THE FIFTIES IN FINLAND

Finnish society in the 1950s from the perspective of the cultural and industrial-banking elites.

Alice Hudlerová
University College London
School of Slavonic and East European Studies

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ABSTRACT

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The main topic of the dissertation is the 1950s in Finland, analysed from the perspective of the cultural and industrial-banking elites. During the first post-war decade, Finland witnessed an immense political reorientation in terms of both foreign and domestic politics occurring as a result of the war. Such circumstances were a salient influence on the position and role of the cultural and industrial-banking elite who, like the rest of the Finnish society, were required to adjust to the post-war circumstances. The process of their adaptability is of particular significance for this study.

The cultural and economic background of Finland in the 1950s is scrutinised within the thesis to illustrate the post-war situation and to facilitate an understanding of the subject. The first part embodies the definitions related to the role of the cultural elite. An emphasis is placed on the old Academy of Finland and the University of Helsinki, and their educational function in the post-war period. Two generations are involved in the study: the older, which comprises members of the cultural elite already active during the inter-war period; and the younger, who began their academic career after the war. Their mutual confrontation is widely discussed within the context of the dissertation.

In the second part, the industrial-banking elite’s economic and social involvement is identified. The economic situation of post-war Finland is outlined together with the significance of Finnish integration into the Western European economic structures, which occurred during the 1950s. The role of the industrial-banking elite within the process of integration is emphasised as it was of crucial importance.

The conclusion leads into a twofold comparison: firstly, between the younger and older generation of the cultural elite, where the first generation was strongly under the influence of the inter-war ideology and the latter already enjoyed the new opportunities created in the post-war period. Secondly, a comparison is made between the adaptability of the cultural and industrial-banking elites, who both reacted differently to the post-war situation. This leads to the conclusion that the industrial and financial circles appeared to be more responsive to the changes and less dependent on Finnish inter-war patriotic ideology.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACC-Allied Control Commission
AKS-Academic Karelia Society
FUSEEC- Fulbright Foundation-ASLA Archive
SHS- Finnish History Society
SK-Suomen Kuvailehti
SKS- Finnish Literature Society
SKS KIA-Finnish Literature Society Archive
SNS-Finland-Soviet Union (Friendship) Society
SS-Suomalainen Suomi
UKK Archive- Urho Kalela Kekkonen Archive
US-Uusi Suomi
VTL-State Information Bureau
YL -Ylioppilaslehti

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Certain decades attract labels - [the] Naughty Nineties, Roaring Twenties, Swinging Sixties - but I find none for my period [the 1950s], despite Hannah Arendt’s contempt for ‘the disgusting, posturing Fifties’.

The Paasikivi line and the ‘Unknown Soldier’ largely changed received public opinion in post-war Finland.

INTRODUCTION

A statement of the significance of the subject

A simple observation about the theme of my study can be made: there are three fundamental topics discussed which at first sight might seem ostensibly unrelated: the 1950s, Finland and elites. In the hope of facilitating an understanding of the mutual interrelation of these topics, their peculiarities will be analysed, in such a way that the significance of the ‘Fifties in Finland from the perspective of the cultural and industrial-banking elites’ will become clear.

Although the 1950s was an important political period, it has been commonly neglected by historians in the context of the twentieth century. If any attention was devoted to the 1950s, it often had negative connotations for the analysis of post-war political and military arrangements affected by the post-war ideology. In general, scholars have tended to write about the Forties, the war period offering dramatic historical and political moments, or the Sixties, a period of ‘peace, love and freedom’. In contrast, the 1950s do not hold such allure; it was a period characterised by hard work and fading illusions in an atmosphere of the newly declared Cold War. Generally, the danger of a nuclear war and economic, political and social transitions were the main characteristics of the fifth decade of the twentieth century.

Politically, the 1950s were a period enriched by many important events, which as a consequence influenced the political flow of the following decades. The death of

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Joseph Stalin in 1953 and the restless political autumn in Poland, Hungary and Suez in 1956 might be offered as examples. Arguably, the turning point of the 1950s was the year 1961, when the symbol of the Cold War, the Berlin Wall was built. In other words, the division of Europe confirmed the failure of post-war international politics conducted during the 1950s, and the 1960s began with no deeper expectations. It might be claimed that the political uncertainty of the Fifties had disappeared at the turn of the decade. Up to that time, there lingered a belief that political arrangements underlined by military tactics could bring changes to the political map of Europe. By 1961, such beliefs and hopes were clearly vain. For such reasons, 1961 is taken as the concluding point for the 1950s in this study.

If my study ends in 1961, the question arises when does it commence? Is the year 1950 to be considered as the beginning or could we start our analysis a few years earlier? Although chronologically an investigation of the 1950s should commence with the year 1950, the essential historical ‘introduction’ of the decade is basically embodied in the previous two years. Another option is the year 1945, when the war ended. However, a detailed analysis of the following post-war arrangements would take us too far beyond the scope of the 1950s. For that reason, 1948 appears to be the most suitable year to begin with as the immediate post-war settlements were solved and new expectations for the 1950s were set down.

Although the decade was a period tremendously rich in political events, due to the intention of my study to investigate the 1950s other than from the political point of view, additional aspects worth exploring should be mentioned. Without doubt, the post-war economic and social transition cannot be overlooked. From this perspective, the 1960s is generally regarded as a decade of great economic and social achievement; however, indisputably, it was the 1950s which witnessed the initial start of such transitions. The post-war integration into the economic structures, and various social and economic programmes, facilitated the overcoming of the war impact and initiated economic advances. The significance of the 1950s as a decade of economic and social transitions will be emphasised throughout the study when either countries whose economy was devastated in war or highly agrarian societies took the road to fully developed economies. Moreover, the political limitations of the 1950s decade on 1948-1961 also applies to the investigation of the economic and social changes: in 1948, the
Marshall Plan ran for the first year; and in 1961 the FINN-EFTA agreement was concluded.

Besides the economic and social transitions, the cultural atmosphere also went through changes during the 1950s. As in any other sphere, the cultural ambience was affected by the war as were the following political arrangements which were reflected in intellectual expression. The war events interrupted the run of the 1930s, with their increasing opportunities in entertainment such as music, film and art. Similarly, intellectual debate, often led by pre-war Germany, were cut off and relocated to the safer United States. Instead of starting from the beginning, there was a desire to find the link lost in 1939 after the war. In other words, the atmosphere of nostalgia, often with the imaginary sentimentality of the pre-war decade, was mirrored in the fashions and manners of the post-war years. Intellectual debates, conducted from the United States, reflected on the causes and consequences of the past. However, the clock could not be stopped and turned back, and modern trends began to interfere with the old nonchalance; the old European culture contrasted with Hollywood movie stars; philosophical debates on totalitarianism were conducted alongside sociological discourses on mass society. Such interaction, or rather the clash between old and new, pre-war and post-war, is what makes the 1950s interesting and exciting to investigate.

The second theme of my study is Finland, specifically Finland in the 1950s. From the political perspective, the 1950s in Finland responds to the picture outlined above, that is a decade extremely rich in political events and negotiations. Under the impact of changes in foreign policy, Finland experienced essential modifications on the domestic political scene. The incorporation of the Left into the parliamentary system had been solved and by 1948, when the mutual treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union (vnya-sopimus) was signed, the so-called ‘years of danger’ (vaaran vuodet) were over. Finland was prepared to enter the 1950s by following J.K. Paasikivi’s Realpolitik.

By 1961, Finland had experienced the general strike of 1956, the beginning of the presidency of Urho Kekkonen in the same year, the parliamentary election of 1958 with an absolute majority of the Left-wing parties, and two political crises in 1958 and 1961. Moreover, the political position of Urho Kekkonen appeared to be more secure than six years earlier, and it seemed as though there were no more obstacles to taking the road to the creation of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line.
Political events reflected on the economic and social transitions, and if the 1950s is generally underestimated in terms of economic advances, as noted earlier, this is particularly so in the case of Finland. Even if the impacts of the transitions had been more visible a decade later, the 1950s witnessed the initial steps toward the changes in social mobility and stratification. Moreover, the economic transition was anchored by international integration into the economic structures which played a decisive role during the 1950s, concluding with Finnish association with EFTA in 1961.

Most significantly, the end of the war meant a watershed within the Finnish cultural milieu. For similar reasons as elsewhere, the significance of the 1950s lies in the clash between the pre-war and post-war cultural and intellectual tendencies. The peculiarity of Finland is that the inter-war decade was characterised by strong pro-Finnish nationalism, with a common pro-German orientation and a distrust of Russian culture. Such inter-war tendencies complicated the post-war cultural situation which featured with the political reorientation. Although the Finnish cultural milieu pursued the restoration of pre-war cultural continuity, with modifications suitable for the post-war decade, the desired result could not be achieved. Moreover, the necessity of opening Finland up to new trends penetrating the country mainly from the United States could not be ignored. Although this could facilitate attempts at a deeper interaction between the old and the new, the reality was less interactive. The Finnish cultural milieu was too deeply sunk in the past and in the search for their own identity.

Logically, the strongest connotation of the 1950s in Finland is with political developments but, as mentioned above, there is plenty to be explored from the 'apolitical' point of view. Although the impacts of the political changes cannot be overlooked, the peculiarity of this work is to take politics only as a background. More important is to trace the view and opinions of the cultural and industrial-banking elites on the post-war situation. These two elites are the third theme of my study.

The reasons for my decision to investigate the 1950s from the perspective of an elite are to be found in the classic theory of elitism of Vilfredo Pareto. He defines an 'elite' as a social group which holds the most powerful positions and appears to react to social changes with more sensitivity than the rest of society. Additionally, Susan Keller, who devoted her research to studying elites in the post-war United States, has pointed out the social significance of elites in being "responsible for the realisation of major
social goals and for continuity of the social order\(^3\). This leads to the substantial link between elitism and a transitional period and, finally, to Finland and the 1950s.

Erik Allardt, the leading Finnish sociologist, observed that

after the Second World War, in Finland, the strain and tensions between East and West were a central phenomenon within the elite. Many 'common' people were not aware of this conflict at all, as they were too preoccupied with the social and economic changes that were taking place within Finnish society as consequences of the war. The post-war development created new opportunities, and individuals who represented new social groups entered the elite\(^4\).

Although Allardt himself is a member of an elite, it can be claimed that during a transition, whether political or economic, the significance of an elite emerges sharply, as its role is more visible against a shifting background\(^5\).

Connecting the 1950s, Finland and the theory of elitism to the notion that has been mentioned above, an evident link might be seen. To put things baldly, the 1950s in Finland has been characterised as a transitional decade, whether taking into consideration the political, economic or cultural aspects. The analysis of the 1950s in Finland from the perspective of elites will allow us to investigate societal changes on the political background.

**Hypotheses and purposes**

The main focus of my study is placed on two elites defined by Vilfredo Pareto as non-governing: the cultural and industrial elites. The cultural elite embodies people involved in the old Finnish Academy and in the University of Helsinki. The identification of the members of the industrial-banking elite is based on the key linkage between the banking sector and the larger industries and the considerable influence which they wielded on economic developments in post-war Finland. Within the analysis of these two social groups, the initial emphasis is put on the processes occurring within the elite, such as recruitment into it, circulation and adaptability.

The primary hypotheses of my study are the following:

\(^3\) Keller 1963:4.

\(^4\) Allardt's comments on the Finnish elite during the post-war years. Erik Allardt (8.12. 1999, Helsinki).

1. Whether the adaptability of the cultural and industrial-banking elites to new post-war political and economic conditions was similar or different. The basic hypothesis is that the adaptability of the analysed elites did not vary, as members of both elites had to adapt to identical conditions, and they experienced similar political and economic strains. Based on such an assumption, the adaptability is supposed to be hypothetically akin. Factors influencing recruitment into the elite will be analysed to justify or disprove such a hypothesis. The dimension of responsibility given by the social status and political involvement of the particular elite will be discussed to verify the hypothesis.

2. Whether the order of importance of the recruitment factors (family background, social contacts and education) changed under the influence of the political and economic transitions of the 1950s compared to the pre-war period or remained the same. The hypothesis is that the inheritance factor and family background, which played decisive roles in recruitment during the inter-war period, were slowly substituted and later overwhelmed by the increasing significance of education, which reached its peak in the late 1950s. To what extent such a hypothesis is valid in the context of the cultural and industrial-banking elites will be scrutinised whilst considering possible distinctions in both analysed groups.

3. Whether we can analyse the 1950s differently from what we have been used to, that is, the pure political analyses, with the main emphases placed on Finnish-Soviet relations. The purpose of this study is to analyse the 1950s by adopting a perspective which is not narrowly political. At the end, the conclusion will clarify whether the picture of the 1950s can build on angles other than the political by their attaining similar historical significance.

What will be achieved by such an analysis? The members of the cultural and industrial-banking elites will be identified with their position and role in both pre-war and post-war Finland. This will lead to the exploration of the dimensions of the cultural and industrial-banking elites, which will reveal the small elitist circles with the common circulation within the elite. In other words, social links and connections will be scrutinised on the basis of the members' social and political involvement and family
background. Moreover, the generation gap is of importance within the context of my study. The members of the post-war elite were also members of the pre-war elite, which means that the context of the earlier period has to be analysed to facilitate understanding of the post-war decade.

To reiterate the hypothesis and purposes of my study, the following can be outlined. In my view, this study is an important contribution to the general analysis of the 1950s as it does not take into consideration the governing elite but the non-governing; it does not search for power but influence. It is not the history of crucial educational institutions and large enterprises but it focuses on the people involved in them. Their professional achievements and decisions are not of crucial significance; rather, their recruitment into and involvement in the elite is. Basically, the study investigates the reactions and attitudes of the analysed elite towards the period under scrutiny.

Previous work on the subject

The first post-war decade in Finland has usually been researched from the political and economic points of view. In particular, the domestic political scene with a detailed analysis of the political parties and the labour movement, and the post-war incorporation of the Left into the parliamentary system, has been widely discussed. Moreover, in terms of foreign affairs, Finnish-Soviet relations have been a common topic of academic discourses in Finland, with the emphasis on the impact of post-war political reorientation on the direction of domestic political life. The major focus has been on the political role of Urho Kekkonen and his political intrigue in Finnish-Soviet relations.

Basically, in Finland two kinds of literature exist concerning the political scene of the post-war period, one written before the 1990s, and the other afterwards. Their elementary distinction lies in their perception of Kekkonen and his active participation in Finnish foreign affairs. For the purposes of this study, both literatures are used to briefly outline the political background which affected the changes in behaviour of the cultural and industrial-banking elites. To mention a few examples, the recent research of Jussi Hanhimäki (1998), Henrik Meinander (2000) and Kimmo Rentola (1997) were of great interest, in addition to the earlier published sources.

The Finnish cultural milieu and the cultural atmosphere as a whole have been widely analysed by Finnish historians, for example by the leading figure of Matti Klinge, who has focused on the formation of the Finnish educated class and its role within Finnish society during the nineteenth century. Moreover, Klinge, and subsequently Laura Kolbe, have researched the history of the University of Helsinki and the student corporations in greater detail. From the sociological point of view, the work of Risto Alapuro and his overview of the Finnish educated class under the influence of its eastern neighbour is of crucial importance for my work.

However, the intellectual atmosphere prevalent within the cultural milieu in the 1950s has been largely neglected by Finnish researchers, though new studies and historical angles have recently been brought to this subject, for example by Pertti Karkama (1997). Also the newly published history of the publishing house WSOY (Häggman 2000), whose second part will come out next year, emphasises the significance of the Finnish educated class in its participation in Finnish political life. Moreover, a study of the impact of the advertisement (Heinonen 2001) has recently been carried out, presenting interesting views on Finnish consumer society of the 1950s.

The terms 'industrial elite' or 'industrial-banking elite' occur only rarely in Finnish historical and sociological works. Great attention has been devoted to the analysis of the development of Finnish industry and the big enterprises and their role within the political context. An example might be Jorma Ahvenainen’s history of the Enso-Gutzeit Company (1992) and Toivo Nordberg’s history of the United Paper Mills (1998). The history of the major commercial banks has also been analysed, most recently by Markku Kuisma, the leading historian in economic and social history. Kuisma carried out his research on the Finnish-speaking KOP bank. Kuisma’s study should be published sometime during 2002.

In the context of the 1950s, great attention has been devoted to the economic integration of Finland into Western economic structures, in particular EFTA (Seppinen 1997 and Paavonen 1998). Furthermore, economic and social transitions have also been extensively analysed, together with their impact on the structure of Finnish society. Part of such research had already been carried out during the 1950s by Heikki Waris, Erik Allardt and Oiva Laaksonen. The study conducted by Susanna Fellman (2000) on the

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8 It is worth mentioning the study conducted by Anna Makkonen (1992), who reflected on the 1950s in her research on the literary atmosphere of that period.
social and educational backgrounds of Finnish industrialists, and the changes occurring in the educational sphere during the last century, have greatly contributed to my work.

Archival sources, biographies, and periodicals of the 1950s have been consulted and interviews conducted for the purposes of this study. The newspapers, periodicals and archival sources were of great help in my research. For the analysis of the cultural elite, the Ylioppilaslehti, Valvoja and Suomalainen Suomi were among the main periodicals used. The Teollisuuslehti and Puu ja Paperi facilitated my understanding of events in the business field. The Helsingin Sanomat and Uusi Suomi served to illustrate the political atmosphere of post-war Finland.

The National Archive in Helsinki provided me with many relevant materials, like, for example, L. A. Puntila’s File-Correspondence and the Fulbright Foundation (FUSEEC) data. Besides that, I was a frequent visitor to the Finnish Literature Society Archive, where Matti Kurjensaari and Kustaa Vilkuna’s files, to mention a few, are placed. Also, I visited the Urho Kekkonen Archive in Orimattila to become more acquainted with the political background, and that contributed to my section on the Paasikivi Society. Moreover, I consulted the archivist of the Paasikivi Society and Finnish Cultural Fund on issues pertaining to L.A. Puntila’s involvement in both associations.

Finally, numerous interviews could be mentioned, whether with people who remember the 1950s or those for whom the 1950s were a far piece of history. Many people I talked to were influential figures in the post-war decades; however, many were just ordinary Finns. For both, the 1950s meant the same; it evoked a special feeling of the ‘old Finnishness’, which they missed in today’s Finland.

As regards the theoretical approach, I have deliberately placed special emphasis on the literature written during the 1950s on the theory of elitism, with a few exceptions, like, for example, Vilfredo Pareto’s The Mind and Society, published in English in 1935 (originally in Italian in 1916). The reason for taking such an approach was to become familiar with the prevalent atmosphere of the 1950s, rather than using the analyses of works written a few decades later. It might be argued that there is a heavy emphasis on the French sociologist and political observer Raymond Aron (1905-1983). Besides the fact that Aron was an influential figure on the post-war French academic scene, who stood in sharp contrast to the more popular Jean-Paul Sartre, with whom he disagreed over his concept of the post-war situation, Aron’s importance is in
his linkage to the work of Max Weber and Vilfredo Pareto. In his academic work, Aron took into consideration their views on the theory of elitism and thus expressed his sociological and political attitudes during the 1950s.

Furthermore, studies of C. Wright Mills' (1916-1962) and Daniel Bell (b.1919) were taken into consideration. The significance of Mills' work lies in his book on the power elite in the United States, published in 1956, and his detailed analysis on this topic. Besides his criticism of Mills, Bell is well known for his comprehensive thesis of the 'End of Ideology' in relation to the intellectual atmosphere of the 1950s.

The work of Raymond Aron, C. Wright Mills and Daniel Bell share a few common traits; however, the one common factor in my study is, paradoxically, that their work remained almost unknown in Finland during the 1950s. Finnish sociology was only to be developed after the war and the international academic streams reached Finnish territory slowly. Not until the late 1970s did their voice begin to be heard in Finland too.

This begs the question why I have focused on the theoretical literature which, though written in the 1950s, was unknown in Finland, and why I have not taken into consideration the literature which was read in post-war Finland. To answer such a question, we have to explore what the Finnish cultural milieu read in the 1950s. Although the work of Vilfredo Pareto was known in Finnish academic circles, especially by Eino Kaila⁹, the dominant approach in post-war Finland was positivist. As positivism places the focus on knowledge rather than on detailed analysis of structure, it fitted well the atmosphere of the cultural debates enriched by the reconstruction of the Finnish past. This was in accordance with the historical methodology written by Pentti Renvall in 1947, when research was conducted in the spirit of the pragmatic Fennomans to uphold national self-identity.

In other words, if my theoretical framework depended only on the literature read in post-war Finland, my study would fail, as the cultural milieu failed to step out of the shadow of the Finnish national pathos of the 1950s. I have tried to put post-war Finland into the context of the 1950s, to outline possible comparisons, but to keep in mind the Finnish peculiarities which have made the research more interesting.

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The structure of the work

In Chapter 1 (Definition of the Elite), the definitions pertaining to the theoretical approach of the thesis are outlined together with an identification of the members of the analysed elites. The processes of recruitment into the elite, circulation within the elite and adaptability are explained to facilitate their implications within the cultural and industrial-banking elites. Moreover, the concept of the generation gap is clarified for the purposes of the analysis. Besides the two main elites, an intermediary group has been identified within Chapter 1, together with the interrelation of all three analysed groups. It should be emphasised that the intermediary group is more or less scrutinised only from the informative point of view as a having an ‘intermediary’ role, not as a separate fully investigated elite.

Chapter 2 (The 1950s in the Finnish Context) deals with the brief description of the political background during the 1950s and its impacts on the cultural and industrial-banking elites. The key words used within the analysed period are defined, and the significance of the ‘myth concept’ in the historical perspective is pointed out. Precise attention is devoted to the labour movement and the situation in the Lutheran Church. Furthermore, the social transitions occurring during the analysed period are extensively analysed, mainly on the theoretical hypothesis of Heikki Waris.

Chapter 3 (The Cultural Atmosphere in Finland during the 1950s) traces the intellectual atmosphere dominant within the 1950s. The questions of cultural conformity and so-called dangerous thoughts are applied to the context of post-war Finland, with a brief account of the publishing houses and their book production. Moreover, emphases are put on the confrontation between the older and younger generations, which is closely associated with the position of historians and sociologists during the analysed period. Also, the new trends and influences in the educational sphere pouring out of the United States to Finland are pointed out like, for example, the importance of the Fulbright Foundation.

The analyses of the cultural elite based on the theoretical approach which is developed in Chapter 1 are conducted in Chapter 4 (The Cultural Elite: Its Adaptability and Aspirations). The institutions playing a role within the study, the Academy of Finland and the University of Helsinki, are briefly described, and their position in post-war Finland outlined. The older generation of the cultural elite has been scrutinised according to its recruitment into the elite, their academic and political involvement, and
their adaptability to post-war conditions. Besides that, the recruitment of the younger generation into the established cultural elite is pointed out, with two main platforms where this process commonly took place: the Finnish Cultural Fund and the Paasikivi Society. Finally, a comparison is made between the educational opportunities of both generations which characterised the gap between the 1930s and 1950s generations.

The industrial-banking elite is analysed in greater detail in Chapter 5 (The Industrial-Banking Elite: Its Adaptability and Influence). At the beginning of this chapter, attention is devoted to post-war European integration into economic structures, which was not only important in the Western European context, but also for Finland. Finnish economic involvement in the GATT, Bretton Woods system, OECD and FINN-EFTA, has been emphasised as the industrial-banking elite played a significant role in the negotiations.

The importance of social background and education as two factors in the process of recruitment into the elite is pointed out, with an overview of the situation at the end of the 1950s, when education became a substantial element in recruitment. Besides the industrial elite, the Finnish banking elite is also defined, with a brief introduction of the two largest Finnish banks, KOP and PYP. In this context, a question arises about the dimension of the Swedish-speaking Finns within Finnish industrial circles. Finally, the crossover between the cultural and industrial-banking elites is described, with a brief account of the historical research performed on this topic.

Before looking at a few basic definitions, it might be of interest to mention a few personal observations which I have made during the years of my research. Originally, I intended to investigate four elites; besides the cultural and industrial-banking elites, I aspired to focus on the Lutheran Church and the labour movement. The Lutheran Church was a great supporter of Finnish nationalistic moods during the inter-war period, with clergymen actively involved in politics. After the Second World War, the Church was caught in a situation similar to the cultural elite, lost in the new political conditions. Moreover, the process of partial secularisation weakened its traditionally strong position within Finnish society.

Being aware of the immense significance enjoyed by the existence of the Finnish Lutheran Church, it became clear that the Church definitely deserves its own study, perhaps in connection with the cultural elite, but hardly with the industrial-banking elite. Furthermore, doing primary research in the archives of the Foreign Office of
Lambeth Palace in London, I have concluded that the topic of the international contacts maintained by the Church would have had to be enriched, which would have been far beyond my scope. Also, the Lutheran Church could not be investigated by itself; the Orthodox Church is worthy of a detailed analysis as well. Although the Church has been excluded from my study, a brief overview is given in Chapter 2.

The labour movement has been left out for more prosaic reasons. Firstly, time has gone too fast, and I had to make a decision to what extent the elites would be investigated to fulfil the purposes of the study. Secondly, as one of my main intentions was to analyse the 1950s ‘differently’, which means without focusing too much on the well documented political events but rather to look at the cultural atmosphere, it appeared that the labour movement did not fit as well with my plans. Analysing the labour movement without seriously taking political developments into consideration would be simply impossible. Besides that, the labour movement has already been quite well analysed in Finland in the context of the 1950s.

Being left with two elites, cultural and industrial-banking, I have begun the period of investigation. My first feelings were, judging by the general perception that ‘business is business not fun’, that the topic of the cultural elite would be more challenging in comparison with the industrial-banking elite. However, in reality, it was the other way around, the industrial-banking elite offering more of the research ‘excitement’, and frankly I have become more passionate about their attitudes, tactics and clever but simple solutions.

The cultural elite, though carrying the ‘intellectual burden’, seemed to be without any real and inspiring challenge. Or maybe because of their awareness of being responsible for the ‘intellectual burden’ and preserving the national cultural inheritance, the cultural elite could not show the same imagination as the industrial-banking elite. However, perhaps the sharp contrast between them made the work more enjoyable, constantly raising new questions, which would in other contexts perhaps have been left unanswered.

Definitions

Before beginning the theoretical analyses, it is essential to explain a few terms which are widely used within the context of the work, whether pertaining to the 1950s

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Civil War- the historical circumstances, such as economic (famine) and political tension (the Russian Revolution), resulted in a conflict between groups of Right-wing (the Whites, whose troops were led by General Mannerheim) and Left-wing (the Reds) sympathisers. The conflict of 1918 lasted only a few months; however, such a short duration did not limit the extent of the cruelty on both sides.

The causes of the war have been understood in various ways, reflected in the numerous names for the war. People on the White side referred to a War of Independence (vapaussota) as the Bolsheviks appeared to be the threat to the newly declared Finnish independence; the Red supporters referred to a Civil War (sisällissota— an inner war or kansalaissota— a national war)\(^\text{11}\). Various interpretations also exist among scholars. For example, Risto Alapuro, as a sociologist, argues that most historians have overlooked the fact that the war might also be analysed from the perspective of being a struggle for power, an attempt to make a revolution and not an ‘inner national war’-kansansota, as commonly interpreted by historians\(^\text{12}\). The Civil War, which ended with the defeat of the Reds, left the nation divided; the terror which followed and its trauma with ‘hidden pain’, as Alapuro mentions, has remained among Finns until the present.

Jäger troops- voluntary units, created during the First World War by students at the University of Helsinki, who received their military training in Germany. During the Civil War, they contributed decisively to the victory of the Whites. After the Second World War, the Jäger troops were generally venerated as part of the heroic Finnish past in their fight for Finnish independence. Most of the analysed members took part in it.

Patriotism- for a better understanding, it is important to put Finnish patriotism into the context of Russian oppression and Finnish independence. From 1809, Finland belonged to Tsarist Russia. In comparison with Finland’s position within the Swedish Kingdom, with which Finland had almost six hundred years of common history, Finland was able to preserve its independent status within the Russian Empire as Grand Duchy. This granted Finland separate institutions from the rest of the Empire.

\(11\) Rintala 1962:32.
\(12\) Alapuro 1997:55-56.
However, by the second half of the nineteenth century, the situation had become problematic, with Russian attempts to unify the Grand Duchy with the rest of the Empire and thus abolish Finnish privileged status. Such Russian desires led to a situation in which Finnish patriotism grew. Although Finns wanted to maintain their status within the Empire, they were not willing to give up their separate institutions. Such attitudes towards the Finnish position with the Empire prevailed as late as 1917, when many Finnish leaders were reluctant to proclaim Finnish independence in the sense of full sovereignty. However, once the opportunity occurred, Finns declared an independent state. From this perspective, Finnish patriotism became associated with an independence that separate Finns from Russians.13

Karelia—though the term is not of key importance in the 1950s, it should be clarified. For a Finn, as Hannes Sihvo observes, ‘Karelia’ comprises the present parts of Karelia belonging to Russia, which is the territory between the south-western part of Murmansk and St. Petersburg (the former province of Viipuri).14

East-Karelia was never a legitimate part of Finland, but during the inter-war period, Finnish nationalists dreamt about its incorporation into Finland not only due to its natural richness (timber and water power resources) but mainly as many Finns believed in historic rights of possession.15 This partly led to the creation of the nationalistic ideals of the Greater Finland (Suur-Suomi), largely supported by the Academic Karelia Society members. During the Finnish-Soviet negotiations in October 1939, this territory was offered to the Finns in exchange for the Karelian Isthmus (more than double the territory). It was not accepted and led to the Soviet-Finnish conflict known as the Winter War.

Karelian-Isthmus—a territory of the so-called Viipuri province, which was ceded to the Soviet Union in 1940. The loss of Viipuri is sometimes understood as the loss of a cultural centre, which was a ‘melting pot’ of Swedish-speaking Finns, Russians, Jews and Finns. However, it is more often associated with the loss of Karelia.

The Academic Karelia Society, AKS (Akateeminen Karjala-Seura) established in 1922 by male students of the University of Helsinki, proclaiming the ideals of a Greater Finland and militant contempt and hatred of the Russians. The establishment of

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13 Maude (4.5.2000, Turku).
14 Sihvo 1999:182.
15 Branch 1999:198. Such a Finnish perception of the Karelia possession was based on the fact that the Finnish national epic, Kalevala, was partly compiled from traditional songs and poetry collected by Elias Lönnrot on its territory (Sihvo 1999:182).
the Academic Karelia Society might be explored from the point of view of the desire to integrate (eheyttäminen) Finnish society, which was seriously disunited after the Civil War. Patriotic ideology was directed to these goals. Risto Alapuro in his dissertation on the function of the Society pointed out the very simple formula regarding the Society’s ideology; Russian hatred + patriotism = Greater Finland. Many members had political ambitions and became involved in pre-war politics, like for example Urho Kekkonen. After the war, the organisation was prohibited under the Armistice Agreement. The Society played an important role within the analysed cultural elite, who, to a large extent, participated in it, and from where recruitment into the elite occurred most frequently during the inter-war period.

In relation to inter-war Finnish nationalism, the IKL- People’s Patriotic Movement (Isänmaallinen kansanliike) should be marginally mentioned as an extreme right-wing movement, closely associated with pre-war fascism. After the war, under the Armistice Agreement in 1944, the movement was prohibited as a fascist organisation.

Finland was, during the Second World War, involved in three separate conflicts. The Winter War (talvisota), during which Finns stood against the Soviet Union, started when negotiations with the Soviet Union failed in November 1939, as Finland did not accept territorial concessions (the exchange of the Karelian Isthmus, Hanko and Salla for East Karelia) which had strategic importance for the Soviet defence of Leningrad (St. Petersburg). The Winter War lasted a hundred days and the terms of its peace treaty was very unfavourable to Finns, who lost one-tenth of their territory.

The importance of the Winter War is in the way it was comprehended by Finnish society, who did not receive any international aid and persistently fought the enemy by themselves with a badly equipped army. It had a significant impact on the Finns, despite its short duration. It united the nation which until then had been divided by the traumas of the Civil War. During the 1950s, the Winter War was largely venerated as a heroic fight of the Finnish nation in preserving their independence, and the myth of the Winter War was created which in a certain respect has prevailed until today. The members of the elite analysed experienced the Winter War, which reflected in the formation of their attitudes in post-war Finland.

The Continuation War (jatkosota), 1941-1944, within which the Finnish position to Germany is explained as co-belligerency (brotherhood in arms), when de facto

Finland fought the Soviet Union and thus stood on the German side. According to Finns, the Continuation War was a continuation of the Winter War, in their desire to regain their lost territory.

However, their troops reached further beyond this area. Under Mannerheim’s orders the troops went into the region of East Karelia and remained there until 1944, a decision which was enhanced by the pre-war ideals of a Greater Finland. Some soldiers refused to cross the Finnish pre-war boundary, as it was a controversial decision. The war ended by the signing of the Armistice Agreement in 1944 and the re-loss of the lost territories.

The third conflict, though not mentioned in the study, is the so-called Lapland War (lapinsota), when German troops were expelled from the northern territory of Finland during 1944-1945.

Moreover, in relation to elitism, the largest Finnish minority, the Swedish-speaking Finns (approximately nine per cent of the population in 1950) and their historical origins in Finland should be mentioned, so any later remarks about their position will be clarified from the beginning. The status of the Swedish-speaking Finns is commonly mistaken to be exclusively the Finnish upper class, in our case defined as an elite. In fact, many members of the analysed cultural and industrial-banking elite were of Swedish-speaking origins, particularly the latter, who came from the old noble families, who had moved to Finnish territory during the period of Swedish dominance of Finland. However, the larger number of Swedish-speaking Finns were farmers, fishermen and workers, who had nothing in common with the Swedish old aristocracy.

The largest concentration of Swedish-speaking Finns was in the area surrounding Helsinki, and the region called Ostrobothnia, near the town of Vasa. The southern archipelagos and Åland islands have also been mainly Swedish-speaking areas.

During the late nineteenth century, the Swedish-speaking educated class played an important role in the national revival, whether emphasising its own Swedish identity or supporting the position of the Finnish language and culture. Most activists during the National Revival had a Swedish-speaking background. After proclaiming independence, the Swedish-speaking Finns appeared to be on the edge of society with the growing

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18 Ross 1984:1.
19 Historically, the first Swedes moved to today’s territory of Finland during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries (Waris 1968:70).
mood of Finnish patriotism. Moreover, the Åland islanders tended to separatist politics until the matter was solved in the early 1920s.

After the war, the language disputes were minimised, mainly due to political circumstances. J.K. Paasikivi, during his presidency, often emphasised the importance of the Swedish-speaking minority of Finland, as “they created the national richness of Finland rather than a heavy burden”\(^{20}\). Paasikivi’s remarks were made mainly for political reasons, emphasising the Finnish historical position within Scandinavia rather than with Russia. Besides, after the war, the Swedish-speaking minority, and the educated class in particular, had its importance in transmitting the new cultural influences into Finland, usually penetrating through Sweden\(^{21}\).

The Swedish-speaking minority is well organised in Finland, with their own language organisations and university. Providing a few examples, there exists the Swedish-speaking political party, \(\textit{Svenska Folkpartiet i Finland, SFF}\), established in 1906; and the Åbo Academy (in Turku) is predominantly Swedish-speaking. At the University of Helsinki, special quotas have been applied to the Swedish-speaking students and professorship holders. The student corporation Nylands Nation embodied mainly Swedish speakers.

With such an infrastructure, a small population, and a widely developed social linkage, questions arise whether Swedish-speaking Finns do not maintain a better social status than the Finnish majority. This issue occurs from time to time during the 1950s\(^{22}\) as well as nowadays. There is no direct answer; however, due to the extensive social links, it might appear, although it is highly debatable, that the Swedish-speakers enjoy better opportunities, especially in terms of employment.

A question which is relevant for my study is whether Swedish-speakers had a privileged position in terms of recruitment into the elite. For this reason, social origins will be taken into consideration and emphasised and their possible application will be examined. This has particular importance in terms of the industrial-banking elite when most industrialists were of Swedish origin. In 1950, indeed, about sixty percent of the large industrial enterprises were in control of Swedish-speakers, in comparison with eleven percent in Finnish-speaking possession\(^{23}\). The language issue will also arise in


\(^{22}\) E.g., the debate led by Jaakko Iloniemi and Matti Klinge in the \textit{Ylioppilaslehti} 1959, # 6.

\(^{23}\) Jutikkala 1989:284.
terms of the two largest commercial banks. However, no other distinctions between the Swedish and Finnish-speaking Finns will be made.
Everything depends on one's definition of the words involved\textsuperscript{24}.

It is no accident that the one group regards history as a circulation of élites, while for the others, it is a transformation of the historical-social structure\textsuperscript{25}.

1. DEFINITION OF ELITE

The hypotheses of this study are based on the character of the elite, and its process of recruitment, circulation and adaptability. Such a process underlines the comparison between the cultural and industrial-banking elites which are of key importance for my dissertation. Their social and political involvement during the post-war period was certainly affected by their convictions and attitudes, which were created and influenced by their social background, educational training and academic and business experience. These factors are crucial in the above mentioned processes occurring within the elite, and as such should be used within the framework of this study.

Firstly, the general approach of the theory of elitism will be briefly pointed out, and its significance during the post-war period together with its connotation in the Finnish context considered. Secondly, the definitions will be explained with their implications for the purposes of this study. Finally, an identification of the cultural and industrial-banking elites will be provided, with a brief characterisation.

Two names are usually mentioned in the historical context of the theory of elitism, Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923) and Gaetano Mosca (1858-1941). Both were Italians, both searching for the principles of the distribution of power in a society, on the basis of the conflict between those who rule and those who are ruled\textsuperscript{26}. Mosca's work is connected with his \textit{The Ruling Class}, published in 1896, in which he recognised two types of elite; one which rules, the other which is ruled. Pareto’s main thesis was

\textsuperscript{24} Aron 1957:97.
\textsuperscript{25} Mannheim 1936:143.
\textsuperscript{26} From this perspective, Mosca and Pareto differed from Karl Marx, for whom the dialectic principle was the struggle of the economically deprived against the privileged (Keller 1963:11).
collected in his large and elaborate *The Mind of Society*, published in 1916 in which he distinguished, in principle, between the governing and non-governing elite, their mutual interaction and their relation to the rest of the society which is under their influence. To put it very simply, Mosca and Pareto searched for answers about the type of leadership in society and its interrelation with the masses, using the term ‘élite’ to refer to the social group which held the most powerful positions.

Leadership, domination and power in society was not only a concern of Mosca and Pareto’s research, but others too, took into consideration the political role of the minority which dominated. A few drew parallels with Mosca and Pareto, using the term ‘élite’ to refer to the ruling class; some regarded these issues separately without pointing out Mosca and Pareto’s original thesis of elitism. Max Weber (1864-1920) related power to the growing significance of bureaucracy, which appeared to be an instrument of those who are in charge. From this perspective, Weber, who worked in approximately the same period as Mosca and Pareto, offered a different view on the issue of those who lead and those who are led, searching for the instrument of power.

During the inter-war period, especially in relation to the growing right-wing nationalism, questions pertaining to power, leadership and domination were frequent topics of intellectual discourse. Karl Mannheim (1893-1947) in his *Ideology and Utopia*, published in 1936 and heavily influenced by the inter-war situation in Italy, referred to Pareto’s theory. According to Mannheim, history was not made by the masses, nor by ideas, but by the elites who ‘from time to time assert themselves’. In other words, the rise of a certain elite signified the historical-social changes.

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27 The English version came out in 1935, in four large volumes, translated by Andrew Bongiorno and Arthur Livingston.
29 In relation to Mosca and Pareto, a few notes should be made. Firstly, assumptions are sometimes made that Pareto copied Mosca to a certain extent. However, on closer analysis it appears that Mosca (for more on his work see the detailed study of Albertoni 1987) was keener on the political effects of this theory, and Pareto regarded the elite more from a psychological point of view (Aron 1967:160), relating his elite to a wider societal context. Secondly, it should be noted that Pareto’s work was compared with the Fascist ideology of the inter-war period. However, this does not indicate his support, only its misuse. Nonetheless, a question might be raised, as to why Italy seemed to be the cradle of elitism, even going back to Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527). Perhaps it might be connected with the lively bureaucracy and the well-developed social network of contacts and cliques in the Italian context.
30 Historically, the term ‘élite’ began to be used during the seventeenth century as a description for commodities of particular excellence. Later, the concept was extended to cover superior social groups (Lewis 1973:3, quoting Bottomore 1964:7).
31 Weber 1946:228.
32 Mannheim 1936:134.
Besides Mannheim, the contribution of Joseph Schumpeter (1883-1950) to the theory of elitism in the war period should also be mentioned. Although through his work *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, published in 1942, Schumpeter refrained from using the term elite, he was influenced by Pareto’s thesis of the distribution of power in society. Without analysing Schumpeter’s concepts of the relation between leadership and democracy, it might simply be said that he largely investigated the principle of ‘rule’ in democracy, the ruling and the ruled.

After the war, the theory of elitism was advanced mainly by the developments taking place within American sociology. Elitism appeared to experience a ‘boom’, which might be explained by searching for answers in terms of the growing mass society and its interrelation with the few who ruled. The theory of elitism seemed to be applicable on both sides of the ideology of the 1950s: capitalism and communism, and their inner connection between the mass and the rulers. One of the most influential figures of American sociology of that period was certainly C. Wright Mills. His book *The Power Elite*, published in 1956, concentrated on the situation in the post-war United States.

Mills focused primarily on what was defined by Pareto as a governing elite, and Mills labelled the power elite as those who were from political, economic and military circles. In Mills’ view, the elite was a set of higher circles whose members were selected and trained and who had access to the institutional hierarchies of modern society. Basically, for Mills the elite was connected with institutions, where its power was centralised and certified.

In the same period, in the European context, Raymond Aron reflected on the concept of the ruling class and the masses, taking into consideration Pareto’s approach. In particular, in his *Social Structure and the Ruling Class*, published in 1950, Aron focused on the contrast between the Marxist theory of a classless society and Pareto’s emphasis on minority rule in a society. In the British context, the study on elitism conducted by Geraint Parry should be mentioned. However, it was not published until 1969. Parry clearly and accurately overviewed the general theory of elitism and applied it to British circumstances.

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33 Joseph Schumpeter’s importance is emphasised by Ettore Albertoni, who traces Mosca’s influence on his successors (Albertoni 1987:121-122).
34 Schumpeter 1942:247.
36 Keller (1963:17) pointed out the importance of Aron for the study of elitism.
In Finland, the tradition of elitism studies is small and mainly concerned with the so-called governing (power) elite. Erik Allardt as a leading Finnish sociologist, recognised, in a study published in 1970, four main elitist groups within Finnish society: political, economic, bureaucracy and media, and thus he disagreed with the idea of a single power elite in Finland. A year earlier, a study of young social scientists had been published, edited by Antti Eskola and Kettis Bruun. They focused on the issue of economic power in Finland, which in their view was limited to a small economic group who responded to economic developments in the country.

Recently, more attention has been devoted to the theory of elitism, especially outside the University of Helsinki. An example is the research carried out by Ilkka Ruostetsaari, from Tampere University, concerning the issue of the governing elite and its use of power in Finland. Ruostetsaari briefly recounted the history of the elite in Finland, pointing out the connection between the large class of peasantry and a strong bureaucratic elite at the end of the nineteenth century and an exceptional allegiance to authority. However, his primary interest was in the issue of the distribution of power in the Finnish political context. Ruostetsaari’s work concerned whether Finland is ruled by one single power elite or by a set of elites.

Nowadays, interest in the theory of elitism seems to be gaining in significance. This might be due to economic growth and thus the existence of new social groups, especially those who have economic power. This means that the issue of political power might be left aside or comprehended in the context of economic power and its interrelation with those who rule.

There may be many reasons why there has been only limited research conducted on elitism in Finland, particularly in the post-war decade. One of the arguments might be the negative connotation of the term ‘an elite’ generated by the influence of the Lutheran Church, where social equality appears to be an important consideration. Furthermore, in Finland, as in other countries whose history is marked by long years of

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37 Allardt 1970:72-75.
38 It might be argued that this study, which was conducted at the end of the 1960s, was influenced by the radicalism of the 1960s generation. Also, a link might be drawn between this book and the work of Geraint Parry, concerning elitism in general, which was published in England in the same year.
40 Ruostetsaari 1993:309. Ruostetsaari relied on research conducted by Alapuro (1990), about the relation of the peasantry and authorities.
41 In the Ylioppilaslehti (2001, #22) a poll was conducted concerning who has the power in today’s Finland. The director of the Nokia Company, Jorma Ollila, came out as winner.
subordination, the ‘elite’ has been associated with a foreign-speaking minority. This resulted in the general perception of the Swedish-speaking Finns as being a part of an elite within Finnish society. There is plenty of historical evidence of the Swedish-speaking nobility and its privileged position in Finland, whose social status was granted to them by their family ties and wealth. For example, industry was for many decades their domain. However, it should not be assumed that the Swedish-speaking minority consisted exclusively of the old aristocracy. On the contrary, the great majority had been farmers from Ostrobothnia, fishermen and seamen who made their livelihood on or near the archipelagos, and there were working-class people, especially in Helsinki, whose mother-tongue was Swedish.

In post-war Finland, the concept of an ‘elite’ was not generally favoured. In the literature of the 1950s, there are only a few references to an ‘elite’. As such, the concept was more or less obscured by interest in the rise of the Left and the labour movement. The situation had changed slightly by the end of the 1960s, however, with some radical differences in perceptions of the elite.

Although Finns were reluctant to accept the ideas of elitism being presented in their society, hierarchy, based on acquiring a social position through involvement in an institution or organisation, did exist in Finnish society. For example, within the Church itself, a hierarchical structure was adhered to and in the cultural context, the inter-war Academic Karelia Society was a highly hierarchical association. This suggests that elitism is present in Finnish society, although its manifestations might not be recognised.

For the purposes of this study, Pareto’s theoretical approach would seem the most applicable. One of the reasons for this is Pareto’s wider perception of an elite, as he did not focus only on those who are directly involved in maintaining power. In Pareto’s view, there is a so-called governing elite, which exists besides a so-called non-governing elite. The first of these comprises individuals who directly or indirectly play some considerable part in government, and who wear labels appropriate to political offices, such as ministers and members of parliament. The latter comprises others

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43 Parallels might be drawn between the Czechs and the Germans, in which context the ‘elite’ indicated the German-speaking minority and was understood as such by the Czech majority during the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Such a connotation of the ‘elite’ prevailed amongst the Czech people for many years.
46 Pareto 1935:1423 (indicates a page, not a paragraph).
whose social position, wealth or heredity grants them elite status. Based on such a distinction, my study is concerned strictly with the non-governing elite, in other words with people who were not members of the Finnish government during the period in question and who thus did not have a direct share in decision-making.47

Although the purpose here is not to analyse the ruling elite, here defined as the governing elite, it is necessary to investigate how this elite maintained its functions. Even if many interpretations of elitism exist, there is a tendency to recognise a common feature, that is the relationship between leaders and the masses. The distribution of power within a society is a crucial concept in elitism. The elite refers to a minority group which has power or influence over others and as such it is recognised as being in some way superior.48 In other words, the power granted to the elite allows it to maintain its position.

There exist various concepts of power. In Pareto’s view, the power structure of any society depends on the political skills of the governing elite.49 Weber, as already noted, linked power to the role of bureaucracy which permits a more efficient organisation of power in society.50 Mills’ perception of power is influenced by his claim that in order to attain power one has to achieve a certain position within the institution. He argues that the so-called governing elite (using Pareto’s definition) makes the key decisions, but they are not the history makers. Although the elite has power and importance, it does not have a decisive role, which is limited to a small circle of ‘history makers’, who are those who “decide or fail to decide in the pivotal moment”.51

Daniel Bell disagreed with Mills, particularly on his connection of power with an organisation or institution through which power or influence can be exercised. Bell argues that having a position in an institution does not necessarily grant power. To determine whether the position can be converted into power one has to

47 The definition of the governing and non-governing elite might be disputable in terms of their direct involvement in politics. In other words, industrialists could be included in the governing elite, as they often share a great part in decision-making. However, here the question of belonging either to the governing or non-governing elite is based on the matter of direct involvement during the period analysed.
50 Parry 1969:16.
51 Mills 1956:46.
define what power [influence] people [the elite] have, what decisions they make, how they make them, what factors they have to take into account in making them.  

Besides that, it would be more fruitful, Bell argues, to discuss power in terms of types of decisions rather than elites, and to analyse the process of decision-making. My purpose is not to speculate on what might be understood by power, as its concept is more or less connected with the governing elite. My main concern is the influence which the non-governing elites exercised in relation to the governing elite. The mutual interaction and the possible impact of the non-governing elite on the decision-making process is of focal interest.

Analysing an elite begs the question of who is actually a member of an elite and whether any opportunity exists for being involved in it. As already noted, the non-governing elite is comprised of those whose social position permits them to be engaged in it. However, a process which is known as recruitment into the elite, occurs from time to time, especially as an elite appears not to have a static character. New members are drafted into the elite within the recruitment which, however, depends on certain factors like family background, social contacts and education.

Moreover, it is essential that the political and economic circumstances are appropriate for recruitment into the elite. For example, recruitment into the elite is more likely to occur during periods of transition, than during periods of economic stability. The extent to which elites are open to outside influences is also a factor. In some societies, elites recruit new members from the non-elite or are even open to pressures from below, whereas elsewhere elites may be less open to outside recruitment and influence.

Recruitment into the elite might also be called climbing the success ladder, as described by Bell. This means that members of non-elites, people without any influence or power but with an interest shared by a certain elite, can obtain influential positions as members. Such climbing of the social ladder is usually affected by the network of social contacts and relations.

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53 Bell 1960:58.
54 Aron 1957:234.
The recruitment is interrelated with another process which takes place within the elite, that is circulation. The so-called circulation within the elite, which has its importance here, is closely connected with recruitment. It refers to a situation in which new members of the elite are recruited from an already established elite. This means that, for example, the members of the non-governing elite might be recruited into the governing elite and vice versa. In other words, the members of the two elites circulate among themselves. Besides social changes, such a circulation is also influenced by 'the art of intrigue', as Pareto emphasised.

Furthermore, the so-called circulation of the elite or 'class-circulation', which is connected with the non-static character of the governing elite, results in social and political changes. Pareto claimed that the governing elite is always in a state of slow and continuous transformation.

It [the governing elite] flows on like a river, never being today what it was yesterday. From time to time sudden and violent disturbances occur. Afterwards, the new governing elite again resumes its slow transformation.

In other words, the circulation of an elite stimulates changes in society and leads to historical transformation when one elite is replaced by a new one. This usually happens when the elite has been in power for too long and is unable to retain its position.

The last process to be discussed, which is crucial for my study and will thus be applied to the analysed elites, is their adaptability towards new social and political conditions. The nature of a person's adaptability determines whether he will retain his position or lose it. Adaptability is particularly important for the period analysed, when under the impact of war the non-governing elite was forced to adapt to changes occurring as a result of the political reorientation of Finnish foreign policy.

In Pareto's view, some members of the elite are more suited to the maintenance of the status quo under stable conditions, while others are adaptive and innovative and

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57 Pareto 1935:1426. Pareto used the term circulation des élites. However, it should be noted that in Pareto's elaboration there is no clear distinction between the circulation of within an elite.

58 Pareto 1935:1431.

59 Aron 1967:163. Mannheim (1936:143-144) recalled the circulation of élites as the process within which historical transformation occurs. According to him, during a period of crisis, it is not that the social situation has changed, but rather that elites have reshuffled.

60 In relation to adaptability as analysed here, a full account might mention the process known as velocity of circulation, used by Pareto in the sense of how speedily the elite responds to changes (Parry 1969:62).
cope better during periods of change. The first are defined by Pareto as lions, the latter as foxes.

In addition to Pareto, a further concept of adaptability can be introduced. Robert Merton, whose contribution to the field of sociological and historical theoretical research during the late 1950s has not yet been mentioned, devoted his attention to the process of individual adaptation to a certain situation. He recognised five kinds of adaptation, which might occur under the circumstances of societal changes: conformity, innovation, ritualism, retreatism and rebellion. Without developing Merton’s concept in great detail, the first type of adaptation may be of special interest in terms of this study. Conformity “to the established culture patterns” appears to be a ubiquitous feature of the elites analysed.

In the Finnish context, Allardt uses a typology of adaptability created by Anthony Giddens in order to describe attempts to cope with the new political and cultural demands. According to Allardt, the adaptive reactions to pervasive uncertainty, as one can describe the post-war situation in Finland, are:

1. Pragmatic acceptance (survival, repression of anxiety from consciousness)
2. Sustained optimism (faith that danger will be avoided)
3. Cynical pessimism (a hedonistic tendency to enjoy life before danger strikes)
4. Radical engagement (radical response to perceived sources of danger).

The adaptability of the analysed elites is of crucial importance for my study, as the hypothesis is based on a comparison between the cultural and industrial-banking elites. The assumption is that members of both elites adapted similarly to the Finnish political reorientation which affected the course of both domestic and foreign trade. Whether this is true or not, and whether any differences in the adaptability occurred, will be explained by investigating the following factors and influences. Firstly, the impact of social background on recruitment into the elite will be analysed, that is agrarian or urban origins and language origins (the Swedish-speaking and Finnish-speaking Finns). Secondly, education will be taken into consideration, such as various

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64 Giddens 1990:134-137.
65 The definitions in parenthesis are Allardt’s (8.12.1999).
studies abroad and international contacts. Finally, emphasis will be put on political aspirations, that is, the dimension of social and political involvement and its relation to the political ambitions of the analysed elite.

Regarding the other processes defined above, post-war political and economic conditions in Finland were favourable for recruitment and circulation. The reorientation of foreign affairs and the new conditions within the cultural and industrial circles opened the governing and non-governing elites to recruitment. Moreover, social changes, specifically in the educational sphere, affected the order of recruitment factors; education became more accessible and a decisive factor in recruitment as was the importance of the family background.

To sum up, the definition of an elite within this study is based on Pareto’s theoretical approach. This means that an elite is considered to be divided into a governing and non-governing elite. The non-governing elite will be the main interest, with divisions into cultural and industrial elites. Within the elite, the process of recruitment, which is closely intertwined with the process of circulation, will be analysed. Furthermore, adaptability will be scrutinised as it has a particular importance in the context of the post-war period.
1.1 Identification and definition of the cultural elite

1.1.1 Definition and role of the intellectual, the intelligentsia and the cultural elite

Defining the character of intellectuals or of the intelligentsia, or even making a distinction between them, is not an easy task. Although many scholars, and among them many intellectuals, have tried to identify the signs which would make this distinction clear, no lucid definition appears to exist which would assist us in distinguishing an intellectual. Even though in the past Aron, for example, has recognised the existence of scribes, men of letters and experts and has defined them as the intelligentsia of modern times, he gave up coming to any conclusion about a single clear definition of an intellectual. However, many different approaches exist, which in one way or another might throw at least a bit of light on this question.

Joseph Schumpeter was slightly disappointed with the definition of intellectuals provided by the Oxford Dictionary, as the given explanation did not serve his purpose well. Schumpeter, like Karl Mannheim, tried to explore the origins and role of intellectuals in terms of class. In Schumpeter's view, intellectuals do not form a social class in the same sense as peasants or industrial labourers. Mannheim agreed with Schumpeter on this point, and he concluded that it could not be maintained that intellectuals were homogeneously determined. Heterogeneity existed among intellectuals, especially in relation to political convictions and social background. This means that neither Schumpeter nor Mannheim believed that intellectuals might form a class which could be firmly defined, despite the education that bound them together.

Education might be one of the features which appears to be common for intellectuals. Education, without any limitation regarding the type, might be the prerequisite for one becoming an intellectual. Intellectuals can be found among journalists, lawyers or medical doctors. Neither engineers nor architects are excluded, which shows that specialisation is indeed no obstacle. However, as Schumpeter argues, intellectuals cannot simply be defined as the sum total of all the people who have had a higher education. By completing a university degree, a man does not automatically become an intellectual; education does not guarantee such a status but only permits its

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66 Huszar 1960:103.
69 Schumpeter 1942:146.
possibility. By obtaining an education, a man becomes, as Schumpeter continues, a potential intellectual.

An important factor in becoming an intellectual is how his education is used later in a practical career. From this perspective, Aron claimed that not all non-manual workers can be called intellectuals. Aron demonstrated, with the example of an office worker, that even if he held a university degree, he would not be considered an intellectual. Despite his integration into a collective enterprise, an office worker becomes only part of a large group of people whose work is already fixed. Such arguments lead to the conclusion that perhaps more decisive than education is the social role which an educated individual has and his political attitudes and orientation.

There is a tendency to believe that intellectuals, even though no common feature defines them, might be easily recognised from their appearance. An intellectual is often associated with wearing glasses; an absent-minded gentleman, who is deep in thought and thus detached from reality. For Aron, intellectuals are those who

Transform opinions or interest into theories: by definition, they are not content merely to live, they want to think their existence.

Aron continues by explaining that intellectuals dream about an imagined state in which power belongs not to money but to knowledge. This means that a potential intellectual might be living his life in the close embrace of his own ideas and beliefs, which might differ from the reality around him.

In accordance with Aron is Huszar’s understanding of the relation of an intellectual towards direct responsibility. Huszar claims, based on his reading of Schumpeter, that the distinguishing feature of intellectuals is their direct absence from

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70 Aron 1957:205.
71 Regarding the relation between an education and the intellectual, I assume that this begs the question of whether a man who has not received any university degree can be counted among the educated elite-intellectuals or not. Two examples, even if diametrically opposite, come to my mind. Firstly, in the Finnish context, Väinö Linna, who became a member of the Finnish Academy and was held in high esteem in Finland, in spite of the fact that he never applied for a university degree course. Secondly, we have the example of Václav Havel who, before becoming involved in high politics, was well known as a playwright.
72 That this is only a picture which is artificially created and does not well reflect the real situation can be shown by the example of C. Wright Mills, who roared into Columbia University on his BMW motorcycle, wearing plaid shirts, old jeans, and work boots, carrying his books in a duffel bag strapped across his broad chest (Wakefield 2000:6).
73 Aron 1957:209.
74 Aron 1954:162.
practical affairs and first-hand knowledge of them. From this perspective, intellectuals are those who stand apart from any social conflict, as they do not experience it directly but only theoretically. How far such an assumption is true and how far false can only be explained in relation to the role of the intellectual in society.

The intellectuals or intelligentsia and their role within a society is a matter which has been widely discussed and analysed. Like the definition, no real and simple conclusion has ever been drawn. Opinions differ from country to country, and according to the period and historical developments which underline the role of an intellectual in his own society. The issue is whether intellectuals should be politically active or whether they should be mere observers. This question is intertwined with other points regarding whether politically active intellectuals lose their intellectual independence or whether political interference is only one of their social tasks and obligations.

In the 1920s, Julien Benda (1867-1956), who devoted his attention to the relation of an intellectual and his involvement in politics, described in his brief though precisely formulated work the decline of intellectuals who confined their ability to politics instead of serving their higher mission. Benda defined intellectuals as the clerks, by which he meant

all those whose activity essentially is not the pursuit of practical aims, all those who seek their joy in the practice of an art or a science or metaphysical speculation, in short in the possession of non-material advantages.

Benda claimed that those clerks for whom politics happens to be their passion begin to use the prestige attached to their political function, lose their independence and become laymen. Benda thus denounced the idea of politically active intellectuals, calling this transition from clerks to laymen, which appeared to be a phenomenon of the twentieth century, the ‘treason of the intellectuals’.

Almost thirty years later, Raymond Aron recognised Benda’s demand to keep intellectuals out of political affairs, specifically out of the advantages which were connected with politics. However, Aron questioned the boundary between being faithful

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75 Huszar 1960:53.
76 It might be interesting to mention that the Left-oriented literary group Killa, during the 1930s, was familiar with the theses of Julien Benda and Karl Mannheim, and reflected on the position and role of the intellectual as analysed by both (Koivisto 1997:80).
77 Benda 1928:43.
to the intellectual mission and ‘treason’. In his view, Benda did not formulate his apolitical demands accurately enough, though it is not feasible to draw such a line, as Aron admitted.

Aron, who did not reach any clear conclusion about whether intellectuals should be involved in politics or not, argued that the revolutions of the twentieth century had been thought up and carried out by intellectuals. Such an argument might indicate that he conceded the political involvement of intellectuals in politics. However, Aron conveyed the idea that as soon as an intellectual discovers the intellectual limitations of politics he withdraws from them.

In contrast, in 1940, Archibald MacLeish (1892-1982), an American poet and an academic, expressed a completely different view on the political role of intellectuals. He strongly criticised intellectuals for not taking any political stand during the difficult pre-war years. Indirectly, MacLeish was blaming intellectuals for political catastrophes, which were also caused by their inactive role and their fear of declaring their attitudes. In MacLeish’s view, it was the obligation of intellectuals to stick to their society and to defend it. Political involvement was the social task of intellectuals. Politically inactive intellectuals were called by MacLeish ‘the irresponsible’.

Herbert Lüthy’s view on the political duty of intellectuals has certain similarities with MacLeish’s. Lüthy (b.1918), who was a Swiss political essayist, considered the political responsibility of intellectuals to be essential; ‘engaged’ intellectuals were those who upheld political development. He criticised the later ‘solipsism’ of intellectuals in France, who more or less carefully entered into discussions about political issues and vigilantly expressed their disagreement with political tyranny. Such an approach, according to Lüthy, creates from intellectuals social ‘mandarins’.

In comparison with Lüthy, Stephen Spender (1909-1995), an editor of Encounter magazine, pondered on the political engagement of intellectuals from a different point of view. He did not judge whether an intellectual belonged to the political arena or not,

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78 Aron 1957:300-301.
79 Aron 1957:312.
80 MacLeish’s article published in the Nation (May 18th, 1940). This version is quoted from Huszar 1960:239-275. MacLeish tried to conceive how the inactivity of the intellectuals in the 1940s would be explained to a future generation. He compared the situation to the answer which Leonardo gave Michelangelo when he demanded why Leonardo was indifferent to the misfortunes of the Florentines. Leonardo explained that he was too preoccupied by the study of beauty. Similarly, the intellectuals in the 1940s were preoccupied by their theoretical research rather than political developments.
81 Lüthy’s article published in Encounter (August 1955). Here, the version is quoted from Huszar 1960:444-458.
but he analysed the attitudes which intellectuals had taken towards politics. He focused on the situation in England before the Second World War and at the beginning of the 1950s. In Spender's observation, intellectuals were a social force but only in order to create a suitable background for their own writing. Although he was aware that most intellectuals played distinguished roles in the services or the bureaucracy, he recognised that their role had more or less "shrunk to [being] passive spectators". However, after the development of the post-war political situation, he indicated that the role of the intellectuals appeared to be important again. In this respect, Spender did not fear intellectuals being politically involved; on the contrary, it seems that he even welcomed such a development. Although Spender did not oppose the idea of politically oriented intellectuals, he was not in favour of individualist literary prophets, who "were offering their experience of living as a kind of secret formula for saving society".

From this perspective, Spender's view accorded with that of Albert Camus (1913-1960), in whose opinion an intellectual should not be the one who preaches or judges. Although Camus did not see the role of an intellectual as being within politics, he denied in 1959 that it was possible to be neutral or to admit silence. Perhaps as a member of the literate one could still be apolitical even though this was almost irrational; however, as a man, Camus concluded, one had to be engaged in political discussion.

At this point, one has to insist that it cannot clearly be concluded whether an intellectual should be politically involved or not. Opinions vary according to the historical period, each of them marked by different political events. Even though opinions differ, one aspect appears to be similar both for the supporters and the opponents of politically engaged intellectuals. This is the issue of intellectual independence. Politically inactive intellectuals should make a virtue of it, as well as politically involved ones, who should develop their interests. Such a conclusion leads one back to the opinions of Mannheim on the character and duty of intellectuals, which he associated with the relation of intellectuals to the other social classes. According to these relations, intellectuals were losing or, in contrast, keeping their intellectual independence.

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82 Spender's article published in The Twentieth Century (June 1951). Here, the version is quoted from Huszar 1960:470-476.
83 Spender in Huszar 1960:484.
84 Camus 1959:147.
In Mannheim’s view, as already noted, it was almost impossible to define intellectuals as a class from the sociological point of view. The reason for this was that the intellectuals participated less directly in the economic process of a society, so their origins varied pertaining to wealth and social status. However, due to social advances, intellectual activity was no longer performed by a rigidly defined social class, but “rather by a social stratum, which is to a large degree unattached to any social class”\(^86\). This simply means that intellectuals were socially unattached, and they adapted their social and political affiliations according to their political orientation. According to Mannheim, there existed two ways in which this adaptation was made; firstly, intellectuals voluntarily affiliated with one or other of the various antagonistic classes; and secondly, they searched for the fulfilment of their mission as the predestined advocates of the intellectual interests of the whole\(^87\).

This means simply that the decisive factor in the relation of an intellectual and his political duty is whether he is linked closely to his society, attached to a certain social class, or whether he is detached from it. Besides this, it is important to recognise to which social class he is attached and how the governing (ruling) elite accepts him. The contacts and social links kept up by an intellectual, together with the way he expresses his opinions, might indicate how far he loses his independence and how far he becomes a part of the governing elite.

According to Aron, the relationship of the intellectuals to the governing elite is a reciprocal one. He argued that

\[\text{\textit{the more remote they seem to be from the preoccupations of those who govern, the more the latter give vent to their innate hostility \ldots. The more recalcitrant to modern ideas the privileged classes appear, \ldots the more the intellectuals incline to dissidence. The prestige society accords to men of ideas also influences their judgements on the practical men}}\] \(^88\).

One of the important factors in relations between the intellectuals and the governing elite is how far intellectuals influence public opinion and how far this is taken seriously by the governing elite. For the sociologist Levin Schüicking (1878-1964), any writer who effectively manipulated public opinion, and was taken into

\(^{86}\) Mannheim 1936:156.
\(^{87}\) Mannheim 1936:158.
\(^{88}\) Aron 1957:215.
consideration by the leaders of State, lost his status of as intellectual. However, the relation between public opinion and the intellectual and public opinion and the governing elite depends more or less on the political system of a society.

By describing the main features of intellectuals which might be significant in defining this specific social stratum, and by pointing out the importance of the relation between an intellectual and his political role within society, the complexity of the definition of an intellectual should have been, at least marginally, clarified. Further, it should be re-emphasised that the definition of an intellectual depends on the dimensions of his political engagement regarding a historical period. Even though no clear conclusion can be drawn in this matter, for the purposes of this work the basic distinction might be made between the terms indicating a politically active or inactive intellectual in relation to the governing elite.

An intellectual might be assumed to be a person who expresses his opinions on the political situation independently. In relation to Schumpeter’s and Mannheim’s definition, he might have a university degree. However, no specific degree is required. Although an intellectual is politically independent, which means he is not related to any political party and does not sympathise with any political ideology, he is not neglectful of the destiny of his nation and is prepared to defend it. However, he is, in Benda’s words, faithful to his mission as a thinker and truth seeker. An intellectual might be associated with a certain appearance, or connote a coffee-house intellectual; nonetheless, in reality it does not have to be so.

The term intelligentsia has its origins in Russian, and it was, as historian Hugh Seton-Watson (1916-1984) claims, in Russia that the phenomenon itself first appeared. The Russian intelligentsia was derived from the secular intellectual elite. There is a tendency to include among the intelligentsia men who hold a university degree and are not necessary politically inactive. The concept of intelligentsia, in Seton-Watson’s context of the Russian Empire in the mid-nineteenth century,

essentially denotes the “free professions”, soon acquired an undertone of opposition to the regime. No member of the intelligentsia could be a supporter of

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89 Schücking in The Sociology of Literary Taste (1944). Here, the version is quoted from Huszar 1960:32-41.
90 Seton-Watson’s article published in Encounter (September 1955). Here, the version is quoted from Huszar 1960:41-51.
the regime, and no convinced supporter of the regime could be considered a member of the intelligentsia.\(^{91}\)

This means that Seton-Watson did not deny the political involvement of the intelligentsia, however only in opposition to the governing elite.

Furthermore, other terms occur such as scholars, prophets and moralists. They are more or less connected with politically inactive ‘intellectuals’ with a university degree who might show their interest in politics in public appearances and speeches. Bell made a distinction between the intellectual and the scholar as follows: a scholar, in his view, has a bounded field of knowledge, a tradition, and seeks to find his place in it, to test knowledge of the past. In contrast, an intellectual, Bell continues, judges the world by his own sensibilities.\(^{92}\) A similar comparison was also made by MacLeish, who claimed that the past belongs to the scholars; the present to intellectuals.\(^{93}\) A scholar is not usually politically engaged, although he might own a large theoretical knowledge about politics.

A scholar, who is in the position of a teacher, might in Mannheim’s view, after careful deliberation, address his students with a comprehension of the political situation.\(^{94}\) However, he should never intend to politically manipulate his students as the lecture halls are not a political arena. A scholar-teacher would thereby become a prophet. A prophet, as defined above by Spender, offers his experience as a kind of secret formula for saving society. Like the moralist, he preaches about the future which can be reached only by the means which he is suggesting. The prophet’s ‘secret formulas’ often closely resemble the ideas of the governing elite, in whose favour both a prophet and a moralist usually speak out.

So far we have looked at an ‘intellectual’, who is apolitical, and whose only concern is his basic mission as a truth seeker; or who is more or less in opposition to the governing elite; or whose support of the governing elite is marginal in an apolitical way. However, there occur ‘intellectuals’ who are politically engaged and who are furthermore in a close relationship with the governing elite. Such ‘intellectuals’, by sticking to Benda’s denunciation of politically active ‘clerks’, lose their intellectual

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\(^{91}\) Seton-Watson in Huszar 1960:43.
\(^{92}\) Bell 1960:372.
\(^{93}\) MacLeish (in Huszar 1960:243).
\(^{94}\) Mannheim 1936:162.
independence, and become laymen, mandarins, conformists, or even create a part of the establishment.

The term layman as explained above was used by Benda for ‘intellectuals’ who show their passion for politics. The term mandarins was mentioned above in connection with Lüthy’s observation of ‘intellectuals’ in France in the 1950s. However, the term mandarins was coined by members of the Frankfurt School in the 1920s and referred to those ‘intellectuals’ who were prepared only to function in the service of the status quo.

The term conformist has a wider application than mandarin or layman, as it does not always have to be connected with the political role of an ‘intellectual’. In other words, whoever is in absolute accordance with the political or social system might be labelled a conformist. A conformist-‘intellectual’ does not question the validity of the existing political regime or the accepted rules of society. By his obedience, he actually becomes a quiet supporter of the governing elite.

The last term which is worth mentioning in the context of this work is the establishment. The difficulty with this term is that it has lately been widely used in the political context, thereby becoming more or less a fixed indication of people who belong to a small circle with political influence. However, as Parry claims, there is no universally accepted definition of establishment. The establishment is not characterised by an education, or an appearance, but by contacts and links which play a crucial role in getting a role in the establishment. In the context of this work, where the focus is more or less on the relation between an intellectual and his political role, it might be argued that an ‘intellectual’ who is using his intellectual ‘independence’ in pursuit of his political advantages and is thus abusing his influence, has become part of the establishment. To put it more simply, it can be said that an ‘intellectual’ who aspires to be a member of the establishment is one who is ‘behind the scenes’, in the position of an eminence grise. His role within the governing elite thereby appears to be invisible, however decisively influential.

95 In this connection, Lüthy pointed out Simone de Beauvoir’s, Les Mandarins, 1955.
96 Jay 1996:11.
1.1.2 The concept of the Finnish cultural elite

Before discussing the term ‘intellectuals’ and ‘intelligentsia’ in the Finnish context of the 1950s, it might be recalled that focusing attention on the political affiliations of the cultural, and later the industrial elite, is no accident. As claimed in the Introduction, social elites are more sensitive towards political and social transitions than ordinary people. This, Allardt’s observation is in accordance with Aron’s statement. Aron notes that elites react more passionately to political developments as their members have higher social ambitions than other classes\(^{98}\). For that reason, the political and cultural advances which occurred in Finland during the 1950s appear to be more transparent in the examples of the cultural and industrial elites.

Although the concept of an elite with the process of circulation and adaptation has already been discussed, it is worth keeping in mind that the circulation within the elite in particular is a crucial factor within Finnish society due to the small number of people involved in it. This means that the boundary between the mission of a ‘clerk’ (an intellectual) and the political passion of a ‘layman’, as analysed by Julien Benda, might indeed be virtually blended in Finland, as members of the cultural elite often entered the government, and vice versa.

As the term cultural elite which is used in this study is wide in its concept, it begs the question who is embodied in it and it is essential to justify it as such. In the Finnish context, two terms which defined the members of the cultural milieu have been used: sivistyneistö and alymysto. The first difficulty is already evidenced by the unclear distinction between these two terms. The second difficulty appears to be in defining their specific role within Finnish society. If, inspired by Joseph Schumpeter, one consults a dictionary, the result looks similar: no lucid distinction. The term sivistyneistö comprises all educated people and alymysto includes the intelligentsia and intellectuals\(^{99}\).

Furthermore, it will hardly be productive to adopt Mannheim’s and Schumpeter’s concept and look for homogeneity in the cultural milieu to determine them as a social class. The members analysed had different social backgrounds, especially if one compares the younger and older generation. The latter often had its origins in the countryside. In contrast, the younger generation had often been born in the

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\(^{98}\) Aron 1957:218.

\(^{99}\) Such explanations are given by the Finnish-English General Dictionary (Alanne:1982). Suuri sivistys-
sanakirja (Valpola: 2000) does not mention these terms.
towns. Furthermore, the reference to their social origins also varied, as some of them came from well-established families. However, the members of the sivistyneistö or älymystö are in the English translation called the ‘educated class’; a class which is intertwined with education. This might be pointed out as the only common feature.

The members of the analysed cultural elite held a university degree and further took a post whether at the University of Helsinki or in the Academy of Finland. In this respect, a slight difference can be observed from the above-mentioned criterion that not all intellectuals have to be holders of a university degree. From this perspective, the cultural elite more resembled the definition of the intelligentsia whose members usually complete their studies and remain working in the academic world.

However, that the distinction between the älymystö and sivistyneistö is not completely apparent might be demonstrated in how the Finnish cultural milieu characterise themselves. There is a tendency in the works of Risto Alapuro, a leading Finnish sociologist, to use the word älymystö to refer to the members of the university circles. Matti Klinge and Laura Kolbe, who have carried out historical research on the position of university circles within Finnish society, disagree with such a narrow concept. They both call the university circles sivistyneistö or sivistyksellinen eliitti (cultural elite).  

What all three agree on is that the educated class, taking the English translation as a neutral term, has a close relationship with the State, which appears to be crucial in the Finnish context. As has often been recognised, the members of the cultural elite had a close, even symbiotic relationship with the state government. In other words, a professor is a civil servant (virkamies) like any other state employee and academic staff are thus employed by the State.

Moreover, the educated class, who held posts in academic circles, have various social involvements, whether connected with their career or outside it. Most members of the cultural elite were politically engaged and expressed their opinions on political developments in Finland. They were, in many cases, influential regarding public

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100 Matti Klinge argues that it is not possible to speak of intellectuals or intelligentsia in the European sense in Finland, as this would mean a relatively independent group of people who criticise the state bureaucracy. Nor can we talk about ‘coffee-house intellectual-bohemians’ in the Finnish context (Matti Klinge, 8.12. 1999, Helsinki).

101 Sevânen 1997:36. During the 1920s and 1930s, many academics held posts in the government. During the war, they were active in national defence work and military service. Some of them even worked for the propaganda and information services.

102 Sevânen 1997:59.
opinion. For some of them, the university was even a political platform which was supposed to educate young people to understand the post-war political reorientation. Although some of the representatives of the cultural elite seemed to stand apart from political development, they were the ones who remained behind the scenes. Political involvement was by many regarded as a national responsibility during the post-war period when Finnish society had to try to understand its past.

In connection with this, it might be interesting to mention the observation of one of the participants in the Fulbright exchange programme, which has been running in Finland since the beginning of the 1950s. He pointed out that “many of the university professors in Finland are persons with active and time consuming interests in fields outside their teaching, and they are prominent members of society”\(^{103}\).

This reflection shows that the definition of the cultural milieu in Finland is based on its role and position within the State, in which its members are actively engaged; it might even be said that they are part of the State establishment. The political involvement of the educated class, whose members very rarely happen to be in opposition to the State officials, as they \textit{de facto} create them, is in sharp contrast to the apolitical role of an intellectual as defined by Julian Benda and the definition of intelligentsia as characterised by Seton-Watson. Therefore, it would seem that reference to a ‘cultural elite’ embodied into the non-governing elite best recognises its character.

1.1.3 Identification of the cultural elite

In talking about the cultural elite, it is essential to identify the members who will be analysed in the context of the 1950s and justify their emergence into the light of day for the purposes of this study. There exist various ways of proceeding. One possibility is to examine the gap between the generations and thus to compare the subsequent cultural and political developments. Another approach, inspired by C. Wright Mills, might be to explore the institutions in which the cultural elite was involved and where they exercised their influence.

An analysis of the cultural elite in terms of generations would necessitate a larger cultural and political frame of reference within the nineteenth and twentieth centuries due to the widely varying ages of the analysed members. Following the

\(^{103}\) FUSEEC, File 4, 1954-1955.
generation division of Timo Soikkanen and Vesa Vares\textsuperscript{104}, this study would be concerned with five different generations, not taking into consideration such members of the governing elite as J.K. Paasikivi or K.J. Ståhlberg. The cultural elite would include, according to the above mentioned distinction, the following categories:

1. Those who were born in the second half of the nineteenth century (like, for example, V.A. Koskenniemi), and belonged to the so-called Independence War generation, \textit{vapaussota sukupolvi}. This generation was marked by the Russian oppression of Finland at the turn of the twentieth century, which prepared them, as Soikkanen claims, to better fight the Soviet Union during the Winter War.

2. Those who were born at the turn of the twentieth century and as students were active within the Academic Karelia Society are called the AKS-generation, \textit{AKS sukupolvi} (like, for example, Martti Haavio, and Kustaa Vilkuna). This generation might be considered to be a late-born generation of the previous Independence War generation with respect to their political ideals and strong Finnish patriotism embodied in the inter-war Academic Karelia Society’s ideology.

3. Those who were born at the beginning of the 1920s belonged to the so-called War Generation, \textit{sotien sukupolvi} (like, for example, Jan-Magnus Jansson). For this generation, the Winter and Continuation Wars were the key events which marked their life. In the 1950s, they were actively involved in the post-war political development, holding either academic or political positions.

4. Those who were born in the second half of the 1920s and at the beginning of the 1930s are known as the Reconstruction Generation, \textit{jälleenrakennuksen sukupolvi}. This generation, mostly represented within my research (like, for example, Erik Allardt and Jaakko Numminen), was marked by the memory of the home front war, and they actively engaged in the post-war political and economic reconstruction.

5. Those who were born during WW II and in the 1940s belong to the so-called Great Transition Generation, \textit{suuren murroksen sukupolvi} (like, for example, Johan von Bonsdorff). The key-experience of this generation was the transition from an agricultural Finland to an industrially developed country.

\textsuperscript{104} Soikkanen 1998: 37-53.
and Finnish migration to Sweden. Even though Soikkanen and Vares claim that this generation was not marked by any diseases, catastrophes or war experience, and only by post-war development, it might be argued that most of the members of this generation lived the greater part of their life through the Cold War.\(^{105}\)

As we can see from the above, in order to give an adequate account of this typology, it would be essential to analyse the generations already active in the first decade of the twentieth century, in the 1920s and the 1930s, and later in the 1950s. Furthermore, it would be necessary to take into consideration their social backgrounds in greater detail, in order to analyse their recruitment into the elite and the following circulation. Without a doubt, such research would facilitate an excellent comparison of the development of political attitudes within the Finnish cultural elite during the first half of the twentieth century, but it would go far beyond the scope of my own research of the 1950s. For this reason, I have divided the cultural elite into only two generations: the older and the younger.

Such a division of the generations will also help to demonstrate, at least to some extent, the cultural and political differences between the generations of the inter-war period and the 1950s. This generational gap might be considered crucial in terms of a better understanding of the post-war cultural atmosphere of conformity which prevailed within the analysed elite.

In addition to this division into generations, the members of the cultural elite have been classified according to the institutions in which they were involved. The division into institutions also seems to be the most practical solution for the analysis of the cultural elite in the 1950s, as it provides an account of the important cultural institutions during the post-war period. Nevertheless, it has to be noted that the influence on the post-war developments of the political attitudes of the members of the cultural elite analysed in this work were not always in accordance with the institution where they worked. For example, it cannot be claimed that the political convictions of Kustaa Vilkuna reflected the opinions of the University of Helsinki in general.

\(^{105}\) Soikkanen and Vares make a division into only five generations. Within the last generation, it might be of importance to raise the question of whether a sixth category, a so-called Cold War generation, should be created.
The Older Generation

The older generation includes those who were born around 1900, and were active in the 1920s and 1930s, usually in the Academic Karelia Society at the University of Helsinki. The key events of Finnish history, such as the involvement in the Jäger troops, the Civil War, and the Winter and Continuation Wars, influenced their political and cultural engagements and their perceptions of the inter-war and post-war situation in Finland\(^\text{106}\).

Looking briefly at their educational background, the older generation had usually graduated during the period when Finland still belonged to the Russian Empire or just after the Finnish Civil War. They usually had international experience as a result of having attended German universities, with which the University of Helsinki had organised an exchange programme.

In the 1950s, this generation was already well established within the cultural elite and many also had political experience from the previous decades. According to the generation division, this group would include the Independence War generation (1.) and the AKS-generation (2).

Members of this group were primarily involved in two institutions:

a) the old Academy of Finland, Suomen Akatemia

b) the University of Helsinki, Helsingin Yliopisto

The following members of the Academy of Finland have been considered for the purposes of this study: V.A. Koskenniemi (1885-1962), Rolf Nevanlinna (1895-1980), Paavo Ravila (1902-1974)\(^\text{107}\), and A.I. Virtanen (1895-1974). In the second group, I have included Martti Haavio (1899-1973), Edwin Linkomies (1898-1963), L.A. Puntila (1907-1988), and Kustaa Vilkuna (1902-1980).

The Younger Generation

The younger generation includes those who were born in the late 1920s and 1930s. Most of them did not participate in the Winter and Continuation Wars, so firsthand war experience was lacking in some of them.

\(^{106}\) Soikkanen 1998:43. In addition, Soikkanen includes the Great Strike of 1905, the *suurlakko*, as a key event, which is usually neglected.

\(^{107}\) Ravila became a member of the Academy of Finland in 1954. Until then, he was a Rector of the University of Helsinki.
During the 1950s, they studied or already taught at the University of Helsinki; thus, they could fully enjoy the new post-war educational opportunities, such as travelling abroad to English-speaking countries. Most of the younger generation was active in the student corporations and to a great degree they contributed to the Ylioppilaslehti, which, together with the Finnish Cultural Fund (Suomen Kulttuurirahasto) and the Paasikivi Society (Paasikivi Seura), happened to be the most important platforms from where recruitment into the elite occurred.

To follow the division of the generations undertaken by Soikkanen and Vares, this generation would comprise a smaller part of the War generation (3); the Reconstruction generation (4) is mainly presented; and partly the Great Transition generation (5). The younger generation includes the following people: Erik Allardt (b.1925), Yrjö Blomstedt (1924-1994), Pauli Burman (b.1933), Lars Dufholm (b.1920), Jaakko Iloniemi (b.1932), Jan-Magnus Jansson (b.1922), Antero Jyränki (b.1933), Jaakko Numminen (b.1928)\(^\text{108}\).

For the younger generation, student corporations and the Ylioppilaslehti, the student newspaper, was the ‘elevator’ to the top\(^\text{109}\), of course not neglecting family background, as in the case of Johan von Bonsdorff. Many young men coming from the countryside to Helsinki took the chance given by the political changes in the 1950s and most of them even joined the governing elite later on, for example Jan-Magnus Jansson or Jaakko Iloniemi. The 1950s offered many opportunities, but also closed many ‘doors’ for people who had difficulties adapting to the post-war situation.

Post-war elite recruitment was not only important for the younger generation in Finland. The older generation had already established its position within the cultural elite (e.g. A.I. Virtanen), and some of them even attained status within the governing elite (e.g. Edwin Linkomies); thus, post-war political developments affected them, too. The careers of Paavo Ravila and Kustaa Vilkuna are excellent examples of the so-called elevator for aspirant males\(^\text{110}\), the herrahissi in operation amongst the older generation. One could even argue that Vilkuna became the ‘shadow’ of the ‘history maker’ due to his close involvement in politics.

\(^{108}\) The group analysed is small in number. It might clearly be larger as many other important figures emerged during the post-war period.
\(^{110}\) The term herrahissi was coined by Yrjö Kallinen in the 1920s (Kurjensaari 1960:232).
Applying Giddens typology of adaptability to the elites being studied here, one has to argue that most members of the cultural and industrial elites took the attitude of pragmatic acceptance, along with a modicum of sustained optimism, as was the case with Edwin Linkomies. Nevertheless, such personalities as A.I. Virtanen expressed some kind of opposition, although not radical. Accordingly to Merton, conformity was dominant.
1.2 The industrial-banking elite

In addition to describing the cultural elite, defined above in terms of Pareto’s non-governing elite, a theoretical foundation for a description of Finland’s industrial-banking elite has to be provided. Little has been written about this influential group and its political aspirations and influence within Finnish society in the 1950s, in comparison with academic circles. Perhaps one reason for this neglect is that examining this small group of people, which is defined by Matti Alestalo as the upper class, might seem to be irrelevant due to the rapid expansion of the working class in Finland which the 1950s witnessed. However, there is at least some truth to Timo Koste’s observation that the Finnish economy was ruled by ‘Twenty Families’, which in any case indicates the crucial importance of this small but influential group.

According to Oiva Laaksonen’s research on the social mobility of Finnish business leaders, during the 1950s most of Finland’s business leadership still consisted of old-guard directors, who were often the founders of their companies. This slowly changed by the second half of the 1960s, when the so-called ‘managerial revolution’ occurred in Finland, enhanced by the fact that either most old entrepreneurs had resigned their post by the 1960s or had passed away.

In any case, the importance of the old entrepreneurs during the 1950s cannot be underestimated. The economic conditions in Finland pertaining after the Armistice Agreement in 1944 and the imposition of huge war reparations forced the directors of the largest Finnish companies to maintain close connections with politicians, and such contacts were crucial not only for Finland’s economy, but also for the political development of the country. The members of the industrial elite took an active part in the negotiations between Finland and the Western economic structures and their contacts, which often took place at a personal level, assisted the successful economic integration of Finland.

With such co-operation, which was not only based on business interests but also on the patriotic responsibility of the Finnish business circles after the war, lay one of the

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111 Alestalo 1986: 106, 140.
112 Koste 1969:64-83. Koste focused on the family interrelations in the big Finnish enterprises and their connections with the largest Finnish bank. He pointed out the most influential and interconnected businesses in Finland at the end of the 1960s, inspired by similar statistics in France.
113 Laaksonen 1962:11.
reasons why the industrial-banking elite is analysed in the context of the 1950s and why it is contrasted with the cultural elite and its reflections on the post-war situation. However, in order to substantiate their importance, it is essential to justify the term the ‘industrial-banking elite’ used within this study and to identify the analysed members.

Following that, a theoretical foundation will be outlined for an examination of the social mobility and adaptability of this elite to the post-war conditions, making a brief distinction between the cultural and industrial-banking elites which will be analysed later. Furthermore, it may be important to take a look at the social background of the industrial elite and thereby to examine the argument of Heikki Waris\(^{115}\) that the basis of its strong economic and social prestige may be found in its belonging to the well-established, wealthy Swedish-speaking minority.

1.2.1 A definition of the Finnish industrial-banking elite

One might agree with Parry, who claims that, in principle as many elites as there are human activities can be defined\(^{116}\). Just as one might talk about a cultural elite, one might also talk about a military or a religious elite, depending on one’s own perceptions of a theoretical approach. In this context, Pareto’s term of the non-governing elite will be taken as decisive, which means that members of the industrial-banking elite were not a part of the governing elite during the period in question in this study. Of course, circulation within elites occurs and has to be taken into consideration; however, in the 1950s, the members of the elite analysed here did not play a direct role in political decision-making\(^{117}\). Only by virtue of their status as leading industrialists were they able to exercise an influence within the economic and political fields which might be defined more or less as a role ‘behind the scenes’.

There are many different ways of identifying the members of the industrial-banking elite, and this elite might be given anyone of several different labels. Instead of referring to an industrial-banking elite, it might be more accurate and simple to call this group a business elite. The term-business elite is encountered more commonly in the theoretical literature. Parry includes amongst the business elite those “whose investment

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\(^{115}\) Waris 1952:82.

\(^{116}\) Parry 1969:75.

\(^{117}\) There are a few exceptions, like, e.g., Rainer von Fieandt, who held the post of Prime Minister for a period of less than six months in late 1957 to early 1958. However, during that time he was no longer engaged with the PYP bank, where his position was taken by Göran Ehnrooth.
decisions and ‘confidence’ substantially influence a governing elite’s economic and social welfare programme.\textsuperscript{118}

However, subsequent studies of the business elite have referred instead to a managerial elite, which is connected with the decline or displacement of the ‘old-guard’ owners and thus with the decline of the business elite. This was not yet the case in Finland in the 1950s, when most of the old-guard directors, as noted above, were still in charge of their own businesses. For that reason, it appears to be useful in this context to refer to a business elite, despite the fact that I will refer to the decline of the old-guard businessmen and the rise of a new managerial class—a skilled technical elite, which was tied to the companies it worked for principally as jobholders.\textsuperscript{119}

Furthermore, in a book published in 1956, C. Wright Mills referred to the business elite, mainly with reference to the United States, as a part of the power elite, together with the government and military elites. Such a definition contrasts with Pareto’s definition, which refers to a non-governing elite. Susan Keller defined the business elite as the strategic elite, which, in pursuing its own interests, appears to represent the national interest.\textsuperscript{120} In addition to the business elite, Keller includes the military, diplomatic, and scientific elites among the strategic elites, which all together contribute essential services to the realisation of the achievement of economic growth and political stability. In this respect, I would agree with Keller that the business elite has its own important share in the process of economic growth. Above all, its relations with the governing elite can have a substantial influence on political stability.

Based on this general understanding of the terms ‘industrial and business elite’, the common characteristics of the group analysed within the Finnish context of the 1950s has to be identified in order to arrive at a common definition. Firstly, most of the members analysed were managing directors of the biggest industrial companies in post-war Finland, and were mainly involved in the engineering and the paper industries. These heavy industries played a key role in the post-war Finnish economy, mainly on account of their importance for foreign trade. Without its rapid revitalisation, the Finnish economy would not have been able to begin the process of industrialisation, and therefore the emphasis on industrialists is important.

\textsuperscript{118} Parry 1969:75.
\textsuperscript{119} Parry 1969:51.
\textsuperscript{120} Keller 1963:96-97.
However, the reader must remember the close connections between the industrial and financial sectors in the Finnish economy, on which account the members of the banking circles cannot be excluded from this study. Even though in the 1950s there were only two main banks in Finland, they both prospered on account of their closely related mutual interests with the industrial enterprises. For this reason, the bankers and financial experts should be embodied in the elite analysed.

In addition to the leadership of the banking and industrial communities, I have included the owner of Finland’s largest newspaper, the Helsingin Sanomat in my study. Such a decision has been based on the significance of the newspaper in the post-war period and the media as a whole for post-war public opinion, and the influence which the owner of Helsingin Sanomat, exercised in terms of his involvement in the industrial and banking circles.

If the term ‘industrial elite’ were to be used, the above-mentioned personages from the financial circles would, strictly speaking, have to be left out. Nor would the term ‘business elite’ be all that appropriate since much of the company allegiance was founded on family relationships, inheritance, and personal relationships rather than stock ownership. Even a ‘managerial elite’ was emerging only gingerly at the end of the 1950s and had as yet, for all its technical skills, no real right to wield power and make decisions. Hence, the term industrial-banking elite appears to be the most accurate and perspicacious, the result of the key linkage between the banking sector and the larger industries and the considerable influence which they wielded on economic developments in post-war Finland.

In these circumstances, the banking sector cannot be separated from the industrial sector in post-war Finland. Conversely, the participation of industrialists on the board of governors (hallintoneuvosto) of the two main Finnish banks, the Kansallis-Osake-Pankki, KOP, (the National Bank) and the Pohjoismaiden Yhdyspankki, PYP, (the Scandinavian Union Bank) was taken into consideration. This approach makes it possible to do justice to the close co-operation between the banks and industry, as well as between the governing elite and the industrial-banking elite. Furthermore, such an analysis allows us to recognise small but significant political differences between the Finnish-speaking and Swedish-speaking economic elites.

121 Kuisma (27.03.2000, Helsinki), Maude (31.05.2001, Turku).
There exist also other possible criteria which might be significant in the emergence of the members of the Finnish industrial-banking elite; nonetheless, none of them seem to be satisfactory. For example, Parry mentions wealth, which may be particularly decisive with regard to an industrial-banking elite. However,

a powerful man is not necessarily wealthy, a wealthy men is not necessary powerful. But wealth often goes along with the control of economic resources [and] direction of an industry.

Even if, as in the case of post-war Finland, wealth went hand-in-hand with power, due to the size of the upper class, wealth does not have to be the clearest indication of membership of the industrial-banking elite. Moreover, it might be argued that, its members might come to light on the basis of Hjerpe’s tables of the largest industrial enterprises in Finland in 1948 and 1964. However, such an analysis would demand a precise explanation of complicated mergers, would exclude the banking sector, and would ultimately be of little value in this study.

1.2.2 The identification of the industrial-banking elite and their social background

As shown in the generational approach defined above for the cultural elite, the industrial-banking elite belongs almost exclusively to the older generation of males born between 1885 and 1907. This means that, according to the division of the generations of Timo Soikkanen and Vesa Vares, the members of the elite analysed would belong to two different generations: the so-called Independence War generation (those who were born before 1885) and the so-called AKS-generation (those who can be considered to be the late-born generation of the previous Independence War generation with respect to their political ideals). However, as explained, the Soikkanen-Vares division would be too complex for the purposes of this study; hence, the simpler division into older and younger generations will be used.

Besides that, the Soikkanen-Vares definition of the AKS-generation is not accurate enough to be applied to the industrial-banking elite. The industrial-banking

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122 Parry 1969:122.
123 Laaksonen 1962:23. Comparing statistics, in 1952 the directors of the biggest companies belonged to the group with the highest salaries (1 per cent of the total population).
elite, even if some of its members took an active part in the Academic Karelia Society, had a different approach to the Society from their cultural counterparts. It appears that the nationalism within the cultural elite during the inter-war period cannot be compared with that of the industrial elite, mainly due to their international connections. However, it does not mean that patriotic movements of that period were irrelevant for the industrialists. They had a different perception of them in respect to their economic interests.

Like the cultural elite, the key events of modern Finnish history left an indelible mark on most members of Finland's industrial-banking elite. All of them experienced the declaration of Finnish Independence; most participated more or less actively in the Civil War; and some in the Jäger movement. They also lived through the Winter and Continuation Wars and many took an active role on the war front or were instrumental in providing economic support to the Finnish Army. In the 1950s, these members of the elite were well established, continuing in their pre-war business, and they wielded a high degree of economic influence which originated from their position.

Amongst the industrial elite, I have included:

a) industrialists who were members of the board of the KOP bank, including its managing director Matti Virkkunen (1908-1980); Elias Erikko (1895-1965), the managing director of the Sanoma Oy; William Lehtinen (1897-1975), the managing director of the Enso-Gutzeit Oy; and Juuso Walden (1907-1972), the owner of the Yhtyneet Paperitehtaat Oy.

b) industrialists involved on the board of the PYP bank, including the leaders of the PYP bank: Göran Ehrnrooth (1905-1996), the deputy director of the PYP bank and its managing director since 1955; Rainer von Fieandt (1890-1974), the managing director of the PYP until 1955; Carl Johan Ehrnrooth (1898-1967), the chairman of Kymi Oy; and Jacob von Julin (1906-1987), the managing director of Kaukaan Tehdas Oy.

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126 The number of the members of the industrial elite might be larger. I have taken into consideration the most influential representatives. Nevertheless the importance of their 'influence' is, of course, debatable.  
127 The English name of the company Yhtyneet Paperitehtaat Oy, the United Paper Mills, will be used throughout the text.
The PYP bank is the oldest banking institution in Finland (est. 1868) and it used mainly to represent the interests of the Swedish-speaking companies and similarly oriented industrialists\textsuperscript{128}.

Despite the fact that Wilhelm Wahlforss (1891-1969), the managing director of \textit{Wärtsilä Oy}\textsuperscript{129}, was never on the board of the PYP, I would include him in this group due to the close relationship between the Wärtsilä Concern and the PYP bank. Although their business interests were closely intertwined, for personal reasons Wahlforss was never invited to take a place on the bank’s board\textsuperscript{130}. However, the account of the members of the industrial-banking elite in post-war Finland would not be complete without including Wilhelm Wahlforss, as the Wärtsilä Concern was the biggest Finnish industrial company in 1948 and 1964\textsuperscript{131}.

As the term industrial-banking elite has been justified and its members identified, it should briefly be mentioned what the process is within the elite that is going to be discussed. I will point out the factors influencing recruitment into the elite, and the changes in terms of hierarchy of family background and education. Furthermore, the importance of social contact in Finnish industrial circles will be outlined and finally a distinction between the cultural and industrial-banking elite will be made; thus, the reader will be able to see clearly the apparent differences as they will be important for further analysis.

According to Oiva Laaksonen, the development of industry on the territory of today’s Finland happened in the second half of the nineteenth century when changes took place within the business circles\textsuperscript{132}. With the establishment of financial institutions in the 1860s, merchants were able to concentrate on their own business interests, as the banks took care of their financial matters. The merchants were thus diversified into industrialists, businessmen, bank directors and managers and ship owners. The status of the business circles increased and expanded during this period. The new stratification within Finnish society was, as Laaksonen says, influenced by new factors in education and social background.

\textsuperscript{128} Kuisma (27.03.2000, Helsinki).
\textsuperscript{129} The English name of the company, Wärtsilä Concern, will be used throughout the text.
\textsuperscript{130} Zilliacus 1984:272.
\textsuperscript{131} Hjerppe 1979:176-178.
\textsuperscript{132} Laaksonen 1962:36-38.
Any examination of the social background of the industrial elite requires us to distinguish between the Swedish-speaking and Finnish-speaking members. The distinction is due not to any language difference but to historical and cultural factors at work within the business circles. In the 1870s, Swedish-speaking directors were predominant in industry and in shipping transport. Often, they were already second- or third-generation entrepreneurs. In other words, the Swedish-speaking businessmen had the advantage of longer experience and closer family contacts than their Finnish-speaking counterparts. However, by the end of the nineteenth century, names of Finnish origin started to appear among the merchants. This means that the generation of the Finnish-speaking industrial elite that was already well established in the 1950s was mostly of the second business generation. Generally speaking, their fathers had founded the companies which they now ran, as may be seen in the case of Juuso Walden.

Laaksonen researched the social background of the industrialists in the 1930s and in the 1950s from the point of view of their father's occupation. He concluded that in 1930 almost 31 per cent of the fathers of the directors of Finland's biggest enterprises had also been businessmen. However, almost 27 percent of fathers had their social origins in agriculture. Twenty years later, in 1951, the percentage of those whose fathers had been in agriculture fell to 14 per cent. Industrialists whose fathers were also industrialists increased to 35 percent.

Using comparable data from the United States, Susan Keller found that almost 57 percent of the business leaders in 1950 had fathers who were businessmen. Only one-quarter of businessmen in the 1950s came from lower-class homes. This shows that the business circles in the USA were historically older and more established than in Finland, where a larger percentage of directors came from agrarian or working-class families.

Besides social background, education is another important factor in the recruitment into the elite, particularly with its growing importance during the post-war period. Laaksonen observed that before the First World War, only a few people in Finland thought that a leadership position in business would require any specific sort of

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133 Laaksonen 1962:37.
134 Laaksonen 1962:37. Laaksonen takes into consideration names of Finnish origins, not the process of Fennisation, when Swedish speakers changed their names into the Finnish equivalent.
137 Laaksonen 1962:63.
education\textsuperscript{138}. This attitude changed after the Second World War when, especially under the influence of the United States, degrees in business administration became prerequisites for leadership in business in Finland also\textsuperscript{139}. Until then, most Finnish members of the industrial-banking elite had either a degree in law or engineering. Comparable data was found by Keller in similar research conducted in the USA. Almost one half of the 1950s generation of American business leaders were trained in law, engineering or some other advanced (MA) studies\textsuperscript{140}.

After the war, education, together with residence in the Finnish capital, Helsinki, where most of the business was transacted, became important factors in recruitment into the industrial-banking elite. Until then, there had been mainly two ways to become a business leader: either to establish a business or to inherit it. Family background was an important factor in recruitment into the elite, a fact which might be analysed in this section of the elite members, who were mostly the original owners or heirs\textsuperscript{141}. Marriage links were also of significance, which might be seen in the example of Wilhelm Wahlforss, who married a daughter of the director of the Turku Iron Industry.

Besides that, social contacts were a primary factor in climbing the social ladder. Although recruitment was considered by Keller to be a process of discovering the "best' available talents", such a process does not always have to be objective\textsuperscript{142}. As Parry argues from the example of the City of London,

personal contact is essential and it is furthered not only by common class and school background but also by overlapping membership on the boards of directors and by the frequency of family businesses and family connections\textsuperscript{143}.

Personal contacts and family connections also played an important role in recruitment into the industrial-banking elite in Finland, where the situation was even more particular, as the business circle was small. For example, Carl Ehmrooth was on the board of the PYP bank, where his brother Göran was a deputy director, and their brother-in-law was Jacob von Julin. Matti Virkkunen married Eeva Honkajuuri, whose father, Mauri Honkajuuri (1882-1948, until 1906 Mauri Tallroth), had previously been

\textsuperscript{138}Laaksonen 1962E:5.  
\textsuperscript{139}Laaksonen 1962:113.  
\textsuperscript{140}Keller 1962:294.  
\textsuperscript{141}Laaksonen 1962:11.  
\textsuperscript{142}Keller 1963:186.  
\textsuperscript{143}Parry 1969:100.
managing director of the KOP bank. Antti Tulenheimo (1879-1952), the Chancellor of the University of Helsinki, joined his nephew, Matti Virkkunen, on the KOP board. In this respect, one can argue that, even if the industrial elite was open to recruitment after the war and it was easier to climb the social ladder, the importance of personal contacts should not be underestimated.

Moreover, it should at least be mentioned that language might also be of importance in recruitment into the elite, especially regarding the banking factor, where each of the analysed financial institutions had their own language interests, though the latter began to wane slowly after the war.

The purpose of the above outline of the situation in Finnish business circles should have clarified the term 'industrial-banking elite' together with the basic factors and circumstances of recruitment into the elite. As such, it will be used in further analysis. In the following paragraphs, the difference between the cultural and industrial elites will be outlined, mostly from the point of view of their influence and social roles. The distinction is essential for a reader to observe the differences and thus better understand the elite's adaptability and recruitment, which will be discussed later.

The basic difference between the cultural and industrial-banking elites is in their role within society and their attitudes towards responsibility. The first elite is the bearer of ideas, supporter of political ideologies and often directly involved in politics. The latter is mainly concerned with its own business matters; however, aware of the impact of political stability on business developments, the industrialists tended to engage in politics, though not directly.

While the cultural elite does not react immediately to societal changes, the industrial circles incline to be more flexible, perhaps as their behaviour is influenced by financial gains and losses. This suggests that the cultural elite responded more rigidly in comparison with the industrial-banking elite to changes in post-war Finland. Such an assumption would mean that the hypotheses of this study are in question; the

\[\text{\footnotesize 144 The importance of close inner family circles in Finnish business was pointed out by Koste (1969:66).}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize 145 In connection with the language preference, it might be mentioned that it is sometimes claimed that Wilhelm Wahlforss preferred to hire Swedish-speaking rather than Finnish-speaking workers (Zilliacus 1984:130). However, this is meant in a more or less humorous sense, as Wahlforss preferred to speak Swedish to his workers. Further, Zilliacus mentions Wahlforss' 'weakness' for workers who were familiar with bridge, as it was his favourite game.}\]
adaptability of the analysed elites was not similar but different. Why it was like that and what affected such behaviour is the purpose of further analysis.
1.3 The intermediary group

Besides the cultural and industrial-banking elites, one more group will be briefly mentioned in the context of my study: those who were involved in the leading cultural periodicals of that period. They were an important part of the cultural circles and perhaps one might argue they were as influential as the other two elites, as they both needed the media for the reflection and publicity which significantly affected public opinion.

Although those who were involved in journalistic work during the period analysed could be easily and correctly considered to be a ‘media elite’, for the purposes of this study the intermediary group definition seems to be sufficient. In other words, the main focus here is not put on media as such - the journalists of the leading newspapers are excluded - but on the intermediary role between the cultural, industrial-banking and governing elites, which those who were involved in these periodicals occupied. The main task addressed here is to identify the most influential ones, and to explore how they perceived and influenced the post-war situation, and to what extent they engaged in cultural debate and thus became a part of the cultural elite.

The study of the type of interchange is particularly important in Finland, where the social circles are small and closely connected. This means that most members of the non-governing elite, especially the cultural elite, were also linked with this intermediary group, and vice-versa. Apart from such a circulation confining recruitment from outside, it also merged the boundary between the intermediary group and the cultural elite as it is hard to make a clear, explicit distinction between these two groups.

Henceforth, it is essential to identify the key figures in the intermediary group and to become familiar with the character of the periodicals with which they were engaged. This will provide a better understanding of the cultural atmosphere of the 1950s, and also clarify relations between the cultural elite and the intermediary group. However, before doing that, the general role of the media will be briefly pointed out in the context of the 1950s.

\[146\] Sevänänen 1997:37.

\[147\] I would like to re-emphasise that this section on the intermediary group does not aim to provide a full account and analysis of each of the periodicals mentioned in it. The only aim is that a reader will become familiar with and orient himself in this context.
The media might have various tasks, for example to create and express public opinion or to show disagreement with or support for the governing elite. In Raymond Aron’s view, the media disseminate the ideas of others and are the communicating link between the wider public and the elite. In other words, journalists serve as the intermediary between what actually happened and what is permitted to be seen and reported on.

The influence of the media lies in the creation of public opinion, which it influences and maintains. Thus, an ‘official’ picture is given to an ordinary reader about a certain event. C. Wright Mills, inspired by Walter Lippmann’s opinion on the role of the media, claimed that

Very little of what we think we know of the social realities of the world have we found out first-hand. Most of ‘the pictures in our heads’ we have gained from [the] media—even to the point where we often do not really believe what we see before us until we read about it in the paper or hear about it on the radio.

In this context, the role of the media is intertwined with their relation to the role of the elite which is a focus of this study. It is generally agreed that the elite is not able to maintain its position simply by its own action and its own decision-making but, as Pareto claimed, the doctrine of ‘public needs’ is a useful means for the governing or non-governing elite to affirm their power and influence. By ‘public needs’, Pareto meant the role of a media which creates public opinion and decisively serves to maintain the position of the elite. Without the support of the media, the elite would hardly be able to uphold its own interests.

Geraint Parry, in support of Pareto, pointed out that to justify its potential activities, any group aspiring to power, “must state its aims not in self-interested terms but in ways which will gain the acceptance of all other classes and groups in society.” To do so, Parry continued, the elite constructs and propagates its ideological defence by controlling the communications and the media. Through these, the elite may spread the values which implicitly legitimise the elite’s position. In other words, for Parry, the elite needs to control the media to gain support for exercising its power and influence.

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148 Aron 1957:205.
149 Lippmann 1922:45.
150 Mills 1956:311.
151 Pareto 1935:1618.
152 Parry 1969:56-57.
Through the media, the elite attains its goals, the manipulation of society for its own purposes.

Joseph Schumpeter elaborated the influence of the press from the socio-economic aspect. For him, the large-scale newspaper concern is in most cases simply a capitalist business enterprise whose very purpose is to advocate its interests or views. The newspaper concern is, as Schumpeter continued, the most powerful tool for raising the position and increasing the influence of the intellectual group. This means that whoever is responsible for the newspaper concern is also responsible for recruitment into the elite and its circulation. The person who rules the newspaper predetermines the direction of the intellectual debate, which creates one's 'own' opinion.

C. Wright Mills, in the context of his analysis of the power elite, distinguished between the mass and the public and was concerned about the direction towards which the media had turned in the mass society characteristic of the 1950s. For Mills, public communications should be organised so as to provide a chance of immediately and effectively replying to any opinion expressed in public. In contrast, in the mass media, far fewer people, if any, had an effective means of answering back. This meant that people were unable to communicate with their source of news, and thus they believed in the created public opinion which had been adjusted by the elite to support their power and influence.

For Mills, the media have not only filtered into our experience of external realities, they have also entered into our very experience of our own selves. They have provided us with new identities and new aspirations of what we should like to be, and what we should like to appear to be.

In Mills' view, the media gives an identity to a man in the mass, an identity which is predetermined by the elite, so that the elite would not be in disagreement with it. Thus, the elite through the media has increased its position and power.

Exploring these opinions on the media, it appears that journalists have been closely connected with the governing and non-governing elites in a society. Through the media, the elite manipulates public opinion, persuading it in a non-violent way, by

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propaganda, to accept and follow its ideology. The media is a means of power, and might even be considered to be a part of the non-governing elite. Mills goes even further in his perception, which is strongly influenced by the social development of post-war America with its impact of the mass media on the loss of man’s self-identity.

In the context of this study, the impact of the mass media, which was the main concern of Mills, appears not to be of crucial importance. The focus here is put on the leading cultural periodicals and to what extent they influenced the post-war cultural atmosphere by their reflections and views. Those who were engaged in such periodicals as Ylioppilaslehti, Suomalainen Suomi, Valvoja, Nya Argus, Suomen Kuvalehti and Uusi Kuvaleti, not only expressed their opinions on the situation in Finland but also played an important role in the creating of the character of the cultural atmosphere.

The selection of the above-mentioned periodicals for the purposes of this analysis is not, therefore, accidental. All were leading platforms around which the most prominent members of the cultural elite concentrated. Members of the industrial-banking elite usually provided the financial support for those periodicals which were closer to their own ideals and convictions. Within these periodicals, topics of cultural debate were introduced and followed up. It might be argued that they represented the character of the Finnish cultural milieu in two respects: firstly, in reflecting the cultural and political atmosphere of the 1950s with variations between the generations dominant in the 1930s and 1950s; and secondly, in their recruitment and circulation.

It might be suggested that the intermediary group supported the official political line of the governing elite, and that the members of the intermediary group more or less adhered to it. The aim was not to have opinions which would deviate from the underlying political situation. If it is claimed that opinions are framed by the dominant values of society, it appears that the values of Finnish society were framed in the 1950s by the war experience which left Finns in doubt about their national self-esteem which, however, was enhanced by the necessity of political unanimity and cultural conformity.

The situation in Finland is even more peculiar with its narrow social circulation, which only underlines the small dimension of the cultural and political circles in the post-war period. In other words, new members of the governing elite were recruited from the intermediary group, as well as from the cultural elite. For example, most

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156 Parry 1969:56-57.
157 E.g., the financial support of Suomalainen Suomi by the KOP during the 1940s (Leino-Kaukiainen 1991:446).
editors of the Ylioppilaslehti and Suomalainen Suomi during the 1920s and 1930s became members a decade later of the governing or non-governing elite. Further, these periodicals, particularly the Ylioppilaslehti, served as a platform for the recruitment of new members into the elite; they served as the social ladder, an 'elevator to the top' during the 1920s as well as the 1950s.

Ylioppilaslehti

When focusing on the various leading cultural periodicals of the 1950s and their characteristics, the Ylioppilaslehti should be taken first. Together with Suomalainen Suomi and Nya Argus, the Ylioppilaslehti was considered to be the largest cultural-political journal in Finland. Its readers existed not only among university circles but also among the general public. The Ylioppilaslehti was a platform from which students and academics could voice their opinions on such diverse topics as literature, film, politics and economics. During the 1950s, it was the "Ylioppilaslehti which restored the right to express opinions freely, which had been lost after the Second World War." In other words, the Ylioppilaslehti was, arguably, a medium for cultural and political discussion and debate, which would otherwise not have taken place in post-war Finland.

The Ylioppilaslehti was established in 1913 by students of the University of Helsinki to express their views and opinions on the political and cultural situation in Finland. However, it became one of the platforms from which ambitious young male students were recruited into governing or non-governing elites. This was most significant during the inter-war period, and those who were recruited usually remained in post-war Finnish politics. For example, Urho Kekkonen took part in the newspaper and for a certain period he was even the editor-in-chief of the Ylioppilaslehti, as were

\footnote{Kolbe 1993:106-107. Kolbe devoted greater attention to the importance of the Ylioppilaslehti and its role in recruitment into the elite during the 1950s.}

\footnote{Ylioppilaslehti 1959, #2 (an article written by Matti Klinge, Ylioppilaslehtea 1958 selaillessa, Ylioppilaslehti in 1958).}

\footnote{In Ylioppilaslehti (1954, #5) a poll was conducted to discover which topics most interested the YL readers. The cultural reviews, regularly published, appeared to be the most popular, followed by literary articles and political columns, economic surveys and sports pages. This shows that the range of the YL was wide, and not only focussed on issues of student life.}

\footnote{Linnilä 1997:476.}
Martti Haavio and Kustaa Vilkuna, who were actively engaged in the debates of the 1920s.

A similar trend continued in the 1950s, when many of the younger generation active in the Ylioppilaslehti became either part of the governing or non-governing elites during the later decades. This shows the importance of the Ylioppilaslehti in terms of climbing the social ladder, which was facilitated by the close co-operation between the University and State officials. Most of them published their opinions in the Ylioppilaslehti, or were invited to participate in various cultural debates organised by the periodical or the Finnish Cultural Fund.

Looking briefly at the character of the articles published during the post-war decade, there appears to be a clear difference between the beginning and the end of the 1950s. At the beginning, the content of the Ylioppilaslehti seemed to be written more carefully, perhaps more in response to Finland’s internal political situation than for any deeper lack of political opinion. Most articles of that time were concerned with the general issues concerning post-war economic reconstruction and the lack of housing, and a significant part was devoted to the new student exchanges, which extended the academic opportunities to travel to the United States. Political debates were missing from the context of the Ylioppilaslehti during this period.

Throughout the decade, the Ylioppilaslehti began to reflect more political and economic developments in Finland and the rest of the world, especially emphasising the political situation in Korea and Germany. From the perspective of domestic politics, the presidential election campaign of 1956 was explored in great detail, and the results of the election were widely commented on. The first researched public opinion poll on political affiliations and each presidential candidate’s popularity was conducted among the students and published in the Ylioppilaslehti pages.

Political issues appeared to gain in importance within the Ylioppilaslehti from the second half of the 1950s, whether concerning events in Hungary and Suez in 1956, or the internal domestic crisis a couple of years later. This was certainly influenced by the change in the generations and was affected by the situation elsewhere in Western

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162 Klinge (1963:62, 77) pointed out that many who were active in the Ylioppilaslehti during the inter-war period, and after the war, became key figures in the cultural and political life of Finland.


164 E.g., Ylioppilaslehti 1952, #40.

165 Ylioppilaslehti 1956, #1 (conducted by Perti Pessonen, an article Ylioppilaiden poliittiset kannannotot, Students political affiliations).
Europe, with the beginning of the adoption of left-wing and Marxist ideas. This happened for the first time in Finland; until then, the Ylioppilaslehti had been more or less associated with right-wing political convictions, which was underlined by the attitudes of the people who were involved in it.

The year 1959 brought important changes for the Ylioppilaslehti, and it is often regarded as the year when the new, 1960s period of the Ylioppilaslehti began. In 1959, a new editor-in-chief, Arvo Salo, was elected. With Salo’s influence, the characteristic interaction of the 1950s between the Ylioppilaslehti and the Suomalainen Suomi was limited. Although this was upsetting for the older generation, it enabled the younger generation to straddle Left-wing ideas and thereby commence with progressive thought. Arvo Salo, a Social Democrat, made the periodical become one of the leading political-cultural platforms. Arguably, this was the inevitable change of generations, the turning point resulting in the change from the conservative 1950s to the radical 1960s.

Suomalainen Suomi

Many of those who wrote for the Ylioppilaslehti during the inter-war period also contributed to another influential periodical, Suomalainen Suomi. It was established in 1933 by people closely involved in the AKS society and the Suomalaisuuden Liitto, the League of Finnishness, during a period which was strongly enhanced by the atmosphere of Finnish patriotism. The name of the periodical, Finnish Finland, reflected the political attitudes of its contributors. During the 1930s, Suomalainen Suomi published articles about the position of the Finnish language and Finns rather than general literary reviews and articles pertaining to the cultural debate. The periodical supported and propagated nationalistic ideas, and served to spread moods of Finnish patriotism, and its readers were mostly Finnish-speaking Finns with similar political sympathies.

As they had done with the Ylioppilaslehti, recruitment and circulation also occurred within the Suomalainen Suomi. This means that many of those who expressed their ideas in Suomalainen Suomi in the 1930s, like, for example, Urho Kekkonen,

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166 Kirby 1979:206.
169 During the 1930s, almost 20 per cent of the articles were about literature, and more than 15 per cent about the language issue (Leino-Kaukianen 1991:442).
belonged to the governing elite a decade later. Other contributors, like Arvi Korhonen, Kustaa Vilkuna, and Marrit Haavio, became an important part of the cultural elite during the 1950s.

After the war, the inter-war nationalistic tone softened, although no major changes occurred within the circles of the contributors of the Suomalainen Suomi with its editor-in-chief, Esko Aaltonen. Even if a few new members of the younger generation participated in the periodical, they were similarly politically oriented, upholding the ideas of Finnish patriotism in terms of the post-war political atmosphere. During the 1950s, Suomalainen Suomi focused more on topics about Finnish literature and history. Writing about the past enabled the journal to remind the nation of its heroic character. Political issues, which might have aroused deeper controversy, were left aside. However, the political agenda continued to be analysed in the periodical\(^{170}\).

The following contributors to the Suomalainen Suomi during the 1950s (some of them contributed also to the Ylioppilaslehti) might be regarded as members of the previously-mentioned intermediary group, mainly due to their activities and involvement:

Lauri Hyvämäki (1913-1980), who coined the term vaaran vuodet, ‘the years of danger’ term for the period 1944-1948 in Finland. In 1966, he became editor-in-chief of the Suomalainen Suomi\(^{171}\).

Kauko Kare (1914-1996), one of the sharpest critics of the 1950s\(^{172}\), who was assistant to the editor during 1948-1952 and 1957-1966\(^{173}\).

Matti Kuusi (1914-1998), already active in the Academic Karelia Society during the 1930s, became a professor of folk poetry at the University of Helsinki after the war.

The following members of the younger generation might be included:

Pekka Lounela (b.1932), who made his name with his pamphlet Ollaan sitten suomalainen (Let us be Finnish) published in 1959. He was critical of the previous war generation, and thus he was much disliked by those for whom the crowning-point of Finnishness was its beatification in the Winter War\(^{174}\).

\(^{170}\) E.g., Suomalainen Suomi, pp. 369-371, 1958, #6, Pertti Pesonen’s article about the elections and research.

\(^{171}\) Lauri Hyvämäki changed his Swedish sounding name Hymander in 1934.


\(^{173}\) Kauko Kare changed his Swedish sounding name Karén in 1932.

Eino S.Repo (b.1919) working for the publishing house Otava and Gummerus. During the 1960s, he became the director of Finnish radio, Yleisradio.

Jouko Tyyri (1929-2001) became for the generation of the 1950s the same as Matti Kurjensaari for the 1930s generation, one of the ‘noisiest’ critics of that period, keen on political issues and later one of the loyal supporters of President Kekkonen. These people created the inner circle of the intermediary group whose opinions and reflections on the political and cultural atmosphere will be looked at and overviewed in this study.

Valvoja

Suomalainen Suomi’s older counterpart was Valvoja, established at the end of the nineteenth century with a deeper emphasis on literary reviews and a more limited focus on political topics. Until 1944, the journal’s title was Valvoja-Aika, when the name was shortened to Valvoja. During the inter-war period, Valvoja maintained its original intentions and concentrated on literary criticism.

After the war, the character of the periodical was preserved, as Valvoja expressed opinions pertaining to political reorientation only marginally and any kind of political debate seldom occurred within its pages. If any political issue was touched upon, it was only in accordance with the official political line

Valvoja was more closer intertwined with university circles than Suomalainen Suomi, whose inner circle was mainly represented by members of the intermediary group, while many members of the cultural elite were embodied in Valvoja. The heart of Valvoja was Edwin Linkomies and V.A. Koskenniemi, whose critics and opinions will be of major interest as they are both members of the cultural elite analysed here.

In comparison with Suomalainen Suomi, which became enriched by the younger generation during the 1950s, Valvoja remained mainly connected with the older generation. It was not until 1964 when Yrjö Blomstedt became the new chief-editor and introduced new contributors that the periodical changed its direction slightly.

Nya Argus

Thus far, only Finnish-speaking periodicals have been mentioned. However, the significance of the Swedish-speaking educated class cannot be dismissed. They had

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their own medium through which their political and cultural opinions were discussed and questions addressed. Although Swedish-speaking Finns contributed to Finnish-speaking periodicals like the Ylioppilaslehti, they mostly published their opinions in Swedish-language counterparts like the Nya Argus, a platform for the younger generation, or the Finsk Tidskrift, a platform for the older generation.

The Swedish-speaking cultural elite as well as the intermediary group has traditionally been considered more liberal and open-minded concerning their political and cultural opinions than their Finnish-speaking colleagues during the 1950s. It is claimed that they were more attached to the cultural Scandinavian streams due to the language connections and thus they oriented more easily to foreign influences and showed a deeper interest in new cultural and political streams reaching Finland in the 1950s. Besides the language similarities, it might be argued that social background played a role in expressing more liberal views. Most of the younger generation came from well-situated families, usually involved in university and industrial circles. Therefore, behaviour ‘out of the norm’ could more easily be excused than that of others due to their extensive social connections.¹⁷⁶

The Nya Argus was established in 1911, inspired by the American Nation journal. At first, its main purpose was to deal with political topics and to reflect on the current political situation. After the Second World War, the Nya Argus remained loyal to this approach, especially publishing attitudes towards political reorientation and the post-war circumstances.¹⁷⁷

One of the most important members of the inner circle of the Nya Argus during the 1950s was Jan-Magnus Jansson, who is included in this study in the younger generation of the cultural elite for his stellar academic and political career. Besides him, Georg Henrik von Wright (b. 1916), the well known Finnish philosopher, who spent most of the 1950s lecturing abroad at Cambridge University, for example, and Henrik Zilliacus (1908-1992), a professor of classical literature, created the editorial staff of the Nya Argus during the 1950s. Further, Erik Allardt, a pioneer of Finnish sociology, often published his views in the pages of the Nya Argus.

¹⁷⁶ Ylioppilaslehti 1951, #6, Jörm Donner (b.1933) demanded the cancellation of some of his compulsory lectures at the University of Helsinki. Further, he wanted the right to refuse conscription into the Finnish Army, which was then a national obligation for every young Finnish man over the age of eighteen. He pleaded successfully for alternative service.
Suomen Kuvalehti and Uusi Kuvalehti

The above-mentioned periodicals were more or less read by people who were involved in cultural discussion, and who themselves often formed the educated class. This meant that the tone of the articles was also moderated to this purpose. However, a large spectrum of magazines existed which, even though they were not exclusively targeted at the educated class, but more or less at the general public, promulgated views and thus influenced public opinion.

The Suomen Kuvalehti and Uusi Kuvalehti were among those periodicals which were widely read during the 1950s. The purpose of the magazines was not to focus uniquely on the political agenda but to attract the whole family. Both magazines reflected political events, social changes and cultural happenings, like, for example, the publication of Väino Linna's books. Among the contributors were not only 'unknown' editors, but also 'well known' names like Urho Kekkonen who, under different pseudonyms, regularly published in both magazines.

The Suomen Kuvalehti was established in 1916. After the war, Ilmari Turja (1901-1998) was the editor-in-chief. His slogan was to have the space within the Suomen Kuvalehti to say whatever he wanted straightforwardly and openly. Turja gave space for views to be expressed which were politically Left-oriented and which supported the new political line. However, Turja left the Suomen Kuvalehti in 1951, after a dispute regarding an article he wanted to publish on a scandal in a bank which financially supported Suomen Kuvalehti.

As early as the following year, Turja established a new magazine called the Uusi Kuvalehti which was basically written in the same style as the Suomen Kuvalehti. Moreover, Turja brought to his new magazine all the 'old' agenda of his previous workplace, which means that Kekkonen and others among his adherents also began to publish their opinions there.

What is important is that both magazines were widely read by ordinary Finns, and the fact that most prominent members of the governing and non-governing elites

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178 During the war period, Kekkonen signed himself Pekka Peitsi (Peter the Lance), after the war usually Veljenpoika (Nephew).
179 Malmberg 1991:133.
180 More about this in Malmberg 1991:134.
181 Ilmari Turja is an interesting figure in the Finnish cultural and political scene of the twentieth century. For his close affiliations with Kekkonen, he might easily be called 'a parasite' on someone else's success. Recently, Ilmari Turja has been scrutinised by Finnish literary researchers, so interesting evaluations can be expected.
expressed their opinions within these magazines. This enabled a wider public to become familiar with political attitudes and to form its ‘own’ picture about the post-war situation.

Matti Kurjensaari

Matti Kurjensaari (1907-1988, until 1939 Matti Salonen) was one of the members of the intermediary group whom I would like to explore in more detail. The reason why I am pointing him out is that he appears to be an example of someone who survived and documented whatever he went through in the historical ‘flow’ of the first decades of independent Finland. Kurjensaari was already active during the 1920s and 1930s within the literary group called Tulenkantajat, the Torchbearers, as well as actively contributing to the Ylioppilaslehti.

After the war, the importance of Kurjensaari might be regarded as twofold. Firstly, he continued with his ‘educational’ reports from his trips abroad. Kurjensaari was one of the few who could travel, as not many Finns could still afford to go abroad. Thereby, Kurjensaari conveyed his experience to Finns who learned about foreign countries through his observations\footnote{During the 1930s, Kurjensaari visited France and pre-war Czechoslovakia; after the war, he travelled to the Soviet Union and China. Basically, through his reports, Finns became a bit more familiar with these two countries.}.

Secondly, Kurjensaari collected and published his perceptions on post-war development in various articles and books. During the 1950s, Kurjensaari contributed to the Ylioppilaslehti and the Suomen Kuvalehti. Further, he became for a short period an editor-in-chief of the Left-oriented newspaper the Päivän Sanomat (The Daily News). In his regular column called Ihmisten puheet (People talking), Kurjensaari expressed his opinions on current issues. Besides that, he reflected on the post-war situation in his numerous books, for example Suomalainen Päiväkirja (A Finnish Diary), published in 1956, and Jäähyväiset 50-luvulle (Farewell to the 1950s), published in 1960.

Moreover, Kurjensaari was an active member of the Paasikivi Society, established in 1958. He kept close connections with members of both governing and non-governing elites, who were often his colleagues from the inter-war Ylioppilaslehti. However, Kurjensaari, as a representative of the older generation, did not appear to be very popular amongst the younger generation. He was strongly associated with the
values of the 1930s, which was especially underlined by his book Taistelu huomispäivästä (The Struggle for Tomorrow), which provided a picture of that period.

Even though Kurjensaari as a journalist did not deviate from the cultural conformity which prevailed in Finland in the 1950s, his opinions are worth looking at, as will be done in this study, as they seem to show both the generational gap differences and the attempt to open discussion, even if ineffectively. Basically, it might be argued that Kurjensaari was good with his pen, but he lacked the necessary insider's view.

This brief account of the intermediary group was presented in the hope of identifying the major leading cultural periodicals and their contributors for the reader to become acquainted with the context of the period in question. As noted at the beginning, it was not intended to be a detailed analysis of the media and press in Finland, as that is beyond the scope of this study.

To what extent the intermediary group contributed to the character of the cultural atmosphere prevailing during the 1950s, and to what extent they digressed from it, will be the question addressed in Chapter 3.
All organized societies are cemented together, not merely by force and the threat of force, and by established patterns of institutional behaviour, but also by accepted ways of feeling and thinking and talking and looking at the world, by ideologies. A society cannot be together unless there is a fairly general acceptance on the part of most of its members, not necessarily of the same ideology, but, at any rate, of ideologies which develop out of similar roots as starting points\(^\text{183}\).

2. THE 1950s IN THE FINNISH CONTEXT

In the previous chapter, definitions used in the context of this work were offered in the hope of identifying and clarifying the basic principles of the theory of elitism. Henceforth, more attention will be devoted to the second theme of my study, the first post-war decade, the 1950s. After 1944, Finland had to reassess its foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. To what extent such political reorientation occurred in Finnish society will be explained in the following.

2.1 Post-war political reorientation and the key concepts used for the characterisation of the 1950s

After signing the Armistice agreement in 1944, Finnish politicians were forced to recognise, among other things, the anti-Soviet direction of inter-war foreign policy which led to the involvement in war with the Soviet Union\(^\text{184}\). The Finnish nationalism pervasive in the 1920s and 1930s was an obstacle to any concrete international cooperation between Finland and its neighbours in general. The ideals propagated by the adherents of the Academic Karelia Society and the patriotism of the educated class, which was largely represented in the inter-war government, made impossible the formulation of a clear foreign political line which would define the Finnish position abroad. Despite the official proclamations of a search for a concept of foreign relations,

\(^{183}\) Burnham 1943:175.

\(^{184}\) Maude 1998:38.
...the 1950s in the Finnish context...

any deeper attempt largely failed due to the Finnish inability to integrate into the inter-war international political scene.

Finland, as a newly proclaimed independent state, needed to establish its foreign affairs; however, the direction in which to go remained largely unresolved by Finnish politicians. Finland failed to find its place within Scandinavia and the ties that were at least partially developed were not trouble-free as newly declared Finland was regarded with suspicion by its western neighbours. Sweden, the country with which Finland had had hundreds of years of common history, was considered within inter-war Finland not to be a country with which to develop any profound foreign relations. The conflict between Finland and Sweden over the Åland islands complicated relations during the first half of the 1920s, together with the attitudes of Sweden towards neutrality and Sweden's wish not to be too closely involved with Finland engaging itself in an anti-Soviet Union policy. Furthermore, Sweden was more associated with the feeling of the old monarchy, and thus with political and cultural subjugation and antipathy to the Finnishness which played such a key role in inter-war Finland. Even Finnish cultural heritage appeared to be more of a burden of the past than a tradition to continue.

Finnish foreign relations with the Soviet Union were completely neglected during the initial years after gaining independence. Under the influence of the results of the Civil War, there developed a Greater Finnish patriotism and extreme Right political orientation with a strong propaganda of 'hatred of the Russian': the Soviet Union did not represent anything more than a hostile neighbour. Moreover, the question of boundaries was widely regarded as not fully solved, particularly in regard to Eastern Karelia, a territory largely inhabited by Finnic peoples. These circumstances continued to sour relations.

There was not much left besides relations with Germany and the Baltic countries. Despite the cultural influence on Finland of Germany, which was the inter-war centre of education, in terms of a range of subjects from philosophy to engineering, its political importance appeared to be more sentimental with the failure of the desires of the early independence period to create a Finnish monarchy with a king of German

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185 Kirby 1979: 186.
186 Kirby 1979: 113.
187 Klinge (1968: 8, 107) mentions that the Swedish passivity expressed during the Finnish Civil War towards the White troops certainly influenced the negative perceptions of Sweden in independent Finland. 
The failure of the creation of a serviceable inter-war foreign policy led Finland into what Hjalmar Procopé called an international ‘splendid isolation’\(^\text{190}\), which led to the impossibility of an accommodation with the Soviet Union by the end of the 1930s. In spite of the fact that, after Finland’s defeat by Russia in the Winter War, the country gradually entered into a political and military relationship with nazi Germany, the Continuation War, in which Finns and Germans fought together against the Soviet Union, was pronounced by the Finns to be an *erillissota*, ‘co-belligerency’ only and not an alliance. The Finns have maintained that they did not take an active part in the siege of Leningrad and soon left the Murmansk railway alone. Apart from SS volunteers, who fought in southern Russia and the Caucasus, the Finns did not participate on other fronts with the Germans. In a sense, therefore, it might be argued that the experiences of Finland in the Second World War tended to reflect and even deepen its isolation\(^\text{191}\).

Henceforth, the heritage left to post-war Finland from three decades of independent foreign policy was not very inspiring: firstly, Finland was left in international isolation with a clear tendency to avoid any deeper political commitment; and secondly, through its war experience, it built up a strong feeling of self-reliance. Whilst the political isolation was a clear disadvantage, the virtue of self-reliance might, in contrast, be comprehended as a beneficial factor in preserving the post-war independent position of Finland. In comparing the other Eastern European countries with Finland after the war, the former had to rely on a tense alliance with the Soviet Union in the hope of a solution to their political situation. There is a clear distinction between them and Finland, whose war experience equipped Finnish politicians with the necessity of self-reliance.

Finland had to rebuild its post-war foreign policy and devised a concept lacking until then. The new direction was ordained by the results of the war; and friendly

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\(^{189}\) Finnish adherents of the monarchy (J.K. Paasikivi was one of them) intended Prince Friedrich Karl of Hesse, the brother-in-law of Kaiser Wilhelm II, to become the Finnish king.

\(^{190}\) Hjalmar Procopé, who was involved in 1920s Finnish politics, labelled Finnish foreign affairs thus (Kirby 1979:114).

relations with the Soviet Union appeared to be of key significance. In other words, the year 1944 witnessed the beginning of a ‘new’ political era as a result of Finland’s defeat, which four years later was underlined by the treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union.

The post-war Finnish situation was hardened by aspects of the Armistice agreement. The Soviet Allied Control Commission (ACC) was present in Helsinki; right-wing oriented groups and associated organisations were prohibited, and instead the Communist Party came out from illegality. Those who were most involved in war politics were sentenced in the War Guilt Trial in 1945, which appeared to be a traumatic and difficult experience for the Finnish public who did not find the trial legitimate. For most Finns, the war politicians were their own heroes, backing their nation in a period when Finnish independence was threatened, and the political act of subsequently judging them hardly seemed credible.

As post-war political circumstances appeared to have been turned completely upside-down for ordinary Finns, the majority of Finns were hostile to the new political line. It was even harder for the politicians who carried out the political reorientation. Most were politically active during the inter-war period and the ideals of the Academic Karelia Society were closer to them than friendly co-operation with the Soviet Union. The previously neglected foreign policy became the primary issue, personalised around the presidency. The president became responsible for the directions of any negotiations under the rubric of foreign policy needs. This trend began on the initiative of J.K. Paasikivi, who was the creator of the post-war foreign policy and a supporter of friendly co-operation between Finland and the Soviet Union. His successor, Urho Kekkonen, persevered with this direction during his twenty-five years in office, and even developed mutual relations beyond Paasikivi’s vision.

To understand the basic framework of what was happening without going into details which would take us beyond the scope of this study, the situation might be simply explained by the key terms which became most current during that period. The key term of the post-war Finnish political scene was Paasikivi’s Realpolitik.
realismi), from which the rest follows. J.K. Paasikivi (1870-1956), who besides his career in the KOP bank, was politically active as early as 1909, was also involved in the inter-war and war political scene. After September 1944, he was aware of the necessity of a political reorientation to preserve Finnish independence as he recognised the political needs of Finland for a modus vivendi with the Soviet Union. While searching for a solution, Paasikivi became inspired by nineteenth-century politics, when Finnish politicians already sought a suitable political accommodation with Russia. Such an arrangement would allow Finland to maintain its independent position; however, possible political and economic concessions would have to be made in return.

To be able to follow Realpolitik, it was necessary to awaken a feeling of political awareness among Finns about the difficulty of the post-war situation. The inter-war ideas of Finnish patriotism had to be re-evaluated and, as Paasikivi often emphasised in his speeches, Finns should be citizens “without prejudices, trying to understand historical and political circumstances.” This would help to overcome the widespread hostility to the Soviet Union. The feeling of awareness should not only reflect on the political behaviour of Finns, who began to articulate their political opinions carefully, but also on the involvement of the elites in social activities. For example, the debates led by the cultural elite were heavily influenced by this need for a new type of political awareness.

Political awareness pertaining to international activities, enhanced by the feeling of a permanent threat in the case of putting a foot wrong, affected the political atmosphere to such an extent that Finland began to sink deeper into its isolation, the so-called foxhole (potero). In other words, being instructed to assume political awareness, Finns did not engage in any international debates which would have appeared to compromise their post-war position. Although Finns seemed to be interested in events abroad, their lives were preoccupied by harsh economic realities and they were careful about expressing their political views openly. Most Finns adapted to a policy of non-involvement, which responded to the needs of the line of Realpolitik.

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196 Ylioppilaslehti 1948, #22, Paasikivi’s salutation to students during the eightieth anniversary of the Helsinki Student Union.
197 Jorma Kalela (18.02.2000, Helsinki).
198 E.g., although the uprising in Hungary in 1956 was greeted with a great wave of sympathy among Finns, this was not expressed officially. Finland abstained from voting for the United Nations resolution condemning the Soviet military intervention.
Finns often explained their standpoint towards the international situation as the result of their rationality (järkiperääisyys), which appeared beside the political awareness to be another requirement demanded by Paasikivi’s Realpolitik. Behaving in a rational way prevented Finns from any unnecessary political involvement. Paasikivi was especially careful about any international participation which might anger Moscow and threaten the fragile Finnish political position.

Political rationality played an important role in terms of accommodating Finnish economic relations with the West and at the same time reaching political agreement with the Soviet Union. Throughout the 1950s, the political and economic orientation of Finland became crucial for future Finnish developments. The political rationality of Finnish politicians, and Kekkonen in particular, seemed to have two aims: firstly, to strengthen the mutual trust (luottamus) between Finland and the Soviet Union and thus to get ‘permission’ for Western economic co-operation; and secondly, to integrate Finland into the European economic institutions, which would secure the Finnish position outside of the Soviet bloc.

Instead of pointing out the crucial terms which defined the post-war political reorientation and the changes in Finnish patriotic behaviour, one simple term could be used: the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line. This embodied more than was accounted for above, starting with the friendly relations between Finland and the Soviet Union, founded on political awareness and rationality and ending with political unanimity (yksimielisyys). The concept of the Realpolitik forwarded by J.K. Paasikivi, became a solution for post-war tensions in Finnish-Soviet relations, and found its successor in Urho Kekkonen, who in 1956 by the narrowest minority won the presidential election and continued to develop the mutual confidence between Finland and the Soviet Union for next twenty-five years.

Although unanimity was reached on issues of foreign policy during the 1950s, the domestic political scene could hardly be called united and struggle-free. The political reorientation succeeded in terms of foreign affairs; however, the incorporation of the Left into the parliamentary system introduced new forces which Finns had to get used to.

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2.1.1 The Left and the cultural and industrial-banking elites

In the context of this study, mentioning the incorporation of the Left into the parliamentary system after the war and referring to the position of radical political organisations in general, has several focal points of significance. As this study does not wholly concentrate on political developments in post-war Finland, there is no major necessity to investigate the political scene in greater detail; however, the framework has to be outlined. It is important to do so, not only to allow a better understanding of the economic and cultural background but also to observe how the elites analysed here reacted to such changes. Moreover, the restoration of the Left and the wider promulgation of Marxist ideas to a general public deepened the confrontation between the historians and sociologists, when the latter began to take the Marxist approach into their scientific consideration.

In Finland, the Communist Party of Finland, (Suomen Kommunistinen Puolue, SKP) was legalised after two decades of prohibition in 1944, as was implicit in the Armistice Agreement\(^\text{200}\). The SKP had been established in Moscow, in summer 1918, comprising members of the more extreme wing of the Social Democrats and the former Red troops who were involved in the Civil War\(^\text{201}\). During the inter-war period, its function on the territory of Finland was affected by the Right-wing political atmosphere which led to the prohibition of Communist parties at the end of the 1920s. Such circumstances brought about a situation in which the SKP became a totally underground political group, whose work became largely ineffective due to forbidden public activities\(^\text{202}\). A few members moved to the Soviet Union and organised their activity from there, while others who remained in Finland were threatened with persecution\(^\text{203}\).

In general, the situation of the Left oriented parties was uneasy during the inter-war period as there was no radical Left within the political scene. The Social Democrats, whose party was heavily divided on the issue of participation in the Civil War, the SDP (Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue) were, despite their strong

\(^{203}\) Rentola 1986:86. One of the persecuted members was Yrjö Leino, who later became the Minister of the Interior (Upton 1973:178-179).
political rhetoric, committed to the principles of parliamentarism. In other words, instead of taking any radical initiative, the Social Democrats remained content with their position in the centre-left orientated governments. Moreover, unionism, which the antagonism between communist and socialist fractions weakened, was forbidden in most factories, and it was not until the war that it was officially accepted. However, the only reason for such a step was integration and a contribution to war production, which needed to be boosted.

In 1944, the Finnish Communists were in a new position, becoming a key force in Finnish politics for the first time in their history. However, instead of taking their opportunities and becoming the leading political party with a decisive influence, they were taken by surprise by this situation; weakened by the inter-war banishment, they were not prepared to take any serious action such as that conducted by their comrades in Eastern European countries. Anthony Upton argued that the Party lacked the financial sources and necessary printing facilities which would facilitate disseminating the Communist post-war programme. Moreover, most members were of the post-war 1918 generation who, as Upton observed, “had been trained as underground organisers, and had no experience of running a public movement”. This fact hardened the situation, together with Party disunity in terms of the political programme.

Despite such circumstances, Finnish Communists were aware of post-war political realities and the necessity to react to the situation. The so-called popular front, the SKDL (Suomen Kansan Demokraattinen Liitto) was founded in pursuit of a larger political platform. Its aim was to create a stronger coalition with the Social Democrats, while detaching the SDP from Väinö Tanner’s inter-war leadership. This should have led to the creation of a united party of workers and even to an attempt to attract small farmers. However, the Social Democrats themselves were going through an internal crisis, as the party remained politically divided on the issue of its co-operation.

204 Maude 1998:28. The Social Democrat Party was founded in 1899, assuming its name in 1903, and within six years developed into an actively working political platform, receiving almost one third of the votes in 1907 (Hodgson 1967:5; Upton 1973:105; Alapuro 1988:101).

205 Kirby 1979:99. Kirby compares the situation within the Social Democratic Party, which was content to play ‘second fiddle’, with its radical Swedish and Danish counterparts, which took the political initiative during the same period.


with the Communists, and the Agrarians kept clear of any coalition\textsuperscript{210}. To put things baldly, it might be said that one side supported such joint action and the other comprised a right-wing oriented group which stood in strong opposition to any cooperation. As a result of such a situation, the SKDL did not attract the larger part of the SDP, and its absorption into the new framework was minimal\textsuperscript{211}. The intended hegemony and the creation of a united party of the working class was not achieved\textsuperscript{212}.

Despite the lack of co-ordination, the Communists\textsuperscript{213} alleged to be in the SKDL gained almost 24 per cent of the votes during the first post-war elections\textsuperscript{213}, and Yrjö Leino became Minister of the Interior. Leino’s nomination to this post was considered to be one of the tactical political steps of J.K. Paasikivi, expressing the importance which he placed on the integration of the Communists into the Finnish political spectrum, which was one of the demands of the ACC\textsuperscript{214}. In other words, the ostensible incorporation of the Communists into the post-war government appeared to confirm the serious intentions of J.K. Paasikivi in terms of the Communists’ future\textsuperscript{215}. The political coalition of the so-called ‘Big Three Agreement’, including the Agrarian party, the Social Democrats and the SKDL, the core of which were the Communists, was created as a result of the elections.

Looking briefly at the developments of the following three years, the situation within the Social Democratic Party was consolidated and the Communists began to lose their popularity. The local elections in December 1947, when the SKDL suffered serious setbacks\textsuperscript{216}, foreshadowed the difficult position of the Communists during the summer parliamentary election in 1948. In June, Yrjö Leino was dismissed from his post, and the Communists started to lose their post-war political significance. A new government was formed by the Social Democrats in July 1948, and on the basis of the election results, they refused to participate with the SKDL any longer\textsuperscript{217}.

\textsuperscript{210} Upton 1973:241.
\textsuperscript{211} Maude 1976:32; Nevakivi 1994:75.
\textsuperscript{212} Rentola 1994:218.
\textsuperscript{213} A question arises how it was possible for the SKDL to achieve such a high percentage of the votes and to maintain a similar level during the following years. Hodgson (1967:227-228), quoting a political scientist Pesonen and a sociologist Allardt, pointed out the character of the political affiliation of most Communist adherents; many voters simply followed the example of their parents and remained loyal to a one party choice.
\textsuperscript{215} Nevakivi 1994:69.
\textsuperscript{216} Rentola 1994:234-235.
\textsuperscript{217} The events of the years 1945-1948 are fully analysed in Upton 1973:263-298.
The collapse of the political career of the SKP in the immediate post-war years, when the chances existed for participating more actively in political life, showed the disunity of the Finnish radical Left and its inability to react flexibly to the current situation. In the political tactics of President Paasikivi, the situation was solved by granting a government post to the Communists. This turned out to be important, especially during the early months of 1948 when Finland had to deal with negotiations on the mutual treaty between the Soviet Union and Finland, which is generally considered to be a key to Finnish-Soviet post-war relations. The immediate threat of losing Finnish sovereignty appeared to be over by the year 1948, and by that time even a few of the ‘old faces’ had returned to the Parliament\textsuperscript{218}.

Although the Communists as a party did not reach the highest government posts, and their position was gradually weakening, Finnish society was enriched by other Left-oriented political forces. The social conditions created by the post-war economic situation, with a high amount of unemployment, inflation, and the intervention of the government in regulating wages, only assisted the growth of the trade unions. However, as with the situation in the Social Democratic Party and the SKDL, and the Central Organisation of Finnish Trade Unions, the SAK (Suomen Ammattiyhdistysten Keskusliitto), a confrontation between Left and Right-oriented wings took place and deepened the existing struggles\textsuperscript{219}. The Communists and the Social Democrats could not agree on mutual co-operation, and this created several disagreements in terms of strikes organised whether by one or the other side, but never both. Such circumstances prevailed until 1947 when the Social Democrats managed to keep their majority and the Communists were increasingly isolated in the Trade Unions\textsuperscript{220}.

The interests of the Finnish farmers were represented by the pressure group known as the MTK, the Central Association of Agricultural Producers, (Maataloustuottajainkeskusliitto). Farmers formed a significant part of Finnish labour, especially during the early 1950s, when almost fifty percent of the working population was engaged in agriculture. The MTK, closely connected with the Agrarian party, played its part in post-war Finnish economic and political situations\textsuperscript{221}. The MTK played a primary role during the complex politics of the general strike in 1956. It lasted

\textsuperscript{218} Kähkölä 1974:43.
\textsuperscript{219} Singleton 1986:129.
\textsuperscript{220} Upton 1973:272-274.
\textsuperscript{221} Kirby 1979:170.
for three weeks and, as Upton pointed out, the general strike began as a dreadful mistake, badly timed around the period of creation of a new government. Although demands for extra compensation payments were agreed to, the unity of the SAK suffered from the growing disagreements within Social Democracy. In addition, the government began to intervene in order to prevent strikes, and the ‘dictatorial’ role of the Trade Unions slowly diminished.

Besides the trade unions, one more Left-oriented organisation should be mentioned, the Finland-Soviet Union (Peace and Friendship) Society, the SNS (Suomi-Neuvostolitto Seura). The society was established at the beginning of the 1940s by Left-wing Socialists and Communists to promote friendship between Finland and the Soviet Union on an educational and cultural basis, which until then had stood outside the general interests of the Finnish community. After the war, with the broadening opportunities for Left-wing political forces, the Society renewed its function under its shorter name. The Society has a particular position, as both the cultural and industrial circles and politicians were involved in it, despite the fact that it was firmly in the hands of the Communists; however, the Society was never patronised by Zhdanov, which shows that it was clearly a Finnish initiative. Its membership was, particularly during the first post-war years, a question of Finnish post-war patriotism, demonstrating Finnish-Soviet friendship and thus supporting the foreign political line. Many high profile members of Finnish society were only passive associates, or were linked to the SNS by their financial contribution. During the 1950s, with political stabilisation, they usually left the Society.

Going back to the political failure of the Finnish Communists, a few observations could be made to illustrate why the SKP was unable to use the post-war situation for their future advantage. Firstly, within the Party, there was a lack of any militant group which would lead the rest in a radical coup d’état. The party lacked a charismatic leader who would initiate and co-ordinate the Party’s political actions so a common agreement would be reached.

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222 Upton 1973:328.
223 Kirby 1979:173. During the general strikes, the SAK demanded an extra compensation payment due to the rise in prices. Though agreement was reached after twenty days, Finland suffered large economic losses during the strike and economic growth slowed down (Singleton 1986:133).
224 Jorma Kalela (18.02.2000, Helsinki) and Singleton (1986:131).
227 J.K. Paasikivi was nominated honorary chairman of the Society in 1944 (Kinnunen 1996:73).
Secondly, and perhaps most significantly, the Finnish Communists had no reliable support from the Soviet Union\(^{228}\), which made any revolutionary attempt even more difficult. The Soviet Allied Control Commissioner, Andrei Zhdanov, interfered only marginally in the matter of the SKP, which was highly disappointing for most Finnish Communists who were in desperate need of tutelage\(^{229}\). Although the situation had changed slightly during 1945\(^{230}\), Zhdanov's 'contribution' was not sufficient. One of the reasons why the ACC did not fully apply its political pressure was that the Soviet Union did not have any interest in the disruption of Finnish industrial production which would influence the delivery of the war reparations, on which the Soviet Union was, particularly during the immediate post-war years, dependent\(^{231}\).

Thirdly, the SKP never really achieved political power in the form of important government positions, and the army especially remained under the influence of inter-war military figures\(^{232}\). Despite the fact that the Communist Yrjö Leino, who demonstrated his solidarity with the ACC, and was regarded as a protegé of Zhdanov, became Minister of the Interior in 1945, he fully supported the decision made by the government opposing any radical street actions\(^{233}\).

Furthermore, it should be noted that the Communist movement in Finland had a slightly different ideological orientation from the countries of Eastern Europe. In Finland, Communism was regarded in terms of the division of labour, the Marxist ideology, not in close connection with Soviet expansionist policy\(^{234}\). Communism as a movement based on political resistance in an opposition did not exist in Finland. Rather than a struggle to seize power, more crucial here was the question of who would exercise power\(^{235}\). In addition, the Communist Party failed to attract a large number of adherents, particularly members of the educated class, compared, for example, with France and Italy. A 'left-oriented intellectual' was a rare phenomenon whether in inter-

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\(^{229}\) Androsova 1994:57.


\(^{231}\) Rentola 1994:69.

\(^{232}\) Rentola 1994:216. Rentola quotes the complaint of Hertta Kuusinen that the army was the weakest point the SKP work.


\(^{234}\) Allardt (1970:50). Allardt researched the specific position of Communism in Finland. He concluded that in Finland two forms are presented: so-called Industrial and Backwoods Communism. Each of them has its own specific relation to the concept of Communism and the ideology propagated by the Soviet Union.

\(^{235}\) Kimmo Rentola has conducted well-documented research about the position of the Finnish Communists, Finnish politicians and Moscow during the period 1947-1958 (Rentola 1997).
war or post-war Finland, which might perhaps be explained by the results of the Civil War\textsuperscript{236} and the lack of Marxist publications.

Although many members of different cultural circles participated in societies like the SNS during the post-war decade, their political orientation was far from being on the Left. In particular, the political convictions of much of the elite represented the opposite political spectrum. During the inter-war period, most of the cultural elite more or less supported Right-oriented political parties and organisations. They were actively engaged in the Academic Karelia Society and in the National Coalition Party which both upheld anti-Russian and pro-Finnish attitudes\textsuperscript{237}. It might be claimed that during the inter-war period they were the bearers of nationalistic-patriotic ideology, and thus created what is called in Finland a bourgeois (Right-wing) intelligentsia (porvarillinen alymystö)\textsuperscript{238}.

There is no direct answer to the question of why the political affiliations of the Finnish educated class inclined more to the Right than the Left. One of the explanations might be the historical experience with neighbouring revolutionary Russia and the fear of Bolshevism connected with it. It is conceivable that after a hundred years of Russian dominance, Finns, and the educated class in particular, evolved antipathies towards the Russians, and thereafter towards communism. In this respect, Finland was distinguished from the other central and eastern European countries, which usually lacked direct political involvement with Russia. This also affected, to a certain extent, post-war attitudes towards the Soviet Union, when some of the latter countries, as, for example, Czechoslovakia, proclaimed their adherence to Panslavism, which contributed to their post-war political dependency on the Soviet Union.

In addition, the Civil War in 1918 appeared to be a pivotal moment, with the struggle between the Whites, within which the educated class found most of its adherents, and the Reds, the pro-Bolshevik oriented minority. The attempt to regain the unity lost during the national conflict culminated in the response to Finnish nationalism

\textsuperscript{236} Alapuro (1988:198) points out that the leaders of the newly-established Communist Party were those who ran the failed `revolution' (Civil War). The fact that neither intellectuals nor peasantry were encourage to join the SKP has been described by Androsova (1994:60) as a tactical error preventing the party from gaining a wider public.

\textsuperscript{237} The National Coalition Party was formed from the adherents of monarchism in 1919, represented by a number of wealthy industrialists, members of cultural circles and clergymen (Alapuro 1988:205).

\textsuperscript{238} Sevânen 1997:40.
during the 1920s, which might be regarded as another explanation for the Right inclination of the Finnish educated class. The growing nationalist moods did not arise only as a result of the Civil War and the Russian danger represented by the new political order, but also by the proclaimed independence, which Finland achieved for the first time in its history. Such circumstances evoked strong patriotic feelings, mainly embodied by an educated class, and often spilling over into extreme Right-wing political actions. It might be of interest to observe that most of the Finnish educated class came from the countryside and were highly ambitious Finnish-speakers.

It should not be forgotten either that, although the right-wing political convictions of the elite were prevalent within the Finnish cultural milieu, a Left-oriented educated class did exist, marginally, in inter- and post-war Finland. The Leftist literary group Kiila, the Wedge, to mention the most noteworthy, embodied many Left-oriented literati as well as workers who were engaged in literature. The group filtered radical ideas into White Finland during the late 1930s. After the war, the figure of Raoul Palgrem and his influence was pervasive within Left-oriented cultural circles and his book The Great Line (Suuri Linja), published in 1948, gave an account of the position of the Left in right-oriented Finland.

Moreover, comparing the beginning and end of the 1950s, there is a slow turn in the perception of Leftist ideology and Marxism in Finland in general. If, during the early 1950s, the left-oriented educated class was rare and students inclined to be more or less apolitical, ten years later the situation had changed. This was not only the case in Finland; on the contrary, Finland was influenced by circumstances in the rest of Western Europe where the political convictions changed to the Left. Such an ideological switch was caused by the slow transformation in generations and the fall in

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240 E.g., the expansionist ideology of the Academic Karelia Society with its clearly anti-Russian attitudes, the prohibition of the Communist Party, and the creation of the pro-fascist IKL movement.
241 The social background of the educated class of the inter-war period might be compared with a similar social group in the middle of the nineteenth century, when the educated class was also a bearer of nationalist ideas. Miroslav Hroch (1968:125-137) claims that most of the ‘patriots’ came from lower social ranks (quoted from Alapuro 1988:88).
242 Sallamaa 1997:97. Sallamaa raises an interesting question as to whether the Kiila and the Academic Karelia Society, both in function during the 1930s, and both representing ideals from opposite political spectrums, might be characterised as the avant-garde of the inter-war Finnish cultural milieu.
243 Koivisto 1997:64.
244 During the 1950s, the Conservative Party was most popular among students (44 per cent). The Social Democrats enjoyed about eight per cent of the votes and the SKDL about one per cent (Kolbe 1993:390).
confrontations characteristic of the 1950s. The war and post-war economic realities were almost overcome and they became the subject of revolt rather than of veneration.

Together with the cultural elite, there is one more social group which shared similar views during the inter-war period, and after the war had to radically re-evaluate its opinions: the Lutheran Church. The clergy played an important role within Finnish society, not only in terms of religious institutions but also in terms of the country's legislation and governance. Like the educated class, which in broader perspective might also comprehend the clergy, the members of the Church often held political posts, mostly involved with the conservative National Coalition Party. Besides their political influence, the Church took a part in upholding Finnish nationalism, as it had been a powerful ideological factor within the Church. Such a tendency allowed the church to be characterised as pro-nationalistic, and its presentation as the 'folk church' associated with strong patriotic feeling and the upholding of the ideas of nationalism, became common.

During the inter-war period, the nationalistic ideology propagated by the Church was related to anti-Communist and anti-Russian moods, the background for which might be seen as the heritage of the period of Russification, the Civil War and the fact that Bolshevism was in its principles atheist. The position of the Church was strengthened within Finnish society, and continued to be strengthened within the war period, especially during the Winter War. The Church praised the heroism of the Finnish nation in the struggle against the Soviet Union, which was regarded as a fight for Finnish independence and freedom. Such proclamations helped to unite the nation.

After the war, the situation within the Church was similar to that of the cultural elite. The Church as an institution was maintained by the same people as during the previous years, with their past ideological persuasions. To what extent nationalism

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245 Lauha (1998:3) relates the term 'folk church' to strong patriotic feelings and evoking feelings of sacrifices for the common Fatherland.
246 Reverend H.M. Waddams, who was in charge of English-Finnish Lutheran Church relations, made a comment about the situation of the Finnish Church in 1944. “Finland is the centre of their world, and there is a strong nationalistic spirit which affects all their views... the Church has a strong hold on the people whose religion is of a pietistic character, and is inclined to be associated with nationalism” (Lambeth Palace Foreign Office Archive, File 31, Lutheran and Reform Churches Anglican Visits 1937-1979).
247 Lauha (1998:3) provides statistics about the large number of clergy who were members of the Patriotic People's Movement, the IKL, an extremely Right-wing political organisation during the 1930s.
248 Although the Lutheran Church is here mentioned only marginally, it should be pointed out that there exist many revivalist movements, as for example Laestadianism and Pietism within the Finnish Church.
dominated the Church might be observed from comments made by English clergymen visiting Finland in late December 1944. They agreed that the best thing to do with the Finns was to educate them out of their narrow nationalism, which appeared to be greatly supported by the Finnish-speaking academic circles. During the visit, exchange opportunities were arranged with the English Church, so Finnish clergymen gained the opportunity to study and work in England for a certain period of time. This was a valuable contribution, as the Finnish Church had to reorient its international relationships, which until then had mostly been connected with the German Church.

In addition to the broadening English co-operation, the Lutheran Church also had contacts in the United States, mostly initiated by Finnish immigrants.

After the war, Finnish society witnessed a partial secularisation, as Finns were leaving the Church due to its inflexibility and not offering any immediate contribution to the changing Finnish society. As the new social developments brought along many new problems, the Church slowly began to recognise its new functions and focused more on social issues rather than propagating its old ideology. It was, for example, necessary to build new churches as many had been destroyed during the war, and to contribute to the settlement and parishes of the Karelian refugees, which constituted almost eleven per cent of the population. Work with children and young people together with family consultations was offered by many parishes. There was, as can be seen, a clear tendency to switch from the foregoing political orientation to social work, where it appeared that the Church might find its future significance.

Additionally, it should briefly be considered to what extent the cultural and industrial-banking elites reacted to the increasing importance of the Left after the war. It is conceivable that the cultural elite had difficulties in adapting to the post-war political changes, and their interest in the new political Left-oriented forces was minimal. Within

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250 E.g., Vilho Rinne studied for one year at St. John's College in Durham in 1948. Moreover, the Finnish Seamen's Mission was represented in London, through which also the mutual relationship between the Finnish and English Churches deepened.

251 An example of the switch might be E.G. Gulin who, during the inter-war period, maintained warm relations with Germany. After the war, with the needs of political reorientation, he propagated relationships with the Church of England. He reacted like the rest of society.

252 Besides this, the Church continued organising its foreign mission, which had traditionally existed here from the nineteenth century.


254 It should be briefly mentioned that, besides the Lutheran Church, the Finnish Orthodox Church also experienced many post-war difficulties, mainly connected with the loss of territory where the vast majority of the Orthodox population lived.
the cultural periodicals, there was no real reflection on the growing importance of the labour movement, which seemed to lie outside their primary attention. In fact, there arises a question as to why the cultural elite should have been profoundly interested in the Left, especially in terms of the SKP, and whether vice versa the Left was interested in the Right-wing cultural milieu. On the one hand, in Finland there was no tradition of Left oriented intellectuals applying Marxist ideas in the context of the Finnish working class. On the other hand, there were few members of the Left who were keen on the academic work of the cultural elite.

Compared with the cultural elite, and eventually with the Church, the interaction between the industrialists and the trade unions was deeper. This clearly arises from the function of the industrialists, who were the employers and depended on the labour of the their employees, the workers. Although most industrialists did not contribute to the trade union’s newspapers, like, for example, Palkkatyöläinen, the contacts between these two social groups proliferated during the post-war period. This was important due to the growing numbers of trade union organisations and the establishment of SNS societies at factories and working places. Moreover, the changes within foreign trade projected immediately into the situation in the labour market. For example, the decline in trade with the Soviet Union in 1948 was reflected in the rise of unemployment\textsuperscript{255} which affected economic stability and could threaten industrial production.

\textsuperscript{255} Upton 1973:300.
2.2 The concept of myth from a historical perspective

There exists a direct connection between an elite, as a group of people having attained power, and a myth as a means of maintaining its position. In Vilfredo Pareto’s view, myths are created by those who hold the most influential posts, both politically and socially, to secure their status. In other words, myths, as Karl Mannheim asserted, can be used as a tool of the governing elite to sustain its ideology. Myth as a means of preserving an elite’s status are created to hide the ‘uncomfortable’ reality, or so-called ‘dangerous thoughts’, which exist in any society and which might, if uncovered, threaten leading positions. The creation of myths serves to avoid a historical truth which is not favourable to the political situation of a certain period. Although the elite is usually in charge of myth creation, it is inevitable that society is vulnerable to its perception.

From this perspective, there exist two different cases. Firstly, a society which has witnessed a historical experience resulting in a social trauma might have a limited capability and willingness to open and lead a discussion about its own past. Such a society is more easily exposed to myth creation, which offers an ostensible explanation of reality, than a society with a strong self-perception. Secondly, a society with a strong leadership and easily manipulated masses which is inclined to venerate its leader under populist promises of a better future, might also tend towards the creation of myths, in this case rather to support its elite than to hide the ‘dangerous thoughts’.\(^\text{256}\)

Like the character of an elite, myths are not static; they change according to the historical period, they rise and are reshaped according to the needs of their creators\(^\text{257}\). There is no rule which regulates the time occurrence of myths. Some historical events appear to be more powerful and easier to manipulate for the purpose of myths than others. Similarly, the time validity of myths varies; some might be usable for years and still fulfil their function; others disappear soon after their existence comes into being. Going to the extreme, some myths might justify political ignorance after their reality is revealed, and thus become a symbol of the painful past.

\(^\text{256}\) This might have been the case with Mussolini’s position in inter-war Italy, as analysed by Mannheim (1936).
\(^\text{257}\) Honko 1999:24. In his article, Honko analysed the impact of traditions on a society and their influence on the national identity.
As the result of the war and the post-war reorientation, which evoked many historical and political paradoxes, Finnish society was greatly vulnerable to myth creation, usually based on the near past. History served such purposes well for two main reasons: firstly, the illustrations of the heroic past could strengthen Finnish self-esteem which had been damaged by the war; secondly, Finns themselves were unable to deal with their own history. Many question were left unanswered, pertaining to the early years of Independence and Finnish involvement in the war. Few historians knew how to handle the historical truth which could damage the already fragile post-war atmosphere. Hence the 1950s was, from a cultural perspective, a period of ‘inventing new traditions’ in which context national history was reflected. The near past was, in the words of Anthony Upton, analysed according to the driftwood scenario, which enabled historians to manipulate history as needed for political purposes.

As Finnish politicians needed large public support after the war, particularly in terms of foreign policy, myths and any other means which could provide national unanimity were welcomed. Finnish-Soviet relationships themselves offered a good deal to myth contribution, and their maintainer, Kekkonen, was a master in it throughout his long presidency. Although, during the first post-war period, the upholding of myths appeared to be politically correct, their prolonged existence led to cultivating a political consensus and, in the words of George Maude, “an unfortunate knack of avoiding problems”, which reflected on the Finnish political scene thirty years after the end of the war.

The time validity of myth, together with myths regarded as image formation, may be explored in the political functions of Urho Kekkonen. Perceptions of his personality shifted over time, together with different perceptions of the past. On the one hand, Kekkonen is considered to be a hero of Finnish history, who led Finland out from the political strains of the Cold War. On the other hand, he is regarded as a betrayer of Finnish post-war development who, by his approach to handling relations through personal contacts with Soviet leaders, ruined the image of Finland in the West.

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258 This was mainly the question of the Continuation War and Finnish involvement in it. Also, the trauma of the Civil War had not yet been overcome.
259 Upton 1999:159. The driftwood scenario (ajopuu) is a term coined by Arvi Korkonen and John Wuorinen, which might be explained as ‘we could not help ourselves’.
261 It might be said that perceptions of Kekkonen divided Finnish society. Some respected him as a political leader, others considered him to be a blot on Finnish history. The personality of Kekkonen also
Paraphrasing Aron’s view on the figure of Kekkonen, it might be claimed that he belonged amongst those politicians who made history by acting in circumstances which were not of their own choosing, but was yet still able to pursue his ambitions and even perhaps his ideals. Kekkonen took his chances in situations where others hesitated. He had the ability to make a career decision at the right historical moment (which was admired by many, for example, L.A. Puntila) which took him to the political top. Seppo Hentilä describes Kekkonen as “an exceptionally gifted and ambitious, if controversial, leader”.

Kekkonen’s position during the 1950s was not as politically clear as twenty years later. He was regarded by most Finns as a betrayer of inter-war patriotic ideals. Kekkonen was among the most active members of the Academic Karelia Society, and his voice was not unheeded in the anti-Russian nationalism of the Finnish educated class of that period. However, at the end of the 1920s, Kekkonen left the Society, which was one of his calculated decisions, facilitating his further political career during the post-war period.

A great deal of controversy arose from Kekkonen’s function as a prosecutor in the War Guilt Trial of 1945. By standing against men such as Väinö Tanner and Risto Ryti, politicians who were largely popular among Finns, Kekkonen incurred the wrath of many for his participation. Although it had an immense negative impact on his popularity, it positively affected Kekkonen’s political career, and he became the Speaker of the Parliament.

At the end of the 1940s, Kekkonen’s frequent visits to the Soviet Embassy were greeted with undisguised disapproval by other politicians and did not contribute much to his better acceptance amongst the political elite. At the beginning of the 1950s, Kekkonen was not well received by most of the cultural and industrial-banking elites. Among people of his own generation, excluding his faithful phalanx, he had a bad

puzzles many historians, who try either to criticise his political activities or praise them (Hentilä 2001:69-70).  
Meinander 1999:300. It might be of interest, in relation to the changing attitudes towards Kekkonen, to mention the perception of Vladimirov (1993:31), for a long time a Soviet agent in the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki. In his view, in the 1950s, it was extremely difficult to persuade Finns to have any contact with the Soviet Embassy, owing to the anti-Russian and anti-Kekkonen atmosphere. In the 1980s, the situation was completely the opposite.
reputation. This was not only caused by his ‘womanising’ reputation but also by his character as a social climber on the political ladder, making it appear that few moral values existed for him. In that period, Kekkonen, according to Hentilä

rose to political prominence as the defender of the interests of the poor areas of eastern and northern Finland, and it took a long time for the ‘gentlemen of Helsinki’ and the urban middle and working classes to accept him.

In the presidential election of 1956, when Kekkonen narrowly won by a difference of one vote, his victory did not evoke general excitement. However, within six years, the position of Kekkonen was sufficiently strong to maintain his political power in the presidential election of 1961. The cultural and industrial-banking elites almost completely supported Kekkonen’s candidature, and only a few of his bitterest opponents stood against him. The change in Kekkonen’s popularity might be explained by several factors. One of them is probably the connection between Kekkonen and the Soviet leaders. Hentilä claims that Kekkonen’s own autocratic style of leadership was well suited to the management of relations with the Soviet Union. Kekkonen became a two-sided ‘guarantor’, one for the West, and the other for the Soviet Union, whose leaders were aware of the mutual trust between them and for whom Kekkonen was important for the countries’ relationship.

Kekkonen’s political status in 1961 was certainly secured by the fact of Finnish economic involvement in EFTA in the same period. Most industrialists perceived Kekkonen as a supporter of Finnish integration with Western economic structures, which could be reached via the friendly line of Finnish-Soviet relationships. In addition, political crises in 1958 and 1961, and their presentation as a threat to Finnish independent status, also reinforced Kekkonen’s position in the eyes of most Finns.

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266 E.g., Kustaa Vilkuna and Lauri Posti belonged among the faithful.
268 Tuure Junnila, one of Kekkonen’s life-long political enemies predicted in 1956: “Kekkonen, if his health allows him, will not be president for six years, but for twelve or eighteen” (quoted from Jakobson 1980:87).
269 The so-called Honka front (Honka liitto) was formed by a number of Social Democrats who supported Olavi Honka in his candidature for presidency.
271 The Night Frost Crisis in 1958 and the Note Crisis in 1961 might be explored from both perspectives, as a crisis in Finnish-Soviet relationships (disagreement on a new government, and the integration into Western economic structures) or as an impact of Cold War tension.
Kekkonen’s reputation changed during the 1970s, when he began to have no compunction in exploiting to the full the unusually extensive political power which was given to a president by the Finnish constitution. By losing his political awareness and being in power for such a long time, his presidency began to be associated with an unlimited dictatorship.

The figure of Urho Kekkonen in the context of myth creation is also associated with his political image building. During the 1950s, Kekkonen was one of a few politicians who maintained a high-level political and social life. He had the skills to use political events to increase his popularity. In 1950, Kekkonen was one of the first to mount a presidential campaign in the American style. During that time, he visited a large part of Finland, showing his interest in the ‘ordinary’ peasant Finn. He promised greater economic help to develop the most remote areas of the northern part of the country. Similarly, the return of Porkkala was presented as Kekkonen’s contribution to Finnish-Soviet negotiations, and as such it secured his presidential victory and improved his political reputation.

The cartoon reflects how Urho Kekkonen used the return of Porkkala in 1955 to aid his presidential campaign in the same year. Paradoxically, Kekkonen as only Prime Minister is in the first car and President Paasikivi follows him (Kari Suomalainen).

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Most significant was Kekkonen’s image building as the successor of J.K. Paasikivi. Kekkonen began to appear to be the only suitable political figure in maintaining the existing foreign policy. If any doubts about his ability arose during the presidential candidature in 1956, they disappeared within the presidency period, which witnessed two political crises between Finland and the Soviet Union. Kekkonen used both, the Night Frost Crisis in 1958 and the Note Crisis in 1961, for his image creation. By their brisk political solution, Kekkonen showed that he had the ability to maintain Finnish-Soviet relations and, further, that he knew how to manipulate political tensions for his own political ambitions. The myth about his uniqueness in terms of Finnish-Soviet relations was cemented in the so-called Paasikivi-Kekkonen line. In other words, Urho Kekkonen, as Jussi Hanhimäki claims, reaped “the largest personal and political benefits of the success of the Finland’s post-war foreign policy, the Paasikivi line”.

Besides political involvement, Kekkonen engaged in various social activities, and particularly in sport, which is highly respected by Finns. Although it was a part of his political prestige to be everywhere where possible support might be gained, Kekkonen and also, at the beginning of his presidency, his wife, Sylvi Kekkonen, participated in various cultural and social events, such as university celebrations and literary previews.

Kekkonen built his domestic popularity, but at the same time focussed on the international context. His involvement with the Soviet Union, which went beyond the political level, has already been discussed. However, it was also necessary to secure Kekkonen’s image in the West, where the close Soviet connection did not evoke great trust. The only solution to gaining respect appeared to be pointing out the neutral position of Finland and its context in post-war divided Europe. Finland, as a country on the edge, could well be presented as the bridge-builder between the East and West, overseen by Urho Kekkonen.

The creation of political myths in Finland during the post-war decade was certainly caused by the insecure political position of the country in terms of domestic and foreign politics. The incorporation of the Left, like the closer relationships with the Soviet Union, which had until then been regarded as an enemy, left Finnish society in a

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275 Hentilä (2001:64) mentions the image of Kekkonen in West Germany.
276 Finnish neutrality has been widely researched and commented on. For further discussion see, e.g., Maude 1976.
vulnerable position. Only skilful political tactics and unanimous support could overwhelm 'the years of danger', which already by their creation contributed to upholding the political myths. To what extent the cultural atmosphere was affected by myth creation and to what extent the cultural elite contributed to it will be discussed in the following chapter.
2.3 Social developments in the 1950s

It might be of interest to look, at least briefly, at the social transition which Finnish society underwent during the 1950s. Without such an account, the analysis of the post-war developments would be incomplete, as the occurring social changes played a significant part in restructuring the post-war Finland from a highly agrarian to an affluent developed society.

As a result of the impact of the war, Finland, like the rest of Europe, experienced a radical economic and social transition, which had considerable repercussions on occupational spheres and the population structure. People began to move out of the countryside, into the rapidly growing urban suburbs and to Sweden, searching for new employment opportunities, usually in the service sphere. Life in the towns became more dynamic, and the agrarian areas were affected by a growing mechanisation and industrialisation.

The social transition and its consequences on Finnish society became a research topic of Heikki Waris (1901-1989), the Professor of Social Policy at the University of Helsinki, who was a pioneer in social research and its main developer and promoter in Finland at large\(^{277}\). In 1950, on the basis of his observations and analysis of the societal structure of Finland in comparison with the rest of the world, he made a brief prediction for the social situation of the 1950s in Finland\(^{278}\). How Waris perceived the forthcoming changes, I will outline first. Whether his predictions were realistic or not will be discussed later. A few statistics will be added to illustrate the transition.

2.3.1 Heikki Waris' predictions

Waris, in an article in Suomalainen Suomi published in 1950, argued that due to the consequences of the war, Finland, like the rest of Europe, would go through a period of social and economic transition, which would start during the 1950s and that real changes would occur decades later. The process of transition in Finland would probably not differ much from those in other Western societies, where a similar process occurred almost simultaneously.

\(^{277}\) Roos 1997:112.
\(^{278}\) Waris 1950: 329-332.
Waris predicted that industrialisation would appear in Finland, which was inevitable due to the still excessively agrarian character of post-war Finland. In consequence, the number of people working in agriculture would decrease and instead most Finns would be employed in the industrial, business and service occupational spheres. So as to find new job opportunities, people would move to urban areas which would rapidly develop to satisfy the number of newcomers.

This industrialisation, according to Waris, would promote the so-called exchange economy, which would make the division of labour more advanced. In other words, every worker would be specialised in his own concrete working task, and ultimately everyone would be able to buy whatever they needed to consume\(^{279}\). The period of home-made production would definitely pass into history, and the 1950s would strengthen the power of the retail sector, which would lead to a growing consumption of goods.

In connection with the increasing urbanisation and more advanced labour market, Waris observed that the 1950s would witness a rapid increase in the means of transportation and communication. Owning a personal car would no longer be an upper class prerogative and the symbol of luxury but a part of everyday life, particularly as the journey to work might be prolonged. Furthermore, lorries and coaches would replace horse-drawn vehicles which were then still in use in the Finnish countryside. Aeroplanes would become the means of connection between nations far and near and would become available for wider public use.

Progress in the field of communication would be even more far-reaching. Radio, which had been of importance from the 1920s, would be replaced by television. TV would serve not only as a source of information but, as Waris hoped, would also have educational purposes, as had been the case in the development of the cinema. These trends would generally have a positive influence in rural and remote areas, which would have better connections with the urban areas.

Besides the expansion within communications, during the 1950s mechanisation would grow in importance and would influence all aspects of Finnish society. Waris placed particular weight on the availability of electric power. Electric power would no longer be a privilege, even in the far northern part of Finland, thank to the construction of electric power plants on the rivers of the north near Kemi and Oulu. In Waris’ view,

the 1950s were supposed to be the period of an electric power which would completely replace steam engines.

Such development together with mechanisation would positively affect human labour and thus manual work would become easier. This trend would allow workers to have more leisure time. Waris predicted that the night shift and Sunday work would disappear and the vacation period would be lengthened. As a result, living standards would rise and leisure time would no longer be limited only to the upper class. In predicting that workers would have the possibility of relaxing and enjoying life, Waris claimed that the life expectancy would be extended. Already at the beginning of the 1950s, the longevity of Finns was being prolonged and, thanks to medical research, Finns were living healthier lives. The rise of the living standard would also be reflected in better access to education, whose standards would, in Waris' view, improve.

As his last point, Waris mentioned certain negative aspects which such a social transition might bring with it. In addition to their positive effects, mechanisation and industrialisation would also create many social problems. Above all, the transition from the simple countryside life to a fast-paced urban life would be a difficult test of human adaptability and flexibility. Family values might deteriorate and result in an increasing divorce rate. Moreover, the number of mentally-ill people, who would be in need of medical consultation, could proliferate and occur as an everyday reality, caused by the stressful adaptation to city life.

2.3.2 The social transition

By 1968, Waris was able to evaluate his predictions and it now looked as if his visions had been almost entirely accurate. The 1950s was a turning point which decisively influenced the post-war economic and social transition in Finland. Though Matti Alestalo claimed that the transition from an agrarian to an industrial urban society took thirty years, it might persuasively be argued that the 1960s, often considered to be radical and rapid in economic terms, would have been impossible without the slow economic and social progress started in the 1950s. In other words, the 'fruits' of the 1950s were harvested in the following decade. Waris himself defined the period

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280 Waris 1968.
between 1947 to 1967 as the period of industrial expansion\textsuperscript{282}, which only supports the argument.

After the Second World War, Finland was, as mentioned earlier, pervasively an agrarian country. Almost two-thirds of its total population were living in the countryside, predominantly engaged in agriculture. In spite of its development in the inter-war period, Finland was economically retarded after 1945 in comparison with the rest of Western Europe\textsuperscript{283}. This began to change slightly during the 1950s with the deregulation of foreign trade, urban development and the increasing mechanisation of the countryside.

The changes in occupational structure were without doubt most profound in the post-war period. In 1950, almost 46 per cent of the total population were working in agriculture, but the next ten years brought more than a 10 per cent decline. Industrial growth was slower than expected, due to the resettlement programme accepted for the people displaced from the lands lost to the Soviet Union\textsuperscript{284}. In 1950, 21 per cent of Finns were working in the industrial sector, while ten years later this figure had increased by only a little over 1 percent. However, the number of people working in the service industry was growing faster, from 11 per cent in 1950 to 14 per cent in 1960 (see Table 1). In connection with the growing service industry, Riitta Hjerppe claims that the situation in Finland was different from that in countries where recruitment for work in the services occurred at the expense of industry. In Finland, it was done at the expense of agriculture\textsuperscript{285}. Such a trend only underlines the agrarian character of Finland in the 1950s.

Moreover, the transformations in the occupational sphere are intertwined with shifts in class stratification. Until 1945, the lower social class, comprising workers and farmers, was most common; after the war, with the growing number of employees in the service industry, the ranks of the middle class widened, in spite of the decline of the farmers (see Table 2).

\textsuperscript{282} Waris 1968:20.
\textsuperscript{283} Hjerppe 1989:68.
\textsuperscript{284} The land reform accepted in 1945 was to assist in the relocation of the Karelian refugees, to whom the land was granted under the reform. It was also a political step to avoid social strains.
\textsuperscript{285} Hjerppe 1982:408.
the 1950s in the Finnish context

Table 1: The changes in the occupational sphere.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational sphere</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1960</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Industry</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2: The changes in class stratification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stratum</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1960</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Class</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Class</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Tables show that Waris' predictions were substantially correct, even with regard to urbanisation, which was a consequence of the changes in occupational structure. The southern part of Finland developed more extensively, for it was here that most of the country's industry and services were concentrated. Due to urbanisation, every year during the period between 1951 to 1975 approximately 20,000 people moved from the countryside to urban areas, which means that in the ten-year period between 1951 to 1961 almost 200,000 Finns moved away from the countryside.

It is natural that a migration of this magnitude not only entailed the creation of new job opportunities, but made it essential to develop new residential areas. Already after the war, many new houses had been built, but the main boom began at the beginning of the 1950s. The suburbs of the Finnish capital Helsinki began to develop particularly rapidly to alleviate the housing shortage caused by the proliferation of the urban population. Helsinki was one of the most rapidly growing towns, with an increase in its inhabitants of almost 100,000 in the period between 1946 and 1956. Henceforth, not only new blocks of flats, located close to nature to remind tenants of the countryside, were built, but also the infrastructure, as city transportation had to be improved since private cars were still a rare means of getting to work. In Helsinki, trams were the most popular means of transportation until the middle fifties, when city buses began to prevail and in 1957 reached higher figures than tram transportation.

Besides Helsinki, towns like Turku, within easy reach of the sea, and thus in connection with Sweden, and Tampere, with its growing industrial developments,

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287 Post-war residential development served more or less to satisfy the needs of the Karelian refugees. (Hjerpe 1989:143).
288 E.g., new blocks of flats were built in the suburbs of Helsinki known as Lauttasaari and Herttoniemi. With the Olympic Games in Helsinki in 1952, an Olympic village was built, which was afterwards used for residential housing.
289 Turpeinen 1997:17. In 1946, Helsinki had 324,000 inhabitants, ten years later 412,000.
290 Heranen 1997:475, 480.
witnessed post-war urbanisation (see Table 3). In general, the southern parts of Finland became targets of post-war economic expansion, experiencing the transition from a highly agrarian to a prosperous region. In contrast, the large territories in the north of Finland, which remained ubiquitously agricultural in spite of the extensions in the transportation net, were far from accessible.²⁹¹

Table 3: The size of the total population in the largest cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1960</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Helsinki</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turku and Tampere</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural communities</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Waris' prediction about advances in the means of transportation and communication appeared to be realistic as well. The number of private cars grew during the 1950s, although the significant increase did not happen until 1963 when import restrictions were relaxed and the market opened. At the beginning of 1955, there were in Finland over 120,000 private cars. The most popular models were the American Ford and Chevrolet. The German Volkswagen, which entered the Finnish market in 1950 with the Beetle car, gained its fans soon after the freeing of the car market, followed by the Czech car Škoda. Six years later, in 1961, the number of cars in Finland had doubled.²⁹² Moreover, the transportation network improved, so that even remote areas could be reached both by car and the public transport system.

Besides the increasing number of cars, the growing number of tractors and other agricultural machines in the countryside deserves mention. Even if in the beginning of the 1950s horses were still important, the scepticism of countryside people about mechanisation was soon overcome. In 1950, there was only 14,000 tractors but by 1966 the number had more than doubled and thus it might be claimed that the Finnish countryside was becoming more or less mechanised.

²⁹¹ It has been known as the industrial ‘triangle’, covering the most industrially developed area from Helsinki to Turku and Tampere, which is still of overwhelming importance. Further, Hustich (1967:49) divided Finland into three parts; so-called Industrial Finland (southern parts), Central Finland and the Åland islands, and Marginal Finland (a typical region in the North).
²⁹² Waris 1968:48. According to the figures in Waris' book, in 1955 there were 141,000 cars; in 1961 302,000. It might be of interest to mention that though Finland was a society with a “thin upper class” in 1955, 108 British Jaguars were registered there (Linnilä 1997:398).
Furthermore, after the war, there occurred improvements in air traffic which had a twofold importance; Finns could now travel abroad, and Finland became more easily accessible for tourists, which advanced the opening up of Finland to international influences. Finnair, the Finnish airlines company, established in 1923 as Aero, expanded its services in terms of international and domestic transportation, with an almost 70 percent increase of passengers over ten years\textsuperscript{293}.

Regular television broadcasting also started in 1957. However, it was not until the 1960s that every second family was able to afford television. In 1960, only hundred thousand television sets were licensed. Radio was a far more popular and more widely distributed means of communication and in 1960 more than one million radio sets were licensed in Finland\textsuperscript{294}.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vehicle</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1960</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private car</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractors\textsuperscript{295}</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Apparatus</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1960</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Telephone</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>722</td>
<td>1228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television\textsuperscript{296}</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


During the 1950s, mainly thanks to the extended accessibility of electric power\textsuperscript{297}, progress had also reached most Finnish dwellings in terms of houses and kitchen appliances. By 1950, three-quarters of all dwellings had been supplied with electric power. New household equipment was introduced between 1955 and 1964, during which time cellar storage was replaced by refrigerators, and washing machines and other useful utensils became more available\textsuperscript{298}. However, as late as 1950 hot water and indoor toilets were installed in only 7 and 17 per cent of dwellings, respectively\textsuperscript{299}.

\textsuperscript{293} Wegg 1983:104, 288. In 1950, there was 43,329 (32,277) passengers on the domestic (respectively international) flights, ten years later 315,193 (respectively 202,247).
\textsuperscript{294} Waris 1968:93.
\textsuperscript{295} The compulsory registration of tractors began in 1958.
\textsuperscript{296} Regular TV broadcasting began in 1957.
\textsuperscript{297} Maula 1996:41.
\textsuperscript{298} Waris 1968:77.
\textsuperscript{299} Hjerpe 1989:119.
The quotas had doubled in 1960 mainly due to urbanisation and the construction of new modern housing which were fully equipped with running hot water\textsuperscript{300}.

Mechanisation had begun to make it possible for workers to enjoy more leisure time. People began to have more disposable income, which was particularly accelerated by the deregulation of foreign trade at the end of the 1950s. Until March 1954, the ration-card system was still being used in Finland for such products as sugar, coffee, rice and butter. The shops of that time were small in size and number; small retail firms with one or two owner-operated and staffed shops dominated the retail market and were able to provide almost all everyday necessities. In 1952 only ten department stores existed in Finland\textsuperscript{301}. One of the most popular department stores, named after its owner, Stockmann, was located in the middle of Helsinki, and in spite of the market regulation was able to offer imported goods which were otherwise seldom available\textsuperscript{302}. Moreover, in 1957, Stockmann expanded its business interests and opened a branch in Tampere.

A comparison of private expenditures in 1950 and 1960 reveals that the most remarkable difference occurred in the expenses for amusements and relaxation. In 1950,

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{300} Waris 1968:81. \\
\textsuperscript{301} Pihkala 1982:455. \\
\textsuperscript{302} Damstén 1961:240. G.F. Stockmann (1825-1906), a German born merchant, established his business in Helsinki in 1862. In 1926, the department store moved to today’s location and it became a significant part of the social life in Helsinki.
\end{flushleft}
Finns spent only 9 per cent of their time in leisure-time activities. However, in 1960 this figure had risen to 12 per cent\textsuperscript{303}. During the 1950s, new ways of spending one's free time became available. For example, in 1950 the amusement park Linnanmäki in the centre of Helsinki was opened, and it soon became one of Helsinki's most popular outdoor attractions. Moreover, in 1958 the number of cinemas reached its all-time peak, with 618 movie houses and the number of the cinema-goers breaking all records\textsuperscript{304}.

From this short comparison between the predictions Waris made in 1950 and the actual social realities of the 1960s, it can be concluded that Finland in the early 1950s was still an agrarian society with people who had, in general, small incomes and who were still living without the benefit of electricity and modern household appliances. However, by 1960 Finland was on its way to reaching the standards of an affluent Western society, with a growing middle class living in and close to urban centres. Waris was right in claiming that the 1950s would be a period of social and economic transition. More and more people were moving to the urban areas in the southern part of Finland, mechanisation was reaching the countryside and the means of communication were rapidly improving. In addition, the fact that people began to have more leisure time resulted in greater consumption. At the same time, however, it cannot be claimed that during the 1950s, considerable sums were spent on amusements and relaxation. Before that was possible, Finns needed to improve their homes and adapt to the new conditions after the war.

During the 1950s, one more process began that prevailed well into the 1960s and which was not predicted by Heikki Waris; this was Finnish migration to Sweden. Although the Finnish economy underwent an immense transformation and living conditions were improving rapidly, social circumstances, such as unemployment and even the political situation, led some 400,000 Finns to leave the country for more prosperous Sweden during these two decades\textsuperscript{305}. Many immigrants were from the Swedish-speaking areas of Finland, which made their leaving more feasible due to their knowledge of the Swedish language. The migration thereby was one of the reasons why the numbers of the Swedish-speaking minority slightly decreased during the post-war decades\textsuperscript{306}.

\textsuperscript{303} Wiman 1982:512.
\textsuperscript{304} Waris 1968:93. Since 1958, the number of cinemas has been slowly decreasing.
\textsuperscript{305} Singleton 1986:7. This trend had stopped by the 1970s, when the economic situation had clearly improved.
\textsuperscript{306} Sandlund 1980:278.
Furthermore, Waris in his 1968 publication did not mention in greater detail the negative sides of the social and economic transition which he predicted in 1950. Social problems did arise, especially in the sense of adaptation to the new urban standards of life in which the dangers of the modern consumption society lurked. At the beginning of the 1960s, the peasantry, who had been on the rise since the 1870s, began to decline. In its place, a new social stratum was born, the urbanites with very different values. The move from the countryside to the town brought along not only hope but also despair. The consumption of alcohol rose and family values began to erode with divorce rates leaping upward.

Family values changed during the 1950s. The father has gone to work, the children have gone to a youth club, and the mother has gone to a women’s organisation. She left a note saying that the dinner is in the fridge (Kari Suomalainen).

All the social changes and economic advances which have been discussed above not only had an immense impact on the structure and development of Finnish society but may also have affected the attitudes and opinions of people who experienced such

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308 According to the American example, the first AA groups were established in 1948 and soon became important for curing alcohol dependence (Kiviranta 1969:2).
transition. It is not easy to state clearly to what extent the social improvements influenced general public opinion; however, two observations can certainly be made.

Firstly, with the progress in broadcasting, the dissemination of information improved. This was of particular importance in terms of political propaganda, as even Finns who lived in remote areas could now be better informed about the political and cultural situation in the Finnish capital. This, of course, affected the tactics of politicians who longed for wider public support, as public opinion could be more easily influenced. On the one hand, radio and TV facilitated dissemination of their political programmes; on the other hand, their political presentations had to become used to the new opportunities.

Secondly, improvements in the infrastructure strengthened communication between the rural and urban areas. Not only did accessibility to the distant farming areas improve but also many country people moved to the urban areas. This enhanced the mobility of Finns in both directions, and thus people in Helsinki became keener on countryside issues and vice versa. For example, in Ylioppilaslehti, many articles were devoted to students from the country, and their reflections on accommodation in Helsinki compared to the rural life style.

Besides that, the international awareness of Finns increased with the better dissemination of information from abroad and the growing opportunities whether with incoming or outgoing tourism. This enabled Finns to broaden their theoretical scope of knowledge of foreign countries and to create their own opinion without being guided by ‘well travelled’ journalists like Matti Kurjensaari. Moreover, interest in industrialisation and its consequences grew, particularly by the end of the first post-war decade. More debates were conducted in terms of economic and social developments, comparing Finland with the rest of Western Europe.

Finally, it can be argued that the increase in leisure time speeded up developments in the entertainment industry in Finland. In other words, the dissemination of information was facilitated with the proliferation of films, documentaries and various educational programmes. All such developments influenced public opinion which could easily be both created and manipulated with the new broadcasting technologies.

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309 E.g., Ylioppilaslehti 1951, #5 (an article Maaseudun ylioppilas Helsingin baabelissa, Babel for a countryside student).
310 E.g., discussions in Ylioppilaslehti, 1956, #37.
Messukaikuja provinssista

— Mutta emäntä Kenkkunen, tämän on mate in Enklant...

At the countryside market.
Mrs Kenkkunen, buy this dress, it is after all mate in Enklant.
(Ylioppilaslehti. 1957, #27).
The idolatry of history arrogates to itself the right to ignore the brute facts or to give each of them the meaning which will fit in with an allegedly definitive system of interpretation\textsuperscript{311}.

The intellectuals ... are to a specific degree predestined to propagate the 'national idea', just as those who wield power in the polity provoke the idea of the state. By ‘intellectual’ we understand a group of men who by virtue of their peculiarity have special access to certain achievements considered to be ‘cultural values’, and who therefore usurp the leadership of a ‘cultural community’\textsuperscript{312}.

3. THE CULTURAL ATMOSPHERE IN FINLAND DURING THE 1950s

The cultural elite and its social and political engagements are of particular interest for this study; however, it is essential to become familiar with the environment in which the cultural elite moved and the atmosphere which stimulated their ideas and debates so as to facilitate an understanding of the elite’s involvement. This chapter will provide a characterisation of the cultural setting with the emphasis on cultural conformity, the causes of which will be explained. In addition, the generational gap will be explored in terms of the situation within the Department of History and the new developments in the social sciences at the University of Helsinki. New trends and the American influence will be the last topic of this chapter, and should complete the picture of the cultural atmosphere in Finland during the 1950s. The significance of the Fulbright Foundation will be pointed out, with a brief look at advances within post-war Finnish design and architecture.

\textsuperscript{311} Aron 1957:193.

\textsuperscript{312} Weber 1946:176.
3.1 Cultural conformity

It might be argued that conformity, defined as adjustment to the rules provided and the acceptance of cultural goals and the legitimate means of achieving them, had been rooted in the Finnish educated class since the nineteenth century. Such argument would be based on the tendency that, as is generally agreed, in Finland the educated class forms a part of the State administration. In other words, the Finnish educated class actively participated in the construction of the State bureaucracy. The Finnish educated class seldom raised its voice or stood in opposition to the State. Such behaviour has a focal significance for the creation of conformity, particularly illustrated by the period of the Grand Duchy, when Finns maintained a high degree of allegiance towards the Russian authorities.

After gaining independence, the situation within the educated class remained unchanged, except that the Russian authorities were replaced by Finnish representatives who became the bearers of nationalistic propaganda and anti-Russian feelings. The University’s political role was strengthened by student movements and academic politicians. Besides that, some elements of the Finnish educated class in the 1920s and 30s had tried to “open windows to Europe to be more European than Finnish” and thus to step out of the shadow of isolation and inner conformity. However, this did not go very far, mainly because of an enduring patriotic ideology which was rooted in the agrarian origins of the cultural circles. The Finnish educated class appeared to be somewhat closed to external influences, which is illustrated, for example, by the lack of translated foreign contemporary literature.

The situation in the 1950s differed slightly from the inter-war decades as the position of the State was weakened and the educated class had difficulties in adjusting to the post-war situation. Their previous active involvement melted into the confusing standpoint of being uncommitted with commitment.

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314 Immonen 1997:207-208. Immonen sustained his argument by the studies made by Matti Klinge and Risto Alapuro, who agreed that the main forum of the Finnish educated class (in Immonen’s words “intellectuals”) has always been the State and matters connected with it.
316 Alapuro 1988: 15, 21-29.
317 An interview with Mika Waltari published in the Ylioppilaslehti 1953, #16. The literary group Torchbearers propagated such ideals during the inter-war period.
Although it is hard to explore what such an attitude meant, it manifests the perplexity of the post-war reality. Being committed meant to be engaged in issues which were crucial to the post-war period. However, it was regarded as a patriotic responsibility not to commit oneself to issues which might be controversial. An example, excluding the reflection on the international political situation, might be the perception of foreign intellectual influences by the educated class.

The international isolation which was a hangover from the inter-war period affected the cultural debate and contributed to maintaining cultural conformity. For example, the confrontations taking place in post-war France between Raymond Aron and his opponent Jean-Paul Sartre about the role of the intellectual under the capitalist and communist regimes were almost unknown in Finland. The cultural elite was sceptical about future developments, which originated in the lack of a cultural tradition in which they could continue their post-war work. The missing link which might facilitate the search for an intellectual response to the post-war situation rather troubled the members of the younger generation. They could not effectively carry on the ideological heritage which the older generation had created during the inter-war period.

Though both the older and younger generation strove to lead a constructive cultural debate which would reflect on the necessary changes within society, they sank into topics more connected with searching for their own identity, role and political commitments than opening a constructive discussion. Both generations blamed each other for the stagnation of the cultural debate and the lack of challenges which might set it alight. Matti Kurjensaari, as a representative of the older generation, strongly criticised the younger generation which, although in his eyes full of ideals, was too immature to maintain the level of cultural discussion which, in Kurjensaari’s opinion, the older generation had maintained during the inter-war period. The immaturity appeared, according to Kurjensaari, in the desire of the younger generation to explore

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320 Immonen 1997:207-208. Immonen, like Alapuro (1997) used the term ‘no commitment’ (sitoutumattomuus) as the key for characterising the cultural atmosphere.
321 Raymond Aron and Daniel Bell were almost unknown in post-war Finland in spite of the fact that Aron’s book The Century of Total War was critically reviewed in Suomalainen Suomi (by Antero Hyvönen, 1956/#2, pp. 96-100) two years after the English version was published. Allardt came to know Aron at the founding of the International Committee of Political Sociology in 1959 in Stresa, Italy.
323 Although both generations constantly complained about insufficient cultural debate, they never really tried to challenge it. For example, in 1954, Paavo Ravila, in a speech during the opening ceremony of the new academic year, mentioned the ‘monotonous uniformity’ within cultural circles. However, he himself did not contribute to breaking down this uniformity (Rehtorin puheet- Helsingin Yliopisto, 1954).
324 Kurjensaari in Päivän Sanomat 18.11.1958.
new trends and challenges, neglecting the recognition of the necessary intellectual responsibility which the older generation respected.

During the 1950s Finnish students, wearing characteristic students’ hat, travelled to Paris where they explored the Parisian atmosphere and ‘integrated well’.

A representative of the younger generation, Pekka Lounela claimed that the main problem lay in poor communication between the older and younger generations. In his view, the generation of the so-called Torchbearers (*Tulenkantajat*), who were active
in the 1920s and 1930s, had nothing in common with the younger generation. As Lounela observed, this resulted in a lack of any mutual admiration between the younger generation and the inter-war generation, because continuity was missing. Further, Lounela considered the lack of a cultural debate to be an inability to define the actual role of the educated class in Finnish society. Thus, a Finnish cultural representative was unable to secure his place in society and this only degraded his self-esteem instead of improving it.

Besides the lack of a creative confrontation between the older and younger generations, other explanations might be suggested in searching for reasons for cultural conformity. Pekka Lounela’s argument about the degrading of the self-esteem of the Finnish cultural elite may be of crucial importance. Finland suffered a defeat in 1944, which shook the self-esteem of the Finnish nation and especially of the cultural elite, which since 1917 had had the chance for the first time in its history to build up its own ideology, which after 1944 appeared to be the wrong one.

After the war, Finns seemed to be even more isolated than they had been before, and such a situation raised doubts not only about national identity and the meaning of Finnish history but also about the Finnish position amongst the civilised countries, and raised the question of whether Finns were educated enough. In this sense, Finns were left with doubts about their cultural and historical existence, which heavily influenced the cultural debate during the 1950s when Finnish self-esteem was in deep crisis. Finns, to borrow an image from George Maude, were a nation which was “struggling with doubt”, as their near past did not provide them with an adequate respond to their future during the 1950s.

The question of the sufficiency of the educational dimension and the position of the educated class within Finnish society, which was indirectly linked with low-self esteem, was not actually anything new within the Finnish cultural milieu. The under-estimation of the Finnish educated class was predetermined not only by the defeat in war of a Finnish patriotism created during the inter-war years: its roots lay deeper in Finnish history. The six hundred years of belonging to the Swedish Kingdom and the

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325 Lounela 1959:119.
327 Fromm (1952:17) focuses on the issue of isolation and doubts. The feeling of not belonging anywhere, of total isolation, would raise doubts about real existence.
328 Maude 1990:23. Maude describes Finns as “a nation struggling with doubt” about their political background. However, his words might as well apply to the cultural atmosphere.
fact that during the National Revival it was the Swedish-speaking upper class amongst whom nationalism as a political movement originated and who even contributed to the awakening of the Finnish language were arguably amongst the factors.\footnote{Alapuro 1999:7, 113.}

Furthermore, Finland was regarded as an “unhistoric nation”, in the sense of a missing link to “existing or even historically remembered polities”.\footnote{Alapuro 1988:89.} Such a perception, certainly, did not contribute to strengthening the national identity after the war, when the past should have served to provide heroic examples. In addition, the unsolved question of Finnish involvement in the Second World War appeared to harden an already complicated role in history. The significance of history, in general, grew during that period, and historians became the key creators of national image upholding the Finnish self-esteem.

The low self-esteem was reflected in the search for identity and the re-identification of Finnishness, which went through a period of crisis. The strong inter-war Finnish nationalism suffered a defeat during the Continuation War of 1941-1944. For that reason, during the 1950s, Finns turned back to their own history to look at turning-points in their past which could be venerated in order to strengthen national self-esteem. In this sense, Finns during the 1950s used history to create and validate their national identity.\footnote{Upton (1999:153) devotes more attention to the use of history to create and validate a national identity in the Finnish context.} It appeared to be essential to explain the Finnish position during the Second World War, and to create from that a national image showing more the heroic side of the war than the side of polemical political decisions.

History was re-created as a picture which would be the best explanation of the Finnish past, and thus Finns would not have to feel like aggressors, but instead as a sacrifice to the political games of the Great Powers.\footnote{Kurjenssaari (1960:167) pointed out that the Finns had a right to be proud of their history, as they were disappointed by Western help during the Winter War, and were thus forced to stand alone against the Soviet Union.} Anthony Upton, in his article on history and national identity, quotes Heikki Ylikangas:

... [written history is] a tool of the power holders. It is desired to make it show that the existing situation—that is the outcome of developments—is not only the best possible but also inevitable.\footnote{Upton 1999:161, quoting Ylikangas 1986:154.}
Basically, the goal was to suggest, as Upton continues, that the Finns were more reactive than proactive during the war, and most books written during the 1950s about the Finnish past were more or less adjusted to these purposes. As Maude ironically claims, both wars, the Winter War and the Continuation War, were pictured with a sense of nostalgic pride. The loss of the war was described by Max Jakobson in 1961 as 'Victory in Defeat'; and, as Maude further argues, even Väinö Linna in 1954 admitted that, even if the Soviet Union had won the war, Finland came in a good second at the post.

Furthermore, there exists one aspect which is especially important in creating national identity: to define a common enemy against which a nation can be united. Finland lost its open enemy by signing the Armistice Agreement with the Soviet Union in 1944. However, the hidden enemy remained within the atmosphere of Finnish society, which determined the homogeneity of the Finnish nation and its ability, at least regarding foreign affairs. During the 1950s, the enemy was basically the same as during previous decades but transformed into the fear of Soviétisation and the fear of Communism.

The lack of self-esteem and the identity crisis which affected the cultural debate and the atmosphere of cultural conformity also led to the inventing of traditions and historical myths. In this respect, one can agree with Laura Kolbe, who claims that the 1950s was the period when traditions were born. Traditions are, according to Hobsbawm and Ranger, “often invented and constantly reshaped according to the needs prevalent in a particular historical situation”. Honko considers traditions to be symbols which connect people by giving them a common identity. This argument shows why traditions were born during the 1950s: to reshape the Finnish past and to strengthen national self-esteem. Moreover, tradition, as Giddens observes, has to be reinvented by each generation because it takes over its cultural inheritance from those preceding it.

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334 Upton 1999:159.
336 Julian Barnes argues that the French created their identity in reaction to an enemy (L'Express 06.01.2000).
337 Kolbe 1993. Though Kolbe devotes a great deal of attention to new traditions, she does not define the concept of traditions and she does not argue about their impact on further development.
In connection with the issue of an untouchable war, war events and heroes became the basis of many traditions as they were the most venerated. The death of Marshal Mannerheim\(^{341}\) occasioned great national mourning and his funeral in 1951 became a national event. Mannerheim represented for Finns an icon of a great man of charisma, who led the Finnish nation in the most difficult moments of their history and whose cult could strengthen national self-esteem\(^{342}\). More than 40,000 people came to pay tribute to Mannerheim’s coffin and the church doors were closed only a couple of minutes before the official funeral began\(^{343}\).

The veneration of the Winter War was the other occasion during which national self-esteem was strengthened and national image built up. The Winter War, despite its short duration, less than six months, was important for the unity of the Finnish nation. Until then, Finns were still marked by the stigma of the Civil War, during which the Finnish nation stood against itself in the bloody ideological struggle between the Whites and the Reds. The Winter War, during which Finnish independence was threatened, had succeeded, as it is often claimed, in overcoming the Civil War trauma, in uniting the nation.

For that reason, the Winter War served perfectly to create a heroic myth. In 1954, the Ylioppilaslehti organised a discussion about the historical importance of the Winter War and the territory of the Karelian Isthmus, which was ceded to the Soviet Union\(^{344}\). A year later, in September 1955, when sixteen years had passed since the beginning of the Winter War, an editorial in the Ylioppilaslehti pointed out the courage and bravery of Finnish soldiers which should always have been venerated and remembered by the younger generation\(^{345}\).

Also, a torchlight procession (soihtukulkue) took place on the occasion of the declaration of Finnish Independence on 6\(^{th}\) December in 1951. Students by the thousand gathered at Hietaniemi cemetery, the largest in Helsinki, where most national figures

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341 Marshall Mannerheim, as George Maude claims, became a Finnish patriot by historical accident. Mannerheim’s origins lay in the old Swedish-speaking aristocracy, and he was a general in the Russian Tsarist Army. Mannerheim, with his active participation in the Civil War, and the Continuation War, when he held the post of commander-in-chief, and in 1944-1946, when he was Finnish President, became the symbol of the Finnish people in their struggle for independence.

342 Kolbe 1996:36-37. It is of interest that the readers of the journal Suomen Kuvalehti (2000, #1) elected Marshal Mannerheim as the most significant Finnish man of the twentieth century. Mannerheim, with 39 per cent of the votes, came far ahead of Urho Kekkonen, the composer Jean Sibelius, and J.K. Paasikivi. This shows that Mannerheim’s merits are still well remembered by ordinary Finns.


344 Ylioppilaslehti 1954, #39.

345 Ylioppilaslehti 1955, #38.
and statesmen are buried, and paid tribute to the war heroes. Then the procession took up torches and marched through the streets of Helsinki to Senate Square, where the main Independence Day ceremonies were held. This ceremony, a tradition that has lasted until the present, had an enormous impact on the patriotic feelings of Finns. The procession, enhanced by the coldness and darkness of the December weather, evoked a feeling of national unity and identity. The participants in the torch procession included students, as well as war veterans who came to remember their war experience and to remind politicians of their service to Finland.

Apart from the veneration of Marshal Mannerheim and the Winter War, in order to support their national identity and self-esteem, Finns turned their attention to earlier history to look for a Finnish patriotic inheritance. Finns were searching for the ‘right’ great men whose actions could be upgraded and venerated as examples of Finnish destiny. A similar trend may also be seen within Finnish society after the Civil War, during the 1920s, when the Right-wing educated class craved the establishment of new national symbols, such as an anthem, national poets’ days and peasants’ cultural traditions, to uphold the common features of Finnish identity. Thirty years later, during the 1950s, the situation was reversed; the Ylioppilaslehti and Suomalainen Suomi became platforms in which discussions were held on the inheritance of J.W.Snellman (1806-1881) and J.L.Runeberg (1804-1877) for the 1950s generation. In general, history was a popular topic, especially themes from the nineteenth century, which offered a large number of historical events to be venerated.

The invention of traditions, low self-esteem and the crisis of self-identity were all connected and, arguably, factors which led to cultural conformity. Fundamentally, history served the present by covering up the controversial past and therefore by identifying the enemy, the nation united. This created a sense of self-esteem previously lost. The inability to challenge the reality of the past in fear of discovering the truth, reflected on the cultural atmosphere of the 1950s. Most members of the older generations were not prepared to react promptly to the political and cultural changes. To what extent such situation is lucidly reflected in the work undertaken by the cultural elite will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

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346 Sevänen 1997:43.
347 E.g., Ylioppilaslehti 1954, #5.
3.2 Dangerous thoughts

If it is claimed that conformity, characterised as voluntary adjustment to the accepted rules, prevailed within the cultural elite in post-war Finland, concrete examples should be provided to support such an argument. Self-censorship might be closely linked with conformity as far as the growing amount of book publishing was concerned. To what extent this affected literary production and to what extent self-censorship was a new phenomenon in post-war Finland will be discussed, together with an outline of the role of the publishing houses and the character of the most commonly published books within that period.

In every society, as Louis Wirth claimed, there exists an area of so-called dangerous thoughts\(^{348}\). Such topics are scarcely debatable, and are regarded as threatening the existing system. What constitutes the dangerous thoughts is a matter that differs from country to country and from epoch to epoch and each society deals variously with them; likewise, the question arises of whether the thought is completely erased from general discussion or the topic discussed carefully within a certain context and an awareness of self-censorship created\(^{349}\).

In Finland during the 1950s, whatever seemed to be threatening Finnish foreign policy might be considered to be dangerous thoughts. In other words, those topics which touched upon anti-Soviet ideas or a pro-German orientation would be treated extremely carefully or at best would have been excluded from political or cultural debate\(^{350}\). Such attitudes meant that Finns began to behave carefully; in the end, political awareness was one of the political demands which was hidden behind the political wisdom of J.K. Paasikivi after 1944\(^{351}\). If Kai Ekholm claims that Finns have been trained to control themselves in terms of expressing their opinions freely\(^{352}\), it might be argued that the 1950s was the period when the post-war ‘training’ began.

\(^{348}\) Wirth 1936:xiv.

\(^{349}\) It might be disputed whether the term self-censorship or censorship should be used in the context of the 1950s.

\(^{350}\) Salokangas (1996:117) mentions self-censorship in foreign policy matters in the context of Finnish Radio (Ylesradio) broadcasting. Unsuitable gramophone records and anti-Soviet books were removed from the Radio’s archives as “a cautious policy”.

\(^{351}\) Esko Salminen (Helsingin Sanomat 19.09.1999).

\(^{352}\) Ekholm 1997:46-47. Ekholm claims that in Finland there is a long tradition of (self)-censorship, and it is not a phenomenon only of the last fifty years. Finns were politically aware, particularly during the Russian oppression of Finland at the beginning of the twentieth century.
This was reflected in a clause, which was added to the Finnish criminal code in 1947, according to which the president could sentence an editor to up to two years in prison for politically abusive writing (the so-called menace clause, *uhkapykälä*)\(^{353}\). Although the clause was mainly meant for newspapers and journals, it also affected publishing houses. The purpose of this clause was, as Esko Salminen mentions, to remind people that protection of the new Finnish foreign policy was the main priority and no exceptions would be allowed\(^{354}\).

The menace clause and the direct demand for political awareness led to one thing only: Finns became over-cautious, and they closed their minds to any foreign influence which seemed to break their ‘harmony’. A rigid cultural debate was thus created which was heavily reflected in the opinions of the Finnish educated class during the 1950s. Finns, as was already noted above, explained (and excused) their awareness by political pressure, but I would claim that, until the end of the 1950s, the rigidity was not the result of Soviet pressure, even if the Soviet shadow lay over Finland. It was created by Finnish political awareness and a feeling of self-control. In addition, low self-esteem and a feeling of doubt, which strongly existed in Finns, did not make the situation easier, which looks even more paradoxical exploring the situation when some books were not published at all; however, some, surprisingly, were published easily.

If the representatives of the older and younger generation blamed each other for their unwillingness in terms of cultural debates, in which each of them was, according the other, the brake, the generation gap was evidenced also in their work in the publishing houses. The oldest and biggest, which were often staffed by members of the older generation, were, as Tuomas Anhava observed, too interrelated with the strict bureaucracy, which made them unable to exercise more flexibility regarding the publishing plan\(^{355}\). In contrast, the smaller houses, often represented by the younger generation, concentrated more on translated literature with a lot more courage and energy.

During the 1950s, amongst the biggest publishing houses were the WSOY (Werner Söderström Company) and Otava. The WSOY is one of the oldest publishing

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\(^{353}\) Markkanen in *Helsingin Sanomat* 19.09.1999. The menace paragraph was removed from the criminal law in 1995.

\(^{354}\) Salminen in *Helsingin Sanomat* 19.02.2000.

\(^{355}\) Anhava 1953:213.
houses in Finland, founded in 1878 by Werner Söderström in Porvoo, located near Helsinki. Despite Werner Söderström's Swedish-speaking roots and his limited ability to speak Finnish, his publishing aims fully supported literature written in Finnish and his firm became the flagship of the Fennoman nationalistic movement towards the end of the nineteenth century.

In the 1950s, the Jäntti family was in charge of the WSOY. They had taken over the enterprise in 1914, after the death of Werner Söderström. Leaving aside the interwar publishing activities, which might briefly be characterised as strongly pro-Finnish and nationalistic, the WSOY not only contributed significantly to the developments of the Finnish written literature, but also played an important role within the cultural milieu. The building of the WSOY on Bulevardi Street, where the publisher moved at the beginning of the 1930s and which is one of the few streets in Helsinki which evokes a central European cultural atmosphere, was the place where Finnish cultural circles met. Most members of the cultural elite co-operated with the WSOY, as, for example, Matti Haavio and V.A. Koskenniemi, who worked for WSOY during the 1950s.

The most serious competitor to the WSOY was the Otava publishing house. By the end of the nineteenth century, the cultural circles in Helsinki lacked a publishing house which would represented the interests of authors of literature written in Finnish. As the WSOY was located in Porvoo, the decision was made to establish the Otava publishing house in 1890 which would operate directly in the capital. The Reenpää (Renqvist) family carried out its foundation, in particular Alvar Renqvist (1868-1947).

During the 1950s, the Reenpää family were certainly among the leading members of the cultural elite in Finland, with representatives not only within Otava but also within university circles. Moreover, the general director of Otava during the 1950s, Heikki Reenpää, attended meetings of the Board of the PYP bank, which enabled the company to maintain relations with the Finnish financial and business world.

356 Werner Söderström was an eighteen-year old school boy at that time. His father, Gustaf Leopold Söderström, was a bookseller, owning the printing works in Porvoo. G.L. Söderström provided the capital for his son’s business activities.

357 The first part of the history of the WSOY has recently been published, covering the 1878-1939 period. In full detail, it devotes attention to the importance of the WSOY in the context of Finnish literature, culture and society in general (Häggman 2000). It is planned to publish the second part, including the 1950s, in 2003.

358 The Renqvists were an old Swedish-speaking family, and notwithstanding the fact that Alvar Renqvist, the founder of the Otava, attended Swedish schools, under the influence of the period, and the Fennoman
Amongst the smaller publishing houses which are of interest for this study belonged Tammi and Gummerus. Gummerus was established in 1872 in Jyväskylä, central Finland, and as in the case of the Otava house, its founder Kaarlo Jaakko Gummerus (1840-1898) was influenced by the prevalent Fennoman atmosphere, which resulted in the promotion of literature written in Finnish. During the 1950s, the significance of Gummerus lay in the field of translations, which accounted for more than half of the production. Furthermore, the Gummerus firm also supported the literary work of the so-called 'angry young men', especially after 1957 when Ville Repo (b.1929) became the literary director.

The last-mentioned publishing house, Tammi, falls a little outside of the by now traditional Finnish-speaking cultural elite. Tammi was established in 1943 by the trade union organisations to support workers' leisure interests, with the focus on publishing popular literature and textbooks. The reasons for paying attention to Tammi in the context of the 1950s are twofold: firstly, Tammi's importance during the post-war decade was rather in translation literature, when Tammi released much key fiction which could not be published during the inter-war period; and secondly, in the field of Finnish literature, Tammi experienced immense success by printing Väinö Tanner's memoirs. However, it witnessed political pressure in the case of Yrjö Leino's memoirs, which were taken off the market in the late 1950s.

The four publishing houses which were briefly characterised above varied in their historical background and aims. However, after 1944, one common topic prevailed: the war and the war experience. This was not only the case in Finland; exploring the war theme was a distinctive feature of the post-war literary world. It was an attempt to search for answers for the many years of suffering. Moreover, the impact of the war was still strongly evident in everyday life, whether in terms of the resettlement of the Karelian refugees or the ration card system, and thus difficult to overcome.
In Finland, the war experience was described in numerous literary forms; however, memoirs were pervasive and the most popular. The most successful book for the Otava publishing house in the 1950s appeared to be the Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim. The Finnish version of the Memoirs, which was acquired for the publishing house through the personal intervention of the managing director, Heikki Reenpää, was published in two parts. Within a couple of weeks of its appearance in 1951, the book became the most sought after publication recalling Mannerheim’s political and military career, which indeed coincided with a description of the Finnish past.

The fact that the first part of the Memoirs came out shortly after Mannerheim’s death certainly affected the book’s popularity. However, the triumph was clearly influenced by the understanding of Mannerheim’s work in post-war Finland; he was regarded as a symbol of independent Finland. His military career and attitudes towards the Finnish position in the war evoked great respect within Finnish society, which was at that time searching for examples of Finnish heroism to uphold a dented self-esteem.

Inspired by the success of Mannerheim’s memoirs and the ubiquitous demand for war literature, other military veterans sat down and put their own war reminiscences on paper. By the second half of the 1950s, Otava had published General Aarne Sihvo’s (1889-1963) extensive memoirs, and those of the infantry General Erik Heinrichs (1890-1965) and Wolf H. Halsti (1905-1985) a few years later. Not looking at the contents but at their significance in the post-war period, these memoirs fall into the category of publications which describe the Finnish war engagement by eyewitnesses who defended Finnish patriotic ideals. Though the war ended differently from the original plans, these books helped to justify the war involvement, and thus to strengthen the self-esteem of the ordinary Finn.

Besides the memory of the war, there was also another category of memoirs, written by people who recalled their own experience of the war with the Soviet Union and described in detail the cruelty of the Soviet regime. These books were highly

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364 Heikki Reenpää signed the publishing rights with Mannerheim for the Finnish version at the beginning of 1950, and later even assisted Mannerheim with the manuscript, which was completed in December 1950. However, the course of Mannerheim’s life ran faster and he did not have a chance to see the printed version of his memoirs, the first part of which came out shortly after his death in 1951 (Lassila 1990:189-191).

365 Both parts sold more than 120,000 copies (Lassila 1990:192).

366 General Erik Heinrichs had already written the chapter dealing with the Second World War in the Memoirs of Mannerheim. Heinrichs was one of the officers closest to Mannerheim (Turtola 1990:43).
popular as, still prevailing from the inter-war years, the Soviet Union was, in spite of official proclamations, considered to be an enemy by Finns. This made such books attractive as they included information which people wanted to be known and which appeared to exonerate the inter-war Finnish orientation.

An example might be the memoirs of Arvo (Poika) Tuominen, published in 1953 by Tammi, which was highly popular. Arvo Tuominen (1894-1981) was a man with a wealth of experience reflecting the inter-war historical position of Finland. At the beginning of the 1920s, involved in the organisation of the trade unions, he was arrested for expressing openly pro-Soviet views. However, Tuominen’s stance during the Winter War, when he turned against the Soviet Union and strongly supported his native country, gained him numerous admirers. In other words, this was perhaps one of the reasons why his memoirs were able to be published, though their anti-Russian content might easily have been labelled as the expression of ‘dangerous thoughts’.

To a similar collection of literature, which appears to be an exception within the atmosphere of cultural conformity and political awareness, belongs Unto Parvilahti’s (1907-1971) account of the Soviet labour camps. The Flower Gardens of Beria, (Berijan tarhat) was published in 1957 and a year later his memoirs To Terek and Back, (Terekille ja takaisin), recalling his participation in a Swedish-speaking SS group. Surprisingly, no problems with their publication by Otava occurred, and the books enjoyed great popularity. The Flower Gardens of Beria was even translated into English and published in Great Britain and the USA.

The books mentioned above comprised one type of war literature; they were memoirs of military commanders or people involved in the war conflict outside Finnish territory. As such, they significantly contributed to buttress the degraded self-esteem of

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367 Arvo (Poika) Tuominen was deputy-chairman of the Trade Union federation during the inter-war period and his political convictions were pro-Communist. After his release from jail, he was entrusted with the leadership of a Moscow-run international organisation. Tuominen was respected for his refusal to become a member of the Terijoki government (run by O.W. Kuusinen) during the Winter War. Tuominen then lived in Sweden where he stayed until 1956 when he returned to Finland. In 1958, he became a Social Democratic member of Parliament (Seppälä 1979: 197-198; Singleton 1989:120-121).

368 Seppo Hiltunen, a Helsinki antiquarian bookshop owner, claims that there was no question about not publishing Tuominen’s memoirs. Its prohibition would have aroused great dissatisfaction amongst war veterans, which even Paasikivi did not want to risk (23.02.2000, Helsinki).

369 Unto Parvilahdi was a member of a Swedish-speaking SS group, operating on the German eastern war front, who was captured by Soviet soldiers in 1944 and who subsequently spent ten years in a camp in Siberia (Jokipii 2000:118).

370 Lassila 1990:210. The Flower Gardens of Beria, describing ten years of captivity in Soviet Siberia, was translated into English in 1959 by Alan Blair and published by Hutchinson, London. A version even appeared in German, published in Austria in 1960, and in French and Spanish a year later.
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the Finns, recounting the heroic war actions and struggles which Finland went through. A war has, in general, various faces, and the perception of a military official whose life is devoted to military service is logically different from the perception of a low social class worker or farmer who stands at the war front to defend his country. Hence, the memoirs of Mannerheim or Halsti, recounted from the perspective of high ranking military officials, were read in great number; however, not every ordinary Finn could fully identify with the war picture presented in them.

Yet this was possible with Väinö Linna’s (1920-1992) novel, The Unknown Soldier, (Tuntematon sotilas), published in 1954 and describing the events of the Continuation War 1941-1944. This book was written by a factory worker, whose war description was familiar to the rest of the ordinary Finns who, not being professional soldiers, understood the war from a different perspective from their superiors. Linna, as Kurjensaari ³⁷¹ claimed, offered a picture of a Finnish soldier, until then unknown, with all the realities of war, which portrayed a profile of the Finnish nation. The Unknown Soldier has been considered to be a pivotal publication in post-war Finland, as its significance lies beyond the literal events; the social impact of the book is more dominant. Linna, for the first time in the decade after the war, gave real faces to the Finnish soldiers fighting in the Continuation War ³⁷².

The Unknown Soldier was published by WSOY and became its biggest success during the 1950s, despite initial scepticism and even attempts to refuse to publish the book. Yrjö A. Jäntti (1905-1985), a WSOY director in the 1950s, expressed doubts about the success of Linna’s book, and was particularly suspicious about its impact on Finnish society. Only on the recommendation of his father, Jalmari Jäntti (1876-1960), did he allow the book to be published ³⁷³. Jäntti’s doubts were caused by the theme of Linna’s book, which dealt with the issue of the Continuation War, which until then had almost been excluded from the cultural debate, as the Finnish position within this war

³⁷¹ Matti Kurjensaari, SKS KIA, File 7, Taistelu Linnan Tuntemattomasta sotilasta (The Struggle for the Unknown Soldier)
³⁷³ Hannu Tarmio in Helsingin Sanomat 18.03.2000. Jalmari Jantti told his son that Linna’s book was good and it would be a publishing success. However, the question was whether the WSOY had the courage to publish it (Jantti 2000:18-19). It should be noted that Jalmari Jantti, who succeeded Werner Söderström in 1918, might be regarded as an open-minded and progressive publisher. Already, in 1919 he had decided to publish F.E. Sillanpää’s book Meek Heritage (Hurskas kurjuus), describing the White terror against the adherents of the Reds (Häggman 2000:266; Tarkka 2001:217).
was disputed. Besides that, Linna did not belong to the cultural elite\textsuperscript{374}, and his book was based on his war experience when he was a little over twenty years old.

There are basically two main controversies surrounding the book; firstly its acceptance and rejection by the educated circles immediately after its publication; and secondly, the question of the editor's manipulation of the manuscript, which has been the subject of renewed discussion. Yrjö Jäntti's concerns that Linna's book would raise controversy were correct, when taking into consideration the criticism which \textit{The Unknown Soldier} received. The book became the most discussed and controversial publication within weeks of coming out\textsuperscript{375}, and the novel and its writer evoked an intense debate among the members of the cultural elite. The literary journals \textit{Valvoja} (with Linkomies as editor-in-chief), \textit{Suomalainen Suomi} and \textit{Ylioppilaslehti} devoted many reviews to the Unknown Soldier, expressing both kinds of opinion, welcoming and criticising the book.

The book was regarded by a few as the best novel published since Aleksis Kivi's (1834-1872) novel, \textit{The Seven Brothers} (\textit{Seitsemästä veljeksestä}, published in 1860), to which it was also often compared for its wide use of dialects and the lack of a main hero, as all the soldiers involved in the story were in this position\textsuperscript{376}. The comparison held a twofold significance; firstly, neither Kivi nor Linna were members of the educated class but came from a lower social stratum, with no education and no literary background; however, both were later, though in Kivi's case not until his death, highly respected\textsuperscript{377}. Secondly, they both had the 'courage' to outline raw portraits of ordinary Finnish characters, in everyday reality, who seemed to be uneducated, or even vulgar, to the most 'educated' critics. In the case of Kivi, it was his literary rival August Ahlqvist-Oksanen (1826-1889), who contested the literary values of the book; in the case of Linna, Edwin Linkomies might be considered to be one of the most outspoken opponents\textsuperscript{378}. Making this comparison was a high-ranking military veteran, K.L.

\textsuperscript{374} When Linna wrote his book, he worked in a textile factory in Tampere. At the end of the 1940s, he published two short novels, \textit{The Purpose} (\textit{Päämäärä}) and \textit{Black Love} (\textit{Musta rakkaus}), which were of no great success. They have recently been re-published.

\textsuperscript{375} Varpio 1997:51.

\textsuperscript{376} Martti Haavio's opinion on Linna's novel (Jantti 2000:24).

\textsuperscript{377} Aleksis Kivi's statue is located in front of the National Finnish Theatre in Helsinki and his novel as well as his dramas are read and performed. Linna's literary appreciation during the 1970s is pointed out in Haapala 2001:32.

\textsuperscript{378} Markku Jokisipilä (24.05.2000, Turku) points out the strong dislike of Linkomies for Linna, based on the latter's vulgarity and on a hurtfully low profile of a peasant Finn.
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Oesch, who also pointed out Linna’s sensitive purpose in showing the simple heroism of every Finnish soldier, which was hidden in his heart.

A different approach towards Linna’s book was taken by Matti Kuusi, in the Suomalainen Suomi, when he outlined the tradition of the unknown soldier within Finnish literature, dating from Johan Runeberg to Väinö Linna. Kuusi was also aware of an easily-made misunderstanding about Linna’s book; it should not, in his view, have been considered a war novel, as it had been in the Swedish-speaking cultural journal Nya Argus, but more as a depiction of a nation at war. Kuusi was particularly surprised by one of the reviews published in the Helsingin Sanomat, in which the patriotism of Linna was pointed out. This was, in Kuusi’s view, a misreading of the book, as “Linna was the scourge (rienaaja) of the Finnish Army, in the same way that Kivi was the scourge of the Finnish nation”.

The criticism of The Unknown Soldier varied to such a degree that, as Alex Matson, one of the leading literary critics pointed out, it was hard to reach any clear conclusion about the character of the book, though the impact on Finnish society was indisputable. While the book aroused polemics, the film made by the Finnish director Edvin Laine in 1955, was well accepted in Finland and, as Pekka Lounela observed, it silenced most of Linna’s opponents. Though it was not regarded as a masterpiece of Finnish cinematography and the film was too long and too descriptive, it did provide a vivid picture of Finnish patriotism and the heroism of numerous unknown soldiers who served in the front line during 1941-1944.

The second controversy aroused by Linna’s novel, which continued until recent years, was the extent to which the language and the context of the book were changed by the WSOY editors. Basically, there are two areas where the editor, Asser Jokinen, interfered in Linna’s text. Firstly, Linna as noted above, had no literary background and

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380 It might be worth noting that in the year 2000, The Unknown Soldier (together with its uncensored version) and The Seven Brothers (published in paperback) were still among the best selling books in Finland (Suninen 2001:226).

381 Suomalainen Suomi (1955, #1, pp. 49-53).


384 The film failed to be shown at the Cannes Film Festival in 1956 due to its “hurting [Soviet] national feelings” according to the French film committee (Kivistö 1996:70). The film version of The Unknown Soldier evoked strong criticism in the Soviet Union in comparison with the book (Nevakivi 1996: 130).

his way of using language reflected this. Furthermore, Linna’s heroes spoke in the military slang and jargon, besides using numerous local dialects, which could hardly be understood by people outside the region. For these reasons, basic adjustments to the language and expressions were made. Moreover, as Yrjö Varpio recalls, “indecent sexual expressions” were left out of the final text because Finnish readers were not “ready for such scenes”.

Secondly, and perhaps more significantly, the question arises whether Linna’s novel contained any dangerous thoughts, particularly regarding hostile Finnish feeling for the Soviet Union, which were deliberately censored by Asser Jokinen through his editing work. As the new version, published in 2000, is now available, it is feasible to make a comparison between the version of the Unknown Soldier published in 1954 and in 2000. There was a tendency to believe that extensive censorship was conducted; however, after revealing the original version, such assumptions appeared to be too strong. Basically, criticism of military officials, and criticism of military executions were left out. From the perspective of anti-Russian feelings, ideas of military retaliation were omitted, together with anti-Russian expressions which could have negatively affected the political awareness of the 1950s.

Looking at the general impact of Linna’s book on Finnish society during the first post-war decade, there is no simple answer to the question as to why Linna’s novel created such a big response among the Finns, and especially among the educated class who itself was searching for an identity and was perplexed by Linna’s perception of war. One of the reasons might be that Linna provided an opportunity for Finns to identify themselves with his heroes, as his book was about them and their feelings. This gave back to Finns, as Lounela argued, their self-awareness and self-esteem.

Linna’s trilogy, Here Beneath the Northern Star, (Taalla Pohjantähden alla), published 1959-1962, also evoked strong feelings within Finnish society. The trilogy deals with the issue of the Finnish Civil War, 1918, and the Red and White terror, which

386 E.g., Linna 2000:158. The swearing was left out.
387 Varpio mentions the dialect adjustments in the introduction to the 2000 edition of The Unknown Soldier.
388 Varpio 2000:5.
390 E.g., Linna 2000:160.
was still a taboo subject for the Finns during the 1950s. Linna describes the events from the point of view of the Reds, which was even more courageous. The trilogy was more negatively accepted than the Unknown Soldier for its 'sociological' uses of facts and interpretation.

By analysing the literary works of Linna, which greatly influenced both the cultural and historical perception of the ‘untouchable’ issues of the near Finnish past in a historical context, the failure of the Finnish historians to react adequately to historical developments appeared quite clearly. The educated class was confused by The Unknown Soldier, as well as by Linna’s trilogy, as they themselves were unable to give a similar account of the war events. Meinander claims that Linna was able to revise the perception of the turning-points in Finnish history better than all the Finnish professors of history. Whether Linna was historically accurate or not, his importance lies in the courage he had to express the war experience through the eyes of the ordinary Finn.

From this perspective should be mentioned Alapuro’s observation of the significance of literary works within the Finnish historical context. He claims that, for decades, and particularly in the early 1950s,

the [Finnish] academic community was incapable of dealing with the encounter, and it is thus perhaps no wonder that literary works have been instrumental in reinterpreting the revolution and making it comprehensible for the dominant culture.

In other words, writers were those who dealt with taboo historical subjects and who clarified them to the general public. In this respect also lies the major significance of Linna’s work.

It might be of interest to note that the historical perspective of Linna’s novel The Unknown Soldier and the trilogy Her Beneath the Northern Star was recently discussed by Pertti Haapala in a Finnish historical journal. This was the first time the journal devoted its attention to the historical importance of Linna’s perception of Finnish history within Finnish society. Primarily, Haapala noted the increasing appreciation of

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392 In Jorma Kalela’s view, the trilogy helped to overcome the taboo which the Civil War created among Finns (18.02 2000, Helsinki).
393 E.g., Linkomies (Valvoja, 1960, pp. 240-241) took a very critical attitude towards the second part of Linna’s trilogy. Linkomies, who never liked Linna as he considered his picture of a Finn to be vulgar and unrealistic, did not accept Linna’s view from the Red side in the Civil War.
Linna's work within historian circles. Initially, only a few historians recognised Linna's historical contribution to recount and thus to describe the painful moments of Finnish history. Three decades later, the situation reversed completely. Such paradox perhaps indicates the significance of Linna's work in the 1950s.

Going back to the issue of the expression of dangerous thoughts, which is the main issue of this chapter for illustrating the cultural conformity of the Finnish educated class, there were a few books, translations in particular, which were severely censored in comparison with The Unknown Soldier and one was not published at all. The latter was the post-war reminiscences of Yrjö Leino (1897-1961), who wanted to publish his memoirs in Tammi. Yrjö Leino was to a certain extent a controversial figure of the Finnish political scene, especially for holding the post of Minister of the Interior during the so-called dangerous years of 1945-1948, as the first Communist in the Finnish post-war government. Henceforth, his close relations with Moscow leaders, dating back to the inter-war period, caused Finnish politicians who had been trained in the spirit of post-war political awareness to fear that Leino's might could reveal several political truths, which would become uncomfortable for relations between Finland and the Soviet Union. For similar reasons, Leino's memoirs became a thorn in the Soviet side, and Moscow showed no interest in publishing it.

By the end of the 1950s, when the book was intended to be put on the market, Leino was heavily addicted to alcohol, and he was arguably more interested in the financial aspect of this project than in making any political scandal and disturbing Finnish-Soviet relations. Despite this, his book was not officially published in 1958 as was planned, affected by both the reasons noted above and the political crisis which coincided with. Moreover, not even the rights for publication abroad were sold and Leino was left with the small hope that his book could perhaps be published later when the political situation had softened. It did not happen and in 1961 Leino died. After his death, his daughter, who was in charge of Leino’s inheritance, opposed any future publication. A couple of thousand copies, which were printed in 1958, were burned in

396 Haapala 2001:25-34.
397 Leino’s ex-wife was Hertta Kuusinen (1904-1974), the well-known daughter of Otto W. Kuusinen (1881-1964), who left for the Soviet Union after the Finnish Civil War. He assisted with founding the Finnish Communist Party in Moscow in summer 1918. He never got the chance to return to Finland, though an attempt was made in 1958; however, he was not granted a Finnish visa and his case became a political issue. He is buried in the Kremlin (Hodgson 1974:7-9; Ehmrooth 1999:202-203).
398 Leino’s daughter from his first marriage is Liekko Zachovalová (b. 1927), who married a Czechoslovak Communist at the beginning of the 1950s and moved permanently to Czechoslovakia.
a central heating plant in 1961 and Leino’s memoirs were not published until thirty years later.

Though the prohibition of Leino’s memoirs was connected with the political events of the year 1958, when Finnish-Soviet relations appeared to be in discord, it shows that Finland, as far as its cultural atmosphere was concerned, is a classic case, as Maude claims, of the way in which political experience constrains culture and identity. Such an influence was also reflected in the publication of translated literature, where the issue of the expressing of dangerous thoughts was often to the fore and the feeling of political awareness led editors and translators to choose their language and expressions carefully. Giving an example, in 1950 WSOY published a translation of George Orwell’s, Nineteen Eighty-Four. Oiva Talvitie, the translator, himself suggested removing some “delicate issues” which could, in his view, have threatened the stability of Finnish foreign policy.

Looking at Linna’s, Leino’s and Orwell’s books again in closer detail, arguably, it is suggested that three types of censorship existed. In the case of Leino, political pressure played its role and the book was prevented from being published due to the political censorship. In terms of Linna and Orwell, the editor and translator interfered with the text beyond the extent of their work and they proposed changes according to their own perceptions. Such interference might be called personal censorship, which was understood as a ‘service to the nation in maintaining political stability’. The last type is moral censorship, which is discussed in reference to Nabokov’s novel Lolita and D.H. Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover. It was not only in Finland but also in other countries where these books aroused attention and indignation for their (speaking in terms of the 1950s) sexual frankness. In general, moral censorship might be linked to the influence of the Church, whether Catholic or Lutheran, and the conservative restrictions it applied within a society.

599 More details on the refusal to publish the book may be found in Leino (1991), where all the circumstances are described and explained. Nevakivi (1996:132) in relation to Leino quotes Herlin (1993), who claimed, similarly to Vladimirov (1993:93) that Kustaa Vilkuna was one of those involved in taking the book off the market.


401 A parallel between the translated literature and the Yleisradio foreign correspondents in terms of the political awareness might be drawn. Foreign correspondents, who operated in a sensitive area, as e.g., in regard to the news from the Soviet Union, and East/West Germany, self-censored material which could cause political trouble between Finland and the Soviet Union (Salokangas 1996:119-120).


403 Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita was published in 1960 by Gummerus.
Translated literature published in post-war Finland was affected by the above mentioned types of censorship and also by the circumstances of the inter-war years. During the 1920s and 1930s, Finland remained closed to any wider foreign influence, particularly in terms of the translations, which were subject to so-called preventive censorship. In other words, books which were not 'politically and culturally correct', in the inter-war intellectual atmosphere, were simply banned from publication. As a result, there was no significant tradition of foreign literature.

Despite the inter-war conditions, the situation improved rapidly during the post-war decade compared with the 1920s. There existed the growing interest of a Finnish reader in the popular genres of Anglo-Saxon literature. According to research carried out by Tauno Mustanoja, a Professor of English at the University of Helsinki and one of the strongest supporters of the Fulbright programme in Finland, American literature, consisting of books written by Steinbeck and Hemingway, became the most read by 1960. Such a trend could be explained by the prevailing American influence and also by the 'foreign hunger' of Finns for books which could never be printed before the war.

The largest publishing houses seemed to be more reserved towards translated literature. Otava's literary director, Hannes Reenpää, was not very keen on publishing modern American writers. His reluctance might be regarded as personal censorship, as offers which were made by the New York agent to publish Hemingway, Nabokov and Mailer were left unanswered. In Otava's edition, more emphasis was put on modern French literature, such as Albert Camus, *The Fall (La Chute)*, which was published in 1957 and *The Rebel (L'Etranger)*, published three years later, which assisted the introduction of expressionism into the Finnish cultural context. However, Jean-Paul Sartre's books were not available in post-war Finland, with the exception of *Nausea (La Nausée)*, published in 1947 by Tammi.

Similarly, the WSOY stood to some extent behind the mainstream, with a couple of German translations of Thomas Mann, whose books were largely read during the 1950s, as a Finnish reader could already make an acquaintance with a few of his masterpieces during the 1920s. Again, the book of the Nobel Prize winner from 1946,
Hermann Hesse, *Treatise on the Steppenwolf* (*Der Steppenwolf*) was put on the Finnish market by the WSOY in 1952. An interesting step was made in publishing *All Quiet Flows the Don* (*Tichij Don*) by Mikhail Sholokhov in 1956, particularly as most of the Russian literature in Finnish throughout the 1950s was printed outside Finland, mainly in Petrozavodsk, in the Soviet Karelian Republic.

The smaller, and peripheral publishing houses, such as Tammi and Gummerus were more progressive in the publishing of translations and indeed this side formed an important part of their book production\(^{409}\). Such a trend was perhaps caused by the greater number of the younger generation working for them, and the more open-minded ideas of this generation, and as well as by their travel and language experience which were more extensive after 1944. Their location outside Helsinki, in the case of Gummerus, might also have been significant; not being under the direct influence of possible political restraint and the limited cultural connections in publishing the Finnish literary classics.

Gummerus in Jyväskylä specialised in translated literature, especially in English originals. However, the turning-point happened when, in 1956, Ville Repo was elected the literary director, at the age only of twenty-eight\(^{410}\). He was one of the first Finns who had the opportunity to travel to the United States during the late 1940s and had become familiar with the nation’s language and culture. Besides his emphasis on publishing modern American novels, he focussed on lighter literary genres such as love stories and detective novels, which were already popular after the war\(^{411}\). Furthermore, of significance was the first publication of D.H. Lawrence’s *Lady Chatterley’s Lover*, (Olli Nuorto was the translator). It was printed in a limited Finnish version in 1950. Soon afterwards, it was prohibited due to its unsuitable sexual scenes. The book was not re-published until ten years later\(^{412}\). The beginning of the 1960s witnessed a general turning-point, with the appearance in Finnish of Henry Miller’s *Tropic of Cancer*.

In the Tammi publishing house, foreign literature became a dominant feature after the war\(^{413}\). Books written by Hemingway, Steinbeck and Truman Capote which were refused by the larger publishers were printed by Tammi, mainly on the initiative of


\(^{410}\) Leino-Kaukiainen 1990:180.

\(^{411}\) Leino-Kaukiainen 1990:186.

\(^{412}\) Leino-Kaukiainen 1990:187.

\(^{413}\) Hellemann 1968:55.
its literary editor and translator, Alex Matson\textsuperscript{414}. In terms of Russian literature, which appeared in general to be neglected, including the Russian classics, Tammi brought out a remarkable translation of Boris Pasternak's \textit{Doctor Zhivago (Doktor Zhivago)} in 1958. After the first cautious edition of three thousand copies, the book sold more than ten times\textsuperscript{415}.

Looking at literature published during the first post-war decade and its impact on the cultural atmosphere, the following conclusions may be reached. On the one hand, the proclaimed political awareness influenced to a certain extent the cultural atmosphere of the 1950s; often society was shielded from matters which could be regarded as expressions of 'dangerous thoughts'. In this respect, culture was affected by political restraints. On the other hand, it appeared on several occasions that no political awareness existed, and books whose context was highly politically disputable were easily published. However, the prevailing atmosphere was rigid and conservative. Moreover, exploring the distinction between the larger and smaller publishing houses, a generation gap clearly existed.

Finally, the significance of literary works in the context of post-war history has been raised. Although the historians failed in explaining and challenging the near past, novelists and playwrights took up their task instead. How war events were comprehended by those most responsible in this matter, that is the historians, and how they coped with the post-war situation, will be discussed next and compared to non-historical interpretations.

\textsuperscript{414} E.g., The Old Man and the Sea in 1952, The First Forty Nine-Stories in 1958.
3.3 Confrontation between the younger and older generations

It was mentioned earlier that during the post-war period history served to create a heroic image of Finland to strengthen national self-esteem and rebuild lost identity, and that it was the historians who shared responsibility for this. The patriotic endeavour of Arvi Korhonen (1890-1967) has been pointed out by Anthony Upton, who argues that Korhonen's historical work fitted the above mentioned images identified by Heikki Ylikangas. Korhonen belonged to those who, paraphrasing the words of Julien Benda, appeared during the post-war period to be less historian-academics and more "[men] of politics, who [make] use of history to support a cause whose triumph they desire". Such attitudes towards historical interpretation affected the historical research of post-war Finland, especially that involving the older generation. To what extent Finnish historians of the 1950s became prophets rather than independent academics will be discussed in the following in connection with the question of the role of historians in post-war Finland. Moreover, the lack of interaction between social scientists, whose field began to develop rapidly under American influence and historians, will be pointed out to illustrate the generation gap, together with the significance of the Fulbright Foundation on Finnish academic life.

3.3.1 The position of historians

Historians and those who were engaged in the historical debate stood in a difficult but inevitable position after the Second World War; the interpretation of the Finnish war involvement had to be explored and explained, together with its implications for the immediate Finnish future. It was essential to justify the Finnish participation in the Second World War, particularly for the status of the defeated country. Such an approach could facilitate the general comprehension of the post-war position and legitimate inter-war anti-Russian nationalism. However, in Finland, the situation was hardened by two basic circumstances: firstly, by the traditional role of the historian in Finnish society; and secondly by the fact that the inter-war political...

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417 Benda 1928:74. Benda proclaimed this in respect of the German historian Treitschke, who in his view lost his intellectual independence as he connected his personality with political involvement. Thus, he became, in Benda's view, a layman.
convictions of most historians varied greatly from the new political direction praised by J.K. Paasikivi, and thus adaptability was one of the essential tasks confronting most historians.

In general, the interpretation of history is a key to comprehending the national past, when heroic points are glorified and controversial moments reviewed with a careful clarification. History serves to uphold national self-esteem at the junctures when it is particularly necessary and historians are those who are most dutiful. In terms of the significance of history in national image making, Anthony Upton claims that

> Since history is an essential component of the image, the historians—when they are writing the history of their own country—may feel an obligation not to damage or subvert the national image.  

In other words, most historians intend to preserve the image of their own nation, particularly at the moments when national self-esteem is on the decline and history serves as one of the means for safeguarding national self-esteem. It has been explained above that in Finland history has always played a significant role, especially in the creation of the national identity. History has been regarded as evidence of an independent Finland and historians as guardians of its national consciousness, reproducing history for the rest of a nation.

Historians, like the rest of the educated class, took important posts in the State administration, which influenced their academic involvement and their angle of view on the interpretation of historical images. This became a reality during the war period when a large number of historians became directly involved in the services of the State Information Bureau (Valtion Tiedotuslaitos, VTL), responsible for the war propaganda and information services. Throughout the war, historians, whilst being engaged in serious State services, expressed strong pro-German sympathies and support for expansionist aspirations, mainly pertaining to the issues of Karelian territory. Such attitudes were mainly affected by the direction of Finnish involvement in the war and

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419 Ahtiainen 1996:222.
420 Ahtiainen 1996:84. The purpose of the State Information Bureau was to disseminate information from the public. It was de facto an office of war censorship.
421 Kirby 1979:152. Ahtiainen 1996:85. For instance, Eino Jutikkala pointed out in his Finlands Lebensraum, published in 1941, the economic advantages of the annexation of Karelian territory.
the inter-war right-wing orientation together with the limited international contacts which led Finland into a closure in both senses; politically and culturally.

From this perspective, it is conceivable that the Armistice agreement in 1944 and its consequences caused long periods of careful deliberation among the historians. What the nation expected from them was similar to what was expected from them during the war but in a very different political atmosphere: to provide an interpretation of the past with implications for the future; in other words, to be the consciousness of the nation and to create a national image which would respond to the needs of the post-war situation.

Although the historians adapted their views to the new situation, and attempted to rebuild the national image through the veneration of the heroic Winter War, they failed to challenge the new situation, being reluctant to discuss controversial matters of the Finnish past. Historical topics in which the ‘dangerous thoughts’ were embodied were avoided or treated with a special awareness, and the history of the Middle Ages appeared to have more importance than the Second World War as more research was carried out on this topic. The failure of historians might well be observed in two examples: firstly, in the role of war literature, which substituted for historical interpretation of the near past, as has been shown in Väinö Linna’s example; and secondly, in the rejection of the historical approach from outside Finnish historical circles, a negative acceptance of foreign historians.

After the war, Finnish historians not only had difficulties in accepting their own past; they also experienced perplexity in recognising the achievements of foreign historians who were keen to develop interpretations of Finnish history. The war events, particularly Finnish involvement in the Continuation War, were marked as a ‘delicate issue’, and investigated marginally. The validity of the witness appeared to be relevant; anyone else seemed to be doomed to failure with his historical interpretation.

Those who were interested in Finnish history and culture were usually inspired by one of two motivations: some had Finnish ancestors, and thus they were keen on becoming familiar with Finland; some were usually only puzzled by the political position of Finland during the Second World War, often in connection with Russian history. Whatever their reason was, the fact that getting closer to the subject of the Finnish past they touched upon ‘delicate issues’ and thus got into a one-way

Ahtiainen 1996:231.
confrontation with Finnish historians. During the 1950s, the Americans Anatole G. Mazour and Leonard Ch. Lundin were among the first to investigate Finnish history and thereby, especially in the case of Lundin, they met with the misunderstanding and hostility of their Finnish colleagues.

Anatole G. Mazour, Professor of Russian History at Stanford University, spent the academic year of 1954-1955 as a Fulbright scholarship holder in Finland, working on his book *Finland Between East and West*, which was published in 1956 in the USA. His main purpose for writing on Finnish history was, as he mentioned in the introduction, to dismiss the lack of understanding of the Finnish post-war position in the West, which was, in his view, rooted in a misleading interpretation of the war events. Mazour, in his book, gave a brief account of the Finnish history, from the period of Finland being under the Swedish Kingdom, the Russian Empire and to the crucial moments of the twentieth century, including the Civil War and the Second World War involvement. The book concluded at the point of the presidential elections in 1956.

From this perspective, the book contributed to the larger international awareness of the Finnish historical position, as Mazour laid emphasis on the Finnish geo-political location 'between' two powers. However, Finnish historians considered Mazour's book to be incorrect and not objective enough because Mazour was unable to research original Finnish materials due to his lack of knowledge of the language. Mazour mainly took his references from secondary sources written in Russian, which provoked disdain among Finnish historians, and his book did not appear to be a serious achievement for Finnish historiography.

John I. Kolehmainen was the son of Finnish immigrants who, although born in the United States, devoted his career as a historian to the research of Finnish history. While teaching at Heidelberg College, Kolehmainen reviewed Mazour's book for a Finnish historical journal defending the use of Russian sources. He outlined the above mentioned negative reception of Mazour's book by his Finnish colleagues, mainly based on the lack of Finnish written material. In defence of Mazour, Kolehmainen justified the Russian sources, pointing out that many Finnish historians used them

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423 Mazour 1956:v-vi.
without any significant controversy. In other words, this manifests unwillingness to accept Mazour’s book rather than Mazour’s unprofessional approach.

Although Mazour’s book did not stimulate any larger discussions within the academic circle, it is of interest to note that the Finnish Foreign Ministry was keen on it. Johan Nykopp (1906-1993), who in the years 1955-1958 was Finnish Ambassador in Washington, was questioned by the Finnish Foreign Ministry about the personality of Anatole Mazour and the reception of his book in the USA. A couple of points were made which were supposed to prove the incorrectness of Mazour’s book. However, after Nykopp fully responded to these enquiries, translated certain issues more precisely into Finnish, and commented on the book to Kekkonen, the Mazour issue was left alone.

Charles Lundin, Associate Professor of History at Indiana University, spent two academic years, 1956-1958, in Finland as a Fulbright scholarship holder. His interest in Finnish history was, as he claimed, “to remove the regrettable ignorance in the United States about Finnish history”. Originally, Lundin’s first intention was to analyse the problem of the survival of Finnish democracy during the 1930s but, when he became more acquainted with the historical position of Finland during his study leave in Helsinki, he focussed on the Finnish involvement in the war, which he perceived as crucial for the following political development of Finland. However, he was not aware of the ‘untouchable’ aura, which this issue had for Finnish historians, who more or less adjusted the issue to the conventionally required picture to satisfy the Finnish public. For this reason, Lundin’s book, Finland in the Second World War, published in 1957 in the USA, provoked a great wave of disagreement in the Finnish cultural milieu and was extensively commented on.

The book deals with the outbreak of the Winter War, with the outline of the major causes, including the analysis of the inter-war Finnish nationalism. The second

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424 Historiallinen Aikakauskirja 1957, pp. 80-82. Besides his origins, Kolehmainen worked as a Fulbright Lecturer at the University of Helsinki in 1956, and ten years later at the University of Turku (Honkala 1986:46).
425 The UKK Archive, File 1/29, Correspondence. One of the points was, for instance, that Mazour claimed that the result of the 1956 presidential election would decisively influence the direction of Finnish foreign policy.
426 The UKK Archive, File 1/29, Correspondence. Nykopp’s letter to Urho Kekkonen dated 07.06.1956.
427 FUSEEC, File 30, 1957-1958. It might be noticed that on his father’s side Lundin was of Swedish-Finnish origin.
428 Lundin’s letter to the Fulbright Foundation, where he explained his reasons for his interest in Finnish history (FUSEEC, File 30, 1957-1958).
429 The Finnish version was published in 1960.
phase of the war involvement, the Continuation War is also investigated, together with
the German destruction of Lapland during the early months of 1945. Lundin drew a
brief conclusion about the war’s influence on the post-war political reorientation of
Finland, emphasising that “Finnish democracy emerged from the war stronger than it
had ever been”\(^\text{430}\). Although Lundin on several occasions seemed to be too sharp in his
observations and there were a few misinterpretations due to the lack of relevant
literature, the book brought a different perception on the largely overlooked issue of
Finnish history; the perception of an outsider.

Moreover, where Väinö Linna recounted the events of the Continuation War,
from the point of view of an ordinary Finn, admitting that the mistake was made by the
military commanders, Lundin challenged the war, searching for the causes and asking
whether the war was inevitable. This was one of the most contentious points, evoking
enormous criticism, often by those who already had difficulty in accepting Linna’s
novel.

Among one of the severest critics of Lundin was Edwin Linkomies, for whom
the war was a personal matter as he held the post of the Prime Minister during the war.
In Valvoja\(^\text{431}\), he expressed in great detail his negative opinion on Lundin’s book.
Lundin was, in Linkomies’s opinion, lacking the qualities which a historian should
have: an awareness of historical context and the ability to work with primary sources.
Lundin misunderstood, Linkomies continued, the historical perspective of Finnish
foreign policy during the first few years of Independence, and his references were
incomplete\(^\text{432}\). Linkomies strongly rejected Lundin’s line about the Finnish preservation
democracy, and, as Linkomies claimed, he should instead have concluded that the
war helped to create a friendly relationship with the Soviet Union\(^\text{433}\).

The Suomalainen Suomi reviewed Lundin’s book in a similarly negative way.
For Aarne Mallinen, Lundin appeared to be an unconventional historian with his own
historical perspective. Lundin’s view on the AKS was completely rejected as was
Lundin’s statement that the first two decades of independent Finland were among the

\(^{430}\) Lundin 1957:256.
\(^{431}\) Valvoja 1957, #2, pp. 110-114.
\(^{432}\) Linkomies pointed out that Lundin overlooked newspapers and government minutes which would, in
Linkomies’ opinion, have helped him better understand the ‘specific’ Finnish position.
\(^{433}\) Edwin Linkomies showed his strong disagreement with Lundin’s book openly in 1960, when the
Finnish version of Lundin’s book was published. Lundin himself talked about his book at the University
of Helsinki. Before Lundin had even begun his presentation, Linkomies left the lecture room to show his
disapproval.
'ugliest' period of Finnish history. Such comments were considered ridiculous by Mallinen.434

Although Heikki Impola in Historiallinen Aikakauskirja took a similarly negative attitude to Lundin, he acknowledged Lundin's knowledge of the language.435 Impola opposed what he called the American black-and-white perception of history, which meant the seeing of history only in terms of winners or losers. As such it could not be applicable on the Finnish war position, which lay beneath the clear distinction of enemy and ally.436

Besides the negative reviews of Lundin's book, Arvi Korhonen published four years later, in 1961, The Barbarossa Plan and Finland, (Barbarossa-suunnitelma ja Suomi), which was regarded as a full academic answer to Lundin, clarifying his 'misinterpretation' of Finnish history. Korhonen, in his foreword, repeatedly refused to accept Lundin's book and again questioned the capabilities of Lundin as a historian.

From this perspective, every nation has its own perception of its history and especially about turning-points which appear to be painful, the national response tends to be mystified. The acceptance of an outsider's view varies from country to country and, as Wirth claimed, each nation has its own way of dealing with 'dangerous thoughts'. The reactions of Finnish historians to Mazour and Lundin were de facto a logical consequence of the degraded self-esteem and crisis of identity through which the educated class went during the 1950s. The past was painful, and even more painful was to find a way to deal with it. Most historians were lost and their inter-war interpretation of history is provided by an inability to answer basic question concerning the involvement in the Continuation War.

Rein Marandi, a historian of Estonian origins, devoted seven pages to a review of Lundin's book in the Swedish historical journal, Statsvetenskapig Tidskrift.438 Marandi provided a detailed review of Lundin's book, which had not been done by any Finnish reviewer. He used many quotations and fully demonstrated Lundin's arguments,

434 Suomalainen Suomi. 1957, #5, pp. 290-291.
435 Historiallinen Aikakauskirja. 1957, pp. 262-266.
436 In this respect, Impola probably referred to the fact that Finland was involved firstly in the war with the Soviet Union (the Winter War), secondly that its position was defined as co-belligerency with Germany, and that after the armistice in 1944 Finland proclaimed war on Germany.
whether sufficient or mistaken. Marandi pointed out that Lundin’s book was inadequately accepted by Finnish historians, who were unable to consider the Continuation War in the context of the Second World War.

Moreover, most members of the Finnish educated class during the post-war period were not only unable to react adequately to criticism of themselves, but also to co-operation with foreign researchers, at least in the field of history, appeared to have blank spaces. Lundin complained that his existence was never recognised by the University to which he was accredited. Although he became familiar with the Finnish academic world and he had contacts with L.A. Puntila, in his own words, he never had the chance actively to engage himself in it. Mazour’s position within the Finnish academic world appeared to be slightly different. In his book, Mazour expressed gratitude to Professor Hugo E. Pipping (1895-1975), a member of the Board of the Fulbright Foundation in Finland and to Heikki Waris for their valuable suggestions.

Despite the important achievement of foreign historians in which they attempted to contribute to the clarification of the Finnish war and the post-war position, the perceptions of Finnish historians cannot be neglected. Among the wide range of historical works published during the 1950s, two books concerning issues of modern Finnish history are of particular importance: Lauri Hyvämäki’s book The Dangerous Years 1944-1948 (Vaaran vuodet 1944-1948), published in 1954, and the future diplomat, Max Jakobson’s The Diplomacy of the Winter War (Diplomaattien talvisota), printed in 1955, with the English re-edited version for foreign readers in 1961.

Both authors might be considered to be part of the younger generation, compared with the established historians, although Hyvämäki was already forty-two years old when his book was published. Again, by the time their books appeared on the market, they were already prominent members of the Finnish cultural and diplomatic circles. Although their perceptions of the Finnish historical context were influenced by

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439 In 1964, Rein Marandi’s work about the Continuation War in the Swedish newspapers Naapurin silmin: Suomen jatkosota 1941-1944 Ruotsin sanomaletikeskustelussa was published in Finland.

440 National Archive, FUSEEC, File 30, 1957-1958. Lundin wrote in greater detail about the discourtesy of the Rector of the University of Helsinki, Erkki Kivinen (1903-1985). Although he had been a guest in the USA, and experienced American hospitality, Kivinen ignored the existence of foreign academics at the University.

441 Even if it is beyond the scope of my work, I should mention the difference between the cultural elite (the university circles) and the diplomatic elite in their attitudes towards foreign researchers. The diplomats, or Finns working abroad, like Max Jakobson and Göran Stenius (1909-2000), were usually more open-minded and ready to assist (Mazour 1956:vi-vii).
the war events, they had international experience which distinguished them from their older colleagues. The common feature of both books was that they dealt with issues that had become largely obfuscated, and Jakobson’s analysis of the diplomatic negotiations in terms of the territorial concessions offered by the Soviet Union to Finland during the autumn 1939\(^{\text{442}}\), attempted particularly to de-mystify the matter of the war involvement.

From this perspective, only a few books dealt objectively with the subject of Finnish-Soviet relations, and the worth of the book is suggested by its high appreciation which has been maintained until today\(^{\text{443}}\). However, Jakobson, who consulted Arvi Korhonen when writing his work, did not overcome the feeling of post-war political awareness. His patriotism is ostensibly visible in his writing, particularly in the last chapter, called ‘Victory in Defeat’, as well as in his characterisation of the Finnish position during the war.

On the other hand, it might be argued that Hyvämäki’s The Dangerous Years more or less helped to obfuscate the four post-war years. Hyvämäki, a right-wing historian, who regularly contributed to the Suomalainen Suomi, de facto coined the term ‘dangerous years’ for the period when Finland appeared to be on the slippery edge between being Sovietised or not. Hyvämäki provided a chronological description of events, from signing the Armistice Agreement in 1944 to the parliamentary election of 1948. He focused widely on the War trial, the incorporation of the Left into the Finnish political spectrum and the treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union from 1948 was, of course, analysed. Hyvämäki, as is the current opinion, correctly assessed the mood of the time among the patriotic elite\(^{\text{444}}\), who saw the four post-war years as politically dangerous.

The book was also written in the context of political awareness. The patriotic undertone is easily noticeable, illustrated for example by a quotation regarding the difficulty of the situation in terms of a surrender, but with the emphasis on the patriotic necessity to comprehend the circumstances\(^{\text{445}}\). Again, the position of Finland during the war was underlined as a struggle for peace and for the defence of territory and in terms of a strong unity, though the latter was weakening by the time the war got into its second phase. It was generally agreed that Hyvämäki’s book contributed to the

\(^{\text{442}}\) Interestingly, Jakobson has not dealt with these issues in his new work, Vâkivallan vuodet. 20.vuosisadan tilinpätös I (Years of Violence. A Twentieth Century Reckoning, I), Otava 1999.

\(^{\text{443}}\) Turtola 1990:43.


\(^{\text{445}}\) Hyvämäki 1954:11.
realisation of the Communist danger in Finland\textsuperscript{446}, and as such it responded to the atmosphere of the post-war decade: to have a new policy, though not to forget past endeavours.

The fact that the influence of the inter-war historians was still largely pervasive decisively affected the character of the debate and subsequently the academic achievement of the younger historians in general. The department of general history was for at least a decade still strongly in the grip of the older generation. Arvi Korhonen was in charge of the Department of History until 1959, Pentti Renvall (1907-1971) held the post at the Department of the Finnish and Scandinavian History until 1973, and Eino Jutikkala was head of the Department of the Finnish History until 1974\textsuperscript{447}.

After the war, Pentti Renvall, who came from a family of clergymen, took the initiative and outlined the main direction of the post-war Finnish historical methodology in \textit{Historiantutkimuksen työmenetelmät} (The Methodology of Historical Research), 1947. Instead of focussing on analytical studies of society and the individual, Renvall emphasised the historian’s precise work with sources and an attention for historical detail. The interpretation of history should be neutral and intuitive, particularly in cases which could be polemic\textsuperscript{448}. Pekka Ahtiainen argues that historians tried to secure their social position by avoiding investigation of the controversial past which could leave open interpretations\textsuperscript{449}. More than securing their positions, historians were under the effects of the post-war Finnish situation, and their research was conducted in the spirit of upholding the national interest. As such, it reflected the historians’ rigidity, as discussed above.

\textbf{3.3.2 The confrontation between historians and social scientists}

If the Department of History at the University of Helsinki represented more or less the conservative and rigid part of Finnish academic life in the first post-war decade, the newly-established social science departments stood in sharp contrast to it\textsuperscript{450}. While historians appeared in the role of national prophets and therefore responsible for the

\textsuperscript{446} Kauko Kare claimed so in his letter to Asko Aaltonen in 1954 (SKS KIA, Aaltonen’s letters collection).
\textsuperscript{447} Ahtiainen 1996:197-198.
\textsuperscript{448} Ahtiainen 1996:126-127.
\textsuperscript{449} Ahtiainen 1996:231-232.
\textsuperscript{450} Kolbe (1996:104-108) pays brief attention to the “academic struggle between history and sociology” during the post-war decade.
national consciousness, social scientists, mostly of the younger generation, attempted to
search for national reconciliation, based on their new scientific approach, which had
reached Finland from the United States.

The development of the social sciences after the war was not only a trend
occurring in Finland. The influence of the American academic approach, mainly in the
field of sociology, was spreading all over Europe. It was certainly caused by the
greatly weakened position of Germany, whose humanistic tradition was dominant in
Europe during the inter-war period, together with the fact that many academics of
German origins fled from the Nazis to the United States, where they continued their
academic career. After the war, the United States was the only country which was able
to offer wide international participation in social science research with the top social
scientists in their fields.

In Finland, the newly 'discovered' American influence was one of the major
causes of the penetration of the social sciences into Finland, as it brought along wide
travel opportunities in the field of education, and thus the younger generation could
easily become acquainted with the newest academic trends. Besides that, the
development was certainly influenced by the economic and social transition through
which society was passing, and on which it was necessary to reflect in some kind of
academic way. This was the role of the social sciences, looking in detail at the societal
changes. Furthermore, the growing number of students, who were not only keen on the
old established academic disciplines but also on the new challenges, played an
important role in the advancement of the social sciences.

It is generally agreed that until the end of the 1940s the social sciences were
largely neglected in Finland and there were a few outstanding academic achievements.
The 1910s, when Finland was still a part of the Russian Empire, is considered to be a
more fruitful decade than the rest of the inter-war and war period. The ethnoso-
earchological work of Edward Westermarck (1862-1939), focusing on matters
concerning marriage, contributed to the partial development of social institutions in the
early twentieth century. Besides Westermarck, who is considered to be the founder of

451 Giddens (1996:114-115) recalls the situation in post-war British social science development. In his
view, "the absence of an adventurous sociological imagination in British intellectual life was
consequential", as sociology remained for years marginal to British intellectual life and did not become a
major subject at Oxford or Cambridge until as late as the 1960s.
452 Allardt 1973a:2; 1981:2. Edward Westermarck is considered to be the founder of Finnish sociology.
He was the first to obtain a teaching post in sociology in 1890. He had extensive international experience,
particularly in teaching at the University of London (Allardt 1997:94-95).
Finnish sociology, Rudolf Holsti (1881-1945) was trained as a social anthropologist of the Westermarck school. However, Holsti was not completely faithful to his academic discipline and he concentrated more on nation-building and the concept of sovereignty. During the inter-war period, he engaged in international politics and he was one of the politically involved Finnish academics. During the 1910s, the work of Eino Kuusi (1880-1936) marked the beginning of research in the field of social analysis, specifically in terms of the problems associated with unemployment. Kuusi’s social-policy research maintained its prominence until the post-war period. He emphasised the importance of arranging the working conditions in such way to bring the different social classes closer to each other. Eino Kuusi summarised his investigations in his work *Sosiaalipolitiikka* (Social Policy), written in 1927-1930, which might be regarded as one of the first studies of Finland’s social policy.

After Finland gained independence and experienced in the Civil War, the social sciences appeared to lose prominence, as the Right-wing oriented educated milieu did not give priority to the analysis of the aftermath of the Civil War aftermath. Minor advances occurred in the field of political science, with the leading figure of K.R. Brotherus (1880-1949), who became the first holder of a professorship in the newly established Department of Political Sciences in 1922. However, the lack of international contacts and few opportunities to exchange ideas with the rest of the European academic milieu, made the effective development of the social sciences virtually impossible.

Although social-policy research did not attract significant attention during the inter-war period, the pioneering work of Heikki Waris, a student of Eino Kuusi, cannot be overlooked, especially as his influence prevailed in the post-war period, when he became the first holder of the Professorship in Social Policy in 1948. Waris, whose predictions of the impact of social transition were largely discussed in the previous chapter began his career in social policy during the early 1930s. In his dissertation, he

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454 Alapuro 1973a:105. Allardt 2000:505. Eino Kuusi’s PhD thesis (1914) were about the prevention and impacts of the unemployment during the winter season.
456 Allardt 2000:497. A detailed account on the development of the social sciences in Finland, with its emphasis on the Hegelian tradition and its impact on Finnish development may be found in Allardt 1997.
457 Pipping 1957:286.
was concerned with the issues of workers’ life styles and the conditions in a working class quarter of Helsinki, a topic which was largely overlooked at that time. The major significance of Waris’ research was in so-called ‘field work’; in other words, interviewing people and collecting material in the ‘real environment’.

Waris was among the few to have an opportunity to become familiar with American trends in the social sciences during the inter-war period. Waris maintained contacts with researchers from the so-called Chicago School of Sociology, and subsequently he studied at the University of Chicago during the 1930s. The experience significantly influenced his further research, as he became one of the most progressive social scientists in post-war Finland, devoting attention to the social transition of Finnish society from being a highly agrarian to an affluent industrial society. One of his major academic interests was in comparing variations in the standard of living in Finland and the improvements in the post-war life style. Waris, as a prominent figure of the 1950s Finnish academic circles, and a person who actively participated in wide non-university engagements, formed the foundations of post-war Finnish social politics.

One of Waris’ most successful students was Pekka Kuusi, a nephew of Eino Kuusi. Pekka Kuusi’s Social Policy for the Sixties. A Plan for Finland, published in 1961, marked the turn of the decade in its distinction between the post-war agrarian 1950s and the promisingly affluent 1960s. Kuusi’s book not only represented the success of social policy in Finland as an academic discipline as applied by Waris, but also by its style and approach it predicted the changes which the 1960s brought. Kuusi analysed the past failures of the practical applications of the social policy and at the same he outlined a plan for the 1960s. While Heikki Waris symbolised the post-war decade, Kuusi challenged the future.

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459 Alapuro 1973a:117.
460 Among many important analyses, one of the most significant is Suomalainen yhteiskunnan rakennus (The Structure of Finnish Society), published in 1948.
462 Waris was a lifelong friend of Urho Kekkonen (born in the same year), and he often participated in ‘political sauna evenings’. In 1957-1958, he even became engaged in politics, holding the post of Minister for Social Affairs.
Although in Finland, compared with the rest of the Nordic countries, a few professorships in sociology had already been established in the late 1920s, the real ‘boom’ in sociology did not occur until the late 1940s. The rapid development in sociology after the war was caused mainly by the educational exchange of scholars between Finland and the United States, which enabled the adoption of American modern sociological concepts into Finnish research. American sociology was easily accepted in Finland because, “the development happened in a milieu that already had a rather strong positivistic orientation”, which was similar to the American trends.

One of the reasons why the positivist orientation prevailed within Finnish academic circles was that positivism gives knowledge rather than penetrates to the inner structures of societal problems. Arguably, such a positivist approach fitted the post-war Finnish methodology of research, when the empirical tradition was strongly emphasised. For such reasons, the critical theory of the Frankfurt School was almost unknown in post-war Finland. Its members fled Germany in the late 1930s for the United States, where they remained after the war. Critical theory stands in contrast to positivism, as it is in its principles a form of rationalism. Besides the Frankfurt School, post-war American sociology still embodied the influence of pragmatism and the field work of the Chicago School of Sociology, mentioned here in the connection with Heikki Waris and the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University. The latter has been connected with Paul Lazarsfeld (1901-1976), who carried out research on mass society in the spirit of the earlier mentioned sociological positivism. Most Finnish sociologists were linked to this institution during the post-war period.

The leading figure in post-war Finnish sociology was Erik Allardt, who became Professor of Sociology in 1958 and brought most of the American sociological influences to Finland. Allardt was among the first post-war members of the younger generation to experience educational opportunities in the United States. During his stay at the University of Columbia in 1954, he became acquainted with American

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464 Pipping 1957:287. Allardt 1973a:2-3; 1997:95. The first professorial chair in sociology was created at the University of Turku in 1926, the next at the University of Helsinki a year later, thanks to the influence of Westermarck.  
467 Eskola 1973:276. Knut Pipping (b. 1920), a relative of Edward Westermarck, became acquainted with the Frankfurt School ideas (authoritarianism) at the beginning of the 1950s, when he worked for UNESCO in West Germany.  
468 Kolbe (1996:105-106) mentions the significance of Allardt for the growing popularity of sociology after his academic appointment.
sociological methods and the leading figure of political sociology, S.M. Lipset. Though his first studies focused on family issues, such as divorce and the impacts of alcoholism, which were visibly influenced by Émile Durkheim\textsuperscript{469}, Allardt later moved further into politico-sociological research, such as the analysis of Finnish Communism.

Besides Allardt, Yrjö Littunen (1929-1994) should be mentioned in the context of post-war Finnish sociology. Littunen, together with Allardt, contributed to the recognition of sociology by compiling a textbook, Sociology (Sociologia), published in 1958, which became an introductory text to sociology, highly recognised in the rest of the Nordic countries\textsuperscript{470}. Littunen, quite significantly, carried on his research outside Helsinki, at the School of Social Sciences in Tampere\textsuperscript{471}. Although the University of Helsinki was the centre of post-war sociology, in terms of the number of students and international opportunities, the peripheral colleges offered an interesting anti-pole. If making a comparison with what has been claimed about the smaller publishing houses, a similar point might be made about the smaller ‘countryside’ universities. They offered more research places for marginal issues, as, for example, Littunen’s research on social confinement or Antti Eskola’s (b. 1934) on social psychology.

The development of sociology also led to studies on new topics, which were analysed from a new methodological perspective. During the early 1950s, non-theoretical fields such as criminology, family matters, divorce and alcoholism were investigated\textsuperscript{472}. Again, the problems of rural Finland were of focal interest to the Finnish sociologists. For example, Elina Haavio-Manila, a daughter of the high-profiled Martti Haavio, devoted her dissertation (Kylätappelut), defended in 1958, to village fights in Finland. In other words, such a strong positivistic orientation developed a sense of empirical observation which was characteristic of post-war Finnish sociology\textsuperscript{473}. However, any sociological analyses of the crucial moments of Finnish history, like, for example, the Civil War, were rare in post-war Finland, particularly from the perspective of critical theory. Although it was possible to read the Marxist classics in lectures at the

\textsuperscript{470} Alapuro 1997:126.
\textsuperscript{471} The School was established in Helsinki in 1925 and called the Civic College (Kansalaiskorkeakoulu). In 1930 the name was officially changed to the School of Social Sciences (Yhteiskunnallinen korkeakoulu) and in 1960 it moved in Tampere. It was transformed into the University of Tampere in 1966 (Numminen 1987:25; Zetterberg 1991:69).
\textsuperscript{473} Allardt 1981:3.
University of Helsinki during the 1950s, the Left’s intellectual approach did not flourish until the 1970s. This was largely influenced by the atmosphere of the late 1960s.

Besides the developments in sociology, political history also appears to have developed during the post-war period, in contrast to the situation in general history. New departments of political history were established, and the number of graduates increased from 76 in 1950-1951 to 97 nine years later. Although L.A. Puntila, whose role will be analysed in greater detail in the following chapter, was in charge of the department of Political History in Helsinki, many members of the younger generation involved in studying of political history tried to break the rigidity of Finnish historians. Jan-Magnus Jansson, who became a holder of the professorship in Political Sciences in 1954, and Jaakko Nousiainen (b. 1931), whose dissertation on Communism in central Finland was published in 1956, might be taken as examples. Even if Nousiainen’s thesis was written in the spirit of empirical methodology, by showing an interest in such a topic, it signified a slight change in the general conservative direction of Finnish history. Moreover, Nousiainen’s following work, The Finnish Political System (Suomen poliittinen järjestelmä), published in 1959, strengthened the interest in the structure of the political parties, the election system and the election polls. Such topics were new for the post-war Finnish academic milieu, as during the inter-war period they had largely been neglected.

The new developments in the social sciences that occurred during the 1950s, which stood in contrast to a partial stagnation of the discipline of history, show the slow integration of the younger generation into the post-war academic milieu. With the exception of Heikki Waris, it was mostly the members of the younger generation born during the inter-war period, who became the developers of the social sciences in Finland, largely influenced by post-war educational developments and opportunities to travel and study in the United States. On their own initiative and through newly established international contacts, modern research methods and methodology penetrated into Finnish academic life.

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476 Nousiainen’s dissertation was reviewed and compared with a similar research conducted in Sweden by Eino Jutikkala in Suomalainen Suomi, #6, 1956, pp.346-348.
477 Ylioppilaslehti 1956, #1. The poll was conducted by Perti Pesonen.
478 During the inter-war period, K. R. Brotherus mainly pursued theoretical research, influenced by German political traditions. However, the work of Yrjö Ruutu (1887-1956) might be considered to be less conservative (Allardt 2000:498-499).
Such progress and advances in fields which were largely overlooked during the inter-war period due to the international closure and the lack of interest in any kind of social analysis meant a step forward in the development of the Finnish social sciences. New horizons began to open and new approaches could be accepted in answering questions pertaining to issues of the Finnish past, which had been left unanswered by the historians. However, the traditional close relation between the State and the university remained unchanged; many new members of the academic circles had adjoining contacts with the political circles and engaged in political forums, as, for example, Jan-Magnus Jansson.

Although the newly established social sciences existed close to the well established history, and many of the social scientists even had their degrees in history or philosophy, there was, indeed, no mutual interaction. Historians had difficulty in accepting any new research methods suggested by sociologists, which in the historians’ view, led to the simplification of history, and the underestimation of serious historical research. Such a negative response by historians towards new advances in the social sciences was caused by the clashing of different approaches and different generations.

History continued to be dominated by the older generation, which was closely connected with the inter-war and war political and cultural atmosphere. The social scientists were members of the younger generation, without the burden of the Academic Karelia Society’s traditions and with enthusiasm for the post-war changes. Moreover, while the historians were influenced by the German educational tradition, the social scientists were heavily influenced by the modern American school of sociology. The English language was a substitute for German, and most of the scientific exchanges were now made with the United States instead of with Germany. Furthermore, historians were regarded as the prophets and preachers of the Finnish nation, who upheld national self-esteem and thus contributed to the creation of national myths to support national unity. Social scientists searched for national reconciliation, dealing with analysis, data and statistics, and tried to challenged the national myths. However, most of them only reached the point of describing the ‘delicate issues’ without any deeper analysis.

In terms of scientific co-operation, there was a little to intertwine the historians and the social scientists. In terms of the post-war political atmosphere, the feeling of

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479 Ahtiainen 1996:156n.
political awareness was one of the few common features. Both groups were, through their different academic approaches, aware of the political situation, which gathered them together on various social and political platforms. However, looking more at their academic interaction, circumstances improved by the second half of the 1960s, when both sociologists and historians were slowly finding a common platform for mutual co-operation. This was certainly caused by the social changes of the 1960s and the widened interest in the social sciences from a growing number of students. Again, the fact that a new generation of historians began to be influential instead of the older and more conservative one, had its impact on reciprocal communication.

The lack of confrontation between historians and sociologists during the first post-war decade also gives a picture of the rigidity and inflexibility of the older generation, and especially of the historians, in adapting and accepting new conditions and approaches. It might be regarded as an example of the deepening generation gap between the inter-war and post-war generations.

3.3.3 The American influence

The socio-economic changes which were taking place during the 1950s were the result of the war and the growing American influence in Europe, the beginnings of which might be traced to the ending of the Second World War. The USA came out of the war not only as a military winner, but also as the winner in terms of the economic development. No other country which belonged to the Allies could compare its economic growth with the United States, whose economy was boosted as the impact of the war production. The American influence, which had various forms, from economic aid to popular culture was, in its political background, penetrating Europe. Its acceptance varied from country to country, dependently on the cultural and political

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481 It might be disputed to what extent the term 'Americanisation' should be used instead of 'the American influence'. In the literature published in the 1950s, especially in France, 'Americanisation' is connected with the political impact of the USA on Europe. It has de facto a pejorative meaning. In the American context, 'Americanisation' is often understood as the cultural influence of the USA on Europe, which is the growing mass culture enhanced by Hollywood. The term 'American influence' appears to provide the best the picture of the US cultural and educational influence on the post-war Europe.
traditions. On the one hand, the American culture was not particularly welcomed in France; on the other, Scandinavia accepted it more than warmly.\(^{482}\)

Analysing the post-war American influence in the Finnish context of the 1950s, there are various perspectives from which the situation might be observed. For Lassila, as for many others, American influence reached Finland particularly in 1952, when two events happened: the Olympic Games took place in Helsinki and the educational exchange of Fulbright scholars began on a regular basis.\(^{483}\) Firstly, the Olympic Games brought not only sporting achievements and records, and a political recognition of the Finnish post-war position, but also two products considered to be a typical example of American culture: Coca-Cola,\(^{484}\) and the cartoon series Donald Duck, whose name was translated to Finnish as *Aku Ankka*. Secondly, the Fulbright programme exchange gave Finns the chance to participate in scholarly training in the United States, where they could become familiar with the most modern technology and developments in various academic fields and thus contribute to Finnish scientific research.

The Fulbright programme will be investigated in more detail; however, before doing that, the comprehension of the American influence within Finnish society should be mentioned against the background of the Cold War during the 1950s. In general, the United States influenced the Western European political and social climate in four different ways: a) the lifestyle, and its inclination to consumerism; b) culturally, with its mass culture concept and middle-class cultural aspirations; c) politically and militarily, in respect of the American military presence in Europe; and d) economically, by the offer of a share in Marshall Plan.\(^{485}\) Due to Finland’s political position after the war when participation in the Marshall Plan was rejected, the American influence occurred mainly in the cultural and educational spheres, though the economic assistance, outside of the Marshall Plan also played an important role.\(^{486}\)

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\(^{482}\) Raymond Aron (1954, 1957) was quite critical of the American presence in Europe, in both the above-mentioned terms; politically and culturally. The traditionally negative French perspective on the United States might be understood as the feeling of the competitiveness, the anti-pole to the French position in Europe.

\(^{483}\) Lassila 1990:141.

\(^{484}\) The patent for the trademark Coca-Cola had already been sold to Finland in 1926. The real expansion of the drink happened in 1957. The researcher Iris Haikonen is writing about the history of Coca-Cola in Finland; the book should be published in 2002.

\(^{485}\) Going into more detail, the question could be raised as to what extent American influence is American or European when most ‘Americans’ came from the Old Continent.

\(^{486}\) Majander (1994:119) points out that Finland had received considerable credits from the USA, two years before the Marshall Plan was launched. Also Hanhimäki (1998:119) deals in greater detail with US economic help to Finland.
It might be claimed that in Finland the penetration of the American influence was perceived in two ways. Firstly, it symbolised the ‘modernity’ of the post-war world, as life overseas appeared to be advanced and affluent. Everything American was associated with modernism from films to fashion. Secondly, American cultural influence contrasted with Soviet political influence, which was perhaps not obvious but certainly such a connotation was rooted in the consciousness of many Finns.

The ASLA-Fulbright Programme

The Fulbright programme, named after its creator Senator J. William Fulbright, was directed at cultural, academic, and professional exchanges between the United States and the war-torn countries. The funding for the programme was provided by loans from the United States which were mostly granted to nations purchasing military surplus left over from the war, and to countries like Finland where it was in the US interest to keep Soviet influence to a minimum.

Even if it was not Fulbright’s aim, his programme tended to become a cultural counterpart to the economic Marshall Plan. In other words, the Fulbright programme carried not only cultural and educational purposes, but was also a means of keeping American influence within the chosen countries. Though the Fulbright programme was ultimately “caught up in the barbs and arrows of the Cold War,” its importance was not eroded, particularly for Finland.

Finland sent out the first students in 1950, after the American Congress decided that the rest of the Finnish loan from the United States should be used for grants for Finns to be able to follow the latest research in the United States. However, the Fulbright programme, which in Finland is known by the name ASLA-Grants from the American Loan to Finland (Amerikan Suomen Lainan Apurahat), was not fully functioning until 1952 when Finland entered into an executive agreement.

The Fulbright programme provided vital exchanges between American universities and chiefly the University of Helsinki, the University of Turku and the Åbo Academy. During the 1950s, almost a thousand Finnish students, teachers and researchers were able to spend part of their academic career at the most prestigious

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488 Kuusisto 1983:11.
American universities. From 1953, American teachers and students come to Finland, mostly to carry out research or to teach the language. Almost two hundred Americans came to spend a year or two in Finland during the first post-war decade. Besides that, until the 1960s, the United States sent books to Finland, where there was a scarcity of international literature, especially relating to the newly-developed social sciences. It is worth mentioning that each book contained a note saying that it was a gift which was "an expression of the friendship and goodwill which the people of the USA hold for the people of Finland".

The ASLA had a particular significance in Finland as the Finnish cultural milieu was traditionally pro-German oriented. Most cultural exchanges during the 1920s and 1930s were made between Finland and Germany, Hungary or Scandinavia. Before the Second World War there appears, as Finnish philosopher Jaakko Hintikka (b. 1929), who was amongst the first to leave for the USA, observes, to have been no first-hand interaction between American and Finnish academics. The situation was similar in regard to the natural sciences and medicine, where only a tiny minority of researchers had been to the United States and had followed developments there during the inter-war period. Such exchanges were usually granted by the Rockefeller Foundation and the W.K. Kellogg Foundation. Although both organisations contributed to the academic research, the exchanges involved a low number of participants.

The Fulbright programme offered wider possibilities, especially during the 1950s, when the number of exchanges was the second highest in the whole history of the Fulbright programme. In the first post-war decade, the emphasis was on specialists in the humanities and social sciences, who received more support than their colleagues from the natural sciences did. Such a focus can be explained mainly by the desire to improve the language skills of Finns; (in general only few Finns were fluent in English at that time) and also by the attempt to develop social sciences, especially sociology and social policy to Finland where, until then, such disciplines had been neglected.

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490 Kuusisto 1983:34.
491 All statistics are taken from the FUSEEC, and Kuusisto 1983:34-37 unless indicated otherwise.
492 Hintikka 1983:46.
494 The Rockefeller Foundation mainly supported research pertaining to medical studies; exchanges in the field of social science were minimal. The W.K. Kellogg Foundation usually offered scholarships to students in agriculture and forestry.
495 The situation changed thirty years later when, during the 1980s, a larger percentage of the exchanges were in the natural sciences.
Basically, the ASLA had three major advantages for Finland. Firstly, the English language began to be taught at all levels in Finnish schools, and thus English within twenty years became the most widespread spoken foreign language. The position of German weakened and it slowly and surely became the language of the older generation. This shift can be clearly demonstrated by statistics. For example, in the Faculty of Science, the number of research reports written in German immediately after the war was six times higher than English written reports. However, at the beginning of the 1950s, the number of reports written in German and in English was almost equal. That this was not an accidental feature within the Faculty of Science can be shown by the language proficiency of dissertations which were submitted to the University of Helsinki during the 1950s. For example, in the academic year 1948-1949, out of a total number of 51 dissertations, 20 were written in English, 16 in German, 13 in Finnish and 2 in Swedish. Ten years later, out of the same number of dissertations, 28 were written in English, 6 in German, 15 in Finnish and 2 in Swedish. Moreover, it is interesting to observe which kinds of dissertations were written in which language. For example in 1954-1955, most of the dissertations written in English related to the medical or biochemical field; historical or religious dissertations were usually written in German; and most of the humanistic theses were in Finnish.

The second major advantage of the Fulbright programme was the possibility it afforded of ‘opening windows’ to new scientific research. The Fulbright programme was usually the first contact-point for Finns within the American academic world, and afterwards relations were kept up by Finns, and further co-operation was developed from that. One of the main impacts of the American academic exchange was reflected in developments in the social sciences. However, medical research was also heavily influenced by the possibility of visiting American universities, even if its proportion was smaller than the social sciences. According to the statistics, 60 per cent of biomedical senior staff, of the generation born in 1920, received their post-graduate training at American universities. Moreover, those who had the chance to participate in the Fulbright programme became leading experts in their fields after their return to

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496 Lehto 1983:55.
497 The figures are based on my own statistics, data are taken from List of Academic Publications—University of Helsinki 1947-1977.
the cultural atmosphere in Finland during the 1950s

Finland\textsuperscript{500}. Many participants left again for the United States, where they decided to continue their studies and work for the rest of their life.

And thirdly, besides the changes in the orientation and direction of scientific research in Finland, the Fulbright programme had its political importance in post-war Finnish society. Even if, as was said above, the Fulbright programme was not perceived as political, it helped to strengthen American influence in Finland and to balance the influence of the Soviet Union. Despite the fact that there existed a scientific exchange with the Soviet Union, the exchange was experienced mainly in terms of foreign policy and only to a small degree as a genuine scientific exchange\textsuperscript{501}. The possibility of establishing contact with American academics and the general public helped Finns to integrate with the Western world. Though the statement of Hankonen, that “Finland may be considered a laboratory of American efficiency and cultural influence”\textsuperscript{502}, is a little exaggerated, it shows the dimension of American influence in Finland.

Before looking at the other new trends occurring in post-war Finland along with the impact of the American influence, it might be of interest to look briefly at how Finns were perceived in the USA and, in contrast, what kind of observations Americans who spent certain periods in Finland made, to demonstrate the 1950s atmosphere. Finnish participants were, on the whole, well accepted within their host institutions, which referred to them as hard-working and flexible students and researchers\textsuperscript{503}. Finns themselves felt that they were warmly welcomed in the USA, and that they and their country enjoyed the special goodwill of the Americans\textsuperscript{504}.

The Americans, who were keen on coming to Finland, usually either had ancestors who were Finnish, and were thus fluent in Finnish themselves and were interested in their roots, or Americans who carried out research in Russian culture and history as the University Library in Helsinki comprises an excellent Russian collection for research opportunities. However, many students of forestry, architecture and design also travelled to Finland, though some of them originally applied for the exchange to Denmark.

\textsuperscript{500} Eriksson (1966:10). Not only did the younger generation participate in the ASLA. E.g., Linkomies and Nevanlinna were great supporters, and themselves visited US universities frequently during the 1950s (Eriksson 1966:9).

\textsuperscript{501} Allardt (8.12.1999, Helsinki).

\textsuperscript{502} Hankonen 1998:284.

\textsuperscript{503} FUSEEC, File 26, 1953-1954, Finnish and American Grantees.

\textsuperscript{504} Ylioppilaslehti regularly reported on Finnish students in the USA, e.g., the letter of the student Joukko Voutilainen (Ylioppilaslehti 1949, # 24).
If Finns usually had no problems with adaptation to the United States, the same cannot be claimed about the Americans arriving in Finland. Though they were usually located in Helsinki and Turku, the two largest cities in Finland, they often found it difficult to adapt to 'introverted' Finnish society. There were clear distinctions between academic approaches and the interaction between professor and student\textsuperscript{505}, and the lifestyle and Finnish temperament caused certain difficulties to Americans, especially those who could not speak Finnish.\textsuperscript{506} One of the research scholars commented on the situation as following:

grantes should not expect the highly gregarious, socially active and outgoing society of American life. Finnish society is less mobile, less interacting, more individually self-sufficient, under greater pressure of daily necessity, more hampered by lack of cars and transportation, by laborious house holding and shopping processes, by lack of money; communication is further made difficult by the language problem; the formality observed in relation with foreigners is often the result of the language barrier\textsuperscript{507}.

\textsuperscript{505} Many participant described the conditions for studying as diametrically different from what they were used to in the United States. The facilities were, according to them, overcrowded and backward (FUSEEC, File 4, 1960-61).


\textsuperscript{507} FUSEEC, File 4, 1954-1955. For interests' sake might be mentioned the observation of Charles Lundin, who often and extensively described the situation in Finland. He advised colleagues who were planning to come to Finland to take with them instant coffee and salted nuts, which were welcome small gifts for one's Finnish friends (FUSEEC, File 30, 1957-1958).
3.4 New trends

The changes occurring during the post-war decade not only reflected on the political, economic and cultural levels of Finnish society, but also on the character of the society in general. The social advances, such as the growth of urban areas and the mechanisation in the Finnish countryside, have already been discussed. What should briefly be pointed out here is the extent to which American influence was evidenced within a wider general public; how Finns began to spend their leisure time; and how Finland was presented abroad in terms of architecture and modern design, which reached an international popularity during the 1950s.

One of the peculiarities of the 1950s was the existing confrontation between the old and the new. The old was represented in many and various ways in Finnish society. In one way, it was embodied in the analysed older generation, who carried the traditions of the inter-war period. After the war, there was a tendency to keep up the cultural and social manners of the 1930s, which were violently interrupted by the war; however, such chances were restrained and limited.

Outside university circles, the old was enhanced in the atmosphere of post-war Finnish society, which remained strongly agrarian until the second half of the 1950s. The picture of an impoverished peasant who sent his son to Helsinki to get an education, and who warned him against the ‘dangers’ of urban life, was still common during the 1950s. It was a characteristic perception of the contrast between a ‘pure but tough’ countryside and the ‘dirty’ town. The countryside maintained its cultural and political traditions Culturally speaking, examples might be taken from music and fashion. Finnish and continental popular songs, and the so-called hit melodies, iskelmät, were most popular there, with a little impact of jazz, swing and more recently, rock and roll. Moreover, women dressed simply, in a dress with an apron and hair covered by a scarf. The use of make up was limited, if any. Politically, the countryside kept its inter-war patriotism, with a large support for the Agrarian Party.

The new, associated with modernity, was mostly represented by the younger generation, who were free of the inter-war political and cultural burden, and thus enjoyed the new post-war opportunities. Although most of the younger generation had their origins in the countryside, they began to get used to the urban life. The American

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508 Olavi Virta (1915-1972) was the most popular singer of iskelmät.
influence was further more visible in the towns than in the countryside, where the access to new trends was less feasible. Culturally speaking, the popularity of jazz, swing and rock and roll won over the old melodies among the younger people. Although, jazz and swing had arrived in Finland through Sweden by the end of the 1920s, rock and roll did not come until 1956, with the first performance of the American film Rock Around the Clock\textsuperscript{509}. The new trends in music apparently influenced fashion, as well as the Hollywood movies\textsuperscript{510}. However, despite James Dean’s pair of jeans, the dress code was, in general, still very formal with the elegance of the pre-war period. A special emphasis was put on a cigarette, clearly a male ‘accessory’\textsuperscript{511}.


\textsuperscript{510} Movies definitely influenced fashion; the elegance of women such as Eva Gardner, or a pair of jeans as worn by James Dean were the dreams of many Finns by the end of the 1950s (Kolbe 1993:271; Seppänen 1996:143). Moreover, American films were also one of the means by which Finns became acquainted with the American, specifically Hollywood, image.

\textsuperscript{511} Seppänen 1996:238. A woman with a cigarette was regarded as highly asocial. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that smoking had a different connotation in the 1950s than it has now. If a cigarette belonged to a Hollywood star as a necessary accessory (which was also obvious from the advertisements), in more recent movies only a few still smoke publicly.
This reflects the fashion and culture of the youth in the 1950s.

(Kari Suomalainen)

Although it appears that the younger generation was politically more open-minded, due to the lack of inter-war political experience, the notion of political awareness was easily recognisable within their political involvement. In fact, the cautious Realpolitik was the link between the older and younger generations. The ability to lead a dialogue with each other was peculiar for the 1950s, especially if compared with the 1960s, when the mutual comprehension disappeared. This was certainly influenced by the immediate post-war atmosphere which, more or less, required cooperation. Again, the war events were respected by both, as most participated in or grew up through the war. This was not the case in the 1960s, when the issue of the war, in terms of the 1960s political scene, brought a major disagreement.

Leaving the question of a generational confrontation behind and looking further at the new trends occurring during the 1950s, it might be argued that with the growth of affluence, Finns began to discover the pleasure of a wider set of hobbies, and other ways of spending their leisure time. One of such changes was seen in the widening interest in literature related to gardening, cars, home design, and travelling. New magazines specialising in these issues began to be published, offering both new social

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512 Aron (1983: 212-213) recalled the growing differences in the political perceptions between the older and younger generations during the late 1960s.

topics and modern graphic appearance, as the emphasis started to be put on a better print, on pictures and colour effects.\(^{514}\)

One of such magazines, which has survived until today, is Seura (Society). The first issue came out in 1947, and with its focus on the entertainment of every member of the family, it became an important part of Finnish society. Its popularity grew, especially during the 1950s, with reports on the Olympic Games, and the Diary of Armi Kuusela, the Miss Universe of 1952, from her trip to the United States\(^{515}\).

In general, magazines for women became very popular after the war. With the improvement in the labour market, women were partly liberated from everyday worries which the war left behind, including food scarcity. They had more time to devote to fashion and taking care of themselves. The traditional position of women, in terms of the Kirche- Küche-Kinder began slowly to change\(^{516}\) as women from the war period started to work outside their homes. Women’s magazines showed the latest fashion tricks and provided them with practical information. In 1952, a new type of women’s magazine came out, Naisten Maailma (Women’s World), which differed from the old magazines not only in its colourful graphics, but also in its content. Articles mainly pertained to fashion, food, design and the lives of famous people, such as royal families. Many articles were written not by Finns, but were translated from similar foreign magazines\(^ {517}\). In the same year, another magazine for women began to be published, Me Naiset (We Women) which, with its slogan “for modern woman a modern reading”, became one of the most popular\(^ {518}\).

Tabloid magazines were becoming popular in Finnish society. At the beginning of the 1950s, Apu (Help) came out with a focus on scandals and unveiling secrets from the life of popular Finnish figures. Kekkonen was usually one of those whose secret love life filled the pages. During the 1950s, most of these new gossip magazines still

\(^{514}\) Malmberg 1991:133.

\(^{515}\) Malmberg 1991:145. Armi Kuusela, is often regarded as a symbol of the 1950s. As Antti Eskola recalled (1983:52-53), Kuusela was an example of the Finnish countryside girl, succeeding abroad by her Finnish beauty, who refused to take a role in Hollywood rather than live in Finland. However, her later marriage to a Philippine man disappointed many Finns, but her life was still one of the most discussed apolitical topics during that period.

\(^{516}\) Ylioppilaslehti 1953, # 12. An article written by Klaus Törnudd about the necessary changes in the role of women.

\(^{517}\) Malmberg 1991:222.

\(^{518}\) It might be of interest to mention the attempts of Violet Erkko (wife of Eljas Erkko) to create a magazine for women which would focus mainly on the English and French prêt-à-porter fashion. The magazine, Chiffons, was published only in 1952 as it did not find sufficient readers.
had a kind tone as Malmberg\textsuperscript{519} observes; their articles were not insulting, nor did they reveal private issues.

The growing trend in magazines of good graphic quality, and the inclusion of a lot of pictures to catch the attention of the reader contributed to the development of advertisements. After the war, advertisements and posters became simpler yet more sophisticated and made a greater impact. An ambitious slogan was usually added to a picture, which attracted more people as text and image were combined\textsuperscript{520}. The advertisement industry was mainly under American influence, many products being promoted used the American image of a successful young man or woman. As one example might be manifested the name of Finnish cigarettes \textit{Boston} or \textit{Life}. Their names, particularly \textit{Boston}, attempted to invoked an American atmosphere, which had a connotation of modernity and progress\textsuperscript{521}.

An example of an advertisement for Boston cigarettes (Ylioppilaslehti, 1954, #19).

\textsuperscript{519} Malmberg 1991:149.
\textsuperscript{520} Aartomaa 1997:248-250.
\textsuperscript{521} Recently a book has been published on the advertising industry in Finland during the post-war years (Heinonen 2001).
Besides the popularity of magazines and the growing impact of advertisements on the level of the consumption, there is another issue which is worth mentioning regarding the new trends. If it is claimed that during the 1950s, the interaction between Finns and the world around them was toughened by the Finnish conservatism, which often limited any deeper international co-operation, Finnish design and architecture was a clear exception. Finnish design was important during the 1950s, when it continued the promising development of the 1930s, which was served by the war. However, the major difference between the inter- and post-war periods was in its presentation. During the 1920s and 1930s, Finnish art and architecture were more or less connected with the creation of the national image, upholding the ideas of Finnish patriotism. After the war these were among the few fields which were under international influence, as many designers and artists travelled abroad and were well prepared to exchange ideas with their foreign colleagues.

Finnish design became famous during this period for its functionality. Its raison d'être was, as expressed by designer Ilmari Tapiovaara (1914-1999), "design for needs". Finnish design celebrated its success in the Milan Triennial, especially in 1951 and 1954. Among the leading designers were Tapio Wirkkala (1915-1985), a glass designer, celebrated in the 1950s for his vase 'Atom bomb', and later well known for the design of the Finlandia vodka bottle; Ilmari Tapiovaara, an interior designer, famous for his project of Domus Academia, the student dormitory house in Helsinki; Kaj Frank (1911-1981), a designer of the porcelain factory Arabia, whose dishware Kilta (Guild), a project supported by Wilhelm Wahlforss, was, for all its simplicity, paradoxically, one of the most popular products in the history of Arabia. A little in the shadow of the male designers stood a female glass designer, Nancy Still (1926-2001), who was one of the prize winners in the Milan Triennial in 1954 and well respected abroad for her pure glass creations.

However, female designers led in the field of textile design, which saw its birth during the 1950s, mainly through the merits of Armi Ratia (1913-1979) and her company Marimekko. Her leisure-time clothes, two colour striped dresses and T-

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523 Aav 1997:304.
524 Nanny Still lived and worked mainly outside Finland.
525 Leena Manula (Helsingin Sanomat 20.05.2001). Ratia registered its trade mark in 1951. After Ratia's death, the company lost its originality and almost fell into bankruptcy when in 1991, Kirsti Paakkanen brought Marimekko back to its success.
shirts became popular not only within Finland but also, as is often emphasised, in the United States, where she began exporting in 1959[^26]. Marimekko enjoyed its main boom during the 1960s, when as Smeds recalls, a Marimekko T-shirt was an essential part of a woman’s wardrobe, and represented ‘a uniform for the intellectuals’ (ällystön univormu)[^27].

The high recognition of Finnish design contributed to creating a new image of Finland abroad, which also awoke an international awareness of which Finns could be proud. Architecture as well as design had its significance in terms of the presentation of Finland abroad. As its representative, the widely acclaimed Alvar Aalto (1898-1976) maintained, Finland was a special country regarding its language, which few could understand and thus communication between Finland and the outside world was hard. However, architecture could easily link Finland with the great world, as the language of architecture was international[^28].

Post-war Finnish architecture, similarly to design, was characterised by its simplicity and functionality. Attention was placed on the use of wood and raw materials, to achieve a symbiosis with nature. With post-war reconstruction in full effect, and the increase of urban areas, the architects tried to maintain the interaction between town and nature, by preserving the character of the landscape. Besides Alvar Aalto, Aulis Blomstedt (1906-1979) and Heikki Sirén (b. 1918) might be mentioned in the context of the post-war decade[^29].

The cultural atmosphere characterised on the one hand by its crisis of identity together with the strong veneration of the Finnish past, and on the other hand by the progress of social science and the American influence, had an impact on the members of the cultural elite. The older generation had to go through the process of adaptability and to challenge new opportunities. To what extent it might be considered a smooth process, and to what extent the older generation contributed to the recruitment of the younger generation into the elite will be explored next.

[^26]: It is often emphasised that Jackie Kennedy discovered the pleasure of Marimekko’s simplicity when she purchased a few dresses.
[^27]: Kerstin Smeds 16.05.2000. Manula (Helsingin Sanomat 20.05.2001).
[^28]: Aalto (Uusi Suomi 8.11.1960).
[^29]: The wife of Aulis Blomstedt was a daughter of Jean Sibelius. Also Siren’s father, alike Blomstedt’s, was an architect.
In the long run, history can be viewed as a series of trial and error experiments in which even the failings of men have a tentative value and in the course of which the intellectuals were those who through their homelessness in our society were the most exposed to failure.

4. THE CULTURAL ELITE: ITS ADAPTABILITY AND ASPIRATIONS

In the previous chapter, the cultural atmosphere of the 1950s was analysed in the hope of illustrating the post-war setting in which the cultural elite worked and engaged in political activity. As could be observed, the members of the cultural elite failed to adapt and react responsively to the post-war political situation. Their failure was manifested in the manner in which they dealt with Finland’s war involvement and their approach toward post-war cultural developments.

This chapter will focus on the specific members of the cultural elite in greater detail, looking at their social background, their recruitment into the elite and their political aspirations. Their academic and political involvement will be discussed, as well as the implication of this in the political context of post-war Finland. Moreover, the confrontation between the older and younger generations will be addressed. Although the older generation maintained its privileged positions, their influence became weaker by the end of the decade and they were slowly replaced by younger members. This ‘transition of the generations’ will be investigated, with a focus on the recruitment of the younger generation into the elite. The Finnish Cultural Fund and the Paasikivi Society will be scrutinised in this context.

It might be argued that the position and role of the cultural circles in Finland is researched with more ease in comparison to the role of the industrial circles. The social importance of the educated class (sivistyneistö) has been analysed from a historical point of view, and from a sociological perspective. Matti Klinge (b. 1936), who might himself be considered to be a member of the younger generation, has undertaken the most significant studies of the cultural circles in Finland. He focuses mainly on the role

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530 Mannheim 1936:159.
and position of the educated class in the nineteenth century. Klinge has also contributed much to the research on the history of the University of Helsinki and the Student Corporations.

The works of Risto Alapuro (b. 1944) definitely have to be taken into consideration as far as sociological research on the Finnish educated class is concerned. Alapuro, though only a few years junior to Klinge, projects different perceptions of Finnish cultural circles from Klinge. If Klinge is mainly concerned with tradition, Alapuro is more interested in the historical changes in the viewpoints of the educated class. The distinction is certainly affected by the differing approaches of the historian and the sociologist, but their social backgrounds and even arguably their experience of the 1950s also make a difference. Klinge was already actively writing in student periodicals in the late 1950s. Alapuro belonged to the 1960s generation, and thus he was affected by the atmosphere of that decade.

Furthermore, the educated class and intellectuals in general were popular topics of the 1990s, when many new studies on them were produced. An example might be Älymystön jäljillä (In the Steps of Intellectuals), edited by Pertti Karkama and Hanne Koivisto, and published in 1997. The merits of this new research was a broader awareness of cultural circles of their historical perspective. Besides the published sources already mentioned, periodicals such as the Ylioppilaslehti, Valvoja, Nva Argus and Suomalainen Suomi were used for this study, as well as archival work at the Finnish Literature Society Archive and the Finnish National Archive.

As laid out in Chapter 1, the cultural elite will be analysed from three points of view: firstly, in terms of the generational approach; secondly, the emphasis will be place on the close relationship between the cultural elite and the State; and thirdly, the elite will be overviewed from an institutional perspective. The generational approach, that is, the division in the older and younger generations, has been analysed earlier in greater detail, so there is no need to reiterate this concept. The relation between the cultural elite and the State was also analysed in Chapter 1, however, due to the crucial

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531 E.g., Bernadotten ja Leninin välissä (Between Bernadotte and Lenin), 1975.
532 E.g., Alapuro’s book Venäjän varjossa (In the Shadow of Russia), 1997. It might be of interest to mention the topic of Alapuro’s dissertation which was concerned with the history and causes of the establishment and function of the Academic Karelia Society (1973). It was de facto the first time that serious attention had been devoted to this topic since 1944, when the Society was prohibited under the Armistice Agreement.
significance of this affiliation, it is worth developing the main point further. Finally, the two institutions, the University of Helsinki and the old Finnish Academy, have not yet been mentioned in the context of this work, therefore more attention will be devoted to their history and their role in Finnish society. As these two last points are interrelated, they will be discussed together, to manifest the relation between the University to the State and the Finnish Academy to the State. Thereafter the analysis of the cultural elite will be commenced.

The relations between the University of Helsinki and the State

In the 1950s, the University of Helsinki represented the largest educational institution, in terms of the number of students and the scope of the academic disciplines. Although Åbo Academy (est.1918) and the University of Turku (est.1920) existed in Finland, together with newly-established universities, such as the University in Oulu, the University of Helsinki maintained its decisive significance, mainly due to its advantageous location in the capital.

To better understand the significance which the University of Helsinki has in Finland, it might be of interest to mention briefly the key points in its history. The University was established in 1640, in Turku, by the Swedish Queen Christina (1626-1689) as the Academy of Turku. After the fire in 1827, when the buildings were largely destroyed, the Academy was transferred to Helsinki and renamed the Imperial Alexander University after the Russian Tsar Alexander I. Besides the fire, another reason for its relocation was simply the possession of Finland by the Russian Empire, which had taken place in 1809. Helsinki was closer to the new capital, St. Petersburg, than Turku, which reflected more the Swedish influence of the previous connections. The name Imperial Alexander University was changed to the University of Helsinki after Finland gained its independence in 1917, and until 1919 it was the only institution of higher education in the territory of Finland.

Besides its educational importance, the University of Helsinki forms a prominent part of the architecture of Helsinki. Its location in the heart of the city with its architecturally imposing main building, designed by Carl L. Engel during the first half

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533 The history of the University of Helsinki is documented in detail in Helsingin Yliopisto 1640-1990 I-III.
of the nineteenth century, and facing the seat of the government, perhaps corresponds to its decisive role within the historical and political development of Finland.

Members of the academic staff at the University, held so-called State posts (virka), which meant that they were basically State employees. As the affiliation of University and State is often analysed within the context of the Finnish educated class, a few comments might be offered because it is the key to an understanding of the position of the cultural elite. Laura Kolbe in her article about the reciprocal relation between the University and the student corporations quotes Klinge’s opinion concerning the new central role of the University in the nineteenth century. “The need for a Finnish civil service and for a national spirit was assigned to the University”. Basically, this means that it was the University that provided an education for these officials. In other words, the University was as much focussed on educating future civil servants than on independent academic research. A similar conclusion might be drawn from Kuisma’s view of the civil service in Finland and its educational background.

Kari Immonen has further emphasised the traditional State influence on the academic and intellectual life in Finland, based as it was on the close correlation between civil servants and academics. Immonen even claims that it might be possible to make a connection between the character of the government and the character of the student generation, which to a certain extent resembled each other. Taking this perspective into an account, the 1950s, a decade of political conservatism, affected the atmosphere at the University where cultural conservatism was a pervasive feature. The political convictions of the elite responded to such a climate. As previously noted, Right-wing political orientation prevailed.

In addition to the State-University political relationship, the university in general has played an important role within Finnish society. In the nineteenth century, the university was a platform for the National Revival and the consequential growth of national awareness; during the First World War, members of the Jäger troops were recruited from university students; the inter-war nationalism embodied in the Academic Karelia Society was founded by students who propagated the patriotic ideals of the

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534 Paavola 2000:86. The German Carl E. Engel was one of the leading architects of his period, and decisively contributed to the creation of the University when the relocation from Turku to Helsinki was decided on. The main building was reconstructed after the war after it had been severely damaged by the Soviet bombardment of 1944 (Paavola 2000:87).


536 Kuisma 1989:79.

Greater Finnish Fatherland; during the Second World War, prominent members of the government were recruited from academic circles. Recruitment into the governing elite already occurred in the inter-war period when the proportion of academics involved in politics was high, and it continued in the post-war period, when leading politicians came from the students most active in the student bodies of the 1920s. In other words, it might be argued that the university could be considered to be a training-ground for the future elite of the Finnish nation, a notion which had validity even in the 1960s and 1970s.

The relation between the Finnish Academy and the State

The reasons for establishing the Finnish Academy was to create an academic institution free of close connections with the State and was inspired by its older counterparts in France and Sweden. However, the first plans became complicated and the aims did not meet with the targets. Without going beyond the scope of this study by discussing the role of the Finnish Academy in too much detail, the primary question should be considered, that is, what was to be the function of the Finnish Academy.

The idea of establishing a Finnish Academy in the post-war years was not actually a new one. As early as 1938, the Prime Minister, A.K. Cajander (1879-1943), who is one of the examples of a politically involved academic, as he was Professor of Forestry at the University of Helsinki, had initiated the establishment of an institution which would represent Finnish science. The so-called Cajander Academy was to have consisted only of natural scientists, excluding artists and humanists who were overlooked in Cajander’s intentions, which corresponded with his own specialisation. However, war events interrupted any plans which were thereby left open until a more convenient period.

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538 Maude 1995:15.
539 Kirby 1979:9.
540 Pohls 1989:82.
541 A.K. Cajander was one of the key figures of the inter-war political scene. Cajander was not only an initiator of academic innovations but was also engaged in the industrial field. Kuisma (1993:67-69) focused on Cajander’s engagement in buying for the State a share in the Enso-Gutzeit Company in 1918 (which is discussed in 5.2) and his subsequent participation on the Company Board.
542 Heikonen 1993:183.
After the war, various initiatives were implemented regarding the future of the Academy\textsuperscript{543}. In spite of long and controversial discussions which were by Kyösti Skyttä called 'a struggle', the Finnish Parliament approved the establishment of the Academy in November, 1947\textsuperscript{544}. During the spring of the next year, President Paasikivi appointed the first ten Finnish members of the Finnish Academy, who were as follows: Wäinö Aaltonen, sculptor (1894-1966); Yrjö Ilvesalo, forestry researcher (1892-1983); Eino Kaila, philosopher (1890-1958); Yrjö Kilpinen, composer (1892-1959); Veikko Koskenniemi, poet (1885-1962); Rolf Nevanlinna, mathematician (1895-1980); Onni Okkonen, art historian (1886-1962); Erik Palmén, meteorology researcher (1898-1985); Yrjö Toivonen, linguist (1890-1959); and A.I. Virtanen, chemist (1895-1974)\textsuperscript{545}. The Finnish Academy was established during a period when political crisis and economic instability were at their height. This leads to the question of why the foundation of the Academy took place immediately after the war instead of being delayed until the period stabilised. The reasons are explained by the function of an Academy which has two purposes: firstly, to emphasise cultural and educational traditions and to maintain a heritage which was worth preserving; and, secondly, to support further scientific development. In other words, the establishment of the Academy after the war was meant to strengthen the Finnish self-esteem which was degraded by the status of a defeated country and a gloomy political situation.

An academic institution was to bolster hopes for a better future for Finnish scientists and foster a belief that Finland, despite its current position with post-war economic and political difficulties, had a cultural inheritance which could be respected and preserved\textsuperscript{546}. A.I. Virtanen, the President of the Academy, stressed in his inaugural speech the scientific importance of the Academy which would support talented researchers and develop optimum conditions for Finnish scientists and artists. The Academy would contribute to improving the economic position of Finnish researchers, which was far from excellent due to the consequences of the war.

\textsuperscript{543} L.A. Puntila's involvement in the establishment of the Academy will be discussed with his academic engagements in 4.1.2.
\textsuperscript{544} Skyttä's book, \textit{Akatemia taistelu} (The Struggle for the Academy, 1975), describes some of the polemics which occurred during the process of foundation.
\textsuperscript{545} The opening celebration of the Finnish Academy in November 1948 was held at the University of Helsinki in the presence of the representatives of politics, the Church and academic circles (\textit{Helsingin Sanomat} 30.11.1948).
\textsuperscript{546} Ketonen 1986:27.
Moreover, the year 1945 appeared to be a turning-point in clinching the process of founding any kind of an academic institution. Finland received its second Nobel Prize, this time in Chemistry\(^{547}\), which brought important changes into the discussions about the significance and necessity of the Finnish Academy. Finnish science was highly recognised by the award of this international prize and it appeared to be essential to have an institution which would adequately represent the achievement of Finnish arts as well as Finnish science\(^{548}\), which seemed to have been overlooked until then.

For these reasons, since the Academy should serve to uphold the national spirit, the Academy’s scientific and educational goals became easily threatened by political pressures. The Academy thus became more of an institution striving to be free of political interference with the strong interrelation with the State than an independent academic institution\(^{549}\).

An example of the confrontation that occurred between the Academy and the State might be in relation to the appointment of the academicians. Urho Kekkonen, who at that time held the post of Speaker of Parliament, accepted the nomination of seven members of the Academy, including Eino Kaila and A.I Virtanen, neither of whom were much in his favour. However, Kekkonen strongly opposed the candidature of Rolf Nevanlinna, Veikko Antero Koskenniemi, and Yrjö Kilpinen\(^{550}\), whose names were too closely bound up with the German sympathies of the inter-war period, as they even figured on the so-called ‘Black List’, issued by the Soviet Allied Commission in Finland in 1944\(^{551}\).

Although President Paasikivi disagreed with Kekkonen on this issue, and in 1948 nominated all candidates, the war time political affiliations of the nominated academicians became a topic which was extensively analysed in the Finnish press. The latter argued for or against the nominees and the possible impact of their nomination on the relations between Finland and the Soviet Union, which was the main cause of such a wide discussion\(^{552}\).

\(^{547}\) In 1939, F.E. Sillanpää received the Nobel Prize in Literature; in 1945 A.I. Virtanen in Chemistry.
\(^{548}\) Heikonen 1993:183.
\(^{549}\) Ketonen 1986:30.
\(^{551}\) E.g., Nevanlinna kept up connections with Nazi Germany during the Continuation War, which later resulted in his post as chairman of the voluntary SS troops in Finland (Pekonen 1997:68).
\(^{552}\) The situation was even more sharpened by the events in Czechoslovakia in February 1948. During the same period, President Paasikivi received a letter from Stalin suggesting Finland and the Soviet Union should negotiate a mutual treaty.
Moreover, the role of the Academy appeared to be polemical when, in particular, the Left-oriented parties did not have the same enthusiasm for establishing a Finnish Academy. Raoul Palmgren, as a columnist of the Leftist oriented newspaper *Vapaa Sana* was amongst the most militant opponents of the Academy; for him, the Academy was equivalent to building a monument to the old conservative times without any progressive step forward.

Besides the political interference, the Academy lacked full financial support, and administrative space was completely missing. Rolf Nevalinna recounted in his memoirs that no offices where necessary paperwork could be done were provided for the Academy, and indeed no real organisation existed as most arrangements were made hastily and ineffectively.

Such circumstances led eventually to the dissolution of the Academy at the beginning of the 1960s, which illustrates even more strongly the close relation between the State and the Academy. Although it is not the intention here to search for the reasons leading to the dissolution of the Academy, two separate interpretations might be mentioned. For Kari Immonen, who devoted a large part of his research to the Academy, Kekkonen’s personal antagonism to it was not the main reason for its dissolution.

Immonen claims that by the end of the 1950s the Finnish Academy was a fortress of academic decline, where the old-fashioned educational and scientific methods of its members prevailed over the constructive scholarly research of the post-war modern approach which would contribute to scientific development. The Academy thus had rather the function of “a brake than of an accelerator”. Modernisation of the Academy seemed to be necessary, and the educational policy started by Kekkonen contributed to that process. In 1958, Kekkonen assisted in establishing the so-called Linkomies’ Committee, where necessary reforms within the educational system were to

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556 Kari Immonen (29.02.2000, Turku). At the end of the 1950s, two close acquaintances of Kekkonen, Kustaa Vilkuna and Martti Haavio, were appointed to the Academy, which only aroused the general disapproval of the older members.
be discussed and the role of the State in science clarified\textsuperscript{558}. In other words, such a step meant the beginning of the Academy's end.

On the other hand, Seikko Eskola, in his review of Immonen's book, pointed out that the question of the abolition of the Academy might be defined not so much as the search for a role of the State in science and its necessary modernisation but rather who would have power in the State and thus in science\textsuperscript{559}, an issue also mentioned by Immonen. The dissolution was, according to Eskola, more or less connected with the growing political radicalism of the 1960s rather than with the educational reforms, which A.I. Virtanen had demanded a long time before Kekkonen\textsuperscript{560}.

\textsuperscript{558} Linkomies' Committee is analysed in greater detail in section 4.1.3, where Edwin Linkomies' political involvement is discussed.

\textsuperscript{559} Eskola 1995:185.

\textsuperscript{560} Eskola 1995:185. Hustich (1982:145) too, mentions A.I. Virtanen's initiative to provide educational reforms placing more emphasis on natural science and technology.
4.1 The cultural elite

The processes occurring in the elite, such as the recruitment, circulation and adaptability will be discussed in accordance with their definitions in Chapter 1. In general, recruitment into the elite will be investigated together with the question as to what extent social background and education played a role in it. Such an analysis will facilitate an understanding of the academic and political involvement of the cultural elite and its attitudes towards the post-war situation in Finland. On such basis, the post-war adaptability and responsibility of this elite will be outlined and briefly compared to that of the industrial-banking elite.

4.1.1 Recruitment of the older generation into the elite

Family background, social contacts and education are the primary factors which influence recruitment into an elite. The question is to what extent their role in recruitment is equally decisive or whether one factor is more important than another. The significance of the recruitment factors depends on the period in question, which means that their order of importance does not have to be the same in terms of the 1930s and 1950s generations.

In relation to the older generation, there are a number of distinctions among each analysed group pertaining to their recruitment. One group consists of those whose family background played a crucial role in their recruitment into the elite. In other words, such members came from the so-called old ‘cultural aristocratic’ families, which means that their entry into the elite was automatic. Although they were only a small fraction, their role and influence was immense, mainly in terms of their close interrelation and social contacts. One such example is Rolf Nevanlinna. The kin of the family Neovius (they accepted the Finnish form Nevanlinna in 1906) belonged to one of the oldest Swedish-speaking families on Finnish territory. The roots of the Neovius family reached back to the eighteenth century, when members of the family held socially prestigious posts such as church clerks and priests. Nevanlinna’s father, Otto Neovius, was himself a well educated teacher of mathematics who received the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Nevanlinna’s mother was of German origin; she was the

daughter of a German astronomer\textsuperscript{562}. This indicates that besides the social contacts which the Nevanlinnas had due to their social position, the family background facilitated access to an education which subsequently played an important role in Rolf Nevanlinna’s recruitment into the elite.

The second group includes the Swedish-speaking Finns, who were not of aristocratic origin. However, their language distinguished them from their Finnish-speaking colleagues. The distinction lies in their social upbringing, usually in Swedish-speaking areas, and their attendance at Swedish-speaking schools. V.A. Koskenniemi and Edwin Linkomies belong to this group. Both changed their Swedish sounding names to the Finnish equivalent under the influence of Fennisation\textsuperscript{563}. Their family background as well as their education was important for their recruitment into the elite, together with the inner social contacts of the Swedish-speaking minority.

A Finnish-speaking counterpart to the above mentioned group comprises Martti Haavio and Kustaa Vilkuna. Both came from educated and culturally-established Finnish-speaking families located in the Finnish countryside. For example Haavio’s father was a country priest, whose family roots went back to the eighteenth century. His mother’s family origins were even older, as her ancestors had close contacts with a Fennophil, Daniel Juslenius, a propagator of the Finnish language in the eighteenth century\textsuperscript{564}. This illustrates how, in these cases, subsequent recruitment into the elite was largely influenced by family background and established social contacts which contributed to the accessibility of their education.

The last group embodies the so-called talonpojat, the sons of impoverished farmers or the rural proletariat. L.A. Puntila and Paavo Ravila are two examples of members of this group. As their family background could not be a sufficient factor for their recruitment, education and social contacts were the most decisive. In particular, the social connections established during their university studies were for them of great significance as they maintained their social network, which enabled them to explore further steps in their recruitment into the elite.

\textsuperscript{562} Pekonen 1997:66. During the Swedish period, there were four priests in the Neovius family; during the Russian period, twenty-three officers; after Independence, the Nevanlinnas held positions as medical doctors, bank managers and mathematicians.

\textsuperscript{563} Koskenniemi changed his Swedish-sounding name, Forsnäs, into the Finnish form in 1906, Linkomies (Flinck) in 1928.

\textsuperscript{564} Sihvo 1997:78.
Such acquaintances were usually made within the student corporations, *ylioppilaskunta*, which had a particular significance for the rural students. Students gathered in a corporation according to their native province to keep their traditions and to express their political and cultural values whilst being away from their homes. This assisted in overcoming the cultural gap as well as creating an excellent opportunity to build social connections. Many members of the analysed elite maintained their association with the corporation even during their later careers, for example some were elected to the post of honorary president, *kuraattori*.

Arguably, based on the social links established during their studies, the elite's adepts from the country created a counterpart to the elite's adepts from well-established families. From this perspective, it might be suggested that family background facilitated recruitment into the elite, though education also played a crucial role, although the accessibility of education was not as common. Besides that, historical circumstances represented a significant factor, when the inter-war period was suitable for the recruitment of new adepts into the elite. As a consequence of the growing Finnish patriotism, the recruitment of rural students was even encouraged.

Social background also reflected on the formation of political affiliations and thus on one's subsequent academic and political involvement. Nevanlinna's well-established and well-educated family strongly influenced his further academic and political development. Nevanlinna was raised in an environment where education was highly appreciated. He was keen on music and became fluent in German (his mother tongue); and his interest in mathematics was rooted in the family tradition. In other words, Nevanlinna grew up in a cosmopolitan atmosphere, where travel to Germany and France was a common occurrence. Such experience was new to most members of the cultural elite, who grew up in the isolated Finnish countryside.

Such members of the elite were strongly influenced by their pro-Finnish and pro-Lutheran Church-oriented family background. For example, Haavio's political involvement was affected by such upbringing, whether during the inter-war period when he strongly supported the Academic Karelia Society or after the war when his sense of patriotic responsibility led him to politically back Urho Kekkonen. Moreover, the members of the elite who were son's of the Finnish farmers grew up in the spirit of

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565 Nevanlinna's father's cousin was Ernst Lindelöf, a Professor of Mathematics, who in 1886 worked in Paris in a circle of well known mathematicians. Further, Nevanlinna's brother, Frithiof, also became a mathematician (Pekonen 1997:67).
appreciating Finnish peasant culture, which affected their strong sense of upholding Finnish patriotism. These agrarian roots subsequently decisively influenced their academic and political involvement, which was usually in support of a strong Finnish nationalism.

Besides the importance of family and social backgrounds in the formation of political and cultural attitudes of the elite herein analysed, the emphasis should be placed on the environment within which the cultural elite studied. Most members studied in Helsinki, whether at the so-called Imperial Alexander University before 1917 or the University of Helsinki afterwards. Taking into consideration that the University, besides its educational purposes, also functioned as an important political platform where pivotal moments of Finnish history took place, the political convictions of the cultural elite were greatly influenced by the atmosphere of the period when they studied.

It can be argued that the pre-independence and inter-war decades affected the cultural elite most. Those who received their education before 1917, such as Linkomies and Virtanen, studied during a period when Finland was still a part of the Russian Empire, specifically at the time when the Russian oppression of Finland was greatest. During the Civil War, most students participated on the side of the White troops, as, for example, A.I. Virtanen. Such historical experience influenced their inter-war support for Finnish nationalism and anti-Russian moods and hardened the post-war adaptability.

During the inter-war period, the Academic Karelia Society was the key influence for those who studied at that time. Basically, the Society had twofold importance. Firstly, it was the propagation of the nationalistic ideology and Finnish patriotism. Secondly, more significantly in the context of this study, the Society became a unifying platform for those young sons of farmers who came to Helsinki during the 1920s to receive an education. As such, the society did not offer only patriotic beliefs; within the society, important personal acquaintances were made. Most such student contacts were preserved into the post-war period and significantly influenced the further political involvement of its members. For example, Vilkuna, a student of Finnish literature and folklore, and Haavio, who studied Finnish literature, thus became familiar with their classmates Urho Kekkonen and Ilmari Turja, the latter later editor-in-chief of the Uusi Kuvalehti.

Membership of the Academic Karelia Society greatly influenced the creation of the future political and cultural elites. From this perspective, the inter-war years were suitable for recruitment into the elite, which was open to males and prepared to widen its membership. The political conditions, enhanced by a strong Finnish nationalism, gave an opportunity to climb the social ladder to virtually anyone who was able to sustain the general patriotic mood and express his national opinions. Moreover, and certainly most significant for this study, the elite that arose during that period maintained its influence into the post-war decades, when they largely dominated the political and academic scenes and partly directed further recruitment.

4.1.2 The academic involvement of the cultural elite

Erkki Sevänen has focussed his attention on the role and position of the educated class during the inter-war period. He has questioned the possible distinction between the intellectuals (älymystö) and the literati (kirjailijakunta), and their political and cultural commitment during the period when Right-wing affiliations were dominant within the members of the Finnish educated class. He distinguishes between five different groups to explore their variety together with their cultural and political strategies. Sevänen bases his division on the involvement of the educated class in the following periodicals: the Valvoja, the Suomalainen Suomi, the Tulenkantajat-lehti (a journal of the literary group the Torchbearers), the Kirjallissuslehti (a literary newspaper, mainly the members of the Left-oriented literary group Kiila contributed to) and the Nya Argus567.

Sevänen’s classification might be applied, with slight modification, to this study as it clarifies well the academic involvement of the cultural elite and its political convictions. Edwin Linkomies and V.A. Koskenniemi were among those who belonged to the circle around the Valvoja, which Sevänen calls humanistic-researchers (humanisti-tutkijoita). They were involved in their university career, in the main, by carrying out research in the literary field. Despite their scientific orientation, A.I. Virtanen and Rolf Nevanlinna might also be placed within this group, as they both occasionally contributed to the Valvoja and, what is most significant, their political convictions were closely related. They sympathised with Right-wing oriented parties, mostly Conservatives.

Edwin Linkomies might be selected as an example of this group. Linkomies was one of the members of the cultural elite with a rich academic and cultural life, both inside and outside the University. His academic career began in his late twenties. Even before he was twenty-eight years old, Linkomies was granted a professorship in Roman Philology in 1923, when preference was given to him rather than to other well-established candidates. Beside that, Linkomies held the post of Vice-Rector of the University during the inter-war period although in 1941 in the election to the post of Rector, he lost to Rolf Nevanlinna.

This was perhaps decisive for Linkomies’ full political engagement in war politics, when he held the post of Prime Minister. After the war, he was as a result of his war political activities, sentenced to five and a half years imprisonment. However, after his release (he served only two years), he was fully rehabilitated. During the inaugural ceremony of the Finnish Academy in November 1948, Linkomies made his first public appearance. Two years later, he officially returned to the University to become a prominent figure of the post-war Finnish academic world.

In 1956, he was elected Rector and in 1962 Linkomies held, even if briefly, the post of Chancellor. In his academic career, Linkomies fully concentrated on his university duties, and even if he had a reputation as a strict and conservative teacher, he was open-minded to further educational developments. He continued with the reconstruction plan of the University initiated by his predecessor Erik Lonnroth, completing the lecture halls of Porthania and the dormitory house Domus Academia. In addition, Linkomies strongly supported international scientific exchanges between Finland and the United States.

Besides to his university career, Linkomies contributed regularly to the Valvoja, where he became the editor-in-chief in 1955 and where he conducted most literary discussions and book reviews, for instance, Linna’s novel was reviewed there. After his retirement from politics after 1944, he actively participated in many other ventures, for example, he edited the encyclopaedia Oma Maa, which WSOY began to publish in

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570 Eino E. Suolahti (1977:95) was Linkomies’ student during the 1930s, and he described the formal atmosphere which Linkomies fostered. Jokisipilä describes Linkomies as a patriarchal type of man who, though he was in favour of the growing number of female students at the university during the 1950s, demanded that female students wore skirts at the university (Jokisipilä, 24.05.2000, Turku).
1953. On such occasions, Linkomies maintained his old contacts, for instance with V.A. Koskenniemi, who was also involved in WSOY at that time. At the same time, Linkomies contributed to creating public opinion, as historical and political issues of the Finnish past were discussed within the pages of Oma Maa.

Linkomies also initiated various cultural debates and as he was indeed a publicly well-known figure on the Finnish cultural and political scene, many members of the educated class met in his house. These included Mika Waltari and Rolf Nevanlinna, a lifelong friend of Linkomies. Furthermore, every second Thursday, the so-called Linkomies' circle (or the Thursday Club, Linkomiehen piiri) gathered, in which many more or less important members of both the cultural and political elites led cultural and political discussions. Among the frequent visitors were Kustaa Vilkuna and Ilmari Turja.

The second group mentioned by Sevânen embodied people involved in the Suomalainen Suomi, which Sevânen characterised as the Haavio-Kekkonen cluster, (haavolais-kekkoslainen haarauma). Here belonged those who were active in the Academic Karelia Society or supported its ideology, and in the post-war period they more or less showed their sympathies for the policy of their confrere Kekkonen. They usually created, as Sevânen maintains, a significant part of the post-war cultural milieu, with a decisive political role though often hardly recognisable at first sight. Their academic involvement was thus influenced by their political aspirations and vice versa, which often reflected on their academic independence.

Moreover, the inter-war cultural and political atmosphere significantly influenced their further academic involvement. In terms of international contacts, they completely lacked any wider experience, as Finland was largely culturally isolated during the period of their studies. If any study trips were made, they were usually to Germany, Sweden, Estonia or Hungary. The lack of an international outlook piled up

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572 Encyclopaedias were highly popular during the 1950s. Besides the WSOY, Otava published a few series of encyclopaedias. It was fashionable to have such books on the household shelf.
573 Koskenniemi’s academic career was connected with the University of Turku, where he became a Professor of Literature in 1921.
574 Kolbe 1996:98.
577 E.g., the case of Vilkuna’s nomination to the post of academician in 1959, when his academic achievement was overshadowed by his political affiliation and thus his appointment provoked serious disagreement among the rest of the Academy (Herlin 1993:375).
difficulties in adapting to the wider foreign influences coming to Finland during the 1950s.

Among this group was L.A. Puntila, whose academic engagements were his professorship at the University of Helsinki and his position at the Finnish Cultural Fund, which became of major interest after his unsuccessful intervention in the establishment of the Finnish Academy. Even if Puntila’s plans did not succeed, it might be of interest to mention the events that happened during his initial proposals.

In 1943, L.A. Puntila who, besides his engagement in the State Information Bureau (VTL), was at that time already in charge of the Finnish Cultural Fund and thereby keen on upholding Finnish culture and science, suggested widening the dimensions of the pre-war plans for an Academy so as to include the arts. Cajander’s focus on the Academy as exclusively an institution for the natural sciences was considered to be a narrow concept which left art and culture unjustifiably apart. For these reasons, Puntila took the initiative and became deeply involved in the planning of the post-war Academy™. Through his wide contacts with members of the cultural elite, such as V.A. Koskenniemi and Edwin Linkomies™, Puntila began to discuss the character of the academic institution which was to have been established as soon as the war was over.

However, Puntila was not the only one who was interested in founding an Academy. His plans appeared to be overtaken by Leo Sario (b. 1911) who, after his return from the war front in 1944, deliberated on the creation of an institution which would be able to support post-war cultural developments in Finland. For Sario, an ambitious young mathematician, the establishment of an Academy was connected as well with upholding Finnish self-esteem which had deteriorated after the outcome of the war and needed to be raised again™. Sario urged the University of Helsinki to take the first steps in creating an Academy, and thus he presented his proposals to Rolf Nevanlinna who, in addition to being his teacher, held the post of Rector at that time. However, Nevanlinna disapproved of Sario’s suggestions, arguing that the university system was too bureaucratic and would slow the process down instead of advancing it™. Nevanlinna, who was familiar with Puntila’s plans, recommended that Sario

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579 Pohls 1989:82-83.
581 Skyttä 1974:15. Leo Sario was born in Karelia to a strongly pro-Finnish oriented family who brought up Sario to have high appreciation of Finnish culture.
582 Skyttä 1975:15.
present his ideas to L.A. Puntila, who had already shown an interest in the matter without University assistance.

Despite similar intentions and plans, the suggested co-operation between Puntila and Sario turned out to be a personal struggle as they could not agree on who would be in charge of establishing the Academy. Puntila emphasised his own initiatives and efforts, as did Sario, and each fought for recognition of his own proposals. Puntila, who began to perceive the future Academy as a competitor to ‘his’ Finnish Cultural Fund, was offended by the younger Sario, who took over his ideas. In the end Puntila gave up, focusing more on his work for the already well-established Cultural Fund.

If the Academy did not happen to be Puntila’s ‘invention’, the Cultural Fund certainly was. Puntila stood firmly by its foundation between 1937-1939, as he saw the necessity for creating a cultural institution representing Finnish cultural interest. Puntila developed the Fund’s cultural policy and his assertion of influence made him frequently known as ‘Mr. Cultural Fund’. The most significant development was Puntila’s perception of the Fund as a platform for the recruitment of the younger generation into the elite, a context which will be discussed in a separate section. However, Puntila showed similar tendencies within the University; Puntila often picked out the most talented students, whose political convictions were, of course, closer to his own, and he supported their circulation within the cultural and governing elites.

Although Puntila held his chair in Political History for almost twenty years, during which time his academic influence was visible everywhere, his beginnings in the academic post might be regarded as highly controversial. Puntila was an ambitious man who was able to overcome many obstacles to attain his goals. This clearly occurred when he declared his candidature for the above-mentioned post. Puntila was determined to follow an academic career at the end of 1944, when he was faced with the decision of a political or academic career. The university world appeared to be more suitable for his desires to educate and lead, even if his academic qualities did not reach any

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583 An article published in the Suomen Kuvalehti (1986, #45, pp.45-48, written by Sakari Virkkunen) based on the memories of Leo Sario clarified the quarrels between Puntila and Sario.
584 Virkkunen 1986:47.
585 Pohls 1989:5. Eskola 1991:113. Pohls, who researched the Finnish Cultural Fund in greater detail, claimed that the influence of Puntila on the whole function of the Fund in the 1950s was immense.
586 Kolbe (11.11.1999, Helsinki).
587 Puntila’s immense personal archives show his extensive contacts with almost every influential figure in Finland. “Puntila was everywhere with everyone and it was hard to overlook his ‘long fingers’, is how many of his students remember him.
heights[^89]. However, similarly as his plans in the Academy, he had to struggle for his position at the University, although this time he was successful.

In 1952, there were two main candidates for the professorship: the "bourgeois L.A. Puntila and the Social Democrat Juhani Paasivirta"[^90]. There were two figures with two historical approaches, of whom Puntila, with his previous political involvement, was a clear favourite. Puntila had already applied for the professorship in 1946, immediately after the Department of Political History was founded. However, he withdrew his application as his chances against a well experienced academic were slim[^91]. However, at the end of the 1940s, when the post was open again, Puntila firmly believed that his time had come, particularly as his opponents were not as well recognised.

It took more than a year of careful deliberation among the academics (the committee comprised Arvi Korhonen, Veli Verkko and Heikki Waris among others) to make the decision. Both Paasivirta and Puntila seemed to be competent enough, but opinions on their academic achievements varied widely. The theme of Paasivirta’s dissertation Suomen itsenäisyyskysymys 1917 I-II (Finnish Independence 1917) stood out from the contemporary stream of historical research and Puntila’s study on Bismarck appeared not to completely satisfy Finnish academic circles[^92].

Surprisingly Puntila lost his battle by one vote[^93]. Less surprisingly, he immediately appealed against the decision as he considered it to be inadequate. In the end, Puntila succeeded but only due to Paasivirta’s withdrawal. Paasivirta was not as far as thick-skinned as Puntila and he decided to concede. Finally, the University Council approved Puntila’s candidature and in 1952 he was officially appointed.

The significance of this controversial election is twofold: firstly it had a long-term impact on the rivalry between the departments of Political History in Helsinki, where Puntila was head, and Turku, to where Paasivirta departed afterwards and after ten years became a Professor. Secondly, it was the figure of Juhani Paasivirta which

[^89]: There exist various opinions about the level of Puntila’s academic achievements. Eskola (1991) is relatively critical, especially about Puntila’s doctoral thesis defended in 1944 (Eskola 1991:119-123).
[^90]: Eskola 1991: 137. Besides Puntila and Paasivirta, there were two more candidates, Yrjö Nurmio and A.K. Viljanti. Eskola (1991:134-155) describes in greater detail the process of election with the emphasis on the different political convictions of Puntila and Paasivirta.
[^91]: Erkki K. Osmonalo was elected to the professorship in 1946. However, he died in 1949 (Eskola 1991:136-137). L.A. Puntila reached his political peak during the war period when he worked for the Prime Ministers, Ryti and Rangell, as their personal secretary.
[^92]: Eskola 1991:139-142.
makes this case significant. Paasivirta was a young, thirty-year old, Left-oriented historian who, with his profound interest in the labour movement, was among a small number with a similar interest. A Left-oriented historical approach was not in vogue with the dominant generation of inter-war historians during the 1950s. However, the committee originally selected him, even if only by one vote. This fact breaks the rigidity dominant in Finnish academic circles, particularly among historians, as the 'outsider' Paasivirta won. However, Puntila’s ambitions illustrate the importance of social connections and the fact that Puntila had a finger in every pie in post-war Finnish society.

4.1.3 The political involvement of the cultural elite

Besides the academic activities of the cultural elite, it is also essential to look at their political involvement. This is of especial interest in Finland due to the close interrelation between University and State, as noted earlier. In the Finnish cultural environment, Julien Benda’s thesis about clerks and laymen would clearly suggest that the Finnish educated class represented more politically committed ‘intellectuals’-laymen, than independent clerks. However, the political affiliations of the cultural elite were changeable, depending on the political circumstances, and not always easily recognisable. The political involvement of the cultural elite was usually influenced by historical circumstances and the political situation as well as by political aspirations. The latter was particularly important during the post-war decade, when political instability enabled possible wavering on the political scene.

As for the political involvement of the analysed cultural elite, a slight distinction might be made between the inter-war and post-war periods. If during the 1920s or the 1930s, the educated class directly participated in the governing elite, during the post-war period their political engagement was on a different level. The cultural elite appeared to interfere more indirectly in decision-making, standing 'behind the scenes'. However, this does not mean that their political influence was diminished by this new position. One example to take might be that of Kustaa Vilkuna who, together with his friend from the Academic Karelia Society, Martti Haavio, practised political interference from 'behind the scenes'. They both stood tightly behind the policy of
Kekkonen, whether their support was as visible as Vilkuna’s or as invisible as Haavio’s.

Kustaa Vilkuna stood by Kekkonen at times which seemed to be critical for Kekkonen’s political career. For example, Vilkuna strongly supported Kekkonen during the War Trial process, when Kekkonen’s position was more than unfavourable in the eyes of others. Vilkuna, in Herlin’s view, proposed the subject of Kekkonen’s speech in 1952, in which Finnish defence policy and the concept of future Finnish neutrality was formulated. Vilkuna publicly participated in Kekkonen’s election campaigns, writing speeches and pamphlets to show considerable support for his friend. Moreover, during the Night Frost Crisis in 1958, when Kekkonen’s position was fragile, Vilkuna was a frequent visitor to the Soviet Embassy, and in the end he also initiated the establishment of the Paasikivi Society, which justified and thereby provided support for Kekkonen’s political line.

Vilkuna’s never-ending support for Kekkonen has been widely discussed and has often put Vilkuna in a negative light in connection with the political consensus, which, however, began to occur in Finland only after the 1950s. Herlin, who devotes great attention to the mutual liaison between Vilkuna and Kekkonen, characterises Vilkuna as an *eminence grise* in Kekkonen’s political ensemble of the most loyal. Herlin argues that Vilkuna was fascinated by Kekkonen’s authoritative character and high political ambitions, both of which features were lacking in Vilkuna.

Taking a different approach and comparing Vilkuna’s behaviour to that of Juuso Walden, a member of the industrial-banking elite, a different perception might be gained. Walden, who like Vilkuna was educated with a strong sense of Finnish patriotism, supported Kekkonen during his political campaigns in 1950 and 1956, when it was a rare phenomenon among the industrialists. Walden’s decision to do so was a reflection of his feeling of responsibility and economic understanding of the future of Finland. A similar suggestion might be made about Vilkuna’s support of Kekkonen,

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594 It should be mentioned that Vilkuna was the only one from the group analysed who took a direct part in government during the 1950s, when he was a Minister in Reino Kuuskoski’s government April-August 1958.
597 During the Night Frost Crisis in 1961, it was Vilkuna again who stood behind Kekkonen firmly and loyally (Seppinen 1997:596).
which perhaps originated in his patriotic convictions: doing the best for Finland. However, in Vilkuna’s case, his academic independence suffered from extensive political involvement. He certainly waded too deeply into political intrigues.

It might be of interest to draw parallels between the political engagements of Kustaa Vilkuna and L.A. Puntila. A clear distinction lies in the dimension of their political ambitions: Vilkuna had none; Puntila, on the contrary, was a member of the cultural elite, who wished to participate in politics directly motivated by his high political aspirations. However, for various reasons, he never really succeeded in achieving his political dreams. Although Puntila was a master of intrigue and political games, he was always flirting with the wrong political parties and organisations which, after he joined them, were relegated to a role of secondary importance.

During the 1950s, Puntila subsequently sympathised with both supporters and opponents of Urho Kekkonen, according to the political situation. In the 1956 elections, he inclined to Kekkonen's victory, strongly opposing K.A. Fagerholm, for whom he expressed his preference in 1948. However, in 1957 he joined the Social Democrats under the anti-Kekkonen Väinö Tanner’s (1881-1966) leadership, which led to the estrangement between Puntila and Kekkonen and proved itself to be the wrong step in Puntila’s further political career. Even if the relationship between Puntila and Kekkonen cooled, Puntila admitted that he admired Kekkonen on the basis of Kekkonen’s successful political career, which Puntila was unable to follow, as he always missed the ‘right’ historical turning-point to enter politics.

In contrast to Puntila, Edwin Linkomies and A.I. Virtanen were consistent in their political attitudes and, although both received an offer to become presidential candidates, they both refused. Linkomies was directly involved in politics from the late 1920s. In 1933, he was elected to Parliament as a member of the Conservative Party.

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599 Vladimirov, who kept in contact with Vilkuna (but never publicly, on Vilkuna’s insistence), made a similar argument about Vilkuna’s political patriotism (Vladimirov 1993:51, 90).
600 In Herlin’s book (1993), many interpretations of Vilkuna’s political contacts are offered. Herlin even mentions contacts with both sides, whether with the KGB or the CIA. Rentola calls Vilkuna Kekkonen’s assistant (Kekkosen apuri). E.g., he mentions Vilkuna’s participation in the Soviet intelligence service (Rentola 1997:42-43, 671).
602 According to Puntila, in 1956 there was no other candidate as capable as Kekkonen, who deserved full support in the presidential elections (National Archive, File of L.A. Puntila, Interviews).
603 Kähkölä 1974:36. Rentola 1997:152. In 1948, Puntila formed the so-called Puntila circle (Puntila piiri) which supported Fagerholm’s government.
604 Puntila 1979:86-89. Puntila kept up correspondence with Kekkonen between 1934-1955 (National Archive, File of L.A. Puntila, 131-Correspondence). Eskola (1991:183) mentions that Puntila was the one who initiated the correspondence, which did not reflect any deeper friendship.
During the crucial war period, he held the post of Prime Minister, which affected his post-war indictment in the War Trial of 1945. Due to this experience, Linkomies retired completely from direct political life. Despite that, it might be of interest to mention Linkomies' political contacts which he maintained during the 1950s. He had an extensive social network which he built up during the years of his political involvement. After the war, he used his connections mainly with regard to the university budget, which was thus always approved as Linkomies wished.

Linkomies' high social profile appeared to be of use to Kekkonen. Kekkonen respected Linkomies, and particularly appreciated his wide political experience. Their mutual relationship, which suffered from the fact that Kekkonen was responsible for Linkomies' sentence in 1945, improved with time. By the beginning of the 1960s, it was on a friendly level and, in principle, based on mutual advantage. In other words, while Kekkonen assisted Linkomies' financial requirements for the University, Linkomies supported Kekkonen's political line, for example, by refusing to be his rival in the presidential election in 1961.

During the few months of 1958, when Kustaa Vilkuna held the post of Minister of Education, Linkomies even stood by the creation of his eponymous committee, the Linkomies Committee which was established on the initiative of Urho Kekkonen. Its purpose was to assist with the educational reforms from which the scholarly and scientific circles could fully profit. Linkomies' participation in the Committee served to strengthen its credibility and it manifested increasing connections between Linkomies and Kekkonen, for whom the Committee pursued the abolition of the old Finnish Academy.

The change in Linkomies' attitudes towards Kekkonen might, to a certain degree, be compared with the change occurring within the industrial-banking elite which by the end of the 1950s also largely recognised Kekkonen's political merits for preserving the stable economic situation in Finland. A similar point might apply to Linkomies' acceptance of Kekkonen and his adjustment to the post-war situation.

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605 For more about Linkomies political involvement during the war see Jokisipilä 1997 and Linkomies' memoirs Vaikka aika (Difficult Time), which he wrote during his imprisonment.
606 Jokisipilä (Turku 24.05.2000).
609 Laurila 1982:118.
The cultural elite: its adaptability and aspirations

Linkomies even was the only one of the politicians sentenced in the War Trial who was *persona grata* in the Soviet Embassy.

A special position within the cultural elite was occupied by A.I. Virtanen and his political involvement. Despite the fact that Virtanen was never directly engaged in politics, he publicly disagreed with the direction of post-war Finnish foreign affairs. Virtanen, if compared with Linkomies, never accepted Kekkonen as a guarantor of political stability in Finland; and Kekkonen remained for Virtanen a traitor to the Finnish nation and patriotic ideals.

Virtanen is one of the members of the cultural elite whose political attitudes were strongly influenced by his social background and origins. He grew up in Karelia, a territory which was annexed by the Soviet Union. Moreover, he experienced severe Russian oppression before Finnish Independence was declared. Both aspects influenced and strengthened his negative feelings to Russia. In principle, Virtanen never acknowledged the loss of Karelia, which left him, like many Finns, with a deep feeling of bitterness. The cultural and political importance of Karelia, and Viipuri in particular, was often a topic of his public presentations and articles. Though the question of Karelianism was suppressed after the war for political reasons, Virtanen at least tried to bring it back to the political arena. For example, during his speech at the Nobel Prize ceremony, Virtanen expressed the view that Karelia should be returned to Finland.

Despite his strong and open criticism, Virtanen never had political aspirations. He refused an offer from the Conservative Party to be their presidential candidate in 1955, when he would have faced Kekkonen. However, Virtanen sympathised with the Social Democrats and especially maintained a good relationship with Väinö Tanner. Their common political disagreement with the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line,

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610 The estranged relationship between Virtanen and Kekkonen already dated from the war period when Virtanen disagreed with Kekkonen's article (written under a nickname, *Pekka Peitsi*) suggesting that an Armistice Agreement between the Soviet Union and Finland was the only way for Finland to survive the war (Suomen Kuvalehti, 11.03.1944, here quoted from Heikkonen 1993:132-133).

611 Heikkonen 1993:142. Virtanen never accepted the post-war arrangement between Finland and the Soviet Union.

612 Heikkonen 1993:154-55 This speech provoked great disagreement among Finnish politicians, especially Paasikivi, who disapproved of Virtanen's political opinions.

613 Heikkonen 1993:225.

614 The wife of Väinö Tanner, Linda (born Anttila, 1882-1978), worked with Virtanen in the Valio Laboratory.
which triumphed clearly in 1961, was sometimes referred to as ‘the Virtanen-Tanner line’, a counterpart to official policy\(^{615}\).

### 4.1.4 Adaptability and responsibility

It is not easy to discuss the adaptability of the cultural elite in the context of post-war Finland. The perplexity lies in the almost invisible duality between what can be called ‘public’ and ‘inner’ adaptations. To put it more simply, it might be argued that Finns under the strains of Realpolitik adjusted to the political awareness which was reflected in their adaptability. They accepted the post-war situation, and all the circumstances arising therefrom, without any major resistance. Basically, the conformist way of adaptability prevailed, suggested by the previous analysis of the cultural atmosphere. The members of the elite actively engaged in post-war academia and politics without any deeper resistance or opposition.

However, this was not the only way that Finns, and the cultural elite in particular, responded to the post-war situation. The inter-war atmosphere could not suddenly disappear, and strongly rooted Finnish nationalism continued within Finnish society though not openly proclaimed. Although there was no connecting link to the pre-war decade, the Finnish cultural milieu tried to find a connection. Historical topics, memoirs and ‘newly invented’ traditions were popular in public debates and Finns contributed to various cultural funds to preserve their cultural inheritance.

The goal of raising a degraded self-esteem was interwoven with the search for a new enemy against which the nation could be unified. However, the enemy remained the same, as the pre-war anti-Russian and anti-Communist paranoia persisted within Finnish society but was hidden behind the ideas of Realpolitik. In the end, under the political circumstances, the enemy became a friend and Finns were even more lost in their doubts.

The duality in adaptation has historical roots in Finland. At the end of the nineteenth century, Finns had searched for political accommodation with Russia. The

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\(^{615}\) Heikkonen 1993:225. Kurjensaari (1960:106-107) mentions it in a sarcastic sense. Furthermore, in relation to the political activities of Virtanen, the so-called ‘Field Advisory Bureau’ (Kenttänäegovontatöimisto) is sometimes mentioned. It functioned between 1957-1958, financed by the agrarian co-operatives, and expressed scepticism with the Kekkonen political line (Kähkölä 1974:119; Heikkonen 1993:229). The question remains to what extent it inspired Kekkonen’s adherents to establish the Paasikivi Society as its political counterpart, or whether any possible parallels are excluded.
nationalistic Fennoman movement did not support the idea of fighting its neighbour. On the contrary, it tried to reinforce the existing institutions to create a national ideology.\textsuperscript{616} The approach of political realism was important, so accommodation could be found and the national identity could be maintained. Finns learned to respect the geopolitical conditions but not to give up their beliefs. Such a political inheritance facilitated post-war adaptability but contributed to the above noted duality: to adjust but not to forget national identity.

After the war, there were a number of situations to react and adapt to: war involvement, political reorientation, and opening Finland up to international influences were among the most crucial. To what extent the cultural elite dealt with the Finnish war involvement was discussed earlier with the example of Väinö Linna. What might be of interest to point out in this context is that the question of the possible punishment of collaborators never arose in Finland. This was probably caused by the fact that Finland had the status of a defeated country and thus the concept of collaborators was alien. Although the so-called ‘Black List’ existed, comprising people who were not suitable to the Soviet Union due to their political past, it was issued by the Soviet Allied Commission in Helsinki, not by Finns.

Eero Silvasti, who had tried to explain the relation between the cultural milieu and wartime Germany, claims that pre-war Germany with its growing Nazi ideology was perceived by most of the educated class in Finland as a new challenge in searching for a better society.\textsuperscript{617} Risto Alapuro, in answering a similar question, emphasises the importance of the cultural connections through which the Finnish educated class became familiar with Nazism.\textsuperscript{618} He links together the inter-war Finnish and German political atmosphere, both strongly influenced by increasing nationalism. Moreover, Alapuro claims that the Finnish educated class had difficulty in making a clear distinction between German cultural traditions and German nationalistic tendencies, which often affected their move towards Nazi ideology.

It is worth mentioning these opinions as they reveal the lack of comprehension for ideologies by Finns. It can be argued that the Finns wanted to know what Hitler’s Germany was like, went to see it, and thereafter distanced themselves from Germany as it did not correspond with their perceptions. The fact is that Finland was isolated from

\textsuperscript{616} Alapuro 1989:148, 150.
\textsuperscript{617} Silvasti (Helsingin Sanomat 30.06.2000).
\textsuperscript{618} Alapuro (Helsingin Sanomat 13.11. 1998).
most European political and cultural influences. In the absence of any sort of multicultural atmosphere, the Finns had great difficulty in grasping the new political forces and ideas of either Nazism or Communism.

This further reflected on the attitudes of the Finnish cultural elite towards the Soviet Union, with whom Finland was obliged to develop cultural relations after the war. This was not easy, as all contacts with its eastern neighbour had been cut off during the inter-war period. Russia was usually considered to be more or less an ideological enemy; such views were based on the ideals propagated by the Academic Karelia Society. For these reasons, Russian culture and science had been terra incognita for Finnish academics and students during the pre-war decades, for there had been an absence of any kind of co-operation

The cultural exchange which developed after the war progressed at a slow pace, and was often marked by the anxiety of being labelled too pro-Eastern-European. Apart from that, the Soviet Union also looked on Finland with a suspicion which prevailed until Stalin’s death, and thus no deeper exchange programme developed until the mid 1950s.

One of the unsuccessful attempts to develop mutual cultural co-operation was the opening of the Finnish Institute for Soviet Studies in 1947. The primary intention was to begin academic research on Russia (the Soviet Union) in Finland. However, academic and scientific plans had hardly commenced at the beginning of 1948 when the Finland-Soviet Union Society (SNS) became involved in making it impossible to follow the scholarly line. The situation worsened when the linguist Valentin Kiparsky, the director of the Institute, resigned under Soviet pressure and left the country.

Academic relations improved by the year 1955, when a group of academics and politicians, among them Kustaa Vilkuna, focussed on the creation of effective academic co-operation. In his arguments for supporting such plans, Vilkuna emphasised the growing need to have Finnish experts on Russian literature and science, particularly as the University Library owned a unique Russian collection which was of a great use to scholars. In the same year, 1955, an agreement was signed in terms of scientific and

References:
619 Ylioppilaslehti 1949, #23. An article written by Kalervo Keranto, who suggested that Finland should seek greater academic co-operation with the Soviet Union.
620 Ville Pernaa has only recently published his PhD thesis on the role of the Institute between 1947 and 1992 (Pernaa 2002).
622 Herlin 1993:360.
technical co-operation between Finland and the Soviet Union, which included the work carried out by the Finnish Institute for Soviet Studies.

As a result, the first scholarships granted to Finnish students by the Soviet Union were awarded in 1955\(^{623}\), and this led to the subsequent advancement of mutual academic relations. After 1958, university relations gradually widened in both directions\(^{624}\). However, not every member of the analysed group expressed approval for the new established scientific collaboration. For example, A. I. Virtanen, strongly opposed any scientific exchange with the Soviet Union and refused to invite any Soviet chemists to the Valio Laboratory\(^{625}\).

The cultural milieu considered it to be their responsibility to support the opening up of Finland to international influence. Although many members had difficulty with the handling international connections as they lacked any deeper experience, they became supportive. The reasons for this could be hidden in the 'inner' adaptation, when Western academic influences were perceived as an anti-pole to Soviet co-operation, and thus Finnish patriotism was upheld. However, many academics were aware of the necessity to maintain the pace with modern scientific trends, which pressured them to support the international exchanges.

A.I. Virtanen, who had already during the inter-war period underlined the necessity of American scientific co-operation\(^{626}\), strongly supported the post-war scientific international programmes. Moreover, through his contacts, Virtanen tried to invite Western scientists to Finland, as he was aware that the financial difficulties which Finns had to overcome to travel abroad limited their chances of becoming familiar with the latest scientific progress. Similarly, Nevanlinna, supported scientific exchange with English-speaking countries, and recognised the significance of the English language for future academic development\(^{627}\).

The responsibility of the cultural elite might also be illustrated with the example of their handling international political issues. This was in accordance with the 'public' adaptation, heavily influenced by post-war political awareness. When, in 1956, Finland refrained from voting in the United Nations to oppose the Soviet intervention in Hungary, Rolf Nevanlinna sent a letter to L.A. Puntila. Nevanlinna, in Zurich at that

\(^{623}\) Ylioppilaslehti 1955, # 20.
\(^{624}\) Kolbe 1996:76-77.
\(^{625}\) Heikkonen 1993:141.
\(^{626}\) Heikkonen 1993:83.
\(^{627}\) Ahlfors 1983:58.
time, expressed his concerns about Finnish attitudes towards Hungary in the United Nations. He demanded all educational institutions in Finland show open support for the Hungarians\textsuperscript{628}. Puntila promptly replied to Nevanlinna that the situation looked differently from abroad and, even if refraining was not a good solution, it was the only thing that Finland could do. Nevanlinna, as Puntila continued, should have remembered that Finland happened to be only part of a game which the Great Powers played between them.

Puntilla’s response suggests what has been claimed at the beginning. He, like many others, was faithful to the principles of political awareness: to express cautiously their views on so-called dangerous thoughts. This was a part of the public adaptation to the post-war situation. However, this contrasted with the features of the inner adaptations mirrored in the involvement in various funds and associations which upheld the national self-esteem in the sense of pre-war Finnishness. Many funds were newly established for such purposes after the war\textsuperscript{629}.

Besides providing the financial scholarships for cultural and academic projects, many funds had a specific provincial character as they supported students according to their native county. From this perspective, geographical association again showed itself to be of significance, like the student corporations. Such intentions facilitated the accessibility of education to many rural students, as well as strengthening the spirit of Finnish patriotism strongly rooted in the Finnish countryside.

\textsuperscript{628} Virtanen took a similar attitude and he got up a declaration in support of the Hungarian people (Heikkonen 1993:227).

\textsuperscript{629} Pohls 1989:351.
4.2 Recruitment of the younger generation into the elite

After the war, when Finnish society experienced political, economic and social transition, the conditions for recruitment into the elite were optimal. The cultural elite widened its circles and often even initiated recruitment. The Finnish Cultural Fund and the Paasikivi Society, as two platforms for the recruitment of the younger generation into the elite, will be briefly analysed within this section.

Certainly, during the 1950s, there were many other organisations and associations which might have been connected with the recruitment of the younger generation, and arguably they would illustrate the process better and more accurately. However, the emergence of the Finnish Cultural Fund and the Paasikivi Society seems to justify the three basic observations which have been made within this study: firstly, the confrontation between the older and younger generation with the persistent authority of the first during the period analysed; secondly, the existence of exceptionally small cultural and industrial-financial circles in Finland, whose contacts were associated with these two platforms; and thirdly, the analysis of the Finnish Cultural Fund and Paasikivi Society allows an exploration of the distinction between public and inner adaptability.

The main points investigated within the contexts of the Finnish Cultural Fund and the Paasikivi Society are their ideological character in the 1950s, their social and political function, and their main representatives. Their cultural policies and inner structures will be left aside, as they do not hold any major importance for this study. Instead, the persistence of the older generation deep into the 1960s in the case of the Cultural Fund will be pointed out; in the case of the Paasikivi Society, the political confrontation between the older generation represented by Kustaa Vilkuna and Jan-Magnus Jansson, as a member of the younger generation, will be discussed.

However, first of all, the dimension of the educational changes will be briefly outlined in the context of the younger post-war generation. The question will be asked to what extent post-war economic and social advances affected the factors of recruitment into the elite in comparison with the inter-war period.

In general, in post-war Europe, a rapid expansion of education occurred. Education was no longer considered to be a privilege of the upper social class; with the growing number of newly-established universities and colleges of higher education, it
became more easily accessible for a larger number of the population. Such a development was reciprocally connected with a growing demand for the education. The number of students proliferated, which led to an increasing disproportion between students and teaching staff. There were insufficient qualified teachers who could fully cope with the number of lectures demanded, and most universities lacked equipment and lecture halls, which made the teaching conditions more difficult. It might be argued that such circumstances were a factor in the revolutionary student mood of the late 1960s in Europe when dissatisfaction reached its peak in a tense political atmosphere.

In Finland, the situation appeared to be similar in terms of the number of students enrolled in the higher educational institutions. After the war, there were slightly fewer than 15,000 students. Twenty years later, the number was three times higher. At the University of Helsinki, the major educational institution, almost nine thousand students were registered in 1950-1951, of whom almost two thousand were first-year students. Ten years later, more than thirteen thousand students studied at the University, of whom almost three thousand were newly registered. Besides the University of Helsinki, student numbers at other universities and colleges also grew, like, for example, the Universities in Turku and in Oulu, even if Helsinki received the largest number of applications.

In terms of the economic conditions at the universities, Finland did not greatly differ from the rest of post-war Europe. After the war, the situation was unfavourable, with a pervasive lack of housing facilities, lecture rooms, teaching materials and staff. The latter certainly led to the tendency for many talented young scholars to be promoted to higher positions in the university at an early age.

However, there was one peculiarity, which might in this context be pointed out. After the war, Finland achieved the highest number of female students compared with the rest of the world, and a large number of women slowly began to be recruited into the elite. The position and role of women, in general, has been neglected within this

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630 The developments of the educational sphere after the war in most European countries and the USA is documented in detail in Locke 1989.
633 Maude (21.01.2002, Turku) recalls that in contrast to students in France the conservative-minded students in Finland praised Finnish conditions during the late 1960s.
634 Waris 1968:82.
study, particularly if looking at the emergence of the members of the cultural and industrial-banking elites. The latter were entirely male. The reality is that, until the 1960s, there were few women who reached a higher position, whether in the cultural or industrial circles, not to mention the banking environment, which was exclusively a male phenomenon. However, the conclusion should not be reached that Finnish women were an inactive part of Finnish society. On the contrary, they actively participated in social and voluntary organisations and had contributed decisively to war production.

Besides the widening opportunities for female students, better educational and scientific possibilities also pertaining to cultural exchanges and new student programmes occurred in post-war Finland. As a detailed account of the ASLA-Fulbright programme has been given in the previous chapter, its impact on post-war Finland does not need to be emphasised. In terms of the recruitment into the elite, the international contacts provided better educational opportunities and as such reflected on the recruitment process of the younger generation, who could fully enjoy the new advantages.

Although the accessibility of education and international contacts affected the recruitment of the younger generation into the elite, the question remains to what extent the order of importance of the recruitment factors had changed. As argued earlier, in terms of the older generation, family background and social contacts played a decisive role, though education could not be underestimated. Additionally, during the inter-war period, specific emphasis was placed on the rural students, whose interests and recruitment was largely encouraged by the Academic Karelia Society.

After the war, with the increasing accessibility of education and new opportunities, the demand for recruitment hardened. International experience and academic recognition were among the requirements, as the number of well educated adepts proliferated. Although among them were many of agrarian origin, arguably only a few got the opportunity to climb the social ladder. Most of the new recruits still came from well established families, as the family contacts played an decisive role.

Erik Allardt may be taken as an example: Although his academic career in sociology and appointment to the professorship in 1956 was largely influenced by his long stay in American universities at the beginning of the 1950s, where he became

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638 Laura Kolbe (11.11. 1999, Helsinki), Sulkunen 1989:178-191. In terms of the cultural involvement of women, the significance of literary salons might be mentioned. They were usually run by women, e.g.,
acquainted with the new developments in the social sciences, his origins were in a well-educated Swedish-speaking family with academic traditions. Likewise in the case of Jan-Magnus Jansson, whose educational achievements and academic experience were certainly significant factors in his nomination for a professorship in 1954. However, his family background resembles Allardt, further strengthened by his marriage. Jansson’s wife belonged to the old aristocratic von Bonsdorff family.

This suggests that even if there are tendencies to believe that under the post-war educational conditions the recruitment factors had changed, in reality the situation was almost the same. What had changed were the platforms where recruitment took place and the political circumstances which affected the whole process of recruitment. Generally, new recruits emerged from the prevailing feelings of political awareness.

The Finnish Cultural Fund

As noted above, there other institutions might have been mentioned in the context of this work. However, the Finnish Cultural Fund basically holds a threefold significance: firstly, each decade of its function fulfilled various cultural and ideological purposes, reflecting the general atmosphere of each period; secondly, the Fund was closely connected with L.A. Puntila, who was closely associated with educational propaganda, attempts to educate, influence and preach in the spirit of the inner adaptation; and thirdly, the Fund would have initiated the further recruitment of the younger generation into the elite by its scholarships and awards.

The idea of establishing a cultural fund which would financially support Finnish culture and science in terms of awarding academic scholarships to pro-Finnish oriented projects was born during the early 1930s. This period was strongly marked by the mood of Finnish nationalism and the influence of the Academic Karelia Society, whose former members assisted with the Fund’s foundation. One of the decisive factors leading to the establishment of a cultural fund was the absence of financial co-operation between the industrial and cultural circles, which the Swedish-speaking cultural elite

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639 The grandfather of Allardt, on his mother’s side, was Ivar August Heikel (1861-1952), the Professor of Greek literature at the University of Helsinki, where he later held the post of Rector.
641 People involved in the Suomalainen Suomi, and the so-called ‘summer university’ (kesäyliopisto), like Puntila, Haavio and Kurjensaaari, were active in the Fund’s establishment (Pohls 1989:22-23).
enjoyed, which would have ensured the constant development of Finnish culture and science. Until then, only the Alfred Kordelin Fund, established in 1918, in memory of his violent death during the Civil War, contributed fully to the development of the Finnish-speaking culture. Additional financial assistance was achieved in 1939, when the Finnish Cultural Fund was established. Companies and individuals whose political affiliations were similar to the ideals of the Fund, that is, having a pro-Finnish patriotic orientation, agreed on regular financial support. The KOP bank, the Pohjola insurance company, and the Otava publishing house belonged to the most active of these institutions.

During the war, the main purpose of the Fund was the awarding of grants to scholars propagating the ideals of Finnishness in the spirit of the Finnish war propaganda. Moreover, one of the major focuses was on projects concerning research on Karelia and its cultural and political preservation. Furthermore, the work of the Fund was affected by the political involvement of most of its members, such as Puntila, who worked for the State Information Bureau. This was reflected in the participation of the governing elite in the so-called ‘discussion days’ (neuvottelupäivät), organised for the first time in 1943, with the main discussion topic being the war situation for Finnish culture.

After the war, the Fund began to concentrate on two fields; firstly, on the development of culture in the Finnish countryside; and secondly, on raising cultural interest and understanding for national symbols among young people. Such an orientation was in accord with the post-war political and cultural atmosphere, when Finnish self-esteem was degraded and its restoration was regarded as a national obligation. The Fund launched what might be called ‘post-war cultural propaganda’ in pursuit of Finnish patriotic unity, though in a distinctively different manner from the 1930s.

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642 Pohls 1989:23-24, 26-27. The Swedish-speaking cultural Fund, Svenska Kulturfonden, was established in 1907, which enjoyed great financial contributions from the Swedish-speaking industrial and cultural circles.
643 Pohls 1989:34, 107. The usual practice was that members of the Fund were on the Board of the companies and vice versa. E.g., Tyko Reinikka (who was sentenced in the War Trial in 1945) from the KOP bank was in charge of the Fund treasury, Yrjö Reenpää (a brother of Jorma Reenpää, whose family owned Otava) was the Fund Chairman, Juuso Walden was a member of the Board.
645 Pohls 1989:73. E.g., Risto Ryti and Edwin Linkomies were participants.
Within the University of Helsinki, the Fund began to arrange various students' competitions and mono-thematic discussions, often connected with the currently venerated Winter War or the great men of Finnish history. From 1952, the Fund began to organise the regular evening lectures known as Studia Generalia, mainly oriented to the purpose of bringing out the history of Finland. Moreover, whether or not the 1950s is regarded as a period of public veneration for the various war-linked events, the Finnish Cultural Fund certainly contributed to sustaining such a phenomenon. In the spirit of the Fund's post-war programme, that is, upholding Finnish self-esteem, financial donations were provided to build statues to great Finnish men, like Eino Leino and P.E. Svinhufvud, and a memorial to the Jäger troops.

Such contributions and work were a reflection of the atmosphere which prevailed within the Fund during the 1950s; its remit was performed in the tradition of the National Revival period. In other words, parallels might be made between the nineteenth and the second half of the twentieth century, when the Finnish nation needed to boost its self-esteem in pursuit of national unity. Puntila himself conceived the role of culture in a similar way, as a continuation of the “Snellman national awaking movement”. The Cultural Fund appeared to be one of the institutions able to do this, and it was therefore its main focus during the 1950s.

The second post-war decade, the 1960s, brought slight changes to the Fund's work. The Fund placed emphasis more on projects concerned with political themes and the international context. The tradition of 'discussion days' was re-established, with a broader political and cultural focus. The turn of the generations was also reflected in the Fund's political orientation; the old patriotic pro-Finnish generation was slowly replaced by more pro-Leftist affiliated younger members of the educated class, though changes in the Fund's work were slow.

Although L.A. Puntila was among the members of the older generation whose influence within the Fund weakened during the 1960s when more progressive changes

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647 Ylioppilaslehti 1952, #2, Pohls 1989:88, Kolbe 1993:326. The opening lecture was giving by the Professor of Philosophy, the hugely popular Eino Kaila who influenced many members of the younger generations, like, e.g., Allardt (1994:2), with his broad perception of philosophy and psychology. During the inter-war period, Kaila belonged to the Academic Karelia Society.


649 Eskola 1991:32. To be precise, Eskola argues that the work carried out by the Fund in the post-war decade was in the Snellman-Fennoman tradition of the nineteenth century.


651 E.g., in 1962, the theme of the 'discussion days' was “Finland and world culture” (Eskola 1991:32).

were taking place, he represented a key figure in the post-war Fund's function. Puntila had closely assisted with the Fund establishment in 1939, and after his unsuccessful involvement in the Finnish Academy, he fully developed the Fund's cultural and political directions. After the war, as a result of Puntila's deep engagement, the Fund often became associated with the name of Puntila. However, after his appointment at the University, Puntila became more oriented to his academic role, though he preserved his influence in the Fund.

There might be various reasons why Puntila was so intensively involved in the Fund's work. It was an excellent opportunity for a person such as Puntila, keen on an important position, to exercise his influence. Through his involvement in the Fund, Puntila widened his personal contacts and strengthened his position within the cultural elite with a possible eye on being recruited into the governing circles. Moreover, and perhaps most significantly, the Fund enabled him to propagate his political opinions. Whether his responsibility forced him to accept the 'public' adaptation in dealing with the post-war political situation, his inner adaptation was injected into the Fund's work, with the emphasis on Finnish patriotism.

The Fund's financial awards, in the form of various scholarships and competitions, was the major way of attaining influence among the cultural elite and for being recruited into the future one. However, during the 1950s, the first more frequently happened than the second. The influence of the older generation prevailed, de facto. Those who stood by the Fund during the late 1930s were still around more than ten years later. Although the Fund initiated the recruitment, its importance was rather in its cultural and ideological persuasion, of which Puntila was especially a master. This influenced the political affiliation of the younger generation, who were educated in the spirit of the post-war political awareness and which reflected on the political consensus of the 1970s.

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653 It might be of interest to mention Puntila's attitude on the dissolution of the Finnish Academy at the beginning of the 1960s. Officially, the Cultural Fund was in favour of such step, whether due to Puntila's personal affiliation to the Academy or Kekkonen's growing influence within the Fund, where he was a member honoris causa (Eskola 1991:40).
655 Pohls 1989: 164. Still, at the beginning of the 1960s, the average age of members of the Board was seventy.
The Paasikivi Society

In contrast to the Finnish Cultural Fund, the Paasikivi Society was established by members of both generations: the older and the younger. Although both represented their own perceptions of the post-war period, their intentions were directed to one common goal: the support of the Finnish-Soviet ‘special relationship’ and thus to continue upholding the Realpolitik of J.K. Paasikivi. Arguably, the principles of the Society reflect the public adaptation of Finns, who adjusted to the post-war situation. Additionally, the confrontation between both generations is another reason for looking closely at the Society. Such an overview will manifest the extent to which the older generation asserted its influence on the political affiliation of the younger generation.

Moreover, the Society included members of various elites\textsuperscript{656}: representatives of the cultural, industrial and governing elite and of the military elite who, though neglected within this study, shared an important place in post-war Finnish society. In other words, the Paasikivi Society illustrates the small range of social circles in Finland, and their interrelating connections.

It is conceivable that there are many ways of analysing the role and function of the Paasikivi Society. One approach might be to make a link between the inter-war Academic Karelia Society and the post-war Paasikivi Society. Although such an interrelation might appear irrelevant and unjustified, particularly in terms of the political ideology propagated by the Academic Karelia Society, there exist a few intertwining characteristics. Both societies were established by members of the cultural elite. In the case of the latter, many of its associates were already active in the first one. Both societies were founded at the University of Helsinki, and both were concerned with Finland’s relationship with its eastern neighbour; however, whilst the Academic Karelia Society’s ideals reflected the inter-war anti-Russian moods, the Paasikivi Society sought to emphasise friendly relationships between Finland and the Soviet Union. Moreover, both societies functioned as platforms for further recruitment, and many future members of the governing elite were drafted in from both organisations. Although the Paasikivi Society’s statutes did not exclude female members as the Academic Karelia Society’s did, its members in 1959 did not include a single woman.

Parallels between the Academic Karelia Society and the Paasikivi Society are of further importance. The ideological changes of Finns’ attitudes towards the Soviet

\textsuperscript{656} Majander (1988:57) calls the Paasikivi Society an elitist group.
Union thus appear rather transparent, which creates a picture of the political and cultural atmosphere of the inter-war and post-war periods.

The Paasikivi Society was officially established in November 1958657. The motivations behind the foundation of the Society were to provide support for the Paasikivi line and to improve the unity of the Finnish nation as a back-up for of Finnish-Soviet relations658. Such a desire had surfaced among a part of the cultural elite a year earlier. During the autumn of 1957, Kustaa Vilkuna and Jan-Magnuss Jansson began to discuss the difficulties apparent in the perception of Finnish foreign policy in relation to public opinion659. Their agitation was influenced by the political situation, the deep unpopularity of Urho Kekkonen, and the growing disunity among the Social Democrats, under its new leadership of Väinö Tanner, who was in disfavour with the Soviet Union660. Such circumstance could, in their eyes, threaten the mutual relationships of both countries.

The political discussions organised by Vilkuna and Jansson continued in the following year, on an unofficial basis, when most of the cultural and governing elite became involved in it661. The political events of the year 1958 confirmed their decision in establishing a society, which would

cherish the memory and political legacy of President J.K. Paasikivi by encouraging deliberation of foreign policy among all circles of the population and a democratic development in our country [Finland], as well as promoting knowledge of Finland’s special neutral status662.

The Society was thus established on what would have been the 88th birthday of J.K. Paasikivi with the general participation of members of the cultural milieu663, with one

658 Kurjensaari (Päivän Sanomat, 30.11.1958), Kolbe 1993:568-569. Halsti (1975:75) recalled that the Paasikivi Society clearly focused on the political sphere, the cultural relationships between Finland and the Soviet Union were influential in the SNS society, with which the Paasikivi society did not want to be a competitor.
659 Tuomisto 1978:54.
661 Halsti 1975:75. Kähkölä 1974:120-121. E.g., people like Wolf Halsti (a military colonel, whose memoirs were published by Otava during the 1950s), Matti Kurjensaari, Lars Dufholm, and L.A. Puntila participated in such unofficial discussion evenings.
662 From the statutes of the Paasikivi Society (UKK Archive, File 1/33), Tuomisto 1978:53.
663 Among the establishing members were, Jan-Magnus Jansson, Kustaa Vilkuna, Matti Kurjensaari, Matti Klinge, Jaakko Numminen, Ahti Karjalainen.
basic task: to persuade the public opinion to side with the official political line, which until then had been either neglected or purposely ignored\textsuperscript{664}.

In spite of the general association of Urho Kekkonen with Finnish-Soviet relations, the Society was faced with a serious dilemma; whether involvement in the Paasikivi Society automatically implied political support for Kekkonen or whether his political role could be separated from the Paasikivi Society\textsuperscript{665}. This appeared to be a most crucial question, which influenced both political opinions within the Society and its membership in general\textsuperscript{666}.

It is conceivable that whilst the Society maintained its contacts with Urho Kekkonen, it would have been in any case almost impossible not to do so\textsuperscript{667}. Though Kekkonen, at the beginning, did not participate in the official meetings, his political phalanx was a part of the Society\textsuperscript{668}, which \textit{de facto} divided it. Basically, for the members of the older generation around Kustaa Vilkuna, the Society was an association directly supporting Kekkonen. The younger generation was represented by Jansson and the so-called ‘Swedish-speaking liberals’ who often contributed to the \textit{Nya Argus}. Although they were politically in favour of Kekkonen, they were keen on the political orientation of the Society\textsuperscript{669}.

This was one of the confrontations between the older and younger generation in terms of political attitudes and it was particularly evident during the election campaign in 1960. Vilkuna and his supporters suggested that the Society might finance the presidential campaign of Urho Kekkonen. Such a proposal stood in a sharp contrast to Jansson’s wing, for whom such a support meant a direct intervention in the politics of Kekkonen\textsuperscript{670}. However, as a result of the political circumstances in 1961, both parts of the Society pronounced on the necessity of supporting Kekkonen, which appeared to be

\textsuperscript{664} The opinion of Jan-Magnus Jansson, quoted by Tuomisto (1978:55).
\textsuperscript{665} Halsti (1975:80) as a member of the Paasikivi Society raised this problem. In his view, the membership did not mean necessary political support for Kekkonen, as many members, particularly at the beginning, were opponents of Kekkonen.
\textsuperscript{666} E.g., Wilhelm Wahlforss left the Society because of its clear political support for Kekkonen.
\textsuperscript{667} E.g., the members sent a telegram to Kekkonen informing him about the Society’s establishment in 1958 and congratulations to Kekkonen on his 60\textsuperscript{th} birthday (UKK Archive, Files 1/33, 25/9).
\textsuperscript{668} E.g., Arvo Korsimo, Ahti Karjalainen and Paavo Kastari (people known as the K-line), were members of the Society.
\textsuperscript{670} Halsti 1975:101.
the only solution. Afterwards, the influence of Kekkonen within the Society increased and he participated more often in the meetings.

Despite the different opinions about supporting Kekkonen, the members of the Society agreed on basic principles: upholding patriotic ideals, which were transformed into support of the current foreign policy. These perceptions were emphasised in the Society’s publication: like the quarterly journal Foreign Policy (Ulkopolitiikka-Utrikespolitik), whose main topic was international relations and the Finnish position. It might be of interest to mention that the journal with an English résumé, was regularly distributed to the largest industrial companies for representation purposes. In addition, the Finnish Institute of International Affairs was established so as to advance the research in the field of foreign affairs. Moreover, the Society focussed on work with younger people, which appeared to be of a similar importance.

Besides the Society’s engagement in the fields of the international affairs, the direction of which was evidently influenced by the statutes of the Society, there are few more points to be looked at. Firstly, the title of the society begs the question of what J.K. Paasikivi would have thought about such an institution bearing his name. Although the Society was following the ideas of Realpolitik defined by Paasikivi after the war, the dimension of the political involvement of the cultural elite might be questioned. Moreover, it might be asked whether the foundations of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line were laid with the establishment of the Society.

In this connection, the Paasikivi Society illustrates the political involvement of the cultural elite, which seems to have increased by the end of the 1950s in comparison with the beginning of the decade. Both generations were more politically active, though indirectly, mainly exercising their influence by cultural and political propaganda. The close relationship between the State-University nexus was thus emphasised.

What is important to observe is the character of ‘the post-war propaganda’, as it has been called above. It is worth making the comparison between the Cultural Fund and Paasikivi Society. The Studia Generalia and ‘discussion days’, taken as examples,
were organised by the Cultural Fund to uphold the national self-esteem. In contrast, the lectures stages by the Paasikivi Society served as a back-up for the Realpolitik. What does this mean in terms of the post-war adaptability discussed earlier? The Cultural Fund represented the ‘inner adaptation’, the national identity; the Paasikivi Society’s programme spoke for the ‘public adaptation’, the post-war political realism. The perplexity is that both adaptations were carried out by the same people.

Like the Finnish Cultural Fund, the Paasikivi Society provides an example of the interrelation of the cultural, political and industrial circles. People involved in the Finnish Cultural Fund were also active in the Paasikivi Society, or their engagements were interrelated. For example, Puntila was involved in both platforms; and, Lauri Aho, who was the chairman of the Gummerus publishing company, was one of the main sponsors of the Cultural Fund, and also a member of the Paasikivi Society.

Moreover, the industrial circles were greatly involved in the Paasikivi Society, financially supporting the Society’s activities. Juuso Walden regularly contributed, similarly, Heikki Herlin, the director of the Kone company who, certainly under influence of his relative Kustaa Vilkuna, financially contributed to the establishment of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. Besides that, the Society organised various discussions, the themes of which were often connected with Finnish foreign trade. The industrial circles participated more or less actively in such evenings. To what extent the industrial-banking elite participated in other political and social activities will be analysed in the following chapter.

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676 E.g., in 1959, one discussion was devoted to the issue of Finnish foreign trade with Eastern Europe. Halsti (1975:79) provided the example of Finnish negotiations on the EFTA agreement to justify the importance of the Paasikivi Society stalwart interest in promoting successful Finnish-Soviet relationships.
5. THE INDUSTRIAL-BANKING ELITE: ITS ADAPTABILITY AND INFLUENCE

The second theme of my thesis will be discussed in this chapter: the industrial-banking elite in Finland during the first post-war period. The industrial-banking elite will, to a certain extent, be compared and contrasted to the cultural elite, especially in relation to their process of adaptability to the post-war situation and their acceptance of the post-war political circumstances.

Firstly, the 1950s will be analysed in the context of the post-war economic recovery. The specific importance of the international economic institutions will be pointed out with an emphasis on the process of integration in Finland and its impact on economic development. Secondly, the members of the industrial-banking elite will be scrutinised from the perspective of their recruitment into the elite and their involvement in the domestic and international affairs. Thirdly, focus will be placed on advances in the educational sphere, particularly considering to what extent business education was becoming an important part of the process of recruitment into the elite and what kind of educational background the analysed industrial-banking elite had.

Subsequently, a brief picture of the banking sector, including the two main Finnish commercial banks, will be provided. The involvement of the industrial-banking elite in political negotiations and its support for economic integration will be explored. Finally, a brief overview should reveal to what extent economic theory and economic history was researched in Finland, and to what extent any crossover between the industrial and cultural elites existed. In other words, to what extent the cultural elite was interested in economic issues and vice versa will be considered, looking at the financial contributions made by industrialists to the cultural institutions.

As has already been noted, the subject of the elite in general has not been widely researched within the Finnish context, and this is even more true of the industrial-banking elite. One of the recently published dissertations which should be mentioned in

677 Aron 1954:162.
this context has been written by Susanna Fellman. Fellman’s thesis focuses on the educational and career background of Finnish industrial managers during the period 1900-1975. The developments in the area of business education has also been the topic of research by Karl-Erik Michelsen, whose book about the history of the School of Economics and Business Administration has recently been published. Michelsen’s book about the advancements of engineering in Finland is also of interest. In addition, there exist relatively large numbers of publications regarding the history of particular industrial enterprises, such as books by Markku Kuisma and Jorma Ahvenainen. Besides these, economic periodicals such as Talouselämä (Economic Life), Kauppalehti (Finnish Commercial Daily) and Finnish Paper and Timber were also of use in my research.

Michelsen 1999.
5.1 The importance of economic institutions and post-war economic integration

It might be argued that the post-war decade experienced two varied developments. Firstly, during the 1950s, an intensive political development took place, characterised by the ideological struggle between two worlds which were engaged in constant political and military competition. Secondly, the post-war period was also significant for a huge economic transition and rapid economic growth. That this period was indeed underlined by extraordinary economic acceleration might well be illustrated in the definition of the period 1945-1973, which is often referred to by historians and economists as the Golden Age. Nicholas Crafts and Gianni Toniolo point out that the period between 1950 and 1973 was "truly exceptional in the process of modern economic growth" as near-full employment was achieved and both growth rates and cyclical stability meant that this period could be described as unique in the economic history of Europe.

With such exceptional development, it is worth raising the question of how the post-war period came to experience such a transition and what the causes were. Although various interpretations exist about the causes of the enormous economic expansion, Crafts and Toniolo insist that most explanations are unsatisfactory. However, common agreement might be found on the point that the atypical speed and stability of European economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s was possibly due to the equally remarkable circumstances. Three factors might be pointed out, in accordance with the views of Crafts and Toniolo, concerning the main trends in post-war European growth.

681 E.g., Kuisma 1985 and Ahvenainen 1972.
682 E.g., Hobsbawn 1994:8, Crafts 1996:3 and Armstrong 1991:118. Armstrong speaks of the fifties and sixties as capitalism's golden age. Hobsbawn refers to the period between 1947-1973 as the Golden Age, Crafts to the period between 1950-1973. This definition is mainly considered from an economic point of view, which emphasises prosperity, and not from a political point of view, as this period cannot be considered 'golden' given the Cold War atmosphere. Furthermore, the term Golden Age is applicable differently to every country. E.g., in France the Golden Age is defined as the period between 1958-1973 (Sicsic 1996:211). On the Eastern side of the Iron Curtain, such definition does not have the same validity as in the West, although economic growth also occurred there.
Firstly, there was the impact of the inter-war period, which was characterised by growing nationalism and slow and uneven economic growth. During the 1920s and 1930s, Europe did not undergo any major economic acceleration. This may partly be explained by ill-advised international co-operation after the First World War, which did not reach its intended goals in terms of broader international co-operation. The Versailles Treaty nullified the trade agreements with Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria, which hardened opening up broader foreign trade. Furthermore, the increase of nationalism which was indicative of that period, only created more difficulties for opening up national markets to international trade when political intentions won over business affairs.

Crafts and Toniolo follow the approach of the economist Simon Kuznets and argue that the major wars “coincide with a considerable slowdown in European growth between 1913 and 1950, plausibly not unrelated to the boom the following two decades.” To put it simply, the two post-war decades were expected to be fruitful in terms of the so-called Kuznets cycle. However, any theoretical expectations were indeed overwhelmed by the reality which was strongly affected by the war events.

The second major reason for such exceptional economic development was, without any doubt, the extraordinary events of the Second World War. The war disrupted normal peacetime economic velocity, and thus the following period offered closer concentration on post-war reconstruction, which was inevitable. Most countries had already reached their pre-war economic level a few years after peace occurred. The demand for fast recovery and for the elimination of the scarcity of food, which was the result of the war, also influenced the behaviour of people who were tired of the perpetual lack of goods. From this perspective, the post-war decades was a period when

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687 Crafts 1996:1. The situation was different in the United States, where the economy grew at a faster pace than in Europe during the same period (Crafts 1996:20).
688 Hjerppe 1993:62. Maddison 1989:51-56. Although, the League of Nations established after the First World War promoted international co-operation, and indeed reached a few important political arrangements, it failed to achieve agreements in disputes when major powers were involved; e.g., during the Munich Agreement in 1938 (Townson 2001:295-296).
690 Eichengreen 1996:64.
691 Crafts 1996:4. E.g., Denmark recovered its highest pre-war level by 1946, Germany by 1951, and Finland by 1945.
an attempt was made to promote investment and responsible behaviour by workers who were encouraged to agree on wage restraint\textsuperscript{692}.

In some countries, like Finland for example, the post-war restoration was even hastened by the war reparations which functioned as a force for maintaining deadlines, along with the national pride at being able to maintain regular deliveries. Thus, it might be argued that a hard work-minded atmosphere was created which, in the Finnish context, responded to the political atmosphere of the period. The cautious political awareness did not allow for cheerful idealism and illusions but created a platform of harsh economic and political realities.

The so-called Golden Age also witnessed an improvement in the field of technology which streamlined the working process and increased productivity. Such progress required an educated and disciplined workforce which could benefit from it\textsuperscript{693}. These factors contributed not only to rapid economic development but also resulted in the achievement of an affluent society by the first half of the 1960s, when workers began to enjoy more leisure time, and more of the workforce was engaged in the service industry.

The war also had an impact on the settlement of international institutional arrangements, which might be considered, in Crafts and Toniolo’s view, as the third factor to buttress post-war growth. European countries had learnt a lesson from the situation which occurred after the First World War, when “the unwise outcome of the Versailles Peace Conference”\textsuperscript{694} could not sustain economic co-operation as large trade restrictions became obstacles\textsuperscript{695}. To avoid a similar miscalculation, the United States and European powers agreed to create international institutions which, according to Eichengreen, were created to

co-ordinate national programmes of economic restructuring along export-oriented lines, and to lend credibility to European governments’ commitment to openness. This encouraged countries to restructure their economies and to exploit more fully

\textsuperscript{692} Crafts 1996:579. Crafts refers to Eichengreen’s (1996:45-46) suggestions about the causes of the rapid economic development, and he uses the examples of the Netherlands and Sweden, where domestic agreement was reached on the issue of wage restraint by contrast with the United Kingdom.

\textsuperscript{693} Crafts 1996:23. Crafts put great emphasis on an educated and disciplined workforce which was, in his opinion, one of the essential causes of rapid economic development.

\textsuperscript{694} Crafts 1996:22. Crafts refers to the opinions of Maier (1987), who paid close attention to the connection between the post-war settlement and the establishment of economic co-operation after the Second World War.

\textsuperscript{695} Armstrong 1991:6.
their comparative advantages, enhancing the productivity and profitability of investment\textsuperscript{696}.

The economic institutions and monetary organisations assisted with the opening up of national markets to international trade, and inter-European trade allowed countries involved in the economic programmes to rely on cheap foreign supplies of raw materials\textsuperscript{697}. Their creation was enhanced by the general atmosphere of the post-war period, when France especially was active in establishing a common European market and pursued the abolition of protection in trade\textsuperscript{698}.

That the institutional arrangements and economic aid programmes also incorporated more than economic dimensions is the other side of the coin. Most of the European institutional arrangements were “tailored to Europe’s special economic and security needs”\textsuperscript{699}, which were not only influenced by the experience after 1918 as Eichengreen claims, but also by the post-war disposition in 1945. The economic arrangement in Europe, starting with the Marshall Plan and ending with the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, assisted in the ideological division of Europe which was the result of post-war political arrangements\textsuperscript{700}. The participation in economic structures which were settled by the Western powers was clearly associated with ‘membership’ on the Western side of the Iron Curtain, even if it was connected with military aims\textsuperscript{701}. For that reason, it appeared to be more significant for a country located on the ‘edge’, like, for example, Finland, to integrate with European institutions. Besides a large economic impact, integration also had fundamental political relevance.

The institutional arrangements which are important in the context of this research are: the Marshall Plan, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the Bretton Woods system, the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Although it is not the task

\textsuperscript{696} Eichengreen 1996:41.
\textsuperscript{697} Eichengreen 1996:45.
\textsuperscript{698}Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet are the two names most often mentioned in relation to post-war European integrity (Seppinen 1997:37). The conception of the Schuman plan inspired the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. The major topic was the integration of post-war Germany into the international organisations and hence the necessity to reinforce the West German economy.
\textsuperscript{699} Eichengreen 1996:56.
\textsuperscript{700} Hobsbawm 1994:274. Hobsbawm claims that institutions such as the World Bank (lately the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) de facto became subordinated to US policy.
\textsuperscript{701} This was, for example, the case of Finland, when the Soviet Union associated the integration of Finland within Western European organisations with Finnish desire for membership of NATO.
here to give a detailed account of the significance and role of these organisations, it might be of use briefly to summarise their tasks.

The Marshall Plan, known also as the European Recovery Programme (1947), is an example of economic aid from the United States to Europe which has been widely analysed in almost every historical source concerning post-war development. Whether it is looked at from a political or an economic point of view, the fact is that it was, without any exaggeration, a great economic push for the Western European countries which suffered and were destroyed by the war. France, Germany and Austria especially profited from it. In connection with the allocation and co-ordination of the European Recovery Programme, the OEEC (in 1961 it became known as the OECD) was founded in 1948. Its task has been to support economic growth and high employment with financial stability.

Although the GATT agreement came into operation in 1948, it ended up being more modest than the proposed International Trade Organisation. It contributed to international tariff bargains and helped to restrain conflicts between regional and global trade liberalisation. The Bretton Woods system, named after the place where an international conference was held in 1944 in the USA, served to solve problems regarding international payments. The International Monetary Fund was part of the Bretton Woods system and pegged exchange rates.

EFTA was established in 1959 and eliminated import duties on goods originating in member countries. In comparison with the Treaty of Rome in 1957, EFTA was a free trade area, not a custom union, within which no external joint tariff was envisaged. EFTA will be discussed in more detail in the following section as Finnish integration turned out to be one of the key events in Finland by the end of the 1950s.

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702 Hobsbawm 1994:275. Regarding the situation in the UK, through the recovery programme the United Kingdom received loans up to £1.5 billion between 1948 and 1950 (Bannock 1998:266).
703 Munkki 1978:67.
705 Eichengreen 1996:56.
706 The EFTA establishing members were the United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Portugal and Switzerland. The Treaty of Rome was signed by France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.
5.1.1 The post-war economic situation in Finland and the importance of integration

In terms of post-war economic recovery and the subsequent economic boom during the two post-war decades, Finland was no exception within the European context. During the so-called Golden Age, Finland developed from a society with a large number of people involved in agriculture into a highly developed country with advanced technology. The rapid economic growth, which began in the 1950s, and its visible impacts occurred a decade later, is often labelled the ‘Finnish miracle’ for its character.

Even if this study is not concerned directly with Finnish economic development, its causes and impacts on post-war society, it might be useful to look a little more at the reasons for the rapid economic acceleration during the first post-war decade. Following the opinions of Crafts and Toniolo on the causes of post-war economic expansion, three factors should be outlined: the economic situation in the inter-war period; the exceptional event of the war itself and its impact on the national economy; and Finland’s integration into institutional arrangements.

Finland, like the rest of Europe in the period of the 1920s and 1930s, was hit by a wave of nationalism which influenced not only the political and cultural atmosphere of Finnish society but also the country’s economic growth. According to Markku Kuisma, the process of establishing Finland’s economic future in the 1920s went hand-in-hand with the development of economic nationalism. Independent Finland, as Kuisma continues, organised a national fight for “survival against the threat of Soviet Russia as well as Western multinational big business”.

The first, ‘the survival against Soviet Russia’, was reflected in mutual trade, which *de facto* ceased to exist. Finnish foreign trade had to be established at the official level during the first years of independence, as until then any independent economic policies were almost non-existent on Finnish territory. Between 1918 and 1921, the trade balance with the Soviet Union decreased from 27 per cent to 0.5 per cent in comparison with the first decade of the twentieth century. Such change in mutual trade

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707 In 1952, K.O. Alho (1952:275-279) published an article about the main features of economic development in Finland after the Second World War. He pointed out the importance of the war, and especially war reparations.
709 Pihkala 1978:10-12. Pihkala pointed out the significance of the years 1918-1921, when the major bilateral agreements were signed, and foreign trade was liberalised. Singleton 1989:34, 49.
trade was certainly influenced by the political atmosphere\textsuperscript{711}, the pervasive anti-Russian mood which also affected Finnish-Soviet trade.

The loss of the Russian market had to be replaced by other international connections and therefore Finland strengthened its trade agreements from the pre-independent period. Great Britain, which was always an important partner of the Finnish paper industry, took the leading position in Finnish export policy\textsuperscript{712}. In terms of imports, Germany played the most decisive role, and continued to do so until 1944, when Finland was almost fully dependent on German supplies.

The second point made by Kuisma about the nationalistic fight 'against the Western businesses' does not completely apply to the actions taken by the industrial circles. Although during the inter-war period the policy of protectionism within the export trade threatened export achievements\textsuperscript{713}, the major industrialists vigilantly followed international economic trends\textsuperscript{714}. And even if a few leading industrialists opposed foreign economic expansion, many were aware of the necessity to establish subsidiary Finnish companies abroad to strengthen their investments. At the beginning of the thirties, for the first time in history, the Finnish paper mill company Kymmene expanded outside Finnish territory purchasing a majority shareholding in the Star Paper Mill Company in Great Britain\textsuperscript{715}.

When comparing the inter-war economic situation in Finland with the rest of Europe, it has to be mentioned that the economic crisis of the late 1920s hit Finland less dramatically than the rest of Europe\textsuperscript{716}. Even if under the effect of the economic difficulties of the first post-war years, which depressed the world economy, Finnish industry underwent consequential economic growth, especially in terms of industrial development. During the inter-war period, the 1930s saw milling and large-scale pulp and paper manufacturing become modernised and work more effectively\textsuperscript{717}. However,

\textsuperscript{711} Singleton 1989:56. Singleton pointed out the catastrophic impact of the loss of the Russian grain imports, when, as a result, many Finns faced hunger and malnutrition immediately after the war (Singleton 1989:34).

\textsuperscript{712} Singleton 1989:60. The statistics are taken from Itsenäisen Suomen taloushistoria III 1982:236.

\textsuperscript{713} The policy of protectionism applied mainly during the 1930s, when the economic crisis deepened (Pihkala 1978:25).

\textsuperscript{714} According to Nordberg (1982:24), Rudolf Walden was one of the industrialists in the 1920s who were constantly interested in international economic trends.

\textsuperscript{715} Ahvenainen 1976:5.

\textsuperscript{716} Singleton 1989:35.

\textsuperscript{717} E.g., in 1920 pulp mills produced a total of 180,000 tons of pulp. Ten years later, the figure was almost four times larger and in 1937 the figure exceeded 1.5 million tons (Nordenswan 1961:145). Furthermore, Kuisma (1997:419) claims that the saw milling and the pulp and paper industries became the key to Finnish success in modern industrial capitalism during the 1920s.
the war interrupted economic developments, and Finland remained an underdeveloped country compared with the rest of Europe, with a prevailing agrarian character. The country had to wait until the war was over for the situation to alter in order for further economic advancements to occur. After the war, the inter-war nationalism gave way to the necessity for economic and political reconciliation, which influenced the direction of economic developments.

The war, as Crafts and Toniolo indicated, was one of the most important factors which affected post-war economic expansion. Finland with its status of a defeated country, by losing its war with the Soviet Union, was one of the countries whose economic growth was bound by war reparations. Under the Paris Peace Treaty, Finland was obliged to deliver to the Soviet Union goods to the value of 227 million US dollars. The war reparations became the crucial challenge to the post-war Finnish economy. They placed the Finnish industrial sector under a heavy strain. Paying the reparations off contributed to the rapid revitalisation of Finnish heavy industry, especially the metals industry, which led to the instant modernisation of machinery and equipment. In addition, companies like Wärtsilä established trade relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of the war reparations.

Moreover, it can be argued that the war reparations had a positive influence on the post-war development of Finnish-Soviet relations. Martti Häikiö has noted that, as the Soviet Union was dependent on regular deliveries of Finnish reparations, Stalin and his Communist comrades were not interested in supporting any strikes or political demonstrations in Finland that might delay the deliveries.

Another important factor influencing the development of the Finnish economy as part of the impact of war events was the resettlement of a large number of Karelian refugees (around 400,000), who had moved out of that part of Finland which had been ceded to the Soviet Union in 1944. In order to maintain peaceful social development and to avoid social unrest as the popularity of the Communist Party increased, the Land

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718 For further details on the war reparations see, e.g., Nykopp 1984; Singleton 1989:66-68.


720 The general director of Wärtsilä, Wilhelm Wahlforss, even took an active part in the negotiations pertaining to the cost and delivery of the goods to be used to pay.

721 This statement is based on the lecture Finnish Foreign Policy given by Martti Häikiö at the University of Helsinki in the spring semester, 1997. The war reparations, of which a huge amount was paid in 1952 when the last goods train left for the Soviet Union, besides their economic and political importance, also had an influence on Finnish self-esteem. For Finns, paying off on time was a question of national pride, and later the ability to pay off war reparations in full turned out to be one of Finland’s favourite arguments in support of Finnish financial credibility.
Acquisition Act was accepted\textsuperscript{722}. Alestalo has reported that 100,000 new holdings were created as a result of this regulation to meet the needs not only of refugees but also of front-line war veterans and invalids. Such an act led to an increase in the number of farms in Finland during the 1950s\textsuperscript{723}.

This was in sharp contrast to economic development in the rest of Europe at that time, where industrialisation started immediately after the Second World War on both sides of a divided Europe. Although these and other wide-ranging measures impacted for many years and acted to some extent as millstones which retarded the industrial development of the post-war Finnish economy\textsuperscript{724}, growth was nevertheless greater than during any preceding period\textsuperscript{725}.

The impact of the war was also reflected in the development of the export trade. During the war, the export industry suffered large losses. However, already by 1948-1949 export industry production had reached the level of 1938\textsuperscript{726}. During the post-war period, the sawmill industry represented the most important export branch until the middle of the 1950s, when the pulp industry assumed a leading position. Finnish paper manufacturing enjoyed a 12 per cent share of world production during the first post-war decade, with the United States and West Germany being its largest customers\textsuperscript{727}. Furthermore, shipbuilding and the construction of icebreakers became key export industries after the Second World War, particularly in connection with Soviet trade and war reparations\textsuperscript{728}.

The importance of trade between Finland and the Soviet Union increased after the war. Until then Finnish industrialists were not very keen on maintaining the trade arrangements with Russian, either for the inter-war nationalistic barriers or newly established bureaucratic permissions. Although the situation changed during the so-called NEP period, when Finns became increasingly eager to obtain economic

\textsuperscript{723} Alestalo 1986:65.
\textsuperscript{724} Hjerpe 1989:51.
\textsuperscript{725} The matter of refugees after the war was not only an issue for Finland, other countries experienced similar problems. Germany took in more than thirteen million of its citizens expelled from parts of Germany annexed by Poland, Czechoslovakia, the USSR, and south-eastern Europe (Hobsbawm 1994:51).
\textsuperscript{726} Laurila 1952:283.
\textsuperscript{727} Hjerpe 1982:421.
\textsuperscript{728} Hjerpe 1979:176. The largest Finnish industrial enterprises in 1949 were Wärtsilä (mainly shipbuilding industry), the State Metal Factories (later Valsmet), Ahlström (saw milling) and Enso-Gutzeit (wood and paper industries).
concessions\textsuperscript{729}, a mutual inter-war trade balance was almost non-existing. On the contrary, during the post-war period the trade figures reached around 12 per cent (for volume), depending on the period. Mutual trade was based on five-year framework agreements, the first signed in 1950, similar to the trade regime between the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe\textsuperscript{730}.

Besides the Soviet Union, Finland's largest export partners during the 1950s were Great Britain (22 per cent) and West Germany (over 10 per cent), with whom exports in 1948 had been practically non-existent\textsuperscript{731}. A similar trend can be seen in imports, with the exception of Sweden. Even if Swedish imports accounted for only 5 per cent of the total at the beginning of the 1950s, they had risen significantly in importance by the end of the 1950s. German imports decreased radically in comparison with the situation during the war, while imports from the Soviet Union increased\textsuperscript{732}.

The expansion of foreign trade and thus the rapid growth of the post-war Finnish economy was also influenced by the lifting of economic policy regulations, which lasted until 1957 when a liberalisation of foreign trade began. The Finnish economist Erkki Pihkala has divided the 1950s into two phases: from 1945 until 1957 when the regulated economy came to an end, and from 1958 with the deregulation of Finnish foreign trade and the first stages of Finland's integration into Western European organisations\textsuperscript{733}.

In Riitta Hjerpe's view, the deregulation of foreign trade was of crucial importance in the developing market for consumer goods and it allowed Finland to replace its worn-out machinery and equipment at the same time\textsuperscript{734}. In addition, as Maude claims, the liberalisation of import restrictions testified that Finland's export

\textsuperscript{729} Hjerpe 1993:62.
\textsuperscript{730} Singleton 1989:78. Paavonen 1998:308, 314. Meinander 1999:300. The comparison between balance of trade of Finland and the rest of the Eastern bloc has often appeared in Finnish economic literature. Paavonen (1991:14) emphasised the clear differences, which lay in the Finland's foreign trade with the West, which most of Eastern European countries missed. Furthermore, during the 1950s, the Finnish economic interests were also commonly discussed in the foreign press, like, e.g., Business Week, January 29, 1955.
\textsuperscript{732} To be more explicit about the Finnish export partners, e.g., in 1953 the biggest buyers in the plywood industry were Great Britain, the USA, the Netherlands, and West Germany. The biggest buyers in sawn softwood were Great Britain, the USSR, and the Netherlands. A similar situation also occurred in 1955 (Paperi ja Puu 1954, #4; 1956, #4).
\textsuperscript{733} Pihkala 1982:370. Another division of the 1950s by Pihkala might be considered as follows: until 1952, when the Finnish economy was trying to return to pre-war conditions and developing industry to meet reparations demands; and from 1952 to 1961, marking the development of Finland's post-war export trade until the special agreement with EFTA in 1961 (quoted from Maude 1976:96).
\textsuperscript{734} Hjerpe 1989:142.
The integration within institutional arrangements was, as Crafts and Toniolo claim above, a crucial element for economic growth. There are two essential points which should be mentioned given the matter of Finnish integration. Firstly, partly an economic implication: being part of Western economic institutions held a political significance for Finland; it meant being a part of Western Europe. Secondly, the situation pertaining to economic organisations and international economic help was more or less constrained by the political situation of the post-war decade in Finland. Finnish economic integration was confused by the Soviet Union with possible Western military engagement, which aroused a large wave of disapproval on the Soviet side as such an involvement would threaten Soviet security. This was especially the case with the Finnish desire to join EFTA at the end of the 1950s. However, Finland was already under political pressure regarding international structures immediately after the war, when the country was forced to reject participation in the Marshall Plan in 1947 in accordance with President Paasikivi’s Realpolitik, though the business circles wanted to participate in the Plan.

Although the most widely discussed form of Finnish integration was the process of joining EFTA in 1961, which is analysed in greater detail in the work of Jukka Seppinen, it is worth considering other organisations in which Finland was involved after the war. These organisations are sometimes in the shadow of the EFTA agreement. In 1948, Finland became a member of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and was thus associated with the Bretton Woods monetary system. Two years later, Finland joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT, which C.-E. Olin, general manager of the Federation of Finnish Industries (Suomen Teollisuusliitto), saw as an important step in opening up Finland to

(Maude’s italics) industry was capable of seizing the opportunities that participation in a freer economic system allowed.

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737 Maude (31.05.2001, Turku). Hanhimäki (1998:121) claims that even though Finland did not accept the Marshall Plan, its situation differed from other Eastern European countries as Finland could count on receiving economic assistance from the USA, which reflected the American desire to keep the country free from political complications.
738 Seppinen 1997. Using the British, French, Swedish and Russian archives, Seppinen very accurately outlined the political difficulties over Finland’s integration into EFTA.
739 Rantanen (1998:13-21) criticises the lack of literature concerning the Finland’s integration process. In his view, too much attention has been devoted to the EFTA process, and Finland’s engagement in GATT, and the International Bank has been overlooked.
foreign trade\textsuperscript{740}. In 1956, Finland became a member of the Nordic Council, which encouraged Finland’s partnership with the rest of the Nordic countries.

When in 1957 Finland showed an interest in participating in the OEEC organisation, the political crisis between Finland and the Soviet Union occurring at the same time made such attempt impossible. The Soviet Union suspected that Finland’s participation in an organisation whose countries were involved in NATO would threaten Soviet security and thus opposed Finland’s OEEC membership. However, representatives of Finnish industrial circles were at least permitted to be observers during meetings concerning the pulp and paper industries and the so-called Helsinki Club agreement signed in 1957 between Finland and the OEEC countries slowly moved Finland closer to broader international co-operation\textsuperscript{741}.

Finland’s participation in EFTA was widely discussed within Finnish society by the end of the 1950s. The matter of integration within EFTA, with its economic benefits for Finland, was a topic often addressed in economic periodicals, where the advantages of Finnish involvement in international structures were pointed out. This was especially so from the point of view of the paper, saw mill and metal industries, whose directors were strongly supportive\textsuperscript{742}. There existed a clear perception that the exclusion of Finland from Western European economic structures like EFTA, would leave Finland out of the Western trade market and thus fully dependent on the Soviet Union\textsuperscript{743}. This would not only limit business investments but also the political position of Finland.

It might be argued that Finland was lucky in the face of bad luck. With the establishment of EFTA in 1959 in Stockholm as a counterpart to the ‘Six’, whose agreement was declared by the Treaty of Rome of 1957, Finland had the chance to integrate and to stay within Western economic arrangements\textsuperscript{744}. However, economic integration was complicated by the political situation and Finnish economic engagement with the Soviet Union. By 1961, arbitration on both sides led to a successful conclusion,
and in July a special agreement, FINEFTA, was created. This agreement suited Finnish economic and political needs and did not disturb Soviet trade relations with Finland. A closer look at the possible causes of the rapid economic growth might facilitate a better understanding of the whole post-war period. Even if the 1950s is sometimes underestimated in terms of economic development, it was the decade when the transition to an affluent Finnish society started. During the 1950s, integration within international economic structures began, and by the beginning of the 1960s it was successfully completed. All this was not only underlined by the political negotiations on both sides of the Iron Curtain, but also by the strong support of the industrial-banking circles, whose support was essential, particularly in Finnish accommodation to Western economic structures.

745 Seppinen (1997) deals in greater detail and very accurately with the whole negotiation process pertaining to EFTA and its political consequences for Finland. The situation was complicated as President Kekkonen tried on the one hand to maintain good Western relations, and on the other hand to preserve Soviet support. Seppinen also underlines the importance of Sweden, which strongly backed the Finnish integration process. Seppinen (1997:250) also brings up the secret agreement which was signed between the Soviet Union and Finland, in which Finland granted EFTA benefits to the Soviet Union. Integration within EFTA was also connected with the political crisis involving the presidential election in 1961, known as the Note Crisis (Seppinen 1997:313-314). For further details see Munkki 1978:59-86.
5.2 The industrial-banking elite

The members of the industrial-banking elite will be analysed from the perspective of their recruitment by outlining the decisive factors which influenced this process. Their international connections will be contrasted with their patriotic involvement; and the question raised whether businessmen share a similar responsibility to that assumed by intellectuals. However, before looking at the industrial-banking elite of the 1950s, it might be of interest to devote brief attention to the three historical phases which distinguished recruitment into the industrial circles. Such an account will facilitate an understanding of the structure and function of the Finnish industrial circles, and will further contribute to comprehension of their commitments in business and to social activities during the 1950s.

The first phase might be the 1880s, when it is perhaps more accurate to talk about entrepreneurs, men who established their businesses and on whose legacy their successors continued. In those times, recruitment into the elite was very complicated for an outsider, as recruitment was done from a thin social level and on the basis of family background and close social connections. As Kuisma points out, most Swedish-speaking industrialists who dominated the circle of that period, were 'Finns' who were originally assimilated Germans, Swedes, Scots or Norwegians, some of them from families living within the territory of Finland only for a short period. Families such as Rosenlew, Serlachius, Björkenheim or Ahlström, and their companies, mostly involved in the wood processing industry, were among the most prosperous and well established. During the 1880s, their economic position within the Finnish industrial circles was even improved, as that period witnessed the first larger industrialisation occurring in the territory of Finland.

At the turn of the century, the situation changed slightly in terms of recruitment. As a result of the Finnish nationalist movement, the first Finnish Bank, KOP, was established in 1889, together with the Finnish insurance company Pohjola two years

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746 Kuisma 1993:54.
747 Kuisma 1991:273. E.g., Carl Frederik Rosenlew was of German noble origin. It was his son, born in Finland, who started to succeed in business. James Finlayson was Scottish, and came to Finland via Saint Petersburg, and established the Finlayson textile factory in Tampere. These entrepreneurs lived only briefly in Finland before establishing their businesses. John Friedrich Hackman, on the other hand, had already come to Viipuri from Germany by 1777 (Alho 1961).
748 Kuisma 1993:53. Michelsen (1999:172) considers Walter Ahlström, Gösta Serlachius and Gösta Björkenheim to be the first modern industrialists in Finland.
later. Such developments facilitated the widening of the industrial-banking elite for Finnish-speaking Finns⁷⁴⁹. At this point, recruitment into the elite was widened, especially with larger opportunities for men of agrarian origins (*talonpoika*) who might, by taking advantage of that period, become new entrepreneurs⁷⁵⁰. With the growing economic developments, the bonds between established Swedish-speaking industrialists and aristocratic officials (*virkaaristokrati*), who, until then had uniquely created the core of the industrial-banking elite, broke down and opportunities were, partly, unblocked for Finnish-speaking Finns⁷⁵¹.

The third phase significant for recruitment into the elite might be considered to be the inter-war period. Besides slow but remarkable advances in manufacturing technologies such as a greater use of electricity, the inter-war period was marked by strong Finnish nationalism, which was also reflected in the industrial circles⁷⁵². The agenda of Gösta Serlachius, who stood for opening up the market to foreign trade and negotiated with British industrialists, as he himself was one of the assimilated ‘Finns’, was often received with mixed feelings. A few industrialists, particularly those like Rudolf Walden, who were recruited into the elite at the turn of the century, argued that Finnish industry belonged only in Finnish hands⁷⁵³. Such patriotic aims were well met in 1918, when a large part of the wood processing company Enso-Gutzeit, established by a Norwegian industrialist in 1872, was bought by the Finnish State⁷⁵⁴. Markku Kuisma argues that as a state company, Enso-Gutzeit was supposed to become a counterpart to the privately owned companies of Swedish-speakers and thus the Finnish-speaking financial circles (KOP) could extend their economic influence. Besides the economic benefits to the State, as Kuisma continues, it should have brought new opportunities for Finnish-speaking Finns, and especially for those from the middle class, to be recruited into the industrial elite and thereby participate more in economic developments⁷⁵⁵.

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⁷⁴⁹ Kuisma 1991:276. More will be said about the KOP bank in Section 5.3.
⁷⁵⁰ Uusitalo (1972:204) claims that at the beginning of the twentieth century, many businessmen had agrarian or working class origins.
⁷⁵¹ Kuisma 1993:95.
⁷⁵⁵ Kuisma 1991:279-280. Behind the upholding of the ideology of the state companies, and hence the broadening opportunities for the Finnish middle class, stood Yrjö Ruutu, one of the most active members of the Academic Karelia Society. Yrjö Ruutu has already been mentioned in the context of this study in relation to the development of political science in the 1920s.
Such a trend continued through the 1930s, when more state companies were created like, for example, the Outokumpu Company (mining). This fully satisfied Finnish nationalists, as a large part of the industry remained in Finnish hands under the close control of the State. Newly appointed directors of companies with State shareholdings forged a new industrial elite, who in the social ladder were situated somewhere between the group of State officials and the industrial entrepreneurs. As Kuisma notes, the difference between such directors was in their economic status, and the distinction between them and entrepreneurs lay in State economic support.

The economic structures built during the inter-war period, and the relations between industrial companies and the State, developed further during the post-war period, when the influence of the State on industry broadened with the changes in the political situation. Furthermore, the recruitment into the elite widened with the growing educational opportunities.

5.2.1 Recruitment into the elite

Family background, education and the essential social connections and links without which any recruitment would be impossible will be investigated in the hope of providing answers to questions such as who the analysed industrial elite consisted of, what their social background was and to what extent their further activities were influenced by their education and apprenticeship. Besides that, attention will be drawn to circulation within the elite, which is of significant importance, particularly for the industrial-banking elite whose circle comprised a very small group.

Excluding bank directors, there are two groups of people analysed in this study. Some were tied to their companies by their family background (inheritance or marriage) and their education was only a complement of their social status. Others were representative of the new industrial elite, as it is called above: directors of State companies, who obtained their posts on the basis of education, experience and essential social connections. Although the latter group does not include traditional entrepreneurs,

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757 Kuisma 1993:93. However, both the old family entrepreneurs and the state company directors were during their business careers awarded the title vuorineuvos, bergsråd (counsellor of industries), a very high and prestigious title.
758 Kuisma 1993:94.
its members still had a specific position during the 1950s, holding their post for a considerable length of time in comparison with their successors in the late 1960s.

Eljas Erkko, Jacob von Julin and Juuso Walden might be considered the entrepreneurs of the 1950s. Their recruitment into the elite was already foreshadowed by their family backgrounds. Erkko’s father, Eero Erkko (1860-1927), a newspaper proprietor and editor, established the Päivälehti (Daily Newspaper) in 1889. In 1904, after its prohibition by Russian officials, it became known as the Helsingin Sanomat, and became by far the largest and most influential Finnish newspaper. During the 1920s, Erkko worked in his father’s company as a member of the editorial board and, after the death of his father, automatically succeeded him.

Jacob von Julin and Juuso Walden acquired their positions in the same way. Jacob von Julin became the general director of the Kaukas Company after his father’s death in 1942. Julin’s family belonged to one of the oldest aristocratic families in Finland, who were for more than a hundred years involved in the metal industry. Julin’s social background is indeed colourful, and provides a good picture of the small industrial and cultural circles in Finland. As an example, it might be mentioned that Jacob von Julin’s grandfather was Albert von Julin (1846-1906), an uncle of Marshal Mannerheim, who enjoyed von Julin’s financial support during his studies. The family von Julin was also related to the Ehrnrooths, another influential aristocratic family.

The case of Juuso Walden is in a certain respect similar, even if the Waldens cannot boast a family history like the von Julins. Juuso’s father, Rudolf Walden (1878-1946), is an example of a Finn who, at the beginning of the twentieth century, took advantage of the widening recruitment into the elite and became one of the leading figures of the Finnish wood processing industry. Rudolf Walden, who left the Army in 1902, became an office manager in Saint Petersburg for a Finnish company representing

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759 Tarmio 1998:330. The Sanoma Company, which publishes Helsingin Sanomat, has preserved its name, Sanoma Oy, until now and is based on shareholding principles.
762 Koste 1969:66-67. Maude 1995:136. Marshal Mannerheim’s father was Carl Robert Mannerheim and his mother Hélène von Julin. Without giving too many genealogical details, it should be mentioned that in 1894, Hugo Standertsjöld (1844-1931), bought the Kaukas company. His daughter, Elsa, married (Rolf) Jacob von Julin (whose father was an uncle of Mannerheim, Albert von Julin), the father of Jacob von Julin analysed in this study. His family owned the Fiskars company (est. 1649), the oldest industrial enterprise in Finnish territory.
763 The grandparents of Juuso Walden were Walfrid Walden, a county judge, and Mathilda Sommelius (Jutikkala 1989:264). Rudolf Walden’s wife, Juuso’s mother, came from Severus Konkola’s family.
industrial interests in Russia\textsuperscript{764}. Through such involvement, Walden became familiar with the Finnish business world, and as a capable entrepreneur, he established his own paper agency in 1912. Simpele Mills, from whom he bought the first shares was among his clients. After the tragic death in the Civil War of the successor of Myllykoski Mills, Björn Björnberg, whose business interests were also represented by Rudolf Walden in Russia, Walden was invited to become its managing director with one third of the share holding\textsuperscript{765}. In 1920, Walden established United Paper Mills Limited (\textit{Yhtyneet Paperitehtaat})\textsuperscript{766} where, after his resignation in 1940, Juuso Walden continued in the family tradition\textsuperscript{767}.

Although the recruitment of the bank directors analysed in this study was not based on the principles of inheritance, family background played a similarly consequential role. Göran Ehmrooth, who became the PYP bank’s director after Rainer von Fieandt left for a post in the Bank of Finland in 1955, had his origins in a very old Swedish-speaking aristocratic family, whose members were engaged in various social activities, including the army, diplomacy and industry\textsuperscript{768}. Through various marriage links, they were related with the von Julins, which enabled family interconnections between companies like Fiskars, Kaukas and Kymin\textsuperscript{769}. Carl Johan Ehmrooth (1898-1967), an older brother of Göran, inherited his position in the Kymi company. His first wife was Hélène Mannerheim, his cousin and relative of von Julins, who established the company. Göran Ehmrooth strengthened the family profile by his marriage to a sister of Jacob von Julin, Louise\textsuperscript{770}.

Matti Virkkunen’s marriage links to the daughter of Mauri Honkajuuri, who was the KOP director before Virkkunen, have already been mentioned above in Chapter 1. However, behind Virkkunen’s recruitment into the elite is hidden his own social profile. The roots of the Virkkunen family reached to the Snellmans and Forsmans, the main prophets of the Fennoman nationalistic movements in the nineteenth century\textsuperscript{771}. Matti

\textsuperscript{765} Tuuri 1999:212. The conflict between the Waldens and Björnbergs after the war, which led to the split of the company, will be mentioned later.
\textsuperscript{766} United Paper Mills Limited is nowadays known as \textit{UPM Kymmene}.
\textsuperscript{767} The marriage link between Juuso Walden and his wife, Tellervo Arvola, should be mentioned. Her mother’s origins were the Brander family (Paloheimo), and her brother (Tellervo’s uncle) was Heikki Brander (Paloheimo), engaged in the KOP bank.
\textsuperscript{768} Göran Ehmrooth 1991:9.
\textsuperscript{769} Koste 1969:68.
\textsuperscript{770} The Ehmrooth family was already related to the Mannerheim family, to whom von Julins was also related.
\textsuperscript{771} Jutikkala 1989:261.
Virkkunen's father, Paavo Virkkunen (1908-1959), a priest, politician and member of Parliament, was one of the most active supporters of Finnish patriotism and member of the cultural and political milieu in Finland during the first half of the twentieth century.

From the above, we can see that one of the most decisive factors in recruitment into the industrial-banking elite was family background and social connections. It might even be argued that the above analysed members were already *de facto* born members of the elite, and only circumstances decided which direction, whether cultural or industrial, they took. By very close observation, it can also be seen that the family links were even sometimes intertwined through further inter-marriages. Simply, it might be said that the analysed members came from well established families, perhaps with the slight exception of the Waldens, who built up their industrial domain only at the beginning of the twentieth century, and hence had suitable social conditions.

The recruitment into the elite of the two following members differs slightly from the rest. In the case of Wilhelm Wahlforss, an advantageous marriage rather than strong family connections (Wahlforss' father was a professor of chemistry), and, of course, the necessary luck, played a significant role in his recruitment. In 1917, Wahlforss married Siri Wrede, whose father, Baron Carolus Wrede (1860-1927), owned the Turku Iron Industry (*Turun Rautateollisuus*)\(^\text{772}\). Wahlforss became the managing director of the Wärtsilä Concern in 1926, after working for a few years for the Fiskars company where he became acquainted with Albert Lindsay von Julin, and also worked in the Lehtoniemi factory, which belonged to his father-in-law.

It should be noted that during the 1950s, the Wärtsilä Concern consisted of eleven affiliated factories. In addition to the Wärtsilä sawmills, the original enterprise established in 1834, the affiliated factories included the Crichton-Vulcan shipyard in Turku, the Kone Company and the porcelain factory, Arabia\(^\text{773}\). Despite various merchandise, basically it might be claimed that the main production of the concern was related to shipbuilding, wood-processing machinery and diesel machines.

William Lehtinen was one of the members of the 'new industrial elite' created during the 1920s by the formation of State companies, as has been described above. Lehtinen's recruitment into the elite was more or less based on his education in forestry,

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\(^\text{772}\) Koste 1969:77. The Wrede family was landed nobility in industry, a family of Baltic origin from the seventeenth century. Carolus Wrede's uncle was Carl Armfelt, who owned the Turun Tellakkat, an industrial company in Turku.

\(^\text{773}\) Singleton 1989:53. The Wärtsilä Concern was declared bankrupt in 1989, and affiliated factories were sold to various owners, like Arabia to the Swedish company, Rörstrand-Gustavsberg Hackman.
and his extensive foreign experience, mainly in the USA. Therefore, after working for fifteen years at Enso-Gutzeit\(^{774}\), he became the managing director. Furthermore, Lehtinen's election was also influenced by post-war political circumstances. His predecessor, V.A. Kotilainen (1887-1959), was unable to take up his position due to his war engagement in the East-Karelia military government, for which Kotilainen was afraid that he could be put on war trial\(^{775}\).

In general, during the inter-war period, education was gaining importance in relation to recruitment into the elite, and yet a significant change occurred after the war, when the emphasis on business and administration education was strengthened. As has been noted above, in this study case, the possession of a certain educational background particularly influenced the future careers of Wahlforss and Lehtinen. However, looking at the education of the rest of the analysed elite during the period under scrutiny, one notes that they had generally studied during the first thirty years of the twentieth century, and were well educated. Furthermore, most of them studied abroad and received an apprenticeship in foreign companies or worked for a short time in Finnish Embassies as economic assistants. This was, however, not exceptional as many industrialists pursued their studies abroad already during the nineteenth century, whether due to lack of the educational institutions in the Finnish territory or given their international outlook.

According to Laaksonen's statistics, more than fifty per cent of the directors of the large industrial companies in post-war Finland held a degree in Engineering\(^{776}\). Among them was William Lehtinen who, besides his studies in Helsinki, completed an MA in Forestry at Yale University (1925-1926). Moreover, Lehtinen studied and worked in the United States and Canada for a few years during the 1920s, and for a year was even an economic assistant at the Finnish Embassy in New York\(^{777}\).

Besides his marriage, Wahlforss' education was an important factor for his recruitment into the elite. His technical orientation was influenced by his family background and, like his brother, Eric Wahlforss (1895-1951), who later worked for one

\(^{774}\) Today the company is known under by the name Store-Enso.
\(^{775}\) Hoving 1963:596. Ahvenainen 1992:445-446. Einar Asplund (1894-1945) was elected instead of Kotilainen. However, Asplund died in 1945. There were afterwards two candidates for this post: William Lehtinen, with his professional experience, and Åke Gartz (1888-1974), who was the favourite of President Paasikivi. However, due to Gartz's involvement in the government, Lehtinen was selected.
\(^{776}\) Laaksonen 1962:106.
\(^{777}\) Ahvenainen 1992:445-446.
of the factories of the Wärtsilä Concern, he held a degree in Engineering\textsuperscript{778}. Included in Wahlforss' international experience was his work in Saint Petersburg for the Swedish company Nobel in 1916. Three years later, he spent a year in the United States, where he became acquainted with the newest trends in mechanisation, and during the 1920s he went to England and Sweden\textsuperscript{779}.

Even those who were recruited into the elite more or less as a result of family background and social connections were fully educated and received excellent training abroad. A university degree in Law was a common qualification, especially for bankers, and was regarded as necessary for a position with financial responsibilities. The deputy director of the PYP Bank, Göran Ehmrooth, was a lawyer, as was Rainer von Fieandt, and Matti Virkkunen. Eljas Erkko and Jacob von Julin were also trained in law. Furthermore, von Fieandt, who preceded Göran Ehmrooth in his post, received several years of juridical experience whilst working for the Kaarlo Castrén law office\textsuperscript{780}, from where he was recruited to the PYP Bank. With respect to their international experience, Jacob von Julin studied at Cambridge University 1924-1925. Virkkunen and Erkko travelled widely to the United States, France, Sweden and England during the inter-war period.

The only one of the analysed group to hold a degree in Economics was Juuso Walden, who attended the Helsinki School of Economics and Business Administration during the 1920s. Walden travelled to France during the 1920s and received considerable working experience in England, where he took his apprenticeship at the beginning of the 1930s.

From the above, one can argue that the industrial elite was widely travelled. The most popular destinations were England and the United States. In comparison with the same generation of the cultural elite, one can see the following clear difference: the cultural elite was rather oriented towards a German educational background during the same period. The clear preference for English-speaking countries amongst the industrial elite was surely caused by the nature of Finnish foreign trade in the 1920s, when Great

\textsuperscript{778} Besides obtaining a university degree, it might be mentioned that Wahlforss attended the Nya Svenska Läroverket, the Swedish-speaking secondary school in Helsinki, which was particularly popular among well-established Swedish-speaking families.

\textsuperscript{779} His brother Eric Wahlforss worked in the United States, including, for example, in Boston, as a chemist for more than ten years during the inter-war period (Paperi ja Puu 1951, #10).

\textsuperscript{780} Kaarlo Castrén (1860-1938) was an influential politician, and senator.
Britain played an important role and technical advances were occurring in the United States.

Furthermore, with opportunities to travel and work abroad, the industrial elite not only widened their range of observation, but were also able to become familiar with technical and economic progress in the rest of the world. Their lively foreign experience was also reflected in their language skills and their interaction in building up foreign contacts important for further business interests. To what extent their international involvement during the post-war period was influenced by the perceptions gained during their youthful years will be the topic of the following section.

5.2.2 The domestic involvement of the industrial-banking elite

In Chapter 1, an attempt was made to define an intellectual and the extent of his political engagement. The conclusion which was drawn was not able to provide us with a clear and precise answer. The definition of an intellectual was directly dependent on his political interests and varied from period to period. The definition of a businessman or an entrepreneur is clearly easier to form: the role of a businessman might be deduced from the word’s morphology. Joseph Schumpeter succeeded better in the case of the entrepreneur, than with his definition of an intellectual. George de Huszar makes a distinction between an intellectual and a businessman as following

Intellectuals and businessmen function by wholly different standards. The businessman offers to the public ‘goods’ defined as anything the public will buy; the intellectual seeks to teach what is ‘good’. The world of business is to the intellectual one in which the values are wrong, the motivations low, the rewards misaddress.

781 In general, the language skills of people involved in the industrial or business sector during the interwar period were strong. E.g., Walden spoke Swedish, Russian, German, and English fluently and had a knowledge of French. In addition, the personnel of many companies spoke several languages. Tanner (1998:58), who examined the social background of the board of directors of FINNPAP, mentioned that out of seventeen people, twelve spoke English, fifteen German, and six French. Regarding the employees (Tanner M. 1998:99), of 79 people every fifth spoke Russian, every third English, and every second German.

782 Schumpeter 1943. Schumpeter defined entrepreneurs as individuals who develop and implement new combinations of the means of production.

783 Huszar 1960:284.
Even if intellectuals are those who carry ideological values, and are more or less responsible for the intellectual growth of society, businessmen also share a part of that social task. If intellectuals create the cultural atmosphere, businessmen support it financially, and if intellectuals are actively engaged in politics, businessmen enable political activity, in most cases indirectly, by supporting political parties or politicians who suit their business interests well.

Although it is not the task here to analyse nineteenth century economic developments in Finland, it will be of interest to mention the research carried out by Markku Kuisma, who pointed out the close relationship between industrialists and State officialdom during the 1880s. The people involved in industry, at that time, were also engaged in political activities, and many of them held high State posts, or supported politicians. Through such connections, many industrialists during that period became 'industrial mandarins', (suurteollisuuden mandariinit) as Kuisma called them. In other words, the close connection between these two social groups reciprocally influenced their positions and interests, as both were dependent on the other. Furthermore, as the recruitment into the elite, whether political or industrial, was only a matter of a very thin level of society, as mentioned above, business and political affairs were undertaken by a very small social group.

During the 1920s, the bond between industrialists and state officials changed slightly, and such a strong reciprocity no longer existed. It has been noted above that many members of the cultural elite were involved in the Finnish political arena during the inter-war period. The percentage of industrialists and bankers participating in the government during the same period is clearly lower, though not to be neglected. One example might be J.K. Paasikivi, the long term director of the KOP bank. In fact, parallels might be drawn between the position of industrialists and the State, as well as the University and the State in Finland.

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784 Burnham 1943:70.
785 A good example of the mutual support of industrial circles and politicians is the case of 1930s Germany, when the leaders of the big German enterprises were sympathetic to Hitler's economic plans, which contributed to the spread of Nazism.
786 Kuisma 1993:10-98.
787 Kuisma 1993:55. Kuisma offers the example of Leo Mechelin (1839-1914), who, besides being a professor, was senator, politician, and a director of the PYP bank, and was also involved in industrial companies such as Nokia.
788 Kuisma 1993:73.
Members of industrial circles, who were engaged directly in politics during the inter-war period\(^789\) intertwined their business interests with their political career. Such engagement was usually recognised by family background or previous involvement in the Civil War. Another reason might be that the newly independent Finland had an immense lack of professional diplomats and politicians having wide experience from overseas, so the industrial circles served well in these cases. An example might be given of the political role of Rudolf Walden, the father of Juuso Walden. Rudolf Walden actively participated in the Civil War, when he held the post of commandant of the headquarters of the Whites with Marshall Mannerheim\(^790\), with whom he afterwards maintained a close friendship. In 1920, Rudolf Walden was one of the members of the Finnish delegation during the negotiations in Dorpat. Twenty years later, he negotiated the peace conditions in Moscow\(^791\). Despite his political activities, Rudolf Walden held the post of managing director of his company throughout that period.

Moreover, the involvement of the industrial circles in cultural and social activities should not be overshadowed by their political engagement, and it is definitely worthy of mention. The financial support provided by the industrialists to various educational institutions and to cultural occasions was an important part of their social contribution. Already, by the end of the nineteenth century, many industrialists were patrons upholding the national movement, and they established numerous educational clubs\(^792\). In other words, the political, cultural and social involvement might be considered a patriotic obligation for the industrial-banking elite.

To what extent the industrial circle became engaged in affairs outside their business interests during the post-war period, and whether it compromised their commitments or contributed to the relaxing of the economic and political situation will be analysed in the following section. The involvement of the industrial elite will be discussed in two parts. Firstly a picture of their engagement in domestic affairs will be provided, examined from political, social and cultural perspectives, together with reflections on their family background. Secondly, their engagement in international affairs will be outlined, with a focus on their personal experience and business interests. The conclusion should lead to the answer to the question to what extent the industrial-

\(^{789}\) Kuisma 1993:89.
\(^{790}\) Autio/Lodenius 1968:47. Tuuri 1999:218. Besides Walden and Gösta Serlachius, another influential industrialist also took part.
\(^{791}\) Tuuri 1999:318. Rudolf Walden held the post of Minister of Defence during that time.
\(^{792}\) Kuisma 1993:38.
banking elite interfered with the new post-war conditions and to what extent their involvement was influenced by their family background, education and ambitions.

Domestic political involvement

With respect to the analysed members of the industrial-banking elite, none of them was a member of the Finnish government during the period in question, with the exception of Rainer von Fieandt, who held the Prime Ministerial post for less than six months during 1957-1958. Like Eljas Erkko, he also had direct political experience from the pre-war and war periods. The reason why none of the industrialists was directly engaged in high politics might be explained by the post-war political and economic circumstances when, firstly, industrialists were more useful in their own field, as the war reparations depended to a large extent on their companies, which also created important links for foreign trade; and secondly, their political experience from the war period made most of them refrain from any direct political involvement, as was the case with Eljas Erkko.

Although Erkko was not directly politically active during the post-war period, his influence, which was underlined by his activities in the newspaper business, was immense. Erkko was de facto the one who exerted influence on public opinion, and any information was filtered through the newspapers owned by him. Furthermore, Erkko’s network of contacts was extremely wide due to his previous political involvement, his diplomatic career, and his family background, which apparently modified his political interests and direction. Erkko, as the owner of a national newspaper, was often seen publicly in political or cultural circles, where he expressed his political opinions. During the post-war decade, Erkko maintained especially good relations with Matti Virkkunen, as Erkko was a member of the Board of the KOP bank.

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793 Eljas Erkko held the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs during the breakdown of the Winter War. His dimension of involvement in war decisions is still in dispute due to closed personal archives.

794 Although Solkkonen (1984) deals with the inter-war period, he well manifests the influential factor of Erkko on the selection and tone of political news printed in Helsingin Sanomat during the period of 1933-1939.

795 Brotherus 1973:9, 33. Erkko, like his father, was a member of the Liberal Progressive Party (Edistyspuolue), and during the inter-war period he took seriously its traditions of standing up to Russia (Maude 1995:69).

796 Erkko was often seen in the Hotel Savoy, Palace, or Pörsiklubi. E.g., he expressed his views about the possible return of the Saimaa Canal, which in his eyes was impossible (Rentola 1997:312).
Common political convictions bound them; during the election campaign in 1956, they both stood against Kekkonen's candidature.\(^\text{797}\)

Matti Virkkunen's political affiliations were also influenced by his family background, as his father was an active member of Parliament, and he educated his sons in the principles of Finnish patriotism, so typical of the first quarter of the twentieth century.\(^\text{798}\) Furthermore, Virkkunen's engagement in the political and economic life of post-war Finland was influenced by his post in the KOP bank.\(^\text{799}\) Politically, Virkkunen had a good relationship with J.K. Paasikivi, unlike his connections with Urho Kekkonen, which were anything but friendly.\(^\text{800}\) During the 1950s, and especially during the election year of 1956, such a political standpoint was common among the industrial-banking elite, who did not support Kekkonen's election and a few, including Virkkunen, even tried to remove Kekkonen from his political position.\(^\text{801}\) However, the situation changed slightly six years later, when most of the industrialists were pro-Kekkonen, which was certainly associated with the EFTA agreement and further economic developments. But Virkkunen remained an opponent, and in 1968 he even indulged his political ambitions with his candidacy for presidency. However, by that time, he no longer represented the political opinions of most industrialists but only his own conservative outlook.\(^\text{802}\)

Virkkunen from his position in the KOP bank was keen on the economic development of Finland, and he became actively involved in numerous discussions, expressing his opinions on financial and trading politics.\(^\text{803}\) At the beginning of the 1950s, Virkkunen often emphasised the necessity of the rationing system, and he also reflected on Kekkonen's plan for the industrialisation of Northern Finland.\(^\text{804}\) During the second half of the 1950s, Virkkunen became more concerned about the growing interaction between politicians and industrialists, and with the impact on business life in

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\(^\text{797}\) Rentola 1997:318.

\(^\text{798}\) Lehmusvaara 1983:36, 73. Virkkunen was a member of the Academic Karelia Society, and during the war, although he was not directly involved in battles, he tried to obtain supplies for Finland (Lehmusvaara 1983:32).

\(^\text{799}\) Lehmusvaara 1983:93.

\(^\text{800}\) Lehmusvaara 1983:85, 113, 188.

\(^\text{801}\) Rentola 1997:366. During 1955, according to Moscow, a group of industrialists, among them Virkkunen, Serlachius, and Rosenlew, tried to remove Kekkonen from his political post. Such tendencies continued until J.K. Paasikivi asked them not to interfere in politics.

\(^\text{802}\) Seppälä 1999:106. Seppälä's MA thesis deals with Virkkunen's political involvement and the development of his political affiliation, with special emphasis on the year 1968.

\(^\text{803}\) Virkkunen's speeches were published in 1967, during his presidential campaign.

\(^\text{804}\) E.g., a speech given in Turku, 28.04.1952.
Finland which had, in his view, fallen increasingly under the direct influence of politicians.\footnote{E.g., a speech in Oulu, 13.05.1956.}

Virkkunen actively assisted with the mergers of the big Finnish industrial companies, which happened frequently during the post-war period, and often sat on their Boards. The one which could be mentioned in the context of the family connections is Virkkunen's participation in the Rauma-Repola saw company, whose managing director was Paavo Honkajuuri (1914-2001), Virkkunen's brother-in-law.\footnote{Koste 1969:68.} Besides this merger, Virkkunen maintained a close connection with Juuso Walden, who was a member of the KOP bank's Board, and later, during the financial problems of the United Paper Mills, KOP supported Walden.

Juuso Walden is one of the key figures in the post-war economic scene in Finland. Walden was one of the industrialists about whom it might be said that he considered political involvement to be a patriotic obligation, and at the same time the means for maintaining his business interests. Walden's political perceptions and business sense for political matters, as his skill might be called, were clearly influenced by the environment in which he grew up. The United Paper Mills were always connected with the Finnish political cream, which was suggested by his father, Rudolf Walden's, political activities.\footnote{Klemola 1970:134. Marshall Mannerheim was a close friend of the Walden family, like Risto Ryti (whose wife was Gerda Serlachius). J.K. Paasikivi was involved in the United Paper Mills Company by owning part of the shares (Tuuri 1999:353).} Although it might be argued that Walden senior's political attitudes towards the Soviet Union completely contrasted with the attitudes of Walden junior\footnote{During the period of Rudolf Walden, the Russian flag never flew in the Valkeakoski; during the period of Juuso Walden, it often did (Klemola 1970:150).}, Juuso Walden took his fundamental standpoint from his father: to do the best for Finland, despite the historical circumstances.

After the war, Juuso Walden's priorities were to deal with the loss of a large part of the United Paper Mills lands which were annexed by the Soviet Union and thus affected the company's production.\footnote{Nordberg 1982:88. Furthermore, Walden had to release more land to the state for the resettlement of refugees from the ceded areas.} In terms of the post-war economic settlements, Walden took an active role in the Committee for War Reparations (Soteva). His company became one of the major supplier of wood products to the Soviet Union, agreed within the framework of war reparations.\footnote{Tuuri 1999:340.} Besides the external financial
arrangements, Walden was also forced to deal with the split of his company when disputes between him and Carl G. Björnberg deepened, mainly regarding the matters of investment and purchase of new technologies\textsuperscript{811}.

One of the reasons why Walden assumes an important place in the post-war period, apart from foreign investment and trade agreements, which will be discussed in connection with his international engagement, is his political support for Urho Kekkonen. Walden was one of a few industrialists who supported Kekkonen during his candidatures for presidency in 1950 and 1956\textsuperscript{812}. During the election campaign in 1961, Walden, with other industrialists, contributed financially to the Kekkonen side\textsuperscript{813}. Walden's support for Kekkonen might be understood in various ways. However, Walden's sense of patriotic responsibility appears to be the most likely. For Walden, who met Kekkonen for the first time in the late 1920s during a student trip to Estonia, Kekkonen represented the only person able to bring economic advantages to Finland by keeping his political line\textsuperscript{814}. In his memoirs, Walden recalled Kekkonen as a wise man with deep patriotic feelings for Finland\textsuperscript{815}.

Walden's support for Kekkonen was not rooted in his desire to be part of Kekkonen's political phalanx, or even to belong to his faithful admirers. Although the relationship between him and Kekkonen certainly had an impact on the business affairs of the United Paper Mills, and vice versa\textsuperscript{816}, the main reason for his backing were the economic and political interests of post-war Finland. For Walden, as for other industrialists, an expression of political support served to strengthen his business. That this might be one of the explanations is also suggested by Walden's participation in the Paasikivi Society. Walden paid his membership fee, but never took a personal part in it\textsuperscript{817}. In this respect, Walden remained the businessman for whom business was everything, and not an industrial mandarin, as Kuisma called some industrialists in the

\textsuperscript{811} Nordberg 1982:98-99.
\textsuperscript{813} Klemola 1970:139-140. In 1968, Kekkonen no longer needed Walden's support as Kekkonen's position appeared to be strong enough. However, when his friend Matti Virkkunen asked Walden to participate in his presidential campaign against Kekkonen, Walden refused (Klemola 1970:140).
\textsuperscript{814} Klemola 1970:134.
\textsuperscript{815} Walden 1971:305.
\textsuperscript{816} Walden 1971:305. Walden mentioned that he and Kekkonen helped each other in pursuing their interests.
\textsuperscript{817} National Archive, L.A. Puntila, File 64, Correspondence. Klemola 1970:145.
nineteenth century who exploited their political connections for their business advantages\(^{818}\).

Wilhelm Wahlforss is another example of a businessman in post-war Finland who may not be called an industrial mandarin. Wahlforss shared with Walden a feeling of patriotic responsibility, and he contributed greatly to the post-war economic recovery. Wärtsilä’s Concerns also suffered by the loss of territories ceded to the Soviet Union, and a large number of factories were destroyed and required reconstruction\(^{819}\). As more than sixty per cent of the war reparations had to be delivered in heavy metal industry supplies, Wahlforss played an important role in the Committee for War Reparations\(^{820}\). Together with Walter Gräsbeck (1892-1952), who was responsible for the negotiations\(^{821}\), he agreed to terms on the division of the deliveries to the Soviet Union.

For Wahlforss, this was the first time that he became involved at an official level with Soviet leaders\(^{822}\), and actually he based the later export trade on the Soviet Union war reparation agreements, to which Wärtsilä made an appreciable contribution\(^{823}\). Wahlforss, who became well acquainted with the demands of Soviet trade during the 1950s, which will be shown in his international involvement, was also well aware, and he often pointed out the dependency of the Finnish metal industry on the Soviet Union and the possible negative impact on the rise of unemployment\(^{824}\).

The difference between Wahlforss and Walden was in their relations with Urho Kekkonen. Wahlforss had no sympathy for Kekkonen, and they met only when it was absolutely inevitable; in other words, during official Soviet visits, or business trips to the Soviet Union. During one such trip in 1954, Wahlforss and Kekkonen more or less

\(^{818}\) Walden was also a member of the so-called Wednesday club (Keskiviikkokerho), which was established in 1942. During the post-war period most prominent members of Finnish society were involved in it, e.g., U.K. Kekkonen, Nils Meinander, and Sakari Tuomioja. Only the strictest opponents of Kekkonen, such as Georg C. Ehrnrooth or Tuure Junnula, and communists were excluded (Klemola 1970:146-147; Nordberg 1998:401).

\(^{819}\) Zilliacus 1984:151.


\(^{821}\) Walter Gräsbeck, the general director of the Finnish Cellulose Association (Suomen Selluloosayhdistys), was in Nykopp’s (1985:29) view one of the key figures in Finland’s successful post-war economic negotiations. Nykopp referred especially to his significant contributions during negotiations with the Soviet Union concerning the war reparations. Gräsbeck also negotiated with the World Bank and with the American Export Import Bank on Finnish loans.

\(^{822}\) Zilliacus 1984:152. Wahlforss’ name was on the so-called Black List, compiled by the representatives of the Soviet Union after the war. The list included people who were, for their pro-German orientation, ‘unacceptable’ for communication with Moscow (Vihola 2000:84).

\(^{823}\) Finnish Paper and Timber 1960, # 8.

\(^{824}\) Zilliacus 1984:267.
agreed on a form of conciliation, which was probably motivated by reciprocal benefit; Wahlforss wanted to widen the trade agreement with the offer of an icebreaker sale, and Kekkonen was aware of the coming elections, and the necessary financial support he required. Although the ‘gentleman’s agreement’ was soon interrupted by Kekkonen’s article in Uusi Kuvaletti, Wahlforss kept his word, and during the 1956 elections he supported Kekkonen’s candidacy. However, his support was not based on sympathy; Wahlforss merely felt obliged to give his support due to their previous agreement.

During the election campaign in 1961, Wahlforss made a rare public appearance as a speaker at a meeting of the Swedish-speaking political party, SFF, when he expressed his support for Olavi Honka, the presidential candidate in opposition to Kekkonen. At that time, he was one of the few industrialists opposing Kekkonen’s re-election which was, certainly, predetermined by his earlier experience with Kekkonen. In addition, Wahlforss was also one of the founding members of the Paasikivi Society, which he considered to be a continuation of J.K. Paasikivi’s political line. However, in 1963, after paying his membership fee, he resigned as the society did not satisfy his political sympathies due to the large pro-Kekkonen influence practised by his supporters.

Benedict Zilliacus, Wahlforss’ biographer, tried to find the causes of the mutual antipathies between Wahlforss and Kekkonen. In his view, Finland was too small for two such personalities. Kekkonen, like Wahlforss, was a self-made man, who reached the top of his career by his own effort. The reason, however, might be found somewhere else. On the one hand, Kekkonen had no motive to be politically jealous, as Wahlforss had no political ambitions, but on the other, jealousy might have arisen due to the huge popularity of Wahlforss among Soviet leaders. Although Wahlforss was

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825 Zilliacus 1984:298-299. Kekkonen wrote a note to Wahlforss on their trip to Moscow, when they negotiated the trade agreements. Kekkonen expressed his thanks for the time they shared together during the evening negotiations and Kekkonen hoped they could maintain the mutual understanding. Wahlforss agreed, and promised to keep his word. Zilliacus mentioned that in reality it is not quite clear whether Wahlforss gave financial support or not. There were no references in the bookkeeping.


perceived by the Soviets as more or less a ‘western capitalist’, he knew how to negotiate with them and how to reach his business goals, which was highly appreciated by the Soviet side\textsuperscript{831}.

Moreover, a comparison might be made between Wahlforss and Walden and their political involvement. Wahlforss, who was by almost twenty years Walden’s senior, certainly based his attitudes on his personal experience. Wahlforss was a great admirer of Marshal Mannerheim and he maintained good relationships with Juuso Walden’s father\textsuperscript{832}. On this basis, it might be said that both had contacts with a similar social environment, only with a language difference. On the basis of their political involvement of the 1950s, it might be argued that they both represented various political principles. However, looking more closely at the details, the main goal of both was their business interests and not their political affairs.

**Domestic social and cultural involvement**

The picture of the industrial elite would be incomplete without taking into consideration their contribution to the social and cultural spheres. Involvement outside business interests was usually recognised by patriotic sympathies. Among such involvement might be included the regular donations of Juuso Walden to the Finnish Cultural Fund\textsuperscript{833}, and the participation of Matti Virkkunen and Eljas Erkko on the Board of the Finnish National Theatre.

Of significant importance was the financial support of Walden for Ilmari Turja’s *Uusi Kuvailehti*. Walden became familiar with Turja during the war period, and suggested he establish his own periodical. This happened in 1952, when Turja left the *Suomen Kuvailehti* and created *Uusi Kuvailehti*, which would sustain the pro-Finnish patriotic line from Turja’s perspective (the ex-member of the Academic Karelia Society)\textsuperscript{834}. Besides Walden’s contribution, other Finnish-speaking industrial companies also contributed financially to these aims, e.g. Enso-Gutzeit and the KOP bank. On the

\textsuperscript{831} Zilliacus 1984:162, 282-285. Zilliacus recalled that the Soviet leaders paradoxically appreciated the ‘old-fashioned’ behaviour of Wahlforss, which was reminiscent more of the old Tsarist times rather than the communist period.

\textsuperscript{832} Zilliacus 1984:152.

\textsuperscript{833} Nordberg 1998:402.

other hand, Wahlforss, as a Swedish-speaking Finn, provided financial support to the Swedish-speaking newspaper company which published the *Hufvudstadbladet*. Wahlforss, as a Swedish-speaking Finn, provided financial support to the Swedish-speaking newspaper company which published the *Hufvudstadbladet*.835

Juuso Walden’s engagement in the social affairs of the United Paper Mills is among the best known. Walden initiated the company’s building programme, which was directed to the needs of the company’s personnel and workers. Generous loans were provided for building new houses and creating a homely atmosphere adjacent to the mill factories. Furthermore, the workers of the United Paper Mills enjoyed other social advantages, such as the possibility of using the company’s holiday cottages in Lapland or taking part in further education programmes. Workers had free access to daily newspapers, such as *Aamulehti* or *Uusi Suomi*, which they could subscribe to for less than half the actual price. Walden financed the reconstruction of the Church in Valkeakoski and supported the Orthodox Church by granting them much-needed space. Sports activities played an important role within the Valkeakoski milieu, as Walden himself was a big sports fan, especially of soccer, with which he became familiar in England. Walden organised an international sports exchange with the English company Reed, whose workers often came to Valkeakoski, or vice versa, which contributed not only to sporting achievements but also deepened cultural understanding.

In 1958, Walden and his wife founded the Juuso and Tellervo Walden foundation which intended to help talented children of the company’s workers in their further education. Walden himself became involved in the Board of the Helsinki School of Economics at the beginning of the 1960s as its alumni student. Besides Walden, Virkkunen and Lehtinen were also engaged in the educational field. They were members of the Board of Turku University. The broadening of school opportunities was

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835 Zilliacus 1984:233. During his involvement in buying the shares of the company engaged in publishing *Hufvudstadbladet* (it belonged to the ‘second media magnate’ after Erkko’s family, Amos Anderson from Turku), Wahlforss was in contact with Carl-Erik Olin, who was later a significant figure in the Finnish negotiations in international economic structures.


838 Klemola 1970:66. Walden supported the above mentioned newspapers. He was not in favour of the pro-socialist oriented press, for which his workers did not get the discount price.


also emphasised by Wilhelm Wahlforss, who financed the college construction in Joensuu.

Wahlforss, even if he had no profound interest in art and was not keen on art collecting, contributed significantly to the Finnish success in the Milano IX Triennale in 1951. Wahlforss played a decisive part in financing the participation in Milano of Tapio Wirkkala, who was at that time a designer at the Arabia porcelain factory (belonging to the Wärtsiä Concern). For Wahlforss, it was important to take part in such international competitions, which could effectively propagate the name of Finnish design abroad. After immense success, Wahlforss donated money to opening representative spaces for Finnish design in Helsinki, and he later stood behind the successful collection of dishes by Kaj Franck.

5.2.3 The international involvement of the industrial-banking elite

Although domestic involvement of the industrial circles might be called a patriotic obligation influenced by their social position, their international engagement carried more of an extensive importance which often pertained to the political spheres. By participating in international organisations and by extending foreign trade between Finland and both sides of the Iron Curtain, the industrial-banking elite contributed to strengthening the Finnish economy and thus Finland’s political position in the West. Finland was able to keep in touch with modern developments, and to co-ordinate its foreign policy. To a certain extent, it might be argued that the non-political international involvement of the industrial elite made a valuable contribution to creating the image of Finland abroad.

The international involvement of the industrial elite was a reflection of their political responsibility, which was based on their desire for the economic propagation of Finland abroad; their business interests, which influenced foreign trade; and their personal pursuits, whose roots lay in their travel experience through family relations. The international involvement of the industrial elite will be discussed from this perspective. The analysis is divided into two sections: firstly, its involvement with the

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842 Zilliacus 1984:310. Wahlforss was a great supporter of developments in Karelia, where the original enterprise was established, in the small town of Värtsiä, which territory was lost to the Soviet Union in 1944 (Singleton 1989:53). The symbol of Karelia, two arms with swords, was the trademark of the Wärtsiä Concern.
843 Zilliacus 1984:231.
Soviet Union, and secondly with the Western countries. Such a division appears to be essential due to the period of the Cold War under discussion.

**Involvement with the Soviet Union**

The members of the industrial-banking elite had various perceptions of Russia (the Soviet Union), which were mainly based on their previous experience with the neighbouring country. From a practical perspective, for example, Juuso Walden was born in St. Petersburg when it was the capital of the Russian Empire, and he spent his childhood there until 1917 when his father returned to Finland. Wilhelm Wahlforss worked for a short time in St. Petersburg before the Russian Revolution.

From a business point of view, Russia represented the trade partner, which was largely influenced by broad business links and commercial contacts, which grew significantly at the beginning of the twentieth century. Although after 1917, Finnish industrialists restricted their contacts with Soviet Russia as a result of the political situation, the general perception of Russia remained similar to that during the pre-independent period. For a large part of the Finnish industrial circle, Russia represented a business interest rather than an ideological threat as for the cultural elite.

The broader business insight of the industrial elite became more apparent after 1944, when the relationship between the Soviet Union and the Finnish industrialists needed to be re-established and re-structured. As noted above, the war reparation deliveries greatly served these purposes. Heavy industry represented more than sixty per cent, and the wood processing industry around thirty per cent, of Finnish supplies to the Soviet Union. These factors forced Juuso Walden and Wilhelm Wahlforss, like the rest of entrepreneurs who were in charge of the factories contributing to the reparations, to become responsively familiar with Soviet trade demands and opportunities.

Even if the trade balance of the United Paper Mills with the Soviet Union in 1956 took third place in the company's total export figures⁶⁴⁴, which might raise the question of the primary business importance, the Soviet exports cannot be undervalued. In addition to its economic importance, the Soviet trade had political significance, and this specific feature became characteristic for post-war Finnish-Soviet economic cooperation. It might be said that as a result of his family background Juuso

⁶⁴⁴ Puu ja Paperi 1957, #32. The United Kingdom and West Germany took first and second place.
Walden's business interests in the Soviet Union were based on realistic business views, his own experience, and a mixture of the old Finnish antipathies. Walden, who received many state officials at his Valkeakoski residence, knew how to treat the Soviet delegations, and his place became a popular destination. For example, in 1954, Anastas Mikoyan visited Valkeakoski, two years later K.E. Voroshilov, and in 1957 Nikita Khrushchev.

The Wärtsilä Concern was more dependent on the Soviet markets than the United Paper Mills, especially at the beginning of the 1950s, due to the large number of war reparation consignments. Further deliveries were undertaken according to the five year plan trade agreement between Finland and the Soviet Union, which guaranteed regular orders for the Wärtsilä Concern. The most profitable trade goods for the Soviet market were icebreakers and paper machinery. These were the usual goods the Wärtsilä Concern manufactured for Russia since the beginning of the twentieth century.

Wilhelm Wahlforss' relationships with Soviet officials were maintained at a friendly business level, and as already noted above, he enjoyed considerable respect in the Soviet Union. Anastas Mikoyan, who was in charge of Soviet trade agreements, got along with Wahlforss especially well. He even refused to make political propaganda speeches in the Wärtsilä Concern, "as there was nothing unfavourable to be said about a director such as Wahlforss". Although Wahlforss did not speak Russian, this did not seem to cause any major communication problems. Like Walden, Wahlforss knew how to look after his visitors, and thus to build a base for their mutual business understanding.

The question might be asked why the emphasis is put on the level of personal relationships between Soviet business partners and the Finnish industrialists. There are

845 Klemola 1970:150.
846 Nordberg 1998:365-397. Nordberg recalled the state visits to Valkeakoski during the 1950s, and the special emphasis which Walden put on them. That Walden knew how to entertain his guests is unquestionable. His gondola, which he brought from Venice, became a popular attraction for sightseeing on the lake. Also, the menu was prepared with a particular emphasis on old Russian traditions.
848 During the first decade of the twentieth century, the Imperial Russian Navy regularly ordered warships from Wärtsilä (Singleton 1989:53, Haavikko 1984:197-199). In 1954, Mikoyan visited Wärtsilä for the handing-over of one of the icebreakers built in the Wärtsilä Concern (Finnish Paper and Timber 1954, #9).
850 Numerous correspondence is preserved in the archive of Wahlforss (National Archive, Wilhelm Wahlforss' File 4, Correspondence) documenting the Soviet visits to Wärtsilä. E.g., V.J. Sukselainen expressed gratitude to Wahlforss for creating a friendly atmosphere during A. Mikoyan's visit on 4.11. 1959.
several reasons, but the main explanation is the political necessity of the business agreements which were enhanced by the atmosphere of that period. Again, the Finnish industrialists did not negotiate with their Soviet counterparts, the business leaders, but with the politicians who were in charge of industrial trade, and this added a political spark to relations. Involvement in Finnish-Soviet affairs was often mistaken for pro-Soviet orientation (and thus anti-Western), which was, however, a political misconception as industrial relationships show. For the industrial elite, business interests were predominant, even if they depended on political affairs which might be observed, for example, on the decline of Soviet exports in 1958, during the so-called Night Frost Crisis.

On the other hand, the Soviet perception of the Finnish industrialists should be mentioned. In most companies, the Finland-Soviet Union Society, SNS was established to maintain friendly relations between the Finnish and Soviet people. Such societies were sometimes financially supported by the industrialists. However, the latter often preferred to keep this secret\(^851\). Such contributions were appreciated by the Soviet leaders, who were aware that Finnish industrialists played a significant role in the political leadership at the country\(^852\). Although the Soviets perceived the Finnish industrialists to be 'Western capitalists'\(^853\), they were aware of the trade importance for the Soviet Union. They examined the political affiliations of industrial circles minutely, and the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki (often referred to only by the name of the street where it was located, *Tehtaankatu*, Factory Street) was well informed about their political attitudes and support\(^854\). Among those who were not welcomed at the Soviet Embassy were Matti Virkkunen and Eljas Erkko due to their political affiliations\(^855\).

Although it is not the purpose of this study to analyse Finnish foreign trade in greater detail, it should be mentioned that Finland also maintained trade relationships with other states behind the Iron Curtain. For example, Wärtsilä exported paper machinery to Czechoslovakia and China\(^856\), and industrialists went on an official visit to Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav president, Josip Broz Tito, visited Valkeakoski, as did

\(^851\) Rentola 1997:310-311. E.g., the managing director of the Ahlström Company offered between two to four million Finnish marks to the SNS on condition that the contribution remained secret.

\(^852\) Rentola 1997:311.

\(^853\) Rentola 1997:357.

\(^854\) Rentola 1997:357.

\(^855\) In 1955, Erkko was invited by one Soviet diplomat to spend a holiday in the Soviet Union. However, the invitation proved to be a mistake made by a less well-informed diplomat about Erkko’s previous war involvement (Rentola 1997:390).
Romanian officials. In general, the export and import numbers in terms of the socialist countries were unusually high up to middle of the 1950s, but declined afterwards.\(^{857}\)

**Western Involvement**

There is an apparent difference between Finnish economic engagement with the Soviet Union and with Western countries, which might be worth mentioning. Negotiations with the Soviet Union were virtually always conducted at the highest level, while negotiations with the West were more or less confined to business circles. However, the significance of the Western contacts is not diminished by that; it merely reflects the situation in the post-war period, when Eastern relations were managed by politicians, and Western ones by businessmen, who were apparently more qualified for such negotiations as they were often better trained in international economic affairs than most politicians.

The international contacts of the industrial elite were commonly based on personal experience. Juuso Walden, who spent a few years during the 1930s in England, liked to return there and to maintain his social contacts. For example, it was his initiative to open the Finland House in London in 1958. The idea of having a representative place in the British Isles, where not only Finnish wood processing companies could publicise their products but where Finland could also present itself as a country, had been born in 1951, when the Finnish economic situation was buoyant due to the Korean war boom.\(^{858}\) Walden went on to investigate the situation, together with William Lehtinen and J.O. Söderhjelm, who were well acquainted with economics in general, and Söderhjelm took part in Finnish negotiations with international institutions. After purchasing the lease of a site in Haymarket in 1952, other Finnish companies, including Enso-Gutzeit, Kymmene, and A.Ahlström, contributed to the building’s reconstruction.\(^{859}\) The representative success of the Finland House in London led to the opening of a similar place in Hamburg, with which R. Erik Serlachius (a son of Gösta Serlachius, the owner of the paper factory in Mänttä and a close friend of Walden) assisted, and one in New York, a venture in which Matti Virkkunen took part.\(^{860}\)

\(^{856}\) *Annual Report of Wärtsilä* 1954.


\(^{858}\) Nordberg 1982:90.

\(^{859}\) *Finnish Paper and Timber* 1958, # 9.

\(^{860}\) Walden 1971:284.
Like Juuso Walden, Eljas Erkko was also an Anglophile; his sympathies for England were partly motivated by his marriage to a British woman\textsuperscript{861}. As early as 1943, Erkko assisted with establishing the Finnish-American Association, which at that time had political intentions rather than cultural goals\textsuperscript{862}. At the same time, the Finnish version of the Reader’s Digest began to be published by the Sanoma Company. During the post-war period, Erkko maintained his international contacts; he was involved in various organisations which represented Finnish cultural interests abroad. He became a founding member of the International Press Institute in 1953, and of the Fondation Européenne de la Culture from 1958. In 1959, Erkko was elected the Chairman of the IBM Board in Helsinki, where his business skills could be intertwined with his international experience.

The members of the banking elite retained their international contacts, often being invited to the various financial forums which were regularly organised after the war. Matti Virkkunen and Göran Ehnrooth frequently travelled abroad during the 1950s to represent Finnish interests in numerous economic symposia and congresses. Besides financial advantages such participation also brought also international prestige to Finnish bankers and within Western economic structures the recognition of Finnish economic advancement. For example, in 1957, Virkkunen and Ehnrooth attended the International Industrial Development Conference in San Francisco arranged by the Stanford Research Institute\textsuperscript{863}. Moreover, Ehnrooth was also closely involved in the cooperation with the American Citibank, with whose Chairman, George Moore, he maintained a close friendship\textsuperscript{864}.

Personal connections were one of the bases of international involvement. Trade agreements with the West were another field through which contacts were built and maintained. Besides the largest export destinations, such as the United States, West Germany and the United Kingdom, United Paper Mills explored other foreign markets

\textsuperscript{861} Erkko married Violet Eugenie Sutcliffe, the daughter of a British engineer, in 1922. Heikki Brotherus (1973:81) recalled that Erkko’s wife never really became acquainted with the Finnish environment. This might be explained by the language barrier, but also by the fact that not many foreigners lived in Finland during this period, and Erkko’s marriage in itself was considered, in Brotherus’ view, to be exceptional (Brotherus 1973:81).
\textsuperscript{862} Brotherus 1973:154.
\textsuperscript{863} Virolainen 1994:38.
\textsuperscript{864} Ehnrooth 1991:141-142. Ehnrooth also kept close contacts with the Swedish family Wallenberg, who in 1856 established the Stockholm Enskilda Bank and belonged to the powerful industrial-banking circles in Sweden.
During the 1950s[^65]. A large investment was made in establishing a factory in Israel in 1951, which was the first United Paper Mills company established abroad. From Israel, United Paper Mills could easily penetrate the Arabian markets[^66]. In 1958, the company expanded to the Brazilian market by purchasing a factory close to Sao Paulo[^67]. The South American market always played an important role in the trade of United Paper Mills; therefore, such an investment only strengthened its position. In Europe, United Paper Mills established subsidiary companies in Switzerland in 1959[^68]. Furthermore, Juuso Walden, who was very keen on Italy, and especially liked the Adriatic port town of Trieste, also decided to invest in paper factories there by the end of the 1950s. However, his investment did not turn out to be successful and almost ten years later, most of the factories were sold[^69].

The Western trade orientation was important in the post-war economic context in distinguishing Finland from the Eastern European countries in maintaining vital economic participation with Western trading structures. From this perspective, the role of industrialists was consequential as they fully supported such economic connections and sustained their further development. This can be observed in the case of Wärtsilä, when Wahlforss tried to widen its export opportunities by 1954 to limit its dependence on the Soviet market and to broaden its trade arrangements with the United Kingdom and West Germany[^70]. Similarly, Enso-Gutzeit’s largest trading partners were the United Kingdom, West Germany and France, its main production being cellulose. The chemical branch of the Enso-Gutzeit company was successful in its export production during the 1950s. More than thirty countries were interested in its products, especially Australia and New Zealand[^71].

In terms of British trade relations, the recently commenced research work of Niklas Jensen-Eriksson might be mentioned. He analyses the economic interests of Great Britain in Finnish trade from the 1950s. Jensen-Eriksson focuses on the significance of

[^70]: Annual Report of the Wärtsilä Concern 1954. Wärtsilä obtained further offers from Switzerland, Sweden, China and Brazil. Finnish Paper and Timber (1960, #8) provides the trade export balance of board and wallboard for the first half of 1960, with almost similar figures in terms of export to the USSR, the UK and the West Germany.
[^71]: Ahvenainen 1992:506.
Finland for British export, both from a political and economic perspective\textsuperscript{872}. From the point of view of this study, the penetration of British Petroleum, BP, into the Finnish oil market might be interesting as it manifests the close interrelation between the industrial companies in Finland. In 1960, the BP bought a fifty per cent stake in a Finnish oil company, whose director was C. J. Ehnrooth\textsuperscript{873}, the managing director of Kymi and a brother of Göran Ehnrooth.

Touching briefly on the issue of foreign trade, it should be mentioned that Finnish companies usually penetrated foreign markets in two ways: (1) they had their own web of agents, who represented their interests (Enso-Gutzeit, Wärtsilä and United Paper Mills used them); (2) through Finnish business associations, such as the Finnish Cellulose Association (\textit{Suomen Selluloosayhdistys}) headed by Walter Gräsbeck, which represented, for example, Enso-Gutzeit; and the Finnish Paper Association, FINNPAP (\textit{Suomen Paperitehtaitten Yhdistys}), which represented the interests of companies like the United Paper Mills and A. Ahlström.

The history of the latter should be traced in more detail as it played an important role within foreign trade agreements either a long time before the analysed period or at the end of the 1950s, when the people involved were largely responsible for the EFTA negotiations. FINNPAP was established in 1918 by Rudolf Walden and Gösta Serlachius as the joint sales organisation for practically the whole Finnish paper industry. The aim of such an association was to strengthen the position of export markets, as the period was not greatly congenial to international developments\textsuperscript{874}.

During the post-war period, the importance of the Association lay in searching for suitable financial support for the Finnish paper industry companies and opening up foreign markets. To a certain extent, the Association partly substituted the work done by agents, making the primary contact between buyers and sellers, and improving communication\textsuperscript{875}.

The leading figure of FINNPAP during the 1950s was Holger Nystén (1905-1964), who was Chairman of the Board. Nystén started to work for the Association as a young lawyer in 1929 and became well acquainted with business matters and

\textsuperscript{872} Jensen-Eriksen 2001.
\textsuperscript{873} Jensen-Eriksen 2001:7. Jensen-Eriksen mentions that although BP received its share, the transaction was not successful due to Finnish trade complexities and the strong dislike of Uolevi Raade, the head of the Finnish national oil company, for C. J. Ehnrooth.
\textsuperscript{874} Research was published only recently on the history of FINNPAP by Heikkinen (2000). In 1968, an English version of the history of FINNPAP was published by Autio and Lodenius (1968).
\textsuperscript{875} Autio/Lodenius 1968: 148, 153,189.
international economic relations between Finland and the West. The importance of Nystén lay not just as Juuso Walden recalled in his memoirs in his being a capable man from whom Walden learnt a lot about foreign markets during his apprenticeship in FINNPAP in the 1930s but in his skills and economic knowledge, used in Finnish negotiations with international structures during the post-war period. Moreover, due to his broad economic connections, Nystén was also closely connected with the post-war political scene. In 1946, Paasikivi considered him for a government position, though preference was given to Åke Gartz. Two years later Nystén’s name was put forward for the post of Finnish Ambassador in Washington. However, he remained faithful to his FINNPAP engagements.

Nystén was aware of the possible negative impacts on the Finnish economy and politics in case of Finnish exclusion from Western international structures. From his post as Chairman of the Finnish-English Business Association (Suomalais-Englantilainen Kauppayhdistys), he began in 1959, during a trip to London, to investigate potential British support for integration. That Nystén became deeply involved in the arbitration, which he considered to be a decisive matter for Finland, is suggested by his discussions with Kekkonen, and in 1961 he was one of the members of the official presidential delegation to the USA. Together with Nystén, Finnish negotiations with the West were led by J.O. Söderhjelm (1898-1985), the General Manager of the Central Association of Finnish Woodworking Industries (Suomen Puunjalostusteollisuuden Keskusliitto), who had similar economic and international experience besides direct political involvement. Söderhjelm already represented Finnish interests in negotiations with GATT and OEEC.

The integration process was fully supported by other industrialists, who were alert to the necessity of the integration process, which was significant not only to further business interests, but also to underline future political developments. Juuso Walden, in 1961, before the decisive conference in Geneva, asked for Finnish support from British
business circles, and the Minister of Trade, Reginald Maudling, who had an influence on the decision\textsuperscript{882}. The United Paper Mills' Bulletin, like other economic periodicals, regularly reported on the EFTA integration process and its advantages for Finland\textsuperscript{883}. Before leaving his post in 1962, Wilhelm Wahlforss also emphasised the economic importance of EFTA membership for the Finnish economy\textsuperscript{884}, as did Matti Virkkunen who, in one of his speeches, devoted attention to the recently achieved integration of Finland within GATT and the Bretton Woods system a decade earlier\textsuperscript{885}.

5.2.4 Adaptability and responsibility

The above-mentioned political and social engagement of the industrial elite might appear to be incomplete and even irrelevant for research involved in the matter of a non-governing elite and its influence on decision making. To justify the dimension of the study and to verify the goals outlined, the following questions might be addressed.

Firstly, it should be explained why most of the political involvement is connected with the figure of Urho Kekkonen and not with other politicians. The relations between industrialists and Social Democrats, or industrialists and members of Parliament, might also be investigated, as they certainly existed and maintained their own importance\textsuperscript{886}. However, the goal of this study is not to look extensively at the interaction between the governing and non-governing elites nor to discuss the matter of power. Such an exploration would lead into one-sided research consisting of the political perception of the 1950s. The purpose here is to provide a broader picture than that, and to focus on the matter of the adaptability of the industrial elite to post-war political and economic conditions, with a possible perspective on the responsibility of the industrial elite for the development of post-war Finland. Urho Kekkonen is a key figure, and especially after 1956 when, under his aegis, Finnish-Soviet trade developed

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Heikkinen 2000:294.
\item Yhtyneet Paperitehtaat Tiedotuslehti, 1960 #5. Teollisuuslehti 1960, # 10.
\item Zilliacus 1984:267.
\item Matti Virkkunen's speech (Finland and International Trade) held in Hämenlinna, 20.05.1957.
\item Contacts between politicians and the industrial elite also occurred on the company's board, where politicians were occasionally involved, especially in the case of a state owned company (Ahvenainen 1992:449-450). E.g., Väinö Tanner and Mauno Pekkala (1890-1952) were involved in the Enso-Gutzeit Company.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
considerably, and by his involvement in the EFTA integration process, he also played a part in Finnish-Western economic relations.

Secondly, the question might be posed as to why relations between industrialists and the labour movement have been completely overlooked, particularly when the 1950s witnessed social conflicts which often resulted in strikes. As is noted in the chapter on the definition of an elite, the labour movement forms its own specific group or elite, which for further observation has to be investigated in more detail and put in a wider context. This would lead this study beyond its own scope, which is as noted above more or less an analysis of the inner structure of the industrial elite in terms of recruitment and adaptability, rather than a focus on the interaction between other social groups. However, it should be emphasised that the significance of the labour movement during the 1950s is not completely neglected, and its role in the political development of Finland through this period is mentioned in Chapter 2.

The considered analysis of recruitment and the political and social involvement of the industrial elite should more or less evoke a comparison with the cultural elite, and to lead to a conclusion regarding its adaptability and responsibility during the post-war period. The relatively easy adaptation of the industrial elite to the conditions occurring as a result of the impact of the war was predetermined by the extensive international contacts which the industrialists maintained since the inter-war period. Business connections had their importance for broadening foreign trade and hence opening up Finland to profitable investments. Even if some of the members analysed were on the so-called 'Black List' issued by the Soviets after the war, comprising people whose inclinations to Nazi Germany were considered to be unacceptable for further political or social involvement, business interests and the necessity to negotiate war reparations won over ideological differences.

It might be argued that most industrialists were free from any ideological 'burden', such as appears to have been carried by the cultural elite. This issue is intertwined with the matter of responsibility, which seems to vary between these two social groups. The intellectual responsibility for political development might be disputed and even considered to work on behalf of the status quo, as was pointed out

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888 Vihola 2000:84. As already mentioned, besides Wilhelm Wahlfors, Rainer von Fieandt and V.A. Kotilainen appeared on the Black List.
earlier. However, this does not diminish the ability of an intellectual to act or to proclaim their opinions in situations where needed.

An industrialist carries out the responsibility for both his own business interests and the political situation. Without the close co-operation of industrialists and politicians after the war, Finland would not have been able to complete its war reparations, and more recently the EFTA integration process would not have succeeded without the industrialists' involvement. That the situation after the war was not easy is not in doubt. Much 'necessary' political involvement of the industrial elite was not in complete accordance with their own convictions. However, their feelings of responsibility in many cases came first. This is the case in their support for the SNS society, for example, and even their membership of it, which, as shown above, was rarely made evident and often did not correspond to their actual political affiliations. This shows the essential interconnection between politics and economics after the war, even if the question might be asked whether, in the pursuit of economic goals, such a close co-operation did not slip into political 'dishonesty' with economic intrigue. Without going into any greater detail, this could have been the case in the numerous economic mergers occurring in post-war Finland.

The reason for such a profound responsibility might be partly explained by the dependence of business matters on developments in the political situation. Without the reciprocal understanding between politicians and industrialists, neither business nor politics would progress. That most business interests triumphed over political antipathies appears clear from the presidential campaign in 1961. The political responsibility of the industrialists during the first post-war decade had its own significance, as it was a part of the political and economic transition which happened after the war. The situation changed by the end of the 1960s, when political responsibility moved into political consensus.
5.3 The banking sector

Arvo Puukari, in his introduction to the centenary of the PYP bank, claims that "the history of leading commercial banks, especially in small countries, is intimately coupled with political and economic history". That this is valid is well documented in Finland, where the two main banks, KOP and PYP, assisted in most important events in Finland, and for their further economic and political engagements its directors might be considered to be more than bankers. For that reason, this study would not be complete without at least a marginal examination of the two main banking institutions.

The influential position of the people involved in the banks, who are in this study defined as a part of the industrial-banking elite, is more or less underlined by the dimensions of the elite in Finland, which are very small. The number of people involved in the industrial-banking elite, which means the people engaged in the biggest industrial companies and banks, is limited. For that reason, circulation within the elite occurs more commonly than in larger societies with presumably wider recruitment. This means that people engaged in the bank were also often on the Boards of large companies, and vice versa, or were even recruited into the governing elite. Through such circulation, the interconnections in the elite became stronger and more difficult to discern by an outsider.

For the purposes of this study, the banks played their role in the emergence of members of the industrial elite, which was done on the basis of participation on the Boards. This was not accidental. On the contrary, by analysing members of the Board of the two largest Finnish banks, more than their economic and political interests might be revealed. There is one more matter which is of significance and which will be emphasised, and that is the language issue.

Firstly, a brief history of the KOP and PYP banks will be outlined, followed by an overview of the situation during the 1950s. The assistance of the PYP bank with the split of United Paper Mills, along with the disagreement between the directors of the PYP bank will be investigated. The conclusion should provide a depiction of the significance of the banking institutions and language matters, which are sometimes underestimated and sometimes overestimated, influencing the business and political involvement of the banks.

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Puukari 1962:3.
5.3.1 The Swedish and Finnish-speaking banks: competition and interaction

The PYP bank, as it was known in the 1950s, was formed in 1919 when the Suomen Yhdys-Pankki, SYP, (*Förenings-Banken*) and Pohjoismaiden Osakepankki (*Nordiska Aktienbanken*) merged, and thus the Pohjoismaiden Yhdyspankki (*Nordiska Föreningsbanken*), PYP, was established\(^{890}\). The SYP bank, the oldest banking institution in Finland, was established in 1862. Among the people involved in the establishment process of the Swedish-speaking bank, besides influential officials and industrialists (like John Julin), was J. V. Snellman, who emphasised the importance of such an event for further political and cultural independence developments in Finland\(^{891}\). The first director was Henrik Borgström, who initiated the bank founding, inspired by Swedish financial institutions. Borgström focused on both the inner and the foreign advances of the bank during his function\(^{892}\). For the following decade, SYP was the only commercial bank functioning in Finland. Ten years later, the Pohjoismaiden Osakepankki was established, and by their merger in 1919, the PYP bank became the largest commercial bank in Finland.

Among the members of the Board during the 1920s was Karl Stockmann, the son of the founder of the largest department store in Finland at that time; Alvar Renqvist, who was in charge of the publishing house Otava; and E.G. Palmén, politician, whose father was one of the initiators of the SYP foundation\(^{893}\). The clients of the bank were the largest Finnish (Swedish-speaking) companies, like, for example, the Wärtsilä Concern, the Karl Fazer Company (food production) and the Kaukas Company (wood processing). The pro-Swedish speaking orientation of the bank during this period clashed with the strident nationalism in Finnish-speaking cultural circles, and became a thorn in the side of its Finnish-speaking counterpart, the KOP bank, which tried to improve its position by poaching from the largest industrial companies\(^{894}\).

The KOP bank was established in 1889 more than twenty years after SYP was founded in a period which witnessed the growth of the pro-Finnish-speaking

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\(^{890}\) In 1975, the name was changed to Suomen Yhdyspankki, SYP. In 1995, the two largest Finnish banks, SYP and KOP, ceased to exist, due to their merger into one banking institution called Merita. With that, the language distinction completely disappeared. In 2001, Merita changed its name to Nordea, in pursuit of creating the northern European bank institution.

\(^{891}\) *Annual Report of PYP 1952*.

\(^{892}\) Lehmusvaara 1983:91.

\(^{893}\) von Fieandt 1970:24-25.

\(^{894}\) von Fieandt (1970:33-37) recalled in his memoirs the atmosphere of the 1920s. In 1924, the year when he began to work for PYP, the language issue was, in von Fieandt’s opinion, solved regarding the cultural and political spheres. However, in the business field, the Swedish language prevailed.
nationalistic movement. The group of so-called ‘pastors’ sons\textsuperscript{895} assisted with the foundation of the financial institution which would challenge the dominance of the power of the Swedish-speaking SYP, and help Finnish-speaking Finns to gain entry to the industrial elite\textsuperscript{896}. According to Kuisma, the rivalry between the KOP and SYP during the first two decades of the twentieth century contributed positively to the dynamism and lively competition of the industrial elite\textsuperscript{897}. During the first decade of the twentieth century, KOP’s importance increased, even if only for two years, so that in 1917 KOP achieved the position of being Finland’s biggest bank\textsuperscript{898}.

The KOP’s pro-Finnish ideology fitted well the context of the inter-war period when Finnishness and its strong support was the key concern. The KOP bank was also closely linked to the State. The KOP director, Mauri Honkajuuri, who succeeded J.K. Paasikivi, once claimed that whatever government was in power during the inter-war period, the KOP had its representative in it\textsuperscript{899}. On the other hand, the PYP was more business oriented and its clients were among the well-established industrial elite. One of the few bigger industrialists involved in the KOP was Rudolf Walden and his Paper Mills. The State company Enso-Gutzeit was also a client of the KOP.

During the 1950s, competition between the KOP and PYP continued. For most of that period, the PYP took the position of the largest commercial bank in Finland, based on balance sheet profit\textsuperscript{900}. However, in terms of the number of new branches founded after the war, the KOP fared better. In 1956, KOP had 257 branches all over Finland, including the rural area of Lapland, while the PYP had only 200\textsuperscript{901}. Also, the banking service improved, which attracted more clients from the general public. Hence, the number of employees increased. For example, in 1950, PYP employed only a thousand people; five years later, the number had doubled and female employees outnumbered males within the banking desk services\textsuperscript{902}.

\textsuperscript{895} Kuisma 1993: 63. Among the so-called ‘pastors’ sons’ were Otto Stenroth and Otto Hjelt (both had Swedish-speaking origins).
\textsuperscript{896} Jutikkala (1989:286) points out the nationalistic perception of the KOP bank. Its purpose was that “the leadership should be in Finnish-speaking possession” to support their business developments.
\textsuperscript{897} Kuisma 1993:64.
\textsuperscript{898} Lehmusvaara 1983:89. In 1919, PYP became the biggest bank in Finland, which was achieved by the merger of SYP and Pohjoismaiden Osakepankki.
\textsuperscript{899} von Fieandt 1970: 35.
\textsuperscript{900} The statement is based on the balance sheet profit from 1951, when the figures for the PYP bank were slightly higher than those for the KOP (Lehmusvaara 1983:89).
\textsuperscript{901} Annual Report of KOP 1956.
The differences between PYP and KOP lay mainly in their clients, and their approach towards international contacts. It might be argued that PYP maintained more foreign connections, and placed more emphasis on the necessity of the representative offices abroad than KOP. In 1956, according to the official statistics, PYP had contacts with almost two thousand foreign banks, maintaining its representative offices, for example, in San Francisco and Hong Kong. This was certainly influenced by the dimensions of the bank's investments and the identity of its clients, mostly the top companies involved in the metal and wood-processing industries. Basically, PYP mainly represented business interests during the 1950s, with less focus on counter services.

On the other hand, KOP remained the "bank for small men" during the 1950s, focusing more or less on clients in the sphere of agriculture, with customers like Valio (dairy production). The United Paper Mills remained one of the few industrial companies involved in KOP, although by the 1960s its investments troubled KOP. Moreover, the pro-Finnish speaking approach of the KOP bank had changed slightly after 1955, when the bank's director Virkkunen realised that the propagation of language preferences was no longer a sufficient strategy in gaining new clients, and had to be replaced by effective financial tactics.

The distinction between the directors was also reflected in the banks' engagements. Virkkunen was almost twenty years the junior of von Fieandt and became the director of KOP at the age of 39, while von Fieandt was 54 when he obtained the same post. Virkkunen was less experienced in the financial sphere, while von Fieandt had worked for PYP since 1924. Furthermore, Virkkunen's post in KOP might be characterised as stable, in contrast to von Fieandt's, whose post in 1955 was taken by Göran Ehmrooth. Relations between Ehmrooth and Virkkunen, through the competition

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903 The advertisement in Unitas periodical in 1956. Vihola (2000:95) mentions the well established foreign contacts of the bank.
904 Puukari (1962:15) emphasised the expansion of the bank's foreign trade activities, which was predetermined by the growing export figures of metal and wood processing production.
905 Vihola 2000:64, 206-207. Personal accounts comprised only 10 per cent of the total share in the bank's transactions during the 1950s; the largest share, more than 50 per cent, comprised the industrial companies.
907 Not until the beginning of the 1960s did the KOP gain important industrial clients like, e.g., the Neste Company, specialising in oil production (Lehmusvaara 1983:129).
908 Lehmusvaara 1983:102. Until then, Virkkunen was one of many who often focused on the pro-Finnish orientation of the KOP in his speeches.
909 Lehmusvaara 1983:89.
of the banks, were maintained at a friendly level until both retired from their positions\textsuperscript{910}.

The situation regarding the change in the leading position of PYP is worth mentioning in more detail. The position of Rainer von Fieandt amongst the members of the Board was not untroubled. Even if he was one of the best financial experts in Finland at that time\textsuperscript{911}, his personal conflicts with Göran Ehmrooth were one of the reasons why he left the post for the Bank of Finland. In 1945, when von Fieandt took his post in the bank, few people were in favour of him. Firstly, von Fieandt was on the so-called Black List for his war time pro-German connections. Secondly, von Fieandt was considered to be more pro-Finnish than pro-Swedish oriented\textsuperscript{912}, and he attempted to sustain the argument of better accessibility to the bank for the Finnish-speaking milieu. However, von Fieandt was elected to his post, even if the second candidate was Göran von Ehrooth, who enjoyed larger support but who gave his votes to von Fieandt. One of the reasons was Ehmrooth’s engagement in various other activities, such as his participation on the Boards of many companies\textsuperscript{913}, which was predetermined by his extensive family contacts.

In the end, the outside involvement of Ehmrooth led to confrontation between himself and von Fieandt, besides other disagreements pertaining to the financial affairs of the bank. Ehmrooth, whose family was well established amongst Finnish industrial circles, had immense business contacts, and his position amongst the important industrial clients of the PYP was more prestigious than that maintained by von Fieandt, who found this hard to accept\textsuperscript{914}. The offer of the director’s post of the bank of Finland in 1955 to von Fieandt seemed to resolve the mutual disharmony.

One of Ehmrooth’s jobs in the early 1950s was to assist with the split inside the United Paper Mills company. After the war, the differences between Juuso Walden and Carl G. Björnberg deepened, mainly due to the unclear division of their duties\textsuperscript{915} and their opposing views on the future of the company. Walden held more progressive

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\textsuperscript{910} Vihola 2000:204. Only during 1968, when Virkkunen was a presidential candidate, did the mutual contacts weaken, as Ehmrooth disapproved of them.

\textsuperscript{911} J.K. Paasikivi appreciated highly the skills and knowledge of von Fieandt (Lehmusvaara 1983:113).

\textsuperscript{912} Vihola 2000:84.

\textsuperscript{913} Vihola 2000:85.

\textsuperscript{914} Vihola 2000:85. Göran von Ehmrooth was involved, e.g., on the Boards of Kaukas and Serlachius. Family Ehmrooth was involved in the Kaukas and Tampella companies. The conflict between Göran Ehmrooth and von Fieandt is described in Ehmrooth’s memoirs (1991:101-104).

\textsuperscript{915} Nordberg 1982:98-99. Juuso Walden took the post of managing director, and Carl G. Björnberg was the Chairman of the Board. However, it was not clear who was in charge of what.
attitudes and wanted to provide investments within the company, even if loans were necessary. This did not correspond to Björnberg's aims; Björnberg further intended to switch the company's bank to the PYP instead of the KOP, which had always taken care of the United Paper Mills. In 1952, the company was divided in a way which satisfied both sides, a solution of Göran Ehmrooth, an economic advisor to the Björnberg family\textsuperscript{916}.

Although the division of the company had mainly an economic impact on the two sides involved in it, and was a battle between two families\textsuperscript{917}, it became a publicly discussed matter. It was presented in the press as a language struggle between Swedish- and Finnish-speaking interests, a representation which was underlined by the interference of the PYP and KOP banks. The most controversial article, published in the newly established 1952 \textit{Uusi Kuvalehti}, was written by Urho Kekkonen, and pointedly described the language struggle between the well-established Swedish-speaking and the hard-working Finnish-speaking industrialists\textsuperscript{918}.

This only shows that the conflict between the Swedish- and Finnish-speaking banks was not completely over by the 1950s. However, it did not reach the same dimensions as during the inter-war period. The issue was more or less political and economic investments were affected as a consequence. However, the fact is that during the 1950s, the KOP bank remained in the shadow of PYP regarding large economic investments, a fact which was predetermined by the business orientation of PYP, for whose purpose the bank was established. The KOP was still dogged with the image of being the "child of the National Revival"\textsuperscript{919} during the 1950s.

This brief analysis of the banks emphasises their importance during the 1950s, together with an insight as to what the banks represented within the period in question. Basically, three subsequent functions might be pointed out. The first function pertains to the language issue, which during the 1950s was mainly preserved by the banks' support for various cultural and political organisations and associations which were close to their ideological convictions, rather than by a clearly defined language policy. The

\textsuperscript{916} Nordberg 1982:100. By the division, the family traditions were \textit{de facto} preserved; the Björnberg family kept the Myllykoski Mills, Juuso Walden Simpele, Valkeakoski, and Jämsänkoski.
\textsuperscript{917} Nordberg 1982:99.
\textsuperscript{918} Tuuri 1999:354. Jutikkala 1989:288. In this context, it should be remembered that Kekkonen enjoyed a close relation with Juuso Walden, with whom (together with Virkkunen) he helped Ilmari Turja with the establishment of the \textit{Uusi Kuvalehti}, as mentioned earlier. Ehmrooth (1991:80-86) in his memoirs recalled the company division.
\textsuperscript{919} Lehmusvaara 1983:93.
second function comprised new banking trends after the war, with a growing number of new branches, modern financial services and advancements in foreign investments. Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly for this study, the crucial interconnection between the industrial circles, the banking sector and the cultural milieu has been emphasised, which characterised the non-governing elite in Finland with its small and closely defined dimensions.

Looking closely at the members of the banks’ Boards, numbered slightly over twenty during the post-war period, they were usually representatives of the largest industrial companies together with a few members from academic circles, mainly from the University of Helsinki and the School of Economics and Business Administration. Moreover, as was observed in Koste’s critical analysis of the Finnish business circles, members of the Board were commonly in family relations with one of the Bank’s directors, as for example in the case of the PYp\(^920\). In other words, such a trend led to the situation which was outlined at the beginning of this section, that economic power in Finland was basically secured by the interconnection between the bankers and the entrepreneurs.

\(^920\) Koste 1969:66.
5.4 Advances in education and their impact on recruitment into the elite

An analysis of the social changes which occurred during the post-war period would not be complete without mentioning the advances in education that happened as a result of the impact of the increase in new technologies which activated the demand for better skilled, and thus a better educated, work force. This trend was reflected in greater social mobility, which resulted in wider recruitment to the elite. The so-called entrepreneurial decline is often pointed out in connection with broadening the social elite, as a consequence of the rise in professional managers instead of traditional entrepreneurs.

What happened during the post-war period might be briefly characterised by the following. The post-war recovery and the growing economic transition brought necessary advances in the technical fields. New technologies, including mechanisation and gradual automation were introduced. They were aimed at bolstering post-war production and facilitating manual work. However, in order to achieve such technical progress, newly skilled and well-trained professionals were required who would be able to follow and work with the newest technical improvements. This resulted in the necessity for educational advances.

In the field of technical science, the focus was on engineering; within economics, business education directed its attention to management training and the organisation of administrative work. To provide the required education, new institutions, universities and colleges were established to satisfy the growing number of students. Through such a development, education became more accessible to a larger part of the population in comparison with the pre-war years, when education was more or less a privilege of the upper and upper-middle classes and was more or less related to matters of wealth and family background.

As business education developed in the United States and spread into Europe, it would perhaps be of interest, briefly, to raise the question of why management education developed in the United States and not in Europe. William Whyte claimed that one of the reasons was that in the United States family background and social contacts did not play such an important role as education did. This was largely because
many successful Americans were self-made men, mostly immigrants\textsuperscript{921}. Other reason might be the American school system, which was based less on the humanities than in Europe.

As education became more attainable, stratification and social mobility were affected. Family background, which was considered to be one of the important factors within the recruitment in the elite, was overshadowed by the importance of education. The transition from an agrarian to an affluent society, simply displayed the characteristics of an industrial society, in which the allocation of people to positions was based “on their achievements, especially their education and technical competence, rather than on traditional ascriptive characteristics such as family connections”\textsuperscript{922}.

The increasing opportunities in education and the widening recruitment into the elite led, in Schumpeter’s view, to the so-called entrepreneurial decline, when entrepreneurs, the founders and owners of companies, were replaced by bureaucratically-minded managers\textsuperscript{923}. A similar opinion to Schumpeter’s was shared by Burnham, who in 1943 predicted that the original business elite would be replaced by a skilled technical elite participating in shares in company stock\textsuperscript{924}. The owners of the companies were forced by the growing competition to become mere shareholders and were no longer outright owners as before. Such a situation, when social status might be achieved through educational merit and professional ability rather than by factors crucial to recruitment into the elite, is also called a meritocracy, a term unknown in post-war Finland; however, it was coined in the Great Britain in 1958 to describe of the rise of educational opportunities\textsuperscript{925}.

To what extent the entrepreneurial decline reflected the real situation in Finland might be observed from the statistics. Until the 1950s, most business leaders were company founders or their heirs; until 1929, more than 54 per cent of directors were company founders and 11 per cent were their heirs. The number of appointed directors

\textsuperscript{921} Whyte 1956:15. Locke (1989) focused in greater detail on the advances in education after 1940, and especially the developments in engineering and economics in Great Britain, France and Germany.

\textsuperscript{922} The definition is based on Marshall 1998:308-309.

\textsuperscript{923} Swedberg 1997:xii. A similar conclusion was drawn a year later, in 1943, by James Burnham (1943:28), who predicted that capitalist society would be replaced by managerial society, and that widening educational opportunities would be one of the causes. Burnham explicitly titled his book: Managerial Revolution.

\textsuperscript{924} Burnham 1943.

\textsuperscript{925} The term meritocracy was coined by Michael Young in his book The Rise of the Meritocracy 1870-2033, published in 1958.
was 34 per cent. In 1951, this number had risen to 79 per cent. The number of founders was just less than 6 per cent.926

5.4.1 The situation in Finland

In Finland, there is no extensive research on the educational background of the business or industrial elites, or on the impacts of the process of industrialisation on the societal changes after the war. The exception is a study on social mobility and the educational background of Finnish business leaders conducted by Oiva Laaksonen in 1962.927 Laaksonen focused from a sociological point of view on the origins of the Finnish business circle and the factors which influenced recruitment.

More recently, Susanna Fellman has explored the changes within the educational and career background of Finnish industrial managers during the period 1900-1975.928 Fellman came to the conclusion that at the beginning of the century, the family and other informal social networks formed the most prominent base for recruitment and further career, but professional and corporate networks gradually became more important. Fellman pointed out the significance of the 1960s decade, when major changes occurred929. However, she did not overlook the importance of the 1950s, which might be understood as a preparatory stage for the advances of the following decade.930 As well as educational opportunities widening during the 1950s due to Finnish participation in the Fulbright Programme-ASLA931, interest in organisational reforms arose within the big corporations, motivated by the American business style.932 Such a transition in Fellman’s view caused entrepreneurial careers to be replaced by

927 Laaksonen 1962. His study was completed as a PhD dissertation at the University of Helsinki, at the Department of Social Science under the supervision of Heikki Waris and Erik Allardt, who were, as already noted, developers of social history and sociology in Finland during the post-war period and had immense international experience, mainly from US universities.
928 Fellman 2000. Within the period of her research, Fellman based her analysis on 324 members of business circles (Fellman 2000:26). Even if it is not of direct importance, it might be interesting to mention that among 324 business leaders, only two are female, and both got their positions only after the death of their husbands (Fellman 2000:26).
929 Fellman 2000:223.
930 Fellman 2000:43. Fellman claimed that during the 1950s, the importance of family relations decreased.
931 Fellman 2000:89.
932 Fellman 2000:41-42. The organisational and structural changes within enterprises were not only a feature of the post-war period, but already during the 1920s and 1930s some industrialists were keen on so-called systematic planning work, systematisk planeringsarbete (Fellman 2000:37).
bureaucratic careers, which predominated with the advances within business and technical education\(^{933}\).

Even if both studies are based on perceptions mainly influenced by the forty year gap and a different methodological framework, two main points might be drawn from both of these analyses. Firstly, the post-war period witnessed a transition from entrepreneurial to managerial business leadership, and secondly until that period there was no general perception of business and management education.

### Development in the educational sphere

During the 1950s, there were three Schools of Economics and Business Administration in Finland which were competent to provide full Economic higher education\(^{934}\). One of them was the Helsinki School of Economics and Business Administration (*Helsingin Kauppakorkeakoulu*), which was established in 1911. Before then, a business education in Finland was hardly possible, as until the late 1880s any desires for founding an educational institution which would provide a business training went unheeded\(^{935}\). Until then, business ability and acquaintance was considered to be a mythical strength which one could only be born with\(^{936}\). Finns who were interested in gaining any kind of business training (most were, of course, relatives of the country’s entrepreneurs) were forced to travel abroad\(^{937}\). With the establishment of the School of Economics and Business Administration, Finns had the possibility of obtaining basic economic knowledge in their own language, and Finnish banks, insurance and industrial companies could employ people who were trained in the Finnish environment in Finnish circumstances\(^{938}\).

However, not until the 1950s did the School of Economics also provide a theoretical economic education and focus on research, which until then was still

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\(^{933}\) Fellman 2000:49,180.

\(^{934}\) Besides the Helsinki School of Economics, there was the Swedish-speaking Svenska Handelshögsholan, and the School of Economics in Turku established in 1950. The account does not include the Department of Economics at the Åbo Academy (Michelsen 2001:169).


\(^{936}\) Michelsen 2001:14. A similar conclusion was reached by Laaksonen and Fellman. That it was widely believed that a business ability could not be acquired was also pointed out by Puukari (1955:152).

\(^{937}\) A popular destination was Germany or France (Fellman 2000:209).

\(^{938}\) Michelsen 2001:28. The study programme at the School of Economics included subjects such as political economy, statistics, and accounting, and the school offered a large range of foreign languages, like, e.g., German, English, French and Russian (Michelsen 2001:31).
understood to be the dominant feature of the University of Helsinki. This situation changed during the first post-war decade, when business training with a widening emphasis on management education gained in importance. But it was not until the end of the 1960s that the significance of business training grew significantly, and research especially went through an immense development, the 1950s marking the first wave of interest in theoretical economic expertise. The Journal of Business Economics (Liiketaloudellinen Aikakauskirja) began to be published as an official periodical of the School. It was an important step forward, not only because most articles had summaries in English in order to be more accessible, but also because it was a platform for publishing the results of economic analyses.

One of the topics which was often discussed in the pages of the Journal was the dimension of business and management education in Finland and its further development. In 1955, Arvo Puukari outlined the absolute necessity of executive education which was by that time taking the first steps in its development. Two years later, Professor Gunnar Fougstedt conducted a study of the contemporary situation with a prognosis on the prospects of the graduates of the School of Economics. Fougstedt tried to evaluate the situation concerning the number of students of economics, which was to a certain extent limited by the lack of teachers, and confined the prognosis to twenty years, during which the “whole number of the managers, administrative and clerical employees” would grow as a result of the demands of the market.

The advances in business and management education during the 1950s were also significantly influenced by the opportunities for Finnish students and scholars to travel to the United States, from where most of the ideas came. Through the ASLA, Finns at American universities were able to study new economic trends with a focus on management organisation. After their return to Finland, they evaluated their experience and shared new research methods with their colleagues. Besides the ASLA programme, there existed other supportive programmes for economic studies, like for example the Ford Foundation, which closely co-operated with the Helsinki School of

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942 Fougstedt 1957:156-175. According to Fougstedt, in 1950 in Finland there were 4130 Bachelors of Commercial Science (BCSc); after five years, the number was already 5,659. Michelsen 2001:227.
Economics[^4]. Professors Henrik Virkkunen (a relative of Matti Virkkunen) and Lars Wahlbäck especially were actively involved in publishing articles about the new management trends in the United States, with a focus on consulting and company organisations. Most of their references to the English written literature were published in Kehittvää Liikeenjohto (Developments in Business Leadership) and Yrittäjästalous (Business Economics).

Not only economic education and hence the status of a manager gained in importance during the post-war period. Due to the arrival of new technologies and the necessity of a large post-war recovery, which in Finland was made more difficult by paying off war reparations, the significance of technical education and the social prestige of the engineering profession clearly increased[^45]. The demand for new and well-qualified people in the field of engineering rose rapidly to maintain the process of industrialisation, with expanding mechanisation, which brought with it a new labour division[^46]. Engineering had a longer tradition in Finland than economic education had, and engineers, whose status was traditionally held in high esteem and fully recognised, held a significant role within the main branches of Finnish industry, such as paper and wood manufacturing[^47]. Before the war, many aspirants of technical training went to study abroad, especially in Germany and Scandinavia, as the technical sciences were well developed in comparison with Finland, especially with reference to the fully equipped laboratories[^48].

After the war, similar opportunities occurred within business training. The Fulbright programme increased in importance, and enabled Finns to carry on professional research in the most technically developed conditions. In Finland, the Helsinki Technical University (Finland Institute of Technology-Teknillinen Korkeakoulu) had an important role. The new university campus was opened at the beginning of the 1950s as the number of students rapidly increased and the old space was no longer sufficient[^49]. The Rector of the School, Martti Lévon (1892-1965),

[^4]: Fellman 2000:89.
[^42]: Michelsen 1999:332.
[^44]: Michelsen’s book (1999) recalled in detail the position of technicians and engineers in Finland. Michelsen (1999:121) reflected on the perception of engineers by the Finnish cultural milieu at the end of the nineteenth century. For the cultural milieu, the picture of industrial Finland was connected with a peaceful countryside and not the heavy work of engineers.
[^45]: Michelsen 1999:119, 143. Also, German and British engineers were often employed in Finnish enterprises.
engaged actively in the organisation of the School and supported further technical education. Lévon, who himself had a degree in electrical engineering, was aware of the situation which occurred after the war with the acceleration of new technologies. He advocated more research in the technical fields and special training for forest industry engineers\textsuperscript{950}. The opening of the University in Oulu, at the end of the 1950s, and the Technical University at Tampere a decade later, contributed to the engineering development that Lévon supported.

In relation to the advances, whether in technical or business education, the growing number of female students should be mentioned. As already noted, women were not hugely represented within the industrial and banking sectors, where only a very small fraction were involved. The humanities, like language and art, were considered more traditional disciplines to be read by female students\textsuperscript{951}. However, like the rising number of female students at the University of Helsinki, a phenomenon which began during the war, the technical and business schools also witnessed the increasing interest of young females after the war. During the 1940s, sixty-three male and four female students concluded their BCSc studies at the Helsinki School of Economics and Business Administration, in comparison with a decade later, when the number of male students doubled and fifteen female students were awarded the degree\textsuperscript{952}. Furthermore, an article published in 1956, concerning as the title suggests "women in a men's world", gave an account of female engineers and architects estimating the number to be around 400 who, although not being in the leading posts, fully participated in the technical developments in post-war Finland\textsuperscript{953}.

The 1960s-the decade of the managerial elite?

Heikki Waris argued that due to the changes in education and the technical advances, recruitment into the elite widened in post-war Finland. It became easier to aspire to industrial circles, especially in comparison with the situation in the nineteenth century\textsuperscript{954}. In contrast, Antti Eskola disagreed with Waris, and claimed that social

\textsuperscript{950} Lévon often published his opinions on education in the journal Paperi ja Puu, e.g., 1952, # 1; 1957, #3; 1958, #1).
\textsuperscript{951} Kolbe 1993:253.
\textsuperscript{952} Kauppi 1961:127. Female students prevailed in the administration courses (secretaries), with 255 women to 4 men during 1956-1960.
\textsuperscript{953} Teollisuuslehti 1956, #6-7.
\textsuperscript{954} Waris 1968:38, quoted in Alestalo 1972:193.
mobility in Finland was still under the influence of the upper social class, and that recruitment was more or less difficult through educational advances alone.\(^{955}\) Alestalo, who analysed both the above mentioned attitudes, concluded that education affected the social stratification in post-war Finland\(^{956}\).

There is a bit of truth in each of these arguments. Finnish society was open to recruitment from outside after the war and many new opportunities existed. This means that Heikki Waris' observation is correct. However, social contacts and family background remained significant factors in recruitment into the elite, which applies to Eskola's argument about the still prevailing influences of the upper class. And finally, education did make an impact on social stratification, as Alestalo pointed out. However, in consequence it did not much affect recruitment into the elite.

What is essential is to ask whether the managerial revolution, as proclaimed by Burnham, took place in Finland during the early 1960s, or whether Finnish industrial circles more or less consisted of the sons of patriarchal entrepreneurs and appointed directors of the State companies. To clarify the situation, a few examples can be provided which will illustrate the actual situation during the late 1950s and 1960s.

Family traditions were maintained in companies like Kaukas, where the family von Julin held the directorship; but instead of Jacob von Julin, Casimir Ehmrooth took the post in 1967. A similar trend might be observed in other family-owned companies like Serlachius and Rosenlew. The only distinction between the successors and predecessors was the generation difference. The first were born at the beginning of the twentieth century and were educated and trained in the atmosphere of the inter-war period, as analysed above; the latter belonged to the generation born in the 1930s, and had already completed their education by the post-war period, taking advantage of new educational opportunities.

In the United Paper Mills, the family traditions were interrupted and Juuso Walden was replaced by Niilo Hakkarainen in 1969. In 1962, Wilhelm Wahlforss and William Lehtinen were replaced by Bertel Långhjelm and Pentti Halle, who were both born in the first decade of the twentieth century. Only after their resignation in the early 1970s did the generation switch happen with the arrival of managing directors educated in the post-war period.

\(^{956}\) Alestalo 1972:205-206.
Although there is a tendency to conclude that radical change happened and that the new directors were of the managerial generation, arguably this would be a mistaken observation. What happened was that in the family-owned companies, the old generation, who represented the first entrepreneurs, only in a few cases continued in their traditions by bequeathing the post to a member of the younger generation. The economic power thus remained in the hands of the influential 'Twenty families' as claimed by Koste in 1969. In the case of the State companies, or companies under the strains of economic mergers, the managing directors of the older generation were replaced by the younger, who were appointed to their post a the competitive basis in terms of their experience, education and contacts.

In other words, changes in terms of economic influence were superficial, as the old families maintained their power. What was new and common, whether for directors of State or private companies, were the new managerial opportunities. The younger generation became acquainted with modern management practices and trends, with the emphasis on advances in company organisation and leadership. From this perspective, there existed a difference between the older and younger generations.

Even if the 1950s brought changes and advances in education, especially in business administration which was more developed during the 1960s, it might be argued that the boom of the MBA and executive management as evolved in the USA did not reach Finland until the 1990s with the widespread appearance of American consultant and management companies and thus the development of a managerial elite in the sense of James Burnham. Furthermore, the increasing significance of the Nokia company during the last decade of the twentieth century has brought changes in the process of recruitment, particularly in terms of Finnish-speaking Finns. Until then, it was often emphasised that the business and financial spheres were 'more suitable' for the Swedish speakers, while humanities and politics were the domain of the Finnish-speaking Finns. Although such an assumption was fully perceived during the post-war period, it had changed in the 1990s, when most students longed for a career at Nokia rather than in the civil service.
5.5 The crossover between the cultural and industrial-banking elites

In the following paragraphs, a brief comparison between the cultural and industrial-banking elite will be provided, together with an overview of their mutual interaction. In analysing the recruitment of the elites, the question arises whether the recruitment factors were of the same importance or any changes occurred after the 1950s in comparison with the pre-war situation.

Family background and social contacts were the dominant factors in recruitment into the industrial-banking elite. Although education played to a certain extent a secondary role during the inter-war period, members of the industrial-banking elite were well educated with international experience. After the war, the two first factors maintained their importance, with an increasing emphasis on the educational advances, particularly in Economics and Business Administration.

In terms of the cultural elite, origins in a well-established family were a clear advantage and de facto granted entry into the elite, but education was the key to being recruited. This was particularly important for young adepts from the rural areas, for whom the academic degree was the only way to enter the elite. Similarly, the social contacts built up during university studies were of great significance in maintaining the social network of links and connections. After the war, with the increasing accessibility of the education, the recruitment became more competitive as a large number of people could achieve academic degrees. Although education and essential international experience were of the key importance for the recruitment, the family background and social contacts maintained its advantageous character.

Moreover, inheritance was one of the key factors within recruitment into the industrial-banking elite, where for a long time a limited number of wealthy, usually Swedish-speaking, families dominated. In contrast, inheritance was of minor significance within the cultural elite. No academic post could be inherited. Similarly, marriages as an advantageous element in recruitment did not play a role within the context of the cultural elite, and it happened only sporadically that a person was recruited into the cultural elite on the basis of marital connections. However, an interesting example might be provided, when Kustaa Vilkuna’s marriage widened his
social engagements and assisted in his involvement in industrial circles, as through his wife Vilkuna became a relative of Herlin's family.\footnote{The Herlin family owned the Kone Company.}

In general, the political engagement differs between the cultural and industrial-banking elite. The latter is usually inspired to become involved in political activities by its business interests, hoping to facilitate the economic development of its companies. The cultural elite considers political involvement more or less to be its ideological obligation. From this perspective, Burnham claims that

the managers themselves [have not] been constructing and propagating their own ideologies; this has been, and is being done for the most part by intellectuals, writers, philosophers.\footnote{Burnham 1943:70.}

Industrialists might be regarded as being an influential factor within society, as economic power is often closely connected with the process of decision-making; however, the cultural elite often becomes a part of the government and thus holds direct political influence. Moreover, if the political convictions of the industrial elite might be a reflection of their family background and thereby motivated by business advantages, in the case of the cultural elite, social background does not have to play such an extensive role in the creation of political convictions.\footnote{E.g., the case of Kustaa Vilkuna, who became a member of the Agrarian Party in 1945 (even if the real motivation for his membership was not party policy but to support his friend Kekkonen), which did not reflect family traditions, which were more or less connected with the more conservative political parties (Herlin 1993:213).}

In the context of the industrial-banking elite, geographical belonging has not been mentioned as it was with the members of the cultural elite. It does not mean that this element played a minor role in the subsequent political and social involvement of the industrialists. However, the significance of the student corporations was negligible within the industrial circles, and moreover their offices were mainly based in Helsinki, which was a decisive location for further business contacts abroad. In spite of that, many industrialists, like, for example Wahlforss, leaned towards Karelia. Such support was based on sympathies with the Karelian people, as well as on the fact that most factories and thus raw material sources were located in Karelia.
Although the cultural and industrial-banking elites are investigated separately and their relationship with the governing elite is analysed generally, it might be worth looking briefly at their mutual interaction. This is particularly important in the case of Finland, where the social circles are small and the social engagement of their members is often intertwined. Basically, a question which will be raised here is where the members of the cultural and industrial-banking elites met, and on that principles their participation in various activities was based.

One of the places where the cultural and industrial elites came across each other was on the Boards of large industrial companies and the KOP and PYP banks. For example, twenty members sat on the Board of the PYP bank, from which one chair each was usually taken by representatives of the University, the School of Economics and Business Administration, the City of Helsinki and the Finnish Academy or the Court of Justice. Taking the year 1956 as an example, next to the industrialists on the Board of PYP were Heikki Reenpää, a director of Otava publishing house, and Bruno Suviranta, a professor at the School of Economics and Business Administration in Helsinki.

Pointing out the Board as a ‘meeting place’ for the analysed elites, various criteria which played a role in their nomination might be outlined; firstly, their emergence was commonly reciprocal, which means that whether or not an academic sat on the Board of the Bank, a banker often participated in academic meetings or associations. Secondly, family connections played a certain role, especially regarding the Ehrnrooth family and their numerous industrial and cultural activities. Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly, presence on the Board was connected with similar political or ideological sympathies. For example, people involved in the KOP for whom the idea of Finnishness was close often supported the activities of the Finnish Cultural Fund and vice versa.

The government might also be considered a place where the cultural and industrial elite met. Though this was mainly a phenomenon of the 1930s and 1940s when, as noted above, the members of the academic world in particular often became involved in high politics, it also occurred during the post-war period. For example, during the short period 1957-1958, Heikki Waris held the post of Minister of Social Affairs in Rainer von Fieandt’s government. Moreover, the political parties in which

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962 E.g., during the war Rudolf Walden was Minister of Defence in Edwin Linkomies’ government.
most industrialists and academics were active or to which they showed their sympathies
initiated the mutual interaction, which was, logically, enriched by the third group, the
politicians.

Further interaction between the cultural and industrial-banking elites happened
commonly at various social events or discussion occasions, which were usually
organised by leading periodicals like Ylioppilaslehti, when both groups often expressed
their views. Such events were largely connected with the financial involvement of the
industrial-banking elite who, more or less in accordance with their convictions,
supported such events as the Paasikivi Society engagements.

Besides this, the unofficial meetings of the cultural and industrial-banking elites
should be taken into consideration. Amongst the most popular places was the Pörssiv
Klubi, located close to the University of Helsinki, where Eljas Erkko, Kustaa Vilkuna
and Edwin Linkomies were often guests. The Seurahuone, Hotel Kämp (where Marshall
Mannerheim had his own permanent room) and Hotel Savoy were favourites of Juuso
Walden and Matti Virkkunen.

The significance of the mutual interaction between the cultural milieu and
industrialists lies mostly in two aspects. Firstly, it shows the small dimension of the
non-governing elite in Finland, which is often intertwined with family links, though
recruitment from outside circles was a common feature of the post-war period. The
second aspect is more prosaic and concerns the importance of their interaction
influencing the financial contributions of the industrialists to cultural developments.
Many cultural and scholarly activities would be difficult to achieve without financial
support. However, it should not be assumed that, in general, the cultural milieu
depended on its industrial counterpart and that there was nothing to offer reciprocally.
Reasons exist why financial donations are made, reasons which are carefully chosen
according to their cultural and political purposes.

Besides the place of mutual interaction, the dimensions in which the economic
situation was discussed within the cultural elite might be outlined. The economic and
social advancements and industrialisation were closely observed by academics from the

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963 Unofficial meetings at Helsinki restaurants, often connected with the high consumption of alcohol,
were particular features of the Finnish political, industrial and cultural circles. E.g., in her study of Sylvi
Kekkonen (1900-1974), Mattsson (2000:141) mentions Kekkonen's many evenings out. Besides this, an
important part of meetings, whether amongst the governing or non-governing elite, was the sauna. 'Sauna
invitations' played a specific part in Finnish political and economic life.
School of Economics and Business Administration in Helsinki. Amongst the leading experts of the post-war period were Gunnar Fougstedt, Henrik Virkkunen and Jaakko Honka. The research conducted by Fougstedt regarding business education has already been mentioned above; however, Fougstedt significantly contributed to research in economic theory in general. At the University of Helsinki, the economic transition and its impact on societal structure was followed more by the academics in the department of Social History and Sociology.

Not until the end of the 1950s did interest in the economic transition and the process of industrialisation become the main focus with the cultural circles. Until then, as mentioned above, it was mostly closely related experts on this topic who were connected with it. At the turn of the decade, the situation changed, mainly due to a slow but certain exchange between the older and younger generations, which influenced the perception of economic, political and cultural issues. Until then, the cultural elite was too preoccupied with their own situation and with searching for their own position within the new political conditions\(^6\). In 1959, the so-called Student Economic Information Campaign (*Ylioppilaiden Taloudellinen Valituskampanja, YTV 59*) was established by the University of Helsinki, and the *Ylioppilaslehti* began to inform its readers about the economic situation\(^7\).

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\(^6\) It might be interesting to mention that during the National Revival, in the second half of the nineteenth century, the Finnish philosopher J.V. Snellman commented on education. Whether he was in favour or not, the issue here is that he was keen on the developments in economic and technical education (Michelsen 1999:147).

\(^7\) *Ylioppilaslehti* 1959, # 28. Kolbe (1996:21) observed in the establishment of the YTV a break with the 1950s, which she characterised as a period of tradition, and the entry of the progressive 1960s.
There are exceptional beings: there is no exceptional society.\textsuperscript{966}

CONCLUSION

I believe that my thesis offers new ideas for further research. It challenges the conceptions of elitism during the transitional period, and is about the reactions of Finnish society to it. It provides analyses of the cultural and industrial-banking elites and it thus reveals a picture of Finland during the transitional period of the 1950s. It presents the concept of the non-governing elite in the Finnish context, which is of significance, as the governing (ruling) elite usually has the main focus. Additionally, it contributes to tracing the cultural atmosphere of the 1950s by making distinctions between the two analysed elites in terms of their adaptability to post-war political re-orientation.

In the following paragraphs, the suggested hypotheses will be addressed and possible implications of the thesis for further research will be discussed. The primary question from this study is: what are the wider implications of my thesis? Basically, three points can be outlined: firstly, what this study can say about the theory of elitism, why the theory is of significance and what the possible theoretical implications are; secondly, what the theory of elitism reveals about Finland in the fifties based on the suggested hypotheses and why my study does not go beyond the 1950s; and thirdly, what the further relevance of my hypotheses is for other contexts.

1.

The theory of elitism is the key to my analysis. This is due to the significance of the elites within the transitional period. To explain this, the following has to be emphasised in the context of my work. An elite is, in general, more sensitive towards transitions. As a non-static social group, an elite emerges from the political and social changes which modify its future structure. The analysis of the inner structure of an elite

\textsuperscript{966} Aron 1957:97.
reveals more about the history of a society; therefore, social background, origins and education are discussed. This means that by revealing the elements of historical developments the study of elitism provides a complex account of a society subjected to transition.

Furthermore, the recognition of the governing and non-governing elites, in accordance with Vilfredo Pareto, permits even more detailed analysis. This means that not only the governing (ruling) elite with its political power is scrutinised, but that also the other elites operating within society are analysed in terms of their non-political influence. This enables the observation of both political and historical advances and thus an understanding of the emerging transition. Moreover, contrasting two elites, which differ in their role, helps to explain developments from various societal angles.

Vilfredo Pareto, whose approach is of crucial importance to my study, focussed on the inner structure of an elite in terms of recruitment, circulation and adaptability. To follow his thesis allows the placing of questions as to who the elite is, how one becomes a member of an elite, and what kind of mutual interaction exists among elites. The responses lead to an investigation of the changes which occur in a society during a period of transition.

Of particular importance is the interaction between the governing and non-governing elites. In the context of my work, it means that we have to look at the relations between the cultural elite and the State, and the industrial-banking elite and the State. The character of such interaction suggests what kind of status the members of the elite have and to what extent they are dependent on the State authorities, which influences their further involvement.

There are two opposing tendencies. The first one, strongly supported by Julien Benda, is that the members of the cultural elite (who can be called intellectuals or intelligentsia, depending on the context) are free of any political engagements. The second tendency approves of the political interference of the cultural elite, particularly during the periods when national freedom is under threat. In the case of the industrial-banking elite, the situation appears to be simpler. Industrialists are more closely connected with State authorities on the basis of their social role. As defined by Keller, industrialists pursue their own business affairs, which represent the national interests. However, the business interests have to be separated from political dishonesty leading to corruption.
In Finland, the connection between the cultural elite, represented by members of the University of Helsinki and the old Academy of Finland, and the State is traditionally regarded as closely intertwined. Historically, such a relation developed during the nineteenth century, when being educated meant to represent the nation in relation to the State\(^\text{66}\). In other words, education was targeted at future civil servants. Moreover, in Finland, the participation of academics in government, particularly during the inter-war period, was unusually high. This, of course, has influenced the identity of the cultural elite, whose members have become closely associated with the governing elite and, although many did not directly take a role in political decision making, they were perceived as standing 'behind the political scene'. Such a close interrelation is the key to understanding the elite's involvement during the transitional period. Also, it foreshadows the elite's adaptability on such occasions.

The hypothesis of my dissertation has been based on the assumption that the adaptability of the cultural and industrial-banking elites was similar during the post-war decade. One of the reasons for such a claim was that the conditions for adaptation were identical for both elites, and thus the adaptability would be similar. The question remains whether the hypothesis was correct or whether there was a clear distinction between the adaptability of these two elites, and if there was, why was it like that?

The political and economic circumstances were similar for each of the analysed elites. The 1950s in Finland was a transitional period, which means the elite was on the move. There were two ways to deal with the situation which arose: to react and to adapt to new circumstances, or to oppose them and to lose position. The first option required a new identity, and an opening up of the recruitment process to new members. The latter option meant that the preservation of the current status was impossible. The main question was how to react to the changes occasioned by the transition and how to retain position.

Basically, there were political, economic, social and cultural transitions which, even if they varied in their impact, are linked. The changes in Finnish foreign policy were crucial and subsequently affected economic arrangements. This mainly related to

\(^\text{66}\) Alapuro 1989:147.
the industrial-banking elite who had to deal with them. In other words, the post-war political changes were projected in the direction of foreign trade. An important step was that the mutual interaction between the industrialists and politicians widened as the latter assumed an important role in negotiations in newly established trade agreements. Until then, the responsibility for foreign trade was mainly assumed by the industrialists themselves when, during the inter-war period, they developed smoothly functioning business arrangements.

The economic transformation undermined the social changes which began in Finland during the 1950s, and its impacts were visible a decade later. The importance of the industry increased with the slow decline of the agrarian population. This caused conflict between urban dwellers (modernity) and peasantry (tradition). The cultural transition played an important role in these conflicts, with the penetration of modern American influences and the resistance of the old countryside culture.

Class stratification was important in terms of changes in the elite’s structure. With the rise of the middle class, the other social classes decreased in number. Although the growing accessibility of education brought employment advantages, it also influenced the social position of the educated class. Its privileged status began to decline with the growing number of educated people.

Despite the fact that the conditions for adaptation were similar, the social role and responsibility between the cultural and industrial-banking elites varied and caused variation in their post-war adaptability. The general role of the industrial-banking elite is to support economic developments and to be engaged in economic reforms which are closely connected with political tactics. This meant that the industrial-banking elite was aware of the possible business losses which they would suffer if their reactions were inappropriate or inflexible. They were less likely to allow to influence their Finnish nationalistic past than their cultural counterparts, who were not likely to experience financial deficits by their wavering behaviour and an inability to identify with post-war cultural needs. Moreover, the adaptability of the industrial-banking elite also showed their dependence on the political situation in terms of their business success. Without political stability, their enterprises would be unable to achieve the planned results, and this would lead to their economic collapse. Such reliance did not exist in the context of the cultural elite who, aware of its responsibility for carrying the intellectual burden, was constricted by such pressures.
The adaptability of the industrial-banking elite was also influenced by the fact that its members defined its post-war identity. As business negotiations with the Soviet Union were mainly led by politicians, the industrialists carried out the responsibility for Finnish integration with Western economic structures. The decisive role of the industrialists in economic negotiations created their new post-war identity, as they were fully aware of the close relation between business and political interests. This facilitated their adaptability to post-war political circumstances.

The question remains whether the members of the industrial-banking elite experienced the 'inner' and 'public' adaptation of their cultural counterpart. The industrialists' inner adaptation was not in such clear contrast to their public involvement. This was caused by their different social role, focussed more on business interests than ideological values. However, industrialists also adjusted their business needs to political circumstances, for example, in terms of their engagement in the Finland-Soviet Union Society.

For the cultural elite, the 'inner' and 'public' adaptation was of great significance. Their attitude towards political developments was fully in accordance with the post-war political awareness, with carefully pronounced opinions and cautiously managed dangerous thoughts. However, their pre-war patriotic feelings did not disappear. They were rather transformed into various engagements in cultural funds and institutions whose aim was to strengthen the national esteem. The clear distinction between the public and inner adaptation was caused by the social role and responsibility of the cultural elite. On the one hand, the sense of upholding national unity and identity, and on the other upholding the official political line affected their dual adaptation.

The atmosphere of political awareness placed restraint on the cultural and political involvement of the cultural elite, who could not define their new identity in post-war Finland. This was caused by a missing diversity and a lack of self-reflection, particularly in terms of the comprehension of painful history. The cultural elite had a hard time coming to terms with the past, which crippled their ability to challenge the future. The apparent disillusion with political developments was well observed in the character of the activities the cultural elite became involved in as they were targeted to uphold the patriotic interests.

Arguably, this indicates that although the political conditions were similar for the members of the cultural and industrial-banking elites, their adaptability varied due to
their different social roles and responsibilities. The industrial-banking elite was more responsive to the changes and less dependent on the Finnish inter-war ideology than the cultural elite, who conformed to the post-war situation.

Moreover, the adaptability was influenced by the process of recruitment into the elite. The second hypothesis of my study has suggested that the post-war economic and social advances influenced the order of importance of the recruitment factors. This would indicate that the so-called older generation, whose members were recruited into the elite during the inter-war period, experienced different conditions for recruitment from the so-called younger generation, whose members were recruited during the analysed decade. Such an assumption has been established as the result of the educational changes occurring during the 1950s, when education became more easily accessible and family contacts appeared to lose their importance.

However, the reality was different. The truth is that education became a significant factor within recruitment, but family background and social contacts maintained their importance. What had changed were the circumstances of the recruitment, with the new political agenda and widening educational opportunities. Although new members of the industrial-banking elite emerged from the political and economic transformations, a managerial elite had not yet been created. What had happened was that the concept of so-called administrative and managerial education penetrated into Finland from the United States and became widely available. However, new recruits into the industrial-banking elite were still largely from the old well established families, though economic mergers opened a few new opportunities for the ‘outsiders’. A similar situation occurred within the cultural elite. Although the number of students of agrarian origin increased in terms of educational opportunities, only a few achieved the top elitist positions.

Arguably, this resulted in the conflicts of the late 1960s, when apparent changes began to occur in Finnish society. This was caused by the entry of members of a new generation who had no association with the inter-war or post-war decades. They took part in a ‘rebellion’ against the old, that is the traditions of the 1950s. This study does not go into any greater detail with this 1960s generation. The reasons for such a strict limitation to the 1950s is caused by a sharp distinction between the 1950s and 1960s and the fact that a new elite emerged from the changes of the 1960s. In other words, an analysis of the 1960s would demand a detailed investigation which would take us
beyond the peculiarities of the 1950s. However, to assist with explaining the differences between these two decades, each generation’s aims and desires should be outlined with reference to the 1960s.

The analysed older generation of the cultural elite, which is of great significance in my study, was already firmly established during the 1950s. Its members had the greatest difficulties in adapting to the post-war circumstances. However, in the spirit of the Fennoman traditions, they accepted the situation which resulted in their maintaining their social positions. Although no political opposition and political lobby against the post-war conditions existed, inter-war patriotism survived in the form of ‘inner’ adaptation, expressed in ‘inventing traditions’. Although by the late 1960s, most members of the older generation had passed away, a few like, for example, L.A. Puntila, still exercised influence.

What is peculiar about the younger generation analysed in this study is the academic and political success which they achieved during their career lives. Many of them became holders of professorships early in their academic career, for example Erik Allardt and Jan-Magnus Jansson. Many were actively involved in Finnish political life, like Jaakko Iloniemi and Jaakko Numminen. Jan-Magnus Jansson was even one of the candidates for the presidency in 1982. In general, their societal influence increased during the 1950s, when they were recruited into the elite, and in many cases have lasted until today. In other words, they were all vaikuttajat, influential figures, during the second half of the twentieth century. From this perspective, they fully profited from the open recruitment into the elite during the post-war period and thus later replaced the members of the older generation. Moreover, they ‘profited’ from the political situation, as they were Kekkonen’s vaikuttajat, an influential group characteristic of Finnish society during the second half of the twentieth century.

With regard to their academic approaches, the younger generation differed from the older in their broader international experience. The latter had difficulties in accepting new scholarly methods, underestimating the significance of the social sciences and their possible contribution to history. The younger generation was better acquainted with post-war academic methodology as they were often the developers of new scholarly disciplines in Finland.

Jaakko Iloniemi worked for the national radio station (Yleisradio) as a foreign political commentator. In 1959, he was co-author (the average age of the authors was 32) of the book "Kylmä rauhan maailma"
In terms of their political affiliations, the younger generation was under the political influence of their older counterparts. Although the members of the younger generation did not experience the inter-war cultural atmosphere and only a few of them were at the war front, their political convictions were influenced by the atmosphere of post-war political awareness. They acknowledged the existence of dangerous thoughts and in accordance with the political atmosphere, they expressed their political views cautiously.

The generation which emerged from the societal changes of the middle 1960s was a completely new generation, particularly in terms of their political engagements. Under the influence of political activism, the late 1960s witnessed an increasing interest in the problems of the so-called Third World Countries and the issues of pacifism. Such involvement was strange to the previous two generations. The sudden wave of internationalism, which was a result of the broader international contacts established during the 1950s, contrasted with the atmosphere of post-war Finnish patriotism. This reflected on the direct influence of the older generation and their post-war principles, which weakened.

Inspired by the improving economic and social conditions and the political situation, the new generation aimed to be different than their parents, to be radical in terms of their political affiliations. With the increasing number of students, their societal and political role proliferated. Such circumstances illustrate the sharp distinction between the conservative 1950s and the ‘rebellious’ 1960s. Although this confirms the limitations of my study to the first post-war decade, the question remains whether any kind of connection existed between the 1950s and 1960s, or whether they were two separate decades in spirit. Kolbe calls the 1960s the magic period, influenced by the aura of the slogans claiming freedom and love. The fact is that the traditions of the 1950s moved on and eventually passed away, the nostalgia of the inter-war period disappeared, and the break towards the future (murros) was made.

To explore the differences or similarities, the 1950s will be contrasted with the 1960s on the basis of the analyses that my study has provided. During the 1950s, history represented the science of national significance. Historians were the preachers of the nation, providing instructions on how to deal with the past and the future. The social
sciences, such as sociology and anthropology, scarcely achieved academic recognition. A positivistic approach, with the focus on knowledge and statistical data, prevailed in accordance with the post-war methodology and influenced by political awareness. In contrast, during the late 1960s, with political activism and an interest in a society, sociology became popularised and the Marxist approach reached Finnish academic circles. Under such influences, Finnish patriotism in its 1950s form waned.

In terms of publications during the 1950s, war literature dominated, with memoirs, and novels describing the past. Väinö Linna's Unknown Soldier was misunderstood by the cultural elite; Yrjö Leino's memoirs were prohibited. A decade later, the literary and sociological significance of Linna was recognised. If during the 1950s intentions existed to publish Leino’s book, such attempts were no longer made during the 1960s. The area of dangerous thoughts was clearly set out. Despite that, the 1960s literature slowly arrived in Finland. The translation of Jack Kerouac’s On the Road was published in 1964. Even the translation of the One Dimensional Man of Herbert Marcuse was put on the Finnish market in 1969, only five years after its first publication in the United States.

In general, the 1950s with strict dress code and the elegance of female fashion was replaced by the rock and roll 1960s, with jeans and hippy flower dresses. If only a few owned a car during the 1950s, a decade later a car was one of symbols of rebellion and an expression of freedom. A feeling of increasing affluence was apparent in the late 1960s, while during the 1950s many still suffered from poor economic and social conditions.

What was similar in both decades was the prevailing role of the state, characterised by the close relationship between the State and the University. The educational reforms commenced by Urho Kekkonen even underlined such close connections. Moreover, the circulation of the elite continued to be valid throughout the period. Finally, the adaptability of the 1960s resembles the circumstances of the 1950s. Such an assumption has to be explained in more detail, as a question might be asked whether adaptability was still a current issue during the 1960s, when probably there was nothing to adapt to.

The truth is that the so-called ‘inner’ and ‘public’ adaptations, characteristic of the older generation, ceased to exist by the late 1960s. They were purely concepts valid

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for the immediate post-war decade, for a generation which was strongly influenced by
the inter-war period and post-war political awareness. This was a generation which
grew up on the ideals of Finnish patriotism rooted in the atmosphere of Russian
oppression. The younger generation learnt it from their older counterpart; however, as
the political situation stabilised and national identity was strengthened, there was no
need to continue with such a form of patriotism. The new generation of the 1960s grew
up in a different environment, and the dual adaptation lost its significance as the rules
were already set.

It appears that the new generation did not have to deal with the issue of
adaptability. However, as the older and younger generation of the 1950s had to adapt to
the post-war situation, the new 1960s generation had to adjust to the post-1960s
atmosphere. Both generations accepted the same way of adaptation, despite the different
political and economic circumstances. To put it baldly, many young student activists
subsequently became involved in high politics, being recruited into the governing elite.
Their political ideals, praised in the late 1960s, disappeared with their entry into the
political establishment. The political conformism which they had fought during their
student involvement was thus maintained. However, this time it was shown by
themselves.

In the adaptability lies the hidden truth of the 1960s, which is often overlooked
and glorified less. Arguably, the acceptance of conformity was a logical process when
the younger generation became older adopting the previous generation ideals, and a new
one emerged. However, this also questions the ideals of the 'magical 1960s' which are
often overemphasised, leaving the post-period atmosphere aside. The point which I
want to make by outlining the similarities in the process of adaptation is that the 1950s
do not stand behind the significance of the 1960s. The 1950s was a period similarly
radical, and similarly important but quieter in its actions and expressions.

There exist several views in terms of when the 1950s stopped and the 1960s
began. It is generally suggested that the turn happened in 1959 when Arvo Salo became
the editor-in-chief of the Ylioppilaslehti. At this point, the influence of the older
generation waned, and a Left-oriented approach was adopted. According to another
opinion, the changes happened in 1963, when Edwin Linkomies died. He was the
representative of the older generation with conservative values and a rigid
understanding of Finnish patriotism. The year 1960 is, according to another source, the
turning point of the decades. In this year, Olavi Paavolainen won the Eino Leino Prize. The award was regarded as the ‘break’ with the cultural rigidity of the 1950s, when the Prize was given to ‘controversial’ Paavolainen. However, Paavolainen represented no more than the changeable atmosphere of the first half of the twentieth century, involved in the inter-war Torchbearers Group, propagating the war’s pro-German cultural inclinations, and inclined to post-war conservatism. In this sense, the real change happened in 1962 with the rise of Pentti Saarikoski, a new generation poet. His political poetry and political activism engagement was unknown to previous generations.

To answer the question raised at the beginning, whether there is any connection between the 1950s and 1960s, the reply has to be affirmative. Basically, the consequences of the political, economic and social transitions commenced during the 1950s were reflected in the developments of the 1960s. In other words, without the 1950s, no 1960s would exist.

3.

The relevance of this study for future research lies in further studies of elitism during the transitional period. A comparison between the cultural and industrial-banking elites might be implied in the context of the rest of Northern Europe and even further afield.

The significance of the theory of elitism rests in its application to the changes occurring during transitional periods, which influenced the elite in a greater measure than other social groups. On such occasions, elites are the key factor for the political and social events which deeply impact on a project. This means that such an analysis facilitates an understanding of the transitional period from other than a purely political perspective.

An obvious implication of this study arises for Sweden, with which Finland is often compared. Both countries are so-called Nordic societies, with similar political and cultural developments and a prevailing Lutheranism. However, there exists a distinction in terms of elites. Sweden has its political and cultural traditions as a kingdom, which implies the existence of a royal elite and a numerous aristocracy. Such an aspect is

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completely missing in Finland. Although the nobility was common on Finnish territory, its members were a remnant of a former association, not the product of a new nation-state.

Also, the relation of the cultural elite to the State is different. In Finland, the University has a strong centrally located position in the capital, with close contacts with the State administration. In Sweden, universities are less orientated towards the capital, and thus less constrained by State officialdom. However, the industrial-banking elites do resemble each other, with the very small circles in both countries closely connected in terms of the banking-industry and family relations.

The post-war situation was also different. Although the 1950s was a transition period for Sweden and the rest of the Nordic countries, they were all in a peculiar political position in terms of their war involvement. Sweden was regarded as neutral, Norway and Denmark were occupied, and Finland was a defeated country. Moreover, the geopolitical position is different: only Finland has a significantly long border with Russia.

More accurate comparisons could be made with central and eastern Europe, with which Finland has often been compared, particularly in the context of the nineteenth century, of the so-called National Revival; after the First World War, with a declaration of an independent state; and in terms of Finland’s political position between the great powers, as a so-called buffer state.

Also, such elites more closely resemble each other. Such elites, as in Finland, are often associated with foreign-speaking minorities, German and Hungarian, who also held political and economic importance. Although, for example, a Czech-speaking aristocracy existed and was well rooted in Bohemia and Moravia, the German-speaking elite prevailed. What is missing in Finland is the central European cultural atmosphere, cosmopolitanism, the feeling of a cultural melting point. This radically distinguishes the cultural elites in both contexts.

The theory of elitism can be appropriately applied to the 1950s in so-called Eastern Europe in comparison to Finland, particularly in connection with the cultural elite, whose members either denounced Communism and were thus forced to migrate or were persecuted, or pronounced their approval of Communist ideology and became an important element in State propaganda. This could have very interesting implications, as
it could well reveal historical developments throughout the second half of the twentieth century due to the significance which the cultural elite played in this context.

A possible implication also exists for the 1990s. This period was transitional in both Finland, which suffered from economic crises, and ex-Eastern Europe, which underwent the transition from Communism to democracy. In Finland, the creation of a new business elite can be observed during this period, caused by the huge developments in new branches of industry. Again, in the context of ex-Eastern Europe, it might be interesting to make an investigation from the elitist point of view, as the cultural elite initiated the democratic changes there. In particular, the creation of a new cultural elite can provide a picture of the atmosphere of the 1990s. Furthermore, due to economic developments, it would also be of interest to observe the advances in the industrial-banking elite with its adaptation to the European Union context.

This study does not, of course, fully cover the analysed period and it has its gaps and limitations. There are many topics which have either been left aside or have not been as fully investigated as perhaps they deserve. The following limitations might be pointed out. Firstly, the work focuses on only two elites while not taking into consideration other, similarly influential groups, such as military and diplomatic elites, the Church and the labour movement. Moreover, the analysed elites do not embody all the members of the cultural and industrial elites, who should perhaps be investigated.

The theoretical approach with a division into governing and non-governing elites with a limited generational approach might be understood as insufficient. The generations could be fully analysed according to the established divisions of Hannu Soikkanen and Vesa Vares; however, this would mean looking closely at historical and political developments from the second half of the nineteenth century until the 1960s. Although such an analysis would be useful and could suggest many interesting comparisons, it would take this study beyond its scope. For that reason, the older and younger generation approach has been taken as decisive, and serves to distinguish between the inter and post-war period.

Neither has the media and its influence on the creation of public opinion been fully scrutinised. Periodicals and journalists have been described only from the perspective of their intermediary role, with an emphasis on their circulation within the elite. This means that the close interrelation between journalists and the cultural elite, in
particular, has been pointed out, without looking more closely at the social and political function of the media in post-war Finland.

Furthermore, the question of attaining power has not been raised perhaps as it should in a study pertaining to elitism. One of the reasons for this is the lack of focus on the governing (ruling) elite. Rather than power, the question of influence has been raised in relation to the analysed elites' involvement, emphasising the small dimensions of the cultural industrial-banking elites. This means that power and influence were in the hands of a small group of people.

Without doubt, more attention could also be devoted to the economic and social developments of the 1950s, together with an analysis of the political circumstances. What has been done instead is to point out the political and social background without overshadowing the analysis of the elites. Although all these topics might be of great importance and interest, there have to be set limits to defining the purpose of a study.

In the end, what has been recently explored by the BBC2 documentary about the differences between the 1950s and 1960s might be quoted. During the 1950s, the elite intended to rule the people, to impose its power and influence and to provide instructions on how to handle the atmosphere of the Cold War. During the 1960s, the economic and social advances took over intentions of the elite, and with the proliferation of the masses, it was they who wanted to enforce their power over the elite.

Under such influences, people became more critical towards the societal changes and the increasing consumerism. The title of Marcuse Herbert's criticism of modern capitalism, One Dimensional Man, published in 1964, indicates accurately the atmosphere of the mid-1960s, with the increasing awareness of the limitation of individual freedom. Such tendencies were unknown during the 1950s, when society was heavily influenced by the propaganda of the Cold War. The basic principles were to conform, to accept, and to adjust to the situation to avoid any futile conflict. The post-war economic and social transitions occupied people's minds more than political activism. From this perspective, Finland's circumstances were not unique. However, they had their peculiarities, which makes their historical and sociological situation worth analysing.
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Aalto Alvar (1898-1976) architect.

Allardt Erik (b.1925) sociologist, developer of social science in post-war Finland.

Ehrnrooth Carl Johan (1898-1967) chairman of Kymi Company, a brother of Göran Ehrnrooth (1905-1996) who was the deputy director of the PYP bank and the managing director. Göran's wife was Louise von Julin, a sister of Jacob von Julin. The Ehrnrooths belong to the old nobility.

Erkko Eljas (1895-1965) managing director of the Sanoma Company during the outbreak of the Winter War. Erkko held the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was the son of Eero Erkko (1860-1927), the founder of Helsingin Sanomat.

von Fieandt Rainer (1890-1974) managing director of the PYP bank until 1955. He became the President of the Bank of Finland and later Prime Minister in late 1957 to early 1958.

Fougstedt Gunnar (b. 1908) economist.

Gartz Åke (1888-1974) politician.

Gräsbeck Walter (1892-1952) general director of the Finnish Cellulose Association (Suomen Selluloosayhdistys).

Gummerus Kaarlo Jaakko (1840-1898) founder of Gummerus publishing house.

Haavio Martti (1899-1973) known also under his literary pseudonym Mustapää was a poet and folklorist. His first wife was Elsa Enärjärvi (1900-1951), docent of Finnish Literature at the University of Helsinki.


Hyvämäki Lauri (1913-1980) active in the Suomalainen Suomi and historian.

Jakobson Max (b. 1923) diplomat.

Jansson Jan-Magnus (b.1922) political scientist, politician and journalist.

von Julin Jacob (1906-1987) managing director of the Kaukaan Tehdas Company, his family belongs to the old nobility (who owned Fiskars Company), his brother-in-law was Göran Ehrnrooth.

Jutikkala Eino (b. 1907) historian.

Kaila Eino (1890-1958) academic.


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Koskenniemi Veikko Antero (1885-1962) member of the old Finnish Academy, poet and literary critic.

Kurjensaari Matti (1907-1988) journalist and writer.


Lehtinen William (1897-1975) managing director of the Enso-Gutzeit Company.


Linkomies Edwin (1898-1963) Prime Minister during the Second World War, sentenced in the War Guilt Trial. During the post-war decades he held the posts of Rector and Chancellor at the University of Helsinki.

Linna Väinö (1920-1992) writer, author of the novel Unknown Soldier and trilogy Here Beneath the Northern Star.

Mannerheim Carl Gustaf (1867-1951) soldier, politician and Finnish President 1944-1946.

Nevanlinna Rolf (1895-1980) member of the old Finnish Academy and a mathematician.


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Numminen Jaakko (b. 1928) politician.


Paasivirta Juhani (1919-1993) historian.


Ravila Paavo (1902-1974) member of the old Finnish Academy and linguist.

Reenpää Heikki (1896-1959) managing director of Otava, the son of Alvar Renqvist (1868-1947), founder of the Otava publishing house in 1890.

Renvall Pentti (1907-1971) historian.

Runeberg Johan Ludvig (1804-1877) poet.

Serlachius Gösta (1876-1942) owner of the paper factor in Mänttä (today known as Metsä-Serla Company), his son was R. Erik Serlachius (1901-1980).

Snellman J.W. (1806-1881) philosopher, politician.


Tanner Väinö (1881-1966) politician and a member of Social Democrat Party.

Tuominen Arvo-Poika (1894-1981) politician and a member of Social Democrat Party.


Vilkuna Kustaa (1902-1980) close associate of Urho Kekkonen and an ethnologist.

**Virtanen Aruturi Ilmari** (1895-1974) President of the old Finnish Academy and holder of Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1945.

**Wahlfors Wilhelm** (1891-1969) managing director of Wärtsilä Company.

**Walden Juuso** (1907-1972) owner of the United Paper Mills, the son of Rudolf Walden (1878-1946), founder of the United Paper Mills, and a member of the government during the inter-war period.

**Waltari Mika** (1908-1979) writer and member of literary group Torchbearers.

**Waris Heikki** (1901-1989) sociologist and pioneer in social research in Finland.
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