyd George); 20 May 1914, cols.1954 (Lloyd George),1975-1976 (Samuel)

57. 63 HC DEB, 24 June 1914, col.1882 (Lloyd George): also 62 HC DEB, 7 May 1914, col.541 (Newman): 63 HC DEB, 25 June 1914, col.2024, et seq

58. M. Swenarton, op cit, p.34: it is therefore necessary, as Swenarton argues, to discount the misreading of the pre-war situation that states that the Government had decided on a subsidised housing policy by mid-1914, as is erroneously given in: P. Wilding, op cit, pp.15-16: the lack of a cohesive Cabinet policy on housing comes as no surprise when it is considered that similar inconsistency existed in relation to an issue that the Cabinet had placed higher up its agenda, namely unemployment relief: J. Harris, *Unemployment and Politics: A study in English Social Policy 1886-1914*, 1972, p.352

59. M. Swenarton, op cit, pp.44- 47: a total of £5,000,000 of public loans was to be made available under the 1914 Housing Act (40% for military bases, 60% for rural labourers) to build in all around 25,000 dwellings - the Treasury were to increase the proportion of low-interest loans to public utility societies from 66% to 90% of capital expenditure

60. 65 HC DEB, 24 July 1914, col. 809 (Runciman), 853-854 (Boscawen)

61. 65 HC DEB, 21 July 1914, col. 266 (Birrell); 24 July 1914, col. 809 (Runciman): SPO/CSO.RP(1914)/4932, (resolution from Irishwomen’s Reform League, 20 March 1914: SPO/CSO.RP (1914)/5234 (resolution from Dublin Trades Council, March 1914): SPO/CSO.RP (1914)/8305, (resolution from Citizens Housing League, 20 May 1914)


63. *Freemans Journal*, 9 April 1914, p.9; 11 April 1914, p.4: *Irish Worker*, 25 April 1914. p.2


65. *Freemans Journal*, 1 January 1914, p.6; 7 January 1914, p.6; 1 July 1914, p.4: 2 July 1914, p.4; 7 July 1914, p.5; 15 December 1914, p.3: *Irish Times*, 31 December 1913, p.4; 7 January 1914, p.6; 13 January 1914, p.4

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67. Freemans Journal, 13 May 1914, p.9: Irish Times, 6 May 1914, p.8, 19 May 1914, pp.6,8; 20 May 1914, p.8: Irish Worker, 9 May 1914, p.2: Citizens Housing League, op cit

68. Freemans Journal, 19 May 1914, p.5; 22 June 1914, p.10; 23 June 1914, p.4; 30 June 1914, p.4; 1 July 1914, p.4; 2 July 1914, p.4; 6 July 1914, p.4; 7 July 1914, p.5; 8 July 1914, p.4; 17 September 1914, p.3


70. Freemans Journal, 19 May 1914, p.5: Irish Times, 30 May 1914, p.9: Dublin Corporation Council Minutes, 18 May 1914, min.378b: PRO/T.1/11914/7107 no.1064 (Sherlock to Lloyd George, 10 July 1914)

71. SPO/CSO.RP (1914)/9641, (note by Magill to Under Secretary, 11 June 1914): Freemans Journal, 15 July 1914, p.5; Irish Times, 20 June 1914, p.6: Dublin Corporation Council Minutes, 19 June 1914, min.470


73. PRO/T.1/11914/7107 no.1064 (note by "J.P.H.", 19 August 1914, on letter from Sherlock to Lloyd George, 10 July 1914)


76. Irish Worker, 21 March 1914, p.1

77. Freemans Journal, 8 January 1914, p.10; Irish Builder, 2 May 1914, p.1: also 28 March 1914, p.181


79. Irish Worker, 2 May 1914, p.4; 6 June 1914, p.1

80. Freemans Journal, 1 June 1914, p.3; 2 June 1914, p.2; 3 June 1914, p.8: Irish Worker, 20 June 1914, p.2

81. Irish Worker, 11 July 1914, p.2; 18 July 1914, p.2

References for Chapter 4 (pp. 124-135)

4. HOME RULE AND GARDEN SUBURB IDEALS IN IRELAND BEFORE 1914 (pp. 124-135)


3. Irish Architect and Craftsman, 5 August 1911, p.393

4. Freemans Journal, 8 January 1909, p.7


6. Lord & Lady Aberdeen, We Twa (2 Vols), 1925, pp.187-191


10. the course of events can be followed in: Irish Builder, 29 April 1911, p.265; 27 May 1911, p.358; 10 June 1911, pp.377,393,406; 24 June 1911, pp.422-425; 8 July 1911, pp.445,457,469; 5 August 1911, pp.513-514,517; 19 August 1911, pp.557; 2 September 1911, pp.578-585

11. BL ADD MSS, Burns Mss, Ms.46282, ff.122-123 (Violet Asquith to Burns, 4 May 1911)

12. Irish Builder, 28 October 1911, p.734; 9 December 1911, p.821; 20 January 1912, pp.44-45; 13 April 1912, p.213


15. Freemans Journal, 17 December 1912, pp.6

16. SPO/CSO.RP (1913)/2697 (report of AMAI deputation to Chief Secretary Birrell, 17 October 1913): see also Freemans Journal, 30 June 1914; 6 July 1914, p.4; 9 July 1915, p.8

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References for Chapter 4 (pp.124-135)


18. SPO/CSO.RP (1913)/21697 (Griffiths to Birrell, 12 November 1913; Robinson to Birrell, 17 November 1913)

19. PP 1914 Cd.7273 xix, "Report of the Departmental Committee appointed by the Local Government Board for Ireland to Inquire into the Housing Conditions of the Working Classes in the City of Dublin", ff.25,26,30

20. SPO/CSO.RP (1914)/6087 (brochure for Civic Exhibition, 25 February 1914): *Freemans Journal*, 12 March 1914, p.8; also 8 January 1914, p.9; 26 January 1914, p.4; 14 July 1914, p.8; 25 July 1914, p.8: for a description of the Exhibition, see: *Official Catalogue of the Civic Exhibition, Ireland*, 1914, 1914


23. PRO/T.1/11782/5824 no.3016 (brochure entitled "The Civic Exhibition: What it will do", undated): also (official brochure on Civic Exhibition, 1914, p.17)


25. PRO/T.1/11782/5824 no.14928 (note by "F.L.R.", 3 August 1914): (also O'Connell & Son to Irish Board of Works, 3 July 1914; Sharrah to Treasury, 20 July 1914; Williams to Treasury, 22 August 1914; no.3016 (note by Whitehouse, 8 May 1914; Lloyd George to Aberdeen, 8 May 1914; Aberdeen to Whitehouse, 12 May 1914; note by "F.L.H.", 16 May 1914; Aberdeen to Whitehouse, 19 May 1914; Brady to Montagu, 24 August 1914; MacFadyean to Brady, 25 August 1914; Brady to MacFadyean, 28 August 1914; Stevenson to Heath, 2 September 1914; MacFadyean to Brady, 4 September 1914; Aberdeen to Lloyd George, early February 1915; etc.); no.7882 (Williams to Treasury, 13 April 1914; Heath to Irish Board of Works, 18 April 1914; Stevenson to Heath, 29 April 1914); no.17511 (O'Connell & Son to Irish Board of Works, 18 August 1914; Treasury to Irish Board of Works, 28 August 1914)


29. H.E. Meller, op cit (1980), pp.216,223: the criticism by Geddes must, however, be seen as part of an internecine dispute in the Irish planning movement in the mid-1920s, as discussed briefly in Chapter 8

References for Chapter 4 (pp.124-135)


32. *Times*, 9 September 1916, p.5,d

33. *Freemans Journal*, 27 June 1914, p.8; 29 June 1914, p.4; 30 June 1914, p.4; 1 July 1914, p.4; 2 July 1914, p.4; 4 July 1914, p.8; 6 July 1914, p.4; 7 July 1914, pp.5,6; *Irish Times*, 1 July 1914, p.6; 7 July 1914, p.6; RPDCD 1914 (Vol.2), no.164, p.392; Dublin Corporation Minutes, 10 August 1914, min.606, pp.370-372; 5 October 1914, min.737, pp.432-433; 2 November 1914, min.780, p.453

34. RPDCD 1915 (Vol.1), no.78, pp.715-722: see also M. Miller, op cit, pp.267-279

35. RPDCD 1915 (Vol.1), no.78, p.752: for the British rationale for Unwinian garden suburbs, see: M. Swenarton, op cit, pp.40-47

36. M.J. Bannon, op cit, p.204; *Irish Builder*, 23 May 1914, p.324


40. P. Geddes, op cit, p.366


47. H.E. Meller, 1990, pp.201-288

48. ibid. p.189

49. NLS MSS, Ms.10514 (Geddes to Bermenting, 1 September 1914); Ms.10573 (Mears to Geddes, 20 December 1914; Mears to Geddes, 25 February 1915): Mears maintained his Dublin connections, and actually secured some work after the First World War, as will be seen in Chapter 8

50. G. Dix, op cit, p.106

References for Chapter 5 (pp. 136-166)

5. WAR-TIME HOUSING AND RECONSTRUCTION AFTER THE 1916 EASTER RISING (pp. 136-166)


2. PRO/T.1/11677/21753 (Montagu to MacFadyean, 30 September 1914); PRO/T.1/11813/19421 no.19421 ("M.G.H." to Bradbury, 31 March 1915); no.27579 (Bradbury to Montagu, 8 December 1914)

3. 65 HC Deb, 10 August 1914, col.2249 (Clancy)

4. PRO/T.1/11914/7107 no.28987 (Montagu to Redmond, 25 November 1914); PP 1914-16 (Cd.8119) xxxiv, "83rd Annual Report of Commissioners of Public Works for Ireland for year ending 31 March 1915", f.137

5. PRO/T.1/11668/18955 (Ramsay to ILGB, 30 September 1914): also (Montagu to Birrell, 29 September 1914)

6. PRO/T.1/11668/18955 (Clancy to Montagu, 7 October 1914): also (Clancy to Montagu, 19 October 1914; internal Treasury note by MacFadyean, 26 October 1914; internal Treasury note by Niemeyer, 26 October 1914; Clancy to Montagu, 25 November 1914; Montagu to Clancy, 27 November 1914)

7. PRO/T.1/11668/18955 (Montagu to Clancy, 15 October 1914)

8. RPDCD vol.2 no.128 (1915), pp.133-146: there was also a claim from a Londonderry public utility company: 68 HC Deb, 16 November 1914, cols.247-248 (Birrell); PRO/T.1/11712/28946 (Barlas, ILGB to Treasury, 21 December 1914; internal Treasury note by MacFadyean, 26 October 1914; internal Treasury note by Niemeyer, 26 October 1914; Clancy to Montagu, 25 November 1914; Montagu to Clancy, 27 November 1914)


12. PRO/T.1/11683/23569 no.23569 (Heath to Office of Public Works, 2 November 1914)

13. BODLEIAN MSS. Ms Nathan 465, f.63 (Nathan to Robinson, 18 October 1915); ff.78-80 (Nathan to Kelly, 20 October 1915)

14. *Irish Builder*, 3 March 1917, p.111: PRO/T.143/5 (Headlam to Leith Ross, 31 May 1917; Headlam to Leith Ross, 2 June 1917)


16. BODLEIAN MSS, Ms Nathan 449, ff.50-55 (Birrell to Nathan, 14 December 1914); ff.56-57 (Birrell to Nathan, 11 December 1914); Ms Nathan 462, ff.316-317 (Nathan to Birrell, 1 January 1915); PRO/T.143/3 (Headlam to Leith Ross, July 1915; Headlam to Treasury, 26 October 1915: PRO/T.143/4 (Headlam to Treasury, 30 November 1916)

17. PRO/T.1/11914/7107 no.28987 (Stevenson to Ramsay, 29 July 1914); no.21956

18. PRO/T.1/11914/7107 no.28987 (Montagu to Redmond, 25 November 1914)

19. PRO/T.1/11914/7107 no.7856 (note by Leith Ross, 8 April 1915)

20. RPDCD vol.3 no.240 (1915), pp.119-120

21. PRO/T.1/11808/17813 (memo by Leith-Ross, 17 July 1915)

22. PRO/T.1/11808/17813 (Robinson to Heath, 22 July 1915): also PRO/T.1/11914/7107 no.2501 (Robinson to Blackett, 22 March 1915)

23. *Freemans Journal*, 8 July 1915, p.8

24. PP 1916 (Cd.8414) xv, "84th Annual Report of Commissioners of Public Works for Ireland for year ending 31 March 1916", f.279

References for Chapter 5 (pp.136-166)


26. BODLEIAN MSS, Ms Nathan 460, ff.206-207 (Robinson to Nathan, 19 November 1915); Ms Nathan 465, f.341 (Nathan to Robinson, 18 November 1915), f.348 (Nathan to Fingall, 18 November 1915) and f.358 (Nathan to Fingall, 19 November 1915)

27. PRO/T.1/11808/17813 (Robinson to Heath, 22 July 1915); PRO/T.1/11914/7107 no.28987 (Headlam to MacFadyean, 12 August 1915): see also (Robinson to Redmond, 10 August 1915)

28. PRO/T.1/11914/7107 no.28987 (Redmond to Montagu, 2 September 1915)

29. NLI MSS, Redmond Papers, Ms.15261 (Redmond to Mayor of Waterford, 18 September 1915)

30. PRO/T.1/11914/7107 no.10641 (Robinson to Hewby, 8 December 1915)

31. RPDCD vol.1 no.35 (1916), pp.337-352: see also: PRO/T.1/11914/7107 no.10641: *Freemans Journal*, 13 November 1915, p.4

32. PRO/T. 1/11914/7107 no. 10641 (Robinson to Hewby, 8 December 1915)


39. quoted in L. O'Brien, op cit, p.166


42. BODLEIAN MSS, Ms Asquith 37, f.34 (Samuel to Asquith ?, 2 June 1916), ff.37-

38 (Chalmers to Bonham-Carter, 5 June 1916); Ms Asquith 44, f.70 (deputation to Samuel, 5 June 1916): PRO/T.1/12038/8599 no.20595 (Stevenson to Heath, 18 June 1916)


44. BODLEIAN MSS, Ms Asquith 44, f.72 (deputation to Samuel, 5 June 1916)

45. ibid, f.74

46. PRO/T.1/12038/8599 no.20595 (Heath to Hamilton, 21 June 1916)

47. BODLEIAN MSS, Dep.c.714, f.81 (Robinson to Duke, 21 August 1916)


50. BODLEIAN MSS, Dep.c.714, ff.154-160 (memorandum by O'Connor, 29 September 1916)

51. BODLEIAN MSS, Ms Asquith 44, f.32 (memo attached to letter from Wimborne to Asquith, 25 October 1916)
References for Chapter 5 (pp.136-166)

52. HLL Lloyd George Papers E/9/4/3 (memo by Duke, 26 September 1916): also 86
HC DEB, 26 October 1916, col.1360 (Duke): *Freemans Journal*, 15 September
1916, p.4
53. *Freemans Journal*, 25 January 1917, p.68
54. *Freemans Journal*, 26 January 1917, p.4
55. PRO/T.1/12396/44750 no.34332 (Higginson and Co. to Bradbury, 31 January
1917): PRO/T.1/12396/44750 no.30212 (Guinness, Mahon & Co. to Dublin
Corporation, 18 October 1916): SPO/CSO.RP (1920)/2381, no.2824 (Dublin
Corporation to Clancy, 17 January 1917; Magill to Clancy, 1 February 1917);
no.24572 (Redmond to Duke, 2 December 1916): RPDCD vol.2 no.103 (1917),
pp.172-174: *Times*, 21 October 1916, p.9c
56. *Freemans Journal*, 21 March 1917, p.8: for the background to the unrest in
Dublin, see: N. Flanagan, op cit, pp.14-16,19-20,48
57. PRO/T.1/12396/44750 no.13447 (JCD to Hamilton, 30 March 1917): also
*Freemans Journal*, 31 March 1917, p.4: Duke also obtained approval for a plan to
build Ford's first European tractor plant near Cork, and to create a special fund
(which was never used) to finance development schemes: PRO/CAB/23/1 (Cabinet
Meeting, 14 February 1917, item 15): PRO/CAB/23/4 (Cabinet Meeting, 6
November 1917, item 9): E. O'Halpin, op cit, pp.151-154
58. PRO/T.1/12396/44750 no.13447 (Bonar Law to Duke, 3 April 1917): also HLL
Lloyd George Papers F/30/2/15 (Hamilton to Davies, 3 April 1917)
59. *Times*, 5 April 1917, p.7c: *Daily Express*, 6 April 1917
60. PRO/T.1/12396/44750 no.13347 (Robinson to Duke, 17 April 1917):
SPO/CSO.RP (1920)/2381, no.10763 (Treasury to Byrne, 3 May 1917)
61. M. Swenarton, op cit, pp.41-44,48-66
62. ibid, pp.35-38,53-58
64. *Freemans Journal*, 10 October 1916, p.2: also 9 June 1915, p.8; 9 July 1915, p.8;
23 September 1915, p.6; 6 October 1915, p.9; 2 January 1917, pp.5-6; 31 July
1917, p.3; 4 January 1918, p.5
65. PRO/T.1/11914/7107 no.7107 (Dublin Tenants League to McKenna, 25 January
1916): PRO/T.1/12396/44750 no.21000 (Dublin Chamber of Commerce to
Treasury, 26 June 1917): *Irish Builder*, 29 September 1917, p.485: N. Flanagan,
op cit, p.82
66. *Irish Builder*, 3 February 1917, pp.51-52; 23 June 1917, pp.310-313: *Freemans
Journal*, 1 January 1917, p.3; 4 January 1917, p.2; 21 July 1917, pp.362-367; 23
June 1917, p.310
67. PRO/T.1/11914/7107 no.7107 (Robinson to Hamilton, 16 February 1916)
68. *Freemans Journal*, 2 November 1917, p.4
69. RPDCD vol.2 no.109 (1917), p.287
70. *Freemans Journal*, 15 September 1917, p.6
71. RPDCD vol.3 no.221 (1918), p.412: see also p.420
72. M. Swenarton, op cit, pp.49-66
73. *Freemans Journal*, 17 August 1918, p.6
74. *Architect*, 29 November 1918, p.299
75. as pointed out in: F.H.A. Aalen, "The Working Class Housing Movement in
Dublin, 1850-1920", in M.J. Bannon (ed). *The Emergence of Irish Planning 1880-
76. PRO/T.1/12396/44750 no.24506 (Eyre to Robinson, 18 June 1917)
77. SPO/CSO.RP (1920)/2381, no.16993 (Barlas to Byrne, 10 July 1917); no.19550
(Treasury to Byrne, 8 August 1917)
79. PRO/T.1/12396/44750 no.18470 (note by "C.B.", 11 May 1918)
80. PRO/T.1/12396/44750 no.18470 (note by "J.M.", 11 May 1918); no.37382 (note
by Gilbert, 31 January 1919)
81. P.B. Johnson, *Land Fit For Heroes: The planning of British Reconstruction 1916-
References for Chapter 5 (pp.136-166)

"War, planning and social change", Planning Perspectives, vol.4, 1989, pp.191-194

82. PRO/T.1/12303/13599 no.28612 (memo by "G.N.", undated but probably November 1916)
83. M. Swenarton, op cit, pp.70-72
84. Freemans Journal, 30 July 1917, pp.2-3: Architect, 15 August 1917, p.75
85. Freemans Journal, 8 August 1917, p.4
86. Freemans Journal, 17 September 1917, p.4; 19 November 1917, p.4
87. 96 HC DEB, 3 August 1917, col.2504 (Duke): also 97 HC DEB, 16 August 1917, col.1575 (Duke)
88. PRO/T.1/12303/13599 no.26388 (Duke to Law, 11 August 1917)
89. PRO/T.1/12303/13599 no.26388 (L.I.H. to Heath, 15 August 1917)
90. PRO/RECO.1/481 (Carter to Addison, 13 November 1917; Addison to Nash, 15 November 1917; Nash to Addison, 26 November 1917)
91. Freemans Journal, 24 August 1917, p.3; 27 October 1917, p.4
92. SPO/CSO.RP (1920)/2381, no.18530 (Brady to Duke, 13 July 1917): Irish Builder, 18 August 1917, p.416
93. SPO/CSO.RP (1920)/2381, no.18350 (Robinson to Magill, 16 July 1917)
94. P.C. Cowan, Report on Dublin Housing, 1918: SPO/CSO.RP (1920)/2381, nos.11455 & 12343
95. 96 HC DEB, 3 August 1917, col.2504 (Duke): 97 HC DEB, 6 August 1917, col.34 (Duke)
96. P.C. Cowan, op cit, pp.12-13
97. ibid, p.7
98. ibid, p.42
99. BODLEIAN MSS, Ms Eng Lett.c.213, f.164 (Duke to Magill, 19 August 1918)
100. Architect, 27 December 1918, p.350: there was more restrained praise in: Builder, 10 January 1919, pp.53-54: Freemans Journal, 14 August 1918, p.2
102. M. Swenarton, op cit, pp.72-77
103. in early 1918 the Ministry of Reconstruction looked into the possibility of using the pre-war subsidy terms of the Irish Labourers Acts, but decided that this would be too costly to implement: PRO/RECO.1/485 (memo by Wallace on report by Gollancz, 7 January 1918; memo by Reiss to Carter, 7 January 1918)
104. PRO/CAB 24/44 GT.3877: a similar vagueness by Addison on Irish housing needs can also be seen in: PRO/T.1/12303/13599 no.1549 (memo by Addison, undated)
105. PRO/CAB 24/42 GT.3682
107. HLL Lloyd George Papers F/63/1/7 (Adams to Lloyd George, 13 May 1917)
108. PP 1917/18 Cd.8573 xxxviii
110. J. Turner, op cit, p.112
111. BODLEIAN MSS, Dep.c.717, f.82 (memo by Duke, 19 February 1918)
112. J. Turner, op cit, p.85: also R.B. McDowell, op cit, p.147
113. HLL Lloyd George Papers F/66/5/11 (memo by Adams, undated)
115. R.B. McDowell, op cit, p.160
116. Sir H. Plunkett, The Irish Convention, Confidential Report to His Majesty the King, 1918, p.88
117. HLL Lloyd George Papers F/64/7/2 (Plunkett to Adams, 27 February 1918)
118. BODLEIAN MSS, Dep.c.716, ff.112-113 (Plunkett to Irish Convention, 9 March 1918)
119. D. Englander, op cit, p.199
120. HLL Lloyd George Papers F/65/3/16 (Vernon to Adams, 22 March 1918)
121. HLL Lloyd George Papers F/65/3/17 (Vernon to Adams, 25 March 1918)
122. HLL Lloyd George Papers F/65/3/19 (Vernon to Adams, 28 March 1918)
References for Chapter 5 (pp.136-166)

125. Sir H. Plunkett, op cit, pp.88,119
126. BODLEIAN MSS, Dep.c.716, f.174 (Duke to Cabinet, 6 April 1918); 104 HC DEB, 11 April 1918, col.1614 (Duke)
127. HLL, Lloyd George Papers F/65/3/20 (Vernon to Adams, 5 April 1918)
128. HLL, Lloyd George Papers F/67/2 (memo by Ramsay, 20 April 1918)
129. HLL, Lloyd George Papers F/67/2 (memo by Niemeyer, 22 April 1918)
130. HLL, Lloyd George Papers F/67/2 (Bradbury to Adams, 22 April 1918)
131. J. Turner, op cit, pp.112-117
132. HLL, Lloyd George Papers F/67/2 (memo by Adams, 30 April 1918); PRO/CAB 27/69, C.I.9
133. The aim of the 1918 Housing Bill was simply to allow County Councils to build if local authorities failed to, and to tempt authorities by extending the loan period and offering Treasury subsidy of 75% of loan charges: the Castle Administration argued that the provisions were unnecessary in Ireland: 110 HC DEB, 28 October 1918, cols.1203-1204 (Samuels)
134. E. O’Halpin, op cit, pp.489-490
136. 109 HC DEB, 7 August 1918, col.1361 (Shortt): see also Freemans Journal, 30 October 1918, p.3
139. Freemans Journal, 9 December 1918, p.2: also 21 March 1918, p.4; 1 April 1918, p.3; 2 April 1918, p.3; 17 June 1918, pp.3-4; 16 August 1918, p.5; 9 October 1918, pp.3-4; 22 November 1918, p.4; 23 November 1918, p.6; 5 December 1918, p.4
140. Freemans Journal, 23 November 1918, p.6
141. Freemans Journal, 2 December 1918, p.6: also 22 November 1918, p.4; 7 December 1918, p.6
142. Freemans Journal, 21 March 1918, p.4: also 30 November 1918, p.6
144. Freemans Journal, 16 November 1918, pp.5-6
145. Northern Whig, 8 March 1918, p.5; 20 January 1919, p.4: Irish Builder, 30 March 1918, pp.171-172
146. Irish Times, 3 January 1919, p.2; 26 February 1919, p.4: Northern Whig, 24 January 1918, pp.4; 6; 19 March 1918, p.2; 2 October 1918, p.4; 3 January 1919, p.3: Freemans Journal, 27 September 1916, p.6: 19 November 1917, pp.3-4; 27 December 1917, p.4; 30 November 1918, p.6: Irish Builder, 16 February 1918, p.94; 2 March 1918, p.120
References for Chapter 5 (pp.136-166)

148. for the latter, see: Irish Builder, 19 January 1918, p.40; 2 March 1918, p.117; 12 October 1918, p.381; 9 November 1918, p.485; 11 January 1919, pp.13-15; 5 April 1919, p.150; Architect, 29 November 1918, p.296: Architects and Builders Journal, 25 September 1918, p.150

149. HLL, Lloyd George Papers F/69/4 (Shortt to Lloyd George, 3 December 1918): for Addison’s strong attack, see: PRO/RECO.1/529 (Addison to Shortt, 19 November 1918; Shortt to Addison, 20 November 1918)

150. HLL, Lloyd George Papers F/69/4 (Adams to Lloyd George, 12 December 1918)

151. HLL, Lloyd George Papers F/45/6/14 (Shortt to Lloyd George, 16 December 1918)

152. RPDCD vol.1 no.18 (1919), pp.129-130
6. THE POST-WAR HOUSING CAMPAIGN IN IRELAND (pp.167-213)

1. PRO/CAB.23/15 (Cabinet Meeting, 5 August 1919)
2. PRO/T.1/12469/4046 no.16386 (Chamberlain to Shortt, 20 December 1918)
6. M. Swenarton, op cit, pp.79-80
8. PRO/CAB.24/72 (G.T. 6559; memo by Shortt entitled "Housing of the Working Classes", 27 December 1918)
10. PRO/T.1/12469/4046 no.16386 (Jones to Macpherson, 21 January 1919): also (Macpherson to Chamberlain, 27 January 1919): HLL Lloyd George Papers F/46/1/1 (Lloyd George to Macpherson, 14 February 1919)
11. PRO/T.1/12469/4046 no.16386 (Macpherson to Chamberlain, 27 January 1919)
12. PRO/T.1/12469/4046 no.16386 (Macpherson to Baldwin, 14 February 1919)
15. *Irish Times*, 30 April 1919, p.5: also 16 April 1919, p.4
16. 114 HC DEB, 3 April 1919, cols.1537-1538 (Macpherson)
17. *Irish Times*, 25 February 1919, p.4
18. PRO/T.1/12469/4046 no.16386 (Macpherson to Chamberlain, 19 February 1919): for Treasury opposition to British proposals, see: M. Swenarton, op cit, pp.80-81
19. 117 HC DEB, 26 June 1919, cols.494-496 (Samuels)
20. PRO/T.1/12469/4046 no.16386 (note by Bradbury, 13 February 1919; Chamberlain to Macpherson, 15 February 1919)
21. PRO/T.1/12469/4046 no.16386 (Chamberlain to Macpherson, 15 February 1919)
22. PRO/T.1/12469/4046 no.16386 (note by Niemeyer, undated but probably February 1919)
23. PRO/T.1/12469/4046 no.16386 (note by Bradbury, 13 February 1919)
24. PRO/T.1/12469/4046 no.16386 (Headlam to Niemeyer, 28 February 1919): also (Macpherson to Chamberlain, 19 February 1919; Robinson to Macpherson, 4 March 1919)
26. PRO/T.1/12469/4046 no.16386 (Niemeyer to Robinson, 13 March 1919)
27. PRO/T.1/12469/4046 no.16386 (Niemeyer to Bradbury, 7 March 1919)
28. 113 HC DEB, 3 March 1919, cols.4-5 (Lloyd-Greene, Baldwin); 6 March 1919, col.593 (Macpherson): 114 HC DEB, 3 April 1919, cols.1538-1539 (Macpherson)
29. PRO/T.1/12469/4046 no.16387 (Niemeyer to Headlam, 17 April 1919)
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30. PRO/T.1/12469/4046 no.16386 (note by Niemeyer, undated but probably February 1919)
31. PRO/T.1/12469/4046 no.16386 (note by Niemeyer, 22 February 1919)
32. 114 HC DEB, 3 April 1919, cols.1539-1540 (Macpherson); Irish Times, 25 February 1919, pp.5-6
33. PRO/T.1/12469/4046 no.16387 (Stevenson to Niemeyer, 10 April 1919)
34. PRO/T.1/12469/4046 no.16386 (Robinson to Macpherson, 4 March 1919): also (Stephenson to Niemeyer, 24 February 1919)
35. PRO/T.1/12469/4046 no.16386 (Headlam to Niemeyer, 4 March 1919)
36. PRO/T.1/12469/4046 no.16386 (Niemeyer to Bradbury, 7 March 1919)
37. PRO/T.1/12469/4046 no.16386 (memo by Chamberlain, 13 February 1919: Macpherson to Chamberlain, 19 February 1919; Robinson to Macpherson, 4 March 1919; Niemeyer to Robinson, 8 March 1919)
38. 112 HC DEB, 13 February 1919, col.264 (Devlin, Law, Guinness); 17 February 1919, cols.524-525 (O'Neill, Redmond, Devlin, Samuels, Law); 26 February 1919, col.1767 (Devlin, Samuels)
39. Irish Times, 12 February 1919, p.4: also 10 March 1919, p.6; 4 April 1919, p.4; 10 April 1919, p.4; 19 April 1919, p.6: The Statist, 19 October 1918, p.595: Irish Builder, 11 January 1919, p.15
40. Irish Times, 30 January 1919, p.6
41. Northern Whig, 26 March 1919, p.4: also 14 May 1919, p.4
42. Northern Whig, 20 March 1919, p.6
43. 112 HC DEB, 26 February 1919, col.1850 (Carson): also 114 HC DEB, 3 April 1919, col.1482 (Carson): H. Patterson, Class Conflict and Sectarianism: The Protestant Working Class and the Belfast Labour Movement 1868-1920, 1980, pp.120-121
44. 115 HC DEB, 13 May 1919, col.1489 (O'Neill): also col.1500 (Dixon)
46. 114 HC DEB, 27 March 1919, col.573 (Carson, Law); 3 April 1919, col.1482 (Carson)
47. PRO/T.1/12469/4046 no.4046 (Headlam to Niemeyer, 7 July 1919)
49. 115 HC DEB, 13 May 1919, col.1488 (Devlin)
51. Dail Eireann, Minutes of Proceedings, pp.21-23, quoted in F.S.L. Lyons, op cit., p.402
53. Times, 27 February 1919, p.5d
54. SPO/DE/2/243 (Report of Activities of Local Government Committee, Dail Eireann, unsigned and undated)
55. 115 HC DEB, 13 May 1919, cols.1473 (Macpherson), 1513 (Guinness): 118 HC DEB, 1 August 1919, cols.2479-2491 (Henry, MacVeagh, Harbison, Dockrell): PRO/T.1/12286/8353 (note by Niemeyer, 7 March 1919; note by "F.M.W.", 20 March 1919; Heath to Under Secretary, 25 March 1919): PP 1921 Cd.1432 xiv, 48th Annual Report of the ILGB for the year ending 31 March 1920", ff.857-861: in Chapter 8 it will be seen that there was some housing built in Ulster under the Labourers Acts in the 1920s, but the measure lay unused in the Irish Free State until revived in 1936 by Fianna Fail

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References for Chapter 6 (pp. 167-213)

56. 115 HC DEB, 13 May 1919, col. 1473 (Macpherson): also 121 HC DEB, 21 November 1919, col. 1394 (Macpherson)

57. 114 HC DEB, 27 March 1919 col. 573 (Carson, Law); 3 April 1919 cols. 1482 (Carson), 1538-1539 (Macpherson): PP 1921 Cd. 1432 xiv, "Annual Report of the ILGB for year ended 31 March 1920", f. 837

58. PRO/T. 1/12469/4046 no. 4046 (Greer to Niemeyer, 14 July 1919): also (Niemeyer to Bradbury, June 1919): Irish Times, 2 May 1919, p. 5; 14 May 1919, p. 4

59. PRO/T. 1/12469/4046 no. 4046 (Headlam to Niemeyer, 28 August 1919)

60. 115 HC DEB, 13 May 1919, cols. 1500 (Dixon), 1508 (Redmond): also cols. 1478-1518 (Carson, Devlin, et seq.)

61. PP 1919 Cd. 181 xli. 685, "Estimate of Probable Expenditure under the Housing of the Working Classes (Ireland) Bill"

62. M. Swenarton, op cit, p. 82

63. 117 HC DEB, 26 June 1919, cols. 500-501 (Banbury, Thompson, Craig)

64. PRO/T. 1/12469/4046 no. 4046 (deputation to Macpherson, 2 July 1919): Northern Whig, 3 July 1919, p. 5

65. PRO/T. 1/12469/4046 no. 4046 (Greer to Niemeyer, 14 July 1919; Niemeyer to Bradbury, 14 July 1919)

66. PRO/T. 1/12469/4046 no. 4046 (Niemeyer to Watt, 4 July 1919): also (Watt to Niemeyer, 3 July 1919; note by Niemeyer, 3 July 1919; note by Bradbury 3 July 1919; note by Chamberlain, 3 July 1919)

67. 117 HC DEB, 8 July 1919, cols. 1771 (Williams), 1776 (Henry): 118 HC DEB, 18 July 1919, col. 847 (Henry)

68. 115 HC DEB, 13 May 1919, cols. 1479-1480 (Carson), 1485-1486 (Devlin)

69. Northern Whig, 18 July 1919, p. 4; 22 August 1919, p. 4; 1 September 1919, p. 2; 12 September 1919, p. 4

70. PRO/T. 1/12469/4046 no. 4046 (Headlam to Niemeyer, 28 August 1919): Irish Times, 2 August 1919, p. 4; 28 August 1919, p. 6; 11 September 1919, p. 5

71. PRO/T. 1/12469/4046 no. 4046 (Niemeyer to Robinson, 8 September 1919): Irish Times, 2 August 1919, p. 6

72. PRO/T. 1/12469/4046 no. 4046 (Headlam to Niemeyer, 5 September 1919)

73. Irish Times, 8 August 1919, p. 6

74. A. Mitchell, op cit, p. 122

75. SPO/DE/2/243 (Report of Activities of Local Government Committee, Dail Eireann, unsigned and undated)

76. ibid

77. SPO/DE/2/243 (Scheme for Housing Conferences, unsigned and undated)

78. F.S.L. Lyons, op cit, p. 423

79. Irish Times, 30 August 1919, p. 6

80. Irish Times, 2 September 1919, pp. 4-6; 3 September 1919, p. 4; 4 September 1919, p. 6; 5 September 1919, p. 6; 10 September 1919, p. 7; 12 September 1919, p. 5; 13 September 1919, p. 6; 7 October 1919, p. 3: Northern Whig, 6 October 1919, p. 8: Irish Builder, 25 October 1919, pp. 473, 482

81. PRO/T. 1/12469/4046 no. 4046 (Headlam to Niemeyer, 28 August 1919)

82. PRO/T. 1/12469/4046 no. 4046 (Niemeyer to Headlam, 2 September 1919)

83. Irish Times, 13 September 1919, p. 6; 7 July 1920, p. 5; 8 July 1920, p. 6; 18 November 1920, p. 5

84. SPO/DE/2/243 (Report on Housing, unsigned but probably by Cosgrave, undated)


86. SPO/CSON/RP (1921-22)/2501/8 (memo by ILGB Housing Committee, 16 July 1921)

87. M. Swenarton, op cit, pp. 112-121

88. PRO/T. 1/12396/44750 no. 2407 (note by "J.S.", 19 January 1920): PRO/T. 1/12416/5/0108 no. 35694 (Devlin to Under Secretary, 9 August 1919; Taylor to Treasury, 14 August 1919): PRO/T. 1/12434/52947 no. 50730
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89. PRO/T.1/12396/44750 no.2407 (note by "A.P.J.", 19 January 1920)
90. this ad hoc measure aimed to help municipal housing by authorising the issue of 'Local Housing Bonds' to raise capital; allowing authorities to prohibit so-called 'luxury building' in their district; and allowing them to draw up 'agreed-price' contracts with local Builders' Federations in order to short-circuit the tendering system: in addition the subsidy to public utility societies was increased to 50% of the loan charge for the first 7 years: M. Swenarton, op cit, pp.123-124
91. 121 HC DEB, 21 November 1919, cols.1390-1393 (Moles)
92. 121 HC DEB, 21 November 1919, cols.1394-1397 (Macpherson)
93. PRO/T.172/1044 (Macpherson to Chamberlain, 28 November 1919): also (Robinson to Macpherson, 26 November 1919)
94. PRO/T.172/1044 (Niemeyer to Barstow, 1 December 1919): also (Treasury to Watt, 3 December 1921): PRO/T.1172/1044 (Treasury note to Barstow, 2 December 1919)
95. PRO/T.1/12429/52124 no.52124 (minutes of Cabinet Housing Committee meeting, 3 December 1919)
96. PRO/T.1/12429/52124 no.52124 (draft clauses for Housing (Additional Powers) Act, section 2, subsection 1, undated)
97. SPO/CSO.RP (1921-22)/2503/2 (Robinson to Under Secretary, 23 January 1920; Barstow to Under Secretary, 1 March 1920)
98. SPO/CSO.RP (1921-22)/2503/2 (Codling to all Irish local authorities, 5 May 1920): also (Robinson to Under Secretary, 5 July 1920)
99. M. Swenarton, op cit, p.136
100. PRO/T.1/12286/8353 (O'Sullivan to Under Secretary, 18 February 1919)
101. PRO/T.1/12469/4046 no.16386 (Headlam to Niemeyer, 4 March 1919; Niemeyer to Robinson, 8 March 1919)
102. PRO/T.1/12308/15462 (note by MacFadyean, 15 April 1919): 115 HC DEB, 13 May 1919, cols.1478-1479 (Carson),1484-1486 (Devlin), 1513-1514 (Guinness): Irish Times, 23 June 1919, p.4
103. M. Swenarton, op cit, pp.110.136-141
104. 116 HC DEB, 29 May 1919, col.1391 (Barrie)
105. SPO/CSO.RP (1921-22)/3065/7 (Robinson to Anderson, 3 December 1920)
106. SPO/CSO.RP (1921-22)/3065/7 (agendas for Housing Committee meetings on 11 August/ 14 September/ 5 October/ 19 October/ 9 November 1920; Barlas to Under Secretary, 18 January 1921)
109. M. Swenarton, op cit, pp.113-117
110. PRO/T.1/12286/9306 no.9306 (note by Vernon, March 1919): SPO/CPO.RP (1920)/19707 no.4245 (Codling to Ministry of Munitions, 3 December 1919); no.7705 (memo by Robinson, 23 March 1920); no.10539 (Robinson to Under Secretary, 21 April 1920); no.11238 (Treasury to Under Secretary, 27 April 1920); no.13090 (note by Duggan to Under Secretary, 15 May 1920); no.13863 (Macpherson to Inverforth, 13 May 1919; Inverforth to Macpherson, 15 May 1919; Macpherson to Inverforth, May 1919)
111. M. Swenarton, op cit, pp.85-87
112. Irish Times, 3 January 1919, p.2
114. Irish Times, 25 February 1919, p.5
115. 115 HC DEB, 13 May 1919, col.1488 (Devlin)
116. 115 HC DEB, 13 May 1919, col.1480 (Carson)
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117. 115 HC DEB, 13 May 1919, cols.1492-1493 (O'Neill)
118. 115 HC DEB, 13 May 1919, col.1518 (Harbison): also cols.1487 (Devlin), 1492 (O'Neill)
119. 114 HC DEB, 3 April 1919, col.1540 (Macpherson): also Journal of the RIAI, 1920, note on AGM, p.15
120. 115 HC DEB, 13 May 1919, col.1514 (Guinness): also cols.1508-1509 (Redmond, Dockrell)
121. Irish Local Government Board, Housing of the Working Classes in Ireland, 1919, p.3
124. Irish Builder, 26 February 1921, p. 121
127. for this tendency in Britain, see: M. Swenarton, op cit, pp.139-141
129. PRO/T.1/12307/15191 no.48348 (Heath to Under Secretary, 9 January 1919): 114 HC DEB, 3 April 1919, col.1540 (Macpherson)
132. PRO/T.1/12307/15191 no.15191 (draft conditions for Irish Housing Competition, March 1919)
133. ibid
134. Housing Journal, November 1917, pp.4-8; February/March 1918, pp.1-8; May 1918, pp.1-8
136. Irish Local Government Board, op cit, p.10
137. ibid, plates xxxvii and xxxviii
138. for the English LGB manual, see: M. Swenarton, op cit, pp.110-111, 114-117
139. PRO/T.1/12469/4046 no.4046 (ILGB Circular, 5 May 1919)
140. ibid
141. Irish Local Government Board, op cit, plates xxxiii to xxxv
142. ibid, p.7
143. ibid, p.4
144. Irish Builder, 31 May 1919, p.275
145. Irish Builder, 14 February 1920, p.95: see also 16 December 1922, p.865
146. RPDCD vol.3 no.210 (1919), p.51; RPDCD vol.2 no.110 (1920), p.396
147. Irish Builder, 3 July 1920, p.438
149. Irish Times, 11 September 1919, p.5

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152. 121 HC DEB, 21 November 1919, col.1391 (Moles)

153. in Britain the new type had L-shaped layouts and asymmetrical roofs: M. Swenarton, op cit, pp.157-160


156. RPDCD vol.2 no.110 (1920), p.422: a further ILGB circular on 12 November 1919 set out the conditions and fees for employing an architect or other qualified person: Dublin Corporation Archives, UDC/2/C/39 (ILGB Circular, 12 November 1919)

157. *Times*, 4 November 1919, p.39d

158. 125 HC DEB, 19 February 1920, col.1015-1016 (Lynn,Macpherson): also 126 HC DEB, 11 March 1920, col.1502 (Macpherson): for British progress, see: M. Swenarton, op cit, p.122


161. *Irish Builder*, 31 March 1920, p.2


163. PRO/T.1/12493/9332 no.9332 (Robinson to Under Secretary, 13 February 1920)

164. PRO/T.1/12493/9332 no.9332 (note by Gilbert, 16 April 1920)

165. PRO/T.1/12493/9332 no.9332 (Gilbert to Strohmenger, 13 March 1920; Strohmenger to Gilbert, 29 March 1920)


167. PRO/CAB.23/38 (Cabinet Meeting, 13 October 1920)

168. J. McColgan, op cit, pp.36-49

169. PRO/CAB.23/18 (Cabinet Meeting, 3 December 1919, item 2)

170. PRO/CAB.27/69 (C.I. 11, draft "B" of Government of Ireland Bill, 16 October 1919; C.I. 14, draft "C" of Government of Ireland Bill, 21 October 1921)

171. PRO/CAB.27/69 (C.I. 35, report of Sub-Committee on Irish Finance of Cabinet Committee on Ireland, 22 November 1919): for Chamberlain's altered views on the British campaign, see: M. Swenarton, op cit, p.130

172. *Irish Times*, 29 May 1920, p.8


175. quoted in J. McColgan, op cit, p.5: see also: C. Townshend, op cit, pp.73-83: E. O'Halpin, op cit, pp.201-203,207-213

176. J. McColgan, op cit, p.12

177. ibid, p.31: R.F. Foster, op cit, pp.503-504

178. *Irish Builder*, 22 May 1920, p.361

179. PRO/CAB.23/37 (Cabinet Meeting, 31 May 1920)


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References for Chapter 6 (pp.167-213)

182. SPO/DE/2/243 (decree by Dail Eireann, 12 August 1920)
183. BODLEIAN MSS. Ms.Eng.Hist.C.1104, f.196 (Kelly to Headlam, 13 October 1920)
184. SPO/DE/2/475 (Fitzpatrick to Lynn, 21 August 1921)
185. SPO/DE/2/45 (General Secretariat, Dail Eireann to Acting Town Clerk, Nenagh UDC, 12 July 1920)
186. quoted in *Irish Builder*, 31 July 1920, p.500
188. SPO/DE/2/516 (Cosgrave to Minister of Finance, Dail Eireann, 17 August 1920; plus various other items)
189. *Irish Times*, 17 September 1920, pp.5-6
190. SPO/CSO.RP (1921-22)/2503 (Robinson to Greenwood, 16 July 1920): also (memo by Housing Committee to Robinson, July 1920)
191. SPO/CSO.RP (1921-22)/2503 (Anderson to Duggan, 4 November 1920)
192. M. Swenarton, op cit, pp.129-135,157-161
193. 133 HC DEB, 28 October 1920, col.1985 (Greenwood): SPO/CSO.RP (1921-22)/2503 (Duggan to Anderson, 3 November 1920)
194. SPO/CSO.RP (1921-22)/2503 (Duggan to Anderson, 3 November 1920; memo by Cowan to Robinson, 17 November 1920): PRO/T.161/94/S.7136 (Duggan to Assistant Secretary, Irish Treasury, 1 December 1920)
195. PRO/T.161/94/S.7136 (Anderson to Under Secretary, Chief Secretary's Office, 1 January 1921)
196. PRO/T.161/94/S.7136 (Waterfield to Under Secretary, Chief Secretary's Office, 27 January 1921)
197. PRO/T.161/94/S.7136 (memo by Cowan, 11 February 1921)
198. PRO/T.158/3 (Anderson to Robinson, 18 May 1921): PRO/T.161/94/S.7136 (Codling to Under Secretary, Chief Secretary's Office, 29 June 1921)
199. SPO/CSO.RP (1920)/19707 no.19707 (Duggan to Assistant Secretary, Irish Treasury, 16 November 1920; Irish Treasury to Under Secretary, 1 December 1920; Barlas to Under Secretary, 17 December 1920; Duggan to Assistant Secretary, Irish Treasury, 23 December 1920; Irish Treasury to Under Secretary, 30 December 1920
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201. 140 HC DEB, 4 April 1921, col.16-17 (Henry)
202. 141 HC DEB, 28 April 1921, col.445 (Greenwood)
203. SPO/CSO.RP (1921-22)/2503/8 (Robinson to Anderson, 16 July 1921): this was borne out by Dundalk UDC, which appears to have abandoned its housing plans because of Dail Eireann's ruling on non-cooperation with the ILGB: *Irish Builder*, 9 October 1920, p.645
205. *Irish Times*, 16 September 1920, p.4
206. examples of Ulster authorities which had loans approved were Amagh UDC, for £10,500; Portadown UDC for £70,000; and Tanderagee UDC, for £7,700: PRO/T.158/3 (Waterfield to Irish Board of Works, 3 May 1921; Waterfield to Irish Board of Works, 3 May 1921): PRO/T.192/28 (Irish Board of Works to Irish Treasury, 19 October 1920; Waterfield to Irish Board of Works, 27
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October 1920): PRO/T.192/48 (Irish Board of Works to Treasury, 15 April 1921; Waterfield to Irish Board of Works, 3 May 1921)

207. Irish Builder, 18 November 1922, p.777

208. Northern Whig, 12 March 1921, p.6; 2 September 1921: Irish Times, 3 February 1921, p.4; 12 March 1921, pp.4-8; 19 November 1921, p.6: Irish Builder, 23 October 1920, pp.665-667

209. Irish Times, 19 November 1921, p.6


212. Irish Times, 9 April 1920, p.4: 15 January 1921, p.5; 27 January 1921, p.8; 30 June 1921, p.2; 29 October 1921, pp.6,8; 1 December 1921, p.6; 19 June 1924, p.4; 25 September 1924, p.3; 30 September 1924, p.6; 10 October 1924, p.4; et seq.: Irish Builder, 17 April 1919, p.273; 3 July 1920, p.438; 2 July 1921, p.449

213. Irish Times, 3 April 1920, p.4: Northern Whig, 2 April 1920, p.6; 7 May 1920, p.5; 13 May 1920, p.6: H. Patterson, op cit, p.121: for the use of direct labour in Britain, see: M. Swenarton, op cit, p.127

214. Irish Times, 2 August 1921, p.3: see also 16 March 1920, p.4; 17 March 1921, p.3; 2 April 1924, p.3; 23 April 1920, p.4; 11 June 1920, p.4; 5 August 1921, pp.5-6; 22 September 1921, p.2; 17 December 1921, p.8: Irish Builder, 13 August 1921, p.545; 19 November 1921, p.749: C. Lincoln, "Working Class Housing in Dublin, 1914-1939" (UCD MA Thesis 1979), pp.38-42: there were also smaller guilds in Cork and Waterford: E. O'Connor, Syndicalism in Ireland 1917-1923, 1988, pp.46-51: for guilds in Britain, see: M. Swenarton, Artisans and Architects: The Ruskinian Tradition in Architectural Thought, 1989, pp.167-188


217. ibid, pp.130-132


219. SPO/CSO.RP (1921-22)/2503/8 (memo by ILGB Housing Committee entitled "The Government's Housing Policy in its relation to Ireland", 16 July 1921)

220. SPO/CSO.RP (1921-22)/2503/8 (ILGB Housing Committee to Robinson, 20 October 1921): also (Robinson to Anderson, 16 July 1921; unsigned memo by Robinson to Greenwood, undated but probably October 1921)

221. SPO/CSO.RP (1921-22)/2503/8 (Anderson to Greenwood, 16 July 1921)

222. Northern Whig, 2 September 1921, pp.4,6

223. SPO/CSO.RP (1921-22)/2503/8 (ILGB Housing Committee to Robinson, 6 September 1921; unsigned memo by Anderson, undated but probably 25 October 1921); 2503 (Codling to Under Secretary, 19 November 1921; Waterfield to Under Secretary, 9 January 1922): see also: Irish Builder, 18 November 1922, p.777

224. SPO/CSO.RP (1921-22)/2503/2 (ILGB Circular to all Irish urban local authorities, 29 July 1921): 2503/8 (memo by ILGB Housing Committee, 16 July 1921; Robinson to Anderson, 16 July 1921; Anderson to Greenwood, 16 July 1921; ILGB Housing Committee to Robinson, 6 September 1921; Robinson to Greenwood, undated but probably October 1921; unsigned memo by Anderson, undated but probably 25 October 1921)

225. Irish Times, 20 October 1921, p.3

226. PRO/T.158/5 (Waterfield to Under Secretary, 22 December 1921): also (Waterfield to Under Secretary, 30 November 2019; Waterfield to Robinson, 7 December 1921; Waterfield to Robinson, 16 December 1921; Waterfield to Robinson, 22 December 1921; Waterfield to Watt, NI Ministry of Home Affairs, 9 January 1922): PRO/T.158/5 (Waterfield to Johnson, 20 September 1921)

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2. F.H.A. Aalen, "Homes for Irish heroes: Housing under the Irish Land 
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   Soldiers' Land Trust", Town Planning Review, Vol.59 No.3, 1988, pp.305- 
   323: for the campaign in Britain, see: P.B. Johnson, Land Fit For Heroes: The 
   planning of British Reconstruction 1916-1919, 1968, pp.347-351
3. E. O'Halpin, The Decline of the Union: British Government in Ireland 1892- 
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4. HLL Lloyd George Papers F/48/6/13 (French to Lloyd George, 30 May 1918): 
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5. PRO/CAB.23/7 (Cabinet Meeting, 29 July 1918, item 6)
6. PRO/RECO.1/785 (internal Ministry of Reconstruction memos, 21 & 28 
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   Reconstruction, 14 December 1918): WRO, Walter Long Papers, 947/231 
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7. PRO/T.1/12427/51828 no.5359 (Cabinet Paper G.T.6527, "Demobilization 
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8. figure calculated from data in F.H.A. Aalen, op cit, p.308
9. PRO/T.172/1402 (internal Treasury memo, 7 March 1921): see also: E. 
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10. IWM, French Papers, 75/46/13 (French to Long, 10 January 1919)
11. PRO/T.1/12427/51828 no.5359 (Macpherson to Treasury, 3 February 1919)
12. BODLEIAN MSS, Ms.Eng.Hist.C.490 (memorandum by Gwynn et al, 14 
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   views on the political danger in Britain, see: C. Petrie, Walter Long and His 
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21. P.B. Johnson, op cit, p.351
22. 121 HC DEB, 18 November 1919, col.854 (Macpherson)
23. 121 HC DEB, 18 November 1919, cols.854-856 (Macpherson)
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24. 121 HC DEB, 18 November 1919, cols.855-857 (Macpherson)
25. PRO/T.1/12497/10124 no.48904 (note by Upcott, 17 October 1919)
26. 121 HC DEB, 18 November 1919, col.858 (Macpherson)
27. 121 HC DEB, 18 November 1919, cols.859 (Carson),863 (Williams): *Irish Times*, 19 November 1919, p.4
29. PRO/T.1/12497/10124 no.48904 (note by Chamberlain, 23 October 1919): also (note by Barstow, 21 October 1919: Greer to Upcott, 6 November 1919)
30. PRO/T.1/12497/10124 no.48904 (Healy to Treasury, 20 November 1919)
31. PRO/T.1/12497/10124 no.48904 (Robinson to Greer, 28 October 1919)
32. 126 HC DEB, 18 March 1920, cols.2357-2358 (Macpherson)
34. cited in C. Trenchard, op cit, p.22
35. PRO/T.160/216/F.7958/1 (Stephenson to Barstow, 17 May 1920):
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36. PRO/T.160/216/F.7958/1 (Robinson to Waterfield, 5 September 1920); also:
PRO/T.1/158/1 (Waterfield to Robinson, 9 October 1920): SPO/CSO.RP (1921-22)/3434 (Robinson to Under Secretary, 11 July 1920; Duggan to Robinson, 19 August 1920)
37. SPO/CSO.RP (1921-22)/3434 (Robinson to Under Secretary, 5 July 1920): also:
PRO/T.158/3 (Healy, Irish Board of Works to Irish Treasury, 3 May 1921)
38. PP 1921 Cd.1481 xvii, "Annual Report of the Irish Commissioners of Works for year ended 31 March 1921", f.47
39. PRO/T.160/216/F.7958/1 (Waterfield to Anderson, 4 August 1920):
PRO/T.160/216/F.7958/2 (note by NWS, 15 March 1921)
40. PRO/T.160/216/F.7958/1 (Waterfield to Anderson, 4 August 1920); also:
(Waterfield to Stephenson, 4 November 1920; Robinson to Waterfield, 24 November 1920): PRO/T.158/1 (Waterfield to Irish Board of Works, 19 August 1920; Waterfield to O’Conor, ILGB, 25 August 1920)
41. PRO/T.160/216/F.7958/2 (Waterfield to Irish Board of Works, 11 December 1920)
42. *Irish Times*, 30 January 1921, p.6; 25 January 1921, p.2: HLL, Lloyd George Papers, F/37/429 (Duke to Lloyd George, 9 July 1917)
43. SPO/CSO.RP (1921-22)/3434 (Robinson to Under Secretary, 27 October 1920)
44. PRO/T.172/1402 (memo by Anderson to Fisher, 5 March 1921): also:
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45. SPO/CSO.RP (1921-22)/3434 (Anderson to Duggan, 1 December 1920)
46. PRO/T.158/3 (Robinson to Anderson, 1 March 1921): also: PRO/T.158/2
(Anderson to Robinson, 25 February 1921)
49. PRO/T.158/1 (Ministry of Health to Waterfield, 31 August 1920; Waterfield to Stevenson, 15 October 1920): PRO/T.160/216/F.7958/1 (Waterfield to Robinson, 1 September 1920)

52. Irish Times, 20 January 1921, p.6

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54. NLS MSS, Geddes Papers, Ms.10573 (Lady Aberdeen to Mears, 10 May 1922): PRO/T.158/9 (Waterfield to Cuthbertson, 2 October 1922)

55. ISSLT, op cit, pp.16-19,72-73 (Appendix viii)

56. PRO/T.158/3 (Irish Treasury to Hanson, Irish Board of Works, 25 May 1921)

57. PRO/AP.3/36 (Browne, ISSLT to Ardee, 8 June 1929)

58. PRO/T.158/4 (Waterfield to Robinson, 5 August 1921: PRO/T.158/8 (Waterfield to Robinson, 16 March 1922; Waterfield to Anderson, 22 April 1922; Waterfield to Robinson, 4 April 1922; Waterfield to Robinson, 8 April 1922; Waterfield to Sturgis, 18 April 1922)

59. account here based on: ISSLT, op cit, 1927: many files, too numerous to list, in: PRO/AP

60. Irish Times, 1 June 1922, p.9

61. Irish Times, 20 September 1923, p.4

62. E. O'Halpin, op cit, pp.181,210

63. 144 HC DEB, 7 July 1921, col.604 (Brown)

64. SPO/CSO.RP (1921-22)/3504 (Barlas to Duggan, 20 August 1921): PP 1921 Cd.1481 xvii, "Annual Report of the Irish Commissioners of Public Works for year ended 31 March 1921", f.47

65. 147 HC DEB, 27 October 1921, col.1012 (Greenwood): PP 1921 Cd.1481 xvii, "Annual Report of the Irish Commissioners of Public Works for year ended 31 March 1921", f.47: SPO/CSO.RP (1921-22)/ 3504 (Barlas to Duggan, 20 August 1921)

66. P.B. Johnson, op cit, pp.442 et seq.

67. SPO/CSO.RP (1921-22)/3434 (Robinson to Greenwood, 5 March 1921; Waterfield to ILGB, 16 June 1921): PRO/T.158/4 (Sturgis, Irish Treasury to Under Secretary, 5 August 1921)

68. SPO/CSO.RP (1921-22)/3434 (Colding to Under Secretary, 6 July 1921)

69. Irish Times, 19 October 1921

70. SPO/CSO.RP (1921-22)/2503/8 (Waterfield to Under Secretary, 30 November 1921): SPO/CSO.RP (1921-22)/3434 (MacMahon to Assistant Secretary, Irish Treasury, 15 August 1921)

71. SPO/CSO.RP (1921-22)/2503/8 (Robinson to Anderson, 16 July 1921; unsigned memo by Robinson to Greenwood, undated but probably October 1921)

72. SPO/CSO.RP (1921-22)/3434 (Waterfield to Under Secretary, 9 November 1921): (also Corbitt to Under Secretary, 21 November 1921; Waterfield to Under Secretary, 5 December 1921; ILGB to Under Secretary, 10 December 1921): SPO/CSO.RP (1921-22)/ 2503/8 (unsigned memo by Anderson, undated but probably 25 October 1921): PRO/T.158/5 (Waterfield to Robinson, 16 November 1921)

73. PRO/CO.739/4 (paper by Finance Sub-Committee of Provisional Government of Ireland Committee to Cabinet, 6 March 1922)

74. PRO/T.158/8 (Waterfield to Whiskard, Irish Office, 4 April 1922)

75. PRO/T.158/8 (Waterfield to Sturgis, 18 April 1922; Waterfield to Niemeyer, 25 April 1922): PRO/T.158/9 (memo by Clark, NI Government, 13 July 1922; Waterfield to Cuthbertson, 30 August 1922; Waterfield to Niemeyer, 26 September 1922; Waterfield to Niemeyer, 4 October 1922): PRO/HO.45/11708 (internal Home Office memo, January 1923; draft memo by Technical
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76. SPO/DE/2/428 (Concubair to Minister of Defence, Dail Eireann, 9 November 1921)
77. SPO/DE/2/428 (Concubair to Barton, Ministry of Defence, Dail Eireann, 29 November 1921)
78. SPO/DE/2/243 (Robing to Dail Eireann Cabinet, 15 February 1922)
79. L.M. Cullen, *An Economic History of Ireland since 1660*, 1972, p.172
80. PRO/T.158/8 (Waterfield to Sturgis, 25 April 1922)
81. PRO/T.158/8 (Waterfield to Anderson, 7 April 1922; Waterfield to IFS Ministry of Finance, 15 April 1922; Waterfield to Sturgis, 18 April 1922; Waterfield to Sturgis, 25 April 1922)
82. PRO/T.158/8 (Waterfield to Niemeyer, 25 April 1922; Waterfield to Niemeyer, 25 April 1922): PRO/T.158/9 (Waterfield to Niemeyer, 26 September 1922)
84. H.A. Law, "Irish Housing in Town and Country" (special section on "European Reconstruction Series: Ireland"), *Manchester Guardian Commercial*, 26 July 1923, p.39
85. PRO/HO.45/14659 (internal Home Office note, 30 January 1925: also PRO/HO.45/14199 (Duckworth, RCHM to Sturgis, 8 November 1923): PRO/RECO.1.558 (letters and notes by Duckworth, Ministry of Munitions)
87. PRO/HO.45/14659 (Guinness, Financial Secretary to Treasury, to Amery, Home Office, 16 March 1925): also PRO/AP.3/5 (Duckworth to Ross, 28 February 1925)
88. PRO/HO.45/14659 (internal Home Office memo on ISSLT conference held on 25 September 1925)
89. PRO/T.160/169/F.6511/014/1 (Waterfield to Tallents, 22 September 1924)
90. PRO/AP.3/5 (ISSLT Trustees to Duckworth, 8 June 1925)
91. PRO/T.172/1537 (Churchill to Devlin, 25 March 1926): also (internal Treasury memo to Churchill, 24 March 1926): PRO/HO.45/14659 (minutes of interview between Guinness, Secretary to Treasury and ISSLT, February 1925)
92. PRO/AP.1/16 (Duckworth to Lefroy, 20 June 1924): also (Duckworth to Lefroy, 15 July 1924; Duckworth to Southern Trustees, 21 August 1924)
93. ISSLT, op cit, p.19
94. PRO/T.160/377/F.6511/08 (Waterfield to Ramsay, 21 May 1926)
95. *Irish Times*, 26 June 1926, pp.6,8; 13 July 1926, p.5: 26 July 1926, p.6
96. PRO/AP.1/98 (Duckworth to Brise, British Legion, 10 December 1926): also (note on ISSLT meeting on 30 March 1926): PRO/AP.3/32: PRO/HO.45/14199 (Cosgrave to Thomas, Colonial Office, 26 July 1924): PRO/HO.45/14659 (Healy to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 26 August 1925; Amery to Healy, 30 December 1925)
98. PRO/AP.1/124 (Browne, ISSLT to Brunyate, 20 September 1928): also (Mahon to Brunyate, 27 July 1928)
99. PRO/T.160/416/F.6511/033 (Machtig, Dominions Office to Heath, British Legion, 17 March 1930; Heath to Dominions Office, 18 June 1930; Alexander,
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ISSLT to Machtig, 8 August 1930; Machtig to Heath, 6 October 1930; Thomas, Dominions Office to Earl of Jellicoe, 17 February 1931)


101. PRO/T.169/377/F.6511/08 (Strohmenger, Ministry of Health to Waley, 13 October 1931)
8. STATE HOUSING IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE IRISH FREE STATE (pp.238-253)


2. PRO/T.161/94/S.7136 (Waterfield to Under Secretary, 3 November 1921; Watt, NI Ministry of Home Affairs, to Waterfield, 11 November 1921; Watt to Waterfield, 17 November 1921; Anderson to Bates, NI Ministry of Home Affairs, 19 November 1921; internal Treasury note by "D.W.S.", 29 November 1921): SPO/CSO.RP (1921-22)/2503 (Codling to Under Secretary, 22 December 1921; Waterfield to Under Secretary, 12 January 1922): *Northern Whig*, 23 March 1922, pp.5-6; 4 April 1922, p.7.


7. the 1923 Chamberlain Housing Act in Britain gave a subsidy of £6 (later £4) per annum per dwelling for 20 years to private builders, although it was available to local authorities to use as a last resort; the 1924 Wheatley Housing Act was the response of the short-lived first Labour Government, and allowed a subsidy to both local authorities and private builders of £9 (later £7:10s) per annum per urban dwelling for 40 years (£13:10s per annum for rural dwellings), as well as permitting local authorities to provide a subsidy of another £4:10s per annum from their own revenues: M. Bowley, *Housing and the State 1919-1944*, 1945, pp.36-47: J. Burnett, *A Social History of Housing 1815-1970*, 1978, pp.227-229; the 1924 Wheatley Act, with its intention to make housing a social service provided by local authorities, was never likely to be adapted in Northern Ireland.

8. the subsidy from the Northern Government varied from £60 in 1923; to £80 in 1925; £100 in 1927; £50 in 1931; £25 in 1932; and was withdrawn in 1937: local authority contributions were more stable: for discussions on variations in subsidy level, see for instance: *Irish Times*, 11 April 1924, p.8; *Northern Whig*, 8 November 1923, pp.7-8; 11 April 1924, pp.6,8; 24 October 1924, p.10.

10. Ulster housing statistics here taken from: R.J. Lawrence, op cit, pp.147-152: M. Bowley, op cit, pp.263-267
11. R.J. Lawrence, op cit, pp.152-154
20. C.E.B. Brett, op cit, p.22
21. PRO/CAB.23/26 (Cabinet Meeting, 26 July 1921): also (Cabinet Meeting, 20 July 1921, appendix)


29. *Irish Times*, 3 February 1922, p.4: also 20 January 1923, p.6; 6 March 1923, p.4; 6 April 1923, p.4; 25 April 1923, p.4

30. *Irish Times*, 5 May 1923, p.5: see also: J. Lee, op cit, p.124


32. *Irish Times*, 6 August 1923, p.5; 20 August 1923, p.7; 23 August 1923, p.8


35. PRO/T.160/169/F.651/014/1 (Waterfield to Hanson, IFS Board of Public Works, 8 September 1924; Le Fanu, IFS Board of Public Works, to Waterfield, 9 September 1924; Waterfield to McCarron, IFS Ministry of Local Government, 11 November 1924): PRO/T.160/169/F.651/014/2 (McCarron, IFS Ministry of Local Government, to Waterfield, 17 November 1924; McCarron to Waterfield, 5 December 1924; Mosse, Ministry of Health, to Waterfield, 23 December 1924): R. Fanning, op cit, pp.120-175


37. developments in housing subsidy in the 1920s Free State were: the 1924 Housing (Building Facilities) Act provided an urban subsidy of £60 for a 3-room house, £80 for a 4-room house, and £100 for a 5-room house: rural subsidy was £50 for a 3-room house, £70 for a 4-room house, and £90 for a 5-room dwelling: the 1924 Housing (Amendment) Act extended these subsidy levels to local authorities: the 1925 Housing Act provided another £300,000, and kept the same subsidies for local authorities while reducing those for private builders to £45 for a 3-room house, £60 for a 4-room house, and £75 per 5-room dwelling: this pattern was continued by subsequent legislation, although the 1929 Housing Act set a maximum subsidy of £60 to urban local authorities, £50 to rural authorities, and only £45 to private builders

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References for Chapter 8 (pp.238-253)

40. *Irish Builder*, 14 November 1925, p.933
41. *Irish Builder*, 29 September 1928, p.824
45. NLS MSS, Geddes Papers, Ms.10573 (Mears to Geddes, 15 August 1922; Mears to Geddes, 5 June 1923): also (Lady Aberdeen to Mears, 10 May 1922; Mears to Geddes, 19 July 1922; Mears to Geddes, 24 January 1923; Mears to Geddes, 12 April 1923); Ms. 10502 (Geddes to Nora Geddes, 14 September 1922)
48. Department of Local Government and Public Health, *Report of Inquiry into the Housing of the Working Classes of the City of Dublin 1939/43*, 1944, p.25: D. Roche, op cit, p.224; C. Lincoln, op cit, pp.62-68: the 1930 Greenwood Housing Act in Britain offered £2:5s p.a over 40 years for every person rehoused in urban areas, and £2:10s p.a. per person in rural areas; there was extra subsidy for expensive urban sites, and local authorities were allowed to offer another £3:15s p.a. for every person rehoused: then the 1933 Housing Act in Britain pursued the policy of making local authorities take on a residual, sanitary policy of slum rehousing, and leaving private enterprise to build new additional housing in the
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suburbs for the better-paid working class and the middle classes: M. Bowley, op cit, pp.135-168: J. Burnett, op cit, pp.234-242


51. Department of Local Government 'White Paper', op cit, Appendix I: D. Roche, op cit, p.225

52. for comparative Irish statistics see above comparison between Ulster and Britain, plus: D.S. Johnston, op cit (1985) [b], pp.40-41


55. RPDCD, vol.2 no.110 (1920), pp.343-528

56. RPDCD vol.3 no.221 (1918) pp.403-414; vol.3 no.248 (1920), pp.529-530; vol.1 no.22 (1921), pp.83-86


62. B. Chubb, op cit (1970/82), p.8: this counters the recent, erroneous portrayal of the Free State Government as a significant conduit for Continental modernism, as argued in: S. Rothery, op cit, pp.140-154


65. *Irish Times*, 8 June 1925, p.6

66. quoted in N. O'Flanagan, op cit, p.156


69. Department of Local Government, op cit (1948), pp.14-15, Appendix A

70. Department of Local Government and Public Health, op cit (1944), pp.15-23,34-48

71. M. Gough, op cit, pp.324-326

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CONCLUSION (pp.254-263)

2. *Freemans Journal*, 29 April 1909, p.8
5. 97 HC DEB, 16 August 1917, col.1575 (Duke)
6. R. Wilson, op cit, pp.152,159-165
8. J. Lee, op cit, p.627
12. ibid, pp.9,44-67
16. PRO/CAB.23/9 (Item 2, Cabinet Meeting, 3 March 1919)
18. RPDCD vol.2 no.120 (1914), p.179
20. see for instance: W. Baumgart, op cit
21. for a wider view of this process, see: S. Hall & B. Schwarz (eds), "State and society, 1880-1930", in M. Langan & B. Schwarz (eds), *Crises in the British State 1880-1930*, 1985, pp.21-24
23. O. MacDonagh, *Ireland: The Union and its Aftermath, 1967/77*, pp.18,43
27. ibid, p.xxix: also pp.15,130-131,295,384
ILLUSTRATIONS

DIAGRAMS AND TABLES

The illustrations shown here are taken from a very wide range of sources. Original drawings and photographs have been used wherever possible; these have only been supplemented by redrawn plans and contemporary photographs where no originals are available, or where reproduction is unsuitable.

All the diagrams and tables have been compiled from official statistics, as indicated.
Fig 1. Map of Ireland, showing the provinces and principal urban centres
Pair of Foremen's Cottages - Garden Village - Kilkenny

Fig. 3.

W.A. Scott; Foremen's cottages at Kilkenny Garden Village. (1907)
Fig 4. Irish Board of Works: recommended two-storey, 4-room type (1869)
(18" rendered masonry rear & front walls)

(20" rendered masonry end walls)

bedroom 1
(85 sq.ft)

living room/ kitchen
(232 sq.ft)

bedroom 2
(85 sq.ft)

GROUND FLOOR PLAN

31'10" frontage

19' depth

Fig 5. Congested Districts Board: recommended single-storey, 3-room type (1914)
Fig 6. Congested Districts Board: recommended two-storey, 4-room type (1914)
CHAPTER II.
CONTRIBUTED BY F. E. GREEN

THE PROBLEM OF PROVIDING COTTAGES FOR RURAL LABOURERS.

Failure of Housing Acts. The Three Ways by which Lack of Cottages can be Met. The Case for Housing Commissioners.

Each successive Housing Act applied to rural districts has been a conspicuous failure. Act after Act has entirely failed to revive country life, even to arouse it from its lethargy. While doctrinaires have been contending with one another, and town statesmen have been drafting and re-drafting Acts, our villages have persistently fallen into decay, and our fields have become denuded of both labour and brains.

FIG. 1. IRISH SMALL HOLDER'S COTTAGE ON THIRTY ACRES.
Built at Roscommon by Congested Districts Board. Labourers' cottages like this are let with one acre at a shilling a week.

Fig 7. Congested Districts Board: photograph of a typical cottage
Middleton Rural District (Ireland) Labourers' Cotts.

Built under the "Labourers' Acts" (see pp. 159 and 32-34)

Cost of Building £150. Rent, 1/3 to 1/6 per week.

Fig 8. Middleton RDC, Co. Cork: single-storey pre-1906 Labourers Act cottage
Fig 9. Carrick, Co. Wexford: typical single-storey pre-1906 Labourers Act cottage
Fig 10. Carrick, Co. Wexford: typical two-storey pre-1906 Labourers Act cottage
Fig 11. W.J. Fennell: romanticised 'Irish' alternatives to the H.GB designs (1907)
Fig 12. IL&GB: recommended 'Type A' single-storey Labourers Act cottage (1907) [based on winning entry for 1906 competition by S. Moss]
Fig 13. H.G.B: recommended 'Type C' single-storey Labourers Act cottage (1907) [based on 3rd-place entry for 1906 competition by T.M. Deane]
Fig 14. II.GB: recommended 'Type F' two-storey Labourers Act cottage (1907)
Fig 15. ILGB: recommended 'Type G' two-storey Labourers Act cottage (1907)
Fig 16. Roscrea RDC: two-storey 'urban' type built under Labourers Act (1913-14)

Fig 17. T.J. Byrne/ South Dublin RDC: typical single-storey post-1906 Labourers Act cottages at Templeogue Road, Templeogue
Fig 18. T.J. Byrne / South Dublin RDC: two-storey 'suburban' plans at Woodview Cottages, off Church Lane, Rathfarnham (1916)
Fig 19. T.J. Byrne/ South Dublin RDC: Woodview Cottages, Rathfarnham

Fig 20. T.J. Byrne/ South Dublin RDC: 'garden village' at Shankhill, Co. Dublin
Fig 21. Photo of a typical Dublin tenement slum in the early-twentieth century.

Fig 22. Guinness Trust: the Bull Alley scheme (1899-1905), and adjacent: Dublin Corporation: the scheme at Brides' Alley (1901-11).
Fig 23. Waterford Corporation: the first terrace at Green Street, Ballybricken (1879)

Fig 24. Dublin Corporation: the Benburb Street / Barrack Street scheme (1885-87)
Fig 25. Cork Corporation: typical municipal terrace plans (1886/1905)
Fig 26. Cork Corporation: Roches Buildings (1892) & Sutton Buildings (1905)

Fig 27. Limerick Corporation: municipal terrace in Grattan Street, Old Pennywell
Fig 28. Limerick Corporation: wide-fronted terrace plans with front dormers (1912)
Fig 29. Chillingworth and Levie: winning entry for Belfast competition (1913)
There are seven houses of the II type, being an extension been called St. Broc's cottages, and each contains, on one floor, a living room 16 ft. 6 in. x 9 ft. 0 in.; one bedroom 11 ft. 6 in. x 9 ft. 3 in., and another 10 ft. 6 in. x 6 ft. 10 ins., and a scullery, 6 ft. 0 in. x 3 ft. 6 in. The roofs are slated, but in other respects these houses are fitted and finished in the same manner as the Home Villas.

The building contract included also the fencing in of the sites.

The amount of the building contract was just over £16,000, and it is interesting to note that there is not a penny of extra. The works were carried out under exceptional difficulties arising from very bad weather, and several long-drawn-out strikes, but when allowance has been made for these delays the contractor is to be congratulated upon not exceeding the time limit.

In addition to executing the building contract, the roads and footpaths, sewerage and water mains were carried out by Mr. P. Shortall, T.C., Temple St., Dublin, under the direction of the District Surveyor, Mr. John H. Middleton, B.E.; and the electric lighting by Mr. A. E. Davy under Mr. Price, the District Electrical Engineer. The bills of quantities for the entire scheme were prepared by Mr. George Metcalfe, of Nassau Street, Dublin. Mr. Joseph Lamh acted as Clerk of Works under the architect, and Mr. Brennan was the contractor's foreman. The architect for the scheme was Mr. Edwin Bradbury, M.R.I.A.T., College Park Chambers, Nassau Street, Dublin.

Fig 30. E. Bradbury/ Pembroke UDC: Home Villas, Donnybrook (1911-12)
Fig 31. P. Abercrombie: winning entry in the 1914 Dublin Town Plan Competition
The remodelled Central Area, showing the new Road Traffic Centre and Central Railway Station. In the drawing the suggestions shown on the following page are seen as though they had been completely realised.

Fig 32. P. Abercrombie: proposal for civic improvements in central Dublin (1914)
Suggested Development of an area off Cober Avenue as example of Suburban Housing; with types of houses.

Fig. 33. P. Abercrombie: proposal for neo-Georgian suburban housing (1914)
Fig. 34. P. Geddes & R. Unwin: site layout proposal for the Marino Estate (1914)
Fig 35. G. O'Connor/ Pembroke UDC: Aikenhead Road, Irishtown (1914-16)

Fig 36. G. O'Connor/ Pembroke UDC: Harmony Avenue, Donnybrook (1916)
HOUSING OF THE WORKING CLASSES
McCaffrey Estate Dublin.
Block Plan.

Fig 37
F.J. Byrne Dublin Corporation: site plan of the McCaffrey Estate (1915)
Fig 38. T.J. Byrne/ Dublin Corporation: 4-room type at the McCaffrey Estate

Fig 39. T.J. Byrne/ Dublin Corporation: 'street picture' at the McCaffrey Estate
Fig. 40. Dublin Corporation: perspective of the Church Street scheme (1916)
Fig 41. Dublin Corporation: site plan & 5-room type at Fairbrothers Fields (1918)
Fig 42. Dublin Corporation: various 4-room types at Fairbrothers Fields
Fig. 1.

TYPE A

Roofed area per pair of dwellings... 920 square feet
All floor areas are exclusive of chimney breasts

Fig. 2.

TYPE A (flats) can be built as one-storeyed houses

Roofed area per pair of dwellings... 818 square feet
See section fig 12

Fig 45. IL&GB: recommended 'Type A' 4-room plan from the 1919 circular
Fig 3. Type D

Ground floor plan  Upper floor plan

Roofed area per pair of dwellings............1200 square feet
Floor areas are exclusive of chimney breasts.

Fig 4. Type B (FLAT3) can be built as one-storeyed houses

Roofed area per pair of dwellings............952 square feet
For section see Fig 12

Fig 46. H.G.B. recommended Type B' 4-room plan from the 1919 circular

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**Fig. 5.**

**Type C**

Ground Floor Plan  
First Floor Plan

Roofed area per pair of dwellings: . . . . . 1078 square feet  
All floor areas are exclusive of chimney breasts

---

**Fig. 6.**

**Type C** (Flats) can be built as one-storeyed houses

Plan of Lower Flat  
Plan of Upper Flat

Roofed area per pair of dwellings: . . . . . 932 square feet  
For section see Fig 12.

---

Fig 47.  
II.G.B: recommended 'Type C' 5-room plan from the 1919 circular
Diagrammatic Plans

Type D

Ground floor plan
First floor plan
Roofed area per pair: 1200 square feet

Type E

Ground floor plan
First floor plan
Roofed area per pair: 1200 square feet

Type F

Ground floor plan
First floor plan
Roofed area per pair: 1350 square feet

All floor areas are exclusive of chimney breasts

Type C with study

Ground floor plan
First floor plan
Roofed area per pair: 1080 square feet

For descriptive notes see text

Scale of feet

10 5 0 10 20 30 40 50

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II CB: recommended Type C/D/E/F plans from the 1919 circular
Fig 49. Plans and photograph of 'Orion' patent building system in Clontarf (1920)
Fig 50. F. Mears/ IL.GB: site plan of the Killester Estate (1920-22)
Fig. 51. F. Mann's 1928 photograph of the Killester Estate in late 1920s.

Scheme 114. KILLESTER, Co. DUBLIN.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sup. area</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<td>A. 675 ft²</td>
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<td>Two bedrooms, living room, scullery, bathroom.</td>
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<tr>
<td>G. 871 ft²</td>
<td>G.</td>
<td>Three bedrooms, living room, scullery, bathroom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. 1,007 ft²</td>
<td>E.</td>
<td>Three bedrooms, living room, parlour, scullery, bathroom.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fig 52. F. Mears/ H.GB: photographs of the Killester Estate now
Fig 53. Irish Board of Works: Type 2A 4-room cottage for ex-servicemen
Fig 54. Irish Board of Works: 'Type 3' 4-room cottage for ex-servicemen
Fig 55. ISSLT: experimental 'Type A' single-storey 3-room cottage at Sallynoggin
Fig 56. ISSLT: photograph of the Shantallow Estate, Co. Londonderry
Fig 57. ISSLT: Type Z.1 two-storey 5-room cottage as used at Shantallow
Fig 58. ISSLT: 'Type D' two-storey 4-room cottage as used in the Irish Free State
Fig 59. Belfast Corporation: parlour houses on Wandsworth Road Estate (1922-24)
Fig 60. Belfast Corporation: 'kitchen' houses on the Woodvale Estate (1923-25)
Fig 62. H.T. O'Rourke/ Dublin Corporation: first design for Marino Estate (1920)
Fig 63.  H.T. O’Rourke/ Dublin Corporation: first house-types for the Marino Estate
Fig 64. F.G. Hicks/ Dublin Corporation: final site plan of Marino Estate (1923-27)
Fig 65. F.G. Hicks/ Dublin Corporation: the Marino Estate as completed
ANNUAL TOTAL OF LABOURERS ACTS LOANS

[Source: ILGB/IBoW/Irish Land Commission Annual Reports]

Diagram A. Annual total of Labourers Acts loans
ANNUAL TOTAL OF LABOURERS ACTS HOUSES BUILT

[Source: Irish Local Government Board Annual Reports]

ANNUAL TOTAL (no)

Diagram B. Annual total of Labourers Acts houses built
Diagram C. Cumulate total of Labourers Acts loans
ANNUAL TOTAL OF IRISH URBAN HOUSING LOANS

[Source: Irish Board of Works Annual Reports]

ANNUAL TOTAL (£)

Diagram D. Annual total of Irish urban housing loans
CUMULATE TOTAL OF LOANS ADVANCED UNDER THE HOUSING OF THE WORKING CLASSES ACTS ONLY

[Source: Irish Board of Works Annual Reports]

Diagram E. Cumulate total of loans advanced under the Housing of the Working Classes (Ireland) Acts
## ABSTRACT OF LOANS SANCTIONED AND HOUSES BUILT UNDER THE 1883-1919 LABOURERS ACTS, FROM 1884-85

[Source: Irish Local Government Board Annual Reports]

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<th>Number of houses built</th>
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<td>annual total</td>
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<td>139 394</td>
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<td>460 977</td>
<td>820 998</td>
<td>3 172</td>
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<td>188 742</td>
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Table U. Abstract of loans sanctioned and houses built under the 1883-1919 Labourers Acts, from 1884-85
ABSTRACT OF LOANS ADVANCED FOR RURAL HOUSING UNDER THE LABOURERS ACTS, FROM 1885-86

[Source: Irish Board of Works Annual Reports/
Irish Land Commission Annual Reports (from 1906)]

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<th>Loans from Irish Land Commission</th>
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Table V. Abstract of loans advanced for rural housing under the Labourers Acts, from 1885-86

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ABSTRACTS OF REGIONAL DIFFERENCES UNDER THE 1883-1919 LABOURERS ACTS

a/ Cumulate proportion of loans sanctioned, by province - to be read in conjunction with Table U

[Source: Irish Board of Works Annual Reports]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Munster</th>
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<th>Connaugh</th>
<th>Ulster</th>
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<td>£1 370 892 [38%]</td>
<td>£85 212 [2%]</td>
<td>£456 028 [13%]</td>
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b/ Cumulate proportion of houses built, by province - to be read in conjunction with Table U

[Source: Irish Local Government Board Annual Reports]

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Year</th>
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<th>Ulster</th>
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<td>1898-99</td>
<td>7 952 [57%]</td>
<td>5 738 [41%]</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903-04</td>
<td>9 254 [53%]</td>
<td>7 005 [40%]</td>
<td>247 [1%]</td>
<td>905 [5%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908-09</td>
<td>11 727 [48%]</td>
<td>9 532 [39%]</td>
<td>547 [2%]</td>
<td>2 841 [11%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913-14</td>
<td>17 988 [41%]</td>
<td>15 959 [37%]</td>
<td>2 165 [5%]</td>
<td>7 590 [17%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918-19</td>
<td>19 090 [40%]</td>
<td>17 335 [36%]</td>
<td>2 459 [5%]</td>
<td>9 031 [19%]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table W. Abstract of regional differences under the 1883-1919 Labourers Acts
ABSTRACT OF LOANS ADVANCED UNDER ALL URBAN HOUSING CODES IN IRELAND, FROM 1882-83

[Source: Irish Board of Works Annual Reports]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Labourers Dwellings Act</th>
<th>Artisans Dwellings Act</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>1882-83</td>
<td>10 908</td>
<td>1 18 421</td>
<td>10 908</td>
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<tr>
<td>1883-84</td>
<td>19 695</td>
<td>1 38 116</td>
<td>29 995</td>
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<td>1884-85</td>
<td>29 476</td>
<td>1 67 593</td>
<td>36 176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885-86</td>
<td>19 154</td>
<td>1 86 746</td>
<td>31 554</td>
</tr>
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<td>1886-87</td>
<td>3 016</td>
<td>1 89 762</td>
<td>38 576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1887-88</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1 89 862</td>
<td>19 803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888-89</td>
<td>19 803</td>
<td>1 27 619</td>
<td>39 606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>54 224</td>
<td>1 81 843</td>
<td>54 224</td>
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<tr>
<td>1890-91</td>
<td>39 070</td>
<td>1 22 913</td>
<td>42 153</td>
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<td>1891-92</td>
<td>19 692</td>
<td>1 24 605</td>
<td>34 387</td>
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<td>37 401</td>
<td>1 27 806</td>
<td>45 207</td>
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<td>24 116</td>
<td>1 30 122</td>
<td>34 238</td>
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<td>14 264</td>
<td>1 31 385</td>
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<td>17 750</td>
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<td>8 260</td>
<td>1 38 582</td>
<td>56 942</td>
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<td>1 47 718</td>
<td>95 338</td>
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<td>105 436</td>
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<td>93 726</td>
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<td>1 67 316</td>
<td>95 157</td>
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<td>16 465</td>
<td>1 69 578</td>
<td>86 043</td>
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<td>1 74 285</td>
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<td>1 83 106</td>
<td>110 056</td>
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<td>1910-11</td>
<td>38 700</td>
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<td>1913-14</td>
<td>132 653</td>
<td>1 342 328</td>
<td>132 653</td>
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<tr>
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<td>144 690</td>
<td>1 487 018</td>
<td>144 690</td>
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<td>191 253</td>
<td>1 678 271</td>
<td>191 253</td>
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<td>1916-17</td>
<td>97 907</td>
<td>1 776 178</td>
<td>97 907</td>
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<td>1917-18</td>
<td>55 369</td>
<td>1 831 547</td>
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<td>1 884 318</td>
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<td>1 937 417</td>
<td>53 099</td>
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<td>1920-21</td>
<td>48 239</td>
<td>1 985 656</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921-22</td>
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Table X. Abstract of loans advanced under all urban housing codes in Ireland, from 1882-83

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Loans advanced to urban councils</th>
<th>Loans advanced to private builders</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td></td>
<td>annual total (£)</td>
<td>cumulate total (£)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[% of total]</td>
<td>[% of total]</td>
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<tr>
<td>1885-86</td>
<td>266 287</td>
<td>[50%]</td>
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<td>301 777</td>
<td>[53%]</td>
<td>263 125</td>
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<td>263 754</td>
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<td>605 461</td>
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<td>679 316</td>
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<td>36 418</td>
<td>326 392</td>
<td>364 806</td>
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<td>19 692</td>
<td>320 605</td>
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<td>37 401</td>
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<td>38 576</td>
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<td>97 907</td>
<td>1 776 178</td>
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<td>55 369</td>
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<tr>
<td>1921-22</td>
<td>399</td>
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Table Y. Abstract of loans advanced under the 1885-1919 Housing of the Working Classes (Ireland) Acts, from 1885-86
PROPORTIONS OF RURAL AND URBAN HOUSING LOANS IN RELATION TO TOTAL PUBLIC LOANS ADVANCED IN IRELAND FROM 1903-04

[Source: Irish Board of Works Annual Reports]

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Loans for Housing of Working Classes Acts</th>
<th>Loans for Labourers Acts</th>
<th>Total public works loans issued</th>
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<td>annual total £ [% of total]</td>
<td>annual total £ [% of total]</td>
<td>annual total £ [% of total]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903-04</td>
<td>774 593</td>
<td>287 764 [36%]</td>
<td>46 013 [6%]</td>
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<tr>
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<td>600 542</td>
<td>255 815 [43%]</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1905-06</td>
<td>434 796</td>
<td>* 80 583 * [19%]</td>
<td>45 264 [10%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906-07</td>
<td>293 233</td>
<td>* 3 962 * [1%]</td>
<td>26 950 [9%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907-08</td>
<td>409 312</td>
<td>* 2 253</td>
<td>102 280 [25%]</td>
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<td>1908-09</td>
<td>529 567</td>
<td>* 4 867 * [1%]</td>
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<td>1909-10</td>
<td>402 224</td>
<td>* 1 489</td>
<td>132 653 [33%]</td>
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<tr>
<td>1910-11</td>
<td>488 973</td>
<td>* 300</td>
<td>144 690 [30%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911-12</td>
<td>414 821</td>
<td>* 125</td>
<td>191 253 [46%]</td>
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<tr>
<td>1912-13</td>
<td>148 197</td>
<td></td>
<td>97 907 [66%]</td>
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<tr>
<td>1913-14</td>
<td>172 370</td>
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<td>55 368 [32%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914-15</td>
<td>72 459</td>
<td></td>
<td>52 711 [73%]</td>
</tr>
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<td>1915-16</td>
<td>62 340</td>
<td></td>
<td>53 099 [85%]</td>
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<tr>
<td>1916-17</td>
<td>87 351</td>
<td></td>
<td>48 329 [55%]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Residue only (after 1906 Act public loans came from Irish Land Commission for this purpose)

Table Z. Proportions of rural and urban housing loans in relation to total public loans advanced in Ireland, from 1903-04
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CAB.27
CAB.37
CAB.41
CAB.43
CO.739
CO.783
CO.784
CO.904
CO.906
HLG.29
HO.45
HO.246
RECO.1
T.1
T.14
T.103
T.143
T.158
T.160
T.161
T.172
T.192

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CSO.RP
DE/2
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S.3642
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S.4278
S.5738

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- Long Papers

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- Samuel Papers
- Strachey Papers

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IMPERIAL WAR MUSEUM
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- Redmond Papers
- Robertson Papers
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