HISTORY, POLITICS
AND
NATIONAL IDENTITY
IN SOUTHERN
AND
EASTERN UKRAINE.

by

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ABSTRACT:

This dissertation examines the interconnection between history, national identity and politics in Eastern and Southern Ukraine (with special reference to the Donbass, Odessa oblast and the Republic of Crimea). The study comprises three distinct parts: the first section (three chapters) explores the history of the region from the beginning of significant settlement in the 18th. century to the onset of the Perestroika reforms. The second part of the study (Chapter Four) considers how intermarriage as well as other demographic forces have informed the regional identity. Currently, much of the population of the region identifies as both Ukrainian and Russian; this identification is generally weak and unstable. This informs popular attitudes towards such key questions as Ukraine's statehood and its relations with Russia. Studies of national identity have tended to assume an individual belongs to only one or another ethnic group, while the process by which an individual determines his or her ethnic identity has been largely ignored. Sociological surveys carried out in Ukraine demonstrate that mixed identification is a fairly common phenomenon. It appears that high levels of intermarriage have been a leading factor contributing to this type of identification. Political life in this region mirrors the ambivalent nature of national identity; support for the Ukrainian 'national idea' has been fairly unstable and unreliable. Furthermore, the intense competition of regional economic, political and criminal elites in the sub-regions of the East and South have limited its political influence on the central government. There is a tendency for one influential group in each region to look to Kiev for allies and sponsors against a local opponent. This phenomenon --- most clearly illustrated by the case of Crimea --- has tended to neutralise latent pro-Russian movements in the region.
PREFACE:

I am very grateful for the patience and help of a great number of people both in London and Ukraine for their help in this project. First I would like to thank Professor Geoffrey Hosking and Andrew Wilson for supervising this thesis. I would also like to thank Jim Dingley for proofreading my footnotes.

The co-operation of a number of individuals in Ukraine who allowed me to interview them is greatly appreciated. Among those interviewed for this study were: Volodymyr Pavlovych Shevchenko, Donetsk, February 1995. Rector, Donetsk State University; Mikhail Alekseevich Krylov, former co-chairman of the Donetsk Strike Committee; Sergei Mikhailovich Tokarev, head of the Donetsk Oblast Branch of the Liberal Party of Ukraine; Grigorii Gnezilov, the editor of the newspaper Zhizn'; Dmitrii Kornilov, the editor of the newspaper Donetskii kriazh; Mariia Oliinyk of Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists; Aleksandr Filimonovich Baziliuk, Chairman of the Civic Congress of Ukraine; Ievgenii Golubovskii of the Worldwide Club or Odessans; a number of students from Donetsk State University, and other public figures.

The following academics and library staff were especially helpful during my research trips: the staff of the library of the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Kiev; Liubov V. Chuiko of the Institute of Demography of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. Oleksandr Ponomarev of the Institute of Ethnography of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. The public opinion research centre Democratic Initiatives, Kiev provided invaluable support and data for this
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A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION:

Transliteration from Ukrainian and Russian in this study is done according to the Library of Congress transliteration system with the following exceptions. Where a proper name begins in lu or la this are rendered Yu and Ya respectively (i.e., Yurii, not Iurii, or Yaroslav, not Iaroslav). Also, place names which have well accepted anglicisms, such as Kiev, Odessa, Donbass, Crimea, are used instead of the Ukrainian equivalents (i.e., Kyiv, Odesa, Donbas, Krym). The spelling Zaporozhia is a well accepted variant and will be distinguished from the modern city and oblast of Zaporizhzhia. These changes have been made simply for the sake of avoiding the jarring effect of a transliteration system which renders names in a way which deviates unnecessarily from the commonly used variants. In general, the names of individuals are translated into their Ukrainian equivalent, unless it is clear that they identify themselves as Russians.
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INTRODUCTION:

It may be said of the historian Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, who drew on sociology, ethnography and a wide range of other subjects in his writing of history, that he followed the common-sense strategy of a craftsman by selecting whatever tools suited the job at hand. In Hrushevskyi's case, the task was to demonstrate a continuity throughout all of Ukrainian history. Where the study of Ukrainian political institutions was impossible, Hrushevskyi looked to sociological and ethnological analysis to find continuity in Ukrainian history. In this study, the task at hand has also defined the tools required for the job. The purpose here is to attempt to understand the evolution of national identity in Southern and Eastern Ukraine and its interconnection with politics. In doing so, the author has found it necessary to look beyond existing approaches to the study of this problem. In particular, as the research for this study progressed, it became apparent that a theoretical framework which could make sense of mixed and compound identity was necessary given the obvious complexity of national identity in a region. Accordingly, this study rests upon three key pillars: historical analysis, ethno-demographic analysis, and case studies of contemporary political developments in the region.

The historical perspective is essential for understanding not only the demographic and cultural starting point of each region, but also for understanding the repository of myths, memories and historical justifications that elites draw from in attempting to fashion a national and local identity. As Anthony D. Smith argues, changes in cultural

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1 See the author's article "The Historical Methodology of Mykhailo Hrushevskyi," Past Imperfect, 1, 1993, pp. 57-84.
identities are often based on traumatic developments which disturb the basic patterning of the cultural elements that make up the sense of continuity, shared memories and notions of collective destiny. He argues, however, that national identities may survive such traumatic experiences. Throughout the twentieth-century, Eastern and Southern Ukraine have undergone a number of traumatic developments which have altered the fabric of the regional identity. Yet, there are also strong currents of continuity in the region's history, such as the Donbass' propensity towards rebellion, or Odessa's strong local particularism. The continuous blending of Ukrainian, Russian and other ethnic elements has been a permanent feature of the ethnic landscape since the outset of settlement in the region. The relative demographic dominance of one or another group has often changed, as has the level of support of one or another national orientation by successive national governments. But the multi-cultural and frequently cosmopolitan character has remained to this day. If the term "Ukraine" means "the borderland," and Ukraine's former borderland status has defined its history, then the Donbass, Odessa and Crimea have been, historically and culturally, something of a borderland of the borderland. This, in turn, has defined the history and identity of the East and South.

As Paul R. Magosci demonstrated in the case of Subcarpathian Rus', at the opposite edge of Ukraine, a national group may face many options in the course of its historical development. Had the course of events unravelled along somewhat different lines, the Rusyns of Subcarpathia may have become a part of the Great Russian, Slovak or Hungarian nations, or even evolved into a separate nation altogether. In

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the case of Eastern and Southern Ukraine, there were two major ethnically-based orientations: a Russian orientation or a Ukrainian one. In fact, the line between these two was eventually blurred to the point that other orientations became plausible, including a "Soviet" orientation in tandem with an especially keen sense of local identity.

The terms Eastern and Southern Ukraine are often used to mean different things. Frequently, the term Eastern Ukraine is used to describe all of Left Bank Ukraine, that is, everything East and South of the Dnieper river. More often, the term Eastern Ukraine denotes the territory of the Kharkiv, Donets'k, Luhans'k, Dnipropetrovs'k and Zaporizhzhia oblasti. The term Southern Ukraine generally is used to denote Odessa, Mykolaiv and Kherson oblasti. Ukrainian geographers, however, use the terms East and South somewhat differently. In their enumeration of Ukrainian socio-economic regions, Eastern Ukraine denotes only the Donbass oblasti of Donets'k and Luhans'k. The South, on the other hand, includes the Crimea, as well as Odessa, Mykolaiv and Kherson oblasti. Although in a sense this study will be looking at the East according to the broader definitions, it is primarily focusing on the more narrow definition of the East as the Donbass. Furthermore, although Crimea is included in the definition of the South, Mykolaiv and Kherson oblasti are only treated in passing, in order to further increase the manageability of the subject.

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4 See, for example, Andrew Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), Map. 1.1, p. xviii.
Approaches to the study of nationalism:

There is an enormous body of literature on national identity and nationalism. Any attempt to survey such a broad field is bound to be highly selective. In the Ukrainian context, the methodological approaches to nationalism that have had the most influence on western scholars have been those of Karl Deutsch, John A. Armstrong, Eric Hobsbawm, Benedict Anderson, Michael Hechter and, more recently, Anthony D. Smith.

Central to Karl Deutsch's work is the idea of channels of social communication, which is in turn linked to modernisation. For a nation to fully develop it must have fully developed internal communicative facilities, meaning the ability to transmit the culture and national myths and memories to the entire membership of the group. Finally, this group must be able to communicate more effectively with members of the group than with outsiders. On the one hand, modernisation may promote internal communication which could help form a national group, but it could also lead to assimilation of the group. This, however, depends upon the nature of modernisation processes but also on the perceptions of material benefits, and the nature of barriers and symbols unifying or separating groups.

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6 For a select bibliography see John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.), Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 357-351. More comprehensive bibliographies include Anthony D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism (London: Holmes and Meier, 1983), and also by Smith, National Identity.

7 For a survey of western literature on national identity in Ukraine, see Taras Kuzio and Andrew Wilson, Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994.)

Other approaches to the study of nationalism, such as that of Eric Hobsbawm or Benedict Anderson are in many ways well suited to the study of identity in Ukraine. John-Paul Himka, among others, has used the ideas of Hobsbawm and Anderson in his work on the Galician peasantry. Because national identity is viewed in this framework as an artificial construction — an "imagined community" with "invented traditions" — this would provide a useful framework for examining the clearly modern and frequently contrived features of Ukrainian and Russian identity in the region.

While the concept of "invented tradition" certainly has its place in the study of national identity, the critiques of it put forward by such scholars as John A. Armstrong, Anthony D. Smith and Donald L. Horowitz should be considered. While Armstrong rejects the naïve conception of the nation as a primordial, unchanging phenomenon, he faults Anderson for his self-contradictory "deconstructionist" approach. To begin with, the fact that traditions are often "invented," does not in itself prove that national identity is an artificially created phenomenon, it simply illustrates an important mechanism of national identity maintenance. As Armstrong puts it, "inter-generational continuity of

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9 John-Paul Himka, Galician villagers and the Ukrainian national movement in the nineteenth century (Basingstoke: Macmillan in association with Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1988).
10 Armstrong argues that, although Anderson implicitly places all large-scale social phenomena on an "imaginary" plane, he arbitrarily chooses to utilize such social constructs as classes, capitalism and administrative vernaculars in his analysis. Anderson's methodology thus supposedly unravels because of the "contradiction between an approach which dissolves all its objects, and his insistence on maintaining fixed points of reference." John A. Armstrong, "The Autonomy of Ethnic Identity" in Alexander J. McAlister, Thinking Theoretically About Soviet Nationalities. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), pp. 24-25.
national identity depends on a myth that transcends ordinary limits of time and space." Moreover, as Donald L Horowitz points out, the "depth of ethnic loyalties suggests that they respond to some rather basic needs"; that ethnicity is "in the same family of affiliations as the family itself." Another popular theory, similar to Deutsch's in that it pays great attention to modernisation processes, is that of "internal colonialism," first proposed by Michael Hechter. This model posits that the "spatially uneven wave of modernisation over state territory creates relatively advanced and less advanced groups." This results in a so-called "cultural division of labour," whereby the dominant cultural group controls important areas of economic and political life. This, in turn, precipitates a national reaction from the disadvantaged group.

Yet, as Walker Connor argues, ethno-nationalism has a psychological component which is "beyond reason," and cannot be adequately understood simply by utilising models which focus on elite ambitions, rational choice theory or internal colonialism. While all rationalistic approaches to the study of nationalism may be criticised on empirical grounds, the principal fault of such approaches is:

their failure to reflect the emotional depth of national identity: the passions at either extreme of the hate-love continuum which the nation often inspires, and the countless fanatical sacrifices which have been made in its name... people do not voluntarily die for things that are rational."

11 Donald L. Horowitz, "How to Begin Thinking Comparatively about Soviet Ethnic Problems," in Motyl, Thinking Theoretically, pp. 10-11
Both Armstrong and Connor agree that the analysis of symbols and myths is an effective method of gaining a window into these irrational elements of national identity. But, myths are only effective insofar as they are capable of achieving a resonance from their intended audience. Extreme demographic and political changes, contrary to Smith's argument, can indeed undermine the ability of myths to sustain a given identity. For example, in 1955 a Crimean identity revolving around Crimean Tatar national myths would have hardly been widely embraced by a predominantly Russian population of Crimea, even though it may have been perfectly legitimate from the point of view of historical argument. Hence, it is not sufficient to simply consider the possible choices of historical interpretations and myths, but it is also necessary to consider the living audience for such myths, and the concrete demographic and political environment in which they are operating. Tradition and myths may be invented, but they will only be accepted within the limits of historical memory and the right demographic and psychological conditions. Hence, the study of nation building myths in and of themselves is only of limited usefulness: they only provide a rough starting point for a meaningful study.

Anthony D. Smith and others have argued that ethno-national identities are uniquely suited to the task of mobilising groups for collective action; that "nationalism provides the most compelling identity myth in the modern world." Smith cites the example of Yugoslavia to illustrate his view that nationalism is an almost irresistible mobilising and state-organising force in the twentieth century. Yet, as this study will argue, and as Taras Kuzio and Andrew Wilson have also argued, Ukrainian independence and the resulting

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break-up of the Soviet Union had more to do with elite ambition than with national consciousness *per se*. To put it another way, a distinction should be made between the propensity of elites to manipulate the national idea to their own ends, and the actual popular prevalence of nationalist sentiment. In much of Ukraine, and also Belarus, independence came largely *despite* the lack of a well-entrenched national identity, and not as a result of national consciousness having been raised to a fever pitch. The case of Eastern and Southern Ukraine suggests that, given the right circumstances, the "ethno-national" bond is indeed not indestructible, and that other affiliations may also prove no less compelling. As John Armstrong argues, "it may be that nationality, or ethnicity, is so complex a phenomenon that no case can be made for its historic necessity, as contrasted to the necessity for some analogous identity structure."\(^{15}\) In particular, it will be argued that a "Soviet identity" was in the process of forming in Eastern and Southern Ukraine by the 1980s. Following the precedent of Linda Colley, who uses the term the "British nation," the term "Soviet nation" will be used, even though this may seem inappropriate given that, in academic discourse, the word "nation" generally denotes a historical phenomenon characterised by ethnic homogeneity. This terminology seems appropriate, however, since in, on the one hand "ethno-national" is now the common term for a specifically ethnic nation, and also because this study will argue that Soviet identity was a legitimate identity structure, analogous to an ethnic identity, in the East Ukrainian context.\(^{16}\)

**Studies of Ukrainian National Identity:**

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There is not a great deal of existing literature on this subject in English, and certainly not from the regional perspective of Eastern and Southern Ukraine. One of the first attempts to consider the problem was a 1974 paper on Russians in Ukraine, presented by Harvard's Roman Szporluk. Szporluk argued that it might be advisable to "partition the Ukrainian SSR along ethnic-nationality lines: the Donbass and possibly several other oblasti would be separated from Ukraine and the the size of the Russian-language element in that smaller Ukraine would be decreased." Foreshadowing post-independence debates, he suggested that, as a second possibility, Ukrainian identity could be redefined in a territorial rather than ethnic sense. Szporluk also noted the large number of Ukrainians in the census who listed Russian as their native language, and wondered whether this inexorably led to full assimilation as Russians, or whether Ukrainians could maintain a separate identity even while using the medium of the Russian language.

The leading Western writer on national consciousness in twentieth-century Ukraine is Bohdan Krawchenko. Krawchenko's major study of national identity, Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine, is a comprehensive and generally reliable guide to the subject. But, given that the work was researched during

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the Brezhnev era, there were obvious limits on the extent to which the author could scrutinise the subtleties of national identity, or the national orientation of regional elites. The current study, by making use of detailed post-Soviet sociological studies and opinion surveys, is able to provide a more comprehensive picture of the character of national identity in the East and South. Moreover, the current political landscape is obviously one where the variations in the national orientation of regional elites is much more obvious.

Krawchenko's study utilises Deutschian theory, and considers how modernisation creates the "channels of communication" (i.e., schools, newspapers) for transmitting the national message in Ukraine at different periods of its history. He stresses that nations are made by elites, and that the creation of a national identity depends on the rise of sophisticated, urban national elites and competition between elites. In accordance with Hechter's internal colonialism paradigm, Krawchenko argues that the Ukrainians were a disadvantaged group and hence they would eventually attempt to reassert their culture in opposition to Russian culture. His prediction ultimately proved to be correct but, as with many of his conclusions, he is mainly concerned with the overall trend in Ukraine. Yet, "Ukraine as a whole" is simply an abstraction; in practice, patterns in one region of the Ukraine do not necessarily apply to other parts of the country. While Krawchenko was correct in surmising that mobilisation around national demands was likely in Western and Central


Krawchenko, Social Change and National Consciousness, p. 199.
Ukraine, where Ukrainians had gained demographic predominance in the key urban centres (i.e. Kiev, L'viv), this would not necessarily be repeated in the same fashion in Eastern and Southern Ukraine. Anthony D. Smith and John Breuilly have challenged the link between modernisation and nationalism, pointing out that in many cases ethno-national movements thrive in societies not undergoing modernisation. Indeed, the epicentre of the Ukrainian nationalism is still the relatively un-modernised Western Ukraine where there are so few Russians that there is very little "elite competition" between Ukrainians and Russians for employment. In the places where Russians are in greatest numbers, such as Donets'k, and hence where one might expect to find such competition and mobilisation, Ukrainian nationalism is weakest. This would tend to confirm, as Eric Hobsbawm has argued, that to a great extent, the current wave of nationalism in Eastern Europe is a case of "unfinished business," leftover from the 1920s, rather than the rise of a new, nationalistic urban elite. It appears that modernisation was something of a double-edged sword in the East and South. Certain modernisation processes, when combined with decades of an official policy of Russification — undermined the national movement and started the process of creating a new, Soviet "nation."

Krawchenko was above all interested in the following question: is there, on the whole, a social base for Ukrainian national separatism by the 1980s? Krawchenko concluded that, overall, there indeed was one. But, as Andrew Wilson and Taras Kuzio argue in their more recent study of Ukraine, Krawchenko's approach does not explain why Ukrainian

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independence came when it did. Kuzio and Wilson were preoccupied, more with this latter question. These questions will be considered, and some alternate answers to these questions will be put forward. Nonetheless, the fundamental task here is different. This study, instead, while not ignoring such issues, seeks above all to understand the intricate and subtle nature of national identity in the East and South specifically, and the forces which informed its development.

As noted at the outset, what has been missing in all of these studies is an approach which could shed light on mixed, multiple identity, since initial qualitative observations suggested that such a phenomenon was prevalent. The assumption that all individuals may be neatly categorised as belonging to one ethno-national group or another underpins most studies of national identity in the former Soviet Union, and indeed most general studies of nationalism. It will be argued here that such a categorisation impedes the study of national identity, as many individuals in these regions have multiple ethnic identifications, or are undergoing a transition from one identification to another. It appears, moreover, that there are a variety of strategies of ethnic self-identification which do not fit into the simple paradigms of "Russification" and assimilation. Thus, research into ethnic identity in these regions must attempt to understand the varieties of ethnic affiliations, including mixed ones, and to begin to investigate which social forces were responsible for the growth of these various identities. One hypothesis of this analysis is that inter-ethnic marriage, language usage, and urbanisation are all factors which contribute to mixed self-identification.

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23 Taras Kuzio and Andrew Wilson, Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence, p. 8.
Theorists of national identity, such as Anthony D. Smith and Ernest Gellner, have generally focused on national identity at the level of the group, and have been preoccupied with questions such as "What is a Nation?" "What are the origins of nations?" "When did the first nations arise?, etc." The process by which an individual determines his own ethnic identity has been outside the focus of such scholars. It is generally assumed that an individual is a member of one ethnic group or another. Recent attempts by Western scholars to examine the ethnic factor and its implications for politics in Ukraine reflect the prevailing methodological approach to the study of national identity. Accordingly, they generally take for granted that the national identification of individuals may be neatly compartmentalised. One is either a Russian or Ukrainian. This has fed an unfortunate tendency to assume the national consciousness and homogeneity of the Russian minority and the Ukrainian majority, and to regard the Russians as something akin to a fifth column in Ukraine. Peter Van Ham, an analyst of regional security describes Ukraine's Russians thus: "The 11.2 million Russians living in Ukraine (making up some 22 percent of the total population) are therefore potentially political allies for Moscow, and they guarantee close Russian involvement in Ukraine's internal politics." An article in the Washington Post provides perhaps the most glaring example of an over-simplified account of the identity of Ukraine's multi-ethnic population: "..the country remains divided between its largely ethnic Russian eastern half and the mainly Ukrainian west about whether to align more with the United States and its allies, or

with Russia." In reality, because of a large number of demographic and historical factors, the national orientation of individuals officially classified as Russians in different parts of the country is often only tenuously so. That is, a great number of individuals frequently labelled as Russians in such studies are also inclined to identify themselves as Ukrainians as well when asked, which raises doubts about the value of such an approach. Conversely, many individuals classified in the census as "Ukrainian" only possess vague Ukrainian identities, and identify more closely with the defunct Soviet state, or with their region or city. How does one know whether to list such individuals as Ukrainians or Russians in such a case? A recent major study of the national identity of Ukraine's Russian minority not only rests on this dubious premise, but it is also flawed in its curious failure to include data concerning Russians from the Donbass, the area of greatest concentration of ethnic Russians outside Crimea.  

The question of language use has further clouded the national identity question in Ukraine. One recent study from Glasgow University claimed that there are three main ethnic groups in Ukraine: Ukrainian speaking Ukrainians, Russian-speaking Ukrainians, and Russians. Again, it is assumed here that the Russian segment of the population is a well defined group, distinct from the Russian-speaking Ukrainians. In fact, many of the 'Russian-speaking Ukrainians' and

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Russians' identify both as Ukrainians and Russians, or even as Soviets. On the other hand, the Russian government has frequently declared its willingness to defend the rights of Russian speakers, as though the use of the Russian language automatically made one a Russian national. Moreover, labels such as "Russian-speaking Eastern Ukraine" or "Russified" Eastern Ukraine reinforce the idea that the region's identity is essentially Russian, which is a highly debatable proposition. Language usage is an important factor which informs national self-identification, and political attitudes, but it should not be regarded as the Alpha and Omega of national identity in Ukraine — other factors play a significant role in shaping identity as well.

The best recent work on the Russians in Ukraine, and in the other republics of the former Soviet Union, is the 1995 study by Paul Kolstoe. Unlike most of the other authors listed, Kolstoe appears to recognise the possibility of mixed ethnic identity. But, in his book he consciously decides not to address directly the question of the collective identity of the Russian Diaspora, because such a study would require prohibitively costly resources. Yet, a basic premise of his work, apparently, is the assumption that the Russian Diaspora possesses a common identity of its own.

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Various practical methods of studying identity in the current context were rejected by the author. On the one hand, an approach relying on content analysis of myths in newspapers was rejected, since — as will be argued in the latter chapters of this study — the East Ukrainian press is generally highly fragmented. In many cases, content analysis of a given publication might only confirm the attitude of a small handful of individuals. Another possible approach to the study of myths would be a custom-designed sociological study. For the reasons cited above, however, sociological surveys focusing on demographic factors was regarded as a more fruitful area to concentrate on.

In theory, a specially designed sociological survey on intermarriage, and ethnic identity may have been very useful, had resources been available for such an undertaking. Yet there is a risk such an approach would have consumed the entire project and, had the specialised study been less than well conceived (such as Bremmer's cited above), the entire project would have been undermined. Instead, by relying on the dozens of different published and unpublished sociological surveys published in Ukraine, and by attempting to confirm their results with other studies wherever possible, a much broader view of the major issues could be gained.

In accordance with the strategy outlined above, this study will begin with a review of historic and demographic developments. The first chapter will consider the first period of settlement in the region from the 18th and 19th century, while the second chapter will consider the decisive revolutionary period. The third chapter will look at the major demographic and social developments in the region from the 1930s until the 1980s. The fourth chapter will present a framework for analysing
mixed identity in the region, while considering its interconnection with yet another key demographic development, intermarriage. The fifth chapter will discuss the interconnection between national identity, as described in the preceding chapter, and the political events leading to Ukrainian independence. In doing so, special attention will be paid to the workers' rebellion in Eastern Ukraine. The next three chapters are the major regional case studies examining political life in each of Donets'k, Crimea and Odessa. Major questions presented by the final portion of this study have been the following: "What factors have led elites to choose to support or oppose the status quo in Ukraine, and the existing relationship of their region to Kiev?", "What alternative vision of Ukraine have the regional elites, or the population at large seemed to support?" and, "What prospects are there for the continued evolution of national identity in the region?" In answering these questions, and in looking at the breakdown of political forces, and competing "nation-building" camps, it is hoped that a convincing picture of national identity and its interconnection with politics in the context of this vital region will emerge.
CHAPTER 1
SOUTHERN AND EASTERN UKRAINE BEFORE 1917:

Regional Variations of Ukrainian Identity:

This chapter will examine the historical and demographic foundations of Southern and Eastern Ukraine in the 18th and 19th century, and consider how these developments informed regional identities. Ukrainian ethnologists speak of many distinct sub-ethnic identities that evolved to make up what is now called the Ukrainian nation. At one time or another people in different parts of the East and South of the current borders of Ukraine referred to themselves, or were referred to, by many different names including Malorosy, Malorosiany (Little Russians), Tavrychany, Kozaky (Cossacks), Cherkasy, Zaporozhtsi (Zaporozhians), Khokhly, Slobozhani, Chornomortsi, etc.¹

In the first half of the 19th century, when Ukrainian intellectuals began to promote the idea of a distinct "Little Russian" (Ukrainian) identity, a debate took place over whether Ukrainian was a separate language and whether Ukrainians were a distinct nation. For the Russian administration, a Little Russian identity was a local one which could complement a Russian Imperial national identity. As Paul R. Magocsi puts it, the Little Russian identity was a "stage in a socio-cultural framework that recognised a hierarchy of multiple and complementary loyalties and identities."² As the Ukrainian national movement evolved,

¹ Anatolii Ponomarev, Ukraïns'ka etnohrafiia, (Kiev: Lybid', 1994), p. 128. The term Cherkasy was used to describe Ukrainian Cossacks, as was the term Zaporozhtsi
the term "Little Russianism," associated with this early stage in the Ukrainian national idea, became a pejorative term to describe Ukrainians with a poorly developed sense of national identity.

The debate over the historic links between Russia and Ukraine invariably begins with the question of Kievan Rus'. For supporters of the "Little Russian" idea, the idea that the people of Kievan Rus' were a single East Slavic nation, or an ethnic melting pot or agglomeration, has obvious appeal. Ukrainian historians, most notably Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, have argued that Kievan Rus' was in fact a product of a distinct proto-Ukrainian nation. Hrushevskyi argues that the traditional scheme of Russian history, which sees Muscovy as a direct descendent of Kiev, distorts Russian as well as Ukrainian history. Great Russian history, he contends, should begin with the study of Suzdal, Vladimir, Rostov and Moscow. Although the legacy of Kievan Rus' figures in virtually all Russo-Ukrainian debates, Southern Ukraine and the Donets'k region were largely outside of the geographical control of the Kievan Rus' polity, although by the 1240s it may have extended to the territory of modern Odessa.

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4 The extent of Rus' settlement in the South has been disputed, and there is little evidence of mass settlement in the South. Andrew Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 2, n. 9; p. 165, n. 122. See Paul R. Magocsi, Ukraine: A Historical Atlas (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), Map 4; The debate over the legacy over Kievan Rus' will be touched upon in Chapter 6.
To move beyond the debates of intellectual circles and look at the actual identity of the local population requires special strategies. A creative approach to the comparative study of popular mentality in 19th century Ukraine is the content analysis of collections of folk-sayings and expressions. According to this method, advanced by Sergei Talhin, each ethnic group has an "ethnic fingerprint" which may be determined by measuring the relative proportion of various themes in folk sayings. For example, 23 percent of 19th century Russian folk sayings dealt with "the household," while 31 percent of Ukrainian sayings dealt with this theme. This research also illustrates sub-divisions within the regions that now make up Ukraine. According to Talhin, materials collected from the Eastern and Southern regions of Ukraine demonstrate a hierarchy of values that is distinct from both the "pure" Russian and Ukrainian samples. According to Talhin, this data suggests that in the 19th century "Little Russianism" may in fact be looked at as "more than a political abstraction, but as a real ethno-psychological phenomenon." This suggests that the national identity of the region has long represented a blending of elements of Russian and Ukrainian identity.

Modern nationalists — particularly those of Eastern Europe — tend to regard peasant settlements as being more important than urban populations when it comes to determining their national borders. Ernest Gellner calls this bias the "Potato Principle," since, even though nationalism is a phenomenon of the industrial era, "the implementation of the nationalist principle pays more attention to where [men] once grew

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Gellner's principle is particularly applicable in the case of Ukraine because its national identity has been preponderantly rooted in romanticised images of the peasantry, and since very few Ukrainians were urban dwellers before the twentieth-century. Furthermore, because Ukraine has had few periods of uninterrupted statehood, its national historians, including Hrushevs'kyi, found it necessary to write Ukrainian history primarily as the history of the Ukrainian peasant masses.⁷

Given the Ukrainian national movement's strong links to the idea of the noble peasantry, it is not surprising that modern Ukrainian nationalists regard a territory as being theirs if in the past the majority of peasants in the area were Ukrainian, even if the non-Ukrainian urban population perpetually outnumbered these peasants. This was precisely the situation that prevailed in Eastern and Southern Ukraine from the very outset of large-scale settlement of the territory.

**The Cossack era in Southern and Eastern Ukraine:**

In the summer of 1990, when the Ukrainian national movement was basking in the success of the Parliament's declaration of state sovereignty (16 July 1990), an enormous Cossack festival was organised in Zaporizhzhia, Eastern Ukraine. This preoccupation with Cossacks may seem like little more than a quaint manifestation of antiquarianism, yet it is in fact a powerful demonstration of the interdependence of

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⁷ See Hrushevskyi's introduction to volume one of his *Istorija Ukrainy-Rusy*. 
history, national identity and politics in Eastern Ukraine. For, since the
nineteenth-century the memory of the Zaporozhian Cossacks as a fairly
autonomous political entity within the Russian empire has been a central
myth of Ukrainian national identity. These celebrations, orchestrated and
attended primarily by Western Ukrainians, represented a declaration that
these Russian speaking territories in Eastern Ukraine were indeed part of
the Ukrainian state. Conversely, they also signalled a repudiation of the
Russian imperial conception of the area. According to the Imperial
version, the territory was not Ukrainian Zaporozhia, but rather
"Novorossiia" or New Russia; largely the creation of Empress Catherine
II and her favourite, Prince Grigorii Potemkin. These two competing
conceptions of Southern and Eastern Ukraine — the lands of the
Zaporozhian Cossacks vs. New Russia — is one of the pivots around
which the Ukrainian-Russian historical competition over these territories
revolves.

The Cossack debate and the Donbass:

The territories most connected to the Zaporozhian Cossack legacy,
both historically and in the modern popular consciousness, are those of
present-day Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovs'k and Kherson oblasti. The
Cossack past has, nevertheless, also been used to assert Ukrainian claims
to Odessa, Crimea and the Donbass. When Zaporozhia was at the

8 On the importance of the Cossack myth in 1990s Ukraine see Frank
Sysyn, "The Reemergence of the Ukrainian Nation and Cossack
9 For claims to Odessa, see O. Oliinykiv, "Nashchadii Chepihy i
Holovatoho," Kul'tura i zhyttia, 5 August 1990; A Bachyns'kyi,
"Kozatstvo i Odeshchyna, " Chornomors'ka novyna, 14 May 1994. For
the Donbass, see "Siudy siahala ukrains'ka violynsia, abo pro shcho
shepocha kovyla donets'kykh stepiv," Visti z Ukrainy, no. 11(1991), p. 8
and Petro Lavriv, Istoriia pivdenno-skhidnoi Ukrainy (Lviv: Slovo,
1992), pp. 40-87. For current historical debates surrounding the Cossack
height of its political power, during the Khmel'nyts'kyi rebellion in the mid-seventeenth century, neither Crimea, the Odessa region nor the Donbass were regular, permanently settled parts of the Ukrainian Cossack polity's territory. Nor had these areas been settled by Ukrainians or Russians during the period of Kievan Rus'. However, much of the territory north of the Sea of Azov was under the de facto control of the Zaporozhian Sich by the mid seventeenth-century; they had wintered and established fortifications there as early as the sixteenth century. By the mid eighteenth-century, when Zaporozhia was more fully under control of Russia, the South-western part of the Donbass was regarded as a regular part of Zaporozhian territory. At this time the northern regions of the modern Donbass were part of a semi-autonomous region within Muscovy known as Sloboda Ukraine. Sloboda Ukraine came into existence during the seventeenth century when Ukrainian peasants and Cossacks from the Polish-Cossack war fled Eastward to Muscovy. A Cossack military-administrative was put into place in the territory by the Muscovite government, and it was permitted a high degree of autonomy. But Sloboda Ukraine, which also covers much of present day Kharkiv and Sumy oblasti, had never been part of the Ukrainian Cossack states (i.e. Zaporozhia or the Hetmanate), and its autonomy was annulled after

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legacy in the Donbass see Andrew Wilson, "The Donbas between Ukraine and Russia: The Use of History in Historical Disputes," The Journal of Contemporary History, 30 (1995), pp. 265-289. This will also be discussed in Chapter 6.


1765, when the entire territory was transformed into a regular imperial province.

The Don Cossacks:

The first permanent settlers in the Don region were the Don Cossacks, who emerged in the 15th century, roughly at the same time as Zaporozhian Cossacks were appearing in Southern Ukraine. While Zaporozhian Cossacks have come to be regarded by the Ukrainian national movement as a symbol of national identity, Russian nationalists have adopted Don Cossacks as an analogous part of their national mythology. The Don Cossacks descended from the indigenous populations of the Don region, as well as from Ukrainian and Muscovite settlers; their culture and language reflects all of these influences. Their Cossack polity was known as the Great Don Host. By the seventeenth-century, Don Cossack settlements were located primarily to the East of the Don river (in the Rostov oblast of modern Russia), but they extended as far west as the Zherebets' river in the modern Luhans'k and Donets'k oblasti. In 1746 the border between the Don and Zaporozhian Cossacks was established by Empress Elizabeth as the river Kal'mius (which divides the modern Donets'k oblast roughly into two equal halves). Competing claims as to the historic extent of Zaporozhian and Don Cossack domains in the Don region may be exhaustively explored.

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12 On the culture of the Don Cossacks, see Volodymyr Kubijovyc et. al. "Don Region," Ukrainian Encyclopedia, I (A-F) (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), pp. 721-723. On the language of the Don Cossacks, see A.V. Mirtov, Donskoy slovari': materialy k izucheniiu leksiki Donskikh kazakov (Rostov na Donu: Trudy severo-Kavkazskoi assotsiatsii nauchno-issledovatel'skikh institutov, 1929). According to this work, "many vestiges of Ukrainian influence" are evident in the Don language"; of the 7,000 words collected in the dictionary 2000, or 33-35 percent were Ukrainian words.(p. viii).

13 V.A. Pirko, Novye stranitsy v istorii Donbassa, p. 29.
Suffice it to say that the available historical evidence may permit either of these Cossack traditions to exist in the consciousness of the modern inhabitants of the region.

As Robert H. McNeal argues, the history of the Don Cossacks is characterised by the competition between two myths: the myth of Tsar and Cossack and the myth of the free Cossack.\textsuperscript{14} The myth of Tsar and Cossack was the official myth propagated by the Tsarist state. According to this conception, the Cossacks and Tsars existed in a relationship governed by mutual loyalty and generosity: the warrior caste was granted land and privileges by the Tsar in return for their self-sacrifice and valour in battle for Russia.\textsuperscript{15} The competing myth of Cossack freedom stems from the proto-democratic institutions of the Don Cossack Host, such as the assembly known as the krug (circle), and from the Don Cossacks' tradition of rebellion and independence from Muscovite domination.\textsuperscript{16} Thus, there are at least two competing Cossack traditions in the Donbass: that of the Zaporozhian and the Don Cossack; the latter tradition is itself characterised by two divergent conceptions.

The Collapse of Ukrainian Cossackdom and the Settling of Southern/Eastern Ukraine:

Following the Pereiaslav treaty of 1654, which formally united Zaporozhia with Muscovy, the Ukrainian Cossacks gradually lost their independence. This trend was particularly evident during the reign of


\textsuperscript{15} For a recent, updated defense of this interpretation see "Otvazhnuye synov'ia tikhogo Dona," \textit{Voennyi vestnik}, no. 1 (1994), pp. 74-75.

\textsuperscript{16} McNeal, \textit{Tsar and Cossack}, p. 12.
Peter the Great and Catherine the Great. In 1775, after successful military campaigns against the Ottoman Empire, Empress Catherine of Russia destroyed the newly formed Cossacks centre of Nova Sich. All of Zaporozhia and Sloboda Ukraine were then made part of an imperial province known as New Russia.

It was also at this time that central Ukraine (i.e. roughly modern Kiev, Poltava and Chernihiv oblasti), then a Cossack territory known as the Hetmanate, was also incorporated into the Russian Empire. Having fully integrated the three Ukrainian Cossack entities — the Hetmanate, Zaporozhia and Sloboda Ukraine — the Russian Empire then looked to its southern borders. After defeating the Ottoman Empire in 1774, Russia gained a slice of territory between the lower Boh and Dnieper rivers (i.e. territory now occupied roughly by the eastern half of the Mykolaiv oblast and the north-western part of Kherson oblast in Southern Ukraine.) Also at this time, the treaty of Küçük Kainarji was signed by Russia and the Ottomans, according to which the Ottoman Porte's influence with the Crimean Khanate were reduced. A mere nine years later, in 1783, Russia annexed the peninsula.17 Then, in 1791, after another successful military campaign against the Ottomans, Russia gained more territory between the lower Dnister and Boh river (i.e. modern Odessa oblast, Transdnistria [now in Moldova], and the western half of Mykolaiv oblast.) New Russia (no longer including Sloboda Ukraine by then) was further subdivided, after 1812, into three separate Imperial provinces, or gubernii — Kherson, Katerynoslav (Yekaterinoslav) and Tavria (Taurida). In 1780 Sloboda Ukraine became the Sloboda Viceregency (Namestnichestvo), with the fortress-city of

Kharkiv (Kharkov) as its capital. From 1796-1835 it was again known as the Sloboda guberniia; from 1835 it became Kharkiv guberniia. Kherson guberniia included the territory of the modern oblasti of Odessa and Mykolaiv, but it also covered part of modern Transnistria (in Moldova). Tavriia — which is the Greek word for Crimea — included the Crimean peninsula, as well as much of modern Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasti. Katerynoslav — "the glory of Catherine" — guberniia covered modern Dnipropetrovsk oblast and the larger, western part of the Donbass. After gaining military control over these territories, Catherine II's administration, led by her minister Grigorii Potemkin, encouraged immigration to New Russia from within the Russian Empire and from without. At this time, several new cities were established, including the cosmopolitan Black Sea port city of Odessa.¹⁸

As a result of Catherine's policies, New Russia in the early nineteenth century witnessed a remarkable period of population growth, as peasants migrated to these newly conquered territories.¹⁹ According to the 1782 reviziia (a government record of taxable male "souls"), the total population of male "souls" in New Russia was 290,026. Of this figure, 71.5 per cent were Ukrainians, 9.1 per cent were Russians, and 8.99 percent were Moldavians.²⁰ By 1815 the male peasant population of

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¹⁸ For a history of the foundation and growth of the city of Odessa, and on New Russia in general, see Patricia Herlihy, Odessa: A History, 1794-1914 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986).
¹⁹ On the agrarian settlement of New Russia see Ia. V. Boiko and N.O. Nanilova, "Formuvannia etnichnoho skladu naselennia pivdennooi Ukrainy (kinets' XVIII-XIX st.) Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal no. 9(1992), pp. 54-65. Also on the settlement of the South, and in particular on the ethno-cultural relations between Russians and Ukrainians in the region, see Yu. V. Ivanova (ed.), Kul'turno-bytovye protsessy na luge Ukrainy, (Moscow: Nauka, 1979).
²⁰ Ibid., p. 55.
New Russia had reached 875,640, and by 1857, 1,347,265. Between 1782-1858 roughly 900,000 settlers migrated to New Russia, and between 1857-1897 a further 600,000 migrated to the region. The vast majority of peasant settlers to New Russia were Ukrainians from Left Bank Ukraine (including some Ukrainian Cossacks). Yet, Russians from Russia proper and foreign settlers (Germans, Bulgarians, Serbs and others) also played a significant role in the agrarian settlement of these territories.\footnote{See Table 1.1.}

New Russia was a frontier region. Even though it was part of an autocratic, centralised empire, its inhabitants enjoyed relative freedom. Moreover, the Russian state apparently recognised that the territory would be best served by free settlers, rather than by the full-scale expansion of serfdom.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 56-61.} In general, the government took a lenient approach towards the construction of the social, political and legal foundations of New Russia in the hope that this would promote the rapid development of the newly conquered territories. This lent the region a unique character.\footnote{On the settlement of foreigners see Roger P. Bartlett, Human Capital: The Settlement of Foreigners in Russia, 1762-1804 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). See also Herlihy, Odessa, pp. 26-34; I. Bruk, and V.M. Kabuzan, "Migratsia naseleniia v Rossii v XVIII --- nachale XX veka (Chislennost', struktura, geografiia), Istorija SSSR, 4(1984), pp. 46; 48.} The distinctive quality of New Russia was embodied by Odessa, the largest of the new cities which sprouted and flourished in this rapidly developing territory.

\footnote{Herlihy, Odessa, pp. 74-77; 80; Boiko and Danilova, "Formuannia etnichnoho skladu naselennia," p. 58.}
Odessa:

While Ukrainians participated fully in the agricultural settlement of New Russia, they almost completely abstained from the two other spectacular development of nineteenth-century Ukraine: urbanisation and industrialisation. The city of Odessa, which was officially founded in 1794 by Empress Catherine II of Russia, is the most striking illustration of the former process. In the year it was born, the city's population was 2,345; by 1827 it had reached 32,995. After a constant and unprecedented growth throughout the nineteenth century, the city's population approached half a million inhabitants by 1900.\textsuperscript{25}

Unlike many large cities in the Russian Empire and in Western Europe, Odessa's growth was not based on the development of industry. The city's lack of ready access to fuel, wood and water, did not favour the growth of industry. Instead, Odessa owed its prosperity largely to its function as a port of export for the agricultural products of southern Ukraine, and as a port of entry for goods for the entire Russian Empire. Hence, at the turn of the century, Odessa's industrial working class still only formed a relatively small portion of the city's population of roughly half of a million. In 1905, of a total Odessa work force of 188,430, only 25,300 persons worked in factories (defined as any manufacturing establishment employing more than twenty persons) and another 46,020 artisans were employed in workshops. In fact, more people were employed as shop clerks (33,000) or in the service sector (38,820) than in factories.\textsuperscript{26} Moreover, industrial and non-industrial workers were sharply stratified along ethnic lines. Most of the industrial workers were Russians

\textsuperscript{25} Herlihy, Odessa: A History 1794-1914, pp. 234; 251.
or Ukrainians, while Jews were generally employed in small workshops or as shop assistants (from 60 and 70 percent of shop clerks in Odessa were Jews). These ethnic cleavages and occupational divisions created powerful centrifugal tendencies within the ranks of Odessa's workers, illustrated by the increasing incidents of pogroms towards the end of the 19th century.\(^27\)

Radical movements flourished in Odessa, in part because of its relative freedom from the autocratic authorities. Jewish liberals and Zionists, Russian liberals, radicals, and ultra-conservatives, all found Odessa a fertile ground for their work. The city also served as a major centre for the Ukrainian national movement. The Odessa *Hromada* (society), consisting mostly of Ukrainian intellectuals and students, was an important organization dedicated to advancing the Ukrainian cultural revival.\(^28\)

From its early years Odessa was distinguished by its cosmopolitan, multi-ethnic character. Pushkin's Yevgenii Onegin paints the following picture of Odessa in the first quarter of the nineteenth-century:

> I lived then in dusty Odessa....
> There for a long time skies are clear.
> There, hustling, an abundant trade sets up its sails.
> There all exhales, diffuses Europe,
> all glistens with the South, and is motleyed

\(^{27}\) Ibid.

\(^{28}\) For a complete history of the Odessa *Hromada* and the Ukrainian national revival in Odessa after 1870 see Oleksandr Boldirev, *Odes'ka hromada: Istorychnyi narys pro ukrains'ke natsional'ne vidrodzhennia v Odesi u 70-ti rr. XIX-Pochat.XX st.*, (Odessa: Maiak, 1994). Also see Herlihy, *Odessa*, pp. 283-291.
with live variety.
The tongue of golden Italy
resounds along the gay street
where walks the proud Slav,
the Frenchman, Spaniard, Armenian,
and Greek, and the heavy Moldovian,
and the son of Egyptian soil,
the retired Corsair, Morali.  

According to the 1897 census, Odessa was still a strikingly multi-cultural
city at the end of the nineteenth-century: only barely half of the
population considered Russian their native language (50.71 percent),
while roughly a third considered Yiddish their native tongue (32.45
percent). It may also be that many of these Russians were in fact
Ukrainians who had recently assimilated, since, according to one
observer in 1880, one-third of the family names in the city were
Ukrainian.

Yet, according to another observer, writing in the mid-1890s,
Odessa's outward appearance had changed drastically since Pushkin's
day: the city's ethnic patchwork was much less conspicuous, and the "the
general character, the outward appearance of her inhabitants does not
distinguish the "Southern capital" from other large cities of Russia... On
the streets you mainly hear Russian speech, now and then alternating with
Jewish jargon and even more rarely [one hears] the Greek language. The
'tongue of golden Italy' one hears extremely rarely." Nonetheless, as the
Italian journalist Concetto Pettinato observed in 1913, Odessans were
somehow on the margin of two worlds: "[in Odessa] Russians feel a bit

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foreign; foreigners feel a bit Russian. Neither the one nor the other are exactly Russians or foreigners."^32 Even the authorities in St. Petersburg viewed Odessa as being somewhat "foreign", degenerate and insubordinate.^33

Crimea:

When Crimea lost its autonomy in the latter part of the eighteenth-century, a mass exodus of the peninsula's indigenous population, the Crimean Tatars, took place. The origins of the Crimean Tatars are unclear, as there is a shortage of reliable documents to shed light on this issue.^34 The Crimean Tatars were not the first to live on the peninsula: Cimmerians, of Iranian descent lived in Crimea in the first millennium BC; they were followed by Scythians, Greeks^35, Romans, Khazars and Slavs (after the fourth century).^36 In the 10th to 12th century the Eastern part of the Crimea belonged to Kievan Rus'. After the Mongol conquest in the 13th century, however, the Tatars of the Golden horde became the dominant people of the peninsula. In 1449 the Tatars formed an state known as the Crimean Khanate, which continued to exist until Empress

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^32 Concetto Pettinato, quoted in Herlihy, Odessa, p. 233.


^35 When Russia occupied Crimea in 1775, most of the Greeks still living in Crimea (30,000) were resettled to Mariiupol(Mariiupil) in the Donbass. A small number later returned. On the Mariiupol Greeks, see P. Lavriv, Istoriia, pp. 87-91.

^36 Some Ukrainian historians argue that these Slavs were of proto-Ukrainian descent. See Andrew Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s, p. 165, n. 131.
Catherine's armies seized the peninsula. The extent to which the Crimean Khanate was a vassal of the Ottoman Sultan has been a subject of much debate. Soviet historiography sought to present the Khanate as a puppet of the Ottomans, so as to undermine the political and territorial claims of Crimean Tatars. Fisher, however, argues that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Khanate, which continued to carry out separate diplomatic relations, "met all of the prerequisites for early modern statehood."  

At the end of Tatar autonomy in 1775, Crimea's population was roughly 250,000. By the time the peninsula was officially annexed in 1783, its population had fallen to 140,000 because of the emigration of many Tatars. Of the remaining population 79 percent were Tatars. Greeks and Armenians made up 17 percent of the population, followed by a number of smaller groups including Jews and Gypsies. In the early part of the nineteenth-century large numbers of Russians and Ukrainians migrated to Crimea, but the multi-ethnic character of the peninsula was further entrenched by the arrival of German, Bulgarian and other colonists, who were enticed to the region by the Russian state. By 1855 the population had reached 319,000 persons. 

In 1783 the fortress city of Sevastopol' was founded as part of Russia's defences for the newly occupied territory. It was also at this time that the Russian Black Sea Fleet was established; after 1804 Sevastopol' became its chief port. By the mid-nineteenth century the fleet was viewed as a serious threat to the free navigation of the Bosphorous straits. 

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38 O.M. Polukhina, "Naseleennia Krymu v 1783-1917 rr.", Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal, 1988(9), p. 27.
and, accordingly, to Ottoman and British interests in the region. At the end of the Crimean War, the Treaty of Paris (1865) deprived Russia of the right to have a navy on the Black Sea. In 1871, however, the fleet was re-established after Russia, with the acquiescence of Germany, denounced the restrictive clauses of the Treaty.

During the Crimean War (1853-1856), the fortified city earned its battle colours. The "First Heroic Defense of Sevastopol'," as it was later known, became a mythical event in annals of Russian imperial history. Count Leo Tolstoy, who witnessed the defense, described it rapturously:

Not once was I able to participate in the defense, but I thank God that I saw these people and live in this glorious time. The bombardment on the 5th is the most brilliantly glorious exploit, not only in Russian but in world history.39

Although Sevastopol' fell in September of 1855, this does not prevent it from earning a sanctified place in Russian national mythology as a "city of Russian glory." As the obsession of Serbian nationalists with the battle of Kosovo demonstrates, military defeats are often just as important in such mythologies as victories.

The psychological bond between Russian nationalism and the Crimea is not restricted to the memory of such military exploits. It appears that, in addition to the "Potato Principle" discussed above, there is also a "Poet Principle" in operation in Ukraine and Russia, perhaps because of the central role of literature and poetry in both cultures. According to this principle, Crimea is spiritually bound to the Russian

motherland because authors such as Chekhov, Tolstoy, and Pushkin were inspired by the peninsula. Ukrainians have retaliated in kind, however, by arguing that the works of such Ukrainians writers as Lesia Ukrain'ka, Taras Shevchenko, Pavlo Chubins'kyi, Stepan Rudans'kyi and others are also tightly bound to Crimea.

The ravages of the war caused the population of Crimea to fall, by 1865, to 194,000. But by 1897 Crimea's population exploded to 545,000 and by 1913 it reached 729,000. In 1897 Crimean Tatars were the largest ethnic group in the Simferopol' district, while Russians were the most numerous in the Sevastopol' district. (See Table 1.2) In 1917 roughly half of the total population of 800,000 were Russians and Ukrainians; Crimean Tatars made up another quarter.

As was the case in Odessa, Crimea's growth was not based largely on industrial development. Before 1917, less than three percent of the peninsula's population were engaged in industrial labour. Moreover, most enterprises were extremely small: in Sevastopol', for example, as late as 1914, there were only two enterprises which employed more than 70 persons; the vast majority employed from 3 to 20 workers. Instead,

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40 Tolstoy was in the Crimea in 1885 and from 1901-2. Chekhov wrote a number of his most famous works on the peninsula, including "The Lady and the Lapdog", "The Cherry Orchard", and "Three Sisters." Istoriia mist i sil' Ukrainy: Kryms'ka oblast, p. 33. Only the first of these works was set in the Crimea.
43 "Iz otcheta Sevastopol'skogo gradonachal'nika Ministerstvu vnutrennikh del o nalichii fabrik i zavodov v gradonachal'stve i kolichestve rabochikh na nikh na konets 1914," in Sevastopoliu 200 let, pp. 122-123.
the region's role was that of a military outpost, a resort area, and a commercial centre. Agriculture, including viticulture and food production, also played an important part in the peninsula's economy. Crimea's population was sharply divided along ethnic and occupational lines. The vast majority of Crimean Tatars, who, as Muslims had a distinct religious and ethnic identity, continued to till the soil, while Russians dominated the cities. The major distinguishing characteristic of Crimea's population was thus its extreme heterogeneity and its high level of urbanization. The rapid population growth which took place in Crimea throughout the nineteenth-century would have meant that very few of its citizens — with the glaring exception of the Crimean Tatars — were rooted in the Crimea. But the military character of Sevastopol', and the memory of its recent exploits, guaranteed that within Crimea there were significant bastions of patriotic and pro-imperial sentiment.

The Donbass:

Katerynoslav guberniia included an area which became synonymous with the phenomenal industrial growth of New Russia in the latter part of the nineteenth-century — the Donbass (comprising

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45 By 1897 41.7 percent of its population was urban; by 1926 46.4 percent was urban. V. Kubijovyc (et. al.) "Crimea" Encyclopedia of Ukraine, I(A-F), p. 614.
Bakhmut, Slavic-Serbia\textsuperscript{46} and Rostov districts\textsuperscript{47}. At the end of the 18th century the population of the sparsely settled Donbass began to grow as settlers streamed in from other parts of Ukraine, Russia and abroad. Even so, as late as the mid-nineteenth century the population was relatively small for, although the region's soil was good, rainfall was infrequent and irregular, and the continental summers were hot and dry.\textsuperscript{48} Most of the settlers to the Donbass were Ukrainians, but in the East, particularly along the Donets river, Russians came in significant numbers as well. In 1857 Ukrainians made up 72 percent of the total Donbass population of 557,909, while Russians made up 11 percent. Greeks, Armenians and Jews were the next largest ethnic groups.\textsuperscript{49}\{See Table 1.3\}

The abundant coal deposits in the Donets Basin had been exploited on a small scale as far back as the period of Kievan Rus', while the Zaporozhian Cossacks used the region's coal and metals to produce some of their weaponry.\textsuperscript{50} It was only in the 1870s, however, when railways

\textsuperscript{46} The district known as Slavic Serbia (Sloviano-Serbs'k) was a Russian state-sponsored, defensive settlement of Serbs. It was established in 1753 within the central territory of the Donbass (in modern Luhans'k); after 1764 it became part of the Katerynoslav province of New Russia. By the 19th century most of these Serbs had either returned home to the Balkans, or assimilated. On Slavic Serbia see Lavriv, Istoriia, pp. 80-84.

\textsuperscript{47} After 1887 Rostov district and Taganrog gradonachal'stvo were detached from Katerynoslav and became part of the Oblast of the Don Cossack Voisko.


\textsuperscript{49} Lavriv, Istoriia, p. 100.

\textsuperscript{50} On the history of the development of coal industry in the Donbass see G.D. Bakulev, Razvitie ugol'noi promyshlennosti Donetskogo basseina (Moscow: Gospolizdat, 1955); Friedgut, Izuzovka, I, pp. 39-70.
linking the region with central Russia were constructed, that significant coal mining and industrial development began in the Donbass. Later, in 1884 and 1902 respectively, the first and second "Catherine Railroads" were built, which more fully linked the region to other industrial centres.

The birth of the modern industrial Donbass may be traced to the year 1872, when the New Russia Coal, Iron, and Rail Producing Co. opened its first blast furnace. This company, founded by the Welshman, John Hughes, served as a model for Donbass industrial development; in the decades following the opening of his plants, coal and industrial production in the Donbass grew at a phenomenal rate. Whereas in 1870 Donbass coal accounted for 37 percent of the Russian Empire's total output, by 1900 it accounted for 68 percent.

In Kherson guberniia, just on the western edge of Katerynoslav, the Kryvyi Rih (Krivoi Rog) iron-ore basin became the major metallurgical centre of the Russian Empire by the turn of the century: in 1900 it accounted for 56 percent of Russian iron production. Thus, from Kryvyi Rih in the west to the Donbass in the east, Southern and Eastern Ukraine became a powerful industrial engine for the Russian Empire.

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51 On the creation of this company and its role in the development of Donbass industry see Friedgut, Iuzovka, Ch. 2.
52 The city of Kryvyi Rih is now in the Dnipropetrovsk oblast. Although historically part of the Kherson guberniia, Kryvyi Rih had more in common with Katerynoslav --- economically and socially --- than with Kherson.
54 Charters Wynn uses the cumbersome term "The Donbass-Dnepr Bend" to describe this large industrial region.
The Donbass city of Yuzivka exemplified the new towns which sprung up in the region in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Yuzivka (Yuzovka in Russian {i.e. "Hughes-ovka," the Russian equivalent of "Hughesville"}) was a sprawling, squalid, spontaneously generated company town. Unlike Katerynoslav, it was not even blessed with an overly-optimistic city plan. In fact, most of the town was built without a plan. It resembled an overgrown village, complete with thatched roofed shacks and clay huts in which many of its workers lived; it had only three paved streets at the turn of the century. Unlike Katerynoslav, Kharkiv or Odessa, Yuzivka was founded as an industrial town; it existed for nothing else but its industry. Its buildings and its name recalled nothing but its industrial present. The city's growth was so rapid that, even when its population reached 20,000 it had only two small churches.\footnote{See Table 1.4} This, argues Orlando Figes, meant that an important mechanism for imposing a Russian identity on the population, the Orthodox Church, was rather weak in the Donbass.\footnote{Istoriia robitnychoho klasu Ukrains'koi RSR, I, (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1967), pp. 123.}

The New Russian Labour Force:

Industrialisation and the accompanying process of urbanisation drastically and irrevocably altered the demographic pattern of Eastern and Southern Ukraine. By 1900 there were over a hundred thousand industrial workers in Katerynoslav \textit{guberniia} alone.\footnote{Orlando Figes, \textit{A People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution, 1891-1924}. (London: Jonathan Cape, 1996), pp. 64-65.}
This process involved the large-scale migration of Russian workers to the region in what would become an enduring pattern throughout the nineteenth and then the twentieth century. This development guaranteed that, by the turn of the century, the Donbass was, as Theodore Friedgut puts it, "within Ukraine but not of it."^58

The influx of Russians, as well as Jews and other minorities, into the new industries and industrial towns of the Donbass was not countered by a corresponding influx of Ukrainian peasants from the sparsely settled countryside.\(^59\) There are a number of reasons for this. To begin with, Ukrainian peasants regarded industrial work as a wretched and foreign way of life. In particular, they considered work in dark, claustrophobic, smoke-filled mines as a repugnant business; as convicts' labour. For them, the new, Russian dominated mining settlements, with their bawdy, frontier atmosphere were foreign, both ethnically and morally.\(^60\) Ukrainian peasants only chose to work in mines or other industrial work when there were no other options left for them. On the whole, Ukrainian peasants preferred to migrate to the East in search of new land, instead of moving to the cities.\(^61\) Nor did mine work have an intrinsic appeal for Russian peasants. But, while in the Donbass the local peasantry was relatively well-off, a severe agrarian crisis of overcrowding gripped Central Russia's peasantry. This intense "land hunger," exacerbated by the rising cost of land, and the constant subdivision of agricultural plots

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\(^{58}\) Friedgut, Iuzovka, p. 331.

\(^{59}\) For example, Jews made up 11 percent of the total population of Yuzivka in 1897; 18 percent by 1917 and 38 percent by 1923. Friedgut, Iuzovka, p. 198. They worked mainly as artisans, shopkeepers or tavern owners.

\(^{60}\) Wynn, Workers, Strikes and Pogroms, pp. 41-45; Friedgut, pp. 207-209; 212.

\(^{61}\) Friedgut, p. 212; Potolov, Rabochie Donbassa, p. 99-100 n. 17; p. 101 n. 23; p. 106 n. 46.
into tinier and tinier parcels, forced Russian peasants to seek means to supplement their income. The new industries of South-Eastern Ukraine were the natural destination for such peasants. On the whole, Russians, with their generally inferior agricultural conditions, were more accustomed than Ukrainians to finding non-agricultural employment to supplement their incomes than their Ukrainian counterparts. Thus, Russia already possessed an experienced working class, many of whom chose to migrate to Ukraine where their skills were in high demand and where wages were often higher.⁶²

The numerical dominance of Russians in the workforce varied considerably from region to region in Southern and Eastern Ukraine. In Kharkiv guberniia Ukrainian-speakers made up 61 percent of the workforce by 1897 while Russian speakers were only 33 percent of the working population. By comparison, only 28 percent of Katerynoslav guberniia’s workers were Ukrainian-speaking while slightly over 50 percent were Russian-speaking. In Kherson (which included Odessa) a mere 18 percent of workers were Ukrainian speakers.⁶³{See Table 1.6}

Many of the Ukrainians who did join the Russian-dominated workforce abandoned their native language, as the Russian language and culture dominated the cities of the East and South. The extent of this cultural Russification of the Ukrainian proletariat is illustrated by the complaint of a Ukrainian Socialist in 1906: "The Ukrainian proletariat has become so completely Russianised that members of the [Ukrainian

⁶² Friedgut, Iuzovka, p. 208.
Social Democratic Labour Party working among them must first teach them the Ukrainian language." But the vacuum created by the absence of Ukrainian national consciousness among the Ukrainian proletariat was gradually filled by the rise of a new type of consciousness: working class consciousness.

**The development of working class consciousness:**

While there were no shortage of socialist activists seeking to raise class consciousness among workers, the predominantly illiterate workers of new Russia were usually either apolitical or downright hostile towards politics, ideologies and the spectacled intellectuals that accompanied them. Above all the workers wanted to improve their physical living conditions; preferably without politics. This trait of the East Ukrainian working population became one of its most enduring features. Nonetheless, the sheer brutality of their working and living conditions eventually began to unite workers in opposition to factory directors. The very nature of the tsarist state was such that simple grievances over working conditions, wages and working hours inevitably developed into confrontations with political authorities.

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66 This was because many of these demands required changes in national laws, while the demand for the recognition of trade unions and other such representative bodies were essentially political issues. Moreover, when strikes were suppressed by the police or the military, workers automatically found themselves in opposition to the government. Weinburg, *The Revolution of 1905*, p. 227.
Not surprisingly, Soviet scholars regarded the development of worker consciousness in New Russia as a linear and inevitable process. But, the development of working class identity in New Russia was a slow process, hindered by fragmentation along ethnic and regional lines, by the strong-peasant character of the workers, and by the remarkably high rate of labour turnover. Moreover, it possessed within it a reactionary strain — inclined towards "black-hundredism" and pogroms. This reactionary, sometimes anarchical strain, would often surface on the heels of a period of apparent working class solidarity, as in the revolutionary period of 1905.

At this time the industrial workers of the Donbass, Katerynoslav, Kharkiv and Odessa spearheaded massive general strikes which shut down the industry and economy of much of Ukraine. Workers threw up barricades, and even formed military detachments that fought against the Tsarist authorities. In Odessa, the June uprising and the mutiny of the Battleship Potemkin (immortalized in the 1927 film by Sergei Eizenshtein), became part of the myth of the Russian radical movement (later, these events were used by the Soviet regime to demonstrate Odessa's "progressive" proto-Soviet credentials). By late 1905, though, improvements in workers' living conditions had failed to materialize, and

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67 Istoriia robitnychoho klasu Ukrains koi RSR.
68 This dual personality of the Donbass working class is the central theme of Charters Wynn's, Workers, Strikes and Pogroms.
70 Significantly, no workers' insurgencies took place outside of the Eastern and Southern regions of Ukraine. For a map illustrating the location of the workers' military insurgencies in Ukraine in 1905 see Istoriia robitnychoho klasu Ukrains'koi RSR, p. 320.
71 On the battleship Potemkin and the Odessa uprising, see Weinberg, Revolution of 1905 in Odessa, pp. 132-138.
72 See, for example, Istoriia robitnychoho klasu Ukrains'koi RSR, I, pp. 284-5.
workers' solidarity melted away. The resulting frustration, combined with endemic and entrenched anti-semitism, resulted in a frenzy of pogroms and a reactionary upsurge in Katerynoslav and in Odessa.\textsuperscript{73}

Nonetheless, while the New Russian working class remained volatile, it was demonstrating that it could on occasion act \textit{en masse} in pursuit of its own interests. Moreover, its peasant and transitory character was gradually fading, as the region's working class became more rooted. By 1914 half the factory workers and nearly half the miners came from an industrial background, and these percentages were growing steadily. As Theodore Friedgut observes, the process by which the working class was constituted primarily by established workers, rather than migrant peasants, "was longer, slower, and more complex than has generally been noted up to now, but it was a clearly evolving process."\textsuperscript{74} Various types of loyalties and identities continued to co-exist among the workers of Eastern Ukraine: regional loyalty, peasantness, Ukrainianess, Russianess, etc.

Yet, as the revolutionary upheaval after 1917 would demonstrate, when workers in Southern and Eastern Ukraine were forced to choose sides, the majority chose to support those who claimed to put the interests of the working class — not of the Russian Empire or the Ukrainian national movement — above all.

\textsuperscript{73} On the reactionary period in Katerynoslav in 1905 see Wynn, \textit{Workers, Strikes and Pogroms}, Chapter 7. On the major pogrom in Odessa of October 1905 see Weinberg, \textit{The Revolution of 1905}, Chapter 7.

\textsuperscript{74} Friedgut, \textit{Izovka}, I, p. 230.
Table 1.1: Population and Ethnic Composition of Kherson, Katerynoslav and Tavriia gubernii by native language, 1897.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language Group</th>
<th>Absolute number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>1,456,369</td>
<td>68.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>364,974</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>99,152</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>80,979</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>112,198</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,113,627</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.1a
Katerynoslav gubernii (includes Donbass), 1897.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language Group</th>
<th>Absolute number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>1,462,034</td>
<td>53.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>575,375</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>322,537</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>373,661</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,733,607</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.1b
Kherson gubernii (includes Odessa), 1897.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language Group</th>
<th>Absolute number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>611,121</td>
<td>42.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>404,463</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimean Tatar</td>
<td>196,854</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>235,252</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,447,690</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.2: Population in Simferopol’ and Sevastopol’ regions of Crimea, by Language 1897.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Simferopol’ District</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Sevastopol’ Gradonachal’shtvo</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>10,132</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7545</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>42,833</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>36,057</td>
<td>62.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimean Tatars</td>
<td>62,876</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>25,876</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>11,843</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>141,717</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>57,355</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 1.3: Population and Composition by Native Language of Key Districts in Modern Donbass, 1897.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bakhmuta (%)</th>
<th>Slavic-Serbia (%)</th>
<th>Mariupol (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>193510 58.20</td>
<td>88218 50.48</td>
<td>117206 46.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>103702 31.19</td>
<td>79281 45.37</td>
<td>35691 14.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>9457 2.84</td>
<td>2631 1.51</td>
<td>10291 4.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>12646 3.80</td>
<td>896 0.51</td>
<td>19104 7.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greeks</td>
<td>142 0.04</td>
<td>14 0.01</td>
<td>48290 19.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatars</td>
<td>346 0.10</td>
<td>151 0.09</td>
<td>15472 6.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarusians</td>
<td>2468 0.74</td>
<td>1564 0.89</td>
<td>1697 0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>2000 0.60</td>
<td>511 0.29</td>
<td>528 0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldovans</td>
<td>6371 1.92</td>
<td>839 0.48</td>
<td>95 0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>20 0.01</td>
<td>4 0.00</td>
<td>5317 2.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1816 0.55</td>
<td>644 0.37</td>
<td>363 0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>332478 100</td>
<td>174753 100</td>
<td>254054 100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.4: Population of Yuzivka (Donets'k) in Selected Years:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>28,076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>32,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>54,701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>37,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Friedgut, Yuzovka in Revolution, I, p. 72.*

Table 1.5: Average Number of Industrial Workers, 1861-1900.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GUBERNIIA</th>
<th>1861-1870</th>
<th>1871-1880</th>
<th>1881-1890</th>
<th>1891-1900</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kharkiv</td>
<td>19,595</td>
<td>19,700</td>
<td>21,644</td>
<td>30,519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katerynoslav</td>
<td>5,239</td>
<td>8,733</td>
<td>23,820</td>
<td>64,266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tavriaia</td>
<td>6,882</td>
<td>8,624</td>
<td>11,049</td>
<td>16,679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kherson</td>
<td>6,581</td>
<td>6,374</td>
<td>15,595</td>
<td>28,721</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 1.6: Native language affiliation of Workers in all areas of industry according to 1897 census (by guberniia):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Guberniia</th>
<th>Total no. of workers</th>
<th>% Russ.</th>
<th>% Ukrn.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kharkiv</td>
<td>83,476</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kherson</td>
<td>117,429</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katerynoslav</td>
<td>106,111</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tavriaia</td>
<td>55,445</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Istoriiia robitynychoho klasu Ukrain's'koi RSR, I, (Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1967), Table 12, p. 136.*
CHAPTER 2:
REVOLUTION AND STALINISM.

Shining like a clear dawn  
My heart — my Donbass...  
People of the fiery age—  
Sons of the Lenin era.

Pavel Bezposhchadnyi

"Great October":

The Russian Revolutions of 1917 precipitated a period of independent Ukrainian statehood, as a series of ill-fated Ukrainian states were established. As the Ukrainian nationalists, Bolsheviks, Anarchists, and Russian Whites all discovered, no domestic force on the territory possessed the social base required to control and govern the disparate regions of Ukraine. The revolutionary period unfolded according to the

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1 Zoia G. Likholobova, Stranoiu vozvelichennyi Donbass (Donets'k: "Donbas", 1987.), {back cover}.
internal forces of each region. In Western and Central Ukraine, a national liberation campaign among nationally conscious Ukrainians, led by its small urban intelligentsia, took place. In the cities of the industrialised East, a revolution among the Russified working classes ensued. In the Don region, there was a brief movement towards Cossack autonomy, but the region, together with the Crimea, became a centre of the White movement. Finally, a massive, uncoordinated peasant rebellion swept through all of Ukraine, engulfing different movements and forces in its wake.

**The Workers' Revolution:**

As noted, the East Ukrainian working class had a reactionary streak, and was capable of frightful anti-Semitism as well as ultranationalistic support for the Russian empire. Hiroaki Kuromiya has argued that the contradictory traits of rebelliousness and conformity characterised the Donbass working class during the revolutionary period. In 1914, for example, a wave of pro-Imperial patriotism swept the region. By August of 1917, however, a state of anarchy prevailed in the region. Some workers even joined the peasant anarchist rebellion of Nestor Makhno (described below). In late 1917, elements of the working class reacted against the Central Rada and the very idea of a Ukrainian national movement. Some supported movements such as the "Gogol' Union of Little Russians" denounced "forcible Ukrainianisation." The majority

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4 Ibid., p. 156.
5 O. P. Reent, "Stavlennia proletariatu Ukrainy do Tsentral'noi Rady," **Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal,** 4, 1994, p. 13. For a broad survey of
of Donbass workers, however, supported class-based, rather than ethnic-based political movements.

The elections to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly provide a unprecedented glimpse at popular political sympathies in 1917. The results demonstrate that, while on the whole, pro-autonomy Ukrainian parties were the most popular, the Bolsheviks had substantial support in the major industrial cities of the East. The Bolsheviks were weaker, however, in more diversified cities such as Kharkiv and Odessa. The influence of the Bolsheviks was thus largely limited to the industrial areas of Left Bank Ukraine. The geographical distribution of its membership further underlines this: in 1917 roughly 71 percent of its membership was from the Donbass.

The existence of strong popular support for the Bolsheviks among Donbass workers, and the weakness of the Ukrainian national movement


6 The bourgeois character of the city of Kharkiv is confirmed by the strong support it gave to the Kadet Party (29 percent), as compared to 23 percent for the Bolsheviks. The Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) only managed to win 8 percent of votes. In the city of Katerynoslav the Bolsheviks were by far the dominant party, with 27 percent support, compared to only 13 percent each for the Kadets and Ukrainian SRs. Odessa's political landscape was predictably fractured along ethnic and class lines: the Zionist parties gained the largest share of the city's vote (34 percent), while Bolsheviks(19 percent), Ukrainian SRs (18 percent) and Kadets(17 percent) had roughly equal support. It is worth noting that, as the Civil War progressed, a radicalisation of the population occurred; accordingly, many supporters of the Ukrainian SRs came to support the Bolsheviks. Steven L. Guthier, "The popular base of Ukrainian nationalism in 1917," Slavic Review, 38, no. 1(1979), p. 45.

7 At the time of the sixth congress of the RSDWP(b), there were 22,402 party members from Ukraine, roughly 16,000 of whom were from the Donets Basin. Borys, The Sovietization of Ukraine, p. 398.
in the region, is confirmed by the election results. Even though roughly one-third of the miners and metallurgical workers in the Donbass were Ukrainians by 1917, Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) received less than one-tenth of the regional vote. This suggests that, even for Ukrainian workers in the Donbass, the Bolshevik preoccupation with the interests of the working class was far more germane than the Ukrainian SRs’ concern with Ukrainian autonomy.

For the most part, the Russian and Russified working class of Eastern and Southern Ukraine viewed themselves as an integral part of the Russian Empire. The attitude of the predominantly Russian leadership of Left Bank Bolsheviks towards the idea of Ukrainian autonomy sheds light on the national orientation of these workers. While in principle the 'Katerynoslavians', as they were called, accepted the right to self-determination of nations, they refused to define Kharkiv, Katerynoslav, Kryvyi Rih and the Donbass as part of Ukrainian territory. From their point of view, there was no difference between the workers of St. Petersburg and Katerynoslav. The Katerynoslav group also favoured the creation of states on the basis of economic rather than

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8 In the mining districts of the Donbass the Bolsheviks received 17,075 votes, compared to a mere 889 for the Ukrainian SRs. In the Russian Society Factory in Yuzivka, the Bolsheviks received 1,105 votes as compared to a paltry 24 votes for the Ukrainian parties. Steven L. Guthier, "The popular base of Ukrainian nationalism in 1917," Slavic Review, p. 45.

9 As M. Popov, a Stalin-era Soviet historian observes, the Katerynoslav Bolsheviks, "relied upon the Russian, Russified, or semi-Russified masses of the proletariat," M. Popov, Narys istorii Kommunistychnoi partii (bil'shovykiv) Ukrainy (5th ed.; Kharkiv: Partvydav Ts.K. KP(b)U, 1931), p. 119. One may therefore assume, that they reflected the orientation of this group, particularly since the Katerynoslav Bolsheviks were popularly supported by them.

national units, which would be tightly bound to the Russian republic. In keeping with this "internationalism", and in view of the imminent military threat posed by the Germans, the "Donets'k-Kryvyi Rih Autonomous Republic" was formally proclaimed on 12 February 1918 by a Congress of Soviet deputies from that region. While this proclamation originally obtained clearance from the Bolshevik authorities in Petrograd, Lenin reversed his stand a month later and instructed the Donets'k-Kryvyi Rih Bolsheviks to abandon their separatism. On 15 March the central committee of the Russian Communist Party resolved that:

> At the Congress [of the all-Ukrainian Communist Party] it is necessary to create one government for all of Ukraine... the Don Basin we consider part of Ukraine.

Thus, the initiative for the establishment of a unified Ukrainian Bolshevik party and, by extension, the creation of a unified Soviet Ukrainian

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12 The Ukrainian Central Rada government in Kiev had just signed a treaty with Germany (9 February 1918). In accordance with its terms, German troops began to occupy Ukraine after the 18th of February.
13 The territory of the republic was to include the Katerynoslav and Kharkiv *guberniia* and the Kryvyi Rih iron ore basin (in Kherson *guberniia*). To the north-east, its borders were to extend to the Russian city of Voronezh, and to the southern border of the modern Russian oblast of Kursk. On the Donbass-Kryvyi Rih Republic see Lavriv, *Istoriia*, pp. 110-115; Theodore H. Friedgut, *Donovka and Revolution: Politics and Revolution in Russia's Donbass, 1869-1924*, 2, pp. 352-359.
republic, came from none other than Lenin and the Soviet Russian
government.\textsuperscript{15}

During the Civil War period pro-Bolshevik workers from the major
industrial areas in Ukraine formed Red Guard detachments to help
establish Soviet power.\textsuperscript{16} The Bolsheviks based in Central Ukraine
viewed the Central Rada as the main obstacle to maintaining control over
the country. Accordingly, they focused their energies on winning over
the peasantry, who — at least in Central Ukraine — had shown
considerable support for the Rada and its nationalist slogans. In the eyes
of the Katerynoslav Bolsheviks, the Don Cossacks and the White armies
— who were menacing from the East and South — were the greatest
threats to Soviet power, not the Ukrainian peasantry.

The Don Cossacks:

During the First World War, and especially during the Civil War,
the independent tradition of the Don Cossacks was revived, culminating
in the establishment of an independent Don Cossack state known as the
Don Military Government (\textit{Dons'kii viis'kovii uriad}). As Alexander
Solzhenitsyn laments in his novel \textit{August 1914}, they "discovered that

\textsuperscript{15} When it came to deciding what to call the grudgingly unified party, the
Bolsheviks of Central Ukraine --- the 'Kievans' --- proposed the name
"the Ukrainian Bolshevik Party," while the Katerynoslavians preferred
"The Russian Bolshevik Party, Ukrainian Branch." The compromise
finally adopted was the name Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine
(CP(b)U). Adams, \textit{Bolsheviks in the Ukraine}, pp. 15-17; Bilinsky, "The

\textsuperscript{16} On working class attitudes toward the Ukrainian Central Rada, see O.
P. Reent, "Stavlennia proletariatu Ukrainy do Tsentral'noi Rady," pp. 3-
18; On the role of Kharkiv's Bolsheviks see: M.I. Kulichenko, \textit{Bolsheviki
Khar'kovshchiny v bor'be za vlast' sovetov, 1918-1920} (Kharkiv:
Izdatel'stvo Khar'kovskogo Universiteta, 1966).
Cossack blood was thicker than Russian water."\(^{17}\) The results of the Constituent Assembly elections confirm that the main political allegiance of the people of the Don region was to the Cossack parties, who gained 46 percent of the vote (which corresponds roughly with the Cossack proportion of the population in that region).\(^{18}\)

Immediately after the 1917 revolution, the traditional Cossack order was restored in the Don region, and the autonomist movement became widespread. Later, after German intervention in 1918, the Ukrainian-Don Agreement (August 1918) was signed between the Don Cossack state and the German backed, aristocratic, Cossack government of Skoropads'kyi. This agreement provided for mutual recognition of independence and established borders, according to which much of the territory of the modern *oblasti* of Donets'k and Luhansk remained part of Don Cossack territory.\(^ {19}\) By 1919, however, the pendulum had swung back in the direction of Russian centralism. The autonomist Don movement had been thoroughly co-opted by ultra-patriotic Russian Whites, and the region became a major stronghold for the forces of Denikin, who refused to countenance Don or Ukrainian separatism.

**The Crimea in the Revolution:**

The Crimea also became a stronghold for the White movement. The local Bolshevik party was so weak on the peninsula that it was


forced to remain united with the Mensheviks until April 1917, when a separate Bolshevik party was established in Sevastopol'. Most of the region's soviets were dominated by Russian Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, while city dumas were dominated by the Kadet party. In Tavria as a whole, the Socialist Revolutionaries won over half of the vote in the Constituent Assembly elections, while Ukrainian and Muslim (i.e. Crimean Tatar) parties had roughly equal strength (twelve percent each). The Bolsheviks garnered only a fraction (less than three percent) of the provincial vote.

The orientation of the Black Sea Fleet, based in Sevastopol', was somewhat different. The sailors, traditionally conscripts from Ukrainian provinces, gave a relatively high level of support to the Ukrainian parties (25 percent) in the elections, although the Russian SRs were the most popular party (42 percent). The Black Sea Fleet, hence, was a strategic wedge for the Ukrainian national movement in a province where pro-Ukrainian parties were relatively weak. In March of 1918 the Soviets declared the founding of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Tavria, which was to be a full-fledged Soviet republic on a par with the Ukrainian SSR and the Russian SFSR. It only existed for a month before it was dissolved by the Germans.

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20 Istoriia mist i sil Ukraїns'koi RSR: Kryms'ka oblast', p. 34.
21 In Tavria the Bolsheviks won a mere 3 percent of the vote as compared to 57 percent for the Socialist Revolutionaries(SRs) and 12 percent support each for the Muslim and Ukrainian parties. Guthier, "The popular base of Ukrainian nationalism in 1917," p. 45.
22 Ukrainian parties received 12,898 (25 percent) votes out of a total of 52,629. The Bolsheviks received 10,771 (20 percent), while the SRs received the largest share, with 22,251 (42 percent) votes. Radkey, Russia Goes to the Polls, p. 38.
Throughout the entire revolutionary period, the Crimean Tatars refused to support the Bolsheviks or the Whites, preferring to follow their own national leadership, the more radical members of which envisioned the re-establishment of Turkish suzerainty over the peninsula. The Crimean Tatar national party, the "Milli-Firka," established a Tatar parliament or "Kurultai," but it was dissolved by the German occupation forces. The Crimean government installed by the Germans, which included representatives of the Milli-Firka, signed an agreement with Petliura's government which would have made the Crimea an autonomous republic within Ukraine.\(^\text{24}\)

Even though the Ukrainian National Republic initially made no claims to Crimean Territory, it did demand ownership of part of the Black Sea Fleet. Ukrainian sailors supported these pretensions by raising the Ukrainian flag on many of the fleet's ships, while other sailors raised the Russian, Communist and Anarchist flags.\(^\text{25}\)

In April of 1919, the Bolsheviks managed to gain temporary control over the Crimea. At this time, the CC RCP(b) ordered the creation of the Crimean Soviet Socialist Republic, which survived a mere 75 days before White forces gained control over the territory (June 1919).

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\(^{25}\) Later, in April 1918, when Ukrainian forces marched into Crimea, the Ukrainian flag was ordered raised on all Black Sea ships. Shortly thereafter, the fleet passed into German control, but in June, many of the fleet's ships were scuttled, in accordance with a decree by Lenin. What remained of the fleet was eventually transferred by the Germans to the Hetman government (November 1918), and subsequently taken over by the Entente's forces. See Kryp'iakevych, I. P. Istoria Ukraïns'koho viis'ka (2 Volumes) (Kiev: Pam'iatky Ukrainy, 1992), 2, pp. 437-438.
It was led by D.I. Ul'ianov, Lenin's brother. For the rest of the Civil War, the peninsula remained a stronghold of the Russian White movement. Once again, the Crimea earned the distinction of being the site of a memorable struggle to defend the "motherland." For the vanquished Whites the defence of the peninsula was one of the last great struggles to save mother Russia from Bolshevism. For the Bolsheviks, the fight to clear the Whites from Crimea (later commemorated in the film "Two Comrades") was, in Lenin's words, "One of the most brilliant chapters in the history of the Red Army." 

At the end of this legendary campaign against the Whites, the Crimean Soviet republic was not revived. Instead, the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was established within the jurisdiction of the RSFSR (18 October, 1921). Hence, Crimea was recognised as a Russian territory, but also as a region distinctive enough to warrant "autonomy" within the Russian Soviet Republic (RSFSR).

The Ukrainian Peasantry and the Revolution:

During the course of the Civil War the peasantry of Eastern and Southern Ukraine threw its support behind a succession of political movements, only to later turn on each of them. Yet all the while they demonstrated a stubborn and steadfast commitment to one cause above all: their own perceived self-interest. While largely preoccupied with gaining control over their land, the peasantry was also possessed of vague and primitive egalitarian ideals, a passion for freedom, and a propensity to revolt in defence of these ideals. All of these features of the peasantry

27 Istorija mist i sil Ukrainy: Kryms'ka oblast', p. 45.
were legacies of their Cossack heritage, a heritage which was never eradicated in Southern and Eastern Ukraine. Their rebellious bent manifested itself in large-scale peasant uprisings throughout the Civil War period. The most successful peasant army was led by Nestor Makhno. The title of one of Makhno's propaganda leaflets encapsulates the peasant suspicion of all governments: "Where there is government, there is no freedom (De vlada — tam nema svobody)."\(^{28}\) As Arthur Adams puts it, these rebellions were a "hydra-headed monster" that could never hope to be suppressed, controlled or led by any party or movement.\(^{29}\)

The son of a wealthy Donbass peasant recalls, in a 1970s interview, his father's attitudes toward the national idea and the Bolsheviks during the revolutionary period:

Father wanted peace and just wanted to live as he lived. He was well off. I will tell you, that my father was not a nationally conscious Ukrainian. He was Ukrainian, he spoke Ukrainian and spoke about many things, but was not publicly active. He respected the Petliurists, respected them, but did not actively join them. But he hated those Communists from day one. He said that they were godless rabble and were going about destroying churches... Above all, he was for freedom. For freedom to work the land, freedom to buy and sell it, and to tend to it.\(^{30}\)

The Constituent Assembly elections of 1917 demonstrated that initially the peasantry, especially in Right bank Ukraine, were generally

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predisposed towards the Ukrainian parties which promised swift land reform, such as the Ukrainian S.R's.\textsuperscript{31} The peasantry at first also regarded the Rada and later the Directory governments as "theirs."\textsuperscript{32} But, as later developments demonstrated, this support was not unconditional, and could be withdrawn or reversed if land reform was not swiftly enacted.

The effect of the October Revolution on Ukrainian national consciousness was variable in different regions within the country. The rebellion which brought Petliura's Directory to power in late 1918 reflected and further stimulated the rise of national consciousness in Central Ukraine. This was much less the case, however, in Eastern and most of Southern Ukraine, in part because most of the region was too remote from the major centres of Ukrainian cultural life (Kiev, Poltava, Kharkiv, Odessa) for the successful diffusion of the nationalist message. Accordingly, many Ukrainians there had simply not heard the national message.\textsuperscript{33} Various other arguments have also been put forward to explain the lower level of national consciousness in Southern and Eastern Ukraine's countryside at this time. It has been argued that the greater

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\textsuperscript{31} According to Steven Guthier, "The results of the Constituent Assembly election repudiate the notion that the Ukrainian peasantry lacked national consciousness in 1917", "The Popular Base of Ukrainian Nationalism," p. 47.


\textsuperscript{33} A recent study of the Ukrainian peasant congress movement between 1917-1919 argues that the Ukrainian peasantry did indeed begin to manifest a national consciousness and to rally in support of Ukrainian autonomy. Yet, as the author notes, these peasant congresses took place mostly in Left-Bank Ukraine. He argues that this was related to problems in communicating the national-idea. Evan Ostryzniuk, "The Ukrainian Countryside During the Russian Revolution, 1917-1919: The Limits of Peasant Mobilisation," \textit{The Ukrainian Review}, 44, 1(Spring) 1997, pp. 56-57. See also Krawchenko, \textit{Social Change and National Consciousness}, pp. 72-3.
\end{flushright}
number of Jews in Right Bank Ukraine helped to accentuate Ukrainian identity in the region. Another explanation considers the greater proximity of Russian dominated urban centres and the existence of large German and Greek colonies in the East and South, which surrounded the Ukrainian peasantry. Arguably, these two features of the region's landscape prevented nationalists from inculcating the anti-Hetman rebellion with a national element as they did in the central Ukrainian countryside. It has also been suggested that the greater compactness of the village in Central Ukraine gave a nationalist tinge to the hatred of the Russified city. Instead of struggling for the establishment of Ukrainian statehood, the rebellion in the South and East took up the black banner of anarchism, and supported various otamans or batkos (warlords). These warlords fought against Petliura's forces, and were often nominally associated with the Bolsheviks. In Left Bank Ukraine, disillusionment with the Directory rapidly developed into "active hatred" for Petliura's nationalist administration. The peasant, anarchist rebellion led by Makhno gained wide support throughout the Katerynoslav guberniia, even though at the time its Russian speaking leadership denounced any expressions of Ukrainian nationalism and the very idea of establishing a Ukrainian state. Later, Makhno's peasant army fought alongside the Bolsheviks in the campaign to rid the Donbass of the Whites. Other

34 The former argument is that of I. Teper [Gordeev], the latter is that of M. Kabunin. Both are quoted in Frank Sysyn, "Nestor Makhno and the Ukrainian Revolution" in Taras Hunczak (ed.) The Ukraine, 1917-1921, p. 284. n. 33.
35 Adams, in Hunczak, Ukraine, p. 262.
36 Sysyn, "Nestor Makhno," p. 285. In this article Sysyn argues that Makhno gradually developed a form of Ukrainian national consciousness (particularly after he emigrated to France). Nonetheless, at the height of his movement's strength he officially repudiated Ukrainian nationalism and the idea of building a Ukrainian state. On the Makhno rebellion see also A.V. Belash and V.F. Belash, Dorogi Nestora Makhno: Istoricheskoe povestovanie. (Kiev: Proza, 1993).
peasant bands even fought for Bolshevik power in Eastern Ukraine in early 1919, although they rejected Bolshevik commissars and apparatchiks, incongruously referring to themselves as "non-party Bolsheviks."Ironically, one of the greatest "red" partisan leaders in Ukraine was hardly a Bolshevik at all, but rather a latter day Zaporozhian Cossack Otaman, Matvii Hryhoriiv. His partisan forces conquered Odessa, which had been under French occupation since the withdrawal and defeat of German and Ukrainian forces. With their rebellions the peasantry demonstrated that they indeed had a freedom loving spirit, but their conception of freedom did not necessarily correspond with that of the Kiev national patriots. At a crucial juncture they refused to support Ukrainian nationalists who sought to contain this spirit within the confines of a modern state system.

**Ukrainianisation:**

Proceeding from the assumption that nationalism was reactive and economically grounded, the Bolshevik leadership sought to conquer Ukrainian nationalism first, by attacking Russian national chauvinism and second, by attempting to eliminate the social inequities within Ukraine. It also sought to appease national sentiment through furnishing Ukrainians and other non-Russian nationalities with the superficial trappings of statehood and sovereignty.

In 1923, in order to expand their constituency in the Ukrainian-speaking countryside and to further legitimise their control in the country, the Soviet Ukrainian administration officially proclaimed the formal

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39 The most important work, and the basis of this discussion on Ukrainianisation is George Liber's *Soviet Nationality Policy*. 
equality of the Ukrainian and Russian languages. This set the stage for
the imposition of Ukrainian as the language of tuition in schools, and of
government and work throughout the republic.\footnote{Liber, \textit{Soviet Nationality Policy}, p. 36; 45.}

With unemployment and crowding gripping the Ukrainian
countryside, peasants began to flood into the cities by the hundreds of
thousands. By 1926 Ukrainians constituted a plurality of the population
in a number of major cities, including Kiev, Kharkiv (by a fraction), and
Dnipro\n
\footnote{Katerynoslav had been re-named Dnipropetrovs'k in 1926, in honour of
the Bolshevik Grigorii Ivanovich Petrovs'kii, who been sent from Russia
to help in the establishment of Soviet power in the Donbass. Petrovs'kii
was also a member of the Ukrainian Politburo in 1920.}

\footnote{On the population Changes in Ukrainian cities, see Steven L. Guthier,
"Ukrainian Cities During the Revolution and the Interwar Period," in
Ivan L. Rudnytsky (ed.) \textit{Rethinking Ukrainian History}, pp. 156-179. See
also, Liber, \textit{Soviet Nationality Policy}, Appendices I-III.}

\footnote{Lavriv p. 117; Krawchenko, \textit{Social Change and National
Consciousness}, p. 129.}
dnipro\n
\footnote{The Ukrainian proportion of the
population of Odessa, Mykolaiv (Nikolaev), and Stalino (as Yuzivka was
known from 1924) also increased, but Ukrainians still did not come close
to constituting pluralities in these cities. The Ukrainian working class
was less and less dominated by Russians, even in the Donbass. By 1929
70 percent of all Donbass workers were Ukrainians; in the following
year, 80 percent of the new Donbass workers were found to be recent
arrivals from the Ukrainian countryside.\footnote{Lavriv p. 117; Krawchenko, \textit{Social Change and National
Consciousness}, p. 129.}}

Because of the policy of Ukrainianisation, the new migrants to the
cities were no longer forced to abandon their Ukrainian peasant identity
for a Russian urban identity, as had been the case. Indeed, the focal point
of the new Ukrainian identity was the city, rather than the countryside.
The NEP period demonstrated that, not only could new peasant immigrants maintain their Ukrainian identity in the cities, but that Russified workers could also adopt (or regain) a Ukrainian identity. In Odessa, a "rebirth" of the use of the Ukrainian language was apparent in 1926, as roughly 73 percent of male youths between the ages of 20-24 gave Ukrainian as their mother tongue, compared to 51 percent of in the age group 35-64.\textsuperscript{44} In the Donbass and the South, many Russified Ukrainians were introduced to Ukrainian literature, music, and theatre for the first time, and generally reacted favourably to it.\textsuperscript{45}

There was considerable difficulty Ukrainianising the local administration in the Donbass. Even when ethnic Ukrainians came to outnumber Russians in the administrative apparatus, many of them could not speak Ukrainian.\textsuperscript{46} Mykolaiiv and Donbass regions were the most resistant to Ukrainianisation. Soviet Ukrainian authorities complained of the Donbass bureaucracy's sluggishness in Ukrainianising.\textsuperscript{47} Only 30 percent of higher educational courses were taught in Ukrainian owing to such resistance. Newly arrived Russian industrial managers were especially hostile to the policy.\textsuperscript{48} As late as 1926, the Donbass

\begin{footnotes}
\item [44] Krawchenko, \textit{Social Change and National Consciousness}, p. 56
\item [46] "Z ohliadu informatsiino-statystychnoho viddilu TsK KP(b)U pro provedennia Ukrainizatsii v period z VIII vseukrainsk’oi partiinoi konferentsii po IX z’izd KP(b)U (Dated January 1926)," Doc. 74, in \textit{Natsional’ni vidnosyny v Ukraini u XX st: Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv}, (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1994), p. 132.
\item [47] "Postanova sekretariatu tsentral’noi komissii KP(b)U pro stan ukrainizatsii radians’koho aparatu i zadovolennia interesiv i kul’totreb natsumshyn, (Dated 14 August 1926), Doc. 87, \textit{Natsional’ni vidnosyny v Ukraini}, p. 161.
\item [48] As of 1924, a mere 158 schools in the region instructed in the Ukrainian language, and only 595 teachers claimed competence in the
\end{footnotes}
newspaper *Diktatura truda*, as if to underline its insolence towards Ukrainianisation, informed a would-be contributor that "we do not print materials in the Ukrainian language." As one would expect, Ukrainianisation met with resistance from some Russified Ukrainians and, even more decidedly, from Russians, who often felt disenfranchised by the policy. These Russian workers — the successors of the Katerynoslav Bolsheviks — provided a local base of support for those forces in Moscow who were, after 1933, inclined to reverse the policy.

Ukrainianisation was not without its successes in the Donbass. Mykola Skrypnyk, the Ukrainian National Commissar of Education, took a personal interest in the region's progress, wrote essays on the subject and opened numerous Ukrainian libraries and theatres. In 1923 Ukrainianisation of schools was well behind other regions of the country with only half of one percent of schools were Ukrainianised. There was only one Ukrainian workers' school in the city of Stalino at that time. But by 1929, notwithstanding chronic shortages of teachers and texts, half of the Donbass' students were studying in Ukrainian language schools. By 1933 a full 64 percents of students were studying in Ukrainian language schools. In that year all elementary schools in the language. The progress of Ukrainianisation in the Donbass was recorded in the newspapers *Diktatura truda*, *Kochełarka*, *Lugans'kaia pravda* and in the journal *Prosveshenie Donbasa*. See Lavriv, *Istorinia*, p. 117; Krawchenko, *Social Change and National Consciousness*, p. 105.

49 Ibid.
51 See, for example, the following essay by Mykola Skrypnyk, "Dlia choho potribnii trymisiachnyk ukrains'koi kul'tury u Donbasi?" *Statti i promovyi* (Kharkiv: n.p., 1931), 2, 2, pp. 142-143; Lavriv, *Istorinia*, pp 115-17.
52 Natsional'nii vidnosyny v Ukraini, p. 131; Ibid.
city of Kherson (South) and Makiivka (Donbass) were converted into Ukrainian language institutions. 53

Ivan Maistrenko, who was sent to Odessa to Ukrainianise its leading newspaper, Odesskie izvestiia, recalls the city's attitudes towards Ukrainianisation. The Ukrainianisation of education proceeded with relative ease in the region, especially outside of the city of Odessa itself. Maistrenko argues that former Bund members (a pre-revolutionary Jewish Marxist party) often attempted to obstruct Ukrainianisation even more so than the city's Russian elite. Most of the Jewish population, however, seemed to support Ukrainianisation and even preferred to send their children to the Ukrainian schools rather than Jewish ones. The new editor, who changed the paper's name to Chornomors'ka komuna (The Black Sea Commune), found that Odessans were more than happy with a newspaper in Ukrainian, provided that it was filled with humorous anecdotes, cartoons and material praising the city and its past glories. The newspaper's circulation reached 130,000, surpassing that of its Russian language predecessor. In short, as long as the material appealed to the local identity, it did not seem to matter what language it was published in. The only remaining Russian language newspaper was Vechernie izvestiia. Even though Ukrainians only accounted for 17 percent of the city's population in 1926, it became a leading centre of Ukrainian cultural and academic life, with many new libraries and scholarly institutions established. 54

It should be remembered, however, that Ukrainianisation's successes were only possible in the context of a rigidly centralised and authoritarian system. The policy may have had some social support at the grassroots level, but it was imposed over the head of reluctant, Russified local elites. Seventy years later, later day enthusiasts of Ukrainianisation have come to discover that such rapid transformations are not necessarily possible in a democracy.

As noted, Crimea was not part of the Ukrainian SSR in the 1920s, and was therefore untouched by Ukrainianisation; there were no Ukrainian schools established on the peninsula. Korenizatsiia ("indigenisation") in the Crimean context meant advancing the Crimean Tatar language and culture, and inviting Crimean Tatars into the local Soviet administration. This was done with remarkable dedication, notwithstanding the fact that Tatars were only a minority of the population. A vigorous campaign against illiteracy was launched, and 343 Crimean Tatar schools were built. The Crimean Tatar language was promoted as an official language of government, alongside Russian, in areas of compact Crimean Tatar settlement. In some cases, there was an ethnic Russian backlash by local officials. This language policy was something of a precedent for Crimea's current policy of having multiple official languages. By 1927 there were an equal number of ethnic Russians and Crimean Tatars in the Central Executive Committee of the Crimean Republic (34 percent each).55 In sum, the Soviet nationalities policy in Crimea contributed to the modernisation of the Crimean Tatar nation.

In Ukraine, as a result of Lenin's nationalities policy, the instinctive "us" vs. "them" identity of the new peasant migrants to the growing cities was modernised. The long-term result of this was that this new Ukrainian urban population became the social base for a powerful National Communist movement, led by the Lenin disciple Mykola Skrypnyk. This movement was increasingly perceived as a threat to the centralisation and industrial programme which Stalin viewed as central to his policies. Accordingly, in the view of such scholars as James Mace, Robert Conquest and George Liber, Stalin launched a pre-emptive strike against Ukraine's intelligentsia, and later the peasantry, to guarantee that this threat could not materialise.56

The Ukrainian SSR at the end of the twenties had all of the social prerequisites for a vibrant national independence movement — Ukrainians dominated most of the urban centres, as well as the countryside, and were developing a confident indigenous intelligentsia and a modern urban culture. Admittedly, the Donbass and the cities of the South were still weak links, but had Ukraine become sovereign then, it had a stronger ethnic basis upon which to build a Ukrainian state then than in 1917 or --- arguably --- as Stalin and his successors would guarantee, than in 1991.

CHAPTER 3:
HISTORY AND DEMOGRAPHY SINCE THE 1930S

Had Ukraine's demographic trends continued, and the policy of Ukrainianisation remained unchanged, it is not unlikely that a much more clear Ukrainian cultural and linguistic identity would have evolved the East and South (not including Crimea). Instead, a series of traumatic and tragic historical events derailed the development of a Ukrainian identity in the region, without advancing a full-fledged Russian one. The collectivisation of agriculture, the famine of 1932-33, the purging of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, followed by the Second World War, and a calculated post-war policy of Russification, all gradually undermined the demographic and cultural gains of the 1920s.

Collectivisation and Famine:

In early 1929 Stalin effectively declared an end to NEP and started his "great leap forward." Shortly thereafter, a number of Ukrainian cultural figures were arrested on the pretext that they were part of the fictitious Union for the Liberation of Ukraine. At the end of 1929 mass, forced collectivisation and the "liquidation of the kulaks" began. Kulaks were well-off peasants, although this was defined arbitrarily by those conducting the "de-kulakisation" campaign; sometimes merely owning a cow, or simply demonstrating opposition to forced collectivisation was sufficient to earn this unfortunate designation. On 30 January 1930 the Central Committee of All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) approved a resolution "On measures regarding the liquidation of kulak farms in areas of complete collectivisation." Hundreds of thousands of
kulaks were consequently deported, many of them dying on the way to their bleak destinations.

While in the Ukrainian village, the Russian or Russian speaking forces carrying out collectivisation may have seemed like a foreign army, many of them were in fact from Ukraine. Of an elite group of volunteers known as the "Twenty-Five Thousanders," 7,397 were from Ukraine, while another 200 were from Crimea. The Donbass was the leading recruiting centre. In a sense, the Donbass was as much a perpetrator as it was a victim of collectivisation and famine.¹

As a result of punishingly high state grain requisitions, a policy of forcibly removing every last ounce of food from the countryside, and the establishment of a tight cordon sanitaire around Ukraine, famine began to grip the countryside in December of 1931. The famine only subsided by the end of 1934. Estimates of the losses vary widely, but most place the deaths in the range of four to seven million.²

While during the famine most regions of Ukraine witnessed an exodus, there was considerable migration of starving peasants into the Donbass. Indeed, even though there were also a huge number of immigrants from Russia to Donbass industry, the proportion of Ukrainians briefly increased. As Petro Lavriv explains, there can be only one explanation for this: the Donbass "saved" Ukrainian villagers from starvation. Of course, not all were saved: according to one witness, a Donbass rail worker, over half of these starving refugees "were living out their last days and minutes" during the journey. Another Donbass resident recalls how, along the tracks of an express train between Zvereve and Millerovo (towns in the Russian Donbass), "People were lying like sheaves along this road."

The highest death rates during the famine were in the wheat growing regions of the country, namely Poltava, Dnipropetrovs'k, and Odessa, where 20-25% percent of the population perished. The cities of Odessa, Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovs'k were flooded with starving peasants; bodies were collected along the streets every morning. In the Donbass and Kharkiv, the death rates were somewhat lower, at 15-20 percent.

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by oblast basis. For Donets'k oblast see, pp. 167-210; for Odessa oblast see pp. 371-440.

3 Holod 1932-1933, p. 77.

4 Lavriv, Istoriia pivdenno-skhidnoi Ukrainy, p. 122.

5 Conquest, Harvest of Sorrow, p. 248.

6 Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine 1932-1933, Oleksii Keis, b. 1912. Case History SW52.

7 Conquest, Harvest of Sorrow, p. 249.

8 Ibid., p. 250.
One group of naive peasants from Odessa, refusing to believe that the "good Tsar" Stalin could have been aware of the situation in the countryside, thought that a letter explaining their dire situation might somehow rectify the situation:

> We know that it is difficult for you to answer every one of the probably hundreds of letters that you receive each day. Nonetheless, we hope that as the leading builder of socialism, you will answer some of our questions through the newspapers:

> 1. Why are we peasant agricultural workers, having collected so much grain and wheat, today without anything to eat?(...)^

Ukrainian national-democrats argue that the famine was a Stalinist, and hence a Russian conspiracy to destroy the Ukrainian nation. It is portrayed as a "Ukrainian Holocaust"—a decisive cataclysm which, nonetheless, gave impetus to the nation-building idea. Yet, it seems doubtful that in the ethnic melting-pot of the Donbass, the famine could be regarded as a symbol of Ukrainian oppression by Russians—as an anti-Ukrainian genocide. The fact that the a main street in central Donets'k, adjacent to the Lenin monument, continues to carry the name "Postyshev"—one of the four leading perpetrators of the terror-famine— is an indication of the city's apparent hesitance to acknowledge the historical event, let alone its alleged nation-building implications. The author recalls pointing out the street name's implications to a middle-aged Donets'k woman who abruptly replied that one shouldn't believe everything one reads in the new history textbooks, as anything could be falsified by the nationalists in Kiev. In an interview conducted in the 1970s, another Donbass woman declared that: "Everyone knew that the

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famine was imposed by the government, not by Russians against Ukrainians." Indeed, the fact that in 1994 pension-aged East Ukrainians, born at the time of the famine, would vote in large numbers for the party that orchestrated the cataclysm, says much about the selective nature of the Donbass' historical memory.

On 7 July 1933 Mykola Skrypnyk, the fallen leader of the Ukrainianisers, committed suicide. That November, the official end to Ukrainianisation was marked by a resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, which declared that "at the present time local Ukrainian nationalism represents the chief danger in Ukraine." In the absence of a Ukrainian-oriented elite, following Stalin's purges, the Russian-oriented group was left with a virtual monopoly over the process of developing local identity. As noted, in the Donbass, the pro-Ukrainian elite had been very tiny to begin with.

As George Liber argues, the famine had the effect of hastening the process of cultural Russification, because the links of the newly urbanised Ukrainian proletariat to the countryside were seriously undermined. These links had formerly been an important mechanism for maintaining Ukrainian identity:

(...)Stalin's ruthless war against the peasants in 1932-33 and his extensive purges of the PK(b)U and the Ukrainian intelligentsia further impoverished the Ukrainian identity established in the 1920s. By starving millions of peasants to death, traumatising the famine's survivors, and by purging those who could best define and articulate this new

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10 Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine 1932-1933, Case History SW40, p. 972.
11 "Rezoliutsiia ob'edinennogo plenuma TsK i TsKK KP(b)U (22 noiabria 1933 g.)" Cited in Liber, Soviet Nationalitv Policies, p. 169.
Ukrainian identity, these interventions left an indelible imprint on the psychology of the new city dwellers and their descendants.\textsuperscript{12}

In short, the famine and the annihilation of the Ukrainian intelligentsia set back — perhaps permanently — the Ukrainian orientation which had been officially sponsored in the 1920s. The bumpy and winding road towards a national identity, which had briefly turned towards Ukraine, now veered away from it again, but not necessarily towards Russia.

\textbf{Stakhanovism:}

While the foundations of an identity based on rural traditions was undermined by the Stalinist state, one based on working class pride was actively encouraged. On 11 September 1935, \textit{Pravda} reported the world record breaking feat of Donbass coal miner Aleksei Stakhanov, who, on 31 August 1935, hewed 102 tonnes of coal in 5 hours and forty-five minutes. This represented 14.5 times the norm. \textit{Pravda} reported on the event by announcing the beginning of a new, ostensibly spontaneous workers' movement to raise productivity:

A new and great movement has been raised up on the shoulders of the workers of mechanised mine-faces. Bolsheviks of the mines of the Donbass, party and non-party, young and old, have taken a path, which will surely bring about yet more unprecedented prosperity to the main coal mining region of the country — we are convinced of this! (...) Full and unconditional support of the Stakhanovite movement! — this is now our main task.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{12} Liber, \textit{Soviet Nationality Policy}, p. 172; 183.
Intended primarily as a way of boosting productivity and maximising output, Stakhanovism became an institutionalised, inefficient and somewhat resented labour practice in the USSR. Aside from its economic implications, Stakhanovism fulfilled an important role in the new mythology of working class identity in the Donbass. A Soviet identity based on working class pride required a pantheon of heroes no less than a national movement did.

A particularly stark elaboration of the Stakhanovite myth is the painfully insipid 1951 novel Donbass, by Boris Gorbatov. The novel, which was re-issued several times (as late as 1980), and even translated into English, was typical of the official portrayals of Stakhanovites. Obviously based on the exploits of Stakhanov, the novel recounts the tale of two young coal miners, Andrei and Victor, from the "Steep Maria" coal mine:

The daring dreams of these brave determined boys come true. Their names become famous throughout the Donbass. Andrei and Victor attain their heart's desire when they leave for Moscow with a delegation of Donbass notables (...) But the most memorable day of Andrei Voronko's sojourn in Moscow was the occasion when the young miner was invited to the Kremlin and received by Stalin.

The reader is assured in the preface that "The pages describing this meeting between J.V. Stalin and the miner Voronko are the most stirring

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The Stakhanov myth of worker loyalty and reward was obviously officially imposed and nurtured by the Soviet state. But that does not necessarily mean that it always failed to have some resonance among the working class. Indeed, as Robert McNeal argues, even though the "Tsar and Cossack" myth of Cossack loyalty was largely manufactured by the Tsarist state, it became a part of Cossack identity.

In a sense, the Stakhanovite myth was an updated version of the Tsar and Cossack myth: in exchange for their undying loyalty and hard work, the Donbass workers earned a special place next to the Leader. By depicting the Donbass as the faithful heart and soul of Soviet industrial might, and the Donbass workers as the vanguard of the vanguard, this helped to inculcate the region with a sense of mission and a pride in its achievements, and to neutralise the rebellious tendencies of Donbass workers. The city of Yuzivka even earned the honour of being renamed "Stalino" from 1924 onwards; from 1938 on the Western portion of the Ukrainian Donbass, which had been divided into two oblasti, was also named Stalino. Perhaps Stalin instinctively realised that Donbass workers were, at heart, no less volatile than their Cossack predecessors, and needed to be neutralised accordingly: a workers' rebellion in the Donbass, such the one at Kronstadt, could be fatal to his plans no less than a rebellion of the Ukrainian peasantry. Indeed, in the final stages of the Soviet regime, the rebellious Donbass did hasten the USSR's demise. Meanwhile, the Stakhanovite movement helped to re-affirm the primacy of working class identity as the primary identification. The Stakhanovite myth was promoted by the Soviet regime until the very end of Soviet

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16 Ibid.
17 In June of 1938 Donets'k oblast was divided into Stalino (1924-1961, then again re-named Donets'k) and Voroshilovgrad (now Luhans'k) oblasts (Donets'k oblast had been formed in June 1932.)
rule. In Stakhanov (formerly Kadievka), a large Donbass town named after the legendary miner in 1978, a massive monument to Stakhanov, poised with his hydraulic pick hoisted over his shoulder, was built in 1985, on the fiftieth anniversary of the movement.

**Industrialisation in the 1930s:**

The first Soviet five-year plan for the development of the Soviet economy was adopted in 1928. It envisioned the complete transformation of the Ukrainian labour force by making all peasants and workers into state employees. Its goal was to increase Soviet industrial development by 250 percent and heavy industry in particular by 330 percent in five years (although it was later decided to fulfil the plan in four years). Ukraine's primary role would be the extraction of raw materials, while Russia would manufacture finished products. The first two Soviet five-year plans were crucial, and largely determined the pattern of future industrial development for the country. Industrialisation was concentrated in the Donbass, Dnipropetrovs'k, Kharkiv and Kiev oblasti, while relatively little attention was paid to Right Bank Ukraine. Between 1928 and 1937, the output of Ukraine's heavy industry increased by 5.5 times.

In the first five-year plan, Ukraine received 20 percent of overall Soviet investment. Subsequently, this share declined as the focus became development beyond the Urals. Stalin was intent on building an industrial base which would be unassailable in the event of a war with Germany. In the event, this strategy was not without its merits, given the disastrously inept defence of the country. Notwithstanding this re-orientation, thousands of new plants built in Eastern Ukraine in the...
1930s. By 1940, the industrial capacity of Ukraine was seven times that of 1913.\textsuperscript{18}

In the first 5 year plan capital investment in the Donbass declined compared to the period from 1921-1928, although 58 new mines were opened during this period. Donbass coal production steadily declined as a proportion of the overall USSR total. In 1928 its output represented 70 percent of overall Soviet production, but by 1940 the Donbass produced just over half of Soviet coal. Increasingly, the region focused on supplying coal for industries in Ukraine, European Russia and Belarus.\textsuperscript{19}

Rapid industrialisation was also forced upon the Crimea. Consequently, the iron ore extracting industry of the Kerch peninsula became economically integrated with Donbass-Kryvyi Rih coal-metallurgical base, and was essentially outside of the control of the republic. Meanwhile, a massive influx of Russian and Ukrainian workers to the peninsula further undermined the position of the indigenous Tatar population. In 1935, only 8.8 percent of the working class was Tatar.\textsuperscript{20}

By the end of the second five-year plan, the industrial output of the peninsula had increased 24 times since 1921.\textsuperscript{21} Odessa's economy suffered under Soviet rule because of the decrease in foreign trade. Metal working and machine building became more important as over 30 new

\textsuperscript{19} Istoriia Ukraïns'koï SSR: Ukraïns'kaia SSR v period postroeniiia i ukrepleniiia sotsialisticheskogo obshchestva (1921-1941), pp. 237-238; G. Vakulev, Razvitie ugol'noi promyshlennosti Donets'kogo basseina (Moscow: Nauka, 1955).
\textsuperscript{20} Kas'ianov, "Kryms'ka ARSR," p. 77.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
factories were built in the 1920s and 1930s. By 1940 its industrial output was eight times that of 1913.\(^\text{22}\)

According to George Liber, the internal logic of industrialisation also undermined the Ukrainianisation process. Industrialisation required supervisors and workers with years of experience. Many of these had to be imported from Russia. Moreover, cadres had to be interchangeable within the Soviet economy; capable of being moved from one region to another. The logic of industrialisation, hence, in part led to the "re-Russification of cities."\(^\text{23}\)

**The Great Patriotic War:**

In *Britons*, Linda Colley's excellent study of British national identity, Colley argues that the prolonged wars against France were decisive in creating British patriotism and hence, the "British nation."\(^\text{24}\) The Great Patriotic War,\(^\text{25}\) perhaps even more so than the October Revolution, played an analogous role in building Soviet patriotism, and advancing a common identification as a "Soviet nation." The following pronouncement from an historical monograph on Russian and Ukrainian "friendship and brotherhood" summarises the official view of the war's effect on Soviet "nation building:"

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\(^{25}\) In Soviet terminology the war between Hitler and France and Britain was the Second World War, and the Great Patriotic War is dated from the invasion of the USSR.
The struggle against a common enemy more firmly tightened the monolithic unity of Soviet people of all nationalities, and made possible the hastening of the process of the formation of the Soviet people as a new historical community of people.\(^{26}\)

Notwithstanding the overwrought and propagandistic language of the declaration, there is an undeniable grain of truth to the statement. Admittedly, many of the Soviet nationalities never developed a strong identification with the Soviet state. Chechens, the Baltic people and Western Ukrainians are only a few examples of groups for whom the Soviet Union remained a foreign, occupying power. But for the population of Eastern and Southern Ukraine, the Great Patriotic War provided a powerful nation-building myth that was reinforced by vivid recent memories of Soviet unity and collective heroism against a common and undeniably brutal enemy.

Before Soviet Ukraine had had the time to recover from the disastrous 1930s, it found itself at the epicentre of a no less disastrous upheaval. Estimates of Ukraine's losses during the war range from just over five to 8 million. Of these losses, roughly 600,000 were Jews, and another 1.4 million were military personnel.\(^{27}\) A generation of economic achievements, bought at terribly high price in the 1930s, was lost.

At dawn on 22 June 1941, the day of the German invasion of the USSR, bombs from the German Luftwaffe began to drop on Odessa. By 4 August the German army had reached the city's limits. By the 25th of

\(^{26}\) *Druzhba i bratstvo russkogo i ukrainskogo narodov*, II (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1982), p. 299.

\(^{27}\) *Krawchenko, Social Change and National Consciousness*, p. 153; The Museum of the Great Patriotic War in Kiev suggested a figure of 8 million.
that month they had already reached the Dnieper river. Four days later Kharkiv was captured. After Sevastopol', Odessa was the main military naval base on the Black Sea. *Stavka*, the Soviet High Command, instructed Odessa's defenders to hold the city for as long as possible, and brought in Black Sea Fleet to aid in its defence. They launched fierce counter-attacks to break through the German encirclement, but to no avail. The Soviet Armed Forces and the Odessan population stoutly withheld the German siege until 16 October.\(^{28}\)

*Stavka* eventually concluded that both Odessa and Crimea could not be held, so it chose to evacuate Odessa with the hope of using its defence forces to boost those of Crimea.\(^{29}\) The official interpretation of the defence of Odessa is that it "played a key role in undermining the military plans of the fascists." By denying the use of the port to the Germans, the attack to the east was delayed by two months. Sixty-two of the city's defenders were given the Hero of the Soviet Union award. In occupied Odessa, Soviet partisan forces undertook a bold campaign, fortifying themselves in catacombs just outside of the city, at Usatovo. They were led by Semen Fedorovich Lazarev, the head of the local KPU(b). Unfortunately, the invaders carried out brutal reprisals for every German death inflicted by the partisans: 100 civilians were murdered for every German soldier killed, and 200 civilians were murdered for every officer killed.\(^{30}\)

\(^{28}\) Odessa i stranitsy geroicheskoi zashchity i osvobozhdeniia goroda-geroia (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politichnoi literatury, 1978), pp. 95-105; Istoria Ukrain'skoi SSR, 8, (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1984), p. 54; See also Alexander Dallin, Odessa, 1941-1944: A Case Study of Soviet Territory Under Foreign Rule. (Santa Monica: University of California Press, 1957.)


\(^{30}\) Ibid., p. 61-62.
As Odessa fell, the Germans moved on the Donbass. From the 15th to the 22nd of October there was bloody street fighting in Stalino. Thousands of miners and metallurgical workers joined the 383rd Division which attempted to defend the Donbass. At the end of September the Germans had reached the Western and South-western borders of the Donbass. Tens of thousands of experienced miners and steel workers evacuated to beyond the Urals, where they were put to use developing the Kuzbass mines and the metallurgical complex at Magnetigorsk. In accordance with the Soviet "scorched earth" policy, most of the region's mines were flooded, and all of Ukraine's blast furnaces were destroyed.

The evolving ideology of Ukrainian nationalists as they moved into Eastern Ukraine offers some insight into the popular mood of workers in the region. Remarkably, Ukrainian nationalists were relatively active in the Donbass during the German occupation. In part, this is because while in Central Ukraine nationalists associated with the OUN-b (Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists-Bandera faction.) had come out into the open and were immediately suppressed, in the Donbass they remained in hiding and focused their energies on propaganda activities. This faction of the OUN was named after Stepan Bandera, the leader of the more fanatical faction of the organisation, which had split in 1941. There were also a huge number of recent immigrants from other regions of Ukraine who had escaped to the Donbass during the 1930s. It also appears that there was significant workers' hostility to Stalinism, notwithstanding the

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31 Ibid.
regime's efforts at cultivating a special relationship with the Donbass working class.\textsuperscript{33}

According to Bohdan Krawchenko, there were 500 active OUN workers, and over 10,000 active sympathisers in the Donbass. This, he argues, was "unquestionably more significant than the Communist underground in the Donbass."\textsuperscript{34} Soviet sources, however, claim that there were 8,200 Soviet partisans active in the Donbass, 33 percent of whom were workers.\textsuperscript{35} John Armstrong argues that, on the whole, Russian elites established "cultural ascendancy" in Stalino during the German occupation; "even according to an OUN organiser active in [the Donbass], the Ukrainians were inclined from long habit to allow the Russian priority."\textsuperscript{36} In Mariupol' in the South of Stalino oblast, however, a well organised Prosvita cultural society and Ukrainian educational system was established, owing in large part to the dedication of a small group of dedicated activists from the OUN-b.\textsuperscript{37}

The quasi-fascist integral nationalism of the 1930s was abandoned by the OUN-b as more East Ukrainians joined its ranks in favour of a vision of a socialist workers' democracy. In the Donbass the OUN Slogan was "For a Soviet Ukraine without the Dictatorship of the


\textsuperscript{34} Krawchenko, \textit{Social Change and National Consciousness}, p. 168.

\textsuperscript{35} Istoriia rabochikh Donbassa, p. 45.

\textsuperscript{36} Armstrong, \textit{Ukrainian Nationalism}, p. 207.

\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 208.
The major policy statement of the OUN-b during the Great Patriotic War (Resolution of the Third Great Assembly of the OUN) also reflected the East Ukrainian desire for workers' rights and workers' control over the work force. It also called for the elimination of "Stakhanovite, socialist competition, the raising of quotas and other forms of exploiting workers." This suggests that — at least in the eyes of the East Ukrainians informing the OUN-b's new ideology — there may have been considerable resentment of Stalinism (including Stakhanovism as a workplace practice), but that the workers nonetheless clearly favoured some type of Soviet, workers' state.

In October of 1941 the German 11th Army and the Romanian Mountain Corps invaded Crimea. During the campaign to conquer the peninsula, Sevastopol' yet again earned a sanctified place in wartime mythology, as it had during the Crimean War. From 30 October 1941 to July 1942, the city withstood three determined attempts by the Germans to seize the city, but was eventually captured. On 8 July 1942, Pravda thus evoked the reinvigorated legend of Sevastopol's heroism:

— Stand like Sevastopolites — here is a slogan for our soldiers, fending off attacks from a brutal foe.
— Work tirelessly like Sevastopolites — here is a slogan for the workers and engineers of our factories.
Love your Motherland like Sevastopolites — here is a slogan for our collective farm workers, and all those who are struggling in the

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39 Rishennia III Nadzvychnoho velykoho Zboru OUN, in Natsional'ni vidnosyny v Ukraini u XX st., p. 253; On the wartime ideology of the OUN, see Peter J. Potichny and Yevhen Shtendera, The Ideology of the Ukrainian Underground, (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, 1986).
40 On the fight for Sevastopol see P. A. Morgunov, Geroicheskii Sevastopol' (Moscow: Nauka, 1979).
rear. This victory is doubtless; we will attain it — Sevastopol' is our guarantee of this!\(^4\)

By 22 September 1943 the Donbass had been recaptured by Soviet forces. Saur Mohyla, the site of one of the bloodiest battles of the liberation campaign was transformed into an enormous war memorial complex for the Donbass.

On 10 April 1944, Soviet troops from the 3rd Ukrainian Front regained Odessa. From 8 April to 12 May, the Red Army re-captured Crimea. In the aftermath of the "liberation of Crimea," the entire Crimean Tatar nation was forcibly expelled from their homeland on account of their alleged collective collaboration with the Germans. Only about half of the Tatars survived the journey to Soviet Central Asia.\(^4\)

**The Great Patriotic War as Soviet "nation-building" myth:**

On the twentieth anniversary of the outbreak of the war both Odessa and Sevastopol' were declared Hero Cities, along with Kiev, thus institutionalising the memory of these cities' wartime experiences. The enduring importance of the Great Patriotic War in the consciousness of East Ukrainians cannot be overstated. Above all, its historians have been preoccupied with the Great Patriotic War. The sheer volume of historical writing on the Great Patriotic War in the Donbass was such that two


lengthy bibliographical guides on the subject were produced, one in 1980, and a further one in 1993.43

In 1995, the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the war, newspapers throughout the South and East, had special tribute sections dedicated to the memory of the struggle.44 The Donets'k newspaper Zhizn' had a special feature entitled "To the 50th Anniversary of the Great Victory." In a typical instalment of this feature, Victor Rudenko, a Donets'k writer, writes that, "Their lives, like a vivacious river, flows before my eyes. And I bow down on my knees before the memory of those who defended freedom. And above all before the dead."45 Such a tribute is not unlike what one would expect to hear in the West to commemorate the war dead. Yet, insofar as "freedom," in this context signifies the return of Stalin's regime — which had only a decade earlier decimated the Ukrainian peasantry and intelligentsia — this conception of freedom is problematic, to say the least, from the point of view of Ukrainian nation-building myths. Yet, in newspapers, and indeed in everyday conversations, in the East and South the Soviet victory is invariably referred to as the "Liberation." With the exception of extreme nationalist publications such as Banderivets' (the newspaper of the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists in Donets'k), this view of the war is accepted across the political spectrum. In 1995 local politicians, such as the

43 Donbas neskorenyi: Bibliohrafichni pokazhchyk. (Donets'k: Donets'ka Derzhavna oblasna Universal'na biblioteka imeni N.K. Krups'koi, 1993.); See also V.I. Lebedev (ed.) Donetskaia oblast' v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny (1941-1945 gg.) Sbornik dokumentov i materialov (Donets'k: "Donbas", 1980).
44 In the Odessa newspaper Yug, the feature was called "K 50-letiiu pobedy nad fashistskoi Germaniei." In the Donets'k newspaper Vzgliad (the newspaper of the pro-reform Liberal Party of Ukraine) the feature was called "K 50-letiiu Pobedy."
Donets'k Governor Volodymyr Shcherban' took great care to demonstrate their respect for the Soviet victory. Shcherban', the oblast governor, for example, appeared with veterans on the cover of a local newspaper, promising to refurbish the Saur Mohyla war complex.46

In the case of Sevastopol', is clear that for many pride in the victory is firmly linked to loyalty to the Soviet regime, and not to its successor states. Sevastopol' war veterans were adamant that, during the parade commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Great Patriotic War, only Soviet flags and insignia should be displayed; they were firmly opposed to the display of either the Ukrainian or the Russian state flags.47 As one would expect, Communist publications in Ukraine pay particular attention to the Great Patriotic war as a symbol of Soviet unity and identity.48

Even the Kiev authorities have been hesitant to offend the sensibilities of Eastern Ukrainians by tampering with such a sensitive and delicate issue. In a 1995 speech, given on the eve of the war's anniversary celebrations, President Kuchma made clear his disdain for the "national-patriotic" view of the war as a struggle between two tyrannies:

I am angry to note that national-patriots are using the 50th anniversary of the Great Patriotic War as an occasion to launch a frontal attack on the historical memory of several generations, for this leads to the contrary effect, because the national-patriotic idea

48 See, for example, Stepan Savon, "Navichno v pam'jati narodni," Komunist, 10(51) March 1995, p. 6.
merely discredits itself in doing so. This group is trying, in one stroke, to impose upon society its conception of the development of events and its estimation of the Great Patriotic War, while not concerning themselves with anyone.\textsuperscript{49}

In short, one of the great, defining myths of the "Soviet people" is, apparently, untouchable, even by the leader of a republic which, by definition, exists in opposition to the Soviet idea.

**Major Demographic Developments in Southern and Eastern Ukraine:**

There are five key trends that characterise Eastern and Southern Ukraine's twentieth century demographic development. The first of these is the rise in the number and proportion of ethnic Russians. Second, there was a marked decline of Ukrainian native language affiliation among Ukrainians in the region. Third, there has been a significant migration of Russians and also Ukrainians from other regions of Ukraine into the East and South. The fourth key development was the dramatic urbanisation of the region. All of these forces have helped to maintain the region's multi-ethnic mosaic. The nature of this mosaic will be discussed as well. Finally, there has been a dramatic rise in inter-ethnic marriage in the region. These developments will be dealt with in turn here; the question of intermarriage, a particularly complex and important issue, will be considered in the chapter that follows.

**Proportion of Russians and Ukrainians:**

\textsuperscript{49} Quoted in M.V. Koval', "Druha Svitova i Velyka Vitchyzniana Viiny ta s'ohodnennia," Ukrain's'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal, 3, 1995, pp. 3-22.p. 17.
As will be elaborated more fully in the chapter that follows, strict census categories only provide part of the picture of ethnic processes in Ukraine: the identities of many individuals fall outside of these categories. Nonetheless, an examination of the trends of these categories illustrates some rather dramatic changes in the twentieth century. The demographic vitality which characterised the Ukrainian nation in the 19th century and the first part of the twentieth, was not maintained from the 1930s on. Between 1926 and 1939 the number of Ukrainians in Ukraine as a whole rose by a mere 2 percent while during the same period the number of Russians in Ukraine rose by 57 percent. Undoubtedly the processes of de-kulakisation, collectivisation and artificial famine took a heavy toll on ethnic Ukrainian demographic dominance.

The growing Russian population was largely concentrated in Eastern and Southern Ukraine. Between 1939 and 1959 the number of Russians in Central and Eastern Ukraine increased by 60 percent; during the same period the number of Ukrainians increased by only 9 percent. In the next period, from 1959 to 1989 the percentage of Ukrainians in the country as a whole declined from 76.8 to 72.7 percent.

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percent. Figure 3.1a illustrates the rise of the Russian population in the Donbass from 1926-1989. In 1926 Russians accounted for a quarter of the population; by 1989 they accounted for a full 44 percent. Meanwhile, during the same period, Ukrainians declined from 65 percent of the population to just over half. The proportion of members of other nationalities declined by roughly five percent. In the South as a whole, including Crimea, the Russian portion of the population nearly doubled from 1926-1989, having grown from 21 percent to 38 percent. (See Figure 3.1b) This was apparently not at the expense of the Ukrainian population, the overall proportion of which remained extraordinarily stable in the South. Rather, the Russian increase coincided with a sharp drop in the portion of the minority population — especially Jews and Crimean Tatars. By 1989 these minorities accounted for a mere 10 percent of the population in the South.

**Ukrainian native language affiliation:**

As with artificially strict census categories, language categories do not necessarily describe the full picture. If one listens to the pronouncements of Donbass deputies in the Ukrainian parliament, or of Donbass trade union representatives, one is immediately struck by the fact that they are usually speaking a patois which is neither Russian nor Ukrainian, but a curious hybrid of the two. This utterly marginal linguistic phenomenon, popularly known as *surzhik*, breaks the rules of grammar of both languages, and is on the whole more prevalent among less educated members of society. There are many different variants of

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52 For an in-depth examination of the language question in twentieth-century Ukraine, see Dominique Arel, *Language and the Politics of Ethnicity: The Case of Ukraine*. PhD, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1993
surzhik; it is more of a linguistic phenomenon rather than a well-defined
dialect. This linguistic situation, in fact, was a considerable source of
frustration for teachers of both languages in the Donbass. Yet, while
surzhik may cause the Russian or Ukrainian language instructor to
cringe, it is in fact a powerful indication of underlying ethnic processes
in the Donbass. In Odessa, there is in fact considerable pride in the local
dialect, with its occasional Yiddish and other multinational-national
influences. To the Odessan, it is an living indication of the city's
cosmopolitan identity.

In many demographic studies of Ukraine written in the 1970s and
1980s, changes in native language affiliation among Ukrainians were
carefully scrutinised, as such a change was regarded as a key indication
of changes in national identity. This preponderant focus on native
language affiliation was, as Krawchenko himself argues, dictated partly
out of necessity, as there were few other sources upon which to base an
analysis. For example, Bohdan Krawchenko, in a table entitled
"National Identity Data" uses the term "Russified" to describe ethnic
Ukrainians who listed Russian as their native language, while Roman
Szporluk uses the term "assimilated" in his work. The use of such
terminology overstates the matter. Language is certainly an important
ethnic marker — in the Ukrainian case especially — but it is only one of

53 G.D Basova, I.V. Borysiuk, et. al., Ukrainsko-russkoe dvuizaychie:
Sotsiologicheskii aspekt (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1988), pp. 6-7; pp. 59-
73; See also Krawchenko, Social Change and National Consciousness, p.
79.
54 Krawchenko, Social Change and National Coniousnes, p. 188.
55 See Bohdan Krawchenko, "Ethno-Demographic Trends in Ukraine in
the 1970s," in Krawchenko (ed.), Ukraine After Shelest (Edmonton:
111; Roman Szporluk, "Urbanization in Ukraine since the Second World
many such markers and sources of ethnic identity. Yet, an individual's sense of national identity is a totality of subjective psychological attachments which may encompass everything from a sense of "blood ties," a distinct historical memory, or identification with various myths. It should be noted, however, that after 1959 the census category "native language" (ridna mova, rodnoi iazyk) did not necessarily correspond to the actual language spoken by an individual. Respondents were asked to provide "the name of the language which the subject himself regards as his native language." This could have been interpreted by the respondent as, "language of my people", or "forefathers," etc. In this sense, for some respondents it may have been interpreted as a roundabout way of asking their national identity.\(^{56}\) Also, as will be discussed below, for some workers and dissidents — even in the Donbass — language and national identity were sometimes equated.

As is the case with census categories, even though they may paint only part of the picture, some important trends can be gleaned from examining these admittedly over-simplified categories. One of these trends is a fairly rapid post-war decline in the portion of Ukrainians who considered Ukrainian their native language. From 1959 to 1989 the number of Ukrainians who regarded Russian as their native language increased from 2.1 million to 4.6 million persons. Russophone Ukrainians made up 6.5 percent of the Ukrainian population in 1959, and 12 percent of the population in 1989. As Figure 3.2 illustrates, Ukrainian native language affiliation in the Donbass declined at an especially rapid rate as compared to other regions in the country, falling from over 80 percent in 1959 to just over 60 percent in 1989. The decline in the South was somewhat less dramatic, falling from 87 percent to 76

99 percent. As the figure underscores, Ukrainian language affiliation in the West remained perfectly stable, while in all of the other regions it declined to varying degrees.

The decline of the Ukrainian native language affiliation was accompanied, and certainly hastened by a decline in Ukrainian language instruction in the region's schools. This was in part a direct result of Nikita Khrushchev's educational policies. In 1958, Khrushchev pushed through a series of reforms which made Ukrainian an optional subject of instruction, and encouraged parents to send their children to Russian language schools. From then on the number of students studying in schools where Ukrainian was the language of instruction gradually dropped so that, by 1991, only 49 percent of children in Ukraine studied in such schools. The situation in the East and South was, of course, far more grave for Ukrainian language instruction than in the rest of the country. In 1945 64 percent of all schools in the Donets'k oblast operated Ukrainian. The last Ukrainian language schools in the city of Donets'k, Horlivka, Artemivs'k, Zhdanov, Druzhkivtsi, Kostiantynivtsi were closed in the 1960s. The situation in Ukrainian institutions of higher education was no more promising. At the University of Odessa in 1965, Ukrainian students made up 55 percent of student body. Yet only 53 of 537 lecturers — 10 percent— lectured in Ukrainian.

Migration processes:

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57 See Ibid., pp. 231-237.
59 Lavriv, Istoriia pivdenno-skhidnoi Ukrainy, p. 126.
Between 1959-1970 there was a positive balance of immigration of 582,000 immigrants to the Southern regions of Ukraine, which represented a gain of 10 percent of the average population of the region during these years. At the same time, there was a positive balance of migration of 395 thousand to the Donbass-Dnieper region which represented 2 percent of the average population of the region. Ukraine as a whole had a positive balance of only .82 percent of its population during this years; the Western region in fact had a negative balance of 3 percent of its average population in these years.  

The 1970 census provided very limited data on migration patterns. It asked respondents whether they had lived at their current address for less than two years, and if not, list where they had lived previously. It found that 13.8 million persons had changed their place of residence in the two years prior to the survey. Just under 600,000 immigrants had arrived from outside Ukraine during these two years alone, 428,000 of whom had come from Russia. Just over half of these migrants (51.2 percent) had settled in the Donbass and Southern regions.

A more precise indication of the overall levels of migration to Ukraine in the post-war period was provided by the 1989 census data on place of birth. This data, summarised in Figure 3.3, shows that, as one would expect, Crimea has the largest proportion of residents born outside of the then current borders of Ukraine (35 percent). Just under half of

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62 Krawchenko, Social Change and National Consciousness, p. 175.
63 On post-war immigration to rural areas of Crimea, see M. M. Maksymenko, "Pereselennia v Krym s'il's'koho naselennia z inshykh
all ethnic Russians born in Crimea were not born on the peninsula; 37 percent were born in Russia proper, the rest in other Soviet republics. The regions with the next highest number of persons born outside of Ukraine were the Donbass, where just over twenty percent were born outside of the republic. The region with the lowest proportion of migrants was Transcarpathia, where a mere 8 percent of the inhabitants of the region where born outside of that region. In other regions, such as Vinnytsia, Volynia, Zhitomir, Ivano-Frankivs'k, Ternopil', Khmel'nits'kii, Chernihiv and Chernivtsi oblasti, migrants made up from 12-15 percent of the total population.\(^{64}\)

**Urbanisation:**

Prior to W.W.II Ukrainians were in a minority in the towns and cities of their republic; they made up only 41.3 percent of urban population in 1926 Soviet census (not including Polish occupied Western Ukraine).\(^{65}\) A major study of national identity in Yugoslavia found that urban dwellers were far more likely to identify as "Yugoslav" on the census than as members of one of the titular nationalities of the republic (i.e., Serb, Croat). It has long been acknowledged by sociologists that urbanisation tends to instil a population with more cosmopolitan outlooks.\(^{66}\) While Bohdan Krawchenko would argue that urbanisation

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and other types of modernisation promoted national identity in Ukraine as a whole, this was not necessarily the case in the Donbass. The high levels of urbanisation in the Donbass, which were established very early in the century, have created unique conditions for the development of a cosmopolitan and non-ethnically based identity. The fact that the historical memory of many Donbass residents is linked to generations of urban existence further inhibits the region's identification with a strict Ukrainian ethnic identity. This is because, as noted, the Ukrainian national idea is firmly linked to idealised images of the Ukrainian peasantry, and the idea of a shared, peasant ancestry.67

Prior to the revolution there were officially only four cities in the Donbass, by post-war period there were 26; as of 1992 there were 87 cities and 243 smaller urban settlements. By 1989, there were 13 cities with over 100,000 inhabitants in the Donets'k oblast, including such large cities as Mariupol' (537,000) Makiivka (475,000), and Horlivka (363,000).68

As Figure 3.4 illustrates, as early as 1939, 78 percent of Donets'k oblast residents were urban, which was more than twice the average for the Ukrainian Soviet republic as a whole. As the table illustrates, from the 1960s onward, there was relatively moderate urbanisation growth in Donbass, although by that point the region was already far more advanced than other parts of Ukraine. By 1994 Donets'k was 90.5 percent urban, while Luhans'k was 87 percent urban. This was at roughly twice the level of the Western oblasti of Ternopil' (43 percent) or

68 Sotsial'no-ekonomichna heohrafiia Ukrainy, pp. 534-536.
Ivano-Frankivs'k (44 percent). Southern Ukraine's major oblast have a level of urbanisation between these two extremes, with Odessa and Mykolaiv both at 66 percent.\textsuperscript{69} Urbanisation has the effect of hastening such developments as linguistic Russification, while also forming closer bonds between ethnic groups through such mechanisms as intermarriage. Moreover, insofar as Ukrainian identity is so firmly rooted in the countryside, such high levels of urbanisation tends to alienate Donbass Ukrainians from their ethnic roots. As a leading Ukrainian ethnographer, Vsevolod Naulko puts it, the village is the "home of our nation, the source of its genetic vitality, culture and spirituality."\textsuperscript{70}

The Ethnic Mosaic:

The East and South have retained their historically high levels of ethnic diversity. While Crimea may have a high number of ethnic Russians, Odessa still has the most ethnically diverse population. The Soviet ethnographer B.M. Ekkel' developed a valuable tool for analysing the degree of ethnic diversity of a given region, a so called "Ethnic Mosaic Index" (\textit{Indeks etnicheskoi mozaichnosti}).\textsuperscript{71} The index measures the extent to which a region represents an ethnic mosaic, that is, a

\textsuperscript{70} Vsevolod Naulko, "Selo na nashii Ukraini: Suchasnyi stan, problemy, tryvohy (Etnohrafichnyi narys), \textit{Narodna tvorchist' ta etnohrafiiia}, 1992, 4, pp. 3-12.
mixture of a wide number of ethnic groups. According to calculations of this index in Eastern and Southern Ukraine, Odessa oblast has the highest level of ethnic diversity, although it has declined somewhat since 1959 (See Figure 3.5). The next most ethnically diverse regions are Donets'k, Luhans'k Kharkiv and Crimea. Crimea has apparently become much more ethnically diverse from 1959-1989, while the Donbass' ethnic heterogeneity has remained at roughly the same level during this time. As the graph illustrates, the index of diversity has been most volatile in Crimea. Since the data begins with 1959, this does not reflect the mass deportation of Crimean Tatars, which of course dramatically altered the ethnic mosaic in Crimea. Nor does the 1989 data used include the large numbers of Crimean Tatars who have subsequently returned to Crimea. It may be supposed, therefore, that Crimea's index has changed again, and is now probably very close to that of Donets'k. The other major oblasti of Southern Ukraine, Kherson and Mykolaiv, are ethnically far more homogenous than Odessa or the Donbass oblasti, although they have become significantly more diverse since the 1950s. As with most

The index of the ethnic mosaic is calculated on the basis of the following formula:

$$P_i = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{n} (p_i)^2,$$

Where $P_i$ is the index of $i$ region; $n$ is the number of nationalities in a given region; $p$ is the percentage of a given nationality in $i$ region. V.V. Sazhin provides the following illustration of the formula. If in a given region there were 60% Ukrainians, 20 percent Russians, 10 percent Moldovans, 5 percent Bulgarians and 5 percent Jews, the Mosaic Index would be calculated as follows:

$$P = 1 - [(0.6)^2 + (0.2)^2 + (0.1)^2 + (0.05)^2 + (0.05)^2] = .585.$$

See A. I. Kliachin, "Dinamika etnicheskikh sistem rasseleniia v Krymu (v sviazi s problemoi vozvashcheniia krymskich tatar)," Etnograficheskoe obozrenie, 2, 1992, pp. 23-35.

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72 The index of the ethnic mosaic is calculated on the basis of the following formula:

73 See A. I. Kliachin, "Dinamika etnicheskikh sistem rasseleniia v Krymu (v sviazi s problemoi vozvashcheniia krymskich tatar)," Etnograficheskoe obozrenie, 2, 1992, pp. 23-35.
demographic phenomena graphed in this study, a typical West Ukrainian 
*oblast* (in this case Ivano-Frankivs'k) stands in sharp contrast to the 
*oblasti* of the South and East; Ivano-Frankivs'k has been consistently far 
more ethnically homogenous than the other regions illustrated. In short, 
the "internationalism" of Eastern and Southern Ukraine was more than a 
myth nurtured by the Soviet state: it had a solid, measurable basis in the 
distribution of minorities throughout the region.

The East Ukrainian Reaction to "Russification":

To some Donbass Ukrainians, the post-war nationalities policy of 
the Soviet state in region appeared as a clear-cut policy of Russification. 
Ivan Dziuba and Oleksii Tykhyi, the *oblast*'s most famous dissidents, 
risked their careers and lives in the name of an anti-Russification crusade. 
Tykhyi eventually died in a Soviet prison camp for his stubborn criticism 
of Russification in his native Donbass. Both Dziuba and Tykhyi claimed 
to be loyal disciples of Lenin, and regularly contrasted current practice 
with Leninist theory. On the whole, there were relatively few dissidents 
from the Donbass. Of 749 dissidents listed by Krawchenko, a mere 7 
were from Donets'k *oblast*.74

Dziuba, who was born and raised in the Donbass, was probably the 
most famous critic of the Soviet nationalities policy. According to the 
recollections of Anatolii Tymocheivich Henenko, a former schoolmate of 
the future dissident, when the young Dziuba began his studies in 
Donets'k, he was as a very rustic Ukrainian peasant boy. Although

74 Kenneth Farmer, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the Post-Stalin Era: Myth, 
Symbols and Ideology in Soviet Nationalities Policy*. (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1980), p. 69; Bohdan Krawchenko, *Social Change and 
National Consciousness*, p. 251.
clearly a very bright lad, he was mocked by his fellow, Russian-speaking students for his peasant ways.\textsuperscript{75}

Dziuba's \textit{Internationalism or Russification?}\textsuperscript{76}, first published in 1968, was widely hailed as an important dissident work on the question of Russification in the Soviet Union. When he wrote this work Dziuba was still an ardent supporter of the principles of Marxism-Leninism; indeed his main argument is that the national policy of Stalin and his successors in Ukraine represented a "Great power chauvinist" deviation from the policy of Lenin, whom Dziuba paints as a hero and champion of Ukrainian culture.

According to Dziuba, there was a "very considerable stratum of the Russian petty bourgeoisie" which, rather than being a carrier of communist internationalism, was instead the "spiritual heir of ten generations of colonisers." Rather than behaving as friendly guests in Ukraine, these Russians regard themselves as masters of the situation and look upon Ukrainian culture only with scorn and contempt. In sum, "[t]his stratum of the Russian petty bourgeoisie ... is a powerful, constantly active, politically reactionary, culturally and morally degrading factor, which does much to poison the cause of friendship of nations in the USSR"\textsuperscript{77} Furthermore, adds Dziuba, this stratum of the population was semi-officially considered to be a "true carrier of correct ideas" and a "reliable prop" for the regime, as a counterbalance to the local Ukrainian population.

\textsuperscript{75} Author's discussions with A.T. and N.D. Henenko, August 1996.
\textsuperscript{76} Ivan Dziuba, \textit{Internationalism or Russification?: A Study in the Soviet Nationalities Problem} (New York : Monad Press, 1974).
\textsuperscript{77} \textit{Ibid}, pp.62-63.
In effect Dziuba was noting — in suitably Leninist jargon — the existence of a local Russian elite which had no interest in Ukrainianisation, never had, and never will have. Certainly, the post-Soviet history of the Donbass, like the region's history in the 1920s, confirms that there is indeed a segment of the local elite that is inclined to resist Ukrainianisation as long as possible.

Dziuba argues that the changed nationality policy in the post-Stalin era confused Ukrainian workers, who were no longer sure whether Ukrainian culture was to be preserved or discarded. Of particular interest is a letter, reprinted by Dziuba, written by two Ukrainian coal miners from the Donbass, and directed to the editors of Pravda. In the letter the miners began by pointing out that, according to Marxism-Leninism,

In the future there will be a single common language on earth and there will be no national divisions. So perhaps, the Ukrainian people will be the first to lose its language and other national characteristics... If the time for the final Russification of the Ukrainian people has come, we should actively work in that direction. If not, we should adopt decisive measures to support the development of the Ukrainian language. It seems to us that both courses will receive the support of the people.78

Interestingly, the miners argue that someone who cannot speak Ukrainian should not have the right to call themselves Ukrainian, which attests to some acceptance of a purely linguistic basis for a Ukrainian identity. In addition, the miners found that "there were almost no contemporary (Ukrainian) national achievements to be proud of," which suggests a further psychological impetus to Russification. Roman Solchanyk aptly summarises the Soviet interpretation of history as the idea that "Ukraine

78 Ibid, pp. 190-192.
and Ukrainians emerged on the face of the earth for one reason and one reason only: to be "reunited" with Russia and Russians.\(^7^9\) Ukrainian leaders were, on the whole, great insofar as they contributed to this lofty goal.\(^8^0\) In general, the miners were confused by the Soviet government's policy which, while not officially sanctioning the elimination of Ukrainian culture or advocating Russification, seemed to be hastening the process nonetheless. It is worth noting that in October of 1992 Ivan Dziuba became Minister of Culture of Ukraine.

Oleksii Tykhyi, a country school teacher from the Donbass, was utterly preoccupied with what he perceived was a conscious plot to de-nationalise Ukrainians in the Donbass. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, in small towns such as Mala Illinivka (city of Artemivs'k) where only between 2-5 percent of the population were non-Ukrainian, the primary schools switched over to the Russian language, although neither the students nor the teachers could speak Russian. According to Tykhyi the problem was twofold: on the one hand, parents were attracted to the greater social prestige of the Russian language, and thus wanted their children to study in Russian, and, on the other hand, official pressure to promote "internationalism."\(^8^1\)

\(^7^9\) Roman Solchanyk, "Politics and the National Question in the Post-Shelest Period," in Krawchenko (ed.) Ukraine After Shelest, p. 17.
\(^8^0\) Kenneth Farmer, Ukrainian Nationalism, p. 69.
In one of his typically emotional articles, entitled "Reflections on the Ukrainian language and culture in the Donets'k oblast," Tykhyi protests that:

Today the Ukrainian language in the Donets'k oblast is secondary, low, non-compulsory for instruction, doomed to disappear. Yet you still hear it on the radio, on the television, in movie magazines, and drinking songs. This generation studies Ukrainian in schools, knows it, but only does not speak it, for hardly anyone (perhaps one in a hundred) has not studied it and does not know it. But what about in twenty or thirty years? What will become of today's children, who from their prams hear only surzhik or Russian, and study Ukrainian as a foreign language? When it comes time to declare their nationality at census time, will our children and grandchildren sign themselves up thus: "Nationality — Soviet of Ukrainian origins. Language — Donbasskii?"82

Tykhyi's projection was not entirely off the mark, for the Soviet nationalities policy, for better or for worse, did indeed encourage identification as "Soviet, of Ukrainian origins." As noted, however, this process of forming the new Soviet person was powerfully aided by the demographic processes described above.

Politics and Regional Elites in the Post-War Period:

Perhaps the most important political event in Ukraine in the post-war period was one which, at the time, may have seemed purely symbolic. Forty years later, however, the 1954 transfer of the Crimea to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic's jurisdiction had very tangible political consequences. The standard interpretation of the transfer of Crimea to Ukrainian jurisdiction, accepted by Russian and Western

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82 Ibid. p. 18.
journalists and scholars alike, is that the peninsular was a "sentimental gesture" or gift to Ukraine by Nikita Khrushchev. According to this interpretation, the transfer was an arbitrary whim that had little reference to the actual needs, political, economic or otherwise, of the Crimean population. By contrast, most Ukrainian scholars and journalists view the transfer as a rational and legally binding decision that was necessitated by practical economic considerations. They point out that in the post-war period Crimea was depopulated and that its economy was in tatters. This was especially the case for Crimean agriculture. The reconstruction of Crimea's infrastructure was made possible with an influx of Ukrainian engineers, while agriculture was revived thanks to an influx of Ukrainian settlers. Most importantly, Crimea was utterly dependent upon water from Southern Ukraine. Ukrainian scholars also argue that Khrushchev, who was at the time embroiled in a power struggle, had little to do with the transfer and had in fact distanced himself from the whole matter because of its potential to become a political liability. The matter was first discussed at RSFSR Council of Ministers, then the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. The actual decree which transferred Crimea to Ukraine's jurisdiction sited the "communality of the economic and cultural ties" as the basis of the decision. 


84 See, for example, Vasyl' Chumak, "Kryms'ka karta," Polityka i chas, (September 1994), 9, pp. 44; Volodymyr Butkevych, "Crimea and the truth behind Khrushchev's 'Gift'', ABN Correspondence, 1, 1993, pp. 37 - 45.

The death of Stalin in the previous year, 1953, and the rise of Nikita Khrushchev revived the self-confidence of Ukrainian party organisation. It increasingly lobbied for Ukrainian interests, demanded a bigger say in economic affairs and fought for a greater role in the USSR's overall governance.

Ukrainian writers, including Dziuba, began to demand a return to the creative freedoms of the 1920s and a revived and central role of the Ukrainian language and culture. In 1963, there was a minor backlash against the liberal cultural policies of the early 1960s, but it was not until 1970 that a full-fledged reaction began. The drive for greater local control of Ukrainian affairs was especially in evidence after 1963, when Petro Shelest became the First Secretary of the CPU. Shelest, who was a fairly hard-line Communist in many respects, sought greater control for Kiev over the Ukrainian economy, and even renewed protection for the Ukrainian language.

In May of 1972, however, Shelest was removed from his post and replaced by a particularly hard-line Brezhnev crony, Volodymyr Shcherbyts'kyi. Shcherbyts'kyi oversaw a very thorough purge of Shelest's supporters and a generalised crackdown on all but the most orthodox manifestations of Ukrainian culture. He was the embodiment of the loyal Soviet non-Russian official. His very first major speech, laden with obsequious praise for the Great Russian nation "who justly

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88 On the first years of the Shcherbyts'kyi period see Ibid., pp. 147-166; see also Bohdan Krawchenko (ed.), Ukraine After Shelest.
deserve the sincere and great gratitude of all the fraternal peoples," exemplified his attitude. Shcherbyts'kyi managed to remain in power until late 1989; his continued rule was in fact one of the major obstacles to the rise of a national-democratic movement in Ukraine.

Certain regions in Ukraine and Russia became increasingly autonomous during the Brezhnev era, and gained the political authority to advance their local economic interests. Without a doubt, the most powerful region in Ukraine — a situation which has not changed to this day was Dnipropetrovs'k, which produced a disproportionate number of leading Soviet political figures. Leonid Brezhnev himself was from Dnipropetrovs'k, and an important part of the city's rise to pre-eminence as training ground for the Ukrainian and Kremlin elite may be traced to this fact. From 1953 to 1980, 49 former Dnipropetrovs'k officials were appointed to positions of leading authority in the all-Union and republican governments. Indeed the dominance of Brezhnev's so-called "Dnipropetrovs'k Mafia" was so noticeable that, according to a common Soviet joke, Russian history was divided into the following epochs: dopetrovskii, poslepetrovskii and Dnepropetrovs'kii" (Pre-Petrine, Post-Petrine and Dnipropetrovs'k). Aside from Brezhnev, the head of the Ukrainian Soviet republic, Volodymyr Shcherbyts'kyi, was also from Dnipropetrovs'k. The then first secretary of the Donets'k oblast committee, I.V. Degtiarev, was one of his close associates.

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89 Boris Lewytzkyj, Politics and Society in Soviet Ukraine, pp. 149-150.
In contrast, a mere 12 former Odessa officials, and only 4 Odessa natives reached leading positions in the government. In comparison with Dnipropetrovs'k and Kharkiv, Odessa was almost completely without influence. That outsiders were regularly appointed to the leading positions of power in Odessa, is a prime indication of its relative impotence.  

The economic and political elite of the Donbass was certainly influential, but it certainly did not match the influence of the Dnipropetrovs'k group. In 1940 Ukraine still accounted for 56 percent of overall Soviet coal production, but by 1978 its share had dropped to a mere 22 percent. The limits of rational exploitation of the region's coal resources were being stretched by the mid-1970s; its production peaked in 1976 at 218.2 million tonnes. It failed to recover in the post-Soviet period and has in fact declined further {The decline of the Region's industry will be discussed in greater depth in Chapters 5 and 6}. In the mid-1980s, when the Soviet government began to re-direct investment into the Kuznetsk Basin in Siberia, the Donbass elite mobilised itself and vigorously lobbied to maintain its status as the pre-eminent Soviet mining region. That it was largely unsuccessful in its self-preservation efforts is an indication of the relative weakness of the Donbass elite.

Conclusion:

In the twentieth century Eastern and Southern Ukraine experienced a long series of traumatic events — Civil War, artificial famine, a

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decimation of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, the Second World War, post-
War Russification — each of which short-circuited the formation of a
clear-cut national identity, Ukrainian or Russian. While, in some cases,
as Bohdan Krawchenko and George Liber have argued, modernisation
may have created a social base for nationalism, in the East and South it
also helped to undermine it, through such twin processes as urbanisation
and migration.

In Eastern and Southern Ukraine, the "Soviet Nation" was indeed
in the process of being made by end of 1980s. The Great Patriotic War
was a key formative myth of this identification. This Soviet identity was
constructed upon a well established workers' identity, a tradition of ethnic
diversity; in short, a genuine cosmopolitan or "internationalist" identity in
the region that was fully compatible with the Soviet idea.

As Dziuba argued, "internationalism" was in some respects just a
code word for Russification. Yet the striking "ethnic mosaic" of the
region, the high levels of urbanisation, higher numbers of recent
immigrants — all of this made the region "internationalist" and
cosmopolitan in a very real sense. Accordingly, a Ukrainian identity
based on an idealised peasant past had increasingly little resonance in
these regions, while a Soviet identity was in fact more compatible with
this urban culture.

In short, the process by which identity was developed in the
twentieth century was informed by a combination of external shocks
(famine, war), state-policies designed to promote assimilation, and
"objective" demographic developments (urbanisation and migration).
There is frequently a fine line between these categories of events. For
example, the extent to which the migration of Russians to Ukraine was a colonising policy, or whether the 1933 famine was a genocidal terror campaign may be debated. Intermarriage, a critical social and demographic mechanism for identity formation, and the subject of the next chapter, is another such phenomenon.
Figure 3.1a: Proportion of Russians and Ukrainians in the Donbass, 1926-1989 (%) 

Figure 3.1b: Proportions of Russians and Ukrainians in the South, 1926-1989 (%).

Source: Same as Above.
Figure 3.2: Ukrainian Language Affiliation among Ukrainians, by Region, 1959-1989.

Figure 3.3: Place of Birth of Population of Southern & Eastern Oblasti, 1989.

Source: Based on material from O.M. Hladun, "Vplyv Mihratiinykh protsesiv na formuvannia naselennia Ukrainy," in Demohrafichna sytuatsiia v Ukraini: Materialy naukoi konferentsii (zhovten' 1993 r., m. Kiev) (In three parts), PART 1 {Vidtvorennia naselennia ta demohrafichna polityka}, pp. 101-102.
Figure 3.4: Urbanisation in the Donbass, 1926-1989:

Figure 3.5  Index of Ethnic Diversity ("Ethnic Mosaic") by Oblast, 1959, 1970, 1979, 1989.

CHAPTER 4:
INTERMARRIAGE AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

Individuals may undergo a long, drawn out process of determining their identity. Yet, as Paul R. Spickard, an American sociologist, has noted, "[m]ost observers have tended to see ethnicity as two boxes: either one has a given ethnicity or one does not." Census statistics which force individuals to select only one nationality help to reinforce this image. While the first part of this dissertation examined the historical and demographic developments shaping national identity formation in Eastern and Southern Ukraine, this chapter will propose a framework for analysing the question of national identity which moves beyond the "two boxes" approach to the study of national identity.

As noted, intermarriage is a demographic development which warrants special attention in the context of Eastern and Southern Ukraine. First, the interconnection between mixed parentage and national identity will be explored by considering both Western and Soviet perspectives on the subject. In particular, the role of biological conceptions of ethnicity will be discussed. Second, a model will be proposed which elaborates how persons of mixed parentage — and others for whom identity selection is likely to involve a choice — determine their identity. Finally, Soviet census data and post-Soviet sociological studies conducted in Ukraine will be examined in the light of this model.

2 An earlier version of this methodological discussion, combined with a preliminary analysis of politics in Southern and Eastern Ukraine was published as "Politics and National Identity in Southern and Eastern Ukraine," Europe Asia Studies, 48, 7 (November) 1996, pp. 1079-1104.
It is widely accepted that intermarriage has a profound effect on the national identity of the offspring. Studies done in various parts of the world — Canada, Yugoslavia, the United States and the Soviet Union have all confirmed this. According to the Canadian researchers Jay Goldstein and Alexander Segall, mixed parentage was the best predictor for 4 out of the 5 indicators of ethnic identity used in their study of identity.

Intermarriage was seen by Soviet scholars as a step towards the eventual fusion of the peoples of the Soviet Union. As a large scale Soviet phenomenon intermarriage was first examined in 1964, in an article entitled "Inter-ethnic marriage — one of the progressive tendencies of the rapprochement of socialist nations." Taking the lead from such works, scholars such as Oleksandr P. Ponomar'ov, a Ukrainian ethnologist and the leading expert on inter-ethnic marriage in late Soviet Ukraine, and Liubov' Chuiko, a demographer, investigated this phenomenon in Ukraine.

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According to Ponomar’ov, intermarriage was a vital mechanism for forging the new "Soviet" man. It helped to advance a new "progressive" material culture and played a key role in eradicating ethnic differences in the process. Ponomar’ov found that in the USSR partners in ethnically mixed marriages, especially East Slavs, often had difficulty defining their own ethnic identity or that of their children. Researchers in other Soviet republics support Ponomar’ov’s conclusions. The offspring of such couples, not surprisingly, had even greater difficulty in selecting their ethnic identity. For example, a 1989 study of children of mixed parentage in Moscow and Tallinn conducted by the Soviet sociologist E.M. Galkina demonstrates that for many children of intermarriage (over 20 percent), the process of choosing an identification is an extremely difficult one.

While it is obvious that Soviet scholarly works lauded the benefits of intermarriage as a means of promoting "internationalism", it has also been suggested by several Ukrainian émigré sources that it was officially supported.


7 Ponomar’ov, Suchasna sim’ia, p. 40; Ibid, p. 139.


encouraged at Komsomol meetings and other social functions, or subtly presented as a way of improving career prospects. In any case, by late 1980s there was little popular resistance to intermarriage. A survey conducted by the Ukrainian Institute of Folklore and Ethnography in 1989 found that 70 percent of unmarried adults were not concerned about whether their choice of spouse would effect their child's nationality.

At the end of the Soviet period, Ukrainian nationalist writers began to re-appraise intermarriage. Instead of rejoicing at the high rate of intermarriage in Ukraine, they lamented it as a grave threat to Ukraine’s families and national identity. According to Oksana Sapeliak, writing in the L’viv journal Dzvin, intermarriage undermines Ukrainian families and thus leads directly to assimilation. The high rate of intermarriage during the Soviet period de-nationalised the population, making them indifferent to their language, their community and their culture. This occurred in part as a direct result of the Soviet policy promoting intermarriage. As a result the Ukrainian population was increasingly morally degenerated and corrupted. In short, in the nationalist scheme of things intermarriage was an unmitigated evil which should not be condoned.

**Interrmarriage and Identity Selection:**

Why does intermarriage apparently have such a strong effect on national identity? While in theory, an individual's choices about their

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12 Oksana Sapeliak, "Mizhnatsional'nyi shliub i asimiliatsiia," pp. 76-78.
own identity are unlimited, choices about identity selection are frequently informed by commonly held quasi-biological conceptions of ethnicity. As the American sociologist Mary Waters has demonstrated, the belief that a racial or ethnic identity is fixed at birth — something in the blood — has a strong effect on how individuals in America think about their own ethnicity. Consequently, this fixed conception of ethnicity influences the ways in which people of "mixed blood" identify themselves, as they respond to other people's attempts to classify them.\(^\text{13}\) Such biological conceptions of ethnicity are no less prevalent in Ukrainian and Russian society than in the west. An interview with a typical Donets'k husband and wife in 1990 illustrates this. Asked about his nationality, Yurii Varevoda, a mining engineer explains that: "I am pure Ukrainian. My parents are Ukrainian."\(^\text{14}\) His wife, Svetlana Varevoda, however, interrupts her partner to correct him:

> My husband said he is Ukrainian, but that's just formal. There is German blood in him, too. The same with my nationality; it is difficult to say which nationality I belong to. There is Jewish, Polish, Ukrainian, and Russian blood in me. The problem of national identity has emerged only recently. Our children were not concerned about their nationality; it made no difference which nationality you belong to.\(^\text{15}\)

It is not uncommon to find nationally conscious Ukrainians mocking staunchly pro-Russian politicians if their surname happens to be

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\(^{13}\) Mary C. Waters, "The Everyday Use of Surname to Determine Ethnic Ancestry," *Qualitative Sociology*, 12, 3, 1989, pp. 303-324.


\(^{15}\) Ibid.
Rather naive remarks made by Crimean politicians during a debate on the ethnically-based ballots in Crimean elections, provide the most stark illustration of the view that ethnicity is something a person is born with, and not a matter of personal choice: "What if my friend is a Ukrainian by nationality, but he considers himself a Russian — asked one deputy?" Another deputy asked: "In which national ballot should a Jew vote in if his nationality is listed as Russian [in his passport]." A study of Russian national identity in Ukraine found that for 37 percent of persons claiming Russian identity, ethnic descent was its primary criterion, while 39 percent found that personal choice was the most important criterion. The implication of this is that, even though in practice there is nothing preventing a half-Ukrainian, half-Russian individual from identifying solely as a Ukrainian or as a Russian (especially in a Russian speaking environment), such widely-held, biological conceptions of ethnic identity incline an individual to feel some sort of pull towards both ethnic groups.

A Model for Ethnic Self-identification:

But how, in practice, do individuals of mixed ancestry cope with such divided allegiances? Does intermarriage necessarily lead to a weak or unstable form of identification or can an individual form a stable and undivided or perhaps dual identity? And finally, what other forces may lead to a mixed identity?

According to scholars who have studied this question in depth, the answer seems to be that an individual may follow any number of routes to ethnic identification. Some of these routes provide for stable identity structures, while others do not. An Indian scholar of ethnic minority identity, Nimmi Hutnik, and a Ukrainian scholar, Mykola Shul'ha, have presented very similar models, both of which suggest that there are

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19 In her 1991 study of ethnic minority identity in Great Britain, Nimmi Hutnik hypothesises that there are four basic strategies of ethnic self-identification that are adopted by members of ethnic minorities. In the first instance the individual may identify strongly with his or her minority group. Conversely, the individual may identify strongly with the majority group, but not with the minority group. Thirdly, the individual may identify strongly with two groups: this strategy is labelled "acculturative" by Hutnik. Finally, the individual may fall into a category termed "marginal." In this case, the individual has a weak identification with both the minority and majority groups. Hutnik's model is extremely useful for our purposes, yet it requires a certain degree of modification to fit the case of Ukrainians and Russians in Eastern and Southern Ukraine. Her model assumes that an individual --- even one who strongly identifies with the British majority --- is still "objectively" a minority member, presumably because of their ethnic origin or because of ethnic markers, such as skin colour. In the case of Russians and Ukrainians there is no basis for claiming that a person who claims to identify as a Russian is "objectively" a Ukrainian or vice versa. Therefore, for our purposes, this premise will be discarded. Nimmi Hutnik, Ethnic Minority Identity: A Social Psychological Perspective. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).

20 Unlike Hutnik's approach, Shul'ha's work encompasses individuals of all nationalities, not just members of ethnic minorities. He proposes four strategies: 1) identification with one ethnic group; 2) healthy identification with two ethnic groups 3) marginal identification 4) cosmopolitan identification or "ethnic nihilism." Shul'ha's categories have been largely followed with the exception of the fourth category. Moreover, Hutnik's over-arching distinction between strategies that imply a strong identification and those that imply a weak identification has been superimposed on the model. Mykola Oleksandrovych Shul'ha, Etnichna samoidentifikatsiia osoby (Dissertation at Institute of Sociology of Ukrainian Academy of Sciences)(Kiev, 1993.); Shul'ha, Lichnost' i etnos. (Manuscript Deposited at the Ukr. I.N.T.E.I No. 1905-Uk 92 08.12.92.), (Kiev, 1992), pp. 382-414.
at least four possible routes to self-identification for individuals who are presented with an ethnic choice (either because of intermarriage, because of minority ethnic status, or for other reasons). Hutnik, moreover, divides these strategies into two basic types: those which are characterised by a high identification with the individual's ethnicity, and those that are characterised by low identification with it. The models will be synthesised to create a model suitable for the purposes of this study.

A first strategy is a straightforward one of identification with only one ethnic group. The former Ukrainian Minister of Defence, Kostiantyn Morozov, is a case in point of this route. His father was Russian and mother Ukrainian, yet he identifies himself solely as a Ukrainian.21

Second, an individual may become fully bi-cultural and bi-lingual, and develop a healthy dual-identity, and a strong identification with two ethnic groups. This form of adaptation is labelled "acculturative" by Hutnik, as it entails the ability to operate freely and feel comfortable in both cultures.

Third, in sharp contrast to the healthy "acculturative" approach, an individual may develop psychological ambivalence relative to the two cultures, and suffer with a "divided-soul" — as in the case of Gogol', who once declared that he did not know whether he was a Russian or a Ukrainian.22 This "marginal" state of identification is unstable, and the person may spend a lifetime lurching back and forth between the two irreconcilable identities, never actually succeeding in determining which

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21 Morozov's case is fairly specific, however, insofar as his Russian father was absent for virtually all of Morozov's childhood. See Liudmila Taran (interview with Kostiantyn Morozov), "General-polkovnyk Kostiantyn Morozov: Mysliu sebe Ukraintsem. Tse ne pafos, a moia pravda." Ukraina, 1994, 4, pp. 3-4.
22 N.V. Gogol', Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 12, (Moscow, 1952), p. 419.
group he belongs to. Alternately, he or she may undergo a slow, frequently painful process of transition from one identity to another. Often, this difficulty manifests itself in outright rejection of the need or relevance of any form of ethnic identity. When this occurs, this "marginal" identification may be included in the category of "weak" identification.

Such marginality in the realm of ethnic self-identification may stem from various factors. According to Shul'ha (who based his conclusions on research conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences) mixed parentage is the most important of these factors. However, personal or social circumstances may mimic the effect of mixed parentage on an individual's self-identification. As mentioned in Chapter III, an immigrant or a member of an ethnic minority (as demonstrated by Hutnik) may also have a marginal identity, as he or she undergoes the process of adaptation to a new society or culture. In the case of Southern and Eastern Ukraine the dominance of the Russian language, and other aspects of Russian culture may also contribute to a state of ethnic marginality among individuals, including those who do not have mixed ethnic heritage. This is because the tension between Ukrainian heritage and Russian ethnic markers (i.e. language, etc.) draws the individual's allegiances in different directions in the same way that mixed parentage does. People who speak a common language are often united by the very fact that they do; they are bonded in a "speech fellowship," as language expresses the experiences and values of

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23 The concept "marginal identity" was first used in 1928 by R. Park to describe the disorientation experienced by migrants. R. Park, "Human Migration and the Marginal Man," American Journal of Sociology, 33, 1928.
Language, however, should not be over-emphasised insofar as there are many cases where a national movement can develop using the "imperial language," (e.g. Irish or Scottish nationalism).

When an individual belongs simultaneously to two separate, mutually hostile or incompatible groups — including ethnic ones — this creates an internal tension. To minimise or eliminate this tension, an individual may reject the need for ethnic identification altogether. Shul'ha labels this reaction "ethnic nihilism" or "cosmopolitanism," since such individuals are apt to claim to be "citizens of Europe" or "the world" when asked in sociological studies. Since the basic feature of this "cosmopolitan" identification is an inability to make an ethnic choice, or a weak attachment to any and all ethnic groups, this form of identification will be treated as a variety of marginal identification. The extent to which Ukrainians and Russians are "separate," "mutually hostile" or "incompatible" groups is, of course, widely disputed. Ukrainian nationalists would argue that Russia is Ukraine's eternal enemy, while pan-Slavists would argue the opposite. For persons of mixed parentage, the latter view, obviously has advantages; this is the case in the strategy which follows.

24 Joyce O. Hertzler, A Sociology of Language (New York, 1965), p. 229. The terms "ethnic nihilist" or "cosmopolitan" are sometimes used as epithets in Soviet or nationalist polemics. No such negative connotation is intended here.

25 Shul'ha, by contrast regards such "cosmopolitanism" as a separate category. There is some a certain degree of logic to this, in that both of these types of identification imply a broad, pan-identity. However, because "cosmopolitanism" implies a very weak identification qua ethnicity, it is best understood as a form of marginal identification, and as an inability, or unwillingness to make an ethnic decision.
The fourth and final category encompasses those individuals who follow a strategy which attempts to reconcile two ethnic-identities with an over-arching 'pan-identity.' That is, an identity (ethnic or otherwise) which accepts both sides of the individual's self-identification. As in the case of the "cosmopolitan" strategy, this is a mode of reducing internal tension stemming from a difficult ethnic identity decision. However, in contrast to the marginal individual, who has a tortured or weak association with two ethnicities, the "pan-identity" may be a very strong allegiance.

A 1994 study of ethnic and political self-identification in the former Yugoslavia found that mixed parentage was the most significant factor leading individuals to select the "Yugoslav" pan-identity in the national census. The authors of the Yugoslav study thus describe the adaptive mechanism of the 'pan-identity':

Yugoslav self-identification also provided individuals a means of avoiding competing claims to their national allegiance. This was especially important for children of nationally-mixed marriages, where each parent might expect their child to recognise their particular national identity. By identifying as a Yugoslav, one could resist claims that others might make on one's identity and thus avoid potential conflicts.

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A study of the effects of intermarriage in Canada also found that persons of mixed parentage were far more likely to define their ethnic identity simply as "Canadian," rather than identifying with the nationality of their parents or ancestors.\(^\text{29}\) In the Ukrainian case, self-identification as a "Soviet" was an analogous form of "inclusive" self-identification for persons of mixed Russo-Ukrainian heritage.

To summarise, four basic routes to self-identification are proposed:

1) Strong identification with only one ethnic group.

2) Strong, stable, identification with two groups simultaneously.
   Bi-cultural, bi-ethnic.

3) Marginal identification: weak or unstable identification with two or more ethnic groups, and vacillation between them. This may lead to a complete rejection of any form of ethnic identity — "ethnic nihilism."
   Insofar as "cosmopolitanism" implies a weak identification with all ethnic groups, it will be regarded as a form of marginal identification.

4) 'Pan-ethnic' identification: strong identification with a group which encompasses several ethnic groups (i.e. East Slavic (Pan-Russian, as in Little Russia, Great Russia, White Russia); South Slavic (Yugoslavian); Soviet; Canadian.).

On a political level, one may assume that individuals who adopt the first strategy will also identify primarily with only one political entity. In other words, those who identify only as Ukrainian will be more likely to identify strongly with the Ukrainian state. Individuals who identify strongly with two ethnicities, may also have a strong identification with

one or both states. Individuals who are marginal, or who claim a "pan-identity" are more likely to identify with a broader political entity, such as the CIS, the USSR, or a new federation of Russia and Ukraine.

It is worth repeating that mixed parentage is only one of several factors which may promote a "marginal," or "cosmopolitan" identity. As noted, speaking a language other than one's native tongue also promotes a sense of belonging to another nationality. According to the authors of the study of Yugoslav identity, urban residents were also far more likely to identify as "Yugoslavs." Furthermore, one may assume that age and personal experience are important factors in determining identification with a given political entity. Hence, one would imagine that individuals who lived through the Great Patriotic War, for example, would possess a greater sense of Soviet patriotism than someone who was born during the Brezhnev era. Perhaps most decisively, the entire transitional epoch is one which is calculated to breed transitional and borderline identities. The death of the Soviet state and the birth of an independent Ukrainian state will have stirred up questions of identity — especially for those who identified primarily as "Soviets" — that otherwise might have remained dormant indefinitely.

The Model in the Light of Statistics & Sociological Surveys:

Material from Ukrainian sociological studies and public opinion surveys, as well as census data, will now be presented to argue the case that this theoretical framework should be adopted for future studies of national identity in Ukraine. Equally importantly, this data demonstrates important differences within the oblasti that make up Southern and Eastern Ukraine.
Research done in 1994 into the national identity of young students in Mykolaiv and Kharkiv (large cities in Southern and North Eastern Ukraine respectively) illustrates several of the forms of self-identification hypothesised in the model. To the question "What do you consider yourself by nationality?" the researchers found that the following responses were the most frequent (especially in schools where Russian was the language of instruction): "I don't know", "it doesn't matter", "Russian and Ukrainian," "I think that people of different nationalities are all the same"\textsuperscript{30} If one looks past the adolescent flippancy of these responses, it is apparent that the students' responses comply with the marginal and bi-ethnic categories hypothesised. It is interesting to note that, according to the study's author, the cultural environment of the Russian language school appears to stimulate these types of attitudes, even where students may be of fully Ukrainian ancestry. This suggests that the dominance of the Russian language in Eastern and Southern Ukraine may lead not only to straightforward "Russification," as has traditionally been argued, but to ethnic marginality, bi-ethnic identification or simply ethnic indifference. This is presumably because an individual feels drawn, on the one hand, by family ties and, on the other, by the cultural bonds of language.

Official statistics do not directly present the various hues of self-identification in Ukraine: individuals were required to select one and only one identity, which was then duly registered in their passports. If one accepts that ethnic intermarriage contributes to mixed identity (as the

numerous studies cited above attest) then it is worth examining data which traces the history and scale of phenomenon. Studies of marriage registration records demonstrate that intermarriage has largely been a regional phenomenon in Ukraine throughout the twentieth century, largely concentrated in Eastern and Southern Ukraine, and in the large urban centres. On the whole it was a fairly uncommon phenomenon before the Soviet period. According to A.P. Ponomar' ov's analysis of marriage registrations, in 1897 only 2.7 percent of marriages in the country were mixed, while at the time of the Russian revolution, this figure had reached 4.1 percent. The rate in the Donbass surpassed that of other regions from the outset. While in 1897 the rate was a mere 7 percent, by 1927 it had already reached 21.5 percent (which was four times as high as the rate in Right Bank Ukraine). Over the next sixty years, the rate of intermarriage in Ukraine as a whole increased sevenfold, to 30.1 percent in 1979. The rate in the Donbass continued to surpass that of all other areas; by the 1970s it had already reached 55 percent. South Ukraine's intermarriage rate was somewhat lower, only reaching 39 percent a decade later. The rate in the North East (Kharkiv) was slightly lower than the South at this time, with a rate of 36 percent.31

One part of the 1979 and 1989 Soviet census provide a further glimpse of the likely levels of mixed identity and its cross-regional variations. This is the section which describes the ethnic composition of families. The census lists how many families are made up of individuals

31 A.P. Ponomar' ov, Suchasna sim' ia i simeinyi pobut robitnykyiv Donbasu. (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1978.), p. 38; Ponamerev, Mezhnatsional' nye braki, pp. pp. 67; 77-8, 80-82. Ponomar' ov's figures for intermarriage in the Donbass were based on a sample of 800 marriages at DODA ZAGS (Donets' k oblast marriage registry office), and 1,900 family cards. He conducted similar research at the ZAGS offices of the other oblasts.
of different nationalities (i.e. the father and mother are of a different nationality). As Figure 4.1 illustrates, the phenomenon of multi-ethnic families is far more widespread in the Eastern most oblasti and in the Crimea than in Central and Western Ukraine. The oblast with the highest number of mixed families is Donets'k (41.7 percent). Only 32.5 percent of Donets'k families are mono-ethnically Ukrainian. In Crimea, where 36.4 percent of families are mixed, in contrast, a full 47.6 percent of Russian families are ethnically homogenous, while only 13.1 percent of the population consists of ethnically homogenous Ukrainian families. This may in part explain why a strictly pro-Russian movement has not flourished in the Donbass, while it has in the Crimea. It also explains the correspondingly weak pro-Ukrainian movement of the Crimean peninsula.

Birth registration records confirm this pattern in Donets'k oblast. In 1992 47.7 percent of all children born in the oblast had parents of different passport nationalities, while 52 percent of children whose mothers were Russian by passport nationality had of a different nationality. The corresponding figure for children with Ukrainian mothers was 41.1 percent. The rate for children whose mothers were of other nationalities was generally much higher.\(^{32}\) Public opinion surveys further confirm that the level of intermarriage of self-declared Russians in Ukraine is very high. In 1991 a survey found that in Eastern Ukraine

\[ \text{children of} \]

\(^{32}\) For example, 93.9 percent of Belarusian mothers in Donets'k oblast had fathers of a different nationality. These figures represent only a modest increase in figures from the preceding decade (roughly 2 percent increase), which suggests that the rate of intermarriage in Donets'k has stabilised. "Udel'nyi ves rodivshikhsia, u kotorykh otets drugoi natsional'nosti, v obshchem chisle rodivshikhsia dannoi natsional'nosti (v protsentakh)", Rozhdaemost' v Donetskoj oblasti: statisticheskii sbornik. (Donetsk, 1993), p. 16.
73 percent of persons claiming a Russian nationality declared that they had close relatives who were Ukrainians. The corresponding figures for Crimea and Southern Ukraine were 53 percent and 63 percent respectively.\(^{33}\)

A 1995 survey by Democratic Initiatives illustrates the relative predominance of intermarriage in four Ukrainian cities, Donets'k, Simferopol', Kiev and L'viv.\(^{34}\) While 72 percent of Donets'k residents claim that their parents are of the same nationality, almost half of all married couples in Donets'k are ethnically mixed. Evidently, the younger generation of the population is more predisposed to intermarriage. To the extent that mixed parentage is a significant factor in informing ethnic self-identification, we can therefore conclude that for subsequent generations of Donets'k citizens this factor will influence an even larger proportion of the population than is currently the case. The situation with regard to intermarriage and mixed parentage in Simferopol', on the other hand, is similar to that of Kiev. But, whereas in the Ukrainian capital the Ukrainian population dominates, the Russian population is predominant in the Crimean capital. L'viv, stands apart from the capital and the cities of the East and South: there only 23 percent of marriages are mixed.

Recently, Ukrainian scholars have conducted surveys which clearly demonstrate that mixed ethnic identity is a widespread phenomenon. According to an all-Ukrainian sociological survey conducted between 1993 and 1994, 57 percent of the adult population of


\(^{34}\) "Sotsial'no-politychnyi portret chotyr'okh mist Ukrainy," Politychnyi portret Ukrainy, 13, 1995, pp. 41-70.
Ukraine consider themselves to be exclusively Ukrainian by nationality, while 11 percent consider themselves exclusively Russian. Another 25-26 percent of respondents considered themselves to be Russian and Ukrainian simultaneously. This is in marked contrast to the official census statistics which registers roughly one fifth of the population as ethnic Russians. Of the "pure" Ukrainians, 36-37 percent prefer to speak Russian, which, as noted above, contributes to identification with Russian culture.\[^{35}\] The number of such bi-ethnic persons is largely concentrated in the Eastern and Southern regions of Ukraine. This fact is confirmed by a 1991 sociological poll done in Donets'k, according to which 32 percent of respondents considered themselves to be Ukrainians, 27.5 percent Russians, while a plurality of 36.5 percent of respondents declared themselves to be both. This presents a much more complex picture than the official census statistics which only registers 51 percent Ukrainians and 44 percent of Russians in the oblast. Another question in the same Donets'k survey demonstrates that the majority of the population consider themselves to be heirs to both Ukrainian and Russian culture: 32 percent supposed themselves to be heirs to only Russian culture; 14 percent - those to Ukrainian culture, and 51 percent -- heirs to both.)\[^{36}\] A survey

\[^{35}\] Valerii Khmelko, "Dva berehy - Dva sposoby zhyttia: linhvo-etnichni struktury ta social'ni orientatsii pravoberezhnoi i livoberezhnoi Ukrainy" Demoz. 1995, 1, pp. 17-20. This study was conducted by the Chair of Sociology of the Kiev-Mohyla Academy and the Kiev International Institute of Sociology as part of the project "Social Structure and its Particulars in the Conditions of Radical Social Change." The methodology of the survey was devised by Prof. Melvin Kon of Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore USA. The interviews were carried out personally at the home of the respondents in 183 points of settlement; they were carried out in December 1993 (1833 interviews) and January 1994 (3038 interviews). The sample was calculated to reflect the social and ethnic structure of the population. Only persons aged 18 years and over were included in the survey.

\[^{36}\] The survey was conducted by the Donets'k State University Department of Statistics. It is cited in Dmitrii Kornilov, "The Problems
conducted in the Eastern part of the Donbass (Luhans'k oblast) came to a similar conclusion. According to this 1992 survey most respondents defined the Donbass as a special community tied to both Russia and Ukraine, as opposed to a Ukrainian region.  

Anomalous results obtained from studies of social distance between ethnic groups in Ukraine confirm that national affiliation can not be meaningfully understood in terms of strict either/or ethnic categories. In the normal scheme of things, a group feels a high level of tolerance towards its own ethnic group, and a lower level of tolerance towards other groups. In the case of Ukrainians in Western Ukraine, their intolerance of Ukrainians was very low, 1.08 (The scale of "intolerance" ranges from 1-7, with 1 representing maximum tolerance and 7...
representing maximum intolerance.) West Ukrainian intolerance towards Russians, on the other hand, was higher, at 2.71. The "internationalism" of self-declared Russians in Ukraine, as well as of self-declared Ukrainians from Crimea, in contrast, provides a curious exception to this rule of thumb. On the whole, persons claiming a Russian nationality in Ukraine demonstrate a higher level of intolerance towards Russians than they do towards Ukrainians, while Crimean "Ukrainians" were found on average to be more intolerant of Ukrainians than of Russians. The Ukrainians from the Crimea, moreover, demonstrate an extremely hostile attitude towards Ukrainians from the Diaspora (4.29).\(^\text{39}\) This suggests that on the whole the "Russians" of Ukraine as well as the "Ukrainians" in Crimea are marginal in their identification, in that they possess relatively weak kinship with their supposed ethnic brethren.

While social distance surveys fail to conform to the usual mould, other surveys also show that traditional ethnic categories provide a weak basis for analysing the political and national orientation of the Ukrainian population. A survey conducted by the University of Glasgow, for example, found that Russian speaking Ukrainians were far more similar to Russians living in Ukraine than to Ukrainian speaking Ukrainians, as regards their attitudes towards the major political and national issues facing the country.\(^\text{40}\) On the whole, the language divide proved to be a

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\(^{39}\) The intolerance rating of "Russians" living in Ukraine relative to Russians was 1.82, and only 1.66 relative to Ukrainians. Ukrainians living in Crimea had an intolerance level of 2.29 towards Ukrainians but only 2.24 towards Russians. This social-distance material is from a study done by researchers at the Institute of Sociology of the Ukrainian Academy of Science. It is cited in E.I. Golovakha, I.V. Panina, Sotsial'noe bezumie: Istoriia, teoriia i sovremennaia praktika (Kiev, 1994), Table 3.4, p. 116.

\(^{40}\) Bill Miller et. al. "Language versus Nationality in the Politics of Ukraine", Press Release no. 4, (Glasgow, 1994)
much more reliable predictor of political attitudes than self-declared nationality. Hence, surveys which assume clear-cut divisions along standard ethnic lines fail to provide a meaningful picture of the national identity mosaic in Ukrainian society.

According to a study by the Pulse organisation in Odessa, a good portion of that city’s population --- especially those identifying as Russians, are in a state of transition from a presumably weak Russian identification, to a mixed Russo-Ukrainian identity, or even a ethnically indifferent "cosmopolitan" identity. See Table 4.1 This suggests that a vacillating, marginal identification is a rather widespread phenomenon in Odessa. It is likely that those individuals changing their identification from Russian to another category are those whose identification as Russians was tenuous to begin with, such as persons who do not have any Russian heritage. A common Southern Ukrainian saying encapsulates the tendency of ethnically mixed individuals in the region to identify themselves as Russians: "Papa --- turok, mama --- grek, a ia russkii chelovek" (Papa is a Turk and Mama is Greek, but I am a Russian man.). Presumably because of the greater social prestige attached to the Russian nationality as compared to Ukrainian or other nationalities, identification as a Russian for passport purposes was the obvious choice for individuals of mixed parentage during the Soviet era, although in fact (as argued above) their national identification was likely to be marginal or "Soviet" rather than purely Russian. But given the new political reality of Ukraine, the appeal of identifying as a Russian is apparently diminishing. 

42 Evidence to support this claim is presented in Chapter 6 of this study (pp. 190-191).
As noted in Chapter 3, Eastern and Southern Ukraine not only have extremely high levels of urbanisation and intermarriage, but also have the greatest number of residents (especially in the Crimea) who were born outside the borders of the republic. Since the ethnic identity of such individuals frequently undergoes a transition as they adapt to their new environment, this also feeds ethnic marginality as a mass social phenomenon. Naturally, the fact that such a large number of ethnic Russians in Crimea were born in Russia proper (i.e., in Russia according to its current borders, and not including Crimea) goes a long way towards explaining why Russian national identity and pro-Russian sentiments in the region is much stronger than in other areas of Russian settlement, such as the Donbass or Odessa.

The stronger Russian ethnic identity of Crimea’s population relative to that of the Donbass or Odessa is reflected by its allegiance to the various churches in Ukraine. A study of the religious identification of the regions of Eastern and Southern Ukraine illustrates a further significant difference between the various sub-regions of the South and East. In keeping with the official Soviet state ideology of atheism, the Sovietised Donbass still maintains a high level of atheism, among both the Russian and Ukrainian populations. The stronger Russian ethnic identity of Crimea’s population relative to that of the Donbass or Odessa is reflected by its allegiance to the various churches in Ukraine. A study of the religious identification of the regions of Eastern and Southern Ukraine illustrates a further significant difference between the various sub-regions of the South and East. In keeping with the official Soviet state ideology of atheism, the Sovietised Donbass still maintains a high level of atheism, among both the Russian and Ukrainian populations.43 In the Crimea, however, the Russian population has maintained a much stronger attachment to the

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43 The relationship between allegiance to Russian orthodoxy and Russian ethnic identity is examined in Natalia Dinello, “Religious Attitudes of Russian Minorities and National Identity,” in Shlapentokh et. al. The New Russian Diaspora, in Shlapentokh et. al. The New Russian Diaspora pp. 195-205. According to Dinello, Russians who claim to belong to the Russian Orthodox Church are more likely to identify as “Russians” as opposed to “Soviets.” (p. 200.) The survey was conducted by the Russian Centre for the Study of Public Opinion.
Russian Orthodox Church, which is an important symbol of Russian national identity. This again suggests that the fiercely pro-Russian orientation of Crimea is based in a better preserved national consciousness on the part of the Russian population on the peninsula. In East-Central and Southern Ukraine, the number of individuals belonging to Ukrainian Churches (either the Autocephalous or the Kiev Patriarchy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church) is much higher than in the Donbass or Crimea.44

The "cosmopolitan" form of marginal self-identification hypothesised above is also in evidence. According to a 1994 survey, roughly six percent of the Ukrainian population claimed to identify themselves primarily as inhabitants of the world or of Europe, rather than of Ukraine or the CIS. While one must of course be sceptical of the extent to which such citizens truly believe themselves to be "cosmopolitan citizens of Earth" these survey results suggest, nonetheless, that these persons have a relatively low identification with strict ethnic categories, or perhaps have some difficulty choosing an identity.45

44 A table of giving the breakdown of the religious affiliation of the Ukrainian population, based on a fall 1992 sociological survey of the RFE/RL Research Institute, is published in Jarowlaw Martyniuk, "News Analysis: The State of Ukraine's Orthodox Church," Ukrainian Weekly, 13 March 1994, pp. 2; 8.
45 "Ukrainian nation-wide public opinion poll", (February-March 1994.) size: 1799 respondents. A Political Portrait of Ukraine, 4, 1994, p. 19. The methodology of Democratic Initiatives as outlined in its publications is as follows. The survey sample is representative of the total adult population (over 18 years of age) according to key socio-demographic characteristics (sex, age, education, and region). To ensure a representative sample selection the survey's authors (N.Panina, E.Golovakha of the Insitute of Sociology of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences) saw to it that research was carried out by interviewers following a previously assigned route. Respondents in all regions of
The appeal of a 'pan-ethnic', Soviet self-identification appears to have been fairly considerable in Ukraine. A 1990-1991 sociological survey, for example, found that 43.4 percent of ethnic Ukrainians (as registered by passport nationality) identified primarily as Soviet citizens, while 47.4 percent of the declared Russians identified as Soviets. Only 26 percent of the "Russians" identified primarily as ethnic Russians in the survey; the rest considered themselves "Soviet" or as inhabitants of a given region.\textsuperscript{46} Another 1991 study by the Russian Centre for the Study of Public Opinion found that 81.8 percent of Russians in Ukraine designated the Soviet Union as "our country" as opposed to Ukraine.\textsuperscript{47} Finally, a 1994 study in Donets'k found that 45.4 percent of Donets'k residents still identified themselves primarily as "Soviet people" rather than Ukrainians or Russian, as compared to only 4.9 percent of respondents in L'viv.\textsuperscript{48}

A 1995 sociological survey by Democratic Initiatives of Kiev explored the extent to which individuals in Southern and Eastern Ukraine, Kiev, and Crimea were polled using standardized interviewing techniques. The margin of error for data collection does not exceed two percent.

\textsuperscript{46} The survey was conducted by V.H. Ohirchuka and L. Ye. Shkliara of the Institute of Philosophy of the Ukrainian Academy of Science. It is cited in Mykola Sliusarev's'kyi, "Chy mozhna vybyraty Bat'kivshchynu? Netradytsiini rozdumy pro etnichnu problemu i natsional'nu polityku v Ukraini" Nauka i suspil'stv. 1993, 11/12, pp. 11; 13.


\textsuperscript{48} Yaroslav Hrytsak, Oksana Malanchuk, Nataliia Chernysh, "Ukraina: Skhid i zakhid," Obshchestvennoe mnenie, 3, 1994, p. 73. The study, which was organised by the University of L'viv Sociological Laboratory, had over 800 respondents.
identify with the territory of Ukraine, or their region or of the territory of the former Soviet Union. The results of the study showed that the Donbass and the Crimea — the two republics with the highest proportion of ethnically mixed families — were by far the most "Soviet" in their territorial identification. Both the Donbass and the Crimea also have high levels of persons claiming to identify above all with their region. A year later, however, an identical survey found somewhat lower levels of identification with the Soviet Union in the Donbass, and higher identification with the USSR in the Dnipropetrovs'k region, which again suggests that identity is unstable in Eastern Ukraine.\{See Figures 4.2a and 4.2b\}

The same 1995 survey also found that people of ethnically mixed parentage hold different patterns of self-identification and political attitudes than the rest of the population. In this study respondents were asked their nationality, and whether they identified most closely with Ukraine, with the ex-USSR, the CIS, etc. As Table 4.2 illustrates, there is a significant difference between the self-identification of Ukrainians of mixed origin and other Ukrainians: on the whole Ukrainians of mixed parentage are far less likely to identify with Ukraine. The case of individuals who identify as Russians, on the other hand, illustrates an interesting nuance: there is no significant difference between their self-identification and other Russians. Presumably, most of the individuals in the category "Ukrainian nationality of mixed parentage" and "Russian nationality of mixed background" are of precisely the same origin: half-Russian and half-Ukrainian. This suggests that persons with a marginal identification gravitate more towards the category "Ukrainian nationality of mixed parentage." Table 4.3 (as illustrated in Figure 4.3), however, demonstrates that the political attitudes of ethnically-mixed Russians in
Ukraine are indeed somewhat closer to those of ethnically-mixed Ukrainians, as compared with other Russians. Note the gradual progression in political views (vis a vis Ukrainian statehood and political relations with Russia) from individuals of only Ukrainian background to individuals with only Russian background. The former group is less inclined to support closer ties with Russian and more inclined to favour a strengthening of Ukrainian independence. The opposite is true of the homogenous Russian category. The attitudes of those in between these two categories falls roughly half-way between these two poles.

As Table 4.3 suggests the popularity of closer ties with Russia extends to the majority of the population: evidently a whole host of political, economic and social factors have fuelled such attitudes. There is a strong overlap between self-identification and political attitudes: individuals who identify closely with the ex-USSR are more likely to support closer ties with Russia, while those who identify more closely with Ukraine are more likely to support the strengthening of Ukrainian independence. While these survey results provide much food for thought, they are only a starting point for a comprehensive analysis of the link between intermarriage, national identity and political attitudes in Ukraine.49

**Situational Identity:**

It is well known that individuals may stress one identity more than another depending upon the particular circumstances in which they find themselves at a given moment. This phenomenon, known as "situational

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49 Ideally, customised surveys should be utilized, and the data interpreted through such statistical methods as logistic regression analysis. Unfortunately, because of restricted access to survey data this was not possible in this study.
identity" no doubt has unique manifestations in the Ukrainian case, and adds a further dimension of complexity to the model described above.\textsuperscript{50} Hence, even individuals who, in one context, such as a survey or referendum, may identify with Ukraine, may stress a different identity in a different context. This may explain, to some extent, why in the surveys cited above there has been some divergence over the proportion of the population which considers themselves primarily "Soviet." Even different wording of the question, apparently, can elicit a different response.

Extreme manifestations of variance of identification in different situations would be regarded as evidence of marginal or bi-ethnic identity. While an in-depth study of the phenomenon would require a separate series of surveys, some observations are possible on the basis of qualitative observations and language data.

Insofar as national identity involves a determination of "us" as opposed to "them," the usage of this term in different situations underscores the depth of situational identification. For instance, the author noted over several months that Nona Genenko, a Donets'k resident, and Lusia Gergaia, an Odessa resident, both had the habit of referring variously to Ukraine, the CIS, and Russia as "Our" (Nash) country, depending on the context of the discussion. On one occasion, the former even referred to Boris Yeltsin as "our President," and the latter referred to an Estonian athlete as "one of ours," explaining later that she meant ethnic-Russian athlete from the ex-USSR. This illustrates that

psychologically the population is only gradually adapting to the idea of an "Us-Them" distinction relative to Russia and Ukraine. Insofar as this distinction is at the very core of any national identity this says a great deal about the local identity. It appeared that emotional experiences, such as the news of the death of a Russian cultural figure, or the playing of a Ukrainian ballad, could evoke fleeting moments of enthusiasm for one or the other culture. Yet, in a different context, the idea of "enforced Ukrainianisation" might be vigorously denounced by the same individual. On one occasion, anti-Ukrainian remarks by a Muscovite visitor to Donets'k precipitated anti-Russian remarks from several Donbass residents who, in a different context, would have probably declared themselves to be pro-Russian.\(^5\)

While it would be wrong to equate language usage with national-identity, language usage does, to some degree, involve entering the mindset of a given culture. Research into language usage indicates that most Ukrainians and Russians in Ukraine use different languages depending upon whether they are with family, friends, at work, or depending on the nationality of the person they are conversing with.\(^5\) An individual who can function equally well in both languages and cultures is likely to do so depending on circumstances. In general, speaking Ukrainian and observing Ukrainian customs is more likely to occur in the home environment.

\(^5\) Authors observations over two months of living with the Genenko family in Donets'k and one month of living with the Gergaia family in Odessa.

The case of Oleg Valentinovich Fesenko, a former medical doctor now very active in Odessa's youth cultural life, is quite instructive. Of mixed Ukrainian, Russian and Jewish heritage, Oleg temporarily wryly boasts his skill in adopting a different ethnic identity depending on which group he is in, to gain their trust and approval. When with Ukrainian speakers from Western Ukraine or the Diaspora, he underscores the Ukrainian origins of his surname, speaks Ukrainian and laments Russification in Ukraine. When in the company of Russians, he mocks Ukrainian nationalists and avoids mentioning his surname; when with Jews he stresses his Jewish ancestry. While Oleg may be a rather extreme example, it is not unlikely that many persons of mixed heritage stress different aspects of their culture depending on whom they are with.

Conclusion:

If, as the evidence presented in the previous chapter suggests, a "pan-identity" (as in a Soviet identity) and "marginal" identity are widespread phenomena in Eastern Ukraine, it is hard to conceive that there would not be political implications associated with this fact. The following chapters will further demonstrate how the national identity characteristic of Eastern and Southern Ukraine informs the local political climate. It will become apparent, however, that the question of national identity and pro-Soviet or pro-Russian vs. anti-Russian orientation are only a part of the equation. The capacity of the East and South to re-define the Ukrainian state-building process on its own terms is regularly short-circuited by a complex series of economically-inspired alliances. Hence, even when there is widespread support for a particular initiative to re-define the Ukrainian state in its image, the population of the South and

53 Author's interview with Oleg Valentinovich Fesenko, leading figure in student cultural life in Odessa, 21 April 1995.
East are unable to impose their will on the government in Kiev, notwithstanding their numerical strength.
Figure 4.1: Ethnic composition of families by oblast, 1989.

Source: Sim'ja v Ukraini (za danymy perepysu naseleennia 1989 r.) (Kiev: Ministerstvo statystyky Ukrainy, 1993). Categories used in graph are as follows: Mixed (Members of family belong to different nationalities), All Ukrainian (all family members are Ukrainian), and All Russian (All family members Russian). All Other (All members of family belong to another nationality).
Figure 4.2a: Territorial-Political identification in Eastern and Southern Ukraine. May-June 1994.*

Figure 4.2b Territorial-Political identification in Eastern and Southern Ukraine, June 1995.*

Source: Data for Figures 4a published in Political Portrait of Ukraine, 9, 1994, p. 45. Data for figure 4b was furnished by Tatyana Herasymenko of Democratic Initiatives, Kiev. A total of 1,807 (in May 1994) and 1,810 (in May 1995) persons were interviewed. The precise wording of the question was: "To which population group do you consider yourself a member of?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SELF-IDENTIFICATION</th>
<th>OCT. 1991</th>
<th>APR. 1993</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldovan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Nationality</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Variants:</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i.e., &quot;Odessite&quot;, &quot;Mixed&quot;{Mainly Russo-Ukrainian}, Cosmopolitan.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL:</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: A.V. Varlamovym, "Odessa, Vesna 1993: etnolingvisticheskai a sit uatsii, politicheskie orientatsii izbiratelei (dannye vyborochnogo oprosa gorozhan 19-22 aprelia 1993 g.) (Odessa: "Pulse" 1993). 400 Respondents surveyed. The specific question asked was "What do you personally consider yourself to be?"
### Table 4.2: Demographic Traits and Political-territorial Identification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS</th>
<th>TOTAL NUMBER SURVEYED IN CATEGORY</th>
<th>IDENTIFY WITH UKRAINE (%)</th>
<th>IDENTIFY WITH FORMER SOVIET UNION &amp; CIS (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTER-MARRIAGE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Ukrainian Nationality &amp; both Parents Same Nationality</td>
<td>1058</td>
<td>60.02</td>
<td>19.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Ukrainian Nationality &amp; Parents of Different Nationalities</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>39.70</td>
<td>28.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Russian Nationality &amp; Both Parents of Same Nationality</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>27.49</td>
<td>43.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Russian Nationality &amp; Parents of Different Nationalities</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>30.07</td>
<td>42.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Other Nationality and Both Parents of Same Nationalities.</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>27.27</td>
<td>28.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Other Nationality and Parents of Different Nationalities.</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>33.33</td>
<td>50.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RESIDENCE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Village</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>56.97</td>
<td>20.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Town</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>46.71</td>
<td>29.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) City</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>30.78</td>
<td>37.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AGE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) 16-36</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>45.18</td>
<td>22.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) 31-55</td>
<td>871</td>
<td>46.84</td>
<td>29.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Over 56.</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>54.49</td>
<td>36.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NATIONALITY (Self-Declared)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Ukrainian</td>
<td>1261</td>
<td>56.86</td>
<td>20.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Russian</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>28.34</td>
<td>43.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Other</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>32.74</td>
<td>35.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NATIVE LANGUAGE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Ukrainian</td>
<td>1075</td>
<td>61.30</td>
<td>18.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Russian</td>
<td>684</td>
<td>29.68</td>
<td>40.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Other</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>22.45</td>
<td>28.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LANGUAGE SPOKEN BY FAMILY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Only Ukrainian</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>56.72</td>
<td>14.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Only Russian</td>
<td>32.74</td>
<td>38.34</td>
<td>22.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Other</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>37.50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) One of two or more</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SEX</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Male</td>
<td>916</td>
<td>48.01</td>
<td>25.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Female</td>
<td>1010</td>
<td>48.03</td>
<td>26.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Data were furnished by Tanya Herasymenko of Democratic Initiatives, Kiev, in accordance with the instructions of the author. This sociological survey was conducted in May 1995, and involved 1810 respondents in all regions of Ukraine.
Table 4.3: Response to Question: "What course of Development do you favour for Ukraine"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mainly to broaden Ties with CIS/ Mainly develop relations with Russia</th>
<th>Mainly rely on our own resources to strengthen independence</th>
<th>OTHER ANSWERS (Black Sea Union, etc.)</th>
<th>DIFFICULT TO ANSWER/ DO NOT KNOW</th>
<th>TOT.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians:</td>
<td>% Absolute</td>
<td>% Absolute</td>
<td>% Absolute</td>
<td>% Absolute</td>
<td>% Absolute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents both same nationality</td>
<td>45.79</td>
<td>17.94</td>
<td>22.48</td>
<td>13.79</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>485</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>1059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians:</td>
<td>% Absolute</td>
<td>% Absolute</td>
<td>% Absolute</td>
<td>% Absolute</td>
<td>% Absolute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents different nationality</td>
<td>49.50</td>
<td>13.64</td>
<td>27.79</td>
<td>9.09</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>98</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians: parents different nationality</td>
<td>66.43</td>
<td>10.49</td>
<td>18.19</td>
<td>4.90</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>95</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians: parents both Russians</td>
<td>75.95</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>14.43</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>221</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify w. USSR/CIS*</td>
<td>77.19</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>12.02</td>
<td>5.30</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>379</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify w. Ukraine*</td>
<td>42.22</td>
<td>20.53</td>
<td>24.08</td>
<td>13.19</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>368</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>872</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*From Question: "To which population do you feel most closely aligne
Source: Same as Table 4.2.

Figure 4.3: Graphic Representation of Table 4.3

Source: Same as Table 4.2.
CHAPTER 5:
THE EAST & THE ALL-UKRAINIAN POLITICAL CONTEXT:

While the first part of this study focused on the historic factors moulding national identity and regional politics in the twentieth century, and the second part stressed the role of demographic factors in shaping national identity, the next four chapters will consider the interconnections between politics and national identity (and vice versa) in the local context. This chapter will look at political issues of an all-Ukrainian nature, such as the 1991 independence referendum, and the 1994 national elections. The chapters to follow will focus on local politics and society.

In terms of population, political and economic importance, the Donbass is of special importance. The role of the Donbass miners' and the workers' rebellion in the East has a special place in any history of the Ukrainian independence movement. Donets'k, as the epicentre of the late 1980s workers' rebellion, also provides a convenient point of reference for a discussion of pan-Ukrainian political developments, such as the parliamentary and presidential elections. This chapter will begin by looking at the economic and social decline of the Donbass, the ensuing workers rebellion in the East, and the interconnection between this rebellion and support for Ukrainian independence.

As an editorial for the Washington Post put it, during the 1994 parliamentary elections in Ukraine, "Voters were in effect choosing not just delegates but a national identity." Arguably this statement encapsulates not only this parliamentary election, but the entire plethora of elections and referenda which have taken place in the past half-decade.

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in Ukraine.\footnote{The best overall look at the relationship between politics and national identity in Ukraine is Stephen R. Burant, "Foreign Policy and National Identity: A Comparison of Ukraine and Belarus," \textit{Europe-Asia Studies}, 47, 7, 1995, pp. 1125-1144.} Therefore, these referenda and elections will be considered. Particular attention will be paid to the question of why voters in Donets'k, Crimea and Odessa supported Ukrainian independence in December 1991 in Eastern Ukraine.

The Decline of the Donbass' "Soviet" Identity:

Toward the end of 1990 a young Donets'k worker, unable to feed his family, threw a noose over the Lenin statue in the city's central square and hung himself.\footnote{Karatnycky, A., "Rukh awakening," 203, \textit{New Republic}, 17 December, 1990, pp 16.} This tragic episode encapsulates the disillusionment among Donbass workers in the final years of Soviet power and explains, to a large extent, why the "Working Donbass" again became a rebellious region. Next to this statue of Lenin, which still looms large over Lenin Square, is a structure — a cross between a flag mast and a obelisk — upon which is inscribed the following: "The Donbass is no ordinary region, but the region without which the building of Socialism will remain only a fond dream.' V.I. Lenin". As Gregorii Nemiria, a political scientist at the University of Donets'k notes, the Donbass was very proud of this extra-ordinary status; proud of its role as the "all-Union Stoke Room."\footnote{Gregory Nemiria, "Regionalism: An Underestimated Dimension of State-Building," Paper presented at conference "Soviet to Independent Ukraine: A Troubled Transformation," 13-14 June 1996, University of Birmingham, p. 1.} In 1985, on the 50th anniversary of Stakhanov's feat, workers enjoyed a parade in Lenin square featuring a large float celebrating over-fulfilment of the state plan for the coal industry. It was with not a great exaggeration to say, as the local newspaper \textit{Vechernii}
donetsk proclaimed, that the workers were indeed "faithful to the Stakhanovite traditions".\(^5\)

How is it, then, that a mere half-decade later this most-Soviet of regions, proud of its industrial traditions and its role as the industrial backbone of the USSR, voted overwhelmingly for the creation of an independent Ukrainian state? This question can only be answered by looking at the decline of the region's main industry, and seeing how this precipitated a quasi-revolutionary movement which coincided with developments in Western Ukraine.

The latter stages of Perestroika precipitated not one but two distinct movements in Ukraine. As in the Civil War period, there was, on the one hand, a rebellion of the nationally conscious Ukrainians in the Western and Central regions; on the other hand, there was a workers' revolt in the East. But after the coup in August 1991, however, the latter day Katerynoslav Bolsheviks — the Eastern Ukrainian party _apparatchiki_ (led by the Dnipropetrovs'k group) — felt compelled to join forces with the nationalists. Paradoxically, the East Ukrainian party apparatus supported independence to _preserve_ some form of Soviet power, not at the all-Union level — it was too late for that — but in Ukraine. By cutting ties with Moscow, then under the control of Yeltsin's democrats, they hoped to maintain control over some levers of power and avoid an anti-Communist witch hunt in Ukraine. The pro-independence camp was also encouraged by the East Ukrainian workers' rebellion, whose vague and self-contradictory aims temporarily coincided with those of the

nationalists. But as in early part of the century, the East Ukrainian working population proved to be volatile and unreliable. After independence, miners' strikes became a regular occurrence, and an immense strain on the Ukrainian economy.

Even before Perestroika reached Ukraine, the declining living standards of the East Ukrainian worker had begun to discredit Soviet authority and the "Stakhanovite myth" of the Donbass. The decline in living standards was an inevitable by-product of the overall decline of the Don Basin as a coal producing area. In part because of the Stakhanovite tradition itself, with its emphasis on quota over-fulfilment at any cost, the region's coal mines were in terminal decay. Easily accessible coal had been removed, and what remained was in thin seams, generally more than 1,200 meters below ground. Even the quality of coal extracted was deteriorating, as illustrated by the rise in ash content of coal in Luhans'k mines by 6.3 percent between the period 1971-1985. Moreover, the average depth of mines was increasing at a rapid pace (10-15 meters a year), which made mine work more dangerous and unhealthy.

Most importantly, the Donbass' share of all-union coal production total was declining precipitously. Whereas in the early post-war years the region accounted for over 50 percent of the Soviet total, by 1985 it had fallen to a mere 26.5 percent. As noted in Chapter III, the central government had been gradually redirecting investment from the Donbass to the Kuznetsk Basin since the 1930s. This tendency accelerated at the end of the 1980s.

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6 This discussion of the decline of the Donbass as a coal producing region, and of the decline in living standards is based on David Marples, *Ukraine under Perestroika*, pp. 178-200.

The decline of the Donbass as a mining region corresponded with a decline in living conditions for the average worker in the region. The increasing hardship for mine workers is illustrated by the significant rise in blood pressure and heart disease between 1978 and 1988; the incidence of coronary heart disease had actually doubled over the previous ten years. The new, deeper mines of the overworked region were especially hard on the health of miners; the incidence of heart disease increased noticeably as a result of these new conditions. The mines themselves were more susceptible to explosions.8

The Strike of July 1989:

The deplorable living conditions which Donbass coal miners endured eventually led them to take part in the first major strike in the history of the Soviet Union, which began on 18 July 1989 (actually in the Kuzbass region of Russia).9 The vast majority of the miners blamed the strike on shattered hopes for material improvement.10 In an era of relative political freedom it is hard to imagine living conditions declining indefinitely without some sort of political consequences. According to a survey conducted during the strike, most miners (86 percent) felt that the

8 Ibid., p. 194.
10 To the poll question: "Why did the workers strike now, and not a year ago?" 73 percent of miners selected the response "Hopes for an improvement in living conditions were not realized.", while 27 percent stated that they "Stopped being afraid" of the authorities, in the aftermath of perestroika. The poll was commissioned by the Institute of Economics of Industry of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukr. S.S.R during the strike. O.V. Volovodova, "Shahtars'kyi rukh: vid stykiino ho vystupu do demokratychnoi systemy samoorganizatsii," Filosofs'ka i sotsiolohichna dumka, 7, 1991, pp. 46-47.
shortage of basic supplies, low wages (79 percent) and the brevity of vacations (62 percent) were main reasons for the strike. A smaller number (41 percent) felt that poor relations with the administration were a major factor.\(^1\)

The demands of the strikers were at first purely social and economic. Like their predecessors a century earlier, most of the miners hoped to improve their lot without politics, if possible.\(^2\) But, as in the 1900s, many workers' demands, such as their desire for workers' control over the industry, would require changes in legislation, and thus set them on a collision course with the political authorities.\(^3\) Hence the striking miners reluctantly, but steadily became politicised.

After the protest ended on 24 July 1989, the strike committees of the various Donbass mines formed themselves into the Regional Union of Strike Committees of the Donbass (RSSKD). The RSSKD's contempt for the existing party and government authorities had by then become almost total. It was, moreover, powerful enough to gain *de facto* control over a number of towns in Eastern Ukraine.

**The Donbass and Rukh:**

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\(^1\) The figure add up to more than 100 percent because respondents were allowed to select more than one cause. O.V. Volovodova, "Shakhtars'kyi rukh," p. 47.

\(^2\) One of the poll questions was "Do you believe that, alongside economic demands, the strikers should put forth political ones?" 62 percent of respondents replied in the negative, while 28 percent replied in the affirmative. O.V. Volovodova, "Shakhtars'kyi rukh," p. 47.

\(^3\) For a complete list of striking Donbass miners' demands see Marples, *Ukraine Under Perestroika*, pp. 204-206.
Because of their hostility towards the government of Gorbachev, some miners considered joining the Western Ukrainian dominated, and moderately nationalist Rukh (Movement), which was at first officially known as the "Peoples' Movement for Perestroika." Accordingly, representatives of the RSSKD were sent to Rukh's founding congress in late 1989. Rukh began as a fairly moderate organisation analogous to the popular fronts formed in the Baltic republics; initially its agenda extended only to greater regional autonomy for Ukraine within the USSR. Not surprisingly, at the time of Rukh's foundation, Western Ukrainians made up half of the delegation; just over a third were from Central Ukraine. A mere 6 percent were from the Eastern Ukrainian oblasts (not including Kharkiv), although those regions made up 25 percent of the nation's population. Likewise, only 9 percent of representatives were from Southern Ukraine, which possessed 19 percent of the nation's population. The miners' reaction to the congress was mixed: some were merely confused by the national symbols (such as the blue and yellow national flag, and the trident emblem), while others were thoroughly offended by them, and by the nationalist rhetoric flourished by some of the congress's participants. The legacy of decades of propaganda against "bourgeois nationalism" and the "Banderovtsi" from Western Ukraine still informed Donbass perceptions of Ukrainian nationalism. Representatives of the Luhans'k strike committees felt it necessary to

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16 O.V. Haran', Ubiti drakona, pp. 45-46.
withdraw from the congress because Rukh was, in their eyes, "the enemy and menace to our struggle." 17

Furthermore, Rukh's pre-occupation with the Ukrainian language and culture was foreign and largely irrelevant to the Donbass workers' materialistic, Sovietized "sausage psychology" (kobbasna psycholohiiia), as it is derisively termed by the Ukrainian intelligentsia. The notorious remarks of a Donbass miner during Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to the region in February 1989, admirably convey the crux of this popular psychology: "if the 'krainian language ('krainskii izayk) helped us mine coal, then we'd switch over to it. We won't get more sausages from that." 18

The political activism of the Donbass miners, and their hostility to the central government of Gorbachev, continued to grow throughout 1990. This was in part due to USSR government's failure to fulfil its side of the 1989 strike agreement, and also from an apparent further deterioration of their living conditions. 19 In June of that year they went so far as to demand the resignation of the USSR government. At the same time, representatives of the Ukrainian government were actively seeking to shift blame for the plight of the workers onto Moscow. They claimed that Kiev had a comprehensive plan to improve living

18 Quoted in Petro Lavriv, "Natsional'na svidomist' robinytstva na Donechchini," Suchasnist. no. 6 (June 1992), p. 106.
conditions, but that it had been blocked by Gorbachev. On July 11, 1990 — less than a week before the Ukrainian SSR's declaration of State Sovereignty — Donbass miners held a one day warning strike. The two events may have been coincidental, but increasingly, the miners, and Donbass residents on the whole, were inclined to support Ukrainian autonomy and later outright independence, but for very different reasons than Rukh's supporters. Several years later, one of the leaders of the 1989 strike, Mikhail Krylov, summed up the miners' attitude thus:

The miners --- us here in the Donbass --- and the Kiev elite understood independence differently. We understood the independence of Ukraine from the Kremlin in this way: 'we will manage that which we produce and we will be "masters in our own home." But the Kiev elite understood independence in this way: 'we will get our embassies and consulates, and in the place of the Kremlin, we will manage all of the country's industry...' And unfortunately that's how it turned out (...) The "independence" that they wanted, they gained. The "independence" that we miners wanted — we haven't gained. We've just replaced the Kremlin with Kiev.\(^{21}\)

The first president of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, used to repeat that "Only Ukraine needs the Donbass."\(^{22}\) If the Donbass was no longer central to the "building of socialism", and was not needed by Moscow, then perhaps the region could gain a new lease on life as a central region in an independent Ukraine.

### Leaning towards Independence:

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\(^{21}\) Interview by author with Mikhail Alekseevich Krylov, Chairman of the Donets'k Oblast Independent Union of Miners & Regional Union of Strike Committees of the Donbass), Donets'k, 6 March 1995.

\(^{22}\) Vadim Kobets, "Donbass v tupikovom zaboe," *Sloboda* (Kharkiv), 12, February 1996.
In October 1990 participants at a large public rally in Donets'k demanded that the Ukrainian Declaration of State Sovereignty be put into effect, and that any new union should be established only after approval in an all-Union referendum. Furthermore, a poll conducted in late 1990 found that already 44 percent of Donbass miners supported the idea of establishing some type of independent Ukraine (24 percent favoured a socialist, independent Ukraine, while 20.0 percent favoured a non-socialist, independent Ukraine).

Some miners actively supported the Rukh-backed student hunger strike in the Autumn of 1990, by marching in support of the students. The striking students in Kiev were calling for the resignation of the Prime minister, Vitold Fokin, and were demanding that the Ukrainian government fulfil the claims of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Ukrainian SSR, which until then had been little more than a dead letter. Hence, as early as 1990 — in what must have been a pleasant surprise for West Ukrainian nationalists — some miners from the Donbass were actively showing their support for Ukrainian sovereignty.

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24 Significantly, support for independence was much lower throughout the Donets'k oblast as a whole (76 percent were opposed to any form of independence) than among miners or residents of the city of Donets'k. This suggests that Donbass miners and Donets'k residents were at the "vanguard" of the regional pro-independence movement at the time. The poll was conduct by the Donets'k "Sotsiolog" centre in Dec. 1990. For its results and an analysis of it see V.N. Toltopiatka, "Trudiaschchiesia o liderakh, partiiakh i budushchem Ukrainy," in Annaly (Nauchno-publitsisticheskii al'manakh), 1, (Donets'k, 1990), p. 122.
An opinion poll conducted later that year demonstrated that the vast majority of Donbass workers (77 percent) still maintained a negative attitude towards Rukh; only 10 percent had a positive estimation of the movement. Nonetheless, the workers—especially the younger ones—were displaying profound disapproval of the Communist Party. But, most miners in Donets’k still regarded Yuriy Andropov most favourably of former Soviet leaders (not including Lenin, who was not listed on the questionnaire). Evidently, the new radicalism was laced with nostalgia for happier days of relative prosperity, stability, and competent and tough leadership which Andropov symbolised. It also suggests that for many workers, it was the chaos and rapid deterioration of living standards associated with Gorbachev’s period in power, rather than Soviet power in general, that was the problem. But, as an analyst of the survey concluded, "the majority of the workers have no clear political-ideological orientation, have lost their faith in Communist ideology and have taken a neutral, wait-and-see position." In sum, Donbass workers were clear about what they no longer wanted—dictatorial Party control over their work places—but vague and uncertain about what they proposed to replace it with.

"Workers' democracy":

Like the East Ukrainian peasants who claimed to be "non-party Bolsheviks" during the Civil War period, workers embraced political doctrines as they imagined them to be, without really understanding their

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27 Andropov was regarded most favourably by 56 percent of miners; Yeltsin was the second most popular leader, with 41 percent; Gorbachev had 11 percent support and Stalin 9.
implications. For example, there appeared to be a genuine popular enthusiasm for a more rapid transition to a market economy and greater self-financing of Ukraine's industries.\textsuperscript{29} Evidently many workers deluded themselves into believing that East Ukrainian industrial enterprises would be profitable in a free-market economy and that workers in heavy industry and mining would be able to continue with their same jobs, except with better pay and improved working conditions.

Workers were also rallying under the banner of democracy, in the form of greater workers' control, and self-organisation of enterprises. This was regarded as a return to 'true Leninist principles.' They were demanding that power be transferred from the Party to local Soviets.\textsuperscript{30} In their representative organisations, such as the RSSKD, strict direct democracy was adopted. As one Ukrainian sociologist effused, "the 1990s workers' movement is a self-directing system which organises itself... The workers' movement is a type of democratic self-organisation new to our society."\textsuperscript{31} By default, this drive for local control and direct-democracy put the workers' movement in the same camp as Rukh. For Moscow and the CPSU were generally regarded as the greatest threats to their movement. This was especially the case after 20 May 1991, when the Supreme Soviet of the USSR declared strikes with political motives to be illegal. Meanwhile, Rukh and the Ukrainian government continued to present themselves as sympathetic to the workers' movement. During the August crisis of 1991, the "coup-plotters" attempted to employ this decree to prevent the outbreak of a general strike in Ukraine in opposition

\textsuperscript{29} O.V. Volovodova, "Shakhtars'kyi rukh," p. 48; 50.
\textsuperscript{31} O.V. Volovodova, "Shakhtars'kyi rukh," p. 50.
to the coup. Rukh, on the other hand, called for a political strike in opposition to the ill-fated junta.³² Therefore, the workers' rebellion and the national movement were dove-tailing in their desire to rid themselves of Moscow's grip.

In sum, two "rebellions" within Ukraine converged in their support for Ukrainian independence by 1991 — a nationalist one in the west, and a workers' rebellion in the East. In addition to this, the pro-independence movement was advanced by the survival strategies of the regional Communist elite.

**Independence Referendum: Why the "Yes Vote" in the East?**

On 24 August 1991, during the latter stages of the coup in Moscow, the Communist-dominated Parliament of Ukraine declared independence. The declaration was made contingent upon its ratification in a nation-wide referendum. It is widely accepted that Communists' support for independence must be seen as an attempt to preserve their power in Ukraine.³³ On the one hand, the Communist deputies feared reprisals from Boris Yeltsin, whom they had failed to support during the crisis. On the other hand, they also hoped to placate the throngs of Ukrainian nationalists, who were rallying in the streets of Kiev at the time. As General Kostiantyn Morozov, independent Ukraine's first defence minister, argues, "By voting for independence and cutting links

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with Moscow, the Communist Party hoped that nothing would change in Ukraine.\textsuperscript{34}

But while these arguments may explain why the Eastern Ukrainian party apparatus chose to jump on the independence bandwagon, they only partly explain why the population voted overwhelmingly for independence in the referendum on 1 December. In the Donbass 84 percent of votes cast were in favour of independence; Odessa oblast supported independence by a remarkable 93 percent, while Crimea demonstrated the lowest support for independence, as only 54\% of votes cast were in favour of it.\textsuperscript{35} Wilson and Kuzio argue that the state's monopoly over the media and the state apparatus guaranteed this stunning victory in the referendum.\textsuperscript{36} But, if the future "party of power"'s control was so all-encompassing, then why, for example, was support for independence so much lower in Crimea, as compared to other regions? If the party of power's influence was so decisive, then why was it unable to engineer a high pro-independence vote in Crimea? Although this may in part be explained by the relative autonomy that the peninsula had won for itself by that time, ultimately, one must look to three further factors in order to explain this phenomenon: first, the workers' revolt described above in Eastern Ukraine; second, the nature of regional national consciousness and, third, popular naivété regarding the true implications of an independence vote.

\textsuperscript{35} In the Donetsk oblast 84 percent of votes cast were in favour of independence; 84 percent in Luhansk; Dnipropetrovsk (90.3 percent); Zaporizhzhia (90.6 percent); Kharkiv (86.3 percent) \textit{Holos Ukrainy}, 5 December 1991.
\textsuperscript{36} Kuzio & Wilson, \textit{Ukraine}, pp. 204-205.
First, the workers' revolt in Eastern Ukraine was increasingly gravitating towards a pro-independence position even before the coup, because Moscow increasingly appeared as the main impediment to their dreams of local and workers' control. Ukrainian self-rule was a logical step in the direction of such local control.

Secondly, an analysis of the level and character of national consciousness throughout Ukraine, in keeping with the methodology outlined in the previous chapter is necessary for an understanding of the referendum results. In Western and Central Ukraine, the high level of Ukrainian national consciousness guaranteed support for Ukrainian independence. In the case of Western Ukraine this stems from obvious historical reasons: it had never been a part of the Russian Empire, and was only incorporated into the USSR during the Second World War. In the East and South, however, it may be hypothesised that it was precisely the lack of national consciousness (i.e. Russian national consciousness) that led so many passport Russians in Eastern & Southern Ukraine to vote for independence. The marginal identification of the population, moreover, could be manipulated by arguments which stressed the economic benefits of independence, while downplaying the actual break that would occur between Russia and Ukraine.

Thus, it is no surprise that economic arguments predominated in the government's pro-independence propaganda campaign in the East and South. Ukraine was presented as a potentially rich country whose natural wealth was exploited by Moscow rule. In the Crimea, the argument put forward was that Western tourists would flock to Crimea within a more

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37 Serhiy Tolstov, "Dimensions of Inter-Ethnic Relations in Ukraine" The Ukrainian Review (June 1993), pp. 33; 35.
European country such an independent Ukraine. In the city of Odessa, it was believed that the region would have a greater chance of realising their dreams of becoming a "free economic zone" within an independent Ukraine.\footnote{Bohdan Nahaylo "The Birth of an Independent Ukraine," \textit{Report on the USSR}, 3, 50 (13 December, 1991), p. 2.}

But the much lower level of support for independence in Crimea also demonstrates that Russo-Soviet consciousness had not undergone a crisis of confidence analogous to the Donbass', since the peninsula's economy was less reliant on dying "rust belt" industries. More importantly, the level of ethnic consciousness of Russians — many of whom were more recent immigrants from Russia proper, was higher in the Crimea, as illustrated by their greater attachment to such institutions as the Russian Orthodox Church. In the Donbass, by contrast, more Russians had never lived in Russia proper and had thus developed some form of mixed, local identity.

A third key factor which must be remembered in evaluating the independence vote in Eastern and Southern Ukraine is the popular naivété regarding the true implications of a "yes" vote. To put the December 1991 referendum in context, one must remember that this was the second vote that year on the destiny of the USSR. In March of 1991, Ukrainians voted in a referendum which put forth two questions, one inquiring whether citizens supported the Ukrainian SSR's "Declaration of State Sovereignty," and a second question concerning the renewal of the Soviet federation. At this time the vast majority of voters supported both of these apparently mutually contradictory aims. Support for the continued survival of the USSR was especially strong in the East and South. The
Ukrainian scholar Yevhen Holovakha cites this voting pattern as a prime example of a type of popular psychology which he labels "Post-totalitarian ambivalence." According to Holovakha, the propensity to support apparently mutually contradictory aims is extremely characteristic of Ukraine's late Soviet and post-Soviet political culture.

In so far as the Ukrainian SSR's 1990 Declaration of State Sovereignty did not provide Ukraine with any notable attributes of sovereign statehood, it is hardly surprising that the political terminology of "sovereignty" and "independence" was a rather devalued currency in Ukraine by 1991. It appears that Eastern and Southern Ukrainian voters did not think that a vote for Ukrainian independence actually entailed the break up of the Soviet Union and the establishment of a fully independent state. Interviews with voters at the time of independence, as well as contemporary sociology surveys, demonstrate this strange conception of independence. On the day of the referendum, a retired Donbass miner, F. N. Shafrans'kyi, declared "I'm for the state independence [of Ukraine], but together with Russia." Another anonymous Donets'k resident put it as follows: "It's all a fraud. Yes, independence is necessary, but in economic unity within a Union of Sovereign States (...) I'm for [Ukraine] joining with Canada or with America, but best of all, with Russia." T.N. Silkina, a Donets'k construction worker, while ostensibly declaring support for independence, underlines his steadfast allegiance to that all-important Soviet ideal ---internationalism: "I voted for the independence of Ukraine. But it doesn't make any difference to me what

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nationality people have, the main thing is that a human should be able to be a Human, in big letters."\(^{40}\)

This curious failure to associate Ukrainian independence with the national idea was apparently no less common in the Odessa oblast. Sociological surveys conducted in Odessa testify that the population continued to favour the establishment of a revived Soviet State during and immediately following the vote on independence. As Irina Popova, an expert in public opinion in Odessa, concludes, the large number of those who claim support for Ukrainian independence (from 60-80 percent) and of those who also favour some form of renewed union (from 58-70 percent), as well as the very low level of support for the national idea (in its various forms) demonstrates that the idea of Ukrainian independence is not linked in the popular mind with the Ukrainian national idea, and, moreover that "support for the Act of Independence does not demonstrate the desire to be outside of a Union-Commonwealth."\(^{41}\)

In sum, the raising of "national consciousness" was thus not a major cause of East Ukrainian support for independence. Because the different halves of Ukraine opted for independence for different reasons, it is not surprising that their reactions to the daunting challenges which


\(^{41}\) Irina M. Popova, "Etnopoliticheskie predstavleniia: Dinamika i faktory ikh obslovlivaiushchie (Na materiale iuzhno-ukrainskogo regiona)", manuscript, Odessa, 1994, p. 11. This article is a working paper of the Pulse Sociological Centre in Odessa. The articles conclusions are based on six separate surveys conducted between 1991 and 1993. The sample of each of the surveys was 400 persons. The authors' claim accuracy of plus or minus 3%.
lay ahead reflected these differences. It is equally unsurprising that the utopian, impractical aims of the workers' revolt would eventually collide with the state-building efforts of Kiev.

Politics in Southern and Eastern Ukraine since independence confirms that support for independence was indeed unstable and unreliable. As it became obvious that independence would actually signify the death of the Soviet Union and the birth of a truly independent state, and as the promised economic benefits of independence failed to materialise, popular support for independence plummeted. The political crisis in Crimea (which will be discussed in the section dedicated to Crimea) was the most serious demonstration of this weak attachment to the Ukrainian state.

Parliamentary & Presidential Elections:

The second major sign that the region was not satisfied with the results of independence was the political backlash in the region during the parliamentary and presidential elections in Ukraine in 1994. On the surface the revival of the Communist Party in Eastern Ukraine appears identical to the revival in Russia. In Russia, however, the movement's success stems from a successful balance between appeals to Russian nationalism, and Soviet nostalgia. Unlike the reformed Communist parties in other parts of Eastern Europe, the Communist party in Ukraine stands squarely in favour of the re-establishment of the Soviet Union. Instead of harnessing Ukrainian nationalism to their cause, it mobilises
Soviet patriotism, and anti-West Ukrainian nationalist slogans in an appeal to the still latent Soviet identity.\textsuperscript{42}

The presidential elections of 1994 clearly underline the ethno-political divide separating Left Bank (Eastern & Southern) from Right Bank (Western and West Central) Ukraine.\textsuperscript{43} The Dnieper river which divides the country roughly in half, was also the dividing line between supporters of the incumbent, Kravchuk, and the challenger, Kuchma. While Kravchuk's failure to tackle the overwhelming economic crisis of the country explains why his support declined overall, it does not explain the East-West dichotomy of the election result. The fundamental distinction between the two candidates was not their differing strategies for dealing with the economy, but that Kuchma was presented as being in favour of closer ties with Russia. The incumbent president, Leonid Kravchuk, made every effort to associate himself with the national idea, even going so far as to warn that the election of Kuchma might signify the end of Ukrainian independence. The result was that Western and West-Central Ukraine rallied around Kravchuk, while the East and South supported Kuchma.\textsuperscript{44} Although in hindsight Kuchma has proven to be a much more determined economic reformer than Kravchuk, at the time this was not evident. This is illustrated by the fact that the Communist party of Luhans'k supported Kuchma during the presidential elections, while the pro-business Liberal Party of Ukraine in Donets'k supported

\textsuperscript{42} The East Ukrainian Communist Party will be studied in greater depth in the next chapter.


\textsuperscript{44} Mikhail Beletskii, "Pobedil vostok?" \textit{Novoe vremia}, 1994, 30, pp. 16-17.
It would therefore be a mistake to assume that the East Ukrainian vote for Kuchma was a vote for economic reform. It would be much closer to the truth to say that the vote represented a vote for closer ties with Russia, and a rejection of Kravchuk's call for a defence of Ukrainian independence. This view is supported by an in-depth survey and analysis done by Igor Galin of Oxford University. Of all factors linked to the vote for Kravchuk, support for independence was the greatest; economic issues were largely irrelevant.

The massive decline in support for Ukrainian independence by 1995 confirms that attachment to the idea of the Ukrainian state in Eastern and Southern Ukraine was shallow and contingent upon demonstrable economic improvements. By 1995 63 percent of Donbass residents declared that they would vote against independence if a referendum were again held, while only 16 percent declared that they would actually vote in favour of independence. In Crimea, 21 percent declared that they would not take part in such a referendum, 55 percent would vote against it, and a mere 6 percent would support independence.

If the election is a true indicator of attitudes towards independence, it underscores some interesting differences between the sub-regions within the East and South. In Odessa oblast, for example, Kuchma only

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45 Author's interview with Sergei Tokarev, Leader of Donets'k oblast branch of LPU (Donets'k, 11 March 1995); On Communist Party of Luhans'k support for Kuchma see Mar'iana Chôma, "Skhidnyi Donbas: Tiazhke probudzhennia," Demoz. (9 January 1995), 1, p. 13.
47 A Political Portrait of Ukraine, 9, 1994, p. 44.
obtained 66.8 percent of the vote, as compared to 88 percent in Luhans’k, 79 percent in Donetsk and 90 percent in Crimea. In fact, not including Crimea, the South Ukrainian vote for Kuchma was only 61.4 percent, which is even lower than the Central Ukrainian average of 65.9 percent. This can be explained by the support for Kravchuk in rural Odessa. Therefore, it may be argued that the rural parts of Southern Ukraine, in contrast to the East, represents a potential new frontier for the nationalist-democratic movement.

**Factions in the Ukrainian Parliament:**

In the immediate aftermath of the Ukrainian parliamentary elections, the general sense was that the parliament was Communist-dominated, although it was initially difficult to determine the political orientation of the large body of independent deputies. Over the next several years the political orientation of the parliament and its deputies has become more clear. Also, some factions, such as the Liberal Party's "Social Market Choice" faction, have been able to recruit a number of deputies, even though they failed to win any seats in the elections. As of 1996 there were a total of 420 MPs, 380 of which were members of factions, and 40 still remained outside parties and factions. The particular orientation of these factions relative to two key issues, attitudes towards Russia and economic and political reform are illustrated by Figure 5.1. Although the Communist faction, with 88 members, (Officially called the "Communists of Ukraine for Social Justice and Popular Rule") represents the largest faction in the parliament, they are not in a position to dominate it altogether (See Figure 5.2). There have been a number of changes in the composition of these factions, such as the merger of the two Agrarian factions ("Peasants' Party Faction and
Agrarians for Reforms”—total 50 MPs) and the formation of the "Constitutional Centre" faction, based on the former "Statehood" and "Centre" groups.

The dominant factions in the East and South, aside from the Communists, are the Yednist' group, the Independent Group (not to be confused with non-aligned independent candidates) and the Social-Market Choice Faction {See Figure 5.3}.

The Yednist' or Unity Group, led by V. Merkushov, with 28 MPs, represents the so-called "Dnipropetrovs'k Mafia," the post-Soviet successors Brezhnev's elite regional group. Twenty-five of its 28 members are from that city, and it is, not surprisingly a staunch backer of Kuchma, also from that city. The Social-Market Choice Faction, with 26 MPs is based on the Donets’k-based Liberal Party of Ukraine. It represents the main East Ukrainian rival to the Yednist group.

Another leading parliamentary faction representing deputies from the East and South is the Inter-Regional Deputy Group (MDG), led by H. Samofalov. With 29 MPs, this group is somewhat uncertain about economic reform, but it is decidedly pro-Russian in its orientation. Some members are blatantly in favour of restoring the Soviet Union. For example, Yurii Boldyrev of the "Citizen’s Congress" party, as well as other members of this faction, are also members of the informal pro-USSR group called "Soiuz" (Union).

Conclusion:
The complicated factional politics of the Supreme Rada is merely an extension of Ukraine's regional political life, and the one cannot be understood without reference to the other. As Sarah Birch, a researcher of Ukrainian voting behaviour has noted, the fragmentation of Ukrainian party politics along lines means that "Ukraine has not one but three party systems." In other words, while there are a large number of parties overall in Ukraine, in any given region the choice is greatly reduced.\(^{48}\)

The next three chapters will pay particular attention to the regional politics of Donetsk, Crimea and Odessa. As will become apparent, even within the South and East there are many different leading parties competing in each local context.

As this section has attempted to demonstrate, in 1991 the different regions of Ukraine had very different ideas of what independence meant to them. It should therefore come as no surprise that since independence, and especially since 1994, a vibrant debate has been taking place over the future structure and character of the Ukrainian state. As Roman Szporluk, a professor at Harvard University, noted in early 1994: "I see quite a big debate, perhaps a political struggle, in which various regions are trying to present their own [nation-building] model, but I think it's a debate about whither Ukraine not whether Ukraine."\(^{49}\) A somewhat more pessimistic characterisation of this internal struggle, proffered by a L'viv political analysis, is a "Cold-Civil War" between the Eastern and Western halves of the country. One manifestation of this struggle has


\(^{49}\) Chrystia Freeland and Jill Barshay, "Face to Face with Ukraine's Future," Financial Times (Feb. 28 1994).
been the rivalry between proponents of a unitary state and the proponents of a federal, decentralised state. In broad terms we may characterise the proponents of a unitary state as nationalists whose agenda is the creation of a standardised all-Ukrainian identity, the basis of which would be the universal use of the Ukrainian language. The supporters of a federal, decentralised state, in turn, tend to favour broad regional autonomy, which would permit regions to elaborate their own language policies, and a civic, non-ethnically based Ukrainian identity. On the whole, Eastern and Southern Ukrainian political organisations have been supporting the latter model, while Western Ukrainian ones have been supporting the former model. While the underlying motif of many studies of regional politics in Ukraine (especially regarding Crimea) has been how the East and South may undermine the territorial integrity of the Ukrainian state, it would perhaps be more instructive to begin to consider how these regions (via their political representatives, parties and movements) have been presenting models which have informed the state-building process. It will be argued that, although there has been considerable popular support in the East and South for such ideas as official status for the Russian language and a federal state, the internal political and economic divisions of the East and South have limited the extent to which the region has informed the state-building process.

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50 This characterisation is to some degree an oversimplification since there are proponents of a unitary state, such as the former "Party of Power" of Kravchuk, and some Communists, who favour a civic Ukrainian identity, as opposed to an ethnic one.
Figure 5.1: Ukrainian Parliamentary Factions: Attitudes Towards Reform & Russia

Figure 5.2: Parliament Of Ukraine: By Factional Affiliation (1996)

Source: Compiled from Ofitsiina Ukraina s'ohodni (Kiev: K.I.S., 1996).
Figure 5.3a: Donets'k Deputies to the Supreme Rada (1996)

Figure 5.3b: Crimean Deputies to the Supreme Rada (1996)

Figure 5.3c: Odessa Deputies to the Supreme Rada (1996)

Source: Compiled from Ofitsiina Ukraina s'ohodni (Kiev: K.I.S., 1996).
CHAPTER 6:
SOCIETY AND POLITICS IN DONETS'K

Each of the next three chapters will take a two-fold approach to studying the regions that make up Eastern and Southern Ukraine. On the one hand, they will consider the society and character of each region, and on the other, political life will be examined. Such an approach is useful for the study of local politics because in the fragmented and underdeveloped political culture of Eastern Ukraine, a straight-forward examination of party-politics would be of limited usefulness. Popular attitudes towards the major political issues of the day will be examined with the hope of creating a clear picture of the regional differences of political culture in Eastern and Southern Ukraine. In doing so, the views of different generations will be examined as a way of glimpsing at the potential evolution of regional attitudes.

The role of literacy and print culture in the process of forming a national identity is widely accepted. Benedict Anderson has argued that the rise of modern print capitalism was a key prerequisite for the rise of modern nationalism, and of shared national identities. Modern forms of communication, from the newspapers, books and television, currently play a central role in moulding group identity. Ernest Gellner has also underlined the importance of modern mass education in this process. Accordingly, both the educational system and the regional media will be examined with a view to determining their possible role on the development of national identity in Eastern Ukraine.

Finally, local politics will be examined in each of the regions. This will be accomplished through surveying the major political events and forces in the regions, including a survey of the leading political parties. Each sub-region of the East and South lends itself to the examination of somewhat different questions. For example, Crimea is an excellent vehicle for a discussion of the interconnection between politics and criminal structures, while Odessa provides an excellent opportunity to examine the power of a local identity. Donets'k, on the other hand, lends itself to an examination of evolution of workers' identity. Consequently, an overly rigid and formulaic approach to the following case studies will be avoided.

The Donets'k Phenomenon:

To understand the paradox of Donets'k—a city which is essentially Soviet in terms of its cultural identity, but which is also a focal point of capitalist economic reform, one must remember the economic and political role of the city as the centre of Ukrainian industry. Although much of the rust-belt industry in the region is likely to remain unprofitable for the foreseeable future, the region has been far more capable of amassing capital than the less industrialised regions of Western Ukraine, even if this has often been at the cost of exporting coal, steel or chemicals at lower than market prices. Former managers of state enterprises were well positioned to become the core of the new business elite, which is now seeking to create a political environment more favourable to its market activities. Mykhailo Pozhyvanov, the pro-reform mayor of Mariupol', a member of the Reform bloc in parliament argues
that "the nascent bourgeoisie is maturing into a political elite." Or, as Sergei Tokarev, the dynamic leader of the Donets'k branch of the pro-business Liberal Party of Ukraine puts it, "Capital has formed, considerable capital. And now it wants to take political power for itself." Unfortunately, Donets'k is not the only East Ukrainian region with capital, and the desire to take power: thus far Dnipropetrovs'k has managed to keep Donets'k out of the levers of power in Kiev. The struggle between the economic and political clans of Donets'k and Dnipropetrovs'k for domination over Kiev became a central feature of Ukrainian national politics by 1996; the less than democratic way this struggle was waged was hardly an encouraging sign for the new Ukrainian state. This will be examined in the second part of this chapter.

Language and Education:

Language is frequently regarded as the primary ethnic marker, and the undeniable dominance of the Russian language in Donets'k must be addressed. The relative ease with which Ukrainian language skills may be acquired by Russian speakers is such that elites from Eastern Ukraine are unlikely to feel especially threatened by Ukrainian language requirements for entrance into universities or the bureaucracy. The case of President Kuchma, from Dnipropetrovs'k, is instructive. During the presidential elections the foreign media reported that he only barely spoke the state language, yet in his first press conference he spoke in Ukrainian, and has been conducting most of his official affairs in Ukrainian since that time.

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4 Author's interview with Sergei Mikhailovych Tokarev Liberal Party of Ukraine (Vice-President of National Party, head of Donets'k Oblast Branch of Party) 11 March 1995, Donets'k.
The case of Crimean Russians is different from Russian speakers in Eastern Ukraine. The relative ease of Ukrainian language acquisition is only partly related to the similarity of Russian and Ukrainian. It is also a matter of exposure to the language. For example, fluent Ukrainian speakers from the Diaspora frequently have great difficulty understanding Russian. For Crimean Russians, most of whom have had virtually no exposure to the Ukrainian language, any language requirements may be a barrier. Thus, students from Crimea seeking entrance to Kiev based higher educational institutions have been particularly affected by language requirements, although their East Ukrainian equivalents would not be. In addition, East Ukrainian students, even in Russian language schools, are much more likely to have studied Ukrainian as a second language than their Crimean counterparts.\(^5\) Hence, the language issue has more resonance in Crimea as a political issue, when put forward by politicians seeking to advance their cause.

Education in Ukraine has been targeted by nationalists in Western and Central Ukraine as a necessary engine of nation building. In Eastern Ukraine, however, it is apparent that at least on a linguistic level, mass education is not being used to "forcibly Ukrainianise" the population, as pro-Russian politicians would argue. Quite on the contrary, it appears that the Russian language’s grip on Ukrainian schools has hardly been loosened at all. In the oblast of Donets'k, a mere 4 percent of students are taught primarily in the Ukrainian language. The situation in the city of Donets’k is particularly unfavourable in this regard, although the elected mayor of the city has said that: “I firmly believe that if parents want their

\(^5\) The author met a Crimean student in Kiev who claimed to be unable to attend a drama institute in Kiev because of the Ukrainian language requirements.
child to study in their native language, then the state should do everything to make that so."\(^6\) Although a third of the city of Donetsk's population is officially registered as Ukrainian, only 0.6 percent of (787 of 121,203) secondary school students in the city study in Ukrainian language schools.\(^7\) Even though competition is intense for entrance into the few Ukrainian schools that exist in the city, the oblast Ministry of Education is apparently careful to avoid any appearance of advancing "forcible Ukrainianisation." As of 1995, there were 1267 schools in the oblast, of which 130 operated primarily in the Ukrainian language. However, in the city of Donetsk, there was only one Ukrainian language school at that time. In 1996, however, the city's administration's resistance to Ukrainian schools lessened, and six new schools were opened. More significantly, an elite Ukrainian language Lycee exists at Donetsk state University, offering high quality instruction in English as well as Ukrainian. Opened in 1990, the school initially had only 100 students, but now it has 240 students.\(^8\)

On the whole, though, the education system is continuing to serve as a vehicle for linguistic Russification in those tiny remaining pockets where the Ukrainian language is still spoken. Even in towns where the children and teachers alike are predominantly Ukrainian speaking, such as Vuhlehrad, the language of instruction is Russian. The language situation in Luhans'k oblast is roughly the same as that in Donetsk,\(^9\)

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\(^7\) Mykhailo Tyshchenko, "Pivnichnyi viter zi skhodu?", Skhidnyi chasopys, 21 January 1995.

\(^8\) Oleksii Hladchuk, "Litsei — Turbota derzhavy", Ridna Shkola, 1, 1996, p. 2.
according to representatives of Prosvita. According to the study in Luhans’k cited above, the majority of the population would prefer to have their children taught primarily in Russian with instruction of Ukrainian as a second language (59 percent). Yet, 17 percent of parents in Luhans’k would prefer Ukrainian language instruction with Russian as a second language. A further 4 percent favoured only Ukrainian language instruction, while 6 percent favoured only Russian language instruction. The educational system is therefore out of touch with the popular wishes of roughly a fifth of the population for Ukrainian to be the primary language of instruction.

Currently none of the universities or higher technical institutes in Donets'k operate in Ukrainian. Unless a student wishes to study in Kiev, or to eventually work in an official capacity, there is no pressing need to learn the Ukrainian language. Proponents of the Ukrainian language are, however, not entirely without influence in the educational institutions of the oblast. The Rector of Donets'k State University, Volodymyr Pavlovych Shevchenko, is also the head of the oblast branch of the "Prosvita" Ukrainian language society. Shevchenko argues, quite pragmatically, that the status of the Ukrainian language in Donets'k can only be gradually improved after several generations, and avoids any statements that might suggest advancing a programme of forcible Ukrainianisation.

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9 Maria Oliinyk, "Ukrains'komu Donbasu — Derzhavnu movu," Banderivets', 1 January 1995, p. 2. According to the 1st Deputy of the oblast administration, in 1993 there were 117 schools and 202 preschools functioning in the Ukrainian language, as well as 197 Russian schools and 153 kindergartens with separate Ukrainian groups. V. L. Nikonechenko, "Prazdnik nezavisimosti," Zhizn', 20 August 1993.

10 Author's interview with Volodymyr Pavlovych Shevchenko, Donets’k, February 1995.
For nationalists who believe that language must be the basic building block of a Ukrainian identity, such as Pavlo Movchan of the "Prosvita" Ukrainian language society, the situation in Eastern and Southern Ukraine must appear quite hopeless. Yet, if a civic form of Ukrainian identification, based on more than language, is a viable option, then has been limited progress in education in promoting a Ukrainian identity. In the past the study of history in schools was used to promote a Soviet identity. Now, the standard historical text is a Russian translation of Ukraine: A History, a work by a Canadian Ukrainian historian, Orest Subtelny. While it would be unfair to label the book nationalistic, it does present Ukraine's history as a continuous process since the time of Kievan Rus', and tends to stress Russian Imperial and Soviet oppression of Ukrainians rather, rather than Ukrainian strivings for "fraternal" unity with Russia.

As noted, a major reason why Ukrainian speaking parents opted to put their children in Russian language schools was the relatively high social prestige of the Russian language, and its promise of leading to greater social mobility. In the past there was a tendency in Eastern and Southern Ukrainian cities for parents to register their children as Russian when one or another parent was Russian.

There is, however, some evidence to suggest that this pattern is reversing. Although there has been a sharp overall drop in the birth rate in Eastern Ukraine, the rate of decline of children registered as Russians

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11 On the Soviet interpretation of history as a tool for creating Soviet identity in Ukraine, see Kenneth Farmer, Ukrainian Nationalism in the Post-Stalin Era.
12 A. P. Ponomarev, Razvitie semei, p. 203
is significantly sharper than that of those registered as Ukrainian. In areas with traditionally higher levels of Ukrainian national consciousness, such as Kharkiv, this drop has been even more marked. Thus, in urban Donets'k and Luhans'k oblasti, between 1989 and 1993 the decrease in children registered as Russians is 6 percent greater than those registered as Ukrainians. In Kharkiv, this gap is a remarkable 10 percent. Very significantly, however, the opposite was true in Crimea: there was a 5 percent greater decrease of children registered as Ukrainian on the peninsula. This suggests that the intensely pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian atmosphere in Crimea has made Ukrainian nationality seem even less appealing to parents then ever. Since the socio-economic status of urban Ukrainians and urban Russians, at least in Eastern Ukrainian cities, is roughly identical, this decline may be related to a greater tendency to register ethnically mixed children as Ukrainians in an independent Ukraine, whereas in the past the tendency was to register such children as Russians. Alternately, this change could be related to the possibility that Russians are in fact immigrating to the Russian Federation in greater numbers than Ukrainians. In any case, it appears that there is a subtle trend towards the greater decline of the Russian population relative to the Ukrainian population in Donets'k. In 1993 roughly 200,000 persons left Ukraine for Russia, presumably a great proportion of those persons were Russians. It is projected that perhaps as many as one million Russians are considering migration from Ukraine to Russia over the next decade.

14 Golovakha, Panina and Churilov, "Russians in Ukraine," in Vladimir Shlapentokh et. al. (eds.), The New Russian Diaspora, pp. 60-64.
Donets'k Generations:

It is widely accepted that the social base of pro-Communist movements is the pension-aged population. This is hardly accidental, as the older population's savings and pensions were destroyed by the collapse of the Soviet price structure and devaluation of the currency. For most older people, the coming of Ukrainian independence has been associated with a dramatic decline in living standards. Sociological surveys frequently understate the older generation's support for Communist movements, as they are often hesitant to support a party which is out of favour with the authorities. The older population is also far more inclined to vote, having been raised in a society where voting was a compulsory civic duty. The following long-time party activist, Vera Andreevna Karpova typifies the dismay of the older generation at the collapse of the Soviet Union:

I am seventy-six years old. I'm an old woman, rooted in the past, in the Soviet Union. It was very difficult for my morale to witness its disintegration. I have been in the Party for forty years. I'm indignant at the behaviour of our ideological leaders.... How can I judge the correctness of the Party course? History will judge. My children will be angry with me now, but the ideals of the Communist party were very good. They were simply discredited by its leaders.16

In Donets'k oblast, as of 1993, pensioners (i.e., over the age of 55) made up 22.57 percent of the total population of 5,345,197. Because of the Great Patriotic War and the higher mortality rate of men, women

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over the age of 55 outnumber men by more than 2:1 in Donets’k (359, 833 to 846, 590). Those under working age (i.e., 18 years of age) numbered only 21.15 percent of the population.

A 1995 survey demonstrates that in Donets’k the older generation is indeed very unimpressed by the free market. Less than 2 percent of persons over the age of 56 in the oblast claimed to be advocates of capitalism. On the other hand, the youth is far less convinced of the merits of the free market than one would expect. Only a fifth of persons between the ages of 16 and 30 identified firmly with the idea of capitalism (21 percent.) Over 60 percent of persons in this younger age category identified with neither capitalism or socialism, but opted for categories such as “both” or “neither” or “difficult to answer.” Thus, while the gap between the older and the younger generations is clear, confusion and ambivalence also dominates attitudes towards ideologies.

On the whole the youth of Donets’k is little interested in politics or the national or language question. Their main priority is their own personal economic well-being, which they often think of in a very short term manner. Increasingly students drop out of school or cut classes to earn money engaging in small-scale trading or vending. Although there

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17 Naselennia Ukrainy 1993, pp. 42-43; On the demographic situation in Donets’k, see also V.I Agarkov et.al., "Demohrafichni zakonomirmosti formuvannia naselennia v umovakh Donbasu," Demohrafichna sytuatsiia v Ukraini: Materialy naukovoi konferentsii, 1, (Kiev: Komisiia verkhovnoi rady Ukrainy z pytan' zdorov'ia liudyny, 1993.), pp.89-90.
18 Data provided by Tanya Harasimenko, Democratic Initiatives Kiev. This sociological survey was conducted in May 1995, and involved 1810 respondents in all regions of Ukraine.
19 This point was frequently made to the author by a Donets’k school teacher, Nona Davidovna Henenko, with whom the author lived in Donets’k. For a sociological survey on youth priorities see Iryna
are several student organisations in Donets’k, ranging from the Leninist Communist Youth League to the Liberal Party Youth League, they are poorly organised and make no efforts to co-ordinate their efforts. A journalist reporting on a Donets’k student conference in 1995 failed to grasp any obvious difference between two of the leading organisations, the Ukrainian Student Union (USS) and the Union of Ukrainian Students (SUS), aside from the different order of the words in their names, so similar were their pronouncements. In theory, the former organisation is meant to be more closely tied to political parties, including the Liberals and Rukh. In contrast to other oblast branches of this organisation, the Donets’k USS was also aligned with Volodymyr Hrin’ov’s ”New Ukraine” movement, which was regarded as a representative of the interests of Russian-speaking Ukrainians.\(^{20}\) The SUS, on the other hand, claims to be less politicised and more interested with bread and butter issues, such as student housing conditions. The primary issue at the Donets’k congress was “Where did all the Komsomol money go?”; apparently the only organisations with any clear plan of action was the Union of Business Students, which also says much about the priorities of Donets’k youth.\(^{21}\)

Yet, while the youth of Donets’k is largely indifferent to the national question, it would be wrong to label them anti-Ukrainian. In 1993 the *Chervona Ruta* Ukrainian language popular music festival was held in Donets’k. This high-profile festival is a quasi-missionary endeavour, as it exists largely to promote an appreciation of Ukrainian-language popular culture in Eastern Ukraine. When it was initially

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\(^{20}\) Politicheskie partii, dvizhenia, obshchestvennye organizatsii (Donets’k: Lebed’, 1994), pp.51; 64-65.

decided to hold the festival in Donets’k it was predicted that it would be ignored by the indifferent Russian speaking youth of the city. To make matters worse, the local authorities attempted to block the festival, seeing it as a nationalist provocation. But contrary to all expectations, the festival was an enormous triumph: 25,000 youths, mostly from the city itself, crowded Lenin Square to hear Ukrainian pop-music. Hence, in certain circumstances, Donbass youth are willing to celebrate Ukrainian culture, although after the festival they almost certainly returned to their traditional diet of Russian and Anglo-American pop music.

**The Media in Donets'k:**

According to a local newspaper editor, Dmitrii Kornilov, in the Soviet era the local Donbass media's orientation towards Moscow was so profound that the editorial offices of local newspapers did not even bother subscribing to Kiev newspapers. Public taste in newspapers and literature remains dominated by Russian and Russian language publications. Only 17.5 percent of publications subscribed to by Donets'k residents are published in Kiev, which is 15 percent lower than the national average. Of those Kiev publications, the vast majority are in the Russian language. Moreover, one would be hard pressed to find a Ukrainian language book on display on the outdoor tables or in the kiosks where most literature is sold. Indeed, in such outlets there is far more material available dedicated to the study of the English language than there is Ukrainian language literature.

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There are only three Ukrainian language newspapers published in the oblast. One is the barely surviving successor to *Sil'ska Donetchyna* (The Donbass Countryside). The second Ukrainian language newspaper is *Skhidnyi chasopys*, which is sponsored by the local Prosvita Ukrainian language society and Rukh. According to the Mariia Oliynyk, editor of the extreme Ukrainian nationalist publication, *Banderivets* (The Banderite), most issues of *Skhidnyi chasopys* are returned by vendors at the end of the day. These latter two publications are extremely politicised and polemical. Another highly politicised publication is the newspaper *Donetskii kriazh* (The Donets'k basin), the leading publication of the pro-Russian intelligentsia; its editor, Dmitrii Kornilov, is also the former leader of the pro-Russian International Movement of the Donbass.

On the whole, the newspaper industry in Donets'k is characterised by fragmentation and poor standards of journalistic ethics. Many newspapers, especially the floundering ex-Soviet publications such as *Donbass* and *Vechernii donets'k* "borrow" a large proportion of their articles and interviews from Kiev and Moscow newspapers. Moreover, many journalists, including Dmitrii Kornilov, write under several pseudonyms to give the impression that there are more staff members working for their publication. On the positive side, however, there has been an extraordinary number of new business or trade oriented publications. The oblast has the highest number of registered publications of any oblast in the country: 351, compared to a mere 102 in Kiev oblast. On the whole this phenomenon is characteristic of the East

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24 For example, in the 25 February edition of the newspaper *Donbass* an interview with President Kuchma was printed, with no reference to the fact that the interview was copied from the 4 January edition of *Kievskie vedomosti*, who carried out the original interview.
and South. The most impressive of the local newspapers, in terms of range and depth of coverage, are *Biznes Donbassa* and *Zhizn*. As Grigorii Gnezilov, the editor of *Zhizn* argues, it attempts to refrain from taking an overly politicised stand and "strives to publish the opinions of all parties, all the way from the extreme Ukrainian nationalists to the Civic Congress." Although the newspaper is indeed quite impartial in its coverage of national and local politics, the editor admits that most of the staff favour official "bilingualism and the closest possible ties with Russia."

Because of the fragmentation of the local print media, and the difficulty of determining the real popularity or influence of local newspapers, the use of content analysis to examine Donbass publications is of limited use. Content analysis of publications such as *Donetskii kriazh* or *Banderivets*, for example, would reveal little more than the personal views of a handful of individuals.

With these reservations in mind, content analysis of large circulation newspapers in the Donbass (conducted in the second half of 1993 and the first half of 1994) suggests several major trends. In the Donbass there was a relatively large proportion of articles which touched upon the territorial integrity of the Ukrainian state. (There were 169 such articles in Donbass newspapers, as compared to 94 in Crimean newspapers and 127 in the republican press.) This indicates that the

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25 Kharkiv has 269 officially registered publications; Dnipropetrovs'k, 262 Odessa 216, and Crimea 189. *UMB Digest*, 4, 1995, p. 10.
debate over federalism and Russo-Ukrainian relations was relatively intense in the pages of some of the more popular Donbass newspapers.  

Television is an extremely important source of information and entertainment throughout Ukraine. It is not surprising that this medium has important political implications, especially as the Ukrainian government seeks to re-direct financing towards its own productions and away from relatively expensive Russian television products. Local pro-Russian political movements, such as the Civic Congress of Ukraine, have generated publicity for themselves by championing the rights of Ukrainian citizens to watch Russian state television. According to public opinion surveys, the popularity of Russian Public Television (ORT, formerly Ostankino) in the Donbass is higher than that of all other available programmes put together. This fact gave the Civic Congress a convenient rallying point when in August 1995 the Kiev government declared its intention to reduce the hours of transmission of ORT, and to move it to the second channel on the TV dial from the first, which offers worse picture reception. The Civic Congress responded by organising picketing of Ukrainian State Television offices throughout Eastern and Southern Ukraine. At this time it sponsored a petition to the Ukrainian

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27 The newspapers surveyed were Lugans'kaia pravda, Zhizn', Nasha gazeta, Aktsent, Vechernii Donetsk, Holos Donbassa, Volydymyr Holotsvan, "Pytannia rehional'noi polityky ta territorial'noi tsilisnosti Ukrainy v dzerkali presy," Politolohichni chytannya, 1994, 4, pp. 35-42.
28 Irina Bekeshkina, "Stavlennia naselennia skhody i pivdnia Ukrainy do problem nezalezhnosti, porivnial'ni otsinky sytuatsii u Rosii i v Ukraini," Politychnyi portret Ukrainy, 9, 1994, pp. 44-49. The survey asked respondents to list which stations they preferred to watch (they were allowed to list more than one station, therefore the totals add up to more than 100%): Ostankino, 86%; Other Russian, 16%; Ukraine TV-1/2, 32%; Local, 11%, Commercial Channels: 11%.
29 "Moscow Television's Air Time Reduced in Ukraine" Holos Ukrainy, August 2, 1995.
President in which the channel switching was labelled "a violation of human rights." In the Southern Ukrainian city of Mykolaiv, local national democrats rallied around the government decision, and protested against the local authorities' refusal to limit the Moscow broadcast.

In Donets'k, because of a fierce public outcry against the proposals, amplified by the pro-Russian Civic Congress of Ukraine's (GKU) propaganda campaign, the policy was reversed within a few weeks. Most local newspapers called for a return of ORT to the first channel. Consequently the Donets'k Governor and other regional officials called for the return of the channel, because of the "historically Russian speaking" character of the oblast.

Local television has also occasionally been a focal point of political conflict. A television programme known as "Vybor"(Choice), produced and hosted by Vladimir Kornilov (brother of Dmitrii Kornilov) has frequently produced radically pro-Russian features. One particularly controversial programme, dedicated to the third anniversary of the independence referendum, featured a lively debate between the two antithetical nationalists, Dmitrii Kornilov and the Ukrainian nationalist Mariia Oliinyk. Among other things, Kornilov suggested that the results of the referendum were fraudulent in Donets'k. The episode was actually banned by Ukrainian television authorities in an act of blatant censorship. The President of the Tele-radio company "Ukraina", Hennadii Kondaurov, declared that:

30 "Public Congress of Ukraine Protests Moscow TV Programs Reductions" Molod' Ukrainy (17 August 1995).
31 "Picketing in Mykolayiv," Molod' Ukrainy (18 August 1995)
The programme "Vybor", regarding the referendum on Ukrainian independence, was pulled by the leadership of the tele-company (concretely speaking, by myself and the chief editor A. Kryvodubskyi) for reasons associated with the fact that the position of the programme's author, Vladimir Kornilov, sharply deviated with the state line on this question.\textsuperscript{33}

In October 1995, the television programme was cancelled outright on account of its alleged anti-Ukrainian bias.\textsuperscript{34}

Notwithstanding this incident, the media in Donets’k is still under the influence of Moscow. Even Ukrainian nationalists admit that the quality of Ukrainian State Television is poor and only gradually improving. The Ukrainian government cannot force the population to watch Ukrainian language television against its will; even limited attempts to reduce Russian television broadcasting in Ukraine has mobilised the population in a way that few political issues can.

**Changing Face of the Donets’k Society and Economy:**

At first glance it appears that nothing has changed in Donets'k, where Lenin Square has yet to be renamed, and probably never will be. However, if one casts a glance in any direction from the square, one cannot but notice another side to the modern Donbass. The advertisements for banks, car dealerships, Western products and services show that Donets'k is not merely a decaying relic to a dead economic system, but a city with a strong and a growing business class. Several leading Ukrainian financial institutions, such as the First International

\textsuperscript{33} Sergei Grivna, "O referendume ne smet' svoe suzhdenie imet'?", \textit{Vest'} 9 December 1994, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{34} Afterwards, a "Committee for the Protection of "Vybor" was formed in defence of the show. \textit{UMB Digest}, 4, 1995, p. 10.
Bank of Ukraine, were founded in Donets'k. This new business elite, and even the leaders of the local Coal miners, have turned Lenin's declaration about the importance of the Donbass to the revolution on its head. For them, the "Locomotive of Reform", as they now call Donets'k, is the region without which the building of *capitalism* in an independent Ukraine will be impossible. The leadership of the city's mining Strike Committee argues that Donbass coal is essential for the survival of Ukraine's economy as an independent state, while the pro-reform Liberal Party of Ukraine, sees the region, with its growing middle class, and its capital, as the epicentre of Ukraine's pro-reform movement. For them, Western Ukraine, the self-proclaimed "Piedmont" of Ukraine, is nothing more than a agricultural, provincial backwater. This sense of having a special destiny within a new Ukrainian state compensates, to some extent, for the absence of an ethnic Ukrainian identity. Instead, the former Soviet identity — with its pride in the region's industrial might, and its pride in the region's importance in the Soviet economy — has been transplanted into the new, post-Communist, reality of an independent Ukraine. In the case of the miners, the sense of abandonment by Moscow made such a re-alignment all the more logical: Ukraine needs their coal (so they reason), while Russia does not.

**Further Decline of the Coal industry & The Rise of the New Elite:**

At the beginning of the 1990s, the Donbass was still utterly dominated by the coal mining industry. In 1991 the livelihood of roughly half of the population of the city and *oblast* of Donets'k was either directly or indirectly dependent on coal mining. Under the

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35 V. Kotel'nikov, "Nezavisimost' na entuziazme? "*Vechernii Donetsk*, no. 228 (28 Nov. 1991), p. 1. Author of article was Deputy Chief of the oblast Statistical Authority.
administration of Kravchuk, and for the first half of Kuchma's rule, the coal mining sector remained a black hole for the Ukrainian economy. Repeated strikes by Donbass miners had a devastating effect on the Ukrainian economy under Kravchuk, as he repeatedly bowed to pressure to buy the miners off with lavish payments. During a large strike in June of 1993, which at its height involved some 500,000 workers at 217 mines and 400 other enterprises, Donbass miners not only demanded economic concessions but "self-rule" for the Donbass, as well as the resignation of the Parliament and President, and "an end to communist populism and totalitarian nationalism" in parliament.

To settle the dispute, Kravchuk initiated a new wave of subsidies to the mining industry, which exacerbated the country’s already severe budget deficit and led to the collapse of the Ukrainian currency, the Karbovanets, in August of that year. The cost of the measures to settle the June strikes alone was estimated to have equalled 80 percent of the country's projected Gross Domestic Product.36 This situation continued until 1996; in that year, more money was directed at dealing with the Donets'k region's economic problems than would be required to finance the Ukrainian Armed Forces for four years. In the summer of 1996, the government of Pavlo Lazarenko, and in particular the First Vice Prime Minister Vasyl' Durdynets', made it abundantly clear that they were not going to tolerate this situation any further, and were not willing to let strikes intimidate the government. While these strikes demonstrated that the workers' militant streak was still intact, the government from April 1996 started taking drastic steps to streamline and privatise the industry. Then in May, the government announced that they would be taking the

long-overdue step of closing 39 unprofitable coal mines in the Donbass.\textsuperscript{37} Those newly privatised mines that were to remain open would have to employ far fewer workers with much higher productivity levels.

According to Durdynets' a total of 103 mines out of 254 still open in 1996 are to be closed, leaving 34,000 miners without work.\textsuperscript{38}

Up until 1996, the unprofitable and heavily subsidised coal industry has been able to avoid drastic measures to reform it through fear of a social explosion in Eastern Ukraine. Local managers also did their best to block reforms. In 1994 there were a total of 1.2 million coal miners at 262 mines in Ukraine, which made up a total of 5 percent of the country’s entire labour force. The miners produced a mere 5 percent of the coal of a western miner; as an article in the Financial Times of London observed at that time, the industry “drain[s] state coffers with minimal return.”\textsuperscript{39}

Above all the Donbass has been famed as a coal mining region: huge slag heaps are still to be found in the centre of the city, and the air is filthy with soot. Yet, it appears that the process of re-structuring the industry which is now underway will change the economic and social face of the region, not unlike similar developments in Pennsylvania or Wales in the 1970s and 1980s. In the first part of this study it was argued

\textsuperscript{37} Yurii Aksenkov, "V seredine aprelia nachnetsia estrukturizatsiia predpriiatii u gol’noi promyshlennosti," Biznes Donbass, 24 May 1996. The plan envisions the creation of 34 holding companies and 60 stock companies.

\textsuperscript{38} "Bolshe pravitel’stvo na koleni ne postavliaet," (Interview with Vasyl Durdynets' by Valentina Symonenko), Kievskie vedomosti, 23 August 1996. See also "Ukraine Announces Plan to Close Unprofitable Coal Producers," Financial Times, 12 May.

\textsuperscript{39} Jill Barshay and Matthew Kaminski, "Ukraine to boost coal imports and exports" Financial Times, 10 August 1994.
that a Soviet, workers' identity was the dominant one in the Donbass at the outset of Perestroika. A clear-cut ethnic identity did not find fertile soil in the region because of large-scale immigration and various social disruptions. A recent study by American scholars has examined worker identity in post-independence Donbass.\(^{40}\) Obviously, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the establishment of a Ukrainian state make a Soviet identity rooted in workers' pride rather anachronistic. But it is the coming economic transformation which is perhaps the greatest threat to the Stakhanovite identity and traditions of the Donbass: as the Ukrainian economy gradually modernises, far fewer workers will be employed in the coal industry, and in heavy industry in general.\(^{41}\) Donets'k's newest monument is perhaps an indication of the emerging post-Soviet identity of the new business class: in August of 1996 a monument to John Hughes, the entrepreneur and founder of the city was unveiled.

Predictions of unemployment in the Donbass following the complete re-structuring of the region's industry is estimated at from 300-400,000. The effect on small communities dependent on closed mines would obviously be catastrophic. Valentin Nikitenko, a mine worker for 54 years, when faced with the imminent closure of his mine, and the devastation of his small community, had this to say: "I plan to work until the very end — And then I'll cry. After that, I don't know what I'll do."\(^{42}\)


A further strike in the summer of 1996 appears to have been the dying gasp of the militant workers' movement in the region. 70 of 227 mines went on strike, which is not as many as in the February 1996 strikes, but illustrative of the new level of desperation, miners actually blocked road and rail traffic into and out of Donets'k.

In the aftermath of the strike, the leader of the Donets'k Strike Committee, Mikhail Krylov, was arrested and taken to Kharkiv for a trial, on the grounds of disturbing the public order, for his role in organising the road blockages. Another accusation levelled against Krylov is that he was financed by then governor Volodymyr Shcherban' to organise the strike. At first glance one might think that the business elite, as represented by the Liberal Party, and the coal miners, as represented by the Donets'k Strike Committee, would have little common ground. It appears, however, that their mutual desire for maximum influence over Kiev, led these two groups into a tacit alliance. It is no coincidence that

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45 Shakhtery blokiruiut' dorogi", Kievskie vedomosti, 10 July 1996; "Raskol'nik" iz Donetskogo stachkoma razduvaiut konfrontatsiu s pravitel'stvom," Kievskie vedomosti, 30 July 1996.
the clamp down on the Liberal elite (Volodymyr Shcherban', then leader of the Liberal Party after Markulov and Soskyn) and the coal mining elite (Vladimir Krylov) in the summer of 1996 took place almost simultaneously. According to an analyst with the L'viv newspaper Post Postup, Ihor Markulov, the founder of the Liberals, had aimed to follow the winning formula of Iukhim Zviahil's'kyi: organise a strike, and then, by helping to suppress it, gain the position of premier. Markulov was reportedly very popular among the miners. Shcherban', in turn, was regarded as a "half-god" by them. One of the accusations levelled against Shcherban' by First-Vice Premier Durdynets', was that the Donets'k governor was sponsoring the strikers in the tradition of his predecessors, as a way of advancing his own political capital. The government clamp down, initiated shortly after the new governor was installed, also included proceedings at the Donets'k oblast arbitration court to disband the Strike Committee altogether.

In the summer of 1996, as part of Kiev's clamp down on Donets'k, a large investigation was inaugurated into corruption and misuse of funds by Donbass directors, which the investigators described as "limitless." Governor Shcherban' was accused of turning a blind eye to this abuse. Shcherban' retaliated by denouncing the investigation as a witch hunt, and claiming that any apparent misuse was more a result of confusion regarding accounting practices. The Liberal Party of Ukraine’s

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50 "Shakhtery soshli s rel'sov i okazalis' v roli strelochnika" Biznes Donbass. 28(55), 15-21 August 1996.
newspaper, Vzgliad, suggested that the removal of Shcherban' had more to do with the desire of Lazarenko and his group to rid themselves of a potential Presidential candidate. At this time a purge of mine directors, with 12 General Directors and 86 other directors sacked. Following the many successive waves of strikes, the quality of directors gradually deteriorated, as new managers with little administrative experience were appointed. The report claimed high levels of incompetence among these directors. According to Durdynets', as of summer 1996, only 18 of 276 mines were working in a stable manner.

Organised Crime in Donbass:

The first episode which truly awakened the Donbass to the severity of organised crime was the murder of Aleksandr Bragin, the popular owner of the football club Shaktior, and chairman of the company Luxe, one of the city's largest commercial firms, on 16 October 1995. The method of the assassination was especially alarming: a bomb was exploded at the stadium, killing numerous innocent bystanders. Bragin had been a controversial public figure, and a year and a half earlier had survived an assassination attempt. He had also been under investigation for fraud by local authorities.

Durdynets', a main force behind the 1996 clamp down on the Donets'k region, argues that the Donbass always played a special role in Ukraine's criminal life:

It has long been known that in the criminal sphere it is precisely the Donbass which is the most difficult to deal

51 Shcherban replied to these accusations in the following interview: "Ia ukhozhu s gordo podriatoi golovoi," Vzgliad, 28(123), August 1996.
with. There are other areas of elevated criminal activity — Crimea, Odessa, Zaporizhzhia and Kiev, and in the West L'viv. But the Donbass is the most difficult in this regard. Among the objective reasons are the difficulty of work and the huge density of the population — 5.5 million people. Plus the "opportunities" for underhanded deals that coal offers. Plus the sea-port of Mariupol'. Plus the absence of strict authority over the past seven years. So, all of the bandit formations have settled there.\(^5\)

Durdynets' comments imply that Shcherban', as well as his predecessors failed to govern with "strict control." The Vice-Premier declared that as in the summer of 1996, a major anti-crime campaign had been launched. Yet, at another level, what appears to be taking place is a pre-emptive strike by the Dnipropetrovs'k dominated group in Kiev against the potential threat of the Donets'k political and economic clan.

**Politics As Clan Warfare: Donets'k Vs. Dnipropetrovs'k:**

The leadership of the so called "Donets'k clan" — the political and economic elite alleged to control the region — has belonged to two men who, although they claim to be unrelated, carried the same surname. Volodymyr Petrovych Shcherban', who eventually rose to the position of "governor" of Donets'k, was born in 1950 in the town of Artemivs'k, Luhans'k oblast. In December 1992 he became deputy head of Donets'k City Executive Committee, and in 1995 he was elected as chairman of the oblast Soviet. Shcherban' also founded a company called "Delo vsekh" (Everyone's Business). The main thoroughfare in Donets'k, Artem Street, is dominated by shops bearing the "Delo vsekh" logo. Donets'k residents

\(^5\) "Bol'she pravitel'stvo na koleni ne postavliaet" Kievskie vedomosti, 23 August 1996.
frequently mutter about this association's control of the city and refer to Shcherban' and his group as the local "Cosa Nostra."54

The other Shcherban', Yevhen Aleksandrovych, was born in 1946 in Kharkiv oblast into a Ukrainian family with eleven children. In 1958 his family moved to Donets'k. After working for some years as a miner, he rose to the position of deputy director of a coal-mine, while studying economics part-time. In 1988 he established one of the first cooperatives in Donets'k, and then became the president of the international conglomerate "Aton," which includes the metallurgical complex "Azovstal;" the industrial trust "Azot," "Melitopolprodmash" and companies in the USA, Great Britain, France, Baltic states and Russia. Both Volodymyr and Yevhen Shcherban' were elected as deputies in the 1994 parliamentary elections.

While the dismissal of Volodymyr Shcherban' was the first strike from the Dnipropetrovs'k clan against the Donets'k clan, the assassination of Yevhen Shcherban' on 3 November 1996, in broad daylight at Donets'k airport, was regarded by Ukrainian political observers as a finishing touch and final strike against its chief rival. According to Vladimir Kornilov, there is an alternative theory circulating in Donets'k that Yevhen Shcherban' was about to make peace with the Dnipropetrovs'k clan and was assassinated by his former Donets'k allies for betraying them. He had numerous enemies and it is also possible that other business dealings may have been his downfall.55

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55 Letter from Dmitrii Kornilov to author, 5 December 1996.
The new Liberal Party faction (Social-Market Choice) leader, Yevhen Marchuk, was very blunt in his estimation of the murder: "It is a political killing. It shows that Ukraine, despite the many steps it has made to reform, still has much to do in terms of democratisation." The killers, dressed in uniforms of the Ukrainian armed forces, presented Interior Ministry identification to gain access to the airport. They were not impeded when driving onto the tarmac, and Shcherban's body-guards made no effort to protect him when the assassins shot the politician as he left the plane.\textsuperscript{56} Volodymyr Shcherban' flew in from the United States to attend the funeral, and scarcely made an effort to conceal the bullet proof vest he was wearing. Significantly the newly appointed Governor of the oblast, Poliakov, did not attend the funeral, and refused to comment on the murder in an interview with the local press that took place a few days afterwards.\textsuperscript{57} Perhaps even more than the alleged attempt on Lazarenko's life, this assassination demonstrates that in Ukraine politics and politicians represent the interests of economic clans who have scant respect for democracy and human life.

Dnipropetrovs'k economic clans, led by President Kuchma, control most of the Ukrainian government: the Prime Minister, Lazarenko, the national security minister, industry and agriculture ministries, are all run by Soviet-era politicians from Dnipropetrovs'k. According to the Ukraine Centre for Political Research there are 204 appointees from the city in the national government, including 55 in top-ranking positions.\textsuperscript{58} This Dnipropetrovs'k clan, which has made an effort

\textsuperscript{56} "National Deputy Yevhen Shcherban killed in gangland-style hit in Donetsk," \textit{Ukrainian Weekly} 45, 10 November 1996.
\textsuperscript{57} Letter from Gregory Nemiria, Centre of Political Studies, Donets'k State University to Taras Kuzio 11 November 1996.
to win allies in Western Ukraine by paying lip service to the national idea, has been in battle with Donets’k clans. Ironically, while at first it appeared that the election of Kuchma would politically empower the East, including the Donbass, it appears that the Donbass has been even further barred from the corridors of power in Kiev under Kuchma. The struggle between these powerful East Ukrainian based economic clans has further undermined the possibility of a united East Ukrainian front which could provide a strong alternative vision of the country to that proposed by Western Ukraine.

In vying for political control, and in competition with the still popular Communists, it is only natural that various political forces in the South and East have looked for allies or patrons in Kiev. Thus, the Liberal party of Donets’k has adopted a neutral attitude towards Russia and the Ukrainian national idea, while the Party of Economic Renaissance of Crimea (PEVK) has worked consistently to support the status quo of Ukrainian control over Crimea. The current patterns of alliances and competitions has managed thus far to neutralise pro-Russian sympathies in the East and South, and perhaps even allowed the passing of a new Constitution. Yet, the risk is that continued corruption will eventually create a social explosion, or at least a pathological popular attitude towards the Ukrainian national idea, Ukraine’s statehood and its national institutions. This attitude is already apparent in Crimea. Senior members of US President Clinton’s administration who have studied the situation in Ukraine expressed concerns that the Dnipropetrovs'k clan is impeding the transition to a market economy. Sherman Garett, a former deputy assistant of defence in the Clinton administration, characterised the clan's influence as "bloodsucking":


This group from Dnipropetrovs'k is choking off benefits that should be trickling down to normal folks by lining their own pockets...They are prolonging the agony of change that Ukraine is trying to make by a systematic looting of assets.\textsuperscript{59}

Perhaps the most distressing event in Ukrainian politics since independence was the alleged assassination attempt on the Ukrainian Prime Minister, Lazarenko, on 16 July 1996, when a bomb exploded near his motorcade.\textsuperscript{60} Lazarenko was apparently about to fly to Donets'k to deal with the coal mining crisis, and later made veiled accusations that the Donbass coal interests and Volydymyr Shcherban' had ordered the attack in revenge for the firing of the corrupt Security Service chief of the \textit{oblast}, and for his attempts to bring order to the industry. Shcherban' immediately declared that the entire episode was a political show, while other observers suggested that the attack may have been related to Lazarenko's own commercial interests as one of the country's richest men.\textsuperscript{61} A few weeks later, at the initiative of Lazarenko, Shcherban' was fired from his position as Governor of Donets'k, allegedly for sponsoring and organising the coal strike, and for allowing rampant corruption in the industry. This development was widely perceived as a decisive blow by the Dnipropetrovs'k clan against its rival Donets'k clan.\textsuperscript{62}

\textbf{Political Parties & Movements in Donets'k:}

\textsuperscript{59} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{60} "Bomb hits Prime Minister's Car," \textit{Kiev Post} 18-24 July 1996.
\textsuperscript{61} Viktor Slezko and Mikhail Beletskii, "Vzryv na Rybal'skom: preduprezhdzenie mafii ili popytka ustranit politicheskuiu figuru?" \textit{Kievske vedomosti}, 18 July 1996.
Andrew Wilson and Artur Bilorus, in a 1993 paper, claimed that the Ukrainian party system was informed by ideologies and did not yet represent distinct social groups. Prior to the 1994 Ukrainian elections, Taras Kuzio also argued that Ukrainian parties "claim to speak for the interests of particular social groups [but], as yet they represent only activist networks or circles of friends." Ralph Clem, an American researcher, argues that, as of 1995, "the conventional wisdom on the lack of social support for political parties is out of date" Instead, Clem claims that the Ukrainian party system was "overcoming potential mass/elite and regional cleavages and developing into a well-differentiated system with a growing social base." In short, Clem argues that the party system in Ukraine is now on the path towards the creation of liberal democracy. Clem is certainly correct in pointing out that Ukrainian parties now represent certain economic groups. The Liberal Party of Ukraine, for example, is clearly the party of the so-called "New Ukrainians." Unfortunately, by focusing on surveys of party supporters and party activists, Clem has missed the broader picture: support for parties among the electorate as a whole is extraordinarily low. Many of the parties Clem studied in Donets’k, such as the Liberal Party, for example, failed to win a single mandate. As illustrated in Figure 6a, percent of all survey respondents were unwilling to express support for any

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65 Clem, The Life of the Parties, p. 135.
66 Ibid.
major political orientation. Only 3.2 percent of Donets'k residents regard themselves as Liberals, 8.5 percent regard themselves as Social democrats. Moreover, the same survey found that 61.7 percent of Donets'k residents did not trust political parties in general. The very word "party" is popularly associated with "The Party" (i.e., Communist Party), and is therefore regarded with suspicion by non-Communists. President Kuchma, in his New Year Address to the Ukrainian nation is also unready to embrace Clem's optimistic scenario for political life in the country:

First of all, I wish to say that parties will become influential when our society becomes structured. Our society is currently amorphous and it is not clear who makes up the electorate of many parties. Only supporters of extreme left and perhaps extreme right parties are more or less known. Therefore, so far all other parties in Ukraine represent either sector or clan interests, or else are oriented toward the people at the helm.

The same survey also demonstrates that Southern and Eastern Ukrainians do not have a very high level of faith that the state they live in will continue to exist as an independent country. As the previous discussion of political clans has illustrated, and the discussion of Crimean politics will also illustrate, it is far too early to begin to declare that Ukraine is on the path to a liberal-democratic system. In fact, a fruitful area of future analysis would be a comparison of Ukraine with developing countries in Africa and Asia, where the interconnection

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68 Politicheskie partii, dvizhenia, obshchestvennye organizatsii, pp. 3-4.
between various economic clans and Mafiosi is an institutionalised feature of the political landscape.\textsuperscript{70}

Western Ukraine has at least some historical memory of party politics from the time of the late Austrian Empire and Polish occupation. It is therefore not surprising that political parties are somewhat stronger in the Western part of the country. In the East and South, however, there is a popular scepticism directed towards all parties. Not only is there a large proliferation of political parties (14 in Donets'k oblast, as of 1994), but there is a large number of independent candidates. Indeed, the highest number of candidates for the office of Deputy of Parliament (562) were registered in Donets'k of all oblasti in Ukraine.\textsuperscript{71} Moreover, surveys of public opinion suggest that, relative to other regions of Ukraine, the population of the Donbass is the most supportive of dictatorial methods and the use of force to "restore order" in society.\textsuperscript{72} As Theodore H. Friedgut observed in 1991, in his analysis of political life in Donets'k, fragmentation, rather than pluralism, is the best characterisation of political life in Donets'k:

There is a lack of historical precedent as well as a near-total absence of personal experience of legitimate, pluralist

\textsuperscript{70} This idea was suggested by Peter Duncan of the School of Slavonic & East European Studies, London.

\textsuperscript{71} 312 of these candidates were nominated by voters, 160 by work collectives, and 98 by political parties. BBC-SWB 07 March 1994, SU 1939.D[20].

politics in Donets'k. Parties are small, undefined, and unstable.\textsuperscript{73}

While parties have improved in terms of financing or organisation since 1991, Friedgut's characterisation remains largely true to this day. Nonetheless, certain parties and movements, such as the Liberal Party of Ukraine, or the party of Labour (both of which were founded in the city), are worth examining, if not for their present strength in the oblast or in the national parliament, but because they represent the interests of important social classes or groups. Other parties, such as the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN) and the Civic Congress of Ukraine (GKU) are worth examining purely because they represent a distinct ethnic and ideological orientation, and have a considerable public profile. Public organisations, not registered as parties, such as the city Strike Committee, the International Movement of the Donbass (IDD), the Prosvita Ukrainian language society, also warrant examination because of their influence on public life.

The only party in the oblast which has consistently demonstrated its ability to win office is the Communist Party of Ukraine. In the Donbass, of forty-two deputies elected to the Supreme Rada in 1994, 23 were Communists. The Socialist Party, the Civic Congress of Ukraine, the Peasant Party and the Labour Party of Ukraine obtained only one seat a piece.

This section will consider the most fundamental attitudes of parties towards the ideal state-structure for the country (i.e., federal state versus

unitary state), towards Ukraine's independence and its role in the CIS. The following 5 point guide to evaluation of parties, suggested by the Ukrainian Institute of Strategic Studies provides a useful starting point for such an analysis:

1) The party or movement's relationship to the idea of an independent Ukraine.
2) Its attitude towards the period when Ukraine was part of the USSR.
3) Its attitude towards the present Russian state and the CIS.
4) The type of state structure, organisation of power, and political "regime" favoured by the movement (i.e. Federalism vs. Unitary state, Presidential vs. Soviet power).
5) Its attitude towards a free-market economy.\textsuperscript{74}

First, however, the unofficial referendum held in the Donbass during the last parliamentary elections will be examined as it illustrates popular attitudes towards some of the major political issues of the region.

\textbf{Donbass Referendum:}

As the survey of Donets'k political parties which follow will demonstrate, virtually every major movement in the \textit{oblast} favours the following main proposals: 1) official status for the Russian language
2) Some form of closer economic or political ties with Russia or the countries of the CIS
3) A federal organisation of the Ukrainian state, along with local self-government. In 1994, the International Movement of the Donbass (discussed below) lobbied successfully to have a "consultative" question inserted on the ballot during the parliamentary elections.\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{74} Politcheskie partii, dvizhenia, obshchestvennye organizatsii, pp. 3-4.
elections. The first question asked citizens whether they agreed that on the territory of Donets'k Oblast Russian should be used "alongside the Ukrainian language" at work, in business and administration, and in science and education. The second question enquired whether Russian should be recognised alongside Ukrainian as the state language of the republic. Voters were also asked whether they supported the adoption of a federal system for Ukraine. Finally, they were asked whether they favoured Ukraine's signature of the CIS Charter, and its becoming a full-fledged member of the CIS economic union and Inter parliamentary assembly. All of these questions were also asked to Luhans'k voters, with the exception of the one on federalism. In Donets'k 87.1 (Luhans'k: 90.4 percent) responded yes to the first question on the functioning of the Russian language as a "second state language" 2) 80 percent of Donets'k voters supported the federal organisation of the Ukrainian state. The use of Russian "alongside Ukrainian" in work, administration, documentation, education and science" was supported by 88.9 percent of voters (90.9 percent in Luhans'k). Finally, full membership in the CIS economic union was supported by 88.7 percent of Donets'k voters, and 90.7 percent of Luhans'k voters.75 While the "consultative" referendum in the Donbass had no official status, it did represent a propaganda victory for the local political movements, the vast majority of which support the aims implicitly supported by the referenda.

It is interesting to note that a survey taken in May-June 1993 regarding the future state structure of Ukraine found that over half of the population (53 percent) of the Donbass had no view on the issue, and only 21 percent supported the idea of federalism at that time. A further sociological survey conducted throughout Eastern and Southern Ukraine in 1994 found that the language issue was not a major priority for the vast majority of voters, with the exception of the literary intelligentsia. This suggests that the local intelligentsia, via the media, together with political activists are able to successfully generate popular support for their agenda, an agenda which does not necessarily coincide in terms of priorities with that of the general population.

**Liberal Party of Ukraine:**

The fiercely pro-market Liberal Party of Ukraine is the self-declared party of Ukraine's incipient middle class. Founded in Donets'k by the flamboyant local businessman Ihor Markulov, the party boasted over 60,000 members in the *oblast* alone by 1996. It also has the strongest youth organisation of any party in the region. Although the Liberals did poorly in the 1994 parliamentary elections, they had a success by proxy with the election of Volodymyr Shcherban', who was backed by them during the election. As noted, Shcherban' later became leader of the Liberal Party, but resigned from the party leadership after he

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was removed from his position as governor, in order (so he claimed at the time) not to damage the party's re-election chances.\footnote{In 1994 the Supreme Rada passed a law that the Chairperson of each local soviet would be elected by popular ballot, to counterbalance the power of the local presidential representative (officially called Head of Regional State Administration). In July 1995 President Kuchma issued a decree which unified these two positions. Victor Tkachuk, "President Pushes For Real Power" UPRESA Weekly-Analysis, (Internet Service) Nov. 1995.}

It appears that the LPU is hesitant to take advantage of local pro-Russian sympathies because they fear that such a policy would only play into the hands of those who want not just cultural, but old-style economic ties with Russia, such as a revived command economy. The example of Belarus' simultaneously pro-Russian, pro-Communist and anti-reform leadership is a striking warning to them of the perils of allying with pro-Russian forces in Ukraine, such as the quasi-Communist Citizens' Congress of Ukraine (GKU). The Liberals have thus far regarded the main political enemy as the Communist Party of Ukraine; all their energies have been directed against it. Given the Liberals' social base of entrepreneurs and directors, they are not particularly interested in issues relating to national identity. For them such questions are largely irrelevant to the main, economic problem of securing the conditions for the growth of a free market. Ironically, instead of leading to plans for a presumably rational economic and political union with Russia, at this stage their liberal ideology puts them in the anti-union camp together with the nationalist defenders of independence. Therefore, the main base of defence of Ukrainian independence in Eastern Ukraine is that portion of the former-communist elite which has transformed itself into a new business elite.
The Liberal Party's national policy has illustrated the inconsistency of the party's national orientation. They originally courted local pro-Russian politicians, who were capable of stirring up anti-Kiev and pro-Moscow sympathies. At one point, they even courted Dmitrii Kornilov, the pro-Russian editor, as a possible candidate for their party.\(^79\) However, the Liberals gradually adopted an alternative strategy which recognised that without an alliance with Western Ukrainian reformers, they were simply too weak on the ground in the Sovietised Donbass to advance reform at the national level. The culmination of this new strategy was the election of Shcherban's predecessor, Oleksandr Soskyn, a mildly nationalistic figure, to the head of the party. However, the East Ukrainian intelligentsia was not very comfortable with Soskyn's nationalism, or his excessively academic image; this led to his early resignation in May of 1995, after only two and a half months in office.\(^80\)

In October 1996, Yevhen Marchuk (who had been dismissed by Kuchma as Prime Minister in May and replaced with Pavlo Lazarenko) succeeded Shcherban' as leader of the Liberals' 24 deputy strong Social Market Choice faction in the parliament. Marchuk declared his candidacy for the 1999 Ukrainian presidential elections, and is probably the leading candidate who will oppose Kuchma, who has also vowed to run again.\(^81\) His candidacy offers the Donbass elite the greatest chance yet to take control over some of the levers of power in Kiev. It is, in fact, not inconceivable that an electoral alliance between Western

\(^79\) Author's interview with Dmitrii Kornilov (Donets'k, 17 March 1995).


\(^81\) "Marchuk stane liderom deputats'koi fraktsii," Radio Lux Information Service (Lviv) 2 October 1996; Chrystyna Lapychak, "Former Ukrainian Premier Plans Presidential Bid." OMRI Daily Digest, 192, 3 October 1996.
Ukrainian national-democrats and the Donbass Liberals will emerge, as these are the only two forces capable of competing with the Dnipropetrovs'k "party of power."

**All-Ukrainian Party of Labour:**

While the Liberal Party of Ukraine represents the new business elite, and accordingly favours unrestrained economic reforms, the *Vseukrainskaia partiia truda* (VPT) (All-Ukrainian Party of Labour), popularly known as the "party of red directors," is somewhat ambivalent about economic reforms. Valentyn Landyk, the director of "Nord", an enormous refrigerator enterprise in Donets'k, is the leader of the party. As its unofficial label suggests, the party is dominated by directors of state and recently privatised enterprises. 63 of 320 delegates at its founding conference were enterprise directors; a further 142 delegates were technical specialists from such enterprises. The Donets'k oblast branch of the party is the largest oblast branch in Ukraine, with 2,000 members. While the party officially supports privatisation and a free-market economy, it also opposes a rapid pace of reforms, using such code-words as "social oriented economy" and "mixed economy" in its official pronouncements, after the fashion of Kravchuk. The party claims that economic prosperity is impossible without a strategic alliance with Russia. It has also favoured regional autonomy within a federal Ukrainian state, and supports official status for the Russian language. The party put forward 12 candidates in 1994 parliamentary elections, but only 2 obtained mandates. The VPT also has one member in the Donets'k oblast Soviet.\(^{82}\)

\(^{82}\) *Politicheskie partii, dvizhenia, obshchestvennye organizatsii*, pp. 8-9.
Communist Party:

Without a doubt the dominant political force in the Donets’k remains the Communist Party. Twenty-three of its candidates in the 1994 elections were elected deputies to the Supreme Rada. Another 14 were elected to the oblast Soviet. In Russia the Communist Party has offered up a potent combination of Russian nationalism, and nostalgia for the days of cheap sausages. By contrast, the Donbass-centred Communist Party has lambasted Ukrainian nationalism, while appealing to the same nostalgia. In the statements of the Communist Party of Ukraine, the patriotism of the "Soviet person" is regularly appealed to. In the Donbass this is a shrewd tactic since this part of the country identifies most strongly with the territory of the former Soviet Union, and desires the revival of the USSR more keenly than in any other part of Ukraine, with Crimea following closely in second place. In the following statement by the Ukrainian First Secretary, Symonenko, at the Second Congress of Peoples of the USSR (13 December 1994), the "Soviet people" are presented as something akin to an ethnic group:

Dear Comrades! In the name of all Soviet people living in Ukraine, permit me to pass on a warm Ukrainian greeting (...) The striving for brotherhood, co-operation, and good-neighbourliness will always define all those who carried, carry, and will carry in their hearts the world-famous, great and proud name of Soviet Person.

83 Politychnyi portret Ukrainy, No. 9, 1994, p. 57.
84 "Ideia Soiuza zhivet i nabiraet silu" Komunist, 40 (Dec 1994), p. 2. (Speech of P.N. Symonenko, 1st Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine at the 2nd Congress of the Peoples of the USSR)
Symonenko, a Donets'k Rada deputy, freely declares his support for the restoration of the Soviet Union. He envisions this occurring gradually with the legal re-establishment of Soviet power in each of the former Soviet republics.

The leader of the oblast branch of the Communist party, Georgii Vladimirovich Buiko, unabashedly kindles nostalgia for the Soviet days. Contrasting the terrible condition of the city today — with its streets dark at night for lack of electricity, shoddy kiosks, and muddy streets running with water — to the "city of roses" that Donets'k was in Soviet times, he appeals to the fond memories of pensioners who undeniably lived better before Ukrainian independence.\(^{85}\)

On 18 March 1995, a public rally was held to commemorate the fourth anniversary of the referendum of 1991, in which Ukrainians voted in favour of preserving the Soviet Union. The Communists of course ignored that they also voted, at the same time, for the approval of Ukraine's declaration of state sovereignty. The rally brought together all political forces aiming to revive the Soviet Union, and was co-sponsored by the Communists, together with the GKU, and Movement for the Re-establishment of the Soviet Union. Not surprisingly, the rally commenced with the singing of the Soviet anthem. Buiko of the Communists began the rally by speaking of the great tragedy that befell the "Soviet People" when the Soviet Union was "artificially" destroyed by political forces from within. After attacking those who abandoned the Communists in 1991, and lambasting the Ukrainian government, the IMF and the West in general, Buiko concluded with the following appeal:

\(^{85}\) G. Buiko, "Donchane pod igom reform", Tovarysh, 2(120) (January 1995), p. 2)
"Long live the Soviet Union, long live the working Donbass, inside a multi-faceted, diverse Soviet Union." Taking advantage of East Ukrainian suspicion towards Western Ukrainians, the reformer Vice Premier Victor Pílenzyk was mockingly referred to by several speakers at this rally as "Pan (lord)" Pílenzyk, as if to suggest that West Ukrainians are Poles rather than true, Soviet Ukrainians, and that the Galicians are lords over the East Ukrainians.

While such rallies might be seen as demonstrating the strength of the USSR restorationist movement, they actually demonstrate its long-term weakness: with the exception of a handful of embarrassed looking Komsomol members, and a handful of young journalists from the local press, the entire assembled crowd were middle-aged or pensioners age. Aside from utter indifference, the attitude of the young towards such gatherings may be summed up by the remarks of an 18-year-old journalist, who reported on the events a few days later: "...the fact that their train left long ago, and that there is no way back, has utterly failed to enter the heads of the Bolsheviks."

In contrast to the relatively less dogmatic Communist deputies from Central Ukraine, only 3 of 22 Communist Deputies from the Donbass voted for the Constitution, which they branded a corrupt product of Western capitalist influence, bourgeois nationalism and criminal structures. Of those Donbass Communist deputies who voted for the constitution, one had previously defected to the Liberals' Social Market

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86 Author's recording of Speech by G. Buiiko at Rally in Lenin Square, Donets'k, 18 March 1995.
88 Komunist Donbass, 8, 31 July 1996.
Choice faction. The firing of Donets'k governor Shcherban' was welcome to the Communists, as he was the main anti-communist force in the oblast. The newspaper Post-postup declared that the question of whether the Donbass will revert to a communist oasis rested on the shoulders of the new governor.89

**Strike Committee:**

While the Communist Party continues to claim to speak on behalf of the "working Donbass," the miners' representatives have long since abandoned the Communists. When the Communist and Socialist Parties set up a new Union, the All-Ukrainian Union of Workingmen, the Strike Committee made clear its hostility to the new organisation, and refuses to co-operate with its activities.90 The most politically influential workers' organisation in the Donbass has thus far been the Regional Union of Strike Committees of the Donbass (RSSKD), although, as noted the Donets'k oblast arbitration court launched proceedings to ban the Committee. The RSSKD was established in August of 1989, during the first major strike of Soviet coal miners. The Donets'k city branch of the organisation, led by M.A. Krylov, was one of the first public organisations in the city to demand official status for the Russian language. Since 1992, the RSSKD has officially supported federalism for Ukraine.

Although the organisation has frequently denounced Ukrainian nationalist extremists, it is also hesitant to be manipulated by pro-Russian

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politicians, such as Baziliuk. It appears, moreover, that the organisation's stand towards the national question has moderated. In January of 1994 Krylov observed that: "We don't really want to be separated from Russia, we want to reconstruct a Slavic State." By early 1995, Krylov was stressing that the miners' calls for federalism and local control over their industry in no way represented a threat to Ukrainian territorial integrity. Krylov also denounced local political forces which were, he claimed, seeking to exploit the language question for their ends. For Krylov, the translation of official documents from Ukrainian to Russian was costly and time-consuming for the miners: "It's a question, I would say, of a strictly technical character."

The major concern of the miners is the payment of overdue wages, and the re-organisation of the industry. The main point of contention is the Ukrainian state's Soviet style control over the industry and the marketing of coal: "We want to be masters in our own homes," he argues, paraphrasing Shevchenko. Krylov is evidently deluded into believing that the Ukrainian government has no choice but to keep open the majority of the Donbass mines, although as the recent closure demonstrate, this is clearly not the case:

It's clear that speaking of mass closure of mines is simply not serious. Ukraine has no other energy supply. If it starts massively closing mines, then Ukraine as a state will simply cease to exist.

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This perhaps explains the RSSKD propensity to resort to mass strikes as a method of negotiation with Kiev.

**Pro-Russian Political Parties In Eastern and Southern Ukraine:**

While the Communist Party and several other Left leaning parties in Donets'k appeal to the "Soviet identity", three other movements in the city are directly appealing to the Russo-Ukrainian identity hypothesised in Part II. They are the Civic Congress of Ukraine (GKU), the Party of Slavic Unity of Ukraine (PSEU), and the International Movement of the Donbass (IDD). The latter organisation is not actually a political party, but rather a lobbying organisation. While there may be some personality clashes between the various representatives of these movements, on the whole they co-operate. In March of 1993, for example, the IDD and the GKU held a joint rally under the slogan "Ukraine in the CIS."^93

**The International Movement of the Donbass (IDD):**

The International Movement (originally known as the Interfront) was initially modelled on the Latvian Interfront organisation. The first manifesto of the movement was published in the newspaper of the Latvian Interfront in August 1990. It declared the primary goal of the movement to be the struggle against all manifestations of nationalism (in practice, only manifestations of Ukrainian nationalism), and the protection of the rights of the individual (in practice, the rights of the Russian-speaking individual). The founding conference of the

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^93 Politicheskie partii, dvizhenia, obshchestvennye organizatsii, p. 43.
International Movement of the Donbass, as it was renamed, took place in November of the same year. The organisation was originally ruled by a troika, which included Dmitrii Kornilov.

Kornilov has withdrawn from active involvement in politics, but continues to propagate the views of his "pan-Slavic, or "Donbass nationalist" movement (as he calls it) through his involvement in a popular local television broadcast (hosted by his brother, Vladimir), and through the newspaper he edits, Donetskii kriazh, which may be regarded as the organ of the movement. The following extract from the 1994 New Year's edition of this publication may be taken as a mission statement:

Although we regard our Ukraine with love, and support the rebirth of its culture and traditions, at the same time we have stood against nationalism, which could be the very undoing of Ukraine's independence, and which has cast aside the most precious thing — the age-old unity of the brotherly Slavonic people...

Throughout Donetskii kriazh, the Galicians and Diaspora Ukrainians (especially those from Canada and the United States) are presented as the primary enemy of the Donbass. Not content to respect the distinct character of the Donbass population, the Galicians, together with their Diaspora accomplices, are depicted as determined to turn Donbass citizens into Galicians, and to expel the local Russian population. Statements of extremists from quasi-fascist organisations, such as the UNSO (Ukrainian Self-Defense Force), are intertwined with quotes from members of the relatively moderate Republican party and of Rukh, to

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95 Editorial by 'The Donetskii kriazh Collective', "I snova — "Zdras'te!" Donetskii kriazh no. 3(50) (21-27 January 1994), p. 1
96 See, for example, Tamara Glotova, "Galichina vystavliaet moshchnuiu komandu. A my?" Donetskii kriazh no. 5(52) (4-10 February 1994), p. 1.
give the impression that all West Ukrainians and nationalists have a pathological anti-Donbass agenda.^^

The IDD, the Civic Congress and the Party of Slavic Unity utilise common symbols and myths to promote a pan-East Slavic national consciousness in the Donbass. They rely heavily on already existing Soviet iconography, much of which is Tsarist in origin, to demonstrate the historical inseparability of the Russian and Ukrainian nations. Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi, the "unifier" of Russia and Ukraine, features prominently in the propaganda of both organisations.^^

Kornilov, although not a trained historian, has elaborated an interpretation of Ukrainian and local Donbass history which ostensibly demonstrates the eternal unity of the Russian and Ukrainian nations in Ukraine as a whole, and in particular in the Donbass. This interpretation is diametrically opposed to that interpretation presented in Petro Lavriv's Istoriia Pivdenno-skhidnoi Ukrainy, mentioned in Chapter I of this study.^^

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97 See for example, Vladimir Alekseev, "Na iazykom fronte," Donetskii kriazh no. 15(62) (15-21 April 1994), p. 4. and Dmitrii Kornilov, "Otravlennyi par: kakoi vidiat Ukrainu natsionalisty?" Donetskii kriazh no. 6(53) (11-17 February 1994, p. 2. The authors are, respectively, members of the GKU and the IDD.

98 For example, the monument to Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi in Kiev, was erected in 1888; that to Volodymyr the Great, was built in 1853. This monument is actually the official symbol of the Civic Congress. For examples of Donetskii kriazh's use of Khmel'nyts'kyi see "A ty idesh na vybory?" Donetskii kriazh no. 12(59) (25-31 March 94), p. 1; Illii Fedorovskii, "Posledniaia kliatva Bogdana," Donetskii kriazh no.5(52) (4-10 February 1994), p. 1.

According to Kornilov, the Ukrainian intelligentsia has, throughout its entire history, been divided over the question of relations with Russia. Some, such as Nikolai Gogol’, Panteleimon Kulish, Mikhail Dragomanov and Yuri Kotsiubinski, regarded Little Russia as an integral part of a greater Russia, or favoured some sort of federal arrangement with Russia. Others, such as Ivan Mazepa or Stepan Bandera (whom he pointedly puts in the same category), favoured outright independence for Ukraine. But, asks Kornilov rhetorically, "Where is the scale, with which you can determine which of these men loved their Ukraine more? On which scale can you measure which love was greater?" Thus, for Kornilov, a Little Russian is not merely a stage on the evolutionary ladder, on which Galician-Ukrainian identity is the apex, but is instead a fully-developed identity with an admirable historical pedigree. Regarding the history of the Donbass, it is no surprise to discover that Kornilov's latest project is archival research on the Donets'k-Kryvyi Rih Republic, established during the Civil War period.

While the IDD fiercely opposed Ukrainian independence during the 1991 referendum and is sceptical of the official results, it has officially moderated its anti-independence stance. It has more recently focused its energies on obtaining maximum autonomy for the Donbass within a federal Ukraine; official status for the Russian language, and closer ties with the CIS. It was in fact, the first local organisation to call for a federal structure for Ukraine. In a paper presented at a conference in Donets'k, Kornilov argues that the mixed Russian-Ukrainian identity of the local population, which distinguishes them from

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100 "Tak kto zhe bol'she liubit Ukrainu?" Donetskii kriazh, no. 90, 1994.
the Galicians, makes federalism necessary in Ukraine. The movement's greatest accomplishment is probably its role in the unofficial referendum in the Donbass described above.

**Grazhdanskii Kongress Ukrainy (Civic Congress of Ukraine)**

The Civic Congress of Ukraine is closely related in its outlook to the IDD. Where they differ is in terms of tactics. While the IDD has preferred a long-term policy of "re-awakening" Little Russian national consciousness, the Civic Congress has focused on campaigns involving maximum publicity, such as an ill-fated petition campaign designed to force a referendum on re-establishing the USSR. This campaign, launched in January 1996 at a joint press conference in Kharkiv, together with the CPU, the Socialist Party of Ukraine, and the Party of Slavic Unity, was sternly condemned by Leonid Kuchma. As Valerii Zaitsev, a Ukrainian political analyst, observes, Kuchma risked alienating Eastern and Southern Ukrainian voters with his condemnation of the campaign.

These tactics prompted Dmitrii Kornilov to label the leader of the party, Alexander Baziliuk, a "political exhibitionist." Baziliuk, a lecturer at Donets'k State University, was trained in Marxist philosophy. During the later years of Perestroika Baziliuk was vociferous in his condemnation of the Communist regime in Moscow, yet following independence he has found much common cause with Ukraine's Communists. The Civic Congress was founded in May 1992, and as of

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103 Valerii Zaitsev, "Dovkola kampanii zbyrannia pidpysiv," UNIAN-Polityka, no. 3(86), pp. 3-4.
1994, had branches in 17 oblasti and in the Crimea. Its total membership at that time was 2000 individuals, 400 of whom were in Donetsk.

The party's new programme, passed at the sixth conference in March 1996, calls for a federal structure in Ukraine, an all-Ukrainian referendum on national symbols and Russian as an official language. The programme observes that:

Progress towards democracy by political regimes in the CIS states provides the key precondition for the voluntary revival of a union state on a confederate or other basis which would guarantee the sovereignty of its members.¹⁰⁴

Like the IDD, the Civic Congress takes advantage of popular antagonism towards Galicians. It also takes advantage of popular Donbass belief that the entire Ukrainian economy revolves around the Donbass and its industry. According to a Civic Congress propaganda leaflet:

Almost all Ukrainian industry is south-east based. The larger part of it comes from here and the majority of the money is made here as well. But all of this goes to Western Ukraine. The money goes to Kiev, only about 20 percent of which returns. On the average the budget share for a Donbass resident is about 3 times less than that of a Galician resident.¹⁰⁵

In the mind of Baziliuk, there is fundamentally no difference between Ukrainians, Russians and Belarusians. They are one nation. It follows, therefore, that this East Slavic people should live in one state. His own

Russo-Ukrainian family apparently informs, or at least confirms in his mind, this interpretation:

Myself, I am half Russian and half Ukrainian. My mother is Russian and my father is Ukrainian. That is not considered inter-ethnic {marriage} ... There was one Rus': one part was, by convention, referred to as Little Rus, another White Rus', and another Great Rus'. But that was simply a convention, and nobody considers Belarus as something distinct. And when a girl is thinking about getting married to someone, the national question never comes to their mind. One simply would not think about the fact that the man is Russian and the woman Ukrainian... When people write in their passports Russian or Ukrainian, nobody ascribes any meaning to that. My brother lives in Russia, and by passport he lists himself as Ukrainian, I live in Ukraine and list myself in my passport as a Russian. According to this my brother and I are of different nationalities. So, we do not ascribe any meaning to this... 106

It is interesting to note that without any prompting Baziliuk jumps from a discussion of his parentage to a discussion of Kievan Rus', as though his own Russo-Ukrainian identity, and that of his family, is somehow directly rooted to this medieval state. While there arguably may have been one East Slavic nation at the time of Kievan Rus' (Hrushevs'kyi argued that it was in fact a proto-Ukrainian nation), its ethnic identity certainly had little in common with the current mixed identity in the East. Moreover, that Ukrainians and Russian may have been one nation at one point in history does not mean that they did not at some later stage evolve into separate peoples. Contrary to Baziliuk's and Kornilov's declarations, the current Russo-Ukrainian identity in East Ukraine is, in fact, not so much rooted in the mists of Kievan Rus' as it is in twentieth century intermarriage and modernisation. In other words, there was a process of

106 Author's interview with Aleksandr Filimonovich Baziliuk (Chairman of GKU) (7 March 1995), Donets'k.
differentiation over several centuries and of re-integration in the twentieth century.

Economic policies are of secondary importance to the Civic Congress for, according to Baziliuk, the main goal is the creation of a new union of the fraternal East Slavic people. After this is achieved the narod (nation, or people) can then decide for itself what sort of economic system, capitalist or socialist, they prefer. However, in practice, the Civic Congress has close ties with the Communists and other organisations favouring the re-establishment of the Soviet Union. For example, on 18 March 1995, Baziliuk participated in a rally in Donets'k together with the "Movement for the re-establishment of the Soviet Union" the Donets'k Communist Party, and the Donets'k Socialist Party. Also, Baziliuk is personally linked with the local "Movement for the re-establishment of the Soviet Union." By mid-1996, while there were reports that the party was growing in popularity, it was also suffering from infighting between various oblast branches. The Dnipropetrovs'k branch of the party refused to recognise Baziliuk as the leader and demanded his resignation, while the Kharkiv branch leader was sacked by the GKU's national leadership.107

Cossack Organisations in the Donbass:

While the Cossack movement in the Donbass does not represent a significant political or military force, as it arguably does in the Crimea, it is worth brief examination as it illustrates some of the difference between the Eastern and Western parts of the Donbass. The Cossack movement in

Crimea (which will be examined in the next chapter) will also provide an interesting contrast to that of Donets’k, as it illustrates the relative levels of ethnically based extremism in these regions. In both halves of the Donbass Cossacks are divided into pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian organisations. But in contrast to Luhans'k and even more to Crimea, Donets'k based Cossack organisations are moderate and preoccupied with cultural activities: they have not formed paramilitary organisations.

The historical borders between the Zaporozhian & Don Cossacks cuts through both the Donets'k and Luhans'k oblasts, and there is certainly ample material for claiming the presence of both Russian and Ukrainian Cossacks in the Donbass. Yet, above all, such organisations provide individuals with an ostensibly traditional framework in which to explore their ethnic culture, while developing fraternal, pseudo-military bonds.

The overall name for the Don Cossack Movement is the Union of Cossacks of the Don Host (Souiz kazakov Oblasti Voiska Donskogo), while the Donets'k branch is known as the Miuskogo Okruga (po Donetskoj oblasti) Oblasti Voiska Donskogo, in reference to one of the rivers which used to be the border between Ukrainian and Don Cossacks. The pro-Ukrainian Cossacks in Donets’k, founded in September 1991, are called the Kal'miuska Palanka Ukrains'koho Kosachevta, named after another river of this same border. As of 1994, there were 500 members of this organisation. According to its programme, these Ukrainian Cossacks must speak Ukrainian and make an oath to "the Cossack brotherhood and to Mother Ukraine." As supporters of Ukrainian culture, they co-operate closely with Rukh and the Prosvita
The Donets'k Cossacks, while not interested in becoming an armed formation themselves, have focused their energies on reviving the military traditions of Ukrainian Cossacks, and have offered supplementary military training for men in the Ukrainian National Guard. In August 1993 the Ukrainian and Don Cossacks in Donets’k issued a joint decree declaring that the relations between the two organisation would "be based on the traditions of Cossack brotherhood, mutual-understanding and non-interference in internal affairs." These Donets'k Don Cossacks also declared their intention to avoid any activities which would undermine Ukraine's borders.

By contrast, the Russian and Ukrainian Cossacks in neighbouring Luhans'k oblast have repeatedly made bombastic declarations, and presented themselves as militants. According to one report, the Don Cossacks were even armed with tanks, and have frequently patrolled streets as an unofficial police force. They have demanded a federal structure for Ukraine, state bilingualism, and dual-citizenship. Significantly, they also declared an oath of loyalty to Russia, which illustrates the continued appeal of the Tsar & Cossack myth. The Luhans'k 'Zaporozhian' Cossacks, in turn, are closely linked to the outlawed ultra-nationalist UNSO/UNA (Ukrainian Self-Defense Force-Ukrainian National Assembly. In contrast to other Ukrainian nationalist organisations, the UNSO/UNA has sought to create a nationalist ideology that did not require "pure" Ukrainians; they argue that there are too few

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of them left for such a nationalism to succeed. Instead, they argue for a new pan-Slavic Ukrainian nationalism which would replace Kiev with Moscow as the imperial capital of a new East Slavic super-state. Given the ethnic climate of the Donbass, such a pan-Slavic Ukrainian nationalism has its advantages over traditional Ukrainian nationalism, which may explain their relative success in the East.\textsuperscript{110}

In a March 1995 rally, the leader of the Luhans'k organisation of Ukrainian Cossacks (Verhuns'ka slobods'ka palanka), Mykola Durakov, railed against the "anti-Ukrainian" forces of the oblast, called for the state Procurator to bring charges against those supporting the referendum on union with Russia, and demanded the banning of the Communist Party, the Socialist Party, the Citizens' Congress and even the Pushkin Russian Language Society.\textsuperscript{111}

**Pro-Ukrainian Organisations in Donets’k:**

One of the interesting features of Ukrainian nationalism in Eastern Ukraine is its propensity towards extremism. Perhaps because it is such an apparently hopeless and exotic cause in these Russo-Soviet regions, the movement tends to attracted some of the most fanatical elements from East Ukrainian society. There is in fact a tradition to this: Dmytro Dontsov, the virulent anti-Russian ideological pioneer of Ukrainian integral nationalism was an East Ukrainian.\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{110} Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s*, pp. 77-78.
\textsuperscript{112} For a biography of Dontsov see Mykhailo Sosnovs'kyi, *Dmytro Dontsov: Politychnyi portret*. (New York: Trident International, 1974).
The leading light of Ukrainian nationalism in Donets'k is the "Banderite" Mariia Oliinyk, leader of the East Ukrainian regional organisation of the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN). Oliinyk is originally from Western Ukraine, but she spent much of her life in Siberia. Oliinyk publishes the newspaper *Banderivets*, described above.

The KUN recognises that the urban Donets'k residents and the older generation of "Sovky" (derogatory term to describe the Homo Sovieticus) are beyond reach for the nationalists. Thus the focus of the Ukrainian nationalists in the Donbass is the younger generation — specifically those living in the as yet "unsullied" rural areas. The KUN has organised several propaganda crusades dedicated to raising the national consciousness of young Donbass residents. Typical of them was a school trip which sent hundreds of students to the Ukrainian Carpathians to show them the "real" Ukraine.

The extremist Ukrainian nationalist organisation Ukrainian National Assembly/Ukrainian National Self-Defence (UNA/UNSO) has had some success in attracting support, especially among radical Ukrainian youths in Luhans'k and even among miners, radicalised by increasing poverty. The UNA/UNSO has made it its policy to disrupt communist rallies in Luhans'k and has regularly taken advantage of strikes and workers' disturbances to advance their popularity.

Yet while Ukrainian nationalists have had some propaganda successes in Eastern Ukraine, they are unlikely to play a major role in the region. The core of Ukrainian ultra-nationalism is an intense anti-

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113 "Support for nationalists grows in reaction to arrests," BBC-SWB, 07 March 1994, SU/1939 D/10;
114 Heorhiy Larin, "Ukrainian Left Shows No Red Faces."
Russian bias, rooted in the ideology of Dontsov, which has little
resonance in a population which feels attracted to both Russian and
Ukrainian culture. Moderate Ukrainian nationalists have had little
success in the region either, in part because the ultra-nationalists have
discredited all nationalist parties with their extremism, but also because
of a popular tendency to blame the so-called “national democrats” for the
collapse of the Ukrainian economy under Kravchuk. Most importantly,
the new business elite in Eastern Ukraine has preferred to finance locally
based parties such as the Liberal Party and the Regional Bloc of Reforms
which it can then influence.

CONCLUSION:

At the beginning of this century the industrial workers of the
Donbass were often recent migrants, more peasant than worker. By the
end of the Soviet era, however, at least one aspect of the regional identity
was fixed and unambiguous — the Soviet, working class identity,
symbolised by Stakhanov. The demise of the Soviet state has revealed
transitional and mixed ethnic identification. For the still dominant
Communists, and the pro-Russian movements, appeals to a "Soviet" or
"Little Russian" identity indicate that the politics of national identity does
in fact exist in the region. Parties that have stressed a purely Ukrainian
identity have had little success. For the new business elite, the national
issue is irrelevant, but they are willing to pay lip service to the Ukrainian
national idea as a strategic move against their primary enemies, the
Communists. Unless a new generation begins to identify with the social
message of the Communists, the Communist Party is unlikely to have a
major long-term role, as its support is based on an ageing generation
which is rapidly passing away. Moreover, where it has taken firm control
of affairs, as in Luhans’k oblast, it has discredited itself by its "fantastical incompetence." Meanwhile, privatisation and economic reform will deprive the party of new financing. Thus, at all levels, ethnic, economic and political, the Donbass is in a state of transition, and its identity is in a state of flux.

The growing threat to the Donets’k group from the Dnipropetrovs’k clan, which has itself forged an anti-Communist alliance with West Ukrainian-based national-democrats, may cause the Donets’k elite to re-consider its alliance structures; possibly even its neutral stand towards Russia. Donets’k voters clearly expressed their support for official bilingualism and a federal structure to the country, yet their wishes were ignored in the constitution making process. This apparent disenfranchisement from the political process could be the basis for future political discontent.

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Figure 6a: Answer to the Question: "You would lend your support to politicians of which political orientation?" (L'viv, Kiev, Donets'k, Simferopol')

* Category "Other" includes: "Do not know", "None" and "Non-Party Candidates"

Figure 6b: Answer to Question: "Do You Think Ukraine Has a Future as an Independent State?" (L'viv, Kiev, Donets'k, Simferopol')

CHAPTER 7

SOCIETY AND POLITICS IN CRIMEA:

Crimea presents a very special case in Ukrainian regional politics, and in the study of national identity in Ukraine. Political life on the peninsula, which has captured international attention, provides a remarkable (albeit hopelessly convoluted and frequently farcical) tale of an internally divided and incompetently led separatist movement.¹

By mid-1994, it was widely predicted that Crimea could well be the spark that could initiate another Balkan-like ethnic war in Ukraine. The CIA warned of a "probable war between Ukraine and Russia" and Chrystia Freeland, a highly regarded journalist and writer, wrote an article at that time in the Oxford International Review declaring that Ukraine was "the next Yugoslavia."² Three years later, there has been no Second Crimean War. One question this chapter will attempt to answer is why this has not yet occurred, and whether it may still happen. It will be argued that the reason why the Crimean separatist movement has failed thus far and is unlikely to in the foreseeable future is three-fold. First, the weakness of the movement is in part related to the muddled nature of Crimean ethnic identity. To be sure, compared to Donets'k, Russian identity is much more well-established in Crimea. Yet, as noted in Chapter 4, Crimea also has a very high proportion of ethnically mixed families; the Russian identity of Crimea is arguably more Soviet than Russian. Second, the local political elite, which has been hopelessly

corrupt and internally divided, has failed to provide a concerted leadership for such a separatist movement. As noted, a society's political elite plays a key role in forming a national identity. In Crimea, this elite is divided into various economic clans. These overlapping economic, political and even criminal divisions form a unique web of interests that have neutralised the Russian idea in Crimea. As in Donets'k, one part of the local elite has looked to Kiev as a backer against its local opponents. Consequently, although the role of crime and criminal structures in Crimea may at first glance seem peripheral to the question of local politics and identity, it is in fact of fundamental importance to these questions in the Crimean context. Finally, notwithstanding the Russian Duma's inflammatory declarations on Crimea, Sevastopol' and the Black Sea Fleet the Russian government has thus far failed to offer concrete backing of Crimean separatism.

This chapter will examine society, regional identity, and popular attitudes towards the major issues of the day. The Crimean media will also be briefly examined, as in the previous chapter. In contrast to the politics of Donets'k, the high profile separatist struggle of Crimea’s autonomous parliament and presidency lends itself to a more detailed chronological and narrative study. After providing a brief outline of the main political parties and organisations in the region, the major political events since 1990 will be outlined. A discussion of Crimea, with its extraordinarily corrupt and criminalised political culture, is also a natural vehicle for a further discussion of the interconnection between crime, politics and national identity.
Crimean Society:

Crimea's population has always been in a state of dynamic flux. The wartime deportation of the Crimean Tatars, and the post-war influx of settlers and veterans from Russia has dramatically altered the demographic makeup of the region since the Second World War. In 1936 the number of Russians and Ukrainians together in Crimea numbered 379,000, or roughly 53 percent of the population. Official statistics do not offer a reliable account of the relative number of Russians and Ukrainians, but it is estimated that at this time there were between 180,000 to 200,000 Ukrainians, who lived mostly in the north, and roughly an equal number of Russians living mostly in the cities.3

Crimea’s population, as of 1994, was 2,651,700. The population had increased by over 200,000 in five years, largely because of the influx of Crimea Tatars. According to the 1989 census, there were a total of 2,430,495 people living in Crimea. Of these, ethnic Russians accounted for 67 percent (1,629,542), 26 percent of the population (625,919) were Ukrainians and a mere 0.4 percent of the population (38,365) were Crimean Tatars.4 By 1993, however, Crimean Tatars already made up nearly ten percent of the Crimean population; at the beginning of 1995 it was estimated that they numbered between 230,000 to 280,000.5

3 "Crimea" entry, "Encyclopedia of Ukraine, 2, p. 615.
5 "Statement By Bogdan Lisovich, Deputy United Nations Representative In Ukraine, At Crimea Conference," UN Online Bulletin, September
Additionally, there is the possibility that many of the 250-300,000 remaining Crimean Tatars in the Central Asian republics may also return to Crimea. In contrast to Donets’k and Luhans’k oblasti, Crimea has a relatively low level of urbanisation: only 68.3 percent, which is only slightly higher than the Ukrainian average of 67.9 percent. The rate of immigration into Crimea, mainly Tatars from Uzbekistan and other Central Asian republics, was between 42-44,000 per year between 1990-1992. In 1993 this figures dropped to 20,000.

Given the age-structure of the overall population, and the relatively high birth rate of Crimean Tatars, it is entirely possible that the non-Russian population could approach the number of Russians within 20 years. The political implications of the continued return of the Crimean Tatars are favourable to the maintenance of the territorial status quo, insofar as the Crimean Tatars have traditionally been opponents of political ties with Russia. Crimean Tatar political culture, like Chechen political culture, has been profoundly affected by the experience of deportation; their enmity towards Russians by default puts them in the pro-Ukrainian camp.

As in the rest of Southern and Eastern Ukraine, however, census categories mean very little for the majority Slavic population, as the intense inter-mixing of the population has reduced boundaries between the population. In the analysis of the Donbass it was argued that the Russian population has been, in a sense, Ukrainianised — not

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linguistically, but insofar as they have developed a territorial attachment to their part of Ukraine. The opposite may be said of Ukrainians in Crimea: they are so thoroughly intermixed with the Russian population that they identify with Russia and Russians as much (if not more) than they do with Ukraine and Ukrainians.

There is every indication that since 1991 there has been a virtual demographic and social catastrophe in Crimea. One Crimean demographer, O. Ye. Kislii, has argued that several sub-regions within Crimea represent a deteriorating “pathogenic social community.” In several sea front resort communities, several industrial zones, and in Simferopol', the number of murders, suicides and deaths from alcohol poisoning rates sky-rocketed in the immediate post-independence period. For example, between 1991 and 1992, the murder rate in Yalta increased by 835 percent.⁷ According to the chairman of the Crimean State Statistics Committee, A. Rudchenko, if the current tempo remains unchanged, then in 65 years the population of the republic would be cut in half, and in 130 years the peninsula would be depopulated altogether.⁸ The Crimean mortality rate is 1.7 times higher than the birth rate; even the 9,000 Crimean Tatars that returned to their ancestral homeland in the last year hardly countered the general pattern of decline, which now resembles that of an ageing village. The rate of in-migration, which was hovering at roughly 43,000 between 1990-1992, declined to 20,000 by 1993. If in 1989, the natural growth of the Crimean population (births minus deaths) was +9515, by 1993, it was -7055, and has been

⁸ Krymskoe vremia, 78, 24 August 1996.
deteriorating since that point. Many other indicators paint a picture of social collapse and stress. There were 13,000 divorces in 1995, as compared to a total of 20,000 marriages. Every fifth child is now raised without a father. For every 100 live births in 1995, there were 235 abortions. Compared to other regions in Ukraine, a much larger numbers of infants are born sick, underweight and with birth defects. Even tuberculosis has made an alarming comeback. Finally, the average life expectancy for a Crimean male has dropped to a mere 62 years.

The return of the Crimean Tatar population has stretched the already collapsing health-care system and local infrastructure to its limits, which has no doubt fuelled anti-Tatar sentiments among the non-Tatar population. The Tatar settlements are generally situated at the outskirts of built-up areas with no water or public services. The returnees are subject to freezing temperatures during the winter months, and are susceptible to respiratory and other diseases, including malnutrition. Consequently, although Crimean Tatars represent only about 10 percent of the population, their share of those suffering from haematological/oncological disorders is 30 percent.

Crimean Identity:

It is frequently suggested by pro-Russian politicians in Crimea and by foreign analysts that Crimea’s identity is so clearly Russian that reunion with Russia is the only just solution. Crimeans are assumed to be convinced pro-Russians with an unflinching desire to be annexed to

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9 Naselennia Ukrainy 1993, pp. 63; 71.
11 See the comments by Aman Tuleyev, Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov and Alexander Lebed cited below.
Russia. Yet, upon closer examination, it is apparent that the national and political identity of many Crimeans — leaving aside the question of the undeniably distinct Crimean Tatars\textsuperscript{12} — is not altogether unlike that of the people of the Donbass. While undoubtedly there are a significant number of Crimeans who have developed or re-discovered a purely Russian identity, to a great extent the population’s allegiance is to the defunct Soviet state, more than to Russia itself, while their attitude towards Ukraine is ambivalent, rather than outright hostile. This explains, in part, why the Ukrainian government’s crackdown on Crimean separatism on 17 March 1995 was met with little popular resistance.

In a 1991 study of Soviet Moldavia, which is analogous to that of Crimea in terms of its post-war ethnic influx, Nicholas Dima noted that the Russian speaking post-war immigrants had "nothing in common with Moldavia." This elite group was favoured by the central government as loyal supporters of the Soviet system which recruited heavily from their ranks. For these alienated non-Moldavian natives" or first generation Moldavians:

\begin{quote}
the USSR must indeed be their motherland and Moldavia just an administrative unit. Their psychological existence depends exclusively on a "Soviet" Moldavia because they do not have any roots anywhere ... Their ethnic motherland is neither
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{12} The national identity of the Crimean Tatars will not be examined in this study as it is a special case which requires a separate treatment. However, their political significance in the Kiev-Simferopol dynamic cannot be ignored.
Moldavia nor Russia per se, but just Soviet-russified Moldavia.\textsuperscript{13}

Pro-Ukrainian politicians in Crimea and the rest of Ukraine mock the suggestions of Crimean separatists, such as the ex-President Yurii Meshkov, that Crimeans are a full-fledged nationality. The first constitution of Crimea, in declaring that "Citizens of the Crimea of all nationalities comprise the Crimean Nation" almost gave a legal basis to this notion.\textsuperscript{14} One of the main points of contention over the new Constitution of Crimea, which has been approved pending minor revisions, is the term "Crimean nation" (\textit{narod krymu}).\textsuperscript{15} Most Ukrainian scholars argue that since most Crimeans came to the peninsula since the Second World War, one can hardly speak of the Crimean population as a new nationality. Instead, they argue, Crimeans are simply a collection of "Soviet people."\textsuperscript{16} While this characterisation of Crimeans by Ukrainian nationalists is meant as a form of abuse, there is certainly more than a grain of truth to this observation. Valerii Averkin, one of the founders of the Russian Speaking Association of Crimea (which later was absorbed into the Russia Bloc), defines the "Crimean Nation" as the Russian-speaking population of Crimea who identify themselves as "former Soviet people."\textsuperscript{17}


\textsuperscript{14} Konstitutsiia Respubliki Krym. (Simferopol', 1992.), Article 2.

\textsuperscript{15} Krymskaia gazeta, 68, 9 April 1996.

\textsuperscript{16} Danylo Kononenko, "Kryms'ka mimikriia nabyraie rozhonu..." Literaturna Ukraina, 1, 1994; Yaroslav Dashkevych, "Etnichni psevdomenshyny v Ukraini," Ukrains'ki problemy, 4/5, 1994, pp. 120-121.

It is by no means surprising, considering Crimea's role in the USSR, that many of its residents — especially the older ones — would have a strong attachment to the defunct Soviet state. While Donets’k was the all Union Stoke Room, Crimea, was an “all-Union resort area.” Because of its warm climate and natural beauty, the peninsula became a popular retirement area for Soviet officers and social elites. Dachas were distributed on a large scale to retired generals, Communist party leaders, and KGB personnel; the Crimean coastline is dotted with dachas and sanatoriums belonging to the CPSU, the Komsomol, and the armed forces. Nostalgia for Soviet rule in Sevastopol' is so intense that one survey found that a full 23 percent of Sevastopol' citizens considered Stalin the ideal type of politician required in the current situation.18

As noted, participation in the Great Patriotic War is a factor contributing to allegiance to the Soviet state. Such war veterans make up a large part of the Crimean population, especially in such places as Sevastopol'. Those persons who obtained personal financial rewards from the Soviet state, were also inclined to have a loyalty towards the state, especially those who experienced great social mobility. With the break-up of the Soviet Union, and the complete loss of special privileges, personal savings, and the devaluation of pensions, one would expect that such people would feel even more nostalgic about the Soviet state than ordinary pensioners in Ukraine and Russia.

Illustrative of the struggle between the Russian and Soviet identity in Sevastopol’ is also the debate over the choice of a new city emblem. One group favoured Soviet symbolism, including a Red Star, while another group supported the return of the Russian Imperial city emblem. Of course, no one suggested that the city’s emblem should include any Ukrainian symbolism. In the end a combination both Soviet and Imperial symbols was proposed. This too is illustrative, as Soviet and Russian mythology is frequently blended in Crimea.

As noted in Chapter One, there have always been competing conceptions of the Cossack myth: the myth of Cossack freedom and rebelliousness to Imperial authority, and the myth of the Tsar and Cossack, which stressed Cossack loyalty to Russia. As in the case of the Luhans’k Cossacks described in the previous chapter, the historic myth of “Tsar and Cossack” has been adopted by a group of ultra-Russian patriots who have fashioned themselves the “Crimean Cossacks.” The fact that historically Cossacks never dwelled in Crimea (with the possible exception of periodic raids from Ukrainian Zaporozhian Cossacks) has not concerned these Russian patriots. This is a prime example of the "invention of tradition" in ethno-national movements, an idea first put forward by Hobsbawm and Ranger in their book The Invention of Tradition. This case suggests that national myths may be quite flexible and not necessarily embedded in some sort of primordial collective consciousness. That is, these myths in part are only a mirror of the prevalent demographic makeup of a given area. An area with a high-concentration of pro-Russian forces, such as Crimea, latches onto a pro-

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Russian conception of Cossackdom, while in Donets’k, a somewhat more demographically balanced region, both pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian Cossack groups have sprouted.²¹

According to Vasyl’ Chumak, a Crimean Ukrainian journalist, Soviet propaganda raised fear among the post-war Crimean settlers against the possible return of the deported Crimean Tatar and German population to their homes. This fear helped to convince the new Crimeans that the Crimean Tatars were collectively guilty of collaborating with the Nazis, and were therefore justifiably punished by deportation. This further re-enforced local pro-Soviet allegiance, as it was felt that only Soviet power could save the settlers from dispossession by the returning Crimean Tatars. Therefore, the local population is all the more inclined to accept myths to the effect that: “Crimea is eternal Russian land,” “Sevastopol’ is the city of Russian glory,” “Uncle Khrushchev gave Crimea to the Ukrainians.”²² One might add to this list the myth of the imminent threat of “forced Ukrainianisation,” and the stereotype of West Ukrainians as treacherous “bourgeois nationalists.” Such myths serve an important function for the Russo-Soviet population of Crimea. They justify their historical right to dwell on the peninsula, the justice of moving into homes formerly belonging to dispossessed persons, and they provide a counter-myth to the Tatar and Ukrainian nationalist view that Russians in Crimea are nothing more than Soviet-era colonists.

Popular attitudes towards politics:

As argued, there was considerable ambivalence and confusion lurking beneath the surface of apparent unanimous support in favour of Ukrainian independence in 1991. Crimean attitudes towards their own independence movement mirrors the ambivalence of Eastern and Southern Ukrainian voters, even though at first glance it appears that Crimeans are staunch in their support for unification with Russia. For example, a 1994 survey of popular opinion in Crimea led to the following conclusion by the puzzled authors of the study:

There is an obvious paradox here. First, most Crimeans do not share the view that Crimea should secede from Ukraine. Second, the overwhelming majority of the same Crimeans, of nearly all ethnic groups, speak out for Crimea to become part of Russia.²³

Significantly, a higher number of Crimean Tatars opposed Crimea’s secession from Ukraine than the self-declared Crimean Ukrainians.

The same survey found that economic concerns of Crimeans far outweighed their interest in the political status of Crimea.²⁴

²³ Pavlo Khriyenko and Yuriy Kolesnikov, "The Crimea: The Spectrum of Public Opinion," Political Thought (Politychna dumka), 3, 1994, pp. 213-218. Pavlo Khriyenko, a doctor of Sociology, is the head of the Crimean International Sociology Center. The study was conducted in April of 1994. According to the study 40 percent of Crimean Russians, 48 percent of Crimean Ukrainians and 54 percent of Crimean Tatars opposed Crimea’s secession from Ukraine. Yet, 63 percent of the same group of Russians claimed to favour Crimea becoming part of Russia, while 53 percent of the Ukrainians and 29 percent of of the Crimean Tatars also held this view. p. 217.

the questions put to then Crimean Prime Minister, Arkadii Demydenko, in a February 1996 public "call-in" radio show, confirm this disinterest in politics: virtually every question posed by citizens was of a domestic economic nature (i.e., relating to pensions, subsidies, etc.). The question of Crimea's statehood and constitution was of no interest to the callers.\(^{25}\)

While elections provide one way of learning the political orientation of the population, the Ukrainian and Crimean political system is hardly a perfect reflection of the popular political orientation, with its weak party system and electoral laws that have favoured independent candidates. As Figure 6a illustrated in the previous chapter, the vast majority of the population of Crimea (as of 1995), and of Ukraine as a whole, were not able to or not inclined to articulate support for a particular political orientation. It is more than likely that supporters of the Communist orientation are rather inclined to hide their support, as opinion polls dramatically failed to predict the Communist electoral success in Eastern Ukraine in 1994. The tendency of survey respondents to down-play support for particular parties that are "out of fashion" or frequently scorned is not unique to post-Communist societies.\(^{26}\) Nonetheless, while political support for all main political orientations (i.e., liberal, national-democratic, nationalist) is very low, the Communist orientation clearly possess the largest block of supporters of any major political orientation in Simferopol' and Donets'k.

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\(^{26}\) Prior to the 1992 British elections, some voters were embarrassed to express support for the Conservative Party, and accordingly the pre-elections surveys downplayed Conservative support. See "Thinking the unthinkable: The huge opinion-poll lead of the Labour Party looks Unassailable. But might the message of the Polls be misleading?," The Economist, 28 September 1996; "Polls Apart: Politics/Puzzling Polls," Economist, 16 November 1996.
Lack of support for political parties in Crimea (which will be discussed below) and elsewhere is part of a larger crisis of confidence in contemporary Ukraine regarding all political institutions. This is especially the case in the East and South. In a whole host of questions regarding confidence or trust in institutions (i.e., the parliament, the president, political parties, private enterprises, state enterprises, political parties, the militia, the army, unions) an extremely low level of trust was found in Simferopol' and in Donets'k. In both of these cities political parties and the Supreme Rada were the institutions which rank lowest of all in terms of popular trust. However, by 1995, it appears that, to some extent a rise spiritual values seem to have accompanied the rise in cynicism toward public institutions. Forty-four percent of Donets'k citizens and 42.4 percent of Simferopol' citizens expressed "complete" faith in God. Also of interest, is the relatively high level of trust in "fellow countrymen", vaguely defined.27

Attitudes towards the Free Market in Crimea:

Before the collapse of the USSR, roughly half of the working population of Crimea worked for enterprises connected to the Soviet military-industrial complex. Up to 70 percent of the partially-completed and fabricated parts for these industries came from other republics of the former Soviet Union.28 As a traditional resort area, however, Crimea

does not have the obviously working class character of the Donbass, and has great potential for small businesses catering to tourists. While in Donets’k there is a small, fiercely pro-capitalist business elite, but a generally Soviet identity, in Crimea there is a Soviet identity combined with relatively widespread support for the idea of private business and the free market. In a 1993 survey, Crimea ranked third behind the city of Kiev and Western Ukraine in terms of popular support for the free market. Donets’k and Luhans’k, by contrast ranked tenth out of eleven regions. Kharkiv was in fifth place, followed by Southern Ukraine. The most anti-free market area was the largely agricultural Central Ukraine.\(^{29}\) An April 1995 survey done in Simferopol’ showed similar results. The residents of the Crimean capital had greater trust for private businesses than citizens of either Donets’k or L’viv.\(^{30}\) Unfortunately, thus far this enthusiasm for the free market has not been able to translate into concrete economic improvement for Crimeans; in fact the region has suffered worse than the rest of the country. This is related to the difficulty of restructuring an economy formerly heavily dependent on a now bankrupt military infrastructure; the dramatic decline in tourism from Russia; the rampant corruption and incompetence which characterised the peninsula's government, and from the resultant criminalisation of the economy.

**Media in Crimea:**

The media in Crimea both informs and mirrors the unstable and apparently violent political culture of the peninsula. There have been

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numerous murders and attacks on journalists. Sometimes these attacks have evidently resulted from reports on Mafia activities, while on other occasions there has been the appearance of political overtones. It has also occasionally appeared as if the official Kiev press was being systematically harassed and intimidated, possibly by forces linked to Crimean authorities. In July of 1995, a Molotov cocktail was lobbed through the window of the flat of two Ukrainian NTV correspondents in Simferopol'.

Most newspapers subscribed to in Crimea are locally published; newspapers published in Russia itself are not as dominant as they once were. Of the roughly 400,000 newspaper subscriptions in the first half of 1996, over three quarters (340,000) were local publications. Publications from Ukraine numbered a further 40,000, while publications from Russia amounted to 22,000. The leading publications include the governmental Krymskaia gazeta (65,300); the independent publication Krymskaia pravda (62,500) and Krymskiie izvestiiia (23,900), which is the publication of the Crimean parliament. The Ukrainian language publication Krymska svitlytsia had a mere 3,600 subscribers. While government publications still dominate subscriptions, there is a rapidly growing number of newspapers and magazines — 136 newspapers and 14 magazines as of the beginning of 1996, many of which are business oriented publications. Illustrating the rise of an independent print media in Crimea was the introduction at the beginning of 1996 of the highly professional weekly newspaper Krymskoie vremia.

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31 UMB Digest 3, 1995; UMB Digest 1, 1996.
The paper was sponsored by two large Crimean corporations, Imperiia and Krymvtormet.

As of June 1996 there were also 15 newspapers published by Crimean political parties. According to Oleg Khemenok, an analyst of the Crimean press, Ukraine is presented in most Crimean newspapers as a neighbouring country somehow apart from Crimea. Khemenok adds, however, that with the exception of certain ultra pro-Russian newspapers, this image is generally neutral rather than anti-Ukrainian. In Crimean Tatar publications, such as Golos krymu, Ukraine is painted in a very positive light, and the common aims of the Tatar and Ukrainian national movements are regularly underscored. Russia, however, is painted as a bloody aggressor in most Crimean Tatar publications. In the dominant pro-Russian press, by contrast, the northern neighbour is generally painted in a highly favourable light — as the “motherland” of both Crimea and the rest of Ukraine, and as a possible “saviour and defender.”

At the beginning of 1996, there was a total of 60 radio and TV broadcasting companies in Crimea. The transmission of Russian ORT television and even specific soap operas, such as the American programme "Santa-Barbara," in the Russian language have become highly politicised. In Crimea, the reaction against the proposed changes to the ORT were even more intense than in Donets'k. In August the Crimean Supreme Soviet passed a law forcing ORT back onto the First

34 Oleg Khomenok, “The Image of the Neighbour in the Crimean Media” UMB Digest, 1, 1996, pp. 8-9.
35 Oleg Khomenok, “Simferopol," UMB Digest, 1, 1996

**Survey of Political Organisations in Crimea:**

Before surveying the complex series of events that culminated in the rise of a strong Crimean separatist movement in 1994, it is necessary to set the stage by surveying the main political forces in the region in the post-Soviet era. There are four main political groupings in Crimea: Communists, pro-Russian parties, centrist pro-business parties, and Crimean Tatar organisations.37

**Centrists:**

In August of 1991 Co-ordinating Council for the Defence of Democracy was formed in Simferopol' as an umbrella group for a wide range of centrist parties. Then, at the end of September 1991 the Democratic Crimea movement was established on the basis of the

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DemKrym faction in the Crimean Soviet, which at that time had 23 deputies. Yurii Komov was the leader of the movement, and it declared itself in opposition to the quasi-Communist leadership of Crimea. Owing in part to mediocre leadership, unclear policies, and also growing opposition from pro-Russian, pro-Ukrainian and Tatar parties, the movement failed to develop into a solid political force. In June of 1993, another centrist organisation, supported by the Association of Crimean (private) Farmers, the Democratic Party of Crimea, led by Anatolii Filatov, was formed. Based in Yalta, where there is a considerable academic and intelligentsia community, it has some success locally for its anti-extremist platform.

**Party of Economic Renaissance of Crimea (PEVK):**

The main centrist party, representing the interests of business circles is the Party of Economic Renaissance of Crimea (PEVK), also known as the "party of fat cats." PEVK unites the directors and businessmen who are eager to advance their business interests even at the price of a strategic alliance with Kiev, which they have little intrinsic regard for. PEVK is the only Crimean-based party with an all-Ukrainian status (Party of Economic Renaissance-PEV), which illustrates its political stature as well as its relatively pro-Ukrainian stance.

The party, which held its first conference on 1 November 1992, has consistently supported the maintenance of the political status quo in Crimea. By 1993, according to Andrew Wilson, it was the most powerful party in Crimea. It suffered an electoral humiliation in the 1994 elections (discussed below), but retained its influence because of its support from Kiev. Vladimir Ilyich Sheviov, the head of PEVK, is actually an ethnic Armenian, as is A. Danelian, another leading figure in the PEVK, who
was also the former Deputy Chairman of the Crimean Parliament. Sheviov only moved to Crimea in 1985, where he started his private business, the Joint Venture “Svenas.” He is now one of Crimea's leading tycoons. Former Crimean Speaker Ye. Supruniuk was also closely allied to PEVK.

The party was founded with the direct sponsorship of the Kravchuk government, which distributed money to the founders from the governmental Fund of Support of Free Enterprise (attached to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine). As in the case of Donbass, the ex-Communist nomenclature in Crimea has become the new business elite. Among the leading members of PEVK, for example, is A.A. Formanchuk, who was at one point the Secretary of the Crimean Republican Communist Committee, but then became the Vice-President of Intercontbank. PEVK’s leadership claims that, as of 1996, its membership numbered over 60,000.\(^\text{38}\)

The party stands for the full entrenchment of property rights, and is in many ways analogous to the Liberal Party of Ukraine. One of PEVK’s mottoes is that they wish to: "Turn Crimeans into Property-Owners — Not Proletarians."\(^\text{39}\) Like the Liberal Party, the PEVK represents a business elite which has taken a pro-Kiev stance for strategic reasons, even though they may personally have little sympathy for Ukraine. In the case of PEVK, the strategic reason is the need for sponsorship and support from Kiev in their struggle with competing political forces, that

are in turn also linked to business interests, such as the Russia Bloc and "Krym-Impeks 55."

The PEVK also pragmatically realises that ethnic and political instability would be damaging to the development of Crimea's tourism-based economy, which it pins great hopes on. While the party has consistently favoured the political status quo with regard to Kiev, it has also lobbied in support of an economic union with Russia.

**The pro-Russian parties:**

The first of the pro-Russian, or Russophone, parties formed in Crimea was the Republican Movement of Crimea. On the 6th of October 1991, in Lenin square, Simferopol', a rally was organised by the Crimean Union of Veterans of Afghanistan of Crimea (SVAK), demanding Crimea's transfer to Russia. This organisation was a militarised and pro-Communist force whose members were veterans not only of Afghanistan, but also of Angola and other conflicts; many were former members of the Soviet special forces. Some of these same militants would later take in the defence of the "Russian White House" in October 1993. At roughly the same time, between the 5th and 6th of October, a conference took place at the Simferopol' Officers' Building, establishing the Republican Movement of Crimea (RDK). In fact, the two organisations merged, as the leader of the SVAK became the Chairman of the Executive Committee of RDK, and SVAK became a "society" within RDK. In fact, SVAK became a paramilitary force (called "Bagram") subordinated directly to Yuri Meshkov — the future President of Crimea, who at this time was selected as the RDK's leader. He gained some notoriety later that month when he and a group of like-minded deputies carried out a
hunger strike in front of the Crimean parliament building, calling for a referendum on Crimea's political status. At that time, a group of deputies from the centrist Democratic Crimea movement, held a press conference in which they claimed that the main founder of the RDK — the firm "Krym-Impeks 55" — was little more than a front for laundering Communist party money. They also claimed that the RDK was linked to organised crime and other forces seeking to destabilise the situation in Crimea. By 1992, RDK had twenty-eight deputies in the Crimean parliament. The RDK cultivated an image as a "popular resistance" to the so-called "party of power" of Bahrov, the pragmatic Crimean leader. Illustrative of the RDK's pan-Slavist and pro-Soviet platform was its resolutions demanding the official recognition, by Crimea and Ukraine, of the "fraternal" neo-Soviet Transdniestrian Republic in Moldova.

Afterwards, the party split into four main factions — mostly for personal reasons rather than for fundamental disagreements over policy. The most direct successor of the RDK was Meshkov's Republican Party of Crimea (RPK). The other breakaway factions include the Russian-Speaking Movement of Crimea (May 1993), the Russian Society and the Russian Party of Crimea (1st Conference, February 1993).

The Russian Party of Crimea (RPK), led initially by Sergei Shvainikov favoured the re-unification of Crimea with Russia, the preservation of the unity of the Black Sea Fleet, and eventually the re-establishment of the a pan-East Slavic Union. Its pro-Russian policies even won it the endorsement of Vladimir Zhirinovskii, the Russian ultranationalist, who declared it to be "...the only party in Crimea capable of

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40 Ukraina: politicheskie partii i organizatsii. p, 21.
defending the interests of Crimeans, the interests of Russian people."  
This endorsement reflects the fact that the right-wing of the Russophile 
movement in Crimea is quasi-fascist in its racist contempt for the 
indigenous Crimean Tatar population. These parties feed on the 
insecurity of Crimean Russians who, as noted, fear that they may be 
displaced by returning Tatars, or colonised by a nationalist Ukrainian 
state. Such extremist slogans or notions as "Crimea is eternal Russian 
land" serve as a legitimising device and counter to the suggestion, by 
Crimean Tatars and Ukrainian nationalists alike, that the Russian 
population are mere colonists themselves.

A number of ultra-nationalist Russian organisations based in 
Sevastopol', such as the National Salvation Front, have regularly made 
virulent anti-Ukrainian and anti-Crimean Tatar pronouncements. Most 
recently, on 5 October 1996, 80 ultra-Russian patriots founded a "Duma" 
to defend their rights and promote a new Slavic union. In their founding 
charter they reserved the right to bear arms "in the event of genocide or 
open terror against the Russian people or its representatives, as well as 
attempts to colonise native Russian territories."  

At the end of December 1993, the Russia Bloc was established to 
unite pro-Russian, separatist forces in Crimea. Its founding congress was 
attended by representatives of the Republican Party of Crimea 
(Meshkov), the People's Party of Crimea, the Sevastopol' Branch of the 
Russian Party of Crimea, the Russian-Speaking Movement of Crimea and 
various smaller groups. Another pro-Russian party was the more radical

42 Nezavisimaja gazeta, 13 January 1994, p. 3. Quoted in 
Krymskotatarskoe natsional'noe dvizhenie, vol. 3, p. 66.
43 Lapychak, "Ethnic Russians In Crimea Form Duma To Defend 
Russian Party of Crimea, initially led by Sergei Shvainikov, and openly supported by Russia's ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovskii. The party eventually split into two factions, with the Sevastopol' branch of the party joining the Russia Bloc. Shvainikov, however, had some success in the 1994 presidential elections, where he eventually won 13.6 percent of the vote.44

The main goal of the Bloc was to prevent the victory of Mykola Bahrov, who favoured the continuation of Ukrainian control over Crimea. According to Sergei Tsekov, the former Speaker of Crimean Parliament, "the principal goal of the Russia bloc is the restoration of spiritual and political unity with Russia."45 The Bloc's election platform included promises to pay wages in Russian rubles (i.e., 10-20 times higher than existing wages). Its electoral successes in the 1994 elections to the Crimean parliament made it the dominant force in local politics. As will be explained below, by 1995, the in-fighting between Meshkov and Tsekov, also a member of RPC, discredited the party, as did their failure to achieve any of their main electoral promises.

Communist Party of Crimea (KPK):

The Communist Party of Crimea is one of the most important political forces on the peninsula, and is largely a direct descendant of the former oblast party organisation.46 If anything, the Party's stock has been improving steadily over the past two years as disillusion with the

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44 Wilson, "The Elections in Crimea, p. 10.
"Russian idea" has reverted to nostalgia for the "Soviet idea." The collapse of the Russia block has also helped their cause. The revival of Crimea’s Communists as a political force following the banning of the Party in August 1991, started with the formation of the 20 January Movement in October 1991. The organisation's name was derived from the referendum at the beginning of that year in which, in their eyes, the Crimean population voted for the revival of the Crimean Autonomous SSR within the Soviet Union. At the founding conference it was declared that, “even if only Russia remains in the Union, then Crimea will also remain.” The movement did not attempt to hide its Communist roots; its founding proclamation stated that "Many honest Communist will naturally find a place for themselves in the ranks of our movement."\(^{47}\)

Beginning in March 1992 a leading circle of local ex-Communists had a semi-legal gathering under the leadership of Leonid Grach, former First Secretary of the Crimean Republican Communist Party. The movement was able to co-operate with activists of the Republican Movement of Crimea and with the Afghanistan veterans' organisation "Bagram." They issued a joint declaration demanding the separation of Crimea from Ukraine, on the declaration of the Crimean Soviet Socialist Republic, and on the re-establishment of the Crimean Communist Party.\(^{48}\)

In August of 1992 the Union of Communists of Crimea was registered, with Grach selected as its leader. The following summer it was renamed the Communist Party of Crimea (KPK). The KPK has maintained close ties with the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF). Gennadii Ziuganov, the Russian party leader, even attended the

\(^{48}\) Chervonnaia, "Krymskotatarskoe natsional'noe dvizhenie," p. 57.
By 1993 it had become a very solid, energetic and self-confident organisation. Its ambition was by no means limited to the peninsula; it viewed itself as a possible Piedmont for the gathering of Soviet lands.\(^5^0\)

Grach has remained the First Secretary of the KPK; by mid 1995, he claimed that the KPK's membership was 54,000.\(^5^0\) Like the Donets'k branch of the Communist Party of Ukraine, the Crimean branch is unabashedly in favour of the restoration of the Soviet Union. It has also exploited the Russo-Ukrainian population's fear of a mass return Crimean Tatars, and has taken an adamantly anti-Tatar stance, including rejecting national quotas in the Crimean parliament. During his tenure as Communist Party first secretary in 1991, Grach enacted policies designed to harass would-be Tatar settlers.\(^5^1\) The party has also been openly hostile to Rukh and other Ukrainian parties in Crimea, and regularly drudges up the traditional appellation "Bourgeois Nationalists" in reference to such parties. In short, the so-called "internationalism" of the CPC extends only to the "Soviet" or Russo-Ukrainian population of Crimea. The party is fundamentally a pro-Russian organisation, somewhat closer to the Russian nationalism of the KPRF than to that of the Communist Party of Ukraine. The recent success of the Communists in local elections (this will be discussed in greater depth below) underlines that the KPK is still a major political force to be reckoned with: its nostalgic appeals to Russo-Soviet patriotism, combined with its

\(^5^0\) Holos Ukrainy, April 26, 1995.
hard-line anti-corruption stance makes it an especially appealing party, insofar as the other main parties (PEVK and Russia Bloc) appear to have dubious commercial connections.

**Crimean Tatar Organisations:**

Although Crimean Tatars only represent a fraction of the Crimean population, because they possess a clear national identity and a well organised national movement, they are currently the one national group most able to mobilise as an electorate, or for public demonstrations.\(^{52}\)

The oldest of the Crimean Tatar organisations is the National Movement of the Crimean Tatars (NDKT), which was established in 1967. By the late 1980s, this organisation was regarded as relatively conservative and conformist in its relationship to Soviet authority. In November of 1993 its leader, Yurii Osmanov was murdered, which effectively brought to an end the NDKT's role as a significant political force. In 1989 the Organisation of the Crimean Tatar National Movement (OKND) was established on the basis of the former Uzbekistan-based Central Initiative Group (TsIG), led by Mustafa Jemilev. Jemilev and the leading figures from the OKND resolved to establish a fundamentally new body, a Crimean Tatar national assembly, known as the *Mejlis*. In doing so, the OKND was relegated the role of a rather ineffectual party, almost completely subordinated to the *Mejlis*, although from time to time it takes a slightly different stand on issues.

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\(^{52}\) On the History of the Crimean Tatar national movement see the first two volumes of M.N. Guboglo (ed.), *Krymskotatarskoe natsional'noe dvizhenie*, 3 vols.
The Mejlis, which regards itself as the sole and authoritative representative body of the Crimean Tatar people, has a virtual monopoly on the political representation of the Tatars. Other Tatar parties and movements have not gone much beyond the point of preparing programmes. The Mejlis is chosen at a Kurultai, which is an all-Crimean Tatar national assembly held roughly annually. The Mejlis is made up of 33 members, and is divided into a number of sub-sections, including a political-legal division, a investment and social-economic security division for returning Tatars; a cultural and linguistic division; an information division and an information and publishing division. Mustafa Jemilev is the leader of the Mejlis, having been selected by an open session of the Kurultai.

Jemilev has been very active in cultivating links with the Islamic world, especially Turkey. He has also given regular moral support to the Chechen separatist movement. The Chechen leader Dzhokar Dudaev, in a letter to Jemilev, underscored the mutual sympathy of the two movements:

"The entire Crimean Tatar nation, having endured a genocide together with the Chechen nation and other nationalities of the Caucasus, understands and empathises with our humane and just aims. Every nation has a right to its freedom and independence... Our goal is just and with the help of Allah, we will win full independence." 53

In the long run it is hard not to imagine that the Crimean Tatar movement would like to duplicate the successes of the Chechen people, and gain full control over their territory. Ultimately, the alliance with the Kiev

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government and with local pro-Ukrainian forces is no more than a means to an end, although in realistic terms the relatively small Crimean Tatar population does mean that full independence must be a very distant goal indeed.

In the fall of 1993, extremists based in Bach-chisarai, a Tatar settlement south of Simferopol', set up a "radical nationalist party" called the Milli Firka (National Party). Under the leadership of Il'mi Umerov, the party has vowed to destroy the colonial yoke of foreign states over Crimea and its indigenous population. It has threatened a violent struggle for the establishment of a Crimean Tatar state; a state it envisions as having only one official language — Crimean Tatar. Ukraine is regarded as a neo-colonial power no less than Russia. Umerov actually became a deputy to the Crimean Supreme Soviet, and later Vice-President under Prime Minister Franchuk during the winter of 1994-95. In doing so, however, Umerov was obviously forced to moderate his stance somewhat and the party has existed more on paper than in fact.54

A Crimean Tatar Nationalist Party Adalet (KMF), was formed in the spring of 1995. This goal of this party is to create a small, well organised, almost revolutionary elite with which it may advance the aims of the Mejlis, which, it underscores, it is not in opposition to, but in full support of.55

Recently, even the usually moderate Crimean Tatar movements, including the Mejlis, have been somewhat radicalised. It increasingly

54 Krymskotatarskoe natsional'noe dvizhenie, 3, p. 76-77; Christopher Moreau, "Heavy brigades..", Economist, 8 January 1994, p. 34.
55 Ibid., pp. 78-79.
appears that the pro-Ukrainian political forces in Crimea (i.e., PEVK) can no longer depend on the Mejlis for its support. A speech made by Jemilev, in June of 1996, sums up the new attitude of the organisation:

It is unfortunate that with our opposition to chauvinism and to the clear Russian fascism in Crimea, that we have not received the necessary support from Ukraine, although the Crimean Tatars and its representative organ, the Mejlis, has always been the main and most consistent supporter of the integrity and independence of Ukraine. It is no secret that in our nation, and accordingly, in members of the Mejlis and local Mejlises there are growing calls for more decisive actions for the attainment of our rights.\(^56\)

On 16 May 1996, 100 Crimean Tatars picketed the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine demanding that the Mejlis be recognised as the only representative organ of the Crimean nation. The Mejlis leadership has also made high-profile visits to Turkey, a move designed to arouse suspicion in the pro-Russian camp.\(^57\)

**Crimean Ukrainians:**

Ukrainian parties have been extremely weak in Crimean politics: the Ukrainian national idea apparently has little resonance among the local Russo-Ukrainian population. There have been a number of organisations, such as the All- Crimean Congress of Ukrainians, which have sought to represent the interests of the local Ukrainian population, and have opposed the leadership of the RP K and the Russia Bloc.\(^58\) A Second Congress of Ukrainians was held in Crimea in March of 1995; at that point Yurii Kolesnikov was chosen as the chairman of the

\(^{56}\) "Krymskaia pravda reprinted in Obzor 21 June 1996
\(^{57}\) Radio Lux Information Service. May 1996.
organisation. The movement declared its intention of working closely with pro-democratic forces, such as the Crimean Tatar Mejlis.59

Initially Rukh was the leading Ukrainian organisation in Crimea, but it has more recently been challenged by more radically nationalist organisations, such as the UNSO and KUN (Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists). KUN established itself in Crimea in 1995, and has been focusing its energies primarily on propaganda work. The KUN opposes any special autonomy for Crimea within Ukraine, although it favours territorial autonomy for Crimean Tatars. In response to the overwhelming Crimean "internationalist" antipathy towards Ukrainian nationalists, the leadership of the Crimean branch retorts that Russia is the truly nationalist state and Ukraine has, thus far, been true "internationalists," to their own detriment:

Judge for yourself: ten million Ukrainians live in Russia, and there is not a single Ukrainian newspaper, television programme or school. And in Ukraine there are eleven million Russians, and almost half of the schools, newspapers, television programmes are in Russian. And in Crimea there's not even one Ukrainian school. So which government is internationalist and which is nationalist?60

While KUN and other Ukrainian nationalist parties have no real role in the political life of Crimea, they could, in theory, instigate a Russo-Ukrainian conflict by organising an especially provocative anti-Russian incident, although KUN claims to be a law-abiding party.

Political Developments in Crimea: 1990-1996

60 Interview of Vasilii Bahutskii (Leader of the Crimean branch of KUN) by Dmitrii Bushev, "Vnuki Mazepy i posledovateli Bandery," Krymskoe vremia, 121, November 1996.
Given the limited powers of the Ukrainian SSR, the political status of Crimea was hardly an issue until the Ukrainian SSR began to take its first tentative steps towards autonomy within the USSR. In response to this the CPSU in Moscow "played the Crimean card" as a way of undermining national-separatism, which had been gaining momentum ever since the 16 July 1990 Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Ukrainian SSR. By manoeuvring to promote regional separatism within Ukraine, Moscow hoped to curtail further union-republic separatism.\(^{61}\) Then, on 14 November of 1990, a special session of the Crimean oblast Soviet resolved that the 1954 transfer of the peninsula to Ukraine was illegal; they called for a referendum on the re-establishment of autonomous status, which had formerly existed while Crimea was part of the Russian Soviet Republic. The vote was held on 20 January 1991, and 93.3 percent voted "Yes" to the following question: "Are you for the restoration of the Crimean ASSR as a subject of the USSR & a Party to the Union Treaty?" The Soviet propaganda apparatus fully backed this endeavour, and on 12 February 1991 the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet acknowledged the change of status in the law "On the Renewal of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic," which renewed Crimean autonomy within the borders of Ukraine.

\(^{61}\) This is the argument of Vasyl Chumak, a Ukrainian political analyst. As evidence for this hypothesis Chumak cites a CPSU memorandum from 22 October 1990 in which it instructed the Ukrainian Communist party to:

Present to the Crimean oblast branch of the party an initiative regarding the political status of Crimea, and to put forward thoroughgoing agitation in the mass media concerning changes in the administrative-political status of Crimea as a fair solution to the problem of the Crimean Tatar nation.

The aftermath of the August putsch, and Kiev's declaration of independence caught the Crimean leadership off guard. On the same day as the declaration of Ukrainian independence, (24 August 1991), the Republican Movement of Crimea was founded by Yurii Meshkov, the future "President" of Crimea. A short while later, on 4 September, the separatist-dominated Crimean parliament declared the sovereignty of the region as a constituent part of Ukraine.

On 5 May 1992 the Crimean Soviet passed a law which amounted to a declaration of independence and union with Russia. The law was subject to a referendum which was to be held in August. According to Taras Kuzio, the declaration of independence in May 1992 was merely a strategic ploy designed to garner greater concessions and autonomy from Kiev, as Mykola Bahrov, the Speaker of the Crimean Soviet, and Kravchuk were considered close allies. After pressure from President Kravchuk, including threats to cut off the water supply and to sponsor separatism of Ukrainian dominated regions in Northern Crimea, the resolution was annulled on 21 May. On 30 June Kiev granted Crimea greater autonomy, but only on condition that its constitution would be brought into line with the Ukrainian constitution.

In December of 1993, the Russia Bloc was formed as a way of uniting pro-Russian political forces in the peninsula. It comprised the Republican Party of Crimea (Meshkov) and the People's Party of Crimea, as well as a number of other smaller pro-Russian organisations. The

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63 Andrew Wilson, “The Elections in Crimea,” p. 9; See below for fuller discussion of the Russia Bloc and the other Crimean parties.
emergence of unity in the pro-Russian camp — which later proved illusory — set the stage for the dramatic victory for these forces in the parliamentary and presidential elections of 1994.

1994 Crimean Presidential Elections & Elections to Crimean Parliament:

Just as most foreign observers predicted that Kravchuk — the representative of the Kiev "Party of Power" — would win the 1994 Ukrainian presidential elections, foreign observers predicted that the analogous establishment figure, Bahrov, had the best chance of winning the Crimean election.64

In the run-off to the elections, which were held on 19 January, Meshkov won a remarkable 75 percent of the popular vote.65 On 4 February, Meshkov was sworn in as Crimea's first (and possibly last) President. His election campaign blended pro-Russian rhetoric with promises for economic improvements, such as the payment of pensions in Russian rubles, instead of Ukrainian karbovantsi, etc. According to journalists based in Crimea who observed the elections, the question of Crimean re-unification with Russia was of less interest to voters than the question of personal economic survival: Crimeans are evidently not immune to the "sausage psychology" prevalent in the Donbass. As discussed above, sociological surveys have found that Crimeans are relatively uninterested in constitutional issues. While, of course, the desire for economic improvement is universal, the relative importance of the question of political self-determination to Crimea's Russians does

64 Andrew Wilson, "Crimea's Political Cauldron," p. 8.
indeed appear to be lower than one would expect in a region that was, in 1994, widely regarded as a potential "tinderbox." As noted, West Ukrainians, for example, have maintained the same high level of support for Ukrainian independence since 1991 regardless of the country's economic decline. The following post-election report by Novoe vremia sums up this economic interpretation of Crimean separatism:

The question of how to survive and live better occupies an incomparably higher place in the minds of [Crimean] citizens than the question of under which flag they would like to stand under to die for the "motherland." It is no coincidence that the most lethal argument of Meshkov was his pre-election campaign promise to enter Crimea into the ruble zone, and to obtain Russian energy supplies — not patriotic rhetoric about "primordial Russian territory." The attraction to Russia is more the poverty of the Ukrainian economy and the worthlessness of the kupon-karbovanets than enflamed pride in the "city of Russian glory."^ ^

In the 1994 March elections to the Crimean Parliament, or Supreme Soviet, each citizen was given two votes, one for single member constituencies, and a second for a candidate selected from one of six lists based on ethnicity. The largest ethnic minority groups were allotted a fixed number of deputies. Significantly, Ukrainians and Russians were lumped together as one category (technically "Russian speaking") and allotted 14 Deputies. This policy clearly re-enforces and even institutionalises the idea of the pan-Slavic or 'formerly Soviet, Russian speaking' identity advanced by the pro-Russian forces in Crimea. Crimean Tatars were given a further 14 Deputies, while four other less numerous nationalities (Armenians, Bulgarians, Greeks and Germans) were each given one Deputy. In the outgoing Crimean parliament

supporters of "Russia" bloc controlled only 28 of 196 seats, while the largest group was controlled by the "Party of Economic Renaissance of Crimea, a centrist group allied with Bahrov.\textsuperscript{67}

The elections took place in two rounds, the first of which took place on 27 March. Of 94 deputies elected, the Russia-bloc and its close allies obtained 58 of 94 seats. The Left Opposition, including Communists and the Russian Party, obtained a mere 3 seats, while the PEVK, formerly a dominant force in the parliament, were reduced to 2 deputies, although, as discussed below, they managed to retain considerable influence in the Crimean Soviet. Other centre-oriented parties obtained a total of 17 deputies, while the Crimean Tatar Kurultai won 14 seats.\textsuperscript{68}

At the same time as the first round of the parliamentary election, an unofficial plebiscite (declared illegal by Kravchuk) was held. The referendum asked 1) Whether voters supported the restoration of the May 1992 Constitution. 2) Dual Citizenship with Russia and 3) Presidential Rule by Decree. The vote was 78.4 percent in the affirmative for the first question, 82.8 percent for dual-citizenship and 77.9 percent support for rule by decree.\textsuperscript{69} This vote was used by the parliament on 20 May 1994 as a justification for reviving the annulled, separatist constitution of May 1992.

\textsuperscript{67} Andrew Wilson, "The Elections in Crimea," p. 7; Table 5, p. 18.  
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid.  
The referendum probably over-stated the actual level of support for unification with Russia. A survey taken by Democratic Initiatives in June 1994 found that only a bare majority of the population supported full unification of the region with Russia, while the rest of the population preferred a variety of other options.  

Yuri Meshkov's Presidential administration was characterised by such incompetence that popular enthusiasm rapidly transformed into profound disillusionment. He took six months to select his Cabinet and annoyed the Crimean Soviet by appointing non-Crimean Russians to key positions, including Yevgenii Saburov, a Moscow economist who was chosen as head of Meshkov's government. He also aggravated Crimeans by spending an inordinate amount of time travelling around the world to raise his international image. Increasingly, he began to act dictatorially, demanding the right to issue decrees and to concentrate executive power in his hands. A year after his election, the level of this disillusionment was gauged by a Crimean public opinion survey in which a mere 9 percent of Crimeans continued to support Meshkov. As Mari'iana Chorna, a political analyst from the L'viv newspaper Post-Postup put it, Meshkov was doomed to suffer from a decline in

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70 The question asked "To whom should Crimea belong?" 55% of all Crimean respondents felt that the peninsula should become part of Russia; 20% supported the idea of Crimean independence, and only 5% supported the idea of Crimea remaining within Ukraine. Politychnyi portret Ukrainy, 9, 1994, pp. 48, Table 5.

71 Tony Barber, "Ousted Crimean President refuses to go quietly", Independent, 21 March 1995.

72 "Sluzhba sotsiologii KTsGI soobshchaet. I gde zhe to ocharovanie?" Krymskaia pravda 23 February 1995. The following categories were used, and the results follow: Fully support Meshkov 2%; Support him 7%; Waiting for Action from him- 19%; Disillusioned with him - 49%; Never trusted him - 29%. The survey was taken on 4 February 1995; 1982 persons were surveyed.
popularity, since it would be impossible for him to carry out the economic side of his election promises.\(^{73}\)

Meshkov's declining popularity was exacerbated by his chronic conflict with the Crimean Soviet. The Soviet was angry with Meshkov for his failure to carry out a strong enough separatist agenda, and also because the legislators apparently feared that Saburov's government would bring in Russian investors who would serve as unwanted competitors in the privatisation process. As Tor Bukvoll has noted, there has been no better explanation for the clash between Meshkov and his Parliament, led by Sergei Tsekov, than economic interest.\(^{74}\) Both Meshkov and Tsekov were from the Republican Party of Crimea, and their outlook towards Crimea's future political status was broadly similar. On 6 September 1994 the conflict reached crisis proportions when Meshkov dissolved the parliament in what amounted to a presidential putsch. His presidential guard occupied the Crimean Supreme Soviet building, and he went on radio to read a list of presidential representatives who would rule at the local level. Forces loyal to the Crimean Soviet, however, soon gained the upper hand. Pro-Russian "Crimean Cossacks" from Yalta, who came to the aid of the Parliamentary forces, removed Meshkov's presidential guard from the radio and television station.\(^{75}\)

Then, on 22 September Meshkov repealed his decree on the dissolution of parliament. A week later (29 September) the Crimean Parliament stripped Meshkov of his remaining powers, and he was left as


\(^{74}\) Tor Bukkvol, "A Fall from Grace for Crimean Separatists," Transition 17 November 1995, p. 48.

\(^{75}\) Ukrainian Weekly, 18 September 1994.
a figurehead. At this point the government of Saburov was dissolved by the Crimean Soviet. In October, Franchuk, a brother-in-law of Kuchma, was chosen by the parliament as Prime Minister, which made him the head of the Crimean government. In a suitably comic-opera postscript to Meshkov's presidential career, the figurehead president travelled to Kiev looking for support, accusing the Crimean Supreme Soviet of separatism, conveniently forgetting that he had built his own political career on precisely such a platform.\(^6\)

In March of 1995 the stage was set for a decisive blow from Kiev against the separatists in the Crimean parliament, and for a finishing touch against Meshkov. The Crimean President had discredited himself with the incompetence of his own rule, and, most importantly, none of the economic changes or links with Russia he had promised materialised. The fighting between the Parliament and the President had thoroughly compromised the public perception of both institutions. As Chrystyna Lapychak has argued, the timing was perfect for a crackdown.\(^7\)

The timing was also excellent as regards Russia's response: the northern neighbour was utterly preoccupied and bogged down with the breakaway region of Chechnia, and was hardly in a position to sponsor separatism in Crimea, or to risk a military conflict over the question. Even before the

\(^6\) V'ячеслав Савченко, “Останній кінок на Північ дяля Іурія Мешкова закінчилась в Києві”, UNIAN-Polityka, no. 3(86), pp. 3-5.

\(^7\) Predictably, Crimea's pro-Russian parliamentary leaders held a somewhat different view of the timing of Kiev's crackdown. According to Sergei Tsekov, then speaker of the Crimean parliament, the reason for the clampdown was the fact that the hitherto divided Russia Bloc, and other pro-Russian forces in the parliament were beginning to show signs of unifying, and developing into an even more radical separatist threat. N. Bobrotsov, “Press konferentsiia S.P. Tsekova” Krymskiaia gazeta, 53(681), 23 March 1995; Chrystyna Lapychak, “Crackdown on Crimean Separatists,” Transition, 26 May 1995, pp. 2-5.
war in Chechnia began in December 1994, Yeltsin was hesitant to show any support for Meshkov, and refused to meet him in the spring of that year, after Meshkov's electoral victory. Thus, on 17 March the Ukrainian parliament abolished the office of President of Crimea and annulled the Crimean constitution. At the same time, the Ukrainian parliament voted for a whole series of resolutions which further circumscribed the Crimean government's authority, especially over privatisation and banking.\(^7\)

The desperation of the Crimean Soviet was apparent on 19 March, when they asked for Russian and Cossack help in the struggle against Kiev. None was forthcoming.\(^7\) Nor was there any popular uprising in support of the Crimean government. Perhaps unable to resist the temptation to gloat over the demise of Meshkov, Mari'ana Chorna of the Galician newspaper *Post Postup* observed that, while Chechens were willing to fight to the last man for the defence of Djokar Dudaev, Crimeans hardly noticed the loss of their President.\(^8\) Chorna's observation, if not her tone, is apropos: the relative indifference of Crimeans towards the demise of their President and the Ukrainian clamp-down on Crimean autonomy is something of a statement on the strength of "Crimean Identity." A survey conducted Simferopol' between April-May of 1995 found that, while 46 percent of the population of the city disapproved of the Ukrainian parliament's crackdown, 18.1 percent supported the moves and another 8.3 percent had not even heard of it.\(^9\)

**Crimean Retaliation:**

\(^7\) For a thorough discussion of these decrees see Lapychak, "Crackdown on Crimean Separatists," p. 3 and *Holos Ukrainy*, 18 March 1995.  
The Crimean Parliament made several further efforts to strike back at Kiev. First, on 22 March they voted to oust Prime Minister Franchuk. On 30 March, the Ukrainian Justice Ministry declared his ouster illegal; the next day, Kuchma re-subordinated the Crimean government directly to the Ukrainian Cabinet, a decision that was cancelled only after Franchuk was reinstated. The sharp divisions within the Crimean parliament also facilitated the pacification of Crimea. Indeed, on 18 April 50 Crimean deputies petitioned the Kiev Rada for the complete dissolution of their parliament.

On 25 April the Crimean parliament put itself even closer to the brink of its own dissolution by again deciding to hold a referendum on Crimea’s political status on 25 June. With little room for manoeuvring, and with obvious fear that Kiev would dissolve the Crimean parliament, the rebellious assembly backed down and capitulated to Kiev’s major demands, such as cancelling its proposed referenda on the constitution and on a pan-Slavic Union. The capitulation was followed by further reconciliatory steps, as Tsekov was replaced, on 6 July, with a less outspoken Parliamentary speaker, Yevhen Supruniuk. Then on 2

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83 “Crimean Parliament Decides on Referendum,” Vseukrainskie Vedomosti, April 26, 1995. The following questions were to be included in the poll: "Do you confirm the Constitution of the Republic of the Crimea, which was unilateraly annulled by the SR of Ukraine (Yes/No)? Do you support the Law of Ukraine On the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea, as of March 17, 1995 (Yes/No)?"
84 Sil'ski visti, June 2, 1995.
August, Franchuk’s removal was reversed and local control over the Crimean government was returned to the Crimean parliament.

The local elections of June 1995 may be regarded as something of a mid-term referendum of the parliament elected in 1994. The in-fighting and ineffectual rule of the pro-Russian parties in Crimea led to a lurch back towards Communist nostalgia by mid-1995. In local elections held on 25 June 1995, Tsekov’s Republican Party was able to capture a mere 5 seats on local councils, compared to 290 for the Communist Party of Crimea.86

After the Crackdown:

Since the crackdown on Crimean Separatism, the real political authority in Crimea resides with the Permanent (Ukrainian) Presidential Representative in Crimea, who, since January 1996, has been Dmytro Stepaniuk. Stepaniuk, as one would expect from a Kiev appointee, is a vocal supporter of the territorial status quo, and has made it abundantly clear that he has little patience for separatism.87 All vital appointments in the peninsula, including the Security and Police chiefs must be made with his approval. So the intense political competition within the Crimean parliament and government is, to some extent, regarded as an irrelevant comic-opera in Kiev.88

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86 Tor Bukkvol, "A Fall from Grace for Crimean Separatists," p. 48.
88 Information brief from staff of Ukrainian Press Agency, 14 October 1996. (Originally an informal letter to Taras Kuzio, later distributed through Internet).
While at first the pacification of Crimea appeared to be a complete success, it would have been unrealistic to assume that the pro-Russian forces that dominated the Crimean parliament would somehow come to terms with their current political impotence and continued Ukrainian control over Crimea. Instead, they simply tactically retreated to regroup their forces.

In February of 1996 the speaker Yevhen Supruniuk, who was regarded as a Kiev sympathiser, issued a report to the Ukrainian Secretary of National Security on the political situation in Crimea. In his report he noted that the unilateral approach taken by Kiev towards the governance of Crimea, and its lack of trust in Crimean authorities risked re-animating the Russian idea on the peninsula, which, he claims, had lapsed by 1994-5. He claimed that an increase in anti-Ukrainian sentiments were notable, and that there was a distinct possibility of a "palace coup" in Crimea on the part of pro-Russian forces. Supruniuk expressed his clear preference of the PEVK as the only political force capable of opposing the increasingly strong Communists.

The Russia-Bloc leadership, such as Sergei Tsekov, argue that Presidential Representative Stepaniuk has been blatantly allying himself with Sheviov and Danelian of PEVK against the pro-Russian forces in the parliament. They also claim that Stepaniuk and PEVK were plotting to dissolve the Crimean parliament, using the Supruniuk affair as a justification for rule by decree. It does indeed appear that Kuchma is

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89 Ibid; Krymskoe vremia no. 87. Reprinted in Obzor 18 September 1996.
90 Krymskoe vremia, no. 85. Re-printed in Obzor 13 September 96.
continuing to follow his predecessor's policy of sponsoring PEVK as the main ally of Kiev against pro-Russian forces in Crimea.

With Supruniuk still in the hospital recovering from his injuries sustained during the alleged kidnapping attempt, pro-Russian forces in the parliament selected a new speaker on 9 October. The new speaker, Vasylii Kisel'ov, is a former collective farm manager and leading pro-Russian figure. Kisel'ov, who is also the leader of the group Deputies Against Crime and Corruption, is thought to have an outlook similar to that of ex-Crimean President Meshkov. This represents the first major political victory of the pro-Russian forces since 1994, and confirm the important role of the anti-corruption group, built on the basis of the Russia-bloc.

In a September 1996 no-confidence vote against A. Danelian, the Deputy Chairman of the Crimean Parliament, and one of the leaders of PEVK, Crimean Tatar deputies of the Kurultai (i.e., representatives of the Mejlis) voted in an alliance with the pro-Russian Anti-Corruption Coalition. This was a grave shock to PEVK, who denounced the Tatar vote as an end to the "firmly principled stand with which that faction has always dignified itself." It is clear that pro-Ukrainian forces can no longer count on Crimean Tatar support.

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92 Radio Lux Information Service, 10 October 1996.
A further development in Crimean affairs is the re-animation of the Russian equation. Recent comments by ex-Russian Security Chief Lebed', which suggested clear territorial claims on Sevastopol', and also statements by Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzhkov, suggest that the status of Sevastopol' could well be a political issue in the next Russian Presidential elections. If so, this is likely to give encouragement to local ultra-Russian forces. The dispute over the Black Sea Fleet, moreover, has never fully been resolved, and could provide further fuel to anti-Ukrainian sentiments in Sevastopol'.

The Black Sea Fleet:

The struggle for a solution to the division of the Black Sea Fleet between Ukraine and Russia has thus far proved extraordinarily elusive, although not for lack of diplomatic efforts. Since this problem is one which belongs primarily to the realm of Russo-Ukrainian diplomacy and relations, an exhaustive account of the numerous doomed failed, makeshift agreements over the past five years would be out of place. The matter is of some interest, because the struggle over the fleet, which is intrinsically linked with the debate over who owns Sevastopol', is one which cannot but affect Crimean politics and identity. Therefore, the salient points of this conflict will be surveyed. It has been suggested by many military observers and journalists alike that the issue is fundamentally political and not military. The fleet, which was designed to counter the US Sixth Fleet, has little military significance in the

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modern context, and the rusting vessels are far from state of the art instruments of warfare.\textsuperscript{96}

On 12 December 1991: An Edict of the President of Ukraine decreed the creation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine based in part on forces of the Black Sea Fleet. In March of 1992, Yeltsin ordered that Russian naval banners be unfurled on all Black Sea Fleet vessels; the Ukrainians retaliated in April by creating the Naval Forces of Ukraine on the basis of units of the Black Sea Fleet ships deployed at Ukrainian ports. Presenting its claim to a portion of the Black Sea Fleet, the Ukrainian Supreme Rada declared that:

\begin{quote}
Ukraine claims only that part of the Black Sea Navy whose ports of registry are in the territory of Ukraine, which is considerably less than the contribution made by Ukraine in the development of the Naval Forces of the former Soviet Union....\textsuperscript{97}
\end{quote}

The Ukrainians explain that they are, in theory, entitled to 16.4 percent of the Navy of the Former USSR as Ukraine contributed this proportion to the Soviet economy, and insofar as Russia has taken full control over all ships of the Northern, Baltic, and Pacific Fleets. In this scheme, Ukraine could justifiably claim 98 percent of the Black Sea Fleet.

In July of 1992 the first round of talks on the Navy's division in Sevastopol' bore no fruit. The following month, at a summit meeting in Yalta, an agreement was signed to the effect that the Black Sea Fleet was to be divided by 1996. Meanwhile the fleet was to be


\textsuperscript{97} Ibid.
jointly financed and controlled. A further agreement in June of 1993 followed this outline, while announcing a fifty-fifty division of the fleet. But the following month, at a summit at Massandra (Crimea), Kravchuk agreed to sell off its portion of the Fleet as payment against Ukrainian energy debts.

The election of Leonid Kuchma to power reduced tensions somewhat in Crimea, because he was thought to be more pro-Russian than his predecessor. But in practice, Kuchma has relatively little room for manoeuvre on the issue. In May of 1996 Yeltsin and Kuchma met in Moscow to discuss the problem of Sevastopol' and the Black Sea Fleet. However, the situation again took a turn for the worse in late 1996 when the Russian State Duma voted 334-1 on 23 October 1996 for a bill that bars the Russian government from transferring any part of the fleet to Ukrainian control. An apparently final resolution to the fleet problem was only achieved at the end of May 1997, after Russia apparently came to the conclusion that good relations with her southern neighbour were necessary to prevent Ukraine developing closer military relations with NATO, and therefore further isolating Russia. At this time it was agreed that both the Russian and Ukrainian navies would share the port of Sevastopol', and that Russia would pay Ukraine 2 billion dollars over twenty years for the rent of the harbour, although most of this would be covered by Ukrainian fuel debts to Russia.

Sevastopol':

With its wealth of historic sites and monuments, and its stunning scenic views, Sevastopol' could be a lively tourist destination. Instead,

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98 Ibid.
the city is crime-infested, bankrupt and decaying, in part because the Russian fleet has refused to pay the full amount of tax it owes to city hall.

The city has also been a major bone of contention between Russian and Ukrainian politicians. This conflict appeared especially tense in July 1993, when the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation passed a resolution subordinating Sevastopol' to the Russian government and designated it the chief Black Sea Fleet base.

The mini-cold war over Crimea and the Black Sea fleet, based at the port city, has to some degree contributed to a re-crystallisation of Russian identity in the city, although, as noted, questions of survival are far more important than the political status of the city. The Sevastopol' City Administration has made every effort to celebrate the city's history, especially its role in the Crimean War. As noted in Chapter I, heroic defeats can be no less effective as nation-building myths than victories, although pro-Ukrainian observers see little point in an ostensibly Ukrainian city commemorating a Russian defeat. The idea of Sevastopol' as the "city of Russian glory", which is somehow linked to the Russian national soul, is also increasingly prevalent in Moscow's political elite. Ironically, the most forceful example of this view is put forward by Aman Tuleiev, Russia's "Minister for Co-operation with CIS States", who artfully links the city's pride in withstanding sieges to the current struggle against Ukrainian control:

When you walk around Sevastopol' you get the feeling that you are dealing with our state's age-old history, Every stone

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100 For celebrations of the 140th anniversary of the end of the war, ambassadors representing the former enemies were invited to attend festivities. "Sevastopol Administration Plans Dubious Celebrations" Ukrainian Press Agency (Daily News) 11 January 1996.
there is washed with Russian blood, every street, every home represents a memory associated with the names of heroes who defended the country in every age. That city is just as holy for Russia as other historic cities. But it is not just a question of history. Today the people of Sevastopol' themselves believe that they are enduring a third siege. They withstood two sieges during the Great Patriotic War. It is time to withstand a third.\footnote{Interview with Aman Tuleyev, minister for cooperation with the CIS states, by Zhanna Kasyanenko, "NATO Seen Inciting Ukraine in Fleet Dispute," Sovetskaia Rossiia, 12 November 12, 1996.}

The status of the city, by early 1997, was becoming an important political issue in Moscow, as likely Russian presidential candidates compete to underscore their nationalist credentials. Sevastopol's political establishment has made its intention to re-unite with Russia clear. In August 1994, a session of the Sevastopol' City Rada declared the city Russian, while also expressing full support for the idea of the Russian Black Sea Fleet having exclusive use of the port. More recently, in October 1996, Yuri Luzhkov wrote an open letter to Yeltsin: "We are calling on you to confirm that Sevastopol' belongs to Russia...The very idea of turning Sevastopol' over to another state is unnatural."\footnote{Angela Charlton, "While Russia and Ukraine Squabble, Historic Port City Rots," Associated Press, October 25, 1996.} Lebed' also declared that Ukraine's right to ownership of the city should be questioned on historical and ethnic grounds, and also because of the popular wishes of the local inhabitants.\footnote{MistNews (Information Agency, Lviv) 14 Oct 1996.} Even after an angry reaction from Ukrainian politicians, including Odessa's mayor, neither Luzhkov nor Lebed' recanted; on the contrary they restated their positions, with Lebed' declaring that "independent legal examination" which he
conducted during his brief stint as National Security Chief, "showed that Sevastopol' has been and will remain a Russian city."\(^{104}\)

The situation regarding Sevastopol' has attracted much speculation and predictions of violent military clashes between Russian and Ukrainian military forces, both of which are based in the city. While no serious skirmishes have taken place, the relations between Russian and Ukrainian forces in the city are hardly amicable, as illustrated by an incident in October 1996 when a group of Russian sailors spat at a Ukrainian naval officer while marching past. The city's 22,000 military veterans, mostly Russian, are among the most politically vocal and mobilised. They often demonstrate at the picturesque Count's Pier, and have appealed to Russia for political support on numerous occasions.\(^{105}\)

In short, for a combination of internal and external reasons, the status of Sevastopol' and Russian forces in the city is likely to remain a sensitive and troublesome point in Russo-Ukrainian relations, notwithstanding recent diplomatic successes in this regard.

Organised Crime and Politics in Crimea:

While on the one hand, almost all of the political power in Crimea is concentrated in the hands of the Presidential Representative, and the parliament and political parties are impotent, there is a more important level upon which politics operates in the republic. Arguably, the leading political parties are in fact forces to be reckoned with insofar as they

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\(^{104}\) "Lebed' Says He Prevented Russia From Selling Out Sevastopol" Interfax (Moscow) 27 December 1996.

"Moscow Mayor Luzhkov Defends View on Sevastopol Status" Interfax 26 December 1996.

\(^{105}\) Ibid.
derive their real power from criminal groups whose interests they represent and who, in turn, protect their interests.

In August of 1994, Vladimir Radchenko, then Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine made the following rather ominous pronouncement on the criminalisation of Crimean society:

> The severity of the criminal situation in Crimea cannot be written off merely as ordinary banditry. There are reasons that go much deeper, but the time to speak of them has not yet come.\(^\text{106}\)

More recently, in July of 1996, Ukraine's National Security Council Secretary, Volodymyr Horbulin declared that the "godfathers" of political groups have taken power in Crimea.\(^\text{107}\) Any study of politics, society and ethnic relations in contemporary Crimea can thus not be separated from an analysis of organised crime and political violence. The detailed litany of Mafia activities and political assassinations provided below is meant to illustrate the scale of the problem, and to underscore that the simple study of public opinion, political parties and their platforms is insufficient in the Crimean context. Corruption and the influence of criminal structures casts a shadow over virtually every aspect of politics and ethnic relations in Crimea. The widespread violence that broke out between Crimean Tatars and Russian racketeers in the summer of 1995 was the closest thing to inter-ethnic violence that has been witnessed in post-independence Ukraine; this volatile situation was directly linked to the criminalisation of Crimean society. Probably the

\(^{106}\) Quoted in "Piat' mgnoenii ukrainskoi nezavisimosti", Kievskie vedomosti, 23 August 1996, p. 3.

most significant development in Crimean politics in the previous year (1996) is that the pro-Russian ethnic idea has been overshadowed as a political issue by the question of all-pervasive crime and corruption. This is illustrated by the formation in September of 1996 of the parliamentary bloc Deputies Against Crime and Corruption, largely on the basis of the pro-Russian political organisations in Crimea. It is no coincidence that, according to survey results, the vast majority of Crimeans believe that the peninsula is run by the Mafia. A survey in Simferopol' also found that 95 percent of the population expressed dissatisfaction with the Crimean authorities' battle on crime. In the continuing competition between Kiev and Simferopol' for political control over the peninsula, crime and corruption has been a central issue, as both competing governments have vied to present themselves as the more dedicated anti-corruption crusaders.

There is an appearance that at the very highest levels of Crimean government, there is a willingness to resort to violence and provocations. The rather provocative assertion of Valerii Zaitsev, a Ukrainian journalist that "Crimean politicians represent the economic interests of Mafia clans" is a view widely held by many Ukrainian and Russian journalists. Leonid Grach, the head of the Crimean Communist Party, who admittedly has his own political reasons for playing-up the role of

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the Mafia in Crimea, is also very blunt in his estimation of the importance of Mafia-clan warfare in the peninsula:

We can shout all we like about separatism but the main quarrel will involve the division of property between clans. Crime has reached such a peak that people enter politics now merely to line their pockets.\(^\text{111}\)

The echo of bombs exploding in cafes, as local *Mafiosi* compete for territory, has become a painful fact of Crimean life; as one local observer put it, Simferopol' has become a post-Soviet Beirut.\(^\text{112}\) In one horrific incident in February of 1996, two gunmen walks into "Mirage", a Simferopol' cafe and shot dead five customers, while seriously wounding seven others.\(^\text{113}\) In 1994 there were 3 clan leaders killed, and twenty other murders of gang members. In the following year, there were seventy-five contract murders in Crimea.\(^\text{114}\) To make matters worse, there is an extremely high degree of corruption in the Crimean police force; in 1994 roughly 500 were charged with criminal activity.\(^\text{115}\)

According to M.V. Kornienko, Head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in Crimea, virtually all branches of the local militia have been corrupt, and some have even been operating as racketeers.\(^\text{116}\)

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\(^{111}\) Ron Popeski, "Ukraine's separatist Crimea plunges into clan warfare" *Reuters*, 7 October.


\(^{114}\) There was, however, a significant decrease in contract killings in the first 9 months of 1996, with only 24 such killings, compared to 42 for the same period in the previous year. "24 Ordered Murders in Crimea - Almost twice as low as in 1995," *Faks-postup* (Amsterdam/L'viv), 2, 41(128), 9 October 1996.


\(^{116}\) Alarmingly, 90 percent of weapons used by Crimean criminals are of military origins. Interview with M.V. Kornienko by Nataliia Panasenko,
structures of Crimea are scarcely intimidated by the local security forces. If the latter demonstrate particular initiative, they can expect to be eliminated. Mykola Zvereva, the Director of anti-Mafia and Corruption branch of the Internal Ministry of Ukraine in Crimea, was regarded as an honest and dedicated Mafia fighter, and was vigorously investigating the "Mirage" cafe murders. His body was found on 29 November, in an apparent retaliation for his unexpected zeal.\textsuperscript{117}

\textbf{Clan Warfare and Crimean Politics:}

Political life is also ensnared in a vicious cycle of terror which is directly linked to criminal structures. A recent investigation by the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs partly confirmed this link: it found that roughly 40 deputies to the Crimean Soviet had direct ties to criminal groups.\textsuperscript{118} According to analysts with the Ukrainian Press Agency, there are three main criminal groups in Crimea, each of which has its own political front organisation.\textsuperscript{119}

The first criminal organisation in Crimea is the \textit{Bashmaki}, named after one of its leaders, Bashmakov. They put Crimea first, or, more accurately, the interests of Crimea's local business elite. Their motto is "No Russia, no Ukraine", meaning that they would like to drive out all Mafiosi except for the Crimean-\textit{Bashmaki} Mafia. This group is allegedly protected by and linked with the PEVK.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item "Krym "pod kryshei" generala Kornienka" \textit{Krymskaia gazeta}, 30, 14 February 1996, p. 2.
\item \textit{Radio Lux Information Service}, 30 November 1996.
\item “Poloustrov mozhet stat’ vtoroi Sitsiliei?,” \textit{Vseukrainskie vedomosti}, 22 January 1997.
\item Information brief from staff of \textit{Ukrainian Press Agency}, 14 Oct 1996. (Originally an informal letter to Taras Kuzio, later distributed through Internet).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
The second economic-criminal group may be labelled the "Moscow" group. It is sponsored by Moscow-based criminal gangs. Their political face is allegedly the pro-Russian political parties, mainly the "Russia Bloc" and the Crimean Party, headed by L. Mirimskii, an MP in the Ukrainian parliament. The third leading criminal group is "Seilem", which protects the economic interests of the Crimean Tatars. The "Seilem" are said to be protected by the Mejlis, the executive committee of the Kurultai.

Each of the three criminal groups has its own political slogans: the Bashmaki group advocates "realistic co-operation with Ukraine"; "Seilem" calls for "Protection of the Crimean Tatars rights," while the "Moscow group" promises "Closeness with Russia".

There have been an entire series of terrorist acts against activists of the Christian-Liberal Party of Ukraine, a tiny centrist party. Among those killed were its leader, Yevhen Podanev and his first deputy, Mykhailo Korchylava. Yurii Tokach, the leader of the Party of Social Guarantees, another small centrist party based in Simferopol', was also murdered.\(^{120}\)

In early March 1995 the then Prime-Minister Franchuk (who was regarded as pro-Kiev, as he was the brother-in-law of President Kuchma) complained that he had received several telephone threats against his life and his family, and a warning not to continue in office. The callers, claims Franchuk, even provided him with a detailed description of his route from work to home as a way of underlining the seriousness of their

\(^{120}\) Vladimir Andronaki, “A v Krymu vse v dymu,” Novaia gazeta, 8(75), 3-9 March 1995.
An even more alarming episode took place on 11 March, when an unidentified man apparently carrying a bomb to the apartment of Vice-Premier Demydenko was killed when it prematurely detonated in the stairwell of Demydenko’s building.

This political violence also extends to local politics. A candidate for the Simferopol' city Soviet, running on an anti-corruption platform, was violently beaten in June of 1995. On 15 September 1996, another Deputy of the Simferopol' city Soviet was gunned down, apparently as a result of his links to criminal structures. The day after a June Presidential ukase against organised crime was issued, a contract killing took place in Simferopol', as if to underline the Ukrainian state's powerlessness against criminal forces.

As noted, the leader of the Crimean Tatar National Movement (NMCT) was murdered in November of 1993. At a press conference in Simferopol' in July 1995, the Deputy Speaker of the Crimean Parliament, Refat Chubarov (also the deputy leader of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis) declared that he had in his possession information revealing plans for the assassination of M. Jemilev, head of the Tatar Mejlis, Peoples' Deputy L. Budjurova, and against Chubarov himself. In his view, "certain forces [are] interested in engineering inter ethnic cataclysms to

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123 "Vyibli kandiydati iz bor'by" Kryms'ka pravda, 22 June 1995, p. 2.
124 Krymskie izvestiia, 173 (1178), in Obzor, 17 September 1996.
weaken Ukraine's position in the Crimea.” Presumably Chubarov had in mind forces of the Russian secret service or the Russian Mafia.

The suspicious death in a road accident of Yakob Apter, the first leader of the Union in Support of the Republic of Crimea, may well have been a further political assassination. In June of 1996, the windows of the flat of Vladimir Shev'iov, leader of the Party of Economic Renaissance of Crimea, were shattered with a hail of automatic rifle fire. PEVK claims that it was planning to reveal information regarding alleged misuse of state funds and their re-direction into the hands of the Mafia, although pro-Russian forces in the parliament would argue that it PEVK itself is the epicentre of Crimean corruption.

Perhaps the most dramatic and disturbing episode of political violence in Crimea to date, however, is the alleged kidnapping of the Crimean parliamentary Speaker, Yevhenii Supruniuk on 24 August 1996. According to Supruniuk's version of events, he later miraculously escaped from his captors. As in the case of the events surrounding the alleged assassination attempt on the Ukrainian Prime Minister, Pavlo Lazarenko, there are a whole host of theories on the events surrounding the alleged kidnapping, including Russian

129 Tat'iana Korobova, "Terror protiv partii ekonomicheskogo vozrozhdeniia Kryma prodolzhaetsia," Kievskie vedomosti, 17 June 1996.
130 "Slidstvo u spravi Supruniuka hal'muiet'sia" Radio Lux Information Service (2 October 1996); Chrystyna Lapychak, "Crimean Parliamentary Speaker Escapes Kidnappers", OMRI Daily Digest, 166, 27 August 1996.
131 If reports from Ukrainian and Crimean doctors are to be trusted, Supruniuk suffered extremely serious injuries. Krymskie izvestiiia, no. 172. re-printed in Obzor, 13 September 1996.
intervention and failed business dealings. According to Sergei Tsekov, ex-parliamentary speaker and leader of the Republican Party of Crimea, the kidnapping was a "political farce." Tsekov’s sentiments are shared by the leader of the "Republic" faction in the Crimean parliament, Vladimir Klychnikov:

The kidnapping of Supruniuk is nothing more than a grubby political provocation and intrigue designed to dissolve the [parliamentary] session, insofar as over one half of the deputies are now positioned in opposition to the current speaker. \(^{133}\)

If nothing else this kidnapping (as in the case of the alleged assassination attempt on Prime Minister Lazarenko) illustrates that some political or criminal forces are willing to resort to extremely unscrupulous measures to determine the face of national politics. Again, this underscores that political and economic elites in the region are so bitterly divided internally, that there is little likelihood of a unified, pro-Russian movement fully recovering for quite some time.

The Mafia and Separatism:

It has been argued by some that the so-called Mafia’s influence has promoted separatist tendencies in Crimea and elsewhere. Russian, Ukrainian and Western analysts of Crimean affairs have argued that

\(^{132}\) The first theory is that it was related to the speaker's financial dealings, namely his personal sponsorship of a rather dubious arrangement to procure a $50 million loan. (On this see Krymskoe vremia, 87. Reprinted in Obzor, 18 September 1996.) The second theory is that it was caused by a conflict between Supruniuk and the Crimean Prime Minister. The third, and perhaps most disturbing theory, is that it was carried out by Moscow sponsored forces seeking to destabilise the political situation in Crimea. The final theory is that it was staged by Supruniuk himself as a way of pre-empting his imminent dismissal. Krymskoe vremia, no. 85, in Obzor 13 September 1996.

\(^{133}\) Tat’iana Korobova, "Sergei Tsekov schitaet ChP s Supruniukom "politicheskim farsom"", Kievskie vedomosti, 28 August 1996, p. 3.
organised crime from Russia proper has been an important source of funding for the separatist and pro-autonomy parties, such as Meshkov’s Russia Bloc.\footnote{Chrystyna Lapychak, “Crackdown on Crimean Separatists,” Transition, 26 May 1995, p. 3.; Nezavisimaia gazeta, 4 June 1994; Kievskie vedomosti, 18 March 1995.}

According to Vladimir Nikolaevich Varaka, a Donets’k expert on organised crime, Mafia groups may be just as inclined to fiercely defend their local “turf” against incursions from competing Mafia; especially those from Russia, who are their leading competitors.\footnote{Vladimir Varaka is the deputy chairman of the Donets’k oblast Committee on the Struggle with Organised Crime. See the following interview with him: “I na piatuiu vlast’ naidetsia vlast’”, Zhizn’, 5 April 1996.} It would appear safe to say that Southern and Eastern Ukrainian Mafia thrive in a power vacuum; they prefer maximum autonomy under weak, easily controllable governments dependent on their patronage. The three-way power struggle in Crimea in 1994, between Kiev, the Crimean President and the Crimean parliament, provided a perfect opportunity for organised crime to gain maximum influence in the peninsula, as it was rarely clear who, if anyone, was in charge. Also, the case of the Bashmaki group is illustrative: their interests are tied to a tacit alliance with Kiev against other Crimean based political-criminal groups.

**Privatisation:**

The privatisation process in Crimea has been the focus of Mafia-clan warfare in Crimea, and has further fuelled inter-ethnic conflict on the peninsula. The much sought after prize in the privatisation struggle are assets formerly held by the state or Communist Party, including sea front
resorts and undeveloped gas and oil deposits. The "Moscow Group" forces, including the Crimean "Cossacks", defend property in the relatively prosperous Southern part of Crimea. The Bashmaki and PEVK, on the other hand, do not want to be shut out of the privatisation process. Presumably the Kiev government — which is itself closely tied to the Dnipropetrovs’k clan — would also like to benefit itself from the process. The case of the Crimean Cossacks (discussed above) is a further illustration of the interconnection between commercial interests and ethnic-based rivalries: while the Cossacks claim to be defenders of Russian identity, the defence and expansion of their commercial interests appears no less important to them. Finally, the Crimean Tatar criminal groups would also like their piece of the privatisation pie. During the privatisation process, the "Moscow group" became increasingly annoyed that Supruniuk supported the Bashmaki group against them in all matters relating to privatisation and business. Control over the privatisation process has also been a major bone of contention between the Kiev and Simferopol’ governments. Crimea set up its own State Property fund which was duplicating the efforts of the Crimean Branch of the Ukrainian State Property Fund.

**Criminal structures and inter-ethnic violence:**

On the 23rd of June Crimean Tatars clashed with a local Russian racket at the market in Kurortne, Crimea. In the fight that ensued, two Crimean Tatars died of head injuries. Then, on the 25th of June Crimean Tatars staged, what Crimean officials called "pogroms" against Russians, while setting various Russian businesses ablaze. After two days of local violence.

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137 "Ne budet li "pirog" krymskoi sobstvennosti slishkom urezannym?" Krymskaja pravda, 14, 1 February 1995.
militia inactivity, about 500 Crimean Tatars rioted in several Crimean Tatar settlements. In the process, they managed to kidnap the head of the Administration of the Interior in Feodosiia. That night a force of Berkut Special Militia from Poltava oblast clashed with the Crimean Tatars, and an additional two Tatars were killed. This latter episode threatened to undermine traditional Crimean Tatar support for Ukraine.

Marketplace clashes in Crimea are frequent occurrence, as Tatars sometimes refuse to pay protection money to local rackets controlling the food and commodity markets. As two Ukrainian analysts argue: "Local law enforcement agencies appear to protect the home-bred Mafiosi, rather than defend citizens' interests. Often, it is difficult to tell the difference between the racket and the militia." Consequently, Crimean Tatars have organised their own armed self-defence units to defend themselves against the racketeers.

The events of July 1995 gave Kuchma the opportunity to improve Ukraine's position in Crimea by presenting the Ukrainian government as the greatest hope for 'law and order' in Crimea. In a Presidential Edict of 26 July 1995, Kuchma upbraided the Crimean Supreme Soviet for their failure to suppress the Crimean Mafia, and outlined a host of initiatives calculated to put the anti-crime campaign directly under Kiev's control. Personnel from the Ministry of the Interior of Ukraine were dispatched, as well as from the Security Service of Ukraine, the National Guard of Ukraine and the Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine.139

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139 “Edict Of The President Of Ukraine: On Urgent Measures To Eliminate Infringements Of Law And Order In The Autonomous...
Throughout 1995 and 1996, the Crimean parliament consistently exploited the criminal situation on the peninsula, turning Kuchma's argument on its head by proclaiming that the root of the problem is the weakness of local control over the police forces. In May of 1996 the Crimean Supreme Soviet approved a declaration "On the political-legal situation in Crimea," ostensibly precipitated by a series of violent acts against representatives of the Party of Economic Renaissance of Crimea. In the statement, it was declared that the direct subordination of Crimean law-enforcement organs of the Crimean Republic to Ukrainian organs leaves the Supreme Soviet and the Government of Crimea as nothing more than a passive bystander to events on the peninsula and that "Ukraine as a government is not fulfilling its direct duties in the capacity of primary guarantor of security of its citizens." Following from this, they again called for the joint division of authority over law-enforcement bodies. Hence, the demands of the fight against crime have been used by both Kiev and Simferopol' as a justification for the expansion of powers.

"Deputies Against Crime and Corruption":

Nothwithstanding their own apparent ties to Russian criminal structures, pro-Russian forces in the Crimean parliament led by V. Kisel'ov, (who became the Chairman of Supreme Soviet on 9 October 1996), and ex-Speaker Tsekov, have manoeuvred for the moral high ground in the parliament by establishing, on 10 September 1996, an anti-criminal coalition called "Deputies Against Crime and Corruption."


140 Tat'iana Korobova, "VS Kryma: Kiev, dai porulit' organami!", Kievskie Vedomosti, May 5 1996.
They claim that Crimea has been under the corrupt administration of the relatively pro-Ukrainian (or status quo) PEVK, which has led to the complete criminalisation of the upper echelons of Crimean power. The Presidential representative in Crimea, D. Stepaniuk, they allege, is also completely in the hands of the PEVK. They accuse PEVK's leadership of being involved in a host of shady deals, including a dubious donation of 50 tons of titanium dioxide (worth $US 285,000) to a sports club.\textsuperscript{141} It appears, however, that the anti-crime coalition is primarily directed against the PEVK; Tsekov's attempts at quieting local newspaper reports that have written of the interconnection between Mafia clans and Crimean politicians including himself, undermines his credentials as a anti-corruption campaigner.\textsuperscript{142} While the sincerity of these anti-corruption crusaders may be rather questionable, there can be no doubt that the mere formation of such a coalition illustrates the extent to which corruption has become the key political issue in Crimea, overshadowing even such issues as relations with Russia.

CONCLUSION:

Although after 1954 Crimea was technically part of Ukraine, it had virtually no connection to Ukrainian cultural or linguistic traditions. The minority Ukrainian population in Crimea would seem to have disappeared or Russified without a trace. Yet, in fact they have mixed with the local Russian population which is neither strictly Russian nor Ukrainian in its identification, and which gravitates towards some sort of pan-Slavic, Soviet identification. Arguably, this is why the idea of


\textsuperscript{142} Ron Popeski, "Ukraine's separatist Crimea plunges into clan warfare" Reuters, 7 October.
Crimean re-unification with Russia is almost always accompanied by the idea of re-unification of all of Ukraine to Russia as well, or the recreation of a pan-East Slavic state. The 1994 success of blatantly separatist forces in Crimean elections over-stated the support for the Russian idea in Crimea. Local election results suggest that the Soviet idea is apparently having a political renaissance in Crimea. What can be said for certain, is that the Ukrainian national idea has no support in Crimea. Yet, local hostility towards Ukraine should not be over-stated: a majority of Crimean voters (albeit a slim majority) did vote for Ukrainian independence in the first place. Should Kiev continue to follow an overly strict or dictatorial policy towards Crimea, they risk reviving anti-Ukrainian sentiments, even within the traditionally pro-Ukrainian political forces of the peninsula (i.e., Crimean Tatars).

A considerable part of this discussion of Crimea has been dedicated to the interconnection between politics, economic or criminal elites and national identity. It appears that, as in the case of Donets'k, economic and political "clans" often support different national-political orientations (i.e., pro-Kiev, pro-Moscow) for apparently strategic reasons. In the case of Crimea, economic interests have sometimes reinforced ethnic divisions (as in the market clashes with Crimean Tatars), but on other occasions they have cut across ethnic lines, as pro-Russian forces on the peninsula have fought among themselves. To date, it seems that the predominance of a generally Soviet local identity, internal divisions within the pro-Russian movement, and Kiev's success in co-opting a leading economic and political group, has thus far neutralised political separatism on the peninsula. Consequently, the process of raising a strictly Russian national consciousness in the ethnically mixed region has been further hampered, as has the separatist political movement.
CHAPTER 8:
SOCIETY AND POLITICS IN ODESSA:

An American Tourist: “This is my first time in Ukraine, can you please tell me about it?”

An Odessan: “Sorry, but this is the first time I’ve been in this country myself.”

Odessa Anecdote from 1991. 1

Odessa Society:

As this anecdote illustrates, Odessans scarcely thought of themselves as being in Ukraine prior to 1991. This is hardly surprising given the city’s historical and cultural links with Russia. The demographic profile of Odessa oblast is quite distinct from that of the Donbass or Crimea. The most fundamental feature of the oblast population is the ethnic and social gap between the ethnically Ukrainian countryside and the Russian speaking city. In contrast to the Donbass, the oblast centre, Odessa, is outnumbered by the outlying small towns and village settlements. In 1993 the city of Odessa’s population was 1,083,300, while the population of the oblast as a whole was 2,627,600. Outside Odessa itself, there are only a handful of towns, such as Izmail (94,700) and Bilgorod-Dnistrovs’kii (70,000) of any size. The remaining urban settlements in the oblast are small towns roughly between 10 and 20 thousand inhabitants. The urban proportion of the population is 66 percent of the whole. This is far lower than in Donets’k (90.5 percent), Luhans’k (86.6 percent) or Dnipropetrovs’k (83.8 percent). 2 According to the last census (which is now rather out of date in view of the high rate

1 Interview with M. Zhvanetskii by Vladimir Katsman, Odesskii vestnik, 26, 9 February 1995, p. 6.
2 Naseleñnia Ukrainy: demohrafichnyi shchorichnyk, p. 25.
of emigration, especially of Odessa’s Jews), out of a total population of 2,624,245, there were 1,432,737 Ukrainians (54.6 percent) in the oblast; 719,039 Russians (27.4 percent); 165,821 Bulgarians (6.3 percent); 144,534 Moldovans (5.5 percent); 69,105 Jews (2.6 percent); and 93,009 representatives of other nationalities (3.6 percent).^3

In their response to a variety of questions relating to Ukrainian statehood, Southerners are very similar in their outlook to representatives of East-Central Ukraine (i.e., Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrov'sk) and North-Eastern Ukraine (Kharkiv). For example, in a 1994 survey regarding Ukrainian independence, 36 percent of inhabitants of the Southern and East-Central Ukrainians, and 30 percent of Kharkiv residents said that they would vote against Ukrainian independence if a new referendum was held. This compares to 63 percent of Donets'k residents and 55 percent of Crimean residents who opposed independence. Also, in questions regarding self-identification with various territorial or state formations, the identification of Southern Ukrainians roughly resembled that of East and North Central Ukrainians.^4

According to a survey of ethnic distance conducted in various regions of Ukraine, Southern Ukrainians on the whole were the least tolerant of Russians—even less so than Galician Ukrainians, who are popularly regarded as the most anti-Russian. At the same time, after Crimean Ukrainians, Ukrainians in the South are the least tolerant of Ukrainians from the Diaspora (Galician Ukrainians, on the other hand,

^4 Politychnyi portret Ukrainy. 9, 1994, pp. 44-45.
feel very close to their Diaspora brethren).\(^5\) This suggests that the rural South has not evolved beyond the traditional suspicion and mistrust of foreigners typical of the Ukrainian peasantry in the 19th century. Yet, in contrast to Donets'k, because there is such a large rural Ukrainian population which has had relatively little social contact with the Russian city, there is the ethnic "raw material" out of which an ethnic-based national identity may emerge. In the long term, therefore, there is the possibility of mobilising the Ukrainian population along ethnic lines in the rural South. But the economic traditionalism of the peasantry (i.e., their attachment to collective agriculture, and fear of moving beyond that) means that political movements which combine an appeal to the national idea with economic conservatism, such as the Peasant Party of Ukraine, have a greater appeal than obviously pro-reform movements such as Rukh or the Republican Party of Ukraine. The peasantry of the South is an inverted image of the Donbass and Crimean population: while the Donbass and Crimea are culturally Soviet and economically relatively reformist, the South Ukrainian peasantry is culturally Ukrainian but opposed to reform.

**Odessa’s "Generation Gap":**

While the peasantry may be regarded as something of a reactionary force in the oblast, the urban, educated youth should, in theory, represent the vanguard of Odessa’s society. A 1994 study of Odessan university students conducted by Pulse provides a valuable picture of the outlook of Odessans towards a wide variety of issues. This study is of particular interest as it provides a preview of the next generation of educated Odessans, a generation whose attitudes to national identity, private

property and the Soviet Union should be quite distinct from those of their parents’ generation.⁶

As in the case of Donets’k and Crimea, there is a very high level of distrust of political and social institutions. While 68 percent of pension age respondents expressed a willingness to vote, a mere 38 percent of students were so inclined. Of those students that said they would not vote, 41 percent claimed that the elections would change nothing, while another 34 percent were convinced that the election results would be tampered with. A high level of distrust towards the media was also in evidence. Optimism in the future was rather low among students, with only 13 percent expressing confidence in the future; pensioners were even more pessimistic, with only 6 percent answering in the affirmative to this question.⁷ To the question “What worries you more today?”, the most common reply was the growth of crime and the strengthening of the Mafia’s power. The possibility of inter-ethnic conflicts was not a great concern to students or pension-aged respondents, it ranked sixth place out of a list of twelve variants. A question regarding fundamental values demonstrated that the Ukrainian national idea had very little support among both generations of Odessans, with 8 percent of students and 6 percent of pensioners regarding it as the highest idea. Not surprisingly, Communism as an ideology had next to no support (2 percent) among young voters, compared to 11 percent of older Odessans. The younger generation apparently more closely reflects the values of the ideal Odessan as described above: 44 percent of young voters considered the

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⁷ Ibid. p. 2, Question no. 8.
“rights and dignity of man” as the highest value, compared to only 21 percent of older voters that selected this choice.\textsuperscript{8} Yet their response to a somewhat different question paints a rather contradictory picture of their regard for human rights and democracy: 29 percent of young respondents also felt that “A strong government should be established which would bring order but temporarily limit or curtail the democratic rights and liberties of citizens.” A full 59 percent of pension-aged voters agreed with this proposition.

The young generation is apparently no more interested in the Ukrainian language than their grandparents' generation. This suggests that the transition to the Ukrainian language in Odessa is not simply a matter of the passing of the older generation. 88 percent of pensioners and 90 percent of students opposed only one official language in Ukraine. A mere 6 percent of students were in favour of this proposition, as opposed to 8 percent of pensioners. Attitudes towards political ties with Russia illustrate the same pattern: slightly more students (88 compared to 86 percent of pensioners) supported full Ukrainian membership in the CIS Economic Union.\textsuperscript{9}

\textbf{Emigration:}

Many young Odessans have, in fact, abandoned all hope for a prosperous life in their city and opted to leave the country altogether. While emigration and immigration is regarded as a natural part of a port city’s existence, the exodus from Odessa represents a clear drain on the intellectual and demographic resources of the city. Between 1987-1992

\textsuperscript{8} \textit{Ibid.} pp. 4-5, Question 17. Note that respondents were able to reply to more than one question.

\textsuperscript{9} \textit{Ibid.} pp. 5-6, Questions 19 and 21.
emigration permits from Ukraine numbered 283,813. Twenty-five percent (70,953) of these were from Kiev; 17 percent (48,248) were from Odessa, 7.5 percent (21,285) from Kharkiv, and 6 percent (17,029) were from Dnipropetrov'sk. When one considers Odessa’s population as compared to Kiev’s, it is clear that Odessa has been subjected to a disproportionately high degree of emigration. This emigration has hit Ukraine’s Jewish community especially hard. 75 percent of permits for residence abroad were for Israel. In 1994, forty nine thousand people left Ukraine permanently and one-seventh of this group was from Odessa. Most Odessans are leaving for economic reasons, and about 60 percent of emigrating Odessans have advanced educational and 11 percent of them have scientific degrees.

Odessa’s social and demographic problems are being exacerbated by an AIDS epidemic, spread mainly through some of the estimated 30,000 intravenous drug users in the oblast. According to the United Nations, the city may well have the fastest growth in HIV infection of any city in Europe, east or west. Typical of the animosity between various levels of government in Odessa (this will be discussed below), an argument over the decision to locate an AIDS treatment hospital in central Odessa broke out between Ruslan Bodelan (the chairman of the oblast Soviet) and Odessa mayor Eduard Hurvyts, with the mayor

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11 A.M. Shlepakov, O.A. Malinovs’ka, O.M. Pinchuk, Emigratsiia naselennia Ukrainy: sotsial’no-ekonomichni aspekty ta mozhlyvi naslidky, vypusk 17, (Kiev: Natsional’nyi institut stratehichnykh doslidzhenn, 1993.)
accusing Bodelan of putting the health of the local resident’s at risk through his spiteful hostility toward the city.\textsuperscript{12}

\textbf{Media:}

Odessa’s local media provides thorough coverage of most of the city’s and oblast’s social and political problems. The media in Odessa represents the full spectrum of public opinion in the city, and has been quite bold in denouncing local politicians and criminal figures. Both of the leading figures in Odessan political life, Hurvyts and Bodelan, have been regularly scorched by critical editorial comments. The former accused the newspaper \textit{Odesskii vestnik} of libel, and requested that the oblast prosecutor investigate the newspaper, while Bodelan had demanded the right to reply to articles written in the newspaper \textit{Yug}.\textsuperscript{13}

Odessa has always been known for its large number of publications. Between 1913-1914 there were 60 local newspapers, which was an extremely high number for that time.\textsuperscript{14} As of 1995 there were 216 periodicals registered in the oblast. 105 of these publications were published in Russian, 37 in Ukrainian, and 40 are published in both languages. The only Ukrainian language daily newspaper in the oblast is the \textit{Chornomorski novyny}. Ukrainian national democrats, however, have been pragmatic about their publishing activities, and the Russian language newspaper \textit{Yug}, is for all intents and purposes a Ukrainian national-democratic publication.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Ukrainian Media Bulletin}, 4, 1995, p. 16.  
\textsuperscript{14} \textit{100 voprosov z Odessu}, p. 85.  
\textsuperscript{15} \textit{UMB Digest}, 3, 1995.
As in Crimea, the murder of journalists in Odessa is a relatively regular occurrence. A reporter for Vecherniaia Odessa, Sergei Lebedev, was murdered for reporting on the local Mafia, and a nationalist editor of the journal Argument, Igor Nechitailo, was also murdered after threats from the local Mafia.16

**Business Odessa:**

The Odessans’ love of commerce has clearly survived the Soviet period: Odessans are more likely than other urban Ukrainians to engage in small scale peddling and trade. A 1995 survey of five Ukrainian cities found that 32 percent of households had at least one family member whose income was supplemented by such so-called “informal” activities. In Odessa, however, this proportion rose to 43 percent.17 One of the aspersions cast upon Mayor Eduard Hurvyts is that he represents the narrow perspective of the small time peddlers and kiosk vendors that dominate the increasingly shabby streets of Odessa.18 As such, he is said to lack any vision in his programme for revitalising the economic, or cultural life of the city.

Odessa’s commercial life is naturally not immune to the influence of criminal structures so prevalent in Ukrainian life. While the situation with organised crime in Odessa is perhaps not quite as grave as it is in Crimea, Odessa is certainly one of the leading criminal centres in the

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18 Author’s interview with Oleg Valentinovich Fesenko, 21 April 1995. Also, Evgenii Olenin, "Gorodskaia sreda i vlast'," Vecherniaia Odessa, 30 January 1996.
country, and it is becoming a growing worry of local citizens. The number of Mafia contract killings in Odessa has increased dramatically over the last two years. In 1995 six business leaders and 5 Mafia clan leaders were murdered. In the same year there were 29 overall Mafia hits, 20 of which used equipment stolen from the military. This compared to only 12 such attacks in 1994. The criminal situation in the port city of Illichivs'k is especially problematic. Mayor Hurvyts has complained that the local authorities have demonstrated almost criminal negligence in their ineffectual attempt to deal with the growing Mafia crisis in the oblast.

The city's 19th century golden age was built upon its important role as the export and import hub of the wealthiest area of the Russian Empire. The dream of every reform-minded Odessan politician and businessman is to rebuild, in contemporary terms, the economic base of that bygone era. As a port city, it is only natural that Odessa is better equipped to re-orient its trade and business to the West as compared with other Ukrainian cities. This is especially the case with the enormous Odessa based Black Sea Shipping Company (Blasco), which possesses the largest merchant fleet in the former Soviet Union. In the transition to the free market, Blasco, which ships mostly metals, sugar and grain, has benefited from its extensive international experience. Pavlo Kudiukin, the former president of Blasco underscores the importance to the company of this international experience:

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19 Oleksandr Volchek, "Zlochyntsi ozbroieni i duzhe nebezpechni, Odes'ki visti, 27 February 1996.
Regardless of whether we were part of the Soviet Union or an independent Ukraine, we've always been a marine company which has worked 100 percent on the world market ... Every single one of our sailors has worked in a market economy every day of his life.\footnote{Chrystia Freeland, "Odessa flexes its old mercantile muscles" Financial Times, 19 July 1994.}

During the Soviet era, 70 per cent of Blasco's business was Moscow-directed; by 1994, a third of its business came from Ukraine and the rest from Germany, China and Russia in that order. Likewise, much of Odessa's trade has been directed away from Russia: the Baltics, Israel, Greece, Germany and the US are now more important than the former imperial centre. As Mikhail Chertov, a leading Odessa businessman puts it: "Spiritually, we are very close to Russia, but in business we've very quickly re-oriented ourselves." Like mayor Hurvyts, Chertkov is confident that Odessa will become "the great wholesale bazaar for the entire former Soviet Union".\footnote{Ibid.}

The construction of a new oil terminal in Odessa has also been touted as a way of returning Odessa's former economic importance. If all goes according to plan, the city would become the gateway to a major pipeline of oil for Europe, as Russian oil reserves dwindle (they are projected to last only another 20 years) and Middle East oil imports expand. A transportation route throughout the Caucasus, Turkey and Ukraine would be roughly half the distance of current routes through the Suez Canal or around Africa\footnote{"Iraqi Oil to Boost Odesa Terminal Construction," Kiev Post 1-7 August 1996; Chrystia Freeland, “Ukraine signs deal to buy Iranian oil,” Financial Times, 24 February 1992.} Unfortunately, it appears that Odessa is not immune to the corruption that cripples much of Ukraine's economy.

\footnote{Ibid.}
Kudiukin was put on trial for corruption, and Blasco’s fleet has been banned from many western ports for unpaid debts; a number of its ships were even confiscated.\textsuperscript{24}

Identity in Odessa:

As the case of the Donbass and Crimea have demonstrated, intermarriage and other demographic and historical legacies of the Soviet period have promoted mixed pan-Slavic and Soviet identity. Insofar as the question of national identity in Odessa is generally considered from the point of view of the city of Odessa, rather than the culturally distinct and rural oblast, particular attention will be paid to the city itself. The short-lived Novorossiia movement will also be evaluated. The character of the largely ethnically Ukrainian countryside, its political orientation, and its apparent incompatibility with the city, will be discussed somewhat later. The city, where ethnic intermixing started with its founding, illustrates that the development of a strong local identity is another possible outcome of these same ethnic processes.

In a 1991 letter to the editor of \textit{Vecherniaia Odessa}, titled “Nationality: Odessan”, Aleksandr Kolpakov explains that “I speak Russian, I sing Ukrainian songs, I dance Jewish dances and I never ask anybody that I know or even just met, what their nationality is.”\textsuperscript{25} In a

\textsuperscript{24}Andrew Baxter and Matthew Kaminiski, “New Boy on Shipbuilders block.” \textit{Financial Times} 25 August 1995. One accusation against Blasco, published in a German newspaper, also links ex-president Kravchuk to Kudriukin’s illegal dealings, although the latter has denied the charges adamantly. "First President Kravchuk Accused of BLASCO Racketeering" \textit{IntelNews} 9 October 1996.

\textsuperscript{25}Aleksand Kolpakov, “Natsional’nost’— Odessit” \textit{Vecherniaia Odessa}, 5 March 1996.
similar vein, the former chairman of the Odessa city Soviet (1978-1992), Valentin Symonenko, asserts that:

In Odessa, in the fifth column [of the Ukrainian passport (designating nationality)] there should be a notation: “Our nationality is Odessit.” If now we were to try to determine who is who [by nationality] there would be a tremendous muddle. Personally this begins with my own family. I am a Ukrainian, and my brother is a Russian. I registered my oldest son as a Ukrainian and my youngest — in honour of the Kuban Cossack blood running in his mother’s veins — as a Russian.  

In Odessa the sense of local Odessit (Odessan) identity is so strong — to some extent this is self-consciously and even ironically exaggerated by Odessans to make the point — that it warrants a special examination. Although Odessans can hardly be considered a nation, and are unlikely to ever develop into one — it is, after all, only a city — they have stretched the concept of local identity to its limits. In a partly ironic 1991 article in Pravda Ukrainy the Odessan academic Svetlana In’shakova declared that “The population of Odessa is almost a fully formed ethnic group. The entire world is divided into Odessans and non-Odessans.” And indeed Odessans do possess several distinct characteristics which in theory could form the basis of a distinct sub-ethnicity, if not a nation: a myth of common origin, a well-developed sense of being distinct, and, arguably, a recognisable local dialect.

In Crimea and Donets’k the elites have been advancing a Little Russian, pan-Slavic identity, or a scarcely updated version of a Soviet identity. The historical reference in Donets’k is generally the period of

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Soviet industrialism, although the era of Russian and Ukrainian Cossack settlement has attracted some attention. In Crimea, the Soviet period and certain specific military events — the defences of Sevastopol', for example — have been emphasised to underscore the historical links with Russia. In Odessa, on the other hand, the local intelligentsia has above all sought to revive a lost golden age (the 19th century), and to construct a local identity based on a mythical interpretation of this bygone era.

The Odessa Myth:

It is widely accepted in studies of nationalism that construction of a “golden age” is an important device in the development of a national idea. The great Ukrainian nation builders, Shevchenko and Hrushevsky, glorified Ukrainian Cossacks and Kievan Rus’ respectively. Usually a heroic age is contrasted with an unpleasant recent past; in the case of Odessa, the Soviet period is regarded as a dark ages to be purged from the physical and cultural life of the city. This is a key distinction between Odessan and Crimean or Donbass identity, for in the latter regions the Soviet period — especially the period of Lenin or the 1960s to 1980s — is a golden age. Of course there is a segment of the Odessan population that does recall the Soviet period fondly, but for the local intelligentsia, the Soviet experience, with its disregard for personal liberty, middle-class sensibility and commerce, is fundamentally antithetical to their conception of the city.

The World-wide Club of Odessans — whose name underscores Odessa’s rather quaintly exaggerated sense of its own international

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stature — has played a leading role in promoting the concept of the
Odessan identity. The most famous member of the association is
Vladimir Zhvanetski, the Moscow based humorist.

The mythology of the Odessan “nation builders” of this
organisation appears to be modelled largely on that of America. First,
the “myth of origin”, as in the case of America, is that the original
Odessans were attracted to the city because of their innate love of
freedom. The free-wheeling, frontier atmosphere shaped the character of
the subsequent generations of Odessans, and lent them their unique wit
and free-spirit. As Svetlana In’shakova put it, “Nature wizened us and
stamped each of us as an absolute individual.”

Yevgenii Golubovskii, the editor of the club’s newspaper, and the
leading guru of the Odessan “national movement”, draws frequent
comparisons with America in his elaboration of his city’s origins. As in
America, the Odessan ”melting pot” ostensibly erases traditional ethnic
distinctions: there are no Russian, Ukrainians, Greeks or Jews, just
Oddsiti:

We have always declared that Odessa has brought into the
world a new ethnicity. If there exists an American nation —
and we think that it exists — then Odessa, which has also
existed for 200 years, in the same conditions [is also a
nation]. Here it is much more free than, say, Saratov or
Kazan, or Chernigov. The process of capital formation took
place. There were Greeks, Turks, Germans, Jews, Russian,
Ukrainians. And they did not remain what they were. They
truly inter-mixed; they truly merged. And the language in
Odessa, it is incorrect and not exactly Russian, because there
are many German words; and there are words borrowed from
Greek. So when we speak of the Odessa nation it is half in
jest and half serious.

29 Svetlana In’shakova, “Odeskie Mankurty.”
One of the key features of the Odessan character, according to this scheme, is ethnic tolerance. The historical evidence that racism and inter-ethnic conflict have also had a place in Odessa, such as the pogrom of 1905, are conveniently ignored by enthusiasts of the Odessa myth such as Golubovskii.

In most national movements certain pieces of natural landscape or architectural monuments take on quasi-mythical significance, such as, in the Ukrainian case, the Dnieper river or the St. Sofia cathedral. Perhaps because the Odessan idea is linked to a small territory and a specific epoch (the 19th century), the architecture of this golden age has an almost magical quality for the Odessan patriots. The fact that Mayor Eduard Hurvyts has overseen the destruction of several pieces of 19th century architecture in his re-development of the historic city has thus earned him the eternal enmity of the Odessan intelligentsia.\textsuperscript{30}

In the eyes of leading Odessans, the central feature of the local character is the unique local sense of humour. Accordingly, such figures as Zhvanetskii and the NEP era satirists Il'f and Petrov, are given special prominence in the Odessan pantheon of heroes. Collections of Odessan anecdotes are regularly published, and related by Odessans.\textsuperscript{31} Odessa even has its own pantheon of anecdotal heroes: on 1 April 1995 a monument was unveiled to "Rabinovich: Hero of Odessan Anecdotes."\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{31} For example, \textit{Odesskie anekdoty}, 2, (Odessa: Porto-Franko, 1991).
\textsuperscript{32} "Vozvrashchaetsia Rabinovich iz komandirovki..." \textit{Yug}, 53, 5 April 1995.
This day, April Fool’s Day, is akin to the Odessan national holiday; celebrations include enormous carnival.

Along with good humour, these idealised Odessans are meant to be rather moderate and apolitical. According to a guide to Odessa’s political life issued by the city Rada,

Social and political life in Odessa operates according to its own rules, which are frequently comprehensible only to Odessans. Here, “ultra” and “extreme” — either “Leftist” or “Rightist”, backwards looking or forward looking, are not especially appreciated. Here any spark of extremism is extinguished by the centrism of Odessans, the primary root of which is either prudence or humour.33

As noted, an enormous number of Odessans have been leaving Ukraine. While this fact is of grave concern to most Odessan elites, it has also been integrated into the local mythology by Golubovskii:

Immigration is the natural state of affairs for this city. The foundation of the city was like that of America. You fought off the Indians; and so we cleared the Turks away from Khadjebe. And people began to flow into the city. Richelieu came from France, and then returned there to become the Prime Minister of France. Alexander Pushkin came here [and then returned to Russia][...]. In short the process of in-migration and out-migration is natural for this city; this city was founded as a city of immigrants and has always been drawn people to it. People were born here, raised here, and left. And there’s nothing wrong with this, as long as borders are not closed in an iron curtain. As long as it is an natural process.34

In survey conducted by “Pulse” in March of 1992, the humorist Vladimir Zhvanetskii was voted to be the most popular Odessan; the one that most

34 Author’s interview with Yevgenii Golubovskii, 15 April 1995.
closely represented the ideals and character of the city. In accordance with the "party-line" of the World Wide Club of Odessans, Zhvanetskii proclaims that "freedom" is the ultimate value of the Odessan. Zhvanetskii’s conception of Ukrainian independence and his own feeling of citizenship, also demonstrates that the Odessan identity, while mainly parochial and ostensibly multi-cultural, also has a significant Russian component:

In America children, when they grow up, live a sovereign, independent life. And all power to them! And does that mean that they cease to feel like part of the family? And so it is with Ukraine and Russia. I consider myself a citizen of both countries. And in this you may condemn me as much as you like.

Cultural representatives of the younger generation of Odessans complain that figures such as Golubovskii and his World Wide Club of Odessans are so utterly preoccupied with Odessa’s 19th century golden age that they are indifferent to the need to revitalise contemporary culture in Odessa. As Oleh Fesenko, a leading student cultural figure, quips that, “Nowadays there is far more talk of 'Legendary Odessan Humour' than there is actual Odessan humour.”

Novorossiia Movement:

Another "new ethnicity", the "Novorussians", was advanced by a small group of pro-Russian intellectuals in the early 1990s. In 1991, the attraction of the Odessa region to Russia appeared to be a potential centrifugal movement; this briefly worried supporters of Ukrainian

37 Author’s interview with Oleh Valentinovich Fesenko, Odessa, 21 April 1995.
statehood and attracted the attention of Western researchers. In mid 1991 the "Democratic Union of Novorossiia and Bessarabia", was declared. The chief ideologue and co-founder of the organisation was Aleksii Surilov, a professor of Odessa University. At the time, this organisation appeared to be making threats not only to Ukraine's growing sovereignty, but also to the territorial integrity of Moldova. At that time, a discussion arose around the idea that "Novorossians" were a distinct sub-ethnicity, presumably of the Russian nation, who represented the descendants of the former imperial province of Novorossiia. The organisation was swiftly condemned by Rukh and other national-democratic forces in Odessa. In an article in the newspaper Yug, a local pro-Ukrainian historian explained that in the original Novorossiia province only 3 percent of the population was Great Russian by nationality, while it was over 70 percent Ukrainian. Hence, there was little historical basis for a Russian oriented Novorossiian ethnicity, state or province. This suggests that the attraction of the Novorossiia idea was not the historical reality of the territory, but rather the fact that the term had the word "Russia" in it, which appealed to local Russophile sentiments. The organisation failed to gain much popular support and rapidly faded from the political scene. Surilov moderated his views retrospectively, almost to the point of recanting his earlier declarations, and claimed that he envisioned Novorossiia as an integral part of a federal Ukraine.

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38 For a Ukrainian nationalist view of the Novorossiia movement and the idea of the "Odessan ethnos" see Yaroslav Dashkevych, "Etnichni pseudomenshyny v Ukraini", Ukrains'ki problemy, 4/5, 1994.
39 A. Boldyrev, "Istoricheskaia pravda i "Novorossiiskie” Legendy" Yug, 17 October 1991, p. 3.
40 Interview with Oleksii Vasil'ovych Surilov by S. Zmievs'kii, "Krapka v diskusii pro novorosiv?" Kul'tura i zhyttia, 22, 1 June 1991, p. 4.
A rather more ominous development in the Odessa region was the short-lived rise of the Cossack movement in the Bolgrad area. This was the direct result of the activities of certain officers of the Airborne Division of the CIS Strategic Forces. This division, which operated formerly in Moldova, was a disciplined, pro-Communist force, with a history of involvement in political activities, including the putsch attempt of 1991. At the end of 1992, and the beginning of 1993, the officers of the Division issued demands that the Bolgrad area be transformed into a national administrative unit (natsional'nyi okrug) and that the armed forces situated there should be subordinated to them. This situation was analogous to the process by which the Russian 14th Army became directly involved in local politics in the Transdnistria region of Moldova. The establishment of an autonomous area around Bolgrad was seen by these pro-Russian Cossacks as an opportunity for the establishment of a pro-Russian bridgehead within Ukraine.

A further development in late 1993 with alarming overtones was the economic accord signed between Bendery (of the so-called Transdnistrian SSR) and Odessa oblast, on co-operation in the manufacture of “high-technology” goods. While the treaty was of little economic significance, it demonstrated that the Odessa oblast leadership was sympathetic to the neo-Soviet government of Transdnistria.

**Political polarity: City versus Oblast:**

In no other Ukrainian oblast has the antagonism between city and oblast levels of government reached such proportions as in Odessa. This

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42 Economist Intelligence Unit: Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova. 1 November 1993.
protracted, seemingly insoluble conflict is probably the most notable feature of Odessa’s political life. This friction has not gone unnoticed in Kiev. President Kuchma recruited Mayor Hurvyts as an ally in his constitutional programmes, and supported the latter against the oblast chief on numerous occasions. This again illustrates the point that life in the regions of Ukraine does not occur in a vacuum: it develops under the influence of competing political forces in Kiev. By playing off local political forces against each other (i.e. reformers vs. conservatives, city vs. oblast governments) Kiev has been able to neutralise centrifugal forces in the regions.

As the previous surveys of Donets’k and Crimea have demonstrated, one of the major features of political life in the regions is the political polarisation between pro and anti-capitalist parties, such as between the Communists and the Liberals in Donets’k.

Aside from ideological conflicts between “rightists” and “leftists” there has also been the general problem of defining the scope of authority at all levels, local city authority, oblast authority and Presidential authority in the regions. Between 1991 to 1996 the complex process of defining the authority of Kiev in the regions preoccupied Ukraine’s first two presidents. President Leonid Kravchuk established the institute of Presidential Representatives in the regions, giving them the buildings that formerly belonged to the Communist Party. The Supreme Rada refused to back this step; consequently these local representatives had difficulties establishing their authority. In 1994, the Supreme Rada sought to further erode Presidential power in the localities through enhancing the legitimacy of the Chairpersons of local Radas, by requiring them to undergo a popular election. Many of the Presidential representatives appointed by Kuchma
ran for office and lost. From the summer of 1994, a process labelled by the Ukrainian press as "meshkovization" began. Each Region and District had a Chairperson that had been elected by general, direct ballot. When Kuchma was elected president he thus had to contend with 26 "mini-presidents" in the oblasti of Ukraine. One of the first Decrees that Kuchma issued gave these elected governors the functions of the state executive power at the local level. This strategy neutralised regional separatism while cementing Presidential authority at the local level.43

The poorly defined nature of Presidential authority, as well as the polarisation of politics at the local level, opened the door for an anti-Communist alliance between President Kuchma and certain reformist local authorities. In December of 1996, one of these allies, Yevhen Kushnar'ov, the mayor of Kharkiv, and also the head of the Association of Ukrainian cities, was appointed the head of the Presidential Administration.44 In the case of Donets'k oblast, the former anti-Communist "governor" Shcherban' was at one point a close ally of Kuchma.45 As noted, however, Kuchma and his Prime Minister, Lazarenko, both representatives of the Dnipropetrovs'k elite, later turned on Shcherban', dismissing him as governor. Kuchma also removed the Communist Governor of Luhans'k, much to the delight of the pro-reform

The mayors of the major cities in the Donbass (Mariupol, Luhans’k and Donets’k) are all reformers, as are the mayors of Odessa and Kharkiv. The focal point of this anti-red alliance was Kuchma’s battle in 1995 to pass his law “On State Power and Local Self-Administration in Ukraine”, which simultaneously raised the autonomy of mayors, and Presidential representatives in the Oblasts while reducing that of the oblast Radas (soviet).

On 21 August 1995, Kuchma passed a decree which provided for extensive municipal self-administration and which curtailed the powers of the oblast Radas to meddle in city affairs. Just over two months later, on 2 November, the Supreme Rada vetoed the Presidential Decree on local authorities. In Chapter IX of the new Ukrainian constitution (28 June 1996) entitled “Local Self-Government,” local self administration was entrenched, signalling a final victory for Kuchma and the city governments, presumably, paving the way for the final resolution of this problem.

Oblast vs. City: Conflict Between Mayor Eduard Hurvyts and Oblast Chairman Bodelan:

Before discussing the conflict between the two rival authorities in Odessa, it is worth providing some biographical information on the two main antagonists. Eduard Iosifovich Hurvyts was born in 1948 into a

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48 The following biographical and pre-election programme information is from documents available from the Kiev office of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES).
Jewish family. He established one of the first co-operative enterprises in Odessa, "Ekopolis," and remained its director until 1990.

On 10 July 1994 Hurvyts was elected mayor of the city as a whole by a razor thin margin; he actually came in second in the first round of voting, with 18 percent of the vote, compared to 20 percent for his very pro-Russian opponent Aleksei Kutusev on July 10 1994. Hurvyts, a pro-reform democrat with libertarian leanings; developed a reputation as a fierce anti-Communist. In his pre-election programme for elections to the Ukrainian Supreme Rada in 1994 — in which his arch-rival Bodelan also competed —, Hurvyts declares that: "There is never too much freedom either in the economy or politics, or everyday life. There are people and institutions that cannot make use of them. The task of the supreme legislative authority of the country is bringing our state to the path to rule of law and common sense." 49 Among his top priorities was the creation of a free economic zone in Odessa which he describes as "our real chance not only to revive the city, but to save it, to save the poor, zealous, honest, and talented people abased by our terrible times." 50

In contrast to Hurvyts, Ruslan Borysovych Bodelan followed a career route typical of a Party apparatchik. Born 1942, in the small village of Berezovka in Odessa oblast, he starting advancing up the Komsomol career ladder in the 1960s, eventually becoming the First Secretary of the Odessa oblast committee of the Komsomol. From 1991 he was the chairman of the Odessa Oblast Council of People's Deputies. Gradually Bodelan distanced himself from the Communist party, and in

49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
1995 the XXIX Conference of the Odessa Branch of the Communist Party of Odessa denounced Bodelan for “desertion.”

While Hurvyts’ programme is clearly designed to appeal to the entrepreneurial spirit of urban Odessa, Bodelan’s political platform is calculated to appeal to the voters outside the city of Odessa, with a combination of Soviet nostalgia and moderate appeals to advance Ukrainian culture. In his 1994 pre-election campaign to the Supreme Rada, Bodelan’s platform was broadly similar to that of the Ukrainian Socialists, and included such leftist stock phrases as “equality of all forms of property.” The program called for closer ties with Russia, and for the strengthening of the C.I.S. and Ukraine’s role within it. Not surprisingly, he also called for preservation of the powers of oblast Radas. His national policy sought to have it both ways, somehow invoking Soviet “internationalism,” the Ukrainian national idea and pro Russian sentiments all at once, by calling for:

- a national policy based on respect for the rights and interests of all nations of Ukraine, the rebirth of their national consciousness and traditions, preservation of internationalism, for the development of Ukrainian culture.
- For a cultural and linguistic policy that considers regional peculiarities, for introduction of the status of Russian and other languages as official languages according to the wishes of the population.

In sum, while Hurvyts was an outsider under Communism, and became a staunch anti-Communist, Bodelan is an ex-Communist establishment figure, who has managed to adapt to post-Soviet Ukrainian political life.

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52 IFES (Internet Service).
The conflict between Hurvyts and Bodelan, and between the *oblast* and city governments, has encompassed every conceivable area of governance, from budget financing to development projects, including the massive oil terminal project, heating of homes and schools and even, (as noted above) over the construction of an AIDS treatment centre.

The main focus of conflict between the *oblast* and city governments has been over budget allocation. At the beginning of 1995, the city government was outraged over the fact that the *oblast* government appropriated all of the city's revenue, and spent only one percent of it on the city. The city at that time had a budget deficit of 850 billion *karbovantsi*, and revenue of 890 billion *karbovantsi* which meant that the city would have been running a surplus, were it not for the *oblast*'s policy.53

The city immediately retaliated by nullifying the *oblast* laws relating to the budget. It also underscored its alliance with Kuchma against the leftist *oblast* by volunteering to be put directly under presidential rule. An appeal to Kuchma, taken at an extraordinary session of Odessa city soviet on 12 January 1995, illustrates the frustration of the city towards the *oblast* government:

Mr. President! Our disagreement — it is not simply a question of money. What is at issue is the question of whether there will be local self-government in a renewed Ukraine. As you well know, not just Odessa is suffering under the *oblast* level *diktats*; their rule, out of sheer inertia gives the real authority to the *oblast* committee of the [Communist] party.54

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Hurvyts declared that the actions represented clear discrimination against the city, and demanded that all of the city's tax revenues should be allowed to stay in the city.\textsuperscript{55} The oblast's policy, it seems, was motivated in part by a desire to "take from each according to his ability" (in this case the relatively prosperous capital) to assist the struggling smaller towns of the oblast. It may have also been motivated by a desire to assert leadership over budgetary matters, as well as by personal animosities. Within a few weeks the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine annulled the law of the Odessa oblast Soviet.\textsuperscript{56}

The other main area of conflict between Hurvyts and Bodelan has been regarding major development projects. Hurvyts has been a staunch supporter of the new oil terminal near Odessa (described above), and has even claimed that it is vital for the preservation of Ukrainian independence. But the project, which has raised some eyebrows because of its ecological implications, has been consistently blocked by Bodelan.\textsuperscript{57} Another project that had been held up by the oblast authorities was the re-development of Greek Square in central Odessa. Hurvyts' involvement in this particular project has raised doubts about his credibility.\textsuperscript{58} On the other hand, it has also been claimed by journalists in

\textsuperscript{55} Eduard Yosifovich Gurvits, predsedatel' gorodskogo soveta narodnykh deputatov," Odesskii vestnik, 17 January 1995, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{56} "Verkhovnyi sovet Ukrainy: Reshenie Odesskogo oblsoveta podlezhit otmene," Odesskii vestnik, 26, 4 February 1995.
\textsuperscript{57} Edvard Gurvits, "Karfagen neftokoruptsii dolzhen byt' razrushen, A terminal postroen," Odesskii vestnik, 14, 24 January 1996.
\textsuperscript{58} The city initially signed a contract to proceed with a plan developed by a Canadian architectural firm, and then unilaterally selected a new proposal by a Greek firm. To make matters worse, Hurvyts then went on Odessa television and proclaimed that he doubted the Canadian firm's very existence. Vitalii Chechyk, "Choho varta uhoda v Odesi," Holos Ukrainy, 196, 17 October 1996, p. 12.
Yug that Bodelan, together with his brother, has been involved in a string of corrupt business deals.  

In January 1996 Bodelan annulled an earlier decree by Hurvyts which made all of January a school holiday in the city of Odessa, to conserve energy. Bodelan then proceeded to cut off the heat supply to Odessa schools. The result was that children were sent to unheated schools until February, and in some cases until March.  

Hurvyts has boasted that he has a stack of letters from President Kuchma on his desk, lending his support to the mayor on a whole host of issues, and urging Bodelan to stop stalling projects. In return, Hurvyts made clear his support of Kuchma’s constitutional plans, including local self administration.  

Insofar as the city of Odessa and the outlying oblast represent distinct economic and even ethnic constituencies, it is possible that this conflict could take on ethnic overtones, with the Ukrainian countryside uniting against the Russified multi-ethnic city. In fact, the web of competing political forces — namely between ultra-reformers and Leftists — transects these apparently obvious ethno-linguistic borders.

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60 Leonid Zveriev, “Chym kholodnishe v Odesi, tym hariachishymy stliut’ svarky mizh oblasnoiu ta mis’koiu vladoiu,” Post-postup, 10 February 1996, p. 3; See also Bodelan’s open letter to the Odessa city council, “Dva khoziaina v gorode ne uzhivutsia,” Yug, 26 January 1996.
Hurvyts has gone out of his way to antagonise the leftist forces within the city; he has been in effect waging a war on many fronts. Hurvyts restored over 170 street names in Odessa to their pre-Communist names, and also removed many of the monuments to Lenin and other Communists, which numbered over one hundred.

For this symbolic purge and other analogous initiatives, Hurvyts won the allegiance of Rukh and the urban Ukrainian intelligentsia. He also supported Rukh's plans for introducing cumbersome and vaguely ridiculous bi-lingual street signs which reproduces the names of streets in Ukrainian (even though on most occasions the difference from the Russian spelling amounts to little more than one or two letters).

All of the main Ukrainian democratic and nationalist parties in Odessa have consistently backed Hurvyts against Bodelan. The Chairman of Odessa’s Rukh, Prof. Shvets, once declared that “Hurvyts, a Jew, is the only real Ukrainian in the higher organs of Odessa power, because he always takes a pro [Ukrainian] statehood position.” The Republican Party of Ukraine, Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, Constitutional Democratic Party, Social-Democratic Party have all backed the mayor. Hurvyts has also had the support of the major pro-reform parties in Odessa, such as the Liberal Party and the Interregional Bloc of Reform. Hurvyts' most dramatic attempt to gain himself Ukrainian nationalist credentials was his offer to import 100 Ukrainian

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63 The leadership as of 1996 of these parties was as follows in parentheses: Rukh (V. Shvets); Liberal Party (V. Kuremoi); Interregional Bloc of Reform (M. Voskoboinikov), Republican Party of Ukraine (M. Baziliuk); Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (M. Perehuchuk); Constitutional Democratic Party (M. Yakupov); Social-Democratic Party (A. Roitburt). “Strannye sovpadaniia,” Yug, 23 March 1996.
language teachers from L'viv to Odessa, and to offer them full housing and payment.\textsuperscript{64}

Aside from his sworn enemies, the Communists, Hurvyts has also created enemies among the Russian speaking intelligentsia in Odessa. The well respected newspaper \textit{Vecherniaia odessa}, in particular, regularly prints anti-Hurvyts articles. In a typically elitist condemnation of Hurvyts and the city's democrats, a writer for this publication calls them "vulgar populists." He also lays the blame for the city's physical degeneration at the feet of Hurvyts: "[t]he kernel of the city centre has been transformed into a cesspool, a parade of kitsch and a shoddy imitation of the West."\textsuperscript{65}

\textbf{Odessa's political orientation:}

While Odessa possesses branches of most of the major national parties, and some local ones, there is a profound mistrust towards parties in general, to an even greater extent than in Donets'k and Crimea.

The Odessa \textit{oblast} Rada, with 75 deputies overall, only has one party faction, the left leaning "For Social Justice" faction, with 33 deputies, 12 of whom are Communists.\textsuperscript{66} In local Odessa city politics, the pre-election campaigns of the leading candidates indicates that official bi-lingualism, and federal structure for Ukraine were the most popular choices. The only candidate who supported a unitary Ukrainian

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\textsuperscript{64} M. Demchenko, "O neobkhodimosti Ukrainskogo obrazovaniia," \textit{Vecherniaia Odessa}, 20 April 1996.
\textsuperscript{65} Evgenii Olenin, "Gorodskaiia sreda i vlast'," \textit{Vecherniaia Odessa}, 30 January 1996.
\textsuperscript{66} Information provided by the Organisational Department of the Odessa \textit{Oblast} Rada, 12 September 1996.
\end{flushright}
state won less than 2 percent of the popular vote, while the candidate that rejected bi-lingualism gained only 7 percent of the vote. Another indication of Odessa’s political orientation is provided by the choice of deputies elected to the 1994 parliamentary elections and in subsequent repeat elections. Of 18 Odessan deputies in the current Supreme Soviet, only two are Communists, and two are socialists, which is proportionately much lower than in Donets’k and the rest of Eastern Ukraine. There are also 5 representatives of the quasi-socialist Peasant party of Ukraine faction from Odessa.

A brief survey of the pre-election programmes of Odessa’s parliamentary deputies provides a clearer picture of the types of platforms that have apparently appealed to Odessa voters. Of 19 such programmes available, 10 may be classified as very pro-Russian or pro-Soviet (i.e., calling for very close ties with Russia or a restoration of the USSR). A further 6 may be classified as neutral relative to relations with Russia. Only four advanced a programme clearly in favour of Ukrainian sovereignty. Five programmes explicitly backed official status for the Russian language. The calls for unity with Russia were not restricted to the programmes of left leaning politicians. Victor Ivanovych Shyshkin, a deputy in the Reform faction of the current parliament, for example, declared that: "We should demand that an economic union with all Slavic countries, especially Russia and Belarus be created as soon as possible..." Significantly, the only elected deputies who espoused a pro-Ukrainian statehood stance were those from the economically conservative Peasants’ Party of Ukraine. Thus, while in the city of Odessa, the

68 Pre-election programmes available from IFES (Internet Service) Kiev.
Ukrainian intelligentsia, and such parties as Rukh, are in favour of reform, the Ukrainian ethnic element in the countryside is hardly more reformist than the urban socialists.

The clearest indication of popular support for political parties in Odessa is provided by sociological surveys. These studies suggest that there is very little popular trust in all political parties. Surveys done in 1993 found support for most parties at from one to five percent.\(^69\)

The most popular, or — more accurately — the least unpopular of these Odessa organisations include the Civic Forum of Odessa, the Communist Party and Rukh. The Civic Forum of Odessa (initially the Civic Movement of Odessa), stands for multi-culturalism, “equality of all cultures and languages, and the civic accord of residents irrespective of their outlooks, religion or nationality.” In practice, this means defence of the Russian language and support of official bi-lingualism.\(^70\)

The moderately nationalistic Rukh, which is an utterly marginal organisation in Donets’k and Crimea, has limited support in Odessa. Together with “Prosvita’ (Enlightenment) society, Rukh has sought to advance such policies as educational Ukrainianisation and to counteract any pro-Russian or Communist policies, or indeed any suggestion that the city has ever had anything to do with Russia. During the celebrations of the 200th anniversary of the city in 1994, Prosvita boycotted the event, because they reject the view that Odessa was founded by a Russian Empress. Instead they link the city’s founding to the Turkish fortress of

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\(^70\) *Vsia Odessa: spravochnaja kniga*, p. 317.
Khedzhebe, and put Ukrainian Cossacks in the centre of the historical record. As then head of Prosvita, Anatoli Ivanovych Vdovychenko put it “I am proud not that Odessa is 200 years old, but that it is much older.” Nonetheless, Odessa representatives of Prosvita are relatively pragmatic, and resolved that it would be wisest to proceed with advancing Ukrainian national consciousness through Russian-language publications and propaganda.

Much to the annoyance of Yevgenii Golubovskii of the Worldwide Club of Odessites, the nationalist forces in the city also managed to block plans for the reconstruction of a statue of Empress Catherine the Great, which was envisioned as a further commemoration of the 200th anniversary of the city.

As in Donets’k and Luhans’k, there are pro-Ukrainian Cossack organisations linked with the Ukrainian nationalist parties. The “Chornomorske podunai-huliapol’ske kazatstvo” was founded in 1992, and claims descent from Black Sea Cossacks who were exiled Zaporozhian Cossacks.

In January of 1996 a new national-democratic civic organisation was established in Odessa, to unite the pro-Ukrainian intelligentsia. The founding conference of the Congress of the Ukrainian Intelligentsia of Odessa had 444 delegates. The delegates denounced the city Soviet’s plans for making Russian an official language, and other such pro-

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71 O. Kanunnikova, “Iz zhizni Ukrainskogo obychestva,” Odesskii vestnik, 157, 18 October 1994, p. 4
72 Literaturna Ukraina, 4 November 1993.
74 Vse Odessa: spravochnai kniga, p. 316.
Russian policies. The new organisation’s membership included such important social figures as the rector of the Odessa State Polytechnic Institute and the head of the Mechnikov Odessa State University. Perhaps in an effort to co-opt Hurvyts’ pro-Ukrainian support base, Bodelan sponsored this organisation, providing it with office space and made a speech at the conference calling for “unity.” But not all of the pro-Ukrainian intelligentsia was convinced; an editorial in the newspaper Yug wondered aloud whether it was not unity against the ex-Communist Bodelan that was required.

While not nearly as powerful a political force as it is in Donets’k or Crimea, the Communist party of Odessa is still one of the leading parties in Odessa, although it represents and ageing and dwindling electorate. At a Conference of the Odessa Branch of the Communist Party in April 1995, the average age of party delegates was 54. As in the case of Donets'k and Crimea, the party appeals to the “Soviet ethnos”; in one speech at this conference, delegate Tamila Yabrova declared that “The Soviet Union exists, wherever there are Soviet People!” The local branch of the party is quite active, and regularly managed to gain regular access to oblast television to propagandise in favour of the restoration of the USSR, official status for the Russian language, and against the Ukrainian constitutional drafts. It has been in its opposition to the latter that it was especially active throughout 1996.

The Communist-dominated oblast deputies group “For Social Justice and Popular Rule” denounced the constitution for limiting the

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77 Oleg Bazak, “XXIX partkonferentsiia KPU (KPSS)”
power of the Soviets, and labelled it as the basis of a “constitutional monarchy.” It also rejected calls for a referendum, declaring that only the Supreme Soviet had the authority to pass a constitution, presumably working on the assumption that a more Soviet-style constitution would be passed by the Ukrainian parliament. The alternate Communist party programme, entitled “The Constitution of the Ukrainian S.S.R”, called for official bi-lingualism, new state symbols and rejected private property on land.

Conclusion:

While there is limited support for parties in Odessa, there appears to be genuine popular support for at least one initiative: official bi-lingualism. Support for a federal structure to Ukraine was also high. None of these policies, though widely supported through Southern and Eastern Ukraine, was instituted in the Ukrainian constitution, which demonstrates that the lack of unity of the region — the chronic divisions between leftists and rightists, between various economic clans, between oblast and city governments, led to the neutralisation or even disenfranchisement of Eastern and Southern Ukraine in terms of Ukrainian constitutional building.

As in the case of the Donbass and Crimea, Odessa is internally divided. In the case of Odessa the division has been largely between various levels of government (oblast vs. city) but also, as in Donets’k, between clear political orientations — Communist vs. anti-Communist.

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Unlike Donets’k or Crimea, there is, in Odessa, a significant Ukrainian element. This element must be subdivided: on the one hand there is the urban, educated Ukrainian national-democratic movement. This group, while not widely supported by the population, is well organised and has developed a close relationship with Mayor Hurvyts. On the other hand, the rural and small town Ukrainian population — generally supported by the oblast government — is not especially liberal or democratic in its orientation, but the fact that it outnumbers the city of Odessa’s population has significant political implications, and counterbalances the pro-Russian tendencies beneath the surface of the Odessan identity.

Alexander Motyl, in his book Dilemmas of Independence provided an outline of the basic myths that the Ukrainian government has been advancing in its nation-building enterprise. One of these myths is the idea that Kievan Rus’ and even the Cossack states were multi-ethnic entities. But the fundamental idea of Ukrainian identity is meant to be the love of freedom: the final passage of the Ukrainian national anthem draws together these two themes:

Our ouls and our bodies we will sacrifice  
For our freedom (svoboda).  
And we will show that we are brethren of the Cossack race.

This formulation of the Ukrainian national idea, with its preponderant concern for freedom, is almost entirely consistent with the Odessan “national” myth outlined above. Even the Russian language, in the final analysis, is not essential to the Odessa myth. Even Golubovskii (albeit reluctantly) admits that, in theory, the city could maintain its unique character as a Ukrainian-speaking city some-day, but only if this occurs

81 Alexander Motyl, Dilemmas of Independence, pp. 69; 84-89.
as a natural process, resulting from the enhanced prestige of Ukrainian culture. After all, in the early days of Odessa’s idealised past the city’s street signs were not in Russian, but in Italian. In short, providing that the city of Odessa is provided with maximum self-administration, and not subject to budgetary exploitation from the oblast government, it will evolve as a unique city and region within Ukraine.
CONCLUSION:

The first chapters of this study examined how the history of the East and South have always developed on the margins of both Ukrainian and Russian history. Consequently, there have always been competing pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian myths available, ready to be wielded by advocates of either orientation. The region's identity, in fact, has frequently alternated between a Russian and a Ukrainian one. At times, such as the 1920s, the Ukrainian orientation appeared to be on the ascendancy, but it then suffered a series of nearly fatal blows over the next half century. In the end, neither a purely Russian nor purely Ukrainian orientation prevailed, but a hybrid of the two. The concept of marginality, which so aptly characterises the region's historical development — on the periphery of both Ukrainian and Russian history — is also a useful interpretative device for understanding the nature of national identity in the region.

What has evolved in the twentieth century is a genuine tradition of cosmopolitanism and ethnic tolerance within the region, and also a well established workers' identity. This, however, has sometimes been combined with a disdain for outsiders, including, apparently, West Ukrainians. The legacy of ethnic mixing, as well as the experience of the Great Patriotic war started the crystallisation of a pan-ethnic, Soviet identity. The intensification of the process of ethnic intermixing and linguistic Russification in the post-war period accelerated the Sovietisation of the regional identity.

In the fourth chapter of this study it was argued that the process by which an individual chooses his ethnicity is informed by popular, biological
conceptions of ethnicity: ethnicity is popularly thought to be something "in the blood." The use of such terms as "mixed-blood" illustrate this phenomenon. Consequently, when an individual is of mixed parentage, he is drawn towards two identities. Individuals adopt several strategies for coming to terms with the tension produced by this. Sometimes the individual attempts to identify with two identities. In many cases, the result is that the person follows a long, drawn out, and perhaps even unsuccessful process of determining an identity. Consequently his or her identity remains marginal. He or she never feels fully part of one or another group. A further strategy adopted is to find an inclusive "pan-identity" such as "Yugoslav" or "Soviet" identity which does not exclude either side of a person's identification. Sociological studies were examined to demonstrate that many of the types of identification hypothesised were in evidence. For these reasons, the high levels of intermarriage made the acceptance of an exclusive, anti-Russian identity unlikely. Those historical myths which underscore the "fraternal" links of Russia and Ukraine consequently have far more resonance in the region.

While the first part of this study examined the historical and social forces which prevented the formation of a clear ethnic identity in the East and South, and promoted marginal and pan-ethnic identification, the second half studied the political life in the region.

On the one hand, the process of consolidating the Ukrainian state and nation has been hampered by the need to simultaneously build a market economy and the need to overcome the legacies of a Communist political system. Horrendous economic conditions have turned many
Eastern Ukrainians against the national idea, and the national democrats who, they believe, were responsible for the post-independence economic debacle. On the other hand, it appears from the analysis of Crimea and Donets’k especially, that the process of building the free-market has unleashed a host of internal political and economic rivalries within each sub-region of Eastern and Southern Ukraine. This has given the Ukrainian central government the opportunity to divide and conquer in its efforts at nation-building — or at least in centralising and consolidating its authority.

By 1993 scholars such as Andrew Wilson were noting that the East Ukrainians were beginning to regain their former political influence over the central government, whereas after 1991 Western Ukrainians were influential out of proportion to their numbers. Indeed, the Dnipropetrovs’k group surrounding president Kuchma clearly appears to control the country. This traditional force in Soviet Ukrainian politics has apparently found it convenient to identify itself with the national idea, while apparently unscrupulously denuding the country of its wealth. With the passage of the Ukrainian constitution, it is evident now that the dominant force in the central government is the Dnipropetrovs’k elite, which does not necessarily share the aims of the rest of the East Ukrainian political establishment, or indeed the population of the region as a whole. Such popularly supported ideas in the East and South as official bi-lingualism, a federal structure to the Ukrainian state, and the possibility of dual-citizenship were left out of the Ukrainian constitution. As Dmitrii Kornilov points out, Donbass deputies elected in 1995 had no common ideology or plan — they were hopelessly split between those calling for a straightforward return to the Soviet Union, those calling for a vague East-Slavic community, and the new business elite that was only
interested in safeguarding their own prosperity. By contrast, the West Ukrainian deputies could sum up what they wanted in two phrases: Statehood, the National Idea.¹

It was noted in the analysis of politics in the region that corruption and organised crime seemed to be an inseparable aspect of the political life of the East and South. There may well be a direct link between the nature of national identity in the region and the apparent criminalisation of political life. Arguably, because local political and business elites hardly identify with the newly established state they live in — especially in Crimea — there is a reduced psychological barrier to corruption at the expense of the state.

It was also noted that a fundamental cynicism and indifference towards most of the institutions of Ukrainian society was a dominant feature of Eastern and Southern Ukrainian society. Most worrisome of all, this was especially the case among the youth of the region. In informal discussions with school teachers in the East and in Kiev, the author was repeatedly told that students had no interest whatever in the idea of Ukrainian nation-building, and had little interest in their community's development; in short, they were alienated from the existing state and its goals.

In large comparative volumes about the "scourge of nationalism" in post-Soviet Europe, a paragraph or two is occasionally dedicated to Ukraine. In one such volume, Michael Ignatieff proceeds from a discussion of nationalism in a host of European countries to Ukraine as follows:

¹ Author's interview with Dmitrii Kornilov (Donets'k, 17 March 1995).
Ukraine, likewise, illustrates the same theme: that as modernisation reduces the salient differences between ethnic groups, nationalism emerges to inflame the minor differences that remain.\(^1\)

In fact, contrary to this accepted wisdom, the lesson of Ukraine and also Belarus, is in fact that the utter *absence of nationalism* can have dangerous implications as well. The failure of a country or region to develop a viable sense of the "we" makes collective mobilisation for the sake of the country as a whole difficult; yet this is precisely what a society undergoing a painful social and economic transition requires.

Although scholars such as Bohdan Krawchenko argued that aspects of modernisation would fuel nationalism in Ukraine, this may only be the case in the Central and Western part of the country. If anything, modernisation has undermined nationalism in the East and South. As Rasma Karklins has argued, modernism may have a *variable effect* depending on the ethnic composition of a given region. In a region with an ethnic mosaic, modernisation does in fact promote a new, cosmopolitan or Soviet identity, whereas in ethnically homogenous areas it may promote the rise of a modern national consciousness.\(^2\)

**The Future of National Identity in the East and South:**

There is unlikely to be any significant change in the political-territorial structure of Ukraine in the medium term. In theory it is conceivable that the East & South might gradually unite and mobilise to protect the mixed Russo-Ukrainian identity, especially if there is any

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increased effort to impose a uniform identity on the population. Yet, given the manifold obstacles to uniting such a population, and the competing economic and political forces in the region, it appears quite unlikely that such a coordinated response could take place.³

Taras Kuzio and Orest Subtelny argue that the Soviet or muddled nature of national identity in Eastern and Southern Ukraine is a purely transitional phenomenon.⁴ In fact, while East Ukrainian society and identity is undeniably in transition, the mixed identity is not necessarily going to dissolve with time, because it is a product of an irreversible process of ethnic inter-mixing. It is, in a sense, a process of "ethnogenesis": a new sub-ethnic group has formed which is somehow on the margins of both Russian and Ukrainian identity. If Ukraine attempts to build its identity around an ethnic core there is bound to be some difficulty if there are, in a sense, two competing ethnic cores. East Ukrainians, on the whole, are inclined to accept those myths which underline the unity of Russians and Ukrainians: they reject the Hrushevks'yi view of Kiev Rus'; they admire Khmel'nyts'kyi. In sum, they share a completely divergent view of Ukrainian identity: it does not exist in opposition to Russia. And, as contemporary enthusiasts of the "Little Russian" idea, such as Kornilov, point out, there has been a long tradition of Ukrainian intellectuals who have supported this outlook. It


is somewhat analogous to Irish Catholic and Irish Protestant identity in Northern Ireland. Both consider themselves to be Irish, but they share a sharply divergent view of what that means: for one group, it means unity with England, for one group it means the opposite.

Kuzio also likens the situation in the East and South to the 19th century identity in border regions of France and Italy. They were initially mixed and muddled, but eventually evolved into a clear-cut identity. Such comparisons with the 19th century are hardly valid in the current context. The modern nation-state — especially the Ukrainian one — is hardly in a position to impose a specific national identity or language on a population. "Ukrainianisation" in the 1920s, it should be remembered, was imposed by a dictatorial regime over the wishes of the local elite. If in the 1920s the workers — then recent migrants from the Ukrainian countryside — may have been amenable to such a policy it seems unlikely that this would be the case today. The complete dominance of Russian language publications in the kiosks and books stands of Eastern Ukraine are a sharp illustration of popular indifference to the Ukrainian language. The Ukrainian state can simply not impose an ethnically Ukrainian identity in a modern democracy. Such international information mediums as the Internet, or satellite television are simply not amenable to control by the state. Even "British identity," which has been nurtured over several centuries, is arguably threatened by such new developments. A British commentator recently remarked that "so much information and choice is bound to effect British culture, which has hitherto been glued together by the very lack of choice on TV." In short, Ukraine has entered into the "nation-building" business at precisely the

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5 Henry Porter, "Murdoch Deal Marks End of TV As We Know It," The Independent, 2 February 1997.
time when the modern state has been deprived of many of the tools of the trade. This view is not universally accepted; some scholars maintain that modernisation and internationalisation will in fact continue to promote the rise of nationalism.\(^6\)

It would appear that the situation described in Eastern and Southern Ukraine is not without parallels in other parts of the ex-USSR. Alexander Kakotkin, a journalist with the *Moscow Times* newspaper thus describes the situation in the self-proclaimed "Transdnistrian Soviet Socialist Republic" on Moldova's Eastern edge:

This "state" is, I am certain, the most unusual in the world. All of the similar ones in former Yugoslavia and on the territory of the former Soviet Union were formed on ethnic principles. But the Transdnistria — with a population that is 39 percent Moldovan, 28 percent Ukrainian and 23 percent Russian — has proclaimed an official ideology of internationalism. It has a red flag, bearing the hammer and sickle. Its state seal mimics the old Soviet emblem, and the republic has three official languages.\(^7\)

The case of Transdnistria is an extreme example of a how a "Soviet" political culture, built upon a strong ethnic mosaic, has fed into a "state ideology" of Soviet internationalism. The case of Belarus is no less instructive. The popularly elected President of Belarus has built his career on his promises to re-unify the republic with Russia, and even brought back the Soviet era Belarusan flag, with minor adjustments. According to Dmitrii Furman, "[O]ne may say that the Belarusans were unable (and to this point have still been unable) to decide whether they


are a separate nation or a sub-ethnic group of the Russian nation." The "Lukashenka phenomenon," he argues, grew out of the popular association of the national cultural revival (and national symbols) and democracy, and the undeveloped nature of the local ethnic identity. The result of this backlash against the national idea in Belarus has been a disastrously painful economic transition, a lack of protection for human rights and liberties in the country, and a virtual return to dictatorship.

Mary Kaldor has elaborated a "cosmopolitan agenda" which could provide an alternative to nationalism in regions such as Eastern and Southern Ukraine where the formation of a national identity is so problematic. Such an agenda could serve as an "alternative around which people can be mobilised, which can overcome apathy, resignation, and fear and can compete with particularisms." Trans-national organisations such as the European Union and the United Nations can play an important role in instilling a regard for international political norms and human rights. In Ukraine, such organisations are already serving an important function in this regard.

Hence, the genuine East and South Ukrainian traditions of cosmopolitanism and internationalism, such as ethnic tolerance, must be separated from the anti-democratic traditions of Soviet internationalism (i.e., the Belarusian variant) and also from the past tendency towards reactionary and intolerant behaviour, as illustrated by the pogroms of the first part of the century. In this connection Odessa is rather promising.

Notwithstanding the pogroms in 1905, the city rightfully prides itself in its history of cosmopolitanism; hopefully this will provide the basis for a civic pride and the development of a democratic society in touch with pan-European values. In short, a restoration of faith in political and democratic institutions\$ and the creation of a viable civic identity in the East and South should attempt to build upon the existing and arguably irreversible demographic realities of the region.
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