TRANSLATION AND TRAVELLING THEORY

The Role of Translation in the Migration of Literary Theories Across Culture and Power Differentials

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ABSTRACT

The thesis explores the role translation plays in the migration of literary and cultural theories across linguistic-cultural borders and power differentials. It shows that translation has a double function in this migration. Firstly, it plays a formative role in shaping and transforming the images of the writers and works involved, the attitudes towards imported theories in the receiving system(s), and the local critical discourses and terminology. Secondly, translation plays an indicative role in that it allows insight into, and analysis of, prevailing attitudes towards the importation of theoretical texts. Translation and translator patterns – such as text-selection, the temporal sequence of individual translations, and the interests and agendas of the translators – together with the metadiscourses accompanying translations reflect and reveal how the source texts and authors are received in their new environments.

The thesis presents a comparative account of the reception of structuralism and semiotics in Turkey (1960s-1990s) and of French feminism in Anglo-America (1970s-1990s). Two case studies are examined in depth: the importation of Roland Barthes’s work into Turkish and of Hélène Cixous’s work into English. They offer detailed analyses of the attitudes towards Barthes’s and Cixous’s work in Turkish literary critical circles and Anglo-American academic feminist critical circles, respectively, and trace how the images of these two writers are shaped, challenged and transformed through translation. Issues of terminology and retranslation in the transfer of their texts into Turkish and English, and the (non-)translation of certain political aspects in their writings are also explored.

As a study in a field rarely examined by translation scholars – especially within the context of power relations – this comparative investigation illuminates the culture and power differentials involved in the translation of theoretical texts, as well as highlighting the traits common to the importation/exportation patterns of literary and cultural theories in general. The thesis thus contributes both to translation studies and to literary and cultural theory.
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### TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract 2  
Acknowledgements 3  
Table of contents 5  
Publications arising out of the research undertaken for the thesis 9  
Introduction 10  
Notes 14  

**Chapter 1 – Travelling Theory Translated** 16
  1.1. ‘Theory’ and ‘translation’ 16  
  1.2. Theoretical framework 20  

**Chapter 2 – Structuralism and Semiotics in Turkey, and French Feminism in Anglo-America** 27
  2.1. Structuralism and semiotics in Turkey 28
    2.1.1. What was written/translated? 28  
    2.1.2. Some key issues 31  
    2.1.3. The critical response to structuralism and semiotics in Turkey 34
      2.1.3.1. Structuralism and art 37  
      2.1.3.2. Structuralism and ‘apoliticalness’ 40  
    2.1.4. ‘Objective/scientific’ criticism 42  
  2.2. French feminism in Anglo-America 47
    2.2.1. The critical response to French feminism in Anglo-America 50
      2.2.1.1. ‘Too elitist’, ‘too intellectual’, ‘impenetrable’ 55  
      2.2.1.2. Indebtedness to ‘white fathers’ 59  
      2.2.1.3. Essentialism and biologism 61  
    2.2.2. French feminism and psychoanalytic theory in Anglo-America 62  
  2.3. Conclusions 66  

**Chapter 3 – Tropes in the Travels of Theory** 68
  3.1. Attitudes towards French feminism in the Anglo-American feminist critical system 69
    3.1.1. Alterity 69  
    3.1.2. Solidarity 73  
    3.1.3. Universality 75  
    3.1.4. Consequences 79  
  3.2. Attitudes towards structuralism and semiotics in the Turkish literary critical system 82
5.2. Barthes’s texts retranslated into Turkish
   5.2.1. Turkish Language Reform
      5.2.1.1. Handling terms and concepts in
               the Language Reform
      5.2.1.2. Terms and concepts in literary and cultural theories
   5.2.2. Terms in the retranslations of Barthes’s writings into Turkish
   5.2.3. Consequences
5.3. Cixous’s texts retranslated into English
   5.3.1. Concepts in the translations of Cixous’s writings into English
      5.3.1.1. Écriture féminine
      5.3.1.2. Jouissance
   5.3.2. Wordplay in the translations of Cixous’s writings into English
   5.3.3. Consequences
5.4. Conclusions
   5.4.1. “Staying at home”
   5.4.2. Tolerance of interference
   5.4.3. Modernisation = translatability
   5.4.4. Multiple-entry visa
Chapter 6 – Translating Theory into Politics
   6.1. Feminist politics and the ‘Anglo-American Cixous’
      6.1.1. Theory in Anglo-American feminism
      6.1.2. Charges of ‘essentialism’
         6.1.2.1. Écriture féminine
         6.1.2.2. Jouissance
         6.1.2.3. Metaphor/metonymy
      6.1.3. Cixous and politics
      6.1.4. The politics of translation
   6.2. Marxist politics and the ‘Turkish Barthes’
      6.2.1. Theory in Turkish literary criticism
      6.2.2. Barthes and politics
         6.2.2.1. Nedim Gürsel
         6.2.2.2. Murat Belge
         6.2.2.3. Ragip Ege
         6.2.2.4. Hasan Bülent Kahraman
      6.2.3. Mythologies
6.2.4. The politics of translation 231

6.3. Conclusions 233

6.3.1. Essay and 'I' 233

6.3.2. Theory and difficulty 234

6.3.3. Fashion and novelty 236

6.3.4. Translating theory into politics 238

Conclusion 241

Bibliography 249

Appendices

Appendix 1: Autochthonous Texts Related to Structuralism and Semiotics in Turkish 280

Appendix 2: Translations Related to Structuralism and Semiotics in Turkish 290

Appendix 3: Bibliographical Information on the Translators of Roland Barthes's Works into Turkish 297

Appendix 4: Bibliographical Information on the Translators of Hélène Cixous's Works into English 306

Appendix 5: Examples of Terms and Neologisms in the Retranslations of Barthes's Texts into Turkish 316

List of Tables

Table 1 - Translations of Barthes's works into Turkish 110

Table 2 - Retranslations from *Essais critiques, Le Degré zéro, and Mythologies* 113

Table 3 - Time-lag in the translation of short texts by Barthes into Turkish 115

Table 4 - Time-lag in the translation of books by Barthes into Turkish 116

Table 5 - Works by Cixous and their translations into English until 2000 120

Table 6 - Works by Cixous and their translations into English until 1985 120

Table 7 - Works by Cixous and their translations into English until 1975 121

Table 8 - Time-lag in the translation of short texts by Cixous into English 122

Table 9 - Time-lag in the translation of book-length works by Cixous into English 123

Table 10 - Time-lag between the excerpts and the complete translations 124
Publications Arising out of the Research Undertaken for the Thesis


INTRODUCTION

The thesis explores the role translation plays in the migration of literary and cultural theories across linguistic and cultural borders, and across power differentials. It examines translation mainly from two different points of view. Translation firstly plays an indicative role in the study of this migration. It allows insight into, and analysis of, the workings of a given system. This is because the product and the process of translation – both the translated texts themselves and the translation practices – are shaped according to the local concerns in the receiving systems, to what is deemed urgent, important, and necessary there, and to the prevailing attitudes towards the importation of theoretical texts. Translation indicates how the system views itself, what its needs and expectations are, and how it handles ‘interferences’ from other sources. Translation and translator patterns – such as text-selection, the temporal sequence of individual translations, the translators’ professional profile and agenda, selection of terms – together with the meta-discourses accompanying translations, reflect and reveal how the source texts and authors are received in their new environments. Apart from being just a symptom, translation also plays a formative role (Hermans 1999:143) in the migration of literary and cultural theories. It shapes and transforms the images of writers and texts, influences the receiving system’s attitudes towards importations, and contributes to the development of local (critical) discourses and terminology.

Theory does not travel on its own, but often under the name of a well-known writer. For this reason, the thesis is based on a multiple-case study consisting of the importation of Roland Barthes’s works into Turkish, and of Hélène Cixous’s works into English. These two cases are examined from comparative and contrastive perspectives, which focus on the similarities and the differences between them (cf. Malmkjær 1999:11-12). Comparison uses translational data to bring to light analogues between the reception of two quite different writers, Barthes and Cixous, in two seemingly disparate systems – the Turkish literary critical system and the Anglo-American feminist critical system – with very different structures, languages, agendas, and power. A contrastive focus, on the other hand, uses translational data in order to highlight the differences between similarly travelling theories associated with these writers. While the analogues

1 On the methodology of multiple-case study, see Yin 1994:44-51; for its application to translation studies, see Susam-Sarajeva 2001b.
2 Having said that, there are many instances in which these two writers have been juxtaposed, not only for contrastive, but also for comparative purposes (see, e.g. Hill 1992:229; Moi 1985:120-121; Moorjani 1996:683; Richman 1980:77; Sellers 1991:25; Wing 1991:vii).
will provide us some clues as to how and why theories travel through translation in particular ways, the differences will demonstrate how the power differentials, among other factors, have a bearing on these journeys.

The reasons why I have chosen these writers and their importation into these particular receiving systems had initially to do with the similarities involved: both writers stood in metonymic relationship (cf. Tymoczko 1999:41-46) to entire schools of thought, Barthes representing structuralism and semiotics, Cixous representing French feminism; both were perceived as saying 'new and important' things, therefore considerable interest was shown in their work – an interest reflected in the number of translations; both were multifaceted writers whose writing careers changed substantially over time, providing the opportunity to see how this diversity fared in the new contexts; and finally, they both received parallel criticisms because of the prevailing political and cultural agendas in the relevant receiving systems. These similarities will be dealt with mainly in chapters 2, 4, and 6. Yet almost at the same time the marked differences also attracted my attention. Barthes was a writer who wrote only theory and criticism, while Cixous also wrote fiction and drama, and this arouse questions as to whether this difference would be reflected in their 'images'. The attitudes towards language in each case were also very different: in Anglo-America language was not something to be tampered with, while in Turkey it could be actively moulded. Most importantly, the dominance-dependence relationships between the source and receiving systems were drastically different. These differences will be covered mainly in chapters 3, 4, and 5.

The two cases studied here are used as foils and mirrors to illuminate each other further. I am fully aware that the duality which permeates the thesis might occasionally unnerve the modern reader, who is no doubt extremely wary of all sorts of dualities and dichotomies. Yet to add a third (or fourth, etc.) case to the thesis was realistically beyond the scope of this study. The conduct of a multiple-case study requires “extensive resources and time beyond the means of a single student or independent research investigator” (Yin 1994: 45). I hope further research into the area will bring forth more case studies on the subject.

The reader may also find that more space is devoted in the thesis to the case of Barthes’s reception in Turkey compared to the case of Cixous’s reception in Anglo-America. As I argued elsewhere (Susam-Sarajeva 2002), this is mainly because periphery researchers writing up their research in dominant languages and for an
'international' audience are all 'translators'. They translate their material — mostly from their own culture of origin — into the dominant paradigms and discourses of contemporary translation studies. In order to justify their findings, they need to contextualize the translations they talk about, and the more unknown this context is for the 'international' audience, the 'newer' the stories they tell (cf. Tymoczko 1999:47). They cannot afford to leave certain historical, literary, social, or political information implicit in their work, as they cannot assume such a vast erudition on the part of their audience. Maria Tymoczko referred to a similar phenomenon in post-colonial writing as 'frontloading' (1998:29). In academic writing, too, I would say, most of the time and energy of periphery researchers necessarily goes to such 'frontloading'.

The thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 assesses the present state of knowledge regarding the translation of literary and cultural theories, and expounds the general theoretical framework used within the thesis. Chapter 2 is an account of the reception of structuralism and semiotics in Turkey (1960s-1990s) and of French feminism in Anglo-America (1970s-1990s). It provides the contexts in which the importation of Barthes's and Cixous's work, respectively, took place. Barthes, of course, was not only a structuralist or a semiotician, and Cixous was not only a feminist — or, according to some critics and to herself, not a feminist at all. Still, these were the initial and most durable labels under which they were presented to the relevant receiving systems, and the debates surrounding their work took place almost exclusively within the framework of literary and cultural theories. My objective in this thesis is not to determine who these writers 'actually' were, or what they 'really' wrote about. Such an interrogation would be highly problematic, given the versatility of both writers. My focus will rather be on the receiving systems' perceptions about and attitudes towards them, since I am looking at the matter mainly from the point of view of translation into these systems.

Chapter 3 presents an analysis of the receiving systems' attitudes towards the relevant schools of thought, and consequently, towards the writers under study. These attitudes are reflected in a variety of tropes used in relation to translation, such as tropes of alterity, solidarity, universality, 'lack', and 'lag'. It is in this chapter that we will first discuss the power differentials involved, and will find important clues to the reasons underlying the different reception of Barthes's and Cixous's works in Turkey, and in Anglo-America, respectively.
The following chapters weave the similarities studied in Chapter 2 and the differences discussed in Chapter 3 around the translations of Barthes and Cixous in order to arrive at certain translational patterns. Chapter 4 deals with the role translation played in the formation of the particular images of Barthes and Cixous in the receiving systems concerned. It examines how their images were initially shaped and consolidated, and later challenged and transformed through translation and critical writings. The selection of texts (not) to be translated, the timing of the translations, and the professional profile of the translators are the factors influencing – and at the same time, influenced by – these changing images. Finding out more about the translation policies involved – who and what was translated, when, how, and why – will provide information on the needs and expectations as perceived by the receiving systems in terms of their own theoretical development.

Issues of terminology and retranslation in the transfer of these two writers' works will be the focus of Chapter 5. Examining the translational patterns from the point of view of 'retranslation' will shed light on the flexibility of the receiving system, the availability and evolution of relevant theoretical discourses in the receiving language, and the power relations between the source and receiving systems.

The nature of the impact of theories on the systems they are introduced into is determined not only by theories' inherent characteristics, but also by the particular conditions under which they were introduced in the first place. Chapter 6 focuses on the prevalent ideas in the receiving systems about the relationship between theory and politics, and on how these ideas played a role in the importation of the theories in question. The (non-)translation of the political implications of Barthes's and Cixous's texts will be discussed in detail, as well as the reasons why their work could not be effectively put into (political) use within the atmosphere prevalent at the time.

As a study in a field rarely examined by translation scholars – especially within the context of power relations – this comparative investigation highlights the traits common to the importation/exportation patterns of theories in general, as well as illuminating the culture and power differentials involved in the translation of theory. A closer look at how translation functions in the transplantation, transfer and circulation of theoretical texts would benefit both the users of these texts and translation scholars. From this perspective, the main contribution of this thesis will be both to translation studies and to literary theory.
NOTES

On Terminology

French feminism: Throughout the thesis, the term ‘French feminism’ will be used insofar as the different kinds of feminisms originating from France were perceived as a unified whole by Anglo-American readers. It is a term designating what is generally known as the 'second generation' or 'second-wave' feminism originating from France. Although the existence of such a feminism which can be called ‘French’ will be questioned throughout the thesis, I will not use the term in quotation marks, since at least in Anglo-America the term exists as such. The plural form ‘French feminisms’ will be used at times when the internal differences are acknowledged by the Anglophone critics in order “to recognize the many different types of political thought and activism incorporated in this term” (Flotow 1997b:100).

Anglo-America: This term refers mainly to the Anglophone America, i.e. Canada and the United States, though the thesis contains occasional references to the British reception of French feminism, too^4.

Anglo-American feminism: This is mainly intended as a short cut for Anglo-American academic feminism, since those who read, criticised, and used Cixous’s works in English were mainly feminists within the academia rather than those within the grassroots movements^5.

System: By this term I do not mean a monolithic concept of ‘target’ system referring to ‘Turkish culture’ or ‘Anglo-American culture’. What is referred to is rather ‘sub-systems’ made up of individuals and institutions who responded, in one way or another, to these imported theories – those who used them, those who rejected them, those who were aware of their existence in the first place – within the framework of the Turkish literary critical system and the Anglo-American feminist critical system.

Receiving system: I tried to avoid using the more established term ‘target system’, since, in my opinion, the latter term does not give enough credit to the initiative of the

^3 Jane Gallop points out that ‘second wave’ was conventionally used by the historians of feminism to indicate the twentieth century in general, and that nevertheless in recent feminist work in English, ‘second wave’ or ‘second generation’ came to represent only the third quarter of the twentieth century (1991:21).

^4 For some of the differences between the reception of French feminism in the United States and in Great Britain see e.g. Ward Jouve 1991:47-48.

^5 I would like to thank Maria Tymoczko for bringing this point to my attention.
system which receives the translations into itself. Although the term 'receiving' similarly detracts from the activity of the system, it is, to my knowledge, the only other widespread option available at the moment in translation studies terminology.

Theory: In line with the general usage, 'theory' or 'theories' will often be used as a short-hand for literary and cultural theories.

On the pronunciation of Turkish characters not found in the English alphabet
(For the pronunciation of the whole Turkish alphabet, see Rona 1989:7-9)

ç, Ç like the 'ch' in 'chair'

ğ This letter has no distinct pronunciation; it serves to lengthen the vowel before it.

ı, İ roughly like the -er combination in some English words, e.g. 'letter', 'speaker'

ö, Ö like the vowel in 'bird' or 'dirt' but short

ş, Ş like the 'sh' in 'sheep' or 'ash'

ü, Ü as in the German 'ü', e.g. 'übersetzen'.

Others

- Throughout the thesis, unless otherwise stated, the place of publication for books in Turkish is Istanbul.

- The translations of quotations from Turkish are mine, unless otherwise stated.
CHAPTER 1

TRAVELLING THEORY TRANSLATED

1.1. ‘Theory’ and ‘translation’

Theory fascinates (Gilbert, cited in Gaudin et al. 1981). Theory awes (Batur 1978). Theories are indispensable (Kantarcioglu 1991). Theories are beautiful (Bruss 1982). Theories are resisted (de Man 1986). Theories travel (Said 1983). Theories are translated... Yet, to what extent has this last feature of literary and cultural theories been subject to scrutiny? In the lengthy discussions on various theoretical texts in languages other than that of their origin, is the ‘translatedness’ of these theories recognised and accounted for? How many critics, poets, scholars, writers, activists, or artists who use, refer to, discuss, and elaborate on these theories have access to them directly in the languages in which they were first written? How can theories travel, on their own, with no relationship to the multitude of the languages of the world, without being translated?

As “critical writing on travel and tourism has [...] largely neglected [the] fundamental aspect of travelling – the relationship of the traveller to language” (Cronin 2000:1-2), the few texts available on the travels of theories have similarly overlooked the relationship of these theories to language. Edward Said, the critic whose work lent the notion ‘travelling theory’ to my thesis, elaborates:

Like people and schools of criticism, ideas and theories travel – from person to person, from situation to situation, from one period to another. Cultural and intellectual life are usually nourished and often sustained by this circulation of ideas, and whether it takes the form of acknowledged or unconscious influence, creative borrowing, or wholesale appropriation, the movement of ideas and theories from one place to another is both a fact of life and a usefully enabling condition of intellectual activity. Having said that, however, one should go on to specify the kinds of movement that are possible, in order to ask whether by virtue of having moved from one place and time to another an idea or theory gains or loses in strength, and whether a theory in one historical period and national culture becomes altogether different for another period or situation. [...] Such movement into a new environment is never unimpeded. It necessarily involves processes of representation and institutionalization different from those at the point of origin. This complicates any account of the transplantation, transference, circulation, and commerce of theories and ideas (1983:226).

In this article, Said talks about how some of Georg Lukács’s ideas were picked up by Lucien Goldmann, and later through Goldmann, were used by Raymond Williams and Michel Foucault. Yet, this chain of thought – initiated in Hungarian/German, transformed
through French, and finally put to use in English and in French – does not seem to suggest any translational problems to Said. He talks about interdisciplinarity, about the vagueness of the boundaries of literature and criticism, about the “transplantation, transference, circulation, and commerce of theories”, but he never mentions translation, let alone discusses it. Predictably, Said’s article did not go without criticism in this respect:

Indeed, who does the traveling? Does theory travel? If so, how? Granting theory such subjectivity leads to a further question: What is the means of transportation? Is it the aircraft, automobile, rickshaw, train, man-of-war, or space shuttle? Commenting on Said’s oversight, James Clifford suggests that “Lukácsian Marxism in his essay seems to travel by immigrant boat; theory nowadays takes the plane, sometimes with round-trip tickets”. I would take this point a step further: not only does the concept of traveling theory tend to affirm the primacy of theory (or Western theory in the context of Said’s book) by endowing the latter with full-fledged, mobile subjectivity, but it fails to account for the vehicle of translation. With the suppression of that vehicle, travel becomes such an abstract idea that it makes no difference in which direction theory travels (from West to East or vice versa) and for what purpose (cultural exchange, imperialism, or colonization?), or in which language and for what audience (Liu 1995:21) [Emphasis mine].

The questions raised by Lydia H. Liu, a scholar who wrote on “translated modernity” in China, are among those I set out to study in this thesis: how theory travels, what the relationship of theory to translation may be in particular cases, and what happens when theory travels in various directions for different audiences.

In the last decade or so, the term ‘translation’ has become a commonplace in literary and cultural theories – yet usually as a metaphor, as “a rhetorical figure describing on the one hand the increasing internationalization of cultural production and on the other the fate of those who struggle between two worlds and two languages” (Simon 1996:134). The migrants have to ‘translate’ themselves, their experiences, their native tongues into the dominant idioms of power, they need to become “translated beings” (Rushdie 1991:13, cited in Simon 1996:135). Women have to ‘translate’ their ‘private’ languages into patriarchal discourses. ‘Translation’ has come to represent the sense of not being at home within the codes of the powerful, of being excluded from these codes. What about ‘translation proper’, then, translation in its more common sense, within literary and cultural studies?

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6 In the sequel to this article translation appears briefly, but only as factual information related to the publication of a certain French translation of Lukács’s work (Said 1994:259).
The highly metaphorical language used to describe translation hides an insensitivity to the realities of languages in today’s world. Anglo-American gender and cultural studies have been abundantly nourished through translations, and yet they rarely look critically at the translation practices through which they have come into being. Confidently conducted mainly in English, these studies give little attention to the specific languages of intellectual and cultural commerce in the world today (Simon 1996:135).

Theories are often attributed ‘universal’ qualities, even if they themselves do not claim them. The ‘translatedness’ of theoretical texts tends to detract from this universality, highlighting the local and the particular in them. Consequently, it is much more convenient to ignore the influx of ideas through translation. Sherry Simon remarks that while the significant role translation played in the transmission of intellectual movements in Western history is often harped upon, less attention is paid to the role of translation in the contemporary circulation of ideas (1991:11). Similarly, in philosophical research “widespread dependence on translated texts coincides with neglect of their translated status, a general failure to take into account the differences introduced by the fact of translation” (Venuti 1996:24). Literary and cultural theories likewise evolve through “the creation of concepts by interpreting domestic versions of foreign [theoretical] texts, but for the most part these versions have been taken as transparent, and the concepts unmediated by the domestic language and culture that is their medium” (ibid.). Nevertheless, when theory travels it is “disfigured, deformed, ‘translated’” (Miller 1996:220). In the receiving system “a theory is made use of in ways the theory never intended or allowed for” (Miller 1996:219):

At the new site, giving an impetus to a new start, the theory will be radically transformed, even though the same form of words may still be used, translated as accurately as possible into the new language. If the theory is transformed by translation, it also to some degree transforms the culture or discipline it enters. The vitality of theory is to be open to such unforeseeable transformations and to bring them about as it crosses borders and is carried into new idioms (Miller 1996:223).

One would, therefore, expect that travelling theory had been an attractive research topic for translation scholars. Research on translation today covers a wide range of issues; nevertheless, remarkably little work appears to have been done within translation studies on the vast field of translating conceptually dense texts, such as philosophical or theoretical writings. This is all the more striking when one thinks about what José Lambert calls “the canonization of literary translation”, “a marked tendency to link Translation
Studies with the (comparative) study of Literary Translation” (1991:27-28). Although the translation of literature has been a favourite topic in the discipline now for many decades, the translation of theories on literature – and on culture which brings forth this literature – has not been of much interest to translation scholars. Although the phrase ‘theories of translation’ is everywhere, ‘translation of theories’ is a rare sight.

In general, in the few instances where the terms ‘translation’ and ‘(literary) theory’ do come together, the issue discussed is not how theories are translated and why, but how (literary) theory can make use of the insights provided by translation, which is presented as 'the closest reading possible'. For example, in an article titled “Translation and Literary Criticism”, Rainer Schulte emphasises that “rethinking of the relationship and interaction between translation and literary criticism is necessary” (1982:1). What he focuses on is how translation can be utilised in the service of literary criticism in the interpretation of literary texts. Neither in this article nor in the response written to it by Paul Mann (1983) is the translation of literary critical texts mentioned. Likewise, Richard Bjornson’s article “Translation and Literary Theory” (1980) explores the relationships between intertextuality and translation, and between cognitive mapping theory and translation, but not the translation of literary theory. A similar approach can be found in Marilyn Gaddis Rose’s Translation and Literary Criticism:

Translation and literary criticism [...] have always been historically interdependent. But over the past quarter century, proponents of both literary criticism and post-Heideggerian philosophy, when classified together as Postmodernists, have found in translation a key to literary theory. Their use of translation [...] can be a cue and a justification [...] for using translation as a critical method both for analyzing literature and teaching it, not to mention translating it (1997:2).

Accordingly “in tandem, translation and criticism enhance the understanding and appreciation of literature” (Gaddis Rose 1997:11). Paul de Man, too, compares translation with criticism and literary theory:

The translation canonizes, freezes, an original and shows in the original a mobility, an instability, which at first one did not notice. The act of critical, theoretical reading performed [...] by literary theory in general – by means of which the original work is not imitated or reproduced but is to some extent put in motion, de-canonized, questioned in a way which undoes its claim to canonical authority – is similar to what a translator performs (1985:35).
The few works which have appeared on the transfer of theories across linguistic and cultural borders come not from translation studies scholars, but from literary and cultural critics. The transportation of French deconstruction to America has attracted some attention (see e.g. Arac et al. 1983; Comay 1991; Johnson 1985; Lewis 1985), and the reception of French feminist theories in Anglophone countries were also considered worthy of interest (see e.g. Gaudin et al. 1981; Finel-Honigman 1981; Freiwald 1991; Moorjani 1996; Penrod 1993). This, I believe, is as much due to the difficulties confronted when transferring these schools of thought into a fundamentally different culture from their origin, as it is to do with the widespread interest shown in these schools themselves. Only a few scholars who had stronger links with translation studies have contributed to the investigation of the area (e.g. Godard 1991 and Simon 1996)\(^8\).

Given the traditional low status translation holds in the eyes of the non-expert, and the absence of systematic approaches to translation outside the discipline of translation studies, this emerges as a considerable setback to a better understanding of translation’s role in the migrations of theories. For instance, the introduction of a study on the Anglo-American reception of deconstruction includes the following passage:

> If the space of this book is particularly that of the ‘gap’ between Anglo-American and Continental criticism and philosophy, then the problem it continually addresses is that of ‘translation’, not only literal matters of turning one language into another, but also the larger matter of cultural transference in general (Arac et al. 1983:ix).

Within current translation studies such a distinction between “literal matters of turning one language into another” would be considered *inseparable* from “the larger matter of cultural transference in general”. I contend, therefore, that more research on the translation, transportation and transfer of literary and cultural theories has to be carried out also from within translation studies in order to increase our understanding of the subject. This thesis is intended as a step in this direction.

### 1.2. Theoretical framework

The travel accounts of theories are often told without any reference to translation. This, of course, does not stop theory from being widely translated, transferred, and circulated.

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\(^8\) The special issue of the journal *TTR (Traduction, Terminologie, Rédaction)* titled ‘Traduire la théorie’ (4:3, 1991), in which Godard 1991 and Freiwald 1991 were published, included just one more article by Paul de Man which could be relevant to the topic, and that is the French version of de Man 1985, quoted above.
In spite of the arguments claiming that individual theories are culture-, language-, and text-specific; that they can be influential only for the time and place they come into being; that they inevitably lose their strength and innovativeness in different contexts, or, on the contrary, that they gradually acquire a dogmatic and authoritative quality which was not intended by their originators, the ideas of leading and canonical theorists are used in the analysis and criticism of a variety of texts written in a multitude of languages.

Theory would, it might seem, [...] differ from pedagogical techniques or specific readings of specific works. The latter are tied to particular sites and situations. Therefore they do not translate well or ‘travel’ well, as they say of certain delicate wines that are best drunk where they are made. Literary theory, on the other hand, is like the vacuum-sealed box wines that travel anywhere and keep for a long time even after they are opened (Miller 1996:208-209).

Theories seem to travel in the “vacuum-sealed boxes” to a variety of destinations, but do they do so erratically, from and towards every direction?

What happens when a word, category, or discourse ‘travels’ from one language to another? In nineteenth-century colonial and imperialist discourse, the travel of ideas and theories from Europe to the rest of the world usually evoked notions of expansion, enlightenment, progress, and teleological history. In recent years, the move to historicize and decolonize knowledge in various academic disciplines has led to a growing number of studies that scrutinize these notions. The word ‘travel’ is no longer seen as innocent and is often put in quotation marks (Liu 1995:20).

Theory promises knowledge. Therefore it carries with it a certain authority and power. As Liu observes, “theory legitimizes and is in turn legitimated; and, in its ability to name, cite, invoke, and perform rhetorical acts, it reproduces, multiplies, and distributes symbolic wealth and power” (1995:233). Theory gives the impression of being “conceptual and generalized, therefore applicable in any context and to works in any language and within the local topography of any culture and time” (Miller 1996:208). When literary theoretical texts are thus “reduced to abstract theoretical formulations, it is often forgotten that those formulations in every case are attained by an act of reading” (Miller 1996:213):

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9 Though this may be a false promise, after all: “Theory’s openness to translation is a result of the fact that a theory, in spite of appearances, is a performative, not a cognitive, use of language. The word ‘theory’, which means ‘clear-seeing’, seems to promise knowledge. Works of theory are nevertheless potent speech acts. A theory is a way of doing things with words, namely facilitating (or sometimes inhibiting) acts of reading” (Miller 1996:223).
Literary theory [...] in spite of its high degree of apodictic generalization, is tied, perhaps even inextricably tied, to the language and culture of its country of origin. Though theory might seem to be as impersonal and universal as any technological innovation, in fact it grows from one particular place, time, culture, and language. It remains tied to that place and language. Theory, when it is translated or transported, when it crosses a border, comes bringing the culture of its originator with it (Miller 1996:210) [Emphasis mine].

When we take into consideration that the cultures in which contemporary theories originate are often central ones (see Susam-Sarajeva 2002), the issues of power involved in the translation of theories gain more significance. Theories travel across linguistic and cultural borders under certain power differentials, often in unilateral import/export relationships. It is suggested that translation as cultural practice is “deeply implicated in relations of domination and dependence, equally capable of maintaining or disrupting them” (Venuti 1998:158), and that it “shapes, and takes shapes within, the asymmetrical relations of power that operate under colonialism” (Niranjana 1992:1-2). In fact, when it comes to studying the power differentials in the travels of theories, contemporary work on postcolonialism seems to offer a viable framework, since this work has addressed issues arising precisely from the “symmetries and asymmetries of linguistic and geopolitical power” (Gupta 1998:182). It is true that the problematic of translation is considered to be “a significant site for raising questions of representation, power, and historicity” in a postcolonial context (Niranjana 1992:1), a site revealing “the asymmetries that have structured international affairs for centuries” (Venuti 1998:158). Nevertheless, these theories do not readily lend themselves to cases like the ones studied in this thesis. Let me briefly explain why.

First of all, postcolonial theories of translation\textsuperscript{10} have primarily dealt with the representations of ‘minority’ literatures and cultures in ‘majority’ systems – or, in Talal Asad’s terms, with the translations from ‘weaker’ languages into ‘stronger’ ones (1986:157). Translations from a ‘stronger’ language into a ‘weaker’ one, as in the case of Roland Barthes in Turkish, are much less subjected to scrutiny within a postcolonial framework. Many scholars who do use this framework focus on the ways in which the colonised is translated into and reconstructed in the language of the coloniser, and on the strategies which have led or could lead the way out towards ‘decolonisation’ (e.g. Asad 1986; Asad 1995; Bassnett and Trivedi 1999; Carbonell 1996; Cheyfitz 1991;

\textsuperscript{10} For a general outline of these theories see Robinson 1997b.
The main distinction is often between coloniser and colonised, civilised and savage, capitalist and kin-ordered, written and oral, etc. The asymmetric relationships between the products of hegemonic languages and their translation and transfer into cultures which may equally well be 'civilised', 'capitalist' and/or 'written', but nevertheless subordinate and peripheral, have been analysed less frequently (e.g. Liu 1995; Chang 1992; and parts of Asad 1986 and Jacquemond 1992).

Second, the 'post-' of postcolonialism tends, in many cases, to imply that colonialism itself is somehow over. Yet this is far from the truth. It is clear that for the 'ex-colonial' countries imperialism still reigns, even if understood purely in economic rather than governmental terms. Therefore, the term 'decolonisation' can refer "only crudely to what has, in the language of national liberation struggles, been called the "transfer of power", usually from the reigning colonial power to an indigenous elite" (Niranjana 1992:7). The importance of this transfer is not negligible; however, "it would be naïve to believe it marks the 'end' of domination, for the strength of colonial discourse lies in its enormous flexibility", and the post-colonial is now subject to an "absentee colonialism", in which the former colony is economically and politically dependent on the ex-rulers (Niranjana 1992:7-8). Furthermore, political and/or economic dependence are not the only factors underlying imperialism. Though inseparable from these two, cultural, educational, and social dependence also leads to its current versions. Therefore, "colonialism (both linguistic and cultural, if no longer administrative) is alive and well, and the post has come early" (Gupta 1998:191) for the 'ex-colonial' countries.

If this is so, what about all those languages and cultures of the countries which have never been a colony – which might have even been centres of empires themselves in the past, as in the case of Turkey – but are now nevertheless under the profound influence of hegemonic powers economically, politically and culturally? This question brings us to another incompatibility of postcolonial theories of translation with the cases I discuss.

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11 Raymond Williams observes: "If imperialism, as normally defined in late 19th century England, is primarily a political system in which colonies are governed from an imperial centre, for economic but also for other reasons held to be important, then the subsequent grant of independence or self-government to these colonies can be described [...] as 'the end of imperialism'. On the other hand, if imperialism is understood primarily as an economic system of external investment and the penetration and control of markets and sources of raw materials, political changes in the status of colonies or former colonies will not greatly affect description of the continuing economic system as imperialist" (cited in Phillipson 1993:45).
here. Cases chosen for study within a postcolonial framework mostly belong to
countries which were, at one time or another, actual political colonies of dominant
powers. These cases are located within particular socio-cultural frameworks which do
not necessarily resemble each other, let alone resemble those which were not subjected
to colonisation. If today's imperialism does not depend on territorial and governmental
rule, but is fed through the various discourses noted by Tejaswini Niranjana as above,
these discourses certainly cover more systems than the 'ex-colonial' ones.

Finally, studies on translations from one 'strong' language to another, as in the case
of Cixous in English, usually lack interest in, or awareness of, the power relations
involved, and therefore, are certainly not carried out from within a postcolonial
framework. In such studies the equality of the systems in question is mostly taken for
granted, and scholars continue on the basis that there was no rivalry, struggle, or tension
between the symmetrical systems involved. The evocation of reciprocity in translation
and the suggestion of 'equal value' implied by this reciprocity, as well as by notions
such as 'equivalence', seem to be misleading not only in cases "where the cultures in
question are not on equal terms economically and politically" (Hermans 1998:62), but
also in cases where they can be considered at least on comparable terms. Speaking of
translation "as exchange, or as bridge-building, suggesting fairness, friendship and two-
way processes" may obscure "translation's one-directionality and its complicity in
relations of power" (ibid.) in any pair of systems.

Where does all this leave a researcher who wants to look at the power differentials
involved in the translation of literary and cultural theories? Because of the above-
mentioned drawbacks, I found the framework provided by postcolonial approaches to
translation rather inadequate for examining the power relations involved in my two
cases, though I did make much use of their insights. As Maria Tymoczko has recently

12 For an argument against the claim that postcolonial theories cannot be applied to countries other than
those which have actually been colonies, see Liu 1995:31-32. Liu observes that at issue "is not who was
colonized and who was not, but how to interpret the interconnected moments of confrontation between
those who sought to conquer the world and those who struggled to survive under such enormous
pressures" (1995:32). Likewise, José Lambert relates the notion of 'decolonisation' to such a broader
perspective, disassociating it from the struggle of ex-colonies against the heritage left by their former
oppressors: "What is called 'decolonization' is in fact just the tendency to resist globalization, or

13 Such a platform for two-way processes is, of course, even smaller in cases where the importation is
predominantly unilateral, i.e. from the 'strong' system to the 'weak' one, which is bound to remain at the
receiving end of this transfer as long as it is economically, politically, and/or culturally dominated by the
former.
and rightly pointed out, although "postcolonial theory has been attractive to literary
studies as a whole because it is one of the few viable contemporary theoretical or critical
approaches that actually deals overtly and concretely with oppression and cultural
coercion" (2000:32), a more differentiated and elaborate theoretical approach to power
is also required (Tymoczko 2000:31; see also Susam-Sarajevo 2001a). Yet such an
approach to translation is not readily available at the moment. The reluctance in
translation studies to take into account the asymmetries between the languages and
systems studied have already been criticised by 'outsiders' like Niranjana: "Translation
studies [...] seems to be by and large unaware that an attempt should be made to
account for the relationship between 'unequal' languages" (1992:48), since the tendency
in translation studies has been to ignore the "historical asymmetry between languages, to
the point where theorists of translation can speak blithely of 'general principles' that
'can be determined and categorized, and, ultimately, utilized in the cycle of text-theory-
text regardless of the languages involved''' (1992:59)^14.

Yet I believe Niranjana's worries over the inefficiency and "inherent limitations" of
translation studies to "initiate or sustain a serious discussion of the political nature of
translation, political in the sense that it is enmeshed in effective history and relations of
power" (1992:61) have already been proven unfounded. The recent work by scholars
such as Jacquemond (1992), Mehrez (1992), Tymoczko (1999; 2000), Cronin (1995;
1998), Robinson (1997b), and Wolf (1997), and by the papers in volumes edited by
Burrell and Kelly (1995), Álvarez and Vidal (1996) and Bassnett and Trivedi (1999), for
instance, all point to the beginnings of such a discussion. I hope that the arguments
presented in this thesis will also contribute to the establishment of such a differentiated
theoretical approach to power in translation studies.

The main theoretical framework of the thesis, then, remains descriptive translation
studies (DTS, e.g. Toury 1995 and 1998) and systems theory (e.g. Even-Zohar 1978 and
1990; Hermans 1999). DTS provides a detailed framework for the analysis of 'who,
what, when, how and why' questions central for studying the history of travelling
theories. The emphasis DTS places on context, as well as on extratextual material and
lower level units, has also allowed me to cover a wide area of research. While focusing
on the historical and political reasons behind the particular reception of structuralism

and semiotics in Turkey, and of French feminism in Anglo-America, I also could deal with the terminological problems in the translated texts, and with the introductions, prefaces, endnotes, etc. in which related issues were discussed. In connection with DTS, André Lefevere’s concept of ‘rewriting’ (e.g. 1992:9 and 1991:143) underpins many of my arguments, since literary and cultural theories travel through various forms of ‘rewriting’, such as quotations, literary histories, anthologies, criticism, editing, and translation.

I believe that the framework provided by the descriptive approach to translation can be usefully extended to cover issues of value and power without necessarily sliding into a prescriptive approach. Such an extension offers a welcome answer to a lacunae in translation studies for studying a variety of power differentials, not just the ‘postcolonial’ type. By insisting on value-free and objective research, DTS has long ignored not so much the issues of value or power as such (see e.g. Lefevere 1992), but the question of value and power as it affects and inhabits the very practice of translation studies (cf. Susam-Sarajeva 2002). Therefore, the present extension can also be taken as an internal critique of DTS.
CHAPTER 2

STRUCTURALISM AND SEMIOTICS IN TURKEY, AND FRENCH FEMINISM IN ANGLO-AMERICA

This chapter presents the contexts underlying my case studies: the reception of structuralism and semiotics in Turkey (1960s-1990s) and of French feminism in Anglo-America (1970s-1990s). The term 'reception' here does not refer to reader responses. Nor do I present my account within the framework of reception theory. What I rather focus on is the varying attitudes found in the written critical responses (in Turkish and in English) towards these schools of thought. After all, critical writing is a form of 'rewriting' (Lefevere 1992:9) which plays a significant role in the importation of literary and cultural theories.

Turkish critics have approached Roland Barthes's works from a variety of perspectives in the last four decades. Yet his work produced within the framework of structuralism and semiotics remained the best known and discussed in the first three of them. Barthes was initially presented to Turkish readers as a 'pioneer' of structuralism and a prominent semiotician. His name appeared in almost all the texts on the subject written in Turkish: be it to praise his writings as good applications of the 'structuralist method', to condemn his work together with the rest of the 'structuralist thinking', to show how he digressed from the 'structuralist principles', or to single him out and pour over him the frustration aroused by the 'structuralist ideology'. The reception of his work in Turkey is closely linked, then, to the reception of structuralism and semiotics. Similarly, for a couple of decades, Hélène Cixous remained the icon of French feminism in Anglo-America. Julia Kristeva, Luce Irigaray and Cixous were often invoked together as the 'Holy Trinity', but Cixous was often regarded as the representative of French feminism, and thus, received most of the acclaim, as well as the negative criticism. Before focusing on the importation of her work into the Anglo-American feminist critical system, I therefore need to place it in the context of the reception of French feminism.

The first section of this chapter presents a brief history of structuralism and semiotics in Turkey and the critical response these schools of thought elicited. In the second section I focus on the history of and critical response to French feminism in Anglo-America. For each of the contexts studied, there is a sub-section devoted to a
particular background issue: the debate on 'subjective' vs. 'objective' criticism in Turkey, and the status of psychoanalysis in Anglo-America. These are important areas of the general context in which the transfer of these schools of thought took place, though by no means do they give the whole picture. Other factors, such as the prevalence of Marxist and socialist-realist criticism in the 1960s-1980s Turkey\(^\dagger\), and Anglo-American feminists' attitude towards theories of 'French-origin' in general will be dealt with in the rest of the thesis.

2.1. Structuralism and semiotics in Turkey

In this section, I first give a brief itinerary of the writings on structuralism and semiotics in Turkish\(^\dagger\). This will be followed by the evaluation of findings and an account of the critical response.

2.1.1. What was written/translated?

The interest in structuralism and semiotics in Turkey can be traced back to the second half of the 1960s. The earliest translations and autochthonous texts on the subject appear between 1965 and 1967 (\(\text{For all the texts mentioned in the section 2.1.1., see appendices 1 and 2, except for the translations of} \text{Barthes's works, which are included in the main bibliography.} \)) Turkish critics initially interested in the subject were mainly linguists, such as Berke Vardar and Süheyla Bayrav, who both published books on structural linguistics in 1968 and 1969, respectively. Osman Türkay seems to be the only literary critic who dealt with structuralism in literature during this period. As for the first translations between 1960 and 1970, these were six articles by Roland Barthes (plus, one retranslation), two by Claude Lévi-Strauss, and two by Lucien Goldmann.

In the 1970s, both the translations and the autochthonous writings on structuralism and semiotics increase in number and diversity. Autochthonous writings outnumber the translations (50 to 35). However, out of this 50, 12 are either against these schools of thought, or at best, express ambivalent attitudes towards them. Tahsin Yücel, who published six articles and two books within this decade (see Appendix 1) is the figure who

\(^\dagger\) Throughout the thesis, I do not want to give the impression that Marxist or socialist-realist criticisms were the only type of criticism carried out in Turkey at the time. However, up until the 1980 coup, they certainly had a prominence among other schools of criticism.

\(^\dagger\) The reader needs to bear in mind that the label 'structuralism and semiotics' may not be accurate for every single text listed here or in appendices 1 and 2. The categorisation is based partly on previous existing bibliographies (cited in Susam 1997), and partly on information about the authors involved.
can be readily associated with structuralism; and Mehmet Rifat, who published five articles and two books, is the most prominent among the Turkish semioticians. Vardar and Bayrav continue to write on structural linguistics and literary criticism. Apart from Yücel's detailed theoretical work, the book-length works in the 1970s are to do with the relationships between structuralism and poetry (Işık 1978; Yüce 1975) and between structuralism and linguistics (Bayrav 1976). The rest of the critics seem to have been interested in structuralism and semiotics only briefly or partially. Some wrote introductory articles for the 'uninitiated', often criticising these schools of thought. Some attempts to use the insights derived from them in other areas apart from linguistics and literature, such as architecture, theatre, and cinema, can also be observed. Yet there are very few attempts to use structuralism for actually criticising or studying literary texts. Among the two articles (Akin 1973; İnal 1979) and one book (Işık 1978) which do so, only one of the articles is on Turkish literature; the other article and the book apply structuralist methods to texts in foreign languages. In semiotics, applications are few in number too, but they are nevertheless more related to Turkish literature. Among the four, two belong to Rifat: his doctoral thesis on Michel Butor (1978) and an analysis of a short story, written by no other than Tahsin Yücel (1976). An article by Umay Güney applies Propp's method to Turkish folk tales (1974), and another by Gül İşik concentrates on the semiotic analysis of certain Turkish poems (1978).

This decade also saw the publication of two special issues on structuralism: Dilbilim, a journal on linguistics published by the French Department of the University of Istanbul (1976), and Birikim, a monthly socialist journal on art, culture and literature (1977). The latter gathered together the criticisms directed at structuralism by Turkish Marxist critics, and will be frequently referred to throughout this chapter.

As for the translations, Lucien Goldmann and Roland Barthes were the favourites of the 1970s. Goldmann had six articles (plus one retranslation) and two books translated (Recherches dialectiques, 1975; Sciences humaines et philosophie, 1977). Barthes also had six articles and one book translated (Eléments de sémiologie, 1979). The other translated authors were Ferdinand de Saussure (Cours de linguistique générale I-II, 1976-1978, and 2 articles), Claude Lévi-Strauss (3 articles), Roman Jakobson (2), Umberto Eco (2), Tzvetan Todorov (2), Victor Shklovsky (1), Julia Kristeva (1), A.J. Greimas (1), Jan Mukafovský (1), Jurij Tynianov (1), Gérard Genette (1), and Michel Foucault (1).
After 1980 – the year when the military coup d'état imposed a temporary silence on Marxist and socialist thinkers and activists, as well as on literary critics who wrote within this tradition – a substantial increase can be observed in the amount of writings on structuralism and semiotics. The number of translations (73) comes closer to that of the autochthonous texts (78). The Turkish critics who responded to these schools of thought in one way or another – in the form of approval, application or negative criticism – amount to 47 in this decade, and almost all contributed with one or two articles. Book-length works on structuralism belong to Ayşegül Yüksel (1981), Berke Vardar (1983), and Tahsin Yücel, who leads with two books in 1982 and ten articles. Ahmet Oktay’s work also refers to the topic, but from a notably socialist point of view (1983). Books related to semiotics are by Fatma Erkman Akerson (1987) and Mehmet Rifat (1980, 1982, 1983, 1988). Rifat is the leading figure in semiotics with nine articles and four books in the 1980s.

As a response to the increasing interest in structuralism and semiotics in the early 1980s, the monthly literary journal Varlıkt devoted two of its issues to their evaluation\(^\text{17}\). A selection of texts on structural linguistics was also published in 1982\(^\text{18}\). As for the applications, they somewhat increased, too. There were some interesting examples which applied structuralism to aruz, the traditional metre of Divan poetry (Kalpakçıoğlu 1982), to folk tales (Yücel 1982), and to a Turkish playwright (Yüksel 1981). The rest used structuralism and semiotics in examining foreign literary texts (Kantel 1980; Güz Gündoğan 1987; Selen 1988; Bayrav 1989).

During the more or less stagnant years of 1980 and 1981, the only authors whose texts on structuralism or semiotics came to be translated were Roland Barthes and Umberto Eco. The real ‘boom’ in translation was experienced after the coup, in 1982 and 1983, with 26 and 13 texts respectively, i.e. equal to the total number of translations done in the whole of the 1970s (39). Most of these translations were published in Yazko Çeviri, a journal on literary translation and theory, which, incidentally, was first published in the summer of 1981 and lasted for the following three years. During the 1980s Barthes (26 texts), Jakobson (8), Foucault (7), Eco (5), Greimas (5), and Todorov (4) were translated frequently. Occasional articles by Kristeva, Goldmann, Lacan, Mukařovský, Hjemslev, Togeby, Piaget, Tomashevsky, Coquet, Martinet, and Shklovsky could also be found. As

\(^{17}\) According to the editorial preface of the second issue, the first issue was welcomed with much enthusiasm, and was sold out within the first few days of its publication (Özer 1983:2).
for book-length works Lévi-Strauss (4), Barthes (3) and Foucault (3) dominate, along with books by Lotman, Propp and Piaget.

After 1990, the number of translations and autochthonous writings on structuralism and semiotics are proportionate, though a considerable decrease can be observed in both compared to the previous decade. Among the autochthonous writings, more than half of them belong either to Tahsin Yücel (3 books, and two articles), or to Mehmet Rifat (7 books, 7 articles). During the first half of the 1990s, more book-length works were translated than in previous decades, and these were from Barthes (11), Foucault (6), Eco (3), Lévi-Strauss (1), Jakobson (1), Todorov (1), and Lacan (1). There were also several articles by the same writers, and by Kristeva, Shklovsky, and Genette. In general the selection of authors seems much more concentrated than before. As for the applications, for instance, Emine Demiray uses Propp’s methodology to examine a Turkish film (1990), and Mehmet Rifat uses semiotics to examine *Little Red Riding Hood* (1990).

### 2.1.2. Some key issues

The importation of structuralism and semiotics into the Turkish literary critical system was part of a sustained translation effort, which ‘opened’ the Turkish intellectual world to ‘the West’, and upon which I will dwell further in Chapter 3. These theories were merely two of the several importations; yet the number of translations involved in their importation far exceeded the translations from other theories between the 1960s and 1990s (see Susam 1997). Structuralism and semiotics were introduced into Turkey as a shift away from traditional literary criticism. Autochthonous literary works themselves were increasingly being written under the influence of Western models, requiring the critics to have recourse to Western forms of criticism. In an article about the Soviet impact on Arabic literary criticism, A.N. Staif talks about

> the influence of foreign culture which works as a stimulant to the modern Arabic literary critic who strives – with varying degrees of success – to employ some of its notions and elements in his encounter with his own literature, which in turn has been exposed to the same influences (1984:156).

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19 Here I have to note that the information I could gather on the publications after 1995 is much less reliable than the previous decades. The increasing number of journals on literature and culture, the more diffused borderlines between disciplines, the lack of existing bibliographies I could make use of, and, most importantly, my own physical distance from my home country have all constrained me to limit my research to the early 1990s.
The issue at stake here is the "varying degrees of success" in employing Western theories to non-western literatures. As the Turkish critic Doğan Hızlan observes:

[...] The critical theories of the West are derived from and based on their own cultures and texts. We have appropriated those theories and analysed them. [...] But when it came to applying these theories, we failed. Because it was not only their literature which was behind these theories; from the ecclesiastical culture to the music of Shonberger [sic], there was a whole world underlying them. One could not apply these theories to a culture which has not lived in that world. The most popular discourses in modern criticism, and theories such as structuralism, are therefore explained through applying them to foreign texts. Our colleagues writing in these fields are obliged to refer to the works of an English writer, for instance, when it comes to illustrating these theories ("Eleştiri Tartışması" 1985:64).

As I have argued in Chapter 1, literary theories are bound up with the actual texts they initially used to theorise on, and they may not apply across the board to texts written in other languages, produced in other cultures. The itinerary given above similarly demonstrates that there were rather few applications of structuralism and semiotics in Turkish, and the ones that did exist often used Western literary works as examples. This fact contributed to the negative criticism these theories elicited from Turkish critics (see 2.1.3.).

But does this lack of application really mean that the introduction of structuralism and semiotics into the Turkish system was fruitless? Certainly not. Apart from some valuable samples of literary criticism they put forward, they generated debates, brought along new discourses and terminology, and opened up some possible paths for Turkish critics and writers. In fact, contrary to my initial assumption that structuralism and semiotics primarily existed in translated texts in Turkish, the survey I carried out suggests that this was not the case. Turkish critics actually wrote in abundance on the subject. This, however, did not change the fact that these bodies of thought were regarded as imported materials (see 3.2.1.). Even autochthonous writings on the subject involved a great deal of translation, as in quotations from foreign writers and translation/transliteration of key concepts. This caused a certain alienation, since Turkish critics allegedly did not contribute much from their own 'Turkish' background to these imported theories: "The various theories of art and approaches to criticism are not arid patches of knowledge. Still, they can be rendered alive and useful only if we are aware of our own identity, our own values and conditions" (Cömert 1981:115).
The "identity, values, and conditions" mentioned refer in great part to the prevalence of the socialist-realist critical tradition in Turkey. Indeed, structuralism and semiotics were introduced into the Turkish system partly as a response to the dominant position of Marxist criticism since the early 1940s. Although another foreign product, Marxist critical theory in Turkey had ceased to be an import, in Itamar Even-Zohar's terms, and was integrated into the home repertoire, becoming an "established and instrumental" portion of the accepted repertoire, a 'transferred' cultural product (1997:358)²⁰:

When goods – material or semiotic – are imported, if they are successful on the home market, they may gradually become integral part of the target repertoire. This occurs if we can observe that they may have become obvious, self-evident, for the target group, indeed indispensable for life (Even-Zohar 1997:358).

How integral Marxist and socialist-realist criticism had been to the Turkish repertoire by responding to its 'needs' up until the 1980s will be clearer throughout the thesis, and especially in Chapter 6. Some of the earlier translations from structuralism and semiotics were probably means of challenging this authority and dominance of Marxist critical theory from within. Hence, for instance, the initial prominence of Goldmann, who did not receive that much attention after the 1980 coup. As the figures mentioned above indicate, the environment created by the junta and the socio-political transformations that followed provided fertile ground for the 'transplantation' of structuralism and semiotics – a metaphor frequently used in the criticisms against the hasty welcome given to these theories by some Turkish critics. Not surprisingly, the translations and the autochthonous writings increased considerably after 1980.

Judging by the names of those who were translated, structuralism and semiotics were introduced into the Turkish system from a variety of perspectives. Apart from 'structuralist' Marxism²¹, Turkish translators explored fields such as linguistics, literary criticism, anthropology, psychoanalysis, architecture, drama, and film studies from the point of view of structuralism and semiotics. Unlike the case of French feminism, as we will examine below, there seems to be no 'real' or 'felt' lack of translations on structuralism and semiotics in Turkish. Among this variety, however, one name attracts all the attention, if only because of the amount of his writings which were translated and

²⁰ I would like to thank Saliha Paker for noting this.
²¹ Apart from Lucien Goldmann, Louis Althusser, too, had several translations into Turkish (see Susam 1997).
retranslated. Neither before nor after the coup — nor in the late 1990s — did Roland Barthes’s particular popularity decline.

The last but not least point which emerges from our findings is that Tahsin Yücel and Mehmet Rifat, both of whom will reappear in Chapter 4 as translators of Roland Barthes’s work, were among the major structuralists and semioticians in Turkey, as demonstrated by both the quantity and the comprehensiveness of their publications.

Research on translations yields more fruitful results when it is carried out in conjunction with research on other forms of ‘rewriting’ (Lefevere 1991:143), since rewritings “all partake in the packaging, remodelling, manipulation, construction and transmission of cultural goods” (Hermans 1999:128). One of the most important rewritings which determine the response towards imported theories is the autochthonous critical writings on them. Let us now turn our attention to such criticism in Turkish. The objective here is not to take sides with or against these criticisms, but to identify the prevalent responses during the earlier stages of the introduction of structuralism and semiotics into Turkey, i.e. the 1970s and 1980s.

2.1.3. The critical response to structuralism and semiotics in Turkey

From the start, structuralism and semiotics were received in Turkey against the background of a strong Marxist and socialist-realist critical tradition. Critics writing within this tradition were concerned that structuralism had already been moving beyond its limits as a method, and was becoming a world-view, a doctrine, a life-style, an ideology (Birkiye 1983:9). To support this argument, Jean-Paul Sartre was often quoted: “I am not against structuralism as long as it is aware of the limitations of its method”. In fact, Turkish critics often questioned whether structuralism was a method or a theory (Yavuz 1983:22). For some, it was “not only a literary theory”, but also a method which could be applied to various fields of science, culture, and art (Moran 1994:169). Some referred to it as a “method of research”, a “new school of thought”, or an “approach” (Güven 1981:231); “a method of analysis” (Birkiye 1983:9), or simply a method, an idea (Anday 1970:6); a “subject”, or even a “thing” (“şey”, Timuçin 1983:24). Some did take structuralism for a method, but insisted that the “underlying philosophy or doctrine should

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22 The reason why semiotics almost disappears from the scene from this point onwards is that the condemnation was mainly directed towards structuralism, leaving semiotics unmentioned, as if the term ‘structuralism’ covered both fields.

23 No reference provided in the Turkish texts.
be investigated" (Timuçin 1983:24). Structural linguistics was “a scientific discipline for some, and a sneaky ideology for others” (Kutluer 1981:23). Aziz Çalışlar, for instance, expressed his “surprise” at the fact that structuralists wrote books titled Structuralism instead of, for instance, The Structuralist Method, only to claim afterwards that what they were writing about was not an ideology, an ‘ism’, but a ‘method’ (1983:21). Structuralism was “definitely a version of the late-bourgeois society ideology” (Sölçün 1983:27). It was wrong to reduce it to a mere method of explanation: “Although our structuralists constantly deny it, structuralism, since its beginnings, has the appearance of a world-view, an ‘ideology’, a ‘war weapon’” (İnce 1983:30). Adnan Onart seems to be the only one who attempted a distinction between ‘structuralism’ and, what he termed, after Lucien Goldmann, as ‘panstructuralism’: “If one denies historical development, ignores the subject, the individual, and says that human behaviour is only governed by structures, this is no more a structuralist method but a panstructuralist ideology” (1973:237).

One related criticism was that structuralism generalised the methods it employed in linguistics and declared them applicable to a wide range of human sciences, which actually required different methods of examination. According to its Turkish critics, structuralism saw only ‘language’ wherever it looked. Some acknowledged the contributions of structuralism to linguistics; however, they did not approve that the same mentality was transposed to anthropology, literature, criticism, etc. Especially for literature, they said, linguistic methods proved to be very limited. Literary works were not only made up of ‘signs’, but had a historical, philosophical, psychological and social background.

For most Turkish critics, structuralism remained the embodiment of inertia, of keeping the status-quo, of scientism, of being technical and static. According to their view, it was futile to expect structuralism to render a major service to politics or to literature. What it was trying to do instead was to “lure the people” and to “destroy the socialist world-view” (Timuçin 1983:24). Nevertheless, some critics tried to establish a fairer balance in their final evaluations. In the conclusion of his chapter on structuralism, Berna Moran underlined not only the “barrenness” of a method which ignored the “values of life”

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24 The Turkish terms bilim, bilimsel, bilimsellik translated as ‘science’, ‘scientific’, and ‘scientificity’, respectively, may sound rather strong within the context of this thesis. However, ‘science’ is used here in a meaning closer to that in ‘social sciences’, and it also covers the connotations of ‘scholarship’ in the humanities. I did not opt for using ‘scholarship’, ‘scholarly’, and ‘scholarliness’, since these terms in English have strong links with the academia, and this connotation does not necessarily exist in the Turkish terms derived from bilim. Another option, i.e. alternating between the terms derived from ‘scholar’ and ‘science’, was also discarded, since this would not have produced a similar cumulative effect on the reader as bilim and its derivatives produce on a Turkish reader.
inherent in every work of art, but also the "inefficiency" of a criticism which did not devote as much time and energy as "formalists" did to the structure of the work (1994:307). Some critics preferred to put their trust only in the methods used by structuralism. Güler Güven maintained that structural analysis could be used as an efficient tool in the examination of complex and multi-layered literary works (1981:250). Asum Bezirci acknowledged the contributions of structuralism and semiotics as methods for linguistics and "linguistic criticism" (1981a:104). Adnan Onart, too, seemed to approve structuralism as a method: after the dust it raised as a "fashion" settled, its contributions to human sciences, and especially to linguistics, would certainly be noted (1973:252). However, he added that he was against structuralism, because, as an "anti-humanist approach", it was indifferent to life and its values (1973:260). Likewise, Murat Belge pointed out that structuralism "as a system" had more characteristics which Marxism could not make use of than those Marxism could possibly benefit from (1977:26).

Now let us look in more detail at some of the critical response structuralism received in Turkey. Almost all the criticisms listed below have a bearing on the assumed inefficiency of structuralism as a theory which would not bring desired social and political changes. These criticisms are in fact not that different from those structuralism aroused world-wide. They do not particularly refer to the Turkish system, or to a certain incompatibility of the imported material with indigenous products. The main issue here is that structuralism was seen as a threat for dialectical thinking. We will come back to this point in chapters 3 and 6. However, even though the criticisms were often presented as 'universal' disapprovals, and the Turkish critics were echoing, to a great extent, the Marxist criticism of structuralism and semiotics in the West, the peculiarities of the Turkish critical tradition from the early 1940s to the late 1980s also caused these theories to be perceived in this particular way. As I will argue below, the indigenous critical tradition was not only under the strong influence of socialist-realism, but was also primary-text-bound – i.e. dealing with the criticism of individual books or authors – predominantly evaluative, non-theoretical, and striving to be 'objective'. With its penchant for general theorising, speculation, and alleged scientism, structuralism was naturally a 'suspect' for this receiving system.

In what follows, I will group the critical responses into two. The first part looks at the relationships between structuralism and art. The second part demonstrates why structuralism and semiotics were seen as a 'threat' by the Marxist and socialist-realist critics.
2.1.3.1. Structuralism and art

Form vs. content

Many of its critics argued that structuralism was formalism in a new guise. It promoted an investigation of form, and ignored the content. İlhan Kutluer, for instance, maintains that the structure of a thing does not have anything to do with its essence or nature, but with its form (1981:22). For Asım Bezirci, semiotics is mainly useful for the analysis of “the formal/narratological plot” (1981a:103). He often equates the “structural characteristics” of a work with its “formal characteristics”, and while he is evaluating the work of Mehmet Rifat, Bezirci accuses him of privileging form over content, and defines his analysis as a “study of form” (1981b:86). Similarly, Aziz Çalışlar asserts that “structuralism reduces content to form, identifies structure with form, and then sets out to examine the structure of a form without content” (1983:24).

Not all critics join in this disapproval. Güler Güven acknowledges that the departure point for structuralist endeavour is limited to form, but adds that only evaluations which do not neglect the unity of form and content may be successful in literary criticism (1981:250-251). Berna Moran recognises that for structuralists content is the structure itself, which generates the meaning “on its own”; structuralists analyse the structure to attain the meaning (1994:196). Hilmi Yavuz, too, opposes the identification of structure with form: “It is necessary to make a distinction between Structure and Form. In the conventional context, Form is defined by contrast to Content. However, Structure does not have an independent content. As Lévi-Strauss suggests, structure is content itself [...]” (1983:22). These debates led to acknowledgements on the part of socialist-realist critics that they had, until then, focused all their attention on the criticism of content, neglecting its relationships with the form, and thus, becoming unable to account for the structure or the style of the work of art (Cömert 1981:138). This “one-sided approach to literature” was later much criticised by the socialist-realists themselves (Ateş 1986:5).

Lack of evaluation

According to their critics, structuralists did not “bother to interpret texts” (e.g. Moran 1994:178; Bezirci 1981b:89), because they were not interested in the evaluation of the work of art. Since their criticism ‘stopped’ at the level of analysis, the results they obtained were no more than isolated observations which did not have much to say about
the value of a work of art, and about its place amongst other works of the same author, of other authors in the national literature or in world literature. In order to better understand this objection, it would be useful to take a brief look at some of the definitions given and goals set for literary criticism and its functions in Turkey during the time structuralism was being imported. The evaluative aspect of criticism is given priority and prominence in almost all the definitions (e.g. Özdemir 1971:729; Uyguner in “Eleştiri Tartışması” 1985:62). Criticism introduces, explains, interprets, classifies, assesses the value of, evaluates and judges (Özkınırlı 1985:77; Bilen 1985:78; Erdoğan 1991:39). The critic has to point out the “good and bad, beautiful and ugly, right and wrong aspects” of the work of art (Bezirci, in “Eleştiri Tartışması” 1985:63). “Genuine criticism” shows “what has been done, what has been done well, and what has been done badly. It places the work under the powerful light of common tastes and judgements” (Doğan 1975:96). Although the role of “detailed study” or analysis which will be carried out on the work is also strongly emphasised, this type of examination is considered to be a mere tool for successful evaluation (Aytaç 1991:50; Bilen 1985:78). The importance of analysis “should not be made absolute. Analysis is not a goal in itself, it is a means. It is a preliminary study which facilitates judgement” (Bezirci 1985:69). The most striking and concise definition of criticism in this respect is given in the Dictionary of Literary Terms published by the then-influential Turkish Language Academy (see 5.2.1.): “A piece of writing which examines the good and bad aspects of a work of art, and which finally judges it” (cited in Bezirci 1985:69).

Providing ‘blueprints’

Some critics were concerned about “a certain danger” that people might actually start producing art/literature according to the principles of structuralism (İnce 1983:33). There were also some who believed that works had already been created in Turkey and abroad (Çalışlar 1983:23) according to “the features looked for or suggested by structuralist theory” (Onart 1973:249), and this was seen as something undesirable. To be able to appreciate this criticism, we need to know more about the attitude in the Turkish literary system towards the relationship between writers and critics. There were two opposing views on this topic. On the one hand, “the critic ha[d] nothing to tell to the writer about how the work of art should be” (Vardar 1985:77). Artists would not care about critics who tried to domineer them: “Great writers would only make use of the experiences of other great writers” and this was only “until they themselves achieved mastery” (Kocagöz 1972:268). Criticism could not “show the artist what to
do" (Doğan 1975:96). In fact, "no one can command artists. They are free; even though they are subject to a thousand influences, their work is still their own creation" (Uygur 1963:722). Accordingly, "exercising laws on, advising rules and principles, or devising methods for an artist" were seen as "futile attempts" (ibid.). It was necessary "to save the artists from the critics' whim" (Yetkin 1963:541). An authoritative criticism which could set rules and oblige the writers to create according to these rules – and, this was apparently how structuralism was regarded by some – was an 'impossibility':

The theory of writing put forward [by the critic] is a summary of the successes of the past. Therefore, it is only meaningful for the works of the past. As for the theory put forward with a desire to shape the writing activity of the future, it can only be a framework without substance. It can only be useful for blunt and colourless writers, listless poets, and uncreative novelists. It is indeed a pitiable endeavour to try and place art at a certain orbit, by relying on the attractiveness of theoretical abstractions and their consistency (Uygur 1963:723).

On the other hand, some did expect the critic to show the way to creative writers and artists (e.g. Okay 1991:25). The critics “should guide both the writers and the readers to the good, the right and the beautiful. They should teach, and act like a teacher” (Bilen 1985:78). Also, if the writers or artists wished “to see the effects of their work on their audience, they ha[d] to listen to the words of the critic who act[ed] as the representative of that audience” (Doğan 1975:96). Yet this view did not support a more favourable reception of structuralism either, since the critic in question usually had to come from the socialist-realist tradition. Because of the socio-political conditions and the censorship in Turkey, the critic had to interfere in order to ensure that literary works would reach the masses, and to become a bridge between writers and readers (Ateş 1986:4). The critics were considered to be the best, or more experienced, readers (Doğan 1975:94; Kılıçbay 1991:32); however, they had a task beyond being mere receptors of art. A critic’s responsibility was to disclose the codes imbedded in the work which might be difficult for the lay readers to solve (Buğra 1991:25), and to interpret the texts in such a way that there would be new horizons opening up for them (Okay 1991:25; İdil 1985:76), but not too much room left to their wandering imagination which could "distort the gist of the text" (Yetkin 1972:130).
2.1.3.2. Structuralism and ‘apoliticalness’

Lack of agency

The critics argued that structuralism, assuming people as prisoners in an unalterable and unconscious structure, denies an active role for the human being in the transformation of the world (Belge 1977:25). Consequently, it obliterates the agency of the artist, the writer, and the poet (Moran 1994:196). In structuralist thinking, especially in the works of Ferdinand de Saussure, the language owes its existence to a certain agreement among the individuals of a society; the subject thinks and talks according to structures that s/he is ignorant of – structures that are supposed to be “there and ready” (İnce 1983:30). Thus, it is believed, the subject is deprived of his/her influence on, and the independent use of, language (Kutluer 1981:26). The individual is “alienated from consciousness”, and can no more have the will-power to transform the world (Onart 1973:236; Çalışlar 1983:22). This was “fatalist thinking” unacceptable for the aims of art and literature (İnce 1983:30) as perceived in Turkey at the time. Therefore, structuralism as a world-view was labelled as “anti-humanist” (Onart 1973:237; Çalışlar 1983:22). In this context, Roger Garaudy’s comments were often quoted: that structuralism was prophesying “the death of the human” after “the death of God”\(^{25}\). Structuralism was accused of “collaborating with cybernetics”, which assumed that people and societies operated in the same manner as machines (Kutluer 1981:30), and of reducing everything, including human beings, to autonomous and abstract structures. It left no space for the individual, and did not take external factors into account while analysing the work of art. Artists, writers, poets, and their ‘intentions’, aims and autobiographies were discarded from structuralist inquiry.

Synchronicity and ahistoricalness

Structuralism’s assumed incompatibility with dialectical thinking was a point which drew fervent objections in Turkey. Structuralism denied diachrony, evolution and history. With its static and synchronic approach, it helped maintaining the political and ideological status quo. In structuralism, every structure could be “translated” into another (Belge 1977:28). There was no dominant structure, no centre. If every structure could be transformed into another, homogeneity prevailed and history would be rejected (ibid.). Structuralism tended “to treat its subject as an independent system, made up of the relations among its elements, and to analyse it synchronically ‘for its own sake, within itself’, by isolating it from

\(^{25}\) No reference provided in the Turkish texts.
external factors and historic roots" (Bezirci 1981a:100). Structuralism distanced itself not only from history, but also from social-individual subjectivity (Çalışlar 1983:22). Trying to conceal the tensions between classes by a 'scientific' approach, it served to establish a 'balance' among different parts of the society, and acted as a new form of 'pluralism'. For this reason, structuralism was said to be defended only by "those Turkish scholars" who were "content with the existing system", and who did their best to preserve it (Timuçin 1983:24; see also Kahraman 1990:46).

At a time and place in which Marxist criticism and socialist-realism were the most powerful, historical development was bound to be considered the most important characteristic of a society. To reject historical materialism in such an environment would have been unacceptable (Belge 1977:18; Bezirci 1981a:102). Furthermore, in the opinion of its critics, structuralism did not aim at changing the world; it merely strived to understand it. Therefore it did not hold any political concerns ("Editorial", Birikim 1977). On the contrary, it was taken to be 'the final shelter' in defence of the bourgeois ideology, 'the final obstacle' against Marxian ideas.

Elitism

According to its Turkish critics, structuralism was 'elitist' (e.g. 'Editorial', Birikim 1977). The static approach of structuralism towards the society aimed at preserving the status quo, and thus, rendered structuralism 'palatable' for the elite. With its 'enclosed meta-language', its 'jargon' full of signs, schemes, and models, and its alleged scientism, structuralism belonged to the circle of the 'intellectuals'. Its scientific aura created an enigma for the lay reader. Even the learned critics complained about the incomprehensibility of structuralist writings, some of which gave "the impression that they [were] written not to be understood" (Onart 1973:231). Its critics asserted that structuralism used this complex terminology to "terrorise and attack" the works of art - not so much to criticise them, but "to put a new layer of knowledge above and over" art and literature (İnce 1983:33).

26 Although a sharp critic of structuralism, Hilmi Yavuz nevertheless has a different opinion on its relationship with history. He claims that there is a possibility in structuralism to "attach itself at some point" to historical research, and that structuralism is not "ahistoric" but "atemporal" (1983:22). Similarly, Adnan Onart points out that in Lévi-Strauss's work, Hegelian approach to history is contested, but diachronic aspects of history are actually not denied (1973:253).
"Myth of scientificity"

As we shall see in 2.1.4. in more detail, structuralism was often presented as a 'scientific innovation' which could bring order to the 'chaotic' Turkish criticism, and which could facilitate progress in various fields of research. Its 'scientific' qualities and its 'objectivity' were constantly underlined. In fact, it was usually referred to as a 'discipline' or a 'branch of science', and as such, was rejected by the socialist-realist critics who found this 'scientism' quite dangerous. In an article titled "Structuralism: The Ideology of the Status Quo", Aziz Çalışlar observes that:

[...] the gap between the technocratic structure of the post-industrial, high-consuming societies and the spiritual world of humans is increasingly widening. It is as if the more 'material' progress humans achieve by scientific-technologic revolutions, the further they go back 'spiritually'. As a result, while science is met with a certain hostility, it is also seen as wrapped up in a 'myth of scientificity', not as a force which can heal only the material relations in life and the social inequalities, but as a force which may shape the spiritual world of humans in a rationalist fashion. In other words, the late-bourgeois capitalist societies are trying to cover up the 'cultural crisis' caused by 'social alienation' [...] with 'scientism', and thus, to render the late-bourgeois society 'stable' (1983:21).

Some Turkish critics regarded structuralism as a branching-out of neo-positivism (Kutluer 1981:23-25; Çalışlar 1983:21). According to neo-positivism, the postulates used in sciences had to be understood in the same way by all the scientists; therefore they needed to be translated into a common language, such as logical or mathematical signs. For this reason, structuralism was leading to "mathematising", chasing after a "mechanic and atomic exactitude" (Çalışlar 1983:21; Sercan 1983:38).

Although scientism is a common accusation directed against structuralism and semiotics elsewhere in the world, the issue was particularly foregrounded and complicated in the Turkish case because of the debates on 'objective/scientific' vs. 'subjective/impressionistic' criticism. Since these debates are quite relevant to the reception of Roland Barthes as a 'scientific critic' in Turkey, let us now look at them in more detail.

2.1.4. 'Objective/scientific' criticism

The reception of structuralism and semiotics and, therefore, of Barthes's work in Turkey have been strongly influenced by the discussions on whether criticism is a form of art or a scientific discipline. These discussions were not a novelty of the 1960s, but had emerged time and again, albeit in various guises, without losing anything of their
vehemence (Yücel 1976a:57), creating a vicious circle and leading to "fruitless arguments" (Cömert 1981:138). According to some, there even was a time in Turkey when criticism was divided as "literary criticism" vs. "structuralist (scientific) criticism" (Kutluer 1981:31).

Although the debate started mainly in the early 1960s (Yetkin 1963:541), the terms 'subjective' and 'objective' criticism date back to the work of Fuat Köprüülü of the 1920s and 1930s, a time when "scientific observation" rather than "critical elaboration" was aspired (Binyazar 1973:134). Köprüülü emphasised the distinction between "historical view", which was "extremely objective and impartial" and "critical view", which was "subjective" (Bek 1996:93). Since, for him, criticism was a branch of literary history, this "impartiality" itself was the responsibility the critic had to feel towards the writer and the work of art (Bek 1996:95). 'Objective' criticism later gained popularity during the 1960s and 1970s under the auspices of Asım Bezirci, a socialist critic. However, what Bezirci meant by the terms 'objective' and 'subjective' were quite different from what Köprüülü had in mind (Bek 1996:94). While Köprüülü had associated 'objectivity' with 'impartiality', Bezirci, in accordance with the prevailing socialist-realist criticism of the time, insisted that one could not be impartial, and had to belong to a certain ideology. Since Bezirci was one of the first to draw the boundaries of 'objective' criticism in Turkey, and since his comments will be relevant while I deal with the criticisms directed against Barthes, I wish to include here a rather long quotation from him – the definition he gave for 'objective' critics:

Those who judge should be acquainted with the object at hand as much as possible. In order to do this, they should approach the object only after they achieve a certain detachment from it, only after they go beyond themselves as much as possible. They should refrain from expressing their own thoughts, feelings, prejudices, and experiences by using the work as a means. They should use their heart, intuition and mind only to understand, analyse and explain the work in detail. They should try and bring out the characteristics of the object – those characteristics which have nothing to do with the subject itself – and should expose the relationships between the work, the creative artist, and their times. They should eschew all types of behaviour which could hinder such a study by protecting themselves from dogmatism, absolutism, idealism, impressionism, extreme relativism and one-sidedness. They should act not as artists, but as broad-minded scientists. They should not aspire for creativity. If necessary, they should make use of philosophy, aesthetics, logic, history, scientific methods and data; should do research, comparisons and investigations; and should gather documents, proofs, and samples. Without all these, without first learning the construction and the qualities of the object, they should not begin to evaluate. [...] They should not talk without basing their arguments on examples, reasons and certain criteria. And when they do
talk, they should forget all personal calculations, ambitions and relationships. [...] In short, they should be 'objective'! (1976:40).

Bezirci then hastens to add in parenthesis:

By calling this type of criticism 'objective', what I have in mind is not a conclusive or absolute attitude; I know this is 'impossible' to achieve. However, what I am thinking of is an attitude that is aware of its responsibility, that does not go too far away from the object at hand, and that reduces the 'personal' elements to a minimum, since they usually cause people to make mistakes. A realistic behaviour which is predominantly objective, but which does not completely shun subjectivity... Maybe it would be better to call such a criticism not 'objective', but 'integrating', or even 'scientific' (1976:41).

Bezirci later warns against the dangers of the alternative attitude, "impressionism" or "subjectivism", which, among other problems, causes the critics "to talk about themselves" and "to shift from criticism to autobiography and psychology" (1976:32-33). In 4.4.1., we will see how these views influenced the reception of Barthes, who allegedly "express[ed] his own 'ego'" (Yücel 1982:12) in his later works, such as Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes.

According to the 'subjectivists', on the other hand, literary criticism could not and should not be written like "a doctor's prescription" (Yetkin 1972:32). Criticism was independent, unconstrained, beyond any restrictions, just like the literary text itself (Akath 1985:74). There could be no rules set for the critic (Kocagoz 1972:266). The critics, like everyone else, had beliefs, world-views, prejudices, etc. and, therefore, could not be objective or impartial, could not help talking about themselves in their criticism (Yetkin 1972:112-113). Thus, the differences between criticism and literary works would diminish, and the critic would become an artist, and criticism, an art (Yetkin 1972:32-35). Objective criticism limited "the freedom of the reader" by declaring absolute judgements, suggesting fixed models, leading to "dogmatism", and leaving no space for "relativism" (Özsezgin 1965:19). The work of art was not an outcome of science, therefore it would be wrong to apply the exact measurements of science onto it (ibid.). Those who tried to do so while advocating imported schools of thought were blamed for neglecting 'subjective' criticism altogether:

[...] Those critics who first applied modern methods of criticism in our country [...] could not acquire the most important strength of criticism, and that is 'evaluation'. They lost contact with those aspects of 'subjective criticism' which are necessary to adopt and became 'disagreeable critics' (Fuat 1982:131).
In the 1980s, the ‘objectivity’ or ‘scientificity’ of the critic continued to be determined according to whether his/her judgements were based on documentary evidence and ‘irrefutable’ proofs or on feelings, tastes and opinions (Aytaç 1991:50). Criticism was still a science for some with “its own rules and exactness” (Yavuz 1988:31). The dichotomies persisted, though in much fuzzier form. As an example to how the discussion was handled in that decade, I would like to quote from Fusun Akath’s introduction to her book on Turkish short stories:

[...I do not claim that I could avoid subjectivity altogether in this collection. [...] I did not try to avoid it anyway. Both in choosing the writers I would comment on and in evaluating them, I acted, naturally, according to my approach to literature, my tastes and my preferences. Maybe this is partly because I am for ‘literary’ criticism rather than the ‘scientific’ one. [...] As for the conditions of being as objective as possible and of making an evaluation as ‘correct’ as possible (although this evaluation cannot declare its uniqueness or absoluteness), they are: to avoid having prejudices towards the writers and their work; to assess the work only according to literary criteria; to be able to support and justify the evaluation with data derived from the work itself; and to be ready to bear responsibility for one’s judgements. I tried to comply with these conditions in my study and to reduce subjectivity to a minimum, giving it a place only when I had the right to (1982:12).

At the beginning of the 1990s, a certain tendency to come out of the dichotomy of subjectivity vs. objectivity can be observed (e.g. Kılıçbay 1991:31). It is emphasised that objectivity includes a subjective aspect and vice versa (Doğan 1991:28; Okay 1991:25); that every work of art is a sign of taking sides, therefore one cannot expect the critic to be completely impartial (Doğan 1991:29; Köker 1991:36), especially if objectivity is understood as “not having any prejudices, preconceptions, obsessions or even preferences about a certain topic”, since “such a person can only be a superhuman” (Buğra 1991:24). The ethical goal, then, was not being impartial, but “playing the game according to its rules”, i.e. not aiming at personal rivalries or conflicts, being able to preclude interference of external factors, and eschewing whimsical judgements (Kılıçbay 1991:32; Ayvazoğlu 1991:32; Okay 1991:25). On the other hand, the heart and the mind were summoned to act together on the text to be criticised, since while criticism depending mainly on the former was “bound to fail”, criticism devoid of it would be without foundation (Kurt 1991:67). However, there were still some who asserted that criticism should, by definition, be objective and that any subjectivity could only be considered a deviation (Erdoğan 1991:39), or some who declared: “Needless to say, criticism itself is not a work of art. As it includes research and investigation, it is known to be closer to science” (Andaç 1990:30).
This is the background against which we need to evaluate the reception of structuralism and semiotics and of Roland Barthes in Turkey. Structuralism and semiotics were presented and received as new branches of science. One paradox emerges here, though. The discomfort felt about structuralism’s ‘scientificity’ seems to be in conflict with the widespread demand for a scientific approach. Despite its ‘aura of scientificity’, structuralism was not considered “genuinely scientific”, because a method could be so only if it could provide “the knowledge about the objective world and to the extent that the results it achieves have practical information value. Every genuine method indeed aims at the comprehension of objective reality and its transformation” (Çaşlar 1983:24). Since structuralism did not aim at transformation, it was not scientific enough – or rather, it was the wrong kind of science. The materialist-realist critics claimed scientificity for themselves, associating it only with historicity and realism (see e.g. Oktay 1981a). Accordingly, a critic such as Bezirci, who was so adamant in his call for an ‘objective’ criticism, could also be very determined in his opposition to structuralism. For him, it was impossible to adopt structuralist methods because of his political commitments. The problem, then, was not whether modern Turkish criticism should be ‘scientific’ or ‘literary’, but what type of ‘science’ it should adhere to. In Chapter 6, we will come back to this point.

The next question is where the science would come from. To go back briefly to the arguments mentioned above, one of the main objections against objective criticism was that the criteria used were not constant and that they changed over time and according to the person who used them (Özsezgin 1965:19). Criticism meant assessment, “to distinguish, ‘to sift’, to evaluate. But whose sieve shall we use? The pores of the sieves differ from one person to another” (Uygur 1963:725). The answer can be found in the comments of a ‘subjective’ critic who approached ‘scientific’ criticism rather cautiously: “In our opinion, the best thing to do is to keep track of the scientific studies on literature carried out in the West and of the results they achieved, and then to try and test our strength in this field” (Yetkin 1963:541). The ‘sieve’ to be used was that of the

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27 It is worth quoting here Tahsin Yücel’s presentation of structuralism as a fruitful alternative to the perpetual discussions on subjectivity and objectivity (1976a:57-61). Yücel argues that both approaches are distorted and mistaken, because “subjective criticism is a vicious circle between the work of art and the writer-reader, while objective criticism is a vicious circle between the writer-reader and the time, the environment and the originator of the work in question. Both of them are merely a search for explanation in the middle ground. They are bound to remain outside the work of art itself”. Structuralism, on the other hand, “as a great school of thought which is about to present humanities with the opportunity of being genuine sciences”, concentrates on the works themselves.
West, then. As a result of the search for a criticism in the Western sense Turkish criticism had become heavily dependent on foreign import. Since the early nineteenth century, the West had been regarded as the only possible supplier of 'science' in almost all areas. Literary criticism was no exception. Turkish literary criticism was thus "striving to be scientific", but was nevertheless remaining "extremely subjective" (Hizlan in "Eleştiri Tartışması" 1985:64). From this point onwards, one can read 'scientific' as Western, and 'subjective' as indigenous.

Unlike Western or Anglo-Saxon criticism, our criticism has not yet been differentiated according to expertise. It is not a criticism which reached the stage of separation, classification and specialisation. [...] A considerably important step in modern criticism in Turkey, however, has been the introduction of some scientific disciplines. Today we talk about structuralism, semiotics, materialist-realist criticism, etc. I believe that there has been some progress in the field with the introduction and application of criteria derived from branches of science (ibid.).

We shall discuss these issues in more detail in Chapter 3. Let us now turn our attention to the other context involved in this thesis – a context where the importation is not from the West this time, but, literally speaking, from the East.

2.2. French feminism in Anglo-America

In this section I will be looking at the ways in which French feminism was received in the Anglophone world, mainly in North America. Since a general critique of French feminism is beyond the scope of this thesis, and since my main concern is the impact of translation on the travels of theoretical texts, I will focus on material which was presented as 'French' and as 'feminist' in Anglo-America. As was the case with structuralism and semiotics, I do not intend to uncover a 'pure', 'uncontaminated' or 'original' French feminism which later came to be 'misrepresented' or 'distorted' in translation, although 'misrepresentation' was indeed a concern shared by many feminist critics. The Anglo-American perception of French feminism was often referred to as a 'misconception', 'misunderstanding' or 'dis-connection' by those American feminists who claimed to have a more first-hand experience of the feminisms originating from

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28 This distinction was of course not self-evident. Complaints were raised, for instance, about the neglect shown by Turkish structuralists towards the Turkish literary critical heritage when a call for 'objective' criticism was made. Asun Bezirci recalls that he himself, and some other critics of his time, devoted all their energies to establishing a 'scientific' and 'objective' literary criticism in Turkey, but complains that the structuralists nevertheless preferred to turn to the Western sources for the same objective without even acknowledging the critical background of their own culture (1981a:101-102).
France. There was a certain unease with and disappointment in translation – partly due to the strong urge among feminists to find ‘the truth’ which would increase their solidarity, but also to the fact that the feminist critics in question were not particularly familiar with translation and mistrusted it:

It is to be remembered that the feminist scholars dealing with this material in English would not have training in foreign languages, and would share the insensitivity to translation common to members of all imperialist cultures. As dominant English-speaking nations in an English-speaking world, both England and the United States have relatively limited practices (and consequently limited awareness) of translation, leaving the obligation of linguistic transfer to non-English-speaking countries (Simon 1996:90).

The ambivalent attitude towards translation did not slow down the extensive importation of literary and cultural theories to Anglo-America. The importation of French feminism was part of “a more general fascination with French thought which dominated th[e] period, embracing such thinkers as Barthes, Lacan, Foucault and Derrida, and recalling the prestige and influence of Sartre, de Beauvoir and Camus on the previous generation of artists and intellectuals” (Simon 1996:86). As Sherry Simon notes, the ‘second generation’ French feminism of the 1970s was not the only wave of French feminist thought which reached the shores of North America. For decades, the work of Simone de Beauvoir had been the symbol of (French) feminism in the eyes of Anglophone feminists. Her “uncompromising refusal of any notion of a female nature or essence” (Moi 1985:92), summed up in her statement “On ne naît pas femme: on le devient” was readily picked up by Anglo-American feminists who regarded themselves primarily committed to change women’s situation rather than investigating an innate ‘womanhood’. However, starting from the 1970s, something called the ‘new French feminism’, brought about by an “immense wave of intellectual enthusiasm” (Simon 1996:86), came to dominate the debates, exerting substantial influence on contemporary Anglo-American feminism (Fraser 1992a:2).

29 However, Christine Delphy, for one, dismisses any claim of ‘misunderstanding’, emphasising that such a misunderstanding – despite “questions and corrections from Anglo-American scholars” and “protests from feminists from France” – could not have lasted for fifteen years, and occurred again and again in almost each individual work (1995:195). Delphy points out that the selection and presentation of French authors and their texts in Anglo-America was dictated by “an ideological and political agenda” (1996).
31 From Le Deuxième Sexe I, “Formation”, Chapter 1, “Enfance”. 
Bina Freiwald puts the date 1976 as "the year that French feminist theory is officially legitimated as an intellectual import in North America" (1991:60), when the first issues of *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* included translated excerpts from Julia Kristeva's "Des Chinoises" and the translation of Hélène Cixous's "Le Rire de la Méduse". From this date until the beginning of the 1980s American feminist critics complained about the non-availability of French feminists' texts in English translation (Gaudin *et al.* 1981:7; Finel-Honigman 1981:319). A bibliographical research project conducted by Isabelle de Courtivron in 1979 had "revealed that out-of-print and untranslated authors included such important figures as Luce Irigaray, Chantal Chawaf, Claude Hermann, Madelaine Gagnon, Christiane Rochefort and Julia Kristeva" and that "political and sociological critics like Geneviève Texier, Evelyne Sullerot, Gisèle Halimi were not even available in excerpt form" (Finel-Honigman 1981:319). Despite the seemingly big interest in her work, Irigaray's *Speculum de l'autre femme* (1974) and *Ce sexe qui n'en est pas un* (1977), for instance, were not translated into English until 1985 (Freiwald 1991:60). Yet, as we shall see in Chapter 4, Hélène Cixous was the one most partially represented through a limited number of translations. Despite the 'non-availability' of translations, there was a profusion of books and articles written on French feminism by Anglophone feminists. The book-length works included translated texts from French writers, but were mainly, sometimes exclusively, autochthonous. This, in turn, contributed to the claims that 'French feminism' is actually an Anglo-American invention (e.g. Delphy 1995:190-191).

The 1980 anthology *New French Feminisms*, edited by Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron, is often cited as "the first anthology to introduce the term 'French feminism' to an English-speaking audience – as the beginning of a sustained, increasingly academic, feminist interest in the writings of various French intellectuals on the questions of woman, the feminine, and the other" (Huffer 1995:1-2). The book "effectively served to canonize the phenomenon of French feminism within the Anglo-American academy" (Penrod 1993:45), and "constructed French feminism as a

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33 Delphy claims that 'French feminism' is "not an Anglo-American construction solely, or even mainly, insofar as it selects, distorts, and decontextualizes French writings. [...] It is an Anglo-American invention quite literally: Anglo-American writings that are 'about' it are it" (1995:194). Jane Gallop similarly argues: "The phrase 'French feminism' referred [...] to only a narrow sector of feminist activity in France, a sector we perceived as peculiarly French. 'French feminism' is a body of thought and writing by some women in France which is named and thus constituted as a movement here in the American academy" (1991:41).
distinctive cultural object for English-speaking readers” (Fraser 1992a:1). It was a much acclaimed and much criticised work. The problems perceived in the reception of French feminism often date back to this very anthology. For instance, although the anthology included texts from a variety of French writers who worked within a feminist framework, it also perpetuated the image of a feminism “preoccupied with questions of psychoanalysis and language to the exclusion of practically everything else” (Duchen 1987:12). It did not represent “syndicalist feminism”, for example, and the feminist currents within the left-wing parties (Fraser 1992a:1-2). The anthology presented the diversity of the arguments in France “in a manner that suggest[ed] greater consensus than actually exist[ed]” (Burke 1981:516), and this in turn led to either the wholesale appropriation or the wholesale rejection of these arguments. *New French Feminisms* is also one of the first texts that delineated the perceived contrasts between the Anglo-American and French feminisms (I will deal with these contrasts in more detail in 3.1.1.). Furthermore, “in putting complex theoretical pieces alongside more transparent political declarations” the anthology produced “a reductive egalitarianism among the authors and a false impression of easy access to all the work” (Simon 1996:89). Last but not least, it contributed to the formation of ‘the Holy Trinity’ image for Hélène Cixous, Luce Irigaray, and Julia Kristeva, who, from then onwards, would be cited together as the French feminists.

In the years that followed most of the texts published on the topic served to reinforce the impressions created by this initial encounter. Up until the late 1990s, the residues of these impressions could be spotted in the material in English on French feminism. Chapters 3 and 4 will deal with the Anglo-American images first of French feminism in general and then of Cixous in particular. Let us now turn our attention to the critical response towards French feminism in the Anglophone world.

### 2.2.1. The critical response to French feminism in Anglo-America

In correlation with the enthusiasm and inspiration it generated, French feminism was met with ambivalence and caution, and at times with straightforward opposition in Anglo-America. The main objection to it was that it was ‘too utopian’ and ‘apolitical’ to meet the demands of Anglo-American activist feminism in particular and of the

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34 For an annotated bibliography on French feminist criticism in English, see Gelfand and Thorndike Hules 1985. For further bibliographical information see Moi 1987 and Oliver 2000.
international or 'supranational' feminist movement in general. The charges of utopianism and apathy against ‘feminist politics’ seem rather paradoxical when the history of the second-wave feminism in France is taken into consideration. Women’s liberation movement in France (*mouvement de libération des femmes*, known as the MLF) was born as “the child of the student revolt of May 1968 in Paris”, at a time “when the near-success in toppling a repressive democracy encouraged the students and the intellectuals to try the apparently impossible” (Moi 1985:95). The new French feminism was born in such a “gauchiste milieu” and carried with it a revolutionary attitude:

> It was axiomatic that existing social relations and institutions were wholly repressive and that no mere reforms could put things right. On the contrary, the realization of the feminist vision would require the creation of an entirely new form of life – new social relations among new social subjects (Fraser 1992a:2).

Nancy Fraser adds that the paradigms of French feminism “codify the self-understanding of a radical countercultural movement at a very specific historical moment – when the spirit was revolutionary and the radicalism hyperbolic” (1992a:3). Utopianism, then, was almost a birth-right for second-generation French feminists, and a way to struggle towards feminist political causes. However, French feminism was destined to be compared with Anglo-American feminism in order to be accepted or rejected there, and during this comparison with the ‘activist’ Anglo-American tradition it came to be labelled as ‘apolitical’: “While the goal of many leaders of the French women’s movement is to be read, American feminists – through conferences, political platforms and speeches – seek to make their ideas heard and acted upon” (Finel-Honigman 1981:318). Anglo-American feminists purportedly chose to “emphasize problem solving and events rather than abstract language” (*ibid.*), whereas French feminists in general “preferred to work on problems of textual, linguistic, semiotic or psychoanalytic theory, or to produce texts where poetry and theory intermingle in a challenge to established demarcations of genre” (Moi 1985:97). The winner was obvious, at least within literary institutions: “There can be no doubt that the Anglo-American feminist tradition has been much more successful in its challenge to the oppressive social and political strategies of the literary institution” (*ibid.*).

The polarisation between the two feminist traditions emerges as early as 1978, in an introductory article by Elaine Marks, “Women and Literature in France”. Marks concludes her article by distributing the roles: as opposed to most American feminists
who investigate the 'oppression' of women, French feminists focus on their 'repression'. She then adds that the fundamental 'dissimilarity' in the American and French orientations can be attributed to this differing emphasis: "We raise consciousness by speaking to and working with each other; they explore the unconscious by writing" (1978:842). This passage was later frequently quoted and referred to. The underlying dichotomy, with its repercussions, served to relegate French feminism to the margins of a philosophical past time as opposed to Anglo-American endeavours towards bringing social equality and justice for women. This dichotomy crops up even in supposedly favourable and propagating texts. For instance, in her introduction to the English translation of Cixous's and Clément's well-known La Jeune née, to which we will later return, Sandra Gilbert comments:

For an American feminist – at least for this American feminist – reading The Newly Born Woman is like going to sleep in one world and waking in another – going to sleep in a realm of facts, which one must labor to theorize, and waking in a domain of theory, which one must strive to (f)actualize (1986:x).

According to Bina Freiwald, there was even an earlier article than Marks' which also set "the terms of the discussion – the frame of reference within which French theoretical texts would subsequently be viewed as they become available in translation" (1991:60). This was a review article by Shoshana Felman in the Winter 1975 issue of Diacritics, in which Felman discusses Luce Irigaray's Speculum de l'autre femme and Phyllis Chesler's Women and Madness:

The interest of Chesler's book, its overwhelming persuasive power [...] lies in the fact that it does not speak for women: it lets women speak for themselves. Phyllis Chesler accomplishes thus the first symbolical step of the feminist revolution: she gives voice to the woman. But she can only do so in a pragmatic, empirical way. As a result, the book's theoretical contribution, although substantial, does not go beyond the classical feminist thought concerning the socio-sexual victimization of women. On the other side of the coin, Irigaray's book has the merit of perceiving the problem on a theoretical level, of trying to think the feminist question through to its logical ends, reminding us that women's oppression exists not only in the material, practical organization of economic, social, medical, and political structures, but also in the very foundations of logos, reasoning and articulation – in the subtle linguistic procedures and in the logical processes through which meaning itself is produced (cited in Freiwald 1991:60).

Freiwald argues that by 1978 Felman's distinction between an empirical and a theoretical formulation of feminist issues — a distinction she presents as interior to a feminist project broadly conceived — is exteriorized (ex-territorialized one might say) and nationalized, translated, in other words, into a conflictual national-cultural paradigm whose fixed points of reference are American vs. French (1991:60-61).

This "conflictual national-cultural paradigm" later reverberates in the preface of Marks and de Courtivron to the anthology *New French Feminisms*. Here it is stated that the feminist inquiry in the United States was predominantly led by women who had been educated in social sciences, had a "strong religious background", and, quite often, been activists in civil rights movement and anti-Vietnam-War groups (1980:xi; see also Showalter 1985a:5). In France, on the other hand, feminist texts were being written by women who were "women of letters, intellectuals, professors of literature and philosophy, and psychoanalysts", who — being "steeped in Marxist culture" and "trained in dialectical thinking" — had "a radical anti-bourgeois bias", whose tradition was "resolutely atheistic", and some of whom had participated in the May 1968 events (*ibid.*).

Marks and de Courtivron note: We do not wish to suggest that all French feminists are theoreticians and that all American feminists are activists. That would be a gross oversimplification of what has been and is happening in each country. But there are important differences. We hope that by examining differences and specificity, by confronting models of writing, thinking and acting, we will be able to enlarge the scope of the discussion, to enrich our understanding of women and feminism, of words and acts (Marks and de Courtivron 1980:ix-x) [Emphasis mine].

The dichotomy of 'empirical' vs. 'theoretical' — read as 'pragmatic' vs. 'idealistic' or 'political' vs. 'apolitical' — found its expression in different forms in the following years, and not only concerning the U.S. feminists, but also other Anglophone ones:

French feminists have the reputation of paying more attention to theory than to practical questions, and there is some truth in this: when a problem is discussed, more time is spent defining the terms of the debate and the nature of the problem than in looking for any practical solution. On the positive side, this means that intellectual debate is rigorous; but it also means that feminists in France have been slower than British feminists in 'networking', or in setting up rape crisis centres or refuges for battered women (Duchen 1987:12).

When we come to the 1990s, the polarisation is still there:

Anglo-American feminism, including its academic and critical branches, has, on the whole, evolved from a grass-roots women's movement set up in the
aftermath of the Civil Rights campaign in America, concerned to value women's experience and to protest against the political, social and economic injustices women endure, whereas the French feminist writing referred to here is in the main a response to a *philosophical* tradition (Sellers 1991:xiii).

The claim that French feminism is 'theoretical', 'philosophical', hence 'apolitical' is an ambivalent one — not only because being 'theoretical' or 'philosophical' does not preclude being 'political'36, but also because the type of politics required is usually not very well defined. For instance, among the aspects of the French inquiry "most unfamiliar to Americans", Thorndike Hules counts "the prominence of a Marxist critical tradition that politicizes and polarizes the theoretical arena" (1985:xli). She notes that:

The politicization of French feminist inquiry is an attribute that may surprise Americans, little accustomed to channeling political energies into their scholarly work. In France, most feminists share in the strong tradition of the Left and espouse, in varying degrees, the principles and goals of Marxism. [...] French feminist theory is characterized by the common preoccupation with correctly (re)conceptualizing and implementing a radical Marxist legacy that is foreign to American scholars (1985:xlii-xliii).

So there was 'politics', at least in some of the French feminists' writings, but it probably was not the 'right' sort of politics for many Anglo-American feminists. Not that none of them worked within the Marxist tradition; Marxist and materialist approaches, preoccupations and vocabulary were indeed more familiar to the U.S. feminists than the philosophical, psychoanalytic and post-structuralist frameworks in which, for instance, Irigaray, Kristeva and Cixous wrote (Jones 1985b:370; Thorndike Hules 1985:xliii). Still, these approaches were not widespread and remained rather marginal. Similarly, in Britain, Marxist-feminism did exist: “Traditionally, British feminism has been more open to socialist ideas than has its American counterpart” (Moi 1985:93). Yet most Marxist-feminist work there was "not carried out within the specific field of literary theory and criticism [but in] cultural studies, film studies and media studies, or in sociology or history [...]" (ibid.), adding to the unfamiliarity of the French feminist critical tradition for British literary critics. The fact that in some French feminists' texts the Marxist perspective could at times go hand in hand with a psychoanalytic one (see Tytell 1974:81; Thorndike Hules 1985:xvi) further complicated the issue: first of all, for Anglo-American readers these two perspectives could not reconcile with each other, and

36 For an analysis of the relationship between theory and political activism see e.g. Bhabha 1994:19-39. I will come back to this issue in Chapter 6.
second, psychoanalysis was initially a suspect school of thought for many Anglo-American feminists, as we shall see in 2.2.2.

The rest of the Anglo-American critical responses to French feminism is related to this central issue of 'not being political enough' or 'not having the right sort of feminist politics' in one way or another. Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity, I will group them under individual subheadings. The relevance of these responses for the case of Cixous will be clearer throughout the thesis, and particularly in Chapter 6 they will be taken up again in relation to the dichotomy of 'theory vs. politics'.

2.2.1.1. 'Too elitist', 'too intellectual', 'impenetrable'

Where French feminism is concerned "usually, on this side of the Atlantic," writes Elaine Marks in 1978, "there is dismissal (too intellectualistic and elitist to be feminist)" (832). The first translations from the writings of French feminists gave Anglophone readers the opportunity to come into contact with continental philosophy and critical thought (Simon 1996:87) – an opportunity which did not prove to be particularly welcome by all. The knowledge necessary to make the most out of these writings was perceived to be enormous, since they were grounded in psychoanalysis, linguistics, Marxism, structuralism, and deconstruction, among others, and several of these schools of thought had already gone through problematic entries into the Anglo-American system. The descriptions given by Anglo-American critics for the theoretical background of French feminism therefore emphasise the complex inheritance confronting the Anglophone readers:

There are serious difficulties in grasping the various theories that inform contemporary French critical discourse. The mélange of the linguistic model based on differential opposition borrowed from Ferdinand de Saussure, refined by Roman Jakobson, and extrapolated by Claude Lévi-Strauss, with lexical items and games from Lacanian psychoanalysis (itself intertextually rooted in the corpus of Hegel and Mallarmé), and with important Derridean divergences, is impenetrable to the uninitiated and unfamiliar to the American feminist critic who follows the empirical mode (Marks 1978:832-833).

In their much cited anthology, where they set their goal as "to illuminate the difficult and exciting feminist inquiry" (1980:xiii), Marks and de Courtivron introduce French

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37 For an account of the reception of deconstruction in America see e.g. Arac et al. 1983 and Comay 1991. For the role of translation in this reception see e.g. Simon 1996:92-95 and Johnson 1985:143. For a detailed analysis of the fortunes of psychoanalysis in Anglo-America see Turkle 1979.
feminism's background as follows:

Such writers as Hélène Cixous, Julia Kristeva, Catherine Clément, Luce Irigaray, and Claudine Herrmann have assimilated and are now deconstructing Western philosophical and literary discourse from Plato through Marx and Freud with important intermediate stops at Mallarmé and the avant-garde of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. They have profited in varying degrees from Kojève's and Hippolyte's rereadings of Hegel, Lévi-Strauss's rereading of Saussure, Lacan's rereading of Freud, Althusser's rereading of Marx, Derrida's rereading of the Hegelian, existentialist, and structuralist traditions (1980:xii).

In another introductory article on women's writing and women's movement in Paris, Carolyn G. Burke describes Julia Kristeva's work as "demanding because of her intellectual omnivorousness and interweavings of different methodological codes (Marxist, Freudian-Lacanian, structuralist and poststructuralist, and anthropological, among others)" (1978:848). Both Kristeva's work and that of Luce Irigaray remained "inaccessible to American readers in spite of the growing number of translations," because their texts assumed "a reader who possesses a certain intellectual 'bagage', as the French call the ideas and codes that one brings to a given subject" (Gallo & Burke 1980:108). Those who were especially critical towards certain French feminists described the connections between their ideas and those of the continental thinkers in a more pungent way:

Steeped as they are in European philosophy (particularly Marx, Nietzsche and Heidegger), Derridean deconstruction and Lacanian psychoanalysis, French feminist theorists apparently take for granted an audience as Parisian as they are. Though rarely wilfully obscure, the fact that few pedagogical concessions are made to the reader without the 'correct' intellectual co-ordinates smacks of elitism to the outsider. This holds for Hélène Cixous's intricate puns and Luce Irigaray's infuriating passion for the Greek alphabet, as well as for Julia Kristeva's unsettling habit of referring to everyone from St Bernard to Fichte or Artaud in the same sentence. That the exasperated reader sometimes feels alienated by such uncompromising intellectualism is hardly surprising (Moi 1985:96).

The work of those French writers — such as Cixous, Kristeva, and Irigaray — who concentrated mostly on deconstructive and psychoanalytic feminism, "with its technical character and unfamiliar vocabulary", purportedly served in America "as a discourse of professional legitimation, provoking complaints about esotericism" (Fraser 1992a:2).

The fact that the influence of these writers remained centred in the academy also contributed to this elitist image. France has a long history of intellectual life outside the academy, but in the Anglo-American case, the cultural-philosophical discourse of French feminism was received into a society where this discourse is restricted mainly to the academia:
Feminist texts that are produced in France tend to find their way into English-speaking circles through French departments in universities and polytechnics, which are frequently literary, linguistic or philosophical in their focus. Both the texts that are likely to interest academic women and the kind of use made of them will exaggerate the tendency that we have to think of French feminism as highly theoretical and as having little in common with Anglo-Saxon feminism (Duchen 1987:12).

Another factor underlying this elitist image was that most of the material on French feminism, especially critical articles, translations and commentaries, were published in specialist and scholarly journals with limited circulation, mostly in *Diacritics*, *SubStance* and *Signs* (Marks 1978:832; Finel-Honigman 1981:319). *Yale French Studies*, *Feminist Studies*, *Enclitic*, and *Critical Inquiry* also included articles on the subject. *Signs* alone seemed to have a wider audience than others (Marks 1978:832), as “the single most visible (and perhaps most authoritative) scholarly publication in the field of women's studies” (Freiwald 1991:60). There were also some ‘bridge’ media like *Sojourner*, *Off Our Backs* and *The Women's Review of Books* (Fraser 1992a:2) with even broader readership.

The immense intellectual ‘bagage’ expected from the reader was not the only reason behind the alleged unintelligibility of French feminist texts. There was also the problem of ‘opaque style’. French theoretical writing “be it by men or by women, ha[d] been of difficult access to American critics” all along (Gaudin et al. 1981:7). In the case of French feminism, its “density” – in particular “its penchant for ultimately untranslatable word play” *(ibid.)* – was regarded as the main obstacle to its translation into other languages. “It is not easy,” writes Louise von Flotow, “to read new utopias created and described in a new language with new syntactic structures” (1997b:12). “Admittedly,” says Domna Stanton, “our understanding of Cixous, Kristeva, Irigaray, and others requires knowledge of philosophy, linguistics, and psychoanalytic theory. Even more, one must be willing to decipher dense texts replete with plays on words and devoid of normal syntactical constructions” (1980:79). Irigaray’s “erudition and plays with the speaking voice”, Cixous’s “mischievous puns and citations of languages from Greek through German to Portuguese”, and Wittig’s “fantastic neologisms and revision of conventional genres” (Jones 1985b:374) were considered insurmountable obstacles for both French and Anglophone readers.

Shifting styles, forms and narrator’s voices, puns, neologisms and unusual syntax were indeed “an integral part of the creative and ideological structures of ‘radical
feminist' writing of the 1970s" (Flotow 1997a:46). For many French theorists and writers of the time, it was

language that embodied, carried and preserved man's vision of the world. The world had no intrinsic meaning prior to the structures we imposed on it, and since it was in language that these structures were symbolized, language held the key both to their understanding and to initiating change (Sellers 1991:xiv).

Feminist theorists looked for ways to avoid and destroy patriarchal oppression, and therefore, challenged "the conceptual structure of patriarchy, a masculine mode of perceiving and organizing the world, a male view encoded in centuries of learning so that it appears natural and inevitable" (Simon 1996:89-90). One way of achieving this, then, was to create a new language, solely for women, a language which would not be "controlled by 'malestream' institutions" (Flotow 1997a:46):

The purposes of [...] feminist work on language were multiple, yet two major objectives can be isolated, namely the deconstruction of 'patriarchal' language and the construction of a women's idiom. Deconstructive activity enabled women to flex their linguistic muscles and participate in the wrecking job on oppressive language; it enabled them to clear a space for the construction of new forms of language by and for women to 'give voice to' their different experiences, intuitions and knowledge. [...] And wordplay was an important instrument in both the deconstructive and the creative dimensions of this work (Flotow 1997a:47).

American feminists, however, tended to consider wordplay "virtuosic and exhibitionistic", observes Domna Stanton: "We ignore the paradoxical disjunction between what we say and how we say it, and thus continue to speak about subverting patriarchal order in pellucid rationalistic discourse" (1980:80). Puns and neologisms drew attention to language per se, and language as a transparent medium in which people freely expressed themselves began to appear as an illusion. This was in itself problematic for Anglo-American feminists, as we will see in 5.3. The differences in attitude between French and Anglo-American feminists towards language emerged as a major rupture between the two traditions, jeopardizing possible solidarity (see 3.1.4.). Anglo-American feminist critics did highlight, to an extent, "the role of language in women's oppression, stressing the power of 'naming' and the debilitating effects on women of our masculine or negative linguistic placing" (Sellers 1991:xiv), but their attempts stopped at "adding women's voices to the debate" or at "the type of surface changes - such as the transforming of 'chairman' into 'chairperson' - that have become such a feature of Anglo-American feminism" (ibid.). However, the French did not
bother to make such “specific linguistic changes in order to eliminate sexist bias”, since for them language was allegedly “more a philosophical concern rather than a pragmatic one” (Burke 1978:844). Indeed, many French feminists found the Anglo-American endeavour “not only ineffective, since it fail[ed] to take account of the way the patriarchal system embodied in our language [...] repressed and made use of women’s difference”, but also “dangerous since it encourage[d] women to believe we c[ould] achieve our potential within the existing system” (Sellers 1991:xv).

2.2.1.2. Indebtedness to ‘white fathers’

Connected with the charges of elitism and intellectualism is the claim that French feminist thought was no more than the offspring of white, male, middle class, European philosophical output. Therefore, its intellectual heritage not only made French feminism impenetrable and alienating from the point of view of Anglo-American feminists, but it also rendered the French feminists suspect of conspiracy with male thinkers who, at least potentially, threatened feminist solidarity. In particular those feminists working on la différence feminine, including Cixous, were decisively, but often unavowedly, influenced by the texts of contemporary masters. At the very least, these women’s explorations represent a complex give and take with modernist discourse, a writing-between or re-writing, which comprises significant continuity and varying degrees of oppositional discontinuity (Stanton 1989:157).

This ‘drawback’ of French feminism had already been mentioned in early introductory articles; however, a pinch of defence or justification had always followed: “The women have the élan and the energy borrowed from male techniques for demystifying and deconstructing, but they also have somewhere to go, to an unknown place, the place of woman from which she can begin to write” (Marks 1978:835). In their introduction to

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38 Twenty years later, the ‘radical feminist’ thought itself came to be viewed as “white-middle-class-educated-feminist” thought (Flotow 1997a:51) by the diverse feminisms which sought to incorporate different perspectives derived from race, ethnicity, class, etc. into their struggles.

39 Incidentally, words of French origin, such as ‘élan’ in this quotation, (‘bagage’ in Gallop & Burke 1980:108 ‘détour’ in Gallop 1991:41; passé and dans le vent in Suleiman 1991:vii, pas fameux in Ward Jouve 1991:102; ‘la mère qui jouit’, ‘le continent noir’, ‘féminité’ in Marks 1978:835) frequently crop up in writings about French feminism, especially in those which can be classified as ‘introductory’. Wordplays derived from French also abound (e.g. ‘nightméres’ in Gilbert 1986:x). Apart from being an indication that the Anglophone writers of these texts were in close contact with the French thought and language – and that they expected their readers to be so, too – these borrowed words and puns also served to add a certain aura, something ‘French’, therefore supposedly exotic, foreign and ‘other’ to the English texts (For a similar argument about the frequent use of écriture féminine and jouissance in English translations see 5.3.1.). Elizabeth W. Bruss talks about the great role “exoticism has played in the superficial popularity of imported literary theories” in the Anglo-American literary world, which was, at the same time, considered ‘contaminated’ or ‘adulterated’ by foreign theories (1982:363).
the 1980 anthology, Marks and de Courtivron claim that "the notion of working without, of doing without, men is more scandalous in France than in the United States where there is the precedent of the black separatists and a less excessive need for male approval" (1980:33), but they quickly add that "in general, French feminists, whether radical or reformist, attack male systems, male values, the pervasiveness of misogyny, more vigorously than do American feminists (with the exception of radical lesbian writers)" (1980:35-36). In later years, the discomfort felt about the issue seems to have increased:

[...] The feminist obsession with correcting, modifying, supplementing, revising, humanising, or even attacking male critical theory keeps us dependent upon it and retards our progress in solving our own theoretical problems. What I mean here by 'male critical theory' is a concept of creativity, literary history, or literary interpretation based entirely on male experience and put forward as universal. So long as we look at androcentric models for our most basic principles – even if we revise them by adding the feminist frame of reference – we are learning nothing new (Showalter 1985b:246-247).

Showalter then adds that according to Christiane Makward “the problem is even more serious in France than in the United States” and quotes: “If neofeminist thought in France seems to have ground to a halt, it is because it has continued to feed on the discourse of the masters” (ibid.⁴⁰). Peggy Kamuf likewise elaborates:

American feminist philosophers often posit Western philosophy as a tradition that is not quite our own […]. Feminist philosophers who study recent French thought […] frequently exhibit in their work a sense of distance from the tradition around which the conversations of modernism and post-modernism circulate. Not only has the Western philosophical tradition been written primarily by white men, but the contemporary interpretations of that tradition often echo the male perspectives that it exhibits (1989:10-11).

Through favourable comparison with French feminists, Anglo-American ones were thus partly absolved from the allegations of over-dependence on the work of male thinkers. In fact, Anglo-American feminism was not a ‘fatherless’ orphan either. According to Domna Stanton, those who maintain that écriture feminine – the notion which came to represent the totality of French feminist writing for a long period of time – is not feminist because it appropriates concepts from such ‘seminal’ thinkers as Saussure, Freud, Lacan, and Derrida choose to forget that it was not feminists.

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⁴⁰ Quoted by Showalter from Makward's article “To Be or Not to Be... A Feminist Speaker” in Eisenstein and Jardine 1980:102. It is interesting to note here that in an article exclusively devoted to Anglo-American feminism, references to French feminism frequently pop up, especially when it serves as a warning example.
but Anglo-American patriarchs who founded, and trained us in, the biographical, thematic, stylistic, sociohistorical, or Marxist literary criticism that we unquestioningly practice (Stanton 1980:80).

2.2.1.3. Essentialism and biologism

The debate around ‘essentialism’ is a recurring one in feminist criticism. The two main arguments run approximately as follows: If ‘gender’ is regarded totally as a cultural construct, and the ‘woman’ has no specific features to it apart from those designated by the society, then women have little free space, agency or inner resources to revolt against the oppressive patriarchal structure. On the other hand, if the feminists wish to draw on assumed ‘feminine’ features, then they risk imprisoning the women back in their bodies, as patriarchy traditionally has done. In the whole vocabulary of feminist theory, the term ‘essentialism’ therefore came to represent the “greatest fear” and the “greatest temptation” for Anglo-American feminists (Fuss 1992:94):

The idea that men and women, for example, are identified as such on the basis of transhistorical, eternal, immutable ‘essences’ has been unequivocally rejected by many anti-essentialist poststructuralist feminists concerned with resisting any attempts to naturalize ‘human nature’. And yet, one can hear echoing from the corners of the debates on essentialism renewed interest in its possibilities and potential usages, sounds which articulate themselves in the form of calls to ‘risk’ or to ‘dare’ essentialism (ibid.).

The objections of the anti-essentialists were clear enough: “any dealing with ‘human nature’” was bound to “wield very disappointing results for any movement bent on changing the world or even simply on understanding it” (Delphy 1995:199). Biology or psychology alone would not help one to understand the feminine or masculine gender identity. Instead, one had to “study the historically specific social practices through which cultural descriptions of gender [were] produced and circulated” (Fraser 1992b:178). Organic or biological criticism was “the most extreme statement of gender difference, of a text indelibly marked by the body” (Showalter 1985b:250). It was also “one of the most sibylline and perplexing theoretical formulations of feminist criticism” since to invoke anatomy risked “a return to the crude essentialism, the phallic and ovarian theories of art, that oppressed women in the past” (ibid.).

The relationship between the charges of ‘essentialism’ and ‘apoliticalness’ will be examined in more detail in 6.1.2. when we look at Cixous’s particular image in Anglo-America as an ‘essentialist’ par excellence. At this point, let us turn our attention briefly
to the relationship between ‘essentialism’ and the psychoanalytic heritage of French feminism.

2.2.2. French feminism and psychoanalytic theory in Anglo-America

As we have seen above, two of the ‘white fathers’ of the second-generation French feminists were Freud and Lacan. This alone caused much aversion and objection among Anglo-American feminists, who considered Freud a misogynist and believed that to make use of his ideas on gender construction would be to betray the feminist cause. This resistance to psychoanalysis was not surprising, “given that Freud's text clearly communicate[d] a vision of woman as deficient man” (Gaudin et al. 1981:9). Feminist criticism based on a Freudian or post-Freudian psychoanalysis, therefore, had to “continually struggle with the problem of feminine disadvantage and lack” (Showalter 1985b:257). Since Anglo-American feminists believed that Freud equated anatomy with destiny, they “repeatedly rejected psychoanalysis as an inimical discourse. Because psychoanalysis seemed to perpetuate the idea of woman’s different (that is, ‘inferior’) nature, [they] were resistant to its central concepts” (Gallop & Burke 1980:107). In their view, patriarchy and its intellectual productions, such as psychoanalysis, should have remained as “an object of study”; they were not and could not be “a means or a tool of feminist analysis” (Delphy 1995:219) [Emphases in the original].

The fact that the three main figures of French feminism in Anglo-America had close links with psychoanalysis aggravated the disapproval felt against them. Irigaray was an ex-student of Lacan and a psychoanalyst by profession. Kristeva was a practising psychoanalyst, as well as a linguist. Cixous was strongly influenced by the Lacanian reading of Freud, especially in her ‘creative’ writings, and also dramatised Freud’s famous analysis of ‘a case of hysteria’ (Portrait de Dora). What proved to be an important background theory for French feminists, then, was emphatically rejected by

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41 Despite its supposedly ‘radical rereading’ of Freud, Lacanian psychoanalysis, too, included the notion of ‘lack’ on the part of the female, since it was based on sexual difference seen “as structured by the subject’s relation to the phallus, the signifier which stands in for the play of absence and presence that constitutes language. Because the oedipal moment inaugurates sexual difference in relation to the phallus as signifier, men and women enter language differently, and Lacan’s argument is that the female entry into language is organized by lack, or negativity” (Kuhn 1981:37).

42 Irigaray’s sharp criticism of her former professor, as well as the disapproval of other feminist thinkers who came from the same psychoanalytic tradition, seems to have been lost on many Anglo-American critics: “[...] Because of the importance of Lacanian thought in the intellectual context in which they operate, feminist theorists in France have felt very keenly the need to engage directly with its arguments about sexual difference: many of their critiques of Lacanian theory in fact started out as criticisms from within” (Kuhn 1981:37).

43 For the difficulty of differentiating between Cixous’s ‘creative’ and ‘theoretical’ writings see 4.4.2.
Anglo-American ones. But how come Freud’s work was received and put to use so differently in these two systems? This, in fact, is a whole story on its own right within my account of receptions and perceptions, and it clearly deserves much more space than I can possibly devote here. Let us nevertheless look briefly at the near-polar reception of psychoanalytic theory in France and in America. Gallop and Burke put the contradiction very succinctly:

[Kristeva and Irigaray] seem to have read a different Freud from ours, and furthermore, they have taken him seriously, whether as teacher, philosopher, poet, or opponent. He is not simply dismissed as the advocate of a reductive female psychology, for both have had to reckon with him as a serious thinker. The American reader of these feminist writers sometimes wonders whether we are talking about the same Freud, and her quandary increases to the point where she wonders whether their analyses are appropriate to our situation. [...] It is likely that our own version of Freud has been colored by those of his followers who stressed the biologistic strands in psychoanalysis, producing the mechanistic model of psychosexuality which we find repugnant (1980:108).

Although it would be difficult to talk about the possibility of a ‘correct reading’ of Freud – or of Lacan, as, for instance, Pamela Tytell does (1974:80-81) – we have to note here that the interpretation of Freud’s work in English has been problematic and the translations involved have already been subject to a series of studies (e.g. Glenn 1995; Mahony 1994; Thom 1981; see also Venuti 1995:25-28). Psychoanalysis was perceived in America strictly within the framework of medicine, and the translations accordingly emphasised the abstract and the scientific in Freud, rather than stressing the importance of the unconscious in people’s everyday lives. In her comprehensive book on the reception of psychoanalysis in France, Sherry Turkle explains how Freud himself was aware of the differences between France and America in their approach to psychoanalysis (1979:4-10). When he first came to the States in 1909, Freud found the American universities “astoundingly unprejudiced and open” while in Europe he was met with ignorance and contempt (Turkle 1979:4). In the following years, he came to the conclusion that Americans were “accepting psychoanalysis too easily” and he “took this as a sure sign that they were misunderstanding it, watering it down, and sweetening it to their taste” (ibid.). On the other hand, he believed that resistance to psychoanalysis would mean it was being taken seriously, since for him “psychoanalysis was so deeply subversive of common-sense ways of thinking about the world that to understand it was to resist it” (Turkle 1979:5).
Turkle argues that American pragmatism turned psychoanalysis into something ‘acceptable’ and ‘medicalised’. Psychoanalysis in America was immediately taken up by psychiatrists and put into use for treatment, rather than opening up new ways of thinking and perceiving in every day life. Freud’s ideas about the unconscious and about infantile sexuality were diluted in the service of making them more palatable to American tastes. The socially relevant aspects of psychoanalysis were erased, since “a special mix of optimism, individualism, and voluntarism contributed to the acceptance of a psychoanalytic therapy founded on the belief that people can change themselves by their own efforts if they want to” (Turkle 1979:7). The American version of psychoanalysis was “able to assuage fears of being different or of being unsusceptible to reform”, and it promised that self-improvement was possible without calling society into question (ibid.), and it thus became an “ego psychology [which] would help the ego gain domination, although a certain reading of Freud finds that the ego’s necessarily fragile, defensive, illusory mastery is the knot of neuroses, the obstacle to happiness” (Gallop 1979:57). The fate of psychoanalysis in the English-speaking countries was “to become a set system of interpretation, a ready-made symbolism to be applied to many cases, giving it an obvious market value [...]” (Gallop 1982:139). This partly explains the reasons of its popularity in America.

The ‘unconscious’, a notion that played a central role in much of the French feminist thinking, was also regarded with suspicion by Anglo-American feminists. The latter places the emphasis upon the “female ego strength”, upon “assertiveness or standing up for one’s rights” (Gallop & Burke 1980:108):

Although we have by no means rejected the concept, we would prefer to confine its traces to art and literature. We have assumed that just as social ills have their remedies, so personal ills have their cures. Yet many feminists realize that we have analyzed the constraints of the social context more avidly than the contradictions within ourselves. Given the need for political action, it is understandable that we commit ourselves to the ideal of an autonomous and coherent female self (Gallop & Burke 1980:108-109) [Emphasis mine].

Turkle elaborates on this point: “Freud’s pessimistic tone suggested that psychology could help people to endure the paradox and tragedy of human life, but ‘endurance’ was no substitution for the sense of wholeness that Americans felt they had lost with urbanization and the end of the frontier and that they hoped to recapture through a therapeutic culture. Freud’s American interpreters shifted the emphasis to a new therapeutic optimism. Their response to Freudian pessimism was to shrug off the suggestion that the individual is not master of his own house, free to act and choose no matter what his problems or environment. Although the Americans welcomed Freud to their shores, Freud’s theory could not stretch far enough to meet American demands for therapeutic optimism and voluntarism. In the end, he was ‘not enough’, and Americans strained to produce more optimistic, instrumental, and voluntaristic revisions of his work” (1979:48).
In France, on the other hand, psychoanalysis was initially taken up, not by medical practitioners, but by poets, novelists and painters, though only after a long period of resistance: "Through the 1960s, the French Left generally scorned psychoanalytic treatment as bourgeois self-indulgence and saw psychoanalytic ideas as reactionary instruments for psychologizing away social problems" (Turkle 1979:8). It was only after 1968 that the French became more interested in psychoanalysis and its potential as a 'subversive' science (Turkle 1979:10), and this was, in most part, the achievement of Jacques Lacan. It is claimed that Lacan read Freud's "most radical moments against his most conservative, in view of a constant vigilance against Freud's and our own tendencies to fall back into psychologism, biologism, or other commonplaces of thought from which his new science was a radical break" (Gallop 1979:57). His reading of Freud was "militantly antibiological, shifting all descriptions from a biological-anatomical level to a symbolic one" (Turkle 1979:17). This "militant psychoanalysis" would "no longer betray feminism (by prescribing and abetting adjustment to the roles 'destined' by one's anatomical difference)", but would provide feminist theory "with a possibility of understanding 'internalized oppression', a concept most efficient when operating within a science of the Unconscious" (Gallop 1979:58).

The first interest in Lacan in the United States, too, came "not from the psychoanalytic community, but from students of literature" (Turkle 1979:60). The initial "pervasive sense of mistrust" towards Freudian psychoanalytic theory was thus replaced, at least in some quarters, by a "growing tolerance for and interest in psychoanalysis as a method of enquiry potentially rich for feminist theory" (Wenzel 1981:57). It was believed that via the French detour, psychoanalysis c[ould] provide feminism with a means of understanding the implication of the political in the personal, an important strategic weapon for a practice which must always battle on those two fronts. Rather than being just 'another patriarchal discourse', psychoanalysis [would uncover] the functioning upon and within us of patriarchy as discourse (Gallop & Burke 1980:106).

Despite all these 'promising' features, the usefulness of psychoanalytic theory for Anglo-American feminists' purposes continued to be relentlessly questioned (e.g. Thorndike Hules 1985; Fraser 1992b; Delphy 1995). And since it was French feminism which introduced Freud and Lacan into the Anglo-American feminist critical system as 'Founding Fathers' and presented continental psychoanalysis as an intrinsic part of
feminist inquiry, it came to be seen as the product of a conspiracy between patriarchy and its 'agents' within feminism. In fact, being a Marxist-feminist sociologist, Christine Delphy maintains that "'French Feminism' was invented in order to legitimate the introduction on the Anglo-American feminist scene of a brand of essentialism, and in particular a rehabilitation of psychoanalysis [...]" (1995:216).

2.3. Conclusions

In this chapter we have examined the contexts in which the translations of Roland Barthes's works into Turkish, and of Hélène Cixous's works into English had taken place. Several points introduced here will later be taken up throughout the thesis in connection with the two cases in hand.

The importations of structuralism and semiotics into the Turkish literary critical system and of French feminism into the Anglo-American feminist critical system present us two analogous instances of migrating theories. First of all, considerable interest was shown in both schools of thought in their new destinations, in diverse forms such as promoting them, trying to engage with them, and opposing or exhaustively questioning them. The second similarity is that a mixture of selective acceptance and rejection took place in both contexts. In each of them an imported body of thought came up against an existing state of knowledge and expectations, and its reception was therefore shaped, even 'bent', according to local concerns and prevailing agendas. While structuralism and semiotics were seen as means for achieving the longed-for 'objective' and 'scientific' criticism by some critics in Turkey, it was regarded as a potential enemy by others. On the other hand, upon the background of the local 'action-oriented' and 'pragmatic' feminism, French feminism was perceived as a radically different form of feminism, which carried with it all the evils associated with psychoanalysis in Anglo-America.

Thirdly, there were certain similarities between the responses these theories elicited in their new destinations. They were charged with being apolitical, elitist, incomprehensible, or too 'theoretical' for indigenous purposes. The responses discussed above might give the reader the impression that the whole scene was too antagonistic, and that these authors were translated only to better attack them. The reason why I concentrated on adverse criticisms rather than enthusiastic welcomes was that my objective was to contextualise the translations of Barthes and Cixous and to highlight
certain problems encountered in the reception of their works. For this purpose, unfavourable opinions, or at least the reservations, proved to be much more telling than the praises. However, the negative criticism is only part of the picture. The domestic demand for translations on structuralism-semiotics and French feminism, and especially for those of Barthes and Cixous, will be illuminated throughout the rest of the thesis from a variety of angles. Chapter 3 discusses the general 'need' felt for translations of 'modern' literary theory in Turkey, and of 'French' 'feminist' 'theory' in Anglo-America. Chapter 4 looks at the translation and translator patterns which closely follow the local debates and requirements. Chapter 5 deals with the linguistic background which made the retranslations necessary for Barthes's work. Finally, Chapter 6 explains the political situation which necessitated the translation of certain texts by these writers for particular purposes.
CHAPTER 3

TROPES IN THE TRAVELS OF THEORY

In the previous chapter, we examined the similarities between the contexts which gave rise to the translations of Barthes in Turkey and of Cixous in Anglo-America. In this chapter I intend to highlight the differences between the two contexts in hand, since these differences are crucial in understanding the role translation plays in the migration of theoretical texts towards diverse destinations. All resemblances aside, the reception of French feminism in Anglo-America and of structuralism and semiotics in Turkey cannot be too similar; not only because the works, authors, translators, commissioners, publishers and readers involved are not alike, but also because "the symmetries and asymmetries of linguistic and geopolitical power" and "the historical-cultural relationships" between French and Anglo-American systems on the one hand, and French and Turkish systems on the other, are "vastly different" (cf. Gupta 1998:182). The formative role of translation depends on the power differentials, since imports do not contribute to the shaping of local discourses to the same extent in every destination. The assimilative capacities of receiving systems are not identical. Some systems prove to be more resilient towards "intersystemic interference" (Lieven D’hulst cited by Hermans 1999:115), and some are, or have to be, more flexible.

In each receiving subsystem – i.e. Turkish literary critical system and Anglo-American feminist critical system – the attitudes towards imported discursive elements are thus determined by the power differentials between the languages and cultures at large. Still, the individuals and institutions involved as mediators or opponents, who respond to the translated material by promoting, using, rejecting, or criticising it, also have a say in determining the stand taken towards importation. Their attitudes do not always coincide with those found in the receiving system’s literary, cultural and political spheres in general, since they have their own interests and agendas partially independent of the dominant attitudes. Therefore, different attitudes can be found side by side within the same system at the same time, and are reflected in the use of certain tropes related to translation. These tropes will be instrumental in understanding the images created for Barthes and Cixous and the way their translations were handled.

An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the “Basic Issues in the Intercultural Study of Translation” workshop conference of the “Translations and Translation Theories East and West” project, carried out under the aegis of the AHRB Centre for Asian and African Literatures (UCL and SOAS), 9-10 July 2001, London.
3.1. Attitudes towards French feminism in the Anglo-American feminist critical system

The attitudes in the Anglophone world towards French feminism can be defined around a continuous oscillation among tropes of alterity, solidarity and universality.

3.1.1. Alterity

Since the very beginning French feminism appealed to Anglo-American feminists because of its 'alterity': "When it reached these shores, what got called 'French feminism' was what seemed strikingly different from the feminism which arose in the United States in the late sixties and early seventies" (Gallop 1991:42-43). Apparently, it was the differences which initiated the dialogue between French and Anglo-American feminists (Marks 1978:832). Even at times when the two traditions were said to converge, the divergences between them were immediately emphasised (see e.g. Jardine 1980:xxvi). This accentuated difference soon became so powerful that it started erasing the actual dissimilarities within the diverse feminisms prevailing in France.

Despite the differences that exist between French feminists on the subject of women and language, their writings nevertheless present a number of preoccupations in common when compared with the work of Anglo-American feminists. The insistence on language as the locus for change for instance, differs radically from the emphasis of a mainstream of Anglo-American and other feminists on political and social reform of the existing system. The notion that this system, created and maintained by language, cannot express woman, and the suggestion that change may come from those areas beyond language, as well as the proposition that this change will necessarily entail a re-ordering and re-valuing of differences are also unlike the more material approaches of Anglo-American and other feminisms (Sellers 1991:121).

And occasionally, within the feminisms in Anglo-America:

Whereas Anglo-American feminist criticism, for all its internal differences, tries to recover women's historical experiences as readers and writers, French feminist theory looks at the ways that 'the feminine' has been defined, represented, or repressed in the symbolic systems of language, metaphysics, psychoanalysis, and art (Showalter 1985a:5).

As mentioned 2.2.1., this distinction between the 'empirical' and 'theoretical' traditions of feminism was soon turned into a "conflictual national-cultural paradigm" (Freiwald

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46 As I stated in my 'Notes on terminology', the feminisms in France were in fact quite diverse. Therefore, "any generic description of 'French feminism(s)' from afar immediately homogenizes and neutralizes the specificities of struggles that, at least in Paris, are of epic (and often violent) proportions" (Jardine 1981b:10).
This paradigm was then "naturalized and rendered rhetorically all the more effective through the alignment of personal pronouns, that is, through the discursive attribution of subjectivity to a collective American 'we' and alterity to a collective French 'they'" (Freiwald 1991:63-64). There is not enough space here to quote from all the Anglophone feminists’ texts dominated by such an alignment of personal pronouns. I will therefore limit myself to two significant examples. The first one is from Elaine Marks’s oft-cited introductory essay written in 1978:

Of all the neologisms raging and colliding in Paris [...] the most useful for both Luce Irigaray and Hélène Cixous has been the vocabulary disseminated by Jacques Derrida. Indeed, one word alone, ‘logocentrism,’ has served both as an invective and as a method of analysis. [...] Where American women cry out ‘male chauvinist pig,’ the French women inscribe ‘phallogocentric’ (841).

This particular comparison between the ‘male chauvinist pig’ and ‘phallogocentric’ reverberates in later texts in English without being questioned – and with the personal pronouns replacing the ‘American’ and the ‘French’ (e.g. Finel-Honigman 1981:319; Jardine 1980:xxvii). According to this passage, Anglo-American women 'cry out', they act, they try to have their voices heard. They make down-to-earth and to-the-point attacks on patriarchy. French women, ‘elitist’ as they are, inscribe, and use incomprehensible and abstract terms, incidentally, disseminated by the white fathers.

The second example is Sandra Gilbert’s introduction to The Newly Born Woman (2.2.1.). This is an ironic piece, which is expected to introduce and promote the work in question, but which actually achieves quite an opposite effect. Here ‘we’ denotes once

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47 Sherry Simon points out how the “fiction that there existed some sort of ‘native’ form of thought, which then came to be ‘enriched’ or ‘tainted’ by a foreignizing influence” was sustained, and the “very fact of the language difference allowed points of view to be crystallized according to their geographical origin. The confrontation of two apparently separate bodies of feminist writing has invited intellectual cartographers to map out, with greater confidence, separate continents of thought” (1996:109-110).
48 Very few feminists try to come out of this dichotomy. An exception is Toril Moi: “[...]. The terms ‘Anglo-American’ and ‘French’ must not be taken to represent purely national demarcations: they do not signal the critics’ birthplace but the intellectual tradition within which they work. Thus I do not consider the many British and American women deeply influenced by French thought to be ‘Anglo-American’ critics” (1985:xiii-xiv). Yet such a statement further strengthens what is assumed to be the ‘essence’ of an ‘Anglo-American’ critic: pragmatic, action-oriented, materialist, etc.
49 It remains a curious editorial decision that the task of writing the introduction for the long-awaited complete translation of La Jeune née was given to Gilbert, who was no fan of French feminism or of Cixous. In fact, Lynn K. Penrod notes that in a later essay (“The Mirror and the Vamp”, in The Future of Literary Theory, 1989), Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar attack Cixous, Irigaray, and Kristeva for allegedly practising ‘the arts of the vamp’ (p.151). Both femme fatale and vampire, the vamp is ‘delectably sensual and transgressive’ but also dangerously glamorous, for she not only ‘suck(s) the blood of male theory’ (p.152) but ‘the drama of seduction and betrayal that she enacts in her foray against patriarchal structure may end up being as seductively treacherous to women as to men’ (p.154)” (1993:42). A similar tendency to treat Cixous as a femme fatale can be seen also in Gilbert’s introduction, starting from the title, “The Tarantella of Theory”, which refers to Italian women’s magical dance supposed to cure the bite of the spider tarantula.
again the Anglo-American feminists, but ‘they’ refers, this time, mainly to Cixous. Just to quote two passages out of a multitude:

To be sure, recent Anglo-American feminists [...] often seem to begin projects of liberation from more moderately empirical positions than the one Cixous here articulates. Documentation is important to us, and we don’t as a rule define our history as primarily ‘hystery’ – or mystery (1986:xv).

We in America may not want – as Cixous sometimes seems to tell us we should – to write in milk or blood; we may not always feel it necessary to overturn ‘mind’ by valorizing ‘body’ (because we may think our minds as distinctive, desirous and desirable as our bodies) [...] (1986:xviii).

The continuous and often deprecating juxtaposition found in Anglo-American feminists’ writings on French feminism is in accordance with what Clem Robyns defines as a ‘defensive’ posture: an attitude in which a discursive practice acknowledges the otherness of intruding elements and explicitly opposes itself to ‘the other’ (1994:60). A discourse characterized by a ‘defensive’ posture “enhances its specificity by heavily emphasizing the otherness of the ‘alien’ discourse” (1994:67). According to Gallop and Burke, ‘alien’ was precisely the adjective used to describe French feminist theory during a conference titled “The Future of Difference” (1980:106). There, together with psychoanalysis, French feminism was introduced as an “alien component” into the Anglo-American feminist scene and was “interrogated” accordingly (ibid.).

A good example illustrating this ‘defensive’ attitude where “a sense of threat to one’s own identity, of alienation, is expressed”, and where, consequently, “translation is generally viewed in a negative light” (Robyns 1994:66, 68) could be found in an extract from the interview of three Anglo-American feminist critics, one of them Sandra Gilbert herself (cited in Gaudin et al. 1981:6):

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50 On the assumption that a discourse “defines itself in relation, or rather in opposition to other discourses” (57), Robyns examines the role translation plays in “the dynamics of self-definition”, and seeks to determine the various positions taken towards the importation of discursive elements and towards translation. He describes four such types of positions and proposes two basic criteria in order to pin them down: “First, does a discursive practice acknowledge the otherness of (potentially) intruding elements from other discourses? Does it explicitly oppose itself to ‘the other’? Secondly, does a discursive practice allow the intrusion of code-violating elements without transforming them according to the target codes? An attitude in which otherness is denied and transformed may be called imperialist, while one in which otherness is acknowledged but still transformed may be called defensive. A transdiscursive discourse neither radically opposes itself to other discourses nor refuses their intrusion, while a defective discourse stimulates the intrusion of alien elements that are explicitly acknowledged as such” (1994:60). Robyns hastens to emphasise that these types are only generalisations, and “should be seen as coordinates for research into specific, complex situations” (ibid.). He adds that “indeed, no discourse will ever correspond exactly to a single type. [...] Very often, [...] the coexistence of various attitudes within the same discourse is itself a function of discursive interference” (ibid.). This final observation of Robyns is also demonstrated in my findings. More about these various attitudes below.

51 No more information was given in the source about the date or venue of this conference.
Susan Gubar: “I would just speak for a moment about the people that I feel are bridge figures between French theoretical/critical thinking and the American literary historical establishment. [...] I wonder if other people feel the same sort of dependence on those figures who really do crucially important translations (trans-lations), carrying across from one culture to another, from one language to another, and from one set of ideas to another.”

Carolyn Allen: “I feel the same dependency especially in reading French writers whose French is very taken up with word play, but it frustrates me. You can’t always tell how much has been lost in translation. And my experience has been that other American feminist critics are also dependent on what has been translated.”

Sandra Gilbert: “And you understand what you are trying to do without when you see how fascinating the work done in France is and how essential it certainly seems. But at the same time, I have to say that I do feel troubled and excluded by it sometimes. I tend to feel that they are very opaque. Even when my French is good enough, it’s still so much an ‘other’ culture. That makes it both fascinating and fearful, and extraordinarily glamorous. [...]”

Bina Freiwald rightly observes that for these Anglophone feminist critics “the dependence on the linguistic and semiotic mediation of translation is an unwelcome and disturbing experience”, since it “triggers anxieties about the impenetrable foreignness of another tongue (an other’s tongue)” and “about loss of control over the communicative process” (1991:56). These critics seem to feel “condemned to a state of linguistic and cognitive exile”, “cut off from the vital sources of authentic meaning and expression” (ibid.), threatened by the imported material, by its differences from the ‘indigenous’ version(s) of feminism52, and by its ‘translatedness’ exposing these very differences.

Both lured and taken aback by the ‘otherness’ of French feminism, Anglo-American feminism defined itself in relation, or rather, in opposition to it. Hence, the tropes of alterity, or oppositional difference, revealed in the juxtaposition of ‘we’ vs. ‘they’. French feminists’ interest in the language and the unconscious as the focus for change could not reconcile with Anglo-American feminists’ insistence on political and social reform. Anglo-American feminism seemed more ‘empirical’, ‘pragmatic’ and ‘action-oriented’ when contrasted with the ‘theoretical’, ‘philosophical’, ‘utopian’ and ‘language-oriented’ French feminism. In this instance, otherness was not acknowledged in a positive fashion – as those who favour ‘foreignising’ translations advocate (see e.g. Berman 1984; Venuti 1995 and 1998) – but was emphasised over and over in a way

52 Needless to say, American versions of feminism actually owed a lot to foreign feminists like Simone de Beauvoir. However, this lack of recognition is exactly part of the problem.
which increases the unfamiliarity of the imported material and its irrelevance or inappropriateness for domestic concerns.

3.1.2. Solidarity

Apart from tropes of oppositional difference, what I would call tropes of 'bridgeable' difference can be detected in the Anglo-American feminists' emphasis on 'exchange' and 'dialogue' with their French 'sisters', and on 'building bridges' between the two traditions. The Atlantic, as the ocean that separated the Anglo-American and French feminists from each other, was a frequent symbol in the writings by the former, who were keenly aware of their geographical and geopolitical stance in relation to the latter. Nonetheless, 'Atlantic' was often prefixed by 'trans-' (e.g. “transatlantic dialogue” Thorndike Hules 1985:xvii; “transatlantic metamorphoses” Comay 1991: 79; “transatlantic feminisms” and “transatlantically speaking” Penrod 1993: 42,51; “transatlantic displacement” and “transatlantic passage” Simon 1996: 4,5). This indicates a desire on Anglo-American feminists' part to surpass the differences, which appeared to them as obstacles on the way to women's emancipation – the ultimate goal each version of feminism was expected to contribute to. If unity in feminist struggle was to be attained, the differences between the two traditions had to be “analyzed, discussed and overcome” (Finel-Honigman 1981:317). In Domna Stanton's words, “transcending our undeniable and important difference, our desire to give voice to woman binds us together in one radical and global project” (1980:81). At this point, what several Anglo-American feminists aspired to is, to all appearances, a ‘transdiscursive’ attitude as described by Robyns:

Without completely losing sight of its specificity, a discursive practice can consider itself explicitly as a part of a larger discursive domain. [...] A transdiscursive doctrine does not explicitly consider imported elements 'other' or 'alien', let alone 'threatening'. Both foreign discursive elements and those of 'local production' are seen as equal contributions to a common goal (1994:69-70).

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53 E.g. Marks 1978: 832; Jardine 1980:xxvi; Gallop & Burke 1980:114, quoting Rachel Blau DuPlessis; Thorndike Hules 1985:xvii; Comay 1991:79; Gallop 1991:42; Penrod 1993:42; Simon 1996:4,5,110; and Delphy 1995:221. Similarly, Gerald Hill talks about Anna Gibb's “third wave” of feminist theory “in which [Gibb] includes Cixous. This theory is ‘full-blown’ in France, of course, but only lately has ‘begun to lap at American shores’ and hasn’t yet reached Australia at all. Here, then, is Cixous as a kind of trans-oceanic tidal wave which, if not moderated somehow – by a selective ‘making use’ of Cixous’s practice and a judicious ‘glimpse of another direction’ it enables – would wash over the coastlines of critical civilization” (1992:229).
Robyns observes that 'transdiscursive' attitude is often "a reaction against what is seen as 'unfruitful provincialism': the local production is not really considered defective, but is expected to reach beyond its local context" (1994:70). This is partly what was demanded from Anglo-American feminism: to expand its boundaries, to open itself to new ideas and to learn from another feminist tradition. At the end, a collaboration was called for:

Perhaps what is needed is an alliance between the two perspectives. As readers and writers, I believe we have much to gain from combining Anglo-American concerns with content and French feminist interest in the way this content is produced and used. [...] The (self) questioning of French feminism and material propositions of Anglo-American feminism similarly seem a fruitful conjunction (Sellers 1991:160-161).

Consequently, the Anglo-American response to French feminism often carries with it an expressed wish for unity, or at least unidirectionality: "On both sides of the Atlantic we are working toward a feminist theory of the maternal, in all its implications. We are engaged, all of us, in 'the poetics of discovery and telling, exploring, and naming'" (Gallop and Burke 1980:114, quoting Rachel Blau DuPlessis). The necessity for establishing solidarity among feminists, the urge to internationalise the women's movement, and the desire to create an atmosphere of 'sisterhood' were the underlying motives of the insistence on the similarities between the two feminisms and on exchange and dialogue:

It is a mistake [...] to overemphasize the distance separating French feminists from their more pragmatic American counterparts. [...] Strength may be found in alliance. The lines of force bringing the cultures into dialogue are as diverse as the voices from either side, and if anything is felt as strongly as the so-called 'dis-connection' (emblematised by the language barrier itself), it is precisely the desire to connect (Gaudin et al. 1981:12).

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54 The preface for the 1980 anthology *New French Feminisms* starts quoting a "complaint" from Hélène Cixous, introduced as "one of France's leading women writers": "We translate what the American women write, they never translate our texts". The editors of the anthology agree with Cixous and state that "in general the texts that have been produced in France since May 1968 around and about the women's liberation movement are not known in the United States" (Marks and de Courtivron 1980:ix). They add: "Our book is therefore the beginning of an exchange". The wish for 'exchange' would from then on mark almost all the work written in English on the theoretical output of French women writers. However, there is no tangible proof that this exchange indeed took place. For instance, Moorjani questions some French writers' awareness of Anglo-American feminism: "There is no preface for the English edition of *Thinking the Difference: For a Peaceful Revolution* by Luce Irigaray. A dialogue might have proved difficult since, in general, Irigaray does not give much evidence of being aware of the theoretical and practical work accomplished by the feminist movements in the English-speaking world, be they in the areas of philosophy, psychoanalysis, religion, linguistics, or civil law, to mention only the domains of her training and/or special focus" (Moorjani 1996:674-675).
It is this “desire to connect” which led to the repeated attempts at foregrounding the similarities between the two traditions, alongside the emphasised differences:

To date, most commentary on French feminist critical discourse has stressed its fundamental dissimilarity from the empirical American orientation, its unfamiliar intellectual grounding in linguistics, Marxism, neo-Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis, and Derridean deconstruction. Despite these differences, however, the new French feminisms have much in common with radical American feminist theories in terms of intellectual affiliations and rhetorical energies (Showalter 1985b:248-249)55.

In order to form an alliance, initial confrontations and disagreements were downplayed to something no more than ‘polemics’:

Beyond polemics, both French and American women are trying to achieve goals defined by Elizabeth Minnich: “The struggle of feminist artists, feminist scholars, feminist workers of all sorts is to see, think and feel not in some mysterious new ways, but in familiar yet unvoiced, unshown ways – ways that those who have begun questioning conventions, stereotypes and ideologies produced by and supporting a sexist world will recognize and take up” (Finel-Honigman 1981:322, citing Minnich 1978:8).

The goals defined here for the French women, as well as the American ones, are peculiarly close to what Anglo-American feminists had long tried to achieve. The manner in which the “mysterious new ways” – evoking the work of certain French writers like Cixous – are summarily dismissed does not fit into a ‘transdiscursive’ stand, but rather to an approach which is better revealed through tropes of universality.

3.1.3. Universality

Marks’s and Gilbert’s above-mentioned texts, which exhibit tropes of alterity, are also among the best to exemplify the other strong tendency in the Anglo-American response to French feminism: the tendency to deny and transform the otherness of the imported discourse, to assimilate and/or hide it. When Marks claims that French women write and American women act (1978:841), and sketches a permanent discrepancy between them, she also concludes that the French neologism ‘phallogocentric’ in fact does not amount to anything much different from the American catchphrase ‘male chauvinist pig’. One term is presented as the counterpart – the translation almost – of the other. In the same article, after talking about the diverse intellectual heritage of French feminism, Marks immediately adds: “But not all French writers today […] are immersed in the debates on

55 Showalter pursues a similar argument in 1985a:5.
the status of the unconscious within the new acts of reading and writing. Literary criticism that resembles ours is still being produced [...]” (1978:833). Accordingly, even the much-acclaimed French feminists whose texts loom awesomely in front of the uninitiated Anglo-American readers have in fact not achieved anything drastically special – or different:

The difference between what Luce Irigaray accomplishes in “La tache aveugle d’un vieux rêve de symmétrie” in Speculum de l’autre femme, where she analyzes Freud’s fictive speech on ‘femininity’ and what many American feminist critics do when they analyze sexism in male writers is a question of degree. Because of her theoretical background, Luce Irigaray reads other signs. Because the signs she reads involve how Freud’s language betrays his prejudices [...] her own writing, attempting to deconstruct his, acquires an intertextual density that excludes the naïve reader (1978:842).

Sandra Gilbert’s introduction to The Newly Born Woman is likewise full of parallels drawn between the work of Anglo-American writers and theorists and that of Clément and Cixous. She quotes, for instance, from Emily Dickinson and adds that “Clément might almost be glossing these lines from nineteenth-century America” (1986:xii). Analogues with Virginia Woolf and Elizabeth Barrett Browning abound. For instance:

American readers are bound to find that such a strategy, along with many of the dreams and dreads that Cixous articulates in the autobiographical opening of “Sorties”, has English equivalents in the writings of such contemporary theorists as Susan Griffin in Woman and Nature: The Roaring Inside Her and Mary Daly in Gyn/Ecology [...]. Indeed, even the witty and rational Virginia Woolf may be seen as a crucial feminist precursor of Cixous (and Clément): what is Orlando if not an elegantly elaborated fantasy of bi- (or pluri-) sexual liberation – creative 'hysteria' unleashed from the hyster [womb] and dedicated at last to ‘the other history’ which Cixous has called for? (1986:xv)

This particular approach can be partly explained by the fact that “all attempts to understand anything unknown begin with an attempt to understand what this thing is

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56 For other examples of such comparisons and parallels see e.g. Richman 1980:72-73 and Gallop & Burke 1980:113.
57 Peggy Kamuf criticises Gilbert’s introduction in a similar way: “The symptom it exhibits is in fact double, for Gilbert seems undecided whether to try to make the ‘French feminist theory’ label stick or, on the contrary, to dispute its pertinence. The result is a version of the ‘kettle logic’ that Freud immortalized in his famous joke: all of this French stuff is very foreign to us American feminists; besides, our English-speaking women writers already invented it; and what they didn’t invent is probably bad for you anyway. On the one hand, Gilbert insists on the strangeness of Cixous’s ‘dazzling tarantella of theory’ for the typical American readers whom she supposes for this purpose. Inadvertently, no doubt, her descriptions of this encounter manage to call up comical images: provincial American tourists squirming with disapproval as they watch some Mediterranean peasant festival in which the women, really, get far too carried away with the rhythms of the dance. On the other hand, however, Gilbert also manifestly wants to domesticate and reappropriate ‘French feminist theory’ by comparing (and postdating) its tenets, procedures, or assertions to those of some of the Anglophone world’s most respected ‘madwomen in the attic,’ Emily Dickinson or Virginia Woolf” (1995:71).
like, what we can see it as" (Chesterman 2000:14). Human beings tend to assimilate new and unfamiliar information to recognised and familiar patterns. Yet there is more to the Anglo-American feminists’ attitude than a mere wish to ‘translate’ the novel information into knowledge they were already accustomed to. The tropes of universality – the assumed ‘universal’ features and value of one’s own project and of the means to achieve it – come to the fore. This is the point where the dominant attitude of the Anglo-American literary system, as well as the political, economical, and cultural systems, can be said to interfere with the attitude of the Anglo-American feminists towards the importation of French feminist theory. All the differences, previously foregrounded, are erased and French feminism is turned into something familiar, i.e. easier to cope with, to assimilate, and, if need be, to dismiss. Robyns calls such an attitude an ‘imperialist’ one (1994:66). Although the choice of the term itself is questionable due to its strong connotations, the definition he provides is useful to shed light on the context in hand. Robyns states that an ‘imperialist’ attitude is characterised by “a paradoxical claim of, on the one hand, the irreducible specificity of one’s own identity, and, on the other hand, the universality of its values” (1994:60). Here otherness is denied and transformed. The “assumption of superiority leads to an unscrupulous assimilation of the alien elements” says Robyns, “an assimilation that effectively denies their specificity” (1994:63). Let me give a few more examples of how this attitude is revealed in the Anglo-American writings on the subject. During a rare mention of another feminist criticism than the American or the French, Elaine Showalter elaborates:

The emphasis in each country falls somewhat differently: English feminist criticism, essentially Marxist, stresses oppression; French feminist criticism, essentially psychoanalytic, stresses repression; American feminist criticism, essentially textual, stresses expression. All, however, have become gynocentric. All are struggling to find a terminology that can rescue the feminine from its stereotypical associations with inferiority (1985b:249).

Jane Gallop detects a certain “universalism” in this statement, which, with the help of “the wonderful rhetoric find of ‘oppression, repression, expression’ transforms large conceptual differences into near sameness through the insistent repetition of the

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58 A similar case is the reception of deconstruction in America. Barbara Johnson observes: “It seems, in retrospect, as though literary criticism in the United States had long been on the lookout for someone to be unfaithful with. All signs seem to indicate that, in some strata, it has chosen Derrida, perhaps because he is such a good letter writer. Yet paradoxically enough, what seems to be happening to the seductive foreignness of Derrida’s thought in this country is that it begins, as Rodolphe Gasché has recently pointed out, to bear an uncanny resemblance to our own home-grown New Criticism. It is though, through our excursion into the exotic, we had suddenly come to remember what it was that appealed to us in what we were being unfaithful to” (1985:143-144).
signifier" (1991:37). In this way, "having given time to national differences, Showalter has worked her way to an international consensus" (ibid.). One could argue that Showalter was trying to highlight the diverse facets of what many Anglo-American feminists considered as the same overall programme, i.e. the emancipation of women around the world. However, as we will see in 4.1.2., many French feminist critics had a different understanding of both the nature and the goals of the feminist movement in France, and even of the content and associations of the word ‘feminism’ itself. Nevertheless, their reservations, interrogations and endeavours were often seen as extraneous by the Anglo-American feminist critics, who summoned their French ‘counterparts’ to recognise the unity of their goal. For example, Claire Duchen expresses her conviction perhaps optimistically, that there is more that connects British and French feminists than divides us [...]. I hope that [French Connections: Voices from the Women’s Movement in France] will contribute to changing the image of French feminism from something that is interesting but largely irrelevant, to that of a sister movement that shares the concerns and the struggles of feminists everywhere [...]. In spite of considerable cultural difference, women's liberation movements everywhere face the same dilemmas, ask the same questions, share the same aspirations, and need to learn from and with each other (1987:12, 15).

With this insistence on ‘sameness’, what may be called “critical universalism” (Cronin 2000:89-92), i.e. the efforts to establish solidarity between Anglo-American and French feminisms despite all the differences, is replaced by a “pathological universalism” (ibid.)\(^59\), i.e. the assimilation of ‘theoretical’ and ‘philosophical’ French feminism into the ‘pragmatic’ Anglo-American one. As Clem Robyns observes, in such a stance, the role of translation in the importation of foreign discursive elements will often be overlooked:

[...] The unquestioned ‘assimilation policy’ makes it clear how translation will be seen. First of all, it has to be denied an innovative function. Imported elements are not allowed to dominate the target discourse, but must be integrated through transformation [...]. Translation is also seen as

\(^59\) Michael Cronin observes: “In the context of travel and translation, it seems necessary to distinguish between pathological universalism and critical universalism. Pathological universalism is the translation movement that would end all translation. Everybody, everywhere, is translated into the dominant language and culture. The universal is the universal projection of the language and values of a hegemonic nation or class. [...] Critical universalism is celebration of difference that leads to an embrace of other differences, the universalism lying not in the eradication of the other but in sharing a common condition of being a human other” (2000:91).
transparency: because of the universality of the target discourse, the understanding of the other can never be a problem (1994:64).^60^

In the following chapters, and especially in Chapter 5, we will deal with these issues of ‘assimilation’ and ‘transparency’ in translation in more detail.

3.1.4. Consequences

French feminism appealed to Anglo-American feminists as a repository of feminist (and continental) philosophical thinking, as a means of opening up new (often ‘utopian’) possibilities of feminist inquiry, and most importantly, as an other ‘feminism’ which one could join forces with, so to speak, in the ostensibly shared struggle against patriarchy. Yet this illusion of a shared struggle was quickly shattered due to the recognition of cultural, political and linguistic boundaries:

In 1970s North America, translation led to an awareness of the cultural differences that can hamper feminist interaction between even the most willing partners. When the writings of French feminists, such as Hélène Cixous, began to appear in translation, the discomfort that anglophones felt at the inherent foreignness of the material led to significant resistance. [...] The interpretive gap between American and French women academics reading and writing at the same historical moment was made visible precisely because of translation. [...] Women thus became aware of the great cultural and political differences that lie between supposedly related Western societies, and began to revise what theories they may have had about solidarity and understanding (Flotow 1997b:86).

Despite the ‘assimilation policy’ prevalent in the Anglo-American reception of French feminism, translation then emerged as a reminder of the specificity of each version of feminism, increasing awareness about the diversities involved. These diversities, however, were not always welcomed or easily digested. Despite the apparently earnest desire to ‘connect’, what Sherry Simon calls “the conflictual pulls between internationalist feminist solidarity and national affiliations” (1996:4) continued to operate. As a result, many Anglo-American feminists decided to adopt a rather utilitarian attitude towards the imported material. The debates about French feminism “focus[ed] on its relevance to Anglo-American concerns” (Delphy 1995:196). The important issue was its (un)suitability for Anglo-American needs. For instance, Ann R. Jones admits that the way Kristeva, Irigaray and Cixous “oppose women’s bodily experience [...] to the phallic-symbolic patterns embedded in Western thought” is a

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^60^ For a strong criticism of such an ‘imperialist’ attitude in the translations of the works of ‘Third World’ women writers into dominant languages, and of assumed easy-understanding see Spivak 1992.
"powerful argument" – incidentally, whose versions were seen “in the radical feminism of the United States, too” (1985b:366). It is powerful, because the “immediacy with which the body, the id, *jouissance*, are supposedly experienced promises a clarity of perception and vitality that can bring down mountains of phallocentric delusion” (*ibid.*). However, according to Jones, *féminité* and *écriture féminine* are “problematic as well as powerful concepts”, criticised as “idealist”, “essentialist”, “theoretically fuzzy”, and “fatal to constructive political action”. Jones finds all these objections worth-while and adds that these objections “must be made if American women are to sift out and use the positive elements in French thinking about *féminité*” (1985b:367). Nicole Ward Jouve comments on this passage:

There is something touching in the goodwill. Something comically pious too in the way in which the body and *jouissance* are written about: strange foreign goods that after due scrutiny, and customs approval, must be allowed on the supermarket shelves if ‘American women’ are to have the best of all worlds. Neo-colonialist almost. You would think that the writing, and the search for an economy of pleasure and giving, which Cixous invites her readers to quest for, made up a keep-fit programme, a magic diet that would give you vitality: like Popeye’s spinach, after you partake of it you can bring down ‘mountains of phallocentric delusion’ (1991:54).

This utilitarian attitude prevailed in the 1990s, too: “Revaluing French feminism today,” says Nancy Fraser, “means sorting the conceptual wheat from the chaff” (1992a:4-5). As a result, what follows is not so much of ‘revaluing’, but rather revising:

The volume concentrates on theoretical arguments – reflecting the disciplinary training in philosophy of most of the contributors. However, the philosophizing found here is not disengaged from practice. On the contrary, these essays share the presupposition that the point of feminist philosophy is to change the world, not merely to theorize it. *The North American contributions, especially, reflect this orientation.* They center their respective assessments of the cogency of French feminist theory on the question of its present usefulness for feminist practice (Fraser 1992a:5) [Emphasis mine].

Thus, French feminist theory is conscripted by Anglo-American feminism into the struggle for “chang[ing] the world”. However, first, it had to be made fitter for the fight. For instance, Thorndike Hules claims that “in addition to making French feminist theory more accessible to Americans, its American-based interpreters offer French colleagues viewpoints that are both familiar and different, work that is both well-informed and less politicized, less polarized, less abstract” (1985:xliii-xliv) – i.e. ‘better’ from the Anglo-American point of view. What follows after this betterment is the absorption of the imported material:
Finally, 'French feminism' has become the subject of a veritable outpouring of books and journal articles. These include translations from the French, of course, but also a large body of indigenous English writing, which consists not only of commentaries and theoretical polemics, but also of appropriations, transformations, and concrete applications in cultural studies (Fraser 1992a:1).

The attitude towards French feminism thus oscillates between the allure of alterity, a wish for solidarity, and the strengthening of the universality of Anglo-American feminists' position. The dreams of collaboration and alliance yield to the urgency of utilisation and appropriation, of improvement and rectification, and of absorbing and digesting the imported material. Talking about the collection of essays, Engaging with Irigaray, Sherry Simon claims:

The critical and theoretical engagement of prominent Anglo-American feminists with the work of Irigaray is in fact the final and most fruitful stage of the translation process. Irigaray’s writing is neither reported on nor defended, but meshed within ongoing issues of contemporary feminist thought (1996:108).

Simon prefers to see the situation as a merger: “Féminisme à l’américaine? Féminisme à la française? L’époque où il fallait déclarer allégeance à l’un ou à l’autre modèle est bien révolue; de plus en plus, par la traduction, la frontière s’efface” (1991:11-12). She elsewhere claims that it is “more and more difficult to define any intellectual tradition in purely national terms. The philosophical location of feminist thought can now be said to be somewhere in mid-Atlantic” (1996:109-110). Despite Simon’s suggestion of a ‘happy end’ for the Anglo-American and French couple, I did not come across in my research anything to suggest that there was a clear-cut historical change in the Anglo-American reception of French feminism. The tropes of alterity, for instance, can be found in the earliest texts in the 1970s as well as the latest ones in the beginning of the 1990s. The dream of a ‘common goal’ lasted all through the 1980s and 1990s. The extent of the absorption can be seen in texts like that of Judith Kegan Gardiner, an article of 26 pages, where the relationship between psychoanalysis and feminism is extensively, and favourably, examined, though without a single mention of the work done on the topic by French feminists. The discussion focuses on “English and American psychoanalytic theory” (1985:114). Although Kegan Gardiner notes that some of the case histories of Freud, such as “Anna O.” and “Dora”, have been dramatised by feminists, she does not provide the names or the nationality of the writers (Portrait de Dora was written by Cixous in 1976).

One cannot overlook the dire exclusion implied here. Any feminist (philosophical) thought other than the Anglo-American or the French are stripped of their right to existence. This is a common attitude among Anglo-American feminists, too. The insistence on a collaboration between the two traditions is often to the effacement of all ‘other feminisms’ in the world. Even at the rare instances when there are calls for contribution from different people and different geographies, as in Ann R. Jones’s urge for “feminist investigations of textual politics” to “take place in more languages than one – or even two” (1985a:108), the word “even” implies the improbability, or at best, the novelty of the situation.

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61 The extent of the absorption can be seen in texts like that of Judith Kegan Gardiner, an article of 26 pages, where the relationship between psychoanalysis and feminism is extensively, and favourably, examined, though without a single mention of the work done on the topic by French feminists. The discussion focuses on “English and American psychoanalytic theory” (1985:114). Although Kegan Gardiner notes that some of the case histories of Freud, such as “Anna O.” and “Dora”, have been dramatised by feminists, she does not provide the names or the nationality of the writers (Portrait de Dora was written by Cixous in 1976).

62 One cannot overlook the dire exclusion implied here. Any feminist (philosophical) thought other than the Anglo-American or the French are stripped of their right to existence. This is a common attitude among Anglo-American feminists, too. The insistence on a collaboration between the two traditions is often to the effacement of all ‘other feminisms’ in the world. Even at the rare instances when there are calls for contribution from different people and different geographies, as in Ann R. Jones’s urge for “feminist investigations of textual politics” to “take place in more languages than one – or even two” (1985a:108), the word “even” implies the improbability, or at best, the novelty of the situation.
assimilative tendencies are similarly distributed to the three decades. There seems to be no mass response towards French feminism which might have evolved over time. Rather, different stances seem to have been promoted by different people in parallel. Therefore, the Anglo-American attitudes towards French feminism waver between the ‘defensive’, ‘transdiscursive’ and ‘imperialist’ positions, displaying tropes of alterity, solidarity and universality. Nevertheless, espousing a common cause and extracting somewhat far-fetched resemblances between the two feminist traditions in order to fight for this cause, served to erase the specificity of the imported material. The dominant motive behind the ‘quest’ of Anglo-American feminist critics remained as “expand[ing] the Self” (cf. Cronin 2000:132). It was for this reason that Bina Freiwald warned about:

[...]

In the following chapters we will see how the translations of Hélène Cixous’s work into English were carried out and received according to such an “implicit theory/ideology of translation”, and were also determined by – as well as strengthened and reshaped – the tropes of alterity, solidarity and universality.

3.2. Attitudes towards structuralism and semiotics in the Turkish literary critical system

The attitudes in Turkey towards structuralism and semiotics can be defined around tropes of alterity, ‘lack’ and ‘lag’.

3.2.1. Alterity

Oppositional difference can also be observed in the Turkish reception of structuralism and semiotics. In this case, an action-oriented and theoretical Marxist and socialist critical tradition sought to define itself in relation – and in opposition – to a text- and language-oriented structuralism, especially in the years immediately before the 1980
coup d'état. The special issue of the left-oriented journal *Birikim* (1977), in which structuralism is interrogated, assessed and finally rejected from a Marxist point of view, is a case in point (see 2.1.1. and 6.2.2.2.). In such instances, the imported body of thought serves, at least for a period, to strengthen the dominant assumptions and basic tenets of a locally established ('transferred') theory. But more about this antagonism in Chapter 6.

This self-definition and self-construction in the face of foreign discursive elements is in accordance with Robyns' description of a ‘defensive’ stance. Furthermore, in cases where such a stance is adopted, “a sense of threat to one’s own identity, of alienation” is expressed and “the threatening intrusion of the alien discourse is often characterized as an ‘invasion’” (Robyns 1994:66, 67). As can be gathered from the critical responses discussed in 2.1.3., structuralism and semiotics were seen as a threat against the socialist world-view and, therefore, against the Marxist and socialist-realist criticism. And Turkish critics repeatedly pointed out that structuralism, “a Western product”, had almost “invaded the country” without being confronted with enough local criticism (Birkiye 1983:9). In the critics’ view (e.g. Bezirci 1981a:100-101; Birkiye 1983:9), the introductory pieces on structuralism and semiotics were either praising these schools of thought with enthusiasm or merely reporting whatever was being done in the West. The lack of applications mentioned in 2.1.2. similarly suggests a certain difficulty encountered in the absorption of this foreign body of thought into local critical production. Without being properly examined, questioned or digested, structuralism had “struck root as soon as it was transplanted” (Timuçin 1983:24), causing a certain amount of alienation within Turkish literary circles.

According to some Turkish critics, the situation was not something peculiar to the importation of structuralism and semiotics only. In any case, “all under-developed doctrines first wander around posing as serious gentlemen with their methods in hand, and then buy the first ticket off to under-developed countries” (Timuçin 1983:24)63. “To our share falls whatever has been prepared in France – neither less nor more” says Hilmi Yavuz (1983:23). Taklitçilik (imitation, copying), implicitly of the West, was “gnawing away at [the Turkish] intellect” (Tozlu 1991:34). The foreign origins and the ‘importedness’ of structuralism were thus pointed out and criticised, although, as we

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63 For a similarly provocative view of migrating theories see Pym 1995. Here, Pym places the adoption of deconstruction in non-European systems “as a postmodernist theory of translative reading, or even as a very modernist sign of development” on a par with “buying Europe’s old trains and airplanes” (18). For responses to his article see Arrojo 1996 and Koskinen 1996.
have seen in 2.1.2., the schools of thought with which structuralism seemed to be competing – such as Marxism or existentialism – were certainly not indigenous to the Turkish system either. Here let me quote extensively from a section titled “The Truth Tahsin Yücel is Trying to Hide” from Turhan Oktay’s article on structuralism, language and literature, since it is a poignant example of the animosity against structuralism and its foreignness:

Tahsin Yücel vehemently opposes those who assert that “structuralism is an importation and a hazardous hoax for our society”. He claims that one of the strongest off-shoots of structuralism started to grow in Turkey years ago, “even before structuralism was well-known in the West”. [...] According to Yücel, one of the basic books on structuralism, Sémantique structurale, was born out of a series of lectures given at the University of Istanbul. But who gave these lectures? One of the most prominent theoreticians of structuralist semantics and semiotics, A.-J.Greimas, of Lithuanian origin. Between 1958-1962, this person gave lectures at the French Language and Literature Department of the University of Istanbul, and Yücel was his student. [...] Tahsin Yücel may try as much as he wishes to prove that structuralism is not an importation. The truth is evident: Structuralism has been imported, together with its live prospectus A.-J. Greimas. Yücel himself accepts that importation is an ‘offence’, but insists that structuralism has not been ‘imported’. Then there should be some Turkish scholars who produce structuralist thought. In the bibliography and index of Yücel’s Anlatı Yerlemleri (1979), there are seventy one names of writers, thinkers and scholars. Seventy of them are foreign names and only one belongs to a Turk. And that is Tahsin Yücel himself (Oktay 1981b:107-108).

The other tropes which characterise the responses in Turkey to the importation of structuralism and semiotics are in fact closely related to this criticised dependence on the West.

3.2.2. Lack and lag

As I have already pointed out, the attitudes of the individuals and institutions who respond in one way or another to imported discursive elements will sooner or later be challenged by the attitude towards importation prevalent within the system which they are a part of. At the time when structuralism and semiotics were being imported, Western literary criticism and theory were looked up to as models within the Turkish literary critical system, and as resources which would provide the components this

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64 Hence, the frequent references to Roger Garaudy, Henri Lefebvre, Jean-Paul Sartre, Günther Schiwy, Paul Ricoeur, [?] Avtonomova and of course, Karl Marx, in autochthonous Turkish texts criticising structuralism.
system believed it ‘lacked’. The notion of ‘lack’ evokes the ‘defective’ position described by Robyns:

[…] A discursive practice may acknowledge that it lacks the necessary components for renewing itself, for adapting to a changing social context. It will then take a ‘defective’ position, turning to ‘alien’ discourses and importing discursive elements from them […]. Since this immigration is seen as an enrichment of the target discourse, these discursive elements will generally be explicitly introduced as alien (1994:72).

At this point, let us turn our attention to the history of such a ‘defective’ position in Turkish literary (critical) system, and then I will elaborate further on Robyns’ description.

3.2.2.1. Turning to the West

The historians of Turkish literature generally claim that the ‘birth’ of ‘modern Turkish literature’ dates back to the second half of the nineteenth century, to the social, economic, legislative, administrative and educational reforms initiated with the declaration of Gülhane Hatt-i Hümayunu (1839). From this date onwards, and well into the 1850s, it was the Tanzimat (Reorganisation) era — a period marked by self-criticism and self-interrogation. The whole administrative system, the rules underlying social life, the modes of expression, in short, a great part of the Ottoman society was under scrutiny. In this atmosphere full of zeal,

‘Western culture’ was associated with concepts such as developments in technology, rationalism, positivism, secularism and modernism by the Turkish elite […], who naturally linked them to the Enlightenment. These concepts emerged as a positive image of the other as opposed to a slightly negative image of Eastern culture, which was then associated with ideas of backwardness, superstition and fundamentalism (Kuran-Burçoğlu 2000:146).

Since the beginning of Tanzimat, the West was considered as the only legitimate source of knowledge:

The reforms, which should be seen as the culmination of a series of often frustrated attempts at military, administrative and educational modernization inspired by European scientific and technological progress since the late eighteenth century, stood as an irrevocable, though controversial, statement of formal and conscious Westernization (Paker 1986:68).

The comparisons made between the prosperity of Western civilisations and the decline of the Ottoman Empire, the criticism of the historical events that had led to this decline, and the interrogation of deep-rooted values, including those of religion, all contributed
to the questions raised about literature, its functions and its desirable impacts. The abandonment of centuries-old traditions – in some cases, a complete rejection of ancient forms and ways of thinking – the quest for innovation in order to recover from an obvious deterioration, and the reliance on Western thought as the creator of a civilisation which provided ready samples for the aspiring East, all caused a bitter split in the society during, and after, the Tanzimat. The far-reaching effects of this duality between 'old' and 'new', 'à la turca' and 'à la franca', troubled the whole society, as well as the intellectuals, for many decades\(^{65}\).

Literary criticism, too, had its share of the changes during this period. As Ahmet Hamdi Tanpinar puts it: "Tanzimat itself was a movement born out of self-criticism", therefore, the new literature emerging in this period would inevitably give more importance to criticism (1967:276). In the evaluation and appreciation of literary works traditional critical concepts were put aside and 'criticism in its Western sense' became the objective. Consequently, there was a massive translation activity from Western literary sources, especially from French. Even the terms denoting 'criticism' changed.

3.2.2.2. Tenkid, critique, eleştiri

The Turkish terms for 'criticism' reflect a certain 'transition' from tenkid to kritik and to eleştiri. Tenkid, the Ottoman-Turkish term with an Arabic etymology, refers mainly to the Ottoman literary critical tradition, which was mostly abandoned in accordance with the general climate of the Tanzimat and the early republican (Cumhuriyet, 1923 to the 1940s) periods. Kritik, the transliteration of the French critique, corresponds to Western forms of criticism and was often presented as a goal to be achieved. This transliteration is not wide-spread today, since it was later translated into Turkish as eleştiri, a neologism signifying the 'modern' criticism mainly from the early republican period onwards. Tenkid, on the other hand, was "widely used until eleştiri replaced it as a counterpart for a certain Western concept" (Özön 1963:548) [Emphasis mine].

In contemporary Turkish dictionaries, and in the writings of some critics (e.g. Gözüm 1991:23), a certain degree of inter-changeability among these three terms is implied, although each of them refers to a different critical tradition. Despite this seeming inter-changeability, the need felt for discarding the Ottoman term tenkid in the first place and the consequent appearance of first kritik, and then eleştiri, suggest a

\(^{65}\) As can be seen from the expression 'à la franca', the influence of French literature and criticism, as well as French culture in general, was extremely powerful after the Tanzimat.
different storyline. In comparison with Western forms of criticism, the critical and theoretical thinking found in the Divan literature, i.e. the canonised literature of the Ottoman Empire, was seen by the following generations as deficient, irrelevant, unimportant and out-of-date. After the Tanzimat, a perennial complaint started within Turkish literary circles about the ‘non-existence’ of critical and theoretical thinking on literature in Turkish and persisted as late as the 1980s (see e.g. Ataç 1957:206; Dizdaroğlu 1961:783; Yavuz 1988:29; Özkırmlı 1985:78). For instance, talking about an article published in 1950, in which the author complains about the “lack of tenkid” in Turkey, Mehmet Çınarlı comments in 1978: “Not much has changed since then. We have only got used to saying eleştiri instead of tenkid, that’s all. We still feel the same need” (reprinted in Çınarlı 1991:26). Or, the 1985 discussion published in the journal Hürriyet Gösteri starts with the following questions: "What is criticism? What should it be like? What are the critical practices observed in Turkish literature? What is the situation of Turkish criticism today?" ("Eleştiri Tartışması" 1985:62). When the ‘absence’ of criticism in the Turkish literary system was harped on, the real issue was “the theoretical level” and the “scientific maturity” of the existing criticism (Cömert 1981:287-290), which was compared to Western criticism as the ideal example. As late as the early 1990s, those who write for the special journal issues on literary criticism start by explaining the origins of the word critique in French, since they apparently consider this term as the basis for discussion (e.g. Ayvazoğlu 1991:32; Çalışlar 1985:74; Erdoğan 1991:38; Köker 1991:36). Only afterwards some of them go on to discuss the origins of eleştiri. As for the term tenkid, it is hardly ever referred to in these texts.

The reason for this ‘silence’ is the ‘rewriting’ of Turkish literary history. Tanınar, for one, claimed that, during the eight centuries of Divan literature, there had been no attempt to study contemporary works and to comment on literary poetics (1967:xx). Eventually, the beginnings of literary criticism in Turkish came to be given as the Tanzimat period itself. Some of the literary historians affirmed that in Turkish literature “essay and literary criticism emerged under the influence of the West”, since “the relationships with the West demonstrated the insufficiency of the genres prevalent up until the Tanzimat” (Binyazar 1973:132). Sometimes, the date of birth for Turkish criticism is postponed even further – to the early republican period:

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66 For more about the need felt for changing existing Ottoman terms into Turkish neologisms see 5.2.1.
One can say that genuine literary criticism in Turkish culture started with the republic; because, it was only during this period that the Turkish people ceased being members of a religious community (ümmet) and became individuals. Just like the other new genres - such as the novel, short story or essay - criticism, as an art of aesthetic investigation and questioning, could only emerge within a social structure that would give birth to and raise the individual (Bek 1996:92)

Other critics, however, suggested that criticism had already existed in different forms in Ottoman literature, but was reshaped and established as a genre of its own under the Western influence after Tanzimat (Ercilasun 1981: 35). Another way of putting this was to say that “criticism in its modern sense” started with Tanzimat (Ertop, in “Eleştiri Tartışması” 1985:63). Still others acknowledged the presence of literary criticism in Divan literature, but pointed out that its boundaries were limited to a criticism of language and terminology (Özön 1941:346).

Indeed, there were some genres of critical and historical writing in Divan literature. They all concentrated on verse as the dominant form. Belágat, the art of rhetoric, was used to find faults in poems and to set the rules these poems should adhere to (Konur Ertop in “Eleştiri Tartışması” 1985:63). There were hal tercümesi, historical works made up of bibliographical information on several poets at a time (Özön 1941:346). The idea of criticism was also inherent in nazines, the rewrites of earlier or contemporary poets’ works, emulating them, using their forms or subject matter, or simply referring to them within the new poems (“Eleştiri Tartışması” 1985:63; Ortaylı 1985:67). And, of course, there were the tezkires. The literary historian Harun Tolasa, who carried out detailed research on tezkires, describes them as the most significant research and criticism activity in Divan literature and one which “most aptly represents” the literary criticism of its time (1983:vii,viii). He comments:

Literary studies and criticism – which deal primarily with the artist, the work of art, and the relationship of these two to their environment – are as old as the literary event itself. In every place and time this literary event existed, an activity which deals with it can be found, albeit in various forms and with diverse objectives. The part of our literature which emerged within the framework of Islamic civilisation [...] is not exempt from this general trend. Naturally it was the subject of, and a platform for, research and criticism activities which had their own forms, approaches and goals (1983:vii).

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67 Here it is worth noting that in many domains the early republican period has been presented as the starting date. This was a consequence of the political climate of the day. In the field of literature, as well as literary criticism, one needs to take into account the transitional period in the Ottoman-Turkish tradition as a result of the alphabet and language reforms, to which I will come back to in 5.2.1., and of the social and political reforms.
Originally *tezkire* meant 'to remember, to evoke'. These works were written to protect the contemporary poets from oblivion (Tolasa 1983:vii). *Tezkires* cover biobibliographical information on at least a hundred poets at a time (*ibid.*). Tolasa notes that they not only gave information, but also provided interpretation and evaluation of individual poets’ works. Furthermore, *tezkires* are texts which "bring to us the entire literary world, the approaches and the value systems of their time, clearly revealing the actual content, extent and procedures of the literary studies and criticism found in that period" (viii-ix). Yet "while doing this, *tezkire* writers also took great pains to make sure that their style would be artistic and harmonious. Therefore, a *tezkire* also carries literary characteristics" (vii). Tolasa observes:

The art and harmony found in the style of *tezkires*, certain omissions and mistakes in the information given about the poets, some clichés and exaggerations in the evaluations have all been picked up time and again by writers and researchers since the *Tanzimat* (especially during the early republican) periods. Thus, *tezkires* were despised and their value was ignored (1983:viii).

Several Turkish critics who wrote during and after the early republican period noted that *tezkire* writers were more interested in individual poets, their vices and virtues, than any general aesthetics of literature (e.g. Özőn 1941:346; Tanpnar 1967:275). They argued that *tezkires* only listed the poets and passed 'subjective' opinions on their merits. The poets could occasionally be ranked not according to their literary talent or output, but to their respective importance in the official and social life of the Ottoman palace. This was seen as a further proof of 'subjectivity'. The links with the debates about objective criticism discussed in 2.1.4. are apparent. In fact, it was Asım Bezirci, the critic who most fervently wrote in favour of 'objective' criticism, who asserted that "it is impossible to consider *tezkires* as criticism in its modern and Western sense" ("Eleştiri Tartışması" 1985:63) [Emphasis mine]. Similarly, referring to Tolasa's work on *tezkires*, Konur Ertop argues:

This work shows us that the roots of criticism – which, we thought, did not exist in our history – in fact reach back to the *Divan* literature. However, the critical writings of that period were not works which could fulfil certain functions, like developing a new concept of literature, helping the reader in the analyses of texts, or eliminating an out-dated approach and introducing a novel one – all those functions which we can expect from modern literary criticism today. In this sense, we do not find it improper to say that [Turkish] literary criticism started with the *Tanzimat* ("Eleştiri Tartışması" 1985:63).
Since Western forms of criticism are used as the yardstick, it is understandable that there were claims as to the 'non-existence' or 'lack' of any prior work in literature which could be considered as literary criticism. When one looks at the reasons given for this 'lack', one can have a better grasp of the comparisons involved with the West. For instance, one reason was the alleged non-existence of self-criticism in Turkish culture, which, in turn, is caused by the absence of confession as institution in Islam and the lack of the concept of 'original sin' as opposed to Christianity (Gözüm 1991:23; Doğan 1991:29; Kılıçbay 1991:33). Another reason was the static nature of the social life, devoid of the class struggles seen in the West (Tanpinar 1967:xli). The 'lack' of a sense of history similar to that of the Western world allegedly prevented the Ottoman thinkers from developing an idea of historicity, which was essential for criticism (Tanpinar 1967:xli). The static nature of religious thought denied access to any kind of theology or philosophy that would question, assert or refute the religious system itself, and therefore, prevented criticism from being a basic support for artistic production, as well as an inquiry into other aspects of life (ibid.). The relationships between democracy and criticism are also often referred to, with the implication that since Turkey did not have a stable history in democracy in the last couple of decades – as opposed to certain Western countries – it had not been easy to establish there a tradition of open discussion and criticism (Gözüm 1991:23; Erdoğan 1991:41). Criticism required individuals to be open and assertive, and this was associated with democracy and civil society (Köker 1991:37). Bezirci, too, noted that “our political institutions, legislative bodies, our customs and traditions [we]re intolerant to criticism” (“Eleştiri Tartışması” 1985:66). Turkish society could not yet take criticism in as a “democratic way of living” (İnam 1991:27).

3.2.2.3. ‘Self-colonisation’

The situation described above is not peculiar to Turkey, of course. It is part of a pattern found in many systems. Lydia H. Liu observes for China:

Not unlike their counterparts in modern Greece, India, Africa, and the Arab nations, Chinese intellectuals struggled to survive in an age of nation building and culture building in which they had little choice but to confront the powerful reality of the West and to come to terms with it, whether the so-called West impinges on their consciousness as a colonizer, semi-colonizer, humanist, evangelist, or cultural imperialist (1995:184).

It is at this point of confrontation that certain indigenous concepts were discarded and replaced by Western ones, which increasingly began to redefine indigenous literary traditions (see e.g. Liu 1995:214-238). Liu describes how the Chinese concept of literature, wenxue, was transformed under the urge of the Western concept of literature,
and how texts which were not fiction, poetry, drama or "familiar prose" were gradually excluded from anthologies and considered to be non-wenxue. Liu adds that "nowadays not even classical works can escape contamination by this translingual notion of literature" (1995:35). But what exactly is at stake in this type of 'equivalence'?

At a certain point, the crossing of language boundaries [between East and West] stops being a linguistic issue, for words are easily translated into analytical (often universal) categories in the hands of scholars who need conceptual models for cross-cultural studies. [...] The subtle or not so subtle bias that informs certain comparative questions – Why is there no epic in Chinese? Is there a civil society in China? etc. – often says more about the inquirer than the object of inquiry. As [Eugene] Eoyang puts it well, "The obverse questions are rarely, if ever, asked. Why are there no dynastic histories in the West? Why has the West produced no counterpart to Shijing? Are there equivalents to the lüshi and zajü forms in the West?". If these challenges to lacunae in the West strike one as slightly absurd, then we must consider the possibility that the original questions might be equally pointless (Liu 1995:7, citing Eoyang 1993:238).

According to Liu, "these acts of equating ideas from the Chinese classics and concepts imported from the West are significant in that they introduced a level of mediated reality or change that came into existence only after the act of equating had been initiated" (1995: 40). As we have seen above, after the surface equation of tenkid, kritik and eleştiri, the level of change encountered in Turkish literary criticism is considerable. The result was the rejection of tenkid, first in the name of kritik, and then, of its counterpart, eleştiri. This is how the idea of 'lack' of criticism in Turkey came about. As Gayatri Spivak notes, "scholars of the non-Western world often come up against the problem that words (signs) and therefore concepts that do not have a field of play there are applied to signify absences" (1999:89). The decision about the existence of an 'absence', 'lack' or 'deficiency' in a given system is arrived at by the system itself only after comparison with available foreign sources; and, more often than not, translations and other importations follow. "Cultures resort to translating precisely as a major way of filling in gaps", says Gideon Toury, and notes that such gaps manifest themselves very often "from a comparative perspective, i.e., in view of a corresponding non-gap in another culture that the prospective target culture has reasons to look up to and try to

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68 Of course, in cases of colonial encounters, as in a situation where a dominant power is governmentally and politically colonising a peripheral culture, it is the source system which insists on introducing cultural, technological, legal, etc. imports to the receiving system. Here the source system decides that the colonised culture is 'backwards' and/or 'deficient'. Yet in these instances too, the notion of 'lack' arises from a comparative perspective, and is often quickly internalised and perpetuated by the members of the receiving system.
exploit" (1995:27). The issue is "not the mere existence of something in another culture/language, but rather the observation that something is 'missing' in the target culture which should have been there and which, luckily, already exists elsewhere" (ibid.). Vanamala Viswanatha and Sherry Simon similarly talk about "imported need" in the context of the introduction of tragedy into Kannada (1999:169). I contend that this need is determined according to a teleological pattern of progress in which certain cultures are perceived by others — at the same time as they perceive themselves — 'backward', since they allegedly 'lack' the necessary technology, legislation, education, literature, criticism, etc. to catch up with 'more advanced' ones.

According to Liu, the experience of those nations which were not directly colonised, but which had to turn to, and became dependent on, "Western superpowers" at some point during their recent history, makes us aware of the possible differences between 'colonisation' and 'self-colonisation' (1995:236). For understanding the notion of 'self-colonisation', or 'autocolonisation', Tejaswini Niranjana finds Antonio Gramsci's concept of 'hegemony' useful:

Gramsci makes a distinction between the state apparatus and 'civil society': the first includes the entire coercive mechanism of the state, including army, police, and legislature, while the second includes the school, the family, the church, and the media. The dominant group exercises domination through the state apparatus, with the use of force or coercion, and ensures its hegemony through the production of ideology in civil society, where it secures its power through consent (1992:32-33).

The term 'hegemony' has sometimes been used as a synonym for domination, however, it also implies some notion of consent (McLellan 1995:345):

Gramsci argues that a politically dominant class maintains its position not simply by force, or the threat of force, but also by consent. That is achieved by making compromises with various other social and political forces which are welded together and consent to a certain social order under the intellectual and moral leadership of the dominant class. This hegemony is produced and reproduced through a network of institutions, social relations, and ideas which are outside the directly political sphere (ibid.).

Although Gramsci suggested these notions mainly for internal politics, they apply equally well to international relations. His distinction between domination and

A side remark here: If the opposite of a gap is only a ‘non-gap’, can there be any tropes of ‘possession’ in contrast with the tropes of ‘lack’? Or, as opposed to the tropes of ‘lag’, can we detect any tropes of ‘growth’? Answering these questions, I believe, require further case studies to be carried out on the subject.
hegemony, with its emphasis on consent\textsuperscript{70}, helps us better understand the notion of ‘self-colonisation’ – a notion which can shed light on the Turkish case. In their pursuit of genuine knowledge and their discontent with the situation Turkish literature and criticism were in, the critics turned to Western models with their own consent. They wished to use the Western forms of criticism as heuristic devices to produce a ‘better/different’ literature and to encourage the establishment of a thoroughly and objectively critical environment. In short, they were ‘travelling’ to enhance Turkish literature, to “move outside the enclosure of self”, and to “generate something other than the familiar from which the self emerges strengthened” (Cronin 2000: 35,100). Like travellers, systems perpetually seek novelty. The crucial point here is the direction which the traveller habitually turns to. When it is almost always the same, the receiving system comes under the hegemony of the source system(s).

Translation, then, emerges as a significant means of ‘self-colonisation’. The discourses found in ‘weaker’ systems are often moulded upon models provided by translated knowledge from ‘stronger’ systems. This is because “in their political-economic relations with Third World countries, Western nations have the greater ability to manipulate the latter”, and because “Western languages produce and deploy desired knowledge more readily than Third World languages do” (Asad 1986:158). In such situations, “at the same time that the subaltern culture desires the knowledge which supposedly belongs to the dominant, the latter never doubts the legitimacy of its status as the owner and guardian of such knowledge” (Arrojo 1999:143). Hence the near impossibility of a dialogue between source and receiving systems in such situations, as in the French-Turkish case. Talking about sub-types of cultural imperialism, such as scientific, media, educational and linguistic imperialism, Robert Phillipson observes:

Activities in each area contribute to the incorporation of the Periphery into the ‘modern’ world system. They all involve ‘modelling’, presenting a norm and an example for the Periphery to follow, the transfer of institutions, ideals of training and education, and occupational ideologies. In each area, the relationship between Centre and Periphery is asymmetrical, that is, it lacks reciprocity (1993:65)\textsuperscript{71}.

\textsuperscript{70} I would like to thank Alexandra Lianeri for reminding me that Gramsci’s emphasis on ‘consent’ and on the agency of the dominated classes may have much to do with the fact that when he was writing his ‘notebooks’, he was actually in prison. See also Anderson 1976.

\textsuperscript{71} Phillipson explains the term ‘modelling’ as follows: “In the process referred to as cultural synchronization [by C. Hamelink], the Centre cultural products serve as models for the Periphery, and many aspects of local cultural creativity and social inventiveness, evolved over centuries, are thrown into confusion or destroyed. The sequence of events is for the new mode to be adopted in its alien form initially and to be gradually transformed. […] Modelling is the term used for following a foreign recipe and transforming it into a local production” (1993:61-62).
As a result of this one-way export/import relationship, translation remained a key issue in the development of critical and theoretical thinking in Turkish. So much so that the existing translation endeavours were often thought to be 'not enough':

We talk about the influence of European literature on the Tanzimat period. Before starting a discussion on the definition of this magical concept 'influence', one should first take a look at the number of translations made into Turkish at that time; it is ridiculously insufficient. [...] Works on modern literary criticism and theory still add up to a long list awaiting translation. (When this is taken into account, how can one explain the phenomenon that original (!) works on literary theory in Turkish are now being produced?) (Ortaylı 1985:68) [Exclamation mark in the original].

The 'original' production of literary theory in Turkish, then, could only follow the near complete importation of Western literary theory – possibly after a collective and exhaustive translation project. Theory was seen almost as a thing that would always be supplied by the 'centre' and consumed by the 'periphery' (cf. Galtung 1980:130). Yet theorising, if not 'theory', can be found in many different forms. One can theorise without the "Western forms of abstract logic", avoiding "decisive statements" and not even attempting to produce a monolithic and "wholesale" theory (Christian 1996:149, 150). Theory is understanding and explanation, not only "something there and established" (Gillham 2000:12). In this sense, theorising on literature was not something 'new' to the Turkish system, which possessed a rich literature and not without accompanying commentaries and other metatexts. Nevertheless, until the late 1980s, the wish for Turkish criticism to catch up with 'worldwide' and 'modern' literary criticism and theory persisted. The only obstacle to this goal was seen as the 'lack' of translations of basic Western works (e.g. Batur 1976:46; Ortaylı 1985:68)\(^2\). In his preface to the first Barthes reader in Turkish, \textit{Yazı Nedir?}, Enis Batur laments:

\begin{quote}
The Turkish readers face the empty space on their bookshelves which should have been filled by the work of all those writers whose names they keep hearing about, but whose writings they still don't have access to: Alain Robbe-Grillet, Sören Kierkegaard, Husserl, Heidegger, Cummings, Fourier, Blanchot, Döblin, Von Doderer and Habermas, to name but a few (1987:7).
\end{quote}

The desire for enhancement and renewal, the acknowledgement of a 'lack', the recourse to "alien' discourses", and the importance given to translation all fit Clem Robyns's

\(^{1}\) Initially and to be gradually transformed. [...] Modelling is the term used for following a foreign recipe and transforming it into a local production" (1993:61-62).

\(^{2}\) Curiously, as mentioned earlier in 2.1.2., I did not find any comments or complaints about shortage of translations on structuralism or semiotics. In 4.2.2.2., however, we will see that many of the Barthes translations, for instance, were considerably 'delayed'.
description of a ‘defective’ stand. Still, it is not obvious why a discursive practice should be labelled as ‘defective’, i.e. faulty, imperfect and flawed, for deciding to turn to ‘alien’ discourses in order to renew itself. Robyns says that he prefers this term to ‘weak’ or ‘dependent’, which Itamar Even-Zohar uses and which, I believe, carry similar negative connotations. It is the problematic notion of ‘lack’ which brings on the pejorative implications and the negative judgement. Who decides that a ‘lack’ exists? As discussed above, through the encounter with other systems, the individuals and institutions in the receiving system may come to the conclusion that there is a certain ‘lack’ or ‘gap’ in their system which needs to be remedied through importation. Theo Hermans takes note of this issue when he criticises Even-Zohar’s oft-repeated statement that a system translates more and that these translations will be ‘primary’, i.e. innovative, when the system is ‘young’, ‘weak’, ‘peripheral’, containing ‘a vacuum’ and/or in a state of ‘crisis or turning point’ (Even-Zohar 1990:47)\(^3\). Hermans observes that this statement lacks “clarity regarding the vantage point from which the comments are being made” (1999:109), since the definition of what can be considered ‘young’, ‘weak’ or a ‘vacuum’ is problematic. He notes that “Even-Zohar’s statements about typical situations when translations are likely to fulfil a primary role make more sense if we take them as referring to perceptions from within a system” (ibid.). Tropes of ‘lack’ relate to the needs and requirements to be catered for and gaps to be filled in as perceived by the receiving system. Therefore, terms such as ‘young’, ‘weak’ or ‘defective’ cannot be taken at face value\(^4\). If used without reservations, this sort of terminology carries a risk of shifting from being ways of expressing self-perception to passing as ‘objective’ value judgements on the part of external observers, including translation scholars. These value judgements might be better demonstrated if we turn the cards around, so to speak, and call the same systems as ‘open-minded’, ‘tolerant’ or ‘flexible’. Then, we would have tropes of ‘tolerance’ or ‘openness’. This alternative terminology may sound far-fetched, but it nevertheless demonstrates the extent in which value judgements may be found in translation studies terminology, either negatively – as in the tropes of ‘lack’ – or positively – as in the tropes of ‘tolerance’.

\(^3\) For a discussion on Even-Zohar’s categories and the Tanzimat see Paker 1986:78-79.

\(^4\) The notion of a ‘young’ system complies with the “teleological pattern of ‘progress’” mentioned above: the idea that other literatures, cultures, nations, etc. are “less or more ‘advanced’” or “‘sophisticated’” than one’s own (Gupta 1998:171). As Talal Asad observes, the “modern world culture” is, as a rule, “equated with ‘Western intellectual production’ and presented as the proper historical destiny of countries that are not yet fully part of it” (1995:329) [Emphasis mine].
3.2.3. Consequences

The Turkish response to structuralism and semiotics can thus be explained through the notion of ‘threat’ posed by the invading alien – demonstrated in the opposition of Marxist and socialist-realist critics – and the notion of ‘lack’, which arises from self-perception and ‘self-colonisation’. The agency of those who welcomed these theories as contributions to the enhancement of indigenous criticism seems to have clashed with the agency of those who rejected them in the name of a different and more ‘political’ theory. The end result is the falsification of Robyns’s claim that in a ‘defective’ stance, “since the target discourse’s repertoire is seen as insufficient, the imported elements will not be transformed in accordance with target discourse conventions” (1994:72). A one-way import/export relationship does not imply a passive reception of whatever comes through the linguistic borders. Imported discursive elements are transformed even in what may be called ‘defective’, ‘deficient’ or ‘weak’ systems.

At this point, Lawrence Venuti’s claim that “all translations inevitably perform a work of domestication” (1998:5) may also prove to be helpful. If we take this axiom to be true, then a ‘defective’ attitude in the periphery may involve not always a conscious resistance as advocated by those who support ‘anti-colonialism’ or ‘decolonisation’, but a manipulation of the imported discursive elements for local purposes. In Chapter 2, we have already seen how structuralism and semiotics were incorporated into the national literary debates, and how the particularities of the Turkish critical tradition caused these schools of thought to be perceived in a specific way. The criticism levelled at them arose from the general definitions given and goals set for literary criticism in Turkey, the prominence of the evaluative aspect of criticism, the debates on ‘objective/scientific’ vs. ‘subjective/impressionistic’ criticism, and the dominance of Marxist and socialist-realist critical tradition. These factors were not necessarily part of a deliberate effort to withstand the Western intellectual pressure on Turkish literary (critical) system. Such appropriations and distortions cannot be explained only as a struggle against dominant powers, as is often the case in postcolonial approaches to translation.

75 Therefore, in the ‘imperialism theory’ he elaborates, Robert Phillipson for instance tries “to avoid reductionism by recognizing that what happens in the Periphery is not irrevocably determined by the Centre. The efforts of the Centre do not mesh in precisely with what the Periphery’s needs are understood to be. Nor are the Periphery representatives passive spectators. They have a variety of motives, at the state and the personal level, as do the Centre inter-state actors” (1993:63).

76 José Lambert likewise argues: “If the receiving society treats translations according to its own norms rather than those of the so-called foreign text, then it means that the cultural phenomenon of importation – which translation necessarily is [...] – is counterbalanced to some degree, by the target society which hence proves to remain more or less autonomous” (1995:103).
Lydia Liu similarly claims that "the possibility that a non-European host language may violate, displace, and usurp the authority of the guest language in the process of translation as well as be transformed by it or be in complicity with it" is often ignored by postcolonial theorists (1995:27). Liu argues that

a non-European language does not automatically constitute a site of resistance to European languages. Rather, I see it as a much neglected area where complex processes of domination, resistance, and appropriation can be observed and interpreted from within the discursive context of that language as well as in connection with other linguistic environments (1995:25).

In addition to the tropes of alterity, 'lack' and 'lag', I have found in the Turkish case what I would call tropes of mimesis. Here, unlike the Anglo-American reception of French feminism, there is no explicit juxtaposition of us vs. them. The context and the position of the parties involved are less clear-cut. In fact, much of the discussion on structuralism and semiotics, and about the forms and functions of criticism for that matter, takes place with no explicit reference to the Turkish culture. The 'us' is not foregrounded, it remains implicit. The Turkish literary critical system is trying to be like, to resemble, and to imitate the West. Talal Asad observes that in the relationship between the periphery and the centre

there are varieties of knowledge to be learnt, but also a host of models to be imitated and reproduced. In some cases knowledge of these models is a precondition for the production of more knowledge; in other cases it is an end in itself, a mimetic gesture of power, an expression of desire for transformation (1986:158).

Related to the tropes of mimesis, then, are the tropes of change, which express this desire for transformation. During the Tanzimat, and especially the early republican period, when the whole economic, political and social systems were undergoing radical changes, these tropes motivated the efforts to bring about similar radical changes in the literary (critical) system in order to make it 'better' and resemble 'the Western' one.

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77 In this context, Liu refers to the work of Gayatri Spivak and the Subaltern Studies group and appreciates their theoretical model which eschews "the idea of 'transition' [...] whether from East to West, from tradition to modernity, or from feudalism to capitalism" and turns, "instead, to the notion of 'confrontation', which provides a new perspective for understanding the kinds of changes that have occurred since the encounter of East and West" (1995:30-31).

78 I would like to thank Theo Hermans for this observation.

79 Incidentally, the writings of socialist-realist critics who took up issue with structuralism also reflect a tendency to merge their own ideas with those of the world socialists and to melt their identities into a collective 'we'.
In the rest of the thesis we will see how these tropes of alterity, ‘lack’, ‘lag’, change and mimesis had an impact on the production and reception of Barthes’s translations in Turkish, and how, in their turn, were fostered or challenged by these translations.

3.3. Conclusions

Since this chapter was mainly about what was dissimilar about the two contexts in hand, let me summarise here the main difference I have found. While one of the main tropes related to translation, namely that of alterity, can be observed in the importation of both schools of thought, other tropes, such as those of ‘lack’ and ‘lag’, and of universality and solidarity are specific to each context due to the particular position the receiving system occupies vis-à-vis the source system. Theo Hermans observes that “the standard metaphors of translation incessantly [cast] translation, on the one hand, as bridge building, ferrying or carrying across, transmission, transfer, ‘trans-latio’, ‘meta-phor’, and, on the other, as resemblance, likeness, mimesis” (1998:63). Although I do not wish to perpetuate these clichés, I still find them helpful in describing the two contexts studied – even if these metaphors mainly relate to the relationships between the source texts and their translations rather than the importation process in general. The Anglo-American feminists aimed at, yet failed to achieve ‘trans-latio’. They tried to carry the French feminists’ texts across a certain space – the Atlantic – and for this purpose, they hoped to build bridges over this space, and to promote collaboration and exchange between two quite different traditions expressed in two different languages. This hope is evident in their emphasis on ‘trans-’. Yet this was no level playing field between ‘equal’ partners. In the end, Anglo-American feminists used French feminism mainly as a foil to define and reinforce their own versions of feminism.

In the Turkish response to structuralism and semiotics, translation was more a means of achieving “resemblance, likeness, mimesis”. Turkish critics drew on these theories – and on others of Western origin – as models to build a ‘modern’ criticism on. This entailed an absence of reciprocity in the Turkish case, as opposed to the ‘imaginary exchanges’ between Anglo-American and French feminisms:

The lesson of these transatlantic metamorphoses, those of the French feminists as well as those of Derrida, Foucault, Lacan and Barthes, is that translation involves a “generalized movement of transition” in which “neither destination nor source” remains untouched [Comay 1991:79]. This means that where ‘we’ are has changed through the contact with ‘them’; but undoubtedly ‘they’ have changed as well (Simon 1996:109).
In the relationship between structuralism-semiotics and Turkish literary criticism, it is
difficult to claim the existence of a comparable give-and-take which would have had an
impact on the former. Therefore, it is also difficult to find a ‘transdiscursive’ stand in
the reception of structuralism and semiotics in Turkey, even though the works of Tahsin
Yücel and Mehmet Rifat, for instance, were contributions to the global text production
on the subject. Yücel was one of the first scholars to make use of Greimas’s semiotics
outside of France (Moran 1994:169). Yet neither him nor Rifat figure in
autochthonous textbooks on literary theory, which are exclusively about Western
theoreticians. In Berna Moran’s introductory book on literary theories and criticism, for
example, critics like Yücel, Rifat and Berke Vardar are mentioned only in the footnotes,
and mostly in relation to the translations they did from the work of Western critics.
Their names also do not appear much in the criticism directed against structuralism and
semiotics. This selectivity is in accordance with the tendency mentioned above: theories
were to arrive from the centre, and no immediate reciprocity was expected.

In this chapter I have presented examples as to the extent and means by which
importation of literary and cultural theories produce, and are also influenced by,
different tropes. It is apparent that no single trope reigns in any one subsystem, let alone
in one ‘target’ culture. For instance, the tropes of alterity and solidarity could both be
found in the response of Anglo-American feminist critical subsystem to French
feminism. As tropes of universality reigned in the Anglo-American system in general,
these tropes were also reflected, so to speak, in this particular subsystem. While tropes
of ‘lack’ prevailed in Turkey, tropes of alterity characterised the response of Turkish
Marxist critics towards the importation of structuralism and semiotics. Individuals and
institutions accommodate positions which do not automatically coincide with the main
stands, and this leaves plenty of room for variation and nuance. Furthermore, different
corpora of theoretical texts translated into the same receiving languages, even into the
same subsystems, might yield different tropes. For instance, the importation of
psychoanalytic theory into Anglo-American feminism seems to have been confronted

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80 Both critics had very close ties with the structuralist and semiotic circles in France and with French
literature and culture in general (see 4.3.1.2.). In some instances Yücel actually wrote in French first, and
then translated his texts into Turkish. Therefore, one cannot argue that the audience their work addressed
was limited to Turkish-speaking readers.
81 His doctoral thesis L’Imaginaire de Bernanos (1965, Faculty of Letters, University of Istanbul),
published as Bernanos’un İmge Evreni in 1969, was chosen as an example for analysis in Greimas’s
Sémantique structurale (1966:222-256). I will come back to this text in 4.4.1.
82 In Chapter 4, we will see how this (lack of) reciprocity is reflected in the translation and translator
patterns of Barthes’s and Cixous’s works.
with even stronger resistance than the importation of French feminism. Similarly, in the importation and subsequent ‘transfer’ of Marxist literary and cultural theories into the Turkish literary (critical) system, we encounter tropes of solidarity.

Apart from being rather case-specific, tropes are also time-bound. In the Turkish literary (critical) system, tropes of ‘lack’ were common since the Tanzimat period, especially whenever there were complaints about the ‘non-existence’ of literary criticism. More or less after the 1950s, tropes of ‘lag’ gained prominence. The issue turned first into ‘catching up’, and then ‘keeping in pace’ with the advanced critical and theoretical production of the West through an increasing number of translations.
CHAPTER 4

IMAGE-FORMATION: 'TURKISH BARTHES' AND 'ANGLO-AMERICAN CIXOUS'

We need to learn more about the acculturation process between cultures, or rather, about the symbiotic working together of different kinds of rewritings within that process, about the ways in which translation, together with criticism, anthologisation, historiography, and the production of reference works, constructs the image of writers and/or their works, and then watches those images become reality. We also need to know more about the ways in which one image dislodges another, the ways in which different images of the same writers and their works coexist with each other and contradict each other (Lefevere and Bassnett 1998:10).

Due to the particular positions Roland Barthes was allocated within structuralism and semiotics in Turkey, and Hélène Cixous within French feminist theory in Anglo-America, the response given to their writings had a profound impact on the reception of these theories. In turn, the reception of their work was influenced by the general response given to structuralism and semiotics and to French feminism. From this chapter onwards, I concentrate on these two ‘representative’ figures as my case studies in exploring the role of translation in the migration of theories. In the present chapter, I study the rather long-lasting images created for Barthes and Cixous in the relevant receiving systems. I try to explain why Barthes came to be labelled as a ‘structuralist and semiotician’ exclusively and Cixous as a ‘feminist theoretician’. I contend that these rather monolithic images are in accordance with the attitudes towards importation discussed in Chapter 3, and that their creation is realised through the “symbiotic working together of different kinds of rewritings”, as Bassnett and Lefevere put it. Among these rewritings, I have already written in detail on the criticisms (Chapter 2). The points mentioned there need to be kept in mind as background information. From now on, the rewriting I will focus on will be one of the most common means of importation – namely, translation.

In examining the role translation played in image-formation, I will draw on the choice of texts to be translated at a certain time (questions of what and when) and on the translators who translated them (by whom). Partial, achronological, and delayed translations; extratextual material provided with the translations; autochthonous texts written about these writers; abundance of retranslations, or their non-existence; and, the identity, affiliation, interests and agendas of the translators have all contributed to the
creation of these particular images, as well as to their gradual transformation – from ‘a scientific critic’ to ‘an essayist’, and from ‘a feminist theoretician’ to a ‘writer’ involved in ‘the thinking about the feminine’ – and to the coexistence of these different images.

The translation and translator patterns discussed here should be regarded as cause and effect simultaneously. On the one hand, they played a formative role in creating and transforming the images of these two writers, and in strengthening or changing the attitudes towards importation. On the other hand, these patterns were influenced by the very images they helped to create and by the prevailing attitudes. Thus, in accordance with the indicative role of translation, they reveal these images and attitudes. Before proceeding with the analysis of these patterns, however, first let us briefly look at how Barthes and Cixous were initially presented to the relevant receiving systems. Towards the end of the chapter, I will come back to these images to further elaborate on them and to demonstrate how they have been altered by time – through rewritings.

4.1. Images

4.1.1. Barthes as a structuralist and semiotician – a ‘scientific’ critic

As mentioned earlier, Roland Barthes was one of the main figures representing the imported structuralism and semiotics in Turkey. Accordingly, his name is often cited in Turkish writings on the topic, mainly in those with an introductory character (e.g. Vardar 1973/1974:317-318; Yavuz 1983:23; Kutluer 1981:29; Yüksel 1981:18,58; Bayrav 1976:60-63; Yücel 1982; Rifat 1992). Nevertheless, in these texts Barthes is not mentioned alone. He usually appears together with others who contributed to structuralism and semiotics, such as Todorov, Greimas, Genette, Saussure, Hjemslev, etc. He is not singled out as a ‘symbol’ of these schools of thought. In Mehmet Rifat’s article “Göstergebilim Kuramları” (Theories of Semiotics, 1982) for instance, Barthes is included under the heading “Some Approaches to Semiotics after the 1960s”. This section comes after the first two – “The Pioneers of Modern Semiotics”, which introduces Peirce and Saussure, and “The First Semioticians after Pierce and Saussure”, which includes Morris, Hjemslev, and Buyssens. Consequently, Barthes is introduced here not as a ‘pioneer’, but as “another French writer who contributed to the development of research on semiotics” (123).

In the extratextual material provided with his translations (such as introductions, prefaces, back-cover information), and also in the introductory articles written about his
work, Barthes’s connections with structuralism and semiotics are often brought up. Still, they are not presented as binding or absolute. For example, in the introductory paragraphs to his translations of “La réponse de Kafka” and “Y a-t-il une écriture poétique?” (1967), Berke Vardar (see 4.3.1.1. Group 4) defines Barthes as one of the most notable contemporary French critics. In the introduction to the former text Vardar states that “Barthes is one of the first critics who elevated criticism from interpretation to creation” (47) and later adds that “another aspect of his work is that he uses the principles and methods of structural linguistics, which itself led to revolutionary innovations in human sciences”. In introducing the latter, Vardar praises Barthes for his mastery in style and comprehension, and for the innovations he brings to language and terminology (40). His use of “the methods of structural linguistics” is again mentioned only as another important aspect of his work. More examples of this approach will be given in 4.4.1.

In fact, the representativeness of the ‘Turkish Barthes’ for structuralism and semiotics is nowhere more emphasised than in the articles written against structuralism. In these texts Barthes is extensively quoted or referred to (e.g. İnce 1983:30-32; Atayman 1983:18-19; Onart 1973:250; Oktay 1981b:108-109; Bezirci 1981a:103-104; Şölçün 1983:25-26). Quite often, the antipathy felt against structuralism is expressed through criticising his ideas, occasionally together with those of Ferdinand de Saussure in linguistics and of Claude Lévi-Strauss in anthropology. Here, Barthes is introduced as a ‘pioneer’ of structuralism in literature. Let me give a few examples here, some of which will clearly demonstrate the ‘time-lag’ involved in the reception of Barthes, since the quotes are taken from texts written as late as the 1980s, i.e. after Barthes’s death.

Sargut Şölçün presents Barthes as “the one who has applied the structuralist method to literary studies” and “one of the well-known representatives of structuralism” (1983:25-26). In this article Barthes’s ideas are briefly analysed and refuted through Picard, Garaudy, Lefebvre, Ricoeur, Althusser and Goldmann. Adnan Onart portrays him as “one of the pioneers of French structuralism and of the most prominent structuralist critics” (1973:250). He talks about Barthes’s ideas on “criticism as metalanguage” and on the futility of attempts to look for right or wrong in literary texts – a claim profoundly against the grain within the Turkish critical tradition, as we have seen in 2.1.3.1. In a section titled “The Trap Suggested by Roland Barthes”, Turhan Oktay

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charges him with "fascism", since he is allegedly "denying the collective language – one of the cornerstones of being a nation – ignoring the presence of all previous literature, and defending an asocial literature which will be born thanks to the efforts of the structuralists" (1981b:108-109). In Oktay's article, Barthes's concept of 'zero degree' is attributed to structuralism as a whole. And in an article titled "Structuralism in Criticism" Asim Bezirci affirms:

[...]

To dwell upon only on the formal/structural characteristics of a work, to neglect its content and cultural characteristics, and to ignore its relations to other texts lead criticism to a one-dimensional and formalistic approach, which overshadows the dialectical wholeness of the narrative. For instance, Roland Barthes, one of the pioneers of structuralism, considers criticism as a "science of forms", and the task of criticism as "a totally formal endeavour". In his view, literature, too, is "only a language, a system of signs". It is a tool which does not have a "cause or objective". It owes its existence to its technical qualities. The particularity of a work of art is not in the meanings it contains, but in the forms given to these meanings. Farewell to the criticism which studies sources and thoughts! (1981a:104).

Barthes thus became the sole target for most of the negative criticisms against structuralism and semiotics in Turkey. Since he was inextricably tied to these theories in the eyes of many Turkish critics, it was extremely difficult for the socialist-realist critics to take an interest in his writings (see 6.2.2.). When this finally happened, though, Barthes was still seen as a representative of these schools of thought. Even at times when the transformation in his thought and work was acknowledged, it was still located within the field of semiotics: "One of the outstanding representatives of structuralism and semiotics" says Murat Belge (1982). "The first thing to note in his various books is not a systematic application of a specific method, but the sudden turns he takes within the considerably wide scope of semiotics".

Barthes was presented exclusively as a structuralist and semiotician firstly by his opponents, then, since the Marxist and socialist-realist tradition needed an 'other' which would justify and reinforce its own presence within the Turkish literary critical system. While the tropes of alterity required an 'other', the tropes of 'lack' demanded 'scientficity'. Those who had a distanced interest in his work – i.e. those who neither specialised in structuralism or semiotics, nor were their fervent opponents – associated Barthes with 'scientficity' and 'objectivity' in literary criticism. After all, these were the qualities required from 'criticism in its Western sense'. However, those who were most

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84 Here Bezirci quotes from Yücel's translation of "Qu'est-ce que la critique?" (1971) and Vardar's translation of "La réponse de Kafka" (1967). See the bibliography.
familiar with his work—such as Sema and Mehmet Rifat, Berke Vardar and Tahsin Yücel—portrayed a different picture of Barthes. I will come back to this second image towards the end of this chapter. Now let us turn our attention to the image of Hélène Cixous in Anglo-America.

4.1.2. Hélène Cixous as a ‘feminist theoretician’

As we have seen in 3.1.1., the internal differences and dynamics of the feminisms in France have often been overlooked by Anglo-American feminists. Consequently, their reception of French feminism has been “partial and selective. It has focused almost exclusively on one or two strands—the deconstructive and psychoanalytic—of a much larger, more variegated field” (Fraser 1992a:1). Apart from this homogenising tendency, there was also “a curious synecdochic reduction: [...] for many English-speaking readers today ‘French feminism’ simply is Irigaray, Kristeva and Cixous” (Fraser 1992a:1; see also Penrod 1993:42). The names of these three writers are “often recited together in ritual homage” (Simon 1996:86), both by those who oppose them (e.g. Moi 1985:97) and by those who show a more positive interest in their work (e.g. Stanton 1989:156). Within this trio one name came to be the ‘symbol’ of French feminism more than the others nonetheless, and that was Hélène Cixous. More than any other French feminist, she has been “the target of attacks, a kind of French Aunt Sally epitomizing all that is wrong with the twin vices of ‘essentialism’ and ‘biologism’” (Ward Jouve 1991:49. See also 6.1.2.). Articles with rather general titles, such as “Sex and Signs: The Language of French Feminist Criticism”, prove to be mainly on Cixous (e.g. Richman 1980:62). Indeed, several introductory articles in English on the feminist movement and feminist theory in France begin with a translated quote from Cixous, almost always taken from her influential article “Le Rire de la Méduse”. The quoted passages are often her most provocative statements. Their novelty and vexing nature for the Anglo-American feminists can be better appreciated when the background information given in Chapter 2 is taken into consideration. Just to give a few examples: “Let the priests tremble, we’re going to show them our sexts”85; “More body, hence more writing”86; women’s writing in “white ink”, referring to mother’s milk87;

85 From “Le Rire de la Méduse”, quoted, for instance, in Marks 1978:832 and Stanton 1980:78. Some twenty years later, it is this quotation which reappears in Louise von Flotow’s article on translating radical feminist wordplay (1997a:49).
86 From “Le Rire de la Méduse”, quoted in Showalter 1985b:250, at the beginning of a general section titled “Women’s Writing and Woman’s Body”.
87 Quoted in Showalter 1985b:263. There is no acknowledged reference to Cixous in Showalter’s text, but the phrase was already a very well-known one first used in “Le Rire de la Méduse”.
A feminine text cannot fail to be more than subversive. It is volcanic; as it is written it brings about an upheaval of the old property crust, carrier of masculine investments; there's no other way. There's no room for her if she's not a he? If she's a her, she's in order to smash everything, to shatter the framework of institutions, to blow up the law, to break up the 'truth' with laughter.

Through this insistent quoting Cixous's statements solidified into declarations on behalf of French feminists, and she came to represent the 'French feminist theory' in Anglo-America. However, Cixous's relationship to feminism and to theory was neither straightforward nor self-evident. This was due to her attachment to a group perceived as rather peculiar to the French feminist movement as opposed to the Anglo-American one. This was a group called 'Psychanalyse et Politique' (*Psych et Po*), "who struggled to develop revolutionary theories of the oppression of women on the basis of psychoanalytic theory. [...] It was the group with which Cixous was most clearly identified" (Shiach 1991:27).

As we have seen in 2.2.2., Anglo-American feminists regarded psychoanalysis as something to be wary of. Consequently, *Psych et Po* did not elicit a positive response in the Anglo-American scene: "They have been portrayed as a wicked and disruptive lot, fortunately incapacitated so that they are prevented from doing any harm" (Ward Jouve 1991:61-62). *Psych et Po* established *Editions des femmes* in 1974, and Cixous "published her fictional work [...] between 1976 and 1982" and later again in the 1980s exclusively through this publishing house (Duchen 1987:47). This intimate relationship with the group "placed her inside the parameters of the struggle over difference, and tended to produce an attitude either of total loyalty or complete rejection – neither tending to aid discussion of the range of her work" (*ibid.*). The negative portrayal of the group exacerbated the already dubious image of Cixous, since she was often presented as their spokeswoman. In their anthology Marks and de Courtivron introduce *Psych et Po* as "the most original of the women's liberation groups in France and perhaps in the Western world", but also "ironically, the most dependent on male psychoanalytic and linguistic theoretical models" (1980:33). They add that "the writer

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88 From "Le Rire de la Méduse", quoted in Jones 1985a:81.
89 Ward Jouve explains this on two accounts: "The positions of their enemies, such as Christine Delphy, are much closer to mainstream Anglo-American positions, and have received a wide audience. Also, their own aggression, paranoia, choice of being underground 'moles' as it were and their paradoxical will to censorship have meant that they have been suspicious of anyone willing to listen to their side of the story, but ever likely to go over to the enemy side [...]" (1991:61-62). For an example of the group's refusal to be exposed see Duchen 1987:49.
whose texts sometimes correspond to what appear to be [Psych et Po's] ideological preferences and verbal praxis is Hélène Cixous" (ibid.). In her introduction to The Newly Born Woman, Sandra Gilbert also introduces Cixous as “the ferocious soprano that issues from Paris’s ‘psych et po’ and other feminist/theoretical groups” (1986:x).

Apart from their extensive use of psychoanalysis, the most unusual feature of Psych et Po for the Anglo-American feminists was its antagonism towards the word ‘feminism’ itself. Editions des femmes was opposed to publishing the works which their authors described as ‘feminist’ (Burke 1978:846). The group was rejecting feminism as “‘a position contained by the dominant ideology,’ one more in the series of reigning ‘isms’, whether humanism, Marxism or socialism. In their view, feminists were reformists, caught up in the old system, to which they merely seeking access” (ibid.). Instead of ‘feminism’, the group preferred to speak of the “women’s movement” (Shiach 1991:27). Accordingly, Cixous herself rejected “feminism as a movement too much like men’s, a search for power that imitates rather than transcends the phallogocentric order” (Jones 1985a:92). This particular stance was in fact made known to the Anglo-American feminists early on, when Elaine Marks pointed out that “the words ‘feminist’ and ‘feminism’ have come under attack by the group Politics and Psychoanalysis and by Hélène Cixous” (1978:833). Marks then took a small step of caution and added that she “shall use the word ‘feminist,’ in quotation marks, to refer to women who are exploring the connections between women and language”. Two years later, the quotation marks are dropped after an initial warning:

Women concerned with the woman question in France use the words ‘feminism’ and ‘feminist’ less often than do their counterparts in the United States. [...] The desire to break with a bourgeois past – with the inadequacies and fixed categories of humanistic thought, including feminism – has led to a vigorous attack against the labels by one of the most influential and radical of the women’s groups (known originally as ‘Psychanalyse et Politique’ – ‘Psych et Po’ – and more recently as ‘politique et psychanalyse’) as well as by Hélène Cixous. We have nonetheless decided to place ‘feminisms’ in our title because there is as yet no better word to account for the phenomenon we are presenting (Marks & de Courtivron 1980:x).

In later writings both Cixous’s position and that of Psych et Po were acknowledged in brief; however, the term ‘feminism’ continued to be used in relation to their work. The early caution was put aside. For example, Toril Moi notes that Cixous’s refusal of the label ‘feminism’ is first and foremost based on a definition of ‘feminism’ as a bourgeois, egalitarian demand for women to obtain power in the
present patriarchal system; for Cixous, 'feminists' are women who want power, “a place in the system, respect, social legitimation” [...]. Cixous does not reject what she prefers to call the women’s movement (as opposed to the static rigidity of so-called ‘feminism’); on the contrary, she is strongly in favour of it [...]. To many French feminists, as well as to most feminists outside France, however, this kind of scholastic wrangling over the word ‘feminist’ would seem to be politically damaging to the women’s movement as a whole. [...] I have therefore no intention of following Cixous’s lead on this point: according to accepted English usage, her indubitable commitment to the struggle for women’s liberation in France, as well as her strong critique of patriarchal modes of thought, make her a feminist” (1985:103-104) [Emphasis mine].

Similar rectifications of Cixous’s position can be seen in the writings of those who actually translated her texts:

There are problems with using the term ‘feminist’ in the context of French writers, because of the contamination with féministe in French which has a rather narrower range of connotations than ‘feminist’, and is often used (pejoratively) to refer to a primarily middle-class reformist movement which is willing to work entirely within existing male-dominated structures in order to achieve small improvements in the lot of some women. Since the English term encompasses a very broad range of positions and is usually only employed pejoratively by those who are opposed to any improvements in women’s situation, I shall adopt it with no further demurral (Still 1990:59) [Emphasis mine].

Although I have chosen, in line with common English usage, to retain the word ‘feminist’ in my title to refer to this body of writings, the appellation is in many ways inappropriate since few of the theorists or writers discussed here would unquestioningly accept the label as applying to their work. Both Hélène Cixous and Luce Irigaray, for instance, believe that the Anglo-American feminist preoccupation with equality forces women to function like men. Hélène Cixous to some extent side-steps the issue with her own definition of ‘femininity’, but since her definition needs explanation, and since there is no other word which adequately conveys the concern with subjectivity, sexuality and language that links the writers grouped in this book, I have retained the Anglo-American term ‘feminist’ which I use in its broadest sense to mean the challenge to the subordination of the female sex by a male-dominated world order (Sellers 1991:xii) [Emphasis mine].

Cixous herself is translated into the “accepted English usage” as a feminist, paradoxically because “the English term encompasses a very broad range of positions”, and because “there is no other word” in English to convey what Cixous and Psych et Po mean. Their stance is thus appropriated through a good example of what Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak calls “translation-as-violation”: “the imposition of our own historical and voluntarist constitution within the second wave of U.S. academic feminism as a ‘universal’ model of the ‘natural’ reactions of the female mind”

While tropes of universality and solidarity led to the creation of ‘Cixous the feminist’, tropes of alterity required ‘Cixous the theoretician’, since the indigenous version(s) of feminism were perceived as ‘pragmatic’ and ‘action-oriented’. In Anglo-America, Cixous was first and foremost identified with philosophy and theory rather than with fiction or theatre. This is partly due to the fact that “all her writing, whether identified by the generic marker of essay or play or novel, ‘works’ in a theoretical way, that it is informed and structured by the theoretical discussions that have been going on in France since the mid-1960s” (Penrod 1996:14). Especially the concept of \textit{écriture féminine}, which she is thought to be the proponent of, remained “in its initial delineations and in its refinement over the years, clearly lodged in the realm of ‘theory’” (Penrod 1996:15; see also Shiach 1991:4-5). Thus Cixous persisted as the defender of a \textit{féminité} that has to do with \textit{jouissance} and body language. It is assumed that, as she herself is a practitioner of \textit{l’écriture féminine}, her practice as it were illustrates her theory. That her writing is difficult, and need only be taken into account by the Francophone specialists. And that the writings, as well as the theoretical positions, are homogeneous, unchanging over time. A monolith is thus engineered, placed on the horizon of foreign theory, its clay feet dangerously planted in the marshy ground of experimental writing (Ward Jouve 1991:91-92).

The encapsulation of Cixous’s oeuvre as a handful of unchanging body of texts has been a source of concern among those who wished to be fairer to her evolving career. “In English Studies,” Morag Shiach observes, “the role of Cixous’s writings has been quite specific, and relatively distinct from [her] complex and continuing project. Her incorporation into the critical language of English Studies has been almost entirely at the level of ‘theory’” (1991:1). Shiach adds: “A small number of her texts has been translated, and these texts have repeatedly been mobilized in support of, or as ammunition against, a reading of the relations between gender and writing” (1991:2). The impact of translation on Cixous’s reception also comes up briefly in Peggy Kamuf’s observations:

It is indeed one of the more remarkable aspects of this reception that so few translations have appeared and yet Cixous’s name is almost always included whenever the ‘French-feminist-theory’ construction is called up. Perhaps this oddity says something about such a construction’s potential disregard for what happens in the encounter between languages or idioms, and more generally in the encounter with the other that is given a space in writing (1995:70).
Let us now turn, then, to the relationship between translation patterns and the images of Barthes and Cixous in the receiving systems.

4.2. Text-selection

4.2.2. An inventory of Barthes's works translated into Turkish

The first translations of Barthes into Turkish started in the early 1960s\(^{90}\). Yet, until his death in 1980, Barthes was known in Turkey only through one book, *Eléments de sémiologie*\(^{91}\) (1964), and ten articles (excluding retranslations). All but one of these articles were texts taken from three of his early books: *Le Degré zéro de l'écriture* (1953), *Mythologies* (1957), and *Essais critiques* (1964) (see Table 1). These texts, which introduced Barthes to Turkish readers, belong to a stage in his career when he was working mainly within the framework of structuralism and semiotics, and, therefore, the two decades dominated by their translation were the period when his name was associated with these two schools of thought in Turkey.

**Table 1 - Translations of Barthes's works into Turkish**

The table includes retranslations by different translators, but excludes the reprints of the same version by the same translator.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pieces from <em>Essais critiques</em></td>
<td>Pieces from <em>Le Degré zéro de l'écriture</em></td>
<td>Pieces from <em>Mythologies</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete translation + 2 essays</td>
<td>Complete translation</td>
<td>Complete translation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles</td>
<td>Complete Translation of other books and long essays</td>
<td>Collection of essays/ Readers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Excerpt from *Critique et vérité*, trans. Berke Vardar and Mehmet Rifat.

Excerpt from *Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes*, "Introduction à l'analyse structurale des récits", and *Fragments d'un discours amoureux*.

Excerpt from *Eléments de sémiologie*, trans. Mehmet and Sema Rifat.

*Yazi Nedir?*

*Yazi ve Yorum.*

After 1980, in correlation with the general increase in the translations of modern literary theory into Turkish, there was also a rise in the translations of Barthes's works. In 1981-1983 alone he had sixteen articles (excluding retranslations) published in Turkish literature.

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\(^{90}\) For a comprehensive list of texts by Barthes translated into Turkish see the bibliography.

literary journals. The number is quite striking when compared to the number of publications in the previous two decades (Table 1). Most of these new pieces, however, were still taken from *Le Degré zéro de l'écriture*, *Mythologies*, and *Essais critiques* (see the bibliography).

It was only after the second half of the 1980s that Barthes's work began to appear in book form in Turkish rather than in piecemeal fashion. This period of books started in 1986 with the retranslation of *Eléments de sémiologie*. The second book-length translation appeared eight years after the first one, in 1987. It still was not a complete translation of any of his books, but rather a selection of essays, mainly from *Le Degré zéro*.

"Introduction à l'analyse structurale des récits", although an extended article in the original, was published in Turkish as a thin book in 1988. *Le Degré zéro* itself was finally translated as a whole in 1989, followed by the complete translation of *Mythologies* a year later. A comprehensive Barthes reader, *Yazı ve Yorum* (Writing and Interpretation), came out in 1990. Translations of *Fragments d'un discours amoureux* and *La Chambre claire* were published in 1992, and that of *L'Aventure sémiologique* in 1993. Although the earliest book by Barthes that attracted attention in Turkey, *Essais critiques* was translated and published as a whole only in 1995. In 1996, there were three translations: *S/Z*, *L'Empire des signes*, and *La Tour Eiffel*. Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes appeared in 1998. To my knowledge, the most recent translation is *Incidents* published in 1999.

There is apparently a subsequent diversity of texts by Barthes translated into Turkish. However, as at the end of the year 2000, out of the 45 texts translated until then (15 books, 30 short texts), 27 still belong to *Le Degré zéro*, *Mythologies*, and *Essais critiques*. (4

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97 Ed. and trans. Tahsin Yücel. Metis. Texts were chosen from *Le Degré zéro de l'écriture*, *Michelet par lui-même, Mythologies, Sur Racine, Essais critiques, Critique et vérité, Système de la mode, L'Empire des signes, S/Z, Sade/ Fourier/ Loyola, La Chambre claire, La Plaisir du Texte, Fragments d'un discours amoureux*, and *Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes*.
book-length works, 23 short texts), i.e. three fifths of the total number. Among the short texts published in various journals, this ratio reaches up to more than two thirds.

At this point it would be useful to note how much of Barthes's oeuvre has been translated into Turkish. 12 of his 26 book-length works in French appeared as Turkish translations, i.e. less than a half. Those texts which have not been translated are mostly his critical studies on certain French writers, and collections published posthumously. However, key texts such as Critique et vérité, Système de la mode, and Le Plaisir du texte are also among those left untranslated. As for the more than 400 articles, prefaces and shorter texts in French—most of which were later incorporated into book-length works—only thirty one have been translated into Turkish.

4.2.2.1. Retranslations

Most of the retranslations—the abundance of which makes the case of Barthes in Turkish quite distinct from that of Cixous in English—are also essays taken from Le Degré zéro, Mythologies and Essais critiques, published individually in several Turkish journals. The collection Yazi Nedir?, too, is made up of texts from Le Degré zero, Essais critiques and Mythologies. Similarly, the later Barthes reader Yazi ve Yorum has retranslations of texts from Le Degré zéro and Essais critiques (See Table 2 below).

Yazi ve Yorum also includes excerpts from many of Barthes's works, which were either translated shortly before the publication of this reader or later translated as a whole (e.g. S/Z, L'Empire des signes, La Chambre claire, Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes), and the retranslation of an excerpt from Critique et vérité. The other text by Barthes which is translated more than once into Turkish is an excerpt from Fragments d'un discours amoureux. Before Fragments was translated as a whole in 1992 by Tahsin Yücel, a small chapter had been translated by two other translators in 1987. In addition to these texts, the translations of Eléments de sémiologie, L'aventure

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108 Total number counted from the comprehensive bibliography in Ungar 1983.


sémiologique, and “Introduction à l’analyse structurale des récits”, especially in their reprinted versions, include complex patterns of retranslation and reediting.

Table 2 - Retranslations from *Essais critiques*, *Le Degré zéro*, and *Mythologies*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Books</th>
<th>Essays retranslated</th>
<th>No. of retranslations by different translators</th>
<th>No. of reprints</th>
<th>Dates of retranslations and reprints*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Essais critiques</em></td>
<td>Que-est ce que la critique?(^{111})</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1966-1971-1990-1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>La reponse de Kafka(^{112})</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3*</td>
<td>1967-1987-1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L’activité structuraliste(^{113})</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1981-1987-1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A l’avant-garde de quel théâtre?(^{114})</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1960-1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Littérature objective: Alain Robbe-Grillet(^{115})</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1965-1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Littérature et meta-langage(^{116})</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1983-1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Il n’y a pas d’école Robbe-Grillet(^{117})</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1983-1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Les tâches de la critique Brechtienne(^{118})</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1987-1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ecrivains y écrivants(^{119})</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1990-1995-1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Le Degré zéro</em></td>
<td>Que-est ce que l’écriture?(^{120})</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1975-1984-1987-1989-1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Écriture et révolution(^{21})</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1974-1987-1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Y-a-t-il une écriture poétique?(^{22})</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1967-1979-1987-1989</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Triomphe et rapture de l’écriture bourgeoise  
L’écriture et le silence  
L’écriture et la parole  
L’utopie du langage  
Saponides et détergents  
Critique muette et aveugle  
Nautilus et bateau ivre  
La critique Ni-Ni  
Le visage de Garbo  
Le plastique  
Martiens  
Strip-tease  
Jouets  
Le Mythe, aujourd’hui

The years in bold character show the different versions by different translators. The years in normal font are the reprints of existing versions. The year in both bold character and italics is the publication date of the complete book in question.

This essay was excluded from the almost complete translation of Essais critiques.

4.2.2.2. The time factor

Related to the text-selection, there is one more factor which I wish to draw attention to, and that is the ‘time-lag’ (cf. Penrod 1993). This term indicates the distance in time separating the translations from their originals. Looking at the time-lag helps us to focus on the selection of a particular author and a particular text at a particular time, as well as the exclusion of the same author’s texts, either temporarily or permanently. As Gideon

Toury notes, “to anyone who wishes to proceed from the assumption that translations form an integral part of the recipient culture, the delayed arrival of a translation would seem a ‘meaningful void’, an absence deserving explanation” (1995:115).

Table 3 - Time-lag in the translation of short texts by Barthes into Turkish

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Initial date of publication in French</th>
<th>Publication year of the book which includes the text</th>
<th>First translation into Turkish</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A l’avant-garde de quel théâtre?</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>1964 (E.c.)</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Littérature objective: Alain Robbe-Grillet</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>1964 (E.c.)</td>
<td>1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qu’est-ce que la critique?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1964 (E.c.)</td>
<td>1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La réponse de Kafka</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1964 (E.c.)</td>
<td>1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y a-t-il une écriture poétique?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1953 (D.z.)</td>
<td>1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excerpt from Critique et vérité</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Écriture et révolution</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1953 (D.z.)</td>
<td>1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qu’est ce que l’écriture?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1953 (D.z.)</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La critique Ni-Ni</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1957 (M.)</td>
<td>1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saponides et détergents</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1957 (M.)</td>
<td>1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critique muette et aveugle</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1957 (M.)</td>
<td>1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L’artisanat du style</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1953 (D.z.)</td>
<td>1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L’activité structuraliste</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1964 (E.c.)</td>
<td>1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le visage de Garbo</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1957 (M.)</td>
<td>1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le plastique</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1957 (M.)</td>
<td>1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martiens</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1957 (M.)</td>
<td>1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nautilus et bateau ivre</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1957 (M.)</td>
<td>1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strip-tease</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1957 (M.)</td>
<td>1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jouets</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1957 (M.)</td>
<td>1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Présentation</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excerpt from Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excerpt from “Le Mythe, aujourd’hui”</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1957 (M.)</td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Il n’y a pas d’école Robbe-Grillet</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>1964 (E.c.)</td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Les deux critiques</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>1964 (E.c.)</td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Littérature et meta-langage</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>1964 (E.c.)</td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excerpt from &quot;Introduction à l’analyse structurale des récits&quot;</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encore le corps</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;L’Attente&quot;, excerpt from Fragments d’un discours amoureux</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecrivains y écrivants</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1964 (E.c.)</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dieci ragioni per scrivere</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(E.c.) Essais critiques, (D.z.) Le Degré zéro de l’écriture, (M.) Mythologies
As can be seen in Table 3, although the early translations were done almost immediately after the publication of the source texts, later translations came with a delay of 15 to 30 years. This interval is even bigger in the case of the translations of book-length works:

Table 4 - Time-lag in the translation of books by Barthes into Turkish

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Date of publication in French</th>
<th>Date of publication in Turkish</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Éléments de sémiologie</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction à l’analyse structurale des récits</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Degré zéro de l’écriture</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mythologies</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragments d’un discours amoureux</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Chambre claire: notes sur la photographie</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L’aventure sémiologique</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essais critiques</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L’Empire sémiologique</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Tour Eiffel</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incidents</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Most of the essays in Le Degré zéro were already included in the collection Yazi Nedin? (1987).

4.2.2.3. Consequences

The translation pattern illustrated above helped to create a certain image of Barthes. The more texts by 'Barthes the structuralist and semiotician' were translated, the stronger became his profile as such. This profile was based on a relatively limited number of translations. For two decades he was represented through ten short texts and one book. Until 1990, i.e. until Yazi ve Yorum, there was nothing in Turkish that could suggest 'another Barthes'. His later texts written within a post-structuralist framework were not translated until the second half of the 1990s.

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138 The relationship between text-selection and the reception of Barthes was studied also for his English translations (Bruss 1982). Elizabeth Bruss observes that "[...] in Barthes, it is the pattern of an entire career that has been telescoped, even rearranged, under the pressure of translation. The order and the tightly compressed form of the translated œuvre means that Barthes's work is [...] capable of provoking wildly discrepant enthusiasms and complaints. The tangle of his references, artificially superimposed on one another, and the seemingly abrupt, almost whimsical shifts of critical position arrived here all at once, to be met by our own more diffuse and slowly formed allegiances" (1982:364).

139 The introductory bibliography on modern literary theory in Turkish compiled by Tuncay Birkan and published as an appendix to the translation of Terry Eagleton's Literary Theory: An Introduction (Edebiyat Kurami, trans. Esen Tarım, Ayrımı, 1990) classifies all works by Barthes translated into Turkish under the heading 'structuralism', since all the ones Birkan could find in Turkish were among Barthes's earlier works. Yet, ironically, only six pages before, the bibliography of Eagleton places all of Barthes's works — including Le Degré zero, Éléments de sémiologie and Mythologies — under 'post-structuralism'. This testifies to the difficulty of pigeonholing writers, and the risks involved in it. There is one early reference in Turkish to Barthes as a 'post-structuralist', and it is in Berna Moran's comprehensive work on literary theories and criticism (1994, 1st ed. 1972).
This particular pattern was, of course, self-reproducing to an extent. It was influenced by the very image it helped to create—an image which increased the likelihood that those texts that fitted into the structuralist paradigm would be chosen for translation. But why were these particular texts translated, and not others? Why were some of them retranslated, and not others? Why three translations of "Que-est ce que la critique?", for instance, within a period of nineteen years, while many other texts—both by Barthes and by other writers—were waiting in line? Answers to these questions will be elaborated on in Chapter 5 when we look at issues of terminology and retranslation, and in Chapter 6 while we deal with the relationship between theory and politics. Nevertheless, let me offer here a few brief explanations.

The first translations of Barthes into Turkish published in the 1960s were essays on general topics in literary criticism—such as the nature of criticism (e.g. "Que-est ce que la critique?", "Que-est ce que l'écriture?", or "Y-a-t-il une écriture poétique?")—interrogating concepts which were being reshaped in the Turkish critical discourse at the time. Other essays dealt with issues of subjectivity and objectivity (e.g. "Littérature objective: Alain Robbe-Grillet"), the heated debate in Turkish literary circles. Still others (e.g. Écriture et révolution) questioned the perpetual opposition between 'art for art's sake' and political concerns in art, which was a constant source of conflict in the Turkish literary (critical) system. In later years, as a result of the shift of institutional powers after the 1980 coup, his work directed against bourgeois values (e.g. Mythologies) managed to attract those critics and translators who were formerly affiliated with the Marxist and socialist-realist tradition, and who, therefore, had to keep Barthes at arm's length. During the early 1980s, when the interest in structuralism and semiotics was on the rise, his work in these fields became the focus of attention. After the late eighties, when the readership reached a certain diversity and openness, his later texts within a post-structuralist framework could finally find their way into the Turkish literary system.

The translation pattern, which initially and emphatically favoured 'Barthes the structuralist and semiotician', consolidated the defensive attitude of Barthes's opponents in Turkey by supplying them with a figure diametrically opposed to Marxist and socialist-realist ideals. In this way, the 'other' required by the tropes of alterity was provided. The

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140 Vardar's translation of the excerpt from Critique et vérité (1969), for instance, starts with the following words: "Criticism is not a science. While science studies meanings, criticism produces meanings and is situated in-between science and reading".
'scientificity' called for through the tropes of 'lack' also found an ally in the early texts by Barthes translated into Turkish, since these texts were offering a good sample of 'scientific' and 'objective' criticism. His later texts – such as Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes, Fragments or Incident which were allegedly more 'personal', hence more 'subjective' – were not translated until much later, partly because they did not address this quest for 'scientific' criticism, and even jeopardised it. As mentioned in 2.1.4., letting the 'self' appear in criticism was seen as an indigenous thing in the Turkish critical tradition and was, therefore, unwelcome. In 4.4.1. and in 6.3.1., I will come back to this point.

Here let me also briefly point out the reason why there were so many retranslations of those texts by Barthes which had been produced within the framework of structuralism and semiotics. These texts included many new terms and concepts for the Turkish critical discourse. As long as counterparts for these terms and concepts were being suggested, rejected or adopted, i.e. until the terminology settled into a more or less accepted usage, retranslations continued. But more about this in Chapter 5. As for the consequences of the achronological appearance of translations and of time-lag, I would like to give two examples here:

a. "Qu’est-ce que l’écriture?", the opening article of Barthes’s first book, Le Degré zéro de l’écriture, was translated into Turkish in 1975. It is in this essay that Barthes introduces écriture as a third concept located between langue and style. He later makes use of this third concept throughout the book. However, two other essays from Le Degré zéro, "Y a-t-il une écriture poétique?" and "Écriture et révolution"141, were translated and published in journals beforehand. Since the semantic load of écriture was explained at the very beginning, in "Qu’est-ce que l’écriture?", the readers of these two later articles were likely to have been confused by the term appearing 'in the air'.

b. The collection Yazi Nedir? (1987) is almost a complete translation of Le Degré zéro, i.e. Barthes's first book. It also includes a number of essays from Essais critiques and the last section of Mythologies, "Le Mythe, aujourd'hui". In short, there is nothing in this collection to give the reader a clue about Barthes's further writings. Nevertheless, in his introduction to the collection, Enis Batur claims that the main theme in this collection is "writing [écriture], as an alternative to literature, and the death of the author as an alternative to the author" (1987:9). If one remembers that the notion of 'the death of the

author' emerged in Barthes's career only some fifteen years after *Le Degré zéro*.² Batur's comment seems rather anachronistic. Indeed similar leaps arising from hindsight can be found in other parts of this introduction. While talking about Barthes's consistent interest in literature, writing, theatre, etc., Batur claims that "this perpetuity is vital in forming a network, a web for gathering, in Barthes's terms, 'whatever is comprehensible in one's day'. 'The text is a texture', then, implies weaving, knitting, his writing as layers, one inside the other" (1987:8). Thus, we arrive at 'intertextuality'. Even when Batur is talking about Barthes's previous work, such as *Eléments de sémiologie* and *Critique et vérité*, he uses a conspicuously post-structuralist terminology:

A 'science of texts' was introduced to the on-going debates; people increasingly believed that the text could not be read without dismantling [sökmek] the denotations and connotations involved, that the relation between the text and the context could only be achieved through a 'plural reading' (1987:10).

Terms derived from the verb sökmek have been used in Turkish to translate 'deconstruction' (e.g. yapısöküçülük). The links established in this introduction between Barthes and post-structuralism are mostly due to Batur's own interest in the latter, of course, but they might have been baffling for those readers who did not have any access to Barthes's texts in French, since, as I have indicated before, Barthes's later writings began to come out in Turkish translation only after 1990.

### 4.2.3. An inventory of Cixous's works translated into English

By 1993, when Lynn K. Penrod examined the translation patterns of the works of Julia Kristeva, Luce Irigaray and Hélène Cixous into English, she found out that virtually all of Kristeva's work had been available, and that there had been no "delay or partiality" in the transfer of her texts (Penrod 1993:43-44). In Irigaray's case, however, only three of her thirteen books were in print in English. Still, this was partly compensated with her essay-length works in various journals and anthologies (*ibid.*). Among these three writers, the main discrepancy between the output in French and translations into English was found in Cixous's work (see also Simon 1996:4-5; Ward Jouve 1991:49, 91-92). Compared to her about forty book-length works in French, only three book-length translations were in print (Penrod 1993:43-44). Three years later, when Penrod wrote a book on Cixous, the number of her writings translated into English in their entirety could amount to "only a half dozen" (1996:ix-x): "A small number of essays, interviews, and selected anthologized 'extracts' complete[d] the English textual corpus".

² "La mort de auteur". *Mantéia* 5. 1968.
If we look at the data I have collected (Table 5), the situation seems to have slightly changed by the year 2000. One sixth of Cixous’s fiction, a quarter of her plays, just a bit more than half of her books of criticism, and around a quarter of her short texts were available in full English translation.\(^{143}\)

Table 5 – Works by Cixous and their translations into English until 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Until 2000 (incl.)</th>
<th>Fiction</th>
<th>Theatre</th>
<th>Books of criticism</th>
<th>Short texts, articles, lectures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In French</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete translations</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excerpts in English</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Apart from the figures above, Cixous also has two collections of her seminars and one reader in English.

These numbers might be taken as a sign of increased representation in and through translation, but they also testify to the selectivity of the receiving system. Cixous’s fiction and theatrical works are the least translated. Taking into account the amount of interest shown in her ‘theoretical’ work in Anglo-America in the 1970s and early 1980s, the figures in Table 6 are more striking. They indicate the number of publications by Cixous in French and in English until 1985, i.e. up to but excluding the complete translation of *La Jeune née*\(^{144}\), one of the key texts in her reception in Anglo-America.

Table 6 – Works by Cixous and their translations into English until 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Until 1985 (incl.)</th>
<th>Fiction</th>
<th>Theatre</th>
<th>Books of criticism</th>
<th>Short texts, articles, lectures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In French</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete translations</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excerpts in English</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When we look at the period before 1975, i.e. before the translation of “Le Rire de la Méduse”\(^{145}\), the text which captured the attention of Anglo-American feminists, we find even fewer translations\(^{146}\). However, by that time Cixous had numerous works published in French (see Table 7)\(^{147}\), and she was known in France for literary critical essays on a

\(^{143}\) For a comprehensive list of texts by Cixous in English, see the bibliography.


\(^{146}\) In her book *Translation and Gender* Louise von Flotow cites “Le Rire de la méduse” as “the first text by [Cixous] to be translated into English” (1997b:17), but this certainly is not the case.

\(^{147}\) Also, before 1975, there were no interviews with Cixous published in English. By the year 2000, she had at least eleven interviews.
wide range of topics, “(from Lewis Carroll to Samuel Beckett and Julien Gracq to the performance artist Karine Saporta)” (Penrod 1996:23).

Table 7 – Works by Cixous and their translations into English until 1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Until 1975 (incl.)</th>
<th>Fiction</th>
<th>Theatre</th>
<th>Books of criticism</th>
<th>Short texts, articles, lectures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In French</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete translations</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excerpts in English</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2.3.1. Retranslations

Among the work of Hélène Cixous published in English there are many reprints (see the bibliography), but retranslations are rare. Apart from the play Portrait de Dora, which was translated twice, the main instances of retranslation by different translators are the excerpts from La Jeune née and Le Livre de Promethea. Many of Cixous’s texts were introduced to Anglophone readers in excerpt form, and later only some of these texts were translated in their entirety (see Table 10) – mostly by the same translators who had the excerpts published in the first place.

4.2.3.2. The time factor

The gap between the dates of Cixous’s publications in French and of their translation into English has already been put forward as a factor influencing her reception in Anglo-America (Penrod 1993). However, as can be seen in Table 8, the time-lag in Cixous’s case is not too drastic, especially when compared to the case of Barthes in Turkish.

---

Table 8 - Time-lag in the translation of short texts by Cixous into English

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title of article, essay or excerpt</th>
<th>Genre of text</th>
<th>Date of publication in French</th>
<th>Date of publication in English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>La fiction et ses fantômes: Une lecture de l'Unheimliche de Freud</td>
<td>Non-f</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Rire de la Méduse</td>
<td>Non-f</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An excerpt from La Jeune née</td>
<td>Non-f</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excerpt from Partie</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poésie e(s)Politique</td>
<td>Non-f</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Sorties”, excerpt from La Jeune née</td>
<td>Non-f</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Préface: D'une lecture qui joue à travailler</td>
<td>Non-f</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aller à la mer</td>
<td>Non-f/T</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joyce, la ruse de l'écriture</td>
<td>Non-f</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The Meadow”, excerpt from La bataille d'Arcachon</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>1986*</td>
<td>1985*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The Last Word”, excerpt from Le livre de Promethea</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five excerpts from Le livre de Promethea</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Her Presence through Writing”, excerpt from “La venue à l'écriture”</td>
<td>Non-f</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La séparation du gâteau</td>
<td>Non-f</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extrême fidélité</td>
<td>Non-f</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tancrède continue</td>
<td>Non-f</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Writings on the Theater”, excerpts from L'Indiade...</td>
<td>Non-f/T</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Dedication to the Ostrich”, excerpt from Manne...</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De la scène de l'Inconscient à la scène de l'Histoire: Chemin d'une écriture</td>
<td>Non-f</td>
<td>1990*</td>
<td>1989*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The Day of Condemnation”, excerpt from Manne...</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethsabée ou la Bible intérieure</td>
<td>Non-f</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We who are free, are we free?</td>
<td>Non-f</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sans Arrêt, non, État de Dessination, non, plutôt: Le Décollage du Bourreau</td>
<td>Non-f/T</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Le Coup” and “C'est l'histoire d'une étoile”</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mon Algériance</td>
<td>Non-f</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Word</td>
<td>Non-f</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(F - fiction, Non-f - non-fiction, T - theatre)

20 out of the 29 texts listed above have a time-lag of only 1-5 years. One translation is published in the same year as its French counterpart. Two texts, marked above with asterisks, are published in English one year before their publication in French. In addition, there were occasional bilingual texts, such as “12 août 1980. August 12, 1980”, or texts written specifically for books in English, such as “Post-Word” (see the bibliography). The time-lag is slightly more pronounced in the case of book-length works (Table 9).

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151 This table includes only the translations of which a source text title could be established.
Table 9 - Time-lag in the translation of book-length works by Cixous into English

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title of book</th>
<th>Genre of text</th>
<th>Date of publication in French</th>
<th>Date of publication in English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L'Exil de James Joyce ou l'art du remplacement</td>
<td>Non-f</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vivre l'orange/ To Live the Orange (bilingual text)</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angst</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedans</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Jeune née</td>
<td>Non-f</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Prise de l'école de Madhubai</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reading with Clarice Lispector</td>
<td>Non-f</td>
<td>seminars from 1980-1985</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Nom d'Oedipe: Chant du corps interdit</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Livre de Promethea</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Coming to Writing' and Other Essays</td>
<td>Non-f</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three Steps on the Ladder of Writing</td>
<td>Non-f</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L'Histoire terrible mais inachevée de Norodom Sihanouk, roi du Cambodge</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manne aux Mandelstams aux Mandelas</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nevertheless, among these 15 works, 5 have a time-lag of 1-5 years, 6 have 6-10 years, and only 3 of them were delayed for 11-15 years. *Vivre l'orange/ To Live the Orange* was published as a bilingual edition. Also, some of the recent books and collection of essays, such as *Stigmata*, have been published first in English. The time-lag in the English translations of Cixous's articles and books, therefore, is not as conspicuous as Penrod suggested. Furthermore, there is no broad difference between the time-lags of her short texts which can be classified under the title 'fiction' or 'theatre' and of those texts which are 'non-fiction'. As far as her book-length works are concerned, the time-lags in the translation of her dramas and her non-fiction are almost identical, too. However, the translations of *book-length fiction works* usually have a delay of 6-8 years. Such a delay might have strengthened Cixous's image as a 'theoretician' rather than a writer. A more significant discrepancy can be seen in Table 10, which shows the gap between the first publication of excerpts and the final appearance of the complete translation of the book in question.
Table 10 - Time-lag between the excerpts and the complete translations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title of excerpt(s)</th>
<th>Genre of text</th>
<th>Date of publication in French</th>
<th>Date of publication of excerpt(s) in English</th>
<th>Date of publication of complete translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>An excerpt from La Jeune née</td>
<td>Non-f</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excerpt from Partie</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The Step&quot;, excerpt from Le Prénom de Dieu</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The Meadow&quot;, excerpt from La Bataille d'Arcachon</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>1986*</td>
<td>1985*</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five excerpts from Le Livre de Promethea</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Her Presence through Writing&quot;, excerpt from &quot;La venue à l'écriture&quot;</td>
<td>Non-f</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Writings on the Theater&quot;, excerpts from Llndiade...</td>
<td>Non-f/T</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Dedication to the Ostrich&quot;, excerpt from Manne...</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The Day of Condemnation&quot;, excerpt from Manne...</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;An Error of Calculation&quot;, excerpt from L'Ange au secret</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1996</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen above, excerpts came usually 1-5 years after the initial publication of the source texts in French. However, of the 9 books out of which excerpts were translated 5 have not, as yet, appeared in their entirety in English. As for the 4 which did appear, their complete translations were published only 6-14 years after the French source texts.

4.2.3.3. Consequences

As in the case of Barthes in Turkey, Cixous's image in Anglo-America was highly partial. Her "continuing and fast-changing, evolving practice [wa]s patchily represented" (Ward Jouve 1991:49). It was on the basis of the translations of "Le Rire de la méduse" and "Sorties" — and, to an extent, also of "Le sexe ou la tête?" (1981) — that Cixous “was launched into the Anglo-American scene as a ‘theorist’” (Kamuf 1995:70) and gained prominence there. According to many, these translations “have radically transformed the course of all language-centered theoretical debates in Anglo-American feminist circles over the course of the past fifteen years” (Penrod 1993:40). These texts where “Cixous discusses the transgressive potential of writing and the relations between sexuality and textuality, have been continually worked over, are frequently cited, and have come to mark the parameters of a long-running debate about 'feminine writing'" (Shiach 1991:1-2).
Although the time-lag in Cixous translations is not as marked as that in Barthes translations, the delay between the excerpts and the complete translations is important. When one takes into account that some of the excerpts proved to be much more influential than the books as a whole, this particular type of time-lag gains more significance. For instance, as we have seen above, “Sorties” – the abridged translation of the brief opening section of *La Jeune née*, which appeared in the anthology *New French Feminisms* in 1980 – proved to be one of the two key texts in both Cixous’s reception in Anglo-America and in the development of the local feminist debates. *La Jeune née* was published in French in the same year as “Le Rire de la Méduse” (1975). However, although the translation of the latter was published a year after its French source text, *La Jeune née* appeared in English only in 1986, i.e. a decade later. Instead, the abridged translation of “Sorties” – “nine pages out of a total of 131” (Penrod 1993:47) – came to represent the book as a whole: “It would be tremendously enlightening [...] to have a citation count of the first section of [‘Sorties’]. A conservative estimate would place that number in the hundreds” *(ibid.)*.

As for “Le Rire de la Méduse”, it was described as “undoubtedly her best-known” text, a “brilliantly explosive and angry essay/ manifesto/ poem” (Suleiman 1991:xvi). As an “innovative combination of fiction and manifesto” it “reached a wider audience than the more restricted feminist tracts which tend to appeal by virtue of content alone” (Marks & de Courtivron 1980:37). Therefore, it became “emblematic of ‘French’ feminism” on its own for a long period of time (Penrod 1993:45), especially in the Anglo-American world (Lydon 1995:99). Its English translation became a “central text” in “French feminism [as] a movement constituted in the transmission of certain French women’s writings into America” (Gallop 1991:41). The success of the translation of “Le Rire de la Méduse” was attributed to the “apparent accessibility” of the essay itself (Lydon 1995:100). Its “overly polemical stance (however unconventionally expressed)” was “readily assimilable” to the discourse American feminists were more familiar with, whereas other texts of Cixous which were “more resistant to translation” could not make the same impact *(ibid.)*. In fact, much of the material in “Le Rire de la Méduse” was also contained in “Sorties”, but was presented in the former in “more polemical fashion: most of the deconstructive argument is absent, leaving a seemingly less tentative, and perhaps less careful, but much more bracing vision of [Cixous’s] writing project” (Shiach 1991:17).
Thus, dependence on excerpts and selectivity emerge as more important factors than time-lag in Cixous's reception in Anglo-America. As a result of the emphasis given to the translation of her 'theoretical' texts, rather than of her fiction or plays, she came to be known as a 'theoretician'. Similarly, since her texts that were not exclusively related to 'women', such as most of her articles on literary criticism and her plays, could not find access to the Anglo-American feminist scene, she came to be known mainly as a 'feminist'. Most of her other texts which did not fit into this category of 'feminist theoretician' were left untranslated almost up to the present moment. The Anglophone critics expected Cixous to provide "a consistently deconstructive reading of phallogocentrism" (Shiach 1991:109) ignoring other concerns she might have had in her writings. Consequently, "those members of the Anglo-American feminist academy who could not read French [...] happily continued writing as if Cixous were still laughing at the Medusa, being newly born day after day" (Penrod 1993:47). Although this petrification is a common problem in the reception of several writers, in Cixous's case such partial accounts are particularly unhelpful, since it is precisely the modifications of her writing that allow us to assess the validity of her theoretical and critical claims, and to understand the shaping of her work in response to changing historical conditions (Shiach 1991:2).

As Peggy Kamuf observes, all these findings seem to testify to "the reluctant relation Cixous's writing maintains to translation, not only in the narrow or 'proper' sense, but all forms of transportation or transmutation, beginning with the transmutation into a 'theory', French, feminist, or other" (1995:71). Yet, for their self-definition and self-consolidation as 'pragmatic' and 'action-oriented', Anglo-American feminists needed Cixous the 'theorist'. In accordance with the tropes of alterity, her most controversial, provocative, most 'other' texts and statements were chosen to emphasise the radical difference, novelty, and rather sensational aspects of French feminism. Anglo-American feminists could thus reject the importation of feminist theory, since, according to them, theoretical texts were by definition unsuitable for the political purposes of the feminist movement. On the other hand, by emphasising Cixous's texts related to écriture féminine, the tendencies towards universality and solidarity turned her into a major (French) feminist. The belief that whatever is useful for the feminist struggle can come only from other feminists was deeply rooted.
4.3. Translators

In my introduction to Chapter 3, I have argued that the general power differentials between the source and receiving systems are not the only factors determining the attitudes towards imported discursive elements. The individuals and institutions involved as mediators or opponents, with their own interests and agendas, also had a say in determining the stance taken towards importation. In the same chapter I demonstrated how structuralism-semiotics and French feminism were challenged in the relevant receiving systems by their opponents through tropes of alterity. In this section, I would like to focus on the mediators – or at least a certain group of them, namely those who translated Barthes and Cixous – and on the role they played both in the reception of these writers’ oeuvres and in the importation process.

This section of my thesis can be taken as a response to the recent calls in translation studies for focusing on translators not as abstract beings or “hypothetical constructs” (Toury 1995:183), but rather as human beings with their own biographies, professions, writings, other output and commitments (e.g. Pym 1998). I contend that the translator patterns, together with the translation patterns discussed above, have an obvious bearing on the reception of the writers in question. Such an account of events based on translators necessarily remains incomplete, of course, because translators are not the only agents in the production and publishing process. However, we cannot find out all the people, such as commissioners, publishers, editors, and translators, who actually took the decision regarding the text-selection, time of publication, contents of extratextual material, etc. The allegedly ‘invisible’ translator can sometimes be more visible than the “phantom of the initiator” (Kaseva 2000) of the translation process. And, precisely due to this relative ‘visibility’ of the translators, their identity and agenda can easily put a mark on the reception of the work(s) they translate – especially, in cases where they have a certain acclaim as writers, scholars, critics, etc. other than being ‘just translators’.

This is precisely the case in the majority of Barthes’s translators into Turkish. Some of Cixous’s translators into English also fall into this category. Translation was not their sole occupation. Although I do not have the space here to do full justice to their lives and oeuvres, I will give brief “bio-bibliographical information” on most of them (c.f. Chapelle 2000:6). This information includes the educational background of the translators, their
connections with the source systems, other texts they translated, and their own writings. In the presentation of the bio-bibliographical information, I will group the translators according to certain features, with the hope that such a grouping may foreground certain patterns. For reasons I will state below, the year 1986 proved to be both a convenient and important date in both cases to divide the groups in question.

4.3.1. Barthes's translators

Roland Barthes has been translated into Turkish by 32 different people over a period of forty years. I will present them in two periods: first 'before 1986', i.e. until the onset of translations of book-length works by Barthes, starting with the retranslation of *Eléments de sémiologie* (see the bibliography), and then 'after 1986'. For detailed bibliographical information on these translators, see Appendix 3. The years in parentheses after the French titles refer to the years of publication of the *Turkish translations*. For the full references to these translations and their source texts see the bibliography.

4.3.1.1. Before 1986

**Group 1:** This is the group of translators I could not find any information about. Murat Köprü translated "Martiens" (1982) and Safter Böke translated "Nautilus et bateau ivre" (1982), both from *Mythologies*, for the section edited by Murat Belge in the daily newspaper *Cumhuriyet* (see Group 3 below and also 6.2.2.2). Ali Kaş translated "Nautilus et bateau ivre" (1983) from *Mythologies*. Zeynel Kiran translated "Les deux critiques" and "Littérature et meta-langage" (1983) from *Essais critiques*. One possible reason for this lack of data about translators' identities will be elaborated on in 6.2.4.

**Group 2:** This group comprises translators with rather autochthonous output, but with translations on a wide range of topics. All except Kirkoğlu translated only one text by Barthes. Bertan Onaran translated "Critique muette et aveugle" (1976) from *Mythologies*. He is a prolific translator of a variety of texts from popular biology to existentialism, from *Le Deuxième sexe* to *Don Quixote* and to the novels of Marguerite Duras. Yaşar Selçuk translated "L'artisanat du style" (1981) from *Le Degré zéro*. He worked as editor in...

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152 A note on the sources I have used to collect this data: For some of the translators, I was lucky enough to gather the information from back-covers of their translations. Some are very well-known writers, critics or scholars and, therefore, plenty of material has been written by and about them. In the Turkish case, I have collected part of their writings and translations from the bibliography I had prepared on literary theory (Susam 1997). Others were found in the idefixe.com database of Turkish publishers. Many details were obtained from the various issues of *Metis Çeviri*, the journal to which they contributed with their translations. In the Anglo-American case, I have extensively used the MLA database.
Göçeba Publishing and prepared books on history, religion, and economic theory. Adnan Benk translated “Encore le corps” (1984). Among his other translations, there are novels from Guareschi, Duras and Salinger. He also worked as editor in the journal Çağdaş Eleştiri (Contemporary Criticism) and wrote essays on literature and criticism. Serdar Rifat Kırkoğlu translated “Qu’est ce que l’écriture?” and “L’artisanat du style” (1984), both from Le Degré zéro. He graduated from the Faculty of Economics in İstanbul University and continued his studies in the Philosophy Department. He has translated many novels and short stories, as well as books on philosophy. However, the only article I could find written by him is a piece of translation criticism.

**Group 3:** These are the individuals with a wide range of interests, especially in literary theory. Most of them are prominent critics with numerous publications as well as translations. With the exception of Demiralp and Rifat, they have translated Barthes either once or twice before 1986.

According to my bibliography, Teoman Aktürel is the first ever to translate Barthes into Turkish with “A l’avant-garde de quel théâtre?” (1960). Aktürel graduated from İstanbul University French Language and Literature Department and did a PhD for E.P.H.E. at the Sorbonne, Paris. He worked as a professor in İstanbul in economy and industrial relations. He has written on Brecht, semiotics, and the relationships between art and politics. He has translated poetry and plays, and also from Plato. Öğuz Demiralp undertook the translations of most of the articles incorporated in the Barthes reader Yazi Nedir? (1987): “Écriture et révolution”, “Qu’est ce que l’écriture?”, “L’utopie du langage”, “Triomphe et rupture de l’écriture bourgeois”, “L’artisanat du style”, “L’écriture et la parole”, and “L’écriture et le silence”, all from Le Degré zéro. The reason why I include him in Group 3 before 1986 is that he had already published the first two of these articles in journals beforehand (1974, 1975). Demiralp wrote as an essayist and critic on general literary theory and criticism, psychoanalytic criticism, methodology in criticism, and Walter Benjamin, among other topics. He occasionally made use of structuralist ideas (Bezirci 1981a:100).

In the early eighties Murat Belge edited a section titled “People and Art” in Cumhuriyet (see 6.2.2.2.). The first issue of this section included two essays from

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153 Yazi nedir?”, “Dil Ütopyası”, “Kentsoylu Yazi’nın Utkusu ve Parçalanışı”, “Yazi ve Devrim”, “Yazi ve Söz”, “Yazi ve Susku”. The translation of “L’artisanat du style” was – for reasons unknown – combined with the translation of “Triomphe et rupture de l’écriture bourgeois”, therefore has no title in Turkish.
 Mythologies, “Le visage de Garbo” and “Le plastique” (1982), which did not bear a translator’s name. Yet it was Belge who translated them. Belge is a leading Turkish writer, publisher, critic and translator. He graduated from the English Language and Literature Department of İstanbul University, and later studied in the United States and England. He has been the head of Comparative Literature Department at Bilgi University, İstanbul, and was also elected as the president of the international organisation, the Helsinki Assembly of Citizens. Belge has written abundantly on literary criticism, Marxist aesthetics, historical novels, etc. Among his main contributions are numerous social and political critiques, and expert guide-books on historical İstanbul. Belge is also a prolific translator. He translated a variety of authors – from Marx and Engels to D.H. Lawrence, Dickens and Joyce – and a variety of texts – from literature to history, economic theory, and even an Ottoman classic into modern Turkish.

Korhan Gümüş did the third translation from Mythologies, “Jouets” (1982), for the “People and Art” section and also collaborated in the translation of “Sémiologie et urbanisme” (1982). The same year, Gümüş published a terminology of semiotics. He has written essays on a variety of social and literary topics. Ünsal Oskay is the translator of the fourth essay from Mythologies, “Strip-tease” (1982), published in “People and Art”. He is a professor of social sciences, and has written books and articles on popular culture, music, mass communication, and the Frankfurt School. He has translated several books on social sciences and the Frankfurt School. Mustafa Irgat translated “La critique Ni-Ni” and “Saponides et détergents” (1976) from Mythologies. He has mainly written on cinema and worked as an editor, but he is also a poet. Sema Rifat translated one article by Barthes in 1983. However, her main Barthes translations are in the 1990s and her place among Barthes’s translators in Turkish is an important one. Therefore I will deal with her work in more detail in the section on translators after 1986.

**Group 4:** This group includes those who were mainly interested in semiotics, structuralism, structural linguistics and ‘scientific’ criticism at the time of translating Barthes. Almost all of them are well-known figures in Turkey. The number of Barthes translations they did during this period varies between 1-4 each, but the majority translated him only once or twice.

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154 I am grateful to Mehmet Rifat for providing me with this piece of information.
Berke Vardar is one of the first to translate Barthes, with at least three articles\textsuperscript{155} during the 1960s: "La réponse de Kafka" (1967) from Essais critiques, "Y a-t-il une écriture poétique?" (1967) from Le Degré zéro, and an excerpt from Critique et vérité (1969). Vardar also collaborated with Mehmet Rifat in the translation of Eléments de sémiologie (1979), the first book by Barthes in Turkish. Berke Vardar was one of the most notable Turkish linguists. He mainly worked within the framework of structural linguistics, and was one of the first to introduce structuralism into the Turkish literary system (see 2.1.1.). He also wrote – in Turkish and in French – on semiotics, French literature, translation, Turkish Language Reform, terminology, semantics, and certain social and scientific issues. For many years he worked as the head of the Department of French Language and Literature in Istanbul University, and also directed its School of Foreign Languages. Within the same institution, he edited the journal Dilbilim (Linguistics). He also worked in the publication committee of the encyclopaedias Meydan Larousse: Büyük Lûgat ve Ansiklopedi and Büyük Larousse Sözlük ve Ansiklopedisi. Vardar translated several works on linguistics, French literature, sociology and semiotics. His most well-known translation is Ferdinand de Saussure’s Cours de linguistique générale I-II.

As we have seen in 2.1.1., Süheylâ Bayrav was also one of the first to introduce structural linguistics into Turkish, and she too is among the first translators of Barthes. Bayrav translated “Littérature objective: Alain Robbe-Grillet” (1965) from Essais critiques. Mehmet Yalçın translated “Y a-t-il une écriture poétique?” (1979) from Le Degré zéro, “Il n’y a pas d’école Robbe-Grillet” (1983) from Essais critiques, and “Présentation” (1982). I found an article by him on scientificity in language and literature, and a translation by him on semiotics. Ahmet Kocaman translated “L’activité structuraliste” (1981) from Essais critiques. Kocaman works on applied linguistics, discourse analysis and translation studies. He graduated from the English Language and Literature Departments of Gazi Eğitim and Hacettepe universities, and worked as the Head of the English Linguistics Department at the latter. He has been co-editor of a journal on linguistics (Dilbilim Araştırmaları). Gül Neyire İşik translated an abridged version of "Le Mythe, aujourd’hui" (1983) from Mythologies. She graduated from the Philosophy Department at the University of Florence, and worked as a professor at the Western

\textsuperscript{155} Osman Senemoğlu writes that Vardar’s translations from R. Barthes, R. Bulman and J. Racine were published in the journals Oyun, Varlık and Yapraklar during 1964 and 1965; however, he does not give any other reference (1990) and I could not locate these texts. Therefore, Vardar’s other possible Barthes translation(s) could not be included in this study.
The last two translators in this group are Mehmet Rifat and Tahsin Yücel. The former co-translated the first book-length work of Barthes in Turkish together with Berke Vardar (see above). The latter is one of the early translators of Barthes, with the article “Qu’est-ce que la critique?” (1966) from *Essais critiques*. However, Yücel took a long break afterwards and started translating Barthes again only in the second half of the 1980s. Since these two figures’ links with Barthes in Turkish are quite strong, I will come back to them in 4.3.1.2., together with Sema Rifat.

**Summary of the findings on Barthes’s translators before 1986**

22 different people translated Barthes’s works until 1986. Among these, 13 translated him only once, 7 translated twice. Mehmet Yalçın translated three texts by Barthes and Berke Vardar translated four. Those who translated most from his work, such as Yalçın and Vardar, and those who translated his only book-length work in this period, i.e. Mehmet Rifat and Vardar, are among the group 4 translators.

There were 4 translators about whom I could gather no information at all (group 1). In group 2, there were also 4 translators whose main interest was translating or editing a wide range of works. Groups 3 and 4 both comprise seven people each. The main translators of Barthes during this period were therefore literary critics, usually quite distinguished ones, and half of them with a strong interest in structuralism and semiotics.

**4.3.1.2. After 1986**

**Group 1:** To my dismay, I could not find any information on Erol Kayra, the translator of the complete *Essais critiques* (1995), which is one of the most recent Barthes translations into Turkish.

**Group 2:** For the period after 1986, the characteristics of the translators placed in group 2 are slightly different from the ones in the same group before 1986. These are either mainly professional translators, in the sense that they earn their living mostly from translation, or also writers and poets. They seem to be mainly interested in ‘writing’ literature rather than ‘theorising’ about it, if this rather crude distinction might be
tolerated for the purposes of the classification here. They all translated either one or two texts by Barthes.

Yurdanur Salman and Hür Yumer collaborated in the translation of “L’Attente” (1987), an excerpt from *Fragments d’un discours amoureux*. Yumer graduated from the Faculty of Economics in the University of Grenoble, and yet has worked as a French teacher in İstanbul University School of Foreign Languages. She has translated literary works, especially from Marguerite Yourcenar, and written various short stories. Yurdanur Salman is a well-known translator of literature. She has also taught at the Department of Translating and Interpreting in Boğaziçi University. Nilüfer Güngörmüş translated two articles from *Mythologies*: “Critique muette et aveugle” and “Saponides et détergents” (1987). She finished the French high school Lycée de Galatasaray in İstanbul and did her first degree in English Language and Literature at the University of İstanbul. Her M.A. in French literature was completed at the Université de Paris VIII. Güngörmüş translated texts on linguistics, translation studies and cinema, as well as some short stories and novels. Ragip Ege translated the long essay “Le mythe, aujourd’hui” (1987, in *Yazi Nedir?*) from *Mythologies* and wrote an extended essay on it published together with the translation (see 6.2.2.3.). However, all I could find about him is that he has translations of poetry. Halil Gökhan translated “La réponse de Kafka” (1990) from *Essais critiques*. He is a prolific translator of poetry, poetic prose, and children’s literature, and is also a short story writer. Reha Akçakaya is the translator of *La Chambre claire: note sur la photographie* (1992). His other translation is another book on photography by Susan Sontag. Pelin Özer translated one short article by Barthes (1997) which was published originally in Italian. She has worked as an editor in Yapı Kredi Publishing and has a journalistic book on Turkish teams in Camel Trophy expeditions.

**Group 3:** As before, this is the group of prominent critics with a wide range of interests, especially in literary theory. Enis Batur edited *Yazi Nedir?* (1987) and translated one of the articles included in this reader: “Les tâches de la critique Brechtienne” from *Essais critiques*. Batur is a distinguished poet, essayist, literary critic and editor. During his career he had a certain interest in structuralism and semiotics (Bezirci 1981a:100), but his later work fits more into the post-structuralist framework (see 4.2.2.3). His poetry books and essay collections are too numerous to be cited altogether even in the long Appendix 3. Among his translations, however, I could only find Foucault’s introduction

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134

to *Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique*. Öğuz Demiralp (see group 3 before 1986), whose translations were incorporated into *Yazı Nedir?* (1987) and Sema Rifat (see below) can again be placed in this group.

**Group 4:** This is the group of those who worked specifically in relation to structuralism and semiotics. It includes Sündüz Öztürk Kasar who translated *S/Z* (1996). After completing her B.A. in French Language and Literature at the University of İstanbul, Öztürk Kasar continued her studies for M.A. at the Centre for Applied Linguistics, *Université de Franche-Comté* in Besançon, France. She did her *Diplôme d'Etudes Approfondies* on literary semiotics with A.-J. Greimas at the *Ecole des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales* in Paris and her PhD with Jean-Claude Coquet at the same institute. Since 1994, she has taught at the Department of Translating and Interpreting, Yıldız Technical University, İstanbul. Apart from a book on Balzac from a semiotic and narratological point of view, Öztürk Kasar has written several articles on linguistics, language use and translation. She also has translations from writers such as Blanchot and Balzac.


Mehmet Rifat is one of the leading Turkish scholars who has worked on semiotics. He has numerous publications on semiotics, linguistics and literary theory, as well as translations on literary theory in collaboration with Sema Rifat. He finished Saint-Benoît High School in İstanbul, completed his B.A. and PhD in French and Romance Languages and Literatures at the University of İstanbul. After 1978, he participated in the research of the Paris Semiotic Circle. He taught at the University of İstanbul (1974-1982) and directed the translation, editing and publication of *Gelişim Hachette*
Encyclopedia (1982-1986). Since 1986, he has been teaching at the Department of Translating and Interpreting, Boğaziçi University, İstanbul.

Sema Rifat, too, finished the Saint-Benoît High School and did her B.A. in French and Romance Languages and Literatures at the University of İstanbul. She completed her M.A. in Linguistics with René Descartes at the Universitaire de Paris V and attended functional linguistics classes of André Marchinet at the École pratique des hautes études, Sorbonne. She taught at various colleges and worked in publishing houses. Her main publications are on functional linguistics, text theory and semiotics. She translated from French and Italian, on her own and also together with other translators. Those she translated include: Eliade, Shklovsky, Jakobson, Propp, other Russian formalists, Eco, Calvino, Butor, and Flaubert.

If six of the fifteen books by Barthes in Turkish are translated by the Rifats, five of the remaining nine are the fruits of Tahsin Yücel’s efforts. Yücel translated only one article by Barthes in the 1960s – “Qu’est-ce que la critique?” (1966) from Essais critiques – but he is the translator of four of his books: Le Degré zéro de l’écriture (1989), Mythologies (1990), Fragments d’un discours amoureux (1992) and L’Empire des signes (1996). Yücel also compiled the most comprehensive Barthes reader and commentary to date in Turkish, Yazı ve Yorum (1990), which includes his own translations from a variety of Barthes’s texts (see 4.2.2.1).

Since the years he was a university student, Yücel has translated more than fifty works – mainly novels, but also children’s literature – by Balzac, Flaubert, Proust, Gide, Montherlant, Aymé, Saint-Exupéry, Camus, Queneau, Tournier, Duras, Ajar and Lévi-Strauss. Still, his translations are not what he is mostly known for. He is a prominent literary critic, novelist, short story writer, and one of the leading theoreticians on structuralism and semiotics. Apart from his work in these two fields, he has written on a variety of topics including psychoanalytic literary theories, Turkish Language Reform, folk tales, narratology, French literature, and ethics in criticism. Yücel finished Lycée de Galatasaray in İstanbul and did a B.A. in French Language and Literature at the University of İstanbul. For many years he taught in the same department where he took his first degree, as a specialist on nineteenth and twentieth century French literature and on semiotics.
Summary of the findings on Barthes's translators after 1986

After 1986, the number of translators decreases to 14. Among these, nine translated Barthes only once, one translated two essays, and Demiralp translated four essays. The rest is divided between Yücel and the Rifats as above. During this period nine translators contributed to his book-length works. Among these, Akçakaya, Kayra and Öztürk Kasar translated one book each, and Batur, Demiralp and Ege all contributed to Yazi Nedir?. Of the three other translators, Sema Rifat contributed to six book-length works by Barthes, Tahsin Yücel to five, and Mehmet Rifat to four.

In terms of groups, there is only one translator whom I know nothing about. The majority of the translators of this period come from group 2, i.e. the group of professional translators, writers and poets. Literary critics have shown rather less interest in Barthes's work after 1986 (there are only three people in group 3, and two of them have continued their interest in Barthes from the period before 1986). Same is true for those who work within the continuation of structuralist and semiotic paradigms (only three people from group 4). Nevertheless, the majority of his texts after 1986, especially the book-length works, were translated by those in group 4.

In 4.3.3. I will elaborate on the significance of these translator patterns. Let us now turn our attention to the case of Cixous.

4.3.2. Cixous's translators

As in the case of Barthes in Turkish, numerous translators were involved in rendering Cixous's works into English. Up until 2000, 38 people have contributed to the translations of her texts. I have similarly divided them into two periods: first 'before 1986', the publication of The Newly Born Woman (see the bibliography), and then 'after 1986'. For detailed bibliographical information on these translators see Appendix 4. The years in parentheses after the French/English titles refer to the years of publication of the English translations. For the full references to these translations and their source texts, as well as to the interviews done with Cixous, see the bibliography.

4.3.2.1. Before 1986

Group 1: Information could not be obtained on Robert Dennomé, Anita Barrows and Sarah Burd. The last two translated two different versions of Portrait de Dora (1977 and

**Group 2:** This is the group of those who had relatively little other output, either as translations or as non-translations. Each of them translated only one text by Cixous. Sally Purcell translated L’Exil de James Joyce ou l’art du remplacement (1972), the first ever publication by Cixous in English. In later years, Purcell edited collections of poetry and translated from Dante. Carol Mastrangelo Bové is the translator of “At Circe’s, or the Self-Opener” (1975). She has written on psychoanalytic literary theory and criticism, and on Proust, Kristeva and Bakhtin. Her other translations are texts by Doubrovsky on Proust. Meg Bortin translated an excerpt (1977) from La Jeune née. All I could find about her is one more translation from R. Bensky. Stan Theis translated “Arrive le chapitre-qui-vient” (1980). He has written on Bukowski and translated a text on literary theory. Marie Maclean translated an introduction by Cixous (1982) for the French edition of a Lewis Carroll book. I couldn’t find anything else than an article on fantasy fiction written by Maclean. Carole Deering Paul and Jill McDonald translated an excerpt (1982) from Le Prénom de Dieu. The texts by Deering Paul that I could find were on Honoré d’Urfé and pastoral romance in French. As for McDonald, she wrote on Medieval German literature and translated texts on Camus. Barbara Kerslake translated an article on theatre by Cixous, “Aller à la mer” (1984). Her other translations are on women drama writers, theories of French feminism, and theatre performance. Penny Hueston and Christina Thompson co-translated “The Meadow” (1985), an excerpt from the short story La Bataille d’Arcachon. Hueston’s other translations are from Blanchot and Tournier, and she also has an interview with the latter. Thompson has edited the quarterly Meanjin of the University of Melbourne, and written on Australian and Russian literatures. Jo Levy translated Angst (1985), one of the first fictions by Cixous in English. In Levy’s case, my findings are doubtful. The two articles I could find were authored by a Jo Anne Levy, and were on paralinguistics, pragmatics, and the hermeneutic-phenomenological approach. Carol Barko translated Dedans (1986), another early fiction by Cixous published in English. All I could find about her was an article on Stéphane Mallarmé and a translation on feminist literary criticism.

**Group 3:** As in the case of Barthes, the translators I placed in this group have a variety of interests and are usually well-known figures in their respective fields. I found numerous texts by them on a wide range of topics, but – as opposed to the case of Barthes – they have few other translations. They all write from within certain
theoretical frameworks, but most of them are also interested in issues related to women. Except Keith Cohen, all have translated Cixous only once.

Keith Cohen is one of the first translators of Cixous in English and also one of the most recent, since, after a long break, he contributed to Stigmata (1998). Apart from “The Character of ‘Character’” (1974) and an excerpt from Partie (1977), Keith Cohen’s most important translation of Cixous is that of “Le Rire de la Méduse” (1976), which he co-translated with Paula Cohen. Cohen himself is a productive scholar writing mainly on film and fiction, but also on Argentinian, Mexican, American and English literatures, on literary theory and criticism, and on translation. Paula Marantz Cohen has also been a prolific scholar. She published mainly on cinematography, but also on English and American literatures, film adaptations of novels, feminist approaches to autobiographical criticism, feminist literary theory and criticism, and family systems. In the Cohen family, she seems to be the one more interested in issues related to women and feminism. However, she collaborated in the translation of only one text by Cixous, albeit a crucial one.

Rosette C. Lamont translated an essay by Cixous, “Boxes” (1977), and she seems to be the most versatile critic who has undertaken to translate Cixous. Apart from several texts on Ionescu and Beckett, on Russian theatre, novel and poetry, and some on Shakespeare, she has also written on international theatre, experimental drama by women, Pinter, the holocaust, surrealism, French and American theatres, Cixous and Portrait de Dora, women writers, and French literature. The only other translation done by Lamont, however, is a book on holocaust.

Annette Kuhn translated “Le sexe ou la tête?” (1981), one of the much quoted texts by Cixous. Kuhn’s main interest is feminism and cinema. She has published on (feminist) film theory and criticism, woman filmmakers, treatment of the female body in cinema, etc. as well as on (feminist) literary theory and criticism, and materialist feminism. She is one of the editors of the quarterly journal Screen of the University of Glasgow, which publishes critical, theoretical and historical articles on film and television studies.

Judith Still translated “Joyce: the (R)use of Writing” (1984). Still has been a lecturer in Critical Theory at the University of Nottingham, and a member of the editorial boards of Nottingham French Studies and Paragraph. She has published on general critical theory,
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, George Eliot and Djanet Lachmet from a feminist point of view. She has particularly worked on the relationships among sexual difference, economy and social hierarchy. She translated Lachmet’s *Lallia* and articles by Rodolphe Gasché.

**Group 4:** Hélène Cixous was one of the co-founders of the experimental University of Paris VIII – Vincennes. Within this university she founded the *Centre d’études féminines* in 1974 and became its director. The translators in group 4 are those who attended her seminars in this research centre. They have very few output unrelated to Cixous, both as translations and non-translations.

**Sarah Cornell** co-translated the bilingual text *Vivre l’orange/ To Live the Orange* (1979) with Ann Liddle and *Three Steps on the Ladder of Writing* (1993) with Susan Sellers. She also contributed to the essay collection ‘Coming to Writing’ (1991) with translations of Cixous. Cornell did her M.A. at New York University and has been a member of the *Centre d’études féminines* since 1976. She did her doctoral thesis at the *Centre* on Cixous. The only other work I could find by her is an article on Cixous. **Ann Liddle** co-translated *Vivre l’orange/ To Live the Orange* (1979) with Sarah Cornell and three articles by Cixous with Susan Sellers: “The Last Word”, “Extrême Fidélité” and “Tancrède continue” (1986, 1988 and 1988). On her own, she translated two texts by Cixous: “Poésie e(s)t Politique” (1980) and “Sorties” (1980), the influential excerpt from *La Jeune née* published in the anthology *New French Feminisms*. Liddle also contributed to ‘Coming to Writing’ with her Cixous translations. She did her M.A. in French Literature at the University of Wisconsin and joined Cixous’s seminars at the *Centre* in 1977 to continue research on translation. I found only one work written by her on Bataille and Artaud.

There is one translator who does not fit neatly in any of the groups above, **Betsy Wing**, with her translation of *La Jeune née* in 1986, emerges as a transition figure which indicates the shift from a large number of translators with a cursory interest in Cixous to fewer translators specialising on the writer. Wing has remained “Cixous’s best-known translator in North America” (Penrod 1993:48) for a long time, though she certainly was not one of the earliest. In fact, the first time Wing translated Cixous was in 1984. In total she translated two articles – “12 août 1980. August 12, 1980” and “Reading Clarice Lispector’s ‘Sunday Before Going to Sleep’” (1984) – and two books by Cixous – *La Jeune née* (1986) and *Le Livre de Promethea* (1991) – which proved to be influential on Anglo-American feminism. Wing did her B.A. in history of art at Bryn
Mawr College. She attended Columbia and Miami universities. In 1988, she was a candidate for the M.F.A. at Louisiana State University. After her translation of *La Jeune née* she continued translating books and articles on opera, (feminist) literary theory, French and Martinique literatures, philology, fiction by women writers and architecture. Thus, Wing emerges as an archetypal translator figure, with numerous translations on a wide range of topics and no non-translations.

**Summary of the findings on Cixous’s translators before 1986**

Until 1986, 23 people translated Cixous’s texts into English. Some of these collaborated on the translation of a single text. Out of these 23, 20 of them translated her only once; others were Keith Cohen (3 texts), Ann Liddle (3), and Betsy Wing (2). The majority of her translators had only a short-lived interest in her work during this period. There were three translators from group 1 (no information), twelve from group 2 (other output), five from group 3 (academics with a variety of interests and their own writings), two from group 4 (from the Centre), and Betsy Wing on her own. When it comes to book-length works and complete plays, they were translated by: Purcell, Barrows, Liddle, Barko, Cornell, Burd and Levy, all translating one work only. These translators, too, are all from group 1 and 2, except Liddle and Cornell (group 4); i.e., most of them are rather less-known figures with no particular interest or expertise in literary/theoretical/feminist issues, or in Cixous.

**4.3.2.2. After 1986**

**Group 1:** I could not find any information on Stéphanie Lhomme and Lollie Groth, who both acted as co-translators, in “Le Coup” and “C’est l’histoire d’une étoile” (1994), and in *L’Histoire terrible mais inachevée de Norodom Sihanouk, roi du Cambodge* (1994), respectively.

**Group 2:** As before 1986, this is the group of rather ‘unknown’ figures. Again, each of them translated only one text by Cixous. **Franklin Philip** translated “La Séparation du gâteau” (1987). He wrote on bilingualism and translated texts on magic and on deconstruction. **Chris Miller** translated one lecture by Cixous: “We who are free, are we free?” (1993). He wrote on poetry criticism and on American fiction and poetry. He also translated an article on Fourier. **Judith Pike** co-translated *L’Histoire terrible mais inachevée de Norodom Sihanouk, roi du Cambodge* (1994) with MacCannell and Groth. The only articles I could find by her are on the female dead body as fetish in fiction.

**Group 3:** As before 1986, the translators in this group are rather well-known figures with a variety of theoretical and literary interests. They have very few other translations, but have written numerous works on a wide range of topics. Apart from Carr, who translated two texts, and Keith Cohen (see Group 3 above), they all translated Cixous only once.

Christiane Makward and Judith Graves Miller co-translated *Le Nom d'Œdipe* (1991). Makward also carried out an interview with Cixous (1976). They are both active scholars. Together they edited and translated *Plays by French and Francophone Women: A Critical Anthology*. Makward wrote mainly on Francophone women novelists and dramatists from Malagasy, Canadian, Martinique, Guadeloupe, Swiss and French literatures, and on feminist literary theory and criticism. Graves Miller wrote on theatre, on Caribbean, Canadian, Guadeloupe and French women playwrights including Cixous, on colonialism and Francophone women playwrights, on novels written by Francophone women writers, on general French literature, and on theatre and revolution in France.

Helen Carr co-translated two essays by Cixous with Stéphanie Lhomme (1994, see above). She is a prolific editor and critic, and has books on Jean Rhys and on Native American literary traditions. She co-edited special issues of the journal *Women: A Cultural Review* and edited a book on women's writing. Carr also wrote articles on a variety of topics from the representation of Africa in English museums to the treatment of Native American women in American literature, from masculinity in poetry to the relationship between feminist and post-colonial literary theories.

Juliet Flower MacCannell co-translated one play by Cixous, *L'Histoire terrible mais inachevée de Norodom Sihanouk, roi du Cambodge* (1994). She wrote and edited books on feminist, psychoanalytic and philosophical theories of literature. She also wrote various articles and essays on the treatment of politics in Stendhal, on Freud and art-collecting, on genocide and *jouissance*, on metaphor and ideology, on deconstruction and on Rousseau.

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**Group 4:** These are again the translators who attended Cixous’s seminars in the Centre d’études féminines. The majority of their output is on Cixous. They rarely translated texts by other writers. Ann Liddle and Sarah Cornell (see group 4 before 1986) have continued to translate in this period.

**Deborah Carpenter Jenson** translated several fiction, drama and non-fiction by Cixous: five excerpts from *Le Livre de Promethea* (1987), an excerpt from “La venue à l’écriture” (1987), the article “De la scène de l’Inconscient à la scène de l’Histoire: Chemin d’une écriture” (1989) and the play *La prise de l’école de Madhubai* (1986). She edited *Coming to Writing* and Other Essays (1991), contributed to this edition with her translations, and conducted an interview with Cixous (1991). Carpenter Jenson has taken part in Cixous’s seminars at the Centre. Her articles are on Cixous, on 19th century French literature, and on French romanticism – the same topic she wrote her dissertation on at Harvard University.

**Verena Conley** is one of the main figures who worked on Cixous in English, mainly between 1984 and 1992. She edited and translated two volumes (1991) of Cixous’s seminars given in the 1980s at the Centre, and translated the foreword by Cixous to one of Clarice Lispector’s books (1989). She also wrote a book on Cixous, and conducted interviews with her (1984, 1984, 1997). Conley attended the University of Geneva and received her PhD from the University of Wisconsin. She worked as an associate professor of French at Iowa State University and as a professor of French and women’s studies at Miami University in Ohio. She wrote mainly on Cixous, but also on general literature, film and women writers. One of her most recent works is on ecopolitics. The only other translation I could find by her is a text by Roland Barthes.

**Eric Prenowitz** is one of the most recent translators of Cixous in English. He seems to be the one who undertook most of her translations in the second half of the 1990s. Apart from various articles by her, he translated *Rootprints* (1997) and wrote an “Aftermaths” to this book (pp.243-254). He also contributed to the essay collection *Stigmata* (1998). The only information I could find about him, however, is that he is

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160 “Attacks of the Castle”, “An Error of Calculation”, “Writing Blind”, and “‘Mamâ, disse ele’, or Joyce’s Second Hand” (all in 1996); “Stigmata, or Job the Dog” and “My Algeriance, in other words: to depart not to arrive from Algeria” (both in 1997); “Letter to Zohra Drif” (1998); and “Post-Word” (1999).
affiliated with the Centre d'études féminines. The only other translation by him is a book by Jacques Derrida.

Susan Sellers co-translated the above-mentioned texts with Ann Liddle and Sarah Cornell (see group 4 before 1986). She also contributed to 'Coming to Writing' with her Cixous translations. Sellers published extensively on Cixous. She wrote a book on her and edited two others (1988, 1994, 1996). She also conducted interviews with her (1985, 1989). Sellers studied at the universities of London and Sorbonne. She taught in the Department of English at the Ecole Normale Supérieure, near Paris, and at the University of Paris VIII. Among all the translators and editors of Cixous's work in English, Sellers is the one who wrote most abundantly on feminist thought, feminist theory and criticism, women's writing, and women in education. She has worked in association with the Centre since 1983. Among her other translations I only found two articles in a book she edited.

As in the case of Betsy Wing, Catherine Anne Franke MacGillavray does not neatly fit into any of the groups above. She is one of the rather recent names associated with Cixous. From 1989 onwards, she translated excerpts from her fiction and several articles\footnote{161 "Writings on the Theater" and "Dedication to the Ostrich" (both in 1989); "The Day of Condemnation" (1992); "Bethsabée ou la Bible intérieure" and "Sans Arrêt, non, État de Dessination, non, plutôt: Le Décollage du Bourreau" (both in 1993); and "Voile noire voile blanche" (1994).} and later the complete translation of Manne aux Mandelstams aux Mandelas (1994). She also translated Firstdays of the Year (1998) and contributed to Stigmata (1998) with her translations. Unlike Wing, however, MacGillavray has no other output apart from her work on Cixous. I could only find an article on the writer\footnote{162 "Dossier: Hélène Cixous", Qui Parle? 3:1. Spring 1989. 113-120.}, prefaces to the translations mentioned above, and an interview again carried out with Cixous (1989). I could not learn for sure whether MacGillavray has ever attended Cixous's seminars, but she could as well be placed in group 4 due to her apparent connections with the writer.

Summary of the findings on Cixous's translators after 1986

From 1986 to 1999, Cixous had 19 different translators in English. Some of them had already translated from her before 1986. Out of these 19 translators, 11 translated Cixous only once. The rest of the texts are distributed as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Translators</th>
<th>Number of texts translated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eric Prenowitz</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catherine A. F. MacGillavray</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Susan Sellers</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deborah Carpenter Jenson</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ann Liddle</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verona Andermatt Conley</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarah Cornell</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betsy Wing</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

As for book-length works and complete plays after 1986, they were translated by:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Translators</th>
<th>Books or complete plays</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catherine A. F. MacGillavray</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Susan Sellers</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deborah Carpenter Jenson</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eric Prenowitz</td>
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<tr>
<td>Verona Andermatt Conley</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sarah Cornell</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Betsy Wing</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Apart from the above, Judith Graves Miller and Christiane Makward co-translated one play, Flower MacCannell, Pike and Groth co-translated another. Ann Liddle and Keith Cohen contributed to one book each. The numbers above do not indicate the actual number of works published by Cixous in English, since many are co-translations and some other texts were written by Cixous in English.

In short, all the main translators after 1986 – except Wing – are from Cixous’s circle of students/colleagues, six of them directly from her seminars in the Centre. Those who do not belong to this group 4, come from group 3 (four academics, with plenty of texts of their own, but with few other translations). Very few people from groups 1 (2 translators, no information) and 2 (4 translators with few other output, translating Cixous only once) dealt with her texts after 1986. The number of translators from group 3 remained almost the same both before and after 1986, but the major shift is from groups 1-2 to group 4 translators. In book-length works, the shift is from groups 1-2 and 4 to groups 3-4. This shift in the form of ‘specialisation’ seems to have had a bearing on Cixous’s changing image in Anglo-America, as we shall see below.
4.3.3. Consequences

Barthes’s work initially attracted those who were mainly interested in literary theory and especially in structuralism and semiotics\(^{163}\). Hence the large number of translators from group 3 and 4 before 1986. During this period numerous translators with a variety of interests and expertise undertook translations of Barthes, and almost all of them worked on his texts only once or twice. This caused a diffused initial interest and a lack of specialisation on his texts. As we shall see in section 4.4.1., the gradual specialisation which came with the second half of the 1980s challenged his established image as a 'structuralist and semiotician'. During this second period, the majority of his translators were not literary critics, but those who used literary language, either as a translator or as a writer. This shift in the identity of translators reflects a certain change in Barthes’s image and has to do with the fact that those who specialise in translating him, i.e. those associated primarily with literary theory and especially with structuralism and semiotics, presented him as a ‘man of letters’. The result is the coexistence of two different images of Barthes in the Turkish literary critical system.

As in the case of Barthes in Turkish, Cixous had several translators in the beginning. Unlike the case of Barthes, however, there were few well-known figures among her initial translators. During the period when she was hailed as a 'French feminist theoretician', the majority of her translators were apparently neither ardent feminists nor prominent theoreticians themselves. In their case, the translation initiative probably lies more with the publishers than with the translators. At first glance, the translator pattern before 1986 does not seem to explain Cixous’s persistent image as a ‘feminist theoretician’. However, this pattern may clarify the situation in a way different from the case of Barthes. Cixous was presented as a ‘French feminist theoretician’ primarily by the mediators other than the translators, by those Anglo-American feminist critics who acted as “cultural intermediaries” (Simon 1996:91) or “bridge figures between French theoretical/critical thinking and the American literary historical establishment” (Susan Gubar, cited in Gaudin et al. 1981:6). Since the majority of Cixous’s translators in the first period were rather less-known figures with a cursory interest in her work, they did not have the necessary authority or influence to challenge and alter the prevailing image.

\(^{163}\) According to the above bio-bibliographical information, we can safely assume that several of Barthes’s and Cixous’s translators initiated the translation process themselves by choosing the particular author and text(s).
The fact that Cixous's later translators had to come from her own seminars in Paris points to the difficulty in finding easy access to the Anglo-American feminist critical system. It seems that she had to gather around her a circle of 'followers' willing to carry the message abroad, so to speak, but the creation of this personal network has taken some fifteen years. The tropes of alterity and universality should have placed considerable obstacles in the way of her reception. Those in group 4, i.e. the majority of her more recent translators, had at least the opportunity to receive feedback from the writer whose works they were translating. In the case of Barthes, however, there is no sign of such direct contact. Many of Barthes's translators pursued at least part of their education in France, and Barthes himself had briefly visited Istanbul in 1959 and given lectures at the Faculty of Literature, University of Istanbul (Benk 2000:277). Still there is no indication that he was in any way involved in the translations of his works into Turkish. Unlike Cixous's case, I could not find any interviews done with him either. This state of affairs reminds us of the absence of reciprocity, the lack of mutual give-and-take, which is characteristic of unilateral import/export relationships.

The same absence can be concluded when we follow another line of argument and focus on the most striking difference between the two sets of translators. While in Turkey Barthes is only a small part of his main translators' literary and scholarly output (especially in the case of Yücel and the Rifats, but also of the other translators in groups 3 and 4), Cixous is the whole or major part of her main editors' and translators' work in Anglo-America (e.g. Liddle, Cornell, Carpenter Jenson, MacGillavray, Prenowitz, and for some time, Conley and Sellers). While Cixous was translated by the participants at her seminars in Paris, Barthes was translated by major Turkish scholars who were interested in literary theory. These scholars saw Barthes as an important figure, but by no means the only source. The translation of his texts is merely a part of their productivity. In the Turkish case, translation is obviously counted as a rewarding activity, unlike Sherry Simon's observation for Anglo-American feminists: "The intellectual 'returns' of translation are clearly not sufficient today to merit the investment of otherwise productive academics" (1996:91). Later translations of Cixous's texts into English were meted out to translators "who have been in some way associated with the intellectual projects of their authors" (Simon 1996:91). The presence

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164 A similar situation can be observed in the case of Julia Kristeva, for instance, "where fully fifty percent of the works have been translated by the same individuals", a group of translators "of staff and graduate students in Columbia's French and Comparative Literature departments" where Kristeva was visiting for several terms in the 1970s (Penrod 1993:43,48).
of Cixous is much more palpable in this case. On the contrary, translations of Barthes’s
texts into Turkish were undertaken by prominent intellectuals whose work Barthes’s
project came to be associated with. As most of these intellectuals were in favour of a
’scientific’ criticism offered through structuralism and semiotics, Barthes was perceived
as exclusively affiliated with this paradigm. And since these intellectuals were seen as
belonging to the ‘other’ camp, the one posing a ‘threat’ to the Marxist and socialist
critical tradition, Barthes was placed there too. In Chapter 6, we will see how this
particular interpellation of ‘apoliticalness’ is reflected in translation and supported by it.

All this may sound rather paradoxical indeed. When we consider the situation from
the power differentials point of view, it is interesting to see that the ‘weak’ receiving
system has so much control over the imports from the ‘strong’ source system. Here
distance plays an important role: not a distance in time and space, of course, but the
distance in interest, or disinterest, on the part of the source system which is engaged in a
unilateral export/import relationship with the receiving system. Her reception in Anglo-
America must have mattered to Cixous in a way and to an extent his reception in Turkey
would probably never have mattered to Barthes. Therefore, it was in Cixous’s best interest
to establish this network of translators with whom she could collaborate, which is not the
case in Barthes’s translations into Turkish.

Up to this point, I have tried to show that the attitudes towards imported discursive
elements are determined not only by the general power differentials between the source
and receiving systems, but also by the agency of the mediators. Below I will try to
demonstrate how some of these mediators helped to transform the images of the two
writers, which they – through their professional affiliations and identities – contributed
to the formation of in the first place.

4.4. The changing images

Images do not stay the same forever. Due to many factors – translation and translator
patterns being two among them – they are gradually transformed into other images. One
image can dislodge another, as Levefere and Bassnett point out (1998:10), and
contradicting profiles of the same writers and their works may coexist. Here are two
examples.
4.4.1. Barthes as an ‘essayist’

Mehmet Rifat and Tahsin Yücel, two of the translators who specialised on Barthes, were also among those critics who tried to put forward a different image for him than the one prevailing in the Turkish literary critical system. On the basis of their position as ‘insiders’ in structuralism and semiotics, they challenged Barthes’s established reputation as a structuralist and semiotician producing ‘scientific’ criticism.

Apparently, Mehmet Rifat’s interest in Roland Barthes has been mainly from a semiotician’s point of view. For instance, in an article he wrote on Barthes in 1983 Rifat briefly comments on his writings in chronological order and emphasises each text’s relationship to semiotics. According to Rifat, after Le Degré zéro de l’écriture, which bears traces of Sartre, all later books of Barthes are based on linguistic, semiotic or structural concerns. For instance, Michelet par lui-même belongs to Barthes’s structuralist period, where he “started to see the surrounding phenomena as systems of signs and wanted to analyse these systems in order to find out their rules of operation. However, at this stage, he lacked a method with established concepts and principles” (1983:104). In Mythologies, Barthes used the concepts of linguistics and of the then-fledgling semiotics: “Founding a new branch of science called semiotics became the main concern of Barthes’s future writings” (104). His later book Sur Racine was a product of his interest in structuralism and psychoanalysis, but Eléments de sémiologie was his return to the endeavours for establishing this young science. As for Essais critiques, the style of which is “a mixture of criticism and essay”, Barthes wrote it while he “continued his work on semiotics”. Rifat places S/Z and “Introduction à l’analyse structurale des récits” among the works Barthes wrote at a time while he was lecturing on semiotics.

Despite the clear emphasis on Barthes’s relationship to language and signs and on ‘Barthes the (structuralist and) semiotician’, Rifat’s chronological approach gives him the opportunity to introduce another Barthes, too. When he comes to Sade, Fourier, Loyola, Rifat acknowledges the influence of Jacques Lacan and the Tel Quel group (especially Julia Kristeva and Philippe Sollers). He then presents Le Plaisir du texte as a turning point in Barthes’s career, where he tried to find ways to explain literary texts according to his own body, his own feelings. [...] As a distinguished and sensitive reader-writer, he started to look for a new life style; to write, to talk and to live only on the basis of his likes and dislikes. In short, in order not to fall into loneliness, he changed his ‘strategy’. From now on, instead of a dull objectivity and a repulsive
scientificity, he would establish a direct link with the readers and would try to convey them – with affection and sensitivity – his experiences, his life as a writer and his tastes (106).

According to Rifat, Barthes gave the best example for this approach in 1975: *Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes*. In *Fragments d'un discours amoureux*, his “most popular” book, Barthes “opted for a plainer, more lucid style in order to provide answers to a certain audience”; and in *Sollers écrivain*, he challenged “the extremely analytical, rationalist, unbiased and objective criticism” of his day, which he considered almost a “criticism made by a superego” (106). Rifat concludes with the following comments:

It is impossible to formulate a decisive definition of Roland Barthes. He is not exactly a scientist, a philosopher or a critic. No one can mark him (exclusively) as a semiotician, a sociologist, a linguist or a writer. The diversity of his work defies such classification. [...] When we approach [Barthes], we have to discard the traditional genres and see him as the founder of a new type of writing. That is why he is a unique subject (1983:107) [Emphases in the original].

As mentioned above, Tahsin Yücel is the other influential translator of Barthes who rejected his almost ossified image in the Turkish system. Unlike Rifat, however, Yücel did not believe that Barthes had ever been a structuralist or a semiotician. In the only article he devoted completely to the writer, notably titled “Roland Barthes ve Deneme” (*Roland Barthes and Essay, 1976b*)165, Yücel claims that, as opposed to the wide-spread conviction, Barthes has never been a theoretician or a scholar. Rather, Yücel says, he is a versatile essayist.

Yücel starts his article by quoting Georges Mounin166, who accuses Barthes of being “dishonest” and of rapidly changing attitude. According to Mounin, Barthes wanders among philosophy, psychology, sociology, linguistics, semiotics, criticism and anthropology in such a way that “one concludes this definitely should not be the proper relationship among these disciplines”. Yücel says that Mounin is wrong in his argument, because although he refers to Barthes as an essayist, he criticises him as if he were a linguist or a semiotician. Yücel warns that one “should not be misled by the gradually increasing inclination towards scientificity in [Barthes’s] works, apparent in the terms and methods he makes use of” during the period between *Essais critiques* (1964) and *S/Z* (1970). “This does not make him necessarily a scientist proper,” says Yücel. Even at times

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when Bartes deals with semiology, he sees it as a "craftsmanship" and himself as an "artisan".

Yuicel continues by commenting on Barthes's major books (1976b:35-37). Although Le Degré zéro de l'écriture "foretells the emergence of a distinguished essayist", it seems to prove "the impossibility of an objective 'writing'". Michelet par lui-même is, at first glance, a critical study; however, it remains "at a level of conscious images and analysed figures". According to Yuicel, Barthes seems to be unwilling to take one step further and to "order and organise these parts", so he leaves the book "at the stage of an inventory". In Mythologies, Barthes himself states that his aim is more ethical than scientific. The book, therefore, is "bound to remain as a collection of short essays". Sur Racine is based on "an approach that cannot be easily adopted by a scientist, i.e. merging two distinct methods – structuralism and psychoanalysis". Like Michelet, Système de la Mode falls short of final analysis; although it is a book often consulted by semioticians, "when observed from the viewpoint of science, it looks like an enormous failure: Here, too, the unity is more literary than scientific". Eléments de sémiologie and "Introduction à l'analyse structurale des récits" have more to do with theory; nevertheless "they bear the stamp of the personal style of an original man of letters. Besides, in these texts, whatever respect is shown to the theoretical works of Greimas or Bremond, Barthes uses their results not as scientific data, but as inspirations". Yuicel adds that S/Z, too, is merely "an inventory" which lacks "unity". In all these works, Barthes cannot show the final resolution: "The elements, with their repeated characteristics, are heaped one over the other; however, the system – the always sensed, longed for, discussed system – remains an unfulfilled dream" (1976b:42).

A year later, in his introductory article on structuralism, published in Birikim's special issue (1977, see 2.1.1.), Yuicel complains about the lack of commitment observed in certain schools of thought, and the consequent difficulty of introducing and explaining these schools in a coherent way to a new audience. He asserts that structuralism has been subjected to such a split during its development and chooses Barthes as an example.

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167 Yuicel here quotes from the preface to Système de la Mode.
168 It is worth noting here A.J. Greimas's comments on Tahsin Yuicel's thesis in Sémantique structurale. Greimas finds L'Imaginaire de Bernanos authoritative, but finds some difficulty in the presentation of the results of Yuicel's work, which he qualifies as "littéraire": "ce qui paraît satisfaisant du point de vue de la critique littéraire ne constitue qu'un état de préanalyse sémiotique" (1966:222). One cannot help seeing a certain parallel here with Yuicel's criticism of Barthes's 'literariness'.
Although Barthes is “known as one of the pioneers of structuralism by the not-so-expert in
the field”, in an article in 1963\textsuperscript{169} he actually placed

the endeavours of the painter Mondrian, composer Pousseur and the novelist
Butor together with those of the researchers who adopted a structuralist method;
he thus regarded structuralism as an action pertaining both to the domain of
thought and to the domain of artistic production, and led a number of people into
confusion. Today this attitude can still baffle anyone who, ignoring the time
factor, continues to regard him as a pioneer. The writer, after his seminal work in
line with the structuralist method, overlooked the principles of structuralism –
especially by his book \textit{S/Z} – and was severely criticised by genuine structuralists
for not being concerned about methodological meticulousness. Therefore, his
work of this kind cannot be regarded as samples of the structuralist method
(1977:30).

Five years later the same article was incorporated into Yücel’s introductory book on
structuralism, \textit{Yapisalcılık} (1982), but this time, with an insertion: Barthes has not only
“overlooked the principles of structuralism”, but

by gradually strengthening his ‘selective’ and ‘subjective’ attitude, as in \textit{Roland
Barthes par Roland Barthes} and \textit{Fragments d’un discours amoureux}, started to
express always his own ‘ego’, his own sensitivity, and his own cultural
accumulation. Although he made very interesting comments on other people’s
works, he used them as tools for projecting his own thoughts and feelings; in
short, he intermingled the object and the subject in a not easily separable way
(1982:12)\textsuperscript{170}.

This, of course, was again “severely criticised by genuine structuralists”, such as J.-
Cl.Coquet. But why cannot Barthes achieve scientificity? Yücel attributes this first to the
influence of Sartre. Like Sartre, Barthes tries to cover as wide an area as possible; he
wishes “to acquire all the knowledge of his era” (1976b:37). The second reason is his
“autonomous attitude. As a thinker who knows by experience the limitations of our
knowledge, the possible ambiguities behind our assertions, he never distances himself
from scepticism” (\textit{ibid.}). He complies with the subjectivity that “locks us within our
boundaries” (38). Therefore, according to Yücel, Barthes is not “a researcher avoiding
subjectivity”, but “a writer as subjective as possible” (39): “Having chosen at the start to be


\textsuperscript{170} It is an interesting ‘coincidence’, then, that the translator of \textit{Fragments} into Turkish would also be
Tahsin Yücel some ten years after this critical piece in \textit{Yapisalcılık}. Taking into consideration that
\textit{Fragments} – a later work by Barthes full of structuralist concepts used with an additional psychoanalytic
load – is a far cry from the ‘scientificity’ of his earlier works, it emerges as a key text deserving the
attention of the researcher who would like to work on shifting concepts and their translations by a
formerly adamant critic of Barthes’s “work of this kind”. Such a relationship in fact violates the common
notion that there should be a sense of empathy, “a sympathetic bond” or some sort of agreement between
the writer and his/her translator (c.f. Bassnett 1996:11; Venuti 1995:276). In my future work, I would like
to come back to this text and its Turkish translation.
an écrivain instead of an écrivant, Barthes “marks the boundaries of his profession with modesty, even after all the distance he had covered”; he is “a ‘sentence-thinker’, a writer, i.e. neither a thinker proper, nor a sentence-maker completely” (1976b:40). Yücel concludes by asking:

Does this show us the failure of Roland Barthes? On the contrary: it just proves that he is not only a writer who would not claim that he could exhaust his subject matter, but a genuine essayist who has proved that it is inexhaustible – under various guises and due to the genre which determines his ‘writing’ (1976b:42).

This is the second image Barthes acquired within the Turkish literary system, then: a ‘unique’ writer and a prolific essayist. The transformation of the early image and the continuing co-existence of these two images can be observed in the the extratextual material provided with the Turkish translations of his texts – mainly in those published after 1990 and written by Yücel and the Rifats. Here are some examples: On the back cover of Yücel’s translation of *Le Degré zéro* (1989), it is stated that “Barthes played an important role in contemporary French thought as a semiotician, a literary theoretician, a sociologist and, most importantly, an essayist”. In his introduction to the translation of this book, Yücel notes: “Without claiming scientificity and by stretching the limits of the essay genre, Barthes turns to naming and classifying the phenomena in order to evaluate them as systematically as possible” (1989:8). Yücel did not write any introduction to his translations of *Mythologies* (1990), *Fragments d’un discours amoureux* (1992), and *L’Empire des signes* (1996), and I take this as a curious silence when his involvement with Barthes’s work and his authority on the topic are taken into consideration. Nevertheless, on the back-cover of *Mythologies* it is claimed that Barthes’s writings owe their strength to being located “at the crossroads of literature and science”. In the reprint of *Mythologies* (1998) there is an anonymous and very brief introduction which shows all the signs of having been written, or at least inspired by, Yücel: “All his life, Barthes was first and foremost an essayist. His output covers a wide range of areas from the position of ‘writing’ and of ‘écrivain/écrivant’ to daily myths, from studies on classical literature to texts which contributed to the theory of semiotics”.

In an introductory paragraph added to the translation of “Présentation” by Mehmet Yalçın (1982), Mehmet Rifat describes Barthes as a French semiotician, literary theoretician and essayist (130-131). In the joint introduction to their translation of

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171 Yücel is here referring to Barthes’s essay “Ecrivains y écrivants” from *Essais critiques*.
172 Yücel here quotes from *Le Plaisir du texte*. 

Introduction à l'analyse structurale des récits (1998), Mehmet and Sema Rifat evaluate the text as “an important essay in the history of semiotics” (5). On the back-cover of this book, Barthes is presented as “a French critic and semiotician”. His methodological analysis of narratives and his peculiar style combining the scientific and the artistic are mentioned. He is described as “a writer and a scientist”, who is a “pioneer in modern criticism, semiotics and literary theory, but especially, in reading with pleasure and writing with joy”. La Tour Eiffel (1996), again co-translated by the Rifats, is introduced as “a product of the years Barthes started living both a (semio)scientific and artistic adventure of writing” (5). In this introduction Mehmet Rifat maintains that “deep down Barthes’s mastery as an essayist, one can trace the hints of a semiotician’s mastery of looking at things, of intuition, analysis, classification and interpretation”. In the anonymous brief introductions to the translations of L’Aventure sémiologique (1993), S/Z (1996) and Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes (1998) Barthes is introduced as “the French essayist, critic and semiotician”. The back-cover information on the translation of Incidents (1999) announces “one of the most important literary theorists and essayists of the twentieth century”. In the introduction written for this translation, Sema Rifat focuses exclusively on Barthes’s essays.

Yücel and the Rifats are not alone in pointing out the ‘unscientific’ aspects of Barthes’s writing (see e.g. Kahraman 1990:43). For instance, Enis Batur (4.3.1.2., Group 3) introduces him as “a great writer”, maybe “the only writer who could embrace modernism in its integrity” (1987:8). For Batur – who himself is well-known for his collection of essays, as well as his poetry – Barthes is exclusively an essayist (a fact which is more affirmatively stressed in the back-cover information taken from this introduction). Batur compares Barthes with Montaigne and Bacon of the classical age. Like Mehmet Rifat, he also emphasises Barthes’s “uniqueness” and his endeavours to prove “the uniqueness of the subject” (1987:15). Neither structuralism nor semiotics is ever mentioned in this long introduction, except for a passing remark on his use of the “structuralist method” (1987:12). Those who were ‘insiders’, then, with more expertise in literary theory and especially in structuralism and semiotics, challenged the established image of Barthes in Turkey and tried to present a multi-faceted Barthes. They either denied his ‘scientificity’, as in the case of Yücel, or at least did not emphasise it to the same extent as his opponents did. In the end, these were the people who undertook his later translations into Turkish. One may conclude that this indicates a more ‘digested’ sort of importation which can defy the passivity expected from a
‘defective’ stand. It also confronts the tropes of alterity which characterised the left-leaning critics’ and intellectuals’ response to Barthes.

Up to now I have described how certain mediators transformed the early image of a writer and challenged the prevailing attitudes towards the importation of his work. This later image, however, can be best appreciated with a certain amount of background knowledge. What would this insistence on Barthes as a writer (as opposed to a scholar) and an essayist (as opposed to a ‘scientific’ critic) imply within the Turkish context? Below is a brief explanation.

“In Turkey”, writes Enis Batur in 1976, “the most conspicuous and intriguing vagueness in the critical field is the perpetual imbalance between ‘criticism/ literary study’ and ‘essay/ critical essay’” (45). The issue of essay vs. criticism was closely related to the debate on ‘subjectivity’ vs. ‘objectivity’ discussed in 2.1.4. and was by no means a less frequently emerging one. In descriptions of ‘subjective’ criticism, for example, references to essay writing are common: “Subjective criticism is based on the direct effect of the object of criticism on the subject criticising it, and on whether or not the subject has liked the object in question. It is closer to the genre of ‘essay’” (Aytaç 1991:50). Objective criticism, on the other hand, “requires that literary criteria are used in the examination and that the critic’s ego is kept at bay” (ibid.). As we have seen in Chapter 2, ‘subjective’ criticism was considered to be an integral feature of the Turkish critical tradition. Accordingly, as the genre which allegedly gives expression to this type of criticism, essay was the main genre in critical writing. This state of affairs was usually attributed to the continuation of what is called ‘the Ataç tradition’ after Nurullah Ataç, a prominent critic, writer and thinker of the 1940s and 1950s – a tradition often summarised as a tendency for critical interpretation based on intuitive likes and dislikes, which are not expected to be justified by proofs (Fuat 1960:3). Ataç’s authoritative writings, which purportedly promoted “taste” and “pleasure” instead of scholarly work, were thought to be at the origin of the widespread adherence to ‘subjective’ criticism up to the 1960s (Cömert 1981:113) and they aroused the demands for a more ‘scientific’ criticism (Cöntürk 1956:681).

Ataç is often referred to as the person who “prepared Turkish literature for

173 Here, Bedrettin Cömert points out that there is no relation between the term used in Turkey as ‘subjective criticism’ in the memory of Ataç and the subjective tradition developed in the West. Yet he does not further elaborate on this point.
criticism” by “improving the tradition of discussion” (Ertop in “Eleştiri Tartışması” 1985:64) rather than by being a critic or a literary theoretician himself (Binyazar 1973:140). There were claims that “becoming a critic starts with the understanding that Ataç was not a critic. He was an essayist and his essays can be read with pleasure even today” (Okay 1991:25). Although almost all Turkish writers and critics acknowledge their debt to Ataç, most of them insist that he used more ‘subjective’ criteria than ‘objective’ ones and that he established “impressionistic criticism” as “a form of art”, “closest to essay writing” (Binyazar 1973:140,143; Bezirci in “Eleştiri Tartışması” 1985:63-64). Ataç’s claim that criticism was “a form of art” was attributed to his early aspirations to be a poet himself (Bezirci 1976:30,35). This, in fact, was a common theme in Turkish critical writings. It was often stated that most Turkish critics had started their career as aspiring poets, or sometimes novelists, and inevitably ‘failed’, since they lacked the necessary ‘talent’, ‘creativity’ or ‘inspiration’. They were often accused of reproaching the much-envied poets and writers because of their own personal grudge (e.g. Aksal 1969:227; Kocagöz 1972:267; Buğra 1991:25) and were charged with “imitating writers, though at a level of so-called meta-language” (İnce 1983:32). In short, critics were not given the right to be ‘creative’ in their own writings (Ataç 1958:47), since the separation between criticism and art was quite strong. One of the most authoritative statements on the issue comes, once again, from Asım Bezirci: “Art reflects the man; criticism introduces the work. Art aesthetically recreates reality through images; criticism tells it in a simple language made up of concepts. Art is creation; criticism is the judgement of this creation. Art is construction; criticism is analysis, etc.” (1976:31).

One can easily notice the parallels between the ‘Ataç tradition’ and the later presentation of Barthes in Turkey as a writer and essayist. If we combine the arguments mentioned above, the main types of criticism envisaged in Turkey until the late 1980s can be represented as follows, albeit in simplified form:

Subjective criticism vs. Objective criticism

Impressionistic criticism vs Scientific criticism

Essay writing (‘traditional’ Turkish criticism) vs. Criticism proper’ (in its ‘Western’ sense)
Although Barthes was initially imported into the Turkish literary critical system as part of the general quest for the notions in the right-hand column, he was later placed in the lower corner of the left-hand column. The tendency to put clear-cut distinctions between literature and criticism must have been a factor in the delayed translations of Barthes’s later works, which were not exclusively theoretical and displayed literary qualities. This type of ‘unscholarly’ essay-writing was ‘non-criticism’ from the point of view of many Turkish critics of the period. As we have seen in 2.1.4., in a literary system and at a time in which criticism was considered to be meaningful only when it involved literary study and examination of the work (Kocagöz 1972:266), where there were complaints that there is little of “noble criticism” and “most of these are more like essays or interviews, since we are more used to thinking with our feelings” (Başçillar 1978:77), where writers thought that “it is high time we go beyond scrawling texts which can be called critical articles” (Fuat 1982:130) bringing no scrutiny, comparison or analysis whatsoever to the allegedly ‘unscientific’ Turkish criticism, how much chance would a Roland Barthes who was introduced as an **essayist** stand?

Quite a lot it seems, because, after being acclaimed as a ‘scientific’ critic by many for a considerable length of time, Barthes later appealed to Turkish readers as an interesting and multi-faceted essayist – writing in a genre which remains familiar to the Turkish critical tradition. This may be one reason behind the fact that, despite adverse criticisms coming both from the Marxist critics – who believed that what Barthes was doing was not the ‘right’ kind of science – and from the expert structuralists and semioticians – who criticised him for not being ‘scientific’ enough – translations of his works into Turkish did not stop. He actually remained a popular figure inspiring, even “directly determin[ing] the development of” a generation of Turkish writers (Kahraman 1990:46). His *Mythologies*, for instance, motivated a left-leaning critic like Murat Belge to reassess the long-denigrated essay form and write *Tarihten Güncelliğe* (see 6.2.2.2.).

The attractiveness of Barthes’s writings was also due the wide range of topics and frameworks he made use of. As we have seen above in 4.2.2.3., his texts provided material to Turkish critics for different purposes. In addition to being a rich source of ideas and inspiration, his texts – with their conceptual density – proved to be productive in developing the Turkish critical discourse through translation and especially retranslation. But I will come back to this in Chapter 5.

It is interesting to note that despite this changing image of Barthes, the advocates of ‘impressionist’ or ‘subjective’ criticism apparently did not take sides with him to prove
their own point. For instance, his later works in which the 'I' plays a significant role, such as Fragments or Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes, were nonetheless translated by those who had already specialised on him. This might be due to his initial forbidding image as a 'scientific' critic securely located within literary theory. This image survives into the 1990s in slightly altered forms and co-exists with his image as an essayist or a 'man of letters'. In the anonymous introduction to Öztürk Kasar's translation of S/Z (1996), for example, Barthes is introduced as follows: “As one of the ‘masters of language’ of the twentieth century, Roland Barthes had important publications on criticism, literary studies and sociology, as well as being an important theoretician in linguistics and semiotics”. On the back-cover of this book, it is noted that Barthes used “methods of psychoanalysis without totally leaving aside the framework of structuralist analysis and semiotics”. Similarly, in the brief introduction to Reha Akçakaya’s translation of La Chambre claire (1992 and 1996), Barthes is presented as “the French thinker and critic who made major contributions to semiotics” and who “developed a literary criticism of his own combining the influences of structuralism, semiotics and psychoanalysis”. A good example for the persistence of this earlier image is Erol Kayra’s introduction to his translation of Essais critiques in 1995, titled conspicuously “Roland Barthes ve Eleşti Sanati” (Roland Barthes and the Art of Criticism). Despite the title, Kayra emphasises Barthes's work on semiotics and linguistics: “Roland Barthes is considered to be one of the major contemporary theoreticians of literature, theatre and, especially, linguistics (more specifically, semiotics). He had close ties with notable linguists, such as Martinet, Hjemslev, Todorov, Greimas, and Benveniste. Among his books were Mythologies, Le Degré zéro de l’écriture, L’Empire des Signes, Critique et vérité, and Système de la mode. He also has numerous scientific articles on literature, linguistics, criticism and theatre” (7). Kayra seems to have forgotten about the title of his introduction, since he insists on the scientific qualities of Barthes’s writings and on his connections not only with semiotics, but also with linguistics. He lists only those books of Barthes which deal with signs and systems. He does not put Essais critiques in its historical place among Barthes’s works and presents it as a text without a date.

One final question before we take a brief look at the changing image of Hélène Cixous: Does the more pronounced time-lag in Barthes’s case reflect the tropes of “lag”? If one believes in the teleological pattern of progress discussed in 3.2.2.3., this is quite probable. To the extent that Barthes’s writings were presented as 'bright new things' imported from the West as part of structuralism and semiotics (see 6.3.3.) – despite two or
three decades of delay – and were presented without being located in their proper historical context, the time-lag is important in his reception in Turkey. Those who resisted this achrony, however, were again the Rifats and Yücel. For example, in their introductions to the translations of *Introduction à l'analyse structurale des récits* and *L'Aventure sémiologique*, Mehmet and Sema Rifat point out that the works in question should be read keeping in mind their historicity. They were written in the 1960s and early 1970s, when semiotics was only a fledgling field of study. A similar attempt at historicising the translations can also be seen in Tahsin Yücel's introduction to his translation of *Le Degré zéro*. Thus, one can conclude that the second image of Barthes as an essayist has defied both the tropes of alterity, characterising a defensive attitude, and the tropes of ‘lack’ and ‘lag’, typical of a ‘defective’ attitude.

### 4.4.2. Cixous as a ‘writer’

At the beginning of this chapter I have written in detail about the problematic representation of Cixous in Anglo-America as a ‘feminist’ and ‘theoretician’ exclusively. This was despite the multifaceted nature of her writings. In fact, similar to the criticisms Barthes has received in many parts of the world, Cixous’s diversity was not always taken as a positive thing either. In her widely read book *Sexual/Textual Politics*, Toril Moi starts her highly critical chapter on Cixous – conspicuously titled “Hélène Cixous: an Imaginary Utopia” – with a quotation from Walt Whitman: “Do I contradict myself?/ Very well then... I contradict myself; / I am large... I contain multitudes” (1985:102). Cixous was “constantly shifting and realigning herself” (Conley 1992:129) and this probably only intensified the efforts to canonise and categorise her.

Yet this was not a very easy thing to do. There seems to be a general consensus among those who write about Cixous that her work is difficult to classify according to the established genre divisions: “It is quite clear that for Cixous there is as much ‘theory’ in a text marked clearly by the word ‘novel’ on its title page as there is ‘fiction’ or ‘novel’ or ‘autobiography’ in a text that would seem to advertise itself as ‘theory’” (Penrod 1996:xii). Her ‘theoretical’ texts or ‘essays’ are “as much prose poems as critical or theoretical statements” (Suleiman 1991:xi). These texts are “written creatively”, while her plays and fiction “work on theory” (Ward Jouve 1991:49). Despite this difficulty in classification, the name ‘Hélène Cixous’ symbolised French feminist *theory* for a considerable period of time for most of the Anglo-American
feminist critics. As long as they needed ‘Cixous the feminist theoretician’, her critical texts on women’s issues were chosen for translation.

As in the case of Barthes, however, this earlier image of Cixous did not stay the same, and was modified and accompanied by another – Cixous the writer and playwright. As we have seen in 4.2.3., until about 1986 her plays, novels, novellas, and short story collections were often represented mainly in excerpt form. The few available fictions in English, like *Angst*, were “solidified into a false representativeness” (Ward Jouve 1991:49). As for her plays, *Portrait de Dora* remained the best known: “Among her theatrical works it holds the same position as ‘The Laugh of the Medusa’” says Penrod (1996:139). Ironically, since this play was based on Freud’s famous ‘case study of hysteria’, such a limited representation might have created further alienation on the part of American feminist readers, who were then either totally against or, at best, very cautious about psychoanalysis (2.2.2.).

After 1986, more of Cixous’s works of fiction and plays were translated, either in excerpt form or as a whole (see the bibliography). Several of these translations were undertaken by her group 4 translators. This might be both due to the influence of Cixous’s personal network in the Centre, which must have provided the opportunity to introduce diverse texts to the Anglophone readers, as well as to the increasing internal diversity of the Anglo-American market, which allowed her fiction and plays to address new audiences apart from the feminist critics. As a sign of this changing image, several books exclusively on Cixous appeared in English in the 1990s (e.g. Shiach 1991; Conley 1992; Penrod 1996; Sellers 1996). These books focus more on Cixous’s ‘creative writing’: novels, short stories and plays. They all start with prefaces where the writers express their wish to introduce a long-neglected aspect of Cixous’s work. For example:

My aim in this introductory study [...] is to explore the development of her fictional and dramatic writing in the context of her theory of *écriture féminine*. Although Cixous is primarily known in the English-speaking world for her work as a feminist and literary critic, this in fact constitutes only a small

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Cixous's shifting image – and the co-existence of her different images – can be observed in several articles and books written about her in the 1990s. Cixous is "a contemporary French writer, critic, and theorist", says Morag Shiach (1991:1). Verena Andermatt Conley observes that "[Cixous] addresses broad issues of cultural exchange through the medium of writing," and "remains foremost a writer who blurs the accepted lines between styles, modes and genres; between reading and writing; and, especially, between the cultural roles traditionally assigned to poetry, psychoanalysis and philosophy" (1992:xiii-xiv) [Emphases in the original]. "[Cixous] calls for a different style of reading," notes Gayatri Spivak, "because she writes as a writer, not as a philosopher, although she is deeply marked by her own version of the philosophies of writing and of the Other" (1993:154). It is worth noting that translators from group 4, such as Susan Sellers and Verena Andermatt Conley, are also among those who tried to "redress the imbalance" in recent years. Thanks to these concentrated efforts to do 'better justice' to Cixous's œuvre – if not exactly due to a more representative selection of texts to be translated – a greater number of people in the Anglophone world came to recognise the name Hélène Cixous as a playwright and fiction writer as well as a 'feminist theoretician'.

4.5. Conclusions

In this chapter I have tried to demonstrate how translation and translator patterns influenced – and were in turn influenced by – the particularities of the reception of Barthes in Turkey and Cixous in Anglo-America; how these patterns helped to create, sustain and transform the images of these two writers; and, how they strengthened or challenged the prevailing attitudes towards the importation of certain (literary) (theoretical) texts. I have also shown how a writer's persistent or shifting images affect the distribution of source texts among the translators and across time.

The translation patterns, i.e. the choice of texts (not) to be translated and when (not) to translate them, reflect the needs, expectations, and self-perception of the receiving

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\(^{175}\) Nevertheless, even such good-willed projects prove to be problematic because of the absence of translations: "[...] I have focused on a relatively small number of her fictional texts which seem to illuminate her writing project as it develops. The non-availability of most of these texts in translation raises particular problems for the discussion of a writer who is so committed to the materiality of the signifier, and whose writing frequently plays on rhythms, verbal echoes, and puns, which are hard to render into English" (Shiach 1991:4).
systems. As perceived representatives of structuralism and semiotics and of French feminism, respectively, both Barthes and Cixous were welcomed against the background of the debates discussed in Chapter 2. Their texts were chosen for translation according to the local interests and agendas. The anachronistic and partial selection defined the initial and most durable images of these two writers in the relevant receiving systems. Their work was thus "rehistoricised" and "recontextualised" (cf. Robinson 1995:47-48). Furthermore, the translations arrived with delays despite the apparent popularity of the writers. Their representativeness, as well as much of the criticism directed at them, was based on a limited number of translations arriving in the wrong sequential order. All of these points attest to the domesticating power of translation regardless of the power differentials involved between the source and receiving systems. Whatever attitude is taken towards importation, whatever trope of translation is adhered to, the imported discursive elements were transformed in these two cases.

Similarly, in both cases translator patterns had an impact on the reception of the writers in question. The professional profiles of the translators and their intellectual affiliations played a role in the formation of the images and in their gradual transformation. Conversely, attitudes towards the importation of the theories in question influenced the selection of translators (in cases where the commissioner and the translator is not the one and the same person) and the translators' choice of texts (in cases where the translators themselves determined which texts would be translated and published).

In both of the cases I have examined one writer symbolised a much wider and variegated field. Such a personification, where diverse and heterogeneous movements, schools of thought — and, in today's international politics, whole nations and cultures — are reduced to a single person, makes it easier to present these persons as the culprits and to attack or dismiss the imaginary totality they ostensibly represent176.

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176 A similar attitude can be seen in the representation of deconstruction mainly through the works of Jacques Derrida.
CHAPTER 5
MULTIPLE-ENTRY VISA TO TRAVELLING THEORY

In my introduction to Chapter 3 I argued that the formative role of translation depends on the power differentials involved between the source and receiving systems, and that imports do not contribute to the shaping of local discourses to the same extent in every destination. In order to substantiate this argument, I would now like to focus on retranslations and the issue of terminology in the cases of Barthes and Cixous. Throughout the present chapter, I will contend that the factors of dominance, elasticity, tolerance and power of the source and receiving systems involved determine whether travelling theory will be granted a multiple-entry visa into the latter through retranslations. As will be shown below, the relationship between retranslations and issues of terminology also sheds light on certain aspects of the reception of the two writers in the relevant receiving systems.

5.1. On ‘retranslation’

In translation studies terminology in English, the term ‘retranslation’ is used to describe two separate instances. One corresponds to “indirect/mediated translation” (Shuttleworth and Cowie 1997:76,146), i.e. translation from a language other than the one in which the text was originally written. The other, more widely accepted sense of the term refers to subsequent translations of a text, or part of a text, carried out after the initial translation which introduced this text to the ‘same’ target language. It is in this latter sense that I use the term retranslation throughout my thesis.

Currently, there is no detailed or systematic study on retranslations per se. Although the practice itself is common, theoretical discussions on the subject are rather rare. Retranslations often serve as case studies illuminating other aspects of translational research rather than drawing attention onto themselves as a topic in its own right. In the...

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177 This chapter is an extended version of a paper forthcoming in Target: International Journal of Translation Studies. I would like to thank the anonymous referees of the journal for their insightful comments.
178 Here I need to note that the notion of ‘same’ target language is problematic. As Gideon Toury points out, if a comparative study of translations done in different periods of time “is to have any real significance, at least the notion of (one) target language would have to be modified, in view of the fact that languages undergo constant changes. The need for such a modification would become all the more urgent as the intervals between the translations grew longer, or as the pace of the changes grew more rapid” (1995:73). I will come back to this point later in the chapter.
179 The French term ‘retraduction’ similarly covers both meanings (see Gambier 1994:413; Rodriguez 1990:67). In Turkish, the distinction is made through ‘yeniden çeviri’ or ‘yeni çeviri’ (retranslation) and ‘ikinci/araci dilden çeviri’ (translation from a second/mediating language) (see Bengi 1992:187-191).
handful of brief articles written about the phenomenon, retranslations are usually associated with the ‘ageing’ of translated texts, especially canonical literary ones. Even if retranslations of non-literary texts, such as those on philosophy, social sciences, etc. are acknowledged (e.g. Gambier 1994:414; Rodriguez 1990:64), the examples dwelt on are often taken from literary translations, and the arguments put forward usually relate to ‘great’ works of literature. As a result, the discussion on retranslation often goes hand in hand with the notion of ‘great translations’ (e.g. Berman 1990:2-3; Gambier 1994:415-416; Rodriguez 1990:71-72; Topia 1990:48). Translation scholars often wonder why some translations age quickly, while others persist (e.g. Berman 1990:1-2; Gambier 1994:414; Rodriguez 1990:64. For a contrary and interesting account of ‘ageing’ originals and translations frozen in time, see Topia 1990). The generally implied argument is that retranslations exist, because ‘great translations’ are so few: “Dans ce domaine d’essentiel inaccomplissement qui caractérise la traduction, c’est seulement aux retraductions qu’il incombe d’atteindre – de temps en temps – l’accompli” (Berman 1990:1).

For the majority of translation scholars, retranslations are things that come up as time passes and succeed the previous translation(s) in linear fashion. Both meanings of the English word ‘succeed’ are connoted here: “to come next after sb/sth and take their/its place” and “to be successful”. In accordance with a history-as-progress model, it is presumed that subsequent translations will succeed in bringing forth more appropriate, more ‘faithful’ texts ‘closer’ to the ‘original’, or texts which will be more suitable for the needs and competence of modern readers: in short, the retranslations will be, in one way or another, ‘better’ than the previous translations\(^{180}\).

[...] The very possibility of translating strongly derives from that of reading insightfully, and the latter derives in turn from a familiarity that can only be gained over time. The closer a translation of a monumental text [...] is to the original’s date of publication, the more likely it is to be unduly deficient (Lewis 1985:59-60).

C’est dans l’après-coup d’une première traduction aveugle et hésitante que surgit la possibilité d’une traduction accomplie (Berman 1990:5)\(^{181}\).

\(^{180}\) For a good example of this claim of betterment see Chapdelaine 1994, where a work by Faulkner, previously “suffered” in the hands of another translator, is “reconstructed” through retranslation (11).

\(^{181}\) However, in these views there is also a certain illusion involved, as Yves Gambier notes: “[...] Ne supposerait-on pas en effet que le sens est déposé dans le texte de départ considéré comme immuable? Cette vision logocentrique du texte et de l’immanence du sens marque d’une certaine façon, par exemple, le projet de retraduction de Freud – comme si les traducteurs pouvaient se débarrasser des interprétations postérieures à l’œuvre même, comme s’ils pouvaient faire une lecture non idéologique, non culturelle d’un sens prétendument stable” (1994:414).
The discussions about retranslations are thus often based on a linear idea of progress. The path leads either towards the source text, its otherness, the translation's adequacy (in Toury's sense), or towards contemporary readers' imagined expectations. The main assumption behind the former is that (re)translations try to restore something back to the source text — something lost in the previous attempts. This argument is especially strong in the writings of those who believe that initial translations are mostly assimilative and tend to reduce the 'otherness' of the source text because of local constraints:

La première traduction procède souvent — a souvent procédé — à une naturalisation de l'œuvre étrangère; elle tend à réduire l'altérité de cette œuvre afin de mieux l'intégrer à une culture autre. Elle s'apparente fréquemment — s'est fréquemment apparentée — à l'adaptation en ce qu'elle est peu respectueuse des formes textuelles de l'original. La première traduction vise généralement à acclimater l'œuvre étrangère en la soumettant à des impératifs socio-culturels qui privilégient le destinataire de l'œuvre traduite (Bensimon 1990:ix).

Scholars who write in line with the argument above claim that later translations would be more efficient in conveying the previously assimilated 'otherness' of the foreign material (e.g. Bensimon 1990; Berman 1990; and to an extent, Gambier 1994:414).

La première traduction ayant déjà introduit l'œuvre étrangère, le retraducteur ne cherche plus à atténuer la distance entre les deux cultures; il ne refuse pas le dépaysement culturel: mieux, il s'efforce de le créer. Après le laps de temps plus ou moins grand qui s'est écoulé depuis la traduction initiale, le lecteur se trouve à même de recevoir, de percevoir l'œuvre dans son irréductible étrangeté, son 'exotisme'. La retraduction est généralement plus attentive que la traduction-introduction, que la traduction-acclimation, à la lettre du texte source, à son relief linguistique et stylistique, à sa singularité (Bensimon 1990:ix-x).

On the other hand, there are also those who maintain that some retranslations are much closer to being adaptations of the source text, succeeding the initial literal translations (e.g. Rodriguez 1990:77). The goal of these retranslations, it is assumed, is to bring the source text closer to the reader of the day. Here the time factor is emphasised again and again: "Traduire est une activité soumise au temps, et une activité qui possède une temporalité propre" (Berman 1990:1). The focus is on "translations of the same text which were done in different periods of time" (Du-Nour 1995:328, emphasis mine). Retranslation "apporte des changements parce que les temps ont changé" (Gambier 1994:413). During the (usually long span of) time which passed since the last — and presumably outdated — translation of a certain text, many changes took place in the
historical, cultural and linguistic situation in a given receiving system (e.g. Paloposki and Oittinen 2000:382-384). Therefore, retranslation "serait liée à la notion de réactualisation des textes, déterminée par l’évolution des récepteurs, de leurs goûts, de leurs besoins, de leurs compétences" (Gambier 1994:413). Retranslations are always seen as consequences of a certain kind of ‘evolution’ in the receiving system (e.g. Rodriguez 1990:73). By examining retranslations one can allegedly reveal the accompanying evolution of translational norms (e.g. Du-Nour 1995).

In addition to the two different lines of argument above, there are also cases where both paths are taken at the same time. For instance, Miryam Du-Nour points out that during the last seventy years in the Israeli literary system, the “main justification given by ‘commissioners’ of retranslations and revisions of children’s books” has almost always been “‘to bring the book closer to the child’s heart’” (1995:332). Nevertheless, after the 1980s, the initial adaptations of children’s books also gave way to concerns of greater “fullness and adequacy” in translation (1995:338).

In this chapter, I want to add my share to the observations on retranslations, while still using them to highlight other aspects of the two cases in hand. My arguments, stated below, will hopefully add to and re-orient the theoretical discussions currently available on the topic:

a. Retranslations do not come about only when the source text is canonical and literary. My case studies are from the field of literary and cultural theories. I believe more research will reveal that many other text types are retranslated, such as scientific texts, E.U. texts, advertisements, etc, and that each type probably carries its own characteristics. This may force some of the generalisations cited above to be modified, such as those related to the equation ‘initial translation = assimilation’, ‘retranslation(s) = respecting otherness’.

b. Retranslations are not necessarily the consequence of ‘ageing’ translations or ‘changing times’, since more than one translation of the same source text may come about within a very short time span (see e.g. 4.2.2.1., Table 2. Also Pym 1998:82-84).

c. Retranslations do not arise only when the existing translation(s) are deficient/‘assimilative/ adaptive/ literal, etc., or when the readers’ attitudes, tastes and competence change. Retranslations may also emerge as a result of a
synchronous struggle in the receiving system to create the local discourse into which these translations will be incorporated.

d. Retranslations may have more to do with the needs and attitudes within the receiving system than any inherent characteristics of the source text which makes it ‘prone to’ retranslations. After all, to grant a multiple entry visa to a foreigner is totally at the discretion of the receiving authorities.

e. In relation to the argument above (d.), the non-existence of retranslations under particular circumstances should be given the importance it merits in translation research. This, of course, raises a rather methodological problem, since it is often the existence of things that draws the attention, but not otherwise. The question “why does a certain text cause more than one translation?” is a frequent one (e.g. Berman 1990:2; Gambier 1994:414; Rodriguez 1990:63), but its opposite, i.e. “why a certain text has not been translated more than once?” is hardly ever asked. Only in comparative studies, such as this one, can such absences be foregrounded as noteworthy.

5.2. Barthes’s texts retranslated into Turkish

In the case of the retranslations of Roland Barthes’s works into Turkish, it is unlikely that the ‘ageing’ of previous translations is a relevant factor. These retranslations were all carried out between 1960-1995, and the great majority of them concentrated between 1975-1990 (see 4.2.2.1.). This is a very short time span to generate such a considerable amount of retranslations from the work of just one author. These retranslations often exist and function side by side. In Anthony Pym’s terms, they are “active retranslations”, sharing “virtually the same cultural location or generation” (1998:82). If ageing is indeed a possibility here, then it points to the extremely fast ‘evolution’ of the Turkish literary critical discourse of the time, into which these translations were incorporated. Even if we could talk about evolution in this case, it is nevertheless difficult to stick to the history-as-progress model described above. Rather than following a linear development either towards the source text, its significance, its previously neglected aspects, etc., or towards the changing reader-profile – or even both at the same time – these retranslations demonstrate the spiral-like and vertiginous ‘evolution’ of the indigenous literary critical discourse.
In the previous chapter I noted that Barthes’s writings which were most often retranslated into Turkish were those produced within the framework of structuralism and semiotics: *Le Degré zéro*, *Mythologies*, *Essais critiques*, and to an extent, *Eléments de sémiologie*, *L’Aventure sémiologique*, and “Introduction à l’analyse structurale des récits”. These texts included an abundance of new terms and concepts for the Turkish literary critical discourse – not only those of structuralism, semiotics and linguistics, but also of Marxist and psychoanalytic theories. Retranslations of these texts proliferated while suitable counterparts for these terms were being suggested, debated, rejected and accepted, and they continued until the ‘modern’ Turkish literary critical discourse itself settled down with a rather more stable terminology.

In accordance with the ideal of ‘betterment’ stated above, the retranslations in Barthes’s case do function, to a certain extent, as criticisms of previous translations. In this sense, they may be considered as examples of “polemical translation” (Popović 1976:21), i.e. translations “in which the translator’s operations are directed against another translator’s operations that are representative of a different or antagonistic conception” of translation (ibid.). However, in the retranslations of Barthes’s works undertaken by different translators (i.e. those apart from the retranslated and reedited versions of *Eléments de sémiologie*, *L’Aventure sémiologique*, and “Introduction à l’analyse structurale des récits”, all done by the Rifats), there is no explicit reference to, or acknowledgement of, previously existing versions. At first glance, these texts seem to exist independently and without any awareness of each other. It is impossible to determine straightaway whether they are “compilative translations” or not, i.e. whether they were realised upon the basis of preceding translations (Popović 1976:20). Consequently, Barthes’s retranslators may not fit into the ‘typical’ definition of retranslators and their tasks given below:

Le retraducteur apparaît donc comme un messager qui aurait consulté d’autres messagers véhiculant le même message, mais en des temps, des lieux, et pour des lecteurs différents. Sa tâche est d’isoler, dans les traductions qui précèdent la sienne, ce qui caractérise les codes et contextes successifs [...] peut-être pour arriver à une meilleure compréhension du message au travers des ‘versions’ qu’en ont données les décennies ou les siècles précédents, peut-être pour comparer ces codes et contextes intermédiaires et éliminer tout ce qu’il

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182 For a similar account of retranslations and their relationship to changes in vocabulary and neologisms see Du-Nour 1995.

183 There are even cases where a certain translator’s version is later incorporated into a Barthes reader without being reedited (except for some typing errors), although there had been other translators’ versions published in-between the two appearances of this first version.
jugera devoir éliminer dans sa propre transmission en code x et contexte x (Rodriguez 1990:68).

This view presumes two things: First, that retranslators always make use of the existing translations of the source text they are undertaking to retranslate (e.g. Chapdelaine 1994; Rodriguez 1990:65; only Gambier mentions that this may not always be the case 1994:415); second, that the retranslators are aware of the existence of the previous translations in the first place. These presumptions are, in practice, quite difficult to prove or disprove. Computerised publishers’ catalogues, CD-ROM databases, and online searches for library holdings have been facts of life for only the last decade or so. Prior to these developments, translators should have had a difficult time in finding out about previous translations, especially if they were working not on book-length works, but on short pieces which could have appeared in various journals.

Let me come back to my main arguments. The abundance of retranslations of Barthes’s texts into Turkish demonstrates the painstaking efforts to establish the modern Turkish literary critical discourse. These retranslations were the consequence of the receiving system’s official openness towards, and dependence upon, imports from the West. They show the extent to which translations were problematic, but, at the same time, taken for granted, as we shall see below. Finally, they undermine many of the assumptions about retranslations stated above. In order to support these arguments and put them into perspective, I now need to digress to a different topic: the Turkish Language Reform.

The section below does not in any way intend to be a thorough survey of the reform – a vast subject on which much valuable research has been done in the last fifty years and published in a variety of languages, including Turkish, Hungarian, Russian, English, German, Georgian and French. What I include here covers the background information necessary to give the reader an idea of the dimensions of the reform, and the relationships between the reform and the translations of theoretical texts into Turkish.

5.2.1. Turkish Language Reform

The Turkish Language Reform, which started in the 1920s and continued, with varying force, up until the 1970s, was a state-supported and collective initiative which aimed at

184 For extensive bibliographical information on the reform see Brendemoen 1990.
‘cleansing’ the Turkish language of foreign elements. The Ottoman language, predecessor of the Turkish spoken in modern day Turkey, was the result of a complex co-existence of Turkish, Arabic and Persian elements due to the religious, scientific and literary exchanges among the three languages. In this trilingual situation, Turkish as a language of culture (Kultursprache) was often despised by the educated and elite native speakers (Korkmaz 1985:4). This situation continued more or less unchallenged until the imperial declaration Gülhane Hatt-i Hümayunu (1839), which implied that the empire was entering a new phase in its development, casting aside the values on which it had been nourished until then, and openly accepting the values of the Western world (Tanpinar 1967:97). New ideas and related concepts, flooding in especially from France, were to be taught to the masses in order to foster fundamental social change. A more understandable and plain prose became necessary, and the first unofficial Turkish newspapers, together with the recently-introduced genre of drama, proved to be influential in spreading the innovations to the people in a simple and less ornate style (see Heyd 1954:97; Tanpinar 1967:78, 126, 180, 224; Korkmaz 1985:1; Paker 1991:20, 27). The urge to compile the first Turkish dictionary also coincides with this period. It was claimed that Turkish should be the core of the language, which should now be called, not Ottoman, but Turkish. The latter would “no longer be a derogatory designation for the language of the illiterate peasants but the name of a great Kultursprache, which was much older than the Ottoman Empire” (Heyd 1954:12-13).

The turning point for the modern Turkish language came with the Language Reform of the 1920s, which was part of the other reforms initiated by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk after the Independence War was won and the Republic was founded in 1923. Since the very beginning, the Language Reform was backed by the Turkish state. Such an intervention was something desired by the purists (e.g. İmer 1976:32, 47; Korkmaz 1995:655, Vardar 1977:59), since they believed that a language reform which could not gain the support of the state – and therefore, the accompanying opportunities provided by the mass media – was doomed to fail. In fact, the state was ever-present in almost all the cultural developments in Turkey during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Gülhane Hatt-i Hümayunu itself was a government initiative and so were the following institutions that contributed to the development of scholarly thinking in the

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185 For information on this trilingual environment and the status of translation within it see Paker 2002.
186 E.g. Ceride-i Havadis (1840), Tercüman-ı Ahvâl (1860), Tasvir-i Efkâr (1862), Tercüman-ı Hakikat (1878).
Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey\footnote{For instance, \textit{Babâli Tercüme Odası} (The Translation Chamber) was founded by the government in 1833 with the objective of teaching European languages to Muslims; however, it soon became a school for aspiring young Ottoman writers and statesmen. \textit{Encümen-i Dâniş} (The Academy, 1851-1862), another government establishment, undertook the "selection, translation and production of teaching materials in science, history and literature" for the \textit{Darülfiünûn} university (Paker 1991:19). \textit{Cemiyet-i İlimye-i Osmaniye} (The Ottoman Scientific Society), founded in 1860, encouraged scientific studies by introducing "Western scholarship". Its \textit{Meemua-i Fünûn}, the first Turkish journal of sciences, published monthly between 1862-1882, covered "translations and original writings in philosophy and history as well as geography and the sciences, thus helping to create a medium for new scientific and scholarly prose" (Paker 1991:19; see also Tanpnar 1967:154). For more information on these institutions see e.g. Paker 1991:19, Tanpnar 1967:113-116. Between the 1940s and 1960s, it was \textit{Tercüme Bürusu} (The Translation Office), another official institution attached to the Ministry of Education, which marked the intellectual development of the Turkish society. The classics of world literature and philosophy translated by the Office and published by the Ministry had allegedly the effect of a "Renaissance that came four hundred years late for Turkey" (Gökberk 1973:82). For more information on \textit{Tercüme Bürusu} see Karantay 1991. On translation institutions in Turkey in general see Kayaoğlu 1998.}. The Turkish Language Academy (\textit{Türk Dil Kurumu}), which we shall return to below, was also an official body founded by Atatürk in 1932. It was "entrusted with the systematic reform of the Turkish language, in close co-operation with the Ministry of Education, the Republican People’s Party and the latter’s cultural organs, the People’s Houses (\textit{Halkevleri})" (Heyd 1954:21-22)\footnote{This involvement of the state was also the reason why the Language Reform became part of ‘party politics’ and was halted/promoted depending on the views of the political party in power (For the relationships between the reform and the political developments in Turkey see e.g. Brendemoen 1990). Today the Language Academy is not \textit{that active} ... and the efforts related to the reform seem to have come to an end (see Brendemoen 1990:483-484; Emecan 1998:26, 40).}. The Turkish Language Academy (\textit{Türk Dil Kurumu}, which we shall return to below, was also an official body founded by Atatürk in 1932. It was “entrusted with the systematic reform of the Turkish language, in close co-operation with the Ministry of Education, the Republican People’s Party and the latter’s cultural organs, the People’s Houses (\textit{Halkevleri})” (Heyd 1954:21-22). State-intervention also determined the direction Turkey would face from the \textit{Tanzimat} onwards. One of the best examples of the official orientation towards the West, and the role translation played in its realisation, can be found in the inaugural speech of Hasan Âli Yücel (poet, writer, translator, and the Minister of Education at the time) to the First Turkish Publications Congress (\textit{Birinci Türk Neşriyat Kongresi, 1939}), addressing the issue of “how to start a ‘translation mobilization to provide Republican Turkey with the classical and contemporary products of Western culture and thought,’ of Western ‘civilization of which it was aiming to be an organic part’” (cited in Paker 1997:49-50; Paker’s translation). The result was the \textit{Tercüme Bürousu}, which, only between 1940 and 1944, managed to have 109 classical works translated and published (\textit{ibid.}). Consequently, while the initial goal of the Language Reform was to bridge the gap between the ornate written language of the İstanbul elite and the spoken language of the Anatolian population (İmer 1976:31; Korkmaz 1995:654; Brendemoen 1990:463), from the early republican period onwards the main focus quickly shifted towards bringing Turkish to “a position to cater for the necessities of modern art, science and technology
Accordingly, the objectives of the Language Academy were stated as follows: "to strive, in a reformist fashion and in accordance with scientific methods, for the purification of our language and for its development so that it will be capable of conveying all the concepts in science, technology and art" (Aksoy 1975:26). All the efforts were directed at making Turkish a Kultursprache, "a rich language which has a superior power of expression and which can cope with all the nuances required in philosophy, literature, science, art and technology" (Korkmaz 1995:653). There was a widespread conviction that

the languages of the societies which are forerunners in science, philosophy, literature and art are those which are capable of finding counterparts for the new concepts introduced by the developing science, philosophy, literature and art — i.e. which can find new words and terms for new concepts (Erdost 1984:87).

5.2.1.1. Handling terms and concepts in the Language Reform

Within the Language Reform, technical and specialised terms have been treated in a substantially different way from ordinary vocabulary. The everyday language was to be purified gradually. The substitutes were chosen, as much as possible, among "living, obsolescent or obsolete speech-material" and "the creation of entirely new words was kept to a minimum" (Heyd 1954:80). Even in the most fervent stages of the language reform, there were no attempts to replace the completely assimilated Arabic and Persian words in everyday language (Heyd 1954:61-62). Similarly, the reformers did not try to oust the naturalised words which had been borrowed from the languages of non-Turkish citizens of the Ottoman Empire and the neighbouring peoples (Heyd 1954:76). Instead, the main target of the language reform became the influx of Western terms in science, the humanities and the media. Purists were keen to find equivalents for foreign terms before they could cross the borders. "Being ready and alert" against such "attacks" was regarded as crucial (Imer 1976:58). In order to be able to express the new concepts encountered through contact with other societies, or arising from the indigenous technical and intellectual development, new terms were to be produced consciously and artificially by extending the resources of Turkish (see Başkan 1973-1974:173; Erdost 1984:88; Brendemoen 1990:466).

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189 This quotation is taken from the standard preface placed at the beginning of each terminology dictionary published by the Language Academy between the 1960s and 1980s. More about these dictionaries below.
Various methods were used by the Language Academy in order to find substitutes for words of foreign origin, such as collecting words from popular vernacular and dialects, reviving obsolete ‘Ottoman’ words of Turkish origin, borrowing from Turkic languages spoken outside Turkey, translating foreign terms literally into Turkish or phonetically turkicising them, and deriving neologisms\(^{190}\) by using still productive or revivified derivative suffixes (see Heyd 1954:29-31; Anday 1975:69-70; İmer 1976:57; Brendemoen 1990:468-472). It is claimed that, as a result of the reform, words of Turkish origin in the written language increased from 35% in 1931 to 70% in 1970 (İmer 1976:114)\(^{191}\).

Among the methods listed above, deriving neologisms was often regarded as the most fruitful one (İmer 1976:51). It is certainly the most frequently employed method in finding substitutes for technical and scientific terms – the fields where the Western impact was the strongest (Brendemoen 1990:477). Unlike the limited changes in the ordinary vocabulary, these terms had to be newly coined, since collection of words from local dialects or old Turkish yielded little material which could be of any use in describing the novelties coming along with Westernisation (Heyd 1954:82). Arabic, and to some extent Persian, had traditionally been the resource for terms in the Ottoman language, especially in the fields of literature and philosophy (Gökberk 1973:74), but these languages had become anathema for the purists. In 1928, in accordance with the reform, the script of the Turkish language was changed from Arabic to Latin. Soon afterwards the teaching of Arabic and Persian in schools was abolished. As a result, the new generation could no longer read the material written just one or two decades ago. This led to a severe rupture in the Turkish intellectual life. The sources were reduced to whatever was written in Latin alphabet after the 1930s and to a flood of translations coming from the West (Erdost 1984:14-15).

From the very beginning, then, Turkish Language Reform was bound up with translation. First, the Ottoman words borrowed from Persian and Arabic were ‘translated’ into Turkish, and then the European, mostly French ones: “Translation on word level for the creation of a new vocabulary (and eventually for glossaries/dictionaries) was just as important, if not more, than the ongoing translation of texts, for which the vocabularies/dictionaries would be used” (Paker 1995). Even if the

\(^{190}\) Throughout the thesis I locate the term ‘neologism’ in line with Emecan’s definition, as in the space between the initial emergence of a new word until its widespread acceptance within the society (1998:30).

\(^{191}\) For more information on the statistical success of the Turkish Language Reform see Emecan 1998:40.
neologisms were Turkish derivations created out of the language’s own agglutinative resources, translation was the main medium used in their creation, as well as being the main reason underlying their creation. Most of the terminology dictionaries published by the Language Academy between the 1960s and 1980s – and there are more than 65 of them on a wide range of fields such as psychology, ethnography, biology, medicine, philosophy, literature, sociology, cinema, linguistics, fine arts, theatre, etc. – were actually based on terminology lexicons in French, English or German. According to the prefaces, the main goal of these dictionaries was “to help future translators in their work”. The experts who prepared them had also become aware of the ‘deficiencies’ of their mother tongue while translating foreign texts into Turkish.

5.2.1.2. Terms and concepts in literary and cultural theories

Terms and concepts were especially foregrounded within literary criticism and theory, which had become heavily dependent on importation from the West. As we have seen in 2.1.3.1., the evaluative-judgmental aspect of criticism carried the utmost importance for Turkish critics for many decades. The task of the critic was not only to comment on the work or to review it, but also to assess it. It was argued that the judgement and evaluation should be based on “terms, concepts and definitions” (Özdemir 1971:729). Only with these tools could one pin down the “success and failure” of a given work (Tansuğ 1959:299). It was claimed that before the early republican period Turkish literary criticism was “poor” because of the lack of conceptualisation, an obstacle in the way of “clear and productive thinking” (Özdemir 1982a:44). Terms were believed to “protect the critique from the shallow waters of subjectivism”, because they were supposed to “bear exactness in meaning” and not to “change from one person to another, from one environment to another” (Özdemir 1982b:46). Exactness of meaning was often given as the raison d'etre of terms (Başkan 1973-1974:174). Furthermore, some of the new terms introduced into literary criticism were already being used in various disciplines of the social sciences, thus allegedly adding a certain ‘scientificity’ and ‘objectivity’ to criticism (Özdemir 1971:730).

192 For a comprehensive list of these terminology dictionaries see Brendemoen 1990:490-492.
193 However, Harun Tolasa's work demonstrates that tezkire writers used their own terms and definitions, apparently clearly identifiable at their time and within their literary circles, but obsolete for the modern Turkish reader (1983:380).
194 One of the rare voices which opposed this myth of exactness was no other than Tahsin Yücel. He argued that terms “do not carry a definitive and fixed meaning” on their own, they “acquire exactness only within the context they are used in” and “even this is not an absolute exactness” (1968:151).
This firm belief in the unproblematic semantic features of terms was rooted in the deep conviction among Turkish writers, critics and scholars of the time that language is transparent – a conviction, in its turn, derived from the initial need for the unifying force of a single language in the young nation’s formation period. ‘Purity’, ‘fluency’, ‘a crystal-clear language’, and ‘our beautiful language’ were frequent expressions in texts written about Turkish. As the language as a whole was regarded as transparent, terms were considered to be even more so. “The light science emits is proportionate with the transparency of its terms”, says Berke Vardar (1980:9). Accordingly, it was believed that by using terms derived from the resources of Turkish, native speakers would achieve the desired transparency and consistency in thought (Başkan 1973-1974:176). When a native speaker encountered a Turkish neologism for the first time, it was claimed, knowing the root of the word, the suffixes\(^\text{195}\) used for derivation, plus the context, should ideally give him/her an idea about the meaning of the term (Anday 1975:21).

However, this was often not the case. The number of the suffixes (and a few of the prefixes used) in Turkish amount to more than 190 (Emecan 1998:48). It is often difficult for a Turkish-speaker to understand which suffix corresponds to what sort of meaning\(^\text{196}\). Furthermore, terms “have also to be adjusted to each other so as to form a system” (Heyd 1954:80-81). Creating a term and leaving it to lead its own life results in the incomprehensibility and/or non-acceptance of the term. One has to work around that term as well, to derive the noun, the adjective, the verb, etc. from the same root, so that this term would have a family of its own, and gain a certain context to pursue its future (Başkan 1973-1974:181). As Saliha Paker emphasises,

\[\text{terms come to life in the way they relate to, weave a relationship with concepts, otherwise they remain lifeless words. Using new coinages, or stringing them together in a sentence does not appear to be enough for contextualizing concepts. For the creation of meaningful discourse in the translation of scientific or theoretical texts, i.e. for a transcreation of discourse that preserves most of the textual relationships of the source text, it seems that translating}\]

\(^{195}\) Prefixes, “a morphological class principally not existing in the Turkic languages” were used sparingly (Brendemoen 1990:470).

\(^{196}\) Brendemoen’s example may help the non-Turkish-speaking readers grasp the difficulties involved: “For denoting, for example, an instrument for seeing, \(g\ddot{e}r\) [see] or \(g\ddot{e}z\) [eye] plus a nominal suffix of course may form new words. But how should the speaker know if this word denotes glasses, a monocle, binoculars, a microscope, etc., or if it has an abstract meaning only related to seeing? The old words have the undeniable advantage that they have entered the language one by one in a natural way, together with the object or concept they signify, and that they already were closely linked to their connotation then” (1990:476). As most of the “almost homonymous neologisms” deriving from the same root were “introduced within a short span of years, the danger of confusion between them [became] highly imminent” (1990:477).
terms can only be regarded as a preliminary task. What is expected to follow is the setting of the context for the translation of a concept, i.e. developing a lexical, syntactic context for the concept, with special regard for the associative aspects of the term/s used to signify the concept, i.e. a context that would not be expected to be entirely alien to the reader (1995).

Given the accelerated speed with which foreign imports entered the Turkish system, these points could not always be taken into consideration. Consequently, a serious problem of unintelligibility emerged in conceptually dense texts, such as those on philosophy, literary theory and social sciences. The type of unintelligibility in question can be described as:

one that results from the translator’s endeavour to cope with the constraints of a philosophical text, for example, especially with those constraints that affect lexical/terminological choices which, in translation, make it difficult, sometimes impossible, for intelligent readers of Turkish to parse and process sentences (Paker 1997:47).

Consequently, the phrase kavram karga§asi (chaos of concepts) became the usual definition of the situation in Turkish thinking (İskender 1990:30-32; also Hızır 1985). This ‘chaos’ or ‘anarchy’ was ‘diagnosed’ already in the early republican period. In 1932, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, a prolific translator of French conceptual writing, spoke as follows in the First Turkish Language Congress (Birinci Türk Dil Kurultayı):

There have been times when I have not understood what I had written, in revising the Turkish of my translations of philosophical and scholarly works. I have had to go back to the French source texts to figure out what I had meant. There were no translational errors. I realized that I had failed in communicating the meaning because my unfamiliarity with those subjects in Turkish had resulted in tortuous forms of statement. Every writer has drawn up his [sic] own terminology, and a variety of writers express the same concept using a variety of terms. It almost seems that we speak different languages, and that is anarchy. We cannot let time decide on terminologies. Anarchy will end the day terminologies are fixed. And the way to do this is to take up a dictionary of any European language and decide on a corresponding term in Turkish for every word in that dictionary (quoted in Paker 1997:48-49, Paker’s translation).

The belief in the one-to-one correspondence between the terminologies of different languages did not wane in the following decades. “It is as much necessary for terms in the philosophical discourses of two languages to be in a one-to-one relationship, as it is not necessary for the same two languages to be equivalent in terms of their vocabulary” claims Hilmi Yavuz (1987:82). Towards the end of this chapter I will come back to the implications of this one-to-one correspondence.
The terminological work carried out within the framework of the Language Reform, intensifying in the 1960s and culminating in the terminology dictionaries published by the Language Academy, testifies to the efforts of rendering the Turkish language 'fit' for translating from the 'modern' languages of the world. The period after 1960 is also the time when 'modern literary theory' was introduced into the Turkish literary system. Thus, translations of texts on philosophy, social studies, and literary criticism and theory into Turkish inevitably became means of testing, questioning and enhancing the capacity of the Turkish language. Already in 1947, Hilmi Ziya Ülken (writer, translator, translation historian, and a prominent academician in philosophy and sociology) had noted that the suitability of neologisms could only be tested while "kneading a conceptual discourse", and that "while we can manipulate the way we use some concepts in our own writings, in translating philosophy we have to obey the constraints imposed upon us by the conceptual subtleties and shades of meaning encountered in the source texts (cited in Paker 1997:50, Paker's translation)\footnote{From "Introduction" to Felsefe Tercümleri Dergisi (Journal of Translations of Philosophy).}

Translation, then, was the (re)source, the cause, as well as the main battleground for the Language Reform, and its significance continued up until the 1990s. In January 1993, the first issue of the journal 'Kuram' (Theory) included this passage in its preface: "This journal aims at enhancing the possibilities of expression in Turkish, determining and defining the terms which proliferate in [literary and cultural theories] and enter our language, and at suggesting adequate counterparts for these terms". The preface also indicated that the editorial board of the journal had decided to include a glossary at the end of each article, if necessary. Although the economic, political and social changes following the 1980 coup changed Turkey's course into dişə açılma and çağı yakalama, i.e. globalisation, which finds its linguistic form in extensive borrowings from English in daily vocabulary, especially in that of the media (see Emecan 1998: 48, 174), the struggle then is not completely over – at least in the field of literary theory, among others.

5.2.2. Terms in the retranslations of Barthes's writings into Turkish

This was the complex linguistic and cultural legacy which awaited the texts on literary theory translated into Turkish, including those of Barthes, the first one of which appeared in 1960. As we have seen above, the Turkish Language Reform was a large-scale and collective effort. Alongside the state-intervention, it was the individual efforts
of poets, writers and translators of the early republican period onwards which made the language reform possible (Anday 1975:83). As Tahsin Yücel himself points out, it is initially the individual instances of parole which cause changes in the langue, since enforcement can only be effective up to a point (1968:151). In accordance with the widespread endeavours, many of Barthes’s translators, especially those who specialised in structuralism and semiotics and in translating Barthes after the 1990s, were also among those who wrote on issues of language and Language Reform, as well as publishing specialised terminologies on linguistics, semiotics, and literary translation, sometimes through the Language Academy. Some of these translators, and still many more, undertook the retranslations of his texts.

In this section, my study focuses on the terminological issues in about half of the retranslations from Essais critiques, Le Degré zéro and Critique et vérité (see 4.2.2.1., Table 2). The next chapter will refer to the retranslations from Mythologies. The examples presented in Appendix 5 are only a handful of the terms encountered in these texts. It is safe to assume that at least some of the neologisms were coined by

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199 The retranslated and reedited versions of Eléments de sémiologie, L’Aventure sémiologique, and “Introduction à l’analyse structurale des récits” are not included here, because the main translators involved in these did not change (Berke Vardar, Mehmet and Sema Rifat).

200 When I refer to this appendix, the reader should keep in mind that the same number yields more than one type of example. It should also be remembered that many of the neologisms mentioned here are now in current use, though some only within the field of linguistics, literary criticism and theory. For the same reason, I had no way of determining all the words which were neologisms at the time of the retranslations, since they are now very much part of the daily vocabulary, at least of mine (e.g. words such as olanak, olaşlık, saptamak, etc. See Brendemoen 1990:458).
Barthes's translators for these specific translations. Some were later adopted by other translators and writers within the field, while others were forgotten or shifted meaning in order to be used as counterparts for other new concepts.

In the case of Barthes translations into Turkish, no term was kept in French for long, unlike the case of Cixous translations into English, as we shall see below. In general, among the 232 examples shown in Appendix 5, French terms on their own appear only in 6 instances and only in earlier translations: e.g. cénesthésie\(^{201}\). In later translations these terms were replaced by Turkish neologisms. However, there are several instances where the translator uses either the phonetically Turkicised French term\(^{202}\) or the original French term itself\(^{203}\) in parenthesis after certain neologisms: e.g. yapısalcılık (structuralisme) (1966, I.B.5.), güçlül (virtuel) (1967, II.B.5), sözgenlik (elokans) (1979/1987, II.B.3), cinsil (générique) (1979/1987, II.B.20), düzgüsel (normatif)/ (normative) (1984, 1987, II.D.15). Similarly, Tahsin Yücel uses footnotes as if to 'explain' certain neologisms, but he simply writes the French words in the footnotes, usually with no additional explanation\(^{204}\). In none of these 'clarifications' are there any clues as to what the words actually mean. The translations seem to have been intended for readers who had at least some knowledge of the French terminology involved. Yet these terms remain incomprehensible for the monolingual reader, augmenting the allegedly 'closed' nature of the structuralist jargon.

If no neologism could immediately be found, the French term was phonetically Turkicised and used on its own. In the retranslations, Turkish neologisms as counterparts for these borrowed words were suggested, rejected, or accepted and established. The number of such cases in my examples amount to 41\(^{205}\): e.g. senkretizm (1965) – algulama (1995) (I.A.12); differansivel (1975/1987) – differansiyel (1984) – ayrımsal (1989/1990) (II.A.14); fenemenolojik (1984) – görüngübilimsel (1987, 1989) (II.D.14). Still, this is not a one-way development at all. In 29 other instances the direction was reversed and borrowed words replaced the previously suggested

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\(^{204}\) I.A.3, I.A.4, II.A.16, II.B.16, II.B.17, II.C.4, II.D.11, II.D.17. Among the terms for which Yücel uses footnotes in 1989 and 1990, there are those which have already been used in Barthes translations, for instance in 1979, with no additional information (e.g. II.B.17).

neologisms\(^{206}\). For instance, *avangarde* was translated as *avangard* in 1995, although the previous three translations used *önçü* (I.B.3). *Ethos* was used in 1984, while a 1975 translation used *ira* (II.A.30). Such a shift can even be the choice of one and the same translator, as in Yücel’s use of *inaksal* for *dogmatique* in his 1966 and 1971 translations, and of *dogmatik* in his 1990 translation (I.B.23). In many cases, the shift from borrowed word to neologism and back could happen for the one and the same term, as in *bourgeois* and *idéologie*:

- **kentsoyulu** ‘bourgeois’, neologistic compound word, Selçuk 1981, II.D.2
- **burjuva** ‘bourgeois’, borrowed word, Kırkoğlu 1984, II.D.2
- **kentsoyulu** ‘bourgeois’, Demiralp 1987, II.D.2
- **burjuva** ‘bourgeois’, Yücel 1989, II.D.2

- **düştince** ‘idéologie’, derivation from the word *düştünmek*, ‘to think’, now meaning ‘thought’, Yücel 1966, I.B.1
- **düştinsel (idéologique)** ‘idéologique’, derivation from *düştünmek*, Yücel 1966, I.B.11
- **ülkü** ‘idéologie’, a word of Turkish origin, used to mean ‘goal, ideal’, Yücel 1971, I.B.1
- **ülküselsel (idéologique)** ‘idéologique’, derivation from *ülkü*, Yücel 1971, I.B.11
- **ideoloji** ‘idéologie’, borrowed word, Yücel 1990, I.B.1
- **ideolojik** ‘idéologique’, borrowed word, Yücel 1990, I.B.11
- **ideoloji** ‘idéologie’, borrowed word, Kayra 1995, I.B.1

- **kentsoyulu düştün yapısı** ‘idéologie bourgeoise’, all neologistic terms, meaning ‘the thought structure of the bourgeois’, Selçuk 1981, II.D.3
- **burjuva ideolojisi** ‘idéologie bourgeoise’, all borrowed words, Kırkoğlu 1984, II.D.3
- **kentsoyolu ideolojisi** ‘idéologie bourgeoise’, neologism + borrowed word, Demiralp 1987, II.C.9, II.D.3
- **burjuva düştüngüsü** ‘idéologie bourgeoise’, borrowed word + neologism, Yücel 1989, II.C.9, II.D.3
- **burjuva ideolojisi** ‘idéologie bourgeoise’, all borrowed words, Yücel 1990, II.C.9

When confronted with new terms, the translators usually did not opt for paraphrasing, but for neologisms. In accordance with the views expressed above in 5.2.1.2., they tended to find one-to-one correspondences for these new terms. Even if the previous translations did not or could not do this, the retranslations substituted usually a single-unit neologism for the initial paraphrase, as in the shift from aynı cinsten olan şeylerin bir sınıfı to ulam (II.B.21, see also I.A.6, I.B.26, I.B.27). Similarly, the rather common vocabulary suggested in previous translations could in retranslation be substituted by neologic terms, as in güzel konuşmanın kuralları/ uzdilin (belagatin) normları/ konuşma uzluğunun düzungüleri (II.D.16, see also II.B.7 and II.D.6). Some terms which were omitted in previous translations, apparently because no counterpart could be found, were later replaced by neologisms. Furthermore, several Ottoman words used in previous translations were then replaced with purist Turkish words, such as eser/ yapıt 'œuvre', zihin/ us 'mind', hayat/ yaşam 'life', etc.

These shifts from paraphrasing, common vocabulary, and Ottoman words to single-unit ‘öztürkçe’ (pure Turkish) neologisms increased the density of terminology in Barthes’s texts, or at least of those words perceived as terms. Even when there was no term as such in the source text, the word could still be translated as a neologism into Turkish. For those Turkish readers who were not necessarily part of the purist movement, such words would sound as incomprehensible terms: e.g. torem ‘rituel’ (II.C.3), eksil ‘négative’ (II.A.13), buyurum ‘prescription’ (II.A.7), ilinek ‘accident’ (II.C.10), yasan ‘intention’ (II.A.19), aliski ‘habitude’ (II.A.8), ister ‘exigence’ (II.A.40), etc.

The above examples might suggest that there was after all a definite shift towards ‘pure Turkish’ neologisms, i.e. a linear development, within these retranslations. Yet this is only part of the whole picture. There are also many instances where neologisms were replaced by paraphrase, common vocabulary, or Ottoman words: e.g. bulgulamak – ortaya çıkarmak (I.A.27), ulam – sınıflandırma (I.B.8), töz – cisim (I.C.6), öke – deha (II.D.8), görünüm – gösteri – sevirlık oyun (II.D.12) [see, also II.A.19, II.A.31, II.C.6, II.D.6]. Also some terms for which neologisms were suggested in previous translations were omitted in later translations.

209 There are also cases where Ottoman words are given in parenthesis after the Turkish neologism (see, e.g. II.B.9, II.D.16). Almost all of these words are not terms at all, but part of the daily vocabulary.
Nevertheless, the main struggle in these retranslations was neither between French borrowed words vs. neologisms, nor paraphrase/common vocabulary/Ottoman words vs. neologisms. It was among the rival neologisms themselves. In 107 instances, the Turkish neologistic derivations suggested as counterparts for the same French term considerably differ from each other. In 65 of these cases, neologisms were derived from different roots and with different suffixes: e.g. ‘analogique’, karşlaştırma (1971), örneklemesel (1990), çağrışmsal (1995) [I.B.14]; ‘mental’, akısal (1966), ussal (1971), düşünce (1990, 1995) [I.B.17]; ‘procédé’, yöntem (1987), yordam (1989/1990) [II.C.13]. The remaining 42 examples involve competing neologisms derived from the same root, but with different suffixes: e.g. ‘contradictoirement’, çelişken (1966), çelişkin (1971), çelişkisel (1995) [I.B.24]; ‘réflexion’, düşünme (1975/1987), düşünün (1984), düşünüm (1989/1990) [II.A.23]; ‘discours’, söylevek (1967), söylev (1979/1987), söylem (1989) [II.B.1]. Such closeness between suggested counterparts probably led the readers to confusion. Among the 232 examples listed, the number of instances where two or more translators use the same Turkish neologism for the same French term is only forty-two. Even among these instances, there are cases where two translators do agree on one and the same neologism, but a third one (or more) still use(s) different neologism(s) for the same term. Furthermore, this number includes those instances where the terms are comprised of more than one word, and the translators agree on only one of these words.


213 There are also instances where neologisms are so new and so close to other existing words in Turkish that they are distorted by typesetting errors. For instance, in his translation of “Qu'est-ce que l'écriture?”, Demiralp looks for a one-word counterpart for the phrase ‘un lexique naissant du corps [...] de l’écrivain’, and decides on a neologism, özüzülük (one's own lexicon) (98/17). However, in the typesetting özüzülük turns into özüzülük, which means ‘being without essence’. This mistake is not corrected in the reprint of the translation in Yazı Nedir?, and the reader is left wondering where the ‘lack of essence’ comes from. Similarly, in a rare consensus the translators seem to have arrived at, écriture is always translated as yazı, meaning ‘writing, handwriting, piece of writing’. However, it is often confused with yazın (see, e.g. II.A.5, II.A.6) – the purist term for the still widely used Ottoman word edebiyat (literature) – especially in cases like yazı'nın (of writing), and yazının (of literature). Then the translator has to opt for an apostrophe, although in Turkish this punctuation mark is used only after capitalised proper nouns.

Among the terms on which a certain consensus seems to have been reached are those used to translate the *langue-langage-parole* trio. However, this consensus brought its own problems, too. *Le Degré zéro de l’écriture* as a whole is characterised by the distinction Barthes makes among Saussure’s concepts of *langage* (the universal human phenomenon of language), *langue* (a particular language system shared by a community of speakers) and *parole* (language in use, specific speech acts) (Lodge 1992:1; Crystal 1985:174). However, in his Turkish translations, this distinction between *langue* and *langage* is often lost. *Langue* was always translated as *dil*, and *langage*, too, was translated in most cases as *dil*. Only Serdar Rifat Kırkoğlu uses the term *dilîyetisi* for *langage* and *dil* for *langue* throughout his translations in 1984 (II.A.2). Tahsin Yücel, who translated the complete *Le Degré zéro*, states his decision in a footnote at the very beginning: “In this book Barthes often uses the words *langue* (*dil*) and *langage* (*dilîyetisi, dil*) together. We translated *langage* – as a linguistic term – as *dilîyetisi* whenever it was necessary, and as *dil* at all other times” (p.19, II.A.2). Here an exchangeability between *langue* and *langage* is implied. If no need was felt to make an immediate contrast between the two terms within the same source text, *dil* was used for both of them. Oğuz Demiralp also used *dil* for *langage* in the early articles he translated, which were later included in the reader *Yazi Nedir?* (II.A.2). Therefore, he had to find various solutions when *langue* and *langage* appeared in the same sentence in the source text. In one instance he translates *langage* as *anlatım* (expression) (II.A.2). In another he finds no alternative than to skip a whole sentence (100/19): “Langue et style sont des données antécédentes à toute problématique du langage” (Barthes 1993:147). In the later articles he translated specifically for the reader *Yazi Nedir?* in 1987, Demiralp uses *toplumsal dil* for *langage* (II.C.2, II.E.18). However, since his earlier translations were not reedited while being included in this reader, *dil, anlatım* and *toplumsal dil* appear altogether throughout the book. The term *parole*, on the other hand, is translated as *söz* by all the translators involved in this study (see, e.g. II.A.3, II.E.7, III.2). However, there are also cases where other terms, such as *mot* or *verbe*, are translated as *söz*, too (I.A.10, II.A.4).

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215 I.A.11, I.C.8, I.C.11, II.A.1, II.C.1, II.E.19, III.1, III.6.
216 It is interesting to note that none of the translators tried to make use of an existing Turkish word of Arabic origin, *fısan*, while they were trying to find counterparts for these terms.
217 Similarly the term *style* – which is the backbone of at least the first article of *Le Degré zéro*, where it is located in the *langue-écriture-style* trio – is translated by Mehmet Yalçın as *deyiş* in his translation of “Y a-t-il une écriture poetique?” reprinted in the reader *Yazi Nedir?*, although Oğuz Demiralp uses *biçem* in the six other articles collected in the same reader. Such instances where more than one Turkish term are used in order to translate one French term can be found also within the same text. For instance, Erol Kayra uses both *optik* and *görsel* while translating *optique* (I.A.1). He also uses *öz* and *töz* for *substance* (I.A.8). Mehmet Yalçın uses *sağdeyi* and *sağdüzen* for *prosodie* (II.B.16).
In the retranslations examined, there is no clear linear development from an ‘assimilative’ approach indicated by the use of common vocabulary, existing Ottoman terms, or use of paraphrase towards borrowed words or neologisms which could allegedly ‘respect’ the ‘otherness’ of source texts. Neither are these retranslations adaptations of the source texts, following initial over-literal versions full of borrowed words and neologisms. They do not bring the source text closer to the reader of the day, or restore something back to the original. They rather demonstrate a chaotic ‘evolution’ pattern. Their main orientation is towards the development of the indigenous literary critical discourse.


- ‘*belâgat*’\(^{219}\), Ottoman word of Arabic origin, Bayrav 1965, I.A.17
- *anlatma*, a word derived from the verb *anlatmak* ‘to tell’, Yücel 1966, I.B.8
- *retorik*, borrowed word, Vardar 1969, III.26
- *anlatım*, a neologism derived again from the verb *anlatmak*, now used to mean ‘expression’, Yücel 1971, I.B.8
- *söz sanatı*, a phrase which can be literally translated as ‘art of word’, and in which no neologism is involved, Yalçın 1979/1987, II.B.15
- *sözbilim*, a new compound word which can be translated as ‘science of the word’, Demiralp 1987, II.C.12

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\(^{218}\) As Lydia H. Liu observes for Chinese, the difference between borrowed words and neologisms is not so clear-cut in terms of their representativeness of the foreign: “Neologism or neologistic construction is an excellent trope for change, because it has been invented simultaneously to represent and to replace foreign words, and in so doing, it identifies itself as Chinese and foreign locked in linguistic tension” (1995:40). Therefore I refer to borrowed words and neologisms together in this context.

\(^{219}\) It is interesting to note that the first term used for *rhétorique*, *belâgat*, is used in the text in quotation marks, as if to indicate the rather reluctant choice of the translator. This term is in fact the one which covers the same semantic area as *rhétorique*, however, since it has Arabic origin, it was used in this translation as a temporary option, until Turkish derivations would be suggested.
• ** sözbilim**, Yücel 1989/1990, I.B.8, I.C.12

• **söz sanatı** and **sözbilim**, used interchangeably by Kayra 1995, I.A.17, I.B.8

Of ‘mythe’, ‘mythique’, and ‘mythologie’ (in chronological order):

• **mitos** ‘mythe’, borrowed word, Bayrav 1965, I.A.22

• **mitoslu** ‘mythique’, derivation from the borrowed word mit, Vardar 1969, III.3

• **mitsel** ‘mythique’, derivation from the borrowed word mit, Demiralp 1975/1987, I.B.8

• **mitologya** ‘mythologie’, borrowed word, Demiralp 1975/1987, II.A.17

• **söylensel** ‘mythique’, derivation from the neologism **söylen**, Kirkoğlu 1984, II.A.22

• **söylen bilim** ‘mythologie’, neologism, Kirkoğlu 1984, II.A.17

• **mitoloji** ‘mythologie’, borrowed-word, Demiralp 1987, I.C.19

• **mit** ‘mythe’, borrowed word, Demiralp 1987, II.E.8

• **söylen** ‘mythe’, neologism, Yücel 1989/1990, II.E.8

• **söylensel** ‘mythique’, Yücel 1989/1990, II.A.22, III.3

• **söylensel** and **söylen** ‘mythologie’, Yücel 1989/1990, II.A.17, II.C.19

• **mit** ‘mythe’, borrowed word, Kayra 1995, I.A.22

Of ‘signe’ and related terms (in chronological order and grouped according to the translators):

• **belirtmek** ‘signer’, initially a neologism derived from **belirmek** ‘to appear’, Bayrav 1965, I.A.19

• **açıklamak** ‘signifier’, initially a neologism derived from **açık** ‘open’, which can literally be translated as ‘to make sth. open/ clear’; today it means ‘to explain’, Bayrav 1965, I.A.7

• **isaret** ‘signe’, Ottoman word of Arabic origin, Yücel 1966, I.B.19

• **açıklamak** ‘signaler’, Vardar 1967, II.B.7

• **gösterge** ‘signe’, neologism derived from the verb **göstermek** ‘to show, to point out’, Vardar 1969, III.7

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220 The situation becomes rather more complicated by the translation of *légendaire* (II.D.6) as *masalımsı*, derived from the Turkish word of Arabic origin *masal*, Selçuk 1981 → **söylensel**, Kirkoğlu 1984 → *efsanımsı*, derived from the Turkish word of Persian origin *efsane*, Demiralp 1987 → **söylencesel**, another derivation from the neologism **söylen**, Yücel 1989.
• gösteren ‘signifiant’, Vardar 1969, III.25

• gösterge ‘signe’, Yücel 1971, I.B.19

• im ‘signe’, Demiralp 1975/1987, II.A.37
• imlemek ‘signifier’, neologism derived from im, Demiralp 1975/1987, II.A.34, I.E.3

• imlemek ‘signaler’, Yalçın 1979/1987, II.B.7

• gösterge ‘signe’, Kocaman 1981/1987, I.C.1
• gösteren ‘signifiant’, Kocaman 1981/1987, I.C.3
• gösterilen ‘signifié’, Kocaman 1981/1987, I.C.4

• im ‘signe’, Kurkoğlu 1984, II.A.37
• imlemek ‘signifier’, Kurkoğlu 1984, II.A.34

• gösteren ‘signifiant’, Yücel 1990, III.25
• belirtmek ‘signifier’, Yücel 1989/1990, II.A.34, II.E.3
• imlemek ‘signaler’, Yücel 1989, II.B.7

• gösterge ‘signe’, a rather established term by then, Kayra 1995, I.A.19, I.B.19, I.C.1
• anlamlama ‘signification’, Kayra 1995, I.C.2
• belirtten ‘signifiant’, Kayra 1995, I.C.3
• belirtilen ‘signifié’, Kayra 1995, I.C.4

The situation becomes even more complicated when the examples below are taken into consideration:

• dolaylı imada bulunmak ‘allusiv’, paraphrase including an Ottoman word, Bayrav 1965, I.A.6
• belirlemek ‘allusif’, possibly a neologism by that time, Bayrav 1965, I.A.6
• işaret ‘marque’, Vardar 1967, II.B.14
• işaret ‘notation’, Vardar 1969, III.16
• im ‘marque’, Yalçın 1979/1987, II.B.14
• belirtke ‘marque’, neologism derived from belirtmek, Yücel 1989, II.B.14
• imlem e’notation’, Yücel 1990, III.16.

As can be seen in the examples above, Turkish terms used for ‘signe’ and the related terms were often derived from different roots and used in one and the same text, despite the above mentioned importance of deriving a whole family of terms from the same root in order to provide a more or less stable context (Başkan 1973-1974:181). A footnote in an introductory article on structuralism is worth quoting here fully to show the extent of the problems encountered in the translation of literary terms in general, and of the term ‘signe’ in particular:

Here I use ‘gösterge’ as a counterpart for ‘signe’, although with hesitation. The terms which are derived from ‘gösterge’ are ‘göstermek’ (signifier), ‘gösteren’ (signifiant), ‘gösterilen’ (signifié), and ‘göstergebilim’ (sémiologie). While ‘gösterge’, which began to carry the meaning of ‘signe’, may easily be confused with ‘müş’ir’221, ‘göstermek’ reduces the meaning to a concrete act such ‘montrer’. Another suggestion worth considering is the derivations from ‘im’, as ‘imlemek, imleyen, imlenen, imbilim’. However, ‘im’ can be confused with ‘in’222. Similarly it is not always easy to distinguish between ‘imlemek’ and ‘inlemek’.223 Also ‘belirti, belirtmek, belirten, belirtilen, belirtibilim’ can be another option. Still, ‘belirti’ corresponds to a natural sign, like ‘indice’ or ‘ålámét, araz’224. I have used ‘gösterge’ as a temporary solution here, and I find it important that this issue will be discussed further (Onart 1973: 240).

Today, ‘gösterge’ and its derivations are the established counterparts for ‘signe’ and its derivations, notwithstanding the unease which goes with them. However, as can be seen above, settling the term was by no means a smooth process. Similar patterns of shifts can be observed in several of the examples in Appendix 5. It would be mistaken, therefore, to assume that the retranslations involved in this study followed an overarching course of ‘development’ in the receiving language. Even though the general transformation within contemporary Turkish literary critical discourse might be diagnosed as one which started from shifting the meaning of available Ottoman terms, which previously had been used to express other concepts, to phonetically Turkicised borrowed words and, finally to Turkish neologisms, the individual translations comprise of examples pointing at all kinds of directions.

221 An Ottoman word of Arabic origin which means ‘that which informs through writing, that which brings news’, as well as ‘sign’ in physics.
222 In means ‘cave, den’.
223 Inlemek is ‘to moan, to groan’.
224 Âlàmet or araz are Ottoman words of Arabic origin meaning ‘sign, mark, symptom’.
5.2.3. Consequences

It would be “inadequate to describe translations in Turkish in terms of a homogeneous target language and to discuss ‘norms’ of acceptability, overlooking the linguistic/stylistic diversity in the target language system, and the ideological differences it reflects”, notes Saliha Paker (1997:47). In accordance with Gideon Toury’s warning that “the assumption of a one-to-one relationship between culture and language often proves misleading, the more so as the exact identity of the target language itself may have to be reconsidered in the course of the study” (1995:29), Paker suggests that for conceptual writing in Turkish, at least two discourses seem to serve as the target language. The first one is the purist discourse which continues the tradition of the Language Reform. The second is an “eclectic” or “libertarian” discourse “that has emerged as a result of the tensions between the older, conservative, Ottomanizing discourse and the purist one” (1997:47). Some of Barthes’s translators prefer to use such an eclectic language which utilises existing Ottoman terms together with neologisms derived from Turkish roots and suffixes, and phonetically Turkicised Western words.

The clashes between the purist and eclectic discourses added to the Barthes translations a ‘remainder’, in the sense Lawrence Venuti uses the term and defines as follows:

[...] Linguistic effects triggered by the variety of forms which the user employs selectively to communicate, but which, because of their circulation in social groups and institutions, always carry a collective force that outstrips any individual’s control and complicates intended meanings. Translating increases this unpredictability. To the foreign text it attaches a peculiarly domestic remainder, textual effects triggered by the dialects, registers and discourses that comprise the target language, and that therefore exceed the foreign writer’s intention (and sometimes the translator’s as well) (1998:25).

According to Venuti, “the addition of effects that work only in the target language thickens the semantic burden of the foreign text” (1998:29), and these “multiple, polychronic forms that destabilize [the translation’s] unity and cloud over its seeming transparency” (1998:95-96) deserve special attention. For Venuti the remainder is important, because “it enables a close reading of translations as translations, as texts
that simultaneously communicate and inscribe the foreign text with domestic values.
Hence, this reading is also historical: the remainder becomes intelligible in a translation
only when its diverse discourses, registers, and styles are situated in specific moments

The remainder in the (re)translations of Barthes’s texts is the terminological
problems and it had two immediate consequences. First, these problems added to the
‘unintelligibility’ of his writings, increasing the already strong opposition to Barthes –
and to structuralism and semiotics, which he seemingly represented – within the Turkish
socialist and Marxist critical circles. Most of the texts in question are 1-3 pages long,
and their incomprehensibility increases in reverse proportion to their brevity, since the
density of problematic terminology they contain becomes quite high. Furthermore there
are many misunderstandings and mistranslations, and the syntax is mostly difficult to
follow. The struggle of most of the translators with the material at hand is extremely
palpable. The novelty of it all was often described as “to talk like the structuralists do”
(e.g. İnce 1983:31). This situation inevitably added to the allegedly “opaque meta-
language” of structuralism and “its jargon-like characteristics” (İnce 1983:33). Several
Turkish critics insisted that structuralism was ‘elitist’ and promoted ‘a myth of
scientificity’. Although these arguments have a certain validity, it is also worth considering
the role translation played in augmenting the ‘elitism’ and ‘scientism’ due to the
remainder, and provoking the charges of ‘apoliticalness’. I will come back to this point
in Chapter 6.

The second consequence is directly related to the issue of ‘scientificity’. As I have
mentioned above, the belief in the exactness of terms and in the objectivity which they
bring to critical thought was very strong. Since translations of Barthes were a good
source of neologisms, i.e. of new terms and concepts, however problematic they might
have been, Barthes’s image as a ‘scientific’ and ‘objective’ critic was thus consolidated.

225 Incidentally, Venuti draws attention to the importance of retranslations in studying the remainder:
“The temporal aspect of the remainder is perhaps most dramatically revealed when several translations of
a single foreign text are juxtaposed. Multiple versions bring to light the different translation effects
possible at different cultural moments, allowing these effects to be studied as forms of reception affiliated
with different cultural constituencies” (1998:99). However, with his emphasis on “different cultural
moments”, he too locates retranslations within the time-change pair.
226 Ironically, in Barthes translations, the terms ending with the French suffix ‘-logie’ are often translated
by using the Turkish word bilim as compound-words denoting ‘branch of science’, instead of their rather
more ‘mundane’ meanings (see, e.g. I.B.21, IIA.17, IIA.21, IIA.29, IIA.35, IIA.36, II.C.12). For instance biologie is translated as biyoloji (1975/1987), yaşamabilim (1984), and dirimçibilim (1989/1990)
(II.A.21). Accordingly, la personne biologique is translated as biyolojik kişi, yaşamabilim kişi, and
dirimçel kişi (II.A.35). In the first two of these translations the relation between the writer’s body
his/her style hardly emerges.
in the Turkish literary critical system – though only in the eyes of those who were not experts in structuralism or semiotics. In this way, Barthes was easily incorporated into the local debates on ‘scientificity’ and ‘objectivity’, became quite popular, and was (re)translated in abundance.

5.3. Cixous’s texts retranslated into English

In my introduction to this chapter, I have argued that the non-existence or rarity of retranslations can also be telling and should be the focus of attention in certain cases. As we have seen in 4.2.3.1., retranslations are indeed rare in the case of Hélène Cixous’s works published in English. Apart from the play Portrait de Dora, which was translated twice, the main instances of retranslations which involve different translators are four excerpts which preceded the complete translations of La Jeune née and Le Livre de Promethea. In addition to these texts, three of Cixous’s articles, “La venue à l’écriture”, “Tancrède continue”, and “L’Auteur en vérité/ Extrême fidélité”, were modified in their reprints, all within the collaboration of Susan Sellers, Ann Liddle, Deborah Carpenter Jenson, and Sarah Cornell (Carpenter Jenson 1991:208-209). It would have been interesting to carry out a detailed study on the retranslation of Portrait de Dora and on the four excerpts mentioned above. However, my main point here is the rarity of retranslations in Cixous’s case, first in comparison with the total number of her texts translated into English (5 instances of retranslation out of 65 texts), and second in comparison with the retranslations in the case of Barthes (28 instances of retranslation out of 45 texts, and this number does not include the retranslations in the reader Yazi ve Yorum, and the retranslation and reediting of Eléments de sémiologie, L’aventure sémiologique, and “Introduction à l’analyse structurale des récits”). The examination of the few retranslations in Cixous’s case may therefore be left open for future research.

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227 Cixous’s play Portrait de Dora was initially translated by Anita Barrows for the London production (1979) under the direction of Simone Benmussa, who had also directed the play’s initial staging in Paris. The second translation by Sarah Burd was commissioned by the journal Diacritics for its special issue titled “A Fine Romance: Freud and Dora”, and was published with the permission of RiverRun Press, the same publishing house which undertook the publication of the first translation (Diacritics, Spring 1983, p.2). No further information could be obtained on the reasons underlying the retranslation, but the differences involved in a play-to-be-performed and a play-to-be-read might have played a role.


"Only in the absence of rivals can a translation really function as a solid point of departure" observes Anthony Pym (1995:12). The translation of Cixous's (in)famous "Le Rire de la Méduse", for instance, never had any rivals in English and acted as the "solid point of departure" for the majority of the feverish discussions about it for decades to come. It had three reprints following its initial appearance in *Signs* (see the bibliography) and reprints "reinforce the validity of the previous translation" (Pym 1998:83). This text, in its English version, became central in what was perceived as 'French feminism' in Anglo-America, and single-handedly symbolised the totality of the feminist writing in France. If such a text regarded as important both in its source system and in the receiving system is not translated more than once, does that mean that the existing translation achieved the 'accomplissement' Berman was talking about? Or maybe no changes took place in the historical, cultural and linguistic situation in the receiving system since the publication of the initial translation? Both are quite unlikely. If a 'strong' and/or 'accomplished' translation can only come long after the initial 'hesitant' translation, as Berman and Lewis claim, "The Laugh of the Medusa", published just a year after "Le Rire de la Méduse" would probably not be a candidate. As already noted (4.2.3.2., Table 8), 20 out of 29 short texts by Cixous translated into English have a time-lag of only 1-5 years. There are other texts which were translated and published in the same year as the French originals, and some even before their publication in French. Similarly, the time-lag in the translations of four-fifths of her book-length works does not exceed a decade (4.2.3.2., Table 9). In general, the dates of the English translations of Cixous's work closely follow the dates of publication of the French source texts. In view of these observations, the rarity of retranslations in the case of Cixous gains more significance.

As one possible explanation for this rarity, copyright laws might be suggested. After all, the fees that need to be paid to the French publishers in order to publish Cixous's works in English should be quite high. Yet in the substantial reading material I have covered for this thesis I have not come across any trace that would prove this point. For instance, there was no one referring to the fact that they would have preferred to retranslate Cixous, but were taken aback by the demands of the French publishers. There were at least some retranslations and this suggests that after all fees were not an insurmountable obstacle in the way of retranslations. Therefore, although copyright might be yet another issue underlying the rarity of retranslations, I do not have any proof to justify this possibility.
I rather contend that the rarity of retranslations in the case of Cixous confirms the 'deproblematisation' of translation (cf. Paker 2002) prevalent in the Anglo-American feminist critical system. Translations in this system were often seen and presented as unproblematic and 'transparent'. The general tendency was not to be caught up by words, in order to be able to focus on 'what was being told', since a certain 'immediacy' was necessary for action and politics. Unlike the Turkish case, words drawing attention to themselves as words were unwanted. The wish to do justice to the French texts was strong, however even stronger was the urge to produce 'good' English, to provide "consistency and readability in English", and not to "violate the technical rules of English" (e.g. Porter 1987; Roudiez 1980). For instance, in his "Notes on the Translation and on Terminology" to Kristeva's *Desire in Language*, Leon S. Roudiez admits that,

there were days, perhaps only euphoric hours, when, contemplating the work that lay ahead, [the translators] might have entertained hopes of having Julia Kristeva come out, in English, reading like Edmund Wilson. Obviously she does not; the chances are that she never will – and probably should not anyway. If the translation is faithful, and that much, I believe has been accomplished, the next thing to wish is that it be readable (even though not always easy to read) and still preserve some of the particular flavor that characterizes the French original (Roudiez 1980:12).

The 'deproblematisation' of translation within the Anglo-American feminist critical system does not in any way mean that translations of Cixous's texts into English were without problems. On the contrary, there were acknowledged difficulties in translating her and the notion of 'untranslatability' frequently came up in relation to her texts (see, e.g. Carpenter-Jenson 1991:194-195; Kuhn 1981:36; Lydon 1995:100; Penrod 1996:x,16; Wing 1986:163). This is an issue which, as far as my research could cover, has hardly ever been discussed in relation to the translation of Barthes's texts; neither in articles written about him in Turkish^230^, nor in the introductions to his translations^231^. In writings on Cixous in English, however, there are frequent references to the 'loss' her texts have suffered in translation due to their 'language-centred' characteristics. Her

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^230^ One exception is Hasan Bülent Kahraman's article where he simply mentions that Barthes has a difficult language and this creates obstacles in translation (1990:43). See 6.2.2.4. for more on this article.

^231^ The only exception is Sema Rifat's short 'introduction' in verse form to her translation of *Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes*: "Bu çeviri/ Bir tek dil için/ bir tek dil içinde var oluşu/ yaşayan ve yaşatan/ bir yazanın/ kendii kendine bakışın/ Bir başka dil için/ bir başka dil içinde/ yaşamaya ve yaşatmaya çalışın/ bir çevirmenin/ 'zorlu' bir serüveni olarak da/ okunabilir" (5) [This translation/ can also be read/ as the 'arduous' journey/ of a translator/ who strove to live and keep alive/ for and in/ a second language/ the self-viewing of a writer/ who lived and kept alive/ for and in/ one single language].
writings, it is claimed, are "consciously focused on the power of the signifier and on strategies of performative rhetoric" (Simon 1996:96). Therefore, "translators, ever keenly aware of the loss of linguistic richness as they attempt border crossings separating one language from another, have had much to mourn when translating Cixous" (Penrod 1996:x). In prefaces written for her English translations, the translators do refer to the difficulties involved, even though briefly, and express their concerns about the accessibility of her work to Anglophone readers (e.g. Kuhn 1981:36 and Wing 1986:163). Yet despite the acknowledgement of translation difficulties in the extratextual material, the translated texts from French feminists' writings tried not to expose these difficulties. For instance, the influential anthology New French Feminisms was "very laconic, if not totally silent, in its actual exposition of translation difficulties" (Simon 1996:88). Susan Sellers (Group 4 translator of Cixous) mentions that she encountered many translation problems in the course of preparing her book on feminist writing in France, but states that since her aim was "to make French feminism accessible to non-French speakers" she "omitted from [her] commentary all but the most glaring and important translational changes" (1991:xii). In her article on "coming to reading" Cixous, Deborah Carpenter-Jenson (another Group 4 translator) notes that "endnotes are one way of documenting the necessarily unstable process of translation [...]. However, since endnotes do interrupt the musical flow of the text, I have tried to minimize their intervention" (1991:194-195).

5.3.1. Concepts in the translations of Cixous’s writings into English

As the translation of French feminists’ texts into English was thus ‘deproblematised’, the concepts and terms in Cixous’s writings did not generate the discussion they deserve. In fact, the first translations from French feminism had beckoned American readers “to enter a heady, new discursive world, a world studded with exotic terms like ‘phallocentrism’ and ‘jouissance’ and trumpeting new modes of subversion like ‘writing the body’” (Fraser 1992a:1). The terms and expressions French feminism brought along “acquired a degree of formative power to reshape some Anglophone feminist agendas” and its discourses influenced and possibly reconfigured the feminist culture in the United States (Fraser 1992a:2). One of the most significant features of the early essays on French feminist theory had accordingly been “a recognition that certain key terms were untranslatable because of a complex cultural grounding that [could] not possibly be conveyed or even suggested by the target language” (Freiwald 1991:62). However, despite the recognition of the difficulties involved in relation to terms and concepts,
Anglo-American translators of French feminism seem to have been reluctant to scare off their readers by introducing or focusing on new terminology within the translated texts. For instance, Roudiez takes great care to emphasise that the words and phrases used to translate Kristeva's expressions are not 'neologisms', and that they are "on occasion, used with their everyday meanings", such as 'author', 'process', or 'other/Other' (1980:13). He notes that since in their translation they have "enough unusual vocabulary as it is", they didn't want to augment them by using 'scripture' for écriture, for instance (1980:20). When compared with the Turkish case, such reservations sound striking indeed.

The majority of the discussions about the problems encountered while translating French feminist theories concentrated on two key concepts only: écriture féminine and jouissance – both of which were closely related to Cixous's work. Especially the former became synonymous with it (see Gallop 1991:42; Penrod 1996:16; Sellers 1991:132; Moi 1985:102). In 6.1.2., while dealing with the charges of essentialism against Cixous, we shall see the reasons why the already-limited discussions on the translations concentrated especially on these two terms.

5.3.1.1. Écriture féminine

"In its American context, 'French feminism' is also called écriture féminine", notes Jane Gallop (1991:42). Although feminist thought in France supported a variety of movements, the concept of écriture féminine came to symbolise the whole for many Anglo-American feminist critics. It was also strongly associated with Hélène Cixous, and vice versa, as can be seen in the following quotes: "[Cixous] has raised many important critical issues but remains most widely known for her writing on écriture féminine" (Penrod 1996:16); "The concept of an écriture féminine – or feminine writing – derives from the work of Hélène Cixous, though it also has links with that of other French feminists" (Sellers 1991:132); "For Hélène Cixous, the best-known and most widely translated theorist of l'écriture féminine, women's writing has genuinely revolutionary force" (Showalter 1985a:5); "It is largely due to the efforts of Hélène Cixous that the question of an écriture féminine came to occupy a central position in the political and cultural debate in France in the 1970s" (Moi 1985:102). Maybe the most striking example of this association is the one below:

Throughout this essay I will speak of 'Cixous' as if the word included "Le Rire, de la Méduse", écriture féminine, and the theoretical positions of Hélène
Cixous herself — as if, in other words, those three signifiers share a textual 'home' so that any one of them may be said, however temporarily, to 'occupy' the others (Hill 1992:225).

The problems caused by the translation of écriture féminine, or quite often, only féminine were acknowledged, neither in the translated texts themselves, nor in the prefaces or introductions which went with them, but in articles written in English about French feminism in general — and all of them in the footnotes or endnotes:

The adjective féminin(e) is frequently used today in such expressions as écriture féminine or sexualité féminine, not in the judgmental sense of a stereotypical woman's nature but in the classificatory sense of pertaining to women (Marks 1978:833).

As most readers of recent French theory in translation know by now, the word 'féminine' in French does not have the same pejorative connotations it has come to have in English. It is a generic term used to speak about women in general, and approaches our word 'female' when valorized in a contemporary context. This said, the word is not always as innocent as it appears precisely because of that context — and because of its history (Jardine 1981a:222).

In English language writing the distinction is often made between questions of gender ('feminine') and questions of sex ('female'). Yet that distinction, which can be a useful tool for one stage of analysis, is not clear cut since our (relation to our) sex is always to some extent constructed by our gender (Still 1990:58).

In the American context it is easy to distinguish 'female' from 'feminine' in terms of sex and gender, the former denoting anatomy and the latter determined by social constructions. The question within the French context concerns 'woman'. Simone de Beauvoir defined 'woman' as a social construction, whereas, I think, Anglo-Americans are more likely to read 'woman' in terms of biological sex. My essay is really about this confusion (a confusion introduced through translation for the triad of female, feminine and woman is not active in French in the same way that it is in English) and thus when I use 'woman' I mean both and neither senses at the same time (Binhammer 1991:78).

In the end écriture féminine was often left untranslated, put either in italics (as I have done throughout this thesis) or in quotation marks. Sherry Simon explains this by the critics' hope to create distance, possibly because they thought that otherwise the term féminine would become "infected by the more pejorative meaning of 'feminine' in English" (Simon 1996:103). However, such a distancing also carries "the risk of fetishizing" écriture féminine (Ward Jouve 1991). As I have previously noted (2.2.1.2.),

232 Endnote for "the ambiguous French adjective féminin(e), which translates into English either as what might be a cultural description 'feminine' or — more problematically — as a bodily description 'female'" (Still 1990:49).
using French words in the English texts served to emphasise the ‘Frenchness’, the ‘otherness’ of the imported theories and of Cixous, and thus reinforced the already ambivalent attitude towards them in Anglo-America.

5.3.1.2. Jouissance

Jouissance was the other term left untranslated and was defined in English as “sensual pleasure/ orgasm” (Burke 1978:852) – adding to the charges of essentialism directed at French feminism and at Cixous. It was actually introduced into literary theory by Jacques Lacan, Julia Kristeva and Roland Barthes (Hawthorn 1994:102) in ways rather different from the ‘female pleasure principle’. However, in Anglo-American writings on the subject, this term is often attributed to Hélène Cixous, since she is “the French feminist” mostly associated with the “female body” (see, e.g. Finel-Honigman 1981:317-318). This is one of the many examples of the unfamiliarity of Anglo-American feminists with the intellectual heritage of French feminism (2.2.1.1.). Below are, once again, four footnotes and endnotes explaining the term, taken from early introductory texts on French feminist theory:

Jouissance in French signifies pleasure, usually sexual pleasure. The expression jouissance féminine stresses the difference between the male and female libidinal economies. Jouissance féminine is a central concept in most of the texts published on women’s sexuality, women’s libido, women’s desire (Marks 1978:835).

The verb jouir (‘to enjoy, to experience sexual pleasure’) and the substantive la jouissance (‘sexual pleasure, bliss, rapture’) occur frequently in the texts of the new French feminisms. We have constantly used the English words ‘sexual pleasure’ in our translations. This pleasure, when attributed to a woman, is considered to be of a different order from the pleasure that is represented within the male libidinal economy often described in terms of the capitalist gain and profit motive. Women’s jouissance carries with it the notion of fluidity, diffusion, duration. It is a kind of potlach in the world of orgasms, a giving, expending, dispensing of pleasure without concern about ends or closure (Marks & de Courtivron 1980:36-37).

A word for pleasure which has been translated as both ‘bliss’ and ‘ecstasy’; these terms do not include, however, its sexual reading of ‘orgasm’. Because of the controversy over the correct translation, jouissance is rapidly becoming a neologism in English (Jardine 1980:xxvii).

It is impossible to give an adequate translation of jouissance. The French verb ‘jouir’ refers to the experience of orgasm. Shere Hite, in The Hite Report, terms the noun orgasm in a verbal form for lack of a better term. In comparison with the French, however, this solution remains too clinical, which is why the original French word will be retained here (Richman 1980:80).
As can be seen in the examples above, the discussion about these two terms, *jouissance* and *écriture féminine*, was relegated to the margins — to footnotes and endnotes. Furthermore, keeping only these two terms in French and not translating them, makes them the focal point of ‘otherness’. Sherry Simon questions the focus on these two allegedly untranslatable terms, and asks whether they “function as a kind of condensation of the untranslatable, thus to free up the rest of the commentary to unmediated transfer” (1996:103):

[...]

It remains that *jouissance* was from the start the one term which was foregrounded as a ‘problem’ concept. Perhaps additional attention had to be channelled outwards into a wider network of terms, fully grounding its meaningful use. It remains that this term was unduly emphasized, to the detriment of a number of other potentially key polysemic words. Why not have retained the French term *propre* (which Betsy Wing gives as ‘selfsame’ or ‘ownself’) because of the untranslatable overtones of property, selfhood and propriety? [...] — or the difficult *sexe*? [...] The focus on this single term [*jouissance*] also suggests that other terms pose little or no problem, and that their meaning is transparent to the English-speaking reader (Simon 1996:104).

Instead of a discussion on a wider range of key terms, wordplay was put forward as a problematic issue in the translations of French feminists’ texts into English and especially in those of Cixous.

5.3.2. Wordplay in the translations of Cixous’s writings into English

In view of lexical problems, the difficulty of translating the wordplay in Cixous’s texts attracted relatively more attention than the translation of new terms. It was noted that Cixous’s language “delighted” in puns arising from connotations in French, that she “unsettled” the language through “sheer playfulness” and “poetic and highly metaphoric style” (e.g. Lydon 1995:100; MacGillivray 1993), that the “gathering connotative force” of her wordplay “resists any word-for-word equivalence” (Carpenter-Jenson 1991:194-195). The wordplay in her work was declared as “not fully translatable” although it was “an important technique for changing the focus of discourse, hence making and finding new discourses, letting the repressed come into language” (Wing 1986:164). What allegedly disappeared in the translation of “Le Rire de la Méduse”, for instance, was this “element of linguistic play that had been (as it remains) intrinsic to the ‘feminine’ as Cixous was attempting to represent it” (Lydon 1995:100).

233 For observations on the English translations of *propre* and *non-propre*, see Godard 1991:115.
The prominence of the wordplay in Cixous's writings has its roots in her Lacanian heritage. Cixous uses wordplay "to subvert the univocal, patriarchal meanings that have constituted the authority of language" (Wing 1986:164). Anglophone psychoanalysis, however, has often "dismissed the current Parisian equivalent as unserious word-play, mere punning" (Gallop 1982:139). Americans often wanted to know whether something was 'play' or 'serious'. They seemed to have the idea that if it is not one it must be the other. But for Lacan himself, wit, word games, jokes, mythology making, the materials of the poet, are all part of a kind of play that is inseparable from what is most serious about the psychoanalytic enterprise. If the analyst does not subvert the line between work and play, he is doing neither science nor poetry, and if the analyst does not subvert the line between science and poetry, he is not a psychoanalyst at all (Turkle 1979:240).^34

The 'play' element, and the questioning of seriousness it brings forth, were suspicious and inappropriate for those Anglo-American feminists who believed in the urgency and gravity of the women’s movement. The wordplay in Cixous’s writings would be another source of ‘otherness’ for many Anglo-American readers. Therefore, although the translators wished “to follow, imitate or reproduce the wordplays and slippages of the original, without reducing the text to its communicative content”, more often than not they “have not followed the defamiliarizing strategy which Cixous herself illustrates” (Simon 1996:99). Barbara Godard gives the following examples for possible strategies which could have been used – and indeed, some of which were used – by translators in order to cope with the wordplay translation in French feminists’ writings:

Various compensatory strategies of non-translation have been deployed by Catherine Porter in her later translation of This Sex Which Is Not One [by Luce Irigaray], notably the addition of a glossary which gives a detailed explanation of the multiple signifieds for the signifiers in question. Another such strategy which foregrounds the polysemy in the act of reading is to cite all the possibilities at each textual occurrence [...]. Neologisms might be introduced...

^34 Turkle elaborates on Lacan’s talk given at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology School of Engineering in 1975: “When Americans heard Lacan speak of Borromean knots, Greek science, paranoia, the concept of number, of symptoms, of phonemes, of spheres, and elephant shit, they were baffled. They tried to find a code to decipher the communication. They may have missed the point. Lacan wants his audience to enter into the circle of his language without trying to understand it from the ‘outside’. Lacan takes his structuralism seriously. If you assume that man is inhabited by language, then the suggestion that you relate to a psychoanalytic discourse, in particular his, by letting it inhabit you makes sense. And as in psychoanalytic experience, there should be no expectation that things will happen quickly. [...]”

“Americans often fear that when style is stressed, it is stressed at the expense of substance. Lacan the stylist was mistrusted, seen as frivolous and uninterested in 'getting a message across.' Lacan was trying to get a message across, but he was trying to do it across an ocean of differences in cultural and intellectual traditions” (Turkle 1979:239).
to foreground such work on the signifier, as with ‘knowing herself cunt birth’ for ‘re-con-naisance’ [...]. Or polysemy might be introduced where such possibilities present themselves in the target language as in ‘booby trapped silence’ for ‘silence piègé’ [...]. This is the strategy of translating by ‘lapse and bounds’ as Betsy Wing puns in English to reproduce the signifying effect of Cixous’s text in *The Newly Born Woman*. ‘Winging it’ in order to ‘voler’ language (1991:116).

However, these suggestions were often found quite difficult to follow by the translators themselves:

Where the author of the source text is unmistakably exploiting the possibilities of word play, the translator has to try to work out — and then work in — all the possible meanings, either by finding an equivalent polysemic term (which is often simply impossible), by adding a paraphrase (which is generally awkward, and is bound to spoil a joke), or else by renouncing the word play entirely (this is often the only choice, and it is usually regrettable) (Porter 1987:42).

5.3.3. Consequences

During the travels of French feminist theory to Anglo-America, the recognition of the translation effects was “rare” compared to “the sheer mass of commentary which accompanied” the theoretical texts (Simon 1996:90). In almost all of the cases, “translations of single texts by the French feminists [we]re accompanied by explanatory articles, rather than buttressed by translator’s notes” (*ibid.*):

To the extent that translators of the French feminists chose not to draw attention to their task, not to encumber their translations with notes or other visible signs of ‘interference’ with the text, they reproduce conventional attitudes toward language transfer. They choose an ideal of fluency over disruption, of immediacy and transparency over density. But in so doing they create a clearly false assumption of easy access to the text. [...] What is principally neglected in such translations is the full import of context, both intellectual and rhetorical. There has been no lack of written commentary to fill this gap — thousands of pages of analysis of these texts have been written. Yet the very disparity between the abundance of commentary and the ‘self-evident’ nature of the texts themselves as they appear in English is striking (Simon 1996:108).

I would contend that the reason why the discussion about translation issues took place outside the translations themselves — and thus relegated to the margins or largely ignored — is because French feminism was seen as an extension (tropes of universality), or a variant (tropes of solidarity), of the more politically oriented Anglo-American version of feminism. For this version, the emphatically language-bound nature of the French texts, like the psychoanalysis and continental philosophy that go into them, was set aside as irrelevant. There was a great concern that “French theorizing on the
subversion of the Logos" was tending "to replace, and not merely to supplement, the kind of political activism which Americans consider[ed] crucial to their self-definition as feminists" (Stanton 1980:80). The 'deproblematisation' of the Cixous translations, and the accompanying erasure of the differences in her texts was necessary for her assimilation into pragmatic Anglo-American feminism, to the extent that her work could fit into it. In Chapter 3, we have seen how French feminist thought was often presented by Anglo-American critics as 'nothing new', and at the same time, how it was tested for its usefulness for Anglo-American purposes. Cixous's reception in Anglo-America, therefore, reminds one of the "us-system" in Jacques Derrida's "La mythologie blanche", "that is, the chain of values linking the usual, the useful, and common linguistic usage" (Lewis 1985:40). As for the aspects of Cixous's writings which did not fit into this scheme, such as those related to jouissance and écriture féminine, they were presented as the French, the other, the 'they' confronting the 'us' of the us-system.

Consequently, no real need was felt for retranslations in Cixous's case. Yves Gambier observes that retranslation can take place when there is less resistance or more tolerance in the receiving language and culture towards the imported discursive elements (1994:416). Similarly, Antoine Berman notes that retranslations wait for the most favourable time (kairos) to come (1990). It seems that although the time was ripe for so-called 'revaluations' and 'retranslations' of, and 'revisits' to French feminism in general (e.g. Fraser and Bartky 1992; Huffer 1995; Spivak 1993), they did not open up the road to actual retranslated texts.

5.4. Conclusions

5.4.1. "Staying at home"

While translating, through the foreign language we renew our love-hate intimacy with our mother tongue. We tear at her syntactic joints and semantic flesh and resent her for not providing all the words we need. In translation, the everyday frustrations of writing assume an explicit, externally projected form. If we are impotent, it is because Mother is inadequate. In the process of translation from one language to another, the scene of linguistic castration – which is nothing other than a scene of impossible but unavoidable translation and normally takes place out of sight, behind the conscious stage – is played on center stage, evoking fear and pity and the illusion that all would perhaps have been well if we could simply have stayed at home (Johnson 1985:143-144).
There were times when Turkish seemed to be ‘inadequate’ to the translators, but the enthusiasm and dedication inherited from the Language Reform gave them the motivation to push the limits of the language, especially at the lexical level. In theory, it was believed, there could be no word for which no counterpart could be suggested in Turkish. There was no question of ‘staying at home’ either. The whole mechanism of literary critical thought was geared to continual contact with foreign theory.

The difficulties involved in translating Barthes into Turkish did not generate similar (self-) interrogation to that aroused by the importation of French feminism into Anglo-America. There was no particular complaint about the translation difficulties encountered in his texts, no mention of gains or losses, or of the efforts necessary to translate them. The problems which were encountered formed only a part of the more general, taken-for-granted complications that went with formation of the indigenous literary critical discourse. In the translated texts themselves, however, the difficulties inevitably became apparent. The abundance of retranslations in the Turkish case testify to the recognition of these difficulties.

In contrast, in the Anglo-American case, complaints did arise. Translation of Cixous into English was often seen as an ‘impossible task’, or at least, one which involved a great deal of ‘loss’. However, the actual translations did their best not to attract attention to these complications by avoiding neologisms, footnotes, endnotes, alienation effects, etc. as much as possible, thus sustaining the illusion of ‘transparent’ translations. The rarity of retranslations in Cixous’s case indicates the extent to which translation was presented as something unproblematic in the Anglo-American feminist critical system. At the same time, the imported ‘French feminist theories’ were regarded as inherently ‘foreign’ and ‘incomprehensible’. In 2.2.1.1. we have seen how French feminism was perceived as impenetrable due to its unfamiliar intellectual heritage. To encounter Cixous’s work, for instance, was “to encounter the thought, vocabulary and general discussions of Western culture’s philosophy, psychoanalysis, and linguistics in the France of the late 1960s and 1970s” (Penrod 1996:16). Therefore, in many instances, Anglo-American feminist critics actually chose to ‘stay at home’, and either ignored the work of the French feminists altogether, or tried to assimilate it through the tropes of universality.

Such concerns over unfamiliarity of background were not expressed in the Turkish case. Was the intellectual heritage underlying Barthes’s work more familiar to the
Turkish readers? Probably not. Barthes is well known for writing exclusively for and about his own (French) culture. However, for a culture so determined to be an organic part of the Western world – despite opposing internal interrogations – this could not have been a deterrent. In 3.2.3., I argued that the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ was not strongly or explicitly emphasised in the Turkish case, and translation was more a way to achieve ‘mimesis’. Incidentally, in Barthes’s texts, phrases like ‘notre langue’ and ‘notre littérature’ are almost always translated into Turkish as ‘dilimiz’ (our language) and ‘edebiyatımız’ (our literature), respectively.\(^{235}\) Alternatives, such as ‘Fransız dili’ (French language) or ‘Fransız edebiyatı’ (French literature) are not opted for.

5.4.2. Tolerance of interference

One could also argue that translation is ‘deproblematised’ in the Turkish case, too, since there the discussion is less about translation itself than, for example, about the nature of the ‘proper’ term to use, and whether this term is composed of Ottoman, French or Turkish elements.\(^{236}\) This discussion is anchored in a national agenda – the Language Reform. Translation in the Turkish case is so much taken for granted that specific writers’ problems are not discussed. Furthermore, language itself was seen as a transparent medium (5.2.1.2.). Therefore, in both of my cases, the majority of the critics and translators involved apparently assumes

a theory of language as communication that, in practice, manifests itself as a stress on immediate intelligibility and an avoidance of polysemy, or indeed any play of the signifier that erodes the coherence of the signified. Language is conceived as a transparent medium of personal expression, an individualism that construes translation as the recovery of the foreign writer’s intended meaning. […] The assumption is that meaning is a timeless and universal essence, easily transmittable between languages and cultures regardless of the change of signifiers, the construction of a different semantic context out of different cultural discourses, the inscription of target language codes and values in every interpretation of the foreign text (Venuti 1995:60-61).

Nevertheless, if only because of the remainder in the Turkish case, this illusion was broken in the Barthes translations. Neologisms, in their abundance, drew attention both to themselves as ‘words’ and to the translatedness of the texts. Yet this certainly does not mean that the problematic terms appearing as ‘conceptual knots’ in the Turkish

\(^{235}\) See, e.g. Yücel’s, Demiralp’s, and Kurkoğlu’s translations of “Qu’est-ce que l’écriture?”, p.24, 100, 53, respectively; Vardar’s translation of “La réponse de Kafka”, p.47.

\(^{236}\) I would like to thank Theo Hermans for this observation.
translations of Barthes served as a strategy of foreignisation – a strategy which goes together with Lawrence Venuti’s observations on the remainder. It has more than once been remarked that Venuti’s views on domestication and foreignisation holds within a translation situation in which the target language, not the source language, is culturally dominant. Conversely, if a domesticating strategy is adopted in the case of translating from a culturally dominant source language to a minority-status target language, it may help to protect the latter against a prevailing tendency for it to absorb and thus be undermined by source language textual practice (Hatim and Mason 1997:145-146).

Communities do “differ in terms of their resistance to interference, especially of the ‘negative’ type” (Toury 1995:277). For this reason, imports contribute to the shaping of local discourses in different ways and degrees. There are diverse approaches to the translation of the signifier (e.g. neologisms or wordplay) and different degrees of openness towards retranslations. It is even possible for certain communities, as it happened in the Turkish case, “to deliberately adopt interference as a strategy; e.g., in an attempt to enrich the target culture/language, in domains regarded as needing such enrichment, in an act of cultural planning” (Toury 1995:279). While dealing with tolerance/resistance towards interference, one should therefore keep in mind the relative prestige of cultures and languages (as seen from the vantage point of the prospective target system) and their power relations with the latter. The rule here seems to be that tolerance of interference – and hence the endurance of its manifestations – tend to increase when translation is carried out from a ‘major’ or highly prestigious language/culture, especially if the target language/culture is ‘minor’, or ‘weak’ in any other sense, ‘majority’ and ‘minority’, ‘strength’ and ‘weakness’ being relative rather than fixed, let alone inherent features of languages and cultures (Toury 1995:278).

The tolerance of interference in the case of Cixous’s translations into English was, needless to say, extremely low. The translations there were being carried out between two ‘major’ languages; therefore, the power relations are less obvious than in the French-Turkish case. However, translation in the former situation is still far from being an ‘exchange’ between ‘equal’ parties, if only because French feminism was seen as a rather dangerous rival that had to be subdued, and because of the linguistic hegemony of English.

In his more recent writings, Venuti clarifies his position: “[...] The cultural authority and impact of translation vary according to the position of a particular country in the geopolitical economy. [...] If domesteciting strategies of choosing and translating foreign texts are considered ethically questionable [...] minority situations redefine what constitutes the ‘domestic’ and the ‘foreign’. These two categories are variable, always reconstructed in a translation project vis-à-vis the local scene” (1998:187).
5.4.3. Modernisation = translatability

Languages of ‘minor’ cultures may, at some point in their history, be regarded by their own native speakers as ‘backward’ or ‘inadequate’, and may require ‘purifying’, ‘reforming’ or ‘modernising’ (Ferguson 1968:27). The examples are too numerous to be cited here, and there is a vast literature available on language and culture planning issues. What I would like to point out is the link between the efforts spent in the name of language ‘modernisation’, and the notions of ‘lack’ and ‘imported need’ discussed in Chapter 3. In these efforts the ultimate criteria is to bring the allegedly ‘backward’ language to a stage of ‘translatability’ from the ‘modern’ languages of the world. Charles A. Ferguson put forward ‘modernisation’ as one of the three dimensions relevant for measuring language development – the other two being ‘graphisation’ and ‘standardisation’ (1968:28) – and explained it as

the development of intertranslatability with other languages in a range of topics and forms of discourse characteristic of industrialized, secularized, structurally differentiated, ‘modern’ societies. [...] The modernization of a language may be thought of as the process of its becoming the equal of other developed languages as a medium of communication; it is in a sense the process of joining the world community of increasingly intertranslatable languages recognized as appropriate vehicles of modern forms of discourse (1968:32).

There is a certain problem with Ferguson’s term ‘intertranslatability’. Languages do not become ‘intertranslatable’ in a two-way relationship. It is the ‘weaker’ languages which are expected to ‘achieve’ one-to-one correspondence with ‘stronger’ languages. ‘Translatability’, then, is an attribute sought by the former. In the Turkish case we have already seen how heavy the emphasis was on finding single-unit words for French terms whenever it was possible to do so. Rendering the ‘weaker’ language ‘fit’ to translate from ‘stronger’ languages involved over-dependence on one-unit derivations, creating an artificial one-to-one correspondence between specialist terminologies, as well as between the languages in general. The increasing “drive towards zero resistance, full equivalence, and transparent immediacy” (Cronin 1998:152-153) brought along with such a conception of ‘modernisation’, ultimately works towards the disadvantage of the

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238 In the last decade or so, the one-unit derivations in Turkish have considerably decreased (Emecan 1998:42). Compound words, and especially noun and prepositional phrases are increasingly the choice to denote new foreign-origin concepts [e.g. çanak anten, çagır cihazı, güneş isıtıcısi, algılir grubu, etc. (Emecan 1998:41-43)].
receiving ‘weak’ languages\(^{239}\). In her work on ‘translated modernity’ in China, Lydia H. Liu observes:

The implication for cross-cultural comparison is that one relies on a conceptual model derived from the bilingual dictionary – that is, a word in language A must equal a word or a phrase in language B; otherwise one of the languages is lacking – to form opinions about other peoples or to lay philosophical grounds for discourses about other cultures and, conversely, about one’s own totalized identity (1995:4).

She then continues to question:

What is the Chinese, Japanese, or Arabic equivalent(s) of the word ‘self’? This troublesome question rests on the assumption that equivalence of meaning can readily be established between different languages [...] I hear people ask – Isn’t it true that the category of the ‘self’ existed all along in the Chinese philosophical tradition? What about the Confucian notion of ji, etc.? I find the questions themselves rather dubious because they overlook the fact that the ‘trope of equivalence’ between the English word ‘self’ and the Chinese ji, wo, ziwo and other words has been established only recently in the process of translation and fixed by means of modern bilingual dictionaries. Thus any linkages that exist derive from historical coincidences whose meanings are contingent on the politics of translingual practice. Once such linkages are established, a text becomes ‘translatable’ in the ordinary sense of the word (Liu 1995:7-8) [Emphases mine].

We have seen that the equivalence among tenkit, kritik and eleştiri was established in the process of translation, too. In Cixous’s case, her texts were deemed ‘untranslatable’, because such a one-to-one correspondence proved to be difficult to ‘achieve’ – even for such ‘basic’ words like ‘feminism’, which was consequently ‘translated’ into activist Anglo-American feminism’s terms (4.1.2).

5.4.4. Multiple-entry visa

As I noted at the beginning of this chapter, the very idea of applying a visa to travelling theory foregrounds the non-passivity of the receiving system\(^{240}\). Both Turkish literary criticism and Anglo-American feminist criticism have determined the ways in which this visa would (not) be granted to the foreign discursive elements involved, under what conditions, for which purposes, and how often. Retranslations, once located in this wider picture, are the direct consequences, not only of factors such as time, ‘greatness’ of ‘originals’, inadequacy of previous translations, ageing or changing, but also of the

\(^{239}\) Turkish Language Reform was criticised precisely for depriving the Turkish language of its nuances and connotations as a result of extreme purism (Heyd 1954:72; Brendemoen 1990:463-468).

\(^{240}\) Hence my reluctance to refer to a ‘target’ culture or language throughout the thesis.
needs, expectations and attitudes prevalent in the receiving systems. It may as well be that within translation studies it is rather early – if not futile – to present generalisations regarding retranslation per se (see also Pym 1998:83), especially generalisations of the type discussed in the introduction to this chapter. After all, case studies located within diverse socio-cultural situations keep yielding alternative results.
CHAPTER 6

TRANSLATING THEORY INTO POLITICS

Whatever forms their images might have gradually transformed into, Roland Barthes and Hélène Cixous were received in the Turkish literary critical system and the Anglo-American feminist critical system, respectively, first and foremost within the context of theory. Even though Barthes was not only a literary critic, a semiotician, or a structuralist, but also an essayist, his work was put into the framework of literary and cultural theories in Turkey. As for Cixous, her fiction and plays only partially altered her image as a ‘feminist theoretician’ in Anglo-America. This early and persistent association with theory has strong links with the dichotomy of ‘theory vs. practice/politics’ – a dichotomy that underlies many of the criticisms noted in Chapter 2. Both structuralism and semiotics in Turkey and French feminism in Anglo-America were taken to task for being apolitical, elitist, and unsuitable for the purposes of the ongoing local struggles. What was produced within the framework of these bodies of thought was not politically relevant – to feminist politics in the case of Anglo-America, and to socialist or Marxist politics in the case of Turkey. Cixous’s work was seen as ‘untranslatable’ into Anglo-American activist feminism, and Barthes’s work could not be effectively ‘translated’ into the concerns of the socialist-realist critical tradition in Turkey.

This chapter examines the theory vs. politics dichotomy found in the relevant systems and focuses on how part of the translation and translator patterns developed in the previous chapters stemmed from and consolidated the charge of apoliticalness directed at these two writers and at the theories they came to represent.

6.1. Feminist politics and the ‘Anglo-American Cixous’

6.1.1. Theory in Anglo-American feminism

In 2.2.1., we have seen how French feminism was seen as too ‘utopian’ and ‘apolitical’ to meet the demands of the activist feminism prevailing in Anglo-America. The roots of this activism dated back to the days when feminism emerged as a breakaway from other social struggles – first the abolition of slavery in the nineteenth century, then the civil rights movement, and later, the anti-Vietnam-war protests – when the activist women began to be irritated by the “discrepancy between male activists’ egalitarian
commitment and their crudely sexist behaviour towards female comrades” (Moi 1985:21). The contrast between the local feminist thinking based on such a political background and the imported ‘French’ thinking, which purportedly lost its activist connections not so long after the May 1968 events, dates back as early as the anthology *The New French Feminisms*:

American feminists are interested in going back, in resurrecting lost women, in re-evaluating those who managed to survive, in reconstructing a past – ‘herstory’. They are engaged in filling in cultural silences and holes in discourse. […] American feminists tend also to be focused on problem solving, on the individual fact, on describing the material, social, psychological condition of women and devising ways for improving it. Their style of reasoning, with few exceptions, follows the Anglo-American empirical, inductive, anti-speculative tradition. They are often suspicious of theories and theorizing. […] It will be immediately evident to the American reader that the greatest discrepancy between French and American feminisms is in the realm of psychoanalytic and linguistic theory. For the initiated, theory and practice are united in the writing and the reading. For the uninitiated, some of the texts will at first appear impenetrable (Marks and Courtivron 1980:xi-xii) [Emphasis mine].

As we have seen in 2.2.1.1., the unfamiliar intellectual heritage of French feminism did present a significant barrier to many Anglo-American feminists. Yet this was not only a question of “different theoretical traditions, but of a different relationship to theory” (Thorndike Hules 1985:xliii). French intellectuals allegedly had “a proclivity for abstraction and theoretical systems” and “in comparison, Americans appear[ed] empirical” (ibid.). Among the feminists in the United States, France was “perceived as the locus of theory (indeed, as being an essentially theoretical sort of place) and French theory as being of a certain kind” (L.S. Robinson 1981:70). It was even claimed that “the invention of French Feminism [in Anglo-America] is contemporary with the invention of ‘French Theory’”, in which other theoreticians from France, as well as the feminist thinkers, were “lumped together, regardless of their theoretical, esthetic, or political orientation” (Delphy 1995:214-215). The reason for emphasising this Frenchness was, as we have already seen in Chapter 3, the confrontation of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’, the foreign, the Other, and often, the theory. In accordance with the ‘defensive’

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241 As another example of the tropes of universality, Moi then continues to compare the situation with the women’s movement in France: “In many ways, the direct experience that led to the formation of the first French women’s groups in the summer of 1968 was strikingly similar to that of the American women’s movement. In May, women had fought alongside men on the barricades only to find that they were still expected to furnish their male comrades with sexual, secretarial and culinary services as well. Predictably enough, they took their cue from American women and started to form their own women-only groups” (1985:95) [Emphasis mine].
attitude, this confrontation had the advantage of keeping these theories at a safe distance.

In the same way as imported theories were anathema to some Turkish critics (3.2.1.) Anglo-American feminist critics were "mostly indifferent or even hostile" towards (literary) theory in general, since they regarded it as "a hopelessly abstract 'male' activity" (Moi 1985:70) best if avoided. Until the 1980s, feminist criticism in Anglo-America was "an empirical orphan in the theoretical storm", since this criticism itself "was an act of resistance to theory, a confrontation with existing canons and judgements", and many feminist critics shared "the suspicion of monolithic systems and the rejection of scientism in literary study" (Showalter 1985b:244). Thus "the sterile narcissism of male scholarship" was satirised and "women's fortunate exclusion from its patriarchal methodolatry" was celebrated (ibid.). However, by the late 1980s this attitude began to change into a "breakthrough of theoretical reflections" (Moi 1985:70). American feminists became "increasingly open to theory, to philosophical, psychoanalytic, and Marxist critiques of masculinist ways of seeing the world" (Jones 1985b:361). Since there was a certain "anxiety about the isolation of feminist criticism from a critical community increasingly theoretical in its interests and indifferent to women's writing" (Showalter 1985b:244), the initial resistance to theory in the name of practical application later went hand in hand with the apprehension that theory could be used as a 'practical tool'. Consequently, the relationship between Anglo-American and French feminisms, which developed around the same time as these changes in attitude, "define[d] itself around a simultaneous attraction toward, and distrust of, psychoanalysis and theory" (Simon 1996:88). Let us now turn our attention to how this attraction and distrust both towards psychoanalysis and towards theory defined the reception of Cixous in Anglo-America.

6.1.2. Charges of 'essentialism'

Cixous's relationship to theory has been as ambivalent as her relationship to feminism. As in the case of the latter (4.1.2.), this ambivalence is partly due to a different understanding of the word 'theory' in English and in French. Recently, Cixous has foregrounded the existence of certain "preliminary distinctions between Theory (a

242 Nicole Ward Jouve writes about "the somehow pleasing British myth that all theory is foreign, and to construct the foreign as pure theory, as the Other of Anglo-Saxon pragmatism, so that it can be critiqued at a distance" (1991:48-49). For a brief account of the development of cultural and literary theories in England after the 1960s and the role played by imported theories in this development see Barker et al. 1986:ix-x.
concept in an Anglo-Saxon context) and Théorie, which does not refer at all to the same
country of meaning” (1999:210). She has noted that she “as a writer, relate[s]
(negatively) to théorie in France” (ibid.). Indeed, as early as in *La Jeune née* she
warned that “any attempt to theorize écriture féminine in line with contemporary
masculine (self-) definitions will only reduce, distort or annihilate its essential features”
(Sellers 1991:139). Much quoted from Cixous, often as an epitaph, is the following
passage from “The Laugh of the Medusa” (e.g. Showalter 1985b:247-248; Jones
1985a:93; Sellers 1996:1):

> It is impossible to *define* a feminine practice of writing, and this is an
impossibility that will remain, for this practice can never be theorized,
enclosed, coded – which doesn’t mean that it doesn’t exist. But it will always
surpass the discourse that regulates the phallocentric system; it does and will
take place in areas other than those subordinated to philosophico-theoretical
domination. It will be conceived of only by subjects who are breakers of
automatisms, by peripheral figures that no authority can ever subjugate (in *New

Cixous’s opposition to theorising *écriture féminine* did not prevent her from being
labelled as a ‘feminist theoretician’ in the Anglophone world. In Chapter 4, we
examined how this particular image was consolidated through translation patterns.
Despite her ambivalent relationship to theory, it seemed that “Anglo-Saxon criticism
has found the theoretical Cixous most useful, if only to use her as a foil for the suspect
essentialism of French feminism” (Simon 1996:95-96). Let me come back to the issue
of ‘essentialism’ then.

> In 2.2.2., we have seen how psychoanalysis formed a problematic background to
the reception of French feminism in general. This challenging heritage was also the
main cause behind Cixous’s being labelled as an ‘essentialist’. Cixous makes use of a
wide range of literary, philosophical and psychoanalytic texts written by what Anglo-
American feminists call the ‘white fathers’243. She has, therefore, received much
criticism for breaking the solidarity among women and betraying the feminist cause.
Among the texts she refers to, the works of Freud and Lacan are quite prominent.
Cixous apparently regarded the Freudian model as providing “a helpful account of the
way sexual difference is organized in response to patriarchal ‘law’, and hence an
opportunity to understand and challenge its tenets” (Sellers 1996:2). She was not
uncritical of Freudian psychoanalysis, but she also thought that it could be usefully

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243 For counter-arguments, see e.g. Penrod 1996:135; Ward Jouve 1991:57.
adapted for the needs of the women’s movement (ibid.). However, “the centrality of the psychoanalytic model” in her work brought along an “accompanying emphasis on the body, the unconscious, and repression”, and it was this emphasis which made Cixous “highly suspect” to many Anglo-American feminist activists (Thorndike Hules 1985:xxxv).

The issue of essentialism is directly related to the question of sexual difference. Those who highlighted this difference were doing so in order to extol “women’s right to cherish their specifically female values” and to “reject ‘equality’ as a covert attempt to force women to become like men” (Moi 1985:98). Yet for an Anglo-American feminist critic “who th[ought] of her work as a more or less direct form of political action, the conceptual framework of différence and écriture féminine present[ed] striking difficulties” (Jones 1985a:92)^244. In fact, the situation was not dissimilar in France, since the “single greatest area of conflict between Psych et Po”, i.e. the group Cixous came to be identified with, and the other feminist groups there lay in their attitude towards ‘difference’. Feminists associated with the journal Questions Féministes, including Christine Delphy, Monique Wittig, and Simone de Beauvoir, believed that any discussion of ‘difference’ in relation to women was bound to reproduce existing hierarchies, and could only play out the existing stereotypes of ‘woman’s nature’. Psych et Po rejected this analysis, claiming that the fear of ‘difference’ within feminism led to reformism and homogeneity, instanced, for example, by the failure of US feminism to address the question of race (Shiach 1991:28)^245.

However, as we have seen in 3.1.1., these internal differences within French feminisms were homogenised through comparison and contrast with what is considered to be the Anglo-American feminism. The emphasis put on difference by the ‘French feminists’ allegedly led to a certain naturalisation of the body. It was feared that by emphasising the ‘woman’, her body and her supposedly feminine characteristics, one would simply give in to the stereotypical male ideas about women. Yet Cixous did not seem to be claiming that écriture féminine was women’s exclusive domain. She did not discriminate according to biological sex, but according to a certain ‘femininity’ which, she claimed, could be found in men as well as women:

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244 For an account of the changing attitudes towards ‘difference’ and ‘femininity’ in Anglo-American feminism see Fraser 1992a:5-6; Showalter 1985b:266-267.
245 Incidentally, those feminists associated with Questions Féministes – i.e. mostly the materialist feminists in France – have repeatedly figured in the writings of Anglo-American critics who were sceptical of the insistence on difference (e.g. Stanton 1980:80; Jones 1985a:90; Jones 1985b:369). This reminds one of the Turkish critics’ frequent references to foreign Marxist and socialist critics who were strongly opposed to structuralism and semiotics (3.2.1.).
Most women are like this: they do someone else's - man's - writing, and in their innocence sustain it and give it voice, and end up producing writing that's in effect masculine. Great care must be taken in working on feminine writing not to get trapped by names: to be signed with a woman's name doesn't necessarily make a piece of writing feminine. It could quite well be masculine writing, and conversely, the fact that a piece of writing is signed with a man's name does not in itself exclude femininity (Cixous, “Castration and Decapitation”, 1981:52)

Nevertheless, her critics in Anglo-America frequently argued that Cixous quickly slipped from ‘feminine’ to ‘female’, or to ‘woman’, and evoked a specifically female writing (e.g. Moi 1985:111-113)^246. Due to this ambiguity in her work, Cixous’s critics “tend still to read her work as being (for feminists) too essentialist, (for pragmatists/activists) too utopian, (for political experts) too naïve” (Penrod 1996:151). They conclude that her writing is “marred as much by its lack of reference to recognizable social structures as by its biologism”, and can only be “an invigorating utopian evocation of the imaginative powers of women” (Moi 1985:126).

I myself feel highly flattered by Cixous’s praise for the nurturant perceptions of women, but when she speaks of a drive toward gestation, I begin to hear echoes of the coercive glorification of motherhood that has plagued women for centuries. If we define female subjectivity through universal biological/libidinal givens, what happens to the project of changing the world in feminist directions? (Jones 1985b:368-369).

This is the point where the question of ‘agency’ came in. The main concern was: If ‘woman’ is reduced to an unchanging (anatomical) essence, then how to achieve social transformation? It would be impossible to revolt against the patriarchal system if one lacked “a coherent, integrated, balanced conception of agency, a conception that can accommodate both the power of social constraints and the capacity to act situately against them” (Fraser 1992a:17)^247. It was claimed that the return to the allegedly and

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^246 Verena A. Conley explains this as follows: “Men and women have been caught in a historical configuration in a theatre of representation. A word is never neutral just as the body is never natural but is always socially ciphered. Therefore, strictly speaking, there can be no essentialism. But the question is slippery. The attributes ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ do not refer to men and women. Nouns solidify. They become objects to be studied. Although still used for historical reasons, ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ will hopefully, [Cixous] argues, be replaced soon by others [...]. Yet as long as they are in use, they can, of course, and do on a number of occasions, slip back into an equivalence” (1992:40).

^247 On the other hand, Betsy Wing, one of Cixous’s best-known translators, suggests that the consciousness in Cixous’s work is far “removed from the notion of agency common to English and American philosophical tradition. Rather than agency the basis of the subject is a place, the active moment, at which [feminine] libidinal effects and a consciousness of them are produced – not unlike those places in the text where she will use a noun to function as a verb. Cixous call this practice ‘writing from the body’. Occasionally, judged in a reiteration of our Anglo-American tradition with its own
specifically feminine, therefore “extra-cultural” powers and energies, was due to the feared omnipresence and omnipotence of patriarchy (Fraser 1992a:16). When the patriarchal constitution of culture and of subjectivity was posited as total and all-pervasive, there could be no space left for female resistance. In certain French feminists’ texts the highlighting of such bodily energies and drives was often the most annoying, as well as the most intriguing, aspect for many Anglo-American feminists. For instance, passages like the one below are quite common in texts in English about French feminism:

Critics find the merging identities and blurred boundaries, which are attributed to women’s relationships, in all aspects of writing by women. French critics of écriture féminine attribute women’s ‘fluid’ styles to the blood, milk and joyful flow of women’s bodies. Fluidity may describe the genres of women’s writing as well as their themes, styles, characters and structures (Kegan Gardiner 1985:137).

This “joyful flow” refers to jouissance, of course, and at this point, it will be useful to go back briefly to the two ‘untranslatable’ terms discussed in Chapter 5, to see how their (non)translation and the definitions given for them strengthened the ‘essentialist’ image of Cixous.

6.1.2.1. Écriture féminine

We have already seen that in the early introductory writings on French feminism, Cixous and certain other French writers were grouped together and conflated into particular stances (4.1.2.). One such stance was their link to the ‘female body’:

Writers otherwise as diverse as Julia Kristeva, Luce Irigaray, Hélène Cixous, Claudine Herrmann, and Annie Leclerc are convinced that what has been repressed is woman’s desire, which they refer to as “la mère qui jouit”, “la jouissance féminine”, “le continent noir”, or, more generally, “féminité” (Marks 1978:835).

In a similar fashion, écriture féminine was often placed at “the heart of French feminism”, limiting the various interests of French women writers to exploring and writing about “the female body, the female pleasure principle (Cixous’ ‘jouissance’), female creative impulses (Kristeva’s ‘le féminin’), female silence (Duras’ ‘non-dit’)” (Finel-Honigman 1981:318). In 4.1.2. we have also seen how Cixous’s certain provocative statements were cited over and over again, overstressing the importance of system of clichés, one will hear it called ‘sentimental’ or ‘self-indulgent’. These clichés define feminine perceptions, states, and activities dismissively, in language that is supposed to be neutral” (1991:vii-viii).
the 'female body' in her writings. Similarly, she was frequently described as a "prolific practitioner of the écriture feminine" who called "for an assertion of the female body as plenitude, as a positive force, the source simultaneously of multiple physical capacities (gestation, birth, lactation) and of liberatory texts" (Jones 1985a:88). It is precisely this sort of description which aggravated the charges of 'essentialism' against Cixous. In its Anglo-American context, écriture féminine was primarily seen as "the inscription of the female body and female difference in language and text" (Showalter 1985b:249), as "writing the body" (Gilbert 1986:xvi), as "writing as a spontaneous outpouring from the body" (Jones 1985b:373). Thus, soon after its introduction to the Anglo-American feminist world, the concept was "quickly relegated to the realm of Cixousian essentialism" (Simon 1996:103), although, as I have pointed out above, Cixous herself insisted that écriture féminine was "the domain of both sexes" (Sellers 1996:5):

For Cixous, [...] masculine allegiance to the law and feminine willingness to risk its prohibition exemplify the poles of behaviour open to every one of us. For convenience, and as an approximation of the way these positions are adopted by men and women within a system in which men ostensibly have more to gain from allegiance, Cixous employs the labels masculine and feminine to suggest the way these positions tend under patriarchy to divide. However – and this is important in connection with Cixous' work on écriture féminine – she stresses that the terms are merely markers and can – perhaps should – be exchanged for others (Sellers 1996:3).

Since this term was either not translated into English at all, and kept in italics or within quotation marks, it was difficult for monolingual Anglophone readers to have access to its wider conceptual domain. The fact that it was sometimes translated as 'feminine writing' increased the suspicion surrounding the term. There were attempts to introduce alternative translations, such as 'writing said to be feminine' or 'writing in feminine' (Penrod 1993:51), which find greater currency today, but these later suggestions could not erase the initial powerful image of Cixous as an 'essentialist feminist theoretician'. Compared to the term 'woman', the term féminine should have created less trouble in English, since the Anglophone feminists were more used to the idea that 'femininity' was a historically variable social construct which "can be attributed to some biological males and not all biological females" (Still 1990:51). Nevertheless in the eyes of many Anglo-American feminists, like Elaine Showalter, écriture féminine seems to have

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248 Even a recent work such as Louise von Flotow's Translation and Gender takes Cixous and "The Laugh of the Medusa" as immediate examples when it comes to the place given to female body in experimental feminist writing (1997b:17), while there was no mention of Cixous in the preceding section on linguistic deconstruction and innovation.
remained “connected to the rhythms of the female body and to sexual pleasure (jouissance)” (1985a:5).

6.1.2.2. Jouissance

As noted in 5.3.1.2., the term jouissance was often defined as ‘sensual pleasure/ orgasm’ experienced by the female body. It is not difficult to see how this definition reinforced the ‘essentialism’ of Cixous. In the glossary added to her translation, The Newly Born Woman (1986), however, Betsy Wing defines jouissance as follows:

Total sexual ecstasy is its most common connotation, but in contemporary French philosophical, psychoanalytic, and political usage, it does not stop there, and to equate it with orgasm would be an oversimplification. It would also [...] be inadequate to translate it as enjoyment. This word, however, does maintain some of the sense of access and participation in connection with rights and property. [...] It is, therefore, a word with simultaneously sexual, political, and economic overtones. Total access, total participation, as well as total ecstasy are implied (1986:165).

This definition, once again in the margins – yet this time in the glossary of a translated text itself, rather than in articles about French feminism in general – calls into question the alleged dependence of Cixous’s œuvre on certain metaphors of the female body and on an ‘essentialist’ foundation. Referring to Wing’s definition cited above, Bina Freiwald rightly observes that if only the term jouissance were provided such a varied context from the very beginning of its introduction, the Anglophone feminists “might have been spared over a decade of dismissive American coy righteousness, annoyingly accompanied by repeated accusations of essentialist biologicist determinism and inexplicable fainting spells at the mere mention of the word” (1991:63). However, such an open stance would probably have required admitting a certain gap in the receiving language, as Stephen Heath had done while translating Roland Barthes into English: “English lacks a word able to carry the range of meaning in the term jouissance which includes enjoyment in the sense of a legal or social possession (enjoy certain rights, enjoy a privilege), pleasure, and, crucially, the pleasure of sexual climax” (1977:9). In fact, the word ‘jouissance’ did exist in English until the eighteenth century (Roudiez 1980:15-16). Then, it also meant ‘enjoyment’. Both ‘enjoyment’ and jouissance share a common etymology, and they both covered “the field of law and the activity of sex”, but while ‘enjoyment’ lost “most of its sexual connotations”, jouissance “kept all of its earlier meanings” (ibid.).
In her satirical introduction to *The Newly Born Woman* (see 3.1.), Sandra Gilbert nevertheless brings the discussion on *jouissance* back to where it was before—and this, despite Wing’s explanations in the glossary. Gilbert continues to compare Cixous’s ideas with certain Anglo-American writers:

Empirical and sceptical, victims as well as beneficiaries of a *Playboy* society in which the erotic is a commodity and ‘coming’ is *de rigueur* for everybody, some women on both sides of the Atlantic will inevitably wonder whether the *jouissance* implicit in what Cixous calls ‘coming to writing’ is really liberating, even if—as Betsy Wing’s valuable glossary reminds us—the currently popular French concept of *jouissance* implies a virtually metaphysical fulfilment of desire that goes far beyond any satisfaction that could be imagined by Hugh Hefner and his minions. Didn’t D.H. Lawrence—in *Lady Chatterley’s Lover* and elsewhere—begin to outline something oddly comparable to Cixous’s creed of woman before she did? (1986:xvii).

6.1.2.3 Metaphor/ metonymy

Cixous referred to the ‘female body’ and emphasized sexual difference for certain emancipatory purposes. However, for the Anglo-American feminist critics who believed in equality rather than difference, the avenues which could be opened up by a return to the ‘body’ were likely to be more problematic than useful, since they often had “difficulty accepting the metaphoricity of the body; they demand[ed] that metaphors of the body be read literally, and they then reject[ed] these metaphors as essentialistic” (Fuss 1992:95, 100). Within the borders of the essentialist debate, the term ‘woman’ was immediately raising “the twin spectres of ahistoricism and biologism” (Still 1990:51), but in the “more abstract universe” of French feminism, shaped by the continental theories and philosophies, ‘woman’ and ‘feminine’ were “metaphors for dissidence, negativity, and irreducible otherness” (Thorndike Hules 1985:xli). Reading such notions literally would be missing the argument.249 ‘White ink’ is a case in point:

Anti-essentialists read ‘white ink’ literally, to signify ‘mother’s milk’, they interpret Cixous as suggesting a direct link between breast feeding and writing

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249 In relation to Gilbert’s references to English-speaking women writers like Dickinson or Woolf (see 3.1.3.), Peggy Kamuf observes that Gilbert tries to purify the ‘Dickinsonian’ strain in Cixous by denouncing its admixture with ‘a decidedly less savory association (at least for Sandra Gilbert and her imagined ‘typical American readers’) to Lady Chatterley. […] Gilbert’s tactic here is unmistakable: appropriate the ‘good things’ in Cixous by assimilating them to respected English-speaking precursors and, once the technique of comparison is in place, switch the poles to a negative, ‘often misogynistic’ association to repel whatever cannot be assimilated” (Kamuf 1995:72).

250 Gayatri Spivak argues along similar lines when she notes that “determinative essentialisms become irrelevant” in Cixous’s use of the figure of the mother: “No matter if I have no children and therefore no ‘experience’ of ‘giving the mother to the other woman’. It is a general sense of mothering—its minimal definitive and presupposed cultural predication as selfless love […] that Cixous is turning into a relationship with the other woman—who is precisely not a child of my body. If read seriously, this must be rigorously distinguished from being motherly or maternal, matronizing, et cetera” (1993:156).
Binhammer initially notes that it is also possible to read 'feminine' metaphorically: “By using feminine and masculine to qualify libidinal economy Cixous participates in their metaphorization which is to say that she is reading cultural inscriptions rather than anatomical bodies” (1991:72). However, she later concludes that there is more a metonymic relationship between ‘woman’ and the ‘feminine’ rather than a metaphorical one (Binhammer 1991:74; see also Fuss 1992:101; Godard 1991:113-114):

The metonymic field is based on contiguity and combination rather than on identity and similarity. This difference allows us to escape the either/or established by traditional articulations of the essentialist problem – i.e., either one reads the relation of feminine to female literally, therefore, biologically and anatomically, or one reads it metaphorically and thus having no relation to women. Anglo-American suspicion of the political ineffectiveness of French feminism is rooted in the latter formulation, that is to say, if the feminine is only a metaphor and Martim, Joyce or Genet can be better women than women, what could be the political usefulness of such a theory for the material conditions of women? To think of the relation as one of contiguity allows for the introduction of material considerations while avoiding essentialist definitions of women (Binhammer 1991:74-75).

6.1.3. Cixous and politics

Against the charges of essentialism and political ineffectiveness, much has been written on Cixous’s defence (e.g. Conley 1992; Hill 1992; Defromont 1990; Sellers 1996; Shiach 1991). Some of her translators, mainly the Group 4 ones, are among those who point out that the radical transformations of behaviour and mentalities Cixous calls for in relation to ‘femininity’ and ‘masculinity’ are not independent of accompanying equally radical political transformations (Still 1990:50). They claim that according to Cixous, writing is “itself a political activity that works in a different sense from that of the tradition of representation”; it is a struggle for “a political cause thought to be outside the noise of common politics” (Conley 1992:11 and 52).

[... Since a feminine subject position, with its refusal of masculine fear and self-defensive appropriation of the other’s difference, necessarily entails new forms, Cixous argues that the hallmark of écriture féminine is its willingness to defy the masculine and seek new relations between subject and other through writing. Not only can writing exceed the binary oppositions that currently structure our thinking and thus create new modes of relations between subject and object, self and other, but, Cixous stresses, through such transformations,
feminine writing will enable corresponding changes in our social and political systems (The Newly Born Woman, p.83) (Sellers 1996:5).

Cixous took up women's cause as one cause among many, and later in her writing career she moved on to other issues. It was this moving through "multiple political causes" which might have confused her readers who looked for "a coherent theory" in her writings (Conley 1992:132). Instead, Peggy Kamuf defines Cixous as a "semi-theoretician", who would "disappoint whoever supposes that theory's political responsibility begins and ends in a present 'reality', by which is meant that which is fully present to itself rather than disseminated by the semi-" (1995:74)

In 4.1.2. we have noted how Cixous's connections with Psych et Po were frequently foregrounded. The group itself was committed to political struggle through writing in order to challenge "the unconscious structures of patriarchal oppression" (Shiach 1991:27). Their battle was primarily "against the masculinity in women's heads", not against the social or legal conditions of women (Duchen 1987:48). Accordingly, Cixous, too, was insisting that "transformations of subjectivity must precede social transformation" (Jones 1985a:92). However, such a different approach to feminist politics was unsuitable for Anglo-American purposes. Cixous's reluctance to be labelled as a 'feminist' complicated the matter even further for those Anglo-American feminists who sought in her a possible ally for their cause.

Such a feminist campaigner can hardly be found in her more recent works in theatrical form which focus on 'humanity in general'. Cixous's Anglophone critics unite in their account of the change her theatrical works brought to her writing (see, especially, Shiach 1991:135-136). They note that it is mainly in her plays where she became more interested in history. She tried to make the best of the "'depersonalization' writing for the stage both requires and makes possible, since the other in a stage production speaks necessarily with a voice different from the author's, and is physically someone else" (Suleiman 1991:xxii). In contrast with the earlier "auto-biographical indulgence" (Conley 1992:99) derived from psychoanalysis, from the inward-gaze found in her fiction (Ward Jouve 1991:97), Cixous's plays include a multiplicity of

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Kamuf notes: "We now call 'theory' the practical demonstration of how and why theory is not in fact possible as an act of thinking uncontaminated by contingency, particularity, or experiential differences. Because it cannot avoid putting these differences materially and practically into play, 'theory' is political: it is implicated necessarily in the very process of signification and symbolization it describes, the process by which some differences are made to represent difference in general. In this sense, 'theory' is always semi-theory" (1995:73-74).
voices, an immediate, live performance of the body. There are also allegedly less “dizzying references to philosophical and literary intertexts” (Penrod 1996:80) which could scare off the ‘uninitiated’. In her plays, Cixous has moved from “the exploration of her own unconscious/other” into a writing period where her texts become increasingly engaged with “the others of culture and history” (Sellers 1996:xv). It is hardly surprising that these later texts were not immediately relevant to the Anglo-American feminist agenda and were, therefore, not translated into English for a long period of time.

6.1.4. The politics of translation

Although Cixous’s theatrical works reflected an important shift in her career, this shift could not be effectively introduced into the Anglophone world. We have seen that until 1985 she was represented in English with the complete translations of 15 short texts, 1 book of criticism, 2 books of fiction, and only one play, and that was Portrait de Dora (4.2.3. Table 6). To that date, she also had 3 excerpts in English from her fiction and 2 from her critical/theoretical texts, but no excerpts of her plays were translated. Even today, the ratio of her plays in English to her plays in French is less than one to four, while more than half of her books of criticism have been translated into English. If her plays are indeed more political in general, this fact remains rather unknown for the Anglophone readers. Instead, a number of her ‘feminist’ ‘theoretical’ texts attracted all the attention. As a result of the selective translation and reception process, the isolated manifestos easily supplied material for the allegations of essentialism (see also Simon 1996:87-88). “Le Rire de la Méduse”, for instance, the text which represented both the totality of Cixous’s writings and ‘the French feminism’ for a long period of time, has provoked strong reactions related to the charges of ‘essentialism’. Attention was concentrated on this text and not on other works where Cixous dealt with more overtly political topics, such as essays like “Poésie e(s)t Politique” and “La Séparation du gâteau”, or plays like L’Histoire terrible mais inachevée de Norodom Sihanouk, roi du Cambodge and Manne aux Mandelstams aux Mandelas.

As for Cixous’s works of fiction, they were regarded as the most difficult of her texts. Consequently, only one fifth of them have been translated into English by the year 2000. As mentioned above, these texts were considered to be written under the prominence of ‘I’, Cixous’s inward-gaze, reflecting her own unconscious. Towards the end of this chapter, I will come back to the assumed relationships between
autobiography and essay-writing, and say a few words about its connections to Cixous's alleged apoliticalness, as well as that of Roland Barthes.

6.2. Marxist politics and the 'Turkish Barthes'

6.2.1. Theory in Turkish literary criticism

As noted in 5.2.1.2., literary and cultural theories were imported into the Turkish system mainly since the 1960s. For a considerable time, they created "awe", even "apprehension" within the Turkish literary circles (Batur 1978:108), where the main debates had focused not so much on literary theory, but on literary criticism. The need for and importance of theory were only occasionally acknowledged. Even then, theory was seen as a complementary tool for literary criticism and history:

In its efforts to understand and explain literary works, literary criticism cannot remain independent and isolated from a certain literary tradition. It also cannot afford to function in an independent and isolated fashion from literary theory, which itself is a system of norms and values developed from the literary tradition. [...] The interpretations we have arrived at through our intuitions and our knowledge of the tradition should also be evaluated in the light of literary theory (Kantarcioglu 1991:44, 48).

Literary theories and the methods of analysis suggested within their frameworks were seen as means for achieving a sound literary criticism. Still, comments such as those of Kantarcioglu were quite rare in the beginning. The more common attitude was to treat literary theory in a way similar to treating the literary critics as untalented writers (4.4.1.). Accordingly, a free-willed critic who defended artistic freedom could not have "predetermined theories in mind" and could not "judge the works in the name of ready-made theories" (Ateş 1986:7):

In almost every period, art is transformed into a mere technical game in the hands of those who lack creative power, or whose creativity is defective, and this game is then turned into a theory so as to legalise it for lay readers (İnce 1983:33).

The comment of Özdemir İnce is taken from his critical piece on structuralism. In general, this particular school of thought seems to have symbolised, at a certain point in the history of Turkish criticism, the theory which threatened artistic productivity (see 2.1.3.1.). Although for slightly different reasons, the preface to the special issue of Birikim on structuralism similarly proclaims:

Structuralism is sheer and unalloyed theory. Since it is content with trying to understand the world and does not aim at changing it, it does not carry any
political implications. The texts included in this special issue prove this point. The topics structuralism deals with are those which are only tangential to politics, such as linguistics, anthropology or criticism of art (1977:5-6).

For many Turkish critics of the time 'changing the world' was the main objective. Criticism had to evaluate and judge the work of art in order to sift 'good' from 'bad'. It had to 'educate' both the originators of art and its receivers. The aloof 'scientificity' of structuralism (and of semiotics) was seen as unhelpful, even dangerous for the dominant tradition which was practice- and action-oriented. As we have seen in 2.1.2., Marxist critical theory itself was not seen as a pure 'theory', let alone an 'imported' one. It was, in one way or another, translated into practice.

6.2.2. Barthes and politics

The opposition of Marxist and socialist-realist critics in Turkey towards structuralism and semiotics was examined in 2.1.3. These schools of thought were seen as incompatible with dialectical thinking. They denied diachrony, evolution and history, and thus, maintained the political and ideological status quo. They took away the power of agency from the artists, writers, and thinkers. As I have shown in Chapter 4, Roland Barthes received the biggest share of this criticism as 'the most prominent representative' of these schools of thought. Nevertheless, there were some Turkish critics who, in their own writings, tried to make use of Barthes's ideas in the name of left-leaning criticism. I will here concentrate on four such critics in order to demonstrate how the political implications of Barthes's writings were handled in Turkish, how they were suggested and negated almost simultaneously.

6.2.2.1. Nedim Gürsel (1977)

Early on in the reception of Barthes in Turkey, a voice had been raised claiming that it was possible to make "some use" of his ideas within the Turkish socialist critical tradition. In a report from Paris on Barthes's inaugural lecture given at Collège de France in 1977, Nedim Gürsel describes him as "the well-known writer", "the interesting semiotician", and quoting from Tahsin Yücel, "maybe the most eminent essayist of contemporary France" (1977:8). Gürsel observes that although Barthes "works within the field of structuralism", he is "nevertheless an intellectual whose stance is also quite close to Marxism" (8).

Gürsel regrets the fact that "like most pioneers of the contemporary literary approaches derived from semiotics, Barthes is not very well known in [Turkey]" (8). He
quotes certain comments on Barthes in Turkish, and adds that since only a couple of his articles — and no book-length works — had been translated into Turkish until then such comments remain too abstract and Barthes's ideas do not reach even the intellectuals, let alone a wider audience. Barthes, however, is a critic who could teach a lot to our writers, and especially to our revolutionist colleagues who accuse everyone of making petit bourgeois literature. [...] The introduction of Barthes to our country may be not that urgent. The social conditions we are living in necessitate, whether we like it or not, focusing more on Marxist thinking. Nonetheless, although he describes himself as a writer "out of Marxism", I think Barthes can help us to grasp all the characteristics of the ideological structure of modern capitalist society, which can be considered as a civilisation of signs. For instance, I have to admit that among the writings of Marxist critics I have not yet read as excellent a critique of the petit bourgeois ideology as that in *Mythologies* (8).

Nevertheless, Gürsel cautiously notes that Barthes is not, "of course", one of the critics who contributed to the theoretical enhancement of Marxist thinking by using concepts from linguistics or psychoanalysis, such as Louis Althusser (8), and that Barthes himself points out he "is not a Marxist", because he cannot make sense of the verb "to be" a Marxist, but he "came to Marxism" in the end through the influence of a Trotskyite friend (8). According to Gürsel, Barthes also maintains that "there is no direct political discourse in his writings, that he is not pursuing a certain action in politics, and that he even is not examining political issues" (8). Then Gürsel adds that Barthes nevertheless talks about 'power':

> Power is everywhere and continuous. I have never seen it exhausted. It is like a calendar: it loses its pages, but then renews itself back again. Power is plural. I believe that the struggle is not against a certain power or authority, but against all sources of power and authority. Maybe in this sense I may be more on the left than the 'Left'. But the fact that I do not have a leftist 'style' makes things more complicated (Roland Barthes, cited in Gürsel 1977:8; no reference provided).

Although Gürsel makes it clear that he does not approve of Barthes's "formalist ideas", he also insists that even in Turkey — a country rendered 'backward', whose social problems await immediate solutions — interest in such an original writer should not be considered as a 'luxury of an intellectual'. I would even claim that it is obligatory for all our writers, and especially for all our critics who exalt non-methodological criticism, to read Roland Barthes (1977:30).

Gürsel's article, which introduces a rather different Barthes to the Turkish reader than the usual structuralist-semiotician, is printed in an interesting format — in four columns.
with small fonts, spreading over three pages (8-9, 30). This is not a totally uncommon format in Turkish journals of the time, where texts were ‘squeezed’ into the pages according to space availability. What is strange is not the way the text is cut into two, but what comes in-between the two pieces. The first page (8) carries full four columns of Gürsel’s article. The second page (9) has one column of the continuing article, but also, separated by borders, three columns of an anonymous text titled “What is Structuralism?”. The rest of Gürsel’s article continues and ends on page 30, in two and a half columns. I would like to focus briefly on this anonymous text, written in the first person plural – a form denoting collectivity and authority. It begins as follows:

Since the times of Ahmet Mithat, the artistic movements of the West have found repercussions in our country. Especially today, living in a shrinking world due to mass media, it is impossible to be unfamiliar with the trends in contemporary art. We should note that this obligation of ‘awareness’ necessitates ‘criticism’, too. We cannot adopt these movements and trends before we evaluate them from the point of view of our country’s level of thought and of the contemporary orientations, and before we determine the foundations of these movements by inspecting them from within the framework of a scientific world-view.

The text continues by noting that structuralism, although frequently talked about, is still unfamiliar to Turkish readers. Then a brief summary of Adnan Onart’s introductory article on the subject is provided (1973; see 2.1.3.). The first section of the text ends with a quote from Onart, emphasizing how structuralism “runs totally counter to” existentialism and Marxism, and how the “disappointment of certain Marxist thinkers opened up a gap in critical thinking – a gap used up by the fashionable structuralism”.

The second section briefly talks about the influence of structuralism on literature and notes that

criticism is the field in which structuralism is most widely talked about, and France is the country in which structuralism found currency. Finally, Roland Barthes is the first to come to mind when one hears about structuralist criticism. He is regarded as the only authority, even the Messiah of this field.

After quoting from the opening sentences of Berke Vardar’s translation of the excerpt from Critique et vérité (1969), where Barthes claims that criticism is not a science and does not aim at illuminating the work of art (see 4.2.2.3.) the text ends with a forceful reiteration of the discord between structuralism and Marxism.

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252 Novelist, short story writer, journalist, publisher, and the most prolific translator of the Tanzimat period (Paker 1998:581).
This three-column, anonymous text has more than enough material in it to cancel whatever Nedim Gürsel was trying to point out in his article. Its location in-between his text, interrupting and delaying it for some twenty pages – even though the remaining two and a half columns on page 30 would easily have fitted into page 9 – serves as a warning to the reader as to the ‘real’ relations between Barthes and Marxism.

6.2.2.2. Murat Beige (1982)

In 4.2.2., we have seen the substantial increase in the Turkish translations from Barthes after the 1980 coup. It is worth noting that, after the 1980 events, those who had previously worked mainly within the socialist and Marxist paradigm began to show some interest in Barthes’s work. Murat Beige, a Group 3 translator, was one of them (4.3.1.1.). In the early eighties Beige edited a weekly section titled “People and Art” in the daily newspaper Cumhuriyet. The very first issue of this section included two essays from Mythologies and four others followed in subsequent issues within six months. I will come back to these translations below.

Belge’s choice for the first issue of “People and Art” is quite remarkable. Cumhuriyet itself was one of the few remaining left-leaning newspapers after 1980. Besides, as I have noted above, Belge’s background is intertwined with the Marxist critical tradition. Indeed, in 1977, he had contributed to the special issue of Birikim on structuralism. In an article titled “Marxism and Structuralism”, Belge looks into the “possible relationships, if any” between these two schools of thought and especially into the ideas of Althusser. He shuns the dogmatic approach of Marxism towards other systems of thought and claims that some day Marxist thinkers “may confront a more valid system of thought than structuralism” and may have to test Marxist thought against such new theories (1977:24). However, he asserts that the reason why Birikim devoted a special issue to structuralism was “to show

233 Incidentally, a similar strategy of negation or cancellation can be noted in the anonymous preface to the two translations from Mythologies published in Birikim (3:13 1976:36-37). Here Barthes is presented as an author “who emerged with the development of the structuralist school in France”, who “wrote on literature, linguistics and semiotics”, and despite all this, who can “most of the time be a radical, a ‘Marxian’ without being a Marxist”. He is appreciated as a clever and interesting writer whose “sharp intelligence is nevertheless wasted”, since “although he understands, explicates and interprets the petit bourgeois ideology”, does not attempt to change it.

234 Similarly, a rising interest in the works of the Frankfurt School can be observed after 1980 (Susam 1997). Since the orthodox Marxist and socialist-realist literature and criticism could not be carried on any longer in Turkey, alternatives might have been sought.

235 In the inaugural issue, Belge introduces Barthes as “the famous writer, [...] one of the outstanding representatives of structuralism and semiotics” (1982). He notes that in Mythologies, Barthes studies “the signs – semiology – of various social gestures, customs and behaviours” and thus “unmasks the underlying ideologies”. After mentioning the unwelcome word ‘semiology’, however, Belge immediately adds that “the alloy of intelligence and sensitivity, which is the landmark of Barthes’s point of view, is always ahead of his methodology”.
that, as a system, those aspects of structuralism which Marxism cannot make use of outweighs any other characteristics it might carry” (1977:26). He adds that one could as well conclude by saying “there is nothing in structuralism Marxism can make use of” (ibid.). He admits that the results obtained through structuralist methods in anthropology and linguistics are important, but they have to be absorbed and transformed by Marxism in order to be rendered useful.

Five years later, with a coup d'état in-between, Belge’s general introduction for the inaugural issue of the “People and Art” section declares that “it is time to open the minds to new theories and approaches, with a view to restart a platform of discussion which was curtailed by the events of the early eighties” (1982). As a result of these events, the intended readers seem to have changed too:

We probably think that the new sections in the newspapers and the journals [...] address a new type of reader. We are scared to treat roughly these budding ‘new’ readers who are just stepping into the ‘lofty’ world of art and culture. An exhaustive and profound study, a text full of difficult concepts might cause them to wilt like magnolias with the touch of a hand. Therefore, we tried to make everything much easier and simpler (Belge 1982).

Belge then asks: “Or are there other reasons underlying this convenience? Maybe we ourselves cannot dive into such depths anymore?” (ibid). He laments the fact that art and culture are not discussed any longer, as if all problems have been solved. Principles, foundations, issues of artistic value are not pondered upon. However, in this new environment, where feverish discussions left their place to “a kind of beauty contest” in which “each and every work of art can vie for recognition”, Belge thinks that there may be a chance to come out of the “gloomy seriousness” which previously dominated the critical field:

Seriousness does not mean gloominess. A brisk and cheerful seriousness is also possible. Seriousness can also be achieved through daily language. On the other hand, a completely different style and language may also be necessary. The simplest topics can be handled with utmost seriousness and the most serious problems can be handled through the plainest approach (1982).

Eventually, for the “People and Art” section six texts by Barthes were chosen, all from Mythologies. As we shall in 6.2.3., these were not the most politically loaded essays from the book, i.e. not ‘serious’ work, but rather easy-going texts with subject matters related to popular culture. The language used in the translations was also extremely plain – common vocabulary, almost no neologisms. As Belge noted, the ‘new’ readers who were quickly
depoliticised in the years following the coup would perhaps have been scared off if anything more directly political or complicated had been offered to them. It seems that Barthes’s work filled a need in Turkey to level a different, more subtle, less ‘gloomy’, and more ‘brisk’ criticism at ‘the Order’. Since direct attacks on the government and its institutions ceased to be possible – at least for a period – Barthes’s restrained and intricate criticism could have been more appropriate. However, this situation limited the access to Barthes’s ideas which could have stronger repercussions in terms of a political inquiry.

A year later, in 1983, Murat Belge published a collection of his essays from 1975 onwards (Tarihten Güncellige, reprinted in 1997). In the introduction to the collection, Belge acknowledges the influence of Barthes, who, by providing a good sample of a solid “method of viewing” in Mythologies, redeemed the traditionally ‘ego-centred’ essay genre in Belge’s point of view (1997:10). As in Mythologies, Tarihten Güncellige covers a wide range of topics, both the ‘small things’ in the Turkish culture and the ‘bigger’ questions: from arabesque music to T.V. series, from art and history to politics, from holiday resorts to football. It even has sections called “Çağdaş Mitler” (Modern Myths) and “Gündelik Söylemler” (Daily Myths). Yet Belge makes sure to distinguish his work from that of Barthes. He stresses that their approaches are very different: the main issue for Belge was not a synchronic picture of the Turkish society, but a diachronic one; furthermore, he did not use a “precise method” like Barthes did (10). This book, I believe, can be a good future case study for looking at the complex relationships between writers and their writer-translators.

6.2.2.3. Ragıp Ege (1987)

Ragıp Ege’s meticulous and comprehensive essay on the concept of ‘myth’ in Barthes’s writings was published in the first Barthes reader Yazi Nedir? together with Ege’s translation of “Le Mythe, aujourd’hui”, the concluding essay from Mythologies. In the very beginning of his text, Ege questions the scientificity associated with Barthes’s writings on ‘mytho-logie’:

Can the activity of a consciousness which takes such an openly critical stance towards the object it chose to study, which rejects, even loathes this object, be compatible with the characteristics required from scientific investigation? Can there be a science of an object which takes on totally negative connotations? Scientific investigation cannot be an activity which is carried out against its object of study and which aims at destroying this object. However, in Barthes’s work each analysis of a myth appears as a destruction of that myth […] (1987:91).
Ege's essay is the only one I could find which unearths the political implications of Barthes's writings for the Turkish reader. Therefore, it is no wonder that he begins by dismissing the 'myth' of disinterested 'scientificity' associated with Barthes. In the rest of the essay, Ege describes how the ancient myths, which were an intrinsic part of the whole society's ways of survival, evolved into today's myths, which broke away from the society and “degenerated into speech acts serving conceptions reflecting the 'ideology', i.e. the world-view of the dominant class” (92). Ege quotes from *Le plaisir du texte*, one of Barthes's books not yet translated into Turkish (108):

> Autant il est juste de parler d’«idéologie de la classe dominante» parce qu’il existe bien une classe dominée, autant il est inconséquent de parler d’«idéologie dominante», parce qu’il n’y a pas d’idéologie dominée: du côté des «dominés» il n’y a rien, aucune idéologie, sinon précisément – et c’est le dernier degré de l’aliénation – l’idéologie qu’ils sont obligés [pour symboliser, donc pour vivre] d’emprunter à la classe qui les domine (Barthes 1994:1510).

Ege also focuses on Barthes's ideas about 'the myth on the Left', and following Barthes's arguments, explains why such a notion is in fact not applicable (114-116). He notes that Barthes's “goal is not to confront the myth on the right with a myth on the left, but to accentuate contingency, historicity, arbitrariness and differentiality against the bourgeois myths which try to naturalise the world” (120). Ege quotes, once again, from *Le plaisir du texte* (ibid.): “La lutte sociale ne peut se réduire à la lutte de deux idéologies rivales: c’est la subversion de toute idéologie qui est en cause” (Barthes 1994:1511). Ege concludes his essay with the observation that ‘mythology today’ is not so much a branch of science *per se*, but that it prepares a suitable ground for carrying out science by attacking and destroying the myths that create alienated meanings, which, in their turn, prevent the realization of scientific investigation (121-122).

The volume *Yazi Nedir?* was published at a time when the immediate effects of the 1980 *coup* were waning and a new era seemed to have opened in the Turkish history. Consequently, Ege's text could include references both to Marx and Engels, and to Lévi-Strauss. Here Ege seems to have managed to incorporate Barthes's ideas in “Le Mythe, aujourd’hui” to a markedly Marxist-socialist framework, especially to a Turkish version of it. He often gives examples from certain ‘myths’ of the Turkish system, such as the ‘greatness’ of certain Turkish writers (112-113), the ‘holiness’ of the mother tongue and the efforts for language purification (119-121). As the only text from *Mythologies* taken into this Barthes reader, the first complete translation of “Le Mythe,
aujourd’hui” and Ege’s accompanying detailed study could have been much more instrumental and effective, if only the Turkish critical system of the time had not become so depoliticised itself.

6.2.2.4. Hasan Bülent Kahraman (1990)

Kahraman’s article on Mythologies, occasioned by the complete translation of the book in 1990, is written precisely against this depoliticisation. It starts with the observation that writers whose works are “difficult to read” are usually represented in foreign languages not with the complete translation of their texts, but through excerpts, which gradually begin to represent the totality of their work, “shattering the body of meaning created by the writer’s discourse as a whole” (43). According to Kahraman, Barthes himself became such a ‘myth’, only partially understood and recognized by the bourgeois intelligentsia: in Turkey, in Anglo-America, and even in France (ibid.).

Kahraman explains this phenomenon by referring to the complexity of Barthes’s discourse, which creates certain obstacles to translation, and to the fact that he writes “almost in any field and on any topic one can think of” (43). This was so because “Barthes [was] first of all an essayist” who had to come to terms with the all-pervasive influence of the French bourgeois values in people’s daily lives (ibid.). However, Kahraman adds that

whatever topic he wrote on, Barthes dealt with its aspects which determined his own self and made himself meaningful. Symbols, music, photographs, texts, they all would exist to the extent that they gave pleasure to Barthes. Gradually, Barthes’s texts became a means of establishing the history, and pre-history, of his own individual consciousness (44) [Emphasis in the original].

Referring to Ege’s essay discussed above, Kahraman notes that Barthes’s discourse, with its antagonism towards the bourgeois ideology, included a social dimension “at least in the 1950s” (44):

So much so that, in his “Le Mythe, aujourd’hui” Barthes even discusses the definitions of the myth on the left and on the right, as well as the nature and characteristics of the relationship myth has established with politics. In short, while he studies myths, Barthes does not appear as someone who avoids meddling with particular issues, who is content merely with writing on certain phenomena, and who does so for the sake of ‘play’ or ‘pleasure’ (45).

Nevertheless, Kahraman doesn’t forget to stress that Barthes later softened his attacks on the bourgeois values, did not want to stick to a doxa, did not deal with political
issues in depth, and was content with demonstrating that whatever subject matter he chose, it involved a certain language (45). Kahraman ends his article with the following note:

It was Barthes who said: “It is necessary to choose between these two: being a terrorist or an egoist”. This statement is plain enough to reveal the secrets of his own development as a whole. […] Of course, it goes without saying that such a choice is open only to a Frenchman, especially to a hedonist Frenchman like Barthes (46).

Kahraman’s four page article has two illustrations: a small photo of Barthes on the second page and a caricature on the third. In the latter, on the streets of an apparently Turkish city, crowds of people are climbing up and down frames and ladders, doing acrobatics. Two passer-bys comment on it: “Look,” one says, “I have told you. Depoliticisation finally turned people into monkeys!” The humour intended escapes me, but why this caricature was chosen for this particular article is clear: in 1990, ten years after the coup which managed to depoliticise the whole country – including its literary criticism – to a great extent, Kahraman must have felt the need to re-evaluate a foreign writer in terms of his political stance – a writer who was frequently translated into Turkish, but could not be integrated into the political debates neither before 1980, and, as I tried to show in this section, nor properly after 1980.

All but one of the texts discussed above were written in relation to the whole or part of Mythologies. Let us now look at the Turkish translations from this book in more detail, since they provide us with important clues as to the relation of text-selection to the political context of Barthes’s reception in Turkey.

6.2.3. Mythologies

As we have seen in 4.2.2., together with Le Degré zéro and Essais critiques, Mythologies has a significant place among Barthes’s Turkish translations. Although its complete translation was published only in 1990 as the fifth book-length work by Barthes, 10 essays from the book were published in journals and newspapers between 1976 to 1983 (see 4.2.2.1., Table 2). In the years up to 1987, four of these essays were retranslated and published in other journals and in the reader Yazi Nedir?. These individual essays, excluding the retranslations, form one third of the thirty short texts by Barthes translated into Turkish, and thus, are likely to have shaped the reception of his work in general, and of Mythologies in particular. The essays from Mythologies have also attracted the greatest number of translators (12 people). This indicates a wide interest in the book
compared to his other works. As for the place of publication, these essays appeared in four well-known journals of the time (*Birikim*, *Soyut*, *Yazko Çeviri* and *Metis Çeviri*) and in the newspaper *Cumhuriyet*.

Despite the apparent importance credited to the book, the essays translated individually do not contribute much to the discussion and evaluation of those ideas of Barthes which carry certain political implications. The reasons why these texts were chosen instead of others from *Mythologies* need to be reflected upon. The essays concerned can be grouped into two: texts dealing with popular culture ("Saponides et detergents", "Le visage de Garbo", "Le plastique", "Martiens", "Strip-tease", and "Jouets"), and texts on literature or criticism ("Nautilus et bateau ivre", "La critique Ni-Ni", and "Critique muette et aveugle")\(^\text{256}\). Accordingly, Barthes is either an essayist who tried his pen on topical issues, as Tahsin Yücel pointed out (see 4.4.1.), or a literary critic 'proper', as he had already been in the eyes of many Turkish critics. Only the concluding essay, "Le Mythe, aujourd'hui" could give an idea about the gist of the book. Three of these essays – "Saponides et detergents", "Critique muette et aveugle", and "Nautilus et bateau ivre" – were translated once again before the appearance of *Çağdaş Söylemler*, and "Le Mythe, aujourd'hui" had already appeared in excerpt form in 1983. This choice is remarkable when one takes into account that there were 43 other essays in *Mythologies* which could have been translated for the first time instead of these retranslations.

The essays on popular culture seem to have been chosen for translation because of their assumed relevance for the Turkish system. "Saponides et detergents" is on two cleansing products which were becoming widespread in Turkey in the 1970s: Persil and Omo. According to Beige's note on the related issue of "People and Art", "Martiens" was chosen because *Star Wars* was on T.V. Similarly, "Le visage de Garbo" was featured in the inaugural issue of "People and Art" because a series Greta Garbo acted in was being shown on T.V., and the two films mentioned in the essay had been broadcast the year before. "Le plastique" and "Jouets" could have been considered general enough issues, but the reason why "Strip-tease" was chosen is rather unclear\(^\text{257}\).

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\(^{256}\) See the bibliography for detailed references to the translations.

\(^{257}\) Some essays in *Mythologies* carry clear traits of 'feminist' ideas (e.g. "Romans et Enfants", "Celle qui voit clair", "Astrologie"). Here, Barthes questions media's approach to women and draws attention to the fact that women's place is always determined by men and for men. None of these texts were translated before *Çağdaş Söylemler* (1990), although the 1980s witnessed the peak of a strong women's movement in Turkey. Similar concerns to those voiced by the French feminists in relation to the biological sex of the writer may have been a deterrent in translating these essays. Instead, the only essay concerning women was "Strip-tease", translated with plenty of ornamental clichés and palatable additions for men.
As for the texts on literature and criticism, "Nautilus et bateau ivre" starts with the following sentence: "L’œuvre de Jules Verne [...] serait un bon objet pour une critique de structure [...]" (Barthes 1993: 610) [emphasis mine], although the essay itself is a subtle critique of the bourgeois myths of plenitude, enclosure and security. "La critique Ni-Ni" and "Critique muette et aveugle" might have provided answers and allusions to certain debates found within the Turkish critical circles. The excerpt taken from the first three pages of "Le Mythe, aujourd’hui" – published four years before Ege’s complete translation (1987) – was translated by Gül Neyire Işık, a Group 4 translator (see 4.3.1.1.). It was introduced specifically as "a semiotic study", starts with the essay’s first sentence, "Le mythe est une parole" (Barthes 1993:683), and ends with the following: "le mythe relève d’une science générale extensive à la linguistique, et qui est la sémiologie" (Barthes 1993:684).

These essays might have responded to certain needs in the Turkish system in one way or another, or have struck familiar chords, but they are not representative of the book they belong to. Mythologies in general comprises of texts on cultural and political issues which were of interest to Barthes. His aim was to unmask the modern myths that try to pass as ‘natural’, or as ‘nature’ itself, and that are in fact products of the petit bourgeois society. Let us now look at what was not translated from this book. For instance, the subject matter of "Le Pauvre et le prolétaire" which concentrates on the films of Charlie Chaplin, or of "Un ouvrier sympathique" which is on a film by Elia Kazan are familiar enough for Turkish readers – as familiar as Greta Garbo’s films. Both texts question the relationship between the proletariat and their employers, and its cinematographic image. There is also a good element of Brechtian acting strategies involved in these two essays. "L’opération Astra" and "L’usager de la grève" were directly related to the Turkish culture, since they dealt with advertisements and strikes, respectively, which became very much part of the Turkish daily life in the 1970s. The latter text also includes arguments against compulsory army duty, a hot potato in the Turkish context. Essays, such as "Conjugales" or "Cuisine ornementale", which are responses to the petit-bourgeois attitude of the French press, are quite familiar for Turkish readers who read similar news in the popular Turkish press. "La grande famille des homes" and "Photo-chocs", both on photography and the manipulation of audience reception, could also have been interesting for Turkish readers who were increasingly subjected to the influence of the media.

258 Especially the latter, since Kazan’s family origins were in central Anatolia.
Essays like "Quelques paroles de M. Poujade", "La croisière de 'Batory'", "Poujade et les intellectuels", "Dominici ou le triomphe de la Littérature", "Grammaire africaine", or "Photogénie électorale" may seem to be too French-culture-bound at first, but are in fact crucial texts — and maybe the most powerful in the whole book — in criticising the State and its organs, and in examining the relationship between politics and language, the manipulation of government elections, etc. A text like "Bichon chez les Nègres" could have been instrumental in reshaping the criticism of Barthes, as well as of Lévi-Strauss, for their allegedly ahistorical approach towards "primitive" cultures. If "Continent perdu" or "La grande famille des hommes" attracted more attention than, say, "Nautilus et bateau ivre", would it have prevented the criticism that Barthes did not take history into consideration, and that, since he was a structuralist, he denied diachrony and evolution, helping to protect the status quo (2.1.3.)?

6.2.4. The politics of translation

If one considers that the first two essays to be translated from Mythologies were published in Birikim (an established socialist journal of pre-1980), the following one in Soyut (another left-leaning journal of the time), and the next six appeared in the socialist newspaper Cumhuriyet, it might seem curious why these other essays were not chosen. In fact, prior to 1980, i.e. during the heyday of Marxist criticism, only three essays were translated from Mythologies: "La critique Ni-Ni", “Saponides et détergents”, and “Critique muette et aveugle”. Two of them concentrate on literary criticism, as if this was the most relevant aspect of this book for the journals in which these essays were published — the first two in Birikim, and the last one in Soyut.

Several factors underlie this highly selective translation pattern. First of all, as I have tried to demonstrate in various parts of the thesis, the receiving system was not

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259 The essays from Mythologies that were translated into Turkish also included many culture-bound elements. For instance, "La critique Ni-Ni", which has been translated twice, is based on a text published in the French daily L’Express.
260 Incidentally, certain other essays not-translated before Çagdaş Söylenler also include material which could have responded to some of the criticisms against structuralism and semiotics. "Racine est Racine" or "Poujade et les intellectuels", for example, could have addressed the futility of the dichotomy of heart vs. mind in Turkish criticism, which eventually led to the accusation that structuralism and semiotics were constraining art and literature (2.1.3.1.). If "Deux mythes du Jeune Théâtre" had been translated beforehand, would Barthes be still criticised as a 'pure formalist'? Here Barthes observes that "Le style excuse tout, dispense de tout, et notamment de la réflexion historique; il enferme le spectateur dans la servitude d’un pur formalisme, en sorte que les révolutions de ‘style’ ne soient plus elles-mêmes que formelles […]" (Barthes 1993:629). "Les Romains au cinéma", for instance, is where the clearest and most detailed description of the term 'sign' can be found, yet it was not translated before 1990.
261 It is worth noting that the four recent translations (including the retranslations) were published in two translation journals, Yazko Çeviri and Metis Çeviri.
ready for an encounter between the established critical tradition and the relevant novelty of the semiotic approach in *Mythologies*. Second, the readers were considered to be either too much steeped in the socialist-realist tradition – and therefore would not even want to hear about anything related to semiotics – or, after 1980, too 'inexperienced' – therefore should not be scared off by complicated texts. An equally important reason might be that Barthes, apart from relentlessly criticising the petit bourgeois ideology, also touches upon certain leftist myths (e.g. in “Le Pauvre et le Prolétaire”, “Un ouvrier sympathique”, and in the “Le mythe, à gauche” section of “Le Mythe, aujourd’hui”). Although he emphasises that the myths of the left are not comparable in quantity or quality to those of the right, some of his views could have been difficult to digest. Furthermore, Barthes’s apparent preference for Brechtian theatre might have been another deterrent for the more orthodox Marxist critics.

Nevertheless, one cannot help wondering what would have happened if more daring Marxist/socialist-realist translators had continued to translate pieces from *Mythologies* using them for their own purposes, or if the complete translation of the book had been carried out by such a translator instead of Tahsin Yücel. Maybe such an open affiliation with Barthes was still not desirable for the left-leaning critics. As noted in 4.3.1.1., the first two translations published in the “People and Art” section of *Cumhuriyet* do not bear any translator’s name, although the translator was Murat Beğec himself. The subsequent two essays published in this section were translated by Group 1 translators, i.e. those on whom I could not find any information. It is difficult to determine whether some of these names were pseudo-names, but one can certainly argue that unlike the case of Group 3 and 4 translators who were well-known and who concentrated on Barthes ‘the structuralist and the semiotician’ as well as Barthes ‘the essayist’, these Group 1 translators remain rather invisible, hence forgivable.

*Mythologies* was thus used in the Turkish critical system in different ways. Marxist and socialist-realist critical tradition in Turkey defined itself, at some point in its development, in opposition to structuralism and semiotics (tropes of alterity). Therefore, Barthes’s texts which carried certain political implications, those which could be regarded as borderline cases, were ignored. And while a few critics coming from this particular tradition tried to utilise some essays from *Mythologies* in order to level a more subtle criticism against ‘the Order’ after the 1980 coup, others translated less poignant essays, presenting them with extratextual material emphasising that Barthes is a ‘non-Marxist’ structuralist.
6.3. Conclusions

6.3.1. Essay and ‘I’

But why did Tahsin Yücel undertake the complete translation of *Mythologies*? Did he want to demonstrate his earlier claim about Barthes’s being first and foremost an essayist? *Mythologies*, after all, consisted of short texts written in essay style on certain topical issues in France. Barthes’s foreword to the book starts as “Les textes qui suivent [...]” (1993:565), for example, and Yücel translates it as “Bu kitapta yer alan denemeler [...]” (The essays in this book [...]?) (1990). Yücel’s choice of the four texts from *Mythologies* included in the second Barthes reader, *Yazi ve Yorum* (1990), may equally be significant in this respect. “Un ouvrier sympathique”, “Le bifteck et les frites”, “La Nouvelle Citroën”, and “Astrologie” are texts which do not have any bearing on literary critical issues, as if to disprove Barthes’s connections with structuralist criticism proper.\(^{262}\)

The fact that Barthes’s second image in the Turkish critical system was that of an essayist carries implications regarding the reception of the political aspects of his work. Since its beginnings from Montaigne onwards, the essay form has allegedly carried an “aura of elitism” (Boetcher Joeres and Mittman 1993:20) and has historically been “a tool of the privileged classes” (Boetcher Joeres 1993:151), since, purportedly, only the elite can indulge in ‘probing the self’. Essays are generally considered “individualistic”, leading to “intellectual exhibitionism” (Belge 1997:9). Added on to the charges of ‘elitism’ associated with structuralism and semiotics (2.1.3.2.), this personal (read: subjective) aspect of the essay did not make Barthes an appealing writer for the Turkish political activists, who adhered to a form of dialectic objectivity.\(^{263}\) Since the essay form entails the personal involvement of the author in the subject s/he writes about, it can not be a detached account of the world (Boetcher Joeres and Mittman 1993:20). However, precisely for the same reason, essay writing has a potentially subversive aspect to it. Margret Brügmann, referring to Theodor W. Adorno (1974), notes that scientists distrust the essay form because the essay can choose to approach the whole mountain of knowledge from whichever angle it chooses, beginning and ending wherever it pleases. This goes against the ‘rules of the game’ of disciplines which like to see themselves as scientific or scholarly. [...] The

\(^{262}\) A similar urge to disprove Barthes’s alleged ‘scientificity’ may be the reason why Yücel later translated *Fragments d’un discours amoureux*.

\(^{263}\) For a discussion of the relationships between subjectivity in essay in the form of ‘I’, the problem of author/authority, and politics, see Boetcher Joeres and Mittman 1993:18-20, and also the essays in the same volume.
essay can be seen as a sort of heresy within the sciences, because it brings to the surface issues that science and philosophy are blind to, and that traditional concepts fail to recognize (Brügmann 1993:74-75).

This was exactly why Barthes was not considered to be a structuralist (anymore) by Tahsin Yücel and other experts in the field. His works such as Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes was seen as 'too personal', 'too autobiographical', and were therefore dismissed as 'unscientific'.

The tension between 'I' and 'politics' had its impact on Hélène Cixous's reception in Anglo-America, too. Her crucial text, "Le Rire de la Méduse", was received as an essay in its English translation (4.2.3.3). Furthermore, the prominence of 'I', the ego, and the writer's unconscious in Cixous's early fiction – which was received as 'practical' samples of a 'theoretical' écriture féminine – similarly looked suspicious to Anglo-American feminists who stressed solidarity and collective efforts for emancipation. Like the essay, écriture féminine too was criticized as "elitist and hermetic" (Brügmann 1993:76). Translation, once again, played a part in this criticism. Because of the 'deproblematisation' discussed in 5.3., Cixous's writings acquired a certain 'writerly' authority which accentuated the 'I':

Whether it be through cumulative semantic effects or through footnotes [...] it would seem absolutely essential that the English-speaking reader be given some idea of how Cixous mobilizes poetic resources in the service of a specific textuality. The semantic slippages and rhetorical hesitation which are generated through the insistence on the signifier is central to Cixous' writing strategy. It highlights the work of the unconscious of the text, and drains authority away from the speaking subject. Those who read Cixous with no indication of these recurring lapses, returns and echoes will indeed get from her work the illusion of a false certainty (Simon 1996:100-101) [Emphasis mine].

6.3.2. Theory and difficulty

The incompatibility between the theories associated with Barthes and Cixous and the local political struggles also has links with the charges of 'incomprehensibility' (2.2.1.1.) and 'unintelligibility' (5.2.3.). One of her Group 4 translators, Susan Sellers writes about the difficulty of reading Cixous, and its implications for activist feminism:

264 Commenting on the translation patterns of Barthes's texts into English, Elizabeth Bruss observes: "As with respect to Roland Barthes [par Roland Barthes] itself, the fact that Barthes's earlier Michelet par lui-même [...] has never been translated makes the later book seem far more 'expressive' and 'personal' (to use two common adjectives from the reviews), far more an autobiography of the 'first degree' than it actually is" (1982:378). Since Michelet par lui-même was not translated into Turkish either, the same observation may apply to the Turkish case.
The experience of reading [Cixous's] early texts can be a bewildering and even alienating one. Time and energy must be invested in unravelling the text's meanings, and it is consequently difficult to return to the text with the freshness and desire that arguably produce the type of textual engagement Cixous is concerned with. The experience of reading some of the early texts can be compared to reading in a foreign language one only imperfectly understands: the text remains scarred by the frustrations and fatigues of the initial reading. This difficulty masks a more serious problem. If a new, feminine 'order' is to be achieved, then feminine writing has to engage with the general consciousness and not only with those individuals whose privileged situation affords time and access to education. Although Cixous is now considered an important figure in academic and literary circles, her work remains largely unknown to the general public (1996:16-17).

A similar observation is certainly valid for Barthes's writings, which are difficult to follow in French, and which, due to the remainder discussed in 5.2.3., became even more difficult to read in Turkish. For instance, Yücel's complete translation of *Mythologies* is much more loaded with neologisms than the individual essays published in *Cumhuriyet*. The latter, after all, aimed at 'making things simpler' for 'inexperienced' readers, who were presumably called *back* to 'politics' (6.2.2.2). From this point of view, neologisms stood in the way of 'action'. Nurullah Ataç, once an enthusiastic advocate of the Turkish Language Reform, affirmed that the alleged 'unintelligibility' was in fact the advantage of 'pure Turkish' (öztürkçe): it delayed comprehension, and thus led the reader to think about the meaning of the terms and to search for their interpretation (cited in Çolpan 1963:vi). However, such a delay in comprehension could not be always welcome when the issue at stake was political activism.

The vital missing link in the discussions about theory and difficulty is, of course, speed. For Marxist and feminist activists, the effort and time spent on reading theory should be cost- and time-effective, so that theory can be immediately put into 'action'. Yet there is also another aspect to speed and it is 'masterful comprehension':

If theory is valuable [...] it is valuable precisely to the extent that it increases the difficulty of poetry and other cultural matters. As de Man famously argued [in *The Resistance to Theory*, 1986], the greatest resistance to theory stems from within theory itself; what he did not add was that the main cause of this

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265 In several of the retranslations from *Mythologies*, however, certain politically-loaded terms were translated rather problematically. For example, although *idéologie* and *bourgeois* have generally been used in Turkish Marxist criticism as borrowed words, as *ideoloji* and *burjuva*, Barthes retranslations often attempted to find neologisms to replace them, blurring the Marxist connotations of the texts (see 5.2.2.). Similar problems arose with the translations of terms such as *aliéné*, *dialectique*, *classe*, *socialiste* and *communiste*. 
was the desire for speed, or for the etymologically given sense of this word, for 'success', for mastery (Docherty 1993:32-33).

Thomas Docherty criticises the "masterful consciousness which assumes, in true optimistic fashion, that the world is available for consciousness here and now and that the 'I' here and now can (at least potentially if not in fact) masterfully comprehend it" (1993:33). One step further than this position lie the tropes of 'universality', or the 'imperialist' attitude – which assumes that "the understanding of the other can never be a problem" (Robyns 1994:64) – paradoxically together with the desire for 'modernisation' that manifests itself in the 'translatability' of languages (tropes of 'lack' and 'lag'):

[...] Market expansionism, like imperialism, seeks the eradication of the 'entre-deux'. Far is always too far and long is always too long. Anything that takes time is a waste of time. The aim is to remove anything that lies in the way, to reduce to nought the obstacles of space, time, culture and language” (Cronin 2000:116).

6.3.3. Fashion and novelty

Apart from the similarities discussed throughout the thesis, the single identical aspect of both cases examined is strongly related to the theory vs. politics dichotomy: structuralism and semiotics in Turkey and French feminism in Anglo-America were both received as ‘fashions’. The two source corpora – originating mainly from Paris, one travelling westwards, the other eastwards – seem to have brought along a whiff of the Parisian catwalks. In Turkey, structuralism was exclusively presented as a ‘fashion’ by its opponents (e.g. Bezirci 1981a; Onart 1973; Timuçin 1983). Allusions were not lacking between Paris the birthplace of structuralism and existentialism – another school of thought that had ‘swept through’ Turkey – and Paris the centre of haute couture. Structuralism was seen as a temporary issue: “[It] will come and go, like existentialism or surrealism. What remains is good literature and brave criticism” (Timuçin 1983:24). In these affirmations, 'importedness' of the literary theories in question was once again emphasised. Critics harped on the “ineffectuality and failure of imitated methods of analysis, such as existentialist or structuralist criticism, which [we]re periodic reflections of foreign trends coming into fashion in Turkey every ten years” (Ertop in "Eleştiri Tartışması" 1985:64). There was a certain disdain towards these “ephemeral intellectual fashions and fantasies” which carried critics along with their tide and caused them only “to advertise goods which have been 'produced' according to temporary trends” (Ayvazoğlu 1991:33). According to the Turkish Marxist and socialist critics,
various schools of thought based on the ‘word’ had passed through history. Structuralism would be just one of them; only ‘action’ would be permanent (Sercan 1983:38).

The ‘fashionable’ characteristics of literary theories were emphasised in a slightly different way in Anglo-America, where the Frenchness of the imported texts in question was much more foregrounded. In the Turkish case, the focus was on the ‘foreign’, or more specifically, the ‘Western’. In the Anglophone world, the attitude towards ‘Frenchness’ and ‘French’ theories seems to be much more ossified, especially within the socialist circles:

France, as everyone knows, is the country of fashion. Intellectual jargons and artistic personalities are picked up as passionately and dropped as ruthlessly as the perpetually daring inventions of Givenchy and Saint Laurent [...] This makes some of us understandably suspicious of the intellectual revolutions which the French perpetually announce (Leo Bersani, cited in Bruss 1982:370).

In addition to this suspicion about French theory in general, its links with the ‘feminine’ strengthened French feminism’s image in Anglo-America as that of a vogue. Even by its proponents, such as Elaine Marks, the feminism attributed to ‘France’ was seen as another “French ism”, a topic “very much ‘in the air’” (1978:832). It came as no surprise, then, when French feminism ostensibly started to fade – not only in the Anglophone world, as Huffer observes: “In 1981, the ideas introduced [...] seemed sexy and new. Today, many of us have lost the fervor, or at least the spark, we felt at that initial encounter” (1995:1-2); but also among the Parisian intellectuals: “Feminism, like Marxism, structuralism, poststructuralism (or like the narrow striped tie?) is definitely passé. No one – that is, no one fashionable, no one dans le vent, in the wind, knowing which way the wind blows – ‘does’ it anymore” (Suleiman 1991:vii).

In accordance with the belief in their trendiness, both structuralism-semiotics and French feminism had been received in the relevant systems as ‘bright new things’ or ‘ground-braking innovations’ – and somewhat anachronistically too. In his enthusiastic introductory essay Melih Cevdet Anday claimed that human sciences had recently been “shaken” by structuralism, which was a “new scientific school of thought”, as yet “not much known in Turkey” (1970:6). Structuralism had opened up “new horizons”, provided scholars with “great opportunities” and “innovatory methods”, helped them to achieve “brightly successful results”, and led to a “revolution” (ibid.). A decade later, it is not a promoter like Anday who presents structuralism as something new: as its severe critic,
Asım Bezirci admits the difficulty he encountered in describing structuralism, since it was a "new movement in its formation period" (1981a:99). Two years later, another opponent of structuralism, Afsar Timuçin also dismisses it as a "harmless, 'modern and new' product" (1983:24). The alleged 'contemporary' and 'innovatory' features of structuralism were claimed to be "the key to every heart" as "soothing remedies" for "some sectors" who allegedly sought to keep a distance from politics and to cling to the existing order of things (Timuçin 1983:24; Bezirci 1981a:99; Kutluer 1981:31).

In the case of French feminism, novelty is more in the foreground, particularly in opposition to Simone de Beauvoir's generation of feminism – hence the anthology titles *New French Feminisms* (Marks and de Courtivron 1980) and *The New Feminist Criticism* (Showalter 1985c). But what exactly is at stake in this recycling of critical thought, and presenting it as 'new' in the context of another system? In the context of the reception of French feminism, Nicole Ward Jouve explains this phenomenon with an example from the reception of structuralism in England:

What is increasingly happening now in the literary market re feminism is rather like what happened in Cambridge when they got rid of Colin McCabe on the ground he was a Structuralist (so the story went in the media). We were treated to Sunday papers' summaries of this breathtakingly disturbing new thing, Structuralism – was it thirty years after Lévi-Strauss had published *The Elementary Structures of Kinship* – a book, incidentally, the consequences of which for women Simone de Beauvoir had discussed in *The Second Sex* in 1949! [...] I do see it as a market (and perhaps institutional) phenomenon, that excitement is being generated about things which are in a sense passé, which have lost some of their momentum. And the further effect of vulgarizing them, making them fashionable as a supposedly cogent field of theory and/ or research, is that it makes them unreal, bland – safe (1991:104).

6.3.4. Translating theory into politics

Predictably enough, transience is not attributed only to structuralism and semiotics in Turkey or to French feminism in Anglo-America. Other theoretical positions are often regarded as ephemeral. Deconstruction, for instance, is now "often invoked as a movement which is no longer fashionable, which has had its moment, which is on the wane, which is finished" (Bennington 1999:105). There are also times when the whole

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266 For another example of historical anachronism and the magic of the 'new' in cross-cultural literary contacts see Chang 1992. This article deals with how New Criticism was introduced to Taiwan in late 1960s and how it gained a stronghold among Taiwanese critics due to the restricting socio-economic relations between Taiwan and the U.S. "Even today," says Chang, "some beguiled 'traditionalists' – victims to the word 'new' – still believe that the New Criticism represents the whole of Western literary scholarship" (72).
of 'Theory' is "reported dead", passing away as "an irritating fad" (cf. McQuillan et al. 1999:ix; Bennington 1999:103). As Jeremy Lane observes, in some of these current attempts to reach a stage of "post-Theory", there is more than an urge "to transcend or move beyond the limitations and weaknesses of 'Theory'" (1999:90). Referring to Robert Young, Lane notes that the notion of "post-Theory" involves "a moving beyond which is somehow also a return [...] to the old certainties of the everyday world outside" (ibid.) [Emphases in the original]. In such a case, there is "less a willingness to engage critically with a set of theoretical concerns than a certain nostalgia for those certainties which 'Theory' has apparently undermined" (ibid.).

One can conclude with Geoffrey Bennington, then, that the driving impulse behind this tendency to consider theory as 'passing away' is a wish to return to the 'certainties' of political activism (1999:103). From an activist perspective, theory "is (was) not political, or at any rate not political enough, never political enough, so it must be politicised" (ibid.). Theory might have once been "born as a political intervention" (Eagleton 1990:30) and proliferated "in the wake of the manifold political events of the late 1960s" (Barker et al. 1986:ix). It might also be that the existing and scattered theories about literature "were refurbished and reconstituted into the loosely connected set of discourses which we now know as literary theory" during these politicised times of the 1960s (Eagleton 1990:30). Yet, at the same time, "the rise of Theory as an institutional practice" [emphasis mine] is thought to be "contemporaneous with the 'decline' of the political left. The retreat of the ambition of left-wing political parties and the advance of the radical claims of Theory are not coincidental" (McQuillan et al. 1999:xi).

Today, then, after four decades of intensive activity in the field of literary and cultural theory, there are still mainly two camps. One believes in the power of theory within the academia, empowering the students, enabling them to think critically and to act accordingly (e.g. Kecht 1992; Eagleton 1990; Zavarzadeh 1992). For some of them, "all theory is a real social practice" (Eagleton 1990:24). Others regard these efforts as misplaced – a "tamed and muted area of special interest (literary theory 1968-1990)" (Sharratt 1993:16) – limited and badly oriented (Foley 1992:84), or falling short of being effective: "Undoubtedly Theory challenges institutional norms and canonical authority where their effects are most assuredly determined. It may disrupt relations of knowledge, but can Theory qua discipline claim that it has ever affected the material
processes of history?" (McQuillan et al. 1999:x). Apparently, "the older formulations of a polarity of theory and practice" (Sharratt 1993:3) are to an extent still in place.

As I tried to demonstrate in this final chapter, the same polarity was crucial for the reception of Barthes and Cixous in the systems studied here. Both in the Turkish literary critical system and the Anglo-American feminist critical system, a different and more action-based understanding of politics was deeply rooted. Changing the material conditions of the suppressed groups was of primary concern. Therefore the works of these two writers could not be effectively 'translated' into the particular forms of politics prevalent in the receiving systems (cf. Brügmann 1993:76). This situation gave way to certain translation and translator patterns, as well as being supported by these very patterns.
CONCLUSION

In this thesis, through an in-depth study of two cases, I explored the role translation played in the migration of certain literary and cultural theories across linguistic-cultural borders and power differentials. The cases yielded many similarities, as well as differences. Below, while concentrating on first the similarities and then the differences, I will put forward suggestions as to the ways in which the importation of theories might differ from that of other text types, especially from literary texts, which have long been the focus of translation studies research.

First the similarities between the contexts of the cases: Structuralism and semiotics were severely criticised and dismissed by Marxist and socialist critics in Turkey on the grounds of ahistoricalness, elitism and scientism. Similarly, French feminism was rejected by pragmatic and action-oriented Anglo-American feminists on the grounds of essentialism, utopianism and elitism. The imported theories were ‘not political enough’ for local purposes and agendas. Turkish Marxist and socialist critics regarded structuralism-semiotics as an ‘invader’, a threat, as well as a contrary example to ‘the desirable’ form of criticism and theory. ‘Pragmatic’ and ‘activist’ Anglo-American feminists, too, viewed French feminism as a contrary example to ‘the desirable’ form of feminism, as an import which could pose a threat unless appropriated. In both contexts tropes of alterity were influential in shaping the attitudes towards these imported theories. In the Turkish literary critical system, structuralism and semiotics in particular and literary theories in general were seen as transitory, as ‘fashions’. Only ‘action’ was permanent. In the Anglo-American academic feminist critical system, French feminism in particular and theories originating from France in general were seen in a similar light. This attests to a certain difficulty encountered in these systems at a particular time in their history – the difficulty of ‘translating’ theory into politics.

It seems that theories – at least in the two cases I studied – have a tendency to remain as travelling foreigners, aliens in the middle of curious, disapproving, friendly, suspicious or downright hostile locals. The distinction between ‘indigenous’ and ‘foreign’ is much stronger in the travels of theory than, for instance, of literary texts, advertisements, business translation, etc. Translated theories continue to be perceived as foreign imports, unless they occasionally become ‘transferred’ cultural products in Even-Zohar’s terms (1997:358). This may be one of the reasons underlying the “resistance to theory” Paul de Man wrote about (1986). Furthermore, the requirement for the theory to be political or
pragmatic enough to warrant its own existence might exert considerable pressure on the mediators who play a role in its importation. Theory does not travel by itself. It travels through people: not only the writers who come to ‘embody’ them, but also the proponents, mediators – including the translators and editors – critics and opponents. These people form what is called ‘the receiving system’. Moreover, as long as the relationship between travelling theory and language(s) is ignored, theories will be no more than ‘sightseeing’ features (cf. Cronin 2000: 2, 82), there to be admired by all, but not to be comprehended in their full significance. Once we can see the human element and the language element involved in the travels of theories, we may be able to better situate these theories, and use, oppose, apply or elaborate on them more critically. In this way, they may cease to be things that are awe-inspiring, fascinating, enchanting, indispensable – or resisted (see 1.1.).

The first similarity between the two cases which I would like to emphasise in fact relates to this human element, though in a rather restricted way: Barthes was perceived and presented as a representative of structuralism and semiotics, mainly by his opponents, and Cixous was perceived and presented as a representative of French feminism, mainly by her critics. Diverse and heterogeneous schools of thought were thus personified and reduced to single persons through metonymic identification. This tendency to associate theories with specific individuals apparently facilitates the resistance and opposition towards them. Furthermore, it may serve as a kind of protection mechanism, since once attached to a small number of specific human beings, theories may be perceived as less threatening, less abstract constructions. Paradoxically, once this attachment is in place, the human beings in question become abstract constructions themselves, ‘straw people’ attracting most of the acclaim as well as the attacks.

The other similarities between the two cases have to do with the main form of rewriting I focused on in this thesis – translation. Among other rewritings, translation played an important role in the reception of these two writers’ work. First of all, through achronological and partial text-selection the overall development of their writings was ignored. Only about half of Barthes’s texts attracted most of the attention, mainly those produced within the framework of structuralism and semiotics. Furthermore, there were long intervals between the publication dates of the French source texts and those of the Turkish translations. Consequently, his work was imported into Turkish rather late and – up until the 1990s – only partially. Likewise, Anglo-American feminists concentrated on only a small part of Cixous’s writings, mainly on the early manifesto-like ‘feminist’
essays. Although there were relatively shorter intervals between the publication dates of
the French source texts and those of the English translations, her work was still
represented incompletely through excerpts. The amount of more recent translations
from her work is still far from catching up with her production in French (4.2.3., Table 5).

When compared to the translation of literary texts, the achronological text selection
and partial representation in the translation of theories may carry greater significance.
While literary texts are usually supposed to carry individual unity in themselves, and
thus, are not necessarily placed against the background of their writers' developing
careers, theoretical texts seem to call precisely for such an effort to situate. This is
especially so because theoretical ideas tend to travel more in the form of quotations,
excerpts, paraphrases, references, etc. than in the form of full texts.

In the two cases involved, translation-translator patterns and the images of the
writers concerned reinforced each other — Barthes became a structuralist and
semiotician exclusively, a ‘scientific’ critic, and Cixous, a ‘feminist theoretician’. Yet
through further translations, extratextual material, and changing translator profile,
Barthes's image turned into a versatile ‘essayist’, and Cixous's image into a fiction
writer and playwright. However, the shifting images did not help much to counter the
negative criticism these two writers attracted in the relevant receiving systems, because
this time there was the question of the ‘I’, the ‘ego’ and the ‘unconscious’ in their
essays and fiction, further augmenting the charges of ‘apoliticalness’ directed at them.

In the hope that one may be allowed to talk briefly about ‘better’ translations in a
descriptive study, I would like to quote here from Lawrence Venuti's observations on
the translation of another conceptually dense text type, the translation of philosophical
texts:

Since translating can communicate only by reconstituting the foreign text, a
translator can choose to judge a translation good when it signifies the linguistic
and cultural difference of that text for domestic constituencies. The ethical
value of this difference resides in alerting the reader that a process of
domestication has taken place in the translating, but also in preventing that
process from slipping into an unreflective assimilation to dominant domestic
values. Foreign philosophies can retain their difference in translation when
they differ to some extent from those that currently dominate the discipline at
home, or when they are translated so as to differ from prevailing domestic
interpretations of their concepts and discourses. The best philosophical
translating is itself philosophical in forming a concept of the foreign text based on an assessment of the domestic scene (Venuti 1998:115).

Nonetheless, in accordance with the fact that translation almost always “appropriates, transforms, deflects and dislocates everything within its grasp” (Hermans 1998:67), the imported theories quickly became part of the internal debates in their new destinations. Structuralism and semiotics were used in the local endeavours to establish an ‘objective’ and ‘scientific’ criticism, and there were similar attempts to incorporate French feminism into the pragmatic Anglo-American feminist criticism. This, I believe, is a good example of the ‘meme’ metaphor suggested by Andrew Chesterman (1997). The theories “spread and change[d] as they [we]re translated, just as biological evolution involves mutations” through genes (1997:2). It is interesting to compare this idea of ‘mutation’ with some of the ideas of the two writers in question. Elizabeth Bruss argues that the transformation Barthes’s texts underwent in their English translations – “the deracination, the ruptures, and the redistributions” – ironically reminds one of Barthes’s “own ideal of textuality”: “a floating signifier without origin or owner, permeable to uncertain echoes and open to a hundred inconsistent readings as it wanders from place to place” (1982:378). Yet Cixous’s ideals seem to support another approach to writing and to the Other, a “feminine approach” involving “not the (masculine) appropriation or destruction of the other’s difference in order to create the self in a masterful position, but locating and maintaining the ‘right distance’ in which self and other can co-exist as equals” (Sellers 1991:82). This proved to be an impossibility in her reception in Anglo-America, as well as in Barthes’s reception in Turkey.

As for the differences between the two contexts, first of all there were the tropes reflecting different attitudes towards the imported discursive elements. While tropes of ‘lack’, ‘lag’, mimesis and change defined the attitudes towards structuralism and semiotics in Turkey, tropes of universality and solidarity prevailed in the attitudes towards French feminism in Anglo-America. The Turkish literary critical system looked upon structuralism and semiotics, as well as upon other imported theories, as models to build its modern criticism on. The boundary between ‘we’ and ‘they’ in the Turkish case was rather diffuse because of the tropes of mimesis. Anglo-American feminist criticism, on the other hand, used French feminism as a foil to define and reinforce their own version of activist feminism. Hence the strong emphasis on ‘we’ vs. ‘they’. The importation of both schools of thought took place within the context of internal and external power differentials: the former referring to the conflicts between Marxist vs.
other critics in Turkey, and political activists vs. other feminists in Anglo-America; and the latter to the tensions between Turkish vs. Western literary critical systems, and Anglo-American vs. French feminist critical systems.

This crucial difference between the two contexts was predictably reflected in the differences between the two cases at hand. In neither of them was translation an 'exchange'. Cixous presumably had a vested interest in being translated into English, and her circle of translators coming out of her seminars in Paris was instrumental in supplying the welcome translations. Barthes, on the other hand, appears to have remained rather indifferent to being translated into Turkish. This difference is mirrored in the translators' professional identities, which, incidentally, may also have a greater impact on the reception of theories when compared to the reception of literary texts. Especially in cases where the translators involved are well-known figures in relevant fields, their signature on a translation alone would foreground certain features of the source text and author while obscuring others. This was the case in Barthes's translations, where, depending on the period, the main translators involved were structuralists and semioticians, literary theorists or writer-translators - experts in their field with plenty of other output apart from translations. Obviously, in this system translation was seen as a significant part of intellectuals' activities. In the Cixous case, however, the main translators involved were initially those whose output was exclusively translations, and then students of Cixous at the Centre d'Etudes Féminines with almost no other publications apart from those related to Cixous. Otherwise productive (feminist) intellectuals showed only a brief interest in engaging with her work through translating it.

The remaining differences between the two cases concern language and terminology issues. In the Barthes case the translations were mostly 'unintelligible' due to the terminological problems. There was particular emphasis on terms and concepts because of the continuing influence of the Turkish Language Reform. As demonstrated by the profusion of neologisms, and also by the considerable presence of borrowed words, the tolerance of interference was quite high, since the local literary critical discourse was being moulded through translation on the models of Western literary critical discourses. The abundance of retranslations attests to this tolerance as well as to the problems encountered in the translations. In the Cixous case, on the other hand, translations gave the impression of 'surface accessibility' by stressing readability and fluency. Neologisms were avoided and there was general ambivalence towards
wordplay. The reluctance felt towards foregrounding words – be it terms or puns – caused the debates to focus on only a few terms. Interference from the imported material was less tolerated. The rarity of retranslations in this case suggests that translations of Cixous’s texts were ‘deproblematised’. Paradoxically, in the extratextual material, there was no explicit acknowledgement of translation difficulties specific to Barthes’s texts, whereas Cixous’s work in particular, and French feminism in general, were regarded as ‘impenetrable’ in Anglo-America. The difficulties encountered in translating them were acknowledged both in the prefaces to the translations and in general critical texts.

As we have seen in 6.3.2., issues of difficulty often come up in relation to theoretical texts. While terminological problems are common to the translation of all conceptually dense texts – and not so much of literary texts – it is worth considering that the resistance to theory in the name of political action particularly augments this negative reaction towards ‘impenetrability’. After all, texts on philosophy, sociology, psychology, etc. are expected to be difficult to read for uninitiated readers, otherwise they are often called ‘popularised’ versions.

In this thesis I have looked at how theory travelled from a ‘stronger’ system to a ‘weaker’ one, and from a ‘strong’ system to a similarly ‘strong’ one. It would be interesting if other case studies could be carried out looking at how theory travels between two ‘weak’ systems, or from a ‘weak’ system to a ‘stronger’ one, though such examples may be more difficult to locate. Also within my case studies, it would be useful to do a detailed comparative analysis of Cixous’s English translations and the French source texts, an analysis which I was unwilling to undertake as neither of the languages involved is my mother tongue. Furthermore, in order to understand to what extent the theoretical ideas concerned were absorbed/transformed in both receiving systems, a detailed study on autochthonous text production on the relevant subjects in Turkish and English should be conducted.

Fulfilling its indicative role, translation – together with other related rewritings – allowed us to look into the mechanisms of the receiving systems studied in this thesis. It showed us what was deemed urgent, important and necessary within these systems, what kind of debates were dominant, what sort of production was expected on behalf of the (feminist) critics, what the professional agendas of the mediators and opponents were, etc. It indicated why these theories were imported in the first place, and why they were
imported in these particular ways. Patterns in relation to translation also revealed how the receiving systems viewed themselves, how they handled interference from other sources, and to what extent they allowed themselves to be affected, even moulded by this interference. As Theo Hermans observes:

Cultures, communities and groups construe their sense of self in relation to others and by regulating the channels of contact with the outside world. In other words, the normative apparatus which governs the selection, production and reception of translation, together with the way translation is conceptualized at certain moments, provides us with an index of cultural self-definition. It would be only a mild exaggeration to claim that translations tell us more about those who translate and their clients than about the corresponding source texts (1999:95).

I argued in my introduction that translation is not only a symptom of the workings of a given system, but also a shaping factor. Translation plays a “simultaneously overdetermined and formative role [...] in the context of prevailing power hierarchies” (Hermans 1999:159). It “actively contributes to the shaping of cultural and other discourses because, whatever its actual complexion, it possesses a momentum of its own, an internal memory resulting from operational closure”(Hermans 1999:143-144)267. In accordance with this second role, translation formed images of writers who were perceived as the embodiment of the travelling theories concerned. It contributed, in different degrees, to the formation of local literary/feminist critical discourses. Translation and translator patterns also determined how these theories would be received and perceived. And finally, as Venuti observes, “not only do translation projects construct uniquely domestic representations of foreign cultures, but since these projects address specific cultural constituencies, they are simultaneously engaged in the formation of domestic identities” (1995:17) [Emphasis mine].

But what is at stake if the indicative and formative roles of translation in the migration of literary and cultural theories are not acknowledged? I contend that if the travel accounts of theory keep on overlooking translation, travel will remain “an abstract idea” and it would still make “no difference in which direction theory travels (from West to East or vice versa) and for what purpose (cultural exchange, imperialism, or colonization?), or in which language and for what audience” (Liu 1995:21, see 1.1.). The disregard of the destination and departure point of travelling theory has implications reaching cultural and

267 “Operational closure” is a term Niklas Luhmann uses for the openness of social systems “in that they require input from their environment” but this input is nevertheless “processed in the system’s own terms” (Hermans 1999:143).
linguistic imperialism, since this disregard helps to conceal the fact that the majority of theories travel from 'central' systems to 'peripheral' ones and shape the latter in accordance with the ideologies of the former. If translation remains the ignored vehicle of travel for theories, theory becomes a universal thing, detached from its particular origins, history and context, supposedly applicable across the board. In fact, theories are presumed to be translatable, otherwise "tied to an idiom, to a particular, singular site of formulation, theoretical concepts would be prevented from posing their universal, generalizable validity" (Kamuf 1995:78-79).

This thesis points out certain directions and suggests some observations regarding the travels of theories through translation and other rewritings. To be able to better justify these observations more studies should be undertaken, examining both a wider corpus of theoretical texts translated into a variety of languages, and comparing the findings with those on the translations of literary texts, for example, or of other conceptually dense texts. Since the translation of theory is an under-researched area within translation studies, a variety of cases yielding similar or different accounts would be more than welcome. After all, the reception of literary and cultural theories ultimately has a bearing on theories of translation, several of which are based on or influenced by the former. For this reason, if not for all the others discussed in Chapter 1, travelling theory should be a fertile and crucial research field for translation scholars.
Roland Barthes’s works in Turkish


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1 The references to French texts provided here are not necessarily to the established source text versions, but rather to the initial publication of related French texts. Book-length works are indicated with publication years in bold character.


Hélène Cixous’s Works in English


---

2 This bibliography is gathered together from Shiach 1991, Conley 1992, Sellers 1994, Penrod 1996, Cixous with Calle-Gruber 1997, and the MLA database. The references to French texts provided here are not necessarily to the established source text versions, but rather to the initial publication of related French texts. Some of the French source texts could not be located, and some texts were initially written in English. Book-length works are indicated with publication years in bold character.


1995 “Great Tragic Characters…”, *Times Literary Supplement* 4804. 28 April. 15.


Interviews with Cixous published in English


OTHER SOURCES


APPENDIX 1

Autochthonous Texts Related to Structuralism and Semiotics in Turkish

1967

1968


1969


1970


1971

1972

1973


1974


1975


1976


Dilbilim 1 (Special Issue on Structuralism). İ.Ü. Yabancı Diller Yüksek Okulu Fransızça Bölümü. 1976.


1977


1978


1979


1980


1981


Güven, Güler. “Öykü Çözümlemesinde Yapısal Yaklaşım ve Bir Örneğin Tanıtımı”. 


1982


1983


1985


1986


1987


1988


1989


1990


1991


1992


1993


1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999
APPENDIX 2

Translations Related to Structuralism and Semiotics in Turkish

1966


1967


1968


1969


1970


1971


For the translations of Roland Barthes’s texts into Turkish see the bibliography.
1973


1974


1975


1976


1977


1978


1979


1980


1981


1982


1983


1984

1985


1986


1987


1988


1989


1990


1991


1992


1993


1994


1995


APPENDIX 3

Bibliographical Information on the Translators of Roland Barthes’s Works into Turkish

Aktürel, Teoman


Batur, Enis


Bavray, Süheylâ


Belge, Murat


Benk, Adnan


Demiralp, Oğuz


**Gökhan, Halil**


**Gümüş, Korhan**


**Güngürmüş, Nilüfer**


**İrgat, Mustafa**


**İşik, Gül Nevire**


Kırkoğlu, Serdar Rifat


Kocaman, Ahmet


Onaran, Bertan

Oskay, Ünsal


Öztürk Kasar, Sündüz


Rifat, Mehmet

For translations, see Sema Rifat.


Rifat, Sema


Salman, Yurdanur


Vardar, Berke


For a more comprehensive bibliography of Vardar's work, and also for interviews conducted with and by him, see Senemoglu 1990.

Yalçın, Mehmet


Yumer, Hür


Yücel, Tahsin

Non-translations:


Prizes: 1956 Sait Faik Short Story Prize for Haney Yaşamali; 1959 Turkish Language Academy Short Story Prize for Düşlerin Ölümü; 1993 Orhan Kemal Novel Prize for Peygamberin Son Beş Günü; and 1984 Azra Erhat Translated Literature Exceptional Contribution Prize (Çeviri Yazar Üstün Hizmet Ödülü).
APPENDIX 4

Bibliographical Information on the Translators of Hélène Cixous’s Works into English

**Barko, Carol**


**Bortin, Meg**


**Carpenter Jenson, Deborah**


**Carr, Helen**

**Non-translations:**


**Cohen, Keith**


**Conley, Verena**


**Non-translations:**


Cornell, Sarah


Deering Paul, Carole


Flower MacCannell, Juliet

Non-translations:


Graves Miller, Judith


Hueston, Penny


Kerslake, Barbara


Kuhn, Annette

Non-translations:


Lamont, Rosette C.


Non-translations:


Levy, Jo Anne


Liddle, Ann


Maclean, Marie


Makward, Christiane


Marantz Cohen, Paula


Mastrangelo Bové, Carol


McDonald, Jill


McGann, Catherine


Miller, Chris


Philip, Franklin


Pike, Judith


Prenowitz, Eric


Purcell, Sally


Sellers, Susan


Still, Judith

Non-translations:

**Theis, Stan**


**Thompson, Christina**


**Wing, Betsy**

APPENDIX 5

Examples of Terms and Neologisms in the Retranslations of Barthes’s Texts into Turkish

I. Texts from *Essais critiques* ¹

A. “Littérature objective: Alain Robbe-Grillet”


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 optique (1185-6-7)</td>
<td>optik (8)</td>
<td>optik (39), görsel (41-2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 description (1185)</td>
<td>tasvir (8)</td>
<td>betimleme (40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 anthologique (1185)</td>
<td>seçme (antolojik) (8)</td>
<td>seçme yazı (40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>footnote: ‘antolojik’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 dialectique du récit (1185)</td>
<td>anlatı akışı (8)</td>
<td>anlatma eti§imi (40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>footnote: ‘diyalektik’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 psychologique (1185)</td>
<td>psikolojik (8)</td>
<td>psikolojik (40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 allusive (1185)</td>
<td>dolaylı imada bulunmak (8)</td>
<td>göndergesel olmak (40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>allusif (1186)</td>
<td>belirtmek (8)</td>
<td>göndergesel (41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 signifier (1185)</td>
<td>açıklamak (8)</td>
<td>belirtmek (40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 substance (1185)</td>
<td>özdek (8)</td>
<td>öz (40), töz (40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(uses these two terms interchangeably throughout the translation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 sans alibi (1185)</td>
<td>‘alibi’siz (8)</td>
<td>özürsüz (40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 mot (1186)</td>
<td>söz (8)</td>
<td>sözçük (40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 langage (1186)</td>
<td>dil (8)</td>
<td>dil (40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 syncrétisme sensoriel (1186)</td>
<td>duyusal senkretizm (8)</td>
<td>duyumsal algılama (41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 littérateur (1186)</td>
<td>yazar (8)</td>
<td>edebiyatçı (41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 phénomène (1186)</td>
<td>olgu (8)</td>
<td>görünüş (41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 allégorique (1186)</td>
<td>alegorik (8)</td>
<td>eğretilemeli (41)</td>
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¹ The page numbers of Barthes’s texts refer to Barthes 1993 and Barthes 1994.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>16 opaque (1186)</td>
<td>yar saydam (8)</td>
<td>saydam (41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 rhétorique (1186)</td>
<td>‘belâgat’ (8)</td>
<td>söz sanati (41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 fonctionnel (1186)</td>
<td>görev (8)</td>
<td>işlevsel (42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 signe (1186)</td>
<td>belirtmek (8)</td>
<td>gösterge (42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 cénesthésie (1187)</td>
<td>cénesthésie (8)</td>
<td>iç duyum (42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 symétrie (1187)</td>
<td>bakışım (8)</td>
<td>bakışım (43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 le mythe du ‘pouvoir’ poétique (1187)</td>
<td>şiir ‘gücü’ mitos’u (8)</td>
<td>şiirsel ‘erk’ miti (44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 gestaltiste (1187)</td>
<td>gestaltçi (8)</td>
<td>gestaltist (44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 homogène (1187)</td>
<td>--- (8)</td>
<td>bağdaşık (44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 plans figuratifs (1188)</td>
<td>figuratif plan (8)</td>
<td>figuratif plan (45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 dialectique (1188)</td>
<td>diyalektik (8)</td>
<td>etişim (45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 explorer (1189)</td>
<td>bulgulamak (8)</td>
<td>ortaya çıkarmak (45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 ‘prospect’ (1189)</td>
<td>(prospect) (9)</td>
<td>‘alıcı adayı’ (45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 ‘project’ (1189)</td>
<td>(project) (9)</td>
<td>‘verici’ (45)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Definition of the term within parenthesis.
B. “Que-est ce que la critique?”


<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 idéologie (1357)</td>
<td>düşüncə (35)</td>
<td>ülkü (436)</td>
<td>ideoloji (80)</td>
<td>ideoloji (215)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 possible (1357)</td>
<td>mümkün (35)</td>
<td>–bilir (436)</td>
<td>olanaklı (80)</td>
<td>olası (215)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 avant-garde (1357)</td>
<td>öncü (35)</td>
<td>öncü (436)</td>
<td>öncü (80)</td>
<td>avangard (215)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 marginale (1357)</td>
<td>sınırda yer alan (36)</td>
<td>sınırda yer alan (436)</td>
<td>kryında kalan (80)</td>
<td>marjinal (216)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 structuralisme (1357)</td>
<td>yapısıncılık (<em>structuralisme</em>) (36)</td>
<td>yapısıncılık (436)</td>
<td>yapısıncılık (80)</td>
<td>yapısıncılık (216)</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 sciences sociales (1357)</td>
<td>toplumsal bilimler (36)</td>
<td>toplum bilimleri (436)</td>
<td>toplumsal bilimler (80)</td>
<td>toplumbilimleri (216)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 modèle linguistique (1358)</td>
<td>dibibilimsel ömek (36)</td>
<td>dibibilimsel ömek (436)</td>
<td>dibibilimsel ömekçe (81)</td>
<td>dilsel model (216)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 catégorie rhétorique (1358)</td>
<td>anlatma ulami (36)</td>
<td>anlatum ulami (436)</td>
<td>sözbilim ulami (81)</td>
<td>süzbilimsel (216) türdeki smiflandurma</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 métaphore (1358)</td>
<td>métaphore (...)* (36)</td>
<td>eğitimleme (436) (métaphore)(...)*</td>
<td>eğitimleme (81)</td>
<td>eğitimleme (216)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 métonymie (1358)</td>
<td>métonymie (…)* (36)</td>
<td>métonymie (ad değişimi, mecaz-ı mürsel) (…)* (436)</td>
<td>düzdeğişmece (81)</td>
<td>ad değişimi (216)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 idéologique (1358)</td>
<td>düştünsel (idéologique) (36)</td>
<td>ülküsel (idéologique) (437)</td>
<td>ideolojik (81)</td>
<td>--- (216)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 positiviste (1358)</td>
<td>--- (36)</td>
<td>--- (437)</td>
<td>olgucu (81)</td>
<td>olgucu (217)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 la vie (1358)</td>
<td>hayat (37)</td>
<td>yaşam (437)</td>
<td>yaşam (81)</td>
<td>yaşam (217)</td>
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<td>kıyaslama kaderciliği (37)</td>
<td>karşılaştırma yazgıcılığı (437)</td>
<td>örneklemesel yazıçılık (81)</td>
<td>çağrışımsal (217) gerekircilik</td>
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<td>ruhbilim (37)</td>
<td>ruhbilim (437)</td>
<td>ruhbilim (81)</td>
<td>psikoloji (217)</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 discours (1359)</td>
<td>anlatı (37)</td>
<td>anlatı (437)</td>
<td>söylem (82)</td>
<td>söylem (218)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 mental (1359)</td>
<td>akılsal (37)</td>
<td>ussal (438)</td>
<td>düşünsel (82)</td>
<td>düşünsel (218)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 méta-langage (1359)</td>
<td>öte-dil (38)</td>
<td>öte-dil (438)</td>
<td>üst-dil (82)</td>
<td>üstdil (218)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 un système de signes (1359)</td>
<td>işaretler düzeni (système) (38)</td>
<td>göstergeler dizgesi (438)</td>
<td>göstergeler dizgesi (83)</td>
<td>göstergeler dizgesi (218)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 intégrer (1359)</td>
<td>tamlamak (intégrer) (38)</td>
<td>tamlamak (438)</td>
<td>tümlevlemek (83)</td>
<td>‘integral’ini almak (219)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 système sémantique (1360)</td>
<td>anlambilimsel (sémantique) düzen (39)</td>
<td>anlambilimsel dizge (439)</td>
<td>anlama dizgesi (84)</td>
<td>anlamsal bir dizge (220)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 système signifiant (1360)</td>
<td>anlatıcı düzen (39)</td>
<td>belirtici dizge (439)</td>
<td>belirten dizge (84)</td>
<td>belirten dizge (220)</td>
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<td>inaksal (439)</td>
<td>dogmatik (84)</td>
<td>öğretisel (220)</td>
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<td>çelişkin (439)</td>
<td>--- (84)</td>
<td>çelişkisel (220)</td>
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<tr>
<td>25 totalitaire (1361)</td>
<td>baskıdan yana (39)</td>
<td>baskıdan yana (439)</td>
<td>tümçü (84)</td>
<td>bütüncül (220)</td>
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<td>26 libérale (1361)</td>
<td>özgürlükten yana (39)</td>
<td>özgürlükten yana (439)</td>
<td>erkinci (84)</td>
<td>özgürl (220)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>karşılıklı- konuşma (39)</td>
<td>karşılıklı-konuşma (439)</td>
<td>söyleşim (84)</td>
<td>diyalog (221)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

* Definition of the term within parenthesis.
II. Texts from *Le Degré zéro de l'écriture*

A. "Qu'est-ce que l'écriture?"


<table>
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<tr>
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<td>dil</td>
<td>dil</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 langage</td>
<td>dil</td>
<td>dilyetisi</td>
<td>dil, dilyetisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>anlatım (98)</td>
<td></td>
<td>footnote: …*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 parole</td>
<td>söz</td>
<td>söz</td>
<td>söz</td>
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<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 verbe</td>
<td>söz</td>
<td>söz</td>
<td>söz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 écriture</td>
<td>yazı</td>
<td>yazı</td>
<td>yazı</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Lettres/ littérature</td>
<td>yazın</td>
<td>edebiyat, yazın</td>
<td>yazın</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 prescription (145)</td>
<td>buyuru (98/16)</td>
<td>yönerge (52)</td>
<td>buyurum (19/19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 habitude (145)</td>
<td>alışık (98/16)</td>
<td>alışkanlık (52)</td>
<td>alışkanlık (19/19)</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 surnature (145)</td>
<td>doğaüstü (98/16)</td>
<td>üstdoğa (52)</td>
<td>üstdoğa (19/20)</td>
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<td>10 engagement social (145)</td>
<td>toplumsal bağlanış (98/16)</td>
<td>toplumsal bir bağlanma (52)</td>
<td>toplumsal bir bağlanma (20/20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 réflexe (145)</td>
<td>tepke (98/16)</td>
<td>tepke (52)</td>
<td>tepke (20/20)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>donukluk (98/16)</td>
<td>donukluk (52)</td>
<td>saydamsızlık (20/20)</td>
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<td>olumsuz (98/16)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>eksiş (20/20)</td>
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<td>differansiyel (98/16)</td>
<td>differansiyel (52)</td>
<td>ayrımsal (20/20)</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 image (145)</td>
<td>image (98/17)</td>
<td>image (52)</td>
<td>image (20/20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>özdevinim (52)</td>
<td>özdevinim (20/20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>mitologya (98/17)</td>
<td>söylen bilim (52)</td>
<td>söylenesel (20/20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 thème verbaux (146)</td>
<td>sözsel tema (98/17)</td>
<td>sözsel izlek (52)</td>
<td>sözsel izlek (20/20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 intention (146)</td>
<td>yasan (98/17)</td>
<td>yönelim (52)</td>
<td>amaç (21/20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 poussée (146)</td>
<td>itki (98/17)</td>
<td>içgüdü (52)</td>
<td>tepi (21/20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 biologie (146)</td>
<td>biyoloji (98/17)</td>
<td>yaşamabilim (52)</td>
<td>dirimbilim (21/20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 mythique (146)</td>
<td>mitsel (99/17)</td>
<td>söylenesel (52)</td>
<td>söylenesel (21/20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 réflexion (146)</td>
<td>düşünme (99/17)</td>
<td>düşünüm (52)</td>
<td>düşünüce (21/20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 phénomène (146)</td>
<td>olay (99/17)</td>
<td>fenomen (53)</td>
<td>olgu (21/20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 métaphore (146)</td>
<td>eğretileme (99/18)</td>
<td>eğretileme (53)</td>
<td>eğretileme (21/21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 référence (146)</td>
<td>kaynak (99/18)</td>
<td>gönderge (53)</td>
<td>gönderim (21/21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 figure (146)</td>
<td>beti (99/18)</td>
<td>görüş (53)</td>
<td>beti (22/21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>footnote: figure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 supra-littéraire (146)</td>
<td>yazınötesi (99/18)</td>
<td>üst-yazısal (53)</td>
<td>yazın-üstü (22/21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 origine biologique (146)</td>
<td>biyolojik köken (99/18)</td>
<td>yaşambilimsel köken (53)</td>
<td>dirimsel köken (22/21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 éthos (146)</td>
<td>ira (99/18)</td>
<td>ethos (53)</td>
<td>töre (22/21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 plaisir moderne (146)</td>
<td>çagcil beğeni (99/18)</td>
<td>modern beğeni (53)</td>
<td>çağdaş haz (22/21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 autorité (146)</td>
<td>yetke (99/18)</td>
<td>yetke (53)</td>
<td>yetke (22/21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33 énergie (147)</td>
<td>erke (99/19)</td>
<td>enerji (53)</td>
<td>güç (23/22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34 signifier (147)</td>
<td>imlemek (99/19)</td>
<td>imlemek (53)</td>
<td>belirtmek (23/22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 personne biologique (147)</td>
<td>biyolojik kişi (100/19)</td>
<td>yaşambilim kişişi (53)</td>
<td>dirimsel kişişi (23/22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 nature linguistique (147)</td>
<td>dilsel bir nitelik (100/19)</td>
<td>dilbilimsel bir doğa (53)</td>
<td>dilsel doğa (23/22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37 signe (147)</td>
<td>im (100/19)</td>
<td>im (53)</td>
<td>gösterge (23/22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38 forme à la fois normale et singulière (147)</td>
<td>hem düzgüne uygun, hem de tekil biçim (100/19)</td>
<td>hem normal, hem de aynıksı biçim (53)</td>
<td>hem olağan, hem benzersiz biçim (23/22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39 réalité ambiguë (148)</td>
<td>bulanık bir gerçeklik (100/20)</td>
<td>ikircikli bir gerçek (54)</td>
<td>çift anlamlı bir gerçeklik (25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>çift-anlamlı bir gerçeklik (23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 exigence (148)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>ister (54)</td>
<td>gereklilik (25/23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 rémanence (148)</td>
<td>angi (101/21)</td>
<td>yeniden yayılma (54)</td>
<td>kalıntı (26/23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42 cryptographie (148)</td>
<td>gizli yazış (101/21)</td>
<td>şifreler örgüsü (54)</td>
<td>şifreleme (26/23)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Definition of the term.
B. “Y a-t-il une écriture poétique?”


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 discours (161)</td>
<td>söylevcik (40)</td>
<td>söylev (48)</td>
<td>söylem (45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 dogme (161)</td>
<td>inanç (40)</td>
<td>dogma (48)</td>
<td>inak (45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 éloquence (161)</td>
<td>hitabet (40)</td>
<td>sözgenlik (elokans) (48)</td>
<td>uzdillilik (45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 catégories (161) éternelles de l'esprit</td>
<td>zihnin değişmez kalıpları (41)</td>
<td>bitimsiz us nitelikleri (49)</td>
<td>usun ölümsüz ulamları (46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 virtuelle (161)</td>
<td>gücül (virtuel) (41)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>gücül (46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 fonction (162)</td>
<td>görev (41)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>işlev (46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 signaler à l’extérieure son identité (162)</td>
<td>kimliğini açıklamak (41)</td>
<td>kimliğini dışa imlemek (49)</td>
<td>kimliğini dışarıya imleme (46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 intellectuelle (162)</td>
<td>düşünsel (41)</td>
<td>anlaksal (50)</td>
<td>düşünsel (47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 spirituelle (162)</td>
<td>tinsel (manevi) (42)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>tinsel (47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 relationelle (162)</td>
<td>ilişkisel (42)</td>
<td>bağlantısal (50)</td>
<td>bağlantısal (47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 consubstantielle (162)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>エステ CLLI (51)</td>
<td>aynı tözden (47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 intention (162, 165)</td>
<td>amaç (42)</td>
<td>güdek (51)</td>
<td>yönelliş (47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(text omitted)</td>
<td>yönelim (55)</td>
<td>amaç (53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 superficielle (162)</td>
<td>yapma (42)</td>
<td>üstyapısal (51)</td>
<td>yüzeysel (47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 marque (162)</td>
<td>işaretet (42)</td>
<td>im (51)</td>
<td>belirtke (48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 la figure rhétorique (163)</td>
<td>(text omitted)</td>
<td>söz sanati (52)</td>
<td>sanatlı beti (49)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\^ The page numbers refer to Yalçın’s 1987 translation which is an exact copy of the 1979 translation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16 prosodie (163, 164)</td>
<td>(text omitted)</td>
<td>sağdeyi (53)</td>
<td>bürtün (50, 50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 inflexion (163)</td>
<td>(text omitted)</td>
<td>bükün (53)</td>
<td>bükün (53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 parodie (163)</td>
<td>(text omitted)</td>
<td>yansıma (53)</td>
<td>öykünü (50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 mystère (163)</td>
<td>(text omitted)</td>
<td>giz (53)</td>
<td>gizlem (50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 générique (164)</td>
<td>(text omitted)</td>
<td>cinsil (générique) (54)</td>
<td>genel (51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 catégorie (164)</td>
<td>(text omitted)</td>
<td>aynı cinsten olan şeylerin bir sınıfi (54)</td>
<td>ulam (51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 éthique (165)</td>
<td>(text omitted)</td>
<td>törel değer (56)</td>
<td>aktörel erim (53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 convention du langage (166)</td>
<td>(text omitted)</td>
<td>dil saymacalığı (56)</td>
<td>dil ulaşımı (54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 sociabilité (166)</td>
<td>(text omitted)</td>
<td>seçkinler çevresi (56)</td>
<td>toplumculluk (54)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Definition of the term within parenthesis.

C. “Triomphe et rupture de l’écriture bourgeoise”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>morale (169)</td>
<td>ahlak (23)</td>
<td>aktöre (58), ahlâk (25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conjonctures historiques (169)</td>
<td>tarihsel konjonktörler (24)</td>
<td>tarihsel koşullar (58/25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dogme (169)</td>
<td>inak (24)</td>
<td>inak (58/25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>idéologie bourgeoise (169)</td>
<td>kentsoyulu ideolojisi (24)</td>
<td>burjuva düşünce (58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>accident (170)</td>
<td>ilinek (24)</td>
<td>engebe (58/25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>décor (170)</td>
<td>bezem (24)</td>
<td>dekor (58/25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rhétorique (170)</td>
<td>sözbilim (24)</td>
<td>sözbilim (59/25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>procédé (170)</td>
<td>yöntem (24)</td>
<td>yordam (59/26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cynisme (170)</td>
<td>kinizm (24)</td>
<td>alaycilik (59/26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>état de fait (170)</td>
<td>edimli durum (24)</td>
<td>olgusal durum (59/26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>caractère (170)</td>
<td>ira (24)</td>
<td>özelik (59/26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>discours (170)</td>
<td>söylev (24)</td>
<td>söylem (59/26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mythologie (170)</td>
<td>mitoloji (25)</td>
<td>söylen (59/26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>romantique (170)</td>
<td>coşumcu (25)</td>
<td>romantik (60/26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>thématique verbale particulière (171)</td>
<td>tikel, sözsel bir izlekçi (thématique) (25)</td>
<td>özel bir sözsel izleklere bütünü (60/26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>norme (171)</td>
<td>düzgü (26)</td>
<td>ölçü (61/27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>industrie métallurgique (171)</td>
<td>metalüriji işleyimi (26)</td>
<td>demir-çelik endüstrisi (61/27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capitalisme moderne (171)</td>
<td>çağcil anamalcılık (26)</td>
<td>çağdaş kapitalizm (61/27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libéralisme (171)</td>
<td>erkincilik (libéralisme) (26)</td>
<td>liberalizm (61/27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vocation intellectuelle (171)</td>
<td>anlaksal anluk (26)</td>
<td>düşünsel iççagnsi (61/27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enjeu (171)</td>
<td>miza (27)</td>
<td>amaç (62/27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vocabulaire (171)</td>
<td>sözçükçe (27)</td>
<td>sözçük dağarcığı (62/27)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
D. "L’artisanat du style"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 L’artisanat du style</td>
<td>Üslûb Zenaatçılıarı</td>
<td>Üslup İşçiliği</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Biçem İşçiliği</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 bourgeoios (172)</td>
<td>kentsoylu (32)</td>
<td>burjuva (21)</td>
<td>kentsoylu (27)</td>
<td>burjuva (63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 idéologie bourgeoise (173)</td>
<td>kentsoylu düşünün yapısi (32)</td>
<td>burjuva ideolojisi (21)</td>
<td>kentsoylu ideoloji (28)</td>
<td>burjuva düşününgüsü (63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 euphémie (172)</td>
<td>söyleniş güzelliği (32)</td>
<td>örtmece (euphémie) özellikleri (21)</td>
<td>üstü kapalı söyleyiş (27)</td>
<td>örtmece (63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 un bien communal (172)</td>
<td>kamusal bir mal (32)</td>
<td>komünal bir meta (21)</td>
<td>bir topluluğun malı (27)</td>
<td>bir ortak mal (63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 légendaire (172)</td>
<td>masalımsı (32)</td>
<td>söylensel (21)</td>
<td>efsanemsi (27)</td>
<td>söylecesel (64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 génie (172)</td>
<td>yetenek (32)</td>
<td>deha (21)</td>
<td>öke (28)</td>
<td>deha (64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 aristocratique (172)</td>
<td>aristokratik (32)</td>
<td>beysoyulu (21)</td>
<td>aksoyulu (28)</td>
<td>aristokratça (64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 pittoresque (173)</td>
<td>pitoresk (32)</td>
<td>pitoresk (21)</td>
<td>resimlik (28)</td>
<td>ilginçlik (65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 exotique (173)</td>
<td>egzotik (32)</td>
<td>egzotik (21)</td>
<td>egzotik (28)</td>
<td>uzaksılık (65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>footnote: ‘exotisme’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 spectacle (173)</td>
<td>görünüm (33)</td>
<td>gösteri (21)</td>
<td>seyirlik oyun (28)</td>
<td>gösterim (65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 paradoxe (173)</td>
<td>aykırı düşünce (33)</td>
<td>paradoks (21)</td>
<td>paradoks (29)</td>
<td>çelişki (65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 phénoménologique (173)</td>
<td>olaysal (33)</td>
<td>fenemenolojik (21)</td>
<td>görüngübilimsel (29)</td>
<td>görüngübilimsel (65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 normative (173)</td>
<td>kuralcı (33)</td>
<td>düzgüsel (normatif) (21)</td>
<td>düzgüsel (normative) (29)</td>
<td>kuralcı (65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 normes de (173)</td>
<td>güzel konuşmanın</td>
<td>uzdilin (belagatin)</td>
<td>konuşma uzluğunun</td>
<td>konuşulan söz sanatı (65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l’éloquence parlée</td>
<td>kuralları (33)</td>
<td>normları (21)</td>
<td>düzgüleri (29)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 code (173)</td>
<td>kod (33)</td>
<td>kod (21)</td>
<td>kod (29)</td>
<td>izge (65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>footnote: ‘le code’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 pragmatisme (173)</td>
<td>pragmatizm (33)</td>
<td>pragmacılık (21)</td>
<td>pragmacılık (29)</td>
<td>yararcılık (66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 codification grégorienne (173)</td>
<td>gregoryen kodlanma (33)</td>
<td>gregorcu kodlandırılış (21)</td>
<td>grégor’gil kodlanışı (29)</td>
<td>yalnızlaştırıcı düzenlenmiş (66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 fétiche (173)</td>
<td>fetiş (33)</td>
<td>fetiş (21)</td>
<td>fetiş (29)</td>
<td>putçuluk (66)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

328
E. “L’écriture et le silence”


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 silence (178)</td>
<td>susku (36)</td>
<td>sessizlik (73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 patrimonie bourgeois (178)</td>
<td>kentsoylu babaocagi (36)</td>
<td>burjuva kaliti (73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 signifier (178)</td>
<td>imlemek (36)</td>
<td>belirtmek (73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 habitude (178)</td>
<td>aliski (36)</td>
<td>aliski (73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 chaos (178)</td>
<td>kaos (36)</td>
<td>kargaça (73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Belles-Lettres (178)</td>
<td>Gzel-harfler (36)</td>
<td>Gzel-Yazin (74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 parole sociale (178)</td>
<td>toplumsal söz (36)</td>
<td>toplumsal söz (74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 mythe (178)</td>
<td>mit (37)</td>
<td>söylen (74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 typographique (178)</td>
<td>tipografik (37)</td>
<td>dizgisel (74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 réflexes techniques (178)</td>
<td>uygulaymsal tepke (37)</td>
<td>uygulaymsal tepke (74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 contexte (179)</td>
<td>baglam (37)</td>
<td>baglam (74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 acte (179)</td>
<td>edim (37)</td>
<td>edim (74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 cryptogramme (179)</td>
<td>gizliyaziç (37)</td>
<td>gizyazi (74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 meurtre (179)</td>
<td>kiya (37)</td>
<td>öldürme (74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 homogène (179)</td>
<td>bagdasık (37)</td>
<td>bagdasık (74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 fait (179)</td>
<td>olgu (37)</td>
<td>olgu (74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 polarité (179)</td>
<td>kutupluluk (37)</td>
<td>kutupsallik (75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 langue (179)</td>
<td>toplumsal dil (langue) (38)</td>
<td>dil (75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 langage (179)</td>
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<td>aliski (76)</td>
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III. Text from *Critique et vérité*

“La Critique”


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<td>langue (44)</td>
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<td>söylensel (89)</td>
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<td>anlamlandırıcı bir işlev (90)</td>
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<td>simgesel (92)</td>
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<td>sözbilim (92)</td>
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<td>gerçek anlamda karşılık (eğretileme) (92)</td>
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<td>yerdeğiştirmece (92) (düzdeğişmece)</td>
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