AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN POLICY TOWARDS SERBIA
1867-1871
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
BENJÁMIN KÁLLAY

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ABSTRACT

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN POLICY TOWARDS SERBIA 1867-1871, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO BENJÁMIN KÁLLAY

This study analyses the effect the Hungarian government had on Austro-Hungarian policy towards Serbia in the four years after the 1867 Ausgleich. Benjámin Kállay, at the request of the Hungarian minister president, Andrássy, was appointed consul at Belgrade in 1868, and thereafter pursued specifically Hungarian objectives at variance with those of the chancellor and foreign minister, Beust. The Hungarian influence on the Monarchy's relations with Serbia was ultimately responsible for a deterioration in those relations.

After the Introduction, which outlines the subject, with reference to the existing literature and sources consulted, the first chapter concentrates on the situation in 1867. Chapter 2 deals with Kállay's background and the initial effect of his appointment, while Chapter 3 charts the effect of Prince Michael Obrenovié's assassination. Chapters 4-8 concern the two questions which dominated relations: the Hungarian commitment to prosecute ex-Prince Alexander Karađorđević for Michael's murder, and the scheme, promoted by Andrássy and Kállay, whereby Serbia would be secured the administration of most Bosnia-Hercegovina, under nominal Turkish suzerainty, in return for a firm economic and political commitment by Serbia to the Monarchy. This Bosnian scheme also involved some acquisition of Bosnian territory by the Monarchy itself.

Both the Karađorđević prosecution and the Bosnian plan failed. The impossibility of securing Karađorđević's conviction, and the implausibility of the Bosnian plan, convinced the Serbian government that the Hungarian policy had been insincere from the start, designed to divert Serbia from its plans for revolt in the Ottoman Empire. Andrássy, in turn, was convinced by the Serbs' reluctance to commit themselves to the Monarchy, and their swing towards Russia after the Franco-Prussian War, that they too were negotiating in bad faith. The Monarchy's future policy, according to Andrássy, therefore should be to coerce Serbia's economic and political subordination.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## INTRODUCTION

1. Thesis
2. Literature
3. Outline
4. Sources
   Notes

## CHAPTER 1: AUSTRIA, HUNGARY AND SERBIA IN 1867

5. The *Ausgleich* and Foreign Policy
6. Francis Joseph and Beust
7. Beust's Eastern Policy
8. Attitudes in Vienna towards Bosnia
9. Hungarian Attitudes towards Russia and Serbia
10. The Croats, the Military Border and Serbia
11. The Hungarian Serbs
12. The Principality of Serbia
13. Serbo-Hungarian Relations 1861-66
14. The Krstić Mission of 1867
15. Serbia, the Powers and the Talks at Salzburg
16. The Meeting at Ivánka
17. Prince Michael's U-Turn
   Notes

## CHAPTER 2: KÁLLAY GOES TO BELGRADE

18. A Hungarian for Belgrade
19. Kállay's Political Career
20. Beust's Instructions of April 1868
21. First Moves
22. The Andrássy-Orešković Negotiations
   Notes

## CHAPTER 3: THE OBRENOVIĆ ASSASSINATION

23. The Topčider Murders
24. Blaznavac Takes Charge
25. The Debate on Intervention
26. Turkish Recognition
27. The Roots of the Conspiracy
28. Hungarian Domestic Consequences
29. The Regents, Miletic and the *Omladina*
30. Consolidating Influence?
   Notes
CHAPTER 4: THE KARADORĐEVIĆ PROSECUTION

31. The Illusion of Serbo-Hungarian Friendship 117-119
32. The Debate on Extraditing Karadordević 119-122
33. The Preliminary Investigations 122-127
34. Political Implications of Delay 127-128
35. Mistrial and Re-Indictment 128-130
36. Second Trial and Acquittal 130-133
37. Consequences of Acquittal 133-135
   Notes 136-140

CHAPTER 5: THE BOSNIAN QUESTION 1868-70

38. Importance and Paradox of the Bosnian Plan 141-143
39. Confusion in Vienna and Abroad 143-145
40. Kállay Convinces Blaznavac 145-147
41. The Meeting at Terebes 147-149
42. Ristić's Doubts 149-151
43. Andrásy Confronts the Emperor and Beust 151-152
44. Emerging Defects of the Plan 152-154
45. Beust's and Prokesch's Objections 154-157
46. Increased Pressure on Vienna and Belgrade 157-160
47. Calculations of the Military and Beust 160-164
48. Beust Gives Way 164-166
49. Negotiations Resume 166-169
50. The Regents Hang Back 169-172
51. Doubts on Both Sides 172-175
   Notes 176-183

CHAPTER 6: EFFECT OF THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR

52. The Crown Council of 18 July 1870 184-186
53. 'Neutralising' Serbia 186-189
54. The Regents' Dilemma 189-191
55. The Crown Council of 22 August 191-194
56. Continuing Difficulties with the Bosnian Plan 194-200
57. Russia's Repudiation of the Black Sea Clauses 200-204
   Notes 205-209

CHAPTER 7: THE BOSNIAN QUESTION REVISITED 1870-71

58. Genesis of the Beust Circular 210-212
59. The Bosnian Negotiations of November 1870 212-218
60. The Draft Treaty of Alliance 218-220
61. The Regents' Reservations 220-225
62. Effects of the Beust Circular 225-230
   Notes 231-235
CHAPTER 8: SERBIA'S SWING TOWARDS RUSSIA 1870-71

63. Reactions to Karadordevic's Acquittal 236-238
64. Karadordevic's Re-Conviction and Appeal 239-242
65. Karadordevic's Final Acquittal 242-243
66. The Deportation Question 243-247
67. Mutual Disillusionment and Suspicion 247-253
68. The Regents' Turn towards Russia 253-255
69. Ignatiev's Proposal of a Visit to the Tsar 255-257
70. The Trip to Livadia 257-259
71. Reactions to Livadia 259-263
72. Andrassy Takes Over from Beust 263-266
73. Apprehension in Belgrade 266-270
74. Reversal of Andrassy's Serbian Policy 270-272
75. The Negotiations of December 1871 272-274
76. Summary 274-276
   Notes 277-283

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. Primary Sources 284-286
B. Secondary Sources 286-293
Dnevnik  Dnevnik Benjamina Kalaja 1868-1875 [The Diary of Benjámin Kállay], ed. Andrija Radenic (Belgrade: Istorijiski Institut, 1976).
FH  Folio Hungarici.
FO  Foreign Office files (Public Record Office, Kew).
HHSA  Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv (Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Vienna).
KA  Kriegsarchiv, Vienna.
Kállay Diary  Kállay Béni naplója [The Diary of Béni Kállay], Magyar Országos Levéltár, Budapest, P344, C.d. 1-4 (31-34 k.).
MOL  Magyar Országos Levéltár [Hungarian National Archive], Budapest.
OSZK  Országos Széchenyi Könyvtár [National Széchenyi Library], Budapest.
PA  Politisches Archiv, Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna.
PRO  Public Record Office, Kew.
Ristić Letters  Pisma Jovana Ristića Filipu Hristiću od 1870 do 1873 i od 1877 do 1880 [The Letters of Jovan Ristić to Filip Hristić from 1870 to 1873 and from 1877 to 1880] (Belgrade, 1931).
INTRODUCTION

1: Thesis

This study is concerned with the changes effected in the policy of the Habsburg Monarchy towards Serbia between the Ausgleich of 1867, when a 'Hungarian factor' appeared in the formulation of that policy, and the appointment of a Hungarian, Count Gyula Andrássy, as joint foreign minister late in 1871. The rôle of Benjámin Kállay is of importance here, not just because he was Austria-Hungary's consul-general in Belgrade throughout this period, but also because, as Andrássy's nominee for the post, he represented a particular, Hungarian view of how relations with Serbia should be conducted. Yet Kállay's views, as well as Andrássy's, had undergone significant modifications by 1871. It is one of the purposes of this study to show how fateful those shifts of emphasis were for the subsequent development of relations between the Habsburg Monarchy and Serbia.

It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the whole course of Austro-Serbian relations, right down to 1914, was determined by policies laid down in the late 1860's and the 1870's; and that these policies bore a distinctly Hungarian stamp. Their essential feature, as evolved by 1878, was the imposition on Serbia of a strait-jacket of economic and political controls, which were designed to nullify Serbian nationalism, to ensure Serbia's availability as a source of foodstuffs and a market for manufactures, and to do all this without the necessity of annexing the country and thus further complicating the nationalities question inside the Habsburg Monarchy. In addition, it was recognised by Austro-Hungarian policymakers, by the mid-1870's, that the occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina by the Monarchy was a likely concomitant of this approach, since on no account should Serbia be allowed to annex Bosnia for itself and thus form a large South Slav state on the Monarchy's border.

Until the crisis of 1875-78 shattered the status quo in the Balkans, this policy remained hypothetical. Serbian isolation at the end of the Russo-Turkish War, however, offered Austria-Hungary the chance of imposing the strait-jacket, while simultaneously resolving the Bosnian question to its own satisfaction. Serbia was
secured territorial gains to the south-east, at the price of a close economic and political alliance concluded in 1880-81, and for the next generation remained effectively a protectorate of the Habsburg Monarchy.

Benjámin Kállay's part in all this was central. He was a driving force behind the treaties of 1880-81. Subsequently, as the Monarchy's joint finance minister (1882-1903), responsible for the administration of Bosnia-Hercegovina, he laboured to make Habsburg rule popular there, and to negate the aspirations of Serbian nationalists for a South Slav state.

Kállay failed, and his Serbian policy was an unmitigated disaster. The Austrians, and the Hungarians, remained as unpopular in Serbia as they had always been, and the blatant subordination of Serbian interests to those of the Monarchy produced a fierce nationalist resentment. Austria-Hungary's administration of Bosnia-Hercegovina added insult to injury; and the sense of humiliation in Serbia was crowned by the wide-spread perception that King Milan Obrenović and his son and successor, Alexander, were the willing guarantors of Austro-Hungarian hegemony. In 1903, Alexander's unpopularity and unconstitutional rule provoked an army coup in which he was assassinated; and the rival Karadordević dynasty was called to the throne. This meant a return to constitutional politics in Serbia, hence the ascendency of the nationalist Radical Party. Serbian governments finally broke the economic stranglehold which Austria-Hungary had exerted since 1881; and with this loosening of economic ties, came a corresponding licence in the expression of nationalist aims. After 1903 relations between the Monarchy and Serbia deteriorated rapidly, until by 1914 the stage was set for the confrontation which led to the First World War. There is a certain symbolism in the fact that Kállay, whose policy of economic and political domination started to unravel with the 1903 revolution, died within a few weeks of it.

The point here is the futility of the whole edifice of control which was the principal result of Hungarian influence in Habsburg policy towards Serbia. Nationalism, on both sides, ensured that relations between the Monarchy and Serbia were never likely to be cordial; but the policy of domination, while typical of a great power's attitude towards its chosen client state, could only exacerbate matters. Austro-Hungarian domination
simply highlighted the fact that Serbia was weak, and could not achieve national unity on its own terms. It fatally embittered an already problematical relationship, and it was inherently likely to fail because of the extra hostility it generated.

This being the case, it becomes a matter of some interest to determine how this policy became the stock-in-trade of Habsburg diplomacy vis-à-vis Serbia in the period 1867-78. There were two phases in its evolution, only the first of which concerns us here. This first phase, from 1867 to late 1871, coincides with the period when Andrásy was Hungarian minister president, and Count Friedrich von Beust the Monarchy's chancellor and joint foreign minister. While Beust pursued a policy of preserving the status quo in the Balkans, Andrásy and his man in Belgrade, Kállay, promoted their own policy with regard to Serbia. This Hungarian shadow policy sought to neutralise Serbia and bind it to the Monarchy by a variety of minor concessions and services, and by one large territorial inducement: the suggestion that Austro-Hungarian intercession might induce the Turks to hand over the administration of at least part of Bosnia-Hercegovina to Serbia. The Bosnian scheme was inherently improbable, and by 1871 the Serbian Regents could see as much, and were turning back to Russia for diplomatic support. By the time Andrásy succeeded Beust as foreign minister, in November 1871, he was convinced the Serbs were not worth winning over with these tactics, and Kállay, the erstwhile proponent of Serbo-Hungarian 'friendship', was beginning to experience the sharp end of deteriorating relations in Belgrade. It was in the second phase, from 1871 to 1878, that the new, 'hard' policy, aiming at economic and political control, was gradually elaborated.

In telling this story, there are a number of aspects which deserve attention. There is the way in which the 'Hungarian factor' began, as soon as Andrásy's constitutional government was in power, to cut across the official policy of Beust in Vienna. Andrásy's role in bedevilling Habsburg foreign policy towards Serbia was a large one; and the saga of his essentially impracticable Bosnian scheme, and its effect on relations with Serbia, will be an important theme in this study. There is the fascinating personality of Benjámin Kállay, whose combination of self-deluding idealism and ruthless duplicity did much to defeat his own objects, and whose voice throughout this
period was virtually the only authoritative guide the Monarchy had to what was happening in Serbia.

The theme which emerges most strikingly from the study of this period is the way those Hungarians, like Andrásy and Kállay, who gained a say in foreign policy, quickly developed a mentality which seems peculiar to the ruling classes of great powers. The Austrians, accustomed to think of themselves as the representatives of a great power, had always looked down upon the Balkan peoples, while at the same time fearing their manipulation by Russia. The Hungarians, by contrast, were merely aping the role of a great power; but in so doing they also absorbed the same attitude, a blend of arrogance and fear – with the difference that their arrogance was heightened by their own sense of inferiority to the Austrians, and their fear doubly sharpened by memories of the Russian invader of 1849. The basic mentality was as old as the idea of empire itself; but the Hungarian factor added a new virulence to the malady by insisting on control, on an unattainable security. It was this inflexibility which was to doom Austro-Serbian relations before the Ausgleich was a decade old.

2: Literature

The middle and the end of this story – the long Austro-Hungarian hegemony, followed by the breakdown of relations after 1903 – have always been known. It is the interval between the Ausgleich and the beginning of the crisis of 1875-78 which looks obscure by comparison. This is not to say that the period has not been covered in numerous general and specialist works. But no one has produced an overall survey of Austro-Serbian relations which gives due weight to this initial phase; nor has the 'Hungarian factor' been addressed in its own right as an influence on the Monarchy's foreign policy towards Serbia in more than a scattering of publications.¹

The earliest accounts, some of them by participants in the events of 1867-75, were predictably partial.² By 1914, a number of surveys of Austrian foreign policy had appeared, but most of these were general in tone. None paid much attention to the period before 1875; and the existence of a Hungarian perspective is not so much as hinted at, despite the presence of a Hungarian as foreign minister from 1871 to 1879. Rather, it seems to be assumed that, merely by virtue of his arrival as foreign minister,
Andrásy too became a sort of honorary Austrian.³

There is one outstanding exception to this pattern prior to 1914 – significantly, by a Hungarian. Eduard von Wertheimer’s massive life of Andrásy remains to this day one of the principal sources for the period in general, and has a variety of interesting things to say about Andrásy’s views on the South Slav question, his interventions in Beust’s foreign policy, and his own policy upon becoming foreign minister himself.⁴ Because Wertheimer had access to the Andrásy family archives and other papers, such as the diary of Count Béla Orczy, which have since been destroyed, and which are frequently quoted by him, his account constitutes a form of primary source in its own right.⁵ It also, however, poses one of the major obstacles to a balanced assessment of Austria-Hungary’s Serbian policy. Wertheimer’s hagiographical approach to his subject, coupled with the fact that so much of his documentary evidence can no longer be questioned by other historians, has encouraged various myths about Austro-Hungarian foreign policy in this period, which even today still find champions.⁶

It is not true, for instance, to say that Andrásy prevented Beust from intervening in the Franco-Prussian War; or that Beust "showed no particular interest in the Near East."⁷ In fact, Andrásy’s whole approach to foreign policy issues while he was still Hungarian premier seems remarkably naïve and ill-informed, as evidenced by his apparent conviction, as early as 1868, that war with Russia was not only inevitable but, in the long run, positively to be welcomed – a far cry from the statesmanship of Wertheimer’s portrait. And with regard to Serbia, the Wertheimer version shows very much the limitations of a pre-1914, Hungarian national liberal perspective. The Bosnian scheme is explained as a momentary aberration in Andrásy’s otherwise far-sighted vision, whereby he toyed with the idea of creating a large South Slav bloc on the Monarchy’s southern frontier, which would somehow be firmly under Austro-Hungarian influence.⁸ Andrásy’s Serbian policy is presented as truly wise only when, in Wertheimer’s view, he gave up the "delusion" of Serbo-Hungarian friendship and fell back on the supposedly more realistic policy of economic and diplomatic coercion.⁹

After the First World War, and the publication of primary sources relating to this period, we start getting something like objective scholarship on the subject of Austro-
Serbian relations, although naturally sentiments either for or against the vanished Habsburg Monarchy, for or against Serbian nationalism, continued to affect the work produced.\textsuperscript{10} This is particularly the case among Yugoslav historians, especially Serbs, where the tendency to see the whole question in adversarial terms, and to ascribe the worst motivation to Austro-Hungarian diplomacy, was clearly hard to overcome. A study in 1925 by Vasilije Popović, for instance, found no real difference between the goals of Beust and Andrásy in the period 1868-71.\textsuperscript{11} A similar confusion is discernible in a general study by Ilija Pržić, where the Bosnian scheme is assumed to have been made with the knowledge and approval of both Beust and Francis Joseph.\textsuperscript{12}

More encouraging is the balanced analysis by one of the greatest of Yugoslav historians. In his work on the regime of Miloš and Michael Obrenović, Slobodan Jovanović initially (1923) seemed unclear as to whether the Bosnian plan originated with the imperial government or not. In an appendix to his second edition, however (1933), Jovanović made good use of material published in the interval to conclude that Austro-Hungarian policy was in fact both 'Austrian' and 'Hungarian': that Beust clearly opposed the Bosnian scheme and that Andrásy was not only for it, but was building on a proposal made by Prince Michael himself in early 1867.\textsuperscript{13} Everything about the Monarchy's relationship with Serbia after 1867, in Jovanović's revised view, hinged upon the fact that there had, in that year, been an Ausgleich, and that "Beust was not the only maker of Austrian foreign policy."\textsuperscript{14} The Bosnian plan was the expression of the institutional schizophrenia which afflicted the Habsburg Monarchy's diplomacy between 1867 and 1871, and which only ceased to be a factor when Andrásy took over the Ballhaus – by which time his disposition towards Serbia had come full circle.\textsuperscript{15}

One of the sources for Jovanović's revision was R.W. Seton-Watson's three-part article in \textit{Le Monde slave} on Kállay in Belgrade, the first serious appreciation of his importance since the hagiographical introduction to Kállay's own \textit{History of the Serbian Uprising} by Lajos Thallóczy in 1909.\textsuperscript{16} Seton-Watson's study was based exclusively on the despatches from Kállay to Beust and later Andrásy preserved in the Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv, which was valuable in itself but which naturally only gave half the picture. Without having looked at Kállay's private papers in Budapest, Seton-Watson
could not begin to realise the literally dual nature of the Monarchy's representation in
Belgrade from 1868 to 1871.17

One other notable contribution of the inter-war years was J.A. von Reiswitz's history
of Serbia's relations with Prussia down to the end of the Franco-Prussian conflict. This
threw some light on Austria-Hungary's role in Serbia, for although unable to explain the
workings of Austrian and Hungarian policy towards Serbia in detail, the reports of
Rosen, the Prussian consul in Belgrade, nevertheless offer independent confirmation
that there was a difference. It was Rosen who on occasion referred to Kállay as the
"Hungarian consul".18

The post-1945 period has seen the appearance of a number of detailed monographs,
all of which however skirt the subject of Austrian versus Hungarian policy vis-à-vis
Serbia, and the eventual direction Austro-Hungarian policy (in the joint sense) took
after 1871. Ljiljana Aleksić touched briefly on the rôle of Napoleon III in putting the
Bosnian question on the agenda in 1866-67. Her main contribution was to show the
extent to which Napoleon was willing to use the offer of Bosnia to the Monarchy as a
means of winning an alliance partner against Prussia. Of Andrásy's counter-proposal,
and the effect the cleft between Austrian and Hungarian had on grand policy, Aleksić
had not much to say.19

A similarly detailed study, but which again stops short at 1868, was brought out by
Grigor Jakšić and Vojislav J. Vučković in 1963. Here, at least, a whole chapter is
devoted to "Michael's U-Turn" in 1867, with Andrásy's contribution to the change in
Serbian policy duly assessed; and in their final chapter the authors debate the
significance of Kállay's appointment to the Belgrade consulate in early 1868.20 Jakšić
and Vučković offer a more complicated version than most previous accounts, in that,
while appreciating the new Hungarian influence, they also drop the old myths about
Beust's revanchism, and his disinterest in the Eastern question.21 The fact that they did
not have access to Hungarian sources, however, meant that Jakšić and Vučković saw
the whole Bosnian imbroglio as a joint Austro-Hungarian exercise in deception: while
Beust told the Serbian government that Austria-Hungary firmly opposed any Serbian
role in Bosnia, Andrásy and Kállay, with Beust's agreement, gave Belgrade the
precisely opposite impression. The point of this Macchiavellian intrigue, Jakšić and Vučković imply, was to paralyse Serbia's own preparations for action in the Balkans and discredit Serbia in the rest of the South Slav world.\textsuperscript{22} They do not, however, adduce more than circumstantial evidence for this conclusion; whereas sources they were not able to consult, such as the Kállay diary, give quite a different picture.\textsuperscript{23}

The first major monograph to make use of the Hungarian archives for the study of Austria-Hungary's eastern policy in this period was published by István Diószegi in 1965. Diószegi, however, was mainly concerned with the diplomatic manoeuvrings around the Franco-Prussian War, and explored policy towards Russia, not to mention Serbia, only tangentially. His principal contribution was to refine further our understanding of the policies of both Beust and Andrássy. Beust, in Diószegi's view, had a level-headed conception of the Monarchy's position, and certainly saw the threat posed by Russia. But Diószegi also maintains that Andrássy's thinking on foreign policy, while he was still Hungarian minister president, was equally wide-ranging, and in support of this Diószegi cites not only Kállay's diary but the correspondence between him and Andrássy. Of particular interest is the sheer intensity of Andrássy's preoccupation with Russia; in this sense his priorities were indeed radically different from Beust's, and it was inevitable that this would influence his attitude towards Serbia, although on this aspect of policy Diószegi was mostly silent.\textsuperscript{24} What is peculiar about Diószegi's approach is that, while admitting the complicated and often contradictory nature of Andrássy's ideas on foreign policy, he nevertheless concludes that the centrality of the "Russo-Slav question" in Andrássy's world-view somehow made his strategy "more realistic" than that of Beust.\textsuperscript{25} One of the central themes of this thesis, by contrast, will be that, whatever the reality of the threat posed to the Monarchy by the "Russo-Slav question", Andrássy's chosen methods of countering this threat, with regard to Serbia, were anything but realistic.

Another balanced appraisal of Beust's policy was provided by Heinrich Potthoff in 1968; but, again, this was primarily a study of Habsburg policy in western Europe. Potthoff did consider the effect on Beust's policy of events in the East; but of how Beust saw relations with Serbia there is little. Of greatest interest is Potthoff's
demonstration of how much Beust saw relations with Russia as determining his policy in the West; for Beust was willing at least to contemplate a war with Russia, if by doing so he could bring France in as Austria-Hungary's ally, to protect the Monarchy against simultaneous Prussian attack. The French would thus do Austria-Hungary's work for it in breaking the threat of Prussian hegemony in Germany, but without Vienna having itself initiated an unpopular war of German against German. Beust, then, like Andrásy, had his own vision of the "Russo-Slav question"; but for Beust any such project must always depend upon certain preconditions, such as the reform and strengthening of the Ottoman Empire.

One Yugoslav historian who did consult the Budapest archives was Vasilije Krestić, whose study of the Hungarian-Croatian Nagodba of 1868 also devoted a chapter to Serbia, based in part on the Kállay diary and the Kállay-Andrássy correspondence. For Krestić, none of Andrásy's dealings with the Serbian government from February 1867 on were anything other than deceitful, and his promises with regard to Bosnia were "completely insincere". What is more, Krestić argued, this strategy of deliberately misleading the Serbian government about Bosnia in order to blunt its interest in stirring up trouble in the Balkans was agreed upon in advance by Andrásy with Beust. Whereas Beust's opposition to a Serbian take-over of Bosnia was well known, said Krestić, Andrásy's position was not; Andrásy therefore, through Kállay in Belgrade, repeatedly held out the prospect of a share in the administration of the two provinces, and made deceptive comments about Hungary's inability to absorb more Slavs, while being convinced all the while that "sooner or later", in Kállay's words, Austria-Hungary would have to occupy Bosnia itself. The evidence for these assertions, however, is questionable: for some of his claims Krestić did not specify his sources; for others he relied on Serbian documents whose views on Andrásy's motives are hardly impartial; and on one crucial point, the question of Beust's complicity in this deception, the only evidence is a somewhat ambiguous reference from Wertheimer. Just how much of Krestić's viewpoint can be accepted will be dealt with in detail below; here, suffice it to say that Andrásy's policy seems at least as much the product of confusion and naïveté as of Macchiavellian duplicity.
A much more centre-line interpretation of policy towards Serbia was provided by F.R. Bridge's general study, which reaffirmed the essential differences between Beust and Andrásy, especially as regards Bosnia, and which, even when based largely on sources in western languages, substantially reinforced a picture of Andrásy as startlingly unbalanced in his judgment of foreign policy issues while still Hungarian premier. Beust's direction of foreign affairs is given its due as relatively realistic, and more hindered than helped by Hungarian interventions; and on the course of Austro-Serbian relations after Andrásy took over in 1871, Bridge even wrote of the "bitter fruit" borne by "Andrásy's exaggerated cultivation of Belgrade in 1869-70".

Andrásy, however, still had a latter-day champion in János Decsy, whose extensively researched but curiously lopsided study of the Hungarian minister president's influence appeared in 1979. Decsy was primarily concerned with the question of Austro-Hungarian neutrality in the Franco-Prussian War, although even here his approach was relentlessly anti-Beust and pro-Andrásy. He was meticulous in documenting the importance of the Russian-Slav question in Andrásy's thinking, and showed convincingly that for Andrásy this was a problem of European significance. It was what Decsy left out that distorted his picture. He paid little attention to the nuances which proceeded from Andrásy's view of the Slav world, such as his Serbian policy. If he had, his extraordinarily adulatory portrait of Andrásy as the statesman who could do virtually no wrong, essentially no different from Wertheimer, might have undergone serious modification. As it is, Decsy quoted most of Andrásy's more egregious ideas, such as the belief in the need for a war against Russia, with apparent equanimity, his admiration for Andrásy's statesmanship undiminished. In so far as the present study sheds light on the Serbian policy of Andrásy and Kállay, then, it can be considered a much-needed corrective to this attempt at an exhumation of Wertheimer's Andrásy.

The same year saw the appearance of two further studies which explored Austro-Serbian relations from peripheral angles. Ljiljana Aleksić-Pejković, on Italy's policy towards Serbia, made use of the Italian archives down to 1870. The Balkans, and especially Serbia, figured in Italian calculations largely as a diversionary element in
successive confrontations with the Habsburg Monarchy. Most of this story is clearly outside the scope of the present study; but the reports of Italian representatives in the years 1867-70 at least give an extra dimension to the new rôle of the Hungarian government in the Monarchy's foreign policy. It is worth noting that Aleksić-Pejković was one of the first scholars to make use of the published version of Kállay's diary.35

The much more wide-ranging account, by the late Heinrich Lutz, of Austria-Hungary and the foundation of the German Empire, placed policy towards Serbia, and the Hungarian factor, in the broadest possible context, and made use of some sources not often found in the bibliographies of mainstream western diplomatic historians. Lutz was excellent on the general importance of the Eastern question in Austro-Hungarian foreign policy, and even discerned "eine ungarische Sonderpolitik" in the Balkans;36 but beyond alluding to Andrássy's Bosnian scheme, and the alliance proposal of 1870, he did not make clear how this Hungarian policy differed, if at all, from the official policy of Beust. Despite citing evidence that Beust was initially opposed to the Bosnian scheme, Lutz in fact concludes, without benefit of Hungarian sources such as Kállay's diary, that Beust's position in the matter by early 1869 was "not clear".37 He was inclined, like Yugoslav historians before him, to regard both the Bosnian scheme and the alliance offer of 1870 as a joint Austro-Hungarian effort, concerted between Beust and Andrássy to "neutralise" Serbia at a time when was with Russia was regarded by both as imminent, instead of an independent Hungarian initiative outside of Vienna's control.38 In view of this (understandable) confusion, it is not surprising that Lutz should have felt that the formal say in foreign policy assured to Hungarian governments by Article 8 of the Compromise Law did not facilitate effective influence.39 This is not a position that can be sustained in the light of the evidence now available. Andrássy not only pursued his own foreign policy goals, by a variety of means, but, with regard to Serbia, he exerted considerable influence, even if this was largely a negative influence.

The most serious recent contributions to the debate over Hungarian influence in Habsburg foreign policy, significantly, have been made by Hungarians. József Galántai's 1985 study included a section on foreign policy in which, for the first time,
the Kállay diary and other relevant sources were used systematically to chart the course of the Monarchy's relations with Serbia for the first few years after the Ausgleich.40 Galántai pointed out that it was Balkan policy which produced the first clash between Beust and the Hungarian government, with Andrássy the proponent of a much more active attempt to bind Serbia to Austria-Hungary. The Bosnian scheme, on which Galántai shed most light, was the key to this whole strategy. Galántai made clear the extent to which Beust was not in on many of the various Bosnian initiatives, the extent to which Andrássy (through Kállay) was acting quite independently, a situation not envisaged by Article 8 of the Settlement Law,41 but which Galántai, echoing Wertheimer, seemed to regard as unexceptionable.42 On the implications of this for good relations between the Monarchy and Serbia, Galántai was non-committal, a reflection of the lack of attention devoted to the Serbian side of the equation. In this respect Galántai's account suffered from its unfamiliarity with Serbian sources in the same way that previous accounts have suffered through ignorance of the Hungarian sources.

The latest coverage of policy within this period has come from István Diószegi's study of Andrássy in 1871-77. This work was again mainly concerned with grand policy; the nuances of Andrássy's new attitude towards Serbia after 1871 received only incidental treatment. Any subsequent analysis of relations with Serbia, however, must benefit from the spotlight Diószegi threw on Austro-Hungarian policy in general. In particular, Diószegi provided the clearest possible account to date of the change in Andrássy's approach to the Eastern Question after 1871. He accepted that Andrássy's intentions with regard to Serbia in 1868-71, including the offer of a part of Bosnia, were honest, in so far as Andrássy believed this to be a legitimate means of weaning Serbia from Russian influence. He also showed how this was a natural consequence of Andrássy's overall outlook, which regarded Russia as the principal threat to the Monarchy. Hence Andrássy's new disillusionment with Serbia, which coincided roughly with his arrival at the foreign ministry, fitted in with this outlook more easily than did his previous readiness to entrust Ottoman provinces to Belgrade.43

By 1873, Andrássy's thinking had undergone important changes. For one thing, he
was no longer convinced that the Ottoman Empire was necessarily the only means of resisting Russia, and at least toyed with the idea that the Balkan nations themselves might form the same sort of barrier. But most important, Andrássy's attitude towards Russia had altered. As a result of the Three Emperors' Agreement of 1873, and the discovery that one could do business with the Russians, Andrássy insensibly adopted one of the most traditional of Austrian policies in the Balkans, that of aiming at a division of the Peninsula into Austrian and Russian spheres of interest. This was an essential precondition of that diplomatic understanding between Austria-Hungary and Russia which led to the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 and finally to Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina. The diplomatic understanding, in turn, helped seal Serbia's fate as Austria-Hungary's reluctant vassal state, for the Russian government was just as happy to engage in this sort of horse-trading as the Austro-Hungarian. Once Andrássy had accepted the 'necessity' of occupying Bosnia-Hercegovina, then, and had learned to work with the Russians, great power interest politics could rule supreme in the Balkans.

3: Outline

The story told here starts with a brief survey of the pivotal year 1867, when the Ausgleich brought a constitutional Hungarian government, with a say in foreign policy, onto the scene. In 1868, Kállay goes to Belgrade, the designated apostle of Serbo-Hungarian 'friendship'; and his arrival coincides with the death of Prince Michael Obrenović and the installation of a Regency even more disposed to take the idea seriously. The next three years see the gradual souring of the relationship, mainly as a result of the Bosnian question, and the Hungarian government's attempted prosecution of ex-Prince Alexander Karadordević for Prince Michael's murder. The Serbian government's return to a Russian orientation in 1871 rounds off the narrative.

4: Sources

A wide variety of primary sources, printed as well as archival, has been used. The greatest single source is the Political Archive in the Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna. This contains the papers of the Austro-Hungarian foreign ministry which necessarily constitute the backbone of such a study, including correspondence with the
Belgrade consulate, with the embassy in Constantinople (to which, because of Serbia’s vassal status, the Belgrade consulate was formally subordinate), and inter-departmental exchanges of relevance to Serbian affairs. Also of use, in Vienna, were the files of the Austro-Hungarian army’s intelligence section, the Evidenzbüro, in the War Archive.

Second in order of importance are the Hungarian archival sources. The Hungarian National Archive contains the Kállay Papers, including Kállay’s Belgrade diary; while the National Széchenyi Library has the extensive Andrássy-Kállay correspondence, and the biographical material on Kállay compiled by Lajos Thallóczy.

There is also a wealth of printed primary material in this area. Not only are multi-volume collections of diplomatic documents available from the Prussian, Italian and French archives; but Yugoslav historians have a convenient habit of publishing primary sources not only from their own national archives, but from those of other countries as well. What is more, such documents are usually reproduced in their language of origin. Thus, Vojislav J. Vučković's collection on Serbian policy towards the Habsburg Monarchy’s South Slav provinces has material from Austrian, French and even British archives as well as Yugoslav ones. Nikola Petrović's two-volume collection on Svetozar Miletić provides a vast amount of Hungarian documentation, including items from the Andrássy-Kállay correspondence. Exhaustive selections from the papers of Serbian politicians like Ilija Garašanin and Jovan Ristić, to name but two, have been available in published form in Yugoslavia for decades.

In addition, one quite unique printed primary source has been essential. The original Kállay diary, in Hungarian, is preserved in the National Archive in Budapest, but has never been published in its original form. To remedy this deficiency, the Yugoslav historian Andrija Radenić brought out in 1976 his own Serbo-Croat translation of this massive source. Radenić’s edition is almost as valuable as the original, in that it contains a staggering apparatus of notes in which Radenić summarises, and often quotes verbatim, reports, letters and even newspaper articles mentioned in the text of the diary itself. Despite being in a language to which only the fortunate few have access, therefore, the published Kállay diary is necessarily the single most important
source for this period of Austro-Serbian relations.
NOTES TO INTRODUCTION


8. Ibid., pp. 459-63.


10. The War itself saw the appearance of the first serious *History of Serbia* in English, by H.W.V. Temperley (London 1917); see pp. 256-64.


13. Slobodan Jovanović, *Druga vlada Miloša i Mihaila* [The Second Government of Miloš and Michael] (Belgrade 1933 [1923]), pp. 370-75; and Appendix I,
"Prince Michael and Austria", pp. 471-81. Jovanović’s subsequent study of the reign of Prince (later King) Milan, published in 1926, still reflects this confusion, stating that the plan was hatched by the Hungarian government, but with the knowledge of Beust and Francis Joseph: Vlada Milana Obrenovića [The Government of Milan Obrenović], vol. I: 1868-1878 (Belgrade 1926), p. 114.


22. Ibid., pp. 461-63.
23. See below, note 54.
25. Ibid., p. 65.
32. Decsy, op. cit., pp. 33-34.
33. E.g., ibid., p. 55.
34. Ibid., pp. 35-36.
35. Ljiljana Aleksić-Pejković, Politika Italije prema Srbiji do 1870. godine [The
Policy of Italy towards Serbia down to 1870] (Belgrade 1979), p. 326.
37. Ibid., p. 182.
41. Ibid., pp. 233-38. On the Settlement Law, Galántai is clear (p. 230) that "the Hungarian government counted in the ranks of the legal formulators of foreign policy. Without its consent the foreign minister could pursue no foreign policy initiative to its conclusion."
42. Ibid., pp. 234-35.
44. Ibid., pp. 52-53.
45. Ibid., p. 74; also p. 76: "Im ganzen genommen unterschied sich Andrássys Balkanpolitik nicht viel von der langjährigen Praxis am Ballhausplatz."
46. Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Ministerium des Äussern, Politisches Archiv (henceforward HHSA, PA), including Administrative Registratur (AR); Abteilung XXXVIII (consular correspondence); XII (Turkey); XL (Interna); etc.
47. Kriegsarchiv (henceforward KA); all references are to Evidenzbüro papers, citing Faszikel number.
48. Magyar Országos Levéltár (henceforward MOL), Kállay Béni iratai (P344).
49. Országos Széchenyi Könyvtár (henceforward OSZK), Kézirattár (Manuscript Archive), Fol. Hung. (henceforward FH) 1649, 1689, 1732-33.
51. Vojislav J. Vučković (ed.), *Politika akcija Srbije u južnoslovenskim pokrajinama Habsburške monarhije 1859-1874* [The Political Activity of Serbia in the South Slav Provinces of the Habsburg Monarchy] (Belgrade 1965); henceforward Vučković.
54. Andrija Radenić (ed.), *Dnevnik Benjamina Kalaja 1868-1875* [The Diary of Benjámin Kállay] (Belgrade 1976); henceforward Dnevnik. Where passages from the diary are quoted they are of course from the Hungarian original (henceforward Kállay Diary); but it should be pointed out that the quality of the
Radenić translation is generally high, and those in a position to consult the Serbo-Croat edition can do so with confidence in its accuracy.
The Habsburg Monarchy in the year of the Ausgleich was still, in terms of territory and population, a great power. By commercial, financial and industrial standards, however, it was weak. Most debilitating of all, with its eleven different ethnic groups, the Monarchy faced a dilemma far more complex than that confronting other multinational empires. No other state in Europe found its foreign policy options so severely limited by nationality problems.

It was precisely this question of nationality, at least in its Hungarian form, which demonstrated the need for some lasting constitutional settlement. Constantly obliged, in the absolutist period, to guard against a renewed revolt in Hungary, the Monarchy could not pursue an effective foreign policy. Even during the Austro-Prussian War, when negotiations between the Emperor Francis Joseph and the Hungarian leadership were already under way, this interconnectedness of foreign and domestic policy was illustrated anew. Forced to cede Venetia to Italy, and to abandon the leadership of Germany to Prussia, Francis Joseph was finally brought to see the necessity of Hungarian cooperation, if he was to recoup these losses. Exclusion from Germany also meant that the position of the German element within the Monarchy was bound to be reduced substantially, while the position of the Hungarians was correspondingly enhanced. Hungarian leaders like Deák and Andrásy, for their part, knew all along that Hungary was too weak to stand on its own, and had to be part of a great power in order to have any influence over its own fate at all.

As far as foreign policy was concerned, the provisions made by the Ausgleich were straightforward. It was the differing emphasis on them subsequently by particular statesmen which produced much of the ambiguity in Habsburg foreign policy towards Serbia, as well as in other areas. As Eisenmann has pointed out, strictly speaking there was no text of the Settlement: "le dualisme est réglé par deux lois, de contenu analogue ou identique."¹ The Hungarian Law XII of 1867, as the senior of these two laws by some six months, deserves to be regarded as the original version, the model of the
subsequent Austrian law, and on the subject of foreign affairs it was the more unambiguous. Paragraph 8 stated that

The effective conduct of foreign affairs is one of the instruments of the common and joint defence which derives from the pragmatic sanction. The effectiveness of such conduct demands common treatment in respect of those foreign affairs which concern jointly all the lands under the rule of His Majesty. For this reason, the diplomatic and commercial representation of the empire abroad, and the measures that may arise as regards international treaties, shall be part of the tasks of the common minister for foreign affairs, [acting] in agreement with the ministries of both parties and with their consent. Each ministry shall inform its own legislature of the international treaties. Hungary, too, therefore considers these foreign affairs to be common....

This seemed at least to guarantee the right of the Hungarian government to be consulted in the formulation of foreign policy. Andrásy, as Hungarian minister president between 1867 and 1871, certainly believed in his right to be consulted, and even, on the evidence available, to make initiatives in foreign policy on his own.

The Austrian Statute 146 of 21 December 1867, by contrast, made no mention of the common foreign minister's obligation to consult with the ministries of the two halves of the Monarchy. Article 1(a) stated to be 'common'

Foreign affairs, including diplomatic and commercial representation abroad, as well as measures relating to international treaties, reserving the right of the representative bodies of both parts of the empire to approve such treaties, in so far as such approval is required by the Constitution.

The discrepancy between the Hungarian Law XII and the Austrian Statute 146 in fact had little significance. "In practice, this omission [in the Austrian version] was disregarded, and the Ministers Presidents of both halves of the Monarchy were consulted equally."

In both the Hungarian and the Austrian laws the dominant role of the Emperor in foreign affairs was indisputable. Francis Joseph's conception of his duty and prerogatives as a monarch was based on his position as supreme commander of the armed forces and overseer of the Monarchy's relations with foreign powers. Control over both these spheres was regarded by him as the raison d'être of the 1867 Settlement
in the first place. Thus whoever the common foreign minister might be, his
appointment as well as his continuance in office remained absolutely a matter for the
Emperor's judgment, and in this sense both Beust and, after him, Andrássy were
executing the Emperor's personal policy.

In practice, however, Francis Joseph was bound to rely to a considerable extent on
the advice of his foreign minister, and both Beust and Andrássy were generally
intelligent and adroit enough to tailor their policies in such a way as to ensure the
Emperor's endorsement. What was more, the situation after the Ausgleich meant that a
forceful personality as either Austrian or Hungarian minister president was equally
capable of exerting an influence over the Emperor. Andrássy, in the period 1867-71,
made full use of this opportunity, in matters relating to Serbia, as in other, larger
foreign policy issues. The Hungarian minister president could, and did, raise foreign
policy in private audience with the Emperor, and in the so-called crown council (the
common ministerial council).

The crown council was where, if anywhere, influences outside the foreign ministry
might be brought to bear on foreign policy. This body, however, met only on an ad hoc
basis, and its agenda was variable, often not even touching on external affairs. And
although, in addition to the Emperor and the common ministers, the army chief of staff,
the Austrian and Hungarian ministers president and, as occasion required, ministers
from their governments could all attend such councils if invited, a great deal once again
depended on how forcefully they presented their case against this or that policy. In
practice, there was little active interference in foreign policy from this quarter. "It was
exceedingly rare that a foreign minister found himself overruled and forced to accept a
particular positive policy." Even here, the Emperor and foreign minister were free to
ignore the council if they so chose, because it was a consultative body only.

The overall authority in foreign affairs remained the Emperor, and the common
minister for foreign affairs was largely responsible to him. Parliamentary control over
the policy of Emperor and foreign minister, in the sense of direct answerability to the
Delegations, or indirectly to the Austrian or Hungarian parliaments, was notable by its
absence. The principal task of the Delegations, elected by the two parliaments, was to
vote the budget for the ministry of foreign affairs, and they had the right to discuss foreign policy. In practice this did not amount to anything, since delegation debates "were usually retrospective, and could in no way be said to determine foreign policy." On occasion a delegation or parliament could give a foreign minister such a rough ride as to provoke his resignation, or cause the Emperor to dismiss him as an embarrassment. This was still a far cry from full public accountability in foreign affairs, and in the early years of the Dualist period what little outside influence was brought to bear on Francis Joseph and his foreign minister came almost exclusively from the office of the Hungarian minister president.

6: Francis Joseph and Beust

Any consideration of Francis Joseph's personal role in foreign affairs has to take account of the fundamental change in his attitudes wrought by the defeat of 1866. However much he may have burned privately to avenge the humiliation of Sadowa, Francis Joseph made it clear to his ministers, at least, "es sei die Ausgabe Österreichts, bis auf lange Zeit jedem Kriegsgedanken zu entsagen." The Habsburg Monarchy's task for the immediate future must be to rebuild its shattered prestige and to hinder, by every peaceful means, the further aggrandisement of Prussia. In western Europe this meant a close relationship with France. In the Balkans it meant détente with Russia, reform in the Ottoman Empire, good relations with the Balkan principalities and vigilance against the spread from Serbia into the Monarchy of what Francis Joseph himself referred to as "Slavische Agitation", which "scharf ins Auge zu setzen sei." It was a conservative policy, for which the Emperor found the ideal advocate in Beust.

The one area where Francis Joseph showed any inclination to abandon his newfound quietism was the question of territorial expansion. For the dynasty's wounded self-esteem the acquisition of new provinces, if this could be accomplished without war, offered important psychological compensation for 1859 and 1866. This had its bearing on relations with Serbia, since the only direction in which the Monarchy could hope to expand, after 1866, was south-east; and the main candidates for takeover were Bosnia and the Hercegovina. As we shall see, Francis Joseph, in common with many of the army leadership, was interested in the acquisition of Bosnia-Hercegovina from an
early date, even if the idea was not a policy agreed on with the foreign minister. Instead, the Emperor was encouraged to think along these lines not by Beust but by Andrásy, whose dabbling in the Bosnian question served to keep it at the forefront of the agenda throughout 1867-71.

Beust came to office with the same policy priorities as Francis Joseph. As he was at pains to stress to the rest of the ministerial council the day before his appointment, "Die Möglichkeit, in einen Krieg verwickelt zu werden, müsse ferngehalten werden." To some extent this renunciation of a war of revenge, reiterated in public, was tactical, since it is clear from subsequent events that both Beust and his master were counting on a French victory over Prussia in 1870-71, and would probably have been glad to reassert Austrian primacy in Germany in this case. But for the present, as was only sensible in view of Austria's defeat, peace must be the first priority. The object of Beust's German policy, therefore, was to hold Prussia on the Main.

7: Beust's Eastern Policy

Beust’s policy towards Russia and the Balkans was conditioned from the start by this imperative. Indeed it would not be too much to say that his first major initiative in the Eastern Question was an attempt to open doors in western Europe. In an effort to win French support he decided to propose a major revaluation of the status quo in the Near East.

In a despatch to his ambassador in Paris, on 1 January 1867, Beust gave expression to concerns which had already, before his accession to office, begun to affect Austrian foreign policy. What gave Beust's démarche point was the revival of the Eastern Question in acute form with the uprising in Crete, which raised once again the issue of the Ottoman Empire's viability. If there were a general revolt against Turkish rule in the Balkans, involving the great powers, the Monarchy could hardly afford to defend its interests by military means, since it was in the midst of reorganising itself. On the other hand, the Monarchy's interests as a great power made it impossible to contemplate a reordering of the power balance in south-eastern Europe from which it was excluded, particularly if such an upheaval resulted in a Russian preponderance.

It was essential, therefore, to forestall an explosion by improving the lot of the
Balkan Christian population, without at the same time impairing the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman administration would have to be reformed, and certain long overdue tactical concessions made, such as the evacuation of Turkish garrisons from Serbia in May 1867. For this, however, it was equally essential for the powers to act in concert, as they were entitled to by the Treaty of Paris, and since the Ottoman government was unlikely to respond to anything but collective pressure. Here, Beust reasoned, was the ideal occasion for the Austrian government to win some sort of control over Russian policy in the region, by inducing the Russians to work with the other powers; here, too, was the opportunity to associate France with Austria in a common diplomatic objective.

As far as the Eastern Question was concerned, the significance of the Beust démarche of January 1867 lay not in the fact that Napoleon III, for a variety of reasons, turned it down. What was revealing was Beust's readiness to revise the Treaty of Paris in order to secure Russian cooperation, in particular to free Russia from the clauses which forbade it a military and naval establishment in the Black Sea.

Certainly too much should not be made of Beust's apparent willingness to work with the Russians in the near East, and to buy their collaboration by a revision of the Treaty of Paris. The Russians had already, late in 1866, noted with approval what Beust himself saw as a "new era" in Austria's eastern policy, by which was meant the understanding for the Balkan Christians' predicament, and the readiness to seek reforms in Turkish administration. But this was not some attempt on Beust's part to resuscitate the old conservative community of interests between the Russian and Habsburg courts. Beust, like Francis Joseph, was far too suspicious of Russia's suspected role in stoking the fires of Balkan discontent to envisage Russia as a close working partner. Rather, his initiative showed an awareness of both the limitations and the possibilities open to Austria. If the Monarchy were to realise any of the potential which south-eastern Europe offered for a great power role, including the possibility of territorial expansion, then this could only be done in agreement with Russia.

In the event, the Beust initiative came to nothing, because both France and Britain,
as signatory powers, flatly vetoed the idea. Yet the thinking behind it shows the essential pragmatism of Beust’s diplomacy. The Habsburg Monarchy needed friends in Europe. It did not necessarily need military alliances, since it had no interest, in its weakened state, in provoking a war. Thus the suggestion of the Near East, as a field where France and Austria could work together, was a reasonable one. By the same token Russia, because of its community of interest with the Slavs, could never be an entirely reliable alliance partner, nor did Beust envisage it as such. Yet there existed a sufficient conservative identity of interests between Vienna and St. Petersburg for a loose working partnership in the Balkans to be a possibility. Beust, in short, was from the start a proponent of the traditional Habsburg policy of spheres of interest in south-eastern Europe, as the likeliest means of averting conflict between Austria and Russia.

8: Attitudes in Vienna towards Bosnia

Beust’s policy on one other matter was also affected by a traditional, cabinet-style outlook. This was the Bosnian question. Here Austrian policy had always been divided, with a minority opinion opposed to the Mettemich principle of preserving the status quo in the Balkans at all costs. The minority group, which included Field Marshal Radetzky and the internuncio ( ambassador) in Constantinople from 1855 to 1871, Baron Anton von Prokesch-Osten, argued that the Monarchy should pursue a more forceful line in south-eastern Europe if it wanted to counter Russian influence. Their advocacy of territorial expansion was strategic: the Monarchy’s long strip of Croatian and Dalmatian territory was regarded as militarily untenable, as long as its hinterland, Bosnia-Hercegovina, was in foreign hands.

What gave these annexationist projects an additional importance, after 1848, was the presence of Francis Joseph on the throne. The fact that the young Emperor habitually surrounded himself with military advisers undoubtedly gave him his subsequent interest in this particular idea. His belief in its feasibility can only have been enhanced, in the early 1850’s, by the fact that most of his conservative advisers, such as the foreign minister, Buol, the ambassador to Paris, Hübner, and the interior minister, Bach, were not only anti-Russian but firm advocates of Austria’s expansion into the Balkans. The territorial losses of 1859 and 1866 only confirmed Francis Joseph’s inclination to look
upon Bosnia as a field for compensation. In February 1861, foreign minister Rechberg reemphasised this aspect of Austria's eastern policy:

...es sei von höchster Dringlichkeit, durch Zufriedenstellung der slawischen Bevölkerung in Dalmatien für die christliche Bevölkerung dieser Hinterländer einen Anziehungspunkt zu bilden, der die Verwirklichung der alten Politik Österreichs in bezug auf diesen Teil des Orients ermögliche und erleichtere.21

Francis Joseph may not have believed annexation of Bosnia was an urgent necessity, but there can be little doubt that he would welcome annexation if it should prove politically practicable.

Beust's own policy with regard to Bosnia was flexible, and the fact that it could be so proves that the Emperor, too, was not committed to any one option. Beust's views differed from the military, in that he was not of the opinion that the Monarchy needed Bosnia for its own sake; the military usefulness of having the provinces could not justify upsetting the precarious status quo in the Balkans. On the other hand, on no account could the Monarchy tolerate an occupation of Bosnia by Serbia. What had hitherto been a relatively weak principality would double in size and resources, and could with time pose a real threat to the Monarchy.

The strength of Beust's opinion in this matter is worth considering, in view of subsequent claims, from Wertheimer on, that Beust and Andrássy were essentially in agreement on the Bosnian question, or that Beust had no clear-cut ideas on eastern policy and weakly followed Andrássy's lead.22 The subject was given renewed life in the fall of 1866, when a French memorandum openly suggested that the Monarchy should pursue its destiny in eastern Europe.23

Not surprisingly, this document, communicated to all the chancelleries of Europe, gave the South Slav principalities of Serbia and Montenegro the impression that an Austrian move in the Balkans was imminent. In October 1866 the French consul in Belgrade reported that to the Serbian government this seemed "une invitation à l'Autriche de s'emparer de provinces appartenant à la Turquie, et la Bosnie et l'Herzégovine ont paru surtout menacées."24 Serbian suspicions were just as strong by January 1867, when French as well as Austrian representatives reported a sudden build-
Beust's principal reason for espousing the cession of the fortresses to Serbia was to forestall an explosion in the European provinces of Turkey and the consequent disturbance of the status quo in the Near East, which would lead to unwelcome Russian interference and an active Austro-Russian clash of interests. Allied to these calculations, however, was the additional hope that, if the Monarchy helped procure a settlement of the fortress question, Serbia's sensitivities on the subject of Bosnia might be blunted, if not ignored. For in the matter of Bosnia Beust had no intention whatsoever of yielding to Serbian sensitivities.

Beust believed that, even if Serbia did win cession of the fortresses, such a settlement would probably have only a provisional value for the Serbian government. On the other hand, he had indications in December 1866 that Prince Michael might pursue a more moderate policy if he could point to tangible success in the fortress question.

With this, Beust contended, the Serbian government would have to be content; there could be no question of the Monarchy tolerating Serbian expansion into Bosnia. As the French ambassador to Vienna reported on 2 March 1867,

_M. de Beust m'a fait observer que l'indépendence de la Bosnie et de l'Herzégo-vine ne pouvait être que le prélude de leur accession ou de leur annexion à la Serbie.... Or cet accroissement de la Serbie constituait pour l'Autriche un danger réel, et il était facile de prévoir qu'un État serbe ainsi grandit de deux provinces importantes ne tarderait pas à appeler dans son orbite la Dalmatie, les Serbes autrichiens de la frontière compris dans les cercles militaires, et la Slavonie. L'Autriche avait trop perdu jusqu'à ce jour pour qu'il lui fût possible désormais de laisser s'établir dans son voisinage une cause de danger permanent, et un ordre de choses qui devait fatalement et nécessairement aboutir pour elle à de nouveaux conflits ou à de nouveaux sacrifices. La Bosnie de l'Herzégovine devaient donc ou rester à la Turquie ou appartenir à l'Autriche._

Furthermore, Beust concluded, "si la Bosnie et l'Herzégovine cessaient d'appartenir à la Porte, l'Autriche prendrait aussitôt les mesures militaires nécessaires pour que ces
provinces ne puissent pas appartenir à un autre."

The extraordinary thing about the constitutional settlement being reached within the Monarchy, however, was that even as Beust stated the Balkan policy of the dynasty in such uncompromising fashion, his efforts were being undermined by the dynasty's new partner in foreign policy, the Hungarian government. Even before the Ausgleich was concluded, contacts between Serbia and Hungary's political leaders were tending in a quite different direction from that conceived in the Austrian foreign ministry.

9: Hungarian Attitudes towards Russia and Serbia

The way in which the Hungarian political elite handled the nationalities question acquired a wider significance once Hungary achieved self-government. Relations between the Magyars and the other nationalities threatened to deteriorate, as the realisation sank in that the Monarchy and the Hungarians had done a deal at the expense of the Hungarian nationalities. After 1867, as far as the nationalities were concerned, there was no longer anyone else to blame for their problems but the Hungarian government. For the latter it became more than ever important to acquire an influence over those aspects of foreign policy, in particular relations with Serbia and Roumania, which might affect nationality issues within the Kingdom of Hungary.

The new leader of the Deákists, in 1867, shared the attitudes towards nationality issues of his senior colleagues, Deák and Eötvös; he also brought to the job an interest in foreign policy which was something unusual in Hungarian politics. Andrásy was a good example of the liberal aristocrat: cosmopolitan, politically adroit, genuinely broad-minded in matters of religion, a sincere, even pedantic champion of the Rechtsstaat, who nevertheless despised what he termed "the ideal" in politics and vaunted his sense of the art of the possible.

By 1867, Andrásy was more than ever obsessed with the danger to Hungary from Pan-Slavism; and considered it vital for Hungary to be part of a great power which could resist this pressure. The installation of constitutional government in both halves of the Monarchy, coupled with the means of influencing foreign policy, were essential prerequisites for Hungarian security. Once in place, the 1867 settlement would enable Austria to fulfil its mission as "a bulwark against Russia."
The sheer strength of Andrásy's preoccupation with the threat of Russia and Pan-Slavism is hard to ignore. Throughout the period in which he was minister president he made this clear to all and sundry. In August 1868 Andrásy considered "a triumphant war necessary for the empire; we cannot wage this war against anyone but Russia." Later that year he expressed his conviction that an active German policy was futile, "when we are threatened in the East." In April 1869, he wanted "to turn the Empire's whole attention towards the East." The Italian embassy in Vienna, when the Franco-Prussian War began, reported Andrassy's fear of Russia's "maneggi segreto presso le popolazioni slave del Danubio", and that the Monarchy faced dying "come lo scorpione circondato di carboni accesi". That fall, Italy's consul in Pest recorded Andrásy's reaction to the Russian renunciation of the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris. Andrásy, the consul said, considered Serbia "le foyer de vastes et formidables intrigues"; but "Ce qui m'a paru impressionner le plus mon interlocuteur c'est la crainte de la Russie." Ten days later, the Italian summed up the mood of both Andrásy and his countrymen:

...la Russia fu sempre, ed è, l'incubo, lo spauracchio degli Ungheresi. Essi ... temono che la Russia, appoggiandosi alle popolazioni slave che si trovano in Ungheria, tenda ad annientare la nazionalità magiara e passar loro sul corpo per impadronirsi della Servia e della Croazia ed assicurarsi il dominio del Danubio.

A year later, the Prussian consul commented of the new foreign minister, "Russia is on his mind day and night."

It is not difficult to see how this Russophobia shaped Andrásy's attempts to influence Habsburg foreign policy. In the Balkans, Andrásy began his minister presidency determined somehow to bind Serbia to the Monarchy, or at least to Hungary, and thus neutralise the threat he considered it to pose.

Andrássy and the Deákists represented mainstream opinion as far as the treatment of Hungary's nationalities was concerned. They rejected the idea of a Danubian confederation, which Kossuth eventually accepted in exile. The importance of schemes for confederation was rather in the reactions they elicited. The news of Kossuth's conversion in 1862 seems to have convinced Deák of the need to make the
final concessions required to reach a compromise with the Monarchy. More intangible is the legacy such projects seem to have left in the minds of the younger generation: as late as 1868 Kállay could refer to confederation as "the only possibility for us and for the Christian nations in Turkey". In view of Kállay's subsequent career it can only be assumed that his conception of confederation involved an unequivocal Hungarian, or rather Austro-Hungarian hegemony. This was also the position of Zsigmond Kemény, a leading Deákist who, in a pamphlet of 1851, recommended the Monarchy's abandonment of its pretensions in Italy and Germany. Strengthened by accommodation with Hungary, Kemény argued, the Monarchy had to pursue outright hegemony in south-eastern Europe. This would fulfil the dual function of frustrating South Slav and Roumanian nationalism, and preventing Russian domination of the Balkans.

Kemény appears to have been unique in putting forward these ideas so early, and so frankly. Virtually all Hungarian politicians took it for granted that Balkan nationalism constituted a threat to Hungary and the Monarchy, and that Russian hegemony in the Balkans must somehow be prevented. Yet even Andrássy, at the outset of the Dualist era, still thought that these goals could be reached without the territorial involvement Kemény implied was necessary. Austria-Hungary's mission was certainly in the East, but its security there could be assured by the creation of client states, by a possible territorial douceur to one of these states, Serbia, in the shape of Bosnia, and by political and economic domination of the area. It is a measure of the distance Andrássy had travelled that, by 1875, he was disposed to accept the Kemény thesis in its entirety. In this process of conversion Kállay, in Belgrade, played a vital role.

10: The Croats, the Military Border and Bosnia

Hungary's Croats and Serbs were naturally of importance in the context of relations between the Habsburg Monarchy and Serbia. The Croats in particular were a potential disruptive element since, in addition to the ethnic affinity between Croat and Serb, their open disaffection from both Vienna and Pest seemed to make them natural allies of Serbia.

In fact the reverse was the case after 1867. The Ausgleich, and the Croat-Hungarian
compromise or *Nagodba* which sprang from it the next year, put the Hungarians between Croatia and the dynasty in a way that had not been possible before. Croatia retained its own administration and *Sabor*, or diet, but control of the provincial executive was firmly in the hands of the Hungarian government. With the exception of the so-called Unionists, whose manufactured majority in the Sabor ensured the passage of the *Nagodba*, virtually all shades of political opinion in Croatia rejected this state of affairs.

The most extreme of the political movements which existed in Croatia was the Party of Rights, which was not only anti-dynastic and anti-Hungarian, but also virulently anti-Serb, claiming that the Serbs were nothing more than degenerate Croats who had embraced Orthodoxy. More complex was the movement known as 'Yugoslavism'. Largely the inspirations of Franjo Rački, with the Bishop of Đakovo, Josip Juri Strossmayer, acting as political standard bearer, Yugoslavism aimed at an independent South Slav state, and at its most ambitious called for the union of all South Slavs, from the Slovenes in the north to the Bulgars in the south. It sought to bridge the vast differences which existed, and saw Croatia merely as part of a larger, federal state.

In the context of the 1860's, Yugoslavism had little chance of practical realisation. Those of its advocates, like Strossmayer, who hoped to achieve anything in the shorter term joined the Croatian National Party. The National Party had its origin in the opposition to the *Nagodba*, and continued to press for greater substantive Croatian autonomy as well as the union of Dalmatia, which was still administered from Vienna, with the main body of Croatia-Slavonia. In doing so, however, the National Party never entirely shut the door on good relations with either the Hungarian government or the imperial authorities in Vienna. By the same token its leaders showed considerable interest, in the period immediately preceding the *Ausgleich*, in cultivating links with Serbia. Strossmayer, in particular, was of the opinion that the creation of any form of South Slav state inevitably involved the use of force, and that the role of 'Piedmont' for the South Slavs could only be filled by Serbia.

All these visions of Serbo-Croat cooperation, however, ignored a fundamental reality. This was the enduring antagonism which historically divided the South Slav
world. Moreover, the Serbo-Croat antagonism was reflected in two questions which both the Habsburg Monarchy and the new Hungarian government knew all too well how to exploit. One was the status of the Military Border in Croatia and southern Hungary. The other was the Bosnian question.

The Border was divided into territorially based regiments, the so-called Grenzer, and was populated by both Croats and Serbs. Its dissolution was one of the principal objectives of the Andrassy government, and was also desired by Croat nationalists, since the territories in question, apart from those in southern Hungary, would augment Croatia-Slavonia.

In their attitude towards the substantial Serb minority within the Border, however, some Croat leaders betrayed an insensitivity that played right into the hands of successive Hungarian governments. In the years immediately after the Ausgleich, with dissolution clearly on the agenda in Budapest, the general mood among the Serb Grenzer was one of disillusionment and resentment that the Emperor should have handed them over in this fashion to a Croat administration in Zagreb. The whole issue was one that naturally divided Croats from Serbs.43

Bosnia-Hercegovina was an even more divisive issue. Both Croats and Serbs laid claim to these Turkish provinces; each side was represented there by a sizeable minority; and each side ignored the fact that there was also a large Bosnian Muslim population.44 There was, however, no easy way of disentangling these groups from one another for the purpose of territorial division; yet neither Croat nor Serb nationalists would admit of any concession.45 The exception in this respect was Strossmayer, who reasoned that, if Serbia were to act as the Piedmont of the South Slavs, it made little sense for the rest of the South Slav world to dispute its claim to Bosnia. In the summer of 1866, with the agreement of his principal associates in the National Party, Strossmayer assured Prince Michael of his commitment to "common action between the Triune Kingdom [Croatia] and Serbia for the foundation of a Yugoslav state independent of both Austria and Turkey."46 The Bishop even offered to serve Michael as a minister in such a state.

The negotiations between Strossmayer and Garašanin which resulted got as far as a
draft agreement, in March 1867, on a "Programme of Yugoslav Policy". This made clear that the initial purpose of Serbo-Croat cooperation was to free the South Slavs still under direct Turkish rule, but ultimately to prepare the ground "for the unification of all Yugoslav peoples [plemena] in a single federal state". Liberation was to be pursued gradually as circumstances permitted, but at all times Belgrade and Zagreb would be the twin "poles" (stožera) of the movement, and complete agreement between them was essential.

"The Croatian and the Serbian nationality is one, Yugoslav." A rising in Bosnia would be instigated jointly by the Croats and Serbia in the summer of 1867, but the latter would not openly intervene for fear of great power intervention, especially by Austria. Instead, the insurgents would form a provisional government, call an assembly, and demand administration by Serbia under the suzerainty of the Sultan.

There could be little doubt that the leadership of the National Party, at this point, were prepared to concede Bosnia to Serbia, in the expectation that the unification of all South Slav lands would follow. The Sabor adopted a resolution, that month, that "the Triune Kingdom recognises the Serbian nation, which exists within it as a nation identical with and enjoying the same rights as the Croatian nation."

In reality this accord was far more fragile than its authors suspected. The single most important reason for this was the fact that Prince Michael was on the verge of changing his entire strategy in the Balkans and in particular with regard to Bosnia. The political will to work with the Croats over Bosnia was fading.

It should also be stressed, however, that the accord would probably have run into difficulties even if the Serbian government had not abandoned it. The leaders of the National Party were sincere in their goal of Serbo-Croat cooperation, but this goal was not shared by political opinion outside the Party. Even the National Party showed a certain nervousness at the idea of entrusting the Bosnian Croats to Serbia once it became apparent, in the course of 1867, that the Serbian government was seriously interested in doing a deal with the Hungarians. Andrásy's Bosnian initiative, when it came, was a classic case of divide and rule, because it exploited the mutual suspicions of Croats and Serbs.

11: The Hungarian Serbs
Among the Hungarian and Croatian Serbs, spread across the Military Border, Slavonia and southern Hungary, the Hungarian Serbs in particular had a prosperous middle class, which by 1867 had become the bearer of national consciousness in this part of the Monarchy. Their leaders were united in rejecting direct rule from either Vienna or Pest, and demanding some form of local autonomy. The Orthodox clergy, together with state employees and officers of the Military Border regiments, represented the conservative line, which placed its trust in accommodation with Vienna, based its claim to an autonomous Vojvodina on the ancient privileges of the Serbs. The liberal middle class and intellectuals, led by Svetozar Miletic, argued not only for a Serbian-controlled Vojvodina, but also for a redefinition of the Vojvodina itself to reduce the numbers of the other nationalities in it. Miletic's emphasis was less on historic rights and more on democratic self-government which, to be truly democratic, had to include self-government by all nationalities. The Vojvodina liberals were convinced that cooperation with the Hungarians, not the imperial government, offered better chances for the Serbs to attain their goal.\(^5\) In reality the majority of the Hungarian political leadership were opposed to autonomy within Hungary for any of the nationalities.\(^6\)

Miletic in February 1866 founded a newspaper, *Zastava* (The Standard), which rapidly became, in the words of one authority, "the most powerful voice of Serbian liberalism in the Balkans."\(^5\) He was assisted in his work by Vladimir Jovanovic, a leading liberal exile from the Principality of Serbia; and it was Jovanovic, with Miletic's backing, who was the driving force behind the foundation in August 1866 of the *Ujedinjena Srpska Omladina* or United Serbian Youth.\(^5\) This was more than just a student society. Jovanovic and Miletic specifically saw it as a broad-based cultural organisation for "every Serb who felt himself young in heart".\(^6\) In their view the political division of the Serbian nation between several separate states made it essential to have a society which would raise national consciousness; once this was done, political unification would inevitably follow.\(^6\)

Both *Zastava* and the *Omladina* brought the liberals among the Hungarian Serbs into conflict with Prince Michael's government in Serbia. Michael and the liberals were at
one over the need for an autonomous Vojvodina; they were even, until the *Ausgleich* disillusioned the Hungarian Serbs, united in wishing to cooperate with the Hungarians. But whatever its nationalist credentials, the Obrenović regime was not noted for its liberalism, and after the summer of 1866 there was another reason for bad blood. Prince Michael was reproached in all quarters of the South Slav world for not taking advantage of Austria's defeat to launch the great war of liberation on behalf of the Balkan Christians; and *Zastava* was among the bitterest of these critics. There was considerable injustice in this: Michael was only too aware that Serbia's real military potential was far less than its strength on paper would suggest. None of this, however, was known outside of Serbian government circles, and the problem was compounded by the events of 1867, when the Prince, at the very time the Hungarian government was abandoning its Serb minority, showed every sign of having done a deal with Budapest. The Vojvodina became, more than ever, the centre of agitation against the Serbian government.62

12: The Principality of Serbia

Serbia, in 1867, posed more of a theoretical threat to peace in the Balkans than a real one. It was small, about a thousand square kilometres, and would have fitted tidily into the Habsburg Monarchy a score of times. Its population still numbered only a million, the vast majority of whom made their living off the land in a country with virtually no modern infrastructure.63 Its official military strength was a sham, rather like the frog that inflates itself to twice its size to impress its enemies. Though autonomous, its Prince was still a vassal of the Sultan.

Yet the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires feared what Serbia might yet become. A greater Serbia would be a power to reckon with, particularly since it could only aggrandize at the expense of its neighbours to north and south. Even if its expansion were prevented, Serbia's importance from the strategic and communications point of view could only grow. Both the intended regulation of the Danube as an international waterway, and the pressure to complete a rail link between central Europe and Constantinople, made the powers all the more anxious to secure some influence over Serbia. The political and economic interests involved made Belgrade one of the
diplomatic listening posts of Europe.

The country's political institutions remained basically autocratic with a constitutional gloss. In the 1860's the practice of government under the Obrenovići was laid down by a number of organic laws passed by the Skupština, or national assembly, at the behest of Prince Miloš and his son Michael. By these, effective power resided solely with the Prince and the executive agents of his power, the ministers. The Prince could select whom he pleased as his ministers, and did so. Each minister, moreover, was responsible directly to the Prince, not the minister president, who was more a coordinator of ministerial activity than a prime minister in the modern sense. Civil servants owed their jobs entirely to the favour of the Prince, and substantial inroads were made on local self-government by giving the state a greater say in the election of local officials.

The Skupština remained the one relatively unfettered institution in Serbia, because it was more an open debating society than a genuine parliament with effective control of the executive. As a purely consultative assembly it could neither initiate legislation nor amend it. The franchise amounted to universal adult male suffrage, but since the ballot was open the government was free to use corruption and intimidation at elections. Yet the Skupština could still produce an opposition, as in 1867 when thirty deputies opposed to the government were returned. Their importance lay not in what they could do, but in their freedom, once elected, to speak against the government. The single most powerful domestic constraint on the Prince was the fear of an upsurge of popular opinion against him. In times of national emergency the Skupština was the one obvious channel for this, and the Serbian government ignored it at its peril. Both Michael, and the Regency which followed him, were acutely conscious of the need for national legitimacy, and this continued to shape their foreign policy in particular.

13: Serbo-Hungarian Relations 1861-66

The Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich began within months to exert an influence over Serbian foreign policy which was, as always, heavily constrained by the relations of the great powers to one another. In 1867 the European scene was already dominated by the Franco-Prussian antagonism, and a natural result of this was that France began
seriously to explore the possibility of alliance with Austria. In the Balkans the
insurrection in Crete rumbled on, raising tension among all the other Balkan Christians.
Yet for Serbia the decisive factor was the arrival of a Hungarian government on the
scene.

Prince Michael was personally more inclined than most of his countrymen to
respond favourably to Hungarian overtures. He had spent most of his exile in either
Hungary or Vienna, had married a Hungarian countess, and was the owner of an estate
in northern Hungary. Unlike his father, Michael had absorbed much of the culture and
outlook of a westernised central European aristocrat.^^

There was more to this, however, than personal sentiment. In 1861 and 1866
Michael's government attempted to help improve relations between the Hungarian
leadership and Hungary's Serbs. Michael saw the Habsburg Monarchy as the single
most steadfast and dangerous opponent of his plans for the liberation of the Balkan
Christians and the formation of a greater Serbia. It was fundamental to his conception
of things that, in this struggle against Austrian interference, the Hungarians were the
natural allies of the Serbs. The two peoples, in his opinion, had a mutual interest,
within the Monarchy, in working together to counteract the centralising tendencies of
Vienna.^^

In March 1861, talks in Pest between representatives of the Serbian government and
the leading Deákists made clear enough the two sides were poles apart. "The Serbs
brought up the question of the Vojvodina restoration," recalled Jovan Ristić in his
memories, "but the Hungarians at once declared that there could be no talk of 'the state
within the state'."^^ This was not, however, the end of the story. The Serbian judge,
Nikola Krstić, suggested to the government that he go to Pest and try again to bridge
the gap.^^ Krstić was to remain in Pest until August 1861, and had a number of
remarkable exchanges with the Hungarian leaders.

On 25 April he was warmly received by Eötvös who, he found, feared the Serbs'
secession, and also that "then the Vlachs [Roumanians], Slovaks and Ruthenes...will all
demand territory".^^ This response was representative of most of Krstić's subsequent
contacts with the Hungarians, both in its willingness to seek some form of
accommodation, and in its determination to preserve the unity of the Hungarian state. Deák, in June, said that it was "not possible to concede the political and territorial dismemberment of the country or support the demand to create even now a federal state." At the root of the Hungarians' response, Krstić felt, was their "terror of Panslavism". Most susceptible to this vision was Andrássy, whom Krstić met early in July:

Eötvös and Szálay have scared this man, representing to him the danger which threatens the Hungarians if they satisfy all the nationalities. He is against regrouping the counties according to nationality, and wants to put off the Serbian question to some other time....

Krstić thought Andrássy "an honourable man", but "his arguments are not strong enough".

In 1866, Austria's defeat at Sadowa raised anew the possibility of the Monarchy's disintegration. Prince Michael felt that Sadowa offered an opportunity to explore once more the idea of Serbo-Hungarian cooperation, and he sent Krstić back, this time with a letter to László Hunyadi, the Prince's brother-in-law, proposing a "pact" between Serbia and Hungary. Krstić's detailed report on the Hungarian response contains some radical suggestions which, if sincere, throw a strange light on Andrássy's conception of Hungary's future role in the Monarchy.

By this time it was clear that a major restructuring of the Habsburg Monarchy was imminent. An autonomous Hungarian government was in the offing, and Andrássy was certain to lead it. Prince Michael, Hunyadi told Krstić, could rest assured that in this case the interests of Hungary's Serbs would be safeguarded. As for Serbia itself, a Hungarian government would assist it in gaining the cession of the Turkish-held fortresses, by blocking the flow of supplies from Austrian territory for the Turkish garrisons. In return, Serbia would be expected to maintain an army brigade on the Austro-Serbian frontier, ready to march into Hungary should the Hungarian government require assistance. Above all, there must be "an alliance for mutual defence and mutual offence", formally concluded between the two governments.

Even today it is difficult to know how seriously to take these proposals. Jakšić and Vučković flatly deny the Hungarians' sincerity. Whatever the emerging constitutional
settlement, they observe, the Hungarian government would still not be empowered to conclude treaties and conduct a foreign policy. They suggest the entire incident was a ruse to keep Serbia from starting any trouble in the Balkans while the Dualist settlement was being agreed upon.78

Yet it is conceivable that Andrassy genuinely believed an alliance was practicable. Andrâssy was not noted for his consistency, and in 1866 he may have ignored the necessary limitations which the Dualist settlement would impose on any Hungarian government.79 In fact the subsequent history of relations with Serbia demonstrates amply that, at least as Hungarian minister president, Andrássy continued to behave as if Hungary could pursue its own foreign policy. What is beyond doubt is the Hungarian leadership's conviction that the Serbian connection would be an invaluable means of putting the pressure on Vienna. Hunyadi made it clear to Krstić that "we [the Hungarians] have to take care that Austria is preserved as a great state."80 But at the same time it was essential that Francis Joseph be shown the limitations of his power. "The Hungarian statesmen have in mind the idea of Dualism for present-day Austria, and by this treaty with Serbia they would show in which direction it was necessary to conduct the policy which affects Hungary."81 If the affair was kept secret until the treaty was concluded Andrássy could present Vienna with a "'Fait accompli'".83

14: The Krstić Mission of 1867

True to his word, Andrássy had no sooner been appointed minister president than he invited Prince Michael, through Hunyadi, to send an emissary to Pest. This, Hunyadi intimated, would be to Serbia's advantage, "because now the Hungarians are going to have an influence even on Austria's foreign policy."83 Garašanin, briefing Krstić for his third foray into Hungary, was suspicious. He wanted Krstić to impress two things on Andrássy. Firstly, "the Hungarians must make their peace with the Serbs and Croats...."84 Secondly, the thing Serbia and Hungary had most in common was that they were threatened not only by the Russians but by the Germans.85

It is important to bear in mind the background to Krstić's arrival in Pest on 28 February. The winter of 1866-67 had been dominated, as far as Serbia was concerned, by the issue of the fortresses, and by the first signs of a breakthrough in Michael's plans
for a Balkan alliance. The time, at least to Garašanin, seemed increasingly to favour action.

Beust, however, lost no time in making clear to the Serbian government that under no circumstances would the Monarchy tolerate Serbia's presence in Bosnia. At the same time, he supported Serbia's request that the Turks evacuate the last of their troops from Serbian soil, and the need for reform in the Ottoman Empire.

This is where the role of the new Hungarian government becomes a matter for debate. What precisely, at the very moment Beust was reining in the Serbian government, was Andrassy up to with his invitation to Prince Michael? Was he trying to exert some not so subtle pressure on Vienna, by demonstrating Hungary's influence in Belgrade? Was he acting in collusion with Beust, in a Macchiavellian bid to distract Serbia from its Balkan programme? Or was he playing a game of his own, exploring the relationship with Serbia in the hope of ameliorating the situation inside Hungary, by securing Serbia's non-involvement with Hungary's South Slavs, and at the same time tying Serbia somehow to Hungary's side and negating Russian influence? The evidence suggests the third of these explanations.

Hunyadi, who first saw Krstić, told him that "Andrássy wants to conclude a treaty with Serbia", but was not forthcoming about the details. If Austria disintegrated, said Hunyadi, it would be necessary "to found a new state", in which the interests of both Serbia and Hungary would be safeguarded. The interview with Andrássy himself was even more peculiar. Krstić was bluntly asked, "What were Serbia's intentions and what was to be done with us?" He was told that Andrássy now had the personal confidence of the Emperor, and "was in a position to effect something with Beust via the Emperor himself." Krstić replied that Serbia's only goals were the evacuation of the fortresses, and the liberation of the Serbs under direct Ottoman rule. Andrássy "recognised the reasonableness and justification of the Serbian demands", but held that "it would be a bad thing if Serbia ... provoked by force a war over this matter." He then warmed to his favourite theme:

'... both we and you have to guard against one and the same danger, ... from Russia. In order to block Russia's path, ... there must be a strong state in the middle of Europe. That
state is ourselves – Hungary.... Hungary ... must be like a wall between Serbia and the Serbian lands and Russia, on the one hand, and the Germans, on the other.90

Andrássy made a couple of promises, which are crucial to an understanding of how relations developed in the period between the Ausgleich and 1871. They also provide a fairly clear idea of what Andrássy was trying to do. The first concerned the Monarchy's position vis-à-vis Bosnia:

Andrássy said to me...that Serbia had nothing to fear from any other quarter than Russia. ... the former Austria ... might perhaps even have had the wish to annex lands beyond the Danube.... But for Austria to do anything in this direction, apart from or without Hungary, to annex these lands, was not to be thought of, nor would Hungary permit it.91

Krstić elicited the second promise, when he ventured the opinion that the only way to avert an uprising of the Balkan Christians would be to entrust the administration of Bosnia, the Hercegovina and Old Serbia to Prince Michael. The Sultan would continue as suzerain, and as such would receive tribute; but otherwise Serbian national aspirations would be satisfied. "Andrássy approved this, remarking that ... Turkey cannot last, but ... that it would be well to arrange this by peaceful means."92

Krstić received the impression that Andrássy's overriding interest in sounding the Serbian government in this way was his fear of a Serbo-Turkish war, and the repercussions this would have in Hungary. But there was something else that proved Andrássy was acting on his own initiative and not in concert with Beust. This was the definite offer of assistance in securing the administration of Bosnia-Hercegovina for Serbia, coupled with a denial of the Monarchy's own interest in these provinces. As we have seen, this flew in the face of Beust's clearly expressed policy opposing a Serbian takeover, and moreover ignored the influential voices in Vienna which were anything but disinterested in Bosnia. More important, by dangling the Bosnian carrot before the Serbs' eyes Andrássy was opening a Pandora's box of nationalist aspirations, one that neither he nor his successors as foreign minister ever succeeded entirely in shutting again. For the carrot worked, in the short term: it induced Prince Michael virtually to abandon his Balkan programme in the course of 1867, and it kept him and the Regency which succeeded him on a pro-Hungarian course for several years. At the end of this
period, however, the scales fell from the Serbians' eyes, and the resulting bitterness remained the dominant note in Serbo-Hungarian relations from then on. By then Andrásy had completely reversed his policy concerning Bosnia; but the Monarchy was to pay dearly for the thoughtlessness with which, as Hungarian minister president, he had made his first foray into the realm of foreign policy.

15: Serbia, the Powers and the Talks at Salzburg

The immediate consequences, though, were gratifying. Prince Michael was already conscious of being torn between two policies. He could see the advantages of heeding Beust's advice, which would secure cession of the fortresses, at least, without a shot being fired. He could also see the disadvantage in pursuing an aggressive policy which might lose Serbia everything. Now the Hungarian government, in seeming contradiction to Vienna, held out the possibility of acquiring Bosnia. It must have seemed to Michael too good an opportunity to leave unexplored.

There were other inducements to quietism. At the beginning of March 1867, in response to the rumours about Serbian designs on Bosnia, the Austrian government ordered the concentration of troops along its southern frontier. Beust followed this up with a more diplomatic warning, and in this he was careful to involve the new Hungarian government. In agreement with Andrásy, he sent another personal friend of Michael, Count Edmund Zichy, to Belgrade in March with a letter from Francis Joseph. The idea was to warn Michael against any disturbance of the status quo, but to do so in a way that would show him that the Monarchy was not otherwise ill-disposed to him.93

Michael was ready to respond to these overtures; but the final warning came from outside, and may have been in the end the most convincing. None of the great powers was prepared to countenance Serbia's expansion into Bosnia, not even Russia. The most decisive put-down, however, came from Paris: as far as the French government was concerned, Serbia had no business in Bosnia, and the Habsburg Monarchy had every business in making sure things stayed that way.94

The reason for this veiled threat lay in the diplomatic manoeuvring of the powers in 1867, the principal feature of which was France's search for partners against Prussia. Napoleon III was perfectly prepared not to oppose the Monarchy's occupation of
Bosnia, in return for a firm commitment to France. Beust, however, argued in favour of an alliance directed against Russia. It was to explore this counter-proposal that Francis Joseph and Napoleon, attended by their foreign ministers, met at Salzburg between 18-23 August 1867.\textsuperscript{95}

As a chapter in the story of Franco-Austrian alliance negotiations, Salzburg was a failure: the only formal result of the talks was an anodyne protocol on the Eastern Question, in which both states agreed to work for the preservation of the status quo.\textsuperscript{96} In view of what had gone before, however, it is unlikely that Napoleon III did not raise the subject of Bosnia again, if only to make it clear that, should circumstances one day permit it, the French government would not object to the Monarchy's presence there. Serbia, too, was undoubtedly on the agenda, since the summer had seen a steady trickle of reports from the Balkans about the Serbian armaments programme, the activities of the Bulgarian revolutionary committees, and Russia's presumed role in directing preparations for revolt.\textsuperscript{97} As Beust put it in a memorandum for Francis Joseph, "The most imminent danger to Austria threatens from Russia...."\textsuperscript{98}

Andrásy also attended the talks in Salzburg. There is little record of his contribution, but it would have been natural for him to express his opinion on the subject of Serbia and Bosnia. In view of his statements subsequently, this opinion can only have been one hostile to an annexation of Bosnia, and in favour of winning Serbia away from its supposed thralldom to Russia.\textsuperscript{99} What is really at issue, as far as Salzburg is concerned, is just how far, if at all, Andrásy was in agreement with Beust and Francis Joseph for what he did next. For Andrásy went from Salzburg direct to visit Prince Michael Obrenović at the latter's country estate of Ivánka in northern Hungary, arriving there on 24 or 25 August.

16: The Meeting at Ivánka

The literature on what happened at Ivánka is contradictory, depending on who had access to which sources.\textsuperscript{100} Basically Andrásy's purpose was to discuss with Michael face to face the project floated, in March 1867, of Serbian cooperation with Hungary in return for a helping hand over Bosnia. The documentary evidence for this, however, is problematical, since neither of the two participants left any written account of their
meeting. The accounts which do survive are all second hand, and historians have been divided ever since as to what they signify.

The first record we have is a memorandum begun, but not completed, by Garašanin in December 1867, after his dismissal by Michael. To this we owe most of the circumstances surrounding the meeting: that Andrásy arrived direct from Salzburg; that he was closeted for five hours with the Prince and left immediately after dinner to return, not to Pest, but to Vienna; that Garašanin was excluded from the conversations entirely, though a guest at Ivánka throughout Michael's stay there.

Unfortunately Garašanin stopped short of recording whatever he might have learned subsequently of what was actually discussed. He knew that some inducement had been offered Michael, the proofs of which were Michael's change of course and Garašanin's own fall from power. He also reiterated his firm conviction that

Hungary will never be a sincere ally of Serbia. No matter what promises she makes to Serbia, and no matter what dazzling prospects she holds before her eyes, all that must never be believed.

But beyond these general fulminations all Garašanin could add was the surmise that Andrásy must have concerted his *démarche* with Beust at Salzburg, "not to mention Napoleon", otherwise he would not have gone back to Vienna upon leaving Ivánka.

Subsequent evidence comes from a letter to Prince Michael from László Hunyadi in the spring of 1868. The Prince's brother-in-law sent him a geographical description of Bosnia, since

sollten wir einmal ernstliche Pourparlers über diese Provinzen haben, so ist es gut, wenigstens gute und gleiche Landkarten davon zu haben, wo man eine eventuelle Theilung leicht arangieren kann.

Much more explicit is a lengthy report to the Serbian government in July 1868 by Colonel Orešković, who was sent to confer with Andrásy by Prince Michael but only finished the talks after the Prince's assassination. According to Orešković, Andrásy told him that an uprising in Turkey could only be dangerous if Serbia helped it, but Serbia will not help it because the Serbian government will not allow this, especially the Prince, who told him in a
conversation – which he had with him last year – that it would by no means permit Serbia to get involved in a war...\(^{107}\)

In return, Andrásy at least claimed that he favoured a Serbian takeover of Bosnia, despite the "strong military party" in Vienna which clamoured for the provinces on Austria's behalf. Orešković quoted him as saying "we have too many Slavs in Hungary.... I would prefer you to take Bosnia and the Hercegovina than for them to be annexed by us."\(^{108}\) And again:

...take Bosnia and the Hercegovina; we won't intervene, and we won't allow anyone else to intervene. ... If Russia gets involved in the least bit, you know that all Europe will be against you....\(^{109}\)

Much later, the picture was complicated by Jovan Ristić and Milan Piroćanac. Ristić claimed that Michael had often discussed with him his talks with Andrásy at Ivánka. The latter had apparently given Michael an account of Salzburg, in particular of how he, Andrásy, had opposed Napoleon III's suggestion that the Monarchy occupy Bosnia. This was the source for Andrásy's famous statement that "The Hungarian ship is so full that it would only need one more weight to sink it."\(^{110}\) Andrásy had also warned Michael of the dangers of Russian "Panslavist" policy, and complained of the anti-Hungarian attitude of leading Serbians like Garašanin. But Ristić denied that Michael had ever talked about being offered Bosnia. All Andrásy wanted, Ristić believed, was for Serbia to avoid stirring up the Hungarian Serbs.\(^{111}\)

In 1867 Piroćanac worked closely with Garašanin. He too regarded Andrásy's appearance at Ivánka as "sufficient proof that the Emperors, at their [Salzburg] meeting, had turned their attention seriously to the situation in the East."\(^{112}\) It was essential for the Monarchy to cover its back in the event of European war, hence the Andrásy mission. And Piroćanac was in no doubt that "Prince Michael must have been promised at Ivánka that France and Austria, in the event of the victory of French arms, would really help him to acquire Bosnia and the Hercegovina."\(^{113}\) Piroćanac' most interesting detail was the assertion that Michael could never really have believed in these promises, coming as they did from such a quarter, and in such a way; he therefore can have committed himself to nothing at Ivánka.\(^{114}\)

There are practical objections to virtually all these accounts of Ivánka. It seems
easiest to dismiss Ristić's belief that no offer of Bosnia was ever made: the evidence for the existence of such an offer, in the Hunyadi and Orešković documents, is hard to ignore, and a similar offer had been made to Krstić in March 1867.

Yet is is equally hard to believe that the Austrian chancellor, let alone the Emperor, can have been associated with such an offer, which contradicted both traditional Habsburg opposition to the expansion of Serbia, and the interest of the Emperor and the military in acquiring Bosnia themselves. Even for the Hungarians the offer only made sense on the basis of a close Serbian association with the Monarchy, which as it turns out is what Andrásy had in mind. And in any case the Hungarian government was not in a position to conclude foreign treaties of this nature on its own, and Andrásy was undoubtedly aware of this. For him to have assumed otherwise would have been remarkably naïve. So in view of the fact that the authorities in Vienna were unlikely to have supported such a project, and that the Hungarian government could not go ahead on its own, can the offer have been sincere, and how much did Beust and the Emperor know about it?

The second of these questions is the easier to answer, yet even here the evidence is inconclusive. Beust undoubtedly knew of such a plan: he even says in his memoirs that "it was communicated to me early in 1867", which would have been at the time of the Krstić mission. There is, however, no direct or indirect record of what either Beust or Francis Joseph thought of the project, or whether they were even consulted. Yet the sheer improbability of Andrásy travelling hot-foot from Salzburg, where he had been an important participant, to the private estate of the Prince of Serbia, and then back to Vienna, and all without discussing his actions at some point with the two figures responsible for foreign policy, has only to be stated to be dismissed.

Even so, Beust at least may well have known all about the plan without approving it and, even more important, without feeling he could do anything to stop Andrásy putting it to the test. Andrásy was a personable and eloquent politician and courtier: on more than one occasion, over the next four years of his minister presidency, he was quite capable of steering around Beust by confronting the Emperor personally. And Beust, for all the clarity of his thinking on the issues which faced the Monarchy, could
on occasion show irresolution and a reluctance to meet opponents head-on, particularly in the case of Andrássy. There is, however, another possibility: Andrássy could conceivably have undertaken the trip to Ivánka on his own, and then reported back to Vienna with another 'fait accompli'. He had, after all, talked of just such a coup back in 1866.

Much of the above must remain speculation. Historical opinion on the matter has tended to divide into three categories. Yugoslav historians have been apt to characterise the entire Bosnian scheme as an elaborate and unscrupulous hoax, concerted between Beust and Andrássy, whose sole object was to induce Serbia to cease its preparations for insurrection in the Balkans, thus destroying Serbia's moral leadership of the Balkan Christian nationalities and weaning it away from Russian influence.

Vasilije Krestić is one such voice, but cites no clear evidence for his conclusions. The evidence for collusion between Beust and Andrássy, for instance is entirely circumstantial, apart from the claim made by Garašanin in December 1867 that Andrássy's initiative was "arranged with Beust". On the basis of this alone Krestić concludes that "The Austrian chancellor [Beust] could not, in this regard, promise anything, because his position vis-à-vis Bosnia was well known....The Hungarian viewpoint in connection with Bosnia was not known." The only real evidence cited for this, however, consists, firstly, of a remark supposed to have been made by Andrássy to the Austrian ambassador to Constantinople, in the summer of 1867, that if the Serbs were to invade Bosnia, the Monarchy would be obliged to invade Serbia itself. The second proof Krestić offers of Hungarian perfidy is the guarded opinion of Benjámin Kállay in May 1868, who thought it "very probable that sooner or later Bosnia...will become part of our territory." Yet even Krestić includes Kállay's next sentence, which concludes "But the time for this has still not come." Both sources merely confirm what has long needed emphasis: that Hungarian politicians were not inexorably opposed, in all circumstances, to any extension whatsoever of the Monarchy's
A more subtle analysis is offered by the earlier work of Jakšić and Vučković. They rightly mention the constitutional constraints on Andrásy's actions, as well as the absolutely essential condition of the Bosnian offer, in his eyes: that Serbia could only be allowed to take over Bosnia if it were firmly in the Monarchy's orbit. Nevertheless, Jakšić and Vučković also conclude that Andrásy may well have been insincere; but all they adduce is a letter from him to Count Lajos Batthyány in 1849, in which the twenty-six year old Andrásy seemed to imply that promises made to the Slavs could be changed if Hungary emerged victorious.

A second, more restrained line of interpretation stresses the extent to which the idea of a Serbia closely bound to the Monarchy was at least feasible politically, and thus a sort of legitimation of the Bosnian scheme. Because of this it was something that Beust and Francis Joseph may have thought worth investigating, even if they had their doubts; and Andrásy was accordingly unleashed, on a sort of free-lance diplomatic mission. This appears to be the position reached by Heinrich Lutz, for whom Beust's position in the matter was "not clear". The result was "a separate Hungarian policy" which nevertheless, Lutz argues, remained semi-officially linked to that of the joint foreign ministry. As evidence for this Lutz cited not only the Bosnian scheme but the later proposal in 1870 of an alliance, which was cooked up in the joint ministerial council in order to "neutralise" Serbia during the Franco-Prussian War.

Neither of these interpretations, however, seems entirely to fit the facts. Instead, the argument intuited over fifty years ago by Slobodan Jovanović, on the basis of the Serbian archives and scanty memoir literature, and only recently buttressed by József Galántai's study of Hungarian archival material, makes more sense. Jovanović, in his revised study of Prince Michael's regime, correctly perceived the genuine duality of foreign policy in the Monarchy, from the moment the Andrásy government was appointed: "Beust was not the only maker of foreign policy." Certainly Andrásy, on the basis of the known documentation, held out the hope of acquiring Bosnia to Prince Michael. With little hard evidence to back up his interpretation, Jovanović nevertheless outlined what he thought must have been
Andrássy's motives:

According to his [Andrássy's] plans, Bosnia had to be the baksheesh which would be given Michael for sacrificing Hungarian Serbdom to the Magyars, and which would finally detach him from Russia and bind him to Austria.\textsuperscript{125}

It would have the additional advantages of driving a wedge between Serbia and Croatia, both of whom claimed Bosnia, and destroying Serbia's role as the Balkan Piedmont. This meant Russia, which relied primarily on Serbia as a stalking horse, in Andrássy's eyes, would be unable to reopen the Eastern Question.

Jovanović made some other observations which, in the light of subsequent developments, seem apt. Benjámin Kállay was selected by Andrássy as his candidate for Belgrade consul because, among other attributes, he was "Feuer und Flamme" (in Wertheimer's phrase) for the Bosnian scheme.\textsuperscript{126} Beust, by contrast, was most definitely against the scheme, as his official instructions to Kállay at the start of the latter's consulship, in April 1868, amply demonstrate.\textsuperscript{127} Andrássy, however, "probably hoped that, with time, his influence would triumph over Beust's." Thus, "alongside Beust's foreign policy, he conducted in secret his own, 'reconnoitring the terrain' for those of his plans which Beust didn't approve."\textsuperscript{128} And so it proved: what amounted to a Hungarian 'foreign policy' emerged, with Kállay as its exponent in Belgrade. For the moment, in view of Beust's obduracy, Andrássy could only ask Prince Michael to cooperate over the Hungarian Serbs, to keep the peace in the Balkans, and steer clear of the Russians. In return, Andrássy would do his level best to prevent any Austrian occupation of Bosnia.\textsuperscript{129}

Galántai's more recent research bears out this interpretation, despite taking up the story only after June 1868. He stresses the constitutional importance of Hungary in foreign policy after the Ausgleich.\textsuperscript{130} That Andrássy wished to influence policy is beyond doubt, and Galántai's summation of his motives and goals with regard to Serbia closely resembles Jovanović's. Andrássy's principal object was to bind Serbia to the Monarchy, since in his view the Ottoman Empire was doomed to collapse, and in this case it was essential for the Monarchy to get in ahead of Russia. "This was feasible, if Serbia received a large part of Bosnia and [the] Hercegovina with the Monarchy's
help.” Most important, Galántai makes clear that, despite the vague approval attributed to Beust by Baron Orczy in 1869, “Andrássy did not prosper with his plan as far as Beust was concerned.” If that was the case after June 1868, it is hard to believe the plan would have found any greater favour in 1867.

17: Prince Michael’s U-Turn

It remains, briefly, to record the effect the Hungarian minister president’s initiative had on Serbian foreign policy. For Andrássy’s scheme paid off, at least in the short term. Prince Michael, as Piroćanac maintains, may never have completely abandoned his previous strategy of Balkan alliance and insurrection. But the effect was the same as if he had.

Michael’s policy differences with Garašanin were already becoming obvious, and in November 1867 the latter was abruptly dismissed. His departure was perhaps the single most decisive signal that could have been made that the Serbian government was no longer in the business of fomenting rebellion in the Sultan’s domains. Michael was keeping his side of the bargain.

Other earnest of what Jakšić and Vučković call “Michael’s U-turn” were already to hand. Relations with the Balkan states, and with the Bulgarian Committee in Bucharest, went into decline. Michael issued specific instructions, upon his return from Ivánka, for the cultivation of better relations with the Turks; by contrast, relations with Russia worsened. The war minister, Milivoj Blaznavac, who was well known for his anti-Russian politics, seemed increasingly the coming man, while Garašanin’s dismissal was widely perceived as a defeat for the ‘Russian party’.

In Serbia, Michael’s new policy meant an increased hostility towards the liberals and the newly founded Omladina, both of which groups were in close contact with the liberal Hungarian Serbs. The liberals, in turn, were not slow to spread the suspicion that the Prince had sold out both the Balkan Christians and the Monarchy’s Slavs at Ivánka.

Within the Monarchy, Andrássy reaped his reward in the breakdown of the relations between the Serbian government and Strossmayer’s Croatian National Party. At the time of Ivánka, Garašanin was conducting talks with the Croats on securing Prussian
support for the acquisition of Bosnia for a future South Slav state. In addition the Croats hoped to receive some form of monetary assistance from Belgrade for the upcoming elections to the Sabor. A delegation from Zagreb actually arrived in Belgrade shortly after Garašanin’s dismissal. They were bluntly told that the ex-minister’s policy was discontinued, and returned empty-handed to Croatia, and a heavy defeat in the Sabor elections. More important, Croat political opinion was given a decided impression that Serbia had come to its own arrangement with Pest regarding Bosnia. It was more than enough to poison relations.

At one blow, it seemed, Andrássy had achieved everything a Hungarian minister president could wish for. Serbia’s preparations for war in the Balkans appeared to have slackened, if not ceased completely. Russia was alienated. The relations between Belgrade on the one hand, and Zagreb and Novi Sad on the other, were embittered. To consolidate these gains, however, it would be useful to establish a permanent link between the Hungarian and the Serbian governments, a person, moreover, who could be trusted to tell the Serbs what Pest, rather than Vienna, wanted them to hear. The roots of Benjámin Kállay’s appointment as Austro-Hungarian consul-general in Belgrade lay in this outcome to the events of 1867.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 1: AUSTRIA, HUNGARY AND SERBIA IN 1867


2. "Law XII of 1867", translation by Dr. László Péter; italics added. For the original see *Corpus Juris Hungarici: Magyar Törvénytár 1000-1895, Milleniumi emlékiadás; 1836-1868 évi törvénycikkek* (Budapest 1896), pp. 333-44; para. 8 on p. 335.


Bosnien gelange, so wie von Belgrad, um von da sich zu den Balkan mit dem
trichten Flügel anschließen zu können."

1977), no. 6, p. 28; also quoted in Helmut Rumpler, "Österreich-Ungarn und die
150, n. 21.
23. Circulaire du Marquis de La Vallette aux Agents diplomatiques de l'Empereur,
16 Sept. 1866, ODG, XII, no. 3598, p. 304.
25. Bourré to Moustier, 2 Jan. 1867, ibid., XIV, no. 3993, pp. 14-15; and Lenk to
26. Beust to Metternich, 10 Nov. 1866; and Stackelberg to Gorchakov, 28 Nov.
1866; both quoted by Beer, Die Orientpolitik Österreichs, pp. 591, n. 1, and 592,
n. 1 respectively.
27. Gramont to Moustier, 5 Feb. 1867, ODG, XIV, no. 4160, pp. 244-45.
30. There is a useful character sketch of Andrásy in Decsy, op. cit., pp. 15-20,
which, however, needs to be disentangled from the author's enthusiasm for his
subject.
31. Common Ministerial Council of 22 July 1870, quoted ibid., p. 33; original
quoted in Dioszegi, op. cit., pp. 42-43.
32. Kállay Diary, 19 Aug. 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 78): "Andrássy is szükségesnek tart
egy diadalmas háborút a birodalomra nézve; e háborút mi nem viselhetjük más
mint épen az orosz ellen..."
33. Orczy Diary, 31 Oct. 1868, quoted Wertheimer, op. cit., p. 469: "nunmehr aber,
wo wir im Orient bedroht sind."
34. Kállay Diary, 4 Apr. 1869 (Dnevnik, p. 169): "egészen keletre fordítani a
birodalom figyelmét."
35. Artom to Visconti Venosta, 7 Aug. 1870, Documenti diplomatici italiani [DDI],
382-83.
37. Salvini to Visconti Venosta, 13 Nov. 1870, ibid., no. 524, pp. 441-42.
38. Wäcker-Gotter to Bismarck, 23 Nov. 1871; quoted Dicsy, op. cit., p. 32.
39. Barany, "Hungary: The Uncompromising Compromise", Austrian History
Louis Kossuth and the Hungarians 1848-1849 (New York 1979), p. 349; Oszkar
Jászi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy (Chicago & London), pp. 312-
13; Macartney, Habsburg Empire, p. 538; Jakšić & Vučković, Spoljna politika
Srbije za vreme vlade Kneza Mihaila, p. 34; Andrija Radenić, "Serbische
Allianz- und Föderationspläne: Ilija Garašanin und Mihailo Obrenović", in
Mathias Bernath & Karl Nehring (eds.), Friedenssicherung in Südosteuropa
(Munich 1985), pp. 92-93.
40. Barany, op. cit., pp. 244-45; Macartney, op. cit.
41. Kállay Diary, 12 May 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 18): "as egyedüli lehetőségnek tartom
reánk és Törökország keresztény népeire nézve."
42. Barany, op. cit., pp. 245-46.


47. Text *ibid.*., App. 9, pp. 494-504; see also pp. 361-63; Vučković, no. 144, pp. 273-83.

48. Jakšić & Vučković, *op. cit.*, App. 9, p. 495: "radi sajedinjenja sviju jugoslavenski plemen u jednu saveznu državu." The adjective *savezni*, in this context, is rather ambiguous, since it can mean both "federal" and simply "united".


53. Quoted *ibid.*, p. 362: "Trojedna Kraljevina priznaje narod srpski koji u njoj stanuje kao narod sa hrvatskim narodom istovjetan i ravnomopravan."


55. Wagner to Beust, 8 Aug. 1869, HHSA, PA XL/129, reporting on the alarm of Mrazović, a National Party leader, at the suggestion that Serbia might acquire Bosnia-Hercegovina: "uns bliebe dann nichts übrig, als selbst dahin zu gehen."


60. Zastava, 26 June/8 July 1866, quoted *ibid.*, p. 83.


71. Krestić Diary, 16/28 Apr. 1861, in Vučković, no. 28, p. 41: "I Vlasi će, i Slovaci, i Rusnjaci, veljaše Etveš, iskati za sebe teritorije."

72. Krestić Diary, 8/20 June 1861, *ibid.*, no. 31, p. 46: "se ne može dopustiti političko i teritorijalno komađanje zemlje i podpomaganje želja da ovde postane sad još federativna država."

73. Krestić Diary, 25 June/7 July 1861, *ibid.*, no. 35, pp. 49-50: "Etveš i Salaj uplašiše tog čoveka, predstavljajući mu opasnost koja preti Mađarima od toga ako se dade satsfaksija svim narodnostima. On je protivan da se varmeše arondiraju po narodnostima i želi da se srbsko pitanje odloži za drugo vreme...."


77. *Ibid.*, p. 188: "savez neki za zajedničku odbranu i za zajedničko napadanje ('Schutz und Trutz Bündniss')".


81. Krestić to Garašanin, 27 July/8 Aug. 1866, *op. cit.*, p. 188: "'Ugarski državnici imaju u vidu ideju dualizma za sadanj Austriji, i ovim savezom sa Srbijom pokazali bi u kom pravcu treba da se vodi politika koja se tiče Ugarska.'"

82. Hunyadi to Michael, 7 Aug. 1866, in Vučković, no. 95, p. 186.

83. Krestić Diary, 10/22 Feb. 1867, *ibid.*, no. 131, p. 244, summarising Hunyadi's letter: "jer će Mađari sad imati uticaja i na spoljnu politiku Austrije."


86. Jakšić & Vučković, *op. cit.*, pp. 351-52; Krestić, *Nagodba*, p. 363. There is, however, nothing in either the Austrian or Hungarian archives suggesting a preconcerted plan between Vienna and Pest.


88. Krestić Diary, 19 Feb./3 Mar. 1867, *ibid.*, no. 137, p. 248: "Kakve namere ima Srbija i šta se kod nas radi? ... je u stanju nešto kod Bajsta podsredstvom sama
cara izdejstvovati."

89. *Ibid.*, p. 249: "priznaje i povoljnost i pravednost srpskih želja, ... bi zlo bilo kad bi se Srbija ... na silu izazvala rat zbog te stvari."

90. *Ibid.*: "... i mi i vi imamo da se čuvamo jedne i iste opasnosti, ... od Rusije. Da se Rusiji stane na put, da ne osvoji zemlje na zapad, treba da bude država u sredini Evrope jaka. Ta država, to smo mi — Ugarska. Ugarska ... treba da bude kao zid između Srbije i srpskih zemalja i izmed Rusije, s jedne, i Nemaca, s druge strane."

91. *Ibid.*: "Andrâšija mi reče da se Srbija nema od druge strane bojati, do od Rusije. Austrija pređasnja ... mogla je možda imati želje da prisvoji sebe zemlje i preko Dunava. Ali ... da Austrija preko i mimo Ugarske što radi u tom pravcu, da sebi prisvoji one zemlje, nije ni misliti, niti bi Ugarska to dopušila."


103. *ibid.*, p. 322: "Mađarska nikad neće biti iskren sajuznik Srbije. Ma kakva obećanja ona Srbiji činila, i ma kakve joj sjajne izgledes pred oči stavljava, svenu tome ne treba nikad verovati."

104. *ibid.*, p. 323: "Njegov [i.e., Andrâssy's] dolazak bio je dogovoren sa Bajstom, da ne kažem i sa Napoleonom...."


107. *ibid.*, p. 360: "...a Srbija ga podpomagati neće jer to neće dozvoliti srbska vlada, osobito knjaz, koji mu je u jednom razgovoru — što ga je prošle godine s ovine imao, — očitavao da ona neće nipošto dozvoliti da se Srbija umeša u rat...."

108. *ibid.*, p. 364: "mi imamo u Ungarskoj i suviše Slavena...Ja volim da Bosnu i Hercegovinu vi uzmete nego da se nama prisajedini."
109. Ibid., p. 365: "...uzmite se Bosnu i Hercegovinu, mi intervenirat nećemo, a nećemo dozvoliti ni da ko drugi intervenira.... Ako se Rusija i najmanje umeša, znajte da će svu Evropu biti protiv vas...."


112. Piroćanac, op. cit., p. 78: "...dovoljan je dokaz, da su Carevi na tom sastanku poklonili obzirnu pomoć političkoj situaciji na Istoku."

113. Ibid., p. 80: "Knez-Mihailu moralo je biti obećano u Ivanci da će mu Francuska i Austrija, na slučaj pobede francuskog oružja, stvarno pomoći da zadobije Bosnu i Hercegovinu."

114. Ibid., pp. 79, 80.


117. Krestić, op. cit.: "Austrijski kancelar nije u tom pogledu ništa mogao obećavati, jer njegov stav prema Bosni svima je bio dobro poznat....Mađarsko gledište u vezi s Bosnom nije bilo poznato."

118. Ibid., p. 367: "Što se tiče Andrešijevih obećanja u vezi sa Bosnom, ona su bila skroz neiskrena."

119. Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 6 Dec. 1867, HHSA, PA XII/89; Jakšić & Vučković, op. cit., p. 398, cite this document wrongly as 'PA XII/86'.

120. Kállay to Andrásy, 31 May 1868, OSZK, FH 1733: "...nagyon is valószínűnek tartom azt, hogy Bosznia...előbb utóbb, bár nem tudom mily formájában, a mi birtokunkba fog kerülni. De ennek meg nem jött el idéje...." Quoted Krestić, op. cit.

121. Jakšić & Vučković, op. cit., pp. 401-03.


125. Ibid., p. 476: "Po njegovim planovima, Bosna je trebala da bude bakšši koji bi se dao Mihailu da žrtvuje ursasko Srpsko Mađarima, i da se konačno otkaže od Rusije i privze za Austriju." See also p. 373.

126. Ibid., p. 476; Wertheimer, op. cit., p. 461.


129. Ibid.


131. Ibid., pp. 235: "Ez megvalósítható, ha Bosznia és Hercegovina nagy részét Szerbia a Monarchia segítségével kapja meg."

132. Ibid., p. 235: "Noha már 1868 nyarán látható volt, hogy Andrássy e tervével Beustnél nem boldogul...." Cf. Wertheimer, op. cit; according to Orczy's diary,
Beust said, upon being informed of Andrásy's scheme, "Die Idee sagt mir."
All the works which take Beust's collusion for granted have been based upon this single, non-committal remark.

133. Piroćanac, op. cit., pp. 80-82.
CHAPTER 2: KÁLLAY GOES TO BELGRADE

18: A Hungarian for Belgrade

In the summer of 1867 Baron Prokesch-Osten, Francis Joseph's ambassador to the Sultan, expressed his dissatisfaction with the quality of the Monarchy's diplomatic representation in Belgrade. It was necessary, he wrote Beust, to convince the Turkish government that the Habsburg Monarchy was making a serious effort to restrain Prince Michael Obrenović. This required

\[ \text{einen politisch und sozial befähigten Agenten zu bestellen} \ldots, \]
\[ \text{dem russischen Einfluß entgegen zu arbeiten und den Fürsten auf dem richtigen Wege zu erhalten. Dadurch kämen wir den russischen Auslegungen in Constantinopel zuvor.} \]

Prokesch-Osten was not the only influential voice raised in favour of some more forceful presence in Belgrade, at a time when Prince Michael's policy in the Balkans still seemed alarmingly warlike. That Prince Michael still needed restraining seemed to be the general opinion among imperial officials.

In his desire for a stronger voice in Belgrade, however, Prokesch-Osten was to get rather more than he bargained for. The Hungarian government wanted the same thing, but for quite different reasons. Andrássy, as we have seen, had a variety of urgent motives to wishing to maintain the hold he believed he had established over Prince Michael at Ivânka. Serbia's non-involvement with the Hungarian Serbs and the Croats; the cessation of preparations for war in the Balkans; the weaning away of Serbia from Russian influence: all these influenced the Hungarian premier. The fear of Russian incitement of the Hungarian South Slavs, in the event of a European war, was particularly prominent in Hungarian political circles that autumn, as foreign observers could not fail to notice. In view of Serbia's strategic importance on Hungary's frontier, and the insufficient importance attached by Beust, in Andrássy's opinion, to the Russian threat, it was imperative to have someone appointed to Belgrade who would represent Hungarian interests there as well as Habsburg ones, and on whom Andrássy could rely to keep him informed as to Beust's eastern policy in general.

To these considerations was added the conviction that Prince Michael, autocrat and
Hungarian landowner that he was, would be more influenced in his pro-Hungarian policy by someone comparable to him in social status. Someone who was noble, conversant with South Slav affairs and the Serbian language, but above all Hungarian: such a combination of qualities was a rarity in Hungarian politics, and virtually unheard of in the Habsburg diplomatic service. Andrássy's choice fell on the young politician, Benjámin Kállay.4

Kállay's appointment on 2 February 1868 was generally seen as evidence of the Hungarian government's influence under the new system.5 While a seemingly ideal choice from the point of view of the Hungarian government, and with much to recommend it as far as winning over Prince Michael was concerned, it was not necessarily agreeable to Beust. Beust was also obliged to accept the nomination by Andrássy, in March 1868, of another Hungarian, Count Béla Orczy, as one of his department heads within the foreign ministry itself. This was specifically so that Andrássy might be kept informed of important developments in foreign policy. The unspoken truth was that Orczy was there to act in Andrássy's name and 'restrain' Beust from what Andrássy considered to be an irresponsible adventurism.6 Kállay's appointment was thus part of this same process of securing guarantees for the Hungarian government's constitutional entitlement, under paragraph 8 of the Settlement Law, to be consulted over foreign policy. Both appointments, moreover, were the result of Andrássy's personal application to the Emperor Francis Joseph. And to heighten the impression on Prince Michael of the new importance attached to the Monarchy's representative in Belgrade, Kállay's post was upgraded from that of consul-general to 'diplomatic agent and consul-general'.7

19: Kállay's Political Career

The man thus elevated to one of the most sensitive postings in the Austro-Hungarian diplomatic service was not yet twenty-nine years old. Kállay was born in Pest on 22 December 1839, the son of the successful administrator István Kállay and Amália Blaskovich. On his father's side Kállay more than met the requirement of noble blood, since the Kállays were one of the oldest noble families in Hungary.8

The young Kállay attended the University of Pest, where he studied law, physics,
chemistry and mathematics. He had long since manifested an extreme precocity, especially in mathematics, although as he confessed at one point, he did not feel that he brought a particularly original talent to the subject. When asked his true talent, he replied: "I only have one, and I hate it: it's politics."

Benjámin Kállay's chosen means for perfecting his political talent were, in Hungarian terms, unusual. By the end of the 1850's he was already turning his attention to the acquisition of foreign languages, especially Near Eastern ones. He learned Russian and modern Greek; sat under the famous Orientalist, Armin Vámbéry, to study Turkish; and, most remarkably in a young Hungarian nobleman, set himself to learn Serbo-Croat, and began cultivating links with the Hungarian Serb community in Pest and nearby Szentendre.

Such an orientation could only have been with some sort of career in the diplomatic service in mind, or as a political voice on nationalities within Hungary, or as a scholarly authority on Near Eastern affairs. The roots of Kállay's decision, however, remain a mystery. His mother's family name was Croat or Serb in origin, but this did not mean much in a country like Hungary where the same could be said of many other families. More likely as an explanation is the general political situation in which Hungary found itself at the outset of the 1860's, when a satisfactory settlement of Hungarian differences with the Habsburg dynasty seemed so hard to attain.

Perhaps the most important influence on Kállay's choice, in his early twenties, was his acquaintance with Eötvös, the foremost Hungarian authority on the nationalities question. At the National Casino, the most prestigious club in the country, Kállay attracted the attention of Eötvös, who was impressed by his obvious ability and seriousness, and prophesied a brilliant future. And it was about this time, too, that he began to take an interest in the South Slavs, "recognising", in Thallóczy's words, "the great importance of the Balkan peoples, especially the Serbs, as far as Hungary was concerned." The acquaintance with Eötvös encouraged Kállay to make his journalistic début with a number of articles, in Serbian, published in the Hungarian Serb press, and extolling Serbo-Hungarian friendship. The response both in Hungary and in Serbia was apparently a favourable one.
Another important contact for Kállay was Count Gyula Andrássy, who despite the sixteen year difference in age appears to have regarded the younger man very much as a personal friend. What remains unknown, however, is to what extent Andrássy influenced Kállay, or Kállay Andrássy, on the subject of relations with the South Slavs. In view of Andrássy's known position, and Kállay's later correspondence with him while at Belgrade, this is perhaps something of a chicken-and-egg argument: the two men obviously influenced one another, although they did not always see eye to eye on individual subjects.

In his search for a political role Kállay at first concentrated on the domestic scene. Despite his good relations with the leading Deákists he was not, even at the outset of his career, a strict party follower, in so far as such a thing even existed in Hungary in this period. He also cultivated links with Baron Pál 'Sennyey, who was appointed lord high treasurer in July 1865 and was thus, until the formation of the Andrássy government in February 1867, effectively in charge of internal government affairs in Hungary. In 1865, therefore, 'Sennyey had his hands firmly on the levers of power, a crude but compelling reason for an ambitious young politician to hedge his bets by voicing some support for him.

It is not surprising that, when Kállay stood for election to the diet in the November 1865 elections, he should have been repudiated by the Deákists. He claimed to be standing on a Deákist platform, but lost the election anyway. The seat he contested was the Serb-populated constituency of Szentendre; and a fragment in the Kállay papers gives some idea of how he courted the Szentendre electors.

Kállay paid fulsome tribute to the Serbs' heroic past and present aspirations. The Hungarians could only count on a happy future "if we progress along the glorious path of civilisation hand in hand with the Slavs." He assured his audience that "complete equality before the law will constitute the basis of our agreement, [and it will be] extended in the same way to languages as well, which is one of the most essential elements of nationality aspirations." The nationalities would thus be guaranteed "their greatest treasure... – their individuality" and, this being the case, would have no further objections to remaining in "the common homeland."
His attempt to get into parliament having failed, Kállay continued to cultivate his image as a friend of the Slavs. His major achievement between 1865 and 1868, however, was an excursion into the realm of political philosophy. Kállay undoubtedly saw himself as a liberal, and to prove it he introduced to the Hungarian public in 1867 one of the classic texts of nineteenth century liberalism, John Stuart Mill's On Liberty.

In a lengthy introduction, Kállay nailed his flag firmly to the mast of liberty, the desire for which "is deeply rooted in human nature." Individuality, and the freedom to express it, was for Kállay the litmus test of a liberal society, although he specifically denied that this had come about through some inevitable progressive tendency in human history.

Kállay also examined the relationship between individuality and the force of most natural interest to a Hungarian politician, nationality. The most distinctive part of Kállay's reflections on nationality is also the one of most interest in view of his subsequent career. For Kállay most "nation-individualities" (p. lx: "nép-egyéniségek"), as he called them, were too weak to stand on their own. To protect themselves they had to unite in ad hoc defensive alliances, which could be dissolved when no longer needed. The "basic principle of the balance of power", in future, had to be based on the self-interest of nations. Just as individuals in society had to unite to resist the tyranny of state and society, so, on the international level, nations could best preserve their individuality in this kind of "free union" (p. lxi: "szabad egyesülés").

The relevance of these passages lies in Kállay's professed faith in the idea of a Danubian confederation, however vaguely worded. For Kállay interest in such schemes may well have waned, once the essential stability of the Dualist settlement became apparent. Yet at the outset of his Belgrade posting Kállay still seemed to cherish what he referred to as "my beloved old idea" of confederation, and duly made note of similarly minded people he encountered in Serbia. For the Serbs, the fact that a rising Hungarian politician could discuss such things at all was remarkable. Like Andrásy, however, Kállay remained convinced there could be no South Slav state unless it was firmly under Austro-Hungarian control.

Personally Kállay was well equipped for his new career in Belgrade. He was
familiar with French, German and English, had studied Russian and Turkish and, as Andrássy rather floridly informed Prince Michael, "a fait une étude approfondie de la langue Serbe - et la parle très couramment." 23 In addition to his reputation as an intellectual, he was accustomed to move in the first circles in both Pest and Vienna. "D’un extérieur un peu froid," Andrássy advised Michael, "vous le trouverez très sûr, et complètement Gentleman." 24

The chilly exterior was less a pose than many assumed. For Kállay was a man of vaulting ambition, with a lonely sense of his own destiny. A year after his appointment to Belgrade he confided in his diary that "I won't give up the hope that one day yet I shall govern some nation." 25 What was remarkable about Kállay was the cold-blooded calculation he brought to everything he did. He seems to have regarded most of humanity, in fact, as so many tools to be manipulated. The result was a ruthlessness of approach which could on occasion contemplate even the most extreme measures, and which contrasted oddly with his view of himself as a liberal. 26

But for the moment Kállay seemed the right man for the job. In Serbia the rumour that a Hungarian was about to be made the Monarchy's representative had at first aroused "großes Befremden"; but this changed to general satisfaction when it was learned that Kállay, the well-known Serbophile, was the choice. 27 Prince Michael, according to the British consul, "does not disguise his satisfaction." 28 The Prussian consul, Rosen, saw a little deeper, especially the essentially Hungarian nature of this new development:

Was seine Sendung anbetrifft, so wird dieselbe...mit einem leitenden Artikel im Pester Lloyd...zusammengebracht, welcher den Serben...anrat, ihre Stütze zur Lösung der ihnen obliegenden politischen Mission bei den Ungarn zu suchen. Das Dasein eines österreichischen Kaiserstaates ignoriert der...Artikel...vollständig. 29

Implicit in Rosen's remarks was the central fact about Kállay's presence in Belgrade, which was the literally dual nature of his role there. Officially he was the representative of the Habsburg Monarchy. Unofficially, however, Kállay was Andrássy's man, as everybody knew before he even went to Belgrade. The extent to which this became a commonplace was revealed in the (perhaps unwitting) references
Rosen was making, within the year, to "den Vertreter von Ungarn-Österreich".  

20: Beust's Instructions of April 1868

Kállay had no excuse for pleading ignorance of Beust's Balkan policy, since the latter provided him with copious instructions prior to sending him off to Belgrade. In his despatch of 5 April 1868, Beust showed himself considerably more inclined to reform in the Ottoman Empire than Prokesch-Osten, but nevertheless firm in drawing limits to Serbian expansion.

It was obvious to Beust that the Serbian government's assurances that it had no further demands on the Porte, in the wake of the fortress settlement, did not count for much. On the contrary, Serbia still seemed to want

vollige staatliche Unabhängigkeit, Gebietsvergrößerung auf Kosten der Türkei, dann wohl auch des nördlichen Nachbars [Austria-Hungary], in letzter Linie Gründung eines alle Südslaven umfassenden Reiches ....

The powers had been obliged as recently as December 1867 to remonstrate with Prince Michael about the level of Serbian armaments. For Austria-Hungary this aspect of Serbian policy was all the more worrying, given reports that Prussia was ready to sell a large surplus stock of rifles to the Serbs. Now, in April 1868, intelligence indicated that a secret treaty of some sort had been concluded between Serbia and Roumania. Without detailed knowledge of the treaty's contents Beust was apt to regard it as yet another purposeful weapon against Ottoman integrity, rather than the last, rather futile, element in Prince Michael's Balkan alliance strategy that it was. It would be a great mistake, Beust advised, to regard Serbian plans for a war of liberation as abandoned. Kállay's first task was to learn as much as possible about Serbia's Balkan alliances. In addition, he must warn Belgrade emphatically against

Wagnissen ..., zu welchen sie durch eigenen unbesonnenen Thatendrang oder durch auswärtige Aufstachelungen verleiten lassen könnte.

Beust's assessment of the balance of forces in the Balkans made sense, and was anything but superficial. In his opinion it would be dangerous to underestimate the Ottoman Empire's powers of resistance. Serbia would be unwise to provoke a general conflict, since its Balkan allies were likely to be unreliable, and even Russian help was
a questionable safeguard against defeat.  

Beust put his finger on another verity when he expressed the conviction "dass Rußland für sich allein, ohne Einverständniss mit Österreich, einen Angriffskrieg gegen die Türkei nicht zu führen vermag." The clear implication of these remarks was that it would be Austria-Hungary and Russia who regulated affairs in the Balkans, and not Serbia. The Treaty of Paris, which placed Serbia under the collective protection of the signatory powers, was a perfectly adequate guarantee of the Principality's constitutional autonomy; to attack the Turks would be to infringe the Treaty, and the powers would be justified in abandoning Serbia to its fate in that case.

On the subject of Bosnia, Beust was categorical. It is hard to square his robust rejection of a Serbian administration in these two provinces with the assertions of his critics that he was somehow in favour of such a scheme, or at least undecided. Beust described it as

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  ein Gedanke..., der darauf abzielte, den serbischen 
  Vergrößerungsgelüsten auf unblutigem Wege Befriedigung zu 
  schaffen, dessen Verwirklichung aber der staatlichen Ordnung 
  an unserm südöstlichen Gränzen einen darum nicht minder 
  empfindlichen Stoß versetzt hätte.
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In the year since the plan first surfaced, Beust observed, nothing seemed to have come of it. Nevertheless,

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  Träte er je wieder in den Vordergrund, so hätten Euer 
  Wohlgeboren es sich angelegen sein zu lassen, demselben 
  kräftigst entgegen zu wirken.
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Beust might have been pardoned for assuming that Kallay, as a Hungarian, agreed with the need to oppose the emergence of a greater Serbian state. He was to be rudely disillusioned within the year.

Beust did what he could to dispel the Serbian conviction that Austria-Hungary was only interested in preserving the Turkish imperium, and indifferent to the plight of Turkey's Christian population. He wanted Kallay to combat this "völlig grundlose Auffassung...mit größter Entschiedenheit." There was also a purely practical consideration at work:

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  die Bewahrung der Sympathien der auswärtigen 
  Stammgenossen unserer slavischen und rumänischen 
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Somewhat less plausibly, Beust claimed that it was precisely because the Porte regarded Austria-Hungary as its well-wisher that the latter was in a unique position to influence Ottoman policy in a sense favourable to the Balkan Christians. Kállay was also expected to counter Serbian suspicion that Austria-Hungary itself aimed at annexing Bosnia:

Die k.k. Regierung wird sicher die letzte sein, an den vertragsmäßig festgestellten Gebietsabgrenzungen nach was immer einer Richtung hin rütteln zu wollen.

Beust must have realised that the value of this last assurance was strictly conditional. But there can be equally little doubt that his preferred option was to keep Austria-Hungary out of Bosnia. He was thus unlikely easily to be converted to the sort of scheme hatched by Andrássy for a Serbian presence there, and with these general guidelines in his pocket Kállay, as he departed for Belgrade, must have realised this.

21: First Moves

Kállay arrived in Belgrade on 19 April 1868, and presented his credentials the same day. Commenting on Michael's formal speech of welcome, which praised the Emperor's choice of diplomatic representative, Kállay noted that "They always praise a newcomer. I believe, however, they will praise me even more on the occasion of my departure."

Kállay's determination to make his mark would have been the greater had he realised just how tenuous Austria-Hungary's, or rather Hungary's, influence in Serbia really was. For Prince Michael, at the time of Kállay's arrival, was actively playing the Prussian card. The interest shown by Bismarck, earlier in the year, in supplying Serbia with arms was hardly philanthropic. It showed rather the Prussian minister president's keen awareness, as in 1866, of Serbia's potential use as a distraction in the event of the widely expected Franco-Prussian conflict, which could so easily degenerate into a general European war, with Austria-Hungary siding with France. Now, late in April, Prince Michael put out his own feelers in response.

The Prince sent the diplomat, Jovan Ristić, on a mission to the capital of the great
powers. Ristić's purpose was to sound Bismarck as to the role the latter envisaged for Serbia in the event of a European war.50 "Serbien müße dem Impuls deren folgen, welche Regen und Sonnenschein machen," Rosen reported the Prince as saying. Michael clearly had not completely abandoned his thoughts of a Balkan uprising and attack on Turkey, despite the negative policies he had pursued in this regard since meeting Andrássy at Ivánka in August 1867. He was as convinced as ever that "Die Reformversuche lösen die Orientalische Frage nicht." The deciding factor in his mind seems to have been the possibility of Prussian support against Austro-Hungarian intervention, as well as the fact that nothing concrete had come of Andrássy's promises at Ivánka.51

Ristić, however, drew a blank when he reached Berlin in May 1868. Bismarck was taking the cure, and later fell sick for several months. Ristić settled down to await Bismarck's return to the direction of Prussian policy; he was still waiting when, on 10 June, Prince Michael's murder made the question academic.52 The fact that such contacts were being sought, however, enables us to put Prince Michael's expressions of gratitude for Austro-Hungarian attentions in their proper light. Michael could appreciate the upgrading of the Monarchy's diplomatic representation in Serbia, and he was undoubtedly interested in whatever the new Hungarian presence in Belgrade had to offer. This did not prevent him from keeping his options open. Blaznavac, who succeeded Michael when he took over as first Regent, was to accept Hungarian assurances more unreservedly.

Kállay's first contacts with Prince Michael concentrated on railways and Russian influence. It was the first of these which bulked largest in Michael's mind. The Prince's anxiety to link his country up by rail with the outside world, after all, had been one of his principal reasons for seeking the cooperation of Austria and Hungary the previous year. Michael was particularly worried at the activities of a financial consortium investigating the construction of a line through Bosnia and the Sancak of Novi Pazar, rather than Serbia, a prospect which spelled economic disaster for the latter.53 Kállay assured Michael, in Andrássy's name, that the Hungarian government strongly favoured a Serbian route.54 The Prince even harked back to a remark made by
Andrássy at Ivánka, to the effect that "the basis of a truly reasonable eastern policy is represented by that which alone is capable of establishing harmony among the different nationalities", and that the railway was an excellent practical means to this end. He ended by giving what Kállay most wanted to hear, a promise to decide on the railway question soon. In return, Kállay offered a fresh hostage to fortune by linking construction of the railway to the Bosnian scheme. When the Prince expressed the hope that the railway would be a firm tie between Serbia and its northern neighbour, Kállay replied: "I hope so too, but only if Bosnia remains remote forever, at least from us."

On Panslavism, Michael confessed to puzzlement as to why the great powers, Austria-Hungary to the fore, persisted in regarding it as anything other than "ein körperloses Gespenst". Obviously the Balkan Slavs were bound to Russia by ethnic and religious ties, but there could be no question of their giving up their separate identities. Michael argued that as long as the Slav nations retained their languages, they could not be assimilated by anyone. He did, however, accept Kállay's thesis that it was not Panslavism, but "Pan-Russismus", which constituted the real danger: the threat to subordinate every Slav people to Russian interests. Even then, Michael claimed, no one in Serbia wanted Russian domination. It was the same disclaimer that leading Serbs had been making for years, but Kállay showed no more sign of having taken the point than any of his predecessors.

From the moment he arrived in Belgrade, Kállay pursued a number of objects with a view to establishing Hungarian influence on a firmer basis. He lobbied hard with Vienna for concessions such as the speedy conclusion of a postal convention between the Monarchy and Serbia, and the renunciation by the Monarchy of its right to exercise consular jurisdiction on behalf of Habsburg subjects within Serbia, both much-resented legacies of Ottoman rule. He also built up a network of contacts and more surreptitious means of control. In immediate terms this consisted of cultivating high-level sources of information, in the recruitment of agents, and the buying of newspaper influence.

For much of his intelligence, Kállay relied on the experience of his vice-consul
Svetozar Theodorovics, a Hungarian Serb from Szentendre, and on the Habsburg army officer in charge of the Monarchy's postal station in southern Serbia, a Captain Čučković. He also depended heavily on the advice of the Hungarian ministry of the interior in monitoring traffic between Serbia and the Monarchy's Slavs. Here the interests of the Monarchy and the Hungarian government often marched together; but at other points they clashed directly, especially where the Austrian military was involved. Kállay had some reason for regarding the military with exasperation. According to Theodorovics,

They talk so indiscreetly and arrogantly about a takeover of Bosnia, that afterwards, of course, it's hard to convince the Serbian government of the sincerity of our government's opposite viewpoint, even with the greatest of efforts.

Kállay accordingly took steps, through Beust, to exclude the Austro-Hungarian military from intelligence activities in Serbia itself, which may have produced more balanced reporting of events there, but which also ensured that what got reported back to Vienna was largely a matter of Kállay's choosing.

In his purchase of newspaper influence, Kállay made two contacts who were to serve him well throughout his stay in Belgrade. These were the journalists Rosen and Popović. Miloš Popović was the editor of the conservative, semi-official Vidovdan, had done much to introduce Eötvös's views on the nationality question to the South Slav world, and was typical of the sort of Serb Kállay hoped to work with in Belgrade. Later that same year Kállay was to find an opportunity to subsidise Vidovdan directly; but in the meantime he acquired another ally in the person of Popović's assistant editor, Dr. Michael Rosen, who also worked in the press bureau of the Serbian government. Rosen, like Popović, but for more crudely financial reasons, was interested in promoting Serbo-Hungarian friendship. In addition to writing pro-Hungarian articles in Vidovdan, and pro-Serbian articles in the Hungarian press, he also became, next to Captain Čučković, Kállay's most prolific source of information.

22: The Andrássy-Orešković Negotiations

While Kállay was busy extending his contacts in Belgrade, Andrássy's last major initiative during Prince Michael's reign was being discussed in Pest. This was the
outcome of an approach made by General Türr to Colonel Orešković at the beginning of May: would Orešković meet him in Pest for talks? Having obtained permission from his superior, Blaznavac, Orešković travelled up to Pest towards the end of the month.\textsuperscript{65} Behind this lay an invitation to acquaint Orešković with Andrássy.\textsuperscript{66} The object was the further discussion of the Bosnian question.

The pre-history of Andrássy’s intervention in the Bosnian question, in particular the question of his objectives in offering even a part of Bosnia-Hercegovina to the Serbian government, has already been discussed. It seems incontestable that the offer made at Ivánka, in August 1867, was a sincere one, as long as Andrássy’s essential condition is borne in mind, the close association of such an enlarged Serbia with the Habsburg Monarchy. Equally certain, in view of Beust’s recent instructions to Kállay, is the essential independence of the offer which Andrássy now repeated to Orešković, that is, its independence of any control or approval on the part of the Austro-Hungarian chancellor.

Andrássy began by expressing his conviction that, in an age of railways and telegraphs, close links between states were unavoidable, especially for small states like Serbia which hoped to avoid impoverishment. The implication was that close relations with Austria-Hungary, as opposed to Russia, were to be desired.\textsuperscript{67} Orešković replied that, on the contrary, "only a strong and independent Serbia would dare enter into close relations with Hungary", because it "would not have to fear that a Hungary equal to her would place her individuality as a nation and state in question".\textsuperscript{68} There could be no firm basis for Serbo-Hungarian friendship, in his opinion, until Serbia had been strengthened by the acquisition of not only Bosnia-Hercegovina but Old Serbia as well.

This gave Andrássy the opportunity to say that he did not have anything against such a merger, but that the time was not yet ripe. Hungary needed time to "consolidate itself", in order to fulfil its task of "protecting a free Europe from Russian barbarism. 'First of all,'" he told Orešković, "'Russia must be driven back, and when this has been achieved then the time will have come for you South Slavs to free yourselves and unite.'"\textsuperscript{69} Only then could the Hungarians dare to abandon the Ottoman Empire, without fearing the latter's immediate absorption by Russia.
Orešković in an extraordinary exchange showed his weakness as a negotiator. The South Slavs of the Ottoman Empire, he told Andrássy, were waiting because they had to; but even if, as Andrássy said, Austria-Hungary "needed" Turkey, the time would come when the Slavs could dispense with their northern neighbour's permission to rise up. In any general war Austria-Hungary would have to deal with Russia, and the Balkan Slavs would not have to fear Austro-Hungarian intervention then. Instead, they would make their own contribution to the Monarchy's discomfiture, for the Slav regiments of the Military Border would also rise up. In a general war, he insisted, Austria-Hungary's chances would not be good, and it was obvious which side Serbia would be on.

Andrássy tried a different tack, reminding Orešković that he had already admitted the Ottoman Empire was not sustainable in the long run: "at the moment we are only propping it up until we have beaten back Russia; when that is done then we will abandon it and will raise you [the South Slavs] up." All Serbia would have to do, he added, would be to refrain from attacking the Turks. To this, however, Orešković raised one of the principal objections to such a strategy from the Serbian government's point of view, an objection moreover that was to recur again and again in Kállay's own reports from Belgrade. In any general upheaval, regardless of how Serbia conducted itself, there was always the likelihood of a spontaneous uprising, especially in Bosnia; and in this case any Serbian government would find it impossible not to join in. Orešković, for all his foolishness, had articulated a central truth about the South Slav question in the 1860's and 1870's, a truth that became apparent in 1875 when the Bosnian and Hercegovinian revolts sparked one of the great diplomatic crises of the century. To Andrássy's revelation that Prince Michael, at Ivanka, had said he would not allow Serbia to become involved in an Austro-Russian conflict, Orešković simply reiterated that "A government in Serbia which, in these circumstances, opposed the national will and its deepest feelings, would fall the same day that it showed this, and the Prince himself would be driven out of the country." It was a precise forecast of the situation in which Michael's successor, Prince Milan, found himself in 1876.
Things would be different, Orešković assured Andrássy, if the Serbs could be united in their own state. Hungary would not be strong enough to threaten such a union; the only danger would be from Germany and Russia, and this could be dealt with by a defensive alliance of the south-east European nations, especially one that included Hungary. In a remark that echoes Kállay's reflections of 1867 on the "free union" of nationalities, Orešković said

We want a strong and even more independent Hungary, because only in alliance with such are we secure and capable of preserving our freedom against a third, stronger power.

And Serbia, he reminded Andrássy, would be all the more bündnisfähig if it included Bosnia.

It was at this point that the two men began to grope towards what appeared to be common ground. Andrássy reminded Orešković of the Croats, who not only had their own claim to part of Bosnia, but were supported by the "strong military party ... who work in Vienna so that Bosnia and the Hercegovina can be annexed." Andrássy stressed that he would prefer Serbia to take Bosnia and the Hercegovina than for them to be annexed by the Monarchy. However,

it is to be feared that if you were to try to annex Bosnia, you would get into a struggle with the Croats who, from the other side, would invade it. Such a struggle ... would oblige us to intervene; and if we intervened, a third party would intervene, and so on, so that would bring a European war down on our heads.

Orešković responded that the Hungarians need not intervene. All they had to do was to restrain Austria from intervening, and to mediate between Serbia and the Croats. Serbia was not aiming to destroy the Ottoman Empire; it just wanted to unite all the Turkish Serbs in one administrative unit. The Croats could be placated by letting them have 'Turkish Croatia', i.e., the Bosnian district of Bosna Krajina.

Andrásy seized upon this, with the remarks quoted in the previous chapter. The Serbs could take Bosnia, he said, and Hungary would not intervene; it would even try to help behind the scenes. But Serbia would have to act soon, if possible by the next spring, because if circumstances arose in which Austria-Hungary found itself at war with Russia, "then you don't dare attack Turkey in any way, and we, cost what it may,
would have to be against you." And when Orešković asked if he could repeat all this
to his own government, Andrássy assured him that he could.

Before Orešković returned to Belgrade he was made an additional offer, this time in
great secrecy via General Klapka. According to Klapka, Andrássy was "ready to
conclude a treaty with Serbia, by which Serbia would annex Bosnia and the
Hercegovina, while the Crown of St. Stephen, that is, Croatia, would annex Turkish
Croatia." In compensation for renouncing this part of Bosnia, Serbia would also
annex the pašalik of Niš. The treaty would be a strictly secret one between Serbia and
Hungary, but in order to implement it the approval of France, which Andrássy engaged
himself to obtain, would be desirable. Serbia's main obligation, in the event of its
takeover of the territories in question, was to conclude a further treaty with Hungary
based on the principle of mutual defence.

The idea of a Serbo-Hungarian alliance was to be shunted back and forth for the next
two years: as late as the autumn of 1870 Kállay submitted a similar proposal to
Belgrade in Andrássy's name. But was Andrássy serious? On the face of it the
proposal was ludicrous. Neither Andrássy nor the Hungarian government was in a
position to conclude foreign treaties of this nature; and even if they were, it is hard to
see how Andrássy can have expected such a treaty to have binding force, if it were to
remain secret from everyone except, egregiously, the French Emperor. To the
Yugoslav historians who have touched on the subject, both the alliance and the
proposals about Bosnia were attempts to draw the teeth of Serb nationalism by keeping
the Serbian government waiting for something that would never come.

Yet it is hard to doubt the sincerity of Andrássy's denial of an interest in acquiring
any part of Bosnia in 1868, however much he may have modified his position over the
next three years. Assuming that Andrássy was telling the truth in this respect, and that
Serbia could somehow be won over from 'Russian influence', there is a certain fractured
logic to the idea of allowing Serbia to take over Bosnia, as long as such an enlarged
Serbian state were firmly under Hungarian control. One would like to know more
about what Andrássy thought, if anything, of the ideas on the association of nation-
states, propounded by Kállay in his introduction to John Stuart Mill, and echoed in May

81
1868 by Orešković. Unfortunately neither the Kállay-Andrássy correspondence nor Kállay's diary throws much light on this; yet it seems likely that Kállay would have discussed such a solution with Andrássy at some time or other. With the Ausgleich barely a year old, could Andrássy have been toying with the possibility of a Danubian confederation, in case this constitutional arrangement with the Habsburg Monarchy did not work out?

If Andrássy's sincerity is to be questioned, it is also necessary to accept that he deliberately deceived his chosen man in Belgrade, Kállay. For Andrássy, who had a capacity for appearing all things to all men, this is a possible explanation, but in this case ultimately unconvincing. Certainly Kállay himself believed in the Bosnian scheme. As he expressed it to Andrássy on 31 May, the latter "sent me here so that I could expressly declare that we harbour no desire to conquer Bosnia-Hercegovina." All the subsequent references to the plan in Kállay's diary attest that he was indeed, in Wertheimer's phrase, "Feuer und Flamme" for it.

What Kállay, and above him Andrássy, hoped to gain, by dangling the prize of Bosnia before the Serbian government, is another matter. A possible answer is the Croatian question. For Andrássy's government, in the year when they had to conclude the Nagodba with the Croats, the urge to divide the nationalities facing them must have been strong. Kállay expressed this with simple force later in the year. "It would really be a beautiful result," he wrote, "if I could alienate the Croats and Serbs from one another." And the ideal "apple of discord" was the Bosnian question. Late in May 1868 this need to keep Croats and Serbs apart constituted one of the themes of Kállay's last letter to Andrássy before Prince Michael's death. This makes clear his concern that recent Croatian claims to Bosnia were a threat to the goodwill he had recently built up.

At the heart of Andrássy's and Kállay's strategy regarding Bosnia was an ambiguity that was not resolved until both men finally accepted the inevitability of annexing the provinces to Austria-Hungary. In 1868 they would rather have avoided such an acquisition. But even in 1868 Kállay, at least, could envisage an eventual annexation, and could put it in Andrássy's head, if it was not already there to begin with:
I think it ... very probable, that Bosnia ... will sooner or later become part of our territory .... But the time for this has still not come; now we must at all costs convince the Serbs that we don't intend starting anything with regard to these provinces.\(^{92}\)

Kállay had reason to think his mission successful, after a couple of months in Belgrade. He had the goodwill of Prince Michael who, according to Orešković, was quite pleased with the news from Pest,\(^{93}\) and the Hungarian government appeared to hold all the threads in its hands for further improvement. Then an event occurred which seemed to undo everything that Kállay and Andrássy had achieved up to that point, and to put their whole policy of binding Serbia to Hungary once more in question.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 2: KÁLLAY GOES TO BELGRADE

1. Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 25 July 1867 (private), HHSA, PA XII/88; cited incorrectly by Jakšić and Vučković, Spoljna politika Srbije..., p. 461, as 'PA XII/85, 25 June 1867'.


6. Ibid., p. 464; Decsy, Prime Minister Gyula Andrásy..., pp. 54-55, and n. 24, p. 146.


9. "Kállay Béni ifjúsága" [The Youth of Benjámin Kállay], typescript by Thallóczy, OSZK, FH 1689/113, folios 3-4; the source for this appears to be Dr. Endre Galffy to Thallóczy, 15 Aug. 1904, OSZK, FH 1689/255-56.

10. "Kállay Béni ifjúsága", op. cit: "Egyhez van, de azt utalom – az a politika."


12. "Kállay Béni ifjúsága", op. cit: "megértvén a nagy fontosságot, amellyel a Balkán népei, különösen a szerbek Magyarországra nézve bimak."


17. Ibid: "ha a szlávokkal kezet fogva haladunk a civilisatio dicsteljes ősvényén."

18. Ibid: "egyezkedéstünk alapját a teljes jogeylelnőség fogja képezni, kiterjesztvén azt egyaránt a nyelvre is, mely a nemzetiségi törekvések egyik leglényegesebb mozzanatot teszi."


22. Kállay Diary, 3, 5 & 12 May 1868, 26 June 1868 (Dnevnik, pp. 13, 15, 18, 44). On the latter date Kállay wrote about "Kedves régi eszméim!" and the concepts of confederation "over which as a youth in my lonely little room I brooded so much" ("melyekkel mint ifjú oly sokat tepelôdtem magános kis szobámban"). The translation in Dnevnik (p. 44) is faulty.
24. Ibid.
25. Kállay Diary, 29 Apr. 1869 (Dnevnik, p. 175): "a reményrôl le nem mondok, hogy egykor még egy nép felett fogok uralkodni."
26. Ibid., 12 May 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 18).
27. Lenk to Beust, 10 Feb. 1868, MOL, P344, 3.k., Ca/39.
28. Longworth to Stanley, 21 Feb. 1868, PRO, FO 78/2033 (no. 12).
32. Beust to Kállay, 5 Apr. 1868, ibid., p. 349.
34. Serbo-Roumanian treaty of alliance, 20 Jan./1 Feb. 1868, in Jakšić & Vučkovié, op. cit., app. 16, pp. 519-21, discussed on pp. 452-55; Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, I, p. 328. See also Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 12 Nov. 1867, HHSA, PA XII/89; Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 13, 20 & 27 Mar. 1868, all PA XII/91.
36. Ibid., pp. 350-51.
37. Ibid., p. 351; italics added; Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 218.
40. Beust to Kállay, 5 Apr. 1868, op. cit.
41. Ibid., p. 353; italics added.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid. Vučkovié (n. 3, p. 355) correctly points out, à propos of this passage, that it does not agree with Andrássy's suggestion to Serbia in March 1867 of a partition of Bosnia. That is precisely the point.
47. Kállay to Beust, 21 Apr. 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177.
52. Ibid., pp. 459-60; cf. Kállay Diary, 21 & 24 Apr. 1868 and 8 May 1868 (Dnevnik, pp. 6, 7, 17).
53. Kállay to Beust, 28 Apr. 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177; Kállay to Andrassy, 29 Apr. 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/79-80; Kállay Diary, 28 Apr. 1868 (Dnevnik, pp. 8-9).
54. Kállay to Andrassy, 29 Apr. 1868, op. cit.
56. Ibid., 28 Apr. 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 10): "Reménylem, de csak úgy ha Bosznia távol marad, legalább töltkön, örökre."
57. Kállay to Beust, 28 Apr. 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177; Kállay Diary, op. cit.
58. On consular jurisdiction: M.S. KnátTSon, The Eastern Question 1774-1923: A Study in International Relations (London & Basingstoke 1966), pp. xvii-xviii; Kállay Diary, 12 and 15 May 1858 (Dnevnik, pp. 18-19, 21); Kállay to Beust, 12 and 19 May 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177; Kállay to Andrassy, 20 May 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/84; Kállay to Andrassy, 31 May 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/89. On the postal convention: Kanitz, Serbien, pp. 581-82; Petrovich, op. cit., p. 340; Kállay to Beust, 30 May 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177; Kállay Diary, 30 & 31 May 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 26); Kállay to Andrassy, 31 May 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/88.
59. Anger to Thallóczy, 26 June 1908, OSZK, FH 1649/1-6; Meyenburg to Lenk, 23 Jan. 1868, MOL, P344, 3.k./38. There is an extensive body of reports by Čučković to Kállay in the latter's papers, MOL, P344, 4.k. Cf. Kállay Diary, 15 May 1868 (Dnevnik, pp. 19-20); Kállay to Beust, 18 May 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177.
60. Kállay Diary, 3 and 16 May, and 5 and 11 Oct. 1868 (Dnevnik, pp. 14, 21, 93-94, 99); Endre Kovács and László Katus (eds.), Magyarszág története 1848-1890 [History of Hungary] (Budapest 1979), II, p. 834; Ráday to Kállay, 30 June 1868, MOL, P344, Ch/63-64; Ráday to Kállay, 3 Oct. 1868, ibid., ff. 76-77.
61. Kállay Diary, 3 May 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 13): "Oly ügyetlenül es oly el---?akodottan [word unclear, Radenic translates as "nadmeno" ("overbearing")]] beszélnek Bosznia elfoglalâsârôl, hogy természetesen a legjobb igyekezettel is bajos aztán a szerb kormányt meggyôzni a mi kormánynk ellenkezo nézeteinek őszinteségérôl."
62. Kállay to Beust, 18 May 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177, and minute. There is no record of this exchange in KA 5409, the Evidenzbüro file for this year.
63. László Katus, "A magyar politikai vezetôtéteg a délszlâv kérdésrôl 1849 és 1867 között", in Fried (éd.), Szerbek és magyarok a Duna mentén, p. 170. See also Paul Bödy, Joseph Eötvôs and the Modernization of Hungary 1840-1870, p. 88, quoting: Miloš Popović, Glas iz Srbije o pitanju narodnosti u Ugarskoj [A
Voice from Serbia on the Question of Nationality in Hungary] (Pest 1865); published in Hungarian as A nemzetiségi kérdés Magyarorszában szerb szempontból [The Nationality Question in Hungary from the Serb Viewpoint] (Szabadka 1865), pp. 146-47 (Hungarian edition). See also Kállay to Andrásy, 9 May 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/82; Kállay to Beust, 9 May 1968, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177; Kállay Diary, s.d. (Dnevnik, p. 17).

64. Kállay Diary, 12 and 20 May, 30 June, 2, 3 and 11 July 1868 (Dnevnik, pp. 18, 23, 47, 49, 53); Kállay to Andrássy, 20 May 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/85; Ludassy to Kállay, 17 June 1868, MOL, P344, 4.k. Cb/45.


67. Ibid., p. 357.

68. Ibid., pp. 357-58: "Samo jaka i nezavisna Srbija smela bi s Mađarkom u tešnje odnošaje stupiti, Jer kao takova ne bi se imala bojati da prama njoj ravnovaj Mađarok svoju narodnu ili državnu osobinu u pogibelj stavi...."

69. Ibid., p. 358: "Ungarska treba vremena da se konsoliduje i okrepi, da može svojoj zadači odgovoriti koja se u tome sastoji da slobođnu Evropu od varvarstva ruskog zaštitava. 'Pre svega, treba Rusiju potisnuti, i kada je to postignuto, onda dolazi vreme na vas južne Slavene da se oslobodite i sajedinite.'"

70. Ibid., pp. 358-59.

71. Ibid., pp. 359-60.

72. Ibid., p. 360: "sada ju mi još samo držimo dok Rusiju ne suzbijemo, kada je to postignuto onda ćemo ju napustiti i vas ćemo podići".

73. Ibid.


76. Ibid., p. 362: "Mi želimo jaku i što nezavisniju Ungarsku, jer samo u sajuzu sa takovom sigurno smo da smo kadri i svoju slobodu protiv trećeg jačeg sačuvati."

77. Ibid., p. 364: "ima i jaka vojnichka partija...koji u Beču rade da se Bosna i Hercegovina Austriji prisajedin."


88. Kállay to Andrássy, 31 May 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/92: "engem oda utasított, hogy itt határozottan kinyilatkoztassam, hogy mi semmiféle hódítási vágyakat nem táplálunk Bosznia iránt."


90. Kállay Diary, 19 Nov. 1868 (*Dnevnik*, p. 116): "Valóban szép eredmény lenne, ha a horvátokat és szerbeket egymástól elidegeníthetném....A boszniai kérdés tehát azon eris alma, mely kellő időben és ügyesen köztük dobva végkép elidegenítheti őket egymástól."


92. *Ibid.*, ff. 92-93: "nagyon is valószínűnek ... hogy Bosznia ... előbb utóbb ... a mi birtokunkba fog kerülni. De ennek még nem jött el ideje, most még minden áron meg kell győznünk a szerbeket, őszintségünkről, hogy nem szándékozunk azon tartományok iránt semmit is kezdeni."

CHAPTER 3: THE OBRENOVIĆ ASSASSINATION

23: The Topčider Murders

In the early evening of 10 June, Kállay went for a drive in Topčider Park, on the outskirts of Belgrade. He was thus nearly an eyewitness to the brutal murder there of Prince Michael who, together with one of his relatives, was shot dead by three men while out for a stroll. Also in Topčider was Ilija Garašanin, whose carriage, racing back to Belgrade, was Kállay's first intimation of the disaster. Kállay, on hearing the news, followed suit, joining Garašanin and the ministers at the government offices. Later he viewed the Prince's body laid out in the summer palace at Topčider.¹

The government declared a state of emergency and wheeled its troops into place to protect itself. For this ministers had Garašanin to thank, who was not even in the government but whose sense of public duty prompted him to swift action in defence of it. The conspirators had in fact planned to slaughter leading ministers and officials and place their own friends in power. Garašanin not only got back into town ahead of them, but by sheer force of personality dragooned the panic-stricken ministers into standing firm. Faced with this solid front, the conspirators' ramshackle plot simply collapsed. They were rounded up by the authorities within a couple of days, and most of them met the firing squad a few weeks later.²

24: Blaznavac Takes Charge

Garašanin, though the saviour of the situation, nevertheless did not take over the direction of affairs. Instead, the war minister Milivoj Blaznavac, once he recovered his nerve, acted swiftly to establish his own ascendancy. In accordance with the Constitution of 1838, the automatic head of the provisional government was the president of the Council, who also happened to be a member of Garašanin's conservative faction.³ This provisional government decreed the convocation of a Skupština to elect a permanent Regency, and an Extraordinary Skupština to choose Michael's successor.⁴ The Garašanin faction would in all probability have favoured Nikola of Montenegro as Prince, the latter being a candidate considered acceptable to Russia.⁵ Blaznavac, however, summoned the officers of the army the day after
Michael's assassination, and proclaimed an oath of allegiance to the dead Prince's nephew, fourteen year old Milan Obrenović.\(^6\)

Blaznavac's move was one that the Hungarian government had every reason to welcome. The war minister counted as a 'Hungarophile', or at least a man opposed to Russian influence in Serbia. The proclamation of allegiance to Milan, whose title to succeed was unimpeachable, thus shrewdly steered around the threat of a Russophile head of state, and at the same time put Blaznavac in a position to influence affairs during the inevitable period of minority rule.\(^7\)

Kállay, who considered Michael's death "a great calamity for us", was at first inclined to despair. "Now I have to start all over again, only there's nothing to start with," he lamented in his diary.\(^8\) He soon realised, however, that Blaznavac would in many ways be just as suitable. Apart from anything else, Blaznavac himself made the first move to reassure the Hungarians, by sending Orešković, on 12 June, to make clear to Kállay what his position was, and to ask Kállay to come and see him. Blaznavac also wanted to know if he could send Orešković up to Pest again, for further talks with Andrásy, since Orešković had told him of the Bosnian negotiations which had been going on up to the time of Michael's assassination.\(^9\)

Kállay came away convinced that, as he put it to Andrásy, the war minister was "a clever, cunning, bold, energetic man".\(^10\) Blaznavac wanted to have the deciding voice in government by having himself appointed *de facto* head of the three-man Regency.

"From our point of view," wrote Kállay,

...the main thing is that the tripartite government should follow policies which are in harmony with our own. ...Milivoj [Blaznavac] offers us more guarantees than anyone else. He is an enemy of Russian influence and is looking to Hungary's help for the prosperity of Serbia.\(^11\)

To underline the fact that the interests under discussion were first and foremost Hungarian ones, Kállay also pointed out the "peculiar circumstance" that

...towards Austria the greatest antipathy prevails, whereas towards constitutional Hungary there is much sympathy, and everything which Serbia hopes for from Austria's support is attributed solely to Your Excellency's influence.\(^12\)

To Beust Kállay merely repeated the fact that Blaznavac had emerged as a
strongman in his own right. Kállay offered Beust no advice whatsoever as to who he thought should succeed Michael. Nor did he make any allusion to Blaznavac's explicitly pro-Hungarian attitude. Instead, he explained the provisional government's anxiety to proclaim Milan Prince as due to their fear of Turkish interference in the succession. Blaznavac, in fact, had specifically requested Austria-Hungary's assistance in preventing this, a request which Kállay endorsed.13

25: The Debate on Intervention

Kállay may have calculated that, for the moment, Andrássy could be relied upon to promote Milan as Austria-Hungary's choice at the highest levels. In this, Kállay's confidence was perfectly justified, even if Andrássy did not have everything his own way.

From the moment Kállay wired the news of Prince Michael's murder a lively tussle had been going on between Beust and Andrássy as to what attitude Austria-Hungary should take in the question of the succession and how far, if at all, the Monarchy should try to influence the results. The fact that Andrássy immediately entered the lists, with the suspicion that not only the Karadorđević family, but also the Hungarian Serbs under Miletić, were implicated in the assassination, may have given pause to any thoughts Beust may have had of supporting the rival dynasty.14 Andrássy claimed to have information, from a source in Paris, that "Karad[orđević] has been in contact with the Miletić party and with Moscow", and called on Beust to have both Prince Alexander and his son Peter shadowed.15 Andrássy was not alone in his suspicions: it turned out that the Emperor himself was reluctant to endorse Karadorđević, another factor which would have influenced Beust.16 In the circumstances, Andrássy's fears that the ex-Prince had "friends in the foreign ministry", because of his compliant role during the 1848-49 revolution, may have been true, but did not count for much in view of the general assumption of his guilt.17

The real conflict of views between Vienna and Pest was over how the Monarchy could ensure that its preferred candidate, Milan, was chosen. On 12 June, Andrássy staked out the high ground for a policy of intervention and control.18 He informed Beust that, the day before Michael's murder, warning of a plot against the Serbian
government had been received from the deputy lord-lieutenant of Bâcs-Bodrog county. According to Andrássy's information, this conspiracy was known to both Karadordević and Miletić. Since Miletić was, in Andrássy's words, "bekanntlich ganz russischen Einflüssen zugänglich", the fact that Karadordević was much influenced by him made a Karadordević restoration highly inadvisable.19

In a revealing passage Andrássy spelt out why the way the choice was made was almost as important as the choice itself:

Überhaupt bin ich überzeugt, daß ein Fürst von Serbien vom Kaiser von Österreich und König von Ungarn gewählt werden müßte wie der Obergespann eines Komitats.... Ein schwacher Fürst wäre wenig geneigt, durch abenteuerliche Unternehmungen die Lösung der Orientalischen Frage zu überstürzen ....20

The Monarchy's influence would be further consolidated, Andrássy felt, by the deployment of a couple of armoured warships on the Danube, a move which he had been urging on Beust since the previous year.21 It would help, too, if troops could be moved into Syrmia, and if Kállay could be instructed to ask the provisional government in Belgrade not to issue passes to Serbian subjects wishing to attend a forthcoming nationalist festival in Austro-Hungarian territory.22

Beust's answer showed how much more aware he was than Andrássy of the wider implications of Austro-Hungarian involvement. He had already received a fairly clear intimation from the Prussian embassy that, in view of the alarm any unilateral action would cause in Russia, the Monarchy would do well to maintain a neutral attitude and do nothing without consulting the other signatories to the Treaty of Paris.23 Since the French and British governments shared this view, Beust knew that his hands were tied.

The chancellor agreed with the desirability of Milan as Prince. The acceptance of Milan would solve the question of the succession, and would clearly not be a triumph for Russian influence. But Beust was convinced that a completely passive attitude, in the period leading up to the meeting of the Skupština, was Austria-Hungary's only feasible option. He made it clear he believed the principle of non-intervention applied to the Turks as well, and he had instructed Prokesch-Osten to make representations to this effect.24 It was equally important, however, to avoid anything, "was bei der
jetzigen Sachlage als Provocation oder Einmischung gedeutet und als solche gegen uns ausgebeutet werden könnte." In line with this resolution, he would not risk moving more troops into Syrmia, and he would ask the Serbian government simply to exercise caution as to whom they issued passes to.\(^{25}\)

The larger view of the affair was for Beust decisive. The Monarchy, two years after Sadowa, simply could not afford to indulge in provocative gestures like troop movements or sending gunboats to breathe down the neck of the new regime. Beust's reference to the "Empfindlichkeit der Serben" reveals, on the contrary, his awareness that such heavy-handedness might actually make things worse.\(^{26}\) In the question of who became Prince of Serbia in 1868, the Ballhaus could afford to sit back and let the Serbian scenery sort itself out.

Andrássy, however, confided to Kállay that "I cannot share this view and hope that I can induce Beust to drop it, by means of His Majesty if by no other."\(^{27}\) He left Kállay in no doubt that some sort of positive intervention on the side of Milan's candidacy was preferable to inaction. "Your task," he wrote on 14 June, "will be to judge how far you can step into the foreground....if you are sure that Milan's party really has as much chance as you report, then I shall assume responsibility in advance for any and all activity."\(^{28}\) Andrássy claimed that the foreign ministry would "later reconcile itself to success" in the matter;\(^{29}\) but there was no indication that this was likely in the letter he received from the Emperor that same day. Francis Joseph, on the contrary, showed no deviation from Beust's already expressed policy.\(^{30}\)

To this Andrássy replied that he still thought the Monarchy should exercise its influence on the elections "in entschiedener Weise".\(^{31}\) He also renewed his assault on Beust, pointing out that "history" showed how the influence of France in the Danubian Principalities dated from its active role in elections there. The same involvement in princely elections explained Russian influence in Serbia, in Andrássy's eyes. And in a frank evaluation of Serbian autonomy, he pointed out that "Die Geschichte zeigt es fernerhin, daß das Recht der eigenen Fürstenwahl ebenso nachtheilig für das betreffende Land, als vortheilhaft für die Nachbarstaaten sich erwiesen hat."\(^{32}\)

For Andrássy, of course, there was an additional reason for treating Serbia as if it
were already a province of the Habsburg Monarchy.

Die Einflußnahme auf die Fürstenwahl ist meiner Ansicht nach nicht nur vom Standpunkte des Vortheiles, sondern auch von jenem der Notwendigkeit mit Rücksicht auf ihre Rückwirkung auf die Nationalitäten im Innern der Monarchie zu beurtheilen, ... das einzige Mittel einem Einfluß Serbiens auf die hierständigen Serben zu begegnen nur darin bestehen kann, unseren eigenen Einfluß auf Serbien auszuüben.33

For this purpose a Regency would be ideal, "weil die Mitglieder derselben ... keine Zeit haben werden gegen uns Pläne zu schmieden." Finally, helping the side most likely to win the election in any case would give Austria-Hungary a leverage it had not previously possessed.34

From the Emperor, all this won Andrássy was a terse reiteration of what he had already been told: "einen factischen Einfluß" in the choice of Serbia's next Prince was not to be thought of.35 From Beust, Andrássy received a further patient expose of the arguments in favour of neutrality. Beust pointed out that, while the Monarchy was in a unique position to influence events, it was also uniquely exposed to Prussian and Russian insinuations that it was aiming to annex Serbia. Non-involvement did not mean indifference to the results. The Monarchy could do no less than voice its "offene Sympathie" for Milan; but it dare not do more without endangering what influence it already possessed, or hoped to possess, and might in fact harm Milan's chances.36

Kállay's official instructions reflected this balance to a nicety, enjoining him to endorse Milan by all means, but "nicht über jene Grenzen hinauszugehen, wo unsere Partheinahme für die Sache des Candidaten ...denselben leicht als speziellen österreichischen Candidaten erscheinen ließe."37 They can have given no comfort to Kállay himself, who had done what he could to convince the chancellor

alle Mittel anzuwenden, um für den Fall, wenn Milan erwählt werden sollte, solche Regenten gewählt würden, welche die äußere Politik Serbiens im Sinn des verstorbenen Fürsten Michael fortführen wollten.38

In a parallel letter to Andrássy, Kállay was even more explicit:

We can perhaps take the fate of Serbia and the East into our hands if we are capable of making financial sacrifices.39

He had mentioned the matter to Beust, he confided, but "not so explicitly." For
Andrássy, Kállay was prepared to fill in the blanks:

> Who knows, the question perhaps turns on only a couple of 100,000 forints, and perhaps only because of this Russian influence will triumph.\(^{40}\)

The clearly expressed desire of both the Emperor and Beust to remain on the sidelines, however, did not prevent Andrássy and Kállay from trying to put some of their ideas into practice. Indeed, they appear to have made ready to do so in open disregard of the official foreign policy laid down by Beust, as if confident that the latter's objections could be overturned, if not simply ignored. The result, before the end of June, was an ignominious climb-down by the chancellor.

The crucial role here was played by Andrássy, who went up to Vienna in person to pursue the matter.\(^{41}\) It is not clear whether Andrássy also appealed to Francis Joseph although, in view of his earlier threat to involve the Emperor if necessary, this seems more than likely.\(^{42}\) What is clear is that, face to face with Andrássy, Beust's reasoned opposition crumbled:

> ...after I had later contacted him personally in Vienna, he changed his point of view, and himself admitted that, in the present circumstances, he would bear the responsibility for the loss of the initiative....\(^{43}\)

Beust, for his part, had some success in persuading Andrássy that money was perhaps not the only way to influence the election result.

> I received the answer that I should find out from you [Kállay] roughly what sort of sum would be needed, and whether it would not be possible to achieve the same sort of success by handing out orders and decorations.\(^{44}\)

For Andrássy this had a certain appeal: his earlier proposal to deploy monitors on the Danube had been just such an attempt to exert influence on the cheap. Beust did not mention any figures, but Andrássy was aware that "under the present set-up, there cannot be a great amount at his disposal."\(^{45}\) Since Kállay obviously trusted Blaznavac, Andrássy suggested, "perhaps through him you can get some idea of what sort of sum might be effective in the last moments of the election."\(^{46}\)

Kállay, however, already knew of Beust's climb-down, and may even have made his own contribution to resolving the argument. He did this not just by reiterating his belief
that the Monarchy might have to pay for the success of its preferred candidate, but also by putting forward an idea which complemented Andrásy's views on the desirability of having a Regency in Serbia.

Andrássy's conviction was that a Regency would be too preoccupied with its own domestic vulnerability to take an active role in foreign affairs, particularly the fomentation of further unrest among the Balkan Christians. Kállay's idea was in some respects more subtle, and occurred to him on 19 June after a conversation with his Roumanian colleague, Ionescu. The latter informed him that the Omladina and Serbian liberals preferred Jovan Ristić as a member of the Regency than Garašanin. Some form of constitutional and political reform was at least a possibility with Ristić, whereas Garašanin was notoriously authoritarian. As Kállay recorded that evening,

> This gave me an idea: we must try to get the new government to embark on a course of liberalism and constitutionality. In consequence of this would come the formation of parties in the country, and such a country cannot be very strong as far as foreign affairs are concerned. A state can be strong in foreign affairs only under an absolutist concentration of powers. With this alone we would put a stop to [their] expansionist aims.

In a report to Beust on 22 June, Kállay developed this theme in a way that would make the idea of flooding the Serbian election with cash more acceptable. Serbia's government was essentially autocratic, and public opinion, unable to concern itself with domestic affairs, was all the more easy to inveigle into nationalist frenzy and foreign wars. The introduction of "freisinnige Institutionen" would change all this.

> ...so würden die Eroberungsabsichten der Groß-Serben wenn auch nicht vollständig vernichtet, doch in den Hintergrund gedrängt werden. Ich habe mit mehreren Groß-Serben gesprochen.... Sie sehen wohl Alle ein, daß ein liberaleres Regierungssystem die Aktionskraft Serbiens in hohem Maße hemmen würde.

Of the two chief rivals for the post of Regent, Garašanin and Blaznavac, it was the latter, Kállay told Beust, who was the more likely to make this sort of development possible, because he had expressed a wish to have Ristić as his principal associate. It was only at this point that Kállay plainly stated that "eine beträchtliche Summe" would be a good way of setting Serbia on its liberal course.
Beust never replied directly to this, so it is impossible to say whether Kállay's appeal fell on fertile ground. Yet not only the subsequent course of liberal nationalism in Serbia, but also its previous history, shows how flawed was Kállay's analysis. Serbian liberalism was by definition strongly nationalist, and notoriously committed to the cause of national liberation. The bitterest criticism of Prince Michael by the *Omladina* and Milič was that in 1866 he had *not* involved Serbia in war; and it was under a succession of Liberal cabinets that Serbia stampeded into war against the Turks in 1876. Neither the unpreparedness of the country for any sort of sustained hostilities, nor the acerbity of political life in the period following the introduction of Serbia's 'liberal' constitution of 1869, offered any impediment to this Gadarene plunge. A Serbia with more liberal institutions was, if anything, more likely to be a firebrand of nationalist emotions.

Whatever the reasons for Beust's change of tack, Kállay received a telegramme on 25 June, asking him what sort of sum he thought would be necessary for "secret expenditure". By this time, however, the situation had changed so much that Kállay no longer saw the need for direct intervention. Blaznavac was so clearly the only serious contender for power that "Jetzt wäre... eine jede Ausgabe Verschwendung." Kállay was at pains to point out that the situation might be different once Blaznavac was firmly in the saddle. Then he might be exposed to temptations from "verschiedenen Seiten", and Austria-Hungary might be obliged "seine Freundschaft auch auf eine handgreifliche Weise zu erhalten." And to make sure Blaznavac knew who his real benefactors were, Kállay informed him personally that "if he should need money after the election, I will be able to dispose of certain sums."

When Kállay assured Beust that Blaznavac "die bisher bestandenen freundschaftlichen Beziehungen zu Österreich nicht nur erhalten, sondern noch mehr consolidiren wünschen," he of course meant 'Hungary' rather then 'Austria', as his correspondence with Andrásy attests. Kállay's diary also shows how much of an anti-Austrian tinge this collaboration with Blaznavac could assume:

He [Blaznavac] claimed that he wants to conduct the friendliest possible policy towards Hungary, and in such a way that there develops between the Hungarian nation and the
South Slavs the most intimate alliance, so that if need be each would defend the others, on the one side, from Russian and Turkish influence, and one the other against Austria.57

Other subjects discussed between Kállay and Blaznavac were equally unlikely to find their way into the despatches Beust received. Blaznavac claimed to want to preserve the Turkish imperium, but was naturally interested in assuming control of Bosnia. In this case he was willing to concede some territory to the Monarchy "in the interest of rounding out our Croatia."58 Once Serbo-Hungarian friendship was on a firm footing, he thought customs barriers between the two countries should be abolished.59 Blaznavac even, much to Kállay's delight, expressed an interest in some form of larger south-east European union, either "a great republic or a monarchical confederation of small states", which would embrace the Hungarians, South Slavs, Greeks and Roumanians.60

Kállay was quite excited at this reappearance of his "dear old ideas", or what he described as

The great Danubian confederation on democratic foundations, which unites the different but roughly equal nations, each of whom has reason to fear that foreign powers will repress its nationality and individuality. However, gathered together in amicable alliance they can all preserve their individuality and protect one another from any and all foreign influence.61

"It would," he concluded, "be a strange twist of fate if I were able to contribute to the realisation of this idea."62

In the end Beust's initial assumption, that there was no need to intervene in support of a faction which already held all the cards in its favour, was justified by events. The Serbian Skupština convened on 2 July, and acclaimed Milan as hereditary Prince the same day.63 The deputies also had to decide which team to approve as Regents, but the result was a foregone conclusion. Blaznavac was elected first Regent by an overwhelming majority. As co-Regents he had already announced he would choose Jovan Ristić, the diplomat and vaguely Liberal politician, and the colourless Jovan Gavrilović.64

The Skupština may have been content to rubber-stamp both Milan's succession and a Blaznavac Regency, because these appeared to be popular choices. It was more,
however, than just a rubber-stamp. Michael's assassination had undoubtedly encouraged expectations, at least among the Liberal intelligentsia and what little urban middle class there was in Serbia, that his repressive police state would now be dismantled. The Liberal element of the Skupština were also eager to see the blame for Michael's death fixed firmly on the Karađorđevići, but were just as insistent on constitutional reform. The Blaznavac Regency appealed to both these factions: both Blaznavac and Ristić found it politically convenient to use Alexander Karađorđević as a scapegoat, and each, for his own reasons, could see advantages in a limited liberalisation of the regime.

26: Turkish Recognition

Even after the Skupština's public endorsement of Milan and his Regents, there was still uncertainty as to whether the Sultan's government would ratify the assembly's acclamation of Milan as hereditary Prince of Serbia. Milan was undoubtedly Prince Michael's closest surviving male relative, which satisfied the requirements of the Serbian law of 1859. He was not, however, the "direct male heir" specified by the hatti şerif of 1830; and it was the latter which, in the Porte's eyes, was the legitimate instrument of succession in Serbia. By sticking to the letter of the hatti şerif, the Turks might seek to maintain that Milan had merely been elected, which implied that any other Serbian subject might conceivably be put in his place, whereas the Serbian government wished above all to establish the Obrenović family as the sole dynastic line. Resolving this arcane but important difference gave the Habsburg Monarchy a renewed opportunity to demonstrate its support for the Blaznavac régime.

On 8 July Kállay saw Ristić, who formally requested Austro-Hungarian help in securing a berat, or imperial decree, from Constantinople which explicitly recognised the Obrenovići as hereditary rulers. Failing this, he told Kállay, it would be better to have a berat which simply recognised Milan as Prince, rather than one which included the word 'elected'.

Kállay threw his weight behind the request, but Beust did not need persuading of its merits. He immediately instructed Prokesch-Osten to back the efforts of Serbia's agent in Constantinople to obtain the desired berat. Blaznavac, he told Prokesch, "nous
inspire de la confiance”; furthermore, he would serve as a useful brake on the more overtly nationalist Ristić. Refusing the Serbian government’s request would create bad feeling; granting it "pourrait produire des avantages considérables". And in view of Kállay’s apparent enthusiasm for Danubian confederation (of which Beust was quite unaware), the main advantage adduced by the chancellor was an interesting one:

Nous devons attacher un grand prix, et l’intérêt du gouvernement ottoman nous paraît identique au nôtre sous ce rapport, à ce que les pays limitrophes de notre Empire ne puissent se fondre en un seul corps politique, dont l’existence constituerait évidemment pour nous une menace permanente. Or, en rendant la principauté héréditaire dans la famille Obrenovitch, le Sultan établirait une barrière propre à empêcher à tout jamais la réunion de la Servie à la Moldo-Valachie....^69

Beust also pointed out that both the Viceroy of Egypt and the Prince of Roumania enjoyed hereditary status, and that the Porte could maintain it was simply reaffirming the spirit of the 1830 hatti şerif.

This at least was language that Prokesch-Osten could understand, both in its cold consideration of the Monarchy’s own interest and in its use of legalistic loopholes. The ambassador reported by 14 July that the Grand Vezir had been won over. The Sultan’s chief minister had to agree that the principle of hereditary succession had already been effectively conceded by the Porte. Even more decisive was the consideration that an undisputed succession offered the best chances of stability in Serbia, and hence the Ottoman Empire.70 A berat was subsequently issued in accordance with the Serbian request.71

Kállay, upon receiving Prokesch-Osten’s news, could not resist claiming this as a triumph for Austro-Hungarian influence in Serbia.72 The Serbian government was all the more thankful, Kállay claimed, because it knew the Russian and Italian agents in Constantinople had done what they could to hinder the Sultan’s recognition.73 As a consequence, and bearing in mind the markedly anti-Russian tendencies of Blaznavac, Kállay felt that Russian policy in Serbia had suffered a considerable setback. The Monarchy should hasten to express its support for the Regents’ reform plans, in order not to lose this advantage.74
27: Roots of the Conspiracy

Political reform in Serbia, however, was intimately bound up with the question of complicity in Prince Michael's murder, for many of the people who came to prominence under the Regency were tainted by, if not directly involved in, the June conspiracy. In backing the cause of reform, therefore, Kállay, and behind him the Austro-Hungarian foreign ministry, were inevitably drawn into supporting the cover-up over who was responsible for the assassination. The Hungarian government went even further: by helping the Serbian Regents in their attempt to fasten the blame for Prince Michael's death exclusively on Alexander Karadordević, the Andrássy cabinet exposed itself to a moral ambiguity which was to rebound on it in the end.

There was no problem as to who had committed the actual murders of 10 June. It was Pavle Radovanović, a Belgrade lawyer of frustrated political ambition, who organised the killing, carried out by one of his brothers and two associates. What the conspirators steadfastly denied, however (except under torture which, to the consternation of Kállay and other diplomatic representatives, the Serbian authorities proved all too willing to employ), was any involvement by the Karadordević family or leading Liberal politicians. Pavle Radovanović went to the firing squad refuting these charges.75

Yet the evidence for the involvement of the Karadordević and the Liberals was considerable. With regard to Alexander Karadordević and his followers, not only the Serbian government, which had a vested interest in blaming them, but also foreign observers like Kállay, were convinced of their guilt.76 It was easily proved that Alexander's secretary and relative, Pavle Tripković, had met them on various occasions and had supplied them with arms and money.77 Karadordević, who lived in exile in Pest but who still had property interests in Serbia, paid Radovanović a retainer to act as his lawyer. The chief beneficiary of a revolution, however, was to be not Alexander but his son Peter. The Karadordević family were the likely replacement for Prince Michael's dynasty, and they must have known a revolution was in the offing, if not an assassination.78

The extent to which Serbian Liberals were privy to Prince Michael's murder, by
contrast, was never satisfactorily cleared up. This was for mainly political reasons, not for lack of at least circumstantial evidence. The Liberals, in fact, because of their opposition to Prince Michael and the latter’s repression of the Omladina, had every reason to hope for a change of regime. What saved the Liberals was the purely political need which the new Regents had of their cooperation. For Blaznavac in particular it was essential to have the support of more than just the army, and since the conservatives would not work with him, the alternative had to be the Liberals. Hence Blaznavac’s insistence on choosing Ristić as a partner. Ristić, though hardly a Liberal by conviction, had earned himself something of a reputation as a constitutionalist, and was thus the link between Blaznavac and the Liberals.

Essentially, Blaznavac and Ristić did a deal with the leading Liberals. The Liberals’ blatant foreknowledge of the assassination was to be skated over, and the Regents would take steps to introduce a constitution. In return, the Liberals would give the government their support, and some of them would even join government service. After first pressing for Liberals on Habsburg soil to be prosecuted or extradited, therefore, the Serbian government quietly let its own investigations drop. The Andrássy government, which had responded willingly by rounding up Vladimir Jovanović and the Bulgarian nationalist Ljuben Karavelov, in Novi Sad, found itself acting alone. In the end Jovanović and Karavelov had to be released for want of evidence, not least because the originators of the action against them, the Serbian government, would not pursue the matter. There was also the ticklish question of whether such persons, charged with what could be described as political crimes, could legally be extradited to Serbia. As Kállay reminded Andrássy on 10 July, there was no treaty of extradition between the Monarchy and Serbia, and in any case if the offences were to be regarded as political, then Jovanović and Karavelov could not be prosecuted for them under Hungarian law.

There remains the possibility of foreign involvement in Michael’s assassination. Suspicion was inevitably directed at Russia, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. The Russian government might have been thought to have had a reason for wanting Michael removed, since it thoroughly disapproved of his dismissal of Garašanin, in late
1867, and the turn towards Austria-Hungary. Andrassy certainly thought a link existed. So did the Prussian consul in Belgrade, although the Prussian government was not convinced by this. But despite the bad feeling which still prevailed between Belgrade and St. Petersburg no one else seriously considered the idea of Russian responsibility, nor did any evidence emerge at the trial of the murderers to suggest it.

The charge against Austria-Hungary is also easily disproven, and had its origins in the generally bad relations between the Monarchy and Serbia for most of the nineteenth century. In support of the suspicion of Austro-Hungarian involvement, however, there are only three considerations worth citing. One was the fact, generally known, that the Monarchy opposed Prince Michael's plans for a Balkan alliance and general uprising against Ottoman rule. Another was the past willingness of the Monarchy to intervene in Serbian affairs and to influence the choice of Prince. The Monarchy's record in this type of interference was irregular; but the willingness was there, and was alive and well in 1868, as Andrassy's correspondence with Beust demonstrates. Thirdly, there was the initial enthusiasm of Prokesch-Osten, the ambassador in Constantinople, for a Karadordevic candidacy in 1868.

Against these points must be ranged the whole trend of Austro-Serbian relations in the year leading up to Prince Michael's murder. Naturally Beust opposed Michael's Balkan alliance schemes; but for both him and Andrassy this was if anything an additional reason for trying to improve relations with Serbia, the better to exercise a restraining influence. Beust differed from Andrassy as to the means to be employed. But there can be no doubt that in Vienna, as much as in Pest, Michael was by and large regarded as an asset, whose replacement would have been not only fraught with risk but unnecessary.

Another proof of the Monarchy's non-involvement was the zeal with which the Hungarian government, with the tacit approval of the Ballhaus, pursued Alexander Karadordevic through the Hungarian courts in the course of the next three years. On Kallay's recommendation, and after a formal request by the Serbian Regency, the Hungarian authorities placed Karadordevic under arrest on 8 August. At the special request of Belgrade, the Hungarian government arranged for this part of Alexander's
The saga of the Karadordević trial, and the way in which it became the litmus test of Serbo-Hungarian relations, will be treated at length later. Here it is worth pointing out that, if either the Austro-Hungarian foreign ministry or the Hungarian government had been behind a conspiracy designed to put Alexander Karadordević on the Serbian throne, then Andrássy would never have put so much time and energy into this prosecution. On Andrássy's behalf Kállay, over the next few years, was repeatedly to protest the government's determination to secure a conviction to the increasingly sceptical Regents.

Finally there is the conclusive evidence of Kállay's own diary and his correspondence with Andrássy. Kállay's expressions of regret at the passing of someone he had personally liked, as well as found useful in furthering Hungarian interests, are too numerous and unqualified to be feigned. Andrássy, too, confessed himself "shaken" by the news. It was only in the weeks following the assassination that Andrássy and Kállay began to appreciate unforeseen advantages in the new situation.

In the case of the Turks, by contrast, a number of clues point to some form of Turkish involvement, although in view of the paucity of evidence it is unlikely that these will ever be substantiated. Of all the powers only the Ottoman government had the sort of motivation that would have made an incitement to murder explicable. Prince Michael had been a thorn in its side throughout the 1860's. Far more than Austria-Hungary, the Porte had reason to fear Michael's activity, which was aimed directly at Turkish rule in the Balkans. The recent reconciliation between Prince Michael and Ilija Garašanin may also have caused alarm in the Turkish government.

28: Hungarian Domestic Consequences

An important domestic consequence of the Obrenović assassination for the Hungarian government was that it provided the pretext for moving against the Serbian nationalist movement in the Vojvodina. Unfortunately for the cause of Serbo-Hungarian friendship, the practical results of this purge were nugatory, in that no evidence of serious involvement by Svetozar Miletić and his supporters was ever uncovered. Instead, the Hungarian Serbs were even further alienated from their
government; and in Serbia, although the action taken was not unwelcome to the
Blaznavac regime, among the population as a whole the persecution of Hungary's Serbs
was not easily forgotten.

Andrássy started from the assumption that Miletic was not only hand in glove with
the Karadordević conspiracy, but backed by Moscow as well. The first part of this
assumption, if not the second, was one that Kállay shared, although he revealed an
additional calculation behind it when he wrote that "It would be very much in our
interest if we could render the incorrigible agitator Miletic harmless so neatly." This
would also, he added, be agreeable to Blaznavac. The problem was proving Miletic's
connection with the assassination.

To gather the necessary evidence the Andrássy government on 20 June appointed as
royal commissioner Nándor Ast, with sweeping powers of investigation. The interior
minister, Béla Wenckheim, advised the commissioner to suspend Miletic from his post
as mayor of Novi Sad, but leave the rest of the administration and council in place if
possible.

Ast arrived in Novi Sad on 26 June, and proceeded to put these instructions into
effect. The royal commissioner soon discovered, however, that his task was a fruitless
one. His early prediction that Miletic's suspension would provoke "maßenhafte
Resignationen" was proven wrong; but in the crucial matter of evidence Ast was on a
hiding to nothing. By 3 July all Ast could relay to Pest was the opinion of some of his
witnesses that "Miletic – as mayor – ...exercises complete absolutism in administrative
matters ...and practises a genuine terrorism on the peace-loving Novi Sad
community." Wenckheim, in reply, conveyed his wholehearted approval of Ast's measures, and
recommended suspending from office any councillors who gave him difficulties. On
the basis of the material Ast had collected on Miletic, Wenckheim wrote, he too came
to the same conclusions "with regard to his [Miletic's] political character and
activities". There was nevertheless a snag:

I do not ... consider this evidence sufficient to undertake legal
proceedings against him [Miletic], ... and for this reason I
request Your Honour to carry on with your investigation
By 8 July, however, Ast was compelled to admit he could find no hard evidence for a couple of secret meetings Miletić was supposed to have had, with Pavle Radovanović and his associates, prior to the assassination.

Long before that the government's strategy for prosecuting Miletić had unravelled completely. On 15 July, justice minister Horvát informed Wenckheim that, on the available evidence, a case against Miletić could not be sustained. The lack of evidence did not prevent Horvát from recommending that Miletić be kept out of office anyway. The latter, Horvát wrote, had shown "such vehement hatred of the government and such anti-constitutional tendencies", that "in the interests of public order" he should not be allowed to resume the post of mayor. But the idea of a criminal prosecution remained untenable, and Ast formally advised Wenckheim to drop the case on 9 September.

Miletić was never reinstated as mayor of Novi Sad, and it was not until May 1869 that the constitutional administration of the town was restored. Jovanović and Karavelov, despite the failure of the Serbian Regency to pursue them, were allowed to languish in Hungarian prisons for months, and the government ignored Miletić's parliamentary interpellation in November, demanding to know under what law they were being held. In fact the whole campaign against Miletić, as well as the studied neglect of Jovanović and Karavelov, was due to more than just the desire of the Andrassy government to remove these domestic thorns from its side. Action against Serbian liberal nationalism within Hungary also tied in with the Hungarian government's policy towards the Serbian Regency.

29: The Regents, Miletić and the Omladina

The Regents' need for an accommodation with the Serbian Liberals did not mean they were any more well-disposed towards the liberal movement among the Hungarian Serbs. On the contrary, the Regents feared all the more the criticism which Miletić, through his journal Zastava, had for years directed against Belgrade governments. Blaznavac regarded Miletić with particular animosity, and was of the opinion that the Hungarian authorities should simply "string him up". Ristić had hardly less reason.
to fear Milić, being frequently attacked for the insincerity of his commitment to national liberation and constitutional reform. So in the aftermath of the assassination, Milić and *Zastava* were openly accused by the Regency of complicity or at the very least foreknowledge, and the Hungarian government did its best to give substance to the accusation.\textsuperscript{110} Milić, however, not only sailed through the storm unscathed, but fought back. *Zastava* raised the suspicion that the Regents themselves might have been implicated in the assassination, especially Blaznavac, who was a member of Michael's government.\textsuperscript{111}

The Hungarian government was thoroughly alive to the credit it could earn with the Regents by acting against Milić. At the same time, Andrásy had his suspicions that the Serbian government was secretly cultivating links with Novi Sad, in a bid to raise its stock in the South Slav world generally. Kállay, therefore, was set a dual task, which became a regular feature of the Hungarian relationship with Belgrade for the next two years. He was expected to encourage the Regents, especially Blaznavac, in their apprehension of Milić as their blackest enemy, and to keep them grateful by promising constant vigilance on the part of the Hungarian government against the Novi Sad "Groß-Serben". He had also to keep on the alert for any signs of a rapprochement between Milić and the Regents, which might signify a renewal of Serbian support for subversive nationalism in Hungary itself. Any such development was to be discouraged as strongly as possible.

This process of mutual reassurance and continual probing was one that enabled Kállay, in the months following Michael's death, to consolidate his hold on the Prince's successors. Each side was anxious to convince the other of its good faith. When Andrásy, for instance, telegraphed Kállay that the Hungarian authorities could prove Milić's guilt, if they arrested Jovanović, Karavelov and other intimates, and were willing to do so if Belgrade wished it, the provisional government replied with a formal request to that effect.\textsuperscript{112}

The question of whether the Serbian government should allow Serbian citizens to attend the third Congress of the *Omladina* in Hungary, in September, prompted further manoeuvrings. The Regents, in Stokes' words, "were well aware that the main tenet of
the Omladina constitution... implied opposition to the Regency's policy of friendship with Hungary. At the same time, the Regents were reluctant to impugn their own nationalist credentials by identifying with the Hungarian government's repressive policy towards the Omladina. Thus, when Kállay intimated to Blaznavac, on 14 August, that "now is the time to show that they [the Regents] are our true friends and not to permit demonstrations against the Hungarian government", Blaznavac wriggled. He assured Kállay that the government would do its best to moderate the tone of the Congress, but that the Omladinists were in any case more concerned with literature than politics.

Otherwise the Serbian government did its utmost to distance itself from Miletic, in a clear attempt to please the Hungarians. In the autumn, as the pact with the Liberals started to take effect and prominent Liberals joined government service, rumours reached Kállay that the Regents were consulting Miletic himself on these changes. Both Blaznavac and Ristić strongly denied this, the former "adding that they don't need Miletic's wisdom." The rumours, however, persisted, and Kállay's confidant Dr. Rosen, at least, was convinced that a "secret correspondence" was going on. "By means of this correspondence," Kállay gathered from Rosen, "the government is courting the Omladina." As long as the Regents continued to deny these allegations, though, the Hungarians continued to profess to believe them.

30: Consolidating Influence?

The opportunity to harass Miletić and his party at home, coupled with the Serbian government's public disavowal of the Hungarian Serb nationalists, were purely domestic political advantages wrested from the seeming catastrophe of Prince Michael's assassination. On the broader front, there was perhaps reason to be thankful at the way things had turned out.

Serbia was now governed by a Regency, committed to internal reform and concerned more for its internal stability than for a dangerous adventurism in foreign policy. By restraining the Porte from intervening in the succession and the choice of Regents, Austro-Hungarian diplomacy had done Serbia a real service. Then, by inducing the Turks to accept the hereditary right of the Obrenović family, the Monarchy
earned the future loyalty of Prince Milan, arguably a factor of greater importance in
Austro-Serbian relations for the next quarter century than all the schemes hatched in
Pest in the period 1867-71. In the place of the potentially formidable combination of
Prince Michael and Garašanin, there was now the fourteen year old Milan, surrounded
by men whose avowed purpose was friendship with Austria-Hungary, or rather
Hungary, and the repudiation of Russian influence.

Kállay was inclined to be optimistic, although he stressed the pitfalls in his reports to
both Beust and Andrássy. Kállay warned Beust, in August, that the expansionist
policies of the previous regime were not entirely abandoned. This was not because of a
natural belligerence or overwhelming sense of grievance among the Balkan peoples.
On the contrary, the Balkan peoples, in Kállay’s opinion, were simply not capable of
united action, because of their differences of language, religion and culture, and would
not be for a long time to come. The real threat was that one of the insurrections which
occasionally broke out in the Balkans, again "meistens durch fremden Einfluß", would
force the Regency’s hand.

Daß aber Serbien... an dieser besonnenen Politik festhalte, und
nicht doch endlich fortreißen lassen, müssen wir... alles
aufbieten daß die Serben sich gewöhnen bei uns
Unterstützung zu suchen, und ihre Wünsche durch unsere
Hilfe realisirt zu sehen.

For the moment, as far as Beust was concerned, Kállay confined himself to the postal
convention, and a settlement of the consular jurisdiction question, as means of attaining
this goal.119 Behind this unobjectionable advice, however, lay the Bosnian scheme,
which in the course of the autumn came out into the open.

With Andrássy Kállay could be more direct. Negotiations between Andrássy and
the new rulers in Belgrade about Bosnia had been going on since June. In the context
of Prince Michael’s murder, and the necessity of establishing with his successors the
same good relationship that the Hungarian government had enjoyed with him, the
Bosnian question was to remain of central importance. It was a question, moreover,
where the recipient of Serbian gratitude was intended to be Hungary, not the Monarchy
as a whole. Andrássy set the agenda, and attempted to carry it out through the
Hungarian he had had appointed to Belgrade. The nominal shapers of ’Austro-
Hungarian' policy towards Serbia, Beust and Prokesch-Osten, were at first bypassed completely and then, when their discovery of the negociations became inevitable, expected to acquiesce. One of the reasons this was to be possible at all was the ambiguous position of the Emperor Francis Joseph.

The other issue, which exercised Andrássy and Kállay far more than Vienna, was a direct consequence of the Obrenovié assassination. This was the undertaking to prosecute ex-Prince Alexander Karađorđević for Michael's murder, and see him convicted. At the end of July 1868, Kállay was confident about the good effect which prosecuting Alexander would have on relations with Serbia. He also made clear what a harmful effect it would have on our, up to now, steadily improving relations with Serbia, if those detained [in Pest] were... not to be convicted. ... This...would be capable of once again opening the way for Russian influence, which is now completely displaced here.... I cannot recommend sufficiently strongly... that Your Excellency... should be so good as to ensure that the persons in question are in any case convicted, the more easily... because their guilt is beyond doubt.120

Nevertheless this was a disastrous miscalculation. The Pest courts were eventually to decide otherwise; but in the meantime Kállay had, with Andrássy's support, staked the Hungarian government's prestige in Serbia on Alexander's conviction. The result was to convince the Serbian Regents that a conviction was inevitable, and the failure to deliver was thus attributed to Hungarian ill will and deception. The relative goodwill, and the readiness to cooperate, which characterised Serbo-Hungarian relations in the aftermath of Prince Michael's assassination, was to be dissipated as if it had never existed.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 3: THE OBRENOVIĆ ASSASSINATION

1. Kâllay Diary, 10 June 1868 (Dnevnik, pp. 29-30); Stokes, *Legitimacy through Liberalism*, pp. 131-45; Jovanović, *Druga vlada Miloša i Mihaila*, pp. 431-60; and the extensive compilation of evidence by Ilija Đukanović, *Ubistvo Kneza Mihaila i događaji o kojima se nije smelo govoriti* [The Assassination of Prince Michael and Hitherto Unmentionable Events], 2 vols. (Belgrade 1935-36). Dragan Jovašević, *Sud ubicama Kneza Mihaila* [The Trial of Prince Michael’s Assassins] (Belgrade 1989), is of value chiefly for its verbatim quotes from the trial.


3. Kâllay to Beust, 11 June 1868, HHS, PA XXXVIII/177; Đukanović, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 82-83.


5. Stokes, *op. cit.*, p. 132, and n. 3; Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 16 June 1868 (no. 35B), HHS, PA XII/91.


7. Kâllay to Beust, 13 June 1868, HHS, PA XXXVIII/177.

8. Kâllay Diary, 10 June 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 31): “Mihály herczeg halála nagy szerencsetlenség reánk nézve. [...] Most minden újból kezdenvő; sót nincs is mit kezdeni....”


10. Kâllay to Andrássy, 12 June 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/95: "ügyes, ravasz, merész, erélyes ember".

11. *Ibid*: "Reánk nézve... a fődolog, hogy oly politikát kövessen a hármas kormány, mely a mienkkel összhangzásba van.... Milívój keünk minden másnál több garantált nyújt. Õ ellensége az orosz befolyásának s Szerbia felvirágzását Magyarország segítségétől várja." *Cf. Kállay Diary, s.d. (Dnevnik, pp. 32-33).*

12. Kâllay to Andrássy, 12 June 1868, *op. cit.*, f. 96: “Austria iránt a legnagyobb ellenszenv, ellenben az alkotmányos Magyarország iránt sok rokonszenv uralkodik, s mindent a mit Szerbia Austria támogatásától várhat egyedül Excellentiad befolyásától reménylik.”

13. Kâllay to Andrássy, 13 June 1868, HHS, PA XXXVIII/177.


15. Andrássy to Kâllay, 14 June 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/98, published in Petrović (ed.), *Svetozar Miletić i Narodna Stranka*, I, no. 196, p. 455: "Karagy. a Miletics párttal s a Muszkával összekötetésben volna...."


17. *Ibid*: "a külügyminisztériumban barátai vannak."

18. Andrássy to Beust, 12 June 1868, HHS, PA XL/128. Three paragraphs of this letter are reproduced, in German, in Andrássy to Kâllay, 14 June 1868, in Petrović, *op. cit*.

19. Andrássy to Beust, 12 June 1868, HHS, PA XL/128.


22. Ibid.

23. Goltz to Bismarck, 12 June 1868, in *APP, X*, no. 63, p. 78; Thile to Werther, 13 June 1868, *ibid.*, no. 68, pp. 81-82.

24. Beust to Andrásy, 14 June 1868, HHSA, PA XL/128; cf. Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 12 June 1868 (no. 34B), HHSA, PA XII/91.


28. Ibid: "A te feladatod leend megítélni mennyire léphetsz az előtérbe...ha biztos vagy benne, hogy Milan pártjának csakugyan annyi kilátása van mint frod, úgy a teljes tevékenységért magamra veszem a felelősséget előre is."

29. Ibid: "A külügyminisztérium majd belenyugszik a sikerbe."

30. Francis Joseph to Andrásy, 14 June 1868, HHSA, PA XL/13.


32. Andrásy to Beust, 15 June 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/183-85 (copy); original in HHSA, PA XL/13.


34. Andrásy to Beust, 15 June 1868, *op. cit.*

35. Francis Joseph to Andrásy, 17 June 1868, HHSA, PA XL/13.

36. Beust to Andrásy, 17 June 1868, MOL, P344, 17.k., Ce/10 (copy); original in HHSA, PA XL/128.

37. Beust to Kállay, 18 June 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177; Kállay Diary, 21 June 1868 (*Dnevnik*, p. 41).

38. Kállay to Beust, 18 June 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177.

39. Kállay to Andrásy, 18 June 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/103-04: "Szerbia és a kelet sorsát vehetjük talán közünkbe ha képesek vagyunk pénzbeli áldozatokat hozni."

Two paragraphs from this letter, dealing with the Hungarian Serb politician "Stratimirovic, are reproduced in Petrovic, I, no. 198, p. 460.

40. Kállay to Andrásy, 18 June 1868, *op. cit.*, f. 104: "Ki tudja nem talán csak par 100000 ft körül forog a kérdés s ne talán csak e miatt fog az orosz befolyás diadalmaskodni."

41. Andrásy to Kállay, 28 June 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/113. This letter is reproduced in Petrovic, I, no. 206, pp. 473-77, but without the first paragraph.

42. See Andrásy to Kállay, 14 June 1868, cited above, n. 27.

43. Andrásy to Kállay, 28 June 1868, OSZK, *op. cit.*: "azonban utóbb személyesen érintkezvén vele Bécsben, állásponjtát megváltoztatát, s maga is beismeré, hogy az iniciatívának elmulasztása a jelen viszonyok közt felelősséggel volna összeköve...."

44. Ibid: "azon valáshat vettem, hogy Töled tudnám meg, körülbelül mily összegre volna szükség, s valjon nem lehetne e egyszersmind a siker biztosítása tekintetéből a rendjelek általi kitüntetést is erényesíteni."

45. Ibid., f. 114: "hogy a jelenlegi rendszer mellett, nagy összeg rendelkezésére nem állhat, azt hínni hajlandó vagyok."

46. Ibid: "talán általa nyerhetnél tájékoztatást arra nézve, hogy a választsás utolsó perczeiben mily pénzösszeggel lehetne sikeresen működni."
47. Andrássy to Beust, 12 June 1868, in Petrović, no. 196, p. 455.
48. Kállay Diary, 19 June 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 40).
50. Kállay to Beust, 22 June 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177.
51. Kállay Diary, 26 June 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 43): "mily összegre van szükségem titkos kiadásokra," Not preserved in HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177.
52. Kállay to Beust, 26 June 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177; also Kállay to Beust, s.d. (telegramme).
54. Kállay Diary, 26 June 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 45): "ha a választás után szüksége van pénzre, én néhány összegek felett rendelkezhetem."
55. Kállay to Beust, 26 June 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177.
57. Kállay Diary, 26 June 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 44): "Állítja hogy át a legbarátságosabb politikat akar Magyarország irányában folytatni, még pedig akként, hogy a magyar nemzet és a délszlávok között a legbensőbb szövetség fejlődjék ki, úgy hogy egymást védjenek és ha kell egy részről a törökök és orosz befolyás, más részről Austria ellen."
58. *Ibid.*: "a mi Horváthországnak arrondirozására némely Bosznýák területeket átengedni."
60. *Ibid.*: "...egy nagy köztársaság, nagy apróbb államok monarchicus confederatioja...."
61. *Ibid.*: "Kedves régi eszméim!....A nagy Dunai confederatio, democraticus alapokon, mely egyesíti e különfajú, de körülbelül egyenlő számú népeket, s melyek minden egyike félhét saját nemzetiséget és egyéniségét külhatalmak elnyomásától. Együtt barátságos szövetségben mindnyájan megőrizhetik egyéniségüket és megóvhatják egymást minden külbefolyástól."
62. *Ibid.*: "Különös játéka volna e sorsnak, ha éppen én működhemem közre ez eszmék létesítéséhez...."
63. Kállay to Beust, 5 July 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177; Kállay to Andrássy, 7 July 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/118-19.
67. Kállay Diary, 8 July 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 53); Kállay to Beust, 5 July 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177.
68. Kállay to Beust, 8 July 1868 (telegramme and despatch no. 43), HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177; Kállay to Andrássy, 8 July 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/189.
69. Beust to Prokesch-Osten, 9 July 1868 (telegramme); and Weisung of 12 July 1868, both HHSA, PA XII/93; passages quoted are from the latter.
70. Prokesch-enstein to Beust, 14 July 1868, HHSA, PA XII/93.
71. Kállay Diary, 18 July 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 59); Kállay to Beust, 30 July 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177.
72. Kâllay to Beust, 20 July 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177; Kâllay Diary, 19 July 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 59).
74. Kâllay to Beust, 20 July 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177.
76. Kâllay to Andrásy, 31 July 1868, OSZH, FH 1733/133; Kâllay to Beust, 13 Oct. 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177.
78. Ibid., pp. 133-34, 141-45.
82. Simits to Ast, 28 June 1868 (Serbian translation from the Hungarian, found in Serbian archives), in Petrović, I, no. 204, p. 467; Kâllay Diary, 8 July 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 52).
84. Kâllay to Andrásy, 10 July 1868, OSZH, FH 1733/121.
85. Andrásy to Kâllay, 14 June 1868, in Petrović, I, no. 196, p. 455.
86. Reiswitz, Belgrad-Berlin, Berlin-Belgrad, pp. 142-43, quoting Rosen to Bismarck, 18 June 1868; Thile to Rosen, 4 July 1868.
87. Kâllay Diary, 12 June 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 32).
89. Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 12 June 1868, HHSA, PA XII/91; cf. Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 24 Feb. 1871, HHSA, PA XII/98.
91. Jovanović, op. cit., p. 47.
92. Kâllay Diary, 10 June 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 31); Kâllay to Andrásy, 12 June 1868, OSZH, FH 1733/94.
93. Andrásy to Beust, 11 June 1868 (telegramme), HHSA, PA XL/13.
95. Andrásy to Beust, 11 June 1868, HHSA, PA XL/13; Andrásy to Kâllay, 14 June 1868, OSZH, FH 1733/98.
b'lgarskata i sr'bskata istoriia iz madžarskite d'ržavi arhivi [Documents for Bulgarian and Serbian History from the Hungarian State Archives] (Sofia 1966), no. 2, pp. 15-16; not in Petrovié.

98. Wenckheim to Ast, 24 June 1868, in Miïatev, op. cit., no. 4, p. 23; not in Petrovié.


100. Ast to Wenckheim, 3 July 1868, ibid., no. 211, p. 487: "Miletits – mint polgármester – ...az administratív téren is teljes önkényt gyakorol, ...és valóságos terrorizmust gyakorol a rendszerető, békés újvidéki közönségre."

101. Wenckheim to Ast, 6 July 1868, ibid., no. 213, p. 495.

102. Ibid., p. 496: "az ő politikai jelleme és eljárására nézve magam is azon meggyőződést meríttettem...."

103. Ibid: "ezek adatokat... arra, hogy ellene bírósági úton vizsgálat indíttassék, ...elegendőnek nem tartom, s ez okból felhívom Nagyságodat, hogy ellene a puhatolásokat ezentúl is folytatni...."

104. Ast to Wenckheim, 8 July 1868, ibid., no. 215, pp. 497-99.

105. Rath to Horvát, 12 July 1868, ibid., no. 221, pp. 504-07; Horvát to Wenckheim, 15 July 1868, no. 223, p. 513.

106. Ibid: "...ily szenvedélyes gyűlölet a kormány irányában s ily alkotmányellenes tendenciák, ...s ennél fogva a közbiztonság érdekében épen nem látjám kivánatosnak, hogy a nevezett egyén polgármesteri hivatalába visszahelyezessék."


108. Interpellation by S. Mitevič of Minister of Justice, 19 Nov. 1868, ibid., no. 251, pp. 564-65; Stokes, op. cit., pp. 140-41.

109. Kállay to Andrásy, 9 May 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/81: "fell kellene akasztani".

110. Kállay Diary, 13 June 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 34).


112. Kállay Diary, 17 and 25 June 1868 (Dnevnik, pp. 39, 42).


114. Kállay Diary, 14 Aug. 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 75): "megjegyeztem, hogy most az ideje megmutatni, hogy jó barátaink és ne engedjék hogy demonstráljanak a magyar kormány ellen."

115. Ibid.

116. Ibid, 2 Nov. 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 109), and 24 Nov. 1868 (p. 118): "hozzá tevén, hogy nincs szükségünk Mitevic bölcseségére."

117. Kállay Diary, 22 Dec. 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 133): "Beszélt egy titkos levelezésről.... Ezen levelezés folytán coquetirozik a kormány az omladinával."


120. Kállay to Andrásy, 31 July 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/132-33: "mily káros hatással volna oly jótuton haladó barátságos viszonyainkra nézve Szerbiával, ha

115
az elfogottak... el nem ítéltethetnének.... E... képes lenne ismét tért nyitni a most
itt teljesen leszorított orosz befolyásnak,... Nem ajánlhatom eléggé... hogy
Excellentiiad mindehatosságánál fogva, oda méltóztatnél működni, hogy az
illetők mindenévre elitéltessének, ...ez annál könnyebb, mert bűnrészességünk
kétségtelen." Cf. Watson to Elliot, 13 Aug. 1868, PRO, FO 78/2034.
CHAPTER 4: THE KARADORĐEVIĆ PROSECUTION

31: The Illusion of Serbo-Hungarian Friendship

The period between the establishment of Prince Milan's Regency, in July 1868, and the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War, in July 1870, was when the ambiguity of Austro-Hungarian policy towards Serbia was greatest. For two years, Andrásy and Kállay exploited that legacy of the 1867 settlement: the ability of a Hungarian minister president, with strong views on foreign policy, to pursue his own agenda contrary to the wishes, and to some extent without the knowledge, of the Emperor and the chancellor.

The Hungarian goal was to persuade the Serbian Regents of the benefit to Serbia in keeping close to the Habsburg Monarchy. This in itself was broadly in line with Beust's own policy towards Serbia, but Hungarian policy differed from that of the Ballhaus in two respects.

Firstly, the emphasis in everything Andrásy and Kállay said to the Serbian government was firmly on the closeness of relations with Hungary, rather than Austria-Hungary, and whatever advantage Serbia derived from the relationship was claimed to be the result of Hungarian friendship. It was an essential part of this strategem to maintain that it was the Hungarian government alone which protected Serbia from the nastier elements in the Monarchy, particularly the Vienna military.

Secondly, the means by which the Hungarian government sought to exert this control were seriously at variance with traditional Habsburg policy towards Serbia. Where Vienna relied on straightforward diplomatic and military pressure to keep Serbia in line, Andrásy and Kállay intervened in detail in Serbian domestic affairs, or tried to. They took sides in obvious fashion by trying to secure the conviction of Prince Alexander Karadorđević. Most drastically, Andrásy's Bosnian scheme stood the Monarchy's proclaimed policy on its head, and introduced an unrealistic note into relations with Serbia. But it still took two years for the illusions fostered by this Hungarian 'foreign policy' to break down.

Blaznavac was the key to this exercise in mutual self-deception. For an ambitious political soldier like Blaznavac to have come out so openly against the Russians was
akin to burning his boats behind him, and Kállay was particularly conscious of the need to safeguard this rarity on the Serbian scene. He kept in close touch with Blaznavac, and continued to promote him, to Beust, as the man most likely to keep Serbia on a peaceful course, favourable to Austro-Hungarian influence and the maintenance of the status quo in the Balkans. To Andrásy, he reported gleefully on Blaznavac' interest in the Bosnian scheme and his professions of solidarity with the Hungarians. The more Kállay saw of the first Regent, the deeper grew his conviction that, barring the sort of nationalist upheaval in the Balkans which would compel any Serbian politician to commit himself, Blaznavac was the ideal instrument for attaining Hungarian aims in Serbia.

How real this picture was, however, is a different matter. In the aftermath of Prince Michael's assassination, Blaznavac' attitude may well have owed more to an opportunistic disposition to see how far the pro-Hungarian line took him, and what profit it brought Serbia, than Kállay in his enthusiasm was willing to admit. The little that can be gleaned on Blaznavac' thinking, from sources other than Kállay's own records, suggests both a cynical readiness to gamble, and a man doing his best to persuade himself that the Hungarian assurances, especially in the crucial matter of Bosnia, were really worth something.

The Italian consul in Belgrade found Blaznavac' estimation of the entente with the Hungarians less than convincing:

Quant à moi je doute que les choses Slaves sont si avancées, et surtout, que les Magyars et les Croates ayant si facilement pris le parti de laisser les Serbes libres de s'annexer les dites provinces [Bosnia-Hercegovina] et même à aider cette annexion....

The whole thing, Scovasso suggested, was a ruse by the Hungarians to keep the Serbian government quiet. Blaznavac, however, devoted considerable effort to convince the Italian that the Hungarians' friendship must be genuine. According to Blaznavac, it was in Hungary's interests to see the creation of a greater South Slav state, especially if such a conglomeration were still formally within the Ottoman Empire. Linked to Hungary by a treaty of alliance, the Turkish Slavs would be a barrier to Russia, which would thus be excluded forever from the Near East.
Blaznavac may have believed this improbable scenario at the time, but his later willingness to turn against the Hungarians suggests he was simply exploring the possibilities. The Prussian consul, while sympathetic to Blaznavac' anti-Russian stance, was sure that it did not correspond to popular sentiment in Serbia. Blaznavac himself was well aware of this. The question, from the Hungarian point of view, was how far he would be able to take Serbia on a course so contrary to the natural tendency of Serbian national feeling.

The answer to this question depended to a great extent on Jovan Ristić, the enigmatic second Regent. Ristić, as a champion of constitutional reform, and committed to the cause of national liberation, inclined personally more towards Russia than Austria-Hungary. The exigencies of the situation which caused Blaznavac to seek him as a partner demanded that Ristic play down his Russophilia. Nevertheless the suspicion remained that his heart was not in the pro-Hungarian policy adopted by Blaznavac. He was especially cautious, Kállay discovered by the beginning of September, about clever schemes like Andrassy's Bosnian plan, and doubted whether Andrássy could deliver, given Beust's known opposition. "I don't know what to think of Ristić," Kállay complained; "he is very suspicious."

32: The Debate on Extraditing Karadorđević

With both the prosecution of Alexander Karadorđević and the Bosnian question Andrássy and Kállay were pursuing objectives which were questionable, if not downright irresponsible. There is thus a certain irony in the fact that it was the Hungarians' failure, in each case, to make good their promises which hastened the end of Serbo-Hungarian 'friendship' in 1870-71. Both questions kept popping up throughout the period 1868-70. Each was a product of the attempt to bind Serbia firmly to the destinies of the Monarchy, especially its Hungarian half; each was characteristic of the essential futility of such an entreprise, at least as conceived by Andrássy and Kállay.

The Karađorđević case started with the issue of whether Serbia's ex-Prince, who had been living in Pest since his deposition in 1858, should be extradited to Belgrade to stand trial for Prince Michael's murder. Blaznavac and Ristić realised that by
concentrating on Alexander, they could divert attention from the role of the Liberals, whose support they needed. At the same time the destruction of the Karađorđević family (it was assumed that Alexander's son Peter was equally involved) would also eliminate the only serious rival of the Obrenović dynasty.

Throughout the summer of 1868, the evidence against Karađorđević accumulated. The documents found on Pavle Radovanović implicated two of the ex-Prince's closest associates, Pavle Tripković and Filip Stanković. Other seemingly damning evidence continued to emerge, to the point where Kállay felt sure that Karađorđević "not only knew about the murder but also planned it." On 13 July Ristić formally notified Kállay that the Serbian authorities had issued a summons to Karađorđević, requesting him to appear at the trial of the conspirators in Belgrade later that month, or name his defence counsel.

By the time of Ristić's request Kállay and Andrássy were already debating about the pros and cons of extraditing not only Tripković and Stanković, but also Karađorđević. The Serbian government had applied for the extradition of the first two at the end of June, but it was clear that a similar application for Karađorđević himself was only a matter of time. The Hungarian government had, upon Prince Michael's assassination, placed Prince Alexander under police surveillance, and at Andrássy's request the foreign ministry started monitoring the movements of Peter Karađorđević. It was one thing, though, to take these elementary precautions against the charge of having harboured a conspiracy against the Serbian government on Austro-Hungarian soil. It was quite another to hand over the former ruler of Serbia, with his associates, to the uncertain justice of a Serbian court.

Kállay was acutely aware of the political capital the Hungarian government stood to gain, in Serbia, by acceding to this request. The awkward truth was, however, that no treaty of extradition existed between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and in the absence of such an agreement the Hungarian government could only be guided by its own laws and whatever precedents the Habsburg Monarchy had already set by diplomatic practice. But established practice, Kállay pointed out, was clear only in cases involving common criminals.
The question immediately arose of whether the murder of Prince Michael was to be regarded as a criminal matter, or whether it was political. "It must be noted," Kállay reminded Andrássy, "that nobody has been extradited for political offences on either side, although up to now no political offenders have committed murder." And even if the murder itself was purely a criminal matter, could the same be said of its planning, by individuals who had no physical hand in it, but whose motives were more likely to have been political? Kállay concluded:

if the persons in question can be proven to have any hand at all in Prince Michael's murder, and our laws can brand them as common criminals, then they should not be judged by us, but extradited to Serbia. Conversely, if their complicity is not completely proven, or if our courts pronounce the deed as only a political offence, then extradition is impossible, because in this case, according to our laws, they would not be punishable.

A few days before, when asked by Blaznavac whether the Monarchy would extradite Karadordević, Kállay had gone so far as to assure him "that it would probably do so if his participation could be proven." Within days of making this remark, however, Kállay was obliged to admit that, according to what he was reading in the Pest newspapers, "the Hungarian government will not extradite the person in question, but has already delegated the Pest civil court to try him." Blaznavac might claim to be satisfied, as long as Karadordević was convicted somewhere; but in view of the Regents' anxiety to ensure that the political threat he posed was eliminated, it is hard to believe they would not have preferred to have the ex-Prince safely in Serbian, rather than Hungarian, custody. Kállay's initial blithe assurance that extradition was a possibility sowed the seeds of future mistrust: it suggested to the Regents that the Hungarian government had an ulterior motive in promising what it patently had no intention of delivering.

Formal confirmation of what Kállay already knew arrived on 17 July, in a despatch from Andrássy setting out the arguments against extraditing Karadordević and his associates. Andrássy's letter showed the extent to which the whole question had become a matter simply between Hungary and Serbia, with the imperial foreign ministry effectively sidelined. Andrássy had as a matter of course consulted Beust for
the foreign ministry's expert opinion on extradition, but under the 1867 settlement any prosecution on Hungarian soil was strictly a Hungarian affair, and appears to have been treated as such by Beust, provided there were no serious diplomatic repercussions.

Enclosing a copy of Beust's reply, Andrássy informed Kállay that, according to international law, political offenders were not normally extraditable. Since it was "undeniable" that the involvement of Karadorđević and his associates was for political reasons, it followed that they were political offenders, and "their extradition...cannot be regarded as practicable." All of them, however, could reasonably be suspected of having known of the plan to commit the outrage. They could thus be regarded as having committed a crime in Hungary, "hence their extradition for this reason would not be justifiable."

The Hungarian government, Andrássy protested, would like nothing better than to comply with the Serbian request, and it is with genuine regret forced to report that it cannot carry out the extradition of the individuals in question....it has however seen to it that the said individuals should not remain without a deserved punishment....

Kállay was accordingly authorised to inform the Regents that the minister of justice, Horvát, had already instructed the Pest civil court to start collecting evidence. Horvát also asked for a Serbian official to be sent up from Belgrade to assist in the investigation. It would help if the subjects of the Hungarian investigation could at some stage be confronted with those already charged in Serbia; and any executions, upon conviction in Belgrade, should be delayed until this standard element of Hungarian justice had been completed.

33: The Preliminary Investigations

Kállay hastened to carry out his instructions, but the response his news elicited, and his own expressed opinion, give some idea of how he and Andrássy were to get themselves into such difficulties over the Karadorđević prosecution. Ristić was visibly annoyed. Kállay explained the difficulties faced by a responsible government, obliged to respect the rule of law, but although Ristić admitted the justice of these objections, and readily agreed to send an official to Pest to assist in the investigations,
he adamantly refused to put off the trial of those held in Belgrade, or the executions which were likely to follow. "Because of the indignation of the people," the trial of the Belgrade conspirators would go ahead, and Ristić expected it to be over by 27 July.\textsuperscript{33} It must remain a moot point whether the Regents' determination to press on with the Belgrade trial was due to a genuine respect for "the indignation of the people", or a baser desire to put Radovanović and his cronies safely under ground before they produced any more evidence implicating the Regents' new Liberal allies. Ristić himself showed some awareness of the obstacles such haste would put in the way of convicting Karadorđević.\textsuperscript{34} But Kállay was so convinced of the guilt of Karadorđević and his associates as to discount the importance of this consideration. It is clear from his correspondence with Andrássy that, for Kállay, the political utility of conviction obscured the need for elementary justice.

With regard to Stanković and Tripković, for instance, Kállay thought their complicity "beyond doubt". He implored Andrássy to

\begin{quote}
be so kind as to exert your influence so that a really harsh punishment be meted out to them. I can strongly recommend this proceeding from the viewpoint of maintaining the good relations which are being strengthened more and more between us and Serbia.\textsuperscript{35}
\end{quote}

The complicity of Karadorđević, too, "can scarcely be doubted."\textsuperscript{36} In a revealing passage, Kállay set forth what were for him the overriding considerations:

\begin{quote}
there are convincing reasons why we should make him [Karadorđević] feel the rigour of the law.... If we don't do this we expose ourselves to the suspicion that we are showing a partiality for him. We would only have to spare him if any political reason required it; but our interest, from the point of view of maintaining peace and consolidating the Obrenović dynasty lie in making Karadorđević as harmless as the boundaries of the law permit.\textsuperscript{37}
\end{quote}

Enough evidence was already to hand to make Karadorđević's involvement seem a foregone conclusion, but this was not the verdict eventually reached by the Hungarian courts. Kállay was assuming Karadorđević's conviction before he had even been interrogated, let alone tried.

The result was to make Kállay apparently indifferent to the dangers of letting the
Serbian government go ahead with the trial and subsequent execution of the Belgrade conspirators, in late July. The trial began on 23 July and concluded the next day; on the 28th Radovanović and thirteen others were executed. They had already made depositions, copies of which were duly forwarded to the Hungarian authorities. Most of the conspirators, however, stubbornly refused to admit Karadorđević's involvement; while the depositions of those who did incriminate him were suspected all along of having been extorted. A face to face confrontation between these individuals and Karadorđević, at a later date, and in the relatively less constrained atmosphere of a Hungarian court, may conceivably have consolidated the case against the ex-Prince beyond all reasonable doubt. Instead, the possibility of such confrontation was let slip.

Kállay, through his preoccupation with the political aspects of prosecuting Karadorđević, was imperilling the very outcome he considered most essential. The importance of a painstaking accumulation of evidence was perhaps better appreciated by the justice minister in Pest, who telegraphed on 28 July asking Kállay to get the executions postponed. Kállay could only reply that the accused had been executed that same day. In any case, he argued, Belgrade had already provided ample evidence; the vital thing now was to make sure Karadorđević was convicted, lest "Russian influence" in Serbia recover the ground it had lost.

The proceedings in Belgrade on 23-24 July were also a trial in absentia of Karadorđević, Tripković and Stanković. Karadorđević and Tripković were each sentenced to twenty years in prison; Stanković to twenty years with hard labour. On 4 August the Serbian government formally applied for Karadorđević's extradition, although resigned to the fact that the Austro-Hungarian authorities were bound to refuse. Karadorđević was duly taken into custody in Pest on 8 August.

The day Karadorđević was arrested by the Pest police, Kállay received another intimation of the difficulties he and Andrássy were preparing for themselves by undertaking to prosecute Karadorđević at all. Kállay's assurances to the Regents had clearly created the impression in Belgrade that Karadorđević's conviction was a certainty. From a conversation with Colonel Orešković, Kállay learned that Blaznavac thought "it would be a bad thing if those arrested by us [the Hungarians] were not
convicted, this would do a lot of damage to his efforts to achieve friendly relations."^43

Orešković himself thought this "stupid, because he [Blaznavac] knows that the
government can't influence the verdict"; and Kállay urged Orešković to keep stressing
this to the Regents.^44 How much impression such caveats were likely to make,
however, was another matter. Ristić at least could appreciate Kállay's points about the
importance of "the rule of law"; to the soldier Blaznavac, by contrast, this apparently
meant very little.

Kállay himself seemed to contradict his own warnings about the need to follow due
process, by the zeal with which he threw himself into the job of ensuring that
Karadorđević really was convicted. In response to the accusations in the Vienna
newspapers that torture had been employed in interrogating the Belgrade conspirators,
he inspired a number of démentis which appeared anonymously in the Austrian and
Hungarian press.^45 Kállay hoped these would convince the Regents that the Hungarian
government (unlike the Vienna establishment) did not question the validity of the
judicial findings in Belgrade; and that they would dispel any idea that such findings
might not be admissible in the Hungarian courts.

Most striking were Kállay's efforts behind the scenes to ensure that the Hungarian
judicial system delivered the kind of verdict he, and the Serbian Regents, wanted. This
went beyond mere exhortation: from first to last Kállay displayed a reluctance to let
judicial officials make up their own minds, a recurrent fear that, without constant
reminders of the political importance of securing a conviction, the courts would let
Karadorđević slip through their fingers.

Kállay's first exercise in judicial wirepulling came with the preliminary hearing of
the case against Karadorđević in October 1868. This involved the confrontation of
Karadorđević with both the evidence collected at the Belgrade trial in July, and the
witnesses held in Serbia. Proceedings were to be held at Zemun, across the Danube
from Belgrade.^46

Well before the confrontation Kállay was trying to influence the way it was
conducted. He had hoped to give evidence in person at the hearing, but De Pont, head
of the political section of the foreign ministry, thought it "inadvisable".^^ Instead
Kállay was allowed to make a written deposition. In Pest, at the end of August, he made a call on the chief public prosecutor, who told him that "in his opinion, the delegated court is in favour of Karadorđević." Kállay at once hurried to the ministerial councillor in the ministry of justice and 

asked him to try to stop this prejudice, because if as a result of it Karadorđević is freed, it would have very bad consequences. He promised he would investigate this.

Back in Belgrade, Kállay did what he could to reassure the Regents, who had already got wind of the rumoured predisposition towards Karadorđević on the part of the Pest judiciary.

When Karadorđević, Tripković and Stanković were eventually brought down to Zemun on 9 October, on board the steamship Maximilian, Kállay immediately repaired on board to see the presiding judge, Titusz Pajor. Kállay found his worst fears confirmed. Pajor raised objections to the presence of both the Serbian public prosecutor and Kállay himself. The chief prosecutor, Sztrokay, by contrast, turned out to be an ally: he "strongly" approved Kállay's presence, since Pajor was "extraordinarily prejudiced with regard to Karadorđević, because of this he might be more restrained."

The hearing took place on 10-13 October. Kállay remained personally convinced of Karadorđević's role as the instigator of the whole conspiracy, although, given the steadfast denials of the three accused, even Kállay had to admit, in his report to Beust, that he could not swear to the factual value of such a confrontation.

What caused Kállay most concern was the attitude shown by the president of the court. During the interrogation of Filip Stanković, for instance, Pajor clearly tried to help the accused and he grasped with great enthusiasm at every circumstance which worked in his favour.

Kállay could not let Pajor's conduct go unchallenged. On a flying visit to Pest after the hearing, he made a point of visiting the ministry of justice again, and saw Horvát himself:

I called his especial attention to the bias of Titusz Pajor, asked him to ensure, if it is possible, that Karadorđević is convicted.
He promised he would do everything in his power.\textsuperscript{56}

It was the first of a number of direct appeals Kállay was to make to Horvát and his officials over the next two years.\textsuperscript{57}

34: Political Implications of Delay

Bringing Karadorđević to trial at all was in fact a matter of years, not months. This was a circumstance which caused Kállay repeated embarrassment with the Regents. If, as Kállay kept telling them, Karadorđević’s conviction was virtually certain, then why should trying him take so long to arrange? And might not the Hungarian government’s delay in doing so be due to a desire to retain Karadorđević and his family as potential tools against the Obrenović dynasty? The longer Karadorđević’s prosecution dragged on, the harder it became for Kállay to counter these suspicions.

Simply assessing the evidence, and deciding whether to commit Karadorđević for trial, took several months. The trial only began on 8 February 1869, but within ten days had run into difficulties with the evidence supplied from Belgrade. Proceedings had to be halted completely while the Serbian authorities were asked for fuller details.\textsuperscript{58}

There was then a lengthy dispute over whether the ex-Prince should be granted bail or not. The formal indictment was not renewed until November, and appointing a new judge took another nine months. It was not until July 1870 that Karadorđević, together with Tripković and Stanković, was finally put on trial again.\textsuperscript{59}

The longer the whole process lasted, the greater was the nervousness on each side as to whether the other side could be trusted. The Serbian Regents, for example, wanted Karadorđević to be tried in public, so that maximum damage should be done to his public image in Serbia.\textsuperscript{60} Kállay duly wrote to Sztrokay, the Pest public prosecutor, and to justice minister Horvát, urging a public trial.\textsuperscript{61}

On the other side, there were signs by early 1869 of a certain impatience with Serbian demands, not just in Vienna, where such a reaction was to be expected, but in Pest as well. This emerges from the somewhat defensive tone of Kállay’s letter to Andrássy of 24 January, which sought to explain the attitude behind a recent article in the Serbian semi-official \textit{Jedinstvo}.

The \textit{Jedinstvo} article, which bore all the hallmarks of Ristić’s authorship, was largely
concerned with the idea of a Serbian administration of Bosnia and, as such, was the
direct result of Andrásy's and Kállay's own activity. It was attacked by the Neue
Freie Presse, which took its lead from Beust, for even suggesting such a scheme. As
Kállay put it, the Presse

has taken in very bad part the passage [in Jedinstvo] on how
the Serbs are anxious to see positive signs of friendship from
Hungary, and against this alludes to the cession of the
fortresses and the Karadordević affair.

Kállay attempted to deal with Beust by pointing out that Jedinstvo was only saying
what he, Kállay, had been reporting to Beust ever since his arrival in Belgrade. To
Andrássy, Kállay complained that

In Vienna...they are always forgetting that we are dealing here
with a very small nation, and that in this regard we cannot be
the sensitive ones. Furthermore they don't want to see that the
Serbs' principal aspirations are directed towards Bosnia, and
that in comparison with this everything else is pushed into the
background. ... the Karadordević affair falls rather under the
heading of provision of justice....

He concluded with a reminder that "we are acting not in Serbia's interests but for our
own purposes."

It would not have been surprising for Andrássy, even at this early stage, to be
showing signs of impatience with his own policy of cultivating good relations with
Serbia. The changeability of Andrássy's ideas was always remarkable, and with regard
to Serbia he had hoped for quicker results, and was correspondingly annoyed at the
time it was taking to get them. Kállay received a clear indication of Andrássy's disquiet
in May 1869:

He [Andrássy] advised me especially to try to induce the Serbs
at long last to declare decisively whether they are to be openly
on our side or not, because they only want to derive advantage
from our friendship, but not to do anything for it.

This may have been an accurate description of Serbian policy, but it was also a classic
example of the pot calling the kettle black.

35: Mistrial and Re-Indictment

When at length the Karadordević trial opened in February 1869, only to collapse
almost immediately, it was an ominous sign of the difficulties ahead. The evidence
collected from the Serbian authorities, it was found, was critically patchy. It has been suggested that the Serbian government, well aware of the damage a full revelation might do them politically, deliberately withheld evidence. This did not necessarily mean Karadordević was innocent; but it did mean that the Hungarian authorities were likely to have a hard time trying to prove otherwise. The Regents were definitely defeating their own object of eliminating Karadordević. They also, however, continued to urge a speedy and unambiguous conviction, which in view of this non-cooperation seems disingenuous at the very least.

The Karadordević prosecution then produced yet another reason for the Serbian government, as it thought, to mistrust Hungarian motives. Late in May the Royal Hungarian Court of Justice decided that Karadordević was eligible for bail, to the consternation of the Regents. Kállay was told that Blaznavac regards it as all the more alarming, because it only serves to bolster the intrigues against the good relations which exist between us. Kállay accordingly wrote to Horvát on the 28th, pleading that he "try to ensure that the High Court of Justice doesn't uphold the verdict of the Royal Court of Justice, by which Karadordević is permitted to defend himself in freedom." He followed this up with a further appeal to Horvát's ministerial councillor, Dezső Szilágyi, in June. By now, Kállay must have wished very much indeed that the affair would lose its significance, but instead it threatened to become more and more of a liability. When the news of Karadordević's definitive release on bail reached Belgrade in September, Kállay learned from Ristić that He very much regrets that Karadordević has been set free. I tried to explain to him that this is bound up with the forms of our judicial system.

Blaznavac, too, expressed regret at the appeal's rejection.

Matters improved slightly at the beginning of November 1869, when Karadordević was again formally indicted. According to Kállay, the wording of the indictment by the Pest public prosecutor, Sztrokay, "in which he asks for the head of Karadordević, has created a very good impression here." Kállay promptly renewed his assault on the Hungarian ministry of justice, imploring Szilágyi "to throw all his influence into the
balance to get Karadorđević convicted, we now need this very much as one of the conditions of Serbian friendship."76

Even as Kállay stepped up his efforts to harness the judicial process to his political agenda, however, he began to receive the disquieting impression that Karadorđević and his supporters were pulling just as hard in the opposite direction. Blaznavac, in a conversation with Kállay at the end of November, told him that "Karadorđević has promised someone in Pest 1,000,000 piastres if he is acquitted."77 Kállay learned nothing further about this; but the suspicion now became rooted in his mind that the Hungarian judiciary was not only biased but corruptible. Kállay's suspicions may have been unjust, although he was not the only observer to conclude, when Karadorđević was finally cleared, that money had been at work behind the scenes. The possibility that it was the paucity of evidence supplied by Belgrade, which prevented the courts from convicting, is not a consideration which appears to have suggested itself to Kállay.

In the months that elapsed between Karadorđević's indictment and the appointment of a new judge, Kállay maintained his vigil against what he perceived as the laxity and possible venality of the courts.78 In May 1870 he started making what he believed was headway against the inertia of the system. During an interview with Andrásy,

> I ... mentioned that the judges, it seems, have been bribed....
> He [Andrásy] promised he would have Sztrokay in and confer with him on the state of affairs and the modalities by which it might be possible to ensure the bringing in of a conviction.79

This at least appears to indicate that Andrásy, too, thought that somehow a verdict acceptable to the Serbian government could be guaranteed. That at any rate was the impression Kállay relayed to Blaznavac, when he told him "that now Andrásy himself is going to interest himself in this affair."80 And late in June Kállay saw Sztrokay once more, who informed him that "he hopes they will convict him, the government takes a great interest in this respect."81 It was a message, as usual, which Kállay made sure was conveyed to Blaznavac, who received it "with great satisfaction".82

36: Second Trial and Acquittal

As the Karadorđević trial finally got under way again in July 1870, the authorities on both sides, Hungarian and Serbian, seemed to succumb to a wave of self-deluding
optimism, despite the straws in the wind which indicated a different outcome. Kállay was told by Blaznavac on 22 July that

if we succeed in convicting Karađorđević then Hungary can count on Serbia unconditionally and we can make a stand together even against Russia.\textsuperscript{83}

This was a statement which only made sense in a larger context, since the Franco-Prussian War had just broken out and the Monarchy, at that point, was still pursuing a policy of "expectant neutrality".\textsuperscript{84} War was considered to be a serious option by both Beust and Andrásy, given the right conditions; but it was Andrásy who was most convinced of the inevitability, indeed the necessity, of a war with Russia. It says volumes for the sort of expectations Andrásy and Kállay had raised, to say nothing of the attractions of a Karađorđević conviction, that Blaznavac was capable of even making such a remark.

The optimism was all of a sudden equally strong in Pest, where Kállay was told by Sztrokay that the case had been entrusted to Chief Justice Bogisics, and that

The minister has had a word with him and since then even the judges, it seems, are for a conviction.\textsuperscript{85}

Horvát, when Kállay saw him, confirmed that he had indeed spoken with Bogisics.\textsuperscript{86}

Back in Belgrade by early August, Kállay assured Blaznavac "that they will probably convict Karađorđević."\textsuperscript{87}

It was a disastrous prediction. Before the month was out Kállay began to receive disturbing news from his confidant, Dr. Rosen. On 16 August Rosen had just seen both Blaznavac and Ristić, and

noticed a great change in them. Blaznavac especially declared that he didn't believe the Hungarians and it may be that now they are going to turn towards Prussia and Russia. He especially mentioned... Karađorđević.... Ristić talked in a similar sense.\textsuperscript{88}

The reason, it transpired a few days later, was that Blaznavac had a source of information whose ear was closer to the ground than Kállay's. The Liberal politician, Jevrem Grujić, had been in Pest and

has heard from the Chief Justice that, according to Hungarian law, he [Karađorđević] can't be convicted.\textsuperscript{89}
Behind the scenes Shishkin, the Russian consul, was busy capitalising on the resentment this news was bound to stir up. As Kállay glumly recorded that evening, Blaznavac was saying that

he doesn't believe the Hungarians any more, because for two years we have kept on deluding him with fine words but in fact we don't do anything, and he says Ristić was right when he always expressed himself in this vein.90

The final indignity, for Kállay, was to learn that the newspaper Srpski narod had published an article "in which it is asserted that I myself have secretly had a hand in ensuring that Karađorđević is not convicted."91 Shishkin was distributing copies of the issue personally.

A week later Blaznavac had cooled down sufficiently, according to Dr. Rosen, to protest his goodwill towards Hungary,

and mentioned only that he would like to see some action on our part, ...otherwise and much against his will he will be forced to make a bargain with the Russians.92

Clearly Kállay was being subjected to a form of diplomatic arm-twisting which he had so far not encountered in his dealings with the Serbian government. All he could reply, however, was the Pest public prosecutor's recent assurance that sentence was now due to be passed between the 19th and 20th of September.93 To this Blaznavac suavely replied that news of a conviction would coincide nicely with the opening of the Skupština on the 26th:

he would be able to make very good use of it and then there would be no fears for the Hungarian-Serbian alliance, which in his opinion has to be all the closer.94

The latter was a reference to the offer made by Andrássy, that summer, of an 'offensive-defensive alliance', which had in fact been made with the object of 'neutralising' Serbia for the duration of the Franco-Prussian War. An inherently improbable project, it was another reason why Blaznavac felt he had been deluded "with fine words". At any rate Kállay passed Blaznavac' appeal directly on to Andrássy, with a final plea of his own that Andrássy "should be so kind as to ensure that the verdict is a condemnatory one."95

Kállay finally learned on 6 October that

they pronounced judgment today in the Karadorđević trial and
they have all been released. This news had an extremely unpleasant effect on me, since I can see evil consequences ahead.96

The acquittal was specifically because of the inadequacy of the evidence, and the government immediately served notice of its intention to appeal. Kállay at once mobilised the journalist Miksa Falk to tell Pester Lloyd’s readership that "Hungarian public opinion is not satisfied" with the verdict, and Popović "to mitigate the bad effect" in Serbia;97 but privately he must have been deeply cast down.

37: Consequences of Acquittal

Something of Kállay’s dejection can be gleaned from the letter he sent Falk, railing against the authorities in Pest:

The weak basis of the judgment bears witness to the fact that if it had come from a higher level, with more chances of success and less timidity, a completely different result might have been attained.98

Despite the fact that a conviction was obviously in the interests of good Serbo-Hungarian relations, at least to Kállay, the court had ignored this. Falk was asked to impress upon his readers that "the acquittal has caused great scandal" among them.99

Even to Beust Kállay did not conceal his alarm. This in itself was unusual, since the common foreign ministry had not been involved in the legal battle being fought in Pest, and Beust could hardly be shouldered with the responsibility for the whole fiasco. But in so far as Kállay saw the failure to convict Karadórdievíč as primarily a foreign policy problem, he was in effect dumping the "evil consequences" of his and Andrássy’s miscalculations squarely on Beust’s doorstep. He warned the chancellor that there would shortly be "ein ungünstiger Umschwung" in relations with Serbia. It was also probable that Prince Alexander’s supporters in Serbia would now come out in the open in agitation against the Obrenović regime. In this they would be able to count on the backing of both the Omladina and Russia.

Kállay was possibly overestimating the level of popular support for the Karadórdievíči. He had a point, however, when he cited Serbian history as a reminder of how ruthless contenders for the throne could be. His conclusion painted a gloomy picture of the problems now facing the Monarchy. The Serbian government,
It was a far cry from 1868, when Kállay had prophesied the ‘elimination’ of Russian influence. Some of the consequences for Kállay personally of the Karadorđević business became apparent from the reaction in Serbia to his inspired article in Pester Lloyd. On 25 October Jedinstvo, Ristić’s mouthpiece, published a leader which "thunders against Hungary, has caused a great sensation here and extinguished even the little sympathy towards us which existed." In reply to Pester Lloyd, Jedinstvo countered that Serbia ...has not sought, nor seeks, in your long lawsuits, and even less in your judgments, proofs of a "good neighbourly disposition". There can be no such proof as long as the murderers of Prince Michael walk freely on Austro-Hungarian soil.

Closer to home, Srpski narod started a rumour that Kállay was to be transferred from Belgrade. The writer professed not to know how he [Kállay] can look our gentlemen in the eye, when a Hungarian court hands down a completely different judgment and when the Hungarian government adopts a completely different from the assurances this consul was giving in the name of his government in authoritative places.

Here, in fact, was the crux of the matter. Yet Andrássy, if he had not shown the same single-minded commitment to Karadorđević’s conviction as Kállay, had nevertheless allowed Kállay to mortgage his government's good name in the eyes of the Serbs. Kállay had kept Andrássy regularly posted on all his communications to the Regents in the Karadorđević affair, and at no stage had Andrássy indicated specific disapproval. He must, therefore, be accorded a major share of the responsibility for what suddenly turned out to be a serious chill in relations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

To be fair, it has to be admitted that the international climate was conducive to such a drop in temperature. The decisive factor here was undoubtedly the Franco-Prussian
War. By swiftly eliminating France as a serious voice in Near Eastern affairs, by exposing the essential isolation and vulnerability of the Habsburg Monarchy, and by facilitating the return of Russia as a strong regional power, the War made a volte-face on the part of whoever led Serbia quite likely. Even Blaznavac, as it turned out, was prepared to abandon his vaunted Russophobia if it seemed the Monarchy was on the way down, and Russia in the ascendant. In these circumstances the Karađorđević prosecution ceased to be something the Regents needed from the Hungarian government, and became instead yet another stick with which they could beat Serbia's traditional enemies. But here, again, it has also to be admitted that the weapon would not have been ready to hand if Kállay, with Andrásy's implicit support, had not made such a parade of Hungary's willingness to prosecute, and virtually promised a conviction.

The Karađorđević saga was not yet over in the fall of 1870. The government appealed; and in late October Andrásy seemed hardly to appreciate the gravity of the problem. He could not understand, he wrote Kállay, how the Serbian government could possibly treat Karađorđević's acquittal as a "pretext" for rushing into the arms of the Russians. In view of the dangers posed by the Franco-Prussian conflict, he considered it "unavoidable" that the Serbs stop seeing things "in inappropriate colours". In short, Andrásy was still relatively sanguine about Serbo-Hungarian relations, and went on to develop at great length his views on the continuing potential of the Bosnian question.

Kállay must have had some bitter reflections. He was particularly sceptical as to how far the Bosnian scheme could be pursued, when the Karađorđević affair looked set to poison relations for the foreseeable future. The events of the next year were to confirm his worst fears.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 4: THE KARAĐORĐEVIĆ PROSECUTION

1. Kállay to Beust, 18 June 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177; Kállay to Andrássy, 12 June 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/95.
2. Kállay to Beust, 20 July 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177.
4. Kállay to Andrássy, 7 Sept., 1868, op. cit.
7. Ibid., p. 323, citing Scovasso to Menabrea, 20 July 1868.
8. Ibid., pp. 323-24, 325-26, citing Scovasso to Menabrea, 19 Aug. 1868; not in DDI, op. cit.
12. Kállay Diary, 1 Sept. 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 83): "Nem tudom Risticsről mit véljek; o sokat kétségeskedik...."
13. Kállay to Andrássy, 18 June 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/102; Kállay Diary, 28 June 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 45).
14. Ibid., 6 July 1868 (Dnevnik, pp. 50-51): "Karagyorgyevics nem csak tudomással bírt a gyilkosságról, hanem rendezte is azt."
15. Ibid., 13 July 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 55).
16. Ibid., 30 June 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 47); Kállay to Andrássy, 7 July 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/119.
17. Andrássy to Beust, 11 June 1868, HHSA, PA XL/13; Landesprasidium in Salzburg to Taaffe, 12 June 1868, ibid., PA XL/128; Andrássy to Kállay, 14 June 1868, in Petrović (ed.), Svetozar Miletić i Narodna Stranka, I, no. 196, p. 455.
18. Kállay to Andrássy, 10 July 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/120.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., f. 121: "Meg kell jegyezni, hogy politikai vétség miatt senki sem szolgáltatott ki egyik részről sem, ám bár meg kell jegyezni azt is, hogy mindaddig a politikai vétkések gyilkosságot nem követtel el."
21. Ibid: "ha az illetők bárminemű részvétele Mihály herczeg meggyilkoltatásába bebizonyul, s a mi törvényeink őket közönséges bűnöskől bélyezik, akkor ne nálunk ítéletetőket el, hanem szolgáltatnának ki Szerbiának. Ellenben ha részesség teljesen nem bizonyulna be, vagy ha a mi bíróságaink a tettet csak politikai vétségnek candidálnak, akkor a kiszolgáltatás nem lehetséges, de ez esetben a mi törvényeink szerint sem lennének bűntethetők."
22. Kállay Diary, 6 July 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 51): "...ha bebizonyul a bűnrészesség valószínűleg."
23. Ibid., 13 July 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 55): "...a magyar kormány nem fogja kiadni az
illetőket hanem a Pest városi törvényiszéket delegálta felettük ítéletet mondani."

26. Beust to Andrásy, 3 July 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/193, refering to a letter from Andrásy dated 29 June (not found).
27. Andrásy to Kállay, 13 July 1868, *op. cit.*, f. 122: "kiadatása... teljesíthetőnek nem látszott."
29. *Ibid.*, f. 124: "csak oszinte sajnálatát kénytelen kijelenteni, bogy a szóban levő egyének kiadatását nem eszközölheti, gondoskodott azonban arról, hogy a mondott egyének érdemlett büntetés nélkül ne maradjanak...."
34. Kállay to Andrásy, 17 July 1868, *op. cit.*, f. 126.
36. Kállay to Andrásy, 20 July 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/129: "Azon esetre ha Karagyorgyevics bűnösségébe bebizonyulna a mi alig szenved kétséget...."
37. *Ibid.*: "hathatos okok szólának, hogy vele is épen úgy éreztessük a törvény szigorút mint a többi bűnösökkel. Ha ezt nem cselekedjük ama gyanunk tehátjük ki magunkat, hogy részrehajlásal viseltetünk iránta. Csak azon esetben kellene őt kimelnünk, ha politikai okok ezt igényelnék; de nekünk már a béke fenntartása a szív Obrenoviccs dynastia megszilárulása tekintetéből érdékelünk áll Karagyorgyevicset a törvény határai között ártalmatlanná tenni."
42. Kállay Diary, 9 Aug. 1868 (*Dnevnik*, p. 73).
44. *Ibid.*: "ostobának találja, mert tudja, hogy a kormány nem folyhat be az ítéletek hozására."
46. Kállay to Andrásy, 7 Sept. 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/142.
47. Kállay Diary, 23 Aug. 1868 (*Dnevnik*, p. 80): "tanúvallomásomat Karagyorgyevics perében nem ajánlja."
49. *Ibid.*: "...hogy nézete szerint a delegált törvényiszék Karagyorgyevics irányában pártosan visel magát."
50. *Ibid.*: "...kérem legyen rajta hogy e pártoskodás megszűnjék, mert ha annak eredménye Karagyorgyevics felmentése lenne, az igen rossz következéseket
vonna maga után. Igéri hogy utána néz."

51. Ibid., 1 Sept. 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 84).
52. Ibid., 9 Oct. 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 96).
53. Ibid: "...ő ezt öröm mel fogadja, s mondja, jó lesz más csak azért is, hogy Pajor, aki felette pártos Karagyorgyevics iránt ezáltal talán kissé visszatartobban viseli majd magát."


55. Ibid., 10 Oct. 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 98): "világosan a vádlott pártját igyekezett fogni, s minden körülményt nagy kézzel felfogott, a mi annak mentségéül szolgálhatott."

56. Ibid., 16 Oct. 1868 (Dnevnik, pp. 101-02): "különösen figyelmezettem Pajor Titus pártoskodására, kérve, hogy ha lehet intézkedjék, hogy Karagyorgyevics elítéltessek. Igéri, hogy mindent meg fog tenni, a mi hatalmában áll."

57. Ibid., 28 and 31 Jan. 1869 (Dnevnik, pp. 149-50).

59. Kállay Diary, 26 May, 9 Sept., 2 Nov. 1869, and 26 July 1870 (Dnevnik, pp. 182, 217, 240, 316).
60. Ibid., 15 Dec. 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 129).
61. Ibid., 17 and Dec. 1868, 12-13 Jan. 1869 (Dnevnik, pp. 130, 137, 143).
63. Kállay to Andrassy, 24 Jan. 1869, OSZK, FH 1733/174: "igen rosz néven vette azt a passust hogy a szerbek Magyarországtól a barátság tényleges jeleit óhajtanák látni, s ennek ellenében hivatkozik a várak átengedésére s a Karagyorgyevics ügyre."

64. Kállay to Beust, 23 Jan. 1869, HHS, PA XXXVIII/183.
65. Kállay to Andrassy, 24 Jan. 1869, op. cit: "Bécsben mindég elfelejtik azt, hogy nekünk itt egy igen kis népnel van dolgunk s hogy ennek irányában nem lehet érzékenyeknek lennünk. Továbbá nem akarják belátni azt, hogy a szerbeknek főtőkefévésük Bosznia iránnyal, s hogy e mellett minden egyéb háttérbe szorul. ...a Karagyorgyevics ügy pedig inkább az igazság szolgáltatás körébe tartozik...:"

66. Ibid: "mi nem Szerbia érdekében hanem saját hasznunkra cselekszünk."

67. Kállay Diary, 20 May 1869 (Dnevnik, p. 181): "Főleg arra figyelmeztet, hogy igyekezzem a szerbeket reábfíni, hogy már egyszer határozottan nyilatkozzanak, hogy akarnak e velünk tartani nyilat vagy sem; mert oly csak hasznot akarnak huzni a mi barátságunkból, de nem tesznek semmit."


69. Ibid., pp. 216-17.
70. Kállay Diary, 26 May 1869 (Dnevnik, p. 182): "Ezt ő aggasztónak tartja, mert csak alkalmat szolgál a köztünk fenálló jó viszony szótt intrigák táplálására."

71. Ibid., 28 May 1869 (Dnevnik, p. 183): "Kérem legyen rajta, hogy a septemviratus ne hagyja helybe a kir. tábla azon ítéletét, mellyel Karagyorgyevicsnek megengedte, hogy szabad lábon védje magát."

72. Ibid., 6 June 1869 (Dnevnik, p. 187).
73. Ibid., 13 Sept. 1869 (Dnevnik, p. 219): "igen sajnálja a Karagyorgyevics szabad
lábra való helyezését. Igyekszem neki megmagyarázni, hogy ez a mi törvénykezési formainkkal jár."

79. *Ibid.*, 9 May 1870 (*Dnevnik*, p. 298): "Én... megemlíttettem, hogy a bírák megvészgetetteknek látszanak lenni.... Igérete hogy elhivatja magához Sztrokay s fog vele értekezni az ügy állásáról s a módozatkör mely szerint az elitélletés biztosítható lenne."
83. Kállay Diary, 22 July 1870 (*Dnevnik*, p. 315): "ha sikerül Karagyorgyevicszet elitélünk akkor Magyarország feltétlenül számíthat Szerbíára s együtt harczolhatunk még Oroszország ellen." The verb used *(harcolnõ)* is ambiguous, and can mean either "to fight" in a physical sense, or the less aggressive "to make a stand against".
84. István Diószegi, "The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in International Affairs of the Last Third of the 19th Century", in his *Hungarians in the Ballhausplatz*, p. 34.
85. Kállay Diary, 26 July 1870 (*Dnevnik*, p. 316): "A minister szólott neki s ezóta úgy látszik hogy a bírák is az elitélletés mellett vannak."
90. *Ibid: "nem hisz többé a magyaroknak, most két év óta csak szép szavakkal ?---- -- [word unclear] de tulajdonképen semmit sem tettünk, s azt mondja igaza volt Risticsnek ki mindig fõ szellemben nyilatkozott."*
92. *Ibid.*, 27 Aug. 1870 (*Dnevnik*, p. 324): "s csak azt említette, hogy tényleket őhajtana látni a mi részünkrõl, ...különben akarata ellen is kénytelen lesz az oroszokkal pactálni."
94. Ibid., 5 Sept. 1870 (Dnevnik, p. 327): "ezt ő naygon jól felhasználna és akkor nem féltene a magyar-szerb szövetséget, melynek nézete szerint a legszorosabbnak kell lennie."

95. Kállay to Andrássy, 5 Sept. 1870, OSZK, FH 1733/200: "de leginkább hogy ha csak lehet oda működni méltóztatnám, hogy az ítélet elmarasztaló legyen."

96. Kállay Diary, 6 Oct. 1870 (Dnevnik, p. 332): "ma mondta ki az ítéletet a Karagyorgyevics pörben, s hogy mindnyáját felmentették. E hír igen kellemetlen benyomást tett réám, előre látnám a rosz következményeket."

97. Ibid., 7 Oct. 1870 (Dnevnik, p. 332): "a magyar közvelemény nincs megelégedve." See also Kállay to Falk, 6 Oct. 1870, OSZK, FOND IV/442.

98. Ibid: "Az ítélet gyöngse indokolása is tanusítja már hogy felsőbb helyről jövő több esélyel és kevesebb timiditással egészen más eredményt tehetett volna elérni."

99. Ibid: "a felmentés nagy megútközés okozott."


101. Kállay Diary, 26 Oct. 1870 (Dnevnik, p. 335): "egy...Magyarország ellen dühöngő cíkk nagy sensatiót okozott itt s ezt a keves sympathát is kioltotta a mi volt irántunk."


103. "...neznam kako može našoj gospodi i u oči pogledati, kad je sud mađarski sašvim drugu presudu doneo i time se vlada mađarska sašvim na drugo zemljište stavila nego što je konzul taj na merodavni mesti u ime vlade svoje uveravanja davao." Srpski narod, 9 [21] Oct. 1870, quoted ibid., n. 256 by Radenić; also Kállay Diary, 5 Nov. 1870 (p. 337).


105. Kállay Diary, 5 Nov. 1870 (Dnevnik, p. 337).
The Bosnian question was at the very centre of what Andrâssy and Kâllay hoped to achieve in Serbia. It was the douceur intended to entice Serbia into the Monarchy's sphere of interest; it played a role in the Hungarian government's management of Croatia and the Military Border; it figured in the diverse railway schemes being promoted at the time as a means of economic manipulation. Only the judicial pursuit of Alexander Karadordević, as an issue affecting the goodwill of the Serbian Regents, possessed an urgency of its own entirely independent of the scheming over Bosnia.

The Hungarian objective in broaching the Bosnian question with the Serbian government seems fairly clear. A Serbia enlarged by the acquisition of Bosnia could only be contemplated in return for the complete elimination of Russian influence in the Principality, and its unequivocal adherence to the Monarchy. In this scheme of political allegiance, moreover, Andrâssy and Kâllay regarded closer relations with Hungary as the main attraction for Serbia, with the Austrian half of the Monarchy at best an involuntary partner, at worst an irritating marplot. At all times the Austrian military, with their scarcely concealed interest in annexing Bosnia to the Monarchy, were perceived in Pest as a threat to this objective.

What complicates this picture is the role of the Austro-Hungarian foreign ministry and of the Emperor himself. It is hard to imagine how Andrâssy could have thought to implement his Serbian policy without beforehand securing the approval of either Beust or the Emperor; nevertheless, the evidence suggests that the Bosnian initiative began, in 1867, as a purely Hungarian one, made without the specific authority of either monarch or foreign minister. As such it remained for the first few months following the arrival in Belgrade of Kâllay, who carefully shrouded from Beust any inking of his discussions about Bosnia with either Prince Michael or the Regents.

By the end of 1868, however, it was becoming obvious to both Beust and Prokesch-Osten, at Constantinople, that something was afoot. But whereas Prokesch's reaction was one of unambiguous dismay, whatever chagrin Beust might have experienced, at
this clear flouting of his instructions to Kállay the previous April, seems to have been succeeded by a paralysed astonishment at what the Hungarians were doing. Beust's indecision was perhaps understandable, for in an attempt to expedite the Bosnian scheme Andrássy took the matter directly to the Emperor in September 1868. The result, for reasons still obscure, appears to have been a qualified approval by Francis Joseph.

From then on responsibility for promotion of the scheme appears to have been lodged exclusively with the Hungarian government and the representative of "Hungary-Austria" in Belgrade. Apart from an inconclusive tête-à-tête with Beust in April 1869, Kállay was left to do more or less what he liked, which amounts to saying that he was free to carry out Andrássy's policy in the matter. No subsequent evidence suggests that either Beust, or even Francis Joseph, ever actively intervened. Nowhere was the pursuit of a distinctly Hungarian 'foreign policy' more glaringly obvious than in the Bosnian question.

The problem was that even with this bait on their hook Andrássy and Kállay failed to get a convincing bite from the Serbian Regents. Here the practical difficulties in the way of delivering what was being promised proved insuperable. The Regents hesitated to come out in the open with proposals which would, on any calculation, provoke a major diplomatic crisis, with no more than the assurances of the Hungarian government as surety. Hungary, it turned out, could no more speak on behalf of the entire Monarchy than the Monarchy could act without taking Hungarian views into consideration. A separate Hungarian 'foreign policy' was a contradiction in terms.

Andrássy did not see the matter in this light. Increasingly, as 1869 wore on with no agreement reached, he came to see the Regents' reluctance to move as evidence of their essential untrustworthiness. To Kállay's dismay, Andrássy's enthusiasm for the Serbian connection began to wane.

At the same time, and with perhaps more reason, the Regents' suspicion of Hungarian motives waxed with every month that the question remained unresolved. The Regents naturally asked themselves how the Hungarians proposed to deliver. They saw no evidence that the traditional interest of the Austrian military in Bosnia had
subsided, or that Andrâssy had demonstrably reversed decades of Habsburg policy in the Balkans. They suspected Andrâssy of acting in collusion with the foreign ministry in an attempt to deflect Serbia from what the Regents, like all Serbs, regarded as the ultimate national aspiration of eventually raising revolt against the Turks. Kâllay found himself discussing the issue in an atmosphere of polite but increasing scepticism.

The use that Andrâssy, this time in agreement with Beust, made of the Bosnian question in July 1870, to keep Serbia quiet at the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War, shows how cynically he had come to regard the whole issue. Kâllay persisted a little longer with his belief in the scheme, but it was in any case dead before the middle of that year. Although it was some time before Serbo-Hungarian relations degenerated once more into expressions of outright hostility, the damage was done.

Andrâssy’s brain-wave of 1867 had encouraged the Serbs in the one aim which it had been the earnest endeavour of Austrian foreign ministers for decades past to thwart, the possession of Bosnia. The gradual realisation that these promises were hollow did much to ruin the relations of the Monarchy as a whole with Serbia. And when Bosnia was eventually appropriated by the Monarchy itself in 1878, under the aegis moreover of Andrâssy as foreign minister, the embitterment was complete. The Bosnian question showed both the scope and the limitations of Hungarian influence on Habsburg foreign policy; but its most important effect was in needlessly exacerbating an already existing conflict of interest, between Habsburg dynastic interest on the one hand, and Serbian nationalism on the other.

39: Confusion in Vienna and Abroad

The Regents, once Colonel Orešković apprised them of his mission to Pest in June, were no less interested in following it up than Prince Michael had been. The idea of securing the administration of even a part of Bosnia, without a general uprising and war against the Turks, had appeal for a régime as unsure of its hold on power as the new Regency. The problem for Andrâssy and Kâllay, however, was that the Austro-Hungarian foreign ministry was still in the dark as to what was being contemplated. For several months after the Obrenović assassination, the Bosnian plan remained in the diplomatic twilight while Andrâssy and Kâllay discussed it themselves and with the
Regents, but without bothering to inform Beust. Nevertheless, rumours of some sort of initiative by Serbia reached Beust, although there is no indication that he realised its origins.

As early as 11 August, Beust queried Prokesch over a rumour that "Serbien mit [der] Pforte wegen Abtretung gewisser türkisch-slavischer Granzstreife an ersteres unter Wahrung der türkischen Oberhoheitsrechte verhandelt." The purpose of entering into these supposed negotiations, according to Beust's information, was to make of Serbia "nebst einem treuen Alliirten auch einen Damm gegen ungarisch-österreichische Gelüste." Clearly his source quite failed to perceive that the threads of these negotiations went back far beyond the Serbian government. As yet no one in the imperial camp realised that there was a Hungarian dimension.

Prokesch was adamant that the Ottoman government not involved in such negotiations. The Turks had decisively rejected a similar plan originated by Prince Michael in 1867, so why should they be any more favourably disposed now?

Moreover,


Instead, Prokesch was inclined to blame the Russians for the rumours:

An die Absichten Ungarns, sich nach und nach in den Besitz von Serbien und Bosnien zu bringen, glauben zu machen, ist die eifrige Bemühung der russischen Botschaft bei der Pforte....

What Prokesch took to be the imaginary expansionism, attributed to Hungary by the Russians, was probably a distorted echo of the real scheme being pursued by Andrássy and Kállay.

The Russians, or at least the Panslav enthusiasts amongst them, took these aspersions against the Hungarians seriously. At all times the Russian government suspected the Habsburg Monarchy of designs on the Ottoman Empire, just as Habsburg diplomats automatically assumed the worst about Russian intentions. Fears with regard
to Bosnia-Hercegovina were particularly frequent. In May 1868, for instance, Ignatiev was convinced that Austria-Hungary was ready to pour thousands of troops into the provinces on the slightest pretext. Kállay's arrival in Belgrade redoubled Russian suspicions and shifted them noticeably towards the Hungarian half of the Monarchy.

By October 1868 Gorchakov, the Russian chancellor, was accusing Andrássy of "ehringe Pläne auf Errichtung eines Slavo-Magyarischen Reiches." Nor were the Russians alone in misinterpreting this new Hungarian activity. Italy's minister president, Count Menabrea, was equally convinced there were
tendenze ognora più manifeste del Governo di Pest a farsi centro d'un grande impero orientale.... This was hardly the case, but Menabrea might be pardoned for thinking it was, since Scovasso, his consul in Belgrade, believed the Hungarians could not seriously intend letting Serbia take over Bosnia. Scovasso had been informed of the recent talks in Pest by Orešković himself, but thought the latter had been taken in.

40: Kállay Convinces Blaznavac

In reality Kállay, in his unofficial capacity as the representative of the Hungarian government, was doing his utmost to convince Blaznavac and Ristić of Hungarian good faith. Kállay's own record shows that he was perfectly sincere in his espousal of the Bosnian scheme, even if, as he had confided to Andrássy in May, he thought that "sooner or later" the provinces would have to be subjected to some form of Austro-Hungarian administration.

By the end of June, Kállay learned from Blaznavac that even Ristić was now convinced "that Russia will not help Serbia to take over Bosnia. It only wants to incite the nationalities against the Turks so it can then fish in troubled waters." Mistrust of Russia, however, did not necessarily mean that Ristić accepted the Hungarian proposals at face value. Of the two, Ristić remained throughout more sceptical than Blaznavac, as Kállay discovered when he got down to serious discussions with both in September.

It was rather Blaznavac on whom, more than anyone else, Andrássy and Kállay pinned their hopes. Kállay, after he had been treated to an expose of Blaznavac' views on the possibility of a federated south-eastern Europe on 26 June, felt sure he was
dealing with a sympathiser.

I have no reason to doubt Milivoj's [Blaznavac'] sincerity, especially since he has even revealed his plans for Bosnia.... He passed over in silence only the fact that in this vision of the future he has assigned the main role to Serbia, just as I didn't mention that I assign it, once again, to Hungary.\(^{13}\)

It was at this meeting that the basic details of the plan were sketched out, details that were to form the topic of much fruitless discussion over the next three years.

Blaznavac repudiated any desire to infringe the sovereignty of the Sultan. Instead, Serbia would simply be entrusted with the administration of the provinces, and in return would pay an agreed tribute to the Porte. The Habsburg Monarchy, or rather its Hungarian half, would also gain from the deal, since Blaznavac said he "would be ready to abandon some Bosnian territory in order to round off our Croatia."\(^{14}\)

Going over these points a month later, Blaznavac expressed to Kállay his belief that implementing the Bosnian plan was the key to resolving the entire Eastern Question. "Russia would not be able to come forward as a protector and saviour, because it would have nobody it could rescue."\(^{15}\) Kállay voiced his delight at Blaznavac' adoption of the plan,

\[
\text{since the provinces could never be dangerous for us, and if united, they could constitute the strongest barrier against Russia.}\quad^{16}
\]

Kállay then promised to "support this plan in Buda and Vienna with all my might" when he went home on leave in August.\(^{17}\)

Mentioning Vienna in the same breath as Buda was less than straightforward, since Kállay had no intention of broaching the Bosnian plan with anyone other than Andrássy at this point. Blaznavac was thus acting under a delusion when he informed Kállay on 10 August that "for the realisation of these goals of their's they [the Regents] are counting especially on the help of Austria, but most of all on Hungary."\(^{18}\) It was one thing for the Serbian Regents to assume, on the basis of assurances given them by Kállay, that the Hungarian tail would somehow be able to wag the Austrian dog. It was quite another for the Hungarians deliberately to give the impression that Vienna was being consulted in the matter, when the reverse was actually the case.
Nevertheless even at this early stage there was a certain realism in the Hungarian offer to mediate, which the Regents clearly understood. In an exchange with Orešković on 8 August, Kállay voiced his own belief in the need for "a great South Slav empire" which would "paralyse Russian influence." He qualified this, however, in unmistakable fashion:

it is really all the same whether Serbia or Croatia plays the chief role in this. At the moment Serbia would possibly be better, because if Bosnia were attached to Croatia this would give rise to certain ill consequences for the Crown of St. Stephen and dualism....

To Blaznavac, two days later, Kállay was equally blunt:

I... regarded it in Hungary's interests to set up a great South Slav country in this region.... Serbian hegemony could possibly be more convenient, but if the Serbs aren't going to go along with us we will support the Croats. Milivoj understood the threat and said that they want an alliance with us above all else, but since this couldn't be public either on our part or their's, but only a secret [one] between Hungary and Serbia, they simply want the Hungarian government to use its influence on Vienna so that Beust in his dealings with the Porte supports the handover of Bosnia.

That getting Beust to endorse such a policy might be easier said than done was not a consideration Kállay wanted to obtrude upon Blaznavac' notice.

41: The Meeting at Terebes

For Kállay the key to the success of the Bosnian plan was not his nominal master, Beust, but his real one, Andrásy, whom he accordingly visited on the latter's estate at Terebes in late August. The Terebes meeting provides a very clear example of the extent to which Andrásy was trying to promote a foreign policy objective independently of both the Emperor and Beust, although Andrásy did accept that their involvement would be inevitable at some later stage. The meeting also reveals the wide-ranging nature of Andrásy's interest in foreign policy issues, the very obvious linkage, in his mind, between the Bosnian scheme and how he thought the Monarchy's relationship with other European powers, particularly Russia, should be conducted. Most arresting of all, however, is the fundamental irresponsibility of much of Andrásy's thinking on foreign affairs.
According to Kállay's account, Andrásy was highly pleased at Blaznavac' desire for
closer relations with Hungary, as opposed to Austria. In response to the Regent's query
as to what Serbia should do if revolution suddenly broke out in the Ottoman Empire,
Andrásy made it clear the best policy was to keep the peace. With regard to Bosnia,
Kállay received an equally clear impression that Andrásy "likes the plan." Andrásy
went on to remark, however,

that it would encounter great difficulties, principally on our side. The military party has not ceased regarding Bosnia as
compensation for all the losses up to now, and is certainly counting on taking it over, and in this way it is striving to win
over the Emperor as well. Beust, however, is afraid of such a daring policy. The Emperor could, perhaps, be won over for
this plan only if we could annex part of Turkish Croatia up to the Vrbas. Additional problems would be posed by the reluctance of the Turkish government, "in
its irrational obduracy," to cede the territory; and by the need to absorb the western strip of 'Turkish Croatia' into the Monarchy. "In spite of these great difficulties,
Kállay recorded, "he will give it a try, but until then I shall not mention it to Beust." Here already was an admission by Andrásy that the scheme was unlikely to get
very far, in Vienna, unless it involved some acquisition of territory by the Monarchy itself. From being a mere rearrangement of administrative boundaries within the
Ottoman Empire, it now envisaged a *de facto* partition of Turkish territory by a signatory power to the Treaty of Paris, a circumstance bound to drag in the other signatories, especially Russia. The willingness to contemplate an increase in territory,
moreover, throws a questionable light on Andrásy's oft-repeated assurances that the Monarchy could not afford to take more Slavs on board.

For Andrásy and Kállay one of the chief attractions of the Bosnian plan was that it would deal "a palpable blow to Russia." This was no mere metaphor. Andrásy was
not only convinced the Emperor wanted "war to make up for Königgrätz", but himself thought "the Empire needs a victorious war", which would "break Russian power". He went on to tell Kállay that, in June, he had advised the Emperor Napoleon to "attack Russia together with Austria on the pretext of liberating Poland." The Bosnian scheme was a prop in this improbable scenario:
...to carry out this plan it is necessary for Russia to start the war, and for this he thinks advisable the support of the plan about Bosnia, to the implementation of which Russia will not agree, because of which it can then come to war.\footnote{30}

The South Slavs could perhaps be bound "by secret treaty" to provide regular troops, but speed was essential, since according to Andrássy the plan was only likely to succeed while the ailing Napoleon III was still alive.\footnote{31}

As to practical implementation, Kállay was specifically authorised to express to the Regents Andrássy's support; but beyond that there was little of substance. Instead, Andrássy wanted the Serbian government to submit a memorandum on the subject to him, setting forth the general need for cession and how it might be achieved. The memorandum should affirm a commitment to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, as well as specifying what contribution of regular troops Serbia could make in time of war.\footnote{32}

The ball was thus firmly lobbed back into the Serbian government's court: it was up to the Regents, Andrássy seemed to be saying, to outline ways and means. This may have been yet another example of Andrássy's inveterate habit of postponing decisions, yet it introduced a fatal note of tergiversation into the subsequent negotiations. Either Andrássy was sincerely interested in pursuing the Bosnian scheme, or he was not; if he was, then the details could have been left for later discussion, while acceptance of the basic proposition was secured in Vienna and Constantinople. The fact that this acceptance had not yet been won was undoubtedly the reason why Andrássy was content to refer the matter back to Belgrade. He simply \textit{could} not initiate anything serious without the involvement of at least the Emperor, if not Beust, and despite his determination to influence policy towards Serbia. Yet the very fact of postponement was apt to create in suspicious minds, such as Ristić's, the fear that Serbia was being led up the garden path.

\textbf{42: Ristić's Doubts}

In the event, this was precisely what happened, although, to begin with, it was Ristić alone who expressed reservations. In an interview with both Regents on 1 September, Kállay was nettled to see that the mere mention of Bosnia caused Ristić to smile. To
the assurance that Andrassy approved the plan, Ristić's immediate response was, "You
do, but what about Beust?" Kállay could only affirm his own belief that "Andrassy will
win over both him and the Emperor for this plan."33

When Kállay mentioned the need for a Serbian memorandum on the subject, Ristić
voiced the ultimate practical objection to the scheme:

he [Ristić] doesn't believe that the Porte will give way
peacefully... he thinks that the Porte will only give way if it is
forced to do so by a general uprising of the Christian peoples.
And if, on the occasion of some war in the West, this revolt
broke out, Serbia would not be able to remain on the
sidelines....34

Kállay countered with, from the Monarchy's point of view, the logical reply:

Since our Slavs...would also probably be affected by this
uprising, we would have to station an army on the frontier,
which would possibly even intervene.35

He also deployed the most lethal weapon in his own armoury of scare tactics:

I stressed that the Croats too want to occupy Bosnia and that
only a hint from Buda is needed in order for there to be 60,000
Croats in Bosnia one day. However, as long as the Serbs can
acquire Bosnia by peaceful means, we don't want it for
ourselves.36

Ristić insisted, however, that if peaceful means were to work they would have to be
rapid. The Regents agreed to the accession of a border strip to Croatia, but on the
subject of a military, defensive-offensive alliance they asked for more details. Kállay
got the impression that "they are afraid that we will exploit them for the purposes of a
renewed conquest of Germany."37 He noted privately that "I still haven't told them that
this alliance would really be directed against Russia."38 The discussions ended in
stalemate: the Regents agreed to "think it over".39

It was clear from this that the Regents were divided on the issue. Blaznavac assured
Kállay that Hungary could count "not only on Serbia's friendship but on its armed
forces as well."40 That Blaznavac genuinely wanted to believe the Hungarian
assurances is borne out by an interview with the Italian consul, in which the Regent
appeared to be trying to convince himself that the Hungarians had every interest in
furthering a greater South Slav state. Linked by treaty to Hungary, he assured
Scovasso, it would constitute a barrier against Russia.\textsuperscript{41}

43: Andrásy Confronts the Emperor and Beust

In the meantime Andrásy had confronted Francis Joseph and Beust on the issue.

Andrésy appears to have had more success with Francis Joseph, although he admitted that the discussion, which took place during a hunt, did not go into details. "His Majesty," he wrote, "didn't receive the idea in general badly, as described by me."\textsuperscript{42} Andrásy resolved to give the Emperor a more detailed view soon. "Only after this did I speak with Beust, but with him quite comprehensively."\textsuperscript{43} But the chancellor, though he listened to Andrásy "with great interest",\textsuperscript{44} was openly sceptical. According to Andrásy, Beust "has no great objection to the idea, except that he doesn't consider it realisable."\textsuperscript{45} Beust thought the Serbs

will promise everything with regard to [Turkish] integrity, but will nevertheless exploit the first opportunity and having allied themselves with the Bulgarians, they will turn against the Turks.\textsuperscript{46}

Moreover, the British government was certain to advise the Porte against the scheme, and "on this the matter will suffer shipwreck."\textsuperscript{47}

Beust's quandary may readily be imagined. In a constitution where the final say in foreign affairs clearly rested with the Emperor, the chancellor could hardly object when his master chose to listen to Andrásy's ideas. The fact that the Bosnian scheme flatly contradicted Habsburg policy in the Balkans hitherto was irrelevant: it was something that could be discussed. This would explain the extraordinary claim that Beust had "no great objection to the idea", which suggests that Beust was merely putting a brave face on what he could not alter. Where he could make a difference, however, was in pouring cold water on the whole scheme, casting doubts on its practicality and pointing out, with perfect truth, that it would in any case encounter the opposition of at least one of the signatory great powers.

Andrésy was not deterred. He still, he assured Kállay, thought the plan "very suitable, indeed I think it not only possible but necessary as well."\textsuperscript{48} Three conditions, however, were essential. It must remain a close secret until it could be discussed openly, and ideally only one of the Regents should be in the know. Turkey's territorial
integrity must be guaranteed by some formal instrument, which should have the endorsement of the Skupština. Finally, Serbia would have to commit itself to some border alteration in the Monarchy's favour.49

Andrássy's reasons for endorsing the Monarchy's acquisition of territory make interesting reading, in view of the fact that it was under his aegis, in 1878-79, that Bosnia was eventually occupied by Austria-Hungary. Even in 1868, when he was prepared to promote an enlarged Serbia, Andrássy was still bound to recognise that certain factors made the Monarchy's participation in the deal inevitable:

I don't attach the least importance to this [border alteration], indeed I would much prefer the matter without it, but it is unfortunately a condition without which, I have to confess, implementation is impossible. The reason for this is that the military party within, and some foreign powers without, have for a long time never stopped holding out the prospect of the provinces in question as possessions of Austria.50

Andrássy obviously had France in mind; but other powers such as Britain clearly preferred the preservation of Turkeish integrity. Should that prove impossible, Andrássy admitted, these supporters of the status quo were far more likely to back an Austro-Hungarian presence in Bosnia than a Serbian one.51

44: Emerging Defects of the Plan

Kállay's first contact with the Regents after this, on 2 October, was with Ristić, to whom he made it clear that the plan had now been raised by Andrássy at the highest levels, although "only superficially", and that "there would unavoidably be greater difficulties."52 As to the Monarchy's annexation of a part of Bosnia, "which I showed was necessary because of the Croats", Ristić "had nothing against this."53 Kállay encouraged the Regents to start drafting a memorandum for Andrássy, which the latter could then use to press for acceptance of the plan.

Given Andrássy's professed belief in the urgency of the Bosnian plan, it is remarkable that by 15 October he had still not managed to discuss it again with either the Emperor or Beust. He nevertheless still favoured the plan, and saw the whole thing in the context of grand policy:

It is a dangerous business because, apart from how we could win the assent of the Turks, we will thereby incite the
Russians against us, which still wouldn't be such a great evil if we were quite clear with regard to our western policy.\textsuperscript{54}

Andrásy had in mind the Franco-Prussian antagonism, in the face of which, he was sure, the only safe policy was a strict neutrality.

Unfortunately, Beust has recently begun to flirt with France....
We must dissuade him from this course and secure ourselves in the east.\textsuperscript{55}

The Bosnian question clearly fitted in with this strategy of security in the East. One can only wonder, however, how Andrásy could with one breath denounce the supposed frivolity of Beust's western policy, and with the next calmly contemplate a reckoning with Russia in the East.

On the question of an alliance with the Serbs, Andrásy informed Kállay that he had been getting assurances that the Serbian government genuinely desired such a connection. Serbia "would be more than happy to help Hungary in the event of any war it might conduct against Austria,"\textsuperscript{56} although this was an assistance which Andrásy stressed was not needed. Kállay used the opportunity to point out once again that this animus against Vienna was grounded in the Serbs' fears for Bosnia, and was primarily due to the noises made by the Austrian military. This was why the Serbian government now saw its only hope in "an Austria in which Hungary would play the main role."\textsuperscript{57}

It is clear too that Kállay already had to devote some energy to combating "Andrásy's fear that the Serbs only want to reach their own objective, and afterwards turn against us."\textsuperscript{58} Kállay's view was that Serbian self-interest, if nothing else, bound Serbia to Hungary. If the Serbs could be secured the administration of Bosnia, "they would be so preoccupied with internal organisation that they wouldn't have much time to concern themselves with further expansion."\textsuperscript{59} Kállay got the impression that his reply reassured Andrásy; but the suspicion on both sides was evidently strong right from the start.

Both Regents, moreover, had reservations about committing themselves to paper over the plan, and Kállay spent much of the next few months simply trying to prise out of them the memorandum desired by Andrásy. In answer to a comment by Orešković, in October, on the desirability of an alliance between Serbia and Hungary, Kállay
produced a rule of thumb which can only have increased the Regents' doubts.

the form in general wasn't important and would come to the
same thing even if Serbia concluded an alliance with Austria,
as long as what is realised is what Andrásy wants.⁶⁰

In other words, the eventual alliance would probably have to be with the Austro-
Hungarian government, but this did not matter as long as the Hungarian government
was satisfied with the details. The bland assumption, that Vienna would be content to
rubber-stamp any bargain driven by the Hungarians with Serbia, did not augur well for
the future of the plan.

45: Beust's and Prokesch's Objections

The fact was that, while Beust may not have felt strong enough to oppose Andrásy's
plan, he was less than enthusiastic for it. At the heart of imperial policy regarding to
Bosnia there was now a confusion for which the two-headed eagle seems an all too
appropriate symbol.

Beust did not, and perhaps felt he could not, come out with a clear denunciation of
the Bosnian scheme. Prokesch-Osten, however, was under no such constraints; and in
October he sought clarification as to how Kállay thought Austria-Hungary should go
about winning "die ganze Anhänglichkeit Serbiens". Kállay argued that the Monarchy
must convince the Serbs that it wished them well and did not oppose their interests.
However, in Prokesch's view,

um dies zu können, müßten wir doch zuerst wissen, was
Serben dann unter seinem Wohle versteht....⁶¹

In reply, Kállay dwelt on the strong bonds between Serbia and Bosnia, making the
remarkable claim that

Serben ist das einzige Land, an welches sich die Christen
Bosniens mit Freude und unter dessen Herrschaft sogar die
dortigen Moslimen von slawischer Abkunft ...sich zufrieden
fühlen würden.

More subtly, Kállay attempted to show that the old Serbian mistrust of Austria was now
on the wane, but was easily aroused over Bosnia, and kept alive most of all by the
authorities in the Military Border.⁶²

By this time, Prokesch knew where the principal threat to the status quo was coming
from. On 27 October he warned Beust "vor der Illusion...die mir in Pest verbreitet scheint, daß wir Rumänien und Serbien zu uns herüber ziehen können." Early in November he and Beust received a despatch from Kállay which made clear the extent of Kállay's commitment to change.

Kállay denied yet again the rumours that Serbia intended a forceful occupation of neighbouring provinces. The Regents' aspirations towards Bosnia were long-term:

> In einem etwas entfernteren Zeitpunkte glaubt vielleicht die Regentschaft mit Österreichs Zustimmung und Hilfe auch ihre Wünsche Bosnien betreffend realisiren zu können.

Kállay nevertheless was of the opinion that it was in the Monarchy's own interests to encourage these hopes.

> ...so ist es...immer vortheilhafter, wenn sie [the Serbs] die Verwirklichung dieser Combination von uns hoffen, da wir dieselben somit fortwährend controlliren können.

The alternative, he warned, was to run the risk that, in the absence of any effort to alter the status quo, an uprising would eventually sweep Serbia into conflict with the Turks regardless.

The suggestion that Austria-Hungary ought actively to promote Serbia's Bosnian ambitions broke new ground as far as the Ballhaus was concerned. Kállay already knew that Andrássy had briefed Beust and the Emperor about the Bosnian plan, and that there had been, if not energetic approval, at least tacit acceptance of it. He evidently judged it time to reveal where he stood himself on the issue.

It was enough to provoke Prokesch, on 10 November, to a response which articulated all the objections of traditional Habsburg policy to the Hungarian plan. First of all was the point that, if Serbia did win control over Bosnia, "dieses neugestaltete Grossserbien nur eine desto größere Anziehungskraft auf unsere Südslawen üben und diese ihm halben Weges entgegen kommen würden." For the Monarchy, in the past, to have striven against these aspirations was understandable; just as understandable was that Russia, for reasons which had very little to do with Serbia, supported them.

The core of Prokesch's counter-argument was based on the irreducible self-interest of a multinational, dynastic state like Austria-Hungary:

> ob die Sympathien Serbiens um den Preis des Zerfalls der
Türkei, des hieraus erfolgenden europäischen Krieges und der schweren Verlegenheiten, die uns dann erwachsen müssten, nicht zu teuer erkauft sein würden, stelle ich Ihrem Urtheile anheim.... die österreichisch-ungarische Politik nicht dahin gehen kann, dem Schwindel einer nationalen Einigung und dadurch die Ablösung unserer Südslawen in die Hände zu arbeiten.

The current moderation of the Serbian Regents, he concluded, was welcome and, because it suited Austro-Hungarian interests, deserved support. It would be dangerous, however, to rely on such moderation continuing.66

To Beust, Prokesch expressed his disquiet at what Kállay was saying to the Regents. Kállay was deluding himself, Prokesch suggested, if he thought concessions to Serbia on any front would secure the Monarchy a decisive influence. He was especially in error if he thought Austro-Hungarian policy was inclined to countenance Serbian national aspirations. Prokesch left to Beust the task of bringing Kállay back into line with what, after all, were Beust's own guidelines.67

Prokesch's confidence in Beust was somewhat misplaced, for as we have seen Beust appears to have tolerated if not encouraged Andrássy's experiments in diplomacy. There was no rebuke meted out to Kállay from Vienna for what was, by now, an obvious departure from both the spirit and the letter of his original instructions. Nor did Kállay show any sign of being intimidated by Prokesch's open disapproval.68 On the contrary, he continued to press Andrássy about the need to resolve the issue speedily.

Kállay informed Andrássy at the end of October that he had raised the Bosnian question with Beust "in muffled fashion".69 He felt emboldened to do so, he explained, because the current situation was so threatening. Roumanian support for nationalist movements, seconded by Russian and Prussian agents, Kállay claimed, increased the danger of a general uprising; and the Serbian government, however desirous of staying out, would not be able to "if the East goes up in flames".70 "All this," he continued,

we can avert by the cession of Bosnia; only it must happen soon. If this plan is implemented not only will these peoples remain quiet, but they will even be of use to us in a war against Russia, and we can maintain our borders in peace.71

In Kállay's opinion it would be enough to come out openly with the plan in order to win Britain and France over on its behalf; the precise details could be settled later.72
The problem from the Hungarian point of view was not in Pest but in Vienna, where Beust seemed willfully disinclined to expedite the idea, thus necessitating further time-consuming manoeuvres by Andrásy to get the ear of the Emperor. The crucial phase of the Bosnian question, by comparison with which the long negotiations that followed were an anti-climax, took place between November 1868 and April 1869.

46: Increased Pressure on Vienna and Belgrade

In a despatch to Beust of 17 December, Kállay made his most explicit plea yet for the cession of Bosnia. He warned that, in any great crisis involving the Balkan Christians, the popular pressure on the Serbian government to act would be irresistible. In these circumstances the Ottoman Empire would probably not survive, and Austria-Hungary would be a helpless spectator, while "die orientalische Frage ohne unsere Leitung, vielleicht sogar gegen unsere Absichten gelöst wird." The only means of averting catastrophe, Kállay argued, was the "Neutralisiren Serbiens", for in any uprising not much would happen if the Serbian element in the Balkans could be kept in check. And the neutralisation of Serbia was only conceivable if its Bosnian aspirations were to some extent satisfied.\(^\text{73}\)

Informing Andrásy a few days later that he had done his best, Kállay reiterated the need for a "decisive move" to counter the Russian threat.\(^\text{74}\) The Bosnian scheme would give the pro-Hungarian Regency a much needed boost in popular esteem. There was also the important consideration, which Kállay had been mulling over for some months, that Bosnia was the ideal "apple of discord" for alienating Serbs from Croats. "A successful solution to the Bosnian question and the complete exclusion of Croatia from Serb interests could secure our future."\(^\text{75}\)

December passed, however, without any discernible effect on Beust. The chancellor, as Andrásy complained on 27 December, "won't make up his mind to act decisively in this regard, however much he (Andrásy) urges him."\(^\text{76}\) Andrásy was glad Kállay was at last tackling Beust openly on the subject, since it was vital to maintain the initiative. Nevertheless, all my efforts to date have failed in face of \textit{vis inertiae}. My old friend [Beust] sits at the piano - I push the tune towards him in vain - he keeps on playing something else.\(^\text{77}\)
Beust's was evidently stalling, but Andrassy intended making a determined effort after New Year's, "and I have His Majesty's promise that now we must resolve things once and for all." 78

Andrassy stressed to Kállay that the Regents must make their move: a memorandum to the foreign ministry in Vienna, submitted "in such a way that it should not be suspected that you had any advance knowledge of it." 79 In this document the Regents should affirm their commitment to the preservation of the Ottoman Empire, but hint at the difficulty any Serbian government would have in restraining its people in the event of a general uprising. 80

Why Andrassy thought the Regents should pretend to be the authors of the proposal, when Beust already knew that the whole scheme was the pet project of Andrassy and Kállay, remains a mystery, especially in view of Andrassy's insistence on secrecy. In any event Kállay himself was in some doubt as to what exactly Andrassy intended, and held up a detailed discussion with the Regents while he sought clarification from Pest. 81

On 17 January Kállay prodded Andrassy again. Since he had not received further instructions, he pointed out, he had not been able to raise the question in detail with the Regents. Kállay implored Andrassy to use his influence to induce the government to act decisively. "The time is short, the danger great, and unfortunately this danger is going to hit Hungary first of all." 82

Kállay knew perfectly well what the Regents thought. His account of a conversation with Blaznavac on 15 January highlights the Serbian government's dilemma, as well as Kállay's relative indifference to the predicament in which Andrassy's offer of help placed the Serbs. Blaznavac expressed what appears to have been a sincere conviction that war with the Turks over the Balkan Christians, and whatever the outcome, would be a terrible misfortune for Serbia. Even if Serbia were victorious it would suffer from the effects of such a struggle for years to come. Because of this, Blaznavac told Kállay, he wanted peace, not war, and accordingly he favoured laying the whole Serbian question before the European powers. 83

This was in fact an unexceptionable proposal. The position of Serbia within the Ottoman Empire was, after all, guaranteed by the powers. To suggest submission of the
Bosnian plan to a European tribunal was obviously in Blaznavac' eyes a reasonable, and much safer, way of proceeding. Kállay, however, could only reply that "if the Vienna government didn't want to approve the Bosnian plan, the Hungarian government would secretly help Serbia." He did not intimate what shape this help would take, and Blaznavac' response suggests his unease at such vagueness. The Regent "would prefer it for this to be public, because in this case he could prove to the people that the friendship of the Hungarians was the most profitable for Serbia."^

As for Ristić, there was a characteristic indication of his thinking on the matter the same day, in the newspaper Jedinstvo. In a leader which Ristić had written himself, the need for Hungary's friendship was acknowledged. However, "if the Hungarians are only trying to keep Serbia quiet, and are not supporting the aspirations of the Serbs towards Bosnia, then there can be no true friendship." Kállay responded by inspiring a leader in Pester Lloyd, which took the view that "Hungary would always look with sympathy on the legitimate expansionist aspirations of the Serbs in the Balkan Peninsula."^

The sense of an opportunity slipping away was by now beginning to dominate Kállay's respectful but clearly frustrated correspondence with Andrássy. Late in January, he reiterated his fear of impending calamity if the Bosnian question were not resolved soon. He was particularly discouraged by the critical comment in the Neue Freie Presse, which was Beust's preferred vehicle, on the recent leader in Jedinstvo.

Not only did Jedinstvo come in for sarcastic treatment, as evidence that the Serbs were once again dreaming of dividing up an Ottoman Empire which was not even dead yet. In a direct attack on Pester Lloyd, the Presse denounced the naïveté of the Hungarian press. Policy, the Presse insisted, was made not in Pest, but in Vienna, and was moreover "ganz und gar nicht serbensondern türkenfreundlich". It was crass to expect an enlarged Serbia to remain an ally of Hungary, with its large South Slav minorities.

"This article in the Presse has disturbed me," Kállay noted; "I can see from it that they have not reconciled themselves to this plan. Worse was to come. Early in February Kállay learned from Orczy that Andrássy had once again spoken with Francis Joseph and Beust on the subject. In a remark made much of by Wertheimer, Beust
apparently went so far as to say that "cette idée me sourit." In Kállay's account of the Orczy letter, however, this apparent concession was immediately followed by the rider, "but because of this both he [Beust] and the others see very considerable difficulties too." For Kállay, the hidden message was clear: "Of course, the fact that they see difficulties amounts to saying they aren't going to do a thing." And in fact nothing further happened on the Bosnian issue for another two months.

47: Calculations of the Military and Beust

For all Beust's vacillation on the subject, a number of documents from early 1869 show that Austro-Hungarian policy regarding Bosnia was still guided by traditional considerations. Memoranda produced in January 1869 by Colonel Beck, chief of the Emperor's military chancellery, and his subordinate Captain Thoemmel, represent a significant counter-weight to Andrâssy's and Kállay's Bosnian project, since Francis Joseph was bound to take seriously the opinion of his military experts.

For Thoemmel the bottom line for the Monarchy was clear:

Oesterreich muß um jeden Preis verhindern, daß Serbien Herr von Bosnien werde, weil damit, der Besiz Dalmatiens sehr gefährdet und der schon jetzt beachtenswerthe moralische Einfluß Serbiens auf die griechisch-orthodoxe Bevölkerung der Militär-Grenze, bedenklich werden könnte.

This did not rule out a partition between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Just as important was to secure for the Monarchy the most mineral-rich valleys, which were also the easiest trade routes. Failing to do so, and above all letting Serbia take over the Hercegovina, meant giving it control of these trade routes and permitting it access to the Adriatic.

Beck rounded described a forcible entry by Serbia and Montenegro into Bosnia-Hercegovina as "mit der Lebensfrage der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie in enger Verbindung." It could have disastrous consequences for the latter's internal stability. Any indication that Bosnia was about to slip from the Porte's control demanded an end to the Monarchy's conservative policy, and an active push to secure "einen strategisch und kommerziell zweckmäßig begrenzten Länder-Antheil." Serbia would probably have to be bought off, but the military were under no illusions as to who the enemy was. "Was es [Austria] bei der ersten Theilung Bosniens nicht erhält,
There is no documentation of Francis Joseph's reaction to these memoranda, but the thinking which informs both of them might explain the Emperor's otherwise surprising assent to the Andrassy scheme. The Hungarian plan clearly involved a disturbance of the status quo in the Balkans, and for radical reasons in diplomatic terms. Andrassy and Kállay aimed to win the Serbs over with concessions, on condition that Serbia bound itself unequivocally to the Monarchy, or at least its Hungarian half. The military advanced more conventional arguments of strategic and commercial advantage, as a justification for ending the status quo, and stressed the imperative need to assure the Monarchy a share in the spoils. Although the Emperor was in no way committed to a partition of the Ottoman Empire, territorial gains of the sort entertained by Beck and Thoemmel may well have been his own condition for letting Andrassy go ahead. More than one authority, with only a sketchy knowledge of the Hungarian scheme, has pointed to the psychological appeal, for Francis Joseph, of gaining territory rather than losing it as a motive inclining him to occupy Bosnia. The compromise partition envisaged in the late 1860's, therefore, can be seen as a staging-post on the way to sole occupation by Austria-Hungary in the late 1870's.

Beust's position is better documented. The chancellor saw the question in terms of its possible effect on the broader scene, and shrank from violent change. In a memorandum of 3 February, Beust started from the truism, ignored by Andrassy, that since "le maintien de la paix nous est encore essentiel", the Monarchy had perforce to reserve "tous nos moyens pour paralyser une action éventuelle de la Russie." War was simply not an option. Alluding to his proposals of 1867, Beust insisted that the Monarchy's policy remained the same: to contain Greece, Roumania and Serbia, while at the same time striving to better the position of the Balkan Christians generally.

Beust conceded that Serbia was still least overtly hostile to the Turks. Hence,

\[
\text{Si, au prix de quelques concessions, la Porte se delivrait de toute inquiétude du côté de la frontière serbe, elle n'aurait pas à regretter ce sacrifice.} \]

The intriguing question here is the nature of the concessions Beust had in mind. Was he resigned to letting the Hungarian initiative run its course, aware that he could do
little to obstruct it? Was he hoping that, against all his expectations, something would come of it, that the Porte would see reason in the Hungarian plan and acquiesce? What seems certain is that Beust did not, like the military, favour annexation of Bosnia for its own sake; nor did he really believe in the Hungarian policy of winning Serbia over by concessions.

The real priority for the imperial government was to open up Turkey-in-Europe to economic development, and thus stabilise the situation in the Near East. This could only be done by hurrying ahead with the railway between Vienna and Constantinople. As far as Beust was concerned, it was essential that construction of such a strategic link should be concerted solely between the Ottoman Empire and Austria-Hungary. Any other power dominant in this area

\begin{quote}
    disposerait pour ainsi dire des clefs de notre Empire et aurait le pouvoir de nous fermer à son gré les débouchés naturels de l'activité industrielle et commercial de nos peuples.
\end{quote}

So important did Beust consider this that he raised it at the common ministerial council on 9 February 1869, discussing railways in Dalmatia. In a clear reference to both the Andrássy plan and the Beck and Thoemmel memoranda, Beust mentioned "den immerhin im Bereiche der Möglichkeit liegenden Fall der Erwerbung weiterer Strecken des Hinterlandes." Bosnia was an obvious means of safeguarding the Vienna-Constantinople route, and it was vital, whether there was a partition or not, that the province not fall into the wrong hands.

As for the Balkan states themselves, Serbia included, Beust was determined to keep them small, divided and dependent. So, despite Beust's seeming acquiescence in the Andrássy plan, and despite the justice of the remark by one historian that the chancellor's stance on the Bosnian question remained unclear, certain conclusions are in order.

Beust's preference was for the status quo, but he was not above contemplating at least partial occupation of Bosnia by the Monarchy. This, if it had to happen at all, would in his eyes be for purely defensive, strategic reasons. Beust cannot have regarded as desirable even the partial expansion of Serbia as envisaged by the Andrássy plan, although he may have resigned himself to accepting it, if the Emperor persisted in
giving Andrássy his support in the matter. What is most likely is that Beust was
resolved to resist the plan as far as he practically could without distancing himself too
much from the Emperor. Kállay was right in anticipating further delaying tactics from
Vienna.

There was a natural tendency, however, among foreign diplomats to assume that the
Bosnian plan was a truly Austro-Hungarian initiative. No one could realise just how
fractured was the process whereby the plan was eventually 'agreed' upon. That it was
primarily Hungarian in origin was generally appreciated; that Beust was a reluctant
spectator, rather than a determined advocate, was at first missed.105

Meanwhile Beust's reservations had received reinforcement from Prokesch-Osten.

There was a sting in Prokesch's remark that,

\[\text{je lui [Kállay] suppose, à cause de son origine hongroise, trop de perspicacité pour le croire capable d'appuyer un projet dont la réussite menacerait l'Hongrie de sérieux embarras dans ses provinces méridionales slaves.}^{106}\]

By late March, however, Prokesch could no longer deny that the policy he represented
in Constantinople was not that pursued by Kállay. To the British ambassador, he
expressed "in the strongest manner" his disapproval of Kállay's "short-sightedness" in
encouraging the Serbs.107 Confronted by the Grand Vizier with clear evidence of
Kállay's support for ceding Bosnia to Serbia, and reminded how incompatible this was
with traditional Austrian policy, Prokesch sought refuge in equivocation. To attribute
to Hungary's leaders such a "Verläugnung der Reichspolitik" would be to believe them
capable of a course which, "man möge ihn verkleiden wie man wolle, Handlanger-
Arbeit für Rußland wäre."108 Everything in the tone of Prokesch's reports to Beust
indicates that he expected the chancellor to back him and not Kállay.

As of the end of March 1869, moreover, Beust still seemed to be in agreement with
Prokesch, endorsing his view that "no encouragement" should be given the Serbs. To
the British ambassador, Beust admitted that Kállay

had been under the influence of the Hungarian Government,
who were in the habit of communicating directly with him
upon various local affairs. The ideas which formed the subject
of our Conversation had issued from Pesth and not from
Vienna, but we should hear no more about them and Mr.
Kellay [sic] would abstain from giving encouragement to the
ambitions of the Servians to look to any annexation of the
Sclave Districts of Turkey.109

In the light of what Beust was about to concede, this was a particularly vain assertion.

48: Beust Gives Way

At the beginning of April 1869 Kállay travelled up to Pest for leave, in the course of
which he finally had the Bosnian matter out with Beust.110 Andrássy informed Kállay
on 4 April that he had broached the subject "several times" with both Francis Joseph
and Beust;111 but the latter

is still preoccupied solely with South Germany, and in the
eastern question, it seems, he is only inclined to give way
when Andrassy, for his part, gives way with
regard to German policy.112

Andrássy therefore had a plan,

by which we offer the Turks effective help in the event of a
war with Russia, but on condition that they agree to carry out
the Bosnian plan. Beust to begin with was
scared even by this, saying that before the Crimean War
Austria concluded a secret alliance with Russia to the effect
that in the event of Turkey's disintegration the two of them
would divide up the remains, this treaty would now be more
suitable for Austria than an alliance with Turkey.113

Beust was clearly making yet another plea for a policy of cautious cooperation with
Russia in the Balkans. Andrássy, however, "energetically and efficaciously explained
to him the danger of friendship with Russia."114

Faced with Andrássy's persistence, Beust appears again to have concluded that direct
opposition was futile. When Kállay saw him in Buda on 6 April, the chancellor made a
remarkable admission. As expected, he stressed that "the matter is not an easy one,
indeed is surrounded by great difficulties."115 However,

although the idea did not originate with him, nevertheless he is
not against it, he even authorised me in this connection to
announce to the Serbian government that we will not hinder its
aspirations.116

In response to Kállay's enquiry as to what he should do if the Serbs took further
measures, Beust simply told him to report it to those above him.

To Andrássy, this meant that "we can now be satisfied with what we have achieved
so far." Convinced that he had a free hand, he told Kállay that the Serbian Regents could once again be urged to submit their memorandum, "which we will then support." Yet Beust, when Kállay saw him again on 7 April, was adamant that the strictest secrecy must be preserved. Kállay could confide only in the French consul at Belgrade, Beust said, since France was already apprised of the plan and, it was hoped, this time would act in concert with the Monarchy.

Beust's concern for secrecy is explicable on two counts. For one, he was undoubtedly anxious to allay the disquiet that rumours of the Bosnian scheme had already aroused abroad. For another, by keeping everything as far as possible under wraps he may have sought to conceal from the Hungarians the extent to which he had been trying to dissociate himself from the plan and discredit it.

It is hard not to conclude that Beust had no clear alternative to Andrásy's Bosnian project, or rather, had not the stomach to defend the only obvious alternative. This was the policy outlined by Beust himself on several occasions, namely, defence of the territorial status quo in the Ottoman Empire, but linked to reforms designed to defuse the potentially explosive situation in the Balkans.

The charge of supine acquiescence, moreover, makes more sense of Beust's policy than previous interpretations. Those historians, primarily Yugoslav, who have seen, in every Bosnian initiative from 1867 on, a cleverly thought out dual strategy by Beust and Andrásy, ignore the very real antagonism between the two men. By June 1869, a propos of the conflict between eastern and western priorities, Beust was complaining that "Kein Minister mehr hindert sein kann als ich durch Andrássy." In view of Beust's known views on the Eastern Question, the conspiracy theory simply does not add up. Far more likely is that Beust, seeing that he could not control Andrásy, decided to let him field his ideas, which Beust could then disavow, and see how far they went. If they worked, which Beust cannot have believed they would, fine; if not, Beust could shrug his shoulders and claim, as he was to complain about Andrásy in 1870, that he "was obliged to bear much from him." It was a peculiar way to conduct foreign policy; but then, the Dual Monarchy was a peculiar institution.

Kállay was quick to perceive the lack of enthusiasm for the project in Vienna. At
the beginning of May he and counsellor De Pont, of the foreign ministry, discussed the plan. De Pont, undoubtedly echoing Beust, was "afraid that Serbia, if it acquires Bosnia will want still more, and sooner or later will attract to itself both Dalmatia and Croatia."123 Kállay replied that the antagonism between Serbs and Croats over Bosnia was so strong that

if we were to strengthen both (Croatia by the annexation of Dalmatia and the Border and Serbia by the cession of Bosnia), we can only increase this antagonism, so we could even in the given circumstances by means of Croatia, acquire Bosnia.124

Kállay had to conclude that "We weren't able, however, to convince one another of our points of view."125

Even before Kállay returned to Belgrade, he received the clear impression that Beust was in no hurry to see the plan implemented. On 18 May the chancellor "expressed himself very vaguely, said that it is necessary to act reassuringly."126 Back in Belgrade, all Kállay heard, from both Vienna and Constantinople, was of the need "to proceed with the Bosnian question with caution."127 The Porte, according to Prokesch, was seriously alarmed at Kállay's activities.128 Beust and Prokesch can hardly have wanted the Turks to believe that Vienna supported the plan as wholeheartedly as Pest.

49: Negotiations Resume

In any case there was little Kállay could do to hurry thing along, since the Serbian government in the summer of 1869 was completely taken up with the elections to the Constituent Skupština, and the deliberations on the new Constitution.129 Until mid-
September Kállay had no opportunity to discuss the Bosnian question with anyone on the Serbian side.130 About the only person he did discuss it with was the Italian consul, Joannini, with whom Kállay raised the idea of the Balkan peoples bound together in "un'immensa Svizzera orientale."131 But the Italian also pointed out the oddity of the entreprise:

osservai al mio interlocutore [Kállay] che accadea per la prima volta di assistere ad un'azione diplomatica esclusivamente diretta dagli interessi ungheresi, senza vedere posti in bilancia gli'interessi, diversi forse in taluna parte, del rimanente della Monarchia.

The Ballhaus itself could not have put it more neatly. Kállay's assurances to Joannini
that "il Conte Beust divide le idee del Conte Andrassy", must have rung hollow even in his own ears.  

Kállay, however, remained anxious to get the Bosnian plan moving again, conscious that Andrásy himself was beginning to get impatient with the Serbs. Early in September 1869, Andrásy was even more insistent. By now he was convinced that the Monarchy was in imminent danger of being attacked as soon as Russia completed its current railway building programme, and the security aspect of the Bosnian question was increasingly uppermost in his mind. To secure both the Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire against attack from the rear, from the South Slavs, was essential.

Because of this we must win the Serbs over completely. They can only be won completely over by the cession of Bosnia. Its cession is the cornerstone of our South Slav policy, without it we are building on sand.

The issue simply must be raised again; "regardless of what they think of it in Vienna and Constantinople, he [Andrásy] will try however to win the upper hand in both places." But in return the Regents had to act on their own behalf; and there was an open threat in the next remark:

They must be warned that, in the event that Austria wins, and they have been on Russia’s side, an extremely melancholy fate would await them.

In response to Kállay’s query about the possibility of a defensive-offensive alliance with Serbia, which after all was still a vassal state of the Sultan, "Andrásy replied that he would achieve this." He would even agree to Blaznavac’ election as Prince, if this facilitated the overall goal.

On 14 September Kállay finally managed to have a serious discussion of the matter with Blaznavac, and stressed that "in my opinion the time was nearing when something would have to be done in this regard." The answer he got, however, reflected the hesitancy which had dogged the issue on the Serbian side from the beginning.

if they were sure of Andrásy’s moral support, they would be willing to turn to Bosnia at once and take it over, preserving of course the Sultan’s sovereignty.

There was "a certain guardedness" in Blaznavac’ general demeanour, moreover, that disturbed Kállay.
A lengthier discussion, on the 17th, gave Kállay the opportunity to employ the strong-arm tactics hinted at by Andrásy. He told Blaznavac that "Russia is going to attack us sooner or later, because she can only break through into the Balkans by going through us." Nevertheless,

there could hardly be any doubt as to our victory. I pointed out that Serbia could expect no good to come out of it if it were not on our side during this war, and we won....

What sort of policy, then, did Blaznavac intend to pursue?

Blaznavac claimed that, "if Hungary and Austria find themselves at war, Serbia will at once declare war on Turkey and annex Bosnia, the Hercegovina and Old Serbia and form a single state." Kállay, however, stamped on this idea as hard as he could: Austria-Hungary was not looking for Serbia's practical assistance in a war, he said, "only that it remain quiet and not disturb the Turks." In return for this passivity, of course, the reward would be Bosnia-Hercegovina.

The problem then arose, as always, of how this reward was to be effected. Kállay's proposed plan of action was a mix of practical, if bold, diplomacy, and what amounted to political incendiarism.

Two means offered themselves: one was for the Serbian government to send direct to the Porte and the guarantor powers in connection with this question a memorandum, which Austria would support, or, if this wasn't enough, covertly to activate the movements in Bosnia and exploit them to demand from the Porte the handing over of Bosnia.

Blaznavac naturally was highly interested but, beyond suggesting that a petition to Belgrade by the Bosnians themselves was another option, he had no practical alternatives for the moment. All Kállay could extract from him was the promise that "he would have a good think about the matter."

When Blaznavac returned to the subject two weeks later, there was a marked change in tone and emphasis. The Regent now thought it necessary "to employ the most pacific methods possible." Perhaps, he suggested, it would be best to start with some less controversial request. For instance, Serbia could ask for jurisdiction over the Orthodox population of Bosnia to be transferred from the Patriarchate of

168
Constantinople to the Metropolitan of Belgrade. If that was successful, it might then be possible to broach the idea of a share in the political administration.\textsuperscript{149}

The switch in Blaznavac' tactics mystified Kállay. On 5 October, he asked Blaznavac point-blank: why the sudden retreat from the idea of an administrative cession? Did the Regents no longer think the sympathies of the Bosnians could be relied on? Blaznavac denied this, "but he didn't see any possibility of action this winter, it could perhaps be started as soon as spring arrived."\textsuperscript{150} He assured Kállay that, in any Austro-Russian, Serbia would remain on the sidelines if guaranteed the administration of Bosnia.\textsuperscript{151} Kállay could only report back to Andrásy, urging further measures.\textsuperscript{152}

50: The Regents Hang Back

It was perhaps at this juncture that the seeds of irreparable suspicion were sown on both sides. Kállay remained baffled by Blaznavac' continuing air of reserve. Were the Regents developing a case of cold feet? Worse, were they making preparations to go their own way, if not throw themselves once more into the arms of the Russians?\textsuperscript{153}

One can only wonder at the effect of a casual enquiry made by Kállay on 5 October. "I mentioned to him [Blaznavac] the cession of a corner of Bosnia to Croatia, he didn't see any difficulties in this regard."\textsuperscript{154} Blaznavac may well have had no objections at this point. Nevertheless he and Ristić were to hold this remark against Kállay, as the Bosnian question dragged on into 1870 with even less likelihood of a breakthrough in sight. The lack of a solution in turn disinclined the Regents to any sort of compromise in favour of the Croats. Then, in the New Year, the revelation of talks between General Wagner, governor of Dalmatia, and the Croatian National Party, coupled with Wagner's subsequent elevation to ministerial rank, may have aroused all over again the suspicion that some sort of Austro-Hungarian confidence trick was being played on Serbia.

To be fair, Ristić in his memoirs made it clear that he regarded the Wagner affair as a case of Vienna trying to set Slavs against Hungarians. Ristić saw in this a preparation for the Monarchy's annexation of Bosnia, and a means of keeping the Military Border intact as a weapon against Hungary. Vienna, he claimed, was acting on the time-honoured principle "that it had to incite one nation against the other, in order to draw its own strength from their dissension. \textit{Divide et impera}."\textsuperscript{155} However, Ristić wrote these
words in 1874. In the murkier circumstances of the winter of 1869-70, neither he nor Blaznavac can have been so sure what to believe.

There was then a break in negotiations for several months, when Francis Joseph, Beust and Andrássy departed to attend the opening of the Suez Canal.156 Kállay's political mentor was effectively out of touch until December and, left to their own devices, Kállay and the Serbian Regents quietly shelved the whole issue.157 It was only upon Andrássy's return to the Hungarian capital that the Bosnian plan was revived. In Andrássy's opinion "the Serbian government could now apply directly to the Porte."158 He had enjoyed a long talk with Ali Pasha in Constantinople, "and from a distance mentioned this matter as well."159 In any case the stay of the Emperor's party in Constantinople gave rise to all sorts of speculation, including the suspicion that an Austro-Turkish alliance was concluded or in the offing, provoking interpellations in the Hungarian parliament from Svetozar Miletic and others.160 Both Kállay and Andrássy felt a renewed sense of urgency about exploiting what they saw as a sudden vulnerability to pressure on the part of the Porte.

Kállay saw both Regents on 5 January. To Blaznavac he argued that now was the moment to submit a memorandum to the Porte. With sublime disregard for the facts of the international situation, Kállay claimed that "Soon every European great power would be seeking Austria's friendship", which put the latter in a unique position to do something about the Eastern Question.161 At the same time, "Turkey was afraid of the movement which could break out this spring and thus would perhaps be more accommodating."162 Everything, Kállay urged, depended on utilising this favourable combination, and quickly:

On our side...the greatest influence was possessed by Andrássy.... Now, it could happen that the great powers will combine amongst themselves, the spring might pass without an uprising and the Porte's fears might dissipate, Andrássy might die - he might even fall from office - or we might get involved in a war which would take up all our attention, and then we would have thrown up a good opportunity for a long time to come or even, perhaps, forever.163

It was Kállay's most determined plea yet for action, but it ran immediately into the Regents' doubts and suspicions.
Blaznavac agreed with Kállay, but was disturbed by one thing. The Serbian government had a long standing policy of trying to establish an influence in Bosnia, and to counteract that of Russia.

Although this had been a success up to a point, it was not completely so and he was afraid that if they take this step Russia will provoke a premature Russian-oriented uprising in these provinces, by which they would be forced to take part in this, and that they wouldn't be able to take the lead in it.\(^{164}\)

This was a crucial objection from the Serbian point of view, and one moreover which had an arresting effect on Andrássy too, when he learned of it. For the moment, however, Blaznavac again promised that he would think the matter over.

Ristić had an even more fundamental objection. He simply did not think the Porte would ever give way over Bosnia. "That's what I think as well," Kállay confided to his diary, somewhat perversely, "but we really want to exert pressure on it [the Porte]."\(^{165}\) After discussing the matter with Ristić, Blaznavac' reservations were only strengthened. He now considered the idea of a formal proposal to the Porte, which could unleash a Russian reaction and a series of events over which Serbia would have no control, as too dangerous. Blaznavac was particularly apprehensive about the situation, not in Bosnia, but in Bulgaria. Here revolution was being promoted, he claimed, by the Russians and the Liberal government in Roumania. Blaznavac insisted that "as long as all these threads were not in his hands it would be dangerous to undertake a step which Russia could use against them."\(^{166}\)

Another divisive issue was raised when Kállay again mentioned the need to cede a corner of Bosnia to the Monarchy. Kállay emphasised "that we didn't want it, but want it only in case the Croats, who also yearn for Bosnia, were to make a lot of fuss."\(^{167}\) Blaznavac, however, in contrast to his acquiescence the previous October, was put out. He nevertheless, as before, accepted this as part of the price Serbia would have to pay.

The rubbishing Ristić gave the idea of a memorandum had a certain weight of experience behind it. A memorandum could even, Ristić suggested, be dangerous in itself. The Porte would reject it, and since the other powers would never support it the Porte, even if it didn't attack Serbia, would nonetheless send an
Instead, Ristić had an alternative plan. This was for the Serbs to stir up a revolt in Bosnia, and then "exploit the situation by writing to the Porte in such a way as to offer their services" in controlling it. As a reward, Serbia could then ask for the administration of the provinces. At this point, "both we [i.e., Austria-Hungary] and the other powers could get involved."

Kállay was helpless. He tried to show the superior advantages of trying diplomacy first, "but I didn't try too much, not knowing whether Andrásy would share his [Ristić's] viewpoint." In fact, in reply to Ristić's questions Kállay was obliged to assure him that not only Andrásy, but also Beust and the Emperor, were involved in the process, an admission that somewhat dimmed the image of the all-encompassing Hungarian government. At the back of Kállay's mind, too, there may have been the uneasy awareness that he was in a bad position to disapprove of instigating revolt, when only the previous September he had been advocating precisely that himself. Ristić's counter-proposal, though not without its perils, could at least claim to be aiming to avoid a general conflagration rather than provoke one.

51: Doubts on Both Sides

The negotiations were now so clearly in confusion that Kállay again repaired to Pest to consult with Andrásy. This is one of the turning-points in the Bosnian question, when Andrásy at last began to realise the difficulties and dangers of what he had been proposing. He may also have become suddenly so exasperated by the lack of progress that he lost interest in the matter.

At any rate, on 11 January Kállay gave Andrásy a detailed account of the recent talks, "attaching especial importance to the view according to which, if we now want to resolve this question peacefully Russia might foment an uprising which would snatch from our hands the leadership in these matters." The effect on Andrásy, in the light of all the arguments deployed against the Bosnian scheme in the past by people like Beust and Prokesch, has a certain ironic aptness. "He was impressed by this angle, which he hadn't thought of." So impressed, indeed, was Andrásy that he decided
that the Serbian government, while continuing its activity in Bosnia, should rather hold itself in readiness to act "the moment it might be necessary."\textsuperscript{174}

There then ensued, through pure happenstance, another one of those long gaps in the Bosnian question in which nothing actually happened. At the end of this period, in March 1870, the first communication made to the Regents by Kállay was to repeat Andrássy's advice to postpone any action. Evidently not much had occurred to change Andrássy's thinking in the course of the last two months. Nor would Kállay accede to a request by Blaznavac for some form of public statement that the Hungarian government "regarded Bosnia as a sister-state of Serbia", and would not impede the amalgamation of the two.\textsuperscript{175} Such a statement, Kállay said, could hardly be made in time of peace.

This was just as much of a turning-point for the Serbian government as Andrássy's conversion to caution had been, for the Hungarian government, in January. After years of talk and exhortation from Pest on the subject of Bosnia, the message now coming through was one of delay. It was one thing for the Regents themselves to raise objections and foresee pitfalls; they could hardly be accused of not wanting eventual Serbian control of Bosnia. But when Andrássy started doing the same, any number of ulterior motives might be imagined by minds traditionally suspicious of all things Hungarian.

And at the very time this news reached the Regents, they were still getting conflicting reports about the significance of the Wagner affair. Wagner's involvement with the Croatian Nationalists was proof to the Regents of continuing Austrian, if not Hungarian, designs on Bosnia. Then there was the rumour that an Austro-Turkish alliance had been signed the previous November, and had been the real purpose of Francis Joseph's Suez trip. According to this, Austria-Hungary would receive Bosnia in return for guaranteeing the rest of the Ottoman Empire's European provinces.\textsuperscript{176} The rumour was groundless, but it put Andrássy's \textit{arrières-pensées} on the Bosnian plan in a suspicious light.

There seems no reason to doubt the sincerity, however selfinterested, with which Andrássy promoted the Bosnian scheme up to the beginning of 1870. Yet if the end result of all the Hungarian proposals was stalemate, what more could the Regents hope
for from Andrássy? More important, Beust's reluctance, the prominence of Wagner in Vienna, the putative treaty with the Turks, all seemed to indicate that Hungarian influence was not as great as all that. Andrássy could initiate debate, but without the wholehearted cooperation of Vienna his promises stood revealed as empty.

Nobody said as much, on either side, but the Bosnian question was effectively dead. Talk about it between Kállyay and the Regents continued for the next few months, until the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War gave it a whole new complexion. In April, Blaznavac floated once again the idea of soliciting the opinion of the European powers, but did not get much further than that.177

It was Longworth, the British consul, who provided one of the sharpest criticisms of Kállyay's handling of the issue. Kállyay, he wrote on 20 June, was

...too intent... on exciting rivalry between the Austro-Hungarian Slavs and those of the Principality, and too glad to avail himself of Bosnia, as a bone of contention, to widen the breach between them, to care much about other consequences: it is nothing to him, who may have that province, provided it be not those, whose territory and numerical preponderance are already inconsistent with the safety of the kingdom and the Empire.178

There was a rough justice in Longworth's description of Kállyay's divide and rule tactics, yet when all is said and done Kállyay was merely an instrument of his political master. Kállyay's account of his two separate interviews with Andrássy, in May and June, make it clear why nothing more was happening with the Bosnian question. By the spring of that year Kállyay found himself increasingly at odds with Andrássy over the policy to be pursued towards the South Slavs generally.

As with Hungarian domestic policy, so with the Bosnian question. Having suddenly given up on the need for a speedy solution to the problem, in January, Andrássy by 9 May seemed almost oblivious to it. He was as concerned as ever about the threat posed the Monarchy by Russia; indeed, he told Kállyay that he considered a Russian war "unavoidable", even imminent.179 But with regard to the Bosnian question, Kállyay commented sourly, "I noticed that he doesn't really have a firm, decided viewpoint, he would like the matter to drag on [forever]."180 Kállyay came away from the conversation "as usual without result."181

174
Their meeting on 28 June, which brought Kállay's sense of helplessness to a head, did not even raise the Bosnian question. Instead, Andrássy expressed his sense of the general manageability of the South Slavs. There was clearly not much interest in the project which had preoccupied both men for the last two years.

The Bosnian plan was briefly reactivated in the summer of 1870. The occasion this time was the outbreak of war in the West, which raised for the first time the possibility of war in the East as well. The Bosnian plan in its second incarnation, however, had no more chance of success than before, and the Regents' reluctance to commit themselves was correspondingly greater. Before the end of 1871, as a result, the traditional Serbo-Hungarian antagonism had once again become a feature of the political landscape.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 5: THE BOSNIAN QUESTION 1868-70


4. Beust to Prokesch-Osten, 11 Aug. 1868, HHSA, PA XII/93; cf. 'Evidenz-Rapport' by Colonel Pelikan, 3 Aug. 1868, KA, Fasz. 5408/1, no. 385/EB.

5. Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 14 Aug. 1868, HHSA, PA XII/92; italics in original.

6. Ignatiev to Gorchakov, 21 June/3 July 1866; Gorchakov to Alexander II, 25 Nov. 1866 [NS]; Ignatiev to Gorchakov, 30 Apr./12 May 1868 (all three in French), in Yu. A. Pisarev & M. Ekmeći (eds.), Osvoboditel'naya bor'ba narodov Bosnii i Gertsegoviny i Rossiya 1865-1875: Dokumenty [The Liberation Struggle of the Nations of Bosnia and the Hercegovina and Russia... Documents] (Moscow 1988), nos. 35, 42 and 68, pp. 56-58, 70-71 and 113-14.


11. Kállay to Andrâssy, 31 May 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/92.


13. Kállay Diary, 26 June 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 44): "Nincs okom Milivoj őszinteségében kétéledem, főkép miután Bosniát illető tervével is előállt.... Talán csak azt hallgatja el hogy ő e jövő álomképben a főszerepet Szerbiának szánta, valamint én sem szólok arról, hogy én meg Magyarországnak szánom azt."


15. Ibid., 22 July 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 60): "Oroszország nem léphetne többé mint védő és mentő fel, mert nem volna kit és mitől megmenteni."

16. Ibid., (pp. 60-61): "miután ránk nézve e tartományok sohasem lehetnek veszélyesek, ellenben ha egyesülnek a legerősebb barriéret képezhetik Oroszország ellen."
lehet, tehát csak titokban Magyarország és Szerbia között; s csak azt óhajtják hogy a magyar kormány hasson oda Bécsben, hogy Beust Bosnia átadását a portánál pártolja."

22. Cf. Decsy, Prime Minister Gyula Andrássy's Influence on Habsburg Foreign Policy, p. 55, with Kállay Diary, 19 Aug. 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 78).

23. *Ibid.*: "Neki e terv tetszik...."

24. *Ibid.*: "hogy ez először is nálunk fog nagy nehézségekre bukkanni. A katonai párt nem szünt meg Bosniát mint egy minden addigi veszteségekért szolgálandó compensatiót tekinteni, s bizton számít annak elfoglalására, es ily módon iparkodik a császárt is hangolni. Beust pedig fél az ily merészsebb politikától. Csak talán ha Török Horváthországának a Verbaszig terjedő része hozzánk csatoltemék lehetne a császárt e tervnek megnyerni." At issue for annexation by the Monarchy was the north-western corner of Bosnia; see map in Sugar, *Industrialization of Bosnia-Hercegovina*, p. 20.


27. *Ibid.*: "Oroszországnak egy érzékeny csapást adni."

28. *Ibid.*: "A Császár háborút öhajt hogy Königrätzet jóvá tegye, Andrássy is szükségesnek tart egy diadalmas háborút a birodalomra nézve....megtörjük az orosz hatalmat."

29. *Ibid.*: "támadja meg Austriával együtt Oroszországot Lengyelország felszabadításának ürülje alatt."

30. *Ibid.*: "Szükséges azonban e terv kivitelére, hogy Oroszország kezdjen háborút, es erre alkalmasnak lájta a Bosniai terv pártolását, melynek kivitelébe Oroszország nem fog beleegyezni, a miből aztán háború támadhat...."


34. *Ibid.*: "ő azonban nem hiszi hogy a porta békeet uton engedni fog, ...azon veleményben van, hogy a porta csak úgy fog engedni ha a kereszttény népeknek egy általános felkelése által erre kényszerítva van. S ha egy nyugateurópai háború alkalmából e felkelés létrejön Szerbia nem maradhat hátra...."

35. *Ibid.*: "...miután az valószínűleg a mi szerbjeinkre is ki fog terjedni, mi kénytelenek leszünk egy sereget a határon felállítani, a mely talán be is fog felhasználni."

36. *Ibid.*: "nagyon hangsúlyoztam a horváthok vágait Bosnia elfoglalására, megjegyezem, hogy csak egy intéz kell Budáról és pár nap alatt 60000 horváth Bosniában van; mi azonban ezt mind addig mig béke uton a szerbek szerezhetik meg Bosniát maguknak nem óhajtjuk."

37. *Ibid.*: "attól tartanak, hogy Németország vissza foglalására akarjuk őket felhasználni."

38. *Ibid.*: "még nem mondta meg, hogy e szövetség tulajdonképp Oroszország ellen lenne irányozva."

39. *Ibid.*: "hogy még megfontolják a dolgot."

42. "Sándor" [Andrássy to Kállay], 8 Sept. 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/143: "Az eszmét Ő Felsége általánosságban mint általam említetett, nem rosszul fogadta."
43. Ibid: "Csak ezután szóllottam Beusttal, de vele egészen kimerítőleg."
44. Ibid: "nagy érdekkel....."
45. Ibid: "Az eszme ellen neki nincs nagy kifogása, csak hogy azt valósíthatónak nem tartja."
46. Ibid: "meg fognak mindent igérni az integritására nézve, de a mellett fel fogják használni az első alkalmat és szövetkezve a bolgárokkal fognak a törökök ellen fordulni."
47. Ibid: "és ezen fog hajtjárészet szenvedni a dolog...."
48. Ibid., ff. 143-44: "igen helyesnek...sőt azt nem csak lehetőnek, hanem szükségesnek is tartom."
49. Ibid., f. 144.
50. Ibid., ff. 144-45: "Én erre... a legkisebb súlyt sem helyezem, sőt sokkal jobb szeretném a dolgot annálkül, de ez, sajnos, oly feltétel, mely nélkül a kivitelt lehetetlennek kell beismernem. Ennek oka az, hogy a katonai párt bent, némely külhatalom pedig kívülről már rég és folytonosan kilátásba teszik a kérdéses tartomány birtokát? Ausztria részére."
51. Ibid., i. 145.
52. Kállay Diary, 2 Oct. 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 92): "hogy meg csak futolag beszélt a császárral és Beusttal, okvetlenül lesznek nagy nehézségek...."
53. Ibid: "ez ellen nincs is kifogása."
54. Ibid., 15 Oct. 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 100): "Veszedelmes dolog az, mert ezáltal, nem is számítva, hogy miként birhatnák erre a törököt, az oroszt magunk ellen uszítjuk, a mi még nem volna oly nagy baj, ha a nyugati politika íránt teljesen tisztában volnánk."
57. Ibid: "s épen ezért azon Ausztriában is, melyben Magyarország játsza a főszerepet...."
58. Ibid: "Andrássynak aggadalmainra, hogy a szerbek csak cégüket akarják elérni, s aztán ellenünk fordulhatnak."
59. Ibid: "annyi ideig lenne dolguk a belszervezkedéssel, hogy nem igen eménének rá további terjeszkedéssel foglalkozni."
60. Ibid., 23 Oct. 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 104): "a forma mindegy s tőkéletesen egyre megy ha Ausztriával is szerződik Szerbia, csak hogy az történjék a mit Andrássy akar."
64. Kállay to Beust, 29 Oct. 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177; Kállay Diary, 29 Oct. 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 106).
65. "Sándor" [Andrássy to Kállay], 8 Sept. 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/143-44.
66. Prokesch-Osten to Kállay, 10 Nov. 1868, HHSA, PA XII/92.
67. Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 10 Nov. 1868, Ibid; Andrija Radenić, "Die Balkanländer in der Strategie Österreich-Ungarns 1867-1878", Balcanica, I
68. Kállay Diary, 16 Nov. 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 115).
69. Kállay to Andrássy, 30 Oct. 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/148: "a Boszniai kérdést is bár megburkolva megpendíteni...."
70. Ibid: "ha a kelet lángba borul."
71. Ibid: "Mindezt megakadályozhatjuk Bosznia átengedése által; csakhogy idejében történék. Ha e terv létesül nem csak hogy e népek nyugodtan maradnak, de még segítségünkre is lesznek egy orosz ellenes háborúban, és a mi határainkat is nyugalomra birhatjuk."
75. Ibid: "A Boszniai kérdés szerencses megoldása és Horvátország teljes elválasztása a szerb érdekektől biztosíthatja számunkra a jövôt."
77. Ibid: "minden törekvésem daczára a vis inertia-vel szemben eddig eredményt eszközölni nem sikerült. A zongora mellett ül az én öreg barátom - hiába tolom neki oda a kotakat - ő mégis mást játszik."
78. Ibid: "és birom űfelsége igéretét arra nézve, hogy most már végleg kell határozunk."
79. Ibid: "oly módon, hogy ne is gyanitaná, hogy arról neked is előleges tudomásod van."
80. Ibid; Kállay Diary, 30 Dec. 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 136).
81. Ibid., 31 Dec. 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 136). 
82. Kállay to Andrássy, 17 Jan. 1869, OSZK, FH 1733/170: "Az idő rövid, a veszély nagy, s e veszély fajdalom elsősorban Magyarországot éri."
84. Ibid. (p. 145): "hogy ha a bécsi kormány nem akar beleegyezni a Boszniai tervebe, a magyar kormány titokban is fogja segíteni Szerbiát."
85. Ibid: "hogy jobb szeretné, ha ez nyíltan történhetik [?], hogy bebizonyíthassa a nép előtt, hogy a magyar barátság a legüdvösebb Szerbiára nézve." 
86. Ibid., 16 Jan. 1869, (Dnevnik, p. 145): "ha a magyarok csak azt akarják, hogy Szerbia csendesen maradjon, s nem akarják a szerbek törekvéseit Boszniára támogatni, akkor nem lehetnek velünk jó barátságban."
87. Ibid., 23 Jan. 1869 (Dnevnik, p. 147): "hogy Magyarország mindég sympathiával viseltetik a szerbek legitim expansív törekvései iránt a Balkan félszigeten."
89. Kállay Diary, 23 Jan. 1869 (Dnevnik, p. 147), and n. 156 by Radenić, pp. 697-98.
92. Kállay Diary, 5 Feb. 1869 (op. cit.): "de azért ő is és mások is igen nagy nehézségeket látan."  
93. *Ibid.*: "Természetesen az hogy nehézségeket látan elég arra, hogy semmit se tegyenek."  
99. "Note annexée à la lettre particulière à Mr. le Prince de Metternich...", *ibid.*, p. 104.  
106. Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 5 Mar. 1869, HHSA, PA XII/94.  
107. Clarendon to Longworth, 23 Mar. 1869, PRO, FO 78/2088; Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 19 Mar. 1869, HHSA, PA XII/94.  
112. *Ibid.* (pp. 168-69): "mindég csak dél Németországgal foglalkozik, s a keleti ügyekben csak akkor... engedése hajlandónak ha Andrassy ismét a német politikát illetőleg enged."  
115. Ibid., 6 Apr. 1869 (Dnevnik, p. 169): "hogy a dolog nem könnyű, sőt igen nagy nehézségekkel jár."

116. Ibid.: "különben bár az idea nem tőle jön mégsem ellenzi, sőt felhatalmaz, hogy e részben a szerb kormánynak kijelenthetem, hogy az aspiratiókat mi nem hátratatjuk."

117. Ibid., 7 Apr. 1869 (Dnevnik, p. 170): "hogy most elégedjünk meg ennyivel...."

118. Ibid: "melyet mi pártolni fogunk."

119. Ibid.

120. E.g., Krestić, Hrvatsko-ugarska nagodba, pp. 367-68; Jakšić and Vučković, Spoljna politika Srbije..., pp. 400-03; Lutz, op. cit., pp. 181-82.

121. Beust to Metternich, 9 June 1869, in Oncken, op. cit., no. 201; quoted by Decsy, op. cit., p. 69, n. 158 (p. 152).

122. Bloomfield to Granville, 13 Oct. 1870; quoted in Bridge, op. cit., p. 46.

123. Kállay Diary, 1 May 1869 (Dnevnik, p. 176): "attól tart, hogy ha Szerbia Bosznia átengedése által meg tobbre fog vâgyni s elôbb utôbb Dalmatiát és Horvátországot is megához vonja."

124. Ibid: "ha mindkettôl erôsitjuk (Horvátországot Dalmatia és a határovidék bekebelezése, Szerbiát Bosznia átengedése által) ezt még csak nôveljük, s adott esetben Horvátország által Bosznia ís megkaphatjuk."

125. Ibid: "Nem tudtuk azonban egymást nézeteink felôl meggyôzni."

126. Ibid., 18 May 1869 (Dnevnik, p. 180): "igen határozatlanul nyilatkozik, azt mondja, hogy csillapítôlag kell hamis."

127. Ibid., 17 June 1869 (Dnevnik, p. 192): "hogy a Bosniai tervvel csak óvatosan bányajak."

128. Ibid; also 12 July 1869 (Dnevnik, p. 199).


130. Kállay Diary, 20 June 1869 (Dnevnik, p. 193).


132. Ibid., p. 420 (both quotes).

133. Kállay Diary, 20 May 1869 (Dnevnik, p. 181).

134. Ibid., 7 Sept. 1869 (Dnevnik, p. 216).


136. Kállay Diary, 7 Sept. 1869, op. cit: "mindegy hogy Bécsben és Constantinápolyban mit gondolnak, ő majd ígyekszik mind a két helyen az illetôket megnyerni."

137. Ibid: "Figyelmeztetni kell őket, hogy ha Ausztria gyôz, és ők Oroszorszâggal tartottak, az esetben igen szomorú sors vár reájuk."


139. Ibid., 14 Sept. 1869 (Dnevnik, p. 220): "hogy nézetem szerint az idô [?] közely, midôn e részben valamit tenni kell."

140. Ibid: "ha biztosak Andrâssy moralis támtotásáról azonnal készek Bosniába indulni s ezért elfoglalni, mindég egységben tartván a szultán suzerenitását."

141. Ibid: "némí tartozkodást."

142. Ibid., 17 Sept. 1869 (Dnevnik, p. 221): "Oroszország bennünket előbb utôbb
meg fog támadni, mert csak rajtunk keresztül hatolhat be a keletre."

143. *Ibid.*: "a mi győzelmiünk alig kétséges. Emlitem, hogy Szerbiára nézve, ha e háború alatt nem tart velünk, s győzünk, nem sok jó vár...."

144. *Ibid.*: "hogy ha Magyarország és Ausztria háborúban bemaradnak, Szerbia azonnal meg kezdi a háborút Törökország ellen s elfoglalja Bosniát Herczegovinát és Ö-Szerbiát s egy államot alkot...."

145. *Ibid.*: "csak azt hogy nyugodtan maradjon s a törököt ne háborgassa."

146. *Ibid.*: "Két módon kinálkozik: az egyik ha a szerb kormány egyenesen egy memorandumot küld e tárgyban a portához s a védhatalmasságokhoz, melyet Ausztria pártolni fog, vagy ha ez nem elég, kéz alatt mozgalmakat idézni elő Bosniában s ezeket felhasználva követelni a portától Bosnia átadását."


149. *Ibid.*.


151. *Ibid.*.


158. Kállay Diary, 15 Dec. 1869 (*Dnevnik*, p. 252): "hogy a szerb kormány most már egyenesen a portához fordulhatna...."

159. *Ibid.*: "s távolról e tárgyat is megemlíttette neki."


162. *Ibid.*: "Törökország a jövő tavasszal kitörendő mozgalomtól tart s úgy talán engedékenyen, lenne." 

163. *Ibid.*: "Nálunk pedig a legnagyobb befolyással Andrássy bir.... Meglehet azonban hogy rövid időn a hatalmasságok tömegülnek; a tavasz elmúlt hat mozgalom nélkül s a porta félelme elfogzható, de mégis bukhat, a vagy mi egy minden figyelmünket elfoglaló háborúba heverhetünk, s akkor a jó alkalmat igen sok időre vagy talán örökre is elszalasztottuk."


165. Kállay Diary, 5 Jan. 1870, *op. cit.*: "Ezt magam is hiszem de mi épen pressiót akarunk reá gyakorolni."


167. Kállay Diary, 8 Jan. 1870 (Dnevnik, p. 263): "hogy ezt nem mi óhajtjuk, s csak is azon esetre kivánók, ha a horvátok a kik szinte vágyódnak Bosniára, nagyon lármáznának."

168. Ibid. (p. 262): "s hogy az a többi hatalmaktól sem pártoltatván, ha a porta nem is támadna meg Szerbiát de legalább egy figyelő hadestet állítana fel a határon, mellyel aztán a szerb haderőnek vagy össze kellene csapnia, vagy ha ezt nem tenné e meghátralás a legsúlyosabb moralis csapás lenne."

169. Ibid. "es aztán fognának Ő ez alkalmat felhasználni a portához irni, oly módosban mintha szolgálataikat ajánlanák fel...."

170. Ibid: "Ekkor mi is és a többi hatalmak is közbevehetnők [?] magunkat."

171. Ibid: "azonban nem erőkődöm nagyon, nem tudván hogy Andrássy nem fog e e nézethez csatlakozni."

172. Ibid., 11 Jan. 1870 (Dnevnik, p. 263): "különösen sülyt fektetem azon szempontra, hogy ha most békés uton óhajtjuk ezt megoldani, Oroszország egy oly mozgalmat idézhet elő, mely kiragadja kezeinkből ez úgy vezetését."

173. Ibid: "Ő méltányolja e körülményt, melyre nem is gondolt."

174. Ibid: "és hogy azon perczben midőn arra szükség lehet legyen."

175. Ibid., 11 Mar. 1870 (Dnevnik, pp. 277-78, 278): "hogy Bosniát Szerbia testvérszágának tekinti...."


177. Kállay Diary, 11 Apr. 1870 (Dnevnik, p. 290).

178. Longworth to Elliot, 20 June 1870, PRO, FO 78/2135.

179. Kállay Diary, 9 May 1870 (Dnevnik, p. 298): "Oroszországgal a háborút Andrássy is elkerülıhetlennek tartja, még pedig rövid időn." 

180. Ibid: "is úgy vettem észre hogy tulajdonkép nincs szilárd határozott nézete, szeretné ha a dolog húzdónék."

181. Ibid: "mint rendesen eredmény nélkül."

182. Ibid., 28 June 1870 (Dnevnik, p. 310).
CHAPTER 6: EFFECT OF THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR

52: The Crown Council of 18 July 1870

The Franco-Prussian War had several immediate results as far as Austro-Hungarian policy towards Serbia was concerned. Beyond this, however, the conflict in the West had a profound effect on the balance of power in the East. With the collapse of Napoleon III's regime in September, the Habsburg Monarchy lost its only potential ally against not only Prussia, but Russia as well. This in turn facilitated the re-emergence of Russia as a serious rival in the Balkans. Within a few months, the Monarchy found itself once again isolated and, in the eyes of its statesmen, exposed to extreme risk of attack.

On 18 July 1870, the day before France declared war on Prussia, the Emperor Francis Joseph held a crown council in Vienna, with Beust and Andrassy present. The purpose was to agree on a policy for the Monarchy during the European crisis.

As far as the War was concerned, it is clear that, on the essential issue of whether the Monarchy should get involved, Beust and Andrassy were not at odds. Where they differed was over how neutrality should be announced, and whether the Monarchy should mobilise. Even on the question of how to deal with a possible Russian intervention, the chancellor and the Hungarian minister president showed a rare unanimity. Each appeared ready to contemplate the inevitability of war with Russia in certain circumstances and, in such an event, accepted the need for counter-measures in the Balkans.

It was in their reasons for accepting the idea of a war in the East, predictably, that Beust and Andrassy really differed. Andrassy saw it as an end in itself, an essential defensive measure to remove a standing threat to the Monarchy's, and Hungary's, security. Beust, by contrast, had his sights fixed firmly in both directions: the Monarchy had the chance both to reorder Germany more to its liking, and at the same time to solve the Eastern Question.

The key to understanding the decisions taken at this crucial council is that the Monarchy was effectively paralysed, and could, by the very nature of its position between East and West, take only temporising measures to meet the crisis. At the same
time, however, all the participants in the council, without exception, were hoping for a French victory, which would then open up the prospect of exploiting the situation in the Monarchy's own interests.4

By far the most important consideration was the threat from Russia: Russian intervention in the event of a Prussian defeat, or any hostile move by Austria-Hungary, could be taken as given.5 The practical results of the council of 18 July, then, were dictated by this danger. It was resolved to adopt a 'wait and see' neutrality; to announce the Monarchy's neutrality; and to make military preparations.6 Nevertheless, the language employed by both Beust and Andrássy during the council made clear that, if events in the West unfolded differently, they were prepared to open up the whole Eastern Question by laying down a challenge to Russia.

Beust, normally so cautious on the subject of Russia, seemed positively to court hostilities in the East at this early stage. It was Russia's attitude, he told the council, which made mobilisation necessary, in order "uns auf einen solchen Fuß zu setzen, daß uns die Ereignisse, wenn sie an uns herantreten, nicht unvorbereitet treffen."7 One passage outdid even Andrássy in its air of belligerence:

> verhindere dies [neutrality] doch nicht, daß wir... unsere Blicke nach Rußland werfen, welches von Tag zu Tag gefährlicher werde, und hier könnten wir im Falle eines Krieges auch auf die Popularität des Krieges bei uns rechnen.8

Behind this, as with Andrássy, was the assumption that a French victory over Prussia, by dragging Russia into the hostilities, would thereby legitimate the Monarchy's own involvement. Beust's announcement that the Ottoman Empire had expressed an interest in joining forces with the Monarchy evidently fitted in with this scenario.9

Andrássy's vision of the Eastern Question was more predictable, and showed no sign of having changed since his discussions with Kállay in August 1868. While Andrássy was not averse to exploiting the conflict in the West to the Monarchy's advantage, it was clear that for him the main point of remaining neutral, and of military preparation, was "nur wegen der Eventualitäten im Oriente." There was, in his opinion, only one circumstance which justified, or rather demanded, a resort to arms: "Nur wenn Rußland sich einmengen, bleibe uns keine Wahl."10 The language of defensive reaction
employed here was doubtless euphemistic for, as we have seen, Andrássy had fairly aggressive ideas on how to handle Russia.

On the subject of the Balkans, Andrássy went into more detail. A 'wait and see' neutrality would give the Monarchy time to ascertain what sort of assistance the Ottoman Empire could provide "im Falle eines Krieges mit Rußland." It would help forestall what Andrássy appeared to regard as the imminent proclamation of a 'red republic' in Roumania. Most significantly, "wir könnten die Zeit benützen, um Serbien, dessen Stellung im Kampf mit Rußland von der größten Wichtigkeit sei, zu neutralisieren."11

None of the points raised by Beust and Andrássy, regarding the Balkans, was made the subject of any practical action by the council of 18 July. Nevertheless, they formed the basis of certain steps taken by the Ballhaus and the Hungarian government almost immediately after. Beust appears to have sounded the Turks with a view to concluding a defensive-offensive alliance in the event of war with Russia. Andrássy, via Kállay, again took up the Bosnian question with the Serbian government, this time with a clear strategic purpose in mind, clearly argued before a joint, Austro-Hungarian forum.

In this sense, it might seem appropriate to conclude that the subsequent history of the Bosnian question, before it finally petered out again in the mutual recriminations between Pest and Belgrade of late 1871, was the product of a genuine, Austro-Hungarian diplomatic initiative. The execution of Andrássy's proposals, however, quickly became an essentially Hungarian sideshow once more. Beust, who certainly knew, and presumably accepted the need for, this new initiative, was left in the dark as to its results, and Kállay's diary shows that subsequent efforts to keep the issue alive, extending well into 1871, were actually undertaken without the chancellor's knowledge.12 Andrássy's 'foreign policy' was no more successful in this instance than it had been before; on the contrary, its principal effect was to create even more confusion and illwill in relations with Serbia than already existed.

53: 'Neutralising' Serbia

The hasty moves concerted between Beust and Andrássy in the next three weeks, to cover the Monarchy's Balkan flank, were undertaken with the clear possibility of war
with Russia in mind. That even the normally cautious Beust could regard such a development with equanimity is a reflection of the general belief in a French victory. The evidence suggests that Beust wanted to be able to point to Russia's threatening behaviour as an excuse for the outbreak of hostilities.\textsuperscript{13}

The Ballhaus maintained this tough stance right down to the end of the first week of August. On 1 August Beust made an unmistakable hint to the Ottoman government of the need for some form of military alliance.\textsuperscript{14} He rejected the idea that the Tsar was genuinely interested in an Austro-Russian entente, as a means of holding the ring.\textsuperscript{15}

Andrássy was even more forthright. Even while pouring cold water on the French ambassador's hope that the Monarchy might come to France's assistance, Andrássy nevertheless accepted that war might be "rendue nationale" by Russian involvement.\textsuperscript{16} Whatever the likelihood of the Monarchy's other nationalities regarding the matter in this light, it was clear that Andrássy felt he could speak for Hungary. The Hungarian press reflected this, as in the statement by the \textit{Pester Correspondenz}, on 20 July, that "Hungary has only one natural enemy and that is Russia. We will fight her, wherever we find her, and whomever she is with, and we will welcome with open arms whomever wishes to unite with us against Russia."\textsuperscript{17}

To Kállay, the change from Andrássy's relaxed attitude a month before must at first have seemed striking. In conversation with Andrássy on 29 July,

\begin{quote}
He [Andrássy] mentioned to me that he doesn't want war, but it can hardly be avoided with Russia.... In this regard his plan is to conclude an offensive-defensive treaty of alliance with Turkey and as a reward for our defending it to demand from the Porte that it cede Bosnia to Serbia, since only in this way can both we and the Turks secure ourselves on that side, and only in this case can we deploy all our strength against Russia.\textsuperscript{18}
\end{quote}

Andrássy added that he had gone so far as to write the Turkish government, through its ambassador in Vienna, asking them to despatch someone "with whom it is possible to negotiate."\textsuperscript{19} Kállay's main task in all this would be to sound the Serbian government as to its intentions. In conclusion, Andrássy said that "if the constellation should prove to be suitable then we will provoke Russia until she attacks us."\textsuperscript{20}

Despite this warlike talk, Kállay treated Andrássy's revelations with a certain
scepticism. He found his instructions on sounding the Regents, for instance, "so imprecise that I really hardly know how to carry them out." More interestingly, Kállay got the impression "that Andrássy would indeed prefer a war, but that he doesn't have sufficient resolution to start it energetically." It was a perceptive insight, even if Kállay's unspoken assumption, that Andrássy was somehow in a position to bring about hostilities single-handed, was equally revealing.

Something even more perplexing was to follow. In Vienna, Kállay was told by Béla Orczy that "in connection with Andrássy's plan he [Orczy] had talked with Bloomfield [the British ambassador] and tried to get him to agree that England too should join us and that together we should try to win over the Porte for the Bosnian plan." This, on the face of it, improbable scenario was to resurface a few weeks later, much to Kállay's consternation. At the time, he made no private comment on Orczy's communication, which leaves some doubt at least as to the accuracy of Diószegi's claim that this proved the joint nature of the new initiative.

The British sources contain no confirmation of Orczy's approach to Bloomfield. Beust of course knew that Andrássy intended taking action to "neutralise" Serbia; and it seems unlikely that Orczy would have broached such a matter with a foreign representative without the chancellor's authority. The same could be said, for that matter, of Andrássy's approaches to the Porte via the Turkish ambassador. Nevertheless, Orczy was essentially Andrássy's man, not Beust's; and one only has to think of what Kállay got up to at Andrássy's behest to realise that the Bosnian question was already falling prey, once again, to the literal duality of the Monarchy's foreign policy process.

Kállay was decidedly against British involvement in the plan, since he believed this would negate whatever advantage the Monarchy stood to gain in Serbia. Orczy might have been acting on Beust's instructions; but in view of Beust's later expressed opposition to the scheme this raises the possibility that the chancellor was deliberately sabotaging it by alerting the British to what was being contemplated. Then again, Orczy might have been acting on Andrássy's orders, with Beust either unwilling to endorse such a step or even unaware of it. If this were the case, it speaks volumes for
the continuing naïveté of Andrássy's diplomacy. As Kálly correctly saw, the British were traditionally the staunchest defenders of Ottoman integrity; and to reveal to them what their ambassador was later to describe as this "insane project" was to risk an international storm.28

54: The Regents' Dilemma

These uncomfortable truths were for the future. When Kálly returned to Belgrade to execute his somewhat ambiguous instructions, he found himself confronted once again with the familiar problem of how to overcome the Regents' reluctance to commit themselves.

Kálly had already received Blaznavac' assurances that, as long as the war was confined to western Europe, the Serbs would stay neutral.29 Only if Russia occupied Wallachia, said Blaznavac, would Serbia march into Bosnia, ostensibly in the Sultan's name. This was the crux of the matter: it was not in the Monarchy's interests to see this happen under any power's sponsorship but its own, or, even worse, as an independent Serbian coup de main. Since Austria-Hungary itself was hardly likely to remain passive in the face of Russian involvement, it was really up to the Monarchy to give Serbia's action a direction favourable to Habsburg interests.30

On 5 August Kálly asked Blaznavac point-blank, "if, as a result of certain circumstances arising, we were able to help them enter into possession of Bosnia, would they be in a position to maintain peace and stability."31 Blaznavac claimed that he was ready "at any moment" to throw 30,000 men into Bosnia, while repeating the standard assurance that the Sultan's sovereignty and right to tribute would be preserved.32 Ristić, a couple of days later, was even more affable, and told Kálly that "we will win eternal sympathy if we help them gain possession of Bosnia."33

None of this, however, amounted to anything practical. The Regents were acutely aware of the dilemma with which the revived plan confronted them. Reports from Serbian agents in Bosnia stressed the discontent of the population and the resentment aroused by Ottoman repression. By the middle of the year this had caused a considerable number of the inhabitants to flee into Austro-Hungarian and Serbian territory; and the Regents were receiving bitter reproaches from their contacts for
Serbia's failure to take action.34

The Franco-Prussian War increased the pressure on the Regents to take advantage of the situation, since they had long counselled their agents in Bosnia to wait until a major European conflict arose. "If this opportunity... were to be abandoned, then a lot of people are going to think Serbia will lose... all hope of ever being able to annex Bosnia," wrote one such confidant on 21 July.35 The same agent estimated that Serbia could easily overcome the resistance of the 4-5,000 Turkish regulars in Bosnia, while Montenegro would overrun Hercegovina.36

In view of Serbia's performance in 1876, this was an optimistic assessment. Such sober considerations were not, however, common among Serb nationalists. Miletic's Zastava was already warning, by early August 1870, that the European crisis was Serbia's last chance to preserve its leadership of the South Slavs. "Bosnia," Zastava editorialised, "is the key to the western side of the Balkans; it is the geographical core of the Serbian lands; whoever acquires Bosnia separately from Serbia, having cut off Serbia's vital artery, will sooner or later become master of Serbia."37 Even the Croats, Miletic claimed, would rather see Bosnia joined to Serbia than abandoned, especially since the province would then act as a "buffer" between Croatia and Serbia.38 In Serbia itself, there was widespread expectation that the government would seize the opportunity, and puzzlement at the lack of military preparation.39

The truth was that the Regents were unable to act, and knew it. Heading a provisional regime for the duration of Prince Milan's minority only, Blaznavac and Ristic naturally shrank from a war, which would entail a major commitment of resources and, if unsuccessful, could even imperil the dynasty and Serbia itself. Added to this fundamental constraint were others. The Turkish authorities in Bosnia, in anticipation of just such an attack as the nationalists demanded, started feverish military preparations.40 Serbia's own military preparedness was still painfully inadequate, as both domestic and foreign observers acknowledged. The links with other Balkan states, and with revolutionary organisations throughout the Ottoman provinces, had been allowed to atrophy where they had not been openly abandoned.41 Of crucial importance also was the fact that the Russian government advised strongly against any
precipitate moves against the Turks. This Russian caution became even more pronounced in the fall, when Russia committed itself to the renunciation of the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris.\(^{42}\)

Finally there was the compromising position in which the Regents found themselves as a result of their links with Austria-Hungary. In today's political parlance, Blaznavac and Ristić suffered from what would be termed a 'credibility gap', not only with Panslavists like Ignatiev, but among the Balkan peoples generally. The relatively long period of good relations with the Monarchy had weakened the links with the Balkans and diminished Serbian prestige there. The despatches of Serbia's representative in Constantinople are full of reproaches by Ignatiev against the Regents for being "instruments" of Austro-Hungarian policy, for having "sold out" Serbia's national interests.\(^{43}\) In the Vojvodina, Serbian newspapers regularly made the same accusations.\(^{44}\) If the Regents had wished to make a move in the summer of 1870, they would have had an uphill task reestablishing themselves as the natural leaders of the nationalist movement.\(^{45}\)

These restraints on the Serbian government, and especially the discouraging attitude adopted by Russia towards any provocative action in the Balkans, make a mockery of Andrásy's urge to "neutralise" Serbia. Had Andrásy been less inclined to assume the worst about Russian policy, and readier to explore contacts with the Russians, he might have perceived that Serbia had little need of neutralising in the first place. On the contrary, the only threat to the status quo in the Balkans was that introduced by Andrásy himself, in the shape of the Bosnian plan. Andrásy in fact was ill-informed. His chosen man in Belgrade, Kállay, in his eagerness to see a Panslav intrigue around every corner, exaggerated the dangers of Russia suddenly gaining the upper hand in Belgrade.

55: The Crown Council of 22 August

By 7 August, the overall strategic situation facing Austria-Hungary had been drastically transformed. With one crushing French defeat following another, the Monarchy's whole policy in both West and East obviously needed urgent reconsideration.
This was nowhere more apparent than in Beust's attitude towards relations with Russia. After several weeks brushing aside the Tsar's feelers regarding a joint Austro-Russian mediation, Beust suddenly discovered an interest in the idea, which formed the basis for the common ministerial council of 22 August.46

Beust had at least abandoned his dangerous flirtation with the idea of a war in the East, and was forced to admit that there might be something in the Tsar's overtures. He now laid before the council an entirely new approach, which entailed working with the Russians to limit the effects of Prussia's victory in the West.47

The Tsar stressed his belief in the need for Austria-Hungary in the overall balance of power in Europe, and gave his word of honour that Russia had no plans for attacking the Monarchy.48 He also reiterated the line Russia had been following for some years: Russia no more wanted the break-up of the Ottoman Empire than Austria-Hungary, since anything else would be, in the Tsar's own words, "un chiffre inconnu."49 In a clear suggestion that Russia and Austria-Hungary revert to the old conservative policy of dividing the Balkans into spheres of influence, the Tsar pointed out that it was in their interests to work together, rather than against one another.

Here, should the Habsburg Monarchy choose to respond to it, was a classic articulation of the alternative to that policy of watchful Russophobia, which had been the mot d'ordre in the BáIIhaus ever since the Crimean War, and which the Hungarian factor had so much strengthened since 1867. The subsequent history of Austro-Russian relations, down to 1914, suggests that the Monarchy would have done well to react swiftly and favourably to the Tsar's overtures. Austro-Hungarian security was generally greatest in periods of détente with the Russians, and least when tsarist policy was ill-disposed or unpredictable. There was a decided logic, for a multinational dynastic state with interests in the stability of the Balkans, in trying to cooperate with the other major dynasty involved there.50 Certainly such a policy ran clean counter to that which Andrásy had been promoting for the last four years, which accepted the virtual inevitability of conflict with Russia, and sought to prepare for this by securing control over countries like Serbia. The Andrásy policy sought hegemony in the Balkans as a weapon against Russia; dynastic conservatism would gain it, in the
western half of the Peninsula at least, as part of the deal.

Beust was not only prepared to take the Russian offer up, but he came to the crown council of 22 August with the consciousness of powerful forces within the Monarchy on his side. There were even sections of opinion within Hungary which inclined towards Russia, at least on the issue of mediation in the Franco-Prussian War. While much of the Hungarian press reacted with unease to the mere rumour of Austro-Russian rapprochement, the influential Pesti naplő warned that the differences between the two empires did not mean that Austria-Hungary could or should avoid all contacts when vital state interests were at stake.\textsuperscript{51}

Beust's recommendation to the council, that the Monarchy respond positively to the Tsar, thus met with no opposition to speak of. Even Andrassy had nothing to say against exploring the Russian offer, for the general purpose of securing a prop against the consequences of Prussia's victory. Andrassy was convinced, however, that Russia was only waiting for the completion of its railway network and armaments programme before falling upon the Monarchy, and sounded a familiar note with his statement that

\[\text{Österreichs Aufgabe bleibe noch wie vor, ein Bollwerk gegen Rußland zu bilden und nur solange es diese Aufgabe erfülle, sei sein Bestand eine europäische Notwendigkeit.}\textsuperscript{52}

The council in short empowered Beust to follow up the Russian lead, but the answer came quicker than anyone could have expected; and although the reason for the reversal of Russian policy remained unclear for another couple of months, the general effect was to vindicate every reservation Andrassy had entered against supping with the Russian devil. Basically what happened was that Bismarck, alerted to the moves towards Austro-Russian détente, had acted immediately to head off this danger to Prussian policy in the West. The inducement he held out to the Russians, moreover, had been sufficient to sink the whole idea of mediation: in return for Russian acquiescence in the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, Prussia would back Russia to the hilt if it unilaterally repudiated the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris.

If it had not been for the Prussian intervention, itself only made necessary by Prussia's annexationist war aims, there were still no insuperable obstacles to an Austro-Russian entente at this point.\textsuperscript{53} The identity of interests which produced the Three
Emperors' League later in the 1870's, and again in the 1880's, was already present at the outset of the Franco-Prussian War. From the Habsburg Monarchy's point of view, and whatever the apprehensions of the Hungarian leadership, it was a major policy failure not to have exploited this.

56: Continuing Difficulties with the Bosnian Plan

On the face of it, however, the volte-face in Russian policy justified Hungarian scepticism. This in turn had practical consequences in the realm of relations between the Habsburg Monarchy and Serbia. The immediate result was to give a further, if unwarranted, lease of life to the futile Bosnian plan, and other aspects of Andrassy's and Kállay's strategy of tying Serbia to the Monarchy by judicious concessions. Whereas détente with Russia, as in the past, would have given Austria-Hungary undisputed sway over the western Balkans, including Serbia, the Hungarian policy meant that Serbia's goodwill had to be bought, while at the same time desperately fending off real or imagined Russian influence in the Principality.

Another consequence of the failure to reach agreement with Russia was the reemergence of the dualism which had bedevilled Austro-Hungarian policy towards Serbia ever since 1867, but which the crisis of July 1870 had temporarily overcome. Beust, and traditionalists like Prokesch-Osten, soon abandoned what little interest they had ever shown in accommodating Serbia, and reverted to a policy of general indifference, interspersed with intimidation. Andrassy and Kállay, by contrast, once more struck out on their own, and for another year conducted negotiations with the Serbian government very much as they saw fit, and in certain notable particulars without the knowledge of the foreign ministry. In the process they completed the sense of disillusionment on both the Serbian and the Hungarian side.

At the end of August, just when Kállay might reasonably have expected to see the talks on Bosnia resume course, a chasm suddenly opened up at his feet, in the shape of what appeared to be British involvement in the plan. This turned out to be a mirage, although there can be no doubt that Longworth made serious proposals to the Regents, telling them that "his government is willing to act as a mediator in the Bosnian question." Quickly disavowed by London, this initiative by Longworth remains a
mystery, and had Kállay in despair. "The raising of the Bosnian question," he told himself,

the English efforts in this affair and our complete inactivity and silence raise in me the fear that we are going to let slip this opportunity and that somebody else is going to gather up before us the fruits of the Bosnian question, [which is] so pressing.56

Such a result, Kállay reflected, would force him to resign, "because I really have no desire to serve a policy which is so inactive and does not grasp, and isn't able to realise, its own interests."57 As for Blaznavac, "The genuineness of his friendship towards us...depends solely on our energetic proceeding in the Bosnian question, and if this is not forthcoming all the fine words and support are in vain."58

Equally discouraging for Kállay was the emphatic rejection of the Bosnian plan which the British incident elicited from the Turkish authorities. Had there been a genuine willingness on the part of one or more of the great powers to contemplate change, of course, Turkish intransigence might not have mattered all that much: the powers were accustomed to bullying the "sick man of Europe" when it suited them. But once reassured of British support the Turks displayed all their usual obstinacy. The language of their ambassador to London, as relayed by Beust to Kállay on 11 October, was representative, and had a certain force of its own.

il était absolument impossible que la Porte se décidât jamais à prêter l'oreille à ce rêve de la Servie dont la réalisation serait impracticable non seulement à cause de l'élément musulman qui constitue la partie la plus considérable de la population de la Bosnie, mais surtout parce que ce projet aurait des résultats subversifs et désastreux pour la sécurité et l'intégrité de l'empire ottoman.59

Worse still, from Kállay's point of view, was the clear implication that Beust, in passing on these sentiments, tacitly shared them. To the British ambassador, in fact, Beust had already distanced himself from the Bosnian plan, albeit somewhat cravenly.

As Lord Bloomfield reported on 27 September,

Count Beust said to me in strict confidence, that he was well pleased to learn of the disavowal of any participation of her Majesty's Government in this affair, and their entire disapproval of it, as the Hungarian Government had evinced considerable anxiety respecting it, and Count Andrassy

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especially was under a false impression regarding the whole question.

Britain's démenti, Beust continued,

had been useful to him in awaking Count Andrassy from his dreams about the Slave Provinces of Turkey. Count Andrassy he observed was inclined to be too active in Eastern affairs, and especially to meddle too much with the Consulate in Servia....

Beust went on to make a remark which highlights admirably the fundamental differences between Vienna and Pest over Eastern policy. Andrâssy, according to Beust, was anxious... to extend the influence of Austria amongst the Slaves, imagining that some day he will be able to compete with Russia in these districts. Count Beust... feels in regard to the project of establishing a joint system of administration in Servia, Bosnia and the Herzegovina that if carried into effect it would be simply advancing the great object Russia has in view, of extending her power towards the Adriatic, and thus inflicting a serious Injury on the Interests of Austria.

In little more than a year's time Andrássy would be using similar language; but in the fall of 1870 the gap between his thinking and Beust's was still a sizeable one. What is even more striking, however, is the extent to which Beust felt constrained to combat Hungarian influence in secret. Again, this was a result of the ambiguities of the 1867 settlement with regard to foreign policy. Beust knew perfectly well that Andrássy had the ear of the Emperor, but evidently did not feel sure enough of his own position to fight Andrássy in the open. Yet it has to be said that the Dualist system encouraged this behind the scenes tussling. Beust was like the helmsman of a ship, with the Hungarians below decks in the steerage flat, trying to alter his course by occasional tugs at the tiller-ropes.

The theme of Hungarian interference was one that Beust returned to in mid-October, but again only confidentially with Bloomfield. À propos of rumoured negotiations for an alliance between Austria-Hungary and Turkey, the chancellor denied ever having endorsed such a project, and portrayed it to Bloomfield instead as yet another of Andrássy's tiresome initiatives. Since the alliance proposals, as reported, included further mention of a cession of Bosnia to Serbia, in return for territorial compensation
for the Porte in Asia, it was relatively easy for Beust to saddle Andrásy and Kállay with the entire responsibility. Beust claimed that Andrásy "ought to know full well that the Porte would never agree to the cession in question." Beust himself "had nothing to do with the affair"; moreover,

these attempts of Count Andrassy to meddle in the Administration of the Foreign Affairs of the Empire, caused him [Beust] at times much trouble and annoyance; but Count Andrassy was an essential element of the Government, and in Hungary, and...he was obliged to bear much from him.62

In a private letter the same day, Bloomfield reported that Beust "lays on Andrassy's shoulders all the blame of the insane project" concerning Bosnia. "His [Andrásy's] notions, he says, are plausible at times, but perfectly impracticable."63

By his supine behaviour Beust had done much to give Andrásy's Bosnian scheme a new lease of life; as Bloomfield warned him, "he will get into endless trouble if he cannot stop this meddling in Eastern affairs."64 When Granville, at the beginning of November, claimed to have heard "on excellent authority" that Beust, not Andrásy, was the prime mover in all the recent troublemaking,65 Bloomfield was politely sceptical, and put his finger on the real problem:

Beust may have been the instigator but both are equally to blame & the Chancellor had no business to admit of Hungary's interference in the Department of Foreign Affairs in the irresponsible way in which it has been carried on in the East.66

It was a just criticism. Unfortunately for Beust, however, Andrásy had no intention of limiting his involvement in the Monarchy's Serbian policy. On the contrary, over the next couple of months he and Kállay intensified their efforts in this direction, fortified by the consciousness of having the direct endorsement of the monarch himself for their actions.

On 24 October Andrásy wrote one of his increasingly rare despatches to Kállay.67 As a detailed exposition of Andrásy's Serbian policy by late 1870 it shows that even at this stage Andrásy continued to believe in the possibility of buying Serbia's allegiance by means of the Bosnian plan, and the prosecution of Alexander Karadžić. It also shows, however, the growth of Andrásy's impatience, his tendency to interpret the Regents' reticence as ill will and conspiracy.
Andrássy was irritated by the Serbian reaction to Karadordević’s release in early October. The Hungarian government would of course continue to press for Karadordević’s conviction, but his case hardly warranted a Serbian turn towards Russia: "this can never be anything but a pretext from the point of view of Serbia’s foreign policy, not a deciding factor."68

In Andrásy’s view the changes wrought by the Franco-Prussian War were fundamental, and perhaps not what the Regents had expected. Despite the tactical cooperation of Prussia and Russia at the outset of hostilities, Andrásy warned, it would be a mistake to imagine that this had survived the by now obvious French defeat. Russia could see that it was no longer needed by the new Germany; and Germany, for its part, was unlikely "to gamble away the mouth of the Danube or the shores of the Adriatic into the hands of Russia or some other, smaller state."69 His next assertion, in view of the storm about to break out over the Black Sea clauses, was glaringly abroad:

already it is undoubtedly a fact that in the East Prussia will under no circumstances offer the Russians a helping hand. Prussia would regard any action, taken by Austria-Hungary against Russian influence in the East, with complete complaisance.70

In short, it was "now more than ever in Serbia’s interest to seek an alliance with us."71

Andrássy pointed out that Germany could easily expand to the Adriatic if it so wished, and would have no difficulty in assimilating five or six million Slavs. Austria-Hungary, by contrast, made a less threatening neighbour for Serbia. Neither Austria nor Hungary wanted more Slavs. On the contrary, Hungary in particular wanted nothing more than good relations with the South Slavs, and to see the Balkans free of Russian influence. "Serbia thus has and can have no more natural and reliable ally than the Austro-Hungarian empire, as it is presently constituted."72

When it came to specifying how an alliance was to be achieved, however, Andrásy was vague. The cession of Bosnia to Serbia continued to be the centre-piece of his Serbian policy, but in return for this "all misunderstanding between Serbia and us must be made impossible."73 Andrásy insisted that neither Russia nor Britain could be involved in this process. Russia in any case was not interested in Bosnia but in revising the Crimean settlement.74
The problem was rather in making use of the opportunity presented, and here by his own admission Andrássy had failed to make any headway with the people who mattered most, the Turks.

Up to now this question has not been raised by anyone at all apart from me, so if it has been aired in Constantinople, this is due to the fact that I have spoken of it, not in the name of but with the knowledge of the Foreign Ministry, with Hajder Effendi [the Turkish ambassador to Vienna] and his successor Halil Bey, openly and decisively.^^

Despite using "every possible argument", however, "The result for the time being has been a decided 'non possumus', and considerable Turkish coldness towards us."^^

In short, there was still no prospect of gaining the administration of Bosnia for Serbia, which Andrássy himself held out as the chief inducement for an alliance. Instead, he returned to his initial theme of how Austria-Hungary had to be able to rely on Serbia, of how Serbia must guarantee that it would hold Russia at arm's length. Bosnia, from being the occasion of closer ties, began to appear more a possible reward for good behaviour:

Once everybody is persuaded that the successor to Turkish rule will not be Russia, then it will no longer be in either our or the other European powers' interests to hinder the natural transformation of the East; then we can boldly entrust the fate of the East to its own peoples.^^

Andrássy concluded by reminding Kállay of all that the Monarchy had done for Serbia in the past three years. The corollary of this was a veiled threat. The Regents must not assume that, because Austria-Hungary sought an alliance, it did so from weakness, or a fear of Serbia. On the contrary:

It would be a good idea to draw Serbia's attention to the fact that at present, not counting the home guard, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy disposes of 840,000 soldiers.^^

The Regents would doubtless find this consideration of use in combating popular enthusiasm for Russia, and in proving that "Serbia can easily safeguard its future with us, but never against us."^^ None of this in any case amounted to a firm, detailed alliance proposal, but some form of draft alliance was the topic of negotiations between Kállay and Ristić at the turn of the year, so it is clear Andrássy intended there to be a
follow-up.

It is striking how Andrássy spoke more and more the language of empire in his dealings with Serbia. From being the zealous spokesman of Serbo-Hungarian friendship, Serbia's defender against the machinations of Vienna, Andrássy wrote increasingly in terms of the Monarchy's interests, rather than Hungary's. One can see the transformation from the national politician, preoccupied with essentially national affairs, to the international statesman, conscious of broader issues. Andrássy in his attitude towards the Serbs became concomitantly more peremptory and, in the process, changed from someone whose words had some hold on Serbia's leaders, to someone who spoke the language they were accustomed to hear from the Monarchy.

57: Russia's Repudiation of the Black Sea Clauses

Before any action was taken in the matter, however, international affairs were once again thrown into uproar by the news of Russia's repudiation of the Black Sea clauses at the end of October 1870. It was in Vienna and Pest that the shock waves of the Russian action were felt most acutely. Beust was in the awkward position of having publicly advocated a revision of the Treaty of Paris as far back as 1867, but had no difficulty in condemning Russia's move, since the whole point of the 1856 settlement lay in its internationally agreed regulation of the Eastern Question, and its restraints on Russian power.

Andrássy's reaction was more intemperate. From the reports of foreign representatives, it appears that Andrássy was once more convinced that now was the time to settle accounts with Russia. The Italian chargé d'affaires found Andrássy "très monté...J'ai été très frappé de la violence de son langage." The Saxon envoy in Vienna noted how pleased the Turkish ambassador was with Andrássy's attitude. "Überhaupt ist von den ungarischen Heißspornen zu besorgen, daß sie diese Gelegenheit zu sehr unzweideutigen Kundgebungen gegen Rußland benutzen werden." And the Italian ambassador reported, on his return to his post, that Andrássy was of the opinion that "si l'on ne s'oppose pas nettement à la Russie elle sera désormais maîtresse de l'Orient. Une guerre serait inévitable plus tard dans des conditions défavorables."
The common ministerial council of 14 November was consequently the sharpest confrontation yet between Beust and Andrásy on the subject of Russia. The chancellor was all too aware that his own policy lay in ruins. With the prospect of German unity looming, he had failed to prevent the nullification of the Treaty of Prague. Now Russia had burst the bonds imposed by the Treaty of Paris, a move to which Beust personally had no absolute objection, but which threatened the Monarchy’s prestige in the Balkans and, at the same time, increased Hungarian dissatisfaction with the policy laid down by the Ballhaus.

Nevertheless, Beust was in a position of some strength to resist what everyone present knew would be a frontal assault by Andrásy. For a start, Francis Joseph himself appeared to have taken the Russian circular calmly; and neither the Austrian minister president nor the common war minister was interested in picking a quarrel with Russia. Even more encouraging was the neutrality of Lónyay, the new common finance minister but still a leading Deákist, who had only recently reacted favourably to the idea of cooperation with Russia.

Above all Beust had the sheer logic of the international situation on his side. Quite apart from the case for revising the Treaty of Paris, to which Beust’s own proposals of 1867 bore witness, how was the Monarchy to reverse Russia’s action? Britain’s resolve was still a matter for conjecture, and without British support any sort of collective resistance was clearly pointless. In contrast to the policy toyed with in July 1870, any risk of war was out of the question.

Andrássy made it clear that his principal fear was of the domestic repercussions: "Werden wir dieses Signal ruhig hinnehmen lassen, so würden die Slawen daraus für die Zukunft Folgen ziehen." He went well beyond Beust in demanding approaches to Britain and other powers in preparation for a collective diplomatic offensive.

Diószegi rightly points out that Andrásy wanted to force a Russian climb-down, "selbst auf die Gefahr eines Krieges hin." This in itself was to be expected of Andrásy. What is astonishing is his conviction that not only Britain, but Italy, France and even Prussia would not be averse from associating themselves with a collective remonstrance.
Now, Andrásy informed the council, it was impossible for Prussia, "bei aller Intimität seiner Beziehungen zu Rußland", to endorse a breach of treaty like the Gorchakov circular. In fact, the Black Sea issue offered in Andrásy's view a glittering opportunity:

Eine bloße Trennung Preußens von Rußland in dieser Frage sei schon ein sehr großes Resultat, welches in der nahen Zukunft die weittragendsten Folgen haben könne und dieses sei entschieden zu erreichen.\(^1\)

Well in advance of the reality, Andrásy was anticipating that Austro-German (or perhaps one should say German-Hungarian) axis which was to be a feature of the diplomatic landscape from the late 1870's to 1918.

For once, however, Beust rebutted Andrásy's arguments with unwonted firmness. It was essential, he replied, not to go further than the other powers; the Monarchy's interests lay rather in keeping options open than in cutting them off by hasty action. With Andrásy quite isolated, the council was therefore content to give Beust a free hand in this regard.\(^2\)

For all his tough words on 14 November, Beust was in fact at the mercy of domestic political factors. He was aware that he could count on no support from the German liberals, and was considered by the military to have bungled the Monarchy's chances in July 1870. The conservative federalists who were shortly to form the Hohenwart-Schäffle government in Austria inclined towards Russia, not Germany, in foreign policy terms.

Now, as a result of the Gorchakov circular, the violent reaction of much of the Deák party threatened to lose Beust what little support he had for his foreign policy in Hungary. Pesti napló, for instance, the tone-setting flagship of the Deákists, spoke darkly on 17 November of the "ultima ratio", of submitting the Black Sea affair to "the arbitrament of the sword", of a "holy war" against Russia.\(^3\) Beust was singled out for especial blame, accused of a naïve trust in Russia, which had only encouraged the latter to encroach the more. Pester Lloyd went so far as to report, inaccurately but to great sensation, that Andrásy had already been appointed Beust's successor as foreign minister.\(^4\)
Beust was also uncomfortably aware that behind the uproar in the Hungarian press stood Andrásy himself. The Hungarian minister president was clearly growing impatient with his inability to control foreign policy, and despite his defeat in council was still determined to promote a firmer anti-Russian line. The British ambassador, late in November, reported that Andrásy was still in "considerable excitement" about the Russian move,

and seemed but little disposed to discuss it calmly, having made up his own mind that war must inevitably result sooner or later from the proceeding of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg.

To Bloomfield's appeals for calm, Andrásy reiterated his naive belief that Prussia would side with Austria-Hungary. Bloomfield concluded that

there is no doubt that at the present moment a war cry would be loudly responded to in Hungary by the great majority of the members of the Diet.95

Privately, Bloomfield described Andrásy as "quite wild for war".96

The evidence of Kállay's diary also shows that Andrásy was counting on the meeting of the Hungarian Delegation to orchestrate a call for Beust's resignation. A week after the Delegation had convened, Kállay openly urged Andrásy to bring down Beust and take his place, "because only he (Andrásy) is in a position to save the empire."97 Andrásy replied that he could easily do so by going before the Delegation "with the facts" [az adatokkal], but would not "because he wouldn't have it said that he forced Beust out of office."98 It would be a different matter, however, if the Delegation in fact brought about Beust's departure. That Andrásy hoped his party colleagues in the Delegation would do so can be inferred from his remark to Kállay that, if they did not, "then he (Andrásy) would probably tender his resignation, because he will not be responsible for Beust's policy."99

Under this pressure of Hungarian public opinion, Beust accordingly ate his words. In the two months leading up to the opening session of the London Conference, called to negotiate a settlement of the Black Sea dispute, Beust associated himself explicitly with the lost cause of a collective note.100 Andrásy could thus be said to have had his way at the council of 14 November, despite his isolation on the day itself. Yet the immediate effect of the setback he experienced at that point had far-reaching
consequences for relations with Serbia.

Convinced by the cold reception accorded his views on the Russian peril, Andrássy resolved to continue his attempts to influence policy behind the scenes. The result was another series of initiatives by Kállay in Belgrade, designed to inject new life into the Bosnian proposals and, at the same time, to explore the possibilities of an alliance or, at the very least, an entente between the Monarchy and Serbia. As a direct consequence of Andrássy's frustration in council, however, these pourparlers with the Serbian Regents were carefully kept secret from Beust although, as we shall see, Andrássy had the guile to secure the Emperor's sanction at a later stage.101 The contacts made brought the Bosnian question to its furthest and most detailed stage of development, but in the process they also made it clear just how pointless the whole exercise was in reality. For no treaty or even understanding with Serbia was possible without the involvement of the Monarchy's foreign minister, yet it was the decided object of the Hungarian minister president to keep his rival out of the business for as long as possible. With or without the approval of Francis Joseph, Andrássy's attempt to guide the Monarchy's Serbian policy at one remove in this fashion was a nonsense, and was shortly to be proved such.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 6: EFFECT OF THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR


8. Ibid., p. 293; Lutz, op. cit., p. 214.


10. Ibid., p. 289.

11. Ibid., p. 294.


14. Beust to Prokesch-Osten, 1 Aug. 1870, HHSA, PA XII/96; quoted in Diószegi, op. cit., p. 88, n. 35.

15. Beust to Chotek, 4 Aug. 1870, HHSA, PA X/63; also cited by Lutz, op. cit., p. 541, n. 23.

16. De la Tour d'Auvergne to Gramont, 26 July 1870, ODG, XXIX, no. 8784, pp. 243-44.

17. Quoted in Manó Kónyi, Beust és Andrássy 1870 és 1871-ben (Budapest 1890), p. 21: "Magyarországnak csak egy természetes ellensége van s ez Oroszország. Küzdeni fogunk vele, bárhol találjuk, s bárkivel lesz, s a ki Oroszország ellen szövetkezni akar velünk, szivesen látjuk."

18. Kállay Diary, 29 July 1870 (Dnevnik, p. 316): "Közli velem, hogy ő nem óhajta a háborút, de az aligha lesz kikerülhető Oroszországgal.... E részben az ő terve Törökországgal véd és dacsa szövetséget kötni, s a mi védelmünk jutalmául a portától Bosznianak Szerbia részére való átengedését követelni, miután mi és a porta is csak így biztosíthatjuk magunkat ez oldalról és csak ez esetben használhatjuk egész erőinket Oroszország ellen."

19. Ibid. (Dnevnik, p. 317): "a kivel alkudozni lehet."

20. Ibid: "hogy ha a constellatiok kedvezőnek mutatkoznak, akkor addig fogjuk Oroszországot ingerelni míg az bennünket megtámad."

21. Ibid: "oly határozatlan, hogy valóban alig tudom miként fogjak hozzá."
21. Ibid: "hogy Andrássy szeretne ugyan egy háborút, de nincs elég elhatározása, hogy azt erőlyesen kezdeményezze."

22. Ibid., 1 Aug. 1870 (Dnevnik, p. 317): "hogy Ő Andrássy tervét illetőleg beszélt Bloomfielddel s igyekezett _____itálni? [word unclear; Dnevnik: "da ga privoli" —"to win him over"], hogy Anglia is csatlakozzék hozzánk és közösen igyekezzünk a portát megnyerni a Bosniai tervnek."

23. Ibid., 1 Aug. 1870 (Dnevnik, p. 317): "hogy 6 Andrássy tervét illetôleg beszélt Bloomfielddel s igyekezett itâlni? [word unclear, Dnevnik: "da ga privoli"—"to win him over"] hogy Anglia is csatlakozzék hozzánk és közösen igyekezzünk a portát megnyerni a Bosniai tervnek."

24. Diószegi, op. cit., p. 89.

25. PRO, FO 7/767; and FO 362/2-3 (Granville private papers).


27. Bloomfield to Granville, 27 Sept. 1870, no. 119, PRO, FO 7/768.


29. Kállay Diary, 22 July 1870 (Dnevnik, p. 315).


31. Kállay Diary, 5 Aug. 1870 (Dnevnik, p. 318): "hogy ha bizonyos eshetôségek bekôvetkeztével mi öket segitenôk Bosnia birtokába jutni képesek e ôk a rendet és nyugalmat fenntartani."

32. Ibid: "minden perczben...."

33. Ibid., 7 Aug. 1870 (Dnevnik, p. 319): "hogy ha Bosnia birtokába segitjük ôket örökös sympathiâkat fogunk szerezni."


36. Ibid.

37. Zastava, 7 Aug. 1870; quoted in Vojvodić, op. cit., p. 37: "Bosna je ključ od zapadne strane istoka; ona je geografski stožer srbski zemalja; ko bi Bosnu odeljeno od Srbije dobio, taj bi podvezavši životnu žilu Srbije pre a posle postao gospodarem Srbije."

38. Quoted, Ibid: "Bosnia would also be at the appropriate moment a 'buffer' of the links between the two peoples" ("bi Bosna bila u zgodno vreme i 'kotva' sveze ta dva plemena").

39. Ibid., p. 36.


43. E.g., Hristić to Ristić, 2/14 Dec. 1870; and Hristić to Ristić, 13/25 Jan. 1871, both in Hristić Letters, no. 21, pp. 26-27, and no. 28, p. 35.


49. Chotek to Beust, 23 July 1870, quoted ibid., p. 135, n. 20.

50. Bridge, From Sadowa to Sarajevo; esp. ch. 6, "The Austro-Russian Entente, 1895-1906".


56. Ibid., 4 Sept. 1870 (Dnevnik, p. 326): "A Bosniai kérdés szőnyegre kerülése, az angol törekvések e tárgyban s a mi tökéletes tétlenségünk és hallgatásunk azon aggadalmat kőlik fel bennem, hogy e jó alkalmat elszalasztjuk s az annyit feszegeties bosniai kérdés gyümölcsét más fogja előlünk elszedni." 

57. Ibid: "mert valóban ily tétlen, saját érdekét felven ismerő vagy valósítani nem képes politikát nincs kedvem szolgálni."


60. Bloomfield to Granville, 27 Sept. 1870 (no. 119), PRO, FO 7/768; italics in


63. Bloomfield to Granville, 13 Oct. 1870 (private), PRO, FO 362/3 (microfilm).

64. *Ibid*.

65. Granville to Bloomfield, 2 Nov. 1870 (private), PRO, FO 362/2 (microfilm).

66. Bloomfield to Granville, 10 Nov. 1870, PRO, FO 362/3 (microfilm).

67. Andrássy to Kállay, 24 Oct. 1870, OSZK, FH 1733/66-78; also printed in Petrović, II, no. 337, pp. 144-49, which omits two pages of the original (ff. 10-11) written in a mixture of German and cipher.

68. *Ibid*.


73. *Ibid.*, f. 70: "közöttünk és Serbia közt minden félelmiértés lehetetlen legyen...."


75. Andrássy to Kállay, 24 Oct. 1870, *op. cit.*, f. 72: "Ezen kérdés egyáltalain eddig eddig rajtam kívül senki által nem lett még megpenditve, ha tehát Constantinápolyban ventiláltatott, az onnét ered, hogy a' Küülügyministerium tudta úgyan, de nem annak nevében, én szóltam róla Hayder effendivel és utódjával Halil béggel, tiszttán és határozottan."

76. *Ibid*: "minden lehető indokot."

77. *Ibid.*, f. 73: "Az eredmény egyelőre egy határozott 'non possumus' lett, és tetemes hidegég török részről irányunkban."

78. *Ibid.*, ff. 73-74: "Ha egyszer meg fog győződni mindenki arról, hogy a' török uralom utódja nem az orosz lesz, akkor sem nekünk, sem a többi európai hatalomnak nem lesz többé érdekében a Kelet természetes átalakulását gátolni; akkor bárán bizhatjuk a' Kelet sorsát saját népeire."

79. *Ibid.*, ff. 77-78: "Jó lesz Serbiát arra figyelmeztetni, hogy az Osztrák-Magyar monarchia jelenleg a' honvédésen kívül 840.000 katonával rendelkezik."


84. Bose to Friesen, 13 Nov. 1870, quoted *ibid*.


86. Diószegi, *op. cit.*, pp. 188-89.


95. Bloomfield to Granville, 23 Nov. 1870, PRO, FO 7/769.

96. Bloomfield to Granville, 24 Nov. 1870, PRO, FO 362/3 (microfilm).


98. *Ibid*: "mert nem akarja hogy azt mondják hogy Ő Beustot helyéből kituda."


It is ironic that the Hungarian attempt to revive the Bosnian question should have been launched on 23 November. For the same day saw the despatch of Beust's circular to the Monarchy's representatives in Belgrade and Bucharest. This was to prove the time bomb which, two months later, brought crashing to the ground the fragile edifice built by Andrásy and Kállay.

Beust in late November was faced with the need somehow to react to Russia's unilateral renunciation of the Black Sea clauses. He associated himself with a number of proposals for discussion at the forthcoming international conference at London, which had their origin in Andrásy's fertile brain but which were illusory to say the least. On a simpler level, however, Beust needed to convince the Russians that he meant business, an ultimately fruitless exercise in view of the Monarchy's essential powerlessness. Part of this exercise involved squashing any ideas of trouble-making in the Balkans. The Beust circular was designed as a direct admonition to what the Ballhaus considered the two most likely sources of unrest in the Peninsula, the Serbian and Roumanian governments.

To Beust the connection between the Russian declaration and a threat to the status quo in the Balkans was self-evident. "Der russische Vorgang," he wrote to his consuls in Belgrade and Bucharest,

ist...nur allzusehr geschaffen, die Gemüther in den unmittelbar oder mittelbar zum osmanischen Reiche gehörigen Ländern in eine bedenkliche Aufregung zu versezen....

Beust expressed the hope that neither the Roumanian nor the Serbian government would be lured into taking steps "welche unabschebares Unheil über ihr Land heraufbeschwören würden." The passage which was to cause all the trouble, when it became public two months later, was not at first sight controversial. Serbia and Roumania, Beust wrote, must be under no illusions that Austria-Hungary's leaders were resolved to uphold the principles of 1856, and "für deren Aufrechthaltung erforderlichen Falles die ganze Kraft der Monarchie einzusezen." In Beust's view this
determination on the part of the Monarchy happened also to serve the interests of both Serbia and Roumania, and should be accepted in this sense.³

Just when Andrássy, through Kállay, was attempting to breathe new life into the Bosnian plan, with the added bait of an alliance or entente of sorts between Serbia and the Monarchy, Beust's circular introduced a decidedly jarring note. Far from encouraging Belgrade to look upon a division of Bosnia as possible, it invoked the Treaty of Paris and the status quo, and virtually threatened the vassal states with war if they endangered either. Beust had not always made his unease at Andrássy's schemes as clear as he might have done; in fact his acquiescence in Hungarian meddling at times amounted to a weak-minded acceptance. The circular of 23 November was a substantial corrective to this tendency, and indeed may well have been conceived as a well-placed torpedo of whatever it was Beust suspected Andrássy of contemplating in relations with Serbia.

That being so, and given the ambiguity of Kállay's position between Vienna and Pest, it is perhaps not surprising that the Beust circular at first vanished without trace. There is no mention of the circular in Kállay's diary,⁴ nor does the original survive in the files of the Belgrade consulate.⁵ Nor did Kállay raise the matter with the Regents, as the circular clearly enjoined him to do.⁶ The evidence, or rather lack of evidence, suggests that Kállay quietly consigned his unwelcome instructions to the fire.

Quite apart from the possibility that Beust might easily query whether the contents of the circular had been communicated to the Regents, Kállay was gambling against the odds. Since 1868 the Austro-Hungarian foreign ministry had been in the habit of publishing selected documents on foreign affairs, and it was entirely conceivable that the circular of 23 November, which usefully demonstrated the Monarchy's support for the status quo, would find its way into one of these so-called Rotbücher. But Kállay, at the end of 1870, was convinced he was on the verge of a breakthrough with the Bosnian plan. His determination to ignore Beust's instructions so blatantly was undoubtedly due to his awareness of something which remained hidden to the chancellor. Not for the first time, Andrássy had secured the highest possible authority for new overtures to the Serbs. The Emperor Francis Joseph himself was involved; and for a tantalising few
weeks it seemed as if, at long last, Serbia might be drawn securely into the Monarchy’s orbit.

59: The Bosnian Negotiations of November 1870

The final stage of the Bosnian negotiations, in the winter of 1870-71, was a Hungarian-led and executed affair, even when the assent of the monarch is allowed for. For one thing, Beust and the foreign ministry were, with the Emperor's agreement, deliberately kept in the dark. In their approaches to the Serbian government, Andrássy and Kállay were once again pursuing their own 'foreign policy', in blithe disregard of the practical obstacles to its realisation. Beust may still have enjoyed the Emperor's overall confidence, but as far as relations with Serbia were concerned Andrássy increasingly behaved as if his views, rather than Beust's, were the ones that mattered.

Andrássy's fresh approach to Belgrade owed much to his sense of isolation at the crown council of 14 November, convened to discuss the Black Sea crisis. If, as Andrássy at first feared, Beust and the Emperor refused to take the threat from Russia seriously, then it was all the more important for Andrássy to do what he could in the one quarter, Serbia, where through Kállay he had a direct influence. As far as the Bosnian question was concerned, Andrássy must have realised, by now, that Beust was not really in favour of the scheme. The chancellor had certainly shown no signs of disappointment when, in the autumn of 1870, the British government so emphatically disavowed any involvement in such a project. Andrássy's proposed carve-up of Bosnia, in return for Serbia's unequivocal alliance with the Monarchy, thus paradoxically had to be put to the Serbian Regents without Beust's knowledge. What was even more paradoxical, as Andrássy admitted to Kállay in late October, the Turkish government, another key factor in the equation, still refused to have anything to do with the Bosnian plan.7

Kállay, because of the vague nature of his brief from Andrássy, and because the recent acquittal of Alexander Karadordević had seriously soured his relations with the Regents, felt his way carefully at first. His chosen instrument was Colonel Orešković, the (frequently self-appointed) mediator between Belgrade, Pest and the Croatian nationalists in Zagreb. As it happened, Orešković returned to Belgrade from talks with
Andrássy at the end of the first week in November.8

Orešković expressed his support for the Bosnian project, although for this Croat exile Croatia's interest in the division of Bosnia was never far from his mind.

He [Orešković] is going to talk to the Regents and seriously propose an alliance with Hungary, however, if they should incline towards Russia... in Bosnia he will start such an agitation in favour of Croatia that Serbia will never be able to acquire Bosnia.9

As usual with Orešković, much of this was bombast, since he hardly possessed the full confidence of the Croat nationalist leadership.10

Over the next few days, Kállay employed Orešković as a species of Trojan horse for ascertaining the Regents' receptivity to Andrássy's proposals. With Kállay's approval, Orešković played the 'Vienna military reaction' card when he told the Regents, on 13 November,

that the military party aims to acquire Bosnia and because of this wants to prevent the dissolution of the Border as well, that Andrássy, of course, is against this plan and wants to get Bosnia for Serbia, so it would be good if the Regents would come to an agreement with Andrássy....11

The Regents ought "to come out once and for all on this", Orešković urged, since he was shortly to see Strossmayer in order to agree on "the position Croatia has to take up towards the Hungarians."12 Implied was the suggestion that it might be the Croats, and not Serbia, who benefited most from any opening up of the Bosnian question.

Orešković also echoed Andrássy's extraordinary claim that Prussia was prepared to tolerate "any action...by Austria-Hungary against Russian influence in the East."13 As the Colonel described it to the Regents, a treaty had been concluded between Austria-Hungary and Prussia, and "in the East Austria is being guaranteed a free hand."14 Serbia would be foolish to range itself on the wrong side in any impending conflict. Even allowing for Orešković's tendency to exaggerate, however, this was a serious claim to be making, on the basis of nothing more substantial than Andrássy's assumptions about the future community of interests between Germany and the Monarchy. Yet Kállay's private record shows no qualms about backing a statement which could so easily be proved false.
If Kállay required fresh evidence of how low Hungarian stock had sunk in Belgrade, he had it in Blaznavac's assertion to Orešković that "an agreement is possible, only because of the Karadžordević business they now can't have much trust in Hungary."\(^{15}\) Despite the rather unsubtle pressure brought to bear by Orešković, both Regents remained stubbornly ill-disposed. On 17 November, for example, Kállay learned that Ristić "doesn't want to know about an alliance with Austria."\(^{16}\) The attitude of both Regents may also have been affected by the news of Russia's renunciation of the Black Sea clauses, only a few days before.\(^{17}\)

Kállay made his own approach to the Regents on 17 November. He had to spend much of the interview reassuring them that the Hungarian government intended taking the Karadžordević case to a higher court. The Black Sea crisis, too, had had its effect. Blaznavac was particularly apprehensive, and made the connection Kállay doubtless dreaded. If the powers did not pull Russia up for its unilateral action, "it will thereby establish its prestige in the East and in this case it will be difficult to struggle against it."\(^{18}\)

On the Bosnian question, Kállay pretended to be acting on his own initiative, but that "in so far as I am acquainted with Andrássy's intentions, I believe that something could be done and that seriously."\(^{19}\) The time for talk, in other words, was past. In a couple of days, Kállay would lay before the Regents 'his' (in reality Andrássy's) plan, and would hope for a clear answer. To heighten the Regents' sense of being surrounded by unreliable elements, by comparison with which Hungary must appear a rock of salvation, Kállay even described Orešković as "an agent of the military party", a slander agreed on by prior arrangement with Orešković himself.\(^{20}\) These scare tactics appeared to work. Two days later Kállay had the satisfaction of learning that Blaznavac and Ristić were "already much more inclined to negotiate with us. They recognise that Serbia's situation is critical."\(^{21}\)

Yet the Regents' attitude on matters of detail seemed if anything to be hardening. Orešković, who still had the Regents' ear, reported on 20 October that they "would not possibly agree, in case they acquire Bosnia, to cede to the Croats the Croatian part of Turkey [i.e. of Bosnia] as far as the Vrbas."\(^{22}\) Or rather, they would, if the Monarchy
were to cede its own southern tip of Dalmatia to Serbia, and with it access to the Adriatic. Since the Vrbas River bounds the entire northwest corner of Bosnia, this sudden caprice seemingly ruled out any sort of division.

On 23 November, when Kállay set forth his plan to Blaznavac, this fresh obstacle soon reared its head. Kállay started by outlining the basic deal:

in case of war with Russia, either they [the Serbian government] would occupy Bosnia, or, if the Porte protested against this, we would guarantee that, upon conclusion of the war, we would, if necessary by force, get Bosnia for them.\(^\text{23}\)

Blaznavac preferred the first option. At the back of his mind, undoubtedly, was the fear that, once in Bosnia, the Monarchy might not be so keen to pull out again. Kállay, however, warned Blaznavac that a Serbian occupation of Bosnia could have a bad effect on the Croats, "who would probably provoke an uprising in the Turkish part of Croatia, in their interest and to Serbia's detriment, and we didn't want the expansion of Croatia."\(^\text{24}\)

This did not impress the Regent. Serbia, said Blaznavac, would cede northwest Bosnia "up to the Vrbas" [\textit{a Vrbaszig}] in order to placate the Croats; but in return it wanted "some insignificant territory" on the southern frontier of Montenegro, "and on the other side of the Boccha di Cattaro."\(^\text{25}\) The rationale for this, it emerged, was that by this the principle of compensation \textit{[i.e., to the Sultan]} for Turkish Croatia would still be reached; on the other hand they would completely encircle Montenegro, which was nothing but a tool in the hands of Russia.\(^\text{26}\)

In effect, Austria-Hungary was being asked to exchange its naval base at Cattaro for the northwest corner of Bosnia, while the Ottoman Empire made an additional, internal border adjustment in Serbia's favour.

Kállay, not for the first time, found himself at something of a loss. He reiterated his conviction that allowing the Monarchy to annex northwest Bosnia was "the sole means which might satisfy the Croats."\(^\text{27}\) The reciprocal cession of Cattaro, however, was a new idea and, although Kállay liked it, he would have to refer the matter back to Andrássy. As for the general feasibility of the scheme,

The greatest difficulty would arise if it didn't come to war \textit{[i.e., with Russia]} because it would then be hard to persuade Turkey
to cede Bosnia. With regard to this I said that Andrásy had already taken steps and that they hadn't found a favourable reception with the Porte.\textsuperscript{28}

In the face of Serbian suspicion, these were embarrassing admissions to be forced to make. The Porte was forewarned and obdurate; and the entire plan was virtually impracticable without the outbreak of war and upheaval.

Undoubtedly one of the factors which kept the Serbian government interested in the Bosnian plan, despite their growing scepticism about Andrásy's ability to make good his promises, was their consciousness that Russia was unlikely to be of assistance. On the contrary: the renunciation of the Black Sea clauses paradoxically made the Russian government an even firmer supporter of the Balkan status quo than it had been hitherto. In return for the Porte's acquiescence on the Black Sea issue, the Russians were willing to offer Turkey a renewed guarantee of its territorial integrity, and thus gain a tactical ally at the projected international conference.\textsuperscript{29}

The indisputable annoyance in Belgrade with Russia caused Kállay to claim, in a despatch to Beust of 24 November, that any Serbo-Russian understanding was out of the question. The realisation was gaining ground in Serbia that Austria-Hungary was the only power from which it could hope for anything, as well as the only power which could seriously threaten it. Kállay concluded that "Serbien wünscht aufrichtig das Erhalten des türkischen Reiches, dieß ist ja die beste Garantie auch für sein Bestehen." Naturally, the Serbian government had not given up its hopes of taking over the administration of Bosnia; but they knew full well that this could only take place, Kállay stressed, "mit Hilfe der Westmächte, besonders aber Österreich-Ungarns und unter der Suzeränität der Pforte."\textsuperscript{30}

At no point did Kállay do more than hint to Vienna at what was really being negotiated. Beust may well have gathered from the above that his subordinate was still encouraging the Regents to dream of a Serbian share in Bosnia, but the details of what Andrásy and Kállay hoped to spring upon him as a \textit{fait accompli} remained hidden from him.

In fact the Hungarian initiative appeared on the verge of a breakthrough. Four days after the despatch just mentioned, on 28 November, Kállay had a meeting with all three
of Serbia's Regents. Jovan Gavrilović, the shadowy third Regent, was no more than a political makeweight, but his presence at this stage of the negotiations seemed to indicate a symbolic commitment to act on the part of the real men of power, Blaznavac and Ristić.31

The meeting of 28 November was held specifically to discuss the Bosnian plan and the question of a formal agreement on the matter between Serbia and the Monarchy. For the benefit of Gavrilović, Kállay began by rehearsing, as if it were his own plan, everything so far discussed with the other two Regents. The Regents agreed with the following summary:

as long as there is no war they [the Regents] would like diplomatic activity which would prepare the terrain, and when that was completed, the takeover of Bosnia by the Serbian army, in which case we would proclaim our intention not to intervene, while secretly we would help them with money and arms. With regard to this I expressed my opinion that this would not pose any great difficulty. In case war breaks out between us and Russia, let Serbia take over Bosnia, and we would guarantee its possession after the war; they, however, must assure us of their friendly neutrality.32

Kállay added that, in the event of an Austro-Russian conflict, it would be inadvisable for Serbia to march into Bosnia at once, since at this point the Turks could still be expected to have substantial numbers of troops stationed there. However, "once the Turkish army was already preoccupied, and the excuse existed they could provoke an uprising in Bosnia and go in under the pretext of maintaining order on the Porte's behalf."33

The Regents appeared to have no difficulty in accepting this scenario. What should have caused Kállay concern, however, was a detail he set down in his diary that evening. Despite Ristić's reservations about a formal agreement, the Regents said "they would accept it if the minister of foreign affairs signed it."34 It was a crucial proviso, which threatened the whole basis of the projected understanding. Short of a change of foreign minister, it is hard to see how it could be complied with; but then Kállay in late November was hoping for precisely such a change at the Ballhaus.

Another indication of future difficulties was the reaction to Kállay's proposed division of Bosnia along the River Vrbas. It was clear that this also found little favour.
with Ristić, who preferred not to discuss such details. Instead, Ristić said, the Serbian government would negotiate directly with the Croatian National Party on the territorial division, and in the event of a partition along the Vrbas line would be looking for compensation in the shape of Cattaro. To this, Kállay merely replied that "we at least didn't want the aggrandisement of Croatia, but this would be in their [the Serbs'] interest, because otherwise they would have trouble with the Croats." 35

Kállay was enough of a realist to see that all was not yet clear sailing, and as he prepared to leave for Pest he was in sombre mood. He pondered whether he should resign his post, "if I don't find that Andrássy is pursuing a more energetic policy." 36 He would see what Andrássy said to the latest proposals from the Regents, but "I fear I am right, and that the time for energy from his point of view has still not come." 37

The remarkable thing about Kállay's despondency was the degree to which he associated success or failure in his Belgrade mission with Andrássy's policy, rather than Beust's. In actual fact a great deal depended on whether, in the end, the foreign policy establishment of the Monarchy as a whole could be induced to back the Bosnian plan. Possibly this essential backing would be secured by a change in personnel, an event which, given the Emperor's personal interest in Andrássy's scheme, was at least conceivable in November 1870. Nevertheless Andrássy was not yet foreign minister, and the Serbian Regents showed every awareness of this awkward fact.

60: The Draft Treaty of Alliance

Between 1 and 23 December, Kállay saw Andrássy a total of five times in Pest. Andrássy was less than pleased with the failure to secure a firm acceptance of the Monarchy's right to northwest Bosnia. He remained optimistic, however, and, on the basis of an ambiguous enquiry by the Turkish ambassador, believed that "the Turks are beginning to become friends with this idea." 38 Such an assumption, for which no other evidence exists, was on a par with Andrássy's belief in the Monarchy's "free hand" for action against Russia. Deciding on the precise limits of the territory Austria-Hungary should claim, in fact, appeared to Andrássy the main problem in the Bosnian question, far transcending the matter of Turkish cooperation. At Kállay's second interview with him, on 8 December, Andrássy still had to "think this over a bit more, and will also
speak to the Emperor."³⁹

On 11 December, Kâllay handed over to Andrássy "a list, in which I have noted down the principal points of the agreement to be concluded with the Serbian government."⁴⁰ This document, which as it turned out represented the closest the Hungarians ever got to finalising the negotiations over Bosnia, has not survived in its original form. Instead, the points drafted by Kâllay resurfaced later in three separate versions.

One, in Kâllay's hand but fragmentary and of questionable provenance, cannot even be dated with certainty.⁴¹ Nevertheless it clearly planned for a secret treaty with Serbia, and obliged the Monarchy, in case of a war with Russia in which Serbia was either an Austrian ally or a benevolent neutral, to permit a Serbian occupation of Bosnia "noch während des Krieges". Even if Turkish protests made this impossible during hostilities, Austria-Hungary engaged to detach the provinces afterwards from Turkey, "welche hiefür in Asien compensirt würde." If Serbia managed to secure the Porte's agreement to a handover in time of peace, "so wären wir genöthigt den Theil bis ungefähr an die Linie Narenta [Neretva]-Verbas als Grenzrektification für uns in Anspruch zu nehmen."⁴² This, incidentally, was the first mention of the Neretva River as a further delineation of Austria-Hungary's share, and made it clear that what the Hungarians had in mind was the entire western third of Bosnia, as far south as Metković on the Dalmatian frontier.

The other two surviving versions of the draft treaty are the virtually identical notes preserved by Jovan Ristić, on the basis of his interview with Kâllay at the end of December, to be dealt with shortly. Ristić's posthumously published third volume of memoirs contained a translation of his original notes of the interview, which he wrote down in French at the time and, according to his own account, "in his [Kâllay's] presence, [and] at his dictation."⁴³ In their published, Serbian form these notes differ from the French notes taken at the time only in minor details. The sole significant inaccuracy is that Ristić in his memoirs describes the interview as having taken place in the autumn of 1870, an error repeated by Vojislav J. Vučković when he published the French text in 1963.⁴⁴ The Kâllay diary, however, makes it clear that the only draft
treaty set down on paper in this fashion, between Kállay and the Regents, was that discussed on 27 December. It also seems probable, in the light of the above evidence, that what Kállay read out to Ristić was the final form of the list he submitted to Andrássy in Pest on 11 December.

On 15 December Kállay saw Andrássy again, and learned that he was now backing away from the idea of a formal treaty at all. From being bent on war, as late as 24 November, Andrássy had apparently calmed down considerably:

he said that since war with Russia, it seems, has been averted, we don't have to conclude a treaty with the Serbian government, but just give one another a verbal guarantee....

Nevertheless Andrássy announced that he was to see the Emperor personally the next day. "With Beust, however, he can't speak about this." Renouncing a formal agreement did not, however, in Andrássy's eyes, mean renouncing Austria-Hungary's claim to northwest Bosnia. In return, Andrássy was prepared to guarantee that, if a dispute between Serbia and the Porte should flare up in time of peace elsewhere in Europe, the Monarchy would not only adopt a policy of non-intervention, but would prevent the intervention of other parties. Andrássy also stressed, on 21 December, that he had indeed discussed the whole matter with the Emperor, "who has accepted it." Kállay was authorised to communicate His Majesty's assent with regard to the Bosnian affair. But Beust must know nothing about the whole thing.

Clearly this state of affairs would not continue indefinitely. Andrássy's sudden reluctance to contemplate a formal treaty, despite Francis Joseph's personal involvement, actually reduced the chances of getting Blaznavac and Ristić to commit themselves.

61: The Regents' Reservations

The terms which Kállay laid before Ristić, on 27 December, were concrete enough. In the absence of Blaznavac, who was sick, Kállay informed Ristić of the Emperor's approval of the conditions proposed. He also claimed, with more presumption than accuracy, that "the minister for foreign affairs would sign the eventual treaty." On the ticklish question of why a formal treaty was no longer required, Kállay fell back on the
fact that the threat of war had receded, hence "we had to reach agreement only with regard to those elements on which we could later conclude a treaty."\(^{51}\)

The points which Ristic then jotted down, in Källay's presence, covered a wide variety of possibilities. In any Serbo-Turkish conflict, for instance, the Monarchy would not intervene, and would ensure that no other power did so either. If Serbia provoked a conflict, it undertook to let the Austro-Hungarian government know of its intentions in advance. If the Porte started hostilities, or if it was uncertain which side had initiated them, Serbia would still be bound to warn Austria-Hungary before deploying any Serbian forces in Ottoman territory. In each eventuality, Austria-Hungary engaged to preserve a benevolent neutrality *vis-à-vis* Serbia.

In the event of Austria-Hungary's direct involvement in war with "une Puissance étrangère", in plain parlance Russia, Serbia would preserve a friendly neutrality. In return, the Monarchy

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\text{s'engage à procurer après la guerre à la Serbie la Bosnie, l'Herz[égovine]. et l'ancienne Serbie (limites à déterminer) de manière à faire annexer ces provinces à la Serbie avec laquelle elles formeraient un État placé sous la suz[eraineté] de la Porte dans les conditions actuelles de la Serbie.}
\]

The Monarchy moreover undertook to enforce this occupation "si l' [sic] faut même par la guerre." The inevitable *quid pro quo* for this was northwest Bosnia:

\[
\text{Aussitôt que la Serbie aura annexé ces provinces l'Autriche occupera, pour son compte, la partie de la Bosnie jusqu'au Verbas et Nerenta.}
\]

Should trouble break out in Bosnia while Austria-Hungary was still at war, then both parties would consult with one another "pour entrer dans les contrées, qui dans les cas prévus formeraient les parties intégrantes de leurs États."\(^{52}\)

As Källay recorded that evening, this was where his own draft ended.\(^{53}\) Ristic, however, tacked on a final clause. According to this, if the Turks actively resisted this joint Austro-Serbian intervention, either on Serbian soil or on their own territory,

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\text{la condition de la maintien de la suz. [suzeraineté] de la Porte tombe et l'Autriche s'engage à reconnaître la Serbie comme un État indépendant, et [à] agir dans le même sens auprès des autre[s]. Puissances.}^{54}\]

Källay sensibly pointed out that he could make no comment on this addendum, and on

221
that point the two wound up their discussion.55

Ristić was a notoriously cautious and suspicious individual. Nevertheless, if his memoirs are to be believed, he personally accepted that the Hungarian initiative with regard to Bosnia was sincerely intended. Ristić at least in retrospect made a clear distinction between the traditional machinations of 'Vienna', after 1867, and the policies pursued by the Hungarian government, which "entered on to a completely different track and showed a friendlier disposition towards Serbia."56 Ever since Andrásy's rencontre with Prince Michael at Ivánka, Ristić conceded, the Hungarian government had demonstrated its desire for good relations. There was, to be sure, a certain sting in Ristić's remark that Andrásy, as minister president, had tried "to attach the neighbouring Balkan nations, and especially Serbia, to Hungary – but for as cheap a price as possible."57 But Ristić had to recognise the encouragement Andrásy had given Serbia's national aspirations, even if he "shrank from the very thought of changing the shape of the Ottoman Empire."58

Ristić saw the contradictions inherent in Andrásy's policy between 1867 and 1871. The Hungarian was a politician whose country found itself "in an insufficiently consolidated monarchy",59 and whose domestic policies were often dominated by nationality issues. As Ristić asked himself, "how could he dare even to think of inspiring and strengthening those nationalities on Hungary's borders?"60 Was this not playing with fire, "which could easily spread to his own premises?"61 Ristić explained this paradox, accurately enough, with reference to the overriding Hungarian concern with Russia, and the need, in the event of an Austro-Russian struggle, to ensure that Hungary was not caught between two fires.

According to Ristić's account, Kállay deployed some powerful arguments in his attempt to gain the Regents' confidence. A comparison with Kállay's own personal record reveals that some of the things he told Ristić were true, while others were not the whole of the matter, or were simply false; but Ristić naturally could not know this. On the crucial issue of Francis Joseph's involvement, for instance, Kállay said "that the Emperor had informed him in brief, that he would receive orders to work for the joining of Bosnia to Serbia."62 Beust, moreover, had not only accepted the project; he had,
claimed Kâllay, "instructed Kâllay that he could start work on the business which Count Andrássy had advised." Finally, Kâllay revealed that Andrássy had already sounded the Turkish ambassador in Vienna on the subject, a detail which, as it happened, Ristić was able to verify from his own sources.

Ristić thus did not share the conviction expressed to him by Bishop Strossmayer, at the start of 1871, that the entire scheme was "a Hungarian swindle." Such recognition did not, however, preclude a thoroughgoing scepticism as to Andrássy's ability to work miracles. Ristić was just as conscious as Strossmayer of the basic objection to the Bosnian plan: that it did not square with the well-known views of Beust on the Eastern Question. Ristić knew well enough by early January what stand Beust meant to take at the London Conference on the question of the Black Sea clauses. He could hardly dispute Strossmayer's reminder that Beust would stress "above all the integrity of Turkey."

The assumptions behind the proposals, in Ristić's judgment, were all too questionable. For instance, Serbia was bound to observe a friendly neutrality towards Austria-Hungary in the event of the latter going to war; but since the likeliest opponent in such a conflict was Russia, would Serbian neutrality really be possible? Nor was Ristić happy at the prospect of handing over to the Monarchy, in the event of a Habsburg victory, what he revealingly described as "a third of these Serbian lands." Rightly or wrongly, Ristić feared the consequences for the Regency of accepting two such positions: "Would we not...enter into conflict with the feelings and interests of all Slavs, not to mention our own people?"

Just as worrisome for Ristić was the clause which provided for the occupation by the Monarchy and Serbia of their respective shares of Bosnia, in the event of 'disorders' breaking out there. For Ristić this was one of the points which made the whole plan unacceptable. He evidently hoped that Austria-Hungary's occupation of the northwest corner of Bosnia would be only temporary. However,

it could happen that Austria would maintain its occupation, but that we would not be in a position to do this with ours. What a miserable result that would be! We would have put ourselves under Austria's thumb, while she occupied our Serbian lands!
And in the event of such a catastrophe, from the Serbian point of view, who would guarantee that Andrássy, whom the Regents could trust, would remain at Hungary's helm? Who would wager that, in return for Serbia's neutrality, the perfidious Monarchy would not in fact occupy Serbia itself? In short, too much in the plan hinged upon Andrássy's continuing presence and influence.

The scenario would be worst of all if the Monarchy suffered defeat in a war against Russia, in which Serbia had sat on the sidelines as a supposedly friendly neutral. Serbia would be exposed to the rancour of Russia and the Slav world for its support for the Habsburg Monarchy, hence "we would share its destruction, without even firing a shot." Since Ristić considered an Austro-Hungarian defeat the most likely outcome, it is not surprising that in the light of all these reasons he preferred to wait upon events. Nor is it any wonder that Blaznavac too increasingly found the Bosnian plan "full of dangers".

It was to be some time before Kállay realised it, but he was to advance the Bosnian question no further. As on previous occasions, the Regents made repeated promises, over the next few weeks, that they would give their answer soon; but this receded, mirage-like, continually into the future. Matters were to continue in this fashion for several more months, with the Regents assuring Kállay that a detailed reply to the alliance proposals was imminent, and Kállay besieging Andrássy for some fresh instructions, on the strength of which he could put the negotiations back on the agenda. Noticeable, too, was a further stiffening in the Serbian conditions: by late March 1871, the Regents were suggesting that Austria-Hungary's share in any partition of Bosnia should not extend beyond the River Una, a considerable reduction.

In reality, however, there was very little to negotiate. On 24 January, Kállay learned for the first time that the Regents knew about what Ristić, in his memoirs, called "The first bomb, which exploded over this confidential relationship." The supplementary volume of the Austro-Hungarian Rotbuch had finally reached Belgrade, and in it was published Beust's circular of 23 November. As Ristić complained to Kállay, the explicit threat to Serbia and Roumania, in the circular, was an affront to "their national self-esteem"; certainly it had created "an extremely bad impression" in Belgrade. To
this, Kállay's attempt to demonstrate that the circular "didn't have any significance and that because of this I hadn't mentioned it to them [the Regents]", must have sounded lame even in his own ears.\textsuperscript{76}

What Ristić forebore to mention, but which both men knew perfectly well, was that there was a glaring contradiction between the policy avowed by Andrássy, and that which Beust continued to represent. While Andrássy promoted a plan which had as its centrepiece a reordering of the status quo in the Balkans, Beust was still, it seemed, prepared to threaten Serbia with condign punishment if it disturbed that status quo. The alleged assent of the monarch himself to Andrássy’s scheme, one must remember, was as far as the Regents were concerned just that: they only had Kállay’s word for it. An inherently improbable plan, given the obstacles in the way, appeared to be opposed by one of the key figures in the Monarchy's foreign policy establishment. Unless the Hungarians' vaunted endorsement from the Emperor was made obvious, moreover, it looked as though Beust's opposition to the plan would be decisive.

**62: Effects of the Beust Circular**

Beust's November circular was certainly a more realistic appraisal of the relationship between Serbia and the Monarchy than that which Kállay had been promoting for the past three years. Its revelation at a time when the Monarchy was confidently claiming Serbian support at the London Conference, however, had a devastating effect. There was no disguising the leverage that the circular gave the Regents, in citing Austrian, if not Hungarian, malevolence as an excuse for non-cooperation over issues raised at the London Conference, such as the regulation of the Danube. The official press in Serbia immediately echoed this tone of outrage, and there was a sudden rash of leading articles complaining about Austrian arrogance and insensitivity.\textsuperscript{77}

Kállay at first made no mention of these reactions to Beust, as if he hoped against hope that the issue would die away. In a despatch to Andrássy on 28 January, however, Kállay did not conceal his alarm at the possible consequences of "this tactless telegramme", which he saw as the culminating point in a long series of "blunders by Austrian statesmen."\textsuperscript{78} Beust's stress on the inviolability of the 1856 treaties, and his slighting references to Balkan national aspirations, had created such a bad impression,
Kállay wrote,

the first because it diametrically contradicts the well-meaning proposals expressed by Your Excellency in the interests of these provinces, the second because small, backward nations, which have nothing else but the concept of a future national greatness, are apt to be sensitive on this point.79

Noting the hostile replies in newspapers like Jedinstvo and even Vidovdan, Kállay drew some comfort from the fact that the Vidovdan leader "is laying great stress on the differences which exist between the policy of Count Beust and Hungarian policy", a line which was apparently dictated by Blaznavac himself.80 Kállay expressed the conviction that Andrássy's standing in the Balkans, by contrast to that of Beust, had if anything increased by comparison. However, "since the common foreign minister is still Count Beust, the bad effect will sooner or later extend to the policy of the entire Monarchy....81

The discomfiture of both Andrássy and Kállay can only have been heightened by the news that General Stratimirović, the Hungarian Serb politician, had tabled an interpellation of Andrássy on the subject in the Hungarian parliament on 1 February.82 Stratimirović pointedly asked whether the Hungarian government was in agreement with the policy set forth in the November circular; whether in fact the Monarchy should not be following "a liberal policy of support for the emancipation of the Christians" in the Balkans; and why the same neutrality, observed so strictly in the West, was not also applied to the East.83

For Andrássy, who had spent the last four years trying to implement a policy favourable to Serbian, if not Roumanian aspirations, to be arraigned publicly in this fashion for Beust's sins must have been galling. In the meantime, Kállay attempted to enlighten Beust as to the effect of the circular.

Something clearly had to be reported officially to Vienna, since Kállay had only just seen Blaznavac who, as Kállay recorded privately, made no secret of the fact that the circular's effect was "extraordinarily unpleasant for him personally."84 The Regent complained that the circular

made difficult if not impossible the work of consolidating good relations with us....the Russians could never have done
anything so useful to their interests as Beust's telegrame. To this Kállay made the bold assertion that although Beust even wrote telegrames in the matter what he wanted wasn't happening, the Emperor was completely won over to a policy which assigned Bosnia to Serbia. However necessary to placate Blaznavac, however, such language clearly would not be acceptable in Kállay’s despatch to Vienna.

Kállay at first tried the tactic of recalling Beust’s past expressions of goodwill towards the Balkan Christians. The frequency of these, Kállay claimed, had gradually created in Serbia the conviction

daß das zukünftige Wohl des Fürstenthums hauptsächlich durch ein engeres Anschließen an die Politik des mächtigen Nachbars Österreich-Ungarns am Sichersten zu erreichen wären [sic].

For 'Austria-Hungary', here, it was of course really 'Hungary' which Kállay had in mind. His next observation, though, was a more straightforward reflection of his priorities. This Serbian loyalty was important, he wrote,

rücksichtlich jenes äußerst schädlichen Einflußes, welchen ein uns feindlich gesinntes Serbien besonders bei Gelegenheit eines äußeren Krieges auf die südslawischen Bevölkerungen unserer Monarchie ausüben könnte.

This ultimate disaster had so far been avoided. Not only had Russian influence waned, but "die Beziehungen Serbiens zu unseren Südslawen können im Gegentheil eher feindlich als freundlich genannt werden."

The circular of 23 November, however, was perceived as a threat, and "eine Drohung von Seite des mächtigen Österreichs kann hier umsoweiter Furcht einfliessen, da die Gefahr in diesem Falle für das kleine Serbien eine imminente wäre." Making the same point he had made to Andrássy, about the touchiness of Serbian national feeling, Kállay went so far as to claim that Beust's own instructions had consistently ordered him, Kállay, "den serbischen nationalen Aspirationen nicht schrof entgegenzutreten."

Since Beust's circular appeared to do precisely that, Kállay feared for the results:

Ein jeder Schritt welcher Serbien uns entfremdet, hat nothwendiger Weise eine Annäherung an die russische Politik zur Folge.
And so indeed it proved, although Kállay completely ignored the extent to which his own and Andrássy's dabbling in secret diplomacy had contributed, and was still contributing, to this result.

To Andrássy on 6 February, Kállay held to it that the Regents continued to look to Pest: "all their trust centres on Your Excellency alone." In view of what both Regents were now openly saying about Serbia's relationship with the Monarchy, however, Kállay's belief in their loyalty to Andrássy seems increasingly like whistling in the dark. It was significant that Blaznavac, especially, made a direct, if unsubtle, link between the maintenance of good relations and the Monarchy's good offices for Serbia. As for Ristić, Kállay was fully aware that the second Regent had always been more sceptical of the benefits to Serbia of a close association with the Monarchy, even under Andrássy's aegis.

By early February 1871, with Serbia being upbraided by Vienna for its position on the Danube question, the revelation of the Beust circular had clearly hardened Ristić's attitude still further. Replying to General Ignatiev's taunt that Serbia had abandoned its leadership of the Balkan Christians, Ristić informed Hristić on 7 February that "When the moment comes to act, then the impatience will disperse like mist and all minds will be with us." He dismissed as nonsense a report, attributed to Turkish sources, that Serbia intended lobbying for the administration of Bosnia at the London Conference: "We know perfectly well that we can't request Bosnia from anyone, so we shan't be asking it from the conference either." If that 'anyone' is to be taken literally, Ristić evidently no longer set much store by Andrássy's Bosnian plan, assuming that he had ever done so.

In mid-February, and with the London Conference entering its final stage, Kállay received a lengthy justification from Beust for the publication of his November circular. It was clear Beust was in no mood to accept the strictures of the Serbian press and government circles. Instead, he went on the offensive, listing all the benefits Serbia had derived from the Monarchy in recent years. These included the evacuation of the fortresses in 1867; securing the recognition of the hereditary nature of the Obrenović succession; and sponsoring the 1869 Constitution. The Regents, Beust insisted, were
completely misinterpreting the circular if they saw in it evidence of a new, anti-Serbian policy on the part of the Ballhaus. "Loin d’y poursuivre des vues hostiles à la Serbie,...la seule cause que je me suis attaché à y plaider est celle du maintien des traités qui garantissent les droits des Principautés." Beust followed this up with a second despatch the same day, making yet another appeal for Serbia’s support over the question of regulating the Danube.

Kállay went to see Ristić on 17 February. He started by reading out Beust’s despatch of 12 February, justifying the November circular, and got the impression that "he [Ristić], it seems, was extremely pleased with it." On the subject of the Danube, however, and despite deploying every possible reason why Serbia should support Austria-Hungary, Kállay ran into a brick wall:

Although he [Ristić] didn’t say so outright, I could already see that they aren’t going to do so. I mentioned that if they maintain their opposition this is nothing other than mistrust of us.

With Blaznavac, whom he saw the same day, Kállay received an identical response: emollient assurances that Beust’s explanations more than made up for the November circular; prevarication and a promise to think it over with regard to the Danube.

Whatever protestations of satisfaction Kállay received from the Regents, their subsequent refusal to give way over the Danube was probably reinforced by the ill will which Beust’s circular had generated. The Regents had received a sharp reminder that the Austria they were most familiar with, the Austria that threatened, and took Serbian insignificance for granted, still existed. Not only did this cast a questionable light on Hungarian assurances of friendship, it clashed with any attempt by Vienna to play down the original intent of the November circular. Ristić, admittedly in retrospect, claimed that Beust’s reluctance to see his February despatch published, as the Regents suggested, proved that the November circular "could not have any other meaning than that which we had given it, and in addition to us everyone else who read it."

Most important from Kállay’s point of view, his credibility as a negotiator was fatally undermined. By February 1871 there was no lack of reasons for the Regents to treat his interpretations of either Austrian or Hungarian policies with scepticism. The
Karadordević case remained in limbo, and Ristić at least was increasingly dismissive of the Bosnian scheme. The need to smooth over Beust's circular appears to have taxed Kállay's powers of explanation to the limit. Filip Hristić informed Ristić from Constantinople that, according to the reports the Italian embassy there was receiving from its consulate in Belgrade, "Kállay's position...has become untenable." The Regents, Joannini was supposed to have informed his superior in Constantinople, have perceived now that all Kállay's fine words have been words only and nothing else... Kállay has... been so compromised and shamed before the Serbian government, that he can't go out of his house.98

Kállay's own record does not quite bear out this highly coloured report; but what he did set down is evidence enough that things had gone seriously wrong.

On 20 February Andrassy rose in the Hungarian parliament to answer the Stratimirović interpellation. In a reply concerted with Beust, Andrassy denied utterly that the chancellor had threatened Serbia and Roumania with armed intervention. Beust's intentions had been, on the contrary, to emphasise just how much the 1856 settlement guaranteed "the contemporary international position and rights" of the vassal principalities.99 Stratimirović's concerns were thus "completely groundless."100

The statement was an anodyne account, which quite ignored the unmistakable note of menace in the November circular's promise to deploy "the whole force of the Monarchy" against any threat to the status quo. Andrassy's reply also studiously sidestepped the real point of the circular, which was not aimed at developments within the principalities themselves, but rather at their possible provocation of revolt in the neighbouring Ottoman provinces. Such a warning had especial relevance for Serbia's known aspiration to gain control of Bosnia, an aspiration which Andrassy and Kállay had of course been encouraging for the past three years. Neither Kállay's diary nor the relevant Serbian sources comment on the reception Andrassy's statement got in Belgrade, but it is hard to imagine how it could have failed to remind the Regents of the dichotomy afflicting 'Austro-Hungarian' foreign policy.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 7: THE BOSNIAN QUESTION REVISITED 1870-71

1. Beust to Kállay, 23 Nov. 1870, copy in Beust to Prokesch-Osten, s.d., HHSA, PA XII/96; later published in Auswärtige Angelegenheiten: Correspondenzen des kais. kön. gemeinsamen Ministeriums des Äussern, no. 4: Vom August 1869 bis November 1870, Nachtrag (Vienna 1871), pp. 10-11. See also Jovanovic, Vlada Milana Obrenovića, I, p. 115. For an English translation, Longworth to Granville, 3 Feb. 1871, PRO, FO 78/2185.


5. HHSA, PA XXXVIII/187.

6. Kállay Diary, 23 Dec. 1870 et seq. (Dnevnik, pp. 348 ff.)


8. Kállay Diary, 10 Nov. 1870 (Dnevnik, p. 338).

9. Ibid: "Fog a regensekkel beszélni s komolyan análni nekik a magyarországgal való szövetséget, ha ők azonban Oroszország felé hajolnának... Bosniában is egy oly horszálszerelemű agitatiót kezd, hogy Szerbia soha többé Bosniát meg nem kaphatja."


11. Kállay Diary, 13 Nov. 1870 (Dnevnik, pp. 338-39): "hogy a bécsi katonai párt Bosniára törekszik, s azért akarja a határőrvidék feloszlattalását is hátráltatni; hogy Andrássy e tervnek természetesen ellene van, s hogy Bosniát a szerbeknek óhajtja megszerezni, ezért jó volna, ha a regensek Andrássyval megegyeznénék...."

12. Ibid. (Dnevnik, p. 339): "hogy nyilatkozzanak e felett határozottan...azon magatartás felett, melyet a horvátoknak a magyarok irányában el kell foglalniok."

13. Andrássy to Kállay, 24 Oct. 1870, OSZK, FH 1733/67-68. Quoted above, chapter 6, part 1; n. 70 refers.


15. Ibid: "lehetséges az egyetértés csak hogy a Karagyorgyevics ügy miatt most nem igen bizhatnak Magyarországban...."


17. Ibid., 13 Nov. 1870 (op. cit.)

18. Ibid., 17 Nov. 1870 (op. cit.): "ezáltal magalapítja tekintélyét a Keleten s ez esetben nehéz lesz ellene küzdeni."

19. Ibid: "a mennyire ismerem Andrássy szándokát, azt hiszem hogy valamit lehetne tenni és pedig komolyan."

20. Ibid. (Dnevnik, p. 341): "a katonai párt ügynöke."

21. Ibid., 19 Nov. 1870 (Dnevnik, p. 341): "már sokkal hajlandóbbak velünk
alkudozni. Elismerik hogy Szerbia helyzete válságos...."


23. *Ibid.*: "egy Oroszországgal való háború esetére vagy Ők szállják meg Bosniát, vagy ha a porta ez ellen protestálva akkor a háború végével mi garantizozzuk nekik hogy Bosniát ha kell erővel is megszerezzük számukra."


25. *Ibid.*: "egy bármik csekké területet...a más oldalon pedig a Boccha di Cattarat...."


32. Kállay Diary, 28 Nov. 1870 (*Dnevnik*, pp. 343-44): "ha nem lesz háború Őhajtjuknak egy diplomatikai munkálkodást, mely a tért előkészítené, s ha ez megtörtént Bosznia megszállását a szerb haderő által, mely esetben mi a non-interventiot proclamálnók s Őket titkon pénzzel és fényverrel segítenők. Erre nézve azon nézetetem fejezem, hogy nem igen lesz nehézség. Ha pedig a háború kütve Oroszország és közöttünk, Szerbia szállhassa meg Bosniát s mi biztosítjuk annak birtokát a háború után; Ők pedig barátságos neutralitásukról biztosítanak."

33. *Ibid.* (p. 344): "akkor midőn a török haderő már elkesz foglalva, és hogy ürügy is legyen, támaszthatnak Bosniában felkelést, és bevonalhatnak Bosniába azon szín alatt hogy a rendet fenntartják a porta javára."

34. *Ibid.*: "reáállánának ha a külügyminister írná alá."

35. *Ibid.*: "hogy mi épen nem Őhajtjuk Horvátország nabyobbítását, de ez az Ő érdekükben volna, mert különben meggyül a bajuk a horvátokkal."


37. *Ibid.*: "félek hogy nem csalódom, s hogy as energia ideje rea nézve még mindig nem érkezett meg."


Draft treaty with Serbia, no date, MOL, P344, 44. cs., F/b.1, written by Kállay.


Austro-Hungarian proposal of a treaty with Serbia, which Kállay dictated to Jovan Ristić [Austro-ugarski predlog ugovora sa Srbijom, koji je Kalaj izdiktirao Jovanu Ristiću], [Belgrade, autumn 1870], in Vučković, no. 222, pp. 428-29.

Kállay Diary, 27 Dec. 1870 (Dnevnik, pp. 348-49).

Kállay Diary, 15 Dec. 1870 (Dnevnik, p. 347): "mondja, hogy az orosz háború, most már mint látszik el lévén hárítva, a szerb kormánnyal nem kell szerződést kötnünk, csak szóbeli biztosítéket adni egymásnak."

"Beustnak azonban erről nem lehet szólni." Galántai, A Habsburg-Monarchia alkonya, p. 239, who quotes the passage cited in note 46 above, neglects to point out that the question was being raised in Belgrade without Beust's knowledge.

Kállay Diary, 21 Dec. 1870 (Dnevnik, p. 348): "a ki azt elfogadja."

Kállay Diary, 27 Dec. 1870 (Dnevnik, p. 348): "hogy az eventualis szerződést a külgüminister fogja aláírni."
ne budemo u stanju to sa svojom učiniti. Kakav bi to bio žalostan ishod! Mi bismo sami pošli na ruku Austriji, da naše srpske zemlje osvaja!"

70. Ibid., p. 146: "mi bismo delili njenu pogibiju i bez boja i krvi."
71. Ibid: "pun opasnosti."
72. E.g., Kállay Diary, 4 Mar. 1871 (Dnevnik, p. 365); Kállay to Andrássy, s.d., OSZK, FH 1733/212-13; Kállay Diary, 16 Mar. 1871 (Dnevnik, p. 367); Kállay to Andrássy, s.d., OSZK, FH 1733/214.
74. Ristić, op. cit: "Prva bomba, koja se rasprsla nad ovim poverljivim odnošajima..."
75. Kállay Diary, 24 Jan. 1871 (Dnevnik, pp. 357-58): "sérti azok nemzeti büszkeséget...az itt igen rosz benyomást okozott."
76. Ibid. (Dnevnik, p. 358): "e sürgönynek nincs semmi fontossága s hogy én azt ez okból nem is közölem nekik."
77. Ristić, op. cit., pp. 147-48, 148, where one such passage, probably from Jedinstvo, is quoted.
78. Kállay to Andrássy, 28 Jan. 1871, OSZK, FH 1733/206, 204: "e tapintatlan sürgöny"; "az osztrák kormányférfiak bakyövései."
79. Ibid., ff. 204-05: "az első mert homlok egyenest ellenkezik a NM. részéről e tartományok érdekében nyilvánított jóindulatú szándokkal, a másik mert fejletlen kicsiny nemzetek, melyek ugysem bimak egyéb mint a jövendő nemzeti nagyság képzetével, felette érzékenyek szoktak lenni a pontra nézve."
80. Ibid: "fontos sulyt fektet azon különbségre mely a magyar politika és Gr. Beust politikája között létezik."
81. Ibid., f. 206: "De miután a közös külügyminister mégis csak Gr. Beust, a rossz hatás előbb utóbb az egész Monarchia politikájára is ki fog terjedni....."
82. Kállay Diary, 4 Feb. 1871 (Dnevnik, p. 359); text in Lederer (éd.), Gróf Andrássy Gyula beszédei, II, pp. 424-25.
83. Ibid; the passage quoted is on p. 424: "egy szabadelvű, a keresztyénök emancipációját támogató politika...."
84. Kállay Diary, 4 Feb. 1871 (Dnevnik, p. 359): "neki személyesen felette kellemetlen." 
85. Ibid: "megnehezeti sot majdnem lehetetlenné teszi működését a velünk való jó viszony megszilárdítására...az oroszok sohasem tehettek volna semmit a mi annyira használon érdekeiknek, mint Beust e sürgönye."
86. Ibid: "habár Beust írja is a sürgönyöket de tényleg nem az történik a mit Ő akar, s hogy a császár teljesen megvan nyerve azon politikának, mely Bosznát a szerbeknek szánya."
87. Kállay to Beust, 4 Feb. 1871, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/191.
88. Kállay to Andrássy, 6 Feb. 1871, OSZK, FH 1733/208: "minden bizalmuk egyedül Nagy Méltságodban összpontosul."
89. Ristić to Hristić, 26 Jan./7 Feb. 1871, Ristić Letters, no. 12, p. 26: "Kad dođe trenutak radnji, ta će nestrippljivost kao magla isčeznuti i svi će duhovi biti uz nas."
90. Ibid: "Mi znamo dobro, da se Bosna ne može isprositi ni od koga, pa je nećemo prositi ni od konferencije."
91. Beust to Kállay, 12 Feb. 1871, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/191.
92. Beust to Kállay, 12 Feb. 1871 (no number), ibid.
93. Kállay Diary, 17 Feb. 1871 (Dnevnik, p. 361): "melyet Ő igen meglátszik

94. Kállay Diary, 17 Feb. 1871 (op. cit.): "Habár nem is nyilatkozik határozottan, de már látom hogy azt nem fogják tenni. Megjegyzem hogy ha megmaradnak ellenállásuk mellett, ez körülfelül nem egyéb mint bizaltság ellenünk."

95. Ibid. See also Kállay to Beust, 18 Feb. 1871 (no. 7), HHSA, PA XXXVIII/191.

96. Ristić, op. cit., pp. 150-51: "nije ni mogla imati drugačijeg smisla, do onega, koji smo joj dali mi, a s nami i svi drugi, koji su je čitali."

97. Hristić to Ristić, 10/22 Feb. 1871, Hristić Letters, no. 34, p. 42: "je položaj Kalajeve postao...neizdržljiv."

98. Ibid: "uvideli su sada, da su sve lepe reči Kalajeve bili samo reči i ništa drugo, ...Kalaj pak da je... tako kompromitovan kod vlade srpske i postižen, da ne može iz kuće da izade."


100. Ibid., pp. 425-26: "teljesen alaptalan."
CHAPTER 8: SERBIA'S SWING TOWARDS RUSSIA 1870-71

63: Reactions to Karadorđević's Acquittal

The story of the Karadorđević prosecution has been taken down to October 1870, when the ex-Prince of Serbia was acquitted in the Pest county court of conspiring to murder Prince Michael Obrenović. Kállay, no less than the Regents, regarded this with consternation, since his repeated assurances of a conviction had tied the Hungarian government's reputation to the outcome. Both Kállay and Andrássy were very much in a dilemma of their own making here. On the one hand, they knew perfectly well that no Hungarian government could literally guarantee a guilty verdict. On the other hand, Kállay, with Andrássy's support, had so often said it could, that the Regents were bound to interpret Karadorđević's acquittal as a sign of Hungarian double-dealing. This in turn gave the Regents every excuse for delay in the Bosnian negotiations; later they were to apply the same principle to the Danube question.

For a full month after Karadorđević's acquittal, the Regents remained preoccupied with the current Skupština at Kragujevac, and were not even in Belgrade. This at least gave Kállay a chance to weather the storm in the press, most of which, he was only too aware, was whipped up at the direct behest of the Regents. He kept himself informed as to the government's doings through Dr. Rosen, and in this way knew that one of the most personal attacks on him, which suggested he leave his post, was almost certainly penned by Matija Ban "on Ristic's orders". Andrássy's Bosnian plan, in the circumstances, struck Kállay as increasingly academic, since "as a result of this outcome to the Karadorđević trial we will hardly be able to negotiate with the Regents about such matters."

It was not until 17 November that Kállay first called on Blaznavac and Ristić. He already knew, from Dr. Rosen, that Blaznavac "has become mistrustful of Hungary and Rosen believes that he will now draw nearer to Russia." Ristić, predictably, was even more hostile.

Kállay's only consolation was the knowledge that the Hungarian government had immediately appealed to the higher court, the King's Bench. He was uncomfortably aware, however, that the Regents still seemed to think, despite the evidence so far, that
a conviction could be had in the Hungarian courts for the asking. Dr. Rosen, for instance, plainly acting on instructions from the Regents in advance of the meeting on the 17th, asked Kállay whether he could "promise that the higher court will convict him [Karadordević]." As Kállay noted that evening, "I simply replied that I couldn't promise anything so foolish." It was a belated and, in view of Kállay's own conduct, a rather futile protestation.

In an interview entirely taken up with the Karadordević affair and the Bosnian question, and which took place moreover in the shadow of the Black Sea crisis, Kállay nevertheless found the Regents affable enough. He stressed that, whatever the outcome,

this is only an unimportant personal question, it cannot possibly prevent good relations between us, seeing as how Serbia has much more important interests in the furtherance of which we can help.

He had a veiled riposte to this straight away, when both Regents expressed the view that Karadordević's acquittal "has made it more difficult to work for a better understanding with us." Both Blaznavac and Ristić showed "showed great confidence in Andrássy and me personally."

To Beust and Andrássy, on 24 November, Kállay put a brave face on things. Indeed, he played down the effect, not only of Karadordević's acquittal, but of the Russian action over the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris, on the ground that there was no real possibility of an understanding between Russian and the present Serbian leadership. This, Kállay told Beust, was despite the release of the ex-Prince. In fact Kállay was anything but optimistic. He had just quietly filed Beust's peremptory circular of 23 November, which he instinctively realised would raise hackles in Belgrade, and in his private view both Beust and Andrássy were part of the problem.

On the eve of going up to Pest for further talks about the Bosnian plan, Kállay contemplated resigning, since neither in Vienna nor in Pest did there appear to be the will to pursue what he considered to be an "energetic policy."

Yet Kállay, too, was part of the problem. When, before his departure from Belgrade, he met all three Regents for a formal consideration of the Bosnian question,
Kállay felt obliged to offer yet more placatory words with regard to Karadorđević. "I promised that we will do everything in our power to get him convicted." This, as in the past, was fatally misleading language in the mouth of a diplomat. What Kállay undoubtedly meant was that he would leave no stone unturned in order to see that justice was done. What the Regents understood by this, or purported to understand, was that the Hungarian government had it in its power to guarantee conviction.

Once in Pest, moreover, Kállay immediately set about pulling every wire he could reach to produce precisely this result. As during the first trial, he had no hesitation in pressing the political merits of the case upon key officials in the bureaucracy and the judiciary itself. He called on Dezső Szilágyi, under secretary in the ministry of justice, to find out more about the composition of the court which would be handling the government's appeal. Szilágyi revealed to Kállay that the president of the King's Bench, Judge Miklós Szabó, would himself head the panel, and urged Kállay to visit Szabó personally.

On 9 December Kállay did just that. He made it abundantly clear that a conviction was of overriding importance. Indeed, he was so worried at the possible consequences of the October acquittal being upheld that he asked Szabó bluntly to postpone judgment, if conviction seemed impossible. To make sure Szabó appreciated the weight of political interest in the case, Kállay also dropped the biggest name at his disposal. "I mentioned that Andrássy would like to talk with him," Kállay noted that evening, adding, "he will go as soon as he has studied the problem." There is no subsequent record of Szabó's interview with the minister president, but Kállay had certainly done his best to drop a hint in the right direction.

Back in Belgrade before Christmas, Kállay was soon immersed in the crucial negotiations with the Regency over Bosnia, which reached their most intensive stage about this time. His final attempt to influence the result of the appeal was in mid-January, when he learned from the newspapers that the King's Bench had convened. Kállay promptly telegraphed Andrássy, "asking him to keep a watchful eye on the affair."
64: Karadordević's Re-Conviction and Appeal

It is impossible to say how decisive Kállay's lobbying may or may not have been, although if the King's Bench verdict was free of bias this was hardly Kállay's fault. In the event the judgment handed down on 14 January reversed that of October 1870. The Szabó court found Karadordević, and his associates Pavle Tripković and Filip Stanković, guilty of conspiracy to murder; Karadordević was condemned to eight years hard labour, Trifković and Stanković to four years each.\(^{17}\)

A key element in the verdict of January 1871 appears to have been the evidence of one Dimitrije Kuzmanović, a fellow suspect in the murder conspiracy who was nevertheless released by the Serbian court in November 1868.\(^{18}\) The circumstances of his acquittal were somewhat suspicious, and at the first Pest trial, in February 1869, Karadordević in fact accused Kuzmanović of being a police spy, adding for good measure that it was Kuzmanović's grandfather who, back in 1817, had axed the ex-Prince's father, Karadorde, at the behest of Miloš Obrenović.\(^{19}\) Despite these objections, and the still unremedied inadequacies of the evidence supplied by the Belgrade prosecuting authorities, the King's Bench evidently felt that the testimony of such as Kuzmanović was sufficient.\(^{20}\)

It must have seemed to Kállay that one of his principal burdens had been lifted from his shoulders. Blaznavac was all thankfulness and cordiality, and gave what Kállay took to be "a convincing assurance that they will now act wholeheartedly on behalf of Hungarian policy, since the necessary basis for this exists."\(^{21}\) In Dr. Rosen's opinion, as Kállay recorded, "I now dominate the situation."\(^{22}\) Only Ristić held aloof, a stance which Kállay put down to sour grapes: "Perhaps he is displeased by the judgment, since now he can't reproach Hungary."\(^{23}\)

Kállay's triumph was short-lived. It soon emerged that Karadordević, Tripković and Stanković had appealed, and that the right to appeal had been granted. This meant that the case would be heard in the Hungarian Supreme Court, whose decision would be final. In a flash the situation was as before, with Kállay anxiously, but with increasing irritation, defending the good intentions of the Hungarian government, and the Regents gloomily withholding their favours. The fact that news of the appeal coincided with
publication of the Austro-Hungarian *Rotbuch*, containing Beust’s November circular, cannot have improved matters.

By late March both sides were getting nervous. Colonel Orešković reported on the 22nd that the Regents were alarmed by rumours that

the [Hungarian] minister of justice has allegedly announced that the Hungarian courts cannot pass judgment in this case, and that Karadorđević moreover has set aside 30,000 forints for bribing the court.²⁴

To compound these fears Karadorđević had now taken up residence in Vienna. The Regents, said Orešković, were "afraid that the Viennese reaction is going to adopt the matter as its own and work upon Andrásy not to oppose acquittal."²⁵ They wanted Orešković to go up to Pest and lobby Andrásy in person.

Kállay’s response showed how little concerned he now was to conceal his own exasperation. He pointed out that Vilmos Tóth, the current justice minister, was hardly likely to have made the remark attributed to him, since it was the minister of justice who was responsible for bringing the prosecution in the first place. "Bribery I didn’t regard as possible, otherwise let the Regents try it themselves from their side."²⁶ Nor did he encourage Orešković to plague Andrásy. As for Kállay himself,

as far as my intervention in this regard is concerned I now couldn’t say anything, because after the attitude which the Serbian government adopted in the Danube question I wouldn’t dare take any steps in their interest with my own government.²⁷

It was precisely the Danube question which, at this very juncture, produced some of the most acrimonious exchanges between Kállay and the Regents to date. After Orešković had promised to explain Kállay’s position to Blaznavac and Ristić, Kállay reflected: "let them get a little alarmed".²⁸

This stone-faced treatment seemed at first to produce results. Blaznavac, whom Kállay saw on 24 March, visibly shared Orešković’s alarm, but Kállay by his own account remained "very cold and reserved".²⁹ He poured scorn on the Regents’ notion that the Viennese ‘military reaction’ was somehow capable of dictating policy to Andrásy in the matter of Karadorđević. When Blaznavac protested that "against the reaction they are ready to do anything possible to support Hungary, because they won’t
allow themselves to be exploited as in 1848", Kállay replied "that we in Hungary weren't afraid of the reaction and that we would defend ourselves on our own." Ristić, later in the day, got similarly short shrift.\(^{30}\)

Kállay did not doubt, any more than he had in January, that the Supreme Court would find for the prosecution. Nevertheless he thought it would be a good thing if the Supreme Court verdict could be postponed for another couple of months. Uncertainty over the outcome, he told Andrássy on 24 March, would make them more flexible on issues like the Danube and the railway franchise;\(^{31}\) or, as he put it in his diary that evening, "let this sword of Damocles hang over the Regents' heads."\(^{32}\) If postponement proved impossible, of course, then "we, who have already done so much in this affair, must in any case press for conviction."\(^{33}\) Kállay followed this up with a letter to Szilágyi, enquiring "whether he has hopes of [Karadordević] being convicted."\(^{34}\)

On 28 March, Orešković called to inform Kállay that, at the Regents' request, he intended visiting Andrássy in Pest after all. As Kállay reported to Andrássy the next day, it would be advisable to let the Regents know "that they can count on Your Excellency's influence in this matter."\(^{35}\) In the end a conviction was just as important for the Hungarian as for the Serbian government, since

Karadordević's definitive acquittal would perhaps have as a consequence the fall of the present Regency, but from the point of view of our interests we can't wish for a better government than the present one in Serbia, for all its faults and vacillation.\(^{36}\)

As further evidence of this, Kállay revealed that the Regents had also entrusted Orešković with a letter for Bishop Strossmayer, in which they apparently urged the Croat leader to make his peace with the Hungarian government.

The authorities in Pest clearly appreciated the seriousness of the matter, and were doing what they could to ensure conviction. Early in April Kállay learned from Dezső Szilágyi that the Lord Chief Justice Fábry was to preside over the case, "and he has promised that he will possibly be able to postpone the case until July."\(^{37}\) On 10 April Orešković reappeared, with the news that "he had been to see Andrássy, who promised to do everything he could to get Karadordević convicted."\(^{38}\) A month later, Kállay assured Blaznavac that the Hungarian government "will do everything in its power" to
secure the desired verdict.39

65: Karadordević's Final Acquittal

Kállay was doomed to bitter disappointment. The Supreme Court assembled to hear the case on 31 May; on 3 June the judges found by a majority of four to three that the King's Bench ruling of the previous January was unsound.40 Karadordević, Tripković and Stanković walked out of court free men, beyond further judicial appeal.

The Hungarian judges' reasons for accepting the Karadordević appeal were threefold, according to the report in the Hungarian journal Hon. Firstly, they agreed with the defendants' argument that "in der zwischen der ungarischen und serbischen Regierung bestehenden internationalen Konvention Ungarn nicht berechtigt wird, über die Thronfolge und überhaupt über die politischen Bewegungen Serbiens zu Gericht zu sitzen."41 In other words, the case was essentially a political one, a view that Andrásy and Kállay had considered, and rejected, as far back as June 1868. Secondly, the Supreme Court concurred with the court of first instance, that the testimony and background of Dimitrije Kuzmanović, on which so much of the King's Bench conviction had been based, were deeply suspect. Finally, the argument advanced in January 1871, to the effect that Karadordević's links with the Turkish embassy in Vienna proved the existence of an anti-Obrenović plot, was rejected on the rather curious ground that "gerade die Pforte Obrenovits auf dem Thron bestätigte."42

Suspictions of corruption arose almost immediately, as they had after Karadordević's initial acquittal in October 1870. The evidence that the defence actually bribed one or more members of the Hungarian Supreme Court was circumstantial, anecdotal, and quite impossible to verify, although it has to be admitted that some of the accusations originated on the Hungarian, and not just the Serbian side.43

It was clear that Andrásy was both surprised and annoyed by what he regarded as a sudden shift in the scales of justice.44 This gives at least some credibility to remarks attributed to him in mid-July, to the effect that the judges "must have been bribed, only he didn't do it, Karad[ordević]. did it!"45 The assumption remained general in Belgrade that the court had been bribed, or in some way or other subverted. In Pest itself, Prince Michael's widow appealed to Andrásy against the verdict, and her brothers, Kálmán
and László Hunyadi, resigned their commissions in the *honvéd* in protest. There was even a popular rumour current, shortly after the news from Pest reached the Serbian press, that the Emperor Francis Joseph himself had ordered the court to release Karadordević, a theory which was discounted in political circles, at least, as being beyond the bounds of possibility.

Longworth, the British consul, evidently believed the charge of corruption. Writing in mid-June, he reported that

> There can be no matter of mutual concern demanding negotiation or explanation, which will be untainted hereafter by the suspicions these proceedings have engendered.

A week later, Longworth described the Regents as "thoroughly convinced that the Austro-Hungarian Governments have connived at the corruption of the judges."

Blaznavac, alluding to his exchanges with Kállay, claimed not only to have warned Andrássy, but to have received the latter’s confirmation of, the judges’ venality:

> Count Andrassy, who while admitting the worst that could be alleged against the Hungarian Tribunals, pledged his word of honor that justice in this case should be done....

Coloured as it was by Blaznavac’ imagination, this nonetheless argued an ambiguity in Hungarian assurances on the subject, which had by now fatally compromised Hungarian credibility. Indeed, according to Longworth the Regents believed

> that Hungary can no longer boast a paramount or independent action in her foreign policy, and that Austria which could always reckon on the subservience of the Cara-Georgevitches... has merely sought to rehabilitate her instruments, with felons and bandits for their associates.

Here was the real importance of the Karadordević prosecution for the Serbian Regency, an importance which far outweighed mere considerations of justice.

66: The Deportation Question

Kállay appears to have broken the news of the acquittal to Blaznavac personally, on 4 June. "The news produced an extraordinary effect on Blaznavac," Kállay recorded. "His expression changed completely." As Kállay fully expected, Blaznavac' immediate response was to deplore the verdict, "because the enemies of Serbo-Hungarian friendship have thereby received a powerful weapon."
The one concrete proposal that emerged at this meeting was Blaznavac' enquiry as to the possibility of deporting Karadordević from Austro-Hungarian soil. Kállay jumped at this chance of making good the damage done by Karadordević's acquittal, and telegraphed Andrássy to this effect the same day. Deportation, he suggested, was "the only way of avoiding extremely unpleasant consequences."^53

The idea of deporting Karadordević in the end produced only further disappointment and annoyance. As with the prosecution, each side now made cooperation conditional upon concessions, which neither side was minded to make. By the time a provisional compromise was reached, at the end of July 1871, it was abundantly clear to Kállay, at least, that even if Karadordević were expelled, it would make very little difference. The suspicion and hostility, with which Serbian politicians traditionally regarded both Austria and Hungary, once more appeared to have the upper hand. What was more, these were sentiments which were in a fair way to being reciprocated.

Kállay does not seem to have expected much from the deportation project. When Ristić assured him, on 5 June, that Karadordević's expulsion would be announced with gratitude by the government in the Skupština, Kállay noted privately, "I don't believe Ristić's promises."^54 He would have been strengthened in his scepticism had he heard of Ristić's own private reaction to the news of the acquittal. "We didn't even ask for this trial," the Regent complained to Hristić, with the implication that, if the Hungarian government had handed Karadordević over to the Serbian authorities in 1868, none of this bad feeling would have arisen.^55

That caution was advisable became obvious the next day, when Andrássy's reply came back. Andrássy informed Kállay that "according to our laws it is not possible to effect deportation after an acquittal, unless the Serbian government finds new evidence on the basis of which a new charge could be framed."^56 This harked back to the difficulties the Hungarian government had experienced in prosecuting: the evidence supplied by the Belgrade authorities was decidedly inadequate, and had already led to much acrimonious correspondence on the subject. Kállay nevertheless professed to see "some hope in the fact that the acquittal was the consequence of an inadequate prosecution", and went to tell Blaznavac of Andrássy's position.^57 He was ready, he

244
told Blaznavac, to go up to Pest in person to do his all for Karadordević's deportation.

Despite this show of optimism, Kállay's underlying mood was sombre. The real problem lay on the Serbian side. On a visit to Blaznavac, prior to leaving for Pest, Kállay was told that there were indeed new facts, on the basis of which the Serbian government might seek deportation, but it can't verify them, because it cannot compromise the people in question.58

This was probably an allusion to the government's evidence that the Turkish embassy in Vienna was implicated; as Blaznavac said to Nikola Krstić a couple of days before, they had a statement to that effect, "but they can't make use of it."59 Given what he had heard, Kállay began to despond; "unfortunately, there's no hope that I shall be able to get a deportation."60

Once in Pest, Kállay began to discover, as he had feared, that this issue of fresh evidence was really the crux of the matter. Andrássy was in uncompromising vein. His annoyance with the Serbs, and his disinclination to exert himself further in the Karadordević affair, were apparent in the setting of a second condition. Andrássy would approve Karadordević's deportation, Kállay noted on 16 June, "only if the Serbian government requests it and to this end submits new evidence of instigation to revolt or hatching a conspiracy."61 That, for the moment, was all Kállay could get from him. It was, however, a slight improvement on Andrássy's position on the 8th, when he had informed Kállay that deportation was "eine absolute Unmöglichkeit". His despatch of that date, which finally reached Kállay in Vienna shortly after he had seen Andrássy in person, was all in all a discouraging sign of his state of mind.62

After expressing his surprise at the Supreme Court verdict, and emphasising all he had done to avert this calamity, Andrássy effectively put the matter behind him, and concentrated on the continuing failure of the Regents to commit Serbia firmly to the Monarchy. He was addressing here a point raised a few weeks before by Kállay, on the Serbian government's attitude towards the Hungarian Serbs. Although the Regency, as Kállay put it, "nichts sehnlicher wünscht als die Unterdrückung der in Süd-Ungarn herrschenden serbischen Agitation", it was extremely reluctant publicly to attack its critics there, since this laid it open to the charge of having sold out to the Monarchy. Of
late, the official and semi-official press in Belgrade had even appeared openly sympathetic to Serb nationalist aspirations in Hungary.63

Andrássy admitted the awkward position in which the Regents found themselves, and he promised that any conspiracy against the established order in Serbia, by either the Karadórdévić camp or the Omladina, would be ruthlessly suppressed "selbst mit bewaffneter Macht". He further acknowledged that the rumoured rapprochement between Russia and the Porte was a fact. What was more, the reason for this was Hungary's friendship with Serbia, and the support "welche wir... den serbischen Ideen bezüglich Bosniens und der Herzegovina angedeihen ließen." The only way of averting the consequences of the Russo-Turkish rapprochement, Andrássy continued, was by giving up this support for Serbia and the Balkan Christians, "was wir jedoch nicht zu thun gedenken."

The inference for the Regents, in Andrássy's eyes, was clear:

Unter solchen Verhältnissen können wir der serbischen Regierung gegenüber nicht länger in Ungewissheit verbleiben, wenn wir nicht zwischen zwei Stühlen auf die Erde sitzen wollen....

The Regents simply must come off the fence; yet their attitude of recent months, as revealed during the London Conference, and in the Serbian press, was hardly conducive to good relations. Nor ought they to think they could flirt with the Novi Sad Serbs and at the same time cultivate anything like good relations with the Hungarian government. "Diese Politik," Andrássy warned, "könnte für Serbien ein verhängnisvollen Ausgang nehmen." What if the Omladina came to power in Serbia? Would they not either restore the Karadórdévić, or "Miletics als Diktator nach Belgrad setzen"? If such an awful scenario even threatened, Serbia's present rulers must remember that they could hardly turn to Russia, which would never forgive them their independent policy of the last few years.64

Where this left the question of Karadórdévić's deportation remained unclear, but late in June a decision was actually reached at the highest levels. Andrássy explained to Kállay on 24 June that, whatever fresh evidence the Serbian authorities came up with, it would not have to be proved; "as long as it is probable", this would serve as an
adequate pretext for expelling Karadorđević. And the very next day Andrásy raised the Serbian government's request at a meeting of the Hungarian council of ministers.

Andrássy began by giving his colleagues a rather curious account of the cause of the problem, the recent verdict of the Supreme Court. This had not only made an extremely bad impression on the Serbian government but had also, he claimed, given rise to the suspicion that the judges "had been influenced by the Hungarian government." (As we have seen, the Regents' real grievance was that the judges had not been influenced nearly enough by the Hungarian government, and all too effectively, as they thought, by the defendants.) With a fine disregard for uncomfortable reality, Andrásy told the council that the anxiety in Belgrade had been allayed, "by stressing on the one hand the continuing friendly relations between the Serbian Principality and Hungary, and on the other the independence of the judicial system in Hungary."

With regard to the request to deport Karadorđević, Andrásy put on record his confidential advice to both the foreign ministry and the Belgrade consulate, that deportation as things stood was impossible, "since in the face of the aforementioned Supreme Court judgment it would run clean counter to the sanctity of the judicature."

However, if the Serbian government could submit anything new, demonstrating that Karadorđević continued to maintain conspiratorial contacts, or inspired agitation, within Serbia, then the Hungarian authorities would be only too happy to expel him. This was not only for the sake of Serbo-Hungarian friendship, but also because any disturbances caused by the Karadorđević faction in Serbia might well spill over the frontier into Hungary. Andrásy revealed that Beust shared his viewpoint, after which the council agreed that deportation could be arranged, provided the conditions stipulated were fulfilled.

67: Mutual Disillusionment and Suspicion

Since Kállay knew that the Regents were unlikely to come up with anything new against Karadorđević, he was not much cheered by this decision. The disillusionment on both sides, by this stage, undoubtedly played a part in the unsatisfactory negotiations which followed Kállay's return to his post on 6 July. It was not until 14 July that Kállay
at last had a thoroughgoing discussion with the Regents about the Karadordević affair. The meeting, lasting some six hours, ranged over all the issues which, in the past half year or so, had become so contentious. Kállay took as his general text Andrassy's letter of 8 June, which he read out to Blaznavac and Ristic. In this, as we have seen, Andrassy's growing suspicion of Serbian policy was the main theme, virtually crowding out the ostensible reason for the discussion.

Kállay started by commenting on the gradual change for the worse in relations, a change which appeared to be accompanied by friendly advances by the Regents towards the Monarchy's South Slavs. This raised the involuntary question of whether good relations depended all that much on the prosecution of Alexander Karadordević. The Regents knew perfectly well how hard Andrassy and Kállay had striven to ensure a satisfactory outcome, and how much they regretted their failure. They also knew how many advantages they had derived from the association with Hungary.

Blaznavac and Ristić pointed out that their pro-Hungarian policy had, from the beginning, exposed them to abuse in and out of Serbia. Nor, they claimed, could they point to any practical advantage which had flowed from the relationship. They cited the lack of progress in ending the Monarchy's consular jurisdiction in Serbia, and in concluding a trade convention. Not only had the relationship done little to further Serbia's interests, but certain developments seemed rather to justify those who reviled the Regents for pursuing such a policy. There was the matter of Beust's November circular, which appeared expressly designed to deny that Austria "eine den christlichen Völkern der Türkei sympathischere Politik befolge." There was Karadordević, whose escape, whatever Pest's intentions, was taken by public opinion in Serbia as proof of the Hungarian government's ill will. The Regents insisted they wished to maintain the relationship, but because of public opinion they could no longer afford to avow this openly.

Kállay had heard these arguments before, and he treated himself to an extended refutation of them. In detail he undoubtedly was in the right of it, and one can understand the tone of exasperation in his account, at having to deal yet again with the same old evasions and half-truths. It is striking, however, how hectoring his language
had by now become, how absolute the choice he posed the Regents. Albeit the
spokesman still for a Hungarian policy towards Serbia, Kállay had insensibly donned
the garb of a Prokesch-Osten. Every word he spoke breathed the stern admonition of a
great power addressing its satellite.

The Regents, Kállay claimed, had certainly maintained a friendly attitude towards
Hungary since 1868, but this in his opinion "eine stets negative war." They had held
aloof from the Novi Sad Omladina and the Croatian National Party for the wrong
reason: not because this was in Serbia's interests, but in order to cultivate good
relations with Hungary. They should rather have realised, Kállay continued, that "Die
Tendenzen der Omladina sind an und für sich destruktiv", while the party of Miletić
was a force for anarchy and revolution, with which Milan's Regents flirted at their peril.

As for Croatia:

so weiß die Regentschaft ganz genau, daß sie dort auf keine
aufrichtige Freundschaft rechnen kann. Die Aspirationen
beiden Länder (Kroatien und Serbien) stehen eben in Folge
ihrer Gleichförmigkeit im schreiendsten Gegensatze zu
einander.

Kállay could cite here no less an authority than Ristić himself, who had in the past "die
Kroaten sehr treffend als die Rivalen der Serben bezeichnet." Such a state of affairs,
Kállay implied, was as it should be; moreover, the Regents' readiness to hold aloof
from Hungary's national minorities happened to coincide with the Hungarian national
interest. "Dies is aber auch alles was wir der serbischen Regierung uns gegenüber
nachrühmen können." It seemed a poor return for all that Hungary, and the Monarchy,
had done for Serbia.

Among these services, Kállay listed the jurisdiction question, which he claimed was
held up solely by the Serbian government's insistence on innumerable amendments to
the original, Austro-Hungarian proposals. The trade treaty, similarly, had been waiting
two years for a Serbian reply. With regard to the Regents' principal grievances: the
Beust circular had been adequately explained, and the readiness with which this was
done was even "ein neuer Beweis der Aufrichtigkeit unserer freundschaftlichen
Gesinnungen." Regarding Karadorđević, Kállay had little to add, although he insisted
that "Niemandem hat diese Angelegenheit so viel Verdrießlichkeiten verursacht als

249
eben uns." Proposals had been laid before the Regents, and the latter could be sure that the Hungarian government would abide by them, if Belgrade responded.

Kállay concluded that there was in the end only one thing that the Habsburg Monarchy wanted from Serbia: "daß sich die serbische regierung in unsere Angelegenheiten nicht mische...." Of late, however, the Regents had appeared to flout this unwritten rule: their pet journal *Jedinstvo* was running daily articles which not only sympathised with the Croatian opposition, but positively encouraged its resistance to Pest. Kállay put it to the Regents firmly,

daß wir uns mit einer so zweideutigen Haltung nicht zufriedenstellen könnten. Wir möchten nämlich in's Klaren kommen ob uns die Regentschaft aufrichtig freundlich oder aber feindlich gesinnt ist. Wir haben auf die Freundschaft Serbiens immer einen großen Werth gelegt, ...denn wir halten ein starkes, entwickeltes Serbien in unserem eigenen Interesse für eine politische Notwendigkeit.

The Regents must make up their minds; and if they opted for Hungary, their commitment must this time be unmistakable.75

The reply Kállay got to all this eloquence was terse and, in its ultimate message, uncompromising.76 It suggested that, for reasons of their own, the Regents no longer cared very much whether they remained on friendly terms with the Monarchy at all. They flatly denied courting either the Novi Sad Serbs or the Croat nationalists, an assertion which hardly squared with recent correspondence between Ristić and Bishop Strossmayer, or with a forthcoming visit to Miletić, in Vác prison, by the Serbian archimandrite Dučić, at Ristić's behest.77 The vital questions were still Bosnia, and the expulsion of Karadorđević. With regard to the first, the Regents anticipated that it "vielleicht bald zu Austragung gelangen dürfte." In that case, they would be satisfied if, when the moment arrived, Andrásy would "die Non-Intervention auch künftighin respektiren und auch respektiren lassen." As for Karadorđević, his deportation would be the final proof needed, after which Hungary would be left in no doubt as to the positive nature of Serbian friendship.

Kállay's riposte showed how little this convinced him. The initiative as far as Karadorđević was concerned, he repeated, lay with the Regents. His references to the
(by now long dead) Bosnian question, however, are of interest as yet another indication
of how seriously he and Andrássy had viewed its success, and why its failure drove a
stake through the heart of what was left of Serbo-Hungarian cooperation. He defined
Andrássy's policy as follows:

Die seit Jahren befolgte consequence Politik E.E. [Andrássy]
erfordert es, daß in dieser Gegend ein je stärkerer Staat sich
entwickele, damit den fortwährenden Unruhen endlich ein Ziel
gesetzt wird. Unsere Interessen erheische es auch in anderer
Beziehung, daß der, in der Türkei wohnende serbische Stamm
sich vereinige und einen Staat bilde.

Nor, claimed Kállay, had Andrássy abandoned this objective, as Kállay had recently
confirmed. Yet if, despite this, Serbia drifted into a hostile or even merely
insufficiently friendly attitude,

denn mit gesundem Verstande könnte es man von uns doch
nicht fordern, daß wir unseren direkten Feinden oder auch nur
zweifelhaften Freunden eine feste Burg in unserem Rücken
aufzubauen helfen sollten. Es würden sich schon gewiß
andere finden, die um den Besitz von Bosnien aus Feinden zu
unseren wärmsten Freunden sich bekehren würden.78

And with this unmistakable reference to the Croats, Kállay retired from the lists.

Whether he had retarded or accelerated the deterioration of relations with Serbia was
not yet clear.

In fact from this point on the signs of decisive alienation on the Serbian side began
to multiply. It was early September before it became obvious that the Serbian
government had no new charge to prefer against Karadorđević. Long before that,
however, Kállay could feel the chill, in the length of time it took the Regents to
respond.79

In a despatch to Beust, on 14 August, Kállay offered a somewhat different
explanation for Serbia's estrangement than he gave Andrássy. It would not do, for
instance, to cite Hungary's failure to deliver on the Bosnian question, in a letter to Beust
of all people. Rather, Kállay sought to explain the recent shift in Serbian policy with
reference to the domestic front. The Regents, with Skupština elections due in a few
days, were obsessed with countering the apparent popular appeal of the opposition and
the Omladina, an appeal which, in Kállay's opinion, they overestimated. Nevertheless,
what Kállay termed the Regents' "übermäßige Popularitätshascherei" was at the bottom of their reluctance to be seen truckling to the Habsburg Monarchy.

On the international scene, Russia's action over the Black Sea had made a deep impression in Belgrade, and indeed was taken "als der schlagendste Beweis der Macht Rußlands". The current rapprochement between Russia and the Porte, moreover, created a fear of being on the wrong side of Russia which was having its inevitable effect. Hence the renewed sensitivity to the views of the Monarchy's own South Slavs, a concern which the Regents felt obliged to express regardless of the ire this aroused in Vienna and Pest. Most damaging of all, however, had been the acquittal of Karadordević. As with Andrásy, Kállay assured Beust that this was taken by the Regents to show that "aus unserer Freundschaft für Serbien und die Regentschaft kein praktischer Vortheil erwachsen kann." It was the immediate cause of "eine gewisse Zurückhaltung uns gegenüber".80

This was somewhat to understate the matter, since there were certainly other factors at work on the Serbian side. Among these was the desire of the Regents to raise their standing among the South Slavs by more active means, such as the publication of a pamphlet inciting the population of the Military Border to revolt. According to Andrásy's intelligence sources, the pamphlet, though privately printed, had been prepared in the Serbian government's press office.81 Blaznavac, however, claimed to know nothing of the pamphlet, and said that in any case he could not order its confiscation, "because that would be such a friendly service to the Hungarian government, to whom he doesn't feel obliged since the judicial release of Karadordević."82

Karadordević's deportation, like Bosnia, had become a dead issue, which provided the Regents with a convenient stick with which to belabour the Hungarian government. That no serious movement was contemplated by the Regents was clear by 7 September, when Blaznavac told Dr. Rosen, for Kállay's benefit, that he would prefer it if the Hungarian government deported Karadordević without any formal request from Belgrade.83 Coupled with the lack of new evidence, this ensured that neither of Andrásy's two conditions would be met. And matters remained at that stage, awaiting
a formal response from Pest, when the whole problem was rendered redundant by the Regents’ next move.

68: The Regents’ Turn towards Russia

Kállay had long predicted to Andrássy and Beust, as if appealing to one of the laws of nature, that a Serbia disappointed in, or, as it thought, repulsed by the Habsburg Monarchy, would automatically scuttle in the opposite direction. If Serbia were not under Austro-Hungarian influence, Kállay consistently argued, it must infallibly fall under Russian influence. In the event this is precisely what happened, at least for a time. Whether it was as inevitable as Kállay maintained, however, is another matter. Kállay also ignored the extent to which Hungarian promises, and the shortfall between those promises and reality, had undermined his and Andrássy’s objective of creating a South Slav satellite, tied to the Monarchy by economic and political interest.

Of the two Regent, Ristić’s position vis-à-vis Austria-Hungary and Russia is by far the easier to analyse. Ristić had always been suspicious of the link with Hungary and the benefits which might spring from it. His politician’s mind logically asked, How was the traditional opposition of the Habsburg Monarchy to the creation of an enlarged South Slav state to be overcome? And as a supreme tactician on the domestic political front, Ristić was concerned to safeguard his reputation as a liberal nationalist, albeit an authoritarian one. This meant that too great a subordination to Austro-Hungarian policy was political death; obeisances in the direction of a more distant Russia, by contrast, were politically much safer.

Even when relations with the Monarchy, through the mediation of the Hungarians, were at their closest, Ristić never entirely cut himself off from Russia. Not for Ristić the outspoken aversion to Russia expressed by Blaznavac. On the contrary, Ristić appears to have believed in the innate strength of Russia’s position. At the height of the Black Sea crisis in 1870, for instance, he remained convinced that no one, not even the Hungarian government, was really willing to challenge Russia militarily. Especially after Filip Hristić arrived in Constantinople in 1870, Ristić kept a fine ear tuned for whatever General Ignatiev had to say about Serbia. The “friend”, as Ristić and Hristić both referred to Ignatiev, was an old acquaintance; and although Ristić frequently
rebutted Ignatiev's charge of having become an "instrument" of Austria-Hungary, this
diplomatic channel was always kept open. Hristić, advised Ristić in September,
should try to show the Regents' desire for better relations with Russia.

Blaznavac' motivation is harder to fathom, in part because, unlike Ristić, he left so
little written record behind. Nevertheless one overriding reason for Blaznavac' pro-
Hungarian policy in the past, as for his obstinate and frequently voiced fear of Russia,
is plain. As the soldier who had staked his career and possibly his life on ensuring the
succession of an Obrenović to the throne in 1868, Blaznavac had far more cause than
Ristić to regard his fate as bound to the dynastic question. The Monarchy, at the
instigation of Andrásy, had endorsed Prince Milan; therefore Blaznavac was willing to
hail the Hungarians, if not the Austrians, as friends. Russia had not only backed Nikola
of Montenegro for the Serbian throne, but ever since had used the Montenegrin rivalry
as an unsubtle threat in its relations with the Regency.

Blaznavac may also have been temperamentally less inclined than Ristić to look
Hungarian gift-horses, such as the Bosnian plan, questioningly in the mouth. Far more
important for him than the prize of Bosnia, however, was the desire to see Alexander
Karadordević put away by the Hungarian courts. Since Blaznavac, and not Ristić, was
the strongman of the Regency, this interest in Karadordević's conviction was probably
the decisive factor in keeping Serbia within Austria-Hungary's orbit. After June 1871,
with the prospect of any solution to the Karadordević threat receding, Blaznavac was in
a bitter frame of mind, and willing at least to consider other policy options. The extent
of his disillusionment was recorded late in July by the German consul. À propos of the
Beust circular, the Danube and Karadordević, Blaznavac was quoted as asking:

was können wir Russland antworten,...wenn es uns unter
Berufung auf diese drei offenen Akte der Feindseligkeit
fortwährend unsern Philomagyarismus vorwirft?

Blaznavac clearly felt he had been led up the garden path; and in a sense he was right.

The reference to Russia is significant, in that, bereft of the Monarchy's practical
support, Blaznavac was increasingly aware of a need to make his peace with the Tsar's
government. Neither Regent, however, had any clear idea of how to escape their
isolation. That they urgently desired to do so, by the autumn of 1871, was due to one
circumstance above all which motivated them both. Throughout that year, momentum was building up for revolt in the Ottoman provinces, and the preparations for it were, from the viewpoint of Belgrade, unofficial and quite unauthorised. Leaders of opinion like Miletic, and activists on the ground like the Bosnian priest Vaso Pelagic, were increasingly determined to act on their own. Miletic, for example, helped coordinate the plans despite his incarceration in Vac prison; and in late July Pelagic went so far as to inform the Serbian minister president, Milojkovic, that the revolt would break out that autumn, or at the latest in the spring of 1872.90

Such activity put enormous pressure on the Serbian government to act, since it lost what little prestige it had left among the Balkan Christians if it did not. Blaznavac and Ristic did respond, with token encouragement and time-consuming 'organisation', but also with secret trepidation. Far more than the nationalists pushing them in this direction, they were aware of the risk for Serbia. "God alone knows what will come of this," Ristic complained to Hristic early in August.91 The Regents feared the uprising getting out of hand, and being led by more radical elements like the Omladina. It was at their request that the Hungarian government closed down the sixth, and last, Omladina Congress at Versec on 29 August, because it belligerently elected the firebrand Pelagic as president.92 On the public stage, however, the Regents were more reluctant than ever to be seen as the playthings of Austria-Hungary, on the one hand, and the scorn of Slav Russia, on the other. It was therefore domestic concerns which moved the Regents to take seriously the first olive branch held out by Russia.

69: Ignatiev's Proposal of a Visit to the Tsar

The resolution of the problem was achieved with considerable speed. On 5 September Hristic reported that General Ignatiev proposed using his personal influence with the Tsar to arrange a visit by Prince Milan. The Prince would of course have to be accompanied by one or more of the Regents, which would afford an opportunity for a face-to-face exchange of views. To make things less Canossa-like for the Regents, Ignatiev suggested timing the visit with the Tsar's tour of the Caucasus.93

On 12 September, Hristic reported that Ignatiev was pressing for an answer. The Tsar in the meantime had left the Caucasus, which made the next likeliest venue for a
meeting Livadia, in the Crimea. If, as Ignatiev had already suggested, some location outside St. Petersburg was to be preferred, then the Regents must act soon if they wished to meet on relatively neutral ground. Once the Tsar had returned to the capital, any decision to accompany Milan, the Sultan's vassal, to a foreign court would assume far greater, and hence more daunting, proportions. 

Ignatiev's proposal produced something like a crise de nerfs, not only in the Regents but in young Milan as well. According to Ristić's later account, both Blaznavac and Milan, upon reading Hristić's despatch of 5 September, exclaimed that "this can't be true." After years of abuse from the Russians for Serbia's pro-Hungarian policy, after Russia's consistent cultivation of Prince Nikola and the coldness of the Russian consul's personal relations with Ristić and especially Blaznavac, the proposal seemed incredible indeed. Blaznavac, especially, had reason to be sceptical, finding it difficult to believe that his anti-Russian stance of the last four years would be forgiven.

Ristić had most title to welcome the Russian initiative, since he had always been less committed to the Hungarian orientation, and more concerned to maintain reasonably good relations with Russia. In his opinion, Ignatiev's proposal was a genuine attempt to bridge differences, and not a demand for unconditional submission to Russian interests. And if it was Blaznavac who, in the past, had most identified himself with an anti-Russian policy, then Blaznavac should be the Regent who accompanied Milan to Livadia. He would then be able to explain his and Ristić's policy to the Tsar in person.

On 22 September, the Regents telegraphed Constantinople, enquiring whether Ignatiev would agree to clear the visit with the Tsar personally, and obtain some assurance that Milan would be accorded a dignified reception. Ignatiev complied with this request a couple of days later and, in agreement with Hristić, worded his telegramme to Alexander II in such a way as to suggest a certain diffidence on the part of the Serbian government. This, as Hristić explained, was in case the Tsar, for whatever reason, was inclined to put off the visit: postponement in response to such a hypothetical enquiry would not give the appearance of a personal rebuff to Milan. After that, another nervous week was spent waiting for a reply.
Eventually the Russian embassy in Constantinople received a telegramme from Count Shuvalov, the Tsar's aide-de-camp and minister attendant. The Tsar, Shuvalov confirmed, would receive Prince Milan "avec plaisir à Livadia." Hristić, informing Ristić of this on 3 October, passed on Ignatiev's recommendation that Milan, accompanied by one Regent, should travel incognito, so as not to give unnecessary offence to the Turks. He would be met at Odessa by a steamer specially sent by the Tsar. Ignatiev engaged to apprise Shishkin, his subordinate, since for reasons of protocol it would be advisable if the latter went with Milan as well.

A few difficulties remained to sort out. The Regents insisted that Milan be met at Galatz on the lower Danube, rather than Odessa. They were also concerned at the request for incognito. According to Ristić, writing on 6 October, both the Skupština and the public would have to be notified of the intended journey, since an unheralded departure by the Prince might give rise to destabilising rumours. Hristić, who was also to meet the Prince en route, was able to report on 10 October that Ignatiev had agreed to place a Russian naval vessel at Milan's disposal at Galatz. The ambassador still favoured incognito, but at length accepted Hristić's claim that "our world doesn't understand that", and that it would create a bad impression in Serbia if Milan appeared to be going "furtively" to see the Tsar.

70: The Trip to Livadia

It was not until 14 October that the formal communication the Regents had been waiting for arrived. The next day being a Sunday, the members of the Skupština were convened for a special session in Kragujevac, and informed of Milan's imminent departure. After a church service and blessings by the Metropolitan Michael, Milan and Blaznavac left the same afternoon. If Ristić's account is to be believed, both the Skupština and the citizens of Kragujevac were delighted at the new development. As the Prince and the Regent set off, Ristić says, many of the deputies threw their caps into the air, and "It seemed as if the shouts of joy would never end."

Ristić was probably right in interpreting such scenes, even retrospectively, as proof that a rapprochement with Russia would be popular. Nevertheless his mood at the time continued to be one of foreboding. He confided to Hristić, on 15 October, that
Now the West is going to turn against us and especially Austria or rather Hungary. Kállay has already begun to campaign against me both publicly and in secret even before this, and now he will do so even more.\textsuperscript{106}

Hristić must work closely with Ignatiev at Livadia, and draw Blaznavac' attention to the need to say or do nothing that might create a bad impression. Above all, Hristić should convince Ignatiev that I am as little a German (which he accuses me of) as little as I am a Turk, a Hungarian or anything else, which is not a Serb. And that I deserve his confidence, the proof is this trip of the Prince to the Crimea.\textsuperscript{107}

In return for the risk of Austro-Hungarian displeasure, in short, it would be useful to have some proof of Russian confidence in Serbia.

In the event, Prince Milan's visit to Livadia went off very well from the Serbian point of view. On 20 October Milan was received by Alexander and the Tsaritsa en famille. After a two day stay, the Prince and his retinue were back in Kragujevac by 1 November.\textsuperscript{108}

What was most important about the Livadia visit was the chance Blaznavac had to discuss Serbian policy face to face with the Tsar, Ignatiev and others. Our main source for these encounters is Ristić who, while admittedly writing after Blaznavac' death in 1873, had in this instance no particular reason for blackening the latter's memory, nor for praising him unduly.\textsuperscript{109} It was more than probable, as Ristić claims, that "The prejudice against Milivoje Blaznavac in the circle of the imperial family was great", since he had been consistently portrayed as an enemy of Russia by the foreign ministry, and had been content to describe himself as such in the past.\textsuperscript{110} Yet the mere fact that it was Blaznavac, rather than the more acceptable Ristić, who accompanied Milan to Livadia spoke for itself. Under the encouraging influence of Ignatiev and Hristić, Blaznavac rapidly made the right impression.

Alexander II, once assured of Blaznavac' willingness to please, appeared content to confine himself to diplomatic generalities. In line with his policy in the Eastern Question since the Crimean War, the Tsar assured Serbia of future "good prospects" \textit{[dobre izglede]}, but "recommended patience".\textsuperscript{111} Ignatiev, in the meantime, was
skillfully showing the Tsar how much his view of Serbia, especially since the fall of Garašanin in 1867, had been coloured by the reports of Garašanin's partisans in the Russian foreign ministry. Such was the revolution in Alexander's attitude towards the Regents that he promised Blaznavac, "My government will not intervene in your domestic affairs, and I am amazed that such a thing could have happened." 112

In the light of Russian policy towards Serbia, both past and future, one should not attach too much weight to this sort of language. True, the Emperor Alexander was well-known for setting great store by his pledged word, but Russian governments had browbeaten Serbian ones in the past, and would continue to do so in the years to come. Nor were the Tsar's expressions of Slav solidarity proof against Russian self-interest and shifting international circumstances, as Alexander's treatment of Serbia in 1876-78 was to demonstrate. Serbia, as Ristić and Blaznavac well knew, was apt to be handled by both great powers, Russia and Austria-Hungary, in much the same way. Which of the two was least likely to impede, and more likely to advance Serbian interests, at any given point, was always a question requiring fine judgment.

Nevertheless the immediate result of the Livadia visit was to improve, at least on the surface, relations between Russia and Serbia. In Serbia itself, which was of most concern to the Regents, the effect was also encouraging. While Milan was out of the country, the Skupština had remained in session; a few days after his return, the Prince closed the proceedings with an address in which he spoke of the warm reception he had been given by the Tsar. 113 The deputies greeted this announcement with cries of acclamation for both the Tsar and Milan. Ristić, summing up the popular mood for Hristić, claimed that the news of Milan's reception in the Crimea "has electrified both the Skupština and the entire country and has routed our opponents." 114 On the whole, Ristić had reason to be pleased with the effect the trip had produced.

71: Reactions to Livadia

Milan's departure for Livadia had caused something of a diplomatic sensation, since the Regents' refusal to accept incognito for him meant the news was in the Belgrade press on the morning of 16 October. Kállay's only way of reacting, for the moment, was to inform Vienna by telegramme. He then had nothing else to do but sit down and
try to draft an official explanation for this stunning reverse.\textsuperscript{115}

Kállay's report of 16 October to Beust was, in its way, a masterpiece of plausible analysis. It managed to suggest an air of inevitability in Serbia's swing towards Russia, with the implied conclusion that there was nothing the Monarchy, let alone Kállay, could have done to prevent it. Although he had to admit, like everyone else, being completely surprised by the move, Kállay avoided anything that might recall his confident assertions, in the past, that Russian influence in Serbia was totally eliminated.

Instead he represented the trip as the natural consequence of the change in Serbian policy which, he now claimed, had set in up to a year ago. To some extent, this was a reasonable enough, if retrospective, conclusion. The sea-change in international relations produced by the Prussian victory over France in 1870, which Kállay cited first of all, was indeed a factor which was bound to have repercussions in eastern Europe. Russia's support for Prussia naturally raised the likelihood of a \textit{quid pro quo} in the Eastern Question. As a direct result, there was the Black Sea question and its successful resolution for Russia, "und der daraus erwachsende Nimbus Rußlands auf der Balkanhalbinsel." The Russo-Turkish entente, which had accompanied this, had an even more direct effect on the mood in Belgrade. Then, Karadorđević had been acquitted; and finally, the Regents had been influenced by "die immer mehr zunehmende Gährung der österreichisch-ungarischen Slawen, hauptsächlich in Kroatien und in der Militärgrenze."

Kállay also attributed the sudden decision over Livadia to domestic considerations. Pointing out how often he had reminded Beust of "die im Lande rasch um sich greifende Unzufriedenheit", Kállay cited as evidence the growing political opposition to the Regents.\textsuperscript{116} Hence the idea of disarming this opposition by the trip to Russia.

Serbien ist also – bis auf eine neuerliche Wendung – wieder einmal zum blinden Werkzeuge der russischen Politik geworden, und als ein solches muß es von nun an in allen politischen Combinationen in Rechnung gezogen werden.\textsuperscript{117}

For the man who had set out for Belgrade, in 1868, as the "friend of the Serbs", this was a bitter conclusion indeed.

To Andrássy, the same day, Kállay displayed an even franker fatalism, as if he too
had decided that Serbia had swung hopelessly beyond the control of either Hungary or the Monarchy. Serbia on its own, Kállay wrote, and even one which was the "blind instrument" of Russian policy,

can't be a danger to us, only at the worst more or less of an inconvenience, as long that is as we can confidently rely on Germany's support in the struggle which, sooner or later, is going to take place between us and Russia.118

Here in fact was the whole international strategy of the Hungarian political elite for the next forty-seven years, sketched out in a sentence. Kállay had his doubts about German support, since he found it difficult to believe the Serbian government would have taken such a step, "had it not been convinced, that Germany was standing behind Russia."119 Nevertheless, if the Monarchy could really count on Germany, then "for Serbia this step [Livadia] can lead to dissolution."120

Other observers confirmed Kállay's estimate of the seriousness of the setback to Austro-Hungarian influence in Serbia, although not all of them saw Kállay as entirely blameless. The embassy in Constantinople reported merely, at first, that Milan's departure to visit a foreign sovereign, without consulting his suzerain, had considerably annoyed the Porte.121 It was not long, however, before Prokesch-Osten himself weighed in with the observation that the grand vizier "Ueber die Tendenzen Serbiens täuscht sich...so wenig als sein Vorfahr im Amte," adding the waspish rider that "auch der Glaube unseres Agenten in Belgrad an seinen Sieg über den russischen Einfluß in Serben einige Minderung erlitten habe." For Prokesch-Osten, the trip to Livadia had "nur den Werth eines Symptoms."122

The shrewdest observations on Hungarian diplomacy in the light of Livadia, however, were made by Germany's ambassador to Vienna, General Hans Lothar von Schweinitz, and by Bismarck himself. Schweinitz saw beyond the activities of Kállay, who was after all only the chosen instrument of Andrássy. Writing to Bismarck first on 21 October, the ambassador simply recorded Andrássy's discomfiture at the news of Livadia.123 A week later, Schweinitz recalled how, for the past four years, Andrássy had striven to convince both the South Slavs and the Roumanians that "bei ihm, nicht bei Rußland, ihr Heil zu suchen sei."124 Andrássy was building here, in Schweinitz's
opinion, on "die serbenfreundliche Politik des Freiherrn von Beust", who had after all begun his period in office by persuading the Turks to evacuate the Serbian fortresses. The appointment of Kállay had been part of this policy; and ever since Kállay had toiled, "nicht ohne Erfolg", to win the Serbs over in matters like the railway question, and above all the Bosnian question. "Dagegen verlangte und erlangte er [Kállay], daß die Serben des rechten Donau-Ufers keine Agitation ihrer Stammesbrüder auf dem linken ermutigten."

Schweinitz singled out the Karadorðević débâcle, and the dispute over the regulation of the Danube, as the two issues which had done most to endanger the influence over Serbian policy thus built up by the Hungarian government. What had really dealt the death blow to Andràssy's project, however, was in Schweinitz's view the recent strengthening of the Slav element in Austria, as represented by the appointment of the Hohenwart-Schaffle ministry the previous February. No matter that, by the time Schweinitz was writing this, the great experiment with the Monarchy's Slavs had already collapsed; its very existence "auf der Quelle der Save bis zur Donau-Mündung, Zuckungen hervorrief." Despite Andràssy's efforts, all peoples in this region regarded the Hungarians as a common enemy, and Serbia as "ihren stärksten, staatlich schon organisierten Hort." Consequently,

die Ruhe war gesichert, so lange die serbische Regentschaft mit der ungarischen Regierung Hand in Hand ging, und jetzt in dem Augenblick, wo die Slawen Oesterreichs schon triumphierend, dann enttäuscht und enttäuscht die Augen nach Rußland wenden.

The Livadia trip, trivial in itself, was "vielleicht der größte Echec, den Graf Andrassy in seiner von Glück begünstigten Amtsleitung erlitt." Yet the Hungarian minister president persisted in believing, Schweinitz thought, that deals could still be done with the governments of both Serbia and Roumania, whereby the latter would not encourage their co-nationals within Hungary.125

Bismarck, who had recently discussed high policy with Andràssy at the Salzburg meeting between Francis Joseph and William I, agreed with this analysis. He thought Andràssy attached too much importance to Livadia, and that this was due to a lack of perspective.

262
Sonst so weitsichtig, findet er [Andrássy] die Gefahren, von denen sein Land bedroht ist, und die Abwehr derselben auf einem zu engen Felde, indem er sich mit den Slawen und Rumänen in gutem Verhalten zu halten sucht, eventuell sich ihrer mit der eigenen Kraft Ungarns auf die Dauer zu erwehren denkt. Die wahre Gefahr und die wahre Abwehr liegen außerhalb dieses Feldes.

Bismarck's point here was that neither Serbia nor Roumania was in a position to withstand serious pressure from Russia: "eine ernste Probe werden sie immer nicht überdauern." The Slav sympathies of Serbia's population, and Roumania's physical proximity to the Russian Empire, would always outweigh anything Hungary had to offer. In these circumstances, confronted with the united hostility of the East, "wird Ungarn immer auf das deutsche Bündnis angewiesen bleiben."\(^{126}\)

Bismarck touched here upon a profound truth about Hungary's position. He was shrewd enough also to spot the inherent contradiction in Hungarian policy since 1867, a contradiction of which Andrássy seemed so far still unaware:

\[
\text{In einzelnen Fragen und zeitweilig mag es dem Grafen Andrássy gelingen, die Rumänen und Südslawen zu beruhigen. Dauernd zufrieden stellen kann er sie nicht und nach seinen Außenungen glaube ich, daß er trotz seines guten Willens für die Serben ebenso wie Graf Beust an der bosnischen Grenze Halt machen würde.}
\]

The answer to this dilemma, according to Bismarck, was that Andrássy "müsste...nicht sich als zwischen Ungarn auf der einen und den Südslawen und Rumänen auf der andern Seite, sondern Ungarn als zwischen Deutschland und Rußland stehend denken."

Implicit in this insight, however unwelcome it might initially be to Andrássy, was that Hungary stood to gain more from cooperation with both Germany and Russia, than by dubious deals with its southern neighbours. The Three Emperors' League of 1873 was the logical outcome of such reasoning.\(^{127}\)

72: Andrássy Takes Over from Beust

Bismarck's assessment of Andrássy's South Slav policy came at a particularly interesting juncture, since it was shortly after this that Andrássy finally took over the direction of the Monarchy's foreign policy, on 14 November.

The supreme irony of Andrássy's appointment as foreign minister was that, after
four years promoting the cause of Serbo-Hungarian friendship, he was now thoroughly disillusioned with the Serbs. Beyond that, however, Andrásy also came to office following a major change in the Monarchy's diplomatic relations, a change initiated by Andrásy's great rival, Beust, and which Andrásy merely furthered and consolidated. This was the switch from hostility towards Prussian expansionism, the legacy of 1866, to acceptance of the new Germany as the Monarchy's most logical partner. The prospect of Austro-German partnership, in addition, opened up the question of an entente with Russia on conservative, counter-revolutionary and dynastic grounds. Andrásy, for whom the inevitability of war with Russia was axiomatic, did not at first accept this conclusion, but eventually found it forced on him as the price of German cooperation.¹²⁸

On 18 May 1871, Beust had submitted a lengthy memorandum to Francis Joseph.¹²⁹ Effectively, it proposed a realignment of the Monarchy with Germany. The entente was given practical point that summer, with the meetings of the two emperors at Ischl and Salzburg. More important, Bismarck and Beust also met at Bad Gastein, then, in the company of Hohenwart and Andrásy, at Salzburg where, on 28 August, a general agreement was reached. Without seeing the need for a formal alliance, the two powers nevertheless recognised that there were no longer any vital interests dividing them.¹³⁰

The significance of the Austro-German rapprochement, in the context of the present study, lies in its effect on the Monarchy's eastern policy. Specifically, the two principles which Beust laid down in May 1871, and which Andrásy was obliged to accept later, if not in November 1871, involved an improved relationship with Russia, and the possibility of territorial gains for the Monarchy at the expense of the Ottoman Empire.

Beust and the Emperor accepted that better relations with Russia were a necessary condition of the new cordiality with Germany. Yet as Beust had pointed out in May, opinion in Hungary laboured under the false impression that reconciliation between Austria-Hungary and Germany would somehow divide the latter from Russia, and might even make possible an Austro-German coalition against Russia. This attitude in Hungary had not only made difficulties for the Monarchy at the London Conference; it
made it fast unmöglich...mit Rußland direkt bessere Beziehungen einzuleiten, ohne zu dem törichten Geschrei, als sei eine zweite heilige Allianz mit einer namentlich gegen Ungarn gerichteten Spitze im Anzuge usw. Anlaß zu geben....

Undeterred, Beust recommended that the only solution was "den Weg nach Petersburg über Berlin zu suchen und auf diese Art zu einem modus vivendi zu gelangen."\textsuperscript{131}

There were other reasons for this \textit{de facto} revival of the old axis between the three northern courts. One of the most prominent, in 1871, was the spectre of revolution raised by the Paris Commune, a danger which virtually all the Monarchy's leaders, Andrássy included, took very seriously indeed.\textsuperscript{132} Regarding relations with Serbia, however, the most significant thing about the shift in Austro-Hungarian policy was the recognition that the Monarchy still had certain interests in common with Russia. This in turn made it possible to envisage a return to the concept of dividing the Balkans into an Austro-Hungarian and a Russian sphere of interest. At the time of his appointment as foreign minister, Andrássy may not yet have accepted this premise; but the Emperor Francis Joseph implicitly had.

The second principle regarding Balkan policy, set forth in Beust's May memorandum, was that of a general disinterest in the future integrity of Turkey-in-Europe. With fine impartiality, Beust observed that

Wir haben kein Interesse und keine Neigung, den Untergang der Türkei herbeizuführen, aber auch kein hinreichendes Interesse...zu ihrem Schutz durch kostspielige Anstrengungen und künstliche Mittel beizutragen.\textsuperscript{133}

As a corollary, which he knew would not displease the Emperor, Beust now felt able to declare the Monarchy's own interest in expanding in this area. Designs which had hitherto been confined to the planning of the war ministry and the military chancellery could now be elevated to the level of \textit{raison d'état}, since

\textit{Eine Vergrößerung Österreichs zukünftig aller Voraussicht nach nur im Oriente stattfinden kann und eine solche namentlich in der Richtung wünschenswert wäre, unsern Besitz in Dalmatien durch ein entsprechendes Hinterland zu kräftigen....} \textsuperscript{134}

Equally undisputable was the fact that the Monarchy could not plan the occupation of
Bosnia, and at the same time continue Andrássy's policy of offering this territory to Serbia.

Andrássy as foreign minister would thus have found it difficult, not to say impossible, to reconcile his new duties with the keystone of his Serbian policy while Hungarian minister president. It is admittedly not clear, from Beust's memorandum, whether the chancellor envisaged taking over only a portion of Bosnia, as had been discussed by Kállay with the Regents, or whether the new strategy reckoned on acquiring the whole of the province. Beust's memorandum is silent on the subject of Serbia, although he had long known the outlines of Andrássy's Bosnian project, if not the details. Nor is it clear whether, by May 1871, Francis Joseph had revealed to Beust the initiative undertaken by the Hungarians, without Beust's knowledge, in December 1870 and January 1871. What is clear is that the Monarchy's foreign policy establishment had already, long before Andrássy became foreign minister, come out in favour of expansion into Bosnia. It seems unlikely that the foreign ministry, any more than the military, would have welcomed a condominium arrangement with Serbia.

That the Emperor should have approved Beust's programme in May did not, of course, mean that Andrássy was somehow bound to adopt it in its entirety in November. On the contrary: while Andrássy naturally would have to tailor his views to those of his master, Francis Joseph to a certain extent was also obliged to take Andrássy as he found him. Despite the Beust memorandum, for instance, the Emperor knew that Andrássy could be relied on to take an anti-Russian stance; only with time and circumstance was this to be modified.135 Equally obvious, though in this case in line with Beust's legacy, was Andrássy's willingness to cultivate the friendship of Germany. It was precisely with regard to the Eastern Question, however, that Andrássy's views had undergone a transformation. From being an advocate of sacrificing the integrity of the Ottoman Empire in the cause of binding Serbia to the Monarchy, Andrássy by November 1871 had swung full circle in the opposite direction.

73: Apprehension in Belgrade

For Kállay there was, at first, no indication of just how far Andrássy's thinking on the subject had changed, although Kállay knew that Andrássy had long ago lost
patience with the Regency. He knew, also, that the Regents had heard the rumours of Andrássy's appointment, "and fear his decisiveness."  

Kállay's first encounter with Blaznavac and Ristić after their return to the capital was on 10 November. From the reception Kállay got, it was clear that the Regents were extremely nervous about the Monarchy's response to Livadia, and Kállay did nothing to allay their qualms. Ristić claimed that he and Blaznavac were morally bound to hand over to Milan, when he came of age, a country strong internally and on good terms with all the powers. To this, Kállay returned only a classic piece of diplomatic double-talk: "since we were on good terms with Russia, we could not take it amiss if Serbia entered into good relations with a country with whom we were friends." Decoded, the message was clear: the Monarchy's leaders were taking it very much amiss.

Blaznavac was even less able to conceal his unease, emphasising how much, in the past, he had been "singled out as an enemy of Russian policy, so that Slavs from all countries were attacking him as such." If there were no improvement in this situation, Blaznavac claimed, he would be forced to step down once Milan attained his majority next year, and to watch helplessly from the sidelines as someone else pursued a policy directly opposed to his own. As a result of Livadia, however, Blaznavac now hoped to maintain his influence over Prince Milan, and gave Kállay to understand that, as long as this was the case, "he would continue with his anti-Russian policy."

The following day the Regents supplied further anxious testimony that their policy towards Austria-Hungary had not changed. Blaznavac, Dr. Rosen told Kállay, stressed that an explicitly anti-Austrian policy would not be practical, and repeated his assurances that the Serbian government had no intention of stirring up trouble in Hungary. There was, however, an important *quid pro quo*:

> The Serbian government hasn't become Russian, so it wouldn't be right for the Hungarians now to agitate against Serbia, because precisely by this means they would drive the Serbs into the arms of the Russians.

Serbia's chief needs, Blaznavac stressed, were peace and internal development.

Both Regents knew that in speaking to Dr. Rosen they were indirectly addressing Kállay. This makes the unconcealed rancour with which Ristić expressed himself, later
Ristic, as Rosen reported, had never intended to perform this about-turn, only the Hungarians, who could have done a lot in the Bosnian business, had forced him to it by their behaviour. Their hypocrisy had been seen through before the end of his life by Prince Michael too, whom they had promised Bosnia but, when the opportunity offered, drew back.\textsuperscript{142}

Inevitably, Ristic also dredged up the Beust circular and Karadordevic as additional reasons. It was clear that, despite their surface determination to maintain normal links with the Monarchy, both Regents were not only apprehensive but at the same time in rather bullish mood.

Kallay’s suspicions were only heightened by the rest of Rosen’s report on 11 November. According to Rosen, Ristic had just had a long conversation with Milan Kujundzic, a civil servant in the ministry of the interior. Kujundzic, who evidently had no doubts about the Regents’ wholehearted support for the cause of national revolt in the Ottoman provinces, allegedly urged the mounting of agitation within the Monarchy, in order to distract the latter from any eventual uprising. Coming a mere few weeks after the abortive attempt by Serb nationalists to raise a revolt at Rakovica, in the Military Border, this was disturbing news. Rosen, like many other observers, believed the government intended acting on Kujundzic’s advice.\textsuperscript{143}

Kallay was therefore all the chillier in manner when, on 21 November, he took leave of Blaznavac prior to going up to Pest. With more prescience than he realised, Kallay made a point of stressing especially, that I believed Andrássy would try to establish a better relationship with Russia. To this he [Blaznavac] asked: didn’t we perhaps intend effecting a partition of the Turkish provinces. He asked this, to be sure, in a joking tone, but despite this he couldn’t conceal his deep apprehension.\textsuperscript{144}

Having thus stirred the pot, Kallay proceeded to deny any such intention on the part of the Monarchy. In any case, he concluded, he did not really know what Andrássy’s policy would be.

In fact Kallay must have had a fair idea of what Andrássy’s position was by now, with regard to Serbia, and his own was one of near total disillusionment. If Ristic is to
believed, Kállay's rage at Livadia was far greater than he indicated even in his private
diary. According to Ristić, "Kállay especially arrived beside himself, saying, 'This is
now a Russian province!'" Commenting on the uproar in the Austrian and
Hungarian press over Livadia, Ristić ventured the (erroneous) opinion that Andrásy's
appointment as foreign minister might even be a reaction to Livadia, or at least that
Livadia had provided the final justification for entrusting the direction of foreign affairs
to so notorious a Russophobe.

Ristić had his own theory about the significance of Andrásy's appointment:

Andrássy thought to surround Hungary with a Slavonic
league, but he fears the Slavs, and especially the Russians, as
the greatest danger.... Now Austria really is in the hands of
the Hungarians, who are going to be our open enemies.

As a result, Ristić concluded, Serbia's position after Livadia was undoubtedly weaker
diplomatically, but the Regency had made things easier for itself at home and among
the Slavs generally, "and that's the main thing."

There was certainly no mistaking the shock to public opinion in both halves of the
Monarchy. For some time, relations with Serbia had been perceived as satisfactory at
least; now, according to Ristić, "The attacks in the Vienna, and especially the Pest
press, exceeded every bound of decency." Some of this invective, as might be
expected, was directly inspired. Two articles in the Hungarian Reform, in particular,
were written by Dr. Rosen, clearly with Kállay's approval, and threatened Serbia with
dire consequences. The first of these suggested that the plans which had surfaced since
Livadia for betrothing Prince Milan to the Grand Duchess Vera would not get very far.
Such a marriage would make Serbia little more than a province of Russia, and the
Monarchy would not permit this.

The second article was even more vituperative, especially where Ristić was
concerned. The latter was accused of being prepared to do anything to stay in power,
and knew that he could only do so by carrying out Russia's orders. Since these entailed
creating unrest among the Monarchy's Slavs, such a situation was not to be endured,
and Austria-Hungary would react accordingly. Ristić was warned of personal risks in
his pro-Russian policy: "even he has to await the day of reckoning."
The *Reform* articles cost Dr. Rosen his job as a Serbian civil servant, since the Regents knew perfectly well that he was one of Kállay's hirelings. Nor was all the mudslinging on one side: Kállay had been singled out for particular attack in mid-November by the semi-official *Jedinstvo*, in a leading article which mocked his naïveté in thinking Russian influence in Serbia vanquished, and for talking of the Regents as if they were "in his pocket." The point about the mutual newspaper fusillades is that they marked a deep antagonism on both sides, an antagonism all the more bitter because both Kállay and the Regents knew just how much such tirades were the result of official inspiration.

74: Reversal of Andrássy's Serbian Policy

Kállay's first official report to Andrássy as foreign minister, on 19 November, reflected this breakdown in relations. Kállay concluded that Livadia was simply "der offene, demonstrative Schlußakt, einer seit geramerer Zeit sich vorbereitenden Wendung in der serbischen Politik." Since, as Kállay claimed, the Regency had so demonstrably been "von der russischen Politik in Schlepptau genommen", it followed that the watchwords for Austro-Hungarian policy towards Serbia from now on must be caution and suspicion. All the Regents' explanations for Livadia were calculated to lull the Monarchy into a false sense of security. In reality, Kállay believed, the Serbian government "eine jede Gelegenheit ergreifen werde, wo sie nur, ohne sich selbst zu compromittiren uns Verlegenheit bereiten könnte." To judge by these words, the many expressions of friendship and mutual interest, of the last four years, might never have been uttered.

Andrássy was in a similarly intransigent mood. Only days before Kállay arrived in Pest for talks, the foreign minister spoke his mind to Lord Lytton, of the British embassy. Considering that only the previous June Andrássy had still been preaching the compelling logic of Serbo-Hungarian cooperation, the change in attitude was startling. He now professed himself "entirely converted" to the cause of propping up the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. In such a scheme the Serbian government, which had proved itself a willing conduit for Panslav propaganda aimed at the Monarchy's Slavs, could have no share. On the contrary, by the trip to Livadia the Serbian Regents
had revealed themselves for what they were. Both the Monarchy and the Turks must keep a sharp eye on Serbia "and crush her the moment she moves."\textsuperscript{155}

To Kállay, on 28 November, Andrássy explained why the Serbian government was no longer to be trusted. As a consequence, Andrássy concluded that the Serbian government

\begin{quote}
doesn't want our friendship, so...from now on he [Andrássy] will adopt a position of expectancy, taking care only to safeguard the political and material interests of the Empire. If, however, the Serbian government believes it to be in its interests to win our friendship, let it turn to him, but in any event only if it is able to offer proofs of its sincerity.\textsuperscript{156}
\end{quote}

In diplomatic terms, this was the equivalent of cold war. Serbia could expect no more favours unless it publicly allied itself with Austria-Hungary. The special relationship to which Andrássy and Kállay had devoted so much thought and rhetoric was dead.

Kállay, in return, had some suggestions to make which are of considerable interest, in view of the Monarchy's subsequent strategy in dealing with Serbia and the Balkan Slavs, a strategy which Kállay for many years to come was to help in shaping. First, he wanted Andrássy to replace the present Austro-Hungarian consul in Sarajevo with Kállay's own Belgrade deputy, Theodorovics. The latter, in addition to being a Hungarian Serb, was a man Andrássy would be able to trust in carrying out whatever policy he now intended pursuing \textit{vis-à-vis} Bosnia.\textsuperscript{157}

Most practical, and in the event most effective, was Kállay's suggestion that, in response to a recent increase in Serbia's protective tariffs, the Monarchy should retaliate by raising its own tariff on swine imported from Serbia. Andrássy asked for a detailed set of proposals on this last, and one of the principal instruments of the Monarchy's economic control of Serbia for the last quarter of the nineteenth century was conceived.\textsuperscript{158}

At this, and a subsequent meeting on 17 December, Andrássy enjoined Kállay to lay particular emphasis, in dealing with the Regents, on the Monarchy's supposedly excellent relations with Russia.\textsuperscript{159} In the meantime Kállay also had a couple of interviews with Lónyay, the new Hungarian minister president. Lónyay too responded favourably to the idea of a ban on Serbian swine imports. He also was inclined to press
ahead with a new Hungarian rail link on the Danube below Belgrade, which would act as a warning to Belgrade that the Monarchy was capable of bypassing Serbia completely in its pursuit of a Vienna-Constantinople railway.\textsuperscript{160}

Andrássy's vaunting of good relations with Russia was, in fact, an elaborate blind, since the foreign minister had no intention of building a lasting bridge to St. Petersburg. Andrássy was actually intent on preparing the Monarchy for war with Russia, which he still estimated was likely in another two years. A top level council in February 1872, held in conditions of strict secrecy, was to lay the Monarchy's own plans for rearmament and fortification in preparation for this conflict.\textsuperscript{161} In the end, of course, Andrássy's feigned \textit{rapprochement} with Russia turned into something like a real one, though this was against Andrássy's better judgment. As a means of worrying the Serbian Regents, however, it proved convincing. Certainly Kállay himself seems to have had no inkling of just how far-reaching Andrássy's plans were.\textsuperscript{162}

75: The Negotiations of December 1871

Kállay finally returned to Belgrade on 21 December in the midst of a severe blizzard, prompting speculation in the diplomatic community that his determination to reach the capital, in the face of such conditions, heralded some important new initiative.\textsuperscript{163} In reality his mission had an air of hopelessness about it, rather than of urgency. Primarily it consisted simply of delivering Andrássy's adamantine 'either-or', and leaving the Regents to make what they would of it.

Blaznavac received him on Christmas Day, after Kállay had first been briefed by Dr. Rosen on the government's position. As Rosen put it, the Regents' attitude was almost a mirror image of Andrássy's:

\begin{quote}
If Andrássy would do something openly which would show that he favours Serbian [interests], the mood would change in his favour in 24 hours.\textsuperscript{164}
\end{quote}

Kállay, however, was having none of this. To Blaznavac, he enumerated the issues which had fallen victim to Serbian obstruction and ill will. The Danube; the railway question; the raising of customs duties on certain Austro-Hungarian goods; and most seriously the suspected agitation by Serbian agents in Croatia and the Military Border, and the distribution of the Grenzer pamphlet the previous autumn: all these, he insisted,
were hardly the signs of a friendly disposition. In view of the numerous "Freundschaftsdienste" which the Monarchy, largely through Andrássy's agency, had shown Serbia, Andrássy could only conclude that he was wasting his time. The Regents could return to the fold anytime but, Kállay warned, this time they would have to furnish "eklatante Beweise ihrer Aufrichtigkeit."\(^{165}\)

Both Regents denied utterly any interference in the Monarchy's internal affairs. Both, as so often before, returned to the Beust circular and the acquittal of Karadórdévić. Kállay, again, rejected the continued reference to these two factors as a justification. Thus, although the Regents protested that they wished to remain on good terms with the Monarchy, Kállay stuck to his original position that the Monarchy's confidence in Serbia "mit Grund erschüttert sei." The Monarchy, in short, would remain the judge of what constituted "eklatante Beweise".

Kállay remained of the opinion that, of the two Regents, Blaznavac "gerne wieder mit uns in intimere Beziehungen treten möchte." This, however, was for the moment impossible, since Blaznavac had committed himself publicly too far, and would have to reckon with the political capital Ristić would make out of any recantation. The best option for the Monarchy, therefore, was

\[
\text{daß wir den Moment ruhig abwarten mögen, wo die serbische Regierung die Initiative zur Annäherung angreifen wird, unterdessen aber, besonders wo es sich um unsere materiellen Interessen handelt, energische Maßregeln treffen sollen.}\]^{166}

Kállay did not specify what the energetic measures were to be, but it seems fair to assume that in any arising diplomatic negotiations he meant the Monarchy to drive a hard bargain. Protecting the Monarchy's material interests also entailed keeping a strict watch on any subversive links between Serbia and the Monarchy's South Slavs.

Subsequent events were to show that Kállay was deluding himself. The combination of intransigence on both sides ensured that relations did not just remain static, but went steadily downhill thereafter. Less than three months after these exchanges, it was the normally emollient Blaznavac, rather than Ristić, who was openly threatening Hungary with a revival of the nationalities issue. "Wherever Hungary has the slightest wound on her body, (Blaznavac shouted) I will do my best where possible to inflame it."\(^{167}\) Any
thought of a closer understanding between Serbia and Hungary, according to
Blaznavac, was an impossibility.

To a certain extent, such hysterical reactions were prompted by an underlying
consciousness that, whatever Andrássy's reputation as a Russophobe, the rumoured
Austro-Russian entente was showing increasing signs of becoming reality. This
naturally made the Serbian government fearful of being caught in the middle, its
interests in national liberation and territorial expansion squashed by a division of the
Balkans into great power spheres of influence. Nor, as the subsequent history of the
Eastern Question demonstrates, were such fears completely unfounded.

Beyond this, however, lay another reason for the Regents' instinctive distrust of
Andrássy as the new Habsburg foreign minister. It was not a reason which either
Andrássy or Kállay appeared to appreciate, or were even aware of; but the British vice-
consul, with whom Blaznavac discussed the matter, correctly reported it. As Blaznavac
told Captain Watson,

he knew better than to believe Count Andrassy, when the latter
say', that he wishes to see Servia prosperous and strong and
become a centre for the Slavs of Turkey, for that was not the
Magyars' programme; Count Andrassy, he said, knew the
danger which might accrue to Hungary, if Servia really should
consolidate herself, for the Slavs of Hungary would then
perhaps look to Belgrade as a capital.168

Here, indeed, was the crux of the matter as far as the Serbs were concerned: Andrássy,
as a Hungarian, simply ought to have known better. The fact that, by the time of his
installation in the Ballhaus, Andrássy had come full circle and had concluded that the
Serbs were untrustworthy after all, made all the protestations of the preceding four
years seem like an elaborate confidence trick.

76: Summary

For four years, the relationship between the Habsburg Monarchy and Serbia had
been distorted by the Hungarian factor. Whereas the traditional policy of the Monarchy
had sought always to curb Serbian aspirations, especially with regard to Bosnia,
Andrássy from the moment of his appointment as Hungarian minister president pursued
goals which flatly contradicted this policy.
To borrow a phrase from British political history, Andrássy, through Kállay, was trying to kill Serbian nationalism with kindness. The Serbian government was to be helped towards the attainment of goals dear to Serbian nationalists: increased autonomy within the Ottoman Empire, economic prosperity, and territorial aggrandisement. In return, Serbia was somehow to be bound to the Monarchy in such a way as to put it beyond the reach of manipulation by Russia, and which would at the same time restrict the ability of Serbian governments to stir up discontent among the Monarchy's own South Slavs.

The centrepiece of this strategy was the Bosnian plan, the proposal that the Monarchy, or rather the Hungarian government, should secure for Serbia the administration of at least a part of Bosnia-Hercegovina. In addition, through the accident of Michael Obrenović's assassination, Andrássy committed his prestige to getting Alexander Karadordević convicted for Michael's murder. Both the Bosnian plan and the Karadordević prosecution, however, went disastrously wrong.

At the heart of the whole Andrássy-Kállay strategy were two flaws. First was the inherent improbability, in practical terms, of what was proposed with regard to Bosnia. How was the approval of the powers, not to mention the Turkish government, to be won for this project? How, most crucially, could the Hungarians guarantee the cooperation of the Emperor and the foreign ministry? Second was the fact that the whole idea of an enlarged South Slav state was so clearly contrary to what were commonly perceived to be Hungarian, as well as Habsburg interests, that no one, least of all the Serbian Regents, could quite believe that there was not some deep deception involved. Yet Andrássy interpreted this understandable scepticism on the Serbian side, and which was only reinforced by the Karadordević fiasco, as the final proof of Serbian ill will and unreliability.

By the beginning of 1872, then, relations between Serbia and the Monarchy might be said to have returned to something like normal. Hostility and tension reigned, interspersed with occasional threats on both sides. In the coming years, Kállay in Belgrade, and Andrássy in Vienna, were to evolve a number of different strategems for bending the Serbian government to their will. The most effective, as well as ultimately
the most rebarbative, was to involve securing a personal hold over Serbia's head of state, Prince Milan, and reinforcing this hold through the political and commercial treaties of 1880-81. Thus the failure of the attempt at Serbo-Hungarian 'friendship', and the increased bad feeling it engendered, were to determine the Monarchy's policy towards Serbia for the next generation. It is in this sense that 1867-71 deserves to be regarded as the formative period for relations between the Monarchy and its troublesome neighbour.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 8: SERBIA'S SWING TOWARDS RUSSIA 1870-71

1. Kállay Diary, 5 Nov. 1870 (Dnevnik, p. 337, and n. 256, p. 731).
2. Ibid: "hogy e czikket Ristics irotta Ban által."
3. Ibid: "hogy a Karagyorgyevics ügy folytán alig ha lehet már többé a regensekkel ily tárgyak felett alkudoznunk."
4. Ibid., 15 Nov. 1870 (Dnevnik, p. 339): "bizalmatlan lett Magyarország iránt s Rosen azt hiszó hogy most Oroszországhoz fog közeledni."
5. Ibid., 17 Nov. 1870 (Dnevnik, p. 340).
6. Ibid., 17 Nov. 1870 (Dnevnik, p. 340): "hogy...igéretem e hogy a felsőbb törvényzők elfoga itálni."
7. Ibid: "Egyenősen azt feleltem, hogy ily bolondot nem igérehetek."
8. Ibid: "hogy az csak egy mellékes személyes kérdés lévén nem gátolhatja a jó viszonyt közöttünk lévén Szerbiának sokat fontossabb érdekei, melyek elérésében mi segíthetjük."
9. Ibid: "hogy ezáltal nehezebben vált reájuk nézve a velünk való jó egyetértés mellet működni...."
10. Ibid: "Andrássy és az én semélyem iránt nagy bizalmat árultak el."
12. Ibid., 29 Nov. 1870 (Dnevnik, p. 344): "erélyesebb politikát."
13. Ibid., 28 Nov. 1870 (Dnevnik, p. 344): "Igérem hogy a mi hatalmakban van mindent megfogunk tenni az eliteltetés végett."
15. Ibid., 9 Dec. 1870 (Dnevnik, p. 346): "Emlétem hogy Andrássy óhajtana vele beszélni; el fog menni mühelyt az ügyet tanulmánya."
18. Ibid., 9 Nov. 1868 (Dnevnik, p. 112); Pester Lloyd, 3 June 1871, quoted in Đukanović, op. cit., I, p. 250.
20. Pester Lloyd, 3 June 1871, quoted in Đukanović, op. cit.
22. Ibid., 17 Jan. 1871 (Dnevnik, p. 355): "most én dominálom a helyzetet."
23. Ibid., 19 Jan. 1871 (Dnevnik, p. 356): "Talán nem tetszik neki az ítélet, nem lehetvén most színdi Magyarországot."
24. Kállay Diary, 22 Mar. 1871 (Dnevnik, p. 368): "az igazságügyminister akként nyilatkozott volna, hogy e pörben a magyar törvényszékek nem is itélhetek, továbbá hogy Karagyorgyevics 30000 fot szánt a bíróság megvesztegetésére."
25. Ibid: "attól is tartanak a regensek, hogy a bécsi reakció ügyét magávévé tevén majd oda működik, hogy Andrássy ne ellenesse a felmentést."
26. Ibid: "A megvesztegetést nem tartom lehetőnek, különben próbálják meg a regensek a maguk részéről."
27. Ibid: "a mi pedig az én közbejárásomat illette, ez iránt most semmit sem mondhatok, mert azon magatartás után melyet a szerb kormány a Dunakérdésben
követett nem merek kormányommal az ő érdekükben lépéseket tenni."

28. *Ibid.:* "hadd üjjedjenek meg egy kicsit."


30. *Ibid.:* "hogy a reactio ellen készek Magyarország mellett mindent meg tenni, mert nem fogják magukat felhasználtatni mint 1848ban"; "hogy mi Magyarországban nem félünk a reactiótól s majd megvédjük magunkat is."


33. Kállay to Andrássy, 24 Mar. 1871, *op. cit.*, f. 216: "nekünk, kik már annyit tettünk ez ügyben, mindenesetere az elitéltetést kellene szorgalmaznunk."


36. *Ibid.:* "Karagyorgyevics végleges felmentetése talán a mostani régence buksát vonná maga után, pedig egy a mi érdekeinkre nézve jobb kormány, mint a jelenlegi Szerbiában, daczár a hibának és ingadozásának nem kivánhatunk."


40. *Pester Lloyd,* 3 June 1871, quoting *Hon,* s.d., both in Dukanović, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 249-50; *Vidovdan,* 21 May/2 June 1871, citing a report from Pest of 19/31 May, *ibid.,* p. 263, note 1; and Krstić Diary, 26 May/7 June 1871, quoted *ibid.,* II, pp. 206-07.

41. *Hon,* 3 June 1871, as quoted by *Pester Lloyd,* s.d., both in Dukanović, *op. cit.*, I, p. 250.

42. *Hon,* 3 June 1871, quoted *ibid.*


44. Andrássy to Kállay, 8 June 1871, *op. cit.*

45. Krstić Diary, 23 Aug./4 Sept. 1871, *op. cit.*

46. László Hunyadi to Ristić, 9 June 1871, in Vučković (ed.), *Politička akcija Srbije...,* no. 239, p. 455.

47. Dukanović, *op. cit.*, I, p. 263.

48. Longworth to Granville, 15 June 1871, PRO, FO 78/2185.


50. Longworth to Granville, 24 June 1871, *op. cit.*


52. *Ibid.:* "mert ezáltal hatalmas fegyvert nyernek a magyar-szerb barátság ellenségei."

53. *Ibid.:* "az egyetlen mód az igen kellemetlen következményeket elkerülni."


55. Ristić to Hristić, 24 May/5 June 1871, in Srpska Kraljevska Akademija, *Pisma*
Jovana Ristića Filipu Hristiću od 1870 do 1873 i od 1877 do 1880 [The Letters of Jovan Ristić to Filip Hristić, henceforward Ristić Letters] (Belgrade 1931), no. 27, p. 56: "Mi to sudenje nismo ni zahtevali."

56. Kállay Diary, 6 June 1871 (Dnevnik, p. 385): "hogy törvényünk szerint a kiutatás az felmentő ítélet után nem lehet, ha csak a szerb kormány nem talál új bizonyítékokat, melyek alapján új vádat emel."

57. Ibid: "Némi reményt nyu JIT, hogy a felmentés próóbák elégtelensége folytán történ."  
58. Ibid., 8 June 1871 (Dnevnik, p. 386): "hogy volnának ugyan új tények a melyek véggett a szerb kormány kérhetne a kiutatási, de nem bizonyíthatja be azokat, mert nem compromittalja az illetőket."

59. Krstić Diary, 26 May/7 June 1871, quoted in Đukanović, op. cit., II, p. 207: "no da to ne mogu upotrebiti."

60. Kállay Diary, 8 June 1871 (Dnevnik, p. 386): "fájdalom nincs reményem hogy a kiutatást ki eszközölhessem."

61. Ibid., 16 June 1871 (Dnevnik, p. 387): "ha a szerb kormány megkeresi e véggett új láztatási vagy összeesküvési adatokat hoz fel."

62. Andrássy to Kállay, 8 June 1871, OSZK, FH 1733/275-80; Kállay Diary, 16 June 1871 (op. cit.)


64. Andrássy to Kállay, 8 June 1871, op. cit.

65. Kállay Diary, 24 June 1871 (Dnevnik, p. 389): "csak valószínűnek legyenek...."  

67. Hungarian Ministerial Council, 25 June 1871, MOL, op. cit: "részint a szerb fejedelemés és Magyarország közt fennálló barátságos viszony, részint pedig a Magyarországban fennálló bírói függetlenségi rendszer kiemelése által...."

68. Ibid: "miután az említett legfőbb bírói ítélettel szemben, az igazságsgolgáltatás szentségével merőben ellenkeznek...."

69. Ibid. The protocol was countersigned by the Emperor on 10 September.

70. Kállay Diary, 14 July 1871 (Dnevnik, pp. 392-93); a further account of this and subsequent meetings, on 24 and 27 July, is in Kállay to Andrássy, n.d. [19 Aug. 1871], OSZK, FH 1733/120-33.  
71. Ibid., f. 121.  
72. Ibid., f. 122.  
73. Ibid., ff. 123-30.  
74. Ibid., f. 124.  
75. Ibid., ff. 128-29, 129-30.  
76. Ibid., ff. 130-32.  
77. See, for example, the correspondence printed in Vučković, notably nos. 224-28, 232-38 and 241.


80. Kállay to Beust, 14 Aug. 1871, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/191; Kállay to Andrássy, 19 Aug. 1871, OSZK, FH 1733/54-56.

81. Kállay Diary, 4 Sept. 1871 (Dnevnik, p. 401); Vasilije Krestić, "Vojna granica u
nacionalnooslobodičkim planovima Srba i Hrvata (1860-1873)" [The Military Border in the Plans for National Liberation of the Serbs and Croats], in his 


82. Kállay Diary, 7 Sept. 1871 (Dnevnik, p. 402): "mert az oly barátságos szolgálat volna a magyar kormány iránt, melyre nem érzi magát hivatva Karagyorgyevics felmentésé után."

83. Ibid.

84. E.g., Kállay to Beust, 14 Sept. 1871, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/191.

85. Stokes, Legitimacy through Liberalism, p. 156; and idem, Politics as Development: The Emergence of Political Parties in Nineteenth Century Serbia (Durham, NC & London 1990), pp. 9-11.

86. Ristić to Hristić, 10/22 Nov. 1870, in Ristić Letters, no. 2, p. 3; Ristić to Hristić, 17/29 Nov. 1870, ibid., no. 3, p. 8; and Ristić to Hristić, 8/20 Dec. 1870, ibid., no. 6, p. 15.

87. See, inter alia, Hristić to Ristić, 2/14 Dec. 1870, Pisma Filipa Hristića Jovanu Ristiću [Hristić Letters], no. 20, pp. 26-27; Hristić to Ristić, 24 Feb./8 Mar. 1871, ibid., no. 36, pp. 44-45; Hristić to Ristić, 18/30 May 1871, ibid., no. 55, p. 68.


90. Vojvodić, op. cit., pp. 1-5. Many of the primary sources used by Vojvodić in this article are in collections like the Ristić Letters, Petrović and Vučković.


95. Ristić, Spoljašnji odnosi Srbije..., III, p. 208: "da 'to ne može biti'." Italics in original.

96. Ibid., pp. 208-09.


98. Ibid.

99. Hristić to Ristić, 14/26 Sept. 1871, Hristić Letters, no. 82, p. 89.

100. Ristić, op. cit., p. 211, quoting the message received 2-3 Oct. 1871 (20-21 Sept. O.S.)


104. Ristić, op. cit., p. 212.

105. Ibid., p. 213: "Činjaše se, da uzcivi radosti neće imati kraja."

106. Ristić to Hristić, 3/15 Oct. 1871, in Ristić Letters, no. 36, p. 73: "Sad će na nas uстати zapad a naročito Austrija ili pravije Ugarska. Protivu mene počeo je već vojevati Kalaj i javno i tajno i pre toga, a sada će još više."

107. Ibid: "da sam tako isto malo Nemac (što mi prebacuje) kiklo sam malo Turčin,
Madžar ili ma šta drugo, što nije Srbin. A da zaslužujem njegovo poverenje, dokaz je eto dolazak Knjažev u Krim."


111. *Ibid.*: "je upućivao na strpljenje."

112. Quoted, *ibid.*, p. 217: "Moja se vlada neće meštati u vaše unutrašnje poslove, a ja se čudim, kako se tako što i moglo dogoditi."

113. The text is given, *ibid.*, pp. 218-19.

114. Ristić to Hristić, 4/16 Nov. 1871, in Ristić Letters, no. 37, 75: "elektrisao je i Skupštinu i celu zemlju a naše protivnike porazio."


118. Kállay to Andrásy, 16 Oct. 1871, OSZK, FH 1733/62: "sem lehet reánk nézve veszélyes, legfeljebb csak többé kevésbé alkalmatlan, ha t.i. mi biztosan számithatunk Németország támogatására azon közelemben mely köztünk és Oroszország között előbb utóbb be fog következni."

119. *Ibid.*: "ha nem lenne meggyőzőve, hogy Oroszország háta megett Németország áll?"

120. *Ibid.*: "Szerbiára nézve e lépés végényszeten hozhat."


122. Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 24 Oct. 1871, *ibid*.


125. *Ibid*.


127. *Ibid*.


135. Diószegi, *Die Außenpolitik der Österreichisch-Ungarischen Monarchie*, esp. ch. II and III.
138. Kállay Diary, 10 Nov. 1871 (*Dnevnik*, p. 414): "igen visszatartó voltam....hogy miután mi jó viszonyban vagyunk Oroszországgal, nem is nézhetjük rossz szemmel ha Szerbia barátságos viszonyba lép egy nekünk barátságos állammal."
139. *Ibid.*: "már úgy volt ismerett, mint as orosz politika ellensége s ily minőségben támadtatott meg minden oldalról a szlávok által."
141. Kállay Diary, 11 Nov. 1871 (*Dnevnik*, p. 416): "a szerb kormány nem lett orosszák, s baj volna ha a magyarok most Szerbia ellen agitálnának, mert épen ezáltal kergetnék a szerbeket az oroszok karjai közé."
142. *Ibid.*: "hogy sohasem volt szándékában e fordulat, egyedül a Magyarok kényszerítették erre röasz eljárássukkal; a kik sokat tehettek volna Bosznia véggett de semmit sem tettek; már Mihály herczeg is átláttá az ő álnokságukat élete ?utolás idejében, kinek megigérték volt Bodzniát, s a midőn alkalom kinálkozott visszahúzódtak."
146. Ristić to Hristić, 4/16 Nov. 1871, *op. cit.* Cf. Watson to Elliot, 13 Nov. 1871, PRO, FO 78/2185.
147. Ristić to Hristić, 4/16 Nov. 1871, *op. cit.*: "Andraši je pomislio, da se oko Ugarske savija liga slavenska, a on se Slavena, a naročito Rusa, boji kao najveće opasnosti.... Sad je upravo Austria u rukama Madžara, koji će nam biti otvoreni neprijatelji."
154. Kállay to Andrássy, 19 Nov. 1871, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/191.
156. Kállay Diary, 28 Nov. 1871 (Dnevnik, p. 422): "nem óhajtja a mi barátságunkat, s...ezentől várákokoz állást fog elfoglalni, csak is arra ügyelvén hogy a birodalom politikai és anyagi érdekeit óvja. Ha azonban a szerb kormány azt hiszi hogy érdekében van a mi barátságunkat megnyeri, úgy forduljon Andrássyhoz, de minden esetben ha őszíntésége felől meggyőző bizonyítékokat képes adni."
157. Ibid. Theodorovics was appointed to the Sarajevo consulate in March 1872.
158. Ibid. (Dnevnik, p. 423).
159. Ibid., 28 Nov. and 17 Dec. 1871 (Dnevnik, pp. 423, 426).
160. Ibid., 1 and 4 Dec. 1871 (Dnevnik, p. 423).
162. Kállay Diary, 28 Nov. and 17 Dec. 1871 (Dnevnik, pp. 423, 426).
163. Ibid., 21 Dec. 1871 (Dnevnik, p. 426); Watson to Elliot, 1 Jan. 1872, enclosed in Watson to Granville, 2 Jan. 1872, PRO, FO 78/2227.
164. Kállay Diary, 25 Dec. 1871 (Dnevnik, p. 427): "Ha Andrássy valamit tenne nyilván a mi hajlamát árulná el a szerb ügy iránt, a hangulat 24 óra alatt az ő javára változnék."
167. Kállay to Andrássy, 18 Mar. 1872, OSZK, FH 1733/3: "Mindennél a hol a legkisebb seb van Magyarország testén igyekezni fogok (így kiáltott fel Blaznavacz) azt lehetőleg elmérgesíteni." Kállay had this account, in quotes, from Dr. Rosen the previous day; Kállay Diary, 17 Mar. 1872 (Dnevnik, p. 451).
168. Watson to Elliot, 1 Jan. 1872, op. cit.
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